Special Operations: Out of the Shadows 9781626378377

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SPECIAL OPERATIONS

SPECIAL OPERATIONS Out of the Shadows

edited by

Christopher Marsh, James D. Kiras, and Patricia J. Blocksome

b o u l d e r l o n d o n

The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position of the United States government, Department of Defense, United States Special Operations Command, Joint Special Operations University, or any other organization with which the authors may be affiliated.

Published in the United States of America in 2020 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com

and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Gray’s Inn House, 127 Clerkenwell Road, London EC1 5DB

 2020 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Marsh, Christopher, 1969– editor. | Kiras, James D., 1966– editor. | Blocksome, Patricia J., 1982– editor. Title: Special operations : out of the shadows / edited by Christopher Marsh, James D. Kiras & Patricia J. Blocksome. Description: Boulder, Colorado : Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., [2019] | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Identifiers: LCCN 2019012756 (print) | LCCN 2019013017 (ebook) | ISBN 9781626378377 (e-book) | ISBN 9781626378223 (hbk. : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Special operations (Military science) | Special operations (Military science)—Case studies. Classification: LCC U262 (ebook) | LCC U262 .S623 2019 (print) | DDC 356/.16—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019012756 British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992.

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Contents

Acknowledgments 1

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Special Operations: Out of the Shadows Christopher Marsh, James D. Kiras, and Patricia J. Blocksome

1

Part 1 Special Operations in Theory and Concept 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

The Dangers of Theory James D. Kiras

The Value of Theory Christopher Marsh, Mike Kenny, and Nathanael Joslyn

The Human Factor Kevin L. Parker

The Resurgence of Special Warfare Homer W. Harkins

Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare Dan Cox

Design Thinking for Special Operations Ben Zweibelson

Design Thinking for Leadership of Special Operations Forces Ben Zweibelson v

11 27 47 53 61 73 83

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Contents

Part 2 Special Operations in Action 9

10 11 12 13

The Strategic Paradox and Third-Party Proxies Richard Rubright

Russia’s Response to the New Western Way of War Charles K. Bartles

Psychological Operations to Counter Online Radicalization Paul S. Lieber and Peter J. Reiley

Foreign Internal Defense and Security Force Assistance James M. DePolo

Combating Transnational Organized Crime Steven R. Johnson

99 113 125 137 165

Part 3 Conclusion 14

Special Operations Forces in an Era of Great Power Competition Christopher Marsh, James D. Kiras, and Patricia J. Blocksome

List of Acronyms Bibliography The Contributors Index About the Book

183 199 201 219 223 231

Acknowledgments

First of all, we each thank our families, for both the support they have given us and the sacrifices they have made. No scholar writes without taking precious time away from family. We thank Marie-Claire Antoine at Lynne Rienner Publishers, who was a pure joy to work with and provided invaluable advice and guidance for the project, from conception to completion. Jason Cook did a superb job copyediting the manuscript and wrestling with our arcane and esoteric prose to make the book much more readable. Finally, we thank Taylor & Francis for permission to publish thoroughly revised and updated versions of articles that previously appeared in Special Operations Journal.

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1 Special Operations: Out of the Shadows Christopher Marsh, James D. Kiras, and Patricia J. Blocksome

Special operations can be traced back in time to the earliest recorded accounts of warfare. This lethal form of competition can be seen in battlefield exploits from Thermopylae and the Trojan War through the Middle Ages and all the way to today’s battlefields (Arquilla 1996). The conduct of modern special operations and the formation of specially trained and equipped units—what we call special operations forces (SOF), as distinct from conventional operations and general-purpose forces—is typically traced to World War II (Thomas 1983). During World War II, all the major players were involved in the creation and use of special operations forces, including the United States, Britain, Germany, and the Soviet Union (Thomas 1983). Most special operations units created during that war were subsequently disbanded and re-created as needed. That need came with the Cold War and as early as the Korean War. Later, as President Kennedy phrased it in a speech at West Point in 1962, the world was becoming characterized by a form of warfare “new in its intensity, ancient in its origins—war by guerrilla subversives, insurgents, assassins. War by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him” (Kennedy 1962). This type of warfare would require “a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training.” The answer to this requirement was the formation of special operations forces. Officially created in 1952, US Army Special Forces were given a tremendous boost under President Kennedy and during the Vietnam War. These forces included the “Green Berets” (Special Forces); the 1

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Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) teams of the US Navy; and the US Air Force’s 1st Special Operations Wing. The United States was not alone in its development and institutionalization of special operations forces during the Cold War; depending on the country, such specialized forces were either created, reactivated, or, for the units that had not been disbanded following World War II, given more institutional attention (Thomas 1983). Despite this history, the large-scale investment in and restructuring of SOF into a stable, efficient, and interdependent organizational structure occurred in the US context only in the early 1980s, particularly after the creation of the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in 1987. SOCOM is the headquarters for all US special operations forces and is based out of MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida. Each service’s special operations forces are organized under a component command, including the US Army Special Operations Command (the largest), the Air Force Special Operations Command, the Naval Special Warfare Command, and the Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command. Since the development of SOCOM, special operators have proven their ability to conduct critical missions with speed and precision, or patience and discretion, and their tactical actions often result in strategic consequences. Beyond the United States, there has been a proliferation of SOF across the globe over the past twenty years as all major powers—and some lesser powers as well—seek to gain the capabilities and status that come from the possession of such elite units (Marsh 2017). This has been seen not only among allies of the United States, but among near-peer competitors as well, such as Russia (Marsh 2016) and China (Cheng 2012). Special operations can be broken down into several different types of mission sets, including the very familiar operations of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. These two missions have recently become the subject of intense academic research and there exists for each a wide variety of publications. Special operations comprise other types of missions as well, including unconventional warfare, security force assistance, and humanitarian assistance, as well as surgical strike and direct action operations. Military historian Simon Anglim has identified three sets of tasks that most SOF have been given across countries and throughout time: surveillance and reconnaissance, offensive actions against important targets, and support and influence (2011:17). This classification of tasks is almost identical to the official US doctrine on special operations, which distinguishes between special reconnaissance, direct action, and military assistance (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2014a). Special reconnaissance is centered on gaining intelligence in sensitive and denied areas through covert means. Direct action is just another way of saying the use of kinetic military force. Finally, military assistance consists of training both the legitimate military forces of a foreign state as well as training resistance fighters and

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proxy forces that may be either resisting an occupying force (or preparing to do so) or working to dislodge a government in power. But this is not all that special operations forces do. In addition, there is humanitarian assistance and countering weapons of mass destruction, two other very critical mission sets of US—and many foreign—special operations forces. The official list of US special operations core activities is the following: • • • • • • • • • • • •

Direct action Special reconnaissance Counterterrorism Unconventional warfare Foreign internal defense Security force assistance Hostage rescue and recovery Counterinsurgency Foreign humanitarian assistance Military information support operations (psychological operations) Civil affairs operations Countering weapons of mass destruction

In the pages that follow, many of these core activities will be discussed and analyzed, primarily direct action, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, security force assistance, counterinsurgency, and psychological operations. Much of the literature on special operations has focused on unit or national histories, or individual “kill and tell” memoirs (the value of which is cogently defended in Pettersson and Ben-Ari 2018), but has been largely neglected by the academic community. Moreover, there is much to be gained by studying special operations and SOF holistically, rather than in a piecemeal fashion, because these missions often occur simultaneously and the roles and capabilities of SOF evolve over time (e.g., from conducting security force assistance and counterterrorism to eventually fighting counterinsurgency). While the importance of special operations today seems quite apparent, academic study and professional research into special operations are still in a nascent stage. It is a rare find to see a course on special operations in college curricula, or faculty members with any direct background in special operations. The fact remains that despite media attention and public fascination, there is no real research community on special operations as a field of study. One factor critical to the formation of a research community in any area is a forum for the exchange of ideas, and this is no less true for special operations than it is for particle physics. It was the strong conviction about this idea among the authors

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of this book that led to the establishment of the Special Operations Journal in 2013, the first academic and professional journal devoted solely to the study of special operations and special operations forces. The general aim of this book is twofold. First it seeks to introduce nonspecialists to some of the many areas of special operations, and second it seeks to delve deeper into some of these areas for the specialist interested in the debates and cutting-edge research being done in the field, ranging from theoretical debates to critical case studies. The initial area we cover, both chronologically and in terms of priority, is that of a theory of special operations. Several excellent studies have been done on this topic (Luttwak, Canby, and Thomas 1982; Gray 1992; McRaven 1996; Kiras 2006; Finlan 2007; Spulak 2007; Celeski 2011; Yarger 2013; Marsh, Kenny, and Joslyn 2015), but the debate is far from over. The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) even held a conference on the theme a couple years ago, with an excellent three-part series of publications emerging from the event (Rubright 2017; Searle 2017; McCabe and Lieber 2017). Not only is there no general theory of special operations, but there is not even agreement among the field as to whether there should (or can) be a theory of special operations. Part 1 of our volume begins with two chapters on special operations theory. Chapter 2 is written by Professor James Kiras of the US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base, who argues that the critiques of special operations forces after World War II are applicable to the current quest to produce a theory of special operations today. A specific theory may be unwarranted, as other existing military theories may already prove necessary and sufficient for special operations. There are a number of individual and institutional impediments to overcome in the writing of special operations theory. Although special operations have a strategic value and can generate strategic effects, this does not necessarily translate into a need for theory. Institutional imperatives are likely to favor pragmatic over pure theory and co-opt such theory in the pursuit of bureaucratic agendas. In the worst possible case, such co-opted theory can become dogma, or a substitute for deep, critical thinking—the very raison d’être of theory. Chapter 3 is a response, of sorts, to Kiras, wherein Christopher Marsh, along with retired Special Forces officer Mike Kenny, and the 10th Special Forces Group’s Nathanael Joslyn, team up to argue that the pursuit of theory is required for a scientifically rigorous body of research on special operations. Following a review of the nature of theory and its role in the study of war and warfare, the authors argue against the development of a single, overarching meta-theory of special operations. Instead, they propose that efforts at theory development should be aimed at a level below that of special operations, and suggest that focusing on the

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doctrinal division between surgical strike and special warfare offers great promise for developing a theory of special warfare in particular. Concepts are the building blocks of theory, and the remainder of the chapters in Part 1 focus on various conceptual issues in special operations research. Chapter 4 looks at the topic of locating the human in doctrine. As US Air Force officer Kevin Parker notes, in 2013 top US Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Command military leaders chartered the Strategic Landpower Task Force to examine the concept of a human domain and inform whether to adopt it into doctrine. The Department of Defense (DoD) should not adopt human domain into doctrine. Examining human in war, however, illuminates opportunities to improve joint doctrine by developing precise terminology for the many facets of humanness in war. This chapter explores the concepts of the human domain, human dimension, human factors, and human capital. It also proposes reevaluating defeat mechanisms to consider human factors and how military operations influence adversary decisions. Human domain concepts have gained attention in the land services and special operations, especially in population-centric conflicts, but the importance of human factors goes beyond these limited viewpoints. Next, the reader is offered a brief introduction to some conceptual issues and design thinking. In a similar vein to Chapter 4, JSOU’s Homer Harkins in Chapter 5 points out that the United States has participated in special warfare for decades, but that the concept has only recently entered formal SOF doctrine. Special warfare differs from traditional warfare principally in its involvement of the human domain and the importance of psychological operations. It occurs across the spectrum of conflict and in both irregular and conventional warfare. To be successful, Harkins argues, special warfare efforts should cooperate with other military organizations, particularly those with intelligence and security assistance capacity, and must be adequately supported by the joint force. Special warfare efforts must also be synchronized with the efforts of interagency partners, quite often through the auspices of diplomatic missions because of the involvement of foreign populations. Special warfare has been a tool used by the United States in conflicts around the world for decades, and future SOF warriors will continue to engage in it. To be successful, it is critically important that these professionals understand this other type of warfare. Further delving into the area of concepts, Dan Cox of the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies argues in Chapter 6 that even defining the term terrorism is a highly contentious act. The lack of an agreedupon definition or even an agreed-upon set of concepts that every definition should encompass creates rifts between scholars and potential confusion among practitioners of counterterrorism. This chapter attempts to examine the difficulty of conceptualizing terrorism juxtaposed against the practice

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of unconventional warfare. Given that special operations forces help foment insurgencies when conducting unconventional warfare and because insurgencies often resort to terrorism, it is important for practitioners of unconventional warfare to understand what terrorism is, how to detect it, and perhaps how to steer insurgents away from this tactic. This chapter explores these concepts as well as the potentiality that the intersection of terrorism and unconventional warfare produces a new type of collateral damage not fully covered in the existing international law of warfare. The next two chapters offer the reader a brief introduction to “design thinking,” particularly as seen by SOCOM. Both chapters are written by JSOU’s Ben Zweibelson, who in Chapter 7 first tackles the issue of special operations and design thinking. As he argues, over the past decade the US military has developed various forms of design thinking for complex problem solving in military conflicts. US Special Operations Command recently developed two operational design and design practitioners courses in an effort to integrate design thinking across all levels of SOCOM. While the conventional Army uses one form of design, the organizational composition, mission, and high level of tacit knowledge production require special operations to pursue other design concepts, design education options, and organizational improvements. This chapter outlines how and why special operations needs a different organizing philosophy for design in context, where the unique qualities of special operation missions require designing differently than conventional approaches. In Chapter 8, Zweibelson looks at change agents for the SOF enterprise and the design considerations for SOF leadership. As the author points out, the military design movement in the past generation has generated much discussion on why, how, and when to apply design thinking in military organizations. Further, there is significant debate on how design and traditional linear planning ought to integrate and complement within a military enterprise confronting a complex, adaptive environment. Although there are multiple design schools, programs, as well as methodologies available across the US Department of Defense and internationally in other militaries, the lack of research and materials for military senior leaders is of paramount concern. For special operations leadership in particular, design requires different consideration when set in the context of SOF unique missions as well as the composition of SOF forces in larger coalition and joint activities. This chapter provides some of the leading design theory tailored specifically for senior military leaders to provide deeper appreciation of how to foster design activities, innovation, and operational planning integration within complex special operations contexts. In Part 2 we turn to special operations in action. These chapters are examples of work focusing on some of the most pressing concerns to

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the special operations enterprise today, from the discourse of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to US strategy and Russia’s countering of the new Western way of war. We begin with a contribution by Richard Rubright, who argues in Chapter 9 that the United States faces a strategic paradox where values conflict with the ability to develop and implement coherent strategies in the complex and dynamic world of today and the future. Special operations forces’ ability to be effective in the contexts of foreign environments, he argues, may mean future reliance on proxy forces that offer plausible deniability for US policymakers. Such opportunities, however, come with a potential of heightened strategic risk that must be carefully managed and judged. Rubright provides examples of historical cases of effective use of third-party proxies, which may become a template for partner nations and special operations forces to effectively meet future challenges while coping with the strategic paradox that currently limits capabilities. Next, in Chapter 10, we turn our attention to the festering problem of Crimea and eastern Ukraine through an examination of Russia’s response to the “new” Western way of war. Charles Bartles of Fort Leavenworth’s Foreign Military Studies Office lays out the context in which General Valery Gerasimov’s often cited article “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying Out Combat Operations,” was written. Furthermore, Bartles explains why Gerasimov’s “doctrine” (if it is a doctrine at all) is not a new Russian development, but is a response to the West’s new way of war, and a description of the future of war in general. Bartles shows that the use of proxy forces, covert operations, and special operations forces is in fact a reflexive response by Russia to US operations across the globe. In Chapter 11, JSOU’s Paul Lieber along with the US Air Force Academy’s Peter Reiley look at the complex issue of countering ISIS’s social media influence. The success of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria in recruiting and sustaining foreign fighter flow is seen by many as a product of the organization’s potent social media efforts. The authors of this chapter argue, however, that a different approach to both problem analysis and measures of effectiveness can potentially counter ISIS’s influence efforts. This includes adopting a whole-of-government approach to synchronize efforts and voice. Next, Chapter 12 looks at the core SOF missions of foreign internal defense and security force assistance, with a particular focus on the new Security Force Assistance Brigades. James “Mike” DePolo highlights the necessity for the US Department of Defense to increase focus and commitment of resources toward foreign internal defense and security

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force assistance capabilities. DePolo, the director for special operations studies at Fort Leavenworth’s Command and General Staff College, analyzes reductions in defense resources among simultaneous emergent threats, which predicates the need for increasingly efficient and persistent force multiplication effects abroad. He utilizes a vignette of a successful security cooperation operation to conceptualize the potential impacts of effective foreign internal defense efforts, which further enabled export of security cooperation strategy through third-party partnerships. This chapter explores various modern approaches, utilized by the service components to help illustrate challenges and opportunities, that are helping to shape future partner capacity-building platforms across the armed services. The last of the case studies, in Chapter 13, turns our attention to the role of US special operations forces in combating transnational organized crime as an evolving threat to international security. Steven Johnson argues that transnational organized crime is evolving and diversifying activities globally, presenting persistent threats to security and governance. Growth in transnational organized crime parallels globalization trends including technology, communications, and transportation advances that facilitate geographically dispersed connected networks. The combating of transnational organized crime, Johnson argues, requires integrated approaches that incorporate diverse resources, authorities, and permissions across elements of national power. Constraints related to political will, interoperability, and capacity continue to limit multilateral cooperative activities. Johnson suggests that the US government should take a leadership role, forging international cooperation through efforts to build capacity and integrate diverse capabilities toward common objectives while integrating US special operations forces’ capabilities into efforts to combat transnational organized crime globally. Finally, in Chapter 14, Christopher Marsh, James Kiras, and Patricia Blocksome look to the future of special operations and special operations research, focusing on the role of SOF in an era of “great power competition,” to use the words of James Mattis, former US secretary of defense, from the 2018 National Defense Strategy. As the world’s great powers begin to align and China and Russia continue to counter US interests globally, the role of SOF might be more important than ever, especially as Special Forces return to their original mission of unconventional warfare (now under the guise of training for resistance). Such a move, however, has not and will not go unnoticed, much less uncountered, by competitors with the United States. Whatever the role of special operations in the future, one thing is for certain: it will be a critical contribution to the ability of the powers great and small to protect their interests and project power locally, regionally, and globally.

PART 1 Special Operations in Theory and Concept

2 The Dangers of Theory James D. Kiras

Writing more than a decade after the end of World War II, British field marshal William Slim assessed a number of aspects of the campaign in his command area of responsibility. Slim arrived in the China-Burma-India theater at perhaps the worst possible time. A Japanese offensive in early 1942 threw British and Commonwealth forces from Burma in an attempt to cut off Allied supplies to beleaguered Chinese forces. Slim had the unenviable task of forging together an effective army out of defeated and demoralized British and Commonwealth troops who had managed to escape the Japanese, as well as untested replacements. Through a variety of innovative means, including reconceiving supply in a jungle environment through the use of air power and the creation of combat “boxes” to serve as isolated fighting detachments, his efforts paid off handsomely in 1944 and 1945. A Japanese counter-offensive in 1944 failed to crack the boxes at Imphal, Kohima, and Sangshak, among others. More important, Japanese forces of the 28th Army were sufficiently weakened for Slim to go on the offensive again in 1945. During the course of the offensive, the 14th Army managed not only to liberate Meiktila and Mandalay but also to cut off isolated Japanese forces from their supplies. During the course of the campaign in Burma, Slim rose from division through corps command and eventually was promoted as commander of the 14th Army (Allen 1984:150–315). In the course of his evaluation, Slim turned, as one of his “afterthoughts” to his memoir, to the role played by what he called “special forces” in his theater of operations. For Slim there were simply too 11

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many special forces trained to too high a level of specialization to be useful. In Slim’s estimation: The rush to form special forces arose from confused thinking on what were, or were not, normal operations of war. In one sense, every operation of war is a special one, whether it is attack, defence, withdrawal, penetration, raids behind the enemy’s lines, destruction of his detachments, assault over a beach, river crossings, jungle or mountain warfare, or any of the rest; each has its peculiar requirements. Yet all are and have always been familiar operations of war; any standard unit should expect that, at some time or other, it may be called to engage in any of them. The level of initiative, individual training, and weapon skill required in, say, a commando, is admirable; what is not admirable is that it should be confined to a few small units. (Slim 1956:547)

In modern parlance, Slim was suggesting that any unit should be prepared to conduct any task in “the familiar operations of war”; no task or mission should be the exclusive preserve of any one unit no matter how specialized the task. Put another way, Slim argued that military forces can and should be maximized for a wide range of tasks, as opposed to optimized for highly specific military activities. At its logical extreme, Slim argued that optimization or specialization of forces could be taken to an absurd degree: “The cult of special forces is as sensible as to form a Royal Corps of Tree Climbers and say that no soldier, who does not wear its green hat with a bunch of oak leaves stuck in it, should be expected to climb a tree” (Slim 1956:547–548). For Slim, maximization of combat units under his command for a wide range of tasks done less than perfectly was a reflection of dire necessity as a commander. Slim was operating in “the forgotten theater” of World War II, akin to T. E. Lawrence’s self-deprecating characterization of his own irregular campaign during the Palestine Campaign of World War I: “this sideshow of a sideshow” (Lawrence 1920:68). Optimizing forces such as Orde Wingate’s Chindits, parachute or mountain regiments, or the highly successful unconventional warfare force, Force 136 (part of the British Special Operations Executive that, in conjunction with local forces and Jedburghs, accounted for almost 17,000 Japanese killed and 1,000 wounded), drained resources, energy, and talent from the 14th Army when the latter needed them the most (Cruickshank 1983:190). Such specialized forces sloughed off a number of the better officers and troops, all of whom could have improved the overall quality of the conventional forces under Slim’s command. Slim was not piqued primarily that specialized forces were developed or drew disproportionate resources. Indeed he saw a role for special forces on future battlefields, small numbers of whom would con-

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duct missions classified as sabotage and subversion lumped under the contemporary doctrinal terms “unconventional warfare” and “special activities” (Slim 1956:548). Rather, he concluded as an operational commander that the cardinal sin of the wide variety of specialized forces in his theater was that they consumed far too many resources relative to their operational utility or effectiveness (Slim 1956:547). Specialized forces took a disproportionate share of resources dedicated to his theater, including the most advanced or latest equipment, and yet sat by idly during times of operational need precisely because of their acute specialization. After all, one would not expect a highly trained commando unit to fight as a line infantry unit when needed, so the line of reasoning went, given its elite status and sunk costs in terms of resources (commanders did occasionally commit specialized forces when absolutely necessary in the China-Burma-India theater). Even worse, the leaders of commando and other specialized units, such as Orde Wingate, lobbied political or military leaders to whom they owed their existence for roles in upcoming campaigns to showcase their military effectiveness, a practice that continues to this day. Many of Slim’s critiques of special forces in his theater a half century ago can be applied in spirit to the need for theories of special operations today. Put simply, other theory may be necessary and sufficient for special operations. The contemporary popularity of special operations and the forces that conduct them has never been higher, leading to calls for a theory of special operations. A number of authors have responded to the challenge, in whole or in part (Celeski, Slemp, and Jogerst 2012; Malvesti 2010; Robinson 2013; Spulak 2007; Turnley 2008; Yarger 2013). This chapter takes issue with the idea that a theory of special operations is desirable. Indeed, laboring on a theory of special operations, much less a theory of special operations forces (SOF), is not only irrelevant and unnecessary but also fraught with danger. The reason for this somewhat gloomy prognostication, as I argue in this chapter, lies in the relationship between the purpose of theory, and impediments to its creation, and the nature of special operations. This chapter first answers the question “What is theory?” Next it explores the impediments, individually and institutionally, to writing a theory of special operations. It then examines special operations and concludes that their nature is incompatible with theory. A theory of special operations is unnecessary given their enabling function, relative value, and strategic utility and effectiveness. The chapter concludes by linking the previous elements together to suggest that a theory of special operations driven by institutional imperative will be not only unsatisfying but also potentially dangerous.

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Before proceeding further, it is useful to first define what I mean by “theory.” In a general sense, theory consists foremost of a supposition intended to explain actions or behavior based on systematic exploration of its nature through a series of codified, related propositions backed by sufficient analysis and evidence. There are two general types of theory: pure theory, based largely on logic and argumentation about the nature of a phenomenon, and pragmatic theory, which seeks to develop a set of principles based on the activity under investigation. Pure theory also seeks to abstract away contextual clutter to determine the essence of the subject of investigation. Military theory instructors within professional military education often refer to pure theory as “descriptive theory” and to pragmatic theory as “prescriptive theory.” The reason why von Clausewitz’s On War (1984) continues to be taught within professional military education is that no other theorist has so comprehensively explored, and succinctly summarized, the nature of war as Carl von Clausewitz did in his descriptive theoretical sections of his incomplete work almost 200 years ago. Educators within professional military education continue to teach Baron Antoine de Henri Jomini’s The Art of War (1971) and J. F. C. Fuller’s The Foundations of the Science of War (1926), given their directive, prescriptive nature. The most informative theories combine prescriptive elements with descriptive ones, but their primary thrust—to identify a phenomenon’s timeless nature or timeless principles—determines the nature of the inquiry used. More recently, social scientists have sought to impose rigor on the nature of inquiry by seeking to identify core truths about war and conflict through a combination of scientific methods including testable hypotheses and datagathering, although their efforts have had mixed effects.

Theory, Authorship, Sponsorship, and Sources Not all theories are created equal, to paraphrase George Orwell, and this is especially true for military theory, including any theory of special operations. Harold Winton of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies has provided the most useful and informative method for evaluating military theory. Winton suggests that military theory should be assessed according to its five functions: define, categorize, explain, connect, and anticipate. Defining clarifies the subject under investigation by outlining what is comprised within it and what is not in a general sense. It establishes the boundaries for inquiry (Winton 2011:855–857). For our field here, the question to be asked is, “What consists of special operations and what does not?” Categorizing “break[s] the field down into its constituent parts” (Winton 2004:2). An important, and often neglected, aspect of categorizing lies not just in identifying and separating out the

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constituent parts of special operations in isolation but rather clarifying how they relate together. Within military theory, this can be done in any number of ways, including across levels of war (strategic, operational, tactical), domains (land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace), or others. More often, in the realm of special operations, it is often done according to roles and missions, such as counterinsurgency or counterterrorism, or operational approach, such as direct or indirect or “surgical strike” and “special warfare” (Army Special Operations Command 2013:10–16). Next, and perhaps most important, a military theory should explain the phenomenon under investigation through “repetitive observation and imaginative analysis,” or Albert Einstein’s “intuition, supported by being sympathetically in touch with experience” (Winton 2011:855). For a theory of special operations to have explanatory power, it must explore both the scope and the limitations of such operations relative to other methods or means. Winton concludes pithily that “theory without explanation is like salt without savor—it is worthy only of the dung heap” (2011:855). Military theory can and should connect to other fields of study as well. Ken Connor (1998) and Alastair MacKenzie (2011) have suggested or described the role that the Special Air Service has played as an instrument of British statecraft, but not in a systematic way. As Winton argues, Clausewitz’s genius lay not in divining the character of battle or identifying timeless principles of war but rather in connecting war to politics (2011:856). Last, theory can anticipate, and this can be especially valuable because it can provide a clear direction for future military operations and guide the organizing, training, and equipping in times of great change and uncertainty. Understanding the functions of theory and creating one are two very separate notions. Consider military theories about actions within specific operating environments or domains. Despite millennia of experience in land warfare, the number of useful theories about war on land can be confined to a single bookcase, and of those, few demand attention today. For sea warfare, the first theoretical work that connected naval engagement to military success and economic prosperity, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, was not published until 1890, despite a similar breadth of experience as war on land (Mahan 1890). Theories of air power crafted in the wake of World War I, including Guilio Douhet’s Command of the Air (1983), are often mocked or pilloried for some of their more outlandish claims or faulty assumptions. In the absence of experience (and often with individual or organizational agendas at play), however, all these early air power authors had to base their theory on hypotheses based on intuition (Douhet 1983; Mitchell 1925). Much of the same hypothesis-driven argumentation,

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based on intuition and in some cases scare-mongering, holds true for theory or conceptualization of the domains of space and cyberspace today that rely heavily on analogy, such as “a cyber Pearl Harbor” (Bumiller and Shankar 2012; see also Clarke and Knake 2010:54–55 and McCarthy et al. 2009:548–549) or metaphor/simile, as with James Moltz: “space is like the ocean and therefore must be treated as a global common for the good of all” (2008:34–35). Winton suggests that military theories are so few and far between, much less comprehensive, for the following reasons: “The formulation of theory demands intense powers of observation, ruthless intellectual honesty, clear thinking, mental stamina of the highest order, gifted imagination, and other qualities that defy easy description” (2011:857). In addition to the list of qualities and characteristics necessary for a theorist outlined by Winton, he could have added three additional individual impediments to the crafting of theory. The first impediment is sufficient evidence with which to make a case. Depending on one’s time horizon, specified characteristics, and definition, special operations have either existed as long as warfare itself or are a relatively recent phenomenon. While sufficient evidence exists to plumb the subject of special operations since the beginning of time, providing useful anecdotes and illustrations, and perhaps illuminating recurring patterns, the opposite is true the closer one gets to the present day (see, for example, Arquilla 1996; Leebaert 2006). Access to documentation, interviews, and other primary source material on which to begin critical inquiry for more recent special operations requires special access, a security clearance, or both. Such access, however, is no guarantee that such information can be subsequently written about, much less published. The majority of contemporary special operations are clandestine or covert in nature, given the range of counterterrorism activities, and national leaders prefer to keep the operations or the guiding hand hidden from public view. National leaders have acknowledged some high-profile specific covert actions, such as the raid that killed Osama bin Laden in 2011 (White House 2011). Some commanders have allowed the details of other operations to be disclosed, to ensure the public is aware of the courage, bravery, heroism, and sacrifice of special operators, such as during Operation Gothic Serpent in Mogadishu on October 3–4, 1993 (covered in Bowden 1999) or Operation Red Wing in Afghanistan in late June to early July of 2005 (covered in Luttrell and Robinson 2007). Most modern special operations, and the records associated with them to include overt actions, remain inaccessible to scholars in order to preserve operational security; to protect sources of information as well as current tactics, techniques, and procedures; or for other political or mil-

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itary sensitivities. At least one scholar and several other authors have argued for greater transparency or access to source material in support of their research (Finlan 2007:x–xi). For a theory to have any soundness, it must be based on deep critical study and analysis of special operations in context, in order to assess the soundness of planning assumptions and command decisions and evaluate their operational or strategic effectiveness. Unfortunately, such study and analysis often means looking at historical examples and campaigns from decades to half a century or more in the past that appear to have little relevance or utility for the contemporary special operator. The second additional individual impediment to a theory of special operations is related to the qualities and characteristics of the author. The sum of these qualities and characteristics affects the credibility of the author and, in turn, the reception of the ideas with the target audience. Few military communities are as driven by credibility and capability than the special operations one. Most special operations components have some sort of rigorous psychological and physical screening process, such as the Army Special Forces “Q” Course or the Navy SEALs Basic Underwater Demolition training, as a means of gaining entry into their ranks. Once entry is gained, special operators are inculcated into the language, norms (results-based, performance-driven problem solving under conditions of great stress), culture, values (NSDQ— “Night Stalkers Don’t Quit,” the motto of the US Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment), and totems (unit symbols and specific badges, headgear, weapons, or platforms) of their particular community. While this phenomenon is not unique to special operations, it is much more acute given the barriers to entry and exclusive membership of the community. Individuals inculcated over time into the various components of the special operations community embrace an identity similar to that found in highly tribal or clannish societies. Membership is exclusive and limited, and those outside of their community are often treated with a mix of curiosity but more often suspicion or even disdain. Entry to a tribe often occurs, as in most tribes or clans, on the basis of personal connection, perceived value and utility for the collective good, or both. Perceived value and utility is a function of the ability to better understand, solve problems, or advance the political agenda (and organizational influence) of the tribe. The credibility of the author and the type of theory will influence its reception by the special operations community. Authors of theoretical works experienced in special operations are more credible in the eyes of their peers than are authors who are not. For example, Joseph Celeski’s work Operationalizing COIN (2005) is a useful work on its own merits

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but is lent added credibility given his experience as a Special Forces Group and Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) commander in Afghanistan in 2002. In addition to previous demonstrations of personal competence, acceptance into the community, and a personal network within the community, those experienced in special operations are better able to craft theory in language best understood by other special operators, given unique connotations. Those outside the special operations community without the perceived requisite knowledge, skills, or ability, or those with an identifiable potentially negative or personal agenda, are more likely to be treated with suspicion or ignored entirely by those within. Examples of the latter include journalists or scholars such as Jennifer Kibbe (2004), Sean Naylor (2013), and Jeremy Scahill (2013). If accepted by the community, there is always the risk that the outsider will become co-opted if they begin to identify with the language, culture, values, norms, and totems of the special operations community, potentially compromising their ability to look at the subject as objectively as possible. The author of pure theory on the nature of special operations must be credible within the special operations community for their ideas to be even considered, as such ideas have no immediate, practical applicability. In addition, a theory based on critical study and analysis, particularly from an outsider, that challenges or overturns established tribal lore, beliefs, or myths, will in all likelihood lead to the theoretical baby being thrown out with its bathwater. Pragmatic theory, particularly one useful in conceptualizing or helping solve the tactical, operational, or organizational problems of the tribe or subtribe, will be the most welcomed but will also likely have the shortest lifespan as context changes, and individual and collective interest in its subject subsides, as the frenzy and subsequent decline of interest in counterinsurgency throughout the wider Department of Defense suggests. There is a significant danger for the theorist in chasing intellectual fashion or fads. The third individual impediment to theory is one common to all human endeavors: time. At the risk of overgeneralizing and oversimplifying, creating theory takes time. Time is necessary to read widely and deeply to better understand events and phenomena to place them in their appropriate context, as well as explore other related fields. The creation of models and hypotheses requires inquiry, investigation, and some level of experimentation to get right. Data must be gathered, sorted, and analyzed, all of which takes time. Although it is seemingly an old saw, a theorist must spend time reflecting and ruminating in the attempt not merely to categorize various phenomena or elements but also to relate them together, explain those connections and their importance clearly and concisely through a set of logically consistent propositions, as well

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as connect them to other fields of study. Carl von Clausewitz’s On War, required reading in US and other staff and war colleges, was the product of fourteen years of writing, reflection, and revision and was still incomplete at the time of his death. Individuals often undertake pure theory largely for altruistic reasons, in the pursuit of greater knowledge or understanding or because they relish the intellectual challenge theory presents. Pragmatic theory seeks to find solutions often because the problem set is discrete, there is a requirement to find an answer, or for other more specific individual or institutional reasons. Institutions almost never create theory but they can establish internal or external requirements for theory. Internal institutional requirements for theory often result from recent operational failure or institutional uncertainties about the future. The first step is the capturing and digesting of lessons learned, followed by review of doctrine or the creation of new concepts of operations based on new techniques or emerging technology. When the technology is insufficiently mature or the future particularly uncertain, theory is created to fill the void and can influence doctrine. The particularly rich military theoretical debates in the Soviet Union in the wake of the unsuccessful Soviet-Polish War of 1920, but before the full potential of mechanizing armies was evident, are one example. The writings of Tukhachevskii, Isserson, and Triandafillov influenced the writing of the highly influential Soviet doctrine for combined arms used prior to and during World War II—the Provisional Field Regulations for the Red Army of 1936. The external institutional requirement for military theory is often tied to establishing or regaining lost political or organizational influence, armed service independence, or greater share of the acquisitions budget. The primary audience for The Influence of Sea Power upon History was not naval officers in pursuit of their education, even though Mahan based his writing on lectures for students. Rear Admiral Stephen Luce charged Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan with researching and writing on sea power throughout history and gave his subordinate ten months to read widely on the subject prior to showing up to lecture (Seager 1977:164–165, 174). The ultimate rationale for Mahan’s writing, however, was the creation of a comprehensive work that would convince the American public and members of Congress that a strong, modern navy was vital to the future growth and success of the nation (Crowl 1986:462–468, 470–472). Institutional impediments of theory are related to, but differ in degree and kind from, the individual impediments just discussed. Large bureaucratic organizations based on hierarchy, such as the military, are conservative in outlook as well as slow to change, and are much less receptive to new ideas. The innovation characteristic of special operations at

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the tactical and operational levels of war reflect the level of trust that more senior leaders have in the skill and ability of the forces to conduct often risky missions with a high degree of success. With few exceptions, however, special operations organizations succumb to many of the same unflattering bureaucratic characteristics of their conventional counterparts at the acquisitions, force development and management, and senior command levels. Such characteristics include infighting, jockeying for influence with more senior leaders, protection of budget and span of control at the expense of others, and in some cases needless prevarication, to name a few. The author of theory, particularly one not from the special operations community, should be aware of the dangers involved before they navigate potentially treacherous institutional waters. The reception within the Royal Navy to Julian Corbett’s theoretical work Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (1988) is both useful and instructive. Corbett trained as a barrister but had little success as an author of historical biography until he turned his attention to naval biography. His earliest works, including a two-volume biography of Lord Horatio Nelson, brought him plaudits and the opportunity to teach naval officers first at Greenwich and later at Portsmouth. Corbett developed a reputation as a fine lecturer of considerable knowledge and intellect, who at times went above the heads of his students. While developing his lectures, Corbett was drawn to the writing and ideas of von Clausewitz. Corbett’s training as a lawyer served him well as a theorist in his ability to construct a logically deep and well-reasoned argument for his case based on overwhelming evidence. He turned a short instructional pamphlet into his theoretical masterwork over the course of six years. In Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Corbett challenged the prevailing Mahanian notion of offensive naval action to the exclusion of all else. Corbett linked maritime commerce to the health and welfare of a maritime nation, and therefore the primary role of naval forces was to ensure that sea lines of communication remained open. Naval forces could protect sea lines of communication in a variety of ways depending on the object of the war and the character of their opponent. Corbett reasoned that in some cases, defensive action and dispersal of naval forces to protect commerce was preferable to concentration and offensive action against the enemy fleet (1988:89–152). For a number of Royal Navy officers, raised in the tradition of Francis Drake and Horatio Nelson, many of the ideas in Corbett’s theory were tantamount to heresy. Corbett stayed true to his intellectual principles in the crafting of his theory but paid a heavy price personally for challenging the cherished canon of the Royal Navy. Those outside the Royal Navy, with

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some exceptions, praised Corbett’s reasoning and the comprehensiveness of his theory. Reviewers from within the Royal Navy, however, were anything but kind. He was attacked personally in a number of reviews by authors, some of whom hid behind pseudonyms, who questioned the ideas of a civilian who had never served in uniform: “His audience [for lectures at the Royal Navy War College] has usually treated his amateur excursions into the subject good naturedly; nevertheless his presumption has been resented . . . [and] his opinion on strategy was of no concern to his listeners because as a civilian he was obviously incompetent to assess at their proper value the influences which purely naval considerations had on the problems that he was gratuitously attempting to solve” (Grove 1988:xl). In subsequent years, the blame for the unsatisfactory outcome of the Battle of Jutland (1916) was placed squarely at Corbett’s feet. Subsequent work as an official historian, first of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) and later of the Royal Navy, prevented Corbett from returning to and revising Some Principles of Maritime Strategy when it was republished. Stung and haunted by the criticism, and constantly at work, Corbett died of a heart attack in 1922 (Shurman 1965:150).

Special Operations and Special Operations Theory The preceding section has looked at the various individual and institutional impediments to the writing and adoption of theory in a general sense. The chapter now turns more specifically to special operations and the challenges they pose to theory in the specific sense. Special operations for the purposes of this chapter are “unconventional actions against enemy vulnerabilities in a sustained campaign, undertaken by specially designated units [special operations forces], to enable [military or other governmental] operations and/or resolve economically politico-military problems at the operational or strategic level that are difficult or impossible to accomplish with [military or other government] forces alone” (Kiras 2006:5; the original parentheticals contained the term “conventional” to describe forces, which limited the scope of my original inquiry). There are a number of key attributes about special operations that are implicit from this definition and other analysis: • They are small-scale actions that can have disproportionate effects relative to their size and scale, but lack sufficient mass to achieve decisive effects on their own. • They are enablers for other actions operationally and strategically—conventional, other government department and agencies (individually or integrated), proxies, or host-nation forces—often

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by setting the conditions for the success of future operations, but cannot resolve problems at the level of strategy by themselves. • They have a relationship, but not a unique one, to time against an adversary by speeding up or slowing down the tempo of conflict, often to buy strategic time and space but also to wrest the initiative from an adversary. • They have strategic utility primarily by providing national security leaders and commanders with appealing economy of force options, because of their high degree of success, with immediate results, relative to other military options (Gray 1996). • Their use conforms to, and is shaped by, the orientation of strategy and policy and should be tailored to meet the unique policy demands of the era (Kiras 2006:112–113; Gray 1999a:3).

The sum of these qualities and characteristics is that special operations are a useful tool for political and military leaders because they appear to address immediate problems successfully and economically. In the current context, the value of special operations to US policymakers lies in their ability to provide both immediate, high-profile success or sustained, secret action to contain, harass, disrupt, and harry an adversarial or enemy state, but most often substate actors who present “a continuing or imminent threat to the United States” (Obama 2013). Strategic value or utility, however, does not translate to a need for theory. Indeed a theory of special operations is unnecessary for a number of reasons. First, special operations derive their value and utility only in comparison to other options available. In other words, special operations are useful relative to other options—they are smaller and more economical and often have immediate or unobservable effects relative to law enforcement, intelligence, military, or development operations. Second, at the level of pure theory, special operations are therefore not so unique from their root phenomena—war, conflict, and espionage—as to warrant a theory of their own (for an opposing viewpoint, see Chapter 3). More pragmatic or practical military theories have been developed to identify the unique attributes of military actions within different operating environments or domains, such as the sea or the air. Special operations, as a subset of war, conflict, and espionage, should operate within all operating environments—and indeed they provide much of their operational value in operating in the spaces between such environments—but do not need a domain-specific theory, much less a cross-domain theory (Poole 2011:12). In sum, a special operations theory is unnecessary, as existing theory on war, military operations, and conflict, including those in the wheelhouse of SOF such as revolu-

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tion, terrorism, insurgency, and coup d’état, is already sufficient to describe the role of special operations within it (Chenowith and Stephan 2011; della Porta 2013; Horgan 2014; Kalyvas 2006; Simpson 2012; Malkasian 2013; Serena 2014). Rather than enhancing our understanding of war, conflict, or military operations, a special operations theory is likely to subdivide the field of study so finely as to evaluate and explain the unique aspects of a tree with little regard for the metaphorical forest or ecosystem. If the library of current joint doctrine, some forty-seven separate volumes in all, offers any insights for specific theory, it is that enthusiasm to codify subfields often comes at the expense of the collective, root phenomena. Most special operators are unlikely to be interested in or welcome a theory of what they do—special operations—particularly if such a theory asks uncomfortable questions. At the simplest level, theory should serve as an unconstrained and critical enquiry to divine the nature of a phenomenon under investigation. In addition, theory should educate and inform by providing answers of a phenomenon that largely begin with the question “Why?” (a point for military professionals made forcefully by J. F. C. Fuller [1926:40]). A theory of special operations should seek answers to difficult questions by challenging core assumptions based on logical reasoning, and investigating them through rigorous study and analysis in depth. Consider the following short list of potential questions: • While desirable, can a theory of special operations bridge wartime and peacetime activities, and military and paramilitary activity? (Jogerst 2012:133) • When have special operations campaigns been effective? When have they been ineffective or failed? What is the basis for measurement of the effectiveness of special operations campaigns, and are sufficient data available to assess? Have special operations succeeded operationally but failed strategically, or vice versa, and if so, why? • What core special operations roles and missions should be added, altered, or dropped in order for SOF to remain “special”? For example, is unconventional warfare useful or practical for Western democracies in the twenty-first century? Should it become virtual instead as technology and society change? If so, should the first SOF truth— “humans are more important than hardware”—be rewritten?

Special operators, in contrast, are first and foremost uniformed pragmatists. The life of most special operators is in the pursuit of answers to questions that begin with “what” and “how” instead. What sets special

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operators apart from their conventional counterparts is not their tasks, which could be done by other forces, but rather performing them to a high standard in challenging conditions, which comes through selection, conditioning, rehearsal, and practical training (Kiras 2011:83). Much of what allows special operations to succeed involves doing what was once thought impractical or impossible through highly specific information, unorthodox solutions to problems, and a high degree of tactical autonomy and flexibility. For the special operator, theory should be pragmatic in nature and inform what to do to defeat current and future threats, how to train and prepare, as well as provide examples and lessons from the experience of others to better inform their craft. Such theory, as mentioned previously, will have a limited shelf life indeed. Those special operators who are interested in theory for institutional reasons are where the primary danger of a special operations theory lies. Pure theory will likely be co-opted to suit the needs of the institution in a way similar to how first the Prussian and later the Imperial German Army picked through von Clausewitz for quotes from his pragmatic theory about battle that supported contemporary thinking and reinforced collective biases and preferences without engaging meaningfully with his ideas. Even worse, practitioners might try to apply pure theory, as was the case with bargaining and coercion theory in Vietnam (Moyar 2006:306). For this reason, giving the special operations community an externally produced pure theory, based on critical enquiry and analysis, is akin to “allowing a child to play with a razor blade.” Pure theory on or related to special operations may not even be read much less favorably received, given the investment in time to draw from substantive scholastic wells. Institutional imperatives within the special operations community, for reasons just outlined, will argue against both deep analysis and critical enquiry in favor of prevailing notions, established history and lore, and historical roles and missions. Such notions include the “SOF Truths” of the special operations community as a whole and the roles and missions central to the function and identity of a number of the service component commands such as the Army Special Operations Command, Naval Special Warfare Command, Air Force Special Operations Command, and Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command. Many of these will form the departure point for and connective tissue of a theory that validates the special operations community in its quest to demonstrate its utility and value, and expand its budget, prestige, and influence. Institutional motivations associated with expansion will necessarily influence or even drive the logic and direction of a theory, to show special operations in the best light possible. An institutionally driven theory of special operations,

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especially one underpinned by a concept such as “SOF power,” will likely fall prey, by accident or design, to the central fallacy of Mahan’s work on sea power: “Mahan, it must be concluded, was consistently guilty of what David Hackett Fisher calls ‘the reductive fallacy [that] reduces complexity to simplicity, or diversity to uniformity’ by confusing a necessary cause with the sufficient cause” (Crowl 1986:454). An emergent theory of special operations, or SOF power, particularly one sponsored by the special operations community, is an indicator of an expansion of bureaucratic confidence and political influence. SOF and special operations continue to captivate the public imagination and are the “force of choice” for policymakers against contemporary irregular threats, adding to this institutional sense of confidence. Special operations leaders have used this to good effect, to expand budget and manpower and strengthen connections with agencies, departments, and Congress (Pincus 2013). With such confidence comes the temptation to increase bureaucratic power and authority and expand political influence. Representative theories written in support of service expansion or independence, such as those of A. T. Mahan, Guilio Douhet, and William Mitchell, served their institutional and political purposes admirably. Such theories had negative consequences as well. At the institutional level, a theory that helps increase institutional prestige and influence is embraced wholeheartedly in the absence of further evidence for a variety of individual and organizational reasons. Propositions within a theory become elevated to principles and a substitute for thought, rather than spurring it on, as first concepts of operations and later doctrine are built on unstable theoretical ground. Once embraced, a theory is often distilled down and many of its central ideas can quickly become dogma or orthodoxy within the institution. This can lead to groupthink about special operations and can create the potential for future operational or strategic surprise or shock as reactions by competent opponents challenge initial theoretical assumptions. On an individual level, questioning the core assumptions of such a theory is tantamount to sacrilege and a sure way to have one’s loyalty to the institution become suspect. The path to success within the institution lies in adherence to, and being a proponent of, the established institutional canon. There are few quicker paths to being marginalized, persecuted as Corbett was, or even excommunicated than by questioning the fiat of Rome.

Conclusion Writing a decade before the creation of the United States Special Operations Command, Eliot Cohen offered a conclusion about the dangers elite military units, such as SOF, posed to democratic societies:

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To sum up: elite units of the guerrilla, counterguerrilla, and commando type offer politicians in democracies both a tool of policy and a source of fantasy. When elite units are used for purposes that are not really defensible in military terms, a number of effects harmful to military efficiency occur. For the most part, however, we can rely on the natural proclivities of the regular military and defense bureaucracies to squelch overeager elite units. Even so, democratic politicians should resist the temptations offered by elite units. Without such restraint the defense of a modern democracy can only suffer. (1978:101–102)

Although written in a much different context and time, Cohen’s warning touches upon a number of the issues related to an institutionally driven theory for special operations. As with SOF, a theory of special operations is appealing for a variety of reasons, but left unchecked it can also propagate or create myths about special operations. More worrisome, a theory of special operations can very easily complement the ambitions of senior special operations leaders, or the institution as a whole, and take on a political life of its own. To paraphrase Viscount Slim, “the rush to form special operations theory may arise from confused thinking on what are, or are not, normal operations of war, conflict, and espionage.”

3 The Value of Theory Christopher Marsh, Mike Kenny, and Nathanael Joslyn

Any field of scientific inquiry must begin either with a theory or with the search for a theory. To do otherwise is simply to attempt to accumulate information about a given subject without any particular purpose or rationale. The idea that the scientist is a completely objective individual who gathers facts without preconceived ideas about them is a myth. Worse still, without theory it is impossible to conduct science; without theory, the researcher becomes a cataloger of “facts” and empirical data devoid of meaning, but even these facts are imbedded with subjective meaning. Early in the development of the philosophy of science, Poincaré pointed out that “it is often said that experiments should be made without preconceived ideas. This is impossible. Not only would it make every experiment fruitless, but even if we wished to do so, it could not be done” (1952:143). Without theory, it is difficult if not impossible to define the parameters of a particular subject of inquiry. Moreover, how does a researcher know what information is relevant and what is irrelevant (or perhaps less relevant)? Research by its very nature is a reductionist enterprise. It is an exercise in the economical use of energy, in this case mental energy. The purpose of theory is to know something about something about which very little is known. Categorizations about armed groups, for instance, help us understand something about them, from their formation and organization to ultimate objectives. Defining the typology of insurgencies (guerrilla, protracted people’s war, etc.) provides valuable insight and understanding of their methodology and construct. Thus labeling a group a guerrilla force and another an unarmed group (hopefully based upon sound intelligence about the groups under investigation) can help 27

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us understand something about their relationship to state authorities (adversarial) and the means they are likely to employ to achieve their objectives (violence and coercion in the former, nonviolent means in the latter). Thus, simply labeling groups leads to significant (theoretical) assumptions about them and their behavior. The project of special operations research, therefore, demands theoretical assumptions to not only have greater clarity of our operating environment and our partners and adversaries, but also to guide research, whether we choose to recognize it or not. Sound theory provides an understanding of phenomena, the potential to predict outcomes (albeit more often in probabilistic than deterministic fashion), and thus a degree of control or the ability to influence outcomes (Reynolds 1971). Hence, our pursuit of special operations–relevant theory seeks to enhance our understanding of the operational environment (political and social theories) but also informs hypotheses regarding what actions to take to achieve a desired effect. Thus, planners of special operations formulate a theory of action (if we do this, then it will have the following effect) and use theory to inform action (understanding the system to take the right action). Our objective here is to argue persuasively and soundly that the study of special operations must attempt to generate scientific knowledge (versus other forms of knowledge, especially “everyday knowledge”) and that such an enterprise is inextricably linked to theorizing and theory-building. Our argument, while not in disagreement with the early formulations of von Clausewitz or the advances offered by Kuhn in the field of philosophy of science, is more firmly grounded in the recent arguments of Hoyningen-Huene and his work into the systematicity of science. After making what we hope is a strong case for scientific rigor and theorizing in the study of special operations, we then argue against the development of a single, overarching meta-theory of special operations, proposing instead that, since special operations are in fact related to different phenomena, multiple theories are necessary to explain the subphenomena of special operations activities. Additionally, we suggest that much of this theoretical body of work already exists. We propose, as an initial attempt at theorizing, dividing special operations into surgical strike and special warfare missions. By dividing the phenomena under investigation in this way, we can more easily examine existing theories that are related to the more specific phenomena of surgical strike and special warfare activities. We do this by examining theories related to each, including the theory of relative superiority and social movement theory, respectively. While far from a comprehensive inventory or treatment of theories applicable to special oper-

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ations, we believe these examples illustrate well the value and necessity of scientific rigor and theorizing in the study of special operations.

On Theory The term theory is derived from the late Latin theōria, which itself originates from the Greek θεωρία, meaning “a looking at, viewing, contemplation, speculation, theory, also a sight, a spectacle.” According to the Oxford English Dictionary, which chronicles semantic changes in the English language, the modern use of the term probably developed from the medieval Latin translation of the works of Aristotle. This is supported by the fact that the first attestations of the word in English with the meaning related to “a system of ideas or statements held as an explanation or account of a group of facts or phenomena” do not occur until the late seventeenth century. The world is infinitely complex, and every human being is bombarded daily with millions of facts, far too many for the human mind to capture, not to mention categorize. Humans thus select certain facts as having meaning and discard most of the others. Facts that have meaning have such due to their effect on the observer, either immediately or in the longer term, and with either minor significance or great significance. What theory does, at its most basic level, is link facts to these outcomes. Thus storm clouds approaching suggest the likelihood of rain. One need not understand meteorology to identify the cause-and-effect relationship between the appearance of storm clouds and an ensuing storm. In its most rudimentary form, this would constitute a theory of storms. Moving from the physical world to the social world, similar primitive theories can be developed. A man getting up abruptly and storming over to another man should suggest that the first man is considering a violent engagement with the second. The facial expression, pace of movement, and physical posturing (these would all be indicators, or variables if you will) would all suggest that he is preparing to engage in a fight. These facts then become meaningful in a way that humans will recognize them, most often without even knowing they are doing it, and probably even react. Over time, therefore, fact accumulation leads to the development of a body of knowledge that assists us in understanding, explaining, and predicting phenomena in the world around us. But some among us are better qualified, whether by training, experience, or simply the possession of keen skills of observation, to make more reliable and accurate assessments about this world and the various observable phenomena in it. Put in more sophisticated terms, theories are knowledge constructions about which there is relative consensus (or at least some movement

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toward consensus) among those competent (and in the case of more arcane material, trusted) to interpret the substance of the construction (Guba and Lincoln 1994:113). As Kuhn made us aware several decades ago, however, sometimes that consensus breaks down, whether due to the accumulation of facts (observed phenomena) that do not fit the existing paradigm (anomalies), or because a new explanation has been developed that gains adherents from both new members of the scientific profession as well as the established scientific community (Kuhn 1962). These resulting scientific revolutions lead to either the emergence of a new paradigm or a division between scholars who adhere to different paradigms, and then engage in research working under the theoretical assumptions of each in a sort of competition to determine which paradigm more closely approximates reality. Scientific revolutions, however, are about theory—the robustness of their assumptions, their accordance with observable phenomena, and the logic of their explanations. While Kuhn’s model of scientific revolutions was a great contribution to the field, one of its weaknesses was in defining just what science is (1962:2, 13). Many of his examples of scientific revolutions were in fact transitions from pre-science (such as alchemy) to science (in this instance, modern chemistry). A recent valuable contribution to the philosophy of science is Paul Hoyningen-Huene’s work on the nature of science (2013). Hoyningen-Huene argues that systematicity—the degree to which an investigation is systematic—is at the core of all science, with his key thesis being that scientific knowledge is more systematic than everyday knowledge (of the primitive variety discussed earlier). That is why scientific knowledge is more highly valued, and that is what makes it so instrumentally valuable. “Systematicity” is a complex notion, and Hoyningen-Huene uses the word as a technical term, examining nine qualities that constitute dimensions or aspects of systematicity. Of Hoyningen-Huene’s points, the most relevant to our concerns here is that scientists (and here we include scholars engaged in special operations research) are more systematic in the way they collect data relevant to their inquiries (2013:138–139). So even though someone may claim to be exerting serious effort in collecting data on a given research topic, scientists do this much more thoroughly and in a structured and systematic manner. Additionally, scientists/scholars deserve to be recognized as authorities in their specialties, according to Hoyningen-Huene, because their research is conducted systematically and they present their findings in a far more systematic way than do laypeople. This devotion to systematicity grounds their authority. Without a theory to guide the

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researcher, however, the systematic collection of data and presentation of findings become near impossible. While the discussion thus far has hopefully convinced the reader of the necessity of systematic scientific inquiry and the importance of theory, we are left with the task of more precisely defining “theory.” Many scholars have attempted to chart these murky waters, while others have almost completely ignored it or offered very loose definitions (e.g., King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Those who have made valuable attempts at it include Johann Mouton (2001:198) and Berth Danermark, Mats Ekstrom, and Jan Karlsson (2001:115). The definition of theory that is most often cited, however, is that offered by Fred Kerlinger (1973) and more recently by Kerlinger and Howard Lee (2000). They state: “A theory is a set of interrelated constructs (concepts), definitions, and propositions that present a systematic view of phenomena by specifying relations among variables, with the purpose of explaining and predicting the phenomena” (2000:11). They further elaborate on this definition, providing greater detail about what each component means. As they continue: 1. A theory is a set of propositions consisting of defined and interrelated constructs (concepts); 2. A theory sets out the interrelations among a set of variables (constructs), and in so doing, presents a systematic view of the phenomena described by the variables; 3. A theory explains phenomena; it does so by specifying which variables are related to which variables and how they are related, thus enabling the researcher to predict from certain variables to certain other variables. (2000: 11)

In more simple terms, a good theory helps define concepts, explains how they are related to each other, and offers the ability to predict. This is the point where most social scientists get hung up, the reason being the difference between what is meant by prediction in the scientific world and in the everyday world. For the purposes of special operations, we suggest that, rather than prediction, we merely suggest that the outcomes of actions informed by sound theory are more predictable and controllable than those taken without a guiding theory. Theory aids our understanding of the operational environment but also helps us shape that same environment and move it toward a desired future environment.

A Theory of War and Theories of Warfare War is a social phenomenon. It has occurred since earliest recorded history, in one form or another. If war is understood as organized violence

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with a political aim, this can be traced back to our earliest ancestors. As a social phenomenon, it is amenable to analytical investigation and, if underlying patterns are observed, to theorizing. Such a theory would seek to describe the phenomenon, define its component parts, and explain its occurrence. Perhaps the most significant work on war is, of course, Carl von Clausewitz’s On War (1984). There has been some debate on the issue of whether or not von Clausewitz set out to develop a theory of war (Calhoun 2011:35). We take a strong stand on this point. Yes, he absolutely set out to write a theory of war as a phenomenon, as well as develop theoretical contributions to the engagement of warfare. This was certainly his intention, as clearly stated in the second chapter of On War. But to examine von Clausewitz as a theorist and his On War as offering a theory of war, one must understand two things related to the time in which he was writing and the paradigm under which he was working. The first is that “theory” (die Theorie) for von Clausewitz meant something other than what we mean by the word “theory” here. In the early nineteenth century, German die Theorie was defined as “view or understanding of general truths . . . in contrast to practice” or “an association of general truths of a manner or type.” These are the definitions offered by Johann Adelung in the authoritative German dictionary of von Clausewitz’s time (Adelung 1811: 577–578). This meaning of the word “theory” predates the meaning we are using here (as an explanation for an observed phenomenon). Von Clausewitz’s attack on theory, therefore, is an attack on theory qua “principles, rules, and even systems for the conduct of war” (von Clausewitz 1966:179)1 of the sort proposed by Jomini, not on theory as an explanation of a phenomenon based upon analysis. Second, von Clausewitz’s weltanschauung was powerfully affected by the work of Hegel, a German philosopher of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries who argued that the course of history was a back-and-forth between opposing structures, beginning with the thesis and then with the emergence of its antithesis, before the two meld into a synthesis (which will, in turn, become a new thesis). Without understanding this Hegelian dialectic and its centrality to von Clausewitz’s thinking, it is nearly impossible to understand what he is trying to express in the second chapter of On War regarding his critique of theory. With these two points of clarification, we can see how von Clausewitz was attempting to develop a theory of war and what that theory entailed. In his discussion on the “efforts to establish a positive doctrine” (Lehre; Howard and Paret confusingly translate this here as “theory”), we see clearly what he was against developing: a doctrine that prescribed

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“principles, rules, and even systems for the conduct of war” (von Clausewitz 1966:179). He sharply rejected this idea because, as he rightly recognized, war has no definite limits, while attempts to describe the phenomenon would be limited (he says “circumscribed”) by nature of a “synthesis,” here referring to his Hegelian method of reconciling theory and praxis. Here von Clausewitz is far ahead of his time. Although held back by his embrace of Hegelianism, he is right to accept that such a definition of theory would be limited by the fact that theories of phenomena are developed based upon phenomena that have already been observed (in this case, past wars). But not every kind of war has been fought (and of course, never will); thus any positive theory would be useless if not dangerous, for it would be prescribing methods for the conduct of war based solely upon lessons drawn from observed past wars, which could be wholly inapplicable to a future war. Adhering to “principles, rules, and . . . systems for the conduct of war” derived from previous wars and built into a doctrine to be employed in a new and different environment of warfare would be a folly and limit the commander by not allowing him to employ his “genius” in battle. Von Clausewitz then summarizes many of the prescripts for the conduct of war that at the time were being understood as “theory,” including superior numbers, basing, and interior lines. He recognizes these as valuable observations (they are progress in their analytical part), but when it came to the Hegelian synthesis, melding theory and praxis, such “precepts and rules” were “absolutely useless” (von Clausewitz 1984:136). After examining the chief components of war, he concludes that such a “positive theory” (again, one of “principles, rules, and . . . systems for the conduct of war”) is impossible. He then argues that “theory must be of the nature of observation, not of doctrine.” Here he investigates what he calls a “second opening for the possibility of a theory” of war, with theory as a “point of view” that does not prescribe directions for action. Rather, he argues that theory as an analytical investigation of military history can be used to develop an objective form of knowledge, which can then be brought over into the subjective employment of skill in action (von Clausewitz 1984:141). The type of theory von Clausewitz wants to develop is one that investigates the “subjects which constitute war,” breaks down the phenomenon into its component parts, and explains their properties and effects. If it can bring critical investigation to bear on the subject of war, then it has fulfilled its duties as a theory. It becomes, then, “a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books; it will light his way, ease his progress, train his judgment, and shield him from error” (von Clausewitz 1966:188). It is hard to refute that, while rejecting a positive

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theory of war, von Clausewitz is offering his readers a theory of war in line with our contemporary understanding of the role of theory in the social sciences. This leads us to perhaps a more contentious issue: defining von Clausewitz’s theory of war. This actually is not entirely pertinent to our argument, and would take a lengthy discussion to engage with any degree of adequacy. Very simply, however, von Clausewitz defined war as “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will” (1984:75). War, moreover, is always an instrument of policy, and politics governs what is possible and desirable in war. Politics not only determines the aim, but also limits it. This limitation prevents war from reaching its theoretical (again, in a Hegelian sense) extremes (von Clausewitz 1984:605–606). The crux of von Clausewitz’s theory of war for the social scientist is his assertion that “wars vary based upon their motives and the situations that give rise to them” (1984:88). We thus have a phenomenon defined (war), its relationship to other variables specified (war subordinate to politics), and an explanation for the variance in the occurrence of the phenomenon. Viewed this way, von Clausewitz offers a very parsimonious theory of war. Of course, von Clausewitz also included many other factors (fog, friction, genius, enmity, passion, etc.) in his theory of war, but their role in his theory is beyond the scope of our discussion here. By pointing to war as an extension of politics, von Clausewitz brilliantly captures the political and human dimensions of war, rather than the “scientific” and physical aspects that his contemporaries were focusing on. By subsuming war beneath politics, moreover, von Clausewitz further brought our attention to something that often confuses students of military theory—the fact that theories, as explanations of phenomena, are superordinate and subordinate to other theories that seek to explain phenomena at higher or lower levels of abstraction. Thus, while a theory of war may be subsumed by a theory of politics, theories of warfare, such as theories of air power, sea power, and special warfare, are subordinate to a more general theory of war. Theories of warfare, therefore, are subordinate to a theory of war, and are necessary to explain types of warfare, a task not within the purview of a theory of war (though von Clausewitz certainly tries to develop a few theories of warfare as well, including those related to tactics, the strength of the defense, etc.). Of importance for the current argument here, however, is the assertion that theories of warfare are necessary to explain the phenomena upon which they focus, phenomena below the level of war in its entirety. No one would seriously argue that Alfred Mahan’s theory of the influence of sea power upon history (1890), Guilio Douhet’s theory

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of air power (1942), or J. F. C. Fuller’s theory on armaments and tanks (1945) were of no value to the understanding of these phenomena, or that they offered a theory of war in its totality. Likewise, there should be little question that theories of special operations are necessary and useful as well.

Toward a Theory of Special Operations It is our hope that by this point we have convinced our readers of the necessity of pursuing theory construction in regard to special operations. Unlike theorizing in regard to air power, sea power, or armor, however, the attempt to develop a theory of special operations is highly problematic due to the fact that special operations include a very wide and varied combination of mission sets, ranging from direct action to humanitarian assistance. The category of special operations, therefore, from a social science perspective, is too broad perhaps to develop a single theory, certainly for the construction of a parsimonious theory. We believe this is where previous attempts at developing an overarching meta-theory of special operations have gone off course. This is because special operations are quite distinct (though interrelated) phenomena, not a single phenomenon. So a theory of special operations look more like Mahan’s theory of sea power and Douhet’s theory of air power than von Clausewitz’s theory of war, since like sea power and air power, special operations are a subset of war, a subphenomenon of a larger phenomenon. Additionally, even these theories of warfare were limited in their scope and did not attempt to develop an overarching theory of the entire relevant domain. Mahan’s theory of sea power was focused on decisive battles at sea, while Douhet focused on strategic bombing. Similarly, we believe it would be useful to develop a theory below that of special operations in their entirety. We believe one method of addressing this situation that holds promise is the distinction within current US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) doctrine between special warfare activities and surgical strike activities. Indeed the division of special operations into these subcategories was an attempt by USASOC to develop a useable construct for delineating between two rather distinct types of special operations. The construct makes sense for more than simply a planning model; it is useful from the theoretical perspective as well. The phenomena in which activities such as foreign internal defense, stability operations, and unconventional warfare are associated share much in common with each other, and less in common with surgical strike activities (though they may, of course, be used in combination). For our purpose here, therefore, which is to explore the value of theory for special operations, we will

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look at these as being related to distinct phenomena and therefore apply theory that can help explain these respective phenomena.

Special Warfare and Social Movement Theory Special warfare comprises “activities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small–unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment” (Department of the Army 2012b). These activities include irregular warfare, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, stability operations, and unconventional warfare. These are, of course, also discreet phenomena, but we believe they share a sufficient number of factors to make a theory of special warfare possible and valuable. There is also undeniable parsimony in this definition, as it firmly anchors the “specialness” of special warfare to the selected, trained, educated, and culturally-linguistically astute men and women who compose SOF. Here, however, the formulation of theory hits a roadblock, at least with respect to deductive reasoning. Are the lethal and nonlethal actions just mentioned so general and the environments alluded to so diverse that a unitary theory of special warfare is simply undesirable or even impossible? Fortunately, doctrine and history provide some additional insight into how US military institutions have constructed the meaning of special warfare by subsuming specific phenomena under its purview. The Department of the Army (2012b) clarifies that “special warfare is an umbrella term that represents special operations forces conducting combinations of unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and/or counterinsurgency through and with indigenous forces or personnel in politically sensitive and/or hostile environments.” Such a definition is conceptually close to the definition formulated by former secretary of the army Elvis Stahr in 1962, when he framed special warfare as “all military and paramilitary measures and activities related to unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, and psychological warfare” (Paddock 2002:2). In terms of history, Paddock’s excellent history of US Army special warfare outlines the psychological and guerrilla warfare origins of special warfare. Arguably, US Army Special Forces have conceived of special warfare as consisting of guerrilla warfare, insurgency (or revolutionary war), and their antitheses (Joslyn 2015:10–24). More recently, the role of special operations engagement in “phase zero” (preconflict phase) has been discussed and illuminated by Brian Petit (2013). These arguments are suggestive that special warfare, as cur-

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rently constructed by the US military, involves the phenomena of guerrilla warfare, psychological warfare, revolutionary war, civic action (or civil-military operations), and military engagement. At the center of special warfare theory therefore is the role of social groups who organize to bring about a change in political power, usually through violent means. The social scientific literature on this topic is vast, and its classic works have been studied for decades and have formed much of the basis of US Army special warfare doctrine, going back all the way to 1969. In its early days, however, there was significant confusion over certain terms and concepts. Doctrine alternated between “guerrilla warfare” and “insurgency” to explain such types of warfare, often confusing the two. But early on Huntington offered a very useful clarification of these phenomena, arguing that guerrilla warfare was a form of warfare, while insurgency and revolutionary war were types of war. Specifically, Samuel Huntington defined guerrilla warfare as “a form of warfare by which the strategically weak side assumes the tactical offensive in selected forms, times, and places,” while describing revolutionary war as “a struggle between a nongovernmental group and a government in which the latter attempts to destroy the former by some or all means at its command, and the nongovernmental group attempts by all the means at its command to replace the government in some or all of its territory” (1962:xv–xxii). Huntington’s definitions provide much needed theoretical distinction on a subject that, at least in the English-speaking world, is fraught with terminology that often confuses methods and outcomes. Rather than constructing a theory of special warfare on warfare itself, we believe a theory of special warfare should be based upon the description and explanation of how special operations forces plan, construct, and utilize functional networks of human relationships to effect the mobilization and demobilization of collective actors operating within political opportunity structures and cultural contexts in order to achieve political objectives. The formulation of such a theory faces two equally daunting challenges: it must account for how relatively limited means can be employed to achieve strategic ends, and also somehow unify diverse and often (purposefully) ambiguous SOF activities. We suggest here that the social science literature on contentious politics, a synthesis of revolutionary conflict and social movement theories, provides a rich point of departure for systematic and scientific discourse aimed at constructing a theory of engagement and special warfare. This argument is not tantamount to the exposition of a fully developed or formed theory of special warfare, but is instead intended to elicit critical discourse and inspire research that is purposefully systematic and

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thus—at least in comparison to the compilation of everyday special warfare knowledge—scientific (Hoyningen-Huene 2013:14–27). To that end, in this section we attempt to tie together the theoretical contributions of contentious politics with the activities of special warfare and outline how the theory of contentious politics might contribute to the development of special warfare theory. Revolutionary Conflict and Social Movement Theory From 1960 to the turn of the century, theories of revolutions and social movements were, with few exceptions, divided between scholars who alternately emphasized the explanatory primacy of structure, agency, and culture. The diffusion of social unrest that swept the world in the wake of World War II and reached its zenith in the turbulent 1960s led to the explosive development of cohesive sociological studies in revolutionary conflict theory (Gurr 1980:16). As social unrest diffused to the global North in the form of student protests, labor strikes, civil rights, feminist, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) movements, scholars also developed a distinguishable body of social movement theory. The structural schools of revolutionary conflict and social movements hold that the broad social, economic, and political constraints that contextualize actors are the key determinants of conflict and outcomes. The scholarly Marxist perspectives of revolutionary conflict offered by Barrington Moore Jr. and Eric Wolf and the political science perspective of Samuel Huntington are examples of early structuralist theories of contentious politics. The contributions of Theda Skocpol, Jack Goldstone, and Misagh Parsa are further examples of more recently developed structural theory. Structural approaches favor the use of comparative historical case studies and seek to distill general explanation from a small group of similar events. Many structural theorists have therefore sought to narrow their analyses by typifying contention as peasant revolution, social revolution, or great revolution. Criticisms of the structural school generally point out that these theories do not account for the strategic interaction of individual or collective agents. Furthermore, while they explain how revolutionary situations develop, they fail to account for revolutionary outcomes except in retrospect (Tilly 1978:193–194). The resource mobilization and rational choice approaches to revolutionary conflict and social movement theory have emphasized the agency of individuals or collectives in taking strategic action within contention. As such, resource mobilization and rational choice scholars have highlighted the structuralist gap between revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes (Tilly 1978:193–194). They have argued that

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while structure may indeed bound political opportunity, the motives and dynamics of agent behavior are the critical variables of contention (Tilly 1978:211–216). Resource mobilization and rational choice theorists have often employed a mix of case studies, game theory models, and quantitative analysis to support their arguments. Ted Gurr, Charles Tilly, and Stathis Kalyvas have each proposed variants of resource mobilization and rational choice theory. Critics of such theory have often referenced the classic economic “free rider” problem of collective action, the problem of preference falsification, and the failure of resource mobilization and rational choice arguments to account for socially constructed identity in their particular logics (Olson 1965:2). The third and most recently developed school of conflict and social movement theory is that of cultural framing. In contrast to scholarship that emphasizes macro patterns of structure or strategic behavior by collective or individual entities, the cultural framing perspective has sought to particularize conflict and protest by examining social construction processes at a micro level (Noakes and Johnson 2005:1). Cultural framing scholars have pointed out that neither individual dissatisfaction nor the strategic mobilization of resources by groups provides a full picture of how conditions and potential yield either revolutionary or social movement outcomes. They have argued that revolutions and social movements require people to believe that collective action will deliver a desired goal commensurate with the risks that such activity entails. In essence, they have maintained that identity-based and rational decisionmaking interact to mediate perceptions of opportunity and threat and inspire mobilization. This scholarship has suggested that analyzing cultural frames or framing processes yields insight into how constructed and communicated narratives resonate with particular audiences and inspire (or fail to inspire) collective action (Noakes and Johnson 2005:2). David Snow and William Gamson have provided complementary perspectives on different aspects of cultural framing. Criticisms of cultural framing have suggested that it is tantamount to ideology-based argumentation, and thus difficult to empirically measure and troublesome to generalize into theory (Oliver and Johnson 2005). Contentious Politics The scholarly field of contentious politics “brings together three familiar features of social life: contention, collective action, and politics” (Tilly and Tarrow 2007:7). This definition is ambitiously inclusive of nonlethal forms (strikes and social movements) and lethal forms (ethnic and religious conflict, civil war, and revolution) of nonroutine political action (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2009). At the center of contentious

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politics is political intercourse in which collective actors other than a government attempt to appropriate power and achieve specified claims. As conceived of by Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, contentious politics is defined as consisting of public, collective claim-making by collective actors on other collectives or on major political actors, when a government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a third party to claims (2001:5). The theory of contentious politics accepts the classic variables of structure, mobilization, and framing, but seeks to examine the way these factors interact and to identify similar cause-effect relationships that occur across a broad spectrum of contention. Contentious politics perceives continuity between forms of violent and nonviolent contention as divergent as the French Revolution and the American civil rights movement (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2009; see also McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001:28–32). To identify generalizable cause-effect relationships, contentious politics examines mechanisms or events that produce the same immediate effects over a broad range of circumstances. Combinations and sequences of mechanisms comprise processes that produce specified outcomes. Mechanisms and processes are located within episodes, bounded sequences of contentious interaction that can range from a series of protests or strikes to broad cycles of contention such as the Arab Spring (Tilly and Tarrow 2007:29, 36–38). McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow (2009:274–275) outline five mechanisms (but do not constrain additional mechanisms) that illustrate reoccurring causal relationships:

• Brokerage: The production of a new connection between previously unconnected or weakly connected sites of contention. • Identity shift and boundary formation: The formation of collective identity by previously unconnected individuals with previously disparate social identities. • Co-optation: The incorporation of a previously excluded political actor into some center of political power. • Diffusion: The spread of a contentious performance, issue, or interpretive frame from one site to another. • Repression/facilitation: Action by an authority that increases or decreases the actual or potential cost of claim-making.

Contentious politics seeks to contextualize forms of contention within political opportunity structures or features of regimes (regular relations among governments, established political actors, outside political actors, and challengers) and institutions that facilitate or repress opportunities, repertoires, and performances of contention and affect

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their likely outcomes (Tilly and Tarrow 2007:45). The theory suggests that levels of political freedom and governing capacity within a regime broadly correlate to the likelihood and manifestations of contention (such as a social movement or an armed insurgency) (McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow 2001:72–88). The theory also addresses contentious interaction principally through the mobilization and demobilization of collective actors and action. The process of mobilization is characterized by sequences of mechanisms such as identity shift, brokerage, the social appropriation of claim-making sites, and the diffusion of contentious repertoires that influence perceptions of opportunity for claim-making. Demobilization, on the other hand, is characterized by sequences that feature mechanisms of co-optation, defection, and increased repression. If special warfare (and engagement, as warfare may not always be an appropriate or palatable term for SOF activities in phase zero) aims to catalyze, empower, or restrain indigenous actors to achieve shared strategic goals, than the social science perspective of contentious politics may have much to offer efforts to construct a theory of special warfare. Indeed, we believe that a great deal of hard-earned everyday knowledge regarding special warfare is highly supportive of this argument. SOF adages regarding the importance of humans over hardware, building rapport, winning hearts and minds, and identifying and gaining the cooperation of the “g-chief” (guerrilla chief) all represent everyday special warfare knowledge aimed at building human networks to mobilize or demobilize collective actors in violent and nonviolent political contention. Perhaps special operations forces have actually evolved to address the key variables of contentious politics. SOF theater commands and organic intelligence capabilities observe and interpret diverse political opportunity structures. SOF units are capable of mobilizing or demobilizing collective actors as they build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations. SOF civil-military operations empower select collective actors and governments. SOF psychological operations interpret and amplify the resonance of cultural frames relative to collective action.

Surgical Strike, Relative Superiority, and Strategic Effect While a theory of special warfare must explain how limited means can be employed to achieve shared strategic goals, a theory of relative superiority must describe the means by which SOF can apply numerically inferior forces to succeed in conducting surgical strike operations. As defined in ADRP 3-05: Special Operations (Department of the Army 2012b), a surgical strike is “the execution of activities in a precise

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manner that employ special operations in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover or damage designated targets, or influence adversaries and threats.” Missions such as counterterrorism, direct action, and special reconnaissance (including advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities developed to support SOF) are at the heart of surgical strike. As David Maxwell has pointed out, the United States has “developed a surgical strike capability that is the envy of the world” (2013). As he continues, it “has a capability to find, fix, finish, exploit and analyze (F3EA) that has captured and killed numerous high value targets as well as disrupted and destroyed networks and cells conducting or threatening to conduct operations against U.S. interests” (2013). This ability, we believe, significantly alters the nature of the power in the international system, as other states seek to gain the status and capabilities that come from the possession of such elite units and their ability to conduct missions such as surgical strike. This has led to a veritable proliferation of special operations forces across the globe over the past twenty years, and is a trend that is likely to continue (Marsh and Kubiak 2013; Marsh 2017). Clearly there is a phenomenon of direct action missions of the type that Colin Gray characterized as “handfuls of heroes on desperate ventures” (1999a). But is there a body of theoretical literature that deals with such phenomena? In fact, one of the earliest theories of special operations, that of the theory of relative superiority, focuses almost explicitly on direct action missions that can be characterized as surgical strike operations. This theory, developed by then–lieutenant commander William McRaven in his book Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare—Theory and Practice (1996) posits that a numerically inferior number of special operators can achieve disproportionate results given that they achieve relative superiority at a specific place and time by virtue of surprise, speed, and preparedness. McRaven’s work is the first durable theory of direct action and was based upon careful research of case studies of several wartime raids by elite or specially selected troops. Through this research, he determined that if relative superiority is not achieved at the pivotal moment or diminishes over time and is ultimately lost, then the mission will likely fail. The “point of vulnerability” for any mission, he argued, is the point at which SOF forces meet enemy defenses or are detected in the approach to their objective. The “area of vulnerability” is a function of time spent in enemy territory beyond the point of vulnerability. The longer that special operations forces spend on the objective, the more likely they are to become fixed and overwhelmed by enemy numerical superiority.

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McRaven’s greatest contribution is perhaps the six principles of special operations through which planners and operators mitigate friction that would otherwise prevent mission success: simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose (1996:2). Applied properly, this theory should enable SOF to rapidly achieve a relative advantage against superior enemy positions by reducing the influence of friction for long enough to accomplish the mission. At its core, McRaven’s theory of relative superiority masterfully translates the Western tradition of maneuver warfare into a functional framework that SOF can use to apply inferior numbers but nonetheless amass combat power at a decisive point to overwhelm an enemy force. In essence, by employing cunning, achieving surprise, unifying forces in time, and concentrating forces in space, joint SOF can project temporary combined arms maneuver logic in places inaccessible to the massing of conventional combat power (von Clausewitz 1966:book 3). The long-term and big-picture utility of individual SOF surgical strikes aimed at sabotage, decapitation, or hostage rescue are often hotly debated. After all, in the context of a general war or even a global “long war” against violent extremists, can a single successful tactical mission really produce lasting strategic results? Operation Neptune Spear, the surgical strike operation that resulted in the death of Osama Bin Laden and dealt a serious blow to the al-Qaeda organization, can certainly be said to have had strategic consequences, but can even an operation of that significance have long-term strategic effects? How about others, not just those of SOF employed beyond US borders but also those of foreign SOF attempting to achieve their own strategic objectives? Finally, are we on the verge of a phase transition in the world of warfare and international relations where such strikes may increase and become as commonplace as proxy wars were during the Cold War? An alternative approach to surgical strike operations is that offered by James Kiras, who sees the value in such operations not in any single successful mission, but in the ability of sustained, longterm special operations campaigns to erode the moral and material will of an adversary. In Special Operations and Strategy, Kiras asserts that special operations “consist of numerous small-scale activities that appear individually insignificant but improve strategic performance by eroding the material resources and moral resolve of an adversary cumulatively, in conjunction with or while supporting conventional forces” (2006:115). This erosion of will and material is what ultimately leads to the enemy’s capitulation. Kiras is here clearly focusing on surgical strike type missions, not on special warfare missions such as foreign internal defense. This is clear by how he describes

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special operations as “unorthodox tactical actions for strategic effect” that exploit vulnerabilities to compensate for their numerical inferiority (2006:113). This success despite numerical inferiority is explained in the concept of relative superiority discussed earlier. “The challenge in special operations is to do the impossible not once but repeatedly, to throw and keep an adversary off balance and continue to inflict moral and material damage out of proportion to the scale of their actions” (Kiras 2006:113). This focus on moral and material attrition places little faith in achieving quick and decisive effects by attacking centers of gravity or critical vulnerabilities; instead it advocates a steady erosion of the adversary’s will and capabilities. Unlike a strategy of annihilation, that of attrition is a “non-linear approach to achieving one’s political goals: it is characterized by shifts between battle and maneuver” and thus is a strategy of choice much like that of an insurgent (Kiras 2006:66). Yet another, although quite similar, approach is offered by Colin Gray in his Explorations in Strategy (1996). Here Gray describes the contribution of special operations to campaign success in terms of two “master claims.” He asserts that the strategic utility of special operations lies in their ability to “achieve significant results with limited forces” and to “expand the options available to political and military leaders” (1996:168, 174). These concepts can be described as economy of force and expansion of choice. Whether leveraging partners and proxies in a foreign internal defense or unconventional warfare campaign or conducting surgical strike globally, special operations often achieve results that far exceed the resources committed. Similarly, by virtue of their small footprint and discreet, precise, and scalable nature, special operations provide decisionmakers with options they would not otherwise have, particularly in areas outside declared theaters of armed combat. This could be conducting hostage rescue in a foreign country or setting conditions for the success of potential future operations. These claims are useful for understanding the value of special operations in achieving campaign objectives and for communicating to decisionmakers the strategic utility of special operations within the range of military options. While applicable not only to surgical strike operations, Gray’s theoretical insights, being equally applicable to special warfare, certainly warrant inclusion in any theory of surgical strike.

Conclusion Robert Spulak, in his A Theory of Special Operations (2007), posits that special operations are activities that achieve strategic effect but

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are so laden with von Clausewitzian friction that they are too risky for conventional forces to undertake. He further argues that their disproportionate number of high performers and unique characteristics is what allows SOF to contend with this friction. While we applaud such contributions to the development of a special operations theory, our purpose here has been to attempt to contribute to theory development at a level below that of special operations in their entirety by focusing on the doctrinal division between surgical strike and special warfare. We believe this is useful because special operations constitute a very broad and diverse range of activities, from kinetic action to humanitarian assistance—in other words, quite different phenomena. The search for an overarching theory of special operations, therefore, is highly problematic. Putting aside the question of whether a theory of special operations is even necessary, our emphasis here has been on the argument that theories are required to explain phenomena and related concepts, so what we need are theories that explain more specific phenomena, such as surgical strike and special warfare operations. Additionally, we have tried to illustrate and survey some of the excellent research that is out there, either explicitly or as composite aspects of other theories (e.g., theories of unconventional warfare as correlates of social movement theory). Since special warfare both leverages insurgency to meet strategic objectives (unconventional warfare) and assists allies in fighting insurgency (foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency), it is useful to have a theoretical understanding of insurgency or social movements. Social movement theory offers a vast body of knowledge to the SOF planner to understand the operational environment, attempt to shape that environment, and achieve a desired future environment. Likewise, the theory of relative superiority describes a means by which SOF can apply numerically inferior forces to succeed in conducting surgical strikes, again aiding the SOF planner in their efforts. For a military planner (whether SOF or conventional force), a good theory provides an understanding of phenomena, the ability to predict outcomes, and a degree of control or perhaps influence. As quoted earlier, von Clausewitz saw great value in such theories, as they became “a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books; it will light his way, ease his progress, train his judgment, and shield him from error” (1966:188). In simple terms, he argued that “theory disciplines the mind of the commander” (179). We believe, in today’s global operational and planning environment, theory aids not only the commander but their staff as well as they seek to translate the commander’s intent into plans and orders for the conduct of operations.

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1. The reader will notice that we switch between the authoritative German edition of von Clausewitz, that of Werner Hahlweg (1966), and the popular English translation of Michael Howard and Peter Paret (1984). We use the latter in each case in which we feel that the translation is adequate; where we disagree we use our own translation based upon Hahlweg.

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4 The Human Factor Kevin L. Parker

Is there an appropriate term to describe the humanness of war? If so, what is it: domain, dimension, element, factor, component, psyche, terrain, or something else? In 2013, the top military leaders of the US Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Command released a white paper amplifying the importance of humans in “winning the clash of wills.” With their signatures, they chartered the Strategic Landpower Task Force to, among other tasks, examine the concept of a human domain and inform whether to adopt it into doctrine (Odierno, Amos, and McRaven 2013). The question “Should there be a doctrinal human domain?” can be answered in one word: no. In fact, the question itself seems to have faded in most circles as each of the leaders who commissioned the Strategic Landpower Task Force has since retired. But examining the subject produced thoughtful debate and illuminated opportunities to improve joint doctrine. To this end, the Department of Defense (DoD) needs to develop precise, descriptive terminology for the many facets of humanness in war. More important, the DoD should strive to master these facets, because they are fundamental to the prevention, conduct, and outcome of wars. Settling on joint terminology would be a good first step. The Department of Defense should not adopt the term human domain into doctrine. The existing DoD-recognized domains—air, cyberspace, land, maritime, and space—all define distinct environments in or through which activities and military operations occur. A human is not a separate physical environment independent of the other domains, because people are constantly on land, at sea, or in the air or space. 47

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Still, some studies consider the human domain as the foundation of the other domains or as transcending them (Hoffman and Davies 2013; Metz 2013). This logic mirrors cyberspace, which has components residing within all the other domains. Yet cyberspace warrants its own term, because warfighting activities occur within it while also being uniquely unbounded as they flow across the other domains. Humans also move across the other domains, but when discussing warfighting, adding human is superfluous. For example, human war is an unnecessary term, since it is hard to imagine a war that is not human at its core—except in the realm of science fiction. Activities and military operations associated with war and strategy are inherently human and do not need definition as such, especially as a domain. However, there are certain human-related terms that are necessary. Human terrain expresses a worthy concept but is not the best term. Army leaders in Afghanistan and Iraq, recognizing “human terrain [as] the decisive terrain” in counterinsurgency, created human terrain teams (Petraeus 2010:334–404). This initiative leveraged experts from the social sciences to provide combat forces “sociocultural knowledge” of relevant populations and key leaders (Lamb et al. 2013:21–22; Sims 2015). Such knowledge is so important in counterinsurgency operations that the counterinsurgency manual of the Army and Marine Corps devotes much of its chapter on intelligence to society, social structure, institutions, norms, values, and the like (Department of the Army 2006:3-1–3-19). Applying the analogy of terrain to these human aspects of warfare is somewhat helpful due to its conceptual parallels with key terrain, decisive points, and maneuver. However, the analogy is weak when applied to other terrestrial actions, like seize, deny, and hold. Rather than rely on an inexact analogy to represent such an important concept, the DoD should make better use of an existing, more descriptive term. The term human factors, already codified in doctrine, describes “the physical, cultural, psychological, and behavioral attributes of an individual or group that influence perceptions, understandings, and interventions” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2016:105). Joint doctrine identifies human factors as part of the intelligence function’s joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment. Specifically, sociocultural analysis—“the study, evaluation, and interpretation of information about adversaries and relevant actors through the lens of group-level decision making to discern catalysts of behavior and the context that shapes that behavior”—“includes the systematic mapping of human factors affecting a leader’s or key actor’s decision-making influences” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2013a:I-17–I-18). With this meaning and use, human factors is an adequately descriptive term, is already codified in

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joint doctrine, and covers the ground intended by human terrain. But there is more to humanness in war. The Army has developed the term human dimension. Joint doctrine does not define the term but does use it to describe one of many dimensions of the operating environment (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011b:III-30, 2013b:II-5, III-6, 2013c:III-2). Army doctrine uses the term differently and identifies the human dimension as “the cognitive, physical, and social components of Soldier, Army Civilians, leader, and organizational development and performance essential to raise, prepare, and employ the Army in unified land operations” (Department of the Army 2014b:33). This definition has two major limitations. First, it only applies inwardly to US Army personnel. Such a focused view is important to maximize Army capabilities but does not address myriad other human groups involved in conflict. If war is a clash of wills, certainly an adversary’s human dimension warrants attention (Odierno, Amos, and McRaven 2013; von Clausewitz 1976:149). Other unaddressed groups include the joint and coalition forces alongside whom Army personnel fight. The Army’s human dimension leaves out a host of human entities in warfare and strategy, including “friendly and allied (blue), host (green), and adversarial (red) forces (including political and military decision makers), as well as the local populations (white)” (Hoffman and Davies 2013). The second limitation of human dimension is that the term human factors adequately covers most of its definition. The attributes or components named are almost an exact match. Where human dimension extends its definitional reach is by applying those attributes to a purpose—to raise, prepare, and employ the Army in unified land operations. The limitations of human dimension make it insufficient and unnecessary, but its extension beyond human factors warrants exploration. Building on the foundation of human factors, human capital provides a better description of the concept attempted by the Army’s term human dimension. In business, capital refers to any form of wealth employed or capable of being employed in the production of more wealth. Rather than wealth, the DoD’s currencies are military force at the operational level and power at the strategic level. If human factors describe the raw elements, then human capital applies those elements toward an objective. The difference is similar to intellectual aptitude versus intellectual capital, which considers how to apply the potential of raw brainpower to creating economic value. Developing an organization’s human capital would cover recruiting, training, educating, exercising, building personal and organizational resilience, speeding decision processes, and similar human-centric activities. The term human

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capital is equally applicable to any population group or organization. Since it overcomes the limitations of human dimension, the DoD should clearly define human capital and write it into joint doctrine. The term human domain should fade away, but its emphasis should not. Proponents argue that codifying its use would provide two benefits. First, it would “make the U.S. military more effective by reinforcing the primacy of human effects during campaigns and operations” (Metz 2013). Indeed, the human effect is of primary importance in war and strategy. Von Clausewitz not only called war a “clash of major interests,” but also included humans as central actors in all three components of his “paradoxical trinity” (von Clausewitz 1976:89, 149). Thomas Schelling further framed conflict within the realm of human decisions. He described deterrence as passive, leaving the decision to act first with the opponent (Schelling 1966:70). Although more active, his description of war is still about human decisions: “War is always a bargaining process . . . [by] actions rather than words” (Schelling 1966:142). With this view, military commanders employ the six joint functions solely to produce strategic decisions made by humans. To emphasize the essential humanness of war and strategy does not require a new term; it takes leadership and a commitment to keep the subject at the forefront of conversation and study in education and the operational joint force. The second benefit that human domain proponents claim is that institutionalizing it as a domain would “provide a framework for investment, leader development, doctrine development, training, education, wargaming, and experimentation” (Metz 2013). Again, leadership rather than a label is key. An identifiable program with a catchy label might gain attention, budget, and resources initially, but when top leaders sustain their weight behind any issue, it tends to get traction. The leadership interest in and development of the “profession of arms” concept over the past several years provides a good example. Institutionalizing a human domain and developing programs centered on it would provide specific attention to the issue, but it would also set it apart as something different. Rather than make it unique, the DoD should drive the joint staff and services to fully explore human factors in all of their concepts. Triggering a review of joint and service doctrine would further discussion and emphasis, and it would likely spur improvements. The publication Joint Operation Planning (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011b) is ripe for change to incorporate the humanness of war. Specifically, it describes two ways of achieving objectives: defeat mechanisms and stability mechanisms. The latter, designed to affect civilians toward attaining peaceful conditions, include compel, control, influence, and support. Each of these actions focuses on the psychological

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reaction of the population. In contrast, the defeat mechanisms of destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, and isolate never address the adversary’s psychological reaction. Defeat mechanisms are meant for combat, so the lack of attention to adversary feelings is understandable when trying to “kill, destroy, or capture by all means available” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011b:III-29–III-31). However, these mechanisms, as written, leave no room for considering how to create conditions where the enemy chooses to stop fighting. It may not be necessary to carry this to the extreme of Sun Tzu’s “acme of skill”—to win without fighting (Sun 1963:77). But considering a desertion rate of up to 30 percent by Iraqi ground troops subject to allied air attacks during Desert Storm, this is a concept worth pursuing (Lambeth 2000:128). Reviewing and revising defeat mechanisms with this in mind would be consistent with joint doctrine’s conditional preference for disruption, rather than attrition, which generally is more costly and time-consuming. Keeping human factors at the forefront of conversation across all services and domains would also help avoid unnecessarily constraining the concept with a limited point of view. Special operations forces have embraced the concept of a human domain (Special Operations Command 2013a:5). Since a large portion of the mission set of special operations forces (SOF) involves working with foreign partners and populations, a human focus is natural and beneficial. However, SOF’s written references to the human domain are almost exclusively in the context of population-centric conflicts (Special Operations Command 2013a:5; Army Special Operations Command 2014:15). SOF’s emphasis on human factors is good, but any downplaying of the importance of human factors in conventional operations is not helpful, because human factors are just as applicable to conventional conflicts (Hoffman and Davies 2013). Likewise, human factors are not the exclusive territory of land forces. The desired effect of an adversary’s decision to cease fighting can result from action in any domain. Thus, each component should constantly evaluate how to better create this effect from or through its domain, as well as in conjunction with joint operations from and through other domains. Counter to the arguments of several land power advocates, just because land power puts friendly forces in close, personal contact with people does not make human factors more important to it at the strategic level. What is important for land forces is to identify the unique ways close, personal contact by friendly forces affect human factors and follow-on decisions of adversaries and relevant groups. Regarding information operations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide a foothold for exploring this concept, as this publication addresses the

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cognitive dimension, target audiences, key decisionmakers, and relationships among information, knowledge, and influence (2014a:I-1–I8). It describes a framework where the “physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions of the information environment provide access points for influencing target audiences” and employs “informationrelated capabilities to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of target audiences to create a desired effect to support achievement of an objective” (I-5, II-1). This framework deserves expansion beyond the information environment to all domains and capabilities, not just to influence decisionmaking abilities, but also to drive adversaries toward decisions favorable to US objectives.

Conclusion Defining a doctrinal human domain remains unnecessary, but the DoD does need to embrace human factors as the key to success in war and strategy. Developing a force that can destroy something is important; however, knowing what to destroy or if destruction is even helpful is harder. Each proponent of a domain needs to not only master its tactical tasks but also anticipate the unique effects operations in its domain are most likely to create. Without this mastery and knowledge of human factors, US joint forces will default to the less preferred method of attrition—at great human cost.

5 The Resurgence of Special Warfare Homer W. Harkins

In August 2012, the US Army published its Army Doctrine Reference Publication on special operations (Department of the Army 2012b). A principal focus of this publication is the idea that Army special operations can be understood as involving the two mutually supporting critical capabilities of special warfare and surgical strike. This chapter will focus on special warfare, a somewhat paradoxical concept. It is paradoxical because, despite the fact that the term special warfare has existed for decades in the jargon of special operations (e.g., both the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School and the US Naval Special Warfare Command share it in their title), prior to this publication on special operations it was largely absent from US military doctrine. What are the origins of special warfare and what aspects of warfare has it referred to in the past? Why is it reemerging now and being formally integrated into US Army doctrine? Answering these questions might better link special warfare into the lexicon of terms and definitions that guide special operations. This chapter provides information that partially answers these questions and offers synthesis of the concept of special warfare into the context of special operations and joint doctrine. The Origins of Special Warfare An excellent source on the history of special warfare is U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins by Alfred Paddock Jr. (2002). Paddock served on active duty from 1957 to 1988, including combat tours in Laos and Vietnam with the US Army Special Forces. His research into special warfare can be traced back to at least 1973, when he attended the US Army War 53

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College. His vision of special warfare blends special forces capabilities with psychological warfare, civic action, and intelligence to provide capability closely linked to the concept of unconventional warfare that emerged in US military doctrine in the early 1950s. Special warfare made its original appearance in connection to special operations in 1956, when the US Army Psychological Warfare Center was renamed the US Army Center for Special Warfare. According to Paddock, the new center focused its efforts on psychological and unconventional warfare. Later this focus expanded to include counterinsurgency, thus including within special warfare concepts the capability to both stabilize and destabilize political regimes. Special warfare was given coherence in 1962 when then–secretary of the Army, Elvis Stahr Jr., defined it as “a term used by the Army to embrace all military and paramilitary measures and activities related to unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, and psychological warfare” (Paddock 2002:2). Interest in special warfare reached the Executive Office of the President in the early 1960s. According to Francis Kelly (1963), President Kennedy clearly understood the importance of special warfare. In June 1962 at the US Military Academy he said: “This is another type of warfare—new in its intensity, ancient in its origin—war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins—war by ambush instead of by combat, by infiltration instead of aggression—seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him.” While not specifically mentioning special warfare, President Kennedy was clearly describing something very similar to it. Through National Security Action Memorandum 56, President Kennedy directed an evaluation of possible future “paramilitary and unconventional warfare requirements.” This memorandum jumpstarted coordination between the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to determine ways to meet these requirements. Recognizing the importance of civil affairs in special warfare, the Alliance for Progress, essentially a Marshall Plan for Latin America, was created in 1961 and authorized $20 billion of funding. According to the Department of State, this was done to counter Soviet and Cuban influence in Latin America. Additionally, Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act on September 4, 1961, creating the US Agency for International Development (USAID). This organization soon had over 10,000 direct hires and was an important player in pacification programs in Vietnam (Andrade and Willbanks 2006). The CIA also prepared to engage in special warfare through the development of its nascent paramilitary capability. A CIA-managed

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effort in Laos in the 1960s and 1970s was executed to interdict North Vietnamese resupply efforts. The CIA undertook this effort in large measure to avoid the onus of official US military intervention in neutral Laos (Best and Feickert 2009). Other CIA paramilitary activity is reported to have occurred during the Cold War in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Somalia. This capability again manifested in 2001 when CIA paramilitary operatives entered Afghanistan ahead of US special operations forces (SOF) to facilitate link-up with Northern Alliance forces, secure helicopter landing zones, and guide SOF teams (Stone 2003). The US military also responded. On September 25, 1961, the green beret, which President Kennedy called “a symbol of excellence, a badge of courage, a mark of distinction in the fight for freedom” (Kennedy 1962), was designated as the exclusive headdress of US Army Special Forces, an organization directly linked to special warfare. The president’s personal involvement reflected his interest in special warfare. The Navy established Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) Teams One and Two in January 1962. Finally, on April 19, 1962, the Air Force established the Special Air Warfare Center at Eglin Air Force Base. Unfortunately, this activity did not produce US military doctrine specific to special warfare. But by 1962 enough had been written and said on the subject to provide a basic conceptual understanding. It clearly included unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, and psychological warfare. Civic action and intelligence played important roles. It involved paramilitary forces and sought to psychologically exhaust the enemy rather than destroy them. The involvement of foreign civilian populations required effort from organizations from the diplomatic, informational, and economic realms. Considering this, a possible definition for special warfare produced in 1962 might have been: military and paramilitary measures and activities related to unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, and psychological warfare that focus on controlling and influencing civilian populations and in which political goals are achieved by employing all sources of power to defeat the enemy through psychological exhaustion. Using this proposed definition, a comparison can be made with the definition of special warfare presented in the Army Doctrine Reference Publication on special operations (Department of the Army 2012b): “the execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small–unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment.” To begin, both definitions specifically describe special warfare

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as including activity beyond direct combat. Both include a psychological dimension and involve indigenous populations. Neither definition limits special warfare to a specific physical domain. There is one major difference: the 2012 definition emphasizes that special warfare is conducted by a “specially trained and educated force,” a constraint absent from the proposed earlier definition. Intuitively, special warfare occurs within or in support of war. According to Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, war is “socially sanctioned violence to achieve a political purpose.” There are many ways to wage war. Currently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (2016), in its Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines twelve types of warfare: amphibious, directed-energy, chemical, electronic, irregular, mine, naval special warfare, navigation, nondestructive electronic, surface, unconventional, and undersea. Twenty other types of warfare, including special warfare, are mentioned without definition. This list of thirty-two types of warfare is not exhaustive. For example, in the 1950s, guerrilla warfare was a common US military doctrinal term. As late as 1991, it was included in FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations, but it is no longer mentioned in the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. On the surface, each of the types of warfare can be thought of as an activity (e.g., antisubmarine operations) that occurs someplace (e.g., at sea). Where warfare occurs is often discussed in the context of operational domains. These generally include land, sea, air, space, cyber, and human. Some have included the information domain (Kozloski 2009). Some types of warfare occur exclusively or predominantly in one domain. For example, undersea warfare occurs in the sea domain. Other types of warfare occur in several domains. Using this structure as a guide, an understanding of special warfare can be enhanced by determining the types of activity inherit to it and where it occurs. Using the definition in the Army Doctrine Reference Publication on special operations (Department of the Army 2012b), one can see that special warfare activity includes lethal and nonlethal actions, small-unit tactics, and building and fighting alongside indigenous combat formations. By considering the proposed definition of special warfare offered earlier, this list of activities expands to include military and paramilitary measures and activities related to unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, and psychological warfare. As for where special warfare occurs, the determining factor is its relationship to indigenous populations. While one could envision special warfare activities in all domains, the high importance of the human domain is emphasized through the need to understand and influence indigenous popu-

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lations. To facilitate this, preparation for special warfare includes language training and cultural education. The Army Doctrine Reference Publication on special operations helps broaden the understanding of special warfare. It expands the list of special warfare activities from the three that Secretary of the Army Stahr mentioned in 1962, specifically unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, and psychological warfare, to include foreign internal defense, stability operations, special reconnaissance, and security force assistance. This implies that the range of conflict in which special warfare is utilized has expanded. The reference also emphasizes the importance of the human domain when it states that special warfare is executed through collaborative efforts with indigenous populations and involves the ability to operate within the population addressing sociocultural factors. This reference also emphasizes that special warfare builds and strengthens friendly networks in the execution of unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense. The emphasis in special warfare on influencing populations links it very closely to the concept of irregular warfare, which is one of two basic forms of warfare, along with traditional warfare, recognized in JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, dated March 25, 2013. It is also one of the twelve types of warfare defined in the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Irregular warfare is defined as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s).” The operating concept for the Army’s Special Forces (Army Special Operations Command 2014) recognizes the connection between special warfare and irregular warfare. As context, it identifies the Russian incursion in Ukraine, the activities of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, social unrest and civil war on parts of the African continent, and China’s use of coercive influence against its neighbors as current examples of irregular threats that Army SOF are uniquely positioned to counter through special warfare. But irregular warfare involves activity beyond special warfare and, although the linkage of special warfare is arguably strongest to irregular warfare, one could envision special warfare occurring within traditional warfare (e.g., Army SOF and CIA support to the Peshmerga in Iraq in 2003) and even in operations other than war such as peacekeeping operations or support for law enforcement confronting extremely violent criminal organizations. From this it is clear why special warfare has reemerged and is now being formally integrated into US Army doctrine. While special warfare is a type of warfare the United States has conducted for over fifty years, activity that falls under the current Army definition of special

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warfare has been particularly salient in the past couple of decades. In particular, Army SOF special warfare activity has been executed extensively in Afghanistan and Iraq. A broad array of tactics, techniques, and procedures have been developed that should be formally captured for future generations to master and rapidly reemploy. In preparation for this eventuality, special warfare is now being described in depth in US Army doctrine.

Integrating Special Warfare into Military Doctrine Considering the history of special warfare, the term should by now be well integrated into US military doctrine. But it is not. For example, while the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms mentions the term special warfare, it does not define it. The term does not seem to be accepted by the joint force, or at least a joint definition has not emerged. What are some of the issues that might be complicating such integration? One potential issue may be the disconnection between the Army definition for special warfare and the joint definition of naval special warfare. Naval special warfare is defined by the DoD dictionary as “a naval warfare specialty that conducts special operations with an emphasis on maritime, coastal, and riverine environments using small, flexible, mobile units operating under, on, and from the sea.” This definition shares little with the Army definition of special warfare. For example, there is nothing in naval special warfare about building and fighting alongside indigenous combat formations. And while it may take a specially trained force to conduct naval special warfare, the need for a deep understanding of cultures and foreign-language skills is not emphasized. There is nothing in the definition that predominately places naval special warfare in either traditional or irregular warfare. There is nothing in the definition that describes the activities undertaken. In short, the two definitions simply describe different types of warfare. Another issue might be that current US Army doctrine seems to limit special warfare to a select group of Army units. Does this suggest that only the Army conducts special warfare? If so, the concept runs counter to almost thirty years of effort developing joint operations capabilities within the US military. Even within the Army, by definition, only a few units execute special warfare. The overwhelming majority of soldiers simply are not provided the education necessary to obtain a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations. This runs counter to the newest SOF truth that most special operations require non-SOF assistance.

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Finally, the Army leadership is arguably moving in the direction of developing a special warfare-like capability. In the Army’s 2015 operation concept, the Army chief of staff, General Ray Odierno, writes about the need for the Army to understand economic, cultural, and political environments. The concept of regionally aligned conventional forces is discussed. This blending of capabilities may blur the line between special warfare and other Army capabilities needed to confront modern complex and hybrid threats. It also risks absorbing special warfare into other programs used to develop partner capability such as theater security cooperation and traditional security assistance. Without stacking out in doctrine where special warfare ends and other activity closely linked to it begins, it risks losing its uniqueness. This is simultaneously occurring at a time when the US military’s interest in irregular warfare is waning. For example, while irregular warfare was mentioned twentyfour times in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, it was not mentioned at all in the 2010 and 2014 reports. This rapid disassociation with nontraditional warfare is normal for the United States after extended periods of irregular engagement. Prudence dictates that advocates strive to delineate the unique and ongoing role of special warfare or risk having the concept go dormant until emergency once again calls for it. What could be done to better integrate the Army concept of special warfare into joint doctrine? A first step might be to review the definition of naval special warfare. SEAL units have gained extensive experience in Afghanistan and Iraq building and fighting alongside indigenous combat formations. They participate in foreign internal defense missions around the world. Perhaps the definition of naval special warfare should be enhanced to include this activity. The view of Army participation in special warfare should be expanded to better integrate support elements. The Army Doctrine Reference Publication on special operations should clearly explain that special warfare is conducted by task forces composed of Army, joint, and often interagency elements. But the distinction between special warfare and traditional security assistance and theater security cooperation must be maintained. Thus, whether or not current Army security force assistance efforts are maintained, the essential and enduring role of special operations forces in such efforts can be protected. Current efforts by US Army Special Operations Command leadership to delineate special warfare from other forms of warfare should be continued.

Conclusion The United States has participated in special warfare for decades. The concept is closely linked to SOF. Special warfare differs from conventional

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warfare principally in its emphasis on the human domain and the importance of psychological operations. It occurs across the spectrum of conflict and in both traditional and irregular warfare. Organizations closely linked to special warfare, and specially trained and educated to execute it, include the US Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and those capable of conducting psychological operations. To be successful, special warfare efforts should cooperate with other military organizations, particularly those with intelligence and security assistance capacity, and must be adequately supported by the joint force. Special warfare efforts must also collaborate with other government organizations, quite often through the auspices of diplomatic missions. Special warfare has been a tool used by the United States in conflicts around the world. Future SOF warriors will continue to engage in it. To be successful, it is critically important that these professionals understand this other type of war.

6 Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare Dan Cox

The concept of terrorism is ill-defined and deeply contested. There are political as well as philosophical reasons behind the difficulty in defining the term. Karunya Jayasena summed up the problem best, stating that “for centuries, the term terrorism has been abused and misused, largely due to a lack of agreement over the precise meaning of the concept” (2011:21). Although most scholars and counterterrorism and counterinsurgency practitioners agree that a universally agreed-upon definition would be beneficial to both the study and practice of countering terror threats, this chapter is not intended to provide the definitive answer to this definitional problem. Instead, I consider the implications of defining terrorism, state sponsorship, and collateral damage when these are juxtaposed against the concept of unconventional warfare. When one considers terrorism in this context, special operators can become conscious or inadvertent facilitators of terrorist activities. If the special operators are purposefully engendering terrorism, then they become the arm of state sponsorship for such terrorist acts. If the special operators have no intention or even no desire for their insurgent warfighting trainees to commit acts of terrorism and they occur anyway, then an interesting new brand of collateral damage is created that needs to be properly identified and understood. I explore these ideas in this chapter, building an argument first by looking at the contentious definition of terrorism as a foundation. This is followed by a brief but specific examination of state sponsorship of terrorist activities. Next, unconventional warfare is defined and linked to the concept of terrorism. Prior to this occurring, unconventional warfare 61

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had to be parsed from the broader notion of irregular warfare. Finally, the interaction between these terms and activities is explored and conclusions and implications not only for the definition of terrorism but also the practice of unconventional warfare are offered.

The Contentious Definition of Terrorism Despite the 9/11 attacks on the United States, the continued relevance and spread of the al-Qaeda threat, and the general rise of terrorism as a nearly ubiquitous insurgency tactic over the past four decades, there is still no universally or even nearly universally agreed-upon definition of terrorism. The situation can be as dire within a state as between states. In the United States, for example, no two major federal agencies share a definition of terrorism. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has even split the concept into twenty different very specific definitions to deal with specific law enforcement issues but even they have failed to provide a more overarching definition that could be shared between agencies. There is a similar if even more convoluted problem at the international level. Sami Zeidan argued early on that there is no general international definition because the “political value of the term currently prevails over its legal one” (2004:491). It is important to have an agreed-upon international definition, for no useful international cooperation to combat terrorism can occur without a universal definition. Recognition of this definitional problem is not new. Ariel Merari argued over twenty years ago that there was a pressing need to define terrorism precisely in order that scholarly research may progress. Still, he found that the discrepancy in the definition of the term terrorism had led to terrorism being defined broadly by some as “violent acts of groups against states, for others—state oppression of its own citizens, and for still others—warlike acts of states against other states” (1993:213). The difficulty in finding scholarly agreement is exemplified to no greater degree than through the work of Alex Schmid and A. J. Longman (2005), who exhaustively examined definitions of terrorism in an effort to find common themes that could be used in a core definition. Alas, they too found the field of definitions offered to be almost too vast to navigate and commonalities between definitions hard to discern. The difficulty in finding agreement on what is an essentially contested concept revolves around several competing factors. First, there is a conflict in worldviews that is unlikely to be overcome. The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) drew a distinction between types of terrorism that is strictly politically and ideologically motivated. In 2001, the OIC declared the 9/11 attacks on the United States to be illegal terrorist acts. However, in the same communiqué they were adamant in

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arguing that the right to self-determination of the Lebanese and Palestinian people under unjust rule and the subsequent violence that was manifested by proponents of self-determination could not be construed as terrorist in nature (Organization of the Islamic Conference 2011). The OIC thus made a false distinction between obvious acts of terrorist violence based on ideological biases. It is unlikely that staunch supporters of the Palestinian separatist movement or Hezbollah will ever agree to a neutral definition of terrorism, but this ideological bias should not hamper the quest for such a definition. Second, there is a conflict in scholarship in which various scholars have engaged in intellectual parochialism to serve either their own research agenda or their own ideological bent. Mark Juergensmeyer has added greatly to the field of study with his exposition on religious violence and terrorism, but he did a great disservice to the definition of terrorism when he added the confounding notion of religious terrorism, arguing that most of the terrorist acts that have been carried out in the past few decades are religiously motivated (2000:4–6). This is unhelpful to any attempt to define terrorism because it unnecessarily constrains the definition. I understand that Juergensmeyer was simply attempting to explain to the reader the justifiably narrow focus of his research, but it would have been far more helpful if he had noted he was studying a subset of terrorism rather than almost dismissing the notion of terrorism altogether while simultaneously attempting to pigeonhole it into a specific category (2000:8). Robert Pape adds a particular brand of confusion to the definitional quagmire by offering three distinct types of terrorism without offering a usable broad definition that could serve as an overarching guide to scholars, practitioners, and policymakers. He breaks terrorism into three distinct categories: demonstrative terrorism, destructive terrorism, and suicide terrorism. He argues that demonstrative terrorism is aimed at drawing attention to grievances and drawing supporters. Destructive terrorism is aimed at coercing opponents and drawing support to the cause. Finally, suicide terrorism is “the most aggressive form of terrorism, pursuing coercion even at the expense of angering not only the target community but neutral audiences as well” (2005:9–10). When one lists the definitions in such close proximity, the overlap is obvious and the distinction seems almost frivolous. The confusion such an arbitrary splitting of the definition of terrorism causes is seen in the literature and lack of general agreement on a common term. Karunya Jayasena also attempts to define suicide terrorism but does not make the same mistakes that Pape makes. Jayasena begins with an overarching definition of the characteristics of modern terrorism as “a

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form of political violence, mostly driven by secular and political objectives, has a target audience, is balanced in range of lethality, coupled with state sponsorship and support, and has a hierarchical organization with a definitive structure” (2011:26). Jayasena then places suicide terrorism under this broad definition as a terrorism subset, which is appropriate and helps one to avoid confusing over competing primary definitions of the phenomenon. Unfortunately, the terrorism characteristics themselves are problematic. While state sponsorship is important, not all terror groups are state-sponsored. The claim of hierarchical organization is bizarre and contrary to the known organizational structures or several notable terror groups. Finally, the terrorists and targets are not well defined. James Kiras adds a narrower definition of terrorism. He defines terrorism as “the sustained use, or threat of use of violence by a small group for political purposes, such as inspiring fear, drawing widespread attention to a political grievance and/or provoking a draconian or unsustainable response” (2002:176; emphasis removed). There is much that is good in this definition and the fact that Kiras draws attention to the fact that terrorism can exist merely as a threat is an important point. This point resonates with Carl von Clausewitz’s assertion that the threat of a military engagement can sometimes have the same effect as an actual engagement (1984:181). However, “small group” is not a specific enough designator of terrorists and there is no specificity regarding targets. Therefore, under this broad definition, an attack on military personnel could easily be construed a terrorist act. Bruce Hoffman adds a singular definition of terrorism as “the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of change” (1988:43). Peter Chalk also adds offers broad definition of terrorism. He defines terrorism as “the systematic use of illegitimate violence that is employed by sub-state actors as a means of achieving specific political objectives” (1999:151). While both are parsimonious, both definitions are too broad. Almost any military action or use of force would fit under these definitions. Thus they designate nothing of use for either the researcher or the practitioner. Omar Lizardo does something clever in his attempt to define terrorism. He accurately and appropriately portrays the fact that several prominent definitions of terrorism are far too negatively pejorative. This leads Lizardo to observe that “the intended target of terrorist attacks is almost inevitably a recognized actor in the larger inter-state system or a proxy for such an actor” (2008:97). But Lizardo overemphasizes the actor in his definition, arguing that the killing of noncombatants is unimportant to a terrorism definition. This forces him to declare the attack on the USS Cole by al-Qaeda to be a terrorist act (2008:101). It

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was not. It was an act of insurgency, and thus his valiant attempt to define terrorism ends up confounding terrorism with insurgency. Adding to the confusion, political expediency has caused various powerful actors over time to misuse the term for their own political gain. While multiple examples exist, only one egregious example will be given here to exemplify this phenomenon. George W. Bush indulged recklessly in naming attacks in Iraq as terrorism when they were clearly committed by insurgents and the targets were US military convoys (Smith 2008). While this may have served domestic political purposes and, perhaps, enhanced domestic will for the war in Iraq, it also served to confound the notion of terrorism and inadvertently open the possibility for those who wish terrorism to remain undefined to point to this misuse as an example of how it cannot successfully be defined. Several authors add more useful substance to the exploration of what a good definition of terrorism would look like by offering generalizable suggestions regarding what a good, usable definition of terrorism would contain. One of the leading authors on this subject, Yonah Alexander, argued that any definition of terrorism must contain five integral aspects: illegality; specificity in what constitutes a perpetrator; a precise definition of targets; an explanation of terrorist objectives and intended outcomes; and a description of methods (2002:3). Louise Richardson adds to this that a useful definition of terrorism must be framed in such a way that it is distinguishable from other forms of violence (1998:52–56). Audrey Kurth Cronin arguably adds the most to this debate with her assertions regarding the four basic areas a good definition of terrorism must address. She argues that all terrorism is political in nature, is perpetrated by nonstate actors, has a psychological impact greater than the event, and is aimed at civilian noncombatants (2011:7). Two definitions come very close to fulfilling these general objectives laid out by these authors. A definition from scholars Walter Enders and Todd Sandler and the official definition of the US Department of State are certainly serviceable definitions. Enders and Sandler conceptualize terrorism as “the premeditated use or threat of use of extranormal violence or brutality by subnational groups to obtain a political, religious, or ideological objective through intimidation of a huge audience, usually not directly involved with the policy making that the terrorists seek to influence” (2002:148). The US Department of State defines terrorism as “politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (2016a:2). Both definitions do a better job of defining actors and targets than any previous definitions offered, allowing for more precise study and actual combating of terrorists and their organizations.

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Still, Enders and Sandler’s emphasis on “extranormal” violence is superfluous and potentially confusing, and the State Department definition needs at least a little tweaking. Considering the debate over the definition and the need for precision without exclusion, this chapter builds on the Enders and Sandler and Department of State definitions to come up with a workable, albeit not perfect, definition for use in this study. Considering all this, I and my colleagues Brian Stackhouse and John Falconer define terrorism as “any premeditated violent act or threat of violence against non–combatants by subnational or international groups, clandestine agents, or individuals sympathetic to larger terrorist groups and movements, with the intent to influence a target audience larger than the intended victims toward or against a particular policy or with the intention to overthrow the current governmental system” (Cox, Stackhouse, and Falconer 2009:42). This definition captures the psychological aspects of terrorism; terrorism is intended to influence an audience much larger than its intended victims, implying the attack should cause fear and perhaps a lack of confidence in the ruling regime. This definition also clearly delineates perpetrators and victims. States cannot commit terrorism, but subnational and international groups can, as can lone wolf perpetrators who are sympathetic to a larger group or cause even if they are not formally affiliated with that group. The final key point in this definition is that terrorism is always aimed at a political change, whether large or small. This could range from a particular policy change, like greater environmental protection, which the Environmental Liberation Front in northwest America aims for, or the overthrow of the Westerndominated, world capitalist system, which is an aim of al-Qaeda. This definition allows precision for the crafter of international legal conventions and the practitioner who has to combat terror organizations, without being overly constrictive. One caveat must be noted. This definition is not without controversy. First, some would argue that this definition does not allow for the multiplicity of interpretation of terrorist acts; thus, “one man’s terrorist cannot so easily be another man’s insurgent.” We argue instead that terrorism and insurgency are linked but that terrorism must be precisely defined as a specific tactical action of the insurgents, so that proper study and combating of the phenomenon is possible. Second, violent acts such as the 1983 bombing of the US Marine barracks in Lebanon and the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000 do not fit under the definition of terrorism and must correctly be labeled acts of insurgency. This does not validate these acts nor mitigate their horror in the least, but it does allow for precision in defining the term.

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State Sponsorship of Terrorism Concomitant with the debate over terrorism, the notion of state sponsorship of terrorism has garnered increasing focus in the literature, especially since the 9/11 attacks. However, Audrey Cronin argues that state sponsorship of terrorism was already on the rise and that there has been an increasing link between terrorist groups and state sponsors beginning during the Cold War. She notes that “terrorism was often employed as a mean of exercising power and indirectly accomplishing policy aims” (2011:4) in an era where direct military confrontation between Cold War rivals brought with it the specter of mutual assured destruction. “State sponsorship” is used in this chapter to denote thirdparty state sponsorship through moral, material, training, equipping, or direct military support of a subnational, international, or individual to commit one or more acts of terrorism. States sponsoring terrorism almost always are using the third party to control or sway either another government or a distinct population that is larger than the intended victims of the terrorist acts. Still, state sponsorship is often conflated with the erroneous notion of state terrorism. Referring back to the literature and our definition, states cannot commit acts of terrorism. While few scholars make the assertion that states can commit acts of terrorism, a brief review of some of the stronger claims will be addressed here. Mark Seldon and Alvin So devote an entire book’s worth of research to support their contention that states can commit acts of terrorism. But they immediately confuse with terrorism the terror that almost any military act can cause a populace (2004:5). Since they begin with the fallacious assertion that terror from warfare equates to terrorism, they conclude that one of the most terrifying military actions, the nuclear bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima in Japan, had to be labeled terrorism (2004:10). Peter Sproat (1997), another proponent of state terrorism, actually illuminates the contradiction in his and Seldon and So’s logic when he attempts to simultaneously define war crimes and human rights violations as terrorism while specifically arguing these acts can never be deemed terrorist. The point is that if we allow this expansion from state-sponsored terrorism to state terrorism, terrorism loses any specificity and, therefore, any useful meaning. Still, the notion of state sponsorship needs to be reconsidered, and this is best done in light of irregular warfare. State sponsorship is usually studied when there is a direct relationship or sponsorship of the terrorist group or act. Iran’s sponsorship of Hezbollah and its separatist terror campaign in Lebanon is one of the most obvious examples of direct state sponsorship (Byman 2005). Direct links like these have been studied extensively, but indirect sponsorship,

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whether intended or inadvertent, has not. Indirect support would come through special warfighters engaging in irregular warfare supporting a foreign insurgency that, since insurgency and terrorism are linked, is likely to engage in terrorist acts. Intention is the key here, as the special warfighter has to consciously encourage or condone such acts, but even inadvertent fostering of terrorism opens up a new and interesting form of collateral damage, which will be explored later.

Irregular Warfare and Unconventional Warfare The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review was the first modern US governmental publication to address irregular warfare. In the 2006 review, an emphasis is placed on irregular warfare as a vital ongoing mission in the long war against al-Qaeda and other terrorist and insurgent threats. This was followed closely in time by a 2008 Department of Defense directive on irregular warfare stating that irregular warfare is as strategically important as conventional warfare. This should not be misinterpreted to mean that irregular warfare is a new phenomenon, but only that it is a resurgent focus area in the post–Cold War era. The evidence presented in this section is aimed at both defining irregular warfare and showing that irregular warfare has experienced a resurgence in importance as the United States continues to grapple strategically with important national, regional, and global insurgencies (see Cox 2010; Kilcullen 2005) and especially states that support these threats to US strategic interests. The increasing primacy of the use and definition of unconventional warfare is important, but what is more important in determining the implications of how we define and approach terrorism is how unconventional warfare is operationalized and how it relates to irregular warfare. The 2007 joint operating concept on irregular warfare defines irregular warfare as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations” (Department of Defense 2007:1). This is surprisingly similar to a definition of insurgency, and only becomes significantly different when one understands that US armed forces, most likely special operations forces (SOF), will be engaging with insurgents in a hostile or semipermissive environment. This should not be confused with a definition of unconventional warfare, but this definition is broad enough to encompass the endeavor. This definition was also found to be sound enough for inclusion into the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2016). The joint operating concept on irregular warfare notes that some irregular warfare and unconventional warfare encompasses acts of terrorism or transnational crime, but US national and international law prevents US forces from supporting these illegal

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activities. Despite providing an exhaustive list of possible irregular warfare activities, the joint concept correctly notes that insurgency and counterinsurgency constitute the core of irregular warfare. What is most important about the relationship between irregular warfare and unconventional warfare comes from the 2010 joint operating concept on irregular warfare, regarding the countering of irregular threats (Department of Defense 2010). In this document, it becomes clear that irregular warfare is mainly a defensive effort. The joint concept lists five activities encompassing irregular warfare: counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, stability operations, and unconventional warfare. Of these, only unconventional warfare is a purely offensive tool that the US military can employ. While SOF may engage in some targeted killings and network disruption of terror cells outside the United States, counterterrorism remains largely a law enforcement and intelligence activity. Even the external disruptive SOF activities covered under counterterrorism serve to help defend the nation from terror attacks. Counterinsurgency, too, is defensive in nature, as SOF and conventional US forces help a host-nation government combat and quell an insurgent threat. Only unconventional warfare offers the opportunity for SOF to foment and support an insurgency against a hostile host-nation government, and the offensive capability of overthrowing that enemy state. What is most important for this chapter are activities conducted almost exclusively by US Special Forces in support of a local insurgency intended to overthrow or subvert in some way an unfriendly or rogue foreign central government. Therefore an examination of US special forces doctrine as it relates to unconventional warfare is a necessary next step in the progression of this examination of the link between terrorism and unconventional warfare. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that “Army special operations forces units develop a deep understanding of local conditions and cultures which allows for a nuanced and often low-visibility or clandestine shaping of the operational environment” (2014a:1). There is an interesting implication from this passage: SOF need to engage clandestinely or at least with a light footprint in order to engage local forces in politically sensitive and partially denied or hostile areas. Building on this, a far more precise and useful definition of unconventional warfare is provided: “activities conducted to enable the resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerilla force in a denied area”; “these operations require distinct authorities” and one should be aware these authorities are distinct to SOF and fall outside the normal authorities that govern US conventional forces (Joint

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Chiefs of Staff 2014a:5). Unconventional warfare is driven by these same authorities as well, becoming inherently an interagency endeavor, and so the military must work in concert with the local embassy despite this activity being sensitive and clandestine in nature. The problem for practitioners of unconventional warfare is that terrorism and insurgency are linked. While insurgencies can operate without resorting to terrorism, the initial asymmetric advantage of the central government’s forces and the inherent weakness in support and organization of a proto-insurgency force most insurgencies to use terrorism as at least an early tactic to undermine confidence in the local and national government. If one allows for a broader definition of insurgency to include any violence perpetrated by a subnational group or international organization in order to overthrow a government or affect a particular policy (O’Neill 2005), then the number of particular groups that US special operations forces can interact with expands. Further, since terrorism almost never occurs outside of insurgency, states that regularly engage unconventional warfare run a greater risk of consciously or inadvertently fostering terrorist acts. Since the US force is downsizing and since there seems to be at least a short-term political preference for smaller, less visible military options, unconventional warfare becomes a more likely option in the near future. Since the Joint Chiefs of Staff define unconventional warfare as working by, with, and through a local insurgency in order to affect or overthrow a government, the likelihood that SOF will have to deal with insurgencies at least considering terrorism as a tactical option becomes a high risk. Even if the special warfighters have no intention of sponsoring terrorism, they have to become aware of the risks of inadvertently fostering terrorism. The strategic messaging damage that could be wrought when US or other Western forces inadvertently foster terrorism by supporting a local insurgency cannot be overlooked. One way to deal with this risk is to recognize it and explain it. As with terrorism, intent is a key component. If a person were to turn a gun on civilians with the sole purpose of creating mayhem, then that person would be justly categorized as a mass murderer. This is exactly the category the Columbine killers fell into and this is justified, for they had no larger political purpose to their random violence. However, if someone or a group of people were to turn very similar automatic weapons against a civilian population with the intent to spread fear and move a population larger than the intended victims toward or away from a particular policy action, these people would correctly be deemed terrorists. Such was the case with the al-Shabaab operatives who raided the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, with the express pur-

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pose of forcing the Kenyan government to cease its military operations against al-Shabaab. Similarly, intent is important in unconventional warfare, since there is a very high probability that local insurgents will be tempted to engage in terrorism. So what does the US military need to do to combat this risk? First, US Army Special Forces need to lead the way in acknowledging this risk and not simply reverting to explaining its illegality as the Joint Chiefs of Staff do (2011b). It is logical for insurgent forces to gravitate toward terrorism, especially early in the campaign. So this needs to be acknowledged and then dealt with. Second, the Army and its special operations forces need to reiterate the illegality of terrorism and the fact that the United States would never knowingly sponsor terrorist acts. Third, SOF doctrine needs to account for mitigating techniques and assessment techniques so that these forces have the ability to shape the insurgent away from terrorism and also recognize quickly when an insurgent force has embraced terrorism. Finally, more research needs to be conducted on the inadvertent fostering of terrorism falling under a new type of collateral damage. The modern laws of warfare (jus in bello) are well developed in terms of collateral damage resulting from conventional warfare, especially tactics such as aerial bombing. The simple equation that has resulted from consensus regarding the laws of warfare is that the violent response has to be proportional to the threat. So in a justified existential fight against belligerent states, like the Axis during World War II, that have not only violated state sovereignty but also grossly violated human rights, operations such as the fire-bombing of Dresden and major cities in Japan are justified. Similarly, if the threat to the state is great enough, or the central government is belligerent enough (perhaps grossly violating human rights), then inadvertent fostering of terrorism when all reasonable mitigation has been attempted can result in a new form of collateral damage resulting from externally sponsored insurgent terrorism.

Conclusion In the final analysis, there is a pressing need for a common definition of terrorism or at least a common core set of aspects that most definitions in the field share. Due to political expediency and ideological considerations, there is unlikely to ever be agreement over a common international definition. Less energy should be wasted here because of this, and more effort should be focused on the scholarly debate. Perhaps in time, if the epistemic communities around the world come to some sort of agreement over a definition, this could produce consensus

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at the political level, but this seems unlikely. Still, a common definition is a key in order for the scholarship to move forward and for practitioners to more precisely combat the phenomenon. This examination of the conceptualization of terrorism in light of irregular warfare produces some interesting implications for special warfighters. When terrorism is accurately addressed in doctrine and in unconventional warfare practice, terrorism emerges as a likely byproduct of SOF engagement with local insurgents. This new form of potential collateral damage must be dealt with in terms of messaging, law, and practice, and it would be so simple to do. All special operations forces need to do is recognize this conundrum and address it.

7 Design Thinking for Special Operations Ben Zweibelson

US special operations forces represent the most technologically advanced, best-resourced, and most combat-experienced force of professional soldiers on the planet. With those accolades, does there really need to be a discussion on how the special operations organization approaches thinking, thinking about thinking (metacognition), and problem solving in complexity? Shouldn’t the other attributes simply bowl over complexity and defeat adversaries through sheer technological and professional overmatch, as the US National Security Strategy and the Army’s recent future operating concept indirectly suggest (White House 2015; Department of the Army 2014c)? As the recent unresolved conflicts in the Middle East, Central Asia, Africa, and elsewhere seem to run against this logic, we might consider how and why special operations as an organization is currently unable to gain a true cognitive overmatch against adversaries, particularly in organizational knowledge production and creative problem solving within complex contexts. Recently, US Special Operations Command (SOCOM), the hierarchical juggernaut in the special operations community, launched new initiatives in military design thinking through several education programs at the Joint Special Operations University. While the US military has already struggled with implementing design through doctrine, education, and practice, this latest initiative is important for several factors (Murden 2013). First, SOCOM acknowledges the importance of distinguishing design thinking from subsequent planning. Design alone is not planning, and planning alone is not design (Joint Staff 2011; Zweibelson 2015). The US Army as an institution continues to wrestle with this issue, while SOCOM seems to be advancing beyond it (Banach and 73

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Ryan 2009; Graves and Stanley 2013; Grigsby et al. 2011). Second, SOCOM realizes that existing design doctrine and approved methodologies are incomplete, still evolving in form and function, and may not be entirely compatible with the unique nature of special operations missions, composition, resources, and perspectives. It is in this second transition where the special operations community is positioned to make exceptional advances (while also risking dangerous false trajectories) in organizational knowledge production and complex problem solving. Despite methodological quibbles over concepts of “this version of design methodology” or “that approach to operational design,” SOCOM has deeper philosophical and paradigmatic challenges for design. A paradigm is “the broadest unit of consensus within a science and serves to differentiate one scientific community from another. It subsumes, defines, and interrelates the exemplars, theories, methods and instruments that exist within” (Rizer 1980:7; see also Kuhn 1962:5–15). For design thinking to take the best course for a tailored special operations organization and mission outlook, we need to consider several significant sociological and philosophical concepts on how we make sense of complexity and convey this understanding with others. This is a chapter about “thinking about how the special operations community thinks about complexity” (or metacognition upon the organization) and why these cognitive distinctions require significantly dissimilar design approaches than what the conventional military now pursues. This requires a trip down the rabbit hole that demands critical reflection and a willingness to creatively replace outdated institutionalisms with novel and unexpected (surprising) adaptations.

Sociological and Philosophical Theories of Knowledge The past five decades of sociological and philosophical advancement have ushered in profound new ways of understanding human cognition, knowledge production, and organizational theory. While various scientific and philosophical fields and disciplines continue to debate many of these theories, enough momentum has generated behind the study of paradigms to provide great value to the military. For special operations as well as the entire military profession, dealing with complex problems is now the new normal, while traditional (and still highly coveted) linear approaches to classic warfare may be less likely to occur, in that adversaries are becoming increasingly capable and elusive (Department of the Army 2014c:15–16; White House 2015:4). Adversaries now avoid fighting the United States where it is traditionally strong, and continue to adapt novel and emergent approaches that exploit US weaknesses. Institutionally, the United States tends to misunderstand

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much of this and routinely attempts to “force the system” to behave the way it wishes it would. The military prefers what sociologists term a “functionalist paradigm,” wherein the world is systematic, reducible through scientific approaches, measurements, and repeatable linear processes (Bousquet 2009:56–60; Guerlac 1986:67; Tsoukas 2005:171). “Systematic” means taking a reductionist approach to complexity wherein the whole can be addressed after understanding the nature of individual components that might later be reassembled back into the larger complexity. This underlies a majority of military planning models such as how to break down analysis into steps, groups, domains, levels, and generalized structures that are labeled with doctrinal friendly acronyms. The scientific method, applied in a blend of military and technological weighted choices and values, underpins this functionalist approach to understanding warfare, military strategy, and organizational approaches in conflicts. Once a “law” is verified by the pseudoscientific military applications, it becomes universal and timeless; the characteristics of mass, surprise, speed, or economy of effort are applicable in every and all conflicts with just the right combination and analysis (Tsoukas and Dooley 2011:730). Every conflict might also be divided and understood if staffs were to correctly dissect complexity into political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information “bins” or other useful models (Department of the Army 2012a:5; Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011a:1–4). At this ontological level (the “what is versus what is not” knowledge level), we make deep and implicit decisions regarding the fundamental nature of reality, upon which we construct our problem-solving approaches, and how we choose not to interpret reality (Hatch and Yanow 2008:24–30; Reed 2005:1623; Stark 1958:13). Functionalism embraces an objectivist outlook on reality, where at the ontological level we know that the world must be constant (Conklin 2008; Schon 1992b:123–134; Taleb 2007:16; Weick 2004:74). Objectivity means that all of the observable as well as conceptual things in reality exist in some form. Further, we as observers might remove ourselves from the equation and apply scientific methods that reveal universal laws that these objects will always obey in some regard. This forms the basis for propositional knowledge, a key hallmark of the functionalist military perspective (Tsoukas 2005:70–71). Although there are alternatives to the functionalist paradigm, nearly all Western military organizations exclusively rely upon functionalism to make sense of complexity in military contexts. Design provides cognitive tools for breaking out of this single-paradigm thinking, and special operations design requires it, as will be further expanded upon here (Gioia and Pitre 1990; Lewis and Grimes 1999; Schultz and Hatch 1996:529–557). Change and organization are intrinsically related; how an organization

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changes relates to what defines its beliefs, habits, and experiences (Tsoukas and Chia 2002:570). Thus, special operations and conventional forces are not interchangeable. However, another important distinction on knowledge now needs to be illustrated, as it becomes a powerful organizing force for how special operations should (and should not) pursue design approaches in practice, education, and doctrinal transformation.

Special Operations and Tacit over Explicit Knowledge Donald Schon (1992a:243) wrote extensively on the sociological premise that organizational knowledge might be split between tacit and explicit forms. Knowledge that is tacit (very hard to explain) appears in tension with knowledge that is explicit (very easy to teach, list, or convey) (see also Gondo and Amis 2013:232). Explicit knowledge is akin to what can easily be put into a list of directions or a checklist, or transmitted to another person so that the other person reliably and easily gains that knowledge. Unlike explicit knowledge that takes form in our instructions, guides, and doctrine, tacit knowledge occurs within high skill sets, and is often impossible to clearly describe or explain to another. Consider how master artists, professional athletes, and highly skilled professionals are unable to articulate how they do the impressive things that define their excellence. Granted, this is not an “either/or” categorization; rather this is one of several ways of considering how organizations construct knowledge over time. Returning to the military context, we do have valid categories for what is militarily explicit and what we might consider tacit military knowledge. In 1966, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, taking a largely nonfunctionalist perspective within the interpretivist paradigm, wrote The Social Construction of Reality, wherein they discussed among many things the concepts of “recipe knowledge” (see also Baudrillard 2001; Kinsella 2006:279). In their explanation of different types of recipe knowledge, Berger and Luckmann discuss how organizations “attempt to transfer practical abilities or ‘knowhow’ from a skilled or knowledgeable performer to a novice. This occurs by offering step-by-step direction in terms that are familiar” (Shaffer 2010:56). Sociologist Leigh Shaffer (2010) expanded upon the Berger and Luckmann distinction by working with the earlier knowledge research of Alfred Schutz (whom Berger and Luckmann drew from) and identified the ontological tension between “simple recipes” and “standardized recipes” as a relationship over tacit and explicit knowledge goals. The simple recipe works as Shaffer described as a “rule of thumb” approach whereby highly skilled performers rely upon tacit knowledge to convey practices in an adaptive act (2010:57–59). Thus, the highly skilled performers offer incomplete and inadequate descriptions in a

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highly artistic, fluid, and context-dependent format. A professional baseball pitcher offering another elite athlete some “rules of thumb” on his slider might qualify as a useful example. A special forces operator training host-nation special operations forces to target and execute raids is yet another. Sometimes we cannot explain it at all, and instead “demonstrate it” like a fine artist or athlete that is operating “in the zone.” Those who also possess similar tacit knowledge tend to grasp new “rules of thumb” easier, while novices quickly become overwhelmed or lost and demand more explicit and simplified explanations. Unlike simple recipes that rely on tacit knowledge and “rules of thumb” between highly skilled performers, Berger and Luckmann’s “standardized recipes” seek explicit, step-by-step procedures in order to eliminate the need for tacit knowledge in performers, and reduce the reliance upon highly skilled users. While standardized recipes work effectively only in simplistic, routine, and closed systems, they have a demonstrated reliability that works well in organizations that rely upon less skilled performers that must conduct many simplistic tasks in uniform and predictable manners (Welsh and Dehler 2012:777). Unlike professional baseball pitchers relying on their tacit abilities and flexible yet incomplete “rules of thumb,” our explicit performers are more like a senior mechanic training a group of new mechanics on the basic sequences of conducting an oil change. Once trained, these new mechanics will operate in multiple locations where a diverse number of vehicles will require oil servicing. Afghan logisticians trained to maintain property and supply chains are another example, where coalition logisticians implement simplistic and streamlined procedures for them to follow. The standardized recipes transmit easily into sequenced performances and are maintained by recipe books that might detail the different adjustments by make, model, and year of automobile. Regardless of the vehicle that needs servicing, the organization reduces the need for tacit knowledge by standardizing explicit knowledge construction to accomplish the problem solving. Complexity and human conflict contexts are not the same as throwing a perfect slider or changing the oil out of a Buick. Instead, they present adaptive and confusing patterns of emergent system behavior where some things might require tacit knowledge, and many routine others demand only explicit approaches. For special operations and design approaches, it is this ratio of tacit to explicit that drives the ontological structure for a proper design construct. Special operations, by nature of the mission, the high skill set of performers, the dissimilated and decentralized approach in unconventional warfare and foreign assistance, and the extensive demands for dynamic and comprehensive problem-solving approaches, lean toward the tacit end of the knowledge production spectrum. Clearly, special operations have a deep foundation of explicit and

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sequential tasks wherein standardized recipes are the only necessary component, yet these also likely do not require much design emphasis. For design approaches, special operations are decidedly unlike operations of conventional forces, in that the high-performance users operate under largely tacit knowledge processes. The “rule of thumb” approach that cannot be accomplished via explicit or standardized methodologies prevents special operations from simply plucking current design doctrine out of the larger Army institution and perhaps slapping a “special operations” title to the front of it. The design of special operations forces (SOF) will not function effectively for the needs of the organization. Proponents of conventional forces might object to the generalization that SOF have a high “tacit to explicit” ratio of performers and that conventional forces are the opposite. Clearly, there are many conventional performers who express high tacit knowledge, and there are many examples of SOF explicit performances identical to conventional practices. Over those objections, one might consider the force structures of SOF versus conventional organizations. While special operations build around decentralized teams of highly trained (tacit) performers, the conventional force has a far larger “bottom pyramid” of privates, junior officers, and explicit performance requirements across much larger, centralized organizations (Rothstein 2007:290). Although the leadership exhibits just as many tacit and experienced performances, conventional forces are still structured toward reducing tacit knowledge requirements for the majority of the conventional organization (Bousquet 2009:56; Romjue 1997:11; Tsoukas 2005:171). This does not occur in special operations; rather the opposite appears to be routine. Smaller groups of highly skilled and trained individuals function in a greater decentralized and flexible process where adaptation and unique, tailored approaches are realized more frequently than standardized, uniform routines (Madden et al. 2014). One should therefore not seek a special operations design approach that shares the same framework, language, and institutional justification of the other. Design for conventional forces aims toward an entirely dissimilar way of building and maintaining organizational knowledge. If SOF design is not like “Big Army” design, then what should it look like?

Future Special Operations Investments One of the strongest seductions on where SOF design ought to move revolves around the special operations community and organizational theory. Sociologist Karl Weick addressed the institutional forces within an organization confronted by looming disasters and unexpected developments, in that organizations tend to stubbornly hold to existing cognitive processes as they outstrip their past experiences (1993:636). For special

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operations (and the rest of Western military forces), technology has unfortunately become a powerfully blinding tool that resists and rejects critical reflection and promises utopian dreams of certainty, predictability, and greater control of complexity (Bousquet 2008a:917–919). Owing in a large way to the deep historical trend of technology paired with military science since the era of McNamara’s “Whiz Kids” and the Vietnam period, technology and science have been an instrumental part of special operations’ organizational consciousness (Bousquet 2008b; Edwards 1996:127–128; Rothstein 2007:294). The acronym “GRIN” addresses the budding fields of genetics, robotics, information technology, and nanotechnology—all of which feature prominently in special operations research and development (Pudas and Drapeau 2009:63). While advanced technology is undoubtedly important and instrumental to many special operations organizational actions, it does not necessarily trump how SOF design and complex problem solving ought to function. Technology is reliant upon explicit knowledge, in that while there surely are art and creativity in developing new technological ideas and applications, the execution of technology in the hands of the user is a largely explicit and standardized process. Novel and emergent technology, of course, begins with tacit creativity. The difference is profound, yet blurred. For design thinking, special operations is tempted by greater technological solutions to potentially standardize design thinking into advanced computer modeling, quantitative metrics, elaborate “human terrain targeting algorithms,” and other pseudoscientific endeavors that essentially mirror the standardized recipe process to reduce the need for tacit knowledge performers. This is not a call for a moratorium on investing in future GRIN technology; it is a caution over seeking SOF design approaches that are entirely reliant upon exclusively explicit knowledge production within the organization. An overreliance on GRIN may leave special operations with a toothless smile when confronting the next emergent complex conflict. Further, there are other risks for special operations due to the overarching military institution and the centralized hierarchical jabberwocky that drives military education, doctrine, practices, and organization.

Special Operations Riddles The US Army incorporated initial design theory into its fifth field manual (Department of the Army 2012a; see also Ryan n.d.). Since then, the Army has struggled to effectively execute design within the force, triggering multiple studies and research into why the organization is unable to work design into planning. In 2012, the US Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences reported that design was considered by some in the military as “dense, elitist, and inaccessible to the masses” and that there were a series of organizational barriers preventing the Army from

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integrating design into existing traditional planning practices (Grome et al. 2012:1–32). Since that report, the Army has retooled design into “Army design methodology” and launched additional studies, still without much success (Banach and Ryan 2009; Murden 2013; Zweibelson 2015; Zweibelson, Martin, and Paparone 2013:23). Concurrently, Joint Forces maintain “operational design” concepts while teasing in some elements of Army design, while other services pursue other interpretations (Banach and Ryan 2009; Joint Staff 2011:10–11; Murden 2013:56. Meanwhile, special operations have tangled with design and produced mixed results as well as great debate within the SOF community on what design even means, and whether it matters for the organization (Martin 2011:2015). In the Alice in Wonderland story, the riddle of the “raven and the writing desk” discusses deeper philosophical notions of organization, identity, time, and the cycle of life and death. An adaptation of this riddle applies to this important design debate in that “how does a special operations complex problem relate to the special operations organization?” SOF performers cannot confuse the different problem frames within complex conflict contexts with those of the conventional force, nor should they confuse a design approach that organizes around a tacit organization with one that capitalizes on reducing tacit performers. “Big Army” has crafted (and recrafted) design approaches into yet another standardized recipe within doctrine and the practice of mission command wherein design works largely in explicit step-by-step procedures and the tacit performance is reduced. Instead of developing larger and deeper explanations on design, doctrine continues to reduce and streamline design methodologies into shorter chapters comprising universal and oversimplified terms and language. The result is that for the conventional force, a larger and larger group of design practitioners can now reliably produce the same largely explicit outputs while using a more generalized and simplistic design approach. While this continues to work for simplistic and closed systems, the adaptive and emergent complex conflict contexts that US forces routinely struggle with categorically reject simplistic design efforts. Special operations might easily latch on to existing design doctrine and concepts and merely build additional “add-ons” into the framework to make some SOF “design jabberwocky” that meets the expectations of conformity and larger institutional pressures. Special operations might also engage in layering greater technological applications upon this, casting the illusion that with more data and faster processes of many things, the United States might gain some cognitive overmatch over its adversaries. Either of these approaches alone becomes problematic. Special operations work in a highly tacit-to-explicit ratio for organization as well as military action. As “doing SOF design” necessitates

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highly skilled designers performing tacit processes, special operations design education must mirror the tacit performer model instead of the shorter and standardized explicit performer approach. Design education cannot be compressed into short and highly standardized modules where special operations students receive explicit design concepts. Output cannot be equated to immediate responsiveness where the organization sends personnel to a week-long course with the expectation of quick results. Instead, special operations design education needs to mirror the long-term operator development glide path. SOF designers require lengthy and cumulative design developments where organizational benefits might not be observed until years after a leader approves a course. Special operations leaders need to consider design education as a major organizational investment, and manage designers individually and in a tailored manner that cumulatively builds upon multiple design developments. For design in particular, special operations should avoid the conventional focused “Army design methodology” model. At a minimum, SOF designers should add an “organizational frame” as a critical precursor to any SOF design endeavors. This SOF organizational frame works differently than the traditional “environmental frame” in that it demands what Karl Weick and Donald Schon term “reflective practice” and “critical inquiry” for organizational understanding (Weick 2011; Schon 1987; see also Gondo and Amis 2013). This “organizational frame” for SOF design should encompass appreciation of all subsequent frames, in that the solutions to complex problems that special operations as an organization decide upon are deeply tied to the organization itself. All SOF design approaches require a far greater emphasis on tacit knowledge construction and highly skilled performers, which will reduce any reliance on existing doctrinal design considerations. Ideally, the optimal special operations design approach does not yet exist, and likely challenges standing positions and organizational barriers. Designers are charged with creatively developing these solutions to complex problems, and then critically reflecting upon SOF institutionalisms to determine the best manner to articulate and implement the design deliverable. Once again, designing with “rules of thumb” will trump “standardized design practices.” Last, special operations need to experiment with design in ways that will defy conventional thinking. Again, conventional organizational structure is explicit-based; the problems confronting special operations and the organization itself are decidedly tacit in nature. No innovation occurs in standardization, and no transformation comes without risk. Design failure is always inherent when confronting complex, adaptive problems where adversaries continue to improvise and seek new vulnerabilities. The “cookie cutter” design approach, whether in execution

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using misapplied conventional practices, or through limited and shortterm design education, will provide an incompatible and inadequate match for the demands of special operations missions. Instituting a long-term design model for the entire force requires lengthy investments in education, individual tailored selection and management, diverse and novel approaches to design solutions, and avoidance of overreliance on emerging technologies. Tools are still tools, regardless of their unique and improved capabilities. If GRIN tools receive significant organizational attention, the same should be given to the cognitive tools under the designer’s skullcap (or green beret). Some of those may take just as much research and just as lengthy periods of development, but offer profoundly different and unexpected benefits to the force.

Conclusion Military organizations tend to favor the yesteryear self-identifications that historian Carl Builder (1989) termed “the Golden Age for military forces in warfare.” The United States prefers to imagine the past, and remember the future, as Karl Weick offered (2006:448; see also Tsoukas and Vladimirou 2001:975). In other words, the US military tends to predict future events based upon flawed reasoning whereby it misunderstands past events. This is not unusual, and special operations as well can be susceptible to the history, rituals, institutionalisms, and desire to repeat previously (seemingly) successful models against emergent problems. However, complexity routinely rejects existent solutions, and emergent problems cannot even be explained using previous language and knowledge without creating new understandings (Bousquet and Curtis 2011:46; Lewis 2010:210). Special operations as an organization relies, and is largely defined by, highly skilled performers who deal with tacit knowledge construction. Despite the underlining existence of special operations’ explicit knowledge and many standardized practices, the overarching roles, requirements, and missions for special operations are tacit, emergent, and dynamic. Military design continues to orbit along a decidedly explicit path whereby standardization is sought to reduce tacit knowledge requirements. Special operations should avoid simply adapting existing design methodologies, practices, and education models without first critically reflecting upon whether SOF need designers who work with tacit knowledge in highly tailored, unique, and organizationally transforming ways, or not. One is not the other. The costs for developing unique special operations designers are higher overall, yet the longterm deliverables will undoubtedly return on the investment in ways unrecognizable from this perspective.

8 Design Thinking for Leadership of Special Operations Forces Ben Zweibelson

The past two decades of military development in both theory and practice have triggered what may be termed the “design movement” across multiple services, militaries, and agencies around the world (Banach and Ryan 2009; Beaulieu-Brossard 2016; Grome et al. 2012; Jackson 2013; Lauder 2009; Paparone 2013). For special operations, design concepts have also made an impact through a variety of programs, processes, doctrine, and theory (Martin 2015; Naveh n.d.; Special Operations Command 2016; Zweibelson 2016). While each military design submovement within this overarching movement appears oriented toward similar goals of increasing organizational innovation, change, critical reflection, and generation of novel options, they might also be characterized as individual tribes battling one another (Grome et al. 2012; Paparone 2010, 2013). Military doctrine writers, professional educators, military theorists, as well as practitioners struggle with what brand or design methodology they wish to apply, and how it functions with regard to detailed planning, campaign design, and the art of military leadership. For US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in particular, the unique missions and composition of special operations forces (SOF) create challenging questions for how design works in the SOF context, and what SOF leadership ought to do when considering design applications for a SOCOM organization. Today, amid the contemporary debates on gray zones, transregional entities such as the Islamic State, and how alliances ought to function in the increasingly dynamic sociopolitical contexts, SOF leadership may not have the necessary organizational tools for design applications, or 83

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potentially are misusing the ones they already have (Bilbao and Mohabir 2016; Elkus 2015; Kapusta 2016; Maxwell 2016). Many may be familiar with design techniques as well as relevant design theories, while others have led or participated in multiple design inquiries that may feature a blend of design, operational design, and detailed planning methodologies. Yet in terms of educational developments for design and leadership, current US doctrine and practice do not yet include sufficient explanation on how leaders might clearly integrate design with detailed planning, or how the role of leadership is different within design versus traditional planning or campaign design. This chapter provides one interpretation and suggests that future SOF doctrine as well as SOCOM education might incorporate these concepts for SOF-specific theory and practice. Many SOF leaders need greater clarification on these essential topics in order to implement and guide innovative design inquiries, generate novel options, and subsequently incorporate useful design deliverables into the detailed planning process within complex special operations contexts.

The Role of the Senior Leader in Design: Change Agent for the Organization For SOF leadership attempting to leverage design inquiries within their organizations to generate novel options (innovation beyond the established or conventional processes, ideas, or frames), sociologist Karl Weick’s concept of “change agents as change poets” (2011) provides a fascinating way to frame this role. Weick presents a deep appreciation of how organizations generate new knowledge and cycle from innovation to standard practices (policy, doctrine, and standard operating procedures [SOPs]) with that leader firmly guiding the process. At the same time, the SOF leader is also experimenting as a military artist, attempting to set better conditions for organizational critical and creative thinking on extremely complex and adaptive problems (Buchanan 1992; Conklin 2008; Paparone 2010). Thus the SOF leader balances between military science and military art, blending them through military philosophy through the design process (see Figure 8.1). Weick uses the term “flux” to frame the abstract and often confusing individual and organizational thoughts when considering complex challenges. Flux is materialized “when it is imagined into hunches about forms and shapes” (2011:9), but one would be misled to equate this to the transition from abstract to the concrete. A “hunch” is clarified by Weick as “a sense of something we are omitting in what we are currently capable of articulating and verifying” (2011:9), or seen as a rich pragmatic tool for sensemaking in design. Organizationally, SOF encounter flux and

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Figure 8.1 SOF Leadership and Blending Design with Military Science ' ' and ' Art ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '

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understanding). In his sociological research, Weick further explains that hunches are a feeling that one gets when something is omitted in what one thinks they can already articulate and verify (1996:310). In order to appreciate these hunches (seeking those omissions), the SOF leader might coach the design team through wiping boards or applying a heuristic aid such as the semiotic square. With the semiotic square, it operates as a divergent generating process where the design team is motivated to explore hunches by detailing first what they feel they can already articulate and verify. Figure 8.4 demonstrates the core concept of the semiotic-square heuristic aid for design inquiries. The semiotic square is called a heuristic aid in that it is a cognitive tool that helps a design team think about their thinking. It is a sensemaking process, not an analytical one, and thus forms out of the design team’s contextual interaction with the dynamic environment. This is different than an analytical process (found in convergent planning) where one simply collects the data or even metadata, and pours it into the established analytical model to produce metrics and results (Snowden 2010). The semiotic square generates different results every time, and often the process is nonrepeating and emergent. Yet the semiotic square is, for the SOF leader guiding the design inquiry, both a divergent as well as a convergent process.

Figure 8.4 Semiotic Square as Heuristic Aids for SOF Leadership Leading Design Inquiries

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The SOF leader might direct a design team to present their latest hunches after significant discourse and whiteboard work within the fluxhunch iterative cycle. Once that team converges upon a frame of “what the system logic is, and what we do not like about it, and how we might move the system toward a better state for us,” this becomes Concept A for the semiotic square depicted in Figure 8.4. Concept A is one designproposed solution, yet the SOF leader now challenges the design team to consider what Concept B might be, in that B must be dissimilar and even incommensurate with Concept A. Design teams might diverge here somewhat; however, Concept B acts only as a foil or reflection of their original Concept A. Next, the SOF leader challenges the team to establish what Concept C might be, where C is a hybrid of both A and B. Most design teams quickly generate a Concept C, in that convergence is a far more familiar process for military professionals. For the SOF leader, as the change agent leading the design, all of the concepts set the team up for the real challenge of generating Concept D. Here we see an example of heightened divergence and the conditions for significant innovation. The team cannot use Concepts A, B, or C and must establish what Concept D might involve. This heuristic aid applies to nearly any design challenge, and motivates a design team toward divergent concepts only where the hunches are used to structure A, B and C, and the team must now return to Weick’s flux to consider what else there might be. The semiotic square is one of several heuristic aids that help the change agent in generating the nonlinear, emergent cycle of divergent design. Experienced SOF leaders will see past the whiteboard products and persuasive deliverables that a team generates early in the flux-hunch cycle, and coach them toward deeper design exploration to generate novel options. After using cognitive tools such as the semiotic square and forcing design teams to “wipe the boards” to continue iterations of flux-hunch, the SOF leader may realize or discover a design deliverable that influences the organization to accomplish relevance in the dynamic system. When this occurs, that SOF leader constructs initial (or refined) planning guidance using the language, methods, and processes of the detailed planning cycle. This is where a design deliverable is converted into detailed planning guidance to generate a very different cycle of convergence, sequential planning, and feedback realization. When SOF leaders can maneuver from one cycle to the other, influencing both and inspiring or coaching progress in different ways, they are able to be the change agents of their organization. When leaders misapply language or methods, or confuse one cycle for the other, the organization generally suffers. Planning without design leads to failure, while designing without considering

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the real needs of convergent planning and action leads to design deliverables that appear meaningless, or entirely incomprehensive.

Conclusion Current design doctrine, particularly for special operations forces, lacks the depth of explanation and technique for how military leaders initiate and guide a design inquiry as well as implement the design deliverables into planning guidance for detailed operational planning. This chapter has provided one approach and utilized sociological and organizational theory as well as design philosophy to explain the different processes that design and detailed planning pursue. SOF leaders should appreciate their organizational frame, and become reflective practitioners where they critically self-examine what typically are tacit methodologies and behaviors (Lichtenstein 2009; Schon 1992b). The SOF leader should not misapply one methodology with another, such as seeking a design inquiry to produce briefings such as those that a campaign-planning group might produce. Similarly with mixing methodologies, language also must make different applications in that words have meaning. Their meaning changes dependent on the context; many linear planning terms such as “end-state,” “problem,” “line of effort,” “center of gravity,” and others work in one context, but fail to explain in the other. The social construction of language means that our deeper justifications behind our terminology reflect our societies, organizations, and cultures (Hatch and Yanow 2008; Paparone 2008; Schon 1993). This means that design inquiries require novel language at times, and emergent processes or new methodologies that are created by iterative cycles of a design team moving from flux (abstraction) to hunch (new conceptual structure) and back (Bingham and Kahl 2013; Schon 1995; Tsoukas 2009). The SOF leader guides and mentors this iterative and nonlinear cycle differently than they do for a sequential and linear campaign design. SOF leaders also might consider how they approach the concept of risk within both the divergent design cycle and the convergent detailed planning cycle. Both treat risk differently, and both require nuanced adjustments as the organization continues its endeavors. SOF leaders should self-appraise how much interaction they have with a design team, and consider whether a design inquiry topic demands that an SOF leader “dive deep” into transforming their organization (Yu and Bower 2010). This cannot be done with intermittent slide presentations or elevator briefs; it can be executed only through extensive and iterative cycles of critical reflection, novel experimentation, and setting the conditions for innovation.

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Although there are no “silver bullets” in design, the SOF leader can at least philosophically and sociologically appreciate that the design work done by an inquiry presents a window into how their organization “makes sense of complexity” within their own values, culture, belief system, and identity. The distinction is nuanced yet essential for leadership consideration. Even if a design team does not realize their whiteboard work (or narrative or other deliverable) is not the challenging topic they are wrestling with; it is how they think about thinking about that topic. The selfreflective SOF leader might be able to gain significant perspective on both the overarching conflict context as well as how their own organization thinks about thinking (Schon 1993; Tsoukas 2009; Weick 2006). SOF leaders, when directing design inquiries as well as parallel planning efforts, must also be heedful of the challenges regarding divergence and convergence for their organization. Special operations forces operate in extremely complex, dynamic environments where frequently the strategic guidance is vague at best. In these contexts, the SOF leader cannot manufacture design in the same mechanical structures that produce exceptional detailed planning. Nor can they reverse the process and attempt to have the detailed planning endeavor gain the highly experimental and fluid processes that provide the design inquiry with the conditions for innovation. Finally, SOF leaders should seek out a variety of heuristic aids to apply when a design inquiry requires greater divergence of thought. This does not seem to be as much a concern for the reverse, as most military professionals have experienced years of convergent structures for a majority of their professional education. Thus getting a group to converge is intrinsically easier for many; divergence is not. This chapter has provided one example of a useful heuristic aid with the semiotic square. The semiotic square has been used in design inquiries and education in SOCOM and the Canadian military, as well as within other military and governmental enterprises with a variety of results. It is not a silver bullet, but an SOF leader equipped with such a cognitive tool should have greater flexibility to guide a design inquiry while assuming the role of the change agent. It is through these processes that military organizations generate novel understanding, and this new knowledge as well as design experimentation form the basis for the next generation of design doctrine, practice, and theory.

PART 2 Special Operations in Action

9 The Strategic Paradox and Third-Party Proxies Richard Rubright

While ostensibly this chapter is concerned with the utility of third-party proxies and the use of special operations forces (SOF), it is in fact much about the conduct of future warfare. War, much like strategy, may be conducted differently, but the nature of both is unchanging and ubiquitous (Gray 1999b:354). Unfortunately, the unchanging nature of war provides only general terms of reference—usually historical and with misleading clarity—and can often be confused with the changing nature of warfare—that is, the conduct of war. Pondering warfare is adequate for providing fleeting glimpses of the current juxtaposition to history and quite often profoundly inaccurate predictions of an unknowable future. Yet there are trends, macro in scope, lacking in fidelity and subject to change that may help guide our understanding of future challenges in the conduct of war—history is that guide, but only in the most general terms (Gray 2014:107). Future uncertainty is compounded by the tendency of military professionals, civil servants, and the outlying academics interested in martial subjects to focus upon challenges with relevance that are immediately apparent. Emerging technologies, new and improved weapon systems, and all manner of rediscovery of subjects previously and thoroughly examined (with exciting new names) provide a bevy of subject matter for debate and publishing opportunities. The process of find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate (F3EAD) would be new and exciting if it were not conducted by the French in the Battle of Algiers half a century ago (von Tunzelmann 2009). The discovery of the “human domain” could be revolutionary, unless of course you buy into 99

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Aristotle’s foundational idea that humans are political animals (1995:xi) and von Clausewitz’s argument that war is politics by other means (1976:271); humans have always been the most relevant aspect of war. The point here is not to lessen the value of thinking about the subject of warfare (or the profession of the author and readers), but to illustrate that transitory rediscovery of known subjects is often distracting from the strategic problems of greater temporal significance. This is to say that current challenges are important, but in a strategic vacuum, or at least a strategic paradox, they are of lesser consequence. The United States faces a fundamental strategic paradox that has additively increased its restraining effect upon its strategic flexibility. The paradox has been slowly evolving; the roots are centuries in the making as the Western conception of liberalism has perpetuated the myth of the possibility of perpetual peace (see Figure 9.1). In the simplest terms, the paradox resides in the inability of US strategic culture to permit the achievement of desired political outcomes because warfare has become

Figure 9.1 The Five Levels of War and US Strategic Context

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ritualized through constraints (Barnett 2003:130–131). The optimistic angle is that nothing in the future is ensured and the United States has a history of adaptation when confronted by challenges. The paradox can be broken, but the paradox is also likely to be the single greatest challenge the US military, and US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in particular, will face in the conduct of war in the coming century.

An Irregular Future The technologic advantage of the US military will likely remain until China reaches parity with the United States, within a few decades at most (Gray 2007:172). While the technical advantages of the US military are profound, they also represent a second-order effect of selfneutralization. China specifically recognized the extreme lethality of the technically oriented conventional forces that the United States developed in the later stages of the Cold War (Federation of American Scientists 1996). After the Vietnam War and the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, the US Army may have relegated irregular warfare to a secondclass military standing, other countries realized that an asymmetrical conflict had become the only viable counter to US military might. In many ways the investment of conventional capability has reached a culminating strategic point in which further investment will not provide the same return relative to other means. I do not imply that the culminating point has taken on terminal context. Rather, for a time, US conventional forces are unlikely to meet opponents within a conventional force-onforce context. In the meantime, the future is far more likely to see irregular threats to US national interests rather than state-backed conventional threats (Kiras 2008:227). SOF will continue to bear the brunt of future commitments, given the public’s war fatigue, while working by, with, and through proxy and indigenous forces. Fundamentally, irregular or otherwise, war is about achieving political objectives through the imposition of will, as von Clausewitz elegantly and perhaps obtusely (in his writing) observed. This means the use of violence and fear, as politically incorrect as many may find such a definition. The other timeless strategic thinker, Sun Tzu, would agree in principle if not within the method. It is important to note that war is not about winning. The idea of winning wars is a truly unfortunate semantic designation. To win falls somewhere between horse racing and a lucky scratch-off without any meaning in modern or irregular conflict. With “win the current fight” as a line of effort at SOCOM, one must ask what that actually entails (Special Operations Command 2013a). What does a “win” actually entail as a strategic end? Does “win” have any relevance within a strategic framework, or

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does it simply supply a slogan, culturally comfortable as a neat construct with a hyper-real sense of finality? The United States is not going to “win” against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) because it is as much an ideology as it is an entity. The United States may be successful in achieving certain political objectives—perhaps degrading the organization—but the underlying ideology is not something the United States can “win” against. The fate of the ideology is in the hands of Muslims in the Middle East. Politicians demonstrate strategic ignorance when making claims or promises to “destroy” ISIS. Such a course of action would require the destruction of the people who support the ideology, which is not something Western democratic leaders will support (Borger and Wintour 2014). The fact that near-term future conflicts for the United States will be irregular in nature against violent extremist organizations means that the United States will be combating an underlying ideology that is supported by a segment of a given population. This population is sometimes recognized as up to 10–15 percent. In the past, such populations and the insurgents they support have been underestimated. ISIS was classified as a “junior varsity squad” in comparison to al-Qaeda (Contorno 2014), and Iraqi insurgents were referred to as “dead-enders” by individuals who preferred to downplay the significance of either emerging threat (Chandrasekaran 2006:96–89). Whether an insurgency starts as a terrorist organization or not, to exist insurgencies must have political support of some percentage of a population. The past fifteen years of conflict have provided ample lessons in the importance of the human terrain and other human-to-human connections within the strategic contexts of the conflicts. As each context is unique, so too must be each effort. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan is not counterinsurgency in Iraq, just as counterinsurgency in Anbar province, Iraq, is not counterinsurgency in Diyala province, Iraq. SOCOM’s recognition of the value and importance of the interagency community to obtain success in these varied conflicts speaks volumes about the adaptability of the military as a learning institution and the ability develop a theory of victory defined by kinetic operations alone. In essence, the US military has come to understand that all war is conducted in a strategic context in which people matter. People will have a vote on whether a political objective may be achieved. This may seem a banal observation of evidence, but it is in fact not a historical norm and is partially one of the foundational issues of the US strategic paradox. Populations have been, are, and will continue to be targets in war. The examples are legion from the historical record of Mongols, Romans, and a myriad of other cultures and peoples. More modern examples can

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be found in the Russian efforts in Chechnya and the Sri Lankan campaign to bring finality to the Tamil Tigers (United Nations 2011). Western democratic nations practiced similar warfare during the colonial period with US treatment of American Indian and Filipino insurgents standing as pertinent examples of US military participation in efforts that would now be classified as war crimes (Jones 2012:352–358). This is not an attempt to engage in revisionist judgment of past military practice. The historical period treated these activities and those who participated as normative. Such conduct of warfare will remain an option for the future but will be judged harshly by contemporary standards, while ignoring the historical efficacy of such methods. The Western world is now different through self-imposed constraints and restraints, but only when viewed through the context of time and ideological paradigms of the present. At the tactical level the US military performs brilliantly, is particularly proficient at the operational level, and mostly just contemplates the strategic level. In reality, there are five levels of war that all fall under the auspices of the umbrella of my preferred “theory” of war. Theory drives politics and policy, which in turn drive strategy, operations, and tactics in descending order. The theory is universally applicable, as the originating theory/ideology that drives the political level may be liberalism, fascism, communism, Wahhabism, and so forth. By design the US military remains below the political level in the formulation of ends, an inherently political realm. Some generals operate well at the political level, such as Eisenhower’s ability to help reorganize the Department of Defense because he understood his role was to execute policy rather than attempt to make policy (Allard 1990:118). Others such as Douglas MacArthur (and his father, Arthur MacArthur) fell to ignominy because they strayed into the political level and attempted to make policy (Halberstam 2007:592–594). Over time, the US conception of appropriate use of force has evolved, or devolved depending on perspective, because the overarching theory of liberalism has impacted the political level. Former behaviors—such as attacking American Indian villages and defining as enemy combatants Filipinos who were older than ten years of age capable of bearing arms—have become much more constrained (Jones 2012:312). This is of course a natural process of the political system to reflect the ever-evolving nature of the normative views of the population, or at least a percentage of them. To be sure, this is not meant to be a critique of liberalism (the political theory) and its impact on American society, an issue far beyond the scope of this chapter. The point is to recognize the historical trend of liberalism acting as a constraint on US strategic flexibility (Barnett 2003:130–131).

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The US strategic paradox then is that ritualization of war, based on a theory of liberalism, combined with technical superiority driving adversaries to irregular means, leaves the US military unable to impose its will on the population-centric enemy. Put another way, the United States cannot force an adversary (population) to stop supporting organizations such as ISIS beyond any normative bounds. Such a paradigm creates a strategic paradox, again, when at the political level policy statements about destroying an organization such as ISIS are then to guide strategy. With strategy as a bridge between means and ends, it becomes the proverbial bridge to nowhere when the ends are unattainable because the ritualization of war has become anathema to the nature of war. The US military is attempting to address the paradox not out of awareness, but rather out of a lack of alternatives. Contrary to popular opinion and public statements made by defense experts of all stripes, there is in fact a military solution to irregular enemies—just ask the Tamils. There is always a military solution, just not one the United States is willing to pay the political price for enacting. Given the theoretical basis within this context, it is an issue of lack of will and a moral/legal self-restraint, not a lack of means. To address the paradox, the whole-of-government or all-of-nation approach is seen as the model by which to move forward. It is ironic that this is just a rediscovery of “grand strategy,” but catchy new names always sound better than do hard-to-grasp, ill-defined, and academically dusty terms (Hart 1967:322). In theory, through the whole-of-government approach, all facets of national power are deployed to achieve the political objective. The means of strategy become more diverse and the ways more complex and the meaning of strategy in its pure form evolves, yet strategic theory remains intact. The interagency approach should address the shortfalls of purely military efforts in a modern irregular context with the attendant constraints on military strategic utility. The problem, as Peter Drucker is credited for recognizing: “culture eats strategy for breakfast.” The whole-of-government approach does not guarantee success because the enemy actually gets a vote. When the United States engages an adversary at the tactical level, it should support the operational objective and strategic objective to effect a political change in the adversary’s context. Too often the military thinks in terms of tactical action for strategic effect as a “win”; think killing Osama bin Laden and then ask what has been won? How have we affected the theoretical and political levels of Salafist Jihadism? Can we change an adversary’s theoretical underpinnings or foundations upon which its entire political paradigm rests? The answer is both yes and no; we have in the past, but the paradox will not allow us to in the future.

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So What for SOF? SOF will not, nor should it attempt, to make policy or affect political theory within the domestic realm. The separation of US military and policymaking is deeply ingrained and is meant to be so, even though it is incumbent upon the military to offer advice for the benefit of civilian leaders. Even a cursory reading of the National Security Strategy will reveal deep connections to liberalism as the foundational theoretical basis with the accompanying constraints. However, SOF do not operate within the same contextual milieu as does the United States. Typically, there are SOF in 75 to 100 countries on any given day. SOCOM, through its size limitations, must work by, with, and through host-nation cooperation to achieve US policy goals with all of the Laws of Armed Conflict and Leahy Law restrictions so implied. It is important to note that we tend to see conflicts from our own lens. There is a tendency to assume that a host nation must have the same goals as the United States. Therefore, as SOF work with other nations, there is an expectation of normative behavior by the host nation or indigenous groups that comport to our Western liberal democratic theory. The truth is that every context is different—every state and group will not have like goals—and there is certainly no guarantee of liberalism becoming the norm worldwide, and existential threats to states have a tendency lessen the regard for rules of war with an attendant move to von Clausewitz’s extreme (Rubright 2014:87). In the context of a given conflict, a myriad of pressures and perceptions will influence actors. The factors will be unique, but the means of addressing them will and do have a degree of consistency. Organizations will form to pursue a given political agenda. It is the natural evolution of any conflict. In such contexts groups with differing agendas, political goals will emerge and fight to obtain those objectives. Even a cursory survey of recent conflicts clearly shows the formation of nonstate armed groups pursuing specific goals. Iraq saw the formation of Shia militias with the prominence of the Badr Brigades and the Jaesh al-Mehdi, with the latter spawning separate special group spin-offs. The Peshmerga refused to lay down their weapons and there continued to be splits within the Kurdish population. At the same time, there was al-Qaeda in Iraq, Sunni tribal militias, and other violent Sunni groups such as Ansar al-Islam. This convoluted milieu of groups in Iraq is certainly not unique. Similar diversity was the norm in places such as Afghanistan and Colombia in the 1980s. In effect, the emergence of armed groups in chaotic situations is a normal evolution of people, power, and politics within a political vacuum that can legitimately claim sovereignty and a monopoly on the use of force. Such

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groups offer the opportunity for partnerships to further strategic goals, but they also represent risks. A proxy actor of the United States is answerable to some degree to the United States for its behavior in a conflict. If the proxy actor chooses not to behave in such a way that is normative, their strategic utility may become a liability and support could evaporate. Yet proxies of the United States find themselves in a conflict zone in which there are technically no “good guys.” They also have to deal with the realities of the milieu, which may include cooperation with other groups fighting for particular goals within the same conflict. In this case, with two examples to be subsequently examined, there becomes the possibility of the United States being quasi-aligned with a third-party proxy—that is, a proxy actor of a proxy supported by the United States. I use the term third-party proxy as opposed to surrogate and proxy to emphasize the one degree of separation between the United States and an ally or surrogate’s proxy force. This third-party proxy represents differing levels of strategic utility but much reduced levels of risk if there is no direct connection between the United States and the third-party proxy. In the examples that follow the use of third-party proxies is examined, from which a single factor can be determined as to whether third-party proxies are worth the risk they represent. A modern example to the inherent tension between strategic utility and risk can be seen in the manhunt to capture or kill former Colombian drug lord Pablo Escobar. Following the death of University of Maryland basketball star Len Bias from a cocaine overdose, there was a new emphasis on combating drugs and cocaine in particular (Evans 2008). The ensuing manhunt would take years and see involvement of SOF. While the hunt would be successful in its finality, with Escobar being killed in Medellin, Colombia, to a large degree it would be accomplished through studiously ignoring the actions of the paramilitary/vigilante organization Los Pepes (National Security Archive 2008). In the hunt for Pablo Escobar, it became clear that much of the police were corrupt, politicians had been bought off, the judiciary had been paid for or thoroughly intimidated to the point that the rule of law had broken down, and the likelihood of ever catching, trying, and incarcerating Escobar, in a real jail, was almost zero. The United States was deeply committed to catching or killing Escobar for his role in cocaine trafficking, particularly after he orchestrated the bombing of Avianca Flight 203, which resulted in the deaths of 107 people, including two US citizens, in November 1989 (McFadden 1994). In essence, the issue moved from one of criminality and law enforcement to being an issue of national security in which the application of military power was justified (Bowden 2001:81). At this point the strategic utility of Colombian law enforcement

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became a proxy actor in support of US policy goals. This is not to imply that US entities such as the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Central Intelligence Agency had not previously worked with or partnered with Colombian law enforcement, but rather that Colombian law enforcement was now strategically linked to US political objectives and the US military was authorized to help achieve those objectives. The US military in general does not make for good law enforcement and is specifically prohibited from operating in such capacity inside the United States under normal conditions (Posse Comitatus Act). There was likely no widespread appreciable understanding of the political risks associated with the hunt for Pablo Escobar. In a simple calculation, the United States would use its power to help Colombia hunt down and kill or capture Pablo Escobar, and the issue would be settled. This potentially shortsighted strategic understanding of the cocaine trade made the effort a fool’s errand if the strategic calculus was to stop the flow of drugs. Yet it can also be classified as a shrewd strategic move if the goal was to put drug kingpins on notice that taking control of sovereign states, blowing up airliners, and killing US citizens would not be tolerated. In short, Pablo Escobar’s ambition and mania could be turned to a deterrent effect. It will never be known for sure which strategic calculus was in play, but the stage was set for a third-party proxy to become a liability and therefore present a degree of risk while simultaneously offering strategic utility. As the hunt progressed it became clear that Pablo Escobar would not be easy to capture and was running an intolerable campaign of terror that included the killing of police, judges, politicians, and criminal rivals. It became clear to some in Colombia that the rule of law and the niceties by which Western democratic nations operate were not going to get the job accomplished. From this morass sprung the shadowy vigilante group Los Pepes, which in turn used the same brutal tactics of torture, extrajudicial killings, and threats to Pablo Escobar’s associates and family to systematically tear down the Medellin Cartel and eventually wear down Escobar (Bowden 2001:263). Los Pepes was studiously being ignored by US officials who understood the risk that the organization posed to the US effort if an explicit connection were ever made. While a direct link between Los Pepes and US military and agencies is extremely doubtful, there is evidence that US support was used by Colombian partners to help Los Pepes further the effectiveness of their extralegal operations (Bowden 2001:268). In this case, the third-party proxy was an effective means to achieve the strategic ends. An important distinction is that the strategic ends of the United States and the Colombian government were aligned

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to a tolerable degree. In essence, the US proxy actor was not pursuing ends that contradicted the ends sought by the United States. The fact that third-party proxies were used from a US relative perspective, while not politically correct, was an inevitable result of the conditions in Medellin. This should not be surprising and would likely be mirrored even in the United States if a criminal organization behaved as egregiously as the Medellin cartel did in Colombia. The next example is a very different vignette from which the strategic ends differed greatly. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 resulted in an unexpected long-term counterinsurgency struggle, which ended in failure for the Soviet Union (Monks 1981:15–17). The common perception of this conflict, especially within the Arab world, is that the holy warriors, or mujahidin, with the help of Allah managed through valor to throw back the atheistic Soviet war machine, resulting in the Soviet Union’s dissolution (Galeotti 1995:2). Naturally, the mujahidin who fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan picture themselves, along with their faith, as being the principal reason for the defeat of the Soviet military. And while it is true that the Soviets would not have been defeated without the mujahidin being willing to sacrifice their lives, personal valor is simply not the whole story. The common belief that technology is not a decisive implement in counterinsurgency strategy was to prove false in Afghanistan, as it did become the deciding factor in the outcome of the conflict (Rubin 1995:80). It should be noted that the Soviet use of extreme oppression and unrestricted operations against those willing to support the mujahidin was a successful tactic until technology changed the conflict (Rubright 2015; Yousaf and Adkin 1992:177). Initially, the Soviet Union had considerable trouble dealing with the mujahidin, who would prey upon the logistics lines while using guerrilla tactics to inflict casualties (Newell and Newell 1981:134). The primary mode of operation for the Soviet military was to use motorized rifle units moving with substantial artillery support and attempt to close with and kill or capture insurgent fighters (Girardet 1985:33). It quickly became apparent that such doctrine left the Soviet military extremely vulnerable and quite often unable to take effective control of substantial areas of territory. The Soviets, however, had considerable technical superiority over the insurgent forces, especially the ability to use close air support both in tactical situations and for punitive measures against population centers who supported the insurgents/mujahidin. It became clear that reliance upon ground forces alone, moving through constricted valleys and passes, was simply not an effective method of fighting in the mountainous country of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union

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developed a new doctrine that employed air mobility to quickly move forces in-theater (Rais 1994:112). This doctrine evolved into hammerand-anvil operations in which an air-mobile force would be moved into a valley while a ground force would move to squeeze civilians and mujahidin between the two forces. It became clear to the Soviets that doctrinal change to incorporate air mobility would serve them better in mountainous terrain than the use of motorized rifle divisions (Yousaf and Adkin 1992:59–61). While the common perception is that the Soviet Union entered into a quagmire in Afghanistan, it is not widely understood that the Soviet Union was in fact very much in control and was expected by both its own military and by the Reagan administration to be successful in Afghanistan. By 1984, the head of the Inter-Service Intelligence of Pakistan had similar misgivings about the likelihood of success in effectively defeating the Soviet military (Yousaf and Adkin 1992:182). In fact, by 1984, Mohammad Yousaf, the head of the Inter-Service Intelligence effort to arm and equip the mujahidin of Afghanistan, was convinced that the effort was doomed to failure unless more modern weaponry were made available to the mujahidin to counter the technical dominance of the Soviet Union. By late 1984, the Soviet military, using ruthlessly repressive measures, had driven much of the insurgents’ civilian support structure back across the Pakistani border (Rais 1994:102), with 3.5 million refugees seeking shelter in Pakistan and 1.5 million refugees seeking shelter in Iran (Urban 1988:157). The people of Afghanistan were either being repressed to the point of compliance or being driven out of the country. This period in the SovietAfghan conflict is often ignored, as it does not reflect the ideal prowess of the Arab or Muslim mujahidin, nor does it portray particularly favorably the halfhearted US support to the mujahidin. It became quite clear by 1984 that the mujahidin, to have any chance of success, required an ability to negate the threat of Soviet close air support and the threat of Soviet helicopter gunships that were making punitive raids on Afghan villages without repercussions (Yousaf and Adkin 1992:180). The mujahidin, up until that point, had been supplied with shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles in an attempt to counter the Soviet air threats (Carew 2000:270). These weapons proved to be completely inadequate for the job. Specifically, while such missiles were available in fairly large numbers, they had the limitation of needing to be generally above and always behind the target to be effective: such opportunities are exceedingly rare. The Stinger missile removed the viability of close air support as a tactical advantage for Soviet military forces in Afghanistan, and this

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changed the military strategic context in which the conflict was being fought. The first result was an inability of Soviet aircraft to effectively carry out punitive raids against Afghan population centers that were known, or suspected, to support insurgents, because they could not operate at low altitudes (Keaney 2006). Therefore, the mujahidin supply bases, which in reality consisted of villages in remote areas of Afghanistan, became sanctuaries that could be threatened only by the use of ground forces with the attendant risks of ambush and vulnerability of logistics trains. The second result, and more important for the overall strategic context of the conflict, was that this ensured that combat between Soviet military forces and the mujahidin took place as direct-fire ground engagements or indirect fire to harass Soviet base areas. In such a context the mujahidin were still at a tactical disadvantage to superior Soviet military firepower but, as was the case for the US military in Vietnam, the overall effect was to transform the conflict into an attrition style of warfare. The mujahidin, given an almost endless supply of volunteer insurgent fighters, albeit still at a severe technical and tactical disadvantage, were capable of inflicting a constant stream of Soviet casualties. The Soviet Union may have been able to foresee the introduction of technical tools that would challenge the Soviet mastery on the battlefield at the military strategic level, and they may have simply assumed that the United States would be unwilling to give such advanced technical capabilities to the mujahidin. This highlights the dangers of conducting counterinsurgency operations through brutal repression, with the resultant increased likelihood of resistance from the population, if the campaign cannot be effectively continued through to its full conclusion. In the case of Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation, the Pakistani safe areas, combined with the technical capabilities of the Stinger missile, guaranteed a defeat of the Soviet intervention in the long term. However, without the introduction of the Stinger missile into Afghanistan, it is quite unlikely that the mujahidin would have been successful in resisting the Soviet occupation, and the Soviet counterinsurgency strategy of brutal repression would very likely have succeeded until the breakup of the Soviet Union itself. The important difference between the uses of third-party proxies in this case is that the support to the proxy was unconditional and the Inter-Service Intelligence, as an agent of Pakistani interests, were not aligned with US strategic interests. Pakistan saw a weak and divided Afghanistan as a strategic rear area in case of conflict with India. The United States saw the Soviet expansion into Afghanistan as an opportunity to bleed the Soviet Union (maybe a bit of payback for Vietnam)

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and the continuation of the containment of communism. While these two strategic interests were not at odds with each other, the fact is they were not aligned as was the case in Colombia. Furthermore, while the emergence of third-party proxies is an inevitable result of the environment, the third-party proxies’ strategic aims were also not in harmony with the policy ends or strategic goals of the United States.

Conclusion The world is becoming more complex, but not to the point it is unrecognizable. The United States faces a strategic paradox in which its strategic culture is at odds with the timeless nature of war causing its conduct of warfare to be disconnected from reality. To overcome this paradox the United States, mostly by accident and due to war fatigue of the American electorate, will seek to work by, with, and through hostnation and proxy forces. This SOF-focused future will be combined with adversaries who recognize that the military prowess of the United States at the tactical and operational level causes an asymmetrical or irregular context for future conflicts. In these future conflicts the emergence of third-party actors will be, and is, a naturally occurring phenomenon; Syria is a typical case in point. Third-party actors have the potential to be third-party proxies that can provide SOF with more localized tools to achieve US strategic goals. The question becomes one of risk versus utility. That calculus should not be made upon the assumption of the old proverb “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” as Afghanistan clearly showed. The calculus for SOF use of third-party proxies needs to be one of whether a proxy actor and the third-party proxy has the same strategic ends. The reasons for those ends will differ, but the overall ends should be in harmony, as the case of Colombia shows. The fact that third-party proxies provide plausible deniability for US forces when it comes to dirty but potentially necessary work, an ability to circumvent Leahy vetting or the Laws of Armed Conflict is simply an ancillary benefit, and one that must be carefully monitored to prevent risk outweighing utility. The final arbiter of SOF’s use of and the utility of third-party proxies should be based on common strategic goals.

10 Russia’s Response to the New Western Way of War Charles K. Bartles

Approximately one year before Russia annexed Crimea, General Valery Gerasimov, chief of the Russian General Staff, outlined his vision of the future of warfare in a February 26, 2013, article in Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer (Military-Industrial Courier) titled “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying Out Combat Operations.” In this article, Gerasimov (2013) sees the future of warfare as a blending of the instruments of national power to create favorable outcomes: “In the 21st century, a tendency toward the elimination of the differences between the states of war and peace is becoming discernible. Wars are now not even declared, but having begun, are not going according to a pattern we are accustomed to” (2013). Correct Terminology: “Hybrid Warfare” or “Indirect and Asymmetric Methods”? Gerasimov’s article has been interpreted, and reinterpreted, by several different authors since its publication. One of the first notable attempts was by Colonel S. G. Chekinov and Lieutenant-General S. A. Bogdanov (2013) in a Military Thought article titled “The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War,” in which Gerasimov’s theory was expanded. Janis Berzins (2014), a Latvian academic, used this article as the basis for his schematic of the eight phases of Russian new-generation war, which has become one of the most frequently cited pieces on the topic. Several Russian and non-Russian pundits have been quick to

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point out that at no time did Gerasimov ever mention these eight phases of new-generation war, or “hybrid warfare” as Western analysts have dubbed it. They have also noted that the new forms and methods of warfare mentioned in Gerasimov’s article were not really new at all but a continuation of methods developed in Soviet times. Although these points can be well argued, I propose in this chapter that the idea of Russian hybrid warfare, as dubbed by the West, would be better described by the Russian term “indirect and asymmetric methods” (neprymyk i asimmetrichnykh sposobov), which is used in 2014 Russian military doctrine and was used by Gerasimov when he described his vision of the new way of warfare (Russian Ministry of Defense 2014).

What Is New: The Four-to-One Ratio—Nonmilitary Versus Military Measures Perhaps the “new” aspect of this theory of war is the relationship between the military and nonmilitary methods of war. The leveraging of all means of national power to achieve victory in state-on-state conflict is nothing new for Russia, but the primacy of effort was always focused on the military’s use of force projection. The political, economic, and informational levers were applied by the other various apparatuses of the state (e.g., foreign ministry, intelligence service), but these were generally considered far less important tools than the Soviet/Russian army. This fundamental difference can best be described by the way the militaries use the term “operational art.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff define operational art as the use of creative thinking by commanders and staffs to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. It is a thought process that uses skill, knowledge, experience, and judgment to overcome the ambiguity and uncertainty of a complex environment and understand the problem at hand. Operational art also promotes unified action by encouraging JFCs [joint force commanders] and staffs to consider the capabilities, actions, goals, priorities, and operating processes of interorganizational partners, while determining objectives, establishing priorities, and assigning tasks to subordinate forces. It facilitates the coordination, synchronization, and, where appropriate, integration of military operations with those of interorganizational partners, thereby promoting unity of effort. (2011a:1)

In practice, this definition has led the US military and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces to think about not just the military aspects of force projection but also the coordination of the

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full gamut of the state’s means of leverage to achieve a desired end state. In contrast, the definition of the term in a Soviet/Russian context is much more military-oriented. Operational art encompasses the theory and practice of preparing for and conducting operations by large units (fronts, armies) of the armed forces. It occupies an intermediate level between strategy and tactics. “Stemming from strategic requirements, operational art determines methods of preparing for and conducting to achieve strategic goals.” Operational art in turn “establishes the tasks and direction for the development of tactics.” Soviet operational art provides a context for studying, understanding, preparing for, and conducting war (Glantz 1991:9). In general, “operational art” has a significantly different meaning for Russia than for the West, though the former developed the term from its analysis of Russian doctrine. In a Russian context, operational art has typically been thought of in the way that the great Soviet military thinkers (e.g., Tukhachevsky, Svechin, and their successors) have focused solely on military matters, such as maneuvering of large military formations for optimum effect. From a Russian military perspective these new “forms and methods,” as proposed by Gerasimov, are indeed a “new” way of conducting warfare. The use of partisan forces and special operations forces (SOF), intelligence services, and propaganda to conduct provocations and shape the area of operations were certainly old tricks in the Soviet/Russian playbook, but these activities were secondary in comparison to the major actions of the conventional warfighter, who did not engage in these other activities. Russia now sees the conventional warfighter as having a role in these activities and has even published a new edition of field manuals that will assist the commander in performing “other tasks of military and nonmilitary conflict resolution.” This is a major change from previous editions of these field manuals, which concerned only high-intensity combat operations (Korabelnikov 2014). Most important, the primacy of effort has now shifted from military to nonmilitary methods, by a factor of four to one. This is indeed a new development in Russian military thinking. The Russian military will now need to be more concerned with nonmilitary methods, as are its NATO counterparts. Gerasimov’s article and the 2014 Russian military doctrine both make the point that the primary threat of regime change comes not from a nuclear attack or a conventional invasion but from nonmilitary sources, such as “color revolutions.” Although nuclear deterrence capability is still required, Russia believes it must now focus on military and nonmilitary methods to deter such a threat (Gvosdev and Marsh 2014:171–172, 246; McDermott 2014).

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Russian Indirect and Asymmetric Methods in Response to the “Western Way of War” Another reason that Gerasimov’s theory should be considered new stems from the context in which the theory was developed. His theory is not a Russian-specific prescription for warfare; rather it is a theory of how warfare, in general, is being conducted. In his view these “new forms and methods” were first practiced by the United States and Great Britain and are becoming the new “Western way of war.” As discussed previously, nonmilitary methods would be used at a four-to-one ratio in relation to military methods. In the Russian view, the “color revolutions” and Arab Spring movement were Western (primarily US and British) implementations of these new forms and methods. As described at a conference on the subject recently in Moscow, Russian defense minister Shoigu was quoted as saying that color revolutions were a new form of warfare invented by Western governments seeking to remove national governments in favor of ones that are controlled by the West, in order to force foreign values on a range of nations. He made the argument that the same scheme has been used in a wide range of cases, with the initial goal of changing the government through supposedly popular protests, shifting into efforts at destabilizing and fomenting internal conflict if the protesters are not successful. This scheme was used in Serbia, Libya, and Syria—all cases where political in interference by the West transitioned into military action. Now the same scheme is being followed in Ukraine, where the situation in recent weeks has become a virtual civil war, and in Venezuela, where the so-called democratic opposition is actually organized by the United States (Papert 2014:1).

According to Russian military theorists, these new ways of warfare were promoted by strong informational resources (e.g., internet, social media) and were further propagated by Western government-sponsored nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). As nations attempt to quell the unrest caused by these methods, the West is quick to use diplomatic means to “tie the hands” of these nations from using greater degrees of force as they attempt to maintain order. If the West’s goals are achieved, the government will be toppled and a new Western-friendly government will be installed. If not, the West will resort to economic sanctions and eventually use human rights abuses as a pretext for the introduction of military means, such as no-fly zones, SOF, and air strikes (Cordesman 2014). From a Russian view, the West would much prefer a manageable chaos than the stability of an unfriendly tyrant. These new methods and forms, and hence Gerasimov’s theory, cannot be seen as only a theory for how future conflicts will be conducted by Russia, but rather should be considered a descriptive theory of how

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modern warfare has been developed by the West. His theory can be considered a key motivator behind the changes to Russia’s 2014 military doctrine. Russia’s de-emphasis on its nuclear arsenal and increased emphasis on conventional assets and nonmilitary methods as guarantors of sovereignty are viewed as essential countermeasures to Western indirect and asymmetric methods of war. The military’s new emphasis on nonmilitary means illustrates the primary innovation within the Russian armed forces. In addition, it sheds light on how President Putin viewed the chain of events leading to Ukrainian president Yanukovych’s exit, and how he sees current economic and political sanctions that have been levied against the Russian Federation as new nonmilitary methods and forms of war being directed against Russia (Escobar 2014).

Russian Application of Indirect and Asymmetric Methods Undoubtedly, at the time of the publication of General Gerasimov’s article he had no idea that a chain of events would lead to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and activities in eastern Ukraine. However, in March 2014 this theory was put into practice, as Russia focused its instruments of national power on these very activities. Gerasimov’s theory of war presents a new way of conducting war, where warfare is started long before any official acknowledgment, if acknowledged at all. This new way of conducting warfare is preceded by persistent, subtle, and not-so-subtle information operations to shape the area of operations by legitimizing and delegitimizing the various actors in the conflict as needed. These information operations are combined with economic, diplomatic, and other covert activities to weaken enemy resistance. Indeed, the theory is predicated upon the firm belief that regular military forces should be used only as a last resort—and only when their inclusion will result in a clear victory. This new form of warfare makes it more difficult to distinguish the lines between strategic, operational, and tactical military objectives. All state assets are theoretically enlisted into the fight. Business, economic, information, and even religious assets work in concert with security and military forces to attain the political objective. On paper, this “powervertical” model looks impressive; the reality is somewhat different. Because command and control is so widely dispersed, relatively minor military activities, such as shooting down a civilian airliner by an errant air defense system, can have great strategic impacts. Russia’s updated theory of warfare can in many ways be attributed to the lessons learned from military conflicts in the post-Soviet era, particularly the conflicts in Chechnya and Georgia. Russian military theorists

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have also drawn conclusions from US experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as other conflicts. Russian force projection through the application of these new forms and methods will most likely occur in what is often referred to as the Russkiy Mir (Russian world). This is an important concept for understanding Russia’s new theory of war. In other theories, a sovereign state’s interests generally stop squarely at the border, but one aspect of the idea of Russkiy Mir promotes a belief that the Russian state’s national interest extends throughout the Russian information space, even when that information space crosses international borders, as it often does in Russia’s near abroad. The concept of Russkiy Mir is far more than just an idea that legitimizes Russian action outside of its borders; it also contains a broader concept that transcends language and culture and outlines a certain Russian worldview, one that puts an emphasis on the primacy of the state and traditional cultural values instead of the West’s emphasis on the individual and ideals of liberal democracy (Kudors 2010). Russia’s actions in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine could all be described as occurring in the Russkiy Mir. The Russian playbook for force projection in the Russkiy Mir has arguably involved a full-court press of the elements of national power, beginning with economic pressure and intense information operations to shape domestic and foreign perceptions. As the information operation campaign ramps up, ethnic Russian separatists, or any other groups in the region with antigovernment leanings and pro-Russian sympathies, will be exploited and primed for action. A population of ethnic separatists (either ethnic Russians or those favorably disposed toward Russia) is a key component for facilitating the introduction of follow-on forces, such as Cossacks, volunteers from Russia, private security companies, and undeclared military forces, into the conflict by providing legitimacy as protectors of the aggrieved separatists. These follow-on forces find a safe haven with the separatists while conducting provocative activities intended to elicit a strong military response from the host government. Eventually, in response to these provocations, the host government deems fit the use of more heavyhanded tactics to suppress these subversive activities. While the host government is struggling to control a downward-spiraling security situation, the Russian Federation uses diplomatic, economic, and informational means to pressure and criticize the target government for its handling of the separatists’ subversive activities. In most cases, the desired end state is de facto Russian control of separatist-occupied areas. This control is secured by the use of Russian peacekeeping forces, preferably requested by the United Nations or some other multilateral institution, to maintain peace between the separatists and the other Russian-backed forces and the

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military of the host government. The Russian Federation’s vision of future warfare has required Russia to use its military forces in new ways rarely used in Soviet times, such as through the use of undeclared military forces (e.g., “polite people” and “little green men”) and peacekeepers. The desire for deniability, an implied requirement for part of Gerasimov’s theory, is causing Russia to further develop and consider the development of military means that can provide degrees of separation between their activities and the Russian government. The West often refers to this as “plausible deniability,” but in the context of recent Russian activities it might be better termed “absolute deniability,” as absolutely any Russian action, no matter how blatant, can be explained away. The denial of Russian military involvement in eastern Ukraine, despite the presence of new Russian military hardware, reports of substantial casualties and funerals for Russian troops, and claims that Russian troops caught fighting are simply “on leave,” are examples of Russia’s use of “absolute deniability” (McCoy 2014; Pivovarchuk 2014; Kostyuchenko 2014).

Russian Military Means for the Conduct of Indirect and Asymmetric Methods Undeclared Forces The most striking aspect of Russia’s Crimean campaign was the appearance of the “polite people” and “little green men” on the streets of Crimea. Russia’s gambit of deploying undeclared forces into Crimea was undeniably successful. The deniability of such forces gave Russia sufficient time to secure Crimea and organize elections without suffering the international condemnation that an overt invasion would have brought. Although the initial success of this gambit is not likely to be repeated, undeclared forces are, and will continue to be, an important component in the Russian toolbox (RIA Novosti 2014; Bartles and McDermott 2014). In the West the term military is typically associated with uniformed service members whose primary occupation is warfighting and who serve under ministries (departments) of defense. In Russia the term military is applied much more broadly due to the militarization of the police (internal security services) and intelligence services. Uniformed officers and conscripts serve in these organizations just as they serve under the Ministry of Defense. The use of undeclared forces will include not just Ministry of Defense forces but also other forces from Russia’s militarized intelligence and security forces. Although in the West the use of undeclared forces would undoubtedly be solely a special operations or intelligence services mission, in the Russian system this is not the case.

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Russia has had no qualms about utilizing in this capacity elite but nonSOF units, such as the naval infantry and airborne forces, and even has used conventional line units when deemed necessary. Peacekeepers Russia’s use of peacekeepers in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria has taught Russia that the use of military force is considered abhorrent in the international community, but that the same use of military force used in the context of peacekeeping is perfectly acceptable and even lauded by the same community. Russia is using peacekeepers, or more accurately the threat of peacekeepers, in eastern Ukraine to temper Ukrainian efforts to crush the ongoing Russian-sponsored insurgencies in Lugansk and Donetsk. Russia’s new fascination with peacekeeping has caused a rapid expansion of peacekeeping capabilities within the Russian military. Traditionally, peacekeeping duties were the sole purview of the airborne forces, which have one dedicated peacekeeping brigade, the 31st Air Assault Brigade at Ulyanovsk, and dedicated battalions in each of the four airborne divisions. In the past few years Russia has expanded the number of peacekeeping forces by designating dedicated peacekeeping battalions in each of its naval infantry brigades and transitioning the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade in Samara to the first dedicated motorized rifle peacekeeping brigade in the Russian armed forces. Currently there are plans for another motorized rifle peacekeeping brigade to be established in Tuva. The designation of “peacekeeping” is considered to be very prestigious in the Russian armed forces, as these units receive top-notch personnel and equipment, including the newest and best-armored personnel carriers and unmanned aerial vehicles (Interfax 2014). Cossacks Historically, the Cossacks were known for being the tsar’s enforcers and, somewhat contradictorily, for being free spirits with a long tradition of resistance to established authority. That said, it seems strange that in today’s Russia, a country with a rigidly centralized and authoritarian government, a quasi-military organization such as a Cossack unit is being formed and utilized, yet that is very much the case. In 2005 Russia passed a federal law on state service of the Russian Cossacks, to clarify the Cossacks’ legal status and allow them to form paramilitary units to fulfill limited law enforcement duties. Today’s Cossacks are split into eleven region-based organizations, each led by a hetman (general) and usually conducting state-contracted security work. Russian Cossacks have been key players in providing domestic security, such as

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in the North Caucasus, but they have also been some of the first bootson-the-ground in Transnistria and Ukraine (Sivkov 2014). Private Military Companies Russia has keenly watched the development of private military companies in the West and is now expressing interest in developing its own private security companies by creating a legal framework to more easily facilitate the operations of these types of forces. Traditionally, Russia has desired to maintain a monopoly on instruments of violence, but new thinking is changing the way this topic is viewed. Although the use of private military companies is in its infancy in Russia, the political advantages of having an undeclared military force with degrees of separation between itself and the Russian government is likely viewed as highly advantageous, as the Russian view of warfare blurs the line between war and peace. The business of private militaries is likely to be one of the few areas of the Russian economy that will be expanding in the next several years (Butina 2014; RAPSI News 2014). Foreign Legionnaires Russian state Duma deputy Roman Khudyakov has proposed the establishment of a Russian version of the French Foreign Legion in Central Asia. The purpose of such a force would be to fend off potential Islamic militants who could threaten the region as US/NATO troops withdraw from Afghanistan; he also mentions the possibility of using such a force to handle the current situation in eastern Ukraine. Although his proposal is unlikely to be implemented in the current Central Asian political environment, in the event of a failed post-Soviet Central Asian state scenario, which is certainly plausible in these states with strong ethnic tensions and no clear paths for the succession of senior leadership, Khudyakov’s proposal may become a more attractive idea if Russia finds itself needing to take a more active role in post-Soviet Central Asia (Molotov 2014). Special Operations Forces In the West, the term spetsnaz is often thought of being equivalent to special operations forces, but in Russian the word special is used in a very broad way that can indicate the unit has a very narrow area of specialization or is an elite combat unit (Glantz 1991). Although some Russian spetsnaz units may perform approximately the same tasks as Western SOF units, they still have significant doctrinal differences, in that spetsnaz units are doctrinally and logistically bound to the conventional ground forces commander by functioning as his eyes and ears. In the Russian system, these assets are controlled by the intelligence staff section.

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In early 2013 Russia established a special operations command (Gavrilov 2013; Marsh 2016). The significance of this command is that it was not placed under the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff but instead under a different staff section. This is a substantial deviation from precedent and suggests this new command will be less involved with reconnaissance and more involved with direct action, especially because the unit will reportedly have organic aviation and logistics support. There has been little reporting on the activities of its roughly 1,000 personnel, but it is likely the unit is at some level engaged in the current activities in eastern Ukraine (Bartles and McDermott 2014; Marsh 2015, 2016). Although Russian SOF are new and gaining a higher profile, primacy still remains with the elite conventional forces. In general, many “SOF missions” from a Western perspective are performed by elite Russian units (e.g., Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, naval infantry, Cossacks) that are not SOF units. Information Warriors The domination of the information domain is seen as an essential in Gerasimov’s new theory of war. Development of its cyber capabilities has been an area of interest to Russia for some time. Information warfare, in this context, refers to capabilities to promote and vilify as needed to shape public opinion at home and abroad through traditional mass communications (e.g., television, newspapers, radio) and through additional, newer, personal methods, such as social media. Much as the maneuver commander marshals his forces and practices military deception (maskirovka) to favorably shape the area of operations to achieve victory, today’s Russia must do the same in the information domain to achieve the same result. Information warfare capabilities are in both the military and the nonmilitary spheres of power. Mass communications, such as domestic news outlets and RT.com, which are directed toward foreign audiences, are typically considered a nonmilitary capability (Russia views RT.com as a countermeasure to CNN). On a more personal level, Russia has reportedly engaged the services of professional bloggers to promote Russian-government viewpoints to shape perceptions. Aside from these obvious attempts to sway perceptions, there are likely more subtle approaches being pondered, such as the sponsorship or development of Russian-favorable NGOs and think tanks. Whatever happens with these activities, undoubtedly Russian information warfare capabilities will grow substantially in both military and nonmilitary capacities, as there have already been some calls for the establishment of “information troops” in the Russian armed forces. The development of military information warfare capabilities and how they are applied

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to General Gerasimov’s theory will be one of the most interesting topics for future researchers (Garmazhapova 2013; Tabarintsev-Romanov 2014; Thomas 2011; Pomerantsev and Weiss 2014).

Conclusion Russia’s indirect and asymmetric methods are seen as a response and countermeasure to similar methods initially developed in the West. The use of such methods requires a synthesis of all the state’s tools for projecting state power. Although the use of all of the state’s means to enact an outcome is nothing new for the Soviets/Russians, never before has this effort been so well coordinated and executed. Russia believes that the most likely threat to its sovereignty is no longer a threat that can be deterred with nuclear weapons or a large conscript army, although nuclear deterrence capabilities are still necessary. General Gerasimov’s article and the 2014 Russian military doctrine tacitly acknowledge that the greatest threat of regime change comes not from overt military invasion but from a “color revolution” or Arab Spring–like scenario. In the view of many Russian leaders, such a regime change may well be Western-sponsored. Russia’s theory of warfare requires conventional military forces that can be used in new ways (such as in an undeclared capacity or as peacekeepers) and has required Russia to look at developing new means (such as implementing an SOF command as well as using Cossacks, private military companies, and foreign legionnaires) to combat the new “Western way of war.” Although Russia perceives the development of indirect and asymmetric methods as essential for countering Western aggression, these same means will be equally useful for conducting offensive operations and will allow Russia to conduct war as the West does. In short, Russia’s indirect and asymmetric methods should be viewed not as proactive and aggressive but instead as reactive and defensive measures designed to be Russia’s response to the new Western way of war.

11 Psychological Operations to Counter Online Radicalization Paul S. Lieber and Peter J. Reiley

While the territory once held by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is significantly diminished, the number of attacks waged by the organization remains at a steady pace. Within Europe, for example, the amount of thwarted ISIS attempts seems mutually exclusive from land holds in the Middle East (Callimachi 2018). A second example lies in southern India, where six individuals “had got together and formed an ISIS terror module named Ansarul Khilafa-KL over social media platforms and had made preparations to carry out terrorist attacks against prominent persons, including judges, police officers and politicians, and also against foreign nationals and rationalists” (Asian Age 2018). Thankfully, the allied interagency is seemingly up to the challenge, as evidenced by its ability to prevent these increasing attacks from reaching fruition. Still, and as evidenced by both European trends and a burgeoning African terror base, ISIS continues to spread its message and attract others to it. Coalition forces recently launched extensive cyber, air, and ground attacks aimed at the heart and headquarters of ISIS to break the group’s grip on these territories and end its ability to inspire or direct terrorist attacks abroad (Baron 2016). While a military victory would deny ISIS these safe havens, it would not solve the problems ISIS has created in the psychological and sociological aspects of the human domain; this can be achieved only through comprehensive engagement in the narrative space (Moore et al. 2016). As evidenced in Europe, ISIS is alive and well in its efforts to radicalize. This was seconded by current US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) commander General Raymond Thomas: “Despite suffering 125

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significant battlefield losses, both ISIS and [al-Qaeda] remain potent in terms of ideology and the means to promulgate it and determined to pursue their nihilistic objectives. We will continue to face future challenges as these groups exploit the lack of partner capacity and undergoverned areas” (Special Operations Command 2018). Special operations forces (SOF) maintain a range of core competencies to counter insurgent and terrorist threats across multiple domains, including employing military information support operations (MISO, formerly psychological operations) aimed at engaging these central human elements (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2014a). Conducting MISO through, or supported with, social media can be an effective form of persistent engagement, providing a timely message with extensive reach. The Department of Defense (DoD) must be prepared to operate effectively in the modern information environment and prevent adversaries like ISIS from gaining asymmetric or even decisive advantages.

ISIS Social Media Arguably the most confounding aspect of ISIS is the organization’s unprecedented ability to capitalize on social media to further its efforts (al-Tamimi 2014; Brooking and Singer 2016). To explain, while the potency and relatively low cost of social media are well known in both influence and commerce circles, few—if any—would have predicted ISIS’s effectiveness in applying this medium in recruiting and sustaining foreign fighter flow into key war zones (Johnson 2015). “The use of social media during terrorist attacks to incite and engage with followers and report to the media . . . is a new phenomenon, changing traditional notions of how terrorist groups communicate and organize,” said CNN national security analyst Peter Bergen (Tadjdeh 2014:24). Current Federal Bureau of Investigations director Christopher Wray said it best, in that “terrorism today moves at the speed of social media” (CBS News 2018). Mainstream defense and intelligence analysts reason that ISIS’s apparent domination within social media is a byproduct of advanced reach and message authenticity (Metz 2015), meaning that anywhere the United States “wants to penetrate, ISIS is already there . . . and with more powerful and resonant messaging. Statistically, the Joint Terrorism Task Force, an organization which includes the FBI and other federal, state and local agencies, receives about 15,000 tips a year. This equates to 40 per day or two an hour” (CBS News 2018). Similarly, ISIS is also proving capable of echoing Russian information operations’ approaches to conducting misinformation campaigns in these spaces, ones they are already familiar with (Leetaru 2018). When threats are found to contain merit, DoD, State Department, and intelligence agency efforts to counter ISIS messaging are most often

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tit-for-tat affairs: be faster, louder, and dominate the social media landscape to drown out the omnipresent ISIS narrative, and in doing so ensure you do not accidentally offend the target audience (West 2016). In theory, this principle seems like sound reasoning. It is no different from conventional MISO leaflet messaging, where presenting alternative perspectives to target audiences provides at least recognition of countering viewpoints. To vulnerable audiences surrounded by an array of perspectives, presence is a prerequisite for any eventual success (Munoz 2012). Still, this approach carries with it unwanted side effects. Making one’s presence known also enables opposition to proactively plan countermeasures. In the ISIS example, it is more familiar with native messaging conventions, and already possesses established messaging networks. Thus ISIS has an inherent advantage over the United States if the latter chooses to engage with similar audiences and fails to celebrate information victories when they occur (West 2016). Unfortunately—and over time—this level of counteractivity only strengthens ISIS’s foothold. There are only a finite number of opportunities to play cat-and-mouse before the cat surrounds the entire area with deadly and enticing mousetraps. US messaging may become watered down and irrelevant as alternative perspectives have only so many options to survive. They are reinforcing the validity of the cat, per se (Eichenwald 2015; Zakaria 2015), also affording the adversary more opportunity to discredit via misinformation initiatives. Moreover—and in many instances—areas of ISIS penetration are ones with unsophisticated media environments. Akin to Afghanistan, the United States was drawn to respond to threat-group, social media efforts in full force, and with this it oversaturated a messaging environment barely penetrated by native media, let alone media from external entities. This unnatural marriage became even more apparent as messaging featured complex subject matter of religion, violence, and ethnic obligation. Looking at the Afghanistan media market today, one sees an alarming, knee-jerk aftermath of billions of dollars spent in hopes of convincing a populace comfortable with traditional forms of communication to make complex decisions via alternative ones (Sreberny 2008). Even in more developed Europe and India, unnatural interventions can trouble a population, weakening an already vulnerable information landscape. The very presence of counter-messaging can substantiate legitimacy of an adversary, leaving locals to consider alternatives by default.

Avoiding Measurement Faux Pas Noting all this, it should come as little to no surprise that accompanying attempts to measure social media effectiveness continue to prove an elusive task (Hoffman and Fodor 2010). With so much competing noise

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within formerly semi-quiet spaces, determining true measures of effectiveness—let alone measures capable of replication—seems unobtainable. In the place of measures of effectiveness emerged an overreliance on trend data, most often obtained within these same social media channels as native-language surveys about core belief systems. While trend data can yield useful insights about foundational values (Kiecolt and Nathan 1985), they add little connecting attitude and opinion formation to behavioral intent. In the ISIS instance, this is perhaps where ideological and corresponding foreign fighter flow correlate (West 2016). From a perspective of data visualization, what began as word clouds morphed into supposed predictive mechanisms about nodes and media space. Communication frequency and communicator associations served as desired outcomes. The glaring problem with this paradigm is that clever messaging can manipulate network and message tracking systems to present a semblance of a network and overamplify the relevance of individuals within them (Kossinets and Watts 2006). Monitored messaging and individuals can be covers for something a great deal more nefarious, and derived from completely different algorithms entirely. A game theorist can take this battle of wills to the next level, in— noting a misdirection—an attempt to unravel the misdirection formula. For the United States, this could equate to a “bluffing the bluffer” chess match (Camerer 2003): a delicate but controlled messaging campaign aimed at uncovering true intent while publicly attacking the secondary misdirection campaign as a seeming end goal. As any marketing scholar can attest to, however, all of these interventions only make the situation worse. With every intervention— misdirection or otherwise—a messaging system becomes corrupted, and potentially ineffective (Shiv, Carmon, and Ariely 2005). And with this comes the opportunity to effect change in a desired direction. Thus comes a third variable, of delicately trying to sustain some element of a natural messaging system—within a potential misdirection campaign—in attempts to uncover true intent or network movements behind them.

Linking Attitudes to Behavioral Intent Combined, this maneuvering becomes an exhausting exercise, all the while unclear if it is even addressing the true goal at the tail end of messaging warfare. Even in an ideal scenario, there is no perfect method to prove behavioral causality derived from persuasive messaging. Related, any and every messaging intervention—as evidenced in the Afghanistan example—comes at a literal and often very expensive price (Nixon 2014). Investing hundreds of millions of dollars, poten-

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tially three stages removed from the actual problem, or nonprescriptive to adversary behaviors, never briefs well. This conundrum produced an unfortunate and additional side effect of giving rise to a boutique industry of ex-military and intelligence personnel producing behavioral prediction solutions claiming to address all of these steps (Duncan 2016). Their popularity is not surprising; any form of potential measurement answer—even if not statistically correlated to the problem set at hand—is certainly more welcome than admiring a seeming impossibility of solving terror-group recruitment and fighter flow. This is in no way, shape, or form intended to criticize these businesses or solutions. Per the preceding discussion, they are working off of decades of experience in psychological operations and some offer sound approaches. Their systems are capable of informing trend information in traditional media markets and broad audiences. Likewise, they highlight overt shifts among opinion leaders within them. The plot hole is an unprecedented adversary and problem space. ISIS is not a nation-state but has global reach. It is reinventing itself almost weekly following regional events of significance, often by other actors. Moreover, the social media platform landscape changes almost overnight, as do the security mechanisms to protect or infiltrate it. There is no realistic way to traditionally hunt an asymmetric adversary changing not only in appearance but also in location and even species (Metz 2015). A final wrinkle is the challenge in determining to what extent potent Russian influence campaigns are deliberately confounding this hunt (Giles 2017). Every day it becomes more and more apparent just how far and wide Russian-based information operations are impacting US opinion-shaping efforts domestically and abroad.

Employing Fundamentals Still, and while the rules have changed, the concept of an ideologically based social movement with military intent is as old as civilization itself. Mirroring its predecessors, ISIS relies on cutting-edge technology platforms used in alternative ways. It does so expecting that its adversaries—being traditional in structure—will be behind the curve in adapting to the threat (Metz 2015). Ironically, however, an old-school approach to countering the ISIS threat is exactly what is needed. With near-infinite resources to communicate and cross-pollinate messaging, military and marketing experts tasked with solving the ISIS problem seemingly forgot the very foundations of influence operations. Traditional media measurement models are derived from social science theory—qualitative (focus-group) and quantitative (survey)

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instruments featuring validated and proven constructs intended to gauge underlying attitude and opinion drivers to eventual behaviors (Bryman 2008). Returning to these concepts—trusting social science theory and proven measures to predict future ones—also ensures that unwanted/unknown error is not inserted into the system. In doing so, measurement criteria do not become the cart leading the horse in being too ISIS-centric or devoid of a baseline to compare against. The white elephant in the room with such an approach is that military leadership must accept—in funds allocated and acceptance of success/failure—that attitudes and opinions can predict but never cause behavior. Even the most reliable social science instruments can— at best—statistically and significantly predict correlations between underlying attitudes and opinions, and desired behaviors.

Assessing ISIS Influence All this offers a potential, though perhaps not ideal, solution for a seemingly unconquerable ISIS recruitment problem. To do so, practitioners tasked with solving it must first shift lenses to focus on underlying attitudes and beliefs versus an ISIS recruitment albatross. Justifications for recruitment are based on a series of core attitudes and opinions, all of which can be measured. This measurement features social science theorybased, validated instruments designed to measure these very same attitudes and opinions (Converse and Presser 1986). Any good measurement consists of multiple methods. Qualitative interviewing can be invaluable, providing such interviews are rooted in questions/structure derived from similar theories as sister quantitative criteria. Subsequently, interview results should be objectively analyzed (via textual analysis, grounded theory, and like rigorous methods) to produce meaningful results. Assuming these are based in similar social science theory, quantitative results can be contrasted against qualitative ones to produce a rich data picture (Minichiello, Aroni, and Hays 2008). This approach goes far beyond an analysis of raw social media metrics or human intelligence from limited sources (or a single person), which may not truly reflect the sentiment or pervasiveness of attitudes and opinions across the target population. This leads us to an element even more important than instrumentation: population. Any successful measurement effort requires proper audience segmentation (Czaja and Blair 1996). Too broad an audience increases likelihood of aforementioned iodine in the petri dish at later stages. ISIS recruits are not monolithic in current or alternative perspectives. Successful social media campaigns should target only primary versus secondary audience stakeholders.

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Segmenting audiences requires an initial measurement step to identify said differences among potential recruits (see Table 11.1). First, investigate underlying attitudes and beliefs conducive to recruitment. Second and through ideally a combination of interviews and surveys, yield some semblance of a line-and-block, attitude/opinion construct chart on what perspectives feed into others. The target behavior (e.g., ISIS recruitment) will be at the very top. Measuring foundational-level constructs at the very bottom will not only yield the most useful and replicable measurement data, but also help identify where and how to segment audiences for recruitment. This becomes vital when constructing messaging interventions at later stages.

Step 1: Segment recruits by a particular country, then by city and area within. Example 1: Male, lower-middle class, potential ISIS recruits (aged eighteen to thirty-five) with at least some college-equivalent education, native to rural areas within Aleppo, Syria.

Step 2: Conduct a series of individual/small-group interviews to determine underlying thoughts and justifications for joining the ISIS movement for a near-immediate timeframe. Example 2: Based on Example 1, interview a series of individuals separately (or a few at a time) fitting the preceding description. Within these interviews, gently explore (via a series of logically ordered questions/ moderation) why interviewees would actively support/denounce ISIS recruitment. Pay particular attention to stated root causes, rationale, and perceived effects on self/family to joining/rejecting the ISIS movement. Ensure questions build upon each other, and be wary of groupthink/ isolation among participants. Consult a university-level/industry-standard statistics/methodology textbook for guidelines on qualitative interview techniques.

Step 3: Separate thoughts/justifications into a series of attitude/opinion constructs—for example, trust, familial responsibility, community (first order) worry, risk, safety, economics, perception of others (second order). Example 3: Based on Examples 1–2, sort the stated responses into ordered groups, ensuring that items fit logically underneath each other (such that a subcategory is not accidentally listed up top). As much as possible, combine very similar responses into the same category to avoid redundancy. Next, items should branch into more subcategories as they are sorted from first- to second-order effects. Second-order constructs should expound upon first-order ones, and so on.

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Table 11.1 Using ISIS Recruitment as a Tangible Example

Step Step Step Step Step Step Step

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Identify and segment audience regarding problem behavior Conduct targeted interviews regarding problem behavior Dissect interviews to identify underlying attitudes and opinions Organize attitudes and opinions into first- and second-order constructs Locate validated measures to test first- and second-order constructs Conduct pilot test; if satisfied, apply to wider sample Assess findings; apply to social media/atmospherics (as appropriate)

Step 4: Create a line-and-block chart hierarchically linking these constructs (with recruitment at the top, followed by first- and then secondorder constructs below; see Figure 11.1). Example 4: For Examples 1–3, ISIS recruitment would be up top, followed by first-order constructs below of trust, familial responsibility, community, and the like, and then second-order constructs of worry, risk, safety, economics, perception of others, and so forth.

Step 5: Identify validated social theory intended to measure firstand second-order constructs (Step 3). Example 5: For Examples 1–4 and using a social science database (e.g., EBSCO, Academic Universe), identify validated social science theory used to measure (through survey questions, interview templates) individual perceptions of trust, familial responsibility, community, risk, safety, economics, perception of others, and the like. While it is ideal for these measures to have been previously applied in testing similar populations/scenarios, this is secondary to locating testing instruments with good external validity (i.e., instruments tested many times, with an array of populations, producing meaningful results). Note that these measures are unlikely to contain most or all of the first- and second-order constructs. Still, try to limit measures to one to two testing instruments (to avoid excessive error by combining instruments or having to adjust for different measurement criteria/scales), depending on the number of items in each instrument. First-order items should be prioritized over second-order ones, especially those deemed most relevant from interviews conducted in Example 2. Create a standardized survey instrument (with uniform scoring options, related) or survey template (to guide all interviews, in ordered fashion) based on these measures.

Step 6: Conduct a series of interviews/surveys on these first- and second-order constructs (Step 3), derived in validated instrumentation (Step 5).

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Figure 11.1 Hierarchy of Constructs

Problem Behavior

First-Order Construct 1 Second-Order Construct 1

Second-Order Construct 2

First-Order Construct 2 Second-Order Construct 3

First-Order Construct 3 Second-Order Construct 4

Second-Order Construct 5

Example 6: Using appropriate selection criteria (snowball/random sample, for instance), survey/interview individuals in Example 1 using the instrument created in Example 5. Conduct a pilot test on at least three individuals to ensure accuracy, relevancy, and appropriateness of the proposed measures. Adjust as needed. Ensure the target sample for the wider population is appropriate for the analysis type (Step 7). Consult a university-level/industry-standard statistics/methodology textbook for guidelines on sampling techniques or required sample size. Conduct desired interviews/surveys.

Step 7: Analyze/assess findings using statistical software and other objective means. Look for statistically significant associations between first- and second-order constructs (Step 4). Example 7: Employ statistics software, as appropriate, to identify relationships between test instruments (Step 5, Example 5) and tested sample (Step 6, Example 6). Statistically significant findings (p < .05) point to key relationships among the target audience (Step 1, Example 1). Again, consult a university-level/industry-standard statistics/methodology textbook for guidelines on quantitative/qualitative data assessment, with appropriate conclusions inherent.

Multiple outcomes emerge from this exercise: first, proper audience segmentation; second, identification of underlying attitudes/opinions behind key behaviors (in this instance, ISIS recruitment); third, validated theory to test against, limiting measurement error; fourth, an assessment program based on these steps, and assessed relationships; and fifth, and most important, among a vulnerable population, statistically significant

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attitudes/opinions capable of increasing/decreasing recruitment by ISIS among them.

Extending Measurement to Practice Over time, repeating these steps across various, vulnerable populations within a country and region will yield insights as to relationships between said populations (Firebaugh 1997). In tandem, this will produce statistical evidence of where attitude/opinion demarcation lines differ. More important, continued analysis can advise on how and where to target social and traditional media interventions. If this assessment is married to primary-audience media-use preferences, what can emerge is a powerful recipe for how to effect change among that audience. It can also reveal where to allocate funds accordingly. ISIS already employs social media methods as attitude/opinion feelers. The United States should be doing the same, albeit more systematically and toward wider result. Even with ISIS arguably a step ahead of such initiatives and conducting potential misdirection campaigns, these initiatives are likely immune from such effects. As such efforts do not target behaviors but rather underlying and statistically significant attitudes/opinions to create and sustain those behaviors, manipulation likelihood is arguably reduced to insignificance. ISIS—first and foremost—is arguably interested in (recruitment) behavior near-exclusively. Moreover, a joint, integrated marketing/measurement and intervention program, with each learning from the other, greatly reduces the amount of interventions required to effect change (Ewing 2009). Blanketing a target population is instead now attitude/opinion acupuncture, carefully segmented by a city or area, and with it a robust measurement program continuously measuring and monitoring unique populations and relationships among them. Finally, aligning on-the-ground, atmospherics intelligence collection with an assessment program can further enhance the overall data picture (Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor 2010). Categorizing and aligning collection categories with those in an assessment program can potentially proactively identify areas of vulnerability and change within a target population. For example, physical manifestations (increased security measures, presence of improvised explosive devices, communication norms within a village, etc.) should align with acquired data, noting heightened sense of fear, safety, or related constructs. Working as a collaborative engine, social media efforts can and should be used to convey messaging compatible with both shaping attitudes/opinions of a target population and also reducing physical threats to US interests within that area.

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Still, these seven steps are neither airtight nor prescriptive. For example, individuals predisposed to nefarious action are logically more likely to pursue terrorist recruitment (Lieber, Efreom-Lieber, and Rate 2011). Related, segmenting audiences is a very careful science. In the preceding example, population selection ignores impact/effect of a growing female recruitment base on vulnerable males (Speckhard 2015). Even the most carefully selected target audience does not exist in isolation.

Coordinating Whole-of-Government Influence Properly engaging the right audience, with the right message, at the right time requires thoughtful assessment methods prior to and throughout influence operations. An added dynamic in US influence efforts involves not only engaging effective channels of influence, but also following bureaucratically dictated roles appropriately. Congress continues to acknowledge MISO’s integral role in armed conflict (as in its executive summary of the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act). However, unlike many traditional, kinetic capabilities unique to the DoD, information operations and MISO are carried out in an information space where other departments and agencies are also operating. The DoD’s role in the information environment differs in declared areas of hostility, versus other locations, and the nuanced distinctions between using information to inform, educate, persuade, or influence create artificial roles and boundaries depending on the audience. These artificial roles and boundaries often raise additional questions and considerations when they are applied to social media in the online domain. This emphasizes the need for a coordinated, whole-of-government, strategic communication effort, which may not always place the DoD in the lead role, to counter threats such as an ISIS. To help address this need, the Department of State recently activated a new Global Engagement Center to spearhead communication efforts to counter violent extremists and more effectively coordinate, integrate, and synchronize messaging to foreign audiences (Department of State 2016b). Coordinating essential influence tasks, such as measurement, will identify priorities and ensure that organizations provide complementary, and not duplicative, capabilities at the national level. For example, DoD data analysis could identify nonhostile areas where foreign fighters are originating. The Department of State, through the Global Engagement Center, may take the lead to build partner relationships and develop narratives around appropriate thematic campaigns. Integrating efforts with the Broadcasting Board of Governors would engage broader audiences and provide factual information to undermine ISIS disinformation. Synchronizing the objectives

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of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) with messaging objectives could amplify influence efforts and address underlying sociological conditions that leave populations vulnerable to the pull of violent extremist organizations. This coordination would allow DoD special operations forces to fill a supporting role in this scenario, focusing on building partner nations’ capacity to counter ISIS recruitment through social media messaging. This does not negate the need for the DoD to engage civilian audiences or maintain appropriate force capabilities; it merely serves to demonstrate a broader, synchronized US government communication effort.

Conclusion One thing is for certain: if the United States fails to contest the narrative and provide a credible, persuasive, and truthful alternative, adversaries will continue to exploit social media for their own ends. While it is difficult to fully quantify some metrics in this battle, such as how many potential ISIS terrorists have been turned away from the path of radicalization, other hierarchically linked indicators provide evidence to guide whole-of-government influence efforts and successfully conduct campaigns in the information environment. Ultimately, leveraging meaningful and timely assessments is essential to effective influence operations across any media channel. Still, this comes with full recognition that the extent of disruptive, peer-competitive influence campaigns is still unknown. Russia and China—through misinformation and denial of service/hacking efforts— continue to impact DoD tactical psychological operations and with this opportunities for valid assessment of effort. Therefore, even the most rigorous and theoretically backed social science assessment strategy of a well-designed information operations campaign will never produce universally trustworthy results. It is for this reason that information initiatives must be conducted alongside traditional military ones for them to be validated.

12 Foreign Internal Defense and Security Force Assistance James M. DePolo

The current state of military affairs for the United States, when aligned against economic principles, shows an increasing demand with a decreasing supply. As the scope of threats across the world continues to increase and military resources continue to decrease, the United States faces growing challenges that require innovative strategic focus to help balance supply-and-demand disparities. A study by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments highlights this trend in stating that “the Navy and Marine Corps are facing a fundamental choice: maintain current levels of forward presence and risk breaking the force or reduce presence and restore readiness. . . . [T]his choice is driven by the supply of ready naval forces being too small to meet the demand from Combatant Commanders, as adjudicated by the Secretary of Defense” (Clark and Sloman 2016:1). Growing challenges with terrorism, both domestic and abroad, cannot be solved strictly with military offensive capabilities. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq may have depleted both the American resolve for war and the bank accounts to fund large-scale operations. At the same time, current and potential threats must be engaged to help maintain world order and progress. In an environment representative of resource and demand imbalance, variables that can help remedy the offset become highly influential. Considering scenarios in the national and global security domains, an updated security strategy of the United States becomes fundamentally paramount. Through the evolution of prominent global

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security situations in recent years such as those involving the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the United States continues to assess and adjust national security strategies and strategic defense guidance. In December 2016, then–defense secretary Ash Carter (2016) epitomized the notion of evolving US security strategy in the Middle East and “elsewhere,” highlighting the change in approach from one of direct US engagement of the enemy to engagement through capable partners. Using ISIS as an example, the contemporary defense strategy of the United States continues to show increased global focus on building partner capacity. With strategic guidance showing an increased focus on building partner capacity, a predominant question arises: How can the US military contribute to the accomplishment of strategic security objectives through increased focus on security cooperation activities?

Background and Significance Over the past fifty years, Department of Defense (DoD) security cooperation activities, specifically foreign internal defense and security force assistance, have displayed positive impacts on national defense strategy throughout the world. Assessment of the Quadrennial Defense Review, National Security Strategy, and National Defense Strategy helps validate the need for effective foreign internal defense and security force assistance in support of contemporary security strategy. Associated with relatively low resource costs in comparison to largescale troop deployments, foreign internal defense and security force assistance can prove vital among DoD efforts to accomplish national security objectives. In a contemporary operational environment characterized by increased resource constraints and heightened threats, the innovative and programmatic implementation of foreign internal defense and security force assistance will become strategic catalysts to accomplishing future defense objectives. Across the armed services, there is a growing application of partner capacity-building efforts that include formalization of concepts and programs. Within the US Air Force, permanent educational infrastructure was recently established in the realm of advisory capabilities focusing on building partner capacity (Zadalis 2013). Most significant perhaps are efforts observed across the US Marine Corps and US Army. US Marine Corps efforts include the creation of a security cooperation command as well as a military occupation specialty for advisers (Department of the Navy 2016). On another front, the US Army recently created permanent security force assistance brigades. Relatively new constructs across the services, these programs will continue to develop in support of evolving national defense strategy.

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Challenges Facing the Department of Defense In comparison to the past century, the exponential threats the United States and its partners face today are not as linear or defined. Among the hazards associated with the current environment are physical threats posed by both nation-states and nonstate actors. From Russia’s reemergence and operations in Ukraine and Crimea, to China’s increasing escalation of confrontational activities in the Pacific, to Iran’s nuclear programs, to the continued unpredictability of North Korea, nationstates continue to be at the forefront of global security concerns. To further complicate matters, nonstate actors and organized criminal organizations continue to threaten sovereignty around the world. From the rise of ISIS and continued hostilities from al-Qaeda, to drug-trafficking organizations and other organized crime groups, the demand for defense resources continues to increase. A review of defense requirements and defense resources depicts the national defense budget and the size of the joint force remaining key subjects of debate and uncertainty. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review’s executive summary highlights this outlook in stating that the review “demonstrates our intent to rebalance the Department itself as part of our effort to control internal cost growth that is threatening to erode our combat power in this period of fiscal austerity” (Department of Defense 2014:iv). More powerful perhaps is a quote from former president Barack Obama in describing his view of the global security environment, in his opening letter for the 2015 National Military Strategy, which reads: “as powerful as we are and will remain, our resources and influence are not infinite” (Obama 2015:2). Understanding the problematic economic situations in the United States and around the globe, it is easy to comprehend genuine concerns and high scrutiny pertaining to federal defense expenditures. A general lack of agreement in defense budget among defense representatives, Congress, and political leaders continues to dilute measures of predictability when it comes to defense resources. In 2016, the federal budget process showed continued disagreements as the president’s request of $534 billion was undercut by the Congress, and in the end $522 billion was authorized (Pellerin 2015). With congressional lack of punctual defense budgeting for the commencement of a fiscal year since 2008, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter continued to stress the correlation between a stabilized defense budget and defense readiness (Pellerin 2015). Debates over the defense budget continued to escalate in 2016, when Carter threatened to recommend a veto of the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act if it contained a “raid on war funding,” which would increase risk to US

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national defense (Ferdinando 2016). Similar budget matters continue to be problematic, with unresolved issues in 2019. The impacts of continuing uncertainty in defense budgets, when combined with a scaled reduction in joint force strength, present even more of a challenge to the supply of defense resources. Military personnel costs continue to compose a significant portion of the DoD budget, and showed a 46 percent increase between 2000 and 2014 (Congressional Budget Office 2014). Following the force surges for Iraq and Afghanistan circa 2007–2010, US military ground force numbers were at their highest level since the end of the Cold War (Coleman 2014). With the joint force continuing to shrink from a peak number in 2010 of 1.4 million personnel, the Army and Marine Corps continue to endure the majority of the reductions (Coleman 2014). During the peak year, the Army consisted of 566,000 troops while the Marines counted 202,000 active-duty personnel (Coleman 2014). Moving forward to 2015, the Army’s troop strength was down to 490,000, with projected reductions of another 40,000 between 2016 and 2018 (Department of Defense News Media Activity 2015). Under the new presidential administration, this trend was reversed in 2017 with an end strength of 476,000, still down around 90,000 from 2010 (Department of the Army 2017). As the Marine Corps continued to reduce troop strength from 186,000 in 2015, the Marines reached their target of 182,000 in 2017 (Department of the Navy 2016). Although reducing the force structure can help reduce the DoD base budget, there are also extensive budgetary implications associated with funding large-scale operations. Between 2015 and 2016 the Overseas Contingency Operations budget added approximately $60 billion to the overall defense budget, with the majority aligned against Afghanistan (Department of Defense 2016:1– 2). Outside extensive monetary costs, other factors exist that contribute to the challenges to current defense strategy. Central to the 2018 US National Defense Strategy assessment of the strategic environment is global disorder, which continues to bring increased complexity to the security environment. Challenges and opportunities associated with the cyber environment warranted the creation of the Department of Defense Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) in 2010, which continues to grow in scope and resource requirements. The budgetary dialogue continued for the 2017 defense budget with an increase from 2016 of roughly 9 percent requested for the CYBERCOM authorization (Pomerleau 2016). Considering the cyber environment, this is yet another element that indicates the complexity associated with growing requirements to counter increasing threats around the world, and further highlights the need to streamline the US approach to defense strategy.

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The United States continues to develop and enhance ways to negotiate the turbulent global security environment, with efficiency in the employment of limited resources becoming more critical. With increases in global threats and reductions in resources, current defense strategy may soon prove invalid to meet the desired end states. To help offset the supply/demand inequalities, the United States must work to increase the supply of resources, or at least the effects of the defense resources available. An increased focus on force multiplication methodology that can reduce resource requirements while providing effective outcomes will be key to meeting national security objectives. One key way the US military can increase efficiencies and effects is through security cooperation activities, specifically foreign internal defense and security force assistance. Routinely ongoing throughout the world as part of “phase zero” (pre-conflict phase of operations) both help to promote capable defense strategy and US interests with reduced resource costs (Petit 2013:6). As the contemporary operational environment continues to change, an increased strategic focus on building partner capacity is simultaneously emergent.

National Strategy Guidance Building partner capacity, “forward presence,” and “military engagement” are terms increasingly referred to in many contemporary strategic defense documents that encompass DoD activities in support of national strategy. These efforts, which are used for the implementation of national defense policy, encompass a broad range of activities the United States conducts to achieve national objectives. Examining foreign internal defense and security force assistance, it is imperative to understand where and how these activities fall contextually within the paradigm of security cooperation and military engagement. This criticality exists through the exploration of national strategy, and helps tie activities into the context of strategic guidance found in national strategy documents. The relationships, definitions, and employment of foreign internal defense and security force assistance among security cooperation, forward presence, and military engagement activities can appear confusing in certain contexts. Exploration of various approaches to modern foreign internal defense and security force assistance, to include both joint and Army doctrine, helps illustrate some similarities, disparities, and relationships between foreign internal defense and security force assistance as they exist with broader security cooperation efforts. Various joint and Army doctrinal publications examine the relationships with foreign internal defense and security force assistance as they exist as security cooperation activities. Security force assistance and

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foreign internal defense are both subsets of security cooperation, but are not subsets of each other (Joint Doctrine Note 2013:1–13). Relationships are explained among foreign internal defense and security force assistance in which the following exist:

• Foreign internal defense strictly addresses threats within a nation’s borders as part of a nation’s internal defense and development, where security force assistance encompasses both internal and transnational threats. • Foreign internal defense programs, with established objectives in support of the host nation’s internal defense and development, provide the ways (i.e., planned sequence of actions to achieve objectives), while security force assistance activities provide means such as security force assistance–qualified personnel, material, and equipment for training and advisory assistance to foreign forces from the tactical unit up to the ministerial level; at the tactical level, foreign internal defense can also provide similar means as does security force assistance through small training teams supporting foreign security forces. • Whereas foreign internal defense at the strategic level encompasses all of the instruments of national power, security force assistance focuses on the military instrument through DoD resources. • Security force assistance may provide many, but not all, of the activities through which foreign internal defense can be accomplished. Other security cooperation activities dedicated to the nonsecurity sector that may support foreign internal defense, such as bilateral meetings, intelligence, psychological operations, or civil affairs activities, fall outside the scope of security force assistance. • Security force assistance activities are conducted with, through, and by foreign security forces, and the portion of security force assistance activities supporting a host nation’s efforts to counter threats from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency support foreign internal defense. • Foreign internal defense at the tactical and operational level is primarily executed by special operations forces (SOF); while foreign internal defense is a legislatively mandated core activity of SOF, conventional forces also generate and employ organic capabilities to conduct these activities (Joint Doctrine Note 2013:I-4, I-5).

As divergent as the relationships between foreign internal defense and security force assistance may appear, the context of foreign internal defense and security force assistance activities addressed as subsets of

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security cooperation will focus on DoD initiatives that address assistance to foreign security forces. Though certain activities within the larger foreign internal defense bubble may be planned and executed outside of DoD activities with the State Department or other agencies in the lead role, particular attention is given where foreign internal defense and security force assistance overlap within the security cooperation bubble (Department of the Army 2009:1–7). In the contemporary operational environment, the terminology “train, advise, and assist” is most commonly used to outline this focus area. Within an established collection of contemporary national strategy documents, security cooperation initiatives can be found as integral elements for the implementation of future strategy. Documents that span the recent past, present, and near-term future such as the Quadrennial Defense Review of 2014, the 2015 and 2017 National Security Strategies, and the 2018 National Defense Strategy all contain evidence of the increasing utility of foreign internal defense and security force assistance in national strategic policy. Exploring more detailed guidance for security cooperation into 2017, additional specificity protrudes that showcases deep roots with foreign internal defense and security force assistance in strategic guidance in the coming era of national security strategy. Summarizing the relationships shared by foreign internal defense and security force assistance under the security cooperation umbrella, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review effectively articulates some of the challenges of the contemporary operational environment, and how foreign internal defense and security force assistance are programmed into the strategy as means to help meet national objectives. 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review The Quadrennial Defense Review is a document that is generally published every four years; the 2014 review remains the most recent document of its kind and assesses national security strategy and priorities. Beginning with the secretary of defense’s cover letter for the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review and throughout the document, the strategic objectives of national security policy effectively relate the importance of innovative foreign internal defense and security force assistance as means to help achieve strategic ends (Department of Defense 2014: cover letter, ii). Serving as a basis to defense strategy in accordance with Quadrennial Defense Review end states, dependence on alliances is paramount and depends heavily on DoD efforts to help grow partner capacity. Reviewing the importance of shared international understanding of the contemporary operational environment, the Quadrennial Defense Review outlines the context of helping to shape the

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strategic environment in projecting the ideals of the United States to develop partner capacities to eventually “play greater and even leading roles in advancing mutual security interests in their respective regions” (Department of Defense 2014: cover letter, ii). With defense of the US homeland at the forefront of national objectives, the Quadrennial Defense Review’s executive summary relates the development of partner capacity to other interrelated objectives such as the promotion of deterrence, counterterrorism, and regional stability. Here, the review stresses the importance of effective security cooperation that will promote forward presence and engagement with allies across multiple regions to help strengthen alliances (Department of Defense 2014:vi). Later as the Quadrennial Defense Review progresses to more detail on strategy, a quote from the defense strategy of the review helps depict this association in stating that “building security globally not only assures allies and partners and builds partner capacity, but also helps protect the homeland by deterring conflict and increasing the stability in regions across the Middle East and North Africa” (2014:13). Referring to more specified regional approaches, the review focuses on specific geographical areas of concern to further articulate the need for restructure and innovation in security cooperation as part of contemporary defense strategy. Considering the global environment that continues to present increased demand for DoD efforts to promote security, the Quadrennial Defense Review specifies geographic focus areas to include the Asia Pacific region, the Middle East, Europe, and Latin America. In presenting the strategic aim for each of these areas, the review explains efforts to bolster security cooperation efforts across all of the armed services. Specifically for ground forces that execute the majority of foreign internal defense and security force assistance, the Quadrennial Defense Review outlines the use of persistent presence to include permanent basing and rotational forces, as well as episodic deployments to further “pursue increased training opportunities to improved capabilities and capacity of partner nations” (2014:34–36). Relating the forecasted increase of regional engagement with the supply-and-demand challenge associated with increasing threats and decreasing resources, the review highlights the reduction of forces in Afghanistan and Iraq from a 2014 perspective. Considering that the Quadrennial Defense Review is a four-year programmed document with the DoD currently negotiating the operational environment nearly five years after the 2014 review was published, it is imperative to review more modern strategic assessments found in documents such as the latest National Security Strategies of the United States.

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2015 and 2017 National Security Strategies of the United States Whereas the Quadrennial Defense Review places a higher emphasis on the military element of national power and DoD endeavors, the National Security Strategy is an all-encompassing document in the sense that it more equally balances the reliance on the four elements of national power. Through detailed exploration of the contents of these documents, the aspects of the military element protrude as key factors in the implementation of national security strategy. The cover letter of the president of the United States in the 2015 National Security Strategy immediately set the stage for the assessment of future defense initiatives and the means to achieve national security objectives, which is further articulated in the introductory chapter of the strategy. Here President Obama stated, as quoted earlier, that “as powerful as we are and will remain, our resources and influence are not infinite,” which projects the common theme of increased challenges and limited defense resources (Obama 2015: cover letter, 2). As the 2015 National Security Strategy progressed, the validity of innovative security cooperation practices became more visible. In addition to the 2015 National Security Strategy showcasing the strategic importance of security cooperation, President Donald Trump’s National Security Strategy—of 2017—further displays this trend. While summarizing the 2017 strategy in a regional context and stating ways in which the United States will militarily execute this strategy, verbiage such as “we will strengthen our long-standing military relationships and encourage the development of a strong defense network with our allies and partners” continues to demonstrate national attention to security cooperation (Trump 2017:47). With the two most recently published security strategies of the United States portraying security cooperation initiatives such as foreign internal defense and security force assistance as key ingredients among other elements of national power to achieve national security objectives, the 2018 National Defense Strategy derives concepts from the 2017 National Security Strategy that are more focused from a military standpoint. Exploration of this document further validates the high demand for security cooperation activities alongside other DoD capability sets. 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States The 2018 National Defense Strategy contextually parallels the 2017 strategy as a derivative strategic document while presenting more microlevel focus on the DoD’s roles in the execution of defense strategy. In doing so, the National Defense Strategy utilizes the same enduring national interests and national security objectives as a framework for this

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strategy document. Going a step further, the National Defense Strategy establishes a strategic approach that includes “strengthening alliances and attracting new partners” (Mattis 2018:8). Within this approach, the increasing relevance of security cooperation initiatives, to include foreign internal defense and security force assistance, is prevalent. Focused on alliances and partnerships, the DoD aims to promote the National Security Strategy on a global scale. From general verbiage that highlights the importance of interoperability among DoD entities and partners/allies, missions and associated tasks clearly point toward the importance of security cooperation activities. Looking geographically, as an example, the National Defense Strategy highlights the need to “support relationships to address significant terrorist threats in Africa.” Here, the strategy illuminates future security force assistance and foreign internal defense activities with a focus on working by, with, and through African partners and the European Union to build partner capacities in order to degrade violent extremist organizations (Mattis 2018:10). Representative of a very influential document for the DoD, the 2018 National Defense Strategy incorporates the necessity for foreign military engagement. Through detailed exploration of the complexities of current and emerging environments, it is evident that the US defense strategy considers the disparity between security challenges and available resources. In-depth analysis of four contemporary national strategic security documents further points to the increasing importance of building partner capacity and strengthening relationships among partners of the United States. Understanding that foreign internal defense and security force assistance activities executed by DoD entities in cooperation with other governmental agencies remains a fundamental concept toward implementation of security strategy, it is important to conceptualize the achievement of strategic success. Review of a historical vignette involving complex problem sets and complex environments helps illustrate challenges and successes of past partnership ventures.

Colombia: A Case Study In 2013, describing turmoil around the world, former Central Intelligence Agency director David Petraeus and Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution explained: “Colombia has come a long way in its half-century fight against drug trafficking, insurgency, kidnapping, and murder. At a time of acute doubt over the future of the Middle East in particular, Colombia provides a model for progress as well as a reminder of requirements necessary to enable success” (Petraeus and O’Hanlon 2013). Through observation of a whole-of-government approach that

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included a heavy focus on building partner capacity within Colombian security institutions, the Colombian experience depicts a positive example of US security strategy implementation. Peaking in the 1990s with instability, Colombia was well known for acts of internal terrorism, drug cartels, murders, and kidnappings (Tomaselli 2013). Through a combination of Colombian efforts and US assistance, though challenges still remain, Colombia has witnessed an overall impressive reestablishment of stability in areas associated with governance and security. Perhaps most impressive in Colombia’s success story is not only the nation’s recent actions to gain control of its internal security situation, but also its ability to export security assistance to neighboring and partnering nations. From the heavy influence of major drug cartel leaders such as Pablo Escobar in the 1980s, to the rise of left-wing insurgencies in the 1990s, Colombia continued to experience a series of threats that undermined domestic stability, “tearing at the national fabric of social cohesion, and challenging the government’s monopoly of power” (Long et al. 2015:60). Late in the 1990s, a combination of growing power and influence among insurgent groups and challenges within the Colombian military showed a drastic deterioration of internal security. Boldly transitioning from traditional insurgent tactics, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was able to mobilize successful, large-scale conventional combat tactics against the Colombian army, and in 1997 was designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States (Department of State 2016a). By 1998, FARC offensives against Colombian military units produced considerable results, but were not the only security concerns for the Colombian government (Moyar, Pagan, and Griego 2014:14). Outside increased battles with insurgents and Colombia’s security forces, violent crime plagued many cities and towns. In 2000, Colombia led the world as the nation with the highest murder rate (Nation Master 2016). Furthermore, kidnappings, attacks against security institutions, along with other violent crimes conducted by cartels and leftist extremist organizations continued to contribute to the unrest around the country. Assessed as too unstable for many, several hundred thousand affluent Colombians secured visas and departed their homeland for other, more secure places to live (Moyar, Pagan, and Griego 2014:14). At such a pace, without outside assistance, Colombia’s government may have reached a point of failure to maintain power and influence across the country. As US foreign policy experts recognized the impact of the fragile Colombian state as a major threat to regional security and US interests, in 1999 Colombia’s President Andrés Pastrana requested assistance from the United States, in an effort that would later be called Plan Colombia (Restrepo 2016).

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Fast-forwarding ten years, data collected from 2000 to 2011 revealed a 92 percent reduction in kidnappings, 45 percent reduction in homicides, and 71 percent reduction in terrorist attacks, with an estimated reduction in cocaine production by 61 (Department of State 2011b). Once a nation where its inhabitants fled the borders for their own safety, Colombia now sees flourishing tourism and boasts perhaps the most capable security institutions across Central and South America. This drastic turn of the tables did not come without cost or dedication on behalf of multiple leaders, agencies, and foreign support. Colombia’s resurgence is primarily due to Colombia’s own efforts, yet the influence of US military and other governmental support are not to be discounted (Petit 2013:120). The overarching strategy that helped bring about Colombia’s success story, Plan Colombia, encompassed a whole-ofgovernment approach, though it was often scrutinized as being overly focused on Colombia’s military and police (Petit 2013:123). Through the incorporation of diplomatic, information, military, and economic efforts, Plan Colombia displayed overlapping objectives among the two major players. For the United States, countering the exportation of narcotics from Colombia and economic development were at the forefront of policy objectives, where the Colombian government also prioritized promotion of internal peace and security as well as economic development (Congress 2005:2). At the heart of the strategic objectives of both nations, enhancing the capabilities of Colombian security institutions served as the basis for policy implementation. The strategy led by Colombian president Álvaro Uribe beginning in 2002 reflected a change to where security was viewed as the top priority for Colombia, and would provide the conditions for improvements in governance and economic development (Moyar, Pagan, and Griego 2014:25). In efforts to set these conditions, Uribe began to increase resources to the Colombian military, including doubling the Colombian defense budget to 4 percent of the gross domestic product, an increase in the size of the army by 60,000 personnel, and the creation of five joint commands responsible for the regional operational areas of Colombia’s major threat groups (Long et al. 2015:62). As Plan Colombia continued to evolve with security force capabilities at the forefront of Colombian policy, US military support to Colombia paralleled Uribe’s strategy. An enduring regional ally of Colombia, prior to Plan Colombia the United States traditionally maintained a force cap of 400 military personnel and 400 military contractors for support to Colombian security institutions (Moyar, Pagan, and Griego 2014:26). Through a combination of factors to include the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001, authorization through executive order granting increased author-

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ities for funding and operations in Colombia, and increased requests from Colombia for more US aid to the Colombian military, the US force cap doubled in military personnel to 800 and increased to 600 contractors (Moyar, Pagan, and Griego 2014:26). US funding to Plan Colombia significantly increased from $276 million in 2001 to $808 million by 2003, followed by a relatively stable level from 2004 to 2010 with figures between $600 and $700 million (Restrepo 2016). Included in these aid packages were costly military expenditures on key equipment such as helicopters, with the Colombian Army Aviation Brigade tripling its number of aircraft to more than a hundred helicopters (Restrepo 2016). Within the expansion of aid, support from US military personnel remained a key component of Plan Colombia. As influential as monetary support and equipment were to the Colombian security institutions, a significant contribution from the United States came as security cooperation activities focused on advisory efforts. A similar notion remains within the current US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) posture statement, which includes the lines of efforts conducted in the geographic combatant command’s area of responsibility. Here the document states that “building partner capacity is the cornerstone of everything we do” (Tidd 2016:14, emphasis in original). Looking at Plan Colombia from its inception to the current SOUTHCOM activities in Colombia, persistent foreign internal defense and security force assistance activities remain a main effort. With a range of partner capacity-building advisory efforts, varying in authorities, techniques, locations, focus areas, target audiences, and US military forces involved, both US special operations forces and conventional forces have continued to remain critically involved in Colombia’s resurgence for more than fifteen consecutive years. Prior to the formalization of Plan Colombia from 1999 to 2000, US special operations forces were at the forefront of engagement with Colombian security intuitions (Moyar, Pagan, and Griego 2014:17). Starting with a mere sixty-five advisers from the US Army’s 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne), between 1999 and 2001, small groups of advisers focused on three Colombian counternarcotics battalions and a newly created brigade headquarters (Moyar, Pagan, and Griego 2014:17). The efforts, which were relatively limited in scope, trained more than 2,300 Colombian troops on light infantry and airmobile tactics, human rights training, and staff planning processes (Moyar, Pagan, and Griego 2014:17). As US commitment to Plan Colombia progressed regarding US military advisory efforts, additional US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) SOF advisers from across the services participated in various capacities and specialized focus areas.

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With the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) maintaining the largest role as far as command structure and persistent engagement, during the peak of its engagement in the 2003–2004 timeframe, battalionsized formations of special operators spearheaded foreign internal defense efforts involving building partner capacity across the Colombian national police and Colombian army. As the demand for special operators needed for combat operations across Afghanistan and Iraq increased circa 2007–2010, SOUTCHCOM-focused SOCOM forces became more involved in Middle Eastern combat roles, which resulted in a decrease in SOF advisory resources for Colombia (Moyar, Pagan, and Griego 2014:26–35). Maintaining a steady demand for US support with a continued force cap of 800 US military personnel, security cooperation activities involving advisory efforts increasingly involved conventional US forces. Whereas in the past the focus of advisory efforts had been predominantly SOF-led efforts, US conventional advisory efforts slightly changed the scope of military-to-military engagement. The US Military Group, stationed in Bogota, Colombia, assumed the lead as the major US entity providing advisory support, and executed with more focus on logistics and operational planning at the strategic to brigade levels. In 2007, 80 percent of all advisory efforts in Colombia were being executed under the Military Group by conventional US forces. Whether the preponderance of advisory efforts was delivered by SOF or conventional forces, a key takeaway involves the persistent and influential engagement of advisers in support of Colombia’s successful recovery as a nation. In reviewing the resultant data as part of what may be considered a role model for a theater security cooperation plan, Colombia’s data are impressive. The following key results apply: • Colombian military forces continue to successfully target and kill senior FARC leaders. Since 2008 they have killed the overall commander of the FARC, two second-in-commands, and numerous other senior tactical and operational leaders associated with the secretariat leadership of FARC (Stone 2011). • All of the 1,099 municipalities in Colombia are under Colombian governmental control, and by 2014 the country’s homicide rate reached a three-decade low (Restrepo 2016). • Between 2002 and 2015, FARC was reduced from approximately 21,000 to 6,000 combatants, and in 2016, FARC signed a peace accord with the Colombian government. • Kidnappings continue to decrease. In 2000 kidnappings were at a high of 3,572 per year and by 2015 kidnappings had dropped to

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277 per year. Whereas in 2000 the vast majority of kidnappings were the acts of insurgent groups, by 2015, 75 percent of kidnappings were not associated with these groups and were attributed to common criminals (Gurney 2015). • Comparing security expenditures of the United States to showcase the return on investment for Colombia, by 2015 the United States had spent $10 billion on Colombia as compared to $1.6 trillion spent for combat and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, which equates to approximately $10 billion spent every twenty-nine days (Restrepo 2016).

Results from a deliberate and concentrated effort in internal security display a completely different environment from Colombia in 2000. Along with Colombia’s continued security progress on a larger scale, FARC and the Colombian government finally reached a peace accord in the late summer of 2016, after more than fifty years of fighting (Kerry 2016). Though the Colombian populace voted and later rejected the details of the agreement by a thin margin, the government and FARC made the agreement to end the fighting in November of the same year. Colombia’s national security success within its own borders continues to expand in the realm of regional security cooperation initiatives. Through what can be considered US “security cooperation by proxy” or “leading from behind,” Colombia continues to receive and fulfill increasing numbers of requests for security cooperation support from regional partners (Tickner 2014). Between 2009 and 2013, Colombia’s international affairs office of the Colombian national police reported the training of more than 20,000 security personnel from forty-seven countries in security-related tasks and operations (Tickner 2014). Colombia’s increasing capability to support US and regional security strategy through the execution of foreign internal defense and security force assistance reflects a unique and relevant correlation between low-cost, low-resource operations and effective execution of national security policy. A summary of Colombia’s resurgence highlights the implications of US security cooperation activities, and is visible through comments from Admiral Kurt Tidd, commander of SOUTHCOM, who states that “after fifty-one years of armed conflict, Colombia—a strategic ally, friend and preeminent partner—is on the verge of ending the hemisphere’s longest-running guerrilla war. Thanks to its own efforts and our sustained assistance, Colombia has been transformed from a near failed state into a major regional player with significant political influence, world-class security forces, and a growing economy” (2016:14).

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Lessons from Security Force Assistance and Foreign Internal Defense Looking across the US military services, advising foreign security forces continues to become more common. The global war on terror provided the most notable platform for conventional military forces in advising foreign security forces, as stressed from a strategic perspective through former secretary of defense Gates’s comments in 2007 when he stated: “arguably, the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries” (Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance 2008:v). For SOF, specifically US Army Special Forces, though the theaters and authorities have changed for certain missions, security force assistance and foreign internal defense have remained a constant and highly sought application. Looking back to US military efforts in the early days of combat operations in Afghanistan from a doctrinal perspective, SOF operations did not fall under security cooperation activities. Arguably however in practice, as US special operations forces partnered with Northern Alliance forces to topple the Taliban regime in 2001–2002, US advisory efforts were ongoing and unknown to the world at the time, and the long-term future of partner capacity building in Afghanistan was born. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 showed early success in dismantling the Iraqi regime, and as the environment unfolded and strategies changed, the US military again found itself with a need to employ advisory operations on a large scale. Perhaps best summarizing the recent history of the US Army’s path to increased focus on building partner capacity that parallels the other services, an article written in the November–December 2014 Military Review states: “thus, after the Vietnam War, Special Forces honed their advising capabilities and deployed military advisors to numerous regions around the globe—albeit typically in much smaller advisor teams—while the conventional Army generally lost its advising capability until the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts after 9/11” (Hajjar 2014:63). Prior to the global war on terror, US Army Special Forces maintained their traditional role of advising regionally aligned foreign security forces, as depicted in the Colombia scenario. As US military security cooperation and combat efforts continued to increase post-9/11, SOF from across the services assumed growing roles in partner capacity building, with their highest concentration of forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2013, with US special operations forces operating in seventy-eight countries, SOCOM commander Admiral William McRaven considered partner capacity building to be “the best approach

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to dealing with some of the world’s most complex security problems” (Marshall 2013). Though SOF have advised a combination of Afghan and Iraqi militias, SOF, conventional military forces, and police units, the preponderance of SOF efforts in these two areas has been with elite military forces (Long et al. 2015:43–44). Outside of US special operations forces, the growing demand for security force assistance and foreign internal defense capabilities has led to increased conventional force involvement around the world. Across the armed services, security force assistance and foreign internal defense have become more common practice, with increased resources committed to advising foreign militaries. For example, within the US Air Force, in formalizing the process to meet increasing global demands for general purpose air force advisors, the Air Advisor Academy was created in 2007 as a permanent training organization under the US Air Force’s Air Education and Training Command (Zadalis 2013:4). By 2013 the Air Advisor Academy had trained 3,400 airmen (Zadalis 2013:5). Since reaching full operational capability the same year, the academy now trains up to 1,500 airmen annually who “will advise counterparts in a multitude of nations across every region, supporting a wide array of contingency and peacetime missions around the world” (Zadalis 2013:5). Observing the US Air Force’s increased focus on security cooperation activities, it is also important to consider modern joint conventional force efforts, which contribute significant amounts of forces to global security cooperation endeavors. The increased involvement of conventional forces in security cooperation activities associated with training and advising foreign security forces through efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other parts of the world since 9/11 is noteworthy. Among many programs, terminologies, and mission sets, the Army and Marines have utilized several prominent programs to execute these duties. Among various efforts, some of the most symbolic include military transition teams, brigade combat team security force assistance deployments, the Army’s regionally aligned force (RAF) paradigm, and the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group and Free Military Occupational Specialty initiative (Department of the Navy 2016). All with distinct formations, backgrounds, merits, and challenges, these initiatives executed in support of national security strategy have remained flexible to meet the demands linked to complex security environments. Joint Military Transition Teams Similarities with situations in Afghanistan and Iraq displayed an increased need for building foreign security forces. Programs that involved the most

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diversity for the services’ contributions to building partner capacity in Afghanistan and Iraq centered on military transition teams. In the period circa 2003–2006 military transition teams in Afghanistan and Iraq were often ad hoc organizations composed of a combination of active-duty, reserve, and National Guard forces (Nagl 2013:5). These hastily created teams varied in size from eleven to sixteen personnel, lacked standardization in military occupational specialty composition and received training varying in content and quality (Nagl 2013:5). With a high demand for qualified security force assistance resources, the US military increasingly institutionalized the military transition team construct. By 2006, formalization of the military transition team concept was more solidified, with the Army taking the lead through the establishment of a permanent cadre as the 1st Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division, which was missioned to lead centralized military transition team training at Camp Funston, Fort Riley, Kansas (Parker 2009). Through this process, ten- to fifteen-man teams composed of servicemen from the Army, Navy, and Air Force were brought together and spent two months organizing as military transition teams (Parker 2009). After organizing and receiving formal training, a military transition team would later deploy to Afghanistan and Iraq to advise foreign security forces (Parker 2009). The formalized military transition team training concept was executed at Fort Riley through 2009, at which time it transitioned to the reactivated 162nd Infantry Brigade at Fort Polk, with a throughput of up to 5,000 advisers per year (Morgan 2009). Further prioritization and institutionalization among the military transition team architecture developed at the Department of the Army level. Here senior leaders were designated to serve dual-hatted as senior advisers to foreign leaders, as well as commanders for military transition teams. These key leaders were selected through scrupulous annual command selection boards and participated in the formalized military transition team training process. The rapid expansion of the military transition team concept was shortly followed by a rapid decrease, which paralleled the force reductions and withdrawals from Afghanistan and Iraq between 2010 and 2014. The military transition team formations eventually dissolved and gave way to brigade security force assistance deployments. Army Brigade Combat Team Security Force Assistance Deployments Through various techniques, missions, and formations, brigade combat teams (BCTs) have been executing security force assistance missions since the inception of the surges in Iraq and Afghanistan. As early as 2010, Regional Command East in Afghanistan began to

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employ Army brigade combat teams as modern security force assistance missions, which would later show the end of the traditional military transition team era and would pave the path for future security force assistance missions involving BCT missions (Gwinn 2015:66). With more employment in Afghanistan, which has continued through the ongoing force reduction, similar security force assistance deployments involving brigade combat teams began in Iraq in 2014 in conjunction with the rise of ISIS. Under this construct, Army brigade combat teams train and deploy with organic resources and personnel assigned to the deploying unit. The exact composition of advisory teams within a BCT varies by mission. Factors leading to a general lack of uniformity include variances in targeted partner audiences, locations, force caps, and other environmental considerations. An example of a contemporary security force assistance deployment involving brigade combat teams was that to Kandahar, Afghanistan, in 2016, involving advisory efforts from the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division. Here the BCT manned approximately thirty adviser billets ranging in officer ranks from the team commander (colonel) down to a first lieutenant, and also included noncommissioned officers, Department of the Army civilians, and contractors. This advisory team’s targeted audience included commanders and staffs across four Afghan National Defense Forces to include an Afghan Army Corps, the Kandahar Provincial Police of the Afghan National Police, and the Afghanistan Border Police. In other locations, task organizations, adviser-team composition, and detailed roles of a brigade combat team’s advisory efforts can vary. Pre-deployment security force assistance training a BCT receives is also variable depending on the assigned security force assistance mission set and other factors involving training levels and readiness guidance. As the military transition team paradigm faded and troop withdrawals from the Middle East continued, so did the scope of employment of the 162nd Infantry Brigade at Fort Polk. With the deactivation of the 162nd brigade in 2014, only the 3rd battalion of the 353rd Regiment still remains as the source for training brigade combat teams tasked to execute security force assistance missions (Joint Readiness Training Center 2016). Reduced in scale, the 353rd Regiment currently runs a one-week security force assistance adviser’s course at Fort Polk and can also tailor mobile training teams to conduct home-station training for brigade combat teams. One key tenet associated with building partner capacity that was more prevalent through the formalized military transition team concept but lacking through the security force assistance BCT model involves selection and training of

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advisers. Where SOF benefit through rigorous selection processes and incorporate partner-building/adviser skill-set training into pipeline training, the void in these formal processes can be detrimental to conventional security force assistance efforts. In addition to training challenges, brigade combat teams face other complexities. For example, a security force assistance–designated BCT is often tasked with multiple deployment requirements within the assigned security force assistance mission, to include unilateral or combined security-related activities. In some cases, as with the 2/4 Infantry Brigade Combat Team, which also deployed a battalion simultaneously to Kosovo, a unit identified for a security force assistance deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan may be further tasked to execute various mission sets across different theaters. Though the main effort for the 2/4 Infantry Brigade Combat Team deployment was security force assistance– related, the BCT conducted a decisive-action mission-readiness training exercise to maintain its core combat mission-essential task proficiency levels, and later executed a one-week mobile training team event provided by the 3/353rd Battalion from Fort Polk. Adding to the challenges of the security force assistance–designated BCT concept, while considering unit readiness under the Army’s Sustained Readiness Model, this type of situation poses significant challenges in the realm of training, mission command, and offset deployment timelines, which directly impact security capabilities at the national level. Under the Army’s 2016–2017 Strategic Readiness Guidance, the Army aimed to regain tactical prowess in combined arms operations while improving key aspects of strategic readiness in support of the National Military Strategy, through the Sustained Readiness Model (Department of the Army 2016a). Under the Sustained Readiness Model, a BCT is expected to maintain a relatively consistent level of proficiency in its core wartime mission-essential tasks, regardless of other deployments or emergent mission requirements. In the case of a BCT designated to execute a security force assistance mission, the challenge of maintaining decisive-action and combined-arms proficiency with security force assistance task training requires a delicate balance of multiple requirements. With the BCT often spread across two or more continents, having forward and rear command structures, it is also common to have subordinate units on different deployment/redeployment timelines, all of which can negatively impact collective BCT combinedarms proficiency. Experiencing many of the same challenges of the security force assistance–related BCT deployment mission, the RAF concept is another common contemporary approach to meet the objectives of national security strategy.

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Regionally Aligned Forces The global footprint of US forces changed drastically beginning in 2011, through a combination of large-scale troop withdrawals from Iraq as well as overseas base closures. Simultaneously, the idea of RAFs highlighted the strategic future landscape for governmental and military leaders. In January 2012 the secretary of defense of the United States outlined this future concept through strategic guidance, stating that “across the globe we will seek to be the security partner of choice, pursuing new partnerships with a growing number of nations including those in Africa and Latin America whose interests and viewpoints are merging into a common vision of freedom, stability, and prosperity. Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities” (Panetta 2012:1). This guidance to the components was further developed by the Army and eventually led to the employment of the RAF concept involving Army brigades. In March 2012, the chief of staff of the Army, General Ray Odierno, explained the 2013 initiation of the RAF concept in describing the involvement of the “Total Army,” also referred to as the “Total Force” (active, guard, and reserves), with a purpose of “improving partner capacity, sustaining strong relationships and to assist our Joint, Interagency, International and Multinational partners in building a stronger global security environment” (Odierno 2012). Later that year, the first RAF mission commenced with the 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division out of Fort Riley, Kansas, providing support to US Africa Command. Since 2013, Army brigades from the Total Force have been aligned against the six geographic combatant commands to execute RAF missions and deployments. The RAF concept was designed to provide culturally and regionally focused forces to geographic combatant commands for employment in support of their respective Theater Security Campaign Plans with a heavy focus on security cooperation assistance such as security force assistance. A RAF could be expected to conduct a wide variety of missions and tasks to include operational missions, bilateral and multinational exercises with foreign partnered nations, along with other security cooperation assistance as directed by the geographic combatant command. While an Army BCT may assume a RAF mission and related deployments, not all of the BCT would deploy or various units and key personnel may deploy to various locations at different times. The RAF construct involves leaving behind elements that can be reorganized as needed to continue training for future requirements or deployment in

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support of the RAF, as well as emergent tasks outside of the RAF requirements (Odierno 2012). With the decentralization of forces necessary to meet the demands associated with the RAF concept, key challenges affect functions such as mission command as well as collective training requirements. This broad array of requirements poses additional challenges to the BCT’s training competencies. A review of the 2014 Strategic Guidance and Priorities of the chief of staff of the Army showcases the flexibility required from a RAF brigade combat team. Here, the BCT was expected to be trained for decisive action and be globally responsive while simultaneously regionally engaged (Department of the Army 2014a). Similar to the security force assistance–related BCT in regard to readiness, the RAF concept can have negative impacts on a unit’s proficiency at mission-essential tasks. Combining the training requirements and skills required to meet the demands of RAF-specific missions, along with skill sets required for a BCT to remain globally responsive and competent in decisive-action skills, often proves challenging to maintain. Along with challenges associated with the RAF concept, the RAF concept provides several key opportunities at the strategic and lower levels. The RAF concept directly supports national strategic priorities in several keys ways. When considering the processes involved to execute RAF deployments at the brigade combat team level to theater levels, there is a direct correlation with strategic priorities such as global responsiveness through improving deployment processes (Department of the Army 2014a). In the realm of increasing deployments of forces across many regions, the RAF paradigm further enhanced capabilities and relationships among partners, through multinational exercises and training events. US Marine Corps Advisers With a rich history in advising foreign militaries dating back to the early twentieth century in South and Central America, again in Vietnam, and most recently through actions in the Middle East through the global war on terror, the US Marine Corps continues to exert influential leverage in the realm of building partner capacity around the world. As early as 1915, the US Marine Corps was influential in building partner capacity in support of US national strategy through advisory efforts associated with the so-called Banana Wars in Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic (Rosenau et al. 2013:9). The foundations established through advisory initiatives in Latin America continue to prove influential within the advisory infrastructure of today’s US Marine Corps. During this historical era, Marine advisers were challenged with

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increasing responsibilities outside of military-focused advisory roles. Leading constabulary organizations, Marines were involved with early whole-of-government approaches to promoting US policy, often involving aspects of diplomacy, economics, law and order, as well as traditional military advising activities (Rosenau et al. 2013:10–16). As enlisted Marines often served as officers within such constabulary organizations, the increased responsibility, power, and influence associated with these billets often led to highly sought Latin American posts for Marines (Melson 2011:13). One Marine noncommissioned officer’s self-description of his duties and responsibilities while serving as an officer in the Haitian Constabulary in the 1920s reads: His duties in this connection are manifold; he is responsible for the training of the native soldiers, their proper feeding and clothing, [and] instruction in their duties as police. He also is financial advisor of one or more towns. He is in charge of paying the civil officials of his subdistrict. These sub-districts are often spread over a large territory and he must make frequent inspections. He must also maintain friendly relations with the native officials in the different towns. For it is only by the cooperation of these officials that he can observe the workings of the courts, [and] the progress of the towns of which [he is the] financial advisor. (Melson 2011:13)

Similar in nature to some of the more contemporary advisory responsibilities of Marines in the global war on terror, some of the experiences and key lessons learned include the importance of adequate pre-deployment training as well as the challenges associated with language and cultural barriers (Rosenau et al. 2013:9). As the US Marine Corps played an important role in advising South Vietnamese forces in the 1950s–1970s, a variety of programs and experiences provided valuable lessons that continue to be integrated into the modernization of the US Marine Corps’ advisory methodology. With two main advisory programs—the Vietnamese Marine Corps and the Combined Action Program, adviser selection and pre-mission training contributed to varying degrees of success between the two (Rosenau et al. 2013:31). Considering the two programs, an overall assessment reveals considerable investment in pre-deployment training, with more detailed selection for advisers generally more prevalent as part of the Vietnamese Marine Corps structure in comparison to the Combined Action Program, which resulted in considerable more challenges for Combined Action Program advisers and missions (Rosenau et al. 2013:32–34). Similar lessons learned were later carried forward and revalidated as the Marines provided advisory efforts during military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq.

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Marine support to security cooperation from 2003 to 2012 in Iraq and Afghanistan provided major partner capacity-building support to the global war on terror across a range of programs and formations. In Afghanistan and Iraq, Marine efforts varied in scope from small ad hoc Marine teams assisting US Army Special Forces working with Afghan commando battalions, to part-time advisers with Iraqi army units, to more deliberate efforts involving the 3rd Marine Division, formally aligned against the advising mission for the Afghan national army’s 201st Corps (Rosenau et al. 2013:55). Amid a long list of advisory and partnering efforts and organizations that Marines supported or led, some of the more formal endeavors included Marine military transition teams, police transition teams, coalition military assistance training teams, adviser support teams, and border transition teams (Rosenau et al. 2013:35–74). To date, the role of the Marine adviser in Afghanistan continues to be at the forefront of US and coalition efforts in places such as Helmand province, where the Marines have a long history of combat and advisory operations. In addition to the ongoing partner capacity-building efforts across the Middle East, US Marine Corps advisers continue to be paramount in the promotion of national security policy around the globe. The establishment of the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group helped formalize the structure and focus of these efforts. Created in 2011 at Fort Story, Virginia, the group was established “as a unique command that consolidates all facets of [security cooperation] to include advisor skills, training and assessment expertise, and security assistance program management” (Department of the Navy 2014). Further institutional efforts within the US Marine Corps and the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group in the realm of building partner capacity include a recent focus on tracking advisory experience, education, and skills across the ranks for talent-management purposes. With the creation a Marine free military occupational specialty called foreign security force advisor in December 2014, and continued annual screening of personnel files, the US Marine Corps is aggressively maintaining visibility on these key skill sets within the ranks (Department of the Navy 2016a). Beyond a starting point in regard to the establishment of an advisory command and identification of advisory skill sets, with continued efforts in this arena the US Marine Corps is postured to further enhance its ability to build partner capacity globally.

The Army’s Latest Initiative: Security Force Assistance Brigades In light of some of the key challenges with current practices and future demands associated with national security strategy, the Army has devel-

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oped a new command architecture to help promote objectives centered on building partner capacity. The security force assistance brigade concept addresses several of the Army’s prevalent challenges to include impacts on BCT readiness associated with the RAF and security force assistance–related BCT concepts, increased persistent engagement capabilities, and the ability of the DoD’s largest ground force to better support subsequent defense strategy. This structure, which stood up its first security force assistance brigade in 2017 at Fort Benning, Georgia, and its second in 2018 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is designed to encompass an entire Army advisory corps, composed of six brigades and two division-level headquarters (Department of the Army 2016a:19). The rapid inception of these new organizations highlighted the versatility of capabilities of the Army in supporting geographic combatant commands with an operational security force assistance brigade as the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade completed its first combat rotation in 2018. Following continued activations of security force assistance brigades, three additional brigades, two divisions, and the corps headquarters’ activations will follow (Department of the Army 2016a:7–8). Now in the execution phase, this initiative displays the ability to best address current and future strategic requirements of the Army. Encompassing the six templated security force assistance brigades, two are to be established as armored and four as infantry variants (Department of the Army 2016a:7–8). Manning of the security force assistance brigades consists primarily of noncommissioned officers and officers, with commanders and advisory-team leaders being more senior in nature and proven former commanders with key and developmental billets successfully executed prior to assignment in the brigades (Department of the Army 2016a:7). As part of the assignment process to the security force assistance organizations, personnel will undergo a formal training process. As the chief of staff of the Army stated, the formations have a “little flavor of Special Forces in there and a flavor of the Foreign Area Officer program.” Within these “flavors,” majors fill the roles of company commanders, and training for personnel assigned to the security force assistance brigades includes cultural and language skill-set development (Department of the Army 2016a:7). Furthermore, US Special Forces officers and noncommissioned officers also serve among the ranks of the security force assistance brigades to provide residential expertise. In the realm of training for future soldiers in security force assistance brigades, in 2017 the Army stood up a permanent military adviser training academy at Fort Benning, Georgia. With the academy already training future advisers, the chief of staff of the Army’s prioritization of security force

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assistance focus within the Army is clear (Department of the Army 2016a:7). Creating this new advisory corps is a complex endeavor striving to better support strategic requirements. With initial controversy among uniform items and roles that at a glance parallel those of US Army Special Forces, General Milley took time to dispel rumors that have fueled such debates. Highlighting the distinct roles and capabilities of special forces, the chief of staff of the Army stressed the differences in the mission sets of the two organizations: security force assistance brigades will focus on conventional foreign security forces and specialties such as general-purpose aviation, artillery, sustainment, and infantry formations; special forces will specialize in smaller, special-purpose, indigenous forces (Myers 2017). In explaining the differences in employing the two organizations, General Milley states: “There is no intent to replace Special Forces, or to compete with Special Forces. This [the purpose of the security force assistance brigade] is a unique mission gap that needs to be filled” (Myers 2017:1). Reviewing some of the key challenges associated with the current paradigms of the RAF and the security force assistance–related BCT involving unit readiness and global engagement between partnered nations, the concept of the security force assistance brigade appears to be addressing both. With the intent to produce regionally focused units with security force assistance expertise, these brigades are being allocated to the geographic combatant commands for security force assistance employment, with the additional capability to perform as conventional combat units in cases of national emergency (Milley 2016). Based on the cohort type of organization, the ranks of security force assistance brigades could rapidly be filled with soldiers to round out the formations as combat units. In recent cases such as Operation Inherent Resolve or Resolute Support, where security cooperation activities involving train, advise, and assist are key aspects of the mission, senior leaders and staff members would be better equipped to serve dual-hatted functions within the advisory division or corps as well as becoming key advisers to foreign senior leaders. A concept well under way, the Army staff continues to address some of its associated challenges. Having completed the first deployment to Afghanistan to work with the Afghan national army, the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade helped pave the way for deployment of the 2nd Security Force Assistance Brigade to Afghanistan in 2019.

Conclusion The world continues to experience growing threats and complexities related to regional and global security. As a global leader, the United States continues to face challenges in the realm of strategic security

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implications as growing concerns continue to mount in the arena of national security and projection of defense strategy. In an era of both domestic and international economic stress, national resources aligned against defense allocations are increasingly restricted and managed with extreme caution. With recent force drawdowns across the services, the challenges presented for security institutions continue to progress along expansive paths. Updated outlooks in the realm of strategic assessments and security strategies lead to changes in the ways and means the US Department of Defense will achieve future strategic end states. Change in national security strategy increasingly relies on security cooperation activities such as foreign internal defense and security force assistance. The notion of increasing focus toward building partner capacity continues to underwrite strategic defense methodology across a wide spectrum of programs, concepts, and strategic documents. Assessments from key defense documents, including the Quadrennial Defense Review, National Security Strategy, and National Defense Strategy, all reveal this growing approach. Expressed concisely during President Obama’s final speech to a large military formation in December 2016 at MacDill Air Force Base, he highlighted a new strategic outlook while discussing the fight against terrorists in the Middle East in stating that “we should ask allies to do their share in the fight, and we should strengthen local partners who can provide lasting security” (Obama 2016). More recently, President Trump highlighted strategic implications for security cooperation activities through his endorsement of the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act, which authorizes funds for defense engagements and activities with allies and partners of the United States. The United States has a long history involving building partner capacity through foreign internal defense and security force assistance. From the earliest days of US military history, advising foreign militaries and building partner capacity have been imperative aspects of the Defense Department’s lineage. With successful endeavors such as those in Colombia, the joint force has demonstrated the powerful resolve of well-executed security cooperation programs across troubled regions. Colombia’s ability to export foreign internal defense and security force assistance, or US “security cooperation by proxy” scenarios now taking place in Central and South America, exemplify the progressive potentialities existing in the defense arena. Across the services, modern initiatives, concepts, and programs show the continued expansion of focus and capabilities related to strategic guidance and national defense strategy. Comparing a multitude of factors across the contemporary operational environment, the armed services’ obligations and commitments increasingly support partner capacity building.

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With robust capabilities in the land, sea, and air domains, US partner capacity-building platforms continue to expand across the services. Future security cooperation programs that incorporate foreign internal defense and security force assistance activities must be executed while considering key lessons learned from historical application as well as through the assessment of contemporary challenges. First, service command architectures must maximize centralization of the entities involved in the execution of foreign internal defense and security force assistance, as is observed with the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group model. Second, personnel serving in capacities focused on building partner capacity must be carefully selected and properly trained. Third, billets and career tracks established through service programs must be career-enhancing and professionally appealing. Fourth, engagement strategies must be persistent in nature to foster rapport, trust, and access. Finally, expansion of security cooperation within security force assistance and foreign internal defense capability sets must increase capacity-building efforts in areas such as cyber and other influential contemporary domains. In summary, the United States continues to represent global leadership with the ability to project military power and influence worldwide. Among turbulent conditions, the strategic reliance on the DoD’s ability to build partner capacity continues to evolve with increasing importance. As the future asymmetric environment encompasses growing uncertainty and complexity, the US military must remain poised to meet the associated demands. Variations in contemporary defense strategy, further supported through increased dedication of resources by the services, highlight the future relevance of foreign internal defense and security force assistance in accomplishing national security objectives.

13 Combating Transnational Organized Crime Steven R. Johnson

Throughout history civilizations have faced threats that seek to disrupt civil society and undermine effective governance. In order to develop effective activities to challenge such problems, one must understand the environment in which they occur and seek to gain a common understanding of the problem to be addressed prior to developing the strategy and approach. Transnational organized crime is a threat that spans the globe and poses a significant challenge to the international community. The rise of transnational organized crime began to take place as early as the 1970s but it largely occurred during the 1990s (Picarelli 2011:6). The increased advance of transnational organized crime in the 1990s is often attributed to a rapidly changing international environment that experienced dramatic advances in technology and communications, globalization of the economy, and a shifting geopolitical environment creating an increasingly interconnected global community (Picarelli 2011:6). These factors contributed to the evolution of organized crime from principally domestically oriented groups with central hierarchies to broad-reaching networks that operate seamlessly across geographic boundaries (Picarelli 2011:6). The expansion of transnational organized crime has led states and international organizations to develop strategies and implement actions to address the problem. In particular, the approach taken by the United States to address transnational organized crime is outlined in the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime from July 2011. This strategy highlights the significance of the problem as it relates to US national interests. Additionally, international support for the United 165

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Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime demonstrates the resolve of the international community to understand the problem and seek opportunities to pursue strategies aimed at preventing the growth of transnational organized crime and actively confronting this crime to disrupt ongoing activities. To date approximately 90 percent of the nations across the globe have ratified this convention (Albanese 2012:11). Continuous unified efforts will have to be undertaken across the international community if states want to achieve goals to disrupt transnational organized crime and diminish the circumstances that allow this crime to expand. In examining the emergence and expansion of transnational organized crime as an international security concern and exploring current US government and United Nations approaches to the problem, one finds that efforts to address the complexity of transnational organized crime require vast resources, multiagency collaboration, and significant cooperation across the international community. Within the scope of this broad approach, what is the role of the US Department of Defense (DoD) in combating transnational organized crime and, more specifically, what is the role of special operations forces (SOF) in contributing to the overall DoD effort to combat transnational organized crime? How can SOF capabilities be applied to directly and indirectly confront transnational criminal organizations, and what authorities currently exist to support the execution of these efforts? The Department of Defense and in particular special operations forces can leverage unique capabilities to assist in the development of necessary capacity worldwide to combat transnational organized crime. DoD placement, access, and intelligence collection and analysis capabilities can directly contribute to efforts to identify and disrupt specific networks of transnational criminal organizations, and when significant pending threats to national security exist, special operations forces can be leveraged to execute sensitive targeting operations focused on high-value individuals. Additionally, DoD planning and joint synchronization experience can be utilized to support multiagency synchronization to commit unified action against transnational criminal organizations. However, in order for the DoD to provide necessary capabilities, US legislation and DoD authorities and appropriations must be aligned for these purposes. This chapter focuses on examining existing strategies and efforts to combat transnational organized crime from the perspective of the United States and seeks to provide recommendations for consideration to integrate the unique capabilities of US special operations forces into the overall approach. Moreover, this research seeks to identify existing authorities

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for DoD efforts to combat transnational organized crime and explore potential shortfalls that require adjustment or expansion of authorities.

Defining and Characterizing Transnational Organized Crime When one seeks to understand and ultimately define transnational organized crime, it is important to understand each component of the overall concept individually that results in the integrated definition. It is also necessary to understand that transnational crime does not necessarily represent a new classification of crime, as it can be considered an extension of existing criminal activities or violations of law, taking place beyond the borders of one single country (Albanese 2012:1). Essentially, transnational crimes can be broken into three categories based on broadly defined objectives: “provision of illicit goods, provision of illicit services, and the infiltration of business or government operations” (Albanese 2012:2). Furthermore, a definition of organized crime that represents a consensus definition incorporating various elements from numerous scholars is outlined as follows: “a continuing criminal enterprise that rationally works to profit from illicit activities that are often in great public demand. Its continuing existence is maintained through the use of force, threats, monopoly control, and/or the corruption of public officials” (Albanese 2012:3). Recognizing these perspectives on transnational crime and organized crime, one should also consider the characteristics of transnational criminal organizations in order to inform the overall definition of transnational organized crime. One of the most significant advances for transnational criminal organizations is their ability to act as dispersed networks that establish linkages with other criminal networks and legitimate businesses to conduct their activities (Williams 1994:60). This effectively establishes an enterprise model for illicit activities; therefore lessons can be learned by examining the operations of transnational corporations that leverage similar methods (Williams 1994:60). Through this approach one can focus on the international supply chain that requires partnerships from the initial design and production of products, through transshipment and distribution, and ultimately to market access and product delivery (Williams 1994:60). Furthermore, transnational criminal organizations demonstrate their understanding of the need to establish and maintain strategic partnerships that present opportunities to gain access to new markets or expand market share within current markets (Williams 1994:61). As an enterprise, transnational criminal organizations seek to maintain their structure and ultimately pursue profit-driven activities requiring such organizations to focus on supply, demand, market regulation,

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and competitors (Albanese 2012:9). This leads to an understanding that transnational organized crime can be driven by a demand for illicit products and services in consumption countries while highlighting the difficulty states face in maintaining rule of law within their sovereign territory (Edwards and Gill 2002:207). Transnational criminal organizations can be further characterized by their network structure, in which they are typically based in one country while executing various components of the operations in other countries that present favorable conditions with the least amount of risk or high payoff to offset increased risk (Shelley 1995:464). For the purposes of this research, transnational organized crime will be defined as it is defined in the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Self-perpetuating associations of individuals who operate transnationally for the purpose of obtaining power, influence, monetary and/or commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means, while protecting their activities through a pattern of corruption and/or violence or while protecting their illegal activities through transnational organizational structure and the exploitation of transnational commerce or communication mechanisms. (Department of State 2011b:ii)

Rapid Expansion Based on International Environmental Changes The emergence and expansion of transnational organized crime aligns with the time in history when significant advances in technology were occurring at a rapid pace (Picarelli 2011:6). Organized crime began to expand beyond national borders and develop transnational enterprises during the 1970s and advanced steadily until the 1990s (Picarelli 2011:6). In the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War, through the emergence of the internet into the public market and an increasingly globalized economy, transnational organized crime began to expand at a much more rapid pace (Picarelli 2011:6). Transnational criminal organizations conduct various criminal activities that have widespread impacts on legitimate markets and goods, government income generated through taxes on legitimate commerce and trade, and ultimately consumers and consumer confidence (Realuyo 2015:38). The continued expansion of the global marketplace at an unprecedented pace creates opportunities for transnational criminal organizations to exploit vulnerabilities in the interconnected systems and intermingle illicit activities with legitimate transactions at the speed of technology (Realuyo 2015:38). This point can be further understood

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by highlighting the connection of expansion of transnational organized crime with the growth of international business and specifically focusing on technological advances including business applications of computers, international communications, and commercial airline travel (Shelley 1995:465). One of the principal points to note is that transnational criminal organizations “follow the trends of international business” (Shelley 1995:466). Transnational criminal organizations are further characterized by their ability to diversify while integrating illicit activities with legitimate international economic activities without disrupting the markets (Williams 1994:59).

Impact of Transnational Organized Crime: Relationships with Public and Government Officials Transnational organized crime has widespread impacts on the social conditions within the countries in which transnational criminal organizations operate, and their activities undermine governance and rule of law, driving instability, which creates an environment conducive to the expansion of criminal activities (Shelley 1995:467). Transnational criminal organizations’ exploitation of legitimate economic activities further limits legitimate investment and development, creating an economy that becomes increasingly reliant on illicit activities for sustainment and ultimately integration into international markets (Shelley 1995:483). Transnational criminal organizations are adept at corrupting officials within governments, including those tasked with disrupting their activities, such as law enforcement officials and compliance officers (Williams 1994:59). Transnational criminal organizations’ corrupting activities undermine government legitimacy, rule of law, and democratic institutions (Shelley 1995:468). This penetration reduces the effectiveness of the state’s institutions to combat transnational organized crime (Shelley 1995:470). As corruption activities continue around the world, it becomes increasingly evident that they contribute to instability, particularly in states where senior government officials are involved in transnational organized crime by design (Levi 2012:42). In addition to corruption activities that take place within a state, some evidence indicates corruption among state officials acting in a diplomatic capacity (Zabyelina 2013:346). In some cases this is the result of criminals seeking to corrupt officials to leverage them for criminal purposes, and in other cases the officials or their accompanying family leverage their position as a means to conduct criminal activity with limited risk due to diplomatic relations and immunities (Zabyelina 2013:345). The primary example of officials operating in a foreign capacity being corrupted by criminals for nefarious purposes is

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demonstrated by cases of visa malfeasance in which officials support criminal activity to falsely issue visas, support visa procurement, and support counterfeiting activities (Zabyelina 2013:352).

Transnational Organized Crime’s Expansion into Cybercrime The internet has proven to be a beneficial platform for information exchange around the world, but it has also increased opportunities for transnational criminal organizations to engage in electronic theft and electronic commerce for illicit purposes (Levi 2012:43). The internet provides users with a degree of anonymity not present in physical interaction, including confidentiality and deniability (Etges and Sutcliffe 2008:91). Underlying conditions can contribute to the emergence and expansion of cybercrime in particular geographic centers such as populations that are exposed to technical expertise through education opportunities in areas where there are limited economic opportunities (Levi 2012:40). Moreover, the impact is far greater in those states that encourage cyber activity or are not capable of effectively countering or preventing it, or in some cases when agents of the state are actively involved (Levi 2012:40). Some of the main geographic centers for cybercrime activities are located within Brazil, Russia, South Korea, India, and China (Glenny 2012:146). Cyber criminals require two unique skill sets to be successful in cybercrime: hacking abilities and social engineering (Glenny 2012:146). Hacking allows access to data necessary for criminal activity, and social engineering supports the ability to convince victims to engage in activities on their computer that are not in their best interest, allowing the cybercrime to take place (Glenny 2012:146). Expansion of transnational organized crime into the cyber realm is a reflection of the fact that criminal activity flourishes where there are lax or confusing laws and where the capabilities and capacities of law enforcement are limited or ill structured (Etges and Sutcliffe 2008:92). Strategies and Approaches to Address Transnational Organized Crime With international recognition of transnational organized crime as a strategic issue that must be addressed, the preponderance of efforts to combat this crime center on law enforcement and judicial activities to confront the problem (Dandurand 2007:226). International recommendations include the necessity to strengthen legislation within states to allow effective law enforcement and prosecution of transnational criminal organizations (Dandurand 2007:226). In addition, increased efforts

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come with the realization for a need to ensure that capacity exists to effectively confront transnational organized crime and therefore that requirements for developing and training additional capabilities across the international community exist (Dandurand 2007:226). The scale and scope of transnational organized crime make it clear that no one country acting alone will have the capability to contain this crime, not even within its own borders (Fijnaut 2000:124). Interagency cooperation is required within states and across the international community in order to be effective against the problem, but barriers to cooperation, including limited information sharing and a lack of consensus about how to pursue the problem, continue to undermine cooperation (Dandurand 2007:229). Furthermore, within the international environment and across functional systems exist discrepancies in regulation and compliance standards that essentially establish specific areas that act as hubs for functions of various systems of transnational organized crime (Calderoni 2014:135).

Understanding Strategic Guidance, Direction, and Authorities The International Crime Control Strategy (ICCS) of 1998 was developed as a multiagency effort in response to Presidential Decision Directive 42 of 1995 (Wagley 2006:6). The ICCS included eight goals focused on protecting US borders and extending defense beyond the borders, denying safe-haven, countering financial crime, preventing exploitation of international trade, addressing emerging threats, and enhancing international cooperation and rule of law (Wagley 2006:6). This initial effort to protect the United States from the impacts of international crime likely contributed to increased international attention to this developing problem. The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime was adopted in November 2000 and provides guidance to the international community regarding the need to address this crime and specific activities states should adopt to increase effectiveness and cooperation against the problem (United Nations Office of Drug Control and Crime Prevention 2000:11). The convention provides definitions in order to develop common language that facilitates cooperation across the international community, and it identifies four crimes traditionally associated with transnational organized crime: “participating in organized crime groups, money laundering, corruption, and obstruction of justice” (11). In addition, the convention goes on to outline “serious crimes,” which represent offenses that would constitute punishment through confinement for four years or more, and “minor offenses,”

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creating the framework that requires states that ratify the convention to enact legislation to address these offenses (11). It further requires states to implement domestic measures to address crimes associated with transnational organized crime and provides specific practices such as bank transparency and cooperation with domestic law enforcement on efforts associated with money laundering. Throughout the negotiations process it became evident that in order to effectively address the problems associated with transnational organized crime, it is necessary for government agencies and departments to work together and across governments (United Nations Office of Drug Control and Crime Prevention 2000:12). One of the main mechanisms for cooperation requires states that ratify the convention to provide for extradition and mutual legal assistance beyond those agreements that already existed through regional or bilateral agreements (13). This provision supports an environment conducive to international cooperation with the ends of prosecution and conviction in mind. Some restrictions on extradition apply based on domestic laws and existing agreements and treaties, as well as minimum thresholds for punishment. In order to address states’ capacity to combat transnational organized crime, the convention calls for states to develop and maintain training facilities and programs, as well as calling on states to provide resources to further this requirement in developing countries where resource constraints may be prohibitive (United Nations Office of Drug Control and Crime Prevention 2000:12). The convention also calls on states to adopt preventative measures including “taking of security precautions, training of officials, keeping of general records about crime and specific records to control key activities, such as the import/export of firearms and the issuance and verification of travel documents” (12). The Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC) was approved in July 2011 and centers on a “single unifying principle . . . [to] build, balance, and integrate the tools of American power to combat [transnational organized crime] and related threats to national security and urge . . . foreign partners to do the same” (Department of State 2011b:4). In accordance with the definition of transnational organized crime included within the strategy, the strategy highlights key elements of the threat including penetration of state institutions, corruption, threats to governance, threats to the economy and strategic markets, the crimeterror-insurgency nexus, drug trafficking, human smuggling, trafficking in persons, weapons trafficking, intellectual property theft, cybercrime, and the role of facilitators (5–8). In addition to the aforementioned key elements, the strategy outlines regional priorities for the Western Hemi-

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sphere, Afghanistan and Southwest Asia, Russia and Eurasia, the Balkans, West Africa, and Asia Pacific (9–11). Within these regions key threats include the Los Zetas Cartel, the Sinaloa Cartel, Dawood Ibrahim, Russian syndicates and oligarchs, Jose Americo Bubo Na Tchuto, and Cehng Chui Ping. The breadth of the threat outlined within the strategy clearly demonstrates the global reach of transnational organized crime and the threat it poses to the international system, specific regions, and individual states. Furthermore, the strategy outlines a strategic approach aimed at reducing transnational organized crime to a manageable public safety problem from its current state as a national security threat (Department of State 2011b:4). The strategic approach consists of five policy objectives supported by a series of priority actions and supporting actions (13). The policy objectives are focused on protecting Americans and partners, improving partner capacity and capabilities to address transnational organized crime, protecting strategic markets, targeting for defeat the most significant threats, and building partnerships and seeking cooperation (13–14). The priority actions focus US government activities to ensure intelligence and information sharing; safeguard financial systems and markets; strengthen interdiction, investigations, and prosecutions; disrupt drug trafficking; and build capacity, cooperation, and partnerships (15–28). Within the scope of strategic guidance provided by the US government, it becomes clear that to establish environments that are generally stable, the United States, including the US military, should conduct significant activities during the pre-crisis phase in conjunction with partners in an effort to avoid conflict or at least be prepared prior to crisis (Peterson 2013:25). The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2015 expanded existing counter-drug authorities for the Department of Defense to include “activities to counter transnational organized crime.” The NDAA for fiscal year 2015 provides a definition for transnational organized crime that is the same definition included in the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime. Following the inclusion of transnational organized crime in the NDAA fiscal year 2015, the DoD was provided the authority under US Code to “provide training and equipment to the national security forces of one or more foreign countries for the purpose of building the capacity of such forces to conduct one or more of the following: Counterterrorism operations; counterweapons of mass destruction operations; counter-illicit drug trafficking operations; counter-transnational organized crime operations; maritime and border security operations; military intelligence operations; operations or activities that contribute to an international coalition operation

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that is determined by the Secretary to be in the national interest of the United States” (10 US Code, chap. 16, § 333). US Code also provides the DoD the authority to “provide support for the counterdrug activities or activities to counter transnational organized crime of any other department or agency of the Federal Government or of any State, local, tribal, or foreign law enforcement agency for any of the [following] purposes” (10 US Code, chap. 15, § 284). For example: Types of Support for Agencies of United States: maintenance, repair, or upgrading of equipment; transportation of personnel; establishment (including small scale construction) and operation of bases of operations or training facilities; counterdrug or counter-transnational organized crime related training of law enforcement personnel; detection, monitoring, and communication of the movement of—air, sea traffic, and surface traffic; establishment of command, control, communications, and computer networks; construction of roads and fences and installation of lighting; establishment of command, control, communications, and computer networks; provision of linguist and intelligence analysis services; and aerial and ground reconnaissance. (10 US Code, chap. 15, § 284)

Types of Support for Foreign Law Enforcement Agencies: establishment (including small scale construction) and operation of bases of operations or training facilities; detection, monitoring, and communication of the movement of—air, sea traffic, and surface traffic; establishment of command, control, communications, and computer networks; provision of linguist and intelligence analysis services; and aerial and ground reconnaissance. (10 US Code, chap. 15, § 284)

In addition to the authorities captured in the NDAA, special operations forces execute additional training engagements, including training with armed forces and other security forces of a friendly foreign country when the primary purpose of the training is to train US special operations forces (10 US Code § 322). This type of training is often referred to as a joint combined exchange training and it is designed to permit elements of US special operations forces to engage in training events with partners globally in an effort to develop and sustain relationships while maintaining DoD readiness. Section 1206 of Public Law 109-163, approved by Congress in 2006, authorizes “global train and equip” activities used to enhance capabilities of foreign military forces. This authority and accompanying appropriation allow the DoD to more effectively engage partner military forces to create sustainable military capabilities that will ultimately provide support to US security interests globally. The execution of this authority goes beyond what is permitted under the authorities previously mentioned in that it allows for a more comprehensive develop-

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ment of a capability by permitting the permanent transfer of equipment for operational purposes.

Developing an Integrated Approach In order to achieve the necessary results to limit the national security threat of transnational criminal organizations, US government departments and agencies will need to establish and maintain partnering relationships with counterparts in other countries as well as with other US government departments and agencies. These partnerships can facilitate information sharing and operational speed when they involve a sufficient level of mutual trust and they are sustained through continuous engagement. No individual agency or country has the necessary reach, authority, or resources to address the threat from transnational organized crime without collaboration and cooperation with other partners globally. Within the current international environment, nations are increasingly cautious about the deployment and employment of large-scale combat forces to address threats, making the use of special operations forces a preferential alternative (Donaldson 2014:37). DoD support to strengthen other governments’ capacities to address international and internal threats largely through programs focused on military assistance and development has been conducted by special operations forces and can be characterized as those efforts that exist within the space between peace and large-scale conflict (Reynolds 2014:63). Future special operations focus areas include the expansion of an interconnected special operations network designed to leverage forward-operating small teams “to deter aggression, build situational awareness, understand local conditions, shape the operating environment, train new partners, and gain actionable intelligence” (Donaldson 2014:37). This approach requires persistent presence and sustained engagement with key and developing partners (Adams 2014:38). As of 2014, SOF on average were deployed to more than seventy countries worldwide (Adams 2014:39). DoD Special Operations Capabilities Historically, DoD counter-threat network efforts have centered on support to countering proliferation and smuggling of weapons of mass destruction, as well as support to counter-drug efforts through DoD detection and monitoring responsibilities and DoD support in key production and transit countries (Wagley 2006:15–17). In addition to the DoD’s assigned role as the lead in the US government for detecting and monitoring drug trafficking in the maritime and air domains, DoD resources and capabilities can provide additional means to address transnational organized crime, especially through use of the DoD’s

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intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; unique equipment; and planning, coordination, and synchronization expertise. Furthermore, DoD special operations forces can provide training for specialized skills and the use of specialized equipment that can contribute to partners’ capabilities to confront transnational organized crime. In order to understand what unique capabilities special operations can provide, it is important to understand the definition of special operations and what activities are at the core of its capabilities. “Special Operations are explained as small unit tactical actions performed by specially organized, trained, and equipped forces aimed at achieving strategic and operational effects” (Morrison 2013:40). Special operations forces operate in environments where other US government agencies may not have access. SOF core activities include direct action, special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, civil affairs operations, counterterrorism, psychological operations , information operations, counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, security force assistance, counterinsurgency operations, and activities specified by the president or the secretary of defense (Morrison 2013:41). According to a recent assessment conducted by Andrew Feickert, US Army SOF are composed of approximately 29,000 soldiers including active, reserve, and National Guard components; the Air Force Special Operations Command, which includes approximately 18,000 personnel; the Naval Special Warfare Command, which includes approximately 8,800 personnel; and the Marine Special Operations Command, which is composed of approximately 3,000 personnel (2014:3–5). Within the US Army, special operations capabilities include Special Forces, military information support operations, and civil affairs, which execute their mission by working by, with, and through indigenous partners (Cleveland 2013:136). These capabilities represent the ability of the DoD’s dedicated military forces to execute unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, small-unit combat advisory programs, psychological and influence warfare, and civil-military operations (Cleveland 2013:136). Deployed SOF missions include foreign internal defense, which is focused on training and development of local forces globally (Donaldson 2014:32). Air Force special operations are composed of special operations aviation capabilities assigned to “assess, train, and advise partner nation aviation units” as well as provide aviation support to foreign internal defense missions (Feickert 2014:4). Air Force special operations also includes special tactics experts consisting of combat controllers, pararescue, special operations weather teams, combat aviation advisers, and tactical air-control parties (Feickert 2014:4). The Naval Special Warfare Command is composed of special warfare operators, known as SEALs

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(Sea, Air, and Land Forces) and special warfare boat operators, known as special warfare combatant-craft crewmen (Feickert 2014:5). The Marine Corps Special Operations Forces Command’s missions include direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, information operations, and unconventional warfare (Feickert 2014:5). In addition to service-specific special operations capabilities, Joint Special Operations Command is tasked to “study special operations requirements and techniques, ensure interoperability and equipment standardization, plan and conduct special operations exercises and training, and develop joint special operations tactics” (Feickert 2014:6). “In special operations the enemy will be prepared; the question is, when will he be least prepared?” (McRaven 1996:18). Understanding the enemy and acting in a decisive manner against the enemy’s exposed vulnerabilities provides a strategic advantage to the attacking force. This is demonstrated by special operations through the understanding of relative superiority as described by William McRaven: “Relative superiority is a concept crucial to the theory of special operations. Simply stated, relative superiority is a condition that exists when an attacking force, generally smaller, gains a decisive advantage over a larger or well-defended enemy” (1996:4). In addition to the concept of relative superiority, McRaven outlines six principles of special operations— “simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose” (8–23). McRaven highlights that “it is these principles that allow special operations forces to achieve relative superiority” (8). Overall, special operations techniques and capabilities can be leveraged to support broader efforts to diminish the threat posed by transnational organized crime. A recent RAND study designed to assess special operations partnerships in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Colombia identified several overarching best practices, including the need to focus on capability development as a higher priority than short-term operational gains, focus support on sustainable efforts and existing intelligence infrastructure, and develop lasting partnerships through consistent engagements and established trusting relationships (Long et al. 2015:73–92). SOF historically engage in missions to develop or enhance the capabilities of partners in order to collectively combat national security concerns. Lessons learned in areas where SOF previously operated can contribute to the understanding of how to employ SOF capabilities in support of the overall mission to combat transnational organized crime.

Case Study: Plan Colombia In the early 2000s, US policy as it related to Colombia was to “strengthen democratic institutions, promote respect for human rights and rule of law,

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intensify counter-narcotics efforts, foster socio-economic development, and address immediate humanitarian needs” (Noriega 2005:57). US policy justification was tied to the understanding that conditions in Colombia represented a potential destabilizing effect for the broader region (Veillette 2005:12). These policy issues were effectively addressed via US support to Plan Colombia, which was a six-year program, initiated in 2000, that sought to align government efforts in support of a common strategic approach (Noriega 2005:59). Security in Colombia has been impacted over the past fifty years by internal criminal and terrorist threats. In order to address these threats, the government of Colombia developed and pursued Plan Colombia in conjunction with support from the United States. SOF played a major role in efforts to improve the security situation in Colombia within the scope of Plan Colombia. As of 2005, assessments of the progress of Plan Colombia showed improvement in the public safety category and advances in economic confidence, which was largely attributed to the improved security situation (Veillette 2005:8–11). Additional assessment input noted sustained quality, availability, and price of cocaine and heroin in the United States despite advances in interdiction of drugs and eradication of illicit crops (Veillette 2005:3). Plan Colombia was composed of ten key elements: strategies; economic, fiscal, and financial; peace; national defense; judicial and human rights; counternarcotics; alternative development; social participation; human development; and international-oriented (Marcella 2001:27–29). Plan Colombia key elements can be grouped into focus areas on economic development and security (Marcella 2001:7). Security concerns in Colombia were essentially fueled by narcotics production and trafficking as both antigovernment forces, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN), and self-defense forces, such as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), utilized the illicit narcotics trade as a means to fund and resource their efforts (Marcella 2001:7). A counterargument to this position is that the illicit narcotics trade is not the cause of instability, but rather a symptom and contributor to an already fragile sociopolitical system in Colombia and the broader region (Flynn 2001:1). This comes with the realization that any effort to address the issues in Colombia must include efforts focused on countering the illicit narcotics trade. Initially US aid in support of Plan Colombia included “support for human rights and judicial reform, expansion of counter-narcotics operations in Southern Colombia, alternative economic development, increased interdiction efforts, and assistance for Colombian police” (Marcella 2001:7). The primary program leveraged by the United States to execute

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its support was the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, which included support to other nations in the Andean region as well (Veillette 2005:1). Four-fifths of the overall aid package was earmarked for support to Colombian security forces based on the understanding that Colombia first had to establish security (Hylton 2010:100). This approach was essentially developed due to wide-ranging problems across Colombia that were rooted in limited government control and presence in large portions of Colombian territory, historical violence and civil conflict, and deeprooted social issues related to inequalities (Noriega 2005:59). Efforts to improve the overall situation in Colombia could not be successful without the ability of Colombian security forces to provide rule of law and security throughout Colombian territory (Marcella 2001:3). US military support in Colombia initially focused on providing training support to Colombian counter-drug units and over time expanded to include Colombian forces conducting counterinsurgency operations (Reynolds 2014:66). Under Plan Colombia, US special operations forces were tasked to develop Colombian special operations capabilities in support of the broader plan (Peterson 2013:27). The support of US special operations forces to Plan Colombia can be characterized as military efforts that do not represent the main effort, and the principal means leveraged by SOF have not been lethal action (Reynolds 2014:65). The main limitation placed on US special operations forces has been that they are not authorized to accompany Colombian forces or act as advisers in combat situations (Reynolds 2014:65). However, over the course of continuous US SOF engagement, Colombian SOF have achieved significant operational success and advanced to the point of competence that Colombia is an exporter of SOF training to other countries within the region (Peterson 2013:27).

Conclusion Transnational criminal organizations represent an expanding threat to US national security and actively undermine stability globally. US SOF activities and capabilities can contribute to the development of partnernation capacity to combat transnational organized crime and enhance international and interagency cooperation globally. Additionally, when directed, specialized SOF targeting can be engaged to address the most pressing national security threats. Due to the dispersed networked operations of transnational criminal organizations, focused efforts to directly confront key individuals and functions will require the alignment of international strategies and development of unified approaches. DoD planning, coordination, and synchronization expertise can provide necessary support to the development and execution of unified approaches.

PART 3 Conclusion

14 Special Operations Forces in an Era of Great Power Competition Christopher Marsh, James D. Kiras, and Patricia J. Blocksome

Despite the words of former US Secretary of Defense James Mattis in the 2018 National Defense Strategy, who warned that the future would be one of great power competition, not everyone is convinced. Speaking later that year at the Association of the US Army conference, Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) commander General Stephen Townsend said that he believed the “future of war will be a hybrid threat.” He went on to add: “There’ll be everything from tanks and missiles and fighter-bombers down to criminal gangs, terrorists, suicide bombers and guerrilla cells. . . . We’re going to have to do all of that, the full spectrum of conflict” (Naylor 2018). Preparing for future great power war that may never happen is prudent defense planning, but for most nations, whose armed forces must respond to an ever-growing list of existing and near-term threats such as those outlined by General Townsend, preparing for great power war may be a luxury they cannot afford. In this concluding chapter, we look to the future of special operations and special operations research, focusing on the role of special operations forces (SOF) in an era of great power competition. As China and Russia continue to counter Western and US interests globally, and national and regional threats to peace and stability continue apace, the role of SOF might be more important than ever. But such a move will not go uncountered by competitors of the United States. Whatever the role of special operations in the future, one thing is for certain: they will be a critical contribution to the ability of all major global players to protect their interests and project their power globally. 183

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The Future of Warfare Predicting the future operational environment is fraught with challenges, perhaps especially in the realm of military affairs. As Lawrence Freedman reminds us in The Future of War: A History (2017), we never predict the future accurately, though sometimes we very nearly get it right. The situation is much like the saying attributed to General Eisenhower about planning: “plans are worthless, but planning is everything.” So we may be wrong when it comes to our predictions of the future operating environment, but it is still a necessary—and even crucial—exercise. After all, as Freedman points out, the vision of the future shapes the forces that countries build and maintain, and therefore there is perhaps nothing more crucial than understanding current predictions of future warfare. Today the question is: What role will, should, or can SOF play in an era that will be increasingly overshadowed by great power competition? To begin to approach this question, we first seek to address what competition is, and what great power competition will look like. Then we can look at the likely continuities and contingences facing special operations missions in the new environment. Some will stay the same, some will change, and some new missions may emerge. Again, we are not prophets and in some ways this exercise is a folly, but to go into the future unprepared is not a superior course of action. Great Power Competition As mentioned earlier and several times throughout this book, the US 2018 National Defense Strategy warns that the future of international relations will be one characterized by great power competition. But what is competition? According to one source at US Special Operations Command (SOCOM), “competition is the interaction among actors in pursuit of the influence, advantage, and leverage necessary to secure their respective interests” (2019, “On Competition,” 1). As the 2017 US National Security Strategy points out, however, competition “does not always mean hostility, nor does it inevitably lead to conflict.” Moreover, it concludes that an “America that successfully competes is the best way to prevent conflict” (Trump 2017). The United States is not the only country that sees such competition as likely in the future. In 1999, two colonels in China’s People’s Liberation Army published a book titled Unrestricted Warfare, which discusses how approaches other than military confrontation could be used to diminish the power of an opponent (Qiao and Wang 2005). More recently, the chief of the Russian General Staff, General Valery Gerasimov (2013), has written that asymmetric methods can be used against superior powers and even peers (see Chapter 10 in this volume).

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Competition can be seen along a spectrum, from cooperation through competition to conflict, and with all three sometimes occurring simultaneously (e.g., economic trade with a state with which one is in conflict, such as US trade with Nazi Germany during World War II; see Borkin and Welsh 1943). An increasingly popular term is “competition below armed conflict.” This is where a competitor aims to change international norms with operations characterized by uncertainty to create ambiguity meant to confuse public opinion, paralyze political decisionmaking, and subvert legal frameworks, but doing so while avoiding crossing the threshold of military response (Votel et al. 2016). This level of competition is the elusive “gray zone” so much discussed and yet so little understood. In fact, engagement in the gray zone is likely to characterize the nature of conflict among the great powers in the future in order for them to achieve their policy objectives without triggering an armed response. Such competition is in some ways a return to the past. During the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union fought each other through proxies, such as the US support for the mujahidin in Afghanistan or Soviet support to Angola. In this way, third-party states became the focal point of the bipolar competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. SOF played critical roles on both sides. US SOF engaged in train-and-equip missions, for example, as well as preparing for staybehind missions should the Soviet Union launch a surprise land attack against Europe. The Soviets were prepared for similar operations as well, which they had practiced during the partisan warfare against invading German forces as part of Operation Barbarossa, launched on June 22, 1941. In Asia, Mao Zedong was leading the Chinese Communists to victory through irregular warfare, and then, following that success, exporting his methods for revolution via his writings to other countries around the world (Marks 1996). Not to be forgotten here are also the actions of small-state SOF, such as that in Ukraine, where underground fighter Stepan Bandera worked with the Nazis against the Soviet forces (TysKrokhmaliuk 1972), or in Indonesia during the Konfrontasi, where President Sukarno infiltrated SOF into Malaysia in a bid to overthrow the British-backed regime (Simpson 2012:157–178). While the environment in which SOF operated during World War II and the Cold War is not exactly the same as the current operational environment, there are useful lessons to be learned from this time period, and further historical research in this area is likely to prove valuable.

SOF in the Future Operating Environment The two main types of SOF mission sets are likely to continue as they are even in the future operating environment. Hyper-conventional activities,

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such as raids, precision strikes, and strategic sabotage, will continue to offer flexible responses to great power provocations, while the deniability and limited nature of these actions offer some protection against unintended conflict escalation. Should competition escalate to open conflict, these SOF mission sets can be used in conjunction with, as supporting efforts for, or in different theaters than conventional force employments. On the other side of the conflict spectrum, the era of great power competition may be one in which irregular warfare activities intended to have direct effects on a polity become more critical. In this competition opponents will likely not fight head-to-head; they will instead use other countries as their proxies, or attempt to destabilize allies. In such an environment, SOF missions such as psychological operations and support to threatened governments via military training may actually increase. Such indirectness of approach is particularly true for unconventional warfare activities and the new facet of unconventional warfare—support to resistance. While unconventional warfare in the past meant directly partnering with the “legitimate” de jure government forces (even if they were not in de facto control of the state), support to resistance takes the concept slightly further, and develops the mission to include support to forces that, while friendly, may not be officially recognized even by their own governments. Thus, great power competition may demand highly effective and specialized SOF units that can succeed across the spectrum of conflict. Given this expectation for the future, how should the different mission sets be assigned? Some are suggesting that a clear delineation of labor is necessary across the spectrum of conflict. For example, should hyper-conventional units be held in reserve for potential great power confrontation, and otherwise be used only in a limited manner for missions associated with counterterrorism or counter weapons of mass destruction? Meanwhile, irregular warfare units could be broadly applied to shaping operations, focused on indirect application of force during competition and low-intensity conflicts around the globe. However, the downside to specifically delineated mission sets is that the future may not be as we expect it. The tradeoffs between highly specialized SOF units, which are highly capable in one area, and more broadly trained SOF units, which may be capable of operating across a range of missions but of necessity are not as highly capable in any specific area, will have to be taken into consideration by every state developing its SOF. The complexities of these mission sets and the expected use of SOF forces will require a new focus on the staffing, training, and education assigned to different SOF units. The variations in SOF specializations and missions across countries may provide

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interesting insights into how those countries view not only the future, but also their strategy for operating in that future.

New and Emerging Mission Sets Support to Resistance and Countering Resistance In the era of great power competition, one area in which we are seeing a boom in the SOF business is in support to resistance prior to any outbreak of conflict—that is, helping nations prepare for a potential invasion and being ready to fight a war of resistance against an expected occupier prior to the occupation happening. This is not exactly the same thing as unconventional warfare itself, but it is certainly related. Unconventional warfare, as discussed in Chapter 6, is essentially support provided by the military (usually SOF) to a foreign insurgency or resistance. Resistance, on the other hand, is more focused on the pre-conflict phase and an occupying power. It has been defined by the Theater Special Operations Command–Europe (SOCEUR), based in Stuttgart, Germany, as: “A nation’s organized, whole-of-society effort, encompassing the full range of activities from nonviolent to violent, led by a legally established government (potentially exiled/displaced or shadow) to reestablish independence and autonomy within its sovereign territory that has been wholly or partially occupied by a foreign power” (2018). Today throughout Europe in places such as Switzerland and the Baltics, states are busy formulating plans for resistance should there be an invasion and occupation (of course, Russia—which annexed Ukraine’s territory of Crimea in 2014 and is supporting an insurgency in eastern Ukraine—is seen as the potential invader). In the Pacific, however, the concept is catching on, and Singapore, for example, is also developing a resistance concept and plan (in this case against the People’s Republic of China as a potential invader). This is an area that falls naturally into the SOF wheelhouse, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) special operations forces have been very active in both theoretically and functionally working with SOF partners—particularly the Baltic states and Poland—in helping train their forces. But these NATO members have been active themselves, not just in engaging with larger partners like the United States and Germany, but also in developing their own contributions to both the concept and the operations of resistance. One aspect of resistance is to have forces (again, often SOF) that can train the indigenous population for a war of national resistance. This training, in places like the Baltics, has already begun, with military units training locals into militias that will be prepared should an invasion occur.

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Of course, this leads to the question of what countries such as China and Russia will do to counter resistance movements should they invade their neighbors. The Russians are no strangers to resistance or counter-resistance. According to the US Army, by “both conception and scope,” Soviet partisan fighting against the Nazis was “the greatest irregular resistance movement in the history of warfare,” combining “all the classic elements of resistance movements of the past with modern means of communication and transportation and modern weapons, and at its peak involved a far greater number of men than had ever before been drawn into an irregular force” (Howell 1956:203). Not only did the Soviets fight an incredible resistance movement against the Nazi invading forces during World War II, making them experts at what they call “partisan warfare,” but also Moscow was able to hold together the multinational Soviet Union for over seventy years, despite active undergrounds in many parts of the country (Motyl 1991). Moreover, they also held together the Warsaw Pact of “allied” states of Eastern Europe, despite undergrounds in these countries as well. The Baltics stand out here, in particular, where the Forest Brethren resisted Soviet occupation for several years after World War II, particularly in Lithuania, where the last member was finally captured in the 1970s (Misiunas and Taagepera 1993). These Baltic states are the very same states that today are planning resistance operations. This long history of such operations in the region means that both Russia and the Baltics have much experience to draw on, making all of the players in this region skilled in resistance and counter-resistance operations. As for the Chinese, they have at least as much experience in resistance warfare as the Russians, having been occupied by the Japanese beginning in 1937 with the invasion of Nanjing and lasting through World War II. Not only was China invaded by the outside, but the Chinese Communists and Nationalists were also simultaneously fighting a civil war against each other. The Chinese Civil War is an interesting study in which both sides were, at times, fighting as a resistance, and at others fighting to put down a resistance. Mao Zedong’s influential writings from this period on the art of guerrilla warfare continue to be one of the pillars of any serious curriculum on the subject, and their influence can even be seen in Western military doctrine.1 Perhaps the greatest effect of resistance planning is the deterrent effect this should have. While, for example, Russia certainly has the military might to occupy the Baltics—a recent RAND study estimated it would take approximately thirty-six hours for the Russians to overrun and occupy the region—the creation and support of resistance efforts by the Baltic states ensure that Moscow knows that they would

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immediately be in for an insurgency and that the Baltic nations would not submit quietly to foreign occupation (Shlapak and Johnson 2016). Given their status as NATO members, they would also likely receive considerable external support from other states that would rather Russia get bogged down in the Baltics than be free to turn their military activities elsewhere. The calculus here is not that Moscow would be unable to occupy these states, but rather that the occupation could be made so painful by resistance movements that the potential cost would deter the onset of aggression. Moscow got a taste of what it is like when a nation refuses to submit and is supported by a powerful external actor during its war in Afghanistan, and knows how painful such a conflict can be. Likewise, as the United States and its allies continue with their “long war” in the same country, they too are learning how difficult countering such resistance is. Therefore, the goal of a unified resistance should be to serve as a powerful deterrent, which threatens a potential occupying power not with defeat, but with what one author has called the “war of the flea” (Taber 2002). Influence and Counter-Influence In contrast to resistance and counter-resistance operations—which require the threat, though not necessarily the actual employment, of trained fighting personnel—influence and counter-influence operations do not axiomatically require any sort of military or paramilitary force. Instead, influence operations are focused on affecting an adversary’s capabilities by changing the perceptions of key targeted populations that are important to the adversary. These populations, once the desired shift in perception is achieved, will then influence the adversary’s overall behavior by either constraining options or changing the type of behavior that is seen as acceptable. Influence operations are therefore a type of soft power (Nye 2004:x). However, as Joseph Nye points out, the lack of physical coercion is not incontrovertibly better than the alternative; “it is not necessarily better to twist minds than to twist arms” (2011:81). A RAND study explains that this type of operation is one that is a “coordinated, integrated, and synchronized application of national diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and other capabilities in peacetime, crisis, conflict, and post-conflict to foster attributes, behaviors, or decisions by foreign target audiences” (Larson et al. 2009:2). As exemplified in this quote, the concept of influence operations often involves a whole-of-government rather than a military-centric approach. In other words, influence and counter-influence operations are not a traditional military activity; rather, these operations describe a situation in which the military can be seen as a supporting element of what might

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otherwise look like, or be, diplomacy. Viewed in this light, the military’s role in influence and counter-influence operations can be understood as a peculiar form of defense support to civil authorities. Influence operations can be seen as occurring along a continuum from attraction, “getting others to want the outcomes you want,” through to coercive diplomacy—the use of threats to get what you want (Nye 1990:31; see also Schelling 1966). Generally, the goal of influence operations is to be successful enough at attraction or friendly appeals that threats or coercion are rarely used.2 Regardless of where along that continuum a specific operation falls, the objective is not the use of force. Once force is used, the role of influence diminishes. This is not to say that influence operations both within the military and within the government as a whole will not still continue during active conflict, but that the military priority at that point will most likely be on fighting, rather than influencing. The strategic thinking behind information operations is described well by Sun Tzu, who notes that “the highest realization in warfare is to attack the enemy’s plans; next is to attack their alliances”; and only after that fails should one resort to physical attacks on the adversary’s military forces or civilian infrastructure (Sun 1963:177). Influence operations, then, can be thought of in terms of the arrangement of military activities in alignment with a larger whole-ofgovernment or whole-of-society strategic narrative. One of the questions surrounding the use of influence operations, therefore, is what role the military, and SOF in particular, have to play. Within the military realm, this may include public affairs, stability, peacekeeping, and humanitarian missions, as well as the “deliberate exploitation of normal U.S. military activities such as exercises, deployments, air and naval displays, and technology demonstrations . . . port visits and presence missions” (Lord 1989:30). More special operations–specific missions are likely to include information operations, psychological operations, civil-military support or cooperation operations, and possibly military deception operations (Guevin 2004:30). An area of particular interest within influence and counter-influence operations is the ability to measure the level of influence created or countered. This is a difficult proposition. It requires, among other things, an understanding of the baseline level of support for an issue prior to any influence activities, as well as the cultural context in which influence activities must be dressed in order to be palatable to the receiving audience (Larson et al. 2009). Additionally, the level of desired support for the target issue—the objective of the operation— needs to be determined. William Hutchinson (2010:15) identifies three

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levels of support that can be achieved by influence operations: compliance, conformity, and conversion. Compliance is simply acquiescence, conformity is tied to the development of social expectations, and conversion is the reshaping of a worldview. The effort and time expended in the influence operation will affect what level of support can be achieved; compliance is quicker to achieve, but conversion is far more long-lasting. Once all of these requirements have been identified and an influence operation has been initiated, levels of support for the target issue need to be monitored for change. Even if an influence operation is successful, this does not necessarily mean that it is over. Sustained support for a target issue may require sustained operations, again depending on the level of support desired. What may make the measurement of influence operations even more difficult is the whole-of-government nature of these activities. The military unit tasked with implementing its piece of a larger influence operation may be able to monitor the results of its operations, but may be less able to monitor other government elements’ activities or effects. Therefore, a key challenge in influence operations is the whole-ofgovernment alignment. Each actor, both state and nonstate, will vary in their civil-military and interagency relationship structures. The differences in the composition and organizational hierarchy of military and nonmilitary institutions may make for meaningful differences in the ability to carry out effective influence operations. Those who are able to develop cohesion between different elements of the interagency operation, and even with commercial enterprises, may be better equipped to carry out influence operations. Interagency relationships are unlikely to change quickly, so one role that SOF will undoubtedly have to address is that of liaison. Influence operations, by their very nature, require effective whole-of-government approaches; liaison officers offer placement and access that may not only enable but also magnify the effect of SOF influence operations. The challenges of executing influence operations are many, but the ability of SOF to shape operational environments through this mission set, or even deter conflict outbreak by changing the perceptions of targeted polities, offer potentially significant advantages to those who master this form of special operations. Special Operations in Space and Cyberspace The emergence of space and cyberspace as new domains also pose interesting challenges for SOF in future conflict. As Martin van Creveld notes: “In the past, each time advancing technology enabled mankind to move into a new environment—from the land into the surface of the sea, from

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the surface of the sea into the depths on one hand and the air and outer space on the other—war quickly followed. . . . To that extent, the extension of war into cyberspace appears inevitable” (2015:123–124). If we accept van Creveld’s assertion, war is coming to the space and cyber domains, even if the way in which conflicts will be fought is still unclear. If war is coming, presumably special operations will follow, if not lead. The most generic definition of special operations is simply those operations that are in some way unique or out of the norm. If this is the case, the norm for conflict in space and cyberspace must first be established before out-of-normal operations can take place. However, even though we do not know those norms, we can make some assumptions about special operations based on the current mission sets of SOF, and how they might apply to new domains. As described earlier, the two main mission sets of SOF are hyper-conventional activities and irregular warfare activities. Both of these mission sets can be applied to the domains of space and cyberspace. Cyberspace is unique in that it is, unlike land, sea, air, or space, a created domain, and one that is relatively new in both its creation and our understanding of that creation. As Henry Kissinger noted: “The pervasiveness of networked communications in the social, financial, industrial, and military sectors has vast beneficial aspects; it has also revolutionized vulnerabilities. . . . Internet technology has outstripped strategy or doctrine—at least for the time being. In the new era, capabilities exist for which there is as yet no common interpretation—or even understanding” (2015:344). It is so new, in fact, that research on special operations in cyberspace is nascent, if not nonexistent. Interestingly, however, the application of theories of special operations to cyber operations has generated some literature (see Duggan and Oren 2016). This literature suggests that, rather than seeking to develop special operations in cyberspace, the first step may be to apply the theoretical methodologies used for understanding special operations toward comprehending operations in cyberspace. A further aspect of cyberspace, applicable to all types of special operations in this domain, is deniability, which is commonplace; the difficulty in this domain appears to be tracing any attacks back to the perpetrators (Guitton and Korzak 2013). This is an interesting phenomenon precisely because the rise of the internet and the proliferation of cameraenabled smartphones has meant that, in the physical domains, the ability to carry out clandestine missions has been decreasing. The increasing difficulty of concealing operations in the physical world, as compared to the relative ease with which operations can be concealed in the cyber domain—where you may not know that your system has been compro-

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mised until months or years after the attack—suggests that operations in the cyber domain may be a natural fit for some special operations missions (Trias and Bell 2010). In general, operations in cyberspace can be broken down into two types: exploitation and attack. Cyber exploitation refers “to the unauthorized access to computers, computer systems, or networks, in order to exfiltrate information, but without affecting the functionality of the accessed system or amending/deleting the data resident therein. . . . On the other hand, cyber attacks are those cyber operations, whether in offence or in defence, intended to alter, delete, corrupt, or deny access to computer data or software for the purposes of (a) propaganda or deception; and/or (b) partly or totally disrupting the functioning of the targeted computer, computer system or network, and related computer-operated physical infrastructure (if any); and/or (c) producing physical damage extrinsic to the computer, computer system, or network” (Roscini 2014:16–17). These two categories of cyber operations are helpful in starting to develop an appreciation of how cyber operations might align with special operations; cyber exploitations would be roughly analogous with irregular warfare, while cyber attacks would be more closely aligned with hyper-conventional activities. In contrast to hyper-conventional activities, which are focused on materiel or kill/capture objectives, irregular warfare activities tend to focus on people and their perceptions as the objective. This begs the question: Are irregular warfare activities possible in cyberspace, if no one lives there? We argue that they are, because, though no one lives in cyberspace in a physical sense, the rise of virtual identities and communities (such as those found on social media) means that irregular warfare operations are not only possible, but also likely.3 Indeed, the same tools used to understand communities in the physical world are easily applicable to the virtual world; there are probably more similarities than differences in terms of missions, tactics, and objectives (Duggan 2015). The infiltration, exfiltration, and use of information on a system is closely akin to information operations in the physical world. The differences to irregular warfare operations in the virtual world primarily have to do with the nature of the domain as a whole; geographic distance is minimized, and communication speed is near-instantaneous. However, the new domain also poses vulnerabilities. Connecting with, or being a part of, the virtual commons requires internet access. This access can be obtained through satellite phones or similar devices, but is generally much more widely accessed via physical networks of cables. Those networks can be switched off by agents hostile to a specific virtual community. Indeed, censoring or blocking internet access is

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so common a response by governments in crises that websites exist with the sole purpose of tracking those outages.4 Given this vulnerability that the internet has to physical or virtual blocking, any cyber special operations remain susceptible to disruption; it remains to be seen if that disruption is a critical limiting factor, or something that can be overcome. The challenges and opportunities provided by the virtual environment can be seen in the Arab Spring protests in Egypt, which eventually led to the downfall of President Mubarak. Protestors around Egypt used the internet to draw inspiration from earlier protests in Tunisia, for communication between activists not only within noncontiguous areas of the country, but also to supporters outside. In response to the protests successfully organized against him, and recognizing the threat posed to him by the cyber domain, President Mubarak shut off almost all of Egypt’s access to the internet, but workarounds were found, as certain internet providers refused to stop providing access, and the protests were ultimately successful (Howard et al. 2011). In contrast to irregular warfare activities in cyberspace, hyperconventional activities such as raids (the theft of information) and sabotage (the destruction of information or systems) already exist. The question, therefore, is whether such activities qualify as “special.” If cyber attacks of this type are the norm, and they appear to be so, these operations might simply be classified as “conventional.” While we expect that, at some point, hyper-conventional special operations will emerge in cyberspace, as of yet the conception of cyber military operations—clearly delineated from criminal or intelligence activities—has not yet been standardized to the point where there is a convention for what regular military operations would look like. Therefore, we do not (yet) make any predictions on the character of hyper-conventional special operations in the domain of cyber. While irregular warfare appears to be the more likely type of nearfuture special operations in cyberspace, the opposite is true in terms of special operations in space. With the exception of one habitable artificial satellite, the International Space Station, people do not continuously live in space. Without the persistent presence of communities, most irregular warfare activities are simply not applicable. This is not to say that warfare, or special operations, will not exist in space. Howard Kleinberg argues that “space warfare is bound to occur between two or more warring states if space is of sufficient importance to, if not a critical medium for, at least one combatant state’s national security, and one or more of the antagonist states has the capacity to actually conduct combat against space assets. Given that the number of states with space capabilities is growing with time, the likelihood of a war in

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space will correspondingly increase in the future” (2007:5–6). Rather, the type of special operations present in a space conflict are unlikely to be associated with traditional irregular warfare. However, hyperconventional activities might be particularly well-suited to both space and space-associated operations. In general terms, space warfare encompasses both space-only operations and also space-to-ground (or vice versa) operations. Spaceto-space operations are exactly what they sound like: an in-space weapon targeting or attacking an in-space object. While this is theoretically feasible, as of the time of this writing such operations have not occurred. What has occurred, however, are ground-to-space operations. The most prominent example is the 2007 Chinese test of an antisatellite missile launched from Earth that successfully destroyed an orbiting obsolete Chinese satellite (Milowicki and Johnson-Freese 2008). What could also occur is an attack from the opposite direction; again, though it has not happened, it is feasible that weapons systems on satellites could use either lasers or projectiles to attack a target on Earth. As space theorist John Klein notes, discussions of space warfare need not “preclude responding to an armed attack in space in a different domain. Therefore, if a system or asset considered essential is attacked in space, a response can include actions on land, at sea, or in the air” (2016). To Klein’s list of domains, we must add cyber as well; satellites run on directions received from Earth, and those directions could be manipulated or subverted. Space operations, therefore, offer a magnitude of both physical and virtual assets and infrastructure to be defended or exploited (Harrison, Johnson, and Roberts 2018). These assets can be in space (satellites) or on the ground (satellite uplink and launch locations), and can be attacked physically from either Earth or space, as well as virtually. Given this smorgasbord of targets, hyper-conventional space operations may span the continuum from missions to sabotage on-Earth physical infrastructure, to the development of “killer” satellites or space debris that are deliberately placed in the path of a targeted orbiting satellite. Ground-based surface-to-air missiles targeting space assets already exist as a capability, but these operations appear to be difficult to carry out clandestinely given current ballistic missile defenses that are built to monitor this sort of thing. Space weapons that target ground objectives similarly suffer from a lack of discretion, not only due to extant ballistic missile defenses, but also because objects in space follow specific orbits from which deviation is difficult; the location from which the attack emanated, once known, should enable relatively easy identification of the space asset responsible, which in turn should make attribution straightforward.

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Therefore, with the caveat that the advent of space warfare has not yet occurred, and that operations in space are probably less well understood than operations in cyberspace, we suggest that hyper-conventional operations appear, at least at this point, to be the more likely form of special operations within space warfare. While space-to-space operations may require novel tactics and processes, ground-to-space operations may simply draw upon current common hyper-conventional mission sets, with only a slight shift in terms of the targets attacked. Though discussed earlier more in terms of space rather than cyberspace special operations, any discussion of operations in both domains should also include a discussion of inter-domain coordination. Just as the employment of air, sea, and land forces can be combined to serve a larger operational purpose, and as special operations can be coordinated with conventional operations for the same purpose, so too will operations across domains. Those planning special operations in space or cyberspace will need to think through not only how those operations can work with conventional operations in that domain, but also how conventional operations in one domain might coordinate with a special operation in an entirely separate domain. This is not an entirely new problem. In World War II, special operations on land in the form of Jedburgh teams worked with members of the French resistance to hamper German road and rail traffic through various forms of sabotage. In the air, Allied air forces were attacking not only trains, but also industrial facilities that produced oil. Each effort amplified the other, and combined to make transportation difficult for the Germans (Beevor 2009). This combination or coordination of efforts across domains offers new opportunities, and new challenges. Operations across multiple domains may provide new advantages, or multiple paths of attack. However, the challenge of coordination across domains, and the friction inherent in such efforts, will likely increase as more domains are synchronized. Therefore, research on special operations in space and cyberspace will not only need to look at what those operations will consist of, but also must consider the interrelationships between special and conventional operations both between and within domains. Finally, the astute reader will have noticed that, throughout this discussion of special operations in space and cyberspace, we have avoided discussing what SOF forces will potentially look like. This is due to the fact that, while we are relatively certain that special operations will exist in these two domains, we are less certain that SOF— specifically trained units—will exist in the near future. When looking at the history of special operations and SOF, the former has always come before the latter. Generally, operations outside of the norm are a

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common occurrence in warfare, as necessity dictates innovation (Hughes and Robson 2017). However, forces that have been set aside only to train on those nonnormal missions are a luxury that comes later. The development of SOF first requires an understanding of what “special,” as opposed to “conventional,” operations in a given environment consist of. As we have noted, that determination has not yet been made in the domains of space and cyberspace. Even when we have a clearer picture as to what special operations look like in these domains, there is no guarantee that SOF will follow. Remember that, following World War II, many of the SOF units that had been created to answer military requirements were deemed no longer necessary and were dismantled. Military necessity will drive the generation of special operations, but it is only when the need for those operations becomes institutionalized and socialized that we expect to see the emergence of standing SOF in the cyberspace and space domains.

Conclusion Though impossible to predict, the future is coming, and we must be prepared for it. It is our opinion—and the opinion of many others (e.g., Marsh and Ellis 2019)—that SOF will play new and old roles in this era of great power competition, but critical roles all the same. Whether it be in traditional domains, such as air, land, and sea, or in emerging domains such as space and cyberspace, military operations are not going to disappear and peace is unlikely to break out. What we can be certain of is that humans will continue to engage in warfare as they have throughout recorded history. As we face “another bloody century,” as Colin Gray (2007) phrases it, it would be wise to pay attention to the innovation, adaptation, and emulation that occur among the world’s special operations forces. 1. For example, in the US Army’s field manual on counterinsurgency, Mao Zedong is cited, and his book On Guerrilla Warfare is listed in the bibliography as one of nineteen “classics” for further reading. 2. The messaging of support to resistance operations, as described here, would probably fall into this more coercive influence area. 3. The “ghost in the shell” concept, in which human consciousness can exist independent of a physical body, would mean that humans could exist solely within a virtual world. However, this state of affairs is unlikely in the near future. 4. See, for instance, https://netblocks.org and https://www.comparitech.com /privacy-security-tools/blockedinchina.

Notes

Acronyms

AUC BCT CIA CTOC CYBERCOM DoD ELN F3EAD FARC GRIN

ICCS ISIS JOPP JSOU JSOTF LGBT MDMP MISO NATO NDAA NGO OIC RAF SEAL SOCEUR SOCOM

United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia brigade combat team Central Intelligence Agency Combating Transnational Organized Crime Department of Defense Cyber Command Department of Defense National Liberation Army (Colombia) find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia genetics, robotics, information technology, and nanotechnology International Crime Control Strategy Islamic State of Iraq and Syria joint operation planning process Joint Special Operations University Joint Special Operations Task Force lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender military decision-making process military information support operations North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Defense Authorization Act nongovernmental organization Organization of the Islamic Conference regionally aligned force Sea, Air, and Land (US Navy) Special Operations Command–Europe Special Operations Command

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200

Acronyms

SOF SOP SOUTHCOM TRADOC USAID USASOC

special operations forces standard operating procedure Southern Command Army Training and Doctrine Command US Agency for International Development US Army Special Operations Command

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The Contributors

Charles K. Bartles is a Russian analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is also a space operations officer (FA40) in the US Army Reserve. He has deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq and has served as a security assistance officer at US embassies in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan.

Patricia J. Blocksome is assistant professor in the National Security Affairs department at the Naval War College, Monterey. Concurrently, Blocksome serves as an adjunct professor at Joint Special Operations University, where she teaches courses on countering violent extremism. She is the vice president for research at the Special Operations Research Association, managing editor of the Special Operations Journal, and associate editor of The Journal of Interdisciplinary Conflict Science.

Dan Cox is professor of political science at the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is the author of three books: Terrorism, Instability, and Democracy in Asia and Africa; Population-Centric Counterinsurgency: A False Idol; and Stability Economics: The Economic Foundations of Security in PostConflict Environments.

James M. DePolo is an active-duty colonel with US Army Special Forces, with over eighteen years of special operations experience. Having served in various capacities in the US Army’s 7th Special Forces Group, he has deployment experience to the SOUTCHOM area of responsibility, and to Afghanistan. He currently serves as the director for the Combined Arms Center Special Operations Directorate at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 219

220

The Contributors

Homer W. Harkins is a faculty member of the Joint Special Operations University. Harkins’s military career included service with infantry and special forces, with counterinsurgency activities in El Salvador, counter-drug activities in Bolivia, and security assistance in Venezuela.

Steven R. Johnson is a Department of the Air Force civilian working at the strategic command level and focused on interagency and joint operations planning, counterterrorism, and counter–transnational organized crime. Previously, he served in the US Army as a psychological operations practitioner with multiple deployments to Peru, Colombia, and Iraq. Johnson’s latest book is Building Character: The Values Journal.

Nathanael Joslyn is a US Army Special Forces officer assigned to US Special Operations Command. His fifteen years of military service includes operational assignments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and West Africa. He is a graduate of the Advanced Military Studies Program at the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies. Mike Kenny is executive director of the nonprofit Warriors’ Ascent, an organization that helps veterans and first responders deal with posttraumatic stress. He is a graduate of the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies and of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He is a retired US Army Special Forces officer.

James D. Kiras is professor at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama, where he has directed the school’s course of instruction on irregular warfare for fifteen years. He is a founding member of the Special Operations Research Association and associate editor of its peer-reviewed publication, Special Operations Journal. He is author of Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War on Terrorism and coauthor of Understanding Modern Warfare.

Paul S. Lieber is an award-winning scholar and practitioner of global strategic communication and information operations, with over two dozen scholarly publications on these topics. He has served as command writer at US Special Operations Command and as strategic communication adviser to Special Operations Command–Australia.

Christopher Marsh is director of the Institute for Strategic Research at the Joint Special Operations University, US Special Operations Command,

The Contributors

221

where he conducts research on global special operations forces (SOF) with a particular focus on Russian SOF. He is also the president of the Special Operations Research Association and serves as editor of Special Operations Journal. He is author of five books, including coauthor of Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors, and Sectors, and has published more than sixty journal articles and chapters in edited collections. He is coeditor of Elite Warriors: Special Operations Forces from Around the World. Kevin L. Parker is a US Air Force officer and distinguished graduate of the US Air Force Air Command and Staff College and graduate of the US Army War College. Colonel Parker currently serves as commander of the 86th Civil Engineer Group at Ramstein Air Base, Germany. He has commanded two civil engineer squadrons and deployed to Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kyrgyzstan.

Peter J. Reiley is a lieutenant-colonel in the US Air Force with over nineteen years of active-duty service as an information operations officer, program manager, and behavioral scientist. He has served on the joint staffs at US Special Operations Command and US States Central Command. Reiley is currently associate professor of behavioral sciences and leadership at the US Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colorado. Richard Rubright served in the 19th and 20th Special Forces Groups (Airborne). His work and study have taken him to over thirty countries, with endeavors as varied as being a war correspondent to conducting directed studies for US Special Operations Command. Rubright’s books include A Unified Theory for Special Operations and The Role and Limitations of Technology in U.S. Counterinsurgency Warfare.

Ben Zweibelson is program director for design and innovation at the Joint Special Operations University for US Special Operations Command and a doctoral student at Lancaster University, United Kingdom. He is a retired US Army infantry officer and veteran of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Index

The Art of War (Jomini), 14, 32 Asymmetric and indirect methods of war, Russia, 113–114, 116–123

Absolute deniability, 119 Adkin, Mark, 109 Afghanistan: BCT in, 154–155; CIA and, 55; human terrain in, 48; Mujahidin of, 109–111; Operation Red Wing in, 16; SOCOM and, 105; Soviet Union and, 108–110; special warfare in, 58–59 Afghanistan the Bear Trap (Yousaf, Adkin), 109 Air Force, US, 5, 7, 24; education in, 153; 1st Special Operations Wing, 1–2; School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 4; special warfare and, 176 Air power: Douhet on, 25; military theory on, 15, 34–35; in WWI, 15; in WWII, 11 America. See United States (US) Amos, James, 47, 49 Another Bloody Century (Gray), 101, 197 Armament and History (Fuller), 35 Arms and Influence (Schelling), 50 Army, US, 1, 80, 140; BCT of, 154– 158; counterinsurgency and, 71; doctrine of, 35, 49, 52; institutions of, 73–74, 78–80; RAF of, 153, 156–158, 161–162; security force assistance brigades, 160–162; social sciences and, 79; SOF and, 36, 57– 58; unconventional warfare and, 59 Art: of guerrilla warfare, 188; operational, 114–115; Russian operational, 115; SOF leadership science and, 83–85, 85fig

Baltic states: Russia and, 187–189; in WWII, 188 BCT. See Brigade combat team bin Laden, Osama, 16, 104; Operation Neptune Spear and, 43 Black Hawk Down (Bowden), 16 Bowden, Mark, 16, 106–107 Brigade combat team (BCT): RAF and, 156–158, 161; as security force assistance, 154–158, 161–162 Budget, defense, 139–140; military theory and, 137; for SOF, 24–25 Bush, George W., 65

Carter, Ash: budgets and readiness for, 139–140; on engagement through partners, 138 Celeski, Joseph, 17–18 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 137 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 107; Afghanistan and, 55; Colombia and, 146; paramilitary of, 54–55 Change agents: design thinking and, 87– 89; SOF leadership as, 84, 92, 92fig China: DoD and, 136, 139; great power competition and, 183–184; resistance movements and, 188; against US, 8, 101 China-Burma-India theater, WWII, 11, 13 CIA. See Central Intelligence Agency

223

224

Index

Civil affairs, 3, 54 Clandestine action, 16; as difficult for space weapons, 195; intelligence gathering through, 2; internet limiting, 192; SOF for, 69–70; terrorism through, 65, 66. See also Covert action Cognitive overmatch, 73, 88 Cohen, Eliot, 25–26 Cold War, 1–2; irregular warfare and, 67–68, 101; SOF and, 185 “The Collapse of Sensemaking in Organizations” (Weick), 78–79, 93 Collateral damage: conventional warfare and, 71–72; from terrorism, 61, 71; from unconventional warfare, 6, 72 Colombia: CIA and, 146; FARC of, 147, 150–151; military budget of, 148; Los Pepes and, 106–107; proxy actors and, 106–107; security institutions of, 146–149; SOF and, 150, 178–179; US military in, 146– 151, 177–179; US political and policy goals in, 148 Color revolutions: in Egypt, 194; regime change from, 115, 123; Shoigu on, 116 Columbine, 70 Columbus, Christopher, 88 Command of the Air (Douhet), 15, 25, 35 Commandos and Politicians (Cohen), 25–26 Constabulary organizations, 159–160 Constructs/concepts, for theorizing, 31, 131–132, 132tab, 133fig, 134, 138 Contentious Politics (Tilly, Tarrow), 40–41 Conventional warfare, collateral damage from, 71–72 Convergent and divergent processes, 87, 87fig, 89; SOF design teams and, 85–86, 85fig, 91–93; SOF leadership and, 96 Cooperation, security: in cyberspace, 196; DoD and, 138, 141–146; Marines Security Cooperation Group for, 153; Obama supporting, 163. See also Leading from behind Corbett, Julian, 25; Royal Navy and, 20–21 Core activities: of irregular warfare, 69; of SOF, 3, 142, 176

Cossacks, 120–121 Counterinsurgency: DoD and, 18; human terrain and, 48; mission sets for, 2–3, 187; SOCOM and, 102; SOF and, 45, 69; US Army and, 71 Counterterrorism, 15; as covert action, 16; mission sets against, 2–3; SOF and, 69 Covert action, 16; as difficult for space weapons, 195; intelligence gathering through, 2; internet limiting, 192; SOF for, 69–70; terrorism through, 65, 66 Crimea, Russia annexing, 113, 117, 119 “The Crisis of Professional Knowledge and the Pursuit of an Epistemology of Practice” (Schon), 81 Cyberspace, 16, 48, 197n3; interdomain cooperation in, 196; irregular warfare and, 193–194, 197; SOF in, 191–192; transnational organized crime in, 168, 170; uniqueness of, 192

Data-gathering, 18; ISIS and, 130–133; for research, 30–31; social media and, 128, 134–135 Defeat Into Victory (Slim), 12–13 Defeat mechanisms, 50–51; reevaluating, 5 Defense, foreign internal, 35–36, 43– 45, 57; US security force assistance and, 138, 141–143, 146–147, 151– 157, 161–164 “Defining Suicide Terrorism” (Jayasena), 61, 63–64 Democratic nations, special warfare and, 25–26 Deniability: absolute, 119; plausible, 7, 111, 119 Department of Defense, US (DoD), 5, 7, 47, 50; challenges for, 139–141; China and, 136, 139; counterinsurgency and, 18; human domain and, 49, 52; information operations of, 135–136; partnerships and, 8, 135–136; against al-Qaeda, 139; Russia and, 136, 139; security cooperation and, 138, 141–146; against transnational organized crime, 166, 175–177. See also Special operations forces (SOF) Design inquiry. See Design thinking

Index Design teams, SOF: convergent, divergent processes and, 85–86, 85fig, 91–93; leadership and, 88–91, 94 Design thinking, 5; change agents and, 87–89; flux-hunch cycle of, 85–95; paradigms of, 74–76; SOCOM and, 73–74; of SOF, 78–82; SOF leadership and, 83–84, 86–87, 87fig Deterrence, nuclear, 115, 123 Doctrine, military: human domain and, 47; of Russia, 114, 117; SEAL teams and, 59; of SOCOM, 84; special warfare and, 53, 55, 57; unconventional warfare and, 55; of US Army, 35, 49; of US joint forces, 5, 19, 23, 49, 52 DoD. See Department of Defense, US Douhet, Guilio, 15, 25, 35 Dying to Win (Pape), 63 Dynamics of Contention (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly), 40–41

“Educating the Reflective Legal Practitioner” (Schon), 76 Education, military, 153; design thinking for, 81–82; human domain and, 50, 58–60; SOCOM and, 83– 84; theory and, 14 Egypt, 194 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 103, 184 Escobar, Pablo, 106–107, 147 Exclusively explicit knowledge production, 79 Explicit versus tacit knowledge, 6, 76–82 Explorations in Strategy (Gray), 22, 44

F3EAD. See Find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate FARC. See Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate (F3EAD), 99 1st Special Operations Wing, US Air Force, 1–2 Flux-hunch cycle, design, 85–95 Foreign legionnaires, 121 Foreign powers: SOF of, 2; US against, 7 Foundations of Behavioral Research (Kerlinger, Lee), 31 The Foundations of the Science of War (Fuller), 14, 23 Four-to-One Ratio, 114–116 Freedman, Lawrence, 184

225

From Mobilization to Revolution (Tilly), 38–40 Fuller, J. F. C., 14, 23, 35 Functionalism, scientific inquiry and, 75 Future of war, 99; Russia and, 113, 116–117, 119; SOCOM and, 101; SOF and, 183–184, 186, 197; in space and cyberspace, 191–197 The Future of War (Freedman), 184

Genetics, robotics, information technology, nanotechnology (GRIN), 79, 82 Gerasimov, Valery, theories of, 7, 113– 117, 119, 122–123 Germany, 185, 187 Gray, Colin, 22, 42, 44, 99, 101, 197 Great Britain: Royal Navy of, 20–21; Slim and, 11–13; SOF, 1 Great power competition, 8, 185–187, 189, 191, 193, 195, 197; China and, 183–184 Griego, Wil R., 147–150 Guerrilla warfare, 26, 36–37; art of, 188

Haitian Constabulary, 159–160 “Handfuls of Heroes on Desperate Ventures” (Gray), 22, 42, 99 Hoyningen-Huene, Paul, 28, 30, 38 Human dimension. See Human domain Human domain, 48; DoD and, 49, 52; institutions for, 50; ISIS and, 125; military doctrine and, 47; military education and, 50, 58–60; SOF and, 51; special warfare and, 56; Strategic Landpower Task Force and, 5, 47; in war, 100 Human factors. See Human domain Human terrain: in Afghanistan, 48; counterinsurgency and, 48. See also Human domain Humanitarian assistance, 2, 3, 35, 45 Hybrid warfare, 113–114

“An Imperfect Jewel” (Winton), 4, 15–16 “The Importance of Commando Operations in Modern Warfare, 1939–82” (Thomas), 1–2 India, ISIS in, 125 Indirect and asymmetric methods of war, Russia, 113, 116–123; neprymyk i asimmetrichnykh sposobov, 114 The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783 (Mahan), 15, 19–20, 25, 35

226

Index

Influence operations, 135–136, 189; of SOF, 190–191 Information operations: of DoD, 135– 136; messaging strategy for, 126–128, 131; of Russia, 117–118, 122, 129 Information warriors, 122–123 Institutions: for human domain, 50; military theory and, 4, 19, 24–26; political and policy goals of, 40; for security, 163; of Colombia, 146– 149; SOF and, 2, 13, 24–26, 81–82; special warfare and, 36; of US Army, 73–74, 78–80 Insurgency: Lizardo on, 64–65; SOF and, 70; terrorism and, 66, 71–72 Interagency approach: SOF and, 191; of US military, 102–104 Internet, 16, 48; interdomain cooperation in, 196; irregular warfare and, 193–194, 197; SOF in, 191– 192; transnational organized crime in, 168, 170; uniqueness of, 192 Iran, 67, 109, 139 Iraq, 48, 105, 153–154; special warfare in, 58–59 Irregular warfare, 58–60, 69; Cold War and, 67–68, 101; cyberspace and, 193–194, 197; al-Qaeda and, 68; space and, 194–197 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 7; data gathering and, 130–133; human domain and, 125; in India, 125; recruitment for, 129–136, 132tab; social media and, 126, 128; social movement theory and, 129; social sciences and, 129–130; US and, 102, 127, 135

Japan: nuclear bombing of, 67; Russian war with, 21; in WWII, 11–12 Jayasena, Karunya, 61, 63–64 Jobs, Steve, 89–90 Joint forces, US military, doctrine of, 5, 19, 23, 49, 52 Joint military transition teams, 153–154 Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), 4–7 Jomini, Antoine de Henri, 14, 32 Juergensmeyer, Mark, 63 jus in bello, 71

Kennedy, John F., 1, 54–55 Kerlinger, Fred, 31

Killing Pablo (Bowden), 106–107 Kiras, James, 43–44, 64, 101 Knowledge, military: as scientific, 28, 30; social sciences and, 76; tacit versus explicit, 6, 76–82; technology and, 79 Knowledge production. See Knowledge, military Kuhn, Thomas, 30

Leadership, SOF: art, science and, 83– 85, 85fig, 85fig; as change agents, 84, 92, 92fig; convergent and divergent processes and, 96; design teams and, 88–91, 94; design thinking for, 83–84, 86–87, 87fig Leading from behind, proxy actors as, 151, 163 Lee, Howard, 31 Levels of war, 15, 100fig Liberalism, political theory of, 100, 103–104, 105 Lizardo, Omar, 64–65

Mahan, Alfred T., 25; on sea power, 15, 19–20, 35 Marine Corps, US, 138, 140; advisors from, 158–159; Free Military Occupational Specialty initiative of, 153; Security Cooperation Group of, 153; Special Operations Command of, 2; Whole-ofgovernment approach of, 159–160 Mattis, James, 8, 146, 183 Maxwell, David, 42 McAdam, Doug, 40–41 McRaven, William, 42–43, 47, 49, 152, 177 Messaging, strategy: for information operations, 126–128, 131; for social media, 136 Military, US: in Colombia, 146–151, 177–179; interagency approach of, 102–104; NATO and, 114; recruitment and, 140; special warfare and, 36; technology of, 101; theory for, 103 Military forces: four-to-one ratio and, 114–116; Slim on, 12; tasks of, 5 Military information support operations (MISO), 126–127, 135. See also Information operations Military knowledge, SOF and, 38, 41

Index MISO. See Military information support operations Mission sets: for counterinsurgency, 2– 3, 187; counterterrorism and, 2–3; of SOF, 185–187, 192 Morgan, Gareth, 90–91 Morgan, Zach, 154 Moyar, Mark, 24, 147–150 Mubarak, Hosni, 194 Mujahidin, 109–111

National Defense Authorization Act, US: of 2015, 173; of 2017, 139– 140; of 2018, 135 National Defense Strategy, US (2018), 8, 138, 140, 145–146, 163, 183–184 NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization Naval Special Warfare, 58–59 Navy, US: Special Warfare Command, 2, 24, 58–59, 176. See also Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) teams Nazi Germany, 185. See also Germany NDAA. See National Defense Authorization Act, US 9/11, al-Qaeda and, 62 Nonmilitary versus military measures, 114–116 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): Baltic states and, 188–189; SOF of, 187; US military and, 114 North Korea, 139 Nuclear arms: as deterrence, 115, 123; proliferation of, 139; Russia deemphasizing, 117; terrorism from, 67

Obama, Barack: on finite resources, 139, 145; for security cooperation, 163 Odierno, Ray, 47, 49, 59, 157–158 O’Hanlon. Michael, 146 OIC. See Organization of the Islamic Conference On War (von Clausewitz), 14, 19, 22, 32 “162nd Infantry Bde ‘Brought Back to Life” (Morgan, Z.), 154 Operation Red Wing, Afghanistan, 16 Operational art, 114–115 Operationalizing COIN (Celeski), 17–18 “Organization as Flux and Transformation” (Morgan, G.), 90–91 Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), 62–63

227

Organized crime, transnational, 8, 165, 178–179; in cyberspace, 170; DoD against, 166, 175–177; technology and, 168–169; UN against, 166, 171–172; US political and policy goals and, 173–174

Paddock, Alfred H., Jr., 36, 53–54 Pagan, Hector, 147–150 Pakistan: Afghanistan and, 109; as proxy actor, 110–111 Pape, Robert, 63 Paradigms: in design thinking, 74–76; of military theory, 30, 74–75; RAF and, 153, 158, 162 Paramilitary: of CIA, 54–55; Stahr on, 36, 54 Partnerships, between security forces, 8, 135–136 Pastrana, Andrés, 147 Peace, perpetual. See Liberalism, political theory of Peacekeepers/peacekeeping, 118–119, 120, 123 Los Pepes, 106–107 Persistent Engagement in Colombia (Moyar, Pagan, Griego), 147–150 Petraeus, David H., 48. 146 Plan Colombia, US and, 148–149, 178–179 Planning, special warfare, 73; convergent, divergent processes and, 85–86, 85fig, 91–93; von Clausewitz on, 45 Plausible deniability, 7, 111, 119 Poincaré, Henri, 27 Political and policy goals, US, 37–41, 105–106; in Colombia, 148; of institutions, 40; proxy actors and, 106–107; terrorism and, 65–66; transnational organized crime and, 173–174 Pragmatic versus pure theory, 14, 19, 22, 24 Private military companies, 121 Proxy actors: leading from behind, 151, 163; Lizardo on, 64; Pakistan and, 110; Los Pepes as, 106–107; plausible deniability through, 7, 111, 119; SOF and, 111; of Soviet Union, 185; strategic paradox and, 99–102, 100–102, 104, 111; of US, 106–108, 185; US political, policy goals and, 106–107

228

Index

Psychological warfare, 36, 54–55, 136; Civil affairs, 3, 54; constructs for, 31, 131–132, 132tab, 133fig, 134, 138; on social media, 129. See also Unconventional warfare Putin, Vladimir, 117

al-Qaeda: bin Laden and, 43; DoD against, 139; irregular warfare and, 68; 9/11 and, 62; political and policy agenda of, 66; terrorism of, 64 Quadrennial Defense Review: of 2006, 59, 68, 138–139, 163; of 2014, 143–144

RAF. See Regionally aligned force RAND Corporation, 177, 188–189 Reagan, Ronald, 109 Reconnaissance, 2 Recruitment: for ISIS, 129–136, 132tab; US military and, 140 “Reflections” (Weick), 81, 84, 85–86, 88–89 Regime change, 115, 123 Regionally aligned force (RAF): BCT and, 156–158, 161; as paradigm, 153, 158, 162 Relative superiority, theory of, 42–45 Research: data-gathering for, 30–31, 130–133; RAND and, 177, 188– 189; terrorism and, 63–65 Resistance movements: China, Russia and, 188; unconventional warfare and, 186–189 Resources, defense, 137–141 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), 147, 150–151, 178 Risk: of being co-opted, 18; of capability blending, 59; goals and, 39; inhibiting, 87; innovation and, 88, 95; of proxys, 106–107, 111; of Soviet Afghan operation, 110–111; strategic, 7; transformation as, 81– 82; of unconventional warfare, 70–71; utility versus, 111 Royal Navy, Great Britain, 20–21 Russia: operational art of, 115; Baltic states and, 187–189; DoD and, 136, 139; future of war and, 113, 116–117, 119; information operations of, 117– 118, 122, 129; military doctrine of, 114, 117; peacekeepers/peacekeeping, 118–119, 120, 123; resistance movements and, 188; SOF and, 121–

122; Ukraine and, 116–122; undeclared forces of, 119–120; the West countered by, 7–8, 116, 123 Russkiy Mir, Russia, as military theory, 118

Schelling, Thomas C., 50 Schon, Donald, 76, 81 School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air Force, US, 4 Science and Hypothesis (Poincaré), 27 Scientific inquiry: as functionalist, 75; military knowledge and, 28, 30; theory and, 27–31, 37–38 Screening, of special operators, 17–18 Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) teams, US Navy, 2, 17, 55; military doctrine and, 59 SEAL. See Sea, Air, and Land teams, US Navy Security, national: Obama on, 139, 145; Trump on, 145, 163; of US, 137–138, 141, 145, 166 Security cooperation by proxy. See Leading from behind Security force assistance, US: BCT as, 154–158, 161–162; foreign internal defense and, 138, 141–143, 146–147, 151–157, 161–164 Security force assistance brigades, US Army, 160–162 Security forces: best practices for, 177; National Security Strategy and, 146; partnering risks for, 106; partnerships between, 8, 175; regional alignment of, 153, 156– 158, 161–162 Semiotic square, 93–96, 93fig September 11th, 2001. See 9/11 al-Shabaab, 70–71 Shoigu (defense minister), 116 Slim, William: in China-Burma-India theater, 11–12; on SOF usefulness, 12–13 Social media: data-gathering and, 128, 134–135; ISIS and, 126, 128; messaging strategy for, 136; psychological warfare on, 129 Social movement theory, 37–41; ISIS and, 129; unconventional warfare and, 45 Social sciences: human terrain and, 48; ISIS and, 129–130; military

Index knowledge and, 76; special warfare and, 37; US army and, 79 SOCOM. See Special Operations Command, US SOF. See Special operations forces Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Corbett), 20–21 Soviet Union: Afghanistan and, 108– 110; proxy actors of, 185; WWII and, 19, 188. See also Russia Space, 16, 43; irregular warfare and, 191–192, 194–197 Spec Ops (McRaven), 42–43, 177 Special Operations and Strategy (Kiras), 43–44 Special Operations Command (SOCOM), US, 2, 6, 51, 96; Afghanistan and, 105; counterinsurgency and, 102; Design thinking and, 73–74; doctrine of, 84; future of war and, 101; military education and, 83–84 Special operations forces (SOF), 176– 177; art, science and, 85, 85fig; bin Laden and, 43; budgets for, 24–25; Cognitive overmatch for, 73, 88; Cold War and, 185; Colombia and, 150, 178–179; core activities of, 3, 142, 176; counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and, 45, 69; design thinking of, 78–82; future of war and, 183–184, 186, 197; human domain and, 51; influence operations of, 190–191; institutions and, 2, 13, 24–26, 81–82; insurgency and, 70; interagency approach and, 191; military knowledge and, 38, 41; military theory for, 24–26; mission sets of, 185–187, 192; of NATO, 187; peacekeepers/peacekeeping, 118–119, 120, 123; proxy actors and, 111; of Russia, 121–122; surgical strikes and, 41, 43; terrorism and, 71; of US Army, 36, 57–58; WWII and, 1–2, 185 Special operators, 6, 16, 23; institutions and, 24–25; screening of, 17–18 Special warfare, 58, 60; in Afghanistan and Iraq, 58–59; democratic nations and, 25–26; human domain and, 56; as indirect military action, 15; institutions and, 36; joint doctrine for, 5, 19, 23; social sciences and, 37;

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strategic value of, 22; surgical strikes and, 35; theory for, 37, 41; US Air Force and, 176; US military and, 36; US military doctrine and, 53, 55, 57 “Speech at West Point” (Kennedy), 1, 55 Spulak, Robert, 45–46 Stability mechanisms, 50–51 Stahr, Elvis, 36, 54, 57 State sponsorship, terrorism and, 67 Stinger missile, 109–110 Strategic Landpower (Odierno, Amos, McRaven), 47, 49 Strategic Landpower Task Force, 5, 47 Strategic paradox, proxy agents and, 99–105, 107, 109, 111 Strategic value, of special warfare, 22 Strategy and Defence Planning (Gray), 99 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn), 30 “The Success Story Next Door” (Petraeus, O’Hanlon), 146 Sun Tzu, 101, 190 Surgical strikes: as direct military action, 15; SOF and, 41, 43; special warfare and, 35; of US, 42 Systematicity (Hoyningen-Huene), 30, 38

Tacit versus explicit knowledge, 6, 76–82 Tarrow, Sidney, 40–41 Tasks, military, 5, 12, 115, 158 Technology: military knowledge and, 79; transnational organized crime and, 168–169; of US military, 101 Terror in the Mind of God (Juergensmeyer), 63 Terrorism: collateral damage from, 61, 71; conceptualizing, 5–6, 61, 65, 72; definition of debated, 62–66; insurgency and, 66, 71; Lizardo on, 64–65; nuclear bombing as, 67; political agendas and, 65–66; of alQaeda, 64; research and, 63–65; SOF and, 71–72; state sponsorship of, 67–68; unconventional warfare and, 61, 68, 70; US and, 62 “Terrorism and Irregular Warfare” (Kiras), 64 Theory, military: constructs/concepts of, 31, 131–132, 132tab, 133fig, 134, 138; education and, 14; of Gerasimov, 7, 113–117, 119, 122– 123; institutions and, 4, 19, 24–26;

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Index

liberalism as, 104; paradigms of, 30, 74–75; pure versus pragmatic, 14, 19, 22, 24; of relative superiority, 42–45; Russkiy Mir as, 118; scientific inquiry and, 27–31, 37–38; of social movement, 37–41; for SOF, 24–26; for special warfare, 37, 41; for US, 103; of war, 31–32, 34–35 Theory, of liberalism, 100, 103–104, 105 A Theory of Special Operations (Spulak), 45–46 Thomas, David, 1–2 “Thoughts on the Future of Special Operations” (Maxwell), 42 Tilly, Charles, 38–40, 41 Transnational organized crime. See Organized crime, transnational Triumph Forsaken (Moyar), 24 Trump, Donald: on Great Power competition, 184; on National Defense Authorization Act, 163; on national security, 145

Ukraine: Russia incursion into, 57, 116–122, 187; Shoigu on, 116 Unconventional warfare, 54; collateral damage from, 6, 72; resistance movements and, 186–189; social movement theory and, 45; terrorism and, 61, 68, 70; US Army and, 59; US military doctrine and, 55 Undeclared forces, in Crimea, 119–120 United Nations (UN), 103; against organized crime, 166, 171–172 United States (US), 1–2; China against, 8, 101; against foreign states, 7; ISIS and, 102, 127, 135; National Defense Authorization Act, 135, 139–140, 173; Plan Colombia and, 148–149, 178–179; political, policy goals of, 105–106; proxy actors of, 106–108, 185; Russia against, 8; security strategy of, 137–138, 141, 145, 166; surgical strikes of, 42; terrorism and, 62. See also specific topics Uribe, Álvaro, 148

US. See United States “US Army Regionally Aligned Forces” (Odierno), 157–158 U.S. Army Special Warfare (Paddock, Jr.), 36, 53–54 US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), 149, 151

“The Value of Science Is in the Foresight” (Gerasimov), 113–114 Virtual world, 193–195, 197n3. See also Cyberspace Vom Kriege (von Clausewitz), 32–34, 43 von Clausewitz, Carl, 14–15, 19–20, 24, 32–35, 43, 45, 46n1, 50, 101 Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer (Military-Industrial Courier), 113

War: domains of, 15; future of, 99, 101, 113, 116–117, 183–184, 191–197; human domain in, 48, 100; indirect and asymmetric methods of, 116– 123; levels of, 15, 100, 100fig; in space, 16, 43, 191–192, 194–197; theory of, 31–32, 34–35 War crimes, 67, 103 War on terror, global, 152, 158–160 Weick, Karl, 76, 78–79, 81, 88–89, 93; flux-hunch of, 84, 85–86 The West, Russia countering, 7–8, 115, 116, 123 Western Way of War: Indirect and asymmetric methods against, 116– 123; Russia countering, 7, 115 Whole-of-government approach, 104, 159–160; coordinating, 135–136 Winton, Harold, 4, 14–16 World War I (WWI), 15 World War II (WWII), 196; air power in, 11; Nazi Germany and, 185, 197; SOF and, 1–2, 185; Soviet Union and, 19, 188 WWI. See World War I WWII. See World War II

Yousaf, Mohammed, 109

About the Book

Why have special operations forces become a key strategic tool in the conduct of modern warfare? How do these specially trained and equipped elite units function? What types of missions do they conduct? Special Operations: Out of the Shadows addresses these questions and more in a comprehensive survey of special ops, encompassing cutting-edge research, current debates, and critical case studies.

Christopher Marsh is director of the Institute for Strategic Research at the Joint Special Operations University, US Special Operations Command, and president and founder of the Special Operations Research Association. James D. Kiras is professor of strategy and security studies at the US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base. Patricia J. Blocksome is assistant professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College–Monterey.

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