South Korea In the United Nations: Global Governance, Inter-Korean Relations and Peace Building 1786341905, 9781786341907

In 1991 South Korea, along with North Korea, was made an official member of the UN. Using international relations theory

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Table of contents :
About the Author
Acknowledgments
Contents
Acronyms
List of Tables
1 Introduction
2 The Two Koreas’ Struggle for UN Membership 1948–1991
3 The Impact of UN Membership on Inter-Korean Relations
4 Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations, Appointments of Koreans, and Budget
5 General Conclusions
Appendix I: Chronology
Appendix II: Questionnaire on the Outcome of UN Membership Since 1991
Bibliography
Index
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Southin theKorea United Nations

Global Governance, Inter-Korean Relations and Peace Building

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Southin theKorea United Nations

Global Governance, Inter-Korean Relations and Peace Building

Gabriel Jonsson Stockholm University, Sweden

World Scientific NEW JERSEY



LONDON

Q0056hc_9781786341907_tp.indd 2



SINGAPORE



BEIJING



SHANGHAI



HONG KONG



TAIPEI



CHENNAI



TOKYO

28/6/16 9:42 AM

Published by World Scientific Publishing Europe Ltd. 57 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London WC2H 9HE Head office: 5 Toh Tuck Link, Singapore 596224 USA office: 27 Warren Street, Suite 401-402, Hackensack, NJ 07601

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Jonsson, Gabriel, 1962– author. Title: South Korea in the United Nations : global governance, inter-Korean relations, and peace building / by Gabriel Jonsson (Stockholm University, Sweden). Description: New Jersey : World Scientific, 2016. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2016039025 | ISBN 9781786341907 (hc : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: United Nations--Korea (South) | United Nations--Membership. | Peace-building--Korea (South) | Korean reunification question (1945– ) | Korea (South)--Foreign relations. | Korea (South)--Foreign relations--Korea (North) | Korea (North)--Foreign relations--Korea (South) Classification: LCC JZ4997.5.K7 J66 2016 | DDC 341.23/5195--dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016039025 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Copyright © 2017 by World Scientific Publishing Europe Ltd. All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission from the Publisher.

For photocopying of material in this volume, please pay a copying fee through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. In this case permission to photocopy is not required from the publisher.

Desk Editors: Suraj Kumar/Mary Simpson Typeset by Stallion Press Email: [email protected] Printed in Singapore

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About the Author

Gabriel Jonsson is a Lecturer in Korean Studies at Stockholm University, Department of Oriental Languages, where he received his PhD in Korean Studies in 1996. He also has a BA in East Asian Studies with a major in Korean Language from Stockholm University in 1987. His research focuses on inter-Korean relations and South Korean politics. He published Peace-keeping in the Korean Peninsula: The Role of Commissions (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2009) and Towards Korean Reconciliation: Socio-Cultural Exchanges and Cooperation (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2006). His latest book is Consolidation of Democracy in South Korea? (Stockholm: Stockholms University, 2014). He is a regular visitor to South Korea.

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‘No Man is an Island’

No man is an island entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main. If a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less, as well as if a promontory were, as well as any manner of thy friends or of thine own were. Any man’s death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind; and therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee. John Donne, 1624

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Acknowledgments

Firstly, I wish to extend my gratitude to those who have been kind enough to offer their assistance during the preparation of this book. This stimulating project would never have reached completion without two research visits to South Korea in 2014 and 2015–2016. I therefore would like to acknowledge Åke Wibergs stiftelse [foundation] for providing research grants. In South Korea, I wish to thank the President of the Korea Institute for National Unification, Dr. Jinwook Choi, PhD, for allowing me to study at the institute. As a guest researcher, I benefited greatly from my affiliation with the institute in terms of collation of relevant material. Counsellor Mattias Chu at the Swedish Embassy in Seoul was helpful in arranging visits to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that were very useful. In addition, I wish to express my gratitude to anonymous readers of the manuscript. I also wish to thank my wife, Lee Hee-Sook, and my daughter, Rebecka Ye-mi, for their extraordinary patience toward me during the preparation of this book. Roberto Menkes has my thanks for his assistance concerning technical matters related to the project. Thank you one and all. Gabriel Jonsson Stockholm, September 29, 2016

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Contents

About the Author

v

Acknowledgmentsix Acronymsxv List of Tables Chapter 1

xxi

Introduction1 1.1 Purpose 1 1.2  Theoretical Framework 5 1.3 Method 17 1.4 Sources 19 1.5  Organization and Scope 19 1.6  Korean Names and Terminology 21

Chapter 2  The Two Koreas’ Struggle for UN Membership 1948–199123 2.1 Introduction 23 2.2  The Korean War and the UN 25 2.3 The North–South Korean Struggle for UN Membership  29 2.4 The Two Koreas Become UN Members in 1991 57 2.5 Conclusions 67 xi

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xii  South Korea in the United Nations

Chapter 3  The Impact of UN Membership on Inter-Korean Relations71 3.1 Introduction 71 3.2 Predictions on the Outcome of South Korea’s UN Membership 73 3.3  South Korea’s Participation in UN Agencies 78 3.4 South Korea Is Elected Member of the UN Security Council Twice 93 3.5 The Outcome of the UN Security Council’s Resolutions on North Korea until 2010 104 3.6 The Outcome of the UN Security Council’s Resolutions on North Korea after 2010 128 3.7 The North Korean Human Rights Issue in the UN 156 3.8 Conclusions 160 Chapter 4  Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations, Appointments of Koreans, and Budget Contributions163 4.1 Introduction 163 4.2  Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations 165 4.3 Appointments of Koreans within the UN System 183 4.4  Contributions to the UN Budget 188 4.5 Assessments on the Outcome of South Korea’s UN Membership 192 4.6 Conclusions 199 Chapter 5 General Conclusions 5.1 The Outcome of South Korea’s UN Membership 5.2 The Significance of Being UN Member

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201 201 209

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Contents  xiii

Appendixes Appendix I: Chronology Appendix II: Q  uestionnaire on the Outcome of UN Membership Since 1991

217 247

Bibliography249 Index265

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Acronyms

AARRO BDA CD CEDAW CFC COPUOS CRC CRS DCRK DMZ DPRK DRC ECLAC ECOSOC ESCAP EU FAO

Afro-Asian Rural Reconstruction Organization Banco Delta Asia Conference on Disarmaments Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women Common Fund for Commodities Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Convention on the Rights of the Child Congressional Report Service Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo Demilitarized Zone Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Democratic Republic of Congo Economic Commission on Central and South America and the Caribbean Economic and Social Council Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific European Union Food and Agricultural Organization

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xvi  South Korea in the United Nations

GNI GNP H.E. IAEA IBRD ICAO ICC ICCROM

ICPRCP

ICSID IDA IFAD IFANS IFC IGO ILO IMF IMO INMARSAT INTELSAT INTERFET IPU ISO ITU

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Gross National Income Gross National Product His Excellency International Atomic Energy Agency International Bank for Reconstruction and Development International Civil Aviation Organization International Criminal Court International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return of Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its Restitution in Case of Illicit Appropriation International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes International Development Association International Fund for Agricultural Development Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security International Finance Corporation Intergovernmental organization International Labour Organization International Monetary Fund International Maritime Organization International Maritime Satellite Organization International Telecommunications Satellite Organization International Force for East Timor Inter-Parliamentary Union International Organization for Standardization International Telecommunication Union

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Acronyms  xvii

JPI KINU KOMID METT-TC MIGA MINURSO MINUSTAH MIT NADA NATO NGO N.K. NLL NPT NSL OMM ONUB PKOs POLISARIO ROK ROK HMEC UN, U.N. UNAMID UNAVEM

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Jeju Peace Institute Korea Institute for National Unification (South Korea) Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (North Korea) Mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops available, time available, civil considerations Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti Massachusetts Institute of Technology National Aerospace Development Administration (North Korea) North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nongovernmental organization North Korea Northern Limit Line Non-Proliferation Treaty National Security Law Ocean Maritime Management Company, Ltd. (North Korea) United Nations Operation in Burundi Peacekeeping operations Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro Republic of Korea Republic of Korea Horizontal Mechanical Engineering Company United Nations African Union–United Nations Mission in Darfur United Nations Angola Verification Mission

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xviii  South Korea in the United Nations

UNC UNCCPCJ UNCHR UNCI UNCND UNCOI UNCOK UNCPC UNCSD UNCSW UNCTAD UNCURK UNDC UNDP UNFICYP UNESCO UNHCR UNHRC UNICEF UNIDO UNIFIL UNKRA UNMIL UNMIN

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United Nations Command United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice United Nations Commission on Human Rights United Nations Committee on Information United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs United Nations Commission of Inquiry United Nations Commission on Korea United Nations Committee for Program and Coordination United Nations Committee on Sustainable Development United Nations Commission on the Status of Women United Nations Conference on Trade and Development United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea United Nations Disarmament Commission United Nations Development Program United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Human Rights Council United Nations Children’s Fund United Nations Industrial Development Organization United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency United Nations Mission in Liberia United Nations Mission in Nepal

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Acronyms  xix

UNMIS UNMISS UNMOGIP UNOCI UNOMIG UNOSOM UNPKOs UNSC UNTAET UNTCOK UNWTO UPR UPU US, U.S. WHO WIPO WMD WMO WTO

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United Nations Mission in Sudan United Nations Mission in South Sudan United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia United Nations Operation in Somalia United Nations peacekeeping operations United Nations Security Council United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea United Nations World Tourism Organization Universal Periodic Review Universal Postal Union United States World Health Organization World Intellectual Property Organization Weapon of mass destruction World Meteorological Organization World Trade Organization

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List of Tables

Table 4.1. South Korea’s contributions to the UN budget, 2000–2010190 Table 4.2. Twenty major contributors to the UN regular budget (2013)

191

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Purpose What does it mean for South Korea to be a UN member? In order to answer this complex question, the size, the origins of, and, above all, the tasks of the UN need to be considered. When the UN was founded in 1945, it had 51 members, but in 2013, the membership had risen to 193. In 2013, the UN had around 50,000 employees worldwide. Having experienced two devastating world wars, the founders wanted to create an organization that would prevent breaking out of a third global conflict.1 The United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China, and France that had the largest militaries and had fought together during World War II would lend their military might to the UN to fight any new aggressors. The name “United Nations” was chosen since the founders hoped that the countries that had united to fight the Axis powers Germany, Japan, Italy, and Spain would remain united to prevent 1

 Since 1945, over 100 major conflicts around the world have left some 20 million dead. The UN was rendered powerless to deal with many of these crises due to 279 vetoes cast in the Security Council, which were a vivid expression of the divisions of that period. From Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping: Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, A/47/277 S/24111 (n. p., June 17, 1992), p. 3. 1

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2  South Korea in the United Nations

future aggression and preserve peace. All “peace-loving” states were eligible for membership. The UN was founded on the basis of three core tasks: (i) to maintain international peace and security, (ii) to encourage development, and (iii) to promote respect for human rights. The UN Charter is the founding legal document of the UN. The Charter’s Chapter VII: Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression, Article 39 states: “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.” Coercion to fight any would-be aggressors would include military force, economic sanctions, and diplomatic isolation. Since member states are bound by resolutions adopted by the Council to dispatch troops to implement its decisions, it is the center of power within the UN system. The Council has the authority to commit all members to take enforcement measures such as sanctions. Other UN bodies such as the General Assembly that comprises all member states and is the central forum for global dialogue can only make “recommendations.” The United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China, and France were given permanent seats and veto power in the Security Council. Since 1965, the Council has altogether 15 members (originally 11). Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would have accepted UN membership without veto power. The veto also reflected a realistic acceptance by others that the UN could not undertake enforcement action against its strongest members or without their concurrence. The nonpermanent members are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms after nomination by one of the five regional groups consisting of Africa, Asia, Latin America, Western and Eastern Europe.2 2

 Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), pp. 96, 97, 98 (Figure 4.1), 99, 110; Kim, Bumsoo, “Yuen-ûi kach’i p’andan kijun-ûn inkwôn,” Mirae Han’guk, October 11, 2013 (http://www.futurekorea.co. kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=25299), p. 1; Jean E. Krasno, “The UN Landscape: An Overview,” in Jean E. Krasno (ed.), The United Nations: Confronting the Challenges of a Global Society (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), pp. 3–5;

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Introduction  3

The UN would serve as a forum for dialogue in which negotiation and diplomatic solutions might replace the resort to war to settle disputes. According to the UN Charter, Chapter I: Purposes and Principles, Article 2(3): “All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means.” Article 2(4) states: “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” Members also accept the legal obligation to support enforcement actions such as economic sanctions and to refrain from giving assistance to states that are the objects of UN preventive or enforcement action. Another key principle is the obligation of member states to fulfill all the obligations assumed by them under the Charter. The most fundamental principle of the UN is the sovereign equality of member states, which means that they do not recognize any higher governing authority. Equality refers to states’ legal status, not their size, military power, or wealth. On this basis, each state has one vote in the General Assembly. Inequality is also part of the UN framework, embodied in the permanent membership and veto power of five states in the Security Council. Since the UN is based on the membership principle of universality, full membership in the UN is a key indicator of international status. The UN, particularly the General Assembly, is therefore the central forum for claims to international status. International support can be quantitatively measured by such indices as the number of full diplomatic partners, memberships in international or intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and attendance at important international conferences or meetings. It can be qualitatively assessed by interpreting the pattern and content of participation in international institutions. Institutions can Park, Heung-soon, “Yuen-ûi kiwôn, palchôn, yôkhal-gwa kukche sahoe,” in Park, Heung-soon, Cho, Han-Seung and Chung, Utak (eds.), Yuen-gwa segye p’yônghwa (Seoul: Tosô ch’ulp’an Oruem, 2013), p. 34; Thomas G. Weiss and Ramesh Thakur, Global Governance and the UN: An Unfinished Journey (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), p. 21. The UN Charter is recorded in Park, Cho, and Chung (eds.), ibid., pp. 416–449. Original quotation marks with exception of the UN Charter’s Article 39.

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4  South Korea in the United Nations

be defined “… as the norms, rules, conventions and codes of behaviour that provide a framework for human interaction.” Notably, the American scholar Jean E. Krasno (2004) writes that “The UN can only become what its Member States want it to become.” Thus, the UN is completely dependent on the support of the member states to implement its mission.3 With this background, the purpose of this book is (a) to investigate what the predictions of membership were at the time of South Korea’s UN admission in 1991 and (b) to analyze whether these predictions have been fulfilled or not. A few assessments of membership made by Korean scholars and diplomats are recorded. The most systematic assessments of UN membership from 2011, 2012, 2013, 2015, and 2016 are recorded in Section 4.5. However, the author has found no work investigating what the predictions at the time of admission were and analyzing whether they have been ­fulfilled or not. This book aims to fill this conspicuous gap 25 years after South Korea became a UN member. First, the study investigates main characteristics of the two Koreas’ UN policies and the global context in which they pursued the policies prior to becoming members in 1991. Second, it analyzes post-1991 developments in far more detail by first investigating what the predictions of South Korea’s membership were and then analyzing on the basis of six standards of evaluation selected on the basis of the referred literature whether the predictions have been fulfilled or not. The six standards are membership in UN agencies, membership in the Security Council, the Council’s resolutions on North Korea, participation in UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs), appointments of Koreans to high posts within the UN system, and 3

 Barry K. Gills, Korea Versus Korea: A Case of Contested Legitimacy (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 18; Karns and Mingst, ibid., pp. 97, 98 (Figure 4.1); Krasno, ibid., pp. 4, 17; John E. Trent, Modernizing the United Nations System: Civil Society’s Role in Moving from International Relations to Global Governance (Opladen & Farmington Hills: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2007), p. 24.

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Introduction  5

contributions to the UN budget. The standards are all related to exerting power within the UN system in order to affect the outcome of the organization’s work and thereby raise South Korea’s global position. A seventh standard added is the General Assembly’s resolutions on the North Korean human rights issue. Otherwise, the account would have been incomplete. In recent years, the issue has received increasing attention within the UN and it is contested between the two Koreas. Also, this standard concerns exerting power to affect the UN’s work. Owing to simultaneous UN membership in 1991 and resolutions adopted on North Korea, the study involves both Koreas in Sections 3.2–3.7 but only South Korea in Section 4.5. Developments in each area are whenever possible analyzed on the basis of concrete examples that are investigated based on the predictions of membership and the theoretical framework.

1.2  Theoretical Framework Two relevant terms for this study are globalization and global governance since they very much form the context in which multilateralism is evolving. Globalization can be defined as a “historical process, which transforms the spatial organization of social relations and transactions, generating transcontinental and interregional networks of interaction and the exercise of power.” Global governance is one of the most recent theories on how the international system operates and includes “those procedures and practices that exist at the world or regional level for the management of political, economic and social affairs.” This definition is in line with that in 1995 of the Commission on Global Governance, an independent group of prominent international figures, stating that governance is The sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken. It includes formal …

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6  South Korea in the United Nations

as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest.4

Global governance is not global government, not a single world order and not a top-down, hierarchical structure of authority. “It is the multi-level collection of governance-related activities, rules and mechanisms, formal and informal, public and private, existing in the world today.” States and other actors work with cooperative problem-solving arrangements and activities to deal with various issues and problems. Pieces of global governance include intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), multilateral agreements, and framework agreements, including select UN resolutions. IGOs are recognized subjects of international law with separate standing from their member states. They are instrumental in helping states form stable habits of cooperation through regular meetings, information gathering and analysis, dispute settlement, and operational activities. They enhance individual and collective welfare. IGOs affect member states by setting international and national agendas and forcing governments to take a position on issues. In this context, power relations are important by affecting participation and influence. The important issues are: Who is responsible for decision making in global governance? Is it states or other actors who really control the agenda? Since World War II, the UN has been the central piece of global governance. It is the only IGO with global scope and its agenda encompasses the broadest range of governance issues. The UN is a complex system with many pieces. Besides the six principal organs — the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat — specified by the UN Charter, the UN in 2013 had 16 specialized agencies, two independent bodies, and 37 associated organizations. 4

 Karns and Mingst, ibid., pp. 3, 4; Kate Seaman, UN-tied Nations: The United Nations, Peacekeeping and Global Governance (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2014), p. 9; Trent, ibid., pp. 19, 20. Original quotation marks.

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Introduction  7

The specialized agencies operate with autonomous legal status and independent budgets, but are functionally connected to the UN via formally contracted relationships between their own memberships and the coordinating machinery of the ECOSOC. The ECOSOC addresses such international economic and social issues as promoting higher standards of living, identifying solutions to economic, social, and health problems, and encouraging universal respect for human rights and basic freedoms. The main power of the ECOSOC lies in its ability to create or initiate studies and reports on the issues of economic and social progress and its facilitation and organization of international conferences in the economic and social and related fields. It now (2015) consumes over 70 percent of the entire UN system’s human and financial resources and oversees 36 agencies, funds and programs that comprise the UN’s development activities. The Secretariat is the administrative organ of the UN and is led by its chief administrative officer, the SecretaryGeneral. The UN is the central site for multilateral diplomacy with the General Assembly as its center stage. One of the UN’s main functions is to provide needed expertise or intelligence and physical and human resources through its specialized agencies to the benefit of member states.5 The UN Security Council is the core of the global security system and is the primary legitimizer of actions dealing with threats to peace and security. At the same time, it is extremely difficult to ensure compliance with global governance. There are simply no ways to enforce decisions and no mechanisms to compel states to comply with decisions in the area of international peace and security. In fact, one of the key criticisms of global governance derives from the lack of institutions suitable to enforce compliance with 5

 Trudy Fraser, Maintaining Peace and Security? The United Nations in a Changing World (London: Palgrave, 2015), pp. 36, 57, 176; Karns and Mingst, ibid., pp. 4–7, 95, 114; Park, op. cit., 2013, pp. 34, 62–63, 64–65; Seaman, ibid., p. 14. When Palau became fully self-governing in 1994, the Trusteeship Council had completed its mandate. Subsequently, its work was suspended. In 2005, the World Summit formally decided to abolish the Council. The International Court of Justice deals with interstate conflicts (Fraser, ibid., pp. 39, 197).

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8  South Korea in the United Nations

international agreements. Notably, the UN Charter, Chapter I: Purposes and Principles, Article 2(7) states: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.” The American and British scholars Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal (2010) argue that states join IGOs such as the UN since they allow for the centralization of collective activities through a concrete and stable organizational structure and a supportive administrative apparatus. These raise the efficiency of collective activities and enhance the organization’s ability to affect the understandings, environment, and interests of states. Membership in IGOs enables states to participate in a stable negotiating forum, pursue self-interest, provide mechanisms for dispute resolution, and create advantages in terms of centralized organization to implement collective tasks. By participating, member states agree to shape international debate on important issues and forge critical norms of behavior. Yet, states still maintain their sovereignty and varying degrees of independence of action.6 Another functional characteristic that leads states to prefer IGOs to alternate forms of institutionalization is independence meaning “… the ability to act with a degree of autonomy within defined spheres. It often entails the capacity to operate as a neutral in managing interstates disputes and conflicts.” Although the independence of IGOs is highly constrained since especially the powerful member states can limit their autonomy, interfere with their operations, ignore their dictates, or restructure and dissolve them, participation by even a partially autonomous, neutral actor can raise efficiency and affect the legitimacy of individual and collective 6

  Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations,” in Paul F. Diehl and Brian Frederking (eds.), The Politics of Global Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), pp. 28, 29; Karns and Mingst, ibid., pp. 6, 7, 95, 98 (Figure 4.1); Seaman, ibid., p. 53; Weiss and Thakur, op. cit., p. 21.

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Introduction  9

actions. Such a situation gives even powerful states incentives to grant IGOs substantial independence. Opinions on the usefulness of IGOs differ. Abbott and Snidal (2010) quote the opinion that “realists believe states would never cede to supranational institutions the strong enforcement capacities necessary to overcome international anarchy.” Consequently, IGOs are of little interest since they merely reflect national interests and power and do not constrain powerful states. Although Abbott and Snidal accept realists’ view that states are jealous of the power of IGOs and deeply concerned with the distributive consequences of their interactions, they claim that realists underestimate the utility of IGOs, even to the powerful. Realist theory assumes that international politics is characterized by the continuous quest for power by all states. Since IGOs cannot change the nature of human beings as striving for power, they are of little help in challenging this perpetual struggle. Nor can they change the anarchical structure of the international system, characterized by the absence of an overarching monopoly of force in form of a world government, which further accentuates this struggle for power. Since the ability to use organizations to pursue national interests is determined by a country’s strength, IGOs are formed and used by the powerful states to implement their power politics more effectively and to pursue their self-interest. The design of IGOs will primarily reflect their interests. Thus, states are selfcentered rational actors. Consequently, decision-making procedures of IGOs will be set up in a way that systematically privileges the most powerful member states, as in the case of the UN Security Council, making them intergovernmental rather than supranational organizations. Skewed decision-making procedures institutionalize power imbalances. On the other hand, IGOs also create opportunities for their member states by, for instance, encouraging the development of specialized decision-making and implementation processes to facilitate and coordinate IGO participation. Most countries perceive that there are benefits to participating in IGOs even when it is costly. For

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10  South Korea in the United Nations

instance, Iraq did not withdraw from the UN when it was subject to more than a decade of stringent sanctions.7 The significance of power will be tested particularly with regard to South Korea’s participation in the Security Council and the Council’s adoption of resolutions on North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests. Liberals place importance on international institutions for collective problem solving and have a more positive view of IGOs than realists. Liberals believe that cooperation is possible and will expand over time for two reasons. First, the international system is a context within which multiple interactions occur and where the various actors “learn” from their interactions, rather than a structure of relationships based on the distribution of power among states and a fixed concept of state sovereignty. The system is a society where actors adhere to common norms, consent to common rules and institutions, and recognize common interests. Although power is important, it is exercised within this framework of rules and institutions, which also makes international cooperation possible. Second, liberals expect mutual interests to increase with greater independence, knowledge, communication, and the spread of democratic values. This will promote greater cooperation and thereby peace, welfare, and justice. Liberals regard IGOs as arenas where states interact and cooperate to solve common problems. IGOs contribute to habits of cooperation and serve as arenas for negotiating and developing coalitions. They are a primary means to mitigate the danger of war, promote the development of shared norms, and enhance order. IGOs carry out operational activities to help address substantive international problems and may form parts of international regimes referring to “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, and rules 7

 Abbott and Snidal, ibid., pp. 28, 29, 32–33; Karns and Mingst, ibid., p. 7; Park, JaeYoung, Yuen-gwa kukche kigu (P’aju: Bobmunsa, 2007:a), pp. 61, 64, 142, 143: fn. 9, 387–388; Volker Rittberger, Bernhard Zangl and Andreas Kruck, International Organization (Houndmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 15, 16, 17. Abbott and Snidal use the term “international organization,” as do Rittberger, Zangl and Kruck, but for the sake of consistency, the term IGOs is used throughout the study.

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Introduction  11

and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” They can be used by states as instruments of foreign power or to constrain the behavior of others. Neoliberal institutionalists share the realists’ view of an anarchic international system and assume that states act rationally. But unlike realists, institutionalists regard cooperation through IGOs as completely rational. International politics is distinguished by interest constellations in which states have a common interest in reaping joint gains or avoiding joint losses by cooperating with each other. International institutions provide focal points for coordination and serve to make state commitments more credible by specifying what is expected, thereby encouraging states to establish reputations for compliance. They are an efficient solution to problems of coordination by providing information that aids decision making and reduces transaction costs to achieve agreement among many states. States benefit because institutions do things for members that cannot be accomplished unilaterally. Thus, for neoliberals, institutions have important and independent effects on interstate interactions both by providing information and by framing actions without necessarily affecting states’ underlying motivations.8 The views of liberals and neoliberals will be tested especially in the context of South Korea’s participation in UN agencies. Since UN sanctions against North Korea are investigated in Sections 3.5 and 3.6, opinions on the impact of sanctions need to be identified. In accordance with Article 25 of the UN Charter, sanctions imposed by the Security Council have to be implemented by all member states. Otherwise, the sanctions would have little impact. Sanctions imposed in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter are recognized as exceptions to Article 2(7) preventing interference in member states’ domestic affairs. For the past 20 years, especially economic sanctions imposed by the Council have played an increasingly important role in global governance. The 8

 Karns and Mingst, ibid., pp. 36–39; Rittberger et al., ibid., p. 18; Trent, op. cit., p. 24. Original quotation marks.

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12  South Korea in the United Nations

goal of economic sanctions is to force one nation to follow the wishes of other countries. If the goal is attained, it can be assumed that sanctions will cease. One type is smart sanctions (or targeted sanctions). The concept arose since the UN sanctions imposed on Iraq from 1990 to 2003 received much criticism from a humanitarian point of view. All UN sanctions applied from 1995 to 2010 were smart sanctions. The purpose is to impose sanctions on certain individuals involved in policymaking and implementation instead of imposing them on the whole population in order to minimize the negative outcome on the general public. Limited and selective measures taken against people who hurt international peace and security include direct ones such as prohibition against travelling, refusal of providing visa, and freezing of foreign assets, and indirect measures, including arms embargo and embargo against exports of certain products, including raw oil, diamonds, and timber. The Swedish scholar Peter Wallensteen (1971) argues that sanctions normally are unsuccessful. It is difficult to affect a particular country’s policies by imposing sanctions. He points out three conditions to succeed. First, a crucial factor is wavering support for the government prior to the imposition of sanctions. Otherwise, support rises. There must be an active opposition whose goals concur with those of the country imposing sanctions. Second, not all trade has been suspended. Third, since the position of the country within the global community is important, if the targeted country is relatively isolated prior to the imposition of sanctions, they can work. But the question is: What are the opportunities for a targeted country to form new alliances? Which countries could be willing to support it? Later, in 2013, the UN assessed that if (a) member states have a strong political will to implement smart sanctions, (b) the domestic system to implement them works well, and (c) the Security Council has a well-developed monitoring system, they can work very efficiently from the point of their purpose. By imposing sanctions, it is commonly expected that economic transaction costs will rise, that the international activities of the targets being individuals or organizations will be restricted, creating psychological pressure, and that

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Introduction  13

international isolation as well as deterioration of the reputation will follow. However, the Canadian scholar Andrea Charron (2011) claims that to create the perfect sanctions regime that serves as an ends to immediately resolve a conflict remains only an ideal. First, conflicts are incredibly complicated events with many causes, players, and competing agendas. Since the Security Council has no intelligence agency, it can only rely on information provided by member states, which may or may not have an accurate understanding of the conflict. Second, since events on the ground can change the Council’s adoption of sanctions, it is nearly always a reaction to dynamic events rather than a means of prevention. Third, the Council has been and will be faced with a variety of threats to and breaches of peace that demand a range of responses, including coercive measures short of force. Research shows that most people suffer from sanctions but policymakers are hardly affected and strengthen their power, as in Iraq.9 The Iraqi case provides support to the opinion that sanctions do not work. Whether these opinions are correct or not regarding North Korea is investigated in Sections 3.5 and 3.6 on the outcome of Security Council resolutions. Since South Korea’s participation in UNPKOs that are now often termed “peace support operations” is the standard of evaluating membership in Section 4.2, the UN’s definitions from 1992 of peacekeeping and the related terms peacemaking, peace-building, and peace enforcement that are applied throughout the study need some clarification. In 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali introduced “An Agenda for Peace” that essentially classified peacekeeping alongside conflict prevention. There may not be a dividing line between peacemaking and peacekeeping 9

 Andrea Charron, UN Sanctions and Conflict: Responding to Peace and Security Threats (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), pp. x, 7, 201: fn. 8; Rim, Kap-soo and Moon, Duk Ho, Yuen anbori chejae-ûi kukche chôngch’ihak (P’aju: Tosô ch’ulp’an Hanul, 2013), pp. 13–14, 19–20, 72–73, 99; Peter Wallensteen, Ekonomiska sanktioner (Stockholm: Bokförlaget Prisma, 1971), pp. 51, 165–167.

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14  South Korea in the United Nations

but both are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. The definitions are Peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. Peace-keeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.

Besides consent, impartiality and nonuse of force are key foundations of traditional PKOs. Peace-building is defined as “… action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.” The end of armed conflicts does not guarantee that communities in conflict will then experience security. In a broad sense, peace-building is a holistic concept embracing political reconciliation, maintenance of public order, economic reconstruction, development and humanitarian assistance, social integration, and the guarantee of human rights. In order to accomplish these targets, while working to eradicate the root causes of conflict, a stage of peaceful state-building through economic reconstruction, good governance, and rule of law is needed. It is a matter of such comprehensive and long-term work, as reconstruction after a conflict has ended aims to secure permanent peace by helping the parties in dispute to promote peace. It has usually been considered that peace-building takes place after peacemaking and peacekeeping but, in recent years, increasing consensus has been developed on the need for peace-building to take place at the same time as the first stage of peacekeeping to attain its target. Peace-building must occur comprehensively and simultaneously to enhance its outcome. Besides military supervision and stabilization, peacekeepers’ work includes support for such tasks as establishing a political system, observing human

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Introduction  15

rights, reforming public order, and dissolving and integrating former rebel groups. Finally, peace enforcement refers to the dispatch of “… forces to restore and maintain the cease-fire.” Peace enforcement units must be more heavily armed than peacekeepers and need to undergo extensive preparatory training within their national forces.10 Also, the term “middle power,” applied in Chapters 3 and 4 to analyze South Korea’s position within the UN, needs to be clarified. The rise of the “G2 era” referring to the United States and China raises the question how the world will develop onward and how stable it will be. Going one step forward, the question is what conditions need to be fulfilled in order to stabilize such a world order. Consequently, scholars and policymakers have recently come to place more focus on middle powers, but the term is not new. Middle powers are seen as a third alternative to stabilize the transformation process to the G2 era and the following period. However, there is no consensus on how to define middle powers but scholars have approached it from three angles: national attributes, behavioral traits, and identity and ideas. The first angle is based on capabilities. The British scholar Martin Wight claims that middle powers have a certain degree of military power, resources, and strategic position. Therefore, in peace time, great powers will seek their support. In war time, middle powers cannot win against great powers but they can hope to cause them more losses than gains. The American scholar Kenneth Organski enumerates in his power transition theory dominant powers, great powers, middle powers, and small powers. Middle powers can play an important role regionally and exert a certain degree of influence on international affairs. 10

 Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., pp. 5, 12, 13; Fraser, op. cit., pp. 82, 189; Seaman, op. cit., pp. 8, 113; Shin, Dong-Ik, “21segi saeroun Yuen-ûi kwaje — p’yônghwa kuch’uk (Peace-building) hwaltong -,” Wegyo, no. 97 (April 2011), pp. 55–56, 58. Shin was, at the time of writing, ranked next to Ambassador at South Korea’s Permanent Representation at the UN and refer to p. 64 (fn. 3) to the UN Secretary-General’s report An Agenda for Peace from 1995. The definitions of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement concur with the 1992 report. The author has found no other definitions making the recorded definitions inaccurate or obsolete.

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16  South Korea in the United Nations

The basis of the second angle is whether a country behaves like a middle power or not. It is assumed that a middle power’s behavior in a predictable way differs from great or small powers. Focus is placed on the norm entrepreneurship. Middle powers assume that their norm impulses are different from other countries and claim that such a situation can be confirmed by their behavior. Norm entrepreneurship changes policymakers’ opinions on certain issues and adjusts their behavior. Middle powers support international norms and are in a unique position by being able to make these norms firmly established in the global society. Middle powers maintain the global order by seeking compromises, forming alliances, participating in international organizations, and reaching mutual agreements. The third angle is based on the state of ideas and identity referring to the pursuit of a particular foreign policy. Such a policy is chosen since it is expected to benefit the country pursuing the policy. All the three angles have their limitations. In the first case, the sole focus is put on capabilities, and casuality between the size of the country and benefits of its foreign policies cannot be reliably proved. Even if capabilities are those of a middle power but the country does not act as such a power, it can yet be regarded as one. In the second case, the concept faces limits from a methodological point of view as a choice based on a dependent variable. The reason is that such behavior is already observed from the concept of middle power. Finally, the state of ideas and identity causes its own problems. In fact, regardless of what definition is used, whether the country’s capabilities to become a middle power are included or not or whether it acts as such a power or not, any state claiming its identity as a middle power can be included in the category. The German and British scholars David Bosold and Nik Hynek suggest that only countries having middle-level physical capacity and a combination of such a capacity and a spirit to act as a middle power should be called middle powers. The ideal middle power possesses these characteristics, recognizes itself as one and aims to become stronger. Nonetheless, critics claim that the criteria for defining which states are middle powers and which are not remain

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Introduction  17

elusive. Realists in particular remain doubtful about the middle power category, which undermines the basic case that all secondary powers in international relations are, to some extent, subservient to the great powers.11 Finally, the author uses, on the basis of his study (2009), the term “peaceful coexistence” to imply coexistence rather than interaction. Peaceful coexistence should precede a “peace regime,” which is a higher stage of peace. Peace regime refers to a state of affairs that creates working relations prior to the signing of a peace treaty that would officially end the Korean War (1950–1953).12

1.3 Method The study follows a chronological account based on the organization of the empirical material. Such an approach gives an overview of the two Koreas’ relations with the UN prior to South Korea’s admission in 1991 and the assessment of the outcome of its membership. It also allows an analysis of the predictions of admission and the outcome. Consequently, the approach is both chronological and thematic. Whether there have been any deviations from patterns identified or not is investigated. The data presented normally refer to what actually has happened or been discussed but not considerations behind actions taken or evaluations made afterward of what could or should have been done. The process-tracing method that has achieved increasing recognition and widespread use in the last few decades is applied to investigate the relationship between the two Koreas’ UN policies and their relations with the UN prior to admission and the predictions of 11

  Kang, Seonjou, “Chunggyôngug ironhwa-ûi issue-wa chaengchôm,” Kukche chôngch’i nonch’ong, vol. 55, no. 1 (2015), pp. 138, 140, 141, 143–144, 145–149; Andrew O’Neil, “South Korea as a Middle Power: Global Ambitions and Looming Challenges,” in Scott Snyder (ed.), Middle-Power Korea: Contributions to the Global Agenda (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2015), p. 76. 12  Gabriel Jonsson, Peacekeeping in the Korean Peninsula: The Role of Commissions (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2009), p. 533.

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18  South Korea in the United Nations

South Korea’s entry and its outcome. The process-tracing method generates numerous interrelated observations within a case. It attempts to identify the intervening causal process, that is, the causal chain and causal mechanism, between an independent variable (or variables), and the outcome of the dependent variable: How did various variables interact over time to produce the outcome? In order to answer this question, the alternative paths through which the outcome could have occurred have to be considered. A historical narrative can serve as an analytical causal explanation on the basis of some theoretical framework. The process of quantitative research to find the main links between the ingredients of approach is also applied. It involves use of multiple-indicator measures for explanation of causes.13 Through detailed narrative process-tracing combined with quantitative research, the theoretical framework and the predictions on the outcome of UN membership are empirically tested to provide an analytical causal explanation. The underlying hypothesis is that UN membership is of crucial importance for a country’s global position but to verify this general opinion, specific questions need to be raised. Did the two Koreas’ UN policies bring about their relations with the UN? Or were there also other explanations? Is there a relationship between the predictions of South Korea’s UN admission and the outcome of its membership? Or are there also other explanations? Or is it a combination of both? Cross-references are made to find out whether the opinions presented in the Introduction are representative or not and whether developments differ over time or not. The greatest possible effort has been made to present a balanced view of post-1991 developments by critically applying the standards of evaluation and evaluating the existing assessments of the outcome of South Korea’s UN membership. 13

 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 62, 63 (Figure 3.1), p. 68; Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 205, 206, 207, 211, 231.

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Introduction  19

1.4 Sources Most of the works are written by Korean scholars, including some of the most well-known researchers in this field such as Chi Young Pak and Park Heung-Soon whose works have been indispensable. Publications by the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been of great help, as have studies by the UN from 2010 onward on the impact of sanctions imposed on North Korea since 2006. Visiting South Korea and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2014 and 2016 was crucial to finding research material. A written reply to the questionnaire in Appendix II was received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the second occasion. The above studies have been supplemented by numerous other books, academic theses, scientific articles, and UN documents. General books on the UN and international relations theory were of great help. The articles were published in well-known journals such as Korea Focus, Korea Observer, and Korea and World Affairs as well as in Korean language journals. Articles from South Korean newspapers have also been used. The written material was, in addition to the visits to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supplemented by an interview made in 2013 with representatives at the Taipei Mission in Sweden. The purpose was to find out the impact on Taiwan of not being UN member as another way to evaluate the significance of UN admission in order to assess what it meant for North and South Korea not to be members until 1991. Since the study’s focus lies on investigating longterm trends, the strategy has been to find data covering such trends rather than being up-to-date for all the seven standards of evaluation identified above. Dates of access of all links/URLs are recorded but in the case of some works which were mainly written in Korean they were not valid at the time of submitting the manuscript. For the sake of accuracy, links/URLs are still recorded as they were originally.

1.5  Organization and Scope Chapter 2 covers the years 1945–1991 and focuses on three interrelated issues: How did the UN handle the Korean question? What

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20  South Korea in the United Nations

policies did North and South Korea pursue toward the UN? What circumstances prevented them from becoming members? The UN intervention in the Korean War is recorded in some detail but the two Koreas’ UN policies and votes on the Korean question in the General Assembly are the main issues. An analysis of what factors enabled membership in 1991 and what assessments then were made of UN admission concludes the chapter. For the sake of convenience, important dates are recorded in Appendix I. For the same reason, along with names of persons quoted, their position and nationality are recorded the first time when they appear throughout the study. Since almost all Koreans referred to are from South Korea, they are only referred to as “the Korean scholars” (or diplomats/ journalists). Chapter 3 first investigates what the predictions of UN admission were in 1991 and then analyzes the outcome in four areas: membership in UN agencies, membership in the Security Council, the Council’s resolutions adopted on North Korea, and the General Assembly’s resolutions on the North Korean human rights issue. Accounts of South Korea’s work in UN agencies are recorded. Membership in the Security Council between 1996–1997 and 2013– 2014 is analyzed. Resolutions adopted by the Council on North Korea following the missile tests launched in 1998, 2006, 2009, 2012, and 2016 as well as the nuclear tests conducted in 2006, 2009, 2013, and 2016 and their outcomes are investigated. Finally, the work of the UN on the North Korean human rights issue and its significance are assessed. Chapter 4 investigates South Korea’s participation in UNPKOs, Koreans appointed to high positions within the UN system and the country’s contributions to the UN budget. Troop dispatches and assessments of participation in UNPKOs are investigated. With regard to appointments of Koreans, the most outstanding examples are recorded and their significance is assessed. South Korea’s contributions to the UN budget is analyzed on the basis of its payments from 1992 to 2013. Finally, the most systematic assessments of UN membership from 2011, 2012, 2013, 2015, and 2016 are recorded and evaluated on the basis of the empirical accounts in Chapters 3 and 4.

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Introduction  21

Chapter 5 presents the general conclusions. First, the outcome of South Korea’s UN membership is assessed on the basis of the seven standards of evaluation and the assessments of UN membership also are included. References are made to the pre-1991 period. Second, the significance of UN membership is analyzed on the basis of globalization, global governance, and the opinions of realists, liberals, and neoliberal institutionalists on the role of IGOs with references to South Korea’s experiences.

1.6  Korean Names and Terminology Korean names are transcribed according to the McCune-Reischauer system. However, Korean scholars’ own preferred spellings are followed when they have published in English. The surname therefore preceeds the family name in some cases but not in others. Spellings of names have in some cases been checked against business cards. The South Korean presidents Park Chung Hee (1963–1979), Chun Doo Hwan (1981–1988), Roh Tae Woo (1988–1993), Kim Young Sam (1993–1998), Kim Dae Jung (1998–2003), and Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013) are spelled in accordance with international praxis. The same is the case with the North Korean leaders Kim Il Sung (1945–1994), Kim Jong Il (1994–2011), and Kim Jong Un (2011–), and the cities Kaesong, Pyongyang, and Seoul. Spellings of North Korean companies targeted for UN sanctions recorded in Section 3.5 normally follow the literature. Since the study embraces both Koreas, it consistently uses North Korea and South Korea. For the sake of variety, it interchangeably writes the two states’ official names, the Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK), the North and the South as well as Pyongyang and Seoul. Korea/Korean is only used when the whole peninsula is referred to and in quotations. All translations of quotations from Korean and of most of the works in Korean recorded in the bibliography are by the author.

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b2530   International Strategic Relations and China’s National Security: World at the Crossroads

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Chapter 2

The Two Koreas’ Struggle for UN Membership 1948–1991

2.1 Introduction The first section investigates how the UN originally became involved in the Korean question after the end of World War II and the contacts between the Republic of Korea (ROK) following its establishment in 1948 and the UN. The UN involvement in the Korean War and in the Korean question afterward focusing on the role of the Security Council is also analyzed. Since the 1954 Geneva Conference on the Korean issue took place due to the war, an account of it concludes the section. The second main section investigates in detail the two Koreas’ struggle for UN membership following the establishment of two Korean states in 1948. Three interrelated issues are the focus of our analysis: (a) how the UN handled the Korean question, (b) what policies North and South Korea pursued toward the UN, and (c) what circumstances prevented them from becoming members. In the first issue, the relationship between the American and Soviet powers in the UN Security Council is of crucial importance. Annual votings on the Korean question held in the UN General Assembly until 1976 is another important issue. By analyzing these annual votings, power relations between the Western, pro-Seoul nations and the Communist, pro-Pyongyang states are assessed. 23

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24  South Korea in the United Nations

The issues raised in the resolutions by these two groups are recorded and their opinions on contested ones are analyzed. The impact of the changing composition of the UN as a result of decolonization raising the total number of member states on the Korean issue is included. Since the UN assisted reconstruction of South Korea after the Korean War, the assistance is partially recorded and its significance assessed. Those cases when issues related to developments in the Korean peninsula were raised in the UN are included in the analysis. Regarding the second issue, great attention is given to the membership applications the two Korean states repeatedly made. Since contacts with the UN not only involved the membership issue, the two Koreas’ attitudes toward the UN and their participation in the General Assembly’s debates on the Korean question are also included. An important issue with regard to UN membership is whether policies were consistent or not and what factors explain the two states’ positions. Political events in the two Koreas of especial importance to UN membership are investigated, including how they were related to other developments that exerted influence on membership. With regard to the third issue, the Cold War system that after 1945 profoundly affected power relationships in the UN, not least in the Security Council, is crucial to consider. The interaction between North and South Koreas’ attitudes toward membership and those of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China are investigated. The second section raises the significance of UN membership from the context of both Korean states not being members. A few comparisons are made with divided Germany and Yemen and their global status prior to reunification in 1990. The third section analyzes how the two Korean states became UN members in 1991. Or, more precisely: What were the specific factors that enabled membership? The interaction between the two Koreas’ policies and international developments is analyzed. Opinions of North and South Korean high-ranking officials on UN admission are investigated and compared. A few South Korean scholars’ assessment of admission are recorded. The chapter ends by briefly analyzing the

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The Two Koreas’ Struggle for UN Membership 1948–1991   25

consequences for Taiwan of not being UN member and being ­unable to become one. This is done in order to further illuminate the ­consequences for North and South Korea of not being UN members for 43 years.

2.2  The Korean War and the UN South Korea’s fate became intertwined with the UN owing to the establishment of the ROK in 1948. The founding was an outcome of the November 14, 1947, UN resolution 112(II) calling for democratic elections to be held in Korea under the supervision of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) that would be established. This Commission was set up following the failure of the American–Soviet Joint Commission, which was to implement the 1945 Moscow Agreement on the independence of Korea and the establishment of a unified government. Since the Soviet occupation authorities refused to cooperate with the UNTCOK, UN-supervised elections were only held in the American occupation zone on May 10, 1948. On August 15, 1948, the government of the ROK was established through the elections. On September 9, 1948, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was founded with Soviet support. The DPRK rejected the authority of the UN. In contrast, the main diplomatic target of the South Korean government was to (a) as a newly founded state receive international recognition, (b) by entering the UN secure legitimacy and its position as the only legal Korean government in the global community, and (c) acquire support from the UN for peaceful reunification. The government initiated its UN diplomacy in December 1948 by dispatching a delegation led by Dr. Chang Myôn to the third General Assembly. The delegation claimed on December 6 in the Political Committee that national division was becoming protracted as a result of the conspiracy by the Soviet Union and North Korea’s [nonexemplified] policies. In a speech, Dr. Chang urged the UN to as soon as possible accept South Korea as member and all countries to recognize the ROK. On December 12, the UN General Assembly,

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26  South Korea in the United Nations

which was dominated by the United States, declared in resolution 195(III) that South Korea is the only legitimate Korean government with 48 votes for and six against with one abstention.1 In accordance with the resolution, the successor to the UNTCOK — the UN Commission on Korea (UNCOK) — was founded. When the fourth General Assembly was held in 1949, the South Korean delegation again urged the UN to recognize the ROK as member.2 The UN Security Council condemned the North Korean invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950. At this time, the Soviet Union boycotted the Council meetings over the issue of Chinese representation. On the same day, the Council determined in resolution 82 that the armed attack was a breach of peace, called for the immediate cessation of hostilities, and urged North Korea to immediately withdraw its armed forces north of the 38th parallel. The UN came to South Korea’s aid by invoking the collective security provision of the UN Charter. On June 27, the Security Council adopted resolution 83 recommending UN member states to assist South Korea. Sixteen countries responded to the resolution, among which the United States contributed more than half of the ground forces, 85 percent of the naval forces and nearly 95 percent 1

 The December 12, 1948, UN General Assembly resolution is recorded in Pak, Chi Young, Korea and the United Nations (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), pp. 209, 210. 2  Han, Sung-Joo, “The Republic of Korea as a U.N. Member,” Korea and World Affairs, vol. 15, no. 3 (Fall 1991), p. 389; Kang, Sung-Hack, “South Korea’s Policy toward the United Nations — How the Icon was Buried and What New Challenge Lies before South Korea in the World Organization-,” Korea Journal, vol. 35, no. 1 (Spring 1995), p. 8; Kim, Hyeong Ju, Han’gug-ûi tae Yuen wegyo chôngch’aeg-ûi kaesôn panghyang (Seoul: Han’guk wegugô taehakkyo, chôngch’i haengjông ôllon taehakwôn, wegyo anbo hakkwa, 2008), pp. 4–5, 6; Kim, Sook, “The United Nations of the 21st Century and its Implications on Korean Diplomacy,” Korean Observations on Foreign Relations, vol. 14, no. 1 (August 2012a), pp. 178–179; Koh, Byung Chul, “North Korea’s Policy Toward the United Nations,” Korea Journal, vol. 35, no. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 30–31; Pak, Chi Young, “Korea and the United Nations — The First 50 Years,” Korea and World Affairs, vol. 19, no. 4 (Winter 1995), p. 612; Yi, Sô-hang, “Yuen-gwa Han’guk, kûrigo segye p’yônghwa,” in Park, Cho and Chung (eds.), op. cit., 2013, p. 321.

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of the air force units. Due to its leading role in the UN military intervention, it was viewed as the American action merely using the name of the UN. On July 24, the UN Command (UNC) was founded on the basis of the July 7 UN Security Council resolution 84 to integrate the UN combat units into one organization to maximize combat strength. When the Soviet Union, in order to halt any further incursions against their interests and to prevent a UN-backed military offensive in Korea, returned to the Security Council and served as Chairman from August 1, the Council could no longer take any measures on the Korean question to restore peace since the Russians could exert their veto. Consequently, since the Council could not receive support from all members, when the controversial Uniting for Peace Resolution was proposed by the United States, the General Assembly on November 3 adopted resolution 377(V). Following the intervention of Chinese forces on November 6, the General Assembly adopted on December 1 resolution 498(V) calling for the cessation of hostile acts toward the UN forces and withdrawal from South Korea. On May 18, 1951, the General Assembly adopted resolution 500(V) that recommended all member states to impose an export embargo on China and North Korea. The Korean War ended with an Armistice Agreement signed by the commanders of the UNC and the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers on July 27, 1953. In Korea, the UN made its most complete commitment to date to deterring aggression as a function of collective security and to maintaining peace afterward. Since 1953, the UNC has — by implementing the Armistice Agreement and exercising control over the Military Armistice Commission that supervises the implementation of the agreement and settles through negotiations any violations of it — played a decisive role in preventing war. In 2008, the UNC was the longest peace enforcement coalition in UN history.3 3

 Fraser, op. cit., pp. 59–60, 61; Han, ibid., pp. 389–390; Jonsson, op. cit., 2009, pp. 17, 19–20, 401–402, 462, 520–521; Kang, ibid., 1995, p. 9; Kim, ibid., 2008, pp. 6–9; Pak, ibid., 1995, p. 616; Park, Cho and Chung (eds.), ibid., pp. 510, 511.

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28  South Korea in the United Nations

On August 28, 1953, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 711 to implement the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 60 to hold a political conference on the Korean question and recommended to all the countries that had dispatched troops to the UNC to participate. The Assembly simultaneously adopted resolution 712 that expressed respect for all the soldiers who had participated in the war and condolences to those soldiers who had resisted the invasion and died to keep freedom and peace. Finally, it expressed satisfaction over the success of the first act of collective security taken to repulse a military invasion following the request of the UN. From April 26 to June 15, 1954, the Geneva Conference was held after a five-month delay against the schedule fixed by the Armistice Agreement. Paragraph 60 of the Agreement prescribes that “…a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.” Except South Africa, which chose not to come, all the other 19 countries, including the two Koreas, China, and the Soviet Union, which took part in the war, participated in the conference that aimed to peacefully solve the Korean question. The UN side prescribed a central role of the UN to solve the Korean issue but North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union argued that the UN as a war party was unsuitable as a mediator. South Korea requested in line with its population figures two-thirds of the seats in a pan-Korean legislative body. In contrast, North Korea proposed to establish a nation-wide Commission with equal representation. North Korea and its allies urged the withdrawal of all foreign troops prior to elections whereas the UN side wanted UN troops to remain until Korea had re-unified. Since no compromise was reached on the role of the UN, the terms to hold national elections and the status of foreign troops, the conference ended in failure. Consequently, the UN side stated in a joint declaration that continued negotiations were meaningless and that the Korean question should be transferred to the UN. On November 11, the 15 countries that had participated on the UN side in the Geneva Conference submitted a report on the outcome to the

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UN Secretary-General with a joint declaration attached. Following this failure, the General Assembly, in its resolution 811 of December 11, 1954, recognized the report responsibility for the Korean question was automatically passed to the UN. A representative government would be peacefully set up to establish a unified, independent, and democratic Korea. International peace and security would be restored. Subsequently, the UN General Assembly, with overwhelming majority each year, passed resolutions on Korean reunification based on holding North–South general elections on the basis of proportional representation. Only a representative from South Korea was invited to participate in the debates.4

2.3 The North–South Korean Struggle for UN Membership As we have seen, the two Koreas’ opinions of the UN differed already prior to the outbreak of the Korean War and widened further owing to the war. Since international support for the rival Korean governments tended initially to mirror Cold War alliance patterns, the same dichotomy prevented admission of either Korea into the UN. Already from the time the UN debate on the Korean question began in 1947, the UN General Assembly Political Committee consistently denied North Korea the right to participate since it defied the competence and authority of the UN to deal with the Korean question. In contrast, South Korea was allowed to participate in the discussions as an observer, without a vote. South Korea ever since regarded the UN as the most important diplomatic forum to promote its political legitimacy and international representation. Such a view confirms the opinion that “Since the UN is based on the membership 4

 Choi, Woo-Soon, Han’gug-ûi Yuen wegyo-e kwanhan yôn’gu: Nambukhan tongsi kaib-ûl chungsim-ûro (Kwangju: Chosôn taehakkyo taehakwôn chôngch’i wegyo hakkwa, 1994), pp. 11–12; Jonsson, ibid., 2009, pp. 53–55; Kim, ibid., 2008, pp. 9–10; Pak, Chi Young, “South Korea and the United Nations Security Council,“ Korea Observer, vol. 27, no. 2 (Summer 1996), p. 254; Park, Cho and Chung (eds.), ibid., p. 512. Original quotation marks.

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30  South Korea in the United Nations

principle of universality, full membership in the world organization is a key indicator of international status” (cf. p. 3). In line with the writing, “The UN is the central site for multilateral diplomacy with the General Assembly as its centre stage” (cf. p. 7), the UN could, in the Korean question, serve as a forum for dialogue facilitating unification. South Korea wished the question to be peacefully resolved within the framework of the UN. Both the United States and the ROK wanted to preserve South Korea’s unilateral participation, since granting the DPRK equal rights might undermine Seoul’s claim to exclusive international legitimacy.5 From the foundation of the ROK in 1948, Seoul advocated its unilateral entry into the UN to seek recognition as the only legitimate government in Korea. Another reason was that the ROK was recognized as the only legitimate government by the UN on December 12, 1948. North Korea also argued for its unilateral admission. On January 19, 1949, South Korea applied for the first time to the Secretary-General for UN membership, which would be a step to ensure its political legitimacy, independence and security. By gaining worldwide recognition, its international position against North Korea would become consolidated. Following discussions in the UN Security Council on February 15–16, it was decided by nine votes for and two against to refer the membership issue to the UN Committee for Admission of New Members. On March 9, a resolution recommending membership was discussed in the Security Council. South Korea then received nine votes of admission and only two against but rejections included a Soviet veto (also Ukraine voted against).6 5

 Gills, op. cit., pp. xix, 72; Pak, op. cit., 2000, pp. 14, 15, 53. Gills (ibid., p. 72) uses the names of North and South Korea with regard to the 1947 UN General Assembly debate, but the two states were established in 1948. 6  Although Ukraine (and Byelorussia, from 1991 Belarus) were republics of the Soviet Union until its dissolution in December 1991, they were original members of the UN. The reason is that when the UN was founded, it was considered that the Soviet Union was in a minority position so for the sake of convenience both republics became members. From Park, op. cit., 2007:a, p. 191.

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The Soviet Union argued that the South Korean government had been elected through a manipulated election and failed to represent the will of the people under the occupation of foreign forces. The Soviet view was that only North Korea was qualified for UN membership. However, the Soviet Union (and North Korea) raising the issue of foreign military forces in South Korea had nothing to do with Chapter IV, Article 1 of the UN Charter, which states that a member as a peace-loving country must implement its duties and have an intention to do so. The argument lacked persuasive power. Actually, both Japan and West Germany became UN members in spite of the presence of American troops in both countries. South Korea’s second membership application made on December 22, 1951, was not processed. On six occasions from 1949 to 1955, Seoul aimed to become UN member through the help of its allies. First, on April 8, 1949, Taiwan presented a resolution recommending UN membership but it was rejected by the Soviet Union in the Security Council. Second, on October 31, 1949, Australia presented at the 25th meeting of the UN General Assembly’s Commission on Special Political Affairs a proposal regarding UN membership for nine countries, including South Korea, recommending the Security Council to reexamine the admission issue. The proposal was adopted by the General Assembly but due to Soviet veto, the issue was not raised at the Security Council. Third, on November 11, 1954, the United States and Argentina presented a revised version of a joint resolution that recommended the admission of 10 countries as UN members. The revised version included South Korea and Vietnam but the General Assembly did not vote on the issue.7 7

 Cho, Myung-Hyun, “Kukche hwangyông-ûi pyônhwa-wa Nambukhan-ûi UN kaip,” Ch’ungnam taehakkyo sahoe kwahak yôn’guso nonmunjip, vol. 2 (1991), p. 269: Table 1; Han’guk wegyobu, Han’guk wegyo 60 nyôn (Seoul: Han’guk wegyobu, 2009), p. 179; Kim, Kang-nyông, “Yuen kaip-gwa Nambukhan kwangye,” Kukche chôngch’i nonch’ong, no. 524 (December 1991), p. 314; Mo, Sang Jip, Han’gug-ûi Yuen kaip-gwa Yuen wegyo chôngch’aeg-ûi panghyang-gwa kwaje-e kwanhan yôn’gu (Kwangju: Chosôn taehakkyo chôngch’aek taehakwôn, chibang haengjông hakkwa, 1998), pp. 4–5, 6: Table 2-1; Pak, Chi Young, “Nambukhan Yuen kaib-e taehan Chung, So-ûi wegyo chôngch’aek,”

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32  South Korea in the United Nations

Fourth, on December 7, 1955, Cuba presented a revised version of recommended membership but withdrew it. In December 1955, the “package deal” of 18 states was discussed but because of the policy of “competitive exclusion” pursued by the United States and the Soviet Union, South Korea was excluded. The December 8 UN General Assembly Resolution 918(IX) admitted only countries that were not involved in any complicated problem of unification. Fifth, on December 10, there was no vote on the recommendation by Taiwan for South Korean UN membership. Sixth, on December 13, the revised proposal for “Admission of New Members” proposed by Brazil and New Zealand and submitted by Taiwan and the United States that included South Korea and Vietnam was vetoed by the Soviet Union in the Security Council. From 1947 to 1958, the Western, pro-ROK majority held sway in the UN General Assembly, but by 1958, the rising presence of new Third World members began to alter the balance of forces in the Political Committee. Yet, North Korea continued to be denied the right to participate. The Committee continued to allow only Seoul the right to represent Korea in the annual debate on the Korean question referring to the submission of the annual report of the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK). The UNCURK had been founded on October 7, 1950, by the UN General Assembly resolution 376(V) after having recalled that the essential objectives of the resolution was the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic government of Korea. Miso yôn’gu, vol. 2, no. 2 (1989), p. 228: op. cit., 1995, p. 618: op. cit., 2000, pp. 63, 64, 70; Song, Young Shik, Kukche yônhab-esô-ûi Han’guk munje-e kwanhan yôn’gu — Yuen kaip munje-rûl chungsim-ûro (Seoul: Hanyang taehakkyo haengjông taehakwôn, 1990), pp. 20–21. Mo (ibid., pp. 5, 6) does not say why the General Assembly did not vote in 1954 on the admission of new UN members. The General Assembly adopted on the basis of a report from the Political Committee on November 22, 1949, resolution 296, calling for reconsideration of South Korea’s membership application but due to Soviet resistance in the Security Council it failed. From Han’guk wegyobu, ibid., 2009, p. 180. This event is not included in South Korea’s membership applications in Cho (ibid., p. 269: Table 1) who otherwise records all occasions when the two Koreas have applied for UN membership separately or through its allies.

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It replaced the UNCOK (cf. p. 26). The resolution enabled the General Assembly to establish the UN Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) to supervise postwar rehabilitation and reconstruction in agriculture, fisheries, mining, power, transportation, health, communications and transportation, manufacturing and industry, foreign trade, housing, civil information, and education. The work from 1950 to 1957 was a big success and contributed greatly to the postwar recovery. The UN had invested $479 million in the program. The UNKRA was one reason why South Korea developed a warm attitude toward the UN. According to the Korean scholar Park Heung-Soon (2012), humanitarian and economic assistance from the UN during and after the war laid the foundation for initial growth and prosperity. Since 1955, the yearly report of the UNCURK recommended that the Commission should make a report to the next regular session of the General Assembly. By excluding North Korea, South Korea could present its own version of the historical development of the Korean question without the threat of being contradicted by the DPRK. Not until 1961 was North Korea invited to participate in the UN General Assembly debate but rejected since the condition the UN had attached called for it to accept the authority of the UN to deal with the Korean question.8 North Korea maintained its long-standing argument that as a belligerent in the Korean War, the UN had forfeited its legal and moral authority to deal with the Korean question impartially. The

8

 Cho, ibid., 1991, p. 269: Table 1; Gills, op. cit., pp. 72–73; Han’guk wegyobu, ibid., 2009, p. 180; Kang, op. cit., 1995, pp. 9, 10; Kim, Hong Nack, “The Two Koreas’ Entry into the United Nations and the Implications for Inter-Korean Relations,” Korea and World Affairs, vol. 15, no. 3 (Fall 1991), p. 399; Koh, op. cit., p. 32; Pak, ibid., 2000, pp. 16, 64–65, 70; Park, Heung-Soon, ”Han’guk anbo-rûl wihan kukche kiguûi yôkhal-gwa hwalyong chôllyak,” Anbo haksul nonjip, vol. 23 (December 2012), p. 327; Amadu Sesay, “Dividends on Investments in History: Korea and UN Peacekeeping and Peace-building Operations,” Korea Observer, vol. 28, no. 2 (Summer 1997), pp. 186–187, 188. Original quotation marks. Cho (ibid., p. 269: Table 1) records that in 1955, Cuba withdrew its proposal and that there was no vote on Taiwan’s recommendation on membership but without stating any reasons.

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34  South Korea in the United Nations

DPRK declared that it would not recognize any UN resolution if a North Korean representative had not participated and approved it. Unlike South Korea, North Korea tried to keep the Korean question out of the UN. In the UN General Assembly, debate on the Korean question took place every year and the UN formula for reunification was reconfirmed. The UNCURK remained, the Western resolution proposal was adopted by overwhelming majority and through conditional invitation for participation in procedural matters North Korean participation was rejected and only South Korea took part in the Political Committee. In contrast, North Korea’s supporters each year proposed unconditional simultaneous invitation of both Koreas, withdrawal of the American troops in South Korea and dissolution of the UNCURK but the proposals were always rejected. Since South Korea and its supporters were faced with a steady growth in the voting strength of Third World countries in the UN, they in 1968 adopted the new policy to not submit the Korean question to the General Assembly every year. Nonetheless, a Western draft resolution was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1968. The purpose of the new South Korean policy was to prevent the unfavorable and unproductive debates on the Korean question in the UN that was the major arena for the inter-Korean rivalry. North Korea objected to this policy by, in both 1969 and 1970, having its supporters submit a draft resolution calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Korea and the dissolution of the UNCURK. South Korea responded by asking its supporters to submit draft resolutions supportive of its own position that called for the intensification of the role of the UNCURK, free elections in North Korea and reiterated the UN position on the ROK as the legitimate government of Korea. Subsequently, North Korea lost its showdown with South Korea in both years. At a time when the People’s Republic of China had become UN member in 1971 replacing Taiwan and the share of nonallied member countries surpassed 40 percent, South Korea succeeded in close cooperation with the United States and its allies both in 1971 and 1972 with overwhelming majority to have the UN General Assembly postpone consideration of the Korean question.

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Both the Sino-American rapprochement and the initiation of Seoul–Pyongyang dialogue contributed to its success.9 Although it is often claimed that North Korea rejected UN competence in the Korean question, it actually applied on February 9, 1949 and on January 2, 1952 for UN membership. Later, Pyongyang applied three times via the Soviet Union to join the UN. On the first occasion in 1949, South Korea’s membership application became a stimulus to apply. The Soviet proposal to refer the application to the UN Committee for Admission of New Members was voted down on February 16 by a vote of eight to two, the two votes being cast by Soviet Union and Ukraine in the Security Council (Argentina abstained). North Korea opposed South Korea’s membership since the ROK was an “illegal” government under the occupation of foreign forces. In 1952, no action was taken. On January 22, 1957, the United States and 12 other countries submitted a resolution to the Special Committee of the UN General Assembly requesting it to call on the Security Council to debate the question of UN membership for South Korea and South Vietnam. In a countermove to the seventh attempt by South Korea to become UN member through its allies, the Soviet Union presented on January 24, 1957, for the first time a resolution to the Committee calling for the Security Council to recommend admission of both North and South Korea plus North and South Vietnam into the UN but the proposal was rejected in the Special Committee on January 30. The Soviet Union had previously supported unilateral UN admission by North Korea but also at the second and third time in 1957 and 1958 proposed that both Korean governments simultaneously enter the UN as full members. The justification of the counterproposal was 9

 Choi, op. cit., 1994, p. 13; Gills, ibid., pp. 137–138; Kim, op. cit., 2008, pp. 12–13; Koh, ibid., p. 32. At the 5th General Assembly in 1950, a proposal was launched to grant the People’s Republic of China representative status in the UN but it was rejected due to the resistance of the Western powers led by the United States. Subsequently, the issue was raised every year but until the 1960s, the American side prevented it to be presented. Following the announcement in 1971 of an American visit to mainland China, the proposal for Chinese membership launched by Albania and others was adopted. From Park, op. cit., 2007:a, pp. 196, 197.

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36  South Korea in the United Nations

that there existed “two separate states” in Korea and Vietnam. Admission of either one of the two states in each case would undermine seriously opportunities for reunification based on equal rights between the rival states. The United States and South Korea continued to firmly adhere to membership only for Seoul, which based its unilateral membership policy on the principle of political legitimacy. Since there was no indication of objection by North Korea of the Soviet proposal, it is generally accepted that it supported dual membership for the two Koreas at this time. However, the United States opposed the states’ simultaneous admission by arguing that it would help perpetuate division of Korea and Vietnam. Another major reason why the United States was opposed to accept North Korea’s entry into the UN was that the DPRK was not a peace-loving state but had been branded by the UN as an aggressor in the Korean War. Also, it had violated the armistice and did not recognise the competence of the UN in the Korean question. In contrast, South Korea had been established in 1948 through elections supervised by the UN and was, as we have seen, later recognized by the General Assembly as the “sole legal government” on the Korean peninsula. Notably, as recorded by the Korean scholar Kim Kang-nyông (1991), if South Korea had not opposed simultaneous admission of the two Koreas into the UN at this time, they could have become members without any particular difficulties.10 Subsequently, the Special Political Committee of the UN General Assembly adopted the American-supported resolution but voted down the Soviet proposal. The Committee’s resolution was approved by the General Assembly and sent to the Security Council. On September 6, 1957, the Security Council took up the resolution submitted by the United States, Australia, Taiwan, Colombia, Cuba, France, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom, recommending admission of South Korea to the UN. The Soviet Union countered 10

 Cho, op. cit., 1991, p. 269: Table 1; Gills, ibid., p. 73; Kim, op. cit., Fall 1991, pp. 399–400, 401; Kim, op. cit., December 1991, p. 314; Mo, op. cit., pp. 20, 21: Table 2.4; Pak, op. cit., 2000, pp. 64, 67; Song, op. cit., 1990, pp. 20–21. Original quotation marks. Kim (ibid., Fall 1991, p. 399) does not enumerate the other 12 countries which were behind the January 22, 1957 resolution.

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the move on September 9 by submitting a resolution calling for admission of the two Koreas and the two Vietnams. The proposal supported by the United States was vetoed by the Soviet Union whereas the Soviet proposal was rejected in the Security Council by nine votes against, one for and one abstention. Also South Korea’s eighth attempt to become UN member through its allies had failed. On the ninth occasion on December 9, 1958, the Security Council tackled again the issue of South Korea’s membership as the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Japan had introduced a resolution recommending the admission of Seoul into the UN. The Soviet Union introduced the same day a resolution calling for the admission of both Koreas to the UN. As had been the case in 1957, the United States resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union and the Soviet proposal was voted down with eight votes to one (two abstentions). Subsequently, North Korea took no initiative on the UN membership issue.11 In contrast, South Korea applied for reconsideration of separate membership on April 21, 1961 but no favorable action was taken by the Security Council. The turning point in South Korea’s policy on UN membership was the new unification policy adopted by President Park Chung Hee that aimed to recognize North Korea as a subject but not as a state. Through the June 23, 1973, “Declaration for Peace and Unification,” South Korea drastically changed its position on UN membership from having insisted on unilateral admission to not opposing entry of the two Koreas into the UN if it was conducive to ease tensions and strengthen international cooperation. Due to unmitigated inter-Korean hostility, peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas should be attained and institutionalized first before any effective and meaningful measures for unification could be implemented. One essential step toward peaceful coexistence would be simultaneous admission into the UN and “cross recognition” of the two Koreas by the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan. For Seoul, UN membership might control North Korea’s military menace. 11

 Cho, ibid., 1991, p. 269: Table 1; Kim, ibid., Fall 1991, pp. 400–401; Mo, ibid., pp. 20, 21: Table 2.4; Pak, ibid., 2000, pp. 67, 183: fn. 156.

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38  South Korea in the United Nations

South Korea’s new policy also hinged upon the support of the majority of member states for simultaneous admission provided that it did not cause obstacles to national reunification and that even before joining the UN. Both the United States and Japan as well as other allies supported simultaneous admission of the two Koreas into the UN. Even before its admission into the UN as a member, South Korea would not be opposed to North Korea also being invited at the time of the UN General Assembly’s debate of the Korean question in which the South Korean representative was invited to participate. Finally, South Korea would open its door to all nations of the world on the basis of the principles of reciprocity and equality, regardless of ideology. In other words, South Korea was willing to bury the icon of the only lawful government on the Korean peninsula for which the country had made the utmost efforts ever since it was created in 1948 because this position began to be perceived as no longer sustainable.12 Although President Park’s June 23 proposal was a delayed acceptance of the Soviet Union’s and North Korea’s position from 1957 to 1958 on simultaneous UN membership for the two Koreas, later on, the same day, President Kim Il Sung rejected simultaneous entry by claiming that it would amount to a policy of two Koreas and thereby perpetuate national division. In the author’s opinion, interKorean hostility referred to in the June 23, 1973, declaration shows that division already had become perpetuated. To accept the South Korean proposal for joint membership would have been tantamount to changing the policy to deny the ROK as a political reality, which would be a step incompatible with President Kim’s ideology of chuch’e [self-reliance]. Instead, he proposed joint UN membership by forming the Confederal Republic of Koryo during the 12

 Cho, ibid., 1991, p. 269: Table 1; Choi, op. cit., 1994, p. 24; Kang, op. cit., 1995, pp. 13–14, 18; Kim, ibid., Fall 1991, pp. 401–402, 403; Mo, ibid., pp. 14–15; Pak, ibid., 2000, p. 66. Original quotation marks. On the April 21, 1961 membership application Kang (ibid., p. 18) and Kim (ibid., p. 401) record that no favorable action was taken whereas Cho (ibid., p. 269: Table 1) and Mo (ibid., pp. 14–15) write that no action was taken. President Park’s “Declaration for Peace and Unification” is recorded in Pak, ibid., pp. 199–201.

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transitional period before national reunification. Confederation meant a union of independent states, implying the acceptance of the North and the South as two separate political entities, thus contradicting Pyongyang’s opposition to separate UN membership under the one-Korea policy. President Kim’s counterproposal included the points to (a) resolve the military tensions between the two Koreas to ease tensions, (b) start various joint cooperative enterprises and ­ exchanges, (c) convene a grand national conference composed of representatives from various political parties and social organizations, (d) form “a confederal republic of Koryo” named after the Koryo dynasty (918–1392), and (e) enter the UN under the single name “the Koryo confederal republic.” According to the Korean scholar Chi Young Pak (1996), the primary purpose of this proposal was to obstruct the two Korea’s admission into the UN. Similarly, Pak (2000) argues that North Korea was more interested in preventing South Korea’s membership than in its own admission. Later, on August 15, 1973, President Park proposed North Korea to simultaneously join the UN. Simultaneous UN admission would contribute to reduce tensions and restore mutual trust on the Korean peninsula and would become an occasion to elevate the position of the Korean people but North Korea rejected the proposal.13 On October 20, 1973, North Korea through a memorandum directed to the UN General Assembly’s Special Political Committee enumerated five reasons for opposing joint UN admission for the two Koreas. First, it would perpetuate division since separate membership would lead to one people, two states. Second, if the Korean peninsula becomes separated into two states by coercion, tensions will become eternal raising the risk for conflict. Third, joint UN admission would be tantamount to rule by division by imperialist powers over colonies. Fourth, since joint admission to the UN is entirely different from the joint admission of East and West 13

 Choi, ibid., 1994, pp. 24, 25; Kang, ibid., 1995, pp. 14, 18; Kim, ibid., Fall 1991, p. 402; Pak, op. cit., 1996, p. 261: ibid., 2000, pp. 66, 67, 69. President Kim’s counterproposal is recorded in Pak, ibid., 2000, p. 201.

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40  South Korea in the United Nations

Germany, this experience cannot be applied on Korea. Fifth, UN admission cannot be a solution of the Korean question. Given North Korea’s first target to liberate the American imperialists’ colony South Korea, one calculation to oppose joint UN admission was that to join the UN would be tantamount to accepting two Koreas and thereby equal to giving up the target. Since the North Korean government was established on the foundation of liberating South Korea, this basis of the government would in such a case be at the risk of disappearing. In spite of North Korea opposing joint UN admission for the two Koreas, they had acted as separate and independent states in international relations. In the early 1970s, North Korea’s international position had improved. Thanks to the campaign to enter as many international organizations as possible, on May 5, 1973, North Korea was admitted to the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in a vote of 57 to 28 and, in spite of stiff opposition from South Korea and its supporters, to the World Health Organization (WHO) on May 17 by a vote of 66 to 41 with 22 abstentions. South Korea had in 1949 joined the WHO, which is one of the specialized agencies of the UN. The Korean scholar Byung Chul Koh (1995) calls North Korea’s admission into the WHO “a major diplomatic victory.” At a time when South Korea had maintained a UN observer mission in New York since 1949 and received observer status in September 1950, admission into the WHO enabled North Korea to for the first time establish a Permanent Observer Mission in Geneva on June 1 and at the UN Headquarters in New York on June 29, 1973. With unanimous approval in the First Committee, North Korea could now for the first time take part in the debate on the Korean question in the UN General Assembly since it began in 1947. North Korea was subsequently admitted into the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in which South Korea was already member. In July 1973, UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim approved North Korea’s application for observer status at the UN. North Korea defended its seemingly contradictory position to oppose UN membership and entering the WHO, despite South Korea being a member, by arguing that its “… entry into the specialized agencies of

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the UN is for the purpose of technical and practical cooperation among all countries.”14 Membership in the UNCTAD, the IPU, and the WHO and the establishment of a UN observer mission in 1973 explicitly indicates that North Korea realized that there would be advantages in joining the UN. This view could not have been entirely new, since its own failed membership applications in 1949, 1952, and those through the Soviet Union in 1957(2) and 1958 indicate an awareness of the importance to join the UN. Although South Korea’s position in the June 23, 1973, declaration received broad support, China and the Soviet Union remained opposed to UN membership for the ROK. In 1975, the United States and other Western nations wished to handle the membership application along with that of North and South Vietnam, a standpoint that the Communist and nonallied countries opposed. Their argument was that the issue of UN membership should be handled in accordance with the principle of universality. However, all membership applications could not be lumped together but had to be handled separately from case to case. The Soviet Union and China argued that mutual consent between the two Koreas was necessary to enter the UN, as had been the case when East and West Germany became members in 1973. Otherwise, tensions would rise making a solution of the Korean issue more difficult. Another reason why the Soviet Union and China opposed separate membership for the two Koreas is that UN membership and Korean reunification were impossible to separate both the Soviet Union and China from each other, as North Korea emphasized reunification prior to admission. In contrast, to South Korea that emphasized UN admission prior to reunification, the two were separate issues. Consequently, the issue of the two Koreas’ UN membership could not be reraised together with that of the two Vietnams in the 1970s.

14

 Gills, op. cit., pp. 125, 137; Kang, ibid., 1995, pp. 13, 18, 28: fn. 75; Kim, ibid., Fall 1991, pp. 402–403; Koh, op. cit., p. 32; Pak, op. cit., 1995, pp. 622–623: ibid., 2000, p. 69; Park, op. cit., 2007:a, p. 189: fn. 3; Yu, Sôk-yôl, “Yuen kaib-e taehan Pukhan-ûi ipchang,” Wegyo, vol. 16 (December 1990), p. 130.

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Nonetheless, on July 29, 1975, South Korea made its fourth own application for UN membership but failed again because of the opposition by China and the Soviet Union in the Security Council. On August 6, voting figures were seven for, six against and two abstentions. On September 21, 1975, South Korea in a letter to the UN Secretary-General requested reconsideration of the membership application. In its fifth own membership application, the South Korean government argued that the country (a) is a member of the UN’s specialized agencies as well as other bodies and maintains diplomatic relations with most countries in the world, (b) in the June 23, 1973, declaration expressed an open policy to establish friendly relations with any country regardless of ideology, (c) has two-thirds of the whole Korean population, (d) wants to contribute to maintain world peace and to global economic cooperation, (e) is a peace-loving sovereign state, (f) has the right to enter the UN in accordance with the principle of universality, (g) should in accordance with strict application of Chapter IV, Article 1 of the UN Charter be accepted as a member, and (h) should as member not oppose North Korea’s admission. But such a state of affairs would only be a temporary measure until Korea is reunified. On September 22, 1975, South Korea requested the UN Secretary-General to resubmit its application for membership to the Security Council. It rejected the proposal with seven votes for, seven against and one abstention. Both China and the Soviet Union voted against. Subsequently, Seoul decided to wait a long while before resubmitting its application.15 The repeated applications for membership indicate that for South Korea not being a UN member was a “national trauma” confirming the significance of joining the UN (cf. pp. 29–30). While the issue of the two Koreas’ UN membership remained unresolved, the Korean question continued to be discussed in the UN General Assembly. In the fall of 1973, the debate was resumed since the inter-Korean dialogue beginning in 1972 had broken 15

 Cho, op. cit., 1991, p. 269: Table 1; Kim, ibid., Fall 1991, p. 403; Kim, op. cit., 2008, p. 13; Pak, op. cit., 1989, pp. 225–226, 228–229: ibid., 2000, pp. 69, 71.

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down. North Korea, now for the first time, took part in the debate on the same footing with South Korea. Since both the pro-DPRK and pro-ROK draft resolutions expressed the opinion that the UNCURK should be dissolved, there was no substantive difference of opinion on this issue. North Korea had attacked UNCURK for being biased in favor of South Korea. While hardly being a sign of bias, the UNCURK had contributed to the development of the ROK by monitoring the transition from civilian to military rule and back again from 1961 to 1963, including the national referendum on constitutional amendments in December 1962 and the National Assembly and presidential elections held in 1963. As after the Korean War, the UN now transferred expertise (cf. pp. 7, 33). Outside critics, including Third World and nonaligned governments, shared the North Korean view of the UNCURK and regarded it as an instrument to internationally legitimize South Korea. The pro-ROK draft resolution presented the dissolution of the UNC and “annul[ling] the right to use the United Nations flag by the foreign troops stationed in South Korea” as “necessary” measures only. Withdrawal of “all foreign troops stationed in South Korea” would only be “recognize[d]” as desirable. The resolution would place the future of the UNC and the question of the use of the UN flag in the hands of the Security Council. Regarding the foreign troops in South Korea, the joint position of Seoul and Washington was that the presence of American troops was based not so much on a UN mandate as on their bilateral agreement. Consequently, even if the pro-DPRK draft resolution that called for an unconditional dissolution of the UNC and withdrawal of all foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the UN would pass, it would have no effect on the issue. Since the opinion of most UN member states was that the best way to deal with the Korean question was to avoid confrontation, a “consensus statement” was adopted first by the First (Political and Security Affairs) Committee and then by the General Assembly on November 28, 1973. The consensus statement “noted with satisfaction” the publication of the North–South joint statement on July 4, 1972, quoting the three principles of Korean reunification “… without external interference

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and peacefully, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies and ­systems…” It also urged “the north and the south of Korea” to continue their dialogue and realize many-sided exchanges. Finally, the statement said that the “General Assembly decides to dissolve immediately the U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.” The decision to dissolve UNCURK was unanimous. A joint statement to dissolve UNCURK was issued on November 29, 1973.16 Previously, on November 14 North Korea’s Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lee Yong-Mok, made the country’s maiden speech in the UN in which he stated that the United States was responsible for the division of Korea and had launched a war of aggression in 1950. The “root cause” of the failure of reunification was the “occupation of South Korea by the foreign troops and continued interference in our internal affairs by the foreign countries.” He stated Pyongyang’s opposition to parallel membership of the two Koreas in the UN by repeating the Foreign Ministry’s statement from June 23, claiming that simultaneous UN admission would perpetuate division but the confederal form of membership did not receive any support among UN member states. In 1974, a pro-Seoul resolution was adopted by the First Committee by a vote of 61 to 42 with 32 abstentions and by the General Assembly by a vote of 61 to 43 with 31 abstentions. Meanwhile, a pro-Pyongyang resolution was almost adopted by the First Committee as well. The  vote in the General Assembly of 48 to 48 with 38 abstentions spelled defeat for the North Korea but it was its best showing ever. The pro-DPRK resolution demanded the withdrawal of all foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the UN and the dissolution of the UNC. The pro-ROK resolution reaffirmed the urgent need to implement fully the consensus of the 28th General Assembly on the Korean question and to maintain peace and security on the Korean peninsula.17 16

 Gills, op. cit., pp. 137–138, 139, 175; Jonsson, op. cit., 2009, p. 257; Kang, op. cit., 1995, p. 14; Koh, op. cit., p. 33; Yi, op. cit., 2013, p. 328: fn. 17. Original quotation marks except for the July 4, 1972 three principles of reunification. 17  Gills, ibid., p. 139; Kang, ibid., 1995, p. 15; Kim, op. cit., 2008, p. 15; Koh, ibid., p. 33; Mo, op. cit., pp. 20–21; Pak, op. cit., 2000, p. 67. Original quotation marks.

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In 1975, the General Assembly for the first time adopted two opposing draft resolutions on the Korean question introduced by the Western and Communist states respectively. The former reconfirmed the urgent need to implement fully the consensus of the 28th General Assembly on the Korean question, urged Pyongyang and Seoul to continue their dialogue to expedite a peaceful unification and expressed the hope that all the parties directly concerned would negotiate on new arrangements designed to replace the Armistice Agreement in order to reduce tensions and maintain peace and security on the Korean peninsula. The latter demanded unconditional dissolution of the UNC, withdrawal of all foreign troops, replacement of the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty with the United States, observation of the July 4, 1972 statement, practical measures to reduce armed forces, cease military reinforcement and make guarantees not to use force against each other. The two competing drafts agreed on the need to dissolve the UNC but diverged sharply on two key points. First, the pro-DPRK draft did not make the dissolution of the UNC and withdrawal of foreign troops contingent upon agreement on alternative solutions. In contrast, the pro-ROK resolution made it absolutely clear that nothing would change unless and until “new arrangements for maintaining the Armistice Agreement” were worked out. Second, although both drafts referred to the need for negotiations between the “parties,” North Korea insisted that the “real parties” specifically excluded South Korea since Seoul was not a signatory of the 1953 Armistice Agreement. That position had been categorically rejected by both South Korea and the United States.18 When the votes were taken in the First Committee on October 30, both competing drafts were for the first time adopted. The vote was 59 to 51 with 29 abstentions for the pro-Seoul draft out of 142 member states. The figures for the pro-Pyongyang draft were 51 to 38 with 50 abstentions. On November 17, 1975, the former resolution was ratified in the General Assembly by exactly the same figures 18

 Gills, ibid., p. 141; Kang, ibid., 1995, p. 15; Koh, ibid., p. 34; Mo, ibid., p. 16. Original quotation marks.

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but for the latter resolution the figures were 54 to 43 with 42 abstentions. Since the DPRK for the first time got a UN resolution, which fully supported its position on the Korean question, the result was a great symbolic victory that was turning point in the history of the UN debate on the Korean question. Although there were limits of the UN in dealing with the Korean question, in 1976, the two Koreas initially opted for the submission of a draft resolution on Korea to the UN. However, after Pyongyang had had second thoughts, its draft was withdrawn from the agenda before the General Assembly officially convened. At this time, the axe-killing of two American military officers belonging to the UN personnel in Panmunjom on August 18 had further turned world opinion against the DPRK. The incident occurred since UNC guards wanted a 25-meter-high poplar tree close to “the Bridge of No Return” that was the only entrance to Panmunjom from North Korea to be cut down to see better between two UN Checkpoints. Soon after a UNC team had begun work, North Korean soldiers protested but work still continued. In the ensuing fight between North and South Korean guards, two American soldiers were killed by axes left behind by South Korean workers who had fled the scene after the attack. With this background, at the Non-Aligned Movement conference held on Sri Lanka on August 16–20, the unilateral pro-North Korean resolution had to be moderated to a considerable extent. Since Seoul also withdrew its draft, the Korean question was kept off the UN agenda altogether. Previously, the pro-DPRK resolution from August 16 had called for the removal of nuclear weapons in Korea, the dissolution of the UNC, the withdrawal of all foreign forces under the UN flag, and the conclusion of a peace treaty with the United States. The proROK resolution from August 20 had urged the two Koreas to resume their dialogue, called upon the parties concerned to start negotiations to dissolve the UNC by replacing the Armistice Agreement with a more permanent peace agreement and demanded all states concerned to create an atmosphere conducive to peace and dialogue. The annual UN debates on the Korean question came to an

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end showing that there were clear limits in what the UN could do with regard to the Korean question. Instead, awareness was raised that peace and reunification of the Korean peninsula should be solved through direct inter-Korean dialogue and between the involved parties.19 Nonetheless, serious incidents related to Korea were raised three times in the UN in the 1980s. First, following the shooting down by a Soviet fighter plane of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 outside southern Sakhalin Island on September 1, 1983, the South Korean government requested the following day, along with the United States, Japan, and Canada, to hold an emergency meeting in the Security Council. At the six meetings held from September  3 to 12 South Korea condemned, along with 17 of its allies, the use of military force against a civilian aeroplane and prepared a resolution requesting the UN Secretary-General and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to make an investigation of the real facts of the case as well as to write a report. On September 12, the resolution received the required nine votes in support and two votes against with four abstentions but it was not adopted due to the veto of the Soviet Union. At the subsequent 38th UN General Assembly session, representatives from 69 countries condemned the incident. Second, it became clear on November 4, 1983, through the Burmese government’s investigation that North Korea was behind the assassination attempt of South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan in Rangoon on October 9 that killed four cabinet ministers and 13 other high-ranking dignitaries. Subsequently, the Seoul government decided to denounce the incident by raising it under the label “Prevention of International Terror” in the UN General Assembly’s Sixth Committee dealing with legal affairs. The South Korean government presented a document denouncing North Korea’s crime to the UN Secretary-General and requested its allies to make condemnatory speeches when the issue would be raised in the Committee on December 6–7 the same year. On this 19

 Gills, ibid., p. 138; Jonsson, op. cit., 2009, pp. 293, 294–296; Kang, ibid., 1995, pp. 16–17; Kim, op. cit., 2008, p. 16; Koh, ibid., pp. 34–35; Pak, op. cit., 2000, p. 20.

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­ccasion, representatives from 45 countries, including South o Korea, denounced the Rangoon Bombing and requested a joint response from the world opinion. Third, on November 29, 1987, a time bomb on Korean Air Lines Flight 858 that flew from Abu Dhabi to Seoul exploded in the Indian Ocean close to Burma, killing all the 115 passengers. The two North Korean agents Kim Sûng-il and Kim Hyun Hui who had posed as Japanese tourists were behind the incident that had been ordered and directed by President Kim Il Sung’s son and successor Kim Jong Il in frustration over North Korea’s unsuccessful attempt to block the holding of the Olympic Games 1988 in Seoul. On February 10, 1988, South Korea requested, together with Japan, to hold a Security Council meeting on the incident. In the meeting held on February 16–17, the 15 member countries, North Korea, South Korea, and Bahrain participated but the issue was only discussed with no proposal for a resolution presented. The South Korean Foreign Minister Ch’oe Kwang-su strongly denounced North Korea’s act of terrorism and requested support from the international community to prevent such an act of international terrorism to reoccur. Nine member countries and Bahrain supported South Korea’s position and the permanent members China and the Soviet Union did not, as allies to North Korea, actively defend the terrorist act. North Korea’s ­terrorism was thereby condemned worldwide.20 The three incidents did not affect the two Koreas’ positions on UN membership. In October 1980, President Kim presented at the sixth party congress a proposal for the establishment of the Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo (DCRK, cf. p. 38). According to the proposal, while the two “regional governments” in the North and the South would exercise autonomy in internal matters, they would act as a unified state externally. Consequently, the DCRK would enter the UN as a single member. Throughout the 1980s, the Seoul government made active efforts to create favorable 20

 Han’guk wegyobu, op. cit., 2009, pp. 177–178; Jonsson, ibid., 2009, pp. 347, 359–360; Kim, ibid., 2008, pp. 17–19.

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international conditions for the ROK to become UN member. On October 21, 1985, Prime Minister Lho Shin-yong in the General Assembly reaffirmed Seoul’s position on membership. In the same month, North Korea’s Vice-President Pak Sông-ch’ôl criticized South Korea’s proposal for joint UN admission by asserting that “if Korea aims to become a UN member it should at least accomplish a North–South confederation and join under a joint nation name.” In addition to the argument that simultaneous membership would perpetuate division, North Korea opposed South Korea’s proposal on the grounds that admission into the UN should come after the unification of Korea and that UN membership was a matter of national self-determination for the two Koreas to agree upon. In contrast, Pak (1995) argues that UN admission would not ­perpetuate the division of the peninsula but could rather help achieve unification (cf. p. 39). UN membership was not a matter for the two Koreas to agree upon but for the UN to decide since Article 4 of the UN Charter does not prohibit the admission of a divided state in any way. On August 18, 1987, the Security Council document S/19054 on why South Korea should join the UN was distributed among member states. The opinion of the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009) is that the document changed their opinions.21 In the aftermath of the 1988 Summer Olympics held in Seoul, there was growing consensus among most UN member states that South Korea, which was the political offspring of the UN and had a population of more than 42 million and the world’s 15th largest economy, should become member. According to the Korean scholar Sung-Hack Kang (2002), South Korea was regarded as something of a second-class nation lacking full membership in the international community during the years when it was not a UN member. Such a view confirms the opinion that full membership in the UN is a key indicator of international status (cf. pp. 29–30, 42). 21

 Han’guk wegyobu, ibid., 2009, pp. 181–182; Koh, op. cit., p. 35; Mo, op. cit., p. 22; Pak, op. cit., 1995, pp. 618–619; Yu, op. cit., p. 130. Original quotation marks. Pak (ibid., p. 619) does not elaborate on how UN admission could help achieve unification.

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The Seoul Olympics was an opportunity for South Korea to show its economic development and cultural achievements to the outside world and thereby generated enormous goodwill toward the ROK among many participants and observers. Also, in 1990, South Korea had diplomatic relations with 141 countries and belonged to around 60 intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), of which 18 were UN agencies. South Korea was member of a multitude of nongovernmental international organizations. In 1988, South Korea launched a new foreign policy toward the Communist countries labelled “northern policy” that drew support from all friendly countries. One objective was to seek full diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, China, and Communist countries in East Europe to help induce North Korea abandon its illusion of communizing the ROK, to recognize South Korea as a legitimate sovereign government and to accept peaceful coexistence between South and North Korea as a first step toward peaceful unification. Another objective was to show that South Korea as an independent country was entitled to have diplomatic relations with any country regardless of differences in ideology or social system. In the July 7, 1988 declaration, President Roh Tae Woo promised that (a) South Korea would not regard North Korea as an enemy but as a member of one ethnic community, (b) Seoul would endeavor to move Pyongyang from its self-imposed policy of isolation and help the North to effectively take part in the international community as a responsible member, and (c) the South would continuously implement its policy of increased mutual cooperation and reconciliation with the DPRK. He declared his government’s intention to end counterproductive diplomatic competition between the two Koreas. South Korea should seek to establish diplomatic relations with Communist countries and show that the country as an independent sovereign state was entitled to have diplomatic relations with any country regardless of differences in ideology or social system.22

22

 Han’guk wegyobu, ibid., 2009, p. 182; Kang, Sung-Hack, “The United Nations and Korean Foreign Policy — A Fox and a Hedgehog?,” Korea and World Affair., vol. 26, no. 1 (Spring 2002), p. 79; Kim, op. cit., Fall 1991, pp. 403–405.

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President Roh gave on October 18, 1988 as the first South Korean president a speech in the UN General Assembly. He then reemphasized the peace policy to achieve peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula and suggested six-party peace talks embracing North and South Korea, the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan, a declaration of nonaggression, disarmament, and the replacement of the armistice agreement with a peace agreement. The following day North Korea’s First Vice-Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju claimed that “if the North and South of Korea would enter the UN separately, the division of the peninsula will be perpetuated and the existence of states legitimized internationally.” He claimed that UN membership first should be discussed between the two Koreas and that after a confederation had been formed as the unified state and decided a name the country would enter the UN. The statement was repeated by the spokesman of the North Korean Foreign Ministry in August 1989. At a time when the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries were experimenting with drastic political and economic reforms enabling them to adopt more realistic views on exchanges and cooperation with South Korea, Seoul had by September 30, 1990 established diplomatic relations with Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Mongolia, and the Soviet Union. Consequently, geopolitics surrounding the Korean peninsula affected North Korea negatively.23 An indication that non-UN membership remained a “national trauma” is that in a speech held on UN Day October 24, 1989, the South Korean Foreign Minister Ch’oe Ho-jung raised three reasons why the country should become UN member. First, the population exceeded 40 million, the GNP was the world’s 15th largest and trade volume was one of the 10 largest. The country was host of the 16th Olympic Games and through a steady democratization and economic development stood on the threshold to become an advanced country. South Korea also fulfilled the demand of a member country in the 23

 Kim, ibid., Fall 1991, p. 405; Mo, op. cit., pp. 17–18; Wang, Im-dong, “Tongsi Yuen kaib-i Nambukhan kwangye-e mich’in yônghyang,“ Sahoe kwahak yôn’gu (1994-I), p. 3; Yu, op. cit., pp. 130–131. Original quotation marks.

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UN Charter saying “that a peace-loving country should have the ability and intention to implement the obligations in the Charter.” By becoming a member, South Korea’s contributions to the international community would become more active and thereby create an opportunity to contribute further to world peace and global cooperation. Second, North Korea’s opposition to UN membership for the two Koreas based on the notion that it would perpetuate division was logically contradictory and lacked persuasive power. As we have seen, North Korea had applied for UN membership in 1949, 1952, 1957, and 1958 and the country was now member of many international organizations and agreements that South Korea had entered. Also the ongoing negotiations on German and Yemeni unification proved that there was no relationship between having the qualifications to become UN member and reunification. That Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964 joined the UN as Tanzania shows that two member states can unite and become one member (Tanganyika entered the UN in 1961 and Zanzibar in 1963). Consequently, North Korea’s argument that Korea should become UN member as a unitary state after reunification was only a pretext to hinder South Korea to become member at a time when the prospects for reunification were unclear. Notably, this opinion concurs with that of Pak (cf. p. 39). Third, since according to the UN Charter a member country has to act peacefully to resolve disputes, by becoming members, North and South Korea could prevent incidental military clashes between each other, reduce tensions, and through dialogue accelerate peaceful reunification. Nonetheless, North Korea continuously rejected UN membership since it could not discard its wish to reunify the Korean peninsula through communization. Consequently, one could not but wonder whether North Korea wished to escape from its duty to peacefully resolve disputes that follows with UN membership. In other words, if the two Koreas would enter the UN, it will become more difficult to unify Korea by military force but reunification itself will not be hindered through membership.24 24

 Pak, Chi Young, “Yuen kaip munje-e taehan Nambukhan-ûi kaltûng,” T’ongil munje yôn’gu, vol. 8 (December 1990), p. 24; Song, op. cit., 1990, pp. 23–25. Original quotation marks.

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In September and November 1989, South Korea distributed its basic position about UN admission to the member states. In 1990, the Foreign Minister engaged in energetic diplomatic activities for South Korea’s UN admission in New York. Consequently, the number of states expressing active support for South Korean membership at the UN General Assembly grew from 48 in 1989 to 71 in 1990. Presidents George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev both expressed in their keynote speeches support for South Korea’s UN membership. In the spring of 1990, North Korea rejected South Korea’s proposal that the two Koreas should join the UN simultaneously but separately as a temporary measure until reunification could be achieved. Thus, Seoul would pursue unilateral membership. At a time when both North and South Korea had acted as separate and independent states in international relations and enjoyed quantitative international support by being full members of nearly all specialized agencies of the UN, on May 30, 1990, President Kim suggested a new formula for UN membership in which North and South Korea pending reunification should share a single seat in the UN on an alternating basis.25 According to Koh (1995), the new 25

 Among 25 specialized and independent bodies affiliated to the UN, South Korea was in 1990 member of 21 and North Korea of 14. For South Korea, these were (acronym and year of membership in parenthesis): the World Health Organization (WHO, 1949), Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO, 1949), the Universal Postal Union (UPU, 1949), the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO, 1950), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU, 1952), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO, 1952), the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 1955), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, 1955), the International Development Association (IDA, 1961), the International Finance Corporation (IFC, 1964), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA, 1988), the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID, 1967), the World Meteorological Organization (WMO, 1956), the International Maritime Organization (IMO, 1962), the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO, 1967), the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO, 1979), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD, 1978), the United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO, 1957), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, 1957), the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP, 1954), and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 1965). For North Korea,

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North Korean proposal was aimed at countering the South Korean proposal for simultaneous UN admission of the two Koreas. Similarly, Pak (2000) argues that the single-seat membership proposal aimed to block South Korea’s UN entry (cf. p. 39). South Korea rejected the proposal by claiming that the idea was unrealistic. Yet, since continuation of North–South Prime Ministers’ talks was regarded important to relax inter-Korean tensions, South Korea decided to postpone the submission of its UN membership application until 1991 rather than risking the breakdown of the Prime Ministers’ talks. China also advised Seoul to wait until 1991 to submit its application. At the North–South Prime Ministers’ Talks held in Seoul in September 1990, Pyongyang suggested in an attempt to block Seoul’s unilateral bid for UN admission to discuss UN membership as one urgent issue. Both sides agreed to conduct negotiations on the issue. North Korea again proposed a single-seat membership formula and repeated the proposal at the second and third Prime Ministers’ Talks held in October and December 1990 but the parties failed to resolve their differences on the issue. However, a sign that North Korea was inconsistent in opposing separate UN membership was that it on October 3, 1990, distributed a letter in the name of its UN Ambassador as a Security Council document. Its contents were that the proposal for a joint seat was not a final proposal, and that proposals consistent with unification would not be excluded and if reaching agreement with South Korea it would show flexibility. Nonetheless, at the second and third inter-Korean Prime Minister Talks held, it continued to advocate one joint seat for the two Koreas in the UN.26 these were (years of membership in parenthesis): the WHO (1973), the FAO (1977), the UPU (1974), the UNESCO (1974), the ITU (1975), the ICAO (1977), the WMO (1975), the IMO (1986), the UNIDO (1980), the WIPO (1974), the IFAD (1986), the UNWTO (1987), the IAEA (1974), and the UNCTAD (1973). From Han’guk wegyobu, 2013 wegyo paeksô (Seoul: Han’guk wegyobu, July 2013), p. 362. 26  Kang, op. cit., 1995, pp. 19–20; Kim, op. cit., Fall 1991, pp. 405–406; Koh, op. cit., p. 35; Mo, op. cit., pp. 22–23; Pak, op. cit., 1990, p. 15: op. cit., 2000, pp. 67, 69, 73. Kang (ibid., pp. 19–20) does not say why China advised South Korea to postpone submissions of its membership application until 1991.

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At the talks taking place in October 1990, the Premier Yon Hyong Muk explained in his keynote speech that the proposal for one seat would mean (a) that North and South Korea apply jointly for one UN seat this year, (b) that the North and the South alternately or jointly exert the right to represent and, if alternating, the period could be one month or more on the basis of joint decisions, (c) that in the case of the right to vote the two Koreas vote jointly when they agree and abstain when they disagree on an issue, (d)  that in the case of the right to speak they decide in advance which side’s representative will speak whereas the other side would speak in case of need, (e) that the joint seat on the basis of the joint name and flag agreed on in inter-Korean athletic summits to vivify this decision will have the name “Korea” having a flag with a white bottom and the map of the Korean peninsula on or something else, (f) that in the case of issues voted in the UN, the two parties as a principle jointly implement them and in inevitable cases act not to infringe on the interests of the other side, and, finally, (g) that in the case of paying the UN membership fee and other expenditures, the two parties pay half each or maintain status quo. At this time, Seoul had indicated a willingness to join the UN alone and since its gains in “northern diplomacy” appeared to have enhanced its chances of success, Pyongyang showed a sense of urgency. North Korea’s opposition to separate UN membership for the DPRK and the ROK was still based on the opinion that separate membership would “legitimize the two Koreas” and “perpetuate the division of the two Koreas.” Benefitting from the favorable circumstances toward UN admission, the accomplishment of the UN membership became the most important task of the South Korean government’s foreign policy in 1991. President Roh strongly declared in the New Year’s press conference on January 8 and on January 24, in the report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the will to accomplish UN membership during the year, 16 years after the latest membership application was made. On March 8, Minister of Foreign Affairs Lee Sang-ock declared at a regular friendly get-together with journalists that “South Korea hopes that North Korea will join the UN together with us this year

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56  South Korea in the United Nations

and we will make all possible efforts to accomplish this target.” If North Korea continues to resist, “South Korea will join first which I believe will become an occasion to promote North Korea’s admission.” Finally, “Concrete measures for South Korea’s UN admission cannot be further delayed.” Later, on April 19, President Roh announced in the opening address to the General Meeting of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) held in Seoul that it is only natural for the ROK to become member by asserting “that South Korea with a population of 43 million people and the world’s 12th largest trade volume annually exceeding $130 billion remains as a non-UN member country is also against the UN principle of universality.” In the spring of 1991, South Korea decided to apply for UN membership regardless of whatever action North Korea might take on the issue. The government memorandum from April 5 on accomplishing UN membership during 1991 was on April 8 distributed among member states of the Security Council to acquire their support.27 The memorandum said (a) that South Korea as a peace-loving country, which will implement the duties in the UN Charter should in accordance with the principle of universality be accepted as UN member which it is prepared to become, (b) that the South Korean government hopes that also North Korea will join the UN and actively contribute to its work and that the two Koreas by accepting the duties and principles of the UN Charter will build up confidence, (c) that the utmost efforts by the South Korean government to along with North Korea become UN member have failed and that the North’s proposal for one seat cannot be implemented and does not receive international support, and (d) that South Korea will continue to work for simultaneous admission with North Korea. However, if the North would not respond to the South’s efforts for joint admission, the ROK would submit a unilateral application for UN membership prior to the opening of the 46th General Assembly 27

 Choi, op. cit., 1994, p. 30; Han’guk wegyobu, op. cit., 2009, p. 182; Kim, ibid., Fall 1991, p. 406; Kim, op. cit., December 1991, p. 325; Kim, op. cit., 2008, p. 24; Koh, ibid., p. 35; Mo, ibid., pp. 18, 23, 26–27. Original quotation marks.

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on September 17. Consequently, through the April 5 memorandum, South Korea officially declared that it would submit a unilateral application for UN membership. During April–May 1991, by dispatching delegations to 37 countries, South Korea secured their support. In addition to the active work South Korea did to become UN member, the international environment had now become more favorable for its application for UN membership. First, at the South Korean–Soviet summit meeting held following mediation by President George Bush on Cheju Island in April 1991, the Soviet Union declared its intention to support South Korea’s bid for membership. Second, China had by the spring of 1991 indicated its intention not to veto South Korea’s application for UN membership. North Korea had counted heavily on China’s veto power to block South Korea’s bid for UN entry. One reason for the Chinese position was that President Bush had applied pressure on China to not oppose simultaneous UN admission of the two Koreas. Also the European Commission urged at the business meeting held on September 28, 1990, China to refrain from putting a veto on South Korea’s membership application. Third, in the 1990 UN General Assembly, 71 member states had spoken in favor of South Korea’s plan for the simultaneous but separate admission of the two Koreas into the UN. Only nine states spoke in favor of the North Korean position. No state spoke in favor of North Korea’s plan for joint admission of the two Koreas to have a combined seat in the UN.28

2.4  The Two Koreas Become UN Members in 1991 As we have seen, the issue of the two Koreas’ UN admission developed its own dynamic in 1990–1991. In May 1991, South Korea made it clear that it would go ahead with its membership application even 28

 Choi, ibid., 1994, p. 29; Han’guk wegyobu, ibid., 2009, pp. 182–183; Kang, op. cit., 1995, p. 20; Kim, ibid., Fall 1991, p. 406; Kim, ibid., December 1991, p. 325; Pak, op. cit., 2000, p. 66; Pak, Yong-nae, Nambukhan Yuen kaip 20 chunyôn, April 17, 2013 (http://www.prok.org/gnu/bbs/board.php?bo_table=bbs_board1& wr_ id=2067), p. 2; Wang, op. cit., 1994, pp. 3, 4.

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if North Korea adhered to its choice of seeking a combined seat for the two Koreas to be chaired in rotation. Eventually, on May 27, the DPRK Foreign Ministry announced officially that it would seek ­separate membership along with the ROK in the UN, thus abruptly reversing its previous long-term position that separate membership would perpetuate division. In an official statement, North Korea claimed that it had no choice but to enter the UN separately: As the south Korean authorities insist on their separate UN ­membership, if we leave this alone, important issues related to the entire Korean nation would be dealt with in a biased manner on the UN rostrum and this would entail grave consequences. The Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has no choice but to enter the United Nations at the present stage as a step to overcome such temporary difficulties created by the South Korean authorities.

Later, on May 30, the DPRK Foreign Ministry announced: “We join to prevent the UN from handling the Korean question in a ­partial way.”29 The Korean scholar Hong Nack Kim (1991) records four reasons for the change in North Korea’s UN policy. First, China’s unwillingness to veto South Korea’s membership application was a decisive factor. Premier Li Peng had during his May 3–6, 1991 visit to Pyongyang told that China would not veto South Korea’s membership bid because it would embarrass China in front of the world. He also advised Pyongyang to seek a separate seat along with Seoul because it would enhance North Korea’s international position and strengthen its security against possible South Korean attempts to “absorb” the North. 29

 Choi, Jae-Ho, Yuen kaip ihu t’ongil chôngch’aeg-ûi hwangyông-gwa panghyang (Seoul: Seoul taehakkyo haengjông taehakwôn, 1992), p. 37; Kim, ibid., Fall 1991, pp. 406–407; Kwak, Tae Hwan, “The United Nations and Reunification,” in Kihl, Young Whan (ed.), Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 306–307; Pak, ibid., 2000, p. 74. Original quotation marks. Small is in the first quotation. North Korea’s May 27, 1991 statement is recorded in Pak, ibid., pp. 201–203.

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Second, South Korea had earlier won assurances from the Soviet Union that it would not veto its membership application. Since the first Soviet–South Korea summit in June 1990, the Soviet Union had, at the advice of Seoul, attempted to persuade North Korea to accept simultaneous but separate UN admission. Third, Japan demanded simultaneous entry of the two Koreas into the UN as one condition for the normalization of diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Pyongyang that was a prerequisite for providing capital and technology to revitalize the stagnant North Korean economy. Fourth, the North Korean leadership accepted the separate entry into the UN in order to protect the North from the possible “absorption” by South Korea through a somewhat similar process of unification as the two Germanys went through in 1989–1990. Owing to South Korea’s stronger position in the fields of economy, diplomacy and military by having a more than ten times larger economy ($230 ­billion versus $21 billion), far more power and influence and a more sophisticated weaponry as well as a mutual defence pact with the United States that stationed nearly 40,000 troops in the South, membership was desirable for regime survival. Membership would enhance North Korea’s legitimacy, bolster its international position, and strengthen its international security. To add credibility to the first opinion of Kim, it is to be noted that Koh (1995) writes that “The single most important reason for Pyongyang’s policy reversal appears to have been China.” In addition, if Seoul’s bid to enter the UN would succeed, the position of both Koreas as observers enjoying equal rights would disappear. North Korea was unwilling to accept the asymmetry in the status of the two rival governments in terms of the inability to vote on resolutions, including those that might affect the Korean peninsula. Regarding the second opinion of Kim, according to the Korean scholar Wang Im-dong (1994), the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and the Soviet Union on September 30, 1990, meant that it would support Seoul’s application for UN membership. South Korea requested Soviet support for its application. Consequently, the Soviet Union regarded North Korea’s proposal for one joint seat to be irrational, joint admission in the UN would

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not be an obstacle to reunification and due to the principle of ­universality, South Korea should become UN member. Owing to the improvement of Sino-South Korean relations, China would not either veto South Korea’s membership application.30 The Korean scholar Kim Kang-nyông (1991) records five quite similar factors that enabled the two Koreas to become UN members. First, North Korea’s decision to join the UN was a result of the great transformation of the socialist bloc and South Korea’s subsequent active pursuit of the northern policy. After Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 had become new leader in the Soviet Union, epoch-making changes such as perestroika (reform) and glasnost (opening) took place that also brought many changes in socialist Eastern Europe. In December 1989, President Gorbachev declared during the summit with President Bush on Malta that the Yalta system that had led the post-World War II order had ended. It was replaced by the postCold War order. Since President Roh’s northern policy that was actively pursued at the time of the July 7, 1988 declaration and the Seoul Olympics that led to the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1989 with Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia followed by Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Soviet Union in 1990 coincided with these favorable external developments, international support for South Korea’s UN admission grew. At the same time, North Korea’s foreign policy received a great shock and its proposal for a joint seat for the two Koreas in the UN was regarded as unrealistic. Second, the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the expansion of cooperative relations with China contributed. As a result of the establishment of diplomatic relations and the three Soviet–South Korean summits held on June 4, 1990 in San Francisco, on December 12–14, 1990 in Moscow and on April 20, 1991 on Cheju Island, South Korea received Soviet support for 30

 Kim, ibid., Fall 1991, pp. 407–409; Kim, op. cit., December 1991, p. 324; Koh, op. cit., pp. 35–36; Wang, op. cit., 1994, pp. 6–7. Original quotation marks except the last quotation.

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its UN admission. Owing to improving relations and international support for South Korea’s UN admission, China did not consider to exercise its veto in the UN Security Council as North Korea had expected. As the United States and the Soviet Union expressed support for South Korea’s UN admission at the 45th General Assembly held in 1990, China better understood the international opinion. Third, since the South Korean government early in 1991 declared its policy to accomplish UN membership during the year, allies such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and France as well as principal nonallies came to support UN admission more than ever before. Especially the memorandum circulated in the UN Security Council on April 8 made North Korea realize that there was no other alternative than to seek UN membership.31 Fourth, North Korea’s argument to oppose simultaneous UN admission of the two Koreas that it would perpetuate division lost persuasion. Consequently, Pyongyang could not obstruct and delay Seoul’s UN admission any longer. Owing to the unification of Yemen on May 22, 1990, and Germany on October 3, 1990, the argument lost reasonability and persuasion since the two divided nations had long been UN members (North Yemen since 1947 and South Yemen since 1962). North Korea’s membership applications in 1949 and 1952 and through the Soviet Union in 1957(2) and 1958 also show that the argument was contradictory. In addition, according to the UN Charter, it is impossible to apply for a joint seat for a sovereign nation. Both the Soviet Union and China as well as many other countries pointed out that the argument for one seat had many problems and was unrealistic. Since North Korea prior to UN admission was member of many international organizations, it lost reasonability to object to simultaneous UN membership for the two Koreas. Joint membership in the organizations would already have perpetuated division. North Korea’s argument that it could decide over the two Koreas’ UN admission was irrational since a decision had to be made between the country wishing to become member and the UN. 31

 Kang, op. cit., 2002, p. 81; Kim, ibid., December 1991, pp. 322–326.

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62  South Korea in the United Nations

Fifth, North Korea probably calculated that through simultaneous UN admission with South Korea, it would escape from diplomatic and economic difficulties by establishing diplomatic relations with Japan and improved relations with Western powers. Eventually, UN membership became above all a matter of survival. If North Korea would continue to pursue the same policies as hitherto at a time when the global environment was changing, isolation would increase and possibilities for the social system to remain diminish. Consequently, North Korea realized that only peaceful coexistence with South Korea would guarantee its survival. The UN admission was clearly the most significant change in its policy.32 With this multifaceted background, Pyongyang and Seoul submitted formal applications for membership on July 8 and August 6, 1991, respectively. South Korea had proposed to North Korea to submit the applications jointly, but the DPRK rejected the proposal to avoid any impression of accommodating the simultaneous and separate memberships the ROK had proposed since 1973. On August 8, the UN Security Council merged the two applications to the Committee for the Admission of New Members as resolution 702, which was adopted without a vote at a meeting that only lasted for seven minutes. On September 17, 1991, both Koreas simultaneously became members through the approval without a vote of the UN General Assembly. Thanks to the end of the global Cold War, South Korea had eventually accomplished the most important target of its foreign policy. The single most important difference caused by the UN admission of the two Koreas was that both acquired the right to vote raising their international positions. As observers, they could only observe the proceedings of the General Assembly, its committees, and other UN organs and express its views at the discretion of the relevant UN bodies. By lacking the right to vote, they could not participate in the decision-making process of the UN. An irrational and unnatural international position had come to an end. Significantly, by joining the UN, both Koreas received official recognition by the 32

 Kim, ibid., December 1991, pp. 326, 329–330; Pak, op. cit., 1990, p. 24.

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international community as respectable sovereign states ending the bitter struggle for exclusive legitimacy between them. To exist as a state without being a UN member means that the fore and the back do not match each other.33 The two last sentences confirm the opinion that full membership in the UN is a key indicator of international status (cf. pp. 29–30, 42, 49). South Korea’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lee Sang-ock, expressed on September 17 through his address to the 46th UN General Assembly hope and expectation that the two Koreas’ parallel membership would certainly open a new chapter in inter-Korean relations. He also claimed: “Now, as a full member of this august world body, my country is prepared to redouble its efforts to promote the noble objectives of the United Nations.” President Roh said on September 24, in his address to the General Assembly, that he regarded it no less significant that along with the ROK also the DPRK had become UN member. The president stated: “In this hall of peace, the two Koreas will open a new avenue of dialogue and cooperation that will lead to our national unity.” Also, “With the entry of the two Koreas into the United Nations, we have embarked on a new phase of coexistence. Now, it is our task to build on this foundation a positive relationship, which will soon bring peace, stability and national unity.” Additionally, “Continuation of wasteful confrontation” and refusal “…to recognize each other…” would “…only prolong the painful tragedy of national division.” Consequently, the joint admission of the two Koreas into the UN marked “…an important turning point in inter-Korean relations since the division of our land in 1945.” On unification, the president further stated: “Imperfect as it may be, the separate membership of the two Koreas in the United Nations is an important interim step on the road to national unification.” “Now, we will seek to achieve national ­ ­ unification: 33

 Cho, op. cit., 1991, pp. 277–278; Choi, op. cit., 1992, pp. 1–2; Han, op. cit., p. 390; Kang, op. cit., 1995, pp. 20, 24; Koh, op. cit., pp. 36, 41; Pak, op. cit., 2000, p. 73; Pak, op. cit., 2013, p. 2; Wang, op. cit., 1994, p. 9. In 2007, only the Vatican State and Palestine had observer status in the UN. From Park, op. cit., 2007: a, p. 189: fn. 3.

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peacefully — without the use of military force; ­independently — on the basis of self-determination; and democratically — according to the free will of the Korean people.” He noted that it took 17 years for East and West Germany to combine their seats and sincerely hoped that it would not take as long for the two Korean seats to become one. President Roh pointed out that North and South Korea became bound by the UN Charter to implement the duty of all members to maintain world peace. Finally, “…we hope to return the benefits we received from around the world by playing an active role in solving the global North-South problem.”34 According to the Korean scholar Han Sung-Joo (1991), since South Korea’s application for UN membership had languished there for 43 years before the country became a member, UN admission had a special meaning to both the government and the people. A long-cherished diplomatic goal had finally been achieved. More important, the international community had given an official stamp of recognition and approval for South Korea’s due place in world politics and economy. It was a success of “northern diplomacy” that aimed to win diplomatic recognition by the formally socialist countries that previously had refused to deal with South Korea for fears of offending North Korea. Kang (1995) writes that the zero-sum struggle between North and South Korea for UN membership now had ended, an opinion that is entirely in line with the account of General Assembly resolutions adopted until 1976. As recorded by Hong Nack Kim (1991), most UN members, including the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, regarded the joint entry into the UN as significantly contributing to peace and security on the Korean peninsula. Regarding Pyongyang’s attitude, on September 18, the North Korean Foreign Ministry welcomed in a statement the “unanimous decision” of the UN General Assembly and called it a “clear expression

34

 Kang, ibid., 1995, p. 21: op. cit., 2002, p. 78; Mo, op. cit., pp. 51–52; Roh, Tae Woo, Toward a Peaceful World Community, Address by H.E. Roh Tae Woo President of the Republic of Korea to the 46th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (New York: United Nations, September 24, 1991), pp. 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 21.

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of the sincere desire of the UN member states to cooperate closely with our Republic” in dealing with global problems, while “respecting the independence and dignity of the [DPRK].” Kim Yong Sun, secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party in charge of international affairs, pledged in a separate statement issued two days later that as UN member the DPRK government would “respect the UN Charter, faithfully carry out international obligations, and fulfil its international responsibilities and role in…building a free and peaceful new world…” Kim then added: Now that the admission of our Republic to the UN has been ­realized, the disgraceful relationship [pulmisûrôun kwan’gye] that has existed between us and the UN for over 40 years can be ­ameliorated. … “The United Nations Command” that exists in the southern part of the Korean Peninsula must be dissolved, all f­oreign troops must be withdrawn, and the Korean Armistice Agreement that has “the United Nations forces” as one of the parties must be replaced by durable arrangements for guaranteeing peace.

Premier Yon Hyong Muk reiterated the preceding points in his speech to the UN General Assembly several days later. He also stressed the need to create a “new international order” in which independence, equality, justice, peace, and democracy prevail. North Korea was described as a country in which “the great leader, the party, and the masses are united as one.” Also, North Korean socialism can withstand “any wind blowing from the outside.”35 The reserved reaction to UN membership compared to South Korea confirms that North Korea decided to join the UN because there was no other alternative (cf. p. 58). Since the account confirms that to become UN member is of the utmost importance for a country’s international status, it is worthwhile to finally pay some attention to Taiwan, which cannot become a UN member and the consequences of nonmembership. Taiwan was expelled from the UN in 1971 when the People’s Republic of 35

 Han, op. cit., pp. 389, 391; Kang, ibid., 1995, p. 20; Kim, op. cit., Fall 1991, p. 409; Koh, op. cit., p. 36. Original quotation marks.

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China took over China’s membership. Since then, Taiwan has, due to China’s one-China policy, been unable to regain membership in both the General Assembly and the UN-affiliated organizations. During President Ma Ying-jeou’s reign (2008–2016) Taiwan has not sought UN membership but attempted to get an observer status in some of the organizations affiliated to the UN. The best hope for Taiwan within the UN system is to obtain observer status in some of those organizations. Recently, Taiwan was awarded observer status in the World Health Assembly without becoming member of the WHO. Yet, this is the first such case. It is a big disadvantage for Taiwan’s international position to not be UN member since it makes it impossible for the country to make its voice heard within the UN system. The island cannot participate in international conferences hampering first-hand acquirement of scientific knowledge etc. available to member states. One such example is the question of entering the ICAO that works with an issue involving Taiwan. To get knowledge indirectly through its few diplomatic allies in, for instance, Central America and the Pacific is not the same thing as to acquire it first hand.36 In spite of not being UN member, Taiwan is member of the Asian Development Bank and some regional organizations. On the other hand, Taiwanese nongovermental organizations (NGOs) have difficulties to attend international conferences due to China’s resistance.37 The disadvantages experienced by the 36

 One underappreciated advantage of the UN is its capacity to convene groups and to mobilize power to help funnel knowledge from outside and ensure that it is discussed and disseminated among governments through, for instance, UN-sponsored world conferences and government-head summits. From Weiss and Thakur, op. cit., pp. 40–41. 37  Interview with representatives at the Taipei Mission in Sweden on September 25, 2013. Since the General Assembly adopted resolution 2758 recognizing one China in 1971, the Taiwanese government is not recognized as a state by the UN or similar organizations and major countries. Taiwan is only member of a few international organizations. It is member of the World Trade Organization and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation under the name Chinese Taipei and in the Asian Development Bank as Taipei, China. Both names imply that Taiwan is one part of

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two Koreas prior to 1991 should have been quite similar to those experienced by Taiwan since 1971, but important differences are that both Koreas had observer status and were members of most UN agencies prior to admission.

2.5 Conclusions Korea’s long history with the UN began in 1947 when the General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for holding elections, but the UN could only enter the American occupation zone where the ROK was established in 1948. South Korea now wished to become UN member in order to elevate its international position. In reality, its position was elevated as an outcome of the December 12, 1948, UN General Assembly that recognized the ROK as the only legitimate Korean government. During the Korean War, the UN helped South Korea to repel the North Korean invasion since the Soviet Union could not exercise its veto in the Security Council due to the issue of Chinese representation. Whereas South Korea had shown a positive attitude to the UN already prior to the war, the opposite was the case with North Korea. The war further solidified their incompatible positions, although there are a few examples after 1953, indicating that the DPRK realized that there would be advantages with joining. The incompatible positions contributed to the failure of the 1954 Geneva conference to resolve the Korean question. In contrast, the UN was involved in the reconstruction of South Korea that benefited from the assistance. South Korea’s application for UN membership in 1949 failed, as it did also in 1952, 1961, and twice in 1975. Also the applications made through its allies in 1949(2), 1954, 1955(3), 1957(2), and 1958 failed. Owing to the Cold War system, the Soviet Union exerted China. From 1993, Taiwan applied under the name Republic of China every year for UN membership but China rejected. In order to reduce tensions with China, it has recently sought membership with the popular name Taiwan but China has rejected. From Park, op. cit., 2007: a, pp. 197–198.

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68  South Korea in the United Nations

its veto in the Security Council or the issue was not raised at all. In 1975, China also opposed South Korea’s UN membership. The repeated applications indicate that not being UN member was a “national trauma.” In 1949 and 1952, North Korea had applied for UN membership but failed. Also applications made by the Soviet Union twice in 1957 and again in 1958 failed since the United States exerted its veto. Since 1949, South Korea maintained a UN observation mission that made its position at the UN stronger than North Korea that only in 1973 established two observation missions. Initially, both Koreas advocated unilateral admission but North Korea supported the Soviet proposals for joint membership in 1957 (2) and 1958. South Korea and the United States then continued to adhere to unilateral UN membership arguing that separate membership would perpetuate division. The turning point in the question of Korean UN membership was the June 23, 1973 policy declaration. South Korea would not oppose separate UN admission for the two Koreas if it was conducive to ease tensions and strengthen international cooperation. This policy was afterward consistently pursued. However, North Korea claimed that separate admission would perpetuate division but contradicted itself by being member of several UN bodies and separate UN membership of Germany and Yemen prior to 1990 unification. South Korea’s launching of the northern policy through the July 7, 1988 declaration advocating improved relations with North Korea and Communist countries and the successful holding of the 1988 Seoul Olympics coincided with reform policies pursued by the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Thanks to the end of the Cold War, both the Soviet Union and China changed their opinion on Korean UN membership supporting separate admission. China in particular played a crucial role to change North Korea’s resistance to separate membership. The Security Council approved the two Korea’s membership applications on August 8 and the General Assembly on September 17, 1991. High-ranking South Korean officials, including President Roh Tae Woo, were highly appreciative of having accomplished the 43-year long dream to become UN member but their North Korean

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counterparts showed a more reserved attitude. A new era of coexistence and peace in inter-Korean relations would open. The major change brought by UN membership was that both Koreas by voting could exert influence on decision-making processes. Attention is now turned to whether South Korea actually did so.

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Chapter 3

The Impact of UN Membership on Inter-Korean Relations

3.1 Introduction As we have seen in Chapter 2, it was an extraordinarily complex process for the two Koreas to eventually become UN members in 1991. Since South Korea’s 43-year-long wish to enter the UN had been accomplished, the question was now what it would do as a member. In order to illuminate this complex question, this chapter investigates, based on the predictions of South Korea’s UN membership, the impact on four standards of evaluation: participation in UN agencies, membership in the Security Council on two occasions, resolutions adopted by the Security Council on North Korea following its repeated missile and nuclear tests, and the North Korean human rights issue. The first section presents the predictions made in the 1990s on the outcome of UN membership by some Korean scholars and the president’s secretary on state affairs. Since the predictions to a large extent focused on the impact on inter-Korean relations, North Korea is included here. Another area was the possibilities for South Korea to raise its global position by exerting influence on world politics by participating in decision making. The second section investigates what UN agencies South Korea took part in after 1991 and enumerates the periods of 71

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board membership. When available, data on work in the most important agencies and evaluations of it are recorded. North and South Korea’s interactions through UN agencies and issues on which the two nations were involved are investigated. A brief account of developments in inter-Korean relations in the early 1990s of importance for the following two sections concludes the section. Focus lies on the North Korean nuclear issue, its impact on relations, and how the issue was handled through bilateral DPRK–United States talks but the UN Security Council is also included. The third section investigates South Korea’s membership in the Security Council in 1996–1997. Opinions on the advantages and disadvantages of being a nonpermanent member are recorded, as are the limitations of being a nonpermanent member. Why South Korea decided to seek membership, how the country was elected, and what it did in the Council are the issues analyzed. Inter-Korean relations form an important part here but other issues are also included. The section contains some assessments of South Korea’s work, including the significance of being a nonpermanent member. The factors that enabled South Korea’s reelection to the Council in 2012 are investigated. Inter-Korean relations are important also in the fourth and fifth sections since they formed the context in which North Korea conducted missile tests in 1998, 2006, 2009, 2012, and 2016 and nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, 2013, and 2016. The main section of this chapter first presents South Korea’s sunshine policy pursued from 1998 to 2008 and records steps forward and backward in inter-Korean relations. Also here inter-Korean contacts within the UN are investigated. The account points out what particular developments led to the North Korean missile and nuclear tests, which are the main issues of investigation. The Security Council’s resolutions and subsequent developments are analyzed in some detail. The Council’s response included economic sanctions. Reports made by the UN and a few other observers on the outcome of the resolutions are included. The section analyzes South Korea’s second term of ­membership in the Security Council from 2013 to 2014 and again

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includes inter-Korean relations. The author’s analysis of the outcome of UN sanctions and the impact of UN membership on relations concludes the section. The fifth section investigates work conducted by the UN on human rights violations in North Korea and South Korea’s role in the process. One major issue is the work of the UN Commission of Inquiry that presented its report in 2014.

3.2 Predictions on the Outcome of South Korea’s UN Membership Predictions on the outcome of South Korea’s UN membership largely focused on inter-Korean relations but not exclusively. According to Han (1991), membership would not only mean the opportunity to participate more actively in international decision making but also the responsibility to take positions on issues and making greater contributions to UN activities such as participating in peacekeeping operations (PKOs). In the past, the South Korean participation had been limited to financial contributions to operations endorsed by the UN such as the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War for which Seoul reportedly gave $500 million. In 1991, a 600-member medical corps was dispatched to support the multinational force that implemented the Security Council resolution on the Iraq– Kuwait War. Although it was the first official contribution to a UN activity, the Seoul government was then criticized for not having dispatched combat troops. Having become member made it more likely and easier to make a more substantive and substantial contribution to UN-sanctioned operations. Regarding the impact on inter-Korean relations, the Korean states’ simultaneous entry created “…a ready and useful channel of dialogue and consultation.” Contrary to the apprehension some hold that North Korea might bring the inter-Korean quarrel into the UN, it will be in Pyongyang’s own interest to maintain a ­relationship of coexistence with Seoul. The UN would offer the DPRK an invaluable opportunity to regularly contact all countries

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e­ nabling it to come out of its international isolation. Separate UN membership would also give it universal recognition facilitating protection of its existence. Consequently, unlike the opinions in Chapter 2, North Korea had a compelling reason of its own to join the UN instead of just counteracting South Korea’s strong drive for admission. Since both Koreas agreed to uphold the UN Charter, they, in effect, renounced war and accepted the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes. South Korea’s insistence on separate memberships has, in effect, helped Pyongyang to join the world community of nations and adopt a policy of peaceful coexistence with Seoul. Institutionalization of peaceful coexistence would help the states to conduct their relations with greater confidence and stability. By entering the UN, the two Koreas have agreed to experiment with accommodation and ultimately cooperation and have taken the first concrete step in the long journey to unification. Similarly, Hong Nack Kim (1991) regards UN admission as the beginning of a new era of bilateral relations between the two Koreas, which had refused to recognize the legitimacy of each other. The admission symbolizes that both Koreas were recognized as legitimate sovereign states by the most comprehensive and authoritative international organization. Such a position stands in sharp contrast to the unilateral recognition by the UN of South Korea on December 12, 1948, reflecting changed geopolitical realities. It has become preposterous to further discuss the legitimacy of the two Koreas or to refuse to recognize the existence of each other. Both Koreas were expected to fulfil the peaceful settlement of international disputes, as stipulated in the UN Charter. The abnormal relationship between the two Koreas would undergo drastic change as a result of UN admission. Since membership is open only to “peace-loving states,” which “are able and willing to carry out these obligations” recorded in the UN Charter, it became futile for either Korea to contend that it alone is the “sole legitimate” government on the peninsula. By accepting separate UN membership, North Korea has nullified its own “one-Korea policy.” This acceptance of the political reality through the existence of two different sovereign

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states on the Korean peninsula would pave the path for the normalization of inter-Korean relations.1 The president’s secretary of state affairs, Yôm Hong-ch’ôl (1991), argues that the symbolic significance of UN admission was that South Korea’s international position had been raised (cf. p. 64). The ROK had become an important country in the global community. However, the real significance was that South Korea, which, in concurrence with the opinion of Kang (2002), had maintained a position outside the global community now had risen to one through which it would be able to exert considerable influence on the formation of world politics (cf. p. 49). The rising global position and role would also be accompanied by a corresponding rise in responsibility. South Korea would have to show interest in global issues and express its clear position. It would be requested to take part in and make contributions in the fields of military, economic, and political issues handled by the UN. It would become necessary to broaden interests from the Korean peninsula to such global issues as the environment, women’s issues, arms reduction, race discrimination, human rights, and religious tensions to contribute to resolve them. In the case of inter-Korean relations, Yôm in a similar way as Han and Kim argues that through UN membership, a new channel for dialogue on a regular basis was created since high-ranking officials from both Koreas could meet at one place. Since by joining the UN the two Koreas would observe the UN Charter to resolve conflicts peacefully and restrain from using military force, the result could become a de facto declaration of nonaggression or nonaggression agreement between the two Koreas. It was expected that the joint UN admission would psychologically act to deter the renewal of warfare. Considering the special state of inter-Korean relations, UN membership itself would become a minimum condition for peaceful relations. In brief, peace would be enhanced and reunification advanced.2 1

 Han, op. cit., pp. 391–392, 393, 396; Kim, op. cit., Fall 1991, pp. 397, 410; Pak, op. cit., 2000, p. 151. Original quotation marks except for the first quotation. 2  Yôm, Hong-ch’ôl, “Yuen kaib-i kajyô-ta-chun Nambuk taehwa-ûi chungyosông,” Han’guk Nondan, no. 11 (November 1991), pp. 169–170, 172, 174.

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In accordance with the assessment made by Han (1991), Kim Kang-nyông (1991) argues that at a time when the role of the UN was regarded to be more important than ever to maintain world peace and to peacefully resolve disputes as well as environmental, development, drugs and human rights issues, joint UN admission would enable both North and South Korea to raise their international position. Consequently, as members they could fully participate in the decision-making process to resolve global issues by, for instance, becoming members of the Security Council and thereby contribute to promote international peace and security. In addition, South Korean citizens could hold positions in such important bodies as the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the Secretariat referred to in the Introduction. South Korea could also raise its position through financial contributions. Similar to the above opinions, Kim writes that since the two Koreas as UN members will have to fulfil their duties to peacefully resolve disputes without using military force, joint UN admission would create an opportunity for inter-Korean relations to develop within such a global framework contributing to normalize relations. Like Han (1991), Kim points out that through UN membership a channel for regular and official dialogue has been secured. In this way, cooperation and exchanges within the UN would be promoted and on the basis of mutual trust new inter-Korean relations based on harmony and cooperation will be created. Such a state of affairs will eventually contribute to promote reunification. Kim differs from the other observers by writing that joint UN admission would establish a basis for reorganizing the security structure in Northeast Asia. In the medium and long run, it was anticipated that North Korea inevitably would have to revise its policy toward South Korea and accept peaceful coexistence on the Korean peninsula in order to overcome its economic difficulties and diplomatic isolation. In such a scenario, North Korea was expected to actively participate in a reorganization of the regional security order. If inter-Korean relations would stabilize, a new regional security order would also be promoted.3 3

 Kim, op. cit., December 1991, pp. 330–331, 332.

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The Korean university student Mo Sang Jip (1998) largely concurs with the above views by writing that UN membership did not simply end with entering the UN but also had political significance as a symbolic act to settle confrontation between the two Koreas and pledge a new era of coexistence and reconciliation. By resettling inter-Korean relations, North Korea would recognize South Korea as an entity. UN membership would institutionalize relations enabling stability, providing opportunities for contacts between the two Koreas, promoting mutual prevention of military incidents and reduction of tensions, contributing to resolve inter-Korean issues peacefully through reconciliation and becoming an opportunity to enhance cooperation. South Korea would be able to participate in decision making on world peace and prosperity as well as global issues. Through the rise as one of the major economic powers with 43 million inhabitants, Seoul will have more duties than rights toward the international community. As the only observer known to the author, Mo writes that to join the UN was in one sense not an entirely new state but a mere recognition of the two Koreas’ past participation in UN agencies, indicating that both states could base their work at least partly on accumulated experiences from 1948 to 1991. In the most cautious evaluation found by the author, the Korean university student Choi Woo-Soon (1994) writes that to expect that the UN would contribute to a final solution of the Korean question would be to have excessive expectations. The previous involvement of the UN in the Korean question had shown that its role in creating a peace regime on the Korean peninsula and preparing for unification was extremely limited. There was a common opinion among [nonexemplified] experts that joint UN membership would not immediately contribute to an improvement of relations. Membership would not mean that the UN could prepare some special guarantees or security provisions for the Korean question. On the basis of this experience, there would be nothing to gain from the UN by again bringing the Korean question there. The notion that by joining the UN inter-Korean relations would automatically be relaxed was a dim expectation that immediately must be thrown away. As previously mentioned, the development of relations

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would also going forward depend on the two Korean governments’ policies. However, in the long run, UN admission could become a turning point for an epoch-making transformation of relations and become the starting point for building a peace regime. Along with UN admission, there was a need for separating the Korean issue from the UN and search for a solution through direct dialogue between the parties concerned. Since South Korea worked for reunification step by step, joint UN admission was one stage in the long process toward reaching this target.4

3.3  South Korea’s Participation in UN Agencies As we have seen, South Korea had a permanent mission at the UN in New York since 1949 and was in 1990 full member of nearly all specialized agencies of the UN (cf. p. 53: fn. 25). The Korean scholar Chung Utak (2015) argues that South Korea in the 1950s and 1960s had one-sidedly received economic and technical support from UN specialized agencies but could not accumulate diplomatic skills and knowledge in policymaking and administration. In contrast, on the basis of its rising position in the global economy during the 1970s and 1980s, the country gradually accumulated experiences and knowledge of UN specialized agencies building up its expertise in this field. From this time onward, Koreans began to advance in international organizations, including the UN, and participate more frequently in their meetings (but no examples have been recorded). Such experiences were the foundations on which to base the opening of real diplomacy in international organizations. Later, in December 2012, South Korea was member of 25 affiliated, specialist and independent agencies compared to 15 for North Korea.5 South Korea had become member of four agencies after 4

 Choi, op. cit., 1994, pp. 43, 58, 59; Mo, op. cit., pp. 29–30, 32.  North Korea was still not member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the 5

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becoming the UN member: the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 1991, the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, the 66-member Geneva Conference on Disarmaments (CD) in 1996, and the UN Economic Commission on Central and South America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) in 2007. The only agencies that North Korea had joined were the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) in 1992 and the Geneva CD in 1996. Such a situation stands in sharp contrast to the prediction by Han (1991) that the UN would offer an invaluable opportunity to regularly contact all countries enabling it to come out of its international isolation. As recorded by Pak (2000), its “… political system has inhibited a meaningful participation in the UN activities.” From February 1992, South Korea began to participate in many UN activities. On April 29, 1992, the ECOSOC, consisting of 54 member states, elected South Korea as a board member of the 48-member UN Development Program (UNDP), which works to eradicate poverty, preserve the environment, transfer technology, and improve the position of women, the 53-member UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), the 34-member UN Committee for Program and Coordination (UNCPC), and the 40-member UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (UNCCPCJ) for two years, and the 81-member UN Committee on Information (UNCI). It was the second mandate period in the UNDP followed by membership in the periods 1998–2000, 2008–2010, and 2012–2014. South Korea was member of the UNCPC during 1993–2010, 2011– 2013, and 2014–2016 and in the UNCHR from 1993 to 2006. Since especially the UNDP, the UNCHR, and the UNCPC constitute the core role of the UN in the economic and social fields, to become their member had great importance from the point of raising diplomatic capacity. South Korea was selected thanks to its important role in the economic and social fields. Since board members judge the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the UN Economic Commission on Central and South America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). From Han’guk wegyobu, op. cit., 2013, p. 362.

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agencies’ plans of operation, report about the work, and decide principal policies, it was crucial for the ROK to serve as a board member in order to upgrade its UN diplomacy.6 In June 1992, the ROK delegate was elected one of two ViceChairmen for the UN Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro. During the 47th General Assembly in 1992, South Korea was elected and played the role of Vice-Chairman in the Assembly’s First Committee. To be elected only about a year after UN admission meant that the ROK enjoyed a high position in UN politics and diplomacy. South Korea actively participated in not only disarmament, political, and security issues but also in economic, social, and environmental issues. By participating in the UNCCPCJ and the 53-member UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (UNCND), South Korea participated actively in the work to resolve such global matters as eradicating drugs and promoting human rights. In 1992, the ROK was elected board member of the ECOSOC and served as such during 1993–1995, 1997–1999, 2001–2003, 2004– 2006, 2008–2010, 2011–2013, and 2014–2016 making Seoul an active member of the main UN agency in the economic and social field. In 1993, the ROK held one of the four posts of Vice-Chairmen in the ECOSOC and was Chairman of the Social Committee. The 6

 Chung, Utak, “Han’guk-gwa kukche kigu: yôksachôk koch’al,” in Park, Heungsoon, Chung, Utak and Lee, Shin-wha, Kukche kigu-wa Han’guk wegyo — iron-gwa silche (Seoul: Tosô ch’ulp’an Oruem, 2015), pp. 32, 34, 35: Table 1; Han’guk wegyobu, ibid., 2013, p. 362; Kang, op. cit., 1995, p. 21; Krasno, op. cit., p. 8; Mo, op. cit., pp. 34–35, 37: Table 3-3; Pak, op. cit., 2000, pp. 150, 151, 152; Park, HeungSoon, Kukche kiguron: UN, taja wegyo, Han’guk (Asan: Sônmun taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 2015), p. 143; Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations, Korea’s Activities, July 30, 2015 (http://un.mofat.go.kr/english/ am/un/main/index.jsp); So, Pyông-yong, “Uri-ûi Yuen kigu ch’amyô hwaltong,” Wegyo, no. 4 (December 1993), pp. 45, 46, 47. The ECOSOC originally had 18 members, but with a growing number of developing countries joining the UN, the body was expanded in 1965 by a Charter amendment to include 27 members. It was enlarged again in 1973 to 54. Although the ECOSOC has the status as one of the six main organs of the UN, it actually functions under the General Assembly and is often criticized for duplicating the work of the Assembly’s six main committees. From Krasno, ibid., p. 8.

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reelection in 1996 was above all a consequence of the global community’s recognition of South Korea’s astonishing growth, which had created the world’s 11th largest economic power. For South Korea as an open economy, it would be especially important to by actively participating in the decision-making process of the ECOSOC, which exerts a great influence on each country’s economic policy and development reflect its position on the formation of the global economic order. In 2008, the ROK UN Ambassador was elected Vice-Chairman of the ECOSOC for one year, enabling Seoul to assume a leading role in the debate on development and environmental issues, humanitarian assistance, and human rights. On January 14, 2014, UN Ambassador Oh Joon was elected one of four Vice-Chairmen of the ECOSOC as representative of the Asia-Pacific Group. On July 24, 2015, he was, in accordance with the principle of rotation, elected Chairman for one year. In the work to prepare the Sustainable Development Goals adopted at the Development Summit Conference held in September 2015, South Korea consulted the other ECOSOC members.7 The prediction of Kim Kang-nyông (1991) regarding Koreans holding high UN positions had through the appointments within the ECOSOC materialized. Following UN admission, South Korea also served as board member of many agencies. They include the Afro-Asian Rural 7

 Author’s visit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 7, 2016; Chung, ibid., 2015, p. 36: Table 2; Donga Ilbo, “‘Kyôngje sahoe isagug’-ûi ûimi,” in Park, Soo-gil, Yuen wegyo ch’oechônsôn-esô: Park Soo-gil taesa, wegyogwan 36nyôn-ûi kirog (Seoul: Tosô ch’ulp’an Oruem, 2014a), pp. 66, 67; Han’guk wegyobu, op. cit., 2009, pp. 186–187: Oh Joon chu Yuen taesa, kyôngje sahoe isahoe (ECOSOC) puûijang sônch’ul, January 15, 2014 (http://www.mofa.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/korb... enum=2&tableName=TYPE_ DATABOARD&pc=&dc=&wc=&lu=&vu=&iu=&du=); Kang, ibid., 1995, p. 21; Mo, ibid., pp. 34, 35; Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations, ibid; So, ibid., pp. 43, 45; The Korea Herald, “S. Korea to chair U.N. organ on development,” July 22, 2015 (http://www.koreaherald. com/ common_prog/newsprint.php?ud= 20150722001146&dt=2). Mo (ibid., p. 34) does not say how South Korea participated in the work to eradicate drugs, promote human rights, and in disarmament, political, security, economic, social, and environmental issues disabling an assessment of its contributions.

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Reconstruction Organization (AARRO) for the eighth time from 1991 to 1994, the Common Fund for Commodities (CFC) from 1991 to 1993, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) for the third time from 1991 to 1994, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the eighth time from 1991 to 1993, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) from 1991 to 1993, the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) from 1992 onward, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) from 1991 onward, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) for the second time from 1991 to 1995, the 41-member UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) for the third time from 1992 to 1994, the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) for the second time from 1991 to 1995, and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) for the third time from 1992 to 1993. In the case of UNESCO, South Korea has maintained a domestic committee since it became member on June 14, 1950. Through the UNESCO, South Korea has participated in the education on world peace and work to promote understanding of global issues among developing countries but without holding any leading posts. By participating in the UNESCO as well as almost all other specialized UN agencies, South Korea has contributed to enhance international cooperation benefiting world peace. South Korea became UNESCO board member for the first time in 1987 and remained as such until 2003 but without playing a leading role. As a concrete example of multilateral assistance through the UN, from 2000, South Korea supplied through its UNESCO Committee printing paper for textbooks to North Korea and again in 2007. From 2005 to 2006, South Korea donated and operated printing facilities of textbooks in North Korea. The ROK government has also provided trust funds for the preservation of wall paintings in old tombes from the Koguryô kingdom (37 B.C.–668 A.D.). The ROK was reelected UNESCO board member for four years in 2007 and 2011. In 1993, South Korea was elected board member from 1994 to 1997 of the 45-member UN Commission on the Status of Women (UNCSW), which is one of the functional committees of the ECOSOC. The

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ROK served without interruption until 2014, including as Chairman from 2003 to 2004. Having been elected board member of the ECOSOC helped South Korea to in 1997 be elected on the board of the UNDP, the UNCSW, the UNCCPCJ, the IMO, and the FAO. The Human Development Report issued by the UNDP is, along with the World Disaster Report published by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), one resource that confirms the wide professional analysis and intelligence capacity by intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) to provide expertise and intelligence to member states (cf. pp. 7, 33, 43). The UNDP provides, together with the UNIDO and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), experiences, knowledge, and intelligence of development as well as support in terms of human and financial resources. In 1999, South Korea was reelected board member of the FAO and the IMO, in the latter case for five years. From March 16 to April 24, 1999, Foreign Minister Hong Soon-young participated for the first time in the UNCHR session and emphasized the importance of human rights in South Korea’s foreign policy. Hong also requested the global community to show interest in the North Korean human rights issue and in divided families.8 In February 2000, the ECOSOC elected South Korea board member of the UNHCR. The country remained board member until 2014. The Ambassador in Geneva, Ch’oe Sôk-yông, served as Chairman from 2013 to 2014. In April 2000, South Korea was elected to the UNESCO Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return of Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its Restitution in Case of Illicit Appropriation (ICPRCP). 8

  Chung, Utak, “Hangug-ûi tae UNESCO wegyo chôllyak — UNESCO-esô-ûi Han’guk yônghyangnyôk chego pangan-ûl chungsim-ûro,” Kukche kigu chônôl, vol. 2, no. 1 (2007), pp. 122, 138–139: ibid., 2015, pp. 35: Table 1, 36: Table 2; Han’guk wegyobu, ibid., 2009, p. 187: Mo, ibid., pp. 34, 37: Table 3-3; Park, op. cit., 2013, pp. 64, 65; Park, op. cit., 2015, p. 46; Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations, ibid; So, ibid., pp. 45, 46; Wang, Im-dong, “Sin kukche chilsô-esô-ûi Han’gug-ûi Yuen wegyo-ûi pang-hyang-gwa kwaje,” Han’guk tongbuga nonch’ong, vol. 22 (2002), pp. 13, 20; Yi, op. cit., 2013, pp. 328–329.

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In September 2000, the ROK was elected board member of the World Health Organization (WHO). Since the global community regarded South Korea as a leading defender of democracy and human rights in Asia, which had played a constructive role in the predecessor the UNCHR, it was, on May 9, 2006, elected board member to the new UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) with 47 member states established on March 15, 2006. It served the Council also from 2013 to 2015. Unlike its predecessor, the UNCHR that was affiliated with the ECOSOC, the UNHRC is auxiliary to the General Assembly. The measure was taken as a consequence of the reform proposal by the 2005 World Summit to overcome complexity and inefficiency since agencies affiliated to the ECOSOC have to report to both the General Assembly and the ECOSOC that both have to approve reports. In disarmaments, in 2006, the ROK was Chairman of the three highest responsible bodies at the UN: the First Committee of the 60th UN General Assembly responsible for disarmaments and international security, the Conference on Disarmaments (CD) in Geneva, and the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC). Consequently, South Korea’s position in multilateral diplomacy and disarmaments was greatly elevated, but it had been an observer in the Geneva CD since 1988 and member since 1996, enabling the ROK to practically participate in important decision-making processes. Also North Korea became member of the CD in 1996. In the UNDC, substantial debates that had been interrupted for two years reopened. In 1993, the ROK had held one of the posts as ViceChairman. In 2009–2010, the ROK was member of the Peacebuilding Commission set up in 2006 and worked in 2009–2010 in its Organizing Committee. In 2009, it was Vice-Chairman. The mandate was extended to 2011–2012. The annual contribution to the peace-building fund was $3.5 million. In addition, South Korea has been board member of the 53-member UN Committee on Sustainable Development (UNCSD), the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM), and the ILO. The country has been committee member of the Convention on the

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Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). South Korea has, through its membership, worked for human rights as well as social and cultural issues and has, thereby in the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009), raised its international position.9 Participation in UN agencies confirms liberals’ opinion that cooperation is possible and will expand over time. By participating in the UN agencies, international support for the ROK had entered a qualitative phase (cf. pp. 3, 10, 53). After UN admission, the two Koreas became more active in global affairs and expanded their interaction on the international arena. On February 1, 1992, the South Korean UN Ambassador Park Soo-gil and the North Korean UN Ambassador Yi Ch’ôl met in Geneva. The North then accepted the South’s proposal to hold one regular monthly meeting. The DPRK suggested contacts between 9

 Cho, Jung-hyun, “Ch’oegûn kukche sahoe-ûi Pukhan inkwôn nonûi tonghyang: Yuen Pukhan inkwôn chosa wiwônhoe (COI)-rûl chungsim-ûro,” Jeju p’yônghwa yôn’guwôn, JPI chôngch’aek p’orôm, July 11, 2013, p. 19; Chung, ibid., 2015, p. 35: Table 1; Han’guk wegyobu, ibid., 2009, pp. 187–188, 202; Minjok t’ongil yôn’guwôn, T’ongil hwangyông-gwa Nambukhan kwangye: 1996–1997 (Seoul: Minjok t’ongil yôn’guwôn, 1996), p. 101; Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations, ibid; Shin, op. cit., 2011, p. 63; So, ibid., pp. 43, 46; Wang, ibid., 2002, pp. 18–19; Yu, Chun-gu, “Global Governance-wa UN: Governance nonûi kujo-ûi munjejôm-gwa chaejôngnip kwaje,” Chuyo kukche munje punsôk (Fall 2014), p. 61. Han’guk wegyobu (ibid., p. 188) does not record the years of membership in the agencies enumerated in the last part. Data from Han’guk wegyobu (ibid., pp. 187–188) on board membership concur largely with the data of Pak (op. cit., 1995, p. 623: fn. 16). Pak divides board membership, without recording the years, into subsidiary organs (10), specialized agencies (9), and IGOs (4). The first category contains the UNICEF, the UNCND, the UNCCPCJ, the UNDP, the UNCHR, the UNCPC, the UNCI, the UNCSD, the UNCSW, and, as the only exception, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). The second category consists of the UNESCO, the FAO, the UNIDO, the WIPO, the IMO, and the WHO. Exceptions were the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the Universal Postal Union (UPU), and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). The third category includes the AARRO. The exceptions were the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), the UN World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), and the INMARSAT.

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the Councillors and, as areas for cooperation onward, a joint position on the comfort women issue, restraint of Japan’s nuclearization, and issuing a joint declaration on denuclearization in English. The reasons for North Korea to accept regular Ambassador meetings could have been the intention to create a beneficial position in negotiations on normalizing relations with Japan and the United States and to highlight the importance of inter-Korean political and military issues. At the second meeting held in Geneva on April 10, 1992, Ambassador Yi supported South Korea’s proposal to cooperate on assuming a joint position on issues before holding international meetings. At North Korea’s proposal, the Ambassadors met on July 7. The North’s Ambassador then expressed the opinion that North and South Korea could cooperate on Japan’s proposal for a law on peacekeeping and on the two Koreas’ advancement as board member of UN bodies. South Korea welcomed with regard to ­keynote speeches in the General Assembly close cooperation on comprehensive UN issues. South Korea agreed with North Korea’s position on joint advancement in UN bodies. At the Sixth UN Conference on the Standardization of Geographical Names held from August 26 to September 3, the two Koreas for the first time took a joint position in a UN agency by jointly suggesting renaming the East Sea. Although the North Korean nuclear issue became a matter of global concern in 1993, North and South Korea cooperated at the ECOSOC board meeting held in Geneva from June 28 until late July by proposing the name East Sea instead of the internationally widely accepted name Sea of Japan. Also at the Seventh UN Conference on the Standardization of Geographical Names held from January 13 to 23, 1998, the two Koreas agreed on the name East Sea but Japan still preferred Sea of Japan. From August 2 to 27, 1993, when the UN Subcommission on Human Rights assembled in Vienna, North Korea urged Japan to conduct a complete investigation on the comfort women issue and to provide appropriate compensation to the victims and claimed that Japan also must fulfil its legal and moral responsibility to solve the issue of forced recruitments. South Korea agreed on the proposal

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that an expert should be nominated to implement an investigation to find out the real conditions of the comfort women. Later, on February 6, 1996, the UN condemned Japan for forcing tens of thousands of women into sexual slavery for its imperial troops during World War II. In 1996 and 1998, the UNCHR adopted condemnatory reports by UN special rapporteurs on the issue. The two Koreas participated, along with China, Russia, and Mongolia as well as UNDP representatives, in the third meeting of the Planning and Management Committee of the UNDP-led Tumen River Area Development Project held in Pyongyang from May 9 to 10, 1993. Two agreements were adopted on legal and systemic issues. The two Koreas also took part in meetings on communications, legal, systemic and financial issues, resources, industry, and the environment and transports. In 1994, they participated in the business meeting held by the UNDP in New York from January 31 to February 2. Participants agreed to until late May prepare material on development strategies and a guide for investments and for implementation form six expert groups.10 From March 27 to 28, 1996 North and South Korea participated in the business group meeting on the Tumen River project held in Sônbong and the meeting of the First and Second Consultative Commission held in China. In the former, along with participants from China, Russia, Mongolia, and the UNDP, mutual issues of interest in communications and infrastructure were discussed. In the meeting organized by the First Consultative Commission in Beijing from April 18 to 19, 1996, the named participants agreed to establish an office for the project in Beijing from July 1996 to June 1999. They exchanged opinions on how to meet operational costs, 10

  Gabriel Jonsson, “Can the Japan–Korea Dispute on “Comfort Women” be Resolved?,” Korea Observer, vol. 46, no. 3 (2015), pp. 496, 497; Minjok t’ongil yôn’guwôn, T’ongil hwangyông-gwa Nambukhan kwangye: 1992–1993 (Seoul: Minjok t’ongil yôn’guwôn, 1992), pp. 108–110: T’ongil hwangyông-gwa Nambukhan kwangye: 1993–1994 (Seoul: Minjok t’ongil yôn’guwôn, 1994), pp. 113–115: T’ongil hwangyônggwa Nambukhan kwangye: 1994–1995 (Seoul: Minjok t’ongil yôn’guwôn, 1994), p. 121: T’ongil hwangyông-gwa Nambukhan kwangye: 1998–1999 (Seoul: Minjok t’ongil yôn’guwôn, 1998), p. 96.

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selection of Executive Office, rules of the Commission, and a midterm business plan. At the second meeting held by the Commission from October 21 to 23 in China, rules and the invitation to accept the admission of Japan’s Consultative Commission were adopted. From November 17 to 18, 1997, a meeting was held in Beijing with the two Koreas, China, Russia, Mongolia, and the UNDP participating. They discussed overall development of the project and a proposal on how to secure capital for implementation. Whereas the above activities created by UN admission were positive signs that the two Koreas can cooperate, in 1997 at the 52nd General Assembly the North called for a DPRK–United States peace treaty and withdrawal of the American troops from South Korea. In an attempt to propagate that the whole blame for tensions on the Korean peninsula lied on the South Korean–American side, the North’s Vice-Foreign Minister claimed in his speech that to remove the threat of war and to guarantee peace the troops should be withdrawn and a DPRK–United States peace treaty signed. In response, South Korea claimed that the real parties to solve the Korean issue are the two Koreas. In 1998, at the 53rd General Assembly, South Korea’s Foreign Minister not only explained the engagement policy toward North Korea based on restoring and building trust but also, while claiming that the policy will remain, regretted that the North’s provocative acts threatened stability on the Korean peninsula. Subsequently, North Korea urged the abolition of the National Security Law (NSL), withdrawal of the American troops from South Korea, dissolution of the UN Command (UNC), and a DPRK– United States peace treaty as preconditions for holding inter-Korean talks on unification. Unification would remove the risk for a new war. By claiming that the American troops were the main obstacle to unification, the whole blame for tensions on the Korean peninsula was again put on the South Korean–American side. In 1999, at the 54th General Assembly, South Korea’s Foreign Minister emphasized that the engagement policy aims to resolve issues on the Korean peninsula by, for instance, helping North Korea to overcome its economic difficulties and to promote coexistence and coprosperity of the two Koreas. The North Korean Foreign

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Minister criticized South Korea’s engagement policy and regarded it as a conspiracy to absorb North Korea into its democratic system. He repeated that reunification should be realized through the Koryo confederal system while concluding a DPRK–United States peace treaty, dissolving the UNC, and repealing the NSL. At the 55th General Assembly in 2000, the two Koreas cooperated to accomplish the president’s statement adopted on September 7 welcoming the inter-Korean summit. The South Korean Foreign Minister claimed that the summit was the beginning of the end of the Cold War on the Korean peninsula and the establishment of a permanent peace regime. Also the North Korean Foreign Minister spoke in positive terms and refrained from criticizing South Korea. Previously, in 1998, the two Koreas had participated in conferences arranged by the UN Disarmament Center, first in Jakarta from February 16 to 18 and then in Kathmandu from February 20 to 24. At the conferences, North Korea raised the issue of the Confederal Republic of Koryo and one-sidedly argued that withdrawal of the American troops from South Korea would contribute to East Asian security. By escaping discussion of the North’s missile and nuclear programs as well as weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), inter-Korean controversies were avoided.11 As we have seen, it was generally predicted that the two Koreas’ joint UN admission would lead to an improvement of inter-Korean relations. Only three months after President Roh had emphasized the importance of joint UN admission on relations, at the fifth round of Prime Minister Talks, the premiers signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation (hereafter “Basic Agreement”) on December 13, 1991. On December 31, they signed the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the 11

 Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), The Unification Environment and Relations Between South and North Korea: 1999–2000 (Seoul: KINU, 2000), pp. 158–160; Minjok t’ongil yôn’guwôn, op. cit., 1996, p. 101: T’ongil hwangyông-gwa Nambukhan kwangye: 1997–1998 (Seoul: Minjok t’ongil yôn’guwôn, 1997), pp. 86--87, 87--88: ibid., 1998, pp. 96, 97–98; T’ongil yôn’guwôn, T’ongil hwangyông-mith Nambukhan kwangye-wa chônmang (Seoul: T’ongil yôn’guwôn, 2000), pp. 127–128.

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Korean Peninsula (hereafter “Joint Declaration”). Both documents were ratified at the sixth round of talks held in February 1992. In the Basic Agreement, the parties agreed to transform the armistice into a firm state of peace and observe the Armistice Agreement. They also agreed to not use armed force and not make armed aggression against each other, principles that concur with the UN Charter which the two Koreas had agreed to observe. In the Joint Declaration, the parties declared not to test, manufacture, produce, introduce, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons. However, as before, the period of improved relations did not last very long, in particular due to North Korea’s suspected nuclear ambitions, in spite of the Joint Declaration. Inter-Korean relations were still characterized by mutual distrust. Since following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 North Korea could no longer rely on Soviet military might to deter American military strength, to restore the balance of terror on the peninsula, Pyongyang speeded up the development of an indigenous nuclear capability. In 1992, the IAEA made three general inspections of North Korea’s nuclear facilities that caused worries regarding its nuclear development. Since the number of times of plutonium extraction and quantity declared by North Korea differed from the analytical results of the IAEA, the agency’s board requested an unprecedented special inspection. North Korea strongly rejected the request as interference in domestic affairs prohibited by the UN Charter, Chapter 1, Article 2(7) (cf. p. 8). As North Korea repeatedly denied the IAEA access to its nuclear waste site revealed by American intelligence, the 1993–1994 nuclear crisis was born. In 1993, the Security Council adopted its first resolution on the North Korean nuclear issue. On March 12, 1993, North Korea declared, owing to the rejection of the request by the IAEA for a special inspection of two military sites near Yôngbyôn where plutonium for one or two bombs may have been produced, its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), taking effect on June 12 the same year. Subsequently, the Security Council on May 11 adopted resolution 825 with 13 votes with only China and Pakistan abstaining. It called upon the DPRK to

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“reconsider that decision, honour non-proliferation obligations and comply with its IAEA safeguards agreement.” It requested the IAEA Secretary-General to continue negotiations with North Korea and report the outcome. The resolution left open the possibility that the Security Council might examine necessary measures on the issue.12 According to Koh (1995), the possibility of a Chinese veto had played a role in toning down its language. On May 12, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman strongly condemned the UN action and argued that every country has a “sovereign right” to join and withdraw from international treaties. The statement also said that the DPRK government “categorically rejects” the Security Council “resolution” as an “interference in our country’s internal affairs and a grave infringement of our sovereignty.” The statement compared the Security Council action with the Council’s “illegal” handling of the Korean question in 1950. If the UN had decided to impose sanctions on North Korea, it would have been regarded as a “declaration of war” on the DPRK. Finally, the statement warned that since the root cause of the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula was the United States, which had been largely responsible for the Security Council “resolution,” America must bear responsibility for “all the consequences” emanating from it. South Korean officials were publicly against any possible sanctions against North Korea or a preemptive strike against the Yôngbyôn nuclear reactor for fear of renewed conflict. Following high-level talks between North Korea and the United States, a settlement agreeing not to use military force, including nuclear weapons, against each other and to ensure denuclearization, peace, and security in the Korean peninsula was reached on June 11. Thanks to the settlement, the DPRK remained in the NPT. Later, from December 24 to 26, 1993, UN Secretary-General Boutros 12

 Gabriel Jonsson, Towards Korean Reconciliation: Socio-Cultural Exchanges and Cooperation (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2006), p. 94: op. cit., 2009, pp. 379–380, 381–382; Koh, op. cit., pp. 37–38; Sô, Po-hyôk (ed.), Yuen-ûi p’yônghwa chôngch’aek-gwa anjôn pojang isahoe (Seoul: Acanet, 2013), pp. 101–102. Original quotation marks.

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Boutros-Ghali and his entourage of nine UN personnel visited Pyongyang having crossed the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in Panmunjom. The North Korean Foreign Ministry had approved his request to cross the DMZ, hoping that a visit to the area might be helpful in “ameliorating the abnormal relationship between our country and the UN in the future.” The Foreign Ministry’s spokesman stated to explain the “abnormal relationship”: “Not only does the UN share a certain degree of responsibility for the division of the Korean peninsula but, as a party to the Korean Armistice Agreement, it remains, from a legal standpoint, a belligerent against us.” Also after the visit, North Korea maintained its position that the DPRK–United States talks remained the proper channel for discussing and finding a solution of the nuclear problem. By June 1994, due to rising tension over the unresolved nuclear inspections and defueling of the Yôngbyôn nuclear reactor the crisis had escalated to one of virtual war that would certainly have involved the United States. Indeed, there were fears for a new war. On June 10, the IAEA passed a resolution that suspended its technical assistance to North Korea, which responded by announcing its withdrawal from the agency. When former President Jimmy Carter met President Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang in June, Kim promised that North Korea would suspend its nuclear program. The parties agreed to hold high-level talks.13 Yet, North Korea’s hostile attitude toward the UN clearly remained after 1991 contributing to the absence of changes in inter-Korean relations after UN admission, in sharp contrast to the opinion of Hong Nack Kim (1991) seeing UN admission as the beginning of a new era of bilateral relations. The absence of change well matches the writing of Choi (1994) that the common opinion among experts was that joint UN membership for the two Koreas would not immediately contribute to an improvement of relations.

13

 Jonsson, ibid., 2009, pp. 382, 383, 384; Koh, ibid., pp. 37, 38, 39. Original quotation marks. Koh (ibid., p. 38) writes that the May 12 statement used quotation marks for the word resolution to indicate Pyongyang’s refusal to recognize it as such.

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3.4 South Korea Is Elected Member of the UN Security Council Twice Following the policy declaration by the South Korean government in February 1993 to contribute more to the international community through the UN as a way to benefit the country, the ROK decided to seek nonpermanent membership in the Security Council for 1996–1997. At a time when the role and the importance of the UN had risen owing to the end of the Cold War, the government set up as one of its principal diplomatic targets to through the UN raise its contributions to the international community. At a South Korea–Sri Lanka summit held in March 1993, President Kim Young Sam gathered opinions on a single Asian candidacy creating a breakthrough on the issue. The government established on May 4, 1993, a policy to reach the target to become a nonpermanent Security Council member. The Korean scholar Park Heung-soon (2010) argues that election as nonpermanent member in the Security Council is a main policy agenda for most UN member states since it provides an opportunity to exercise binding power over international peace and security under the UN Charter. Brazil and Japan were most active in this regard by serving 10 times each in the Council. Park records five reasons why states wish to become nonpermanent members: (a) to display or strengthen national prestige and power by being one of only 10 nonpermanent members and the considerable power of the Council, (b) to have an opportunity to exert influence on international affairs, (c) to through the work realize overall national foreign policy objectives, (d) to by serving in the Council strengthen their position within the UN, and (e) to strengthen their relationship, or sometimes get economic assistance, from the five permanent members. The reasons imply that also vain is an important reason to seek membership. Park (2015) also records four limitations for nonpermanent members to exert influence: (a) the permanent members are strong military powers possessing nuclear weapons and are economically highly advanced, (b) the two-year term in office makes it difficult to acquire sufficient

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data on principal global issues and to take standpoints on foreign policy, (c) the end of the Cold War has made consensus voting based on solidarity and cooperation common among the permanent members, which often hold closed consultations or informal sessions but such ties are more difficult to form with the nonpermanent members, and (d) the permanent members are — by maintaining closer relations with the UN Secretariat, which partly works with such issues as PKOs and humanitarian assistance that are raised in the Council — in a more favorable position to decide on them. In addition, the British scholar Trudy Fraser (2015) writes that the current structure of the Security Council in addition to claims of financial coercion leaves nonpermanent members subject to intense and conflicting pressures from the permanent members at times of international tension. Nonpermanent members have expressed doubts about the usefulness of a nonpermanent seat in promoting either their own specific interests or being able to in a meaningful way affect the outcomes of the Council in general.14 On September 29, 1993, Foreign Minister-turned scholar Han Sung-Joo declared at the 48th General Assembly that South Korea would seek an opportunity to serve in the Security Council in the near future to better contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. The statement reflects his argument (1991) that UN membership would mean the opportunity to participate more actively in international decision making and the responsibility to take positions on issues. In March 1994, South Korea notified through all diplomatic missions abroad and the UN Representative all member states its candidacy for the Security Council requesting their support. Subsequently, the government dispatched 14 special representatives of the president to 44 coun14

 Fraser, op. cit., p. 144; Han’guk wegyobu, op. cit., 2009, p. 184; Kim, op. cit., 2008, p. 37; Mo, op. cit., p. 42; Park, Heung-soon, “The UN Security Council and Role of the Non-permanent Members — Implications for the Republic of Korea,” Korean Observations on Foreign Relations, vol. 12, no. 1 (April 2010), pp. 109–110, 118–119, 120–122: op. cit., 2015, pp. 91, 92.

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tries and mobilized various joint committees and policy associations to acquire support. In May 1994, Asia-Pacific nations recommended South Korea as regional candidate. As a result of the government’s active efforts, on May 19, 1995, rival Sri Lanka withdrew at the meeting of the Asian group its candidacy for the nonpermanent seat for Asia. Park (2010) records the interpretation that Sri Lanka withdrew its candidacy owing to serious domestic instability caused by civil conflicts and that South Korea persuaded Sri Lanka behind the scenes for a compromise. Whether true or not, South Korea became the sole Asian candidate. Additionally, at the special summit held on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the UN from October 21 to 25, 1995, President Kim requested support from leaders of each country. On November 7, 1995, South Korea was elected by the General Assembly to the Security Council along with Chile, Poland, Egypt, and GuineaBissau having received votes from 156 of 177 countries. Thus, South Korea had been elected to the two main organs of the UN: the ECOSOC from 1993 to 1995 and the Security Council from 1996 to 1997. Sri Lanka’s withdrawal was a key factor in the selection to the Security Council that was a great diplomatic success for South Korea only four years after UN admission. The Korean university student Jeon Young Ju (2002) records the opinion that South Korea’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs) contributed greatly to the election. According to the Canadian scholars Alec Lalonde and Jane Boulden (2011), becoming Security Council member could “…be seen as symbolic affirmation on the part of the international community of South Korea’s standing as an independent sovereign state.” In contrast, many member countries have never been elected to the Security Council or if they have contested to become member, it has on average taken more than 10 years.15 15

 Han’guk wegyobu, ibid., 2009, p. 184; Jeon, Young Ju, Han’gug-ûi Yuen p’yônghwa yuji hwaltong (PKO)-e kwanhan yôn’gu — ch’amyô silt’ae-rûl chungsim-ûro — (Taegu: Keimyung taehakkyo, June 2002), p. 74; Kang, op. cit., 1995, p. 21; Kim, ibid., 2008, pp. 37–38; Alec Lalonde and Jane Boulden, “South Korea on the United Nations

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As Council member, South Korea in January 1996 attended all of eight formal and 20 informal meetings and took a clear position on various (nonexemplified) issues under consideration. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the Security Council work team for active and efficient work on a 24-hour schedule. On April 4, North Korea claimed in a letter to the UN Command that it would no longer continue its responsibilities according to the Armistice Agreement for the maintenance and administration of the Military Demarcation Line and the DMZ since the “South Korean puppets” had violated the armistice’s provisions: these measures were taken in self-defence. Heavily armed North Korean troops entered the DMZ during April 5–7. In order to bring the pressure of world opinion on North Korea, on April 11, the Security Council President issued a press release statement criticizing North Korea’s attempt to scrap the agreement.16 South Korea had urged the Council to adopt a strong resolution containing a warning to North Korea but China rejected this move. Thus, power politics matter in the UN in accordance with realists’ opinion. The statement expressed its concern over the present intrusion by North Korean troops into the DMZ, reaffirmed that the 1953 Armistice Agreement should remain in effect, urged North Korea to refrain from making any unilateral actions to undermine the agreement, and noted that such acts by North Korea were a great threat

Security Council,” Peace Forum, vol. 27, issue 2, no. 36 (December 2011), p. 27; Mo, ibid., pp. 41–42; Pak, op. cit., 1995, pp. 623, 628, 629; Park, ibid., 2010, p. 131: fn. 17. Although the opposing views of Park and Fraser on the usefulness of a nonpermanent seat imply that candidates for nonpermanent membership should have to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of membership against each other, the referred works do not contain any opposing opinions on South Korea seeking ­nonpermanent membership. 16  Among the UN Security Council’s official documents, member states are legally bound only to follow resolutions, not presidential statements or press statements that have less weight. A presidential statement is close to a “political act” and since all 15 member states stand behind it, the statement has a binding effect on Security Council members. From Rim and Moon, op. cit., pp. 29–30. Original quotation marks.

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to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, which had been maintained by the Armistice Agreement since 1953.17 Later, on September 18, 1996, an armed North Korean espionage submarine with 26 armed commandos onboard infiltrated and ran aground at Kangnûng on the South Korean east coast. The only man captured revealed that their mission was to test South Korea’s defence. Among the others, 11 had been executed with their own consent to avoid being captured. In shootouts with South Korean soldiers over the next two weeks, 11 commandos were killed but two other held out for 48 days before being killed. Another commando may have found his way back home. As the commandos fled across the South, they killed five soldiers and four civilians. Through the incident, North Korea violated the UN Charter(Article 2(3): “All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means”) it had agreed to uphold. The Security Council President tried to convey the Council’s serious concerns over the incident to North Korea’s UN ambassador but he refused to see the president and ignored the summons, which amounted to an act of challenging the Council’s authority. On October 15, a formal Security Council presidential statement expressed the Council’s serious concern, called for continued adherence to the Armistice Agreement, which remained effective until a new peace arrangement would be established, urged all to refrain from any act creating tensions, and called on the parties concerned to resolve the problem peacefully to strengthen peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. Notably, it was the first Council presidential statement referring to observing the Armistice Agreement but it did not include infiltration of the South and a warning against such an act. By using the word “incident” instead of “infiltration,” the statement did not entirely exclude North Korea’s claim that the submarine had drifted due to engine trouble. It did not point out the violation of the Armistice Agreement and did not inquire for North Korea’s responsibility. According to Kang (2002), South Korea played an important 17

 Jonsson, op. cit., 2009, pp. 440, 646–647; Pak, op. cit., 1996, p. 264: op. cit., 2000, pp. 86, 157, 158. Original quotation marks.

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role in adopting the Security Council president’s statement both in April and in September 1996. This opinion concurs with the assessment of Han (1991) that UN membership would enable South Korea to more actively participate in international policy decision making. It is also in line with the opinion of Yôm (1991) that South Korea had risen to a global position through which it would be able to exert considerable influence on the formation of world politics. However, it contradicts the notion recorded by Park (2010) that it is no exaggeration to call cynically the nonpermanent members as a “rubber stamp” or “tourists” in the Council. It should be noted that a difficulty in assessing decision making is that 95 percent of the Council’s work is conducted in the corridors or through informal consultations meaning that formal meetings only publically confirm what already has been decided without official records. It is impossible to negotiate at formal meetings since it is hard to reach consensus in opinions. Nonetheless, Pak (2000) argues that ROK membership in the Council had a restraining influence on North Korea, which found it increasingly difficult to pursue a policy of confrontation: the security situation on the Korean peninsula improved. In other words, South Korea’s seat in the council contributed to stabilizing relations. Eventually, North Korea, on December 29, made an official apology for the submarine incident to South Korea and then informed the Security Council of this gesture. The Council had played some role in putting pressure on the world opinion on North Korea to respect the Armistice Agreement.18 In fact, the two actions in 1996 give some credibility to the opinion expressed by Pak (1995) that in the long run, South Korea’s nonpermanent seat in the Security Council will by having a restraining influence on North Korea’s confrontational policy against 18

 Jonsson, ibid., 2009, pp. 443–444, 448; Kang, op. cit., 2002, p. 88; Minjok t’ongil yôn’guwôn, op. cit., 1996, p. 103: fn. 16; Pak, ibid., 2000, pp. 27, 86, 157; Park, op. cit., 2007:a, pp. 473, 477; Park, op. cit., 2010, p. 118; Song, Sûng-chong, Yuen p’yônghwa yuji hwaltong-ûi ihae: modu-rûl wihan hana, hana-rûl wihan modu (Seoul: Yôngyông munhwasa, 2006), p. 111. Kang (ibid., p. 88) does not explain how South Korea contributed to the adoption of the Security Council president’s statements. Data on the Security Council’s decision making are from Park (ibid., 2007a, pp. 473, 474) and Song (ibid., p. 111) but the author has found no later data contradicting them.

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Seoul contribute to stabilize inter-Korean relations. However, since Kang (2002) argues that it was unclear how many UN-mediated steps the two Koreas had taken toward reunification, the significance of South Korea’s Council membership on relations should not be overvalued. These different opinions confirm that the above opinions that UN admission would lead to improved inter-Korean relations were dubious (cf. p. 92). When South Korea assumed Chairmanship in May 1997, the Council’s first open debate on the refugee issue that was serious in Afghanistan and Zaire was held on May 21 with participants from 40 countries as presenters, which were the highest numbers ever. Representatives from the UNHCR, UNICEF, and the International Red Cross also made presentations. The Chairman’s statement on protection of refugees was adopted in June raising the Council’s interest in the urgent issue. Since the statement also requested follow-up measures by the UN Secretary-General, the action was highly evaluated by the global community, including the UNHCR. South Korea was also successful as a mediator in achieving consensus on how to react with regard to the situation in Cambodia in July 1997 and on inspections in Iraq between the Council’s five permanent members and the nonallied members. As Council member, the South Korean delegation put more efforts on the long and torturous Angolan peace process than any other issue owing to the troop contribution there since autumn 1995, which was one of the major ones. According to Lalonde and Boulden (2011), the troop contribution, generous financial support toward Angola’s reconstruction and rehabilitation, and, above all, the persistent focus on Angola in the Security Council showed what an elected member of the Council can accomplish with the adequate resources and attention. Four resolutions and eight presidential statements were adopted.19 19

 Han’guk wegyobu, op. cit., 2009, pp. 184–185; Kang, ibid., 2002, p. 79; Kim, op. cit., 2008, p. 38; Lalonde and Boulden, op. cit., pp. 31–32; Pak, op. cit., 1995, p. 630; Yi, Ch’ôl-min, “Kukche sahoe-ûi chudo kukka-ro na sôl ttaeda,” in Park, op. cit., 2014:a, pp. 233, 234, 235–236. Yi (ibid., p. 233) does not say what issues the resolutions and presidential statements adopted referred to except for the two statements recorded.

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The prediction of Yôm (1991) that it would become necessary to broaden interests from the Korean peninsula to global issues in order to contribute to resolve them had materialized. South Korea also participated in discussions on the Cambodian question, the coup d´état in Sierra Leone, the escalation of the civil war in Afghanistan, Libya’s violation of sanctions, and the collapse of the Mobutu regime in Zaire, among many others. A presidential statement requesting holding free elections and accepting a UN investigation of alleged massacres of Hutu refugees was adopted on May 29. In April 1997, South Korea had attended the nonaligned foreign ministers’ meeting in New Delhi as guest member. Kang (2002) records the opinion that these experiences were regarded as a first-hand opportunity to learn about genuine globalization. According to Pak (2000), since South Korea’s past efforts to gain UN membership had been frustrated in the Security Council and it had, as we have seen, debated such issues as the Soviet Union’s shooting down of a Korean Air Lines Flight 007 and North Korea’s terror activities in Burma in 1983 and the terrorist explosion of a Korean Air Lines aeroplane in the Indian Ocean in 1987, the Council membership had special significance. Pak argues that the membership “…had a special and political meaning for the Korean people because it represented political triumph for Seoul’s search for peace and justice.” Also, “[i]t may not be an exaggeration to say that South Korea attained the status of an important member state as a result of being elected to the Security Council, which allowed it to act as one of the important players in UN politics and diplomacy.” Pak also claims that South Korea’s membership in the Security Council was important by first enhancing the country’s position in the UN. Both Council members, states involved in disputes, and many other states had increasingly requested consultation with the ROK. Second, the security situation on the Korean peninsula improved during 1996–1997, which was considered the most critical period in establishing the peace system. Third, by being a Council member, understanding of UN activities among the South Korean general public was promoted. Another opinion Pak records is that through its active participation in international decision making

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and international governance of common global concerns, South Korea had emerged as a major actor in world politics. Park (2010) argues that membership and activities in the Council significantly contributed to national interests by providing a big momentum to strengthen diplomacy toward the UN and a valuable opportunity to exert influence internationally.20 The assessment concurs with the prediction of Kim Kang-nyông (1991) that South Korea as the UN member could fully participate in the decision-making process to resolve global issues by, for instance, becoming member of the Security Council and thereby contribute to promote international peace and security. Four of Park’s five reasons for wishing to become nonpermanent Council member are (a) to display or strengthen national prestige and power, (b) to have an opportunity to exert influence on international affairs, (c) to through the work realize overall national foreign policy objectives, and (d) to by serving in the Council strengthen their position within the UN and they seem to have been successfully accomplished. The fifth reason — to strengthen a country’s relationship, or sometimes get economic assistance, from the five permanent members — cannot be assessed from the account. Among the four limitations recorded by Park for nonpermanent members to exert influence, the account somewhat contradicts (a) that the two-year term in office makes it difficult to acquire sufficient data on principal global issues and to take standpoints on foreign policy since South Korea took positions. The other ones being (b) the permanent members are strong military powers possessing nuclear weapons and are economically highly advanced, (c) the end of the Cold War has made consensus voting based on solidarity and cooperation common among the permanent members, and (d) the permanent members are by maintaining closer relations with the UN Secretariat in a more favorable position to decide on them are hardly possible to judge from the account.

20

 Kang, ibid., 2002, p. 88; Pak, op. cit., 2000, pp. 156, 158; Park, op. cit., 2010, p. 132; Yi, ibid., 2014, p. 238.

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The cautious opinion by Fraser on the usefulness of the Council that its current structure in addition to claims of financial coercion leaves nonpermanent members subject to intense and conflicting pressures from the permanent members at times of international tension cannot either be assessed. The author has found no occasion when South Korea has expressed doubts on the usefulness of a nonpermanent seat in promoting either its own specific interests or being able to in a meaningful way affect the outcomes of the Council in general. In 1999, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concluded in its report that the ROK as Security Council member by experiencing the work, the capacity, and the limitations of the Council and by becoming familiar with its operation system, the dynamics among the permanent members and decision-making processes had acquired significant previously unknown experiences. In other words, South Korea could cultivate considerable diplomatic capability through practical experiences in dealing with major issues involving peace and security. South Korea was also able to promote real cooperation through direct consultation with the permanent members and Japan, as well as enhancing systematic collaboration with the Council’s nonaligned members. Later, on October 18, 2012, the General Assembly reelected South Korea as the nonpermanent member of the Council. In the second vote, South Korea won against Cambodia by receiving 149 votes against 43 after the third candidate Bhutan had withdrawn its candidacy. In line with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’s opinions in the 1999 report, reelection to the Council reflected an assessment of South Korea’s objective capability and its accumulated track record for the international community, which created expectations that the ROK would implement its tasks successfully. After the South Korean government in January 2007 had made an official declaration to bid for the seat of nonpermanent membership for 2013–2014, during five years, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UN Representative Office, and diplomatic missions abroad pursued a comprehensive and solid campaign. However, a disadvantage was that South Korea was regarded as member of the

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Western advanced group whereas rivals Bhutan and Cambodia belonged to the nonallied and developing nations. Such nations originally favored Bhutan and Cambodia more. The disadvantages of South Korea in the campaign were (a) that a member must receive two-thirds of votes, (b) that the country, unlike Bhutan and Cambodia, was not member of a regional group, (c) that the country had the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, the Head of the World Bank, American-born Kim Yong, and the Head of the International Criminal Court (ICC) from 2009 to 2015, Professor Song Sang-hyun, creating jealousy, and (d) negative propaganda that as a member it would bring inter-Korean tensions into the Security Council making its normal work complicated. Pro-North Korean states argued that if only one party of a conflict enters the Security Council, objectivity is lost creating an unfair situation. The advantages were (a) the growing favorable images of South Korea as a successful model of development that had overcome war and poverty and had been host country of the G-20 summit in 2010, the General Summit on Development Assistance in 2011 and the Nuclear Safety Summit in 2012, (b) the assessment to have a better capacity to make real contributions to peace and the fact that the country was a major contributor both to the UN budget and peacekeeping forces as well as provided official development assistance,21 (c) the appointment of Koreans in the UN who also included WHO Secretary-General from 2003 to 2006, Lee Jong-ok, demonstrating the Korean spirit, (d) the ROK had permanent embassies in around 110 countries creating a huge diplomatic network, and (e) South Korea’s representative to the UN had by serving as Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Summit on Sustainable Development 21

 After having received $13 billion from the United States, multilateral development and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as well as other foreign aid donors over the four decades after World War II, South Korea began to provide official development assistance in 1987. Contributions rose from $24 million in 1987 to $1,551 million in 2012. The figures do not include assistance provided to North Korea. From Terence Roehrig, “South Korea, Foreign Aid, and UN Peacekeeping: Contributing to International Peace and Security as a Middle Power,” Korea Observer, vol. 44, no. 4 (Winter 2013), pp. 625–628.

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and the UN Executive Committee on Women made real contributions to world politics and global security as well as sustainable development, climate changes, and women issues creating a deep impression upon countries with permanent representation at the UN. In 2012, the Foreign Ministry forecasted that as Council member, the ROK would play a leading role in UN efforts to maintain world peace. Reelection to the Council would also contribute to stabilize inter-Korean relations. By becoming a member, South Korea’s position in UN diplomacy would be further raised.22

3.5 The Outcome of the UN Security Council’s Resolutions on North Korea until 2010 The UN Security Council has adopted resolutions on North Korea also after the first one on the nuclear issue was adopted in 1993. At a time of tense relations following the September 1996 submarine incident, in October 1996, the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution stating that the Armistice Agreement should remain in force until it is replaced by a special peace mechanism, indicating the wish of the UN that peace should be maintained on the Korean peninsula. When Kim Dae Jung became president in 1998, he launched the sunshine policy in order to through positive engagement promote peaceful coexistence, reconciliation and cooperation between North and South Korea, as the first stage toward reunification. One outcome of the policy was the launch of the Mt. Kûmgang tourist project on November 18, 1998, which, for the first time, enabled South Korean tourists to travel northward, albeit on restricted tours. The tours continued until July 11, 2008, when they were interrupted after a South Korean tourist had been 22

 Chung, op. cit., 2015, p. 34; Han’guk wegyobu, 2013–14nyôn imgi Yuen anbori pisangim isaguk chinch’ul, n. p., October 22, 2012 (http://www.mofa.go.kr/ webmodule/­htsboard/template/read/korboardread. jsp?typeID=); Park, op. cit., 2010, pp. 132–133: op. cit., 2015, p. 103; Shin, Dong-Ik, “Han’gug-ûi Yuen anbori chinch’ur-ûi ûimi-wa kukche p’yônghwa-e kiyô,” Wegyo, no. 105 (April 2013), pp. 146, 147–148, 153–154: fn. 5. Park refers to the 1999 report (ibid., 2010, p. 132).

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killed on that day. From June 13 to 15, 2000 the first inter-Korean summit was held in Pyongyang. It led to more active contacts than ever by 2000 holding, for instance, two rounds of family reunions, four rounds of inter-Korean ministerial talks, economic talks twice, and the first meeting between the defence ministers who agreed to work together to remove the risk of war. Also, the two Koreas’ UN Ambassadors began to have regular contacts by eating together or calling each other. Previously, there were active contacts through personal dialogue between diplomats since 1991, creating acquaintance with each other. There were also steps backward in relations. Following nine days of tensions, on June 15, 1999, a naval clash in the West Sea where maritime borders were contested ended in the destruction of a DPRK warship and the death of at least 30 North Koreans whereas South Korea suffered only a few lightly wounded seamen. Both Koreas now violated the UN Charter, Chapter I: Purposes and Principles, Article 2(3): “All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means” and Article 2(4): “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” A few days later the North Korean authorities detained a South Korean housewife who allegedly had attempted to entice a tour guide to defect to the South. Consequently, the company Hyundai cancelled the Mt. Kûmgang tours but the tourist was released within a week, although only after having been forced to write a “confession.” However, the incidents did not bring about the collapse of South Korea’s engagement policy and the tours were resumed. On October 31, 2000, the UN General Assembly adopted without vote the first ever inter-Korean joint resolution (55/11) on peace, security, and reunification of the Korean peninsula. Among 189 UN member states, 149 had jointly proposed it. For the first time in the UN, the two Koreas took a joint step. Following the second interKorean summit held in Pyongyang during October 2–4, 2007 on October 31, the General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 62/5 on peace, security, and reunification of the Korean peninsula.

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The resolutions had been suggested by South Korea jointly with 61 other countries. Diplomats from the two Koreas cooperated closely to adopt the resolution. The two resolutions (a) welcome and ­support the inter-Korean summits and the joint declaration adopted on June 15, 2000, and the Declaration on the Advancement of North–South Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity adopted on October 4, 2007, (b) encourage the two Koreas to implement fully and in good faith the joint declarations to consolidate peace on the Korean peninsula as well as lay a foundation for peaceful unification, and (c) invite member states to support and assist inter-Korean dialogue, reconciliation, and reunification to contribute to peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in the world as a whole.23 Given the ups and downs in inter-Korean relations also after they had begun to improve in 1998, it is, in contrast to the predictions of the positive impact of UN membership on relations, hard to find any causality between UN admission and their state (cf. pp. 92, 99). The same pattern was repeated also from 2001 onward. Family reunions took place once in 2001, twice in 2002, three times in 2003, and twice in 2004. Two rounds of ministerial talks were held in both 2001 and 2002, followed by four in 2003. In 2003, South Korea stressed on the need for a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue and emphasized the need for multilateral talks. On June 30, 2003, a groundbreaking ceremony of the Kaesong Industrial Complex was held. The first products were manufactured in December 2004. 23

 Author’s visit at the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 9, 2014 and January 7, 2016; Han’guk wegyobu, op. cit., 2009, p. 202; Jonsson, op. cit., 2006, pp. 58, 60, 61–62, 68, 72–73, 74, 75, 77: op. cit., 2009, pp. 402, 420, 491, 505–506; T’ongil News, “Nambuk Yuen chujae taesa, chônggichôk chôpch’ok,” April 14, 2001 (http://www.tongilnews.com); United Nations General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 55/ 11. Peace, security and reunification on the Korean peninsula, A/RES/55/11 (n. p., October 31, 2000), pp. 1–2: Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 31 October 2007, 62/5. Peace, security and reunification on the Korean peninsula, A/RES/62/5 (n. p., October 31, 2007), pp. 1–2; Wang, op. cit., 2002, pp. 9–10. Original quotation marks. Han’guk wegyobu (ibid., p. 202) does not say whether the 2007 General Assembly was an inter-Korean joint resolution but only record that the number of joint sponsors of the two resolutions was 61.

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In 2004, ministerial talks were held twice and the official military talks were held for the first time on May 26 and June 3 and 4. These first general talks resulted in an agreement to prevent incidental military clashes along the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea and forbade propaganda and defamation along the military demarcation line. Yet, a second naval clash occurred in the West Sea on June 29, 2002 when North Korean patrol boats clashed with South Korean naval vessels close to the NLL and fired on them. One high-speed patrol boat was sunk and five of the crew were killed. One North Korean vessel was severely damaged and at least 10 seamen died. In late July, for the first time, North Korea directly expressed its regret to South Korean authorities and indicated a willingness to prevent a recurrence. Again, both Koreas violated the UN Charter, Chapter I. The most shocking event in 2002 occurred when North Korea, on October 17, admitted to the American envoy, James Kelley, that it had been engaged in developing a program of highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. The program did not violate the October 21, 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework between the DPRK and the United States stipulating that the North would freeze its existing nuclear program, accept international inspections, and replace its old graphite-moderated reactors, converting to militarily less dangerous two lightwater reactors to be provided by America. But it violated the 1991 Joint Declaration on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula that the Agreed Framework had pledged to uphold. The confession made the United States, Japan, and South Korea seek a peaceful solution of the nuclear issue through North Korea’s dismantlement of uranium enrichment facilities in a prompt and verifiable way. In December, the United States cut off its heavy fuel oil supplies to North Korea, which responded by reactivating its Yôngbyôn nuclear reactor, removing the monitoring devices of the IAEA and telling its inspectors to leave. The nuclear issue escalated in 2003 to its most dangerous level since 1994. On January 10, North Korea declared its withdrawal from the NPT in response to the American refusal to hold bilateral talks and to the IAEA resolution demanding that the DPRK should

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comply with its obligations under the NPT. In April, the DPRK formally withdrew from the NPT becoming the first country to do so. In May, North Korea declared the 1991 Joint Declaration null and void. Later, thanks to China’s shuttle diplomacy, six-party talks involving North Korea, South Korea, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia were held in Beijing on August 27–29 but ended with no tangible progress. A symbolic six-point consensus was agreed that called for continued dialogue, a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, consideration of North Korea’s security concerns, and avoidance of actions that could aggravate the situation, but tensions over the unresolved nuclear issue remained even after the meeting. During 2004, the second and third rounds of six-party talks were held in Beijing during February 25–28 and June 23–26. However, no progress took place since North Korea’s position that it would only give up its nuclear program if the United States abandoned its hostile policy and the American stand to demand a complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of the nuclear program were incompatible.24 A fourth round of six-party talks was held in Beijing in two ­sessions from July 26 to August 7 as well as from September 13 to 19, 2005. An agreement was reached on September 19, which stipulated that North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons and the existing nuclear program, reenter the NPT talks, and permit IAEA inspections of facilities. In reciprocation, the United States undertook not to conduct offensive operations against North Korea or stockpile nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula. North Korea received promises of assistance regarding energy supplies and technical aid. At the first ­session of the fifth round of the six-party talks held in Beijing from November 9 to 11, it was decided to comprehensively implement the September agreement through confidence-building measures. A Chairman’s statement was issued in which the parties reaffirmed that they would fully implement the agreement in accordance with the principle “commitment-for-commitment, action-for-action” in 24

 Jonsson, ibid., 2006, pp. 57–58, 79, 82, 83, 85, 86–87, 88, 91, 92, 93: ibid., 2009, pp. 384–385, 484, 499–500; Rim and Moon, op. cit., p. 228.

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order to soon accomplish a verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and lasting peace and stability in the region. However, North Korea delayed the implementation of the agreement first due to the demand for a lightwater reactor and then for the request to remove financial sanctions that the United States Ministry of Finance imposed on September 15 on its account amounting to about $25 million in the Macau-based Banco Delta Asia (BDA) due to its alleged money-laundering counterfeiting of American currency. Subsequently, the Monetary Authority of Macau seized the bank and froze the North Korean accounts to protect its financial system. The DPRK leadership argued that if the sanctions were not removed, no new six-party talks would be held. The United States claimed that the sanctions were unrelated to the six-party talks but had to do with implementing American law. For North Korea, the sanctions were not only harmful for the government but also hindered business transactions, infringed on sovereignty, and contributed to the failure to implement the September 19 agreement. The BDA incident became an important learning experience for Pyongyang elites, which led to adjustments and modifications in North Korea’s evolving evasion practices in response to American and Security Council sanctions. Whereas the October 1996 Security Council resolution was adopted in order to express UN support to promote peace on the Korean peninsula, the following resolutions were all adopted in response to North Korea’s threats against peace. On August 31, 1998, North Korea launched its first multistage missile that splashed down 1,380 kilometers away in the Western Pacific to the east of Japan. Serious concerns about security were kindled in Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo. On September 14, 1998, the Security Council adopted with consensus a press statement expressing regret and appealing for self-restraint. On July 15, 2006, the Council voted in resolution 1695 unanimously to condemn North Korea’s launch of seven short-, medium-, and long-distance missiles in the East Sea that was made on July 4 since the DPRK felt insulted and ignored. The resolution as a whole stipulated that the overall North Korean problems posed a threat “to the maintenance of international peace and security”

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defined in the UN Charter and a threat to peace, s­ tability, and security in Asia and beyond. The main contents were to (a) condemn the ballistic missile test, (b) demand on North Korea to stop all missile programs and to observe the declaration of a moratorium of missile launches, (c) call for the member states not to transfer to Pyongyang missiles and related goods, materials, products, and technologies and not to provide financial assistance, and (d) recommend the DPRK to return to the six-party talks and to implement the joint agreement of September 19, 2005. The resolution was important by being stronger than a presidential or a press statement and by being adopted unanimously. Yet, the New Zealand scholar Tim Beal (2007) forecasted that the resolution will have no major effect.25 Also North Korea’s underground nuclear test conducted on October 9, 2006 was unanimously condemned by the Security Council in resolution 1718 adopted on October 14 in reflection of the determined position of the UN and the global society. On October 3, the North Korean Foreign Ministry had declared that a safe nuclear test would be conducted, that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons, to threaten anyone with them, or to transfer them and that it would work for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and global nuclear reduction. On October 6, the UN Security Council, in a presidential statement, warned that a test would be met by joint condemnation from the international community. Since a test would be a clear violation of international peace and security, the Council would respond in accordance with the UN Charter. The statement also urged North Korea to implement all the relevant points in resolution 1695. The reasons for conducting the test were the legacy of the Cold War on the Korean peninsula and the ensuing insecurity, the tilting balance of power in favor of South 25

 Tim Beal, “The United Nations and the North Korean Missile and Nuclear Tests,” New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 9, no. 2 (December 2007), p. 105; Jonsson, ibid., 2006, pp. 68, 91–92: ibid., 2009, pp. 500–501; Park, Heung-soon, “North Korean Nuclear Issue and the United Nations,” Korean Observations on Foreign Relations, vol. 9, no. 1 (August 2007:b), pp. 138, 139; John S. Park, “The Key to the North Korean Targeted Sanctions Puzzle,” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 3 (Fall 2014:b), p. 204; Rim and Moon, ibid., pp. 82, 198: Table 6-5. Original quotation marks.

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Korea in strategic, political, economic, and military terms, the North’s nuclear calculation with regard to the United States, hardening American North Korea policy since the 2001 policy review, and, finally, domestic civil–military relations reflecting the position of hardliners. Regime survival was the primary goal for Kim Jong Il and the United States was the main threat to that end.26 Notably, at this time, the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, China, and France had from 1945 to 2006 altogether ­conducted 2,045 nuclear tests against only seven by North Korea (1), Pakistan (2), and India (4). Thus, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council having conducted virtually all nuclear tests since 1945 now condemned North Korea. In contrast, although the Security Council in June 1998 under the label “international peace and security” adopted resolution 1172 following the nuclear tests made by India on May 11 and 13 and by Pakistan on May 28 and 30, the Council did neither refer to Chapter VII of the UN Charter nor impose sanctions. The resolution only confirmed that the tests were “… a serious threat to global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament” and urged India and Pakistan to refrain from further tests. North Korea and Iran argue that it is unjust to impose sanctions on them and not on nuclear powers India, Pakistan, and Israel but a big difference is that the two former were NPT members whereas the latter three were not. Yet, they criticize some major powers to apply double standards. Clearly, the UN can only become what the member states want it to become (cf. p. 4). In fact, Beal (2007) argues that North Korea being found guilty was not a matter of law but of geopolitics. There was hypocrisy surrounding the missile test since such tests are so frequent and missiles themselves are so commonplace showing that there are double standards, in contrast to the UN Charter’s principle that all member states have sovereign equality. If the UN is to live up to its Charter,

26

 In addition, as recorded by Seaman (op. cit., pp. 11, 17), the United States had challenged the authority of the UN by pursuing a policy of unilateral action bypassing the Security Council with the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Fearing a similar fate, the invasion likely strengthened North Korea’s wish to conduct a nuclear test.

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one set of rules for the powerful, or those under their wing, and another for the weak is unacceptable. It should be noted that neither the missile nor the nuclear test was illegal since North Korea was not a signatory to an agreement forbidding them. There are no blanket prohibitions on missile or nuclear tests. Since the resolutions were violations of the UN Charter and of natural justice, their passing further undermined the moral credibility of the UN. The other members of the Security Council bear some moral responsibility by voicing uncritical and one could suspect, unthinking, support of the United States. The resolutions did not offer any solution to the problems that the tests exemplified but, if implemented thoroughly, would exacerbate them.27 The October 14 UN Security Council resolution 1718 expressed its gravest concern and called for North Korea’s return to the six-party talks, implementation of the joint statement of September 19, 2005, return to the NPT, and observation of the safeguard agreement of the IAEA by providing transparency measures extending beyond the agreement to include access to individuals, documentation, equipment, and facilities. Since the test was a challenge to the NPT and the international efforts to prevent nuclear diffusion as well as a clear threat to international peace and security, the resolution urged that the missile program should cease, that all nuclear weapons should be abolished, that the nuclear program should be abandoned, and that all other forms of weapons of mass destruction as well as ballistic missiles should be eradicated in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. North Korea was not recognized as a nuclear power. The resolution included strong legal measures against the North. Capital inflow would be cut off, a travel ban on people related to the nuclear weapons program as well as their family members would be imposed, and receiving or exporting any battle tanks, heavy artillery, other military hardware as well as nuclear materials or equipment would be prohibited. Also, selling such luxury items 27

 Beal, op. cit., pp. 105, 107–108, 110, 119, 124, 125; Jonsson, op. cit., 2009, pp. 502, 503; Park, op. cit., 2007:b, p. 140: op. cit., 2015, p. 165; Rim and Moon, op. cit., pp. 111–112, 172, 195, 227, 228. First quotation has original quotation marks.

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as German Mercedes Benz cars, Swiss Rollex watches, and French cognac, which were an important means for Kim Jong Il to rule, would be prohibited as punishment for the nuclear program that threatened global peace. Member states were to ensure compliance with the resolution’s demands required to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to North Korea of (a) aircraft, military equipment, spare parts and related material, (b) items, equipment, and technology set out in several UN documents related to nuclear programs, ballistic missile programs, and other weapons of mass destruction, and (c) luxury goods. However, small arms, light weapons, and their related material were not banned. The Council called upon all states to take cooperative actions including the inspection of cargo to and from North Korea. Member states could not provide technical assistance, training, or advice regarding weapons or nuclear technology. All member states were obligated to freeze funds, assets, and other economic resources located in their territories or owned by persons or entities designated by the 1718 Sanctions Committee set up under the October 14 resolution or by the Council that were involved with or engaged in North Korea’s nuclear program. Being targeted for sanctions, North Korea criticized the resolution as a ­scenario staged by the United States, pointed out its “illegitimacy,” and further i­ndicated the possibility of “additional measures.” On October 17, the North Korean Foreign Ministry in a statement ­criticized the UN sanctions as a “declaration of war under the US scenario.” North Korea warned that it “would unmercifully strike whoever tries to even slightly interfere with national sovereignty and right of survival (of North Korea) in the name of UN resolution.”28 North Korea’s hostile attitude toward the UN confirms that membership had hardly changed inter-Korean relations (cf. pp. 92, 99, 106). 28

 Charron, op. cit., p. 130; Jonsson, ibid., 2009, p. 503; Kim, Chong-il, “Kukche sahoeûi pinan-gwa taebuk chejae-ro koriptoenûn Pukhan ch’eje,” Pukhan (September 2009), p. 93; Park, ibid., 2007b, pp. 142, 151–152: “Pukhaek sat’ae-wa Yuen (UN) chejae: Yuen chejae 1718ho (2006)-mit 1874ho (2009)-ûi ihaeng kyônggwa-wa kwaje,” Kukche kigu chônôl, vol. 4, no. 1 (2009), p. 36; Sô, op. cit., p. 271. Original quotation marks.

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According to Park (2009), resolution 1718 had four characteristics. First, it was the first time the Security Council adopted a resolution related to a nuclear test. As an unanimously taken decision, it expressed the firm position of the UN and the international community regarding denuclearization. Second, for the first time in relation to the North Korean nuclear issue, the UN Chapter VII, Article 41 on nonmilitary sanctions with binding force was put into action. Measures taken under Article 41 included (a) ban of trade of goods related to North Korean nuclear materials and trade in luxury goods, (b) limited financial sanctions freezing the North’s assets related to nuclear weapons and missiles but humanitarian goods were excepted, (c) denial of entry of the personnel related with nuclear materials, (d) calling for check up of North Korean goods, (e) creation of a sanctions committee, (f) obligation to report for the member states within 30 days after the adoption of the resolution, and (g) further possible measures in response to Pyongyang’s reactions. Third, the imposed sanctions were not full-scale ones but smart sanctions intended to maximize their effects and to minimize their side effects. In other words, the targets were North Korean decisionmakers and ruling class but not ordinary citizens. Smart sanctions consisted of embargo on arms exports, freeze of assets, prohibition of foreign travel as well as transactions in nuclear arms, weapons of mass destruction, and ballistic missiles, and, finally, search for luxury goods and suspected cargo. Fourthly, all UN members had a duty to implement the sanctions but for structural reasons, support from them were dependent on voluntary cooperation. Most UN member states and the EU took part in the sanctions. Simultaneously, a few countries, including the United States and Japan, implemented unilateral sanctions based on domestic laws. The resolution clearly mirrored realists’ perceptions of the importance of power in international relations (cf. p. 96). Although the resolution was unanimously adopted, it was a result of intense consultations and compromises between China, the United States, and Japan. The contested points were the scope and level of the sanctions, the application of Chapter VII of the UN

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Charter on enforcement of measures and the inclusion of diplomatic solutions. The United States and Japan wished to clarify Chapter VII and urged comprehensive sanctions to be imposed, but China and Russia wanted to be more moderate. Eventually, the resolution was a considerably mitigated version of the draft launched by the United States and Japan. The resolution’s final version excluded demands for inspections of sea transports and a freeze of North Korean assets abroad. Regarding Chapter VII of the UN Charter, reference was only made to Article 41 clearly excluding the possibilities for military sanctions or the use of military force. Since the target of the international community at the time was to diplomatically resolve the North Korean nuclear program through the six-party talks, the resolution did not emphasize enforcement of the sanctions and did not mention designated individuals or organizations but referred the issue to a sanctions committee to later decide upon. Since no concrete definition was made of luxury goods, it was up to each member state to make it.29 As noted, the basis of the UN sanctions regime is the UN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 39 stating that the Security Council has the power to take appropriate measures when “there exists a threat against peace, breach of peace and an act of invasion.” According to Article 39, member states have to participate in military and nonmilitary sanctions. On October 23, Committee 1718 was established to monitor the implementation of sanctions. Its tasks were to supply information regarding measures to implement the sanctions, review materials on violations and enforce appropriate measures, designate additional products, individuals, and organizations for sanctions and deliver regular reports. Originally, the Sanctions Committee was not active at a time when the six-party talks made some progress and China and Russia were worried that the Committee’s work would affect reopening of the talks negatively. Its work was limited to such tasks as writing a report every third month.

29

 Park, ibid., 2007b, pp. 141, 142: ibid., 2009, pp. 31–32, 35–37; Rim and Moon, op. cit., pp. 177–178, 179.

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At the second session of the fifth round of the six-party talks held in Beijing during December 18–22, 2006, the United States urged North Korea to take rapid steps for denuclearization. North Korea argued that financial sanctions on accounts in BDA had to be removed since the issue was thoroughly closely linked to denuclearization. The third session of the fifth round of the six-party talks was held in Beijing during February 8–13, 2007. In the February 13 agreement, the parties agreed to denuclearize the Korean peninsula, to normalize relations between, on the one hand North Korea, and, on the other, the United States and Japan, to cooperate on economic and energy issues, and, finally, to work for peace and security in Northeast Asia. North Korea would first close down the nuclear facilities at Yôngbyôn until April 13 and then report on its entire program and incapacitate all existing reactors. In return, North Korea would receive 950,000 tons of heavy oil. After the BDA issue was resolved in June by the transfer of around $25 million via a Russian bank to North Korea, the DPRK on July 6, 2007 officially declared that it had suspended the nuclear facilities at Yôngbyôn. Yet, after the latest round of the six-party talks was held in December 2008, all parties expressed doubts over their usefulness. The South Korean scholar Chung Eun-sook (2013) records the parties’ opinion that if North Korea does not change, the nuclear issue cannot be resolved. Chung regards the six-party talks as a failure by having made it more difficult to accomplish the target to denuclearize North Korea.30 Whether a true assessment or not, it is from the account unrealistic to expect that North Korea will change prohibiting a resolution of the nuclear issue. Nuclear possession by the United States will always create a motive for North Korea for nuclear armaments.

30

 Chung, Eun-sook, “Yuen anbori-ûi taebuk chejae: Ihaeng kyônggwa-mith ­chônmang,” Chôngse-wa chông-ch’aek, no. 204 (April 2013), p. 3; Jonsson, op. cit., 2009, pp. 503–504; Park, ibid., 2009, pp. 33, 38; Rim and Moon, ibid., pp. 183–184. Original quotation marks.

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Following inauguration in February 2008, President Lee Myungbak replaced his predecessors’ policy of engagement with a “give-and-take” approach that led to an end of a 10-year period with expanding contacts. On April 5, 2009, North Korea launched a longrange rocket test that was widely condemned as a de facto missile test. The launch took place in violation of the Security Council resolution 1718 (2006). Thus, the prediction of Beal (2007) had turned out to be entirely correct (cf. p. 112). One reason for the test could have been to consolidate Kim Jong Il’s power, following rumours of his bad health and the possible nomination of his third son as his successor. On April 13, the Security Council unanimously adopted a presidential statement that condemned the rocket launch and demanded that North Korea refrain from any further ballistic missile tests and return to the deadlocked six-party talks. The statement stipulated that the Sanctions Committee until April 24 would designate additional entities and goods for sanctions and then report them to the Security Council. North Korea immediately announced that it was pulling out of the six-party talks, resuming its enrichment activities and expelling all nuclear inspectors. In April, the Committee strengthened sanctions by designating the Korea Mining Development Trading Company (KOMID), the Tanchon Commercial Bank, and the defence conglomerate Korea Ryonbong General Corporation as well as components for ballistic missiles as targets. After North Korea on May 25, 2009 had conducted its second underground nuclear test, the Security Council condemned it in a presidential statement as “a clear violation” of resolution 1718 banning tests. According to Park (2009), it was estimated that North Korea, since sanctions were imposed in 2006, had received considerable economic and political pressure from the sanctions and strongly opposed them, but the DPRK did not respond with military revenge or provocations. Simultaneously, it was clear that Pyongyang ignored most of the demands for denuclearization and of the UN sanctions. The reasons for the test were to secure recognition of its status as a nuclear power, to increase leverage in negotiations with the United States, and to consolidate Kim’s grip

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on power (cf. pp. 110–111). On June 12, the Security Council unanimously approved resolution 1874 that banned North Korea from conducting further ballistic missile and nuclear tests. Since the outside world regarded North Korea’s two nuclear tests as a clear intention to acquire status as a nuclear power and a severe challenge toward the NPT regime as well as security on the Korean peninsula and peace in Northeast Asia, strong sanctions were imposed. Similar to resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 rejected military sanctions but intended to exert economic pressure on the North Korean government. Compared to resolution 1718, the resolution clarified the duty for member states to implement it but still the UN had to rely on their voluntary cooperation. The resolution called for (a) an overall arms embargo, including technical training and advice, against Pyongyang, except for light weapons or small arms, (b) strengthening of financial sanctions to prevent the flow of funds that could benefit the missile and nuclear program but humanitarian assistance was again excluded, (c) restrictions on travel and freeze of assets, (d) the establishment of a Panel of Experts to monitor the implementation of sanctions for an initial period of one year, and (e) inspection by all member states of ­suspected cargo from North Korea at domestic harbors, airports, and even the high seas as well as prohibition against providing ­bunkering services to suspected ships. Forbidden goods would be confiscated and disposed. North Korean exports of weapons and related materials were prohibited.31 The resolution stated that a Sanctions Committee within 30 days would designate entities, goods and individuals for sanctions and report the work to the Security Council. If the report would not be delivered in time, the Security Council will have to complete adjustment measures within seven days after having received the report. The Panel of Experts would have seven members and supplement the work of the Sanctions Committee. Its tasks were to 31

 Charron, op. cit., p. 131; Jonsson, ibid., 2009, pp. 505, 510, 511–512; Kim, op. cit., 2009, p. 92; Park, ibid., 2009, pp. 32, 37–38; Rim and Moon, ibid., pp. 180, 181–183, 184, 190, 317.

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review reports from the member states, investigate violations of sanctions and encourage member states to implement the resolution and make policy recommendations on how to raise the efficiency of sanctions. Member states had to report to the Security Council on the implementation of sanctions within 45 days and thereafter at the request of the Sanctions Committee. On June 13, North Korea denounced the resolution and vowed to go ahead with uranium enrichment and weaponize all new plutonium it made. Any outside attempt to impose a blockade would be considered an act of war. The Sanctions Committee designated five companies and five individuals as targets of sanctions. In addition to the KOMID, the Tanchon Commercial Bank and the Korea Ryonbong General Corporation which already were targeted for sanctions, the Namchongang Trading Company, Hong Kong Electronics, the Korea Reform Trading Company, the Korea Atomic Energy Agency and the Korea Tangun Trading Corporation that were involved in administering capital for nuclear diffusion, acquirements of parts and learning of technology were targets. The Namchongang Trading Company was subordinated to North Korea’s Bureau of Atomic Energy and was directed from Pyongyang by Jun Byung-ho who was member of the supreme National Defence Commission and apparently was in charge of the uranium enrichment program. In the early 2000s, it set up its main office in Beijing. The Korea Reform Trading Company belonging to the Korea Ryonbong General Corporation was involved in the development of weapons of mass destruction. The Korea Atomic Energy Agency was in charge of the nuclear program in terms of not only fuel and reprocessing facilities but also the nuclear research institute at Yôngbyôn and plutonium reactors. The Korea Tangun Trading Corporation was in charge of acquiring products and technology for supporting research on and development of nuclear missiles. The five targeted individuals were Yun Ho-jin, Director of Namchongang, Ri Che-sôn, Director of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy who since 1997 had played the central role in the North Korean nuclear program, Hwang Sôk-ha, Bureau Director for

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the nuclear program, Ri Hong-sôp, former official of the nuclear facilities at Yôngbyôn and in charge of production of plutonium for weapons manufacturing at three core facilities and Han Yu-ro, manager at the Korea Ryonbong General Corporation and working with the development of ballistic missiles.32 In the 1980s until the late 1990s, Yun had played the central role in North Korea’s acquisition of various intelligence data from the IAEA with the Embassy in Vienna as basis. Yun reportedly arranged North Korean delegations’ visits to Europe and mobilized trading companies in Germany and Switzerland to purchase materials needed for nuclear development in large quantities. Yun is also known to have played a role in acquiring various items for the uranium enrichment program. After returning from Europe in the late 1990s, Yun seems to when living in China having organized illegal purchases for the Namchongang Trading Company. A concealed branch of Namchongang named after China’s Shenyang Aircraft Corporation was set up in Dandong on the Sino-Korean border. In 2002, Yun purchased 200 tonnes of high-grade aluminium pipes from the German company Optronic and attempted to transport it by sea via China’s Shenyan aircraft. However, since the German authorities detected the illegal transaction, it was confiscated at the first transfer port Alexandria in April 2003. From 2007 onwards, Namchongang procured goods likely intended for the uranium enrichment program. On July 17, 2009 the Security Council released a list of five names, five entities and two items related to manufacturing of ­missiles subject to travel and financial sanctions. One of them was Ri Che-sôn. Ri was the only high official included on the list. It was the first time government officials became targets of sanctions that prohibited foreign travels and froze their assets abroad. However, since such core state institutions as the General Reconnaissance 32

 Jonsson, ibid., 2009, p. 512; Kim, ibid., 2009, pp. 93, 94; Larry A. Niksch, “China’s Policies toward North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs,” International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, vol. 24, no. 2 (2015), pp. 16–17; Park, ibid., 2009, pp. 37, 40; Rim and Moon, ibid., pp. 184–185, 190.

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Bureau, the 39th unit of the Korean Workers’ Party, the Second Economic Committee, the Second Academy of Natural Sciences and the Ministry of Defence Industries which were believed to lead the development of weapons of mass destruction and various illegal activities were excluded it was difficult to efficiently implement sanctions. The limited range of sanctions in comparison to Iran meant that they were only inactive and symbolical, strongly reflecting neighboring countries’, in particular China’s position, on the Korean question.33 Yet, since North Korea, on June 13, had denounced the resolution, there can be no doubt that the sanctions strengthened its hostility toward the UN. China’s position confirms the impact of power in accordance with realists’ opinion (cf. pp. 96, 114). The mandate of the Panel of Experts was one year during which one of its tasks was to complete a final report containing activities and recommendations. The Panel made one report each for 2009, 2010, and 2011 but since there was disagreement regarding the 2011 report on how to assess North Korea’s high-enrichment uranium program for nuclear arms, the Chinese panel member refused to sign. The report was delivered to the Security Council without his signature and was not made open to the public. But not being signed by all permanent members, China opposed referring it to the Council. China’s policy stand exerted great influence on the Panel’s work since it due to its geopolitical interests preferred to handle the North Korean nuclear program peacefully and diplomatically through the six-party talks rather than by imposing sanctions. China therefore wished to minimize the Panel’s work and argued that only objective and verifiable intelligence would be reported. Meanwhile, on August 12, 2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon nominated in accordance with resolution 1874 (2009) a panel of experts under the Security Council consisting of members from the five permanent Council members the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom and one each from South Korea and Japan to support the work of the Sanctions Committee. 33

 Kim, ibid., 2009, p. 91; Niksch, ibid., p. 17; Park, ibid., 2009, p. 40; Rim and Moon, ibid., pp. 194–195, 216, 251.

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The panel’s expertise included nuclear and missile armaments, export control, nonproliferation, and finance. On November 11, the panel reported about the implementation of the sanctions on the basis of materials received from UN member states. Also after the Security Council had implemented resolution 1874, North Korea continued with fraud exports of materials related to the nuclear and missile programs. There were forges of cargo items, use of false labels, use of famous shipping companies, and records of cargo passing at several transfer points. Through such false maneuvres, North Korea escaped UN sanctions. Other companies and individuals than the listed eight ones were involved in the disguised trade. It was difficult to receive full cooperation from all member states. China’s lack of cooperation was the major obstacle in implementing them confirming that UN can only become what its member states want it to become (cf. pp. 4, 111). Yet, since as a result of the UN sanctions the estimated trade deficit by far exceeded $1 billion since they were imposed in June, their impact was considerable. South Korea had worked closely with the permanent Security Council members and Japan to adopt Security Council resolutions 1718 and 1874, although it was not member on either occasion. On January 13, 2007, the ROK delivered its report on the implementation of sanctions to the 1718 Sanctions Committee. South Korea also continued to disrupt deliveries of food and fertilizer that had been disrupted after the July 4, 2006 missile test but was on the whole more reserved toward imposing sanctions than the United States was.34 Park (2009) writes that also after the imposition of resolution 1874, North Korea continued to threaten that its nuclear program would continue. On June 13, 2009, North Korea clarified that it continued to extract enriched uranium, that it would use the existing enriched uranium exclusively for military purposes, and that it would use military force to respond to blockades. On September 3, 34

 John Everard et al., Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009), S/2012/ 422 (n. p., May 11, 2012), p. 11; Kim, op. cit., 2012a, p. 182; Park, ibid., 2009, pp. 40–41: op. cit., 2012, pp. 327, 353; Rim and Moon, ibid., pp. 185, 187–188.

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the North Korean UN Ambassador wrote in a letter to the Security Council that “reprocessing of used fuel rods was being completed, the extracted uranium is weaponized and tests for uranium enrichment are progressing successfully.” On November 3, North Korea claimed that already until late August reprocessing of 8,000 used fuel rods had been completed. The September 19, 2005 joint statement had been nullified. At the 64th UN General Assembly, the DPRK Foreign Minister Pak Kil-yôn asserted that “our nuclear weapons are intended to prevent war” and “according to the principle of equal sovereignty in the UN Charter we cannot recognize and receive unfair and unjust sanctions” (cf. p. 113). North Korea’s position was that “dialogue will be met with dialogue but sanctions will be met by nuclear deterrence.” However, North Korea did not follow up its threats by launching military provocations against South Korea or the United States. One negative outcome of the sanctions against the DPRK is that they did not change its attitude toward denuclearization. There has been no substantial progress in the case of the most important targets to get North Korea back to the six-party talks and prevent trade in strategic weapons and no progress at all in the ultimate target North Korea’s denuclearization. To begin, North Korea has basically refused and rejected the sanctions and shown a firm position against them. Although the United States has strengthened sanctions and to some extent was supported by the international community in such fields as prohibition against arms exports and freezing of assets, the results were yet minimal. Neither did the outcome show up as a shock to the North Korean economy but strengthened the country’s isolation and bellicose attitude. Some experts pointed out that without support from China, the effects of sanctions would be low. Another opinion was that the sanctions would make North Korea more dependent on China. On the positive side, since the North Korean nuclear crisis has been approached through the UN and multilateral sanctions, it is a great turning point in the North Korean nuclear issue and the peace process on the Korean peninsula. It is an epoch-making event that American or South Korean policies or regional approaches

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have been replaced by international efforts, raising the legitimacy and legal status of economic sanctions toward North Korea as well as other kinds of pressures against the country. After the imposition of UN sanctions against the DPRK, it is not easy to voluntarily remove them.35 Similar to the November 2009 report, the Panel of Experts’ May 2010 report states that the DPRK to circumvent measures in resolution 1874 (2009) and to mask its illicit trade in arms and related materiel in some cases had falsely described and mislabeled closed crates or containers intended for exports. They were shipped under DPRK Customs seal to ports in other countries, where they were packed with extraneous items and/or repacked into standard-size maritime shipping containers. The contents of the containers were then marked and labeled to reflect the added extraneous cargo or were otherwise falsely described and labeled. The manifests covering the shipments were also likely falsified to reflect this cargo description. Information on the original consignor and ultimate consignee were also likely to be obscured, altered, or falsified. In several cases, the consignors hid the real contents by further laundering the documentation as the container passed through key transshipment ports in East Asia. Multiple layers of intermediaries, shell companies, and financial institutions were also used to hide the true originators and recipients. When the process of packing and repacking was carried out by the freight forwarder, it acted in most cases on instructions received from the original consignor and had no knowledge of the containers’ actual content. Notably, a shipment of arms made in the DPRK destined for Iran reportedly worth some $18 million was seized in an aircraft in Bangkok on December 11, 2009. Considering North Korea’s ability to circumvent resolution 1874 (2009), with regard to changing the society, the Russian scholar Andrei Lankov (2011) writes that during the past two decades, neither sanctions to make the leadership reconsider its stance nor concessions to make leaders institute Chinese-style reforms raising economic efficiency, bringing development and abandoning 35

 Park, ibid., 2009, pp. 55, 60–61. Original quotation marks.

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­ angerous nuclear brinkmanship have led leaders to reconsider d their strategy. The reason why neither approach worked is that the society is designed in a way which makes it very resistant to pressure from abroad. The leaders assume that they have no viable alternative to their current strategy if they want to retain their power. Nonetheless, the panel’s report states that most interlocutors with whom the Panel spoke agreed that the sanctions had the intended impact. The many statements by government officials demanding the lifting of sanctions as a condition to return to the six-party talks attested to the impact that the Security Council measures had on the country. Measures such as travel ban and asset freeze implemented to constrain the ability of the DPRK to market and export weapons and other proscribed nuclear and ballistic missile items that had previously comprised a large share of foreign earnings had a significant effect on arms exports. Consequently, the measures had a substantial impact on the DPRK and its leaders, but they yet hardly contributed to the country’s severe economic difficulties impacting on the general population.36 Thus, the smart sanctions were to some extent successful. Notably, since North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 do not support the opinion by Pak (1995) that, in the long run, South Korea’s ­nonpermanent seat in the Security Council from 1996 to 1997 will contribute to stabilize inter-Korean relations, the significance of its then membership should not be overvalued (cf. pp. 98–99). In June 2012, the Panel of Experts delivered its final report to the Security Council that included the implementation of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). In March 2012, only 93 of 193 UN member states had followed the requirement to report on the 36

 David J. Birch et al., Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), S/ 2010/571 (n. p., May 12, 2010), pp. 24, 27, 44–45; Andrei Lankov, “Telling the Subversive Truth: Information Dissemination and North Korea’s Future,” The Korean Journal of Defence Analysis, vol. 23, no. 1 (March 2011), p. 21; Park, ibid., 2009, p. 55; Yang, Un-Chul and Ha, Sang-Sup, “UN-ûi taebukhan kyôngje chejae-ûi hangye: kangjesông-ûi chehan-gwa chôllyakchôk sônt’aeg-ûi hwakdae,” T’ongil chôngch’aek yôn’gu, vol. 21, no. 2 (2012), p. 156. Original ­quotation marks.

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implementation of the resolutions. In fact, many states, particularly those geographically and politically distant from the DPRK, did not regard implementation as a priority and did, in many cases, not recognize what obligations they would fulfill. Regarding the Uranium Enrichment Program, the panel’s views were largely in line with data acquired in October 2011 through consultation with the IAEA on the state of North Korea’s nuclear program. The estimated amount of plutonium was 30–50 kilos enabling manufacturing of six to eight atomic bombs. The Korean scholar Yi Chong-sôn (2012) regards the successful construction of a uranium enrichment factory recorded in the report as a clear failure of the measures prohibiting exports of nuclear materiel. Regarding sea transports of prohibited materials, in October 2007 and in November 2009, Greece confiscated North Korean ships bound for Syria transporting items for missiles and protection clothes for and equipment to detect chemical weapons. In November 2010, France confiscated a ship bound for Syria with materials containing brass discs and copper rods to be used for manufacturing artillery munitions and aluminium alloy tubes usable for making rockets. In May 2011, a DPRK ship destined for Burma refused inspection by the United States and returned home. With regard to transactions between North Korea, Iran, Syria, and Burma in weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, the Panel paid attention to similarities in design between missiles from the DPRK and Iran. The speaker of the Burmese parliament signed a Memorandum of Understanding with North Korea during the visit in 2008. There was according to a report by the IAEA from May 2011 a high probability that nuclear facilities in Syria destroyed by Israel in 2007 were supported by North Korea. In the case of luxury goods, most such goods from Japan, including second-hand MercedesBenz, notebooks, cigarettes, and cosmetics, were delivered through Chinese brokers.37 37

 Everard et al., op. cit., pp. 4, 6, 13, 16, 20, 21, 22 (Figure VI), 23, 24, 25, 26, 27–28, 29, 31, 40; Rim and Moon, op. cit., pp. 204–206; Yang and Ha, ibid., pp. 160–161; Yi, Chong-sôn, “Yuen-ûi taebukhan chejae hyoyulsông p’yôngka,” Kyôngnamtomin sin-

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Since China wished stabilization of North Korea that was strategically important in terms of Chinese–American rivalry in the region, the passive and negligent Chinese attitude toward sanctions imposed on the DPRK was a problem in implementing the sanctions. Since China was North Korea’s main trading partner, without its cooperation, the sanctions could not succeed. Although resolutions 1718 and 1874 contain comprehensive sanctions, they were not successfully implemented due to China’s lack of cooperation but, as in the case of many countries not reporting, the UN had no enforcement mechanisms to prevent Chinese policies. The Korean scholars Un-Chul Yang and Sang-Sup Ha (2012) point out that, owing to the absence of enforcement mechanisms in the UN resolutions, their efficiency was lowered. Actually, in spite of UN sanctions, Sino-Korean trade grew from $1.7 billion in 2006 to $5.6 billion in 2011, confirming their assessment. China’s share of foreign trade grew in the same years from 39.1 to 70.1 percent. North Korea continued to reject and violate the resolutions by exporting and importing weapons and luxury items with Chinese ports serving as principal transfer places. Among 13 items, 11 had entered through Dalian. According to the Korean scholar John S. Park (2014), the large North Korean state trading companies affiliated to elite branches of the regime engaged in a number of different commercial activities, ranging from legitimate such as mineral trade to illicit ones like procurement of dual-use industrial equipment. For an elite regime organization, higher transaction costs that a company incurred in a procurement deal with a Chinese middleman were readily offset by the profits made by a company specializing in North Korean mineral resource exports to China. In 2011, of bilateral China–North Korea trade, an estimated 60 percent was related to the rapidly growing mineral resource trade. Rising Chinese–DPRK trade and the increase in financial sanctions have improved procurement networks for mun, July 4, 2012 (http://www.gndomin.com/news/articlePrint. html?idxno=23007), p. 2. It is unclear why Greece is recorded by Rim and Moon (ibid., pp. 205–206) but not by Everard (ibid., pp. 24, 27), although Moon was Panel member.

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North Korean state trading companies. The overall effect of sanctions has deepened trade and commercial relationships between North Korean companies and private Chinese firms. In a far more cautious way than the evaluations of the referred Korean scholars, the Panel’s report concludes that, although the UN resolutions have not caused the DPRK to halt its banned activities, they appear to have slowed them and made illegal transactions significantly more difficult and expensive. Also, there was no evidence of sanctions having unintentionally harmed the civilian population.38

3.6 The Outcome of the UN Security Council’s Resolutions on North Korea after 2010 North Korea’s military acts were raised in the UN Security Council also in 2010 and 2012. As recorded by the American scholar Bruce E. Bechtol (2010), on March 26, 2010, a North Korean mini-sub snuck across the Northern Limit Line (NLL) which is the de facto border in the West Sea along the Korean coast, and launched an indigenously manufactured wake-homing torpedo at the ROK navy ship Cheonan. The torpedo produced a bubble effect, causing an explosion that split the ship in half. The attack, which he calls “a provocation,” killed 46 of the 104-man crew. At the time of the attack, the Cheonan sailed in waters south of the NLL that even North Korea recognizes as being within South Korean sovereignty but the DPRK denied any responsibility of its violation of the UN Charter. The former American journalist Don Oberdorfer and cowriter Robert Carlin (2014) write that one reason to instigate the incident could have been that in November 2009, South Korean naval vessels had attacked a North Korean patrol boat that had crossed the NLL. The incident took place in spite of the North’s regret for the naval clash in 2002 (cf. p. 107). In 2009, the South Korean guns poured 38

 Everard et al., ibid., pp. 4, 40; Park, op. cit., 2014:b, pp. 203, 207, 209; Rim and Moon, ibid., pp. 221–222; Yang and Ha, ibid., pp. 160, 161, 162, 163: Table 5, 168–169, 175; Yi, ibid., 2012, p. 1.

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fire into the ship, which retreated badly damaged, likely with serious casualties, but the South’s warships were virtually unscathed. They also write that the aftermath of the Cheonan incident was handled badly by the South Korean military, logs were altered to show defence officials were somewhere other than they actually were, and details of the events in the reports were changed or inaccurate. China generally took the position that there was not enough evidence to say what had happened. North Korea denied any part in the incident, which the South Korean government brought to the UN Security Council on June 4, requesting it to take appropriate measures. Previously, on May 20, the multinational Joint CivilianMilitary Investigation Group had announced its conclusion that the Cheonan sank due to an underwater explosion caused by a torpedo. Regardless of the incident’s cause, because of the resistance of China and Russia, the Council did not adopt any resolution on the issue. Instead, on July 9, the Council through a presidential statement deplored the attack without pointing explicitly out the DPRK as responsible. The incident endangered peace and security in the region and beyond. “In view of the findings of the Joint CivilianMilitary Investigation Group led by the Republic of Korea with the participation of five nations, which concluded that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was responsible for sinking the Cheonan, the Security Council expresses its deep concern.” Also, “Therefore, the Security Council condemns the attack which led to the sinking of the Cheonan.” The statement fell short of the hopes of the United States and South Korea. This was a consequence of China’s close relationship with North Korea confirming realists’ perception of the importance of power in international relations (cf. pp. 96, 114). Previously, on June 7, the Council had adopted a resolution that extended existing sanctions introduced following the 2009 missile and nuclear tests for another year. Following North Korea’s artillery attack on Yônp’yông Island in November 2010 killing four people, there was hardly any response from the Security Council due to the passive attitude of China and Russia and their resistance toward stronger measures. Also the United States was lukewarm, fearing that sanctions or warnings could cause military incidents. As was

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the case with North Korea’s nuclear test in 2006, the incidents meant that inter-Korean personal contacts within the UN decreased markedly (cf. p. 110).39 On April 13, 2012, North Korea launched a long-distance ­ballistic rocket that raised inter-Korean tensions, although the test failed after only about two minutes. The UN Security Council immediately held an emergency meeting in which the member countries strongly condemned the test that they regarded as a serious violation of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). The Council urged North Korea not to undertake any new test and to observe the resolutions. On April 16, the Council unanimously adopted a presidential statement that strongly condemned the test and underscored that it was a serious violation of the two resolutions. Subsequently, the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Korean Committee for Space Technology declared that North Korea will continue to conduct satellite launches. Following the adoption of the statement, the Sanctions Committee added in May the Green Pine Association Corporation, the DPRK Hûngjin Trade, and the Amnok River Development Bank to the list of companies selected for sanctions. Among those entities, the first was in charge of more than half of arms exports whereas the DPRK Hûngjin Trade and Amnok River Development Bank were reportedly involved in 39

 Author’s visit to the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 7, 2016; Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., “The Implications of the Cheonan Sinking: A Security Studies Perspective,” International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, vol. 19, no. 2 (2010), pp. 2, 3, 23, 24; Don Oberdorfer and Robert Carlin, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (New York: Basic Books, 2014), pp. 444–445, 451, 452; Park, Heung-soon, “UN-ûi yôkhal UN anbori-wa Han’gug-ûi wegyo, anbo,” Good Society, November 27, 2013 (http:// www.goodsociety.kr/bbs/news_print.php?bbs_code=bbsIdx13&bbsnumber=37), p. 11; Rim and Moon, ibid., pp. 139–140; Song, Il Kweon, Han’gug-ûi Yuen wegyo-e taehan punsôk — Ch’ônanham sakôn-ûl chungsim-ûro — (Seoul: Kungmin taehakkyo, chôngch’i taehakwôn, December 11, 2011), pp. 34, 43–44, 48; UN Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2010/13 (n. p., July 9, 2010), p. 1. The second and third quotations have original quotation marks. Italics in the original. The five countries that participated in the Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group were South Korea, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Sweden (Bechtol, ibid., p. 17).

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Iran’s development of ballistic missiles through exports of parts for missile manufacturing and financial assistance. The Amnok River Development Bank was the main affiliated company of the Tanchon Commercial Bank. Although resolution 1874 states that North Korea cannot have the status of a nuclear weapons state, in April 2012, the DPRK revised the preamble to its Constitution to describe itself as a “nuclear-armed state.”40 On December 12, 2012, North Korea made in spite of warnings from the international community a new ballistic missile launch that was successful. The Security Council responded by on January 22, 2013 unanimously adopting resolution 2087 that condemned the test as a violation of resolutions 1718 and 1874 and demanded that the DPRK not make any further missile launches as well as comply with the resolutions. Resolution 2087 urged that the DPRK “…abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner…” New sanctions were enforced freezing the assets of four North Korean individuals and six companies and prohibiting foreign travelling making it far more progressive than the 2006 and 2009 sanctions but government institutions and policy decision-makers were still excluded. Targeted individuals were Paek Chang Ho, head of the Satellite Control Center of the Korean Committee for Space Technology, Chang Myong Chin, General Manager of the Sohae (West Sea) Satellite Launching Station, and head of the launch center at the time of the two missile tests conducted in 2012 and officials Ra Ky’ong Su and Kim Kwang Il at Tanchon Commercial Bank. Targeted companies were (a) the Korean Committee for Space Technology, which orchestrated the two missile tests conducted in 2012, (b) the Bank of East Land, which facilitated weapon transactions by arms manufacturer and exporter Green Pine Association Corporation and transferred capital to circumvent sanctions, (c) the 40

 Bae, Jung-ho et al., Pukhan misail palsa-e taehan kukche sahoe-ûi taeûng (Seoul: T’ongil yôn’guwôn, April 2012), pp. 1, 20–21; Everard et al., op. cit., pp. 17–18; Rim and Moon, ibid., pp. 190–191, 219; Martin Uden et al., Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), S/2013/337 (n. p., May 12, 2013), p. 12. Original quotation marks.

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Korea Kumryong Trading Corporation, which was used as a nickname by the leading arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) to carry out procurement activities, (d) the Tosong Technology Trading Corporation, which is the mother company of the KOMID, (e) the Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation, which is the mother company of the Korea Ryonbong General Corporation, and (f) Leader (Hong Kong) International, which replaced the KOMID for sea transports. The number was lower than the international community had expected. In contrast to resolution 1874, the targets of sanctions were recorded in resolution 2087, which was a step forward. Monitoring financial institutions and inspections of ships with suspected cargo on open sea would be strengthened. The technique to evade sanctions through large-scale cash transfers would be hindered. Exports to the DPRK would be more strictly controlled by not only including arms but also items that could be used for military purposes. By introducing new norms for designating additional targets of sanctions, the work of the Sanctions Committee would be strengthened and its scope would be widened. The resolution also made it clear that if North Korea made a new provocation by conducting a new nuclear test, the Security Council would undertake significant actions by strengthening the clause of “automatic intervention.” In the same month, the DPRK sent a defiant response to the Security Council declaring that it “will continuously launch satellites for peaceful purposes to conquer space and become a world-level power.”41 The prediction made by Beal (2007) that the UN resolu41

 Rim and Moon, ibid., pp. 195, 198–201, 308–309, 313–318; Sô, op. cit., pp. 378–379; Uden et al., ibid., 2013, pp. 4, 12, 15; Martin Uden et al., Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), S/2014/147 (n. p., February 7, 2014), p. 16. Original quotation marks. Names of companies recorded in p. 119 are from Rim and Moon (ibid., pp. 313–318) when the same names as those here appear. Korea Tangun Trading Corporation is from Uden et al., ibid., 2014, p. 20. Rim and Moon (ibid., p. 195) do not say why government institutions and policy decisionmakers were still excluded from sanctions.

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tions did not offer any solution to the problems that the tests exemplified but, if implemented thoroughly, would exacerbate them had turned out to be entirely accurate (cf. p. 112). Obviously, the UN can only become what its member states want it to become (cf. pp. 4, 111, 122). As we have seen, South Korea was on October 18, 2012 elected for a second term in the Security Council. North Korea vehemently resisted resolution 2087 and successfully conducted its third underground nuclear test on February 12, 2013, while South Korea was Chairman of the Council. A study published by the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) claims that since the test was made during the transition period of government in South Korea and before the finish of the line-up of the second Barrack Obama administration in the United States, it was conducted to affect the establishment of the countries’ policies toward North Korea. The reasons for the test were to (a) get recognition as a nuclear power by the global community, (b) realize the teachings of deceased Kim Jong Il and thereby legitimize hereditary politics, (c) stabilize popular feelings and maintain political power, (d) acquire superiority in inter-Korean relations, (e) surpass South Korea militarily, (f) acquire the capability to attack the American mainland by putting small size nuclear warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles, and (g) use the nuclear threat toward the United States to break its defence readiness and incapacitate the ROK-American alliance.42 The reasons are quite similar to those enumerated on the 2006 and 2009 nuclear tests (cf. pp. 110–111, 117–118). The three nuclear tests imply that UN membership for North Korean leaders had not facilitated protection of the state’s existence, in contrast to Han’s forecast (1991). The repeated missile and nuclear tests also contradict the first half of Han’s prediction (1991): “Contrary to the apprehension some hold that North Korea might bring the interKorean quarrel into the UN, it will be to Pyongyang’s own interest 42

 Cheon, Seong-Whun et al., 3 ch’a haeksirhôm-ihu Kim Jong Un chôngkwôn-ûi taenaewe chôngch’aek (Seoul: T’ongil yôn’guwôn, March 2013), pp. 1, 3, 4; Rim and Moon, ibid., p. 138; Shin, op. cit., 2013, p. 150.

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to maintain a relationship of coexistence with Seoul” since quarrel has been brought into the UN. The repeated tests indicate that the North’s leaders well knew that there are no ways for the UN to enforce decisions and no mechanisms to compel states to comply with decisions in the area of international peace and security making them determined to continue their tests (cf. p. 7). The Security Council responded to the nuclear test by only 11 hours later holding an urgent meeting called by South Korea. At the time of the test, the South Korean representative almost daily met with colleagues both of the permanent and nonpermanent members, creating regular contacts. Such contacts became a valuable asset to quickly respond to North Korea’s nuclear program meaning that South Korea exerted strong influence by leading decision-­ making processes. A press statement was issued. The statement issued by Council President Kim Sung-hwan strongly condemned the test that was a grave violation of Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), and 2087 (2013) and therefore threatened international peace and security. Resolution 2094 unanimously adopted on March 7 expressed “… the gravest concern …” at the nuclear test that was made in violation of the three resolutions. The test was a challenge to the NPT and to international efforts aimed at strengthening nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. It posed a danger to peace and stability both in the region and beyond. As the 2006 and 2009 resolutions, resolution 2094 requested a complete, verifiable, and irreversible disarmament of the nuclear program. Like resolution 2087, resolution 2094 introduced new measures aimed at convincing Pyongyang to comply with its international obligations as well as at inhibiting further development of its nuclear, other weapons of mass destruction, and ballistic missile programs. In particular, instead of letting member states themselves assess whether transfer of financial assets and provision of financial services could contribute to the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, such assistance was now prohibited. Targeted individuals for travel ban and asset freeze were Yo’n Cho’ng Nam, representative for the KOMID, Ko Ch’o’l-chae, Deputy Chief Representative for the KOMID, and Mun Cho’ng-ch’o’l, official at

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the Tanchon Commercial Bank. One company targeted for asset freeze was the Second Academy of Natural Sciences, a national-level organization responsible for research and development of North Korea’s advanced weapons system. Korea Complex Equipment Import Corporation whose parent company is Korea Ryonbong General Corporation was also targeted. As we have seen, in April 2009, the latter was a designated entity by the Sanctions Committee. When there was intelligence on ships destined for North Korea loading prohibited items, inspection was mandatory. North Korea strongly resisted these demands creating a very dangerous situation on the Korean peninsula in the spring of 2013.43 Notably, since the 2006, 2009, and 2013 nuclear tests and the 2009 missile test have been met by strong sanctions imposed by the Security Council, UN membership has created a new viable channel for North Korea to challenge the global community that it would not have had otherwise. The repeated tests discredit the prediction by Kim Kang-nyông (1991) that the two Koreas’ joint UN admission would establish a basis for reorganizing the security structure in Northeast Asia. In response to the two resolutions, Pyongyang stated that it would continue to launch missiles and claimed that denuclearization of the Korean peninsula would be impossible unless the world is denuclearized at a time when the hostile American policy toward the DPRK remained unchanged. In March, it declared the termination of the 1953 Armistice Agreement, the 1991 Basic Agreement and Joint Declaration, and even threatened to launch war. According to the Korean diplomats Rim Kap-soo and Mun Duk Ho (2013), the reasons for rejecting the resolutions were first that its nuclear 43

 Author’s visit to the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 7, 2016; Han’guk wegyobu, P’yônghwaropko anjônhan chiguch’on-ûl wihayô: Taehanmingug-ûi 2013-14nyôn Yuen anbori pisangim isaguk hwaltong (Seoul, May 2015), pp. 105–106, 118–120; Rim and Moon, ibid., p. 138; Shin, ibid., 2013, pp. 150–151; Sô, op. cit., p. 379; Uden et al., op. cit., 2013, pp. 9, 13; United Nations Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Nuclear Test Conducted by Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, SC/10912DC/3415, n. p., February 12, 2013 (http://www.un.org/News/Press/ docs/2013/sc10912.doc.htm).

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program serves as a measure of self-defence against the American threat of a nuclear war giving it political legitimacy. Second, constructing lightwater reactors and dispatching satellites are “peaceful uses of atomic power” and “peaceful use of space” based on international law and universal rights. Third, the UN Security Council, in which United States plays a pivotal role, shows hostile attitudes toward North Korea, which is the only country on which it applies double standards. As previously noted, the Council has not criticized or imposed sanctions on nuclear powers Israel, India, and Pakistan, a fact that has been criticized by North Korea. The DPRK, in particular, claims that the United States actively defends Israel in spite of, in addition to its nuclear program, building settlements, and committing human rights violations in Palestine areas. North Korea also points out the problem that only 15 member states of the Security Council make decisions that all UN member states have to adhere to. The DPRK does not recognize the representativeness of the Council and claims that only the General Assembly has the right to make decisions on criticism and coercion pertaining to certain member states. In brief, the legitimacy behind the imposition of sanctions is questioned. Notably, as recorded by the British scholar Kate Seaman (2014), the Council’s structure is outdated in relation to the way it represents the balance of power within the international system. Compatriot Trudy Fraser (2015) notes that the general membership of the UN has complained of arbitrary and self-serving behavior by the five permanent members but also, conflictingly, of failure to act when the majority of member states would wish them to do so. The Panel of Experts’ 2013 report claims that the imposition of sanctions had not halted North Korea’s development of nuclear and ballistic missile programs but it had most likely considerably delayed the timetable. The imposition of financial sanctions and the bans on the trade in weapons had choked off significant funding that could have been chaneled into its prohibited activities. In both its exports and imports of goods under the sanctions, the DPRK continued to use a variety of techniques to circumvent national controls, indicating that the imposition of sanctions has hampered its arms sales and

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illicit weapons programs. Also Chung (2013) points out that North Korea through various [nonexemplified] measures evaded the sanctions and adds that a considerable number of UN member states for technical, financial, or political reasons hesitated to actively implement them. The Security Council resolutions were also crucial in preventing North Korea from exporting sensitive nuclear and missile technology, which would increase the risk to international peace and security. On the other hand, it was difficult to link the implementation of UN sanctions to any adverse effect on the civilian population.44 Again, smart sanctions to some extent worked. As Chairman of the Security Council, South Korea, in addition to the above contributions after North Korea’s third nuclear test, presided over all the meetings and mediated opinions among member states. On February 12, the ROK organized a high-level public debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts. Since it is a central issue in the areas of UN peacekeeping, protection of human rights and provision of humanitarian assistance, four foreign ministers, delegates of 74 countries, and representatives from international organizations participated. By adopting a presidential statement reconfirming member states’ responsibility to protect civilians and observe related international law, the responsibility of prosecuting countries to cease nonpunishment of violators of related international law, guarantee supplies of humanitarian assistance, implement the task of PKOs to protect, and regularize submission of a report to the Secretary-General, the outcome of the debates was enhanced. South Korea also held 13 meetings and 13 consultations. During February, three resolutions on Burundi, Sudan, and Guinea-Bissau as well as two presidential statements on the protection of civilians in military conflicts and support for political dialogue 44

 Cheon et al., op. cit., pp. 18, 19; Chung, op. cit., 2013, p. 4; Fraser, op. cit., p. 145; Oberdorfer and Carlin, op. cit., pp. 459–460; Rim and Moon, ibid., pp. 223–225, 227; Seaman, op. cit., p. 179; Uden et al., ibid., 2013, pp. 5, 10, 55. Original quotation marks. On reforming the Security Council see Fraser, ibid., pp. 118–150 and Park, op. cit., 2015, pp. 173–204.

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in Yemen, respectively, were adopted. The mandates of the UN office in Burundi and the Sanctions Committee for Sudan for one year were extended one year each whereas the peace-building office’s mandate in Guinea-Bissau was prolonged for three months. Three press statements on bomb terror against the American Embassy in Turkey, North Korea’s nuclear test, and welcoming the signing of a framework on peace and security cooperation between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and its neighbors were adopted. Among regular conflicts, the main issues were Syria, Mali, the DRC, Sudan, and South Sudan. Numerous briefings were heard with the special representatives of the UN Secretary-General, the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. In cooperation with regional groups such as the African Unity, South Korea contributed to grope for plans for solutions of pending problems. In accordance with the above forecast by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in October 2012, the Ministry assessed in March 2013 that the ROK by implementing its task successfully had elevated its capacity for multilateral diplomacy. South Korea had played the leading role in the UN response to North Korea’s nuclear test. It had by under the label “Protection of Civilians during Military Conflicts” opening public debate in the Council and adopting a press statement contributed to reconfirm the Council’s core responsibility in this field. By after only one month since becoming Council member having raised urgent issues such as the Middle East, threats from weapons of mass destruction, and climate change, the Council members highly assessed South Korea’s work during its Chairmanship.45 When South Korea assumed Chairmanship again in May 2014, it held 42 meetings. Five resolutions, four presidential statements, and 45

 Han’guk wegyobu, Yuen anbori-ûi ûijangguk hwaltong kyôlgwa, n. p., March 3, 2013 (http://www.mofa. go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/readkorb...enum=5&table Name=TYPE_DATABOARD&pc=&dc=&wc=&lu=&vu=&lu=&du=), pp. 1–2: op. cit., 2015, pp. 17, 32; Kang, Pyông-ch’ôl, “Anbori isaguk imgi naeju chongnyo… Han, 2028 nyôn chaechinch’ul ch’ujin,” Yonhap News, December 26, 2014 (http://www. yonhapnews.co.kr/dev/9601000000.html), p. 1; Shin, op. cit., 2013, pp. 150, 151.

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13 press statements were adopted. Resolution 2155 was important by strengthening the responsibility of the UN mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to protect civilians. However, a proposed resolution to refer Syria to the International Criminal Court (ICC) was vetoed by Russia and China confirming realists’ perception of the importance of power in international relations (cf. pp. 96, 114, 121). On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of resolution 1540 on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) to nonstate actors adopted in April 2004, a high-level public debate on nonproliferation of WMDs was held on May 7. A presidential statement confirming that diffusion of WMDs is a threat to world peace and security and urging all member states to strengthen their efforts until 2021 to fully implement resolution 1540 was adopted. The statement was considered to give new momentum to the efforts. UN Ambassador Oh Joon was Chairman of the 1540 Committee and of the Somalia–Eritrea Sanctions Committee. During the two periods of being Council Chairman, South Korea managed to accomplish consensus among all member states on the meeting form on such politically sensitive issues as Syria and Ukraine. Thus, each member state praised its role as mediator. A significant effect of Council membership was that South Korea by participating in debates on the North Korean missile, nuclear and human rights issue could reflect its position. As a member, South Korea could lead the response to North Korea’s provocations instead of relying on intelligence from its allies. It was especially important at the time of the December 22, 2012 missile test and the February 12, 2013 nuclear test cooperate with its allies to adopt resolutions 2087 and 2094 that both were among the important outcomes of membership. In this way, the above prediction by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2012 that Council membership would stabilize inter-Korean relations could have been fulfilled but as, we have seen, sanctions imposed on North Korea have not solved the nuclear issue. By since 1991, having served twice in the main decision making UN organ, South Korea has made many contributions to maintain world peace and security. At the same time, Seoul has accumulated

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capacity to rise as a real middle power (cf. pp. 15, 16). The UN is an arena where middle powers can form alliances and show strength in combination with other member states, which they cannot do individually. The size and global reach of the economy is the most important capability underpinning South Korea’s claim to middle power status. Similar to the cases of middle powers such as Australia and South Africa that have sought to make a greater impact on international relations through proactive diplomacy aiming principally at influencing multilateral outcomes, the second period of Council membership became an opportunity to strengthen diplomatic capabilities. During 2013–2014, the Council adopted 110 resolutions, 50 presidential statements, and 224 press statements. In December 2014, the Seoul government assessed that the ROK had been active as Chairman and through its work in 2013–2014 contributed to maintaining global peace and security.46 As from 1996 to 1997, South Korea should have been able to successfully display or strengthen national prestige and power, to exert influence on international affairs, to realize overall national foreign policy objectives, and to strengthen its position within the UN (cf. pp. 93, 101). Again, the foreign policy agenda was widened. Among the four limitations recorded by Park for nonpermanent members to exert influence, the account again somewhat contradicts (a) that the two-year term in office makes it difficult to acquire sufficient data on principal global issues and to take standpoints on foreign policy. The other ones being (b) the permanent members are strong military powers possessing nuclear weapons and are economically highly advanced, (c) the end of the Cold War has made consensus voting based on solidarity and cooperation common among the permanent members, and (d) the permanent members 46

 Han’guk wegyobu, ibid., 2015, pp. 18–20, 68, 69; Kang, ibid., 2014, p. 1; O’Neil, op. cit., pp. 75, 80; Park, op. cit., 2015, pp. 42, 104, 149. According to Kang (ibid.), the number of press statements adopted was 834. It is unclear what explains the huge difference with the figure recorded in the text. O’Neil (op. cit., p. 75) does not record examples of what Australia and South Africa have done to make a greater impact on international relations.

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are by maintaining closer relations with the UN Secretariat in a more favorable position to decide on them are hardly possible to judge from the account. Returning to the outcome of sanctions imposed by the Security Council, in 2014 the Panel of Experts’ report concluded that the ballistic missile-related shipment seized by the ROK in May 2012 violated resolution 1718 (2006) that prohibits the DPRK to export ballistic-related items. The real consignor was Dalian Liaosin Trading Company, Ltd. in Liaoning, China, and the consignee was Electric Parts Com. South Korea claims that both companies acted on behalf of Korea Tangun Trading Corporation, which had been involved in a missile-related shipment seized in October 2007 on its way to Syria. Dalian Liaosin Trading Company, Ltd. has maintained a close, long-standing business relationship with many entities in the DPRK. In March 2013, Japan reported to the Sanctions Committee that it had seized five aluminium alloy rods found onboard a container ship in August 2012. Japanese authorities determined that the rods originated from North Korea, were shipped via Dalian in China and were bound for a third country. In January 2014, Chinese authorities confirmed in response to the panel’s inquiry that the shipment had originated from the port of Namp’o and that the declared destination port was in Burma. The declared consignor was an entity named Korea Kumpyo Trading. In September 2013, a member state told the Committee that it in May 2013 had inspected an air shipment stated to contain “machine spare parts” and “relays” intended for use in “freezing carriers,” “fish-factory mother ships,” “fish-processing machines,” and “old ships.” The shipment was suspected to have originated from and/or had been brokered by the DPRK. The Panel was requested to assist to determine whether the items found in the cargo were prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and 2094 (2013) but found that none of the items in the cargo met the criteria defined by the lists of prohibited items, material, equipment, goods, and technology related to nuclear, other weapons of mass destruction, and ballistic missile programs. However, all the items were spare parts or other items related to Scud ballistic missile

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systems. They were arms and related materials whose export and brokering by the DPRK is prohibited by resolutions 1718, 1874, and 2094. The cargo had originated from North Korea.47 Among components for the December 12, 2012 missile launch, 14 were manufactured in the former Soviet Union (3), the United Kingdom (3), China (3), Switzerland (1), the United States (4), and South Korea (1, together with the United States). Almost all items were off-the-shelf ones that did not meet any of the specifications in the list of prohibited items. Two of the items were cannibalized Scud parts. Five pressure transmitters were acquired in 2006 and 2010 by an entity registered in Taiwan, which already was known for illicit exports to North Korea. On May 10, 2013, the United States designated Taiwanese Chang Wen-Fu, chief executive officer of the Trans Multi Mechanics Co., Ltd., who had been actively involved in the procurement of dual-use machinery for the DPRK. The company was used by businessman Hsien Tai Tsai to procure 100,000 dollars’ worth of equipment to the DPRK and to negotiate contracts on behalf of its entities or individuals. The incidents reported to the Committee and the information collected by the Panel show that the DPRK actively engaged in trade in arms and related material in violation of the Security Council’s resolutions. Although the exact amount of money earned from this trade was subject to debate, it was doubtless one of its most profitable income sources. Since financial measures in the resolutions, along with the strengthening of standards governing international finance, have combined to change fundamentally the financial environment in which the DPRK operates, it has become far more difficult to make direct use of its banks to remit earnings and make payments for transactions in prohibited goods, training, and technology. On the other hand, the measures imposed by the resolutions could not be directly blamed for the country’s food shortages. According to Rim and Moon (2013), sanctions imposed by the Security Council to stop the North Korean nuclear program and transports of them through ballistic missiles have raised the opportunity 47

 Uden et al., op. cit., 2014, pp. 8, 18–21. Original quotation marks.

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cost of development in order to induce the DPRK to abandon the program. The Council’s financial sanctions have, in combination with unilateral financial sanctions imposed by the United States and the EU, turned out to be a great shock to the North Korean ruling class but the North has yet accomplished a stable power transition and there were no signs that the elite was shaken.48 That the elite was not shaken concurs entirely with the writing of Lankov (2011). In July 2013, authorities in Panama stopped and inspected on the Atlantic side of the Panama Canal DPRK-owned and -flagged general cargo vessel Chong Chon Gang whose route was from Cuba to North Korea. Concealed under more than 200,000 bags of sugar, they found items believed to be arms and related materiel. The Panel concluded in its incident report that both the shipment itself and the transaction between Cuba and the DPRK were sanctions violations. It found six trailers associated with surface-to-air missile systems and 25 shipping containers loaded with two disassembled MiG-21 aircraft, 15 engines for MiG-21 aircraft, components for surface-to-air missile systems, ammunition, and miscellaneous arms-related materiel. Contact phone numbers and records found in the captain’s notes made the Panel conclude that DPRK embassy officials in Cuba had made arrangements for the shipment of the consignment of arms and related materiel, including the payment methods. This was the largest amount of arms and related materiel interdicted to or from the DPRK since resolution 1718 was adopted in 2006. On July 16, Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledged ownership of the arms and related materiel and stated that they were being shipped to be repaired and returned. Cuba argued later to the Panel and in a report to the Committee that there was no “supply, sale or transfer” since Cuba retained “ownership” of the cargo. Also, “maintenance” was distinct from “repair,” which Cuba claimed was the basis of its contract with the DPRK. On July 17, the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the arms were of Cuban origin and were being transported for overhaul under a contract between the two 48

 Rim and Moon, op. cit., pp. 15, 101; Uden et al., ibid., 2014, pp. 22–24, 25, 56, 61; Yang and Han, op. cit., p. 166. Original quotation marks.

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countries. Following its investigation, the Panel confirmed the contents of the concealed consignment found onboard the ship were arms and related materiel en route from Cuba to the DPRK. It considered that the shipment violated resolutions 1718 and 1874 prohibiting the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of all arms, and related materiel to North Korea. The transaction violated the resolutions and resolution 2094 that were adopted to prevent the provision of technical training, advice, services, or assistance related to the provision of technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms or materiel by the DPRK, its nationals or from its territory. The Panel was unconvinced by Cuba’s rationale to distinguish “maintenance” and “repair” since both are services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance, and use of arms and related materiel that the DPRK shall not provide under resolutions 1718 and 1874. Extraordinary and extensive efforts to conceal the cargo of arms and related materiel and the contingency instructions found onboard the vessel for preparing a false declaration for entering the Panama Canal, if required for transit, pointed to a clear and conscious intention to circumvent the said resolutions. The captain had received and acted upon “secret” instructions regarding the loading and concealment of the undeclared cargo. He also had a list of the containers and trailers that showed part of them to be arms and related materiel. The consignor of the sugar was Cubazucar and the consignee Korea Central Marketing and Trading Corporation. Cuba confirmed that the parties were involved in the sugar deal. The arms shipment was part of a government agreement. The Panel concludes that the Chong Chon Gang case “… shows that determined action can thwart prohibited activities on the basis of existing measures.” On the other hand, it also writes: There have been no signs that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea intends to respond to the Security Council’s calls to abandon its nuclear, ballistic missile and other weapons of mass destruction programmes. On the contrary, it is persisting with its arms trade and other prohibited activities in defiance of Security

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Council resolutions, while activities related to its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes continue.49

Similarly, the Panel of Experts’ report from 2015 observes that the DPRK, in defiance of Security Council resolutions, continued to strengthen its nuclear capability. There were no signs that it intended to abide by the resolutions and stop its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. On the contrary, North Korea remained actively engaged in prohibited programs: between February and August 2014, at least 90 test firings of missiles, artillery, and rockets were made. The number of ballistic missiles launched during the year was unprecedented. On March 27 and July 17, 2014, the Security Council, in press statements, condemned these ballistic missile launches as violations of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), and 2094 (2013) and reaffirmed its decision that the DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing ­programs, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. No new instances of seizure or inspection of prohibited items related to nuclear or missile programs were reported by UN member states to the Panel. However, 158 of 193 member states had not, in response to resolutions 1718, 1874, and 2094, submitted reports describing the steps or measures taken to implement effectively specified sanctions provisions impeding work, confirming that the UN can only become what its member states want it to become (cf. pp. 4, 111, 122, 133). Of those 158 countries, 94 had not submitted any implementation reports. Many member states lack the technical capacity to develop the reports and implement sanctions. 49

 Uden et al., ibid., 2014, pp. 4, 26–29, 31, 32. Original quotation marks except the last quotation. In June 2015, a court in Panama jailed Captain Ri Yong-Il and first mate Hong Yong-hyon for 12 years for trying to smuggle Cuban weapons through the Panama Canal. They were convicted of arms trafficking over the undeclared cache. The rest of the crew of more than 30 on the Chong Chon Gang were acquitted earlier. From The Tico Times, “Two North Koreans jailed in Panama over Cuba arms cache,” June 14, 2015 (http://www.ticotimes.net/2015/06/14/two-north-koreansjailed-in-panama-over-arms-cache), pp. 1–2.

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The luxury goods cases that the Panel investigated showed that North Korea managed to procure items from multiple countries, including by making use of its diplomatic missions. Different definitions of the term “luxury goods” by various member states were exploited. Luxury goods acquired generally travelled through multiple countries first with the manufacturers/companies having no idea about their final destination. In the case of financial sanctions, North Korea continued to use multiple circumventing techniques to mask its involvement in both legitimate and illicit business transactions. Its entities have frequently used established international financial channels and foreign intermediaries and, where possible, still moved money through bulk cash. North Korea has been able to bypass banking organizations’ due diligence processes by initiating transactions through other entities acting on their behalf.50 Unsurprisingly, John S. Park (2014) argues that sanctions have strengthened the North Korean government by forcing it to innovate. The large state trading companies did not constitute the innovation but their newly formed procurement channels with unique Chinese middlemen operating in the globalizing Chinese national economy did. More efficient Chinese middlemen-centric procurement networks based in a globalizing Chinese national economy have replaced the North Korean government’s previous method of conducting direct transactions and utilizing its freighters for shipment. Confirming the argument by Park, designated entities and individuals demonstrated resilience and adaptability to defy the Council’s resolutions. The entities exploited the time lags between the adoption of sanctions measures and implementation by member states. They preemptively adopted new aliases to evade assets freezes. On July 28, 2014, the Sanctions Committee designated the 50

 Hugh Griffiths et al., Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), S/2015/131 (n. p., February 23, 2015), pp. 9, 10, 13, 21, 25, 40–41, 52, 53, 69, 73; Han’guk wegyobu, op. cit., 2015, p. 25; United States Government Accountability Office, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, North Korea Sanctions: United States Has Increased Flexibility to Impose Sanctions, but United Nations Is Impeded by a Lack of Member State Reports, GAO-15-485 (n. p., May 2015), pp. 21, 28, 29.

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Ocean Maritime Management Company, Ltd. (OMM) for targeted sanctions based on the recommendations by the Panel of Experts and member states. The company played a key role in arranging the shipment of concealed arms and related materiel on board the vessel Chong Chon Gang from Cuba to the DPRK in July 2013. It had used foreign intermediaries in Hong Kong, Thailand, and Singapore to conduct financial transactions on its behalf. The sanctions imposed on the OMM were the first after the Chong Chon Gang incident. A consequence of the sanctions is that North Korea reportedly suffers from a shortage of hard currency. However, since the American scholar Sheena Chestnut Greitens (2014) enumerates the Kaesong Industrial Complex, trade with China, tourism, export of labor, remittances, cell phones, arms sales, and illicit activities such as state-sponsored drug production and trafficking, counterfeiting of American currency, and counterfeited cigarette production as sources of foreign currency, it could be asked to what extent the DPRK suffers from a shortage. Notably, sanctions have failed to end arms sales. North Korea acted in order to evade the strengthened sanctions by changing the registration and ownership of vessels controlled by the company. Of the 14 vessels controlled by the OMM, 13 were renamed, their ownership transferred to other single shipowner companies, and vessel management transferred to two main companies. One evasion technique in shipping has been to compartmentalize tasks by delegating them to different agents or representatives in various countries. Financial transactions have been deliberately disassociated from its logistics and operations. One key company official made regular use of a false identity, while others avoided using their full names to conceal their identities. Again, there were no incidents where bans imposed by the Security Council’s resolutions directly resulted in shortages of foodstuffs or other humanitarian aid.51 51

 Author’s visit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 7, 2016; Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Illicit: North Korea’s Evolving Operations to Earn Hard Currency (Washington: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2014), pp. 46, 48, 51, 54, 58, 61, 64, 66–67; Griffiths et al., ibid., 2015, pp. 9, 46, 53–54, 73; Han’guk wegyobu, ibid., 2015, p. 26; Park, op. cit., 2014:b, pp. 210–211; United States Government Accountability Office, ibid, p. 27.

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The Panel writes that the Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation targeted in resolution 2087 (2013) remained resilient in the face of UN sanctions. Ryonha is the principal manufacturer of computer numerically controlled machine tools that North Korea has emphasized the importance of for its nuclear programs and launches using ballistic missile technology. The entity has maintained its ability to operate abroad while concealing its involvement by using shell companies and intermediaries. It has relied on individuals with long-standing business relationships with the DPRK. Its agents have skilfully manipulated several aliases, in different languages, that are not included on the 1718 Sanctions List. One new event was that in May 2014, Mongolia stated in its national implementation report that it had terminated an attempted sale to North Korea of MiG-21 fighter jets, their engines, and other parts in 2009. In early 2009, a Mongolia-based company signed a contract with a North Korean entity to sell 32 decommissioned MiG-21 PFM fighter jets as spare parts. The sale would violate the 1979 Agreement between Mongolia and the former Soviet Union that remained in force and prohibited Mongolia to transfer military equipment or hardware to any third country without obtaining approval from the Russian Federation. It would also violate resolution 1718 (2006). Since the Mongolian Ministry of Defence decided against transferring the jets to the Mongolia-based company for onward sale, the jets were disassembled. Despite the decision, the individuals involved forged documents and declared a Russian company as the recipient but the Mongolian authorities detected and stopped these attempts. Following the investigation by the Independent Agency against Corruption of Mongolia in 2012, three individuals were prosecuted and sentenced to imprisonment ranging from 3.5 to 7.1 years. Mongolia claimed that these individuals acted in their personal capacities. The Panel confirmed during its on-site inspection that a complete MiG-21 PFM fighter jet, 31 engines, and a large amount of other parts were kept in storage. By intercepting the attempted sale of MiG-21 fighter jets and their components to the DPRK, the Mongolian government prevented a violation of UN resolutions and

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acted in accordance with them to prevent the return of the funds amounting to $679,000 to the North that requested the return of this sum.52 The Mongolian government’s handling of this case deviates from North Korea’s successful evasion of UN sanctions. Nonetheless, in 2016, the Panel of Experts’ report stated that the sanctions had not prevented the DPRK “… from gradually improving and expanding its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities.” The DPRK conducted its fourth nuclear test on January 6, 2016. In three cases, the arms embargo was implemented in accordance with resolution 2094 (2013). First, in December 2015, a member state reported to the Sanctions Committee its decision to dispose of a shipment of cargo from September 2010 following its inspections and seizure in May 2014. The vessel was travelling from Dalian in China to Syria. The Panel’s investigation and on-site inspection confirmed that the cargo was owned and controlled by entities and individuals working for sanction-targeted Leader (Hong Kong) International and Korea Kumryong Trading Corporation. Both were connected to the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID: cf. p. 117). The consignment consisted of such items as machinery, components, and measuring devices, of which some could be used for military purposes. Leader/Kumryong used two Chinese companies to procure the items that were mostly sourced from China and Taiwan. The procurement was made by Dalian Union owner, Mr. Cai Guang, who has also served as director of Leader. The companies had direct links to individuals or entities that transferred arms and related materiel of ballistic missile-related items. Such concealment techniques as the use of foreign intermediaries, front company networks and incomplete documentation were adopted. Second, in 2013, a member state reported to the Committee the interdiction of a consignment on its way from Beijing to Cairo. While none of the items met the specific criteria in the list of prohibited items, they were spare parts for or items used in Scud-B missile 52

 Griffiths et al., ibid., 2015, pp. 37–38, 65, 72–73.

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s­ystems. As arms and related materiel, their export is prohibited under the resolutions. Since two of the items had markings in Korean and inspection certificate stamps, the Panel concluded that they had been produced in the DPRK. Also the name of the individual listed as responsible for the packing list is Korean. Third, the Panel’s on-site inspection and investigation of the wreckage of unmanned aerial vehicles identified two Chinese companies advertising almost identical vehicles. There were indications that at least one of the drones was acquired abroad. According to a member state, the vehicles were likely procured through front companies in China.53 Meanwhile, violations of the arms embargo and the luxury goods ban continued. KOMID reportedly conducted business activities in Namibia until at least early 2015, including through the construction of a munitions factory. The above Green Pine Association Corporation had, in 2011, been involved in deliveries of items for military patrol boats to Angola and of submarine parts to Vietnam. The consignments were shipped from Vienna by Austrian national Josef Schwartz through his company that has violated the luxury goods ban and assisted Green Pine in evading the arms embargo. North Korea continued to in violation of resolution 1874 (2009) provide technical training and assistance for financial and political reasons through police and military cooperation with Uganda and police training cooperation with Vietnam that, however, took place from 2012 to 2013. Transfers to Pyongyang of armored Mercedes-Benz limousines took place. They were originally from Europe, underwent armored customization in the United States, and were delivered by an intermediary in China. The deal was organized and financed by Chinese businessman Mr. Yunong Ma. Cases of export of luxury goods to the DPRK were identified also in terms of gold shipments from Israel in 2013, jewellery sold in Brazil to nonresident nationals of the DPRK in 2013 and 2014, copper exported by India in 2014, and silver jewellery and five vehicles delivered by Thailand between September 2013 and February 2014. 53

 Hugh Griffiths et al., Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), S/ 2016/157 (n. p., February 24, 2016), pp. 9, 12, 29–33.

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In the case of the above Ocean Maritime Management Company, Ltd. (OMM), nine of the 15 vessels appeared still to be in service and 14 had been re-registered. Following coercion by the OMM and the Ministry of Land and Marine Transport, the Korea Mirae Shipping Company Limited (Mirae) had acted on behalf of the OMM to coerce the claimants to transfer at least two vessels to the DPRK operated by Mirae. Thus, Mirae and the Ministry assisted the OMM to evade sanctions. Mirae had acted on behalf of OMM in December 2014 and assisted it in evading sanctions through crossborder transfers of the vessels in December 2014 while serving as owner of the Great Hope, which was actually controlled by the OMM. Two new owners were nominated by Mirae or the OMM as new ­owners of the two vessels and thereby helped the OMM or Mirae to evade sanctions. The OMM evaded sanctions through its coercive acquisition of another vessel from the claimants on behalf of the vessel’s operator Korea Tong Hung Shipping and Trading. As before, the number of nonreporting and late-reporting ­member states was extremely high. During the reporting period, only six member states had submitted national implementation reports. Only 42 of 193 member states had reported under resolution 2094 but 90 had never reported under any of the resolutions calling for sanctions. In addition to the low rate of reporting, the reports received were of poor quality and lack of detail, preventing the Panel to report on implementation. Such conditions create opportunities for the DPRK to continue its prohibited activities. As before, there were no incidents where bans imposed by the Security Council’s resolutions directly resulted in shortages of foodstuffs or other humanitarian aid.54 Following the January 6, 2016 nuclear test, North Korea claimed that it had made its first successful test of a hydrogen bomb ordered by Kim Jong Un but it was not confirmed as a hydrogen bomb. The reasons for the test could have been (a) to technically confirm the nuclear capacity accumulated after the third test made in 2013 as one part of the strategy to strengthen North Korea’s position as a 54

 Griffiths et al., ibid., 2016, pp. 10, 40, 42, 43, 44–46, 47, 52, 53–54, 66.

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nuclear power, (b) to strengthen internal unity prior to the seventh party congress to be held in May 2016 in order to harden the foundations of the government, and (c) to strongly demonstrate the strategic value of the nuclear capacity to the United States. Clearly, the reasons are similar to those behind the 2006, 2009, and 2013 tests (cf. pp. 110–111, 117–118, 133). On January 7, the UN Security Council issued a press statement that strongly condemned the nuclear test. The test was followed on February 7 by a long-range rocket launch that North Korea claimed was a satellite into orbit. On the same day, the Security Council strongly condemned the North’s sixth missile launch since 1998, which it called a “dangerous and serious violation.” North Korea’s acts reflect its intentions to disregard international censure of its nuclear ambitions. On March 2, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2270 containing strengthened sanctions intended to be punitive actions against North Korea. The resolution requires all UN member states to inspect all cargo to and from North Korea, whether by land, sea, or air, for illicit goods. There is also an arms embargo preventing sales of small arms and banning military and police cooperation. The arms embargo requires all countries to expel diplomats from the DPRK involved in illicit activities as well as a ban on exports of all minerals such as coal and iron except if used for “livelihood purposes” in North Korea unrelated to the nuclear and ballistic missile program. Sanctions include banning jet and rocket fuel supplies, except for passenger planes, grounding North Korean flights suspected to carry contraband, and denying vessels suspected to carry illicit items access to ports. Assets of organizations involved in banned activities are required to be frozen. No branches or subsidiaries of North Korean banks can open in UN member states or establish a relationship with financial institutions in them. The resolution blacklists four senior North Korean officials in charge of nuclear and missile programs. The officials are Ri Man-gon in charge of development of military technologies as a director at the ruling Korean Workers’ Party, Yu Chol-u, director of the National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA), Hyon Kwang-il, senior official at the NADA, and Choe Chun-sik who headed the longrange missile program in 2013. They will theoretically be banned from

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traveling to any UN member state. North Korea’s Foreign Minister Ri Su-yong protested by saying that the country will “never be bound” by the resolution. In an apparent protest against resolution 2270, North Korea test fired on March 3 several short-range missiles. The statement by Ri turned out to be true when the DPRK on the anniversary of its foundation on September 9 conducted its fifth nuclear test. The Korean scholar Park Young-Ja (2016) argues that the main reason for the test was to complete the nuclear weapons system and by laying the foundations for long-term rule consolidate Kim Jong Un’s political power. At this time, progress had been made in producing nuclear warheads that can be loaded on ballistic missiles. The test was the same day strongly condemned by the UN Security Council through a press statement.55 Notably, the fact that it has required longer time after each nuclear test for the Security Council to adopt a resolution indicates the difficulties to reach consensus and could also reflect doubts over the efficiency of the sanctions. 55

 Bae, Hyun-jung, “N.K. ups tension with short-range missiles,” March 3, 2016 (http:// www.koreaherald.com/common_prog/newsprint.php?ud=20160303000971&dt=2), p. 1; Chung, Sungyoon, Pukhan 4ch’a haeksirhôm-ûi ûimi-wa p’ajang (Seoul: T’ongil yôn’guwôn, January 11, 2016), pp. 1, 2; Lee, Sangsoo and Alec Forss, After North Korea’s Nuclear Test: The Dilemma of Response, Stockholm: Institute for Security & Development Policy, Policy Brief, no. 192, February 16, 2016 (http://www.isdp.eu/publications/ option=com_jombib), p. 1; Park, Young-Ja, 5ch’a haeksirhôm, Kim Jong Un changgi chipkwôn chôllyag-e ttarûn haengbo (Seoul: T’ongil yôn’guwôn, September 13, 2016), p. 1; The Korea Herald, “UN Security Council ‘strongly condemns’ N.K. test, vows to seek new resolution,” January 7, 2016 (http://www.koreaherald.com/common_prog/mnewsprint. php?ud=20160107000181&dt=2), p. 1: “U.N. Security Council strongly condemns N. Korean launch,” February 8, 2016 (http://www.koreaherald.com/common_prog/ newsprint.php?ud= 20160208000069 &dt=2), pp. 1, 2: “A look at sweeping new U.N. sanctions on North Korea,” March 3, 2016 (http://www. koreaherald. com/ common_prog/newssprint.php?ud=201603030000&dt=2), pp. 1, 2: UN Security Council condemns NK nuclear test, vows to begin work immediately on sanctions resolution,” September 10, 2016 (http://www.koreaherald.com/common_prog/ newsprint.php?ud= 20160910000050&dt=2), p. 1; Yi, Whan-woo, “4 N. Korean officials blacklisted by UN council,” March 3, 2016 (http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/common/printpreview. asp?CategoryCode=485& newsldx= 199466), p. 1; Yoon, Min-shik, “U.N. passes toughest sanctions against North Korea,” March 2, 2016 (http://www. korea herald.com/common_prog/newsprint.php?ud=20160302000075&dt=2), pp. 1–2, 3. Original quotation marks.

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The account shows that UN sanctions have failed to make North Korea abandon its nuclear and missile programs but have made it more difficult to pursue them. Consequently, the sanctions cannot only be dismissed as failures and North Korea has shown an extraordinary ability to evade them in line with the writing of Lankov (2011). Regarding Wallensteen’s (1971) three criteria for sanctions to succeed, the first one being wavering support for the government prior to the imposition of sanctions is owing to the writing by Charron (2011) that North Korea is the most isolated state in the world virtually impossible to apply.56 Second, not all trade was suspended and following the imposition of sanctions Sino-Korean trade grew rapidly reducing their efficiency. Third, that sanctions can work if the targeted country is relatively isolated before they are imposed is according to Charron’s writing not applicable and China has owing to its self-interest supported the DPRK. If adding the three reasons suggested by Charron (2011) why the perfect sanctions regime does not exist, the limits of sanctions become even clearer. First, since conflicts are incredibly complicated events with many causes, players and competing agendas and the Security Council has no intelligence agency, enforcement is entirely reliant on member states’ wish to implement sanctions. There are no ways to enforce decisions and no mechanisms to compel states to comply with decisions in the area of international peace and security. Second, since events on the ground can change the Council’s adoption of sanctions is nearly always a reaction to dynamic events rather than a means of prevention. Third, the Council has been and will be faced with a variety of threats to and breaches of peace that demand a range of responses including coercive measures short of force. Consequently, it is extremely difficult to expect that successively strengthened sanctions will bring an end to the North Korean nuclear issue. Also, as long as the United States is considered a threat possessing nuclear weapons, North Korea will not give up its weapons. With regard to inter-Korean relations, the account shows that in sharp contrast to the prediction by Hongnack Kim (1991) that the 56

 Charron, op. cit., p. 128.

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abnormal relationship between the two Koreas would undergo ­drastic change as a result of UN admission, there are hardly any indications that they have done so. Neither are there any clear signs supporting the prediction by Yôm (1991) that peace would be enhanced and reunification advanced. On the positive side, the main reason emphasized by the author (2009) why the 1953 armistice has been maintained in terms of both parties’ desire for peace remains unchanged. On the negative side, the author notes the high level of mutual distrust as a characteristic of relations. The mutual will to maintain peace became clear when North Korea and the United States when there was risk of war at the time of the 1993–1994 nuclear crisis maintained talks that temporarily resolved the nuclear issue. Tensions created by the North Korean missile tests in 2006, 2009, 2012(2), and 2016 and the nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, 2013, and 2016 did not cause any military incidents, implying that all concerned parties anticipated that in such a case, tensions would have risen further. Irregular contacts also after the 2000 interKorean summit show that UN membership has not reduced mutual distrust. Following the two Koreas’ UN admission the Korean question has been raised to the highest international level but the account does not imply any causality between such a new state of affairs and relations. Such a state of affairs confirms that to induce a transformation of relations from the abnormal relationship to a higher level of contacts the ultimate responsibility lies on Pyongyang and Seoul. The Korean scholar Yi Sô-hang (2013) points out that the contributions of the UN to resolve the Korean question are very small in comparison to Seoul’s participation in PKOs and UN activities. Park (2011) writes that during the first term of UN SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-moon’s term in office, the UN was relatively passive in the Korean question that relied on inter-Korean and the United States-North Korea dialogue and six-party talks. In fact, the parties rejected the intervention or participation of the UN.57 The opinions of Yi and Park confirm that the UN can only become what its mem57

 Jonsson, op. cit., 2009, pp. 518, 519; Park, Heung-Soon, “Ban Ki-moon Yuen samu ch’ongjang-ûi yônim-gwa che 2gi-ûi kwaje,” Wegyo, no. 99 (October 2011), p. 58; Yi, op. cit., 2013, pp. 351–352.

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ber states want it to become (cf. pp. 4, 111, 122, 133, 145, 156). The limited role of the UN is also in line with the writing of Choi (1994) that it would be to have excessive expectations to expect that the UN would contribute to a final solution of the Korean question.

3.7  The North Korean Human Rights Issue in the UN In addition to the nuclear and missile program, the UN has worked to exert pressure on North Korea also in human rights. In 1997, the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion of Human Rights adopted a North Korean Human Rights resolution. As we have seen, South Korea raised the North Korean human rights issue at the 1999 ­session of the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) but due to special inter-Korean relations, Seoul did not vote in the UNCHR in 2003 and abstained from 2004 to 2005. In 2004, the UNCHR appointed a Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in North Korea but Pyongyang refused to recognize the mandate or to extend cooperation to him. After the UN General Assembly adopted its first North Korean Human Rights Resolution in 2005, resolutions have been adopted every year. South Korea abstained due to special inter-Korean relations in 2005 and 2007 but in 2006 supported the resolution owing to the North’s nuclear test that strengthened the global opinion against North Korea. After the UNCHR was replaced by the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in 2006, South Korea supported the resolutions that were adopted annually from 2008. As one of the proposing countries from 2008 to 2013, South Korea supported the resolutions since it regarded human rights as a universal value. In 2009 and 2014, the UNHRC conducted Universal Periodic Reviews (UPRs) on North Korea. When the first review was completed, the UNHRC made 167 recommendations, of which the North Korean representative office rejected 50. The recommendations concerned a visit by the UN Human Rights Rapporteur, a cessation of public executions, torture, inhuman punishment, and forced labor and guarantees for citizen’s rights for free travel. North Korea made no firm statement whether it would adhere to the other 117 recommendations or not but claimed that it would review its

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position later. When the final report was adopted in 2010, North Korea stated that it rejects 50 recommendations and claimed that they were unrelated to serious human rights concerns but laid their focus on changing the country’s social system and damaging its image. They only expressed a deep sense of rejection of and hostility against North Korea. The DPRK declared that it would further consolidate its human rights regime. When the second UPR was conducted from April 28 to May 9, 2014, North Korea rejected 93 of 268 recommendations, accepted 113, partially accepted four, and noted 58 for further review. Rejected recommendations include acceding to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), cooperating with UN human rights mechanisms including the Commission of Inquiry (COI), improving the criminal law, eliminating discrimination based on class and recommendations on abducted people as well as closing down its political prison camps. The last point was rejected already in 2009. Recommendations accepted concern fulfilling duties set forth in international treaties, improving economic, social, and cultural rights and cooperation and dialogue on human rights. Noted recommendations include acceding to international human rights conventions such as the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, establishing an independent national human rights instititution, and abolishing the death penalty. North Korea stated regarding the recommendations that it would be difficult to take measures at present owing to its circumstances and environment but that it will make continuous efforts to review possibilities for implementation onward.58 58

 Han, Dongho, Han’gug-ûi taebuk ingwôn chôngch’aek yôn’gu (Seoul: T’ongil yôn’guwôn, 2014), pp. 34–35, 36–37, 41; Han’guk wegyobu, op. cit., 2009, p. 196; Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), Improving Human Rights in North Korea (Seoul: KINU, 2015(a)), pp. 2–3: Implementation Strategies for Policies on North Korean Human Rights (Seoul: KINU, 2015(b)), pp. 23–24, 29; Soh, Changrok and Kim Yooneui, “Yuen hônjang kiban inkwôn poho ch’eje-wa Tongasia inkwôn: Pop’yônjôk chôngnye inkwôn kômt’o (UPR)-rûl chungsim-ûro,” Kukche chôngch’i

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On March 21, 2013, the UNHRC adopted a resolution to establish the UN Commission of Inquiry (UNCOI) on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which published its written report on February 17, 2014. South Korea, Japan, and the EU were among the proposing countries. The report that was based on the inquiries of 320 witnesses abroad and satellite images condemned North Korea for numerous and severe human rights violations in terms of freedoms of thought, movement, and residence and the right to food as well as discrimination, arbitrary detention, abduction, enforced disappearances, and the imprisonment of 80,000–120,000 political prisoners in camps. The Commission concluded that crimes against humanity have been committed.59 North Korea rejected the nonch’ong, vol. 64, no. 4 (2014), p. 170; UN General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 2005, 60/173. Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (n. p., December 16, 2005), p. 2. 59  Crimes against humanity entail gross human rights violations of a scale and level of organization that shock the conscience of humanity. Crimes against humanity have a high legal threshold. Two elements must coincide: (a) Individuals must commit inhumane acts with the requisite criminal intent and (b) These inhumane acts must form part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. The Rome Statute also requires that the attack must be pursuant to, or in furtherance of, a state or organizational policy. The policy required under the Rome Statute does not have to be incorporated in a written document or formal statement. The types of conduct amounting to inhumane acts largely overlap with those recognized as constituting gross human rights violations. The inhumane acts relevant for the purpose of this inquiry are: murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or forcible transfer of a population, imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law, torture, rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity, persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, enforced disappearance of persons and the “residual category” of inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. From Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights Violations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Report of the detailed findings of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, A/HRC/ 25/CRP.1 (n. p., February 7, 2014), pp. 320–321. The entire report is a shocking read.

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findings as having “no relevance” and argued that it was being wielded as a tool to overthrow the government. The United States was also criticized for double standards with the issue being raised of its treatment of suspected terrorists. While the dire human rights in the DPRK has long been known, the report is important as the most ­comprehensive study on the issue to have been made so far. The Commission’s work transformed the global community’s position on the North Korean human rights issue from one of observation to one calling for accountability. Previously, the human rights situation in the DPRK was seen as a state of affairs requiring improvement but it is now regarded as a problem concerning justice in which perpetrators must be identified and punished. On November 18, 2014, the UN General Assembly Third Committee responsible for human rights overwhelmingly adopted a condemnatory but nonbinding resolution of the large-scale human rights violations in North Korea based on the UNCOI report. The resolution acknowledges the commission’s findings that crimes against humanity have been committed in the DPRK and calls for referring those responsible, including Kim Jong Un, to the ICC. North Korea protested strongly against the resolution by, for instance, on November 25 holding a mass protest at the Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang to support the National Defense Committee’s objection to the resolution and to criticize the United States. Indeed, there is no evidence that the country has taken steps to ameliorate its human rights record. The General Assembly adopted the resolution on December 18. On December 22, 2014, the Security Council adopted for the first time the state of human rights in North Korea as an issue on its agenda owing to the global community’s concerns that the North’s human rights violations can have a significant impact on world peace and security. The decision was another meaningful outcome of South Korea’s Council membership from 2013 to 2014 (cf. pp. 138, 139–140). No vote was made whether to refer any high-level North Korean officials to the ICC. China has declared that it would not back any step referring North Korea to the ICC, further arguing that the COI report lacked credibility. China’s position thwarts the accomplishment of

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anything more than a nonbinding General Assembly resolution. Later, on June 23, 2015, following one of the recommendations by the UNCOI a UN office aimed at monitoring human rights violations in North Korea opened in Seoul. North Korea strongly protested against the establishment of the office that it called a “hideous politicallymotivated provocation challenging the dignity and social system” of the country and “a criminal act of escalating tensions.” On November 26, 2015, the UN special rapporteur on North Korea’s human rights since 2010, Indonesian Marzuki Darusman, said during his official visit to Seoul that “nothing has changed” since the COI report was launched. Also, “Regrettably, the human rights situation in the DPRK has not improved, and crimes against humanity documented by the Commission of Inquiry appear to continue.” On December 17, the UN General Assembly for the eleventh consecutive year adopted a resolution denouncing North Korea’s human rights record. As the 2014 resolution, it encouraged the Security Council to refer the case to the ICC.60

3.8 Conclusions Predictions on the outcome of South Korea’s UN membership focused on the anticipated positive impact on inter-Korean relations and the possibilities for South Korea to exert influence on world politics by participating in decision making. In the latter area, the 60

 Cho, op. cit., 2013, p. 18; Han’guk wegyobu, op. cit., 2015, p. 27; Gabriel Jonsson, “Human Rights in North Korea: Pressure and Engagement,” Stockholm: Institute for Security & Development Policy, Policy Brief, no. 172, March 8, 2015 (http:// www.isdp.eu/publications/option=com_jombib), pp. 1, 2; KINU, op. cit., 2015(a), pp. 2–5: op. cit., 2015(b), pp. 16, 19, 51; Song, Sang-ho, “UN passes resolution calling for N.K. referral to ICC,” December 18, 2015 (http://www.koreaherald.com/ common_prog/newsprint. php?ud=20151218000295&dt=2), pp. 1, 2; The Korea Herald, “U.S. hails opening of U.N. human rights office in Seoul,” June 24, 2015 ( h t t p : / / w w w. k o r e a h e r a l d . c o m / c o m m o n _ p r o g / n e w s p r i n t . p h p ? u d = 20150624000246&dt=2), p. 1: “U.N. rapporteur calls for accountability over N.K. human rights abuse,” November 26, 2015 (http://www.koreaherald.com/common_prog/newsprint.php?ud=20151126001219&dt =2). Original quotation marks.

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opinion was that South Korea’s global position would rise. The impact of South Korea’s UN membership has been analyzed in four areas: participation in UN agencies, membership in the Security Council on two occasions, the resolutions adopted by the Council on North Korea following its missile and nuclear tests and the General Assembly’s resolutions on human rights violations in the DPRK. South Korea joined four new UN agencies after 1991 but more important was its election as member of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) from 1993 to 1995 and for six more periods. South Korea also served as board member of many other agencies following UN admission. That South Korea during the 47th General Assembly in 1992 was elected and played the role of Vice-Chairman in the Assembly’s First Committee showed that the country enjoyed a high position in UN politics and diplomacy. In brief, active participation in UN agencies has raised South Korea’s international position. Joint admission has led to inter-Korean contacts within the UN that have showed both progress and tensions in accordance with the general pattern of inter-Korean relations. Relations showed progress in 1991 but worsened in 1992 due to the North Korean nuclear issue. The UN Security Council passed its first resolution on the issue in 1993. Otherwise, the nuclear issue was initially handled by the two Koreas and then through bilateral DPRK–United States talks. After South Korea in 1993 had declared that it would seek membership in the Security Council, it was in 1995 elected member. During its membership from 1996 to 1997, South Korea actively contributed to the adoption of two statements on North Korean aggressions in 1996, indicating that it through participating in decision making processes affected world politics. Whereas inter-Korean relations now were stabilized, South Korea was also active in other areas diversifying its foreign policy interests away from the Korean peninsula. South Korea’s diplomatic capabilities were raised contributing to its reelection in 2012 for 2013–2014. Again, its membership contributed to maintaining global peace and security. Inter-Korean relations improved in 1998 but again showed ups and downs and distrust remained. The 1994 DPRK-United States

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Agreed Framework did not resolve the North Korean nuclear issue that reappeared in 2002. Neither six-party talks nor UN Security Council resolutions adopted following the 2006, 2009, 2013, and 2016 nuclear tests have prevented North Korea from becoming a nuclear power. In contrast, UN membership has created a new channel for North Korea to challenge the world. The Council also adopted resolutions on North Korea’s missile tests in 2006 and 2012 and presidential statements in 2009 and 2012 but all were violated. Sanctions imposed have delayed the missile and nuclear programs, but one main difficulty in implementing them is China’s close relations with North Korea. Owing to China’s resistance, the Council, in 2010, only adopted a vague presidential statement on North Korea’s alleged sinking of the Cheonan. Thus, power politics ­matter profoundly in the UN in spite of all member states having sovereign equality. The positive predictions on the impact of UN admission on inter-Korean relations have not been matched with actual progress. On the other hand, the mutual will to maintain peace has remained and tensions caused by the missile and nuclear tests did not evoke military incidents, indicating that both parties realized that in such a case the situation would have aggravated. The UN has not only failed to stop North Korea’s missile and nuclear program but has also been unable to improve its poor human rights record.

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Chapter 4

Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations, Appointments of Koreans, and Budget Contributions

4.1 Introduction As we saw in Chapter 3, South Korea has been an active UN member since 1991 but any assessment of the outcome of its membership would be incomplete without including its participation in peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and Koreans appointed to important positions within the UN system. In the first case, it is a question of responsibility to work to secure world peace. In the second case, by holding high posts, participation in decision-making processes is enhanced, making it possible to exert influence on world politics. Contributions to the UN budget are included since they, in addition to being mentioned in Section 3.2, reflect economic strength. Section one first records some data on and notions of peacekeeping that are important for the account and supplement information recorded in the Introduction. The interrelation between global developments and South Korea’s participation in PKOs forms the context of the account. How South Korea got involved in global peacekeeping, its attitudes toward and characteristics of peacekeeping are investigated, as is to which countries’ troops have been

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dispatched from 1993 onward. The number of peacekeepers for a few years since the turn of the century is recorded in order to find out the scale of participation from a worldwide perspective. Peacekeepers’ tasks are enumerated. Financial issues and law-making are included in order to make the picture more complete. Assessments of participation are investigated and evaluated on the basis of the account in order to find out whether they are reasonable or not. With the exception of one former Korean officer, all assessments are made by scholars. The section concludes by an account of the experiences of a Korean conscript who served in South Sudan in 2013 presented from both a military and cultural point of view. The second section investigates, in particular, Koreans appointed to high positions within the UN system. The highest positions Koreans have held are analyzed but a few other examples of people who have led the UN in specific fields are also recorded. Most attention is given to Han Seung-Soo as president of the UN General Assembly from 2001 to 2002 and Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon who was appointed in 2006. Their work is presented and its evaluations are recorded. In the case of Ban, what circumstances enabled his election are investigated followed by a brief account of his work and evaluations of it, prior to his reelection in 2011. The third section investigates South Korea’s contributions to the UN budget from 1992 to 2013 in relation to those of other member states. How the UN calculates assessed contributions is briefly explained followed by data on contributions throughout the 1990s. South Korea’s contributions are then presented in two tables covering the period 2000–2010 and 2013 with some supplementary data added. The fourth section investigates assessments of the outcome of South Korea’s UN membership made in 2011 and 2012 by the Korean scholar Park Heung-Soon and in 2013 by UN Ambassador Oh Joon. An analysis of a study from 2013 by the Korean scholar Yi Sô-hang follows. The comprehensive assessments by Park and Yi are recorded in some detail and are compared and evaluated on the basis of the accounts in Chapters 3 and 4 in order to find out whether they are reasonable or not. The section includes some

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data on general characteristics of the UN and of world politics of relevance for the assessment. Finally, three assessments from 2015 and 2016 are briefly recorded.

4.2  Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations As we have seen, the Korean scholar Han Sung-Joo (1991) predicted that UN membership would mean the responsibility to make greater contributions to UN activities such as participating in PKOs. The common positive arguments favoring the use of a global organization for peacekeeping is that it has a strong standing in international law, access to such global resources as finances, troops and logistics, and competence. Thus, it can act in an even-handed manner vis-à-vis the conflicting parties and in conflicts around the world. A global organization offers capacity and an element of protection, particularly for weaker regional or local actors. Peacekeepers enhance the stability of peace by raising the cost of aggression, making a surprise act more difficult and serving to reassure belligerents about each other’s intentions through monitoring and the provision of credible signals of intentions. Also, peacekeepers serve to minimize the risk of accidents or skirmishes from escalating to full-scale fighting. According to the German scholars Volker Rittberger, Bernhard Zangl, and Andreas Kruck (2012), the presence of peacekeepers reduce the risk of another international war by more than 85 percent relative to cases in which belligerents are left to their own devices after a war. Also, in intrastate wars, peacekeeping makes civil war much less likely to resume once a cease-fire is in place. Peacekeeping is overall an effective conflict-management tool, which reduces belligerents’ incentives for fighting, alleviates mutual fear and distrust, prevents accidental escalation to war, and shapes political procedures to stabilize peace. In October 1991, South Korea received a questionnaire from the UN Secretary-General on participation in PKOs. After four months of preparations, Seoul decided to participate with 730 men, divided into an infantry battalion unit (540), medical assistance personnel (154), and military observers (36). The Nigerian scholar

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Amadu Sesay (1997) argues that the “pay-back” syndrome referring to the perception of indebtedness to the UN for its involvement in post-Korean War reconstruction, in particular among government officials and the generation of Koreans who experienced both the war and rehabilitation efforts, to a large extent explains South Korea’s advocacy of a strong and self-reliant UN as well as its enthusiasm for its peacekeeping activities (cf. p. 33). Participation in PKOs also creates worldwide recognition as a peace-loving country. Thus, the right to speak can be enhanced through one of the easiest way to raise the moral causes of foreign policy. The motives to participate in PKOs were (a) to raise South Korea’s global position and image, (b) to as a UN member and former recipient of UN assistance fulfil its obligations and rights, (c) to contribute to lay the foundations for promoting diplomatic relations and friendly cooperation with the countries concerned with conflicts, (d) to secure support from the UN in case of an emergency situation on the Korean peninsula, and (e) to raise the military’s capability to participate in joint operations and to promote internationalization of the military.1 When Foreign Minister Han Sung-Joo addressed the 48th UN General Assembly on September 29, 1993, he declared that South Korea will support UNPKOs and will actively participate in them. At this time after the end of the Cold War, one change in the nature of PKOs was that their tasks had expanded and diversified. They had expanded from traditional peacekeeping missions like supervising a cease-fire agreement or general elections to military actions to halt fighting, direct disarmament, restore internal security, and provide more extensive assistance for peace-building beyond postconflict stabilization efforts. Consequently, the missions of the PKOs have come to contain a combination of all peace-related activities through peace-making, peace enforcement, and peace-building. Another 1

 Jeon, op. cit., pp. 2, 56–57; Kim, op. cit., 2008, p. 33; Rittberger, Zangl and Kruck, op. cit., pp. 159–160; Sesay, op. cit., pp. 181, 188; Peter Wallensteen and Birger Heldt, “International Peacekeeping: The UN versus Regional Organizations,” in Diehl and Frederking (eds.), op. cit., p. 145; Wang, op. cit., 2002, p. 15. Original quotation marks.

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change was that since the task of a PKO widened the number and types of participants in an operation increased and diversified. In addition to military personnel, an operation included a variety of officials and civilians from different national and international organizations. Volunteers and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) also actively took part in many of the current operations. Within this global framework, in 1993, South Korean armed forces were dispatched overseas for the first time since the Vietnam War. Following a request from the UN in February 1993, South Korea began its involvement in UN peacekeeping by dispatching a military engineering unit of 252 members known as “The Evergreen Unit” to the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) from July 1993 to March 1994. Twelve staff belonging to the headquarters were also dispatched from December 1993 to March 1994. The National Assembly approved the military participation after completing its fact-finding mission in April to Somalia, which had long suffered from anarchy. Since the National Assembly considered it safer to dispatch an engineer unit rather than sending combat troops and its achievements would be tangible and lasting, it approved the plan to send engineers in May. The unit’s work included repairing roads and principal facilities such as schools, constructing protection facilities, developing underground water supplies, and providing medical assistance. The unit repaired 350 kilometers of main roads. It received praise from the UN, the local headquarters, and the population as the most exemplary unit. The mission of the second unit also consisting of 252 men ended in February 1995. Some of the equipment and material used were donated to the local UN headquarters and residents. In February 1994, the UN requested South Korea to replace Swiss medical troops who had worked in Western Sahara since 1992 but had to be withdrawn for domestic reasons. In September 1994, a military medical team consisting of 42 personnel was dispatched to provide medical services for PKO personnel. After the end of ­colonization, Morocco and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro (POLISARIO) had fought for control over the territory in 1976. After the parties had agreed to

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hold a popular referendum in 1988, the UN established the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) in April 1991 to supervise the armistice and support the referendum. After the mission was extended in July 1995, the number of personnel was reduced to 20 in 1996 since the mission was scaling down its work. Participation ended in May 2006. In 2006, altogether 542 Koreans had served in the Western Sahara.2 In October 1994, seven military observers were dispatched to the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) to supervise the ceasefire. The self-governing Moslem state Abchazia had previously declared its independence, which Georgia sought to suppress militarily. In 2005, altogether 53 Korean officers had served in Georgia. In November 1994, nine officers were sent to the disputed Jammu and Kashmir area to through the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) to observe the armistice. In 2005, altogether 89 Korean officers had served in the area. In March 1995, a major from the engineer troops was assigned to the UN Department of PKO attached to the UN Secretariat. Later, in 1996, a military officer was appointed within the ROK Representative Mission to the UN to provide advice on military issues. From March 1997, for one year, a major was dispatched to the UN Department of PKO, Planning Section. In 2000, a Lieutenant-Colonel was dispatched to the UN Department of PKO. Following a request from the UN in February 1995, the National Assembly decided to dispatch troops to Angola in July 1995. Previously, a civil war had been fought since independence in 1975 but a peace agreement was signed in May 1991, which the UN would 2

 Choi, Myoung-Ho, Han’gug-ûi Yuen p’yônghwa yuji hwaltong-e kwanhan yôn’gu (Taejôn: Ch’ungnam taehakkyo, p’yônghwa anbo taehakwôn, October 2005), p. 22: Table 4; Han’guk wegyobu, op. cit., 2009, p. 190: Table 1; Jeon, ibid., pp. 31, 62, 63, 64, 65; Kang, op. cit., 1995, p. 21; Kim, Young Ho, “Peacekeeping Operations in the 21st Century: Opportunities and Challenges for South Korea,” IFANS Review, vol. 20, no. 2 (December 2012:b), pp. 126–127, 128, 131; Pak, op. cit., 1995, p. 623; Sesay, ibid., p. 204; So, op. cit., p. 49; Yang, Jihyun, In Pursuit of Power or Peace? Korean Involvement in UN Peacekeeping Operations (Seoul: Kyung Hee University, the Graduate Institute of Peace Studies, December 2008), pp. 20, 21, 24, 51: Table 1.

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help to implement. From October 1995, an engineering unit of 198 men was dispatched to the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) to support reconstruction of major roads, buildings, and bridges and thereby support peacekeepers’ work to supervise the armistice. Eight bridges were restored and more than 400 km of main road and airports in cities in the vicinity were maintained and repaired. The unit also helped the civilian population by improving irrigation facilities and repairing principal buildings, including two airports, until the mission ended in February 1997. Altogether 600 Koreans had then served in Angola. The unit received praise from both the UN and the local population for its work that also included medical examination and treatment.3 In October 1999, infantry soldiers were for the first time, in the history of ROK participation in UNPKOs, dispatched to East Timor following the turmoil after the result of the August 30 popular consultation in favor of independence from Indonesia had been announced in early September. The violence was a serious challenge to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. President Kim Dae Jung announced on September 12, 1999 his desire to send troops to East Timor if the UN made a request. For the first time, South Korea offered to dispatch troops before the UN made a request. The request came after the Security Council on September 15 had decided to dispatch the multinational International Force for East Timor (INTERFET). Following the establishment of the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in October 1999, the INTERFET was replaced by a UN peacekeeping mission in February 2000. In the first participation in a multinational operation comprised of around 8,000 troops from 13 countries, the South Korean mission consisted of 419 soldiers who participated in the 3

 Choi, ibid., 2005, p. 22: Table 4; Han’guk wegyobu, ibid., 2009, p. 190: Tables 1 and 2; Jeon, ibid., pp. 31, 32, 62: Table 4-2, 66–68; Pak, op. cit., 1995, p. 623; Yang, Cheol-ho, Han’gug-ûi Yuen p’yônghwa yuji hwaltong (PKO) palchon pangan yôn’gu (Seoul: Dongguk taehakkyo, Haengjông taehakwôn, June 2002), pp. 46, 69; Yang, ibid., 2008, pp. 27, 28; Yi, Sang-dae, “Angola-e ppurin Han’gug-in-ûi chôngsin — Angola Yuen p’yônghwa yuji hwaltong-ûl mach’imyô-,” Kunsa segye (March 1997), pp. 72, 73.

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work to expand democracy and human rights. Thus, the task was limited to maintaining public order. In October 2003, altogether 3,283 Korean soldiers had served in East Timor. A few Korean officers have been appointed to high positions. General Hwang Chin-ha was Commander of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) from January 2002 to December 2003. According to former Colonel Song Sûng-chong (2006), the work of General Hwang contributed to raise the position of the South Korean military and expand its area of activities. Previously, from April 1996 to April 1997, Han Sung-Joo had served as a Special Representative of the Secretary-General to UNFICYP. Two military observers were dispatched to the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) to supervise the armistice from September 2004 to December 2006. Finally, in June 2012, a Korean Army General was made head in Kashmir of the UNMOGIP. It was the third time a Korean general held that post since the first appointment in March 1997.4 In August 2006, the UN asked member states to contribute to the expanded mission in Lebanon. Later, on December 22, 2006, the National Assembly approved the dispatch of troops. In July 2007, South Korea sent its first contingent to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) with a deployment of 360 men. The tasks were to help to oversee a cease-fire and maintain a buffer zone between Lebanon and Israel while providing such services to the local population such as medical care, building, and repairing roads and school construction. On the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of UN peacekeeping forces in 2008, the Seoul Conference on Peacekeeping Operations opened in June 2008. Representatives from more than 20 of the most important countries for peacekeeping and of the UN took part to discuss each country’s policy on peacekeeping as well as the experiences and lessons acquired. The conference was assessed to have contributed to the

4

 Choi, ibid., 2005, p. 22: Table 4, fn. 24; Han’guk wegyobu, ibid., 2009, p. 190: Table 1; Jeon, ibid., pp. 62: Table 4-2, 67, 69–70, 76; Park, op. cit., 2015, p. 479; Roehrig, op. cit., p. 635; Song, op. cit., 2006, p. 21; Wang, op. cit., 2002, p. 16; Yang, ibid., 2008, pp. 29, 30, 31–32, 51: Table 1.

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development of policies on PKOs in the ROK and abroad. There should be no doubt that knowledge then was transferred confirming that the UN is an important provider of expertise, as it previously had been through support to postwar rehabilitation and reconstruction, electoral monitoring, and publication of important resources (cf. pp. 7, 33, 43, 83). In February 2010, a 240-person engineering unit was dispatched to the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) following the 7.0 earthquake in January that destroyed the capital Port-au Prince and much of its surroundings. They were to assist in clean-up efforts, road repair, aid to refugees, and orphanages and clearing waterways along with providing medical care, education, and vocational training. The government also provided close to $13 million in emergency aid for recovery. When the UN modified the number of peacekeepers in Haiti in 2012, all but two men of the ROK contingent were withdrawn. In 2013, a group of 275 peacekeepers was dispatched to the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The group consisted mainly of engineers and medical personnel to assist in rebuilding the war-torn country. Peacekeepers have assisted in refurbishing the main airport, expanding city infrastructure, constructing landfills, and providing medical services.5 South Korea has also contributed troops to multinational stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The ROK military reports such operations under peacekeeping in its Defence White Paper. The first unit deployed to Iraq in April 2003 consisting of engineer troops and a medical assistance team did construction projects by rebuilding schools, hospitals, roads, and water supply and drainage. The unit also helped the allied forces to build their base and cooperated with South Korean companies to establish information technology centers in schools. It provided humanitarian assistance. Following requests from America, in 2004 a 3,600-man unit consisting of airborne troops and the Marine Corps were dispatched in the “Zaytun unit” making the contingent the third largest contributor to 5

 Han’guk wegyobu, ibid., 2009, pp. 189–190; Roehrig, ibid., pp. 635–636; Yang, ibid., 2008, pp. 39, 41–42.

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the international coalition after the United States and the United Kingdom. The contingent mainly worked with such peace-building efforts as reconstruction and medical assistance. When the mission ended in December 2008, altogether 19,032 men had participated. The first deployment to Afghanistan as part of the NATO-led mission began in February 2002 when 60 medics set up a field hospital at the Bagram Airbase. In 2003, an additional 150 engineers were sent to assist in construction at Bagram. These units remained until December 2007 when they were withdrawn after a tragic incident with the Taliban had occurred. In July 2007, the Taliban had abducted 23 Koreans who were working as Christian missionaries. Two of them were executed before the other 21 were released and South Korea had agreed to withdraw its units. In December 2007, the 210-men contingent of medical and engineering personnel left. From February 2002 to December 2007, the Dongeui unit, a 100-men Korean medical assistance team, had treated more than 250,000 patients. The figure is three times higher than that of other civilian hospitals. In February 2010, the National Assembly approved the deployment of a provincial reconstruction team. From July 2010, it, along with aid workers, provided medical care, reconstruction of buildings, and infrastructure and development assistance along with close to 350 troops to provide security. The team remained until 2012.6 According to the Korean scholar Chung Eun-sook (2010), South Korea’s economic growth and democratic advancements provided strong confidence in international activities. In line with the above argument by Sesay (1997), participation in PKOs repaid international assistance South Korea had received after 1945. It also demonstrated the country’s will to contribute to maintain world peace. Yet, an opinion in 2002 was that in spite of the appointment 6

 Lee, Shin-wha, “Han’guk kukche p’yônghwa hwaltong-ûi yangbunhwa koch’al: Yuen PKO vs. takukchôk p’abyông,” Asea yôn’gu, vol. 56, no. 2 (2013), pp. 205, 206: “Does Helmet Color Matter? Discrepancy in Korea’s International Peace Operations,” Korean Political Science Review, vol. 48, no. 3 (2014), p. 58; Park, op. cit., 2015, p. 477; Roehrig, ibid., pp. 636–637.

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of Korean officers to high posts, participation was yet tiny in relation to national power. There was lack of proper recognition of PKOs, which was regarded equivalent to participation in war. Participation in terms of people and tasks was not diversified. In fact, in 2005 only 41 Koreans served in PKOs making South Korea number 66 in terms of troop contributions. In May 2006, the country was number 67. Explanations of the low figures were that it took 6–12 months to prepare dispatches and that it was difficult to receive consent from the National Assembly when it rested. In October 2009, South Korea participated with 400 men in 10 missions, making it the 39th largest contributor. Among them, 367 officers served in Lebanon and two each in the African Union–UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). One policeman served in the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and four in East Timor. In the case of military observers, there were one in Afghanistan, two in Côte d’Ivoire and Western Sahara, four in Nepal, six in Sudan, and nine in India/Pakistan. Participation in the UNMIL began in November 2003, in UNMIS in December 2005, in the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) in March 2007, in the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) in July 2009, and in UNAMID in June 2009. In July 2012, 644 peacekeepers served in UN missions. South Korea had now advanced to number 31 among 109 troop contributors. In 2013, the ROK took part in eight of the 15 UN PKOs: India and Pakistan, Liberia, South Sudan, Lebanon, Darfur, Côte d’Ivoire, Western Sahara, and Haiti with altogether 599 troops as well as 16 military observers and advisers on mission. Their numbers were: Lebanon (321), South Sudan (273), Darfur (2), Haiti (2), and Liberia (1). There were seven UN military observers and advisors on mission in India and Pakistan, four in Western Sahara, two each in Côte d’Ivoire and South Sudan, and one in Liberia. Yet, South Korea had fallen to number 34 among countries dispatching troops.7 7

 Choi, op. cit., October 2005, p. 37; Chung, Eun-sook, “Korea’s Law on UNPKO and Participation in International Peacekeeping Missions,” Korea Focus, vol. 18, no. 2 (Summer 2010), pp. 100–101; Chung, op. cit., 2015, p. 37: Table 3; Han’guk ­wegyobu, op. cit., 2009, pp. 190–191: Table 2; Jeon, op. cit., pp. 2–3; Kim, op. cit.,

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Altogether, South Korea has participated in 16 UN missions in 15 countries. In time, order these were Somalia, Western Sahara, Georgia, India/Pakistan, Angola, East Timor, Cyprus, Liberia, Burundi, Sudan, Nepal, Lebanon, Darfur, Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, and South Sudan. In March 2014, South Korea was, with 630 personnel men participating in UNPKOs, at number 33. In March 2015, the country participated with 637 men in Lebanon (320), South Sudan (297), Kashmir (7), Liberia (5), Darfur (2), Côte d’Ivoire (2), and Western Sahara (4), making it number 36 among, as of December 2014, 122 troop dispatching countries. In 2012, South Korea had altogether dispatched more than 9,800 men to UNPKOs and 29,000 men had been dispatched to six multinational stability operations. In 2014, the total number of dispatched military personnel since 1993 exceeded 40,000. In 2012, South Korea was in terms of financial contributions to UNPKOs number 12 with a share of 1.99 percent corresponding to approximately $150 million. From 2013 to 2015, the share rose to 2.26 percent, making South Korea the 10th largest contributor. In comparison, from July 1, 2013 to June 30, 2014, the total approved UN budget for PKOs was $7.54 billion. Since the “Evergreen Unit” was dispatched to Somalia in 1993, South Korean troops have implemented various types of missions including humanitarian assistance, supply and logistics, policing, postconflict reconstruction, and antipiracy successfully. Participation in PKOs has since evolved through three phases. First, throughout the 1990s the military dispatched its troops mainly to the UN’s PKOs. Second, from 2000 to 2008, participation expanded to various stabilization and postconflict reconstruction missions by multinational forces, especially in Afghanistan. Third, participation has afterward expanded further to include more diverse objectives such as operations like the “Cheonghae Unit” for antipiracy missions in the Sea of Aden (2009), rescue, and emergency relief missions 2008, p. 33; Park, op. cit., 2012, p. 348; Roehrig, ibid., pp. 634–635, 636. Kim does not record the numbers of troop contributions for May 2006 (ibid., p. 33).

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for Haiti (2010) and the military training team for the United Arab Emirates (2011). In this phase, peace operations included both military field action and military diplomacy.8 Regarding the financing of participation in PKOs, in 1997 South Korea, like all other contributors, got back about 85 percent of all its peacekeeping expenses from the UN. Thus, costs were not a serious constraint on the capacity to provide peacekeepers. On the other hand, due to the constant need for vigilance against North Korea, South Korea had until 1997 concentrated its contributions to PKOs to the technical and professional corps of the armed forces: engineers, doctors, observers, and election monitors. In such “lowprofile” activities as delivery of medical services, bridge building, military observers, and election monitoring, all of which fall within the purview of peace-building, casualties were most unlikely to be incurred and costs were the lowest. Another limitation was that Koreans believed that PKOs would involve their soldiers in active combat roles, as was the case in Vietnam in the 1960s and early 1970s, with the inevitable return of “body bags.” In 2005, participation in PKOs had mainly consisted of soldiers, in particular, engineer troops, medical corps, and military observers. Song (2006) argues that South Korea, due to military confrontation with North Korea, still had to decide cautiously on participation in PKOs. Also the Korean scholar Shin-wha Lee (2014) claims that the main barrier to contributing to UN PKOs is the military confrontation with North Korea. However, Lee (2013) also records the opinion that by active participation in UNPKOs, a global system of mutual cooperation can be created benefiting South

8

 Chung, ibid., 2015, pp. 37–38; Kim, op. cit., 2012b, pp. 131–132; Lee, op. cit., 2013, pp. 189, 203: op. cit., 2014, p. 58; Park, op. cit., 2015, p. 476; Roehrig, ibid., p. 638; Yang, Cheol-Ho and Yi, Seung-Cheol, “Han’gug-ûi kukche p’yônghwa yuji chôngch’aek sônggong yoin-e kwanhan yôn’gu — METT-TC punsôkt’ûr-e ûihan kun, kyông-ûi sarye punsôg-ûl chungsim-ûro,” Ch’ian chôngch’aek yôn’gu, vol. 28, no. 2 (2014), pp. 291, 320. Lee (ibid., 2013, p. 189) does not record the six multinational stability operations.

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Korea in case of an emergency situation on the Korean peninsula contributing to enhance its security.9 Law-making is another important part of PKOs. Since South Korea attempted to become a “mature global player,” it was obliged to expand its contributions to international PKOs. Consequently, on December 29, 2009, the South Korean government enacted the Law on Participation in the UNPKOs that took effect in April 2010. The law included a definition of UNPKOs, principles of mission performance, the legal basis for establishing standing forces, parliamentary approval procedures for dispatching forces, extension of operation period, activity report to the National Assembly, and the formation and operation of an interministerial body for policy consultation. The law authorized the administration to make “provisional agreements” with the UN on the scale of forces for dispatch amounting to within 1,000 men each time, the location for PKOs, and the duration of service, all of which require National Assembly approval. At this time, an enlarged permanent unit of “International Peace Cooperation” in the Ministry of National Defence handled overseas troop dispatches. In 2010, the South Korean military decided to establish a standby military unit for overseas peace operations consisting largely of 3,000 troops. Among them, 1,000 men belonged to a designated unit for operations, 1,000 men were designed as reserve forces, and the final 1,000 troops were soldiers with specialized functions like medicine, transportation, and engineering. Consequently, South Korea was able to more rapidly and efficiently dispatch peacekeeping forces. Regarding the outcome of participation in UNPKOs, the Korean scholar Young Ho Kim (2012:b) argues that peacekeeping activities for the past 20 years have attained much success. Both numerous local peoples and other countries’ military personnel who have participated jointly in past peace operations with South Korean troops have highly praised them for their strong commitment and devotion to their missions. For instance, the Dongmyeong Unit in Lebanon 9

 Choi, op. cit., October 2005, p. 23; Lee, ibid., 2013, pp. 208–209; ibid., 2014, p. 65; Sesay, op. cit., pp. 204–206; Song, op. cit., 2006, p. 440. Original quotation marks.

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has earned a good reputation for its excellent counterterrorism and civilian support activities. On August 15, 2000, the “Evergreen Unit” stationed in East Timor received the UN Medal for its achievements as the first ROK unit dispatched abroad.10 Kim (2012:b) summarizes the achievements of South Korea’s participation in PKOs in five points in the most exhaustive account the author is aware of. First, they have raised the country’s national image and reputation. A survey of the Iraqi local people’s opinions in 2005 showed overwhelming support for the South Korean “Zaytun Unit,” confirming the opinion that civil–military operations were a textbook case for PKOs. Another local newspaper’s survey also showed strong support and high praise for the South Korean troops. Second, participation in various peace operations has helped the armed forces strengthen their fighting capabilities and gain actual battle experiences. Participation in real operational missions has enabled them to accumulate diverse know-how in command and control, tactical maneuvering and civil–military affairs, and has sharpened their skills further. South Korean military officers have learnt about the institutional and operational strengths of the advanced countries’ militaries through joint operations and information sharing with them. Third, participation in PKOs has made a tangible contribution to national interests. Although it cannot be proven directly, the positive image owing from the ROK forces’ successful accomplishment of peace operations has indirectly helped many private South Korean companies to gain business contracts with local governments for their postconflict reconstruction. Consequently, South Korea has gained material benefits. Fourth, participation in PKOs has also contributed to improve diplomatic relations with the United States and many of its other allies. Many times, participation in PKOs was invoked or suggested by the United States. Consequently, through participation in PKOs the ROK–United States alliance has been consolidated and the role of the alliance has expanded beyond the Korean peninsula. Relationships 10

 Chung, op. cit., 2010, pp. 98, 100, 101; Jeon, op. cit., p. 74; Kim, op. cit., 2012:b, pp. 132–133. Original quotation marks.

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with many other countries have also widened and deepened through military consultation and joint operations with them. Fifth, participation in PKOs can be utilized as a platform for exploring future multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia, which lacks such a framework. Instead, a bilateral security order prevails. Accumulated experiences in many multilateral PKOs and valuable lessons learnt from them can provide a base to initiate and lead multilateral security cooperation in the region. These accomplishments have contributed to enhance South Korea’s soft power.11 The outcomes correspond well with the motives for participation in UNPKOs (cf. p. 166). On the other hand, Kim points out that the South Korean government has spent too much time deciding on whether to dispatch troops overseas. The time from receipt of a request from the UN to the actual dispatch of troops has since 1993 been on average 6.4 months. Because of the confrontational security situation with North Korea and the conscription recruiting system, it took time for the government to consider security conditions of deployment areas, local environments, and cultures as well as the availability of necessary personnel and equipment but it intentionally postponed decisions since it wanted to avoid anticipated objections from the opposition party and the general public.12 A few other assessments have been made by Korean scholars on UNPKOs’ participation. Pak (1995) argues that active participation in PKOs has enhanced South Korea’s political status in the global community and has helped the country to gradually emerge as a major actor in the politics and diplomacy of international organizations. Kang (2002) concurs by pointing out that participation in PKOs can be assessed to having contributed to promote South Korea’s international profile. Similarly, Wang Im-dong (2002) claims that by actively 11

 Power when one country gets other countries to want what it wants might be called cooptive or soft power in contrast with the hard or command power of ­ordering others to do what it wants. From Joseph Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, no. 80 (Autumn 1990), p. 166. Italics in the original. 12  Kim, op. cit., 2012:b, pp. 133–135, 136: Table 2. Kim uses the term “peace operations” a few times but apparently means peacekeeping.

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participating in PKOs, South Korea has shown its will to sincerely implement the task of the UN to maintain peace and security to the world and has thereby had a chance to raise its international position. Also university student Jeon Young Ju (2002) points out that PKO participation has elevated South Korea’s global position and adds that its position vis-à-vis the UN has been strengthened. Like Kim (2012:b), Jeon writes that ROK units have received praise to be models for UNPKOs. Similar to the opinions of Kim (2012:b), Song (2006) writes that by participating in PKOs, the South Korean military has acquired outstanding equipment, high morale, and stern discipline, which, in combination with participation in joint military exercises with the United States, has made it capable of acting on the global scene on an equal level with other states. Such a sense of self-confidence is an intangible gain that nothing can replace. Park (2012) writes that positive results are that South Korea by faithfully implementing its duties as UN member has contributed to (a) secure world peace, (b) as an ally create confidence strengthening the alliance with the United States, (c) in the case of an emergency situation on the Korean peninsula, secure potential support from the outside world as well as from the upgraded ROK military expanding interest and raising confidence in the fields of security, diplomacy, and economics, and (d) promote internationalization both on a popular and government level. The American scholar Terence Roehrig (2013) claims that the ROK government has made “…considerable contributions to UN peacekeeping missions…” In the latest assessment known to the author, Yang Cheol-Ho and Yi Seung-Cheol (2014) summarize preceding research results. The outcomes from a national strategy point of view are (a) promotion of global peace and enhancement of national prestige, (b) promotion of essential national interests, and (c) strengthening of the South Korea–United States alliance. From a military strategic point of view, the outcomes are (a) accumulation of real warfare experience, (b) enhancement of civil operations capabilities, and (c) development of the capacity to dispatch combatants far away. The prediction of Yôm (1991) that South Korea would have to show interest in global issues has certainly materialized in the case of PKOs.

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Finally, the American Korean scholar Balbina Hwang (2012) argues that participation in international PKOs serves a number of national interests including: Contributing to regional and global security by preventing ­further conflict and enhancing stability, raising the ROK’s international profile through tangible contributions that are not only commensurate with its global economic status, but go beyond by demonstrating measurable sacrifice, repaying its debt to the international community — 21 countries participated in the U.S.-led UN Command to support the ROK during the Korean War — and enhancing the ROK’s own security by establishing a reputation as a proactive stability force.13

Her opinion concurs with the above. Unlike the positive and based on the account reasonable evaluations, the Korean university student Kim Hyeong Ju (2008) writes that in spite of the national target “to improve the international position in order to enhance national prestige and to contribute to eternal world peace” and the national defence target “to contribute to regional stability and world peace,” participation was both quantitatively and qualitatively at a low level. One reason was that except for participation in Vietnam War, it was the first time South Korea dispatched soldiers abroad. Another reason was that, although the task of the PKOs was not to implement regular operations but a low level of military activity together with economic and social work, owing to a lack of recognition of PKOs, worries were constantly expressed both within the military and by the domestic opinion. Park (2015) records five limitations in PKO policies. First, the government has not clearly presented its policies and policy targets and has been inconsistent in troop dispatches. Second, it has not launched an own model for PKO participation based on South 13

 Jeon, op. cit., p. 73; Kang, op. cit., 2002, p. 89; Pak, op. cit., 1995, p. 624; Park, op. cit., 2012, p. 333; Roehrig, op. cit., pp. 625, 639–640; Song, op. cit., 2006, p. 22; Wang, op. cit., 2002, p. 16; Yang and Yi, op. cit., p. 300. The assessment of Hwang is quoted from Roehrig, ibid., p. 640.

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Korea’s distinction as a middle power or its comparative advantages. Troop dispatches are lower than in other (nonexemplified) middle powers. Third, the government has allowed political party interests and a few influential NGOs representing the public opinion to highly influence troop dispatches, as in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq. The motives for participation were ambiguous and in Iraq the justification of American warfare was challenged by the global community creating domestic controversies. Fourth, the targets, justifications, significance, meaning, and appropriateness of policies have not been sufficiently stated. Consequently, in spite of the political will to take part in PKOs participation has, as we have seen, been limited. This is due to fatigue syndromes, misunderstandings of PKOs, some people’s resistance to troop dispatches, and lack of confidence in government, UN and PKO policies as well as the absence of such policies. Fifth, public information on the needs for troop dispatches has been insufficient, as have been government efforts to acquire public support. In addition, cooperation between principal government agencies is deficient, the domestic system for nonmilitary participation in PKOs is insufficient, and troop dispatches have been intermittent. Professional training for participation is greatly inferior compared to principal countries taking part in PKOs, there is shortage of responsible personnel, and experts in the involved agencies and efforts to enhance the efficiency of PKO participation through international cooperation are not sufficient. Finally, a comprehensive support system for troops facing natural disasters abroad is not in place.14 The deficiencies in PKO dispatches become clear from the only account the author has found based on practical experience. Conscript Ban Seok Choi (2014) assesses South Korea’s contribution to global security through the dispatch of the First Contingent of the Republic of Korea Horizontal Mechanical Engineering Company (ROK HMEC) to the UN Peacekeeping Force in South 14

 Kim, op. cit., 2008, pp. 33–34; Park, op. cit., 2015, pp. 486–488. Original quotation marks.

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Sudan from March to October 2013. The contingent paved an amicable relationship between the two countries by launching ­ civil–military cooperation. The unit provided medical treatment and supported reconstruction by constructing flood-control conduits and reconstructing the local road system. Choi participated in the Second Contingent in the force protection unit as an airborne paratrooper of the ROK Army Special Operations Command to secure the base and the UNMISS compound in Bor as well as to protect the ROK HMEC working with reconstruction tasks requested by the UN. After the December 15, 2013, coup attempt by former VicePresident Riek Machar, the ROK HMEC had to treat critically ill patients, supply internally displaced people with water and food, and handle the deceased in a quick and calm way. The South Korean military showed its ability to contribute to peacekeeping activities in volatile situations. At the same time, safe shelters were provided to the UN police, military liaison officers, and the UNMISS within the unit’s compound. On the other hand, when the ROK HMEC took care of the ­foreigner evacuation operation in the Bor area, from the point of view of other South Korean soldiers, the African Americans’ skin color caused them to blend with the other refugees and come to our compound to seek protection. The South Korean forces were not friendly to them because their skin tone was similar with the domestic refugees. However, when they told us that they were Americans, we started to treat them differently from the Sudanese. The unit called the American Embassy in Juba and even arranged a helicopter for them to evacuate. As an interpreter, it was a little embarrassing that the ROK military is still close-minded when it comes to race. If the military continues to serve in multiethnic settings, it should be more respectful to other ethnic groups regardless of their national competitiveness. Another weakness is that the unit lacked preparedness during the coup by lacking adequate ammunition and bulletproof vests for all personnel. Only the Force Protection Unit and some officers could outfit themselves with full gear. The Ministry of National Defence argued that since the unit’s primary task was to provide

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engineering support for reconstruction projects full gear for all personnel was unnecessary. It did not anticipate the coup. The South Korean military still lacks complete ability to thoroughly assess its operation area. A final concern is that at one time, all three power generators had exploded unable to withstand the heat in the dry season demonstrating the inability of the ROK military to properly outfit its forces abroad. Soldiers lost access to air conditioning and water pumps. Consequently, the ROK military must address shortcomings in supplies and assessment to make effective, responsible, and safe contributions to global peacekeeping efforts.15 Although it is necessary to be cautious when drawing conclusions from only one account, this experience shows that contributions to global peacekeeping need to be improved.

4.3  Appointments of Koreans within the UN System In addition to the data in Section 3.3 on participation in UN agencies, a few Koreans have held high positions within the UN. At the 20th General Assembly of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) held in November 1997, Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Ch’oe Tong-jin, became the first Korean to be elected Chairman of the General Assembly of a UN specialized agency. In 1999, Sohn Bongsook was member of the Central Election Commission in charge of the UN-managed popular consultation in East Timor. In 2001, she was Chairman of the UN East Timor Independent Election Management Committee that successfully completed the general election held on August 30. When scholar Kim Hack-Soo was appointed Secretary-General of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) in 2000, he became the first Korean to the position as UN Deputy Secretary-General. Kim remained on the post until 2007. In 2002, South Korea held the 15

 Choi, Ban Seok, “Ban Seok Choi: A Soldier’s Reflection on South Korea’s Contribution to Global Peacekeeping Operations,” June 24, 2014 (http://blogs.cfr. org/asia/2014/06/24/ban-seok-choi-a-soldiers-r...p_mid-4663471&sp_rid=Z2Ficml lbC5qb25zc29uQG9yaWVudC5zdS5zZQS2), pp. 1–3.

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position of committee member of 14 UN organs. In 2002, judge Kwon Oh-Kon worked for the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia and Park Chun-Ho had been elected judge for the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. The appointment of Doctor Lee Jong-ok as the Secretary-General of the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2003 was the first appointment to such a position of a specialized UN agency (cf. p. 103). According to Kang (2002), given South Korea’s minimal status on the international stage in recent centuries, in particular, the ROK presidency of the 56th UN General Assembly through Foreign Minister Han Seung-soo from September 2001 to September 2002 was a watershed in its diplomatic history. Along with the position of nonpermanent member of the Security Council in 1996 to 1997, South Korea regards his election as a major achievement since it became UN member, even a kind of climax in its UN diplomacy. The South Korean Foreign Ministry (2009) writes that since Han assumed office the day after the September 11 terrorist acts against New York and Washington, he concentrated his power on establishing a policy on how the UN should respond to the new threat from terrorism to the global community. Other issues raised during 2001–2002 were implementation of the Millennium Declaration, activation of the General Assembly, strengthening of PKOs, diffusion of human rights and democracy, establishment of a policy to eradicate terrorism, alleviation of the information gap, and development in Africa, etc. By immediately adopting a resolution denouncing terrorism after having assumed office as General Assembly president, Han contributed to the determined response by the global community to eradicate terrorism. Since the debate on how to respond to terrorism was transferred from the General Assembly’s Sixth Committee to the Assembly’s plenary session, it was handled as an urgent task. When the issue was discussed during October 1–5, 167 member states condemned terrorism. It was the highest number ever who had spoken out on a single issue in reflection of the global community’s will to eradicate terrorism. Other issues raised in the Assembly were dialogue between civilizations, follow-up measures to the New

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Millennium Summit, the crisis in Afghanistan, the Palestinian question, mobilization of international financial resources, and a plan to diffuse information and communication technologies to developing countries. As Chairman of the plenary session held from September to December 2001, Han met high-level officials from each country and held 78 meetings and courtesy calls. He represented the UN, along with Secretary-General Kofi Annan, to receive the Nobel Peace Prize in 2001 for its central role to achieve peace and security and meet the world’s economic, social, and environmental challenges. By leading the debate to resolve the enumerated global issues, South Korea gained profound understanding of global issues and learnt how to effectively resolve them in 2001–2002.16 In addition to the precious experiences gained by Han in raising Seoul’s global position, in 2005, South Korea acquired for the first time Chairmanship of the First Committee of the 60th General Assembly. Until 2005, 22 Koreans had advanced to specialist positions in the UN Secretariat. In March 2007, UN Councillor Pak Ûn-ha was elected Vice-Chairman of the UN Committee on the Position of Women. In May 2007, Sônggyungwan University Professor Yi Yang-hûi was elected Chairman of the UN Committee on the Rights of Children for two years. In July 2007, Yi Ho-jin, Head of the Centre to Assess Diplomatic Capacity at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, was elected Chairman of the UN Advisory Committee on Disarmaments founded in 1978 as an advisory body to the Secretary-General dealing with international security, disarmaments, and nonproliferation. In October 2007, UN Ambassador Kim Hyun Chong was elected Chairman of the 53-member UN AsiaPacific Group and the General Director of UNPKOs, Ch’oe Yông-jin, was appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Côte d’Ivoire. From late 2006 until November 2008, the number of Koreans working in the UN Secretariat and affiliated agencies rose from 245 16

 Chung, op. cit., 2015, p. 34; Han’guk wegyobu, op. cit., 2009, pp. 185–186, 187; Kang, op. cit., 2002, pp. 79, 88, 89; Karns and Mingst, op. cit., pp. 95–96; Wang, op. cit., 2002, p. 16.

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to 305. The last figure was twice as high as in 1992. Among 10,583 employees in the Secretariat, 60 were Koreans. In December 2010, among 353 Koreans working in 51 international organizations, 23 had a position above director of bureau in the UN Headquarters or in international organizations associated with the UN. Among the 353 employees, 65 worked in the UN Headquarters. In August 2014, 120 Koreans worked in the UN Secretariat in contrast to no one in 1992. In 1992, three Koreans worked in the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) but 13 in 2014. In the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the number rose in the same years from five to 30. As recorded by Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the ROK to the UN, Kim Sook (2012:a), the unanimous election by the General Assembly on October 13, 2006 of the then Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon as the eighth Secretary-General of the UN is without doubt considered to be one of the momentous achievements in the history of South Korean diplomacy. He had previously worked as chief secretary of Han Seung-Soo from 2001 to 2002. Park Heung-Soon (2011) writes that his election had an enormous significance for South Korea raising its international position, although he officially represents the UN. Although Ban possessed outstanding talents and benefitted from a thorough election campaign as well as support from the government, he was — according to the Swedish journalist Niklas Ekdahl and the Swedish Head of the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services from 2005 to 2010, Inga-Britt Ahlenius (2011) — the choice of China and in particular of the permanent UN representative of the United States, John Bolton, as representative of an American right-wing government, which openly showed contempt toward the UN. In fact, the permanent Security Council members did not wish to have a strong Secretary-General. In Park’s (2006) opinion, Ban would be a suitable leader for their strategic interests and who would be possible to cooperate with.17 17

 Chung, ibid., 2015, p. 34; Niklas Ekdahl and Inga-Britt Ahlenius, Mr Chance: FN:s förfall under Ban Ki-moon (Brombergs Bokförlag AB, 2011), pp. 78, 80, 225, 246; Han’guk wegyobu, ibid., 2009, p. 193; Kim, op. cit., 2008, pp. 39, 40; Kim, op. cit.,

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Participation in UN  187

Park (2015) enumerates five reasons why Ban was elected Secretary-General: personal ability, national capability, election campaign, international factors, and American support. His diplomatic skills met international standards, South Korea had risen considerably as a middle power within the UN since 1991, the election campaign was meticuluous, such international factors as the postCold War global environment and the dynamic relations between the five permanent Security Council members worked in his favor, and, finally, the American support was of decisive importance. The first term in office became an opportunity to elevate soft power by participating in the work on such global issues as poverty, diseases, regional conflicts, and humanitarian disasters as well as political and diplomatic leadership. His mild and determined leadership style had raised the global community’s confidence in the UN, internal reforms had contributed to raise the efficiency of and trust in the UN, and in the opinion of member states, he had acted to resolve global issues in a neutral and amicable way. Ban had acted resolutely to terminate the turmoil in Côte d’Ivoire when the loser in the November 2010 presidential elections had refused to accept the outcome and had led the world opinion at the time of the Arab Spring in 2011. However, Ban failed in 2009 to replace the Kyoto protocol on climate change with the Copenhagen process. He also showed weak leadership in the case of terrorism and the global financial crisis. An opinion expressed in Foreign Policy in June 2009 was that Ban was 2012:a, pp. 173, 180; Kwôn, Se-jin, “Yuen kigu-e kûnmuhanûn Han’gugin-dûl,” Wôlgan Chosôn (December 2008), pp. 378, 379; Lee, Shin-wha, “Han’guk, kukche kigu-mit global governance: mirae-ûi kwaje,” in Park, Chung and Lee, op. cit., 2015, p. 110; Park, Heung-soon, “Ch’oech’o Han’gugin UN samu ch’ongjang kukig-ûi sirhyôn hog-ûn Migug-ûi chôllyak,” Wôlgan mal (November 2006), pp. 90, 91: op. cit., 2011, p. 48; Park, op. cit., 2007:a, p. 289; Yun, Wan-jun, Chông, Mi-gyông and Sin, Sôk-ho, “(1991–2011 Han’guk Yuen wegyo 20nyôn) ‘sôngnyôn’ majûn Yuen wegyo,” February 16, 2011 (http://m.donga.com/NEWS/List/3/all/2011021 534856827/1), pp. 1, 3. The book by Ekdahl and Ahlenius that harshly criticizes Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon received considerable public attention in Sweden. The core message is: “Mr. Ban Ki-moon is not the right man to lead the world organization” (p. 7).

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188  South Korea in the United Nations

the most incompetent Secretary-General who had failed to create a world opinion against the nuclear threat and the global refugee problem. He had made the UN become an insignificant actor. Such an opinion became even more apparent in the 2009 report by The Economist that gave him credits for his work on global change and the food issue but dismissed his ability to handle China and Russia and his low organizational skills even more. On July 1, 2009, Al Jazeera wrote that critics claimed that the Secretary-General did not properly understand his role in the 21st century. Yet, the unanimous reelection on June 21, 2011 showed that he had broad support and confidence among UN member states. In May 2016, The Economist expressed the opinion about Ban Ki-moon’s term in office as UN Secretary General that he “… is viewed as the dullest and among the worst.” On the other hand, “He can claim some credit for new development goals set last year and for overseeing a climatechange arrangement in Paris in December.” Finally, “Overall Mr Ban personifies the defect to which the UN is prone: plumping for the lowest common denominator.”18 Although opinions on his work differ, the positive impact on South Korea’s image cannot be denied.

4.4  Contributions to the UN Budget Since member states’ assessed contributions to the UN regular budget are decided every third year by the Fifth Committee of the UN General Assembly in charge of administration and budget issues on the basis of gross national income (GNI), foreign debt, and other economic indicators, payments to the UN differ from the other standards of evaluation. An 18-member Expert Committee on Contributions meets annually to review the scale of assessments. The 18

 Kim, ibid., 2012:a, p. 180; Kim, Yông-mi, “Han’gugin Yuen samu ch’ongjang-ûi sônggong-gwa chwajôl: Mukiryôkhan, nômu-na mukiryôkhan Ban Ki-moon-ûi Yuen,” Sindonga (June 2012), pp. 294–295, 297; Park, ibid., 2011, pp. 48, 49, 51–52, 53: op. cit., 2015, pp. 316, 427, 428, 429, 430–432, 452; The Economist, “The United Nations: Master, mistress or mouse?,” May 21–27, 2016, p. 49. Kim (ibid., June 2012) quotes the opinions of Foreign Policy, The Economist, and Al Jazeera.

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Participation in UN  189

Committee prepares the General Assembly’s decision by reevaluating the scale in order to fit economic capacity. In early 2013, percentage shares ranged from a minimum of 0.001 percent ($28,113) to a maximum of 22 percent. South Korea’s assessed contribution ratio to the UN budget was 0.22 percent before UN admission in 1991 but the figure rose to 0.69 percent for the years 1992 to 1994. The ratio corresponded to $10 million annually. Including voluntary contributions, the total amount of payment was over $28 million per year. In 1993, South Korea was in terms of contributions number 21 among the 184 member states. In 1995 and 1996, contributions had risen to more than $38 million and $46 million, respectively. When the assessed contribution ratio for the first time passed one percent in 2000, South Korea became one of the core contributors.19 South Korea’s rising contributions to the UN budget are clear from Table 4.1. The total number of member states was 189 from 2000 to 2001, 191 from 2002 to 2005, and 192 from 2006 to 2010. The rise in contributions is in line with the prediction by Kim Kang-nyông (1991) that South Korea could raise its global position through financial contributions. The highest rise in its share from 2000 to 2002 reflected the UN’s demand to raise it by 0.86 percent since South Korea had lost the privilege it had in 1991 as a backward country with a per capita income below $5,000 and the United States’ share was lowered from 25 percent to 22 percent. The slight fall in 2004 was explained by the voluntary decision of Russia to raise its share of payments. The second highest rise in 19

 Marjorie Ann Browne and Luisa Blanchfield, United Nations Regular Budget Contributions: Members Compared, 1990–2010 (CRS Report for Congress, n. p., January 15, 2013), pp. 2, 6; Kang, op. cit., 2002, p. 90; John J. Metzler, “Who’s paying and not paying their fair share at the UN?,” World Tribune.com, February 24, 2013 (http://www.worldtribune.com/2013/02/24/whos-paying-and-not-paying-theirfair sha…), p. 1; Pak, op. cit., 1995, p. 624; Pak, op. cit., 2013, p. 4; Yonhap News Agency, “Han’guk Yuen pundangûm sunwi 13wi… 13nyôn cchae haeksim pundamguk,” October 24, 2013 (http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/medialabs/info/ graph/131023_01.html), pp. 1–2.

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190  South Korea in the United Nations Table 4.1.   South Korea’s contributions to the UN budget, 2000–2010 Year

Contributions ($)

Share (%)

Ranking

2000

10,581,996.00

1.01

16

2001

13,631,862.00

1.73

11

2002

20,720,841.00

1.87

10

2003

24,990,822.00

1.85

10

2004

25,791,150.00

1.80

11

2005

31,959,981.00

1.80

11

2006

30,650,503.00

1.80

11

2007

43,476,401.00

2.17

11

2008

39,744,527.00

2.17

11

2009

62,941,150.00

2.17

11

2010

47,789,976.00

2.26

11

Sum

342,279,209.00





Source : An, Ch’i-yong, “Han’guk 11nyôngan Yuen pundamkûm 3ôk 4ch’ôn 3paekyô mandallô — pundam sunwi 11wi: Mi ûihoe chosa pogosô,” February 5, 2013 (http://andocu.tistory/com/entry/% ED%95%9C% EA%B5%AD%EC%9C%AO%EC%...), p. 1.

2007 derived from the rise of GNI and the wôn–dollar exchange rate. In terms of contributions to UN agencies, South Korea was, in 2006 and 2007, the 11th largest contributor to the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) by paying $2.4 ­million and $2.9 million, respectively (cf. p. 82). The shares of total contributions were 1.8 and 2.18 percent. The rise in 2007 was due to a decision made by the 2006 UN General Assembly to raise the share. The UNESCO had 191 member states in 2006 but 193 in the general meeting held in October 2007. South Korea also made voluntary contributions to the UNESCO amounting to approximately $800,000 from 2002 to 2004 and $1 million in 2005, but $1.8 million in 2006.20 Table 4.2 shows South Korea’s payments relative to major contributors to the UN budget. 20

 Browne and Blanchfield, ibid., pp. 13–23; Chung, op. cit., 2007, pp. 123: fn. 3, 127–128; Yonhap News Agency, ibid., p. 2.

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Participation in UN  191 Table 4.2.   Twenty major contributors to the UN regular budget (2013) Country

Contributions ($)

Share (%)

United States

61848.00

22.000

Japan

27606.00

10.833

Germany

18197.00

7.141

France

14253.00

5.593

United Kingdom

13198.00

5.179

China

13119.00

5.148

Italy

11335.00

4.448

Canada

7604.00

2.984

Spain

7576.00

2.973

Brazil

7477.00

2.934

Russia

6213.00

2.438

Australia

5285.00

2.074

South Korea

5081.00

1.994

Mexico

4694.00

1.842

Netherlands

4215.00

1.654

Turkey

3384.00

1.328

Switzerland

2668.00

1.047

Belgium

2543.00

0.998

Sweden

2446.00

0.960

Poland

2347.00

0.921

Source : Yonhap News Agency, op. cit., p. 1.

South Korea was still a major contributor but its position fell from number 11 from 2011 to 2012, with a share remaining at 2.26 percent, to number 13 in 2013 among 193 member states. The fall was due to the rising share of countries with high economic growth such as China, Brazil, and India. South Korea’s share of the budget had been adjusted to 1.994 percent during 2013–2015, but in 2014, payments had risen to $54 million. The same share also applied to UN specialized agencies.21 21

 Chung, op. cit., 2015, p. 39; Lee, op. cit., 2015, p. 110: fn. 4; Meltzer, op. cit., p. 1; Yonhap News Agency, ibid., p. 2.

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192  South Korea in the United Nations

4.5 Assessments on the Outcome of South Korea’s UN Membership Assessments of the outcome of UN membership were made in 2011, 2012, 2013, 2015, and 2016. Park Heung-Soon (2011) argues that South Korea’s diplomacy has developed enormously since its admission into the UN. By becoming a member late, membership has in earnest widened opportunities for multilateral diplomacy. South Korea’s UN diplomacy has, by strengthening the target to secure the position as a middle power and selecting an agenda for global issues, contributed to the development of a mature foreign policy. Its global position has been enhanced through the harmonious pursuit of national and global interests. UN diplomacy is an important channel and measure to enhance peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and Korean reunification as well as to become an advanced middle power. In accordance with the account, contributions to the UN budget have risen from 0.8 percent in the beginning of membership to 2.25 percent in 2011, making it the eleventh largest contributor. Contributions to PKOs have annually amounted to similar levels. Voluntary contributions to specialized agencies as well as affiliated organizations have also risen. As a major contributor to the UN budget, South Korea has shown its capability. By dispatching well-trained and disciplined military personnel, they have contributed to secure peace by maintaining public order and helping reconstruction work and thereby, in accordance with the above assessments, received an excellent reputation worldwide.22 In accordance with the prediction by Yôm (1991) that UN membership would lead to a rising global position, Park (2012) argues that South Korea through UN membership has established a position as a middle power in the global community and used it as a tool 22

 Park, Heung-Soon, “Han’guk-gwa UN wegyo 20nyôn: sônggwa, hyônhwang-gwa chuyo kwaje,” in Han’guk wegyo t’ongsangbu, Yuen kaip 20 chunyôn kinyôm: tae Yuen wegyo panghyang mosaeg-ûl wihan t’oron-hoe (Seoul: Han’guk wegyo t’ongsangbu, 2011), pp. 31, 34–35, 36, 50.

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Participation in UN  193

to play a role matching with this status. The account supports his opinion. First, the UN has, as a place to pursue international and multilateral diplomacy, become important in foreign policy. South Korea has by, for the first time widening its policy focus beyond the Korean peninsula and embracing universal values and rules of the global community as well as global issues, pursued multilateralism and thereby got to adopt the type of diplomatic role of advanced countries. Membership has provided the ROK an important opportunity to consolidate its position on various pending questions, negotiate, and tune policies nurture diplomatic leadership through participation in UN agencies. Diplomatic skills have been diversified and qualitatively improved and manpower has become professionalized. Domestically, the structure for multilateralism has been strengthened and popular understanding of the UN enhanced. Second, South Korea has firmly secured its position as a middle power in the global community. Through approximately 20 years of experience and efforts, South Korea has matched its UN budget contributions by becoming one of the 10 main economic powers and a middle global power. Since the two Koreas simultaneously joined the UN, the Korean question is not simply an inter-Korean political and military issue but an official issue for the UN. The Korean question has been elevated to an issue directly related to peace and security in East Asia and the world. Such a state of affairs was important when the DPRK threatened to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in March 1993, when North Korean troops entered the DMZ in April 1996 and when an armed North Korean espionage submarine ran aground on the South Korean east coast in September 1996 (cf. pp. 90, 96–98). Contributions to the budget, participation in PKOs, and the election of Ban Ki-moon as Secretary-General has, along with the economic development, ­enabled South Korea to secure a position as a middle power in the UN. Through the UN, South Korea has been able to pursue soft power benefiting both its national interests and global position. South Korea has acquired a useful opportunity and channel to exert political and diplomatic leadership. Since a new path for

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194  South Korea in the United Nations

multilateral diplomacy has opened, by actively participating in resolving such global issues as security, human rights, environment, terrorism, poverty, and underdevelopment, its influence on world affairs has expanded requiring a reorganization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ work. On the other hand, as we saw in Section 3.5, a restriction for the UN to guarantee security on the Korean peninsula is that China (also Russia) exerts absolute influence on the Security Council’s work. Another restriction is the insufficient apparatus to implement UN sanctions, making them dependent on member states’ voluntary cooperation causing doubts over their efficiency, as in the case of North Korea’s persistent evasion of sanctions. In addition, that South Korea cannot become a permanent Security Council member and comprises one part of the divided peninsula limits the role of the UN in the Korean question. In spite of South Korea’s contributions to the UN budget, there are not many ways for the country to directly participate in the Council’s work or exert influence on it regardless of the positive account of its work as discussed in Section 3.4, partly reflecting the Council’s unbending structure. Finally, North Korea’s use of brinkmanship creates considerable restrictions for the Council’s negotiation strategies and role. Since North Korea shows extreme behavior, sanctions or responsive measures for the sake of security on the Korean peninsula face limitations.23 Park’s assessment largely concurs with the present study but he adds raising diplomatic skills, confirming that the UN is an important provider of expertise (cf. pp. 7, 33, 43, 83, 171). Without joining the UN, such a channel would not have existed. Enhancement of soft power is worthy to note, although he is not the only scholar ­having raised this issue. Since Park points out similar limits by the UN in the Korean question as those noted above, the dominating predictions of a positive outcome of UN membership on inter-Korean relations were clearly partially based on wishful thinking. 23

 Park, op. cit., 2012, pp. 322–323, 325, 328, 329–330.

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Participation in UN  195

In 2013, journalist Kim Bumsoo had an interview with UN Ambassador Oh Joon. At that time, South Korea’s position in multilateral diplomacy was rising. In addition to having been ­ elected member of the Security Council twice and having the Secretary-General since 2007, the 2010 G-20 Summit had been held in Seoul. It was significant that South Korea’s position rose at a time when the global community had to cooperate to resolve such problems as the North Korean nuclear issue, prohibition of diffusion of weapons of mass destruction, human rights, and the environment. In other words, diplomatic activity within the UN had become more important. South Korea was originally a small and weak nation but was at the time, according to many indexes, on the way to become an advanced country or a small but strong country. The ROK is a very important example that the border between strong and weak countries within the UN is not fixed but can change. The account confirms that South Korea’s enhanced strength has contributed to elevate its position within the UN. In the most comprehensive study the author has found, the Korean scholar Yi Sô-hang (2013) writes that the opinions among many scholars on the country’s UN membership can be summarized in four points. First, UN admission has meant the establishment of a normal relationship with the global community. Although the UN in 1948 recognized the Republic of Korea as the only legitimate Korean government and Seoul had established diplomatic relations with most nations of the world, by only having observer status in the UN it was an outsider. This opinion concurs with that of Kang (1995) that South Korea was regarded as a second-class nation by not being UN member (cf. p. 49). Through UN admission, South Korea has acquired the formal right of expression and right to vote in the world’s largest international organization and has acquired a position to exert influence on major current international issues, including world peace. The above account supports these opinions, especially on the basis of South Korea serving in the Security Council from 1996 to 1997 and 2013 to 2014. The appointments of Han Seung-Soo as UN General Assembly Chairman in 2001–2002 and Ban Ki-moon as Secretary-General in 2006 are recognitions of

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196  South Korea in the United Nations

their abilities confirming that South Korea can exert influence on major current international issues. Second, UN admission took place at a time when the post-Cold War period and the revival of the UN function concurred with the intervention of the global community in such international issues as the environment, human rights, and development. Consequently, an opportunity and channel to act was created. South Korea had long focused on resolving inter-Korean concerns and by managing great power diplomacy secure peace on the Korean peninsula whereas participation in current international issues had been neglected. UN membership has opened a channel for South Korea to intervene and participate to resolve various international issues that have emerged in the post-Cold War era meaning that the horizon of diplomacy has been enlarged.24 The account shows that the second opinion corresponds with particularly South Korea’s contributions throughout the two periods of UN Security Council membership. Third, in concurrence with Park (2012), UN admission has served as an opportunity for multilateral diplomacy and thereby raised South Korea’s international position. Multilateral diplomacy creates through the adoption of agreements and resolutions on international issues norms. By participating in UN meetings to implement agreements and resolutions, South Korea’s international position has been raised enhancing the country’s soft power. As the typical place for multilateral diplomacy, the UN has served as a place to enhance negotiation ability needed in international relations. These opinions concur with those of Park and cannot be questioned on the basis of the above account, although the concept of “soft power” is somewhat difficult to prove. One intricate question is to what extent the UN has contributed to raise Seoul’s international position since it is not the only place for multilateral diplomacy. The same could be asked with regard to enhanced negotiation ability, an expression that should correspond with “raising diplomatic skills” above. Fourth, since UN admission of the two Koreas took place simultaneously, the UN has become a place for inter-Korean contacts and 24

 Kim, op. cit., 2013, pp. 1, 3; Yi, op. cit., 2013, p. 346.

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Participation in UN  197

dialogue: a new channel for contacts has been opened. This outcome is entirely in line with the predictions by Han (1991), Kim (1991), and Yôm (1991). While UN membership has been no guarantee for automatic contacts, since both states participate in UN work an opportunity for regular contacts has been created, although the account is not exhaustive and there were both positive and negative ones. As we have seen, through the UN, South Korea has raised the North Korean human rights issue that is difficult to resolve between them. In the case of an acute change of the situation in North Korea and on the Korean peninsula, it is assumed that help can be received from the UN to make the situation stable. In accordance with the above account, by serving in the Security Council twice, South Korea has contributed directly to secure international peace and security. Admission into the Council reflected South Korea’s elevated position and its diplomatic skills. The ­second term in the Council from 2013 to 2014 showed that South Korea is no longer a divided nation but a “soft middle-power” that works beyond the Korean peninsula to resolve various international problems.25 In spite of Yi’s positive assessments of Council membership, it is worthy to reemphasize that there are no signs from the account that UN admission has contributed to transform interKorean relations. As Park (2012), Yi records participation in PKOs as an outcome of UN admission. In line with the above opinion of Kim (2012:a), the selection of Ban Ki-moon as Secretary-General in 2006 can be regarded as the most epoch-making event in South Korea’s UN diplomacy and reflects South Korea’s rising global position. As a model for economic development and having transformed itself from an aid recipient to an aid donor, the ROK has transferred its development experiences to less developed countries enabling it to actively participate in the UN’s development work (cf. p. 103: fn. 21). South Korea is therefore recognized as a country contributing to promote world peace. Consequently, the right of expression has been strengthened enabling Seoul to play a “bridging role” 25

 Yi, ibid., 2013, pp. 347–348. The last quotation has original quotation marks.

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198  South Korea in the United Nations

between divided Western and nonallied countries as well as between advanced and developing nations. In this context, having become an aid donor provides credibility to South Korea’s claim to be a bridge between the developed and the developing countries, that is a central feature of its middle power identity and global strategy. The strengthening of the right of expression and the improved image of South Korea are important outcomes of UN admission. The Korean scholar Chung Utak (2015) argues that the two periods as nonpermanent member in the Security Council, the presidency of the UN General Assembly from 2001 to 2002, and the election of Ban Ki-moon as Secretary-General show that ­astonishing achievements were made since joining the UN. At the same time, there is an opinion that UN diplomacy is brilliantly evaluated based on a few “star players” whereas the system to foster capable experts on multilateral diplomacy is deficient. Park (2015) adds to his above assessments that South Korea has played a central role in the UN by participating in various UN agencies and committees and has thereby exerted influence on policymaking. He exemplifies by nonpermanent membership in the Security Council from 1996 to 1997, presidency of the General Assembly from 2001 to 2002, and board membership of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) as well as the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC). Finally, since joining the UN, South Korea has acquired expertise within the organization’s main areas peace and security, development, and human rights contributing to ­participation in the UNHRC, ECOSOC, and the Security Council. As forecasted by Yôm (1991), the scope of diplomacy has widened beyond the Korean peninsula. The provision of development aid is one such example.26 The recorded positive opinions concur with this study and can hardly be questioned, but to what extent they are correct can be debated.

26

 The author’s visit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 7, 2016; Chung, op. cit., 2015, p. 38; O’Neil, op. cit., p. 85; Park, op. cit., 2015, p. 503; Yi, ibid., 2013, pp. 349–350. Original quotation marks.

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Participation in UN  199

4.6 Conclusions The participation by the UN in post-Korean War reconstruction has created a “pay-back” syndrome for South Korea. Since 1993, the ROK has dispatched more than 40,000 soldiers to 16 UN missions in 15 countries and the multinational stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, in terms of troops dispatched, the ROK has been an insignificant contributor. The troops’ work was until 1997 concentrated to the delivery of medical services, bridge building, military observers, and election monitoring that all fall within the purview of peace-building. Assessments of South Korea’s participation in UNPKOs are generally positive. By participating in UN missions, South Korea’s global position has been raised. Military skills have been enhanced and South Korean soldiers are considered to be highly qualified and they have received support from the local population in, for instance, Iraq. On the other hand, one deficiency is domestic lawmaking, which has delayed the dispatch of troops. There is also space for qualitative improvements in participation in UN missions, which the experiences from South Sudan show. Among Koreans who have held high positions within the UN the two outstanding ones are Foreign Minister Han Seung-Soo who was president of the General Assembly in 2001 to 2002 and Ban Ki-moon who was elected Secretary-General in 2006. The election of Han was, along with Security Council membership from 1996 to 1997, a major achievement since its UN admission in 1991. Han made important contributions for the UN response to the September 11 terrorist attacks by adopting an antiterrorism statement. South Korea gained deep understanding of global issues and learnt how to effectively resolve them. The election of Ban partly owed to South Korea’s position as a middle power but also to the wishes of the United States and China who believed he would be suitable to cooperate with. A clear sign that their wish was fulfilled was his reelection in 2011. His first term in office had contributed to raise international confidence in South Korea and create a positive image of the country. It also became an opportunity to elevate soft power as well

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200  South Korea in the United Nations

as political and diplomatic leadership by participating in the work on global issues. A few other Koreans have also held high positions within the UN system. Since UN member states’ assessed contribution rates to the budget are regularly calculated on the basis of their economic strength, South Korea has risen in this area from an initial level of 0.69 percent to surpass one percent in 2000, making it a major contributor and elevating its global position. South Korea has since remained a main contributor. Assessments of South Korea’s UN membership made in 2011, 2012, 2013, 2015, and 2016 showed that the predictions that the country’s global position would be raised had largely been ­fulfilled. The UN has, by serving as a place for global diplomacy, become important for foreign policy. In 2012, budget contributions, participation in PKOs, and the election of Ban Ki-moon as Secretary-General had, along with the economic development, enabled South Korea to secure a position as a middle power in the UN. The UN has served as a place to enhance diplomatic skills that otherwise would not have existed. At the same time, the pro-DPRK position of China and Russia in the Security Council, the insufficient apparatus to implement sanctions, North Korea’s evasion of sanctions and its pursuit of brinkmanship were restrictions for the UN to guarantee security on the Korean peninsula. In 2013, common assessments were that UN admission has (a) meant the establishment of a normal relationship with the global community, (b) created an opportunity and channel to act in world affairs, (c) served as an opportunity for multilateral diplomacy raising South Korea’s international position, and (d) opened a new channel for inter-Korean contacts and dialogue. Also later evaluations confirm that South Korea has benefited greatly from UN membership and acquired expertise previously unavailable.

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Chapter 5

General Conclusions

5.1  The Outcome of South Korea’s UN Membership Considering South Korea’s applications for UN membership in 1949, 1952, 1961, and 1975 (2) and through its allies in 1949(2), 1954, 1955(3), 1957(2), and 1958, its status as nonmember for 43 years was a “national trauma,” reflecting awareness of the disadvantages by not being member of the most important intergovernmental organization (IGO). Both Koreas were inconsistent in their approaches toward UN membership. Originally, both states wished unilateral membership but when North Korea through the Soviet Union in 1957(2) and 1958 applied for joint UN admission, South Korea and the United States argued that it would perpetuate national division. Reversing its own policy, the June 23, 1973 policy declaration by President Park Chung Hee stating that South Korea would not oppose separate UN admission for the two Koreas if it was conducive to ease tensions and strengthen international cooperation was the turning point in the Korean UN membership issue. Now North Korea claimed that separate membership would perpetuate division. This policy was afterward consistently pursued whereas North Korea persistently repeated that separate admission would perpetuate division. Simultaneously, reflecting awareness of the benefits of UN membership, North Korea contradicted its own claim by being member of 14 UN agencies prior to admission. That both Germany 201

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and Yemen were UN members separately prior to reunification in 1990 also undermined North Korea’s argument. In spite of the South Korean government’s active efforts to achieve simultaneous UN membership for the two Koreas and North Korea’s belated response, without the end of the Cold War making the Soviet Union and China change their views on the issue, they could not have jointly joined the UN on September 17, 1991. The main difference was that both states acquired the right to vote enabling them to ­participate in decision making. Whether the predictions on the outcome of South Korea’s UN admission in 1991 have been fulfilled or not is not a yes-or-no ­question but a matter of assessing to what extent subsequent developments have matched with them. The study identified seven standards of evaluation: membership in UN agencies, membership in the Security Council, the Council’s resolutions on North Korea, the General Assembly’s resolutions on the North Korean human rights issue, participation in UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs), appointments of Koreans to high posts within the UN system, and contributions to the UN budget. First, South Korea began already in 1992 to participate in many UN activities. To become member of the UN Development Program (UNDP), the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), and the UN Committee for Program and Coordination (UNCPC) in 1992 was very important from the point of raising diplomatic ­capacity since these agencies constitute the core role of the UN in the economic and social field. Equally important, in 1992, South Korea was elected board member of the powerful ECOSOC and served as such during 1993–1995, 1997–1999, 2001–2003, 2004–2006, 2008–2010, 2011–2013, and 2014–2016. In 2015, the ROK UN Ambassador was elected Chairman of the ECOSOC. In addition, since South Korea has been elected board member of many other agencies and joined four new ones, after 1991, its global position has, in accordance with the predictions of UN admission, risen, enabling it to participate more actively in international ­decision making. Through active participation in UN agencies, international support for South Korea entered a ­qualitative phase

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replacing the pre-1991 quantitative phase. UN admission has activated South Korea’s global interactions to an extent that would have been impossible to reach without joining the organization. Such a situation reflects liberals’ view that cooperation is possible and will expand over time. Second, since South Korea as member of the Security Council could participate in decision-making processes to resolve global issues and contribute to promote international peace and security, when the country after active preparations was elected Council member in 1995, it was the first major success of UN membership. Since South Korea contributed to the adoption of two Council statements following the intrusion of North Korean troops in the DMZ in April 1996 and the submarine incident in September 1996, membership led to a stabilization of inter-Korean relations. However, since that effect was temporary, the impact of nonpermanent membership from 1996 to 1997 on relations should not be overvalued. The first term in the Council contributed to reelection in 2012. As Chairman in February 2013, South Korea played an important role in responding to the third North Korean nuclear test. Also ­during the second term, the foreign policy agenda was widened from the Korean peninsula to global issues, enabling Seoul to reflect its position. South Korea contributed also through its work in 2013–2014 to maintain global peace and security. Both during 1996–1997 and 2013–2014, South Korea could in spite of the identified disadvantages of being nonpermanent member (a) display or strengthen national prestige and power, (b) exert influence on international affairs, (c) realize overall national foreign policy objectives, and (d) strengthen its position within the UN. In this way, it could also fulfil vain associated with membership. From 1996 to 1997, South Korea acquired considerable diplomatic capability. By implementing its tasks successfully from 2013 to 2014, it raised its capacity for multilateral diplomacy. However, South Korea also had to in accordance with realists’ perceptions of the central importance of power in international relations experienced limitations in the Council’s work on North Korea due to China’s pro-DPRK policies, as was the case in April 1996 when only a press release was issued.

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Third, although it was predicted that UN membership would create a new channel for dialogue, coexistence would be enhanced and inter-Korean relations would be normalized there are few signs that these predictions have been realized. The UN has become a new area for contacts lifting the Korean question to the highest international level. But UN admission has also created a new channel for North Korea to challenge the global community by repeatedly conducting missile and nuclear tests condemned by the Security Council that otherwise would not have existed. The repeated tests indicate that the leaders know that there are no ways for the UN to enforce decisions and no mechanisms to compel states to comply with decisions in the area of international peace and security making them determined to continue conducting tests. The two Koreas have not accomplished peaceful coexistence but continuously maintained tense relations. Since peaceful coexistence implies coexistence rather than interaction creating working relations, a peace regime remains a distant goal. Developments in 2016 make it hard to ­predict changes of the current situation. In contrast to the optimistic predictions of UN admission on inter-Korean relations, the common opinion among experts that membership would not mean that the UN could prepare some ­special guarantees or security provisions for the Korean question matches the account far better. On the basis of hindsight, it might be asked: If the UN could have prepared special guarantees or security provisions, would the North Korean nuclear issue have arisen? Clearly, there have been limits to what the UN could do in the Korean question. Relations have continued to be determined by the two Korean governments’ policies. In spite of accepting to observe the UN Charter, both Koreas have violated its Chapter I: Purposes and Principles, Article 2(3): “All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means” and Article 2(4): “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state” through the 1999 and 2002 sea battles. North Korea also violated the Charter through the April 1996 intrusion in the DMZ, the September 1996 submarine incident, the November 2009 shooting at Yônp’yông

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Island and its alleged sinking of the ROK navy ship Cheonan in March 2010. Considering repeated violations, condemnations by the Security Council of the incidents in 1996 did not help to ­prevent recurrence of such incidents. North Korea’s missile tests conducted in 1998, 2006, 2009, 2012(2), and 2016 and the nuclear tests made in 2006, 2009, 2013, and 2016 were all met by condemnatory resolutions from the Security Council in order to prevent further tests but without success. Due to the impact of geopolitics on world politics, the five permanent Security Council members having conducted almost all nuclear tests from 1945 to 2006 have in violation of the UN Charter’s principle that all member states have sovereign equality only criticized North Korea for its nuclear tests. In 1998, no resolution was adopted against the tests conducted by India and Pakistan. Such a contradictory behavior has made Pyongyang upset. As long as the DPRK perceives that there is a threat from the United States, the North Korean nuclear issue will remain unresolved. The nuclear issue clearly ­mirrors realists’ perceptions of the central importance of power in international relations. Sanctions imposed by the Security Council five times have not accomplished their targets, the ultimate being denuclearization. North Korea has successfully escaped them and there is no perfect sanctions regime. The criteria for sanctions to succeed such as wavering support for the government prior to the imposition of sanctions have not matched with realities in the world’s most isolated state. Another reason is that the society is designed in a way, which makes it very resistant to pressure from abroad. Also China’s pro-DPRK policies that the UN has had no enforcement mechanisms to prevent have helped Pyongyang withstand sanctions. Notably, Chinese– North Korea trade more than trebled from 2006 to 2011. Such a situation confirms that the UN can only become what its member states want it to become. Few member states have reported on the implementation of sanctions. However, since UN sanctions have made it more difficult for North Korea to pursue its nuclear and ­missile programs, they cannot just be dismissed as a failure. There are no cases reported where the general population suffered from the effects of sanctions.

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Whereas the UN has shown its limits to deal with the Korean question, the mutual wish to maintain peace is the most positive characteristic of relations remaining from the pre-1991 period. Such a situation became clear when there was risk of war during the 1993–1994 North Korean nuclear crisis. Tensions caused by North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests have not led to military incidents. Through the resolution unanimously adopted by the Security Council in October 1996 stating that the Armistice Agreement should remain in force until it is replaced by a special peace mechanism the UN indicated its wish that peace should be maintained. Equally important, the General Assembly resolutions adopted on October 31, 2000 and on October 31, 2007 on peace, security, and reunification of the Korean peninsula welcomed the inter-Korean summits and the joint declarations then adopted. In addition, in the case of an acute change of the situation in North Korea and on the Korean peninsula, it is assumed that help can be received from the UN to make it stable. Fourth, since the UN has worked to exert pressure on North Korea in the field of human rights, the General Assembly has adopted condemnatory but nonbinding resolutions annually since 2005. More significantly, the UN Commission of Inquiry (UNCOI) published in 2014 the most comprehensive study on the issue to have been made so far. The UNCOI’s work transformed the global community’s position on the North Korean human rights issue from one of observation to one calling for accountability, but there is no evidence that the DPRK has taken steps to ameliorate its human rights record or will do so. One success of South Korea’s second term in the Security Council was that the Council for the first time adopted the state of human rights in North Korea as an issue on its agenda due to the opinion that its human rights violations can have a significant impact on world peace and security. As a sensitive issue, UN membership has helped South Korea to raise North Korean human rights through a channel that it would not have had otherwise. Fifth, since UN admission meant responsibility to make greater contributions to activities such as participating in peacekeeping

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operations (PKOs), by participating in 16 UN missions in 15 countries and two multinational stability operations since 1993, South Korea has raised its international position. It is the only standard of evaluation related to the pre-1991 period owing to the “pay-back” syndrome referring to the perception of indebtedness to the UN for its involvement in post-Korean War reconstruction. Through participation in PKOs, South Korean troops have not only contributed to maintaining world peace but also elevated their military skills. An intangible benefit is that South Korea’s worldwide image has improved. In brief, participation in PKOs has made a tangible contribution to national interests. Although troop dispatches have been slow, limited in terms of number of troops and shown qualitative deficiencies, accomplishments in this area have contributed to enhance South Korea’s soft power in a way that would not have existed otherwise. Sixth, since Korean citizens could hold positions in important UN bodies the presidency of the 56th UN General Assembly through Foreign Minister Han Seung-soo from September 2001 to September 2002 was a watershed in its diplomatic history. Han played an important role in the global response to the September 11 terrorist attacks. The unanimous election by the General Assembly on October 13, 2006 of Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon as the eighth SecretaryGeneral of the UN was a momentous achievement in the history of South Korean diplomacy significantly raising the country’s global position. His first term in office enabled South Korea to elevate soft power as well as political and diplomatic leadership. Together with nonpermanent membership of the Security Council during 1996–1997 and 2013–2014, the two appointments are South Korea’s major achievements in the UN since it became member in 1991. Although opinions on Ban Ki-moon’s work differ, the positive impact on South Korea’s image cannot be denied. Seventh, since it was predicted that South Korea could raise its international position through financial contributions to the UN budget, it is significant that when the assessed contribution ratio for the first time passed one percent in 2000 the country became number 16 among 189 member states. South Korea has since remained a main contributor.

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The standards of evaluation support the assessment by Park Heung-Soon (2012) that the UN has as a place to pursue international and multilateral diplomacy become important in foreign policy and that South Korea has firmly secured its position as a middle power in the global community. Although the identification of middle powers is contested, at least in terms of capability, South Korea has considering the major achievements since 1991 acted as one in line with the argument by Kenneth Organski that middle powers can exert a certain degree of influence on international affairs. The United States’ wishes to involve South Korea in PKOs indicate that it has regarded the country as a middle power. South Korea’s major achievements in the UN and participation in PKOs support Martin Wight’s claims that middle powers have a certain degree of military power, resources, and strategic position. South Korea’s emergence as a middle power has been enhanced by its economic rise. The evaluation by Yi Sô-hang (2013) that UN admission has (a) meant the establishment of a normal relationship with the global community, (b) created an opportunity and channel to act in current international issues widening the horizon of diplomacy, (c) served as an opportunity for multilateral diplomacy raising South Korea’s international position, and (d) made the UN a place for inter-Korean contacts and dialogue also concurs with the account. Both Park and Yi add elevation of diplomatic skills and pursuit of soft power as outcomes of membership but to what extent could be asked since the UN is not the only channel in these respects. Yi adds that South Korea by transferring its development experiences to less developed countries has actively participated in development work that, along with maintaining peace and security and promoting human rights, is the core UN task. To have become an aid donor provides credibility to South Korea’s claim to be a bridge between the developed and the developing countries, which is a central feature of its middle power identity and global strategy. South Korea has clearly benefitted substantially from UN membership since 1991. The main deviation is that developments in inter-Korean relations have not corresponded with the optimistic

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predictions showing that wishful thinking was involved. The common opinion that joint UN membership would not immediately contribute to an improvement of relations has turned out to be far more accurate. Since the core responsibility in the Korean question lies on the two Korean governments, it remains unrealistic to predict that the UN can play a constructive role unless a new state of relations would develop. The UN has shown its limitations in dealing with particularly the North Korean nuclear and missile issue but also with the human rights issue. Such a situation somewhat reduces the significance of admission but could be regarded as inevitable owing to the UN’s lack of enforcement mechanisms as well as the impact of geopolitics on the nuclear issue. By adding the most significant pre-1991 contacts identified in terms of (a) the UN General Assembly resolution in 1947 to hold elections, (b) the holding of elections in 1948 that led to the establishment of the ROK government, (c) the UN intervention to defend South Korea during the Korean War, (d) the important role of the UN Command (UNC) to maintain peace since 1953 onward, and (e) the assistance of the UN to postwar reconstruction and its concurrent transfer of expertise, the great significance of the UN to the country becomes even more obvious. In addition, that South Korea, since 1949, had maintained observer status at the UN and in 1990 was member of 21 of the 25 specialized UN agencies mean that the accumulated experiences to base work on when joining the UN in 1991 should have been beneficial. Without UN assistance and membership, South Korea would not have become the country it is today.

5.2  The Significance of Being UN Member The definition of globalization as an “historical process, which transforms the spatial organization of social relations and transactions, generating transcontinental and interregional networks of interaction and the exercise of power” fits well with the foundation of the UN in 1945 and its central role for multilateral diplomacy. Without being member of the UN, it is impossible to benefit from the opportunities

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such a characteristic creates. Applying the definitions of global governance on the role of the UN confirms both the organization’s possibilities and limits. One definition is “those procedures and practices that exist at the world or regional level for the management of political, economic and social affairs.” Another similar one is: The sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken. It includes formal…as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest.

A third definition is: “It is the multi-level collection of governancerelated activities, rules and mechanisms, formal and informal, public and private, existing in the world today.” Regarding the possibilities, the UN can assume a role as a ­supranational organization to work with global issues that require joint efforts to resolve. By participating in the Security Council during 1996–1997, South Korea played an important role with regard to North Korea in 1996 and was successful as a mediator in achieving consensus on how to react regarding the situation in Cambodia in July 1997 as well as on inspections in Iraq between the Council’s five permanent members and the nonallied members. South Korea was the Council Chairman in February 2013 and thereby played the leading role in the UN response to North Korea’s third nuclear test by meeting with all Council members and leading the decisionmaking processes. Under the label “Protection of Civilians during Military Conflicts,” by opening public debate in the Council and issuing a press statement, South Korea contributed to reconfirm the Council’s core responsibility in this field. Also through Han SeungSoo holding the presidency of the General Assembly from 2001 to 2002 and Ban Ki-moon serving as Secretary-General since 2007, South Korea has exerted influence on global issues requiring joint efforts to resolve. Through participation in UN agencies and PKOs, contributions have been made to the organization’s work that could not have been provided prior to 1991.

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On the other hand, a severe obstacle in implementing its work is that the UN can only become what its member states want it to become. In the case of sanctions imposed on North Korea, China’s wish to pursue its national interest to maintain stability in North Korea has been more important than to implement sanctions it helped to adopt undermining their impact. Inequality in the UN framework through the permanent membership and veto power of five countries in the Security Council in combination with the impact of geopolitics explain the glaring contradiction to oneself possessing nuclear weapons and only criticizing the DPRK for conducting nuclear tests. Such a situation mirrors realists’ perception of the central importance of power in international relations. The study confirms that realists’ opinion that “Since IGOs cannot change the nature of human beings as striving for power, they are of little help in challenging this perpetual struggle” is relevant to explain how the Security Council works but there is less reason to believe that this is the case with other agencies. The North Korean nuclear issue confirms that it is virtually impossible to ensure compliance with global governance. Applying double standards through violation of the principle of sovereign equality by only criticizing North Korea for conducting repeated nuclear tests has not only made it more difficult to ensure compliance but has also contributed to make Pyongyang becoming more determined to pursue its nuclear program. China’s resistance toward referring the DPRK to the International Criminal Court (ICC) means that it is difficult for the UN to act also on the North Korean human rights issue. Consequently, it is only natural that one of the key criticisms of global governance derives from the lack of institutions suitable to enforce compliance with international agreements. Yet, if such institutions existed, they would be incompatible with the UN Charter, Chapter I: Purposes and Principles, Article 2(7) stating “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state,” making it extremely difficult to enforce compliance. It is unrealistic to expect that goodwill is enough for any country to follow a UN decision it resists.

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As the most important IGO, the UN should for South Korea have been instrumental to help it form stable habits of cooperation through regular meetings, information gathering and analysis, dispute settlement, and operational activities with question marks only for dispute settlement owing to tense inter-Korean relations. The UN should have affected South Korea by its ability to (a) set international and national agendas, (b) force the government to take position on issues, (c) allow for the centralization of collective activities through a concrete and stable organizational structure and a supportive administrative apparatus raising the efficiency of collective activities, and (d) enhance the organization’s ability to affect the understandings, environment, and interests of states. The first three points, in particular, should have been apparent, especially during the periods of Security Council membership during 1996–1997 and 2013–2014. Undoubtedly, South Korea has benefitted substantially from one of the UN’s main functions to provide needed expertise or intelligence and physical and human resources through its specialized agencies to member states both before and after 1991. UN support to postwar rehabilitation and reconstruction from 1950 to 1957 contributed greatly to the postwar recovery. With regard to the post-1991 period, a less tangible learning effect is that diplomatic skills have been diversified and qualitatively improved and that manpower has become professionalized, although the UN is not the only channel in this respect. The significance of those opportunities becomes even more apparent if considering the case of Taiwan, which cannot participate in international conferences hampering first-hand acquirement of scientific knowledge etc. available to member states. In spite of the obvious benefits IGOs create, opinions on their usefulness differ. The opinion that “realists believe states would never cede to supra-national institutions the strong enforcement capacities necessary to overcome international anarchy” concurs with China’s noncompliance with UN sanctions on North Korea. On the other hand, since the UN is a complex system with many pieces by acting through the UN framework legitimacy for decisions requiring strong enforcement capacities such as Security Council resolutions can be

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secured. Realists’ view of the anarchical structure of the international system does not match with the UN being the only IGO with global scope and an agenda encompassing the broadest range of governance issues, creating an extensive framework for global cooperation. At the same time, the notion that “IGOs are of little interest since they merely reflect national interests and power and do not constrain powerful states” cannot be dismissed due to the inequality in the UN system manifested by the veto power of the Security Council’s five permanent members and the lack of enforcement mechanisms in global governance. Although the ideals and realities of the UN differ, South Korea’s repeated membership applications confirm that the advantages of being member far outweigh the disadvantages. That the main diplomatic target of the ROK government in 1948 was to, as a newly founded state, receive international recognition, by entering the UN secure legitimacy and its position as the only legal Korean ­government in the global community, and, finally, acquire support from the UN for peaceful reunification confirms the relevance of the opinion “Since the UN is based on the membership principle of universality, full membership in the world organization is a key ­indicator of international status.” The disadvantages for Taiwan by not being UN member disabling the country to make its voice heard within the UN system also provides support for this notion. The impact of power politics in accordance with realists’ view is apparent from the People Republic of China’s one-China policy that disables Taiwan to regain UN membership lost in 1971. Liberals’ opinion that cooperation is possible and will expand over time since the international system is a context within which (a) multiple interactions occur and (b) where the actors “learn” from their interactions, rather than a structure of relationships based on the distribution of power among states and a fixed concept of state sovereignty, concurs with South Korea’s participation in UN agencies and UNPKOs through which expertise and skills have been acquired. Regarding liberals’ view that in the international system actors adhere to common norms, consent to common rules and institutions and recognize common interests, data on South Korea’s

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participation in UN agencies and UNPKOs support such a view. In contrast, power politics within the Security Council make it far more difficult for the Council to observe these characteristics. South Korea’s participation in UN agencies and PKOs supports liberals’ view of IGOs as arenas where states interact and cooperate to solve common problems. Participation shows that the functional characteristic of IGOs in terms of independence meaning “…the ability to act with a degree of autonomy within defined spheres. It often entails the capacity to operate as a neutral in managing interstates disputes and conflicts” is relevant in these two cases. This study confirms neoliberal institutionalists’ opinion that since cooperation through IGOs is completely rational international politics is distinguished by interest constellations in which states have a common interest in reaping joint gains or avoiding joint losses by cooperating with each other. Otherwise, there would not have been compelling reasons for South Korea to become board member of numerous UN agencies and to join new ones. Although not always the case, there should be no doubt that international institutions are an efficient solution to problems of coordination by providing information that aids decision making and reduces transaction costs to achieve agreement among many states. In other words, states benefit because institutions do things for members that cannot be accomplished unilaterally. Altogether, to be a UN member is doubtless of crucial importance for a country’s global position. The opinion of Sung-Hack Kang (2002) that “South Korea was regarded as something of a second-class nation lacking full membership in the international community during the years when it was not UN member” implies that the country had a weak position in world politics. Although limits deriving from membership have been identified, the post1991 experiences show a sharp contrast. Nonetheless, reservations have to be expressed regarding to what extent South Korea in reality has been able to make its voice heard, considering the impact of power politics in the Security Council. In addition, few data on the specific contributions through work in UN agencies and Koreans holding high posts within the UN system were identified.

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Anyhow, the significance of being a UN member for South Korea cannot be overvalued. Although the case of Taiwan not being UN member is different since the island also lacks observer status and is only member of a few international organizations, South Korea shared one of the disadvantages of not being UN member prior to 1991 by being unable to make its voice heard within the UN system. The end of the Cold War opened a new era for South Korea’s global contacts, which have significantly expanded afterward. During the past 25 years, South Korea has acquired previously unavailable experiences of immense importance for its global status. Such a firmly established pattern will not only persist but will be further strengthened.

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b2530   International Strategic Relations and China’s National Security: World at the Crossroads

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Appendix I

Chronology 1945

The UN is founded and has 51 members. The number increased to 193 in 2013.

1947 November 14

The UN General Assembly adopts resolution 112(II) calling for elections to be held in Korea.

1948

Only South Korea is allowed to participate in the UN debate on the Korean question.

May 10

UN-supervised elections are held in ­southern Korea.

August 15

The Republic of Korea (ROK) government is established. The ROK advocates its ­unilateral admission into the UN.

September 9

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is established. The DPRK ­advocates its unilateral admission into the UN.

December

South Korea initiates its UN diplomacy by dispatching a delegation to the third General Assembly. The delegation calls for the UN to accept South Korea as a member. 217

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December 12

The UN General Assembly declares in ­resolution 195(III) the Republic of Korea to be the only lawful Korean government.

1949

South Korea becomes member of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the Universal Postal Union (UPU), and the World Health Organization (WHO). South Korea establishes a UN observer ­mission in New York.

January 19

South Korea applies for UN membership but the Soviet Union exercises its veto in the Security Council on March 9.

February 9

North Korea applies for UN membership but entry is rejected.

April 8

Taiwan presents a resolution demanding UN membership for South Korea. The Soviet Union vetoes it in the Security Council.

September

At the fourth General Assembly, the South Korean delegation again calls for the UN to accept the ROK as member.

October 31

Australia presents a proposal urging the Security Council to reexamine admission of South Korea. Due to the veto of the Soviet Union the issue is not raised at the Security Council.

1950 June 14

South Korea becomes member of the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

June 25

North Korea invades South Korea. The UN Security Council adopts resolution 82  demanding an end of hostilities.

June 27

The UN Security Council adopts resolution 83 recommending UN member states to assist South Korea.

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Appendix I  219

July 7

The UN Security Council adopts resolution 84 to integrate the UN combat units into one organization to maximize combat strength.

July 24

The UN Command (UNC) is established.

September

South Korea receives observer status in the UN.

October 7

The UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) is founded by the UN General Assembly.

November 3

The UN General Assembly adopts the Uniting for Peace resolution 377(V) ­proposed by the United States.

December 1

The UN General Assembly adopts r­ esolution 498(V) calling for the cessation of hostile acts and withdrawal from South Korea.

1951 December 22

South Korea applies for UN membership but it is not processed.

1952

South Korea becomes member of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).

January 2

North Korea applies for UN membership but entry is rejected.

1953 July 27

The Korean War ends with an Armistice Agreement.

August 28

The UN General Assembly adopts r­ esolution 711 to implement the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 60, to hold a political conference on the Korean question and recommends all the countries that had dispatched troops to the UNC to ­participate. The Assembly also adopts ­resolution 712 expressing respect for the soldiers who had participated in the war and condolences to the dead s­ oldiers.

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1954

South Korea becomes member of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP).

April 26–June 15

The Geneva Conference fails to resolve the Korean issue.

November 11

The United States and Argentina suggest UN membership for South Korea and Vietnam but the General Assembly does not vote on the issue.

December 11

In accordance with the General Assembly resolution 811, responsibility for the Korean question is automatically passed to the UN.

1955

South Korea becomes member of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

December 7

Cuba presents a revised version of recommended membership for South Korea but withdraws it.

December 8

The UN General Assembly resolution 918(IX) admits 18 countries that were not involved in problems of unification.

December 10

There is no vote on the recommendation by Taiwan for South Korean UN ­membership.

December 13

The Soviet Union vetoes in the UN Security Council the revised proposal on “Admission of New Members” submitted by Taiwan.

1956

South Korea becomes member of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO).

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1957

South Korea becomes member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the UN World Tourism Organization (UNWTO).

January 22

Thirteen countries submit a resolution to the UN General Assembly requesting it to call on the Security Council to debate the question of UN membership for South Korea and South Vietnam.

January 24

The Soviet Union presents in a countermove to the January 22 proposal a resolution to the General Assembly calling for the Security Council to recommend admission of both North and South Korea plus North and South Vietnam into the UN but it is rejected on January 30.

September 6

The United States proposes UN membership for South Korea but the Soviet Union exercises its veto in the Security Council.

September 9

The Soviet Union proposes joint UN ­admission of North and South Korea but the proposal is rejected in the Security Council.

1958 December 9

The American proposal for South Korea’s admission into the UN is vetoed by the Soviet Union. The Soviet proposal for admission of both Koreas into the UN is vetoed by the United States. North Korea supports the Soviet proposal. The United States opposes the two Koreas’ simultaneous admission by arguing that it would help perpetuate division.

b2659_Appendix-I.indd 221

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b2659  South Korea in the United Nations

222  South Korea in the United Nations

1961

South Korea becomes member of the International Development Association (IDA). North Korea rejects the invitation to ­participate in the UN General Assembly’s annual debate on the Korean question.

April 21

South Korea applies for reconsideration of separate membership but no favorable action is taken by the Security Council.

1962

South Korea becomes member of the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

1964

South Korea becomes member of the International Finance Corporation (IFC).

1965

South Korea becomes member of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

1967

South Korea becomes member of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).

1968–1970

The UN General Assembly adopts pro-Seoul resolutions.

1971–1972

The UN General Assembly postpones ­consideration of the Korean question.

1973

North Korea becomes member of the UNCTAD. North Korea participates for the first time in the UN General Assembly debate on the Korean question.

May 5

North Korea is admitted into the InterParliamentary Union (IPU).

b2659_Appendix-I.indd 222

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b2659  South Korea in the United Nations

Appendix I  223

May 17

North Korea is admitted into the WHO.

June 1

North Korea establishes a permanent UN observer mission in Geneva.

June 23

South Korea is in the “Declaration for Peace and Unification” for the first time willing to accept North Korea’s entry into the UN but the DPRK rejects the proposal the same day by arguing that separate membership would perpetuate division.

June 29

North Korea establishes a permanent UN observer mission in New York.

July

UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim approves North Korea’s application for observer status at the UN.

August 15

President Park Chung Hee proposes to North Korea simultaneous admission into the UN but Pyongyang rejects the p ­ roposal.

October 20

North Korea through a memorandum directed to the UN General Assembly’s Political Committee enumerates five reasons for opposing joint UN admission for the two Koreas.

November 14

Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lee YongMok, makes North Korea’s maiden speech in the UN and repeats opposition to South Korea’s proposal for separate UN ­membership.

November 28

A “consensus statement” on the Korean question is adopted by the First (Political and Security Affairs) Committee and the General Assembly to avoid confrontation. The UNCURK is dissolved.

b2659_Appendix-I.indd 223

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b2659  South Korea in the United Nations

224  South Korea in the United Nations

1974

North Korea becomes member of the IAEA, UNESCO, UPU, and World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). The UN General Assembly only adopts a pro-Seoul resolution.

1975

North Korea becomes member of the ITU.

July 29

South Korea applies for UN membership but the Soviet Union exercises its veto in the Security Council.

September 21

South Korea requests reconsideration of its membership application. The Security Council rejects the proposal.

November 17

The UN General Assembly ratifies both a pro-DPRK and a pro-ROK resolution adopted by the First Committee on October 30.

1976

The annual UN debates on the Korean question come to an end.

August 18

The axe-killing of two American soldiers occurs in Panmunjom.

1977

North Korea becomes member of the ICAO.

1978

South Korea becomes member of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD).

1979

South Korea becomes member of the WIPO.

1980

North Korea becomes member of the UNIDO. North Korea proposes the establishment of the Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo (DCRK), which would enter the UN as a single member.

b2659_Appendix-I.indd 224

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b2659  South Korea in the United Nations

Appendix I  225

1983 September 12

The Soviet Union vetoes in the Security Council a resolution requesting the UN Secretary-General and the ICAO to investigate the shooting down by a Soviet fighter plane on September 1 over Sakhalin Island of Korean Air Line Flight 007 and to write a report on the incident.

December 6–7

Following North Korea’s assassination attempt on President Chun Doo Hwan in Rangoon on October 9, 45 countries, including South Korea, denounce in the UN General Assembly’s Sixth Committee the incident and requests a joint response from the world opinion.

1985 October 21

In the UN General Assembly, Prime Minister Lho Shin-yong reaffirms South Korea’s position on UN membership.

1986

North Korea becomes member of the IFAD and the IMO.

1987

North Korea becomes member of the UNWTO.

August 18

The Security Council document S/19054 on why South Korea should become UN member is distributed among Council member countries to change their ­opinions.

1987–2003

South Korea is board member of the UNESCO without holding any leading posts.

1988

South Korea becomes member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The Seoul Summer Olympics are held. South Korea launches the “northern policy” toward Communist countries.

b2659_Appendix-I.indd 225

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b2659  South Korea in the United Nations

226  South Korea in the United Nations

February 16–17

Following the explosion on November 29, 1987 of Korean Air Lines Flight 858 in the Indian Ocean killing all 115 passengers that two North Korean agents were behind, the UN Security Council meets but no proposal for a resolution is reached. North Korea’s terrorism is condemned worldwide.

July 7

President Roh Tae Woo launches the July 7 Declaration calling for improved relations with North Korea and Communist ­countries.

October 18

President Roh holds as the first South Korean president a speech in the UN General Assembly reemphasizing the peace policy to achieve peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula and suggesting six-party peace talks embracing North and South Korea, the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan, a declaration of nonaggression, disarmament, and the replacement of the armistice agreement with a peace agreement.

1989

In the UN General Assembly, 48 states express support for South Korean ­membership.

September– November

South Korea distributes its basic position about UN admission to the member states.

1990

North and South Korea are full members of nearly all specialized agencies of the UN. In the UN General Assembly, 71 states express support for South Korean membership compared to 48 in 1989. No state speaks in favor of North Korea’s plan for the joint entry of the two Koreas to have a combined seat in the UN.

b2659_Appendix-I.indd 226

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b2659  South Korea in the United Nations

Appendix I  227

May 30

North Korea suggests a new formula for UN membership in which the two Koreas pending reunification should share a single seat in the UN on an alternating basis.

September 30

South Korea establishes diplomatic ­relations with the Soviet Union after having been recognized by Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Mongolia.

October 3

North Korea distributes a letter as a Security Council document. It states that the proposal for a joint seat was not a final proposal, proposals consistent with unification would not be excluded and if reaching agreement with South Korea it would show flexibility.

1990–1991

South Korea reportedly gives $500 million for the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War.

1991

South Korea becomes member of the International Labour Organization (ILO). South Korea becomes board member of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). A 600-member South Korean medical corps is dispatched to support the multinational force that implements the Security Council resolution on the Iraq–Kuwait War.

Spring

China indicates its intention not to veto South Korea’s application for UN ­membership.

March 8

South Korean Foreign Minister Lee Sangock expresses his hope for UN admission of the two Koreas during the year.

April–May

South Korea dispatches delegations to 37 countries to secure their support for its UN membership application.

b2659_Appendix-I.indd 227

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b2659  South Korea in the United Nations

228  South Korea in the United Nations

April 5

The South Korean government writes a memorandum on accomplishing UN ­membership during 1991. It is distributed on April 8 among Security Council member states to acquire their support.

April 19

President Roh announces at the General Meeting of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) that South Korea should become UN ­member.

April 20

At the South Korean–Soviet summit meeting held on Cheju Island, the Soviet Union declares its intention to support South Korea’s bid for UN membership.

May

South Korea states that it would go ahead with its membership application even if North Korea adhered to seeking a ­combined seat for the two Koreas to be chaired in rotation.

May 3–6

Chinese Premier Li Peng declares during his visit to Pyongyang that China would not veto South Korea’s UN membership bid.

May 27

North Korea’s Foreign Ministry announces officially that it would seek separate UN membership along with South Korea.

July 8

Pyongyang submits a formal application for UN membership.

August 6

Seoul submits a formal application for UN membership.

August 8

The UN Security Council resolution 702 unanimously adopts the two Koreas’ ­membership applications.

b2659_Appendix-I.indd 228

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Appendix I  229

September 17

North and South Korea simultaneously join the UN.

December 13

North and South Korea sign the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation.

December 31

North and South Korea sign the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The two documents are ratified in February 1992.

1991–1993

South Korea is board member of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the IAEA and the Common Fund for Commodities (CFC).

1991–1994

South Korea is board member of the FAO and the Afro-Asian Rural Reconstruction Organization (AARRO).

1991–1995

South Korea is board member the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).

1992

North Korea becomes member of the ESCAP. South Korea becomes board member of the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT). During the 47th session of the UN General Assembly, South Korea is elected and plays the role of Vice-Chairman in the First Committee of the General Assembly. The IAEA makes three general ­inspections of North Korea’s nuclear ­facilities causing worries on its nuclear development.

b2659_Appendix-I.indd 229

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b2659  South Korea in the United Nations

230  South Korea in the United Nations

February 1

The two Koreas’ Korean Ambassador meet in Geneva. They agree to hold one regular monthly meeting.

April 10

North Korea’s UN Ambassador Yi Ch’ôl ­supports South Korea’s proposal to ­cooperate on assuming a joint position on issues prior to the holding of international meetings.

April 29

The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) elects South Korea as board member of the UN Development Program (UNDP), the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), the UN Committee for Program and Coordination (UNCPC), and the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (UNCCPCJ) for two years and the UN Committee on Information (UNCI).

June

The South Korean delegate is elected one of the Vice-Chairman for the UN Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro.

August 26– September 3

At the Sixth UN Conference on the Standardization of Geographic Names, the two Koreas for the first time take a joint position in a UN agency by jointly suggesting renaming the East Sea.

1992–1993

South Korea is board member of the WIPO.

1992–1994

South Korea is board member of the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF).

1993

South Korea is Vice-Chairman of the ECOSOC and the UN Disarmament Commission.

b2659_Appendix-I.indd 230

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b2659  South Korea in the United Nations

Appendix I  231

February

The South Korean government makes a policy declaration to contribute more to the international community through the UN as a way to benefit the country. The government makes a policy announcement to reach the target on May 4.

May 11

The UN Security Council adopts resolution 825 calling upon the DPRK to reconsider its decision on March 12 to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). On May 12, the North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman condemns the UN action.

June 10

The IAEA passes a resolution that suspends its technical assistance to North Korea. The DPRK responds by announcing its withdrawal from the agency.

June 11

A settlement is reached between North Korea and the United States enabling the DPRK to remain in the NPT.

June 28–late July

At the ECOSOC board meeting North and South Korea cooperate by suggesting the name East Sea instead of the internationally widely accepted Sea of Japan.

July–March 1994

South Korea sends a military engineering unit of 252 members to Somalia to provide humanitarian assistance. The mission ends in February 1995.

December 24–26

UN Secretary-General Boutros BoutrosGhali and his entourage of nine UN personnel visit Pyongyang.

1993–1995

South Korea is board member of the ECOSOC.

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b2659  South Korea in the United Nations

232  South Korea in the United Nations

1993–2006

South Korea is board member of the UNCHR.

1993–2010

South Korea is board member of the UNCPC.

1994 September

A South Korean military medical team of 42 members begins to serve in Western Sahara to provide military service for the peacekeeping personnel. The service is extended in July 1995 but the team is reduced to 20 in 1996 because the UN scales down its presence in the territory. The mission ends in May 2006.

October

South Korea sends seven military officers to supervise cease-fires in Georgia.

October 21

North Korea and the United States sign the Agreed Framework in order to prevent the DPRK nuclear program.

November

Five South Korean officers are sent to the Jammu and Kashmir area.

1994–2014

South Korea is board member of the UN Commission on the Status of Women (UNCSW).

1995

South Korea becomes member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). South Korea had served on the governing bodies of ten UN subsidiary organs, nine specialized agencies and four other IGOs.

March

A South Korean major is assigned to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

May 19

Sri Lanka withdraws its candidacy for the nonpermanent seat for Asia making South Korea the sole Asian candidate.

b2659_Appendix-I.indd 232

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Appendix I  233

October

South Korea dispatches an engineering unit of 198 men to Angola. The mission ends in February 1997.

November 7

South Korea is elected nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council.

1996

North and South Korea become members of the Geneva Conference on Disarmaments (CD).

April 1997

Han Sung-Joo serves as Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the UN Mission in Cyprus.

April 5–7

Heavily armed North Korean troops enter the DMZ.

April 11

The UN Security Council President issues a press release statement criticizing North Korea’s attempt to scrap the Armistice Agreement.

September 18

The UN Security Council adopts a ­statement when an armed North Korean espionage submarine infiltrates the same day.

October

The UN Security Council unanimously adopts a resolution stating that the Armistice Agreement should remain in force until it is replaced by a special peace mechanism.

October 15

A formal Security Council presidential ­statement expresses serious concerns, calls for continued adherence to the Armistice Agreement, urges all to refrain from any act creating tensions and calls on the ­parties concerned to resolve the problem peacefully in order to strengthen peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.

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b2659  South Korea in the United Nations

234  South Korea in the United Nations

December 29

North Korea makes a formal apology for the submarine intrusion.

1996–1997

South Korea is nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council.

1997

In the General Assembly North Korea calls for a DPRK-United States peace treaty and withdrawal of the American troops from South Korea which claims that the real ­parties to solve the Korean issue are the two Koreas. The UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion of Human Rights adopts for the first time a North Korean Human Rights Resolution.

May

South Korea is Chairman of the UN Security Council.

1997–1999

South Korea is board member of the ECOSOC.

1998

President Kim Dae Jung launches the ­sunshine policy.

January 13–23

At the Seventh UN Conference on the Standardization of Geographical Names the two Koreas agree on the name East Sea but Japan still prefers Sea of Japan.

August 31

North Korea launches its first multistage missile. On September 14, the Security Council adopts with consensus a press ­statement expressing regret and appealing for self-restraint.

1998–2000

South Korea is board member of the UNDP.

1999 June 15

A North–South Korea sea battle takes place in the West Sea.

b2659_Appendix-I.indd 234

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Appendix I  235

October

419 infantry soldiers are dispatched to East Timor following the popular consultation turmoil. The mission ends in October 2003.

2000

South Korea’s assessed contribution ratio to the UN budget passes one percent. Kim Hack-Soo is appointed SecretaryGeneral of the ESCAP. It is the first time a Korean reaches such a position within the UN.

February

South Korea is elected board member of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The ROK serves until 2014 and is Chairman for 2013–2014.

April

South Korea is elected to the UNESCO’s Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return of Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its Restitution in Case of Illicit Appropriation (ICPRCP).

June 13–15

The first inter-Korean summit takes place in Pyongyang.

September

South Korea is elected board member of the WHO.

September 7

The General Assembly president adopts a statement welcoming the inter-Korean ­summit.

October 31

The General Assembly adopts without a vote Resolution 55/11 “Peace, security and reunification on the Korean peninsula.”

2001

Sohn Bongsook is Chairman of the UN East Timor Independent Election Management Committee ahead of the August 30 election.

September 2001– September 2002

South Korean Foreign Minister Han Seungsoo serves as president of the 56th General Assembly.

b2659_Appendix-I.indd 235

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b2659  South Korea in the United Nations

236  South Korea in the United Nations

2001–2003

South Korea is board member of the ECOSOC.

2002

South Korea is committee member of 14 UN organs.

January–December 2003

General Hwang Chin-ha is Commander of the UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus.

June 29

A second North-South Korea sea battle takes place in the West Sea.

February

60 South Korean medics set up a field ­hospital in Afghanistan. In 2003, an additional 150 engineers are dispatched. These units are withdrawn in December 2007.

October 17

North Korea admits that it had been engaged in developing a program of highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.

December

The United States cuts off its heavy fuel oil supplies to North Korea, which responds by reactivating its Yôngbyôn nuclear reactor, removing the monitoring devices of the IAEA and telling its inspectors to leave.

2003

The UNCHR adopts a resolution on North Korean human rights. Resolutions are adopted during 2004–2005 but South Korea abstains.

January 10

North Korea declares its withdrawal from the NPT. The DPRK formally withdraws from the process in April.

April

The first South Korean units are deployed to Iraq. In 2004, 3,600 men are dispatched. The mission ends in 2008.

b2659_Appendix-I.indd 236

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b2659  South Korea in the United Nations

Appendix I  237

August 27–29

The first round of six-party talks is held in Beijing.

2003–2006

Doctor Lee Jong-ok is Secretary-General of the WHO.

2004

The UNCHR appoints a Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in North Korea, which refuses to recognize the mandate or to extend cooperation to him.

February 25–28

The second round of six-party talks is held in Beijing.

June 23–26

The third round of six-party talks is held in Beijing.

September– December 2006

Two South Korean military observers are dispatched to supervise the armistice in Burundi.

2004–2006

South Korea is board member of the ECOSOC.

2005

South Korea acquires Chairmanship of the First Committee of the 60th General Assembly. South Korea had 41 participants in UNPKOs making it number 66 in troop contributions.

July 26–August 7

The fourth round of six-party talks is held in Beijing.

September 15

The United States Ministry of Finance imposes sanctions on North Korea’s account in Banco Delta Asia (BDA) due to its alleged money-laundering counterfeiting of American currency. The issue is solved in June 2007.

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238  South Korea in the United Nations

September 13–19

In the fourth round of six-party talks is held in Beijing an agreement is reached on September 19. North Korea will abandon its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear ­program, reenter the NPT talks and permit IAEA inspections of facilities. The United States undertakes not to conduct offensive operations against North Korea or stockpile nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula.

November 9–11

The fifth round of six-party talks is held in Beijing.

December 16

The General Assembly adopts its first ­resolution “Situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” Resolutions are subsequently adopted every year. South Korea abstained, as in 2007, but was supportive in 2006 and from 2008–2013.

2006

South Korea holds Chairmanship in the three highest bodies of disarmaments of the UN: the First Committee of the 60th UN General Assembly, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD), and the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC).

March 15

The UNCHR is replaced by the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) that from 2008 to 2013 annually adopts resolutions on the North Korean human rights issue ­supported by South Korea.

May

South Korea is number 67 in troops ­dispatched to UNPKOs.

b2659_Appendix-I.indd 238

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b2659  South Korea in the United Nations

Appendix I  239

May 9

South Korea is elected board member of the UNHRC.

July 4

North Korea launches seven missiles in the East Sea.

July 15

The UN Security Council unanimously adopts resolution 1695 to condemn North Korea’s missile launches on July 4.

October 9

North Korea conducts a nuclear test.

October 13

South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon is elected eighth Secretary-General of the UN by the General Assembly.

October 14

The UN Security Council unanimously adopts resolution 1718 following the October 9 North Korean underground nuclear test. The resolution expresses the gravest ­concern and includes strong legal measures against North Korea.

October 17

The North Korean Foreign Ministry criticizes the UN sanctions as a “declaration of war under the US scenario.”

December 18–22

The fifth round of the six-party talks is held in Beijing.

2007

South Korea becomes member of the UN Economic Commission on Central and South America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). South Korea is reelected board member of the UNESCO. South Korea’s assessed contribution ratio to the UN budget passes two percent.

b2659_Appendix-I.indd 239

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b2659  South Korea in the United Nations

240  South Korea in the United Nations

February 8–13

The fifth round of the six-party talks is held in Beijing. In the February 13 agreement, the parties agree to denuclearize the Korean peninsula, to normalize relations between North Korea and the United States and Japan, to cooperate on economic and energy issues and to work for peace and security in Northeast Asia.

July

South Korea sends its first contingent to Lebanon with a deployment of 360 ­people.

October 2–4

The second inter-Korean summit is held in Pyongyang.

October 31

The General Assembly adopts unanimously Resolution 62/5 “Peace, security and ­reunification on the Korean peninsula.”

2008

The UNC is the longest peace enforcement coalition in UN history.

February

President Lee Myung-bak replaces his ­predecessors’ policy of engagement with a “give-and-take” approach.

2008–2009

South Korea is Vice-Chairman of the ECOSOC.

2008–2010

South Korea is board member of the ECOSOC and the UNDP.

2009 April 5

North Korea launches a rocket.

April 13

The UN Security Council adopts a presidential statement that condemns the April 5 rocket launch and demands that North Korea refrain from any further ­ballistic missile tests. The launch takes place in violation of resolution 1718.

b2659_Appendix-I.indd 240

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Appendix I  241

May 25

North Korea conducts a second nuclear test.

June 12

The UN Security Council condemns the May 25 nuclear test as “a clear violation” of resolution 1718. The Council unanimously approves resolution 1874 that calls for an overall arms embargo against North Korea, except for light weapons or small arms. On June 13, North Korea denounces the resolution.

October

South Korea participates with 400 ­uniformed participants in 10 UN missions making it the 39th largest contributor.

November 11

The Panel of Experts reports that also after the Security Council had implemented ­resolution 1874, North Korea continues to through false manoeuvres escape UN ­sanctions.

December 11

A shipment of arms made in the DPRK reportedly worth some $18 million is seized in an aircraft in Bangkok.

December 29

South Korea enacts the Law on Participation in the UNPKOs that takes effect in April 2010.

2009–2010

South Korea is member of the UN Peacebuilding Commission and works in 2009 as Vice-Chairman.

2010 February

South Korean dispatches a 240-man ­engineering unit to Haiti.

March 26

North Korea allegedly sinks the ROK navy ship Cheonan in the West Sea. Among the 104-man crew, 46 are killed.

b2659_Appendix-I.indd 241

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242  South Korea in the United Nations

May

The UN Panel of Experts’ report states that the DPRK had circumvented measures in resolution 1874 (2009).

July 9

The UN Security Council adopts a presidential statement deploring the March 26 attack without explicitly pointing out North Korea as responsible.

2011 June 21

Ban Ki-moon is reelected Secretary-General of the UN.

2011–2013

South Korea is board member of the ECOSOC and the UNCPC.

2011–2015

South Korea is board member of the UNESCO.

2012

South Korea had dispatched more than 9,800 men to UNPKOs and 29,000 men to six multinational stability operations. South Korea was number 12 in financial contributions to UNPKOs with a share of 1.99 percent.

April 13

North Korea launches a long-distance ­ballistic rocket. The UN Security Council condemns the test that is regarded as a ­violation of resolutions 1718 and 1874 and urges North Korea to observe the ­resolutions.

April 16

The Security Council unanimously adopts a Chairman’s statement that condemns the April 13 rocket test.

June

A ROK Army General is made head of the UN mission for India and Pakistan. It is the third time a Korean general holds that post.

July

644 South Korean peacekeepers serve in UN missions making it number 31 among 109 troop contributors.

b2659_Appendix-I.indd 242

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b2659  South Korea in the United Nations

Appendix I  243

October 18

South Korea is for the second time elected nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council.

December

South Korea is member of 25 affiliated, ­specialist and independent international agencies compared to 15 for North Korea.

December 12

North Korea launches a ballistic missile.

2012–2014

South Korea is board member of the UNDP.

2013

South Korea dispatches a group of 275 peacekeepers to South Sudan. South Korea takes part in eight of 15 UNPKOs with 599 troops and 16 military observers and advisers. The ROK is number 34 among countries dispatching troops.

January 22

The Security Council adopts resolution 2087 condemning the December 12 North Korean missile test.

February

South Korea is Chairman of the UN Security Council and holds 13 meetings and 13 consultations. Three resolutions, two presidential statements and three press statements are adopted.

February 12

North Korea conducts its third ­underground nuclear test that is ­condemned by a Security Council press statement. South Korea organizes a high-level ­public debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts in the Security Council.

March 7

The Security Council adopts resolution 2094 condemning North Korea’s nuclear test. An end of the nuclear program is urged.

b2659_Appendix-I.indd 243

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244  South Korea in the United Nations

May

The UN Panel of Experts claims that the imposition of sanctions had not halted North Korea’s development of nuclear and ballistic missile programs but it had delayed the timetable.

July

Panama stops and inspects a DPRK-owned and -flagged general cargo vessel whose route was from Cuba to North Korea. The UN Panel of Experts concludes that the shipment itself and the transaction between Cuba and the DPRK are sanctions ­violations.

2013–2014

South Korea is nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council.

2013–2015

South Korea is board member of the UNHRC. South Korea’s share of the UNPKO budget is 2.26 percent making it the 10th largest contributor.

2014

The total number of military personnel ­dispatched since 1993 exceeded 40,000.

January 14

UN Ambassador Oh Joon is elected Vice-Chairman of the ECOSOC.

February 17

The UNCOI on Human Rights in North Korea publishes its condemnatory report.

March

South Korea is with 630 personnel men in UNPKOs number 33 among countries ­dispatching troops.

May

South Korea is Chairman of the Security Council and holds 42 meetings. Five ­resolutions, four presidential statements, and 13 press statements are adopted.

b2659_Appendix-I.indd 244

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b2659  South Korea in the United Nations

Appendix I  245

November 18

The UN General Assembly Third Committee adopts a condemnatory resolution of large-scale human rights violation in North Korea. The General Assembly adopts the resolution on December 18.

December 22

The UN Security Council adopts for the first time human rights in North Korea as an issue on its agenda.

2014–2016

South Korea is board member of the ECOSOC and the UNCPC.

2015 February

The UN Panel of Experts claims that the DPRK in defiance of Security Council ­resolutions continues to strengthen its nuclear capability.

March

South Korea is with 630 personnel men in UNPKOs number 33 among countries ­dispatching troops.

June 23

A UN Human Rights Office on North Korea opens in Seoul causing protests from the DPRK.

July 24

Oh Joon is elected Chairman of the ECOSOC.

November 26

UN Rapporteur on North Korean human rights Marzuki Darusman says during his ­official visit to Seoul that “nothing has changed” since the COI report was launched.

December 17

The UN General Assembly adopts a ­resolution condemning North Korea’s human rights record.

2016 January 6

North Korea conducts its fourth nuclear test that is condemned by a UN Security Council press statement on January 7.

b2659_Appendix-I.indd 245

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b2659  South Korea in the United Nations

246  South Korea in the United Nations

February

The Panel of Experts state that UN ­sanctions had not prevented the DPRK from improving and expanding its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities.

February 7

North Korea makes a long-range rocket launch that is condemned by a UN Security Council press statement the same day.

March 2

The UN Security Council unanimously adopts resolution 2270 containing strengthened sanctions against North Korea.

September 9

North Korea conducts a nuclear test that is condemned by the Security Council in a press statement.

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Appendix II

Questionnaire on the Outcome of UN Membership Since 1991 Personal data 1. During which years did you serve as UN Ambassador? Assessment of UN Membership 1. What role has South Korea played as board member of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and UN specialized agencies for their work? 2. What role have Koreans appointed to key positions within the UN system played for the work of the UN? 3. In what ways did South Korea throughout your time in office exert influence on decision-making processes of the main organs and specialized agencies of the UN? 4. What kind of expertise provided by the UN was available to South Korea thanks to UN membership during your term in office? 5. What kind of personal contacts existed between the two Koreas during your term in office? If there were contacts, what influence did they exert on interKorean relations?

247

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6. How do you assess the impact of UN membership on interKorean relations? 7. How do you assess the outcome of Security Council resolutions imposed on North Korea in 2006 (1695, 1718), 2009 (1874), and 2013 (2087, 2094)? Please include the impact of sanctions. 8. What impact did the resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly on the North Korean human rights issue since 2005 have? 9. How do you assess the overall outcome of South Korea’s UN admission?

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b2659  South Korea in the United Nations

Index

A Abbott, Kenneth W. and Snidal, Duncan, 8–9 Ahlenius, Inga-Britt, 186 Annan, Kofi, 185

C Cai, Guang, 149 Carlin, Robert, 128 Carter, Jimmy, 92 Chang, Myong Chin, 131 Chang, Myôn, 25 Chang, Wen-Fu, 142 Charron, Andrea, 13, 154 China, becoming UN member, 34, 65 obstacle to implement sanctions against North Korea, 121–122, 127, 154, 162, 205, 211–212 opposes referring North Korea to the International Criminal Court, 160, 211 opposes South Korean UN membership, 41–42, 68 supports South Korean UN Membership, 57–58, 68, 202, 227–228 Choe, Chun-sik, 152 Choe, Ho-jung, 51 Ch’oe, Kwang-su, 48 Ch’oe, Sôk-yông, 83

B Ban, Ki-moon, 121, 155, 186, 193, 195, 197, 199–200, 207, 210, 239, 242 assessments of, 187–188, 199, 207 reasons for elected, 164, 186–187, 199 Banco Delta Asia (BDA), 109, 116, 237 Beal, Tim, 110, 117, 132 criticizes double standards in the UN, 111–112 Bechtol, Bruce E., 128 Bolton, John, 186 Bosold, David, 16 Boulden, Jane, 95, 99 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 13 visits Pyongyang 91–92, 231 Bush, George, 53, 57, 60

265

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b2659  South Korea in the United Nations

266 Index

Ch’oe Tong-jin, 183 Ch’oe, Yông-jin, 185 Choi, Ban Seok, 181–182 Choi, Woo-Soon, 77, 92, 156 Chong Chon Gang incident, 143–145, 147, 244 Chun, Doo Hwan, 21 assassination attempt of, 47, 225 Chung, Eun-sook, 116, 137, 172 Chung, Utak, 78, 198 Cold War, 24, 29, 62, 68, 89, 93, 94, 101, 110, 140, 166, 202, 215 Confederal Republic of Koryo, 38, 89 Crimes against humanity, definition, 158: fn. 59 D Darusman, Marzuki, 160, 245 E Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), tasks of, 7, 80: fn. 6 South Korea’s participation, 79–81, 83, 95, 161, 198, 202, 230–231, 234, 236–237, 240, 242, 245, 247 Ekdahl, Niklas, 186 F Fraser, Trudy, 94, 101, 136 G Geneva Conference, 23, 28–29, 67, 220 Globalization, definition of, 5, 209 Global governance, definitions of, 5–6, 210

b2659_Index.indd 266

ensure compliance with, 7–8, 154, 204, 211 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 53, 60 Greitens, Sheena Chestnut, 147 H Ha, Sang-Sup, 127 Han Seung-Soo, president of the UN General Assembly 2001–2002, 164, 184–185, 195, 199, 207, 210, 235 Han, Sung-Joo, 64, 73, 75–76, 79, 94, 98, 133, 165–166, 170, 197, 233 Han, Yu-ro, 119 Hong, Soon-young, 83 Hong, Yong-hyon, 145: fn. 49 Hsien, Tai Tsai, 142 Hwang, Balbina, 180 Hwang, Chin-ha, 170, 236 Hwang, Sôk-ha, 119 Hynek, Nik, 16 Hyon, Kwang-il,152 I Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), characteristics of, 6, 8–9 liberals’ opinions of, 10–11, 85, 203, 213–214 realists’ opinions of, 9–11, 96, 114, 139, 203, 205, 211–213 purposes of joining, 8 significance of the UN for South Korea, 212, 214–215 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 82, 90–92, 107–108, 112, 120, 126, 186, 221, 224, 229, 231, 236, 238

04-Jan-17 7:08:54 PM

b2659  South Korea in the United Nations

Index  267

International Criminal Court (ICC), 157, 159–160 Iraq, sanctions against, 10, 12–13 J Jeon Young Ju, 95, 179 Jun, Byung-ho, 119 K Kang, Sok-ju, 51 Kang, Sung-Hack, 49, 64, 75, 97, 99–100, 178, 184, 214 Kelley, James, 107 Kim, Bumsoo, 195 Kim, Dae Jung, 21, 169 launches sunshine policy, 104, 234 Kim, Hacksoo, 183, 235 Kim, Hong Nack, 58, 64, 74–75, 92, 154, 197 Kim, Hyeong Ju, 180 Kim, Hyun Chong, 185 Kim, Hyun Hui, 48 Kim, Il Sung, 21, 38, 48, 92 counterproposal to the Declaration for Peace and Reunification, 39 proposes the Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo, 48, 224 suggests a single seat in the UN, 53–54, 227 Kim, Jong Il, 21, 48, 111, 113, 117, 133–134 Kim, Jong Un, 21, 151, 153, 159 Kim, Kang-nyông, 36, 60, 76, 81, 101, 135, 189 Kim, Kwang Il, 131 Kim, Sook, 186

b2659_Index.indd 267

Kim, Sung-hwan 134 Kim, Sûng-il, 48 Kim, Yong Sun, 65 Kim, Young Ho, 176 Kim Young Sam, 21, 93, 95 Ko Ch’o’l-chae 134 Koh, Byung Chul, 40, 53, 59, 91 Korean War, 17, 36, 67, 219 Armistice Agreement, 27–28, 45–46, 90, 92, 96–97, 104, 135, 206, 219 Krasno, Jean E., 4 Kruck, Andreas, 165 Kwon, Oh-Kon, 184 L Lalonde, Alec, 95, 99 Lankov, Andrei, 124, 143, 154 Lee, Jong-ok, 184, 237 Lee, Myung-bak, 21 “give-and-take” approach, 117, 240 Lee, Sang-ock, 55, 63, 227 Lee Shin-hwa, 175 Lee, Yong-Mok, 44, 223 Lho, Shin-yong, 49, 225 Li, Peng, 58, 228 M Ma, Ying-jeou, 66 Ma, Yunong, 150 Machar, Riek, 182 Middle power, angles of, 15–16, 140 limitations of angles of, 16–17 MiG-21 fighter jets sales terminated, 148–149 Mo, Sang Jip, 77

04-Jan-17 7:08:55 PM

b2659  South Korea in the United Nations

268 Index

Mun, Cho’ng-ch’o’l, 134 Mun, Duk Ho, 135, 142 N Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 90–91, 107–108, 111–112, 118, 134, 193, 231, 236, 238 North Korea, advocates simultaneous UN admission, 36, 68, 201, 221 advocates unilateral UN admission, 30, 68, 201, 217 applications for UN membership, 35, 41, 61–62, 68, 218–219, 221, 228 challenging the UN though nuclear tests, 135, 162, 204, 211 criticizes UN Security Council, 111, 136 criticizes UN Security Council resolutions, 91, 113, 119, 121, 132–133, 135–136, 153, 239, 241 difference caused by UN membership, 62, 69, 202 Foreign Ministry, 58, 64, 91, 92, 110, 113, 130, 143, 228, 231, 239 human rights violations, 73, 158–159 membership in UN agencies, 40–41, 53, 67, 78–79, 226, 243 missile tests, 72, 109, 117, 130, 131, 139, 142, 152–153, 155, 162, 204–206, 234, 239, 240, 242–243, 246 nuclear issue, 86, 89–91, 106–108, 122–123, 156,

b2659_Index.indd 268

161–162, 195, 204–205, 209, 211, 236, 238 nuclear tests, 72, 110, 117, 118, 133–135, 137–139, 149, 151, 153, 155–156, 162, 203–206, 210, 239, 241, 243, 245–246 North Korea-United States talks, 91–92, 155, 161 one-Korea policy, 39, 74 opinions on UN membership, 24, 64–65, 68–69 opposes simultaneous UN admission, 38–40, 44, 49, 51–52, 54–55, 68, 201, 223 protests against UN human rights resolution and human rights office, 159–160, 245 reasons for nuclear tests, 110–111, 117–118, 133, 151–152 reasons for reversing position on UN membership, 58–60 rejects findings of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 158–159 rejects recommendations by the UN Human Rights Council, 156–157 takes part in the debate on the Korean question, 40, 43–44, 222 targets of Security Council sanctions, 117, 119–121, 130–132, 134–135, 147–149, 152 UN observer status, 40, 62, 67–68, 223

04-Jan-17 7:08:55 PM

b2659  South Korea in the United Nations

Index  269

violates resolution 1718 (2006), 117, 130–131, 134, 141, 144–145, 240–241 violates resolution 1874 (2009), 122, 124, 130–131, 134, 144–145, 150, 241–242 violates resolution 2087, 134, 145 violates resolution 2094 (2013), 144–145 withdraws from the NPT, 107–108, 236 Northern Limit Line (NLL), 107, 128 O Obama Barrack, 133 Oberdorfer, Don, 128 Oh, Joon, 139, 164, 195, 244 elected Chairman of ECOSOC, 81, 245 Organski, Kenneth, 15, 208 P Pak, Chi Young, 19, 39, 49, 52, 54, 79, 98, 100, 125, 178 Paek, Chang Ho, 131 Pak, Kil-yôn, 123 Pak, Sông-ch’ôl, 49 Pak, Ûn-ha, 185, Panel of Experts, makes reports, 121 mandate, 121 reports about implementation of sanctions, 122, 124–126, 128, 136–137, 141–143, 145–146, 148–151, 241–242, 244–246 tasks, 118–119

b2659_Index.indd 269

Park, Chun-Ho, 184 Park, Chung Hee, 21, 37, 201, 223 Declaration for Peace and Unification, 37, 223 Park, Heung-Soon, 19, 33, 93, 95, 98, 101, 114, 117, 122, 155, 164, 179–180, 186–187, 192, 196, 198, 208 Park, John S., 127, 146 Park, Soo-gil, 85 Park, Young-Ja, 153 Peace-building, UN definition of, 14 Peace enforcement, UN definition of, 15 Peaceful coexistence, 17, 37, 50, 62, 74, 76, 204 Peace regime, 17, 77–78, 89, 204 Peacemaking, UN definition of, 14 Peacekeeping, arguments for the use of a global organization, 165 UN definition of, 14 Peacekeeping operations (PKOs), key foundations, 14 tasks, 166–167 Process-tracing method, 17–18 R Ra, Ky’ong Su, 131 Ri, Che-sôn, 119–120 Ri, Hong-sôp, 119 Ri, Man-gon, 152 Ri, Su-yong, 153 Ri, Yong-Il, 145: fn. 49 Rim Kap-soo 135, 142 Rittberger, Volker, 165 Roehrig, Terence, 179 Roh Tae Woo, 21

04-Jan-17 7:08:55 PM

b2659  South Korea in the United Nations

270 Index

holds speech in the UN General Assembly, 51, 63–64, 89, 226 July 7, 1988 declaration, 50, 60, 68, 226 expresses will to accomplish UN membership, 55–56, 228 S Sanctions, conditions to succeed, 12–13, 154, 205 opinions on, 12 smart sanctions, 12, 114, 125, 137 Schwartz, Josef, 150 Seaman, Kate, 136 Sesay, Amadu 166, 172 September 19, 2005 agreement, 108–110, 112, 123, 238 Six-party talks, 108–110, 112, 115–117, 121, 123, 125, 155, 162, 237–240 assessments of, 116 Sohn, Bongsook, 183, 235 Song, Sûng-chong, 170, 175, 179 South Korea, advocates simultaneous UN admission, 37–39, 49, 68, 202, 223 advocates unilateral UN admission, 30, 36, 68, 201, 217 applications for UN membership, 22, 30–32, 35, 37, 42, 62, 67, 201, 213, 218–222, 224 appointments of Koreans to high posts within the UN system, 4, 20, 103, 163–164, 183–186, 199, 202, 207, 247

b2659_Index.indd 270

as middle power, 140, 181, 187, 192–193, 197–200, 208 assessments of participation in UNPKOs, 164, 167, 169–170, 176–181, 192, 199, 206 assessments of UN membership, 4, 20–21, 164–165, 192–198, 200–209, 248 assessments of UN Security Council membership, 100–102, 138–140, 161 Chairman of the UN Security Council, 99–100, 133, 137–139, 203, 210, 234, 243–244 contributions to the UN budget, 5, 20, 163–164, 189–194, 200, 202, 207, 235, 239 difference caused by UN membership, 62, 69, 202 diplomatic work for UN admission, 49, 53, 56–57, 61, 225–228 establishes diplomatic relations with Communist countries, 51, 60, 227 financial contributions to UNPKOs, 174, 192, 242, 244 impact of UN admission on global position, 73, 75–76, 98, 101, 161, 192–198, 200, 202 impact of UN admission on inter-Korean relations, 63–64, 73–78, 92, 98–99, 133–134, 154–155, 161–162, 197, 203–206, 208–220

04-Jan-17 7:08:55 PM

b2659  South Korea in the United Nations

Index  271

inter-Korean incidents raised in the UN Security Council, 96–98, 161, 203 international support for UN membership, 49–50, 53, 57, 60 limitations and possibilities of participation in PKOs, 175–176 major achievements of UN membership, 95, 184, 186, 197, 199, 203, 207 membership in UN agencies, 4, 20, 42, 50, 53, 67, 71–72, 78–85, 161, 202–203, 209–210, 213–214, 226–227, 229–230, 232–236, 238–239, 243, 247 membership in UN Security Council, 4, 20, 71–73, 95, 102, 125, 133, 161, 195–199, 202–203, 207, 210, 212, 233– 244 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19, 49, 85, 96, 102, 104, 138–139, 194 motives for participation in PKOs and their fulfillment, 166, 172, 178 numbers of peacekeepers dispatched, 164, 167–174, 199, 231–233, 235, 237–238, 240–245 opinions on UN membership, 24, 63–64, 68 opposes simultaneous UN admission, 36, 68, 201, 221 participation in multinational stability operations, 171–172, 174, 207, 236, 242

b2659_Index.indd 271

participation in PKOs, 4, 13, 20, 155, 163–171, 173–174, 193, 197, 199–200, 202, 206–207, 210, 213–214, 231–233, 235–237, 240–245 personal account of participation in PKO, 181–183 predictions on the outcome of UN membership, 4, 20, 71, 73–78, 160–161, 194, 202 reasons to become UN member, 51–52 resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the North Korean human rights issue, 5, 20, 71, 161, 202, 238 resolutions adopted by the Security Council on North Korea, 4, 20, 71, 161, 202 second-class nation, 49, 195, 214 seeks membership in the UN Security Council, 93–95, 102–104, 232 soft power through the UN, 178, 187, 193–194, 196, 199, 207, 208 South Korean-Soviet summits, 57, 60–61, 228 standards of evaluation of UN membership, 4–5, 18, 21, 71, 188, 202, 206, 208 sunshine/engagement policy, 72, 88–89, 104–105, 117 three phases of participation in PKOs, 174–175 UN observer status, 40, 62, 67–68, 195, 209, 218–219 Soviet Union, veto against South Korean UN membership, 30–32, 37, 67–68, 218, 220–221, 224

04-Jan-17 7:08:55 PM

b2659  South Korea in the United Nations

272 Index

supports South Korean UN membership, 57, 59–61, 68, 202, 228 T Taiwan, expelled from the UN, 34, 65, 213 impact of not being UN member, 19, 25, 65–67, 212–213, 215 The two Koreas, attitudes toward the UN, 24–26, 29, 33–34, 67, 92, 121 Cheonan incident, 128–129, 205, 241 consequences of not being UN members, 19, 25, 66–67 contacts through the UN, 72, 85–89, 129–130, 196–197, 200, 230–231, 234 cooperation in the UN General Assembly, 89, 105–106 cooperation on the comfort women issue, 86–87 factors enabling UN membership, 60–62 inter-Korean relations, 71–73, 88–91, 104–107, 229, 235, 240 Joint Declaration, 22, 90, 107–108, 135 Prime Ministers’ talks, 54, 89 simultaneous UN membership, 5, 20, 35, 62, 68, 229 Tumen River Area Development Project, 87–88

b2659_Index.indd 272

West Sea battles 105, 107, 204, 234, 236 U United Nations, assisted reconstruction of South Korea after the Korean War, 24, 33, 67, 166, 199, 209, 212 budget, 188–189 can only become what its Member States want to become, 4, 111, 122, 133, 145, 156, 205, 211 importance of membership, 18, 29–30, 42, 65, 201, 209–210, 213–214 involvement in the Korean question, 23, 25, 28–30, 32–34, 77, 155–156, 193–194, 200, 204, 206, 209 involvement in the Korean War, 25–27, 67, 209 membership principle of universality, 3, 29–30, 41–42, 56, 213 name, 1–2 number of member states, 1, 189, 217 origins of, 1–2 principal organs of, 6 provides needed expertise, 7, 33, 43, 83, 171, 209, 212 recognizes South Korea as the only legitimate Korean government, 25–26, 30, 36, 67, 74, 195, 218 sovereign equality of member states, 3, 162, 205, 211

04-Jan-17 7:08:55 PM

b2659  South Korea in the United Nations

Index  273

specialized agencies of, 6–7, 40 tasks of, 2–3 United Nations Charter, Chapter I, Article 2(3), 3, 97, 105, 204 Article 2(4), 3, 105, 204 Article 2(7), 8, 211 Chapter IV, Article 1, 31, 42 Chapter VII, Article 2, 39, 115 Article 41, 114–115 United Nations Command (UNC), 27–28, 43–44, 46, 88–89, 96, 180, 209, 219, 240 United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), 32–34, 43–44, 219, 223 United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), adopts resolutions on North Korea, 156, 236 appoints special rapporteur on human rights in North Korea, 156, 237 South Korea’s participation, 79, 83, 156, 202, 230–231, voting, 156, 236 United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (UNCOI), 73, 157–158, 206 report on North Korea, 158–160, 206, 244–245 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), South Korea’s contributions, 190 participation, 82, 225, 235, 239, 242

b2659_Index.indd 273

United Nations General Assembly adopts inter-Korean joint resolution (55/11), 105, 206, 235 adopts opposing resolutions on the Korean question, 45–46, 224 adopts resolution 62/5, 105, 206, 240 adopts resolution 112(II), 25, 217 adopts resolution 195(III), 26, 218 adopts resolution 376(V), 32 adopts resolutions 377(V), 498(V), 27, 219 adopts resolution 500(V), 27 adopts resolutions 711, 712, 28, 219 adopts resolution 811, 29, 220, central forum for global dialogue, 2, 7 holds annual votings on the Korean question, 23–24, 32, 34, 42–47 only allows South Korean participation in the UN debate on the Korean question, 29, 32, 34, 217 resolutions adopted on the North Korean human rights issue, 5, 156, 159–161, 206, 238, 245, 248 United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), South Korea’s participation, 84, 156, 198, 238–239, 244 United Nations Sanctions Committee, 113, 115, 117–119,

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b2659  South Korea in the United Nations

274 Index

121–122, 132, 135, 141–142, 146–147, 149 United Nations Security Council adopts condemnatory press statements on North Korean nuclear tests, 134, 152–153, 243, 245–246 adopts presidential statements condemning North Korean missile tests, 117, 130, 162, 240, 242 adopts presidential statements condemning North Korean nuclear test, 117 adopts presidential statement expressing concern over North Korean submarine incident, 7, 233 adopts presidential statement expressing regret over North Korean missile test, 109, 234 adopts presidential statement on Cheonan incident, 129, 162, 242 adopts press release statement criticizing North Korea’s attempt to scrap the Armistice Agreement, 96, 233 adopts press statements on North Korean missile tests, 109, 145, 246 adopts resolutions 82–83, 26, 218 adopts resolution 84, 27, 219 adopts resolution 702, 62, 228 adopts resolution 825, 90–91, 231

b2659_Index.indd 274

adopts resolution 1172, 111 adopts resolution 1695, 109–110, 239, 248 adopts resolution 1718, 110–113, 143, 239, 248 adopts resolution 1874, 118–119, 241, 248 adopts resolution 2087, 131, 243, 248 adopts resolution 2094, 134–135, 243 adopts resolution 2155, 139 adopts resolution 2270, 152, 246 adopts the North Korean human rights on its agenda, 159–160, 206, 245 advantages and disadvantages of membership, 72, 93–94, 101–102, 140–141, 203 applies double standards on North Korea, 136, 205, 211 characteristics of resolution 1718, 114 consultations and compromises on resolution 1718, 114–115 holds meetings on incidents related to Korea, 47–48, 96–97, 100, 225–226, 233 impact of sanctions on North Korea, 117, 121–128, 136–137, 142–143, 146–147, 151, 154, 162, 205, 248 nonpermanent members, 2, 72 permanent members, 2–3, 99, 111, 122, 186–187, 205, 210–212

04-Jan-17 7:08:55 PM

b2659  South Korea in the United Nations

Index  275

United States, imposes financial sanctions on North Korea, 109, 237 main threat to North Korea’s survival, 111, 154, 205 veto against North Korean UN membership, 68 Universal Periodic Review (UPR), recommendations to North Korea, 156–157 W Waldheim, Kurt, 40, 223 Wallensteen, Peter, 12, 154 Wang, Im-dong, 59, 178 World War II, 1, 6, 23, 60 Wight, Martin, 15, 208 Y Yang, Cheol-Ho, 179 Yang, Un-Chul, 127

b2659_Index.indd 275

Yi, Chong-sôn, 126 Yi, Ch’ôl, 85–86 Yi, Ho-jin, 185 Yi, Seung-Cheol, 179 Yi, Sô-hang, 155, 164, 195, 208 Yi, Yang-hû, 185 Yôm, Hong-ch’ôl, 75, 98–99, 155, 179, 193, 197–198 Yo’n, Cho’ng Nam, 134, Yon, Hyong Muk, 55 holds speech in the UN General Assembly, 65 Yôngbyôn nuclear reactor, 91–92, 107, 116, 120, 236 nuclear research institute, 119 Yu, Chol-u, 152 Yun, Ho-jin, 119 Z Zangl, Bernhard, 165

04-Jan-17 7:08:55 PM