Soviet Iraqi Relations, 1968-1988: In the Shadow of the Iraq Iran Conflict 9781685854591

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Soviet-Iraqi Relations, 1968-1988

Soviet-Iraqi Relations, 1968-1988

In the Shadow of the Iraq-Iran Conflict HAIM SHEMESH

Lynne Rienner Publishers • Boulder & London

Published in the United States of America in 1992 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 1992 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Pnblication Data Shemesh, Haim Soviet-Iraqi relations, 1968-1988 : in the shadow of the Iraq-Iran conflict / Haim Shemesh Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-293-X 1. Iraq—Foreign relations—Soviet Union. 2. Soviet Union— Foreign relations—Iraq. 3. Soviet Union—Foreign relations—1945I. Title. DS70.96.I72S54 1992 327.567047—dc20 91-30996 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

To the victims of dictatorships

Contents

Preface

ix

Introduction: The Historical Background, 1944-1968

1

1

Moscow and the Ba'th Regime, July 1968-May 1971

19

2

The Intensified Conflict with Iran and the Peak of the Soviet-Iraqi Relationship, May 1971-July 1973

57

The Beginning of the Decline: Iraq Moves Toward Solving the Dispute with Iran, July 1973-May 1975

111

Downhill: A Lull on the Iraq-Iran Front, June 1975-March 1980

147

The Limits of Rapprochement During the War with Iran, April 1980-August 1988

181

Conclusion: The Passing "Strategic Alliance"

249

Appendix 1: Economic Data Appendix 2: Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between the USSR and the Iraqi Republic Appendix 3: Soviet and Iraqi Ambassadors, 1968-1988 Selected Bibliography Index About the Book and the Author

255

3 4 5

vii

259 263 267 273 285

Preface

This book is the first comprehensive study of Soviet-Iraqi relations from the time of the establishment of the Ba'th regime in Iraq in 1968 to the end of the Iraq-Iran war in 1988. Based on a comparative analysis of mainly Soviet and Iraqi primary sources, it provides a thorough and multifaceted view of the subject. It deals with virtually every factor that had an impact on the Soviet-Iraqi relationship, from the central ones of the Iraq-Iran conflicts of 1969-1975 and 1980-1988 and the superpowers' rivalry in the Middle East, to the less important ones such as the ArabIsraeli dispute, the Kurdish problem, and the Iraqi Communist Party. The study also contributes to a better understanding of the unfolding of Soviet-Middle Eastern and Soviet-Third World relations. One should bear in mind the disproportion between Baghdad's status in Soviet global policy and Moscow's position in Iraq's overall external relations during the period covered in this book. Whereas the USSR, as the only superpower with which Ba'th Iraq maintained extensive relations, occupied the central place in Iraq's foreign ties, the latter's significance as a medium-sized, non-Communist, Third World country was secondary in Soviet policy. The countries that clearly preceded Iraq in the USSR's system of alliances—still intact in 1988—belonged to the following categories: (1) states in which the Soviet army was deployed, therefore constituting a military, and to a great degree political, extension of the USSR—the Warsaw Pact members except Romania, plus Mongolia and Afghanistan (the latter from 1979 to 1989); (2) pro-Soviet, Communist, Third World countries with special strategic value to the USSR, namely Cuba, as an advance position against the United States, and Vietnam also as an outpost against the United States during the Vietnam War and against China in the late 1970s and in the 1980s; and (3) greater Third World countries with some pro-Soviet orientation, such as India and Egypt under Nasser. Nevertheless, Iraq was an important ally of the USSR, for it was bound by a friendship treaty to the latter from 1972 and ix

X

Preface

located in the Middle East region, adjacent to the Soviet border. Further, Moscow's interest in counterbalancing the growing US-Iranian relationship under the Shah in the mid-1970s and the Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s also rendered Iraq a weighty place in Soviet policy. The year 1988 can be logically regarded as the terminal date for this book not only because it saw the end of the Iraq-Iran war, but also because it was the last year in which the Soviet empire was still maintained. Subsequent years witnessed the decline of this empire—manifested in the collapse of Soviet control in Eastern Europe and the beginning of the disintegration of the USSR—a process that substantially reduced Moscow's interest in the Middle East in general and in Iraq in particular. * * *

Thanks are due to Yaacov Ro'i and Uriel Dann of Tel Aviv University, who provided advice during the writing of my Ph.D. dissertation, Soviet-Iraqi Relations, 1968-1975, and encouraged updating and developing it into a book; to Ofra Bengio of the Dayan Center of Middle Eastern and African Studies of Tel Aviv University, who offered advice on Iraq's policies; to Philippa Shimrat, who did the English style editing with great patience; and last but not least to Gabriel Sheffer and David Hornik of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, who helped me to conclude a publishing agreement with Lynne Rienner Publishers. Haim Shemesh

Introduction: The Historical Background, 1944-1968

The Soviet Union and Monarchical Iraq: at a Low Ebb (September 1944-July 1958) At the end of World War II, the Arab East witnessed a certain Soviet thrust, marked by the establishment of diplomatic ties between the Soviet Union and several states: Egypt in August 1943, Syria in July 1944, Lebanon in August 1944, and Iraq in September 1944. Although the monarchical regime in Baghdad opposed communism, it agreed to maintain diplomatic relations with the Soviets because of Iraq's close links with Britain, a Soviet ally in World War II. The level of Soviet-Iraqi bilateral activities during the monarchy was, however, very low, and in January 1955 Baghdad severed diplomatic relations with Moscow.1 This step coincided with Baghdad's integration into a pro-Western regional organization. In February 1955, Iraq concluded a military alliance with Turkey, which later in the year was joined by Britain, Pakistan, and Iran, named the Baghdad Pact. The aim of this pact—from the viewpoint of its architects, the United States and Britain—was to contain Soviet expansion in the Middle East. It was probably no coincidence that Iraq, the only Arab member of the pact, was also the closest Arab state to the Soviet borders: from Baghdad's perspective, the threat of Soviet expansion appeared real.2 (In this respect, Iraq differed from the other Arab states and resembled more the non-Arab Middle Eastern states bordering on the Soviet Union.) Despite Moscow's indignation over the formation of the Baghdad Pact, from the mid-1950s the Soviet Union, under its new leader Nikita Khrushchev, strove to improve relations with its southern neighbors and consequently conducted a conciliatory policy toward Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. In accordance with this policy, as well as with Khrushchev's efforts to develop ties with even pro-Western Arab countries, Moscow aimed its propaganda campaign against the Baghdad Pact mainly against

1

2

Introduction:

The Historical

Background

the United States and Britain rather than the Nuri Sa'id government of Iraq.3 Indeed, it was Khrushchev who initiated a major shift in Soviet policy toward the Middle East (and the Third World at large). Whereas under Stalin Moscow's objective in the Middle East had concentrated on diminishing Western influence, in the post-Stalin era the Soviet Union sought to establish its own influence in the region and thus to achieve the status of a power in the Middle East. In the mid-1950s, the new Soviet trend was manifested in the establishment of extensive economic and military ties with Egypt and, to a lesser extent, Syria. The broadening of Soviet goals in the Arab East led Moscow to court political parties in this area with anti-Western undertones, which, in Soviet terms, represented the "national bourgeoisie." The Soviets endorsed cooperation between the local Communists and these parties, including the Arab Socialist Resurrection(Ba'th) party (hereafter the Ba'th). 4 At the beginning of 1957, a National Unity Front was formed by the Iraqi political parties that opposed the regime of Nuri Sa'id and Iraq's membership in the Baghdad Pact. Among the participants in this front were the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), established in 1934, and the Ba'th, which was established in Syria in 1947 and had operated in Iraq since 1952. The Ba'th was an all-Arab party advocating pan-Arab unity and socialism, as well as nonalignment vis-à-vis international blocs. The philosopher, founder, and spiritual leader of the Ba'th at the all-Arab level, Michel 'Aflaq, espoused liberal socialism and assumed that Arab socialism was incompatible with communism.5 Contrary to Marxism-Leninism, the Ba'th did not reject religion, but considered Islam an integral part of the Arab national heritage. The Ba'th, however, was an elite party and resembled a Communist party in its organizational structure. Moreover, the very agreement of the Iraqi Ba'th to cooperate with the ICP within the framework of the front in 1957-1958—and the analogical cooperation between the Ba'th and the Communists in Syria in the mid-1950s—indicated a softening of the Ba'th's anti-Communist line. Moscow and the Qasim Regime: Laying the Foundations (July 1958-February 1963) The monarchical regime in Iraq was overthrown on July 14, 1958, in a military coup headed by 'Abd-al-Karim Qasim. The basic trend of Qasim's foreign policy was "positive neutrality," according to which Qasim tried to maintain, to a certain extent, the relationship with Britain and the West, including in the military field. Yet, a prerequisite for neutrality was a reduction in Iraq's heavy dependence on Britain and the West, and this Qasim decided to accomplish with Soviet aid. In July 1958 Qasim immediately restored diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union, and in

Introduction: The Historical Background

3

the same year started to purchase Soviet arms. Iraq's merely formal membership in the Baghdad Pact at the inception of Qasim's rule was terminated officially by Baghdad in March 1959. (Following Iraq's withdrawal from the pact it was renamed the Central Treaty Organization, CENTO.) The Soviet Union, for its part, welcomed the revolution in Iraq as a tremendous blow to British-US interests in the Middle East. From 1958/59 on, the Soviet Union extended huge economic and military assistance to Iraq, modeled upon the aid it had been giving to Gamal Abdul Nasser in Egypt since the middle of the decade. Like Qasim's policy in the international arena, his policy toward his own region comprised important components congruent to Soviet interests. He resisted Nasser's attempts to incorporate Iraq into the United Arab Republic ( U A R ) — a union formed between Egypt and Syria in February 1958—and desired to maintain Iraq's independence. The Soviet Union also opposed Nasser's aspiration to bring about a merger between the U A R and Iraq as part of his ambitious design to unite the Arab world into a single state, because Moscow feared that a strong and highly nationalistic Arab empire would be a barrier to Soviet influence in the region. In March 1959, Khrushchev publicly supported Qasim's intent to preserve Iraq's independence vis-à-vis the U A R , accusing Egypt of overt and covert interference in Iraq's internal affairs following Qasim's refusal to join the UAR. 6 Qasim's internal policy during his first years in power was to a large extent a corollary of his politics in the Arab arena. His rejection of a union with the U A R required him to seek assistance from the internal forces in Iraq that also opposed the union. These were the Communists and the Kurds, a national minority comprising about 20 percent of Iraq's population. Consequently, at the end of the 1950s, the ICP enjoyed considerable political freedom and became a large party that could conceivably challenge Qasim's rule.7 The Kurds also benefited from political freedom. In October 1958, after an eleven-year exile in the U S S R , Mulla Mustafa Barzani, 8 chairman of the Iraqi Democratic Party of Kurdistan (DPK), which had been formed in 1946, returned to his native Iraq. In 1945 Barzani had fled to Iran after the defeat of his rebellion in Iraq. In 1947, when the Kurdish People's Republic, established on Iran's territory under the protection of the Soviet army, collapsed, Barzani had taken refuge in the Soviet Union. 9 Barzani had taken this step reluctantly; being a conservative leader who relied on a tribal constituency, and also a practicing Muslim, he would have preferred to promote Kurdish national interests with US rather than Soviet support. His long stay in the Soviet Union had not changed his outlook. 10 Besides the tribal-conservative component headed by Barzani, the DPK had an urban-intellectual constituency influenced by Marxism and led by Ibrahim Ahmad, secretary general from 1952, and Jalal Talbani.

4

Introduction: The Historical Background

At the end of the 1950s, Qasim's interests were served by the campaign of terror conducted by the Communists and the Kurds against the political forces, including the Ba'th, that supported a union with the U A R . Indeed, the existence of the U A R made the notion of Arab unity feasible and accentuated the divergent positions of the Communists and the Ba'th on this issue, as a result of which the fronts between the two parties in Iraq and Syria were dismantled. The Soviet Union argued at this time—the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s—that the Ba'th only outwardly espoused socialism and accused it of hatred toward the Socialist camp.11 Indeed, an eminent ideologist of the Iraqi Ba'th, Sa'dun Hammadi, contended that Soviet opposition to Arab unity revealed that Moscow's real aim was to take control of the Arab states and that Soviet and Western interests in the Arab East were in fact identical.12 At the outset of Qasim's rule, the Soviets commented favorably on his internal policy of "democratization," which contrasted sharply with the U A R ' s persecution of the Communist parties of Syria and Egypt. However, as early as the second half of 1959, a decline in Qasim's tactical cooperation with the Communists could be discerned. Believing he had succeeded, with the Communists' support, in removing the threat to his regime posed by the pan-Arab and pro-Nasserite forces, Qasim now aimed at weakening the ICP through the harassment and sporadic assassinations of Communists. In response, the Prague-based Problems of Peace and Socialism—the mouthpiece of the international Communist movement dominated by Moscow—condemned Qasim's anti-Communist practices.13 Moscow typically cited this ostensibly unofficial periodical to express its criticism of Qasim's internal politics because an attack in an official Soviet publication risked damaging its relationship with the "antiimperialist," namely anti-Western, regime in Baghdad. In September 1961, the Kurds revolted after Qasim refused to grant them autonomy, and all Qasim's military efforts to suppress the Kurdish insurgency failed. From 1962 the Soviet Union was sympathetic toward the Kurdish rebellion, although it attempted to preserve an impression of evenhandedness by expressing the hope that the Kurds and the Iraqi authorities would eventually reach an agreement. 14 The note of impartiality reflected the general principle in Soviet foreign policy of preferring relations with existing governments, especially those with anti-Western inclinations, to those with insurgents. Accordingly, Moscow did not extend military assistance to the Kurds and continued its military and economic links with the Qasim regime.15 Nevertheless, Qasim's inability to quell the revolt undermined his authority, and Moscow's disillusion with Qasim's policy toward the ICP induced the Kremlin to display sympathy for the Kurdish rebels as an important factor on the Iraqi political scene. In 1962 the significance attached by the Soviets to developing rela-

Introduction: The Historical Background

5

tions with Qasim's regime undoubtedly decreased. This was the result not only of Moscow's frustration over Qasim's harassment of the ICP and his entanglement in the war against the Kurds, but also of an improvement in its relations with Egypt. The secession of Syria from the U A R in September 1961, although not putting an end to the ideological controversy between Moscow and Cairo regarding Arab unity, constrained Nasser's unionist aspirations and removed an irritant in the Soviet-Egyptian relationship. The Soviet Union now ascribed even greater priority to evolving ties with Egypt than with Iraq, for Egypt was not only the pivot of the Arab world, but also the Arab country in which Moscow had invested the most, especially in the construction of the Aswan Dam, which had begun in 1958.

Deterioration During the First Ba'th Rule (February-November 1963) On February 8,1963, Qasim's regime was overthrown by a group led by 'Abd-al-Salam 'Arif, which included army officers, some with pro-Nasserite leanings, as well as other members of the Ba'th. Although 'Arif became president of the new regime, most power was held by the Ba'th, whose members occupied key positions in the government. These included Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, prime minister;16 'Ali Salih al-Sa'di, deputy prime minister, minister of the interior,17 and secretary of the Iraqi Ba'th; Salih Mahdi 'Ammash, minister of defense; and Talib al-Shabib, foreign minister. An additional high-ranking Ba'th official was the commander of the air force, Hardan 'Abd-al-Ghaffar al-Tikriti. During Ba'th rule in 1963, Saddam Hussein was a low-ranking official: a source that eulogizes him claims that Saddam Hussein worked at the department of agriculture, whereas a censorious source maintains that he was an interrogator and torturer.18 The new regime embarked on a campaign to liquidate the ICP through terror, arrests, and executions of Communists, including the killing of the general secretary of the ICP, Husayn al-Radi (Salam 'Adil).19 This persecution, which was carried out by the National Guard—a Ba'th militia of which 'Ali Salih al-Sa'di was in charge—and continued throughout the Ba'th rule, was only partially intended to avenge the terror the Communists had waged against the Ba'th at the beginning of Qasim's rule. The main reason was that the Ba'th perceived the ICP as its ideological-political archenemy, which had to be destroyed. In the aftermath of the terror, the Communists fled to rural areas—mainly the Kurdish region controlled by the Kurdish rebels, where they were granted political asylum.20 The Ba'th regime, especially at its outset, publicly distinguished between its battle against the ICP and its basic willingness to maintain friendly relations with the Soviet Union and other "Socialist" states.21

6

Introduction:

The Historical

Background

Nevertheless, in mid-February, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) issued a statement condemning the "bloody terror" against the Marxists in Iraq and an additional protest in March, after the killing of Husayn al-Radi. A t the same time, protest gatherings were staged in the Soviet Union, culminating in a demonstration outside the Iraqi embassy in Moscow. The Soviet media labeled the Ba'th regime as "Fascist," and an East German radio station broadcast appeals of the ICP to overthrow the Iraqi regime.22 The Iraqi government reacted to this propaganda campaign with restraint: at the end of February, Talib al-Shabib—in a statement that mirrored the Ba'th's foreign policy throughout its first rule—said that the war of words against Iraq directed by the "Socialist" states would not divert the "revolution" from its policy of "positive neutrality."23 From the summer of 1963, Soviet-Iraqi relations deteriorated even further, following the military campaign against the Kurdish rebels waged by the Ba'th regime. Since its assumption of power, the Ba'th had been conducting negotiations with the Kurdish insurgents, who were demanding extensive autonomy. The government rejected the very term " a u t o n o m y " and o f f e r e d instead only a formal administrative "decentralization."24 When the negotiations deadlocked, on June 10 the Iraqi army launched an all-out assault on the Kurds. The Ba'th regime in Syria, which came to power on March 8, 1963, dispatched a limited contingent to Iraq to participate in the war against the Kurds as a gesture of solidarity with the Ba'th regime in Baghdad. Nevertheless, the slow advance of the Iraqi army into the Kurdish region was stalled in the fall.25 The Soviet Union described Iraq's war against the Kurds as "genocide," and tried—albeit unsuccessfully—to initiate a debate on Iraq's "policy of genocide" at the United Nations. In addition, on July 9, the Soviet Union lodged official protests with the governments of Syria, Turkey, and Iran over "the interference of other states in the events taking place in northern Iraq." On the same day, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko lodged a complaint with the Iraqi ambassador in Moscow, charging that Iraq and the C E N T O countries, Turkey and Iran, had reached an accord on "joint military operations against the Kurds," and that Syrian forces were already taking part in the fighting. Moscow's complaint to Baghdad also warned that providing military bases in proximity to the Soviet border to forces belonging to C E N T O constituted a "threat to the security . . . of the USSR." 26 A Pravda article of July 11 elaborated on these charges, arguing that Turkey and Iran had sealed their border with Iraq in order to prevent supplies from the Kurds in these countries from reaching the Kurds in Iraq. It expressed concern that the coordination of military operations between Iraq and Turkey and Iran against the Kurds might induce Iraq to join CENTO. 27 In addition to these efforts on the level of propaganda, the

Introduction: The Historical Background

7

Soviets curtailed their economic assistance and at least reduced substantially their military aid to the Iraqi regime,28 although they stopped short at supplying weapons to the Kurds.29 In response to the Soviet complaint of July 9, on July 11 the spokesman of the Iraqi Foreign Ministry said that the Iraqi government would "never permit any foreign circles to install themselves as guardians . . . of the rebels."30 On July 14, Bakr contended that an unjustified propaganda campaign was being launched against Iraq by "foreign circles, first among them the USSR." Bakr continued: "Though we have often declared our desire to maintain our friendship with the USSR and the socialist countries, we declare here that we stand determinedly against anyone who threatens the security of our country and interferes in its affairs."31 In reaction to the Soviet allegations that Iraq was considering joining CENTO, both Bakr and the spokesman of the Iraqi Foreign Ministry emphasized in their statements Baghdad's adherence to the policy of nonalignment. Whereas Iraq's response to the Soviet war of words at the governmental level was by and large mild, Iraq's media—particularly al-Jamahir, the mouthpiece of the Ba'th, edited by Tariq 'Aziz—countered with vociferous attacks on the Communist regime of the Soviet Union and Moscow's policy toward Eastern Europe and the Third World.32 Soviet policy toward Iraq under the Ba'th in 1963 deserves special attention as an exceptional case in Moscow's treatment of an Arab state, with Iraq's conduct of its internal affairs determining the Soviet Union's bilateral relationship with it. The strongly negative attitude of the Soviets toward Ba'th Iraq did not take into consideration that, although the regime was suppressing the Communists and waging a war against the Kurds, Iraq did not intend to join a pro-Western alliance, adhered to its policy of nonalignment, and repeatedly expressed readiness to develop relations with the USSR.33 This untempered condemnation of Baghdad stemmed from a variety of factors, the principal among them being the relatively low priority the Soviet Union ascribed to developing ties with Iraq. If the USSR had placed higher value on sustaining normal relations with Iraq, it probably would have moderated its reaction to the oppression of the ICP, as it did in other countries. For example, the Kremlin's response to the liquidation campaign against the Tudeh—the Iranian Communist party—in 1953, and even to Iran's joining the Baghdad Pact in 1955, was muted. The difference between Moscow's policies toward Tehran in 1953-1955 and toward Baghdad in 1963 can be explained by the enormous importance the Soviet Union attributed to preventing Iran from being turned into a US base and to maintaining friendly relations with Iran, which shared a border with the Soviet Union and also exceeded Iraq in both territory and population. Moreover, the flagrant Soviet animosity toward Iraq during the Ba'th rule was also the result of relations between Baghdad and Cairo, the

8

Introduction: The Historical Background

cornerstone of Moscow's policy in the Arab East. Despite the formal tripartite union of April 17,1963—comprising Iraq, Syria, and the U A R as three countries espousing Arab unity and socialism—the politicalideological rivalry between Ba'thism and Nasserism continued, and by the second half of 1963 relations between Iraq and the U A R had already soured.34 Hence, the intensive propaganda campaign of the Soviet Union against the Iraqi Ba'th at this time not only did not exacerbate the Soviet-Egyptian relationship, but partially corresponded in content and style to Cairo's verbal attacks on Baghdad, with Moscow and Cairo sharing the tactical goal of toppling the Ba'th regime in Baghdad. An additional reason for the tough Soviet response to the suppression of the ICP was probably related to Moscow's assessment that the Iraqi regime—based on a small political party split into competing factions 35 and bogged down in an unsuccessful war against the Kurds—would not last long. The intensity of the terror campaign against the Communists and the importance of the large ICP to Moscow were also responsible for the tone of the Soviet protest. The sharp tone and the veiled Soviet military threat against Iraq in connection with Baghdad's assault on the Kurds reflected also Khrushchev's idiosyncratic sensitivity to persecutions of Communists abroad 36 and his customary bluffing. Finally, Soviet solidarity with the ICP seems also to have been intended to demonstrate Moscow's devotion to Marxism-Leninism in the context of its rivalry with the People's Republic of China over the leadership of the international Communist movement. It should be noted that since the mid-1960s the mainstream of the ICP—like the mainstream of the other Communist parties in the Arab East—had supported Moscow in its ideological warfare with Beijing. As we have seen, Iraq's reaction at the governmental level to the Soviet war of words was temperate. This self-restraint stemmed partly from Baghdad's desire to appease Moscow, in order to preclude Soviet interference in Iraq's internal affairs, and partly from Iraq's considerable dependence, since Qasim, in the military and economic spheres, which necessitated maintaining a working relationship with the Soviets. However, Iraq's continued adherence to neutrality primarily reflected the Ba'th regime's major goal of preserving Iraq's complete independence vis-à-vis international blocs and avoiding a renewal of the close relationship with the West. As an Arab nationalistic and a revolutionary party, the Ba'th was not prepared to turn back to the West, with its recent legacy of colonialism and imperialism in the Arab world in general and Iraq in particular—the same West with which the monarchical ancien régime of Iraq had been associated. Paradoxically, in this period of utmost Soviet hostility toward the Ba'th regime of Iraq—and a somewhat milder Soviet hostility toward the Ba'th regime of Syria, which carried out sporadic persecutions of Com-

Introduction: The Historical Background

9

munists—the Ba'th at the all-Arab level moved ideologically closer to Moscow. The sixth Pan-Arab (qawmi) Congress of the Ba'th, which convened in Damascus in October 1963, endorsed a left-wing model of socialism, with emphasis on a planned economy, industrialization, and the formation of collective farms.37 Nonetheless, both in theory and practice the Ba'th brand of socialism gave far greater latitude to private property and private enterprise than the Soviet model. The Ba'th moved closer to the Soviets in the international arena as well, with its Sixth Congress affirming that "non-alignment should not be construed as a bar against closer and friendlier relations with the peoples of the Socialist camp." 38 Despite these ideological shifts, Moscow continued to treat the Ba'th with suspicion. Commenting on the resolutions of the Sixth Congress, the Soviet Union argued that although the Ba'th had set itself the goal of building Socialist regimes in Syria and Iraq, it had undermined this aim by suppressing the "progressive" elements in Iraq; moreover, while ostensibly supporting improved relations with the "socialist countries," the Ba'th had been pursuing a "pro-imperialist" policy.39

Rapprochement Under the 'Arif Brothers (November 1963-July 1968) On November 18, 1963, the Ba'th regime was ousted by army officers, most of them with pro-Nasserite inclinations,40 and 'Abd-al-Salam 'Arif became Iraq's new ruler. Three days after his death in a helicopter crash on April 13,1966, he was succeeded by his brother, 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Arif, who on the whole followed the policy of his predecessor. Under the 'Arif brothers, Iraq cooperated with the U A R , although Iraqi-Egyptian relations during this period were not particularly close. On the international arena, the 'Arif brothers espoused "positive neutrality" with a propensity to the Soviet bloc. From the outset of his rule, 'Abd-al-Salam 'Arif worked to normalize relations with the Soviet Union and the Communist states, promptly halting the wide-scale terror against the ICP. Nevertheless, sporadic persecution of Communists continued throughout the rule of the 'Arif brothers, reflecting their personal, as well as their governments', aversion to communism. On February 10,1964, 'Abd-al-Salam 'Arif and Barzani reached an agreement, which led to the cessation of hostilities between the army and the Kurds. In July 1964—imitating the Nasserite model of socialism accomplished in Egypt at the beginning of the 1960s under which the Arab Socialist Union was the only legal political party of Egypt—'Arif nationalized Iraqi commercial and industrial enterprises and founded the Arab Socialist Union as the only legal political party of Iraq. The Soviet Union welcomed the overthrow of the Ba'th as well as the

10

Introduction: The Historical Background

establishment of friendly relations between Iraq and the UAR. On February 15,1964, Khrushchev congratulated 'Arif on putting an end to the war against the Kurds. The Soviet media depicted 'Arif s reforms as "progressive objectively," although not as far reaching as Nasser's. Last but not least, the Soviet Union resumed arms supplies to Iraq.41 In October 1964, Khrushchev was ousted and his functions as first secretary and prime minister were assumed by Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksei Kosygin, respectively. The new Soviet leadership generally followed the Middle Eastern policy of its predecessor, giving priority to developing relations with Egypt. Soviet interest in Egypt in the mid-1960s stemmed from Cairo's pivotal position in the Arab, African, and nonalignment arenas, as well as the stability of the Egyptian regime (contrary to the regimes in Syria and Iraq), its Socialist reforms, and the charismatic personality of Nasser. A striking evidence of Moscow's special relationship with Nasser was the disbanding in 1965, under Soviet direction, of the small and splintered Egyptian Communist party, whose members subsequently joined the Arab Socialist Union on an individual basis.42 After February 1966, when the "left wing" of the Ba'th seized power in Syria, having dissociated itself from the conservative party leadership of Michel 'Aflaq and Salih Bitar, Moscow's attitude toward Damascus warmed. After the February coup, the Ba'th in Damascus was described by the Soviets like the Nasserite regime, as having embarked on the noncapitalist path of development, while laying the foundations for building socialism. The new government in Damascus included a Communist minister, although the Syrian Communist party was not legalized. In contrast to the improved Soviet ties with Egypt and Syria, the Soviet-Iraqi relationship encountered difficulties in 1965-1966; Moscow continued to attach importance, although less than during the Ba'th rule, to Baghdad's internal policy as a criterion for developing relations with Iraq. After the failure of the negotiations between the government and the Kurdish rebels, which had been conducted since the cessation of hostilities in February 1964, the government launched several major military operations against the Kurds from spring 1965 to spring 1966.43 Pravda condemned these operations and reported that the Red Cross and Crescent of the USSR had requested the Iraqi government to halt the assault against the Kurdish forces and to be permitted to extend humanitarian relief to the Kurdish population. Nonetheless, the newspaper also indicated Soviet willingness to mediate in the conflict.44 During the military campaign against the Kurds, which lasted about a year, Moscow substantially curtailed arms supplies to Baghdad.45 In any event, the military campaign against the Kurds did not succeed, with the moderates on the Kurdish question within the Iraqi government gaining the upper hand. Prominent among these was Prime Minister 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Bazzaz, who also strove to upgrade ties with the

Introduction:

The Historical

Background

11

Soviet Union.46 On June 29,1966, during the presidency of 'Abd-al-Rahman' Arif, Bazzaz released a government statement on the Kurdish issue. It contained twelve principles for solving the Kurdish problem, including recognition of Kurdish national and linguistic rights as well as a promise to implement administrative decentralization (as a substitute for autonomy). Iraq's statement of June 29 was approved by the Kurds, thus putting an end to the war, and was welcomed by the Soviet Union; Bazzaz's subsequent visit to Moscow in July-August 1966 was a milestone in the process of improving Soviet-Iraqi relations. The statement of June 29 was, however, only an agreement in principle between the government and the Kurds; the negotiations on its implementation dragged on without result. The DPK resented the government's support for the left-wing faction of the DPK, headed by Jalal Talbani, which had split from the party in 1966 and collaborated with the regime ever since.47 The DPK led by Barzani still had a left wing, which included such senior party members as Mahmud 'Uthman, Salih al-Yusefi, and Dara Tawfiq. After the statement of June 29, the Soviets stressed the need to reach a negotiated settlement to the Kurdish problem. They also continued to sympathize with the mainstream of the DPK represented by Barzani and with Barzani personally48—despite his basically pro-Western orientation—recognizing his authority within the Kurdish community and the DPK. Another problem that marred Soviet-Iraqi relations was the ICP. With the end of the Ba'th terror, the ICP renewed its activities. In August 1964, 'Aziz Muhammad—a Communist of Kurdish descent who during the Ba'th terror had stayed in the Soviet bloc and was considered particularly loyal to Moscow—was elected first secretary.49 From mid-1965 the ICP advocated the overthrow of the 'Arif brothers' regime and its replacement by a "national coalition." Problems of Peace and Socialism cited the ICP's position several times, evidence of Moscow's "unofficial" backing for the party's goal. The Soviet Union was interested in cooperation between the Iraqi Communists and the DPK, which it regarded as the strongest opposition party, whose struggle for autonomy and democracy undermined the power of the central government and thus served the aims of the ICP.50 Despite Soviet political support for the Kurdish rebels and the ICP, the preponderant tendency in the Soviet policy toward Iraq, especially after the cessation of the war against the Kurds in the summer of 1966, was to promote economic and military ties with the "anti-imperialist" regime of the 'Arif brothers. The June 1967 Arab-Israeli war brought about changes in both the Soviet position in the Arab East and Soviet-Iraqi relations. The military defeat of Egypt and Syria—the major client states of the USSR in the region—increased their dependence on the Soviets and consequently enhanced Soviet influence in these countries. After the June war, the

12

Introduction:

The Historical

Background

Soviet Union, as the superpower that bolstered the Arabs militarily and politically, strengthened its stand in the Arab East, whereas the status of the United States in the area, associated with one-sided support for Israel, was weakened. Contrary to Egypt and Syria, Iraq's participation in the June war and its losses were insignificant. Moreover, the Soviet Union was the principal supplier of arms to Iraq, but not the only one since even before the war and to a greater extent afterward, Iraq had procured weapons in France.51 Nevertheless, like Egypt and Syria, impelled by its commitment to the military confrontation against Israel, Iraq now sought to increase arms purchases in the Soviet Union. Moreover, Iraq, also like Egypt and Syria, had severed diplomatic relations with the United States in the aftermath of the Six Day war and adopted a stronger anti-Western posture, while redoubling its efforts to promote ties with the Soviet Union. From July 17 to 18, 1967, 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Arif, together with President Houari Boumedienne of Algeria, visited the Soviet Union as representatives of the Cairo summit conference of several Arab states—the UAR, Algeria, Syria, Iraq, and the Sudan. In Moscow, the two Arab presidents discussed the Arab-Israeli conflict with Brezhnev and Kosygin.52 In accordance with the general Soviet policy of capitalizing on the opportunities for promoting ties with Egypt and Syria, which had arisen in the wake of the June war, Moscow also made efforts to improve relations with Iraq. From July 3 to 4, 1967, Soviet President Nikolai Podgornyi visited Iraq on the third and last stage of his Arab East itinerary, after visits to Egypt and Syria.53 The trips of Podgornyi to Baghdad and of 'Arif to Moscow were the first exchange of visits at the presidential level between the Soviet Union and Iraq and marked an improvement in the Kremlin's attitude toward the 'Arif regime. Indeed, Soviet publications at this time mostly portrayed this regime as an "anti-imperialist" one, which favored developing ties with the Soviet Union and playing an active role in the liquidation of "the consequences of the Israeli aggression." Yet, even after the June war, Soviet publications distinguished between the "progressive" regimes in the UAR and Syria, and the "national" regime in Iraq.54 There were other signs that Moscow continued to be ambivalent about the 'Arif brothers' regime: even in 1968, for example, Problems of Peace and Socialism reproduced the ICP stand advocating the removal of the "reactionary-dictatorial" regime in Iraq.55 The ICP maintained that a "national front" of opposition parties had to be established in order to overthrow the regime. In line with this tactic, the Third Conference of the ICP in December 1967 hinted at possible cooperation between the Communists and the Ba'th within the framework of a single front. Specifically, the resolutions of the Third Conference— whose publication in Problems of Peace and Socialism in April 1968 indicated their approval by Moscow—stated that "some petty-bourgeois

Introduction:

The Historical

Background

13

organizations" were beginning to "refer critically" to their concepts and deeds in the past, "introducing positive changes in their attitudes, thus creating better conditions for coming closer and an alliance between these parties... [and] the communists."56 Indeed, since its ouster in November 1963, the Iraqi Ba'th had experienced changes both in the composition of its leadership and its concepts. During 1964-1965 (without any relation to the issue of the ICP), a power struggle had occurred between the faction of Sa'di and the faction of Bakr, with the latter supported by Saddam Hussein, secretary of the Iraqi Ba'th from 1964. A s a result of this struggle, Sa'di and his followers were expelled from the party and Bakr was appointed as secretary general in May 1965. A f t e r the establishment of the "left-wing" Ba'th regime in Syria in February 1966, the Iraqi Ba'th (except a small splinter faction) opposed it, remaining faithful to the leadership of Michel' Aflaq. 57 However, the Iraqi Ba'th's acceptance of the latter's authority as the leader of the Ba'th at the all-Arab level in the mid-1960s was mainly formal and became merely symbolic during the second Ba'th rule in Iraq from July 1968. Contrary to the allegations of its opponents in the Syrian "left-wing" Ba'th, the Iraqi Ba'th did not consider itself to represent the "right-wing" Ba'th, namely less "progressive" than the ruling faction of the Syrian Ba'th. The ousted "right-wing" Ba'thists of Syria and the Iraqi Ba'th regarded themselves as the true and legitimate Ba'th, and the February 1966 regime in Damascus as a gang of usurpers who had illegitimately adopted the party's name. Following the collapse of the Ba'th government in Iraq in 1963, the party attributed its failure, among other things, to its attempt to rule single-handedly without forming a coalition with other "revolutionary" forces, as well as to the terror campaign it had waged against the ICP and which had harmed Baghdad's ties with Moscow and the Soviet bloc.58 These lessons were reflected in the resolutions adopted by the Ninth Pan-Arab Congress of the (pro-'Aflaq) Ba'th convened in February 1968 in Beirut. The congress decided to abandon the thesis of rule by the Ba'th as "the sole" or "the leading" party and to call for the formation of a "patriotic front" to include the Nasserites and the Communists.59 * * *

For most of the ten years from the inception of Qasim's regime in 1958 to the establishment of the second Ba'th regime in 1968, a working relationship in the military, economic, and political spheres was maintained between Republican Iraq and the Soviet Union. The uniqueness of Soviet policy toward Iraq—in contrast with the Soviet policy toward other Arab states with which it cooperated in many spheres, namely Egypt and Syria—was the importance Moscow attached to Baghdad's internal policy

14

Introduction:

The Historical

Background

regarding the ICP and the Kurds as a criterion for developing relations with Iraq. This was clearly exemplified in the rupture in the Soviet-Iraqi relationship during the Ba'th rule in 1963. The Soviet Union's willingness to place its bilateral relations with Republican Iraq at stake on issues concerning Iraq's internal policy reflected first and foremost the relatively low priority—compared with Cairo and Damascus—it assigned to ties with Baghdad. Except for a brief period during Qasim's rule in 1959-1961, the Soviet Union clearly preferred fostering relations with the UAR, as well as Syria, to evolving cooperation with Iraq. Moscow's support for the overthrow of the Ba'th and the 'Arif brothers' regimes was rooted, to various degrees, in its desire to assure the ICP a significant role in a coalition government. Moscow valued the Kurdish rebels because they shared the Iraqi Communists' goal of establishing a coalition regime in Baghdad. Hence, it viewed the DPK—which, contrary to the ICP, was not a pro-Soviet party but an organization solely devoted to the Kurdish cause—mainly as a means of promoting the status of the ICP. Given the secondary importance of the DPK to the Soviets, it is no wonder that Moscow vehemently condemned the war against the Kurds only when it was waged by a regime such as the Ba'th, which was attempting to liquidate the ICP, whereas the war against the Kurds under Qasim and the 'Arif brothers provoked relatively mild Soviet protestations. Nonetheless, despite the Soviet Union's concern for the ICP and the DPK, its policy was primarily aimed at promoting relations with the existing republican regimes of Iraq (with the exception of the Ba'th government of 1963), especially after the June war, which opened up new opportunities for upgrading Soviet ties with Baghdad. Notes 1. On the policy of monarchical Iraq toward the Soviet Union in 1944-1945, see 'Abd-al-Munaf Shakr Jasim, al-'Alaqat al-'Iraqiyya al-Sufyetiyya, 1944February 8, 1963 [Iraqi-Soviet Relations, 1944-February 8, 1963] (M.A. diss.) (Baghdad: Mudiriyya Matba'a al-Hukm al-Mahali, 1980), pp. 55-60. 2. In 1916-1917, during World War I, the Russian army conquered lands in the northeastern, Kurdish region of present-day Iraq. At that time, Iraq did not exist as a political entity but was part of the Ottoman Empire. 3. See, for example, Pravda, March 8, 1955, a statement by the Soviet Foreign Ministry on April 16,1955, in Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR, SSSR i arabskie strany 1917-1960 [USSR and the Arab Countries 1917-1960] (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1961), pp. 127-130; and Khrushchev's speech on December 29, 1955, in Izvestiia, December 30,1955. See also Soviet appreciation for Iraq's policy during the Suez crisis (summer-fall 1956) and the Suez campaign (OctoberNovember 1956) in Izvestiia, September 12, 1956, Kommunist 16 (November 1956), p. 76. 4. Voprosy vostokovedeniia 1 (1956), pp. 7-8; Walter Z. Laqueur, The

Introduction:

The Historical

Background

15

Soviet Union and the Middle East (London: Routledge & Kegan, 1959), p. 153. 5. On Michel 'Aflaq's early thinking, see his book Fi Sabilal-Ba'th [For the Sake of Ressurection] (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'a, 1963), especially pp. 209-212, discussing communism. Yet 'Aflaq opposed, on principle, the campaign of terror against the ICP during the Ba'th rule in Iraq in 1963. See Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 990-991. On the change in 'Aflaq's attitude toward the ICP and the Soviet Union in the mid-1960s and the 1970s, see note 58 below. 6. Oles M. Smolansky, The Soviet Union and the Arab East under Khrushchev (Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1974), p. 118. 7. The ICP during Qasim's rule is thoroughly discussed in Uriel Dann, Iraq Under Qassem (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1969). 8. The name of Mustafa Barzani's tribe was Barzan. Barzani was born around 1904 and led the Kurdish rebellions in Iraq in 1931 and the mid-1940s. 9. The Soviet army was temporarily deployed in northern Iran in 1941 to secure the supply routes from the United States and Britain to the Soviet Union during World War II. With the end of World War II, and following US pressure, the Soviets withdrew from northern Iran in the spring of 1946. However, this was not before trying to retain their influence there: the establishment of the Kurdish People's Republic in December 1945 reflected Soviet attempts to capitalize on the national aspirations of Iran's minorities. 10. On Barzani's crossing from Iran into the Soviet Union, see Dana Adams Schmidt, Journey Among Brave Men (Boston: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1964), pp. 104-110. 11. Aryeh Yodfat, Arab Politics in Soviet Mirror (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1973), pp. 111-113. 12. Sa'dun Hammadi, Nahnu wa-al-Shuyu'iyya ft al-Azma al-Hadira [We and Communism in the Current Crisis] (publisher and date unknown), pp. 58-60, 62,68. 13. The English edition of Problems of Peace and Socialism is entitled World Marxist Review. On the Soviet reaction to the persecution of the ICP, see Smolansky, Soviet Union and Arab East, pp. 172-173. 14. Walter Laqueur, The Struggle for the Middle East (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 99; Smolansky, Soviet Union and Arab East, p. 192. 15. Edgar O'Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt 1961-1970 (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1973), p. 86; Smolansky, Soviet Union and Arab East, pp. 185,192. 16. Bakr was born in 1914 in Tikrit (a town north of Baghdad) and served in the army from 1938. At the beginning of Qasim's rule, in October 1958, Bakr was forced to retire from the army for supporting 'Abd-al-Salam 'Arif, who favored a union between Iraq and the UAR. Bakr joined the Ba'th in 1960. For Bakr's biography, see Batatu, Old Social Classes, p. 1104; and Majid Khadduri, Socialist Iraq (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1978), pp. 70-71. 17. Sa'di was minister of interior from February to May 1963, and minister of guidance from May to November 1963. 18. Saddam Hussein was born in 1937 in Tikrit, joined the Ba'th in 1957 and took part in an assassination attempt on Qasim, carried out by the Ba'th in October 1959. In the aftermath of its failure, Saddam Hussein fled through Syria to Egypt, returning to Iraq following the Ba'th coup of 1963. Back in Cairo in 1962, he commenced studying law, graduating in Iraq in 1970. For the eulogistic source, see Fuad Matar, Saddam Hussein (London: Third World Centre, 1981), pp. 31-44; and for the censorious one, see Judith Miller and Laurie Mylroie, Saddam Hussein and the Crisis in the Gulf (New York: Times Books, 1990), p. 31. For a detailed

16

Introduction:

The Historical

Background

description of the attempt upon Qasim's life in 1959, see Fu'ad al-Rikabi, al-Hall al-Awhad [The Only Solution] (Matabi' Dar al-Kitab al-'Arabi bi-Misr, n.d.). 19. Contrary to the official Iraqi statement of March 9,1963, on the trial and execution of Husayn al-Radi at the beginning of March, it is more likely that Husayn al-Radi had already died of torture on February 24,1963. For the more likely version, see Batatu, Old Social Classes, p. 986; A. F. Fedchenko, Iraq v bor'be za nezavisimost' 1917-1969 [Iraq in the Struggle for Independence, 1917-1969] (Moscow: Nauka, 1970), p. 264. 20. On the terror campaign, see Batatu, Old Social Classes, pp. 986-990; and Fedchenko, Iraq in the Struggle, pp. 264-266. 21. See, for example, R. Baghdad, February 17, 1963¡BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 4 (hereafter BBC), February 19, 1963; al-Jamahir in R. Baghdad, February 14,1963IBBC, February 15,1963. 22. Smolansky, Soviet Union and Arab East, pp. 228, 231-235; Batatu, Old Social Classes, p. 987. 23. R. Baghdad, February 25,1963IBBC, February 27,1963. For further Iraqi reactions, see, for example, Bakr's interview to the Middle East News Agency (MENA), February 23,1963IBBC, February 26,1963. 24. Mahmud al-Durra, al-Qadiyya al-Kurdiyya [The Kurdish Problem] (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'a, 1966), pp. 311, 325, 330; Schmidt, Journey Among Brave Men, pp. 255,258. 25. O'Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt, pp. 102-110. 26.Smolansky, Soviet Union and Arab East, p. 237. 27. Ibid., pp. 237-238. 28. Ibid., pp. 235-236; Schmidt, Journey Among Brave Men, p. 275; Fedchenko, Iraq in the Struggle,~p. 268. 29. O'Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt, p. 101. 30. R. Baghdad, July 11,1963/BBC, July 13,1963. 31. R. Baghdad, July 14,1963IBBC, July 16,1963. 32. See, for example, R. Baghdad, July 9,1963IBBC, July 11,1963; al-Jamahir in R. Baghdad, June 29,1963IBBC, July 2,1963; and Tariq 'Aziz in al-Jamahir in R. Baghdad, July 11,1963IBBC, July 13,1963. 33. See, for example, a statement by Talib al-Shabib in R. Baghdad, September 10,1963IBBC, September 12,1963. 34. On the relations among the members of the Cairo-Baghdad-Damascus axis, see, for example, Kamel S. Abu Jaber, The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1966), pp. 69-77. 35. On the split of the Ba'th, see Majid Khadduri, Republican Iraq (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 208-210. 36. Smolansky, Soviet Union and Arab East, p. 232; Mohamed Heikal, Nasser (London: New English Library, 1972), p. 143. 37. Abu Jaber, Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, p. 161. 38. Article 24 of the resolutions of the Sixth Congress in Abu Jaber, Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, p. 165. 39. Pravda, November 11 and 14,1963, in Yodfat, Arab Politics, p. 116. 40. Paradoxically, the Ba'th regime was deposed by Ba'thi army officers as well, among them Hardan al-Tikriti. It is also interesting that at the outset of 'Arif's rule and until January 1964, Bakr served as deputy prime minister. 41. On Soviet-Iraqi ties at the inception of 'Arif's reign in 1964, see Smolansky, Soviet Union and Arab East, pp. 241-244; and Laqueur, Struggle for the Middle East, p. 102. 42. Significantly, Moscow's disappointment with Sadat's regime led to the

Introduction:

The Historical

Background

17

re-establishment of the Egyptian Communist party in 1975. 43. On the Kurdish problem, see Mahmud al-Durra, The Kurdish Problem, pp. 360-377; and O'Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt, pp. 116,125,130,133,138. 44. Iu. Potomov, Pravda, February 7,1966. On the Soviet mediation attempt, see also Arab Report and Record (ARR), 1966, p. 87. 45. Financial Times, in ARR, 1966, p. 171; O'Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt, p. 127. 46. Bazzaz espoused improving relations with the Soviet Union, even though his outlook was anti-Communist, pan-Arab, and liberal. On Bazzaz's attitude toward the ICP and the Soviet Union, see' Abd-al-Rahman al-B azzaz, Safahat min al-Ams al-Qarib [Pages from the Recent Past] (Beirut: Dar al-'Ilm lil-Malaiin, 1960), pp. 9,13,35,124-125; and Edith Penrose and E. F. Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and National Development (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1978), p. 342. 47. In its initial stages, the splinter faction was headed also by Ibrahim Ahmad. 48. Pravda, February 7 and July 6,1966; Evgenii Primakov, Pravda, January 15 and 18,1967, in Yodfat, Arab Politics, p. 190. 49. On the ICP during the 'Arif brothers' reign, see Uriel Dann, "The Communist Movement in Iraq Since 1963," in M. Confino and Sh. Shamir (eds.), The USSR and the Middle East (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1973), pp. 378-380. 'Aziz Muhammad was born in 1924 and joined the ICP in 1945. He was detained in October 1945 and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment, but was released following the July 1958 coup. After his release, 'Aziz Muhammad became a member of the Central Committee and from 1959 a member of the Politburo in charge of Iraqi Kurdistan. For 'Aziz Muhammad's biography, see R. Petrov, Agitator 19 (October 1969), p. 62; G. Nechkin, Pravda, July 1,1974. 50. On Soviet policy toward the ICP during the 'Arif brothers' reign, see Yodfat, Arab Politics, pp. 177-179,188; and Laqueur, Struggle for the Middle East, p. 104. 51. ARR, 1966, p. 158; O'Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt, p. 146; Middle East Record (MER), 1968, p. 96. 52. Pravda, July 18 and 19,1967; ARR, 1967, p. 241. 53. Podgornyi's visit to Egypt took place from June 21 to 24,1967, after which he returned to the Soviet Union. His visit to Syria took place from July 1 to 3,1967. 54. For Soviet appraisals of 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Arifs regime, see, for example, Novoe vremia (hereafter NV) 3 (January 19,1968), pp. 13-14; NV 29 (July 19,1968), pp. 3-4-, Pravda, July 14,1968; MER, 1968, pp. 44-45; and Yodfat, Arab Politics, p. 210. 55. Problemy mira i sotsializma (hereafter PMS) 4 (April 1968), pp. 88-89. 56. Ibid., p. 89. 57. On changes in the Iraqi Ba'th in the mid-1960s, see Khadduri, Socialist Iraq, pp. 16-18. 58. The Reasons for the Collapse of the Ba'th Rule in Iraq (a Ba'thi document), translated and annotated by Ofra Bengio (Tel-Aviv University, The Shiloah Center, 1981) [in Hebrew], pp. 53, 54, 60; Sa'dun Hammadi, Qadaya al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya [Problems of the Arab Revolution] (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'a, 1968), pp. 159-161,261. On the improvement in Michel 'Aflaq's attitude toward the ICP and the Soviet Union, see 'Aflaq's speech in February 1966 in Mahmud al-Durra, The Kurdish Problem, p. 346; and 'Aflaq's speech in October 1974 in al-Thawra, October 30,1974. 59. Al-Anwar (Beirut), August 8,1968; MER, 1968, p. 512.

1 Moscow and the Ba'th Regime, July 1968-May 1971

The Ba'th and the ICP (Summer 1968-Winter 1969) Officers at the Presidential Palace, rather than Ba'thists, played the crucial role in overthrowing 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Arif's regime in a bloodless coup on July 17,1968. However, the supreme authority of the new regime, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC)—in which the legislative and executive powers were invested—was headed by Bakr. On July 30 another coup was carried out, with the Ba'th deposing its non-Ba'thist partners in the July 17 coup. The three strongmen of the Ba'th government formed on July 30 were all RCC members from the military: Bakr, who was both president and prime minister as well as the incumbent secretary general of the Iraqi Ba'th; Hardan 'Abd-al-Ghaffar al-Tikriti, deputy prime minister and minister of defense; and Salih Mahdi 'Ammash, deputy prime minister and minister of the interior.1 The name of Saddam Hussein (al-Tikriti),2 member of the Regional [Iraqi] Command of the Ba'th 3 did not appear in the Iraqi media until the spring of 1969, although he had enjoyed considerable influence behind the scenes since the outset of Ba'th rule.4 In the summer and fall of 1968, the Ba'th regime and Bakr personally made conciliatory gestures toward the Communists in the form of declarations indicating a willingness to establish a front with them, conducting a dialogue with the Communists, and releasing Communist prisoners.5 Nevertheless, having seized power, the Ba'th had no intention of transferring a tangible share of it to the Communists, let alone relinquishing the Ba'th's leading role in the new regime. Instead, the Ba'th offered them some representation in the government (the real power in Iraq, as we have seen, being vested in the RCC). 6 Moreover, the regime's precondition for Communist participation in the government and for granting limited political freedom to the ICP was the latter's approval of a National Action Charter, which reflected the Ba'th ideology. 19

20

Moscow and the Ba'th Regime, July 1968-May 1971

The Ba'th's search for a modus operandi with the Communists reflected the lessons it had drawn from its experience in 1963 and was based on two main considerations. The Ba'th regarded the ICP as a large political organization that enjoyed popular support among the intelligentsia, the workers, and the peasants (although Communist influence in the army was inconsiderable and confined mainly to the low ranks). 7 The Ba'th also assumed that a working relationship with the Communists would contribute to enhancing relations with the Soviet Union. 8 In response to the Ba'th's appeals to establish a front, the ICP demanded the formation of a coalition government, stipulating that "none of the parties should impose its political leadership beforehand." 9 In addition, in 1968, as well as in the coming years, the ICP insisted that pro-Communist military officers who had been forced to retire on political grounds be reinstated. 10 This was part of its general effort to strengthen the Communist footing in the army, the institution that had played a crucial role in the political upheavals in Republican Iraq. Moreover, the ICP emphasized the need for "democratization," specifically to ensure the "patriotic" parties political freedom and to elect a constituent assembly, which would draw up a democratic constitution. The ICP's democratic demands indicated that it was confident of being able to compete successfully with the Ba'th in an atmosphere of political freedom and that it was willing to obtain legalization for the political parties that had been cooperating with it.11 These apparently democratic demands should certainly not be construed as the ICP's support for a real democracy: given the ICP's blind following of the Soviet Union's lead on international affairs (including approval of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968), its dogmatic adherence to Marxism-Leninism, and also the prevailing norms of violence in Iraq's internal politics, the ICP was far from being a party with a democratic ideology, even to the degree espoused by some Communist parties in Western Europe. In response to the repeated Communist demands for democratic liberties, the Ba'th used the Soviet arguments regarding democracy to point out that the true meaning of democracy was not granting "bourgeois-democratic" liberties, but liberation from class oppression, adding that the experience of the "socialist" states ruled by a single "socialist" party had long ago refuted the "bourgeois" meaning of democracy. 12 These arguments were directed at Moscow as well, in an attempt to gain its understanding of the Ba'th attitude vis-à-vis the ICP. Despite the Ba'th's declarations of readiness to come to terms with the Communists, there were soon signs that it was returning to terrorist practices when, in November 1968, there occurred two shooting attacks against groups of Communist activists.13 Although the mouthpiece of the Ba'th, al-Thawra, exonerated the regime from any involvement in these incidents, even claiming that the authorities were looking for the culprits,14

Moscow and the Ba'th Regime, July 1968-May 1971

21

it seems that these attacks were the first overt signs of the two-faced policy of the Ba'th toward the ICP. Sporadic persecutions of Communists were being carried out by the security services at the same time that the regime was not only denying any involvement in the anti-Communist measures but even renewing its proposals for cooperation with the ICP. The Ba'th evidently used these tactics in order, on the one hand, to terrorize and cripple the ICP and, on the other hand, to soften the Communists' terms regarding the formation of the front, to keep the door open for a dialogue with the Communists, and, last but not least, to prevent the suppression of the ICP from harming ties with the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the Ba'th continued to advocate establishing a front with the Communists even in the months following the events of November. 15 The first Soviet reports on the two coups of July 17 and 30,1968, in Iraq were brief, factual, and without comment. The upheaval of July 17 was described by Pravda as a "coup" headed by a "group of army officers," 16 and the Ba'th takeover of July 30 as the formation of a new government.17 Given the political instability that characterized Republican Iraq, Moscow was evidently waiting to see how long the new regime would last before elaborating its policy toward it, wary of repercussions this policy might have on Soviet-Iraqi relations in the event of additional coups. A Pravda article in the fall of 1969 indicated that this consideration was indeed paramount in formulating Moscow's early reports of the July coups. Its author recollected questions asked by "many" regarding the new Ba'th regime more than a year ago, namely: "Whether the Ba'th leadership would survive at a l l . . . [and] whether the Ba'thists [had] deduced the proper conclusions from their unsuccessful experience of their first rule in 1963." 18 Indeed, Moscow's initial reactions denoted in one way or another the new regime's relationship to the Ba'th rule of 1963, which, as Soviet sources recalled, had carried out a "bloody terror" against the Communists. Nevertheless, the Soviets noted the reservations of the pro-'Aflaq Ba'th regarding the excesses of 1963 and were ready for a new start, on the condition that Baghdad agree to "democratization," namely, political freedom for the ICP. 19 The first Soviet criticism of Ba'th policy toward the ICP appeared in Pravda on August 26, expressing resentment over the continued imprisonment of "hundreds" of Communists despite Baghdad's promises to release political detainees. Other Soviet newspapers—albeit not the central paper Pravda—also charged the Iraqi authorities with responsibility for the shooting incidents of November 1968 in articles entitled " A Massacre of Toilers." 20 However, Moscow appeared to be attempting to prevent a deterioration in its ties with Baghdad because these reports condemned the Iraqi regime less severely than the statement of the Central Committee of the ICP. 21 From Moscow's perspective, the ICP was only one important consideration—among others, such as maintaining relations with an anti-

22

Moscow and the Ba'th Regime, July 1968-May 1971

Western regime—in determining its attitude toward Baghdad. By contrast, the ICP's stand toward the Ba'th was shaped to a certain extent in accordance with its own local interests, whereas direct persecution of Iraqi Communists could not but harden their attitude toward the regime. Nevertheless, the ICP, as a party loyal to the Soviets, was capable of sacrificing its local interests for the sake of the Soviet Union—especially because the Iraqi Communists needed the Soviet Union as a guardian to deter the Iraqi regime from anti-Communist practices. The ICP had a tangible interest in displaying support for Moscow's policies on international affairs while avoiding inasmuch as possible friction with the Soviets over Iraqi internal politics. To sum up, at the inception of Ba'th rule, Moscow emphasized the need to put an end to persecutions of Communists, but refrained from urging the ICP to form a front with the Ba'th, pending evidence of the new regime's stability.

The Kurdish Problem: Differences Between Moscow and Baghdad (Summer 1968-Winter 1969) While the Ba'th regime had not yet consolidated its power, it conducted a conciliatory policy toward the Kurdish minority, avoiding a resumption of hostilities. On August 3,1968, the RCC confirmed its adherence to the June 29,1966, "statement" as a basis for solving the Kurdish question.22 It seems that the Iraqi government was sincerely willing to grant autonomy to the Kurds in the cultural-linguistic sphere, but the dictatorial character of the Ba'th regime made its consent to real self-rule for the Kurdish minority extremely unlikely. As early as mid-August, the negotiations between the government and the DPK collapsed, and from the middle of fall the authorities—assisted by the faction of Jalal Talbani—became engaged in a limited, gradually intensifying war against the forces of Barzani.23 From September 1968, Pravda published a series of articles on the Iraqi Kurds, written by a special correspondent of the paper who had visited the Kurdish area,24 indicating the importance Moscow accorded this subject. The first articles in the series reported with approval the Iraqi government's decision to implement the June 1966 "statement." 25 However, most of the articles expressed deep sympathy for the "just struggle [of the Kurds] to assure their rights within the framework of a united state with the Arabs," 26 as well as appreciation for Barzani, with whom the Soviet correspondent had a meeting.27 The articles concluded that the Kurdish question must be solved by peaceful means.28 These expressions of support for the Kurds led by Barzani reflected Moscow's interest in attaining the friendship of this significant factor in

Moscow and the Ba'th Regime, July 1968-May 1971

23

Iraqi politics, which since 1961 had successfully repelled the military offensives of one Iraqi government after the other. The Soviets regarded the Kurds as a means of promoting the interests of the ICP. Pravda claimed that among the sixty-three persons comprising the highest institution of the Kurdish fighters was one Arab, the commander of a "Communist battalion" composed of Arabs and Kurds—members of the ICP who had fled northward in 1963 (during the first Ba'th rule). 29 Hence, Moscow had a stake in the existence of a Kurdish area controlled by Barzani as a place of refuge for Communists, where they could also organize a small number of military units. Pravda's description of fraternity between the Communist and the Kurdish combatants undoubtedly indicated Moscow's support for close cooperation between the ICP and the DPK to exert joint pressure on the Ba'th to relinquish its monopoly on power. However, Pravda failed to mention the intermittent squabbles between the two parties, arising from ideological differences and political rivalry.30 While seeking the friendship of the Kurds, Moscow was nonetheless just as interested in maintaining amicable relations with the newly established anti-Western regime in Baghdad. In their attempt to reconcile these conflicting goals, the Soviets adopted a fairly evenhanded approach toward the dispute between the Kurds and the Ba'th regime. This impartiality was also intended to facilitate eventual Soviet mediation in the dispute and thus to increase Moscow's influence in Iraq. When the Soviet Union stressed the need to solve the Kurdish problem peacefully, it evidently envisaged the kind of settlement that would secure, at least to some degree, the DPK's strength as a military factor and certainly as a political factor, because such a solution would potentially serve the purposes of the ICP. The Iraqi regime's decision to attempt a military solution of the Kurdish problem was certainly opposed by Moscow, although the Soviet media refrained from expressing this criticism. Instead, from late fall 1968 they kept silent on the Kurdish issue to avoid exacerbating relations with Baghdad.

Soviet-Iraqi Relations: Ideology and Practice At the end of the 1960s, the U A R continued to be the most important country in Soviet strategy in the Arab East, followed by Syria, with Iraq only in third place. As we saw in the Introduction, from the Soviet perspective, the U A R and Syria clearly took priority over Iraq, among others, because of their direct involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, which Moscow regarded as second in significance to the Vietnam War. The prominence of Syria in comparison with Iraq in Soviet policy can be deduced from the fact that Moscow classified the "left" Ba'th regime in

24

Moscow and the Ba'th Regime, July 1968-May 1971

Damascus as "progressive" and had maintained relations with it at the party level since 1967, even though Damascus consented to the participation of only a single Communist in the government on an individual basis and refused to legalize the Syrian Communist party. By contrast, despite the fact that the second Ba'th regime in Iraq offered the local Communists better terms of cooperation than the Syrian Ba'th, the Soviet Union neither recognized its "progressiveness" nor established relations with it as a party. Because relations with Iraq had relatively low priority in Soviet Middle Eastern policy, Moscow continued to expect from Baghdad not merely an anti-Western stand, but also a domestic policy geared to Soviet interests as preconditions for establishing close ties with the Ba'th regime. Iraq's approval of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968, exemplified Moscow's unwillingness to reduce pressure on Iraq concerning Baghdad's internal politics, despite the latter's "anti-imperialist" posture. The Soviet Union justified the invasion by claiming that the existence of the Socialist regime in Czechoslovakia had been threatened. Bakr personally (despite sounding a note of reservation regarding the invasion) backed the invasion, declaring that "the most important thing . . . [was] Czechoslovakia remaining socialist." 31 Baghdad's media described the deployment of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia as a "natural self-defense . . . as well as a legitimate blow to Western and Zionist influence." 32 Iraqi propaganda, for obvious reasons, underlined Soviet allegations about Zionist activities in Czechoslovakia, which had tried to compel Prague to change its policy of support for the Arab states vis-à-vis Israel prior to Moscow's intervention. 33 The Soviet media, for their part, quoted Iraq's approval for the introduction of Warsaw Pact forces into Czechoslovakia.34 Nevertheless, although Iraq was among the few states outside the Eastern bloc to support the Soviet invasion (other Arab states that expressed their support were Syria and, with a modicum of reservation, Egypt), 35 the Soviets continued to criticize Baghdad's internal policies, as seen in the article in Pravda on August 26 demanding the release of imprisoned Communists, Soviet castigation of the persecution of Iraqi Communists, and open sympathy for the Kurdish rebels. Whereas Moscow's Middle East strategy accorded Iraq a relatively unimportant position, in early August 1968 Bakr proclaimed that the Soviet Union occupied "the first place" in Iraq's foreign policy. 36 However, Iraq had no intention of relying on a single power. From Baghdad's point of view, the Soviet Union was merely the first among the powers with which Iraq aspired to establish close relations, the others being the People's Republic of China and France, which Bakr also mentioned in the same statement. The Ba'th explained its desire to develop links with the U S S R and China on the grounds of its ideological affinity with "socialist" regimes regarding certain goals,

Moscow and the Ba'th Regime, July 1968-May 1971

25

namely the struggle against "imperialism," the support of "national liberation movements" and the building of "socialism." 37 It is noteworthy that the Ba'th adopted a neutral stand on the Soviet-Sino dispute,38 whereas the Soviet Union generally ceased referring to China as a "socialist" state from the end of the 1960s (and throughout the 1970s), when the conflict with China intensified, charging it with pursuing an adventurous and chauvinistic foreign policy. Anyway, the differences in Moscow's and Baghdad's attitudes toward Beijing at the end of the 1960s did not affect Soviet-Iraqi relations, if only because China's relations with Middle Eastern states in this period were extremely limited.39 Although the Ba'th regime attributed special importance to developing relations with Communist states, its main criterion for establishing links with foreign countries in the late 1960s and the 1970s was their stand on the Arab-Israeli dispute. Indeed, this was how Bakr explained Iraq's willingness to augment relations with the Soviet Union, China, and France in his statement of August 1968. It should be recalled that in 1968 Iraq sought to procure French-made Mirage aircraft and continued its efforts to purchase French weaponry in the coming years as well.40 However, at the end of that decade and until the mid-1970s, French arms deliveries to Iraq were insignificant and did not include military airplanes,41 so the Soviet Union continued to be Iraq's major and almost exclusive arms supplier. The Soviet Union did not seem to resent the limited Iraqi-Franco relationship, especially because it regarded France, which kept itself somewhat aloof from the Western alliance, as the lesser evil in comparison with Britain and the United States. In line with the principle that Iraq's relations with a country depended on that country's policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iraqi Ba'th stated that it would not resume diplomatic relations with the United States, 42 which, as we saw above, had been severed in the wake of the June 1967 war. (Since then the United States had been represented in Iraq by the Belgian embassy, and Iraq had been represented in the United States by the Indian embassy.) Baghdad also launched a vociferous propaganda campaign against Washington's policy in the Middle East conflict. In retrospect, it could be argued that the main ideological motive of the Ba'th regime for fostering close ties with the Soviet Union—namely, the Soviet attitude toward the Arab-Israeli conflict—provides only a partial explanation for Iraq's policy toward the Soviet Union; it does not explain Baghdad's effort to loosen links with Moscow from the mid-1970s. The desire to mitigate Moscow's criticism of Iraq's internal policy43 and to associate itself with a great power that seemed to be gaining predominance in the Middle East following the June war also contributed to Iraq's attempt to improve relations with the U S S R . Nonetheless, the major reason was undoubtedly the supply of military hardware. It is reasonable

26

Moscow and the Ba'th Regime, July 1968-May 1971

to assume that the Iraqi regime needed Soviet arms first and foremost to intensify its war against the Kurds. In addition, given the Ba'th regime's dictatorial character, its enormous dependence on the loyalty of the army, and its belligerent slogans concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict, a military buildup was inevitable. Significantly, the first delegation of the new regime to visit the Soviet Union in SeptemberOctober 1968 was a military one, with the aim of acquiring weapons. 44 However, until the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran conflict in the spring of 1969, no significant Soviet arms transfers to the Ba'th government were reported. 45 Moscow withheld its backing from Baghdad in the military and political fields so as not to strengthen the Iraqi regime vis-à-vis the Kurds and the Communists.

The Outbreak of the Shatt-al-Arab Dispute and Iraq's Recognition of East Germany (Spring 1969) The Soviet Union had continued its general policy of courting the regional members of CENTO since the mid-1950s so that by the end of the 1960s there were friendly relations and extensive economic links between Moscow and Tehran. From January 1967, the Soviet Union also supplied arms on a limited scale to the Shah,46 and in 1968 started to construct a pipeline for transporting Iranian natural gas to the Soviet Union. Since 1959, the relations between Republican Iraq and Iran had been somewhat marred by the ongoing dispute over the treaty of 1937 regarding the status of the border river Shatt-al-Arab. Iran was dissatisfied with this treaty because it had given Iraq sovereignty over the whole of the Shattal-Arab, except for areas near the Iranian cities Abadan and Khurramshahr, where the boundary was delineated according to the "thalweg" line—the deepest point in the middle of the river. In the winter of 1968-1969, Iran and the new regime in Iraq still tried to settle the dispute over the Shatt-al-Arab by quiet diplomacy, with all the restraint and courtesy of negotiations between friendly countries.47 However, in March 1969, Tehran claimed that the Iraqis had opened fire on Iranian fishermen on the Shatt-al-Arab. 48 In April, feeling increasingly self-confident vis-à-vis Iran, Baghdad decided to exercise its sovereignty over the Shatt-al-Arab in accordance with the treaty of 1937. On April 15, Baghdad demanded that Iranian ships lower their Iranian flags when passing through the Shatt-al-Arab and threatened that if Iran did not comply with this demand, Iraq would prevent ships bound to Iranian ports from using the waterway.49 This official Iraqi demand had been preceded by similar instructions given by Iraqi navigators to Iranian vessels since the beginning of April.50 On April 19, Iran abrogated unilaterally the treaty of 1937, denounc-

Moscow and the Ba'th Regime, July 1968-May

1971

27

ing it as unequal and charging that it had been imposed on Iran when Iraq had been abetted by an "imperialist" power, namely Britain. Tehran argued that nowhere in the world was a large river that divided two states under the sovereignty of only one of them.51 Iran called upon Iraq to conclude a new treaty that would demarcate the boundary in the middle of the Shatt-al-Arab. Iraq, for its part, dismissed the Iranian step as "one-sided, contradicting both the principles of international law and respect for agreements and treaties" and continued to regard the treaty of 1937 as valid.52 Following the abrogation of the treaty, the Iraqi media embarked on a propaganda campaign against the Iranian regime, condemning it as "pro-imperialist" and "reactionary." Baghdad's propaganda also claimed that Arabistan—a region in Iran inhabited by ethnic Arabs and called Khuzistan by Iran—was part of the Arab homeland.53 Nevertheless, Iraq did not interfere either with vessels that carried the Iranian flag or with general navigation to Iranian ports on the Shatt-al-Arab. Baghdad justified its inaction at the military level in the face of Iran's flagrant violation of the 1937 treaty with the argument that Iraq should not be drawn by the Iranian "provocations" into a secondary battle at the expense of "the battle of destiny to liberate Palestine." The real reasons were probably more tangible, however—namely, Iran's military superiority over Iraq coupled with the weakness of the Ba'th regime, which was engaged in the conflict with the Kurds. Moreover, from Iraq's perspective, the Arab states' response to the Shatt-al-Arab dispute was far from encouraging. Neither the conservative Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia, which feared a radical Iraq, nor the UAR, which had no interest in deflecting world attention from the Arab-Israeli conflict, supported Iraq's position. Syria under the Ba'th was one of the few radical Arab states to espouse the Iraqi cause, despite the undercurrent of tension in its relations with the Iraqi Ba'th. In any case, despite the massing of troops and the war of words by both Iraq and Iran, hostilities did not erupt, and by May-June 1969, after some Middle Eastern countries—Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Turkey—attempted to mediate between Iraq and Iran, a gradual military relaxation could be discerned. At the time of the Shatt-al-Arab dispute, certain developments in Iraq's relations with the Soviet Union and East Germany were also occurring. Iraq's Foreign Minister 'Abd-al-Karim Shaikhli visited the Soviet Union from March 20 to 25 and held separate talks with his counterpart Andrei Gromyko, with President Nikolai Podgornyi, and with Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin.54 At end of the 1960s and in the first half of the 1970s, power in the Kremlin was still concentrated in the hands of a "troika," in which Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev was clearly the senior member, although Kosygin and Podgornyi still enjoyed tangible influence. The joint communiqué issued at the end of Shaikhli's trip made

28

Moscow and the Ba'th Regime, July 1968-May 1971

reference to East Germany,55 indicating that Iraq's recognition of this country was discussed during the visit. Indeed, Shaikhli continued from Moscow to East Germany, where he was received by its leader Walter Ulbricht, held talks with Foreign Minister Otto Winzer, and departed for Iraq on March 31. In the joint communiqué, Shaikhli voiced support for East Germany's demand for membership in the United Nations General Assembly and its organizations, although he stopped short of extending full diplomatic recognition to East Germany.56 As we have seen, on April 19, the dispute over the Shatt-al-Arab broke out, and on April 24, al-Thawra reported that the East German press had denounced Iran's steps in regard to the Shatt-al-Arab. Finally, on April 30, the RCC granted "full recognition" to East Germany. It is surely no coincidence that Iraq's relations with the Soviet bloc were improving precisely at the time when relations with Iran were more and more strained. In March, as tension on the Shatt-al-Arab increased, Baghdad was holding high-level talks with Moscow and East Berlin, and it seems reasonable to assume that, because Iraq anticipated a possible exacerbation of its dispute with Iran, it sought to secure the support of the Soviet bloc in return for recognizing East Germany. Indeed, Iraq's selfconfidence vis-à-vis Iran increased from the beginning of April, after Shaikhli's return from East Germany on March 31. Furthermore, after the outbreak of the Shatt-al-Arab dispute on April 19, East Germany was quick to side with Iraq, and shortly afterward Iraq granted full recognition to East Germany. It is possible that even during the Shaikhli-Winzer talks in March, Iraq had succeeded in striking some kind of a deal with East Germany, trading recognition for support on the Shatt-al-Arab, which had encouraged Iraq to be more assertive toward Iran from the beginning of April. Evidence of this connection between Iraq's recognition of East Germany and East Germany's support for Iraq in the Shatt-al-Arab conflict was provided by the joint communiqué, issued at the end of Winzer's visit to Baghdad, May 6-11,1969. In this communiqué, Shaikhli affirmed that Iraq's decision to recognize East Germany on April 30 was an expression of Baghdad's deep appreciation for East Germany's support for "the vital interests of the Iraqi people especially concerning the Palestine problem and the imperialist provocations on the Iraqi borders." Winzer, for his part, in the same communiqué voiced East Germany's "complete support for the position of the Iraqi Republic on . . . the border treaty of 1937 . . . considering it valid and binding," and also condemned the "provocative" concentration of troops by Iran.57 In view of East Germany's special allegiance to the Soviet Union, it can be assumed that its support for Baghdad had been previously coordinated with Moscow.58 Moscow approved this move, despite the negative repercussions it might have on Iranian-Soviet relations, because until

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29

April 30 not a single non-Communist state had agreed to grant full diplomatic recognition to East Germany,59 and Iraq's recognition prompted other Arab countries (the Sudan, Syria, South Yemen, and the U A R ) to follow suit. By extending recognition to East Germany, Iraq sought first and foremost—as was hinted by Shaikhli60 and Bakr 61 —to promote relations with the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc at large and gain their support vis-à-vis Iran. The Soviet Position on the Iraq-Iran Dispute (Spring 1969-Spring 1971) On April 23,1969, Izvestiia published a report on the Iraq-Iran conflict that tended to favor Iran. At the beginning of May, it played down the importance of Iraq's recognition of East Germany—the very step aimed at gaining Soviet support in the Shatt-al-Arab dispute—reporting that Iraq had decided to recognize East Germany "following a number of Arab states, which [had been] maintaining consular and commercial ties... with Democratic Germany."62 Unlike Izvestiia, Pravda, in brief reports on April 24 and 26, implicity criticized Tehran's behavior at the military level following the outbreak of the Shatt-al-Arab dispute. Pravda reported: "The Iranian Third Army, deployed on the Iraqi border, has been placed in a state of full military alertness Iranian fighter-planes are patrolling the air-space of the border area, while Iranian ships are passing through the Shatt-al-Arab estuary accompanied by gun-boats."63 Pravda also noted that Iraq was the first Arab state to extend full diplomatic recognition to East Germany, although it omitted mentioning that Iraq was the first non-Communist state to do so.64 It seems that the Soviet Union had no intention of awarding Iraq the prize it sought for recognizing East Germany. On the whole, the Soviets did not take sides on the issue of the validity of the 1937 treaty, with East European states, except for East Germany, following Moscow's neutrality. Moreover, the Soviet Union ignored Baghdad's propaganda campaign against Tehran and continued to profess its willingness to maintain friendly relations with Iran.65 The objective advantages of Iran over Iraq certainly influenced the Soviet position on the dispute between the two countries. Iran's territory was about four times the size of Iraq's and it had more than three times the population.66 In contrast to Iraq's short coast on the Gulf, Iran had a long coastline on both the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Iran's border with the Soviet Union also inevitably increased its strategic significance for Moscow. Furthermore, following the eruption of the Iraq-Iran conflict, Moscow was anxious not to arouse Tehran's deep-rooted suspicions regarding its northern neighbor. It wanted to prevent an increase in Iran's military relationship with the United States,

30

Moscow and the Ba'th Regime, July 1968-May 1971

which, besides arms supplies, included US intelligence stations in proximity to the Soviet boundary. The Soviet Union was also interested in preserving its considerable economic ties with Iran. On the other hand, it desired to maintain friendly relations with Iraq, as an anti-Western state eager to extend its links with the Soviet Union in the military, political, and economic spheres. Moscow's cautious and evenhanded approach toward the Iraq-Iran dispute was the result of this attempt to avoid jeopardizing its interests with regard to both countries. The very delay in reporting the outbreak of the dispute as well as its laconic coverage in the Soviet press attested to Moscow's uneasiness about it. Indeed, the Soviets apparently tried to mediate between Baghdad and Tehran at the end of May and the beginning of June 1969, when Moscow was visited simultaneously by Hardan Tikriti67 and a veteran Iranian minister, who held separate talks with Vladimir Novikov, deputy prime minister of the Soviet Union.69 From a historical perspective, this attempt at mediation somewhat resembled Kosygin's mediation in the Indo-Pakistan conflict at the Tashkent conference in January 1966. In both cases, the enhanced Soviet effort to neutralize CENTO at the inception of Brezhnev's and Kosygin's rule was seen in the Soviet decision to adopt a neutral stand rather than side with "anti-imperialist" states (India and Iraq) against members of CENTO (Pakistan and Iran). In view of the somewhat tense situation on the Shatt-al-Arab and the possibility of its escalation, it is reasonable to assume that the question of arms was already discussed during Shaikhli's visit to Moscow in March 1969. Indeed, the communiqué issued at the end of Shaikhli's visit noted: "The two sides believe that the experience of their cooperation in the political, economic, cultural and other fields meets the interests of the two peoples."70 The term "other fields" is usually a diplomatic Soviet reference to the military sphere,71 so the language of the communiqué hinted that the Soviet Union had consented in general terms to supply weapons to Iraq. It seems, therefore, that a certain degree of understanding reached with the Soviets on the question of arms supplies, coupled with East Germany's aforementioned agreement to support Iraq against Iran politically, accounted for Baghdad's firm approach on the Shatt-al-Arab issue from the beginning of April. The differences in the reports of Pravda and Izvestiia on the dispute also shed light on Moscow's attitude to supplying Baghdad with arms. Izvestiia, the mouthpiece of the government, on the whole reflected Premier Kosygin's school of thought, which at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s advocated a moderate foreign policy, as opposed to General Secretary Brezhnev's more militant approach, expressed by Pravda, the organ of the party.72 In the specific case of the Iraq-Iran conflict, Izvestiia was at pains to maintain neighborly relations with Iran, whereas Pravda, referring to Iran's

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31

military preparations, implied that Iran posed a threat to Iraq and so justified supplying Baghdad with Soviet arms, despite the adverse affect this might have on Moscow's links with Tehran. Iraq's urgent need for Soviet military hardware at this time can be deduced from the frequent contacts that took place after April 19,1969, between Bakr and Hardan Tikriti and the Soviet ambassador in Baghdad,73 leading to the ambassador's conveying an invitation to the Iraqi defense minister on April 27 to come to Moscow.74 Hardan Tikriti visited the Soviet Union from May 26 to June 3, holding separate talks with Defense Minister Andrei Grechko, Novikov, and Kosygin.75 He achieved a Soviet commitment to supply Iraq with arms, including fighter planes, for the first time since the assumption of power by the Ba'th. 76 From the Soviet perspective, the arms deliveries were aimed at redressing the military balance between an anti-Western state associated with the Soviets—namely, Iraq—and a pro-Western state associated with the United States—namely, Iran. Despite Soviet logistic support for Iraq, differences between Moscow and Baghdad over the Shatt-al-Arab controversy remained, and no joint communiqué was issued at the conclusion of Hardan Tikriti's visit to the Soviet Union. A further indication of differences over the Shatt-al-Arab dispute was the silence on this issue in the statement released at the end of Salih Mahdi 'Ammash's visit to the Soviet Union from June 24 to July 5, 1969, during which he met with Kosygin.77 The Moscow trips of three senior Iraqi officials—Shaikhli, Hardan Tikriti, and 'Ammash—on the eve of and shortly after the eruption of the Iraq-Iran dispute, demonstrated Baghdad's urgent need for Moscow's military and political backing in this conflict. From the summer of 1969, tension on the Iraq-Iran border relatively subsided, as did the war of words between Baghdad and Tehran. Except for a temporary flare-up of tension in the winter of 1970,78 this situation continued until the summer of 1971. Nevertheless, the issue of sovereignty over the Shatt-al-Arab was not resolved, and both sides adhered to their initial positions. The Soviet Union continued to signal its readiness to assist in settling the dispute. For example, Podgornyi stated during a visit to Iran in March 1970 that the Soviet Union could not "remain indifferent . . . to the appearance of situations of conflict between states."79 Another implicit reference to the Iraq-Iran dispute was included in a Soviet-Iraqi communiqué issued by the end of a visit to the Soviet Union in August 1970 by Saddam Hussein, who in November 1969 had become Bakr's second-in-command.80 In a general paragraph that referred, among other things, to the importance of the United Nations for peace and security, Moscow and Baghdad expressed support for "observing scrupulously . . . norms of international law and international treaties and agreements." 81 This part of the paragraph was most probably introduced at Iraq's initiative,82 reflecting its desire to elicit

32

Moscow and the Ba'th Regime, July 1968-May 1971

Soviet backing for the validity of the 1937 treaty, whereas the Soviet Union, in keeping with its professed neutrality over the Shatt-al-Arab dispute, was apparently responsible for omitting any explicit reference to this issue in this paragraph. Evidence of Iraq's continued need for Soviet weapons in its confrontation with Iran was provided by the visits to Moscow in 1969-1970 by senior Iraqi military officials, among them the chief of staff (since April 1970), 'Abd-al-Jabbar Shanshal,83 and minister of defense (since April 1970) and member of the RCC, Hammad Shihab.84 In accordance with the military aid it had extended to Iraq since the eruption of the conflict over the Shatt-alArab, the Soviet Union provided Iraq in 1969-1970 with advanced weapons such as tanks, helicopters, fighter-bombers, and interceptors.85

The Gulf: In Anticipation of Britain's Withdrawal (1968-Spring 1971) At the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, the Gulf was of secondary importance in Soviet Middle Eastern policy, which centered on the Arab-Israeli conflict. During this period, the Soviet Union maintained a conspicuous naval military presence in the Mediterranean Sea, but only a limited presence, from 1968, in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf. The Soviet vessels in the Indian Ocean served partly as a countermeasure to the possible deployment in this area of US submarines carrying nuclear missiles capable of striking Soviet territory. However, they also fulfilled more general purposes, such as protecting the Soviet merchant fleet and strengthening Moscow's influence in friendly countries by calling at their ports.86 Thus, Soviet military vessels visited the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr for the first time in May 1968, returning apparently only a few times more at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s.87 It is reasonable to assume that Moscow's arms supplies to Baghdad were partly in return for the Soviet navy's access to Umm Qasr. Also, it is possible that the USSR's slight preference for Iraq in its dispute with Iran, expressed in the Soviet-Iraqi communiqué of August 1970, was intended to obtain the option of increased use of Umm Qasr by Moscow. Indeed, along the Gulf, Iraq was the only pro-Soviet state and hence the only one that might have approved a Soviet request for providing extensive port facilities. In January 1968, Britain announced its intention of withdrawing from the Gulf region by the end of 1971.88 The Soviets suspected that Britain aspired to retain its influence in the Gulf by creating in the area from which it promised to withdraw a puppet state, the Federation of Arab Emirates. Accordingly, in this period the Soviet Union, on the whole, opposed the projected federation and even provided certain military assistance, through South Yemen, 89 to the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG)—a Marxist organization dedicated to

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the overthrow of the conservative regimes in the emirates. The Soviet Union's main rival in the Gulf was Britain, whose moves to secure its interests in the projected federation were time and again condemned by Moscow. The Soviet Union therefore applauded Iran's opposition to the British presence in the Gulf.90 Indeed, Iran was interested in British withdrawal from this area because of its own ambitions in the Gulf. Iran also opposed a US military presence in the Gulf for fear that it would induce a Soviet one.91 Whereas the Soviet Union called the Gulf "Persian" (except in its Arabic publications, which referred to it as the "Arab Gulf'), Iraq, like all the Arab states, called it the "Arab Gulf." This linguistic difference also had political implications. Iraq's archenemy in this region—portrayed as the main threat to the Arabism of the Gulf after the outbreak of the Shatt-al-Arab dispute— was Iran. Although Iraq publicly opposed the British presence, British activities aimed at the cohesion and unification of the shaikhdoms were, in fact, in line with Iraq's goal of containing Persian "expansionism" in the Gulf. Thus Iraq—in harmony with most of the Arab states, including the UAR, and in opposition to the Soviet Union—supported the establishment of the federation of emirates. This difference in the Soviet and Iraqi positions on this issue should not, however, be exaggerated, because the Soviet Union did not exclude the possibility of recognizing the federation, provided it adopted an "anti-imperialist"92 policy—a purpose also shared by Iraq. Thus, a Soviet article described favorably Iraq's relations with the emirates, assuming that such relations would encourage the latter's anti-Western inclinations.93 Just as the Soviet media had carried only brief reports on the Shatt-al-Arab dispute, so they merely hinted at the rivalry between Iraq and Iran in the Gulf, without taking sides. The Soviets contended that disagreement between Iran and the Arabs only served Britain's interests by facilitating its continued presence in the Gulf. Hence, the Soviets believed the Gulf states should mend fences among themselves and concentrate their efforts upon opposing the British presence.94

The March Manifesto of 1970 After the relaxation of tension with Iran in May-June 1969, the Iraqi army conducted a major operation against the Kurdish rebels in August-October. Its failure strengthened the civil wing of the Ba'th, which, compared with its military wing, advocated a relatively moderate approach to the Kurdish problem. On November 9,1969, Saddam Hussein was promoted to deputy secretary general of the Iraqi Ba'th and, along with nine other civilians, to membership in the RCC.95 On the same day, Saddam Hussein was appointed vice chairman of the RCC, thus becoming ex-officio the second in Iraq's hierarchy, outranking his rivals, deputy prime ministers

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Hardan Tikriti and ' Ammash. 96 The following month, the government started negotiations with the Kurdish rebels in which Saddam Hussein played a key role and which led to an agreement in the form of the March 11,1970, manifesto. Although recognizing in principle the national and linguistic rights of the Kurds, the manifesto did not offer solutions to substantive issues such as the geographical demarcation of the autonomous region or the structure and jurisdiction of its authority.97 These issues had been left unresolved during the negotiations, and the two parties assigned a period of four years, until March 11,1974, to settle outstanding differences and implement the manifesto. From a historical perspective, the March accord turned out to be a temporary truce in the war between the government and the Kurds, with the Kurds maintaining their control over a part of Kurdistan and retaining their military forces. Neither the Kurds nor the government abandoned their incompatible goals, namely broad autonomous rule versus total subordination to Baghdad. During the Iraqi army's offensive against the Kurds in the summer and fall of 1969, the Soviet Union did not suspend arms shipments to the Ba'th regime, which had commenced that spring with the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran dispute. This continued flow of arms to Iraq, despite Soviet opposition to the war against the Kurds, demonstrated that Moscow considered that upholding the military balance of Iraq vis-à-vis Iran had priority over preventing a military solution to the Kurdish problem. As the assault against the Kurds proceeded, in September 1969 Pravda criticized the Kurdish rebels, accusing "extreme Kurdish elements, which . . . [were] often becoming an instrument in the hands of outside forces," of creating obstacles to solving the Kurdish problem.98 This remark hinted at the military relationship between the Kurdish rebels and Iran, which had been providing the Kurds with weapons since the mid1960s and had increased this aid after the eruption of the Shatt-al-Arab dispute. Although the Soviet Union avoided referring explicitly to this Iranian interference in Iraq's internal affairs, Pravda's comment showed ostensible support for the position of Baghdad, which during the onslaught vehemently condemned the Kurdish links with Iran. However, the Soviets usually ignored the military relationship between the Kurds and Iran in particular and the West in general. It seems that Western arms supplies to the Kurds actually also served the Soviet interest of sustaining the military balance of the DPK vis-à-vis the Iraqi government; Moscow evidently considered the Kurds' political ties with the West, concomitant with their military links, as a lesser evil when compared with the possible elimination of the DPK. It appears that at this time the Soviets tried to persuade the Ba'th to halt the offensive against the Kurds and may have hinted at the possibility of suspending arms deliveries to Baghdad. This was implied in an internal

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periodical of the Ba'th, which attributed the accord with the Kurds, among other things, to Iraq's apprehension of becoming isolated from the "progressive" states if the war were prolonged." The Shah also asserted that Moscow had pressured Baghdad to reach an agreement with the Kurds.100 Pravda itself indicated sympathy toward the stand on the Kurdish problem shared by the civilians within the Iraqi leadership, and especially by Saddam Hussein.101 Saddam Hussein also figured prominently in Soviet articles published shortly after the March accord,102 which probably reflected Moscow's appreciation for his central role in producing this agreement. Mahmud 'Uthman, member of the Politburo of the DPK and a key Kurdish participant in the negotiations with the Ba'th leading to the March manifesto, maintained that these had been "direct negotiations between the DPK and the Ba'th Party only."103 Without contradicting this statement, 'Uthman added in an interview with Pravda that Moscow "had helped to clean the atmosphere with the aim of encouraging a dialogue, contributing to the achievement of necessary results." 104 Indeed, Moscow's role in the attainment of the March accord seems to have been at most an important secondary one. Even when the offensive against the Kurds proceeded full steam ahead, Moscow did not exert heavy pressure on Baghdad by cutting arms supplies and therefore did not affect the principal cause for the agreement, namely the failure of the military solution. The Soviet Union's support for the March manifesto—expressed in a joint congratulatory dispatch sent by Podgornyi and Kosygin to Bakr 105 — stemmed from a variety of reasons. The cessation of the war improved the military posture of Iraq vis-à-vis Iran while also enhancing Iraq's ability to take part in the confrontation against Israel. The March agreement also secured a basic Soviet interest in Iraq's domestic sphere, namely the survival of the DPK.106 Moreover, the Soviet Union hoped that the freedom of political activities granted to the DPK in the wake of the March accord would create an atmosphere that would enable the ICP to enjoy a similar freedom and even participate, along with the DPK, in a coalition government. In this connection, the Soviets cited Barzani as saying that the solution of the Kurdish problem "should be a part of a general democratic progress,"107 whereas Pravda assessed that the accord would "help to rally all the progressive forces in a united national front."! 08

The Ba'th Warms Toward the ICP (Spring 1969-March 1970) The external challenge posed by Iran from April 1969 impelled the Ba'th to extend its internal base of power and to seek Soviet support. To these ends, the Iraqi regime resumed its efforts to mend fences with the Com-

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munists, calling for a joint front with them in view of the "critical circumstances" and the "Iranian provocations." 109 These gestures of reconciliation with the ICP, which coincided with Baghdad's preparations for a war against the Kurds, 110 were also designed to undermine the Communists' tactical cooperation with the Kurds and consequently to induce the Soviets to withdraw their moral backing from the Kurds. A hint of this new policy was given in an article in al-Thawra in September 1969—as the assault against the Kurds advanced—which, along with the usual criticism of the ICP, included rare words of praise that described the party as "proceeding from the concepts of scientific socialism, representing the interests of the proletariat... [and] having international ties with the socialist countries and the Communist parties which . . . [were] standing by the Arab revolution." 111 In addition to these gestures of good will toward the ICP, Iraq strove to convince the Soviets of the "progressiveness" of the Ba'th regime, both in order to weaken Moscow's interest in a strong Communist party in Iraq and to prompt the local Communists, who followed the Soviet line, to moderate their conditions for cooperation with the Ba'th. Baghdad's desire to obtain Moscow's recognition of its "progressiveness" was clearly seen in the resolutions of the Tenth Pan-Arab Congress of the Ba'th, which took place in Baghdad from March 1 to 10, 1970. The congress called for conducting a "dialogue with the socialist parties... to expound the ideas of the party and the goals of the Arab revolution . . . in view of the incipient openness characterizing the attitudes of the Soviet Union and the socialist states toward the party after the July 17 revolution." 112 Indeed, as the Ba'th's attitude toward the ICP warmed, the Soviet Union improved its ideological evaluation of the Ba'th. In September 1969, Pravda quoted al-Thawra's flattering comment on the ICP as representing a change in the Ba'th's policy toward the ICP and reported that the Iraqi regime was adopting "progressive measures meeting the interests of the workers and peasants." 113 It seems probable that this Soviet assessment that the Ba'th was embarking upon a course of negotiations with the ICP during the summer and fall of 1969, when Baghdad was waging a war against the Kurds, contributed palpably to decreasing Moscow's pressure on Baghdad regarding the Kurdish problem. However, the Soviet Union's demands that Iraq end all harassments of the Iraqi Communists and give them a share in the power114 went beyond what Baghdad was willing to concede. This seems to explain why Moscow refrained from endorsing the Socialist trends of the Ba'th regime and from establishing links between the CPSU and the Iraqi Ba'th. The USSR's vague acknowledgment of the "progressiveness" of the Ba'th regime also stemmed from Moscow's uncertainty about its stability until March 1970—that is to say, until Baghdad had produced a solution to its main internal problem, the Kurdish one.

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37

Persecution of the ICP and Saddam Hussein's Visit to the Soviet Union (Spring-Summer 1970) As soon as the March 11,1970, accord was reached, the security services of the Ba'th regime launched a campaign to suppress the ICP, manifested in arrests and torture of Communists and even sporadic murders.115 The relationship between this campaign and the March manifesto seems clear. By resolving, if only temporarily, its principal internal problem, Baghdad had reduced its need for military and political backing from the patron of the local Communists, the Soviets, and freed itself to some degree from exercising restraint toward the ICP. The relative lull in the conflict with Iran also decreased Iraq's dependence on the Soviet Union. Iraq's leaders were, however, aware that the disputes with the Kurds and Iran were far from settled and could flare up again at any time, so they did not feel sufficiently secure to embark on an all-out campaign to liquidate the ICP and thus imperil Iraq's relationship with the Soviet Union. Instead, Bakr and Saddam Hussein tried to diminish the damage to Iraqi-Soviet relations resulting from the anti-Communist persecutions, denying that such acts were taking place.116 The Ba'th even continued its efforts to obtain Soviet recognition as a "progressive" party.117 In the spring and summer of 1970, the reaction in the Soviet press to the oppression of the ICP was mild,118 except for Problems of Peace and Socialism, which sharply condemned the persecutions and implicitly held Baghdad responsible for them.119 This restrained Soviet response should be seen in light of the increased stability of the Ba'th regime after the March accord and the Soviet reluctance to spoil relations with a viable government. Moreover, given Baghdad's denials of the persecutions, Moscow probably decided to enable the Ba'th to mend its policy toward the ICP. Indeed, the Soviet Union even took some steps toward establishing links with Baghdad at the party level. In April 1970, at the invitation of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the first delegation of the Iraqi Ba'th arrived in the Soviet Union to participate in an international conference marking the centennial of Lenin's birthday;120 and on July 27, the Central Committee of the CPSU extended an invitation to an Iraqi delegation headed by Saddam Hussein to visit the Soviet Union.121 However, a distinction should be made between inviting a delegation of a foreign political party to visit the Soviet Union and establishing party-toparty relations. The latter, which would involve an exchange of party delegations and an agreement on party cooperation, was a stage not yet attained in the relationship between the CPSU and the Iraqi Ba'th. The Iraqi delegation led by Saddam Hussein visited Moscow in August 1970, and held talks with a Soviet delegation headed by Kiril Mazurov, member of the Politburo and one of the two first deputies of the Soviet premier.122 Boris Ponomarev, secretary of the Central Committee

38

Moscow and the Ba'th Regime, July 1968-May

1971

in charge of its International Department, also participated in these talks. As a rigid ideologist, Ponomarev was less inclined to sacrifice the interests of the local Communist parties in the Third World for the sake of expanding Soviet relations with the existing regimes of this region. Saddam Hussein also met with Kosygin at the end of his visit.123 In a speech in honor of Saddam Hussein, Mazurov stated that the "Soviet people . . . [were] following with deep interest the implementation of the progressive socio-economic transformations in Iraq."124 His speech was phrased diplomatically to avoid direct references to the ICP, while hinting at the importance the Soviet Union attributed to this issue in order to encourage the positive trends within the Ba'th toward the Communists. Saddam Hussein's speech in honor of Mazurov referred three times to Iraq "under the leadership" of the Ba'th,125 giving Moscow to understand Baghdad's principal condition for establishing a joint front with the Communists. Significantly, Pravda's version of this speech deleted two of Hussein's references to the Ba'th's leadership, and the remaining one was somewhat weaker because the phrase "under the leadership" of the Ba'th was mentioned along with the Ba'th's "cooperation" with the DPK. Also, the joint communiqué released at the conclusion of Saddam Hussein's trip contained no reference to the ICP, a clear indication of irreconcilable differences between the Soviet and Iraqi stands on this issue. Moreover, although at the beginning of Saddam Hussein's visit Mazurov described the transformations taking place in Iraq as "progressive," this ideological attribute was omitted from the "achievements" of the Ba'th denoted in the communiqué, although Baghdad had evidently been anxious to include it.126 Similarly, although Saddam Hussein's visit to Moscow at the invitation of the CPSU was in itself a harbinger of the CPSU's intention to establish relations with the Ba'th, no party links were established at the end of the visit, again contrary to the Ba'th's desire.127 All in all, it appears that during Saddam Hussein's trip to the Soviet Union, the Iraqi side was not prepared to compromise with the Soviets on the ICP, as a result of which Moscow temporarily withdrew its recognition of the "progressive" trends of the Ba'th and delayed the establishment of party-to-party ties with the Ba'th.

Relations Cool (Fall 1970-Spring 1971) Following Saddam Hussein's August 1970 trip to Moscow, the Soviet media reacted more harshly to the suppression of the ICP, probably as a result of the failure of the talks on the ICP with Hussein and the continuation and even intensification of the persecutions.128 For example, Problems of Peace and Socialism forthrightly charged Baghdad with responsibility for the persecutions, pointing out that it would be a "naivety to assume, as if without the consent of the Ba'th and the government the blade of the

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39

security services of the state... [was] directed against the Communists."129 Pravda, with greater caution, reported that during a meeting between Mikhail Suslov, Ponomarev, and 'Aziz Muhammad in Moscow on May 5, 1971, it had been "emphasized . . . that the persecutions against the Communists... [were] obstructing the accomplishment of the unity of the progressive-patriotic forces [in Iraq]."130 It should be noted that Suslov, a senior member of the Politburo and the chief Soviet ideologist under Brezhnev, was, like Ponomarev, more committed to the cause of the local Communist parties in the Third World than the mainstream of the Soviet leadership. Moscow not only condemned the oppression of the ICP verbally but also worked through diplomatic channels to halt it.131 Soviet discontent with the Iraqi regime was also expressed in Brezhnev's lengthy speech to the Twenty-fourth Congress of the CPSU on March 30,1971, which—in contrast to the favorable evaluations of other Arab countries, such as the UAR, Algeria, Syria, and the Sudan—pointedly omitted any mention of Iraq.132 Nevertheless, Soviet reaction to the persecutions was still restrained, evidently because of Moscow's continuing desire to prevent a rupture with the anti-Western government in Baghdad, which, for its part, still refrained from total repression of the ICP. Indeed, the Ba'th had not completely rejected the idea of establishing a front with the Communists; in March 1971, Saddam Hussein contended that such a front was the preferable way to advance the "revolution."133 Also in March, al-Thawra attempted to refute charges that Communists in Iraq were being persecuted.134 Nor did the Ba'th, which was increasingly self-confident vis-à-vis Moscow, confine itself to refutations, but even retorted with a counteroffensive: in an interview with an Iraqi magazine, Saddam Hussein sarcastically wondered whether the Iranian regime had better relations with the Iranian Communist party than the Ba'th with the ICP. If this were the case, Saddam Hussein continued, the Soviets should really establish most-favored economic and trade links with the Iranian regime.135 In fact, because the Soviet Union had a profound interest in maintaining friendly ties with Iran, it virtually turned a blind eye to the Shah's suppression of the Tudeh, and the trade turnover between Moscow and Tehran in 1970 was four times larger than that between Moscow and Baghdad.136 Baghdad's professed willingness to form a front with the Communists and the denials of harassment against the Communists issued by the Iraqi regime in March 1971—as the opening of the Twenty-fourth Congress of the CPSU on March 30 was approaching—indicated the Ba'th's interest in participating in the Congress. This was a continuation of Baghdad's aspiration to sustain friendly relations with the Soviet Union and to earn its recognition as being "progressive." Indeed, at the end of March, al-Thawra prominently reported the departure of the Ba'th delegation for the Twenty-fourth Congress, at the invitation of the Central Committee

40

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of the CPSU, conveyed by the Soviet ambassador in Iraq to Saddam Hussein.137 From the Soviet perspective, the invitation to the Iraqi Ba'th was in accordance with the invitation extended to other non-Communist parties with which the CPSU maintained either contacts or party links.138 The Soviet Union may have been trying, through this invitation, to strengthen those elements inside the Ba'th that were well disposed toward the ICP, and in this connection the composition of the Ba'th delegation to the Congress deserves notice. It included two persons, 'Abd-al-Khaliq alSamarra'i, member of the RCC as of November 1969, and Tariq 'Aziz, editor in chief of al-Thawra as of May 1969, both of whom had been previously described by Soviet sources as proponents of establishing a front in Iraq.139 Another Ba'th official portrayed by the Soviets at various times as an advocate of the front was Saddam Hussein,140 and Pravda, in a special gesture toward Hussein, published his greetings to the Twentyfourth Congress.141 The Kurdish Question After the March Manifesto (Spring 1970-Spring 1971) After the March accord, the Ba'th courted the Kurds, seeking to eliminate the DPK's support for the Communists during the persecutions. On March 29,1970, five Kurdish ministers, members of the DPK, were incorporated into the government, although not in key positions; and in May, the publication oial-Taakhi, the organ of the DPK, was renewed. The regime also promised that the "alliance of our party with the D P K . . . [would be] the basis of the front"142—that is, that the Ba'th considered the DPK its main partner in the projected front, leaving the ICP a secondary role. The DPK, however, was wary of the Ba'th and tried to maintain friendly relations with the ICP, as the party closely associated with a power sympathetic to the Kurds—the Soviet Union. Accordingly, despite the resentment of the Ba'th,143 a representative of the ICP participated in the Eighth Congress of the DPK, which took place in July 1970, and persecuted Iraqi Communists continued to find refuge in the Kurdish area. The Soviet Union, for its part, acknowledged the "progressiveness" of the DPK by sending greetings on behalf of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Eighth Congress,144 as well as inviting the DPK to take part in the Twenty-fourth Congress of the CPSU. The DPK delegation to the congress consisted of Muhammad Mahmud' Abd-al-Rahman, member of the Politburo and minister of construction of the North, who was considered close to Barzani and who delivered a speech at the Congress, and Dara Tawfiq, member of the Central Committee and editor of al-Taakhi, who belonged to the left wing of the party.145 'Abd-al-Rahman conveyed congratulations on behalf of the Kur-

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dish people and its leader Barzani "to the great Soviet people, its vanguard . . . the friendly Communist party, and its distinguished leaders." In an implicit call to Moscow to intercede on behalf of the Iraqi Kurds, 'Abdal-Rahman contended that "a condition of utmost importance" for the accomplishment of the revolutionary tasks in Iraq was "the support of the Soviet Union and other socialist states for the struggle of the progressive forces in Iraq." He also advocated the establishment of a national front in Iraq, comprising the DPK, the Ba'th, and the ICP.146 Evidence of the Soviet desire to promote relations between the Iraqi Communists and the DPK can be seen in the fact that the Kurds' two basic demands, autonomy and democracy, were included in 'Aziz Muhammad's speech to the Twenty-fourth Congress, as published by Pravda.ui Nonetheless, despite the congruence of interests between the DPK and the ICP vis-à-vis the regime in Baghdad, Moscow still sought to preserve its bilateral ties with Baghdad and avoided siding with the Kurds. Thus, a Pravda feature article on the Kurds, which appeared on the first anniversary of the March agreement, called on both the Arabs and Kurds to show vigilance in view of imperialist attempts to promote dissension and even armed clashes.148 The Arab-Israeli Conflict at the End of the 1960s Although the Soviet Union conducted a malicious propaganda campaign against Israel after the June 1967 war and increased its arms deliveries to Arab states involved in the conflict, it also emphasized the need to use political means to "liquidate the consequences of the Israeli aggression." Specifically, Moscow urged the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22,1967, which it interpreted as stipulating a total Israeli withdrawal to the pre-Six Day war borders and the termination of the state of war between Israel and its Arab neighbors. In order to attain a legitimate status in the Middle East, the Soviet Union strove to promote such a settlement under Soviet-US auspices, and included in its peace proposals the provision of guarantees to the "recognized borders" between Israel and the Arab states by the permanent members of the Security Council.149 Contrary to the Soviet Union, Ba'th Iraq opposed the very existence of Israel, making no secret of its goal to liquidate "the Zionist entity" by military force,150 and rejected Security Council Resolution 242. The Soviet media, as a rule, refrained from reporting the real Iraqi stand on the Arab-Israeli conflict,151 and even implied that Iraq merely aimed at Israel's withdrawal from the territories captured in the June war.152 This presentation of Iraq's attitude was designed to reinforce the leitmotiv of Soviet propaganda, that Israel was "the aggressor" and the Arab states "the victims of the aggression." From Moscow's perspective,

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Baghdad's extreme position on the Middle East dispute was not a serious irritant; because Iraq had no common border with Israel and its participation in the confrontation against Israel was limited to about twelve thousand troops stationed in Jordan, Iraq could not obstruct Soviet efforts to advance a political solution. Indeed, Moscow favored Iraq's deployment on the Eastern front as a means of increasing the pressure on Israel to consent to the Soviet model of a political settlement.153 Iraq scarcely criticized the Soviet attitude on the Arab-Israeli dispute. In a rare instance of such criticism, al-Thawra took exception to the call to liquidate "the consequences of the aggression," on the grounds that it might detract from the task of liquidating "the source of the aggression," namely Israel.154 Generally, Baghdad's media sought to adapt the Soviet stand on the Middle East crisis to the Iraqi one by deleting from Moscow's pronouncements those components unacceptable to Baghdad, such as "the cessation of the state of war" between the Arab states and Israel,155 while commending Soviet military and political backing of the Arab countries.156 The Ba'th even justified this tactic ideologically by arguing that the party did not expect foreign (i.e., non-Arab) countries to espouse completely the Arab attitude toward Israel.157 Ideology aside, Iraq had no intention of impairing its bilateral ties with the Soviet Union because of differences over the Arab-Israeli dispute—an issue that in fact had only secondary importance for Baghdad in comparison with the Kurdish problem and the conflict with Iran. The first reference to the Arab-Israeli conflict in a joint Soviet-Iraqi Ba'th communiqué appeared at the conclusion of Shaikhli's trip to Moscow in March 1969. The two parties declared that "in order to relax tension in the Middle East, the forces of the aggressor must be withdrawn from all the occupied Arab territories." 158 Because the customary Soviet formula demanded an Israeli withdrawal from the Arab lands conquered in 1967, this more vague formulation in the communiqué indicated a concession to the Iraqi position. From the Ba'th perspective, there was no difference between the territories captured by Israel in 1967 and those "conquered" in 1948; hence, any specific reference to the limited goal of regaining the former territories was tantamount to a deviation from the task of "liberating" the whole of Palestine. The joint communiqué ignored two salient subjects on which the gap between Moscow and Baghdad was unbridgeable—Security Council Resolution 242 and the superpowers' talks on promoting a Middle East settlement on the basis of this resolution. The Rogers Plan, the Events in Jordan, and the Federation of Arab Republics On July 23,1970, Nasser announced that Egypt accepted a US initiative, named the Rogers plan, which called for the implementation of Security

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Council Resolution 242 and a cease-fire along the Egyptian-Israeli front. Iraq not only rejected the Rogers plan, but—striving to replace Cairo in its leading role among the radical-nationalistic circles of the Arab world— orchestrated a propaganda campaign against Nasser's assent to a ceasefire with Israel. The Soviet Union, however, publicly sided with its major ally in the Middle East, the U A R , whose position corresponded to the Soviet one. 159 Nonetheless, despite Baghdad's war of words against Cairo, Moscow agreed to play host to Saddam Hussein in August 1970, and Mazurov avoided criticizing the Iraqi stand on the Middle East dispute in his speech in honor of Hussein. This suggested that the Soviets desired to preserve their relationships with both Iraq and the U A R , and to mend fences between their two allies.160 It seems, however, that these verbal attacks on Egypt made it difficult for Iraq to formulate a joint statement with the Soviets on the Arab-Israeli conflict, even along the lines of the communiqué released at the end of Shaikhli's visit in March 1969. Consequently, the only reference to the Arab-Israeli dispute in the joint statement issued at the conclusion of Saddam Hussein's visit was the vague admission that "the two sides exchanged views on the situation in the Middle East." 1 6 1 Despite deep differences, Iraq continued to refrain from criticizing the Soviet stand on the Middle East conflict. Thus, on return from Moscow, Saddam Hussein argued that although "our Soviet friends" dealt with the Palestinian problem not as Arabs, and had their own considerations, they worked with "a sincere will for peace and preservation of Arab friendship." 162 Another issue was added to the existing Soviet-Iraqi differences over the Middle East dispute in September 1970, when the Jordanian army inflicted a lethal blow to the military presence of the Palestine Liberation Organization ( P L O ) in Jordan. T h e Soviet Union tried through diplomatic channels to prevent a Syrian and Iraqi intervention in favor of the PLO forces in Jordan 163 (although in the case of Syria these efforts failed), apprehensive that this might lead to a US-backed Israeli intervention on behalf of the Jordanian regime and to complications in Soviet-US relations. Besides, the Soviet Union was primarily interested in bringing about a cessation of hostilities in Jordan in order to create a convenient atmosphere for continuing the talks with Washington on resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute. Although Iraq loudly expressed solidarity with the Palestinian forces in Jordan and condemned King Hussein's government as a "fascist" and an imperialist "agent" regime, it did not invade Jordan, and the Iraqi troops already stationed in Jordan did not come to the rescue of the Palestinians. Moscow's influence over Baghdad's decision not to attack Jordan was probably marginal,164 for there is no evidence to suggest that the Soviets attempted to forestall an Iraqi offensive by threatening to halt the flow of arms to Baghdad. The Iraqi decision not to intervene was

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probably the result of other considerations, such as the reluctance to risk the military and political consequences of waging a war against a neighboring Arab state that had a highly professional and competent army. Another development relevant to Soviet-Iraqi relations was the formation of the Federation of Arab Republics on April 17, 1971. It comprised Egypt, under its new president, Anwar Sadat (Nasser died on September 28,1970); Libya, headed by Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi; and Syria, led by Hafiz al-Asad. The Sudan planned to join the federation as well. In February-March 1971, Iraq had launched a propaganda campaign against Sadat's moderate policy on the Arab-Israeli dispute165 including the projected federation, described as an organization "in the shade of which the greatest crime is being committed, namely the recognition of Israel." 166 Iraq's hostility to the union seems to have reflected its renewed efforts to obtain hegemony among the radical-nationalistic circles in the Arab world. Although the Soviet Union was outwardly sympathetic to the federation, claiming that the latter would strengthen the front of the "anti-imperialist" Arab states, inwardly the Soviets were somewhat apprehensive of the enhanced status and bargaining position the states in the federation would have vis-à-vis Moscow. 167 However, because the UAR—which was the centerpiece of Soviet Middle Eastern policy—formed the nucleus of the federation, Moscow had no choice but to adapt to the new circumstances by striving to expand cooperation with the other member states of the federation as well. Thus, Iraq's decision to stay outside the federation and actively oppose it reduced even further its status in Moscow's Middle East strategy.

Soviet-Iraqi Economic Relations (Summer 1968-Spring 1971) Soviet oil production continued to grow throughout the 1970s, although at a slower rate than at the beginning of the previous decade, and the Soviet Union maintained its position as an important oil exporter: Soviet oil output rose from 353 million tons in 1970 to 586 million tons in 1979. In 1970, the Soviet Union exported 96 million tons of oil (27 percent of total production), of which 40 million tons (42 percent of total exports) went to Eastern Europe; in 1979, it exported 155 million tons of oil (26 percent of total production), of which 90 million tons (58 percent of total exports) were delivered to Eastern Europe. 168 The Soviet Union obviously had no vital economic interest in Middle Eastern oil, but it did have a financial interest in Arab oil. Moscow wanted to obtain oil, mainly for the East European countries but also for its own consumption, on a barter basis in order to increase Soviet oil exports to the West in return for hard currency. Another Soviet interest was to weaken the standing of the Western oil

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companies in Arab countries. To this effect, the Soviet Union assisted Iraq in developing its own oil industry and thus provided the infrastructure for nationalizing Western oil companies—a common strategic goal of the Soviets and the Ba'th. It should be noted that at the end of the 1960s, Iraq's oil was produced exclusively by Western oil companies, first and foremost the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), whose oilfields were located in the Kirkuk area and whose ownership was shared by British, Dutch, US, and French companies. At the inception of Ba'th rule, Soviet-Iraqi economic links evolved slowly. However, following the outbreak of the dispute over the Shatt-alArab in the spring of 1969, Iraq sought not only to strengthen relations with the Soviet Union militarily and politically, but also to expand its economic ties with Moscow. During 'Ammash's visit to the Soviet Union on July 4, 1969, a Soviet-Iraqi agreement was concluded providing for Soviet assistance in developing the oilfields in North Rumaila—situated in southern Iraq, near the Kuwaiti border—in return for shipments of Iraqi crude oil.169 From 1969, there was a remarkable growth in Iraq's economic ties with East European states as well, some of which participated in developing Iraq's oil industry.170 In addition, Soviet-Iraqi cooperation in developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which dated back to the Qasim era, continued under the Ba'th, with a new agreement signed in May 1969.171 The momentum in Soviet-Iraqi economic activities in 1969 was accompanied by a moderate improvement in trade relations. Soviet exports to Iraq in 1969 totaled 60.9 million rubles, with the Soviet share in Iraq's imports in 1969 and 1970 amounting to around 10 percent annually. During these years, the Soviet Union was the second-largest exporter to Iraq, preceded only by Britain, traditionally the largest exporter to Iraq, whose share in Iraq's imports in the same period was 12 percent.172 The share of the USSR and East European countries altogether in Iraq's imports in 1969 was 17.4 percent.173 In these years, the Soviet Union exported to Iraq mainly industrial produce comprising different kinds of machines, whereas Iraq's exports to the Soviets were small, consisting principally of agricultural produce, especially dates.174 All in all, Soviet economic aid to Iraq in 1969-1971 was directed primarily to the profitable oil sector and, unlike Moscow's aid to its major allies—Egypt and Syria— did not include wide-scale projects in the sphere of electricity and irrigation. From March 31 to April 11, 1971, a prominent Soviet economic delegation, headed by Ivan Arkhipov, first deputy chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, paid a visit to Iraq, resulting in a comprehensive economic agreement between Moscow and Baghdad.175 It seems that the visit and the agreement harbingered a Soviet desire to improve political relations with Iraq,176 prompted by develop-

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ments in Soviet-Egyptian ties. Although there were no conspicuous difficulties in the Soviet-Egyptian relationship from Nasser's death in September 1970 to May 1971, at the beginning of 1971 there were certain indications that Moscow resented Sadat's policy of de-Nasserization and his readiness to weaken ties with the Soviets in return for US pressure on Israel to withdraw from Sinai.177 Early that year, a Soviet periodical specializing in the Third World published a series of articles on Iraq,178 in itself a rare occurrence because it had literally ignored Iraq for a long time. The articles dealt mainly with nonpolitical themes, such as culture, but also included a few signs of a favorable Soviet attitude toward the Iraqi regime. For example, Tariq 'Aziz was quoted as telling a visiting delegation of Soviet scholars that the editorial staff oial-Thawra needed "serious material on problems such as the solution of the national question in the Soviet Union, the ideological struggle in the process of building socialism, and the international movement for unity of democratic and revolutionary forces."179 Presumably, the Soviet Union's growing interest in Iraq, along with its increased economic aid to Baghdad, marked an incipient shift in Soviet Middle Eastern policy: a move toward strengthening links with Iraq to offset a possible decline in the Soviet-Egyptian relationship. * *

*

During the first three years of Ba'th rule, Soviet-Iraqi relations developed slowly, despite Iraq's efforts to establish close ties with the Soviet Union, both because of its need for Soviet weapons in the conflicts with the Kurds and Iran and because of a certain ideological affinity between the Ba'th and Moscow. The intensity of Iraq's efforts to promote relations with the Soviets was related to the degree of severity of its disputes with the Kurds and Iran. Hence, the March agreement of 1970, which coincided with a relative relaxation of tension with Iran, tempered Iraq's attempts to expand links with the Soviet Union. Although Moscow supplied arms to Iraq to maintain its military power vis-à-vis Iran, its response to the Ba'th's initiatives to upgrade political ties was reserved. Senior members of the Iraqi leadership visited the Soviet Union, but neither a high-level nor even a mid-level Soviet delegation visited Iraq. Given the continued secondary importance of Iraq in Soviet Middle Eastern strategy, Moscow's precondition for fostering close relations with Baghdad was the latter's accommodation not merely of its external politics to Soviet interests, but of its internal politics as well. Accordingly, the persecutions against the ICP, especially from the fall of 1970 to the spring of 1971, cooled Moscow's attitude toward Baghdad. On balance, however, we have seen how even in this period the Soviets still sought to maintain their ties with Iraq, and by the beginning of 1971, following the incipient difficulties between Moscow and Sadat, first signs

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of an improvement in the Soviet policy toward Iraq had already emerged.

Notes 1. The five-member RCC also included two Ba'thists from the military: Sa'dun Ghaidan and Hammad Shihab. 2. Saddam Hussein, like other central figures of the Ba'th regime—including all the members of the RCC except 'Ammash—was from the town of Tikrit. In order to dilute the impression that the power in Baghdad was concentrated in the hands of people from this town, from 1969 both Saddam Hussein and Hardan Tikriti omitted their surname Tikriti, which indicated the name of their birthplace and not family relationship. (Other Iraqi surnames, such as al-Samarra'i and al-Hadithi, also denote a common birthplace and not necessarily kinship.) 3. Saddam Hussein was secretary of the Iraqi Ba'th from 1964 to 1968. However, from 1968 to November 1969 he held the relatively modest position of a member in the Regional [Iraqi] Command of the Ba'th. See Batatu, Old Social Classes, p. 1220. The pro-Iraqi Ba'th consisted of a Pan-Arab Command (or Leadership), ostensibly representing the whole Arab world, with Michel' Aflaq as its figurehead, and Regional Commands representing particular Arab countries. The Ba'th called its organizations at state level "regional" rather than after their respective countries (Iraqi, Jordanian, and so forth) in accordance with its ideology, which stressed the unity of the Arab world. The structure of the pro-Syrian Ba'th resembled the pro-Iraqi one, with its own Pan-Arab Command and Regional Commands. 4. I first came across Saddam Hussein's name in the Iraqi media in alThawra, April 4,1969. For the July 17 and 30 coups, see Batatu, Old Social Classes, pp. 1074-1077; and MER, 1968, pp. 518-523. 5. See, for example, Bakr's declarations in al-Jumhuriyya, August 4 and 11, 1968. For the release of political prisoners, see al-Jumhuriyya, August 5 and 7 and September 6 and 8,1968. 6. The supreme authority of the RCC was confirmed by articles 44 and 50 of Iraq's provisional constitution of September 22,1968. 7. On the Ba'th's assessment of the ICP's strength, see a Ba'thi pamphlet restricted to party members, quoted in al-Anwar (Beirut), November 27,1968. 8. This consideration was listed in the Ba'thi pamphlet, ibid. 9. Al-Akhbar (the mouthpiece of the Lebanese Communist party, Beirut), November 17, 1968, in Rabochii klass i sovremennyi rnir 1 (January-February 1974), p. 139. 10. See, for example, a joint statement by the ICP and the Arab Socialist Movement in al-Akhbar (Beirut), February 16,1969, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Part 5, Middle East and North Africa (hereafter DR), February 24,1969. On the Arab Socialist movement, see note 11 below. 11. These parties comprised a Nasserite group called the Arab Socialist movement and personalities with liberal-left inclinations in the National Democratic party (which had a liberal tendency). 12. Al-Thawra, January 29,1969. Similar articles appear in al-Jumhuriyya, August 15 and 16,1968; and al-Thawra, November 17,1968. 13. On the shooting incidents, see the ICP statement in L'Humanite (organ of the French Communist party), December 14,1968IDR, December 19,1968; and excerpts from this statement in al-Thawra, November 25,1968.

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Moscow and the Ba'th Regime, July 1968-May 1971

14. Al-Thawra, November 25,1968. 15. Tariq 'Aziz, al-Thawra, January 9,1969; al-Thawra, January 4,8,18, and 25, 1969; R. Baghdad, February 4, 1969IDR, February 5, 1969. See also the resolutions of the Seventh Regional [Iraqi] Congress of the Ba'th in R. Baghdad, February 6,1969IDR, February 7,1969. 16. Pravda, July 18,1968. 17. Pravda, August 1 and 2,1968. 18. Pravda, September 18,1969. 19. NV3Í (August 2,1968), p. 26; G. Mirskii, NV 33 (August 6,1968), pp. 12-13; E. Primakov, Pravda, August 12,1968. 20. Trud (mouthpiece of the Soviet trade unions) and Sovetskaiia Rossiia (then a paper of the Central Committee of the CPSU), December 3,1968. 21. See notes 13 and 20 above. 22. Al-Jumhuriyya, August 4,1968. For the "statement" of June 1966, see the Introduction to this volume, p. 11. 23. On the faction of Jalal Talbani, see the Introduction, p. 11. For the developments in the Kurdish area, see Edmund Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question in Iraq (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1981), p. 76; MER, 1968, p. 529; MER, 1969-1970, pp. 730-731. 24. E. Primakov, Pravda, September 1, 9, and 20 and October 3, 1968. Primakov served as Pravda's special correspondent to Iraq from 1968 to 1970. Subsequently he was promoted to senior positions in the Soviet academic establishment, including director of the Institute for Oriental Studies in Moscow at the end of the 1970s; General-Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev nominated Primakov as his adviser on Middle Eastern affairs in the mid-1980s. 25. Pravda, September 1 and 9,1968. 26. Pravda, October 3,1968. 27. Pravda, September 9 and October 3,1968. 28. Pravda, October 3,1968. 29. Pravda, September 20,1968. 30. Al-Anwar (Beirut), April 4,1969. 31. Al-Jumhuriyya, August 23,1968. 32. R. Baghdad, August 21,1968IDR, August 22,1968. 33. Al-Jumhuriyya, August 28 and September 2, 24, and 25,1968. 34. Pravda, August 25 and 30,1968. 35. MER, 1968, pp. 19-20. 36. Al-Jumhuriyya, August 7,1968. 37. The policy of "strengthening friendly relations with all the socialist states and peoples" was adopted at the Seventh Regional [Iraqi] Congress of the Ba'th. See R. Baghdad, February 6,1969IDR, February 7,1969. For Baghdad's evaluation of the Soviet mode of socialism, see, for example, al-Thawra, December 15, 1968; for the Ba'th's affinity with Socialist modes in the Third World (North Korea, North Vietnam, China, and Cuba), see al-Thawra, November 17 and December 9,1968; and al-Thawra, January 5,1969. 38. For Iraqi references to the Soviet-Sino dispute, see, for example, alThawra, May 6 and September 17,1969. 39. In the mid-1960s, following the Cultural Revolution, Chinese ambassadors were recalled from most Arab states (except the UAR), including Iraq; the Chinese ambassador did not return to Baghdad until December 1970. On Chinese relations with Arab states, see Yitzhak Schichor, The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy 1949-1977 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 131,145-147. On the return of the Chinese ambassador to Baghdad, see Baghdad Observer, December 22,1970.

Moscow and the Ba'th Regime, July 1968-May

1971

49

40. On the Franco-Iraqi military relationship, see the Introduction, note 51; for Bakr's intent to acquire Mirage airplanes, see Baghdad Observer, August 16, 1968. In June 1969, Iraqi Chief of Staff Hammad Shihab visited France; see R. Baghdad, June 3,1969IDR, June 5,1969. 41. On French arms transfers to Iraq, see MER, 1969-1970, p. 496; ARR, 1970, p. 36; Military Balance, 1968-1976. 42. See Bakr's statement in al-Jumhuriyya, August 7,1968. 43. For Baghdad's desire to obtain Soviet understanding for its policy toward the ICP, see p. 20 above. 44. On the Ba'th delegation's visit to the Soviet Union, see Pravda, September 23 and 24 and October 1,3, and 4,1968; al-Jumhuriyya, September 24 and 27, 1968; MER, 1968, p. 46. 45. Military Balance, 1968-1969, p. 43; Military Balance, 1969-1970, p. 34. 46. A. Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Policy Toward Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 76,83, and 95. 47. On Hardan Tikriti's visit to Iran in December 1968 and Iraq-Iran talks on the Shatt-al-Arab in the winter of 1969, see al-Thawra, December 8 and 10, 1968; Kayhan International, December 9,1968IDR, December 18,1968; R. Baghdad, February 1,1969IDR, February 6,1969; R. Tehran, February 13, 1969IDR, February 19,1969. 48. Reuters, March 8,1969, in ARR, 1969, p. 96; R. Tehran, April 19,1969IDR, April 21,1969; Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question, p. 84. 49. This account is taken from an Iranian allegation, which was never denied by Iraq. See R. Tehran, April 19,1969IDR, April 21,1969. 50. Ibid. 51.Ibid. 52. See Iraq's official statement in al-Jumhuriyya, April 21,1969. 53. See, for example, al-Thawra, May 5,12, and 27,1969. 54. On Shaikhli's visit, see Pravda, March 21-26,1969. 55. Pravda, March 27,1969; al-Jumhuriyya, March 27,1969. 56. Al-Thawra, April 3,1969. It should be noted that Iraq had no need to fear that West Germany would apply the Hallstein doctrine against it in the event of granting recognition to East Germany because Iraq had already broken off diplomatic relations with West Germany in 1965 following the establishment of diplomatic ties between the latter and Israel. 57. The joint communiqué in al-Thawra, May 11,1969. Emphasis added. 58. Ulbricht's visit to Moscow from March 24 to 27,1969, coincided partially with Shaikhli's visit to the Soviet capital, whereas Winzer visited Moscow on April 18, before leaving for Iraq in May 1969. See Pravda, March 25-28 and April, 19, 1969. It is also significant that on August 18,1969, Pravda published an article by Winzer on his country's foreign policy. 59. On Winzer's unsuccessful efforts to secure such recognition from the U A R and Syria in January-February 1969, see Reuters, February 8, 1969IDR, February 11,1969. 60. Al-Thawra, May 16,1969. 61. R. Baghdad, May 17,1969IDR, May 19,1969. 62. Izvestiia, May 5,1969. 63. Pravda, April, 24,1969. 64. Pravda, May 4,1969 (also reproduced prominently in al-Thawra, May 9, 1969). 65. See, for example, Gromyko's speech in Pravda, July 11,1969. 66. In 1969, the populations of Iraq and Iran numbered 8.7 million and 27.5 million, respectively; in 1975, the year the conflict terminated, the figures rose to

50

Moscow and the Ba'th Regime, July 1968-May

1971

11 million and 33.2 million, respectively. 67. On Hardan Tikriti, see p. 19 above. 68. The Iranian minister in charge of economics was ' Alinaqi ' Alikhani, who had served in the Iranian government since 1958. 69. Pravda, May 29 and 30 and June 4,1969. 70. Pravda, March 27,1969. Emphasis added. 71. For example, although the Soviet-Iraqi friendship treaty of April 1972 included an article on military cooperation (article 9), after its conclusion Kosygin stated that the treaty foresaw "close cooperation between the two sides in the political, economic, cultural and other fields," omitting an explicit reference to the military sphere. (For Kosygin's speech, see Pravda, April 10, 1972 [emphasis added].) Similarly, Podgornyi maintained that the treaty constituted a new stage in the Soviet-Iraqi relationship in the "political, economic... and other [fields]," avoiding a clear mention of the military one. (See Pravda, September 15,1972 [emphasis added].) 72. On the differences between Brezhnev and Kosygin in relation to foreign and internal politics, see P. J. Murphy, Brezhnev (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland and Company, 1981), pp. 251, 263, and 271; S. I. Ploss, "Politics in the Kremlin," Problems of Communism 3 (May-June 1970), pp. 7-8. 73. The ambassador was Vasilii F. Nikolaev. For his biography, see Appendix 3. For the contacts in Baghdad, see al-Jumhuriyya, April, 22,1969; al-Thawra, April 25,1969; and R. Baghdad, April 26,1969/Di?, April, 29,1969. 74. Al-Jumhuriyya, April 28,1969. 75. Pravda, May 27-June 4,1969; al-Thawra, May 25-June 2,1969. 76. Khadduri, Socialist Iraq, p. 144; MER, 1969-1970, p. 437. 77. On 'Ammash's visit, see Pravda, June 25-30 and July 2-6,1969. 78. The tension surfaced when, on January 21, 1970, Baghdad charged Tehran—apparently not without basis—with complicity in a coup attempt against the Iraqi regime. 79. Pravda, March 28,1970. 80. For details, see pp. 33-34 below. 81. Pravda, August 13,1970; al-Jumhuriyya, August 13,1970. 82. A similar passage about the need to comply with international treaties was included in a number of communiqués between Iraq and foreign states in the first half of the 1970s. See, for example, an Iraqi-Hungarian communiqué in al-Thawra, August 23, 1971; an Iraqi-French communiqué, following Saddam Hussein's visit to France, in al-Thawra, June 20, 1972; and an Iraqi-Spanish communiqué, following Saddam Hussein's visit to Spain, in al-Thawra, December 13,1974. 83. Shanshal was included in the delegation, headed by Saddam Hussein that visited Moscow in August 1970. See Pravda, August 13,1970; and al-Jumhuriyya, August 13,1970. 84. On Shihab's visit to the Soviet Union in September-October 1970, see Iraqi News Agency {INA), September 14,1910/DR, September 15,1970; Baghdad Observer, October 17 and 22,1970; and Krasnaia zvezda, October 14,1970. Shihab had already visited the Soviet Union in his previous capacity as chief of staff in November-December 1969. On this visit, see Pravda, November 29 and 30 and December 9 and 10,1969. 85. According to a Western intelligence source, in the period from the summer of 1969 to the summer of 1971 the number of Soviet-made T-54/55 tanks in the Iraqi army increased from 300 to 800, the number of SU-7 fighter-bombers from 20 to 50, and the number of MiG-21 interceptors from 60 to 85. See Military Balance, 1969-1970, p. 34; Military Balance, 1970-1971, p. 40; and Military

Moscow and the Ba'th Regime, July 1968-May 1971

51

Balance, 1971-1972, pp. 28-29. 86. On the Soviet military presence in the Indian Ocean, see, for example, M. MccGwire (ed.), Soviet Naval Developments (New York: Praeger, 1973), pp. 391-398. 87. On Soviet navy calls at Umm Qasr, see, for example, al-Jumhuriyya, May 30,1970; R. Baghdad, January 5, 191VDR, January 6,1971; and G. Jukes, "The Indian Ocean in Soviet Naval Policy," Adelphi Papers 87 (May 1972), pp. 16-17, 22,25-26. 88. The British dependencies in the Gulf comprised ten principalities: Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and seven shaikhdoms of the Trucial Oman, the most important of them being Abu Dhabi, Dubay, and Sharja. 89. After its independence in November 1967, South Yemen was named the People's Republic of South Yemen, and from November 1970 it was called the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) (hereafter South Yemen). 90. See, for example, Pravda, July 10 and 29,1970. 91. On Iran's policy in the Gulf, see Rouhollah K. Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941-1973 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1975), pp. 410411. 92. On the Soviet attitude toward the projected federation, see, for example, L. Medvedko, Pravda, July 17, 1968; G. Drambiants, Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn' (hereafter MZ) 9 (September 1970), pp. 93-99; and L. Medvedko, Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia (hereafter MEMO) 12 (December 1970), pp. 75-78. 93. L. Medvedko, MEMO 12 (December 1970), p. 78. 94. G. Drambiants, MZ 9 (September 1970), p. 98. 95. Besides Saddam Hussein, among the newly appointed members of the RCC were Taha al-Jazrawi (since 1976, Taha Yasin Ramadan), 'Abd-al-Karim al-Shaikhli, 'Izzat al-Duri (since 1976, 'Izzat Ibrahim), Murtada al-Hadithi (since around 1971, Murtada Sa'd 'Abd-al-Baqi), and 'Abd-al-Khaliq al-Samarra'i. With the ten new members, the membership of the RCC now numbered fifteen. See note 1 above. 96. On December 28,1969, the post of deputy prime minister was abolished, with Hardan Tikriti and 'Ammash becoming vice-presidents (still outranked by Sadam Hussein). On April 3,1970, they were replaced in their capacities as defense minister and minister of the interior by Hammad Shihab and Sa'dun Ghaidan, respectively, while retaining the vice-presidency. Shihab and Ghaidan were considered personal friends of Bakr. See Khadduri, Socialist Iraq, p. 59 and also note 1 above. 97. For the text of the manifesto, see R. Baghdad, March 11, 1910/BBC, March 13,1970. 98. E. Primakov, Pravda, September 21,1969. 99. Al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya in Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question, pp. 83-84. 100. New York Times, April 26,1970, p. 9. 101. E. Primakov, Pravda, September 21,1969; Pravda, January 29,1970. 102. Pravda, March 23 and April 5,1970; Izvestiia, March 21,1970. 103. MEN A, March 14,191Q/DR, March 16,1970. 104. Pravda, April 5,1970. 105. Pravda, March 18,1970. Brezhnev did not send a congratulatory note to Bakr, if only because there were no party links between the CPSU and the Ba'th. 106. For Soviet appreciation of the March accord, see, for example, Pravda, March 13 and 14,1970; and Izvestiia, March 21,1970. 107. Pravda, January 29,1970. 108. Pravda, March 14,1970.

52

Mosccrw and the Ba'th Regime, July 1968-May

1971

109. Al-Thawra, April 24, May 6 and 11, and June 17,1969. 110. For Baghdad's intensified hostility to the DPK, see, for example,al-Jumhuriyya, April 4,1969 and Bakr in R. Baghdad, May 17,19691DR, May 19,1969. 111. Al-Thawra, September 2,1969. 112. Al-Jumhuriyya, April 14,1970. For additional Ba'th efforts to win Soviet recognition as a "progressive" party, see al-Thawra, May 6,9, and 25 and October 28,1969; and Pravda, November 29,1969. 113. E. Primakov, Pravda, September 18,1969. For additional Soviet positive appraisals of the Ba'th regime, see Pravda, August 18,1969; Pravda, January 19, 1970; and V. Rumiantsev, Kommunist 16 (November 1969), p. 100. 114. Because of diplomatic considerations, these demands appeared in Soviet sources indirectly. See, for example, Pravda, April 5, June 11 and 14, and September 18,1969; R. A. Ul'ianovskii, Narody Azii i Afriki (hereafter NAA) 4 (1969), p. 10; and PMS 8 (August 1969), p. 89. 115. See the ICP's statements in the Lebanese Communist press al-Nida', April 5 and May 30,1910/DR, April 17 and June 4,1970; and al-Akhbar, July 12, 1970/DR, July 21,1970. 116. Saddam Hussein in al-Jumhuriyya, May 13,1970; Bakr in al-Jumhuriyya, July 21,1970. 117. See, for example, a commentary by R. Baghdad on April 21,1970 (DR, April 22,1970), marking the centennial of Lenin's birthday; a speech on the same occasion in Moscow by 'Izzat Mustafa, member of the RCC, in Pravda, April 25, 1970; and quotations of favorable Soviet comments on certain aspects of the Ba'th policy in al-Jumhuriyya, July 14 and 16,1970. 118. Sovetskaia Rossiia, April 4,1970; Trud, April 17,1970; 'Aziz Muhammad, Pravda, April 26,1970. 119. World Marxist Review 8 (August 1970), p. 47. 120. Pravda, April 20,1970. On this occasion the Ba'th was represented by 'Izzat Mustafa, whereas the ICP was represented by 'Aziz Muhammad. See notes 117 and 118 above. 121. Al-Jumhuriyya, July 28,1970. 122. Besides Saddam Hussein, other key figures in the Iraqi delegation were Shaikhli and 'Abd-al-Khaliq al-Samarra'i. On these persons, see note 95 above. For the list of participants in Moscow talks, see the joint communiqué in al-Jumhuriyya, August 13,1970; and Pravda, August 13,1970. 123. Pravda, August 12,1970; and al-Jumhuriyya, August 12,1970. 124. For Mazurov's speech, see Pravda, August 6, 1970 (cross reference, al-Jumhuriyya, August 6,1970). 125. For Saddam Hussein's speech, see al-Jumhuriyya, August 6,1970 (cross reference, Pravda, August 6,1970). 126. An editorial in al-Jumhuriyya, August 14, 1970, even misquoted this sentence in the communiqué by inserting the adjective "progressive" before the word "achievements." 127. For the Ba'th's willingness to establish relations with the CPSU, see Saddam Hussein's speech in Moscow (note 125 above); and the headlines in al-Jumhuriyya, August 7 and 8,1970. Many years later, Saddam Hussein revealed the difficulties he had confronted during his 1970 visit to Moscow, some of them related to the issue of the ICP, in an interview in IN A, January 2,1983/DR, January 4,1983. 128. On the persecutions, see al-Akhbar (Beirut), December 13,1970IDR, December 21,1970; al-Akhbar (Beirut), February 28,1971IDR, March 4,1971; and L'Humanité, June 15,1911/DR, June 16,1971. 129. Ara Khachadur, member of the Central Committee of the ICP, PMS 4

Moscow and the Ba'th Regime, July 1968-May 1971

53

(April 1971), pp. 83-84. 130. Pravda, May 7,1971. For additional references to the persecutions in the Soviet media, see, for example, Pravda, September 26,1970; Pravda, April 9,1971 ('Aziz Muhammad's speech at the Twenty-fourth Congress of the CPSU); and note 131 below. 131. For indications on Moscow's activities through diplomatic channels, see Pravda, November 11, 1970; Sovetskaia Rossiia, February 11, 1971; and Trud, February 11,1971. 132. XXIVs"ezd KPSS, Stenograficheskii otchet [The 24th Congress of the CPSU. A Stenographic Report] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1971), pp. 4 1 ^ 2 . 133. Al-Thawra, March 21,1971. 134. Al-Thawra, March 7,1971. 135. AlifBa' in al-Thawra, March 11,1911IDR, March 23,1971. 136. Foreign Trade (Moscow) 6 (1972), p. 57. 137. Al-Thawra, March 29,1971. On the arrival of the delegation in Moscow, see al-Thawra, March 30,1971; and Izvestiia, March 30,1971. 138. The Twenty-fourth Congress was attended by representatives of the ruling parties of the following Arab states: the UAR, Syria, South Yemen, and the Sudan. See XXIV s"ezd KPSS, pp. 10-11. Yet, although the speeches at the Congress made by the representatives of the Arab Socialist Union (Egypt), the Syrian Ba'th, the DPK, and the ICP were published in the Soviet press, neither Soviet nor Iraqi sources contain any reference to the speech of the Iraqi delegation, which suggests that this delegation was not allowed to deliver a speech. 139. On al-Samarra'i, see Pravda, September 18,1969; and Pravda, April 5, 1970. On 'Aziz, see Pravda, June 22,1969; and Aziia i Afrika segodnia (hereafter AAS) 8 (August 1969), p. 4. 140. Pravda, September 18,1969; Izvestiia, May 21,1970. 141. Pravda, March 29,1971. 142. See, for example, R. Baghdad, July 9,1910/DR, July 10,1970. 143. Al-Iumhuriyya, July 8,1970. 144. Pravda, July 30,1970. 145. On the arrival of the DPK delegation in Moscow, see Izvestiia, March 30,1971. 146. For 'Abd-al-Rahman's speech, see Pravda, April 11,1971. 147. Pravda, April 9,1971. For the ICP's stand on the Kurdish issue, see its statement in al-Akhbar (Beirut), December 13,1970/Di?, December 21,1970. 148. Pravda, March 11,1971. 149. On Soviet peace proposals, see, for example, Pravda, October 13,1968; D. Podvoiskii, NV5 (January 31,1969), pp. 13-14; and A. Tryasunov, International Affairs (Moscow) 3 (1969), pp. 55-56. 150. See, for example, Bakr's statements in Baghdad Observer, October 1, 1968; and al-Jumhuriyya, August 8,1968. 151. For a rare Soviet criticism of Iraq's rejection of Security Council Resolution 242, see E. Primakov, Pravda, September 18,1969. 152. For favorable Soviet comments on Iraq's stand on the Arab-Israeli conflict, see, for example, Pravda, November 30,1969; and Pravda, January 27 and April 24,1970. 153. Izvestiia, May 27,1970. 154. Al-Thawra, November 25,1968. For another implicit criticism, see Tariq 'Aziz, al-Thawra, January 23,1969. 155. Pravda, January 11,1969 (cross reference, al-Thawra, January 12,1969). An additional example is in Pravda, December 3, 1968 (cross reference, alThawra, December 4,1968).

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Moscow and the Ba'th Regime, July 1968-May

1971

156. See, for example, al-Jumhuriyya, August 21, 1968; and al-Thawra, January 1 and 6 and September 3 and 9,1969. 157. Al-Thawra, September 2,1969. 158. Pravda, March 27,1969; al-Jumhuriyya, March 27,1969. 159. Pravda, August 1,1970. 160. On Soviet mediation efforts, see Nida' al-Watan (Beirut), August 26, 1970, in MER, 1969-1970, p. 637. 161. Pravda, August 13,1970; al-Jumhuriyya, August 13,1970. 162. Al-Thawra, August 20,1970. 163. For indications, in Soviet sources, of Moscow's efforts to prevent the Syrian and Iraqi intervention, see Pravda, September 19,20,24, and 27,1970. See also Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1979), pp. 599,600,606,614,616,617,629, and 930. 164. This is contrary to a later allegation by an Iraqi diplomat who attributed Iraq's inactivity in September 1970 to Soviet pressure (see al-Hawadith, Beirut, August 27,1971, in MER, 1969-1970, p. 858). This was probably an attempt to exonerate Iraq's disgraceful conduct (from the point of view of radical-nationalistic Arab circles) during the events of September 1970. 165. Note that on February 15,1971, Egypt expressed readiness, to a special UN envoy, to sign a peace agreement with Israel in return for an Israeli withdrawal to the June 4,1967, borders. 166. Saddam Hussein, al-Thawra, March 21,1971. See also Bakr's statement opposing the federation in al-Thawra, April 12,1971. 167. A note of reservation in the Soviet position on the federation can be discerned, for example, in Kosygin's speech in honor of Asad, in which, unlike Asad, he refrained from making an explicit reference to the planned federation (see Pravda, February 2,1971). The joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of Asad's visit also contained no mention of the federation. (However, an agreement in principle to form a federation had already been reached in November 1970.) 168. See Appendix 1, Table 1. The figures are approximate. 169. Pravda, July 5 and 6, 1969; and al-Thawra, July 7, 1969. The Iraqi delegation to the talks in Moscow included Sa'dun Hammadi, director of the Iraqi National Oil Company. Semen Skachkov, chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, participated on the Soviet side. 170. G. S. Shakhbazian, Gosudarstvennyi sektor v ekonomike Iraka [The State Sector in Iraq's Economy] (Moscow: Nauka, 1974), p. 224. 171. On Soviet-Iraqi nuclear cooperation in the Qasim era, see MER, 1960, p. 73; and MER, 1961, p. 297. In the Ba'th era, see Izvestiia, May 1, 1969; and al-Thawra, May 25,1969. 172. See Appendix 1, Table 2; and Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopedia (hereafter BSE), Ezhegodnik, 1971, p. 275; BSE, Ezhegodnik, 1972, p. 275. 173. Abbas Alnasrawi, "The Changing Pattern of Iraq's Foreign Trade," Middle East Journal 4 (Autumn 1971), pp. 488-489. 174. An. Matiushin, AAS 3 (March 1970), p. 28. 175. Al-Thawra, April 9, 1971; A. Dvornikov, Sotsialisticheskaia industriia, August 18,1971. 176. Besides having talks with Iraqi economic officials, Arkhipov conferred with senior Iraqi statesmen, among them Shaikhli and 'Ammash. See al-Thawra, April, 4,1971; and R. Baghdad, April 3 and 6, \91UDR, April 5 and 7,1971. 177. Podgornyi's speech in honor of Sadat in Pravda, January 16,1971; Iu. Glukhov, Pravda, March 20,1971; R. Petrov, Agitator 3 (February 1971), p. 61. On Soviet suspicions of Sadat's pro-US orientation since he succeeded Nasser, see A. N. Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985),

Moscow and the Ba'th Regime, July 1968-May 1971

55

pp. 171-172. 178. AAS 3 (March 1971), pp. 16-33. The periodical was "authorized for printing" on February 18,1971. 179. Vladimir Li, AAS 3 (March 1971), pp. 32-33.

2 The Intensified Conflict with Iran and the Peak of the Soviet-Iraqi Relationship, May 1971-July 1973

Cracks in the Soviet-Egyptian Relationship in May 1971 and Novikov's Visit to Iraq in June On May 2, 1971, Sadat dismissed Vice President 'Ali Sabri, who was believed to be close to the Soviets, and proceeded to oust others in the Egyptian leadership associated with Moscow. At the same time, from May 4 to 6, US Secretary of State William Rogers paid a visit to Cairo to promote an Egyptian-Israeli interim accord. The USSR viewed this visit as part of the US effort to exclude the Soviets from participating in a political solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and to undermine Moscow's relations with Cairo.1 In May and June, Iraq demonstrated that it shared the Soviet view of the recent moves by the UAR. Thus, as part of Baghdad's propaganda campaign against Rogers' trip to the Middle East, al-Thawra reported that the Soviet ambassador to the United Nations, during the Four Powers talks on the Arab-Israeli dispute, had attacked Rogers' visit as a one-sided US action.2 Also, the Ba'th ideologists argued that, unlike Nasserism, which "always strove to maintain some balance in its relations between the imperialist and the socialist camp"—not to mention the prevailing group of Nasser's successors associated with "imperialism"—"the [Iraqi] revolution rejected determinedly the policy of balancing international relations" and supported stronger links with the "socialist" states.3 The Iraqis were evidently striving to discredit Egypt under Sadat in Soviet eyes, while emphasizing Iraq's loyalty, so that the Soviets would be willing to adopt Baghdad as their main ally in the Arab East. This goal corresponded to Baghdad's desire to replace Cairo as the center of revolutionary inspiration in the Arab world as well.4 Nonetheless, the Soviet Union endeavored to preserve its links with Egypt as the pivot of Soviet Middle Eastern policy, a trend exemplified by the conclusion of the friendship treaty with Cairo on May 27,1971. 5 57

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The Intensified

Conflict with Iran, May 1971-July

1973

Egypt was the first state in the Third World in general and in the Arab world in particular with whom the Soviet Union signed such a treaty. Moscow evidently hoped this would bolster its troubled relations with Egypt, while demonstrating outwardly the continuity and even strengthening of these relations. Yet (as noted in Chapter 1), even before May, in the wake of the incipient difficulties with the UAR, the USSR had moved toward improving relations with Iraq to offset a possible deterioration in the Soviet position in Egypt. It was only natural, then, that the further difficulties in Moscow's ties with Cairo in May would prompt Moscow to improve relations with Baghdad. From June 16 to 24, 1971, a Soviet party-government delegation headed by Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Novikov visited Iraq. Even though Novikov by no means occupied a senior position in the Soviet hierarchy (at this time the Soviet prime minister had seven deputies and two first deputies, and Novikov was a member of the Central Committee and not the Politburo), the delegation he led was the most senior (and the first party) delegation of the Soviet Union to visit Iraq since the Ba'th assumed power in 1968. Novikov was received by Bakr and Saddam Hussein; the Iraqi side at the talks with the Soviet delegation was led by 'Ammash, whose formal position ostensibly paralleled that of Novikov.6 In the joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of Novikov's trip, "the two sides expressed their interest in strengthening relations between the CPSU and the Ba'th Party of Iraq." 7 This intention was made more concrete when, for the first time, a Ba'th delegation of party workers left for the Soviet Union on June 20 to learn about the activities of the CPSU.8 Novikov's trip symbolized a qualitative change in Soviet economic aid to Iraq. Specifically, the protocol for economic cooperation signed during the visit provided for Soviet assistance in excavating a 40-km-long canal from the Tharthar Lake to the Euphrates for both irrigation and draining purposes.9 Thus, for the first time, Moscow undertook to carry out a huge hydro project for Baghdad. It also deserves notice that Soviet exports to Iraq increased by about 70 percent in 1971 compared with 1970, reaching 99.1 million rubles. The Soviet Union became the largest exporter to Iraq, with its share in Iraqi imports amounting to 12 percent.10 The quality of Soviet exports to Iraq was upgraded as well to include such industrial produce as heavy-duty mechanical equipment, ships, and airplanes.11 On the Arab-Israeli conflict, the joint communiqué at the conclusion of Novikov's visit stated that there would be no peace in the Middle East "without liberating all the Arab lands occupied as a result of the Israeli aggression, and without securing the legitimate rights . . . of the Arab people of Palestine."12 The communiqué also described the "Palestine resistance movement" (i.e., the PLO) as part and parcel of the Arab national liberation movement. Thus, as in the Soviet-Iraqi statement of March 1969, no specific reference was made to the year 1967 in connection

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with the "occupied lands," enabling Iraq to include in this term the territories "occupied" in 1948. The new components in the Soviet-Iraqi communiqué of June 1971 that had not appeared in the previous communiqué of March 1969—namely, the support for "the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine" and the recognition of the "Palestine resistance movement" as a national liberation movement—reflected increased Soviet backing, discernible since the second half of 1969, for the Palestinian factor.13 Iraq's consent to issue a joint formula with the Soviet Union on the Arab-Israeli dispute, unlike in August 1970, stemmed from Baghdad's growing desire to develop ties with Moscow and capitalize on the difficulties in Soviet-Egyptian relations. In addition, in June 1971 Moscow came closer to Baghdad's criticism of Egyptian appeals to the United States related to the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is noteworthy that similar versions of the formula on the Arab-Israeli dispute in the June 1971 communiqué reappeared in the major Soviet-Iraqi statements released at the beginning of the 1970s.14 The improvement in Soviet-Iraqi relations in June was somewhat furthered by the events of July 1971 in the Sudan. On July 19,1971, the regime of Ja'far al-Numayri was toppled by army officers sympathetic to the Sudanese Communist party. On that same day, Iraq was the first state to recognize the new regime in Khartum—and the only one to do so. Iraq's aim was twofold: to extricate itself from its isolation in the Arab world and to advance relations with the USSR. The Soviet Union, for its part, adopted a favorable, although cautious attitude toward the coup,15 reluctant to avoid imperiling ties with Egypt. The latter, which maintained close relations with the Numayri regime, had rejected a Soviet request to recognize the new government in Khartum 16 and even abetted Numayri's return to power only three days after the coup. Moscow's prevailing interest in preserving the relationship with Cairo accounted for only a modest Soviet coverage of Iraq's support for the short-lived July 19 government.17 Yet, it can be assumed that Soviet frustration over Sadat's behavior regarding the events in the Sudan drew Moscow closer to Baghdad.

The Case of Three Islands in the Gulf (June-December 1971) Regarding the Gulf, the joint Soviet-Iraqi communiqué at the end of Novikov's visit in June stated: "The two sides expressed their complete support for the struggle of the Arab peoples in the region of the Persian[Arab18] Gulf, for their right to determine their own destiny by themselves and for their struggle against colonialism, for the liquidation of the

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imperialist rule and all the foreign military bases."19 The last phrase was directed against the political rule and military presence of Britain. However, support for the struggle of the Arab peoples "to determine their own destiny" and against "colonialism" was, from Iraq's perspective, directed against Iran, and was probably introduced on Baghdad's initiative, for this clause appeared also in joint statements of Iraq with other countries.20 For Iraq, which considered itself the guardian of Arab interests in the Gulf, the clause hinted at Baghdad's opposition to Iranian "expansionism" in the Gulf, which was taking place in two ways. One way—immigration and settlement of Persians in the Gulf principalities—was described by Iraq as a colonialist phenomenon, posing a threat to the Arabism of the Gulf similar to the Zionist colonization of Palestine.21 The second way—Iran's territorial claims vis-à-vis the shaikhdoms—was depicted by Iraq as an infringement upon the right of the Arabs to determine their destiny.22 In May 1970, Iran had conveyed to Britain its claim on three small, strategically important islands at the entrance of the Gulf in the Strait of Hormuz: the Greater and Lesser Tunb, belonging to the emirate of Ras al-Khayma; and Abu Musa, belonging to the emirate of Sharja. Both emirates were British dependencies to be included in the Federation of Arab Emirates, which was to be established after Britain's final withdrawal from the Gulf on December 1, 1971. As this date approached, Iran resumed its claims on the three islands in the summer of 1971, coupled with threats to use force, if negotiations with Britain regarding the islands failed.23 Iraq's isolation in the Arab world in the face of Iran's threat induced Baghdad to seek a rapprochement with Arab states, including Egypt,24 at the beginning of November. Also, on November 1, Bakr declared that the confrontation against Israel and the protection of Arabism of the Gulf required augmenting ties "with the international forces, supporting Arab rights, especially the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China."25 Indeed, as well as strengthening relations with the Soviet Union, Iraq had been striving to foster ties with China.26 However, since 1971 and throughout the decade, China had clearly regarded the Soviet Union rather than the United States as its archenemy. Accordingly, in the Third World arena, Beijing attributed greater importance to developing relations with rather pro-Western states, among them Iran. Moreover, China preferred Iran to Iraq out of strategic considerations as well, as a country with a larger territory and population, bordering on the Soviet Union.27 As tension with Iran over the three islands increased, Iraq intensified its military contacts with the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc in the fall of 1971, with Hammad Shihab visiting the Soviet Union, Hungary, and Bulgaria, and the commander of the Iraqi air force visiting Moscow.28 Despite these contacts, no substantial arms shipments from the East-

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ern bloc to Iraq in the second half of 1971 were reported.29 It seems that in order to preclude any delay in British withdrawal, the Soviets were anxious to forestall an escalation in tension between Baghdad and Tehran. Indeed, the Soviet media almost ignored this subject. At the beginning of November, Pravda confined itself to a single factual sentence: "Left unresolved is the question to whose possession the three important strategic islands in the Strait of Hormuz will be transferred, after 'England's withdrawal'—to Iran or to the projected federation." 30 On November 30,1971, Iranian forces captured the three islands in the Strait of Hormuz. On December 1, Iraq broke off diplomatic relations with Iran, as well as with Britain, charging it with conniving with Iran. In the meantime tension on the Iraq-Iran border escalated. The attitude of the Arab states to Iran's seizure of the three islands diverged along the lines already manifested during the Shatt-al-Arab dispute. Arab radical and anti-Western states—South Yemen, Syria, Libya, and Algeria— resolutely condemned the occupation of the islands, demanding an Iranian withdrawal. However Egypt, apprehensive that the growing tension in the Gulf might overshadow the Arab-Israeli dispute, appealed for moderation: it called upon Iran to withdraw from the islands and to enter into negotiations to attain a just and peaceful settlement. Saudi Arabia, as a conservative and pro-Western state, did not directly urge an Iranian pullout, but indicated its dissatisfaction with the occupation of the islands. Because Baghdad's relations with Cairo were still somewhat marred by previous tension, and its ties with the radical Arab states were not close and with Syria were even tense, the exacerbating conflict with Iran prompted Iraq to seek the support of foreign powers. On November 30, Murtada Sa'd 'Abd-al-Baqi, 31 member of the RCC and foreign minister (having replaced Shaikhli on October 30, 1971 32 ), met with the ambassadors of the Soviet Union, China, and France in Baghdad to inform them of the Iranian "aggression" and to urge these states, in accordance with their international commitments, to request Iran to withdraw from the islands.33 This appeal reflected the Iraqi desire to boost relations with these three powers, particularly with the superpower, the Soviet Union, especially as Iraq's efforts vis-à-vis France and China remained inconclusive.34 Iraq's endeavor to upgrade relations with the Soviet Union following the rekindling of the conflict with Iran was expressed during Soviet Defense Minister Andrei Grechko's visit to Iraq from December 14 to 22, 1971. On December 17, al-Thawra published an article subtitled: "On the occasion of the visit by the Defense Minister of the friendly Soviet Union to our country." The article maintained that the conquest of the three islands by Iran required raising the Iraqi-Soviet relationship to the level of a "strategic alliance." This was the first time Baghdad had made such

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a proposal, which indicated Iraq's desire to conclude a treaty with the USSR. However, the Soviet position on Iran's capture of the three islands differed from that of Iraq. On December 1, Pravda reported merely Tehran's version, according to which "the Iranian forces have landed on the three islands—Abu Musa, the Greater and the Lesser Tunb . . . in accordance with the consent of the Arab principalities of the Persian Gulf Ras al-Khayma and Sharja." This Iranian version was incomplete and distorted, for only the ruler of the Sharja, under Iranian pressure, had agreed to transfer Abu Musa, the island in his possession, to Tehran. On December 2, Pravda reproduced the Iraqi version on the severance of diplomatic relations with Iran and Britain, in the wake of the "occupation of the Arab islands," yet adding: "As [Iran's prime minister had] stated yesterday," the "landing" had taken place "in accordance with the consent" of Ras al-Khayma and Sharja. Apparently, just as the Soviet Union preferred Iranian to British influence in the Gulf as the lesser evil, so, from the Soviet perspective, there was nothing wrong with the islands coming into the possession of Iran rather than the federation of the emirates, which was suspected of being a British tool. Nonetheless, in keeping with the general Soviet policy of establishing relations with existing regimes, once the federation came into being Moscow recognized it and expressed willingness to establish diplomatic ties.35 Contrary to Pravda's pro-Iranian inclination on December 1 and 2, on December 3 the paper cited solely the negative reactions of Arab states to Iran's seizure of the islands, with Egypt's attitude figuring prominently,36 probably as an indication of Moscow's closeness to Cairo's stand, which emphasized the need to settle the dispute through negotiations. It seems that it was only after the Soviet Union realized the extent of opposition to the Iranian move in the Arab world, including Moscow's main client state Egypt and other important clients such as Syria, that it balanced its predilection for Iran with a pro-Arab tendency. Iraq's intensified conflict with Iran, in the wake of the latter's capture of the three islands, coincided with the India-Pakistan war from December 3 to 18, 1971. Throughout this war—resulting in the secession of East Pakistan and the establishment of Bangladesh—the Soviet Union supported its ally India both militarily and politically. India was bound to the Soviet Union by the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation of August 9,1971, whereas Pakistan was backed by the United States and China. Since the India-Pakistan war, and at least partially paralleling the US buildup in the Indian Ocean during and after this war, an increase in Soviet military interests in the Indian Ocean was discernible.37 The Soviet effort to secure an access to port facilities for its navy in the region of the Indian Ocean was indicated in the announcement in the

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first half of December that in the second half of the month Grechko would visit Iraq and Somalia.38 As we have seen, Grechko visited Iraq 39 from December 14 to 22 and, in addition to holding talks with Hammad Shihab, he met with Bakr and Saddam Hussein.40 The gap between the Soviet and Iraqi attitudes regarding Iran and the Gulf was revealed by the absence of reference to these issues in the joint communiqué at the conclusion of the visit. Yet, the communiqué noted that "the two sides reached an assent to promote the development of military cooperation and to exchange military delegations."41 The phrase "to promote... military cooperation" had not appeared in previous Soviet-Iraqi joint statements issued since the assumption of power by the Ba'th in 1968.42 Its appearance can therefore be seen as an upgrading, at least in principle, of the military relationship, presumably because, on the one hand, Iraq's need for Soviet weapons had grown following the escalated tension with Iran, and, on the other hand, the India-Pakistan war had augmented the Soviet Union's desire to extend the navy's access to Umm Qasr and made Moscow willing to increase its arms deliveries to Iraq in return. Although the communiqué released at the end of Grechko's visit to Iraq omitted any reference to the India-Pakistan war, the Soviet and Iraqi attitudes toward India had some common ground. When hostilities between India and Pakistan broke out, Iraq—despite its traditional friendship with the Muslim Pakistan, and contrary to most Arab countries, which sided with Pakistan against India—cautiously avoided taking sides, expressing readiness to assist in bringing an end to the conflict.43 Irrespective of the Soviet stand on the India-Pakistan dispute, Iraq had its own reason for maintaining amicable relations with India: during the war between India and Pakistan, the Indian press, as quoted by al-Thawra, condemned Iran's conquest of the three islands and praised Iraq's position on this issue.44 India, for its part, was interested in fostering relations with Iraq because of the latter's hostility to Iran, an ally of Pakistan within the framework of CENTO.

Saddam Hussein's Visit to the Soviet Union in February 1972: Toward a Friendship Treaty At the invitation of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet government, an Iraqi party-government delegation led by Saddam Hussein visited the Soviet Union from February 10 to 17,1972. 45 Contrary to Saddam Hussein's previous visit to the Soviet Union in August 1970, when a first deputy prime minister had headed the Soviet delegation to the talks with Hussein, in February 1972 it was Kosygin who headed the Soviet

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delegation, 46 thus reflecting Baghdad's growing importance in Soviet policy. Kosygin was actually the second in command in the Soviet Union, so his status ostensibly paralleled that of Saddam Hussein's in Iraq. In his public speech, Kosygin addressed Saddam Hussein as "friend," but this designation was revised to "comrade" by Pravda,47 a term usually reserved for Communist leaders, both Soviet and foreign. Similarly, when Kosygin visited Iraq in April 1972, his designation of B a k r was also changed by Pravda—and this time by Izvestiia as well—from "friend" to "comrade." 4 8 (These corrections hinted at continuing differences between the cautious school of thought of Kosygin, compared with that of Brezhnev, regarding relations with Iraq during the Iraq-Iran dispute. T h e fact that Izvestiia had also made this amendment indicated that Brezhnev's position was strengthening). 4 ' These corrections were the last public signs of differences between Kosygin and Brezhnev on evolving ties with Iraq. In any event, from 1972, Saddam Hussein and B a k r were included in the category of non-Communist Third World leaders to whom the Soviets usually referred as "comrade." 5 0 For their part, Saddam Hussein in Moscow, and B a k r during Kosygin's visit to Iraq in April 1972, addressed Kosygin in their speeches as "comrade." 5 1 It is interesting that just as the Soviet media referred to a member of the Kremlin leadership as "comrade," Baghdad's media bestowed the same title upon members of the Iraqi leadership. In his speech in honor of Kosygin, Saddam Hussein alleged that "plots" were being hatched against Iraq by U S and British "imperialist circles" and that "the Iranian reaction has committed some provocations on our borders, and a l s o . . . [has occupied] three Arab islands in the Gulf. . . . In view of this dangerous situation... there is a growing feeling within our people about the need for a serious and speedy action to raise . . . the relationship between our two countries Iraq and the Soviet Union to the degree of a firm strategic alliance." This part of his speech reflected his personal initiative to conclude a treaty with the Soviet Union, as a result of the perceived threat from Iran. 52 The request to upgrade the relationship with the Soviet Union to the level of a "strategic alliance" was the main purpose of Saddam Hussein's trip to Moscow, 53 and he repeated this request at his talks with Podgornyi on February 14, 54 and probably also at his meeting with Brezhnev on February 15. 55 This was the first audience of a Ba'th official with Brezhnev. The Soviet media, however, continued to reflect the U S S R ' s neutral stand on the issue of the three islands and Moscow's desire to maintain friendly relations with Tehran by deleting all of Saddam Hussein's hostile references to Iran in their reports of his speech. Likewise, Kosygin's speech in honor of Saddam Hussein made no mention of the Iraq-Iran dispute in general and the problem of the three islands in particular. 56 In contrast to Saddam Hussein's call to raise the Iraqi-Soviet relationship to

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the level of a "strategic alliance," Kosygin promised in general terms that "the visit of the I r a q i . . . delegation would serve the strengthening of the Soviet-Iraqi all-round cooperation." The Soviet media also, as a rule, omitted mention of Saddam Hussein's requests to elevate the ties with Moscow to the degree of a "strategic alliance." 57 The formula on the Gulf in the joint Soviet-Iraqi communiqué at the close of Saddam Hussein's visit resembled the one used in the Soviet-Iraqi statement at the conclusion of Novikov's visit to Iraq in June 1971,58 except for an addition stating that both sides condemned "the machinations and conspiracies of imperialism [Soviet version] in this region" ("the imperialist expansionism and its conspiracies [Iraqi version] in this region.") 59 The addition was most likely introduced at Iraq's insistence, with "imperialist expansionism" alluding to the conquest of the three islands by Iran, "the agent of imperialism." In addition, an implicit reference to the Shatt-al-Arab dispute resembled the one made in the communiqué at the end of Saddam Hussein's trip to the Soviet Union in August 197060 and Novikov's visit to Iraq in June 1971.61 In short, Saddam Hussein failed to bring about a change in the basically neutral Soviet stand regarding the dispute with Iran over the islands and the Shatt-al-Arab. An evenhanded position on this conflict was also adopted by the East European states, including East Germany, which did not reiterate its support for Iraq's sovereignty over the Shatt-al-Arab. The joint communiqué of February 1972 did, however, contain a most important statement on the bilateral relationship: "The two sides agreed . . . to study what supplementary measures can be taken within the nearest time, in order . . . to raise . . . [their relations] to a new and still higher level, and shape them in a form of a treaty." This suggested that the two countries had agreed in principle to conclude a treaty. Because it was Saddam Hussein who advocated a "speedy" action to elevate the Iraqi-Soviet relationship to the level of a "strategic alliance," whereas the Soviet side adopted a rather lukewarm attitude on this issue, Moscow tried to obscure its consent to a treaty with Baghdad with vague formulations. It seems that the main reason for Soviet ambiguity was the very same reason for Iraq's urgency—the exacerbating tension with Iran. The Soviet Union was apprehensive that if the Iraq-Iran conflict intensified, it would be treaty-bound to provide massive assistance to Iraq, and thus would drive Iran to consolidate its military relationship with the United States. The Soviets therefore confined themselves to a vague commitment to a treaty that would enable them to delay its implementation to a time when the tension between Iraq and Iran subsided. Yet, they also wanted to keep the option for a treaty with Iraq open to compensate themselves for the continuing erosion of their influence in Egypt and to extend the use of

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Umm Qasr. All in all, the implicit agreement to sign a treaty achieved during Saddam Hussein's visit symbolized a major boost in the SovietIraqi relationship.

Moscow Recognizes the "Progressiveness" of the Ba'th Regime and the Charter for National Action (Summer-Fall 1971) The increased Soviet interest in developing ties with Iraq was also reflected in Moscow's enhanced ideological attitude toward Baghdad. As we have seen, during Novikov's visit to Iraq in June 1971, the CPSU agreed to establish party links with the Iraqi Ba'th. 6 2 Also, in the joint communiqué at the end of this visit—contrary to the one issued at the conclusion of Saddam Hussein's visit to the Soviet Union in August 1970—the Soviet Union recognized the "progressiveness" of the socioeconomic transformations taking place in Iraq and, although not yet explicitly, the leading role of the Ba'th party in Iraq. 63 Yet, an unbridgeable gap remained between the USSR and Iraq on the issue of the ICP. Although the Ba'th reduced its pressure on the Communists in order to facilitate a rapprochement with the Soviets, Moscow insisted on a complete halt to the harassments and the incorporation of the ICP into the government.65 In July 1971, a further improvement in the Soviet attitude to the Iraqi Ba'th could be detected. At the end of the 1960s, Moscow had described the Ba'th party, which had assumed power in Iraq in 1968, as belonging to the "right wing" of the Ba'th, 66 and hence inferior to the "left-wing" Ba'th ruling Syria. From July 1971, however, Soviet sources began to depict the political changes of 1968 in Iraq as the coming to power of the "progressive" or "left wing" of the Ba'th. 67 This revision in historiography corresponded to an attempt by Moscow to balance its somewhat preferential attitude to the Syrian Ba'th with a favorable evaluation of the Iraqi Ba'th as well. Accordingly, a periodical of the CPSU claimed that "in the last years two centers of leadership of the Ba'th have been created—in Damascus and Baghdad." 68 Furthermore, a Pravda article of July 1971 recognized for the first time the aspiration of the Iraqi Ba'th to build "socialism," arguing that this party, "espouses, in the future, rebuilding society on a socialist basis." 69 The Pravda article of July 1971 that marked a shift in the Soviet ideological assessment of the Iraqi Ba'th also contained the following critical comment on the Iraqi regime: "Within strata of the army which have influence [in the Ba'th party], vestiges of anti-communism can still be discerned." 70 This criticism hinted at Soviet preference for the civilians within the Ba'th leadership for two main reasons: First, prominent civilians in the Ba'th leadership of 1971, foremost among them Saddam Hussein, had not occupied important positions during the large-scale

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persecution of the ICP in 1963, whereas the eminent members of the leadership from the military, namely Bakr and 'Ammash, had held most senior posts in 1963. 71 And second, during the first years of the Ba'th second rule, the attitude of the civilians within the Ba'th regarding the Kurdish issue and cooperation with the ICP was more convenient to the Soviets than that of the military.72 'Ammash in particular seems to have adhered to his tough stand on these two issues.73 Soviet coolness toward Bakr was indicated when Novikov, during his visit to Iraq in June 1971, delivered an invitation to Bakr to visit the Soviet Union on behalf of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Soviet government, but not the Central Committee of the CSPU, even though Bakr was secretary general of the Iraqi Ba'th, which had party relations with the CPSU. 74 By contrast, in July 1970, even before the establishment of party links between the CPSU and the Ba'th, Saddam Hussein, as deputy secretary general of the Iraqi Ba'th, had been invited to visit the Soviet Union on behalf of the Central Committee of the CPSU. He visited Moscow again in February 1972, at the invitation of the Central Committee, whereas that body did not lend its name to the invitation to visit the Soviet Union that Kosygin conveyed to Bakr during his trip to Iraq in April 1972. 75 Moscow's reserved attitude toward 'Ammash was revealed during Novikov's visit to Iraq, when 'Ammash was absent from the talks between the Ba'th and the CPSU that began on June 20,1971, 7 6 even though he headed the Iraqi delegation at the governmental talks with the Soviet delegation led by Novikov, who continued to head the Soviet delegation at the party talks as well. Bagdhad's desire to satisfy Moscow may even have played a small part in the ouster of 'Ammash from the Iraqi leadership on September 28,1971, although this move was primarily the result of Saddam Hussein's increasing strength, already manifested in the dismissal of his other rival, Hardan Tikriti, on October 15,1970. 7 7 However, the appointment of 'Ammash, on October 13, 1971, to the secondary (although still important) post of ambassador to the U S S R reflected the limits of Saddam Hussein's power.78 Significantly, despite 'Ammash's harsh attitude toward the local Communists, it seems that he too advocated extending ties with the Soviet Union. 79 On November 15,1971, the Iraqi regime published the Charter for National Action—a long programmatic document reflecting Ba'th ideology on foreign and domestic affairs.80 In an implicit appeal to the ICP, the charter contained some references to the Ba'th's willingness to enable other political forces to work and to cooperate with these forces. 81 However, the charter left no doubt that the power in the state was to be retained by the RCC, 8 2 whose membership, as mentioned above, was restricted to the Ba'th party. Also, according to the charter, the control over the army was to be exercised solely by the Ba'th, 83 with Saddam Hussein warning that "any secret or overt [non-Ba'thi] organization inside the armed forces

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will be considered a tool for plotting." 84 In short, as from the outset of the Ba'th rule, the Communists were requested to approve the ideological goals of the Ba'th in the shape of the charter, in return for a limited freedom of party activities, a few ministers in the government, and representation in the trade unions and public organizations. Nonetheless, the very publication of the charter indicated that the regime was again willing to conduct negotiations with the Communists on establishing a front, especially as the charter was proposed not as a final product but as a blueprint to be discussed by "all the patriotic and progressive forces." 85 Moreover, to gain the ICP's backing for the charter, the persecution of Communists waned. The timing of the charter—with the date of the British withdrawal from the Gulf on December 1 approaching—indicated its intention to rally the "progressive" parties against Iran. It should be noted that the ICP, which was not constrained by Soviet state considerations and apparently with Moscow's approval, supported Baghdad's stand on the three islands and the Shatt-al-Arab. 86 Last, but not least, it seems that the promulgation of the charter with the concomitant improvement of relations with the Communists was aimed at creating an atmosphere conducive to upgrading ties with the Soviet Union, if tension with Iran was exacerbated. Soviet reactions to the charter were outwardly favorable. Nonetheless, by arguing that the charter envisaged the formation of a "national coalition with the participation of all the national and progressive forces," the U S S R intimated its interest in the real participation of the Communists in power.87 In addition, Soviet sources quoted 'Aziz Muhammad as saying that cooperation between the Communists and the Ba'th should be implemented "while preserving our organizational and ideological independence [vis-à-vis the Ba'th] and our legitimate right to work as a political party." 88 Undoubtedly, the demand to secure the organizational, political, and ideological independence of the ICP was the basic Soviet condition for the establishment of the front. The positive Soviet reaction to the charter, even though the charter still expressed the Ba'th's continued monopoly on power, reflected the increased Soviet interest in establishing a front between the ICP and the Ba'th, in order to remove an obstacle to improving Soviet-Iraqi relations following the decline in Soviet-Egyptian relations. However, Soviet state interests, which induced the U S S R to moderate its stand on the formation of the front, could not have the same impact on the ICP's position. Indeed, although the ICP welcomed the charter in principle, it also insisted on its independence vis-à-vis the B a ' t h and pressed for " a permanent democratic constitution" and constitutional institutions.89 From the end of 1971, there were even indications of Soviet pressure on the ICP to temper its conditions regarding the front because of the mounting importance the Soviets ascribed to the formation of the front. For example, a

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Soviet article of December 1971 that criticized the Ba'th's position also argued that raising demands not corresponding to the real situation could only delay the formation of the front.90

An Attempt on Barzani's Life and the Kurdish Question in the Charter In the summer and fall of 1971, the U S S R continued to display a friendly attitude to the DPK, attributing to this party support for the establishment of a front with Communist participation.91 There were hints of particular approval for Salih Yusefi, a member of the Politburo of the DPK and minister of state, and also deputy chairman of the Iraqi-Soviet Friendship Society, who belonged to the left wing of his party.92 At the same time, Moscow maintained its sympathy for Barzani, especially after an attempt on his life on September 29,1971. Although the Iraqi regime was quick to condemn the assassination attempt,93 it was probably engineered by the security services94 and reflected the tension between the Ba'th and the DPK. Following the attempt on Barzani's life, a senior Pravda correspondent visited the Kurdish area, where he met with Barzani and published a feature article on the Kurdish question.95 The article did not try to play down the tension created by the assassination attempt. It is reasonable to assume that at least as long as the front was not established the Soviets had a stake in controlled tension between Baghdad and the Kurds, both to draw the Kurds closer to the ICP, and primarily to weaken the Ba'th's bargaining position vis-à-vis the Communists on forming the front. The November charter, which contained articles implicitly denouncing the Kurds' connections with Iran,96 reflected this deterioration in relations between the Ba'th and the DPK and can be seen as marking a shift in Baghdad's policy toward the DPK. Whereas since the March manifesto of 1970 the Ba'th had preferred to cooperate with the DPK rather than the ICP, the charter in certain respects represented a return to Baghdad's policy of the spring of 1969. Specifically, while preparing for the contingency of waging war against the Kurds, the Ba'th demonstrated a renewed openness to come to terms with the Communists, in order to induce them, as well as the Soviets, to withdraw their support from the Kurds. The Soviet Union found no advantage in siding with the Iraqi regime against the Kurds because of the differences between it and the Ba'th regarding the formation of the front, even after the publication of the charter. The Soviets therefore maintained their evenhanded approach, coupled with a basic interest in gaining true autonomy for the Kurds.97 The ICP, out of similar considerations, adopted a neutral position with an inclination toward the Kurds.98

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Following the escalation of the dispute between Iraq and Iran in December 1971, Tehran showed greater willingness to extend military aid to the Iraqi Kurds. It can be assumed that the Kurdish factor—in addition to Iraq's apprehension of a direct confrontation with Iran—played an important role in Baghdad's initiative to conclude a treaty with the Soviet Union. By signing a treaty with the USSR, Iraq strove to diminish Iran's military intervention on behalf of the Iraqi Kurds, as well as to obtain the means for a military option against the Kurds.

The Friendship Treaty of April 1972 From April 6 to 10,1972, Iraq was visited by a Soviet party-government delegation headed by Kosygin," the highest-ranking Soviet official ever to travel to Iraq.100 Kosygin was received by Bakr, and Saddam Hussein headed the Iraqi side at the bilateral talks.101 On April 9, Kosygin and Bakr signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Iraq. Interestingly, during this period it was Soviet President Podgornyi who, as a rule, signed treaties of friendship and cooperation, whereas Kosygin did not sign any such treaties, except for the one with Iraq.102 In the latter case as well, it was Podgornyi who, strictly on grounds of protocol, was the most suitable Soviet figure to sign the treaty.103 Kosygin, however, had a better knowledge than Podgornyi of Iraq in general and the questions related to the Soviet-Iraqi treaty in particular because he had met with most senior Iraqi officials who had visited the Soviet Union since the outset of the Ba'th rule in 1968,104 and he headed the Soviet delegation that had conducted the talks with Saddam Hussein on a treaty in February 1972. Podgornyi, in contrast, had little contact with Iraqi leaders105 but was in charge of fostering ties with Iran, probably because his position, in accordance with diplomatic protocol, paralleled that of the Shah. It was Podgornyi who visited Iran in March 1970; took part, with the Shah, in the inauguration of a pipeline for transporting Iranian natural gas to the Soviet Union in October 1970; and participated in the ceremonies marking the twenty-five hundredth anniversary of the establishment of the Persian Empire, which were held in Iran in October 1971 (his participation provoked indirect criticism from Iraq106). Thus, from both the Soviet and the Iraqi standpoints, Podgornyi was not the appropriate person to sign a treaty with Baghdad. From the Soviet perspective, the treaty with Iraq was part of the Soviet global policy of maintaining—in addition to its solid influence in Eastern Europe—some influence, embodied in treaties, with developing countries struggling against "imperialism" and for "social progress."107 In May 1971, the Soviet Union had concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Egypt, thus initiating a process of concluding similar pacts with other

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Afro-Asian states (a total of twelve by the end of the Brezhnev era).108 Iraq was the second Arab state, after Egypt, with whom the Soviet Union signed such treaties of friendship and cooperation. The first article of the Soviet-Iraqi treaty spoke of the "unbreakable friendship"109 between Moscow and Baghdad. This was undoubtedly a Soviet formulation; the term "unbreakable friendship" appeared in Soviet treaties with East European as well as Arab countries and implied that the state concluding a treaty would be unable to release itself from Moscow's "friendship." However, the first article also referred to respect for sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs—Soviet formulae designed to emphasize that the Soviet-Iraqi treaty, like other treaties between the USSR and developing countries, was essentially different from a treaty between an imperialist power and a client state. Specifically, the aim was to dilute the association with the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930, concluded for twenty-five years, and the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1948 (never ratified by Iraq), concluded for twenty years—two treaties the national circles of Iraq regarded as subservient. Therefore, in response to an Iraqi request, the Soviet-Iraqi treaty, like the one with Egypt,110 was concluded for only fifteen years, instead of the standard period of twenty years the Soviet Union usually stipulated with a developing country. Yet, like the treaties concluded for the standard period of twenty years, the Soviet-Iraqi treaty could be automatically extended for subsequent periods of five years.111 However the Soviet treaties with Arab states such as Iraq and Egypt differed substantially from Britain's treaties of 1930 with Iraq and of 1936 with Egypt, which were still characterized by elements of classic colonialism, because violation, or even one-sided abrogation of the Soviet treaty (as in Egypt's case in 1976), did not entail the threat of Soviet military action against that state. Iraq concluded the treaty in order to secure Soviet aid in advancing its own interests in different spheres, one of them being oil. From the beginning of February 1972, the talks between Iraq, headed by Murtada Sa'd 'Abd-al-Baqi, and foreign oil companies had been deadlocked, with Iraq demanding, inter alia, a 20 percent share in the capital of the companies and an increase in oil production. During his trip to the Soviet Union in February, Saddam Hussein asked for Soviet political and economic backing of Iraq against the oil companies.112 The importance of oil in Soviet-Iraqi relations was emphasized by Kosygin's attendance at the inauguration of the oilfields in North Rumaila on April 7,1972—which the Soviets had been developing since 1969113—and the participation of ministers of oil and economics in the Soviet-Iraqi talks in April.114 At the former event, Kosygin solemnly declared that the Soviet Union was standing "completely by the side of Arab states waging a struggle to ensure that their natural resources, first and foremost oil, belong to their genuine owners—the peoples of these countries."115 Notwithstanding Kosygin's

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support in principle for nationalization of oil companies, it is reasonable to assume that Moscow did not urge Bahgdad to nationalize the oil companies, because it did not possess the means to ensure a successful takeover of the companies economically—that is, to provide tankers for transporting the nationalized oil and to find markets for it—if the world oil cartel imposed a boycott on the nationalized oil.116 Indeed, Kosygin's declaration did not contain concrete promises of economic assistance. The articles in the Soviet-Iraqi treaty regarding oil and economic aid were also worded in general terms and resembled articles in treaties between the Soviet Union and other Arab states.117 Nonetheless, shortly after the conclusion of the Soviet-Iraqi treaty, Iraq presented on May 17,1972, a "final ultimatum" to the oil companies, and on June 1 it nationalized the Iraq Petroleum Company.118 It can therefore be inferred that the very fact of Soviet commitment in principle to support Iraq politically and economically in its conflict with oil companies contributed to Baghdad's decision to take control of the oil. The Palestinian problem, regarded by Ba'th ideology as the central issue of the Arab nation, provided a significant ideological motive for Iraq's conclusion of a treaty with the Soviet Union as a country supporting the Palestinian cause. The preamble of the Soviet-Iraqi treaty stated that the two countries were inspired by the ideals of "struggle against imperialism, colonialism, Zionism and reaction." In addition, article 4 of the treaty asserted that the two parties would "continue to wage a steadfast struggle against imperialism and Zionism." Given the absence of the struggle against Zionism in the Soviet-Egyptian treaty, although this treaty contained an article on the Arab-Israeli conflict, it can be concluded that this phrase was introduced on Baghdad's initiative.119 Kosygin maintained in his speech at the ceremony of signing the treaty that the Soviet Union was deeply convinced that the treaty accorded with "the interests of cooperation... of the Soviet Union and Iraq with other Arab states."120 He evidently desired to stress to Cairo and Damascus Moscow's continued interest in furthering relations with them, despite the treaty with Iraq. Notably Syria, which had not been responsive to Soviet requests to conclude a treaty since the beginning of 1972, ignored Kosygin's visit to Iraq as well as the Soviet-Iraqi treaty.121 Egypt, however, seemed to have had a stake in an enhanced Soviet-Iraqi military relationship,122 which could enable Iraq to play a more effective role in a war against Israel—a war Egypt was seriously planning. The Soviet Union, for its part, while emphasizing the need 10 solve the Arab-Israeli conflict by political means, worked to strengthen the military capacity of the Arab states in order to increase the pressure on Israel to consent to the kind of political solution favored by Moscow. This explains the portrayal of the Soviet-Iraqi treaty in some of Moscow's commentaries as designed to strengthen the position of the Arab countries struggling against "Israel's aggression."123

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It was probably no coincidence that Kosygin's visit to Iraq coincided with a visit by ' Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il, the statesman closest to Moscow in the South Yemen leadership.124 It can be assumed that Kosygin tried to draw Baghdad nearer to Aden, in order to extricate South Yemen from its regional isolation as well as to encourage Iraq to extend military assistance to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf (PFLOAG). 125 However, in the first half of the 1970s, Iraq was engaged in subversive activities against the conservative regimes of the principalities with the purpose of establishing pro-Ba'thi, non-Marxist, regimes. Moreover, Iraq preferred to develop relations with the existing regimes of the Gulf states, in order to rally them under its leadership against Iran. Consequently, at the beginning of the 1970s, Iraq's military aid to the Marxist PFLOAG was tiny, and its relations with Aden were not particularly close.126 Iran was Iraq's archenemy in the Gulf and remained so, and hence an important consideration in concluding the treaty with the Soviets was Iraq's desire to augment its military position vis-à-vis Tehran in the Gulf. This Iraqi goal was shared by the Soviet Union, but to a lesser degree, for at the beginning of 1972 Moscow was still describing Tehran's policy in the Gulf in positive terms and commending Iran's opposition to the US presence in Bahrain.127 The differences between the Soviet Union and Iraq on the Gulf issue were not patched up during Kosygin's visit to Baghdad, and no reference to this subject was made in the joint communiqué.128 Iraq's continued dispute with Iran over the Shatt-al-Arab and the escalation of tension between the two countries on their common border since the end of 1971—accompanied by sporadic incidents in early 1972129—were the principal reason for Iraq's signing a treaty with the Soviet Union. Iraq was thus attempting to deter Iran from making any offensive move along the border and to bolster up the Iraqi stand on the Shatt-al-Arab dispute. Unlike Baghdad's ideological commitment to the Palestinian problem, which had never brought the Ba'th regime to request the Soviets to upgrade their relationship with Baghdad to a "strategic alliance," increased tension with Iran in December 1971 involved Iraq's vital interests and led to such an Iraqi request. Even the seizure of the three islands by Iran was of secondary importance to Iraq, compared with the dispute over its own territory and sovereignty. Similarly, the nationalization of foreign oil companies was a less important consideration for Iraq's concluding a treaty with the USSR than the conflict with Iran, because nationalization posed mainly economic problems, which required an economic agreement with Moscow rather than a political document in the form of a treaty. The major factor that impelled Iraq to a treaty with the Soviet Union—the conflict with a neighboring state—was indeed the one that induced most of the Third World states that had concluded treaties with the Soviet Union to take such a step: Egypt, for

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example, because of the dispute with Israel; India, in view of the conflict with Pakistan; and so forth. 130 Given Iraq's prime purpose of deterring Iran, article 8 of the treaty was of utmost importance. It stated: "In the event of the emergence of situations threatening peace of either Party or creating a threat to peace or violation of peace, the High Contracting Parties will contact each other without delay with the aim of coordinating their positions for removing the emerged threat or re-establishing peace." From the Soviet perspective, this was a rather standard article, and it appeared with slight variations in other Soviet treaties of friendship and cooperation. 131 The article did not oblige the two sides, in the case of a threat posed to either, to "take appropriate effective measures" 132 or to "cooperate" 133 in order to remove the danger, but rather to conduct urgent consultations. Yet, article 8 implied that if the two parties reached consent regarding the nature of the threat, joint action between them in the political, not necessarily the military, field to eliminate the threat was feasible. Another standard article in treaties of friendship and cooperation, included also in the Soviet-Iraqi treaty, was article 7, which asserted: "The High Contracting Parties will regularly consult each other at different levels on all important international issues concerning the interests of both states." 134 As a rule, this article was designed to adapt to Soviet interests the foreign policy of a country bound by a treaty to the Soviet Union by obligating the country to consult with Moscow on foreign affairs. In the instance of Iraq, the article imposed a duty on it to confer with the U S S R , inter alia, on the Iraq-Iran dispute, thus giving Moscow some control over Baghdad's policy on this issue. Article 9, on military cooperation between the Soviet Union and Iraq, was also a standard article of Soviet treaties of friendship and cooperation, maintaining: "The High Contracting Parties . . . will continue to develop cooperation in the subject of strengthening their defense capacity." 135 From Iraq's viewpoint, this article constituted a Soviet commitment in principle, embodied in a treaty, to supply weapons needed by Baghdad first and foremost in the context of its dispute with Tehran. However, in line with the general Soviet policy of preventing an escalation in the Iraq-Iran conflict, it was in no hurry to provide arms to Iraq. Kosygin's delegation did not include military officials, and no military officials participated on the Iraqi side. Nor did Kosygin make any explicit reference to military cooperation in his speech at the ceremony of signing the treaty. The joint communiqué spoke about "a mutual aspiration"—that is, not yet a concrete agreement—to augment the cooperation in the sphere of defense. Indeed, according to an authoritative Western source, a substantial increase in Soviet arms shipments to Iraq was discernible only from the second half of 1972. 136 The Soviet-Iraqi military cooperation guaranteed by the treaty

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seemed to have included, in return for the Soviet commitment to supply weapons to Iraq, Iraq's consent, either in the form of an understanding or a secret accord, to permit the Soviet navy to extend the use of Umm Qasr. 137 Symbolically, a squadron of Soviet warships called at this port on April 11, two days after the treaty was signed, and stayed until April 16. 138 Umm Qasr provided the Soviets with port facilities (for refueling, repairs, and so forth) for their navy in the Indian Ocean and was probably envisaged by Moscow as a counterweight to the limited US military presence in Bahrain and the British base on the Masira island in Oman. It should be stressed that it was precisely the increased Soviet military interest in Umm Qasr following the India-Pakistan war of December 1971, together with the Soviet aspiration to offset its weakened position in Egypt, that were Moscow's principal reasons for concluding the treaty with Baghdad. The Soviet media reported favorable comments in the Indian press on the Soviet-Iraqi treaty, 139 and Iraq published the positive reaction to the treaty of the Indian embassy in Baghdad. 140 Indeed, India favored the Soviet-Iraqi treaty as a move aimed at counterbalancing the US military presence in the Indian Ocean, enhanced after the India-Pakistan war, and at strengthening Iraq vis-à-vis Iran, an ally of Pakistan. Given their common anti-Iranian interest, India and Iraq—to Soviet satisfactionwere promoting relations in the political, economic, and military fields at the beginning of the 1970s.141 Also, to the satisfaction of the Soviet Union and India, Iraq was the first Arab country to recognize Bangladesh, on July 8,1972. 1 4 2 In order to soothe Iran and to emphasize the Soviet stake in preserving its vast relations with Tehran—notwithstanding the conclusion of the treaty with Iraq—Kosygin promised in his speech at the treaty-signing ceremony: "This treaty is neither directed against any third country, nor infringes upon the legitimate interests of any one. Rather, to our deep conviction, it meets the interests of a wide international cooperation." The assurance that the treaty with Iraq was not directed against third countries was repeated by Podgornyi143 and other members of the Soviet leadership, and was intended also to reassure Turkey. 144 It is noteworthy that the traditional friendly ties between Iraq and Turkey were maintained after Iraq's signing of the treaty with the Soviet Union as well, whereas the Soviet-Turkish relationship, like the Soviet-Iranian relationship, was characterized by a détente. Despite the Soviet assurances beamed to Iran and Turkey, it can be assumed that Moscow considered the treaty with the Baghdad and the concomitant option to upgrade the military cooperation with Iraq as countermeasures to the pro-Western alliances of Turkey ( C E N T O and N A T O ) and Iran (CENTO), and to the US military presence in both of them. Contrary to the Soviet Union, Iraq made no assurances that its treaty

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with Moscow was not directed against a third country, for from Baghdad's perspective the treaty was intended to strengthen its posture vis-à-vis Iran. Thus, after the conclusion of the treaty, the differences between the Soviet Union and Iraq on the central issue of Iran remained. In line with Bakr's diplomatic style, as opposed to Saddam Hussein's bluntness, and also to avoid marring the solemn occasion of signing the treaty, Kosygin and Bakr did not refer to the Iraq-Iran dispute in their speeches on this occasion. Nor was the Iraq-Iran conflict mentioned in the joint communiqué. Shortly after the conclusion of the Soviet-Iraqi treaty, in mid-April 1972, an incident took place in the central sector of the Iraq-Iran border, in the Khanaqin area, during which heavy weapons were employed. 145 Some Western correspondents estimated that Iran was responsible—at least for the escalation of this incident—with the aim of demonstrating its vigor to Iraq and testing the effectiveness of the treaty.146 Baghdad alleged that a senior commentator of Izvestiia, on a visit to Iraq at the time of the incident, "condemned the Iranian aggression."147 However, this alleged condemnation, and the incident itself, was not reported by the Soviet media, which thus indicated the Soviet uneasiness about the event and its own continued neutrality.

The Treaty and Iraq's Internal Affairs On April 8, 1972, Kosygin held talks at the Soviet embassy in Baghdad with an ICP delegation headed by 'Aziz Muhammad, and then with a senior DPK delegation, to discuss the formation of the front. 148 It seems that at these talks, conducted only a day before the conclusion of the Soviet-Iraqi treaty, Kosygin tried to emphasize continued Soviet solidarity and friendship not only with the ICP, but with the DPK as well. Evidence of this was the Soviet description of the atmosphere at Kosygin's talks with the DPK as "comradely," 149 even though it was a meeting with representatives of a non-Communist party. As mentioned above, the first article of the Soviet-Iraqi treaty asserted that cooperation between the Soviet Union and Iraq was based on "non-interference in each other's internal affairs."150 However, the second article of the treaty to a certain extent canceled the first article, for it stated that the USSR and Iraq "will maintain a close and comprehensive cooperation to ensure conditions for preserving and further developing the socio-economic gains of their peoples." This article appeared in other Soviet treaties of friendship and cooperation, 151 indicating that it was introduced on the Kremlin's initiative. It can be assumed that from the Soviet standpoint, this article was intended to legitimize Soviet interference not only in strictly socioeconomic affairs, such as ascribing priority to developing the state sector over the private sector, but also in other

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issues of Iraq, such as the establishment of the front. It can be assumed further that an internal policy that contravened Soviet norms for advancing socioeconomic gains, such as suppression of the ICP, would be interpreted by Moscow as a violation of the second article of the treaty. Kosygin quoted this article in his speech at the treaty-signing ceremony, manifesting the importance attached to it by the USSR. This article was also singled out by Ponomarev (an alternate member of the Politburo as of May 1972) at the debate on the ratification of the Soviet-Iraqi treaty in the Supreme Soviet in June 1972.152 Bakr's speech at the treaty-signing ceremony only hinted at the second article when he maintained that Soviet assistance "to the Arab countries and Iraq [was being viewed by Baghdad] as one of the basic factors . . . for precipitating [their] socioeconomic progress." 153 Nonetheless, one should bear in mind that Ba'th ideology on socioeconomic issues corresponded in principle to Moscow's guidelines to developing states on these matters. For example, the charter for National Action of 1971 affirmed that the state sector was the cornerstone of the national economy and asserted the aspiration of the Ba'th regime to establish government, collective, and cooperative farms,154 while collective farms, along the lines of Soviet kolkhozes, had been established by the regime, on a limited scale, since 1969. In keeping with the preponderance of sheer great power considerations in Soviet foreign policy, in the case of Iraq the Soviet Union regarded developing bilateral ties with this country, manifested in the conclusion of the treaty, as more important than pressuring Baghdad to modify its internal politics. That is to say, the USSR signed a treaty with Iraq, despite Baghdad's nonacceptance of the Soviet stand on forming the front and granting autonomy to the Kurds. The reaction of the Kurdish leader, Barzani, to the treaty was negative. In an interview with a Western newspaper, although not explicitly criticizing the Soviet Union, Barzani estimated that the large shipments of weapons to be delivered by that country to Iraq following the treaty would be employed not against Iran, but against the Kurds.155 In accordance with this unfavorable comment by Barzani, the DPK did not release any official reaction to the treaty. As already noted, the Kurdish factor—in addition to the Iranian one—had induced Iraq to sign a treaty with the Soviets.156 Nonetheless, the salient factor here was Iran's military might, and it is doubtful whether the strife with the Kurds would have driven Iraq to sign a treaty with the USSR if the Kurds had not received military assistance from Iran and if Iraq had not feared an increase in this aid following the worsening conflict with Iran since the end of 1971. Therefore, among Iraq's motives for aligning itself with the Soviet Union iivthe form of a treaty, the Iranian factor clearly outweighed the Kurdish one.

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Contrary to that of the DPK, the ICP's reaction to the Soviet-Iraqi treaty was favorable,157 if only because the loyalty of the Communists to Moscow left them no choice but to approve this move. Yet, among themselves, the Iraqi Communists might have been worried that Moscow's tightening of relations with Baghdad would lead to directing Soviet pressure regarding the formation of the front on the ICP rather than the Ba'th. Anyway, the conclusion of the treaty was followed by deliberations between Soviet delegations and members of the Iraqi leadership on the formation of the front,158 and a presidential decree of May 14,1972, on the appointment of two Communists to the government.159 The two were members of the Central Committee of the ICP: Mukarram Talbani, nominated as minister of irrigation, and 'Amir 'Abdallah, nominated as minister of state. A statement by the ICP on May 15,1972, as reproduced by Pravda, hinted at a connection between the agreement of the ICP to participate in the government and the signing of the Soviet-Iraqi treaty.160 Indeed, from the Soviet perspective, these appointments could be regarded as complementing the cooperation between Moscow and Baghdad embodied in the treaty, as they achieved some degree of cooperation between the Ba'th and the local political party closely associated with Moscow. From the Ba'th viewpoint, the incorporation of the Communists in the government corresponded to its general policy of providing the Communists with a symbolic share of power in order to remove a certain impediment to its relations with the Soviets. In addition, with this move the Iraqi regime sought to mobilize the widest support internally, and from the U S S R externally, in its crucial confrontation with the foreign oil companies.161 Three days after the incorporation of the Communist ministers, on May 17, the RCC presented the foreign oil companies with a "final ultimatum." The Nationalization of the IPC and Soviet Economic Assistance On June 1, 1972, Baghdad nationalized the IPC, whose production in 1971 reached 50.8 million tons of oil, or 62 percent of Iraq's total oil production in that year.162 At the end of May, and in an article published in Pravda on June 1—still before nationalization—Moscow was sympathetic to Baghdad's demands vis-à-vis the foreign oil companies, but avoided calling for their nationalization. 163 Hence, in continuation of Soviet policy on the eve of the treaty, Moscow did not urge Baghdad to nationalize the oil companies. Yet once the nationalization was carried out—given Moscow's interest in the success of this antiWestern move and in the impact it might have on other oil-producing countries to follow suit, and in keeping with the friendship treaty—the

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Soviets supported it. 164 Iraq's need for Soviet economic assistance following the nationalization was demonstrated when an Iraqi economic delegation arrived in Moscow on June 2. The delegation was headed by Murtada Sa'd 'Abd-al-Baqi, who met with Kosygin and senior Soviet economic officials. The joint communiqué at the conclusion of this visit noted that the talks on developing relations between the Soviet Union and Iraq in the wake of the nationalization of the IPC had been conducted in accordance with the Soviet-Iraqi treaty of friendship. 165 'Abd-al-Baqi's trip also resulted in the conclusion of a Soviet-Iraqi commercial and economic agreement, which included the sphere of oil, but its content was not released. 166 The main problems facing Iraq in the aftermath of nationalization— and hence presumably discussed during the Soviet-Iraqi talks in June and at further deliberations 167 —centered on the transportation and marketing of the nationalized oil, because the world oil cartel, which controlled a substantial part of the world's fleet of oil tankers, boycotted the nationalized Iraqi oil.168 From July, Soviet tankers started transporting Iraqi oil, transferred through a pipeline to the Syrian port of Banias, for marketing in East European states. However, as already noted, the Soviet capacity to assist Iraq in economic matters related to the nationalization of oil was limited,169 with Soviet oil imports from Iraq in 1972, the first year the Soviet Union imported Iraqi oil, amounting to only four million tons. 170 Further, contrary to Western oil companies and in line with the Soviet-Iraqi barter trade arrangements, Moscow did not pay for oil in hard currency. 171 In order to overcome the boycott, Iraq tried to drive a wedge among the oil companies comprising the IPC. T o this effect, from June 14 to 18,1972, Saddam Hussein paid his first visit to France, reaching a long-term accord for providing Iraqi oil to the French company affected by the nationalization.172 In view of the inability of the Soviets to deal with Iraq's oil problems singlehandedly, Moscow approved Baghdad's attempts to enlist French assistance in this field.173 Soviet economic aid and Iraq's new oil contracts with some countries in the West and the Third World compensated Baghdad only partially for the loss of oil revenues in the wake of nationalization. Consequently, it was reported that in September 1972, desiring to increase Soviet assistance, Iraq had applied for an observer status membership in the economic organization of the Soviet bloc, the Comecon. 174 Iraq's very application to the Comecon—an organization whose membership, as a rule, was confined to Warsaw Pact states and states with strong political and ideological allegiance to Moscow 175 —symbolized the close connection between the evolvement of the political and economic aspects of the Soviet-Iraqi relationship. Anyway, it is doubtful whether the Soviet Union was ready to assume additional economic and political responsibilities for Iraq

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by incorporating it in the Comecon, if only because during the 1970s only a few Third World countries, ruled by Marxist-Leninist parties, were granted either full membership or an observer status in the Comecon.176 On February 28, 1973, the question of compensating the IPC for nationalization was settled—an agreement welcomed by Moscow.177 The settlement of the dispute with the world oil cartel eased Iraq's economic situation, and from then on Iraq no longer sought observer status in the Comecon.178 Moreover, in view of the increase in world oil prices from the beginning of 1973, Iraq became dissatisfied with its barter arrangements with the Soviets and indicated that further agreements on oil would be made against hard currency.179

Iraq Benefits from Difficulties in Soviet-Egyptian Relations (Summer 1972-Spring 1973) On July 18, 1972, Sadat announced that his decision to terminate the service of Soviet "advisers" in Egypt—a decision already conveyed on July 8 by Sadat to the Soviet ambassador in Cairo—had been implemented on July 17. Thus the presence of most of the Soviet military personnel in Egypt, estimated at around twenty thousand, was put to an end. Probably it was not a mere coincidence that on the day after Sadat's announcement, Murtada Sa'd 'Abd-al-Baqi arrived in Moscow to exchange the documents of ratification of the Soviet-Iraqi treaty, and the exchange of documents between 'Abd-al-Baqi and Gromyko took place on July 20.180 By this symbolic ceremony, the Soviet Union tried to demonstrate that its position in the Middle East was still strong, notwithstanding the difficulties with Egypt.181 To forestall a further deterioration in relations with Egypt, the Soviet media tried to play down and even ignore the troubled state of Soviet-Egyptian ties, and only alluded to Cairo's moves to improve relations with the West by charging the "imperialists" with an attempt to sabotage Soviet-Egyptian friendship. The Soviet forbearance toward Egypt stemmed from the same considerations that had guided it since the emergence of difficulties in May 1971: because of Egypt's importance in the Arab world in general and in the context of the Arab-Israeli dispute in particular, it was essential for a power interested in maintaining its influence in the Arab world to preserve links with that country. A break with Cairo would mean the loss of the colossal Soviet investments in Egypt and a decline in Moscow's position in the Middle East at large. Therefore, even in the summer and fall of 1972, when Soviet-Egyptian relations were especially strained, Soviet publications still usually placed Egypt at the top of

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the list of "progressive" A r a b countries, followed by Syria and Iraq. Only in a few instances, as a hint that not all was well, did Iraq head this list in the fall of 1972.182 It seems that Moscow contemplated replacing Cairo with Baghdad as the focus of its Middle Eastern policy, and Iraq's importance in the Soviet strategy was certainly enhanced. For its part, Iraq's reaction to Egypt's attempts to loosen its relationship with the Soviet Union and to improve ties with the West was restrained for two reasons. First, since the end of 1971, in the aftermath of the growing tension with Iran, Baghdad had embarked on a rapprochement with Cairo,183 with this trend continuing into 1972. Second, from the summer of 1972, Iraq itself was also examining the possibility of repairing ties with the United States and other "hostile states" (i.e., those that supported Israel). A t the end of July 1972, Iraq and the United States established interest sections, with the Iraqi section manned by two diplomats installed in the Indian embassy in Washington and the US section of the same size in the Belgian embassy in Baghdad.184 Although Iraq insisted that the appointment of two of its diplomats to look after Iraq's interests in Washington should not be interpreted as a readiness to restore diplomatic relations with the United States,185 the establishment of the interest section symbolized Baghdad's openness to mend ties with Washington.186 The Soviet reaction to these moves was to reproduce Baghdad's soothing statements—from Moscow's viewpoint—on the low state of Iraqi-US relations.187 Despite these considerations, the problems facing Iraq in 1972—the conflict with Iran, the Kurds, and the oil companies—required it to strengthen relations with the Soviets. In addition, Iraq believed that cooperation between the Soviet Union and Arab states was vital in the confrontation with Israel. Iraq therefore stressed, in its indirect references to the impasse in Soviet-Egyptian ties, the need to consolidate the relationship between the Soviet Union and the " A r a b liberation movement." Thus, Iraq essentially accepted the Soviet position and, without saying it overtly, opposed Egypt's policy of weakening links with the USSR.188 In addition, by siding with Moscow, Iraq hoped to promote its goal, discerned already since May 1971, of replacing Egypt as the prime Arab state in Soviet policy.189 The difficulties in Soviet-Egyptian relations and Iraq's increased significance in Soviet foreign policy were manifested during Bakr's visit to the Soviet Union from September 14 to 19,1972. Whereas in April 1972 the Soviets had still refrained from inviting Bakr to visit the USSR on behalf of the Central Committee of the CPSU,190 in September Bakr arrived at the invitation of this institution, as well as the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Soviet government.191 The entire "troika"— Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgornyi—took part in the talks with him.192 Moreover, the Soviets described the atmosphere at the discussions with

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Bakr at their initial stage as one of "comradeship" and "cordiality,"193 terms ordinarily applied by the Kremlin to talks with Communist leaders. Bakr's visit to the Soviet Union in September was his second trip outside Iraq since coming to power,194 and the second visit by an Iraqi president to Moscow.195 (Bakr rarely made trips abroad because of poor health and for fear of plots against the regime in his absence.) In his speech in honor of Bakr, Podgornyi denied Egypt's allegation that the Soviet Union was interested in preserving the state of no war and no peace in the Middle East (although without mentioning Egypt by name). 196 This was apparently an attempt to enlist Baghdad's support for Moscow in its controversy with Cairo, so as to improve the Soviet image among the nationalistic-radical circles in the Arab world. In his turn, Bakr emphasized the importance of "the strategic alliance between the forces of the Arab revolution and the world revolutionary movement, at the vanguard of which your friendly country is standing," 197 and the joint communiqué spoke of the need to augment cooperation between Arab and "socialist" states and "first and foremost" the Soviet Union. 198 From October 1972, and especially from February 1973, there was an improvement in Soviet-Egyptian relations. Egypt concluded that if it wanted to wage a war against Israel it would have to mend its relations with the Soviets, primarily in the military field. The Soviet Union strove to repair its relationship with Cairo by augmenting substantially arms shipments to Egypt from the end of 1972 and especially the beginning of 1973, while acquiescing to Egypt's preparations for attacking Israel. However this rapprochement between Moscow and Cairo was limited, and in the spring and fall of 1973 the Soviet media still charged "certain circles" in Cairo with trying to undermine Soviet-Egyptian ties.199 As a result of the uncertain state of Soviet-Egyptian ties in 19721973, the USSR became more concerned with bringing Iraq and Syria closer to each other, in order to strengthen the nucleus of the proSoviet states in the region.200 However, the usually poor state of relations between the rival Ba'th regimes in Baghdad and Damascus did not facilitate this Soviet goal.201 From March 21 to 24,1973, Saddam Hussein made a trip to Moscow, during which he had an audience with Brezhnev and held talks with Kosygin.202 The Soviet-Iraqi "statement" released at the end of the visit— apparently in response to continual expressions of hostility against the Soviet Union in Egypt's press—affirmed "the determination [of the Soviet Union and Iraq] to repulse any attempt by imperialist and reactionary forces to shake the Soviet-Arab friendship."203 Not long before his departure for Moscow, Saddam Hussein had "sharply criticized" those that were courting the Western states while attacking the Soviet Union, without making an explicit reference to Egypt. He also took exception to

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" s o m e A r a b s t a t e s m e n " who, he alleged, o b j e c t e d to b o t h Soviet and U S influence, and claimed that the attacks on Soviet influence were designed to hurt a friendly state, the U S S R . 2 0 4 Kosygin's speech in honor of Saddam Hussein included the following passage on the Arab-Israeli dispute: "And the longer Israel resists the establishment of a just peace in the Middle East, the more ignominious end awaits its aggressive policy. . . . In the struggle of the peoples of Iraq and other Arab countries against the imperialist aggression . . . the unity of action and cohesion of the Arab countries are called to play their great role. We sincerely wish them [the Arab countries] success in this matter." 2 0 5 Bearing in mind that in March 1973 the Soviets had already reconciled themselves to Egypt's war preparations against Israel, these remarks seem to have indicated the Soviet desire for improved relations among Baghdad, Cairo, and Damascus in order to facilitate Iraq's military assistance to Egypt and Syria, if these countries launched an offensive against Israel. On the same occasion, Saddam Hussein revealed a change in Iraq's attitude regarding the means to be employed for the "liberation of Palestine." He argued that the Palestine problem could not be resolved except by "using the whole potential of the Arab nation and its military, economic and human capacities." 206 Until early 1973, the Ba'th regime had stressed military means often as the only means of combating Israel. Now, however, Iraq was suggesting that political and economic means (such as the oil weapon) should also be applied. 207 It is reasonable to assume that the appearance of some flexibility in Iraq's pronouncements on the Middle East dispute stemmed mostly from its desire for some improvement in relations with the United States and the West. 208 It is interesting that the visits of Bakr and Saddam Hussein to Moscow revealed signs of continued Soviet preference for the latter Iraqi leader as compared with the former. 209 For example, the joint communiqué at the end of Saddam Hussein's visit to Moscow in February 1972 described the atmosphere of the talks as "friendly and comradely," 210 and at the conclusion of his trip to the Soviet Union in March 1973 as "comradely," 211 whereas this term was absent from the joint communiqué issued at the end of Bakr's visit to the Soviet Union in September 1972. 212 It was also absent from joint statements between the Soviet Union and all other Arab leaders in the same period,213 a fact that serves to emphasize Moscow's specially favorable attitude toward Saddam Hussein. Moscow's preferential treatment of Saddam Hussein resulted from his role in initiating and implementing the policy of establishing close links betwen Iraq and the U S S R . Also, the Soviets apparently estimated that Saddam Hussein, as the strong and dynamic man of the Ba'th regime, might become leader of his country, as well as a

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prominent personality on the Arab scene at large, and hence they strove to foster connections with him.

Moscow Strengthens Baghdad vis-à-vis Tehran (Fall 1972-Spring 1973) In May 1972, Bakr had already tried to defuse tension with Iran, declaring that Iraq did not harbor aggressive intents toward that country.214 In July, he stated: "We stress our constant readiness to solve the problems [with Iran] peacefully, if the Iranian Government behaves reasonably and abandons its present policy." 215 Iraq's greater willingness to resolve its problems with Iran was in line with Baghdad's moderate openness to repair relations with Washington. Both developments were first signs that revolutionary-ideological zeal was playing a reduced role in Iraq's foreign policy. However, Iraq's willingness to normalize relations with Iran was not accompanied by a shift in Iraq's attitude on the treaty of 1937, and the hostility between Iraq and Iran continued. The Iraq-Iran dispute was discussed during Bakr's visit to the Soviet Union in September 1972. The joint communiqué contained the same kind of formulations on this subject that had appeared in SovietIraqi statements in the early 1970s. Regarding the Gulf, the communiqué stated support for the struggle of the Arab peoples of the Gulf to determine their own destiny by themselves—a hint, according to Iraq's interpretation, at resistance to Iran's "expansionist ambitions" in the region. Similarly, from Baghdad's viewpoint, the reference to Soviet and Iraqi adherence to international treaties implied the validity of the treaty of 1937 regarding the Shatt-al-Arab. 216 In addition, however, this communiqué contained a new component, probably arising from the controversy over the Shatt-al-Arab, to the effect that Soviet-Iraqi relations were being built on "the solid basis of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity [and] non-interference in each other's internal affairs." The phrase "territorial integrity" had been absent from Podgornyi's speech in honor of Bakr, which merely stated that the Soviet-Iraqi treaty was based on "the principles of a real equality of rights, respect for sovereignty [and] non-interference in internal affairs."217 It was also absent from the Soviet plan for establishing a Collective Security System in Asia. Throughout the 1970s, the Soviets tried to obtain the approval of Asian states, including Arab ones, for this plan, which was proposed by Brezhnev in March 1972.218 By comprising principles such as "respect for sovereignty and non-violabililty of borders," the plan actually endorsed the Soviet stand on the territorial dispute with China, and was, in fact, intended to bolster Moscow's position vis-à-vis Beijing. In view of these anti-Chinese undertones in the Soviet security

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proposal, Iraq evidently agreed that only two principles of this proposal— respect for sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs—be included in the joint communiqué of September 1972, thus dragging its feet on accepting the Soviet plan. It therefore seems that the principle of respect for territorial integrity, which appeared in the SovietIraqi statement of September 1972, was introduced on Baghdad's initiative, in order to emphasize the Soviet backing, however indirect, of Iraq's territorial integrity in the context of the territorial dispute with Iran over the Shatt-al-Arab and the tense situation along the land boundary with Iran as well. 219 At Baler's talks in Moscow, senior military officials participated on the Soviet and Iraqi sides,220 and the joint communiqué announced that the Soviet Union and Iraq had "agreed on concrete measures for the continuation of strengthening the defense capacity [military capacity 221 ] of the Iraqi Republic and raising the combat training of its armed forces." This was the most binding Soviet promise in the military field ever to appear in a Soviet-Iraqi joint statement since the inception of the Ba'th regime. 222 Indeed, Soviet arms shipments to Iraq apparently increased from the second half of 1972, comprising tanks, interceptors, fighter-bombers, and military vessels.223 The enhancement in Soviet arms transfers to Iraq seems to have been motivated primarily by Iran's procurements. It should be noted that Tehran—despite Moscow's repeated assurances— regarded the treaty between Moscow and Baghdad as a Soviet attempt to squeeze Iran with Soviet-Iraqi pincers and, in its wake, Iran embarked upon a massive purchase of US weapons.224 T o sum up, although Bakr's trip to the Soviet Union resulted in a greater Soviet commitment to Iraq in its dispute with Iran, especially on the military level with an increase in the flow of Soviet weapons to Baghdad, on the political level the basically neutral Soviet stand on the Iraq-Iran conflict was maintained. Indeed, the Soviet Union tried to preserve a symbolic balance in its links with Iraq and Iran. A month after Bakr's trip to Moscow, Moscow played host to the Shah from October 10 to 21,1972, with the U S S R concluding a fifteen-year treaty of economic and technical cooperation with Iran, 225 for precisely the same period as the SovietIraqi friendship treaty. On the occasion of the Shah's visit, Podgornyi made an implicit reference to the Iraq-Iran conflict and expressed a neutral stand, advocating that "disputed issues between states . . . [should] be settled peacefully... by negotiations, taking into consideration the rights and legitimate interests of the peoples." 2 2 6 Like previous high-level visits between the Soviet and Iranian officials in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Shah's trip to the Soviet Union in October 1972 was still considered successful both by Moscow and Tehran.227 By contrast, Kosygin's visit to Iran from March 14 to 16, 1973, was

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the first visit during which differences of opinion between the two countries surfaced. First, Iran had expected that Podgornyi would take part in the inauguration of the Isfahan Steel Complex, which had been built with Soviet assistance; instead, it was Kosygin, who had signed the treaty with Iraq, who arrived for the ceremony. 228 Moreover, Kosygin, in his speech in honor of Iranian Prime Minister Amir 'Abbas Hoveida, implied criticism of Iran's military buildup and justification of Soviet arms shipments to Iraq by arguing that a "bellicose policy of any country necessarily raises tension in the whole region . . . [and] compels the neighbors to take measures . . . for protecting their national interests." 229 Not long after Kosygin returned from Iran, he discussed the Iraq-Iran dispute with Saddam Hussein during his visit to Moscow from March 21 to 24,1973. Kosygin apparently continued his efforts to mediate between Iraq and Iran,230 although the Iraq-Iran dispute was not mentioned publicly during Saddam Hussein's trip to the Soviet Union. In his address in honor of Saddam Hussein, Kosygin referred to a "unanimity and congruence of views" between the Soviet Union and Iraq on international affairs, contending that the two countries were " c o m r a d e s in arms" in the "anti-imperialist" struggle.231 These were terms usually used by the Kremlin to depict links with Communist states. The closeness of views between Moscow and Baghdad claimed by Kosygin related probably to a variety of issues in the Gulf. Specifically, since the end of 1972—following the strengthening of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran—Iraq had condemned Saudi Arabia as serving the Shah's and "imperialist" interests in the Gulf.232 The Soviet Union, for its part, remained most hostile toward Saudi Arabia, charging it with subversion against "progressive" Arab regimes, including the Iraqi one.233 In addition to the issue of Saudi Arabia, the Soviet and Iraqi stands came closer regarding Iran's policy in the Gulf. As long as Britain had not withdrawn from the Gulf, the Soviet Union had considered the replacement of British influence by an Iranian one as the lesser evil. However, once Britain had evacuated the Gulf, the question of diminishing Iran's influence in the Gulf, as a pro-Western factor, was gradually gaining importance in Moscow, especially since the dispatch of Iranian military experts and equipment to Oman at the end of 1972 to bolster the regime of Sultan Qabus in its fight against the PFLOAG. 2 3 4 Although Moscow's and Baghdad's positions vis-à-vis Tehran seemed congruent, each had its own motives for formulating its respective policies toward Iran. Soviet motives were related to the global confrontation between Moscow and Washington; that is, the USSR's cooler attitude toward Iran stemmed from Iran's massive procurement of US weaponry and transformation into an "American policeman" of the Gulf. The animosity of Arab Iraq toward Persian Iran, however, originated primarily from local national causes, and had little to do with Tehran's opposite

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global orientation via-a-vis Baghdad. During Saddam Hussein's visit in March 1973, Kosygin stated that strengthening Soviet-Iraqi relations contributed to consolidating "the foundations of peace in Asia and in the world." This reference to Asia again indicated continuing Soviet interest in obtaining Iraq's support for the Collective Security System, with its anti-Chinese tendencies. Nonetheless, despite Iraq's close relationship with the Soviets and China's indirect siding with Iran in its conflict with Iraq in 1973,235 Iraq consistently strove to develop relations with China236 and evaded subscribing to anti-Chinese formulae. The fact that Kosygin attributed to Soviet-Iraqi relations also a role in consolidating world peace implied the Soviet use of military-strategic installations in Iraq. In this connection, it is noteworthy that the commander of the Soviet fleet, Sergei Gorshkov, visited Iraq for the first time from April 4 to 11,1973, when he inspected Umm Qasr.237 In addition to the usage of naval facilities in Iraq, the Soviet Union reportedly deployed supersonic bombers in Iraq in September 1973, which served Moscow's strategic interests in the Gulf.238 The Soviet strengthening of its military position in Iraq in mid-1973, coupled with its intensive supply of weapons to Egypt since the beginning of 1973 for launching a war against Israel, marked a growing assertiveness in the Kremlin's Middle Eastern policy. This assertiveness was bolstered by the approximate strategic nuclear parity Brezhnev achieved with the United States, formalized in the S A L T (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks) I Agreement of May 1972, and the impressive arsenal of conventional weapons he built.

The Iraq-Kuwait Dispute When Britain granted independence to Kuwait in June 1961, Iraq under Qasim claimed sovereignty over it. However, confronted by the dispatch of British and Arab League troops to protect Kuwait, Qasim pledged not to use military means to obtain his claim. The Soviet Union did not support Qasim's right to Kuwait. Nevertheless, in view of its friendly relations with Qasim and Kuwait's close ties with Britain, Moscow vetoed Kuwait's application for United Nation's membership in November 1961 and never recognized Kuwait during Qasim's rule. A month after Qasim was overthrown, in March 1963, the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with Kuwait, while the first Ba'th regime in Iraq recognized Kuwait in October of that year. From the second Ba'th assumption of power in 1968, Iraq's ties with Kuwait had been mainly friendly, and hints at Iraq's territorial claims toward Kuwait had surfaced only occasionally.239 However, on March 20, 1973, Iraqi forces captured a Kuwaiti police outpost in as-Samita, next to

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Umm Qasr. This action was aimed at exerting pressure on Kuwait to transfer to Iraq two strategically important islands off Umm Qasr— Warba and Bubiyan—in return for Iraq's withdrawal from as-Samita and Iraq's consent to conclude a border demarcation agreement with Kuwait. 240 It is possible that Saddam Hussein's arrival in Moscow on March 21, 1973, a day after the incident with Kuwait, was aimed at enlisting Soviet support against Kuwait. Kuwait was the only conservative Arab state in the Gulf that maintained diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union since 1963—in line with Kuwait's policy of sustaining some balance in its links with the great powers—and Moscow reciprocated with an amicable attitude toward Kuwait. Nevertheless, on March 22, 1973, Pravda published only Iraq's version of the incident of March 20, alleging that Kuwaiti forces had attacked Iraqi ones, and thus siding with Iraq. Even before Iraq met Kuwait's demand to pull out its forces from as-Samita on April 5, and during the negotiations of Murtada Sa'd ' Abdal-Baqi in Kuwait from April 6 to 8, in which he reiterated Iraq's claim to the two islands,241 Gorshkov visited Iraq from April 4 to 11, and simultaneously a squadron of Soviet warships called at Umm Qasr.242 These Soviet moves can be interpreted as additional manifestations of Moscow's incipient backing of Baghdad against Kuwait, which stemmed from the following reasons. First, from the Soviet perspective, Iraq, as a country bound by a treaty to the Soviet Union, clearly exceeded in importance the small and basically pro-Western country, Kuwait. Second, the improved strategic position of Umm Qasr, which could have resulted from Iraq's taking control of the two islands at the entrance of this port, served Soviet interests as a power using Umm Qasr. Yet the Soviet Union neither sided overtly with Iraq nor made any mention of Iraq's claim to the two islands. Moreover, following the negative reaction of the Arab world, including Egypt and Syria, to the Iraqi attack on Kuwait and to the presence of Iraqi forces on Kuwait's territory, the Soviet Union strove to bring an end to the incident by apparently urging Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.243 Also, on the regional level, the Soviet Union feared increased tension between Iraq and both Iran and Saudi Arabia as a result of the Iraq-Kuwait dispute. It can be assumed that it was this development on the regional level coupled with the Arab world's disapproval of Iraq's behavior, rather than Soviet urging, that induced Iraq to evacuate Kuwait's territory. Nonetheless, the Iraq-Kuwait territorial dispute was never completely resolved, with Iraq occasionally continuing to pressure Kuwait during the 1970s to transfer to it the two islands Warba and Bubiyan. The Soviets publicly kept silent on the issue. This and the decline in Moscow's relations with Baghdad in the second half of the 1970s coupled with the former's sale of arms to Kuwait in the same period indicated that the Kremlin no

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longer had an interest to side with Iraq. Thus, as a rule, the Soviets favored the maintenance of an internationally recognized border and only when they enjoyed a special relationship with Iraq sided with in one way or another against Kuwait. Finally, it was probably no coincidence that at the time when Iraq was exerting pressure on Kuwait regarding the two islands in the spring of 1973, the former began indicating its willingness to partially cede its sovereignty over the Shatt-al-Arab to Iran.244 Iraq apparently attempted to moderate Iran's reaction to its moves against Kuwait and to compensate itself for agreeing to narrow its Shatt-al-Arab outlet to the Gulf by extorting another one from Kuwait. (This policy had a semblance to Iraq's improving relations with Iran and subsequent acceding to the latter's position on the Shatt-al-Arab simultaneously with Iraq's threats and subsequent occupation of Kuwait in the summer of 1990.)

Deterioration in Relations Between the Ba'th and the DPK, and Soviet Mediation (Summer 1972-Spring 1973) Following the Soviet-Iraqi treaty, the military links between the Iraqi Kurds and Iran increased substantially. Iran's aid to the Kurds was aimed at creating difficulties for Iraq, thus constituting another means—in addition to Iran's own military buildup in the wake of the treaty—to ensure Iran's security.245 Iran was the main arms supplier of the Kurds, who also received military aid from the United States and Isreal.246 (US support was upgraded to a remarkable extent after Iraq's conclusion of the treaty with the Soviets.) For the DPK, Barzani took the lead in strengthening military ties with the West, believing that Moscow's alignment with Baghdad embodied in the treaty clearly left the Kurds with no choice but to turn to the West.247 In the summer of 1972, relations between the central government and the Kurds soured when the security services made another attempt upon Barzani's life, although the authorities allegedly denied complicity. At the end of July 1972, a series of three articles in al-Thawra charged the DPK with receiving heavy weapons from Iran, and charged the DPK's militia, the Pesh Merga, with cooperating with Iran instead of partrolling the border.248 The Soviet media ignored the escalation in tension between the regime and the DPK, including the assassination attempt on Barzani. This indicated the Soviet displeasure with this development and apprehension that it might bring the Kurds and the Arabs to the verge of war, which would mean for the Soviet Union the weakening of an anti-Western country bound by a treaty to Moscow. Moreover, such a war might exacerbate the conflict between Iraq and Iran, consequently compelling the Soviet Union to support Iraq against both Iran and the Kurds, which

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would lead to the liquidation of the DPK. In an apparent Soviet effort to mediate between the Ba'th and the Kurds, a DPK delegation consisting of Muhammad Mahmud 'Abd-alRahman and Dara Tawfiq 249 arrived in Moscow in August 1972 at the invitation of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The delegation discussed with Suslov the implementation of the March manifesto but made no progress. 250 Yet, the Soviet statement on the meeting maintained that it was held in a "warm friendly atmosphere," and that "the representatives of the two [political] parties emphasized the great importance of the relations of friendship and cooperation established between the CPSU and the DPK." The Soviet statement also noted that the DPK delegation "welcomed" the conclusion of the friendship treaty between the Soviet Union and Iraq. 251 This reflected the desire of the DPK, especially its left wing, to sustain friendly ties with the Soviets by paying lip service to the treaty. 252 After the Kurdish problem was discussed by the CPSU and the D P K in August 1972, this subject was debated again in Moscow in September, during Bakr's visit. In the communiqué at the conclusion of this visit, the Soviet side came close to backing the Ba'th policy toward the Kurds by expressing "satisfaction with the steps taken to implement the March 11, 1970 Manifesto." 253 Yet, by making no explicit mention of the Ba'th as the side that had taken these steps, the Soviet Union left room for interpreting the communiqué as referring to steps taken by the regime in cooperation with the DPK, 254 thus preserving some evenhandedness in its approach. As already mentioned in the context of the Iraq-Iran dispute, the Soviet-Iraqi statement at the end of Bakr's visit in September 1972 asserted that relations between the Soviet Union and Iraq were being built on "the solid basis of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity." 255 This passage was relevant in respect to the Kurdish question as well. Specifically, from Baghdad's perspective, professed Soviet support for Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity implied backing against the violation of Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity by the Kurds, who were maintaining a quasi state within a state in the north, and also against the violation of Iraq's sovereignty by Iran, which was extending military aid to the Kurds. Moscow's expression of rather clear support for Baghdad on the Kurdish problem in September 1972 reflected an increase in Iraq's importance in Soviet strategy—a development discussed above 256 —as well as apparent Soviet opposition to the Kurds' intensifying ties with Iran, the United States, and Israel. It can be assumed that the desired Soviet solution for the Kurdish problem was based upon lessening, and even terminating, the DPK's relations with the West, along with autonomy for the Kurds led by the DPK. Moscow's avoidance of voicing unequivocal support for Baghdad on the Kurdish issue was intended to prevent the

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D P K from turning yet further to the West, and to enable the Soviets to maintain their role as mediator. Bakr's visit to Moscow, during which the Soviet Union had come close to endorsing Baghdad's stand on the Kurdish issue and had committed itself to augmenting arms deliveries to Iraq, was immediately followed by Iraqi moves against the Kurds. O n September 23, 1972, the B a ' t h presented to the D P K a memorandum containing harsh and detailed accusations on the D P K ' s ties with Iran, 257 implying in fact that these were a causus belli. The memorandum and the subsequent propaganda campaign against the Kurds launched by al-Thawra in O c t o b e r - N o v e m b e r included indications that Baghdad intended to gain Moscow's understanding. For example, the memorandum criticized "internal instructions" issued by the D P K calling to adopt a reserved attitude regarding the Iraqi-Soviet treaty. 258 T h e Kurdish al-Taakhi, for its part, extolled Soviet national policy in its public controversy with al-Thawra, thus hoping to obtain Soviet sympathy for Kurdish national demands. For instance, al-Taakhi alleged: "The progressive policy implemented by the Soviet Union in the problem of nationalities . . . provides an example . . . and a beneficial lesson for our Iraqi society consisting of two nationalities." 259 The Soviet media, however, were careful not to report this exchange of accusations between the central government and the Kurds. A t the same time, the Soviet Union continued its mediation efforts, with Mukarram Talbani, the Communist minister of irrigation, who was of Kurdish descent, delivering a Soviet invitation to Barzani to visit Moscow. 260 However, Barzani declined to come to Moscow, 261 probably estimating that the Soviets were siding with Baghdad. Anyway, he had already concluded that reliance on the West was his only option. The propaganda campaign against the D P K in the fall of 1972 that laid the ground for a military offensive stopped short of such a move, which the regime still considered to be premature. In the summer and fall of 1972, Saddam Hussein had already emerged as the driving force within the Iraqi leadership regarding a military solution of the Kurdish problem, whereas Bakr presumably adopted a cautious stand. 262 Possibly aware of these differences between Bakr and Saddam Hussein, two Soviet articles in the second half of 1972 focusing on the Kurdish issue in Iraq ignored Saddam Hussein while emphasizing Bakr's role in reaching the March 1970 Accord. 263 Indeed, contrary to the period from 1969 to 1971,264 from 1972 there were no more indications that the continued Soviet favor of Saddam Hussein stemmed from his views on Iraq's internal affairs, namely the Kurdish problem and forming the front with the Communists. In the middle of November 1972, the Ba'th proposed to the D P K to resume the dialogue, 265 but in February 1973 tension increased, and in March the dialogue was interrupted. 266 The Soviet Union, probably as a result of the cessation of the war of words and the renewal of the talks,

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displayed a favorable attitude toward the D P K and the Pesh Merga, crediting the Kurdish fighters with defending their people's aspiration for freedom. 267 And in March 1973, an article in Pravda by a senior Soviet academician, while maintaining a neutral stand, tried to play down the differences between the government and the Kurds. 268 It should be borne in mind that Iran was responsible for the substantial increase in the Kurds' military capacity. Consequently, the way to liquidate the Kurdish problem, from the Ba'th's viewpoint, was to come to an agreement with Iran. Accordingly, from spring 1973, senior Iraqi officials expressed willingness to settle the dispute with Iran, and for the first time indicated readiness to compromise on the issue of the Shatt-al-Arab. 269

The Ba'th-Communist Front (Summer 1972-Summer 1973) After the inclusion of the two Communist ministers in the government in May 1972, the Soviets continued to work to establish a front between the Communists and the Ba'th, trying to moderate the positions of both sides. Yet Moscow persistently upheld the ICP's demand for preserving its ideological, political, and organizational independence within the framework of the projected front. 270 The formation of a front was discussed during Bakr's talks in Moscow in September 1972, with one Communist minister, 'Amir 'Abdallah, participating in Bakr's delegation as a gesture to the Soviets. 271 However, the joint communiqué, which merely noted that the Iraqi side had informed the Soviet side on "the consolidation of the progressive forces" 2 7 2 — without expressing any evaluation of this development by the Soviet side—suggested that tangible differences of opinion on the terms for creating the front remained. Nevertheless, given the growing importance of Iraq in Soviet strategy, Moscow did not allow these differences to mar its bilateral ties with Baghdad. Accordingly, in the joint statement at the conclusion of Bakr's trip—as in the statements at the end of Saddam Hussein's visits to the Soviet Union in February 1972 and March 1 9 7 3 — both sides expressed satisfaction with the relations between the C P S U and the Ba'th and agreed upon their further development. 273 Indeed, in 19721973, visits of party delegations between the Soviet Union and Iraq became more frequent. Most of the visits were of Ba'th delegations coming to the Soviet Union to study the CPSU's experience in propaganda, and in one instance its indoctrination work in the army.274 As mentioned above, relations between the Ba'th and the D P K deteriorated sharply following Bakr's trip to Moscow in September 1972. The Soviet Union tried to take advantage of this situation, which actually weakened the Ba'th's bargaining position on the formation of the front vis-à-vis the Communists, to promote the ICP's demands. Thus, in Oc-

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tober 1972 the Soviets indicated new conditions for establishing a front. Specifically, Moscow contended that the formation of a front "could advance positive changes in the content of the work and in the forms of organization of the ruling executive institutions . . . contribute to the democratization of the army . . . the police and the security services."275 "Changes" in the "executive institutions" implied Soviet aspirations to provide the institution of the government with greater authority and to establish an elected national assembly, thus curtailing to some extent the absolute executive and legislative powers of the RCC, whose membership was restricted to the Ba'th. "Democratization" of the army, the police, and the security services alluded to Moscow's support for allowing the ICP to carry out political activities within the armed forces, as well as Communist participation in these institutions, and for purging these organizations of anti-Communist elements.276 Prominent among the latter was Nazim Kazzar, who had headed the security services since 1969 and was responsible for persecutions against the ICP and for the two attempts on Barzani's life.277 According to Iraq's official version, Kazzar attempted a coup on June 30,1973, which failed, and he was executed on July 7.278 Research based partially on conversations with Iraqi officials maintains that even before the attempted coup, the Iraqi leadership (i.e., Saddam Hussein) had wanted to oust Kazzar because as head of the security services he had accumulated too much power, which no longer served the regime's desire to form a front with the Communists and sustain close relations with the Soviet Union.279 It is most likely that the desire to please the Soviets played merely a secondary role in Kazzar's removal, and not only because in general the USSR exercised a meager influence on the Ba'th's internal politics. In addition to Kazzar, 'Abd al-Khaliq al-Sammarra'i,280 a senior member of the Iraqi leadership whose views on the ICP and the Kurdish problem were rather convenient to Moscow, was arrested on a false charge of involvement in Kazzar's plot.281 Anyway, the removal of Kazzar, the formidable anti-Communist of the Iraqi regime, facilitated the formation of a front. On July 17,1973, on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the Ba'th rule, Bakr and 'Aziz Muhammad signed the Charter for National Action and Rules of Work of the National and Pan-Arab Progressive Front. A certain understanding on the formulation of these documents may have already been reached in Moscow in March 1973, during Saddam Hussein's talks with Ponomarev, who specialized in nonruling Communist parties and the Third World.282 Further Soviet involvement in the last stages of negotiations between the Ba'th and the Communists can be deduced from the visit of Sharif Rashidov, an alternate member of the Politburo of the CPSU and first secretary of the Communist party of Uzbekistan,283 to Iraq from July 13 to 20. The timing of Rashidov's trip and his meetings on July

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16 and 17 with "the leadership of the three main parties of Iraq"—the Ba'th, the ICP, and the DPK—and on July 18 with Bakr 284 implied that he discussed and watched closely the formation of the front. The preamble of the charter—that is, the part that has less legal importance than the body of the charter—stated: "The relations among the progressive national parties of the front will be on the basis of mutual respect for ideological, political and organizational independence of each party." 285 This provision was absent from the charter proposed by the Ba'th in 1971, hence its appearance in the 1973 charter, if only in the preamble, reflected Baghdad's responsiveness to the principal demand of both the Soviets and the ICP. In line with this article, following the establishment of the front, the Communists were allowed to publish a daily newspaper, Tariq al-Sha'b.2S6 The rules of the front stipulated that it was to be headed by a Supreme Committee consisting of sixteen members and a chairman. The rules accorded the office of chairman to the secretary general of the Regional [Iraqi] Command of the Ba'th or his deputy and distributed the membership of the Supreme Committee as follows: eight representatives of the Ba'th, three of the ICP, three of the DPK, and one representative of each of the two other parties. 287 Na'im Haddad, a member of the Regional [Iraqi] Command of the Ba'th, was appointed secretary general of the front. Undoubtedly this composition assured the Ba'th's leadership of the front. Moreover, the Rules of the Front described it as a voluntary body and a forum for discussions of political and economic issues, which meant that the front was a public organization, with state power still to be held by the RCC. Also, in accordance with the charter, the Ba'th retained sole control over the army and the right to conduct political activities within its ranks. Thus Baghdad firmly rejected Moscow's proposals to introduce substantial changes in Iraq's political system and "democratize" the army. In June, skirmishes had already broken out between Communists and DPK members in the Kurdish area, probably because some circles in the DPK became suspicious that the Communists were collaborating with the regime. 288 As the DPK published its reservations about joining the front in mid-August, 289 tension between the two parties escalated further, a situation that served the interests of the Ba'th regime not only on the Iraqi scene, but also as a means to engage Moscow's support against the Kurds. Indeed, a significant motive for the Ba'th's establishing the front with the Communists seems to have been the desire to obtain Moscow's backing on the Kurdish issue. The Soviet Union welcomed the formation of the front, 290 and the Central Committee of the CPSU dispatched a congratulatory note to both Bakr and 'Aziz Muhammad. 291 From the Soviet Union's perspective, the front, which provided a framework for cooperation between the ICP and the Ba'th, was important as a contribution to stabilizing the ties between

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these two parties and for consolidating the Soviet-Iraqi relationship. Nevertheless, there was also a disapproving undertone in Moscow's reaction to the formation of the front. The dispatch of the CPSU's congratulatory notes 292 was delayed for almost a month, and the text of the front's documents appeared in the Soviet media several months later. 293 It is reasonable to assume that the tiny share of power accorded to the ICP, as a result of the front's limited functions, did not necessarily meet the minimum requirements of the Soviets. The establishment of the front without the D P K disturbed the Soviets for the very same reason that it pleased the Ba'th. Whereas the latter was interested in discord between the Communists and the Kurds, the Soviet Union, alongside its central interest in the coalition between the ICP and the Ba'th, also had a stake in cooperation between the Communists and the Kurds, which could strengthen the ICP vis-à-vis the Ba'th. Therefore, once the Ba'th-Communist front had become a fait accompli, the Soviets preferred that the D P K join it even without a change in the rules of the front, rather than the D P K remaining outside the front. Accordingly, the congratulations of the CPSU's Central Committee on the formation of the front expressed hope that the D P K would also participate, and this emphasis on the importance of the DPK's membership in the front was echoed by Soviet commentaries. 294 The Soviet Union had some reservations about the kind of front that had come into being; therefore, the ICP's agreement to participate in the front was presumably not completely in line with Soviet instructions, but rather stemmed from local constraints. The hostility of the D P K toward the ICP and Baghdad's preparations for a military solution of the Kurdish problem led the ICP to distance itself from the D P K and to associate itself with the regime in the shape of the front, in order to secure its legal status in Iraq. * *

*

The main reasons for Iraq's conclusion of a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union can be ranked in the following order: (1) the escalation of the conflict with Iran, (2) the deteriorating relations with the D P K and the Kurds' military buildup, and (3) the dispute with the Iraq Petroleum Company. The Soviet Union, for its part, worked to establish close ties with Iraq because of the Soviet navy's increased need for the use of U m m Qasr and because of the worsening Soviet position in Egypt, whereas Soviet interest in fostering relations with Baghdad gained impetus only from the fall of 1972, in the face of expanding military ties between Washington and Tehran. The real peak in the Soviet-Iraqi relationship therefore commenced from this time, when a partial congruence of interests between Moscow and Baghdad regarding a central regional problem

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in the shape of Iran had emerged, and not immediately after the signing of the treaty in April 1972. Accordingly, the visits to Moscow of B a k r in September 1972 and of Saddam Hussein in March 1973 can be regarded as symbolizing the apex of Soviet-Iraqi ties. Nonetheless, even during this period, Baghdad never became a Soviet satellite, but conducted a policy corresponding to its own interests, and resisted Moscow's pressures on matters related to Iraq's internal affairs. Still, the establishment of the Ba'th-Communist front in July 1973 provided a reasonable solution to the thorny issue in Soviet-Iraqi relations, the ICP. However, in July 1973, the zenith in Soviet-Iraqi ties was already over, and not merely because Moscow had reservations about certain aspects of the front. In that spring, there were first developments that weakened Iraq's need for the Soviet Union, when Iraq tried m o r e vigorously to settle its dispute with Iran. In addition, the resolution of Iraq's conflict with the IPC and the rise of oil prices on the world market created favorable circumstances for improving Iraq's economic and political links with the West.

Notes 1. See, for example, E. Primakov, Pravda, June 5,1971. 2. Al-Thawra, May 7,1971. See also al-Thawra, May 9,1971. 3. Al-Thawra, June 2 and 29,1971. 4. See, for example, al-Thawra, June 30,1971. 5. On the Soviet-Egyptian treaty, see Yaacov Ro'i, From Encroachment to Involvement, 1945-1973 (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1974), pp. 549-553. 6. ' Ammash was vice president jointly with Hardan Tikriti from December 28,1969 (see Chapter 1, note 96); with the dismissal of Tikriti on October 15,1970, Ammash became the only vice president—that is, formally the third person in Iraq's hierarchy. Among the other participants in the talks with Novikov was 'Izzat [Ibrahim] al-Duri, member of the R C C from November 1969 and minister of agrarian reform. (On al-Duri see Chapter 1, note 95. On the list of the participants in the Soviet-Iraqi talks in June 1971, see al-Thawra, June 25,1971; and Pravda, June 26, 1971.) It can be inferred that in the first half of the 1970s al-Duri's involvement in Iraqi-Soviet relations was insignificant, because in this period of intense contacts between the two countries, he visited the Soviet Union only a few times. One such visit was in August-September 1970, to discuss issues related to his ministry, and another was from August 14 to September 5,1972. (See Pravda, August 21 and 22 and September 5,1970.) 7. Al-Thawra, June 25,1971; Pravda, June 26,1971. 8. R. Baghdad, June 20,191HDR, June 21,1971; Pravda, June 25,1971. On the return of the Iraqi delegation, see R. Baghdad, July 21,1971/DR, July 22,1971. 9. On the conclusion of the protocol, see al-Thawra, June 24, 1971; and Pravda, June 25,1971. For details on the canal project, seeAnba'Mosku (a Soviet weekly in Arabic) 1 (January 1,1972), p. 11. 10. See Appendix 1, Table 2 and Direction of Trade (International Monetary Fund), August 1973, p. 72. 11. Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR za 1971 god, pp. 236-238. 12. The Iraqi version of the communiqué referred to "the legitimate and

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inalienable rights," and also to the support of both sides for "the struggle of the Arab people of Palestine to return all its legitimate and inalienable rights." 13. See, for example, Kosygin's support for "the struggle of the Palestinian organizations" in Pravda, December 11,1969; and Galia Golan, The Soviet Union and the Palestine Liberation Organization (New York: Praeger, 1980). 14. See joint communiqués: (1) at the conclusion of Saddam Hussein's visit to Moscow in Pravda, February 18,1972; and al-Jumhuriyya, February 18,1972; (2) at the end of Kosygin's visit to Iraq in Pravda, April 11,1972; and al-Thawra, April 11,1972; (3) at the end of Bakr's trip to Moscow in Pravda, September 20, 1972; and al-Thawra, September 20, 1972; and (4) at the conclusion of Saddam Hussein's visit to the Soviet Union in Pravda, March 25, 1973; and al-Thawra, March 25,1973. 15. See Pravda, July 21 and 22,1971. 16. On the Soviet request and its rejection by Cairo, see Eric Rouleau, Le Monde, August 20,1971, in USSR and Third World 8 (1971). 17. For example, Pravda, July 21,1971, reported in a single sentence Iraq's recognition of the new regime in the Sudan. 18. The word "Persian" was used in the Soviet version and " A r a b " in the Iraqi version. On the meaning of this difference, see Chapter 1, p. 33. 19. Al-Thawra, June 25,1971; Pravda, June 26,1971. 20. See, for example, a joint communiqué between Iraq and North Korea—a country that in this communiqué sided with Iraq on the Shatt-al-Arab dispute—in al-Thawra, June 3,1971. In accordance with our assumption that the clause in the June communiqué was included on Iraq's initiative, this clause was absent in a Soviet-South Yemeni statement dealing with the Gulf in Pravda, October 11, 1971. 21. See, for example, al-Thawra, May 30,1971. 22. Al-Thawra (an editorial), December 2,1971. 23. See a statement of the Shah on June 24,1971, and of his prime minister on June 27 1971, in Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy, p. 424. 24. With the agreement to form the tripartite federation, consisting of the U A R , Libya, and Syria, which came into force on September 2,1971, the U A R changed its name to the Arab Republic of Egypt (hereafter, Egypt). 25. al-Thawra, November 2,1971. 26. In April 1971, the same month in which the Soviet economic delegation headed by Arkhipov visited Iraq, an Iraqi low-level trade delegation departed for China {INA, April 20,1971/Dtf, April 21,1971); and while Novikov was visiting Iraq, from June 15 to 25,1971, an Iraqi economic delegation led by Minister of Oil Sa'dun Hammadi was visiting China (al-Thawra, June 23,25, and 27,1971). 27. China and Iran established diplomatic relations on August 16,1971. 28. Shihab's visit to the Soviet Union took place from September 6 to October 4,1971. (See al-Thawra, September 8 and 29,1971; and Pravda, September 9 and 30, 1971.) On the visit of the commander of the Iraqi air force to the Soviet Union, see Krasnaia zvezda, October 12,1971. 29. Military Balance, 1971-1972, pp. 28-29; Military Balance 1972-1973, p. 31. 30. A. Vasil'ev, Pravda, November 3,1971. 31. Murtada Sa'd 'Abd-al-Baqi's original name was Murtada al-Hadithi (see Chapter 1, note 95). 32. Shaikhli was relieved of the post of foreign minister on September 28, 1971, and appointed ambassador to the United Nations. In February 1978, he was dismissed and sentenced to six years' imprisonment for plotting against the state, and he was murdered in Baghdad in April 1980. 33. Al-Thawra, December 1,1971.

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34. On December 20, 1971, the French ambassador to Iraq delivered an invitation to Saddam Hussein to visit France (al-Thawra, December 21, 1971). However, the fact that Hussein did not depart for France, after the dispute with Iran, indicated that Baghdad did not expect substantive results from Paris. From December 24,1971, to January 3,1972, an Iraqi delegation led by 'Abd-al-Khaliq al-Samarra'i visited China, with some gains only in the economic sphere. On the visit, see Samarra'i's statements in R. Baghdad, December 24,1971/DR, December 27, 1971; and al-Thawra, January 4,1972. See also D.C. Watt, "The Persian Gulf—Cradle of Conflict," Problems of Communism 3 (May-June 1972), p. 40. 35. Anba'Mosku, January 1,1972, p. 7. 36. Pravda's report of December 3,1971, appeared on the same day also in Krasnaia zvezda and, in a slightly abridged version, in Izvestiia. 37. Geoffrey Jukes, "The Indian Ocean in Soviet Naval Policy," Adelphi Papers 87 (May 1972), p. 23; Robert C. Horn, Soviet-Indian Relations (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 72, 95. 38. Pravda, December 8, 1971. According to R. Baghdad, December 22, 1911IDR, December 22,1971, Grechko's stay in Iraq was extended because of illness, and for the same reason he canceled his projected visits to Syria and Somalia and returned to the Soviet Union. 39. This was the first visit by a Soviet defense minister to Ba'th Iraq; Grechko's previous visit to Iraq had taken place in March 1968. 40. Al-Thawra, December 16,1971. 41. Al-Thawra, December 19,1971; TASS, December 1 7 , 1 9 1 V D R (Soviet Union), December 21,1971. 42. For previous joint statements, which included a reference to the military field, see the communiqué at the end of Saddam Hussein's visit to the Soviet Union in Pravda, August 13,1970; and al-Thawra, August 13,1970; and at the conclusion of Novikov's trip to Iraq in al-Thawra, June 25, 1971; and Pravda, June 26,1971. 43. Al-Thawra, December 5,1971. For Iraq's coverage of the Soviet attitude toward the India-Pakistan war, see, for example, al-Thawra, December 15,1971. 44. Al-Thawra, December 5 and 8,1971. 45. Among other important personalities in the Iraqi delegation were Murtada Sa'd 'Abd-al-Baqi, Sa'dun Hammadi, and 'Abd-al-Jabbar Shanshal. For the list of participants in the Soviet-Iraqi talks, see the joint communiqué in al-Jumhuriyya, February 18,1972; and Pravda, February 18,1972. 46. Among the important persons in the Soviet delegation were Ponomarev, Gromyko, Vladimir Novikov, and Deputy Defense Minister Sergei Sokolov. 47. TASS (in English), February 11,1912/DR (Soviet Union), February 14, 1972; and Izvestiia, February 13,1972, used the word "friend" (drug), whereas Pravda, February 12,1972, referred to "comrade" (tovarishch). 48. The word "friend" was used by R. Moscow (in Arabic), April 9,1972/DR (Soviet Union), April 10, 1972; and also al-Thawra, April 10, 1972, whereas "comrade" was the version given by Pravda, April 10,1972; and Izvestiia, April 10,1972. 49. On differences between Brezhnev and Kosygin regarding the Iraq-Iran dispute in 1969, see Chapter 1, pp. 29,30-31. 50. Since the end of 1971, the Soviets had addressed some "progressive" leaders of the Third World as "comrade." Besides the leaders of Iraq, other Arab leaders so addressed were those of Algeria, South Yemen, and Syria—but never Sadat. 51. Saddam Hussein's speech in al-Jumhuriyya, February 12, 1972 (cross reference, Pravda, February 12,1972); and Bakr's speech in al-Thawra, April 10,

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1972. The Arabic term for "comrade" is rafiq. 52. Because of the close resemblance of this part of Saddam Hussein's speech to the editorial of al-Thawra, December 17,1971 (pp. 61-62 above), we can deduce that as early as December Hussein had advocated concluding a treaty with the Soviet Union. Also, according to the well-informed correspondent Eric Rouleau, Saddam Hussein was the architect of a treaty with the Soviets. See Le Monde, April 14,1972/Dfl, April 18,1972. 53. Al-Jumhuriyya, February 12,1972, entitled Saddam Hussein's speech in Moscow as follows: "Comrade Saddam Hussein calls for a firm strategic alliance between Iraq and the Soviet Union." 54. Al-Jumhuriyya, February 15,1972. 55. Al-Jumhuriyya, February 16,1972; and Pravda, February 16,1972. 56. Kosygin's speech in Pravda, February 12,1972. 57. See, for example, the report on Saddam Hussein's meeting with Podgornyi in al-Jumhuriyya, February 15,1972, in comparison with Pravda, February 15,1972. 58. See pp. 59-60 above. 59. Pravda, February 18,1972; and al-Jumhuriyya, February 18,1972. 60. See Chapter 1, pp. 31-32. 61. Al-Thawra, June 25,1971; Pravda, June 26,1971. 62. See p. 58 above. 63. For the Soviet-Iraqi communiqué of August 1970, see Chapter 1, p. 38; and for the communiqué of June 1971, see al-Thawra, June 25,1971; and Pravda, June 26,1971. 64. There was no mention of this issue in the communiqué of June 1971. 65. Pravda, July 14,1971; R. Ulyanovsky, International Affairs (Moscow) 9 (September 1971), pp. 32-33. 66. E. Primakov, Pravda, August 12, 1968; I. Valentinov, International Affairs (Moscow) 10 (October 1969), pp. 115-116. 67. In July 1970, a single Soviet article already described the events of 1968 as the assumption of power by the "left wing" of the Bá'th. See N. Konstantinov, MZ 8 (August 1970), p. 158. (The article was authorized for publication on July 22, 1970.) However, this new trend in Soviet historiography was short lived because of the growing difficulties in Soviet-Iraqi relations after Saddam Hussein's visit to the Soviet Union in August 1970. On the change in July 1971, see R. Petrov, Pravda, July 14,1971; and V. Shmarov, Izvestiia, July 15,1971. 68. R. Petrov, Agitator 16 (August 1971), p. 53. For a sign of Soviet preference for the Syrian Ba'th to the Iraqi one, see, for example, Pravda, August 5,1971. 69. R. Petrov, Pravda, July 14,1971. 70. Ibid. 71. For indications of Moscow's negative attitude toward Bakr during the first years of the second Ba'th rule because of his responsibility for the "massacre" of Communists in 1963, see Fedchenko, Iraq in the Struggle, pp. 261,263,295. 72. For signs of Soviet preference for the civilians in the Ba'th leadership because of their stand on the Kurdish question and the ICP in 1969-1971, see Chapter 1, pp. 35 and 40 and Chapter 1 notes 139,140, and 141. 73. MER, 1968, pp. 523,525; MENA, January 24,1969ÍDR, January 28,1969; Sa'ad Jawad, Iraq and the Kurdish Question, 1958-70 (London: Ithaca Press, 1981), p. 266; O'Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt, p. 159. 74. Pravda, June 26,1971; al-Thawra, June 25,1971. 75. Pravda, April 11,1972; al-Thawra, April 11,1972. 76. Al-Thawra, June 21,1971. Heading the Ba'th delegation at the party talks was ' Ali Ghannam, member of the Pan-Arab Command of the Ba'th.

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77. On the circumstances of Hardan Tikriti's dismissal, see Batatu, Old Social Classes, p. 1097. The murder of Hardan Tikriti on March 30,1971, in Kuwait is generally believed to have been carried out on the orders of Saddam Hussein. 78. As we shall see, a further strengthening in Saddam Hussein's position led to 'Ammash's transfer to less important posts. It should also be noted that at the beginning of the 1970s two key ministries, the defense and the interior, were still occupied by Bakr's supporters. See Chapter 1, note 96. 79. See 'Ammash's appreciation for Soviet assistance to Iraq in the sphere of oil in al-Thawra, July 16,1970; and the appreciation of 'Ammash's activities in the field of oil in Pravda, September 21,1969; Pravda, June 19,1971; and MZ 9 (September 1970), p. 130; and a favorable evaluation of 'Ammash's efforts to develop Iraqi-Soviet relations by the Soviet ambassador to Iraq in al-Thawra, October 29,1971. 80. For the text of the charter, see R. Baghdad, November 15, 19711 DR, November 17,1971; and al-Thawra, November 16,1971. 81. See the preamble of the charter and article 2 of the section, "Political System." 82. Article 3 of the section, "Political System." 83. Article 3 of the section, "Army." 84. IN A, December 31, \91UBBC, January 3,1972. 85. See the preamble of the charter. 86. See ICP's statement in al-Thawra, December 10,1971. 87. P. Demchenko, Pravda, November 21,1971; R. Petrov, NV49 (December 3,1971), pp. 20-21. 88. R. Petrov, NV 49 (December 3,1971), p. 20. 89. The ICP's response to the charter was published in al-Thawra, December 1,1971, as an expression of the Ba'th's openness. 90. R. Petrov, NV 49 (December 3,1971), pp. 20-21. 91. Pravda, August 16,1971; Kommunist (Armenia), September 15,1971. 92. For some positive Soviet references to Salih Yusefi, see Pravda, April 14 and October 29, 1970; Pravda, March 23 and August 19, 1971; and, especially, Kommunist (Armenia), September 15, 1971. Salih Yusefi also represented the DPK at celebrations of historic Soviet events {Pravda, May 10, 1972; and alThawra, December 18,1972), as well as at the ceremony marking the anniversary of the Soviet-Iraqi treaty (al-Thawra, April 9, 1973), and at an international congress of "partisans of peace" taking place in Moscow (Pravda, October 29, 1973). See also note 247. 93. al-Thawra, October 1,4, and 8,1971. 94. Khadduri, Socialist Iraq, p. 64. 95. P. Demchenko, Pravda, November 5,1971. 96. See the Kurdish section in the charter. 97. Pravda, November 17,1971; R. Petrov, NV49 (December 3,1971), p. 20. 98. See the reaction of the ICP to the charter in al-Thawra, December 1,1971. 99. Among the participants in the Soviet delegation was Arkhipov. For a list of the participants on the Soviet and Iraqi sides, see the joint communiqué in Pravda, April 11,1972; al-Thawra, April 11,1972. 100. Podgornyi, who as president visited Iraq in July 1967 (see the Introduction, p. 12), only formally outranked Prime Minister Kosygin. 101. Other important officials on the Iraqi side were Murtada Sa'd 'Abd-alBaqi; Taha al-Jazrawi, member of the R C C since November 1969 and minister of industry (considered to be close to Saddam Hussein, see MER, 1969-1970, p. 703); Sa'dun Hammadi; and Tariq 'Aziz. 102. During Podgornyi's tenure as president, he signed treaties of "friendship

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and cooperation" with Egypt in May 1971, Somalia in July 1974, and Mozambique in March 1977. He did not sign the treaty with India in August 1971, because it was signed at the foreign minister's level, nor the treaty with Angola in October 1976, which was signed by Brezhnev. In June 1977, Podgornyi was replaced as president by Brezhnev. 103. From 1969 to 1972, it was only Podgornyi who, on behalf of the Soviet Union, sent greetings to Bakr on each anniversary of the July 14,1958, coup. See, for example, Pravda, July 14,1972. 104. Kosygin met with the following Iraqi officials during their visits to the Soviet Union: Shaikhli in March 1969 (see p. 27); Hardan Tikriti and 'Ammash during their separate visits in June 1969 (see p. 31); Hammad Shihab on December 8,1969, and October 13,1970 (see Chapter 1, note 84); and Saddam Hussein in August 1970 (see p. 38). 105. Podgornyi met with Shaikhli during his visit to the Soviet Union in March 1970 (see p. 27) and also had a meeting with Saddam Hussein in February 1972, apparently because the importance of concluding a treaty with Iraq required all the members of the "troika" to have talks with Saddam Hussein. This was, in fact, the only meeting between Podgornyi, during his presidency, and Saddam Hussein. 106. On October 15,1971, al-Thawra published an editorial entitled "Progressive mankind does not respect the ceremonies [in Iran] and those taking part in them." 107. On this criterion for signing treaties between the Soviet Union and developing countries, see Anba' Mosku 16 (April 15,1972), p. 7. 108. During Brezhnev's rule (until November 1982), the Soviet Union concluded treaties with the following Afro-Asian states: (1) Egypt, on May 25,1971; (2) India, on August 9, 1971; (3) Iraq, on April 9,1972; (4) Somalia, on July 11, 1974; (5) Angola, on October 8, 1976; (6) Mozambique, on March 31, 1977; (7) Vietnam, on November 3,1978; (8) Ethiopia, on November 20,1978; (9) Afghanistan, on December 5,1978; (10) South Yemen, on October 25,1979; (11) Syria, on October 8,1980; and (12) Congo (Brazzaville), on May 13,1981. This policy was continued during the short rule of Konstantin Chernenko, who signed a treaty with North Yemen on October 9,1984. 109. The treaty is quoted from Pravda, April, 10,1972; and al-Thawra, April, 10,1972. The Russian term for "unbreakable friendship" is neriishimaia druzhba, whereas the literal translation of the Arabic termsadaqa da'ima la tanfasim 'uraha is "permanent friendship the bonds of which will not be sundered." 110. For Moscow's agreement to an Egyptian request to sign the treaty with Cairo for fifteen years, instead of twenty, in order to weaken the association with the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936, see Mohamed Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1978), p. 228. 111. Article 12 of the Soviet-Iraqi treaty provided for such extensions. 112. See Saddam Hussein's speech in Moscow in al-Jumhuriyya, February 12, 1972. 113. See Chapter 1, p. 45. It should be noted that the planned production of the inaugurated oilfields, during the first years, was five million tons annually (see 'Anba Mosku, April 8,1972, p. 10), whereas Iraq's total oil output, produced by foreign oil companies, reached eighty-four million tons in 1971. 114. Officials dealing with economics on the Soviet side were Arkhipov and Minister of Oil Valentin Shashin; on the Iraqi side they were Murtada Sa'd ' Abd'al-Baqi, Taha al-Jazrawi, and Sa'dun Hammadi. See notes 99 and 101 above. 115. Pravda, April 8,1972. 116. The world oil cartel consisted of seven giant companies—five of them US companies—with a substantial number of oil tankers under their control. The

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companies were Standard Oil of New Jersey, Gulf Oil, Standard Oil of California, Texaco, Mobil Oil, British Petroleum, and Dutch Royal Shell. On the limited ability of the Soviet Union to assist oil nationalization in the economic sphere, see A. J. Klinghoffer, The Soviet Union and International Oil Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 137; and an implicit admission by prominent Soviet oil expert B . Rachkov in MZ1 (July 1970), p. 51. 117. The phrase in article 2 of the Soviet-Iraqi treaty regarding "respect for the sovereignty . . . over all their natural resources" is similar to article 2 of the treaty with Syria (but is absent from the treaty with Egypt). Article 5 of the Soviet-Iraqi treaty resembles article 5 of the treaty with Egypt, article 3 of the treaty with South Yemen, and article 8 of the treaty with Syria. 118. On the IPC, see Chapter 1, p. 45. 119. There is no reference to the struggle against Zionism in the treaty with South Yemen as well. Yet, this subject is included in the treaties with Syria (preamble and article 3) and with North Yemen (article 5), probably at the insistence of these Arab states. 120. For Kosygin's speech, see Pravda, April 10, 1972 (cross reference, al-Thawra, April 10,1972). 121. For Syria's refusal to sign a treaty with the Soviet Union and Damascus's silence on the Soviet-Iraqi treaty, see al-Muharrir (Lebanon) in AFP, April 15, 1972IDR, April 18,1972. 122. This reaction to the treaty was hinted at in the Egyptian weekly Akhbar al-Yawm (cited by al-Thawra, April 16,1972; and NV April 21,1972, pp. 26-27). 123. R. Moscow (in Arabic), April 11 and 14,1912/DR (Soviet Union), April 12 and 17,1972. 124. 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il was secretary general of the National Front, the ruling party of South Yemen. On Isma'il's meeting with Kosygin in Iraq, see Pravda, April 10,1972. 125. This was the new name of the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (see Chapter 1, pp. 32-33). The change of name took place in January 1972, following its unification with the National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf ( N D F L O A G ) . 126. For Iraq's subversive activities against the principalities at the "party" level (as distinct from the "government" level), see Jasim M. Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran: The Years of Crisis (London: Croom Helm, 1984), pp. 79-80. For Kosygin's meeting with Isma'il in Iraq in April 1972 (see note 124) and a somewhat different assessment of the Soviet-Iraqi-South Yemeni relationship, see Stephen Page, The Soviet Union and the Yemens (New York: Praeger, 1985), p. 35. 127. R. Moscow (in Persian), February 27,1972IDR (Soviet Union), March 3,1972. 128. The joint communiqué appeared in Pravda, April 11, 1972; and alThawra, April 11,1972. 129. The two sides, as a rule, refrained from reporting these border incidents. For a single Iraqi report on an incident, see al-Jumhuriyya, January 17,1972. See also R. Tehran's claim on April 16,1972 (DR, April 17,1972), according to which the incidents had been "continuing for a long time"; and a similar assessment by a British correspondent, Robert Graham, "Iraq and Iran: Gulf Power Struggle Sharpens," New Middle East 45 (June 1972), p. 14. 130. Treaties with the Soviet Union were concluded by Somalia because of its conflict with Ethiopia, by Angola and Mozambique because of their war with insurgents supported by South Africa, by Vietnam because of its conflict with Cambodia and China, by Ethiopia because of its war with Somalia, and by Syria because of its relative isolation in the conflict with Israel following the Egyptian-

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Israeli peace treaty. For the list of Soviet treaties with Third World states, see note 108. 131. This is article 7 of the treaty with Egypt, article 9 of the treaty with Somalia, article 11 of the treaty with South Yemen, article 6 of the treaty with Syria, and article 6 of the treaty with Syria. As an exception, this article is absent in the treaty with North Yemen. 132. Article 9 of the treaty with India. 133. Article 6 of the treaty with Syria. 134. This article corresponds, to a certain extent, to article 7 of the treaty with Egypt, article 8 of the treaty with Somalia, article 6 of the treaty with Angola, article 11 of the treaty with South Yemen, article 5 of the treaty with Syria, and article 6 of the treaty with North Yemen. 135. This article corresponds to article 4 of the treaty with Somalia, article 10 of the treaty with Angola, article 5 of the treaty with South Yemen, and article 10 of the treaty with Syria. Article 8 of the treaty with Egypt is more detailed than article 9 of the treaty with Iraq. As an exception, there is no reference to military cooperation in the treaty with North Yeipen. 136. Military Balance, 1971-1972, pp. 28-29; Military Balance, 1972-1973, p. 31; Military Balance, 1973-1974, p. 32. 137. This is a generally accepted assessment. See, for example, Khadduri, Socialist Iraq, p. 147, a book based partially on conversations with the Iraqi leadership; and Financial Times, April 11,1972, in USSR and Third World, 1972, p. 215. 138. For reports on the forthcoming visit and the visit itself, see al-Thawra, April 3 and 12, 1972; Pravda, April 9, 1972; and TASS (in English), April 16, 19721DR (Soviet Union), April 17,1972. 139. TASS (in English), April 11,1972IDR (Soviet Union), April 13,1972; D. Iakovlev, MZ 5 (May 1972), p. 80. 140. Al-Thawra, April 11,1972. 141. On the political level, in August 1972 the Iraqi foreign minister visited India, and in May 1973 the Indian foreign minister visited Iraq, voicing criticism over the Iranian military buildup. See al-Thawra, May 25,1973. On the economic level, India purchased Iraqi oil; on the military level, in May 1972 the commander of the Indian west fleet paid a visit to Iraq, and in September Iraq was visited by the commander of the Indian air force and an Indian military delegation. See ARR 1972, p. 254; INA September 13,1972/DR, September 14,1972; and al-Thawra, September 29,1972. For Soviet relations with India and Iraq in the context of the Iranian buildup, see Pravda, June 21,1973; and Horn, Soviet-Indian Relations, p. 88. However, from the end of 1973, Iran initiated a rapprochement with India, recognizing Bangladesh in February 1974 (the same month Bangladesh was recognized by Pakistan). 142. Al-Thawra, July 9,1972; Pravda, July 9,1972. See also al-Thawra, July 14 and 16 and August 1,1972. 143. Pravda, June 10 and 14,1972. See also R. Moscow (in Persian), June 17, 1972IDR (Soviet Union), June 19,1972. 144. This w ^ j implied by Podgornyi's visit to Turkey, from April 11 to 17, 1972, only two days after the conclusion of the treaty with Iraq. See also R. Moscow (in Turkish), June 14,1912/DR (Soviet Union), June 15,1972. 145. Al-Thawra, April 16,1972; R. Tehran, April 15,1972/DR, April 17,1972. 146. Graham, "Iraq and Iran," p. 14. See also Daily Telegraph, April 15,1972, in A. Yodfat, "Soviet-Iraqi Relations," Hamizrakh Hekhadash (in Hebrew) 24, nos. 1 - 2 (1974), p. 38. 147. Al-Thawra, April 17, 1972. The name of the Sovet commentator was

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Vladimir L. Kudriavtsev, who was a member of the Supreme Soviet as well. 148. In addition to 'Aziz Muhammad, the ICP delegation included Zaki Khayri, member of the Politburo, and 'Amir 'Abdallah, member of the Central Committee. It was the first meeting in Iraq during the Ba'th rule between a Soviet official and local Communists reported by Soviet media. The Kurdish delegation at the talks with Kosygin included Politburo members Muhammad Mahmud 'Abd-al-Rahman, Salih Yusefi, Nuri Shawis, and 'Ali Abdallah, and Central Committee members Ihsan Shirzad and Dara Tawfiq. See al-Thawra, April 9, 1972; and Pravda, April 10,1972. 149. Pravda, April 10,1972. 150. See p. 71. 151. This article also appeared in article 2 of the treaty with Egypt (plus an important addendum), article 2 of the treaty with Angola, article 2 of the treaty with South Yemen, and article 7 of the treaty with Syria. As an exception, the article paralleling article 2 of the Soviet-Iraqi treaty was absent from the SovietNorth Yemeni treaty, if only because North Yemen was not considered a "socialist-oriented" state by Moscow. 152. Pravda, June 10,1972. 153. For Bakr's speech, see al-Thawra, April 10, 1972 (cross reference, Pravda, April 10,1972). 154. Al-Thawra, November 16,1972. 155. Le Figaro in AFP, April 10,1972IDR, April 11,1972. 156. See p. 70. 157. Al-Thawra, April 16,1972; al-Nida', April 12,1972, in Batatu, Old Social Classes p. 1108. 158. Al-Thawra, April 12,1972; IN A, May 7,1972IDR, May 8,1972. 159. R. Baghdad, May 14, 1972/Di?, May 15, 1972. The new government comprised altogether thirty ministers. 160. Pravda, May 17,1972. 161. On the inclusion of the Communists in the government as a means to obtain "popular" support in the confrontation against oil companies, see The Political Report Adopted by the Eighth Regional Congress of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party (Baghdad, 1974), p. 91 (hereafter, The 8th Congress of the Ba'th). 162. IN A, June 2,1972IDR, June 7,1972. 163. Pravda, May 24 and June 1, 1972; R. Moscow (in Arabic), May 29, 1972/Di? (Soviet Union), May 31,1972. 164. See, for example, Pravda, June 3 and 4,1972; R. Andreasian, MEMO 12 (December 1972), p. 109. 165. Pravda, June 8,1972; al-Thawra, June 8,1972. 166. Pravda, June 8,1972; R. Moscow, June 9,19721DR (Soviet Union), June 12,1972. 167. Such further deliberations included Taha al-Jazrawi's visit to Moscow from August 28 to September 6,1972. The extensive coverage of Taha al-Jazrawi's visit by the Soviet media seemed to have indicated Moscow's favorable disposition toward him, stemming from his closeness to Saddam Hussein (see note 101) or his own views. For Moscow's reports on the visit, see Pravda, August 28, 29, 30, and 31 and September 1, 6, and 7,1972; Anba'Mosku 36 (September 9,1972), p. 10; and NV 37 (September 8,1972), p. 15. 168. Klinghoffer, p. 137. ^ 169. See pp. 71-72 above. 170. See Appendix 1, Table 1. 171. Klinghoffer, p. 138. 172. Al-Thawra, June 20,1972.

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173. Pravda, June 20,1972; Izvestiia, June 21,1972. 174. UPI, October 11, 1972, in ARR, 1972, p. 475; AFP, May 25,1973IDR, May 30, 1973. See also IN A, September 4, 1972IDR, September 5, 1972; and Izvestiia, September 30,1972. 175. The only states that were not members of the Warsaw Pact and yet were full members of the Comecon were the following: Mongolia, Cuba (since 1972), and Vietnam (since 1978). South Yemen since 1979 and Afghanistan since 1980 had participated in Comecon activities as observers. 176. See note 175. 177. B. Mikhailov, AAS 4 (April 1973), pp. 20-23. 178. AFP, May 25,1973IDR, May 30,1973. 179. Klinghoffer, p. 138. 180. Pravda, July 21,1972. It should be noted that Iraq already ratified the treaty with the Soviet Union on April 25,1972, and the Soviet Union ratified that treaty on June 13. 181. This Soviet aim was hinted at by R. Moscow (in Arabic), July 23,1972/73/? (Soviet Union), July 24,1972. 182. R. Petrov, MZ 10 (October 1972), pp. 32, 38. The article was submitted in August 31-September 8 and authorized September 21. The article listed the "progressive" Arab states in the following order: Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Algeria, and South Yemen! It is also noteworthy that the greetings of Arab heads of state to the Soviet leadership on the anniversary of the October revolution were published by Pravda first for Iraq (Pravda, November 7,1972); and then for South Yemen, Syria, and Egypt (Pravda, November 8,1972). 183. See p. 60. 184. As mentioned, since 1967 India represented Iraqi interests in the United States, and Belgium looked after US interests in Iraq. See Chapter 1, p. 25. 185. Al-Thawra, July 30 and August 1,1972. 186. For Iraq's openness to improve relations with the United States, as well as with Britain and West Germany, see an editorial in al-Thawra, October 3,1972. 187. R. Moscow (in Arabic), August 1 and 4, 1972IBBC (Soviet Union), August 3 and 7, 1972. For a single hint of Soviet suspicions that Baghdad's openness toward the United States was not so limited, see Pravda, October 31, 1972. 188. See Bakr's speech in R. Baghdad, August 17,1972/7)7?, August 17,1972. 189. For indications of this Iraqi trend, see an editorial in al-Thawra, October 3,1972, and a statement attributed by 7?. Baghdad on August 3,1972 (DR [Soviet Union], August 4,1972) to the Soviet ambassador in Iraq. 190. See p. 67. 191. Pravda, September 15,1972. 192. Additional Soviet officials taking part in the talks with Bakr were Gromyko; Grechko; V. V. Kuznetsov, first deputy foreign minister; and Viktor G. Kulikov, first deputy defense minister and chief of staff. The dinner given in Bakr's honor on September 14,1972, was attended by seven out of the fifteen Politburo members, including all the "troika," and also by Iurii Andropov, alternate member of the Politburo and head of the KGB (Pravda, September 15,1972). Andropov was also in the Soviet party welcoming Bakr on his arrival at Moscow's airport and seeing him off on his departure (Pravda, September 15 and 20,1972), although he did not participate in the talks. 193. Pravda, September 15 and 16,1972. 194. Bakr's first visit abroad was to Libya and Algeria in June 1970. 195. Bakr's visit to the Soviet Union was preceded by that o f ' Abd-al-Rahman 'Arif in July 1967. See the Introduction, p. 12. The Bakr-headed delegation

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included Murtada Sa'd 'Abd-al-Baqi, Sa'dun Ghaidan, Tariq 'Aziz, and ' Abd-alJabbar Shanshal. 196. Pravda, September 15,1972. 197. Al-Thawra, September 15 and 16,1972. 198. Pravda, September 20,1972; al-Thawra, September 20,1972. 199. For example, Anba' Mosku 21 (May 26,1973), p. 5; and Pravda, July 21 and September 28,1973. 200. R. Petrov, Pravda, September 29,1972; V. Rumiantsev, NV 9 (March 2, 1973), p. 23. 201. From the summer of 1972 to January 1973, Iraq and Syria were at odds over the rate of revenues Baghdad had to defray to Damascus for the use of the trans-Syrian pipeline for transporting Iraqi oil. 202. As was the case for the two previous trips of Saddam Hussein to the Soviet Union, in 1970 and 1972, the visit in 1973 was at the invitation of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet government. Additional officials in the Iraqi delegation were Murtada Sa'd 'Abda-al-Baqi and Tariq 'Aziz; Soviet officials included Gromyko and Ponomarev. See Pravda, March 25,1973; and al-Thawra, March 25,1973. 203. Pravda, March 25,1973; al-Thawra, March 25,1973. This "friendly"—as distinct from "official"—visit of Saddam Hussein in 1973 did not require a "joint statement" to be issued. 204. Al-Thawra, March 19,1973. 205. Pravda, March 23,1973; al-Thawra, March 23,1973; hvestiia, March 24, 1973. 206. Al-Thawra, March 23,1973; Pravda, March 23,1973. 207. For a tactical change in Iraq's attitude toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, see al-Thawra, February 25 and 26,1973; see also Bakr's speech in al-Thawra, July 17,1973. See the differences of style on this issue between the charter for National Action of 1971 (al-Thawra, November 16, 1971) and the revised version of this charter in 1973 (al-Thawra, August 26,1973). 208. See Saddam Hussein's cautious approach toward the Middle East dispute in an interview with the New York Times, July 15,1973, evidently designed to mend relations with the United States. 209. For a previous discussion of this subject, see pp. 66-67. 210. Pravda, February 18,1972; al-Jumhuriyya, February 18,1972. 211. Pravda, March 25,1973; al-Thawra, March 25,1973. 212. The joint communiqué at the conclusion of Bakr's visit stated that the talks had been conducted "in the spirit of friendship, frankness, and mutual understanding" (see Pravda, September 20,1972; and al-Thawra, September 20, 1972). Another example is Kosygin's speech in honor of Saddam Hussein in March 1973, which referred to him twice as "comrade," whereas in that speech Bakr, whose name appeared three times, was never given the title "comrade" (see Pravda, March 23,1973). 213. The phrase "comradely atmosphere" was absent from the joint statements at the end of the visits to the Soviet Union of the following Arab leaders: Sadat {Pravda, February 5 and April 30,1972); Asad (Pravda, July 9,1972); Salim Rubay' 'Ali, president of South Yemen (Pravda, November 26,1972); and 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, prime minister of South Yemen (Pravda, March 9,1973). 214. Bakr's interview in Borba (Belgrade), May 5,1972IDR, May 9,1972. 215. Al-Thawra, July 18,1972. 216. For the joint communiqué, see Pravda, September 20, 1972; and alThawra, September 20,1972. Similar formulae on the Shatt-al-Arab were included in the joint statements of August 1970, June 1971, and February 1972; and on the

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Gulf in the joint statements of June 1971 and February 1972. See Chapter 1, pp. 31-32 and Chapter 2, pp. 59-60 and 65. 217. Pravda, September 15,1972. 218. Pravda, March 21,1972. For indications of the Soviet interest in gaining the support of the Arab states for its scheme, see "Observer," Izvestiia, October 31,1972; and V. Kudriavtsev, MZ 11 (November 1973), p. 117. 219. To strengthen the assumption on Iraq's role in including territorial integrity in the statement of September 1972, see an Iraqi-Algerian communiqué at the end of Bakr's trip to Algiers in al-Jumhuriyya, June 26,1970, which closely related the issue of Iraq's territorial integrity to the problem of the Shatt-al-Arab. See also the communiqué between an Iraqi "public" organization and the Soviet Committee for Peace in al-Thawra, May 8,1972. It should be noted that the Soviet Committee for Peace, being ostensibly an unofficial organization, afforded itself to come closer than the official Soviet stand to endorsing Iraq's position on the conflict with Iran. 220. See notes 192 and 195. Hammad Shihab did not participate in the talks, but had already visited the Soviet Union from July 31 to August 23, 1972, and again in December 1972. See Krasnaia zvezda, August 2, 1972; and al-Thawra, August 2, 23, and 30 and December 26 and 28,1972. 221. This term is "defense capacity" in the Soviet version, and "military capacity" in the Iraqi version. 222. See note 42; the joint communiqué at the conclusion of Grechko's visit to Iraq in December 1971 (p. 63); the joint communiqué at the end of Saddam Hussein's visit to the Soviet Union in February 1972 (al-Jumhuriyya, February 18, 1972; and Pravda, February 18,1972); and the joint communiqué at the conclusion of Kosygin's visit to Iraq in April 1972 (p. 74). 223. From June 1972 to June 1973, the number of T-54/55 Soviet tanks in Iraq's army increased from 800 to 900, SU-7 fighter-bombers increased from 48 to 60, and MiG-21 interceptors increased from 80 to 90. Also, Iraq's navy received three Osa patrol boats and two minesweepers. See Military Balance, 1973-1974, p. 32. 224. On Iran's reaction to the Soviet-Iraqi treaty, see Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy, pp. 350, 368; and Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1982), p. 675. 225. Pravda, October 13,1972. 226. Pravda, October 11,1972. 227. See "Observer," Izvestiia, October 31,1972, quoting also Tehran Journal. 228. Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy, p. 350. See also the theory on the division of labor between Kosygin and Podgornyi regarding the handling of the Iraq-Iran problem (p. 70 in this text). 229. Pravda, March 16,1973; "bellicose" is the meaning of voinstvennaia, the actual word used. 230. Financial Times, March 22,1973, and Times, June 2,1973, in USSR and Third World (1973), pp. 175 and 319. 231. Pravda, March 23, 1973 (emphasis added); "comrades in arms" is the meaning of soratniki, the word used by Kosygin. 232. Because of some Saudi closeness to Iran, tension between Baghdad and Riyadh had been discernible since 1970. For Iraq's verbal attacks on Saudi Arabia, see, for example, al-Thawra, December 12 and 31,1972; and al-Thawra, March 5 and 12 and May 11 and 28,1973. 233. See, for example, A. Vasil'ev, Pravda, June 10,1973; and R. Petrov, NV 23 (June 8,1973), p. 5. 234. For condemnation of Iran's policy on this issue, see Anba' Mosku 46

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1973

(November 18,1972), p. 7. 235. On China's preference for developing relations with Iran rather than Iraq since 1971, see p. 60. On China's indirect siding with Iran in its conflict with Iraq, see a statement by the Chinese foreign minister on a visit to Iran in R. Tehran, June 15,1913/DR, June 18,1973. 236. See Bakr's speech in al-Thawra, July 17,1973. In addition, from June 14 to 18,1973, an Iraqi delegation headed by a member of the R C C 'Izzat Mustafa visited China. 237. V. Sinegubov, Krasnaia zvezda, April 20,1973. 238. Efraim Karsh, "Soviet Arms Transfers to the Middle East in the 1970s," Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies (Tel Aviv), Paper no. 22, December 1983, p. 45. See also The New York Times, October 3,1973. 239. For Baghdad's territorial claims, see Saddam Hussein in R. Baghdad, October 17, 1971IDR, October 18, 1971; and Murtada Sa'd 'Abd-al-Baqi in al-Thawra, May 4,1972. 240. MENA, March 27,1973/DR, March 27,1973; MENA, April 4,1973/DÄ, April 4,1973. 241. Al-Ray al-'Amm (Kuwait) in MENA, April 9,1973/Dfi, April 9,1973. 242. Anne M. Kelly, "The Soviet Naval Presence During the Iraqi-Kuwaiti Border Dispute," in Michael McGuire, Ken Booth, and John McDonnell (eds.), Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 287-306. 243. NV14 (April 6,1973), p. 7. 244. See p. 92. 245. See the Shah's conversation with Kissinger in Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 675. 246. On military assistance to the Kurds from Iran, the United States, and Israel, see Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question, pp. 140-143; Jawad, Iraq and the Kurdish Question, p. 312; and Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1265. 247. See note 155 and Barzani's interview with The Washington Post, June 22,1973, in ARR, 1973, p. 271. (The interview of 1973 was basically in line with Barzani's interview with The New York Times in August 1962. See Schmidt, Journey Among the Brave, p. 204.) At the end of 1972, Barzani could still pay lip service to the Soviet Union in the form of a friendly statement (see al-Taakhi, December 23,1972). According to a source within the DPK, the only member of the Kurdish leadership who opposed the alliance with the Shah and the United States in 1972 was Salih Yusefi. See Ismet Shariff Vanly, "Kurdistan in Iraq," in Gerard Chaliand (ed.), People Without a Country (London: Zed Press, 1980), pp. 189-190. 248. Al-Thawra, July 25, 26, and 27, 1972. The March accord allowed the Kurds to keep some of their forces, called the Pesh Merga, intact, ostensibly as border guards in the pay of the central government. 249. For data on these two personalities, see Chapter 1, p. 40. 250. This can be concluded from the Soviet statement on the meeting in Pravda, August 26,1972. 251.Ibid. 252. See a favorable reference to the Soviet-Iraqi treaty in an editorial of al-Taakhi, December 21,1972. 253. Pravda, September 20,1972; al-Thawra, September 20,1972. Al-Taakhi's version of September 20,1972, was identical to that in al-Thawra. 254. To strengthen our assumption that the absence of an explicit reference to the Ba'th was meaningful, it should be noted that the same communiqué contained the following passage: "The Soviet side highly appreciated the progrès-

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sive course carried out by the Iraqi government under the leadership of the Ba'th party"—a clear reference to the subject of who was carrying out the "progressive" policy. 255. See pp. 84-85. 256. See a discussion of Bakr's visit to the Soviet Union in September 1972 in the context of the Soviet-Egyptian crisis and the Iraq-Iran dispute on pp. 80-82 and 84-85. 257. For the complete text of the memorandum, see al-Thawra, November 16,1972. 258. Ibid. For additional examples, see al-Thawra, October 31 and November 15,1972. 259. Al-Taakhi, December 21,1972. 260. Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question, p. 126. Ghareeb relies on his interview with Mukarram Talbani on November 20,1976, which corroborates reports from the fall of 1972 to the effect that Talbani's trip to Moscow at that time was related to the Kurdish question. 261.Ibid. 262. Al-Nahar in MENA, November 8, \91HDR, November 8,1972. The war of words against the DPK in July and October-November 1972 was waged by al-Thawra, a newspaper controlled by Saddam Hussein. 263. A. Matiushin, AAS 8 (August 1972), p. 43; Viktor Kudriavtsev, AAS 1 (January 1973), p. 24 (the article was authorized for printing in December 1972). 264. See pp. 66-67 and note 72. 265. Al-Thawra, November 16,1972. 266. See subsequent revelations by the regime in al-Thawra, August 27,1973, and a statement by the Ba'th-Communist front on September 27, 1973 (DR, September 28,1973). 267. Viktor Kudriavtsev, AAS 1 (January 1973), pp. 24,25. 268. E. Primakov, Pravda, March 10,1973. 269. See Muhammad Fadil, a member of the Regional Command of the Ba'th, in R. Baghdad, April 7,1973/DR, April 20,1973; and Bakr in al-Thawra, May 2, 1973. 270. Vladimir Kudriavtzev, Izvestiia, June 8,1972. 271. See the joint communiqué in Pravda, September 20,1972; and al-Thawra, September 20,1972. 272. Ibid. 273. See al-Jumhuriyya, February 18,1972; Pravda, February 18,1972; note 271; Pravda, March 25,1973; al-Thawra, March 25,1973. 274. Pravda, June 20 and July 4,1973. 275. R. Ul'ianovskii (deputy head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU), NV41 (October 6,1972), p. 20. On Moscow's coming closer to supporting the ICP's demands in general terms, see a report on a meeting of Suslov, Ponomarev, and Ul'ianovskii with 'Aziz Muhammad in Pravda, October 21,1972. 276. On a call to purge government institutions, see also 'Aziz Muhammad, Agitator 10 (May 1973), p. 53. 277. Khadduri, Socialist Iraq, p. 63. 278. Al-Thawra, July 2 and 9,1973. Presiding over the special tribunal that sentenced the conspirators was 'Izzat al-Duri—an indication of his closeness to Saddam Hussein at that time. 279. Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question, p. 128. 280. ' Abd-al-Khaliq al-Samarra'i was sentenced to life imprisonment. However, he was executed following Saddam Hussein's assumption of power in 1979

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for alleged participation in a coup while serving his sentence. 281. For indications that 'Abd-al-Khaliq al-Samarra'i's views were relatively close to Moscow's, see Chapter 1, note 139; E. Primakov, Pravda, January 29,1970, and March 10,1973; and al-Akhbar (Beirut), November 25,1912/DR, December 5, 1972. The Soviets confined themselves to reporting the official version of Kazzar's plot, including the alleged involvement of Samarra'i. See Pravda, July 3, 10, and 11,1973. 282. For Ponomarev's participation in the talks with Saddam Hussein in March 1973, see note 202. No reference to the front was made in the Soviet-Iraqi statement at the end of Saddam Hussein's visit. 283. Rashidov headed the most important Muslim republic of the Soviet Union and was one of the eminent Muslims in the Soviet hierarchy in the Brezhnev period. Because of his Muslim descent, the Kremlin occasionally dispatched him on missions to Arab countries. His full name was Sharif Rashidovich Rashidov—a "Russianized" form of the original Arab name Rashid. 284. On Rashidov's visit to Iraq, see Pravda, July 14,18,19,20, and 21,1973; and Pravda vostoka, July 19,1973. On his meeting with Bakr; see al-Thawra, July 19,1973. 285. For the text of the charter and the rules of the front, see al-Thawra, August 26,1973; and BBC, August 30 and 31,1973. 286. Pravda, September 17,1973. According to a Soviet source, the circulation of Tariq al-Sha'b at the beginning of 1977 was twenty-five thousand copies. See TASS (in English), January 9,1911/DR (Soviet Union), January 14,1977. 287. Articles 2 and 3 of the rules stipulate this membership distribution. The two parties were the Progressive Nationalists and the Independent Democrats, with the former having a Nasserite inclination and the latter having liberal-left tendencies. These parties joined the front only in 1975. See Richard F. Nyron (ed.), Iraq, a Country Study, 3rd ed. (Washington D.C.: The American University, 1979), p. 200. 288. Al-Anwar (Beirut) in MEN A, June 27,1973/DR, June 27,1973. 289. Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question, p. 129. 290. See, for example, Pravda, July 19, 27, 28, and 29,1973. 291. Al-Thawra, August 15 and 16,1973; TASS (in English), August 14,1973, and R. Moscow (in Arabic), August 14,1973/DR (Soviet Union), August 15,1973. 292. See note 291. 293. For example, Pravda published the rules of the front only on April 30, 1974. 294. Pravda, July 19, 27, 28, and 29, and August 21,1973.

3 The Beginning of the Decline: Iraq Moves Toward Solving the Dispute with Iran, July 1973-May 1975

Iraq Starts Diversifying Its International Relations (Summer 1973-Winter 1975) In a comprehensive interview with Western correspondents in mid-July 1973, Saddam Hussein stated Iraq's interest in a rapprochement with the West in the economic and political fields. He admitted that the main markets for Iraqi oil were in the West and, while pointing out that until the present the US and British policies toward Iraq had been hostile, asserted that Iraq would never close the door to any possible development that might take place in the policies of these countries. Moreover, to obtain Western credibility, Saddam Hussein stressed Iraq's refusal to be "a political or economic satellite of anyone, including the Soviet Union," adding that his country was willing to maintain "neutrality in international conflicts."1 Although signs of Iraq's openness toward the United States had appeared in the summer of 1972,2 with suitable conditions for expanding Iraq's economic ties with the West created in the spring of 1973,3 on this occasion Saddam Hussein went further: he clearly announced Iraq's willingness to deviate from its pro-Soviet orientation and improve relations with the West. Even if Bakr approved of the policy of loosening ties with the Soviet Union, he did not initiate it. In general, as a sixty-year-old statesman in poor health, Bakr opted for conducting a more cautious policy on a variety of issues—among them the weakening of relations with the Soviets—than his younger and more ambitious colleague. Accordingly, since mid-1973 the Soviet attitude toward Bakr had been improving. For example, in July 1973, Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgornyi dispatched a joint congratulatory note to Bakr on the anniversary of the July 14,1958, coup—a note that until then had been sent by Podgornyi only.4 At the same time, signs of Moscow's special appreciation for Saddam Hussein were disappearing. For instance, the Soviet-Iraqi "statement" at the conclusion of Saddam 111

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Hussein's visit to the Soviet Union in February 1974 failed to describe the atmosphere in the talks as "comradely," a particularly warm term that had been used in Soviet-Iraqi statements at the end of Saddam Hussein's two previous trips to Moscow.5 Saddam Hussein's initiative to advance relations with the West, along with his distinction between the United States and Western Europe, was canonized by the Eighth Regional [Iraqi] Congress of the Ba'th convened in Baghdad from January 8 to 12,1974. Although arguing that the contradiction between Iraq and the United States was "basic, sharp and long-ranged," the Congress, as an innovation, assented to expanding Iraq's relations with the United States in, and only in, the economic field. As to other Western countries, the Eighth Congress contended that some of them had adopted a sympathetic attitude toward the Arabs, and hence sanctioned promoting relations with Western Europe and Japan in both the political and economic spheres.6 The Congress also dwelt on the importance of developing Iraq's ties with China.7 All in all, by implying a need to diversify Iraq's foreign relations, Baghdad strove to lessen its overdependence on Moscow. Nonetheless, the Eighth Congress still expressed Iraq's willingness to sustain the centrality of the USSR in Iraq's overall foreign ties. At the ideological level, the Congress asserted that the Soviet Union and the Socialist states were the greatest forces of the world revolution, of which the Arab revolution was a part. Accordingly, the Congress reaffirmed the slogan of "strategic alliance" with the Soviet Union and the Socialist states and referred to the Iraqi-Soviet treaty.8 In line with the policy formulated by the Eighth Congress of the Ba'th, on February 28,1974, Iraq restored diplomatic relations with West Germany,9 and on April 10 with Britain. 10 That year also witnessed a tremendous growth in Iraq's imports from Western states, especially Japan, West Germany, and the United States. Iraq's imports from Japan increased from $61 million in 1973 to $269 million in 1974, imports from West Germany from $36 million to $191 million, and those from the United States from $50 million to $188 million. Japan's share of Iraq's total imports rose from 7 percent in 1973 to 11 percent in 1974, that of West Germany from 4 to 8 percent, and that of the United States from 5.5 to 8 percent.11 China's share in Iraq's total imports decreased from 4 percent in 1973 to 2 percent in 197412 because Beijing could not compete with Western technology. At the political level, Beijing still considered Baghdad proSoviet and was not responsive to Baghdad's initiatives for better relations, but displayed sympathy for the pro-Western regime of the Shah.13 Compared with the remarkable surge in Iraq's imports from the great industrial nations of the West, Iraq's imports from the Soviet Union grew

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moderately, from $79 million in 1973 to $108 million in 1974. This meant that the Soviet Union's share, in Iraq's imports shrank from 9 percent in 1973—the year the Soviet Union and Britain were the largest suppliers of Iraq— to 5 percent in 1974. 14 The share of the entire Soviet bloc in Iraq's total imports decreased from 21 percent in 1973 to 13 percent in 1974. 15 In 1974, as at the beginning of the 1970s, the Soviet Union exported industrial produce to Iraq and imported mainly oil and dates from that country. 16 In 1973, Soviet purchases of Iraqi oil culminated in 11 million tons (out of a total Soviet import of 14.7 million tons), but declined to 3.8 million tons in 1974.17 As noted, in early 1973, with the upward trend in oil prices on the international market, Iraq was already discontented with its barter agreements for providing oil to the Soviets and demanded hard currency for new deals.18 The Soviet Union consequently decreased its imports of Iraqi oil. It is noteworthy that the Soviets resold some of the oil they imported from Iraq to Iraq's own customers in Western Europe at a lower price than Iraq demanded—a practice that drew Baghdad's protest.19 However, despite the difficulties in Soviet-Iraqi economic relations, the USSR still maintained an important role in Iraq's economy, continuing to develop the oilfields in North Rumaila, construct electric power stations, and dig the Tharthar-Euphrates canal, to be completed in 1976.20 The quadrupling of oil prices after the October war was the main reason for the shift in Iraq's foreign relations. The enormous growth in oil revenues brought about an expansion in Iraq's development programs beyond the aid capacity of the Soviet bloc and impelled Iraq to seek Western assistance. The extraordinary oil revenues also enabled Baghdad to buy more Western technology and produce,21 which were superior to that supplied by the Soviets. While diminishing its dependence on the Soviet Union in the economic field, Iraq was also taking steps, however small, to reduce its almost total reliance on the Soviets in the military sphere. Thus, following the visit of French premier Jacques Chirac to Iraq at the end of 1974, in January 1975 Iraq reportedly signed an arms accord with France for the supply of forty helicopters.22

Changes in Moscow's Attitude Toward the Iraq-Iran Dispute (Summer-Fall 1973) In summer 1973, Baghdad continued to show readiness to concede to Tehran's claim regarding the Shatt-al-Arab in return for the complete termination of Iran's military links with the Iraqi Kurds. 23 For example,

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Bakr declared that "common sense dictates that neighboring states should live in peaceful coexistence and solve their problems through mutual understanding of rights and interests of all the parties,"24 refraining from calling upon Iran to comply with the border treaty of 1937. Besides the pressing Kurdish problem, the fact that Iraq's overtures to Iran coincided with Baghdad's incipient diversification of foreign relations suggested that there was yet another motive for Iraq's conciliatory attitude. Iraq was seeking to remove the main reason for its need of Soviet support in order to pave the way for a rapprochement with the West. Iraq's flexibility over the question of Shatt-al-Arab coupled with its initiative to promote relations with the West and its first moves to loosen ties with the Soviets suggested that the Ba'th was, to a certain extent, suffering from revolutionary fatigue. All in all, the Ba'th was moving away from its policy of intransigent and fruitless confrontation with adversary states and regimes toward a policy of peaceful coexistence and cooperation—a turnaround that sooner or later takes place in the politics of all revolutionary regimes, as it did in the Bolshevik one itself. During Iranian Prime Minister Hoveida's visit to the Soviet Union in August 1973, Kosygin expressed criticism of Iran's excessive military buildup in stronger terms than during his speech in Iran in March 1973. Nevertheless, Kosygin reaffirmed Soviet willingness to maintain friendly relations with Iran and alluded to Moscow's continued efforts to mediate between Iran and Iraq. In an indirect reference to the Iraq-Iran conflict, he also noted: "Obviously, to strengthen confidence [among states], international treaties and agreements should be scrupulously observed."25 This intimation to Iran to adhere to the 1937 treaty on the Shatt-al-Arab came at a time when Iraq itself was showing flexibility on this treaty. It seems, therefore, that the Soviet Union desired to discourage Iraq from offering concessions on the Shatt-al-Arab and so maintain the controlled tension between Iraq and Iran. The emergence of a Soviet interest in continued, limited tension between Iraq and Iran can be explained by Iran's increasing ties with the United States. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the Soviets had hoped that their policy of appeasement toward Iran would weaken Tehran's relationship with Washington, and, from 1972, that Iran's rush to procure US weapons might slow down, the Iraq-Iran dispute impeded these Soviet goals. However, when Moscow saw that Iran's rearmament was accelerating, it began to doubt whether this process would be curbed, even if a settlement to the Iraq-Iran dispute was reached. Moreover, before the early 1970s, Iraq did not yet occupy a significant place in Soviet policy. Therefore, the opportunity the Iraq-Iran dispute gave the Soviets to advance relations with Iraq was of secondary importance to the USSR, which reacted cautiously to Iraq's initiatives to cement close ties. How-

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ever, in mid-1973, just when Iraq desired to loosen ties with the Soviets, the U S S R became interested in consolidating its links with Iraq to counterpoise the intensifying US-Iranian relationship. The Soviet Union's diminishing expectations of Iran and growing interest in relations with Iraq produced a change in Moscow's position on the Iraq-Iran dispute. Although in public the Soviet Union persistently urged a peaceful settlement to the conflict, from mid-1973, as Kosygin's above-mentioned statement revealed, Soviet interest in a solution to this conflict became ambivalent. On the one hand, a settlement of the IraqIran dispute could moderate the military ties between Tehran and Washington and give Moscow a role in the settlement to raise Soviet prestige. The likelihood of such an outcome was, however, small. On the other hand, it was far more probable that a solution of the Iraq conflict would precipitate the process already discerned in Iraq's foreign policy— the weakening of Iraq's pro-Soviet orientation and consequent restriction of Soviet use of military installations in Iraq. The Soviets therefore preferred to maintain a certain tension in Iraq-Iran relations. To sum up, the Soviet Union had apprehensions over a complete settlement to the Iraq-Iran conflict for the same reason that, among others, influenced Iraq to favor a settlement—the creation of the prerequisite for substantially weakening Baghdad's ties with Moscow. On October 7, 1973, a day after the outbreak of the October war, Baghdad announced its decision to restore diplomatic ties with Tehran. It can be argued that the October war provided Iraq with the opportune moment to implement its conciliatory policy toward Iran under cover of an all-Arab interest: to enable Iraq to dispatch its troops to the war against Israel. Yet, an equally important motive was to induce Iran to cut its military aid to the Kurds.26 From the restoration of diplomatic ties between Iraq and Iran in October 1973 to February 1974, relations between the two states seemed, on the surface, to have been normal. However, during this period, no progress was made in resolving the outstanding problems between Baghdad and Tehran, namely the Shatt-al-Arab and Iran's assistance to the Kurds. Radio Moscow's broadcasts on October 9 and 10,1973, welcomed the re-establishment of diplomatic links between Iraq and Iran, 27 but on the whole the Soviet media paid scant attention to this event and made no evaluation of Iraq's move either during the October war or after. 28 The limited coverage of the event indicated that Moscow was not enthusiastic about it, to say the least. Although the Soviet Union could regard Iraq's renewal of diplomatic relations with Iran as a positive step that might facilitate Iraq's participation in the October war, it feared that any step that promoted a solution to the Iraq-Iran dispute would do more to enfeeble Baghdad's ties with Moscow than

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diminish Tehran's military relations with Washington.

Developments in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean (December 1973-February 1975) In December 1973, Iran augmented its involvement in Oman 29 by dispatching about two to three thousand troops to take part in the fight against the P F L O A G alongside the army of the sultanate, estimated at around ten thousand. (Notably, in August 1974 the P F L O A G changed its name to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman [PFLO], indicating that its goal was confined to liberating Oman, and no longer extended to the shaikhdoms of the Gulf.) Given the Soviet military support for the P F L O A G through South Yemen, Iran's support for the opposite side created a certain irritant in Soviet-Iranian relations. Indeed, following Iran's intervention in Oman, the Soviet Union apparently urged increased military aid by the Arab states in general and Iraq in particular to the P F L O A G . 3 0 Iran's intervention in an Arab state in the Gulf was naturally a matter of concern to Iraq, especially as tension between Iraq and Iran re-erupted in February-March 1974 because of Baghdad's war against the Kurds, and lasted until the Algiers agreement of March 1975. 31 Accordingly, Iraq increased its political, and apparently also military, support for the rebels in Oman. Moscow and Baghdad did not, however, have the same goals regarding Oman. Whereas the Soviet Union aimed not only to bring about the withdrawal of Iran's troops from Oman but also to depose the regime of Sultan Qabus, Iraq was mainly interested in ending Iran's military presence in Oman, and not in installing a regime headed by the Marxist P F L O A G . Iraq's attitude to the Omani regime was naturally part of its overall policy toward the Gulf states. On April 8 , 1 9 7 4 , Saddam Hussein initiated a rapprochement with the conservative Gulf states, inviting them to set up a regional organization to preserve the Arabism of the Gulf. 32 After Saudi Arabia imposed an oil embargo on the United States in the October war, the Soviet Union also tried to improve relations with Riyadh. When, however, the Saudi oil embargo was lifted in March 1974, and Riyadh continued to maintain close relations with Washington and employ its vast financial resources to diminish Soviet influence in Egypt and Syria, Moscow gradually renewed its hostile attitude to Saudi Arabia. Therefore, Iraq's intensified efforts to better relations with the conservative Gulf states at the end of 1974 and the beginning of 1975, coupled with the attempt to establish a regional organization with the basically antiSoviet Riyadh, clearly contravened Soviet interests. The Arab oil embargo against the United States during the October

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war and the increased importance of the Gulf's oil for the industrial West, raised the US stake in maintaining a military presence near the Gulf. From the beginning of 1974, the United States worked to convert its communications facilities on the Diego Garcia island in the Indian Ocean into a big naval and air base. At least partially in response to this buildup, the Soviet stake in preserving and obtaining military installations in friendly states in the region of the Indian Ocean, namely Somalia, South Yemen, and Iraq, also grew. However, in early 1975, Baghdad's desire to improve relations with Riyadh and the West strengthened and it probably curtailed Soviet use of military facilities on its territory.33

Clashes Between the ICP and the DPK, and Ponomarev's Visit to Iraq (November 1973) Armed clashes between the ICP and the DPK in the Kurdish region had occurred even before the formation of the front.34 These clashes intensified in early November 1973, with Tariq al-Sha'b, the mouthpiece of the Communists, charging the DPK with waging a persecution campaign against the ICP and its supporters in Kurdistan,35 and al-Taakhi, the organ of the DPK, denying the charges and blaming the Communists for starting hostilities against the DPK. 36 Despite these denials, it can be assumed that the skirmishes reflected the DPK's effort to oust the Communists, who were now formally allied with the Ba'th, from the Kurdish region.37 As skirmishes between the DPK and the ICP continued, on November 14,1973, a meeting took place in Moscow between Ponomarev and a DPK delegation comprising Salih Yusefi and Dara Tawfiq. Although the statement issued at the end of this meeting indicated little progress on the DPK's incorporation in the front, it noted that the meeting was conducted in a "warm friendly atmosphere... with the representatives of [the CPSU and the DPK] voicing support for the continuation of developing relations of friendship and cooperation [between the two parties]." 38 The friendly Soviet attitude toward the DPK demonstrated that Moscow still had an interest in the existence of this party. The Kurdish party was in fact the main reason for the Ba'th's cooperation with the ICP, which stemmed from the desire to enlist Communist backing against the DPK. Furthermore, without the DPK an important reason for Baghdad's need of Moscow would also be lost. A subject not mentioned in this statement involved the clashes between the DPK and the ICP, a subject ignored by the Soviet media as well. Yet, this problem was most likely discussed at the talks—with Moscow trying to persuade the DPK to halt the anti-Communist campaign, and the D P K agreeing if only temporarily to show restraint—in order to thwart

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the Ba'th's goal of setting the Soviets and the DPK at odds. On November 18, al-Taakhi reported the meeting in Moscow and in the same issue announced its decision to cease unilaterally the propaganda campaign against the ICP, because this campaign would arouse the "anxiety of our friends abroad, thus playing into the hands of the enemies of our people." On November 19 and 20, representatives of the leadership of the DPK and the ICP held talks, which resulted in a suspension of hostilities between the two parties.39 From November 27 to 30,1973, Ponomarev visited Iraq and met with Bakr and Saddam Hussein.40 It is reasonable to assume that the Kurdish question, which was high on the agenda of the Iraqi regime and was among Ponomarev's fields of specialization, figured prominently in his talks. However, there was no reference to it in the Soviet-Iraqi statement released at the conclusion of Ponomarev's trip, a silence that indicated continuing differences of opinion. The Soviet side presumably tried to convince the Iraqis to show patience toward the Kurds and eschew steps that might aggravate the tension and renew the fighting. The Iraqis, for their part, were ready to resort to military means if the DPK rejected their proposals for a settlement. Ponomarev also met with a DPK delegation comprising Muhammad Mahmud' Abd-al-Rahman and Dara Tawfiq. A comparison of the Soviet and Kurdish reports of the meeting reveals that the Kurdish side was at least outwardly interested in maintaining friendly relations with the Soviets, whereas the still friendly attitude of the Soviets toward the DPK had somewhat cooled.41 This Soviet reserve can be explained by the Ba'th's determination not to compromise with the DPK, combined with the DPK's unwillingness to come to terms with the regime on both autonomy and participation in the front and its attempts to expel the Communists from the Kurdish region. It is most likely that the conflict between the Kurds and the Communists was also discussed during Ponomarev's visit and that Ponomarev tried to mediate between the two parties. In this connection, Ponomarev's meeting with the ICP First Secretary 'Aziz Muhammad deserves notice.42 It seems, however, that his mediation attempt was unsuccessful, as the dispute between the DPK and the ICP again flared up in the winter of 1973-1974.43 In a rare public Soviet reference to the conflict between the ICP and the DPK, a Radio Moscow broadcast in Arabic in January 1974 still preserved an evenhanded approach, arguing that it was imperative that both parties should put an end to the charges and countercharges and re-establish ties of fraternity. The broadcast contained a favorable reference to Barzani, attributing to him support for restoring normal relations among the "progressive" forces of Iraq.44 Thus, despite Barzani's leading role in the DPK's policy of reliance on the West,45 the Soviets continued

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to display sympathy toward him,46 probably because of his immense prestige among the Kurds. The Autonomy Law (December 1973-March 1974) In December 1973, the front submitted its plan for Kurdish autonomy to the DPK, and negotiations over the scheme between the Ba'th and the DPK started in January 1974. It should be borne in mind that the period of four years assigned by the Ba'th and the DPK for the implementation of the March 11,1970, manifesto was due to expire on March 11 of that year.47 Baghdad indicated that if no agreement with the DPK on the government's autonomy proposal was reached by that date, the Ba'th would implement its proposal unilaterally, which meant the renewal of war between the regime and the Kurds. As this date drew near, a serious border incident in the Badra area (east of Baghdad) "occurred" 48 on February 10,1974. The tension and war of words between Iraq and Iran then resumed, and the Soviet Union adhered to its mainly neutral position with only a slight inclination toward Iraq.49 From February 25 to 27, 1974, Saddam Hussein visited the Soviet Union and met with both Brezhnev and Kosygin. The Soviet Union and Iraq issued a single statement on the visit only after it was over.50 The maintenance of secrecy during the trip was apparently at Iraq's request in order to save time on ceremonial procedures and tackle immediately the urgent problem—the growing possibility that in March Iraq would launch a war against the Kurds, who were backed by Iran. The goal of Saddam Hussein's trip was undoubtedly to secure Soviet support for his regime at the military and political levels in the forthcoming war against the Kurds. The Soviet-Iraqi statement issued at the conclusion of this visit included some allusions to the Kurdish-Iranian problem. Thus, the two sides expressed satisfaction that their relations were developing "in complete accordance with [according to51] the friendship treaty, on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity [and] non-interference in internal affairs." This formulation had appeared only once before, in the joint Soviet-Iraqi communiqué at the close of Bakr's visit to the Soviet Union in September 1972. As already mentioned, from Iraq's perspective, the assertion that its relations with the Soviet Union were evolving in line with the principle of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity implied indirect support for Baghdad in its conflict with the Kurds and in its territorial dispute with Iran.52 The fact that the Soviet-Iraqi statement of February 1974, unlike the communiqué of September 1972, contained no reference to the two sides' adherence to international treaties implies that the principles of sovereignty and ter-

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ritorial integrity applied only to the Kurdish question and that Iraq continued to show willingness to cede the 1937 treaty.53 Thus, Saddam Hussein managed to attain Soviet support in principle against the Kurds and against Iran's intervention on their behalf. However, the statement released at the end of Saddam Hussein's visit contained no expression of Soviet approval for Baghdad's policy toward the Kurds in general or for the government's autonomy plan in particular. Nor was there any clear Soviet commitment to extend military aid to Iraq in its pending war against the Kurds. Rather, the statement stressed the desire of the two sides to continue developing "cooperation in the political, economic and other fields," with no explicit reference to the military one. The omission of the military sphere in the statement was probably done by Moscow, for in a conspicuous deviation from the diplomatic protocol, no official from the Soviet military took part in talks with Saddam Hussein, despite the participation of Iraq's chief of staff, 'Abdal-Jabbar Shanshal.54 The fact that the Iraqi version of the statement noted that Soviet-Iraqi ties were developing "according to" rather than "in complete accordance with" the treaty may have reflected Iraq's anger over the absence of a Soviet commitment to help Baghdad in the military field. To sum up, by withholding both approval for the autonomy plan and the pledge of military support, the Soviets seem to have been trying to dissuade Iraq from launching a war against the Kurds. Nevertheless, on March 11, 1974, Baghdad promulgated the autonomy law, which guaranteed Kurdish linguistic-cultural rights and the establishment of ostensibly autonomous ruling institutions in the Kurdish region,55 although, in fact, the very composition of these institutions was to be determined by the RCC. Saddam Hussein granted the DPK a period of fifteen days from the proclamation of the autonomy law—until March 26—to comply with this law and join the front. 56 From March 23 to 26,1974, Grechko (a member of the Politburo since April 1973) visited Iraq, where he met with Bakr (who since July 1973 had also occupied the post of minister of defense57), delivering a message from Brezhnev, and with Saddam Hussein.58 As the representative of the military sector at the Politburo, Grechko stood for a rather tough foreign policy in general, advocating the augmentation of Moscow's military backing for its allies in the Third World. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that Grechko showed greater willingness, as compared with his colleagues in the Soviet leadership, to extend military support to Iraq's central government against the Kurds. From the Soviet perspective, the dispatch of Grechko to Iraq was intended to warn the DPK that if it rejected the autonomy law and war broke out, the Soviet Union would back Baghdad. It can be presumed that, given the Ba'th's determination to launch a war against the Kurds once the fifteen-day ultimatum expired, the lesser evil from Moscow's viewpoint was for the DPK to accept the autonomy law

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and ensure its continued existence.59 The Soviet-Iraqi statement at the conclusion of Grechko's visit to Iraq noted that Grechko "had the opportunity to acquaint himself with... the strengthening of the national unity, the defense of the territorial integrity of the country and its sovereignty." (The italicized phrase appeared in the Iraqi version only.) The statement also asserted that relations between the Soviet Union and Iraq were developing "in complete accordance" with the treaty and described Grechko's visit as "an important positive step in developing friendship and close cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Iraqi Republic . . . and their armed forces," with both sides expressing "satisfaction with the state of cooperation in the military field."60 Although this statement expressed Soviet support for the Ba'th's policy on the Kurdish problem in clearer terms than the one issued at the end of Saddam Hussein's trip to Moscow in February 1974, the Soviet backing was still incomplete. The statement merely pointed out that Grechko "had the opportunity to acquaint himself with" certain measures implicitly related to the Kurdish problem without saying that he had voiced support for these steps. As a hint at serious Soviet reservation regarding the military measures Baghdad intended to undertake to implement the autonomy law, the Soviet version deleted the euphemism "the defense o f " from the reference to Iraq's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Given the rejection of the government's ultimatum by the DPK61 and the resolution of the regime to launch a war, the Soviet Union promised to fulfill its military obligations to Baghdad at the close of Grechko's visit, although it undoubtedly would have preferred a peaceful settlement of the Kurdish question. The commitment to help the Ba'th regime militarily in the impending war against the Kurds was aimed at sustaining and enhancing Moscow's political and military relationship with Baghdad.62 This commitment was another step in Moscow's movement toward Baghdad's position on the Kurdish issue, which had been discernible since Bakr's visit to the Soviet Union in September 1972 and paralleled the increase in Iraq's strategic importance for the Soviets.

War with the Kurds (Spring-Summer 1974) From the end of March 1974, hostilities between Baghdad and the Kurds resumed and rapidly escalated into a full-scale war. The Iraqi army, reinforced by reservists, employed the best of its Soviet weaponry, including artillery, tanks, and aircraft. In May, an al-Thawra editorial stated unequivocally: "There will be no truce or negotiations with the gang [of Mulla Mustafa], . . . The struggle for its final liquidation . . . is a holy national duty."63 From April to July—despite the propaganda warfare

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between Iraq and Iran—no border incidents between the two states were reported. In July and August, the Iraqi forces managed to conquer the greater part of the Kurdish area, and the territory under Barzani's control shrank to a strip along the Iranian border. In its war against the Kurds, Iraq strove to enlist complete Soviet backing at both the military and political levels. Accordingly, a few senior members of the DPK, who had expressed support for the autonomy law in March 1974 and cooperated with the Ba'th regime ever since,64 were dispatched to the Soviet Union to explain the government's policy.65 The Soviet Union pursued three objectives in backing Iraq's military effort against the Kurds: (1) to deter Iran from direct intervention on the Kurdish side, (2) to display the competence of its ally Iraq and the efficiency of Soviet military hardware vis-à-vis that supplied by the West to the Kurds, and (3) to persuade the DPK to compromise with the regime. On the political level, Soviet propaganda claimed that the decision to reject the autonomy law, which had led to the outbreak of the war, had been adopted by the "right wing" of the DPK under the influence of "outside imperialist and reactionary forces."66 In accordance with the basic Soviet interest in maintaining friendly relations with Iran, the USSR refrained from making overt references to Tehran's military assistance to the Kurds. Despite Moscow's support for Baghdad, the DPK still tried to preserve a modicum of openness toward the Soviet Union, especially at the inception of the war in the spring of 1974. For example, a broadcast by Voice of the Iraqi Kurdistan at the end of April asserted that the Kurdish national movement headed by Barzani was interested in sustaining Soviet friendship,67 whereas a broadcast in May argued that the autonomy for which the Kurds were fighting fell short of the kind of autonomy enjoyed by each of the Soviet republics.68 However, Barzani, who strove to secure US aid to the Kurds, described the Kurds as "the only force opposing Soviet influence in Iraq."69 Although the Soviet Union adapted its attitude on the Kurdish issue to the Iraqi one, significant differences remained between the two countries. Whereas the Ba'th regime depicted the whole of the Barzaniled DPK as "the gang of Mulla Mustafa," the USSR used the term the "right wing" of the DPK, thus ostracizing only a part of Barzani's DPK and clearly avoiding condemning Barzani in person.70 It seems that the Soviet Union did not take Barzani's demonstrative anti-Soviet statements too seriously. Moscow apparently believed that a settlement of the Kurdish question that would maintain the DPK's political independence should preserve a place for Barzani as the symbol of the Kurdish national movement. Also, in contrast to the Ba'th's policy of a war to the end against the DPK, the Soviet Union contended that ways should be found to halt the war and promote a peaceful solution to the Kurdish problem based on the autonomy law.71

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The War and Iraq-Iran Relations (Summer-Fall 1974) As Iraq's army succeeded in driving the Kurdish forces to a strip along the Iranian border, in August 1974 negotiations between Baghdad and Tehran started in Istanbul, with contacts between the two parties continuing inconclusively into the fall, accompanied by border incidents. During these negotiations, Iraq presumably maintained its readiness to concede part of its sovereignty over the Shatt-al-Arab in return for the complete termination of Iran's military aid to the Kurds.72 In July 1974, there were increasing signs of Iraq's desire to loosen its political ties with the Soviet Union. For example, Bakr failed to mention the Soviet-Iraqi treaty in his lengthy speech on July 17, 1974, on the anniversary of the Ba'th's accession to power, whereas his speech on the same occasion in 1972 and 1973 had contained such a reference. 73 Elated by its conquest of most of Kurdistan, Iraq apparently estimated that it would be able to complete the occupation of the Kurdish region not only by military means, for which it was dependent on the Soviets, but by diplomatic means as well, through negotiations with Iran. In order to create a conducive atmosphere for reaching a settlement with Iran, Iraq tried to neutralize an important reason for Tehran's suspicion of Baghdad, namely Iraq's close relations with the Soviet Union, symbolized in the treaty.74 Against the background of negotiations between Iraq and Iran, the new Iraqi foreign minister, Shadhil Taqa, departed for the Soviet Union on September 18,1974. He had been appointed foreign minister on June 23,1974, the day his predecessor, Murtada Sa'd 'Abd-al-Baqi, had been dismissed and nominated ambassador to the Soviet Union. 75 The ousting of 'Abd-al-Baqi reflected Saddam Hussein's policy of removing his opponents and those suspected of disloyalty from positions of power and even from posts of secondary importance. According to this policy, 'Ammash was replaced by 'Abd-al-Baqi as Iraq's ambassador to Moscow, was then transferred to the post of ambassador to France, and in 1977 became ambassador to Finland.76 The Soviet version of Shadhil Taqa's talks with Podgornyi on September 21, 1974, contained a lengthy reference to the Soviet-Iraqi treaty, whereas the Iraqi version made no mention of the treaty.77 In Moscow, Shadhil Taqa reportedly asked the Soviets to provide sophisticated weapons for the war against the Kurds, 78 and in October the U S S R delivered MiG-23 fighter-bombers to Iraq. 79 This upgrading of Soviet military aid to Iraq was, at least partially, in response to Iran's intensified backing of the Kurds since the summer of 1974, which included artillery support and the transfer of antiaircraft weapons to the Kurdish rebels. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union still preferred a negotiated settlement to the Kurdish problem that would preserve the DPK. Accordingly, in the

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fall of 1974, Moscow's media indicated the need for a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question,80 and the Soviets reportedly tried to promote this goal in Baghdad through diplomatic channels.81 Two months after Shadhil Taqa's visit, the Shah visited the Soviet Union from November 18 to 20, and had talks with Brezhnev, Podgornyi, and Kosygin. Podgornyi, in his speech in honor of the Shah, presented a neutral stand on the Iran-Iraq dispute and expressed support for the resolution of differences between Iran and Iraq by "these countries themselves, around the table of negotiations on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence and good neighborliness."82 Despite this display of evenhandedness, it is reasonable to assume that in private the Soviets asked the Shah to cease his interference in the Kurdish problem in Iraq, which Moscow opposed because of the danger that it might escalate into a full-scale war between Iraq and Iran and also because it strengthened the position of the pro-Western elements inside the DPK, encouraging the party to stick to its rejection of the autonomy. Nonetheless, it can also be presumed that the Soviet Union had no interest in a total cut in Iran's military assistance to the Kurds, as long as the Ba'th was determined not to negotiate with the DPK. Also, notwithstanding Podgornyi's peaceloving posture, the Soviet interest in finding a comprehensive settlement to the Iraq-Iran conflict remained ambiguous. In reaction to Podgornyi's statement on the Iraq-Iran dispute, the Shah commented: "If Iraq adopts the same stand in relations with us, as you, our great neighbor, adheres in relations with us, and does not adhere with such bias to the legacy of English imperialism [i.e., the 1937 treaty], there will be no problems between [Iran and Iraq]."83 The fact that Pravda did not omit this offensive utterance of the Shah toward Iraq certainly deserves notice. It is possible that by reproducing this utterance and playing host to the Shah the Soviet Union wanted to demonstrate an ostensible inclination toward Iran in its dispute with Iraq,84 in order to warn Baghdad that if it continued to weaken its political affinity to Moscow, Soviet support for it vis-à-vis Tehran might be curtailed. The Algiers Agreement (March 1975) The above-quoted statement of the Shah on the Iraq-Iran dispute during his visit to Moscow in November 1974 implied his willingness to terminate his aid to the Kurds in return for Iraq's assent to rescind the 1937 treaty. However, from December 1974, Iraq hardened its position by renewing its adherence to the 1937 treaty,85 accompanied by growing efforts to conquer the Kurdish area, whereas Iran augmented its intervention on behalf of the Kurds, with Iranian anti-aircraft missiles shooting down two Iraqi airplanes over Iraqi Kurdistan. Although Moscow's report of the air

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incident was generally balanced, 86 the Soviet response at the military level was the conclusion of an especially large arms deal with Iraq in January 1975. 87 This was probably also a Soviet attempt to outbid a potential competitor, France, which had concluded an arms agreement with Iraq in the same month. 88 In the following months, Iraq continued to adhere to the 1937 treaty 89 and intensified its propaganda campaign against Tehran. 90 However, on March 5,1975, at the summit meeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries ( O P E C ) in Algiers, Saddam Hussein held talks with the Shah, and on March 6, assisted by the good offices of President Houari Boumedienne of Algeria, 91 Iraq and Iran reached an accord in the shape of a communiqué signed by Saddam Hussein and the Shah. The Algiers Agreement satisfied Iran's demand for demarcating the Shatt-al-Arab along the middle of the waterway, and Iran undertook to cease completely its military aid to the Kurds.92 The Algiers agreement also stipulated that the Gulf region would be "safeguarded against foreign intervention." Among the Shah's reasons for signing the Algiers agreement was the weakening in the position of the Kurdish rebels, and Iran's desire to encourage Iraq to loosen ties with the Soviet Union. 93 The salient reason for Iraq's conclusion of the Algiers agreement was Baghdad's estimate that cooperation with Iran was vital in order to put an end to the Kurdish revolt once and for all. Also, the war was taking a heavy economic and military toll on Iraq. According to official Iraqi data, its army had sustained sixteen thousand casualties, and the total number of both Arab and Kurdish victims reached sixty thousand casualties. 94 It was only much later, in July 1980, that Baghdad tried to provide a new explanation for its conclusion of the Algiers agreement, when Saddam Hussein alleged that a severe shortage of ammunition had compelled Iraq to assent to the terms of this agreement. 95 It seems that this allegation was aimed at vindicating his concession over the Shatt-al-Arab—most disgraceful from the viewpoint of the Ba'th ideology—by laying indirect blame on the Soviets as the arms suppliers of Iraq. However, as already noted, the U S S R had, in fact, increased its arms shipments to Iraq from the fall of 1974 and especially from 1975. Therefore, even if Saddam Hussein's allegation contained some truth, the shortage in ammunition was temporary, for the Soviets were ready to replenish Iraq's military supplies. A secondary, although important, consideration for Iraq's signing the agreement with Iran in 1975 was related to Baghdad's policy toward Moscow. Specifically, the establishment of good-neighbor relations with Iran was intended to create convenient conditions for reducing Iraq's dependence on the Soviet Union. Thus, Iraq and Iran shared, to some extent, a common goal when signing the Algiers agreement: to bring about a relaxation in Iraq's ties with the Soviet Union. The Soviet media reported on the Algiers agreement without delay,96

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an indication that the agreement did not take the USSR by surprise and that Baghdad had possibly informed Moscow on the forthcoming accord, even if only on short notice.97 Yet, it is also true that Iraq's propaganda campaign against Iran until the agreement was directed partially, and until a certain stage, at misleading the Soviets about Baghdad's intentions vis-à-vis Tehran. Also, contrary to article 7 of the Soviet-Iraqi treaty obligating Iraq to consult with the Soviets "on all important international issues concerning the interests of both states," Iraq did not hold consultations with the Soviet Union before concluding the Algiers agreement. 98 It is reasonable to assume that the decision to present the Soviets with a fait accompli about the agreement stemmed from Iraq's awareness of Soviet reservations regarding a complete solution to the Iraq-Iran dispute. Radio Moscow's broadcasts in Arabic and Persian claimed that the Soviet Union was happy at the conclusion of the Algiers agreement, describing it as a "heavy blow to the imperialist policy of divide and rule."99 Also, Iraq reported that on March 19,1975, the Soviet ambassador had conveyed to Iraq's foreign minister, Sa'dun Hammadi (appointed on November 11,1974, after the death of Shadhil Taqa on October 20,1974), a Soviet government decision in support of the Algiers agreement.100 However, even after the Soviet Union was left with no choice but to welcome the agreement, there were still signs of Moscow's reservations toward it. Pravda's report on the Algiers agreement was brief and without comment.101 Unlike the conclusion of the agreement between the Ba'th and the Kurds in March 1970, when Podgornyi and Kosygin had sent a congratulatory note to Bakr,102 the conclusion of the Algiers agreement had no such note dispatched by the Soviet leadership. In addition, the Soviet media did not report the delivery of the Soviet government's decision in support of the Iraq-Iran agreement to Sa'dun Hammadi on March 19, and the transfer of the message was somewhat late. Bakr received congratulatory notes on the conclusion of the Algiers agreement mainly from Arab leaders. Although Syria and Libya opposed the agreement, most other Arab states welcomed it.103 To understand Moscow's lack of enthusiasm about the Algiers agreement, it should be recalled that since mid-1973 the Soviets had estimated that a comprehensive settlement of the Iraq-Iran dispute might harm their interests. On the one hand, the continuing accelerated rearmament of Iran left no doubt that this process was related first and foremost to Tehran's ambitious foreign policy in general, and therefore would not cease once the dispute with Iraq was terminated. On the other hand, during the negotiations for a settlement between Iraq and Iran in the summer of 1974, Baghdad had already been increasing its independence vis-à-vis Moscow exemplified in the following moves: improving relations with the conservative Gulf states, concluding an arms deal with France, reducing Moscow's rights to use military facilities in Iraq, and occasionally omitting

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references to the treaty with the Soviet Union. Finally, Iraq's avoidance of consulting the U S S R prior to signing the Algiers agreement was apparently viewed by Moscow as a portent of Baghdad's defiance of Soviet interests in the years to come. The Soviet Union was also probably displeased that the Algiers agreement included the Iranian principle of securing the Gulf region from "foreign intervention," because this principle was intended to stop the U S S R from using Umm Qasr, without taking into consideration the fact that the military buildup of Iran constituted part of CENTO and US strategy in the region or the military balance between the superpowers in the Indian Ocean.104 Also, the Soviets feared that Iraq's reconciliation with Iran would lead to a curtailment in Iraq's military support for the PFLO. Last, but not least, the total termination of Iran's military aid to the Kurds, in accordance with the Algiers agreement, did not correspond to Soviet interest, for it paved the ground for liquidating the DPK both militarily and politically. Following the Algiers agreement, the DPK, headed by Barzani, decided to cease its armed struggle. Barzani and some DPK leaders and Kurdish fighters crossed into Iran, whereas others among his supporters, prominent among them Salih Yusefi, made use of the general amnesty granted by the Ba'th and remained in Iraq.105 However, only those DPK members who in March 1974 had backed the autonomy law and had formed a new DPK under the auspices of the regime, which had joined the Ba'th-Communist front in February 1975, were permitted to engage in political activities.106 At the beginning of April 1975, Iraq's army completed the conquest of the Kurdish region. Pravda reported this development conspicuously late, on May 24, noting that the fighting had come to an end, after "the right-wing leaders of the DPK . . . fled the country and their units laid down their arms." Thus, it was only post factum that Moscow reconciled itself to Iraq's military solution of the Kurdish question. The paradox was that it was Moscow's massive arms supplies to the Iraqi army—enabling it to cope with both the Kurds and Iran—that had promoted a development contrary to Soviet interests, that is, the imposition of the central government's authority over the Kurdish region for the first time since the Kurdish revolt of 1961.

Soviet Policy Regarding the ICP After the Establishment of the Front (1973-1975) After the formation of the front, the CPSU concluded the first annual agreement for cooperation with the Iraqi Ba'th on November 30,1973, with Ponomarev signing it for the Soviet side during his visit to Iraq, and Murtada ' Abd-al-Baqi signing it for the Iraqi side.107 The statement at the

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end of Ponomarev's trip noted that the Soviet side highly appreciated the "progressive" policy of Iraq under the Ba'th leadership aimed at "the realization of socialist transformations." 108 It was the first and only time that the Soviet side used the term "socialist transformations" to describe the Ba'th policy in a Soviet-Iraqi statement.109 This ideological improvement in Moscow's attitude toward Baghdad stemmed from its continued hope that the Ba'th would eventually come closer to the Soviet model of socialism and from the step taken by the Ba'th in this direction by establishing the front. However, it can be argued that the existence of some affinity between the Ba'th and Soviet socioeconomic systems was a secondary and even a marginal factor in preserving Baghdad's relations with Moscow because, despite this affinity, Iraq loosened its ties with the Soviet Union in the mid-1970s. Indeed, the national factor that motivated Iraq's aspiration to relieve its dependence on the Soviet Union was far stronger than the certain attachment of the Ba'th to communism, and no wonder. Even Communist regimes such as Yugoslavia, China, and North Korea—outside the recognized sphere of the Soviet influence in Eastern Europe wherein the Soviet army was deployed—opted to sever their dependence on Moscow, loosen their ideological affinity with the Soviet regime, and exercise an independent policy out of national considerations. After the establishment of the front, the Soviet Union was at pains to raise the prestige of the ICP and its leader, 'Aziz Muhammad. Accordingly, 'Aziz Muhammad had an audience with Brezhnev on November 8, 1973, in Moscow.110 In addition, senior Soviet officials met the ICP leadership during visits to Iraq—Ponomarev in November 1973 and Grechko in March 1974111—and in June 1974, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet awarded 'Aziz Muhammad the Order of Friendship Among Peoples on his fiftieth birthday, with Pravda giving prominent coverage to this event.112 Advancing the position of the ICP meant, from the Soviet perspective, converting the Supreme Committee of the front from a forum for discussion into a decisionmaking body on internal and foreign affairs, and increasing Communist representation in public and professional organizations of Iraq. Also, despite the ban by the charter of the front, the Soviets seemingly supported the engagement of the ICP in political activities in the army, as well as advocating the return of officers associated with the ICP to the armed forces. Specifically, in April 1974, Problems of Peace and Socialism published a debate on the political role of the army in developing countries with the participation of a Soviet theoretician and a member of the ICP Central Committee, Ara Khachadur. Khachadur was quoted as saying: "In conditions of a patriotic regime—such as the Iraqi one—an important task of the left forces becomes the struggle for democratizing the army. This struggle includes granting permission to the military personnel to participate in public life... and the return of patriots

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to military service, if they were ousted on political grounds."113 The failure of long-standing Soviet endeavors to influence the political orientation of developing countries in general and Iraq in particular through traditional Soviet means, namely military and economic aid, apparently generated greater Soviet efforts to promote the status of local Communists in the army, which was the pillar of regimes in the Third World. The Soviet Union also assumed that by strengthening the influence of the ICP it would be able to restrain undesirable tendencies in Baghdad's foreign policy, such as increased economic ties with the West—a development criticized indirectly by the ICP.114 The Soviet attempts to promote the participation of the ICP in the power were also connected with Moscow's effort to take advantage of Baghdad's need of the Soviet Union and the local Communists in the war against the Kurds.115 Indeed, at the beginning of the campaign against the Kurds, the leeway of Communist activities tolerated by the Ba'th was extended, and new Communist branches were established, part of them in the Kurdish region.116 However, probably from the fall of 1974,117 and undoubtedly from 1975 onward, a worsening in the Ba'th policy toward the ICP was discernible, and Communists were arrested on the charge of forming secret cells in the army.118 This can be explained by developments in the war against the Kurds: as the Iraqi regime succeeded in pushing the Kurds to a strip along the Iranian border in the summer of 1974, its need for the patrons of the local Communists—the Soviets—decreased, and even more so after April 1975, once the conquest of the Kurdish region was completed.

The October 1973 War and Its Aftermath As we saw in Chapter 2, from February 1973 the Soviet Union substantially increased its arms shipments to Egypt, thus consciously serving Cairo's war preparations. Moscow's awareness of the approaching Egyptian-Syrian offensive against Israel was indicated by the conspicuous omission of any reference to the Arab-Israeli dispute in Brezhnev's last major speech before the October war, delivered on September 24,1973. 119 Iraq, for its part, alleged that it had learned about the outbreak of the war from a radio broadcast.120 This allegation was presumably intended to justify Iraq's limited participation in the war,121 and hence its accuracy may be doubted. Even if the Iraqis had no prior knowledge of "D day," they were aware of Egypt's preparedness to wage a war.122 Moreover, during Saddam Hussein's visit to the Soviet Union in March 1973, Kosygin expressed Soviet interest in Iraq's cooperation with other Arab states in the context of the "ignominious end" awaiting Israel's "aggressive policy."123 Indeed, Iraqi airplanes, which had been deployed in Egypt since

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April that year, took part in the war on its first day, October 6.124 It seems that the option of a joint Egyptian-Syrian onslaught against Israel must have been raised during Soviet-Iraqi contacts prior to the October war, such as during the visit to the Soviet Union of Taha al-Jazrawi, member of the RCC close to Saddam Hussein, from September 18 to 22,1973. 125 It is also reasonable to assume that the Soviet arms transfers to Iraq in 1973 were geared to the possibility of Iraq's participation in the planned war.126 Iraq's announcement of October 7 that it was restoring diplomatic relations with Iran expressed the desire to settle the dispute with Iran so that Iraq's army could take part in the war against Israel. The announcement contained an appeal to "friendly states to provide their good offices in this direction," 127 thus requesting the Soviet Union to intercede with Iran in order to de-escalate the tension along the Iraq-Iran border and facilitate the dispatch of Iraqi troops to the Syrian-Israeli front. Indeed, this goal was achieved during Murtada Sa'd 'Abd-al-Baqi's trip to Moscow from October 9 to 10, during which he delivered a message from Bakr to Podgornyi.128 The Soviets, for their part, wanted Iraq and other Arab states to reinforce Egypt and Syria in the war against Israel, in order to enable the Arab side to score a gain. Yet, Radio Moscow's coverage of 'Abd-al-Baqi's visit was short and, contrary to Baghdad's version, made no mention of the Soviet-Iraqi treaty129; Pravda ignored the visit altogether. This was in line with the general Soviet policy in the October war, especially in the first stages, of maintaining a low profile in order to minimize the damage to détente and prevent an intensified US commitment to Israel. Accordingly, the Soviet Union made no mention of its friendship treaty with Egypt during the war.130 On October 10, Israel recaptured the Golan Heights and the next day launched an offensive on the Syrian front beyond the cease-fire lines of the June 1967 war; and on October 15, Israeli forces crossed the Suez Canal. It is reasonable to assume that the Soviet Union's interest in Iraq's participation in the war, as well as its own commitment and military assistance to the Arabs, strengthened as the tide of the war turned more against the Arabs. As a sign of Moscow's increased obligation to the Arabs, on October 13, Izvestiia and Krasnaia zvezda reported that "with the purpose of conducting consultations in accordance with the SovietIraqi treaty," 'Abd-al-Baqi had visited the Soviet Union. This was most likely a late report on 'Abd-al-Baqi's trip to Moscow from October 9 to 10. On October 15, TASS reproduced Bakr's declaration that the whole military potential of Baghdad was being placed on behalf of the war against Israel;131 and on October 19, a special Soviet broadcast in Arabic was devoted to Iraq's contribution to the war.132 It should be noted that during the October war the Soviet media did not usually give special prominence to Iraq's par-

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ticipation in the war, but rather noted it along with the assistance provided by other Arab countries to Syria and Egypt.133 Some sources reported that on October 21 Kosygin paid a secret visit to Baghdad, where he met with Bakr and Asad, who was also on a secret trip to Iraq.134 The Iraqis also hinted at such a visit.135 Moreover, in 1975 Saddam Hussein disclosed that Asad had indeed traveled to Iraq during the October war.136 The purpose of Kosygin's presumed journey to Iraq remains unclear.137 Although Kosygin's presumed trip to Baghdad took place only a day before the Security Council cease-fire resolution of October 22 was adopted on Soviet-US initiative, Iraq alleged that the Soviet Union did not hold prior consultation with it on that resolution.138 It seems that Egypt, as the prime Arab client state of the Soviet Union, was indeed the only Arab state whose position the Soviets heeded while working with the United States to promote a cease-fire resolution. It was Sadat's assent to a cease-fire on October 20, in the wake of Israel's rapid advance west of the Suez Canal, that precipitated Moscow's diplomatic efforts to pass an appropriate resolution in the Security Council. This was Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, which, besides a call for a cease-fire, called for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967, rejected by Iraq. Until Security Council Resolution 338, Iraq praised Soviet support for the Arabs, but after that resolution, the RCC voiced Iraq's rejection in principle of a cease-fire, insisting on Baghdad's right to expound its stand to the Arab nation.139 An al-Thawra editorial hinted at Iraq's displeasure with the Soviet Union regarding the cease-fire resolution.140 These, however, were just isolated instances of Iraq's implied criticism of Soviet policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite Iraq's formal opposition to the cease-fire resolution, Baghdad did not intend to violate it and pulled its troops from Syria at the end of October 1973.141 The Ba'th regime, in keeping with its policy since assuming power, did not want its relationship with Moscow to be overshadowed because of differences on the ArabIsraeli dispute.142 The Soviet Union, for its part—given the gap between Iraq's many words and its few deeds in the Arab-Israeli dispute, and the absence of a common border between Iraq and Israel—did not consider Baghdad's rejection of Security Council Resolution 338 as a stumbling block to a political settlement based on this resolution. The Middle East dispute was discussed during Ponomarev's visit to Iraq at the end of November 1973. The Soviet-Iraqi "statement" issued at the conclusion of the visit maintained that there would be no peace in the Middle East without "liberating all the occupied Arab lands and securing the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine," and that the "Palestine resistance movement" constituted part and parcel of the Arab liberation movement and should continue to be assisted.143 Thus, the

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statement contained the same ingredients that had appeared in other Soviet-Iraqi communiqués in the early 1970s and continued to appear with slight variations throughout the decade. 144 Just as Soviet-Iraqi announcements before the October war had never referred to Security Council Resolution 242, so those released after the October war, such as the one at the closure of Ponomarev's trip, made no mention of Security Council Resolution 338. On December 21, 1973, the Geneva Conference on Peace in the Middle East was convened, under the cochairmanship of the Soviet Union and the United States and with the participation of Egypt, Jordan, and Israel. The Soviet Union favored this conference because it provided a role for the U S S R in the process of achieving a settlement of the ArabIsraeli conflict, as well as in the future settlement itself, whereas Iraq labeled the Geneva conference a "surrender conference," 145 for it symbolized Arab recognition of Israel. Yet, when condemning the Geneva conference, Iraq was careful to avoid reference to the Soviet Union. 146 The importance of the Geneva conference rapidly declined because of the "shuttle diplomacy" of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, which produced the Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement in January 1974 and a similar Syrian-Israeli agreement in May 1974. The Soviet-Iraqi statement at the conclusion of Saddam Hussein's visit to the Soviet Union in February 1974 implied criticism of Egypt's willingness to use the good offices of the United States for advancing a negotiated settlement with Israel, and emphasized the vitality of Cairo's cooperation with Moscow. 147 The statement also hinted at the negative attitude of both the Soviet Union and Iraq toward Egypt's policy of improving relations with the United States. Despite Iraq's criticism of Egypt, there was some resemblance in the way in which Iraq, Egypt, and Syria were weakening their relations with the Soviet Union. As we have seen, Iraq began to loosen its ties with the Soviet Union in mid-1973 when, by its willingness to concede to Iran on the issue of the Shatt-al-Arab, it provided itself with a viable option to solve the dispute with a neighboring state by diplomatic means. Similarly, both Egypt's and, to a small extent, Syria's links with the Soviet Union were loosened after the October war, when they gave priority to the use of political means for resolving the conflict with Israel (again, Egypt far more than Syria). Yet, contrary to Egypt, Iraq intended to retain the centrality of its relations with the Soviets in its overall relationship with foreign powers. Whereas in 1974 Sadat declared the goal of maintaining a balance in his ties with the superpowers, Iraq's stand on developing links with the United States, except in the economic field, remained strongly negative. Moreover, in the spring and summer of 1974, Iraq once again tried to capitalize on the precipitate decline in Soviet-Egyptian relations in order to replace Egypt as the prime Arab country in Moscow's Middle Eastern strategy. Thus, Saddam Hus-

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sein indirectly criticized Egypt's behavior toward the Soviet Union and stressed that "Iraq's relations with the socialist countries are of a totally different nature," describing them as "exemplary" and based on "principles and interests securing their stability."148 Nonetheless, throughout 1974 Cairo continued to rank first in Moscow's Middle Eastern policy, as Brezhnev had not yet given up hope of mending relations with Sadat.149 However, at the same time, Syria's importance for the Soviets as a potential substitute for Egypt was growing. This was because of Syria's direct involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, which was now the focal point of tension in the Third World, after the United States had withdrawn its troops from Vietnam in early 1973. The Soviet Union regarded a close relationship with Syria as a means to reinforce Moscow's claim to play an active role in resolving the ArabIsraeli conflict and to block a settlement of this dispute under the exclusive aegis of the United States. Changes in Iraq's Policy in the Arab World (Summer 1974-Spring 1975) The beginning of Iraq's negotiations with Iran in August 1974 was accompanied by a further weakening of Baghdad's pro-Soviet orientation. From August 1974, Baghdad stopped referring to the substantial difference between its own and Cairo's policies toward Moscow, reduced its criticism of Egypt's policies on the Arab-Israeli dispute, and improved ties with Cairo.150 Moreover, from the end of 1974, Iraq was improving relations with Jordan—relations that had been at a low ebb since the events of September 1970151—and, as we saw above, Iraq redoubled its efforts to improve links with the conservative Gulf states. All in all, Iraq tried to break its isolation in the Arab world by advancing relations with countries belonging to the Arab mainstream, namely Egypt, as the strongest state in the Arab arena and the group of "moderate" and conservative states. This was a natural extension of Baghdad's desire to break out of its somewhat secluded position in the international setting by developing ties with the West, as well as part of the deradicalization of Iraq's overall foreign policy. In addition, normalizing relations with Arab states was aimed at enabling Baghdad to concentrate on its struggle with the rival Ba'th regime in Damascus. In March 1975, Iraq charged the Syrian regime with withholding the flow of the Euphrates water to Iraq. Syria's restriction of the quantity of Euphrates water reaching Iraq was apparently aimed at pressuring Baghdad to consent to Syrian terms for the distribution of the river's water. Iraq's attempt to enlist Soviet support in the conflict with Syria was clearly manifested in the press conference in Baghdad on March 25,1975, held

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by Iraq's minister of irrigation, Mukarram Talbani, a Communist. Talbani revealed that at the beginning of the 1970s, in response to a Syrian proposal, Soviet experts had prepared a report determining the quotas of the Euphrates water to be put at the disposal of both Syria and Iraq. He contended that the conclusions of this report had been accepted by the Iraqi side in November 1973, whereas the Syrian side had retracted its agreement to this report.152 The Soviet media, as a rule, ignored this dispute between Iraq and Syria, indicating Moscow's desire to avoid taking sides and see the dispute resolved through quiet diplomacy because a conflict between two states associated with the U S S R contravened its interests. Contrary toTalbani's statement at the press conference, which demonstrated a deviation of the ICP from the Soviet attitude as a result of local constraints, the Soviet Union wanted the Communist parties of Iraq and Syria to serve as a bridge for a rapprochement between Baghdad and Damascus. In line with this goal, the secretary general of the Syrian Communist party, Khalid Bakdash, arrived in Baghdad in March 1975. The communiqué between the Syrian and Iraqi Communist parties issued at the end of his visit, as reported by Pravda, hinted at the need for cooperation between the two countries.153

Saddam Hussein's Visit to the Soviet Union in April 1975: The Dawn of a New Era in Soviet-Iraqi Relations From April 14 to 15, 1975, Saddam Hussein made an official visit to Moscow.154 Kosygin's speech in honor of Saddam Hussein, in the section dealing with the Arab-Israeli dispute, expressed Soviet support for establishing a Palestinian state.155 This reflected an evolution in Moscow's stand, which had been visible since the fall of 1974,156 and stemmed from the strengthening in the PLO's position in the Arab and international arenas, as well as from the USSR's own interests, such as the desire to establishing a state with an international orientation that suited the Soviet Union. Saddam Hussein, however, merely referred to "the right of the people of Palestine to its country and to self-determination in its land, Palestine," refraining from explicit support for the formation of a Palestinian state.157 The creation of such a state was not, in fact, in line with the Ba'th's ideology, which advocated restoring the unity of the Arab nation after its division into artificial separate states during the colonial period. The Soviet-Iraqi joint communiqué at the end of Saddam Hussein's trip—and for the first time in a Soviet-Iraqi statement—spoke of ensuring the right of the Arab people of Palestine to "self-determination" as a precondition for establishing peace in the Middle East, while making no mention of the

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Palestinians' right to set up a state. Commenting on the situation on the inter-Arab scene, Kosygin contended that the achievements of Arab states friendly to the Soviet Union—Iraq, Syria, Egypt—would be more meaningful if they "overcome more quickly all that is impeding the unity of their efforts." Thus, Kosygin indicated Soviet interest in a speedy solution to the dispute between Baghdad and Damascus over the Euphrates water. A further indication that this dispute was discussed in Moscow was the participation of Iraq's deputy minister of irrigation, 'Afif al-Rawi, in Saddam Hussein's delegation. 158 However, this Soviet mediation bid was apparently inconclusive, for the controversy over the Euphrates did not subside until October 1975. 159 Saddam Hussein's visit to the Soviet Union took place a month after the conclusion of the Algiers agreement, and it seems that the main purpose of his visit was to explain this agreement to the Soviets. Indeed, an important part of Saddam Hussein's address in honor of Kosygin was devoted to this subject, with Hussein reviewing the efforts Iraq was making to normalize relations with Iran and to implement all the articles of the agreement. By contrast, Kosygin made no mention of the agreement in his speech, a clear sign of Soviet reservations about the agreement. Another indication of Soviet dissatisfaction with the agreement was that, unlike during his three preceding visits to Moscow, Saddam Hussein did not meet with Brezhnev this time.160 As we saw above, the Soviets were critical of Iraq for having concluded the agreement without consulting Moscow. The fact that the agreement had no clause setting a limit to the arms race in the region, which could restrain Iran's spectacular rearmament, and the anti-Soviet implications of the principle of securing the Gulf from "foreign intervention" embodied in the agreement were also points the Soviets presumably raised in their talks with Saddam Hussein.161 The Soviet version of the joint communiqué at the end of the visit, which surprisingly was not issued until one day after the publication of the Iraqi one, contained a short sentence absent from the Iraqi version: "On the Soviet side satisfaction was expressed in connection with the agreement reached lately between the Iraqi Republic and Iran." 162 This was a sign that only when Moscow had been faced with the fact of the Algiers agreement had it reluctantly and coolly approved it. One result of the Algiers agreement was the liquidation of the Kurdish revolt. Significantly, Saddam Hussein arrived in Moscow after the Iraqi army had already completed the conquest of the Kurdish region at the beginning of April, thus presenting the Soviets with another fait accompli. Kosygin referred to the Kurdish problem in his speech in honor of Saddam Hussein. Noting that the Soviet Union had "gained vast experience in national construction," he added, "Therefore, on the part of the Soviet people you will always find a deep understanding for a policy aimed at a

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democratic solution of the national problem, for ensuring not just the legal but the practical equality of nationalities." 163 Kosygin's words implied that the Soviet Union intended to proceed with offering paternalistic advice to Baghdad on the Kurdish question and that Moscow was interested in greater autonomy for the Iraqi Kurds. Saddam Hussein, for his part, asserted that "the agent's pocket" (i.e., the Kurdish rebels headed by Barzani) had been totally liquidated. This sentence was moderated by Pravda, which omitted the term "the agent's pocket." It should be borne in mind that throughout the war against the Kurds in 1974-1975 and after, the Soviet media had usually refrained from referring to Barzani in person, except at the beginning of May 1975, when both Pravda and Izvestiia described Barzani as the "leader of the Iraqi Kurds" when they reproduced a small portion of his interview with an Iranian newspaper. 164 Hence, it seems that the Soviet Union did not exclude the option of restoring its connections with Barzani's group if the latter decided to renew the rebellion and if Soviet-Iraqi relations continued to decline. Barzani, however, argued in an interview conducted after his defeat that the Kurds had no choice but to maintain their ties with the West.165 During Saddam Hussein's visit to Moscow, a Soviet-Iraqi agreement on exploiting atomic energy for peaceful purposes was concluded. 166 In keeping with the Soviet international commitment to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, the USSR refused to supply other states with nuclear reactors that might be used for manufacturing atomic bombs. Given Saddam Hussein's goal of equipping Iraq with the means for producing nuclear weapons,167 the agreement on nuclear cooperation with the Soviets did not satisfy Iraq. Therefore, in order to provide Iraq with an atomic option, on September 8,1975, during a visit to France, Saddam Hussein initialed an accord for nuclear collaboration with that country. Signs of Moscow's specially favorable treatment of Saddam Hussein still remained during his visit to the Soviet Union, such as the use of the word "cordiality" to depict the atmosphere in the talks with him168—a term usually reserved for talks with Communist politicians. In any case, this was his last visit to Moscow during Brezhnev's reign in which this term was used, maybe as a reminder of past Soviet appreciation for Hussein and an indication of the Soviet attempt to court the rising star of the Ba'th 169

regime. Both the Soviet and Iraqi sides hinted during Saddam Hussein's visit to Moscow that changes in their relations were taking place. For the first time, a Soviet leader expressed concern over Iraq's policy of weakening ties with the USSR, when Kosygin noted: "The forces of imperialism and reaction have not abandoned their attempts to divert Iraq and other progressive Arab countries from the way they have chosen." He also said: "We want to assure the Iraqi friends, that the Soviet Union has a single

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policy regarding the Iraqi Republic. It lies in widening the dimensions of the cooperation . . . enriching it with a new content, finding mutually advantageous solutions to practical problems."™ Thus Kosygin emphasized the Soviet goal of sustaining close ties with Iraq, while alluding to the emergence of circumstances unfavorable to this end. Saddam Hussein also referred to the changes that were taking place. He noted: "Since our last meeting in Moscow some changes have occurred having great importance . . . in relation to the situation in our country . . . [and] the Arab region." In an interview on his return from the Soviet Union, Saddam Hussein contended that even if the justification at the national level for developing relations with the USSR was to become less strong, there was still the justification at the pan-Arab level; for Iraq was building its relationship with the USSR as an Arab nation, working against Israel and imperialism, and not merely as Iraqis.171 He thus intimated that although the disputes with Iran and the Kurds were waning—which had been factors in maintaining close relations with the Soviets since 19681969, and the main motives restraining Baghdad's policy of loosening ties with Moscow in 1973-1975—Iraq still had other reasons for preserving these links, such as the struggle against Israel and the United States. Indeed, following the Algiers agreement, the Iranian and Kurdish factors lost their significance to a great extent. Although the source of the perennial hostility between Iraq and Iran, like that of the Kurdish revolt, was not eliminated, a process of reconciliation replaced the situation of conflict between Baghdad and Tehran, and the military might of the Kurds was shattered. Hence, the fact that during Saddam Hussein's visit to Moscow in April 1975 both the Soviet and Iraqi sides were aware that changes in their relationship were yet to come indeed suggested that the Soviet Union and Iraq were on the verge of a new epoch. * *

*

The steep rise in oil prices on the world market in 1973 both before the October war and even more so afterward created the basis for reducing Iraq's economic links with the Soviet Union and widening its ties with the West. Also, by conceding to Iran's claim regarding Shatt-al-Arab, Iraq deliberately paved the way for loosening its political-strategic relationship with the Soviets. By contrast, Moscow sought to strengthen its links with Baghdad to counterbalance the augmented US-Iranian military relationship. The Soviet Union therefore became interested in the continuation of the Iraq-Iran dispute on a small scale. Iraq, however, defied Soviet interests and pursued its own goal of finding a comprehensive settlement to its dispute with Iran. When this was accomplished in the spring of 1975, Baghdad now had the opportunity to initiate a new policy toward Moscow.

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Notes 1. Juan de Onis, Baghdad, July 13,1973, The New York Times, July 15,1973, pp. 1,14. 2. See Chapter 2, p. 81. 3. See Chapter 2, p. 80. 4. Pravda, July 14,1972, July 27,1973; Pravda, July 17,1974. Another instance was the Soviet-Iraqi "statement" at the conclusion of Ponomarev's trip to Iraq at the end of November 1973, in which Ponomarev expressed his gratitude to Bakr for the hospitality, whereas no such reference had been made in the communiqué at the end of Kosygin's visit to Iraq in April 1972. See Pravda, April 10,1972; and Pravda, December 3,1973. 5. For the two previous trips, in February 1972 and March 1973, see Chapter 2, p. 83. For the visit in February 1974, see Pravda, February 28,1974; and al-Thawra, February 28,1974. 6. The 8th Congress of the Ba'th, pp. 225-226. 7. Ibid., p. 220. 8. Ibid. 9. For Iraq's severance of diplomatic relations with West Germany in 1965, see Chapter 1, note 56. 10. For Iraq's severance of diplomatic relations with Britain in December 1971, see Chapter 2, p. 61. 11. See Appendix 1, Table 3. 12. Ibid. 13. On Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-Lai's assessment of Iraq and Iran in November 1973, see Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 687. 14. See Appendix 3. 15. Ibid. 16. Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR za 1974 god; - za 1975 god. 17. See Appendix 1, Table 1. 18. See Chapter 2, p. 80. 19. Klinghoffer, p. 138. 20. On the inception of this project, see Chapter 2, p. 58; on its completion, see Ezhegodnik BSE, 1977, p. 273. 21. On the reasons for the change in Iraq's economic relations, see al-Nahar (Beirut), July 12,1975; Khadduri, Socialist Iraq, p. 88. 22. For the helicopter deal, see al-Nahar, January 19,19151 DR, January 20, 1975; and Military Balance, 1975-1976, p. 90. 23. See Chapter 2, p. 92. 24. Al-Thawra, July 17,1973. See also statements of Saddam Hussein in INA, July 19, my DR, July 20, 1973; al-Siyasa (Kuwait) in ARR, 1973, p. 366; and Chareeb, The Kurdish Question, p. 147. 25. Pravda, August 7,1973. 26. On the prominence of the Kurdish problem in Baghdad's media even during the October war, see al-Thawra, October 19,1973. 27. USSR and Third World 1 (September 3,1973-October 21,1973). 28. Pravda, October 9 and 10,1973; Izvestiia, October 10,1973. 29. On the inception of Iran's involvement in Oman, see Chapter 2, p. 86. 30. See, for example, NV19 (May 10,1974), p. 17. 31. Iraq-Iran relations from February 1974 to March 1975 are discussed in a separate section dealing with the Kurdish question; see pp.119-127. 32. Al-Thawra, April 10,1974.

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33. International Herald Tribune, February 12,1975, in ARR, 1975, p. 107. 34. Chapter 2, p. 94. 35. For example, Tariq al-Sha'b, November 13-17,1973. 36. For example, al-Takkhi, November 13 and 17,1973. 37. For a partial confirmation of this assumption, see a source within the DPK, Vanly, "Kurdistan in Iraq," pp. 190 and 209. Moreover, because the DPK enjoyed a clear military superiority over the ICP, it was very unlikely that it was the Communists who initiated and maintained an aggressive policy against the DPK. 38. Pravda, November 16,1973; al-Taakhi, November 18,1973. 39. See a joint communiqué between the DPK and the ICP at the end of the meetings in al-Takkhi, November 22,1973. 40. Ponomarev also met with Murtada Sa'd 'Abd-al-Baqi and Tariq 'Aziz. See a "statement" on the visit in al-Thawra, December 3, 1973; and Pravda, December 3,1973. 41. See al-Taakhi, December 1,1973, as compared with TASS (in English), December 1, 1973IDR (Soviet Union), December 3, 1973. In contrast to the previous meetings between delegations of the CPSU and the DPK in 1972-1973, the TASS version of the meeting on November 30,1973, was not published in Pravda\ the atmosphere at the meeting was described as "friendly," without the additional adjective "warm." For the previous meetings, see Chapter 2, pp. 76,90, and 117 above. 42. Pravda, December 1,1973. 43. See the exchange of accusations in Tariq al-Sha'b in IN A, December 14, 1973/DR, December 14,1973; Tariq al-Sha'b, January 30,1974; al-Taakhi, December 23,1973; and al-Taakhi, January 21,22, and 28,1974. 44. R. Moscow (in Arabic), January 4,1974IDR (Soviet Union), January 7, 1974. 45. See Chapter 2, pp. 89 and 91. 46. For other positive Soviet references to Barzani, see E. Primakov, Pravda, March 10 and July 12,1973. 47. See Chapter 1, p. 34. 48. This was Iraq's version, which also hinted that this incident was Baghdad's retaliation for the border incidents of December 24, 1973, and February 4, 1974, allegedly initiated by Iran. See al-Thawra, February 11, 1974. 49. Pravda, February 12,1974. 50. Like Saddam Hussein's previous visit to the Soviet Union in March 1973, the present visit was a "working" one at the invitation of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet government. Other Soviet participants in the talks with Saddam Hussein were Gromyko (since April 1973 a member of the Politburo) and Ponomarev. Iraqi participants were Taha al-Jazrawi and 'Abd-al-Jabbar Shanshal. See the Soviet-Iraqi statement in Pravda, February 28, 1974; and al-Thawra, February 28,1974. 51. The Soviet version said "in complete accordance with"; the Iraqi version said "according to." See Pravda, February 28,1974; and al-Thawra, February 28, 1974. 52. See Chapter 2, pp. 84-85 and 90. 53. For example, the political report of the Eighth Congress of the Ba'th, published in March 1974, did not make Iraq's improvement of relations with Iran conditional upon Iran's respect for the 1937 treaty. See the report in R. Baghdad, March 7,1974IDR, March 12,1974. 54. See note 50.

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55. For the complete text of the autonomy law, see al-Thawra, March 12, 1974; and INA, March 11,1974IDR, March 12,1974. 56. Al-Thawra, March 13 and 15,1974. 57. Bakr assumed the defense portfolio following the murder of Hammad Shihab by Nazim Kazzar's accomplices during the abortive coup of June 30,1973. For a discussion of the coup, see Chapter 2, p. 93. 58. A l s o participating in the talks with Grechko on the Iraqi side were Taha al-Jazrawi and ' Abd-al-Jabbar Shanshal. For a list of the participants, see TASS (in English), March 25,1974IDR, (Soviet Union), March 27,1974; R. Baghdad, March 26,1974/flflC, March 28,1974. 59. On Grechko's abortive effort to persuade the D P K to compromise with the regime in order to prevent war, see a late revelation by William Safire, "Son of 'Secret Sellout'," New York Times, February 12,1976, p. 33. 60. Pravda, March 27,1974; al-Thawra, March 27,1974; R. Baghdad, March 26,1974/BBC, March 28,1974. 61. For the D P K ' s explanation for rejecting the autonomy law, see an interview with Mahmud 'Uthman, R. Paris, April 1,1974/Dfl, April 2,1974; Voice of the Iraqi Kurdistan, April 5,1974IBBC, April 9,1974. 62. In this connection, the participation of Admiral N. D. Sergeev, chief of the general staff of the navy, in Grechko's delegation may have alluded to a Soviet request to extend the use of Umm Qasr. (The list of participants is according to the sources in note 58 above.) 63. Al-Thawra, May 7,1974. 64. These included Central Committee Member Hashim' Aqrawi and Politburo member 'Aziz 'Aqrawi. The latter did not persist in his collaboration, fleeing to Syria in August 1980. See Middle East Contemporary Survey (hereafter M E C S ) , 1979-1980, p. 513. 65. Hashim 'Aqrawi visited the Soviet Union in April-May 1974, and ' A z i z 'Aqrawi visited in October 1974. On the two personalities, see MECS, 1979-1980, p. 513; on the visits, see al-Takkhi, May 1 and 4,1974; and al-Thawra, October 23, 1974. Since April 1974, al-Taakhi had resumed publication as an organ of D P K members who supported the autonomy law. 66. Pravda, April 26,1974. See also Pravda, May 14,1974; A . Ignatov, NV 21 (May 24,1974), p. 23. 67. Voice of the Iraqi Kurdistan, April 29, \91AIBBC, May 2,1974. 68. Voice of the Iraqi Kurdistan, May 6,1974, in ARR, 1974, p. 171. 69. Barzani in Christian Science Monitor, March 20, 1974, in Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran, p. 138. See also The Times (London), November 16,1974, in ARR, 1974, p. 511. 70. For a rare instance in which a Soviet source came close to condemning Barzani in person, see A . Ignatov, NV 21 (May 24,1974), p. 23. 71. Pravda, April 26, May 14, and July 1,1974; R. Moscow (in Arabic), June 28,1974/D/? (Soviet Union), July 1,1974. 72. This is indicated in an interview in 1976 by Zayd Haydar, head of the Foreign Department of the Pan-Arab Command of the (pro-Iraqi) Ba'th. See Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question, pp. 172,215. 73. Al-Thawra, July 18,1972; R. Baghdad, July 16,1973IDR, July 17,1973; al-Thawra, July 18,1974. 74. For evidence bearing out this assumption, see Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question, pp. 166-168. 75. Al-Thawra, June 24,1974. For details of the careers of'Abd-al-Baqi and Shadhil Taqa, see Appendix 3. 76. 'Ammash died in January 1985 in Finland as Iraq's ambassador to this

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country. 77. See Pravda, September 22,1974, as compared with al-Thawra, September 22,1974. 78. Al-Nahar, September 21,1974, in ARR, 1974, p. 398. Notably, just before Shadhil Taqa's visit to Moscow, Iraqi chief of staff ' Abd-al-Jabbar Shanshal visited the Soviet Union and was received by Grechko. See Pravda, September 27,1974; and Krasnaia zverda, September 27,1984. 79. A. Z. Rubinstein, "Air Support in the Arab East," in S. S. Kaplan, Diplomacy of Power (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981), p. 505; The Washington Post, February 2, 1975, in Chareeb, The Kurdish Question, p. 167. However, contrary to some sources (including Rubinstein's article), it is doubtful whether Soviet pilots took part in the war against the Kurds (a private source). 80. R. Moscow (in Arabic), October 11,1974/BBC (Soviet Union), October 14,1974; B. Orekhov, Pravda, November 26,1974. 81. Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question, p. 167; Financial Times, October 22, 1974, in USSR and Third World, 1974, p. 470. 82. Pravda, November 19,1974. 83.Ibid. 84. The Shah's visit in November 1974, in fact, marked a further decline in Soviet-Iranian relations discernible since mid-1973, with the Soviet side continuing to criticize Iran's excessive military procurement and the joint communiqué describing the atmosphere in the talks as "businesslike and frank." See Pravda, November 19 and 21,1974. 85. See Tariq 'Aziz (minister of information since November 11,1974) in al-Nahar, December 11, 1974/DR, December 17, 1974. See also Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question, pp. 172,215. 86. Pravda, December 19,1974. For Iraq's version, see al-Thawra, December 17 and 18, 1974; for Iran's, see R. Tehran, December 17 and 18, 1974IDR, December 18 and 19,1974. 87. Al-Nahar, January 19, 1975/D/?, January 20, 1975; Washington Post, January 21 and February 1,1975, in Rubinstein, "Air Support in the Arab East," p. 506; Military Balance, 1975-1976, p. 90. It is also noteworthy that 'Abd-al-Jabbar Shanshal visited the Soviet Union in January 1975. See Krasnaia zvezda, January 16,1975. 88. See p. 113. 89. Saddam Hussein in al-Thawra, February 12, 1975, and in al-Ahram (Cairo), February 21,1975. 90. See al-Thawra, March 2,1975. 91. Boumedienne had been trying to mediate between Iraq and Iran since the Arab summit of Rabat (Morocco) in October 1974. 92. For the text of the Algiers agreement, see al-Thawra, March 7,1975. The euphemism for the termination of Iran's aid to the Kurds used in the agreement was that the two sides undertook to put an end to any subversive infiltrations. 93. For these and other considerations, see Rouhollah K. Ramazani, "Iran's Search for Regional Cooperation," Middle East Journal 2 (Spring 1976), pp. 176-180. 94. Quoted in Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question, p. 174. 95. Quoted in Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran, pp. 156-157. 96. R. Moscow (in Arabic), March 7,1975IDR (Soviet Union), March 10, 1975; Pravda, March 8, 1975 (a day after the agreement was published in al-Thawra). 97. In this connection, it should be noted that on February 19,1975, Saddam

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1975

Hussein had a conversation with the Soviet ambassador lasting forty-five minutes, and on the same day a representative of the Algerian president left Iraq for Algiers, carrying Bakr's response to Boumedienne's message. See al-Thawra, February 20,1975, and also note 91 above. 98. This is generally accepted. See also the ICP's charge that the Algiers agreement was concluded without consulting it in Arab World Communist Weekly (Beirut), July 19, 1975, in Yearbook on International Affairs, 1976, p. 545. 99. R. Moscow (in Arabic), March 7,1975; R. Moscow (in Persian), March 8,1975IDR (Soviet Union), March 10,1975. 100. Al-Thawra, March 20,1975. 101. Pravda, March 8,1975. 102. See Chapter 1, p.35. 103. For Syria's reaction, seei?. Damascus, April 9,1975IBBC, April 11,1975; for Libya's reaction, see al-Fajr al-Jadid, March 10,1975IDR, March 17,1975. 104. Soviet reservations regarding the Iranian principle of securing the Gulf from foreign intervention can be deduced from the absence of this principle in the Soviet-Iranian statement of November 1974, following the visit of the Shah (Pravda, November 21,1974), unlike in major Soviet-Iranian statements in 19721973. For additional indications of Moscow's suspicions of this principle, see R. Peace and Progress, June 19,1975IDR (Soviet Union), June 20,1975; and Izvestiia, October 4,1975. 105. IN A, March 23, 1975IDR, March 25, 1975. Also, during 1975, Habib Muhammad Karim, former secretary general of the DPK, and Dara Tawriq made use of additional amnesties of Baghdad and returned to Iraq. However, Dara Tawriq "disappeared" in November 1980, and Salih Yusefi was murdered in June 1981. See MECS, 1980-1981, p. 588. 106. The newly formed DPK (see also notes 64 and 65), along with two other Kurdish parties working under the patronage of Baghdad (the Revolutionary Kurdish party and the Progressive Kurdish movement), were granted one representative each in the Supreme Committee of the Front. (See al-Thawra, February 12, 1975.) Thus, the three vacant seats on the Supreme Committee, originally designated for the DPK headed by Barzani (see Chapter 2, p. 94), were now occupied. 107. Pravda, December 1,1973; al-Thawra, December 2,1973. 108. Pravda, December 3,1973; al-Thawra, December 3,1973. 109. As mentioned, Soviet recognition of the Iraqi Ba'th aspiration to build socialism, not within the context of the communiqué, already appeared in July 1971 (see Chapter 2, p. 66). For additional instances of such Soviet recognition, see Vladimir Kudriavtsev, Izvestiia, June 8,1972; and Pravda, July 17,1974. 110. Pravda, November 9,1973; Tariq al-Sha'b, November 9,1973. From the official information on the audience and its timing, the meeting seems to have had a relevance to the October war. It is noteworthy that this was the first and the only meeting between 'Aziz Muhammad and Brezhnev. 111. On the meeting between Ponomarev and 'Aziz Muhammad in November 1973, see p. 118; on the meeting between Grechko and 'Aziz Muhammad, see Pravda, March 27,1974. Also, Ponomarev had a meeting with 'Aziz Muhammad on October 29,1974, in Moscow (see Pravda, October 30,1974). 112. Pravda, July 1 and November 14,1974. 113. PMS 4 (April 1974), p. 39. 114. A statement of the ICP quoted in Pravda, June 25,1974. 115. For this assessment, see al-Nahar (Beirut), October 11,1974, in Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question, p. 167.

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116. For the establishment of new branches, see, for example, Tariq al-Sha'b May 21,1974; and R. Moscow (in Arabic), May 11,1974IDR (Soviet Union), May 16,1974. 117. See hints in the ICP's congratulatory note to the CPSU on the anniversary of the October revolution in Pravda, November 12,1974; and a speech by 'Aziz Muhammad in Pravda, November 14,1974. 118. See a late disclosure by Saddam Hussein, quoted in MECS, 1977-1978, p. 520. 119. L. I. Brezhnev. Leninskim kursom (Moscow: Politizdat, 1974), Vol. 4, pp. 285-303. Brezhnev made brief references to the Arab-Israeli conflict in two preceding speeches in September 1973. See ibid., pp. 261-262,273. 120. See a statement of the RCC on October 29 (after the October war) in al-Thawra, October 30,1973. 121. For Iraq's participation in the October war, see Iraq's Army in the Yom Kippur War (Tel-Aviv: Ma'arakhot, 1986), especially pp. 17-21. (This source, written in Hebrew, is mostly an annotated translation of a book issued under the auspices of the Iraqi regime in 1975.) See also a statement by Chief of Staff Shanshal of Iraq in IN A, May 4,1975IDR, May 5,1975. According to Shanshal, the total number of Iraq's army casualties in the October war was around five hundred (as compared with the sixteen thousand Iraqi casualties in the war against the Kurds). Furthermore, Iraq's official data on its participation and losses in the October war should be treated with caution, bearing in mind Baghdad's predilection for exaggerating its contribution. 122. Even a book published under the auspices of Baghdad admits that Iraq knew about Arab war preparations. See Iraq's Army in the Yom Kippur War, pp. 66-67, and note 121 above. 123. Chapter 2, pp. 83. 124. Al-Thawra, October 7,1973; INA, October 12, 1973/Dfl, October 12, 1973. The airplanes were British-made Hawker Hunters. See also Iraq's Army in the Yom Kippur War, pp. 68, 232-233; and Patrick Seale, Asad (London: I. B. Tanris & Co. Ltd., 1988), p. 215. 125. Pravda, September 19,21, and 22,1973. 126. From June 1973 to June 1974, the number of Soviet-made tanks in the Iraqi army increased from nine hundred to thirteen hundred and included advanced T-62 tanks; and the number of MiG-21 airplanes increased from ninety to one hundred. See Military Balance, 1973-1974, p. 32; and Military Balance, 1974-1975, p. 34. 127. Al-Thawra, October 7,1973. See also p. 115 above. 128. Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (London: Collins, 1975), p. 218; Galia Golan, Yom Kippur and After (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 84. The Iraqi forces reached Syria on October 10. 129. For Iraq's version, see al-Thawra, October 12, 1973; for the Soviet version, see Golan, Yom Kippur and After, pp. 83-84. 130. Golan, Yom Kippur and After, p. 78. 131. TASS (in English), October 15, Í913IDR, (Soviet Union), October 16, 1973; Pravda, October 16,1973. (The original statement was made by Bakr to the Sudanese News Agency on October 14.) In mid-October some sources reported that Bakr paid a secret visit to Moscow. See, for example, al-Nahar in MENA, October 15, 1973IDR, October 17, 1973. However, the alleged visit was not corroborated by either Iraq or Soviet sources. 132. R. Moscow (in Arabic), October 19,1973/AR, (Soviet Union), October 23,1973. 133. For example, Izvestiia, October 9,10,11, and 16,1973; Pravda, October

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11; and Krasnaia zvezda, October 11 and 20,1973. See also note 132. 134. Guardian and Financial Times, October 23, 1973, in USSR and Third World, 1973, p. 548; R. Amman, October 22,1973/DR, October 25,1973. 135. For example, on October 22,1973, IN A exclusively reported that Kosygin had arrived in Cairo on that morning, without giving any further details (see al-Thawra, October 23, 1973). Iraq's unconfirmed report on Kosygin's visit to Cairo on October 22 may have been an allusion to Kosygin's trip to Baghdad. Kosygin did visit Cairo during the October war, but from October 16 to 19,1973. 136. Al-Thawra, April 15,1975. 137. It is possible that Kosygin's mission to Baghdad was related to a Soviet contingency plan to augment the pressure on Israel on the Syrian front, in order to check the rapid Israeli offensive west of the Suez Canal. This contingency plan would have been implemented if Moscow's diplomatic efforts to secure a United Nations-sponsored cease-fire had failed. Indeed, according to several sources, in the wake of the Security Council cease-fire resolution of October 22,1973, the Syrians decided to cancel a big armored offensive with Iraq's participation, scheduled for October 23. 138. For Iraq's allegation, see an RCC statement of October 22 in al-Thawra, October 23,1973. 139. Al-Thawra, October 23,1973. 140. Al-Thawra, October 25,1973. 141. Iraq's official explanation for the withdrawal of its forces from Syria was the existence of a cease-fire on the Syrian front. However, it can be assumed that the pullout was mostly related to the lack of a solution to Baghdad's dispute with Iran and the Kurds. 142. See, for example, a statement by Murtada Sa'd 'Abd-al-Baqi in R. Baghdad, November 17,1973IDR, November 20,1973. 143. Pravda, December 3,1973; al-Thawra, December 3,1973. 144. See Chapter 2, note 14, and pp. 58-59. See also Soviet-Iraqi statements following Saddam Hussein's visits to the Soviet Union in Pravda, February 28, 1974; Pravda, April 17,1975; Pravda, February 4,1977; and Pravda, December 14,1978. See also a Soviet-Iraqi communiqué at the conclusion of Kosygin's trip to Iraq in Pravda, June 1,1976. 145. Al-Thawra, December 21 and 23,1973. 146. Ibid. 147. Pravda, February 28,1974; al-Thawra, February 28,1974. 148. Saddam Hussein's speech was delivered at an international symposium, held under the auspices of Problems of Peace and Socialism, in Baghdad in June 1974, and quoted in World Marxist Review 11 (November, 1974), p. 64. For a similar statement by Bakr, see al-Thawra, July 18,1974. 149. The most important evidence of Egypt's continued priority in Soviet Middle Eastern policy was Moscow's announcement on October 15, 1974, of Brezhnev's forthcoming trip to Cairo scheduled for January 1975. Only as a late addendum to this trip did Moscow announce on November 19 that Brezhnev would also visit Syria, and on November 20 that he would visit Iraq as well. On December 30, the Soviet Union announced the cancellation of Brezhnev's visit to these three states, probably because of Brezhnev's illness and the continuing difficulties in Soviet-Egyptian relations. 150. Among the signs of the Iraq-Egypt rapprochement: on August 5,1974, an extensive economic agreement between the two countries was concluded (al-Thawra, August 6,1974); and in May 1975, Sadat visited Iraq for the first time. 151. See Chapter 1, pp. 43-44. 152. Al-Thawra, March 27,1975. For additional indications of Iraq's efforts

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to mobilize Soviet backing in the dispute with Syria, see a statement by the Ba'th-Communist front in al-Thawra, April 10,1975; and a cable by Arab students in Moscow to Bakr in al-Thawra, April 30,1975. 153. Pravda, March 14,1975. 154. Similar to Saddam Hussein's previous trips to the Soviet Union, the visit was at the invitation of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet government. The central personalities in Saddam Hussein's delegation were Taha al-Jazrawi and Sa'dun Hammadi; on the Soviet side, the delegates were Kosygin, Gromyko, and Ponomarev. See the joint communiqué in al-Thawra, April 16, 1975; and Pravda, April 17,1975. 155. For Kosygin's speech, see Pravda, April 15, 1975 (cross reference, al-Thawra, April 15,1975). 156. For still implicit utterances of Soviet leaders in favor of establishing a Palestinian state, see Podgornyi in Pravda, September 9 and November 19,1974; and Brezhvev in Pravda, October 12,1974. 157. For Saddam Hussein's speech, see al-Thawra, April 15, 1975 (cross reference, Pravda, April 15,1975). 158. For the list of participants see note 154. 159. The relaxation of tension between Syria and Iraq in October 1975 was probably related to the conclusion of the second disengagement agreement between Egypt and Isreal in September 1975. In order to compensate itself for its weakened military position vis-à-vis Israel in the wake of this accord, Syria strove to improve ties with Iraq. 160. The three previous visits of Saddam Hussein to Moscow were in February 1972, March 1973, and February 1974. 161. For a detailed discussion of Soviet reservations regarding this principle and other aspects of the agreement, see pp. 126-127. 162. For the two versions of the communiqué, see note 154. The Iraqi version of the communiqué did not contain this sentence, probably because (1) the expression of support was a late Soviet addendum; and (2) confronted with Soviet criticism of the agreement during his talks in Moscow, Saddam Hussein decided to delete the formal Soviet consent to this accord. 163. Emphasis added. 164. Pravda, May 5,1975; Izvestiia, May 5,1975. For the original interview, see Kayhan, May 3,1975, in ARR, 1975, p. 277. 165. Die Welt, April 1, \915IDR, April 2,1975. 166. See the joint communiqué mentioned in note 154. 167. Matar, Saddam Hussein, pp. 162 and 273. 168. Pravda, April 17,1975. 169. In November 1974, Minister of the Interior Sa'dun Ghaidan, who was considered to be close to Bakr, was replaced by 'Izzat al-Duri, who was close to Saddam Hussein. 170. Emphasis added. 171. Al-Sayyad (Beirut), April 24,1975IDR, April 28,1975.

4 Downhill: A Lull on the Iraq-Iran Front, June 1975-March 1980

Changes in Iraq's Policy Toward the Soviet Union and the West: General Trends (1975-1979) Following the Algiers agreement, on June 13,1975, Iraq and Iran concluded the Baghdad treaty, called the Treaty on International Borders and Good-Neighbor Relations. Just one day before signing the Baghdad treaty, Saddam Hussein outlined a new strategy for his country in the international arena. Whereas the principles of the Eighth Regional Congress of the Ba'th of January 1974 had reserved a central and special place for the Soviet Union in Iraq's foreign relations, Saddam Hussein now described the Soviet Union merely as one of the great-powers and insisted that Iraq had to strive to maintain a balance in its ties with the USSR, Western Europe (in practice, France), and China.1 Despite Iraq's intentions, China continued to assign clear priority to relations with Iran rather than Iraq, and praised the Iranian military buildup.2 In any case, China's resources were too limited to counterpoise Soviet connections with Iraq. Although Iraq failed to bring about a breakthrough in its relations with China, the second half of the 1970s witnessed a steady growth in Iraq's links with France in the political and military fields. In accordance with an agreement of September 1975,3 France was building a nuclear reactor with the potential for producing nuclear weapons in Iraq. Further, while continuing to acquire military helicopters from France, in June 1977, following the visit of French Premier Raymond Barre to Iraq, the regime signed its first deal for the procurement of French fighter planes.4 In the second half of the 1970s, Iraq continued to depict the United States as an "imperialist" power backing the "Zionist entity." Nevertheless, some progress in Iraqi-US relations could be discerned. In May 1977, at the initiative of the Carter administration, Under-Secretary of State Philip Habib visited Iraq and met with Iraqi Foreign Minister Sa'dun 147

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Hammadi. Habib was the highest US official to visit Baghdad since the severance of diplomatic relations between Iraq and the United States in 1967.5 Another sign of Iraq's growing openness toward Washington was its decision in April 1978 to establish a friendship society with the United States and with other "pro-Zionist" states.6 Despite the improvement in Iraq's relations with the West, Iraqi media still used the term "strategic alliance" to describe the Iraqi-Soviet relationship in the second half of the 1970s,7 and almost every year high-level visits were exchanged between the two countries. In May-June 1976, Kosygin visited Iraq, where he met with Bakr and Saddam Hussein. Hussein traveled to the Soviet Union in January-February 1977 and December 1978, on both occasions having an audience with Brezhnev and conducting talks with Kosygin. The public speeches delivered during these visits, by the Soviet and the Iraqi sides alike, and the joint communiqués at the conclusion of these visits always contained a reference to the Soviet-Iraqi treaty.8 These outward signs of normalcy could not, however, conceal the gradual decline in Soviet-Iraqi relations on the political level. In June 1975, Saddam Hussein had referred to the Soviet Union as merely one of the powers competing for global influence. In January 1977, he stressed in still stronger terms Baghdad's highly Arab nationalistic approach toward Moscow, contending: "We regard the Soviets, the Americans and the French, all as aliens, notwithstanding their attitudes, positions and our relations with them . . . whether [these relations are] in the framework of friendship or alliance."9 Saddam Hussein's visit to the USSR in 1977 saw further difficulties in Soviet-Iraqi ties. For example, in his speech in honor of Saddam Hussein, Kosygin noted that although Soviet-Iraqi cooperation had solved quite a few problems, "life presents new and still greater problems."10 The joint communiqué at the conclusion of this visit also gave evidence of more serious differences between Moscow and Baghdad when it used the cool phrase "businesslike" to describe the atmosphere of the Soviet-Iraqi talks.11 At the end of the following year, Saddam Hussein again visited the Soviet Union, and this time, unlike in 1977, the joint communiqué contained no invitation to Kosygin to visit Iraq, which was a conspicuous deviation from the diplomatic etiquette between the Soviet Union and friendly states.12 Saddam Hussein's statements on Iraqi-Soviet relations in comparison with Bakr's left no doubt that it was Hussein who masterminded the policy of loosening relations with Moscow. For example, in May 1979, Bakr could still declare, in the style of the Ba'th's ideology of the first half of the 1970s, that "the need to strengthen the Iraqi revolution" required "an alliance with the socialist countries and first and foremost the Soviet Union." 13 Saddam Hussein, for his part, throughout 1979 defined Iraqi-Soviet ties at best as a "real. . . friendship" 14 and made no reference to the strategic

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alliance. Since February 1979, Saddam Hussein had been preparing the ground to succeed Bakr and on July 16, 1979, probably under pressure from Hussein, Bakr announced his resignation from all his posts. On the same day, Saddam Hussein was appointed to president, secretary general of the Regional (i.e., Iraqi) Command of the Ba'th, chairman of the RCC, head of the executive, and commander-in-chief of the armed forces, concentrating a great amount of power in his hands at the expense of the RCC. He nominated 'Izzat Ibrahim (who until 1976 had been called 'Izzat al-Duri15), a member of the RCC since November 1969, to deputy secretary general of the Regional Command of the Ba'th and deputy chairman of the RCC. Thus 'Izzat Ibrahim, considered a colorless personality who could not overshadow Saddam Hussein, formally became the second-in-command. More important figures in Iraq's leadership were Taha Yasin Ramadan (until 1976, Taha al-Jazrawi), a member of the RCC since November 1969,' who was now promoted to first deputy prime minister; and Tariq'Aziz, a member of the RCC since September 1977, who was now appointed deputy prime minister.16 All three leaders had taken part in shaping Iraqi-Soviet relations since the early 1970s.17 In the second half of the decade, 'Izzat Ibrahim and Tariq 'Aziz accompanied Saddam Hussein on his two visits to the Soviet Union,18 and Taha Yasin Ramadan continued to handle mainly the economic sphere of the Iraqi-Soviet relationship. At the end of July 1979, Saddam Hussein carried out purges in the highest echelons of the Ba'th regime on the pretext of their complicity in an alleged plot. The purges were directed against different groups, including supporters of Bakr and of a rapprochement with Syria, and also, presumably, opponents of Iraq's turn westward. The fact that Murtada Sa'd' Abd-al-Baqi, Iraq's ambassador to the Soviet Union from June 1974 to June 1979, was among those convicted of involvement in the "plot," strengthens the assessment that the purges were also aimed at adherents of maintaining close ties with Moscow.19 As might have been expected, the year in which Saddam Hussein came to power and consolidated his position witnessed a further cooling in Baghdad's policy toward Moscow. The tradition of exchanging high-level visits between the Ba'th regime and the Soviet Union at least once a year since the beginning of the 1970s was broken in 1979. This symbolized that the senior position of the Soviet Union in Iraq's foreign relations, which had been preserved until that year, had been undermined. Also in 1979, the term "strategic alliance," which Baghdad's media had usually used to describe Iraqi-Soviet relations, was replaced by such terms as "friendly relations," "balanced relations," and "cooperation." At the same time, Baghdad's policy of developing ties with the West gathered additional momentum, and French Premier Raymond Barre and the foreign ministers of Britain and West Germany all visited Iraq in July 1979, the month Saddam Hussein took command.

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By expanding relations with the West, Saddam Hussein sought to decrease further Iraq's reliance on the Soviets and create conditions for consolidating Baghdad's independent policy in the international arena. His long-term ambitions were, however, far more grandiose: he strove not only to release Baghdad from dependence on Moscow, but also to realize his vision of Iraq's destiny, which was to achieve a status equal to that of the Soviet Union and other big powers. As he declared in December 1979, "We are drawing a big image for Iraq and we want our country to achieve its proper weight based on our estimation that Iraq is as great as China, as great as the Soviet Union and as great as the United States." 20 Despite the decline in political relations, Soviet-Iraqi military ties continued to expand throughout the second half of the 1970s. Officials from the military of both sides participated in Kosygin's talks in Iraq in 1976 as well as in Saddam Hussein's talks in the Soviet Union in 1977, and visits also were exchanged on the military level.21 According to an authoritative Western source, from the summer of 1975 to the summer of 1980, the number of Soviet-made tanks in the Iraqi army increased from twelve hundred to twenty-five hundred and fifty, including advanced T-72 tanks, whereas the number of MiG-23s grew from thirty to eighty. Because the French fighter planes ordered in 1977 were not delivered to Iraq until the end of the 1970s, and notwithstanding Iraq's other military purchases in France, the bulk of Iraq's weaponry remained Soviet.22 It seems that Iraq was hesitant to implement a swift and comprehensive turnaround in its sources of military hardware because of the predominance of Soviet weapons in its army since the rule of Qasim in 1958. Also, the Soviet Union had a quantitative edge over France in arms production, and, at least in some categories, Soviet weaponry was qualitatively on a par with its Western equivalents. Given these constraints and considerations, Iraq conducted the policy of diversifying its military sources gradually, concentrating on the air force rather than the ground forces. Soviet-Iraqi economic relations were not so prosperous. As we saw in Chapter 3, since 1974 Iraq had tended to use its burgeoning oil revenues to acquire superior Western produce. Thus, whereas in 1974 Iraq's imports from the Soviet Union were estimated at $108 million, accounting for 5 percent of Iraq's total imports, the following year they declined to $103 million and accounted for only 2.5 percent of Iraq's imports. During the same period, the share of the entire Soviet bloc in Iraq's imports decreased from 13 to 8 percent, whereas Japan's share increased from 11 to 20 percent, and West Germany's increased from 8 to 18 percent. In 1975, the United States accounted for 9 percent, and France and Britain each for 6 percent of Iraq's imports.23 In July 1975, an agreement on economic cooperation between the Comecon and Iraq was concluded in Moscow. It was the first accord of this kind signed between the Comecon and a non-Communist state in the

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Third World, although the agreement did not grant Iraq observer status in the Comecon. 2 4 In light of Iraq's general policy of loosening ties with the U S S R , it is reasonable to assume that the accord was initiated by Moscow. Yet, the very fact that Iraq signed this agreement attested to Baghdad's need for economic assistance from the Soviet bloc to develop oilfields, construct power stations, and carry out irrigation projects. For the Soviet bloc, Iraq was important as an oil supplier. The Soviets continued to be interested in the procurement of Iraqi oil, mainly for the East European countries, in order to enable the Soviet Union to reduce its oil exports to the Eastern bloc and augment its oil exports to the West for hard currency. 25 Indeed, in 1975 and 1976 the Soviet Union imported a total of 11.1 million tons of oil from Iraq, which constituted 85 percent of total Soviet oil imports in this period. 26 However, the significance of Iraq's oil for the Soviet bloc should not be overestimated, for in the second half of the 1970s the U S S R continued to be a leading producer and an important exporter of oil 2 7 The Soviet Union had no intention of relinquishing its position as the principal oil supplier to the East European states (a position used as a lever to exercise influence on these countries); it merely desired to lessen its oil commitments to these states. The proportion of Iraq's imports shared by its foreign trade partners in 1975 did not change substantially throughout the second half of the decade. More specifically, the average annual percentage of Iraq's imports from the Soviet Union in 1975-1979 was evaluated at 3.5 percent, and from the entire Soviet bloc at 10 percent, whereas the average annual percentage of the main Western industrialized states—Japan, West Germany, the United States, France, and Britain—in the same period remained the same as in 1975.28 It deserves notice that following the decline in the Iraqi-Soviet relationship at the end of the 1970s, Baghdad publicly expressed its disappointment with Moscow's economic assistance. 29

Repercussions of Syria's Intervention in Lebanon (Winter 1976-Spring 1977) As the decline in Soviet-Egyptian relations accelerated following the second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement of September 1975, concluded under the auspices of Washington, in March 1976 Egypt finally abrogated unilaterally its friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. Thus, the process that had begun in 1974 was completed: Syria now replaced Egypt as the prime Arab state in Soviet Middle Eastern policy, and Iraq became the second. 30 Nevertheless, 1976 also witnessed difficulties in Soviet-Syrian ties regarding the issue of Lebanon. The limited Syrian intervention in

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Lebanon in the winter of 1976 was welcomed by Moscow, for it was aimed at strengthening the Lebanese left wing, and was a stage in Damascus's strategy to set up a joint front with Jordan, the PLO, and Lebanon directed against Israel. However, in the spring, after Syria's traditional allies in Lebanon had rejected the Damascus-sponsored reforms to the Lebanese constitution, Syria switched its support to the right-wing Christian forces. The Soviet Union, for its part, was still eager to sustain its relationship with Syria and therefore refrained from reporting, let alone criticizing, the shift in Syria's policy in Lebanon.31 Contrary to the Soviet ambition to draw its two principal allies in the region, Syria and Iraq, closer to each other, Iraq's relations with Syria went from bad to worse, with the 1975 conflict over the distribution of the Euphrates water now replaced by the dispute over Syria's policies in Lebanon. The Iraqi Ba'th regime considered any enhancement of the rival Syrian Ba'th regime's position in Lebanon as detrimental to Baghdad's interests, especially as Damascus's intervention in Lebanon from the spring of 1976 was aimed against the left-wing forces, comprising the pro-Iraqi Ba'th. In mid-May 1976, Iraq conveyed to the Soviets its concern over Syria's activities in Lebanon, 32 and at the end of May, Minister of Information Tariq 'Aziz was dispatched to Moscow as a special envoy of Iraq's president, to deliver a message from Bakr to Kosygin, presumably about the situation in Lebanon.33 On May 31 and June 1, Kosygin visited Iraq. In a speech on Baghdad television on June 1, Kosygin hinted at Soviet opposition to Syria's intervention in Lebanon,34 and an obvious allusion to this effect was included in the joint Soviet-Iraqi communiqué at the conclusion of Kosygin's trip. The communiqué stressed that a "positive solution to the Lebanese crisis can be achieved by the Lebanese people itself."35 The fact that the Soviet Union chose to voice its indirect criticism of Syria precisely in Iraq, and also that Iraq preceded Syria in Kosygin's itinerary to the Arab East, was apparently intended as an implied Soviet threat to Damascus that it might lose its senior status in the Kremlin's strategy unless it amended its policy in Lebanon. However, Syria decided to present the Soviet Union with a fait accompli. On May 31, the night before Kosygin left Baghdad for Damascus, the Syrian army invaded Lebanon. Kosygin concluded his journey to Damascus on June 4, failing to reach a concrete agreement with the Syrians on the Lebanese issue.36 As Syria continued its military campaign against the left-wing forces and the PLO in Lebanon, from mid-June the USSR began to voice ever stronger criticism of the Syrian intervention, although still expressing hope that the breach between Syria and its "natural allies" in Lebanon would be healed. From Iraq's standpoint, the crisis in Soviet-Syrian relations combined with the Iraqi and Soviet opposition to Syria's presence in Lebanon

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created an opportunity to promote Iraq's relationship with the Soviet Union at Syria's expense. Iraq's desire to strengthen ties with the Soviets was also the result of its worsening relations with the conservative and "moderate" Arab states, because these countries—first and foremost Saudi Arabia and Egypt—approved of Syria's politics in Lebanon. Iraq's efforts to improve relations with the USSR were manifested in the dispatch of Tariq 'Aziz, as a presidential envoy, on two visits to Moscow in the summer of 1976. During the first visit he had a meeting with Gromyko, and during the second with a senior member of the Politburo, Andrei Kirilenko. The Soviet reports on Tariq 'Aziz's talks indicated opposition to Syria's intervention in Lebanon, although they did not refer to Syria by name. At the conclusion of Tariq 'Aziz's talks with Gromyko, the two sides expressed support for "the solution of the acute problems [in Lebanon] . . . without outside interference,"37 and at the talks with Kirilenko the two sides "stressed the importance . . . of normalizing the situation [in Lebanon] by the Lebanese themselves without any outside interference."38 However, the absence of an explicit condemnation of Syria's intervention was a sign that Moscow wanted to avoid making a provocative move vis-à-vis Damascus. This was also evidenced by the relatively low Soviet representation at the talks with Tariq 'Aziz in the summer of 1976. Although Tariq 'Aziz was sent as a presidential envoy, he was not received by any member of the "troika" (Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgornyi), unlike on his two preceding visits to Moscow and even his next visit in 1977. 39 The Soviet Union's reaction to Iraq's bid to exploit the crisis in Soviet-Syrian relations in 1976 to promote its ties with Moscow resembled its reaction to Iraqi attempts to capitalize on the difficulties in Soviet relations with Sadat in the first half of the 1970s. In both cases Iraq's initiatives failed to change Moscow's set of priorities in the Arab East according to which Egypt and subsequently Syria were the key states. Nevertheless, against the background of the events in Lebanon, 1976 witnessed a slowdown, or even a temporary shift, in the gradual process of decline in the Soviet-Iraqi relationship since 1975. The congruity between the Soviet Union and Iraq on the Lebanese issue did not last long. From the end of 1976, following the normalization of relations between Syria and the PLO, Moscow was beginning to resign itself to Syria's presence in Lebanon. Nevertheless, Soviet suspicion regarding Damascus's intentions vis-à-vis the Lebanese left wing still remained.40 This suspicion, along with Iraq's continued resolute resistance to the Syrian "occupation" of Lebanon, were manifested in the joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of Saddam Hussein's visit to Moscow in February 1977. It asserted that the two sides were "unanimous in their belief that the Lebanese crisis should be resolved by the Lebanese

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themselves, without foreign interference."41 However, this was rather a vestige of Soviet opposition to Syria's intervention in Lebanon in 1976. Asad's visit to the Soviet Union in April 1977 marked a reconciliation between Moscow and Damascus and was a step toward Soviet consent to Syria's presence in Lebanon—a presence that by the end of the 1970s was directed against the right-wing Christian forces.

Resistance to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Process (Fall 1977-Sununer 1979) Sadat's visit to Jerusalem from November 19 to 21, 1977, signaled the beginning of the Egyptian-Israeli peace process—a process which, to the resentment of the Soviet Union, took place outside the framework of the Geneva Conference and in which the United States played the leading role. The fact that both the USSR and Iraq opposed Sadat's peace initiative created conditions conducive to Soviet-Iraqi cooperation. On November 30, Iraq announced that it was to participate in a summit of radical Arab states (including Syria) scheduled to convene in Tripoli (Libya) to counteract Sadat's intiative, and the following day, RCC member Tariq 'Aziz42 arrived in Moscow as a special envoy of Iraq's president and met with Brezhnev and Gromyko on December 2.43 Brezhnev received Tariq 'Aziz not only as general secretary, but also as president, a post he had assumed after dismissing Podgornyi in June that year. Brezhnev's appointment to president reflected the strengthening of his personal rule in the second half of the 1970s and the weakening of Kosygin's position. Gromyko, who had been Soviet foreign minister since 1957 and a Politburo member since 1973, participated in the talks between Brezhnev and Tariq 'Aziz even though, according to diplomatic protocol, the talks should have been held only between the Soviet president and the emissary of the Iraqi president. This indicated Brezhnev's considerable reliance on Gromyko in foreign affairs. Indeed, the continued deterioration in Brezhnev's state of health from the mid-1970s led to an increase in Gromyko's role in shaping his country's foreign policy. It is interesting that, in his capacity of foreign minister, Gromyko participated in most of the Soviet delegations that held talks with visiting senior Iraqi delegations during the 1970s,44 but he never traveled to Iraq as he did to Egypt (in the late 1960s and the first half of the 1970s) and to Syria (in the middle and the second half of the 1970s).45 This was another sign of Iraq's inferior status in Soviet Middle Eastern policy compared with that of Egypt and Syria. These talks between Brezhnev and Gromyko and Tariq 'Aziz presumably dealt with coordinating the resistance of the radical Arab states to Sadat's peace initiative and with mending fences between Iraq

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and Syria to facilitate this goal. Immediately before Tariq 'Aziz's visit, Syria's foreign minister, ' Abd-al-Halim Khaddam, had also been in Moscow (from November 28 to 30), and the Tripoli summit was convened from December 2 to 5. The participants in the Tripoli summit (except for Iraq)—Syria, Libya, Algeria, South Yemen, and the PLO—formed the Front of Steadfastness and Confrontation (hereafter the Confrontation Front), an organization with a pro-Soviet orientation, which received Moscow's blessing. Iraq, which was represented at the summit at a relatively low level by RCC member Taha Yasin Ramadan, left the summit before its closure under the pretext that Syria refused to change its "defeatist" attitude (i.e., acceptance of Security Council Resolution 338) and did not join the Confrontation Front. Iraq's continued hostility toward Syria, as opposed to Soviet support for the Confrontation Front and its leading state, Syria, undoubtedly marred Soviet-Iraqi relations in 19771978. Iraq's policy toward Syria changed only after the conclusion of the US-sponsored Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement at Camp David in September 1978. The Camp David Accords46 were opposed by most Arab countries and provided Iraq with a historic opportunity to replace Egypt as the leading state in the Arab world by assuming the role of the coordinator of all-Arab resistance to these accords. To this end, on October 1, 1978, Iraq called for an Arab summit in Baghdad and embarked upon the road of reconciliation with Syria, which led to the conclusion of a Charter for Joint National Action between Iraq and Syria on October 26. The charter envisaged a unification between the two states but left unresolved the complicating issues dividing the two rival regimes. Besides the formal unification agreement with Syria, another prestigious achievement for Iraq was the convening of the Arab summit conference in Baghdad at the beginning of November and Iraq's leading role in formulating the conference's joint decision against Sadat's peace policy. The conference condemned the Camp David Accords, called upon Egypt to abrogate them, and decided on punitive measures to be implemented against Egypt if it signed a peace treaty with Israel. (Indeed, following the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in March 1979, a conference of Arab ministers of foreign affairs and economics assembled in Baghdad at the end of the month and announced diplomatic and economic sanctions against Egypt.) Iraq's leading role in rallying the Arab states' opposition to the Camp David Accords seems to have stalled the development of Iraqi-US relations in the political field. On the other hand, the Baghdad summit and the improved relations with Syria provided Saddam Hussein with assets in his talks in Moscow from December 11 to 13, 1978, which evidently focused on the Arab-Israeli dispute. The Soviet-Iraqi communiqué issued at the end of the talks referred for the first time to the need to fulfill the

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Palestinian people's right "to establish its own independent state"47 as a condition for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. As we have seen, the Soviets had tried to persuade the Iraqi side to support the establishment of a Palestinian state during Saddam Hussein's visit to Moscow in April 1975, and again during Kosygin's visit to Iraq in 1976 and Hussein's visit to the USSR in 1977, but to no avail.48 However, Iraq's support for the establishment of a Palestinian state had already appeared in the resolutions of the Baghdad summit in November 1978 and in Saddam Hussein's speech in Moscow in December,49 reflecting Iraq's attempt to adapt its stand to the Arab consensus in order to play a central role in the Arab world. Nonetheless, Iraq made no change whatsoever in its opposition to Israel's very existence. As in other Soviet-Iraqi communiqués issued in the second half of the 1970s, in the joint statement of December 1978, Iraq voiced support for cooperation between Arab countries and "socialist" states for the success of the struggle against Israel's "aggression."50 The Soviet Union decided to increase arms shipments to Iraq,51 probably because the formal unification between Iraq and Syria made Iraq a state in direct confrontation with Israel, and also in appreciation for Iraq's initiative in convening the Baghdad summit. The joint communiqué at the conclusion of Saddam Hussein's visit spoke of continued Soviet-Iraqi cooperation "in strengthening the defense capacity of the Iraqi Republic." From Moscow's standpoint, the military strengthening of Iraq and Syria was aimed at exerting pressure on Israel in order to promote the Soviet scheme for a political solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute. Although the Soviet Union was interested' in improved relations between Iraq and Syria, some signs of Soviet reservations about the formal unification between the two countries could be discerned during Saddam Hussein's trip to Moscow. For example, although Kosygin, in his speech in honor of Saddam Hussein, welcomed "the determination of Iraq and Syria to open a new page in their relations, and to act in concert," he made no explicit mention of the Iraqi-Syrian charter.52 Saddam Hussein, however, emphasized the charter, and described it as "an important pan-Arab achievement," and "expressed appreciation to the Soviet friends for their support for this great achievement." However, Pravda's version of Saddam Hussein's speech omitted this expression of gratitude for Soviet backing of the charter.53 Finally, the joint communiqué noted that Saddam Hussein had "informed" the Soviet side of the intent of Iraq and Syria to cooperate in accordance with the charter, whereas the Soviet side again avoided a clear reference to the charter, merely appreciating "the determination of the leaders of Syria and Iraq to act in concert."54 Moscow would probably have preferred Iraq to improve its relations with Syria by joining the Confrontation Front rather than by concluding a bilateral charter. It was wary of the Iraqi-Syrian rapprochement because,

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as we shall see below, in 1977-1978 Iraq was moving away from the Soviet orbit by siding with Somalia in the war against Soviet-backed Ethiopia and by persecuting the ICP. Moreover, Saddam Hussein stressed Iraq's independent course during his visit to the Soviet Union in December 1978, declaring that "the Iraqi Republic adheres to the principles of non-alignment, respect for sovereignty and the free will of all nations." Therefore, from Moscow's viewpoint, Iraq's participation in the pro-Soviet Confrontation Front might have curbed Baghdad's desire to distance itself from Moscow. Conversely, the Syrian rapprochement with Iraq might undermine the Confrontation Front and even lead Damascus to adopt Baghdad's independent course vis-à-vis Moscow, especially given Iraq's promised financial support for Syria. (The USSR probably preferred Libyan aid to Syria, which had already been facilitated by the formation of the Confontation Front.) In any case, the Iraqi-Syrian rapprochement turned out to be a short-lived phenomenon in the history of animosity between the two Ba'th regimes. From February 1979, the bilateral contacts between the two states decreased considerably, and the unification talks virtually ceased following Saddam Hussein's assumption of power in July 1979.

Iran and Regional Issues from the Algiers Agreement to the Collapse of the Shah's Regime (Summer 1975-Fall 1978) After the Algiers agreement and throughout the Shah's rule, Iraq described its relations with Iran as "good-neighborly" while high-level visits between the two states were exchanged. Nevertheless, problems remained, which Iraq refrained from raising publicly, such as the presence of an Iranian force in Oman.55 An even more important controversy between Iraq and Iran was related to the security of the Gulf. Following the Algiers agreement, which spoke about safeguarding the Gulf from "foreign intervention," Iran worked to establish an organization of the Gulf states to defend the Gulf. Iraq, however, feared that such an organization, which was to include Iran plus the conservative Arab states and Iraq, would lead to Baghdad's isolation inside this forum, to Tehran's hegemony over it, and even to a link between it and CENTO. As an alternative to the Iranian scheme and as evidence of Baghdad's desire to come closer to Iran and the conservative Gulf states, Iraq expressed willingness to conclude bilateral agreements with Iran and the other Gulf states to secure the Gulf.56 The differences between Iraq and Iran regarding the Gulf attested to an undercurrent of suspicion, which, coupled with Iran's intensive rearmament, accounted to a great extent for Iraq's interest in maintaining military ties with the Soviet Union and not overstraining its political ties with that country.

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During the second half of the 1970s, the Soviet Union continued to be friendly toward the Shah's Iran and even augmented arms deliveries to Iran, which included armored personnel carriers and antiaircraft missiles. Nevertheless, the USSR intensified its criticism of Iran's excessive purchases of US weapons, its growing activity in CENTO, and its military aid to Sultan Qabus' regime in Oman. (After Sultan Qabus, assisted by Iran, succeeded in suppressing most of the rebellion in Dhofar in 1976, Iran's expeditionary force in Oman was reduced.) The Soviets also argued that the Iranian security scheme for the Gulf was only ostensibly aimed at ousting both superpowers from the region, whereas in actuality it would preserve a Western presence both because Iran was a member of CENTO and because Iran's projected organization of the "reactionary" Gulf states was to be linked to US "imperialism."57 In opposing Iran's security plan for the Gulf, Soviet and Iraqi interests coincided. Thus, Soviet arms transfers to Iraq intended to contribute to the latter's resistance to Tehran's designs in the Gulf in particular and to counterbalance Iran, as a pro-US factor, in general. However, the congruence of interests between the Soviet Union and Iraq regarding the Gulf was not complete, as was evidenced by the lack of a reference to this subject in Soviet-Iraqi joint communiqués issued in the second half of the 1970s. Whereas Iraq avoided directly criticizing Iran's policy and expressed readiness for limited cooperation on Gulf security with Iran and the pro-Western Arab states, the Soviets explicitly criticized Iran. Moreover, Iraq's very participation in regional discussions on Gulf security (as in the conference of Gulf states that took place in Muscat, Oman, in November 1976) and its willingness to cooperate on a limited scale with the Gulf states on matters of security aroused Soviet suspicions. As Radio Moscow pointed out, "some countries o f . . . [the Gulf] region are not yet convinced of the danger of [ C E N T O ] . . . to their interests."58 Whereas there was only a modicum of agreement between Iraq and Iran concerning the Gulf following the Algiers agreement, the two states did agree on several developments in the periphery of the Middle East. Both Iraq and Iran opposed increased Soviet influence in the periphery of the region and therefore sided with Somalia in its conflict with Ethiopia in 1977-1978 and were disturbed by the establishment of a pro-Soviet Marxist regime in Afghanistan in April 1978. All in all, from the Algiers agreement to the fall of the Shah, the Iraqi and Iranian attitudes on regional issues moved closer to each other, whereas the Soviet and Iraqi attitudes on these issues moved further apart. Soviet-Iraqi differences on the Ethiopian question were not new. From the end of the 1960s, Ba'th's Iraq had supported politically and militarily the secessionist movement of Eritrea, a region in northern Ethiopia along the Red Sea coast considered by the Ba'th ideology as part of the Arab world. This support, however, began to contravene Soviet

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interests, when a pro-Soviet Marxist regime in Ethiopia was set up in the mid-1970s and began receiving Soviet military aid. Yet, the Soviet Union preferred a political rather than military solution to the Eritrean issue, based on granting autonomy to this region. The Ethiopian-Somali war of 1977-1978 intensified the differences between the USSR and Iraq.This war arose from Somalia's claim to the Ogaden region (an area in southeast Ethiopia called "Western Somalia" by Somalia) and its invasion of this region in July 1977. The war put the Soviet Union in a delicate position because the Somali regime was also Marxist and bound to the Soviets by a friendship treaty of 1974. However, by the fall of 1977, Moscow had chosen to side with Ethiopia, as a state more important than Somalia, which was defending a sacred principle of the Organization of African Unity, namely the respect for the territorial integrity of each member state. Somalia reacted by abrogating the friendship treaty with the Soviet Union on November 13, 1977. In the winter of 1977-1978, the Soviet Union airlifted large quantities of military hardware to Ethiopia, while Cuba, in coordination with the Soviets, dispatched an expeditionary force to Ethiopia. This Soviet-Cuban assistance decided the outcome of the war in favor of Ethiopia. The Soviet support of Ethiopia against Arab Somalia—which was supported by most Arab states, including those friendly to the Soviets such as Syria and Iraq59—also indicated Moscow's frustration over its relations with the Arabs. Indeed, in the second half of the 1970s, the Soviet Union ascribed special significance to developing relations with Marxist regimes in Black Africa, which, besides Ethiopia, included Angola and Mozambique.60 An article in al-Thawra in August 1977 explained the differences between the Iraqi and Soviet stands on the Eritrean issue, as well as Iraq's support for Somalia's claim to the Ogaden. It also disclosed that Saddam Hussein had tried to dissuade the Soviets from supporting Ethiopia at the beginning of 1977, during a visit to Moscow.61 Also in August 1977, Tariq 'Aziz, then information minister, made a statement implicitly aimed against Ethiopia, as the only non-Arab state bordering the Red Sea, when he emphasized that the Red Sea was an "Arab lake" and must remain so.62 Unlike Iraq, the Soviet Union objected to calling the Red Sea an "Arab lake" on the grounds that not all the states along its coast were Arab and that it was an important route for international shipping. Moreover, Moscow argued that the term "Arab lake" played on nationalist feelings and was employed by some Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, in their desire to establish a closed alliance of conservative states directed against Ethiopia and the USSR. 63 Iraq was concerned not only about Soviet activity in the Horn of Africa, but also about Moscow's involvement in the June 1978 coup in South Yemen, which reinforced the pro-Soviet orientation of the Aden regime.64 Iraq's resentment at the strengthening Soviet position in the

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periphery of the Middle East was expressed by Saddam Hussein in an interview with a US magazine, Newsweek, in July 1978, when he declared that the Soviets "won't be satisfied until the whole world becomes communist." He also claimed that Iraq had not allowed the use of its territory as a transit station for airlifting Soviet military equipment to Ethiopia. 65 This and similar statements by other Iraqi officials66 reflected the Ba'th's effort to emphasize the independence of Iraq's policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. However, it is undisputed that one of the routes of the Soviet airlift to Ethiopia passed via Baghdad. Even Saddam Hussein, when pressed in the above-mentioned interview, admitted that an indirect Soviet supply route from Baghdad, via Aden, to Addis Ababa had existed, although he alleged that in accordance with Iraq's request the Soviets had made no direct flights from Iraq to Ethiopia and that Iraq could not be held responsible for the destination of Soviet flights from Aden. Iraq's assent to provide landing facilities to the Soviets on their way to Ethiopia stemmed probably from Baghdad's still substantial dependence on Soviet weapons, and its reluctance to risk the delivery of these weapons. The USSR, for its part, refrained from reacting to Iraq's statements concerning the Soviet airlift, and in any case they were uttered when the EthiopianSomali war had already ended, as did subsequently the Soviet-Iraqi controversy on this war. However, the question of Eritrea still remained. It was apparently discussed during Saddam Hussein's visit to Moscow in December 1978 when he met with, among others, the vice president of Cuba67 (the Cuban expeditionary force had remained in Ethiopia). Saddam Hussein left Moscow for a five-day trip to Cuba on December 13. Although the joint communiqués at the conclusions of Saddam Hussein's visits to Moscow and Havana made no reference to the Eritrean question, it can be assumed that Iraq sought to reach a compromise on this question with the patrons on Ethiopia, such as granting extensive autonomy to Eritrea. At the least, he tried to avoid exacerbating relations with the Soviet bloc because of Eritrea. 68

The Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan (Fall 1978-Winter 1980) Despite the increasing popular resistance to the Shah in the fall of 1978, Iraq still clearly maintained a friendly attitude toward his regime in November. On November 19, Empress Farah of Iran visited Iraq and met with Saddam Hussein, and in the same month military visits were exchanged between Iraq and Iran. The USSR, however, was becoming increasingly disappointed with the Shah and since the fall had reported favorably on the opposition movement to his regime (although playing

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down the religious component of this movement), thus indicating Soviet interest in its victory. Against the background of developments in Iran, it seems that the aim of Saddam Hussein's visit to Moscow in December 1978 was to overcome difficulties in Iraqi-Soviet relations at least on secondary issues, such as Eritrea, in order to ensure further arms supplies to Iraq. Iraq was probably considering seizing the historic opportunity of Iran's weakness in this turbulent period to compel Tehran to rectify the Algiers agreement of 1975. An article in al-Thawra in January 1979 suggested such plans when it noted: "We were told by some people . . . that what is happening in Iran was an opportunity for us to avenge the 16,000 casualties in the Iraqi army [during the 1974-1975 war]."69 Yet, the article claimed that Baghdad had rejected such advice. It is unlikely that it was the Soviets who advised Iraq to renew its conflict with Iran, if only because they had no desire to provide the United States with an excuse for intervening to save the Shah's regime. On January 16, 1979, the Shah was forced to leave Iran, and in February his regime totally collapsed. From Iraq's viewpoint, the new Islamic regime in Iran led by the Ayatollah Khomeini presented a challenge. As a militant Shiite Muslim regime that sought to spread its religious model of government to other Muslim states, it was considered a subversive factor by the Ba'th regime, whose ideology was mainly secular and which relied to a great extent on the Sunni Arab elite. (The Sunni Arabs constitute only about 20 percent of Iraq's population and the Shiite Arabs more than 50 percent. The Kurds make up about another 20 percent of Iraq's population, and most of them are Sunni.) Nevertheless, Baghdad probably regarded the emergence of a new and unconsolidated regime in Tehran, whose relations with Iran's traditional ally, the United States, were strained, as an opportunity to recover Iraq's sovereignty over the Shatt-al-Arab. From April 1979, a war of words between Iraq and Iran began: Baghdad charged Tehran with inciting the Iraqi Shiites, and in June some border incidents took place. Saddam Hussein's assumption of the presidency in July signaled the victory of the advocates of a tough stand against Iran within the Iraqi leadership. In September, Saddam Hussein presented the Iranian foreign minister with conditions for normalizing relations, among them the return of the Shatt-al-Arab to Iraq's sovereignty.70 It seems that the enormous increase in Iraq's orders of Soviet weapons during 1979, including most advanced airplanes, was first and foremost related to the incipient military confrontation with Iran.71 The Islamic regime espoused strict nonalignment, in accordance with its slogan "neither East, nor West." Although hostile to both superpowers, the bulk of Tehran's animosity was directed at the former ally of the Shah, the United States, which was called "the Great Satan," whereas the Soviet Union was called "the Lesser Satan." The Soviets, for their part, were eager to establish friendly relations with the anti-US regime in Tehran and

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emphasized its virtues, such as its "anti-imperialism," its closure of US surveillance stations near the Soviet border, its withdrawal from CENTO, and also the evacuation of the Iranian force from Oman. At the same time, Moscow exercised self-restraint regarding the Islamic regime's hostility toward the USSR and communism manifested, for instance, in urging Soviet Muslims to follow the example of the Islamic revolution in Iran and in sporadic persecutions of the Iranian Communist party, the Tudeh (literally, the People's party). Although ascribing priority to establishing friendly relations with Iran, the Soviets, on the whole, responded favorably to Iraq's request for arms during 1979 and until the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war in September 1980,72 probably estimating that arming Iraq at this stage would still not affect significantly SovietIranian ties. On the other hand, the sales of weapons to Iraq provided the Soviets with hard currency together with a modicum of leverage over Baghdad, and also enabled them to maintain their position as the principal exporter of military hardware to Iraq vis-à-vis France. However, Iraq's interest in Soviet arms did not prevent it from asserting an independent policy in 1979. In the military sphere, Iraq increased its arms purchases in the West, especially in France.73 Another sphere in which Iraq showed independence and even hostility toward the Soviet Union was the Gulf. The fall of the Shah and the concomitant weakening of Iran encouraged Iraq's attempts to obtain recognition as the senior Gulf state from the conservative Arab countries in this area, especially Saudi Arabia. With the purpose of gaining the Saudis' confidence, Saddam Hussein declared in April 1979: "We must draw our weapons against any foreigner... who violates... [Arab] sovereignty We cannot allow the Soviets, who are friends of Iraq, to occupy the land of the Saudis, because Saudi Arabia does not lie outside the Arab map."74 Saddam Hussein's policy of fostering relations with Saudi Arabia reflected also his interest in establishing a regional Arab organization against possible Soviet expansion in the area, after the collapse of the pro-Western barrier, Iran. Whatever the extent of Saddam Hussein's fears of Soviet expansionism, it was not reasonable, from the Soviet standpoint, to attribute any aggressive designs to Moscow in the case of Saudi Arabia. After all, they reasoned, from the beginning of 1979 Moscow had been trying to court Riyadh and to capitalize both on Saudi opposition to the Camp David Accords and on the decline in the US credibility in Saudi eyes after Washington had failed to come to the rescue of the Shah. Iraqi and Soviet policies in the Arab arena also diverged, such as in the case of South Yemen, whose Marxist regime was the Soviet Union's most loyal ally in the Arab world and which had concluded a friendship treaty with the USSR on October 25,1979. Iraq considered South Yemen a Soviet satellite and resented the fact that it granted political asylum to Iraqi Communists after the ICP was suppressed in 1978-1979.75

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On December 27, 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, in order to strengthen the allegiance of the Marxist regime there to Moscow76 and defend it against the growing armed resistance of Afghan, mainly religious, organizations. In the wake of the Soviet invasion, Iraq considered abrogating its friendship treaty with the USSR, apprehensive that just as Moscow had interpreted its December 1978 treaty with Kabul as providing legal grounds for the Soviet invasion, it might use its treaty with Baghdad to justify a similar action against Iraq.77 However, it should be noted that the Soviet-Afghan treaty differed from the Soviet-Iraqi one, and, significantly, the article the USSR used as a pretext for the intervention in Afghanistan was not included in the treaty with Iraq.78 Against the background of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, al-Thawra contended that "interference in the internal affairs of others and the wish to impose hegemony on small states and peoples constitute one of the most prominent rules adhered to by the superpowers."79 On January 6, 1980, Saddam Hussein described the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as an "unjustifiable, erroneous behavior that could cause anxiety for all freedom-loving and independent peoples." 80 Moreover, in January 1980, Iraq voted for the resolutions condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which were adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and the Islamabad (Pakistan) conference of the Islamic states. Nevertheless, Iraq argued that it would be wrong for Third World states to align themselves with the United States. As an alternative, Iraq urged the nonaligned countries to strengthen relations among themselves;81 and on February 8, 1980, Saddam Hussein called upon the Arab states to sign a charter opposing the existence of foreign bases on Arab soil.82 Although the charter made no explicit reference to either the United States or the Soviet Union, it was undoubtedly directed against both of them, including Moscow's military presence in South Yemen. Iraq's vigorous opposition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan stemmed only partially from its special sensitivity to further Soviet expansion as the Arab country closest to the Soviet border. Because Iraq's stand was shared by the overwhelming majority of the nonaligned states in general and the Arab states in particular, it seems that Saddam Hussein's policy on Afghanistan was also influenced by his aspiration to attain a leading role for Iraq among the Arab and nonaligned countries. Significantly, the only Arab state that voted with the USSR at the United Nations General Assembly session on Afghanistan in January 1980 was South Yemen. Algeria, Syria, and North Yemen abstained, and Libya did not participate in the voting. Iraq's reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the winter of 1980 marked the nadir in the Ba'th regime's relations with Moscow, which had been gradually deteriorating since 1975. However, even at this time, occasional signs of Baghdad's self-restraint could be discerned. For in-

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stance, on January 31, 1980, while expressing concern over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Saddam Hussein added that "Iraq would not change the trends of its general policy in its relations with the Soviets,"83 implying that Baghdad would not annul its treaty with Moscow. The major reason for Iraq's caution was undoubtedly its preparations for a possible military confrontation with Iran, which necessitated preserving relations with the Soviet Union, and especially the treaty with it, to ensure further arms supplies. The Soviet Union generally ignored Iraq's hostile utterances toward it. Yet, in a rare reaction to a series of articles in al-Thawra condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Radio Peace and Progress—Moscow's ostensibly unofficial radio station, which represented "Soviet public opinion"—described al-Thawra's stand as "reactionary."84 The Soviets also refrained from direct criticism of the charter of February 8 proposed by Saddam Hussein, and one Soviet commentary even depicted it in positive terms as directed against the United States.85 This moderate response to Baghdad's unfriendly attitude reflected the Soviet interest in preventing a further deterioration in relations with Iraq, which might make Iraq susceptible to US influence.

The ICP: Clash and Suppression (1976-1980) As in the first half of the 1970s, the Soviets continued to report meetings that took place toward the end of each year in Moscow between a CPSU delegation, which included Ponomarev and sometimes also Suslov, and an ICP delegation headed by 'Aziz Muhammad.86 Since 1972 high-level Soviet officials who visited Iraq also made a point of meeting with an ICP delegation, as Kosygin did during his trip to Iraq in 1976.87 These meetings were apparently intended to provide encouragement for the local Communists as well as to demonstrate to the Ba'th Moscow's interest in the well-being of the ICP. Since Iraq had begun to deviate from a pro-Soviet orientation in mid-1973, the ICP had gained importance in Soviet eyes as a pressure group for restraining the trends in Baghdad's policy that Moscow opposed.88 From the Soviet perspective, this function of the ICP became even more vital in the second half of the 1970s, as Iraq moved farther away from the Soviet Union. Accordingly, in this period Soviet sources, and mainly Problems of Peace and Socialism, published the ICP's indirect criticism on some of Iraq's policies, mostly in articles signed by 'Aziz Muhammad.89 He particularily criticized Iraq's limited economic liberalization, which, he alleged, was creating convenient conditions for developing economic relations with the West and was drawing Iraq closer to the West also in the political sphere, a situation that resembled the way in which Sadat's regime had broken with Moscow. For example, in an article published in

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September 1977, 'Aziz Muhammad argued: "The situation today is still dangerous, for reactionary forces are trying to pull the country back to capitalism and make it dependent on imperialism (the experience of other countries furnishes similar evidence)."90 In addition, a Soviet source citing Tariq al-Sha'b implied the ICP's solidarity with the Soviet position in the war between Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as the ICP's sympathy for the Confrontation Front,91 in opposition to Baghdad's policies. The Soviet Union sought to strengthen the authority of the Ba'thCommunist front in order to give the Iraqi Communists greater leverage with the regime.92 The ICP's demand for the right of Communists to engage in political activities in the Iraqi army also received Soviet support. A statement to this effect by a member of the ICP, which had been published in 1974 in Problems of Peace and Socialism,93 was cited again in a 1977 Soviet book on the Iraqi army.94 Soviet support for the ICP's attempt to establish an overt organization in the armed forces, and possibly a covert organization as well, reflected Moscow's growing frustration with the Ba'th regime. Nevertheless, the preponderant trend in Soviet policy toward Iraq was to maintain bilateral relations with the existing regime. Accordingly, the CPSU continued to maintain party ties with the Ba'th, 95 and both a Ba'th and an ICP delegation participated in the Twenty-fifth Congress of the CPSU, which took place in February-March 1976.96 Also, at the invitation of the Ba'th (and Iraq's state institutions) Kosygin visited Iraq in 1976, and at the invitation of the CPSU (and the Soviet government), Saddam Hussein visited the Soviet Union in 1977.97 The Ba'th regime, however, had a clear strategic goal to liquidate the ICP, especially after the settlement of the dispute with Iran had reduced its dependence on the Soviet Union. In February 1976, Saddam Hussein declared the regime's ambition "to make all Iraqis in this country Ba'thists in membership and in belief or in the latter only."98 The Ba'th regarded the ICP's criticism of certain aspects of Baghdad's policy as intolerable slander, and the Communist activities in the army as plotting against the state. The Ba'th itself had twice come to power through military coups in 1963 and in 1968, and hence was very sensitive to the activities of other parties inside the armed forces. Nonetheless, if the Ba'th regime refrained from wide-scale persecutions of the ICP in 1976-1977, it was only for tactical considerations. The regime seems to have feared that a sudden shift in its policy toward the ICP might lead to a sharp decline in its relationship with the Soviet Union, whereas Baghdad wanted its withdrawal from overdependence on Moscow, especially in the military field, to proceed in a gradual and organized way. Also, as long as Saddam Hussein was engaged in an internal party struggle to succeed Bakr, he decided to postpone the campaign against the Communists to avoid displeasing the USSR, which was still the major state in Iraq's foreign relations. Indeed, Saddam Hussein's visit to the Soviet Union at the

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beginning of 1977 was presumably related to his struggle for power.99 The same visit also indicated Saddam Hussein's desire to improve his image in Moscow regarding the ICP. In his speech in Moscow, Saddam Hussein contended that the Iraqi people, led by the Ba'th and "supported by all progressive forces . . . of the country," was marching on the road to accomplish its national and pan-Arab tasks.100 From the fall of 1977 to the winter of 1978, there were frequent reshuffles in the highest echelons of Iraq's leadership, which strengthened personalities close to Saddam Hussein. Among the notable changes were the promotions of Tariq 'Aziz and'Adnan Khayralla (a relative of Saddam Hussein) to membership in the RCC in September 1977, with the latter replacing Bakr as defense minister in October 1977. With the consolidation of Saddam Hussein's position, from the spring of 1978 a shift in the Ba'th's policy toward the ICP took place. The first sign of such a shift was an anti-Communist article published in May 1978 in al-Rasid, a periodical apparently reflecting the views of Tariq 'Aziz and Saddam Hussein.101 The article accused the ICP of following Moscow's policies blindly, such as on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Ethiopian-Eritrean dispute, as well as of attempting to drive a wedge between the Kurdish people and the government.102 At the beginning of June, the secretary general of the front (and member of the RCC since September 1977), Na'im Haddad, confirmed that twenty-one Communists from the military, who had been convicted three years before on the charge of forming secret cells inside the armed forces, had been executed in May.103 Saddam Hussein also disclosed that the Communists had been executed, despite appeals for clemency from the Soviet and East European ambassadors.104 These executions indicated the Ba'th's growing suspicions that the Soviet Union might attempt to undermine the regime through the ICP. Only one month before, a pro-Soviet Marxist party, with the assistance of army officers loyal to it and possibly with Soviet involvement, had carried out a coup in Afghanistan. Also in April, the Iraqi authorities had compelled the Soviet embassy in Baghdad, which had been located close to the Republican Palace and was suspected of eavesdropping, to move to another site.105 A correspondent close to Saddam Hussein has alleged that "Saddam will never forget that the Soviet Union tried to arm[?] the Iraqi Communist Party and to infiltrate the Iraqi army."106 However, it seems that the main reason for the executions and the new wave of persecutions against the ICP was not so much an attempt to organize in the army (such attempts had taken place previously without leading to executions), but rather a turnaround in the Ba'th's policy toward Moscow. Close relations with the USSR obliged the Ba'th to find a modus operandi with the ICP, which it could avoid just by maintaining friendly relations with the Soviets. It was probably no coincidence that the persecution of the ICP began in

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the spring of 1978, when Iraq had major differences with the USSR on several international issues, such as the Ethiopian-Somali war, the Confrontation Front, and the coup in Afghanistan. In the summer of 1978, Saddam Hussein and Na'im Haddad argued that the Communists had been executed not for being Communists, but because of involvement in activities in the army that violated the law. Haddad added that the Ba'th had no intention to destroy the ICP, but was ready to maintain the front with the Communists.107 These declarations were aimed at softening the Soviet reaction (and were reminiscent of the Ba'th's statements regarding the ICP in 1968-1971). Despite the continuing persecution, the regime was apparently still prepared to allow the ICP to exist108 on condition that the latter, besides strictly observing the ban on its activities in the army, ceased its criticism of the government and kept its political activities on a small scale, in line with the other participant in the Front, the DPK. From the Ba'th's perspective, the existence of a legal and tamed Communist party seems to have been preferable to outlawing it. First, Iraq did not want to risk its relations with the Soviets, as indicated in the summer of 1978, when Saddam Hussein insisted that the basis for maintaining friendly relations between Baghdad and Moscow still existed.109 Second, an illegal Communist party might find fertile ground for reorganizing in the military and political fields in the Kurdish region, and further, it might receive covert aid from a superpower, the USSR, and its local allies, Syria (in a period of hostility between the two Ba'th regimes) and South Yemen. During 1978, the USSR reacted moderately to the crisis between the ICP and the Ba'th. Pravda apologetically cited an article of Tariq al-Sha'b, which denied the ICP's involvement in subversion against the regime.110 The Soviets did not report the executions or the persecution of the ICP, but merely admitted the emergence of "difficulties" in the working of the front and stressed the need to maintain the Ba'th-Communist cooperation.111 The importance of the "cohesion of all the anti-imperialist forces included in the Front... of Iraq" was also stated in the 1978 annual Soviet congratulatory note on the anniversary of the July 14 (1958) coup, which also made no mention of the persecution. However, unlike the Soviet notes on this occasion since 1973, which had been signed by Brezhnev (in addition to Podgornyi and Kosygin) in his capacity as general secretary, the note in 1978 and in the coming years was dispatched in the name of the Soviet state institutions only (the Supreme Soviet and the government).112 The fact that the CPSU Central Committee did not lend its name to this note signaled Soviet intent to terminate party ties with the Ba'th if it persisted in persecuting the ICP.113 At the beginning of Saddam Hussein's visit to the Soviet Union in December 1978, there were still some signs characterizing party ties between the CPSU and the Ba'th. The visit took place at the invitation of

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the CPSU (and the Soviet government), and Kosygin's speech in honor of Saddam Hussein included a reference to "comrade" Bakr and "comrade" Saddam Hussein.114 However, the joint communiqué at the conclusion of the visit contained no mention of party relations between the CPSU and the Ba'th, let alone the usual formula about the mutual aspiration of the two parties to continue party ties, which had inevitably appeared in Soviet-Iraqi joint statements while these ties had been intact.115 This indicated a failure to find a way to settle the conflict between the ICP and the Ba'th. The Iraqi side could accept the ICP's legal existence only as a docile party. The Soviet Union, aware that the Communists' strength had declined during the decade of the Ba'th's effective dictatorship and apprehensive that the regime might outlaw the ICP, agreed to reduce the ICP's activities. Now the Soviets seemingly accepted the Ba'th's ban on Communist activity in the army,116 although they apparently insisted on the ICP's right to engage in "constructive" criticism of the Ba'th regime,117 for to cede this privilege would virtually remove the raison d'être of the ICP in Moscow's eyes. Nonetheless, the persecution of the ICP continued and even intensified,118 and in early April 1979 the regime suspended the publication of Tariq al-Sha'b for thirty days (its legal publication was never resumed). The Ba'th's harsher policy toward the ICP was in line with other steps, which symbolized Iraq's increasing distance from the Soviets, such as improving relations with the conservative Gulf states and the West. Significantly, all these steps took place when Saddam Hussein's position was strengthening. Yet, Iraq still tried to minimize the negative repercussions of its anti-Communist measures on its relations with the Soviet Union. Thus, unlike during the first Ba'th rule in 1963, when even members of the highest echelons of the ICP, including its leader, were imprisoned and executed, in 1978-1979 the authorities allowed members of the Politburo and 'Aziz Muhammad to go abroad (although some members of the Central Committee were arrested and executed).119 In April 1979, Na'im Haddad even claimed that the Soviet Union had not been influenced by the ICP's "lies" regarding the persecution and described the Iraqi-Soviet relationship as strong.120 In mid-April 1979, Iraq's minister of information disclosed that the Communist minister Mukarram Talbani had met with 'Aziz Muhammad in Moscow and proposed a formula for a reconciliation between the Communists and the Ba'th, but had returned empty-handed.121 The failure of this reconciliation attempt presumably led to the dismissal of the two Communist ministers—'Amir 'Abdallah at the end of April and Mukarram Talbani at the beginning of May.122 In July, Tariq 'Aziz declared that there was no need for a Communist party in Iraq.123 Nevertheless, formally—and only formally—the regime did not expel the ICP from the front (in which the ICP had not, in fact, participated since the beginning of 1979)

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nor outlaw it. Besides the reasons for preferring an overt rather than a covert Communist party, as had guided the regime in 1978, in 1979 there was an additional reason for leaving a vague option for normalizing relations with the ICP: the possibility of an urgent need for the Soviet Union in case of war with Iran. In January 1979, apparently in the wake of the failure of the talks on the ICP with Saddam Hussein in December 1978, a Pravda article for the first time reported "wide-scale persecutions against the communists in Iraq."124 Yet this article, as well as other Soviet reports on the persecution of the ICP that appeared in the spring of 1979, still emphasized the need to resume cooperation between the ICP and the Ba'th. 125 This idea was also expressed in the congratulatory note of the CPSU to the ICP on the forty-fifth anniversary of its establishment, published at the end of March 1979.126 Even when the break between the Ba'th and the ICP had become a fait accompli, Moscow's public reaction to the suppression of the ICP was cautious: neither the Central Committee of the CPSU nor "unofficial" Soviet organizations, such as the trade unions, issued a statement condemning the persecution of the ICP. Although the Soviet media, as a rule, ignored the fate of the ICP, from early 1979 the CPSU terminated its party ties with the Iraqi Ba'th, and Soviet publications ceased referring to Iraq's regime as "progressive" or "socialist oriented."127 Also, whereas in July 1978, on the anniversary of the Ba'th's assumption of power in 1968, Pravda had described the event in positive terms, in July 1979, the major Soviet newspapers made no reference to the anniversary in their reports on Iraq.128 The Soviet Union was concerned by the suppression of the ICP not only for ideological reasons (the obligation to a "fraternal" Communist party), but mainly because the Ba'th's internal anti-Communist policy was a corollary of its external policy. In this light, the suppression of the pro-Soviet group, the ICP, could be seen as symbolizing the removal of the last vestige of the Ba'th's special relationship with the USSR. Nonetheless, several factors contributed to moderating the Soviet reaction to Iraq's anti-Communist policy. First, the Ba'th left an opening, however narrow, for the ICP's return to legal activity; second, Iraq still pursued an anti-US foreign policy and played a central role in organizing the opposition of the Arab world to the Camp David process; and third, Iraq maintained in this period (October 1978 to July 1979) friendly relations with Syria, now the major Soviet ally in the Arab East (this circumstance bore some resemblance to the kind of grace the USSR had granted Iraq under the 'Arif brothers because of their friendship with Nasser). However, it seems that these factors were not crucial because even when Iraq's friendship with Syria and its centrality in resisting the Camp David process declined, in the second half of 1979, the Soviet policy toward Iraq did not change significantly. On the whole, Moscow had evidently decided to ensure

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its continued bilateral relations with Baghdad. Rather than launching a fruitless propaganda campaign against the Ba'th regime, which might only induce it to "defect" to "American imperialism," the Soviet Union preferred to preserve this arms market and its other economic ties with Iraq. Indeed, the Soviet aspiration to maintain normal and outwardly even friendly relations with the anti-Communist regime in Iraq was a typical example of Moscow's politics toward similar regimes in the Third World. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Iraq intensified its criticism not only of the Soviet Union but also of the ICP. For example, Saddam Hussein's speech of February 8,1980—in which he proposed concluding an Arab charter aimed indirectly against the USSR—also contained a violent attack on the ICP. He claimed that in Qasim's rule the Communists had turned Iraq into a "large lake of blood," meaning the ICP's terror against the Ba'th at that time.129 The Ba'th's harsh measures against the ICP after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan seem also to have been designed as a defensive means against what Iraq saw as Moscow's increasing subversive activities in other states, including Iraq.130 In keeping with its desire to maintain normal relations with Iraq, the Soviet Union replied to Saddam Hussein's anti-Communist speech only through Radio Peace and Progress. This reaction was, however, much stronger than the criticism voiced by the USSR against Iraq's anti-Communist measures in the previous year and reflected its anger at Baghdad's anti-Soviet—and not just anti-Communist—trend after the invasion of Afghanistan. The station alleged that "some reactionary leaders in Iraq" had tried to distort the history of the ICP,131 and predicted that the fate of the ICP's executioners would be the same as for those who had preceded them, such as Nuri Sa'id (Iraq's prime minister under the monarchy overthrown by Qasim).132 Moscow was indicating its interest in deposing Saddam Hussein, as well as its support, possibly not only at the propaganda level, for the ICP's armed struggle against the regime that had begun in the Kurdish region.

The Kurdish Question: History Seems to Repeat Itself (1975-1980) After the Ba'th regime had re-established its rule in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1975, it continued to regard the Kurds as a disloyal element that might resume the revolt. In the following years the regime destroyed and evacuated Kurdish villages in order to create a security zone, ten to twenty kilometers wide, along the Iranian border. In addition, it transferred some of the Kurdish population from the Kurdish region in the north to the Arab areas of Iraq.133 The Ba'th was assisted in its political activity in the Kurdish region by Kurdish parties that worked under its auspices, the

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important one being the new DPK (consisting of members of the original DPK who had been cooperating with the regime since 1974).134 Nevertheless, in 1975 the first signs of renewed Kurdish revolt, which developed gradually in the coming years, could already be discerned. The rebellion was conducted by two rival Kurdish parties: the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), headed by Jalal Talbani135—a left-wing organization supported by Syria—and the original DPK, considered to be stronger than the PUK, led by two of Barzani's sons, Mas'ud and Idris. (Mustafa Barzani himself resided in the United States from July 1976 to his death in March 1979 and was buried in Iran.) At a secret congress of the DPK in August 1976, the party reportedly attempted to build itself a "progressive" image in order to gain Soviet support. Accordingly, the congress criticized Mustafa Barzani for his reliance on "American imperialism" and praised Moscow's sympathetic stand toward the Kurds until the revolt of 1974, mitigating its criticism of Soviet behavior during the revolt.136 The Iraqi regime also sought Soviet support for its policy in the Kurdish region at both the military and political levels. In September 1976, Iraq's minister of the interior,137 'Izzat Ibrahim (al-Duri), who was responsible for the Kurdish region, visited the Soviet Union, where he met not only with his Soviet counterpart, Nikolai Schelokov, but also with Defense Minister Dmitrii Ustinov. Ustinov, a member of the Politburo since March 1976, had been appointed to his ministerial post a month later, after Grechko's death. The meeting between 'Izzat Ibrahim and Ustinov was attended by Viktor Kulikov, chief of staff and first deputy minister of defense, who had already acquired experience in the Kurdish question on his visit to Iraq during the Kurdish revolt in 1974.138 An additional meeting between 'Izzat Ibrahim and Ustinov took place in Moscow in February 1977.139 In supplying Iraq with weapons against Iran and Israel, the Soviet Union was in fact arming Baghdad against the Kurds as well. Moreover, Moscow ostensibly seemed to approve Iraq's policy on the Kurdish question in the period after the suppression of the revolt.140 For example, Pravda published a favorable report on the progovernment DPK's party program adopted at its Ninth Congress in May 1976 and noted the party's call to develop relations with Socialist states.141 However, the CPSU did not send greetings to this congress as it had to the Eighth Congress of the DPK in 1970. Nor did it invite the progovernment DPK to take part in the twenty-fifth Congress of the CPSU in 1976, whereas a DPK delegation had attended the CPSU's twenty-fourth Congress in 1971.142 The Soviet Union seems to have had no interest in maintaining ties with a small political party that followed closely the Ba'th's lead and could not align itself with the ICP. On the contrary, it desired to improve the ICP's image among the Kurds, who, as a discontented national minority, were a potential source of support for the local Communists. Thus, in 1977,

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Problems of Peace and Socialism published an article signed by 'Aziz Muhammad that contained implicit criticism of the Ba'th's Kurdish policy. It described an information campaign that the ICP was conducting in support of autonomous rule for the Kurds and their right to develop their culture and language, as well as to preserve "the composition of the population of Iraqi Kurdistan" (a hint at the ICP's opposition to the mass deportations of the Kurds).143 Undoubtedly, criticism of the regime's Kurdish policy was an important sphere of the ICP's propaganda144 because the latter wanted to preserve the option of restoring its ties with the Kurdish rebels if its shaky cooperation with the Ba'th came to an end. Indeed, as the Ba'th-Communist Front disintegrated in 1978-1979, some of the Communists fled to the Kurdish region and cooperated with the PUK. The vestiges of hostility between the ICP and the DPK before and during the Kurdish revolt145 apparently prevented the two parties from resuming their cooperation at the end of the 1970s. In 1979, the level of Kurdish insurgence increased because after the collapse of the Shah's regime the article of the Algiers agreement that bound Iran and Iraq to put an end to any subversive infiltrations was no longer observed. Nevertheless, the Kurds' military might was far less at the end of the 1970s than it had been at the beginning of the decade. The Soviets refrained from reporting the renewal of the Kurdish revolt, in accordance with their main policy of preserving normal relations with the existing regime in Iraq. Moscow did, however, indicate endorsement of the cooperation between the Communists and the Kurdish rebels, when a Soviet broadcast in the spring of 1980 contended that the ICP was struggling for "genuine self-rule" for the Kurds.146 * * *

The normalization of relations with Iran in 1975 enabled Iraq to accelerate its policy of reducing its material reliance on and political attachment to the Soviet Union. It diminished its dependence on the U S S R in the economic field, broke the Soviet monopoly in the military field, and adopted an independent and even anti-Soviet stand on regional issues. Such regional issues included the dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1977-1978 and, especially, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. In the domestic arena, the ICP was virtually outlawed in 1979. Nevertheless, the gradual decline in Soviet-Iraqi relations in the second half of the 1970s was interrupted whenever a congruence of interests between the two states emerged on some issues, such as Syria's intervention in Lebanon in 1976 and the Camp David process in 1978-1979. However, it seems that the main consideration that prevented Iraq from overstraining its ties with the Soviet Union was the fact that the latter was still Iraq's principal supplier of military hardware, which Baghdad needed first and

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foremost to maintain its military balance against Iran. Even in a period of friendly relations between the Ba'th and the Shah, an undercurrent of tension remained and the dispute between the two countries re-erupted after the Shah's fall in 1979. The Soviet Union, for its part, ascribed importance to preserving relations with Iraq because the latter constituted both a military counterbalance to Iran and a factor opposing a settlement to the Arab-Israeli dispute under the aegis of the United States. In addition, the arms sales to Baghdad provided Moscow with hard currency. In view of the decline in Soviet-Iraqi ties and the rupture in the Soviet-Egyptian relationship, Moscow's status in the Arab East, which had begun to decline in 1973, continued to worsen in the second half of the 1970s. At the same time, the relative place of the Arab East and its nationalistic regimes in Soviet Third World policy was also declining in favor of the Marxist regimes in Black Africa (Angola and Mozambique) and in the periphery of the Middle East (Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Afghanistan). From 1979, the Soviet Union also made an effort to promote relations with another regime in the periphery of the Middle East, the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Notes 1. Saddam Hussein, Social and Foreign Affairs in Iraq (London: Croom Helm, 1979), pp. 68-74,84. 2. A sign of the enormous importance Beijing ascribed to fostering relations with Tehran was Chairman Hua Guofeng's visit to Iran in August-September 1978, despite the anti-Shah turmoil. 3. See Chapter 3, p. 136. 4. The deal included thirty-six Mirage F-l fighter planes and four Mirage F-1B trainer planes. See Military Balance, 1978-1979, p. 105. See also Military Balance, 1980-1981, p. 103. 5. On October 4,1977, during the annual session of the United Nations General Assembly, US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance also met with Sa'dun Hammadi—the first meeting at foreign minister level between Washington and Baghdad since the severance of diplomatic relations. 6. MECS, 1977-1978, p. 258. 7. See, for example, R. Baghdad, May 29, 1976/DR, June 1, 1976; INA, December 15,1978IDR, December 18,1978. 8. Pravda, June 1,1976; Pravda, February 2 and 4,1977; Pravda, December 13 and 14,1978. 9. Hussein, Social and Foreign Affairs in Iraq, p. 97. 10. Pravda, February 2,1977. 11. Pravda, February 4,1977. It was the first joint communiqué in the history of Soviet-Iraqi Ba'th relations in which the term "businesslike" was used to depict the atmosphere in the talks. 12. Pravda, February 4,1977, in comparison with Pravda, December 14, 1978. 13. INA, May 19,1919IBBC, May 22,1979.

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14. Saddam Hussein in al-Mustaqbal (Paris), October 13,\919IDR, October 17,1979. 15. In 1976, the Iraqi regime decided that members of its leadership should delete surnames that attested to either local or tribal origin. Saddam Hussein himself had already dropped his surname Tikriti in 1969. 16. On the assumption of power by Saddam Hussein and the central figures in his regime, see Ofra Bengio and Uriel Dann, MECS, 1978-1979, pp. 56(>-561; and Ofra Bengio, MECS, 1979-1980, pp. 501-504. On the circumstances of the nomination of 'Izzat al-Duri and Taha al-Jazrawi to the RCC in November 1969, see Chapter 1, note 95 and p. 33. 17. On 'Izzat al-Duri's activities in the sphere of Iraqi-Soviet relations during the first half of the 1970s, see Chapter 2, note 6. During the same period, Tariq 'Aziz participated in talks with a Kosygin-led delegation to Iraq in April 1972 (Chapter 2, note 101); in a delegation to the Soviet Union led by Bakr in September 1972 (Chapter 2, note 195); in a delegation to the Soviet Union headed by Saddam Hussein in March 1973 (Chapter 2, note 202); and in talks with Ponomarev, during his trip to Iraq in November 1973 (Chapter 3, note 40). In the first half of the 1970s, Taha al-Jazrawi took part in discussions with the Kosygin-led delegation to Iraq in April 1972 (Chapter 2, note 101); visited the Soviet Union in August-September 1972 (on this and Moscow's preferential treatment of him, see Chapter 2, note 167), and again in September 1973 (Chapter 3, p. 130); participated in talks with the delegation to Iraq headed by Grechko in March 1974 (Chapter 3, note 58); and also accompanied Saddam Hussein on his visit to the Soviet Union in February 1974 and April 1975 (Chapter 3, notes 50 and 154). Taha al-Jazrawi dealt mainly with the economic aspects of Iraqi-Soviet relations. 18. On his visits to the Soviet Union in 1977 and 1978, Saddam Hussein was accompanied by Sa'dun Hammadi as well. 19. In the 1970s, there were some indications that 'Abd-al-Baqi maintained a stand on the ICP and the Kurds that was relatively closer to Moscow's. See Pravda, April 5,1970; 'Abd-al-Baqi's biography in al-Thawra, October 31,1971; ' Abd-al-Baqi's signing on behalf of Iraq of the first annual agreement for cooperation between the Ba'th and CPSU in November 1973 (Chapter 3, p. 127); and 'Abd-al-Baqi's attendance of the ceremony awarding a Soviet medal to 'Aziz Muhammad in 1974 (Chapter 3, p. 128 and Pravda, November 14,1974). In August 1979, 'Abd-al-Baqi was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment for complicity in the "plot," but he was executed in June 1980. A correspondent close to Saddam Hussein—possibly alluding to the existence of suspicious ties from Baghdad's perspective between 'Abd-al-Baqi and the Soviets during his tenure as ambassador to Moscow—claimed that after the plot of 1979 the post of Iraq's ambassador to the Soviet Union was left vacant for nine months. On April 28,1980, a new ambassador, Rahman Ahmad al-Duri, who was loyal to Saddam Hussein, was nominated. See Matar, Saddam Hussein p. 122. 20. INA, December 31,1979IDR, January 2,1980. 21. During Kosygin's visit to Iraq in 1976, the colonel-general of the air force, G. P. Skorikov, participated in the talks on the Soviet side and 'Abd-al-Jabbar Shanshal participated on the Iraqi side; during Saddam Hussein's trip to the Soviet Union in 1977, the first deputy minister of defense and chief of staff, Nikolai V. Ogarkov, participated on the Soviet side, and Shanshal participated on the Iraqi side. For further visits on the military level, see notes 51 and 72. 22. This paragraph on Soviet-Iraqi military ties is based on Military Balance, 1975-1981. 23. See Appendix 1, Table 3. 24. The agreement was signed by Comecon secretary Nikolai Fadeev and

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Ambassador 'Abd-al-Baqi. For commentary on the accord, see Pravda, July 10, 1975; Izvestiia, July 13,1975; and Anba'Mosku 29 (July 19,1975), p. 7. 25. See Chapter 1, p. 44, and also R. Andreasian, AAS, 12 (December 1979), p. 7. 26. See Appendix 1, Table 1. From 1977 onward, Vneshniaia torgovlia ceased providing figures on the quantity of Soviet oil imports. 27. See Chapter 1, p. 44, and Appendix 1, Table 1. 28. See Appendix 1, Table 3. 29. IN A, January 3,1980/DR, January 4,1980. 30. For the beginning of this process, see Chapter 3, p. 133. For the order of importance of Arab states in Soviet eyes, see Brezhnev's speech at the Twentyfifth Congress at the CPSU on February 24, 1976, in which, while discussing Soviet-Arab relations, he first referred to Syria and then to Iraq. L. I. Brezhnev, Leninskim kursom [Following Lenin's Course], Vol. 5 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1976), p. 462. 31. Soviet displeasure with Syrian policy in Lebanon can be derived from a statement issued at the end of May 1976 by secretary general of the Lebanese Communist party, George Hawi. See ARR, 1976, p. 319. 32. R. Baghdad, May 12,1916/DR, May 12,1976. 33. On Tariq 'Aziz's mission, see R. Baghdad, May 27,1976/DR, May 27, 1976. Tariq 'Aziz was appointed minister of information in November 1974. 34. Pravda, June 2,1976. 35. Pravda, June 1,1976. 36. The communiqué on this meeting, although it made no mention of Syria's policy in Lebanon, spoke of the need to secure the independence and sovereignty of this state. See Pravda, June 4,1976; and R. Damascus, June 4,1916/DR (Soviet Union), June 4,1976. 37. Pravda, June 23,1976. 38. Pravda, July 31,1976. See a similar formula on the Lebanese issue in a joint communiqué between Ponomarev and 'Aziz Muhammad in TASS, October 14,1916/DR (Soviet Union), October 15,1976. 39. In October 1975, Tariq 'Aziz met with Podgornyi; in May 1976, with Kosygin; and in December 1977, with Brezhnev. See Pravda, October 31,1975; R. Baghdad, May 27,1916/DR, May 27,1976; and Pravda, December 3,1977. 40. See, for example, Izvestiia, December 28, 1916/DR (Soviet Union) January 5,1977. 41. Pravda, February 4,1977. 42. As we have seen, Tariq 'Aziz had occupied this post since September 1977. However, he was relieved of the post of minister of information in October 1977. 43. Pravda, December 3,1977. 44. Gromyko participated in the talks with Saddam Hussein in February 1972 (Chapter 2, note 46); with Murtada Sa'd 'Abd-al-Baqi in July 1972 (Chapter 2, p. 80); with Bakr in September 1972 (Chapter 2, note 192); and with Saddam Hussein again in March 1973 (Chapter 2, note 202), February 1974 (Chapter 3, note 50), and April 1975 (Chapter 3, note 154). In addition to the talks between Brezhnev and Tariq 'Aziz in December 1977, Gromyko also took part in the talks between Brezhnev and Saddam Hussein in December 1978. See Pravda, December 13,1978. 45. Gromyko visited Egypt in May 1966 (in a delegation headed by Kosygin), in March 1967, in June and December 1968, and in March 1974; he paid several visits to Syria from February to May 1974 (related to negotiations on the SyrianIsraeli disengagement agreement), as well as in March 1979 and January 1980.

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46. Besides the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement, the Camp David Accords included a framework for a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially the Palestinian problem. 47. For the communiqué, see Pravda, December 14,1978. 48. Although a Soviet report on the talks between Kosygin and Bakr included a reference to the Palestinian people's right to establish a state (Pravda, May 31,1976), this reference was absent in the joint communiqué at the conclusion of Kosygin's visit to Iraq (Pravda, June 1,1976). Also, in his speech in honor of Saddam Hussein, Kosygin advocated the establishment of a Palestinian state (Pravda, February 2,1977)—but this point was absent from the joint communiqué {Pravda, February 4,1977). 49. For Saddam Hussein's speech, see IN A, December 12,1978/DR, December 13,1978 (cross reference, Pravda, December 13,1978). 50. For previous joint communiqués, see Pravda June 1,1976; and Pravda, February 4,1977. 51. Increased Soviet arms deliveries to Iraq had already been discussed shortly after the conclusion of the Iraqi-Syrian charter of October 1978, during Iraqi Defense Minister 'Adnan Khayralla's visit to the Soviet Union in November 1978. On the visit, see Pravda, November 22 and 26,1978. 52. For Kosygin's speech, see Pravda, December 13,1978. 53. See note 49. 54. There are other examples of the Soviet Union's reservation regarding the Iraqi-Syrian unification agreement. The Soviet report on the talks between Kosygin and Saddam Hussein on December 11, 1978, contained no explicit reference to Iraqi-Syrian relations, let alone to the charter, whereas the Iraqi report included an explicit reference to the discussion of the Iraqi-Syrian charter during the talks. See Pravda, December 12,1978, compared with IN A, December 11,1978IDR, December 12,1978. Also, a Soviet formulation on the Iraqi-Syrian rapprochement—similar to the one that appeared in the Soviet-Iraqi communiqué of December 1978—appeared in the Soviet-Syrian communiqué at the end of Gromyko's visit to Damascus in March 1979. See TASS (in English), March 26, 1979IDR (Soviet Union), March 27,1979. 55. Iraq had actually curtailed its military aid to the PFLO. For Iraqi-PFLO relations, see Na'im Haddad's statement in June 1975 and Tariq 'Aziz's in July 1976 in ARR, 1975, p. 342; and ARR, 1976, p. 447. See also Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran, pp. 158-159. 56. For Iraq's implicit opposition to Iran's security scheme, see, for example, Bakr's speech in R. Baghdad, July 16,1976/Dfl, July 19,1976. For Iraq's stand on the security of the Gulf, see also Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran, pp. 169-170; and ARR, 1976, p. 710. 57. For Soviet policy toward Iran and the Gulf, see, for example, Pravda, November 20, 1975; and TASS (in English), November 22, 1916/DR (Soviet Union), November 23,1976. See also Shahram Chubin, "Soviet Policy Towards Iran and the Gulf," AdelphiPapers 157 (Spring 1980), pp. 12-15. 58. R. Peace and Progress, June 19,1975IDR (Soviet Union), June 20,1975. See also Chubin, "Soviet Policy Toward Iran," p. 27. 59. South Yemen and Libya followed Moscow's policy: they withdrew their support from Somalia and backed Ethiopia. 60. The Soviet-Cuban intervention in favor of Ethiopia was modeled upon the Soviet-Cuban assistance to the Marxist regime in Angola in 1975-1976. The Soviet Union concluded friendship treaties with Angola in October 1976, with Mozambique in March 1977, and with Ethiopia in November 1978. 61. For this article, see IN A, August 16, \91HDR, August 17,1977.

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62. INA, August 5,1977, in ARR, 1977, p. 633. 63. V. Kudriavtsev, Izvestiia, April 16,1977; R. Moscow (in Arabic), May 15,1911IDR (Soviet Union), May 16,1977. 64. For a later revelation of Iraq's suspicion, see al-Thawra, January 4, 1980/DR, January 7,1980. 65. Saddam Hussein in Newsweek, July 17,1978, p. 24. 66. Cited in Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran, p. 163. 67. INA, December 12,1918IDR, December 12,1978. 68. In a press conference on July 18,1978, Saddam Hussein said that if the Eritreans were to decide to negotiate with the Ethiopians and establish any link with them, that would be their affair. See Saddam Hussein, al-'Iraq wa-al-Siyasa al-Duwaliyya [Iraq and International Policy] (Baghdad: Dar al-Hurriyya lilTaba'a, 1981), p. 244. For Iraq's desire for a compromise on the Eritrean issue, see also Morris Rothenberg, The USSR and Africa (Miami: Advanced International Studies Institute, 1980), p. 140. It was estimated that in 1978 there were 150 Cuban military advisers in Iraq. 69. Al-Thawra, January 15, 1919/DR, January 23, 1979. The article was published the day before the Shah was forced to leave Iran. 70. This was disclosed by Saddam Hussein in R. Baghdad, April 15,1980/DR, April 17, 1980. See also Majid Khaduri, The Gulf War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 68-69,80-82. 71. For Iraq's arms orders in 1979, including MiG-23, -25, and -27s, see Military Balance, 1980-1981, p. 103. 72. See Saddam Hussein in R. Baghdad, July 20,1980/DÄ, July 24,1980. See also Military Balance, 1979-1980, p. 40; and Military Balance, 1980-1981, pp. 42-43. In December 1979, the commander in chief of the Soviet air force and deputy minister of defense of the Soviet Union, Pavel S. Kutakhov, visited Iraq; in the same month, an Iraqi military delegation visited the Soviet Union. See Krasnaia zvezda, December 11,16, and 20,1979. 73. Military Balance, 1980-1981, p. 103. 74. Al-Thawra, April 9, 1919/DR, April 11,1979. 75. When an Iraqi Communist who had found refuge in South Yemen was murdered by agents of the Ba'th regime, South Yemeni security forces broke into Iraq's embassy in Aden to arrest the culprits. Iraq retaliated with punitive actions against the South Yemeni embassy in Baghdad. 76. The Soviets executed the Afghan leader, Hafizullah Amin, because of suspected links with the United States, and installed a new ruler, Babrak Karmal. 77. KUNA, January 6,19801DR, January 7,1980. 78. The Soviet-Afghan treaty also had a different title from the Soviet-Iraqi one: Treaty of Friendship, Goodneighborliness and Cooperation (emphasis added). In invading Afghanistan, the Soviet Union relied on article 4 of this treaty, which read: "The high contracting parties, acting in the spirit o f . . . goodneighborliness . . . shall consult each other and take by agreement appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence and territorial integrity of the two countries." (TASS [in English], December 5,1918/DR [Soviet Union], December 6,1978.) 79. Quoted in INA, January 3,1980/DÄ, January 4,1980. 80. R. Baghdad, January 6,1980/DR, January 8,1980. 81. INA, January 4,1980/DR, January 7,1980. 82. For the content of the charter, see R. Baghdad, Voice of the Masses, February 8,1980/BBC, February 12,1980. 83. INA, January 31,1980IBBC, February 2,1980. 84. R. Peace and Progress (in Arabic), January 30,1980/DR (Soviet Union), February 4,1980.

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85. TASS (in English), February 9,1980IDR (Soviet Union), February 11,

86. The Soviets reported on meetings between a CPSU delegation and an ICP delegation, which took place in Moscow on the following dates: in May 1971 (Chapter 1, p. 39); in October 1972 (Chapter 2, note 275); in November 1973 (Chapter 3, p. 128); in October 1974 (Chapter 3, note 111); in December 1975 (Pravda, December 13,1975); in October 1976 (TASS [in English], October 14, 1976IDR [Soviet Union], October 15,1976); and in December 1977 (TASS [in English], December 29,1977IDR, [Soviet Union], December 30,1977). From the end of the 1970s, Moscow did not usually report such meetings, in accordance with its customary practice of not reporting meetings with representatives of Communist parties outlawed in their own countries. 87. Pravda, May 31,1976. For previous meetings between high-level Soviet officials and an ICP delegation in Iraq, see Chapter 2, pp. 76 and 93-94, and Chapter 3, p. 128. 88. See Chapter 3, pp. 128-129. 89. See, for example, 'Aziz Muhammad's articles in Kommunist 8 (May 1976), pp. 74-75; AAS 6 (June 1976), pp. 9-10; AAS 8 (August 1977), p. 7; and 'Aziz Muhammad, World Marxist Review 9 (September 1977). 90. 'Aziz Muhammad, World Marxist Review 9 (September 1977), p. 14. 91. TASS, April 27,1978IDR (Soviet Union), April 28,1978. 92. For indications to this effect, see 'Aziz Muhammad, World Marxist Review 9 (September 1977), pp. 12-13; and a report on a session of the Central Committee of the ICP in Pravda, February 23,1977. 93. Chapter 3, pp. 128-129. 94. F. P. Penkin, Irakskaia respublika i ee vooruzhennye sily [The Iraqi Republic and its Armed Forces] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1977), pp. 93-94. 95. In 1975-1978, only low-level party delegations were exchanged between the CPSU and the Ba'th. 96. The Ba'th was represented at the congress by Zayd Haydar, head of the Foreign Department in the Pan-Arab Command of the [pro-Iraqi] Ba'th, and the ICP was represented by 'Aziz Muhammad. For Haydar's speech at the congress, see R. Moscow (in Arabic), March 1, 19761DR (Soviet Union), Appendix 25, March 9,1976; and 'Aziz Muhammad's speech in R. Moscow, March 1, \916IDR (Soviet Union), March 5,1976. 97. Pravda, June 1,1976; and Pravda, February 4,1977. 98. Hussein, Social and Foreign Affairs in Iraq, p. 57. 99.ARR, 1977, p. 196. 100. R. Baghdad, February 1, 1911IDR (Soviet Union), February 3, 1977; Pravda, February 2,1977. 101. See al-Nahar al-Arabi wa-al-Duwali (Paris), June 3, 1978IDR, June 8, 1978; and New York Times, May 27,1978. 102. MECS, 1977-1978, p. 520. 103. Reuters, June 6,1978, in ARR, 1978, p. 402. 104. Saddam Hussein's interview in Newsweek, July 17,1978. 105. ARR, 1978, p. 284. 106. Matar, Saddam Hussein, p. 111. 107. See notes 103 and 104. 108. This contention appeared in a Ba'th document and seems reasonable in the light of subsequent developments in 1979 to be discussed below. For the Ba'th document, see The Ninth Regional Congress of the Ba'th (Joint Publications Research Service, Near East/South Asia Report no. 2738, April 15,1983), p. 40. 109. Hussein, Iraq and International Policy, p. 222. See also Na'im Haddad in

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ARR, 1978, p. 402. 110. Pravda, June 18,1978. 111. P. Demchenko, Pravda, July 14,1978. 112. This was an indication of Moscow's displeasure with Baghdad's policy. (However, in the post-Brezhnev period the Soviet Union dispatched such notes on the national holidays of foreign countries in the name of Soviet institutions (the party, the Supreme Soviet, and the government), rather than the heads of these institutions, even to states that had close relations with the Soviet Union. Therefore, this form of sending notes from 1982 onward can no longer be interpreted as a bad sign.) For the note of 1978, see Pravda, July 22,1978. (For comparison, see the note of 1977 in TASS [in English], July 22,19111 DR [Soviet Union], July 22, 1977.) For the notes in the following years, see R. Moscow (in Arabic), July 25, 1919/DR (Soviet Union), July 27,1979; and Izvestiia, July 27,1980. 113. For probably the last exchange of party delegations between the CPSU and the Ba'th, see Pravda, February 26 and March 30,1978. Moscow reported that a Soviet delegation—but without saying that it was a party one—headed by V. G. Lomonosov, a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU, participated in the July celebrations in Iraq. See Pravda, July 25,1978. 114. Pravda, December 13,1978. 115. Pravda, December 14, 1978, compared, for example, with the two preceding communiqués in Pravda, June 1,1976; and Pravda, February 4,1977. 116. MENA, August 2,1978, in USSR and Third World, 1978, p. 89. 117. This was the basic Soviet position on the issue of the ICP. See, for example, P. Pak, AAS1 (July 1978), pp. 9-11. 118. See, for example, a statement by Zaki Khayri, a member of the Politburo of the ICP, at a press conference in Paris in he Monde, April 6,1919/DR, April 13,1979. 119. For the Ba'th's policy toward the ICP in 1978-1979, see Ofra Bengio, MECS, 1978-1979, pp. 567-568. 120. IN A, April 22,1919/DR, April 23,1979. See also Tariq 'Aziz's statement, less friendly to the Soviet Union, in IN A, January 16,1919/DR, January 17,1979. 121. ARR 8 (April 1979), p. 22. 122. As we have seen, these two ministers served in the Iraqi government since 1972. 'Amir 'Abdallah was minister of state, and Mukarram Talbani was minister of irrigation and, since November 1977, minister of transport. 123. MECS, 1978-1979, p. 568. 124. Pravda, January 10,1979. 125. R. Moscow (in Arabic), March 31,1919/DR (Soviet Union), April 3,1979; Naziha Duleimi, World Marxist Review 3 (March 1979), p. 86. 126. Pravda, March 31,1979. 127. The few references to the Ba'th regime as "progressive" that still appeared in Soviet sources in 1979 were probably vestiges of the previous trend, or were made in a historical context. See AAS 8 (August 1979), p. 56; and AAS 11 (November 1979), p. 63. See also note 113. 128. See Pravda, July 14,1979; and Izvestiia, July 15,1979, as compared with Pravda, July 14,1978. 129. R. Baghdad, Voice of the Masses, February 8,1980/BBC, February 12, 1980. For the charter proposed by Saddam Hussein on February 8, see p. 163. 130. For evidence of this assessment, see INA, January 4,1980/DR, January 7,1980. 131. R. Peace and Progress (in Arabic), March 6,1980/DR (Soviet Union), March 7,1980. 132. R. Peace and Progress (in Arabic), April 3, 1980/DR (Soviet Union),

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April 9,1980. 133. Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question, pp. 177-178; ARR, 1978, p. 514. 134. On the establishment of the new DPK under the regime's auspices and on other Kurdish parties that worked under the regime's patronage, see Chapter 3, note 106, and pp. 122 and 127. The new DPK's secretary general was Hashim ' Aqrawi, a former member of the original DPK's Central Committee. 135. On Jalal Talbani, see the Introduction, p. 11, and Chapter 1, p. 22. 136. Times (London), November 10,1976, 1976, p. 659. 137. 'Izzat Ibrahim was appointed to this post in November 1974. See Chapter 3, note 169. 138. Kulikov had visited Iraq from November 27 to December 1,1974. On the meeting between 'Izzat Ibrahim and Ustinov, see Krasnaia zvezda, September 23,1976. 139. R. Moscow, February 1, \91HDR (Soviet Union), February 2,1977. The meeting took place while 'Izzat Ibrahim was staying in Moscow as a member of an Iraqi delegation led by Saddam Hussein. 140. Ezhegodnik BSE, 1977, p. 273; A. Repin, New Times 20 (May 1977), p. 22; Ezhegodnik BSE, 1978, p. 268. 141. Pravda, May 21,1976. 142. On the events in 1970-1971, see Chapter 1, pp. 40-41. An additional sign of Soviet reservations regarding the progovernment DPK was Kosygin's failure to meet with a delegation of the progovernment DPK during his visit to Iraq in 1976, even though both Kosygin and Ponomarev had met a DPK delegation during their respective visits to Iraq in April 1972 and November 1973. 143. 'Aziz Muhammad, World Marxist Review 9 (September 1977), p. 14. 144. The extent of the ICP's activities in the Kurdish region can be partly deduced from the Ba'th's accusations and allegations against the Communists on the issue. See The Ninth Regional Congress of the Ba'th, p. 37. 145. See Chapter 3, pp. 117-118 and 129. 146. R. Peace and Progress (in Arabic), April 3, 19801DR (Soviet Union), April 9, 1980. For the ICP's support for the Kurds, see 'Aziz Muhammad in Morning Star (London), December 28,1979/DR, January 2,1980.

5 The Limits of Rapprochement During the War with Iran, April 1980-August 1988

The Iraq-Iran War The First Two Years (Spring 1980-Summer 1982) From mid-1979, relations between the Ba'th regime in Iraq and the Islamic regime in Iran had already begun to deteriorate and, as we saw in Chapter 4, both sides were engaged in a war of words accompanied by border incidents. In April 1980, Saddam Hussein began to make preparations for launching a war against Iran,1 and from then on the incidents intensified and became more frequent until war broke out in September 1980. As Iraq prepared for war, it made a limited effort to rebuild its relations with the Soviet Union, without, however, intending to return to the policy of alignment with the Soviet bloc. Whereas Iraq's outspoken criticism of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan marked the nadir of Baghdad's relations with Moscow in early 1980, in April of that year the Ba'th regime played host to the Afghan foreign minister, who met with Saddam Hussein. In these talks, Iraqi radio reported "the president reaffirmed Iraq's wellknown positions . . . on the situation in Afghanistan," 2 but this report did not elaborate on these positions and thus refrained from criticizing Moscow on the Afghan issue. About two years after the eruption of the Iraq-Iran war, Saddam Hussein admitted: "Actually we have not shown any interest in this problem [Afghanistan] over the past two years because we have been preoccupied with the war."3 Another reason for Iraq's willingness to improve relations with Afghanistan 4 was the latter's animosity to Iran, whose Islamic regime advocated overthrowing the Marxist one in Kabul and was extending limited military assistance to the Afghan rebels. Besides removing the Afghan question as a stumbling block to relations with the Soviet Union, Saddam Hussein made the gesture of listing the Soviet Union first among the states friendly to Iraq during a press conference held in July 1980. At the same press conference, Saddam 181

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Hussein disclosed that during his talks with a (low-level) Soviet delegation that had visited Iraq that month, "we asserted our eagerness to preserve our friendship with the Soviet Union." He added: "As you know, most of our arms come from the Soviet Union." 5 Iraq's attempts to revive its relations with the USSR received a lukewarm response from the Soviets. In the spring and summer of 1980, Moscow, as a rule, reported the border incidents between Iraq and Iran in a neutral fashion, although a few Soviet reports showed an inclination toward Iran.6 This was a harbinger of Moscow's stand when the Iraq-Iran war broke out. On September 17, 1980, Saddam Hussein abrogated the Algiers agreement of 1975, claiming that Iran had already violated this agreement by resuming its assistance to the Kurdish rebels in Iraq. He also accused Iran of not having fulfilled the agreement regarding the demarcation of the land boundary, 7 and he declared that the Shatt-al-Arab was returning to Arab sovereignty. On September 22, Iraq attacked Iran, hoping to take advantage of the rupture of Iran's relations with the United States, its main arms supplier. The rupture had taken place after Iranian fundamentalists had seized the staff of the US embassy in Tehran as hostages in November 1979 and subsequently received the backing of the Iranian government. (The release of the hostages in January 1981 did not lead to an improvement in Iranian-US relations, nor to the restoration of diplomatic ties.) Besides its professed goal of recovering its sovereignty over the Shatt-al-Arab, Iraq also aimed to overthrow the Khomeini regime—which had been trying to incite the Iraqis, especially the Shiites, against the Ba'th regime—and to "liberate" Khuzistan (Arabistan), an oil-rich province in Iran inhabited by ethnic Arabs. 8 Baghdad also hoped that dealing a blow to Tehran would turn Iraq into the predominant state in the Gulf 9 as well as in the Arab world as a whole. Iraq's military offensive focused on the southern sector of the front, in the region of Shatt-al-Arab and Khuzistan, where, after Iraq scored territorial gains in September-October 1980, the front line did not change for about a year. During most of the war, Iraq enjoyed superiority in weapons, whereas Iran's advantage laid in manpower, in both the number and motivation of its fighters. The stands of the various Arab countries on the Iraq-Iran war diverged. Most of the countries that supported Iraq financially (the Gulf states and particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait), logistically (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan), and politically (Jordan and Morocco) belonged to the conservative or "moderate," pro-Western group of states, whereas the radical pro-Soviet states either supported Iran politically and militarily (Syria and Libya, and to a certain extent South Yemen), or were neutral (Algeria). It is interesting that during most of the Iraq-Iran dispute of 1969-1975, the radical states had sided with Iraq, whereas the proWestern states had been neutral. The shift in the attitudes of the Arab states on the Iraq-Iran war in 1980 reflected the situation in which Iraq

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was moving away from the radical anti-Western stream of the Arab world and Iran's new regime was integrating into this stream. Nonetheless, as during Iraq's earlier dispute with Iran in 1969-1975, the Soviet Union remained Iraq's main arms supplier. Accordingly, just as top Ba'th officials had paid frequent visits to the Soviet Union on the eve of and shortly after the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran conflict in 1969,10 Deputy Prime Minister Tariq 'Aziz visited the Soviet Union on September 21-22, 1980, and again, as Saddam Hussein's envoy, on November 11, 1980.11 The purpose of these visits was presumably to obtain Moscow's understanding for Iraq's onslaught and to ensure further deliveries of Soviet arms. Tariq 'Aziz's trip to Moscow in September 1980 was the first visit by a senior Iraqi official to the Soviet Union since Saddam Hussein's journey in December 1978, and marked the continued Iraqi effort to improve relations with the Soviet Union since the escalation of the incidents along the Iraq-Iran border in April 1980. T h e Soviet side at the talks with Tariq ' A z i z was headed by Ponomarev, alternate member of the Politburo, who had acquired extensive experience in negotiating with delegations of the Ba'th regime in the 1970s.12 H e was, however, a relatively low-level Soviet official compared with those who had received Tariq 'Aziz on his five preceding visits to the USSR as an emissary of President Bakr in 1975-1977—even before his promotion to the top of Iraq's leadership in July 1979.13 On three of these visits he had been received by a member of the "troika," and on the other two visits by a senior member of the Politburo.14 In addition to the low-level Soviet representation, another indication of the USSR's cool attitude to the Iraqi side was the laconic statements it issued on the talks, which made no mention of the Soviet-Iraqi treaty.15 Because Tariq 'Aziz came to the Soviet Union as an envoy of Saddam Hussein, the low-level reception also signaled Moscow's bitterness toward Saddam Hussein personally, as the man responsible for weakening Iraq's relations with the USSR in the second half of the 1970s, although the main reason was undoubtedly Soviet resentment at Iraq's war against Iran. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union did not condemn Iraq's military offensive against Iran but from the outset adopted a neutral stand and called to put an end to the war. In a speech on September 30,1980, Brezhnev described both Iraq and Iran as states "friendly" to the USSR, expressed sorrow over the bloodshed and the economic damage the war was inflicting on both sides, and stated: " W e are in favor of Iran and Iraq settling their outstanding problems at the negotiating table."16 Moscow's neutral position was the corollary of complicated considerations. From the Soviet point of view, Iraq's launching a war against Iran was a negative move because it might compel Tehran to normalize relations with Washington because of its enormous dependence on US weapons. This appeared to be Moscow's principal concern. Indeed, during the first years of the war

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the bulk of Iran's weapons were US-made and continued to come from Western sources,17 although the United States adopted a neutral position on the Iraq-Iran dispute, formally adhering to the arms embargo it had imposed on Iran in 1979 following the hostage crisis. In addition, the war led to an increased US military presence near the war area and to a strengthening in relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia, which was interested in some kind of a US shield. Specifically, from early October 1980, the United States operated four surveillance airplanes of the AWACS (airborne warning and air control system) type in Saudi Arabia to monitor the developments of the war, and the United States augmented its navy in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean as well. Moreover, the Soviet Union had no desire for an Iraqi victory because Moscow's experience with the Ba'th regime had shown that the latter was willing to adapt itself to Soviet interests only when it was weak vis-à-vis its external and internal adversaries. Hence, Iraq's clear military superiority over Iran at the beginning of the war was an important consideration, from Moscow's perspective, for not providing arms to Baghdad, especially as Iraq's initial gains in the war only increased the probability that Tehran would reluctantly resume its military ties with Washington. The Soviet avoidance of direct arms supplies to Iraq from the beginning of the war18 and the modest reception it accorded Tariq 'Aziz in the fall of 1980 were evidently intended to facilitate Soviet relations with Iran. True, at first glance the Soviets had weighty considerations for supporting Iran. First, as we have seen in earlier chapters, the Soviet Union ascribed greater importance to developing relations with neighboring Iran, whose territory was four times the size of Iraq and which had three times the population. Second, Iraq's one-sided abrogation of a legally binding border agreement and decision to attack Iran provided the USSR with a case for supporting Iran based on international law. Indeed, in early October 1980, the Soviet ambassador to Tehran reportedly offered the Iranian prime minister arms supply to his country, but the Islamic regime rejected this offer.19 It is reasonable to assume that the USSR regarded the deliveries of Soviet-made arms that pro-Soviet countries such as Syria, Libya, and North Korea had made to Iran since the beginning of the war as laying the ground for direct arms shipments to Iran from the Soviet bloc in order to create Soviet leverage on Iran, and to decrease Iran's dependence on Western arms. If, in the end, the Soviet Union did not side with Iran, this was first and foremost the result of Iran's anti-Soviet policies. In addition to the continued incitement of the Soviet Muslims, the Afghan issue had become the focus of tension in Soviet-Iranian relations. Iran—which not only shared a border with both the USSR and Afghanistan and was therefore particularly sensitive to Soviet expansionism, but also had a deep religious-ideological commitment to the Afghan rebels—sharply con-

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demned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and demanded Moscow's withdrawal. However, Iran's military assistance to the Afghan rebels, which continued during the Iraq-Iran war, was insignificant, so the USSR had little to gain from Iran's engagement in a war with Iraq, which might lead it to reduce this aid. In view of Iran's refusal to expand relations with the Soviet Union, the latter wanted to preserve the Iraqi option. It therefore allowed East European states to transfer relatively obsolete military equipment to Iraq in an effort to make up to Iraq for having stopped its own arms deliveries.20 Iraq, given its high dependence on Soviet military hardware, mostly refrained from criticizing the Soviet Union for suspending arms supplies or failing to fulfill the 1972 friendship treaty, particularly article 9, on military cooperation.21 In any case, the treaty implied that the USSR would come to Iraq's aid in the event of a threat posed to the latter (article 8), which, from the Soviet standpoint (and to all appearances), was not the case on the eve of the Iraq-Iran war, let alone after Iraq scored territorial gains. Following the continuing ebb in Soviet-Iraqi ties, Iraq was particularly keen to strengthen relations with France. France was the second state, after the USSR, visited by Tariq 'Aziz in September 1980, and again in November and December. Indeed, France increased arms sales to Iraq, although formally Paris adopted a neutral stand on the Iraq-Iran dispute. Meanwhile, the US military buildup in the vicinity of the Gulf continued to cause concern to the Soviets. On December 10,1980, Brezhnev proposed to major Western powers, China, and the Gulf states a scheme to demilitarize the Gulf region from the presence of the great powers. In order to induce a cooperative attitude from the West, the proposal included an article on freedom of navigation between the Gulf states and other countries—that is, to secure the oil supply routes to the West. 22 However, because neither the great powers nor the Gulf states wanted to grant the USSR a legitimate status in the region, Brezhnev's scheme received no support. At the beginning of 1981, Moscow still showed signs of favoring Tehran and evidently continued to hope that it could improve relations with the Islamic regime. In a speech at the Twenty-sixth Congress of the CPSU in February 1981, Brezhnev argued that the Iranian revolution, despite its contradictions and complexity, was basically "anti-imperialist," and he reaffirmed the Soviet willingness to develop friendly relations with Iran. On the other hand, unlike at the preceding congress of the CPSU, 23 Brezhnev made no mention of Iraq, except in the context of the Iraq-Iran war. He reiterated Moscow's neutral position regarding the war and emphasized the need to put an end to it. He alluded to Moscow's desire to mediate in the dispute by noting: "We strive in practice to contribute to this."24 The fact that the USSR's friendly appeal to Iran at the Twenty-sixth

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Congress received no response induced Moscow to give greater consideration to the Iraqi option. Washington's contacts with Baghdad in mid-April 198125 were also a factor, and it was probably no coincidence that the first signs of an improvement in the Soviet attitude toward Iraq appeared in the same month, the most significant being the visit of a high-level Soviet economic delegation to Iraq and the conclusion of an economic protocol.26 Some other circumstances also contributed to a further improvement in Soviet-Iraqi relations in June 1981. On June 7, the Israeli air force destroyed the French-built nuclear reactor Tammuz, near Baghdad. (Israel had suspected that Iraq would use the reactor for manufacturing atomic weapons.) The bombing of the reactor provided the Soviet Union with the opportunity to present its willingness to strengthen relations with Iraq as part of the Soviet support for the Arab states against Israel's "aggression"—that is, not as an act directed against Iran. From Baghdad's perspective, Moscow's strong condemnation of the Israeli air raid created a convenient ground for promoting ties with the Soviets. From June 17 to 20,1981, First Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yasin Ramadan of Iraq visited the Soviet Union and held talks with Prime Minister Nikolai Tikhonov. Tikhonov, a member of the Politburo from November 1979 and close to Brezhnev, had replaced Kosygin as prime minister in October 1980 and thus became—formally, although not actually—the second personality in the Soviet hierarchy. (Kosygin, according to the official version, had resigned on health grounds and died in December 1980.) Taha Yasin Ramadan was therefore received by a higher level of Soviet representation than Tariq 'Aziz had been in the fall of 1980, even taking into consideration that the former was somewhat higher in the Iraqi hierarchy than the latter. An additional indication of the Soviet desire to advance relations with Iraq was the fact that the Soviet report on the talks between Tikhonov and Taha Yasin Ramadan noted the willingness of both sides to develop ties on the basis of the friendship treaty,27 which had not been referred to during Tariq 'Aziz's visits. Indeed, following Taha Yasin Ramadan's visit, the Soviets resumed arms supplies to Iraq on a limited scale,28 which was aimed more at securing ties with Baghdad than at promoting Iraq's position on the battlefield. All in all, Taha Yasin Ramadan's trip marked the beginning of the rapprochement between the USSR and Iraq, after the relations between the two states had been at a low ebb since 1979.2® In the fall of 1981, Iran launched an offensive to expel the Iraqi forces from its territory, and from then on the initiative in the war passed to Tehran. In November-December 1981, Iran recaptured a substantial part of its territory, and in Mach-May 1982, in another offensive, Iran recovered almost all of its territory, including the town of Khorramshahr. Meanwhile, an additional blow was inflicted upon Iraq, when in April 1982 Syria blocked the Iraqi pipeline for exporting oil through Syria to the port

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of Banias. These military defeats prompted a renewed Iraqi effort to augment relations with the Soviet Union. 30 From June 3 to 4,1982, Tariq 'Aziz again visited the USSR, but the brief coverage of this visit by both Moscow and Baghdad did not disclose its purposes and results.31 Besides the obvious goal of obtaining weapons, the proximity of the visit to Iraq's announcement on June 10 that it was withdrawing from Iran's territory suggests that Tariq 'Aziz tried to ascertain the Soviet reaction to this projected move. In Moscow, Tariq 'Aziz conducted talks with Ponomarev and First Deputy Prime Minister Ivan Arkhipov.32 Despite Arkhipov's senior governmental post, his party position as a member of the Central Committee was inferior to Ponomarev's (alternate member of the Politburo). Tariq 'Aziz's relatively low-level reception, in contrast to the preferential Soviet treatment of Taha Yasin Ramadan, might have reflected Moscow's displeasure with Tariq 'Aziz personally. Indeed, during the first year of the Iraq-Iran war, Taha Yasin Ramadan visited all the East European states and the Soviet Union,33 declared that his country was not a "captive" of its relations with France, 34 and uttered friendly statements toward the Soviet Union.35 In the same period, Tariq 'Aziz paid five visits to France 36 and was clearly the architect of developing relations with this state. Moreover, his record contained unfriendly statements toward the USSR from the pre-war period.37 In any case, the absence of a meeting between Tariq 'Aziz and a senior member of the Soviet leadership in June 1982 hinted that there was still no shift in the Soviet attitude toward the Iraq-Iran dispute.

Iran Carries the War into Iraq (June-December 1982) On June 10,1982, Iraq declared a unilateral cease-fire in its war with Iran and promised to withdraw to the international border. At the end of June, Iraq claimed that it had carried out this promise.38 Iraq's willingness to end the war immediately even at the price of foregoing its claim to the Shatt-al-Arab evidently resulted from war fatigue. The beginning of the Israeli military campaign against the PLO forces in Lebanon on June 6, 1982, provided Iraq with an excuse to present its decision to withdraw from Iran (which Israel's operation at most precipitated) to enable Iraq to participate in the war against Israel. Iran, for its part, rejected Iraq's unilateral cease-fire as well as the July 12,1982, Security Council resolution, which called for a cease-fire in the Iraq-Iran war and the withdrawal of both sides to "internationally recognized borders." Moreover, from July, Iran carried the war into Iraq without, however, scoring tangible territorial gains in the second half of 1982. Tehran's conditions for ending the war were Iraq's payment of a large amount of reparations and the

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deposing of Saddam Hussein, as the one responsible for starting the war, although the implication was that the entire Ba'th regime should be replaced by an Islamic government. Soviet commentaries described Iraq's decision to pull out its troops from Iran as a "positive" and "very important" step to bringing an end to the war.39 Yet, even after Iran invaded Iraq, the Soviet Union adhered to its neutral position at the political level and did not condemn Iran. The significant shift in the Soviet position occurred at the military level: from mid-1982 the USSR resumed on a large scale the supply of arms to Iraq, which included advanced MiG-25 airplanes (for the first time) and T-72 tanks.40 This change can be partly explained by the emergence of legal grounds for assisting Iraq: from July 1982 it was Iran that violated Iraq's borders and rejected the Security Council's repeated calls to end the war, which Iraq accepted. Also, now that Iraq faced a threat from Iran, the friendship treaty obliged the USSR to aid Iraq. However, such legal arguments were secondary to great power considerations: an Iranian defeat of Iraq would mean the victory of anti-Soviet Islamic fundamentalists, which flatly rejected all Soviet overtures to improve relations, and which Moscow obviously sought to restrain. The Soviet Union also feared that Iran's advances would draw the conservative Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, closer to the United States, thus augmenting Washington's footing in the Gulf. It is reasonable to assume that on the whole Moscow continued to regard the Iraq-Iran war as a negative development. Besides the danger of an Iranian victory, the continuation of the war increased the probability that Iran might normalize relations with Washington to obtain the US weapons on which it still mostly relied. Because Iran, rather than Iraq, was the strategic asset in the Soviet viewpoint, Moscow's option for improving relations with Baghdad, which the war provided, was of secondary importance. Indeed, because the Soviets had not yet given up hope of ameliorating relations with Iran, they cautiously refrained from taking full advantage of the opportunities to upgrade ties with Iraq. On November 10,1982, Brezhnev died, and Iurii Andropov (head of the KGB in 1967-1982 and a member of the Politburo from 1973) succeeded him as general secretary on November 12, and also as president in June 1983. Andropov's insufficient experience in foreign affairs in general and in Middle Eastern affairs in particular (he had never participated in Soviet-Iraqi talks), and the gradual deterioration of his health (from August 1983 he ceased appearing in public) reinforced Gromyko's key position in shaping Soviet foreign policy.41 In March 1983, Gromyko was promoted to first deputy prime minister,42 while retaining the post of foreign minister. Iraq saw the arrival of a new leader in the Soviet Union as an opportunity to turn over a new page in its relationship with that super-

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power. The ground for Iraq's initiative to improve relations with the Soviets was prepared by King Hussein of Jordan during his visit to Moscow in early December 1982, when he met with Andropov. Formally, he had come to the Soviet Union on a mission on behalf of the Fez (Morocco) Arab summit concerning the Arab-Israeli dispute.43 However, because King Hussein was the most outspoken Arab supporter of Iraq in its war with Iran, and because he provided an important supply route (through the port of Aqaba) for the flow of Soviet arms to Iraq, he was also able to use his meetings with the Soviet leadership to persuade Moscow to strengthen its support for Iraq, and he was optimistic about the outcome of his efforts.44 Shortly after King Hussein's visit, an Iraqi delegation comprising Taha Yasin Ramadan, Tariq 'Aziz, and Chief of Staff 'Abd-al-Jabbar Shanshal45 visited the Soviet Union from December 9 to 10,1982, and held talks with Gromyko and Ponomarev. It seems, however, that no breakthrough in Soviet-Iraqi relations took place because both sides reported the visit only briefly,46 and the Iraqi delegation did not meet Andropov, whose assumption of power was an important reason for Baghdad's dispatch of the delegation. After the visit, the Soviet Union did somewhat augment arms deliveries to Iraq,47 although this was both a continuation of Moscow's policy toward the Iraq-Iran dispute and a sign of Andropov's efforts to invigorate Soviet policies in a variety of spheres, including the Middle East, after the stagnation at the end of Brezhnev's rule.48

The Ninth Congress of the Ba'th (Summer 1982-Winter 1983) The Ninth Regional [Iraqi] Congress of the Ba'th was convened from June 24 to 27,1982, but its updated report, which included evaluations of the events that had taken place in the second half of the year, was published in January 1983. In this report, Western Europe (which mostly meant France) headed the section reviewing Iraq's foreign relations.49 This implied that the Iraqi regime desired to deviate not only from the policy outlined by the Eighth Congress of the Ba'th (1974)—which had still preserved the USSR's central place in Iraq's overall foreign relations50— but also from the balance in Iraq's ties with France and the Soviet Union advocated by Saddam Hussein in June 1975.51 However, since 1979—the year in which Saddam Hussein strengthened his position and subsequently assumed power 52 —there had been signs that Iraq was giving priority to developing ties with France over the Soviet Union. This trend became clearer when the war with Iran broke out in the fall of 1980 and the Soviet Union avoided supplying weapons to Iraq on a large scale until the summer of 1982.53 Therefore, it can be argued that the Ninth Congress

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merely canonized a shift in Iraq's policy that had already occurred. In accordance with Saddam Hussein's aim of conducting a foreign policy based on true nonalignment, strong ties with France as a medium-sized power was preferable to reliance on the Soviet Union, which as a superpower inevitably sought to drag Iraq into the Soviet sphere of influence. The Ninth Congress formalized Iraq's readiness to develop relations with the United States,54 which had been indicated since 198055 when Baghdad had been trying to take advantage of the tension in AmericanIranian ties. In early 1982 the United States, for its part, removed Iraq's name from the list of states supporting international terrorism and permitted US companies to sell civil aircraft to Iraq. Saddam Hussein's role in initiating the shift in Iraq's policy toward the United States was evidenced in his interview with a US congressman conducted in Baghdad on August 25,1982, and published by Iraq on January 2,1983,56 in which he stated: "I believe that it is incorrect for Iraq—a nonaligned and independent country—[not] to maintain . . . relations with one of the two superpowers." He even added: "I think it is in our interest that America be present in the [Middle East] region when any other big or superpower is present." In line with this approach, the Ninth Congress portrayed the United States and the Soviet Union in similar terms as two powers competing for global influence.57 Whereas Tariq 'Aziz probably shared and implemented Saddam Hussein's policy of improving relations with the United States,58 Taha Yasin Ramadan's approach toward Washington, at least in the summer of 1982, seems to have been different. In early August 1982, after describing the Soviet Union as Iraq's friend, Taha Yasin Ramadan accused the United States of enmity toward Iraq manifested in supplying arms to Iran through a third party, and stated: "Iraq cannot equate or even compare the USSR with the US at least in the issues that are of interest to the Arab nation."59 The change in Iraq's policy toward the United States stemmed partly from tactical and circumstantial considerations. Its growing dependence on the financial support of the conservative Gulf states since the beginning of the war with Iran necessitated at least a limited rapprochement with Washington. In addition, Saddam Hussein apparently hoped that improved relations with Washington might lead it to exert pressure on its allies in NATO and Israel to stop supplying US arms to Iran. (In the abovementioned interview, published in January 1983, Saddam Hussein claimed that besides Israel, NATO countries, in response to a US request, were supplying arms to Iran in order to maintain the Iranian option for the United States.) Also, Iraq apparently intended to use any sign of improvement in its relations with the United States as pressure on the Soviets to increase their support for Iraq in the war. However, the fact that even increased Soviet military and political backing for Iraq in the mid1980s and disclosures about covert US arms shipments to Iran at the end

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of 1986 60 did not divert Baghdad from its goal of establishing friendly relations with Washington shows that this goal was not merely tactical. Rather, Iraq regarded maintaining ties with the United States as a prerequisite for preserving its nonalignment. The report of the Ninth Congress of the Ba'th, in line with the policy outlined at the Eighth Congress, spoke of the need to develop ties with China.61 Given the special importance Iraq attributed to evolving relations with the PRC, as a potential great power, Baghdad had refrained from reproaching Beijing for providing Tehran with substantial quantities of arms from the outset of the war. China, however, continued to ascribe priority to developing relations with Iran, although, to avoid alienating the Arab world, China denied supplying arms to Iran, formally espoused a neutral stand on the Iraq-Iran dispute, and even sold some weapons to Iraq. 62 On Iraq's relations with the Soviet Union, the report of the Ninth Congress of the Ba'th declared: "It is essential that friendly and cooperative relations with the Soviet Union and with countries of the socialist bloc continue in those areas where cooperation presently exists." 63 The report also admitted that preserving the nonalignment of the Arab nation was not an easy task.64 Indeed, Iraq seemed to comprehend the gap between its desired goal of maintaining preferential ties with France and friendly balanced relations with both superpowers and the exigencies of its situation. A number of factors—Iranian attacks on Iraq's territory during 1983 (although Iran had not yet scored any remarkable territorial gains), France's inability to compete with the Soviet Union in providing large quantities of arms, and the US avoidance of delivering weapons to Iraq— left Baghdad with no real alternative to its relationship with Moscow. Therefore, when the U S S R resumed supplying arms to Iraq on an extensive scale in the summer of 1982, it secured its de facto position as the most important state in Iraq's foreign policy.

An Ebb in Soviet-Iranian Relations and Increased Soviet Support for Iraq (Winter 1983-Winter 1985) In February 1983, Iran announced that the leadership of the Tudeh, including General Secretary Nur al-Din Kiyanuri, had been arrested on the charge of spying for the USSR, and in May Tudeh was outlawed and eighteen Soviet diplomats expelled. Given the enormous importance the Soviet Union assigned to maintaining good-neighbor relations with Iran, the liquidation of the Tudeh would have had little influence on Soviet policy toward Tehran, if not for the anti-Soviet campaign (of which the action against the Tudeh was the climax) the Islamic regime had been conducting for a long time on issues such as Soviet Muslims, Afghanistan,

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and Moscow's support for Baghdad. Because the option of promoting relations with Iran had been closed, at least in the short run, the Soviet Union decided to exert more efforts to advance relations with Iraq. Gromyko's speech at the Supreme Soviet on June 16, 1983, which indirectly blamed Iran for the continuation of the Iraq-Iran war, was the first sign of increased Soviet support for Iraq. Gromyko contended: "The conflict between Iran and Iraq is senseless. For anyone to oppose the ending of the war is irrational."65 In accordance with the cue in Gromyko's speech, some feature articles in the Soviet press subsequently charged Iran with refusing to end the war.66 The publication of articles that were strongly anti-Iranian and pro-Iraqi in the organ of the Soviet army, Krasnaia zvezda,61 indicated that the military sector was particularly interested in expanding the relationship with Iraq, and not just in order to increase the sales of its produce. This sector probably viewed Iran as a country actively intent on undermining the security of the Soviet Union, as shown in its attempt to foment the Soviet Muslims and the military aid (however limited) it was extending to the rebels in Afghanistan. Encouraged by the Soviet desire to strengthen ties with Iraq, Tariq 'Aziz arrived in Moscow on November 20,1983, and on the next day held talks with Gromyko. It should be noted that Tariq 'Aziz, who had already been acting as foreign minister of his country for some years, had been formally appointed to this post in January that year (replacing Sa'dun Hammadi), while retaining the post of deputy prime minister. Thus, for the first time since the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war, Tariq 'Aziz was received in Moscow by a personality corresponding to his status. In addition, for the first time since the war, the Soviet report on the talks with Tariq 'Aziz mentioned the desire of both sides to continue developing relations in accordance with the friendship treaty.68 During the talks, the Soviet Union repeated that it was imperative to end the war and that it would "continue also in the future in the efforts . . . to bring about a political settlement to the Iran-Iraq dispute."69 Thus, the Soviet Union tried to maintain its neutrality at the political level in order to qualify for a mediating role. However, Tariq 'Aziz's visit resulted in a further increase in Soviet arms shipments to Iraq. Besides thwarting an Iranian victory over Iraq, the increased Soviet military aid to Iraq in 1983 and the coming years was aimed at restraining Iraq's acquisition of arms from the West, mainly from France.70 (It is noteworthy that from 1983, as Iraq's foreign currency reserves became depleted, it purchased weapons from both the USSR and France on credit.) On February 9, 1984, Andropov died. On February 13 he was succeeded by Konstantin Chernenko (a member of the Politburo from December 1978 who had been close to Brezhnev) as general secretary and on April 11 also as president. Chernenko's assumption of power in a poor state of health and his limited experience in foreign affairs led to a further

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increase in Gromyko's role in determining the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Iran kept up its offensives against Iraq, and in February 1984 conquered a small marshy area in the southern sector of the front, which included part of the oil-rich Majnoon region. From this time onward, Iraq occasionally employed chemical weapons (mainly mustard gas) to check Iran's advances, and the Soviet Union, as a rule, ignored Baghdad's use of these weapons. In line with its continued support of Iraq, in March 1984 the USSR reportedly asked Syria to allow Iraq to resume transporting oil through the trans-Syrian pipeline, but Damascus declined.71 Iraq's desire for increased Soviet aid in view of Iran's continued assaults, as well as its desire to present its case in the dispute with Iran to the new Soviet leader, probably lay behind Taha Yasin Ramadan's visit to Moscow from April 24 to 26,1984. Baghdad reported that during the talks with Tikhonov, Taha Yasin Ramadan had conveyed the greetings of Iraq's leadership headed by Saddam Hussein to the Soviet leadership and President Chernenko, expressing Iraq's "pride in the development taking place in [Iraqi-Soviet] relations and its desire to strengthen and expand them in all the fields."72 Although he was not granted a meeting with Chernenko,73 this was the first time since the beginning of the Iraq-Iran war that Moscow reported the participation of a Soviet military official in meetings with an Iraqi delegation,74 which indicated that an additional increase in Soviet military assistance to Iraq was forthcoming. The more vigorous Soviet support for Iraq seems to have been influenced by changes that had been taking place in the US position on the Iraq-Iran war. Since the end of 1983, fearing that an Iranian victory would jeopardize US interests in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, Washington had been taking steps to improve relations with Baghdad and to apply pressure on its allies to cease supplying arms to Iran,75 to forestall further Iranian advances. In December 1983, a special envoy of US President Ronald Reagan was dispatched to Baghdad and had a meeting with Saddam Hussein. The Soviet Union could therefore be reassured that the United States did not as yet intend to capitalize on the crisis in Soviet-Iranian relations and the intensified Soviet support for Iraq to rebuild its ties with Iran. Following Taha Yasin Ramadan's trip to the Soviet Union, Saddam Hussein claimed that Baghdad's relations with Moscow were in an "excellent state" and "at their best," and that Iraq was grateful to the Soviets for their military support.76 This rosy view of Iraqi-Soviet relations seems, however, to have been aimed at deterring Iran and did not reflect reality. The Ba'th regime did not use the term "strategic alliance" in describing its relations with the Soviet Union, nor did it adopt Moscow's stands on issues related to Soviet-US competition. For example, whereas the Soviet report of the talks between Tikhonov and Taha Yasin Ramadan alleged

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that both sides had condemned the US attempts to "intervene" in the Gulf, the Iraqi report made no mention of this subject.77 This also alluded to differences between Moscow and Baghdad regarding the "tanker war," which had begun in February of that year and continued until the end of the Iraq-Iran war. Iraq had initiated this kind of warfare by using its air force to attack oil tankers exporting Iranian oil, regardless of their nationality, in order to undermine Iran's capability to finance the war. In response, Iran attacked tankers exporting oil from the Arab Gulf states, especially Kuwait, on the grounds that these countries were financing Iraq's war machine. It could not, however, retaliate directly against tankers exporting Iraqi oil, because Iraq had not been exporting oil through the Gulf since the beginning of the war in 1980, when its loading facilities in the Gulf had been damaged. Moreover, Iraq's superiority in firepower, particularly of its air force, ensured it a greater capacity to hit oil tankers.78 The Soviet Union reacted to the tanker war mainly by voicing concern that the United States might "exploit" this war to augment its military presence in the Gulf under the "pretext" of protecting the flow of oil to the West. Unlike the Soviet Union, Iraq welcomed the increased US military presence in the Gulf, as long as it was aimed at protecting the flow of oil from the Arab Gulf states, and in fact against Iran. Yet, as a nonaligned state opposed in principle to any foreign military presence in the Gulf, Iraq avoided admitting publicly its stake in the US buildup in the region. Because US military deployment in the Gulf region was mainly directed against Iran, Iran's interest in ousting the United States from the Gulf coincided with that of the USSR. Nonetheless, even though the Soviet Union was apprehensive that the tanker war might provide a motive for US intervention in the region, it ignored Iraq's responsibility for starting this kind of warfare and did not call upon the sides to halt it.79 By 1984, signs of moderation in Iran's internal process of Islamization were emerging, along with a certain willingness to reduce its revolutionary rhetoric in foreign affairs in order to promote state interests.80 These were the first indications that the Islamic regime was slowly moving from radicalism to pragmatism—a transformation that other revolutionary regimes, such as the Soviet and the Ba'th ones, had also undergone sooner or later. Despite its slogan "neither East nor West," from June 1984 Iran tried to ameliorate somewhat its relations with the USSR,81 and also to put out feelers to the West.82 In any case, the slight shift in Soviet-Iranian relations beginning in 1984 had no impact on Soviet political and military support for Iraq.83 From October 18 to 19,1984, Tariq 'Aziz visited the Soviet Union and had a meeting with Gromyko. Prior to his departure for the Soviet Union, Baghdad had indicated its intention of restoring diplomatic relations with Washington after the presidential elections in the United States scheduled

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for November 1984,84 and it seems that this subject was raised during the Moscow talks. In fact, one of the purposes of 'Aziz's trip may even have been to explain this forthcoming move to the Soviets. Tariq 'Aziz apparently asked the USSR to prevent the transfer of Soviet-made arms to Iran through a third party, as an Iraqi commentary issued shortly after his visit to Moscow urged "the international community" to adopt effective measures to end the Iraq-Iran war, and first and foremost to stop supplying weapons to Iran.85 Iraq made similar requests of Moscow in the coming years,86 in response to which the Soviets sometimes evaded the issue by alleging that they had no information on it, and sometimes promised to act to halt the transfer of weapons to Iran.87 However, the truth is that the Soviet Union still had a basic interest in a limited flow of its arms through friendly countries to Iran—not in order to tip the military balance in Tehran's favor (which is why Moscow occasionally asked these countries not to supply certain categories of weapons to Iran), but to preserve the option of improving relations with Iran. Moreover, because in the first half of the 1980s most of the arms to Iran still came from Western sources, a one-sided embargo on arms from Soviet sources would have put the USSR in a disadvantageous position regarding Iran. In any case, Soviet control over the main suppliers of Soviet-made military equipment to Iran— North Korea, Libya, and Syria—was far from complete, and it is doubtful whether Moscow was willing to risk tension in relations with these countries, which were its allies, in order to satisfy Iraq, which was no longer its ally. On November 26,1984, at the conclusion of Tariq 'Aziz's talks with Reagan, Baghdad and Washington resumed diplomatic relations. The USSR was concerned not by the formal step of renewing diplomatic ties with the United States, but by Baghdad's basic willingness to maintain a neutral stand on the Soviet-US rivalry. Anyway, Moscow reacted by merely quoting a US official to the effect that the restoration of diplomatic relations between the United States and Iraq would not bring an important change in the policies of the two countries.88 This assessment seems generally true for, as we have seen, the ideological ground for Iraq's rapprochement with the United States had already been laid by Saddam Hussein personally and by the Ninth Congress of the Ba'th in the summer of 1982. The delay in the symbolic act of resuming diplomatic relations with Washington suggested, however, that Iraq's leadership was not united on the policy toward the United States. Indeed, it was reported that Tariq 'Aziz supported the policy of cautious maneuvering between Moscow and Washington, whereas Taha Yasin Ramadan opposed the rapprochement with the United States.89 The restored relations with the United States provided Iraq with certain new benefits such as increased US intelligence support in the war against Iran 90 and the sale of "nonmilitary" helicopters, which Baghdad modified for military use,91 but it did

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not overshadow the primacy of the USSR in Iraq's foreign ties. The Gorbachev Era: General Trends in the First Three Years (Spring 1985-Spring 1988) On March 10,1985, Chernenko died, and on the next day Mikhail Gorbachev, a member of the Politburo since October 1980, who had already emerged as Chernenko's successor before his death, was elected general secretary. Young (born in 1931) and dynamic, Gorbachev gradually dismissed most of the elderly members of the Politburo associated with Brezhnev's policies. Under Chernenko, Politburo member and minister of defense Dmitrii Ustinov had died, and in December 1984 had been succeeded by Sergei Sokolov. Unlike the defense ministers under Brezhnev (Grechko and Ustinov), in April 1985 Sokolov became only an alternate (i.e., nonvoting) member of the Politburo.92 Thus, Gorbachev weakened the representation in the highest institution of the party of the military sector, which on the whole advocated a greater military buildup against the West and increased Soviet military activities in the Third World. Gromyko was not ousted from the Politburo, but on July 2,1985, he was relieved of his capacities as first deputy prime minister and foreign minister, and was appointed president (a post left vacant with Chernenko's death).93 Hence, Gromyko still remained one of the senior personalities in the Kremlin, although his influence on matters of prime importance in Soviet foreign policy, such as Soviet-US relations, certainly diminished. It seems that by replacing Gromyko as foreign minister by Eduard Shevardnadze, a member of the Politburo from July 1,1985, who lacked experience in foreign affairs, Gorbachev paved the way for implementing his own foreign policy. On September 27, 1985, Nikolai Ryzhkov, a member of the Politburo from April 1985, replaced Tikhonov as prime minister. Ryzhkov was responsible for foreign economic relations and mainly for implementing Gorbachev's far-reaching internal economic reforms (perestroika) aimed at revitalizing the Soviet economy. The intensity of these economic reforms, as well as Gorbachev's policy of democratizing Soviet society (glasnost), encountered some opposition from Egor Ligachev, a member of the Politburo from April 1985, who was second in command in the Kremlin. In order to devote greater resources to his far-sweeping domestic reforms, Gorbachev needed a détente with the principal Soviet adversaries. Accordingly, toward the end of Chernenko's rule—apparently under Gorbachev's initiative—the Soviet Union had already augmented its efforts to improve relations with the United States and China, and this trend was reinforced when Gorbachev assumed power. Significantly, in negotiating with the United States on limiting nuclear weapons, Gor-

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bachev abandoned the relatively tough positions that had been determined by Gromyko, and in December 1987 signed a treaty in Washington with President Reagan on the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles. The considerable losses the Afghan resistance had been inflicting on Soviet troops, combined with Gorbachev's desire to preserve détente, led the U S S R to sign the April 1988 Geneva Agreement on Afghanistan, which stipulated the withdrawal of Soviet forces from that country within nine months, beginning on May 15. Moreover, in view of the negative affect the perennial regional conflicts in the Third World had on détente and the heavy financial burden of bolstering up its belligerent allies (especially Vietnam and Cuba), the Soviet Union under Gorbachev placed more emphasis on the need to settle international disputes through diplomacy. Gorbachev also strove to strengthen relations with geopolitically important states in the Third World regardless of their capitalist regimes,94 while not abandoning the "socialist-oriented" Soviet allies of the 1970s. However, besides the particular case of Afghanistan, continuity rather than change was the prevailing trend in Soviet policy toward the Third World during the first three years of Gorbachev's rule. Faced with the constraints of Brezhnev's legacy in the Third World and with a certain degree of internal opposition on essential matters such as his domestic reforms, Gorbachev presumably decided not to press too hard with innovations in fields of secondary importance such as the Third World.95 Moreover, during his first years in office, Gorbachev seems to have left to Gromyko, to a significant extent, the treatment of some of the Third World problems, such as the Iraq-Iran war. Saddam Hussein's Visit to the Soviet Union (December 1985) On March 29,1985, Gromyko (until July 2, still first deputy prime minister and foreign minister) held talks with Tariq 'Aziz, who was on a short working visit to the Soviet Union. 96 The timing of Tariq 'Aziz's trip suggested that it was aimed at examining the possible repercussions of Gorbachev's coming to power on Soviet policies, in addition to securing further arms supplies, which 'Aziz probably achieved.97 The proximity of Gromyko's meeting with Tariq 'Aziz to Gromyko's talks in Moscow with Iran's deputy foreign minister on April 598 indicated that 'Aziz's visit was also related to a Soviet mediation bid in the Iraq-Iran war. Indeed, during Gromyko's separate talks with Tariq 'Aziz and Iran's deputy foreign minister, the U S S R reportedly proposed to hold negotiations between Iraq and Iran under Soviet auspices, without prior conditions, with the purpose of ending the war—but Iran refused.99 On May 27, Gromyko was dealing again with the Iraq-Iran dispute, when he met a delegation of the

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Arab League, which had been designated to work to end the Iraq-Iran war and included Tariq 'Aziz; and on May 28, Gromyko held bilateral talks with Tariq 'Aziz.100 Iraq's enormous dependence on Soviet weapons and its realization that the period of "interregnum" in Moscow was over impelled it to become acquainted with the new Soviet leader, and to expound to him on the war against Iran and ensure and even expand Iraqi relations with the Soviet Union.101 Thus, on December 16 and 17, 1985, Saddam Hussein visited the Soviet Union for the first time in seven years. This was also his first visit outside the Arab world since the beginning of the Iraq-Iran war, which emphasized the senior position of the Soviet Union in Iraq's foreign relations. On December 16, Saddam Hussein had a meeting with Gorbachev, which, according to Baghdad's version, lasted more than two hours and was devoted to the Iraq-Iran war and bilateral relations. Baghdad also claimed that there was agreement on "most" of the issues during this meeting.102 However, Moscow's concise report on the meeting, which was not accompanied by a photograph, and the description of its atmosphere as "businesslike, frank and friendly"103 undoubtedly implied that d i f f e r e n c e s and a r a t h e r cool a t m o s p h e r e characterized Gorbachev's talks with Saddam Hussein. This was the only meeting Gorbachev had with Saddam Hussein, whereas Gromyko—whose post of president, in accordance with diplomatic protocol, paralleled the governmental position held by the Iraqi leader—headed the Soviet delegation at the talks that took place on December 16 and 17 and also included Shevardnadze, Sokolov, and Arkhipov. The fact that Gorbachev did not head the Soviet delegation— although during 1985 he had already led his country's delegation at talks with leaders of Third World countries such as India, Syria, and Libya104— stemmed, if only partly, from Iraq's secondary position in the Soviet Third World policy. The Iraqi delegation included Taha Yasin Ramadan, Tariq 'Aziz, and 'Abd-al-Jabbar Shanshal, minister of state for military affairs (appointed to this post in December 1983, after being relieved of his position of chief of staff).105 In line with the participation of military officials at the talks, a Gulf source subsequently reported that Iraq was to receive new types of weapons from the USSR, without elaborating.106 In addition to arms, Saddam Hussein requested that the Soviets intensify their diplomatic efforts to end the Iraq-Iran war. In his speech in honor of Gromyko, Saddam Hussein called upon "friendly states, among them the Soviet Union, to increase urgent efforts either in the Security Council or at other levels to establish a just and comprehensive peace."107 For his part, Gromyko said: "Those who contrary to any reason are calling for the war to be continued 'to a victorious end,' considering it as a means to settle accounts with the adversary and impose their will upon him, are behaving irrationally."108 Thus, in similar terms to his speech of June

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1983,109 Gromyko in fact condemned Iran's stubborn continuation of the war and also indirectly rejected the Iranian condition for ending it, namely the establishment of an Islamic regime in Iraq. The Soviet report on the talks with Saddam Hussein also insisted that both sides "vigorously opposed any attempts to impose from outside on other countries and peoples regimes which are alien to them." 110 The Soviet report on the Gromyko-Saddam Hussein talks of December 16 contained an implied reference to the Iraq-Iran war: "The Soviet and the Iraqi sides noted with satisfaction that the friendly relations between the two countries are being built on the solid foundation of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, on the basis of the principles sealed in it of equality, non-interference in internal affairs of each other and mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity."U1 A similar formula, also related to the Iraq-Iran dispute, had appeared for the first time in the Soviet-Iraqi joint communiqué at the end of Bakr's visit to the Soviet Union in September 1972,112 and only once more in a statement at the conclusion of Saddam Hussein's trip to the Soviet Union in February 1974.113 As in the past, it seems that the Soviet commitment to Iraq's territorial integrity was directed against Iran. Moreover, as on previous occasions when the principles listed in the Soviet-Iraqi statements (such as equality, noninterference in internal affairs, and so on) had hinted at the Soviet attempt to mobilize Iraq's support for a Collective Security System in Asia, now, too, they alluded to a similar Soviet proposal. In what seems to be an enlarged version of the Brezhnev scheme for Collective Security in Asia, from mid-1985 Gorbachev had been trying to promote a security plan for the Asian-Pacific region (as a single geopolitical entity), in order to reaffirm existing international borders and also the USSR's actual position of a senior Asian power.114 The reiteration of the Soviet commitment to the territorial integrity of Iraq implicit in the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation—which had been given when Soviet-Iraqi relations had been tight (1972) or still close (1974)—may have also indicated Moscow's willingness to upgrade relations with Baghdad in exchange for Baghdad's return to an anti-US policy. Gromyko even noted, "The Soviet Union makes due acknowledgment of the anti-imperialist course which Iraq has been taking in the international arena." Gromyko also attacked at length the US policy on issues related to the nuclear arms race. However, Iraq's version of Saddam Hussein's talks and the exchange of speeches did not contain the passage specifying the principles on which Soviet-Iraqi relations were based, nor Gromyko's appreciation of Baghdad's "anti-imperialist" policy and his anti-US utterances.115 In the mid-1980s, Iraqi officials castigated the United States on issues such as arms supplies to Iran through a third party (even before the November 1986 disclosure about US secret arms deliveries to Iran) and Washington's

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condemnation of Iraq's use of chemical weapons, but not on issues related to the Soviet-US rivalry par excellence, such as the nuclear arms race. In Moscow, while referring to the Iraqi-Soviet treaty as a factor that strengthened relations between the two countries, Saddam Hussein indicated Iraq's continued independent course vis-à-vis the U S S R by contending that Iraqi-Soviet ties were based upon "respect of the free will of the two friendly peoples." The Soviet report published at the conclusion of Saddam Hussein's talks on December 17 made no mention of the principles on which Soviet-Iraqi relation were being built, among them the respect for territorial integrity, which had been included in the earlier Soviet report.116 It seems that the Soviet Union had no cause to commit itself to Iraq's territorial integrity as long as Iraq showed no signs of returning to the anti-imperialist camp. Also, no communiqué was issued at the end of Saddam Hussein's visit, as at the conclusion of all the visits of senior Iraqi officials to the Soviet Union during the Iraq-Iran war. This was another sign that no breakthrough in Soviet-Iraqi relations had been achieved. The rosy picture of Saddam Hussein's trip to Moscow presented by Iraq's media117 should not mislead the reader, both because Baghdad failed to single out any concrete accomplishment and because in keeping with the personality cult of Hussein, the Ba'th regime had to describe any move he made as a major success. The description of the trip was also undoubtedly aimed at deterring Iran. All in all, Saddam Hussein's visit marked a continuity in Soviet-Iraqi relations. While making an intensive effort to augment Soviet support in the war against Iran, Iraq continued to maintain a neutral position on the Soviet-US rivalry and aspired to develop relations with the United States. The USSR, for its part, maintained its military and political support for Iraq in the war against Iran at the level that had been fixed in 1983-1984, while preserving the option of improving relations with Iran. It seems that this was why Gorbachev's reception of Saddam Hussein had been somewhat cool and Gromyko had avoided condemning Iran by name. Moreover, as speaker of the Iranian parliament, 'Ali Akbar Hashimi Rafsanjani subsequently disclosed—during Saddam Hussein's trip to the Soviet Union—that Moscow had sent a message to Tehran promising to pursue a neutral policy.118 Significantly, among Iran's top leaders, Rafsanjani was relatively pragmatic on developing ties with the superpowers.119

Moscow Intensifies Its Activities on the Iraq-Iran Scene (Winter 1986-Spring 1987) From 1986, Soviet diplomatic activities regarding the Iraq-Iran dispute were growing. This was part of the dynamism with which Gorbachev tried

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to endow Soviet foreign policy at large, as well as part of the diplomatic effort he initiated in the countries of the Asian-Pacific region, aimed at enlisting their support for his security scheme.120 Indeed, Moscow believed that a political solution to the Iraq-Iran dispute and to other conflicts in Asia would promote this security plan.121 In early February 1986, not long after Saddam Hussein completed his trip to Moscow, Georgii Kornienko, first deputy foreign minister and member of the Central Committee of the CPSU, visited Iran and held talks with its leadership: President 'Ali Khaman'i, Prime Minister Hosayn Musavi, and Rafsanjani. Kornienko was the highest Soviet personality to visit Iran since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, but the visit achieved little in advancing Soviet-Iranian relations or bringing a settlement to the Iraq-Iran war any closer. Rather, Iran kept up its pressure on Iraq, and in mid-February scored a prestigious gain by capturing part of the Faw peninsula, including the Faw oil port (which was not operational). At the same time, Tariq 'Aziz paid a one-day visit to Moscow, which was to some extent related to the recent Iranian offensive and Soviet diplomatic moves to end the war, and conferred with Shevardnadze.122 At the beginning of November 1986, the US secret arms deliveries to Iran during this year were revealed (the so-called "Irangate affair"), an exchange which had partly been aimed at establishing lines of communication with the "moderates" within the Iranian leadership. (These arms shipments contravened both the US arms embargo on Iran from 1979 and Washington's declared policy since late 1983 of discouraging its allies from supplying arms to Iran.) The US arms sales to Iran to some extent substantiated Moscow's apprehension since the beginning of the Iraq-Iran war that Iran's acute need for US weapons might eventually lead to an Iranian-US rapprochement. Yet, Moscow was probably reassured, in view of the embarrassment the covert military ties between the United States and Iran caused to both countries, and also due to Washington's renewed commitment in late 1986 not to sell arms to Tehran, that a revival of the Iranian-US relationship was now less feasible. In any case, in its public reaction to the disclosure of the secret arms affair, Moscow mostly refrained from castigating Iran's leadership for showing willingness to restore relations with US "imperialism," and rather attacked the United States. In statements directed at Iraq and the Arab world at large, most of which supported Iraq, the Soviet Union contended that US arms shipments to Iran were responsible for the ongoing Iranian assaults against Iraq.123 Iraq itself condemned the United States on the arms affair, although, in accordance with its basic interest in maintaining correct relations with the latter, it concentrated its verbal attacks on Israel (which played the role of a conduit in the US-Iranian arms deal) and, of course, Iran.124 On January 8, 1987, for the first time since the beginning of the

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Iraq-Iran war, the Soviet government published a plan for ending the conflict.125 The plan reviewed the Iraq-Iran conflict in a fairly balanced manner, in order to make the USSR acceptable as a mediator. On the one hand, alluding to Iraq's use of chemical warfare against Iran, the Soviet plan noted: "During the war, inhumane acts are being committed, such as the use of chemical weapons." On the other hand, it implied criticism of Iran's adherence to a military solution when it stated: "Military means only make the attainment of a settlement more remote rather than bringing it closer." On the whole, however, the plan accepted Iraq's basic position by supporting the termination of the war and "confirmation of the borders between Iraq and Iran which had existed prior to the dispute," and upholding the rights of each people "to choose its way of life and determine its destiny." Moreover, the plan ignored Tehran's claim that Saddam Hussein's Ba'th regime had been responsible for the crime of launching the war, and did not demand an enquiry into the issue of who had started the war, maintaining that both sides "should not look to the past, but to the future." Likewise, the plan made no reference to the question of reparations. Iran rejected the Soviet plan126 and, the day after its publication, launched a massive assault on Basra (Iraq's second-largest city), which the Iraqis halted only a month later. Iraq, for its part, welcomed the Soviet proposal: Iraq's foreign ministry spokesman stated that his country was "ready to cooperate with the USSR or with any country that wants to work for a radical and definitive solution to the conflict." But his insistence that "any sincere effort to attain peace must first of all include [applying] great pressure on the aggressor Iranian regime" to compel it to end the war 127 seemed to criticize the Soviet plan for being toothless. To reciprocate Kornienko's visit to Iran in February 1986, from February 13 to 14, 1987, Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Vilayati of Iran visited the Soviet Union and held separate talks with Shevardnadze, Ryzhkov, and Gromyko. The Soviet side reaffirmed its policy of maintaining and developing good-neighbor relations with Iran; Vilayati likewise asserted his country's interest in strengthening good-neighbor relations with the Soviet Union, and he invited Shevardnadze to visit Iran.128 Despite these declarations of good will, there were deep differences between the USSR and Iran, which were elaborated in the Soviet report on Gromyko's talks with Vilayati. Criticizing Iran's refusal to end the war with Iraq, Gromyko told Vilayati: "Your people also has no interest in enlarging the cemeteries with the graves of those who have died in the war." Gromyko also reproached Vilayati on the question of Afghanistan when he charged that "Iran carries full responsibility t h a t . . . its territory is being used as a basis for an armed struggle against Afghanistan." 129 Vilayati reportedly asked the Soviets to stop supplying arms to Iraq, and when they responded that Iran must first agree to peace, Vilayati

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threatened that his country might restore relations with the United States.130 All in all, although important exchanges of visits between the USSR and Iran began taking place and there was some improvement in economic ties,131 the contentious issues between Moscow and Tehran, coupled with the basic enmity of the Islamic regime toward the Soviets, persisted. Because there was no significant progress in relations with Iran, and also because Iran maintained its offensives against Iraq, the Soviet Union continued to support Iraq. The Soviet Union also probably hoped that its position as Iraq's chief arms supplier would provide it with leverage over Iran, and compel it eventually to modify its policies to suit the USSR. Indeed, Iran's willingness to improve relations with the Soviet Union to a certain extent—despite the growing Soviet military support for Iraq— strengthened Moscow's assessment that the road leading to Tehran passed paradoxically through Baghdad. Shortly after Vilayati's visit, on February 20,1987, Tariq 'Aziz visited the Soviet Union and held separate talks with Shevardnadze, Ryzhkov, and Gromyko. In addition to briefing Tariq 'Aziz on his talks with Vilayati, Gromyko reportedly promised him to reschedule Iraq's debts-for arms and to continue the generous supply of weapons, including the most advanced Soviet fighter-plane, the MiG-29, which had already been delivered to Iraq at the beginning of 1987.132 Iraq received the MiG-29 aircraft about half a year before Syria, the major Soviet ally in the Arab East, because in Baghdad's case Moscow had to compete with Iraq's military purchases in France, which were concentrated on acquiring modern airplanes.133 Gromyko also expressed criticism of Iran for its refusal to end the war when he argued that the Soviet Union and most of the United Nations member states had voiced their support for settling the differences between Iraq and Iran not on the battlefield but through negotiations, adding: "Enormous is the weight of responsibility of those who do not pay attention to these voices, who ignore them."134 It should be recalled that Gromyko had been the first to criticize Iran's policy in the war in June 1983 and had continued to do so on various occasions.135 However, in February 1987, while Gromyko was castigating Iran's policy in his talks with both Vilayati and Tariq 'Aziz, Gorbachev was expressing elsewhere a rather impartial view on the Iraq-Iran war: "[The war] is disastrous for both countries. It has not brought and cannot bring a solution to controversial issues. It must be ended as quickly as possible around the table of political negotiations. There is no other way."136 The differences in Gorbachev's and Gromyko'sistatements on the Iraq-Iran war can be only partly explained by a "division of labor," according to which the Soviet leader assigned the task of reproving Iran to someone below his rank so as not to forfeit the option of ameliorating relations with Iran. If this were the case, then Ryzhkov and Shevardnadze,

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who were promoted to their posts by Gorbachev and hence shared his views, but whose formal status was inferior to that of Gromyko, should have been able to reproach Iran even more harshly than Gromyko. Nevertheless, in their talks with Vilayati and Tariq 'Aziz in February 1987 both Ryzhkov and Shevardnadze refrained from criticizing Iran's refusal to discontinue the war against Iraq. 137 It therefore seems that there were two main schools of thought in the Kremlin on the Iraq-Iran war: one, headed by Gromyko, put the emphasis on military and political support for Iraq, whereas the other, headed by Gorbachev, was careful to maintain the option of improving relations with the strategically more important Iran and hence advocated only a guarded support for Iraq. Gorbachev's cautious policy on the Iraq-Iran war, aimed at developing friendly relations with the southern neighbor Iran, was in line with his prudent policy on Soviet-US relations aimed at reviving détente. By contrast, Gromyko's policies tended to risk Soviet relations with Iran, just as they endangered détente in the pre-Gorbachev era. At the end of April 1987, a delegation of the Arab League, which included Tariq 'Aziz, arrived in the Soviet Union. This visit was part of the delegation's tour to the five permanent member states of the Security Council with the aim of enlisting their support for a new Security Council resolution, which was no longer to confine itself to a call to end the Iraq-Iran war, but was to contain an article on imposing sanctions on the side that might refuse to comply with the new resolution, namely Iran. The Arab League delegation held talks with Shevardnadze on April 28 and with Gromyko on April 29. Both Soviet officials stressed their country's interest in ending the Gulf war. However, the Soviet report on the talks omitted Tariq 'Aziz's insistence on the need to adopt "practical measures against the side which refuses to respond to the will of the international community" to the end the war.138 In light of the Soviet refusal to support meaningful measures by the Security Council to put an end to the IraqIran war, the sincerity of Moscow's repeated declarations about its desire to see a speedy end to the war should be re-examined. At the beginning of the 1980s, the Iraq-Iran war had indeed not served Soviet interests. The war had not promoted Soviet relations with Iran; on the contrary, Soviet-Iranian ties reached a nadir in 1983. Moreover, during the first years of the war, the Soviet Union had refrained from taking advantage of the option to improve relations with Iraq so as not to alienate Iran. In later years, however, since 1983-1984, the U S S R had been gaining from the war by deepening its relations with Iraq, both as its major arms supplier and in fact as the most important power in Iraq's foreign relations. Further, since 1984-1985, Moscow had even been managing to improve slightly Soviet relations with Iran. The war not only diverted the bulk of the anti-Communist Islamic regime's hatred to another Muslim country

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rather than the U S S R , but also weakened Tehran's resistance to developing ties with "the Lesser Satan." As we have seen, the Soviets' apprehension that Iran's urgent need for US weapons might compel it to restore its relationship with Washington certainly diminished from the end of 1983, when the United States began to work to halt arms shipments from its allies to Iran, and even further from late 1986, when the Reagan administration's secret arms sales to Iran were disclosed. Thus, from the mid-1980s the war promoted, to a great extent, Soviet relations with Iraq, and, to a small extent, with Iran. Bearing this in mind, in the spring of 1987, Moscow feared that the prospects for furthering relations with Iran would be harmed if it supported the United Nations sanctions against Tehran. At the same time, the war continued to have its risks and drawbacks for the U S S R . It resented the increase in the US military presence in and around the Gulf. Moreover, with Iran still on the offensive, the danger that it might defeat Iraq still remained, and furthermore the protraction of the war meant the continued financial burden of bolstering up Iraq's war machine, an investment that had not yielded Moscow substantial dividends in the form of influence over Baghdad. Also, the priority given by Gorbachev to implementing internal reforms required a quiet atmosphere abroad, particularly in the Middle East, which, from the Soviet point of view, was close to its borders. Indeed, Moscow had been trying to mediate a negotiated settlement to the Iraq-Iran dispute, hoping to boost its prestige. Finally the desire voiced by the U S S R under Gorbachev to enhance the status of the United Nations should have made it eager to have the Security Council adopt tangible measures to end the Iraq-Iran war. On balance, the Soviet Union appears to have had only little to gain from a continuation of the war. In particular, the benefits it could reap from the protraction of the war in its relations with Baghdad seemed to have reached the maximum point, whereas the chances for improving its relations with Tehran were still remote. Nevertheless, the U S S R preferred to pursue further gains, however small, to the possibility of ending the Iraq-Iran war through resolute measures by the United Nations. Notably, the Soviet Union seemed to be less interested in settling the Iraq-Iran dispute than ending other regional disputes, particularly those in which its major Third World allies, Cuba and Vietnam, were involved, for two main reasons. Whereas Cuba and Vietnam had been receiving heavy subsidies from the Soviets, Iraq received military supplies on credit, and repayment after the war was guaranteed by Iraq's proven oil reserves. Also, contrary to most Third World disputes in which Soviet and U S support for opposite sides of the conflict tended to aggravate Soviet-US relations, there was no such polarization in the Iraq-Iran war, and therefore its effect on the superpowers' relationship was marginal.

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The Extension of the Soviet-Iraqi Treaty (April 1987) The Soviet-Iraqi friendship treaty of April 9,1972, had been concluded for a period of fifteen years, with the possibility of being automatically extended for subsequent periods of five years, unless one of the parties declared its desire to terminate the treaty one year before the date of expiry (article 12). Accordingly, in April 1986, important consultations took place between the Soviet Union and Iraq. On April 10, Taha Yasin Ramadan received the Soviet ambassador in Iraq,139 and from April 17 to 20, Ramadan visited Moscow and had talks with Arkhipov and Ryzhkov. From the timing of the talks and their focus on bilateral relations,140 we deduce that they dealt with the extension of the treaty. Taha Yasin Ramadan implied that this was the case when he stated that his visit to the Soviet Union was related to the Saddam Hussein-Gorbachev summit of December 1985 "and the application of the principles of this summit... for the current stage and the future, particularly in the sphere of bilateral cooperation."141 Hence, it seems that a mutual understanding to prolong the treaty had already been achieved during Saddam Hussein's journey to the Soviet Union in December 1985, and an agreement to extend the treaty automatically, without issuing a public declaration, was attained during Taha Yasin Ramadan's visit to the Soviet Union in April 1986. Notably, during these separate trips of Saddam Hussein and Taha Yasin Ramadan to Moscow, as well as in the traditional exchange of greetings between the Soviet leadership and Saddam Hussein on the fourteenth anniversary of the treaty in April 1986, neither the Soviet nor the Iraqi side announced the prolongation of the treaty.142 Furthermore, in the greetings on the fifteenth anniversary of the treaty in April 1987, both sides only indicated that their relations were to continue to be based on the treaty.143 In any case, because neither party requested an end to the treaty, it was regarded as being automatically extended.144 The Soviet Union and Iraq each had its own reasons for a tacit prolonging of the treaty. From Baghdad's perspective, the treaty constituted a Soviet commitment to assist it in the ongoing war for survival against Tehran. Therefore, during the war and particularly while Iran's threat seemed real, Iraq did not intend to use the legal option provided by the treaty to terminate it. Nevertheless, in order not to alienate the United States and to retain the option of possibly terminating the treaty once suitable circumstances were created—for the treaty contravened Iraq's aspiration to maintain a policy of true nonalignment—Baghdad probably preferred not to announce publicly the extension of the treaty. From Moscow's standpoint, the treaty was a prestigious achievement whose prolongation provided an appropriate formal framework for Baghdad's return to a pro-Soviet policy. Also, the prolongation of the

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Soviet-Iraqi treaty served Moscow as an example for other Third World states bound to the Soviets by similar treaties to follow in due course.145 However, because of the Soviet desire not to estrange Iran, it also made no public statement on prolonging the treaty. The Soviet Union manifested its desire to sustain the treaty by dispatching to Iraq on the fifteenth anniversary of the treaty, from April 8 to 10, 1987, Petr Demichev, alternate member of the Politburo and first vice-president,146 who conferred with Saddam Hussein. Although Demichev was the highest Soviet official to visit Iraq since Kosygin's trip in May-June 1976, the visit was ceremonial, with Demichev attending Baghdad's official celebrations to mark the anniversary of the treaty at which both the Soviet and Iraqi sides again failed to announce its prolongation.147 Moreover, at the end of April 1987, and in line with the policy determined by the Ninth Congress of the Ba'th, Saddam Hussein listed the powers friendly to Iraq in the following order: France, the Soviet Union, and China. H e added that "Iraq could become a friend to the Americans," should they show consideration for its interests.148

Soviet Policy Shifts Toward Iran (Spring-Summer 1987) A s we have seen, since the beginning of the tanker war, Kuwait's tankers had been an important target of Iranian attacks. Consequently, in November 1986—and in accordance with its traditional policy of maintaining some balance in its relations with the superpowers—Kuwait asked both the Soviet Union and the United States to protect its tankers. In response, in mid-April 1987 the Soviet Union leased three of its own tankers, which remained naturally entitled to Soviet protection, to Kuwait. The United States, for its part, at the beginning of 1987 agreed to hoist the US flag on eleven Kuwaiti tankers and defend them, although by the spring this accord was still not operational. Although Moscow's arrangement constituted an innovation in its policy in the Gulf, it was still within the guidelines of that policy. By agreeing to protect the three tankers, the USSR worked to ensure itself a legal status in the Gulf rather than a military presence; even after this agreement, the size of the Soviet navy in the Gulf remained small, numbering only three vessels.149 Moreover, in view of the US naval superiority in the Gulf region, which was about to increase even further with the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers, the U S S R continued to strive to demilitarize the Gulf from the presence of nonlittoral states.150 The Soviet commitment to protect the three tankers it had leased to Kuwait, a de facto ally of Iraq, constituted a strengthening in Soviet support for Baghdad in the Gulf war. In response, on May 6, Iranian gunboats carrying no iden-

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tification marks shelled a Soviet cargo ship bound to Saudi Arabia, and on May 16 one of the Soviet-leased tankers hit a mine planted by Iran. The USSR reacted cautiously and even avoided charging Iran explicitly with perpetrating these two acts because the latter had not assumed responsibility for them.151 A t the end of May 1987, the United States announced that in early June it would reflag the eleven Kuwaiti tankers. Although this was not done during June, the substantial increase in US military presence in and around the Gulf that would accompany this operation raised Soviet concerns. Although avoiding criticism of Kuwait's decision to ask for US protection, the Soviets sharply condemned the scheduled US buildup in the Gulf region. This buildup, which was in fact directed against Iran, drew belligerent anti-US statements from it, thus creating a common ground between Moscow and Tehran that made the latter willing to condone the tiny Soviet military presence in the Gulf. In order to forestall the strengthening of the US navy in the Gulf region and to mediate in the Iraq-Iran war, Moscow dispatched Iulii Vorontsov, first deputy foreign minister and a member of the CPSU Central Committee, on a visit to Iran from June 12 to 15 and to Iraq from June 16 to 18. During these visits, Vorontsov reportedly proposed to stop the tanker war as a first step, to be followed by Iraqi-Iranian negotiations in Moscow to achieve a comprehensive settlement to the dispute.152 Vorontsov's emphasis on the need to stop the tanker war initiated by Iraq—in which Iraq maintained its edge over Iran and which Iran was willing to halt—marked a slight shift in the Soviet position on the war. Thus, in contrast to the gradually increasing Soviet military and political support for Iraq against Iran since the summer of 1982, the most recent manifestation of which had been the leasing of Soviet tankers to Kuwait in the spring of 1987, Moscow was now moving closer to Tehran on a certain aspect of the Gulf war. This can be explained by several considerations. First, because Moscow desired to prevent any further augmentation in the US buildup in and around the Gulf, it had to try to remove the cause for this buildup, namely to attempt to halt the tanker war—an approach that coincided with Iran's stand. Second, the convergence of the Soviet and Iranian positions on the growing US naval presence in the Gulf region, manifested during Vorontsov's visit to Iran,153 drew Moscow toward Tehran. Third, the modest reverse in the USSR's virtually complete support for Iraq presumably reflected Gorbachev's enhanced role in formulating his country's policies also on secondary issues, such as disputes in the Third World.154 A s we have seen, Gorbachev was keen to preserve the Iranian option, and it was not by chance that the attempt to improve relations with Iran was made by a first deputy foreign minister appointed under him, Vorontsov. The Soviet Union apparently believed that a shift toward Iran

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would do little damage to its relations with Iraq because of the latter's continued heavy dependence on Soviet weapons. In contrast to Iran, Iraq did not voice opposition to the US military buildup in the Gulf. Specifically, whereas the Soviet report on Vorontsov's meeting with Saddam Hussein on June 17, 1987, claimed that both had pointed "to the need to oppose any attempts by imperialist forces to exploit tension in the [Gulf] region for increasing their military presence," no such contention appeared in Iraq's version.155 A s already noted, Iraq, in fact (albeit not openly), welcomed an increased US presence in the Gulf zone because it was in practice directed against Iran.156 A s at the meeting between Vorontsov and Saddam Hussein in Iraq, during Taha Yasin Ramadan's separate meetings with Ryzhkov and Gromyko in the Soviet Union on July 2,1987, the Iraqi side again failed to join the Soviet one in condemning the intensifying US military presence in the Gulf.157 Significantly, in line with Gorbachev's continued effort to improve relations with Iran, the Soviet version of Gromyko's talks with Ramadan contained no criticism of Iran's refusal to end the war with Iraq, contrary to Gromyko's preceding talks with Tariq 'Aziz in February 1987.158 On July 3,1987, the Soviet government issued a statement on the Gulf. After leveling at the United States the customary accusation of attempting to exploit the tense situation in the Gulf to impose its military-political hegemony over it, the Soviet government proposed that "all warships of states not belonging to this region be withdrawn from the Gulf in the shortest time, while Iran and Iraq, in their turn, refrain from activities creating a threat to international shipping." Although the Soviet statement suggested that these measures "be taken in the context of a comprehensive settlement to the Iraq-Iran conflict," the Soviet proposal— as Pravda1 s commentary indicated—was aimed in the main at halting the tanker war and pulling out all foreign military vessels from the Gulf.159 The proposal showed that the Soviet Union was concerned more with ousting US warships from the Gulf than with putting an end to the Iraq-Iran war. A l l in all, Moscow was now advocating publicly and more forcefully the same scheme it had tried to promote behind the scenes during Vorontsov's trip to Iran and Iraq in June 1987. Not surprisingly, Iraq was angered by the Soviet proposal because it regarded striking at tankers exporting Iranian oil as an important means to compel Iran to end the war. Alluding to the Soviet proposal, Saddam Hussein declared on July 16: " W e warn against any attempt . . . to concentrate on one aspect of the [Iraq-Iran] conflict, while excluding others," for such attempts "perpetuate" the war.160 Iran, for its part, expressed support for the Soviet call upon foreign forces to leave the Gulf161 and was ready to discontinue attacks on international shipping on a mutual basis, but it remained committed to pursuing the war against Iraq.

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Security Council Resolution 598 and Sanctions (Summer 1987-Winter 1988) In response to Iraq's appeals to the five permanent members of the Security Council to take effective measures to end the Gulf war, the latter formulated a draft resolution that was adopted unanimously by the Council on July 20, 1987, as Resolution 598. The first article of the resolution called for an immediate cease-fire in the Iraq-Iran war to be followed by a withdrawal of all forces to internationally recognized boundaries. This article was clearly in Iraq's favor because it was still on the defensive in the war and pieces of Iraq's territory were occupied by Iran. However, article 6 of the resolution was somewhat responsive to Iran's demand to brand Iraq as the aggressor that had started the war, by proposing that "an impartial body" be set up to inquire into "responsibility for the conflict."162 The fact that the substance of the first article of the resolution had appeared in the Soviet statement on the Gulf of July 3, 1987,163 and that this article was included in Pravda's report of the resolution,164 whereas article 6 appeared in neither, implied that the Soviets participated in initiating the former but not the latter and thus retained a significant bias toward Iraq.165 The resolution stated that the Council would meet again, if necessary, "to consider further steps to ensure compliance with this resolution." This allusion to possible sanctions against the side failing to comply with the resolution was apparently a compromise between US and Soviet positions. Because the US reflagging operation of the eleven Kuwait tankers was due to begin on July 21, the United States anticipated a military confrontation with Iran in which it sought the support of the international community. However, the Soviet Union—which in view of the scheduled reflagging operation had already been trying to exploit Iran's intensifying enmity toward the United States to promote its own ties with Iran— shielded Iran from sanctions to further this end. Moscow's objection to sanctions stemmed also from an unwillingness to forfeit its position as the only great power mediator in the Iraq-Iran dispute. Although Resolution 598 stopped short of adopting sanctions, Iraq welcomed it, hoping that if it were rejected by Iran, a second resolution imposing an arms embargo on Iran would be issued. Iran attacked the resolution as biased toward Iraq, but did not reject it explicitly. With the advantage of hindsight, this appears to have been a significant sign of fatigue in Tehran's determination to continue the war. Following Resolution 598, Vorontsov paid his second visit to both Iraq and Iran, from July 30 to August 4. Although his professed purpose was to explore the possibilities of implementing the resolution,166 Soviet coverage of Vorontsov's trip suggests that its main goal was to enlist Baghdad's and Tehran's support for the Soviet proposal of July 3, which had called for the withdrawal of all foreign warships from the Gulf and for

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an end to the tanker war.167 Saddam Hussein's failure to receive Vorontsov was perhaps a sign of Iraq's continued resentment at this proposal,168 whereas President Khaman'i of Iran, during his reception of Vorontsov, "expressed . . . satisfaction at the recent position of the Soviet Union concerning the Persian Gulf."169 Soviet-Iraqi differences on the issue of ending the Iraq-Iran war surfaced also during a trip to Moscow by an Arab League delegation that included Tariq 'Aziz and had separate meetings with Shevardnadze and Ryzhkov on September 9,1987. Whereas the Arab side apparently sought Soviet support for imposing Security Council-sponsored sanctions against Iran, the Soviet report on the talks reiterated the USSR's commitment to Resolution 598, but made no mention of sanctions and did not criticize Iran's attitude toward the resolution. Significantly, Gromyko—who had voiced indirect criticism of Iran's adherence to continuing the war against Iraq during the preceding visit of an Arab League delegation to Moscow in April 1987170—did not participate in these talks, which indicated an erosion of his role in formulating Soviet policy on the Iraq-Iran war. Rather than reproaching Iran, Ryzhkov and Shevardnadze told the Arab League delegation that the huge military presence of the United States and other N A T O states in the Gulf (in August some N A T O states, especially Britain and France, had dispatched warships to the Gulf as well) was obstructing the search for a peaceful settlement to the Iraq-Iran dispute. They restated the July 3 Soviet government proposal for normalizing the situation in the Gulf. Furthermore, Shevardnadze argued that the establishment of peace in the region required a "balanced approach."171 This balanced approach was manifested in Shevardnadze's proposal, presented in his speech to the annual session of the U N General Assembly on September 23,1987: "It is necessary to try to secure, concurrently and immediately, a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq and the fulfillment of the U N secretary general's mission regarding [the establishment of] an impartial body for investigating the issue of responsibility for the conflict."172 Bearing in mind that in mid-September 1987 Iran had told U N Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar that it would be prepared to accept an informal cease-fire (article 1 of Resolution 598) if an impartial commission was established (article 6 of Resolution 598), to be followed by a formal cease-fire when the investigation of this commission was completed and Iraq had been convicted of launching the war, Shevardnadze's proposal to combine the implementation of paragraphs 1 and 6 of Resolution 598 seems both evenhanded and worth a try. Yet, it can be assumed that by moving toward Tehran's position, Moscow's proposal was aimed first at improving relations with Tehran, and second at achieving a Sovietmediated settlement. Shevardnadze's speech of September 23 also included a call to replace

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the foreign warships in the Gulf by a UN force designated to secure the freedom of shipping. Because the July 3 Soviet proposal on the Gulf had not been accepted by any Western power, this suggestion for ensuring the freedom of navigation in the Gulf was a means to diminish the immense Western military presence and obtain for the Soviet Union an internationally recognized role for its own small naval unit173 within the framework of the projected force. Two days later, Tariq 'Aziz conveyed to Shevardnadze Iraq's firm rejection of the USSR's proposed linkage between articles 1 and 6 of Resolution 598, stressing that this resolution must be implemented according to the sequence of its paragraphs.174 Baghdad opposed any attempt to accommodate Tehran's position, hoping that if the latter persisted in its refusal to implement Resolution 598, it would be subjected to sanctions. Security Council sanctions were important for Iraq, not only as a means to force Iran to end the war, but as an international indictment of its archenemy in order to cover up Iraq's own responsibility for starting the war. Shevardnadze's proposal of September 23 to establish a UN force for the Gulf obviously contradicted Iraq's interests as well, for it meant replacing the huge naval force that was, in fact, directed against Iran with a weaker neutral one. From October 28 to 30,1987, Vorontsov visited Baghdad to promote Shevardnadze's proposals of September 23 regarding both the Iraq-Iran war and the Gulf. In his talks with Vorontsov, Saddam Hussein rejected "any attempt to misinterpret" Resolution 598;175 that is, he reaffirmed Iraq's rejection of a simultaneous implementation of articles 1 and 6 of this resolution. In addition, it can be concluded that Iraq rejected the Soviet scheme concerning the Gulf as well, for although the Soviet report on talks stated that Vorontsov had drawn Baghdad's attention to the scheme, Iraq's report omitted this issue altogether.176 Vorontsov's visit to Iraq was followed by a visit to Iran from October 31 to November 1, where the same proposals that had been rejected in Iraq received some understanding but still were not accepted.177 All in all, after completing three visits to Baghdad and Tehran since June 1987, Vorontsov's mediation efforts came to a deadlock. Even worse, despite the gradual shift toward Iran in the Soviet position regarding its conflict with Iraq during these visits, Moscow made no significant progress in its relations with Tehran, but rather irritated Baghdad. Indeed, besides firmly rejecting Moscow's "misinterpretation" of Resolution 598, in the fall of 1987 Taha Yasin Ramadan and Tariq 'Aziz criticized Soviet opposition to UN sanctions against Iran, which were to include first and foremost an arms embargo.178 In reply, Soviet officials argued that prior to imposing sanctions, more time should be given to the UN secretary general's mediation efforts, and, in any case, an arms embargo would be ineffective because private companies in the West

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would not abide by it. Further, while insisting on their country's right to pursue its foreign policy according to its own national interests, such as developing relations with neighboring Iran, Soviet officials stressed that the Soviet Union was not providing Iran with arms. They also reaffirmed the USSR's ongoing supply of weapons to Iraq and reiterated the validity of the Soviet-Iraqi friendship treaty.179 It can be reasonably assumed that the Soviets deliberately underrated the effectiveness of sanctions as a pretext for refusing to support this move, whereas their real reason for objecting to sanctions remained basically the same as in July 1987. The Soviet Union hoped that its consistent opposition to sanctions would be appreciated by Iran—especially against the background of the support for sanctions of the three major Western powers, the United States, Britain, and France—and consequently improve the conditions for the painfully slow progress in Soviet-Iranian relations.180 China also objected to introducing sanctions against Iran, and in the second half of the 1980s China had become Iran's main arms supplier.181 However, because at the same time China tried to maintain friendly relations with Iraq and the Iraqi Ba'th continued to accord special importance to developing ties with China, Baghdad refrained from condemning Beijing's policy on the Iraq-Iran war.182 The Soviet media, in line with Gorbachev's efforts to promote relations with China, made no mention of Chinese arms sales to Iran,183 while dwelling on real and alleged secret Western arms supplies to Iran with the purpose of discrediting the West and particularly its advocation of sanctions in Iraq's eyes. The Soviet media only partially reflected the shift in Soviet policy toward Iran on the diplomatic level in the fall of 1987. True, the press that expressed Gorbachev and Shevardnadze's line, especially Pravda, tried artificially to shift the blame for the continuation of the Iraq-Iran war from Iran to the US military presence in the Gulf and, on the whole, took Iran's side on its clashes with US forces in the Gulf.184 However, other central Soviet newspapers, such as Krasnaia zvezda,lss remained strongly antiIranian, charging Tehran with rejecting Resolution 598.186 Thus, there still seemed to be a strong school of thought in the Soviet establishment that, unlike Gorbachev, attributed greater weight to further relations with Iraq and the Arab world at large, most of which supported Iraq's demand for sanctions against Iran. Finally, with the approach of his summit with Reagan—which began on December 7,1987—Gorbachev himself may have decided to explore the possibility of meeting the US request for sanctions as a means to boost Soviet-American relations, and in return for Washington's acceptance of Moscow's proposal of September 23 regarding the Gulf. Accordingly, both before and after the summit, if only for the sake of impressing the United States, the Soviet Union implied that it might move toward supporting sanctions. For example, on December 4, Gromyko warned Iran's

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ambassador to Moscow that if Resolution 598 was not carried out, "the question of further steps toward ensuring the implementation . . . might be put on the agenda." 187 However, at a press conference in Washington on December 10, 1987, Gorbachev's own formulation was even more vague. He claimed that the "possibilities" of Resolution 598 "have not been exhausted yet," adding that he would not comment further because Moscow and Washington had decided to continue the discussions on the Gulf and the Iraq-Iran war.188 These discussions dragged on inconclusively into 1988. Additional noncommittal Soviet statements on the issue of sanctions were expressed during the winter of 1987-1988 in response to mounting Arab pressure. For instance, in reply to King Hussein's request from Gorbachev, made during King Hussein's visit to the Soviet Union on December 22,1987, to support the imposition of a Security Council arms embargo on Iran, Gorbachev maintained that the Soviet Union was not "against considering this issue by the Security Council," adding that his country was not providing Iran with arms. Yet, in an attempt to divert Arab criticism from the Soviet Union to the United States, Gorbachev questioned the effectiveness of such an arms embargo, by raising doubts whether those who had been involved in secret arms sales to Iran would comply with an embargo. 189 As the Soviet Union remained in practice opposed to sanctions and possibly, behind the scenes, still advocated the linkage of articles 1 and 6 of Resolution 598, Iraq continued to criticize Moscow's position on sanctions and reiterated that the Security Council resolution must be implemented according to the sequence of its clauses. On January 6, 1988, Saddam Hussein declared: "We warn those who try to tamper with various aspects of the Security Council resolution and who seek to appease the Iranian regime," adding that "appeasement of the Iranian regime . . . by some people in past months . . . contributed to prolonging the war." 190 Whereas Saddam Hussein's critical statements of the Soviet stand, such as the one quoted above, in fact charged the U S S R with protracting the war,191 no such accusation appeared in Taha Yasin Ramadan's critical comments regarding the Soviets. For instance, in mid-December 1987, while explaining the differences between Baghdad's and Moscow's positions on the Iraq-Iran war, Taha Yasin Ramadan asserted: "We do not cast doubts on Moscow's desire to stop the war or on the Soviet commitment to Resolution 598." 192 Hence, it can be inferred that Taha Yasin Ramadan was still friendlier to the Soviets than was Saddam Hussein. In yet another attempt to convince the Soviets to support sanctions, Tariq 'Aziz came to Moscow, where he conferred separately with Shevardnadze and Ryzhkov on February 2,1988. 193 With the failure of this attempt, Iraq apparently decided that it had no choice but to resort to military means to force Iran to accept Resolution 598. Such a course of action required Iraq to improve the atmosphere in relations with the

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Soviets, who were still its major arms suppliers. Thus, on February 20, before Iraq launched a missile attack against Iran's major cities, particularly Tehran at the end of that month, Saddam Hussein tried to make up for his harsh criticism. While admitting differences with the Soviets, he called them "our friends," and expounded: "Sometimes, stronger reactions are made against friends when they commit a mistake than against those with whom we are not friends." 194

The Cease-Fire (Winter-Summer 1988) Besides subjecting Iran's major cities to heavy bombardment with Soviet missiles modified by Iraq to increase their range, Iraq intensified the employment of chemical weapons. Following Iran's strong protests to Moscow over Iraq's missile barrage, on March 9,1988, the Soviet Union requested the Security Council to adopt a resolution demanding an immediate end to the "war of the cities." 195 Iraq, however, which had an advantage over Iran in this kind of warfare, indirectly rejected the Soviet call to end it.196 The Soviet reaction to Iraq's use of chemical weapons continued to be evasive, indicating Moscow's unwillingness to strain relations with Baghdad. The Soviet media made a few implicit references to Iraq's use of such weapons,197 while the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman condemned "any use of chemical weapons," without singling out Iraq.198 On April 17,1988, Iraq recaptured the Faw peninsula, and from then on regained the initiative on the battleground. With the recapture of the Majnoon area on June 25, Iraq had liberated most of its territory. Pravda commented approvingly on Iraq's successes on the battlefield, recalling that Iraq had accepted Resolution 598, whereas Iran, although not rejecting it, "had advanced a number of conditions which in fact meant the continuation of military activities."199 This commentary seems to have reflected Moscow's disappointment with Tehran. Not only did the Islamic regime remain intrinsically anti-Soviet, it also adopted a negative attitude toward the April 1988 Geneva Agreement on Afghanistan. Rather than commending the Soviet Union on its obligation to withdraw from Afghanistan according to a fixed timetable, Iran noted that the Geneva Agreement had been rejected by the Afghan resistance, the Mujahidin, whom Iran regarded as the only representatives of the Afghan Muslims who, in their continued fight against the Soviet-backed Kabul regime, were waging a holy war. However, Tehran's military support for the Afghan rebels remained probably on a small scale.200 Given Iran's intransigence, Iraq's successes in regaining its territory pleased the Soviets, who had been heavily arming Iraq since 1982 with the aim of containing the Islamic regime. As Iraq succeeded in the war, its bitterness over the Soviet

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objection to imposing sanctions against Iran weakened,201 even though Baghdad still sought Soviet support for sanctions until Iran accepted Resolution 598 on July 18,1988.202The Soviet Union continued to oppose sanctions, still hoping to improve relations with Iran, especially in the light of limited hostilities between Iran and the US navy in the Gulf in the spring and summer of 1988, on which the Soviets reported with a clear bias toward Iran. In his fourth bid to mediate in the Iraq-Iran war, Vorontsov paid a visit to Baghdad from July 17 to 19,1988,203 and from there continued to Tehran. While Vorontsov was still in Iraq, on July 18, Iran conveyed to the UN secretary general its unconditional acceptance of Resolution 598, thus depriving the Soviet mediation effort of any claim for credit for ending the war.204 Iran accepted the Security Council resolution because its war machine had partially collapsed, both physically and morally, as shown in the ease with which Iraq had regained its territory and had even been making incursions into Iran. After Iran's acceptance of Resolution 598, the UN secretary general tried to arrange a cease-fire, to be followed by negotiations between the two parties. Baghdad, however, responded to Tehran's agreement to end the war by launching wide-scale raids into Iran, in an attempt to frighten Iran and seize pieces of its territory so as to improve Iraq's position in the forthcoming negotiations. The USSR's public reaction to Iran's acceptance of the Security Council resolution was positive, with the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman expressing "deep satisfaction" over it.205 Yet, a careful reading of Moscow's commentaries reveals its lack of enthusiasm that the war was coming to an end. The first TASS report on Iran's acceptance of the resolution contained no comment.206 On July 22, a central Soviet newspaper quoted approvingly Tariq 'Aziz's reaction to Iran's acceptance of the resolution to the effect that "until Iran takes practical tangible steps to establish a complete and lasting peace, it will be more logical to regard the war as continuing."207 Furthermore, at first the Soviets avoided making any criticism of Iraq's incursions into Iran and only from late July contended that intensive attempts by "both sides" of the conflict to gain advantageous positions prior to negotiations would not promote a speedy settlement.208 In any case, on August 8, 1988, the UN secretary general issued a declaration on a cease-fire acceptable to both Iraq and Iran, which went into effect, as scheduled, on August 20. The termination of military activities between Iraq and Iran, without any political solution to their dispute in the offing, had both advantages and disadvantages from the Soviet point of view. On the bright side, Iraq, which intended to negotiate from a position of strength, was still looking to Moscow for military aid; the reconstruction of Iraq's economy could facilitate the repayment of its debts to the Soviets. There was also reason to believe that with the consolidation of the cease-fire the United States

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would reduce substantially its military presence in and around the Gulf. Yet, as the Soviet objection to employing sanctions against Iran for more than a year had demonstrated, the Soviets attributed greater importance to improving relations with Iran than to either fostering relations with Iraq or the marginal contribution to détente that the end of the Gulf war might bring. Also, although the Soviet Union was basically opposed to US military presence in the Gulf, even this most negative by-product of the war, from the Soviet viewpoint, had a certain benefit, for it exacerbated the Iranian-US antagonism. By contrast, the termination of the war brought to an end the hostilities between Iran and the United States in the Gulf and seemed to create a basis for Tehran's rapprochement with Washington. All in all, the end of the Iraq-Iran war appeared to have been a mixed blessing for the Soviets. (Indeed, Iran's relations with the West were beginning to improve immediately after the war throughout the second half of 1988—however, this trend reversed the following year. Thus, only in retrospect was it clear that at the end of the 1980s there was no tangible improvement in US-Iranian relations, whereas Moscow promoted its connections with Tehran.)

The Middle East Arena and the Iraq-Iran War (Fall 1980-Summer 1988) On October 8,1980, the Soviet Union concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Syria, aimed at consolidating relations with a country that had already occupied the prime position in Soviet strategy in the Arab East since the mid-1970s. Iraq, however, interpreted the conclusion of this treaty as a hostile Soviet move because Syria had been supporting Iran in the war with Iraq, and the timing of the treaty coincided with the halt in Soviet arms shipments to Iraq at the beginning of the war. In March 1983, the Soviet Union agreed, in principle, to conclude a similar treaty with Libya, although the former preferred not to implement this agreement, apprehensive that a treaty with the hot-headed Qaddafi might entangle it in a confrontation with the United States. All in all, the Soviet policy in the Arab East in the 1980s was based on Syria, Libya, and South Yemen. These three countries were part of a regional quasi-coalition of radical anti-Western states that also included Iran and, loosely, Algeria. Iraq, in continuation of its policy from the mid-1970s,209 and especially in view of the support it was receiving in the war against Iran from the pro-Western Arab countries—particularly Jordan and the Gulf states— was close to this group of countries. Already during Sadat's rule, Egypt had been supplying Iraq with weapons in the war against Iran, so that when Housni Mubarak—who had shared less responsibility for the March 1979 peace treaty with Israel than had Sadat—assumed power in October 1981

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and maintained the flow of arms to Iraq, Iraq moved closer to Egypt as well. While fostering relations with the pro-Soviet Arab states, in the 1980s the Soviet Union worked more vigorously to promote ties with the basically pro-Western Arab states as well. It seems that the lesson Moscow had learned from the frustrating experience of its relationship with the anti-Western states (Egypt and Iraq) during the previous decade was to diversify its connections in the unpredictable Middle East. Accordingly, at the beginning of the 1980s, the Soviet Union tried to establish diplomatic relations with the conservative Gulf states (which in May 1981 formed a regional organization called the Gulf Cooperation Council), started selling limited quantities of weapons to Jordan, and strove to ameliorate relations with Egypt under Mubarak. The Soviet Union called to end the Iraq-Iran war from its very beginning in order to remove the contention that was dividing the Arab world between the states that sided with Iran (Syria, Libya, and, to a certain extent, South Yemen) and the mainstream, which supported Iraq. Indeed, this division was detrimental to Soviet interests, for it weakened the cooperation between the conservative and radical Arab states against the possible continuation of the Camp David process—that is the conclusion of separate peace agreements between Israel and additional Arab countries under US auspices. Also, Iraq's engagement in the war against Iran reduced the strength of the Arab confrontation front against Israel. Not surprisingly the Soviets tried to reconcile Syria and Iraq. 210 However, at the same time the Soviet Union wanted Syria and other pro-Soviet Arab countries to maintain friendly relations with Iran in order to facilitate the promotion of Soviet-Iranian ties. At the Twenty-sixth Congress of the CPSU in February 1981, Brezhnev called to convene an international conference on the ArabIsraeli dispute with the participation of the concerned countries and the PLO, and also the Soviet Union and the United States and possibly other countries as well. Thus, similarly to the idea of reconvening the Geneva conference, which Moscow had advocated in the mid-1970s,211 the convocation of an international conference was aimed at securing for the U S S R a recognized role in settling the Arab-Israeli conflict—a role equal to that of the United States. Additional components of Brezhnev's proposal, which had already appeared in Soviet schemes for a Middle East settlement since 1975, 212 were as follows: (1) Israel's withdrawal from all the territories occupied in 1967; (2) the realization of the national rights of the Palestinians, including the establishment of an independent Palestinian state; and (3) ensuring "the security and sovereignty of all the states in the region . . . including Israel." 213 From the Soviet point of view, the negative effect of the Iraq-Iran war on developments in the Arab-Israeli dispute was manifested during

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Israel's invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982, when the diversion of Iraq's resources to the war against Iran and the rupture between Iraq and Syria contributed to Israel's military defeat of Syria and the P L O . The defeat of Moscow's two allies marked the nadir of its position in the Arab-Israeli arena. Worse, as if to confirm Soviet fears that further Arab countries might join the Camp David process, on May 17,1983, Lebanon and Israel concluded an agreement under the aegis of the United States. (The agreement terminated the state of war between the two countries and provided for Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in return for security arrangements along the Lebanese-Israeli border.) However, Lebanese forces aligned to Syria prevented the implementation of this agreement and subsequently compelled the United States to evacuate its marines from Beirut in February 1984. Washington's failure in Lebanon helped the restoration of Moscow's position in the region, which had already begun in early 1983 in Syria with the deployment of ground-to-air missiles operated by Soviet personnel. Although the Soviet fear that Lebanon might join the Camp David process had been eliminated, this suspicion remained with regard to Jordan, the weakest link in the Arab opposition to this development. From the Soviet standpoint, the Iraq-Iran war had a damaging effect in this case as well, for Jordan's and Syria's support for the opposite sides in the Gulf war strained relations between these two states and inhibited the coordination of their positions against Israel. Iraq's occupation with the war also enfeebled its opposition to the possibility that Jordan might reach a separate peace agreement with Israel. Yet, the significance for the Soviets of Iraq's role in the Arab-Israeli conflict should not be overestimated. A s Iraq clearly moved toward improving relations with the United States from the beginning of 1983, its resistance to Israel's right to exist decreased, and it even tended to reconcile itself to Israel's existence in utterances beamed to Washington.214 This was accompanied by a decline in Baghdad's objection to a US-sponsored settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, which was evidenced in its reticent opposition to the May 1983 Lebanese-Israeli agreement. This, in turn, reduced the importance the Soviet Union ascribed to the renewal of Iraq's active role in the Arab-Israeli dispute and to ending the Iraq-Iran war. The Soviet Union obviously sought to push Iraq into an anti-US stand on the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the occasion of Saddam Hussein's visit to the Soviet Union in December 1985, Gromyko claimed that there were "no differences of assessment between us in regard to the aggressive plans of the US and Israel" in the Middle East and that both the United States and Israel wanted to impose "separate deals" on the Arab countries. However, despite the attacks in the fall of 1985 by the Iraqi media and personal attacks by Saddam Hussein on US policy concerning the ArabIsraeli dispute,215 Iraq's report of Gromyko's speech omitted his anti-US

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statement, 216 and Saddam Hussein, in his speech in honor of Gromyko, made no reference to the United States and merely expressed gratitude for Soviet support for the Palestinian people. 217 All in all, Iraq's resistance to US activities regarding the Arab-Israeli dispute indeed diminished in the mid-1980s. 218 Iraq's report of Gromyko's speech also omitted his call to convene an international conference on the Middle East dispute. Iraq's avoidance of sanctioning this Soviet proposal can be seen as a vestige of its outspoken criticism of the Geneva conference at its time. In other words, Iraq continued to oppose, although less determinedly, Israel's very right to exist, 219 and therefore also the international mechanism that was supposed to ensure Israel's security. Nevertheless, Iraq was prudent not to challenge the idea of an international conference, which the Soviets were advocating and most of the Arab states supporting, precisely when Iraq needed Soviet and Arab aid in the war against Iran. The Soviet Union under Gorbachev increased its efforts to convene an international conference on the Middle East, and during 1986 and 1987 Soviet envoys were dispatched to Arab countries, including Iraq, to promote this idea, but Iraq remained evasive on this issue.220 Later, however, Iraq moved toward an acquiescence to Israel's existence by approving the resolutions of the November 1987 Amman (Jordan) Arab summit conference, which supported "the convocation of an international peace conference under UN auspices and the participation of all the concerned parties" without an explicit reference to Israel.221 Following the Amman summit, in a joint statement between Soviet and Iraqi parliamentarian delegations issued in Baghdad in February 1988, both sides voiced support for the convening of an international conference on the Middle East. 222 It was only natural that the Ba'th regime, which since the mid1970s had gradually been moving away from its extreme ideological attitudes toward realistic approaches on a variety of issues, was finally showing signs of willingness to relinquish even its deep-rooted ideological commitment to eradicate the "Zionist entity." In the second half of the 1980s, the radical Arab states tended to cool their relations with Iran, which had stubbornly been pursuing the war against a fraternal Arab state, and to mend their ties with the mainstream of the Arab world. Thus, by the end of 1985—despite its continued animosity toward the Iraqi regime—Syria somewhat distanced itself from Iran and normalized relations with Jordan. In September 1987 Libya normalized ties with Iraq, and in July 1988 South Yemen improved relations with Iraq. Both Libya and South Yemen called upon Iran to accept Security Council Resolution 598, although they stopped short of supporting sanctions against Iran. With the healing of the rift in the Arab world and particularly the rapprochement between Syria and Jordan, the detrimental effect of the Iraq-Iran war on the Arab-Israeli conflict, from

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the Soviet perspective, was weakened further. In line with Gorbachev's drive to advance relations with important states in the Third World, regardless of their pro-Western orientation, the Soviet Union increased its efforts to establish diplomatic ties with the oil-rich Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, especially Saudi Arabia. Consequently, besides Kuwait, which had maintained diplomatic links with Moscow since 1963, three other GCC members established diplomatic relations with the Soviets: Oman in September 1985, the United Arab Emirates in November 1985, and Qatar in August 1988. However, the major state of the GCC, Saudi Arabia—despite its growing political contacts with the Soviets—remained ideologically opposed to the establishment of diplomatic ties with either the Soviet Union or any other Communist state. All in all, despite the strengthening of the Soviet position in the Arab East in the mid-1980s, it was still far weaker than at its apex in the early 1970s. Even the upsurge in Soviet diplomatic activities during the first three years of Gorbachev's era should not be overestimated. In this period the Soviets apparently did not expect, nor did they score, any major gain in the Arab East. Significantly, Shevardnadze did not visit this region until 1989,223 although he had traveled to other Third World areas, going as far as Southeast Asia and Latin America in 1987.

Soviet Policy Toward the ICP and the Kurds During the First Two Years of the War (Fall 1980-Spring 1982) As the Ba'th regime diverted the bulk of its military resources to the war against Iran, the Iraqi forces of opposition recuperated. Iran failed to stir up a rebellion of Iraq's Shiite population, which on the whole remained docile, and it was the Kurds who constituted the main resistance group to Iraq's regime. The Kurdish opposition was divided into two principal parties, the DPK, headed by Mas'ud Barzani, and the PUK, headed by Jalal Talbani. Both employed left-wing terminology to portray their goals. Yet, besides the historic differences between the two parties,224 they also diverged regarding the Khomeini regime: the DPK tactically cooperated with this regime, but in the first half of the 1980s the PUK cooperated with Iranian Kurds, who were fighting for their national rights against the Khomeini regime.225 At the beginning of the decade, the ICP, numbering a small group of militants, consolidated its political and military organization in the Kurdish region and was a member of a group of opposition parties called the Democratic National Front, which was established in November 1980 and included the DPK. Indeed, in the early 1980s, the ICP moved closer to the DPK, 226 though still maintaining cooperation with the PUK. Significantly, from the beginning of the 1980s, the Iraqi Communists

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had been receiving financial and military backing from the Syrian Ba'th because of its animosity to the Iraqi Ba'th, and also some assistance from South Yemen on ideological grounds. Thus, although the ICP was being aided by the USSR's regional allies, which were at odds with Iraq, Moscow itself, although seemingly providing some covert support for the ICP, put the emphasis on maintaining normal relations with Baghdad. It is reasonable to assume that during Tariq 'Aziz's two visits to the Soviet Union in the fall of 1980, when he sought to obtain arms from Ponomarev,227 the latter, who was in charge of the nonruling Communist parties, saw an opportunity to raise in one way or another the issue of the ICP, or at least to request the release of imprisoned Communists. However, because at the beginning of the war the Soviets still pinned hopes on improving relations with Iran and thus had little to offer Iraq, and because Iraq's military advantage in the war with Iran did not require it to change its attitude toward the ICP in order to appease the Soviets, the likelihood of reaching any accommodation between Moscow and Baghdad on the issue of the ICP was poor. The double-faced Soviet policy toward Iraq, which consisted of extending some support to the ICP while trying not to strain the relationship with the B a ' t h regime, transpired in Pravda's version of 'Aziz Muhammad's speech delivered at the Twenty-sixth Congress of the CPSU in the spring of 1981.228 On the Iraq-Iran war, 'Aziz Muhammad contended: "Our army and people found themselves plunged into a destructive military adventure." This formulation, unlike the original stand of the ICP, failed to explicitly charge the Ba'th regime with launching a war against Iran and corresponded, to some extent, to the propensity toward Iran shown by the USSR at the beginning of the war. In thePravda version of his speech, 'Aziz Muhammad also spoke about a campaign of "savage repression" conducted against the ICP and the Kurdish people without, however, stating plainly that the Ba'th regime had been carrying out this campaign. Further, 'Aziz Muhammad told that the ICP was employing "diverse methods of struggle for the establishment of a democratic regime and autonomy for the Kurdish people," thus stopping short of a clear reference to the ICP's "armed struggle" to overthrow the Ba'th regime. Furthermore, while referring to the Kurdish issue and even greeting the Twenty-sixth Congress not only on behalf of the ICP but also on behalf of the "Kurdish national movement," 'Aziz Muhammad failed to name the Kurdish parties with which the ICP had been cooperating (the DPK and still the PUK), nor apparently were these parties invited to participate in the congress. All in all, Pravda's text of 'Aziz Muhammad's speech and the Soviet media's sporadic references to the ICP and the Kurds229 indicated that Moscow's support for the Iraqi Communists was low and even less so for the Kurds. The Soviet Union apparently continued to regard the Ba'th

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regime, especially until the spring of 1982 when it still had an edge over Iran, as fairly stable, and showed only little interest in the Iraqi opposition.

Iraq's Internal Problems After Iran Crossed into Its Territory (Summer 1982-Winter 1985) As we have seen, the Ninth Congress of the Iraqi Ba'th was convened in June 1982, and its report was promulgated in January 1983. This report authorized Iraq's moving away from the U S S R in the international arena, in accordance with the trend that began with Saddam Hussein's assumption of power in 1979. Also, the Congress authorized the Ba'th regime's moving away from the Soviet model of socialism, in line with the tendency that likewise began in 1979. From this year, first and foremost with the purpose of increasing efficiency, but also in order to attract Western capital, the regime embarked upon a wide-scale privatization of the economy. It had been reducing the cooperative and collective sectors in agriculture and expanding the private,230 and from the beginning of the 1980s had been providing incentives for the private sector in industry and commerce as well. Nevertheless, the enlargement of the private sector in Iraq appears to have been inherently constrained, for the dictatorial and, to a certain extent, totalitarian nature of the Ba'th was more suited to state ownership of most of the means of production. Baghdad, in fact, did not completely abandon the Soviet model of socialism. Furthermore, the Ninth Congress even tried to justify its change in attitude toward private property by noting that a positive trend in the direction of "personal property" (the Soviet euphemism for private property) also occurred in the U S S R , and that some East European states never abolished private property at all.231 Indeed, already in the last years of Brezhnev's rule, when Gorbachev was secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU responsible for agriculture, the Soviet Union introduced reforms aimed at increasing agricultural production through the expansion of the private sector. Major analogous reforms in the sphere of agriculture, as well as in the services, were implemented in the first years of Gorbachev's era. However, because of ideological constraints, the strings attached to the operation of the private sector in the Soviet Union, even under Gorbachev, remained far greater than in Iraq. The attitude of the Ninth Congress concerning the ICP was strongly negative. The ICP was charged with plotting against the Ba'th regime in the 1970s, supporting "Kurdish chauvinism" in the past and present, and supporting Iran during the current war. Although the report of the Congress concentrated on casting accusations against Communist parties rather than against the Soviet Union, the report in fact portrayed this

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power as working persistently and in a professional manner, through the local Communist parties, to undermine foreign regimes and replace them with Communist rule. Specifically, the report implied that the Soviets' attempt to subvert a foreign government through a local Communist party had been crowned with success in 1978 in Afghanistan, had failed in Iraq in the late 1970s, and was still proceeding, via the Tudeh, in Iran.232 It seems that this sinister image of the Soviet Union reflected the Ba'th's deeprooted suspicion of Moscow's long-time meddling in Iraq's internal affairs through the ICP. It is reasonable to assume that the passage dealing with Soviet subversion had been composed prior to Iran's invasion of Iraq in July 1982 and the concomitant massive resumption of arms supplies to Iraq. In any case, Baghdad's increased dependence on the Soviets precluded it from uttering further statements about their subversive activities. Moreover, Baghdad's policy toward the Soviets was guided by expediency. Thus, the Ba'th report actually contradicted its allegations about Soviet subversion, in contending that it was "essential" to maintain relations with ruling Communist parties.233 This hinted that the Iraqi Ba'th— which, indeed, was maintaining links with East European Communist parties—desired to restore relations with the CPSU in order to pursue the following aims: First, to strengthen relations with the Soviet Union and to decrease its support for the ICP; second, to spread confusion among the ranks of the local Communists and possibly make some of them abandon the opposition and even join in defending their country against Iran's invasion; and third, to deprive the Kurds of Soviet support. It should be borne in mind that because of the ICP's cooperation with the Kurdish rebels, there was at least a loose connection between the USSR and the Kurds, whereas Iraq's failures in the war with Iran in 1982 stimulated Kurdish resistance. All in all, the weakening of the Ba'th regime as a result of its unsuccessful war with Iran led to a renewal of its interest in establishing party-to-party links with the Soviet Union. From a historic perspective, this bears a certain similarity to the Ba'th regime's attempts, prior to its consolidation in the late 1960s and early 1970s, to foster ties with the CPSU with the purpose of strengthening itself against the ICP and the Kurds. In July 1982, Baghdad released some of the imprisoned Communists,234 a move that may have already been discussed in the talks between Ponomarev and Tariq 'Aziz in Moscow the previous month.235 This step was undoubtedly aimed at facilitating a generous supply of weapons from the Soviet Union, during the critical moment when Iran crossed into Iraq, and also to generate hopes in the Kremlin that the Ba'th was considering to restore its defunct front with the ICP. Baghdad was also interested in improving its image in Soviet eyes regarding the Kurdish issue, and at least partially to this end, the Ba'th regime designated Taha

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Muhyi al-Din Ma'ruf as a Ba'th representative at Brezhnev's funeral in November 1982. Ma'ruf was a Kurdish statesman who had been cooperating with the Ba'th government since its establishment in 1968, and accordingly had been promoted to vice president (mainly a ceremonial post) in April 1974 and to membership in the RCC in 1982.236 As we have seen in Chapter 4, the CPSU withdrew its recognition of the Ba'th regime as being "socialist oriented," and terminated party-toparty links with it as well in 1979, the year the ICP was actually outlawed in Iraq.237 From then on, as a manifestation of the negative Soviet attitude toward the Ba'th regime on the one hand, and Moscow's unwillingness to launch a propaganda campaign against it on the other hand, the Soviet media refrained from publishing any ideological evaluation of this regime and even ignored the anniversary of the Ba'th assumption of power, on July 17. However, from the summer of 1982, as the Soviet Union began to tilt toward Iraq in the Iraq-Iran war, it improved its attitude toward the Ba'th regime. Specifically, a Soviet broadcast in Arabic in July 1982 contained a brief positive comment on the Ba'th's coming to power in 1968.238 Also in 1982, on the anniversary of the Ba'th rule, Moscow Television broadcast a speech by Iraq's ambassador to the USSR on this occasion, which eulogized Saddam Hussein and described the Ba'th "revolution" as "progressive" and "socialist."239 The gesture of Moscow Television broadcasting the speech of Iraq's ambassador on the July 17 anniversary continued in the mid-1980s; these broadcasts were also used by the ambassador for crediting the Ba'th with the implementation of a "peaceful, just and democratic solution to the Kurdish question, by granting autonomy to the Kurdish region." 240 Nevertheless, except for these small signs of goodwill, in the mid-1980s, on the whole, the Soviet media (Problems of Peace and Socialism excluded) continued to be evasive on the issue of the Ba'th regime.241 In any case, the slight improvement in the Soviet attitude toward the Iraqi regime seems to have reflected the emergence of a certain interest in the Kremlin in its survival, apprehensive that the disintegration of the central authority in Iraq might lead to an Iranian victory in the war. Nevertheless, Moscow had an interest in ousting the personalities in the Ba'th government with anti-Soviet and strongly anti-Communist inclinations, first and foremost among them, Saddam Hussein.242 Thus, in the light of the covert Soviet aim to depose Saddam Hussein, Iran's continued war against Iraq, inasmuch as it was directed to the same goal, served the Soviets. Although the predominant Soviet trend toward Iraq from the summer of 1982 was strengthening relations with its regime in its survival, Moscow was becoming to have some stake. From the summer of 1983, the USSR began to pay greater attention to Iraq's opposition, especially the ICP, presumably because of two developments. The first was the deterioration

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in Iraq's socioeconomic situation, caused by the Ba'th's inability to continue providing "guns and butter" simultaneously. And the second was the conspicuous weakness of the central authority in the Kurdish region, to the point that Baghdad permitted Turkey to conduct a military operation against the Kurdish rebels inside Iraq's territory in May 1983, and some similar campaigns in the coming years. Indeed, these two developments were discussed in an article by an ICP Central Committee member, published in Problems of Peace and Socialism in the summer of 1983. The article assessed that the regime was facing a crisis because of Iraq's heavy losses in the war and a decline in its oil revenues, and portrayed the Turkish military operation in the Iraqi Kurdistan as "terrorist action," claiming that it had been aimed against the ICP and its allies in the Democratic National Front (namely the DPK). The goal of this front was described as "the accomplishment of the democratic alternative," implying the overthrow of the Ba'th regime.243 Some reasonable explanations can be furnished for the absence of a clear reference to the purpose of toppling the Ba'th government in this article and in an additional analogical article on Iraq published in Problems of Peace and Socialism in the spring of 1984.244 Given the Soviet desire to maintain bilateral relations with Iraq, the USSR undoubtedly moderated the tone of the articles. Also, Moscow little believed in the ability of the opposition to depose the Ba'th regime, at best considering it as a tool to compel the Ba'th to restore some kind of a working relationship with the Communists and the Kurdish rebels. Indeed, the Ba'th regime, in view of its relative weakness, was ready to open a dialogue with the opposition, at least as a tactical ploy. As early as 1982 the regime had been conducting negotiations with the PUK, and in December 1983 reached a cease-fire agreement with it. Although eventually the talks between the Ba'th and the PUK collapsed in October 1984 because of the Ba'th's objection to granting wide autonomy to the Kurds, Baghdad temporarily succeeded in exacerbating the relations between the components of the opposition. Thus, in 1982-1984 the Communists and the DPK were charging Talbani's faction with collaboration with the government in launching attacks against their forces, with one such accusation appearing in Problems of Peace and Socialism in the summer ofl983. 245 The Ba'th attempt to neutralize the opposition was directed toward the ICP as well. From the fall of 1983 to the spring of 1984, the Ba'th was in contact with some members of the ICP on the issue of restoring the coalition.246 It can be assumed that simultaneously Iraq was discussing this issue with the Soviets, especially during Tariq 'Aziz's and Taha Yasin Ramadan's visits to Moscow in November 1983247 and April 1984, respectively. At the start of Taha Yasin Ramadan's visit to the Soviet Union, it

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was reported, probably in reliance on an Iraqi source, that he would "discuss the return of Iraqi communists to the open political life in Iraq, as well as ending the current problem in Kurdistan."248 It seems that Baghdad tried to take advantage of its improved relations with Moscow in order to bring about Soviet pressure on the Iraqi Communists to accept the Ba'th's terms for renewing cooperation. These terms presumably stipulated legalizing the ICP, provided it would operate in strict obedience to the regime. However, it is possible that the Ba'th's contacts with certain Iraqi Communists were aimed mainly at attaining a distinct tactical gain— such as to split the ICP, while capitalizing on the differences of opinion within its ranks between the supporters and opponents of an agreement with the regime249—rather than at finding an accommodation. The Soviet Union, for its part, seemed to be interested in the normalization of ties between the Ba'th and the ICP as a contributing factor to the ongoing process of improvement in Soviet-Iraqi relations. Moscow's support for reconciliation between the Communists and the regime was alluded to in the greetings of the CPSU to the ICP sent on its fiftieth anniversary and published in Pravda in March 1984. The greetings claimed that "despite the unjustified persecutions to which the Iraqi Communist Party was subjected time and again, it consistently supported the cohesion of the anti-imperialist forces."250 Yet, it can be assumed that Moscow sought to restore cooperation between the Ba'th and the Communists on the basis of its own conditions, which included ensuring the ICP's ideological and political independence vis-à-vis the Ba'th. In any event, the dialogue between the Ba'th and the ICP did not produce tangible results, and in June 1984 the ICP adopted "disciplinary measures" against senior members of the party who were willing to reach an accommodation with the regime.251 Even after the ICP, led by 'Aziz Muhammad, had refused to proceed with negotiations with the Ba'th—a policy that may not have corresponded to t h e U S S R ' s tactics—Moscow's support for 'Aziz Muhammad remained strong. On July 1984, Pravda published the greetings of the Central Committee of the CPSU to 'Aziz Muhammad on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday and also a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, signed by Chernenko in his capacity of president, awarding Muhammad with the Order of Lenin (the highest Soviet award). It should be noted that it was Soviet custom to bestow a medal on a Communist leader on his decimal birthday. 252 Thus, what deserves notice is not the actual granting of the order, but Pravda's giving publicity to this event, including the Soviet leader's nominal sanctioning of it. It is possible that the public honoring of the Communist leader dedicated to the overthrow of the Iraqi regime—as a detrimental step to furthering Soviet-Iraqi relations—reflected an attempt to check Moscow's growing support for Baghdad in the Iraq-Iran war by opponents

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of this trend within the Soviet leadership. In any case, Moscow's overt connection with the ICP showed that the Soviet Union, notwithstanding its improved relations with Iraq, had not abandoned the marginal subversive facet of its policy toward the Ba'th regime. Indeed, the marginality of this aspect of the Soviet policy toward Iraq was confirmed in 1984-1985, when the few utterances of the ICP in the Soviet media focused on the innocuous theme of the urgent need to end the Iraq-Iran war,253 a position to which this party formally adhered.254 However, it is reasonable to assume that there were differences between the Soviet and the ICP's attitudes toward the war. Whereas, on balance, the benefits the Soviet Union gained from the prolongation of the war in the mid-1980s were by no means great, this was not the case for the ICP. Bearing in mind that the ICP's activities in Iraq concentrated in those Kurdish areas over which the Ba'th regime had lost control 255 —due to the deployment of the bulk of its army against Iran—the termination of the war meant reimposing the Ba'th rule in Kurdistan, depriving the ICP of its base in Iraq.

The ICP and the Kurds in the First Years of Gorbachev's Era (Spring 1985-Summer 1988) In April 1985, Iraq's traditional greetings to the Soviet leadership on the anniversary of the conclusion of the Iraqi-Soviet friendship treaty were addressed to "comrade" General Secretary Gorbachev and to "comrade" Prime Minister Tikhonov and were signed by Saddam Hussein in his capacity as party secretary general and state president.256 This indicated the Ba'th's continued interest in restoring ties with the CPSU, 257 now trying to take advantage of Gorbachev's assumption of power just a month before. However, the Soviet greetings to the Iraqi regime on the anniversary of the treaty in 1985 were dispatched on behalf of Soviet state institutions only and were addressed without the designation "comrade" to Saddam Hussein in his capacity as ruler of the state alone.258 From Moscow's perspective, there was no reason to resume party links with Baghdad as long as there was no change in the Ba'th's negative attitude toward the ICP. Nevertheless, during his visit to the Soviet Union in December 1985, Saddam Hussein again tried to restore party links with the CPSU. This was indicated in his speech in honor of Gromyko, which included implicit praise for the Soviet regime and a reference to an "understanding" reached with "comrade" Gorbachev. 259 In a further attempt to convince the Soviets to remove their support from the ICP, in Moscow Saddam Hussein apparently strove to present Iraq as a "stable country," 260 as well

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as to obtain the Soviet commitment not to interfere in Iraq's internal affairs.261 The Soviet unwillingness to resume party ties with the Ba'th was evidenced in the fact that Saddam Hussein's visit was not at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee; the omission of the "understanding" with "comrade" Gorbachev from the Soviet version of Saddam Hussein's speech; 262 the fact that Gorbachev did not head the Soviet delegation to the talks with Saddam Hussein; and Gromyko's addressing of Saddam Hussein as "Mr." 2 6 3 Further, although noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries was one of the USSR's own advocated principles and was included in its report of the talks with Saddam Hussein, 264 in practice the Soviets showed no intention to withdraw their support for the ICP. This was demonstrated at the Twenty-seventh Congress of the CPSU held in February and March 1986, when Gromyko in his capacity of president awarded medals to six Third World Communist leaders, the first being 'Aziz Muhammad, who was granted another Order of Lenin. 265 Gromyko also conveyed Gorbachev's congratulations to the recipients of the awards, and in his main speech at the Congress, Gorbachev expressed "deep fraternal solidarity" with Communist parties subjected to persecution in their countries. 266 Yet, an important portion of Pravda's version of 'Aziz Muhammad's speech at the Congress dealt with a topic harmless to Soviet-Iraqi relations, namely, the need to end the Iraq-Iran war. Furthermore, Pravda moderated 'Aziz Muhammad's utterances on Iraq's internal affairs, avoiding an explicit condemnation of the Iraqi regime and defining the ICP's goal as Iraq's democratization and a tangible self-rule of Kurdistan.267 The D P K was probably not invited to participate in the Twentyseventh Congress, just as it had not been invited to the preceding one. It seems that the different tendencies in the Soviet policy toward the ICP at the Twenty-seventh Congress stemmed from conflicting considerations. On the one hand, it can be assumed that, as in 1984, the support for 'Aziz Muhammad demonstrated by the grant of an award was aimed at inhibiting the expansion of the Soviet relations with Iraq, a view promoted by the school of thought within the Soviet leadership eager to preserve the Iranian option. As we have seen, to this end, a Soviet first deputy foreign minister had visited Iran in February 1986. 268 Besides, the CPSU's traditional ideological commitment to "fraternal" Communist parties still obliged it to express support for the ICP in one way or another. Yet, on the other hand, with a further decline of ideology in shaping Soviet policies under Gorbachev, Moscow tended to decrease its backing for illegal Communist parties. Indeed, on March 6, 1986, at the conclusion of the Twenty-seventh Congress, Ponomarev, the Soviet official associated with dogmatic approaches and support for nonruling Communist parties and "national liberation movements," was relieved of the post as head of the

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International Department of the Central Committee (Brezhnev's chief ideologist who shared Ponomarev's views, Suslov, had died in January 1982). He was replaced by Central Committee member Anatolii Dobrynin, who as a pragmatist and a former veteran Soviet ambassador to the United States, was supposed to show greater consideration for maintaining the détente in formulating his country's policy toward the Third World. In November 1986, one year after the Fourth Congress of the ICP had taken place (apparently in Iraq's Kurdish region), for the first time Problems of Peace and Socialism published an article on this event signed by 'Aziz Muhammad.269 The conspicuous delay probably reflected Soviet reservations about the militant anti-Ba'th course of action the Congress had adopted. The article noted that the Congress had discussed "strengthening the ICP's guerrilla units, raising their combat capacity and joining of new fighters," as well as the need to establish clandestine party organizations within Iraq's armed forces. The Problems of Peace and. Socialism report of the Fourth Congress resolutions indicated that no substantial change in Soviet policy toward the ICP took place even after Dobrynin replaced Ponomarev. It seems that Gorbachev, who was keen to develop relations with Iran, had no particular interest in promoting relations with its rival Iraq to the point of sacrificing the local Communists. Gorbachev's initiated shift toward Iran from the summer of 1987, together with the concomitant cooling in Soviet-Iraqi ties,270 brought with it even stronger Soviet support for the ICP. Specifically, the Soviets allowed 'Aziz Muhammad to express his attitude toward the Ba'th regime in an outspoken article published by Problems of Peace and Socialism in September 1987,271 Unlike his article in the same periodical in November 1986,272 'Aziz Muhammad now spelled out the slogans of the Fourth Congress of the ICP, which included a call to "overthrow . . . the fascist dictatorship" in Baghdad and "making the Hussein dictatorial regime answerable for its crimes against the country and people, for starting the devastating war" against Iran. Further, presumably in order to counter Iraq's implicit accusations that Soviet appeasement of Iran was contributing to the continuation of the Gulf war, 'Aziz Muhammad claimed that although the Iraqi regime was publicly declaring its desire for peace, it virtually caused the escalation of the war by being the first to use chemical weapons and to launch the tanker war, and was now seeking US intervention in the Gulf. The publication of 'Aziz Muhammad's bold words vis-à-vis the Ba'th regime reflected the decline in Soviet-Iraqi relations rather than glasnost, for an article by Tudeh's leader in the same issue of Problems of Peace and Socialism did not speak openly about the need to overthrow Iran's Islamic regime.273 Also, as in the pre-glasnost period, the Soviet media, with the notable exception of Problems of Peace and

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Socialism, continued to mute ICP's utterances. 274 In the winter of 1988, while the decline in Soviet-Iraqi relations still continued, another article by a member of the ICP attacking the Iraqi regime appeared in Problems of Peace and Socialism. It condemned the hard working conditions the Ba'th had imposed on Iraqi workers during the war as well as Saddam Hussein's economic reforms, contending: "The true nature of the regime is rooted in its goal of asserting capitalist relations of production and according every privilege to the private sector." 275 From the Soviet perspective, it seems that Iraq's reforms indeed went too far in emulating capitalism. In the summer of 1988, however, a number of factors tended to diminish Soviet interest in voicing support for the ICP, first and foremost among them an improvement in Soviet-Iraqi relations.276 Further, the ICP's prospects seemed particularly bleak, for Iraq's successes in the war against Iran consolidated its regime, opening the opportunity to regain its control over the Kurdish region, which, as we have seen, served as the main base of the tiny Communist party. Indeed, a Soviet correspondent who had visited Iraq in this period noted the regime's effective organization of the front and the rear during the war and its stability.277 Yet, despite its consolidated position, the Ba'th was considering legalizing new political parties in an effort to give its tightly knit dictatorship a veneer of democracy and pluralism.278 This trend was influenced by a sincere movement toward a limited democracy by other left-wing dictatorships, such as the Soviet regime under Gorbachev, aimed at improving the economic performance as well as their image in the West, with a view to gaining economic assistance. As part of this scheme to create a democratic facade, and also to remove the irritant issue of the ICP in relations with the Soviets, the Ba'th was apparently giving some thought to the relegalization of the ICP. Such a possibility was indicated favorably by a Soviet article, published in July 1988, which surveyed the positive aspects of the Ba'th's policy toward the ICP from its assumption of power in 1968 to the establishment of the Ba'th-Communist front in 1973, and conspicuously omitted any reference to the subsequent deterioration in Ba'th-Communist relations and the dismantling of the front in 1979.279 However, by the end of 1988 neither the ICP nor other political parties were legalized. During the first years of Gorbachev's era, public manifestations of Soviet support for the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq continued to be few. As from the beginning of the 1980s,280 these manifestations consisted of Soviet sources quoting the ICP's support for a "real autonomy" for Iraqi Kurdistan. They made no specific references to the Kurdish parties that were cooperating with the Communists (important among them was the DPK), but to the umbrella organization of the opposition parties, the Democratic

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National Front. 281 Only 'Aziz Muhammad's aforementioned article of September 1987, which was exceptionally outspoken vis-à-vis the Ba'th regime, condemned its use of chemical weapons against the Kurds. 282 Thus, it seems that Gorbachev, who put special emphasis on developing relations with existing regimes rather than rebels, showed just a little interest in the Iraqi Kurds. True, the Soviet long-standing and preferred solution to the Kurdish problem was "real autonomy," and it can be assumed that Moscow had been trying to persuade Baghdad to accept such a solution—to be accompanied by a general process of democratization and relegalization of the ICP—but it is doubtful whether the Soviets were exerting pressure on the Ba'th to this effect. Following the August 8,1988, cease-fire agreement between Baghdad and Tehran, and the concomitant severance of Iran's military aid to the Iraqi Kurds (reminiscent of the Shah's cut of military assistance to the Kurds after the 1975 Algiers agreement), in the middle of that month the Iraqi army launched an offensive against the Kurds in which it employed chemical weapons. Iraq's use of such weapons was condemned by the United States, with the Senate voting to impose economic sanctions against Iraq on September 10. In response, the Iraqi regime staged a huge anti-US demonstration in Baghdad, but basically did not alter its willingness to develop relations with the United States, as was evidenced in statements by high-level Iraqi officials. 283 Yet, in view of the decreasing prospects for promoting these relations, Saddam Hussein tried harder to earn the goodwill of the Soviets. On September 11, while censuring the US Senate's attempt to impose sanctions on Iraq, Saddam Hussein alleged that in 1982 Baghdad had rejected a U S offer to provide it with heavy guns in return for transferring a specimen of the Soviet advanced T-72 tank to the United States. 284 T h e Soviet Union, on the whole, tended to accept Iraq's denials concerning the employment of chemical weapons against the Kurds. Pravda claimed that Washington had no substantial evidence to charge Baghdad with the use of such weapons and that it had ignored the latter's "authoritative and categorical" denials to this effect. 285 In addition, Pravda reported that during the talks in Moscow on September 14 between Shevardnadze and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Sa'dun Hammadi of Iraq, Hammadi denied allegations of Iraq's use of chemical weapons against the Kurds and "the Soviet side took note of that statement." 2 8 6 Nevertheless, in some instances the Soviet media presented a balanced report on Western accusations of the use of poisonous gas against the Kurds and Iraq's denials. 287 All in all, while not completely abandoning the beleaguered Kurds, the predominant Soviet trend was to capitalize on the deterioration in Iraqi-US relations to promote its own ties with Iraq.

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Economic Ties During the War In the first two years of the war, Iraq still managed to increase civilian imports, but the enormous war expenditures coupled with a sharp decline in oil exports288 and a fall in world oil prices, subsequently compelled Iraq to drastically reduce its imports from $21.7 billion in 1982 to $12.3 billion in 1983, with further more moderate cuts in the coming years.289 Iraq's lack of foreign currency to finance imports from the major Western industrial states should have benefited the Soviet Union, who, in line with its growing military and political support for Iraq from 1983, was willing to provide civil goods on a barter basis and against ruble credits.290 However, in the mid-1980s most of Iraq's imports continued to flow from the West, mainly Japan, West Germany, France, Italy, Britain, and the United States. The Soviet share in Iraq's imports in 1980-1986 fluctuated around 1 percent annually and was estimated at $70 million in 1986, which meant a decline from the annual average of 3.5 percent in 1975-1979. The annual average share of the Soviet bloc in Iraq's imports in the same period, compared with the second half of the 1970s, shrank from 10 to 7 percent. Although these figures are estimates,291 which should be treated with extra caution because of the absence of reliable data on Iraq's economy during the war period, the general trend seems unmistakable: Iraq's imports did not shift away from the West to the Eastern block, but rather Iraq continued to show a clear preference for obtaining Western produce, which was superior to the Soviet goods. Yet, it is reasonable to assume that the depletion of Iraq's financial resources obstructed its bids to obtain Western participation in its developing schemes, impelling it to augment efforts to receive Soviet economic and technical assistance. Indeed, the remarkable upward trend in the Soviet-Iraqi relationship from 1983 was accompanied by a revival of Soviet aid in developing key branches of Iraq's economy, especially oil, electricity, and irrigation, with an agreement to this effect concluded in November of that year.292 The agreement provided Soviet assistance in developing the West Qurna oilfield (in south Iraq), and another agreement of May 1986 stipulated Soviet aid in the construction of a trans-Iraqi gas pipeline.293 The Soviet Union was the world greatest oil producer in the 1980s, with its annual production still moderately increasing—except in 19841986—culminating in 624 million tons of oil in 1987.294 And the Soviet Union had no desire to give up its position as the prime supplier of Eastern Europe's oil needs. In the first half of the 1980s, it even provided these countries with oil on more favorable terms than those prevailing in Western markets, and Prime Minister Ryzhkov's economic plan for integration of the Comecon was directed at stimulating the bloc's self-

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sufficiency in energy and raw materials. Bearing in mind the major portion of oil in Soviet export earnings during the 1980s, the fall in oil prices in an oil-surplus world market presented a far greater problem for the U S S R than difficulties in sustaining its increase in oil output.295 All in all, as we have seen in Chapter 4, 296 Soviet interest in purchasing Iraq's oil remained commercial rather than vital. The greatest Soviet hydroenergy project that was under construction in Iraq in the 1980s was Haditha on the Euphrates, with a planned capacity of 660 megawatts. The first two turbines, supplied by a Yugoslav company, were commissioned in July 1986.297 The reservoir created by the Haditha dam served for irrigation, and in May 1986 the Soviet Union began another irrigation project, the Tigris-Euphrates drainage canal. 298 Also, Soviet assistance to Iraq in developing nuclear energy continued. 299 In the 1980s, the leading official who dealt with economic matters on the Iraqi side was Taha Yasin Ramadan, and on the Soviet side it was Arkhipov. A major five-year Soviet-Iraqi economic agreement was signed in Baghdad in May 1986, following Ramadan's visit to the Soviet Union in the preceding month. 300 * *

*

Iraq's move to a war against Iran from April 1980, and especially its launching of the war in September, compelled it to repair relations with the Soviets in order to obtain weapons, and with the resumed flow of Soviet arms to Iraq from mid-1982 the Soviet Union regained its position as the first power in Iraq's foreign ties. Nevertheless, Iraq's enormous dependence on Soviet weapons during the war did not result in its returning to a pro-Soviet orientation. Rather, to counterbalance its relations with the U S S R , the Ba'th regime not only strengthened its links with France, but also initiated developing ties with the Soviet Union's rival superpower, the United States. These relations were made within the framework of Iraq's long-term goal of deepening its policy of nonalignment. Only after the Soviet initiatives to improve relations with Iran had failed, and the latter had crossed into Iraq in the summer of 1982, did Moscow begin providing Baghdad with extensive military aid. Although this aid was intensified in the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union carefully maintained a certain evenhandedness in its political stand toward the Iraq-Iran dispute aimed at preserving the Iranian option. The improved Soviet-Iraqi relations manifested especially from 1983-1984 coincided with the recuperation of the Soviet position on the scene of the ArabIsraeli dispute as well. Following Gorbachev's assumption of power in 1985, Soviet diplomatic activities regarding the Iraq-Iran war increased, and from the summer of 1987 Moscow somewhat shifted toward Iran, causing

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a cooling in Soviet-Iraqi relations. However, Moscow's renewed attempt to improve relations with Tehran failed, and by the end of the Iraq-Iran war in the summer of 1988 the chill in Soviet-Iraqi ties had ended.

Notes 1. R. K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 60. Ramazani's assessment is based on unidentified "Arab diplomats in the Gulf." See also Edgar O'Ballance, The Gulf War (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1988), p. 48. 2. R. Baghdad, April 12,1980IDR, April 14,1980. 3. Saddam Hussein in an interview with US Congressman Stephen Solarz held in August 1982 and published by INA, January 2,1983IDR, January 4,1983. 4. An important landmark in Iraqi-Afghan relations occurred much later, when Afghan's prime minister visited Iraq in June 1987, during which Baghdad evaded the issue of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. See a joint Iraqi-Afghan communiqué in R. Baghdad, June 6,1987IDR, June 9,1987; and a favorable Soviet comment on the visit in Pravda, June 8,1987. 5. R. Baghdad, July 20,1980/DR, July 24,1980. For Soviet arms deliveries to Iraq prior to the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war, see Chapter 4, p. 162. 6. See, for example, TASS (in English), April 9,1980/Di? (Soviet Union), April 10,1980; and Pravda, April 11,1980. 7. Saddam Hussein contended that, in accordance with the Algiers agreement, Iran should have returned to Iraq small border areas in the central sector, east of Baghdad, which had been held by Iran contrary to the Constantinople Protocol of 1913. 8. For the Khuzistan (Arabistan) issue, see Chapter 1, p. 27. 9. In 1979-1980, Iraq renewed its demand that Iran withdraw from the three islands in the Strait of Hormuz captured by the Shah in late 1971. On the controversy over the three islands, see Chapter 2, pp. 60-62. 10. See Chapter 1, pp. 27-31. 11. INA, November 11,1980IDR, November 12,1980. 12. During the 1970s, Ponomarev participated as part of the Soviet delegation in the talks with delegations led to the Soviet Union by Saddam Hussein on the following dates: in August 1970 (Chapter 1, pp. 37-38); in February 1972 (Chapter 2, note 46); in March 1973 (Chapter 2, note 202); in February 1974 (Chapter 3, note 50); in April 1975 (Chapter 3, note 154); and in February 1977 (Pravda, February 1,1977). In addition, Ponomarev headed a Soviet delegation to Iraq in November 1973 (Chapter 3, p. 118). Also, in the 1970s Ponomarev held talks with delegations of the ICP (Chapter 4, note 86 and p. 164). 13. For Tariq 'Aziz's promotion with Saddam Hussein's assumption of power, see Chapter 4, p. 149. 14. During his visits to the Soviet Union as Bakr's envoy, Tariq 'Aziz met with the following members of the Soviet leadership: Podgornyi (in October 1975); Kosygin (in May 1976); Gromyko (in June 1976); Kirilenko (in July 1976); and Brezhnev and Gromyko (in December 1977). See Chapter 4, note 39 and p. 153. 15. Pravda, September 23 and November 12,1980. For the Iraqi reports on the two visits, see INA, September 22,1980/D7? (Soviet Union), September 23, 1980; INA, September 23,1980IDR, September 24,1980; and note 11 above.

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16. Pravda, October 1,1980. 17. For data on Iran's arms imports, see Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security, 1984-87 (London: Jane's Publishing Company Limited, 1987), pp. 34-35. 18. Two Soviet cargo ships, which had been on their way to the port of Basra (Iraq) to transfer military equipment purchased prior to the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war in September 1980, returned to sea when war broke out. Nevertheless, despite Moscow's denials, this equipment was delivered to Iraq through the port of Aqaba (Jordan). See MECS, 1979-1980, p. 62. For a Soviet denial, see Pravda, October 11,1980. 19. For the offer and its denial by the Soviets, see A. Yodfat, The Soviet Union and the Arab Peninsula (Kent: Croom Helm, 1983), p. 123. 20. In 1980-1981, Iraq received about one hundred T-55 tanks from Poland, Bulgaria, and East Germany. See MECS, 1980-1981, p. 26. For arms shipments to Iraq from Eastern Europe, see also Radio Liberty, Research Bulletin 144/83, March 31, 1983. For an example of Moscow's denial of arms transfers to Iraq from Eastern Europe, see TASS, February 3,1981/Di? (Soviet Union), February 4,1981. 21. See Tariq 'Aziz in Amman Television, September 26,1980/DR, September 29,1980; Saddam Hussein in INA, November 11,1980/DR, November 12, 1980; 'Adnan Khayralla in al-Hawadith (London), March 13, 1981/Di?, March 17,1981; and Taha Yasin Ramadan in MAP (Rabat), June 16,1981 /DR, June 16,1981. 22. For Brezhnev's Gulf proposals, see Pravda, December 11,1980. 23. For Brezhnev's reference to Iraq in the Twenty-fifth Congress, see Chapter 4, note 30. 24. For Brezhnev's speech, see Pravda, February 24,1981. 25. On April 12,1981, Morris Draper, US deputy assistant secretary of state, visited Iraq—the first visit by a US envoy to Iraq since May 1977. See Chapter 4, pp.147-148. 26. For the signing of the protocol, see R. Baghdad, April 21,1981//A04, April 22,1981. An additional sign of the improved Soviet attitude toward Iraq was that in April 1981 the traditional Soviet note on the anniversary of the Soviet-Iraqi friendship treaty was sent to Saddam Hussein personally by Brezhnev (in his capacity as president) and Nikolai Tikhonov (prime minister), unlike the previous year, when it had been sent merely in the name of the Supreme Soviet and the Soviet government. A similar change took place in the Soviet note on the anniversary of the July coup in 1981, compared with 1980. See R. Baghdad, April 9, 1980/D7?, April 10, 1980, in comparison with INA, April 8,1981 /DR, April 9,1981; and Izvestiia, July 27,1980, in comparison with TASS (in English), July 23, 1981/Di? (Soviet Union), July 24, 1981. On the meaning of this change, see Chapter 4, note 112. 27. TASS, June 18,1981 /BBC (Soviet Union), June 22,1981. This report was not published in Pravda. 28. Ofra Bengio, MECS, 1980-1981, p. 592. 29. For the beginning of the low ebb, see Chapter 4, pp. 149-150. 30. See Tariq 'Aziz's statement in INA, April 28,1982IDR, April 30,1982; see also the statement of Iraq's ambassador to the Soviet Union in R. Moscow (in Arabic), April 9,1982/DR (Soviet Union), April 14,1982. 31. INA, June 3 and 4,1982/DR, June 4 and 8,1982; Pravda, June 5,1982. 32. Arkhipov specialized in economic relations with foreign countries and participated in developing Soviet economic ties with Iraq in the 1970s. (See, for example, Chapter 1, p. 45, and Chapter 2, note 114.) If we bear this in mind,

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along with the closure of the Iraqi oil pipeline by Syria in April 1982 and also Arkhipov's visit to Syria in May 1982, Arkhipov's participation in the talks with Tariq 'Aziz in June 1982 was probably related, among other things, to the issue of the closed pipeline. It is possible that even at this stage Moscow was trying to persuade Damascus to reopen this pipeline. For the Soviet appeal to Syria to reopen the pipeline in March 1984, see pp. 193 below. 33. During 1981, Taha Yasin Ramadan visited the following countries of the Soviet bloc: East Germany and Hungary (March), Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria (April), the Soviet Union (June), and Romania and Poland (September). (In May 1981, Taha Yasin Ramadan visited China, Yugoslavia, and West Germany.) See Ezhegodnik BSE, 1982, p. 269. 34. Al-Watan al-'Arabi (Paris), July 10-16, 1981, in MECS, 1980-1981, p. 593. 35. See, for example, Taha Yasin Ramadan's statement at the conclusion of his visit to the Soviet Union in June 1981 in MECS, 1980-1981, p. 592. 36. Tariq 'Aziz visited France in September, November (while visiting the Soviet Union in the same months), and December 1980, and in March and August 1981. 37. See Chapter 4, pp. 159,166,168. 38. Iraq apparently did not withdraw from some border areas inside Iran, such as in the central sector of the front, claimed by Baghdad at the beginning of the war. See note 7 above. 39. R. Moscow (in Arabic), June 21,1982IDR (Soviet Union), June 22,1982; and R. Moscow (in Arabic), July 15,1982IDR (Soviet Union), July 16,1982. 40. For the resumption of arms shipments, see, for example, Saddam Hussein, in R. Monte Carlo, September 27,1982IDR, September 28,1982. For the type of weapons, see MECS, 1981-1982, p. 607; Military Balance, 1982-1983, pp. 55-56; and Military Balance, 1983-1984, pp. 55-56. 41. For Gromyko's senior position in formulating Soviet foreign policy under Brezhnev, see Chapter 4, p. 154. 42. During Andropov's rule, Prime Minsiter Tikhonov had three first deputies: Arkhipov, Gaidar Aliev (nominated in November 1982, after Brezhnev's death), and Gromyko. 43. The Fez summit of September 1982 adopted a plan to settle the ArabIsraeli dispute and designated a delegation headed by King Hussein to travel to the five Security Council permanent members' states in order to promote the Fez plan. 44. For the Iraq-Iran dispute in King Hussein's talks in Moscow, see al-Majalla (London), January 22-28,1983IDR, January 26,1983. 45. For Shanshal's participation in the talks, see ibid. However, Soviet and Iraqi versions of the talks did not report Shanshal's participation. 46. Pravda, December 11, 1982; IN A, December 10, 1982/.DR, December 14,1982. 47. Al-Majalla (London), January 22-28,1983IDR, January 26,1983. For the conclusion of an arms deal between the Soviet Union and Iraq in January 1983, see Military Balance, 1983-1984, p. 129. 48. Another sign of the limited increase in the Soviet activities in the region was the deployment of SA-5 surface-to-air missiles manned by Soviet personnel in Syria at the beginning of 1983. 49. The Ninth Regional Congress of the Ba'th, pp. 233-234. Iraq's relations with Britain in the first half of the 1980s were rather problematic because of the latter's transfers of military equipment to Iran. 50. See Chapter 3, p. 112. 51. See Chapter 4, p. 147.

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52. See Chapter 4, p. 149. 53. For Iraq's resentment at the halt in Soviet arms deliveries at the beginning of the war, see The Ninth Regional Congress of the Ba'th, p. 22. 54. The Ninth Regional Congress of the Ba'th, p. 228. 55. For details, see Saddam Hussein's interview with US Congressman Stephen Solarz in IN A, January 2,1983IDR, January 4,1983. 56. Ibid. 57. The Ninth Regional Congress of the Ba'th, p. 232. See also Saddam Hussein's description of the Soviet Union and the United States in analogical terms in R. Baghdad, Voice of the Masses, January 6,1982IDR, January 8,1982. 58. Tariq 'Aziz's meetings with US Secretary of State George Shultz in France in October 1982 and in May 1983 deserve notice. 59. INA, August 1,1982IDR, August 3,1982. For Taha Yasin Ramadan's additional anti-US statements in the context of the Iraq-Iran war, quoted by the Soviets, see NV 5 (January 30,1987), p. 23; and MZ 6 (June 1987), p. 117. 60. For these issues, see p. 201 above. 61. The Ninth Regional Congress of the Ba'th, p. 234. 62. For China's policy toward the Iraq-Iran war, see Gerald Segal, MECS, 1982-1983, p. 96. 63. The Ninth Regional Congress of the Ba'th, p. 234. 64.Ibid. 65. Pravda, June 17,1983. 66. New Times 33 (August 1983), p. 13; Iu. Glukhov, Pravda, November 14, 1983. 67. V. Ivanenko, Krasnaia zvezda, December 7,1983; V. Pustov, Krasnaia zvevda, April 21,1984. 68. For the preceding Soviet reference to the treaty in the talks between Tikhonov and Taha Yasin Ramadan in 1981, see p. 186. 69. Pravda, November 22,1983. 70. According to an evaluation based on a CIA report, during 1979-1983 Iraq received $7.2 billion worth of arms from the Soviet Union and $3.8 billion from France (Cordesman, Iran-Iraq War and Western Security, pp. 34-35). France was supplying Iraq with some of the most advanced weapons of its arsenal. In October 1983, one month prior to Tariq 'Aziz's visit to Moscow, France lent Iraq five Super Etendard airplanes equipped with Exocet air-to-surface missiles; and in 1985 Iraq received a new version of the Mirage F-l, which could launch the Exocet missile and enabled Iraq to return the Super Etendards to France (ibid., p. 81). 71. As we have seen, this pipeline was blocked by Syria in April 1982. For a Soviet appeal to Syria in March 1984, see Pedro Ramet, "The Soviet-Syrian Relationship," Problems of Communism 5 (September-October 1986), p. 46. See also note 32. 72. Al-Thawra, April 26,1984. 73. By contrast, on May 31,1984, Chernenko received Rif'at Asad, second vice president of Syria (one of the signs of the Soviet Union's preferential treatment of Syria). It is also noteworthy that Saddam Hussein's greetings to Chernenko were not mentioned in the Soviet version of the Tikhonov-Ramadan meeting. See Pravda, April 26,1984. 74. The military official was First Deputy Minister of Defense Nikolai V. Ogarkov. See Pravda, April 26,1984. For the increase in Soviet arms transfers to Iraq, see Ofra Bengio, MECS, 1983-1984, p. 487; Military Balance, 1983-1984, pp. 55-56; and Military Balance, 1984-1985, pp. 62-63,143. 75. MECS, 1983-1984, p. 488.

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76. Saddam Hussein's interview with al-Anba' (Kuwait), May 20,1984IDR, May 22,1984. 77. Pravda, April 26,1984 (cross reference, al-Thawra, April 26,1984). 78. The tanker war is discussed extensively in Cordesman, Iran-Iraq War and Western Security. 79. For Soviet commentaries on the tanker war, see, for example, Pravda, May 19 and 22,1984; and V. Pustov, Krasnaia zvezda, July 1,1984. 80. David Menashri, MECS, 1983-1984, pp. 453-454. 81. The director of Iran's foreign ministry visited the Soviet Union and had a meeting with Gromyko on June 6,1984. See Pravda, June 7,1984; and R. Tehran, June 7,1984/Di? (Soviet Union), June 8,1984. 82. Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher of West Germany visited Iran in July 1984. 83. In August 1984, the Soviets reportedly concluded an agreement for supplying their most advanced interceptor MiG-29 to Iraq. See Military Balance, 1985-1986, p. 175. For Soviet political support for Iraq, see, for example, TASS (in English), October 22,1984IDR (Soviet Union), October 23,1984. 84. MECS, 1983-1984, p. 43. 85. IN A, October 22,1984IDR, October 24,1984. 86. KUNA (no date)/DR, April 1,1985; Sa'dun Hammadi, chairman of the National Assembly (Iraq's parliament), in al-Tadamun (London), January 25, 1986IDR, February 5,1986. Iraq particularly resented the supply of Soviet-made ground-to-ground missiles through Libya and Syria to Iran, which Iran used to bomb Baghdad. See MECS, 1984-1985, pp. 51,478. 87. Such Soviet responses can be derived from Sa'dun Hammadi's interview with al-Tadamun. See note 86. 88. TASS (in English), November 27,1984IDR (Soviet Union), November 27,1984. 89. Foreign Report (London), January 10,1985, in MECS, 1984-1985, p. 447. See also note 59. 90. The United States started providing Iraq with intelligence support in 1983—when Iraq, for the first time, faced a possible defeat in the war with Iran—and expanded this assistance in 1985. See Cordesman, Iran-Iraq War and Western Security, p. 36; and MECS, 1984-1985, p. 477. 91. For the deal regarding forty-five Bell helicopters, see Military Balance, 1985-1986, p. 175; and Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1986, p. 34515. 92. The man who succeeded Sokolov in May 1987, Dimitrii Iazov, was also an alternate member of the Politburo. 93. After Gorbachev had consolidated his own position, he removed Gromyko from the Politburo and from the presidency on September 30 and October 1,1988, respectively. 94. This trend was approved in the new program of the CPSU adopted under Gorbachev. See Izvestiia, March 7,1986. On Gorbachev's policy toward the Third World, see Francis Fukuyama, "Patterns of Soviet Third World Policy," Problems of Communism 5 (September-October 1987), pp. 1-13; and Stephen Sestanovich, "Gorbachev's Foreign Policy: A Diplomacy of Decline," Problems of Communism 1 (January-February 1988), pp. 1-15. 95. The secondary importance of the Third World in Gorbachev's policy was clearly seen in the brevity of his reference to this subject, in which neither Iraq nor Iran was mentioned specifically, at the Twenty-seventh Congress of the CPSU. See Izvestiia, February 26,1986. 96. Pravda, March 30,1985. 97. The discussion of further arms supplies during Tariq 'Aziz's visit was

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indicated by the participation of 'Abd-al-Jabbar Shanshal in the talks. See INA, March 28,1985/DR, March 29,1985. On additional Soviet arms shipments to Iraq, see Tariq 'Aziz in KUNA (in English), May 18,1985IDR, May 20,1985. 98. TASS (in English), April 5,1985/DR (Soviet Union), April 8,1985. 99. Al-Mustaqbal (Paris), April 20,1985IDR, April 23,1985. 100. Pravda, May 28 and 29,1985. 101. These purposes of Saddam Hussein's trip were hinted by Sa'dun Hammadi in al-Tadamun (London), January 25,1986IDR, February 5,1986. 102. Al-Thawra, December 17,1985. The meeting between Gorbachev and Saddam Hussein was attended by Shevardnadze and Tariq 'Aziz. 103. Pravda, December 17,1985. Emphasis added. 104. Specifically, Gorbachev headed the Soviet delegation at the talks with Rajiv Gandhi in May, with Asad in June, and with Qaddafi in October 1985. 105. For the composition of the delegation, see Pravda, December 17,1985; and al-Thawra, December 17,1985. 106. Qatar News Agency, December 19,1985IDR (Soviet Union), December 19,1985. 107. For Saddam Hussein's speech, see al-Thawra, December 17,1985 (cross reference, Pravda, December 17,1985). 108. For Gromyko's speech, see Pravda, December 17,1985 (cross reference, al-Thawra, December 17,1985). 109. See p. 192 above. 110. Pravda, December 18,1985. 111. Pravda, December 17,1985. Emphasis added. 112. See Chapter 2, pp. 84-85. 113. See Chapter 3, pp. 119-120. 114. For Gorbachev's plan, see, for example, his speech in honor of Rajiv Gandhi in Pravda, May 22, 1985; slogan 42 in Pravda, October 13, 1985; Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok in Pravda, July 29, 1986; and Gorbachev's speech in India in Pravda, November 28,1986. 115. Al-Thawra, December 17,1985. 116. Pravda, December 17,1985, compared with Pravda, December 18,1985. 117. See, for example, INA, December 18,1985/Di?, December 18,1985. 118. David Menasrhi, MECS, 1984-1985, p. 450. 119. Ibid, p. 459. 120. For the plan, see p. 199 and note 114 above. 121. This was stated clearly in the Soviet plan for settling the Iraq-Iran dispute. See Izvestiia, January 9,1987. 122. Pravda, February 18,1986. 123. For Soviet reaction to the arms deal, see for example, Iu. Gudkov, NV 47 (November 21, 1986), pp. 22-23; Shevardnadze's conversation with Iraq's ambassador to the USSR in TASS, December 9,1986IDR (Soviet Union), December 10,1986; a Soviet government statement in Izvestiia, January 9,1987; Izvestiia, December 22,1986; and Izvestiia, January 16,1987. 124. See, for example, Taha Yasin Ramadan's statement in INA, February 8, 1987IDR, February 9,1987. 125. For the plan, see Izvestiia, January 9,1987. 126. DR, January 12,1987. 127. INA, January 10,1987IDR, January 12,1987. 128. For Vilayati's talks in Moscow, see Pravda, February 14 and 15,1987. 129. Pravda, February 14,1987. 130. Al-Ray al-'Amm (Kuwait), February 15, 1987IDR (Soviet Union), February 24,1987.

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131. On December 12,1986, the Soviet Union and Iran concluded a protocol for economic cooperation. 132. Al-Qabas, (Kuwait), March 2,1987/DR, March 4,1987. According to this source, important headway on Soviet arms supplies to Iraq had already been made during ' Adnan Khayralla's visit to the Soviet Union in late 1986. For the delivery of MiG-29 aircraft to Iraq, see al-Dustur (Amman), February 7, 1987/DR, February 9,1987; Cordesman, Iran-Iraq War and Western Security, pp. 128,138. See also note 83 above. 133. See note 70. Iraq was, in fact, the second country in the Third World, after India, to receive MiG-29 aircraft. 134. Pravda, February 21, 1987. For Iraq's report on the talks, see INA, February 20,1987/DR, February 24,1987. 135. See pp. 192,198,202. 136. Izvestiia, February 12, 1987. For a further indication on differences between Gorbachev and Gromyko on the Iraq-Iran war, see a report on Gromyko's talks with a delegation of the A r a b League in Pravda, April 30,1987. 137. On the talks of Gromyko, Ryzhkov, and Shevardnadze with Vilayati, see Pravda, February 14 and 15,1987; and with Tariq 'Aziz, see Pravda, February 21, 1987. For f u r t h e r examples of differences between Shevardnadze's and Gromyko's stands on the Iraq-Iran war, see Izvestiia, April 30,1987, in comparison with Pravda, April 30,1987; and note 159. 138. R. Baghdad, Voice of the Masses, April 29, 1987; and INA, April 29, 1987/Di? (Soviet Union), April 29,1987 (cross references,Izvestiia, April 30,1987; and Pravda, April 30,1987). 139. INA, April 10,1986/DR, April 11,1986. 140. Izvestiia, April 20 and 21,1986; INA, April 17,1986/DR, April 17,1986. 141. INA, April 20,1986/DR, April 21,1986. 142. For the exchange of congratulations, see INA, April 9,1986/DR, April 9,1986. 143. Pravda, April 9, 1987 and al-Thawra, April 10,1987. Also the central articles published in the Iraqi and Soviet press on the fifteenth anniversary on the treaty made no explicit references to its prolongation. See the editorial in alThawra, April 9,1987; A. Ostal'skii, Izvestiia, April 9,1987; and A. Vasilinov, NV 14 (April 3,1987), p. 29. 144. See the customary annual exchange of greetings between the Soviet leadership and Saddam Hussein on the sixteenth anniversary of the treaty in TASS (in English), April 8,1988; and INA, April 8,1988/DR, April 12,1988. 145. As already noted, the Soviet-Egyptian treaty of May 1971—which was the first in the series of treaties signed by the Soviet Union with Third World states in Brezhnev's period—had been annulled by Egypt in 1976, whereas the second pact in this series, the treaty with India of August 1971, was concluded for twenty years and did not yet require prolongation. Hence, the treaty with Iraq, despite being the third in this series, was the first to be extended. For the list of the treaties, see Chapter 2, note 108. 146. Demichev's official title was first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet. Because, in accordance with the accepted Western terminology, we describe the chairman of the Supreme Soviet as president, we describe his first deputy as first vice president. 147. For Demichev's visit, see INA, April 8 and 9,1987/DR, April 9 and 10, 1987; and Pravda, April 9,1987. 148. INA (in English), April 22,1987/DR, April 23,1987. 149. NV 31 (July 31,1987), p. 8. 150. See Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskii in TASS (in English),

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The Limits of Rapprochement During the War with Iran, April 1980-August

1988

June 3,1987/DR (Soviet Union), June 4,1987. For Brezhnev's previous proposal to demilitarize the Gulf, see p. 185 above. 151. For the two incidents and Soviet reaction, see TASS, May 8 and 17, 1987IDR (Soviet Union), May 11 and 18, 1987; and Petrovskii, TASS, June 3, 1987/DR, Soviet Union, June 4,1987. 152. R. Monte Carlo, June 17, 1987, in reliance on al-Ray al-'Amm (Kuwait)IDR, June 18,1987. 153. R. Tehran, June 13,14, and 15,1987; and IRNA, June 14,1987/DR, June 15,1987. See also Izvestiia, June 17,1987. 154. Interestingly, in the summer of 1987, when Gorbachev's voice on the Iraq-Iran dispute began to be discerned, his different approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict also began to emerge. In June 1987, the Soviet Union applied to Israel for entry visas for a Soviet consular delegation, and in July this delegation arrived in Israel—the first such mission since Moscow broke off diplomatic relations with Jerusalem in 1967. 155. See Izvestiia, June 20,1987, in comparison with R. Baghdad, Voice of the Masses, June 17,1981/DR, June 18,1987. 156. See p. 194 above. Also, in accordance with this stand, Tariq 'Aziz stated: "We have neither said that we want nor that we do not want [foreign navies in the Gulf]." See al-Hawadith (London), October 23,1987IDR, October 29,1987. 157. Pravda, July 3,1987, in comparison with INA, July 2,1981/DR (Soviet Union), July 10,1987. 158. See Pravda, July 3,1987, in comparison with Pravda, February 21,1987. For a further strengthening of Gorbachev's line toward the Iraq-Iran war vis-à-vis Gromyko's, see note 187 below. 159. For the text of the Soviet statement, see Pravda, July 4,1987; for the commentary, see V. Ovchinnikov, Pravda, July 12, 1987. However, when Gromyko presented this statement to Iran's deputy foreign minister in Moscow on July 17,1987, Gromyko insisted, in accordance with his pro-Iraqi inclination, on the importance of ending the Iraq-Iran war for relaxing tension in the Gulf—an observation that was absent from Shevardnadze's talks with the same Iranian official. See Pravda, July 18,1987. 160. R. Baghdad, July 16,1981/DR, July 20,1987. 161. IRNA (in English), July 18,1981/DR (Soviet Union), July 20,1987. 162. For Security Council Resolution 598, see Keesing's Record of World Events, 1987, p. 35600. 163. See p. 209, above; and Pravda, July 4,1987. 164. G. Vasil'ev, Pravda, July 22,1987. 165. Indeed, in mid-July the Soviet media were still strongly anti-Iranian. See, for example, P. Demchenko, Pravda, July 20,1981/DR (Soviet Union), July 22, 1987; I. Beliaev, Literaturnaia gazeta, July 22,1987, p. 9. 166. See a statement on Vorontsov's forthcoming visit in Pravda, July 29, 1987. 167. For the Soviet coverage of Vorontsov's visits to Iraq and Iran, see Pravda, August 1 and 5,1987, respectively. 168. Vorontsov had a meeting only with Tariq 'Aziz. See R. Baghdad, July 30,1981/DR, July 31,1987; and note 167 above. 169. R. Tehran, August 3,1981/DR, August 4,1987. On Vorontsov's visit to Iran, see also IRNA, August 3,1987; R. Tehran, August 4,1981/DR, August 3 and 4,1987; and note 167 above. 170. Pravda, April 30,1987. 171. For the Soviet version of the talks between Ryzhkov and Shevardnadze and the Arab League delegation, see Pravda, September 10, 1987; for Iraq's

The Limits of Rapprochement During the War with Iran, April 1980-August 1988

243

report, which revealed little, see al-Jumhuriyya, September 10 and 11,1987. 172. For Shevardnadze's speech, see Pravda, September 25,1987. 173. The number of Soviet military warships in the Gulf remained small in the next year as well, amounting to only four. See an interview with the commander of Soviet naval forces in the Gulf in al-Anba' (Kuwait), March 29,1988/DR (Soviet Union), April 5,1988. 174. Tariq 'Aziz in R. Monte Carlo (in Arabic), September 26, 1987/DR, September 28,1987; and in al-Hawadith (London), October 23,1987/DR, October 29,1987. For the Soviet version of the Shevardnadze-'Aziz meeting, see Pravda, September 26,1987. 175. IN A, October 29,1987/DR, October 30,1987. See also a similar statement by Taha Yasin Ramadan in WAKH (Manama, Bahrain), November 2,1987/DR, November 2,1987. 176. Pravda, October 31,1987, as compared with INA, October 28 and 29, 1987/DR, October 29 and 30,1987. 177. On Vorontsov's visit to Iran, see IRNA, October 31 and November 1, 1987; R. Tehran (in English), November 1, 1987/DR, November 2, 1987; and Pravda, November 2,1987. Contrary to the Soviet report, which attributed to Iran support for the Soviet proposal to establish a UN force for the Gulf, Iran's version referred only to its support for the Soviet call to withdraw all foreign forces from the Gulf. 178. Taha Yasin Ramadan in WAM (Abu Dhabi), September 12,1987/DR, September 14,1987; and note 175 above; Tariq 'Aziz in R. Monte Carlo (in Arabic), September 26, 1981/DR, September 28, 1987; and Tariq 'Aziz in al-Hawadith (London), October 23,1987/DR, October 29,1987. 179. For Soviet responses to Iraq's criticism, see, for example, Oleg Peresypkin, rector of the Diplomatic Academy of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, in KUNA (in English), September 7,1987/Di? (Soviet Union), September 10,1987; Evgenii Primakov, alternate member of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Gorvachev's adviser on Middle Eastern affairs, in al-Hawadith (London), September 25, 19811DR (Soviet Union), October 1, 1987; Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskii in R. Monte Carlo (in Arabic), October 5,1987/DR (Soviet Union), October 6, 1987; Vorontsov at a press conference in Baghdad, INA, Ocotber 30,1987/DR, October 30,1987; and Soviet charge d'affaires in Baghdad in WAKH (Manama, Bahrain), November 6,1981/DR (Soviet Union), November 10, 1987. Notably, the new Soviet defense minister, Dmitrii Iazov, who had succeeded Sokolov in May 1987, participated in the talks with Taha Yasin Ramadan in the Soviet Union in July 1987, and Shanshal took part on the Iraqi side. See Pravda, July 3,1987; and INA, July 3,1987/D7? (Soviet Union), July 13, 1987. 180. The Soviet report on Gromyko's conversation with Iran's ambassador to Moscow on December 4, 1987, indicates these motives behind the USSR's opposition to sanctions against Iran. See Pravda, December 5, 1987. For Iran's version, which significantly differed from the Soviet one, see R. Tehran, December 5,1981/DR (Soviet Union), December 7,1987. 181. According to one Western estimate, China and North Korea provided about 43 percent of all Iran's military imports in 1985, and nearly 70 percent in 1986. See Cordesman, Iran-Iraq War and Western Security, p. 29. It can be assumed that China's share in Iran's arms imports increased in 1987 with the supply of anti-ship Silkworm missiles. 182. For the reluctance of Iraqi officials to reproach China on arms supplies to Iran, see Sa'dun Hammadi in al-Majallah (London), June 10-16,1987/DR, June 17,1987; Tariq 'Aziz in al-Hawadith (London), October 23,1981/DR, October 29,

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The Limits of Rapprochement During the War with Iran, April 1980-August

1988

1987; and Saddam Hussein's criticism of China on this issue mal-Thawra, February 27,1988, p. 8. See also Tariq 'Aziz's comment on the Chinese refusal to support sanctions against Iran in al-Watan al-'Arabi (Paris), May 6,1988, p. 28. 183. See, for example, a Soviet official's refusal to comment on Chinese arms sales to Iran in WAKH (Manama, Bahrain), November 6, 1987/DR (Soviet Union), November 10,1987. 184. See, for example, A. Maslennikov, Pravda, October 18, 1987; Soviet foreign ministry spokesman in Pravda, October 21, 1987; Pravda, October 23, 1987; M. Krutikhin, NV 38 (September 18,1987), p. 23; and D. Zgerskii, NV 47 (November 20,1987), p. 19. 185. On November 20,1987, Krasnaia zvezda reported an incident in which an Iranian frigate had come close to firing on a Soviet tanker in the Gulf, retreating only with the approach of a Soviet destroyer. 186. I. Beliaev, Literaturnaia gazeta, September 30, 1987; O. Peresypkin, Sovetskaia Rossiia, October 14,1987. 187. Pravda, December 5,1987. For a further example, see E. Korshunov,NV 51 (December 18,1987), p. 11. Gromyko's conversation with Iran's ambassador on December 4,1987, also contained mild criticism of Tehran's refusal to end the war—one of Gromyko's last utterances in this vein as Gorbachev's policy on the Iraq-Iran war strengthened. For a further such utterance, see Gromyko's speech in honor of King Hussein in Pravda, December 22,1987. 188. Pravda, December 12,1987. 189. Pravda, December 23, 1987. See also, for example, V. Ovchinnikov, Pravda, December 27,1987; and Shevardnadze's and Gromyko's replies to Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Sa'ud al-Faysal's request to impose sanctions, made during his visit to Moscow, in Pravda, January 30,1988. 190. R. Baghdad, Voice of the Masses, January 6,1988IDR, January 7,1988. 191. See also Saddam Hussein's statement on July 16,1987, on p. 209 above. 192. Ramadan in Jordan Times, December 17,1987IDR, December 17,1987. See also Ramadan in WAM (Abu Dhabi), September 12,1987IDR, September 14, 1987. 193. On Tariq 'Aziz's visit, see Pravda, February 3, 1988; and al-Thawra, February 2 and 3,1988. The editorials of these two issues of al-Thawra requested the permanent members of the Security Council to impose sanctions against Iran. 194. Saddam Hussein in al-Qabas (Kuwait), February 24,1988IDR, February 26,1988. 195. TASS (in English), March 9,1988/DR (Soviet Union), March 10,1988. 196. INA, March 10,1988/DR, March 10,1988. 197. See, for example, TASS (in English), April 15,1988/DR (Soviet Union), April 18,1988; Iu. Glukhov, Pravda, August 11,1988. 198. Gennadii Gerasimov in TASS (in English), May 6, 1988IDR (Soviet Union), May 6, 1988. See also IRNA (in English), May 21, 1988/DR (Soviet Union), May 24,1988. 199. P. Demchenko, Pravda, June 3,1988. See also V. Skosyrev, Izvestiia, July 23,1988. For an early factual Soviet report on the liberation of Faw, see Pravda, April 19,1988. 200. For Iran's stand on Afghanistan, see R. Tehran (in English), April 14, 1988; R. Tehran, April 15, 1988; and Iran's deputy foreign minister in IRNA, August 14, 19881DR, August 15, 1988. Also, the speaker of Iran's Parliament, Rafsanjani, contended that Iran had rejected Soviet offers to curtail military support for Iraq in return for Iran's recognition of the Afghan regime. See IRNA (in English), August 11,1988IDR, August 11,1988. For the USSR's mild reactions to Iran's stand on Afghanistan, see TASS (in English), April 20,1988IDR (Soviet

The Limits of Rapprochement During the War with Iran, April 1980-August

1988

245

Union), April 21,1988; and a report on Vorontsov's visit to Iran in Pravda, July 23,1988. 201. Tariq 'Aziz in al-Watan al-'Arabi (Paris), May 6,1988, p. 28, and in INA (in English), May 26,1988IDR, May 27,1988; Saddam Hussein in R. Baghdad, July 17,1988/ÖÄ, July 18,1988. 202. See especially, Iraq's version of Sa'dun Hammadi's talks with Gromyko in Moscow on July 13,1988, in INA, July 14,19881DR (Soviet Union), July 15, 1988; and the Soviet version in Pravda, July 14,1988. 203. For the Iraqi and Soviet brief accounts of Vorontsov's trip to Baghdad, during which he met with Saddam Hussein, see INA, July 18, 1988/Di?,July 19, 1988; and Pravda, July 20,1988. 204. Iran reportedly also rejected Vorontsov's offer to host direct talks between Iraq and Iran in the Soviet Union. See Kyodo (Tokyo, in English), July 23,1988IDR, August 26,1988. On Vorontsov's visit see also note 203. 205. Pravda, July 20,1988. See also TASS (in English), August 2,1988IDR (Soviet Union), August 3,1988. 206. TASS (in English), July 18,1988IDR (Soviet Union), July 18,1988. 207. Sovetskaia Rossiia, July 22,1988. 208. A. Bogomolov, Sovetskaia Rossiia, July 30,1988. See also P. Demchenko, Pravda, August 6,1988; and S. Volovets, Sovetskaia Rossiia, August 9,1988. 209. See Chapter 3, p. 133. 210. See also note 32 above. 211. See Chapter 3, p. 132. 212. See, for example, Kosygin's speech in honor of Saddam Hussein in April 1975 in Pravda, April 15,1975. 213. For Brezhnev's proposal, see Pravda, February 24,1981. 214. See note 55 above. 215. MECS, 1984-1985, p. 477. 216. Pravda, December 17,1985, compared with al-Thawra, December 17, 1985. 217. Al-Thawra, December 17,1985. 218. See, for example, Saddam Hussein's evasive stand on US Secretary of State George Shultz's mediation mission to the Middle East in February 1988 in al-Thawra, February 27,1988. 219. In December 1985, Taha Yasin Ramadan admitted Iraq's continued nonacceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. See MECS, 19841985, p. 481. 220. See, for example, the report on Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskii's talks with Saddam Hussein in Baghdad in Izvestiia, April 27,1987, compared with INA, April 25,1987/DÄ4, April 27,1987. 221. Amman Television, November 11,1987/DR, November 13,1987. 222. R. Baghdad, Voice of the Masses, February 7,1988IDR, February 9,1988; Izvestiia, February 9,1988. Also, the Soviets attributed to the Iraqi side support for the convening of an international conference during the talks between Shevardnadze and Tariq 'Aziz in February 1988 and between Gromyko and the speaker of Iraq's Parliament, Sa'dun Hammadi, in July. See Pravda, February 3 and July 14,1988. 223. In February 1989, Shevardnadze went on a Middle East tour, which included Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, and Iran. 224. See Chapter 4, note 135, and pp. 171-172. 225. For the Kurds in Iraq, see Charles G. MacDonald, MECS, 1982-1983, pp. 262-263,269. 226. See Mas'ud Barzani, Voice of the Iraqi Kurdistan, May 30,1981/DR, June

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The Limits of Rapprochement

During

the War with Iran, April

1980-August

1988

3,1981. 227. See p. 183 above. 228. For 'Aziz Muhammad's speech, see Pravda, March 2,1981. 229. For some Soviet references to the ICP and the Kurds, see R. Peace and Progress (in Arabic), March 31,1981/Di? (Soviet Union), April 2,1981; Pravda, June 23 and July 5,1981; TASS (in English), July 23,1981/DR (Soviet Union), July 24,1981; and Naziha Duleimi, World Marxist Review 5 (May 1981), pp. 120-123. 230. For changes in Iraq's agricultural sector, see Robert Springborg, "Infitah, Agrarian Transformation and Elite Consolidation in Contemporary Iraq," Middle East Journal 1 (Winter 1986), pp. 34-37. 231. The Ninth Regional Congress of the Ba'th, p. 71. 232. Ibid., p. 225. 233. Ibid., p. 237. 234. For the release of the Communists, see R. Monte Carlo (in Arabic), July 20,1982IDR, July 21,1982; MEN A, September 23,1982/DR, September 28,1982; and al-Majalla (London), October 12-22,1982IDR, October 20,1982. According to the last source, 280 Communists were released. 235. For the talks between Ponomarev and Tariq 'Aziz, see pp.186-187 above. 236. Ma'ruf represented Iraq at the funeral of Andropov as well. See Pravda, February 16,1984. (However, at Chernenko's funeral, Iraq was represented by 'Izzat Ibrahim. See Pravda, March 13,1985.) In addition, Ma'ruf, whose status in accordance with the diplomatic protocol paralleled Demichev's, exchanged speeches with the latter in a ceremony marking the fifteenth anniversary of the Soviet-Iraqi treaty. See IN A, April 9,1987/DR, April 10,1987. 237. See Chapter 4, pp. 168-170. 238. R. Moscow (in Arabic), July 15,1982/DR (Soviet Union), July 16,1982. 239. Moscow Television, July 17,1982/Dfl (Soviet Union), July 19,1982. 240. Moscow Television, July 17,1984IDR (Soviet Union), July 18,1984. For speeches by Iraq's ambassador to the Soviet Union on Moscow Television on July 17 in the consecutive years, see DR (Soviet Union) July 19,1985 (the speech made no reference to Iraq's internal affairs); DR (Soviet Union), July 21, 1986 (the speech referred to the "achievements" of the regime, including in the Kurdish sector); and DR (Soviet Union), July 24,1987 (the speech made no mention of Iraq's internal affairs). 241. For a certain exception, see Sotsialisticheskaia industriia, July 17,1986. 242. See a reported Soviet utterance to this effect in L'Espresso (Rome), October 26,1980IDR (Soviet Union), October 31,1980. 243. Hamid Musa, PMS 8 (August 1983), pp. 56-57. 244. Hamid Musa, PMS 4 (April 1984), pp. 91-93. 245. See note 243 above. For the negotiations between the government and the PUK, see Ofra Bengio, MECS, 1982-1983, p. 576; MECS, 1983-1984, pp. 481-482; and MECS, 1984-1985, p. 471. 246. Ofra Bengio, MECS, 1983-1984, p. 480. 247. The discussion of the issue of the ICP during Tariq 'Aziz's visit to Moscow can be inferred from Ponomarev's attendance of a luncheon given by Gromyko in honor of 'Aziz. See Pravda, November 22,1983. 248. Al-Watan (Kuwait), April 26,1984IDR, April 30,1984. 249. For an indication of this goal, see al-Majalla (London) February 18-24, 1984IDR, March 12,1984. 250. Pravda, March 31,1984. See also the two following Soviet articles on the ICP published on its fiftieth anniversary, which seem to have indicated Moscow's interest in reconciliation between the Communists and the Ba'th: P. Demchanko,

The Limits of Rapprochement During the War with Iran, April 1980-August

1988

24 7

Pravda, March 31,1984; and G. N. Nechkin, Voprosy istorii KPSS 3 (March 1984), pp. 135-139. 251. Al-Siyasa (Kuwait), September 26,1984/DR, September 28,1984. See also 'Aziz Muhammad, PMS 11 (November 1986), p. 28. 252. For the awarding of a medal to 'Aziz Muhammad on his fiftieth birthday, see Chapter 3, p. 128. 253. A joint statement between the ICP and the Tudeh in Pravda, November 14,1984; see also Kadhim Habib, member of the central Committee of the ICP, in a joint article with a representative of the Tudeh in PMS 12 (December 1985), p. 75. 254. Fakhri Karim, member of the Politburo of the ICP, Tishrin (Damascus), December 1,1984/DR, December 7,1984. 255. For the ICP's implicit admission of this situation, see note 254 above. 256. INA, April 8,1985/DÄ, April 9,1985. See also note 258 below. 257. See p. 224 above. 258. See note 256 above. Further, Saddam Hussein's greetings to the Soviet leadership on the treaty anniversary in 1986 were again sent to "comrade" Gorbachev (and "comrade" Gromyko), but the Soviets dispatched greetings on behalf of their state institutions only, as in the past. However, on the same occasion in 1987, Saddam Hussein sent greetings to the heads of the Soviet state institutions only (Gromyko and Ryzhkov), without the designation "comrade," in line with the Soviet congratulatory message. See INA, April 9, 1986/DR, April 9, 1986; Pravda, April 9, 1987; and R. Baghdad, Voice of the Masses, April 9, 199,1/DR, April 10,1987. 259. Al-Thawra, December 17,1985. 260. Tariq' Aziz in Arab Times (Kuwait), January 5,1986IDR, January 7,1986. 261. This can be inferred from Iraq's commentaries on Saddam Hussein's visit to the Soviet Union, which stressed time and again that the Iraqi-Soviet relations were based on noninterference in internal affairs. See, for exampl&,al-Jumhuriyya in INA, December 18,1985IDR, December 18,1985. 262. Pravda, December 17,1985. 263. Ibid. 264. See p. 199 above. 265. Pravda, March 2,1986. 266. Pravda, February 26,1986. 267. Pravda, March 2,1986. 268. See p. 201 above. 269. 'Aziz Muhammad, PMS 11 (November 1986), pp. 25-28. 270. See pp. 208-215. 271. 'Aziz Muhammad, World Marxist Review 9 (September 1987), pp. 112114. 272. See note 269 above. 273. Ali Khavari, World Marxist Review 9 (September 1987), pp. 115-119. 274. 'Aziz Muhammad in Sovetskaia Rossiia, November 3,1987. 275. Fawziya Ayed, World Marxist Review 2 (February 1988), p. 155. 276. See pp. 215-216 above. 277. V. Skosyrev, Izvestiia, July 23,1988. 278. At the end of November 1988, Saddam Hussein announced that after "deep thought" the regime had decided to allow the formation of new political parties and adopt pluralism. See R. Baghdad, Voice of the Masses, November 27, 1988/DR, November 28,1988. 279. Iu. Zinin, AAS 7 (July 1988), pp. 25-27. 280. See, for example, 'Aziz Muhammad's speech at the Twenty-sixth Con-

248

The Limits of Rapprochement During the War with Iran, April 1980-August

1988

gress of the CPSU in Pravda, March 2,1981. 281. See, for example, 'Aziz Muhammad, PMS 11 (November 1986), pp. 27-28. See also Kadhim Habib, PMS 12 (December 1985), p. 75; 'Aziz Muhammad's speech at the Twenty-seventh Congress of the CPSU in Pravda, March 2,1986; ICP's greetings to the CPSU on the seventieth anniversary of the October revolution in Pravda, November 10,1987; and brief factual references to the Kurdish rebellion in Soviet articles: A. Notin, AAS 6 (June 1987), p. 11; and D. Zgerskii, NV 47 (November 20,1987), p. 20. 282. 'Aziz Muhammad, World Marxist Review 9 (September 1987), p. 113. 283. See, for example, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Sa'dun Hammadi in R. Monte Carlo (in Arabic), September 9,1988; and in INA, September 11, 1988/Di?, September 12 and 13,1988. 284. INA, September 11,1988/DR, September 12,1988. 285. V. Gan, Pravda, September 11,1988. 286. Pravda, September 15,1988. 287. Moscow Television, September 8,1988/Di? (Soviet Union), September 12,1988; Izvestiia, September 14,1988. 288. Iraqi oil net exports declined from 2.5 million barrels per day in 1980 to 0.7-0.9 million in 1983, rising gradually in the following years and reaching 1.7-1.8 in 1986. See Cordesman, Iran-Iraq War and Western Security, p. 48. See also Appendix 1, Table 1. 289. See Appendix 1, Table 3. 290. Quarterly Economic Review of Iraq (London) 2 (1984), p. 4; Quarterly Economic Review of Iraq (London) 4 (1984), p. 11. 291. See Appendix 1, Table 3. 292. Pravda, November 25,1983. 293. TASS, May 21,1986IDR (Soviet Union), May 21,1986. 294. Soviet oil production reached 616 million tons in 1983, 613 million in 1984,595 million in 1985, and 615 million in 1986. See Appendix 1, Table 1 \ Pravda, January 18,1987; and Pravda, January 24,1988. 295. For these evaluations about Soviet oil, see Alan H. Smith, "Foreign Trade," in Martin McCauley (ed.), The Soviet Union Under Gorbachev (London: Macmillan Press, 1987), pp. 135,146,151. According to this source (p. 138), Soviet oil exports in 1984 accounted for 41.5 percent of the ruble value of total Soviet exports. 296. Chapter 4, p. 151. 297. A Country Report, Iraq (London) 4 (1986), p. 13. See also TASS (in English), November 21,1983/Di? (Soviet Union), November 29,1983, which also lists other Soviet power stations already constructed in Iraq. The most important of these is the 840-megawatt Nasiriyya thermoelectric station and the 400megawatt Dokan hydroelectric station. 298. TASS, May 21,1986IDR (Soviet Union), May 21,1986. 299. Quarterly Economic Report of Iraq 2 (1985), p. 13, reported that the Soviet Union undertook to provide two nuclear power stations to Iraq. 300. Arkhipov conducted economic talks with Ramadan during his visits to Moscow in June 1981, April 1984, and April 1986. In July 1987 the Soviet side was headed by Ryzhkov. For the agreement, see TASS, May 21, 19861DR (Soviet Union), May 21,1986; R. Baghdad, Voice of the Masses, May 21,1986IDR, May 22,1986.

Conclusion: The Passing "Strategic Alliance"

The policy of Ba'th Iraq toward the Soviet Union was determined first and foremost by its need for Soviet military support vis-à-vis Iran. Thus, the outbreak of the conflict with Iran in the spring of 1969, and particularly its exacerbation by the end of 1971, induced Baghdad to seek a "strategic alliance" with Moscow, which was formally achieved with the conclusion of the Iraqi-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in April 1972. In addition, at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, the ideological goals of the Ba'th regime, especially the struggle against "imperialism"—that is, the United States—drew Baghdad nearer to Moscow and to pro-Soviet orientation. Baghdad's loosening of its relationship with Moscow began from mid-1973, when Iraq, by moderating its position in the. conflict with Iran, created the possibility of settling the dispute through diplomacy. Nevertheless, the period from mid-1973 to the termination of the Iraq-Iran dispute in the spring of 1975 can still be regarded as an era of a close Iraqi-Soviet relationship during which the Ba'th regime still sought to maintain the centrality of its ties with the Soviet Union in its overall foreign relations. However, the solution of the Iraq-Iran dispute in 1975 led to a gradual decline in Iraqi-Soviet relations, which reached a nadir at the outset of 1980. Specifically, Iraq continuously moved away from a pro-Soviet orientation and even adopted anti-Soviet stands on some issues, particularly on Afghanistan. At the same time, however, Iraq maintained its hostile policy toward the United States. With its supply of military hardware still heavily dependent on one superpower, the USSR, Iraq's waging of a war against Iran in the fall of 1980 necessitated the amelioration of relations with this power. Since the Ba'ths ideological motivation for rebuilding relations with the Soviets declined, there was no return to a close relationship with Moscow, but rather, simultaneously, Iraq attempted to promote relations with the 249

250

Conclusion: The Passing "Strategic

Alliance"

USSR's rival superpower, the United States, convinced that this was a prerequisite for conducting a foreign policy based on genuine nonalignment. The Soviet stand on the Iraq-Iran dispute of 1969-1975 and the war of 1980-1988 was influenced by the objectively greater importance the Soviet Union ascribed to developing relations with Iran rather than Iraq, as a country with a larger territory and population, and also bordered on the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, in 1969-1975, the Soviet Union supported Iraq militarily, because of the latter's pro-Soviet orientation compared to Iran's pro-US orientation. Moreover, Tehran's accelerated rearmament with US weapons from 1972-1973 provided the major factor for Moscow's interest in fostering ties with Baghdad in order to counterbalance the US-Iranian relationship. Thus the peak in Soviet-Iraqi relations was in 1972-1973, once Moscow's and Baghdad's interest in containing Tehran coincided, and before Iraq embarked on the way to settling its dispute with Iran. Given the latent enmity between Ba'th Iraq and the Shah's Iran— even after the spring of 1975 and until the fall of the Shah in 1979—during this period the USSR still accorded importance to maintaining relations with Iraq, as a counterpoise to the pro-US regime of the Shah. In the Iraq-Iran war of 1980-1988, at first the USSR tilted toward Tehran, supporting Baghdad militarily only from the summer of 1982, with the purpose of blocking the expansion of Iran's Islamic fundamentalism, which had stubbornly been rejecting Soviet conciliatory attempts. Notwithstanding the military support for Iraq, and because of the great significance it assigned to promoting relations with Iran, the Soviet Union strove to preserve some balance in its political attitude toward both the dispute in 1969-1975 and the war in 1980-1988. Despite the fluctuations in Soviet-Iraqi relations from the Ba'th assumption of power in 1968 to the end of the Iraq-Iran war in 1988, as a rule, the Soviet Union remained the first great power in Iraq's foreign relations at the military and political levels. Given that during this period Iraq's relations with Iran were either somewhat strained or the two countries were engaged in a conflict or a war, Iraq had no substitute for the USSR as its chief arms supplier. France, as a medium power with which Iraq was expanding military ties from the mid-1970s, could only partly reduce Iraq's dependence on the Soviets, and the United States, with which Iraq restored diplomatic links only in late 1984, was unwilling to provide it with weapons. Thus, despite the emergence of the new powers of Western Europe, China, and the economic giant Japan—a situation that helped Iraq and other Third World countries to decrease their dependence on the superpowers and promote their nonaligned policies—the two superpowers retained their predominance in the world arena. Interestingly, in its desire to maintain a true nonalignment in the 1980s, as well as in its inability to accomplish this, Iraq shared the dilemma of the

Conclusion:

The Passing

"Strategic

Alliance"

251

majority of the Third World states. Contrary to the senior position of the Soviet Union in Iraq's foreign relations during the Ba'th rule, Iraq's place in Soviet policy was secondary. This was not only because the Arab East as a whole played a secondary role in the Soviet global policy, but was also due to the fact that even in this region the prime state in Soviet strategy at the end of the 1960s until the mid-1970s was Egypt, and from then on throughout the 1980s was Syria. During all these years, the USSR preferred to foster ties with a key Arab country that was both pro-Soviet and directly involved in the ArabIsraeli dispute, for the Soviet-US rivalry in the Middle East was concentrated around this dispute, which was the most active one in the region until the 1980s. Yet even in the 1980s, the fact that the principal opposite sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Syria and Israel, had been aligned to rival superpowers—a dimension absent in the Iraq-Iran war—still preserved this conflict as a focal point of Soviet-US competition. The Arab-Israeli dispute occupied a secondary place in Soviet-Iraqi relations, and the differences of opinion between Moscow and Baghdad on this issue did not inhibit the development of bilateral ties. This was partly because the Ba'th Iraqi policy reflected first and foremost Iraqi rather than pan-Arab interests and centered on Iraq's dispute with its regional rival, Iran. This was the case even before the Iraq-Iran war of 1980-1988, despite the fact that ideologically the Palestine issue was supposed to be the core of Baghdad's policy. Other secondary matters on which differences of approach between Moscow and Baghdad did, however, overshadow their relationship were the Iraqi Communist Party and, to a lesser extent, the Kurdish problem. Notwithstanding the Ba'th regime's sensitivity to Soviet subversion on the one hand, and the significant weight the USSR attributed to the issue of the ICP and the Kurdish problem, mainly during the first three years of Ba'th rule, on the other hand—the issue of the Iraqi Communists did not, on the whole, determine the development of Soviet-Iraqi relations. The case was rather the reverse: fluctuations in Soviet-Iraqi ties were reflected in the state of relations between the Ba'th and the Communists. Specifically, only when Soviet-Iraqi relations reached the apex in 1972-1973 was formal cooperation between the ICP and the Ba'th achieved; a gradual deterioration in Soviet-Iraqi ties in the second half of the 1970s was accompanied by a growing exacerbation in Ba'th-Communist relations to the point of the dismantlement of the front in 1979; and finally, the limited Soviet-Iraqi rapprochement in the mid-1980s was not sufficient to produce a reconciliation between the ICP and the Ba'th. All in all, Soviet foreign policy was formulated by and large in line with its state interests rather than with its commitment to a universal Communist ideology, whereas the Ba'th regime was willing to reach a modus operandi with the local Communists when it wanted to maintain close ties with their patrons, the Soviets.

252

Conclusion: The Passing "Strategic

Alliance"

In the relationship between the superpower, the Soviet Union, and the medium client state, Iraq, the former was not able to make the latter pursue a policy contrary to its will. Even in the late 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, when Iraq's dependence on Soviet arms was almost total, the Soviets failed to compel the Ba'th regime to implement their schemes regarding the Iraqi Communists and the Kurds. Likewise, Moscow did not succeed in forestalling Baghdad's anti-Soviet moves in foreign and domestic affairs at the end of the 1970s, nor returning Iraq to a pro-Soviet orientation in the 1980s. Not only was Iraq's readiness to adapt its policies to Soviet interests low, but, in fact, Iraq managed to obtain Moscow's military support against the Kurds in 1974-1975. The main reason for the Soviet failure to exercise influence on Iraq and other Third World client states, in contrast to substantial Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, was Moscow's inability to use military power against Baghdad and Third World client states at large. In addition, Moscow's competition with the West figured prominently in shaping its policy toward Baghdad. Thus because of Iraq's pro-Soviet orientation and its growing importance in Soviet Middle Eastern strategy in 1974-1975, the USSR worked to secure its ties with Baghdad even at the expense of sacrificing its interests in the Kurdish problem. Further, at the end of the 1970s, the USSR reacted cautiously to Iraq's anti-Soviet policies in order to check the latter's withdrawal from the Soviet orbit, and in the mid1980s, the Soviet Union generously supplied Iraq with military hardware, to a remarkable extent, in order to restrain its purchases of weapons in the West. Note should be taken of the diminishing Soviet expectations regarding Iraq. Whereas in the late 1960s and the early 1970s the Soviet Union could take Iraq's pro-Soviet orientation for granted and press Baghdad to adapt its internal policy to Moscow's designs as well, from the mid-1970s the Soviets had to concentrate on curbing Iraq's gradual movement toward a true nonalignment. The upward trend in Soviet-Iraqi relations from the late 1960s, which had been a result of Iraq's need for Soviet assistance in a dispute with a neighboring state, bore resemblance to the improvement in Soviet-Egyptian relations after the June 1967 war. In this period, Nasser needed Soviet military aid in the dispute with Israel, and from late 1972, even Sadat deemed to mend fences with the Soviets in order to obtain the means for launching a war against Israel. During the same period, Syria, who was also preparing for a war against Israel, maintained close relations with the Soviet Union. As in the case of Iraq's loosening of relations with the Soviet Union from the mid-1970s—when Iraq moved toward and subsequently achieved a settlement with Iran—Egypt and, to a degree, Syria began weakening their ties with the Soviets after the October 1973 war, when Egypt and, to a far lesser extent, Syria favored diplomatic means for settling their dispute with Israel. Soviet links with the Arab states in the

Conclusion: The Passing "Strategic Alliance"

253

1980s were also largely influenced by these countries' disputes with their neighbors. Among the three key Arab states—Egypt, Syria, and Iraq—it was Egypt, which had concluded a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, that had the weakest ties with the Soviet Union. However, Syria, which strongly opposed the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and sought to obtain a reliable military option against Israel, concluded a friendship treaty with the U S S R in 1980 and kept a close relationship with the Soviets; whereas Iraq was compelled to partly reconstruct its relationship with the U S S R because of the war with Iran. Significantly, in the mid-1980s the Soviet Union was not only far from regaining its position as the first superpower in the Arab East of the early 1970s, but this region—while still of remarkable importance for being close to the Soviet border—lost ground in overall Soviet Third World policy. This schematic description of Soviet-Arab East relations leads to one principal conclusion. The Iraq-Iran and the Arab-Israeli disputes were the major factors that promoted the USSR's relations with the key Arab East states. Such a conclusion can be also drawn from the Soviet ability, during the period of research, to compete successfully with the West in supplying military hardware to Third World countries 1 —that is, to meet the needs of states either preparing for a war or in a state of war. This stood in contrast to the Soviet inferiority in relation to the West in supplying civil goods and economic assistance to Third World countries, namely to meet the needs of states that embarked upon the road of peace. Not surprisingly, when in the 1980s the most important Arab state, Egypt, relinquished the use of military means in the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Soviets could not return to their senior position in the Arab East. The fact that Iraq had abandoned its "strategic alliance" with the Soviets in favor of a rather sophisticated policy aimed at balancing its foreign connections also prevented a Soviet comeback. Notwithstanding the contribution of regional conflicts to promoting Soviet-Arab East relations, the conclusion that the Iraq-Iran and the Arab-Israeli disputes always and clearly served the overall Soviet interests would be wrong. At certain periods, such as in 1972-1973 and 1982-1983, the U S S R ' s gaining ground in Iraq was accompanied by losing ground in Iran, and its military support for the Arabs in the October 1973 war, as well as other Third World allies in the second half of the 1970s, had an accumulative negative effect on the détente. Further, Gorbachev's salient interest in fostering détente tended to diminish—although by no means to eliminate, as shown by his policy in the specific case of the Iraq-Iran war—Moscow's stake in the existence of conflicts in the Third World. Thus, Gorbachev's policy toward the Third World in 1988 still had a resemblance to that of Brezhnev. At that time, while earnest to introduce radical changes in Soviet domestic and foreign policies, Gorbachev had no intention of discarding communism but rather believed that a reformed

254

Conclusion: The Passing "Strategic

Alliance"

communism could work and even outdo capitalism. This, in turn, would strengthen the Soviet position abroad, including the Third World, from where Gorbachev did not want to withdraw unilaterally. However, developments in subsequent years, which started with the disintegration of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe in 1989 and was followed by growing secessionist trends and a severe economic crisis inside the Soviet Union, compelled Gorbachev, to a great extent, to disengage from active competition with the United States over influence in the Third World. Needless to say, the importance the Soviet Union attached to promoting relations with Iraq was becoming marginal, as was demonstrated during Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and its aftermath in 19901991. In the 1980s, prior to its Kuwait fiasco, Iraq under Saddam Hussein was considered an acceptable member of the international community not only by the Soviet Union and the Third World, but by the West generally. Although megalomaniacal, in comparison to other players in the Middle East Saddam Hussein seemed to behave rationally and conventionally, for his policies toward the West were a far cry from the fanaticism of Khomeini and his brutality was not so much greater than Asad's. It is not clear when Saddam Hussein decided to break flagrantly the rules of international conduct by occupying Kuwait; however, it is reasonable to assume that his illusive sense of victory in the war against Iran contributed, to a large degree, to this miscalculation. Be that as it may, the outset of the 1990s witnessed quite a different Iraq and an unrecognizable nonCommunist and defunct Soviet Union.

Notes 1. For a research on this subject, see Mark N. Kramer, "Soviet Arms Transfers to the Third World," Problems of Communism 5 (September-October, 1987), pp. 52-68.

Appendix 1 Economic Data

Table 1. Soviet and Iraqi Oil Production and Trade (in millions of tons)

Soviet Production Total Soviet Exports Soviet Exports Eastern Europe Total Soviet Imports Soviet Imports from Iraq Iraqi Production

1970

1972

353 96

404 107

40 4.6

1973 1974 1975 429 118

459 116

491 130

1976

1979

1980

520

586 155

603 162

616 170

90

80 6

72 12

130

44

49 9.1

55 14.7

59 5.4

4.0 70

11 99

3.8 5.3 5.8 92 110 104 165

6.5

6.4

1983 1984

Sources: J. Russell, Energy as a Factor in Soviet Foreign Policy (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1976), pp. 17,18,23,46; A. J. Klinghoffer, "Soviet Oil Politics in the Middle East and Soviet-American Relations," Slavic and Soviet Series (Tel Aviv) 6 (December 1976), p. 4; J. P. Stem, "Gulf Oil Strategy," The Washington Quarterly 2 (Spring 1980), p. 68; Alan H. Smith, "Foreign Trade," in Martin McCauley (ed.), The Soviet Union Under Gorbachev (London: Macmillan Press, 1987), p. 140; Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR za 19721976; Ezhegodnik BSE, 1980, p. 259; Ezhegodnik BSE, 1982, p. 269; Ezhegodnik BSE, 1984, p. 262; Ezhegodnik BSE, 1985, p. 66; Ezhegodnik BSE, 1986, p. 259.

255

256

Appendix

Table 2. Soviet Trade with Iraq, Iran, and the UAR (Egypt) (in millions of rubles) 1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

Iraq

Turnover Exports Imports

49.4 45.7 3.7

65.1 60.9 4.2

63.5 59.4 4.1

104.6 99.1 5.5

151.7 90.1 61.6

332.1 141.5 190.6

Iran

Turnover Exports Imports

115.4 79.3 36.1

196.2 145.4 50.8

231.9 169.0 62.2

239.4 139.3 100.1

229.5 95.5 134.0

276.9 137.3 139.6

Syria

Turnover Exports Imports

56.7 37.9 18.8

76.6 43.0 33.6

59.1 41.8 17.3

78.3 51.9 26.4

112.3 58.6 53.7

118.8 72.1 46.7

UAR

Turnover Exports Imports

331.8 178.2 153.6

419.7 214.4 205.3

606.4 326.9 279.5

643.9 343.2 300.7

513.7 266.1 247.6

541.1 277.2 263.9

Sources: Vneshniaia torgovlia 6 (1970), p. 53; Foreign Trade (Moscow) 6 (1972), p. 57; Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR za 1972 god, p. 12, za 1974 god, p. 14.

257

Appendix

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