Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 9780824844288

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Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations

ASIAN INTERACTIONS AND COMPARISONS

General Editor]osh\xà

A. Fogel

Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Unryu Suganuma The I Ching in Tokugawa Thought and Culture Wai-Ming Ng

ASIAN

INTERACTIONS

AND

COMPARISONS

Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands UNRYU SUGANUMA

Association for Asian Studies and University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu

ASIAN

INTERACTIONS

AND

COMPARISONS,

published jointly

by

the

University of Hawai'i Press and the Association for Asian Studies, seeks to encourage research across regions and cultures within Asia. The series focuses on works (monographs, edited volumes, and translations) that concern the interaction between or among Asian societies, cultures, or countries, or that deal with a comparative analysis of such. Series volumes concentrate on any time period and come from any academic discipline.

© 2000 Association for Asian Studies, Inc. All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America 05

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01

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Suganuma, Unryu, 1964Sovereign rights and territorial space in Sinojapanese relations : irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands / Unryu Suganuma. p.

cm. — (Asian interactions and comparisons)

Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-8248-2159-9 (cloth). — ISBN 0-8248-2493-8 (paper) 1. Senkaku Islands—International status. 2. Irredentism—China. 3. Irredentism—Japan. 4. China—Foreign relations—Japan. 5. Japan—Foreign relations—China. I. Title. II. Series. KZ3881.S46S84 327.51052—dc21

2000 99-41551 CIP

University of Hawai'i Press books are printed on acid-free paper and meet the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Council on Library Resources. Book design by Kenneth Miyamoto Printed by The Maple-Vail Book Manufacturing Group

To Chi Shuzheng and Suganuma Toshimoto, with love and gratitude

CONTENTS

List of Tables Series Editor's Preface Acknowledgments Notes on Chinese and Japanese Names

viii ix xi xiii

Introduction: Irredentism, the Diaoyu Islands, and Sinojapanese Relations

1

1. International Law and the Diaoyu Islands

19

2. Historical Documents of the Diaoyu Islands: A Cross-Time Analysis

42

3. Critics of the Irredentism Debate over the Diaoyu Islands

101

4. From Irredentism to Modern Geopolitics: The Diaoyu Islands during the Twentieth Century

116

Conclusion: Historical Justification and Chinese Hegemony

152

Appendix: The Diaoyu Islands: Maps and Historical Evidence

163

Notes Glossary Bibliography Index

189 237 245 285

vii

TABLES

1. Examples of Unsolved Irredentist Claims

9

2. Physical Geography of the Diaoyu Islands

12

3. The Chinese Cefeng [Investiture] Missions to the Liuqiu Kingdom during the Ming Dynasty

46

4. The Chinese Cefeng [Investiture] Missions to the Liuqiu Kingdom during the Qing Dynasty

70

5. The Identification of the Diaoyu Islands from Various Historical Documents

95

6. No Name of the Diaoyu Islands Recorded in the Japanese Textbooks

viii

128

SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

This volume by Unryu Suganuma inaugurates a new series, "Asian Interactions and Comparisons," to be jointly published by the Association for Asian Studies and the University of Hawai'i Press. Books within the series will look at issues that cross national or cultural borders within the context of Asia. Dr. Suganuma's work therefore marks an excellent point of departure. While there has been peace between China and Japan for the past half century, massive amounts of trade, numerous educational and cultural exchanges, and memories of World War II and before still cloud virtually every state-to-state interaction between the two countries today. One of the most contentious issues has been the disputed sovereignty over a tiny chain of uninhabited islands known in Chinese as the Diaoyu Islands and in Japanese as the Senkaku Islands. Dr. Suganuma takes a deep historical approach in trying not so much to resolve this issue as to understand how the two parties have come to articulate their opposing legitimacy claims to sovereignty. "Irredentism," the claim to terrain based on a historical "right," is the model he applies. While the Chinese repeatedly contend that the island chain was known and used by Chinese navigators from Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1912) times on, the Japanese ground their arguments in the "discovery theory" of international law, namely that the land had long been ignored and unused until Japan "rediscovered" it in 1884. In both instances, the irredentist claims of history ground the arguments, and no one seems to be questioning the validity of history as a determinant. History as the ultimate deciding factor in disputes of this sort can be found around the world, but in East Asia

ix

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Series Editor's Preface

—with its long tradition of history writing as a means of claims to legitimacy—history is something much more. Thus, we have in Dr. Suganuma's work a study simultaneously of geography, international relations, comparative history, and international law, a mixture rarely found in East Asian studies. It is based on a primary and secondary literature that almost never finds its way into mainstream East Asian studies. With the publication of Dr. Suganuma's book, a whole new literature opens up for interested readers. He examines the wealth of texts from premodern and modern China that mention the Diaoyu Islands in the context of navigation to and from the Liuqiu (Ryukyu) Kingdom—connected with contested claims over sovereignty there—and, to a lesser extent, to and from Japan. In addition, he uses a vast array of recent Chinese, Japanese, and English-language studies to situate the issues in the larger context of the debate not just about the islands themselves but of irredentism itself. From the perspective of the present, international law has ultimately been unsuccessful—or, at least, inconclusive—in mediating the competing claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands made by Chinese and Japanese. Absent a clear resolution emerging from accepted norms of international law, Dr. Suganuma sees continued irredentist claims being made by the two sides well into the foreseeable future. This volume is, without a doubt, the fullest scholarly treatment that the contested issue of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands has received to date—and in any language. It will be of interest to historians of modern China and modern Japan as well as to political scientists in international relations and Sinojapanese interactions. And it will certainly be of interest to those in the field of historical geography, Dr. Suganuma's specialty. It would be a valuable addition to any publisher's list, and we are especially proud that it launches "Asian Interactions and Comparisons." Joshua A. Fogel Series Editor

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book originated with the doctoral dissertation I completed at Syracuse University in July 1996. To readers of that dissertation committee—Daniel A. Griffith, Norman A. Kutcher, Donald W. Meinig, Marwyn S. Samuels, Jeffrey D. Straussman, and John C. Western—I am so grateful for the intellectual freedom they allowed me as I developed my ideas on this important topic, which has never been examined in the West. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my two professors: Norman A. Kutcher and Donald W. Meining. In 1995 and 1996, they continually gave their advice and encouragement, not only for my dissertation, but also for my personal life. Without their help, my career would never have gone this far. I am glad to call them my teachers as well as my "life-savers," and I will never forget them as long as I live. In preparing this book, I am indebted to many outstanding intellectuals, who either read the entire or part of the manuscript or my articles, for their valuable comments and encouragement. I would like to thank James P. Bennett, James E. Bradley, Timothy Brook, George J. Demko, Norton S. Ginsburg, Akira Ishii, P. P. Karan, Jeffry C. Kinkley, David Chuenyan Lai, John S. H. Lin, Yukimasa Nagayasu, Motoharu Naito, Yasuaki Okuno,John C. Palumbo, Richard J . Smith, V. F. S. Sit, Katsunori Suzuki, Iwao Taka, Suminori Tokunaga, Gungwu Wang, Allen S. Whiting, and Jack F. Williams. I would also like to thank my writing consultants: Jeanette Jeneault, Helga Lindberg, and Ruta Regli. They provided useful advice concerning the writing structure of this research. Jeanette, especially, assisted me from the time I entered Syracuse University in 1992 in teaching me not only about writing style, but also the American edu-

xi

xii

Acknowledgments

cational system. In addition, I deeply appreciate the University of Hawai'i Press for publishing this work as the first volume in the new Asian Studies monograph series, "History and Culture in Asia: Interactions and Comparisons." I appreciate the fastidious work of Joshua A. Fogel, general editor of the series, and my meticulous copy editor, Lee S. Motteler, who saved me from some of my worst tendencies with the English language. They must not, however, be held accountable for what remains. Finally, without help from Ann Ludeman, managing editor, and Patricia Crosby, executive editor of the University of Hawai'i Press, this book would never have come out smoothly. Of course, in the process of completing this book, I also have a group of friends and family members who offered constant encouragement and moral support. I would like to express my gratitude to Keiko Aoki, Kenichi Asabe, Mie Asai, Stella Binder, Quande Chi, Zhihui Dong,Jianren Du, Yilin H o u , J a n e Hiis, Mrs. Wm. B. Hutchinson and her late husband, Juri Ito, Porter Jarrard, Akihiro Kawakami, Harumi Komoriya, Wei-zen Lin, Guangchi Liu, Li Liu, Wei-fen Liu, Yuxin Lu, Kenichi Matsumura, Masae Nakamoto, Chieko Nagayama, Junko Oi-kawa, Tsu-yin Pan, Rev. Yoshihisa Sawano family (his wife Yoko and their children: Megumi, Yoshimi, and Hidemi), Kristen Smith, Kentaro Someya, Teruko Suganuma, Hedemi Takao, Xiaofeng Tang, Hai-yang Tong, Evelyn Tsirakis, Lingling Ye, my parents, sisters, brother, and brother in-laws. Finally, I thank the Pacific Cultural Foundation, which provided financial support in the late stages of my research, and libraries, including Cornell University, Japan Diet, Library of Congress, and Syracuse University. I am especially indebted to a group of librarians at Syracuse University—Martha Anderson, Carol Hamilton, Dorcas MacDonald, Marie Procks, and Betty Reid—who worked endlessly searching for historical documents through interlibrary loan for more than two years. Lastly, I am indebted to my best friend, Kristen Smith, for support not only in reading the entire manuscript, but also for her help in completing this research. Needless to say, I am solely responsible for any mistakes in this final version of my book. Unryu Suganuma Chicago, April 1999

NOTES ON CHINESE AND JAPANESE NAMES

Chinese and Japanese personal names are given in the text in the customary order, family name first. Works published in English by Chinese and Japanese authors are given in Western order, surname last. Pinyin romanization for the Chinese is used unless the Englishlanguage work cited has employed a different system of romanization. Macrons are used to indicate long vowels in Japanese. Where necessary in text and glossary, I have indicated double Chinese/Japanese pronunciations for Chinese characters as follows: C: Liuqiu/J: Ryükyü. When there is a Western reference to a name or term, the notation is so indicated (e.g., E: Raleigh Rock). If the pronunciation is not indicated, the name derived from the Chinese characters is based on Chinese romanization. Translations from both Chinese and Japanese sources are my own unless otherwise indicated. English translations of names, when provided, are set off by brackets (e.g., Huangwei Yu [Huangwei Island]).

xiii

Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations

Introduction Irredentism, the Diaoyu Islands, and Sino-Japanese Relations

Claims to territory are among the most prominent sources of conflict between states. This is illustrated by interstate warfare throughout human history in which countless lives have been sacrificed in the effort to expand or to defend "national space" on land, at sea, and, in modern times, in the air. More often than not the justification for such behavior is cast in some historical argument in which the past discovery, occupancy, or access to the "land of the people" takes precedence. Frequently too, such historical justifications easily inflame or serve to reflect nationalism or patriotism, in which the territory and the people become synonymous or so closely linked that a threat to one, no matter how distantly removed, becomes a threat to the others. Indeed, in the course of the modern history of the industrial state since the mid-nineteenth century, the association of land, people, and history with the legitimacy of the state is so intimate that fault lines in that relationship invariably threaten the very definition of the state. As such, challenges to the territorial integrity of the state become challenges to the definition of the people and their history. It is in this context that "irredentism," the claim to territory based on one or another historical "right," has become a common feature in interstate rivalry in the modern era. In East Asia, the dispute between China and Japan over the uninhabited Diaoyu1 or Senkaku Islands, a small group of islets north of Taiwan in the Liuqiu (J: Ryukyu, or today's Okinawa Prefecture of Japan) chain (see Appendix Fig. 1), stands out as an especially rich example of the application of irredentist arguments in the rivalry between states. The dispute is made particularly rich by virtue of the long and complex history of relations between China and Japan—

1

2

Introduction

and even more challenging by virtue of the fact that the subject of the dispute is a group of islands distantly removed from the cores of both societies. The dispute is both territorial and maritime, involving not only the discovery, occupancy, and use of the islands themselves, but also the sea lanes to and, in contemporary times, the water column and seabed near the islands. In short, the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands is a "window" not only on Sino-Japanese rivalries in East Asia, but also on disputes at sea, over marine space, the ramifications of which are broadly relevant. Suffice it to say that, based on the ancient and medieval history of maritime exploration and trade in East Asia, the Diaoyu dispute is quite literally rooted in the historical geography of China and Northeast Asia. The dispute between Japan and China over these islands has been "fought" mainly on irredentist grounds involving debates among scholars across many fields, such as history, law, political science, geography, geology, and economics. As a result, two competing groups have evolved: one is a pro-China irredentist group that emphasizes the use of historical evidence, in particular, from the archives of the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1911) dynasties. Another is a pro-Japan irredentist group based on the "discovery" theory of international law, by which the Japanese "rediscovered" these islands in 1884, as terra nullius (unadministered territory or no-man's-land). This study serves to explore in depth the case of the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands as an example in applied irredentism. The failure of international law, especially the law of the sea, ultimately led to historical justification of the irredentist Diaoyu issue. The author has provided an analysis of this in the beginning of this research (Chapter 1) as it may apply to this dispute. To that end, the author has sought here to present a virtually exhaustive analysis of the historical literature in China and Japan on the discovery, occupation, and use of the islands (Chapters 2 through 4). By the same token, whatever the biases of the current study, the author has not specifically attempted to justify either the Chinese or the Japanese claims to the Diaoyu Islands and their surrounding seas. Rather, the primary goal of the study has been to analyze the dispute as a case study in irredentism. Whether history ought or ought not to be a determinant of contemporary state policies and interstate relations, much of the purpose of this study is to demonstrate that history is a prime determinant—and especially so in the relations between China and Japan.

Introduction

3

State Policies and Historical Justification of Territorial Claims Many states have used the past to justify current policies toward the acquisition and maintenance of sovereign space. In particular, the use of the past to justify such policies is a common feature of expansionist states, perhaps the most egregious example of which in the twentieth century was Nazi Germany's claims to the Sudetenland (the modern Czech Republic), Poland, and other parts of the "volk land." To be sure, territorial expansion comes in many forms and enjoys a variety of rationalizations. In the case of the United States, for instance, Maxwell Research Professor Donald W. Meinig of Syracuse University has identified six different forms of "imperial" expansion.2 Nevertheless, irredentism, the use of the past to justify contemporary claims to territory, is an especially prominent form—and one that is most favored by states in East Asia. For example, during the 1962 SinoIndian War, Beijing declared that the Chinese army had the right to defend territories "historically" belonging to China.3 In 1969, when the Chinese military clashed with the Russians in the Zhenbao/Damansky Islands, China excused its actions by claiming "historical justification" based upon an "unequal" treaty.4 Similarly, when Japan and China claimed the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea, both governments insisted that "a great amount of historical" evidence supported their own claims.5 To be sure, such historical claims are seldom related only to territorial space; they also invoke cultural, ethnolinguistic, and other associations with the state and its people. As Alexander B. Murphy points out: "In many instances historical arguments are probably little more than attempts to seek support for territorial designs. . . . [Therefore], justifications for territorial change . . . [are] frequently rooted in ethnic-cum-historical arguments."6 Similarly, according to David Knight, "common territory by itself is not enough, for there must also be a complex set of other factors that physically, socially, and especially psychologically link the people who live in different parts of that common territory."7 In this sense too, language and language policy is a powerful tool of the state that not only reflects attitudes and values of people, 8 but also helps define the special extent of the state and its sovereign territory. Because one fundamental duty of a state is to protect and to identify its territory, the association between

4

Introduction

land, people, and state is equally basic to the maintenance and expansion of the state. Here, the history of the discovery, occupancy, and use of such territory is often critical to the very definition of the state. What this "suggests is that the articulated basis for a state's territorial claims has a momentum all its own,"9 and that historical arguments can produce "a powerful emotion, patriotism, which can lead [people] to sacrifice their lives for the 'fatherland' or the 'motherland,' for survival of the nation is more important than personal survival."10 In Andrew F. Burghardt's terms, historical arguments for territorial claims operate on an "emotional basis."11 At the same time, for one state to claim "new" territories is to simultaneously deny the claim of another state that is holding the territory. Justifications for such claims may be legal, economic, or strategic, but historical arguments are often projected in order to garner maximum domestic and international support. 12 A state seeking to acquire territory outside of its current domain simply cannot hope to receive much international or even internal support if territorial claims are solely based on economic, geographic, strategic, legal, or cultural grounds. 13 Historical justification for territorial claims, however, become the most "plausible" (i.e., convincing) argument within the international community. 14 In other words, historical arguments to territorial space internationally or domestically are more effective as well as more prevailing than any other types of arguments. This is especially true since the beginning of the modern era, when the state and the nation sought to converge. As Richard Hartshorne points out: "If the idea of the state is based on the recognition of the existence of a nation, then the major geographic question to consider is whether there is close correspondence between that area of the nation and that of the state. Are there regions within the state whose population do not feel themselves part of the nation? Are there regions of the nation that are not included with [in] the state—the issue of irredentism?" 15 In effect, state policy based on historical justifications is the nutsand-bolts motivation of irredentist movements for claims to "new" territories, and irredentist claims have achieved a quasi-legal status in the international arena. Indeed, state propaganda invariably seeks to create a single cultural and political unity that contains "not only nationalisms and their attendant irredentisms, but also all those ethnic, religious, and other cultural characteristics that bind people

Introduction

5

together."16 Similarly, the cultural-political ideal and irredentism lead to the slogan "self-determination,"17 which has been widely recognized in the international community. In short, on the one hand, territory is a frequent source of conflict between states. On the other hand, territory itself is not the only source of interstate conflict. Economic, legal, political, and cultural factors also influence such disputes.18 When all or many of these factors converge, however, and especially where they converge on a particular place, interstate conflict becomes all the more emphatic. Indeed, where such convergence occurs in the context of an irredentist movement, the potential for conflict becomes all the greater. Such is the case in the British-Argentina dispute over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas, in the case between China, Vietnam, the Philippines, and others over the Nansha Qundao [Sprady Archipelago] in the South China Sea, in the case of the Japanese-Korean dispute over Takeshima/Tok-Do in the Sea of Japan, and so too is it the case of the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea.

What Is Irredentism? Irredentism is complicated because it is based upon historical recollections of the contenders for the geographical space.19 These collective memories, whether held by the present population or their ancestors centuries ago, help to define and distinguish territories. Irredentist claims, such as those of the Irish Republic to Northern Ireland, Iraq to Kuwait, Syria to Lebanon, and Japan to the Four Northern Islands, continue to frustrate normal diplomatic efforts and often bring the nations involved to war, allowing "a state to pay lip service to formal international law while proceeding to act in its own territorial interest."20 T H E PROVENANCE OF IRREDENTISM

The term irredentism originated from the Italian language when it was used by Italian nationalists who called for the annexation of Italianspeaking communities in Gorizia, Trieste, Trentino, Istria, Ticino, Nice, Corsica, Malta, and South Tyrol from Austrian, Swiss, French, and British rule respectively.21 After Italy fought many wars for Italian unification (1859-1866), several Italian-inhabited areas were still held

6

Introduction

by Austria after 1866. In 1877, the phrase Italia Irredenta ("unredeemed Italy") was first used by Matteo R. Imbriani referring to Austrian-held Trieste. On July 21, 1878, Menotti Garibaldi, the son of the famous Giuseppe Garibaldi, formed volunteer battalions in Rome to conquer the Austrian-held Trieste, the powerful irredentist association. This organization claimed unfounded evidence that Trentino had been conquered by Giuseppe Garibaldi during the war of 1866 and insisted that the district was an "enclave" of Italian territory.22 Consequently, various irredentist groups within Italy were established, and Italia Irredenta became vocal as well as popular. Their activities began to spread over all Italian-speaking territories. Some groups pressed for the liberation of Corsica and Nice, which were held by the French. Others claimed British-held Malta. During the years of these irredentist movements within Italy, there were two divided groups: those who favored peaceful solutions and those who urged war if necessary. Despite internal disputes, the irredentist movement was a significant force in Italian politics, particularly in foreign policy during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, especially from 1900 to 1914.23 For example, the irredentists contributed significant pressure influencing the Italian government to enter World War I on the side of the Allies. In addition, Italy's territorial gains at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, including the German-speaking South Tyrol, reflected its irredentist goals. In short, the Italians invented the concept of irredentism, which claims sovereignty of "new" territories by using historical arguments, and irredentism became one of the major Italian foreign policy tools used to acquire "new" territorial space during the first part of the twentieth century. IRREDENTISM VERSUS SECESSIONISM

There are many examples of both secessionism and irredentism in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East in the postcolonial world era because most states are ethnically heterogeneous and have territorially tight minorities. Conceptually, secessionism and irredentism are closely related. Although these arguments may be distinguished for analysis, a degree of interchangeability between secessionism and irredentism permits people to choose one or the other, as well as a combination of the two phenomena. 2 4 Yet, it is important to recognize the specifics of each case, and it is imperative that all irredentists and

Introduction

7

secessionist disputes (despite being within separate categories) be "viewed through a similar lens because their commonalities are considerable, their genesis alike, and the issues to which they give rise interrelated." 25 According to Donald L. Horowitz, secessionism is the attempt by an ethnic group claiming a homeland to withdraw with its territory from the authority of a larger state of which it is a part, and irredentism is the movement by members of an ethnic group in one state to retrieve ethnically kindred people and their territory across borders. 26 Irredentism comprises two subtypes: an attempt to detach land and people from one state in order to incorporate them in another (such as the case of Somalia's irredentist movement against Ethiopia), and an attempt to detach land and people divided among more than one state in order to incorporate them in a single new state (such as the case of "Kurdistan," composed of Kurds now living in Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey) .27 In other words, irredentism is a "top-down" phenomenon, initiated a n d / o r maintained by the government, but secessionism is conducted from the "bottom up," initiated from the grassroots level.28 But the major difference between secessionism and irredentism is that irredentism subtracts from one state and adds to another state, new or already existing, and secessionism involves subtracting alone. 29 Secessionism is common, but the victory of secessionist movements is extremely difficult. From the end of the Second World War to the end of the Cold War, there are only two clear-cut secession cases: the peaceful formation of Singapore, which separated from the Malaysian Federation in 1965,30 and the formation of Bangladesh, which separated violently from Pakistan in January 1972.31 Because successful secessionism requires external assistance, which must have sufficient forces and capital to win the war and create a new secessionist state, the secession movement rarely achieves victory. Unlike secessionism, irredentism remains a largely unexplored and ignored concern because it is so difficult to define. O n e reason for this is that irredentism is rare. Despite this rarity, however, victory of irredentist movements, such as the Italian case, do occur. Often irredentist claims are discounted because they are anachronistic in nature, as opposed to secessionism, 32 which can ultimately end in the modern catch-phrase, self-determination.33

Irredentism often can be used as state policy supporting or oppos-

8

Introduction

ing irredentas. Somalia, perhaps the most persistently irredentist state in the postcolonial era, has endeavored to achieve a Greater Somalia 34 by adding the Somali-inhabited territories of Ethiopia (Ogaden) and Kenya (the former Northern Frontier District) as well as the state of Djibouti to the Somali nation-state. As former Somali President Haj Mohammed Hussein expressed, because the Somalis are "a people inhabiting a contiguous territory and possessing a common language, culture, history, and tradition, with Islam providing an important ingredient of their common culture," 35 Somalia's constitution maintains the demand for a union of all Somali territories. Therefore, Somalia has fought two bitter irredentist wars with Ethiopia (in 1964 and 1977) and has been involved in guerrilla warfare in both Kenya and Ethiopia. 36 When irredentism is considered as a state policy, many questions are raised: Can territory under the effective control of one state be claimed by another state on the grounds that it is of far greater significance to the claimant than to the possessor? What of the Japanese claim to the four islets north of Hokkaido, which have been occupied by the former Soviet Union since August 1945? Should the Diaoyu Islands belong to the Japanese or Chinese territories based on historical evidence? In fact, until mid-1994, there were at least sixty-five irredentist claims (including some minor movements of secessionism) in the post-Cold War era. 37 Some examples of unsolved irredentist claims (Table 1) may never be solved, either peacefully or politically, because they involve enormously complicated issues that include not only ethnicity and politics, but also culture and history. Some cases have to go back many centuries to verify their history. T H E REDEFINED IRREDENTISM

"Irredentism is an abstract notion that hardly ever fits a concrete historical case perfectly"; 38 therefore, it has been defined in various ways. Some analysts treat irredentism as the liberation of the unredeemed brothers' suffering 39 and "the necessary ideology to justify the plundering raids issuing from the frontier." 40 Others regard irredentism as "historical studies" 41 to resolve current political problems. Like Horowitz, scholars such as Naomi Chazan define irredentism narrowly: irredentism "highlights the importance of people and the land they occupy in the determination of the frontiers of the state." 42 By following Chazen's interpretation, the Argentinian claim on the

Introduction

Table 1. Examples of Unsolved Irredentist Claims Affiliation

to/also

Region

Current Owner

Claimed by

Bosnia and

Muslims, Croats,

Muslims, Croats, Serbs

Herzegovina

Serbs

Cyprus

Greece/Turkey

Greece/Turkey

Diaoyu/Senkaku

Japan

China

Djibouti

Djibouti

Somalia

Falkland Islands/

Britain

Argentina

Guantanamo

United States

Cuba

Hatay

Turkey

Syria

Jerusalem (Palestine)

Israel

Jordan/Palestinian

Islands

Islas Malvinas

People Kuril Islands

Russia

Japan

Kuwait

Kuwait

Iraq

Lebanon

Lebanon

Syria

Mayotte

France

C o m o r o Islands

Sprady and Paracel

China/Vietnam/

Islands

Taiwan

Brunei/Malaysia/ Philippines

South Tyrol

Italy

Austria

Taiwan

Taiwan

China

Source: Compiled by author from von Hippel, "The Resurgence of Nationalism," 192-194.

Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) cannot be considered as an irredentist argument because the islands do not contain an Argentinian population. Similarly, the boundary disputes between China and India and between China and the former Soviet Union cannot be categorized as irredentist claims.43

10

Introduction

On the other hand, Karin von Hippel defines irredentism in a broad way: "a historical claim made by one sovereign state to land a n d / o r people outside its internationally recognized boundaries, justified on the grounds that earlier separation was illegal or forced." 44 In addition to Hippel's wider interpretation, this research, however, endorses irredentism as "an attempt made by an existing state to redeem territories and peoples it considers its own,"45 or any state policy of "seeking the recovery and reunion to one country of a region/regions for the time being subject to another country" 46 by reason of ethnic, cultural, or historical ties.47 In other words, based on historical, cultural, or ethnic reasons, any state policy in any country that considers foreign-ruled territories as belonging to them is called irredentism. This definition, which will be used in this research, is not a restrictive one, and it supports the broader definition of irredentism because so many territorial debates are about land (including uninhabited islands), space, and people, and because the ultimate means for protecting the identity of its territory is seen to be the state. Consequently, there is no question about state policy involving irredentist movements. In short, the international community is reluctant to support both secessionist and irredentist efforts simply because almost every state has disaffected groups. 48 To be sure, any international law concerning territorial disputes favors the status quo, which for these cases means prolongation of the conflicts. 49 "The contemporary discourse of territorial claim justification reflects the recent ascendancy of the principle that a state is not entitled to seize territory from another unless that territory itself was originally wrongfully seized. . . . What this means is that the justifications now offered in support of territorial claims are almost invariably couched in terms of recovery of territory that historically belonged to the claiming state. The disputed territory is rightfully 'ours,' the argument goes: it was illegally taken away from 'us' and 'we' have the right to reclaim it."50 By the same token, irredentism or historical claims are less likely to receive legal sanction by the international community because the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is one of the few major international institutions deferred to for verifying available historical evidence; unfortunately, under the agreement granting jurisdiction to the court, the parties involved must agree to submit their dispute for adjudication (see Chapter 1 for details).

Introduction

11

The Diaoyu Islands and Sino-Japanese Ambivalent Relations In September 1996, six members of the right-wing Japan Youth Federation repaired the lighthouse on Diaoyu islet, largest of the Diaoyu group, which resulted in outrage among ethnic Chinese in Hong Kong and Taiwan.51 Serious confrontations between the Japanese Marine Self-Defense Force and protesters from Hong Kong and Taiwan continued for months. As a result of these confrontations, David Chan, a Chinese activist, drowned off the Diaoyu Islands. Soon after Chan's death, governments in Tokyo and Beijing staked their own claims over the Diaoyu Islands, referring to historical documents for support.52 The dispute remains unresolved today, although tension over the Diaoyu Islands has subsided since the end of 1996. Suffice it to say, however, that both governments have strong domestically and internationally motivated irredentist movements that continue to claim sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. Geographically, the Diaoyu Islands are located from 123°25' to 124°45' east longitude and from 25°40' to 26°00' north latitude, about 120 miles (200 km) northeast of Taiwan, 180 miles (300 km) west of the Liuqiu (J: Ryukyu or today's Okinawa Prefecture, Japan) Islands, and 250 miles (400 km) east of the mainland China coast (see Appendix Fig. 1). The Diaoyu Islands are an uninhabited group of eight small islets (from west to east): Diaoyu Dao or Diaoyu Tai, Bei Xiaodao, Nan Xiaodao, Feilai Dao, Danan Xiaodao/Chong Nanyan, Dabei Xiaodao/Chong Beiyan, Huangwei Dao, and Chiwei Dao. Diaoyu Dao, the largest among the eight islands, has an area of about five square kilometers,53 and often the name Diaoyu Dao or Diaoyu Tai [Diaoyu Islands] refers to all eight islands (see Table 2). Until the 1970s, the Diaoyu Islands were essentially "worthless" land for both China and Japan, and neither country appreciated these islands' value. Only after the discovery of abundant natural resources under these islands in 1969 did the dispute of ownership over them ignite the fuse of territorial confrontations between Japan and China. Today, ownership of these uninhabited islands has become one of the most complicated territorial disputes in the world. The cornerstone of the Diaoyu dispute sprouts from an intricate tapestry of economic interests, geopolitical considerations, symbolic reasons, and historical rights. The most obvious or immediate reasons Japan and China contest

Table 2. Physical Geography of the Diaoyu Islands Names of Disputed Islands

Areaa km? /mi2/ acres

Maximum Elevation (meters)b Vegetation

1

Diaoyu Dao

4.5/1.7/1,088

383

Palm trees, prickly pear, and Statice Arbuscula

Potable water available

2

Huangwei Dao

1.1/0.4/256

117

Same as above

No potable water

3

Nan Xiaodao

0.465/0.18/115

149

Little

Nicknamed "Snake Island"

4

Bei Xiaodao

0.303/0.12/75

135

Little or none

Barren rock

5

Chiwei Dao

0.15/0.06/37

84

None

Barren rock

6

Chong Beiyan/ Dabei Xiaodao

0.014/0.005/3.5°

28

None

Barren rock

7

Chong Nanyan/ Danan Xiaodao

0.005/0.002/1.2°

13

None

Barren rock

8

Feilai Dao

0.00006/0.00002/ N.A. 0.014e

None

Barren rock

Note

Notes: "Total area of the Diaoyu Islands (including all islets) is 6.5 sq. km/2.5 sq. mi/1,575 acres. (1 sq. mi = 640 acres = 2.59 sq. km; 1 sq. km = 247 eres = 0.39 sq. mi) b This refers to the elevation above sea level. c The area of the island is based on estimates. Sources: Yingjeou Ma, "The East Asian Seabed Controversy Revisited: Relevance (or Irrelevance) of the Tiao-Yu-T'ai (Senkaku) Islands Territorial Dispute," Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs 2 (1982): 7; Yang Zhongkui, "Diaoyu Tai Lieyu Wenti" [The Problem of the Diaoyu Islands], in Diaoyu Tai Lieyu Wenti Ziliao Huibian [Collection of Materials Concerning Problems of the Diaoyu Islands] (Taiwan: Yutai Yinshuachang, 1971), 64.

Introduction

13

ownership of the Diaoyu Islands are economic interests. 54 Japan, a country lacking natural resources, is one of the largest oil consumers in the world, spending approximately $25 billion annually to import oil from overseas. 55 This is problematic because Japan is competing with the postindustrial nations of the West and needs natural resources to sustain competitiveness in world markets. At the same time, China, since beginning economic reforms in 1978, has come to recognize that natural resources, especially oil and natural gas, have been increasingly indispensable to the modernization process—not least of all for power generation. Today, shortages of electricity are a major concern for Chinese modernization. In fact, "China's annual demand for new power stations equals what Switzerland will build in a century." 56 Without oil, it is impossible for China to maintain energy resources needed to fuel Chinese modernization. Indeed, China has become a net importer of oil since 1993.57 Geopolitical considerations are another factor fueling the conflict because the location of the Diaoyu Islands is strategically important for both countries. Since the Diaoyu Islands are located only 120 miles northeast of Taiwan and 250 miles east of mainland China, they constitute a potential strategic base from which a hostile power might threaten China. Indeed, Japanese military bases on the Diaoyu Islands could mean Japanese guns under China's nose. 58 Presumably the opposite also applies. As a result, the geostrategic location of the Diaoyu Islands is unquestionably important for both Japan and China. In addition, the unfortunate history of Sino-Japanese relations since the nineteenth century is of symbolic significance. Specifically, the humiliations suffered by China at the hands of the Japanese during the wars in 1895 and 1937 have motivated the Chinese to confront Japan as an overt expression of dignity. Therefore, even if the Diaoyu Islands did not have any natural resources, the Chinese would not relinquish even an inch of what they consider their territory. In the end, China, as former civilization supplier, would not tolerate that its former tributary nation, Japan, took over sovereign rights to the Diaoyu Islands. Moreover, both Japan and China claim that they have national rights to exercise sovereign control over the Diaoyu Islands. As illustrated above, historical rights have been one of the most important

14

Introduction

reasons for both the Japanese and the Chinese to claim ownership of these islands. In both cases, the assertion of historical claims serves as a powerful tool to motivate internal patriotism and nationalism. Historically, there have been many fluctuations in Sino-Japanese relations over the past two millennia. As Chae-Jin Lee, one of the foremost specialists in Sino-Japanese relations, argues, "neither common cultural background nor geographical proximity had any appreciable beneficial effect upon their conceptual deficiencies, political estrangement, or diplomatic confrontation."59 Furthermore, the Chinese always have had ambivalent feelings toward the Japanese. This is in part because once the Japanese finished studying China in the eighth century, they began to challenge the Chinese Empire. The most obvious of these challenges occurred in 1894-1895, when the Japanese won the Sino-Japanese War. The following conversation exchanged tout de suite after the war between the Chinese representative Li Hongzhang and the Japanese representative Ito Hirobumi (then prime minister) reveals the Chinese feeling toward the Japanese: Li: In Asia, our two countries, China and Japan, are the closest neighbors, and moreover have the same language. How could we be enemies? Now for the time being we are fighting each other, but eventually we should work for permanent friendship. If we are enemies endlessly, then what is harmful to China wiU not necessarily be beneficial to Japan. Let us look at the various European countries which, even though their military forces are strong, do not lightly start hostilities. Since we Chinese and Japanese are on the same continent, we should also imitate Europe. If the diplomatic ministers of our two countries mutually and deeply understand this idea, we ought vigorously to maintain the general stability of Asia, and establish perpetual peace and harmony between ourselves, so that our Asiatic yellow race will not be encroached upon by the white race of Europe. ITO: I am very much pleased with [the] idea of the grand secretary (Li Hongzhang). Ten years ago when I was at Tientsin, I talked about reform with the grand secretary. Why is it that up to now not a single thing has been changed o r reformed? This I deeply regret. Li: At that time when I heard you, sir, talking about that, I was overcome with admiration, and furthermore I deeply admired, sir, your having vigorously changed your customs in Japan so as to reach the present stage. Affairs in my country have been so confined by tradition that I could not accomplish what I desired. . . . The soldiers and generals of your honorable country are excellendy trained in the model of Western methods; in

Introduction

15

all kinds of policies and administration, you are advancing daily to newer and more prosperous planes. . . . ITO: "The providence of heaven has no affection, except for the virtuous." If your honorable country wishes to exert itself to action, Heaven above would certainly help your honorable country to fulfill its desires. It is because Heaven treats the people below [i.e., mankind] without discrimination. The essential thing is that each country should do its own best. Li: Your honorable country, after it has been so reorganized by you, sir, is very admirable [emphasis added] , 60

As illustrated above, the Chinese expressed their envy of the Japanese success in modernizing their nation and hoped the Japanese would stop their attacks on China. On the other hand, the Japanese tried to dictate what the Chinese should do. For centuries, the Chinese image of the world order caused them to assume that they were superior to all others. After losing the 1894-1895 war with the Japanese, the Chinese superiority complex suffered.61 During the Second World War, the Japanese set up Manzhouguo [or Manchukuo] in northeast China, creating the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." Although some Chinese collaborationists hoped that the Japanese would help China become liberated from Western imperialism, most realized that the Japanese were not much different from any other imperialists. The Japanese, in fact, did not liberate the Chinese from Western powers; instead they colonized parts of China. Pu Yi, the last emperor of China, optimistically stated that Japan would have complete control over the "defence and security" of "Manchukuo;" that Japan would administer the railways, harbours, waterways, and airways of "Manchukuo" and could [.rc'c] carry out further construction; that the supplies and equipment needed by the Japanese troops would be provided by "Manchukuo;" that the Japanese would have the right to open mines and exploit natural resources; that the Japanese would be allowed to hold office in "Manchukuo;" that Japan would have the right to move immigrants into "Manchukuo;" and many other items. 62

Even today, the Chinese have ambivalent feelings toward the Japanese despite the fact that economic and cultural ties between Japan and China have continued to deepen.63 When Japan normalized relations with the nationalist Taiwan regime, Jiang Jieshi [or Chiang Kaishek] waived reparations for the Second World War.64 Similarly, when

16

Introduction

Japan normalized relations with China in 1972, Mao Zedong, according to the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement (article 5), waived Japan's reparations for WWII.65 However, when the Qing government lost the war in 1894-1895 and the Boxer movement in 1900, China paid a total 289,540,000 taels of silver to Japan, despite the weak economy of the Qing dynasty. Even though Japan had great economic power in 1972 (GNP $300 billion), Japan did not pay any money to China for the war.66 This reparation problem reflects the question of Japan's morality. To be sure, war reparations are a constant thorn aggravating Sino-Japanese relations. The ambivalence in Sino-Japanese relations is not one-sided. For instance, since the Chinese economic reforms of 1978, Japan has provided grants for establishing the China-Japan Friendship Hospital in Beijing and the preservation of the Dunhuang Mogao Cave on the Silk Road, yen credits or soft loans for building roads, railways, dams, as well as technological assistance. But assisting in the modernization of China has led many in Japan to fear that someday China will become too strong (i.e., threaten Japan's security). As a result, Japan has been reluctant to transfer advanced technologies to China.67 This, in turn, only increases the "stingy" image of the Japanese in China. The Japanese also shoulder burdens of the past and face dilemmas in the future.68 On the other hand, an unstable China remains Japan's worst nightmare (i.e., mass refugees). Because of the relatively close proximity ofJapan to China (see Appendix Fig. 1), the potential impact of an aggressive China is certainly a concern to Japan. As Regents Professor Allen S. Whiting, a guru in the study of Sino-Japanese relations, points out, the conventional idea of a "love-hate relationship" does not apply to Sino-Japanese relations because there is no "love" on the Chinese side,69 even though the Chinese have greatly admired the Japanese economic growth and technological modernization.70 Toward the fin de siècle of the twentieth century, as the two major powers in the Asian region, the stability of Sinajapanese relations can contribute not only to peace and prosperity in both countries and the Asian region, but also to harmony in the world as a whole. In sum, if Chinese irredentism is the case, why did the Chinese choose this "place"—the Diaoyu Islands—to emphasize their sovereignty? If historical justification or use of the past is Chinese state policy, why did Beijing decide to shelve the Diaoyu case when China and Japan normalized relations in 1972? Moreover, Deng Xiaoping

Introduction

17

declared in 1978 that the issue of the Diaoyu Islands could be solved by posterity. Now that the "next generation" headed by Jiang Zemin has officially taken charge in China, 71 will the Chinese seek a resolution of this dispute in the near future, or has Beijing a broader strategic game plan? If China has a strategic game plan, how might this affect Sino-Japanese relations? How does the Diaoyu Islands dispute relate to Chinese naval development and Chinese oceanic policy? Will the Chinese seek regional hegemony in the twenty-first century? In addressing the above mentioned questions, this research employs a frame of reference derived from the study of historical geography and geopolitics. The major purpose of this study is to reveal the fact that people living in different places during different periods of time have different concepts of territorial space, and that states have tried to use historical arguments (i.e., irredentism) to justify their current policies. Among the major issues addressed by this study, the first centers on the historical development of the Diaoyu Islands dispute. In particular, to whom do the Diaoyu Islands belong? When did the Chinese and the Japanese become involved in this dispute? Does historical evidence prove who has the sovereign right of the Diaoyu Islands? And how has irredentism become a major state policy in both China and Japan? A second issue centers on Chinese views of sovereignty and their methods of delimiting the international boundary of the Diaoyu Islands during the Ming and the Qing dynasties. Based on the long history of Chinese administrative geography, the Chinese had their own way to demarcate legitimate political space and marine space in the East China Sea. In particular, the Chinese created the Sinitic world order by networking their investiture-tributary system to demonstrate the Chinese way of hegemony during traditional periods. A third issue is that the Chinese have their own concept of hegemony that they apply to their international relations or international diplomacy in the international arena today. China might not follow the Western pattern, but it will seek its own way of hegemony with "Chinese characteristics" in the world political system. In particular, China's strong economic growth means a strong China in the next millennium. A fourth issue, and one of the more significant threads running through this work, is that the Diaoyu Islands dispute is not an isolated affair, but rather a deeply rooted cultural and historical conflict be-

18

Introduction

tween Japan and China, illustrating the long-standing mistrust in SinoJapanese relations. Moreover, the Diaoyu dispute exposes complicated geopolitical relations among Japan, China, the United States, and Taiwan in the Asian-Pacific region. Finally, this study discloses the interwoven relationship between history and geography. By analyzing the history of the Diaoyu Islands, many Chinese and Japanese historical geographers contributed their knowledge to their own states as national diplomatic policy and national security policy for centuries. Many of these historians and geographers and their works have been unknown in the West, and it is an underlying purpose of this thesis to expose this material to a Western readership. In the end, none of these issues is discrete, and they often relate to one another in conjunctive ways. This book demonstrates that the fundamental theme linking all of these issues together is that the irredentist arguments are the major driving force behind state policy by China to contest Japan over the territorial space of the Diaoyu Islands. The dispute may be resolved, whether by negotiation or by warfare; however, the justifications for this dispute will remain deeply rooted in the historical, political, and cultural geography of the Asian region. Because of the failure of international law, it is the primary goal of this research to reveal that historical geography might offer some guidance to the possible resolution of this irredentist dispute. The author sincerely hopes that scholars will turn to this work for generations to come as the primary source for insight into this irredentist Diaoyu issue.

1

International Law and the Diaoyu Islands

The case of the Diaoyu Islands cannot and will not be easily resolved by principles of international law because not only are the arguments based on international law regarding the Diaoyu Islands' case controversial, but also there are no appropriate rules to settle this dispute. Depending upon who interprets international law and what rules of international law one uses, the resolution of the Diaoyu dispute could vary. Even though the Diaoyu Islands case has become a hot topic for international legal scholars who have created many arguments based on their own interpretations, their arguments and possible solutions rely heavily on the numerous historical archives of the Diaoyu Islands, especially historical documents during the Ming and Qing dynasties.

Limitation of International Law and the Chinese Law Whenever territorial disputes occur around the world, scholars—especially international lawyers—have a tendency to seek resolutions based on their own interpretations of international law, including the law of the sea. Unfortunately, however, there is no such thing as a universally accepted international law of the sea.1 Conversely, developments in the law of the sea are continuous, constantly transforming the character and content of the international legal system.2 Often new definitions or rules are underdeveloped and extremely ambiguous. Moreover, countries often disagree on fundamental principles of international law. As a result, international law fails to provide the panacea solution expected by many. There is little chance that many territorial conflicts, including the Diaoyu Islands, will ever be brought before the ICJ simply because territorial disputes tend to be settled

19

20

International Law and the Diaoyu Islands

through diplomatic negotiations by the disputing parties, 3 rather than by playing a "zero-sum game" in the court. T H E " F R A G M E N T A T I O N " OF I N T E R N A T I O N A L LAW

Not until the seventeenth century did the concept of international law begin to appear in historical textbooks. The Law of War and Peace, written by Dutch jurist H u g o Grotius in 1625, is widely acknowledged as f o u n d i n g the m o d e r n discipline of the law of nations. Grotius argued that the law of nations established legal rules that b o u n d the sovereign states of Europe during the medieval era. 4 In his writing, Grotius used only phrases such as "interpretation of law," "interpretation of promises," "interpretation of treaties," and "taken in c o m m o n acceptation" 5 to describe the idea of international law; he never utilized the words international law. T h e terms international or law of nations did not appear until 1789, when they were first mentioned in An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation by Jeremy Bentham. 6 Today, both law of nations a n d international law are used interchangeably. 7 Similarly, sovereignty is a fundamental principle of international law. T h e first Western notion of sovereignty appeared in Bodin's celebrated work, De la republique, published in 1576, describing the absolute power of a m o n a r c h within his own state. 8 Today, Western notions of sovereignty are considered "gibberish" by some scholars. 9 As a "universal" constitution, international law has never functioned as an efficient and effective law.10 International law, in fact, has a few extreme limitations. First, international law has many ambiguous and equivocal definitions. International law is initiated f r o m the Western imperialist experience, and its functions a n d concepts have favored many Western countries. Even though a n u m b e r of Western countries have tried to eliminate the reference to many equivocal words, most current treaties and laws still d e p e n d on the old formula of international law (i.e., Roman law or C a n o n law, which drew heavily on principles of natural law). 11 For instance, the first paragraph of Article 83 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) states, "The delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution." 12 According to Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ,

International Law and the Diaoyu Islands

21

The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: (a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; (b) international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; (d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law [emphasis added].13 The phrase "recognized by civilized nations" in Article 38(c) raises questions as to what countries are to be considered as "civilized nations." Does "civilized nations" mean "Christian states?" Which country should be the model of the "civilized nations"? Whose values judge a country as a "civilized nation" or an "uncivilized nation?" A second problem with international law is the issue of "universality." How "universal" is existing international law? How can the law be made more "universal"? Because there are so many countries that have different cultural and ideological backgrounds, how can only one international law equally apply to states of different political, social, and economic systems? Should newcomers (such as China) with different ideological and cultural backgrounds be considered outside the realm of international law because their views do not coincide with Eurocentric principles of law?14 Should international law, which has grown out of the traditional Western value system, be reviewed by new challengers (e.g., countries of the third world) who have totally different value systems?15 As a developing country, China has rejected traditional international law, which, in China's view, served only the interests of the capitalist countries in the West.16 Accountability and enforceability are other problems presented by international law. This is illustrated by the U.S. Hostages Case in 1980. The ICJ noted that those attacking the U.S. Embassy had no status as recognized agents of the state. Like the Iran-U.S. Claim Tribunal, the court refused to interpret the general declarations of the Ayatollah Khomeini as authorizing such operations. Nor were his subsequent congratulations enough to alter the character of the militants' attack on the U.S. Embassy as governmental. 17 The court, ergo, found limited responsibility on the part of Iran's violation of duties under the 1961 Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which requires a coun-

22

International Law and the Diaoyu Islands

try (i.e., Iran) to protect a foreign embassy a n d its diplomats (i.e., the United States). Even in the Balkan war of Bosnia-Herzegovina today, there is n o d o u b t that international law has played an ineffective role. Although international organizations have the right to bring war criminals to trial, most war criminals in the f o r m e r Yugoslavia have n o t been b r o u g h t to justice. 18 Furthermore, the newly created International Criminal Court (ICC) has n o t gone smoothly. 19 Fourth, arguments based on international law provide little or n o right to bring territorial disputes, including the irredentist Diaoyu Islands case, before the international tribunal. In fact, the ICJ does n o t have power to setde territorial disputes unless disputed parties submit their jurisdiction to the court.20 This means that as long as disputed parties (e.g., J a p a n a n d China) continue to claim their sovereignty rights in a particular territory (e.g., the Diaoyu Islands) a n d do n o t agree to go to the ICJ, international law cannot be relied upon to resolve such disputes. Given these facts, many territorial disputes simply are not solved on the basis of international law. But a state, according to H u g o Grotius, has the right to make war to setde the territorial disputes. 21 In the final analysis, many m o d e r n concepts a n d methods to resolve disputes according to international law are new and still underdeveloped; international law is n o t the miracle panacea to solve all kinds of international disputes. Because of the dubious nature of international law, many arguments a n d discourses m a d e by international lawyers often pass by each o t h e r rather than address o n e another. In addition, the f u n d a m e n t a l principles of international law unquestionably originated f r o m the experiences of the imperialist era by the Western powers, when strong states ruled or colonized weak states using the muscle of the gun. As a result, many underdeveloped countries that were victimized by Western imperialism often attack the creditability of international law. INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH "CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS"

Because China was humiliated by the Western powers during the second half of the nineteenth century, it is n o t difficult to understand why the Chinese were strongly against the United Nations a n d against international law during the 1950s a n d 60s. From the Chinese viewpoint, that international law has served as a tool for Western imperialists to colonize a n d conquer countries in the third world, in-

International Law and the Diaoyu Islands

23

eluding China. W h e n China finally became a p e r m a n e n t m e m b e r of the Security Council in the United Nations in the 1970s, it used its status to push its own political agenda (i.e., antihegemony and antisuperpowers) by associating with underdeveloped countries in the international arena. China's behavior at the U N reflects its "pick a n d choose" 22 attitude; China's views toward international law are often based on its own political agenda rather than legal considerations, such as judicial decisions of the ICJ and principles of international law. Chinese Foreign Policy and International Law In traditional Chinese society, there were state laws that dealt with the structure and functioning of government, as well as a general code enforced by the imperial government. T h e purpose of the legal code, however, was primarily to deal with disturbances to the social order. 23 Chinese legal philosophy is based on the concept of the dichotomy between the concept of li [moral rules of correct conduct a n d good manners] and the concept of fa [law]. Li is the primary Confucian teaching a n d is a f o r m of social control against unrestrained expression of h u m a n desires. Fa is primarily the teaching of the legalist school by H a n Feizi (280P-233? B.C.) a n d relies on sanctions by force to exact obedience to a n d compliance with the law. Whereas li forbids trespasses before they are committed, fa punishes criminal acts after their commission. 24 Ever since the fall of the Roman Empire, law has h a d a different function in Chinese civilization compared to the West. Until 1911, law never played a mzyor role in Chinese society. Some scholars regard Chinese society (or even the current regime) as "rule by man," rather than "rule by law."25 Analogous to the Roman concept, the Chinese view of international diplomacy was based essentially o n a theory of the "universal" state. U n d e r Pax Sinica, the Chinese practiced their own concept of international law—the investiture-tributary system— based o n the rule of Confucian li (see Chapter 2). This practice "comes closer to customary law a n d court decisions of pluralist origin [s] than to [the] monist law of Western systems of codification." 26 Because of its geographical, military, political, a n d cultural centrality in the Asia region, China had n o natural allies and n o p e r m a n e n t enemies, but a mutually separable relationship with its neighbors. 2 7 T h e Chinese enjoyed considerable f r e e d o m of diplomatic maneuvers in the region because they were consistently able to

24

International Law and the Diaoyu Islands

deal independently, on a bilateral basis, with neighboring states, kingdoms, and tribes in the Asian region. Today the Chinese have restored their cultural and political unity, whereas the West has never recovered these characteristics of the Roman Empire. 28 During the Republican era, the Chinese leaders attempted to reform the traditional system by ending the keju [imperial examination system] ,29 signifying the end of the institution of the gentry and the role of li. The disappearance of this old social order by the rule of its moral code made the acceptance of a new system imperative; the Chinese leaders started to aim at bringing Western law into the society. Under Yuan Shikai, China promulgated many laws, including the Law of Merchants and the Chinese Nationality Act.30 In 1928, the Law Codification Commission finally completed the Criminal Code, 31 reflecting concepts of Western law. Nonetheless, the national government never got a chance to exercise these laws because the stability of Chinese society was threatened during the warlord, the Japanese, and the civil-wars periods. Despite these legal reforms, the fundamental principles of Chinese cultural and political unity have never changed. When Mao Zedong made his famous "standing up" proclamation during the ceremony of the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, he laid down three principles of international diplomacy: "equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect for territorial sovereignty,"32 indicating that the PRC sought recognition and diplomatic relations rather than legal considerations. But the year 1954 was the turning point of the Chinese view of international law. On April 29, 1954, Prime Minister Zhou Enlai declared the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (FPPC) during the ceremony of the Sino-Indian Trade Agreement in Tibet. The FPPC are: (1) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) Mutual non-aggression; (3) Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; (4) Equality and mutual benefit; and (5) Peaceful coexistence.33 This FPPC policy represents an expansion of the three cardinal principles that Mao declared in 1949, 34 becoming China's ruling policy when dealing with foreigners in the international arena. The significance attached to the concept of sovereignty in the FPPC represents

International Law and the Diaoyu Islands

25

the most fundamental principle of international law.35 From this point onward, the Chinese leaders have often used their own interpretation of international law based on China's internal political considerations by taking a "pick-and-choose" position toward principles of international law. In addition, antihegemonism has been another principle of the Chinese diplomacy. For the Chinese leadership, antihegemonism has also meant a self-identifying and self-legitimating principle; many important diplomatic documents, including the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty in August 1978 and the Sino-Soviet Joint Communiqué in May 1991, have embodied the principles of FPPC and antihegemony. According to Beijing Review: "Hegemonism is implementing a policy of aggression and expansion abroad in the attempt to control the world or any one region of the world. To determine whether or not a country is hegemonic, we must look not at the size of its territory, population or military forces, but rather at the nature of its foreign policy. Big countries are not necessarily guilty of hegemonism, nor are small countries necessarily innocent of this crime [emphasis added]." 36 Because China, as a permanent member of the Security Council, has an influence in the UN, it has attempted to cultivate friendship with as many states in the third world as possible to fight against hegemony in the international arena. In a major speech at the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1974, Deng Xiaoping as the head of the Chinese delegation pledged: The Chinese Government extends its warm congratulations on the convocation of this session and hopes that it will make a positive contribution to strengthening the unity of the developing countries, safeguarding their national economic rights and interests and promoting the struggle of all peoples against imperialism, and particularly against hegemonism. . . . We hold that in both political and economic relations, countries should base themselves on the Five Principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.... If one day China should change her color and turn into a superpower, if she too should play the tyrant in the world, and everywhere subject others to her bullying, aggression and exploitation, the people of the world should identify [it] as social-imperialism, expose it, oppose it and work together with the Chinese people to overthrow it.37

26

International Law and the Diaoyu Islands

Deng's speech, based on Mao's "Three World Theory"38 and Zhou's FPPC, proclaimed that China as the revolutionary vanguard was to respond to the third world's call. As Deng states, China will never seek hegemony; this policy remains in force and continues to influence China's international diplomacy.39 But the three central foreign policy challenges—antihegemonism, unification of Taiwan, and modernization in 1980—were reaffirmed during Deng's era.40 In 1981-1982, Beijing began to shift emphasis to an independent and nonaligned antihegemonic line. In October 1982, Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua insisted that China continually advocate an "independent foreign policy," firmly opposed to hegemonism and always abiding by the FPPC.41 The 1982 constitution, de facto, clearly stated that China adheres to "an independent foreign policy" and the "FPPC," as well as opposing "imperialism, hegemonism, and colonialism."42 According to Deng Xiaoping's speech in 1985: "Some people are talking about the international situation in terms of a big triangle. Frankly, the China angle is not strong enough. China is both a major country and a minor one. When we say it is a major country, we mean it has a large population and a vast territory. But at the same time, China is a minor country, an underdeveloped or developing country. It is a minor one in terms of its ability to safeguard peace or deter war."43 During both Mao's era and Deng's age, Beijing has always maintained a foreign policy based on its own national interests or domestic power politics by alternating the dual roles of major and minor country status in the international arena. China also began to appreciate the role of the United Nations, in which China has maintained relative success in pushing through its own agenda. As a Chinese leader notes, "since 1970, the imperialists, hegemonists, and expansionists no longer have been able to do as they wished in the organization. . . . The UN arena has become a rostrum from which the third world countries speak out against aggression and hegemonism."44 China "firmly sides with Third World Nations"45 in the international arena. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the principles of Chinese international diplomacy did not change much; the FPPC remains the primary basis of Chinese foreign policy.46 When the "New World Order" or "Bush Doctrine" was launched after the Gulf War in the 1990s, China expressed an opposing view to the American proposal

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27

by saying that "the international order is n o t . . . an abstract existence beyond every country's interests; instead, it reflects the change in the balance of power in the world and the interest demand of different forces." 47 During the post-Deng era, leaders in Beijing seem to attach a new condition—economic development—to Chinese foreign policy. On December 13, 1995, at the Discussion Meeting of Deng Xiaoping's Foreign Policy, Jiang Zemin gave a speech previewing Chinese foreign policy of the future. According to Jiang, based on principles of the FPPC and Deng's philosophy of international diplomacy, China should primarily focus on economic development and maintain an independent foreign policy during this post-Cold War era. The two major goals of Chinese diplomacy are to oppose hegemonism and to safeguard peace in the world by increasing international cooperation and promoting common interests. 48 In the final analysis, the goals of Chinese foreign policy today are to make China a regional power first, to exercise limited global influence, to become an international power as the Chinese economy and resources grow, and to finish the still incomplete agenda of national reunification 49 by resolving territorial disputes with others. In short, China's primary concern is its own political agenda rather than legal principles. As long as the Chinese have their own interests in the international arena, they will endorse international law with "Chinese characteristics" that reflect their own domestic political agenda. Despite the influence of modern concepts of law in the West, the Chinese have retained elements of the traditional Confucian concept of li during the Sinitic world order (see Chapter 2). In particular, as a vanguard of the third world, China speaks for smaller countries in the international arena as if China was a suzerainty during Pax Sinica. A Perspective on Modern Territorial Seas

The definition of territorial sovereignty under international law in the West refers to "the power of a state to exercise jurisdiction over persons and things within its own territory, usually to the exclusion of all other authorities." 50 Under this definition, some Sinologists claim that the idea of sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction did not exist in traditional China. 51 This does not mean, however, that the Chinese do not have their own definition of sovereignty. Rather, the Chinese have different views of territorial sovereignty than

28

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those f o u n d in Western nations. In terms of territorial seas, if there was to be ownership of the sea in ancient times, then the e m p e r o r was considered the sole owner. 52 Therefore, the Chinese emperor was considered the ultimate landowner during imperial China. T h r o u g h o u t the long history of China, Chinese m e r c h a n t and naval vessels were quite active in the seas adjacent to the Chinese coast. China acknowledged the concept of territorial waters as early as the Ming dynasty, when the Chinese military set u p a defense system against the wokou [Japanese pirates]. Territorial conflicts, however, rarely surfaced until the Japanese began to challenge the Chinese regarding the annexation of the Liuqiu Kingdom in 1879. This incident became known as the S i n o j a p a n e s e quasi-war of 1871-1881. 53 Since the PRC era, Beijing has become the inheritor of a long social a n d political history, and the Chinese have tried to adjust to the m o d e r n concept of territorial seas in international law. In September 1958, China issued the Declaration on the Territorial Sea, which designates the m o d e r n maritime space a n d is compatible with international law.54 Two factors have shaped Chinese attitudes toward the International Law of the Sea. O n e is that the sea has historically been a threat for the Chinese since the Western imperialists invaded the Middle Kingdom f r o m the sea during the second half of the nineteenth century. T h e other is that natural resources, such as fish, oil, a n d natural gas, are economically important. 5 5 Legally, a few features of the 1958 Chinese Declaration can be characterized. First, China unilaterally promulgated a 12-mile limit of territorial sea, which contradicted the 3-mile limit followed by the West. This 12-mile limit of the territorial sea reflects the Taiwan issue. Since the American Seventh Fleet protected Taiwan against possible Chinese invasion, the Chinese declaration attempted to keep the American Seventh Fleet away f r o m the Taiwan Strait. This declaration demonstrates how China is influenced by political rather than legal considerations—the unification of Taiwan. 56 Second, the Chinese prefer the straight baseline method 5 7 because this would p u t all islands, including Taiwan and the Penghu Archipelago [the Pescadores], within China's territorial sea. But the Chinese Declaration on the Territorial Sea does not expressly state the m e t h o d by which the outer limit is to be drawn, n o r does it appear to have been specifically dealt with elsewhere. 58 In the case of the irredentist Diaoyu issue, n o t o n e of the three parties (China, Taiwan, or Japan) is able

International Law and the Diaoyu Islands

29

to draw baselines that would include these islands within their national boundaries, although Taiwan is about 120 miles away from the Diaoyu Islands, making it geographically the closest.59 Third, one of the most important rules of international law in terms of exercising sovereignty in the territorial sea is the recognition of the right of innocent passage for foreign vessels. The announcement of the Chinese Declaration concerning the right of innocent passage is implicit in paragraph 3 of the declaration. Fourth, if the ocean is free to all mankind, it is reasonable to suppose that every country should have access to the shores of the ocean and the right to navigate all navigable rivers60—the freedom of the high seas.61 Since this declaration is motivated by the hope to regain Chinese offshore islands (i.e., Taiwan), there is no explicit passage for the freedom of the high seas. This 1958 declaration was issued several months after the conclusion of the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea and illustrates that Beijing was prepared to avoid violations of international law. Even though China was not a member of the 1958 Geneva Convention, she recognized that the convention would create customary international law in the future. 62 As the Chinese proverb states, "to take the initiative is to gain the upper hand." Since the 1958 convention did not have any international consensus regarding the limit of the territorial sea, this Chinese preemptive strike, according to international law, cannot be considered illegal.63 The post-1958 development on the Law of the Sea has been favorable to the Chinese views. By the time the UNCLOS III convened in 1982, not only did a number of countries extend their territorial sea to China's 12-mile limit, but they also preferred to use the straight baseline method; as a result, China successfully pushed its political agenda throughout the UNCLOS III. The Chinese views regarding the protection of marine space are as follows: "The earth's vast seas and oceans make u p 70 per cent of its surface and form important routes linking all the continents. The imperialists and colonialists have all along proclaimed that control of the seas is a prerequisite for world domination. As early as the 16th century, the British colonialists preached that those who ruled the seas could exercise control over the world. Late in the 19th century, Alfred Thayer Mahan, the early exponent of the 'influence of sea power,' even asserted that world domination could be established through the 'command of the sea.' A Russian tsar also shouted: 'Water areas—that's what Russia

30

International Law and the Diaoyu Islands

needs.' "64 For the Chinese, a sea is considered an important marine space needed to provide natural resources for the countries of the third world, which must protect the marine space against imperialists. In addition, the Chinese favor the creation of certain zones of special jurisdiction in the area beyond the territorial sea; economic zones are considered especially important. On J u n e 21, 1974, China firmly endorsed the 200-nautical-mile maritime rights, which China considers a fundamental right of the third world countries to against hegemonism: The struggle which has been waged in recent years by a large number of coastal states against the maritime hegemony of the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, and in defence of the 200-nautical-mile maritime rights in many different ways has become an irresistible historical trend. . . . The expansionist activities of the two superpowers have promoted the formation of a broad international united front on the question of maritime rights among the countries of the Third and Second Worlds against hegemonism and thus placed the two superpowers in utter isolation. 65

As Beijing has pointed out, "by strengthening unity, the third world is now waging a steadfast struggle against the aggressive ambitions of the superpowers scrambling for maritime hegemony." 66 Importantly, on November 7,1984, Ni Zhengyu, 67 a noted Chinese international jurist, was elected to the ICJ. As a result, the Chinese have their own voice in the ICJ and seek their own agenda in the international arena. As Judge Ni has stated: "The most important thing for a judge is to uphold justice. The present international situation is turbulent. International disputes and incidents keep emerging, and some of them are submitted to the ICJ. I'll stand with other judges for justice, and do my best to promote world peace and security."68 Finally, a draft of the Law of the Sea Convention at the UNCLOS III was adopted on April 30, 1982, with 130 countries voting in favor, 4 (i.e., the U.S., Turkey, Venezuela, and Israel) against, and 17 countries (including the Soviet Union, the U.K., and the Federal Republic of Germany) abstaining. 69 The UNCLOS III is undoubtedly a victory for China and the countries in the third world. This convention recognizes a 12-mile territorial sea (Article 3), 70 a 200-mile exclusive economic zone (Article 57) ,71 and the principle of the common heritage of mankind (Article 125).72 Moreover, this conference achieved much

International Law and the Diaoyu Islands

31

progress in protecting the common resources of the deep seabed and the legitimate maritime rights of nation-states, breaking up the old maritime tradition that favored a few sea powers. As a result, a few industrialized countries, especially the United States, cannot monopolize the exploitation of minerals lying in the international seabed area by using their abundant capital and advanced technology.73 Despite these achievements, China is still not satisfied with some provisions of the convention, such as the definition of the continental shelf 74 and the passage of foreign warships through territorial waters.75 Despite the dissatisfaction, however, on May 15, 1996, the Chinese Parliament, National People's Congress (NPC) ratified the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, to which China now is the 93rd nation to subscribe. 76 One might wonder how the Japanese participated in the UNCLOS III. Michael Blacker analyzed the Japanese attitude toward the Law of the Sea in Japan's Foreign Policy, edited by Gerald L. Curtis.77 The fact of the matter is that Japan did not play a major role at all at the Law of the Sea Convention because each ministry (e.g., Ministry of Foreign Affairs vs. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries) maintained its own view of the territorial sea. As a result, the Japanese government did not have a single and unified voice regarding the territorial sea.78 In fact, the Japanese representative embarrassingly was forced to apologize for the lack of instructions from his government and for a lack of expertise on the subjects being negotiated by the committee; 79 this was because the Japanese lacked sufficient time to study the issue and prepare ground already covered by other nations such as China. As a result, at the Law of the Sea Convention, Tokyo championed no significant causes, took no major initiatives, was not a key consensus builder, and was not associated with any major formulation. Nor did Japan seem particularly interested in making its mark on the convention text. 80 The few statements made by Japanese delegates were narrowly focused, nonideological, closely attentive to minor issues and textual details, and devoted to contrasting differences between existing drafts or raising rather inconsequential points about others' proposals, revisions, and drafts.81 When the time came to vote on the 200-Mile Economic Zone issue, only one country, which had never played a major role or made contributions at the UNCLOS III at all, voted against the issue. This county was none other than Japan. 82 In the end, the Japanese representatives

32

International Law and the Diaoyu Islands

were "silent, smiling, and sleeping" throughout the whole conference. Despite having the fourth largest delegation—behind the United States, the U.S.S.R., and Canada—Japan had only Iguchi Takeo, counselor to its UN Mission, as the sole Japanese official to attend every meeting of the UNCLOS III.83 Ironically, Japan has three territorial disputes, all related to the territorial sea.84 In fact, the sea is truly the Japanese lifeline. For instance, Japan is one of the largest fish consumers in the world. Additionally, with a sixth of the world's merchant shipping, it handles a fifth of the world's maritime freight. Japan is the world's largest importer of raw materials and is heavily dependent upon imports of the minerals found in abundance in the deep seabed. 85 Why did the Japanese government not care much about the UNCLOS III? Nobody believes that the Japanese government could not find some specialists in the Law of the Sea among their 120 million citizens. Nor does anyone believe that the Japanese government did not understand what the purpose of the UNCLOS III was. The UNCLOS III will become the customary international law in the future regardless of Japan's role in developing the convention and certainly will directly affect the Japanese territorial disputes with others. Then why did the government send a number of bureaucrats, who acted like junior high school students, doing nothing but being "silent, smiling, and sleeping" at the conference? It is a waste of time to discuss what the Japanese delegation contributed to the UNCLOS III because they provided nothing to the international community with regard to the Law of the Sea Convention. Hopefully, someday history will j u d g e the Japanese actions in the UNCLOS III. IfJapan could not take the lead and contribute its efforts in an important meeting like the UNCLOS III, many people now wonder why the Japanese government even bothered to try to be a permanent member of the Security Council at the UN!

To Whom Do the Diaoyu Islands Belong? The Law of the Sea Analysis The fundamental question is: To whom do the Diaoyu Islands belong, based on the International Law of the Sea? Even though the concept of international law has existed for centuries, there is no clear and precise rule of international law applicable to the irredentist Diaoyu

International Law and the Diaoyu Islands

33

Island case. As a result, the many arguments regarding the Diaoyu dispute made by international lawyers confuse the dispute rather than clarify it. Interestingly, the historical facts surrounding the Diaoyu Islands comprise the primary evidence supporting claims to the Diaoyu Islands, even to international lawyers analyzing this dispute. In other words, the historical documents from both China and Japan will be evidence if the Diaoyu case is submitted to the ICJ. T H E U N C L O S I AND II

Because neither Japan nor China were parties to the 1958 Convention or the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I), this convention of international law cannot apply to the case of the Diaoyu Islands. 86 Even though Taiwan was a party to the 1958 Convention, it cannot be the party to claim these islands because Taiwan has been a province o f the PRC in the international arena. In addition, there is no existing bilateral boundary agreement between the Chinese and the Japanese governments regarding the Diaoyu Islands. Similarly, UNCLOS II, starting in 1960, during the six-week conference at Geneva, did not achieve much. Generally speaking, the developing countries participated only as clients, allies, or dependents of the United States or the Soviet Union; 8 7 there was no voice for countries of the third world. Nor did China express interest in the UNCLOS II. T H E U N C L O S III

After ratification of the UNCLOS III, which both Japan and China (but not Taiwan) 88 signed, it came into force on November 16,1993. 8 9 Unfortunately, there are so many equivocal definitions in this law that this convention will be hard to apply to the case of the Diaoyu Islands. For example, as Paragraph 3 of Article 121—which is relevant to the disputed Diaoyu Islands—states: "Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf." 90 But the UNCLOS III fails to define rock. In addition, the term habitation is not clear. The question is: How long should the rock in question sustain human habitation in order to qualify as an exclusive economic zone—weeks, months, perhaps years?91 In addition, what standards should be used in determining economic feasibility? If Article 121 applies to the case of the Diaoyu Islands, more ques-

34

International Law and the Diaoyu Islands

tions will arise. How will the Diaoyu Islands fit into Article 121 (3) of the UNCLOS III? Given its potable water and cultivable soil, one can argue that the Diaoyu Islands can sustain human habitation for a fairly long period of time. On the other hand, one also can point out that the Diaoyu Islands cannot sustain human habitation because Koga Tatsushiro brought food supplies and seasonal inhabitants into these islands. Therefore, Koga failed to live on the Diaoyu Islands, retreating when Japan faced the shortage of oil during the Sino-Japanese War in the 1930s (see Chapters 2 and 4). Ultimately, all depends on who will interpret the term economic life. Similarly, based on the convention, the Diaoyu disputes simply cannot apply the delimitation of the continental shelf, which is stated in Article 83 as follows: 1. The delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution. 2. If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time, the States concerned shall resort to the procedures provided for in Part XV.92 3. Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and co-operation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be without prejudice to the final delimitation. 4. Where there is an agreement in force between the States concerned, questions relating to the delimitation of the continental shelf shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of that agreement. 93

The question is how to delimit the continental shelf between states with opposite or adjacent coasts. In 1937, Whittemore Boggs offered the method of the median lines (or equidistant method) to delimit international boundaries through territorial waters. 94 Japan favors this method to draw the line between the two shores. But China opposes the equidistant method and "argues that delimitation should be based on agreement between the states concerned and the application of equitable principles, taking into account all circumstances, and without prejudicing the methods to be utilized." 95 Unfortunately, Article 83 of this new convention fails to mention both the "equi-

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35

distant rule" and the "equitable principle"; it simply calls to apply Article 38 of the ICJ Statute in a negotiation. 96 Because the convention does not specifically cover the delimitation of the continental shelf, the Statute of the ICJ will be the next source of the international law to deal with a continental shelf based on paragraph 1 of Article 83. According to Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ, the Court's function is to decide in accordance with the following precedence: international conventions, customary law, the general principles of law, judicial decisions, and public opinions. 97 C U S T O M A R Y I N T E R N A T I O N A L LAW

If the first source of international law, treaties, and conventions cannot be applied to the Diaoyu Islands case, customary international law will be the next possible source to determine this dispute. Oppenheim defined customary international law as "wherever and as soon as a frequently adopted international conduct of States is considered legally necessary or legally right, the rule, which may be abstracted from such conduct, is a rule of customary international law."98 The first case is the North Sea Cases (West Germany v. Denmark; West Germany v. Netherlands) in 1969.99 This is surely one of the most interesting and controversial judgments in the history of the ICJ. The court stated that the continental shelf of any state must be the natural prolongation of its territorial lands and must not encroach u p o n what is the natural prolongation of another state; the Chinese favor the "natural prolongation" element advanced by the ICJ in this case.100 The case, however, does not discuss the question of islands in the delimitation issue.101 The second well-known case is the Anglo-French Channel Continental Shelf Case (France v. U.K.) in 1977.102 At the macrogeographical level, this case shared a few similarities with the disputed Diaoyu case. Both involve an insular state (Japan and U.K.) and a continental state (China and France) and both involve opposite-coast situations. Even though the court recognized the importance of the concept of natural prolongation, the principle of natural prolongation was not accepted. 103 The arbitral court determined that the equidistant principle can be combined with the rule of special circumstances to achieve a broadly equitable delimitation. The Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf Case in 1982104 is different from the two cases mentioned above. In this case, ICJ rejected equidistance

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as either a mandatory legal principle or a m e t h o d having some privileged status in relation to the methods. T h e court also argued that the principle of the natural prolongation of the coastal state is a basis of its legal tide to continental shelf rights a n d did n o t in this case necessarily provide criteria applicable to the delimitation. 105 In the final analysis, it is important to note that the principle of natural prolongation is n o t absolute but may be subject to qualification in particular situations. Both the Anglo-French Case a n d the TunisiaLibya Case show that the concept of natural prolongation was downgraded because physical prolongation alone could n o t be equated with an equitable solution. These cases do indicate that it is possible to ascertain certain customary international laws in resolving the question of the delimitation of the continental shelf between states of adjacent or opposite coasts. 106 In short, because there is n o clear definition of the continental shelf, which is a relatively new concept, two factors have been major problems of customary international law to prevent the delimitation of the continental shelf. O n e is that every maritime boundary situation is geographically unique. T h e o t h e r is that the nature of ocean regimes is changing. 107 Like the past three conventions of international law, the past cases dealing with the continental shelf simply cannot be applied to the case of the Diaoyu Islands. Therefore it may be extremely difficult for customary international law to resolve the Diaoyu Islands dispute. M O D E S OF A C Q U I R I N G TERRITORY

T h e possibility of acquiring ownership of or sovereignty over the sea adjacent to the territory of a state is an alternative "manner" of interpreting international law during the m o d e r n era. On the premise that both Japan and China agree to submit their jurisdiction to the ICJ, and that all current historical documents (see the full text in Chapters 3 and 4) will be evidence in the court, what kind of irredentist arguments will both governments present to the court? Will their claims to the territories be based on international law? Will historical documents favor the p r o j a p a n e s e side or the pro-Chinese side? Because the Diaoyu Islands are uninhabited, they themselves are n o t a sovereign state. According to international law, however, these islands can be absorbed into the political control of an existent state (Japan or China), which thereby acquires sovereign rights. U n d e r international law, the acquisition of

International Law and the Diaoyu Islands

37

a territory permits a state to gain territory through its own unilateral acts in the following ways: discovery-occupation, cession, accretion, subjugation (or conquest), and prescription. 1 0 8 Principle of Discovery-Occupation: Analysis During the period of E u r o p e a n discovery ranging f r o m the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries, the discovery of territory terra nullius required both visual apprehension a n d a formal acquisition ceremony to sustain a claim of original sovereignty (e.g., the case of the United States of America versus Native Americans). T h e discovery gave the state an inchoate title. If the discovery occurred in the posteighteenth century, however, a real taking possession of the territory was considered necessary for effective control within a reasonable time. If such a period lapses without any attempt by the discovering state to turn its inchoate title into a real tide of occupation, the inchoate title is extinguished a n d any other state can thereafter acquire the territory by using means of an effective control. 109 In light of this legal framework, the Chinese unquestionably deserve the inchoate tide to the Diaoyu Islands because they discovered a n d n a m e d these islands a n d because the Chinese government acted to sustain effective political control. 110 As early as 1534, when the Chinese cefeng [investiture] missions led by Chen Kan visited the Liuqiu Kingdom, the names of the Diaoyu Islands were recorded in Shilu. Not only a n u m b e r of Chinese officials, b u t also the Liuqiuan officials and the Japanese geographer Hayashi Shihei reported that the Diaoyu Islands were part of Chinese territory. In addition, when the Chinese set u p the defense system during the Ming dynasty against the wokou, this defense system also included the Diaoyu Islands. T h e most important historical evidence to support this claim is that Prefect Wu Wei died on one of the Diaoyu group while defending these islands against the wokou. In 1893, the Diaoyu Islands were transferred to private ownership by the Empress Dowager Cixi when she bestowed them on Sheng Xuanhuai, who h a d offered free pharmaceutical services to the Chinese people (see Chapter 2). Despite the "rediscovery" of the Diaoyu Islands by the Japanese businessman Koga Tatsushiro in 1884, the Decree of Empress Dowager Cixi in 1893 will provide the key evidence to terminate the Japanese soi-disant rediscovery theory. Therefore, all evidence suggests that the Chinese fulfilled their sovereign duty to manifest effec-

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International Law and the Diaoyu Islands

tive control of the Diaoyu Islands. Yet somehow the pro-Japan irredentist scholars seem to rely exclusively on this principle of discoveryoccupation by degrading the Chinese historical documents. 111 Importantly, the key question is how the principle of "effective occupation" should be applied to the specific historical facts and physical conditions about the Diaoyu Islands. Principle of Cession: Analysis International law recognizes the cession method, by which one nation can acquire sovereign territory from another. Cession of state territory is the transfer of sovereignty over state territory by the owner state to another state.112 For example, a treaty of peace that specifically refers to such territory will serve as such a manifestation (e.g., Hong Kong to the British in 1899 and Korea to the Japanese in 1911). Since cession is a bilateral transaction, it has two subjects: the ceding and the acquiring state. In the case of the Diaoyu Islands, it seems that legal theory could support the transfer of sovereignty through cession. In the Treaty of Shimonoseki, China transferred the Penghu Archipelago and Taiwan with "its appertaining islands" to Japan after the Chinese lost the war with the Japanese in 1894—1895. The key question is whether or not the Diaoyu Islands were ceded to Japan in 1894—1895 along with Taiwan and all the islands appertaining or belonging to it. It is possible that the phrase appertaining islands embraces the Diaoyu Islands. Most treaties and agreements (including the Cairo Declaration, the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and the Bilateral Treaty of Peace between Japan and China) support a Japanese relinquishment of the Diaoyu sovereignty through a cession following cessation of hostilities113 after World War II because these treaties are considered "a final settlement of the war"114 (see Chapter 4). Nevertheless, there is a problem with the phrasing of international agreements. For instance, according to the Cairo Declaration, all territories "stolen" by the Japanese shall be restored to the Republic of China. The problem is whether or not the phrase "all territories stolen" includes the Diaoyu Islands. Moreover, even if "all territories stolen" embraces the Diaoyu Islands, Japan still has a strong position. The Chinese did not have any objections when the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, and the Bilateral Treaty of Peace between Japan and China in 1952, were signed. The Japanese government, ergo, can

International Law and the Diaoyu Islands

39

argue that the Diaoyu Islands have officially been integrated into the Okinawa Prefecture. In fact, during the United States' occupation period, some islets of the Diaoyu group were used for American military firing exercises. As a result, when the United States returned Okinawa to Japan in 1972, based on the Reversion Treaty, the Diaoyu Islands, along with the Okinawa Prefecture, were returned to Japan (see Chapter 4). Principle of Accretion: Analysis

The third way to acquire territory through international law is accretion. Accretion is the name for the increase of land through new formations (e.g., rivers and lakes) that may be a modification only of the existing state territory. 115 The accretion method cannot apply to the Diaoyu Islands, which are located in the sea, because new formations do not exist in this Diaoyu case. Subjugation (or Conquest):

Analysis

Under international law, subjugation or conquest is another way to possess new territory. Often conquest is the taking possession of enemy territory through military force in time of war. However, conquest alone does not ipso facto make the conquering state the sovereign of the conquered territory. 116 In the process of acquisition of territory through conquest, three stages need to be completed: (1) invasion of the territory, (2) occupation of the territory, and (3) transfer of territorial sovereignty.117 In addition, international law requires that the state must maintain "peaceful and steady" situations or relations during the period of occupation. Unfortunately, regarding the acquisition of uninhabited islands such as the Diaoyu Islands through conquest, no definition exists under current international law. According to the interpretations of some international law scholars, however, two additional requirements are needed for subjugation to be applied to uninhabited islands: (a) the islands must lie within a region that is completely and finally subjugated, and (b) the conquering state must issue a proclamation stating its intention to annex those uninhabited islands. 118 In light of this legal framework, the Japanese seem to have a strong position. Even though Japanese troops never physically occupied the Diaoyu Islands, the proclamation of the Japanese government annexing these islands in 1895, immediately after the Sinojapanese War,

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seems to constitute an effective occupation. When the Japanese government unilaterally announced the annexation of the Diaoyu Islands, the Chinese government expressed no objections. Still, the Japanese government proclamation might not be valid because no imperial edict has confirmed any names of the Diaoyu group to be annexed into the Japanese territory. In addition, it is hard to believe that Sinojapanese relations have been "peaceful and steady" since 1895; consequently, the conquest of the Diaoyu Islands by the Japanese might not be valid based on current international law. Principle of Prescription: Analysis The last mode of international law to acquire new territory is the theory of prescription. Under international law, prescription might be defined as "the acquisition of sovereignty over a territory through continuous and undisturbed exercise of sovereignty over it during such a period as is necessary to create under the influence of historical development the general conviction that the present condition of things is in conformity with international order." 119 In other words, prescription operates only in the absence of written agreement. Yet international law does not recognize a shift in sovereignty unless the prescribing sovereign's occupation has been public, peaceful, and uninterruptedL120 It is possible to apply the Diaoyu case to the prescription method. The Japanese might claim that Chinese apparentiy acquiesced in their annexation of the uninhabited Diaoyu Islands after the Second World War era. But historical documents cut against the Japanese interpretation. For instance, the proclamation of unilateral annexation by the Japanese government might analytically operate as a subjugation (or conquest) under international law. Moreover, it seems clear that the Chinese have never acquiesced to the Japanese acquisition since the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895. Rather, the hostile climate of Sinojapanese relations (particularly the Sinojapanese War in the 1930s) suggests that the Japanese occupation of the Diaoyu Islands was not "peaceful." From the Chinese perspective, ergo, the situation is not in conformity with international law (see Chapters 2 and 4). In sum, among the five methods to acquire a new territory, only discovery-occupation and cession might be suitable to apply to the case of the Diaoyu Islands under current international law. In partic-

International Law and the Diaoyu Islands

41

ular, both conquest and prescription modes require stability and peace in Sino-Japanese relations. It would be hard to convince any judge before the ICJ that Sino-Japanese relations have been peaceful and stable since 1895; therefore, neither conquest nor prescription can be utilized in the Diaoyu Islands case. In reality, regarding the case of the Diaoyu Islands, whereas the Chinese side has appealed to both the law of territorial acquisition and the concept of the continental shelf, the Japanese exclusively have emphasized the principle of discovery-occupation. In the final analysis, because of the controversial nature of international law, "historical justifications are the only arguments that can be advanced in support of the armed seizure of territory that both have at least some colorable basis in international law and are grounded in contemporary notions of justice." 121

2

Historical Documents of the Diaoyu Islands A Cross-Time Analysis

"We need to understand and appreciate the evolution and social construction of knowledge, as much as to understand the knowledge itself, and we need to ask ourselves and re-evaluate, what we really know."1 The failure of international law (Chapter 1) ultimately leads to the conclusion that the irredentist Diaoyu issue has to be solved in the context of the long historical development in these islets. Whether the resolution of the matter will be through diplomatic negotiation or the ICJ, we as human beings can neither ignore nor avoid the influence of human history upon the Diaoyu Islands dispute. Indeed, the influence of human history is evident when conducting geographical research on the Diaoyu Islands, where a cross-time analysis of historical documents provides essential insight to this ongoing territorial dispute. This historical knowledge provides the primary evidence supporting both Japan's and China's claims to the contested "place"—the Diaoyu Islands.

The Provenance of the Diaoyu Islands In modern Chinese, the Diaoyu Islands are called Diaoyu Yu or Diaoyu Tai. Yudijisheng [History of Famous Geographical Locations in China], written by Wang Xiangzhi in 1221, presents the earliest known written reference to the Diaoyu Islands. Importantly, this book indicates the provenance of the Diaoyu Islands, whose names were taken from famous sites of China's landscape. Based on Wang's book, the name Diaoyu Tai originated from a story of Chinese folklore; according to the legend, when Peng Zu, a mediocre fisherman, caught two carps on a fishing trip at Pengli Lake,2 the carps fell onto the

42

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fishing steps and climbed to the sky as dragons. 3 According to Huan Yu Ji [The Record of the World], Diaoyu Tai4 was named combining the words Diaoyu [fishing trip] and Tai [ (fishing) steps] by Yangdi (reign 605-618) of the Sui dynasty (589-618). Based on the administrative geography of the Southern Song period (1127-1279), as a result of this legend, Diaoyu Tai became a famous site,5 located under the boundary jurisdiction of Nankangjun [Nankan Subprefecture] in the Jiangnan Donglu [Eastern Circuit of Jiangnan]. 6 The name Diaoyu Tai was also used to describe a famous site in Fujian Lu [Fujian Circuit] ? Yudi Jisheng also mentioned other islets of the Diaoyu group. For instance, in the same Fujian region, Chi Yu, one of the Diaoyu Islands, was considered a famous site in Zhangzhou [Zhang Subprefecture]. 8 Unfortunately, important questions—such as when did the Chinese begin to call the islands Diaoyu Tai or Diaoyu Yu and when did the Chinese begin to use the word dao to identify an island in lieu of yu and tai—are not discussed in Wang's book. In addition, the location of the Diaoyu Islands in Yudi Jisheng is not the same as the Diaoyu Islands in today's East China Sea. Rather, this book merely identifies the name Diaoyu Islands as a famous Chinese site.9 As a result, we are left with some essential questions. Specifically, to what extent does the provenance of the Diaoyu Islands connect to the current island dispute between China and Japan? Moreover, when did the Chinese name the disputed islands the Diaoyu Islands? To answer these questions, the history of YudiJisheng and Wang Xiangzhi must be analyzed. Yudi Jisheng is a mystical and little-known geography book that has been largely ignored by both Chinese and Western scholars. For some unknown reason, this book was missing for a long period of time; even Siku Quanshu [The Complete Collection of the Four Treasuries], which the Qianlong emperor (reign 1736-1795) ordered compiled in 1772, did not include Yudi Jisheng. As the Siku Quanshu Zongmu [General Catalog of Works in the Complete Collection oj the Four Treasuries], which was completed in 1782, states, the " Yudi Jisheng by Wang Xiangzhi of the Sung [or Southern Sung dynasty] did not survive."10 The author of Yudi Jisheng, Wang Xiangzhi, was born the fifth of seven children, and was brought up by a rich family. His father was a high official in the government with a jinshi [doctoral degree]. Just as his older brother passed the highest official degree in 1184, Wang Xiangzhi successfully passed the jinshi examination in 1195 and was

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bestowed the post of county magistrate in Sichuan Province.11 By 1221 (according to the introduction), Wang Xiangzhi completed Yudi Jisheng; however, this book was not widely known. Not until 1801, when Qian Daxin (1728-1804) 1 2 learned of its existence, did this book reappear after its disappearance for nearly six hundred years.13 Therefore, no one read the entire Yudi Jisheng for more than a half of the millennium until the Qing government officially sent it to the printers in 1849. If the Chinese government officially printed Wang's book in 1849, when did the Chinese adopt the names of the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea? As only a few chapters of Wang's book existed for an extended period of time, this book was not read in its entirety during the Yuan (1279-1368) and the Ming dynasties. How did the Ming officials recognize the name of the Diaoyu Islands without officially recognizing the existence of Yudi Jisheng? Since Wang Xiangzhi recorded some events in 1227, 14 it is reasonable to believe that his book was originally lost after 1227. Based on simple mathematical calculation, Yudi Jisheng WAS originally lost around the year 1227, only six years after Wang completed the book. As a result, the names of the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea were adopted by the Chinese sometime between 1221 and 1227. Historically, before the Chinese adopted or used a new name of any landscape or location, the new name would have had to be recognized by the government. The most likely case is that the emperor would name the location or rename a landscape in his honor. This often occurred with famous locations such as historical sites. The Southern Song government, ergo, probably was responsible for recognizing the existence of the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea and naming these islands. In other words, someone during the Southern Song dynasty discovered the Diaoyu Islands by traveling to the East China Sea, and the government recognized or named the Diaoyu Islands during a six-year period between 1221 (when Wang completed the book) and 1227 (when the book was lost). Unfortunately, there is no existing literature that can verify the exact date when the Chinese adopted the names of the islands, who discovered them, who named them the Diaoyu Islands, and when these events occurred. Thus, as the previous dynasties (i.e., Southern Song) named the Diaoyu Islands, or the imperial government recognized their existence in the East China Sea before 1227, the officials from later dynasties such as the Ming and the Qing continued to use the names.

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Archives from the Ming Dynasty Before the Western notion of sovereignty or the Western concept of international law appeared during the last quarter of the sixteenth century,15 those living in the early modern era in Asia, especially the Chinese, had already begun to recognize international boundaries between countries that were customarily respected by all. During Pax Sinica, according to the Ming and Qing archives, the Chinese had already created a Sinitic world order by using tributary-investiture relations with other societies.16 Surprisingly, this traditional system survived, and elements of the Sinitic world order remain in modern Chinese politics even today.17 Prior to the Ming dynasty, the Chinese traveled the East China Sea to Japan (Xu Fu in the Qin dynasty, 221-207 B.C.) and to the Liuqiu Kingdom (Zhu Kuan in Sui times), but documents recording their voyages that might bear eyewitness to the Diaoyu Islands did not survive. Thus, in the current existent literature, the oldest governmental archives—including those in Chinese, Japanese, and English regarding the names of the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea—are from the Ming archives. These historical documents, including both official documents that were stored in imperial government archives and popular literature widely read by the public, have provided powerful evidence for the pro-China irredentist scholars to support their position of Chinese sovereignty over the pro-Japan irredentist arguments. T H E SHILU18

ARCHIVES

Until the Yang Zai mission in 1373, the Liuqiuans had virtually no contact with outsiders, including the Chinese, despite frequent Chinese demands for tribute.19 Only after the first emperor of the Ming dynasty, Zhu Yuanzhang or the Hongwu emperor, defeated the Mongol Empire in 1368, did he successfully send Yang Zai as a chief envoy for the first cefeng [investiture] mission to the Liuqiu Kingdom to announce the newly established dynasty and to demand that they pay tribute to the Chinese court.20 As a result, the Liuqiu Kingdom was helplessly brought into the Chinese tributary system as a member of the tributary nations. Within the traditional Sinitic world order,21 missions from tributary countries frequently went to China. However, the Chinese imperial court rarely dispatched missions abroad; only a small number of Chinese missions were sent as the cefeng of tributary kings.22 Chinese commanders of investiture missions were tided Tianshi [celes-

Table 3. The Chinese Cefeng [Investiture] Missions to the Liuqiu Kingdom during the Ming Dynasty Names of Chief Envoy and Vice Envoy

Yeara

Year Gap

Investiture Kings

1

Yang Zai

1373

0

2

Shi Zhong

1404"

31

Wuning

3

Chen Xiuruo

1415

11

Talumei

4C Chai Shan and Ruan Jian

1427?

12

Shangbazhi

5

Yu Bian and Liu X u n

1443

16

Shangzhong

6

Chen Chuan and Wan Xiang

1448

5

Shangsida

7

Qiao Yi and Tong Shouhong

1452

4

Shangjinfu

8

Yan Cheng and Liu Jian

1456

4

Shangtaijiu

9

Pan Rong and Cai Zhe

1464

8

Shangde

10

Guan Rong and Han Wen

1472 d

8

Shangdan

11

Dong Min and Zhang Xiang

1479

7

Shangzhen

12

Chen Kan and Gao Cheng

1534

55

Shangqing

13

Guo Rulin and Li Jichun

1561«

27

Shangyuan

14

Xiao Chongye and Xie Jie

1579

18

Shangyong

15

Xia Ziyang and Wang Zizhen

1606f

27

Shangning

16

Du Sance and Yang Lun

1633

27

Shangfeng

17

Chen Yanyi and Han Yuanxun (The task was never carried out.)

Chadu

Notes: a The date indicates the year of the mission departure from China. Some books, including the Mingshi, might suggest different dates because they indicate the designation date from the emperor, which usually was one or two years earlier than departure dates. b The Yongle emperor dispatched a mission to the three kingdoms of the Liuqiu led by Bian Xin and Liu Kang, which bestowed Wenqi (Chinese Silk) and Shaluo (Silk Clothes), as well as an imperial edict on the kings. cTwo dates of the Chai Shan mission were reported: one was in 1423 and the other was in 1427. dIn 1472, Qiu Hong was named the chief envoy but, because of illness, he was unable to carry out his task. He was replaced by Guan Rong. e In 1558, Wu Shilai was named the chief envoy. Because Wu was charged in a corruption

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47

tial envoys] and were considered the representatives of the Son of Heaven (i.e., the emperor) to tributary nations under Pax Sinica. In the course of the nearly three hundred years of Ming history, seventeen investiture missions were appointed by emperors,23 and sixteen of these missions were dispatched to the Liuqiu Kingdom (see Table 3). On the other hand, kings of the Liuqiu sent more than 384 missions24 to China, and most missions were to pay tribute to the imperial court. Until the mission of Chai Shan in 1427, only one chief envoy25 was named. Thereafter, two commanders (i.e., chief envoy and vice-chief envoy) were appointed to each delegation. Upon the mission's return to China, the chiefs of the missions usually presented a written report to the emperor about their journeys, often entitled Shi Liuqiu Lu [The Record of the Mission to the Liuqiu Kingdom]. These reports became confidential documents kept in the imperial government archives.26 Records before the Chen Kan mission were destroyed by fire;27 therefore, Chen's report was the first available of these written records,28 counting as the twelfth trip (Table 3) after the Liuqiu Kingdom became a tributary nation under Pax Sinica. Chen Kan Mission After having received the news of the death of the Liuqiu king in the sixth month of the eleventh year of the Jiajing reign (1532), Chen Kan was appointed by the emperor as the chief envoy of the cefeng mission to the Liuqiu. Along with the vice-chief envoy Gao Cheng, Chen's primary duty was the cefeng [investiture] of the new ruler of the Liuqiu Kingdom.29 Because there were no records from previous missions remaining in the central government archive as

case, the emperor dismissed him as the head of the Chinese mission. Guo Rulin was appointed as the chief envoy. In 1606, the emperor named Hong Zhanzu as a chief envoy and Wang Shizhen as a vicechief envoy of a special cefeng mission to the Liuqiu Kingdom. But after the death of Hong Zhanzu, Xia Ziyang replaced Hong and carried out the mission. Sources: The author compiled this table using the following sources: Zhang, Mingshi, 8346-8370; Noguchi, Chugoku to Ryukyu, 186-206; Takara, Ryukyu no Jidai, 99; Shimakura Ryuji and Majikina Anko, Okinawa Issennen Shi [A Millenary-Year History of Okinawa] (Okinawa: Ozawa Shoten, 1924), 120-122; Shunzo Sakamaki, Ryukyu: A Bibliographical Guide to Okinawan Studies (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1963), 76; and various Shilu records from the Ming and Qing dynasties.

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the result of fire and in the local Fujian government archive as the result of rain and wind damage, Chen had to rely on information gathered from local people to prepare for his trip. In the case of the investiture ceremony, he had to gather information from previous ministers and totally rely on the Liuqiuans to inform him of the Fuzhou-Liuqiu route 30 [or Fuzhou-Naha 31 route], known as the "compass route" to the Liuqiu Kingdom. In the fifth month of the thirteenth year of thejiajing reign (1534), Chen Kan, accompanied by the Liuqiuan envoys, departed from China with new ships, which officially cost some 2,500 tael of silver, to the Liuqiu Kingdom. Despite his diligent efforts to collect information and prepare for his trip, Chen and his associates lost their way following the compass route to the Liuqiu and "drifted away from the guojiaojie [international boundary] of the Liuqiu Kingdom, a mountain called Rebi Shan [emphasis added] ,"32 When Chen asked the Liuqiuans onboard the name of the nearby mountain, he was surprised when the Liuqiuans told him: "Please do not worry about anything because this is the Yebi Mountain, which belongs to our country (the Liuqiu Kingdom), about 300 li [one li = 0.317 miles] from the capital, but if you drifted further away to the east, it will be [the territory of] Japan." 33 Only after learning Chen's situation in the sea did Shangqing, 34 the new king, order his minister, accompanied by some four thousand people with forty vessels, to retrieve the Chinese delegation, serving them a luxurious meal of lamb and beef. 35 Despite help from some four thousand Liuqiuans, however, it took seven days to reach the port of Naha, the capital of the Liuqiu (see Appendix Fig. 1836).37 After twenty days at sea, the Chinese delegation finally rested at the capital, where they were treated with extreme hospitality by the new king of the Liuqiu Kingdom. Staying in the Liuqiu for 115 days,38 Chen's mission left at the end of October. At that time, the new king presented 40 tael of gold to Chen, who had declined the offer earlier. 39 Shordy after returning to Beijing, Chen wrote a book detailing his mission and presented it to the emperor early the following year. The full version of Shi Liuqiu Lu consists of five parts. The first part is comprised of a collection of official documents regarding the appointment of the mission, including an autobiographic note, imperial edicts addressed to the Liuqiu king, and lists of gifts to be presented. The second part contains a record detailing the preparation for the

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49

journey, the construction of vessels, the route taken to the Liuqiu, including a discussion on passing by the Diaoyu Islands, the investiture ceremony (see Appendix Fig. 19), and the hazards encountered on the return voyage. The third part discusses earlier accounts of the Liuqiu Kingdom, including pre-Ming literature no longer in existence, and Chen also corrects some misrepresentations regarding the Liuqiu Kingdom. In the fourth part, Chen lists 407 expressions used by the Liuqiuans. This is followed by forty-eight Japanese hiragana symbols. The last part of the book concludes with a compendium of documents submitted by Chen and Gao concerning their mission. 40 In the second part of Chen's record, he unveils the most important facts concerning the Diaoyu Islands, which his vessels passed on the compass route in the East China Sea: On the fifth of the fifth month, vessels left Fujian.... On the ninth, a small mountain can be seen, it must be the Xiaoliuqiu [Taiwan]. A brisk southerly wind on the tenth day of the voyage propelled the ship forward. We sailed past Pingjia Shan41 [Pengjia Mountain], then Diaoyu Yu [Diaoyu Island], Huangmao Fw42 [Huangwei Island], and Chi Hi43 [Chiwei Island], using only one day to cover a distance which would have normally required three days. The Liuqiu boats lagged far behind due to their smaller sails. Gumi Shan [Gumi Mountain], 44 [which, therefore, belongs to the Liuqiuans] naishu Liuqiu zhe, appeared on the horizon on the evening of the eleventh day, with ecstatic Liuqiuan envoys singing and dancing out of joy over at long last seeing their home. . . . On the twenty-fifth, we reached berth where the ship can stop, and the name of this place is called Naha Ko [Naha Harbor] [emphasis added] ,45

Interestingly enough, Sho Shoken, also known as Haneji Choshu, a chief civil administrator of the Liuqiu Kingdom, recorded precisely the same passage of the Diaoyu Islands as in Chen's record. 46 There are some significant features from both the Chinese and Liuqiuan archives that can be verified. First, these documents used the word guojiaojie [an international boundary], indicating that there was a boundary around the Rebi Shan between Japan and the Liuqiu Kingdom when the Chinese mission drifted by the mountain. This mountain is geographically located on the east edge of the Liuqiu Kingdom, one of the closest mountains to the international boundary with Japan. This indicates that people as far back as the early modern period already had a sense of guojiaojie between countries. Second, both the Chinese and the Liuqiuan officials recognized

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the Diaoyu Islands—including Diaoyu, Huangwei, and Chiwei Islands —as navigation aids, similar to modern-day beacons and lighthouses. Moreover, Chen Kan presented and identified the precise names of the Diaoyu Islands—from the Diaoyu to the Chiwei Islets—and so did Sho Shoken. By giving the exact order and names of these islands from west to east, Sho Shoken reconfirmed their existence. This is important because previous missions' records (before the Chen Kan mission) are not available, and all information on the Fuzhou-Liuqiu route (or Fuzhou-Naha route) was learned from the Liuqiuans. In addition, before Chen's trip, eleven cefeng missions were dispatched to the Liuqiu, and more than a hundred tributary missions came to China from the Liuqiu Kingdom; these missions took the same compass route as did Chen for years. This shows that these islands were known to both the Chinese and the Liuqiuans as the Diaoyu Islands instead of the Senkaku Islands. Third and most importantiy, both Chinese and Liuqiuan officials noted that the Gumi (J: Kume) Mountain was u n d e r the sovereignty of the Liuqiu Kingdom by using the words "naishu Liuqiu zhe [Gumi Mountain, therefore, belongs to the Liuqiuans]," according to both Chen's and Sho's writings. That is why Chen Kan remembered Gumi Mountain as the distinguishing landscape between China and the Liuqiu Kingdom by asking the Liuqiuans where the Gumi Mountain was. In other words, somewhere around Gumi Mountain, there was an international boundary between China and the Liuqiu Kingdom, because Gumi Mountain is located east of Chiwei Island, the last islet of the Diaoyu group, and is situated about 40 nautical miles west of the Liuqiu Kingdom. As distinguished Japanese historian Inoue Kiyoshi notes, "up to Kume Island, Chiwei, Huangwei, and Diaoyu Islands do not belong to the territory of the Liuqiu Kingdom." 47 Fourth, as noted by Shuowen Jiezi Zhu, the oldest Chinese etymological dictionary, the terms dao and yu have been used by the Chinese to describe islands since ancient times. 48 In fact, the use of yu to identify an islet has been documented as early as the Three Kingdoms Era. 49 Today there are six yu surrounding Taiwan Island, seventeen yu in the Penghu Archipelago, and six yu along the coastal cities of Fujian Province. The naming of an island as yu is a systematic process.50 Significantly, the Chinese have consistently called the disputed islands Diaoyu Yu [Diaoyu Island] (or Diaoyu Tai), Huangwei Yu [Huangwei Island], and Chiwei Yu [Chiwei Island] since at least the

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51

thirteenth year of thejiajing reign (1534), and perhaps even prior to the Ming dynasty. Guo Rulin Mission In the thirty-fourth year t h e j i a j i n g reign (1555), the king of the Liuqiu Kingdom died, and the Liuqiuans visited China to request an investiture mission two years later. Guo Rulin was appointed the thirteenth chief envoy to the Liuqiu of the cefeng mission. 51 During the Jiajing emperor's reign (1522-1566), however, the Chinese were annoyed about the wokou [the Japanese pirates] who often attacked the coastal provinces. 52 In fact, the ships for the mission took over five months to build after they were damaged by wokou aggression, delaying Guo's departure. 5 3 Finally, Guo departed from Guangdong in the fourth month of the fortieth year of t h e j i a j i n g reign (1561), and in the fifth month he arrived at Changle County of Fuzhou in Fujian Province, where he took on drinking water for the long trip. Following the compass route Chen had taken, Guo passed the Diaoyu Islands on the way to the Liuqiu: We left Meihua 54 Port to the Liuqiu.... After seeing Xiaoliuqiu [Taiwan] , we passed HuangmacP5 [Huangwei Island]. On the first of the fifth month, vessels passed Diaoyu Yu [Diaoyu Island]. On the third, we passed Chi Yu [ Chiwei Island]. Chiyu zhe, jie Liuqiu difang shan ye [This is Chiwei Island, where there is a boundary (jie) with the Liuqiu Kingdom] . One more day with the wind, we can reach Gumi Shan [Gumi Mountain] [emphasis added]. 56

Fortunately, Guo was picked up at Gumi Shan by two Liuqiuans sent by the new king, who was aware of the fact that Chen Kan had lost his way to Naha on the previous mission. After ten days at sea, on the ninth of the fifth month, the Chinese mission, accompanied by the Liuqiuans, reached Naha. 57 During this trip, the vice-chief envoy Li Jichun recorded a similar account of the trip to the Liuqiu Kingdom as that provided in Guo Rulin's record. For instance, he also included the sentence, "Chiyu zhe, jie Liuqiu difang shan ye [This is Chiwei Island, where there is a boundary with the Liuqiu Kingdom]," describing the m o m e n t when the ships passed Chiwei Island. 58 But Guo's account raises a curious question: Why did Guo reverse the order (from west to east) of Huangmao (Huangwei) and Diaoyu Islands while previous records had Diaoyu before Huangwei? Diaoyu Island, located west of Huangwei Island, should be the first one to

52

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come into view if one takes the compass route to the Liuqiu Kingdom. Because Diaoyu Island is relatively close to Huangwei Island, the Chinese delegation might not have remembered the exact order of these islands. It is possible that as Diaoyu and Huangwei (approximately 25°40' to 26°00' north latitude and 123°25' to 124°00' east longitude) are relatively close to each other, Guo did not take the trouble to record the exact order of their appearance. Second, why did the Chinese officials designate Chiwei Island as the last island of the Diaoyu group? In fact, Chiwei Island is geographically situated at approximately 25°85' to 26°00' north latitude and 124°25' to 124°40' east longitude, the eastern boundary of the Diaoyu group, which makes it relatively isolated from other islets of the Diaoyu group, and it is the closest island to the Liuqiu Kingdom. Chiwei Island is a tiny islet, described as "about 650 meters long eastwest and 280 meters long north-south; the height being 84 meters at most locations. The cliff of the island is very steep and the northern end is separated from the main island. In some parts of the coast there are the [sic] platforms, about 100 meters in width, caused by an erosion."59 Unlike other islands in the Diaoyu group, including Huangwei Island, Chiwei Island is located in a unique geographical location, isolated from the other islets; therefore, the Chinese officials could easily identify and remember it. In addition, according to the official Chinese accounts, there was a shengwang huanglong baiyu [saint-king yellow-dragon white fish] in the East China Sea. This "sea god" was believed to live in an oceanic trench60 between Chiwei Island and the Liuqiu Kingdom. To insure their safe passage through this area, the Chinese had to offer pigs and sheep to the sea god in a ceremony called haishenji [rutual to the sea god] or guogouji [trench-crossing ritual]. In the ritual, the chief envoys always prayed and thanked the sea god. For instance, when Guo and five hundred followers were becalmed at Chiwei Island, Guo solicited the sea god: "I along with 500 people was ordered by the emperor to invest the king of the Liuqiu; I need help from you for safety in finishing my work"61 Suddenly the wind blew, and the vessels passed the 2,000-meter depths. This deep trench is mentioned in a sentence from Guo's record, "Chiyu zhe, jie Liuqiu difang shan ye, " describing when ships began to cross the water between Chiwei Island of the Diaoyu group and the Liuqiu Kingdom.

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T h e word jie [boundary] reveals that there was a boundary between China a n d the Liuqiu Kingdom, starting just beyond Chiwei Island. Indeed, the continental shelf f r o m Diaoyu to Chiwei has "a general slope f r o m west to east, with a large depression in the central part with water d e p t h of 170 meters. T h e rest of the continental shelf is flat with an average water d e p t h of 130 meters." 62 In other words, the n o r t h e r n part of the Diaoyu Islands has a blue sea with a continental shelf ranging f r o m 110 meters to 170 meters in depth; yet, off the southern coast of Chiwei Island, the continental shelf reaches m o r e than 2,000 meters in d e p t h (see Appendix Fig. I). 6 3 As a result, the ceremony of haishenji or guogouji a n d the 2,000meter trench are both indications of a significant fact: the geographical and geological shape of the deep area south of Chiwei Island seems to be the legitimate boundary or the international maritime boundary between the Liuqiu Kingdom and China. Indeed, it does make sense that people living in the sixteenth century decided international boundaries of the sea based on the geological shape of islands and continental shelves, which were later called "natural boundaries" by twentiethcentury scholars. 64 Xiao Chongye Mission In the fourth year of the Wanli reign (1576), the f o u r t e e n t h mission to the Liuqiu Kingdom was named, and Xiao Chongye was appointed a chief envoy, along with Xie Jie as a vice-chief envoy to invest Shangyong, the new ruler of the Liuqiu. T h e Liuqiuans requested a cefeng mission (as early as possible) f r o m the Chinese court because the wokou often attacked the Liuqiu Kingdom, which desperately n e e d e d a new leader. 65 O n the third of the sixth m o n t h of the seventh year of the Wanli reign (1579), the Xiao Chongye mission departed f r o m China, but Xiao unfortunately lost his way to Naha. O n the thirtieth of the fifth m o n t h , when Xiao a n d his associates approached a mountain, Xiao said, "it is n o t Gumi. It must be a Yebi Shan." 66 O n the third of the sixth m o n t h , the king dispatched his minister, with luxury food, to retrieve the Chinese mission at Yebi Mountain. After thirteen days at sea, Xiao finally reached Naha. During Xiao's visit, the king of the Liuqiu revealed that his kingdom h a d often suffered Japanese invasions. 67 As time passed by, Xiao's record of his j o u r n e y to the Liuqiu became m o r e detailed and accurate. Xiao's record seems to follow a

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format different from that of his predecessors. First, his first juan [fascicle] contains records of previous journeys, including dates of these journeys, the names of the investiture kings, and names of the Chinese envoys. The most important development of this juan is not only that, for the first time, Xiao drew navigation maps detailing the sailing time of the Fuzhou-Liuqiu route, but also that he reprinted the accounts of previous journeys—in particular, the Fuzhou-Naha and Naha-Fuzhou routes of Chen Kan's and Guo Rulin's missions. Xiao's maps indicate that navigators during early modern times depended upon the prevailing wind of the moment and the estimate of time to travel the distance and relied on detailed instructions of setting and resetting the compass at a particular island in order to reach the next one. The primary reason for the significant change by Xiao Chongye was that he realized this navigation information could be used in future cefeng missions. Chen Kan had a difficult time in collecting the necessary information for his cefeng mission and had lost his way to Naha. In the map section, Xiao Chongye detailed the most essential facts of the Diaoyu Islands by including seven navigation maps of the Fuzhou-Liuqiu route. For the compass route, Xiao provided detailed instructions for setting and resetting the compass at a particular island in order to reach the next one. The order of the islands or mountains served as navigation aids showing the Fuzhou-Naha route from west to east. Xiao illustrated the landscape of the navigation aids on the compass route as follows: Meihuasuo [Meihua Minor Garrison] Port of Fujian Province, Xiaoliuqiu [Taiwan], Huaping Yu [Huaping Island], Jilong Yu Qilong Island], Pengjia Shan [Pengjia Mountain], Diaoyu Yu [Diaoyu Island], Huangwei Yu [Huangwei Island], Chi Yu [Chiwei Island] [emphasis added] (see Appendix Fig. 5), and Humi Shan 68 [Gumi Mountain], The last two maps illustrated Machi Shan [Machi Mountain] ,69 Naha Ko [Naha Port], and Liuqiu Cheng [Liuqiu Castie] .70 Notably, as his ships approached Liuqiuan territory, Xiao tried to identify whether or not the landmark they saw was Yebi Mountain. As Xiao recorded, "On the first of the sixth month, before vessels passed the Yebi Mountain 71 . . . from this 'compass route,' it took two days for us to ruguo [enter the Kingdom]." 72 This passage reveals the important fact that there was some kind of marine boundary around the mountain. Otherwise, Xiao would not have used the word ruguo.

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Here Xiao demonstrates his knowledge of navigation by describing the international boundary between the Liuqiu Kingdom and China by using the word ruguo. Why did both Chen (using guojiaojie) and Xiao (using ruguo) repeatedly "place" the international boundary around Yebi Mountain? The fact of the matter is that both Chen and Xiao remembered the international marine boundary located near Gumi Mountain, even though both mistakenly referred to Gumi Mountain as Yebi Mountain when they lost their way to Naha. After this, Chinese envoys continued to recognize the international boundary, although they referred to it as Yebi Mountain time and time again. Only Guo did not lose his way to Naha because the Liuqiuans, ordered by the king, were waiting for the Chinese at Gumi Mountain, which marked the international boundary between China and the Liuqiu Kingdom. The second juan [fascicle] of Xiao's record is of particular interest and value to historians. Xiao comments on historical accounts of the Liuqiu Kingdom prior to Ming times and corrects some misrepresentations. Furthermore, he includes observations on the Liuqiuan language, culture, and customs as well as a number of poems. For example, by using Diaoyu Island and others, Xiao's poems73 describe his journey as follows: Pingjia Lingyi yu [Go beyond Pingjia Mountain]; Jilong Yu anzai [Where isjilong Island]? Huaping yin Bufu [Huaping (Mountain) is hidden (in the sea)]; Diaoyu chen cuidai [and Diaoyu (Island) sinks into the dark green (i.e., Diaoyu Island is far away)] [emphasis added] .74 By using the islands and mountain, this poem written by Xiao discloses the fact that the mission to the Liuqiu Kingdom was a long and tough journey at sea, frustrating the Chinese officials desperately searching for the next landmark, such as the Diaoyu and Huaping Islands. Xia Ziyang Mission The penultimate Ming mission to the Liuqiu Kingdom was headed by Xia Ziyang in the thirty-fourth year of the Wanli reign (1606). When informed of the death of the Liuqiuan king in the twentyeighth year of the Wanli reign (1600), the emperor named Hong

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Zhanzu as chief envoy and Wang Zizhen as vice-chief envoy for a special cefeng mission to the Liuqiu Kingdom. Unfortunately, Hong passed away due to illness.75 As a result, Xia Ziyang assumed Hong's position and became the chief envoy of the fifteenth cefeng mission to the Liuqiu (Table 3). Due to incessant raids by the wokou, China's southeastern coastal area was under martial law. In view of this, the emperor issued an edict in the seventh month of the thirty-third year of the Wanli reign (1605), demanding that Xia and Wang finish the cefeng mission to the Liuqiu as quickly as possible. 76 Moreover, the size of Xia's mission was reduced dramatically. Accompanied by about four hundred members, half the size of previous missions, 77 Xia Ziyang left China on the twenty-fourth of the fifth month of the thirty-fourth year of the Wanli reign (1606), and recorded the following: In the afternoon of the twenty-fourth of the fifth month, our ships reached Dongsha Shan [Dongsha Mountain] and Jilong Yu [Jilong Island] the next morning, and Xiaoliuqiu [Taiwan] the next afternoon. . . . On the twenty-sixth, we sailed past the Pingjia Shan 78 [Pengjia Mountain] and the Huaping Yu [Huaping I s l a n d ] . . . . In the afternoon of the twenty-seventh, we passed Diaoyu Yu [Diaoyu Island]. The next day, we sailed past Huangwei Yu [Huangwei Island]. At night, the sea became rough and the ships shook terribly. Day after day, we sailed through an area of shenheise [dark black color] water as if zhuogou [turbid trench] water or dianse [dark blue color], Alas! It is just like what is recorded in the Shilu Buyi [The Addendum of the Record on the Mission to the Liuqiu], "quyou cangshui ru heishui [(they) entered the black water from the blue water]!" On the twenty-ninth, when we saw the head of the Humu Mountain, 79 the Liuqiuans were extremely happy as if they were at home. . . . On the first of the sixth month, about 40 li (a li = 0.3107 miles) from the Naha Port, we were greeted by a minister (of the Liuqiu) and the king's uncle, sent with some ten vessels, and were treated to luxurious food, such as lamb, beef, fruits, and wine. The next day, we finally reached Naha Harbor [emphasis added]. 80

Xia and his associates departed from the Liuqiu on the twentieth of the tenth month. Xia's return via the compass route was quite an adventure; the Chinese mission faced heavy rain and their ship developed a leak. Finally, on the twenty-ninth, they spied a passing ship, and everyone was oveijoyed: "There is a ship! Therefore, the distance to China is not too far. Passing from heishui [black water] and entering cangshui [blue water], Zhonggou zhijie [we have crossed the border with China] "81 (see Appendix Fig. 1) [emphasis added].

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Like Xiao's record of Shilu, Xia's record consisted of two juan [fascicles], including sixteen navigation maps to the Liuqiu Kingdom. In the current existent literature, Xia was the second person (Xiao was the first) to draw navigation maps. There are two major differences between the two records. O n e is that Xia provided not only navigation maps, but also described the Fuzhou-Naha route in detail. The other is that Xia provided fujiu shilu [old cefeng records]. Significantly, the Diaoyu Islands are disclosed in the map section of Xia's record. He also illustrates navigation aids, such as Meihuasuo [Meihua Minor Garrison] Port, Dongsha Shan [Dongsha Mountain], Xiaoliuqiu [Taiwan],JilongYu Qilong Island], Pengjia Shan [Pengjia Mountain], Huaping Yu [Huaping Island], Diaoyu Yu [DiaoyuIsland], Huangwei Yu [Huangwei Island] (see Appendix Fig. 6), Machi Shan [Machi Mountain], and Naha Ko [Naha Port]. 82 Two essential facts regarding Xia's document are that he mentions the names of the Diaoyu Islands and distinguishes the international marine boundary between the Liuqiu Kingdom and China. When Xia passed by Huangwei Island, he observed an area of shenheise [dark black color] water day after day. He recalled the quotation—"quyou cangshui ru heishui" [from the blue water enter into the black water]—from Shilu Buyi, which he verified. In particular, on Xia's return route, he referred to his ship crossing from blue water passing black water to blue water again as "Zhonggou zhijie." Moreover, Xia indicated that the heise or dianse or zhuogou water appeared at the exact time the ship began to pass the 2,000-meter trench (where Guo Rulin clearly stated the national boundary [jie] between China and the Liuqiu lies). In fact, the term gou in Chinese means a "partition" (such as a wall, board, or boundary), separating two places by water.83 For instance, the Chinese often used gou to describe a boundary such as goujing, gouhuang, and goufeng.84 As a result, based on the geographical and geological shape of the continental shelves (or the mountains and the islets in the sea), the Chinese in early modern times considered the gou and jie as the international marine boundary between the nations. But the question still remains: Why did Xia not mention Chiwei Island on his Fuzhou-Liuqiu route? Conceivably, Xia misrepresented the name of Chiwei Yu as Huangwei Yu when he approached Chiwei Island. In sum, the Shilu archives of the Ming dynasty verify important facts about the Diaoyu Islands. First, the names of the Diaoyu Islands were mentioned time and time again by both the Chinese and the

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Liuqiuan officials; not once was the name of the Senkaku Islands recorded. The use of yu to identify an island indisputably originates from the Chinese language (and not the Japanese language), and the Chinese consistently used yu to distinguish each islet of the Diaoyu group. It does not make sense that the Diaoyu Islands were part of the Japanese territories. Since the Diaoyu Islands are located south of the Liuqiu Kingdom, which was a Chinese tributary state, there is no reason to believe that Japan, which is located north of the Liuqiu, could claim ownership of the Diaoyu Islands. Second, as navigation aids, the Diaoyu Islands remained the sine qua non for not only the Chinese and the Liuqiuans as early as 1373, when Yang Zai visited the Liuqiu Kingdom, but also for other people in the Asian region who traveled to the Middle Kingdom to gain access to the Chinese market. Third, people in early modern times had knowledge of the jie [boundary] between the two countries that is called an "international boundary" today. Both Chinese and the Liuqiuans distinguished the international marine boundary by using geographical and geological shapes of the continental shelves (i.e., the 2,000-meter trench). Just as the Chinese created the "artificial" boundary with the Great Wall, representing the traditional Chinese political, cultural, and administrative boundary on the land, they delimited the international marine boundary between China and the Liuqiu Kingdom based on the "natural" boundary during the Ming dynasty. Indeed, the Chinese determined the jie based on the 2,000-meter trench of the continental shelf between Chiwei Island and the Liuqiu Kingdom. The fact of the matter is that, for the Chinese, both jie and guo have been interchangeably used to express a boundary in the sea between two places. As a result, based on these historical documents, it is hard to believe that the Diaoyu Islands were part of the Liuqiuan territories. Nor were the Diaoyu Islands a terra nullius (unadministered territory, or noman's-land). The fact that no one lived on the Diaoyu Islands due to their uninhabitable condition does not mean that the Diaoyu Islands were terra nullius. T H E M I N G LOGBOOK

As both the Chinese and the Liuqiuans depended heavily on navigation aids such as the Diaoyu Islands to travel between China and the Liuqiu Kingdom, how did they know of the existence of the Fuzhou-

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Naha route? In particular, where did their knowledge of navigation to the Liuqiu come from? Shunfeng Xiangsong [May Fair Winds Accompany You!], one of the oldest navigation guides in existent literature, published as early as 1403 by an unknown author (or authors), was one important source providing information on the Fuzhou-Naha route. This ancient logbook contributed significant knowledge on navigation not only of the Fujian-Liuqiu route but also of other Chinese routes, such as the Fujian-Java and Fujian-Arabian routes. As early as in the beginning of the Ming dynasty, both economic and political pressures forced the Ming emperors to send many envoys to other countries such as the Liuqiu Kingdom and Java. These missions, accompanied by imperial edicts, announced a new dynasty and requested countries to pay their tributes to the Chinese Empire; they needed a book describing the accurate compass directions and navigation aids for voyages around the world. 85 Especially during the Yongle emperor's reign (1402-1424), the Chinese showed a great interest in maritime/naval development. 86 During this period, the Chinese emperor dispatched a number of missions overseas, including the Ma Bin mission to Java and seven expeditions to Southeast Asia and Africa by Admiral Zheng He. In fact, "half the world was in China's grasp, and with such a formidable navy the other half was easily within reach, had China wanted it. China could have become the great colonial power, a hundred years before the great age of European exploration and expansion." 87 As early as the Zhou dynasty around the eleventh century B.C., the Chinese invented guide books of navigation, which were unfortunately destroyed. 88 For the Chinese, knowledge of geography and navigation had been an unquestioned science, closely tied to Chinese life,89 helping them to understand the non-Chinese world. 90 Shunfeng Xiangsong contributed to the critical knowledge of navigation and geography by explaining how to use a mariner's compass, 91 how to navigate vessels,92 and how to guide ships by qianxing [reading the stars] for celestial navigation. 93 Furthermore, this book provided details of the condition of each port, 94 such as the depth of the water and submerged reefs, and which ports could be used as a refuge in case of bad weather. According to Shunfeng Xiangsong, "berths with a depth of 15 tuo (a tuo = 6 inches) 95 on Diaoyu Yu [Diaoyu Island] are good for refueling wood and drinking water [emphasis added] ."96 That is, Diaoyu Island was a major refuge as well as a port

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for taking on drinking water and wood for voyagers during the early modern era. Another crucial fact of navigation in the early modern period was the need to know the time of departure and navigation aids. Unless voyagers understood the fluctuation of weather, they were analogous to people j u m p i n g into the ocean without life jackets. Astrologically, the Chinese considered "24 jieqi [24 solar terms] a year 97 as the primary tool for determining the seasons of favorable departures and arrivals.98 Voyagers had to be able to predict when bad weather would occur and when the "curse" 99 of the journey, such as haishenji [ritual to the sea god], might occur. Knowledge of nature and voyage, such as when to start a voyage (which day should they depart?), to navigate ships (how to use the wind?), to use mariners' compasses a n d / o r a nautical almanac (what kind of means?) (see Appendix Fig. 16), to avoid hurricane seasons (in which days, and which ports can be a refuge?), and to understand the currents of the seas (where should they stop?) 100 were fundamental sciences required to safely navigate the seas. For example, all Chinese cefeng missions voyaging the Fuzhou-Liuqiu route departed from China around May and June, when the weather benefits sailing to the Liuqiu Kingdom, and returned to China in October. In order to have safe and efficient voyages, navigation aids were another essential knowledge for adventurers. Both the Chinese and the Liuqiuans had used the Diaoyu Islands as crucial navigation aids when traveling the Fuzhou-Liuqiu route. Using the compass route, according to Shunfeng Xiangsong, A ship departs from Taiwu.101 At 7 geng (a geng= 18.642 miles), 102 the ship heads toward Niaoqiu 103 . .. passing Xiaoliuqiu [Taiwan]. After passing Pengjia Shan 104 [Pengjia Mountain], the ship goes toward Diaoyu Yu [Diaoyu Island]. The ship leaves Diaoyu Yu [Diaoyu Island] following the south wind toward the e a s t . . . heading toward Xiaoliuqiu . . . and arrives at Huaping Yu. [Or] a vessel departs from the Meihua Port.. . passing Xiaoliuqiu following the south wind; it arrives at the southern part of Diaoyu Yu [Diaoyu Island]. When the vessel heads for Chikan Yu105 [ Chiwei Island], after sailing 4 geng, Gumei Shan 106 [Gumi Mountain] is visible. With good weather, after traveling a geng.. . the vessel will arrive at Machi Shan [Machi Mountain] . . . then the Liuqiu Kingdom [emphasis added]. 107

In short, based on information from Shunfeng Xiangsong, the Diaoyu Islands were important not only as navigation aids, but also

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as ports of refuge in the East China Sea for people navigating to the Liuqiu Kingdom. Two types of historical documents, the Shilu compiled by Chinese officials and Shunfeng Xiangsong, a general navigation guide, have contributed different but essential information. The former provides necessary "national interests," such as boundary and diplomatic issues, and the latter contributes general navigation and geographical knowledge of the world, an essential guide for those diplomats who traveled to tributary countries and those merchants who traded with other countries. DEFENSE MANUALS108

The Chinese have had a sea defense system since A.D. 220, during the Three Kingdom Period. 109 Before the Yuan dynasty, the Chinese were mainly attacked by "barbarians" from the north and northwest;110 therefore, the Great Wall was the best defense boundary between Chinese and non-Chinese. 111 In the early Ming dynasty (around 1388), the Chinese built a sea defense system along coastal provinces 112 and assigned defense commands: Shuizhai [Marine Camps]. 113 Because of frequent attacks from the wokou, the Yongle emperor ordered the establishment of the Jiubian or Jiuzhen [the Nine Border Defense Commands] defense system in 1435 to protect the Chinese coasdine. 114 The Writings of Zheng Ruozeng and Zheng Shungong In the year of Guo Rulin's mission during the 1500s, the wokou raids on Chinese coastal provinces gready intensified. 115 In particular, they attacked North Guangdong and Fujian Provinces, especially Quanzhou, 116 the Penghu Archipelago, and Meihuasuo in Changle County, from which the cefeng missions to the Liuqiu departed. 117 Hu Zongxian was a governor-general of the Jiangsu region and was famous for winning hundreds of battles against the wokou,118 having received three "symbols of favor" (or honor) from the Son of the Heaven (i.e., the emperor). 119 As a governor-general, Hu had the great responsibility to secure Chinese coastal cities. In order to successfully crack down on the wokou as well as protect Chinese citizens, he invited Zheng Ruozeng to be his military advisor. Zheng was already known as a specialist of military arts and geography and had just finished the first draft of his magnum opus, Chouhai Tubian [Illustrated Maps on Coastal Defense].

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Zheng was encouraged to continue his work on the book by Hu after receiving his position as advisor. With the backing of Hu, Zheng Ruozeng enjoyed not only the privilege of interviewing the captured wokou and the gathered information from Japan by Chinese delegations, but also gained access to government documents and archives, including confidential reports from the emperor. By chance, Zheng learned that the wokou had relatively little geographical knowledge of Chinese coastal cities, and their raids on coastal provinces were mainly dependent upon collusion with Chinese pirates. 120 As a result, Zheng advised "Hu that he sow discord between the Japanese and Chinese to weaken their military strength. This tactic helped Hu win a decisive victory over the wokou." 121 In 1561, Zheng completed the 13 juan [fascicles] of Chouhai Tubian, which marked a turning point in geographic studies in China. Prior to Ming times, the major threat to China came from the north; therefore, both Chinese geographers and military strategists emphasized the northern frontier and northern boundaries. During these years, the Chinese paid little attention to coastal areas. Only after Zheng published the Chouhai Tubian did the Chinese geographers' works begin to shift attention to the seas. 122 Chouhai Tubian contains seven parts: 123 Part One has maps of the eastern world and of offshore islands, such as the Diaoyu Islands along the Chinese coast (juan 1); Part Two covers a history of Sinojapanese relations from the Han dynasty (202 B . C . - A . D . 8) to later Ming times, including maps ofJapan (juan 2); Part Three comprises maps of the Chinese coastal area that suffered from the wokou (juan 3 to 7); Part Four embodies a chronological table of the wokou raids in the same region since the Jiajing reign and an account of the routes and years in which the wokou invaded (juan 8); Part Five contains an account of the methods used in defeating the wokou by the Ming forces under GovernorGeneral Hu (juan 9); Part Six consists of a list of those Chinese officers and civilians who lost their lives in the struggle against the wokou (juan 10); Part Seven includes a history of the way the Ming government dealt with the wokou and a list of the Ming military forces (juan 11 to 13). Unfortunately, to honor Hu's contribution, Hu's descendants purposely dropped Zheng's name as the author and supplanted it with Hu Zongxian in the last editions (1592 and in 1624). Today this book has been praised by both Chinese and Japanese scholars. The great Chinese historical geographer Wang Yong called it a "solid

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contribution to Chinese historical geography in the early modern era." 124 Well-known Japanese historian Tanaka Takeo referred to it as "a Bible of researching wokou,"125 and it is one of the important documents for the study of Sino-Japanese relations in the early modern era. As Zheng noted, the Ming government enforced its jurisdictional boundaries by setting a military defense system around the coastal regions from Shandong to Guangdong. The Chinese defined the marine space of islands or isolated islands in the sea. In the case of the Fujian region, sixteen wei [Garrisons] and twenty-one suo [Minor Garrisons] 126 were set up. Chouhai Tubian documents the fact that the Diaoyu Islands were part of the Chinese defense system in the early modern period. In this defense manual, the seventh Fujian map illustrates the defense system (from west to east) as Meihuasuo [Meihuasuo Minor Garrison] Port, Jilong Yu [Jilong Island], Pengjia Shan 127 [Pengjia Mountain], Diaoyu Yu [Diaoyu Island], and Huaping Shan [Huaping Island], which were all under the jurisdiction of Dinghai Suo [Dinghai Minor Garrison] of the Luoyuan Xian [Luoyuan County]. 128 In the eighth Fujian map, Huangmao Shan129 [Huangwei Island], Ganglan Shan 130 [Ganglan Mountain], and Chi Yu [Chiwei Island] [emphasis added] (from west to east), were all under the jurisdiction of Ningde Xian [Ningde County] (see Appendix Fig. 3).131 The Diaoyu Islands, id est, were part of the Chinese defense system. In Part Two, Zheng's book covers a history of Sino-Japanese relations from the Han dynasty to later Ming times. In this section, Zheng reveals another significant development of the Diaoyu Islands. In order to travel to Japan, people in the early modern age could take the compass route, which would pass by the Liuqiu Kingdom. Thus, as navigation aids, the Diaoyu Islands were not only vital to the Fuzhou-Liuqiu route, but also to the Fuzhou-Japan route. Zheng wrote as follows: A ship departs from the north of Meihua. After traveling 7 geng (a geng = 18.642 miles), the Xiaoliuqiu [Taiwan] is visible.... After sailing 10 geng, the vessel arrives Diaoyu Yu [Diaoyu Island] . . . passing the north of Diaoyu Yu [Diaoyu Island] and heading for Huangma K M [Huangwei Island]. After traveling 10 geng, the ship passes the north of Huangma Yu [HuangweiIsland] . . . and reaches Chi Yu [ChiweiIsland]. The vessel sails past Gumi Shan [Gumi Mountain] . . . passing Naha [Naha Port] of Daliuqiu [the Liuqiu Kingdom] . . . after traveling 4 geng, arrives atYebi Shan [Yebi Mountain]. Then, a ship reaches Hyogozan [Hyogozan Harbor] [emphasis added]. 133 132

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Contrary to the respected and successful professional life of Zheng Ruozeng under Governor-General Hu Zongxian, Zheng Shungong spent a heartbroken, miserable, and depressed life full of tragedy. He was dispatched to Japan as Chuhai Shaotan Zhe [a Secret Overseas Agent] by Governor-General Yang Xuan, 134 the predecessor of Hu Zongxian, to gather information on the wokou route and to deal with the wokou crisis with the Japanese government. 135 In Japan, he was greeted by Minamoto Yoshishige, with whom he discussed the principles of the Ming's foreign policies, especially the crackdown against the wokou,136 During his stay in Japan, Zheng researched the wokou and gathered geographic materials on Japan. As time went by, he learned that many Chinese merchants had cooperated with the wokou activities in raiding Chinese coastal cities.137 Meanwhile, Zheng's boss, Governor-General Yang Xuan, was in trouble in China. He was framed by his enemy Zhao Wenhua 138 and was eventually dismissed from his government job. As soon as Yang was cashiered, Zhao recommended Hu Zongxian, who was already holding the post of governor-general, to replace Yang Xuan. 139 Hu Zongxian and Zhao Wenhua worked well together, 140 and both men became ingratiated to the emperor. At that point, both Hu Zongxian and Zhao Wenhua reached the zenith of their career. When Zheng Shungong returned from Japan, Hu Zongxian had already taken the j o b of Yang Xuan; therefore, no one supported Zheng, whose life took a turn for the worse. Despite Zheng Shungong's strong patriotism and the valuable information regarding the wokou he brought back from Japan, 141 his potentially useful knowledge was not respected, and his life became tortured. Ultimately, a false charge against Zheng resulted in his imprisonment for seven years, despite his repeated request for reinvestigation and mercy.142 This public humiliation led Zheng Shungong to write a book about Japan. In addition to the information that he gathered in Japan, Zheng researched many essential geography books on Japan, such as Riben Kaoliie [A Study ofJapan] by Xue Jun 1 4 3 and Chouhai Tubian by Zheng Ruozeng. 144 In 1565, Zheng Shungong completed Riben Yijian [A Mirror ofJapan], which intensively studies Japan and surrounding countries such as the Liuqiu Kingdom. In this book, Zheng details both the geography ofJapan and his own personal life, especially after returning to China. Unfortunately, the name of Zheng Shungong appears in Mingshi [History of the Ming Dynasty] only once; his book

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has been unknown by scholars in both the East and West with only a few exceptions. 145 In Zheng's Riben Yijian, he mentions the names of the Diaoyu Islands in a passage discussing the compass route to the Liuqiu Kingdom, and he provides a map. According to Riben Yijian: departure from Meihua to east of Penghu, passing the Liuqiu, and reach Japan. I discovered this route from the person who accompanied Chen Kan when he used it to the Liuqiu Kingdom. . . . Penghu is located in sea of Quanzhou Sub-prefecture, about 160 li (one li = 0.317 miles) . . . and Diaoyu Yu [Diaoyu Island] is xiaodong xiaoyu ye [part of Taiwan territories]. Passing a small i s l e t . . . with south wind . . . at 4 geng (a geng= 18.642 miles) reached Huangma K M 1 4 6 [Huangwei Island] and Chikan F« 147 [ChiweiIsland] (see Appendix Fig. 4) [emphasis added]. 1 4 8

The vital revelation in this passage is that Zheng Shungong not only mentions the names of the Diaoyu and Huangwei Islands, but he also includes the sentence "xiaodong xiaoyu ye" after Diaoyu Island. This sentence can be interpreted as meaning that the Diaoyu Islands are part of Taiwan's (xiaodong) The Mapping

of Luo

territories. 149

Hongxian

According to Zheng Ruozeng's own acknowledgment, the maps in his book are largely based on the works of Luo Hongxian, 150 one of the great geographers in Chinese history, who has received little attention in the West. During the chaotic years of wokou aggression during the Jibing era, the government demanded maps for defense. As few accurate maps existed, Luo, with a Jinshi degree, working at the Hanlin Academy, decided to provide a new map. During the three years it took to collect materials, Luo found Yuditu [Adas of China], mapped by Zhu Siben (1273-1337), 151 a master geographer of the Yuan dynasty. Luo revised and enlarged Zhu's original works by supplying additional details from other sources of the Yuan and Ming dynasties152 and entitied his magnum opus Guangyutu [Adas of the World]. In addition, by providing great knowledge, Luo helped Hu Zongxian defend the coastal cities.153 Because of his knowledge of strategy and military affairs, Luo was frequently offered important positions, including minister of war—but Luo declined these offers. 154 Luo's book contained forty main maps (including sixteen provincial maps, eleven regional border maps, three Yellow River maps, two Grand Canal maps, and others), and some sixty-eight supplementary maps, including a map of Japan, a map of Korea, and a map of the

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Liuqiu Kingdom. 155 Luo's mapping method is based on the method of indicating distances by a grid system (i.e., rule over spaces defined by geometric grids), first used by Pei Xiu (224-271) and redefined by Zhu Siben, a system that dominated Chinese cartography throughout the late Ming and early Qing dynasties.156 Luo's work provided valuable sources on Chinese geography, particularly the northern expedition maps of Zhu Yuanzhang, the first emperor of the Ming dynasty. Furthermore, Luo's book became a source for the Mercator Map (published in 1569) and the Ortelius Map (published in 1570) by Matteo Ricci.157 This great masterpiece of Chinese geography by Luo Hongxian also recorded the existence of the Diaoyu Islands. On the map of the Liuqiu Kingdom, Luo notes that it took only seven days to get there, 158 and he illustrates navigation aids such as the Diaoyu Yu [Diaoyu Islands] (see Appendix Fig. 2), Xiaoliuqiu [Taiwan], Pengjia Shan 159 [Pengjia Mountain], and Huaping Yu [Huaping Island] surrounding the Liuqiu Kingdom. 160 Similar to Luo's map, Sancai Tuhui [The Collection of Maps by Three Talented People] by Wang Qi and Wang Siyi in 1609, also contains the name of the Diaoyu Islands in the map section covering the Liuqiu Kingdom. 161 The Unknown Hero: Wu Wei Many Chinese sacrificed their lives during the wokou years when raids by the Japanese pirates forced Chinese to set u p the sea defense system. After 1548, when the Chinese forces smashed Shuangyu, 162 the major secret trade base for the wokou activities, their raids on coastal cities became more aggressive than ever. During the "golden era" of the wokou (from 1551 to 1555), 163 the Chinese were extremely agonized; many national heroes such as Hu Zongxian and Yang Xuan defended China against aggression, and many died for the country as unknown heroes. Wu Wei was a good example. Wu was born in Lishui, today's Liyang County in Jiangsu Province. In 1552, when he was the prefect of Taizhou Fu [Taizhou Prefecture] ,164 Deng Wenjun, 1 6 5 one of the wokou leaders, attacked Taizhou. Wu pursued the wokou to the Diaoyu Islands, attacked them, and died there without the acknowledgment of imperial authorities. "The Diaoyu Islands Batde" is described in the loyal soldiers section of the 178th liezhuan [biographies] chapter of the Mingshi. This treatise describes "The Diaoyu Islands Battle" as follows: "Taizhou Prefect, Wu Wei, who was

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b o r n in Lishu, pursued a n d attacked the wokou to the Diaoyu Ling [Diaoyu Islands], a n d died there without acknowledgment of the higher authorities [emphasis added]." 1 6 6 Only after Shangshi, the son of Wu Wei, appealed his father's death to the imperial court did Wu Wei finally receive h o n o r f r o m the court. In addition, Shangshi received cefeng and was admitted as a student to the Guozixue [Imperial College] 167 by the imperial court due to his father's death in the Diaoyu Islands Battle. T h e Diaoyu Islands Batde has raised many interesting questions: Why did Wu Wei fight and pursue the wokou to the Diaoyu Islands if the Diaoyu Islands were n o t part of Chinese territory? Why did a local prefect of Zhejiang's county fight a n d go after the wokou to the faraway Diaoyu Islands, which were u n d e r the jurisdiction of Fujian? Were the Diaoyu Islands terra nullius? O n e thing is clear: Prefect Wu and his associates h a d surely recognized a n d understood that the Diaoyu Islands were a part of Chinese territory; otherwise, there was no reason for a local prefect to fight the wokou outside of China or on terra nullius. This batde demonstrates that the Chinese n o t only recognized but also had considerable knowledge of the disputed islands a n d their surrounding areas. T h e significance of the Diaoyu Islands Battle also illustrates that the Chinese d e f e n d e d their national sovereignty, and that the Diaoyu Islands were n o t terra nullius. Based on the Diaoyu Islands Battle, it is hard to believe that the Diaoyu Islands were n o t a part of Chinese territory. Why did the local prefect of Zhejiang fight a n d go after the wokou to the faraway Diaoyu Islands, which were u n d e r the jurisdiction of Fujian? Because of his frustration with wokou activities, Prefect Wu Wei f o u g h t a n d went after t h e m to the Diaoyu Islands, although the islands were n o t part of his jurisdiction. In 1548, when the Chinese forces abolished the major secret base, Shuangyu, which was located near Zhejiang, the wokou shifted their base to J a p a n by reorganizing their forces 168 and began to retaliate. According to the statistics of wokou activities, there were only two attacks in 1548, when Shuangyu was destroyed, only one attack each in 1549 and 1550, a n d two in 1551. Suddenly in 1552, the wokou activities j u m p e d to a total of thirteen attacks, a n d Zhejiang suffered the most wokou aggression—ten attacks. 169 Unlike the well-known national h e r o H u Zongxian, Wu Wei was merely an unknown local prefect. Because his n a m e was not well

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known either by top officials or the emperor, only two books 170 mention his name. Only after his son appealed to the court did the imperial court investigate this problem. The Ming government was aware of the existence of the Diaoyu Islands and their surrounding areas because the imperial court investigated Prefect Wu Wei's case. Thus, Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Island, Chiwei Island, and other islands were within the scope of China's coastal defense. 171 Furthermore, according to Hanyu Dacidian, the Chinese used ling to describe mountains as shan [mountain range] ,172 which the Chinese often employed to identify an islet or island in the sea since ancient times. 173 In fact, from time to time the Chinese have interchangeably used ling, shan, yu, and dao to identify an islet in the sea. The use of ling in the naming of an island, however, is not found in the Japanese language.

Archives from the Qing Dynasty Similar to the archives of the Ming dynasty, the Qing's archives of the Diaoyu Islands include many Shilu records, revealing the international boundary between China and the Liuqiu Kingdom, and they provide important information concerning the ownership of the Diaoyu Islands. In addition, many academic works contribute crucial facts regarding the Diaoyu Islands. Specifically, these works demonstrate that the Diaoyu Islands were acknowledged not only by governmental officials, such as chief and vice-chief envoys to the Liuqiu Kingdom, but also by Chinese intellectuals. Toward the end of the Qing dynasty, however, Chinese territories including Hong Kong, Macao, and parts of northeastern Manchuria were conquered by Western imperial powers such as Russia, Great Britain, and Portugal—and even by Japan. Surprisingly, the Chinese government did not desert or forget the existence of the Diaoyu Islands (on the premise that the Empress Edict of 1893 is genuine). Rather, these disputed islands were granted to a Chinese businessman for pharmaceutical uses by the Empress Dowager Cixi. T H E SHILU A R C H I V E S

The Liuqiu Kingdom was a curious case of divided loyalties. The Liuqiuans were actually controlled by Satsuma-han of southern Japan, but during their tribute missions they continued to profess them-

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selves loyal tributary subjects of the Qing. 174 Approaching the Qing period, relations between China and the Liuqiu Kingdom remained unchanged 1 7 5 —many of the customs originating in the Ming dynasty were maintained during the investiture missions. But the Liuqiu Kingdom faced enormous economic burdens and financial crises following the Japanese invasion in 1609.176 For example, when Chinese officials gathered navigation information about tributary nations under Pax Sinica, the Liuqiu Kingdom could not contribute maps and records to the Chinese due to financial hardships. 177 Although the Liuqiuans were forced to sign an "unequal" treaty with the Japanese, the Japanese continued to pressure the Liuqiu Kingdom by threat of force. Unfortunately, the timing was not favorable for the Liuqiuans. Because of the breakdown of the Ming Empire and its replacement by the Qing Empire in China, the Liuqiu Kingdom simply did not have any protection from Japanese aggression. This enabled the Japanese to gain golden opportunities and to reinforce Japan's political interests toward the Liuqiu Kingdom. By the time the Qing was fully in control of China and had begun to protect national interests, the Chinese effort to protect the Liuqiu Kingdom was too little too late, because the Japanese influence over the Liuqiu Kingdom had already affected the reception of Chinese cefeng missions. On the other hand, Chinese investiture missions178 continued to go to the Liuqiu Kingdom to perform the investiture ceremony (Table 4). As with the envoys during Ming times, the envoys of the Qing took the major route to the Liuqiu Kingdom, and the description of the route became clearer, more accurate, and more comprehensive. As usual, the route to the Liuqiu Kingdom followed many mountains or islets, including Pengjia Mountain and the Diaoyu Islands during the southwest wind of summer. The return route from the Liuqiu passed on the northwestern sides of mountains, including Nanqi Mountain, 179 with the northeastern wind. 180 Consequently, these Shilu provided significant information regarding the ownership of the Diaoyu Islands. Specifically, the Chinese acknowledged both the existence of the disputed islands and the international boundary between the Diaoyu Islands and the Liuqiu Kingdom on the Fuzhou-Liuqiu compass route. As an essential navigation mark in the East China Sea, the Diaoyu Islands served as modern beacons or lighthouses for both the Chinese and the Liuqiuans while voyaging at sea. Importandy, there were no territorial

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Table 4. The Chinese Cefeng [Investiture] Missions to the Liuqiu Kingdom during the Qing Dynasty Names of Chief Envoy and Vice Envoy

Year

Year Gap

Investiture Kings

1

Zhang Xueli and Wang Gai

1663

0

2

Wang Ji and Lin Lin? a

1683

20

Shangzhen

3

Hai Bin and X u Baoguang

1719

36

Shangjin

4

Quan Kui and Zhou Huang

1756

37

Shangmu

5

Zhao Wenkai and Li Dingyuan

1801

45

Shangwen

6

Qi Kun and Fei Cizhang

1809

8

Shanghao

7

Lin Hongzhang and Gao Renjian

1838

30

Shangyu

8

Zhao Xin and Yu Guangjia

1866

28

Shangtai

Shangzhi

Notes: "The first name of Lin cannot be verified. Sources: Zhao Erxun et al., Qingshi Gao [The Draft History of the Qing Dynasty], 526th juan [fascicle] (China: 1927; reprint, Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1991), 14616-14625. Also see Ch'en, "Investiture of Liu-ch'iu Kings in the Ch'ing Period," 136; Sakamaki, Ryukyu, 76; and various Shilu records from the Ming and Qing dynasties.

disputes between China and the Liuqiu Kingdom during more than five hundred years of foreign relations. Zhang Xueli

Mission

Even though the southernmost area south of Mukden (modern Shenyang city) in Manchuria was a quintessential Chinese agricultural region of the sixteenth century, the Ming government did not recognize Manchuria as a civil administration but rather as an important military district. By establishing hereditary and registered military units in Manchuria, separate from the civil administration of the agricultural area, the Chinese government sought to maintain both a military buffer against nomadic inroads and a check upon any separatist tendencies of local Chinese officials.181 People in Manchuria were descendants of seminomadic tribes who established the Jin dynasty (1115-1234) in northern China during the twelfth century. In 1616, Nurgaci (reign 1606-1626), a minor chieftain on the eastern

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b o r d e r of the agricultural basin of southern Manchuria, f o u n d e d the Manchurian state, a n d in 1636, Abahai, his son and successor, proclaimed the Qing dynasty. During this period, the Ming Empire became progressively weaker, a n d rebellion was endemic. T h e famous Chinese national h e r o Li Zicheng successfully raided the Yangtze River (or Changjiang) valley. By 1644, Li succeeded in capturing Beijing, the Ming capital. But Li eventually was removed f r o m power by the Manchus, who began to organize the government of the Qing dynasty. During this transitional a n d chaotic period, the Liuqiu delegation, led by Jin Yingyuan, arrived at Fujian in 1646 to request a Chinese cefeng mission to confirm Crown Prince Shangxian. 182 As the Ming struggled to retain its power a n d the Qing attempted to extend its power, n o party dominated or served as the "legitimate" government during this time. As a result, the Liuqiuans were not tout de suite recognized by either party a n d did n o t receive an imperial decree to return to their country. Ironically, when Chen Yanyi and H a n Yuanxun were n o m i n a t e d as heads of the Chinese mission to the Liuqiu Kingdom by the deteriorating Ming (see Table 3), 183 Zhang Xueli was also designated as a chief envoy of a cefeng mission by the increasingly powerful Qing government (see Table 4) ,184 But the Chen Yanyi mission was never carried out because of the e n d of the Ming Empire. Even though Zhang Xueli a n d vice-chief envoy Wang Gai were designated to undertake the first Chinese cefeng mission to the Liuqiu Kingd o m in the Qing Empire in 1654 by the Shunzhi e m p e r o r (reign 1644-1661), they could n o t instantly depart f r o m China. As a result, in 1647 the crown prince of the Liuqiu Kingdom died without confirmation by the Chinese. 185 W h e n the crown prince's younger brother, Shangzhi, became the next possible candidate for king of the Liuqiu, the crown prince dispatched a n o t h e r mission to China, again requesting a cefeng mission. At this time, the Kangxi e m p e r o r (reign 1661-1722) immediately reappointed Zhang and his associates to the Chinese investiture mission to the Liuqiu, a n d the Chinese mission departed f r o m Fuzhou to the Liuqiu in 1663. In Zhang's mission record, 186 there are n o accounts of any islands or mountains, including the Diaoyu Islands, as navigation aids along the Fuzhou-Naha route. In fact, like many missions during the Ming dynasty, Zhang lost his way on the compass route to the Liuqiu Kingdom. After Zhang a n d his associates realized that they h a d drifted

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away to Beishan Yu [Beishan Island], a boundary between the Liuqiu and Japan, they were oveijoyed. 187 In his record, Zhang observes, On the ninth, many people vomited due to the rocking of strong waves. The color of water began to change from blue to dark blue. "Hey! We entered the 'ocean'," shouted the captain. There is a white water line crossing between south and north. "Here, therefore, is jiezhongwai [the boundary between China and foreign country]," stated by the captain. Thereafter, we witnessed many schools of fish [emphasis added]. 188

Based on Zhang's eyewitness account, we cannot verify whether or not the location of the boundary is around Chiwei Island. Nevertheless, despite the failure to identify any islets or mountains as navigation aids on the compass route to the Liuqiu Kingdom, one fact is crucial: there is an international boundary between China and the Liuqiu (indicated by the use of the term jiezhongwai). Remember that, until the year 1662, when the Ming Empire was extinguished, there were constant fights between the routed Ming remnants and the Manchus. The Qing government, ergo, could not fully control administrative affairs by the time Zhang departed from China for the Liuqiu Kingdom. As the imperial edict of the Kangxi emperor pointed out, the reason why Zhang Xueli could not depart from China to the Liuqiu Kingdom (since 1654, when Zhang was nominated as a chief envoy) was the lack of information about the compass route to the Liuqiu Kingdom. As a result, Zhang and his associates stayed in Fujian for years. . . . As the emperor, I determined to dispatch the Chinese cefeng mission led by Zhang to the Kingdom. . . . I hope that the King of the Liuqiu Kingdom understands my sincerity.189

The imperial edict also indicates that the Qing government had not fully organized the national archives, including the Shilu, that the Ming officials left. But Zhang and his associates recognized that there was an international boundary between China and the Liuqiu Kingdom even though the Chinese envoys could not specify the exact location of the boundary. Wangji

Mission

In the twenty-first year of the Kangxi reign (1682), Crown Prince Shangzhen sent a mission to China to file a request for a Chinese cefeng mission. Because many people, including the Liuqiuans, tried to persuade the Chinese officials not to leave China after the summer season, which had the best winds to navigate to the Liuqiu, the

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second Chinese cefeng mission in the Qing dynasty—led by Wang Ji and Lin Lin?190—was postponed until the following year. After Wang's mission returned to China, he completed the Shi Liuqiu Lu in five juan [fascicles]191 and presented them to the emperor in the twentythird year of the Kangxi reign (1684). In Wang's report, he unveiled new and vital facts of the Diaoyu Islands learned during his journey. First, the Chinese cefeng mission was accompanied by Liuqiuans, who were dispatched by the new king because Zhang had lost his way on the previous mission.192 As a result, it took only three days for Wang Ji to reach the Liuqiu Kingdom; 193 no mission had ever traveled only three days at sea to the Liuqiu Kingdom. The fifth juan of Wang's record documents the following: We departed from Wuhumen Port.194 Following wind to the south, we sailed past Dongsha Shan [Dongsha Mountain]. With the Liuqiuans as navigators, we reached nearby Xiaoliuqiu.. . . According to navigation maps we should see Xiaoliuqiu, Jilong Yu, and Huaping Yu after passing Dongsha Shan. However, we observed Pengjia Shan [Pengjia Mountain], but no other mountains in the early morning of the twenty-fourth. After the ships passed Diaoyu Yu [Diaoyu Island], we sailed so fast that the ships streaked across the sky. On the twenty-fifth, we were supposed to see Huangwei Yu before Chi Yu. For some unknown reason, we arrived at Chiwei Yu [ChiweiIsland] without passing by Huangwei Yu [Huangwei Island]. In the evening, the ships went through the jiao or gou [trench] (to celebrate the haishenji [ritual to the sea god] or guogouji [trench-crossing ritual]. Along with rice, live pigs and sheep were sacrificed to the sea god. "What does jiao mean?" asked Wang Ji. "This means that there is zhongwai zhijie [the boundary between China and foreign country]," replied by the captain. "How do you distinguish the jie [boundary]}" asked Wang again. "I believe the jie is located here. But this does not mean that everyone can guess this location. Nor is my belief irresponsible," replied the captain. . . . When nobody sighted Gumi Shan [Gumi Mountain], Zheng Yongan, the Liuqiuan minister, sang.... We passed Machi Shan [Machi Mountain] . . . and entered Naha Port [emphasis added].195 One significant development of this mission record is that the Chinese began to utilize modern nomenclature to identify some islets of the Diaoyu group. For instance, Chi Yu, which was used during the Ming, was no longer employed. Instead the Chinese officials began to utilize the name Chiwei Yu, which is still used by the Chinese today to distinguish the islet.

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In addition, unlike the mission record of Zhang Xueli in 1663, this report indicates where the conversation between Wang a n d the captain took place. It occurred above the 2,000-meter trench when the ships passed Chiwei Yu. For b o t h the Chinese a n d the Liuqiuans, this trench was neither new n o r accidental. Indeed, Wang Ji was n o t the first n o r certainly the last to cross the international boundary between China a n d the Liuqiu Kingdom passing the Diaoyu Islands, as many Ming officials, such as Guo Rulin, Xia Ziyang, a n d Chen Kan, had already d o c u m e n t e d the same passage. T h e mzyor significance of W a n g j i ' s record is that he was the first person to discuss the international boundary issue in such detail. Moreover, H u a n g Jingfu, a guest on the Wang Ji mission, also wrote a record of the j o u r n e y to the Liuqiu. H u a n g indicated that the Liuqiu Kingdom contained only thirty-six islands, 196 which did not include any islets of the Diaoyu group. In addition, when W a n g j i and his associates left the Liuqiu Kingdom, the Liuqiuan scholars dedicated four poems to the Chinese cefengmission. T h e following p o e m was contributed by H u a n g Zhuangyou, 1 9 7 the Liuqiuan minister: Xinan Shuangli chu Jiangwei [Two robust carps (i.e., ships) passing the corner of the river]; Song Erxing Chaxiang Rikai [Two starts (i.e., envoys) going to the Sun (i.e., new date)]. Yaoxiang Xinanfeng Xinhao [Recalling the southwest wind for a good journey]; Zhijun Yiguo Diaoyu Tai [Knowing gendemen sailing past the Diaoyu Islands] (haizhong xiaoyu) [small islets in the sea] [emphasis added]. 198

In ancient societies, whether Japanese or Chinese, the dedication of a p o e m to a person is one of the highest privileges a n d is considered entertainment for gendemen and the well-educated classes.199 Huang's p o e m indicates that the Liuqiuans also used the n a m e of Diaoyu Tai to identify these disputed islets. Xu Baoguang Mission T h e forty-eighth year of the Kangxi reign (1709) was catastrophic for the people of the Liuqiu Kingdom. T h e r e was a sudden natural disaster, an earthquake that resulted in the b u r n i n g down of temples a n d the death of people a n d animals. In addition, the ephemeral life

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of the kings resulted in unstable politics in the kingdom. That same year (1709), before King Shangzhen died, Crown Prince Shangchun passed away. Shangyi, the son of Shangchun, was next in line to inherit the throne. Unfortunately, before having been confirmed by a Chinese cefeng mission, the new king died in the fifty-first year of the Kangxi reign (1712). 200 Finally, Crown Prince Shangjing dispatched a mission to request a cefeng mission from China the following year. At this time, Hai Bin and Xu Baoguang were appointed to the cefeng mission to the Liuqiu Kingdom in the fifty-seventh year of Kangxi (1718).!201 On the twenty-second of the fifth month of the fifty-eighth year of the Kangxi reign (1719), accompanied by the Liuqiuan minister Chen Qixiang as navigator, the Chinese cefeng mission departed from Wuhumen Port. The Chinese official describes the compass route to the Liuqiu as follows: On the twentieth, we departed from W u h u m e n . . . . We relied on the guidance of Chen Qixiang, who was in charge of the compass. . . . On the twenty-fourth, two big islets were visible . . . passing Jilong Shan, we did not see other islets, such as Huaping and Pengjia... . On the twenty-seventh, after traveling 2 geng (a geng = 18.642 miles), we should have sighted Diaoyu Tai, Huangwei, and Chiwei Islands, but we did not see any of these islands. . . . On the twenty-eighth, "This is not Gumi; it must be Yebi Mountain, which is located in northwest of our kingdom," stated the Liuqiuan minister.202

Even though Xu and his associates followed the navigation directions of the Liuqiuans, they missed many navigation aids, including the Diaoyu Islands, on the compass route to the Liuqiu Kingdom. But Xu's mission record documents the Fuzhou-Naha Route in a quote of a paragraph from Shinan Kdgi [Broad Interpretation of Navigation Guide] by Tei Junsoku, also known as Nago no Chobun, the well-known Neo-Confucian scholar and Liuqiuan geographer. 203 One of the major reasons Tei wrote Shinan Kdgi was because of the Liuqiuan anxiety regarding navigation. This work extensively analyzes the necessary information of the voyage routes from the Liuqiu Kingdom to other countries. 204 It exhaustively describes the atmospheric as well as marine conditions that prevail along the sea routes between the Liuqiu Kingdom and southern China; it contains maps, other illustrations, and diverse advice on how to journey safely.205 A portion of Shinan Kdgi dealing with winds was published in a German transla-

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tion by Okada Takematsu at the Central Meteorological Observatory of Tokyo in 1914. 206 According to Shinan Kogi, the compass route between Fuzhou and Naha is described as follows: The route from Fuzhou to Liuqiu starts at Wuhumen of Minanzhen,207 heading Dongsha islet. After traveling 10 geng (a geng = 18.642 miles), ships pass Jilongtou Qilong Island] . . . then Huaping Yu, and Pengjia Shan.208 After sailing past 10 geng, vessels pass Diaoyu Tai [Diaoyu Island] . .. traveling 4 geng, and reach Huangwei Yu [Huangwei Island]. After traveling 10 geng, ships pass Chiwei Yu [Chiwei Island], After sailing past 6 geng, vessels will arrive at Gumi Shan, where Liuqiu xinanfang jieshang zhenshan [is located the southwest boundary between the Liuqiu Kingdom and China]. Heading Machi. .. ships finally reach Naha Ko [Naha Port] of the Liuqiu. . .. On the return Liuqiu-Fuzhou route, vessels leave from Naha Port . . . and reach Gumi Mountain after traveling 1.5 geng. After sailing past 4 geng, vessels arrive at Nanqi Shan . . . passing Lima Mountain, and enter the Minanzhen of Fuzhou [emphasis added].209 The significance of this passage is not only that the names of the Diaoyu Islands were mentioned, but also the citation by X u Baoguang immediately after the name of Gumi Mountain: "Liuqiu xinanfang jieshang zhenshan." This citation signifies the ownership of the Diaoyu Islands between China and the Liuqiu Kingdom. Some scholars 210 argue that the sentence was not written by X u Baoguang but rather by Tei Junsoku. This is because the original Shinan Kogi did not contain the citation. 211 Because X u Baoguang and Tei Junsoku had known each other for a long time, they always kept in touch, even though they lived in separate countries. 212 After X u returned from the Liuqiu Kingdom, Tei Junsoku, along with the Liuqiuan king's uncle, headed a mission to pay tribute to the Chinese imperial court in 1720. 213 It does not matter, however, whether X u Baoguang or Tei Junsoku wrote the sentence. Rather, the significance of this sentence is that it is tout de suite cited after the mention of the Gumi (J: Kume) Mountain, where both Chinese and Liuqiuan officials recognized the international boundary between China and the Liuqiu Kingdom. In fact, the terms jie and zhen were used to demarcate boundaries by both the Chinese and the Liuqiuan officials. Since the fifteenth century (the Northern Wei), zhen was used by the Chinese to refer to their military regions. For example, the military was systematized as thejiuzhen [Nine Regions] or t h e j i u b i a n [Nine Boundaries] defense system during the Ming dynasty,214 and the Qing military was

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divided into 36 zhen in 1804. 215 Since ancient times, the Chinese used zhen to set up a military boundary, meaning to "put down" or "stabilize" a region. 216 Many military terms, such as zhenbiao [regional command] and zhenjiang [superior military officers], have been widely employed by the Chinese. 217 The phrase "Liuqiu xinanfang jieshang zhenshan"means that Gumi Mountain is located at the extreme southwestern boundary of the Liuqiu Kingdom. Indeed, Naha is the center; Gumi Mountain is geographically located at the southwestern extreme boundary.218 In other words, southwest of Gumi Mountain, there is a military boundary between China and Liuqiu Kingdom. Thus, the Diaoyu Islands, located to the west of Gumi Mountain, unquestionably belonged to Chinese territory. Another significant development of Xu's mission record is that Xu provided a comprehensive map of the compass route (see Appendix Fig. 7). In addition, he documented the geographical location of the Liuqiu Kingdom, whose territory consisted of thirty-six islets. These thirty-six islets219 included four islets220 in the east: Gudajia, Jinqinu, Bama, and Yiji; three islets221 in the central west: Dongmachi Shan, Ximachi Shan, and Gumi; five islets222 in the northwest: Dunaqi, Angenni, Yi, Yebi, and Liuhuang; eight islets223 in the northeast: Youlun, Yongliangbu, Dugu, Youlii, Wuqinu, Jiaqiliima, Dadao, and Qijie; seven islets224 in the south: Taiping, Yiqima, Gulima, Yiliangbao, Dalama, Mianna, and Wugami; and nine islets225 in the southwest: Bachong Shan/Bazhong Shan, Wubama, Baduma, Younaguni, Gumi, Daqidunu, Gulushima, Alagusigu, and Batiluma (see Appendix Fig. 8) , 226 None of the eight islets of the Diaoyu group was included in the thirty-six islets making up the Liuqiuan territory. Zhou Huang Mission In the twentieth year of the Qianlong reign (1755), the emperor named Quan Kui and Zhou Huang as the head of the fourth mission of the Qing dynasty to the Liuqiu Kingdom to invest Shangmu. Accompanied by the Liuqiuan minister, Zheng Binghe, the Chinese cefeng mission departed to Liuqiu in the twenty-first year of the Qianlong reign (1756). 2 2 7 Upon returning to China, Zhou Huang completed the sixteen-juan [fascicle] Shilu, which is an exhaustive study of the Liuqiu Kingdom. Zhou not only reviewed many available sources, including previous Shilu, but also revealed day-to-day events of Sino-Liuqiuan relations since the Sui dynasty. About two-thirds of

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his account reveals many important historical, political, cultural, social, and geographical facts regarding the Liuqiu Kingdom. In the first part of the fourth juan, Zhou describes the national boundary of the Liuqiu Kingdom by listing the names of all major cities and islands, including maps. 228 Zhou provides a map of the compass route to the Liuqiu Kingdom, including navigation aids such as Diaoyu Tai, Huangwei Yu, and Chiwei Yu (see Appendix Fig. 9) 229 used for his voyage to the Liuqiu. Zhou's record reads as follows: On the tenth, following the morning tide, we departed from Wuhumen P o r t . . . seeingJilong Yu [Jilong Island], and reached Diaoyu Tai [Diaoyu Island].... On the left and right sides of our vessel, a huge fish followed us day by day. At night, we celebrated guogouji [trenchcrossing ritual].... On the eighth of the seventh month, we arrived at Naha Port. . . . Due to the need to repair damaged ships and build new ships, the Chinese stayed in Liuqiu until the twenty-second year of the Qianlong reign (1757). Finally, on the twenty-eighth of the first month, we left the kingdom. After passing Gumi Shan [Gumi Mountain], we celebrated guogouji [trench-crossing ritual] again [emphasis added] ,230

It is consequential that Zhou's record mentions the Diaoyu Islands on the compass route to the Liuqiu Kingdom, and the guogouji on his return route from the kingdom. This demonstrates that, just as many of his predecessors, Zhou also recognized the international marine space or international boundary between China and the Liuqiu Kingdom. Li Dingyuan Mission In the fifty-ninth year of the Qinlong reign (1794), Shangmu died and his grandson, Shangwen, became the next king of the Liuqiu Kingdom because Shangzhe, the son of Shangmu, died two years before his father's death. 231 Zhao Wenkai and Li Dingyuan were appointed for the fifth cefeng mission to the Liuqiu Kingdom in the fifth year of the Jiaqing reign (1801). As no cefeng mission to the Liuqiu had been dispatched for four decades (Table 4), Zhao and Li had to visit Ji Xiaofeng, who served the Qing government during Zhou Huang's mission, to collect information on matters such as the cefeng ceremony. 232 Li Dingyuan's Shilu is written in a very different style from the works of his predecessors. Li documents the entire journey of the

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cefeng mission daily, starting from the date of his nomination to the date of the completed mission upon his return to China. The compass route is described by Li as follows: On the seventh of the fifth month, some forty "destroyers" came to protect us against pirate attacks and escorted the cefeng ships, which were waiting in Wuhumen Port. Somehow the captain or his associates forgot the hourglass.233 That night two Liuqiuans, along with Liang Huan, the Liuqiuan minister, stayed overnight to take charge of the compass.... On the ninth, we passed Pengjia Shan [Pengjia Mountain].... Since our departure, we have traveled a total of 16 geng (a geng = 18.642 miles) .. . passing Diaoyu Tai [Diaoyu Island]. "Ready, everyone! According to Wangji's Shilu we are supposed to enter the blackwater trench and celebrate guogouji [trench-crossing ritual]," said the captain. Three days have passed since we left China; however, we did not see the trench. 'You do not witness the trench when we come and go. But when you see the Diaoyu Tai, you know that it is time to celebrate guogouji, worshipping to the sea god. To do this, you have to throw living sheep and pigs as well as dedicate alcohol," said the Liuqiuans. . . . On the tenth, after sailing past about 14 gmgsince passing Pengjia Mountain, we arrived at Chiwei Yu [Chiwei Island]. ... Suddenly, Liang Huan shouted, "the drinking water well234 is broken and drinking water is gone." Huge fish squeezed our ships; Li prayed to the sea god by saying, "celestial envoys were ordered by the emperor. We can only go forward, but not backward. . . . God! You can change the wind . .. and I will never forget your kindness. . . . " On twenty-fifth of the tenth month, we left the Liuqiu Kingdom. We sailed past Gumi Shan [Gumi Mountain].... Suddenly our ships began to shake and people threw up. .. . The water became a black color. Oh! This is the so-called heigou [black trench]! Nobody dared to look at the trench by himself [emphasis added] .235 Unlike Li's writing style, chief envoy Zhao Wenkai documented the trip using a poetic style of the Shilu. For example, Zhao 236 describes the compass route to the Liuqiu as follows: Zhou chu Wuhumen [Departure from Wuhumen] Mangdang fu Yuanqi [Blowing strong (wind) vastly], Weimang jie Taikong [in the blurred sky]. Guo Diaoyu Tai [Sailing past the Diaoyu Islands] Dahai Cangmang li [In the misty sea], Heren diao Juao [How many people caught a huge chela]!

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Heigou Zhiyang Bukeyi Jingkua [Unable cut cross the black ocean-trench directly], Leiyinyin xi Zaixia [Under the faint thunderstorm (sky) ] [emphasis added] !237

Once again, like other Chinese officials, Li and Zhao acknowledge that the international boundary between China and Liuqiu Kingdom is located between Chiwei Island and Gumi Mountain. Although the Chinese and the Liuqiuans, on the compass route to the Liuqiu in Li Dingyuan's mission, did not observe the heigou—which used to distinguish the international boundary after passing Gumi Mountain— it was seen on their return route to China. Another significant insight provided by Li's record is the transcription of a conversation held between Li and the Liuqiuan minister on the eleventh of the eighth month. When Li Dingyuan asked the minister how many islands the Liuqiu Kingdom had, without any hesitation, he replied, "thirty-six islands, calling each island by its individual name."238 Among these thirty-six islands, not one islet of the Diaoyu group was mentioned. This indicates the Liuqiuans recognized that the Diaoyu Islands were not part of the territory of the Liuqiu Kingdom. Qi Kun Mission In the twelfth year of thejiaqing reign (1808), when King Shangwen died, Crown Prince Shangcheng did not have a chance to receive the Chinese cefeng mission because of his illness.239 Tragic events continued to befall the Liuqiuans. During that year, tributary ships to the Middle Kingdom sank at sea. Thejiaqing emperor (reign 17971820) ordered the Chinese government to provide 1,000 tael of silver to rebuild ships, and another 500 tael of silver to sixty-three families whose relatives died in this incident.240 Furthermore, the Chinese imperial court decided to impose Zhuifeng [posthumous investiture] upon the Crown Prince, something that had not occurred before.241 Then the Jiaqing emperor designated Qi Kun and Fei Cizhang as heads of the cefeng mission to the Liuqiu Kingdom. The Chinese mission contacted the Zhuifeng of the Crown Prince, as well as performing cefeng to the new king, Shanghao, the grandson of Shangwen. In Qi's Shilu, he focused intensively on his own mission, as well as on the Li Dingyuan mission in the fifth year of the Jiaqing reign (1801). Qi and his associates departed from China to Liuqiu in the

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thirteenth year of Jiaqing (1809). As he described the geographical location of the Liuqiu Kingdom, Qi mentioned the importance of the gou [ocean trench] in his report and recorded as follows: The Liuqiu Kingdom is located east of the Wuhumen Port of Fujian. Until reaching Gumi Mountain, which belongs to the Liuqiu Kingdom, we can stop at some islets. However, we must not belittle the importance of the gou.... On the eleventh of the fifth month, we departed from Wuhumen Port. After traveling 3 geng (a geng = 18.642 miles), we passed Dongsha . . . and arrived at Huaping Yu [Huaping Island].... On the thirteenth, we reached Diaoyu Tai [Diaoyu Island0.... After sailing past 2 geng, we passed Chiwei Yu [Chiwei Island]. After traveling another 4.5 geng, we celebrated guogouji [trench-crossing ritual]. . . . On the fifteenth, we arrived at Gumi Shan [Gumi Mountain].... On the seventeenth, our vessels finally entered Naha Port. . . . This time, we left the Liuqiu Kingdom on the second of the tenth month toward Machi Mountain. On the ninth, after leaving Machi Mountain and traveling 3 geng, we passed Gumi Mountain.... In the evening of the eleventh, we celebrated guogouji [trench-crossing ritual]. . . . On the fifteenth, we entered Wuhumen [emphasis added] ,242

The most critical elements of Qi's excerpt are that it mentions names of the Diaoyu Islands, the guogouji of the compass route in the middle of the passage, and the location of the Liuqiu Kingdom at the beginning of the sentence. Qi states that ships would pass mountains, as well as the trench, before reaching "Gumi Mountain, which belongs to the Liuqiu Kingdom." In other words, the mountain and islands to the west of the Gumi Mountain, including the Diaoyu Islands, were not Liuqiuan territory. There was no ambiguity about the Diaoyu Islands being part of Chinese territory; these eight islets belonged to the Middle Kingdom, period! Zhao Xin Mission The Japanese collaborated with the British and attacked the Liuqiu Kingdom in 1864, annexed it, and eventually set u p Okinawa Prefecture in April 1879. Thus the cefeng mission of Zhao Xin and Yu Guangjia in the fifth year of the Tongzhi reign (1866) was the last Qing mission to the Liuqiu Kingdom to contact cefeng Shangtai, the new king. In the eighteenth year of the Daoguang reign (1838), Zhao's predecessors, Lin Hongnian and Gao Renjian, led the penultimate Qing cefeng mission to the Liuqiu to invest Shangyu. Lin's orig-

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inal mission record is n o longer extant; Zhao Xin's citation of Lin in his book provides the important documentation of that mission. Unfortunately and surprisingly, Zhao's record is only forty pages long— the shortest and the simplest Shilu since the thirteenth year of the Jiajing reign (1534). Nevertheless, Zhao's record provides some interesting information regarding the Diaoyu Islands (i.e., the appearance ofJapanese words) in its discussion regarding the previous official Chinese observation about the compass route between Fuzhou and Naha. In Lin's mission, according to Zhao Xin, Our vessels departed from Wuhumen on the fourth of the fifth month of the eighteenth year of Daoguang (1838).. . . On the sixth, our ships passed Diaoyu Shan [Diaoyu Island] . . . heading Jiuchang Dao (J: Kubajima) [Huangwei Island].... In the morning of the seventh, our vessels sailed past Jiuchang Chidao (J: Kuba Sekijima) [ Chiwei Island]. . . . On the ninth, ships entered Naha Port [emphasis added] , 243

In the same section, Zhao illustrates his own mission on the FuzhouLiuqiu route, which is similar to the account of Lin's mission in 1838, as follows: On the ninth of the sixth month of the fifth year of the Tongzhi reign (1866), we left China. On the eleventh, we passed Diaoyu Shan [Diaoyu Island] . . . heading toward Jiuchang Dao (J: Kuba Jima) [Huangwei Island],.. . On the twelfth, our vessel sailed past Jiuchang Chidao (J: Kuba Sekijima) [ Chiwei Island] ... and entered Naha Port on the twenty-first [emphasis added] .244

Why did the Chinese begin to use dao to identify an islet? Why did the Chinese officials use the Liuqiuan (or Japanese) names to identify two islets of the Diaoyu Islands? Was there any reason to change the names of the Diaoyu Islands? The fact of the matter is that Zhao's mission record was compiled by Guo Boyin in 1882, more than twenty years after the date of the cefeng mission, 245 and the Liuqiu Kingdom had already been annexed by the Japanese. Perhaps Guo misrepresented some passages. Another explanation is the possibility that Zhao omitted many passages in his text. When Zhao was dispatched to the Liuqiu Kingdom, the Qing Empire had become severely weakened, having lost control of many of its territories to the imperialists. The Chinese were defeated by the British in the Opium Wars; as a result, the sovereignty of Hong Kong was lost. As a semicolony, China was divided into many parts by different Western powers, including the United States and Russia, after signing "un-

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equal" treaties. Consequently, China herself could no longer survive; the Chinese-style foreign policy of the Sinitic world order began to tear apart.246 For instance, even when the Japanese began to annex the Liuqiu Kingdom, the Guangxu emperor (reign 1875-1908) was persistentiy persuaded by Li Hongzhang in 1880 to give up the traditional Chinese position in its foreign policy247 by abandoning its tributary states. In other words, the Chinese were less concerned with keeping the Sinitic world order than with surviving the new wave of an alternative imperialism from the West. Under such circumstances, Zhao did not prepare his mission record as well as he should have. Rather, Zhao provided a simple and shorter record as the Qing government was less concerned about small tributary states such as the Liuqiu Kingdom. As a result, without much preparation of his work, Zhao completed the Shilu. Ironically, as the Chinese Empire began to deteriorate, Japan grew in power and transformed itself into a modernized nation. The annexation of the Liuqiu Kingdom in 1879 provided the Japanese confidence in foreign policy and symbolized that the Chinese had lost control over traditional foreign policy despite a more than five hundred-year-old relationship with the Liuqiu Kingdom.248 The loss of the Liuqiu Kingdom to Japan eventually led the Japanese to triumph in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. Therefore, the Liuqiuans increasingly felt pressure to pay not only cultural respect, but also economic "respect" to the Japanese. 249 In fact, when Lin's mission in 1838, as well as Zhao Xin's mission in 1866, was dispatched by the Chinese imperial court, the Liuqiu Kingdom was clearly Japanized, rather than SinicizedI.250 The fate of the Liuqiu Kingdom was finally sealed by the Japanese when it officially became part of Japanese territory in 1879. Truly, when Zhao Xin visited the Liuqiu Kingdom, less than thirteen years would pass before the Liuqiu Kingdom lost its sovereignty and independence. There is no question that the Japanese had more influence upon the Liuqiu Kingdom than the Chinese during the period of the last two cefeng missions. The Liuqiuans probably began to use the Liuqiuan (or Japanese) names to identify Huangwei and Chiwei Islands around the time these Chinese missions visited their nation. As a result, when Zhao and Lin asked the escorting Liuqiuans the names of these

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islands, the Liuqiuans simply replied with the Liuqiuan (or Japanese) names. 251 Otherwise there is no way the Chinese officials would know the Liuqiuan (or Japanese) names. Despite the above questions, both Zhao and Lin used Diaoyu Shan to identify the main islet of the Diaoyu group in their mission records. T H E Q I N G LOGBOOK

Just like the Ming logbook of Shunfeng Xiangsong, Zhinan Zhengfa [The Corrective Way of Navigation] is the logbook of Qing times. Zhinan Zhengfa was probably completed during the Kangxi emperor's reign by an unknown author (or authors). This logbook contained both necessary information on navigation and important news regarding the Diaoyu Islands. According to Zhinan Zhengfa, "the 12 tuo (a tuo = 6 inches) 252 Diaoyu Tai [Diaoyu Islands] are easy to navigate [emphasis added] ."253 Moreover, this logbook illustrates the compass route of the Fuzhou-Liuqiu route as follows: Ships start from Meihua P o r t . . . at 6 geng (a geng= 18.642 miles), passing the northern part of Diaoyu Tai [Diaoyu Island]. Then, ships travel by the northern part of Huangwei Yu [Huangwei Island] at 4 geng. After passing Gumi Shan, the ships reach the Liuqiu [emphasis added] , 254

Despite many similar elements between the Ming logbook and the Qing logbook, there is a major difference. The latter discusses more routes (such as the Xiamen-Nagasaki route) and provides more information on the East Asian region, in particular Japan, than the Ming logbook. 255 This reflects the fact that Sinojapanese relations had reached a new stage. OTHER Q I N G HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS

Besides Shilu and the logbook, some other Qing documents, including academic writings and the Empress Dowager Cixi's Decree, indicate ownership of the Diaoyu Islands. These historical documents have been crucial evidence supporting pro-China irredentist arguments that might ultimately deny the Japanese claim. Academic Research Although many Liuqiuan studies were undertaken by Chinese scholars during the Qing dynasty, some historical documents include essential information regarding the Diaoyu Islands. In 1764, one re-

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searcher, Pan Xiang, 256 provided an extensive and comprehensive study based both on Chinese archives, including Shilu, and on Liuqiuan sources, such as Shinan Kdgi. Pan was a professor in the Guozijian or Guozixue [Imperial College], which was the highest educational institution (since the Sui) during the imperial era. Many well-known Chinese scholars, members of imperial families, as well as talented scholars and princes of tributary states, were educated at this college. During Pan Xiang's tenure at the Guozijian, he taught Chinese philosophy to many well-known Liuqiuan bureaucrats, including Zheng Xiaode, the Liuqiuan minister. 257 In his position, Pan's exposure to these Liuqiuan officials enabled him to successfully complete Liuqiu Ruxue Jianwen Lu [Eyewitness Account of the Liuqiuans Studying at the Imperial College] in 1764. This study provides exhaustive historical and geographical studies of the Liuqiu Kingdom, including documentation of the compass route to the Liuqiu Kingdom, which is the same map contributed by Zhou Huang's Shilu (see Appendix Fig. 9). In addition, he analyzes historical facts, such as the meaning of the heigou between China and the Liuqiu Kingdom. According to Pan's analysis, Heishuigou [black-water trench] is the Haijie [marine boundary] between Fujian and the Liuqiu Kingdom. From Fujian to Liuqiu, ships must pass through the Heishui [black-water], which has often been called cangming [dark blue water in the East Sea] since ancient times. Also it is called dongming [Eastern D e e p ] . . . . Nevertheless, heishuigou is Zhongwai Jieshui [the boundary water between China andforeign country]. Before crossing this gou, people must celebrate the festival [emphasis added] . 258

Once again, this unambiguous passage undeniably confirms that there was an international boundary between China and the Liuqiu, which was distinguished by the heishuigou, located between Chiwei Island and Gumi Mountain. Since most students who studied with Pan Xiang were top officials from the Liuqiu Kingdom, his authoritative book certainly relied on Liuqiuan accounts. Indeed, Pan's book contains both poetry and conversations between Pan and the Liuqiuans, 259 including Zheng Xiaode and Cai Wenpu. 260 The Chinese writer Huang Shujing presented another significant development of the Diaoyu Islands in his eight-juan Taihaishi Chalu [Record on the Mission to Taiwan]. Huang was born in 1677 to an extremely fortunate family; in 1709, along with his two brothers, he advanced into jinshi and another brother passed into juren [provin-

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cial level] degree. 261 After the rebellion of Zhu Yiguan in Taiwan in 1722, H u a n g Shujing was dispatched to the islands as a provincial censor. After he spent a year in Taiwan, H u a n g completed Taihaishi Chalu. This book is regarded as the best early description of Taiwan during Qing times. 262 Even though h e focuses primarily on Taiwan, H u a n g provides valuable information o n the Diaoyu Islands. In the military defense section of the second juan, H u a n g states, "There is a shan whose n a m e is Diaoyu Tai [Diaoyu Island] in the north, a n d it can hold ten huge ships." 263 Furthermore, another notable historical book, Huangchao Zhongwai Yitongyu Tu [Geographical Atlas of China a n d Foreign Countries in the Qing Dynasty], written in 1862, clearly includes the Diaoyu Islands as part of the Chinese defense system. T h e m a p section of this work describes navigation aids for the compass route between the Liuqiu Kingdom a n d China as follows: Xiaoliuqiu [Taiwan], Penghu, Diaoyu Yu [Diaoyu Island], Huangwei Yu, Chiwei Yu [Chiwei Island] (see Appendix Fig. 12), a n d Gumi (J: Kume) Shan [Gumi Mountain] ,264 T h e major difference between this m a p and other maps in Shilu is that maps in Huangchao Zhongwai Yitong Yutu record the names of navigation aids in both the Chinese and Liuqiuan (or Japanese) languages on the Fuzhou-Naha route: until Chiwei islet, all islets of the Diaoyu group use the Chinese name. Starting with Gumi islet onward, however, all islands, such as Ximachi Shan and Dongmachi Shan, are given both Chinese and Liuqiuan (or Japanese) names. In other words, until Chiwei islet (or before Gumi islet), all islands belonged to China; after this point all islets belonged to the Liuqiu Kingdom. In addition, Haiguo Wenjian Lu [The Eyewitness Account of the Maritime Nations] by Chen Lunjiong provides a m a p of the Diaoyu Island that designates waiyang Diaoyu Tai,265 The Decree of Empress Dowager Cixi Some p r o j a p a n irredentist scholars 266 argue that the Chinese aband o n e d sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands at the e n d of the Qing dynasty when Chinese territories were divided into many parts by Western powers. But according to the Qing edict, Empress Dowager Cixi granted the Diaoyu Islands to Sheng Xuanhuai, the chief minister of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices (or Ministry of Posts a n d Communications), as well as a famous business e n t r e p r e n e u r in the development of pharmaceutical uses. In the 1970s Sheng's grand-

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daughter, Sheng Yuzhen (with the adopted name Xu Yi), revealed the will (dated December 5, 1947) of her father, Sheng Enyi, containing the Empress Dowager's Decree. In this will, Sheng provided maps indicating the location of the Diaoyu Islands and an explanation of the history of the Empress Dowager's Decree (see Appendix Figs. 21 and 22).267 The following passage is the Empress Dowager Cixi's Decree: The medicinal pills submitted by Sheng Xuanhuai have proved to be very effective. The herbs used in making the pills are said to have been collected from the small island of Diaoyu Tai [Diaoyu IslandI], beyond the seas of Taiwan. Being made of ingredients from the sea, the prescription is more effective than these available on the Chinese mainland. It has come to my knowledge that the said official's family has for generations maintained pharmacies offering free treatment and herbs to destitute patients. This is really most commendable. The three small islands of Diaoyu Tai [Diaoyu Island], Huangwei Yu [Huangwei Island], a n d Chi Yu [Chiwei Island] are h e r e b y o r d e r e d to b e

awarded to Sheng Xuanhuai as his property for the purpose of collecting medicinal herbs. May the great universal benevolence of the Imperial Dowager Empress and of the Emperor be deeply appreciated [emphasis added]. Imperial Edict of Dowager Empress Cixi The tenth month of the nineteenth year of Emperor Guangxu, 1893 (see Appendix Fig. 20) 2 6 8

The translation of this decree was also published in the U.S. Senate Congressional record in 1971.269 An examination of the decree reveals that the empress dowager affixed two seals to render this imperial edict official (see Appendix Fig. 20). That is, the Chinese government officially recognized the existence of the Diaoyu Islands in 1893, fourteen years after Japan annexed the Liuqiu Kingdom. Because Empress Cixi granted these islands to a Chinese businessman, the Diaoyu Islands became Chinese private property.

Archives from the Japanese and English Languages One of the oldest historical documents in Japanese literature recording the status of the Diaoyu Islands is a work by Hayashi Shihei written during the Tokugawa era. The first book recording the name of the Diaoyu Islands in the English language was written by Sir Edward Belcher, the captain of the British battleship Samarang in 1843. Like

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the Chinese historical materials, the Japanese document reassured and reconfirmed the ownership of the Diaoyu Islands. But the English source became a primary reference relied upon by the Japanese to create "new" names for identifying the Diaoyu Islands. After a Japanese fisherman soi-disant rediscovered the uninhabited Diaoyu Islands, the Japanese government built an administrative territorial landmark on the islands. The building of territorial landmarks on the Diaoyu Islands also remained a top secret and controversial issue between the Japanese central government and the local Ryukyu government (the former Liuqiu Kingdom) prior to the Sinojapanese War in 1894-1895. HAYASHI S H I H E I ' S W R I T I N G S

When Tokugawa Ieyasu took power after the death of Toyotomi Hideyoshi, he established the Edo Bakufu (1603-1867). In 1639, during the reign of the third shogun, Tokugawa Iemitsu (reign 1623-1651), the sakoku [national isolation] policy was declared, lasting throughout most of the Edo period. During these sakoku years, Hayashi Shihei (1738-1792), the well-known Japanese geographer, published Sangoku Tsuran Zusetsu [An Illustrated Account of Three Countries] in 1785, and Kaikoku Heidan [The Military Debate on Maritime Nations] in 1791, indirectly denouncing the shogun's policy. The former book discusses the social and political situations of three countries: Korea, the Liuqiu Kingdom, and Ezo (today's Hokkaido region),270 and the latter book points out that Japan, as an island nation, faced potential foreign attacks.271 These books became extremely popular and widely read, both by intellectuals and Japanese citizens. The regime of the Tokugawa Bakufu, however, was upset because Hayashi urged the use of Western military science and arms, including cannons to repel foreign naval vessels and the creation of a national defense system. At the time, Japan did not have a navy or a merchant fleet necessary for such defense.272 In fact, Russian movements in the north, as well as stories about European activities in the rest of Asia, demonstrated that Japan was vulnerable. The Bakufu, then under the direction of Matsudaira Sadanobu, arrested Hayashi Shihei for publishing a book dealing with national security, confiscated his publications, and executed him on May 16, 1792.273 In Sangoku Tsuran Zusetsu, a masterpiece among geographical books during the Tokugawa era, Hayashi Shihei includes many maps, using

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latitude and longitude to illustrate world geography.274 Using Zhongshan Chuanxin Lu by Xu Baoguang as a resource, Hayashi analyzed the Liuqiu Kingdom. Importandy, he disclosed that the Liuqiu Kingdom had only thirty-six islands, which did not include any islets of the Diaoyu group.275 In the map section, Hayashi reveals the names of the Diaoyu group: Diaoyu Tai [Diaoyu Island0, Huangwei Shan [Huangwei Island], and Chiwei Shan [Chiwei Island]276 (see Appendix Fig. 10) on the compass route between Fuzhou and the Liuqiu Kingdom. T H E N A M E OF T H E SENKAKU R E T T O

All Chinese and Japanese literature during the Ming to the Qing dynasties consistentiy identifies the disputed islands between China and Japan by using the name Diaoyu Tai or Diaoyu Yu. But, based on British accounts, the Japanese copied the name of Senkaku to identify the Diaoyu islets in the East China Sea. The British Battleship Samarang Survey in 1843 After the British defeated China in the 1840s, many Europeans demonstrated their interest in Asian countries, especially China, by crossing the East China Sea. As early as 1843, the British naval battleship Samarang surveyed areas surrounding Diaoyu Island. Later, Sir Edward Belcher, captain of the Samarang, published a two-volume work entided Narrative of the Voyage of H.M.S. Samarang during the Years, 1843-46. According to Captain Belcher, On the morning following we were sufficiently near to Hoa-pin-san [Diaoyu Island] to secure a landing for the meridian distance.... Towards sunset the ship found anchorage on a bank to the eastward of Pinnacle Islands [tiny islets surrounding Diaoyu Island], and thus prevented her being drifted beyond our sight before the morning. . . . On the 16th (ofJune in 1845), we endeavoured to obtain observations on Tia-usu [Huangwei Island]; a landing was effected, but the absence of sun prevented our obtaining satisfactory observations, and bad weather coming on hastened our departure. This group, comprehending Hoa-pin-san, Pinnacle Rocks, and Tai-usu, form a triangle, of which the hypothenuse, or distance between Hoa-pin-san and Tia-usu, extends about fourteen miles, and that between Hoa-pin-san and the Southern Pinnacle, about two miles. Within this space lie several reefs; and although a safe channel exists between Hoa-pin-san and Pinnacle Islands, it ought not, (by reason of the strength of the tides destroying steerage) to be attempted if it can be avoided.... The extreme height of Hoa-pin-san was found to be 1181 feet, the island apparently cut

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T h e g e o g r a p h i c a l l o c a t i o n in the East C h i n a Sea is d e s i g n a t e d by providing i n f o r m a t i o n o n latitude a n d l o n g i t u d e in t h e a p p e n d i x o f Captain Belcher's book. 2 7 8 D i a o y u Yu [Diaoyu Island] is i d e n t i f i e d as "Hoa-pin-san" (25°47'7" N a n d 123°25'44" E), H u a n g w e i Yu [ H u a n g wei Island] as "Tia-usu" (25°57'13" N a n d 123°37'6" E), tiny islets l o c a t e d east o f D i a o y u Yu as "Pinnacle Islands" o r "Pinnacle Group" (29°51'48" N a n d 129°48'12" E), a n d Chiwei Yu [Chiwei Island] as "Raleigh Rock " (see A p p e n d i x Fig. 11). Based o n the information o f the Diaoyu Islands by Captain Belcher, t h e British Naval Waterway R e c o r d in 1 8 8 4 d o c u m e n t e d t h e D i a o y u Islands as follows: Hoapinsu, the south-western island of an isolated g r o u p about 90 miles northward of the west e n d of Meiaco sima, is 1,180 feet high with a steep cliff o n the southern side of the summit, a n d a gradual slope on the eastern side. This island is barren and uninhabited; there are pools of fresh water, with fish in them, on the eastern slope [emphasis added]. 2 7 9 A n English b o o k by H o s e a Ballou Morse also records the e x i s t e n c e o f the Diaoyu Islands. After w o r k i n g thirty-three years f o r t h e C h i n e s e g o v e r n m e n t as a n imperial maritime c u s t o m s commissioner, 2 8 0 Morse

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wrote the three volumes of his International Relations of the Chinese Empire. In the map section of Morse's first volume, he records the names of the Diaoyu Islands by using the English language without Chinese characters: Tia-yu-su is given as Huangwei Island and Hoapin-sin as Diaoyu Island.281 In the map section of volume three, he describes the Diaoyu group as Tai-a-u-su [Huangwei Island], Hoa-pinsin [Diaoyu Island0, and Raleigh Rock [ Chiwei Island] (see Appendix Fig. 14) 282 Similarly, maps in Western languages, such as The Empire of China with Its Principal Division's [sic] published by Robert Sayer Press in 1790, Cruchley's China in 1861, Atlas of the World by Rand McNally & Co. in 1894 (p. 126), and Steilers Hand-Atlas: Justus Perthes in 1906 (no. 65) also indicate the existence of the Diaoyu Islands by using the Chinese pronunciation. 283 Japanese Naval Records and the Geological Survey in 1897 Issued in 1886, the waterway record of the Japanese imperial navy notes that the Japanese began to identify the disputed islands by using sources from the British navy. Significantly, the Japanese copied the names that the British navy used to identify the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea in 1884. The Japanese naval record identifies Diaoyu Yu, Huangwei Yu, and Chiwei Yu as "Hoapin-san," "Tiau-su," and "Raleigh Rock" respectively by using the Japanese katakana pronunciation with Chinese characters. Similarly, the small islets located to the east of the Diaoyu chain were identified as the "Pinnacle Group," 284 signifying that the huge rock in the Diaoyu Islands can be seen as a "pinnacle" mountain when viewed from the sea2SS—the provenance of the term Senkaku. In its 1894 issue, the Japanese imperial naval record dropped the Chinese characters and English and used Japanese katakana to identify Diaoyu islet, Huangwei islet, Chiwei islet, and other small islands of the Diaoyu group. 286 But in the 1908 issue, the Japanese navy changed to both the English and the Chinese characters and eliminated all Japanese katakana, identifying the Diaoyu group as follows: Sekibi Sho (E: Raleigh Rock) is located in latitude 25°55' N., and longitude 124°34' E. . . . Gyochö Jima (E: Hoapin su), an isolated isle, is located in west of IriomoteJima and about 80 li (a li = 0.3107 miles).. . . Sen tö Shotö (E: Pinnacle Islets) are located in 6 li east of Gyochö Jima [C: Diaoyu KM] . . . . Kobi Sho (E: Ti a usu) is located in 15 li northeast of Gyochö Jima [ C: Diaoyu Yu] [emphasis added] ,287

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T h e Japanese navy adopted most Chinese names and incorporated the English names as well. T h e Japanese translated the name "Pinnacle Islets" into Japanese as "Sentó Shotó" (rather than "Senkaku Rettó"). In fact, the word pinnacle in English refers to a pointed formation such as the top of a mountain or peak, translated into Japanese as Sentó. According to Kojien (Great Dictionary of Ideograms) compiled by Shinmura Izuru in 1998, "Sentó" means "sharp point" or "peak." "Senkaku" means "Sentó"; therefore, Senkaku [the Japanese version of Diaoyu Yu] also means "sharp point" or "peak." In 1897, the Japanese scientist, Kotó Fumijiró, conducted a geological survey on the Ryükyü Islands, which also included a survey of the Diaoyu Islands. H e recorded the following: In the south, the unknown geology of Sekibi Sho (E: Raleigh) has many volcanoes. . . . There is Chao-su Sho (E: Tia-u-su) in the southwest. . . and to Pinasuru and Hoahin-su (E: Pinnacle and Hoa-pin-su).... The former is formed by a peak of a mountain as if there were destructive volcanoes... . Hoahin-su [C: Diaoyu Yu] is about 3 li (a li = 0.3107 miles) in diameter with a 1,081 shaku (one shaku =1.0936 ft) mountain. . . . All above are uninhabited islands. Between Hoahin-su and Kiryü (Taiwan), there are three islands. Hókazan (E: Agincourt) in extreme n o r t h . . .. Here, Shinajin (the Chinese people) formed a village. . . . Wata Sho (E: Crag) is located in [the] s o u t h . . . . Kabin Sho [Huaping Yu] is located in the northwest.... Thus, islets located from the south of Sekibi Sho [C: Chiwei Yu] to Taiwan are different from Sentó Gunto [C: Diaoyu Islands]. These islets do not contain coral structures (according to Nihon Suiro Shi, vol. 2) rather many volcanoes [emphasis added] . 288 Three years later, in 1900, another Japanese scientist, Yoshiwara Shigeyasu, completed a geographical survey and wrote a treatise exclusively discussing the uninhabited islands located to the south of the Ryükyü Islands. According to Yoshiwara, The southern islands, nearby the Liuqiu, are not yet developed. A few people inland (Japan) have visited these uninhabited islets in the sea. People even doubt the existence of these islets.. . . The islands located about 250 li (a li = 0.3107 miles) northeast of Taiwan are Chogyo Jima (E: Hoa-pin-u), Sentó Shosho (E: Pinnacles), and Kóbi Sho (E: Tia-u-su). About 50 li further, there is Sekibi Sho (E: Raleigh Rock/J: Kuba Jima Guntó). Chogyo Jima (E: Hoa-pin-u) is also called Gyochó Jima (E: Hoa pin su/ Heiwazan). According to Zhongshan Chuanxin Lu, it is called Diaoyu Tai.... There are albatross . . . which are now grown by Koga Tatsushiró, who moved into this island . . .

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Sento Shosho (E: Pinnacles) is located 6 li east of ChogyoJima [ C: Diaoyu Yu] ... and formed by six islets. . . . Kobi Sho (E: Tia-u-su) is also called Kuba Jima or Kobajima [ C: Huangwei Yu], about 15 li from Chogyo Jima [C: Diaoyu Yu]... . Currently Mr. Koga is developing this island by collecting birds and planting trees... . Sekibi Sho (E: Raleigh Rock) is also called Kuba Sekijima [C: Chiwei Yu] and is located in latitude 25°55' N. and longitude 124°34' E All islands above are called Senkaku Gunto [C: Diaoyu Yu] (see Appendix Fig. 13) [emphasis added]. 2 8 9

By comparing these two articles published in Chishitsugaku Zasshi [Journal of Geology], some interesting and fascinating features emerge. First, to identify the Diaoyu Islands, both writers use the English names that originated from the British Samarang survey in 1843. There is no question that they copied names from either Japanese or British naval records. Second, the Japanese scientists use sho (C: ^uwith the same Chinese character) to identify islands, although this term does not exist in the Japanese language. Yoshiwara repeatedly uses Chinese names to acknowledge many islets of the Diaoyu group. Moreover, both writers had difficulties translating "Pinnacles Islets" into Japanese; the translations used are "Sento Gunto" in the first treatise and "Sento Shosho" in the second article. Third, the major difference between these two treatises is that Yoshiwara mentions Koga Tatsushiro was developing the Diaoyu and Huangwei Islands. Furthermore, he indicates that the Japanese had geographically and geologically little knowledge about these islets, noting "people even doubt the existence of these islets." Notably, neither Japanese scientist uses the name Senkaku Retto, which the Japanese use to identify the Diaoyu Islands today. Nor do they state that these islets belonged to Japan. Rather, they merely mention the words uninhabited islands, despite Koga's investment in the Diaoyu Islands. The Kuroiwa's Survey and the Naming Senkaku Retto Where did the Japanese get the name Senkaku Retto, used to identify the disputed islands today? The Japanese began to call the islands Senkaku Gunto at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries (e.g., Yoshiwara's article and the Japanese naval record in 1886). But they never mentioned the name Senkaku Retto, either in the Japanese naval records or in the geological surveys by Japanese scientists. In fact, the name Senkaku Retto does not exist in

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any historical documents (including Japanese, English, a n d Chinese literature) before the year 1900. T h e n a m e Senkaku Retto originated with Kuroiwa Hisashi, an instructor at the Okinawa Normal School, in an article he published in the Chigaku Zasshi [Journal of Geography] in 1900. According to Kuroiwa, The main island was formed by Chogyo Sho [ C: Diaoyu Yu], Sento Shosho [small islets of Diaoyu Group], and Kobi Sho [C: Huangwei Yu],... Because these islands do not have a single name to identify them, this has contributed to the difficulty of geographical work. Therefore, these islands were given a single name, Senkaku Retto, to identify them as a whole [emphasis added] ,290 Like Kuroiwa Hisashi, Miyajima Mikinosuke also made a survey of the natural resources and geographical features of the Diaoyu Islands. Whereas Kuroiwa focused primarily on the main island of the Diaoyu group and other small islets, Miyajima's survey primarily focused on Huangwei Island. 291 T h e crucial question is: What Chinese characters did Kuroiwa a n d Miyajima use to identify the Diaoyu Islands? In the case of Kuroiwa's treatise, he writes that the Senkaku Retto contains "Chogyo Sho" [C: Diaoyu Yu], "Senkaku Shosho" [small islets including (J: Kita-Kojima/C: Bei Xiaodao) a n d (J: Minami-Kojima/C: Nan Xiaodao)], and "Kobi Sho" [C: Huangwei Yu].292 In addition, Kuroiwa uses two terms, "Chogyo Sho"and "Gyocho Sho " to identify Diaoyu Islet,293 Koroiwa does not m e n t i o n Chiwei Island at all; he did n o t consider it part of Senkaku Retto (see Table 5). O n the other hand, Miyajima uses "Gyocho Sho " a n d "Kobi Jima" to identify Diaoyu islet a n d Huangwei islet respectively. 294 Furthermore, Miyajima utilizes "KubaJima"and "Kume Sekijima" to identify both Huangwei islet a n d Chiwei islet respectively. 293 In his next treatise, Miyajima notes, however, "the uninhabited islands between Taiwan and the Liuqiu are called Senkaku Gunto, "m b u t n o t Senkaku Retto. Moreover, h e uses "Hoping Zan" a n d "Sekibi Sho" to identify Diaoyu islet a n d Chiwei islet,297 Where do the names "Kuba Jima" and "Kume Sekijima" used by Miyajima come from? According to the Liuqiuan Makino Kiyoshi, a specialist in village samurai, Even today, elders of the Yaeyama County call Senkaku Retto "Igunkuba fima." This name includes two islands: "Igun fima " referring to "Gyocho fima" [C: Diaoyu Yu] and "Kuba fima"referring to "Kubafima" [ C: Huangwei Yu]. However, people do not use these two names instead of Senkaku Retto, which is used to reference the islands as a whole.298

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Historical Documents of the Diaoyu Islands Table 5. T h e Identification of the Diaoyu Islands f r o m Various Historical Documents Documents from the Ming Dynasty

Documents from the Qing Dynasty

Sir Edward Belcher's Record in 1843a

TheJapanese Imperial Naval Records in 1886

The Survey by Hisashi Kuroiwa in 1900

Diaoyu Yu Diaoyu Ling

Hoa-pin-san

Hoapin-san

Chogyo Sho Gyocho Sho

[Diaoyu Island]

Diaoyu Yu Diaoyu Tai Diaoyu Shan [Diaoyu Island]

[Diaoyu Island]

[Diaoyu Island]

[Diaoyu Island]

Huangwei Yu [Huangwei Island]

Huangwei Yub [Huangwei Island]

Tia-usu [Huangwei Island]

Tiau-su [Huangwei Island]

Kobi Sho [Huangwei Island]

Chi Yu [Chiwei Island]

Chiwei Yuc [Chiwei Island]

Raleigh Rock [Chiwei Island]

Raleigh Rock [Chiwei Island]

No name was given to identify other small islets

No name was given to identify other small islands

Pinnacle Islands or Pinnacle Group [other tiny islets]d

Pinnacle Group [other tiny islets]

Sento Shosho' Senkaku Shosho [other tiny islets]

Notes: a No Chinese characters were provided in the document. last cefeng mission to the Liuqiu Kingdom led by Zhao Xin used the Liuqiuan or Japanese name (C: Jiuchang Dao/J: Kubajima) to identify Huangwei Island. c In Zhao Xin's mission record in 1866, he used the Liuqiuan or Japanese name (C: Jiuchang Chidao/J: Kuba Sekijima) to identify Chiwei Island. d Other small islands surrounded Diaoyu islet, including Northern Small Islet (C: Bei Xiaodao) and Southern Small Islet (C: Nan Xiaodao). e When Kuroiwa named the Diaoyu Islands as the Senkaku Islands (J: Sento Shosho or J: Senkaku Shosho), he did not include Chiwei Island as a part of the Senkaku Islands. Today some Japanese scholars even call Diaoyu Dao, one of the largest islets in the Diaoyu group, Uotsurijima. b The

In fact, the Liuqiuans also used the n a m e ' Y o k o n " to i d e n t i f y Diaoyu islet;299 thus, " Y o k o n " o r ' Y u k o n " o r " I g u n " has b e e n used by the p e o p l e o f the L i u q i u K i n g d o m f o r centuries to identify the main island o f the Diaoyu g r o u p : Diaoyu Island. T h e y have used "Kuba J i m a " t o identify H u a n g w e i islet. A t what date the Liuqiuans began to

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use these names to identify each individual islet of the Diaoyu group is unknown. The use of "Yokon" or 'Yukon" or "Igun" to identify Diaoyu Yu by the Liuqiuans probably started at the beginning of the twentieth century. 300 People may wonder why the Japanese used "Gyochó Jima," reversing the Chinese characters to identify Diaoyu Island. When the Chinese use the word diaoyu, it means to "go fishing." When the Japanese express "go fishing," they use Chinese characters called sakana tsuri in the Japanese language, which reverses the order of the Chinese characters. The Japanese, ergo, have used the reversed order of the Chinese characters, "Gyochó Jima," 301 to identify the main island of the Diaoyu Islands. Yet Kuroiwa's survey of the Diaoyu Islands certainly has influenced many Japanese scholars. For instance, a well-known Japanese historian, Higaonna Kanjun, also noted the existence of the Diaoyu Islands based on Kuroiwa's article. By usingjapanese names, Higaonna identified the Diaoyu Islands as follows: "The Senkaku Retto contains Chogyo Sho, Kobi Sho, and Sentó Shosho [emphasis added] ."302 In short, Japanese knowledge of the Diaoyu Islands during the Meiji Era relied on sources from the British naval record in 1884; the name Senkaku Retto or Senkaku Gunto was translated into the Japanese language from the English name "Pinnacle Islands" or "Pinnacle Group." Later, when Kuroiwa visited the Diaoyu Islands in 1900, he named them Senkaku Retto, which identified the Diaoyu group as a whole. Moreover, the first official document recording the name Senkaku Retto was by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Nihon Gaikd Monjo [Documents on Japanese Foreign Relations], which was published in the 1950s. T H E S O I - D I S A N T R E D I S C O V E R Y OF T H E U N I N H A B I T E D I S L A N D S BY K O G A T A T S U S H I R Ó

The Chinese lost contact with the Liuqiuans as the Japanese annexed the Liuqiu Kingdom in 1879, and records of activities around the Diaoyu Islands by the Chinese decreased. Because the Diaoyu Islands were uninhabitable and economically worthless, they were virtually virginal lands floating on the East China Sea, despite their occasional use as a refuge port for fishermen as reported in the Samarang account. When Koga Tatsushiró, a native businessman from Fukuoka Prefecture, "rediscovered" both Diaoyu and Huangwei Islands in

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1884, he embarked on a new enterprise of collecting tortoise shells and other kinds of shells, guano, and feathers of albatross. 303 Thereafter Koga moved to Ishigaki Jima (in the territory of the former Liuqiu Kingdom), where he opened business in an attempt to develop uncultivated land in the Diaoyu Islands. 304 However, the soi-disant rediscovery of uninhabited islands by Koga Tatsushiro attracted the attention of the Ryukyu government of Okinawa Prefecture (the former Liuqiu Kingdom). O n September 22, 1885, Governor Nishimura Sutezo of Okinawa Prefecture submitted a formal request to Yamagata Aritomo, the minister of interior of the Meiji government. He demanded that the Diaoyu Islands be included in his jurisdiction and that an administrative landmark be built, as he could not distinguish whether or not these uninhabited islands were the same ones that were recorded in Zhongshan Chuanxin Lu by Xu Baoguang. On October 9, Minister Yamagata wrote a note to Inoue Kaoru, the foreign minister, inquiring whether or not to grant the petition of Governor Nishimura before taking this matter to the cabinet: According to Zhongshan Chuanxin Lu the Chinese cefeng mission used Diaoyu Tai, Huangwei Yu, and Chiwei Yu as navigation aids to the Liuqiu Kingdom, but there was no indication that these islands belonged to the Q i n g . . . . Is it possible to build an administrative landmark on these islands? [emphasis added] 305

On October 21, however, the foreign minister, in a memorandum of advice to Minister Yamagata, wrote: Between Okinawa and Fuzhou are scattered Kume Sekijima and two other islands, which have already been surveyed in connection with a territorial landmark by the Prefecture of Okinawa. It has been found that these islands (the Diaoyu Islands) lie near the border area with the Qing . . . and have Chinese names. Recently there were articles in a Chinese newspaper saying we are occupying these offshore islands of China in the vicinity of Taiwan. If we erect the territorial landmark at this particular time, it would arouse China's suspicions. I would advise putting off establishment of the territorial landmark until a later time [emphasis added]. 306

As a result, Governor Nishimura's request was rejected in a letter dated November 30, sent by Minister Yamagata. In addition, he insisted in the letter that this matter should never be revealed to the news media. The governor of Okinawa made the same requests in

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1890 and again in 1893 to the Japanese government; 307 once again the Japanese government declined his petition and did not grant permission to build the national territorial landmark in the Diaoyu Islands. Yet shordy after the Japanese army occupied Liishun and blockaded the Qing navy in the Weihai Defensive Zone at the end of November 1894, the Meiji government was firmly convinced victory was at hand and proceeded to draft a treaty designed to pressure China into ceding Taiwan as a precondition for peace. In the following year, the Shimonoseki Treaty was signed, 308 granting Japan control over the Liaodong Peninsula and Taiwan. On January 14, 1896, just prior to the end of the war, the Japanese government adopted a cabinet decision that placed the Diaoyu Islands under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture and erected the territorial landmark in the islands.309 In September 1896, the Japanese government granted Koga the right to use the islands free of charge for thirty years.310 Given these facts, many pro-Japan irredentist scholars 311 claim that Imperial Edict No. 13 implemented the decision of the Meiji government in 1896. The following is a translation of Edict No. 13: We, hereby, declare to the division of organized counties in Okinawa Prefecture: (Seal of Meiji Emperor) 5 March 1896 Imperial Edict No. 13 Prime Minister: Ito Hirobumi Minister of Interior: Yoshikawa Akimasa Article One: Okinawa Prefecture is divided into five counties except sectional areas of Naha and Southern section of Shuri Shimajiri County: Each division line of Shimajiri, Kume Jima, Kerama Shoto, Tonaki Jima, Aguni Jima, Ihiya Shoto, Tori Jima, and Dai to Jima Nakagami County: Each division line of Nakakami Kunigami County: Each division line of Kunikashira and Ie Jima Miyako County: Miyako Shoto Yaeyama County: Yaeyama Shoto Article Two: When any boundary of the county and the name of the county must be changed, Minister of Interior has the authority to make these decisions Article Three: The implementation date of this edict depends upon the decision of the Minister of Interior [see Appendix Fig. 23] 312

Nowhere in this edict are the names of the Diaoyu or Senkaku Islands mentioned in the Japanese, Chinese, or English language. Therefore,

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it is clear that this edict is irrelevant with respect to the sovereignty of the disputed Diaoyu Islands. Furthermore, even prior to Japan's occupation of Taiwan in 1895, as the result of the Shimonoski Treaty, two maps (preserved at Harvard-Yenching Library) published by the Japanese did not include the Diaoyu Islands as part of the Ryukyu Islands. One is Fuken Kaisei Dai Nippon Zenzu [The Revised Map of Prefectural Divisions of the Great Japan], dated 1875. The other is Dai Nippon Chin Zenzu [The Completed Geographical Map of the Great Japan] by Ide Inosuke, with no publication date. These maps made by the Japanese did not use the Japanese language to identify the Diaoyu Islands; therefore, it is extremely difficult to believe that these islands belong to Japan. 3 1 3 Similarly, Ryukyu Shoto Zenzu [The Adas of the Ryukyus] by Otsuki Fumihiko in 1873, also did not indicate the existence of the Diaoyu Islands. In sum, since the Ming dynasty, the Chinese have consistentiy used Diaoyu, Huangwei, and Chiwei by adding the suffixes yu, shan, tai, and ling to identify the Diaoyu group (see Table 5). This reflects China's rich geographical knowledge of the Diaoyu Islands, as well as Chinese experience and activities in these Diaoyu Islands and surrounding seas for centuries. On the other hand, the Japanese have never had a consistent name to identify the disputed islands in the East China Sea; rather they used various prefixes and various suffixes attached to various names (Table 5). Although the Japanese copied names from the British to identify the Diaoyu Islands, and named the Diaoyu Islands Senkaku Rettd, they lacked consistency in recognizing the individual islands of the Diaoyu chain. Ironically, Kuroiwa and Miyajima used many names when referring to these disputed islands, confusing not only themselves but others (Table 5). In short, the Japanese cannot agree on a single name (even using Chinese characters) to recognize an individual islet of the Diaoyu group. This demonstrates that the Japanese had little knowledge or presence with respect to the Diaoyu Islands. As Confucius once said, "I must give historical facts if I want to make my argument. Otherwise, my perspective will be a hypocritical one." 314 More than two millennia later, J o h n King Fairbank, one of the greatest Sinologists at Harvard University, suggested, "History cannot be repeated, but neither can its influence be avoided." 315 A number of historical examples and facts, whether Chinese, Japanese, or

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English, provide crucial evidence of the ownership of the Diaoyu Islands in East China Sea. Most of these archives, particularly Shilu from both the Ming and the Qing dynasties, contain detailed instructions for setting and resetting the compass at a particular island in order to reach the next one and show, depending upon the prevailing wind of the moment, the estimated time to travel the distance on the Fuzhou-Naha route. In addition, these historical documents evaluate who—either the Chinese or the Japanese—was most familiar with the "place," the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. As a result, those who are the most familiar with the Diaoyu Islands might have the unadulterated "legitimate" right to claim these islands.

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Critics of the Irredentism Debate over the Diaoyu Islands

As Wm. Theodore de Bary of Columbia University points out, constitutionalism is a European-American concept of relatively recent provenance. On the Chinese scale of time, it has hardly been around long enough to count as a tradition, although there is no doubt that constitutionalism in its modern version has grown out of long-term Western experience. 1 In fact, "principles [such] as national independence, national sovereignty, and national equality, upon which modern international law is built, were meaningless for the Chinese; they were repugnant to their sense of a universal state and civilization. The boundaries in the Chinese world order were stricdy cultural, separating the civilized from the barbarian." 2 As international law scholars have already recognized, "although the idea of sovereignty originated in the West, China has fervently embraced the concept. Its reasons for doing so, however, differ from those underlying [the] Western development of the concept." 3 Given these facts, how can people disregard the significant development of historical events, including the investiture-tributary relations of Pax Sinica for more than two millennia, by simply applying modern concepts of international law? Without understanding the patterns (or laws) of the historical development of the Diaoyu Islands and analysis of significant historical trends of the Sinitic world order, application of modern (or Western) concepts of international law to the disputed Diaoyu Islands is problematic. For instance, when the British envoy headed by Lord Macartney visited China in 1793, the Qianlong emperor treated Great Britain as its tributary nation, which benefited from the "mother of civilization," China. 4 This Chinese attitude toward foreigners reflected both the Sinocentric spirit and arro-

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gance and the Confucian doctrine of Chinese foreign policy.5 Although Ming and Qing officials did not colonize the Liuqiu Kingdom or occupy the Diaoyu Islands, this does not mean that the Chinese in early modern times did not know how to be imperialistic, or that they did not have the will to occupy uninhabited islands. Rather, Chinese attitudes, mirrored by the Chinese symbolic acts of cefeng missions, reflect China's practice of international law in a "Chinese fashion" or with "Chinese characteristics." Most governmental officials in the Ming and the Qing dynasties had only vague ideas regarding the extent of territory acquired using "Western methods" of colonization and imperialism. But the Chinese certainly repeated their practice of territorial acquisition, demonstrated by symbolic acts such as using the Diaoyu Islands as navigation aids at short intervals during journeys to the tributary nation, the Liuqiu Kingdom. The history of the Diaoyu Islands must be understood and analyzed in the context of its historical framework. This is because it is impossible to separate the historical development of the Diaoyu Islands and Chinese foreign relations during the Ming and Qing eras, as well as China's unique practice of international diplomacy. These practices were especially different from the West, which relied heavily on colonization and occupation. In short, the Chinese and Japanese historiographies (Chapter 2) provide irresistible trends regarding the development of the Diaoyu Islands during the Ming and the Qing dynasties. These irresistible historical facts of the Diaoyu Islands constitute strong historical and legal evidence for both the pro-China and the pro-Japan irredentist scholars' claims of sovereign rights over these islands.

The Limitations of the Pro-China Irredentist Arguments Despite a large number of historical documents supporting the proChina irredentist arguments, historiography has raised some fundamental questions. For example, did the Chinese in the fifteenth century control territories that currently belong to South Korea and Japan? Did the Chinese recognize the existence of the islands near Taiwan during the Ming dynasty? Nonetheless, most historical documents have proven more favorable to the pro-China irredentist scholars than the pro-Japan irredentist group. There is no doubt that the Chinese discovered the Diaoyu Islands first, named them, devel-

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oped their own practice of marine space, and delimited marine boundaries between China and the Liuqiu Kingdom as early as the sixteenth century. T H E M I N G ARCHIVES

There is little room for pro-Japan irredentist scholars to contend with pro-China irredentist claims of the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. This does not mean, however, that the historiography of the Ming is free of limitations for the pro-China irredentist arguments. Chouhai Tubian by Zheng Ruozeng and Riben Yijian by Zheng Shungong are good examples. Even though both books are considered masterpieces of historiography by many scholars in the world, especially many Japanese historians, there are contradictions between the writings of Zheng Ruozeng's and Zheng Shungong's books. In Riben Yijian, Zheng Shungong states that Diaoyu Yu [Diaoyu Island} was "xiaodong xiaoyu," which means, according to the pro-China irredentist writer Fang Hao, that Diaoyu Island is part of Taiwanese (xiaodong) territories.,6 Suppose that the Diaoyu Islands were part of Taiwanese territory. How do the pro-China irredentist writers explain Zheng Ruozeng's book, which provides maps indicating that all islets in the Diaoyu group were under the jurisdiction of the Fujian region, not Taiwan? Ironically, both Riben Yijian by Zheng Shungong and Chouhai Tubian by Zheng Ruozeng were completed in the same era. Whereas Zheng Ruozeng completed Chouhai Tubian in 1561,7 Zheng Shungong finished Riben Yijian by 1565, based on his experience in Japan. 8 Therefore, when did the Ming government change the jurisdiction of the Diaoyu Islands from Fujian to Taiwan? Second, Chouhai Tubian by Zheng Ruozeng demonstrates another limitation for the pro-China irredentist scholars. In order to claim the Diaoyu Islands under the Chinese defense system, the pro-China irredentist scholars must premise with Takeshima (C: Zhu Dao or Tok-Do in Korean), which is currendy a disputed island between Japan and South Korea, and which was part of Chinese territories during the Ming dynasty.9 Furthermore, where was Taiwan? Zheng Ruozeng did not include Taiwan on his maps. If Taiwan was not part of the Chinese defense system, were Taiwan and its surrounding islands such as Penghu Archipelago not part of the Chinese territories? On the contrary, Penghu Archipelago, according to Mingshi, had already been u n d e r the jurisdiction of the Quanzhou Prefecture during the

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Ming dynasty.10 What were the reasons the Chinese did not include Taiwan as part of their territories or their defense system? Did Zheng Ruozeng forget Taiwan, the largest island in the East China Sea? In short, some questions must be clarified by further analysis of historical documents from the Ming dynasty. In any case, today, both Chouhai Tubian by Zheng Ruozeng and Riben Yijian by Zheng Shungong are considered to be the most valuable historical documents of Ming times by well-known geographers and historians in both China and Japan, including Akiyama Kenzo, Wang Yong, Kobata Atsushi, and Tanaka Takeo. As a result, there is litde doubt that these books are authentic histories. T H E Q I N G ARCHIVES

Did the Chinese abandon the Diaoyu Islands after they ended their relationship with the Liuqiu Kingdom at the end of the nineteenth century? If the decree of the Empress Dowager Cixi is a genuine edict, this will unquestionably be the most important historical document of Qing times. This imperial order was issued to challenge the actions of the Japanese government, which began to build a territorial landmark on the Diaoyu Islands. From both historical and international law perspectives, this edict can certainly refute the arguments of p r o j a p a n irredentist scholars, and it even might completely demolish the Japanese sovereignty claims over the Diaoyu Islands. Unfortunately, this imperial edict also has limitations and is more problematic than other historical documents. First, the decree of the Empress Dowager Cixi does not have a precise date (it contains only the month and year: see Appendix Fig. 20). This decree is set up in an extremely unusual form compared to other Qing imperial edicts. As a pro-China irredentist scholar admitted, this is an informal imperial edict. 11 For example, the seal on this decree is different from the official seal. Normally, the seal of a Qing edict contained two languages: Chinese and Manchu (see the Seal of the Liuqiu King, Appendix Fig. 17). The seal of Cixi's edict is only in the Chinese language. It is possible that the Chinese used a seal containing only the Chinese language. Indeed, according to Samuel S. Kim, "by the mid-19th century, the triumph of Chinese civilization over the Manchu was nearly complete, with the abolition of Manchu even as a secondary official language." 12 The Qing government, ergo, might have used a seal engraved only in Chinese. In addition, this

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imperial seal is stamped in an unusual place. Normally, the imperial seal would be stamped at the end of the edict (or after the date of the edict), not at the top of the imperial edict as in this case.13 Furthermore, some statements of this decree are contrary to historical facts. In this edict, which is dated 1893, Sheng Xuanhuai is referred to as Taichangsi Zhengqing [Chief Minister of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices] (or Minister of Posts and Communications); 14 however, Sheng was not promoted to vice-minister of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices until 1896.15 Therefore, how could people refer to Sheng Xuanhuai as minister of the Taichangsi in 1893? Moreover, who issued this imperial edict? If this edict was issued by Empress Dowager Cixi herself, she would not call herself huangtaihou [Empress]. If this edict was issued by the "puppet" Guangxu emperor, he would not use the word huangshan. Under imperial China, there were strict laws on the use of language between the emperors and Chinese citizens. For instance, when commoners mentioned the name of the emperor, they had to use words such as huangshan, bixia, shengshang, and wansui, meaning "Your Majesty."16 When the emperor referred to himself, he would use the word zhen, meaning the "Sovereign" or "We."17 As this edict uses the word huangshan, it was not issued by the Guangxu emperor. If someone was ordered by either the Guangxu emperor or Empress Dowager Cixi to issue this imperial edict, there is a problem too. This person could not use the word qinci because qinci could be used only by the emperor as the last word when the emperor concluded the imperial edict. 18 Who, then, did write or issue the imperial edict in 1893? Finally, the Empress Dowager's Decree suggests that Sheng Xuanhuai would establish a pharmaceutical company. But Sheng, according to Qingshi Gao, was a businessman who invested mainly in railroads, electronics, and some joint ventures with foreigners. 19 There is no indication that Sheng ever did business in the pharmaceutical field. In addition, this matter was never mentioned in other historical works, including the Qingshilu. In any case, there is little doubt that this edict is an authentic document because it was discovered before the Sino-Japanese dispute started. 20 Also it is important to note that during the Qing dynasty, many goods—including silver, land, and islands—were bestowed as gifts on Qing officials by the imperial family time and time again. It is possible that the "unworthy" (for the imperial family) Diaoyu

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Islands were privately bestowed on Sheng by the Empress Dowager Cixi, and it might have been normal not to record such a gift in official documents.

The Limitations of the Pro-Japan Irredentist Arguments Like Chinese historiography, Japanese historical documents also have limitations in supporting the Japanese sovereignty claim over the Diaoyu Islands. Not until the end of the nineteenth century did the Japanese government have knowledge of the existence of the Diaoyu Islands, when the governor of Okinawa requested the building of a national landmark there. Even a Japanese scientist acknowledged that few people in Japan visited these uninhabited Diaoyu Islands, and that people even doubted their existence (see Chapter 2). 21 This demonstrates that the Japanese had, at best, a limited relationship with the Diaoyu Islands. After Koga "rediscovered" them, however, the Japanese government constantly expressed its intention to annex these islands. T H E P R O B L E M A T I C D E C I S I O N BY T H E J A P A N E S E C A B I N E T

Why did the Japanese cabinet reluctantly give permission to build the territorial landmark in the Diaoyu Islands? As Foreign Minister Inoue pointed out in his memorandum to the interior minister, the Diaoyu Islands were located near the border area with the Qing and had Chinese names. In fact, the Japanese could have annexed the Diaoyu Islands if they were sure or confident that these islands were terra nullius when the governor of Okinawa asked to build this landmark in the Diaoyu Islands in 1885. T h e Japanese government repeatedly rejected petitions from the governor of Okinawa in both 1890 and 1893. Therefore, the Japanese government clearly knew that the Diaoyu Islands were not terra nullius because they possessed Chinese names. 22 Suddenly, however, after Japan won the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, the Japanese cabinet decided to annex the Diaoyu Islands and build this landmark. Evidendy, the Japanese had some kind of conspiratorial "game" in mind when the governor of Okinawa requested the building of the landmark in the Diaoyu Islands in 1885. Did the Japanese intend to occupy the Chinese territories in 1894? Were the Japanese preparing to make war with the Chinese when the governor of

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Okinawa made his first request? Why did the foreign minister, in his memorandum to the interior minister, say that the Japanese should not arouse China's suspicions and put off the establishment of the territorial landmark until a later time? In fact, Japan's encroachment on the Diaoyu Islands was simply an extension of the expansionist policy of the Meiji government, which had successfully annexed the Liuqiu Kingdom in 1879, and a long premeditated act based on Sino-Japanese War. Second, the reluctance of the Japanese government during the process of building the territorial landmark reflects the fact that the government realized the Diaoyu Islands were not terra nullius. Therefore, the soi-disant rediscovery of the Diaoyu Islands by Koga Tatsushiro cannot be valid according to both historical rights and international law. If the Japanese government claimed that the Diaoyu Islands were terra nullius, why did they annex the Diaoyu Islands in 1885, immediately after Koga's so-called rediscovery? Why did the Japanese government have to wait almost ten years to build the territorial landmark in the Diaoyu Islands? Why did the Japanese government give permission to annex the Diaoyu Islands tout de suite after Japan won the war in 1894-1895? Third, the Imperial Edict No. 13 does not support the sovereignty claims over the Diaoyu Islands. 23 The Imperial Edict No. 13 is an irrelevant document to the Diaoyu Islands case because the edict does not mention a single islet of the Diaoyu group. Under the Meiji Constitution, the Meiji emperor (reign 1867-1912) had the sole authority over the government; the Meiji government had a limited administrative jurisdiction. As a result, the ultimate power of decision making in Japan fell upon the emperor. Any decision made by the Meiji government, therefore, could not formally be the decision of the state, Japan, without approval by the emperor (i.e., the imperial edict). Consequently, the decision of the Japanese cabinet to give permission to build a national landmark on April 1,1896, cannot be considered a formal or valid law enacted by the state. In other words, any decisions by the Japanese government regarding the Diaoyu Islands during the era of the Meiji Constitution cannot be regarded as the state policy unless the Japanese emperor explicitly and unequivocally confirmed it in his imperial edict. The annexation of the Diaoyu Islands by the Japanese government is problematic because it lacks authorization from the Japanese emperor.

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The "rediscovery" of the Diaoyu Islands by Koga Tatsushiro is extremely powerful evidence for Japan's claim to sovereignty only if the Diaoyu Islands were terra nullius. Then, the question is: How should pro-Japan irredentist scholars deal with the Ming and the Qing historiography? Since the Ming dynasty, both Chinese and Liuqiuan officials used the Chinese language to identify the Diaoyu Islands. Use of Japanese names identifying the Diaoyu Islands did not appear in existing literature until the twentieth century. As a result, the Chinese naming of the Diaoyu Islands becomes strong evidence for the proChina irredentist arguments. Ironically, despite two scientific surveys of the Diaoyu Islands by Japanese geologists at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, there was no unified name to describe the Diaoyu Islands on the Japanese side, and the Japanese still used some Chinese names to identify the Diaoyu Islands (see Table 5). This reflects that the Japanese did not have a deep knowledge of the Diaoyu Islands. The critical question is: Did or did not the Chinese abandon the Diaoyu Islands after the last cefeng mission of the Qing to the Liuqiu Kingdom? If they did, then the Japanese had the right to claim sovereignty. Otherwise, the Japanese have extreme limitations in their claim of sovereignty over these islands.

The Diaoyu Islands: An Irresistible Trend of History Obviously, Chinese international diplomacy during the Ming and Qing dynasties (i.e., the investiture-tributary system) reflects China's version of "sovereignty." The sovereignty issue of the Diaoyu Islands, therefore, should be examined under a particular space and time framework. Specifically, one must understand a fundamental premise underlying the existence of the Diaoyu Islands—control under the Pax Sinica. For example, the purpose behind the investiture-tributary system used by Chinese rulers was to establish political ends of selfdefense, fundamental commercial necessity, and Chinese international relations and diplomacy.24 Because China's foreign political, economic, and cultural relations were conducted based on the notion of the Sinitic world order, a few matters should be noted. First, the Chinese world order, in particular the investiture-tributary system,

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according to Mark Mancall, must be understood in terms of the vocabulary and institutions of traditional China itself. Second, the concept of the tribute system is a Western invention for descriptive purposes. Third, Confucian scholar-bureaucrats and barbarian chieftains recognized the tributary system by its forms, which were consciously described in documents and represented by symbolic acts.25 A well-known Chinese historian, Yu Ying-shih, a Henry Strater Professor of Princeton University, states: "The theory of history is based on patterns [or laws]. These [patterns] are irresistible trends of history because they followed patterns [or laws] of the development of history."26 Historical documents from the Ming and Qing dynasties disclose irresistible trends of history relating to international diplomacy or international relations of China and the historical development of the Diaoyu Islands. First, the symbolic acts of the Sinitic world order, especially the investiture-tributary system, created by the Chinese, represent an irresistible trend in history. Chinese cefeng missions to tributary states dispatched by Chinese emperors signify symbolic acts of Chinese-fashion "sovereignty" during both Ming and Qing times. Naturally, the details of these formal ceremonies of cefeng missions varied, often quite markedly, among the various nations concerned. For example, during the visit of the Chen Kan cefeng mission in 1534, Chen revealed the fact that the Liuqiuans had used a language that was highly influenced by the Japanese language. 27 But Chinese officials never ordered the Liuqiuans to stop using it. Similarly, during the Xiao Chongye mission in 1579, when the king of Liuqiu complained about frequent attacks from the Japanese, 28 the Ming government did not interfere with the foreign policy of the Liuqiu Kingdom. This demonstrates that the Chinese had a different way of practicing international diplomacy with tributary states than the Japanese, whose primary strategy on foreign policy and international relations with the Liuqiu Kingdom was to use armed force. 29 Moreover, the Chinese government never interfered with the internal affairs of tributary states.30 Rather, cefeng missions performed symbolic acts demonstrating the Chinese superiority in the Chinese world order. In Bradford L. Thomas' words, the Asian Empire was "more a phenomenon of gradation than of finite limits."31 Relatively speaking, the Sinitic world order in the Asian region was static rather than kaleidoscopic. In particular, the investiture-tributary system since the fourteenth century demonstrated

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that the Chinese had a different notion of occupation and colonization from others (e.g., the Japanese who eventually annexed the Liuqiu Kingdom). Second, the tributary system served as an institutionalized expression of the Chinese image of the world order; political and economic considerations were subordinated to cultural symbolism.32 Specifically, the Chinese relied upon Confucianism, rather than the gun, as a teaching tool to guide tributary states. Confucian philosophy is the kind of philosophy that can transform the fundamental spirit of politics and social morality. 33 Unlike the Japanese, who eventually annexed the Liuqiu Kingdom in 1879, the Chinese never tried to colonize or conquer territory from their tributary Liuqiu. Rather, they demanded that people in tributary nations show respect and dedication to Confucian philosophy. 34 The value of harmony stands out as the salient feature in Chinese images of domestic and world order. According to the Confucian-sanctioned text, The Doctrine of the Mean, this ideal world is as follows: While there are no stirrings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, or joy, the mind may be said to be in the state of EQUILIBRIUM. When those feelings have been stirred, and they act in their due degree, there ensues what may be called the state of HARMONY. This EQUILIBRIUM is the great root from which grow all the human actings [sic] in the world, and this HARMONY is the universal path which they all should pursue. Let the states of equilibrium and harmony exist in perfection, and a happy order will prevail throughout heaven and earth, and all things will be nourished and flourish. 35

Imperial China in its foreign relations clearly acknowledged the prerogatives of rulers of sovereign territory and the compelling equity of the notion of reciprocity in relations between states under the umbrella of the Sinitic world order. 36 If a region is accustomed to one set of political concepts, ideals, and institutions, it may be extremely difficult to bring them under the common cloak of a quite different system.37 Accordingly, people at a particular location and time recognized and accepted a particular system. For centuries, many countries in the Asian region recognized and accepted the Confucian doctrine of the Sinitic world order practiced by the Chinese 38 as the legitimate dogma. To use Confucianism in organizing the Sinitic world order was viewed by many Asian countries as the "universal" practice, and China, as a center of civilization, provided high culture. 39

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For instance, when Xia Ziyang stayed in the Liuqiu as the chief envoy of the cefeng mission in 1606, the Japanese suddenly visited the Liuqiu Kingdom. Xia noted, "The Japanese are rampant; they do n o t understand li. As the representative of the Son of Heaven, I d e m a n d a meeting with t h e m [the Japanese]. If they refuse to see me, they must be timid people. I really want to see what they look like." 40 Only after the Japanese paid a visit to the Chinese commanders, kowtowing according to Confucian custom, were the Chinese satisfied a n d then did n o t ask questions, such as why they came to the Liuqiu Kingdom. Even J a p a n , which was born f r o m the womb of Chinese civilization, recognized and accepted the Confucian doctrine of the Sinitic world o r d e r for years. 41 For example, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the great Japanese challenger against the Ming Empire during the medieval era, showed his respect for Confucianism by calling the Chinese Empire Darning [Great Ming]. 42 This demonstrates that the Sinitic world o r d e r became the legitimate (accepted) system of tributary states, including J a p a n a n d the Liuqiu Kingdom, for centuries. In addition, there is n o d o u b t that the use of Chinese goods such as silk a n d porcelain as economic weapons was fully incorporated into the tributary system. T h e taking of hostages f r o m the barbarians also represented an important symbol of tributary submission. 43 Third, the use of the Diaoyu Islands as navigation aids by both the Chinese a n d the Liuqiuans during Ming a n d Qing times to travel in the East China Sea, indicating a symbolic act, is the imperative device during the early m o d e r n era. Political scientist Tao C h e n g raises an interesting question: 44 What more could and should have been done in the early modern period with respect to such islands and rocks to fulfill the requirements of symbolic acts with greater legal significance than the Chinese utilization of them at a short distance and in an essentially routine operation ? "Islands of small or m o d e r a t e size were usually considered to have been acquired by a single symbolic act;" 45 the Chinese n a m e d the Diaoyu Islands in the Chinese language a n d used t h e m for navigation purposes during Ming a n d Qing times, representing symbolic acts. It may be asserted that the prior authorization was n o t regarded, according to the international practice prevailing at that time, as essential to the validity of a title acquired by a symbolic act. It is a fact that the Chinese discoverers and explorers who visited the Diaoyu Islands the first time did n o t specify their extent with any degree of precision.

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It is true, however, that the Chinese created the names Diaoyu Tai (or Diaoyu Yu) as early as the Song dynasty; the Chinese deserved to have an inchoate title (sovereignty) over the Diaoyu Islands based on their acts of symbolic possession. Later, the Chinese named the islands of the East China Sea as today's Diaoyu Tai (or Diaoyu Yu) and Chi Yu, the provenance being from the Yudijisheng. The names of the Diaoyu Islands recorded in the historical works of the Ming and the Qing dynasties—especially the Shilu, written by the chief and vice-chief envoys of cefeng missions dispatched by the emperors—represent the most challenging historical-scientific documentation for pro-Japan irredentist scholars to "swallow." That is, the creation of rights of sovereignty through symbolic acts in the Diaoyu Islands cannot be denied. As early as the 1930s, a group of scholars defined symbolic acts as follows: It may be asserted on the basis of the facts that the formal ceremony of taking of possession, the symbolic act, was generally regarded as being wholly sufficient per se to establish immediately a right of sovereignty over, or a valid tide to, areas so claimed and did not require to be supplemented by the performance of other acts, such as, for example, "effective occupation." A right or title so acquired and established was deemed good against all subsequent claims set up in opposition thereto unless, perhaps, transferred by conquest or treaty, relinquished, abandoned, or successfully opposed by continued occupation on the part of some other state.46 After the Chinese named the Diaoyu Islands, these islands could not be terra nullius during Ming and Qing times. Indeed, based on both the Chinese and Liuqiuan historiography, there were no diplomatic controversies in which the Chinese relied u p o n their symbolic taking of possession as establishing their title of the Diaoyu Islands. Significantly, the historical trend of the geographical location of the Diaoyu Islands between China and the Liuqiu Kingdom in the East China Sea cannot be denied because the Diaoyu Islands are geographically located on the international boundary between the Chinese territory and the Liuqiuan territory. There was no room for a third party to claim the ownership of the Diaoyu Islands because there were no territorial disputes between suzerain China and the tributary Liuqiu Kingdom for over five h u n d r e d years. Indeed, as the Liuqiu Kingdom became a member of the Chinese tributary system in the early fourteenth century following the Yang Zai mission, 47 the Liuqiuans did not have any territorial disputes over the issue of the

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Diaoyu Islands with the Chinese authorities. 48 Furthermore, as a j a p a nese historian acknowledged, n u m e r o u s historical d o c u m e n t s f r o m both the Chinese and the Japanese languages provide crucial evid e n c e that the Liuqiu K i n g d o m h a d a total of thirty-six islands (see A p p e n d i x Fig. 8), which did n o t include any islets of the Diaoyu group. 4 9 A l t h o u g h the Chinese did n o t have the same Western c o n c e p t of territorial possession, they certainly had their own way o f possessing terra nullius. W h e n p e o p l e try to possess a territory, "a physical sign of some sort [is] usually left o n the spot, and some action to symbolize jurisdiction or control followed." 5 0 T h e Chinese possessed the Diaoyu Islands n o t only through symbolic acts, by using these islands as navigation aids, but also through the official expression of an intention to possess these islands by d e f e n d i n g and dying on them. T h e death of Prefect Wu Wei o n the Diaoyu Islands while fighting the aggression of the wokou in Ming times symbolized that the Diaoyu Islands were u n d e r jurisdiction of the Chinese. If the Diaoyu Islands were n o t part o f Chinese territory, why did Prefect W u Wei have to pursue and attack the wokou on the Diaoyu Islands? This "quasi-possession" of the Diaoyu Islands, based on the death of Wu Wei, certainly is p o w e r f u l evidence supporting the Chinese intention to d e f e n d their territorial jurisdiction. Fourth, p e o p l e living in a particular place and at a particular time use their own particular m e t h o d s to delimit marine space. Since all states (like China) have their own concepts of the state or of the international unit (such as the Sinitic world order), it is inevitable to have some differences in interpretation and implementation of national jurisdictional concepts, such as marine space, legitimate political space, and international boundaries. Just as the Chinese d e f i n e d the territory of tianxia [all u n d e r Heaven] by creating the Great Wall to eliminate threats f r o m n o r t h e r n barbarians, they set u p an o c e a n defense system 51 by f o r m i n g haijin to overcome the aggression of wokou against major cities, such as Tianjin. 5 2 Based o n the geographical and geological shape of the continental shelf in the East C h i n a Sea, the Chinese demarcated the "natural" boundary or marine space as an international boundary between China and the Liuqiu K i n g d o m . Specifically, the fact that the haigou [oceanic trench] or heishuigou [black-water trench] or guoshui [passing through the black-water] had b e e n used to delimit a marine boundary in the East C h i n a Sea d u r i n g the M i n g and Q i n g dynasties by

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the Chinese cannot be denied. For instance, there is a heishuigou between Taiwan and the Penghu Archipelago; 53 therefore, the heishuigou prevented the Chinese from developing Taiwan for years because people had to risk their lives to cross a heishuigou during Ming and Qing times.54 Similarly, when the Chinese traveled to Japan, they used guoshui to identify marine boundaries. 55 The Chinese, that is, developed their own methods to delimit marine boundaries by using the "natural" boundary. As Stephen B. Jones argued, "A boundary, like the human skin, may have diseases of its own or may reflect the illnesses of the body. The same line may be a good boundary at one time, a bad one at another. All boundaries, 'natural' or 'artificial,' are works of man and are respected or violated by that unpredictable species." 56 The natural boundary might not be a good boundary today, but it certainly was a good marine boundary during Ming and Qing times. Since the sixteenth century, many Chinese cefeng officials in the Ming and Qing governments used words such as guojiaojie [international boundary], jie Liuqiu difang shan ye [a boundary with the Liuqiu], quyou cangshui ru heishui [from the blue water enter into the black water], and zhongwai z hi jie [the boundary between China and a foreign country] to define the delimitation of the marine boundary between China and the Liuqiu Kingdom. Indeed, zhongwai zhijie was also used in the South China Sea. 57 Fifth, "geographical position and historical development are so [sic] largely determining factors of foreign policy."58 In particular, the mountains of Japan have pushed the Japanese out to the seas, making them the greatest seafaring people in Asia.59 Whereas the Chinese were living in the celestial kingdom on the continent, the Japanese were living on the island empire. Psychologically, the geographical setting created more anxiety for the Japanese than for the Chinese. 60 As a result, the Japanese practice of international diplomacy or international relations was different from the Chinese. As a recipient of Chinese civilization, Japanese foreign policy (unlike the stasis of Sinitic world order) during Pax Sinica was kaleidoscopic. In the case of the Liuqiu Kingdom, Japan eventually annexed the kingdom and constantly coveted territories. The Japanese, ergo, brought about painful experiences for many people in Asia, including the Liuqiuans. On the other hand, as long as the tributary nations respected the Middle Kingdom, the Chinese never interfered with their affairs,

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such as the occupation of the Korean Peninsula or the annexation of the Liuqiu Kingdom. In fact, tributary nations like Japan might view their relationship with China differently from the way China viewed her relationship with them. 61 After a long period of learning the Chinese political and social systems and accessing the Chinese market, the Japanese eventually departed from the Sinitic world order and entered the feudal era, which was ruled by the shogun. The invasion of Korea during the Toyotomi Hideyoshi era and the attack on the Liuqiu Kingdom reflect that the Japanese had a different way of practicing international relations or international diplomacy. 62 These events also demonstrate that the Japanese had the ability to bring their master, the Chinese, to the table to negotiate the issues of Korea and the Liuqiu Kingdom. Ultimately, Japan challenged and won the war with the Chinese in 1895. All this does not mean that historical documents provided in the Japanese language do not support any Japanese claims of the ownership of the Diaoyu Islands. History unquestionably demonstrates that the Japanese had an intention to control the Diaoyu Islands. This is demonstrated by acts such as the soi-disant rediscovery by Koga Tatsushiro and the building of a national landmark by the Japanese cabinet. 63 The crucial question remains whether or not the Chinese abandoned the Diaoyu Islands after ending five hundred years of foreign relations with the Liuqiu Kingdom. If the Chinese really abandoned these islands, as already suggested, the Japanese certainly have the right to claim the ownership of the Diaoyu Islands by using the "rediscovery" argument. In sum, notwithstanding some limitations of historiography, most historical documents among the Japanese, Chinese, and English languages demonstrate patterns [or laws] of historical development of the Diaoyu Islands. In particular, history illustrates that people in a particular time and place had their own way to delimit marine space. In the early modern period, id est, the Chinese developed their own concept of marine space as well as their own concept of world order. Certainly, therefore, for many Asian countries, the Sinitic world order reflected well-organized customary international law for centuries. Again it is important to stress that there were no territorial disputes (including the territorial issue of the Diaoyu Islands) whatsoever between suzerain China and the tributary Liuqiu Kingdom in over five hundred years.

4

From Irredentism to Modern Geopolitics The Diaoyu Islands during the Twentieth Century

By the time the Chinese realized the existence of the alternative practice of occupation and imperialism exercised by Western powers, it was too late to stop foreign aggression and invasion at the end of the nineteenth century. As a result, large portions of Chinese territories were lost to Western countries.1 The Chinese were particularly caught off guard by the seizure of two of China's tributary nations, the Liuqiu Kingdom (later named Okinawa) and Korea by the Japanese. These losses made the Chinese realize that the static idea of the Sinitic world order could not overcome the strength of Western technology and modernization. As the fin de siècle of the nineteenth century approached, China remained silent regarding the Diaoyu Islands as the result of the chaotic situation both domestically (e.g., the overthrowing of the Qing dynasty) and internationally (e.g., World War I). Although the government of the Republic of China (ROC) tried to maintain control during this unstable and chaotic period, the aggression by powerful Western countries, especially Japan, interrupted these efforts. Not until the discovery of oil around the Diaoyu Islands in 1969 did both the Nationalist Chinese regime in Taiwan and the Communist Chinese regime on the mainland officially claim ownership of the Diaoyu Islands. The Japanese, on the other hand, have consistently paid attention to the Diaoyu Island since the soi-disant rediscovery of these islands by the Koga family in 1884. Koga continued to develop these islands until the eve of the second Sino-Japanese War in the 1930s. Interestingly, the Chinese from both sides of the Taiwan Strait never protested or complained about these activities. After Japan lost World War II, the United States officially occupied

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Okinawa Prefecture, along with the disputed islands. Subsequently, its military exercises in the Diaoyu Islands brought the United States into the muddy issues surrounding the Diaoyu Islands dispute.

Years of Humiliation and Silence In the Qianlong emperor's famous response to the request of King George III for possible expansion of trade opportunities, the emperor devalued the British products, which he considered worthless for the Chinese.2 This cultural arrogance of the Chinese acted as a restraint on technology transfers that might otherwise have altered the course of Sino-Western relations during the second half of the nineteenth century.3 The technological gap between China and the Western powers was demonstrated when the British defeated the Chinese defense system in 1840, beginning 150 years of Chinese humiliation.4 The humiliation came not only from Western powers, but also from Japan, once China's tributary nation,5 which directly challenged the Chinese navy in 1894-1895. The Japanese decisively and devastatingly defeated the Middle Kingdom, their own mother of civilization, which was the size of the Roman and Greek Empires combined.6 China lost this modern naval war more by reason of technological underdevelopment than by command confusion, poor seamanship, or the failure to create a unified modern maritime defense system. By then, the Sinitic world order was completely broken down and China had lost many tributary states, such as the absorption of Vietnam and much of Indochina by the French, as well as the loss of Korea and the Liuqiu Kingdom to Japan. Moreover, the Chinese lost control over many of their own Middle Kingdom territories, such as Hong Kong to the British, Macao to the Portuguese, Outer Mongolia and a part of the northeastern territories to Russia, and Taiwan and the Penghu Archipelago to the Japanese. As Marwyn Samuels points out, these defeats at the hands of Western and the Japanese powers "came as another violent shock to an already weakened Confucian nervous system."7 In particular, the growing power of Japan became a psychological and physical blow for the Chinese. The loss of the Liuqiu Kingdom in 1879 and Taiwan under the Shimonoseki Treaty in 18958 both devastated the Sinitic world order and destroyed Chinese confidence

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and hope. According to the Shimonoseki Treaty, Japan not only acquired Chinese territories, such as "the island of Formosa (Taiwan), together with all islands appertaining or belonging to said islands of Formosa" [Article 11(b)], but also retained 200,000,000 taels in silver (Article IV) (about $150,000,000 in American gold 9 ). It must be pointed out that the Shimonoseki Treaty did not specifically mention the names of the Diaoyu Islands in Chinese, Japanese, or English. Whether the words "appertaining to Taiwan" or "belonging to said island of Formosa" included every islet of the Diaoyu chain or not has become one of the hottest debates regarding the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands among projapan and pro-China irredentist scholars. In addition, the Chinese government suffered the internal crises of the Taiping Rebellion in 1851 and the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, as well as external crises such as the negotiation of "unequal treaties" with Western powers. As a result, the Chinese seemed to lose sight of the uninhabited Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. Meanwhile, however, the Japanese followed the footprints of other Western powers, and their triumph in the RussoJapanese War in 1904—1905 stimulated their ambition to covet new territories in the Shimonoseki Treaty. Since Koga's "rediscovery" of the Diaoyu Islands in 1884, the situation of these islands also changed. After three ill-fated requests to the central government from the governor of Okinawa Prefecture requesting building of the territorial landmark in the Diaoyu Islands, Koga, soon after Japan won the Sinojapanese war in 1896, received the thirty-year free right to use four of the eight islets of the Diaoyu group (Diaoyu Dao, Huangwei Dao, Bei Xiaodao, and Nan Xiaodao). During the following year, he invested huge amounts of capital in these islands. During this period, some thirty Japanese, sent by Koga, immigrated annually to these islands.10 He not only built houses, reservoirs, wharves, and piers on the Diaoyu and Huangwei Islands, but also improved sanitary facilities and drainage, protected seabirds, conducted cultivation tests, and planted trees.11 The ambitious expansion of businesses on Diaoyu Dao and Nan Xiaodao by Koga never stopped. He began to engage in the business of collecting guano and albatross feathers in these islets. These feathers were exported to European countries as materials to make woman's hats.12 In 1909, the total number of immigrants reached 248 people, with a total of 99 families; the heyday of these four islets had arrived.13

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After the death of Koga Tatsushiro in 1918, his son, Zenji, took over the settlement work and the business on these islands. In 1926, when the thirty-year free lease of the Diaoyu Islands expired, the Japanese government converted it to a rental basis, subject to an annual contract valuing the Japanese currency at 136 yen. Subsequently, on March 3 1 , 1 9 3 2 , Koga purchased the four islands of the Diaoyu group from the Japanese government: Diaoyu Dao for 1,825 yen, Huangwei Dao for 247 yen, Nan Xiaodao for 47 yen, and Bei Xiaodao for 31.50 yen. 14 Therefore, the Japanese government transferred these four islets of the Diaoyu group to private ownership. As it happened, the businesses in the Diaoyu Islands conducted by the Koga family soon ended as the result of numerous regulations imposed by the Japanese government after the relations between Japan and China became violent during the second half o f the 1930s, affecting Koga's ability to obtain fuel (or oil) for ships. As a result, his businesses in the Diaoyu Islands were completely withdrawn and moved to the mainland of Okinawa Prefecture (the former Liuqiu Kingdom) in 1941. 15 Thereafter, there were no Japanese activities in the Diaoyu Islands until the involvement of United States in the 1950s. Once again, the Diaoyu Islands returned to silence as in previous periods. In short, the Japanese have constantly paid attention to these islets by both investing and sending immigrants since 1884. These activities reflect Japan's clear intention to possess the Diaoyu Islands. To the contrary, it is unavoidable to conclude that the Chinese conducted no activities in the East China Sea, including the Diaoyu Islands, after the Liuqiu Kingdom was annexed by the Japanese in 1879, except with regard to Taiwan, which was ceded to Japan after 1895.

Mistakes of the Republic of China and U.S. Involvement In 1937, the Second Sinojapanese War and the beginnings of the Second World War in the Pacific were well under way. In the first half of 1939, the Japanese imperial armies seized almost the entire coast of China and islets in the South China Sea, including the Xisha and Nansha Archipelagoes. 16 By the time Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and the United States j o i n e d the war in 1941, Japan controlled almost all waters surrounding mainland China, including both the East and the South China Seas. However, the might of Japanese imperial power began to decline as soon as the United States military fought back.

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T h e battle of Pearl H a r b o r symbolized the beginning of the e n d of Japanese expansion. O n December 1, 1943, three great powers, represented by President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United States, Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill of Great Britain, and Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi (E: Chiang Kai-shek) of the Republic of China, issued the Cairo Declaration. It stated, in part, that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands of the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria [Northeast China], Formosa [ Taiwan], and the Pescadores [Penghu Archipelago], shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed [emphasis added]. 17 Furthermore, on July 26, 1945, the three powers once again declared the Potsdam Proclamation, d e m a n d i n g that the Japanese surrender. According to Article 8 of this proclamation, "the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine [emphasis added] ,"18 But the Japanese did n o t give u p fighting in the Pacific region. Not until the Americans landed in Okinawa Prefecture during February of 1945 did the Japanese imperial army begin to think about surrender. T h e clash in Okinawa between the United States a n d J a p a n was o n e of the bloodiest battles during World War II.19 O n August 15, 1945, J a p a n officially surrendered a n d accepted "theprovisions set forth in the declaration issued by the heads of Governments of the United States, China and Great Britain on 26 July 1945, at Potsdam [emphasis added]." 2 0 Yet the Chinese m a d e mistakes when they entered into the Cairo Declaration a n d the Potsdam Proclamation regarding the Chinese territories. Specifically, n o names of the Diaoyu Islands, whether expressed in the Chinese, Japanese, or English language, were mentioned in these treaties. Based o n these documents, one might or could conclude that the Diaoyu Islands should be returned to the Chinese simply because of the wording. In the Cairo Declaration, "all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese. . . shall be restored to the Republic of China" might be interpreted to include the Diaoyu Islands. In the Potsdam Proclamation, "Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku and such

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minor islands" might be interpreted to exclude the Diaoyu Islands from Japanese sovereignty. What do "all the territories" and "Japanese sovereignty shall be limited" mean? Do these words signify that the Diaoyu Islands were Chinese territories? It is inevitable to conclude that these words are particularly ambiguous. Thus, the representatives from the ROC made extremely serious mistakes when they drafted these international treaties with the allied forces. The Chinese had the golden opportunity to mention the names of the Diaoyu Islands, but they did not. Why were the names of the Diaoyu Islands not included in these documents? It is not believable that the representatives from China were too idle or too lazy to record the names of the Diaoyu Islands in these treaties. Mistakes by the Chinese continued. When the Supreme Allied Command, led by Douglas MacArthur, occupied Japan for seven years, representatives from the ROC had another opportunity to address or to add the names of the Diaoyu Islands to international treaties, but this was never done. Furthermore, in 1951, when Japan and the United States negotiated the San Francisco Peace Treaty (or Multilateral Treaty of Peace with Japan), the Nationalist government did not express any objection regarding the Diaoyu Islands. Instead they supported this treaty. Indeed, before signing this treaty, the representatives of the Republic of China advocated no objection whatsoever to the fact that these islands were placed under the American administration on the basis of Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.21 According to the San Francisco Peace Treaty,22 "Japan renounces all right, tide and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores [Chapter II Article 2(b)]," and Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29° north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Islands and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters (Article 3) [emphasis added].

As a result, based on this treaty, the United States army was able to practice military exercises in Okinawa Prefecture and the Diaoyu

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Islands. Along with the Amami Islands, 23 the Diaoyu Islands were incorporated in the treaty of United States Civil Administration Proclamation (USCAR) Number 27oiDecember 25,1953. According to Article 1 of USCAR 27, all islands, islets, atolls, and rocks situated in an area bounded by the straight lines would be under the jurisdiction of the American army. These islands are listed in this order: North Latitude 28 degrees 24 degrees 24 degrees 27 degrees 27 degrees 28 degrees

East Longitude 124 degrees 40 minutes 122 degrees 133 degrees 131 degrees 50 minutes 128 degrees 18 minutes 128 degrees 18 minutes 24

As the Diaoyu Islands are located in latitude 25° 40' to 26° 00' N and longitude 123° 25' to 124° 45' E, all islets of the Diaoyu group were controlled by the United States Army. Two islets of the Diaoyu group were used for the main training exercises of the U.S. Army. According to the Department of the Army U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryuky-u Islands, U.S. Navy units had practiced firing at Huangwei Island, one of the Diaoyu group, in October 1955, and at Chiwei Island, another islet of the Diaoyu group, in April 1956.25 Because Huangwei Island was privately owned by the Koga family, the U.S. Civil Administration entered into a Basic Leasing Contract for military use with the owner of the islands. In this contract of July 1, 1958, the Civil Administration paid Koga Zenji a rent of $5,763.92 annually. 26 During the period of these activities between the Japanese and Americans, the Chinese government did not complain about or protest activities on either Huangwei or Chiwei Islands. Nor did China try to negotiate with either the United States or Japan regarding the ownership of the Diaoyu Islands. Compounding its previous errors, the ROC government made its most serious mistake in 1952 when the Chinese signed the Bilateral Treaty of Peace 27 with Japan: It is recognized that under Article II of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco in the United States of America on September 8, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the San Francisco Treaty), Japan has renounced all right, title and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) as well as the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands.

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The disposition of property in Japan and of its nationals in Taiwan and Penghu, and their claims, including debts, against the authorities of the Republic of China in Taiwan and Penghu and the residents thereof, and the disposition in Japan of property of such authorities and residents and their claims, including debts, against Japan and its nationals, shall be the subject of special arrangements between the government of the Republic of China and the government of Japan. The terms nationals and residents whenever used in the present Treaty include juridical persons (Article III).

Where are the Diaoyu Islands? This peace treaty was drafted based on the San Francisco Treaty and also failed to mention the Diaoyu Islands. Officials from the ROC did not record any names of the Diaoyu group, whether using Chinese, English, or Japanese, in the treaty. It is inevitable to say that representatives from the ROC failed to recall the existence of the Diaoyu Islands. Only the People's Republic of China (PRC), established in 1949 by Mao Zedong and a few million others (at that time, not representative of the Chinese people in the international arena), has consistendy denied the legality of the San Francisco Treaty. As Zhou Enlai said in his statement on August 15, 1951, the San Francisco Treaty "violates international agreements" and is "unacceptable." 28 Still, the reason for the protest from the PRC was not due to the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands. In short, when the ROC government, headed byjiangjieshi, represented the Chinese people as a legitimate government in the international community, it had numerous opportunities to mention the names of the Diaoyu Islands in the international arena. Yet no islet name of the Diaoyu group, whether using the Chinese, Japanese, or English language, was even stated in either the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951 or the Bilateral Treaty in 1952. To make matters worse, neither the Chinese from the ROC nor the PRC protested or complained when the American army publicly practiced military exercises on two islets of the Diaoyu group: Huangwei and Chiwei islets. Sadly enough, after more than half a millennium, the Diaoyu Islands—from the time when the Chinese discovered them, used them as navigation aids, and defended them, even sacrificing their lives in battles with the wokou in Ming times—were virtually forgotten by the Chinese people of the twentieth century. It is inescapable to say that representatives of the ROC must shoulder most of the blame and the responsibility. Ultimately, history will j u d g e these mistakes.

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Years of Confusion Before the 1969 survey by the United Nations in the East China Sea, both Japan and China were confused about the existence of the Diaoyu Islands. On the one hand, the Chinese side, whether mainland China or Taiwan, seems not to remember the existence of the Diaoyu Islands. The government in Taiwan itself recognized that the Diaoyu Islands were part of Japanese territories, which provides significant support for arguments of the p r o j a p a n irredentist scholars. On the other hand, even though the Japanese government built the territorial landmark in the Diaoyu Islands after the first Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the Japanese side did not fully pay attention to these islands after World War II. Relatively speaking, the Diaoyu Islands seemed to be worthless to both countries prior to 1969. T H E C H I N E S E E R A OF C O N F U S I O N

When fishermen from Fujian Province were shipwrecked in 1920, ships owned by Koga Zenji rescued them, and the Chinese received proper care in Ishigaki Village of Okinawa Prefecture. Thereafter, on May 20, 1921, Feng Mian, a consul general of Taiwan at Nagasaki, sent letters of gratitude to the chief of Ishigaki Village, Koga Zenji, and others respectively. In his letter, he thanked the chief of Ishigaki Village for the rescue and care of "the 31 fishermen from Fujian Province in 1920 [who] were wrecked . . . within the Senkaku Retto of the Yaeyama County in Okinawa Prefecture, the Great Japan." 29 This document, however, does not have much significant value because Taiwan was colonized by the Japanese as a result of the Shimonoseki Treaty in 1895. Therefore, the Taisho government might have influenced the outcome of this Chinese letter. From 1949, when Jiang Jieshi escaped to Taiwan to continue his Nationalist government, the ROC represented the Chinese people in the international community until the 1970s. Some documents published by the ROC are quite damaging to the pro-China irredentist claims. O n e of these documents is the Zhonghua Minguo Yingwen Nianjian [The ROC Yearbook in the English Edition], whose chapter on geography failed to mention the Diaoyu Islands for many years. For example, the 1951 issue of Zhonghua Minguo Yingwen Nianjian states that Taiwan is located at "21°45'25"-25 0 37'53" North Latitude [and] 119°18'13"-122 0 6'2" East Longitude." 30 In addition, the 19611962 issue states that Taiwan is located

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between 21°53'48" and 25°18'5" north latitude and 121°58'10" and 120°3'13" east longitude... . The longitudinal axis of the island shows a convex curve toward the Asiatic continent, an unusual feature as far as islands of the Western Pacific are concerned. The northeastern section of the axis inclines toward the east and its extension can be traced in the Ryukyu Arc, while the southern end of the axis stretches to northern Luzon. Taiwan lies exactly at the intersection of these two islands arcs which form a festoon of islands with their concave sides facing the Asiatic continent. 31

According to the 1962-1963 issue, Taiwan is located "between 21°45'25" and 25°37'53" north latitude and 119°18'3" and 122°6'25" east longitude."32 This physical geographical description of Taiwan remained in this book until the mid-1970s. However, according to the 1976 issue of Zhonghua Minguo Yingwen Nianjian, suddenly Taiwan is located "between 21°45'25" and 25°56'30" north latitude and 119°18'3" and 124°34'30" east longitude."33 This illustrates that there is no doubt that the government of the ROC was aware of the sovereignty issue of the Diaoyu Islands in 1976. As the Diaoyu Islands are located at latitude 25°40' to 26°00' N and longitude 123°25' to 124°45' E, the ROC did not include the Diaoyu Islands as part of the Taiwan territories for a long period of time. The representatives of the ROC not only failed to record the names of the Diaoyu Islands in international treaties, but also failed to acknowledge that the Diaoyu Islands belonged to the ROC. What is worse is that the ROC, as the legitimate government of China in the international community, clearly denied that the Diaoyu Islands were a part of Chinese territories. Chapter 5 (pp. 125 and 1089) of Taiwansheng Difang Zizhi Zhiyao [The Outline of Local Self-Government in Taiwan Province], published in 1965, states that to the "extreme North" of Taiwan Province is Jilong Island,34 meaning the Diaoyu Islands were not included as part of Taiwanese territories. Similarly, the 1968 issue of Zhonghua Minguo Nianjian [The Yearbook of the Republic of China] states that Taiwan is bounded by Jilong City of Mianhua Island as Jidong [eastern limit or extreme east], 122°06'25", Penghu Archipelago as Jixi [extreme west], 119°10'03", Qixingyan of Pingdong County as Jinan [extreme south], 21°45'25", and Jilong City of Pengjia Island as Jibei [northern limit or extreme north], 25°37'37" (respectively) [emphasis added] , 35

In other words, the Diaoyu Islands were not part of the Chinese territories because their geographical location was beyond Jilong,

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Mianhua, and Pengjia Islands. Furthermore, the first volume of Shijie Dituji [The World Atlas], published by the Taiwan Defense Ministry and the Institute of Physical Geology in 1965, records the Diaoyu Islands with Japanese names: Gyocho Jima [Diaoyu Island!], Taisho Jima [ Chiwei Island], and Senkaku Guntd. In addition, a high school textbook in Taiwan uses Japanese names to identify the Diaoyu Islands. 36 In the late 1970s, the government of the ROC began to recall these books, but it was too little too late—the damage was already done. Academics also began to record the names of the Diaoyu Islands, which were u n d e r the jurisdiction of the Japanese government. For instance, LiuqiuDili Zhilu [Short Geography of the Liuqius] in 1948, records that the Senkaku Islands contain the Diaoyu Islands including Gyocho Jima [Diaoyu Islet], Sekibi Sho [ Chiwei Islet], Kobi Sho [Huangwei Islet], and others. 37 Similarly, Chinese-Liuqiuan writer Cai Zhang recorded that the Diaoyu Islands were part of Okinawa Prefecture in Liuqiu Wangguo Shitan [Discussion of the Subjugated History of the Liuqiu Kingdom] as follows: Sento Shosho are located north of the Yaeyama. To the extreme west of [ this Sento Shosho] is Gyocho Jima [Diaoyu IslandG, Kita Kojima [Bei Xiaodao]. Minami Kojima [Nan Xiaodao] lies to the extreme east. Oki no Hokugan [Dabei Xiaodao] and Okino no Nangan [Danan Xiaodao] are located in the northeast. Kobi Sho and Sekibi Sho are small islands, located to the east

[emphasis added] ,38

Cai Zhang not only used the Japanese language to identify the Diaoyu Islands, but he also clearly stated that all Diaoyu Islands were under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture. Further, Liang Jiabin noted that the Senkaku Gunto "included Uotsurijima, formerly called Diaoyu Tai by our country, Sento Shosho [other small islets of the Diaoyu chain], Kobi Sho (J: Kuba Jima) [Huangwei Island], and Sekibi Sho [Chiwei Island]" [emphasis added] .39 Parallel to the confused position of the ROC, the government in the PRC also had a confused position regarding the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. Liangzhong Haidao Zhenjing [Two Log Books], compiled by Xiang Da and published in 1961, is a good example. In the index of geographical names of Liangzhong Haidao Zhenjing are the following explanatory notes regarding the Diaoyu Islands: Chikan Yu [Chiwei Island]40 is located northeast ofjilong in Taiwan, as is Chiwei Yu [Chiwei Island] in the Senkaku Guntd [Senkaku Islands]. . . .

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Diaoyu Yu [Diaoyu Island] is an island of the Senkaku Gunto [Senkaku Islands] on the way to Liuqiu from Jilong of Taiwan. Today's name is GyochoJima [Diaoyu Island].... Diaoyu Tai [Diaoyu Island] refers to Gyocho Jima [Diaoyu Island] of the Senkaku Gunto [Senkaku Islands] in the Liuqiu Islands.... Huangwei Yu [Huangwei Island] is located inside of the Senkaku Gunto [Senkaku Islands] between Taiwan and the Liuqius. Another name is KubaJima [HuangweiIsland] [emphasis added]. 41

To make matters worse, when on January 8, 1953, Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], the official propaganda organ for the Communist Party, criticized the occupation of the Ryukyu Islands (or Okinawa Prefecture) by the United States, it stated that "the Ryukyu Islands are located northeast of our Taiwan Islands . . . including Senkaku Shotd."42 According to this statement, the PRC recognized that the Diaoyu (J: Senkaku) Islands were a part of the Liuqiu Islands (or Okinawa Prefecture). In other words, the Diaoyu Islands belonged neither to Taiwan nor to mainland China, but to Japan. In short, before the year 1969, the Chinese side, whether the Communist or the Nationalist governments, did not clearly remember the existence of the Diaoyu Islands. Instead, both governments began to use the Japanese names to identify these islands. Ironically, Chinese ancestors during Ming and Qing times had considered the Diaoyu Islands to be part of the Chinese territories as reflected by the naming, using, and sacrificing of life for the country to defend these islands, but the Chinese in the twentieth century simply did not remember these islands. T H E J A P A N E S E E R A OF C O N F U S I O N

Since Koga "rediscovered" the Diaoyu Islands in 1884 and the Japanese government made a decision to include the Diaoyu Islands as part of Okinawa Prefecture in 1897, the Japanese side was also inconsistent in including the Diaoyu Islands as part of its territories. For instance, Nihon Kinkai Kishozu [Pilot Chart of the Adjacent Seas of Japan], compiled by the government agency Suirobu [Hydrographical Office] and published in 1913, did not mention the names of the Diaoyu Islands, either in Chinese or Japanese. 43 Furthermore, Dai Nippon Dokushi Chizu [Greater Japan Historical Adas] by Yoshida Togo in 1935, did not contain names of either the Diaoyu Islands or the Senkaku Islands. 44 Similarly, during the Japanese occupation of Man-

Table 6. No Name of the Diaoyu Islands Recorded in the Japanese Textbooks Name of Books

Publisher

1

Toyo Tokushi Chizu [The Historical Atlas of the Far East]

Fuzanbo

4-24-1944

2

Nihon Rekishi Chizu [The Map of Japan's History]

Zenkoku Kyöiku Tosho

4-30-1957

3

Shinsho Kötö Chizu [The New Detailed Map for High School]

Teikoku Shoin

12-15-1958

4

Shinsho Koto Chizu [The New Detailed Map for High School]

Teikoku Shoin

1-20-1963

5

Shakaika Chügakusei no Chizu [The Map of Social Studies for Junior High Students]

Nihon Shoin

2-08-1963

6

Kötö Chizu [The Map for High School Students]

Nihon Shoin

4-20-1963

7

Hyöjun Sekai Chizu [The Standard World Adas]

Jinbunsha

4-30-1963

8

Kötö Chizu [The Map for High School Students]

Nihon Shoin

2-08-1964

9

Saishin Kötö Chizu [The New Map for High School]

Nihon Shoin

2-08-1965

10

Kötö Chizuchö [The Adas Book for High School Students]

Ninomiya Shoten

1-15-1967

11

Sekai Genshoku Dai Hyakka Jiten [The Encyclopedia of the World]

Shögakukan

7-10-1968

12

Saishin Shömitsu Chizu [The New Detailed Map]

Nihon Shoin

1-15-1970

13

Kötö Chizuchö [The Adas Book for High School Students]

Ninomiya Shoten

1-20-1971

Source: Takahashi, Senkaku Retto Noto, 92.

Dates

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churia, an official m a p published by the Japanese government in 1936 did n o t include any names of the Diaoyu Islands in either Japanese or Chinese. 45 In addition, Kihan: Nihon Dai Chizu [A Model: T h e Great Map of J a p a n ] , published by Teikoku Shoin in 1958, did n o t include the names of the Diaoyu Islands. 46 Moreover, Dai Nippon Fukenbetsu Chizubetsu Narabi Chimei Daikan [The Map of Prefectural Division of Great J a p a n a n d a Guide to Place Names], published by the Geographical Academy of Great J a p a n in 1939, did n o t mention any names of the Diaoyu Islands in either Japanese or Chinese. 4 7 Although this m a p illustrated major streets of most counties a n d islands of Okinawa Prefecture, there is n o m e n t i o n of the Diaoyu Islands. Nor were the Senkaku Islands n a m e d in Japanese. Finally, textbooks for Japanese j u n i o r high a n d high schools, which were approved by the Ministry of Education, did n o t contain the names of either the Diaoyu Islands or the Senkaku Islands for years (Table 6).

The "Magic" Year of 1969 In November 1967, the ROC, the Republic of Korea, a n d the Republic of the Philippines, u n d e r the sponsorship of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia a n d the Far East (ECAFE), f o r m e d a Committee for Co-ordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources in Asian Offshore Areas (CCOP) ,48 This body, assisted by the United States Naval Oceanographic Office, conducted a seismic survey of the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea in O c t o b e r / November 1968, a n d concluded that the shallow sea floor between Japan and Taiwan might contain one of the most prolific oil and gas reservoirs in the world, possibly comparing favorably with the Persian Gulf area. The survey had been undertaken by the United States Government with the participation of geologists and geophysicists from China (Taiwan), Japan, and the Republic of Korea. During the cruise, more than 12,000 line-kilometers of continuous seismic reflection profiles had been run with a 30,000 joule sparker and a continuous geomagnetic profile had been made simultaneously. Final analyses, compilations and illustrations had been completed ashore in the United States, and the results of the survey had been published in the Committee's Technical Bulletin, volume 2. The results of that survey had already aroused considerable interest and it was understood that further investigations were being planned by industrial enterprises.49

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T h e most favorable part of the region for development was identified as a 200,000-square-kilometer area just northeast of Taiwan or almost exactly the location of the Diaoyu Islands—where the N e o g e n e sedim e n t is more than 2,000 meters thick. 50 T h e ECAFE report was followed u p by a more thorough survey sponsored by the Japanese Prime Minister's Office, headed by Professor Niino Hiroshi of Tokai University. From J u n e 14 to July 13, 1969, the survey team conducted submarine topographic, 51 geologic, 5 2 magnetic, 5 3 and seismic 54 surveys of the 200,000-square-kilometer area northeast of Taiwan, especially the immediate area surrounding the Diaoyu Islands. A summary of the report appeared in the Japan Petroleum Weekly. T h e result of this survey by the Japanese team confirmed that The southern part of the area surveyed is under strong influence of the Japan Current—i.e. Black Current, while the northern part is not. The continental shelf has a general slope from west to east, with large depression in the central part with water depth of 170 meters. The rest of the continental shelf is a [sic\ flat with an average water depth of 130 meters. A culmination exists on the outer rim of the continental shelf. The marine topography of the outer rim is so complicated that another detailed survey will be needed. Fine grey silt and silty sand are observed throughout the central depression, while relatively coarser grey sand is deposited on the surrounding flat continental shelf. Rocks which seemingly constitutes \_sic\ the basement of the Neogene are exposed near Uotsuri Island [Diaoyu Island] and the northern part thereof. Soft rocks crop out here and there, containing shallow-water shells of the Pleistocene/Holocene. The survey confirmed a general belief that there exists [sic] marine Neogene deposits of more than 2,000-meter thickness throughout the entire area surveyed. Existence of folding structures also has been confirmed at several locations. The ECAFE (Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East) survey which had been conducted in the fall of 1968 suggested that there existed a large scale of sediment basin and thick deposits. The recent survey by the Japanese team, taking [a] further step forward, has led us to believe the area is worth prospecting for oil resources [emphasis added] .55 Furthermore, Niino concluded that The Sparker record indicated that over almost the whole area studied there develops a layer of marine Neogene sediments more than 2,000 meters in thickness. The gendy folded zones are discovered in both

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the northwest and the southwest of the area. In some places, it was found that the sea bottom consisted of Neogene basements. Between Uotsurijima [Diaoyu Island] and Sekibi-sho [ Chiwei Island] a deep depression was discovered [emphasis added] ,56 Both the ECAFE and Niino surveys affirmed that the Diaoyu Islands area contains o n e of the most prolific oil and gas reservoirs in the world. Naturally enough, the expectations of a great oil find p r o d u c e d m u c h activity. By May 1969, nearly fourteen thousand applications for drilling rights were filed with the Ryukyu Government of Okinawa Prefecture, and the n u m b e r of applications approached twenty-five thousand by September 1970. 57 A second survey was sponsored by the Japanese Prime Minister's Office on August 20, 1970, led by Professor Hoshino Michihira of Tokai University. This survey reconfirmed the first survey by Professor Niino. Because garnets, zircons, tourmalines, a n d rutiles were f o u n d in the Diaoyu Islands and their surrounding areas, these regions might contain o n e of the most prolific oil and gas reservoirs of the world. 58 In short, these surveys eventually generated o n e of the biggest territorial conflicts between China a n d J a p a n .

The First Conflict between China and Japan O n July 30, 1970, the Executive Yuan in Taiwan approved a draft statute governing the exploration and drilling of oil and gas in China's territorial waters and the adjacent continental shelf. 59 This led to various tax incentives to encourage foreign investment. In addition, the Executive Yuan chalked off an area covering 69,000 square miles for undersea oil prospecting. This area comprises the continental shelf in the Taiwan Strait a n d the sea north of Taiwan, about 25° to 29.5° north latitude a n d 121° to 127.5° east longitude. 6 0 Based on the geographical location given above, the Diaoyu Islands are covered in this area. Furthermore, the China Petroleum Corporation, a state-owned company, signed agreements with Amoco, Gulf Oil Company, Oceanic Exploration Company, and Clinton International Oil Company to develop these resources. 61 O n August 25, 1970, the Legislative Yuan passed a statute governing the prospecting and exploring of undersea oil resources by saying, "the Chinese government will speed u p its effort to explore petroleum a n d natural gas in waters north of Taiwan, including the area a r o u n d the Tiaoyu Tai islets [Senkaku Islands]." 62

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Furthermore, a member of the National Assembly in Taiwan urged the Chinese government to officially incorporate the Diaoyu Islands into Chinese territory: "There is no question that the isles (Diaoyu) are part of Chinese territory geographically, historically and from the standpoint of international law."63 A group of reporters from the China Times planted a Taiwanese flag on one of the islets of the Diaoyu group in September 1970; patriotic sentiments were very bruised when the flag was torn down by Ryukyu policemen and reporters were forcibly evicted. 64 Thereafter, the Japanese foreign minister stated, "there is no question that Japan has territorial rights over (the Senkaku Islands) and there is no need, either, to discuss their territorial status with any country." 65 By now, both the Chinese and the Japanese realized that there was a territorial dispute—the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. Nevertheless, beginning in late October 1970, the climate of controversy began to change; talks were held between officials of Japan and the ROC to see whether the disagreements could be resolved. 66 On November 12, 1970, a "Liaison Committee" was formed in Seoul by representatives of the ROC, the Republic of Korea, and Japan to explore jointly and exploit the undersea oil resources. Until 1970, Japan and the ROC had been disputing sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands while the PRC had been strangely silent. The exact reason for this silence on the Diaoyu disputes by the PRC is unknown. Yet in early December 1970, the New China News Agency denounced the formation of the "Liaison Committee" and declared that the "act of aggression committed by the United States and Japanese reactionaries in league with the Seoul and Taibei [Taipei] regimes would provoke great indignation in China and North Korea." 67 By the end of 1970, the Renmin Ribao commentator stated, Taiwan Province and the islands appertaining thereto, including the Tiaoyu, Hungwei, Chihwei, Nanhsiao, Peihsiao and other islands, are China's sacred territories. The resources of the sea-bed and subsoil of the seas around these islands and of the shallow seas adjacent to other parts of China all belong to China, their owner, and we will never permit others to lay their hands on them. The People's Republic of China alone has the right to explore and exploit the resources of the sea-bed and subsoil of these areas. The Chiang Kai-shek gang is a political mummy, spurned long ago by the Chinese people. All agreements and contracts concerning the exploration and exploitation of

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China's sea-bed and subsoil resources that gang concluded with any country, any international organization or any foreign public or private enterprise under the signboard of "joint development" or anything else are illegal and null and void.68 O n c e the PRC officially claimed the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands by giving strict warnings regarding drilling on these islands, the Japanese a n d U.S. governments took notice. O n March 11, 1971, the Japanese government decided to suspend oil development a r o u n d the Diaoyu Islands. 69 In addition, the U.S. Department of State advised American oil corporations not to explore for oil deposits in the offshore areas u n d e r dispute between China a n d Japan because the government would not intercede if their vessels were seized by China. 70 Clearly, the intention was to prevent the oil dispute f r o m affecting the détente between the PRC a n d the United States; J a p a n had n o choice b u t to go along. Virtually all exploration activities t h r o u g h o u t the Yellow Sea a n d the East China Sea came to a stop by the middle of April 1971. Furthermore, international politics were changing in 1971; n o party particularly wanted to stress points of disagreement since both the United States a n d J a p a n were making approaches to the PRC for normalizing relations. In addition, the West could not afford to ignore the result of changes in China, such as the development of nuclear and hydrogen bombs; dimensions of international politics and geopolitics in the Asian-Pacific region shifted dramatically. In particular, Sino-Soviet territorial disputes strengthened the close relationship between China a n d the United States. This geopolitical significance of China also directly affected the position of the United States regarding the Diaoyu Islands case. According to the statement of President Nixon to the Senate of the United States regarding the Reversion Treaty, The New Agreement provides that after reversion Japan will grant the United States the use of facilities and areas in the Ryükyüs in accordance with the Mutual Security Treaty of 1960 and its related arrangements, such as the Status of Forces Agreement. This means that the United States will continue to have the use of bases in Okinawa necessary for carrying out our mutual security commitments to Japan.71

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Under the Reversion Treaty that took effect on May 15, 1972, Japan resumed full sovereignty over the Okinawa Islands. 72 In this reversion agreement, the United States included the Diaoyu Islands with the Ryukyu Islands (the former Liuqiu Kingdom). As Howard McElroy, country officer for Japan in the Department of State, pointed out, Under Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, the U.S. has full administrative rights over "Nansei Shoto," including the Ryukyus, south of 29 degrees north latitude. The term "Nansei Shoto" was understood to mean all islands under Japanese administration at the end of the war which were not otherwise specifically referred to in the Peace Treaty. The term, as used in the treaty, was intended to include the Senkaku Islands [see Appendix Fig. 15]. 73 Based on this provision, 74 it appeared that Japan received support from the United States, which could mean it would fight against China regarding the irredentist Diaoyu issue. Moreover, Japan had already included these islands in its air defense identification zone and had begun to patrol in surrounding waters. 75 These statements and activities of Japan and the United States brought forth strong attacks from the PRC, such as the following: Tiaoyu and the other islands have been China's territory since ancient times. There is no question about this whatsoever.... It is even more absurd for the United States to want to include China's territory Tiaoyu and other islands it has occupied into the "area of reversion" in accordance with Okinawa "reversion" agreement. After World War II, Japanese imperialism returned Taiwan and the Penghu Islands to China. It was illegal in itself that Japan handed over the Tiaoyu and other islands appertaining to Taiwan to the United States. The United States which occupied Japan's Okinawa after World War II should return Okinawa to Japan completely and unconditionally. But it has no right at all to include China's territory Tiaoyu Islands and other islands under its illegal occupation in the "area of reversion. . . ." All the endeavors of the U.S.-Japanese reactionaries concerning China's territory Tiaoyu Island and other islands again incontrovertibly prove that the so-called Okinawa "reversion" agreement is a big fraud.76 Once again, the warning from the PRC took effect. With respect to the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands, the United States quickly expressed a neutral position. According to the United States Department of State,

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The United States believes that a return of administrative rights over those islands to Japan, from which the rights were received, can in no way prejudice any underlying claims. The United States cannot add to the legal rights ofJapan possessed before it transferred administration of the islands to us, nor can the United States, by giving back what it received, diminish the rights of other claimants. The United States has made no claim to the Senkaku Islands and considers that any conflicting claims to the islands are a matter for resolution by the parties concerned. 77 Moreover, Secretary of State William P. Rogers, testifying b e f o r e the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, c o m m e n t e d o n the irredentist Diaoyu issue by saying, "This (Reversion) treaty does n o t affect the legal status of those (Diaoyu/Senkaku) islands at all. Whatever the legal situation was prior to the treaty is going to be the legal situation after the treaty comes into effect." 78 F u r t h e r m o r e , the Foreign Relations Committee of the U n i t e d States Senate declared: The Republic of China, the People's Republic of China and Japan claim sovereignty over these islands. The Department of State has taken the position that the sole source of rights of the United States in this regard derives from the Peace Treaty under which the United States merely received rights of administration, not sovereignty. Thus, United States action in transferring its rights of administration to Japan does not constitute a transfer of underlying sovereignty nor can it affect the underlying claims of any of [the] disputants. The Committee reaffirms that the provisions of the Agreement do not affect any claims of sovereignty with respect to the Senkaku or Tiao-Yu Tai Islands by any state.79 As late as S e p t e m b e r 11, 1996, U.S. State D e p a r t m e n t spokesman Nicholas Burns notes, "The United States neither recognizes, n o r supports the claim of any country to sovereignty ov- r the Diaoyu Islands." 80 Based o n the treaty between J a p a n a n d the U n i t e d States, the Diaoyu Islands currently are u n d e r the control of the J a p a n e s e gove r n m e n t . Nevertheless, the U n i t e d States g o v e r n m e n t clearly expresses that the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands should be settled by J a p a n a n d China alone. This attitude e n r a g e d the Japanese, in particular f o r m e r Japanese foreign minister Fiikuda Takeo expressed disa p p o i n t m e n t a n d subsequently apologized to the p e o p l e of Okinawa. 81 For the Japanese, the U n i t e d States was too neutral, 8 2 giving the Chinese the c h a n c e to claim sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. J a p a n , that is, did n o t receive the s u p p o r t it h o p e d f o r f r o m its

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friend—the United States. On the other hand, the Chinese criticized the United States as being partial to Japan. 8 3 In other words, on the irredentist Diaoyu issue, both China and Japan were unhappy with the policy of the United States. There is no doubt that the geopolitical significance of China let the United States desert its "friend"— Japan. In short, during the process of returning Okinawa to Japan, the United States maintained a "soft" position toward China regarding the irredentist Diaoyu issue. The Japanese hope became almost a nightmare when the entrusted United States took this neutral position. Japan hoped that the United States would maintain Japan's side as a "friend" against "evil" China regarding this territorial dispute, as the United States decided to return Okinawa and other islands to Japan. The Diaoyu dispute quieted with the visit of President Nixon from the United States and Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei in 1972 to the Middle Kingdom. Ultimately, the ROC was deserted by both governments—Japan and the United States—when these countries moved to normalize relations with the PRC. Yet the disputed Diaoyu Islands have generated both pro-China and pro-Japan irredentist movements around the world. For the Chinese side, students and intellectuals of Chinese descent living in the United States created an irredentist association, Diaoyudao Baowei Xingdong Weiyuanhui [The Committee for Action to Protect the Diaoyu Islands]. In Japan, many intellectuals (except a few intellectuals endorsing the pro-China irredentist arguments) and all political parties, including the Japan Communist Party, supported the Japanese government and p r o j a p a n irredentist arguments. 84 A powerful irredentist association, Nanpô Dôhô Engokai [The Support Group of the Southern Compatriots], sponsored by the Japanese government, was formed. Both irredentist associations from the two sides have spent time and money to advocate their own arguments and propaganda.

The Diaoyu Islands as "Hostage" since 1971 When SinoJapanese relations normalized in 1972, the irredentist Diaoyu issue was deliberately shelved by both governments. However, the sovereignty issue of the Diaoyu Islands has always been a thorn in the side of Sinojapanese relations. As the time approaches for another fin de siècle, the ownership of the Diaoyu Islands seems impos-

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sible to resolve. Specifically, Japan has still refused to accept the Chinese proposal ofjoint development of the Diaoyu Islands. As long as the sovereignty issue of the Diaoyu Islands is unsettled, Japan cannot unilaterally drill oil, nor can China freely enter the Diaoyu Islands and their surrounding areas. As a result, the Diaoyu Islands, in reality, have become "hostage" to the dispute between Japan and China. A V O I D I N G C O N F R O N T A T I O N OVER T H E D I A O Y U D I S P U T E

In February 1972, despite Nixon's surprise visit to China and the issue of the Sino-U.S. Joint Communiqué,85 the Chinese were still furious about the involvement of the United States in the Diaoyu Islands. On March 3, 1972, An Zhiyuan, representative of the People's Republic of China, now legally representing China in the international community, made a speech at a meeting of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, denouncing Japan's occupation of the Diaoyu Islands. For the first time ever, the issue of the Diaoyu Islands was brought to the UN as an international arena. The Chinese people suffered long from imperialist aggression and oppression. The United States is to this date forcibly occupying China's territory [in] Taiwan Province, and of late it has colluded with the Japanese reactionaries and used the fraud of the "reversion of Okinawa" in an attempt to include into Japan's territory the Tiaoyu and other islands—islands appertaining to China's Taiwan Province. . . . On behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China, I hereby reiterate: China's Taiwan Province and all the islands appertaining to it, including Tiaoyu Island, Huangwei Island, Chihwei island, Nanhsiao Islands, Peisiao Islands, etc., are part of China's sacred territory. The sea-bed resources of the seas around these islands and of the shallow seas adjacent to their parts of China belong completely to China and it is absolutely impermissible for any foreign aggressor to poke his fingers into them. No one whosoever is allowed to create any pretext to carve off China's territory and plunder the sea resources belonging to China. And no one will ever succeed in doing so. 86

After receiving China's powerful denunciation, all major Japanese newspapers reported this speech in their editorial pages, either by criticizing it or by defending the pro-Japan irredentist positions.87 However, the climate of international politics soon became "peaceful." After the "Nixon Shock" in February, the "Tanaka Shock" created another typhoon around the world in September 1972. This time,

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Japan officially recognized China as a legitimate government. Even though Tanaka met with Nixon in Hawai'i in August before visiting China, Japan's recognition of Beijing went far beyond the American initiative in China because Japan desired to stress normalized SinoJapanese relations. When China and Japan normalized relations in 1972, both governments decided to leave the Diaoyu Islands issue to posterity for setdement. Once again in 1978, both countries determined to continue to shelve the issue of the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands and left it to future generations to settle, as they signed the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty.88 Answering a question regarding the Diaoyu Islands put forward by a Japanese journalist, Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping stated, Our two sides agreed not to touch upon this (Diaoyu Islands) question when diplomatic relations were normalized between China and Japan. This time when we were negotiating the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, the two sides again agreed not to touch on it.. . . It does not matter if this question is shelved for some time, say, ten years. Our generation is not wise enough to find common language on this question. Our next generation will certainly be wiser. They will surely find a solution acceptable to all.89

In 1983, Deng Xiaoping once again commented about the issue of the unification of Chinese territory in a meeting of top leaders: China has a history of 5,000 years—in fact, more than 5,000 years. The cultural relics unearthed in Xi'an have proved a history of 6,000 years. China has never been unified before. China was not truly unified until 1949. However, Taiwan and Hong Kong are not yet unified with the motherland. The question of the Nansha (Spratly) Islands is too complicated; we will consider them at another time. As for the question of the Diaoyu Islands, I have said that "the coming generations of people can solve it;" the coming generations of people will be more intelligent than we are.90

Nevertheless, of course, the Diaoyu dispute has been one of the most sensitive problems between Japan and China. For example, when Japan built a temporary heliport in the middle of the disputed islands in 1979, the Chinese Foreign Ministry denounced the Japanese action. 91 When the Okinawa Development Agency of the Central Government conducted geographical, meteorological, and other scientific researches in the Diaoyu Islands, this activity was also condemned by the Chinese Foreign Ministry.92 When Prime Minister Uno

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Sosuke, after visiting Moscow in May 1989, claimed that the SinoJapanese dispute over the Diaoyu Islands had b e e n settled because "Japan at present [had] de facto control over them," 9 3 the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman immediately rejected Uno's statement by saying that the matter was only being shelved. 94 T H E 1 9 9 0 L I G H T H O U S E PROBLEM AND A S I A N GEOPOLITICS

T h e Japanese government in 1988 allowed right-wing organizations to improve lighting in a nongovernmental facility on Diaoyu Island, the largest islet of the Diaoyu chain. Since every lighthouse, according to the law in Japan, h a d to m e e t strict regulation standards every ten years, the Japanese authorities examined, approved, a n d recognized this lighthouse. 9 5 Nevertheless, the Maritime Safety Agency (MSA) of J a p a n has never gotten a r o u n d to recognizing the lighthouse's official status in the Diaoyu Islands. 96 In 1990, the lighthouse on Diaoyu Island reignited the huge public controversy when the Maritime Safety Agency was prepared to recognize the lighthouse—upgraded by the rightists—as an official beacon. Quickly, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman d e n o u n c e d the Japanese actions: "The Chinese government strongly d e m a n d s that the Japanese government take immediate a n d effective measures to stop forthwith the above action by the Japanese right wing groups and prevent the recurrence of similar incidents." 97 But this lighthouse controversy h a d already spread to Taiwan, a n d students planted the flag of the ROC on the Diaoyu Islands. Within days, Japanese Defense Agency officials landed on the island a n d removed the flag. 98 By October 21, patrol boats and helicopters f r o m Japan's Maritime Safety Agency prevented Taiwanese athletes, politicians, a n d reporters aboard ships f r o m approaching these disputed islands. 99 At a press conference, Sakamoto Misuji, the chief cabinet secretary of the Japanese government, stated, "The Senkaku Islands are the i n h e r e n t territory of our nation and the action of Taiwan is regrettable. J a p a n has managed (the islands) by the appropriate application of related laws a n d ordinances." 100 O n the following day, the Xinhua News Agency reported that Japanese chief cabinet secretary Sakamoto was "arrogantly" claiming the Diaoyu Islands, "The Diaoyu Islands have always b e e n part of Chinese territory, a n d China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands. It is totally unjustified for the Japanese government to dispatch warships a n d airplanes to enter the sea water

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of the Diaoyu Islands and intercept the ships from the Taiwan Province." 101 Thereafter, Japan tried to calm this controversy; Sakamoto told reporters that he agreed with a 1978 statement by Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, and that the ownership of the islands should be decided by the next generation. 102 In the end, Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki blamed the right-winger's act in upgrading the controversial lighthouse on Diaoyu Island. 103 Both governments seemed to prefer to allow this matter to die down. Unfortunately, the anger of the Chinese, in particular those who live overseas, did not stop; the controversial lighthouse on Diaoyu Island began to complicate international politics in the East Asian region. The year of 1990 was extraordinary in the world of geopolitical affairs. In Europe, the unification of Germany was achieved. In the Middle East, Iraq invaded Kuwait. In Asia, Japan was the first industrial country to lift economic sanctions against China, which had suppressed student demonstrations on J u n e 4, 1989 by resuming the Japanese $2.2 billion development loan. 104 Furthermore, the Japanese government decided to send a "Self-Defense Force" (SDF) to the Middle East to participate in the work of safeguarding peace in the name of "assisting the UN."105 This was the first time the Japanese army had gone overseas since the Second World War. To the Chinese, the removal of constitutional constraints on the overseas deployment of Japanese soldiers by the Japanese Diet was clearly linked with the issue of the Diaoyu Islands, which were occupied by the Japanese. This deployment also enraged the overseas Chinese, especially in Hong Kong, who marched to the Japanese consulate-general to condemn the lighthouse on Diaoyu Island and connected the irredentist Diaoyu issue to Japanese imperialism during 1937, the Rape of Nanjing. 106 By October 28, over ten thousand residents in Hong Kong took the irredentist Diaoyu issue to the street. 107 By then, the anti-Japanese sentiment movements spread over Taiwan and China, and it was the first time ever that both sides of the Taiwan Strait condemned Japanese activities regarding the Diaoyu Islands. 108 To make this matter worse, the extreme right-wing Japanese politician, Ishihara Shintaro, who is best known for his book, The Japan That Can Say No, made a comment about the Rape of Nanjing as being gready exaggerated. His statement led Renmin Ribao to publish a treatise attacking Ishihara under the headline "Lies Cannot Obscure Facts Written in Blood." 109

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For the Chinese, the timing could n o t have been better. T h e ent h r o n e m e n t ceremony of the Japanese E m p e r o r Akihito (whose father, E m p e r o r Hirohito, h a d passed away in January of the previous year), was also scheduled in November. This e n t h r o n e m e n t ceremony was d a m p e n e d by the anti-Japanese activities in the Asian region. This time n o t only the Chinese b u t also the South Korean people d e n o u n c e d the e n t h r o n e m e n t ceremony a n d Japanese imperialism because J a p a n has a similar territorial dispute with South Korea. 110 As Mao once said, "A single spark can start a prairie fire." That is what h a p p e n e d with the Diaoyu Islands dispute; the relatively small issue of the lighthouse in the Diaoyu Islands between J a p a n and China quickly spread a n d became a titanic anti-Japanese movem e n t in the Asian region. T h e Chinese government tried to play down the irredentist Diaoyu issue by expressing "mild" protests to J a p a n . T h e r e is n o d o u b t that Beijing was grateful for Tokyo's help in persuading Western countries to resume ties with China, which suffered economic sanctions f r o m the West d u e to crackdowns after the student movement in 1989. Yet, China simply could n o t retreat f r o m the sovereignty of the irredentist Diaoyu issue. O n October 25, the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman, Li Jinhua, issued another statement: We have always held that China and Japan should place their overall interests above everything else and handle the Diaoyu Islands issues prudently, thus preventing it from affecting bilateral relations.... If the Japanese side fails to do that, it undoubtedly will bring an unfavorable effect on the relations between the two countries.... In that case, China will take necessary measures in line with the developments of the situation.... The Diaoyu Islands have always been part of the Chinese territory and China has indisputable sovereignty over them.... [It is] something only too natural and fully understandable that the Chinese compatriots in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao and overseas have expressed concern over [the Diaoyu issue].111 Clearly the Chinese government gave the Japanese government a strong warning by using the words "necessary measures." At the same time, it showed the passion of the Chinese living overseas by saying "natural a n d fully understandable." O n October 27, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Qi Huaiyuan called Hashimoto Hiroshi, Japanese Ambassador to Beijing, and m a d e a stern representation to J a p a n by proposing the j o i n t development of the Diaoyu Islands, on the con-

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dition that the joint attempt would in no way affect its stand on the territorial issue.112 Nonetheless, Japan took a cautious stance toward a Chinese proposal that China and Japan jointly develop the Diaoyu Islands simply because the former Soviet Union has long been calling on Japan to agree to a joint development scheme for the "Four Northern Islands" dispute. Japan has rejected these proposals. 113 T H E 1 9 9 2 C H I N E S E TERRITORIAL W A T E R L A W

On the one hand, the Japanese government officially took great caution regarding the Chinese proposal to jointly develop the Diaoyu Islands. On the other hand, the Japanese business world, specifically the petroleum industry, such as the state-run Japan National Oil Corporation (JNOC), 114 expressed interest in jointly developing oil on the Diaoyu Islands. This was a result of the political situation in the Middle East, which became unpredictable after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq at the beginning of the 1990s. Although the Chinese officially tried to play down the Diaoyu dispute by saying, "China and Japan have already reached an understanding that this issue should be set aside for the time being, and that both sides will not do anything that will sharpen the situation," 115 in reality, in the Chinese mind, the Diaoyu dispute has never been settled, and the area surrounding these islets has been unstable. 116 When the 24th meeting of the Standing Committee of the NPC, the top Chinese legislative body, adopted the Territorial Water Law on February 25, 1992, the issue of the Diaoyu Islands flared u p again. In this law, China claims sovereignty over the water, seabed, and airspace stretching 12 nautical miles from its coast. The new law particularly reiterates China's claim of sovereignty over the disputed Diaoyu Islands, as well as the Xisha and Nansha Archipelagoes, and gives the Chinese military the right to remove by force any incursion on the islands and surrounding territorial seas.117 In response to this bill, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kato Koichi stressed that Beijing's territorial claim over the Diaoyu Islands was not acceptable, and there was no doubt that the Senkaku Islands historically and legally belonged to Japan. 118 In addition, Saito Masaki, the Japanese consul to Beijing, lodged a protest with the Chinese government regarding the Territorial Water Law.119 Furthermore, Vice Foreign Minister Owada Hisashi summoned the Chinese ambassador Yang Zhenya to his office in Tokyo to demand that some corrective

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action be taken and noted that these islands "historically, legally, and effectively [are] under Japan's control." 120 Moreover, three days after China passed the Territorial Water Law, Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa rejected the Chinese law by saying, "Senkaku is Japan's sovereign territory. Japan cannot accept the Chinese law."121 But the Chinese did not reconsider the Territorial Water Law despite the Japanese protests. Instead, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Wu Jianmin responded by saying, "A great [number] of historical facts have proven the Diaoyu Islands belong to China. . . . The representation made by the Japanese side [is] unnecessary." 122 To a certain extent, the Territorial Water Law damaged Sino-Japanese relations during the whole year of 1992. Nevertheless, many major events in both countries, such as Jiang Zemin's coming to Japan in April and the visit of Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko to China in October, were smoothly carried out without any incidents. Regarding the Diaoyu issue, Jiang Zemin commented during his interview in Tokyo, The Diaoyu Islands have been a part of Chinese territory since ancient times. This is an historical fact. The "Law on Territorial Waters and Their Adjoining Areas" that was promulgated recendy reiterates our long-held position. We have always called for solving territorial disputes through holding negotiations. Comrade Deng Xiaoping thoroughly explained the Chinese government's position and stand on the Diaoyu Islands' issue. This position and stand have not changed. 123

Jiang reaffirmed to Japan that the irredentist Diaoyu issue would continue to be shelved according to Deng's promise in 1978 despite the adoption of the Territorial Water Law. Interestingly, compared with the lighthouse incident in 1990, Sino-Japanese relations did not deteriorate over the controversy of the Territorial Water Law in 1992. One of many reasons for the success of major events between the two countries is that the complex international and domestic politics forced both countries to work together without further discussion of this Territorial Water Law.124 O n the other hand, Japan also has its own problems. The Japanese Diet had been trying to pass a bill since 1990 permitting the SDF to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKO) abroad. In order to avoid condemnation from Asian countries, Japan needed China to support this bill. The Japanese government reaffirmed that this PKO bill did not reflect the revival of Japa-

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nese militarism. The Japanese government also wanted an assurance that no embarrassments such as student demonstrations would occur during the Japanese emperor's visit to China during the twentieth anniversary of Sino-Japanese normalization. 125 Notwithstanding China's broken promise in reaffirming the Diaoyu Islands into the law, the Japanese media was not encouraged to go to town on the irredentist issue of the Diaoyu Islands. Nor did the Japanese government try to provoke the controversy of the Territorial Water Law into the irredentist movement in public. Importantly, China also shared a relatively closer relationship with Japan than the West, particularly the United States, and was satisfied by the actions of the Japanese government. For instance, since the 1989 student movement, Japan was the first nation to lift economic sanctions among industrial countries against China, and Tokyo has denied asylum to many political refugees from the Tian'anmen Square Incident. Japan also took a softer line on human rights in China than the other industrialized nations, especially the United States.126 Furthermore, when President George Bush announced the sale of 150 F-16s to Taiwan during his presidential campaign in September 1992, China could hardly view the United States as a "friend." Rather, the United States was viewed by China as a seeker of unjustifiable hegemonism in the Asian-Pacific Region. 127 As a result, the action of the United States toward Taiwan was another element that helps keep Sino-Japanese relations close in spite of the 1992 Territorial Water Law.128 C H I N A ' S B L U E SEA FLEET A N D T H E D I A O Y U I S L A N D S

"There lies a sleeping giant," said Napoleon about China. "Let her sleep. For when she wakes, she will shake the world." 129 Today, the sleeping giant seems to have awakened. As the Chinese adopted the Territorial Water Law in 1992, everyone took the Chinese action seriously. "If Italy passed a law claiming the whole of the Mediterranean, or if Britain had asserted dominance over the North Sea before oil was discovered, . . . they would have been laughed or scorned out of court. . . . But, in China's case, no one laughs or scorns." 130 In today's world politics, every country carefully watches, listens, and analyzes the activities of the Middle Kingdom, as China is no longer the sleeping giant of the late nineteenth century. "China," states Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's senior minister, "is a fierce animal that became

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friendly, but could be easily agitated and become fierce again." 131 After the 150-year humiliation of losing huge chunks of territory at the hands of the Western imperialists, the Chinese voice is finally being heard and is able to penetrate into world politics. China might not dominate the world at this moment, but it certainly is currently able to influence and shake world politics. Traditionally, territorial control by boundary delineation and administrative jurisdiction was an ancient tool of the Confucian bureaucracy both within China and between China and foreign states. Yet the concept of state territoriality (i.e., rule over spaces defined by geometric grids) was not part of the traditional Confucian-literati cognitive map. 132 Based on the investiture-tributary strategy in the Confucian world order, the Chinese demanded loyalty to the person of the Chinese emperor, his representatives, and most of all to the hierarchical system of relationships patterned on the family. This strategy of international relations or international diplomacy symbolized the imperial-bureaucratic establishment. In other words, the Chinese emperors and their officials ruled men, not space, and loyalty was to individuals, to the family, and to the system—not to the area of state. The area of rule was defined by evidence of human residence and use. Areas or places lacking in human use and organization were regarded as being on the margin, in the frontier and wilderness, or simply off the map as zones beyond civilization.133 Given these facts, the traditional Chinese geopolitical framework primarily focused on the rich and civilized territorial space along the Yellow River, rather than on uninhabited places or empty spaces. Therefore, to build the Great Wall against the northern threats was the fundamental defense strategy for centuries. The traditional Chinese political doctrines did not encompass the idea of oceanic sovereignty or the extension of legitimate state authority over the territorial water of the sea.134 Even during the wokou aggression of Ming times, the Chinese oceanic strategy was primarily focused on smuggling and pirate campaigns along the coastal provinces, not on oceanic space. Not until attacks from the Western imperialists using naval power in 1840 did the Chinese recognize the importance of naval development and the essence of ocean space or ocean frontier. Since that time, however, the Chinese military strategy and delimitation of marine space have changed. According to a Chinese government official, "There are three reasons to respect China's growing

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military power: its nuclear capability, stepped-up production of missiles, and most of all its expansion of naval might." 135 Specifically, the modern Chinese naval power advocates seemed to dominate the whole military strategy by naming naval promoter Liu Huaqing 136 as a member of Central Military Commission in 1992. As Hatakeyama Shigeru, director-general of the Agency's Defense Policy Bureau in Japan, points out, "China is decreasing the military strength of its land forces but at the same time it is equipping its navy with the latest technology." 137 There are several reasons for the accelerated expansion of China's naval development in the 1990s. First of all, Chinese fundamental military strategy has changed. During Mao's era, the "People's War"138 based on continental tactics was the primary Chinese defense strategy because the "northern threat" of the Soviet Union was always the enemy. During Deng's era, however, Mao's military strategy changed because there was less of a threat from the north, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Today, the "Marine Defense System" based on maritime tactics has become the central strategy of the Chinese military.139 Second, there is little doubt that the perception of external naval threats (like the Western and Japanese naval powers at the end of the 1800s) has played a major role in the process of developing the Chinese navy. As the Chinese economy has continued to rapidly grow since 1978, Beijing realizes that it has some big-time interests that need maritime protection. In particular, the most current Chinese territorial disputes, such as the Diaoyu, Xisha, and Nansha Islands, involve marine space claims. "China takes issues of territory, sovereignty, and stable borders seriously. China doesn't budge an inch and will never budge an inch." 140 These marine space disputes have forced Beijing to pay attention to naval development. The development of China's navy was influenced by the need for a strong naval force to protect its economic interests at sea, including oil fields in the Diaoyu and Nansha Islands, 141 because the maritime economic interests have become increasingly important for the future of China's economy and modernization. Third, besides the marine space disputes in the China seas, Taiwan has been the most sensitive issue to the Chinese. 142 As a Chinese lawyer in Beijing points out, "Taiwan was inherited from previous generations of Chinese. . . . No leader would dare let Taiwan go."143 In other words, it is absolutely intolerable for mainland China to

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allow Taiwan to be "independent." As the political system in Taiwan has b e e n democratized since the 1990s, a n u m b e r of Taiwanese have increasingly advocated an "independent" nation. Unless the Taiwan issue is resolved in a peaceful way, the reincorporating of Taiwan by military force is inevitable if Taiwan declares to be "independent." As long as the Taiwan issue exists, the involvement of the United States is unavoidable. From the Chinese perspective, the United States increasingly interferes with Chinese internal affairs, such as h u m a n rights, Tibet, and, in particular, the Taiwan issue 144 by selling military weapons to Taiwan (such as F-16s by George Bush) a n d making irresponsible statements advocating the recognition of Taiwan (by Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich). 145 It is inevitable to view, at least f r o m Beijing's perspective, that the United States might d e f e n d Taiwan if China tries to resolve Taiwan's issue by using military muscle. In China's view, naval power is a necessity to unify Taiwan and to fight the hegemony of the United States, if that country decides to intervene in a war between Taiwan a n d Mainland China. As a Chinese central government d o c u m e n t warns, "One cold war has ended—two m o r e cold wars have begun." 1 4 6 Fourth, the "Persian Gulf War's Effect" also encouraged the Chinese military leaders to improve their old military technologies. 147 During the Persian Gulf War, the impressive U.S. naval power, including jets f r o m aircraft carriers a n d Tomahawk Cruise Missiles, provided the picture of m o d e r n warfare; Beijing realized that warfare technologies will determine f u t u r e conflicts. Either to protect the Chinese territories or to fight against superpower hegemony requires China to develop a m o d e r n naval fleet. W h e n the 1990s approached, the new or m o d e r n maritime advocates began to comm a n d the Chinese military strategy. In particular, when Admiral Zhang Lianzhong was the Chinese naval c o m m a n d e r in the 1990s, he h a d fundamentally emphasized to his soldiers the naval doctrine in Mahanist terms—essentially, a defense against attack f r o m the sea. Such a defense would have to be conducted farther a n d farther f r o m China's coast because of the increasing range of enemy firepower.148 T h e primary mission of the Chinese navy is territorial rather than maritime and coastal rather than oceanic. Today, these twin Mahanian concepts of sea control a n d power projection, which are enduring features of Western maritime philosophy, are centrally alien to Chinese naval thinking. 149 T h e current Chinese navy consists of three fleets: Beihai Jiandui

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[the North Sea Fleet], headquartered at Qingdao in S h a n d o n g Province, covering the area f r o m the Yalu River at the Sino-North Korean b o r d e r to the south of Lianyungan; Donghaijiandui [the East Sea Fleet], headquartered at Ningbo in Jiansu Province, covering f r o m south of Lianyungan to Dongshan; Nanhai Jiandui [the South Sea Fleet], headquartered at Zhanjiang of G u a n g d o n g Province, covering f r o m Dongshan to the Vietnamese border, including Hainan, Xisha, a n d Nansha Islands. 150 A m o n g the three fleets, the North Sea Fleet has the best e q u i p m e n t and weapons, including nuclear submarines. During the Cold War, there were three major geopolitical tasks undertaken by these fleets: the North Sea Fleet was to stop a potential southern invasion by the "Soviet Pacific Fleet," the East Sea Fleet was to liberate Taiwan, a n d the South Sea Fleet was to support a n d train the other two fleets. Nevertheless, in this era of the post-Cold War, the geopolitical responsibilities of these fleets have changed; that is, J a p a n has been added into the geopolitical strategy. T h e North Sea Fleet cooperates with the East Sea Fleet to stop the Japanese navy f r o m entering the south. In addition, the East Sea Fleet collaborates with the South Sea Fleet to extend their naval power to the South China Sea and eventually to the Indian Ocean. 151 Clearly, the territorial disputes with J a p a n (i.e., the Diaoyu Islands) and countries of Southeast Asia (i.e., the Nansha Archipelago) are considered the primary threats by the Chinese maritime advocates. Given these facts, Beijing is planning to build a Chinese "Blue Sea Fleet," or "China's Great Wall at Sea."152 China is the only country in Asia with a triad of sea-, air-, and land-based nuclear weapons. Since the 1990s, two major developments have occurred in the Chinese navy: o n e has been to upgrade the submarine fleet, and the other has been to create China's first carrier-based battle group. 1 5 3 T h e Chinese navy developed the Jiangwei class of frigates, the J i a n g h u II frigates, J i a n g h u III frigates, the L u h u class of destroyers, a n d upgraded two types of the older Luda II a n d Luda III destroyers. Based on Western technologies, the new ships have surface-to-surface missiles and electronic warfare abilities that let China patrol the ocean farther out than just along the coast. These naval developments indicate that China is considering the eventual addition of aircraft carriers.154 In fact, China has decided to acquire an aircraft carrier by building its own because the lowest price for buying a carrier to field a carrier batde group would be between $4 billion a n d $6 billion. 155

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149

These developments have given the Chinese navy the potential to challenge rivals in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. According to military experts, at the present time the Chinese navy has reached the level of Western naval development at the beginning 1980s.156 As Sun Zi, the father of Chinese geopolitics, taught, "When capable, feign incapacity."157 Today, the Chinese army is more combatcapable, multilayered, and integrated than ever before. Its conventional forces are more streamlined, lethal, mobile, versatile, better coordinated, and have a greater operational reach. The Chinese army has gained some advanced weapons and technologies from overseas. Beijing signed a contract to acquire at least four Kilo-class submarines from Russia by November 1994.158 Beijing has already acquired Mig-31 interceptors, Su-27 fighters (equivalent to F-15) and S300V (SA-12a) air-defense systems from Moscow,159 as well as air-to-air missiles and air refueling technology from Israel.160 The most significant purchase was the Su-27 fighters from Russia, whose combat radius is 1,500 kilometers, and which can easily reach the Nansha Archipelago without air refueling. 161 Overall, Chinese military modernization has primarily emphasized increasing unit mobility and training in combined arms operations; improving logistics, combat support, and command and control; introducing imported weapons systems, and developing surface ships and submarines, and a multirole fighter aircraft. 162 In the final analysis, this Blue Sea Fleet will be able eventually to cover all of the Yellow, East China, and South China Seas and all disputed territories, including the Diaoyu Islands. According to Hiramatsu Shigeo, the Chinese military expert at Kyorin University in Japan, China intends to convert the China seas into the "All China Sea," seeking to become the marine superpower in the Asian region, filling the vacuum left at the end of the Cold War.163 This does mean, however, that the Chinese naval weapons do not have technological problems. For example, The major air surveillance radar of the Luda class destroyers continues to be the P-band 'Bean/Pea Sticks' with its primitive multiple-dipole antenna. Even the very latest frigates of the Jiangwei class have an air surveillance antenna derived from the 'Knife Rest' radar fitted in Soviet post-war cruisers... . Chinese attempts to develop an effective naval surface-to-air (SAM) system have been fraught with difficulties. The SD-1 missile, derived from the land-based HQ-61, took some 20 years to develop, and installation has been limited to two frigates of the

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Jiangdong class. The missile only reached operational capability 10 years after the completion of the first ship, and its limited range and capabilities make it inferior in performance to comparable Western short-range systems.164 By comparing Japan's existing defense forces, the Chinese military power currently cannot match the Japanese. Japan has the most hightech weapons in the world, such as the Aegis-class destroyer, F-15 fighter jets, the P3C antisubmarine detection technology, and Patriot Antimissile Weapons Systems.165 Jointly developed with the United States at present is the FSX (Fighter Support Experimental) fighter plane, a major Japanese high-tech weaponry development project, which "will be 30 years more advanced than any other Western fighter jet." 166 Among the issues of security in Asia, the China seas have been highlighted as some of the most disputed waters in the world. The China seas, ergo, have become potential flash points. In the case of the Sinojapanese territorial dispute, neither Japan nor China seems to concede the ownership of the Diaoyu Islands. In fact, there have been about fifty incidents since early 1991 in which an unidentified vessel has fired shots at a Japanese fishing boat near the Diaoyu Islands. 167 As a Japanese diplomat states: "We are trying to persuade China to help with some of the problems in the region and in the process bring about greater stability. We believe this regime or its close cousin, will be around for some time." 168 Yet neither country seems to trust the other. On the one hand, Beijing asserts that the Japanese army, symbolizing "Japan militarism," is ready to engage in operations that extend beyond their territorial defense. 169 O n the other hand, Tokyo perceives the Chinese Blue Sea Fleet that has extended China's ambition beyond the South China Sea170 as the "China Threat." As David M. Lampton points out, "There may be occasional warmth in Beijing-Tókyó ties, when it serves the purposes of both nations; there will not be intimacy in any foreseeable future." 171 Given the geographical proximity between two countries, the way China views Japan is just as important as the way Japan views China. It is impossible politically, economically, and culturally to separate the two countries and to isolate one from the other. Increased confrontations between Japan and China will only provide disaster for their own people and for all people of other countries in the region as well.172

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151

In sum, if there is a flash point to ignite a third Sino-Japanese War, it will be the ownership of the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. As long as the issue of the Diaoyu Islands exists, the postponement of the settlement of the Diaoyu Islands is not a bad idea for the Chinese because time favors China's side. China will be militarily in a better position in the next millennium (i.e., the twenty-first century). While the Diaoyu dispute is shelved, the Chinese can concentrate on modernizing their nation. If the current economic trends continue, China in the twenty-first century will unquestionably be one of the most powerful nations in the world.173 In addition, "Greater China" 174 is another nightmare for the Japanese.

Conclusion Historical Justification and Chinese Hegemony

The Diaoyu issue involves not only political and economic factors, but also many cultural and historical sentiments between the Japanese and Chinese peoples. Many Chinese especially still have strong memories ofJapanese imperialism during the wars of 1894-1895 and 1937, and do not want to repeat a history of granting concessions to the Japanese. As a result, the territorial dispute of the Diaoyu Islands seems unlikely to be resolved in the near future. The debate over the historical development of the Diaoyu Islands has also contributed an alternative understanding to the problem of territorial disputes. History has been the primary reference for this territorial dispute, providing answers to why and how the Diaoyu Islands dispute occurred. Regardless of potential resolution of the Diaoyu Islands case based on either principles of international law or political settlement, the historical development of the Diaoyu Islands will remain the primary source of evidence for debate at any negotiation table.

The Traditional Chinese Concept of Marine Space versus Modern Territorial Claims In imperial China, the Chinese created their self-image of the world order based on their own values and beliefs according to the Confucian moral order. Under this image of Pax Sinica, the Chinese also had their own concept and meaning of "sovereignty." Importantly, the term sovereignty can be used in different ways and for different purposes1 by different people when they control sovereign territories. For instance, when the Europeans began to conquer North America during the 1600s, they did not have a unified definition of areas or

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"territory."2 Similarly, the perspective of sovereignty held by the Chinese from the 1500s to the 1800s was quite different from the Western definition of sovereignty in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries. China, based on its geographical, historical, political, and cultural settings, persisted in acting out its self-image in international diplomacy or foreign relations and gradually developed a unique sense of its "place" under heaven. That is, Chinese international diplomacy through the investiture-tributary system during the Ming and Qing dynasties demonstrates that the Chinese practiced their own type of sovereignty, which did not fit into the imperialist model utilized by Western nations. As a suzerain nation of Pax Sinica, the Chinese primarily practiced their foreign relations through the process of cefeng missions dispatched to tributary nations by emperors. The Middle Kingdom considered itself unequaled in the entire world and viewed itself as standing at the head of a family of nations comprised of the tributary nations surrounding its borders. 3 The significance of the dispatched cefeng missions is that the Chinese had promoted their own agenda (i.e., Confucian values) to people of tributary nations. The investiture-tributary system proved to be politically and culturally useful as it served as a first step in bringing the barbarians into the edifying influence of Chinese civilization.4 For centuries, the tributary nations, including the Liuqiu Kingdom, Korea, and even Japan, accepted Confucian teachings; they followed the leadership of the suzerain nation, China. As long as the tributary nations accepted the superiority of the suzerain nation and paid tribute to the Middle Kingdom, the Chinese Empire never interfered with the internal affairs of the tributary nations. Unlike the Japanese, who eventually annexed the Liuqiu Kingdom and occupied Korea, the Chinese did not colonize their own tributary states.5 For instance, during the more than five-hundred-year history of SinoLiuqiu relations, the Chinese emperor did not influence the choosing of the Liuqiuan king. Just as diverse definitions of sovereignty exist, the meaning of territory can be defined in various ways. As David Knight points out, in a sense "territory is not; it becomes, for territory itself is passive, and it is human beliefs and actions that give territory meaning." 6 Or, following the argument of Alexander B. Murphy, "territory must be seen in terms of the dynamic relationship existing between an area and the social processes and ideologies that give it meaning." 7 In

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other words, human beliefs and actions will determine the definition of territory. Moreover, territory is not only a physical and measurable entity, but also something in the mind, because people impute meaning to and gain meaning from territory.8 The landscape and the shape of lands (or islands) often reflect the symbolizing possession of territory because symbolic landscapes share a "set of ideas and memories and feelings which bind a people." 9 That is, landscapes are often memorized or remembered by people to identify their own territories. Did the Chinese authorities during the imperial era have any idea of fixed national boundaries serving as political-legal dividers between two sovereign territories (i.e., China and the Liuqiu Kingdom)? The answer is yes. During the Ming and the Qing dynasties, many Chinese and Liuqiuan officials had used the shape of the landscape in the East China Sea (i.e., the shape of the continental shelf) to distinguish the international boundaries between the Liuqiu Kingdom and China. Based on the geographical and geological shape of the continental shelf in the East China Sea, the Chinese demarcated the "natural" boundary that functioned as an international boundary between China and the Liuqiu Kingdom. This natural boundary was distinguished (or demarcated) by the 2,000-meter trench, which was recognized and remembered by both the Chinese and the Liuqiuan officials since the sixteenth century. As Stephen B. J o n e s pointed out, Boundary description cannot be reduced to a set of rules. It is an earth science rather than a branch of law or grammar. A boundary is not a page in a treaty or a line on a map. Foremost in the mind of the describer must be an awareness of the boundary as a line on the ground —ultimately, in many cases, a structure on the ground, as material and visible as a road or wall.10

Basing the natural boundary in the sea, the traditional Chinese concept of marine boundaries was formed. As history illustrates, it is difficult to pinpoint essential features of frontier and boundary that are universally valid. 11 Thus, boundaries can be defined in different ways, during different times, and at different places. Specifically, officials from both China and the Liuqiu Kingdom developed their own terminology: haigou [oceanic trench] or heishuigou [black-water trench] or guoshui [passing through the black water], or when they used the term in reference to the event haishenji or guogouji [trench-crossing ritual], a festival in which mariners had to dedicate living sheep and pigs to the "sea god." Thus, based on the geographical and geolog-

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ical shape of the continental shelf in the East China Sea, the traditional Chinese demarcation of marine space was created. This demonstrates that the Chinese clearly had their own definition and own demarcation of territorial space, especially marine space, although it might n o t reflect the exact m e a n i n g of Western "territory" and "sovereignty" in the twentieth century. But the traditional Chinese concepts of territory and sovereignty were prevalent during the Ming a n d Qing periods u n d e r Pax Sinica a n d were recognized by many tributary nations, including the Liuqiu Kingdom. Even today, the Chinese military has defined sovereignty in its own terms, which is unlike the American a n d Japanese definitions. 12 Unlike the Japanese, the Chinese did n o t look back on a tradition of borrowing f r o m abroad because the Chinese empire was vast a n d its institutions were slow to change. It took the Chinese leaders decades, after the first defeat by the British in 1840, to acknowledge the necessity of studying the West. 13 Eventually, the treaty system replaced the tributary system after the Chinese were defeated in the O p i u m War. As a result of contact with the West, the Chinese were forced to recognize the existence of an alternative way of colonization or occupation that was m o r e powerful than the Sinitic world order. By then, the Chinese acknowledged the anachronism of their international diplomacy. After a 150-year humiliation by the West, o n e may expect that foreign relations of the "new" China (or PRC) would be totally different. Yet the Chinese behavior in the international community can still be viewed as a reflection of their image of self and of the world, 14 sharing some elements of the Sinitic world o r d e r during the imperial China era. T h e Chinese perspective of international politics has n o t changed much, owing in part to their immutable culture. As I m m a n u e l Wallerstein points out, "every individual belongs judicially to one unit only, and each such unit is called u p o n to make a series of cultural decisions, most of t h e m legally binding." 1 5 Just like the self-promotion of Confucian philosophy to tributary nations during the Chinese imperial era, China also advocated its own agenda as the embodiment of heroic anti-imperialism in the international arena u n d e r Mao's era. In 1958, China issued the Declaration on the Territorial Sea by challenging the U.S. military, which was committed to helping Taiwan. After breaking off Sino-Soviet relations, the Soviet Union became a n o t h e r enemy added to China's list of imperialists,

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besides the United States. Mao constantly insisted that the Chinese Revolutionary Civil War was unfinished and that only foreign interference had kept China from unifying Chinese territories, including Taiwan Province. 16 During Deng's era, China has played the vanguard position in the Third World, attacking the imperialism and hegemonism of the superpowers in the international arena, including the United Nations, advocating self-determination of territorial seas by supporting the Latin American 200-mile exclusive economic zone. 17 In the final analysis, the Chinese have constantly advocated their own agenda, whether during the sixteenth or the twentieth centuries. Confucian doctrine, which was accepted by most countries in Asia, was fundamental to Chinese foreign policy (i.e., the tributary-investiture system) during Pax Sinica. Anti-imperialism and antihegemony, which were recognized by many developing countries, have become the essential principles of Chinese diplomacy (i.e., the FPPC) in the twentieth century. As Tu Wei-ming points out, the idea of being Chinese, geopolitically and culturally defined, "is reinforced by a powerful historical consciousness informed by one of the most voluminous veritable documentary records in human history. Indeed, the chronological annals have flowed almost uninterruptedly since 814 B.C." 1 8 Sinocentrism, ergo, has never totally disappeared in Chinese international relations, whether during the imperial era or today. Under Pax Sinica, each country that wishes to have foreign relations with China had to visit the Middle Kingdom, kowtowing in front of the Chinese emperors. Today, nationalism continues to influence China's foreign policy or international diplomacy with the Chinese "Middle Kingdom" complex. Most countries who hope to have normalized relations with China publicly and physically do not kowtow in front of the Chinese leaders. In reality, Sinocentrism has played a major role in Sino-foreign relations. Instead, the ceremony of the initial visit in order to establish normalization between China and foreign countries is usually held in Beijing, not vice versa. In all cases, foreign leaders, including Japanese prime minister Tanaka, American president Nixon, and Russian president Gorbachev, all made the first move by visiting Beijing. As of this writing, Beijing expresses the concern that America might be seeking to impose its values and objectives on the rest of the world through this "New World Order." 19 Will Sino-U.S. relations affect the outcome of the Diaoyu Islands in the future? At this

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moment, it is difficult to predict. But Taiwan, which is another party to claim sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, will certainly affect SinoU.S. relations. Since the private visit to the United States by Lee Tenghui in 1995, the relationship between China and the United States has not been getting better. In particular, when the Chinese army performed missile tests and military exercises near Taiwan in March 1996 to influence the Taiwanese presidential election, two aircraft carriers dispatched by the United States to the Taiwan Strait made Sino-U.S. relations worse than before. 20 Because of the transitional period of both Chinese leadership and economic structure, the Taiwan issue has become increasingly important for the current Chinese leaders. 21 In the end, as Kenneth Lieberthal points out, "the United States must treat with respect whatever leaders the Chinese system produces and make domestic Chinese issues less of an object of American bilateral diplomatic priorities." 22

Is History a Guide? History is the study of man and society developing through time in various places that present different opportunities, and geography is the study of places as they have been and are being transformed by the hand of man. 23 "Geography and history are rooted in the basic stuff of human existence. As fields of study they are analogous, complementary, and interdependent." 2 4 "The historical mind does not give free reign to personal whim, and it denies most emphatically that one opinion is worth as much as another. An interpretation becomes plausible only when it is fit to known fact, and scholars will dismiss ideas that do not have such grounding." 25 In the case of SinoJapanese territorial dispute, historical facts of the Diaoyu Islands, whether favoring pro-China irredentist or pro-Japan irredentist arguments, become irresistible trends regarding territorial space between China and Japan. "History," E. A. Freeman wrote in 1886, "is past politics, and politics is present history."26 Today's politics, id est, are tomorrow's history. Superficially, the Diaoyu Islands dispute seems to be only a political dispute; however, this dispute in reality is rooted in the deep history of Sino-Japanese relations and their irrefutable geographical closeness, as well as their complicated cultural interchange. Therefore, the resolution of the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands will likely come from the working out of the historical, geographical,

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and cultural contexts of the larger contest for power in the AsianPacific region. As J o h n King Fairbank pointed out, China's modernization might have rivaled Japan's if the Qianlong emperor in 1793 had accepted the request of King George III via Lord Macartney to join the trading world of nation-states. 27 Because of the slow Chinese response, many Chinese territories were lost by signing "unequal" treaties. Once a master of civilization, China suddenly became a chaotic society during the second half of the nineteenth century, which eventually led the Chinese to forget the existence of the Diaoyu Islands. Tragically, the Chinese people of the twentieth century virtually forgot over half a millennium of the history of the Diaoyu Islands, including the fact that their ancestors discovered them, used them as navigation aids, defended them, and even dedicated their lives in batdes with wokou in Ming times. This provided a golden opportunity for the Japanese to claim sovereignty of these islands. The past is necessarily reappraised in the framework of present thinking, conditioned by today's needs and problems, and is interpreted in the light of contemporary experience; 28 the present is continually reshaping the past as new ideas, approaches, and information allow people to produce an improved retrieval of previous human conditions. 29 As Donald W. Meinig argues, "We cannot 'undo' history, but we can u n d o common understandings of history and put in their place interpretations that offer a better view of what actually happened and how we might best comprehend it."30 The representatives of the ROC certainly should learn a historical lesson; that is, the international treaty must contain all their own territories, including small isles such as the Diaoyu Islands, before they sign the document. While condemning hegemony, Beijing, advocating irredentism, might not make any concession regarding sovereignty of any territorial disputes. Even though the Chinese leaders have proposed a temporary solution to the territorial disputes involving the joint economic development of the islands with Japan, the fundamental principle of sovereignty rights in the disputed Diaoyu Islands will not likely be given up by the Chinese side. As the British geographer Alan Jenkins points out, the Chinese irredentism of the restoration of their territories will be the primary task in their international diplomacy. 31 Two factors have motivated the Chinese not to give u p the sovereignty rights of these disputed territories. O n e is that the Chinese cannot

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allow another humiliation over the loss of territory, such as those China experienced during the last decades of the nineteenth century. In particular, the Chinese will not make any compromise with a former colonizer, especially the Japanese. The territorial claims reflect Chinese strength, resolve, self-confidence, and dignity. The second factor is that most Chinese territorial disputes involve marine space at sea, namely the East China Sea and the South China Sea. As a last frontier on the earth, seas increasingly have become important for Chinese economic development and the modernization of their nation. As Jiang Zemin, the core-leader in the post-Deng era, declared on May 14, 1993, "We are not afraid o f . . . confrontation and challenge [with hegemonists]. For the motherland's sovereignty, independence and dignity, we are ready to pay a price." 32 As Hans J. Morgenthau predicted thirty years ago, "China is the most powerful nation on the mainland of Asia and potentially the most powerful nation in the world." 33 Thirty years later, today, history also is trying to suggest something. That is, the great number of historical facts regarding the Diaoyu Islands in this study indicate that the power of history cannot simply be ignored. This research certainly does not claim omniscience in prognosticating all territorial disputes, but it does provide material of value in resolving such problems between Japan and China. The resolution of the Diaoyu Islands dispute either according to international law or diplomatic negotiation between Japan and China will depend on the historical evidence. While both Japan and China are able to document historical claims based on continued use, fishing grounds, treaty rights, and prior occupation of the territory, there are no concrete documents (e.g., treaties) to determine ownership of these disputed islands. Even if the territorial sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands were settled, there would still be difficulty in delimiting the continental shelf boundary line. It is impossible to decide sovereign rights over the irredentist Diaoyu issue based solely upon existing international law. Given these facts, the Diaoyu dispute might be resolved only in the following scenarios. 1. Joint Development Scenario: Both China (including Taiwan) and Japan may join together to develop the Diaoyu Islands while the sovereign right of the Diaoyu Islands is shelved. This is the most likely solution to the Diaoyu Islands case because China has made a proposal to joindy develop these islands. Once the Japanese agree with

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China, the development of the Diaoyu Islands can get underway. As long as natural resources in the Diaoyu Islands can benefit both countries, the joint development scenario might be the best way to resolve the irredentist Diaoyu dispute. In particular, as the sea is the last frontier on the earth, natural resources in the ocean have increasingly become important for all countries.34 As the fin de siècle of the twentieth century approaches, both Japan, which is competing with postindustrial nations of the West, and China, which is continuing to modernize its nation, require a great amount of natural resources (i.e., oil and natural gas) to sustain their competition. It is not difficult to imagine that both countries will agree to develop the Diaoyu Islands together. 2. Japanese Unilateral Development Scenario: Unlike the first scenario, this is the most unlikely way to resolve the Diaoyu Islands issue. As the Diaoyu Islands are currendy in Japan's possession, with all the advantages of actual occupation,35 Japan might unilaterally begin to develop their natural resources. Yet a condition must be attached: the Chinese empire (including Taiwan) must begin to break down by civil war or ethnic unrest (like the former Yugoslavia). Once China becomes chaotic without a legitimate government body, Japan can successfully achieve this unilateral development scenario. The likelihood of this scenario certainly is very low, however. 3. The Third Sino-Japanese War Scenario: As long as the Diaoyu Islands case is shelved to be setded by posterity, it is not a bad situation for the Chinese side. While modernizing its country by opening its doors to foreign investors and pushing economic reform, China eventually will be a superpower in the world. As Lee Kuan Yew, former prime minister of Singapore, notes: For millennia, China had controlled the whole Asian region. It is uncertain whether or not this position will continue in the long-run. As long as the Chinese Empire does not break up, China will economically and militarily be a sole major superpower in the world. . . . China has extraordinary potential power to be a superpower in the world in the next hundred years because it has all the requirements of a superpower. It might delay China's progress by putting pressure on her, but it is inevitable that China will be the superpower in the world. 36

Clearly, time does not favor the Japanese side. Day by day, China will be stronger than ever before. "History is too complex to be fitted

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neatly into a set of categories;"37 therefore, violence might be one way to resolve the territorial dispute. If one day China determines to use force to resolve the Diaoyu issue, or Japan decides to take unilateral advantage to drill oil, the East China Sea will be colored by bloodshed because no one believes that either Japan or China will stand idly by in the face of such actions. It is certain to follow that a third Sino-Japanese War38 would take place in the East China Sea. Yet, unlike the past two wars, this war will be extremely complicated because China might have to fight with both Japan and the United States. Nobody believes that the United States is going to look on with folded arms and watch Japan be beaten by the Chinese. Rather, the United States might indirectly or directly involve itself in this war as the result of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the U.S. In fact, one of the largest U.S. military bases in the Asia region is located in the Okinawa Prefecture (the former Liuqiu Kingdom), which is relatively close to the Diaoyu Islands. On the other hand, it leaves no room for doubt that the Chinese will not back off, as their losing the Diaoyu Islands means a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Japanese imperialists. Once the United States joins the war against the Chinese, China might utilize nuclear weapons when the Chinese army is faced with the advanced technological weaponry from the West. There will be no international resolution because both China and the United States are permanent members of the U N Security Council. The international community would simply have to stand by and watch the messy war in the East China Sea. 4. The ICJ Decision Scenario: Any issue involving territorial sovereignty, in particular cases involving boundary disputes, can hardly be solved through compulsory third-party settlement (i.e., the ICJ). If the natural resources in the Diaoyu Islands were to dry out, both China and Japan may possibly agree to submit their jurisdiction to the ICJ. As long as natural resources exist in the disputed islands, there is almost no chance that the Diaoyu Islands case will be filed in the court. Even though Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen expressed that Beijing is willing to recognize the UNCLOS III,39 it does not mean that China will agree to submit its indisputable sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands to the ICJ. Japan might want to go to the ICJ, but China certainly will not agree. The zero-sum nature of the ICJ, where one party "wins" and the other "loses," causes much reluctance

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on the part of states to entrust their interests to international adjudication. As of this writing, in fact, no countries from East Asia have submitted any territorial disputes to the ICJ.40 It seems quite clear that the dispute between China and Japan over the Diaoyu Islands is much more serious and fundamental than many observers in the West realize. Among the above four scenarios, only the first one is a peaceful solution with the potential of providing an acceptable outcome. The most likely scenario of the Diaoyu dispute is setdement through diplomatic negotiations. Obviously, international law cannot simply resolve the Diaoyu dispute because many definitions and concepts of this modern law are still underdeveloped. Often, historical evidence becomes the primary evidence to determine such disputes in the ICJ. Indeed, historical justifications are the only arguments that can be used in support of the armed seizure of territorial space. International law, id est, cannot fully serve its justice. Unless both Japan and China seek a peaceful resolution regarding the issue of the Diaoyu Islands, a potentially explosive war only waits to be ignited.

Appendix

THE DIAOYU ISLANDS MAPS AND HISTORICAL EVIDENCE

Fig. 1. The Geographical Location of the Diaoyu Islands Fig. 2. Guangyutuby Luo Hongxian in 1555 Fig. 3. Defense Maps by Zheng Ruozeng in 1561 Fig. 4. Riben Yijian by Zheng Shungong in 1565 Fig. 5. Maps by Xiao Chongye in 1579 Fig. 6. Navigation Maps by Xia Ziyang in 1606 Fig. 7. The Compass Route to the Liuqiu Kingdom by Xu Baoguang in 1719 Fig. 8. The Atlas of the Liuqiu Kingdom: 36 Islands Fig. 9. The Compass Route to the Liuqiu Kingdom in 1757 Fig. 10. The Diaoyu Islands in Sangoku Tsuran Zusetsu Fig. 11. The Diaoyu Islands as Identified by Sir Edward Belcher Fig. 12. Huangchao Zhongwai Yitong Yu Tu rn 1862 Fig. 13. Map of the Liuqiu Kingdom by Yoshiwara Shigeyasu Fig. 14. Map of China by Hosea Ballou Morse in 1910 Fig. 15. The Diaoyu Islands under the U.S.-Japan Reversion Treaty in 1972 Fig. 16. Navigating Tools to the Liuqiu Kingdom: An Hourglass and a Compass Fig. 17. The Seal of the Liuqiu King Fig. 18. The Arrival of the Chinese Cefeng Ship in the Port of Naha Fig. 19. The Parade of the Cefeng Ceremony Fig. 20. The Decree of Dowager Empress Cixi in 1893 Fig. 21. Posthumous Paper of Sheng Enyi Regarding Cixi's Decree Fig. 22. Map of the Geographical Location of the Diaoyu Islands by Sheng Fig. 23. Japanese Imperial Edicts No. 13 and 14 in 1896

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