South Asian Women and International Relations [1 ed.] 9789811994258, 9789811994265

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South Asian Women and International Relations Edited by Abhiruchi Ojha · Pramod Jaiswal

South Asian Women and International Relations

Abhiruchi Ojha · Pramod Jaiswal Editors

South Asian Women and International Relations

Editors Abhiruchi Ojha Central University of Kashmir Ganderbal, India

Pramod Jaiswal Nepal Institute of International Cooperation and Engagement (NIICE) Kathmandu, Nepal

ISBN 978-981-19-9425-8 ISBN 978-981-19-9426-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9426-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Dedicated to Anaiah and Riyansh

Acknowledgements

The book ‘South Asian Women and International Relations’ is an outcome of the combined efforts of various scholars from across South Asia who were willing to submit their valuable research for this volume along with our personal contributions as authors and editors. Hence, we would like to express our gratitude to Akanksha Khullar, Researcher at the Centre for Internal and Regional Security at Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, India; Prof. Anuradha Chenoy, Former Dean, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India; Dr. Dickey Lama, Assistant Professor in the Women’s College, Kolkata, West Bengal, India; Dr. Hijam Liza Dallo Rihmo, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Shri Ram College of Commerce, University of Delhi, New Delhi, India; Dr. Judith Anne Lal, Research and Programme Campaign at National Commission on Dalit Human Rights, New Delhi, India; Dr. Kamna Tiwary, Independent Researcher based in College Park, USA; Maitree Devi, Doctoral Fellow at Centre for Comparative Politics and Political Theory, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India, and Manish Jung Pulami, Doctoral Fellow at Department of International Relations, South Asian University, New Delhi, India. Our thanks also go to other authors Dr. Rashmi Gopi, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Miranda House, University of Delhi, New Delhi, India; Satyaki Aditya, Doctoral Fellow in International Relations at Jadavpur University, Kolkata, West Bengal, India; Dr. Sehar

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Iqbal, Independent Researcher and author based in Jammu and Kashmir, India; Dr. Shabana Fayyaz, Associate Professor at Defense and Strategic Studies Department, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan; Dr. Shazana Andrabi, Senior Assistant Professor at Centre for International Relations, Islamic University of Science and Technology, Jammu and Kashmir, India; Shriya Patnaik, Doctoral Fellow at Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Department of International History, Swiss Government Excellence Scholar and Swiss National Science Foundation Fellow, Switzerland; Shumaila Fatima, Doctoral Fellow at the Department of Sociology and Interdisciplinary Social Science at the University of South Florida, USA; Shuvechha Ghimire, Doctoral Fellow Department at the Department of Sociology and Interdisciplinary Social Science at the University of South Florida, USA, and Prof. Tinaz Pavri, Professor of Political Science, Division Chair, Social Sciences and Education and Founding Director of Asian Studies Program, Spelman College, USA. We would also like to place on record our sincere gratitude to the women diplomats of South Asia who gave their time, views, and perspectives which greatly enriched this book. Hence, we thank Dr. Anjan Shakya, Manju Seth, Deepa Wadhwa, H.E. Himalee Arunatilaka, and Neelam Deo for giving us their time and encouraging our research. We would also like to thank all the interns of Nepal Institute for International Cooperation and Engagement (NIICE), and Dr. Leslie Keerthi Kumar SM for their help and support in finalising the book. Last but not least, we would like to thank Palgrave Macmillan for providing all help and support for the publication of this book. Dr. Abhiruchi Ojha Dr. Pramod Jaiswal

Contents

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Conceptualizing South Asian Women in International Relations: Issues, Opportunities, and Challenges Abhiruchi Ojha and Pramod Jaiswal

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Part I Gendering International Relations of South Asia: Theoretical Perspectives 2

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South Asian Women and the Gender Issues in International Relations Anuradha Chenoy

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Mainstreaming Feminist International Relations: An Analysis of the Works of IR Theorists in South Asia Shazana Andrabi

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Theorising International Relations from South Asia: A Feminist Perspective Hijam Liza Dallo Rihmo

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Part II Gendering Foreign Policy Theory & Practice in South Asia 5

Feminist Aspects of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Shabana Fayyaz

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CONTENTS

National Security in India’s Foreign Policy: A Feminist Reading on Developments from 2004 to 2020 Rashmi Gopi Re-envisioning South Asia’s Foreign Policy from a Feminist Perspective Akanksha Khullar

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Part III South Asian Women and International Politics: Profiles, Impact and Representation 8

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Blazing a Pioneering Trail: South Asia’s Women Leaders in International Affairs Tinaz Pavri

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A ‘Seductress’ for Nepal: An Analytical Study of a Woman Diplomat in South Asia Dickey Lama

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Amplifying Women’s Voices in International Relations: A Study of What Has Been Done and What Requires to Be Done Satyaki Aditya Underrepresentation of Women in Conflict Resolution: A Case of South Asia Shuvechha Ghimire and Shumaila Fatima

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Part IV Widening Horizons: South Asian Women and Socio-Political Movements 12

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Women’s Participation in Anti-nuclear Movement in India: Role of Nuclear Knowledge and Exclusion of Women’s Concerns Kamna Tiwary Anti-caste Movement and Rise of Dalit Women’s Voices from South Asia Judith Anne Lal The Other Movement: Women’s Activism in Kashmir Sehar Iqbal

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CONTENTS

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Exploring the Contested and Controversial Nature of the Sex Industry in India: Experiential Encounters by Sex-Workers from the Periphery Shriya Patnaik Minority Community Women’s Struggles Against Gender Unjust Religious Personal Laws in India and Bangladesh Maitree Devi Populism as a Gendered Phenomenon in South Asia Manish Jung Pulami

Index

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289 313

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Editors and Contributors

About the Editors Dr. Abhiruchi Ojha Ph.D. is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics and Governance at Central University of Kashmir, India and Visiting Fellow at Nepal Institute for International Cooperation and Engagement (NIICE). Her research interests span International Politics and Gender Studies with specific focus on women’s participation in politics, gender dynamics of conflict & peace, gendering Artificial Intelligence and developing non-western perspectives on International Relations. She combines her research and teaching with gender advocacy. She completed her PhD in International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, India where she was awarded with Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR) Doctoral Fellowship. Her doctoral thesis was on the dynamics of gender and citizenship in Post-apartheid South Africa. She was a Visiting Research Fellow at Centre for the Advancement of Non-racialism and Democracy (CANRAD), Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, Port Elizabeth, South Africa. She has previously taught in Lady Shri Ram College for Women (University of Delhi), Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution (Jamia Millia Islamia) and Ambedkar University Delhi. She has been part of several research projects, including one on the impact of Dalit women in Indian politics for International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Canada and Indian Institute of

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Dalit Studies (IIDS). Her publications include ‘Two Decades of Development: Gender and Citizenship in Democratic South Africa’, ‘Issues of Under-representation: Mapping Women in Indian Politics’ and ‘Women’s Political Representation in the 16th Lok Sabha: Continuity, Contestation or Change’. She is presently working on a book on Gender and Technology, with a specific focus on Artificial Intelligence. Dr. Pramod Jaiswal Ph.D. is a Research Director at Nepal Institute for International Cooperation and Engagement (NIICE). He specialises on China and South Asia and has done extensive work on Chinese Foreign Policy, China’s South Asia Policy and China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). His research focus also includes insurgencies, border management, terrorism, illegal migration, radicalism, and ethnic conflicts. He has been a regular and visiting faculty at different universities of Nepal (Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu University, Pokhara University and Army Command and Staff College) and China (China Foreign Affairs University, Fudan University, Tongji University, and Qinghai University of Nationalities). He is Visiting Fellow at Sandia National Laboratories, Cooperative Monitoring Center, Albuquerque, New Mexico, US; Senior Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi and Researcher at South Asian Studies, Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok. Previously, he has worked with Manohar Parikkar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi and as Delhi Correspondent with the Rising Nepal. He is the Member of the Editorial Board, Journal of International Affairs, Kathmandu; Member of the Academic Committee at the Pangoal Institution, Beijing; Member of International Advisory Committee, Journal of Liberty and International Affairs, Macedonia; and the Editor in Chief of Journal of Security and International Studies and member of Subject Committee of International Relations and Diplomacy, Tribhuvan University. He has also worked as Strategic Affairs Editor with Khabarhub and Nepalkhabar, Nepal’s largest digital medias. He holds Master’s, M. Phil. and Ph.D. from School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He has authored, edited and co-edited around dozens of books on China and South Asia affairs.

EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS

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Contributors Satyaki Aditya Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, India; Department of Political Science (Raghabpur Campus), St. Xavier’s College (Autonomous), Kolkata, India Shazana Andrabi Centre for International Relations, Islamic University of Science and Technology, Awantipora, India Anuradha Chenoy School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India Maitree Devi Centre for Comparative Politics & Political Theory, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India Shumaila Fatima Department of Sociology and Interdisciplinary Social Science, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, USA Shabana Fayyaz Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, QuaidI-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan Shuvechha Ghimire Department of Sociology and Interdisciplinary Social Science, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, USA Rashmi Gopi Department of Political Science, Miranda House, University of Delhi, New Delhi, India Sehar Iqbal Jammu and Kashmir, India Pramod Jaiswal Nepal Institute of International Cooperation and Engagement (NIICE), Kathmandu, Nepal; Department of Political Science, Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, Nepal Akanksha Khullar New Delhi, India Judith Anne Lal Christ (Deemed to be University) Delhi NCR, Ghaziabad, India Dickey Lama Women’s College, Kolkata, India

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EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS

Abhiruchi Ojha Department of Politics and Governance, Central University of Kashmir, Ganderbal, India; Nepal Institute of International Cooperation and Engagement (NIICE), Kathmandu, Nepal Shriya Patnaik Department of International History, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland Tinaz Pavri Asian Studies Program, Spelman College, Atlanta, GA, USA Manish Jung Pulami Department of International Relations, South Asian University, New Delhi, India Hijam Liza Dallo Rihmo Department of Political Science, Shri Ram College of Commerce, University of Delhi, New Delhi, India Kamna Tiwary College Park, MD, USA

Abbreviations

ADR A-e-N AERB AIADMK APDP BCIM BIMSTEC BJP BLM BMMA CBD CEDAW CEFM CII CORO CSO CSW CTBT DMK FCC FEDO FFP GBV HBCUC

Alternative Dispute Resolution Aawaaz-e-Niswaan Atomic Energy Regulatory Board All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Forum Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation Bhartiya Janata Party Black Lives Matter Movement Bhartiya Muslim Mahila Andolan Caste Based Discrimination Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women Child Early and Forced Marriage Council of Islamic Ideology Committee of Resource Organization for Literacy Civil Society Organization Committee on the Status of Women Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Federal Shariat Court Feminist Dalit Organization Feminist Foreign Policy Gender Based Violence Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council xvii

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ABBREVIATIONS

HIV HWM IAEA ICAN ICJ IGC ILO IMF INGOs IPE IR ITPA IWIR JNUS KNPP LGBTIQ+ LGBTQ LoC LTTE MDGs MKM MMS MOFA MoU MTCR NAM NAP NC NCDHR NCP NDA NFU NGOs NHRIs NLD NPP NPT NSG NWM PM PMNAE PPP PRUN

Human Immunodeficiency Virus Heterosexual Warrior Masculinity International Atomic Energy Agency International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons International Court of Justice International Growth Centre International Labour Organization International Monetary Fund International Non-Governmental Organizations International Political Economy International Relations Immoral Traffic Prevention Act Indian Women in International Relations Jago Nari Unnayan Sangsta Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, Intersex and Queer Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Line of Control Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Millennium Development Goals Muslim Khawteen Markaz Multi-media Message Ministry of Foreign Affairs Memorandum of Understanding Mission Technology Control Regime Non-Aligned Movement National Action Plan National Council National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights Nepali Communist Party National Democratic Alliance No First Use Non-Governmental Organizations National Human Rights Instruments National League for Democracy Nuclear Power Plant Non-Proliferation Treaty Nuclear Suppliers Group Nordic Women Mediators Prime Minister People’s Movement against Nuclear Energy Pakistan People’s Party Permanent Representatives of United Nations

ABBREVIATIONS

RENEW RSS SAARC SANGRAM SC SDG SIPRI ST TBIP TMC TVPA UFC UK UN UNDP UNGA UNHRC UNICEF UNSC UNSCR UNSDG UPSC US USA USAID VAMP WAF WHO WID WISCOMP WOT WPS WPSI YWLP

Respect, Educate, Nurture and Empower Women Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation Sampada Grameen Mahila Sanstha Scheduled Castes Sustainable Development Goals Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Scheduled Tribes Teesta Barrage Irrigation Project Trinamool Congress Trafficking Victims Protection Act Uniform Family Code United Kingdom United Nations United Nations Development Program United Nations General Assembly United Nations Human Rights Council United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund United Nations Security Council United National Security Council Resolution United Nations Sustainable Development Goals Union Public Service Commission United States United States of America United States Agency for International Development Veshya Anyay Mukti Parishad World Action Forum World Health Organization Women in Development Women in Security, Conflict Management and Peace War on Terror Women, Peace and Security Women, Peace and Security Index Young Women Leaders for Peace

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List of Tables

Table 9.1 Table 12.1

Masculination as valourisation and feminisation as devalourisation Nuclear reactors in use and under construction

159 215

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CHAPTER 1

Conceptualizing South Asian Women in International Relations: Issues, Opportunities, and Challenges Abhiruchi Ojha and Pramod Jaiswal

South Asian women’s voices remain marginalized in the theory and practice of international relations (IR) in the region. Foreign and security policy in South Asia is chiefly driven by men. Diplomatic corps of South Asian countries tend to have very few women in positions of power. This is largely due to false yet persistent gendered beliefs in many foreign policy establishments about lack of ‘toughness’ of women which results

A. Ojha (B) Department of Politics and Governance, Central University of Kashmir, Ganderbal, India e-mail: [email protected] A. Ojha · P. Jaiswal Nepal Institute of International Cooperation and Engagement (NIICE), Kathmandu, Nepal P. Jaiswal Department of Political Science, Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, Nepal

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Ojha and P. Jaiswal (eds.), South Asian Women and International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9426-5_1

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in their neglect in debates of ‘High Politics’. This problematic construction further leads to many critical issues being neglected as they are seen as having less priority. Moreover, the academic field of IR in South Asia is also dominated largely by men. Women scholars are often pushed implicitly or explicitly to perceived ‘soft’ subject areas in IR like environmental or development studies. This belies the fact that South Asian women are working as academics in diverse domains within the discipline of IR, with their intersectional identities informing their works. Some are contributing immensely to traditional security studies, while some others denounce the toxic masculinity of security studies itself. Feminist epistemology thereby demands unthinking and rethinking theory as well as practice of IR in a manner that places women’s experiences and their diverse voices at the center. The challenge of this book was therefore to refuse the temptation to typecast women and instead embrace and highlight the varied voices of South Asian women in international relations. Women of South Asia are not a monolithic block and this book seeks to survey and showcase the varied roles South Asian women play in theory and practice of international relations. With such an ambitious goal, this book was conceived from the beginning to be radical and disruptive, intending to push the boundaries of methodological, epistemological, and ontological debates in the field of IR in particular and Social Sciences in general. This needs a bit more clarification. Women engage with international politics at various levels and as diverse actors. Their lives are impacted by international relations and they in turn shape the nature of international relations. Yet, women, their perspectives, and their concerns remain at the margins of academic discussions, policy debates, and decision making. It is our submission that this is largely because the present methodological, epistemic and ontological consensus in IR specifically and in social sciences in general privileges a certain kind of knowledge production which emphasizes on ‘rational’, ‘structured’, ‘realistic’, ‘pragmatic’, and ‘testable’ methods that help in ‘categorizing’ and ‘controlling’ the subject matter being studied. Such an epistemic direction, pursued by a set of acceptable ‘methods’, leads to affirmation of only certain ontological existences while negating the existence and relevance of several others. This is so because the chief purpose behind such an exercise is to ‘categorize’ and ‘control’ in order to establish or maintain or extend power structures. The epistemic purpose, therefore, is not ‘understanding’ but to figure out ‘how to control’ or ‘maintain power’. This narrow focus automatically leads to negation of

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those ontological categories which are too complex to control or categorize. Thus, many Realist scholars of IR theory prefer the ‘billiard ball’ conception of states as it is easier to ‘control’ and study, rather than seeking to understand the complex sub-national factors which influence state behaviour. Political Realists after all are not concerned about understanding state behaviour in general but only about how states can retain ‘power’, Machiavelli in fact is quite explicit about this. Such an epistemic undertaking serves the purpose of existing structures of power, i.e. the status quo preferring actors, be it heterosexual men in the context of patriarchy or powerful states in the context of the international system. Since patriarchy underpins all social structures, the modern state system as well as knowledge production itself are characterized by the dominance of heterosexual men and their epistemic and ontological indulgences. One can even draw a parallel between the discomfort heteronormative people feel with the growing acknowledgement of the existence of several gender/sex categories (LGBTQIA2S+) and the reluctance of many traditional IR scholars to embrace the presence and relevance of diverse non-state actors in the international system. Acknowledgement of many genders/sexes and accepting the relevance of non-state actors will both disrupt existing sanitized theorizations which are certainly not true ontologically but are helpful to control and maintain existing power structures. Since these existing heteronormative power structures greatly influence research funding, university recruitments, publishing houses, and premier journals, knowledge production by and large has become subservient to preservation of the status quo, to the detriment of subaltern groups which desire radical change like women, Dalits, and small states of the international system. It is unfortunate that at times scholars from even radical theoretical traditions like feminism also feel compelled to play by the existing framework in order to gain legitimacy and recognition. It is in this context, this edited volume eschews the dominant knowledge framework to embrace a feminist epistemology which is focused on ‘understanding’ rather than ‘control’, ‘liberation’ rather than ‘domination’, and is not afraid of ‘subjectivities’. Understanding begins with acknowledgement and recognition of multiple existences, voices and it may not always lead to neat theorizations as Feminist epistemology emphasizes on ‘situated knowledge’. This might provoke more questions than it answers, problematize rather than resolve, and disrupt rather than

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build. For those socialized predominantly via the dominant heteronormative knowledge framework, some of the chapters in this edited volume might seem unconventional. This will be especially true with respect to the discipline of IR because of its relatively recent origin. In many other disciplines of Social Sciences, feminist epistemological interventions have greatly expanded their scope, nature, and methodologies. Due to its young history, this has not happened to a great extent in the discipline of IR and this might make this work seem more radical, especially among the South Asian IR community which still remains largely aligned with traditional IR frameworks. Hence, some might question why issues like caste, prostitution, anti-nuclear movements, and populism are being discussed in an edited volume on international relations. Some others might be critical of the methodological diversity of the chapters in this book which includes unstructured interviews, surveys, and subjective reflections. This edited volume’s very purpose itself is to provoke such questions and foster constructive debates on hitherto neglected areas and approaches. A note of clarification on feminist epistemology’s relationship with this edited volume is likely needed. While the editorial direction of this volume was underpinned by feminist epistemology, not all chapters are written by feminists, nor is it a ‘feminists only’ project as such. Feminist epistemology is about acceptance of diversity and differences. The volume’s intention was to capture the diversity of South Asian women’s engagements with the practice and theory of international relations. Hence, non-feminist perspectives have also been provided space in the volume and the editors were open to receiving chapters with varied approaches, including from those who do not see themselves as feminists. This underlines the value and strength of a feminist epistemological paradigm as it is inclusive and thereby more comprehensive. Such an approach is especially needed to understand women’s engagements in international relations as the field remains largely dominated by masculine, militaristic, state-centric, and realist paradigms. This is especially true of South Asia. This gap in knowledge informed from lived experiences of women (‘situated knowledge’) invites (un)thinking and rethinking of the complex interplay among gender, women, and International Relations. In doing so, the gendered and intersectional experiences of women based on caste, class, religion, region, ethnicity, etc., needs to be captured in its complexity, without resorting to reductionist oversimplifications for the sake of convenient categorization.

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Feminist Interventions in the Discipline of International Relations This edited volume’s conceptualization and focus was made possible by the works of a generation of feminist IR scholars and activists. The question of gender and international relations has been raised by scholars since the 1980s. Scholarship of Elshtain (1987) and Grant (1991) challenged the domestic and international divide and this was followed by feminist IR scholars who highlighted the need for going beyond positivism. Murphy (1996) argued that a path breaking work towards women in international relations was Caroll’s (1972) ‘Peace Research: The Cult of Power’. A decade later, The Millennium: Journal of International Studies came up with a special issue in 1988 which brought together essays by prominent scholars such as Tickner, Halliday, Eishtain on the issue of women in International Relations. Enloe (1989) starts by posing the question, ‘where are the women in international relations?’ and challenges the restriction of security to the arena of high politics. Tickner (1992, 1997) critically examined power and security by highlighting the dominant masculinist approaches. In doing so, Tickner problematizes state-centric approaches to security and rejects the divide between the international and domestic. The 1990s were marked by landmark works by scholars such as Grant (1991), Tickner (1992), Sylvester (1994), Zaleswski (1994, 1998), and Enloe (2014) who in many ways shaped feminist theory of international relations as we know it today. The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 of the year 2000 gave more impetus to the questions raised by scholars in previous decades. UNSCR 1325 was a result of Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), deliberations of the UN Decade for women from 1975 to 1985 (Mexico to Nairobi), various transnational women’s movements, and the scholarship of women in previous years. Gendering of the question of security in international relations paved way for discussions about militarism, women’s role in conflict, peace, and security issues (Chenoy, 2002; Manchanda, 2001; Shepherd, 2013). While literature on feminism and international relations grows, there are still critical gaps. The interaction between local and international from the standpoint of women’s lived experiences informed by global south regions including South Asia remains underexplored (Singh, 2017). To this end, recent scholarship bringing forth cases from South Asia have attempted to inform the

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debates on security from the standpoint of lived experiences (Giri, 2021; Parashar, 2019, 2020; Yadav, 2020). Further, notions of power, representation, security, marginality, movement, agency, and justice remain at the periphery of the debates on international relations. The complex, intersectional (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 2005; Crenshaw, 1989), and hierarchical relation of identities based on caste, class, religion, etc., need to be examined from a gender lens at transnational level.

Listening to the ‘Situated Knowledge’ of South Asian Women Diplomats As noted earlier, this volume was conceived from the beginning to be a work that is grounded on the lived experiences of women, challenging many false binaries like object/subject, theory/practice, domestic/international, private/public, and personal/political. In that spirit, the binary of academic/practitioner also needs to be bridged and challenged in the context of international relations. Academic disciplines can get distant from the domains they study. False binaries like academic/practitioner are misleading because in the social world, reality and knowledge are co-constitutive. Hence, academics influence the practice and practitioners influence academic knowledge. Feminist epistemology calls for questioning of such false binaries and exposing their shortcomings. Hence, instead of relying only on academic works to provide the context of this volume, we reached out to women practitioners of international relations in South Asia. In an attempt to bridge the academic/practitioner gap in the field of international relations, we had conversations with five South Asian women diplomats from three different countries (Nepal, Sri Lanka, and India) to hear from them what they perceive as challenges faced by South Asian women diplomats. Their perspectives, based on their lived experiences, not only provide first-hand narratives but also provide academic insights which could not have been acquired in any other manner. Quantitative studies can only reveal so much and in order to understand the subtle undercurrents which are difficult to quantify and might be more critical for understanding, it is important to theorize based on subjective, everyday experiences of people, in this case, South Asian women diplomats. This exercise in itself was enlightening for us and it highlights the need to listen to the ‘situated knowledge’ of South Asian women to understand their lived experiences

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of international relations, be it diplomats or social activists or political leaders. Such efforts are much needed in the profession of diplomacy, as the profession itself has been imagined and constructed as a masculine field. The dominant representation of diplomatic corps as men in tailored suits is a testimony to this construct. Moreover, in the diplomatic world, women’s work as wives of diplomats which require unending networking, support services, and extension of soft power rarely gets captured and constitute the unpaid, unacknowledged ‘invisible labour’ of high politics (Daniels, 1987). With respect to the constitution of diplomatic corps, there are very few women diplomats and officers as has been shown by several quantitative studies. However, the numbers are captured but nuances often missed. We have a blind spot when it comes to narratives of lived experiences of women in diplomacy. The attempt of this chapter is therefore to give space to the voices of women diplomats from South Asia. In doing so, this chapter seeks answers for the following questions: . Why is there less representation of women in diplomacy in South Asia? . What are the hurdles and ceilings faced by women diplomats in South Asia? . How can women make a difference in diplomacy, especially in South Asia? . How to bring focus to women’s shared issues and concerns at the International level? Telephonic and electronic interviews were conducted with chosen diplomats between January–September 2022. The diplomats interviewed were Dr. Anjan Shakya, former Nepalese Ambassador to the State of Israel; H.E. Himalee Subhashini Arunatilaka, Sri Lankan Ambassador to Nepal; Manju Seth, former Indian Ambassador to Republic of Madagascar and Comoros; Deepa Wadhwa, first Indian woman to be appointed Ambassador to the Gulf State of Qatar and Ambassador to Japan, Sweden, Latvia, and Republic of Marshall Islands; and Neelam Deo, Indian Ambassador to Denmark and Ivory Coast with concurrent accreditation to Niger, Guinea, and Sierra Leone. A few prominent themes which stood out are briefly discussed with excerpts from the interviews.

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Gender, Career, and Distance/Being in Foreign/Alien Land The interviews show that patriarchal gendered roles greatly impact women’s choices of career. Most often diplomatic corps as a career is considered a masculine job. The general norm that women can work, if they choose so, but only near their homes, is informed by masculine security concerns that are upheld by families and society. The home here can be understood as the familiar territory while the ‘foreign’ is the international unknown other, permissible only for men. The idea that women are insecure or open to threats is also closely associated with the idea of their ability or inability to ‘protect’ themselves hence being constructed as bodies that need protection in the home or the ‘foreign’ by men and also from men. Diplomat Manju Seth from India: “In South Asia, particularly in India, the numbers have been very small. And I think one of the main reasons has been the fact that society, political parties, the general milieu, social milieu has been discouraging women, young girls joining the Foreign Service. Even when we joined it, we were questioned, ‘Why are you joining the foreign service, you must take something within India’, and a similar kind of attitude is there across South Asia”. Another challenge faced by women diplomats is the expectation that they are to balance family and work, a question which is rarely asked of men diplomats. South Asian women diplomats who carry this expectation are also not given adequate resources to manage this difficult balancing act. Diplomat H.E. Himalee Subhashini Arunatilaka, Sri Lankan Ambassador to Nepal: “Being the traditional home maker, a woman has to balance her career and the household responsibilities. The difference is that in the case of South Asia, the resources available or allocated to help overcome those challenges may be inadequate. In diplomacy, women face the additional challenge of having to be away from their home country, depriving her of the familial social network which is abundant in South Asia. Thus, a female diplomat, particularly when posted abroad, faces additional challenges, as she has to balance her representational duties with her familial duties”. However, on a positive note, the diplomats felt that across the world, even in South Asia, the scope for women in diplomacy is changing for the better, however, at a slow pace. The pace of change will be dependent on larger societal transformation as that is what will determine how free or restrained women are made to feel in pursuing diplomatic careers.

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Diplomat Neelam Deo from India: “Even in India, we have not even reached 20 percent but on the other hand the numbers are increasing and we need to see it as a process and not a fixed destination. If we were to discuss about increasing numbers and increasing the representation of women; that’s a very large question and it is located within the attitudes in society… This depends on changes in society, when women can be more prominent, be seen more in all sectors of society, there will be more women in diplomacy. But we cannot have a situation where in the Foreign Service Cadres of our countries, there are 50 percent women but not 50 percent women in bureaucracy, politics, industry, cultural efforts. All these things move together as far as gender justice is concerned”. The diplomats were hopeful that as society changes and as more women enter the services, they will create symbols for other women to aspire thereby slowly paving way for normalizing the image of women as diplomats and officers. Male Spouses, Wives’ Associations, and Gendered Networking/Performance Some of the diplomats mentioned that due to the masculine construction of diplomacy, it becomes difficult to imagine their husbands in support services, networking parties and events, and performing their duties as spouses of diplomats. These performances themselves are gendered in nature and images are constructed keeping in mind the woman. Diplomat Manju Seth from India: “Having an accompanying male spouse is not the norm. So, when you go for Indian foreign service, you have a wives’ association, and they’ve changed it to spouses’ association where there’s a pot system for all the wives to meet regularly, you meet them, the ambassador’s wife usually gets them together for certain activities. And so, there is a support system, but what do you do with the husband? You know you can’t be part of that, though they’ve made it spouses’ association, but if you’re one and six others or eight other women spouses and you have one male spouse coming, it’s awkward. It’s awkward for the ladies, it’s awkward for the gentlemen. So, it becomes a little difficult to adjust, to adapt, because you don’t have that kind of levy or support that would be there otherwise for wives or female spouses ”. One has to keep in mind that the wives of diplomats were not handed down any support system but rather they constructed them over time. These are therefore not given networks, women struggled to create spaces

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for themselves whereby they can create such networks. These networks provide supporting roles, work as a tool for soft power, and are a result of the agency of women over generations. Therefore, the journey from wives’ club to spouses’ club may be decades long and awkwardness is not only due to the numerical minority that the husbands of diplomats find themselves to be in but also due to the gendered space of the spouses’ associations which is yet to evolve and diversify in terms of its performance. It mirrors the awkwardness of being a woman diplomat in a male-dominated diplomatic field. Both need to change in tandem and as one changes, the other will also change. Further, the diplomats also pointed to changing identities of men and masculinity itself. Today, more men are ready to leave their present jobs and be in supportive roles for their constantly migrating diplomat wives as homemakers or freelance workers. This is also helped by technological changes in the job market which has made possible freelance digital jobs. One diplomat, Manju Seth, mentioned that her husband left his job. This also indicates towards a slowly changing conception of masculinity in South Asia which is encouraging even though it largely applies to admittedly an elite section of the society. Diplomat Deepa Wadhwa from India: “When women get married, what happens to the career of their husbands. I think opportunity now, particularly in IT related fields, opportunity for husband to travel with their wife and continue their job becomes much better. I know many young women officers whose husbands are able to travel with their wife, but not all. Attitude of man has changed. When I went to my UPSC interview in 1979, I was asked by the Chairman of the UPSC board that I have taken the option for the Foreign Service, did I think I should marry a cook? The reason was will the man follow you or who will come with you. This was the attitude of the people in the UPSC and that was the attitude of the men in the country. Today nobody dare to ask a questions like that. I think the concept of equality and political correctness is much deeper today”. The changing conception of masculinity is especially visible at the institutional level where structural obstacles like barring women diplomats from marrying if they have to keep their jobs, as it was in India, are disappearing. Women aspiring for ambitious diplomatic positions used to face sarcastic questions and while a good amount of it still persists, positive changes are happening.

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Women Diplomat Bodies: Crossing Borders and Biases As the interviews reveal, one of the reasons given for gendered control by state for limited postings for women in diplomacy is their security. However, growing number of women in diplomacy are asserting their expectations to be posted in all positions across the world, claiming they don’t need any more security than their male counterparts, thereby challenging patriarchal notions of security. There has been appointment of women in diplomatic services in new and challenging roles, making space for more women to follow the same path. Another aspect is that of gendered construction of women’s contribution to the nation. As biological reproducers of the nation, they are hailed. However, when same bodies perform their reproductive roles, it further limits their choices within diplomacy due to active discrimination. Diplomat Dr. Anjan Shakya (Nepal): “There is a natural distinction between female and male, but such distinction of female is seen as a weakness. The fact that male also have a duty and are a part of it [pregnancy] is completely disregarded. In a family setting, this joint problem or opportunity is regarded as normal but the moment a female is in such a situation out of a family setting, she is seen in a different light, seen as a weakness… Even now when any female worker is pregnant, she is judged and disregarded as incapable, which is not true. She is giving birth to another youth, another citizen, the government should think it in that manner. So, to answer the question, ‘What can be done to bring women into diplomacy?’ I think we need to make some corrections in that particular area”. The idea of a pregnant body disrupts the heteronormative masculine imagery. There is an awkward pause. This is also related to the construction of a seasoned diplomat, necessarily attached to experience which is directly translated from age. So, if at all a diplomat is imagined, a pregnant woman body is not part of that imagination. There has been lack of discussion in this area in both theory and practice. South Asian Families and Normalization of Western Values This is an aspect which might not have been picked up in any quantitative study and it goes to show the research value of unstructured conversations with practitioners. In South Asia, families are defined contextually. It is not uncommon for single women to live with parents and see themselves as having a family. Families are not defined narrowly as comprising

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of spouses and children like in the West. South Asian women diplomats operate in the context of this ‘contextual family’ system of South Asia. As indicated in one of the interviews, they face difficulty when the Western type of family system is upheld as the norm and dependents like elderly parents are denied privileges. Diplomat Deepa Wadhwa from India: “The problem most of the Indian women diplomats face is the concept of family, particularly in the West. The concept of family in the West is only your spouse, your children and even your living partner who is LGBTIQ is accepted. The Western countries do not accept parents as part of your family, which is part of our family in South Asia. So, we had problems with lady diplomats who were unmarried and posted to European countries and she wanted to take her mother to stay with her because her mother was her family and that country refused to give her a visa for her mother. These are issues I think which are real… and particularly the so called developed world which talks about human rights and equality, they must understand that the concept of (what) constitutes family differs and if they want us to accept same sex partner or not married but living partners (as family) they should also be expanding their definition of what conceptual family is as far as South Asians are concerned”. Such practices show how the Western family system is constructed as the norm in international relations and diplomacy, leading to othering of South Asian women diplomats. Such practices tend to enforce homogeneity and heterosexual masculine conception of family where single women or women with parents as family members are ‘othered’. It is important that live-in partners and LGBTQIA2S+ families are recognized globally. However, it is equally important that other conceptions of family, be it from South Asia or from other parts of the global south are also given equal respect and recognition. From ‘Lady Ambassador’ to ‘Ambassador’ and Going Beyond Numbers The ‘lady ambassador’ as a tag is a marker of women diplomats being in numeric minority hence perceived as an exception. As more women join, there is a possibility of acceptance of the word ambassador as a genderneutral term, rather than seeing it as a masculine profession. Only then the image of men alone being diplomats may make way for a possibly ‘queer’ future in diplomacy. Further, individual achievers certainly have symbolic value for other women but they also face the challenge of being called exception (hence not the norm). Once the struggle to reach desired

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numbers is achieved, it may pave way for more voices on gender issues informed by lived experiences of women in diplomacy. Diplomat H.E. Himalee Subhashini Arunatilaka from Sri Lanka: “Female diplomats. the world over, either in bilateral or multilateral institutions, bring fresh perspectives every day to resolve issues facing mankind particularly in matters involving the environment, and issues of social, economic and cultural importance. These are all areas where women play a prominent role in their day to day life, so they understand the issues around them. Thus, women can play a positive role on these issues at multilateral fora as well”. One important aspect is to examine if care ethics can inform the public performance of diplomacy by women diplomats. One of the most debated issues around representation of women in South Asia has been if women would actually behave differently in leadership positions or play by the already set rules. This question is also raised with respect to women in diplomacy. Diplomat Dr. Anjan Shakya from Nepal: “So culturally, since women learn such things from their houses, they have been able to show that difference in diplomacy. They are friendlier, less arrogant and stubborn, at least in my opinion. Females are more endurant, you might say I’m bragging about females, but having done studies, understanding females, they have more capacity to endure. This brings a lot of difference in diplomacy. Silence is sometimes better than talking, sometimes we need to handle diplomacy peacefully. So, I think, generally we can witness a good performance by females in diplomacy”. In concluding this section, it is worth noting that these interviews were revealing and they highlight the importance of bridging the academic/practitioner binary. It opens a new method of talking about international relations, one which not only examines the lack of women in the field of diplomacy but also reaches out to those who are in the field in order to understand the practice of international relations from their subjective perspectives (‘situated knowledge’) as South Asian women diplomats. Several questions are brought to focus by these interviews and they provide a much needed, grounded, lived experiences-based introduction to this volume. Many of those questions are explored in this volume itself in different chapters, while some others require more research.

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Overview of the Volume As noted earlier, this edited volume seeks to bring fresh insights based on the lived experiences of South Asian women and shows how they are significant for international relations theory and practice. The attempt is to capture conversations around theory and practice of international relations in order to rethink the ontological, epistemological, and methodological frames of International Relations. Some of the questions that this volume explores include: How does the lived realities of women of South Asia blur the boundaries of domestic and international? What implication this has on theory and practice of IR? How are South Asian women’s lived experiences informing theory and policy? How does state masculinity impact women’s agency in South Asia? To what extent policies on representation impact women’s status? What are the epistemological frameworks emerging out of women’s experiences from South Asia? What has been the shift from ‘Speaking about Women in international relations’ to ‘Women in international relations speaking’? How can we inform policy discourses from a gender lens? How can we capture women’s writing on international relations? What are the concerns of South Asian women academics in IR? How are the intersectional experiences of South Asian women impacting their everyday lives? The chapters put together in this volume the dialogue between local and international, attempting at widening and providing depth to discourses on gender and international relations. An introduction to the different sections of this edited volume will be helpful for the readers to navigate them better. The volume is thematically arranged into four sections and a lot of thought went into this arrangement. The first section, Gendering International Relations of South Asia: Theoretical Perspectives consists of three chapters which unpack key theoretical debates on gender and international relations, offering South Asian perspectives. The first chapter by Anuradha Chenoy tracks the evolution of theoretical debates concerning gender and international relations with special focus on South Asia. Chenoy argues that the prevalence of militarism and the predominance of a ‘masculine’ security narrative in South Asia has meant that the gender lens has not been mainstreamed in South Asian IR debates. The second chapter by Shazana Andrabi highlights the importance of mainstreaming feminism in IR in the context of South Asia and identifies scholarly works from South Asia which have attempted this goal. Andrabi argues that mainstreaming feminism in IR

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can provide fresh and holistic perspectives but admits that at South Asian level, much work needs to be done in this respect. The third chapter of this section, authored by Hijam Liza Dallo Rihmo examines how South Asian women’s intersectional identities are different from that of Western women and argues that the way threat construction happens among South Asian women is distinct. Hence, Rihmo argues that a South Asian women specific understanding of threat perception is needed to construct grounded theories which are democratic, emancipatory, and representative. In this way, the second section provides a sound theoretical platform to proceed further. These works are also valuable contributions to the already growing set of scholarship on ‘worlding’ international relations, by contributing unique South Asian perspectives (Acharya & Buzan, 2007; Behera, 2007, 2008; Tickner & Smith, 2020). The second section, Gendering Foreign Policy Theory and Practice in South Asia comprises of three chapters which examine foreign policy theory and practice in South Asia through a gender lens. They employ the framework of feminist foreign policy and try to reimagine traditional foreign policy concepts like national security, power, and peace. The first chapter by Shabana Fayyaz critically examines the feminist aspects of Pakistan’s foreign policy and identifies some of the challenges faced by the country in embracing elements of feminist foreign policy. Fayyaz argues that by incorporating feminist aspects in foreign policy, Pakistan can prevent conflicts from escalating, ensuring regional stability and security. The second chapter by Rashmi Gopi discusses how the concept of national security in India’s foreign policy is constructed based on a hegemonic masculinity that is based on militarism and increasingly Hindu nationalism. She argues that Hindutva discourses of Ardhnarishwar and Akhand Bharat have shaped India’s national security discourse and her chapter examines the India–US nuclear deal and the Teesta River water dispute with Bangladesh to substantiate the arguments. The third chapter of this section by Akanksha Khullar argues that adoption of feminist foreign policy frameworks by South Asian countries can lead to emergence of new solutions to old protracted problems and enable an inclusive and human-centric approach. She argues that a feminist approach can broaden the conceptualization of security, promote badly needed regional stability in South Asia, recognition of women’s agency, and foster a constructive reconceptualization of power. The papers of this section build on previous sections and show how gender approaches can influence policy and decision making through case studies of foreign policies of different

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South Asian countries. They offer constructive policy suggestions which are detailed, country specific, and actionable, thereby demonstrating that these discussions do not merely have theoretical value but also can inform policy and actions. The third section, South Asian Women and International Politics: Profiles, Impacts and Representation, uses gender as a tool of analysis to examine the representation of South Asian women in international relations and related domains. Some of the chapters of this section examine the nature and impact of women leaders at national and domestic levels in South Asia. The imprints of South Asian women leaders are long lasting and are not limited by territory. However, the issue of which person and voice gets represented and why is a complex case, considering the numerically low representation of women on leadership roles. Such difficult questions are discussed by the four chapters of this section. The first chapter by Tinaz Pavri uses the comparative study method to analyse the rise and careers of three women leaders, Indira Gandhi, Benazir Bhutto, and Aung San Suu Kyi. She argues that all these women owed their political rise to their families and in general shared the world views of their families. They were products of their times and while they inspired women in South Asia, their policies did not focus specifically on women. The second chapter by Dickey Lama critically examines the sexist treatment of Hou Yanqi, a Chinese diplomat in Indian media in response to her diplomatic work in Nepal. Using this particular incident as a case study, Lama throws light on how women leaders are treated and evaluated differently than their male counterparts. She argues that such treatment of women leaders are part of the hyper masculine narratives that are normalized in international relations discourses, leading to conflicts, inequalities, and othering. The third chapter by Satyaki Aditya evaluates the role of prominent Indian women leaders and discusses the challenges they navigated in order to succeed in politics. He also documents their individual contributions to different discourses in international relations. The profiles he builds of individual women leaders are marked by remarkable similarities and key differences which have great heuristic value. The fourth chapter of this section by Shuvechha Ghimire and Shumaila Fatima evaluates the reasons for underrepresentation of women in conflict resolution mechanisms in South Asia. The chapter does a detailed country-wise analysis of South Asian countries to flush out the gendered narratives in each country. The chapters of this section contribute immensely to understanding the nature and limitations of women’s representation in different

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domains. They show how even the limited number of women who slip through and succeed in some of these domains are evaluated with a gendered yardstick and this can change the way these leaders project themselves. This suggests that underrepresentation of women in theory and practice of international relations is not just a quantitative aspect but on its own it can have qualitative impacts as well. The final section of this volume, Widening Horizons: South Asian Women and Socio-Political Movements, provokes the reader to (un)think and (re)think international relations from the margins. The intersectional experiences of women demand a radical reimagination of international relations in a way that it not only widens the arena but also connects the local to the global, breaking the constructed hierarchy of domestic and international. There has been a pressing need to bring into focus the experiences of women who are exercising their agency, everydayness of their politics reshaping everything that is around them and connecting it all in a transdisciplinary manner with the global. This is a daunting task as the boundaries of disciplines are guarded with passion as it is part of the neat categorization that is the hallmark of heteronormative knowledge systems. It is important to disrupt and destabilize these boundaries to highlight marginalized voices and this is what this section undertakes to do by bringing together six chapters with an eclectic mix of themes which are seen by many as not belonging to the discipline of IR. The first chapter by Kamna Tiwary examines the participation of women in anti-nuclear movements in India and situates it in the context of global anti-nuclear movements. The subsequent chapter by Judith Anne Lal discusses the intersectional existence of South Asian Dalit women and links their struggles with that of Black women and other oppressed communities across the world. This is an important work which throws the spotlight on the transnational nature of marginalization and argues that for global solidarity networks to emerge, theorization has to happen at a global level. The third chapter of this section by Sehar Iqbal examines women’s activism in Kashmir valley with the help of first-hand interviews of Kashmiri women activists. Kashmir dispute in many ways has defined the security structure of South Asia but the focus in IR has always been only on inter-state narratives, ignoring women’s and sub-state narratives which also influence the conflict. The content and methodology of Iqbal’s chapter showcases the existence of several possibilities if one foregoes the strict binary of International/Domestic. Similarly, the next chapter by Shriya Patnaik explores discussions about prostitution in

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India by situating them within the international discourse on sex work. The chapter uses the ‘experiential life-stories’ of marginalized women to document the intersectional issues plaguing women in the global south. The fifth chapter by Maitree Devi discusses in a comparative perspective the situation of minority Muslim women of India and minority Hindu women of Bangladesh with respect to religious personal laws which are discriminatory towards women. The chapter is based on extensive fieldwork and first-hand interviews and it brings to light how minority women in both India and Bangladesh use informal judicial structures to seek remedies. Analysing this issue at South Asian level allows one to theorize the similarities of experiences of women of different religions and different countries as their experiences do intersect as ‘women’ despite their different socio-political and religious contexts. The final chapter of this section by Manish Jung Pulami examines the rise of populism in South Asia as a gendered phenomenon and argues that populisms are driven by conservative values which are detrimental to women. The chapter shows examples from everyday politics of different countries of the region to highlight how populism is sexist and gendered. Thus, the chapters of this section expand and push the boundaries of what can be studied in IR as a discipline, which is an explicit purpose of this volume from the moment of its conception. This edited volume has brought together diverse South Asian women’s voices and perspectives. While many chapters have been written by established scholars, the volume has also given space and representation for emerging South Asian women’s voices and perspectives. It has also set the conceptual foundation for future editions as each section of this volume can be enriched in future with additions of more case studies and even more varied perspectives with innovative methodologies.

References Acharya, A., & Buzan, B. (2007). Why is there no non-Western international relations theory? An Introduction. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 7 (3), 287–312. Anthis, F. & Nira, Y.-D. (2005). Racialised boundaries: Race, nation, gender, colour and class and the anti-racist struggle. Routledge Behera, N. (2007). Reimagining IR in India. International Relations of the AsiaPacific, 7 (3), 341–368.

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Behera, N. (Ed.). (2008). International relations in South Asia: Search for an alternative paradigm. Sage Carroll, B. A. (1972). Peace research: The cult of power. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 16(4), 585–616. Chenoy, A. (2002). Militarism and women in South Asia. Kali Books. Crenshaw, K. (1989). Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: A black feminist critique of antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory and antiracist politics. University of Chicago Legal Forum, 1989(1), 139–167. Daniels, A. K. (1987). Invisible work. Social Problems, 34(5), 403–415. https:// doi.org/10.2307/800538 Elshtain, J. B. (1987). Women and war. University of Chicago Press. Enloe, C. (1989). Bananas, beaches and bases: Making feminist sense of international politics. Pandora Press. Enloe, C. (2014). Bananas, beaches and bases: Making feminist sense of international politics (2nd ed.). University of California Press. Giri, K. (2021). Do all women combatants experience war and peace uniformly? Intersectionality and women combatants. Global Studies Quarterly, 1(2), 1– 11. Grant, R., & Long, D. (Eds). (1988). Women and international relations. Millennium Journal of International Studies, Special Issue, 17(3). Grant, R. (1991). The sources of gender bias in international relations theory. In R. Grant & K. Newland (Eds.), Gender and international relations. Indiana University Press. Manchanda, R. (2001). Women, war and peace in South Asia: Beyond victimhood to agency. Sage Publications. Murphy, C. N. (1996). Seeing women, recognizing gender, recasting international relations. International Organization, 50(3), 513–538. Parashar, S. (2019).The WPS Agenda: A postcolonial critique. In S. E. Davies and J. True (Eds.), The Oxford handbook on women, peace and security. pp. 829–839. Parashar, S. (2020). Old narratives, new methods: UNSCR 1325 and the WPS Agenda, Frauen*solidarität (Women’s Solidarity), 3/4, pp. 24–25. Shepherd, L. (Ed.). (2013). Critical approaches to security: An introduction to theories and methods. Routledge. Singh, S. (2020). In between the Ulemas and the Local Warloards in Afghanistan: Critical perspectives on the “everyday”, norm translation, and UNSCR 1325”. International Feminist Journal of Politics., 22(4), 504–552. Singh, S. (2017). Gender, conflict and security. Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2(2), 149–157. Sylvester, C. (1994). Feminist theory and international relations in a post-modern era. Cambridge University Press.

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Tickner, A. & Karen, S. (Eds.) (2020). International relations from the global South: Worlds of difference (Routledge Worlding Beyond the West) Routledge. Routledge Tickner, J. A. (1992). Gender in international relations: Feminist perspectives on achieving international security. Columbia University Press. Tickner, J. A. (1997). You just don’t understand: Troubled engagements between feminists and IR theorists. International Studies Quarterly, 41(4), 611–632. UN Women. (2015, October 12). Preventing conflict transforming justice securing the peace—A global study on the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. Retrieved from http://www.unwomen. org/~/media/files/un%20women/wps/highlights/unw-global-study-132 5–2015.pdf Weber, C. (1994). Good girls, little girls and bad girls: Male paranoia in Robert Keohane’s critique of feminist international relations. Millennium Journal of International Studies, 23(2), 337–349. Yadav, P. (2020). When the personal is international: Implementation of the national action plan on resolution 1325 and 1820 in Nepal. Gender, Technology and Development., 24(2), 194–214. Zaleswski, M. (1994). The women/‘women’ question in international relations. Millennium Journal of International Studies, 23(2), 407–423. Zaleswski, M. (1998). Where is woman in international relations? To return as a woman and be heard. Millennium Journal of International Studies, 27 (4), 847–867.

PART I

Gendering International Relations of South Asia: Theoretical Perspectives

CHAPTER 2

South Asian Women and the Gender Issues in International Relations Anuradha Chenoy

International Relations (IR) in South Asia has been less resistant to women at the topmost leadership positions while women are comparatively less present at work places and comparatively excluded in public spaces. Feminist knowledge, epistemology, and practice in international relations are resisted in most of South Asia as security practices and foreign relations remain embedded in Realist paradigms. We traverse this field through recent history and lived experiences to highlight the challenges faced by women. South Asia led the world with several women prime ministers in almost all these countries from the 1970s onwards at different periods when others countries especially in the South were dominated by male only leaderships in the top most positions. So from Mrs. S. Bandarnaike (Sri Lanka), Indira Gandhi (India), Ms. Benazir Bhutto (Pakistan), and Begum Hasina and Khalida Zia (Bangladesh), men served under women Prime Ministers, all of whom took hard and often aggressive security

A. Chenoy (B) School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Ojha and P. Jaiswal (eds.), South Asian Women and International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9426-5_2

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stances. Of course all these women achieved these positions because of their privileged relation with male leaders. So their ‘greatness’ was relational—they were either daughters or wives of great male leaders. And perhaps that was also a key reason they were accepted by men and masses alike. These women leaders negotiated with existing patriarchal structures to ensure their individual leadership. They did not challenge patriarchal social relations of power and social and gendered structures remained unchallenged and barely questioned. Of course no one can deny that when these women actually came to power, they took it upon themselves to rise to the occasion of leadership and memorialize the legacy they inherited. All of them were often complimented for being ‘like the real man’ in their cabinets. They did little to change laws to reserve a place for women’s inclusion in legislatures or district administration so as to institutionalize women’s participation and roles in politics, but rather they went along with the accepted assigned men and women’s roles. They did little to advance other women leaders at regional or district level institutions, or from the grassroots. The real advancement of women leaders at different levels of politics as well as women’s participation in politics was an outcome of the collective struggles of women’s movements. Women leaders like Brinda Karat, Annie Raja, Aruna Asafali. Mamta Bannerji and others, rose through mass struggles and spoke for women’s participation in politic, in peace and at the work place. Popular struggles and the force of the international women’s movements also propelled and guided women’s groups in South Asia. Movments like Jagori and Sangat led by Kamla Bhasin and Sunita Dhar is a stellar example of women’s groups mobilising against violence on women. Similarly the Aurtat group in Pakistan. Research and writing by women academics and some progressive men academics influenced women’s liberation struggles and also challenged existing patriarchal structures and ideas since these writings deconstructed the, entrenched masculinity and its practices in the social system, in the work place and in the homes. Such knowledge production influences the slow social and economic change that brought more women into the work place and into positions of power. Sometimes change for women, came through populist decisions by male leaders. For example, former Indian Prime Minister Rajeev Gandhi enacted the 73rd Constitutional amendment that mandated that one-third of women have to be elected to local government bodies—the Panchayat, was an unusual but historic decision by a national leader. Nepal’s new Constitution that safeguards women’s

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representation in parliament and at the district levels by reserving seats for women in the legislature is a consequence of the mass Maoist movement and also women’s own movement and struggle for change from a feudal, monarchical order to a democratic secular Republic. In the structured world of professional diplomacy—like the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) where by future diplomats are chosen through an open public examination women have faced challenges. Women diplomats who entered through the same exam as their male counter parts have had to struggle against personal, social, institutional, and state patriarchy. When the Indian Foreign Service, where entry is based on a competitive exam to train and recruit professional diplomats, started in independent India, the rule for women was that even if they qualified and joined this service, they would have to resign if they chose to get married. So the Indian State directly framed rules to control women’s choices and relationships. This rule was overturned many years later after many women publicly decried this rule, but this also meant that this service has been dominated by men. (Whose wives for years were not allowed to work in the country where their husbands were posted). Further, one woman diplomat who was among the toppers in the Indian Foreign Service (1949) when it was her turn because of seniority to become the foreign secretary, was superseded. Ms. C.B. Muthamma challenged the Government of India in the Court in 1979, arguing that the rules of the Indian Foreign Service were discriminatory. She won this case and the Courts asked the Government to change the rules for equality in the service. This became the basis for many women in the Indian Foreign Service reaching high ranks. International Relations and the discipline of security studies in all South Asia countries, has remained a male-dominated discipline for decades. This has been true in universities and in the many think tanks that developed over the years. Initially, IR remained a subset of the political science discipline and was seen as a ‘soft’ subject. But an institutional base had been set up to advance world affairs. The leaders of the Indian nationalist struggle had the vision of India’s autonomous place in the world and in 1943 set up the Indian Council of World Affairs—a stellar but totally male-dominated institution of its time, located in historic building in the centre of New Delhi ‘The Indian School of International Studies’ (later School of International Studies—SIS) was the logical outcome of this development in 1955—the age of institution building in India. This was housed in Sapru House that also housed the nascent

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‘Indian Institute of Defense Analysis’, both of which are now formidable institutions of national importance. As the SIS grew and became part of the Jawaharlal Nehru University, several well-known women scholars of international studies emerged. These institutions opened cracks that allowed women to enter the field. Most well-known among them were Professor Urmila Phadnis who wrote the book on ethnicities in South Asia (Phadnis, 1979: 329–350. Then there were the eminent scholars of Chinese Studies Prof. Meera Sinha (Sinha-Bhattacharya, 2002) and Prof Gargi Dutt. When I (this author) joined the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University as Assistant Professor in 1979, there were a total of six women to about eighty men professors. But overall this School was dominated by male scholars. Women’s status, roles and participation in all fields, as a topic of research was now beginning to be studied and understood in other social science disciplines—and finally under the leadership of Prof. Veena Mazumdar ‘Women’s Studies’ as a discipline was initiated in the 1990s. IR remained indifferent to this development. But individual women in IR disciplines and outside it including in civil society organizations started research, writing, and thinking on how to approach the question on women and security in South Asia. Interestingly several women who shaped gendered security did not come from the traditional international relations disciplines but were affiliated with different disciplines and some were civil society activists. Important in this development of women thinking about security were two major developments. First, was the breakthrough and foundational work feminist approaches in international relations and security issues that was done by women scholars in the West. Outstanding amongst them are Anne J. Tickner who showed realism as a male centred, patriarchal theory that excluded women and relied on the idea of force. Cynthia Enloe’s work showed how militarism as an ideology is deeply embedded in promoting masculinity and denigrating and sexualising women. Anne Tickner challenged the foundations of Realism in international relations by showing how its founder Morganthau was essentially patriarchal and clearly biased against women (Tickner, 1992, 2001). Tickner’s critique and bringing gender into the lens of IR and security issues influenced academics who began to engage in a broader vision on international relations and are willing to accept the gender gap across the world. Enloe’s work deconstructs militarism in daily life and the subconscious, and shows how much militarism is taken for granted until one actually starts noticing that this mindset determines our/ordinary thought

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processes (Enloe, 1989). Further Enloe showed that militarism is linked to gendered thinking, relations between genders and power, gendered violence, and all kinds of hierarchies. Second, is the influence of the international women’s movement. In the 1980s and in the 1990s, the international women’s movement made significant strides especially with the International UN sponsored Conference on Women in Beijing (1995). This gave a boost to research and institutionalisation of women’s studies and research worldwide. South Asian Universities, and research institutions introduces women’s studies as a discipline. Civil society in South Asian countries took steps and several women-based resource centers started examining the conflictridden South Asia. Sri Lankan academic Kumari Jayawardane wrote the remarkable book on the role of women in South Asia’s freedom movements (Jayawardena, 1986). In all these freedom movements, women had played a stellar role but were excluded from historical records, and women’s roles in nationalism was invisibilised, and the history of nationalism made women into invisible subjects while male leaders and ideas were projected. Jayawardena’s book in a sense opened the gates for several women scholars who researched, wrote and analyzed women’s place and agency in the history and development of their nation states. Some outstanding research came from Kamla Bhasin, Ritu Menon, and Urvashi Butalia wrote path-breaking accounts of women during the Partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, a field hitherto that was dominated by men-centered scholarship (Butalia, 2000; Menon & Bhasin, 1998). Later Saba Gul Khatak wrote on security discourses in Pakistan—a major step for a military-dominated Pakistan (Khattak, 1996). Ayesha Siddiqa wrote on the relationship between the Pakistan military and business interests. In Bangladesh, Meghna Guhathakurta & Ayesha Banu (2017) and Amena Mohsin (2003) spoke on the role of women in the liberation struggle of Bangladesh. This was indeed path breaking as the official volumes on the liberation of Bangladesh had completely left out the role of women. In fact the story of rape in these struggles was a factor that the gendered history chose to leave out since rape is so associated with losing of honor of men and the nation. Amena then examined movement in the conflict ridden region of the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh. Amena revealed how the state approached the movement of indigenous people in militarized security ways and gave vivid account on how society and the state treated women in conflict areas.

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Even as the academic discipline of IR in South Asia compartivley ignored the topics of gender till the 1980s, women in South Asia started examining the role of women in conflicts, security, and peace. During the extremely violent ethnic conflict between the Tamils—represented by the militant group known as the LTTE or Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan State raged, ethnic Tamil women were part of the radical Tamil movement in different roles. Sri Lankan women’s groups and progressive women started examining the role of women in this conflict. These women like Nimalko Fernando, Sunila Jayawardane, Nilufer de Mel, Kumudini Samuel, Malathi De Alwais, and several others deconstructed this Sri Lankan ethnic conflict to show the links between masculinity, patriarchy and militarist choices (De Mel, 2007). They showed how deeply women were impacted by this combination and their bodies held hostage as symbolizing the honor of state and community alike. In fact, when the Norwegians tried to effect some peace between the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan Government, Samuel and some others were appointed as a women’s group to advise on peace making. This initiative however was dissolved as the conflict intensified. Studies and research from Sri Lanka was similarly joined by research on women, war, and peace by their counterparts in the rest of South Asia, like the work by Anuradha M. Chenoy around militarism. (Chenoy, 2002). This work was followed up with a book on Human Security in partnership with Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh , 2007. Rita Manchanda focused on Women and Peace in South Asia (Manchanda, 2017). Others like Asha Hans and Swarna Rajagopalan dedicated themselves to the links between women and peace and edited several books on this subject. Women in Nepal like Hisla Yami (2010) wrote important articles on women’s role in the Nepalese movement, Rita Thapa and others in Nepal, women researchers from Pakistan and Bangladesh wrote on South Asian women in war and peace but also had the opportunity to meet and conference together (Shrestha & Thapa, 2007). Dr. Meenakshi Gopinath founded ‘Women in Security, Conflict Management and Peace’ (WISCOMP) encouraged and sponsored large number of important research-based articles on women and peace and other issues across South Asia. Besides encouraging work on women and IR, Meenakshi’s own work is of signal importance (Gopinath & Manchanda, 2019). In 2001 onwards, UN Women began mobilizing for passing Security Council Resolution 1325 that focussed on Women’s participation and leadership in security and peace bodies. This galvanized more women

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writing on armed conflicts and peace negotiations, and explaining why women needed to be included in peace talks as well as in peace and reconciliation commissions (Chenoy, 2009). South Asian women made significant contributions to the collective work of understanding armed conflicts. Roshmi Goswami showed the multiple roles women play in armed conflict situations. Rita Manchanda, Hisila Yami did case studies of women’s roles in conflict areas like the Maoist women in Nepal to uncover the variety of roles women play. Dr. Shweta Singh add to feminist research with her work on Women in Sri Lanka. During this period, UN Women South Asia developed a small working group of women working in peace and security in South Asia, but this lasted only for a short time. With the turn of the century in the 2000s, disciplines like economics, sociology, political studies, and public health had already produced and popularized research on not only women’s role in all these fields, but also pointed to the fact that leaving women out of the picture meant a bias and exclusive and biased research and practice. That including women was not just about ‘adding and stirring’ but it is of critical importance to analyse and show the gender relations and uncover that biases were institutional and structural and needed to change. Further this change was necessary for making a better society. By now several universities had established women’s studies departments. In the School of International Studies, this author taught a popularly attended course on ‘Gender and International Relations’. Further many women professors in fields other than IR supported and taught through a feminist lens to influence their students and the discourse of International Relations. These included Prof. Neera Chandoke, Prof. Navneeta Chadha Behra, Prof. Rumki Basu, and several others. Many young scholars have taken the issue of gender and IR seriously to continue with the earlier generations. Of special mention is the indigenous woman researcher and activist from Manipur, Binalakshmi Nepram (2002), her work with gun violence affected women in India’s North East, especially in Manipur has had a good impact. Others include Shweta Singh from South Asian University, Swati Parasher, Dr. Ayesha Ray, and others. Some peace activists like Dr. B.R. Upreti (with Ashid, 2016) from Nepal and especially young male researchers like Vineet Thakur and Pramod Jaiswal introduce gender in their teaching and work. The Council for Social Relations under Dr. Ranjana Kumari has initiated research on a feminist foreign policy. All these efforts as we have shown above, made the difference and women’s roles became acknowledged in knowledge

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production and in the practice of international relations. No decent work on IR theory can escape analysis of gender relations. Yet, practice, transactions, teaching, and research by the South Asian ‘strategic thinkers often’ remains embedded in Realist and Neo-Realist paradigms that exclude the role of gender in mainstream discourses. The strategic community that consists of a club of retired diplomats, high-ranking military officials, strategic affairs media, and other analysts, do have some women associated in such communities in South Asia focus on the geopolitical chess board. In a recent statement the Indian foreign minister said that India would promote a ‘feminist foreign policy’ (Panicker, 2021) But what this feminist foreign policy will be has to be outlined. It is widely held that a feminist approach will lead to isolation and rejection from the international strategic thought that is deeply embedded in realism. Moreover the politics in many of the South Asian countries is one where militarist ideas are triumphant symbolically as well as part of the official worldview. Even something as gentle as human security is often neglected.. In debates on the nuclear issue or increasing defense expenditure there is minimal mention of the real crises of South Asia whether it is inequality, COVID-19 pandemic, or threats from climate change. Gender issues are largely token or are falling off the map. Geopolitics and strategic choices are well spoken about but gender is generally relegated to ‘nontraditional’ security realms. Gender and IR in South Asia still have a long way to go.

References Butalia, U. (2000). The Other Side of Silence. Duke University Press. Chenoy, A. M. (2002). Militarism and women in South Asia. Kali for Women. Chenoy, A. M. (2009). Women, war and peace, security council resolution 1325, peace women across the globe: Switzerland. and Sangat. https://www. 1000peacewomen.org/admin/data/files/page_section_file/file/28/pwag_s angat_brochure-1325.pdf?lm=1399301890. Chenoy, A. M. (2009). The gender and human security debate. IDS Bulletin, 40(2), 44–49. Chenoy, A. M. (2012). Countering militarization, building peace: The intersectionality of SCR 1325 and responsibility to protect, New Delhi: WISCOMP. https://www.academia.edu/26738940/Countering_Militarization_Buil ding_Peace_The_Intersectionality_of_SCR_1325_and_the_Responsibility_to_ Protect_Anuradha_Chenoy

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De Mel, N. (2007). Militarizing Sri Lanka: Popular culture, memory and narrative in the armed conflict. Sage Publications. Enloe, C. (1989). Bananas, beaches, and bases: Making feminist sense of international politics. University of California Press. Gopinath, M. & Manchanda, R. (2019). Women’s peacemaking in South Asia, Oxford Handbooks. Guhathakurta, M. & Banu, A. (Eds.). (2017). Gendered lives, livelihood and transformation, The University Press Limited. Jayawardena, K. (1986). Feminism and nationalism in the third world. Zed Books. Khattak, S. G. (1996). Security discourses and the state in Pakistan. Alternatives, 21(3), 341–362. https://doi.org/10.1177/030437549602100304 Manchanda, R. (2017). Women and politics of peace: South Asia narratives on militarization, power and justice. Sage Publication. Malathi, D. A. (2009). Interrogating the ‘political’: Feminist peace activism in Sri Lanka. Feminist Review, 91(1), 81–93. Menon, R., & Bhasin, K. (1998). Borders and boundaries: Women in India’s Partition, New Delhi: Kali for Women, 1998; Urvashi Butalia, Urvashi (1998). Penguin. Mohsin, A. (2003). The Chittagong Hill Tract, Bangladesh XE “Bangladesh” : On the difficult road to peace. Lynne Reinner Publishers. Nepram, B. (2002). South Asia’s fractured frontier: Armed conflicts, narcotics and small arms proliferation in India’s Northeast. Mittal Publishers. Panicker, L. (2021, August 7). Indian foreign policy need more women. Hindustan Times. Phadnis, U. (1979). Ethnicity and nation-building in South Asia. A case study of Sri Lanka. India Quarterly, 35(3), 329–350. https://doi.org/10.1177/097 492847903500303 Shrestha, A. D., & Thapa, R. (Eds.). (2007). The impact of armed conflict on women in South Asia. Manohar Publishers. Sinha-Bhattacharya, M. (2002). China, world and India, New Delhi: Sanskriti. Tadjbakhsh, S. (2006). Human security: Concept and implications. Routledge. Tadjbakhsh, S., & Anuradha, C. (2007). Human Security, Concept and Implications. Routledge. Tickner, J. Ann. (1992). Gender in international studies: Feminist perspectives on achieving global security. Columbia University Press. Tickner, J. Ann. (2001). Gendering world politics: Issues and approaches in the post-cold war era. Columbia University Press. UN Women. (2014). South Asia expert group of peace and security, 2012– 2014. https://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/news-and-events/stories/2012/ 1/un-women-forms-expert-group-on-women-and-peace-in-south-asia

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Upreti, B. R. & Åshild K. (2016). Women in Nepal’s transition, PRIO Policy Brief, 11. Oslo: PRIO. https://www.prio.org/publications/9098 Yami, H. (2010, March 21). Women’s role in the Nepalese movement, making a people’s constitution, Monthly Review. https://monthlyreview.org/commen tary/womens-role-in-the-nepalese-movement/

CHAPTER 3

Mainstreaming Feminist International Relations: An Analysis of the Works of IR Theorists in South Asia Shazana Andrabi

This paper emphasizes the importance of an interdisciplinary connection between the fields of study of International Relations (IR) and Feminism with emphasis on scholarship from South Asia in an attempt to recognize the importance of decolonizing knowledge production. By bringing forth and analysing the works of female IR theorists from South Asia, the intention is to bring into focus the works of such theorists and scholars, and to add to the debate on the colonization of knowledge production and the proliferation of a single (Western) type of scholarship as ‘knowledge’. Also, the contradiction between the practice of having more women heads of state in South Asia and the lack of women-oriented policies is pointed out, and explained. The State, constructed as a masculine entity, has performed accordingly, giving disproportionate opportunities

S. Andrabi (B) Centre for International Relations, Islamic University of Science and Technology, Awantipora, India e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Ojha and P. Jaiswal (eds.), South Asian Women and International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9426-5_3

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to men. The extent to which the State, and subsequently interstate relations, is masculinized, makes it almost obligatory for women in positions of power to ‘de-feminize’ themselves and acquire the ‘toughness’ required to be in a position to influence interstate/international relations. This is borne out by the fact that even though South Asia has the distinction of having the largest number of female heads of state in the world, this has not translated into any major policy shifts towards women in the region. Women leaders implementing masculine policies is the norm in international politics. Cynthia Enloe (1989: 13), while explaining the masculine in national and international affairs, posits that while politics at the national level allows women some “select access”, “…the international political arena is a sphere for men only, or for those rare women who can successfully play at being men, or at least not shake masculine presumptions”. This will be exemplified further in the paper while discussing the female political leaders in South Asia in the works of Rounaq Jahan. The need, therefore, is to bring into focus a feminist understanding of IR where women are not required to be masculine in order to be effective, and subaltern women are given a voice and their points of view regarding international politics are given legitimacy akin to that of their Western counterparts. This layering of IR, feminism in IR, and recognition of South Asian voices is the predominant theme of this paper. Aydinli and Mathews (2000: 289–292), highlight this recognition by laying emphasis on the fact that IR as a discipline can truly be international when it incorporates theories from the periphery into the existing, core-dominated field. They further go on to argue that “An interdisciplinary and cosmopolitan discipline that gains from many different national discourses would not only lower the likelihood of…failures, but could also reduce the time wasted on excessive concentration on one dimension at the expense of other approaches” Aydinli and Mathews (2000: 290). There have been increasing attempts at trying to find the feasibility or possibility to create alternative, non-western theories, particularly in IR. Even though scholars are divided on this, they recognize the need for the inclusion of a non-western paradigm in the solely Western-dominated field of IR (Bilgin, 2010; Blanchard, 2003). In order to tie these concepts together, this paper begins with an understanding of gender mainstreaming as a concept and its recognition and critique. It goes on to understand feminist mainstreaming as a deeper nuance of gender mainstreaming and proceeds to examine its

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importance in the field of IR, and the core–periphery analysis of knowledge production by feminist scholars from the periphery. The periphery for the purpose of this paper is South Asia, the intent is to focus on three important states in this region (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh) and analyse the work of feminist scholars from these states. However, at the outset, it is important to mention that the main limitation faced while conducting research for this paper was the scanty literature that has been produced by writers from South Asia which integrates the fields of Feminism and IR. There are scholars of Feminism and scholars of IR, but very few who integrate the two fields together and try to produce new knowledge with inputs from this part of the world. The paradigms within which the scholars have researched also belong to the so-called ‘American Social Science’ or International Relations as we know it. This finding gives this paper a greater significance with respect to the importance of intersections and interdisciplinarity. It is believed that the absences and limitations of this topic can be a very valuable area of research in itself.

Mainstreaming Feminism in IR As it gained ground, scholars realized that discourses on gender equality or gender studies ended up constricting the space for women’s studies to be a part of the mainstream discourse, and unwittingly relegated it to a separate space where a special effort was required to study and understand it. Not considering intersectionality within and among women had resulted in unidimensional policies that were oblivious to the differences in socio-economic class, race, caste, and other characteristics and identities of women. Even the policies and practices employed exclusively for the benefit of women reinforced their marginalized status by being implemented on the peripheries and as addendums to existing policies. In this context, the recognition of gender mainstreaming is increasingly being seen as an attempt at the rectification of this marginalization. It seeks to recognize women’s unique capabilities and vulnerabilities that envisage a sustained effort to induct policies that are gender-sensitive, and not just gender-neutral. “Gender mainstreaming seeks to produce transformatory processes and practices that will concern, engage and benefit women and men equally by systematically integrating explicit attention to issues of sex and gender into all aspects of an organisation’s work” (Woodford-Berger, 2007: 66) (Also see Murphy, 1996: 513–538). The 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action acknowledged and

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promoted gender mainstreaming as a potent tool for the empowerment of women. However, it has been critiqued as being unaware of the colonial histories and other nuances of the “subaltern structural positions” that perpetuate the exclusion of women from the Global South (Ibid.: 65). This paper is an effort at bringing forth the literature that has been emanating from the so-called ‘indigenous’ societies and has been continuously disregarded as not being modern enough to stand the scrutiny of the predominantly positivist Western frameworks. This paper understands gender mainstreaming as a macro concept, theoretically and practically, and mainstreaming feminism as its subcategory, where a feminist lens is used to understand the scholarship of exclusion among feminist scholars of International Relations (IR), particularly from the Global South. Since gender mainstreaming is mainly seen from a development perspective, mainstreaming feminism in IR forms a very crucial sub-category as it seeks to bring to the core the field of feminist studies, which Richmond and Graef (2014: 69) refer to as the “theoretical hinterland” within the field of IR. IR in itself is a derivative of the structure of power that presupposes the superiority of the (predominantly masculine, state-centric) theories emanating from the Global North. As a result, it has internalized the power structures in its curriculum and pedagogy. A feminist critique entered this field in the 1980s, when feminist scholars “…questioned the biases (largely male) within the theoretical constructs and methodologies employed by IR experts” (Khattak, 2008: 51). The fact that Realism is one of the most prominent theories of IR is a testament to this fact. IR theories are accused of being exclusive of the Global South. Feminist IR theories, and theorists from this part of the world, then, become a subset in this core–periphery analysis, where the Global North is the core, the Global South the periphery, and Feminist IR theories and theorists a subset of that periphery. The very language and terms that dominate the understanding of IR are masculinized to the extent that women are all but invisible at this level. Nirupama Rao, an Indian Foreign Service officer, opines that “Gender equality should define the grammar of daily existence” (2018, para.1), implying that inclusion/gender mainstreaming is the need of the times. Emphasizing the forced invisibility of women in IR, Khattak posits that “women cannot simply be added in for ‘IR’ has been constructed on the exclusion of women from ‘high politics’” (Ibid.: 50).

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In academics, this structure of “epistemic violence” (Spivak, 1988: 76) is present in the colonization of knowledge emanating from the Global South. In practice, whether it is foreign policy, intervention in military or other forms, trade, peace agreements, ceasefires, or post-conflict reconstruction, it affects women in myriad ways at every level. In such a scenario, when these very policies are un-gendered to such an extent that either women are physically excluded from these processes or are included but their voices hold no value, one can hardly expect the policies to include specific women’s issues. The participation of women in such a scenario remains restricted to symbolism. They may not be totally invisible in the physical sense, but their voices are either muted or too weak to make an actual difference to the more ‘concrete’ decisions facing the particular country. Even the women who are a part of this field do their best to de-feminize themselves and blend into existing structures of gendered invisibility and structural violence rather than create and build new structures. ‘Standpoint Feminism’ is one of the important lenses that seeks to critique the centralization of male hegemony. This theory aims at building epistemologies based on divergent views, while at the same time keeping the lived realities and experiences of women at the centre (Halpern, 2019). The idea that all knowledge is ‘situated’ in a context provides an insight into those groups of people (in this case women) who, by virtue of being marginalized, do not feature in theoretical paradigms. Standpoint feminism works towards bringing this situational experience into the theoretical domain and bringing to the core the hitherto marginalized women (Narain, 2014). Geographical placements are also an important situational aspect of Standpoint Feminism. Recognizing the exclusion of non-western women in theoretical frameworks, Harding (2009: 196) states that it is not enough to bring in their voices into the existing frameworks that have been produced keeping in view the West and its experiences. The need for a structural change that locates women’s experiences from the non-western world into theories and practices is what will decolonize knowledge production. In an endeavour to bring in feminist voices from the Global South, this paper intends to decolonize knowledge production in the field of IR and look at this field from the lens of female scholars from South Asia. However, Western feminist scholars of International Relations cannot be ignored in terms of their contribution to pointing out the absence of women-centred theories and practices in IR. Tickner (1999: 44) cites the

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example of Machiavelli’s ‘The Prince’ and uses this as a symbol of how authority is constructed and naturalized as being male. She argues that the foundation of the field of IR has been laid by men, where the state has been envisioned as a structure of power that resides in men. “Princesses are scarce both in the discipline of international relations and in the realm of international politics” (Ibid.: 44), she says. Tickner has rallied for the inclusion of gender issues in IR theory, positing that absence of women from foundational theories tends to feed into already existing biases in contemporary international theory (Ibid.: 46–47). Gillian Youngs (2004: 76) broadly sums up feminist IR thus: “…feminist International Relations has expanded, and built the work of feminist political and economic theory to examine the masculinist framing of politics and economics and associated institutions, including notably the state and its key military and governmental components, as well as the discourses through which these institutions operate and are reproduced over time”. Cynthia Enloe (2004) stands out in this field as one of the most prominent scholars to straddle the fields of feminism and IR through the incorporation of the lived realities of women as a result of policy decisions taken at international levels. Enloe formalized the concept of “intellectual curiosity” regarding life in general and the field of International Relations in particular (Ibid.: 95). The scholars whose works have been chosen, stand out among their peers in the quality of their work, and their nuanced understanding of a feminist lens to understand the politics of South Asia and their recognition of the missing link in IR theories by way of inclusion from peripheral contexts. By doing so, they give voices to the subaltern, and bring into focus the masculine and West-centric identity of the State and its structures. Saba Gul Khattak (Pakistan) integrates the fields of Feminism and IR, and views the absence of women scholars in these fields a feminist understanding of the masculine nature of the state. Rounaq Jahan writes from the unique perspective of a Bangladeshi woman academic in the fields of Politics and International Affairs. Her focus is mostly the policies of Bangladesh and their effects on Bangladeshi women. The increasing recognition of the field of IR in India has seen a rise in scholarly activities in this field. In particular, feminist writers and activists have come forth to claim their rightful space in the intersection of the fields of Feminism and IR. Some organizations like the IWIR (Indian Women in International Relations) have been formed exclusively by Indian women and women of Indian origin living in the West to further this agenda. As they

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straddle both lived and academic experiences in the core and periphery, they intend to be the link between these geographical spaces by building, i. A strong and sustainable network of women in the field of IR and IPE. ii. A forum to showcase the work and expertise of Indian Women and Women of Indian origin in the field of IR and IPE. iii. A network to mentor the upcoming generations of women in the field. (Global Policy Insights, n.d., para.3) The straddling of lived and academic experiences between the West and South Asia is a prominent feature of the scholars’ lives whose works are being studied. It is important to mention this because the visibility that they require and aspire to for their work may not be available to them if they do not showcase their work in a Western academic environment that has greater visibility, acceptability, and opportunity. This raises further questions on the geographical monopoly over knowledge production and dissemination, and would require research that is beyond the scope of this paper.

Women in IR in South Asia South Asian women writing about the politics of the region can itself be viewed as an attempt to challenge and change the IR perspective of the core-dominated narrative. The very fact that incidents, individuals, and political spaces are seen from the perspective of the people whose lived realities are manifestations of the policies and politics of the region give it a validity that complements, or may even contradict, ‘outside’ narratives of internal politics and its effects on the population. Saba Gul Khattak (2008: 54) explains how intersections between IR and feminism manifest in the South Asian women’s understanding of the state. “South Asian women’s concerns centre on the nature of the state, violence against women (particularly sexual and cultural) and interstate relations”. She places women’s activism in relation to IR where women are more capable of analysing and understanding issues concerning women and thus better placed for creating positive changes. The links between international politics and the effect it has on national policies, especially with respect to women from South Asia, is a recurring theme in her work. She sees these

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women as agents of change within their contexts as activists and scholars of IR. Khattak (2008: 56), cites the examples of women from India and Pakistan who got together to increase people-to-people contact and work towards bringing about peace between the two hostile neighbours (Also see Andrabi, 2019: 9). As a South Asian scholar of IR and Political Science, and a member of the Planning Commission of Pakistan, Khattak, in her works, provides an insight into the absence of women in IR in South Asia, while bringing forth their active efforts to integrate into the international system of academics and activism to create positive peace in the region. Her work highlights the protests by female scholars and activists from India and Pakistan after both countries conducted nuclear tests. The hypermasculinization of the state visible in the language employed by both States to celebrate the nuclearization of each, viewed from a feminist lens, highlights the effects of such policies and posturing on women from women’s perspectives. Khattak’s work on inter and intrastate relations focuses on the status of women in Afghanistan as well, and her work critiques the masculinist policies of the State in dealing with problems related to women in Afghanistan. She goes on to state how the narrative of the ‘liberation’ of Afghan women was created to suit the interest of the United States of America, how the misogynistic policies of the Taliban worked towards further regression of the rights of women, and how even the government of Afghanistan did precious little beyond symbolism to alleviate the sufferings of Afghan women (Khattak, 2004: 213–236). Women have been used as pawns in the foreign policy of great powers in the region. The use of a feminist lens to understand these policies gives them a nuance that would be difficult to find if viewed solely from a state and Western-centric perspective. The State is seen as using various distinctions, including gender, to legitimize its narratives and policy decisions (Khattak, 1996: 341). For example, her work underscores the importance of the “symbolic significance of women’s bodies in nationalist and security discourses and struggles” (Khattak, 2008: 56). She looks at the violence against women during the partition of India in 1947, and the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 through the prism of women’s cultural and traditional roles in society as bearers of the honour of the society. While on the one hand, Khattak uses the works of Urvashi Butalia to cite examples of violence against women, particularly during the partition of 1947, on the other hand she sees the 1971 Bangladesh war through the lens of authors like Amena Mohsin, whose works bring forth the masculinized nationalist

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discourses after the rape of hundreds of thousands of Bangladeshi women by the Pakistani army soldiers. She focuses on the forced silencing of these women and the society in general because of the ‘shame’ and feelings of emasculation it produces in South Asian societies when the men are seen as not being able to protect the women, the ‘honour’ of their society. Khattak’s works bring forth a nuanced understanding of the multitude of problems that are unique to South Asian contexts in many ways. She analyses these problems from a feminist understanding of International Relations and brings forth the fallacy of states in focusing on state and national security at the cost of the human security of women. Rounaq Jahan, a Bangladeshi feminist scholar of Political Science and International Affairs and an activist, brings to the reader two images, contradictory in nature to each other, of the perception of women in South Asia. One is that of powerful political figures like Indira Gandhi, Benazir Bhutto, Khaleda Zia, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, and others, and the other is of “…female masses, poor, illiterate, often veiled, huddled in groups in separate ‘women only’ polling booths or ration lines, or in labour lines seeking casual jobs” (1987: 848). She initially sees these women from the prism of ‘outsiders’, or Westerners, and their understanding of strong women leaders from South Asia as a result of the class differences that make it easier for women with particular affiliations of class and caste to get ahead irrespective of their gender. Jahan has researched the question of whether this perception holds true, or whether it is just another misunderstood misrepresentation of the qualities of women leaders from the South. She has extensively researched the internal politics of Bangladesh, though not always from a feminist lens. Her works on women can be classified as falling into the theoretical category of ‘Standpoint Feminism’ that has been discussed earlier in this paper. This is because she analyses the lived experiences of women from a ‘situational’ standpoint, whether as political leaders/Heads of State or female recipients of the policies developed and implemented by those leaders. A very illuminating part of the research of Jahan is the analysis of how women Heads of State in South Asia came to acquire, and then hold on to, these positions of power, and what they did, or did not do, for women when they were in power. Again, the situational analysis that brings forth important cultural nuances works as an important indicator of knowledge production from a non-western understanding. She points out the fact that women leaders in South Asia, while in power, did not do anything

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substantial that would change the situation of women in their countries (Ibid.: 856). Jahan puts forth a variety of reasons for this, including primarily the religious and cultural backlash that they could face if they went against the norms of the society. This could translate into a loss of votes in an electoral democracy. From this analysis of women leaders and their policies within South Asia, we can assume that the same applied to their foreign policy as well. They did not want their identities as women to be prominent and thus did not bring any changes in the form of reform in political leadership or policy changes at the intra or interstate levels. They ended up as women who tried equally hard, or harder than men to work within the masculine structure of the State. Rita Manchanda, an Indian scholar and activist, has written extensively on women in peace and conflict, both within and outside the boundaries of India. In her essay, ‘Redefining and Feminising Security’, she starts with a very powerful statement; “Marginalised and rendered a footnote all through history, women’s voices have been rarely heard in security concerns” (2001: 1956). She goes on to state that happenings on the international front have an impact on women as well, and not recognizing this impact as well as the contributions that women can make towards sustainable peace is to the detriment of the society as well as the State. She bats for a change in the security paradigm from state security to human security where a masculine, Realism-dominated IR framework is structurally changed to include women and their diverse experiences. Her work underscores the importance of an approach in IR where security is complete only when its theoretical and practical base is grounded in a bottom-up (elicitive) approach as opposed to the prescriptive, topdown approach of State-centred security paradigms. Again, as showcased in the above scholars’ works, Manchanda’s work also depicts an awareness of the ‘situatedness’ of women. By challenging the assumption that men’s experiences are at the core of State-centric policies, she intends to bring women’s experiences from the periphery to the core and give them a voice in policy-making and implementation. In a lot of her work, Manchanda brings forth the fact that women are absent from the policymaking processes, and explains why it is important to include them. Peacebuilding, she says, is one of the very important constructive statebuilding exercises where women’s agency can build peaceful societies (Manchanda, 2005). Her work focuses on women’s roles in state building by way of active participation. Positive state building, in turn, results in human security, which can lead to national security. Each country that

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follows this route has the potential of turning the region into a stable, human-centric, and peaceful one. Seema Narain (2014: 180) emphasizes the importance of feminism in IR and sees feminism as carving out a role in IR, and creating collaborative scholarships between the two fields. However, in the present state of affairs in IR, feminism has taken a back seat to the masculine structures of power prevalent in policy and practice in the field of IR. Narain uses Ann Tickner’s use of the term ‘malestream’ to describe her concept of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ and how that shapes international affairs. Her work looks at the broadening of the scope and capacity of IR theories through the incorporation of gender (Narain, 2017). A prominent scholar of International Relations in India, Navnita Chadha Behera focuses on the need for changing epistemologies in the field of IR, and the need for mainstreaming the non-western narrative, particularly through Indian IR. She cites the example of Chanakya’s political philosophy as a conceptual and theoretical device to create that alternative discourse. Behera (2007: 355) makes a strong case for creating “alternative sites for knowledge construction” by stepping out of the box created and designed by the West. Her works carry this theme of a ‘new IR’ not just informed by non-western pedagogies and theoretical frameworks, but a field where the starting point may not necessarily be the Western model of IR. Behera sees feminism as a vantage point “…to debate issues that lie at the heart of IR” (Ibid.). Her work concurs with that of her peers in stating that gender inequality and exclusion of women from the political and economic scenario benefits the modern state, and is thus perpetuated as a conscious form of power play. Critiquing IR as a field of study that has failed to acknowledge gender awareness and mainstreaming, she states, “In the Indian academe, anthropology, sociology, and history have integrated gender-aware analyses far better than international relations” (Ibid.). There are, however, certain suggestions she puts forth to overcome these obstacles and erase the peripheral nature of Indian IR theory. One of these is the suggestion of “throwing open the disciplinary gates of IR” to include fields like feminism and other fields of study that will enrich it. Secondly, she states that lived experiences of people (including women) need to be incorporated in knowledge production rather than relying on the “expertise” (mostly Western) that has hitherto shut its gates to any other form of knowledge production. Again, we find that the theme of ‘situatedness’ runs through all the works

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studied thus far. The third and very important suggestion is the “indigenization of academic discourses in IR” (Ibid.: 359), which has been stated as a crucial factor in mainstreaming gender and feminism in IR at the beginning of this paper. Being a strong proponent of a separate situatedness of Indian IR through incorporation of feminism and other fields of study, Behera posits that a change in the field of IR can be brought about by inclusionary pedagogical and discursive practices; a co-existence of the two paradigms to create a new, non-hierarchical field of study.

Conclusion Mainstreaming feminism and feminist thinking is crucial to a holistic understanding of any field of study from the perspective of women, who, more often than not, are invisiblized in policy and decision-making, even though they suffer the consequences of these policies equally, or in some cases, more so than their male counterparts. As evident from the works of the authors from South Asia, mainstreaming feminism in IR gives the discipline of IR an ontological and pedagogical edge that could result in adding to, or even reconstructing the field of IR. Next is the situatedness of IR, a recurrent theme in the works of the scholars cited in this paper, and an increasingly important premise emanating from the disciplinary and geographical subaltern—the Global South. However, as mentioned at the outset, it was quite a task to locate women Feminist IR scholars/activists from South Asia. The category was too specific, so it had to be broadened to include political scientists who had worked on theoretical aspects of IR and tried to integrate it with feminism from their perspectives as South Asian women. The limitations of this research threw up exactly what the paper had set out to underscore, namely the invisibility of research in this particular intersection from a non-western perspective. While trying to locate scholarship in the intersection of the two fields (Feminism and IR), it can be concluded that the paper has been successful in bringing into focus the absence of such scholarship in addition to highlighting existing discourses. It was found that even in these existing discourses, the focus was on working within the frameworks set out by the West, and hardly any effort was made to step out of those boundaries. Theories are discussed and analysed, but there is no theory in IR or Feminism from South Asia that has been hypothesized, developed, and tested here. Our contributions to the field are on the rise, but they are scanty. In an era where

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mainstreaming feminism has gained ground, every field of study needs to integrate feminist theories, more so the field of IR, since it deals with policy-making at the highest level. If women are not part of either the academic or executive phase of these policies, they will continue to remain incomplete and exclusive to the detriment of human and state security. There is, therefore, a pressing need for original, new frameworks to view IR from a feminist, peripheral perspective. South Asian women, including but not limited to feminists, scholars, academics, and practitioners can tell their own stories better. These stories need their own space in the generalized and mainstream narratives. This paper was a conscious effort at bringing the periphery to the core, but as the research progressed, it was found that even in the discursive spaces of a core–periphery analysis, it was the scholars from the core that took centre stage. The most visible scholarship on the topic was that which was written by academics/scholars/researchers from the Global North. Their names were more familiar, as was their work. One of the reasons for this is the “disciplinary deafness” that Aydinli and Mathews (2000: 300) talk about, where the Western theorists of IR do not give the non-western perspectives their due, resulting in their words, in “…intellectual loss and stunted disciplinary growth”. Their recommendations to remove this institutionalized discrimination include “greater disciplinary transparency”, more scholars from the periphery on editorial boards of international journals, accepting papers in other (non-western) languages and translating them before publication, and holding conferences in the geographical periphery (Ibid.). As a theoretical tool, Elise Boulding’s (2002) concept of imaging the future by “remembering history” can be a useful tool in imagining IR through a lens of what the future should be, 30 years or more from now, then working backwards to the present and finding strategies to achieve that goal. It can help to streamline specific actions that need to be taken in order to include a feminist perspective to the field of IR, and give more recognition to non-western concepts and methodologies. The works of feminist IR scholars should be seen simply on the basis of their merit and not on geographical considerations. To this effect, and even though this paper has extensively used the core–periphery terminology to understand the relationship between Western and non-western IR, and IR and Feminism, a major recommendation is that the end of the core–periphery hierarchy should begin with the derecognition of the terms ‘core’ and ‘periphery’. Decolonization of knowledge production

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can be successful if this distinction is done away with. In the absence of this acceptance, any discussion, even if it critiques the distinction, only adds to its legitimacy. This again brings us to the fact pointed out by Navnita Chadha that instead of stepping outside the boundaries to create new knowledge, we simply try to rework the existing boundaries and fit into the existing paradigms set out by the hegemonic discourses of the West. Mainstreaming will only be effective if it is inclusive of all knowledge.

References Andrabi, S. (2019). New wars, new victimhood, and new ways of overcoming it. Stability, 8(1), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.665 Aydinli, E., & Mathews, J. (2000). Are the core and periphery irreconcilable? The curious world of publishing in contemporary international relations. International Studies Perspectives, 1(3), 289–303. https://www.jstor.org/sta ble/44218134 Behera, N. C. (2007). Re-imagining IR in India. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 7 (3), 341–368. Bilgin, P. (2010). Looking for the international beyond the West. Third World Quarterly, 31(5), 817–828. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27896579 Blanchard, E. M. (2003). Gender, international relations, and the development of feminist security theory. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 28(4), 1289–1312. https://doi.org/10.1086/368328 Boulding, E. (2002). A journey into the future: Imagining a nonviolent world, Peace and Conflict Studies, 9(1). https://doi.org/10.46743/1082-7307/ 2002.1023 Enloe, C. (1989). Bananas, beaches & bases: Making feminist sense of international relations. University of California Press. Enloe, C. (2004). ‘Gender’ is not enough: The need for a feminist consciousness. The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 80(1), 95–97. https://www.jstor. org/stable/3569298 Halpern, M. (2019). Feminist standpoint theory and science communication, Journal of Science Communication, 18(04). https://doi.org/10.22323/2.180 40302 Harding, S. (2009). Standpoint theories: Productively controversial. Hypatia, 24(4), 192–200. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2009.01067.x Jahan, R. (1987). Women in South Asian politics. Third World Quarterly, 9(3), 848–870. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436598708420004 Khattak, S. G. (1996). Security discourses and the State in Pakistan. Alternatives, 21(3), 341–362. https://doi.org/10.1177/030437549602100304

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Khattak, S. G. (2004). Adversarial discourses, analogous objectives: Afghan women’s control. Cultural Dynamics., 6(2–3), 213–236. https://doi.org/ 10.1177/0921374004047749 Khattak, S. G. (2008). Women’s concerns in international relations: The crossroads of politics and peace in South Asia. Pakistan Horizon, 61(3), 49–68. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23725985 Manchanda, R. (2001). Redefining and feminising security. Economic and Political Weekly, 36(22) 1956–1963. http://www.epw.in.iustlibrary.remotexs.in/ journal/2001/22/perspectives/redefining-and-feminising-security.html Manchanda, R. (2005). Women’s agency in peace building: Gender relations in post-conflict reconstruction, Economic and Political Weekly, 40(44/45), 4737–4745. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4417360 Murphy, C. N. (1996). Seeing women, recognizing gender, recasting international relations. International Organization, 50(3), 513–538. https://doi. org/10.1017/S0020818300033464 Narain, S. (2014). Gender in international relations: Feminist perspectives of J. Ann Tickner. Indian Journal of Gender Studies, 21(2), 179–197. https://doi. org/10.1177/0971521514525085 Narain, S. (2017). Gender in international relations. Global Affairs, 3(4–5), 421– 430. https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2018.1463145 Rao, N. (2018, March 8). Feminist voices could change the nature of international diplomacy. The Wire. https://thewire.in/women/foreign-affairs-dip lomacy-feminism-womens-day Richmond, O., & Graef, J. J. (2014). Citing international relations: Beyond the boundaries of disciplinary IR. European Review of International Studies, 1(2), 69–91. https://doi.org/www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26593336 Spivak, G. (1988). Can the subaltern speak? In Nelson, C. & Grossberg, L. (Eds.), Marxism and the interpretation of culture, (pp. 66–111). Macmillan Tickner, J. A. (1999). Searching for the princess? Feminist perspectives in international relations, Harvard International Review, 21(4), 44–48. https://www. jstor.org/stable/43648973 Woodford-Berger, P. (2007). Gender mainstreaming: What is it (about) and should we continue doing it? IDS Bulletin, 35(4), 65–72. https://doi.org/ 10.1111/j.1759-5436.2004.tb00157.x Youngs, J. (2004). Feminist international relations: A contradiction in terms? Or: Why women and gender are essential to understanding the world ‘we’ live in, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 80(1), 75–87. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2004.00367.x

CHAPTER 4

Theorising International Relations from South Asia: A Feminist Perspective Hijam Liza Dallo Rihmo

International relations is traditionally a male-dominated arena and it has constantly been challenged both theoretically and in practice. It interrogates international political processes that have rendered gendered lived experiences invisible and inaccessible for women. This is even truer for South Asia women. It is argued that “the discipline of international relations in South Asia still largely remains dominated by masculine, state centric, realist and neorealist analyses” (Singh, 2017: 149). There is a need to contextualise women from the subcontinent as they are situated in different hierarchies of identities, including its relational position vis-a-vis man and masculinity, which informs their agency. In the 1980s when feminist IR scholars started getting major attention for their rigorous intellectual engagement in the field, they introduced the concept of gender as a category of analysis. They systematically challenged major theoretical assumptions of IR theories on state, power,

H. L. D. Rihmo (B) Department of Political Science, Shri Ram College of Commerce, University of Delhi, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Ojha and P. Jaiswal (eds.), South Asian Women and International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9426-5_4

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political economy, environment, national security, conflict, and diplomacy. Feminist theorisation on IR emphasised on analysing international affairs through gender roles. However, the lived experiences of women across the globe are different. Intersectionality of our social and political identities, which defines our limitations and opportunities, affects how women engage in international relations. Their identities inform their perception of their environment. Most importantly, the role of perception of threat, both real and imagined, becomes the nexus between women’s identity and their security. Threat perception in international politics and the construction of threat discourse by South Asian women demands a renewed interest. The purpose of this chapter is to articulate South Asian women’s viewpoints, their vulnerabilities, and their narratives of threat contributing towards the larger global feminist discourse in international relations.

Gender in International Relations Feminism as a movement for gender equality has a long history but the feminist analysis of IR is a relatively new development which got firmly established only by the end of the Cold War. The global political landscape was changed as the post-Cold War period saw new sets of challenges and new ways of thinking where feminist IR scholars also contributed towards a critical analysis of international relations and redefined some of the central concepts and theoretical assumptions on state, power, national interest, security, and diplomacy. At the foundational level, feminist critique of the IR discipline revolves around how gender functions as a hierarchical organising principle where masculinity is central to their theoretical underpinnings. In general, gender as a socially constructed category (Butler, 1990) identifies attributes of ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ to men and women. And this masculinity is expressed both in theory and practice of international relations where it privileges national power as dominance, militarisation of security, and also in terms of state’s practices such as policymaking and diplomacy as it is male-centred as well. It should come as no surprise that during the formative period of the IR discipline, major theoretical traditions like Realism, Neorealism, and Liberalism were gender-biased as they did not include women’s voices (Sylvester, 2004: 10). There is a huge marginalisation, if not an absence, of women in international politics that made J. Ann Tickner term it as a

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man’s world (Tickner, 1988: 429). Both in terms of theories and as practitioners of international politics, women are underrepresented. As such, gender relations are not confined only to the private domain but it has implications in international relations as well. The concept of gender is crucial to understanding why international politics is inhospitable and inaccessible to women. Feminist IR scholars argue that this is because gender roles shape state’s attitudes and behaviours in the international system. Masculinity is privileged and it dominates the field. Feminist IR scholars present an alternative narrative by analysing international politics through a gender lens. They seek to expose and challenge gender gaps in IR theory and practice. The commendable works of Jean Bethke Elstain, Cynthia Enloe, and J. Ann Tickner have become elementary readings for getting an introduction to feminist approach to international relations. They make a critical assessment of how socialisation of gender roles takes place in state practices and they examine IR concepts perpetuating gender inequalities in terms of employment, wages, representation, division of work, etc. They engaged with most of the issue areas in the IR field like peace and conflict, international political economy, environmental movements, state, and diplomacy. However, gender as a category of analysis is not a stable concept because what is considered ‘masculinity’ or ‘femininity’ varies across cultures. There are variations in gender relationships. It espoused an understanding that there exist multiple narratives to gender hierarchies, power relations, social positions, privileges, and discriminations that are constructed and expressed within the feminist IR scholarship as well. In South Asia, gender relations can be articulated differently as it is quite extensive and interlinked with other social structures such as ethnicity, caste, class, culture, geographical locations, etc., which produces different socio-political implications. South Asian men stand as patriarchs, as powerful and dominating figures over women in the subcontinent. The manifestation of gendered relationships in South Asia is different from the global discourse. Thus, not only is the concept of ‘femininity’ have multiple narratives but even its relations to ‘masculinity’ is contextual as it is practised distinctively across the subcontinent. These differences can be generally captured within the framework of intersectionality in IR (Ackerly & True, 2008). But intersectionality is a recent undertaking in this field and despite their engagement with identity politics in forming different modes of operations, discriminations, and

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privileges in the international system, the lived experiences of South Asian women needs more inclusion in their epistemic assumptions. It can be observed that although some IR feminists introduced the intersectionality framework, it leaves a lot of room for engagement with respect to the South Asian region. The region offers a wide scope to explore in terms of the dynamism in gendered relationships. We find women both at the top of political power and at the same time women in majority are in powerless positions. The development and expression of the lived experiences of South Asian women are largely missing as women in general are underrepresented in international relations and unfortunately, women from South Asia are even more marginalised not only in IR theories and practices but even within feminist IR scholarship as well. Thus, while introducing gender as an analytical tool major feminist IR scholars argue how women are missing in international relations, it should be noted that there is also an underlying assumption of a universal category of women which is problematic.

Feminist IR Theory: Methodological Challenges and Possibilities There is no universal category of women by which women’s experiences can be generally defined and standardised. It is a myriad of different identities playing out with different struggles and narratives. However, if one makes a literature review of the IR works done by feminist scholars one can see that they discussed about women’s experiences in general. They talked about women’s movements, women in conflict, women in international political economy, women and environment, etc. This brings us to the question of women’s status in international politics and how one can navigate IR theories. Based on these observations, it becomes easy for one to be critical of their works as being in want of diversity in their study of women’s lives and struggles. However, we need to further examine the parameters within which they approach international relations theories as an IR scholar. There are two ways of understanding the development of feminist IR theory. Firstly, in order to maintain rigour in their theory, they look at recurring patterns of women’s experiences which meant that specificities are purposely abandoned. Secondly, difference politics is important for inclusivity of different experiences and events but the downside is that it

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weakens the arguments against established IR theories like Realism, Liberalism, or Constructivism. Thus, it can be argued that it is a trade-off made in the development of feminist IR theory as it becomes necessary to introduce women as a universal category so that it can lead to a more rigorous theory. The problem is that this leads to a flawed epistemic assumption in feminist IR theory that women in general have the same kind of struggles, vulnerabilities, and accessibility restricting multiple voices and concerns of women in the peripheries. This is a challenge for South Asian feminist IR scholars as the present feminist IR theory is found to be limiting in its reach and depth. However, element of diversity and inclusivity need not be all lost in the feminist IR theory. One of the features about feminism in IR is that it is a reflectivist approach which focuses on intersubjective meanings and knowledge (J. Ann Tickner, 1998). This gives room for an interpretative method of analysing gender relations in international relations. Through this method one can analyse how gender roles are interpreted affecting gender position in international politics. For example, in the global economy women are paid less wages because it is assumed that they perform less quality work as they are mentally and physically weaker than men. But interpretive methods can also be applied to understanding not only different gender roles but also the different roles within the same gender as well. While in most cases there is gender pay gap globally, what we find in South Asia is that there is also high invisibility of women’s work as they mostly work in informal economies where they are not on the official payroll (Swaminathan, 2009). In this case, before we address the gender pay gap in South Asia one needs to formalise the unorganised economy where most women are employed. As such feminism in IR does have the analytical methods needed to capture different women’s positions globally and we need to extend that analytical discourse. Another possibility for the South Asian feminist IR thinking to be included is through the pluralist framework such as the politics of difference and intersectionality to enrich feminist IR theory in terms of diversity and inclusiveness. Although, there is some validity to the argument that pluralism can affect certain theoretical synthesis by diluting the strength of an IR theory. Mearsheimer (2016) had observed that pluralism will bring about a divided discipline in the IR field. But pluralism is the best plausible way forward to bridge the theoretical and spatial gaps in terms of global women’s experiences despite its limitations. These frameworks

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are well utilised in other social science disciplines but it is a recent undertaking in the IR field. Rightly so, scholars from the margins like Black feminist and post-colonial feminist scholars such as Kimberlé Crenshaw, Gayatri Chakraborty Spivak, Uma Chakravarti, Jayawardena, Nivedita Menon, etc., re-interrogate the prevailing fundamental concepts and assumptions. Their works are critical in understanding the multi-layered and multi-dimensional existence of gender relationships. There is a knowledge production from the margins which appreciates a pluralist voice to an otherwise single dimension, Western women experiences-oriented field. These are some of the feminists that have made contributions towards broadening the feminist discourse by highlighting different perspectives. Their works help to construct a South Asian women narrative that is specific to their social and political context. To conceptualise the lived experiences of South Asian women in international relations, the following section examines how conceptualisation of threat perception in international politics takes place and how threat is constructed by South Asian women.

Thematic Analysis of Construction of Threat Some of the major themes in international politics are discussed here to contrast how women construct their threat narratives differently. State The state is a major actor in international politics and it is male-centric. Women are marginalised, if not absent, in the functioning of a state, be it in decision-making, military, legal system, diplomacy, etc. When the majority of the state functionaries are men, it is compelling to view the state as expressing and privileging ‘masculine’ attributes such as dominance, power, and aggression as political virtues (Tickner, 1988). But there is another critical aspect that the subcontinent presents and which is the subject of women in the nation-state making process. The participation of women in the freedom struggle to the politicisation of her body, becoming a political and communal terrain, inflicting violence in the wake of partition of India and Pakistan (Menon & Bhasin, 1998), Maoist movement in Nepal (Luna & Haar, 2019), Bangladesh liberation war and ethnic conflicts in Sri Lanka (Silva, 2004). There are gender

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debates and other empirical explorations to be engaged more in the articulation of sexuality and the state’s governance as well. Women are not just invisible and inaccessible to this male-dominated political space, even the state laws affect its citizens differently because of gender. Gender inequality exists and can be observed through state’s intervention in the expression and resistance for rights to abortion, rape laws, inheritance laws, customary laws, family laws, and labour laws among others. And as there are different kinds of states, the effect of state power and the legal system affects women differently. The global South countries lack strong institutional support for women seeking justice without repercussions. While feminists are rightly concerned about greater representation and fair justice globally, women in the global South are doubly burdened with fighting to even come out in the public and fight for their rights for fear of social stigmatisation, caste violence, ethnic conflicts, and other violent responses. The nature of vulnerabilities and institutional access are different presenting a complex multi-layered gender relationship that needs to be nuanced when discussing women’s representation and gender equality. Nivedita Menon stated that “the universality of women’s experience of sexual violence has always provided an immediate entry-point for feminist intervention” (Menon, 2004: 106). She also mentioned that sexual violation is experienced in different ways and in different degrees. Thus, the presence of a state institutional apparatus to hear cases for gender disparity is never the complete story for South Asian women as it needs to be coupled with greater social mobility and breaking down deep-rooted social structures. War and Conflict Another closely related subject to gendered state is the topic of genderbased violence. War and conflict affect men and women differently. Not only is there a strong link between masculinity and militarism, as it is about projection of power and domination, even women themselves are also participants and agents in perpetuating these masculine traits of militarism and security. Thus, the political history of powerful women in politics from the subcontinent is still wrought within the gender-biased framework of the state while the majority of the womenfolk struggle against overarching state patriarchy. In order to have a better understanding of how South Asian women construct their threat narratives we need to examine how gender-based violence in conflict situations is

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linked to other identity markers like caste, race, etc. With respect to castebased violence inflicted upon Dalit women in India or in the case of state fighting women insurgents belonging to particular ethnicities or communities, there is prevalence of sexual assaults (Agnihotri & Mazumdar, 1995). This is true in the case of ethnic-based sexual violence in Sri Lanka against the Tamil Women (Manoranjan, 2010). Several studies and reports show that police and judiciary officials of the state work against the victims of sexual violence in India especially in the case of Dalit women (Human Rights Watch, n.d.). Another case of state patriarchy can be observed from Nepal where there is a National Action Plans (NAPs) under the aegis of the UN Security Council resolution 1325. Maoist female ex-combatants were pushed away to their traditional roles with low representation in the post conflict peacebuilding process after the civil war (Goswami, 2021). This displays the interplay of multiple identities concerning ethnic hierarchy and nation-building process in South Asia that needs to be weighed in gender studies where the gravity of the situation is sometimes exposed by the structural violence committed by the state machinery itself. Political Economy Generally, women’s household work is not considered as making a contribution to national economic growth but there is also gender disparity even in the organised and formal sector as well. The International Labour Organization (ILO) stated in its 2020 report that the contemporary labour market is characterised by gender inequality (ILO, 2020: 13). Feminist IR scholars like Kathryn Sikkink also make similar observation that there is gendered international political economy because in the international market it is not common to see women in influential economic or financial positions and they are more present in jobs like secretaries, receptionists, nurses, and in other care jobs. So feminists like Saskia Sassen (1996) discussed about capturing the gendered global economy and rendering visibility to the evicted accounts of women. There is underrepresentation of women in the global market but this data is largely in terms of formal economy. But in the case of South Asian women, economic opportunities and challenges are presented differently to them. The state does not take into its official records women involved in economic activities like making papads, pickles, weaving, etc., in the rural economy. So, women are not only unpaid but they are even made

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invisible by the state in the global economy. Although, the unpaid care work performed at home is the same narrative for all women globally, what is different for women from the subcontinent is that they are mostly engaged in an unorganised or informal economy (Swaminathan, 2009). It has been reported that with respect to women in informal employment, for the year 2016, the developing countries comprised 92% as compared to 18% in the developed countries (Bonnet et al., 2019: 18). This data is a testament to how labour market, production relations, and gender discourse can produce different configuration of power relations, legality, and forms of resistance in different regions. Globally, women are demanding equal pay and removal of gender pay gap, whereas for South Asian women there is problem of visibility itself. They are not being protected by labour laws which is the direct effect of their invisible work. They are not only disadvantaged by the gender wage gap but they are also losing out on any kind of legal protection. Environment There is a huge gender gap in sharing domestic chores and care work in South Asia and the plight of these women is also aggravated by poverty. In the absence of modern equipment to alleviate their expected gendered responsibilities of mundane household work, they become responsible for collecting firewood and water for the family and because of these gendered roles that they perform, womenfolk end up having a close relationship with their natural environment. Any ill-planned development project causing environmental degradation impacts women gravely. Thus, it is critical to examine the complex relationship between gender studies and the discourses on development. While modern development is desirable, it should not also disrupt the relationships people, especially women share with their natural environment. Further, when compensation is dispensed by the state either for displacement or resettlement because of development projects like dam construction, it has been observed that women are discriminated against their male counterparts (Ravi Hemadri et al., 1999).

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Conceptualisation of Threat Perception and Construction of Threat The above thematic construction of threat narratives shows that South Asian women’s vulnerabilities and perceptions of threat are different. Thus, in order to have a fair representation of women from across the globe, it is necessary to make a deconstruction of women as a universal category. In the process, there should be a construction of threat informed by multiple identities that is assigned to women. South Asian women are marginalised both as women and as belonging to a certain race, ethnicity, community, or state. The larger implication of these constructions of threat is that women occupy different positions and thus, in order to enrich the feminist discourse in IR, it is important that the literature captures these contrasts and differences. Integrity of theory is important but knowledge construction should also reflect fairness of representation and participation. Despite the flexibility in the feminist approach to IR which gives ample space for examining gender relations in international politics, it is important to note that generally the “non-Western worlds and their voices sit on the margins of the discipline; we must grapple with this marginalisation or underrepresentation” (Eun, 2019). And this is even truer for non-Western women from the margins. As a woman from the developing world, one is not only entering a non-hospitable arena from the margins but also one where she is a marginalised woman herself, she suffers a double process of marginalisation. So when it comes to the theorisation of international relations from South Asia, it is important to note that the challenges are quite daunting as it involves a twin process of deconstructing the concept of women as a universal category and at the same time re-reading certain epistemic assumptions in the feminist reading of IR in the context of South Asia. Women from different regions with different backgrounds experience different gender relations and power structures and those experiences should be put into context for fair representation of their struggles yet maintaining theoretical integrity of IR feminist theory. This would create space for the marginalised women within the IR feminist theory. Post-modernist feminists like Jill Steans (2010) do criticise and reject what is considered a women’s standpoint to understanding world affairs but if we look at the larger picture the tendency is to produce women as a single category which is juxtaposed

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against a category of privileged white male. In this power equation, a non-Western woman is marginalised to all of them. One of the possibilities where scholars can effectively engage a robust feminist thinking from South Asia is in the area of threat discourse. The discourse on threat is essentially about the identification process of threat, vulnerabilities, implications, and responses. And it doesn’t stop at identification and categorisation of what threat is but this is always followed by policymaking and state actions. The concept of threat perception is not a new understanding in the field of IR either, although, it is under-theorised. It is presented only as a decisive intervening variable between action and reaction (Cohen, 1978). But it is not to deny that the concept of threat plays an important role in understanding world affairs and even in the major IR theoretical assumptions as states formulate policies and take actions only when threat is perceived. The notion of threat perception can be found in IR literature as well, for instance, Robert Jervis (1976) discussed perception and misperception in international politics about policymakers making decisions. Unless threat is perceived then no knowledge about threat would have existed which is a prerequisite to states’ responses and actions towards national security, political economy, conflict resolution, cooperation, balance of power, environment, etc. Thus, the perception of threat is a functional concept to understand state behaviour and also in understanding difference politics of women across the globe. However, the determination of threat or non-threat is an intersubjective process which involves making an objective assessment of the environment by our faculty of reasoning and inferences. Our environment alone does not determine threat perception. The realities of women globally is the product of both the material world and the social world. What can be drawn from the reflectivist approach of feminist IR theory is that even women’s identities are socially constructed carrying intersubjective meanings. As such they defined, expressed, and produced different knowledge traditions on gendered relationships which is not only informed by their identity as a woman but also by their perception of threat. Threats are not given, they are also socially constructed. This doesn’t mean that threats are not real. They are both real and constructed at the same time because threats are understood and perceived by us through social meanings in a socio-cultural and linguistic context. This is where construction of threat narratives takes place leading to knowledge production.

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Similar to the category of women, the category of threat is also not a universal category. Different women have different attitudes and vulnerability to what is being identified as threatening in every aspect of their life. South Asian women have different vulnerability thresholds as compared to their other counterparts in the world. The importance of the conceptualisation on the construction of threat is that it has both theoretical and policy implications. In terms of theory, construction of threat narratives allows plurality of voices which allows for proper assessment of the structural violence faced by women at large that comes from patriarchy, caste, and class structures. Broad engagement and conceptualisation can lead to better understanding on the nature of threat whereby state can formulate well-informed policies. This will broaden the horizon of an already existing feminist theoretical framework. It is in the representation of the finer details that the theory can be progressive and useful to women in South Asia otherwise it can alienate them and would not be able to connect with their everyday lives.

Conclusion The implications of discerning the construction of different narratives of threat by women especially from South Asia will not only extend the scope of feminist IR theory by bringing in inclusivity and diversity but it can also increase the performative value of the theory itself. Although, presenting women as a universal category might increase theoretical integrity and support a robust feminist intervention in an otherwise male-dominated space, such generalised theory with a standardised model might not serve the larger sections of women whose vulnerabilities are made invisible. Pluralism and intersectionality might be understood as increasing the variables in the development of a concrete theory in a traditional sense hence, seen as weakening its theoretical position but yet again, the purpose of a theory should focus on catering to the requirements of larger sections of the society. More than the integrity of a theory, it is the performative value that one needs to focus and one can do that by examining different categories of women who have different sets of vulnerabilities, accessibility, and participations. Theory informs policy changes and when most of the South Asian women’s perception of threat and construction of threat narrative are not taken into account, many women are going to lose out, thereby defeating the purpose of feminist theory itself.

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Theorising international relations theory from a South Asian women’s perspective is not an attempt to invalidate the already existing feminist IR literature but it is rather about making an argument for extending their category of analysis. This chapter does that in two ways; firstly, by establishing the importance of construction of threat in international politics and secondly, by constantly reminding ourselves that instead of accepting the traditional narrowly focused parameter for theoretical integrity, a theory can have better performance value in terms of policy changes if it focuses instead on flexibility, pluralism, and democratisation. To sum it up, it is important to rethink and revisit some of the major lines of argument in international relations, even within feminist IR theory to have a healthy outlook towards different lived experiences and knowledge traditions.

References Ackerly, B. A., & True, J. (2008). An intersectional analysis of international relations: Recasting the discipline. Politics and Gender, 4(1), 156–173. Agnihotri, I., & Mazumdar, V. (1995). Changing terms of political discourse: Women’s movement in India, 1970s–1990s. Economic and Political Weekly, 30(29), 1869–1878. Bonnet, F., Vanek, J., & Chen, M. (2019). Women and men in the informal economy: A statistical brief. Women in informal employment: Globalizing and organizing. Retrieved April 23, 2021, from https://www.wiego.org/public ations/women-and-men-informal-economy-statistical-brief Butler, J. (1990). Gender trouble. Routledge, reprinted 2016. Cohen, R. (1978). Threat perception in international crisis. Political Science Quarterly, 93(1), 93–107. Eun, Y.-S. (2019). Opening up the debate over ‘non-western’ international relations. Politics, 39(1), 4–17. Goswami, R. (2021). UNSCR 1325 and female ex-combatants: Case study of the Maoist women of Nepal. UN Women, Retrieved April 23, 2021, from https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/Headquarters/Attachments/ Sections/Library/Publications/2017/UNSCR1325-and-ex-combatants.pdf Hemari, R., Samiti, B. B. S., & Mander, H. (1999). Dams, displacement, policy and law in India. World commission on dams. Retrieved April 23, 2021, from https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/162463595.pdf Human Rights Watch. (n.d.). Attacks on Dalit women: A pattern of impunity. Retrieved April 23, 2021, from https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/india/ India994-11.htm

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ILO. (2020). World employment and social outlook trends 2020. International Labour Organization. Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and misperception in international politics. Princeton University Press. Luna, K. C., & Haar, G. V. D. (2019). Living Maoist gender ideology: Experiences of women ex-combatants in Nepal. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 21(3), 434–453. https://doi.org/10.1080/14616742.2018.152 1296 Manoranjan, T. (2010). Beaten but not broken: Tamil women in Sri Lanka. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 11(2), 139–147. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2016). Benign hegemony. International Studies Review, 18(1), 147–149. Menon, N. (2004). Recovering subversion: Feminist politics beyond the law. University of Illinois Press. Menon, R., & Bhasin, K. (1998). Borders & boundaries: Women in India’s partition. Rutgers University Press. Sassen, S. (1996). Toward a feminist analytics of the global economy. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 4(1), 6–41. Silva, N. (2004). The gendered nation: Contemporary writings from South Asia. SAGE Publications. Singh, S. (2017). Gender, conflict and security: Perspectives from South Asia. Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 4(2), 149–157. Steans, J., Pettiford, L., & El-Anis, I. (2010). An introduction to international relations theory: Perspectives and themes (3rd ed.). Pearson. Swaminathan, P. (2009). Outside the realm of protective labour legislations: Saga of unpaid labour in India. Economic and Political Weekly, 44(44), 80–87. Sylvester, C. (2004). Feminist international relations: An unfinished journey. Cambridge University Press. Tickner, J. A. (1988). Hans Morgenthau’s principles of political realism: A feminist reformulation. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 17 (3), 429–440. Tickner, J. A. (1998). Continuing the conversation. International Studies Quarterly, 42(1), 205–210.

PART II

Gendering Foreign Policy Theory & Practice in South Asia

CHAPTER 5

Feminist Aspects of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Shabana Fayyaz

Situating Feminist Foreign Policy The feminist approaches toward international relations and foreign policy have introduced gender as a key variable in analyzing international behavior of states. It is guided by the vision that states and their representatives in their external relations and interactions shall prioritize gender equality, rights of women, and pursue allocation of enhanced resources for empowering women in patriarchal power structures. This empowerment in the conduct of foreign policy takes the shape of aid (material and professional), trade, defense, and diplomacy. This thinking stems from the fact, that in present times, women comprise nearly half of the global population, and similarly of national populations and a significant portion of labor force. Yet, they have been excluded from power and decisionmaking, or are mostly confined to “soft area” of governance, while, men owing to masculine traits are seen as appropriate wielders of power (Mansbridge, 1999). Meanwhile, male-dominated violence is often viewed as a

S. Fayyaz (B) Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Ojha and P. Jaiswal (eds.), South Asian Women and International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9426-5_5

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tool for resolution of conflict and pursuit of dominance (Sjoberg, 2013). Feminist foreign policy seeks to counter these values and thinking. Thus, promoting rights of women, young girls, ensuring women’s access to positions of power, diplomacy, and governance need to be placed on the agenda of a state’s outlook toward foreign policy and international engagement (Young, 2011). Essentially, when engaging with other states, multilateral organizations, and foreign groups, diplomatic representatives states must highlight and advance role, rights, and opportunities for women. Gradually, this approach has evolved to connect with broader agenda and issues of international politics and foreign policy. Now a genderbased foreign policy agenda also aims to promote social justice equality for women and men, while being cognizant of asymmetric social structures; fighting inequality in accessing material resources; battling violence particularly against girls and women; advancing cause of environmental protections; pushing for peace and security while defending universal democratic values. This way, feminist and gender-based foreign policy agenda aspires to engage with realist world of international politics. In framing of broad contours of feminist foreign policy, literature and scholarship in international relations is still developing. Some works have focused on linking feminism to militarism and nationalism (Enloe, 2000), the role of gender in war and peace, and exploring ways of distinct understanding of securitization for men and women (Caprioli, 2000) (Hudson, 2010).

How It Has Evolved in Developed and Developing World? In recent years, five countries—France, Canada, Norway, Sweden, and Mexico—have affirmed importance of gender equality and feminism as central tents of their respective foreign policies. Sweden was the first country to announced pursuit of a feminist foreign policy. In December 2014, Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström announced broad outlines of feminist foreign policy focusing on pursuing gender equality as according to her, “half of the population that so far has been almost systematically excluded and forgotten—namely, women—will now be included” (Volokh, 2014).

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In 2016, addressing United Nations Committee on the Status of Women. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau renewed his commitment to advancing gender equality globally while pledging to take greater role in shaping promising futures for women and girls at home and around the globe (W. & G. E. Canada, 2016). It was manifested in by launching “feminist international assistance policy” of the Canadian government in 2017 (G. A. Canada, 2017). This policy aims to support health of women and children across the world with annual funding of CAD 1.4 billion till 2023 to governments and international organizations for ensuring access to nutrition, healthcare, and education for women in the developing world. In 2019, France also joined the growing club and announced intention to spearhead a feminist foreign policy. French foreign ministry has indicated that “gender equality” is slated to be a key French priority (France, 2019). For it, upto 50% of official development assistance of France has been dedicated to support projects which advance gender equality as significant or main a objective. France has also published a detailed report on contours of feminist foreign policy in its international strategy for gender equality (2018–2022) (M. de l’Europe et des A. France, 2018). In early 2020, Mexico adopted a feminist foreign policy approach, thus, becoming the first Latin American, and a developing country to do so (Exteriores, 2020). Mexico envisions promotion of gender equality at the international level, working to fight gender-based violence and combating inequalities across social justice system programs. More specifically, Mexican foreign ministry has pledged to increase its staff to be at least 50 percent women by 2024 and has committed to ensuring a violence-free work environment for women. Before this trend, in 2009, Obama administration appointed Melanie Verveer, as first ambassador for global women’s issues. Her work focused on incorporating gender issues in foreign policy discourse, particularly on the agenda of Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit and ensuring presence of women in Afghanistan peace negotiations held in 2010 (Wheaton, 2013). This was practical manifestation of the pledge made by the Secretary of State Hilary Clinton that women’s issues are central to “foreign policy, not as adjunct auxiliary or in any way lesser than all of the other issues” (Zenko, 2015). In March 2012, she authorized release of first-ever Secretarial Policy Guidance on Promoting Gender Equality to Achieve Our National Security and Foreign Policy Objectives.

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Feminist Foreign Policy and Women Peace and Security A key feature of feminist foreign policy is Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda of the UN. It comprises of eighth UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) that introduced gendered perspective into various inter-governmental and UN bodies focusing on matters of peace and security. This process commenced in October 2000 when on the call of civil society organizations and women movements in international security, UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted a resolution acknowledging crucial role of women owing to impact conflict on women and called for proactive participation of women in conflict resolution, peacekeeping operations, and peace building efforts through UNSCR 1325. Most importantly, these resolutions emphasize protection of women and girls in the armed conflict. This first resolution was adopted unanimously in October 2000 and it led to seven other resolutions during the next 13 years. WPS resolution mandate states to take steps at global, national, and local levels to safeguard and advance rights of women and girls during and after the armed conflict. UNSCRs have tasked UNSC, the UN Secretary General, member states, and all UN entities for implementation of the resolution. In implementation of these resolutions, member states have been encouraged to enhance participation of women in political and civil society positions, and protection of women and girls, and ensure gender trainings on national scale. These are also the broad contours of feminist foreign policy approaches. Over the past two decades, WPS agenda has promoted a better understanding of international affairs through a gendered perspective in peace and security debates at multilateral level. Developed states, particularly, European nations have supported several women-centric international organizations to build a strong support for WPS agenda and its smooth implementation by the member states. It is crucial to state that WPS agenda in essence ensures a holistic approach to peace and security and it’s rooted in four pillars that is, participation, conflict prevention, protection, and relief and recovery. It is vital to make progress in all these pillars for ensuring across-the-board implementation of WPS agenda. This implementation needs to be backed by strong political will and tool-boxes which should empower member states and UN agencies for advancing the cause of challenges to international peace and security such as climate change, refugee crisis, and violent extremism.

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International Agreements on Status of Women in Peace and Security Over past seven decades debates at the United Nations platforms have given considerable attention to the unique impact of armed conflict on women and girls. Multilateral forums have recognized value of women’s important role in conflict avoidance and conflict resolution mechanisms. In doing so, the following two instruments related to women have been agreed upon by UN member states and are in force: . Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW, 1979) . Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995)

CEDAW (1979) The convention was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979. It is widely considered as equivalent to the international bill of rights for women. It is the first international instrument to define what constitutes discrimination against women and call on member states to take specific actions. It underscores the importance of distinct gender roles and promotes equality before law while calling for more social work to minimize prejudices of superiority or inferiority of a particular gender. In 1983, a special committee was formed to monitor progress made by state parties’ signatory to the CEDAW (OHCHR, 1979). In 1996, Pakistan assumed the obligation to protect women from sexual and other forms of gender-based violence perpetrated by state agents and private actors alike being a party to CEDAW, and Pakistan is obliged “to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women” including “any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women on a basis of equality of men or women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”

Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995) At the end of the Fourth World Conference on Women held in 1995. Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action was finalized (UN Women,

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1995). This declaration was at that time the most progressive document ever to advance women’s rights. The platform for Action comprised specific and detailed commitments under 12 critical areas of concern. It laid bare wide-scale gender discrimination across international organizations and the absence of focus on gender inequality by state parties to the CEDAW. To address this, platform for action adopted recommendations from A to L to ensure gender equality and women’s empowerment. The critical area E relates to the WPS agenda. It emphasizes increased participation of women in decision-making related to all stages of conflict; ensuring safety of women in conflict zones; promoting non-violent conflict; active participation of women in peacebuilding; and targeted support to women living under colonial occupation. Besides these instruments and eight UNSCR resolutions of WPS agenda, it is the platform of the UN that advances the cause of women’s rights and gendered perspective in foreign policy and international peace and security. In 2000, UN member states from the platform of UN General Assembly adopted UN Millennium Declaration, which called on member states to make significant progress on achieving targets in eight specific areas known as Millennium Development Goals (MGDs). MDG 3 related to WPS agenda as the objective is to “promote gender equality and empower women.” More specifically, MDG 3, envisions ending gender disparity in primary and secondary education at all levels by enhancing ratio of girls to boys in education, increasing share of women in labor force, and increasing proportions of seats held in national parliaments by the women (Leal Filho et al., 2022).

Subaltern Realism and Feminist Foreign Policy in Pakistan For a developing and post-colonial state such as Pakistan, broadening the contours and discourse of foreign policy to incorporate gender perspective is a challenging task. It is a generational challenge as the domain foreign policy discourse remains limited to advancing interests of state instead of society. As Mohammad Ayoob has highlighted in subaltern realism that weak majority of global South is not well-versed in the vocabulary of changing values and norms, neither does it have enough economic resources to pursue a change even if it so desired, and finally, its global focus remains limited. As a developing country, Pakistan therefore is challenged by a myriad of issues including inability to invest high degree of

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material resources into new programs to implement a feminist foreign policy approach. Moreover, Pakistan’s internal political dynamics have often titled toward rule consolidation than implementing feminist foreign policy. And at times, geo-strategic context and global real politics have further constrained states like Pakistan to pursue gender-based external posture. The focus of state-building and power consolidation is a domestic goal which requires a favorable external environment to the extent that can help in maintaining control (Ayoob, 1998). According to some keen security analysts, external challenges emanating from India and Afghanistan have defocused the state and also used to maintain domestic political control and direct the trajectory of state-building and this behavior is not just unique to Pakistan, rather used by almost all regional states close and beyond. Following this trend, high priority to an inclusion of a gendered perspective in foreign policy conduct is absent and hard-based security concerns dominate foreign policy approach. This is best explained by subaltern realism’s four assertions about third-world countries. First, for developing nations “issues of domestic order and international order are inextricably intertwined,” particularly, those related to “conflict and conflict resolutions” (Ayoob, 1998). This applies to Pakistan as its enduring conflict with India and peculiar security situation in Afghanistan continues to influence Islamabad’s domestic politics and stability. Second, Ayoob says, developing states are also vulnerable to strategic policies of major powers and international institutions (Themnér & Wallensteen, 2011). In the case of Pakistan, this has held constant as Pakistan’s alignment with the United States has strongly influenced the state-making trajectory during the Cold War. Similarly, Pakistan’s engagement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for Structural Adjust Programs has hampered social and economic development in the country. Third, Ayoob argues in understanding developing nations, domestic level variables should be prioritized to explain causes of armed conflicts in international policies as primary cause, and destabilizing impact of external factors on domestic orders needs to be studied as secondary cause. For Instance, because Pakistan’s critical role in the War on Terror (WOT) that produced domestic unrest (for example, cases of genderbased violent acts were reported), the United States and Western nations committed economic and development assistance. Fourth, for Ayoob,

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the linkage between internal and external variables also explains connectivity between intrastate and interstate conflict (Ayoob, 1998). This line of thinking also explains fusion and complexity of internal and external threads of Pakistan’s foreign policy with reference to feminist right-based outlook within and beyond.

Pakistan’s Feminist Foreign Policy The end of World War II led to the birth of the United Nations to be a core international organization promoting peace and stability across the globe. Soon after its inception as an independent state, Pakistan became a part of this international organization in September 1947. In 1948, when UN General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that presented a foreground for Women’s active role—Pakistan signed it. It was nascent Pakistan’s first international declaration on the observance of fundamental human rights and freedoms. In such a manner, all the commitments of the United Nations and resolutions of its Security Council were now applicable to Pakistan (Noreen & Musarrat, 2013). It was a crucial undertaking for Pakistan as it was still in its development phase and needed worldwide recognition and support. From then onwards, Pakistan consistently supported women’s rights at international forums. In 1995, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto led Pakistan’s delegation to the fourth World Conference on Women called “Beijing Platform for Action,” whose agenda focused on women’s empowerment. This moot recognized three key areas, economic development, equal rights, and violence against women to be advanced in letter and spirit. Pakistan, as a member of the United Nations, participated in the conference. Being a signatory to the “Beijing Declaration,” Pakistan committed to ensure all fundamental rights to women and eliminate existing barriers to their development in various domains. Following this, Islamabad adopted “National Plan of Action” as per the stipulation (297) of the Beijing Plan of Action (Noreen & Musarrat, 2013). The Beijing Declaration paved the path for Pakistan to sign the CEDAW in 1995 and ratified in March 1996. Under this Convection, all signatory states were required to take necessary measures, including upgrading the existing legislations. It considered replacing prevailing laws, regulations, and practices that promoted discrimination against women. Though Pakistan adopted it, there was delay to produce a single report to the CEDAW until 2004. The 2004 report was seen by some domestic

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quarters as an attempt by General Pervaiz Musharraf’s government on promoting a sift image of Pakistan externally. Internally this regime gave significant representation to the women in the national and provincial parliaments and policy-making processes (Noreen & Musarrat, 2013). Next, Pakistan pledged to implement Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the UN in 2015. These Global Goals adopted by all United Nations member states, including Pakistan, to eradicate poverty, safeguard the planet, and ensure harmony and prosperity by 2030. As it is a well-integrated framework, it highlights that action in one domain can influence the outcome in the others. Therefore, a balance is required in all social, economic, and environmental spheres for sustainable development (UNDP in Pakistan, 2021). In this manner, goal five (5) of SDG is Gender Equality that aims to remove all forms of discrimination against women and girls, not as a fundamental human right rather than a mandatory measure for sustainable development and growth of Pakistan (UNDP, 2021).

Women Leader’s Role in Pakistan’s Policy-Making For Pakistan to translate its international commitment to actions, there must be manifested action across political and economic arenas. Previously policymaking has been male-dominated, making it difficult for women to voice their concerns. However, various female appointments at crucial positions do reflect the country’s dedication to the overleaf discussed international resolutions and pledges. A prominent example is Hina Rabbani Khar, who was the first-ever female Foreign Minister of Pakistan. She was appointed by the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) government in June 2011. Previously, she served in the Ministry of finance and directed policies regarding the economy during the absence of the finance minister in 2009 (Hina Rabbani Khar—Agenda contributor, n.d.). Earlier, in March 2009, PPP elected its first woman speaker Dr. Fehmida Mirza, who presided over the lower house till June 2013 (Haider, 2008). Hailing from a political family from Sindh, she is again serving as a Federal Minister for Inter-Provincial Coordination in Prime Minister Imran Khan’s government. Benazir Bhutto is a known name in Pakistani politics as well as on the international stage. In 1979, she took over the leadership position of her party, Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) after her father’s ouster and execution. During that time, Benazir Bhutto faced frequent house arrests and even went into exile for two years. However, after returning to Pakistan,

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she established her standing as the opposition leader against a military dictator. She was the first woman leader of a Muslim nation who served two terms as Prime Minister of Pakistan from 1988 to 1990 and 1993 to 1996 (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2021). The PPP’s push for women empowerment is based upon Benazir Bhutto becoming its natural political face. Furthermore, Abida Hussain is another name that made her way into the political arena of Pakistan. She has left a mark in the history by being the first female to chair the District Council of Jhang and, later, the first woman to get elected in the National Assembly of 1985, directly elected on General seat. Given her diverse experience and reputation, she was appointed as Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States during the tumultuous period in bilateral relations between the two sides. This was the time when the first Afghan war ended and Soviet Union collapsed, leading to the US pressure upon Pakistan to roll back its nuclear program (Saiyid, 2015). Similarly, on the social front, women’s activism has played an integral role in creating awareness about equal rights and discrimination against women and girls—Asma Jahangir, who was a heroic champion of human rights. She co-founded the Women Action Forum (WAF) to confront the military dictator, Zia-ul-Haq’s and challenged Hudood Ordinance (Amnesty International, 2018). The forum was established chiefly to oppose the given law and its criteria for a woman’s testimony which was considered half to a male’s witness (BBC News, 2018). Later on, being a pioneer of human rights, she co-established the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (an independent NGO). Her commitment went beyond Pakistan when she served as UN Special Rapporteur thrice on varied topics like extrajudicial, arbitrator executions, and Iran. Despite such prominent women in different arenas and international commitments for women empowerment, the ground realities in Pakistan are not black and white. The country lags far behind in achieving its goal of gender equality. In the recent Global Gender Gap Index Report (2020), Pakistan was ranked 151st position out of the 153 countries (Chaudhury, 2020). It can get accounted for political and legislative problems on women’s rights and their equal representation. Currently, in the National Assembly of Pakistan, sixty seats are reserved for women, which accounts for about eighteen percent of the total seats. At the local level, these seats predominately remain understaffed. Even if a quota system is in place in some domains, there are few female candidates to

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compete which signifies how Pakistan’s government and institutions have failed to eliminate various barriers to women empowerment in the society (International, 2013).

Challenges to Pursue Feminist Foreign Policy in Pakistan For a country such as Pakistan, where social norms are systemically set against women with restricted access to education and deep-rooted structural inequalities, challenges confronting state and society are manifold. In the public and political sphere, while, women are active players, their role and presence are often secondary to that of men counterparts. Even though Pakistan was the first Muslim-majority nation to elect a female Prime Minister, it is a fact that this has not been repeated for over three decades. Religious ideology in the construction of feminism in Pakistan is a significant factor that defines how policies, practices, and regulations will get introduced. Gender-based activism gets viewed under a binary framework where it is either “secular” that is, Westernized or “authentic”—Islamic (Khan & Kirmani, 2018). Such binary has been propagated by numerous stakeholders that portray western thought solely fostering secular, liberal, and corrupt feminist values among women. Pakistani women are at times seen as western community funded agencies and considered as non-Islamic or anti-state. Parallel to this, the state has set up institutions such as Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) in the 1980s, with the aim to promote religious deliberation and introspection (Khan & Kirmani, 2018). Against this backdrop, gender-based interventions can be effective when they are rooted within a religious and social/cultural framework. Here, one must note a trend by number of donor institutions increasingly supportive of initiatives that are formulated in religious terms and involve the local religious actors. Large sums of funding are directed to faith-based organizations as faith and tradition simple cultural authenticity in Pakistan. For example, United States Agency for International Developed (USAID) funded a project to “sensitize” the religious leaders in order to gain broad support for contraceptives and eventually get a manual approved by the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) in the country.

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Similarly, World Health Organisation (WHO) and United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) invited Maulana Samiul-Haq, who is widely known spokesperson for religious rights, to the polio vaccination drive in 2015 and 2016 (Khan & Kirmani, 2018). The fact remains that, religious institutions profoundly impact the norms, values, practices, and belief systems prevalent in the country. Throughout history and even today, feminist movements face consistent resistance from number of religious parties. These conservative religious groups at some instances employ debatable legal enactment endorsed by the state bodies such as the Federal Shariat Court (FSC) and Council of Islamic Ideology (CII). One such incident is when the FSC ruled that some elements of the Women Protection Act 2006, that amended the biased Hudood Ordinance, as “unconstitutional” (Khan & Kirmani, 2018). The traditional mindset is deeply rooted in the social structure of Pakistan, also shared by sizable women groups who perceive arguments of women empowerment and equal rights as not justified. For instance, women representatives of religious groups implicitly backed opposition to Zina laws. However, in the National Assembly, they resisted the suggested amendments. They agreed with their male colleagues that such amendments endorse “free sex zone” in the country (Khan & Kirmani, 2018). Such an ideologically fraught setting is a systematic hindrance in promoting women rights in public discourse. In case of Pakistan, one has to understand that feminist foreign policy notion is very different than western countries. A secular approach that advocates complete separation of religion from the state affairs does not and cannot exist (Khan & Kirmani, 2018). Religious imprints do contextualize several laws, regulations, and policies focusing on women’s rights. The donors (western) funding is based on religious interpretations. In such a manner, theoraization of development, there is no explicit understanding and demand from the state (Khan & Kirmani, 2018). According to one school of thought and analysis, Pakistani policymakers employ active role of women in public life to project a soft image of the country abroad. That is, women are often awarded key ministerial and civil service portfolios. There is increasing trend of growing female participation in country civil service, particularly, diplomatic service. Pakistan has access to opportunity and key role in shaping public policy. Here, a plausible observation is, can “soft image” abroad will undo the systematic inequalities and disparities where millions of women remain

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out of labor market and are socially discriminated in their pursuit of professional careers. If a woman decides to pursue a career, she has to make her own support system to overcome the gender divide. Thus, to understand the roadblocks in pursuing a feminist foreign policy in Pakistan the prism must be enlarged to register decades-old struggle for women’s rights, empowerment, and gender equality in Pakistan. In the field of peacebuilding and crisis resolutions, presence of women is rare—applicable to majority of the developing state. Male-dominated security forces and male-dominated discourse on security issues prevail nationally and regionally. Implementing a WPS agenda in Pakistan necessitates greater and meaningful participation of women in political, social, and hi-tech fields, beyond just being model public servants. An inclusive foreign and security policy discourse related to peace and security and peacebuilding is critically needed.

Pursuit of Feminist Foreign Policy and its Impact on Pakistan Foreign Policy For a state, such as Pakistan, to pursue a feminist foreign policy agenda will have a direct impact on the present foreign policy outlook. At the same time, it will add new dimensions and nuances to the existing foreign relations framework. First, a feminist foreign policy agenda will transform present foreign policy into a “value-driven” foreign policy. If Pakistan champions rights of women and grants them wider acceptability in public spaces basked by legislation and meaningful action, this will resonate with the global voices on this subject—whether domestic context allows, that remains an unanswered question. Second, value-driven foreign policy, would not undercut present strategic posture of the country, and regional outlook. Rather, it will complement the existing foreign policy framework, and enable it to gain support of more countries for its regional goals. Thus, being mindful of challenges and opportunities, Pakistan needs to balance its existing foreign policy toward a more pro-women foreign policy. A Pakistani voice, which would represent over 110 million Pakistani women, and a crucial voice in Muslim world for women rights, would be a tangible support to women’s rights and empowerment across Pakistan, the Muslim world, and the international community.

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Concluding Remarks and Policy Recommendations Pakistan can have a participatory foreign policy by having larger role for women in foreign policy-making and implementation. Through a feminist approach to foreign policy, Pakistan can potentially prevent escalation of crises and work on conflict avoidance by pursuing new ideas for peaceful co-existence in South Asia. For this, following recommendations can be considered by Pakistani policy-makers: . A humanitarian approach to foreign policy can protect women and girls in large numbers and prevent violations of their rights in conflict zones. Since conflict in various forms is present in Pakistan and South Asia, this needs to be an important intervention. This narrative is in line with the Quranic injunctions and practices. . A feminist foreign policy will also lead to enhanced support for international humanitarian law, an aspect that Pakistan currently favor in Kashmir, and it will enhance Pakistan’s standing in the UN member states, and also lead to deepening of relations with the countries backing women right’s and security agenda at international level. . By giving equal space to women in policy-making and implementation, particularly, at the highest level of national policy and diplomatic representation, a country goes beyond mere focus on soft image. Rather through such sustained actions country reflects its values-driven domestic character. This will enhance Pakistan’s international reputation in South Asia and at the global stage. . Pursuance of feminist foreign policy also needs to register the ground realities where majority of women and girls live under extreme poverty and are deeply impacted by the climate change, ongoing conflicts, and insecurity traditionally and non-traditionally. A Pakistan pursuing feminist foreign policy would need to extend support to vulnerable women and girls across South Asia, Africa, and other conflict zones, and in extreme poverty nationally. Such practical actions will decisively add up to the credentials of Pakistan. . For realizing a feminist foreign policy, all national decisionmakers and stakeholders including Prime Minister’s Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Parliament, and Judiciary need to focus on enhancing representation of women at levels, providing adequate resources and opportunities to women to excel in their fields. This

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will gradually change their weak and vulnerable social standing and in turn would transform international image of Pakistan. . Institutionalizing a feminist foreign policy needs to be a strategic objective of Pakistan’s foreign policy in the medium-to-long-term. A genuine commitment to implement and advocate for feminist foreign policy needs to be led from the highest level of Pakistani decision-makers. . While pursuing such a foreign policy, when Pakistani representatives will speak at the international level in support of women’s and girls’ rights and ending discrimination, their voices will be taken more seriously, as Pakistan would be implementing the same calls. . Such foreign policy would also enhance Pakistan’s credentials when it would speak for the right of Kashmiri and Palestinian men and women, boys and girls and children. In a nutshell, adoption and advocating of gender balanced foreign policy posture on part of Islamabad will be a win–win situation for all. This implies implementation of the Quaid’s vision of the country where gender, race, religion, and social status does not define “Pakistan.” This notion is also compatible with the very crux of Islam—where woman is seen as an equal partner in all domains of life—often misinterpreted by power-hungry stakeholders in the country. However, to asses if Pakistan is well-equipped with all the conducive parameters, ideational and structural to pursue a feminist foreign policy requires more introspection, debate, and dialogue.

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CHAPTER 6

National Security in India’s Foreign Policy: A Feminist Reading on Developments from 2004 to 2020 Rashmi Gopi

The concept of national security has been one of the key components constituting the foreign policy of different nation-states. India is no different. However, in the phrase itself, gendered notions of ideas cannot be ignored. The nation is predominantly conceptualised as a feminine figure and therefore her security is the responsibility of a masculine state.1 What type of security is imagined and implemented through foreign policies? Who imagines and implements these notions of security? Whether this security is normative or empirical or both? These are the 1 The works by Kumari Jayawardene (Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World); Sikata Banerjee (Make Me a Man! Masculinity, Hinduism, and Nationalism in India); Nira Yuval-Davis (Gender and Nation) will be helpful to understand how feminine and masculine notions are reproduced in imagining nation and state.

R. Gopi (B) Department of Political Science, Miranda House, University of Delhi, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Ojha and P. Jaiswal (eds.), South Asian Women and International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9426-5_6

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questions that are relevant for students and scholars of political science and international relations. In this chapter, the focus has been on highlighting how national security as a concept is contested and gendered. The priority and performance of national security vary in different bilateral relations. The global power structure and geographical contexts are two main factors that shape conceptions of national security. Since 2004, we can see a subtle shift in both global power structure and geographical relations due to many factors, namely, the challenge to US hegemony on economic and cultural grounds. India perceives a change in her image projections by this time, mainly due to the nuclear tests conducted in 1998 and closer alignment with the global economic order. Therefore, in this chapter we are discussing India’s bilateral relations since 2004. India’s relations with the US (the hegemonic power in the post-cold war era) are important, especially in the background of the India–US nuclear deal. This relationship is crucial for India when we view China as a challenger to the US hegemony and as an ascending Asian power trying to redefine its geographical boundaries. For India, South Asia is the region where it claims its supremacy. Here Bangladesh is seen as a nation-state that is created with the help of Indian intervention. How India is measuring its national security in terms of sharing natural resources with Bangladesh, particularly Teesta River water, is an interesting episode to engage with. The following sections of this chapter engage with these issues in detail.

Unpacking the Concept of National Security The framing of what is national security has been predominantly defined by personal perceptions of the Prime Minister, political elites and bureaucracy. With changing contexts and leaderships, the concept of national security became essentially contested. India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru was not inclined towards building military capabilities to ensure national security and relied more on diplomacy. However, the 1962 war with China changed the discourse around national security. Singh (2004) cites that the disintegration of the Soviet Union has made it clear that enormous military power cannot ensure national security in terms of territorial integrity. When it comes to national security in the contemporary world, there is an imminent need to look beyond military power to economic and cultural aspects. Baru (2013) discusses how Manmohan Singh, as the Prime Minister of India for a decade, places economic and technological progress as keys to national security. But

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he also simultaneously emphasises the need to acquire adequate defence capabilities to counter and rebut threats to national security and seeks global partnerships at all levels (military, economic, technological and cultural). Baru (2013) quotes what Manmohan Singh said in the India Today Conclave in February 2005. Manmohan Singh shares in this platform that the idea of India should reflect the idea of the importance of pluralism wherein the periphery also becomes the centre of development. Only an inclusive and open society can strengthen national security. Today we can see that Narendra Modi has used diaspora and digital technology to intrinsically link foreign policy with national security (Sen, 2016). National security is seen as the ability of a country to overcome both its internal and external threats. An effort is underway since 2007 to draft a National Security Strategy but has not yet been finalised (Srivastava, 2019). The time taken in the process shows the difficulty in bringing together a diverse understanding of what constitutes national security. The Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces (2017) broadly touches upon India’s national security goals as involving credible deterrence, territorial integrity and protection of trade routes, cyberspace, airspace and maritime interests. There is also a focus on internal security, promotion of friendly and peaceful relations with other countries with an eye on global stability and peace (Srivastava, 2019). These point out that national security is an ever-widening concept beginning from conventional territorial integrity to the contemporary cyber world; focusing on internal threats to international ones. Therefore, it is accepted by the current government that the issue of the National Security Strategy is of prime importance and cannot be ignored for long. Arunkumar and Sakthivel (2017) state that the task ahead is to find means to coordinate between various state agencies and departments, optimal utilisation of information and communication technologies and involve people in the policymaking processes. In recent years, non-military threats to national security in South Asia is increasing and India is witnessing the same. Cross-border human trafficking, drugs and arms smuggling, ethnic tensions and environmental degradation are a few non-military threats to mention. Muhanad Seloom (2020) further highlights a new dimension of national security by bringing the fact that COVID-19 has increased the need for shifting entire institutions to online spaces and thus making vital state information vulnerable to digital infiltration.

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Gender and National Security Eric M. Blanchard (2003) explains about three ways in which national security is aligned with gender by feminists. The first school of feminists accepts stereotypes about aggressiveness as natural to men and passiveness to women. They speak about utilising maternal thinking in shifting national security discourse from militarism to peace. The second school of feminists rejects the idea that this natural binary opposition between men and women defines national security. They emphasise the fact that women have the right to equal representation on issues of both war and peace. The third school of thought presents the view that war and military structures are embedded in patriarchy and it is supported by both men and women. This work agrees with the third school of feminists that men and women are influenced by patriarchal values and therefore their take on national security has a continuum rather than opposition. However, this work stretches the argument to the third gender as well. It is not only men and women but also all persons who are identifying themselves between and beyond the binary opposition of gender that is embedded in a patriarchal context. Therefore, we cannot completely agree with scholars like Ulf Bjereld (2001) and Sara Angevine (2017) who argue that just by adding/increasing women’s representation as policymakers, the definition and performance of national security will change. It is not biology but patriarchy that defines national security. Amy Kaplan (1994) stresses the fact that national security is seen as a strategy to protect domestic core values from external threats. This perspective might appear gender-neutral for many but not for feminists. Although there is no outward expression of gender in this formulation, it indirectly feeds on the idea that men are protectors of the nation-state and women against foreign aggression. Here women are assumed to be passive and dependent on aggressive and independent men. Cornelius Adebahr and Barbara Mittelhammer (2020) emphasise that there is a need to problematise the concept of national security wherein military-enforced security is seen as masculine and peace-based security as feminine. In this chapter we can see when we use the masculine/feminine prism to understand national security then it makes security for certain people significant. It also views certain types of security as natural. In the context of India, we can say that as upper-caste, upper-class heterosexual Hindu men embedded in patriarchal values (hegemonic

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masculinity of India) 2 are predominantly represented in the policymaking process, their security perspectives are valued more. If this particular category of policymakers believes that national security can be ensured only by prioritising hard power over soft power, then that becomes the norm. In this scenario, the absence of war is equated with national security. Issues pertaining to the environment, health and social justice are either ignored or pushed to the periphery in formulating national security. Victoria Scheyer and Marina Kumskova (2019) cite R.W. Connell’s work in which she names the process of shaping institutions and organisations according to specific gender norms as ‘the gender regime of an institution’ which creates a supportive setting for exclusion. This is true in most countries where the top positions of decision-making hierarchies are dominated by men and supposed masculine principles. Scheyer and Kumskova (2019) observe that this is often overlooked in a patriarchal society as gender is invisible when only the masculine is present. Anita Gurumurthy, Nandini Chami and Sanjana Thomas (2016) highlight the fact that gender biases are not only in conventional ways of defining national security through militarism but also in the contemporary method of the digital world-driven national security discourses. They cite the fact that in the digital paradigm ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ creates the myth of ‘masculine entrepreneurialism’ and ‘misrecognition’ of women. Digital technology is used both by the state and the market for surveillance of the poor and powerless, irrespective of gender. The government and market in the name of connectivity and transparency compromise the privacy and perspectives of the powerless. In this hegemonic exercise, omissions and silences are as significant as presence and assertions. What is not seen, heard and spoken by the framers of national security is a gendered and political response to consolidate the male vote bank during the elections (Gurumurthy et al., 2016). Deborah Stienstra (1994/1995) also highlights the fact that there is a silence maintained by policymakers of national security about violence against women (both in war and peace times) as women are not part of these decision-making processes. We can add that it is not only the absence of women per se but also persons who are sensitive to gender questions. Even those who identify themselves as men can speak for women and the third gender 2 Hegemonic Masculinity is a concept developed by R.W. Connell in his work Masculinities (1995). Connell borrows the term hegemony from Antonio Gramsci and applies it to gender relations.

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if they have the inclination and intention to do so. The absences and silences are invisible to the framers of national security as there is a lack of plurality in representatives’ social, cultural and economic backgrounds (not only limited to gender identities). Gitta Shrestha, Deepa Joshi and Floriane Clement (2019) emphasise the fact that the performance of hegemonic masculinity makes the side-lining of ethics of care and distributive justice-based organisational values. After looking into the contributions of the above-mentioned scholars, we can understand that what is national security is a constructed notion. Therefore, it can be changed. However, the realisation that something is wrong in the current hegemonic masculinity-based formulations of national security is the first step towards change. Countries like the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Australia, Costa Rica and Germany have already started the process to reframe and redefine national security as a concept. But a country like India and its decision-makers have failed even to acknowledge the gaps and silences inherent in its hegemonic masculinity-based national security. India needs to reimagine its social and governmental structures and how they interact with both global and local power hierarchies. These aspects are discussed in the following sections through two case studies.

Masculine Armament and India–US Nuclear Deal Praful Bidwai (1998) cites that India’s nuclear history can be divided into four phases. The first phase is 1947 to the mid-1960s which was driven by Nehru’s vision of complete opposition to the acquisition of nuclear weapons on moral, political and strategic grounds. In this phase possession of a nuclear weapon is seen as a crime against humanity and there was no enthusiasm to engage with nuclear energy per se. The second phase is from the mid-1960s to 1974. Soon after Nehru’s death, there was pressure put on Lal Bahadur Shastri, the Indian Prime Minister, to develop nuclear weapons citing the threat from China. Shastri refused to toe the line. However, Indira Gandhi went ahead with the development of nuclear capabilities in the name of using them for peaceful purposes. Four days after the nuclear tests were done in 1974, Indira Gandhi wrote a letter to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the then Pakistan’s Prime Minister that the nuclear tests were done for peaceful purposes and it had no political or foreign policy implications. The third phase is from 1974 to 1996. During

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this period India maintains dual standards concerning nuclear capabilities. On the one hand, India refuses to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Complete Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) for their discriminatory nature curtailing India’s prospects for developing nuclear capabilities. On the other hand, India continues its rhetoric in support of nuclear disarmament by joining the Five-Continent Six-Nation Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament in 1986 and Rajiv Gandhi puts forward a plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons in the UN in 1988. In 1995 Narasimha Rao prepares for nuclear tests. The Cabinet members were divided on the feasibility of nuclear tests and the US military satellites detected preparations. The fear of economic sanctions stopped Narasimha Rao from going ahead with the tests. At the same time, the Bharatiya Janata Party and right-wing organisations pushed for nuclear tests. In the fourth phase beginning in 1996, India goes ahead with the next level of nuclear tests and the justification for it was to counter China–Pakistan nuclear and missile collaboration (Bidwai, 1998). The works of scholars like Rashid Ahmed Siddiqi (2015), Shashank Joshi (2015), Manpreet Sethi (2016), Mahrukh Khan (2017), Sadaf Farooq, Sadia Kazmi and Javaria Javed (2018) trace the India–US journey of nuclear collaboration and its implications. Ahmed Siddiqi (2015) highlights that the relationship between India and the US froze soon after the tests in 1998. However, the thawing of relations began when Bill Clinton openly supported India and pressurised Pakistan to pull back its forces along the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir during the Kargil war of 1999. He further notes that the events following the 9/11 attacks on the US brought the two countries closer. During this period, India improved its relations with traditional friends of the US like Israel, Australia, Singapore and Japan. India also sacrificed its traditional support and linkages with Iran to appease the US. India invested in infrastructural facilities in Afghanistan to support US’s supposed peacebuilding initiatives in the country (Ahmed Siddiqi, 2015). Joshi (2015) explains how India has modified its No First Use (NFU) clause over the years to dilute its true meaning. In 1998, soon after its nuclear tests, India vouched for NFU and credible minimum deterrence subject to strategic, technological and national security needs. Joshi states, that in 2003, India reaffirms NFU but attaches the condition that if its opponents use nuclear weapons first against India, then her response will be overwhelming. India also adds that NFU stands cancelled in case of a major attack on India with chemical or biological weapons (Joshi, 2015).

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Sethi (2016) highlights how the process of finalising the India–US civil nuclear deal witnessed many efforts being made to convince members of US and Indian legislative bodies; the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Beyond the deal, the issue for India was to get recognition and membership in the four key multilateral export control regimes—the Missile Technology Control Regime, the NSG, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group. For making concessions to India, there were demands to extend the same concessions to other countries. Indian decision-makers questioned why despite being a consistently constructive participant in non-proliferation and disarmament discussions, India is being treated as an outcast (Sethi, 2016). Khan (2017) says that India’s age of confusion regarding its strategic closeness to the US was reduced greatly with the Modi–Trump era. The Republican Hindu Coalition financially supported Donald Trump’s presidential campaign and the Hindu lobby has developed deep connections in the US administration. By this time, the US had realised that India is an ideal partner for containing the rise of China. India also had realised that to counter China and Pakistan, it needs US support. However, some of the decision-makers in India are sceptical about India– US nuclear relationship due to the whimsical ways in which the US imposes sanctions and lifts them and how it ditches its allies according to convenience. Further, close collaboration with the US limits India’s chances of improving relations with China, Russia and Iran. Trump’s ‘America First’ policy and interest in interfering in the Kashmir issue with Pakistan are some of the other irritants in the US–India relationship (Khan, 2017). Sadaf Farooq et al (2018) trace the shifts in India–US nuclear deal understandings over the years. Under the 123 Agreement in 2007, the US agreed to India’s demand for the right to reprocess spent nuclear fuel and assurance of non-disruption of nuclear supplies if India conducts another nuclear test in future under compelling situations. The US also didn’t force India to sign NPT and permitted India to build military reactors and to decide which reactors to be kept under safeguard. By 2015, the US abandoned its demand that India should allow US agencies to keep a tab on all the fissile material supplied by the US. India agreed to join the UN Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (Farooq et al., 2018). Today India is part of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group. India is waiting for membership in NSG. Biswas (2019)

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states that the nuclear deal with the US paved the way for India to sign agreements for cooperation in the peaceful use of Nuclear Energy with Vietnam, Bangladesh, Japan, the United Kingdom, Australia, Sri Lanka, France, Canada, Kazakhstan, Argentina, South Korea, Czech Republic, Mongolia, Namibia and Russia. When we analyse the repercussions of India–US nuclear deal on national security from a gender lens, three main features are noted in this chapter. Firstly, national security based on nuclear energy prioritises development for a few and not the protection of the environment. Secondly, it promotes a techno-savvy rational hegemonic masculinity. Thirdly, it builds on Hindutva masculinity based on Ardhnarishwar and Akhand Bharat concepts. The story of people in Pokhran reflects who matters in national security and who pays the cost for national security. A study by The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) reveals the reality of Pokhran village situated in the Jaisalmer district of Rajasthan. Since the first nuclear test in 1974, the number of cancer and genetic abnormalities, birth defects or developmental delays, began to rise consistently. The land became non-cultivable. The effects of radiation contaminated groundwater. The environment and the poor farming communities have been ignored without any recognition or care. No government has taken initiative for a systematic study on the impact of nuclear tests on the people in Pokhran. Many national and international organisations have conducted research in the region. However, these reports are hidden from the mainstream media and society at large. This reality showcases how the national security narrative is created and controlled by politicians, bureaucrats, technocrats and those who are closer to government establishments. In the name of national security, the poor people of Pokhran have been denied their basic right to a dignified life without diseases and a secure livelihood. The environment has suffered a silent death in serving national security with policymakers singularly concentrating on showcasing defence might to the world. Security as a concept has not counted the security of human life and the environment. Rashid (2015) points out that the signing of a nuclear deal with the US is a big leap for India’s development aspirations. It will ensure energy security by reducing dependence on fossil fuels. It is the coalition of politicians, bureaucrats, media barons, scientists and technocrats that trigger this narrative. This author wants to emphasise that nuclear energy by itself is harmful (both for civil and defence purposes) due to its radioactive nature which gets suppressed in the development narrative.

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The second aspect which we see in the national security narrative is a prioritisation of techno-savvy rational hegemonic masculinity. Adebahr and Mittelhammer (2020) point out that the possession of nuclear weapons is projected as the symbol of domination and absolute power. The international non-proliferation regime maintains a hierarchy of states between which are legitimate and rational (masculine) nuclear power states and others which are emotional, unpredictable, irrational, immature [or] misbehaving (feminine) states. Feminist scholars have questioned this hierarchy wherein the power to destroy is placed above the power to survive. They challenge the logic of deterrence with that of complete disarmament. Feminists argue that security as a concept should be based on the survival of life rather than the potential to destroy human life (Adebahr and Mittelhammer 2020). Blanchard (2003) stresses how the policymakers use gendered code in describing nuclear capabilities wherein possession and readiness to use nuclear weapons is seen as virility and refusal to develop or use nuclear weapons is seen as emasculation. Women policymakers are expected to toe this line of argument if they want to be taken seriously. Thus mere adding of women to the nuclear planning process is not going to end the degradation of supposed feminine ideas (Blanchard, 2003). Therefore, we can see in India, that just having more female computer programmers, missile technologists or a full-time female defence minister in 2017 never really changed the national security discourse. Blanchard (2003) quotes R.W. Connell in emphasising the fact that the development of nuclear technology and possession of nuclear weapons created a new type of hegemonic masculinity based on professionalised, calculative rationality of the technical specialist. Therefore, militaristic masculinity is performed not only on actual battlefields but also in labs and offices of nuclear planning. Thus we can argue that in India, the appointment of APJ Abdul Kalam as President of India in 2002 by the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee epitomises acceptance and celebration of this new hegemonic masculinity. Abdul Kalam was one of the significant players in planning and executing Pokhran II in 1998. The third aspect of national security discourse is that it builds on Hindutva masculinity based on Ardhnarishwar and Akhand Bharat concepts. Ardhnarishwar is an androgynous deity composed of Shiva on the right side and Shakti on the left side. It represents the coming together of masculine (head) and feminine (heart) energies. The left

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side symbolises the heart and supposed feminine characteristics like intuition and creativity, while the right depicts the brain and supposed masculine traits like logic, valour and systematic thought. It also signifies the synthesis of creation and destruction. India’s policy of No First Use (which we have already discussed above) is an expression of this Ardhnarishwar concept. Nuclear power is a combination of creative and destructive aspects. When used carefully, nuclear power can be a source of energy for electricity and fuel to power cars and automobiles or launch spaceships. When nuclear power is used for militaristic purposes, then it is a tool for destruction. The cylindrical shape of a nuclear bomb is equated with Shivling. The pot of water hanging above the Shivling signifies the water needed to cool down the reactor in the energy generation process. Deriving from these narratives is the fact that the naming of Pokhran II as Operation Shakti itself is not a coincidence but a calculated move in the construction of an image based on Ardhnarishwar (the co-existence of the creator and the destroyer). National security is not only ensured through the peaceful and civil (supposed feminine qualities) use of nuclear power but also through aggressive and virile (supposed masculine qualities) use of it in case of emergency on the battlefield. India’s Ardhnarishwar postulation can be seen also in its placement in the galaxy of nuclear weapon states. India is there in between rationallegitimate (masculine) nuclear players and immature-illegitimate (feminine) nuclear ones. Concerning the US and its co-members in NSG, India is playing a feminine-submissive role. India in its relations with these countries is seen as continuously seeking approval, inclusion and protection. However, concerning nuclear powers that have not yet got concessions from NSG like Iran, India plays a masculine role of domination with a sense of superiority. Another concept of national security that derives its meaning from Hindutva narratives is the concept of Akhand Bharat. The idea of Akhand Bharat is traced to Chanakya’s Arthashastra. Chanakya articulated the idea of an Akhand Bharat, which means all states in the region, namely, present-day Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Myanmar, Tibet, Bhutan and Bangladesh, being under one authority, rule and administration. During the nationalist movement in India, Vinayak Damodar Savarkar propounded the notion of an Akhand Bharat emphasising the impending cultural, religious and political unity of Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs and Jains throughout the Indian subcontinent from Kashmir in the north to Rameshwaram in the south and from Sindh in the west to Assam in the east. Srini Sitaraman (2020) brings to light the

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fact that both China and Pakistan are revisionist states that want to redraw the national boundaries by claiming territories belonging to other nationstates. India is a direct bearer of these ambitions. Sitaraman (2020) argues that in India also Akhand Bharat concept is revisionist in approach but is merely a dream. Here we would differ with Sitharaman. If we closely study India’s domestic and foreign policies in recent times, we can see a revival of the Akhand Bharat concept. The Hindus in the South Asian region from Afghanistan to Bangladesh are seen as potential returnees to India due to religious persecution and they can be made citizens of India on their arrival on easier terms (the Citizenship Amendment Act3 is a step in this direction). Similarly, India’s resistance to China’s increased involvement in South Asia is also drawing on Akhand Bharat’s idea. There is a possibility that India may revise its nuclear policy of No First Use from a defensive to revisionist position to further enhance its idea of Akhand Bharat.

Masculine Appropriation and Teesta Water Sharing Deal Bikramjit De (2014) traces the origin of the Teesta water dispute to the colonial era. He notes that the realisation on the part of British colonial officials that decolonisation is a reality waiting to happen in the Indian subcontinent came by the 1930s. The British colonial officials also accepted that any process of decolonisation will involve finding solutions to water management in the region. The claim to a larger share of Teesta River water by post-Independent India and East Pakistan came with the realisation of the Teesta River’s immense potential for both irrigation and hydroelectric power generation. For the same purpose, India proposed the construction of the Tipaimukh Dam. To flush out excessive sedimentation in the Hooghly near the Kolkata port, the Farakka Barrage was completed by 1971 by the Government of India as part of the Teesta Barrage Irrigation Project (TBIP). Like Farakka Barrage on the Indian side, the Dalia Barrage on the Teesta at the Daoni–Lalmonirhat point was built in 1990 to exclusively serve the Bangladeshi people. Thus, both 3 The Citizenship Amendment Act was passed by Lok Sabha in 2019. It extends Indian citizenship to illegal migrants belonging to Bangladesh, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The religious identity of illegal migrants recognised by this act for citizenship includes Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Christian, Parsi and Jain.

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India and Bangladesh visualise the utilisation of modern technology in tapping natural resources. However, this vision is restricted to people of their own country. Starting from the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace in 1972 between India and Bangladesh to specific Teesta water sharing agreements between the two countries in 1975, 1977, 1982, 1985 and 1996 failed to bear any fruit in solving the dispute. De believes that factors like flooding and drought, food security of the people, production of hydroelectricity and irrigation facilities on both sides of the border have triggered tensions in the region. The willingness to accept equitable sharing of the Teesta River water, both in times of high and low levels of water, by Bangladesh and India is missing. It has led to failure in finding solutions by bureaucrats sitting in Delhi, Dhaka and Kolkata. This is even reflected in the failure of the Joint River Commission formed in 1972 to find a solution. The politics of water is also entrenched in the cultural nationalism propagated on both sides of the border wherein Muslims and Hindus are seen as two incompatible communities (De, 2014). Rubul Patgiri and Obja Borah Hazarika (2016) observe that over the years, both India and Bangladesh, are trying to improve their relations through bilateral and multilateral initiatives. India with its Look East Policy and Act East policy has realised the relevance of connecting with Bangladesh. Narendra Modi in his maiden visit to Bangladesh in 2014 said that India’s Act East begins with Bangladesh. Therefore, efforts will be made to improve physical connectivity between India and Bangladesh to further connect with Southeast Asia (Bajpaee, 2017). Through multilateral initiatives like the Bay of Bengal Initiative for MultiSectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), India and Bangladesh are improving cooperation in transport and communication, tourism, disaster management, counter-terrorism and transnational crime. However, the Teesta River water question is stuck in disagreement. Another platform is the Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Forum (BCIM) wherein India and Bangladesh are trying to improve connectivity between the north-eastern states of India with Bangladesh (Patgiri & Hazarika, 2016). Bhattacharya (2021) also explains that the Bangladesh– India connectivity is crucial in strengthening the economy in the Bay of Bengal region. India and Bangladesh are promoting transport networks for the same reason. Currently, there are four rail links between India and Bangladesh, namely, Petrapole–Benapole, Gede–Darshana, Radhikapur– Biral and Singhabad–Rohanpur. The Agartala–Akhaura railway link is

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expected to be active by September 2021. According to Patgiri and Hazarika (2016), India expects to improve its relations with Bangladesh not only for economic gains but also for dismantling insurgency groups working against India from Bangladeshi soil. But we can see all efforts to improve economic relations are incomplete with a lack of a culture of trust and confidence between the people of India and Bangladesh to share natural resources on equitable terms, especially about Teesta River water sharing. Banerji (2021) concludes that this is the golden period of the India and Bangladesh relationship and it will be meaningful for both parties to resolve the Teesta River water dispute now. In 2011, the then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made all efforts to find a resolution and reached an understanding with Bangladesh to share 37.5 per cent of Teesta waters while retaining 42.5 per cent of the waters during the lean season between December and March. But the deal got a last-minute shock from West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee who strongly opposed the treaty. The construction of dams along Teesta in Sikkim has negatively affected the flow of water to Bangladesh as it is a lower riparian country. India has consistently stayed away from addressing this issue and the Joint River Commission meetings have not yielded any positive results so far. For these developments, Bangladesh in recent times has been contemplating accepting the proposal from China to comb and embank large portions of the Teesta River so that it formed a single manageable channel towards Bangladesh. If India delays direct bilateral management of the Teesta issue with Bangladesh at the earliest, then India is inviting Chinese interference closer to the ‘Chicken Neck’ corridor near Siliguri that connects mainland India to its states in the northeast. For Sheikh Hasina, Prime Minister of Bangladesh, who is viewed as ‘pro-India’ by Bangladeshis, the earliest resolution of the Teesta issue is a matter of political survival. After the Land Boundary Agreement of 2014, the solution to the Teesta matter will ensure a friendly neighbour in Bangladesh (Banerji, 2021). Gitta Shrestha, Deepa Joshi and Floriane Clement (2019) emphasise the fact that water science, knowledge, technology and infrastructure fields are dominated by men and hegemonic masculine values such as rationality, efficiency, competition and aggression. In the process, not only women are excluded from the decision-making process but also people from all marginalised communities. The predominance of men’s presence helps the maintenance and reproduction of masculinity in these spaces. Here, in this chapter, we are agreeing with the observations

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made by Shrestha, Joshi and Clement. We further explore how masculine perceptions are shaping the India–Bangladesh Teesta water sharing dispute. Again we could see that in the Teesta River water sharing issue India prioritises development for a few and not the protection of the environment as a whole. Secondly, it promotes a techno-savvy rational hegemonic masculinity. Thirdly, it builds on Hindutva masculinity based on Ardhnarishwar and Akhand Bharat concepts. Taylor Graham (2015) cites in his study that India has utilised the Teesta River for building many dams to generate hydroelectricity. The fact that hydroelectricity projects produce energy from renewable resources is marketed well to justify India’s commitment to the green economy. It serves its national security narrative by ensuring energy security. However, India ignores the fact that a renewable resource can also be polluted and finished if it is used in an unsustainable way. Graham (2015) highlights the fact that overexploitation of the Teesta River is a threat to the rich biodiversity of the region, especially for endangered Golden Mahseer fish. The compensation process is faulty as only those whose homes or lands got submerged were listed as project-affected peoples (excluding those people whose homes got damaged due to heavy drilling and tunnelling), and Lepcha people’s voice and cultural identity are ignored. Suvojit Bagchi (2017) reveals that many of the glaciers in the Teesta basin have retreated and this has reduced the quantity of water flow. Thus, in the name of development for national security, the aspirations and voices of marginalised communities are suppressed. From planning to implementation, the impact of development projects serving national security excludes security concerns of local communities and the environment at large. The point is that the negative impacts of development projects on the environment are not limited to national boundaries. The quality and quantity of Teesta River water have reached new lows and it is felt by local communities living in both India and Bangladesh. Even during the meeting between Narendra Modi and Sheikh Hasina in April 2021 commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the creation of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina appealed to Narendra Modi to resolve the Teesta dispute. She calls for the earliest resolution to address the sufferings of millions of people dependent on the Teesta River basin in Bangladesh (PTI , 28 March 2021). A techno-savvy rational hegemonic masculinity permeates the whole approach to the Teesta question. The members of the Joint River Commission (from both India and Bangladesh) are engineers and experts (Banglapedia National Encyclopaedia of Bangladesh). The immense

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ecological and cultural knowledge of the local communities is not represented. We have discussed above how these engineering fields are predominated by men (remember most of them are from urban middle-class backgrounds), therefore it excludes representation not only of women but also of men and persons from diverse backgrounds. The appointment of S. Jaishankar, a former Foreign Secretary, as External Affairs Minister in 2019 is an extension of expert-driven masculinity at its display. The bureaucrats and their rationality is projected as unquestionably efficient in dealing with policy matters. Thus we can see that the local people’s voice is distanced further from the decision-making process. The recent visit by S. Jaishankar in March 2021 to Bangladesh just before Narendra Modi’s visit and assuring his Bangladeshi counterpart AK Abdul Momen that India is ready to discuss Teesta and there is no issue we cannot resolve amicably also reflects the significance attached to rational bureaucratic approach (Basu, 2021). The Teesta question reflects reliance on Hindutva masculine narrative. In the background of the expert-bureaucratic rational approach, lies the tapping of Hindu mythology to justify India’s dominance over the Teesta River. The etymology of Teesta in Sanskrit means desire which never dies. According to Kalika Purana, Teesta River is the younger daughter of Himalaya. In another mythology, it is believed that the Teesta River is created by Lord Shiva. One of the demons after doing hard penance won over Shiva’s blessings. But this demon showed less regard for Goddess Parvati, the wife of Lord Shiva. Parvati felt insulted and entered into a war with this demon. The demon got injured and requested Lord Shiva to quench his thirst. Thereupon Shiva made milky water flow from Parvati’s breast. This water is called the Teesta River and continues to fulfil the desires of the people. It is interesting how most of the rivers in India are connected with Hindu mythology. Bikramjit De (2014) traces the origin of tensions regarding sharing of Ganges and Teesta water with India’s neighbours. He asserts that one of the issues is earlier Islamabad’s (before 1971) and later Dhaka’s reluctance to acknowledge religious and spiritual values attached by Hindus to these rivers. Here we can further observe that in this process India’s foreign policy is constructing a homogenised Hindu narrative to claim natural resources. In the process, it is not only ‘othering’ neighbours’ culture and claims but also erasing plural traditions and narratives embedded in India. Taylor Graham (2015) also speaks about the rich cultural traditions of local communities near Teesta River,

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especially that of the Lepcha community being ignored in the development discourse adopted by the Indian government. Gauri Noolkar-Oak (2017) studies the geopolitics of water conflicts in the Teesta Basin and concludes that the voice of local stakeholders, the environmental and health security of the local communities and the economic and spiritual value of the Teesta River are neglected in the official channels dealing with the dispute between India and Bangladesh. She highlights that internal disputes such as the anti-dam movement in Sikkim, the struggle for Gorkhaland and the ‘Save the Buri Teesta’ movement in Bangladesh are not given significance in dispute resolution. Hence while reading the issue through a gender lens, we realise that not only the voices of women are side-lined but also the voices of men belonging to different social-cultural and economic backgrounds are being subordinated. These local communities are infantilised by hegemonic rational masculinity to assume that these local women, men and persons beyond binaries of gender either have no knowledge and agency or their knowledge is inferior and immaterial. The Hindu hegemonic masculinity is not only in conflict with the Muslim masculinity of Bangladesh but also in conflict with the plural local masculinities of the region. Here, we can also see how the image of Ardhnarishwar is played out. The Teesta River is seen as a procreative (feminine) force, feeding and nurturing the people in its vicinity and also as a destructive (masculine) force, a river changing its course and strength damaging the livelihoods of people around it. India is playing as an aggressive masculine state taking advantage of its geographical location (of being an upper riparian state) to control and dominate the Teesta River as well as Bangladesh. However, the threat of China entering the scene to help Bangladesh, simultaneously makes India a submissive state, verbally assuring Bangladesh that they should seek to resolve the dispute bilaterally. Similarly, India projects itself as the sole protector (masculine father figure) of Bangladesh by claiming its military role in creating Bangladesh in 1971. However, the use of the China card in the recent past by Bangladesh has made India project economic-cultural (non-militaristic feminine) linkages between the two countries more often. Similarly, the Akhand Bharat concept, which we have discussed above, influences India’s approach towards Bangladesh. India’s arrogance in looking at Bangladeshi people as powerless has been reflected in recent comments by Home Minister Amit Shah (The Wire, 2021). India believes that it has a natural right over South Asian countries

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and it is one of the reasons for the failure of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Amit Ranjan (2019) notes that even though people perceive Modi’s ‘Neighbourhood First Policy’ as different from his predecessors, a closer study reveals that Modi has continued with the past practices. Ranjan (2019) stresses the fact that Bangladesh has received better attention from India only after the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Bangladesh in 2016 and the two countries signed the Strategic Partnership of Cooperation. Increasing Chinese assistance is seen as a threat to India’s national security. It is interesting to note here that India simultaneously engages in ‘othering’ and ‘extension of self’ discourses about Bangladesh. The Modi government has justified the passing of the National Register of Citizens in Assam4 and Citizenship Amendment Act in the name of protecting Hindus in India and Bangladesh. In these narratives, the predominance of the Muslim population in Bangladesh is seen as a threat and opposition to a predominantly Hindu nation. Whereas, the increasing Chinese investments in Bangladesh are seen as meddling with India’s sphere of influence. In this case, attempts are made to win over Bangladesh by being a big brother who helped in its very own creation. Bangladesh is seen as an extension of India itself.

Conclusion This chapter argues that the concept of national security is contested and gendered. Those who are in power define national security according to the prevailing context. However, there is always continuity and conflicts in meanings attached to national security. This chapter makes the argument that instead of seeing India’s national security concept as masculine we need to recognise the variation and fluidity in the ways masculinity is performed through the national security concept. Borrowing from R.W. Connell, it has been shown that there is hegemonic masculinity based on technology, rationality and militarism defining India’s national security. At the same time, the Hindutva discourses of Ardhnarishwar and Akhand Bharat have equally shaped India’s national security discourses. The degree and form vary in each bilateral relation. Here, through the 4 National Register of Citizens in Assam was introduced in 2019 to identify the illegal migrants from Bangladesh after 24 March 1971 to Assam. It is used as a tool to identify genuine citizens of Assam.

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case study of the India–US nuclear deal and the Teesta River water dispute with Bangladesh, these elements of India’s national security have been unpacked. In conclusion, we can argue that in India’s national security discourses, not only women and the third gender are excluded but marginalised men are also missing. Not all men are shaping national security and not all men are benefitting from it.

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CHAPTER 7

Re-envisioning South Asia’s Foreign Policy from a Feminist Perspective Akanksha Khullar

It is important to have a wide diversity of voices—not because we want to be politically correct, but because we want to be accurate. (Adichie, 2018)

The historical trajectory of the South Asian region—from a feminist vantage point—has been prolific, textured and even contentious, where feminist movements have often co-existed along with Western influences. Whether we talk about women’s active role in the attainment of democracy in Pakistan or women’s participation in the Indian nationalist movement or the struggles of rural women in Bangladesh, all have been profusely documented (Basu, 2005). These feminist movements have in fact, gained considerable traction at the global stage. Meanwhile, there also exist various studies on ethnic secessionist and religious nationalist movements that have successfully organised women in the region (Aun et al., 2012). As such, women’s local, national and transnational activism

A. Khullar (B) New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Ojha and P. Jaiswal (eds.), South Asian Women and International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9426-5_7

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has always been well and alive in South Asia. Yet, owing to the deeply embedded patriarchal values and cultural norms that predominate the South Asian societies, the field of politics and the process of policymaking within the subcontinent has largely failed to incorporate the concerns, interests or needs of these women (Singh, 2017). Agency in South Asia thus continues to be unreservedly depicted as male while women are considered as mere passive victims in need of protection. These gender-based prejudices and discriminatory practices are so discernibly systematised within the South Asian societies that they often come to the surface even before a girl child is born. And, entrenched patriarchal norms, socio-cultural laws and institutional hierarchies subsequently keep these gender biases alive. As a result, sexual violence, rape, women’s economic vulnerability, lack of authority and participation form some of the most endemic characteristics of the South Asian sociopolitical landscape (Banu, 2016). Coupled with these gender stereotypes and prejudicial practices are the numerous anti-state rebellions, crossborder tensions and heavy militarisation that reverberate across different parts of the region. For instance, the Jammu and Kashmir conundrum between India and Pakistan, which has in fact, plagued the entire South Asian subcontinent for over more than seven decades now. Similarly, tensions between India and—its other bordering neighbour—Nepal have been brewing for many years. And it is these escalating tensions and conflicts that ultimately fuel the problems of forced migrations; normalising patriarchal or political violence against women and intensifying attacks on ethnic, religious and sexual minorities. Conflicts in this sense exacerbate pre-existing inequalities (Buvinic et al., 2012). As a consequence, men and women experience conflicts differently. In furtherance, due to their gender-differentiated roles or positions within the societies, men and women also contribute differently towards peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction processes. Based on this perception, emerging literature and academic theorising have extensively argued that matters of peace and security, especially in terms of a country’s foreign policy would be better guided by gender-mainstreaming efforts and inclusion of women in broader political dialogues, sectoral cooperation or global security. For instance, Enloe (2000: 300) states that “femininity as a concept and women as actors need to be made the objects of analytical curiosity when we are trying to make sense of international political processes”. The reasons outlining the significance of adopting a gendered approach are however many. On

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the one hand, some theorists believe that the invocation of gender in international politics is important to ensure that women’s fundamental rights are being upheld and maintained; and like their male counterparts women are being granted an equivalent access to resources and opportunities (Scheyer & Kumskova, 2019). And then there are others who stress upon the fact that an analysis of foreign policy frameworks from a gendered lens can potentially enable a better understanding of how institutionalised and masculinised power relations end up reproducing themselves in ways that foreign policy is structured and gender equality is talked about in public forums (Bacchi, 2005). But either which way, the truth is that this revised gendered-framing of a nation’s foreign policy would not only provide fresh perspectives for conducting diplomacy but also alternative ways for formulating public policies by breaking away from the male-dominated policymaking structures, shifting the emphasis from military means and reimagining the traditional hard-core securitised approach (Naves, 2020). And in this regard, the adoption of Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP) offers an innovative social laboratory for institutionalising the much-needed paradigmatic shift in conventional foreign policy establishments. A FFP provides stepping-stones to move towards the goals of equality, well-being and sustainable as well as long-lasting peace. Although, FFP across different contexts does not work from a fixed definition yet, “it does make an effort to adopt an intersectional approach to questions of peace, security, economic well-being and development, from the viewpoint of the vulnerable and under-represented sections of society” (“A Gender-Sensitive”, 2021: 9). And in doing so, it weighs the concerns of humanitarianism against the predominating interests of power and use of force (Rao, 2018). In simpler terms, the FFP agenda, at the bare minimum, requires a rethinking of its conceptual framework and initiates empathetic conversations around the struggles of women and other marginalised groupings. While it is a relatively new phenomenon, FFP derives its key tenets from the contours of feminist international relations (IR) theory, which essentially critiques the traditional conceptualisations of peace and security that remain state-centric, and outlines the ways in which these conceptualisations invisiblise hierarchies, gender boundaries and power structures (Masood, 2020). As such, the principles of humanitarian rights and gender equality form the heart of this revolutionised concept. From an international law perspective, the FFP framework can be viewed as an extension of the far-reaching worldwide efforts following

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the formulation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda as laid out in the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and subsequent resolutions that call for the meaningful participation of women; the protection of women; the prevention of violence against women; making relief and recovery a gender-sensitive process. The FPP however, has not been immune to resistance. Critics of such an approach have in fact, justified their arguments by linking the feminist political framework with normative soft power and have therefore raised questions regarding the capacity of FFP to confront aggression and its ability to deal with hard-core security issues (Alwan & Weldon, 2017). But, the truth is that the FFP approach is not even remotely close to the pacifism that it is often perceived to carry. The FFP instead, proclaims that state actors must alternatively choose between hard and soft power approaches, and depending on the complexity of threats should tactfully apply them. At the global stage, the concept of FFP has nonetheless, been gaining momentum with Sweden becoming the first country to officially adopt a feminist approach as a key feature of its foreign as well as development policies in 2014. And even though, it has now reliquinshed FFP stating that the label could be ‘counter-productive’, but since Sweden’s adoption, a handful of other countries began moving towards FFP including, Canada, France and Spain. Apart from the progressive western countries, this approach has also gained traction in Global South with Mexico framing its foreign policy to reflect a feminist shift in 2020. But even today, in South Asia, the discipline of IR and its subfields continues to be largely dominated by state-centric, masculine, realist and neorealist analysations (Singh, 2017). As such, the spaces for alternative and innovative ways of thinking remain rather limited, and the path to challenge the conventional notions of conflict, security and state remains long and arduous. However, in light of the changing global political context as well as the altering actualities of conflicts in the South Asian region and its growing intersection with gender, the confines of international politics as a discipline needs to be expanded beyond the traditional analytical impressions. It should thus, focus on making spaces for women at all levels of foreign as well security policymaking. This chapter therefore, makes the case for the adoption of a FFP in the South Asian region. In doing so, it is based on the premise that there is a need for comprehensive gender analysis across peace and security policies, and governance in South Asia since gender as an analytical categorisation

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intersects with diverse sectors such as climate, trade, environment, etc., that will better guide a country’s foreign policy interests. The study has been divided into three sections where section “The Prevailing Foreign Policy Framework in South Asia” explores how foreign policy has been framed in South Asia so far. It also attempts to locate the inclusion of gender perspectives in policy formulation and outcomes along with women’s participation in diverse foreign policy mechanisms. Based on the consideration that the region needs a formidable framework for apprehending the complexities of gender issues in diplomacy and for working towards addressing these issues holistically, section “Feminist Foreign Policy: The Transformational Shift” analyses why an FFP will serve as a better approach for South Asia to frame its foreign policy and conduct its diplomatic affairs. The chapter, in section “Conclusion” winds up by pointing towards the feasibility as well as challenges for the implementation of FFP within the region. Overall, the study relies on a mixed method of research, alternating between process tracing and qualitative data analysis. Process tracing is employed to understand the causation and changes in the foreign policy dynamics of the South Asian member states. Qualitative data analysis, on the other hand, is used to examine gender-mainstreaming efforts in policy outcomes and the representation of women in the process of policymaking.

The Prevailing Foreign Policy Framework in South Asia Objectives, Principles and Pathways In South Asia, foreign policies designed by member states are mostly based on the dual principles of non-interventionism and defending national sovereignty. For instance, India’s foreign policy revolves around five basic virtues, which include, mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; peaceful co-existence; mutual non-interference; equality and mutual benefit; and, mutual non-aggression (Malhotra, 2019). Likewise, “the fundamental objective of Nepal’s foreign policy is to enhance the dignity of the nation by safeguarding sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence, and promoting economic wellbeing and prosperity of Nepal” (Government of Nepal, n.d.). This list goes on for other South Asian countries, the foreign policies of which have been based on similar premises. In terms of specific priorities, foreign policy goals in South

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Asia—like in any other nation around the world—emphasise on the preservation as well as the advancement of national interests of individual states and guarantee the security of their territorial borders (Ahmed, 2019). In this sense, the problem does not lie either in the objectives or in the direction of prevailing foreign policies in South Asia but is instead, seeded in the way these foreign policies are being deliberated. To begin with, while framing their foreign policy goals and the security agenda, South Asian nations have adopted a rather narrow and traditional view of security, one that is highly influenced by military interests and political concerns (Buzan & Wæver, 2003). These conventional, statecentric military approaches in fact, legitimise the application of force and often serve as a tool to justify the use of violence or other coercive means in the name of protecting ‘sovereignty’ or ‘interest’ of a nation. In addition to this security dynamics is the political objective to establish power over ‘others’ that drives the South Asian foreign policy establishments (Ranjan, 2015). According to the realists, the politics of power fundamentally refers to the capacity of individual states to influence actions, decisions or behaviours of others either through political aggression or military capabilities (Mastanduno et al., 1989). As such, defence frameworks in the subcontinent have continued to gather strength, aggravating the arms race and building nuclear capabilities. Besides, South Asia’s inherent focus on regime stability and power acquisition has further heightened enmity and hostility within the region, retarding the ability of member states to come together and collaborate on multifaceted challenges (Nayak, 2013). Thus, as a regional forum, even the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has often been marred by divisions and is time and again dismissed as a talk shop or as a loosely packed organisation with the minimal authoritative mandate (Khullar, 2015). South Asia in this sense, tops the list of examples of a geographically and historically contiguous region, which despite sharing cultural, linguistic, social and spiritual practices, continues to experience a lack of stable and peaceful regional environment. As a result, collective mistrust and mutual suspicion are terms that aptly describe bilateral relations within the subcontinent. And, it is these cleavages along with the hardcore military-based approach that has made the true optimisation of the region’s potential rather difficult, leaving several possibilities for cooperation still unexplored. For instance, the prospects of cultivating economic

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interdependence, which can potentially serve as a suitable tactic to counterbalance the political and strategic tensions have not received much attention among the South Asian members. There in fact, exists various studies deploring the low levels of economic trade within the South Asian subcontinent and stress upon the largely unrealised, prospective gains that could be obtained from improving it (Weerahewa, 2009). This stands true even today, where South Asia as a region is highly disintegrated in terms of formal trade between its countries, a total of which accounts for only 23 billion dollars, falling far below an estimated value of at least 67 billion dollars (Kathuria & Rizwan, 2019). In percentile, intra-regional trade amounts for barely 5% of the region’s total trade (Balakrishnan, 2018). Hence, instead of being complimentary, the economies of the SAARC countries continue to remain competitive towards each other. As a result of which, multidimensional security architecture—focusing on economic integration—has broadly been missing from South Asia’s regional dimensions. Adding on to this, South Asia’s overemphasis on traditional security aspects also brings with it some of the most obvious ramifications for the situation of human security within the region. And, while governments in South Asia have been confronted with both military as well as human security dilemmas yet, allocation of resources, especially in terms of national budgets have been more inclined towards military spending over human security matters. In fact, ever since the end of cold war, South Asia’s military expenditure as a percentage of the region’s total GDP has been measured as one of the highest in the world and this graph has only been rising (Soherwordi, 2005). According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) report published in 2009, South Asia’s focus on defence budgets during 1998–2008 resulted in a sizeable increase—of nearly 41%—in terms of military expenditure, growing from USD21.9 billion in 1999 to USD30.9 billion in 2008 (SIPRI, 2009). Even the latest statistics available for the year 2019 reflect this upward spending trend, where South Asia as a region devoted USD88.1 billion on building its military capabilities with India alone having the highest military expenditure hovering at around USD71.1 billion (Silva et al., 2021). Such excessive defence spending has however, squandered the capacity of these countries to provide adequate resources that might be needed for social or human development. As a consequence, states in South Asia have generally done a poor job of contributing towards issues of human security at all levels—nationally, regionally or internationally. This remains

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the case despite South Asian countries having pledged to uphold as well as contribute towards the advancement of peace, human development, social justice and women’s empowerment at various international forums (Sattar et al., 2012). But in reality, they have not and do not shy away from using coercive means to accomplish their ‘national interests’. In this sense, the narrow conceptualisation of security—as ingrained in South Asian strategies and policy documents—has recurrently devalued ‘soft’ security topics in comparison to ‘hard’ security parameters. And it is these practices that then result in binary policymaking, partial conflict analyses and incomprehensive response strategies emanating from within the region. Nevertheless, it is only over the past few decades that there has been a greater realisation among member states regarding the mounting implications of new “soft” or non-traditional security challenges such as cybercrimes, environment degradation, water resources, etc. (Nayak, 2013). As a result, these non-traditional security issues have begun envisaging in diplomatic conversations and foreign policy frameworks within the region. But keeping the significance of non-traditional security threats aside, the shift towards these issues in South Asia cannot entirely be seen as a conscious or as an intentional move on the part of its member states to redesign their highly securitised foreign policy environment. Consequently, political will and commitment to the underlying aspects of the non-traditional security challenges have remained rather narrow within the subcontinent. In fact, South Asia’s shift towards the unconventional security issues— at least in part—can be identified as being incidental to the way SAARC was formulated in 1985. India and its leadership, from the beginning, had been very reluctant to join SAARC. But in order to be a part of the common regional effort, circumventing its apprehensions, the Indian government imposed a conditionality that barred the regional organisation from either discussing or moderating bilateral issues (Jain, 2005). As such, though the concept of SAARC was founded on the idea of providing a mutual platform for interaction among member states, it was not really equipped to deal with interstate conflicts or resolve bilateral disputes within the region. And now that the hard-core security areas were out of SAARC’s ambit, the regional forum had more space to manoeuvre. Its course was subsequently steered towards the adoption of non-traditional security issues with its agenda incorporating many of the “human security concerns, including counterterrorism, food and energy security, poverty alleviation, curbing of human trafficking, and

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mutual help against natural disasters such as floods, tsunami and earthquakes” (Sehrawat, 2018). It was essentially in parallel to this whimsical that non-traditional security challenges notably began surfacing in individual foreign policy architectures of the South Asian member states as well (Nayak, 2013). For example, in the form of water sharing agreements between India and Bangladesh or by India extending development assistance to Nepal in the education sector. But despite these efforts, progress in the sphere of non-traditional security matters within the subcontinent has remained far below expectations. And, till date there does not exist any comprehensive regional cooperative security framework that is designed to address both traditional as well as non-traditional security concerns. This can however, once again be pinned down to the fact that over the years, South Asian national discourses as well as mindsets have developed a tendency to constantly prioritise traditional security norms, which further feeds into the overall foreign policy and security dynamics of the region; thus, making any deliberations towards soft security issues unnecessary or redundant. Extrapolating from this, it would be appropriate to say that the South Asian subcontinent has been experiencing an ever accentuating and sharpening of dichotomies between the hard and soft security issues, even when in reality, no clear distinction exists between the two. Both aspects of security, hard or soft, are fundamentally inter-connected and overlapping, thereby, posing numerous multifaceted challenges not only for the states within the subcontinent but also for the millions of its citizens. Yet, it is the hard security matters that continue to receive greater attention. The ‘Masculinised’ Discourse These systemic practices and linear ways of thinking—as embedded in the South Asian foreign policy environment—are nonetheless, only a reflection of the specific forms of hegemonic masculinities that continue to dominate the security and political frameworks in the region. As a matter of fact, in almost all countries in South Asia, patriarchal values and gender-differentiated notions have stereotypically characterised matters of politics, security and conflict as masculine domains (Manchanda, 2001). As such, the conduct of diplomacy and foreign relations has exclusively and typically been reserved for men and continues to be monopolised by these very men. It is indeed, these masculinised traits that associate

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the conduct of diplomacy and foreign relations with the application of force, portraying it as the most pertinent solution to resolve conflicts and maintain or command dominance. In addition, it considers only traditional security threats or challenges as significant themes that are relevant in the process of developing a country’s foreign policy. This approach in fact, also allows states to manipulate access to space, resources, goods or services and in doing so, fundamentally violates the democratic principles of equality and non-discrimination. As a result, South Asia’s foreign policy architecture has largely failed to accommodate diverse issues or perspectives, especially of people originating from other intersectionalities of caste, class, race or ethnicity. But in this state-centric, masculinised foreign policy discourse, what has been even more disappointing is the persistent marginalisation of women, who not only account for nearly half of the population in South Asia but also bear the disproportionate burden of conflict and violence that remains endemic within the region. To put it simply, instead of being acknowledged as equivalent agents of peace and security or as multifaceted security providers and players in foreign policy dynamics, women in South Asia are the non-recognised, silent victims of the society. Gendered notions and stereotypical characterisations have thus, traditionally cut women off from power structures (Jahan, 1987). These notions aggregate that women are subordinate to men, and henceforth, unlike men they are merely decision-followers not the decision-makers. Besides, in the domain of South Asian foreign policymaking, it has been widely perceived that women’s inclusion or a typical “female approach” would carry a prejudice towards “soft-security” matters—such as women empowerment, gender rights, migration and trafficking—and therefore, detract focus from the indispensable hard security concerns including conflict, power ambition and nuclearisation (Smith, 2018). And, it is owing to these gender insensitivities and fragmented perceptions that not only women themselves but also considerations about their needs, concerns and interests remain absent from the process of policymaking and in forums where discussions about matters of peace, security or conflict are undertaken. In this sense, although foreign and security policies in South Asia might have evolved over the past few years to expand its reach, yet they have endured to be—until today—gender blind. Meanwhile, post-colonised South Asia did make a promising beginning with regard to women’s political representation and put forth the highest number of female leaders across different time frames, cultures

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and democratic systems (Prashar & D’Costa, 2017). In Nepal, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka women have occupied both the highest constitutional positions and served as executive heads of state either as Presidents or as Prime Ministers. They have also been involved in important cabinet posts and in the federal governance of various provinces. Be it Indira Gandhi, Benazir Bhutto, Chandrika Kumaratunga, Sheikh Hasina, Khalida Zia or Sirimavo Bandaranaike—all are famous names of women who have succeeded in dominating national politics within the subcontinent for decades. However, despite their power and leadership positions, even these women have found it rather difficult to break away from the shackles of patriarchy that guide the institutions of security and politics in the region. Resultantly, these women leaders had to often co-opt to attain power, thus, following or supporting the process of conservative policymaking just like their male counterparts (Bukhari, 2021). The acquisition of power by these women, nonetheless, is also exemplary of the practice of legacy or dynasty that remains prevalent within the South Asian subcontinent, where only a small proportion of urban women belonging to strong, educated or wealthy families are provided with the space to participate in the sphere of politics (Omvedt, 2005). Consequently, while on one hand such exclusionary participation might have facilitated in the instrumentalisation of a few elite women, on the other hand, it has fundamentally compromised genuine inclusiveness of women’s empowerment and participation within the region. Following these practices of the past, even today, the status of women’s agency in the current South Asian political structures and institutions has been no better with only limited spaces available for their adequate representation. For instance, as of October 2020, women held merely 14.365% of seats in the national parliament of India, 20.917% in Bangladesh, 20.17% in Pakistan, etc. (The World Bank, 2021). And, with the exception of Pakistan, these statistics do show an improvement from the previous years where in 2014, women held 11.48 seats in the Indian national parliament and 19.8 seats in Bangladesh (The World Bank, 2014). Yet, even six years later, these updated numbers are not anywhere close to the total number of women living within the individual South Asian countries and thus, continue to reveal the rather grim reality of women’s participation in the political landscape of the region. The male-dominated political institutions within the subcontinent have therefore, persistently and considerably failed to provide for an ecosystem that is conducive for the equal treatment and visibility of its women members.

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Moreover, the roles of women in the South Asian foreign service establishment have remained narrower still where in the history of thirty-three appointees for the position of foreign secretaries in India only three have been women (Rathore, 2021); one out of twenty-six appointees in Sri Lanka (Perera, 2016); one out of thirty appointees in Pakistan (Khan, 2011) and so on. This paucity of women’s participation—from varying hierarchies of class, religion, caste and region—in the upper echelons of law making processes nonetheless, continues to pose a problem for the advancement of peace, justice and humanitarian rights in the entire region as without these women, the point of focus in the management of diplomacy continues to ponder around the male-dominated traditional security concerns. Apart from women’s restricted participation, even the practice of gender mainstreaming has simply remained a work in progress within the South Asian region, especially when it comes to defence and security aspects. As such, foreign policy strategies have largely failed to include gender perspectives when talking about broader political dialogues, ensuring regional security, enhancing sectoral cooperation or extending protection to refugees (Kelkar, 2005). This is despite the formal adherence of the South Asian countries towards the ground-breaking WPS agenda that strongly advocates for gender-mainstreaming efforts across diverse policy outcomes. So far, Nepal and Afghanistan are the only two SAARC countries that have adopted a National Action Plan (NAP) on UNSCR 1325, which provides a unique blueprint to implement the WPS agenda within their respective domestic policies and departments, in peace and security operations and in engagements with the national, regional and global actors (Singh, 2017). But, in both these countries, the NAP development process has not been very effective on the ground (CARE, 2017). Lack of political will, limited financial resources and absence of accountability mechanisms are often cited as the reasons for this failure. Meanwhile, the Indian government has completely disassociated itself from the implementation on UNSCR 1325 on the basis that there exists no armed conflict within its domestic territory and therefore, the values of the resolution are not applicable to the Indian context (Khullar, 2021). As a result, there does not exist any reasonable framework to support conflict-affected women or for ensuring women’s representation in postconflict recovery and rebuilding programmes—either at the individualistic country level or at the regional level within the South Asian subcontinent.

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However, the division where gender-mainstreaming efforts in the South Asian foreign policy mechanisms have been observed is under the socio-economic development assistance paradigm. As per this development assistance approach, specific programmes have been designed to make women the drivers of inclusive growth. For instance, in a 2019 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between India and Afghanistan, the focus was on amplifying economic opportunities for women residing in seven provinces—Heart, Bamyan, Kabul, Balkh, Kapisa, Ghor and Badghis (Chaudhury, 2019). Similarly, India’s infrastructure projects in Nepal have emphasised the construction of schools with separate sanitation facilities for boys and girls (“India Builds”, 2021). These projects have in fact, been based on the consideration that improvement in women’s economic participation as well as in female sanitisation standards comes with significant positive implications for the overall development of the country (“Facts and Figures”, 2018). Now, some might argue that these gender-mainstreaming efforts are steps in the right direction to bring about women’s empowerment; the truth is that it does so only partially. This is the case because women’s inclusion under the development paradigm simply relegates them to predetermined roles rather than giving them the choice or equal rights to participate in diverse fields—such as politics, defence, security, etc.—like their male counterparts. The Global Human Development Index 2020 provides a convincing evidence in this regard. The report in fact, ranks South Asia as the second-lowest performer—among the eight regions of the world— in terms of the prevailing gender gaps within the subcontinent (World Economic Forum, 2019). In light of these various above-mentioned challenges, it is critical that the governments in South Asia pursue reforms not only at the organisation level but also revolutionise their policymaking processes to institutionalise the involvement of women in security and foreign policies; to break away from male-dominating structures of foreign policy; deemphasise the focus on military means and reimagine the South Asian approach to securitisation. The next section will therefore explore, how the adoption of FFP as an offshoot of feminist IR theory, which demands a reconsideration of the notions of power and security by altering decision-making actors within the international system and by including women along with other marginalised beings might serve as a reasonable option to bring about the paradigmatic shift in traditional ways of conducting foreign policy in South Asia.

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Feminist Foreign Policy: The Transformational Shift When ‘Feminism’ Meets Foreign Policy As it has already been highlighted above, the notions of feminism have not usually been employed in the work of states’ foreign policy or the language of international institutions within South Asia. But it is not like member states have not paid any attention at all towards the inclusion of gender in the conduct of diplomacy. In fact, in the past, the importance of gender insertions within diplomatic mechanisms and foreign policy institutions has been acknowledged by South Asian states’ through their commitment to the WPS agenda, Sustainable Development Goal number 5, going further back to the Beijing Principles and the numerous UN conferences on women. Yet, within the subcontinent, actions towards these commitments have often ended up reinforcing the protectionist discourse surrounding women, victimising them instead of empowering them as actors of change. However, research strongly indicates that negotiations in which women are stakeholders place lesser and lesser emphasis on militarised solutions and instead facilitate cooperation on socio-political reforms; ways to create equal and peaceful societies and, achievement of progressive relationships (Krause et al., 2018). In this sense, mainstreaming of gendered aspects and women’s meaningful participation serve as critical contributors in the advancement of national, regional and international peace as well as security; bringing about the overall development of a country and, strengthening of democracy (Bigio & Vogelstein, 2020). Besides, the integration of feminist values into policymaking could also serve as a vital measure to break away from the traditional analysis of state, conflict and security, and focus on aspects that have been ignored so far including the issues of gender inequality, human rights, sustainable development, etc. And FFP—which calls for the promotion of exactly these values—is a perfect tool in this regard. The purpose of a FFP is in fact, to transform the process of policymaking across all diplomatic domains by adopting a course of action that is based on the premise of bringing about equality and providing solutions to the problems of masculinised hierarchy and power dominance (Adebahr & Mittelhammer, 2020).

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Therefore, the application of a feminist lense to foreign policies in South Asia could offer new solutions, enabling a comprehensive, inclusive and human-centred approach that focuses on diverse individuals or groups of people and reflects upon the international power structures. With regard to its current foreign policy framework, the adoption of a feminist approach could potentially assist the South Asian member states across four important elements that define the conduct of diplomacy and international relations within the region. These potential systemic changes have been outlined as follows. Broadening the Conceptualisation of Security Unlike the traditional understanding of security, a feminist perception of security predominantly revolves around human security issues, thereby, prioritising humanitarianism, development and peace over aspects of power. At the same time, it strongly challenges the conceptualisation of security as masculinised and military enforced, and de-emphasises the use of coercive means as a measure to enhance security. As such, a feminist framework to foreign policy is essentially grounded in positive definitions as well as aspirations of security, one that does not merely consider the absence of conflict as a pathway for achieving peace but instead, goes beyond the cessation of hostilities in order to include other multifaceted problems related to development, health, economics, etc. (Tickner, 1992). Besides, FFP does not perceive the occurrence of violence as a phenomenon that takes place in isolation but also recognises it as a consequence of structural violence where systemic inequalities and the subsequent problem of unequal access to power or resources are identified as some of the most common root causes of violence (Tickner, 1992). A feminist approach therefore, believes in addressing these causes to transform a violent conflict into the advancement of sustainable peace. And in doing so, it steers the focus away from the conventional practices that only revolve around making areas of conflict safe and move towards the goals of conflict prevention as well as viable reconstruction of war-torn societies by laying greater concentration on the establishment of harmony and peace. For South Asia—which has historically stressed upon traditional security threats and the use of coercive means—the adoption of a feminist framework will serve as an important tool to look at security in a more holistic and a comprehensive way. This broader security understanding

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will, in fact, clarify the gendered misconceptions revolving around the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security aspects that are prevalent within the South Asian societies. And thus, bridge the gap between the traditional and non-traditional security issues, bringing them in conjunction with each other in the domain of international politics. In this sense, the FFP approach will play a noteworthy role in the inclusion of a variety of other important non-traditional security concerns—such as environment, migration, education, women empowerment, etc.—perhaps, shifting the present focus of policymaking within the subcontinent, especially in terms of states’ reliance on force and attainment of power. The new widened perception or understanding of security will allow the South Asian countries to place human security and humanitarian rights at the centre of political discussions, enabling them to highlight women’s equality agenda more effectively. Additionally, the feminist framework would also reverse the predominant understanding of security in South Asia as simply the termination of armed conflict, which in some ways overlooks the fact that violence— especially for women—often continues even in post-conflict societies. It would say no to violence, against all and at all times, but especially crimes against women and children, and challenge the settled institutional gendered norms that the proponents of patriarchy have so far not wanted to disturb. And, with the incorporation of these aspects and the broader notion of security, South Asia’s conventional approaches to foreign policy, which have in essence remained deeply gendered or gendered blind will start progressing towards becoming more gender aware. As a result, with the adoption of a FFP, the South Asian member states will produce policy outcomes that will look at security from a more holistic approach by including the effects of its policies on women and other marginalised groups on the ground. Building Regional Stability Foreign policies begin at the borders. This dictum has been guiding the field of international relations, especially in the post-cold war era, which witnessed a perceptible trend towards regionalism with a large number of countries across the world having organised themselves into regions to provide the innovative impetus for a wide range of cooperative ventures based on shared regional values (Harshe, 1999). The concept of regionalism has in fact, proven to be an efficacious measure to serve both

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commercial as well as economic objectives of various states belonging to a particular region, further contributing to the principles of peace, harmony and prosperity around the world (Harshe, 1999). In the process, some of the old organisations were recasted and new organisations were created in order to adapt to the changing global political context. Now while, countries in South Asia too have made attempts to develop a common regional mechanism, however, the persistent tensions, differences, cleavages and conflicts in the region have resulted in the long-drawn-out strategic disharmony among member states (Nayak, 2013). In fact, over the past couple of decades, South Asia has widely emerged as a theatre of rivalries and ethnic tensions, which has seriously dented the international standing of the region (Muni, 2013). Consequently, South Asian member states, at both the national as well as the regional level should consider incorporating a feminist approach within their foreign policy mechanisms, which essentially highlights the importance of looking at regional military escalation, hostility and enmity from a feminist perspective. Such an approach will assist South Asia in investing more time and resources in regional conflict prevention and instead, pave a way for increased regional cooperation. We should not forget that mutual cooperation between member states is the primary step towards developing a comprehensive security structure, which would further facilitate a broader dialogue in areas such as climate, maritime security, migration and religious tourism. This comprehensive security architecture along with the values of feminism would henceforth, fulfil the dual motive of allowing South Asian member states to come together to counter common risks and also serve as a potential medium to achieve the much harder goal of security cooperation in the region. In this sense, the collective, common and comprehensive security environment will emerge as a multidimensional framework for foreign policies within the subcontinent, one that is responsible for developing responsive strategies for both the traditional and non-traditional security needs. Moreover, this framework would also assist countries in the region in devising joint mechanisms to deal with gender issues and at the same time, ensure a greater representation of women in political processes, not for the sake of gender balance but to instil gender sensitivity and to advance female empowerment through regional diplomatic initiatives. Besides, by de-securitising the existing insecurities between states and helping them work in a unified manner to meet common challenges, the feminist approach would also play a critical role in rectifying the economic

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disintegration of the region and perhaps, enable an understanding of the economics of proximity rather than promoting proximity as a peril. This would then lead to a stronger economic amalgamation of the region. With these newly developed diverse interdependences and integrations, even the prospects of SAARC to emerge, as an all-encompassing strategic regional forum for South Asia—to envision multilateral solutions—will become rather promising. Recognising Women’s Agency A feminist security approach further aims to lower barriers that impede the equal representation of women and other marginalised beings (Neumann, 2020). However, this at no point implies that women should simply be added to the political domains. It therefore, does not call for mere gender symbolism. FFP instead, necessitates the acknowledgement of women as equal participants and political agents, thereby, granting them access to necessary information, tools and resources to be able to influence decision-making across different levels. Apart from participation, it also stresses upon institutional mainstreaming of gendered aspects. And in doing so, it essentially stands against the inherent perception that it is only women who can design a feminist framework and instead, believes that men can also undertake the formulation of feminist policies as long as the needs, interests and concerns of women and other groupings are being taken into consideration (Aggestam & True, 2020). Women, should nonetheless, be treated as equal beings at par with their male counterparts—in political processes. While, South Asia’s focus on building military capabilities and the monothematic traditional approach has often side-lined women’s rights, the adoption of a FFP therefore, offers a fresh opportunity for its member states to enhance women’s representation at all stages of foreign and security policymaking—not only quantitatively but also qualitatively. It would thus, enable a creation of conducive environment for the participation of these women as well as other marginalised groups to ensure that those affected by distinct policies are being incorporated in policy formulation processes, facilitating multidimensional perspectives to any given issue. In doing so, it will also make more and more space for the inclusion as well as strengthening of civil society organisations and actors—at home as well as abroad—in both, policy formulation and implementation. We should not forget that to make foreign policy more inclusive, it is crucial

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to ensure that civil society organisations are provided with ample room to voice their opinions in all dimensions of the policy cycle, from analysing circumstances to accumulating and interpreting information to provide feedback on decision-making and policy implementation. Along with the promotion of diversity in numbers, the feminist perspective will also bring about a cultural transformation to move ahead of the gender-stereotypical security discourse that intrinsically restricts policy options and perhaps, catalyse an internal shift in South Asia’s domestic sphere, particularly in terms of subverting the strictly carved out patriarchal gender roles. Thus, with this approach, the South Asian nations will substantially transform its organisational and institutional setup in order to facilitate equal representation for all that will automatically result in a more gender-aware allocation of resources, goods, services, etc. Decoding International Power Relations and Institutions Coming on to the power relations, a closer examination reveals that power structures are often based on patriarchal normative frameworks (Einspahr, 2010). But with regard to these power dynamics, a feminist approach considers both institutional as well as systemic imbalances along with actor-specific dynamics in order to detect the patriarchal frameworks, masculinised mechanisms and intersectional inequalities (Adebahr & Mittelhammer, 2020). This form of analysis helps in developing a better knowledge of elemental drivers and concerns of diverse actors; therefore, contributing more effectively towards policy outcomes that are responsible for addressing core reasons of conflicts rather than merely curing the symptoms. To define it simply, the feminism in foreign policy dissects systemic and institutionalised imbalances as much as the specific power dynamics. The fundamental principle, which undergirds this analysis of power relations, is the sound understanding of the concepts of intersectionality that constitute different forms of inequalities—such as sexism, nationality, racism and classism—which in certain ways compound one another. Such an intersectionist approach, in fact, brings to light the manner in which gender inequalities are often interweaved with various other social divisions in the process of policymaking. As a result, applying this framework to the South Asian foreign policy will mean looking and examining the concept of power all across the board—at the global level, in the regional context, and within the individual states’ foreign policy mechanisms.

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Moving further, a complete understanding or examination of power relations will also compel South Asian member states to look at its internal national dynamics. And, it is this perspective that is essentially responsible “for deconstructing the gendered dynamics influencing the external policies of individual states, such as the use of language and modes of policymaking, the current political climate, upcoming elections, and the overall impact of toxic masculinity” (Adebahr & Mittelhammer, 2020). In adopting a feminist approach to foreign policy, South Asian states will therefore, not only challenge the gender power relations within the subcontinent but also the prevailing national or regional peace and security structures, which often rely on unequal political economies, further perpetuating power imbalances. What Would a South Asian FFP Look Like? It is the combination of these four elements—broadening the conceptualisation of security, building regional stability, recognising women’s agency, decoding international power relations and institutions—which together constitute the transformational characteristics of a FFP, bringing about the much-needed shift in the discourse as well as mindsets that are involved in framing foreign policies in South Asia. But, these pointers only provide general guidance and are in fact, open to independent and diverse interpretations by member states. As such, there exists no direct answer to the question of what would count as a suitable feminist framework for the region or perhaps, what would a South Asian FFP look like. However, former Indian Ambassador, Nirupama Rao has tried to solve this puzzle by providing important insights into the ways a South Asian FFP should ultimately materialise. She states that, “a FFP in our region would embrace the idea of a South Asian commons; it would speak and act in favour not of ravaging disunities, but of rationalising unities, of merging capacities to build, to develop, to link. It would weigh the interests of humanitarianism against the interests of power” (Rao, 2018). Her vision is pragmatic and serves as a stepping-stone for the member states to start moving towards a FFP. Consequently, this broad framework can/should be utilised as driving principles that inform policy choices of decision-makers who want to make feminism as an important aspect of diplomacy and foreign policy within the South Asian region.

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In furtherance, to outline a few steps, the concrete adoption of feminist values within the South Asian foreign policy architecture can be made possible by inculcating the following course of action: 1. Actively commissioning women in authoritative and influential positions at various policy levels including national, regional as well as a global stages, and incorporating them directly in the conduct of diplomacy as well as foreign relations within the region. The member states can perhaps, make a strong commitment in this regard by either imposing a quota system for women’s participation or by simply, in principle ensuring that there is an equal representation and opportunities for men and women across all policymaking mechanisms. 2. Embracing an approach which is needs-based and formulating policies in cooperation with the diverse civil society actors. The political representatives of South Asia should make substantive efforts to organise timely personal meetings with civil society organisations that are better positioned to explain the interests and concerns of the masses belonging to their respective states. 3. Address the biased resource management in the region, thereby, making more goods, services and information available for all, especially the women. 4. Develop a greater respect for the global humanitarian treaties and laws; strengthen the credibility of these international commitments and foster better relations with countries that have already been deliberating over women’s rights and security. These efforts will in turn help South Asian states to better implement as well as incorporate feminist values in its foreign policy dimensions. With these measures, the leadership in South Asia can choose to bring about a paradigmatic shift in the way they interact with other countries and demand foreign policies. The adoption of these steps, would in fact, assist in re-envisioning a country’s national interests—if not completely then at least partially—moving them away from militarised aspects of security and global dominance to position equality and human rights as the basis of a healthy and a peaceful world by giving weightage to the promotion of human rights, particularly women’s rights.

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Conclusion It has therefore become evident that within South Asia’s exceedingly securitised foreign policy environment, the member states—for too long—have pursued a gender blind approach largely owing to the rigid masculinised notions that have continued to drive the patriarchal societies of the region. And in the process, the policymaking mechanisms have essentially failed to pay any heed to the voices and concerns of almost half of its population. However, considering that foreign policy and diplomatic methods signify a country’s virtue and character, and mirror its domestic principles and values, it is perhaps time for the entire South Asian subcontinent to change its outlook by giving equal spaces to their women. In this regard, the adoption of a FFP framework offers a positive, deliberate and direct tool to provide for a robust intervention within the affairs of the South Asian societies by not only addressing the deep-rooted historical or structural norms that hinder inclusion and equality but also stimulates—in both design and application—a transformative approach. But, due to its loosely defined nature, a FFP poses both opportunities as well as challenges for conducting or managing the predominant foreign policy dynamics within the region. There is nonetheless, little doubt about the fact that the adoption of a FFP would assist South Asian countries in fostering innovative ways of thinking, build upon its traditional view of security, decrease barriers to women’s representation and bring about the much-needed regional stability. And, a closer look at the past efforts of SAARC member states in fact, suggest that the region is ready to move towards this new form of conducting diplomacy and foreign policy. For instance, India set an example by becoming the first country to deploy an all-female police unit to Liberia as early as 2007; Bangladesh played a pioneering role in the adoption of the landmark UNSCR 1325; civil society initiatives such as Aman ki Asha between India and Pakistan—all contribute towards FFP goals. Besides, given that South Asian governments at least rhetorically have committed to further the cause and advance the welfare of its female population, women’s education, economic progress and mobility as well as participation in key political institutions, there should be no barrier obstructing the articulation of these values in the South Asian foreign policy outlook. Yet, South Asia’s historical track record on gender rights—or rather, women’s subjugation—makes it unlikely for the region to swiftly and

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constructively adopt a FFP framework. Adding on to this differential behaviour towards women is the problem of inconsistency, which remains a serious challenge for the proper implementation of the FFP in the subcontinent. There exists, a clear conflict between the concept’s strong point for broadening the understanding of security as well as taking a humanitarian approach and the overemphasis of South Asian countries on enhancing their military capabilities and power ambitions. These masculinised patriarchal values are so deeply ingrained within the South Asian societies that member states have barely managed to bring about a transformation in the system of inequity at home in decades. However, negating the pessimism, an optimistic approach can rectify these apprehensions and problems by moving towards the necessary psychological transformation in the mind-sets and nationalist discourses along with the seeding of a strong political will among the leadership of the region. In fact, today, the time is all the more ripe to progress in this direction as the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic has raised pressing questions and concerns on gender equality in the subcontinent, demanding a remodification of the decision-making actors and frameworks within its national, regional as well as global systems. As is true in any other crisis situation, even the COVID-19 health crisis has exaggerated pre-existing inequalities and to some extent also deepened them, with women in the region increasingly being confronted with the complex problems of gender-based violence, lack of health security and economic vulnerability. Therefore, for South Asia, the adoption of FFP will be the smartest thing to do to be able to come up with multifaceted and inclusive solutions for both, meeting the short-term consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic as well as to develop sustainable, inclusive and long-term peace within the region.

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Scheyer, V., & Kumskova, M. (2019). Feminist foreign policy: A fine line between “adding women” and pursuing a feminist agenda. Journal of International Affairs, 72(2), 57–76. Sehrawat, R. (2018). Role of SAARC in peace and conflict in South Asia region. International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Development, 5(9), 149–150. Silva, D., Tian, N., & Marksteiner, A. (2021). Trends in world military expenditure, 2020. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. https://www. sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-04/fs_2104_milex_0.pdf Singh, S. (2017). Gender, conflict and security: Perspectives from South Asia. Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 4(2), 149–157. https:// doi.org/10.1177/2347797017710560 Smith, S. (2018). Introducing feminism in international relations theory. EInternational Relations. https://www.e-ir.info/2018/01/04/feminism-in-int ernational-relations-theory/ [Accessed 16 April 2021]. Soherwordi, S. (2005). Human security in South Asia: Military expenditures dimension of India and Pakistan. Pakistan Horizon, 58(1), 35–46. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2009). Armaments, disarmament, and international security. Oxford University Press. The World Bank. (2014). Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%). https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS The World Bank. (2021). Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%). https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS Tickner, J. (1992). Gender in international relations: Feminist perspectives on achieving global security. Columbia University Press. Weerahewa, J. (2009). Impact of trade facilitation measures and regional trade agreements on food and agricultural trade in South Asia. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. https://www.une scap.org/resources/impact-trade-facilitation-measures-and-regional-trade-agr eements-food-and-agricultural World Economic Forum. (2019). Global gender gap report 2020. http://www3. weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2020.pdf

Akanksha Khullar is an Independent scholar working on gender security issues.

PART III

South Asian Women and International Politics: Profiles, Impact and Representation

CHAPTER 8

Blazing a Pioneering Trail: South Asia’s Women Leaders in International Affairs Tinaz Pavri

In the post-independence period, South Asia’s women leaders have received some measure of recognition as both strong leaders as well as anomalies in a regional landscape that has not always been kind to women. In the mid-twentieth century, as countries in the region embarked upon existences free of the yoke of British colonialism, there were widespread problems, including poverty, the lack of infrastructure and industry, illiteracy, paucity of healthcare, etc. Endemic also was the second-class nature of women’s citizenship. Traditional norms and patriarchies kept women less educated, less healthy, victims of gender violence and unequal in their marriages, families and workplace. In such a landscape then, with men at the helm of social, political and economic life, the women who were elected and re-elected as Prime Ministers in four countries (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh) and as Counsellor in Myanmar, broke through the formidable barriers of sexism, tradition and patriarchy to serve in the highest office in the land. In India,

T. Pavri (B) Asian Studies Program, Spelman College, Atlanta, GA, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Ojha and P. Jaiswal (eds.), South Asian Women and International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9426-5_8

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Indira Gandhi was one of the country’s longest-serving Prime Ministers (1966–1977 and 1980–1984). In Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto was elected to two short stints as Prime Minister (1988–1990 and 1993–1996), the first in a Muslim-majority country. In Sri Lanka, Sirimavo Bandaranaike was Prime Minister three times (1960–1965, 1970–1977, 1994–2000), the world’s first female in that role. Bangladesh’s Sheikh Hasina is the country’s longest-serving leader (1996–2001, 2009–present), and in Myanmar, Aung San Suu Kyi was State Counsellor, an analogous post to the Prime Minister, from 2016 to 2021. The fact that each of these women was the wife or daughter of powerful former leaders connected with the independence struggle, who had received widespread support from the public, is of course an extremely salient factor in discussing how these women broke through in a region that did not make such female leadership easy. There are other explanatory variables—their social class and education, ethnic group or religion—which might have propelled them to the top of the political hierarchy (Pavri, 2006; Richter, 1990). Moreover, some political scientists attribute the difference in policy actions to gender, inviting us to view how women leaders’ worldviews, values and beliefs might have been influenced by their gender (Masters & de Waal, 1989). Others have written on how foreign policy may be influenced by personality traits (Hermann, 2003). This chapter looks at how, once elected, these women ruled. A fair amount of literature exists on the domestic policies undertaken by these women, and their style of leadership. For instance, much has been written about Indira Gandhi’s close inner circle of advisers, her deeply distrustful nature and willingness to use extreme constitutional measures like the Emergency rule (Prakash, 2019; Sahgal, 2013).1 However, much less examination exists of these women’s engagement in the international relations and foreign policy realms. This, in particular, is what this chapter examines.

1 Gandhi instituted Emergency rule in 1975. Permitted by the Constitution for reasons of internal disturbance or external threat, Gandhi employed it to suspend constitutional liberties and arbitrarily jail opposition members. She lifted it in 1977 and called new elections.

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Method Using the comparative case study method, we will compare three of these five regional leaders for this chapter, Gandhi, Bhutto and Aung San Suu Kyi. Specifically, we will compare them on three main variables that might have had an impact on their foreign relations: (i) worldview; (ii) personal beliefs/outlook and (iii) policies for women. We define worldview as ideological and other orientations of the leader on a number of political, economic and social issues. Personal beliefs/outlook are defined as the proclivity of the leader to view world events through diverse experiences in their lives, to bring their understanding of their morality to bear on the situation, to approach situations through a cooperative or conflictual lens and to approach the situation through a realist/pragmatist or idealist prism. Finally, we examine both the domestic and international spheres when assessing their impact on women’s issues and policies, and the promotion of more women to key political positions and national or international prominence. We will examine the foreign policy legacies and international relations mark these women left, through a series of hypotheses and questions arising from the three broad variables identified above. First, it is hypothesized that they had a shared worldview with the men and women of their families who had held the office before them or had played a role in the prevailing politics of the time. Did their foreign policy dovetail with the relatives who held office before them, or did it diverge? Did they share with their relatives and their political parties the prevailing sentiments of the time about issues like imperialism, socialism, the Cold War and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)? Second, it is hypothesized that their personal experiences—as famous daughters or wives, as educated women connected with their country’s and the world’s elite, as women growing up amidst personal stress and strain (the impact of the imprisoning of their relatives during the independence struggles, for instance),—impacted their ideas and politics in the global sphere. The state of the world, whether bipolar or unipolar, whether deeply divided by resources and power, would also affect their outlook. Also, were they inclined toward a cooperative and consensual global relation or did they view the world as a place of conflict and competition? Were they idealists or pragmatists? Finally, on the third point, it is hypothesized that the three leaders would have made an impact on women’s positions in their countries and on the world through declarations, policies and support of

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women’s issues as well as the promotion of women themselves, both in the domestic and global spheres. Essentialist views that accept that women best represent women’s interests, have been widely accepted in the international domain. Organizations like the United Nations underline that women’s participation in the political arena is an “essential” condition of promoting women’s interests (Paxton et al., 2021). The holding of highest office by these women, then, might be expected to translate into their promoting women’s participation and interest. These questions will be explored, beginning with Indira Gandhi.

Indira Gandhi Worldview Growing up as her father’s daughter during the turbulent times of independence made a deep impact on Indira Gandhi. She has recounted that she would often hold impassioned mock political speeches in the house as a child, on the burning issues of independence from the British (Richter, 1990). The Nehru household hosted a myriad of political luminaries including the fabled Mahatma Gandhi, a close friend of Nehru’s and someone to whom Indira Gandhi was also close. Nehru was key in the development of her intellectual and moral compass. In his letters to his daughter (Nehru, 1930) Nehru writes to her about subjects as varied as the birth of civilizations, labor and class relations, morality, peace and justice in the world. The letters, written when she was only ten years old, nevertheless serve as a sort of road map for who he clearly believed would be a future leader of the country and the world. In addition, the socialist worldview of Jawaharlal Nehru found a deep resonance in Gandhi, who was first elected in 1966. The policies of the Congress party under Nehru and then Gandhi were focused on poverty reduction, equity and secularism. In the domestic realm, the nationalization of key industries was rapidly undertaken, and the economy was organized in quasi-Soviet style five-year plans. In the global realm, having accompanied her father to numerous foreign trips as his closest assistant, Gandhi continued the key foreign policy planks that had been initiated by Nehru. These included India’s leadership of the NAM and its continued suspicion of Cold War bipolarity and reluctance to be drawn into it, with its simultaneous distaste of imperialism and colonialism, and subsequent movement toward the Soviet camp.

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Outlook Authors like Mansingh (2015) have stated that Gandhi’s foreign policy outlook could best be described as realism combined with pragmatism, rather than one that was wedded to idealism and moralism. Although the author agrees that she was often pragmatic, especially in issues that concerned the immediate South Asian neighborhood, she would argue that she was firm about voicing her anti-imperialist views and her skepticism of the moral authority of a North that had wreaked havoc in the world through centuries of colonial rule. Nehru’s idealistic influence also cannot be overlooked. His philosophical musings on justice, human rights and peace were offered to her at every bent, and had been enshrined in her through his letters. Often, Gandhi’s anti-imperialist outlook combined with her personal relationships or dislike toward global leaders, overtook the pragmatist in her. A case in point was her conflictual relationship with Richard Nixon, which seemed to put in jeopardy one of the most important bilateral relationships for India. In his book, Bass (2013) notes the deep antipathy of Nixon and Gandhi for each other, and Gandhi’s distaste at spending even a few minutes meeting with him. On the other hand, Gandhi’s own upbringing as the daughter of the Prime Minister who had deep and complicated ties with the former colonialists, and her own education in England made her more at ease with the U.K. and the Commonwealth rather than the U.S. Gandhi’s close ties with the former Soviet Union could also be viewed as her idealism/moralism over the adoption of a realist outlook. There was a level of comfort with the elements of socialist planning and interventionist government that the Soviet Union embodied, and conversely, a level of discomfort with the capitalist framework that guided the U.S. and had guided and fueled colonial expansion in the West. Like the Soviet bloc, India under Indira strongly supported the anti-apartheid movement, and showed solidarity with the Palestinian cause. In fact, for many decades the Indian passport prohibited travel to South Africa and Israel. This often made for a paradox that Western scholars puzzled over: why the world’s largest democracy would not get along better with the world’s most powerful democracy. On the other hand, the long post-independence relationship with the Soviets revealed a level of comfort on the part of the Congress party, Nehru, Gandhi and many Indians despite the authoritarian political system of the Soviet Union. This was so at odds with India’s democracy, a consolidated democracy, one of only a handful in

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the post-colonial landscape, that the world had recognized and feted India over, and that the country itself was proud of. Women’s Issues Indira Gandhi did not speak the traditional language of feminism, having said it made no difference to her whether one was male or female, and explicitly rejecting the mantle of feminism by stating “I am in no sense a feminist, but I believe in women being able to do everything” (Norman, 1985). Like many of her generation, she fought her way into the maledominated arena of politics and world politics, but often adopted the gender hierarchies that stood in the way of more women assuming power.2 As a result, she has been accused of not making a significant dent in the election or promotion of more women during her tenure. Two of the most high-ranking women in the foreign policy sphere in the 1950s and 1960s were her aunt, Vijayalaxmi Pandit, who in 1968 became the first woman president of the United Nations General Assembly, and her cousin, Nayantara Sahgal, who was slated to become ambassador to Italy. Both women had been privileged by their relationship with the Nehru family. When they became critics of what they viewed as Gandhi’s increasingly authoritarian bent, however, she cut ties with both, a symptom of her deep distrust in those that might oppose her, whether male or female. Gandhi’s support for women’s development and women’s rights was steadfast, and integrally linked to her passion for poverty reduction in India. This was apparent even before she became Prime Minister, with her role as leading the Congress Party’s Women’s section in 1956 (Norman, 1985). This is why India’s women, and particularly poor women, saw her as a champion, even though she did not actively promote individual women into the rungs of politics or into her cabinet (Manchanda, 2003). There are innumerable stories and pictures of Gandhi reaching out to women and taking the time to listen to the travails of India’s impoverished and rural women, who in turn trusted and believed in her. She regularly held “darshans,” open meetings with her constituents, often lower class and caste women, whose issues she listened to and addressed. 2 When Nehru died, Gandhi became a cabinet minister in Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri’s government. Upon his death, she survived a power battle to become party leader and prime minster, elbowing out a hierarchy of waiting male politicians and proving wrong their assumptions of her weakness as a young woman.

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Benazir Bhutto Worldview Benazir Bhutto came to power in Pakistan three years after the assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1984. When her father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was executed in 1979 after a military coup that overthrew his government, Benazir was named head of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). Like Gandhi, Bhutto also gained her earliest political experience through her father and her early foreign policy experience accompanying him to events that hosted the likes of Zhou En Lai and Henry Kissinger (Bhatia, 2008). By the start of her second term in 1990, the world had become a very different place from the bipolar world of Gandhi’s rule. By the late 1980s, the Soviet Union was showing signs of strain, although few predicted the final implosion in 1991. The Berlin wall came down in 1989, and in 1990, the two Germanys were reunited. The world now had only one remaining superpower, and the Cold War world that had dominated the imagination of Indira Gandhi had passed. Most importantly for the India–Pakistan relationship, the Kashmir problem had escalated exponentially since Gandhi’s death into an open insurgency and independence movement that increasingly resulted in violence and drew a highly militarized response and presence from India, and covert and overt support of insurgents on the part of Pakistan. Pakistan’s alliance with the U.S. during the Cold War now stood to greatly benefit it, as the U.S. began to be accepted de facto as the sole remaining superpower. Unlike Gandhi’s antipathy toward the U.S., Bhutto had the benefit of an education at Harvard, where she had made strong and lasting friendships with students who had become powerful voices in the global arena. Mark Siegal, a close friend, remained a supporter and collaborator on two books, including her (auto)biography, Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West (2008). When she was arrested, he rallied powerful Americans to pressure the government on her safety and release. Peter Galbraith, a former U.S. Ambassador to Croatia, was another close supporter, as was Ann Fadiman, a Harvard classmate who worked with her in Pakistan on a number of issues, including election strategy. Bhutto once called Harvard “the very basis of my belief in democracy” (Balakrishna, 2007). Bhutto’s comfort with, and indeed affection for, the U.S., strengthened the U.S.–Pakistan relationship, while the Soviet Union’s decadelong incursion in Afghanistan made anti-Soviet sentiment part of her

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worldview. This made for a completely different foreign policy than India under Indira Gandhi. In addition, the U.S. continued its strong support of Pakistan over the Kashmir issue. Prior to her visit to Pakistan in November 1993, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphel released a statement of unequivocal support that stood at odds with India’s long-standing stance on Kashmir.3 The statement said that “Kashmir is not an integral part of India, and the status of Kashmir needs to be settled” (Shakoor & Ahmed, 1994). For her stance, Raphel was dubbed anti-Indian in the Indian media (Swarajya, 2020). In a sense, Bhutto’s comfort with the West and particularly with the U.S. was quite a far distance from the socialist beliefs and policies of her father. Outlook By the end of her tenure, Bhutto was firmly wedded to the Kashmiri independence cause, and the initial promising beginnings toward a more amicable and thawing relationship with India under Rajiv Gandhi deteriorated into a hardening stance on Kashmir on the part of both countries. Her early idealist vision of regional cooperation with an Indian leader, Rajiv Gandhi, who was from her own generation and social background, where much ground between the two countries could have been covered, was replaced by her unyielding stance on Kashmir. This could be viewed as a new pragmatism that led her to realize that as Pakistan’s leader, she could not appear to bend on Kashmir, not just because of Pakistan’s historical claim on the region and the utmost importance each country placed on the issue of whom Kashmir belonged to, but also because of the overarching issue of appearing in full solidarity with Muslim brethren in the state, an imperative which had come to trump all other factors in Pakistan. In the larger world arena, however, Bhutto continued stressing a world vision that favored cooperation over conflict, as she underlined the peaceful resolution of problems. The Commonwealth remained an important arena for her to seek support for Pakistan, and she used the venue to speak on global issues that were important, including conflicts in the 3 India has always insisted that the Kashmir was an integral part of India and that the issue is a bilateral issue that will be addressed by none other than the two countries involved. Even as recently as 2020, India politely turned down the Trump administration’s offer to mediate.

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Muslim world like Bosnia. She was recognized for her persuasive speaking style and expert foreign policy grasp honed at Harvard, and was a coveted global speaker. During a 2007 visit to the U.S. before her assassination, she was invited to speak on global issues by both the Middle East Institute and the Aspen Institute (Imtiaz, 2011). Women’s Issues As the first female leader in the Muslim world, Bhutto occupies a trailblazing place. Her election to the top office was a powerful symbol not just for Pakistan’s women but also for Muslim women in societies where such political office was not yet a possibility. As Prime Minister in an era that had started to take women’s issues seriously, she advocated for women’s presence in the policy arena and in the media. She pushed for more women’s programming and for their voice to be heard within her party (CBS News, 2008). The 1999 Manifesto on Women’s Rights put forward by her party included promises that Pakistan would sign the United Nations convention on the “Elimination of all forms of discrimination against women,” which it did. On the domestic front, it included a slew of measures to strengthen women’s rights, including increasing literacy, eradicating the dowry and supporting women’s right to work. It vowed to repeal all discriminatory laws against women. In 1989, the Women’s Division became the Ministry of Women’s Development, and she named a few women to high profile cabinet positions (Weiss, 1990). Most scholars agree, however, that her two tenures, in part because of their brevity, did little to change life for women in Pakistan, and indeed Pakistani women scholars have reiterated this. More women were elected to parliament during her tenure, but the overall numbers remained small and their positions did not ascend to the highest levels. However, it cannot be denied that she was a powerful symbol for women in Pakistan and the Muslim world, and for their development, voice and visibility on the political scene.

Aung San Suu Kyi Worldview Aung San Suu Kyi followed the same rocky path into politics as Benazir Bhutto. Although she shared with Gandhi and Bhutto the power of a

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name and lineage that was revered in Myanmar, there were powerful forces in the military that arrayed against her from the start. Like Pakistan, independent Burma became imprinted by repressive military rule. The country was first put under military rule in 1958, and a coup in 1962 by General Ne Win solidified the military’s control over the country. Suu Kyi spent much of her adult life battling against the army for a return to civilian rule of the country. Like Nehru, Suu Kyi’s father Aung San was also an independence leader who had led the erstwhile British Burma to freedom and self-rule in 1947, the same year he was assassinated. Like both Gandhi and Bhutto, Suu Kyi was educated in the West, and spent formative time in both Britain and India, receiving an excellent education. This was, of course, in addition to the education she received by virtue of being her parents’ daughter. Although her father died when she was a toddler, her mother Khin Kyi was ambassador to India and Nepal, and Aung San Suu Kyi was able to learn world politics firsthand through her mother’s appointments. Later, as she spent her early years in Britain raising a young family, Suu Kyi’s fight on the world stage continued from exile. Making the difficult decision to return to Myanmar in 1988 while the military was in firm and repressive control, Suu Kyi left her family in Britain to challenge and inspire her country with her physical presence and become the globally recognized face of the country’s civilian opposition. From 1989 to 2010, she protested military rule while under house arrest in her own family home in Yangon, acquiring a heroic status both in her country and the world. Her biography describes her years of sacrifice spent in the big colonial-era bungalow that was almost falling to pieces around her, sometimes allowing rainwater to collect in a pool on the floors of its vast and vacant rooms. In 1991, she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for her work in opposing the military rule and her fight for freedom for her country. In 2015, her time came, as her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD) won a huge electoral majority, and she became State Counsellor. She also held the contiguous position of Minister of Foreign Affairs. She was beloved at home, and the world feted her election and return to politics. Few, then, would have predicted her current predicament. The adulation and celebration have proven short lived as her time in power quickly became marred by allegations of indifference to, and even culpability for, the abrogation of human rights and plight of the Rohingya minority. By 2017, the Rohingya were fleeing Myanmar in large numbers due to

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the military’s persecution. Suu Kyi remained muted and even defended the military against accusations of genocide in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Predictably, the wellspring of global support that has characterized Suu Kyi’s journey for decades is currently in jeopardy. Her deposement and current house arrest have galvanized many to condemn the military, but her issues of culpability in the Rohingya crisis will never allow her to re-attain the hallowed global status she once held. Outlook What impact in the realm of international relations has she had in her many decades as the conscience of Burma, and then as an elected official? Her idealist, non-violent worldview was on display for decades as she sought a peaceful return to democracy in her country. As she acquired degrees in Politics, Economics and Philosophy, she also gained diplomatic experience through her three years of work at the United Nations prior to her marriage. Her years spent in exile often found her communicating with the United Nations officials, who served as mediators between her and the military during this time. She was often visited by U.N. officials, including the Undersecretary-General of the Department of Political Affairs, Ibrahim Gambari. Her years spent in India and the U.K. allowed for a worldview that comfortably included the West and the Commonwealth as supporters of her cause. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was not an important factor in Suu Kyi’s delineation of the world and was not salient as a power that would help Myanmar return to civilian rule. Women’s Issues Although Suu Kyi’s election was hailed as a win for both democracy and women, the reality during her five years of uneasy coexistence and rule with the military was that nothing really changed for Burma’s women. During her years as Counsellor, Burma still continued to constitutionally disallow women for key positions in the ministries. A deeply patriarchal military still controlled positions and appointments, and even though women in the parliament grew from 5 to 15% during her time in office, they continued to be excluded from power and any discussions of transition from military to civilian rule (The Conversation, 2021). Suu Kyi has spoken out about the need for women’s rights and representations, but in a general and global way. She has mentioned the

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need to keep girls in school and women represented in political parties. However, in her victory speech, she did not specifically mention women’s issues (The Conversation, 2021). Her party, the NLD, did field a historic number of women for election, but there has not been a change in the party structure which continues to foster unequal treatment for women, often leaving them in low positions (The Diplomat, 2019).

The Leaders: A Comparison All of the women could not help but be greatly influenced by their fathers (and, even if not specifically elected leaders, mothers) before them, by their independence struggles and struggles to shape newly independent countries. Because Gandhi came to power so much earlier than the other two, her worldview was heavily shaped by the retreat of imperialism and the prevailing and omnipresent Cold War. Her distaste for unbridled capitalism and her preference for a more interventionist state to bring India’s people out of poverty was inherited from her father, the idealistic Fabian Socialist. On the other hand, Bhutto was born of a different generation, one that grew up in the post-Cold War era. Her ease with the West and the U.S. in particular allowed Pakistan to continue to strengthen its relationship with the most powerful actor in global politics, America. Suu Kyi benefited from an adulatory and supportive world, whether West or East, as her selfless actions on behalf of her country even at great cost to herself and her family, was recognized and rewarded by an admiring world public.4 It is ironic that decades of world adulation for Suu Kyi has turned almost overnight into criticism and opprobrium because of her support to the military’s hard-line stance on the Rohingyas. In light of this comparative analysis, we find that our first hypothesis, that these leaders shared their worldviews with their fathers before them, is borne out. We find that all three leaders were indelibly influenced by the presence, actions, positions, interests and guidance of their fathers (and for Suu Kyi, her mother). Gandhi was perhaps the most obviously shaped by the worldview and beliefs of Nehru, and much evidence in the form of both her writing and his, exists to underline this point.

4 While under house arrest, Suu Kyi lost her husband Michael Aris to cancer in 1999. He had been denied a final visit to his wife by the military government, and last saw her in 1995.

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Although all three leaders spoke the language of cooperation, they were not afraid of confrontation when necessary, as Indira Gandhi displayed during the wars with Pakistan, including the 1971 war that created Bangladesh. Although all three took many pragmatic foreign policy actions that benefited their own countries in terms of who they chose to ally with, all three shared the ultimate idealist belief in democracy as the best path forward for their countries. Even though Gandhi instituted the Emergency in 1975, she lifted it and called for national elections in 1977, a move which has had some scholars debating her motive ever since, with some concluding that it was the democrat in her that led her to do so. Bhutto and Suu Kyi battled the military on the singular belief that their countries should be in the hands of a democratically elected civilian government. On different occasions, each one of them articulated the belief in democracy as the best system for their countries, even though Suu Kyi did not fight against the oppression of the Rohingyas. Hence, our second hypothesis, that their outlook on the world was shaped by personal experiences as well as world events, and that it operated on cooperative–conflictual and idealist–pragmatist continuums, is also largely borne out. There is no doubt that these three charismatic powerful women represented a huge symbolic step forward for women in their countries. Their dedication to women’s rights and for the uplift of the poorest and most oppressed of the women in their countries is unquestioned. The hope that they gave women in their countries and in the region is also obvious. Whether they actually made a significant difference in lifting women out of their second-class status and into the rungs of power is more debatable. They did not tend to surround themselves with or appoint women to key positions in the bureaucracy or cabinet. In Myanmar, more women were elected to parliament when Suu Kyi’s party came to power, but their numbers were still small. Even in 2019, Pakistan, India and Myanmar stood ranked at 102, 149 and 158, respectively, for the percentages of women in parliament (Paxton et al., 2021). Gandhi in particular did not view her role as a woman leader as essentially feminist, rejecting the notion that women could and should rule differently in favor of women’s particular issues. Bhutto, being of a different generation when women’s issues were being given deserved importance, was more cognizant of her role as a powerful woman with the potential to lift up other women. In her own life, she also had her mother’s example, as Nusrat Bhutto was elected to parliament, making gender more salient in her own life than it may

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have been for Gandhi and Suu Kyi. However, our final hypothesis, that as women leaders they would have made a difference to the status of women through policies, procedures and other supports for women in politics and public affairs, is not fully borne out. Although each one constituted a mighty symbolic step forward for all women of their country and region, specific policies that resulted in the uplifting of women across the board but in particular to the rungs of power, were not enacted or enshrined.

Conclusion A comparison of these three women across the three imperatives of worldview, outlook and women’s issues finds many similarities, even though the generational context differs widely among the three. Gandhi’s era was steeped in the Cold War, and as such, far different from the eras within which Bhutto and Suu Kyi were in power, which in turn are themselves very different. Bhutto’s rule coincided with the emergence of the U.S. as the unipolar hegemon, which in turn as Pakistan’s long-term ally, served her and Pakistan well. Suu Kyi came to power in the new millennium, with American power beginning to fade, but without the clear ascendance of another power. Despite these different eras, it is undeniable that familial legacy and influence played a critical role in the unfolding of these leaders’ foreign policy worldview and global outlooks. Their fathers’ role in the independence struggle, their leadership of political parties that defined post-independence politics in their countries, their shaping and influence of their daughters’ real-life political and global education and their beliefs and values in socialism, equality, democracy and anti-imperialism all shaped who their daughters were, and in turn how they ruled and how they engaged in international relations. In terms of their influence on women’s issues, the three leaders’ social class, education and familial background again made them naturally supportive of women’s uplift, but their legacies in this area are weaker. Overall, each of these women leaders has left powerful imprints on their countries. Even if they were first elected in large measure because of their fathers before them and the legacies of their fathers’ independence struggle politics and political parties, they have enabled their patriarchal and tradition-bound countries to see firsthand the possibility of women in power. Experiencing domestic politics and world politics—their leaders on the world stage, addressing global fora, negotiating tough global situations and even war—through the eyes of their women leaders has forever

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changed India, Pakistan and Myanmar and left lasting legacies for their citizens. It could be said that in addition to world events and international politics of their time having shaped these remarkable women, these women played a role in shaping international politics, giving the world a representation of powerful, dynamic women of the global south acting as equal partners on the world stage.

References Balakrishna, A. (2007, December 28). Classmates remember strong-willed and patriotic Bhutto. The Crimson. https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2007/ 12/28/classmates-remember-strong-willed-and-patriotic-bhutto/ Bass, G. (2013). The Blood telegram: Nixon, Kissinger and a forgotten genocide. Random House. Bhatia, S. (2008). Goodbye Shahzadi: A political biography of Benazir Bhutto. Lotus Collection. CBS News. (2008, January 3). Bhutto’s mixed legacy for women’s rights. https:// www.cbsnews.com/news/bhuttos-mixed-legacy-for-womens-rights/ Hermann, M. G. (2003). Assessing leadership style: Trait analysis. In J. M. Post (Ed.), The psychological assessment of political leaders: With profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton. University of Michigan Press. Imtiaz, H. (2011). Remembering Benazir. Memoirs of an old friend. The Tribune. https://tribune.com.pk/story/312532/remembering-benazir-mem oirs-of-an-old-friend Manchanda, R. (2003, June). Women, war and peace in South Asia: Beyond victimhood to agency. Indian Anthropology, 33(1), 96–100. Mansingh, S. (2015). Indira Gandhi’s foreign policy: Hard realism? In D. Malone et al. (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of Indian foreign policy. Oxford University Press. Masters, R., & de Waal, F. B. M. (1989). Gender and political cognition: Integrating evolutionary biology and political science [with commentaries]. Politics and the Life Sciences, 8(1), 3–39. Retrieved April 21, 2021, from http:// www.jstor.org/stable/4235650 Nehru, J. (1930). Letters from a father to his daughter. Reprinted 2004. Penguin Books India. Norman, D. (1985). Indira Gandhi: Letters to an American friend. San Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Print. 20. Pavri, T. (2006). What determines women’s entry into national politics in India? The 2004 elections (J. Trachtenberg, Ed.). Proceedings of the Georgia Political Science Association.

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Paxton, P., Hughes, M., & Barnes, T. (2021). Women, politics, and power: A global perspective (4th ed.). Rowman and Littlefield. Prakash, G. (2019). Emergency chronicles: Indira Gandhi and democracy’s turning point. Princeton University Press. Richter, L. (1990). Exploring theories of female leadership in South and Southeast Asia. Pacific Affairs, 63(4), 524–540. https://doi.org/10.2307/275 9914 Sahgal, N. (2013). Indira Gandhi: Tryst with power. Penguin India. Shakoor, F., & Ahmed, M. (1994). Pakistan’s foreign policy: Quarterly survey: October to December 1993. Pakistan Horizon, 47 (1), 1–6. Retrieved April 9, 2021, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/41393452 Swarajya. (2020, March 10). Controversial anti-India US diplomat Robin Raphel returns to spread pro-Pak propaganda over Kashmir. https://swaraj yamag.com/insta/controversial-anti-india-us-diplomat-robin-raphel-returnsto-spread-pro-pak-propaganda-over-kashmir The Conversation. (2021, February 1). The exclusion of women in Myanmar politics. https://theconversation.com/the-exclusion-of-women-in-myanmarpolitics-helped-fuel-the-military-coup-154701 The Diplomat. (2019, August 9). Dashed hopes for Myanmar’s women. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/dashed-hopes-for-myanmarswomen/ Weiss, A. (1990). Benazir Bhutto and the future of women in Pakistan. Asian Survey, 30(5), 433–445. https://doi.org/10.2307/2644837

CHAPTER 9

A ‘Seductress’ for Nepal: An Analytical Study of a Woman Diplomat in South Asia Dickey Lama

Gender as a category of analysis in International Relations (IR) has been marginalised, considered apolitical, and illegitimate. This understanding of IR has been reflected in most of the major debates in the discipline as theoretical frameworks, whether realist or liberal, that use different types of power to keep unequal gender structures in place. The approaches to IR have been male-centric and this hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 2002) occupying a central position of power legitimises (Hutchings, 2008) actions and discourses in the discipline as well as the practice. The position of a woman diplomat which is not a secondary or ‘unconventional’ place (Enloe, 1989) therefore, is problematic for this male-centric space. This paper analyses the portrayal of Hou Yanqi, the Chinese ambassador to Nepal, in Indian news channels as a ‘seductress’ or ‘temptress’ pushing Nepalese Prime Minister Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli towards an ‘evil’ or dangerous China. The construction of such a narrative comes

D. Lama (B) Women’s College, Kolkata, India e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Ojha and P. Jaiswal (eds.), South Asian Women and International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9426-5_9

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from a ‘heterosexual warrior masculinity’ (Munn, 2008) position created in a post-conflict society with China. The nationalistic myths and narratives enter into the public domain through agencies, media, political leaders, and corporations. The visual aesthetics created by such agencies evolve from hypermasculine agents, force, and determination to prevail against the ‘enemy’. The information wars between India and China include the Nepal– China alliance which can be seen as a ‘conscious choice’ (Starr, 2015: 77), the Nepalese decision-makers that indicate formal commitment and willingness. This creates a complex equation of political preference as both India and China compete to ‘expand their defensive and offensive spheres’ (Walt, 1990). It is in the backdrop of this complex equation that we locate the masculine underpinnings of IR and the portrayal of a female diplomat who is demeaned and termed as a ‘femme fatale’ or a ‘seductress’. This paper uses analytical feminism to identify the politics of knowledge and the ‘positioning’ of women in South Asian International Relations. This paper is divided into three sections, the first discusses questions of gender within the concept of diplomacy wherein the modern state and diplomatic institutions are male-centric. In such a power structure, we see the absence or invisibility of women while privileging the masculine narratives of hypernationalism. From this empirical position of presence and absence, we move into the analytical where the second section discusses the devaluing of femininity in diplomacy by constructing the ‘body of the diplomat’ (Nuemann, 2008) and naturalising masculinity. There is a creation of masculine identities for women who are leaders or diplomats and not ‘wives’ or secretaries. The third section discusses the position of Hou Yanqi as a female ambassador caught between nationalist narratives while subverting the heterosexual warrior masculine position endorsed by a vindictive popular geopolitical understanding. The three sections analyse diplomacy as an institution through a ‘gender sensitive lens’ (Peterson, 1993) questioning a hegemonic masculine culture that devalues and excludes women aggressively.

The Politics in Action and Inaction Diplomacy is the ‘established method of influencing the decisions and behaviour of foreign governments and peoples through dialogue, negotiation, and other measures short of war or violence’. Bandyopadhyaya

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defines diplomacy as the science of doing foreign policy (1970). Diplomacy is a practice older than the idea of the modern state and has held a position of esteem as well as disdain. The statist and secretive functioning of the state is legitimised with ideas of a dynamic national security wherein universal moral principles are disregarded (Morgenthau, 1948). Morgenthau states that men in IR must use persuasion, compromise, and threats to achieve political goals. Neumann (2008: 682) in writing about the ‘body of the diplomat’ reports a ‘traditional civil servant masculinity’ with a ‘relaxedly authoritative’ stance. A distinguished historian of diplomacy, Nicholson (1998) spoke of ‘boudoir diplomacy’1 as an informal network where the women would use their informal relationships to ‘flirt, seduce, and bribe persons of interest to advance their husband’s cause’ (Minarova-Banjac, 2018). Nicholson categorises diplomats as either a hyper-competitive individual using zerosum game rationality or an assertive but self-controlled individual creating value and maximising benefits. The conceptual understanding of diplomacy therefore, in its understanding, academic as well as institutionalisation of thought naturalises masculinity and devalues the feminine, restraining it from privileged domains. The sovereign state is a masculine construction of privileged White Western men. Realism interprets this sovereign state as preceded by an inhospitable environment or the ‘State of Nature’ (Hobbes, 2014). Christine Di Stefano (1983) considers the Hobbesian argument as augmenting masculinity in political theory, here, the state is posited against anarchy, which is negative and chaotic. Machiavelli speaks of ‘Fortuna’2 a goddess or a feminine power that men must forcefully control or coerce into subjugation. Fortuna becomes dangerous and perilous to the order of the masculine power. The binaries positioned as such will be discussed later in the paper. The underpinnings of theory from Hobbes, Machiavelli to Mearsheimer are masculine without which the diagnosis would not be accurate (Hutchings, 2008: 29). Thus, masculine discourses legitimise presumptions or perceptions of most strands of IR theories. Tickner’s

1 A woman’s bedroom or a private dressing room. Merriam-Webster. (n.d.). Boudoir. In Merriam-Webster.com dictionary. Retrieved May 30, 2021, from https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/boudoir. 2 ‘Fortuna’ is the Roman Goddess of Fortune or Luck.

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(1988) criticism of Morgenthau’s (1948) principles as a limited, masculine assumption about human nature could be used to analyse most theories of IR that constrain feminine perspectives. The privileged position for men in diplomacy or IR is not just from particular theorists or individual acts but systemic power structures. The ‘white male privilege’ manifests itself through habitus3 and is ‘constructed, reproduced, taught, and practised’ (Dunn, 2008: 51). Our discipline [IR] is discursively structured to privilege white male subject positions and associated methodologies, work that questions, challenges or even draws attention to this structure may be seen as a threat or dismissed as poor scholarship employing a flawed methodology/theory. (ibid.: 59)

Francis Fukuyama in his criticism of The ‘Man’ Question in International Relations connects males (human as well as other primate relatives) with violence, aggression, and competition in status hierarchies. The question of why men dominate the study of IR is ‘utterly trivial’ to him, the premise that gender roles are constructed ‘untenable’, and he naturalises masculinity as present in the ‘genome’ rather than a social construction and therefore IR he states cannot be ‘engendered’ or ‘feminized’ so easily (Fukuyama, 1998). The inclusion of women in diplomacy, in practice or academically is a rarity as the diplomatic institution is less adaptive and flexible. Diplomacy becomes a ‘homosocial activity that centralises male knowledge and experience’. International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) include women in ideas of peace and security (Cassidy, 2017). The power structures and organisational arrangements are resistant to alternatives from feminist viewpoints. Cassidy (2017) speaks of the absence of women in the United Nations and the academic failure to address this gender divide. To enumerate the position of women in diplomatic positions, in 2018, only 15% of the world’s ambassadors were women (Scheimichen, 2019). India has 125 embassies or high commissions, of which 23 are headed by women that is 18% female foreign officers. Indonesia has 100 embassies/high commissions with 12 headed by women. Thus, 12% of Indonesian diplomats are women. Out of 163 embassies/high commissions in Japan, 3 are headed by women that is 2% (Tyler & Jheengun,

3 The author uses Pierre Bordieu’s concept of Habitus.

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2020). There are 193 members that constitute the Permanent Representatives of the United Nations (PRUN). In 2019, there were only 50 women PRUNs out of 193. In September 2014, six of the 15 members of the UN Security Council were women (Deen, 2019). In 2020, women make up 62% of all senior appointments in the UN (Lieberman, 2020). In India, the strength of the IFS Cadre is 815, with 176 women officers, 19 of them serving as heads of Indian missions to various countries (Rathore, 2020). This is 21% of the IFS which like most prestigious careers is male-centric and underrepresents women. The period right after Independence saw the inclusion of many females into the MEA. Rathore (2020) in her attempt at locating the position of female diplomats mentions, The years around 1947 witnessed several women politicians taking charge as Indian envoys on the world stage. These included Hansa Mehta (played a key role in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), Begum Shareefah Hamid Ali (a founding member of the UN Commission on the Status of Women in 1947), Lakshmi Menon (member of the alternative Indian delegation to the U.N., Head of U.N. Section on the Status of Women and Children between 1949 and 1950, and Deputy Minister in the Ministry of External Affairs in 1952), and Renuka Ray (Indian Representative, UNGA, 1949). All these women were representing India in different capacities at the newly founded world assembly, so much so that at the inaugural session of the U.N, American newspapers wrote of India’s commitment to women’s representation, given that so many of its voices at that world forum were female. (Rathore, 2020)

Rathore further elaborates how this contribution to diplomacy in India has been forgotten by history while men have been celebrated for their ‘brilliance and relevance’ (ibid., 2020). C. B. Muthamma, the first woman to join the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) in 1949 ‘was dissuaded in her interview from joining the IFS’. The ‘marriage ban’4 for female diplomats was only to be lifted in 1973, meanwhile, Mutthama was compelled to take the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) to the Supreme Court for its ‘misogynistic service rules’ that refused to promote a woman despite her achievements. 4 The ‘marriage ban’ on female diplomats has been lifted by different countries. 1966/1988 in Brazil, 1971 in the United States, Early 1970s in Sweden, 1973 in Great Britain. See. Aggestam and Town (2018).

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The paper elucidates the gendered structure of diplomacy and the diplomat, the legitimisation of decision-making by masculine sovereign states, and the mere absence of women from diplomacy and IR. Gender is a social construction and in an intersectional analysis, needs to be understood in relation with other categories of inequalities. Gender identities, masculine, feminine, and others have differences associated with geographies, nationalities, ethnicities, spaces, and sexual identities. “Acting like a man” (or a “woman”) means different things to different groups of people (e.g., transgendered people, heterosexual Catholics, Native Americans, British colonials, agriculturists versus corporate managers, athletes versus orchestra conductors, combat soldiers versus military strategists) and to the same group of people at different points in time (e.g., nineteenth- versus twentieth-century Europeans, colonized versus postcolonial Africans, prepuberty versus elderly age sets, women during war versus women after war). Men may be characterized as feminine (e.g., Mahatma Gandhi, “flamboyant” gay men) and women as “masculine” (e.g., Margaret Thatcher, “butch” lesbians). Gender is shaped by race (models of masculinity and femininity vary among Africans, Indians, Asians, Europeans), and race is gendered (gender stereotypes shape racial stereotypes of Africans, Indians, Asians, whites). Moreover, because masculinities and femininities vary (by class, race/ethnicity, sexuality, age), some expressions of gender (Hispanic in the United States [US], Muslim in India, Turkana in Kenya) are subordinated to dominant constructions of gender (Anglo, Hindu, Kikuyu). There are thus multiple masculinities…. (Runyan & Peterson, 2014: 3)

Diplomacy as a structure which privileges masculine narratives is furthered by nationalist constructions wherein masculine subjectivities5 are produced and reproduced especially in conflict situations. The nationalist histories circulate myths that connect the masculine with the ‘national religious, secular, or popular cultures’ (Munn, 2008: 145). The warrior as such is to be a heterosexual man who as a father or husband attains control, becomes a powerful myth or hero suitable for the images of warfare. The constitution of nationalist identity therefore, calls for a masculinisation which can protect or provide the illusion of protecting

5 The Masculine subjectivity, the viewpoint of the world formed from masculine ideals– thoughts, actions, feelings which are found appropriate only when presented by masculine figures.

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the ‘motherland’ and ‘nationality’ (Bose, 2017) especially in post-conflict societies. The nationalist myths and narratives used to construct such identities are gendered in form leading to an understanding of the female/motherland as chaste and needing protection. This Heterosexual Warrior Masculinity in the construction of the ‘self’ creates an ‘other’ in the enemy. Today, the Heterosexual Warrior Masculinity (HWM) understanding in India uses Hindu Nationalism in this creation of the self as a masculine nationalist body. Thus, nationalism itself creates, awakens, and strengthens a gendered nationalism with masculine as well as feminine aspects (Anand, 2011). The HWM in the case of Hou Yanqi perceives the Chinese diplomat as hypersexual. The gendered nationalism projects the female of the hostile enemy state as the ‘other’, an immoral woman as against the Hindu national self of moral superiority. Furthermore, the Indian ‘male gaze’ sexualises the Mongolian East Asian features. Herein, the layered masculine understanding perceives a woman with mongoloid features as promiscuous, provocative, and unchaste. The ‘Double Othering’ here of racism and sexism rooted in specific histories (Sherpa, 2020) are further asserted by these nationalist masculine narratives. Geographical knowledge in the public domain is prejudiced and adds to the portrayal of the other as ‘inferior’, ‘evil’, or in this case ‘immoral and manipulative’. Harvey (2005) explaining about cosmopolitanism and the banality of geographical evil reviews Kant’s arguments on a cosmopolitical ethic. Kant in recognising both geographical and anthropological understanding as necessary preconditions for ‘all forms of knowledge’ is ‘unsystematic’, ‘incoherent’, ‘prejudicial in the extreme’ (Harvey, 2005). Humanity achieves its greatest perfection with the white race. The yellow Indians have somewhat less talent. The Negroes are much inferior and some of the peoples of the Americas are well below them…… Burmese women wear indecent clothing and like to get pregnant by Europeans…. (Harvey, 2009)

The prejudice in Kantian argument, as discussed by Harvey, is inconsistent with his universal ethics and principles are embodied in principles of global governance. The Universal principle enforced in different geographies is discriminatory and nevertheless is portrayed as the ‘universal good’. The Oriental woman works into this understanding and prejudice

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perfectly around the hypermasculine nationalist narratives. These hypermasculine geopolitical understandings about China in India, and vice versa, especially after the Galwan Valley conflict is apparent in the representation of Hou Yanqi as a ‘Seductress’. The position of a woman amidst such narratives of nationalism especially in a position of power is reprehended if not debased in South Asian International Relations. The elite geopolitics reflects such reprehensions through the media and women in power have had their sexualities attacked on multiple occasions in the media.

Order and Disorder, Devaluing Femininity The absence of women in diplomacy is a part of the complex equation wherein a male-centric state interacts with nationalism, the idea of universal good, and prejudices, creating geopolitical understandings of the ‘other’ while justifying a Heterosexual Warrior Masculinity. The analytical understanding of this equation through a gender-sensitive lens (Runyan & Peterson, 2014: 1) discusses the instrumental inclusion of women in diplomacy and IR which is bound into strict binaries of sexuality and the associations with it. The women involved adapt masculine identities with their bodies, clothing, and styles of negotiation. The structures remain indifferent to this instrumental inclusion and resist change through these patriarchal discourses and the creation of binaries. This ‘dichotomisation, stratification, and depoliticisation in thought and in action’ can be witnessed through the gendered lens (Runyan & Peterson, 2014: 2). The rigid male/female distinction is specific to modernity and to Western cultures wherein it has been justified on the grounds of biological differences. The subordination of women has been justified with philosophical reasoning of biological determinism, ‘because it is natural and inescapable, therefore unchangeable’ (Menon, 2008). A nationalist, hegemonic masculinity does not identify multiple masculinities and femininities but maintains privileges sustaining power structures with an interlocking of inequalities.

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Table 9.1 Masculination as valourisation and feminisation as devalourisation

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Masculinised

Feminised

Men Sexual majorities/normative genders White (nd) (Neo)colonising Western Global North War International States

Women Sexual minorities/nonnormative genders Racialised (Neo)colonised Non-Western Global South Peace Domestic Families/communities/social movements Care economy

Market economy

Source Runyan and Peterson (2014: 18)

The creation of Dichotomies6 has an ‘either-or’ thinking where any overlaps or continuities are avoided. Similarly, the gendered binaries of masculinity and femininity are polarities that are not completely independent but by definition are positioned as opposites, incomplete without the ‘others’ position. The dichotomisation is ‘simplifying, reductionist and of parsimonious quality’ reducing complex phenomena of gender into categories creating polarities of domination and subjugation. In constraining how we understand realities, these dichotomies also create static and politically problematic positions (Runyan & Peterson, 2017) (Table 9.5). The dichotomy devalues the feminine by constructing it as man’s negative, refusing to share the masculine space of diplomacy. The women who do enter such a space are forced to be ‘submissive, obedient, and receptive to succeed’ (Minarova-Banjac, 2018). Luce Irigaray uses psychoanalytical feminism to state that diplomacy is a ‘hom(m)osexual’ order (1996). The fraternal order of the ‘same’ (homo) wherein the woman is posited against the male ‘his inverse, his scrap, his other’ (ibid.: 63). The public and the private sphere institutionalised this devalued position of the feminine. Moreover, other binaries drawn with respect to women in IR are 6 ‘Dichotomies’ as lenses divide concepts (terms, ideas, characteristics) into two, mutually exclusive, ontologically separate poles: paired opposites that share nothing in common because whatever qualities each depicts must belong only to one but not the other. See Peterson and Runyan (2014: 44).

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of being irrational, submissive, and passive, related to reproduction and food versus the masculine which is rational, dominant, active, and related to the political economy. The state itself is a masculine construct which has been positioned against the devalued, negative, chaotic, disordered anarchy which is external to the rational, ordered, and organised state. Hobbes and Machiavelli in realist comprehension of international politics create similar binaries. Hobbes creates the State of Nature which in chaos needs the social contract for the creation of the state, while Machiavelli posits the masculine virtù (virtue) against the feminine fortuna (fortune) (Machiavelli, 1940: 94). Menon (2008) rightly states that Western moral philosophy has ideas of rationality, autonomy, and justice all associated with male experiences while the female experience is invisible. The allocation of order to the masculine and disorder to the feminine rendered women invisible in the rational world of diplomatic history. The cultural images of the feminine since the idea of Eve have been full of deception, vengeance, and manipulation. Moreover, it was considered dangerous to let a woman ‘loose’ in the world of men hence the position of a woman is monitored and often denied or guaranteed because of their relation to men (McCarthy & Southern, 2017). Enloe declares the ‘international is personal’ (Enloe, 2014: 196), the gender-based relations are reproduced by military operations, international economy, and diplomatic relations. The women in diplomacy have been present in unconventional spaces as secretaries, wives, and domestic servants. Women in these positions have been crucial and have provided a degree of visibility, however this visibility which is far from the halls of power is not enough as women are placed disproportionately in low paid or non-enumerated occupations (Tickner, 1992). Women in diplomatic history have been influential through their aristocratic lineages or marriages to men in power. Women were restricted from entering into spaces of power thus influenced as wives or mistresses. The Nigerian expression attempts to explain it as ‘bottom power’ which translates as women using their sexuality to get things from men. Adichie (2014) states that bottom power is not power at all but a form of dependency. The ‘hom(m)osexual’ order of diplomacy and international politics thus becomes an order of men where women’s bodies are appreciated and made exclusively to serve the male needs, desires, and exchanges. Women who have worked in diplomatic careers were presented with consular rather than policy-oriented positions, they were less likely to

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be chosen for conferences, faced biased recruitment patterns, discrimination, and had a ban on marriages until the late 1960s and 1970s (Aggestam & Towns, 2018: 281). The jobs of diplomats are ones where frequent movement is required without accommodative jobs for spouses. The presumption that men with better and more stable careers should not be asked to move led to this ban on marriages for women in foreign services. Moreover, the feminine is associated with the passive, peaceful, and caregiving qualities that are positioned for peacekeeping, whereas the men are to be in fields of military and economic diplomacy. Women have been coupled with children in narratives of war and migration, this categorisation as a single entity furthers the helpless and dependent position of the women. The dichotomisation of women as inferior thus pervades perspectives, institutions, as well as our everyday language in entertainment, sports, and cultures. The gendered aspects of diplomatic institutions coerce the limited number of women in foreign services to adapt masculine identities with their bodies and styles of negotiation. The imagined body of the diplomat itself is a male body with dark suit and polished shoes. Longhurst (2000) in the construction of the body discussed the ‘incorporeal’ tidy and respectable body of the diplomat. This conception is of a professional and respectable body which represses sexuality, emotions, and bodily functions. The female body with a complex network of bodily functions, and reduced to being feminine, irrational, and hormonal does not fit into the conceptualisation of the diplomat. The civil servant is framed into hero scripts of diplomacy wherein through control he overcomes the psychological vulnerabilities in ‘honey trapping’ operations (Neumann, 2008: 684). These norms naturalised the masculine, more so through popular geopolitics, like the James Bond movies. The women are forced to wear suits and so the woman needs to put aside her feminine identity to adapt to masculine clothing. Women in powerful spaces appear to act like men. Feminists have argued that such behaviour of adapting to masculine styles is necessary to succeed in international politics (Cohn, 1988). Female negotiators are in some cases ignored for feminine traits are related to poor negotiation skills and emotional instability. The women who adopt such masculine behaviour are most positively described as ‘men in skirts’ and ‘iron lady’ and negatively as being unreal ‘witches’ and ‘hags’. Either way the seat at the table is not enough because despite inclusion, the women could never fit into the Heterosexual warrior masculine

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construction of the structure and knowledge systems. This naturalisation of the masculine depoliticises the interlocking inequalities persistent in international politics making it seem acceptable to sexualise a female diplomat.

A ‘Seductress’ for Nepal: Representation and Legitimacy The dichotomisation, stratification, and depoliticisation of gendered structures cater to the interest of a hegemonic nationality that involves narratives of nationalism to legitimise their position. The interconnected relations of inequality pervade ideology, discourses, and social as well as institutional perspectives. The previous sections have established the gendered structure of diplomacy wherein a Heterosexual Warrior Masculinity addresses solutions to conflicts not just at the level of the state but of general public opinion. These vindictive nationalist geopolitical narratives publicised and propagated through the media in sexist or racist terms are further depoliticised making them acceptable opinions. These opinions through popular understandings or various pressure groups in turn influence foreign policy decisions supporting the nationalist exclusionary narratives. The Indian media’s portrayal of Hou Yanqi post the Kalapani issue between Nepal and India took a deplorable turn in July 2020 which led to a backlash in Nepal against the Indian media. This event analysed through the gendered lens brings us to confront the status of women in South Asian geopolitics who are still named as ‘witches’, ‘hags’, and ‘femme fatale’. This section discusses the balance of threat and power in the South Asian region with respect to India and China with competitive interests in Nepal. The diplomatic-historical as well as the contemporary-historical literature on International Relations in South Asia sees China and India as the two emerging powers maintaining a balance of power and threat in South Asian politics. Nepal as the buffer between the two has been building alliances and bandwagoning like other smaller states thereby creating an aggressive competition in the region. The section will discuss how the bandwagoning and competition have led to narratives of nationalism and ‘othering’. The border conflicts that India and China have had in the past few years become a catalyst in these nationalist narratives. The Heterosexual Warrior Masculine position adapted by the State and often more rigourously by the media creates the evil other at the cost

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of sexual discrimination against women in power. The geopolitical equation between India and China remains crucial towards understanding the security, political economy, and the regional architectures in South Asia. The incorporation of constructed images, identities, and norms depends upon the security concerns of the countries and their perceptions of other countries. The perceptions are in turn influenced by the politics of identity, construction of images, and the norms institutionalised in the social, domestic as well as international (Sridharan, 2015). Nepal on the north-eastern side of India has more than 1800 km of open borders with India, it is geopolitically positioned as the buffer and remains crucial to both India and China. The relationship that India shares with Nepal is often cited as ‘Roti Beti ka Sambandh’ (MEA, 2015) referencing the economic relationship between the two countries and marital relationships that pervade the borders. The relationship between the two states has often turned hostile as India tries to play the ‘big brother’ (PTI, 2015) card that becomes unacceptable to Nepal. The need to balance Indian hegemony in the South Asia region moves Nepal into bandwagoning with China. The balancing and bandwagoning acts of Nepal depend on the perceived intentions of the adversary (Walt, 1990) and images thus become important. The images formed with repeated communication and involvements are linked to the history of interactions pertaining to states-in-the-making and nations-in-the-making, these interactions could be antagonistic or peaceful (Sridharan, 2015). The perception of threat in states arise from geographical proximity, territorial disputes, ideological hostility, and perceived aggressive intentions (Walt, 1990). India’s relationship with Nepal is characterised by close geographical proximity, the territorial disputes of Lipulekh and Kalapani, the ideological position of democracy that has been supportive of the Nepali Congress, and finally an aggressive ‘big brother’ stand using economic blockades as punishment against resistance. The perception of threat results in building alliances while interests in profit and fear, may lead to bandwagoning (Sweeney & Fritz, 2004). Nepal thus signed the Belt Road Initiative with China in May 2017 and this relationship has been an irritant for India ever since. Meanwhile, the Indian perception of the Chinese is associated with the 1962 humiliation and various territorial disputes. The McMohan Line, the Aksai Chin, John Ardagh-Johnson Line, Maccartney-MacDonald line, Trig Heights, Demchok, Barahoti, Namka Chu, Sumdorong chu, Chantze, Asaphila, Lonju, and the Finger Area in Sikkim have all been

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land territorial disputes while China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean Region remains strategic concerns to India. The recent banning of Chinese goods after the Galwan valley conflict coincided with the Kalapani issue with Nepal that left New Delhi and the Indians furious. India’s history of interactions with China and Nepal generated, especially in 2020, a hatred for everything Chinese, thereby building a nationalist narrative. The disappointment persists with Nepal on Prime Minister Oli’s defiant anti-India statements. This series of events led to the Indian Media attacking the Prime Minister and the Chinese ambassador with reports filled with jingoism and national fervour. On 6 June 2020, Zee News, an Indian News channel aired a news report sensationalising an alleged relationship between Prime Minister (PM) KP Oli and Chinese ambassador to Nepal Hou Yanqi (Zee Hindustan, 2020). The channel had titled its controversial report as ‘Oli kiIshqiya’ loosely translated as Oli’s love affair. The report continued for 17 mins and discussed how China had bribed Nepal with Hou Yanqi’s body. They had also alleged that the Chinese government had a multimedia message (MMS) showcasing intimacy between the PM and the ambassador through which they were blackmailing him. They categorised her as a ‘femme fatale’, a ‘seductress’, the Chinese spy who manipulated Oli like a puppet. The media with its jingoism and ‘out-to-get-justice’ media trials refuses to accept the existing problems in the India–Nepal relationship. Instead, they blame the ambassador for all the hostility, while India remains disappointed by the ‘sudden change’ in Nepal’s loyalties towards its ‘big brother’. J. K. Tripathi, a retired IFS officer, appeared as an expert in the report, stating that Hou Yanqi has been on the news not just because of her beauty but her ability to use this beauty to infiltrate the Nepalese Government. Hou Yanqi is also suspected to be a ‘Vish Kanya’—the fictional young woman with poisonous blood used as assassin against powerful enemies.7 Other news channels, including news websites printed similar allegations against the ambassador. News 24 (2020) called the ambassador a model who has trapped the PM under her spell. Interestingly, they also state how Hou Yanqi as a diplomat functions differently than the diplomatic protocols. The Nepali Communist Party (NCP) around this time had been torn apart by different factions and the Chinese ambassador was continuously

7 See Arthashastra and usage of spies and assassins.

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meeting different leaders urging them to unite the party. She managed to achieve her desired result, however short lived, while increasing Chinese influence and intervention in the domestic affairs of Nepal. The Indian media however in a nationalistic fervour constructed a narrative drawing from a Heterosexual Warrior Masculinity position. They perceived it as a scheme by the Chinese government, which it certainly is as a unified communist regime that is conducive to Chinese interests. However, the statements about the ambassador ‘honey trapping’ the PM was certainly deplorable. The Nepalese government urged the Indian media to stop broadcasting news damaging the image of Nepal and called it an attack on their nationality, sovereignty, and dignity. Most Indian news channels were blocked in Nepal after the ‘Mudslinging against Oli’ (The Wire, 2020). Nilamber Acharya, the Indian ambassador to Nepal, warned about such reports destroying India–Nepal friendship and the Indian media houses were asked to apologise for baseless allegations that hampered an already wavering relationship. The blocking of news channels was done under Article 9 of the National Broadcasting Rules of Nepal. Interestingly, the Nepalese outrage was for tainting the Prime Minister’s image and not the ambassador’s. The idea that an envoy was deemed to be a poisonous assassin, a honey trapping, hypersexual seems to be normalised under everyday naming, speaking, and overall dominant approaches to knowledge. Hou Yanqi is a 52-year-old, well-trained diplomat, who has been immensely successful in maintaining Chinese influence over Nepal and also intervening in domestic politics as is convenient for China. Hou Yanqi as a female ambassador subverts many strands of heterosexual masculinity as she is a rational, authoritative figure who has protected the China–Nepal relationship in different ways. She rejects the gendered masculine idea of body as well as clothing as she embraces her femininity while doing her job and becoming immensely popular. In light of the civilisational and religious attachment that India enjoys with Nepal, Yanqi’s cultural diplomacy decisions were successful in creating a picture of cultural acceptance. Yanqi had performed a Nepali dance at an event in the Chinese embassy on International Women’s Day in 2020. She has also worked on the vaccine diplomacy towards Nepal relentlessly while the vindictive popular geopolitical opinions were being circulated against the ‘femme fatale’. The Indian understanding and male gaze towards the oriental woman accentuated the nationalist narratives in creating

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the ‘other’ woman as being immoral, manipulative, and poisonous— a ‘Vishkanya’. This dual othering of gender and race that Hou Yanqi was subjected to is evidence towards a privileged masculine nationalist narrative. This gendered understanding of events and concepts of diplomacy devalues the feminine and creates questions about illegitimate power if practised by women. Such an order constrains thinking, refuses alternatives, and becomes an impediment to justice and social action.

Conclusion The idea of a woman, in a position of power, in a male-centric reality has always been met with suspicion. Stefano speaks of masculinity as an ideology in political theory, hence, in the ideas and construction of realities, whether it is through individual ideas, theories, or systemic structures we witness an exclusion. The idea of the feminine is associated with chaos and unpredictability creating cultural images like Eve and Draupadi. Words like ‘witch’, ‘femme fatale’, seductress are used to delegitimise powerful women and place them outside society. The word seductress used in the title of the paper is a direct reference to the reality that transposes upon the woman in question. The gender-sensitive lens locates Hou Yanqi in a vindictive narrative through popular geopolitics in its nationalistic fervour. The female is treated as the passive (the one looked upon) dichotomous to the active male (the one looking) even when she is allegedly and actively, pursuing or engaging in the act of seduction. The power structures and understandings through such masculine underpinnings create this hom(m)osocial activity, centralising male knowledge and experiences. The politics of action (the presence) as well as inaction (invisibility and exclusion of women) sustains the system. The instrumental presence of women is accepted only with masculine norms and various dichotomies. The ‘disorder’ is associated with anything feminine in theory and practice. The concept of diplomacy and the construction of the ‘body of the diplomat’ does not allow any feminine presence. Diplomacy fails to accept women if not as wives or secretaries, removed far from the ‘halls of power’ (Tickner, 1992). Moreover, the creation of a discourse that portrays the ‘other’ female as immoral positions the national self as moral. The images of warfare, (the Kalapani issue and the Galwan Valley conflict) in the case of India, Nepal, and China are relevant in the construction of narratives of sexuality. The masculine

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imagery of rape and penetration utilises nationalising myths and narratives, creating heterosexual warriors as the ‘self’, and the hypersexual woman as ‘the other’. The media and social media platforms have become centres of such discourse creation, using artistic interventions by the state-controlled media and influencing public opinions. Popular geopolitics analyse such interventions which help to constitute public understandings of key actors and spaces. However, this relationship is transposed as these public understandings begin to influence state decisions under domestic demands and compulsions. Discourses and positions of heterosexual masculinities as hegemonic understandings thus create an interlocking of inequalities. This discourse of othering, shaming, hypersexualising, and racism is popularised and in turn influences the decisions of the state. The portrayal of Hou Yanqi by Indian media houses is one example of normalisation of such discourses. The casual reference to a female ambassador’s sexuality is positioned amidst information wars wherein both China and India compete aggressively to build alliances in South Asia.

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Menon, N. (2008). Gender. In R. Bhargava & A. Acharya (Eds.), Political theory—An introduction (pp. 224–233). Pearson. Munn, J. (2008). National myths and the creation of heroes. In J. L. Parpart & M. Zalewski (Eds.), Rethinking the man question—Sex, gender and violence in international relations (pp. 143–162). Zed Books. Neumann, I. B. (2008). The Body of the Diplomat. European Journal of International Relations, 14(4), 671–695. Nepali Law Commission. (1995, June 11). National Broadcasting Rules, 2052. Nepal Law Commission. https://www.lawcommission.gov.np/en/wpcontent/uploads/2018/09/national-broadcasting-rules-2052-1995.pdf News 24. (2020, July 6). Nepal Hou Yanqi . https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q_9dn95eYOg Nicholson, H. (1998). Diplomacy. Georgetown University Press. Peterson, V. S. (1993). Gender in international relations: Feminist perspectives on achieving global security. Political Science Quarterly, 108(2), 347–349. PTI. (2015, November 29). ‘Big brother’ attitude of India unacceptable: Nepal leader. The Indian Express. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/indianews-india/big-brother-attitude-of-india-unacceptable-nepal-leader/ Rathore, K. (2020, November 12). Where are the women in Indian diplomacy? The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/where-are-the-womenin-indian-diplomacy/ Runyan, A. S. and Peterson, V. S. (2014). Global gender issues in the new millennium (4th ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429493782 Scheimichen, L. (2019). Madam Ambassador: A Statistical Comparison of Female Ambassadors across the US, Germany, and the EU Foreign Service. EU Diplomacy paper, 3/2019. Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies. Sherpa, R. O. (2020, May 21). Do we also owe an internal apology? A reflection on racism, gender, and stereotyping in response to web series ‘Paatal Lok’. https://countercurrents.org/2020/05/do-we-alsoCountercurrents.org. owe-an-internal-apology-a-reflection-on-racism-gender-and-stereotyping-inresponse-to-web-series-paatal-lok/ Sridharan, E. (2015). Introduction: International relations theory and South Asian Regional Cooperation: Security, political economy, domestic politics, identities, and images. In E. Sridharan (Ed.), International relations theory and South Asian Regional Cooperation—Volume 2: Security, political economy, domestic politics, identities, and images (p. 7). Oxford University Press. Starr, H. (2015). On geopolitics—Space, place and international relations. Routledge. Stefano, C. D. (1983). Masculinity as ideology in political theory: Hobbesian man considered. Women Studies International Forum, 6(6), 633–644. https://doi.org/10.1016/0277-5395(83)90024-9

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CHAPTER 10

Amplifying Women’s Voices in International Relations: A Study of What Has Been Done and What Requires to Be Done Satyaki Aditya

The deliberately straightforward nature of the title of this paper is meant to highlight the heart of the concern: the lack of female voices in mainstream (“male stream” is a term often used by feminist critiques) International Relations (IR). IR, a relatively new discipline is preoccupied with interstate relations and the related issues of sovereignty, international law, war, international order and security. Feminist IR questions the masculinist framing of politics, notably the state and its key military and government units as well as the practical way how these institutions operate and are visualized over time. Feminist debates entered IR, understanding roughly around the 1980s. It was the voices of those

S. Aditya Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, India (B) Department of Political Science (Raghabpur Campus), St. Xavier’s College (Autonomous), Kolkata, India e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Ojha and P. Jaiswal (eds.), South Asian Women and International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9426-5_10

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women who were working within the parameters of IR that exposed the multiple facets of patriarchy that manifests itself in the dichotomy between national and international, which effectively symbolizes the public–private and inside–outside debate. There is a dearth of awareness and recognition as far as the analytical grouping of gender is concerned, which makes the intertwined social construction of masculinity and femininity hazy and unclear. Explaining the exclusion of women, a researcher has argued “Feminist IR projects can be identified as deconstructing, revealing the discipline and its key concepts and categories to be male; and as reconstructing, making women and gender relations visible. These reconstructions in turn disrupt the discipline. Women cannot be simply added in for ‘IR’ has been constructed on the exclusion of women from ‘high politics’” (Pettman, 1996: 7). This is exactly what this paper tries to enquire. Zooming into women who have been capable enough to climb the ladder of high politics in South Asia (especially India), it undertakes a comparative study of what have they really done to magnify the suppressed women voices in these developing post-colonial countries. It is true that there exists a difference in women’s participation in high offices in South Asia in comparison with women’s participation in grass-root politics (South Asian Feminist Declaration, 1989). Shirin M. Rai (2011) attributes this trend to institutional politics, the politics of access through (patriarchal) family networks. The situation in contemporary times is changing quickly though, with more women taking front positions in social movements, active interest in participating in political parties and also due to the constitutional practice of reserving seats for women in elections and also in parliament.

Female Figures in South Asian Politics Two alternate resemblances pop up when we try to segregate women in South Asian politics in general and India in particular. The first is dynastic succession, during times of crisis and sometimes simply to continue family domination. However, in recent years, a second image of women-led political parties and civic organizations has come into the fray. Women leaders like Indira Gandhi in India, Sirimavo Bandaranaikie of Sri Lanka, Khaleda Zia and Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan and Sheikh Hasina of Bangladesh are outstanding examples of female members of big political families who stepped in mostly during times of death of either father or

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husband. The colonial legacy of continuing dominance and to avoid fallouts in the political parties they had to take up these huge roles (Bukhari, 2021). On the other hand, politicians like Mamata Banerjee, Mayawati, Jayalalithaa and Sushma Swaraj have been leaders of their parties after having risen on their own, in a societal environment that still stigmatizes gender and their associated roles (Jahan, 1987). This gives rise to certain questions: Do family linkages play a crucial part? What impact does emergence of female politicians have in high politics and society? Finally, what is the future of important feminine issues that require global concern? Indira Gandhi Indira Gandhi is called the “master” of Indian politics, because it is believed that she is among the very few women leaders who transformed the polity of her country. Indira Gandhi’s popularity in the early stages relied on being the only child of India’s first Prime Minister Nehru and at the same time she was also her close confidante. She faced a lot of upheavals in the post-Nehruvian period from the political elites of her own Indian Congress party called the “syndicate”. She was a woman leader who was definitely popular among the masses but wasn’t the choice of male politicians who could not accept initially that a woman could lead a country and negotiate with other states in international affairs. This brief insight into Indira Gandhi’s early struggle is an example of an instance where a new social object contested the very meaning of the established cultural framework responsible for defining its legitimacy (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 119). The status of Nehru’s daughter complicates her relationship with her gender. She must not only overcome the negative traits (attached in the societal fabric) of her gender, but also face life under her father’s shadow. She did not talk directly much about gender, but she studied with great interest women’s issues before moving on to higher politics. She worked in the women’s section of the Congress party. She played an active role in the creation of the women’s branch of the party in 1956 (Katz, citing Genovese, 2012). Even though she was surrounded by men while growing up, even as a child, Indira Gandhi had a female role model. Several letters she wrote and books of her interests speak of her attachment to Joan of Arc. She truly followed Joan as she led her people to freedom. This transcendent attitude may have alienated her from her

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collective feminist goals. Because for her, the goals of the Indian state took precedence over the struggle for women’s rights. Indira Gandhi did spend quite a long time in different party roles before becoming Prime Minister. She wrote to Norman after she became President of the Congress party that “irritable that women had organized around the communist cause but not mobilized for the Indian cause. The women, whom I have been trying to organize for years to come into politics are out in the field” (Norman, as cited in Katz, 2012). She could not really visualize the connection of feminism with marshalling the cause of women. She relied on the success of a woman as an individual and she followed the norm that given the opportunity Indian women can catapult themselves to the top at once. Scholars who have worked in depth about Indira Gandhi are of the view that she never indulged herself in guilt about not being able to be a champion for her gender’s cause but rather she emphasized working on women’s requirement for a personal space for their family and especially children. Mrs. Gandhi’s egalitarian upbringing might be the reason for her to believe that if she could rise to the top so could other women in her own country and the only detriment to this spiral upbringing was that of extreme poverty of a huge section of the masses (Singh, 2012). Mamata Banerjee Mamata Banerjee is a rare politician in India, i.e. a self-made politician without any political lineage. She had no benevolent male patron, no father, brother or husband prodding from the side-lines. In spite of her success as a student leader of Congress in the 1970s, her bravery in taking on directly the male-dominated Left Front hierarchy was a unique feat. She has chosen not to marry and continued her politics by forming an all new political party—All India Trinamool Congress (TMC) in 1998. Her courage and grit to break away from the Congress party and to float a new front all on her own did envy her erstwhile male colleagues, which we still get to notice if we see comments particularly against her as a person and not so much against her politics. TMC is one of the recognized national parties of India and her party was successful to come to power only within thirteen years. This was not only because of antiincumbency against 34 years of left rule in West Bengal but also because of Miss Banerjee’s dominant presence in peasant movements (following leftist strategy to counter the Left Front) and her image of always rising

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against the wrong and her indomitable will to not surrender in the face of state repression. Mamata’s message to female voters is not limited to campaigns and speeches or when there is a desperate need to woo voters before elections. The TMC government in the past decade under her prudent leadership has specially targeted women and girls through its legislations and beneficial schemes. The most popular and talked about is the Kanyashree scheme launched in 2013 which effectively provides direct bank transfer to girls between the ages of 13 and 18 years, provided that they remain unmarried and in school. The broader vision of this scheme that also won the United Nations Public service award in 2017 is to prevent child marriage, trafficking among girls and most importantly that they complete school education. Another equally successful and admired scheme launched in 2018, called Rupashree, provides a onetime financial grant of Rs 25,000 to the parents who are below poverty line at the time of their daughters’ weddings. The purpose behind this scheme is well thought out, which is to deter child marriages and child trafficking because it has been a menace for populations living in the “Jangal Mahal” and economically backward areas. Swasthya Sathi, the health insurance scheme, again a brainchild of Banerjee aims to provide health service benefits upto 500 thousand in the name of the household matriarch. It has been a huge success in the face of public health infrastructure shortage. She boasts about breaking the conventions and making women in Bengal rise in the international foray. Her government also has bagged the first place in women’s employment under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act. All these achievements might make some think that she is an out-andout feminist but the story is not that simple, like most other South Asian women politicians. All her references of gender and bargains with gender have been arbitrated by the ethos of welfare and community service. Mamata prefers a conventional approach which is primarily focused on the notion of women as victims. She has rallied all her political life being a permanent victim of sorts. After becoming Chief Minister she made many comments against rape survivors and questioned their integrity. She is arguably the most talked about politician in India who has brought women in the international relations. Improving lives of sex workers, school going girls, housewives and even bringing women-only coaches when she was the Railways Minister. Though she has no access to feminist vocabulary and cannot be ideologically described as one, her emergence

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as a single woman leader of lower middle-class origin fighting with her backs to the wall does situate her in a feminist context (Ghosh, 2021). Mamata Banerjee has made her presence felt in the arena of International politics by not only receiving international awards for her policy making but also had made her stance clear on Teesta river water sharing issue with the neighbouring country Bangladesh. She has kept Sheikh Hasina’s government waiting for the last ten years after she backed out of the tripartite deal in 2011 because she felt West Bengal would lose its due share of water if the deal went through to meet the interest of New Delhi and Dhaka. In spite of that, she has kept good relations with Bangladesh. In the last seven years or so she has been vocal on the worsening diplomatic relations with neighbouring countries like Nepal, Bhutan and China and has accused the central government of adopting wrong decisions which serve the need of the government and not of the realm. Mayawati The most prominent woman who comes into mind when one thinks about the Bahujan (Dalit) movement today is Mayawati, the former chief minister of the biggest Indian state Uttar Pradesh and the Bahujan Samaj Party supremo. The credit for mentoring women leaders goes to the founder of the Bahujan movement Kanshiram who put a sincere effort throughout the 1970s to urge women activists to take up leadership roles. Mayawati has eclipsed all other women leaders across the Hindi-speaking belt of northern India. Mayawati belongs from Chamar Jati (one of the lowest Dalit subcastes), who are associated historically with the tannery industry. Arguably, it was Mayawati who first gained the focus of international relations scholars and specially neoliberal scholars because of the subaltern identity that she was promoting which hardly got any recognition in international relations field before. The subaltern woman—rural, poor, Dalit proved to be a necessary counter to the new Indian global woman (Rao, 2018). The importance given to identity politics since the introduction of mass media in the 1990s makes analysing the views of Mayawati particularly relatively straightforward (Belli, 2014). Scholars and academicians in contemporary times have made understanding the intricate issues related to identity politics much simpler and interesting. Mayawati during the start of her political carrier was a rabble-rouser who was hell-bent to put the pressure of civilizational guilt on the upper castes.

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Thus her arrival into the new Indian middle class, a space that was represented as apolitical and inclusive was now threatened to be disruptive and produced unease (Ghose, 2009). In this section we will focus on something different, the architectural monuments that Mayawati built throughout Uttar Pradesh during her reign, of notable Dalit leaders and social reformers who championed Indian subalterns. The underlying aim to build these memorials and statues was to empower the Dalits through twin strategies; presence in space and presence in time, both of which have been denied to the Dalit community from time immemorial (Fontanella, 2012). Drawing on Foucault’s work on the relationship between space and power, this social marginalization of Dalits inside and outside the community, does not surprise anyone of their territorial claims of physical space (Bhatt et al., 2010). Significantly the case of Mayawati will be better explained following what Weber suggests: the main point of fact here is that the followers believe a leader possesses extraordinary characteristics, not only that he or she actually possesses them. Mayawati announces her unique and exceptional powers through this monumental public art with straightforward messages in a unique style (Henderson & Parsons, 1947). She has been successful in her tenure to instal the belief among subaltern people that in order to challenge upper-class privileges, they need to make their presence felt among the society that they have the capability to represent themselves on the highest level of social strata. Mayawati may not have been successful to rally for the day-to-day causes of her community and may have ended up endorsing a lifestyle that she previously vowed to rally against but she has in her own way been successful to bring the focus of international scholars to study and give importance to such a grey area that hardly was looked into in this way. What Mayawati has successfully done is to bring the issue of caste under the lens of IR. Previously caste remained woefully understudied in IR and was considered exclusively as an Indian or Hindu phenomenon which was considered to have hardly any relevance in foreign policy. The interventions previously made by Jyotirao Phule and B.R. Ambedkar and now by Mayawati have very well articulated the similarity of caste oppression with other forms of racial stigmatization. Female figures like her have very well contributed towards the immediate and sustained engagement of IR with caste and related issues.

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Jayalalithaa Jayalalithaa is one such women politician in India who falls under the category of a leader who came into the deeply patriarchal and sexist political sphere of Tamil Nadu with the help of a famous male figure MG Ramachandran (MGR). There is no doubt that she stepped into politics under the supervision and guidance of an established male politician and without him she had little chance in this arena. However, she had to face challenges being a woman, something that MGR did not have to encounter. Her story is a testament of fortitude in the face of rampant misogyny present in Tamil Nadu politics. The humiliation that she had to face started early into her political career when she became a party member of AIADMK in 1982. She was often called a temptress within her own party and rivals went to the extent of objectifying her sense of fashion with lewd comments on how young movie stars were able to use their gender in the service of the state. Nobody took cognisance of the fact that she possessed within herself strong leadership qualities but only kept on highlighting her close apprenticeship with MGR and what material benefits she would have got from such an intimate relationship (Banerjee, 2004). After MGR’s death she had to fight with MGR’s wife Janaki and her supporters to establish herself as the rightful heir of MGR. Her woes didn’t stop there, in 1989 during a session of the legislative assembly she faced her biggest humiliation as a woman. In an altercation between DMK and AIADMK, inside the floor of the house, opposition MLAs went to the extent of pulling her sari. This extreme image of misogyny shows how much a female political figure in Indian politics (of that time) had to go through to establish herself (Ghosh, 2016). Jayalalithaa was an incredibly fortitudinous woman who rose above the systematic sexist objectifying imagery associated with her background as an actress. This led to her drastically altering her image in a bid to deglamourize and desexualize herself. She understood the real plight Indian women have to face in a society that is entrenched in patriarchy. Jayalalithaa had no pedigree to flaunt, but she modelled herself on Margaret Thatcher and Indira Gandhi and preferred to be known as the only man in her 100 million strong political party. She transformed herself to become a politician with a difference. Though only a provincial leader, she pulled herself to be respected by pan-India leaders because of her focused pursuit of realpolitik.

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It is true that very little research work is there on this very enigmatic and private woman, but one thing that stands out was her fierce and formidable approach in the political field and a genial and gracious attitude outside the realm of politics. Her focus was on keeping women in politics relevant so that women can’t be treated as something dispensable in the future. She had to overcome huge hurdles to make herself established in Tamil Nadu politics, which previously had been a male bastion. She had a strong belief in God and orthodox Hindu practices which is alien to atheistic Dravidian sentiments. She was also not a Dravidian by birth and for that she had to face the outsider stigma. Her upper-class swanky brashness also went against the pro-poor egalitarian philosophy of the Dravidian movement, which might have pushed her later in her political career to adopt the imagery of Amma (mother), who is for the poor and needy. She had a preference for English and Western education, which was directly opposed to the Tamil-speaking fanatic Dravidian leaders, but she chose to keep a liberal attitude in the cultural sphere, so that her vision of empowerment of women and Tamils alike would bear fruit. Jayalalithaa handled the Sri Lankan issue very tactfully. Her stance was very different from that of her opposition party DMK. During Black July 1983, when civil war broke out in the neighbouring country she was sympathetic towards the Sri Lankan Tamils seeking refuge in Tamil Nadu. Although she did oscillate in her stance a bit but in 2011 she passed resolution in the assembly to enhance their allowances and laid down the scheme of building durable houses. She took a strong line on the issue of any refugees using the Indian soil to plan militant strategies. She made herself heard in the field of international politics by calling out DMK for supporting the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) cause. She did not allow any cultural or linguistic sentiment to overpower her stance and dealt with the issue pragmatically. She adopted the persona of Amma, the nurturing caretaker of the downtrodden masses. Many number of welfare schemes which she started during her reign in Tamil Nadu from the Cradle baby Scheme, Amma canteens, call centres and micro loan schemes aimed to help the poor and especially the female population. She nullified the masculine norms for gaining success and popularity in politics and she went on to invent her unique feminine norms that she used to gain ground in politics.

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Sushma Swaraj Three decades ago, Cynthia Enloe, the pioneer feminist scholar of international relations, famously asked of her field, “Where are the women?” Even today this answer is often met with uncomfortable silence especially when we talk about Indian women heading missions in other countries or serving as diplomats in international institutions. This scenario took a positive turn when Sushma Swaraj took charge as the External Affairs Minister in 2014. Although the underrepresentation of women all over the globe in diplomacy is a known fact in the field of diplomacy, Indian Foreign Service recorded an all-time high of 176 female officers out of its total strength of 815 (Nirupama, 2020). It was Sushma Swaraj who was successful to instal the belief that there are high chances for a woman without popular, well-known parents or support derived from family’s reputation and popularity to raise her own family and at the same time to climb the political ladder and creating the much required space for Indian women in world affairs. Swaraj not only inspired her own party’s female cadres but her fellow colleagues in the cabinet like Smriti Irani and Harsimrat Kaur Badal. The then Lok Sabha speaker, Sumitra Mahajan was also her follower, due to Swaraj’s persona and her commitment for promoting women representation in all levels to make them heard globally. She was never an out-and-out feminist per se. She always exemplified work-life balance, out-arguing her critics in the Parliament and elsewhere. Swaraj always believed that freedom emanates from empowerment and authority. As far as political empowerment is concerned, she believed it is the real empowerment as it provided authority and an opportunity to amplify the voices. Political empowerment for her was the source of much required power that any ordinary woman in a patriarchal society lacks. It would enhance the acceptability of women not only in political arena but also have a catapult effect in other spheres of the society. She doesn’t belong to that category of women who perform femininity for profitable political purposes that keeps on changing with time and required circumstances. Understanding Sushma Swaraj reveals that she always had a narrative approach to politics. She always stressed on how the personal attribute is a key factor in shaping the public and the political as women in India make their journey to the Indian Parliament. During her tenure in the external affairs ministry she was accessible to any Indian outside the country. She was always within the reach of a single verified tweet. Sushma Swaraj was that genre of

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a woman leader who built her political base from an educated family with the aspiration of political empowerment of women and not merely economic sufficiency.

Conclusion The central question that we have raised in this paper is that, should we not hear more women’s voices shaping agendas and outcomes so that more sense and sensibility prevails. The question that sequentially follows is that can IR and diplomacy organize itself more effectively that takes into account the largely silent multitudes that comprise women? In the above section we have willingly chosen to study women in Indian High Politics, to know about what space and agency have they been able to provide over the years as it is often considered that people in high politics are the ones who can change things. Mrs. Indira Gandhi has been the only woman discussed in this chapter who was the head of a government running a post-colonial society characterized by deep patriarchal norms and a public and private separation attached to the two genders. She herself rose to the helm with a lot of struggle and to such a space that was largely considered to be a male bastion. She withered away that age-old belief and installed a sense of security among the female population that they have a leader who is capable to understand their plight. It wasn’t possible for her to give a call for ontological revisionism of IR altogether. She instead chose community politics as an empowering process. Whether it is Indira Gandhi’s foreign policy or her approach towards domestic issues of poverty and unemployment, she has been a hard realist. It is difficult to ascertain whether she had an articulated world vision, but is safe to say that her actions were pragmatic. She valued power more than personal influence, which resulted in India gaining profound influence in global affairs. The notion of empowerment of all the leaders we talked about has focused on typical feminine issues (like economic independence, rape, and dowry) to an overall approach of tackling general issues (women’s health and their right to work). The aim has been to bring in cooperation with other forces such as unions, parties, people’s movement, human rights group and the voluntary sector to raise consciousness and deal with feminine problems. When we go into scholarly dissection of different women concerns like women’s experiences of conflict, as well as peace, we get to witness the fact that state apparatus has always overlooked their concerns. Even if

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there are female figures in high politics, women’s experiences in conflict areas have never been given importance in comparison to the national interest. The examples from the partition of the subcontinent in 1947, 1971 and the ever-present issue of cross-border infiltration demonstrate how issues of honour, rape and killing figure prominently in intra and interstate relations but doesn’t get the required attention from people posted in high politics (Singh, 2010). It is surprising that India still does not have a National Action Policy in tune with Security Council Resolution of the United Nations which was adopted way back in the year 2000. India as a country is far from acknowledging the unique and disproportionate impact that women and children tend to experience during armed conflicts. This fear stems from the prevalent egregious crimes against women that is still rampant in insurgency-infested areas and any adoption of NAP would first need to accept the prevalent scenario which our leaders, even women leaders fear to do, because it would expose their rule. Leaders like Mayawati and Mamata Banerjee have been successful to create agency and spaces for Dalit women and women from below the poverty line which now is a focus of Subaltern studies. They have realized that women entrepreneurship in political field is an integral part of the democratic process. Women must be in decision making in all socio-economic and political organizations. But the area where more breakthroughs are required is that, through the identification of collective problems associated with the gender, the creation of political agency will enable them to take control over their own life and help to instigate social change. Another major point of highlight is the wide disparity of women scholars in the field of IR. The higher education sector of South Asia sees more male scholars in the perceived male-stream field of diplomacy, policy making and IR theorization. The gender citation gap is omnipresent in major arenas of IR. There needs to be a common will to promote more female voices in this field who can really uphold their problems that require more importance. Family support still plays a major role in the ascendance of female figures in South Asian politics and diplomacy, but the increasing importance of social movements has laid the ground for women to establish their own space in the political circuit. We get to see more self-made women choosing to play an active part in everyday politics and helping the women fraternity to create their much required agency so that their problems get attention not only domestically but

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also in international relations. Social media as a tool is playing the role of a catalyst.

References Banerjee, M. (2004). Populist leadership in west Bengal and Tamil Nadu: Mamata and Jayalalithaa compared. In: Jenkins, R., (ed.) Regional reflections: comparing politics across India’s states (pp. 285–308). Oxford University Press. Belli, M. (2014). Monumental pride: Mayawati’s memorials in Lucknow. Ars Orientalis, 44, 85–109. https://www.jstor.com/stable/43489799 Bhatt, A., Murty, M., & Ramamurthy, P. (2010). Hegemonic developments: The new Indian middle class, gendered subalterns, and diasporic returnees in the event of neoliberalism. Feminists Theorize International Political Economy, 36(1, Special Issue), 127–152. Bourdieu, P., & Wacquant, J. D. (1992). An invitation to reflexive sociology. Polity Press. Bukhari, A. (2021, January 28). How have women leaders shaped South Asia’s politics? The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/howhave-women-leaders-shaped-south-asias-politics/ Cronin, Thomas E., & Michael A. Genovese. (2012). Leadership matters: Unleashing the power of paradox. Paradigm, Print. Fontanella, J. (2012, May 18). India’s Dalit queen in statue’s scandals. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/6eb55f42-a0c5-11e1-851f-00144f eabdc0 Ghose, S. (2009, April 7). Look back in hatred. Hindustan Times. https:// www.hindustantimes.com/india/look-back-in-hatred/story-Efogs7qkQZq0 W3PBPOP2lM.html Ghosh, A. (2016, December 8). How Jayalalithaa combatted the sexism in Tamil Nadu politics. Feminism in India. https://feminisminindia.com/2016/12/ 08/jayalalithaa-combatted-sexism-tamil-nadu-politics/ Ghosh, H. (2021, February 10). Bengal: From schemes to speeches, TMC has made the women voters the focus of its campaign. The Wire. https://m.thewire.in/article/gender/bengal-from-schemes-to-spe eches-tmc-has-made-the-woman-voter-the-focus-of-its-campaign Jahan, R. (1987). Women in South Asian politics. Third World Quarterly, 9(3), 848–870. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3992008 National Action plans: Localising Implementation of UNSCR 1325, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, 15 January 2016. https://www. wilpf.org/national-action-plan Nirupama, M. (2020, October 15–16). ICWA-SAU webinar on women and power: Gender within international relations. ICWA. https://www.icwa.in/ show_content.php?lang=1&level=2&ls_id=5426&lid=3835

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Pettman, J. J. (1996). Worlding women. A Feminist International Politics. Allen & Unwin. Rao, N. (2018, March 8). Feminist voices could change the nature of international diplomacy. The Wire. https://www.thewire.in/women/foreign-affairsdiplomacy Rai, S. M. (2011). The politics of access: Narratives of women MPs in the parliament. Sage Journals. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9284.2011. 00915 Singh, K. D. (2010). Women, security, peace and conflict in South Asia. The Indian Journal of Political Science, 71(2), 651–661. https://www.jstor.com/ stable/42753724 Singh, S. (2012). Unravelling the enigma of Indira Gandhi’s rise in politics: A women leader’s quest for political legitimacy. Theory and Society, 41(5), 479–504. https://www.jstor.com/stable/23263480 Singh, S. (2017). Gender, conflict and security. Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 4(2), 149–157. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10. 2307/48602140 South Asian Feminist Declaration. (1989). http://www.sacw.net/Wmov/sasiaf eministdecla.html Weber, M., Henderson, A. M., & Parsons, T. (1947). The theory of social and economic organization (1st Amer. Ed.). Oxford University Press.

CHAPTER 11

Underrepresentation of Women in Conflict Resolution: A Case of South Asia Shuvechha Ghimire and Shumaila Fatima

Gender differentiation in South Asia has a long historical trajectory with women facing discrimination and power differential in almost every field (from domestic sphere, politics, economics to diplomacy). The constrained set of gender roles in South Asian countries is a product of several elements with culture at its core. These gender roles then account for women’s limited representation in private as well as public spheres. Subjects such as history, government, and politics have long been malecentric and masculinist to an extent that, “… one can study gender in these political settings where men remain dominant and women are rarely to be seen, on the understanding that women are just not there. The result has been that despite available evidence of women as agents and

S. Ghimire (B) · S. Fatima Department of Sociology and Interdisciplinary Social Science, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, USA e-mail: [email protected] S. Fatima e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Ojha and P. Jaiswal (eds.), South Asian Women and International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9426-5_11

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subjects in the arena of diplomacy, the core historical narratives of international politics have remained depleted of women” (James & Sluga, 2016). Among various governmental and political fields, conflict resolution remains to be one of the most difficult fields for women to access. Even when women manage to enter this field, they are deemed suitable only to deal with “soft conflict.” Demeter et al. (2015) observe that male arbitrators are seen to be fit for every conflict and female arbitrators are seen suitable for domestic conflict involving family and children or in other words “soft conflicts.” One arbitrator commented that women “… have to be twice as good to make the same impression” and mistakes of women are “forever remembered, as opposed to mistakes made by men” (Demeter et al., 2015). In other words, women have long been the victims of epistemic injustices where they struggle to possess forms of credibility of testimonies (i.e., who do we judge to be credible) just because of their embodied self, that of being a woman, a female (McKinnon, 2016; Pitts, 2017). Even among women, certain groups of women remain more deprived of representation than others. One such group is women from South Asian countries. Despite the growth in globalization and development around the world, there exist some issues that hinder the growth of developing nations. Some may even argue that it is precisely the effects of globalization causing a greater divide among nations (Burawoy, 2007; Castells, 2016). While states are competing economically in the rat-race of development, they are paying little attention to issues of women like new forms of domestic violence, such as those arising from information and communication technologies (Hearn, 2013), continuing lack of access to education caused by cultural constraints such as early child marriage, inability to travel alone, and continuing sexual division of labor in which women’s status in the society remains that of unpaid proletariat class (Hartsock, 2004). Consequently, gender divisions persist in the political economy of development, which then has a direct correlation to limiting the emergence of female leaders. For example, theoretical discourses and policy agendas in economic development and politics neither take into consideration the structural and symbolic boundaries within which women function in various geographical contexts nor the intersectional matrixes of one’s identity such as sexuality, class, race, caste, religion, ethnicity, and ableism, that further compartmentalizes women (Crenshaw, 2017; Rai, 2002). Even when development efforts have been designed to have a focus on gender equality and women’s representation, they are

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in constant conflict with the regional political and cultural dynamics that hinder efficient implementation of such initiatives. This chapter explores the role of women in conflict resolution through regional examples. The first part of the chapter delineates various international and local initiatives, organic movements, and organizations that have the agentic prowess of women working mainly in the area of conflict resolution, ranging from domestic violence, health to policy information. The second part of the chapter then discusses and scrutinizes one, the role of education as a promoting factor and two, localized social culture as a limiting factor for the reach of women to leadership positions in political and decision-making positions. The chapter also contextualizes some critical insights to substantiate ontologies of standpoint feminist and critical epistemologies into current scenarios of women in conflict management and mediation. Lastly, the chapter provides concluding remarks with recommendation for further research and direction of studies.

Women in Conflict Resolution Women suffer ignorance in conflict and conflict mediation as agents, victims, as well as survivors. Broadly speaking, although the level of women’s participation is at an all-time high, the number of women in formal international leadership positions in peacebuilding remains proportionately lower than their male counterparts (O’Reilly et al., 2015). According to the Council on Foreign Relations (2021), women constituted on an average only 10% of negotiators, mediators, and signatories in all international peacekeeping missions and conferences between 1992 and 2019. Furthermore, there was no presence of women as mediators and signatories in about 70% of these missions and conferences. Moreover, while references to gender equality in peace agreements have increased, gender provisions have not (United Nations Security Council, 2020). This substantiates our argument that irrespective of nationality, women lack opportunities. United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) have been adopted worldwide by nation-states and organizations alike. One of the major goals of SDG is enhancing representation and leadership in areas of conflict resolution and peacebuilding by promoting gender equality (under Goal 3). Additionally, the UN established UN Women as an agency dedicated to increasing women’s participation in conflict resolution and mediation, hosted conferences on women’s participation, such

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as the historic United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women at Beijing in 1995, and passed several resolutions, such as the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325. UNSCR 1325 was passed in 2000 with an aim for equal participation of women in different areas of national, international, and non-governmental activities pertaining to peace and security. The resolution proposed a global framework for increasing women’s participation in preventing, managing, and resolving conflict. It specifically addresses the need for women’s representation in decision-making and adoption of gender perspectives in peace agreements. Furthermore, it also illuminates “… local women’s peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements” (Bell, 2015). Through developing women centered lens, the resolution brings to attention the need to focus on women’s issues during various stages of conflict and post conflict like repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation, and reconstruction (ICM Policy Paper: Women, Peace, and Security, 2016). An example of its impact is that since its inception, there has been an increase in the number of women partaking in peace agreements, decreasing the number of sexual and domestic violence, increased number of quotas for women, and developing more firmer commitments as compared to general references (Bell, 2015). As remarkable as the Resolution 1325 and other UN initiatives are, they have varying impacts in different nation-states and societies. One such challenge to the impact arises from lack of financial aid and executive, agentic prowess at nation-state level. According to the Report of the Secretary General on Women, Peace and Security (2020), in conflictaffected countries, while 4.5% of the total aid commitment was for gender equality, only 0.2% was funneled directly to women organizations actively working in conflict-ridden countries. Acknowledging that nationstates are heterogeneous formations, their differential outlook toward various institutions of society (ranging from conservative-normative to liberal-democratic) significantly impacts the implementation of these UN initiatives. Moreover, most of these initiatives are not state-specific, making their implementation difficult in states who view conflict differently. UNSCR 1325 has been criticized for centering more on state than on human security in general (Goswani, 2015). In this light, it is vital to consider the sociocultural, economic, and political capital of not just societies (where UNSCR 1325 gets actively implemented) but of nation-states in general too.

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A brief analysis of Nordic countries, who have set the benchmark with highest performances in gender parity shows that education plays an imperative role in their achievement. With approximately cent percent literacy rates for both the binary genders, data shows that women supersede men by nearly 50% in university enrollment, have significantly low wage gaps, and more avenues for female leadership opportunities, which then can be accounted for by their greater presence in the high skill labor market (economic and political) (Zahidi, 2014). Nordic Women Mediators (NWM) Network is one such example of leadership opportunities which was founded by an expert network of women on conflict, mediation, and peacebuilding from five Nordic countries. The core aim and goal of NWM is inclusive participation of women in peace proceedings through advocacy and operational engagement that ultimately results in a sustainable peace process (Nordic Women Mediators, 2015). Unlike the performances of Nordic countries, the section below will highlight the grappling performances of South Asian countries in securing Women’s voices in conflict mediation at various levels (local, community, and nation-state). We will also briefly underline other organizations and institutions in South Asian countries that have been incessantly and relentlessly working for women empowerment in areas other than conflict mediation at the level of macro structure. The Case of South Asia Present day South Asia consists of countries affiliated to the federation of SAARC which includes Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka. While they are a part of larger regional cooperation initiative, they are imbued with heterogeneity of sociocultural, religious, economic, political, and psychological dimensions. There are, however, also striking similarities among these nations, mainly pertaining to history and norms that constitute their social structures. One such striking similarity among these nation-states (with an exception to Nepal and Bhutan) is the historical trajectory of colonialism by Dutch, Portuguese, French, and British. Historically speaking, women of the global south, like women of the global north, have faced discrimination and struggled with structural hurdles, albeit in varying trajectories and intensities. What differentiates women in the global south from the women in the global north is their slow and limited progress due to widespread patriarchy in the region. For example, while in the

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US, women’s empowerment has taken strides toward ensuring rights to vote and advocating against gender wage gap, countries like Pakistan are still grappling with women’s education and mortality. To combat discriminatory practices in the society, waves of feminist interjections and interventions began, especially during the “post Cartesian modern” period following the Second World War. It is important to note here that emphasis on human rights leads to an emphasis on women’s rights (Murthy & Clyde, 2010). One of the key interventions in promoting and improving socioeconomic and political status of women is through formulation and implementation of developmental policies imbued with aspects of active participation and social inclusion. Many formulated policies promote goals of gender equality; however, the question remains, despite so many interventions why does the lag persist? The answer lies in critically assessing these policies as they are most often created and constructed outside the theoretical framework of the feminist agendas. Additionally, states often struggle to devise gender-inclusive policies and practices due to friction between global agendas and local traditions. Prioritizing issues also influence states’ response to gender mainstreaming. For example, in states with a wide gender gap in education, concern will be placed on devising policies to close that gap than leapfrogging to policies that increase women’s representation on national and international levels. These assessments indicate that the goal should then be to incorporate feminist knowledge production into the mainstream not just in pervasive and extrinsic issues but also in the underlying ideologies and consequences of the issues. Specifically, in conflict and mediation, discussions on gender and women are emphasized on sexual violence with little attention to women’s participation as conflict mediators (Kreft, 2017). Although women’s participation in diplomacy and mediation has evolved over time, women in conflict resolution still battle quests to attain rights in economic and political sphere. Among the eight South Asian countries, only three— Afghanistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh—have a National Plan of Action (NAP) on Women, Peace, and Security Index (WPSI). To what extent it meets the changing demands of the population is a different debate altogether. Countries without NAP do not produce information on WPSI. This exemplifies the heterogeneity among South Asian nationstates among which Nepal’s exemplary performance in active engagement with NAP is invigorating. To this end, the section below highlights

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various examples from SAARC countries on the grounds of local and grassroot level initiatives by nation-states, societies, and organizations on women, mediation, and empowerment. Afghanistan Afghanistan has one of the highest recorded cases of conflict in South Asia ranging from domestic and state induced violence, to organized crimes to an extent that according to WPSI, it ranks second highest in least safe countries for women (following Yemen). Afghanistan holds a wide gender lag in women’s leadership and political representation; despite a reservation of 25% on provincial council seats, 33 of 34 are chaired by men (nationally) and with women participating a total of 22% in international and national peace negotiations (globally). One of the highlighting factors that called for women’s representation came through the bleak number of women’s representation (12%) in the historic peace agreement of 2020 (Council on Foreign Relations, 2021). While the numbers paint a rather desolated picture, it has fostered awareness among Afghani women. To name a few, New Afghan Women’s Association, Malala Company, Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program, and Afghan Women’s Network (OSCE, 2016) have been working in creating platforms to ensure empowerment, spread awareness, and secure political representation of women. Despite having to face constant threat by Taliban, they continued their resilience and activism to support Afghan women and girls primarily through running home schools, facilitating vocational training, and expanding their advocacy and activism toward understanding and providing knowledge development on Islam and women, women’s health, and women’s political rights and leadership. The return of Taliban to power in 2021 has of course drastically changed equations for women to their detriment. Bangladesh Bangladesh is one of the three countries to adopt the NAP on WPSI. Through congruent efforts of international and national agencies, Bangladesh has established some local initiatives that support and strive to empower women and children. Bangladeshi society is normatively governed by social norms of patriarchy that create hindrances in achieving long-standing goals of gender parity. It ranks in the lowest quartile of

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WPSI (142nd). Despite the challenges, there are some local initiatives that have performed remarkably in marching toward a sustainable future of women. Jago Nari Unnayon Sangsta (JNUS), a Civil Society Organization (CSO), advocates for sustainable peace, women’s rights, and gender equality by providing literacy to both Bangladeshi and Rohingya refugee population with the objective of dispelling anti-Rohingya rhetoric and creating positive dialogues between the refugee and host communities. Furthermore, JNUS, along with its subsidiary group Young Women Leaders for Peace (YWLP) have played a crucial role during the COVID19 pandemic in supporting the marginalized population when national and international support had halted. Bhutan The long-standing Royal nation of Bhutan recently witnessed its first election as a democratic state in 2007–2008. In the first election to the National Council (NC), out of 52 individuals, 6 were women contestants, and in 2013 out of 64, 5 were women. As the data shows, in 2013, none of the women contestants won and the only two female members in NC were appointed by the king post-election (Chuki & Turner, 2017). According to Chuki and Turner (2017), the poor performances of women in Bhutan can be accounted to patriarchal norms and values internalized and instrumentalized in Bhutanese society like lag in girl child’s education, gendered division of labor, normative attitudes toward women as office and position holders, and the evolution of party politics itself, all of which leads to lack of women’s participation in decision-making. The nation considered as the “island of women’s entitlements in Asia” has high rates of forms of violence against women, such as intimate partner violence and child marriage (UN Women, 2021a). Another hindering factor is Bhutan’s political system that has been focused on preserving the monarchy and traditions of the region; the results have been restricted access to media and information and compromise of human rights, more specifically a delayed attention to women’s rights even as they struggled in the domestic sphere (Priyadarshini, 2014). Despite these hindrances, Bhutan has its share of civil society organizations and womencentered NGOs, like RENEW (Respect, Educate, Nurture, and Empower Women), Bhutan Network of Empowering Women, and Center of media and Democracy focused on women and children affairs, specifically addressing the survivors of domestic violence, increased engagement

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with microfinance and encouraging political leadership and representation through networking. India Feminist struggle, movements, and advocacy have a long-standing trajectory in India spanning from pre-independence struggles to the organic movement surrounding Nirbhaya rape case of 2012. The political representation and leadership in India vary by local and state levels. Since the 90s, India witnessed a surge in women elected as Sarpaanch at village levels, however, the political leadership in decision-making echelons is still low. According to the data published by International Growth Center (IGC), as of March 2021, six states in India have no women ministers and all states have less than one-third women representatives, the highest being Tamil Nadu with 13% representation. Studies show a corresponding increase of women representation in political leadership positions and mediations in states where women are the head of states and where gender bias is relatively low (Gulati & Spencer, 2021; O’Connell, 2020). Especially in states of North-East India, there are a few radical, activist groups of women and mothers who have been lobbying and advocating for equal participation of women in peace processes, mediation, and cease-fire and to name a few are Naga Women’s Association, Naga Mothers Association, Northeast Network, Women in Governance, Xobdo. In 2021, five grassroot level organizations in Assam prepared “Women Manifesto 2021” demanding to meet women’s needs and to be included in campaigning process of election (The Hindu, 2021). The regional diversity of India is reflected in the status of women, where region-specific and state-specific political dynamics impact women’s status in leadership. It must be noted that women’s initiatives in the North-Eastern states are inspired by initiatives of neighboring countries of Myanmar and Thailand, thus they perform better than other Indian states in terms of women’s empowerment. Nonetheless, other states too have witnessed movements in which women assumed agency in response to local issues. Examples include Gulabi Gang in Uttar Pradesh—an organically developed movement that raises awareness on domestic violence and corruption and supports marginalized population, Self-Employed Women’s Association in Gujarat—a women’s union for informal workers, and SheTeam—a state initiative in Telangana to prevent harassment and child marriages. Despite numerous initiatives, India performs poorly on women

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empowerment and leadership on a global level. While there are a multitude of small-scale initiatives addressing issues from lack of education to domestic violence to employment, that cater to specific populations around the country, these initiatives hardly communicate with each other to aggregate the force required for influencing policies. Maldives The extant literature on Maldivian women and political agency is sparse. While multiple reasons can be attributed to that (lack of funding for research, minimal foreign and funders presence), one of the major reasons could be the allowance of Maldivian government for women to run for head of states since 2008. The sparsely available review of literatures on topical areas of political agency, women and empowerment (Naseer, 2013; NCTC & UNDP, 2021; Waheeda & Nishan, 2018) suggest that their human rights are continually threated with rising cases of domestic violence (46%), women are absent in higher echelon sectors of administration, education, finance, and political leadership and women lack political agency. Comparatively, there seems to be fewer presence of CSOs and local level initiatives in Maldives. A few of them actively working for women’s health and rights are Uthema and Society for Health Education. Maldives, a nation with a long history of female monarchs, is also a nation that did not allow women to assume Presidency for over 40 years. The nation’s commitment to international and regional conventions on gender equality, such as Beijing Platform of Action 1995 (Ritchie et al., 2014) alongside its government’s inability to implement gender-equitable laws and policies (El-Horr & Pande, 2016) make it uniquely challenging to generalize women’s status in the Maldives. Perhaps one way of comprehending the absence of Maldivian women in international relations (IR) and mediation is to recognize that while they actively assume leadership in the fields of education, health, and secretarial services, they are widely absent in the economic and political arena. Nepal Women organizations and grassroot movements in Nepal began as early as the late 1800s under the leadership of Yogamaya Neupane. Historically, despite the patriarchal monarchical state, women have been active in politics through their peaceful engagement against the Rana regime

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of the 1950s to partaking in an insurgency movement that culminated into a decade long (1996–2006) arms struggle between the Maoists and the government of Nepal. The people’s war resulted in the drafting of a new constitution in 2015 that secured 33% seats for women in all fronts of political leadership and participation from local to national level giving rise to appointment of the first female members in constitutional assembly (CA), chief justice, president, and mayors and deputy mayors nationwide. As a result, through local and national elections of 2017–2018, there is a total of 48.9% participation of women in political fields (Upreti et al., 2020). While the numbers look promising, yet again with striking normative structure of patriarchy women succumb to the sociocultural system of discrimination specifically targeting the household dynamics. Furthermore, women of hill high caste have a better access and reach to the political leadership and decision-making fronts creating a cleavage between them and women of other geographical locations and low castes. There are various organizations, efforts, and initiatives in Nepal established with an aim to foster women empowerment and leadership positions in decision-making fronts (Pokharel, 2016) like Tewa, Ama Samuha, Women’s Foundation Nepal, Chhori, Women for Peace and Democracy. Pakistan According to World Economic Forum’s GGI (2021), Pakistan ranks at the bottom (153rd). Much of it can be attributed to the normative structure that is built upon and follows principles of Islam and attitudes of patriarchy while choosing to adhere to the staunchest of masculinist ideologies within it. These patriarchal norms in Pakistan “have restricted women and girls to the margins of the society” and the relevant challenges arising from such marginalization “increases their vulnerability to violence, exploitation, and abuse in crisis situations,” such as Pakistan’s fifteen-year war on terror with an estimated death-toll of sixty thousand (Faraz, 2017). Given the rural–urban divide plaguing South Asia, rural women in Pakistan survive in dire circumstances with low levels of literacy, economic freedom, and political participation, let alone the idea of leadership. Despite so, with quota, it has seen some representation of women in higher positions of leadership. However, quotas need to be problematized as the gatekeepers are again cisgender men. Recently Pakistan had 20% women representatives in lower and upper house (UN

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Women, 2020). Pakistan has more recently experienced a rise in women’s movements and to name a few are organizations like Women in Struggle of Empowerment, Aurat Foundation, Afghan Institute of Learning and Working Women’s Association of Pakistan, and Women’s Initiative for Peace in South Asia. There has also been establishment of mediation networks, such as PAIMAN Alumni Trust and Asia Foundation’s Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) for Equitable Access to Justice, that are increasingly attracting women mediators and law students. A required action toward gender equitability is the closing of class and location-based gaps among women, availability of resources, mainly education, and policies that benefit women altogether and not merely the elite with existing knowledge to utilize policies. Sri Lanka Out of all SAARC nations, Sri Lanka ranks the best in WPSI (107th). This however does not imply quality of women’s livelihood. According to UN Women (2021b), Sri Lanka still has structural barriers and societal norms due to which “women continue to be underrepresented and discriminated in the economic, political and social spheres.” Sri Lanka also performs better than neighboring countries in women’s education. Women surpass men in terms of enrollment as well as performance at universities. The same however also serves to halt progress toward gender equality as policymakers remain complacent about the enrollment and pay little attention to the curriculum embedded with “mechanisms that reinforces gender inequalities” (Gunawardena, 2015). Nonetheless, women’s agency in political participation, conflict, and mediation has been largely shaped by the decades long ethnic strife between Sinhalese and Tamil Tigers. The conflict witnessed emergence of several mother’s associations—women led groups that assume peace-making roles, advocate for women’s rights, and protest against violence and war crimes. Sri Lanka and India are the only two South Asian countries in which women associations have entered peace politics and joined ceasefire negotiations in regional wars (Banerjee, 2008). Some notable local level initiatives are Rural Women’s Front Support Group and Women’s Development Foundation. In addition to responding to local issues, Sri Lanka also responds to international initiatives; examples include establishment of Women’s Bureau of Sri Lanka, following the declaration of UN Women’s decade, and ratification of CEDAW.

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While the numbers provide a promising picture of women’s representation (of some nation-states), it does not substantiate the underlying sociopolitical and economic structure that hinges on succumbing women to the eon’s old traditional patterns and structures of patriarchy. As Iyer (2021) writes, “Within the current context there is an urgent need for localized, feminist humanitarian action which moves beyond meeting basic needs to fostering social cohesion, community resilience, sustainable development, and gender equality.” Furthermore, much of the gender gap in decision-making and mediation stems from low levels of political participation. While more and more women are voting and exercising their rights, there is still a lag in non-electoral activities. Countryspecific assessment of women’s international and domestic leadership in these countries indicates that women are actively taking agency through local initiatives, some are also able to elevate to international leadership positions, but the numbers remain low and not necessarily in conflict mediation. What puts the region behind other regions in IR and international mediation is absence of collective and collaborative agencies, such as Southeast Asian Network of Women Peace Negotiators and Mediators and NWM Network that provide the essential resources and platform for women mediators in the region.

Interplay of Traditional Norms, Practices, and Education in Women’s Positionalities Some factors that limit women’s participation in peace processes are selection criteria, decision-making procedures, coalition building, transfer strategies, inclusion-friendly mediators, early inclusion in the peace process, support structures, monitoring, and funding (Paffenholz et al., 2016). Additional factors may include discriminatory laws, practices, attitudes, and gender stereotypes, low levels of education, lack of access to health care, and the disproportionate effect of poverty on women (UN Women Politic Brief, 2016). The generically held stereotype against women directly affects women in mediation leadership positions. Furthermore, feminist and postcolonial scholars in particular have shown that the dominant feature of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is often characterized by male-dominated and patriarchal modes of governance and control (Bano, 2017). The question then is, how can we achieve a sustainable participation of women in decision-making processes of conflict mediation and what are the major obstacles on the way?

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Symbolic boundaries create, recreate, enforce, and reinforce norms, values, traditions, and beliefs in the society. The relations that we form as individuals are then defined by these symbolic boundaries. Marxist feminist and standpoint scholars (like Nancy Hartsock, Gloria Anzaldua, Uma Narayan, and Sandra Harding) would contend that it is the epistemic standing of one’s class position that defines one’s relation in the larger social world. These feminist scholars view the social world as being constructed by various social relations, one that is interpreted, and vested in underlying notions of power and inequality. For example, when we think of women from South Asia, two disparate images come afore— one that of women cladded in neatly ironed cotton and silk traditional attires like Indira Gandhi, Benazir Bhutto, Sushma Swaraj, Hasena Wazed surrounded by political party members (presumably all cisgender, heterosexual males) and on the other end the UN poster images of women from rural parts of South Asia signifying mass illiteracy, poverty, malnourishment, equipped with incapability and embedded with unfreedom to access resources for self-development. So, it becomes imperative that we as social scientists develop a collective conscience to de-silence the marginalized voices and reattach it to the underlying power relations of that defines the perspectives and contextualizes the differences in and within the social world. Globally, more than 10 million girls are affected through early child forced marriage (CEFM), out of which more than half occur in South Asia (UNICEF, 2018). The extant review of literature points toward the increasing adverse effects of these early child marriages on physical and mental health, exacerbating gender inequality and a prime reason for secondary and tertiary level education dropout. The literatures assessing political empowerment of women in South Asia discuss family, legal support and environment, political awareness, religious bondages, issues of safety, and personal motivations as ameliorating or exacerbating factors of political leadership (Jahan, 1987; Nazneen et al., 2019; Sharma, 2020). Sharma (2020) critically discusses the participation of women in major social movements at nation-state level in India (independence movement, Narmada Bachao, Chipko movement) and questions as to why their contribution has remained shelved at macro level. In the normatively structured society of South Asia, built upon the principles of patriarchy (to the extent that virilocality is religiously observed), education of a girl child (especially in rural parts) is considered a liability and in many cases a risk factor too. Despite establishment

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of laws against CEFM as early as 1929, child marriages are still largely practiced in the region. In this light, those who marry at a younger age are more likely to discontinue their education and conform to domestic life as a young wife. Education for some is the way out of poverty and the gateway to better standards of living. For example, leadership positions in the corporate and governmental sectors require high education standards. However, for a girl child from South Asia, discouraged to pursue tertiary (many a times secondary) level education, achieving such positions becomes a matter of fantasy riddled dreams. Studies have shown that investing in secondary level education influences women empowerment and improves quality of life (Rihani, 2006; Tembon & Fort, 2003). Sociocultural barriers can be observed even for those who can afford higher education; two such challenges include difficulty for female students to consider studying abroad and preconditioned emphasis on “safer” fields for women, such as education, medicine, and secretarial administration, that keeps women from exploring fields related to IR, politics, and mediation. While there have been some policies and reformations, the status of women in general largely remains unchanged. This opens avenues for further studies to analyze the gestures of implementing these policies on one hand and critically assessing the socioeconomic and political support for the implementation and furthering of these policies that education can actually benefit women as a group in the long run on the other.

Women, Feminism, and Mainstream IR’s Discourses To draw the attention toward structural inequalities, we would like to begin with the argument of how nation-states in South Asia are considered feminine, as possessing she/her pronouns. Despite this, women have been denied access to positions of power in terms of loci which are imperative to decision-making structures. Since foreign and military policymaking has been largely conducted by men, the discipline that analyzes these activities has a strong standpoint perspective defined by men and masculinity. IR, a discipline that for the most part resisted the introduction of gender into its discourse, echoes it the most, basing its assumptions and explanations almost entirely on the activities and experiences of men (Tickner, 1992). Consequently, these discourses are exemplified in studies of conflict management, resolution, and securitization wherein all these remain highly masculine, to an extent that it is based

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on premises of colonial liberalism, and promote ideals of heterosexual, cisgender male, and masculinity discourse. Although feminist advocacy groups have made major contributions to the different aspects of policymaking, questions of gender are still marginalized in both theory and practice of the mainstream discourse. Such marginalization results from a “… consensual understanding of what constitutes knowledge in the mainstream” (Steans, 2003). Standpoint feminist scholars like Harding and Narayan contend that academics as a discipline is inherently male dominated. Furthermore, the nexus that academics forms with politics exacerbates the male and masculine discourse to an extent that it becomes highly misogynistic (Harding, 2004; Narayan, 2004). By critically analyzing these approaches and practices, these interventions not only challenge such forms of knowledge production but also move toward making real contributions to the field by expanding upon the restricted contours of the discipline. Where naturalist ontologies seek to establish the normalcy of war and conflict, feminist theories seek to question the logic of war. Sjoberg (2009) aptly summarizes, “… international relation is a man’s world, a world of power and conflict in which warfare is a privileged activity” (Sjoberg, 2009: 183). By accepting war as normal, the discourses and practices of security are one which is fixated upon the “masculine logic of protection” (Young, 2003). Such narratives reinforce masculinity within and outside of the state structures. For instance, one can see this in the discomfort with the presence of women and other sex/genders in the institutions like the military, which is a staunch reflection of the masculinization of these institutions. Conversely, Hartsock through her dialectical analysis of sexual division of labor argues that people’s knowledge and their relationships are formed primarily on the basis of labor, and that the positioning in the social world is what sets a limit to our knowledge base and production. She further states that capitalism distorts reality by setting up certain rules where work like caregiving is devalued in the society, is relegated to the “women’s sphere,” and is excluded from the economic measures of activity (Hartsock, 2004). Since the mainstream approach in discourses of IR continues to operate with the logic of “protection of the vulnerable,” the gender hierarchy is kept in place and power structures that uphold such hierarchies are maintained (all facilitated by a nexus of capitalism and patriarchy). To contextualize, this kind of statist approach addressing issues of conflict mediation emanates from a war-like mentality whereby they continue to be fought by men as soldiers and policymakers. This

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is not to say that women have not been a part of conflict, they have, but mostly at receiving end, consequently reinforcing traditionalist gender relations. Lastly, perceiving the notions of conflict and securitization from a gendered perspective, a rather masculinist discourse flourishes wherein according to the patriarchal logic the protector (a masculinist, in here nation-state) protects the vulnerable (feminine, in here women and children). This holds true for most democratic nation-states that allow the leaders to function around such stances whereby the position of women is relegated to that of culture, a nurturer, a caregiver, and thus, domesticated private sphere of a household. What this discourse does is then, it serves as an authoritative legitimacy over its citizen which equally justifies the ideologies of war and who is allowed to fight it (Young, 2003).

Conclusion and Recommendations According to the UN Women chart (2020), two out of eight SAARC countries have women in the highest positions of state (Bangladesh and Nepal). Similarly, Maldives has twenty-six percent of women in ministerial positions followed by India at thirteen, Nepal at eleven, and Bhutan at 10%. Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka each have women representation at ministerial positions at ten, eight, and six percent, respectively. In an institution like politics, which has seen eons of gender discrimination, women’s representation and presence is a welcome social change, however, numbers can provide a rather narrow focus veiling the underlying sociocultural dynamics. While there has been a technocratic shift toward developing women’s empowerment through quotas and formal representations in politics, men still act as gatekeepers. Furthermore, neglecting intersectionality like that of caste, class, and conceptualizing women as a homogeneous category has hindered the true essence of embodying empowerment and emancipation of women. Social change can be exacerbated by providing education, however, in many parts of South Asia, women and girl children are seen as liability which results in a cyclical discrimination toward women and girls through reinforcement of normative traditions like dowry and early child marriages. The ideological and the concurrent sociopolitical, economical values prioritize the normative structure of the society, one that is platformed on patriarchal ideas. While economically women in many countries of south Asia have struggled for rightful gain of means

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of production (natural and economic resources) in the struggle for emancipation through organic movements and established organizations (or what some are referring to as NGOization), much less has been achieved in mobilizing women’s agentic representation and participation in political leadership like in the case of conflict mediation on domestic violence, poverty, securitization issues, and social justice. To sustain the growing numbers of women in leadership position in political prowess, situating women as a heterogeneous group (considering intersectionality of ableism, genders, sexuality, caste, class, age, and ethnicity) will help improve the overall quality (not just quantity) of women representation at various level and institutions. As Paffenholz et al. (2016) note, “… the strength of women’s influence is positively correlated with agreements being reached and implemented.” To this end, by increasing women’s participation in policymaking, diplomacy, mediation, and securitization, the nation-states can benefit largely from the diverse perspectives brought forth by women and yield better results in decision building and production processes.

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PART IV

Widening Horizons: South Asian Women and Socio-Political Movements

CHAPTER 12

Women’s Participation in Anti-nuclear Movement in India: Role of Nuclear Knowledge and Exclusion of Women’s Concerns Kamna Tiwary

Women’s participation in anti-nuclear movements has remained of much value and interest in IR (International Relations) scholarship. The antinuclear protest movements in Europe and America during 60s and 70s were noted for their large female participation (Baron & Herzog, 2020; Swerdlow, 1982, 1993; Service, n.d.). A number of studies have documented the relevance and importance of women in anti-nuclear movements in US and Europe (Eschle, 2013; Kitschelt, 1986; Nelkin, 1981; Paull, 2018). Most such empirical studies have focused on what women thought about nuclear technology and how different sub movements have strengthened women’s resolve against nuclear technology

K. Tiwary (B) College Park, MD, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Ojha and P. Jaiswal (eds.), South Asian Women and International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9426-5_12

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(Acheson, 2018; Dávid Karácsonyi, 2020; Escle, 2018). From the feminist perspective to environmentalist perspective, women’s roles have appeared appealing to scholars from different countries when it comes to anti-nuclear protests (Das, 2007; Daubert & Moran, 1985; Fazzi, 2016; Nelkin, 1981). However, a major limitation has been witnessed in studying antinuclear movements driven by data and surveys in the global south in comparison to countries of global north which happen to have a greater share of discussions, debates, protests related to nuclear technology. The studies in global south on issues of nuclear technology have mainly focused from the arms and security paradigm (Das, 2007; Flam, 1994; Haines, 2019). In such studies, thrust has been on commitments to disarmament and questions about inequality, exacerbated by nuclear technology, between more powerful and less powerful countries. Women’s role in voicing anti-nuclear concerns thus remains limited to intelligentsia and scholarly networks. Women’s participation in anti-nuclear protests thus appears different in motivation and ways from their counterparts from global north or developed countries. Though a survey-based study on what general people think about nuclear weapons or nuclear energy in countries like India, Pakistan and Bangladesh is desirable, most of the opinion formation happens through media outlets and political campaigning. In these efforts, necessity of a nuclear state is considered essential and important to match the status and power of a developed country. This study will try to understand nuclear technology from the perspective of a common man in India. Here, case of nuclear energy and nuclear power plant is especially taken so that common people can connect it to their utility unlike when nuclear technology is used for making weapons systems. My focus will be particularly on the Kudankulam nuclear power project in Tamil Nadu, a state of India which witnessed large scale protests against nuclear power plant in 2011 which continued for few years in different ways and forms. Kudankulam nuclear power plant (KNPP) witnessed protests mainly by the fishermen community as well as the residents of the few villages located near the power plant. My attempt in this chapter is to study the gender roles of the protest movements. The chapter will document interviews of residents of Idinthakarai village, especially women that were taken from the protest site in the year 2017 (Tiwary, 2017). These narratives of women will be particularly important to understand the reasons behind women’s participation in such

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movements. Literature of women’s political participation during wars and civil rights have been documented well but when it comes to protest against nuclear energy, a counter narrative by the establishment is run strongly through the media that people who protest against nuclear technology are less informed about it (Tiwary, 2017). This narrative by the establishment gets better entrenched as more women’s participation from lower middle income groups, especially housewives becomes noticeable. This also suggests that a supposed lower understanding of such sophisticated technology is used as a tool by the establishment to dismiss the credibility of the protestors and women as a group gets targeted easily. The paper brings to attention such discrimination against women protestors in the anti-nuclear protest movements. More so, the idea of dismissiveness towards women protestors by the establishment and the reasons behind it needs to be contested by building narratives of women’s responses towards these accusations (Tiwary, 2017). Furthermore, what are the reasons for women’s participation in anti-nuclear movements needs to be brought into picture again by examining the case of KNPP protest movement. This study will address and focus on women’s narratives, their chief concerns and the constraints associated with them. After tracing a history of active participation in anti-nuclear movements by women, the subsequent section of this paper will address the reasons behind differential attitudes of women and men towards nuclear energy, exclusion of women from development discourse of nuclear energy, how gap in nuclear knowledge affects formation of decisions, how lack of participation in all forms of nuclear sector affects women’s trust in communications and most importantly what are the chief concerns of women residing near KNPP and if they feel that their concerns were adequately articulated in public forums.

A Brief History of Anti-nuclear Protest Movements Anti-nuclear protest movements have remained an essential part of the socio-economic anguish expressed against the governments of different countries (Fazzi, 2016; Flam, 1994). Among these, the protest movements in 1960s, 1970s (Kitschelt, 1986; Price, 1982) and in the 1980s after the Chernobyl accident and the latest after Fukushima accident in 2011 have found serious discussions in public forums across nations (Do,

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2019). Many anti-nuclear activists have called for a proper categorization of anti-nuclear protests—One comprises of protests against nuclear weapons testing, as well as building up of capabilities that will deliver nuclear warheads in other countries as and when desired. The other type of anti-nuclear protests is against use of nuclear technology as an energy source (Kitschelt, 1986; Litmanen, 1998). Both forms of anti-nuclear protests have overlapped many times and therefore the threat is thought to be emanating from nuclear technology itself (Eschle, 2018). It is this nuclear technology that has stood as a potent threat to people in many ways. The devastation caused by nuclear weapons at the end of the Second World War and the threats to environment, health, safety, culminated in generating negative emotions among people about nuclear technology (Brown, 1997). However, nuclear technology as a source of energy tried to change the attitudes of people. Governments advocated the necessity of this technology in other areas of life e.g. medicine, energy which interestingly also included health and environment. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established to generate and oversee the use of nuclear technology in other facets of life. These developments, with time made nuclear technology a dual use technology and its effectiveness were construed and presented as positive as and when suited. Despite such efforts, a strong advocacy and peace rights activism against nuclear technology remained vibrant and gave the civil society a resilience to resist nuclear technology and question it whenever relevant. Substantial studies have taken place in US and Europe to understand the factors which guide public attitudes and perceptions towards nuclear energy or nuclear technology in general (Baron & Herzog, 2020; Stoutenborough et al., 2013). The anti-nuclear protest movements in the West, especially Europe, US, UK and also Japan have set examples to pursue anti-nuclear activism in the global south. The Pokhran nuclear tests in 1998 were criticised by the Indian intelligentsia and feminist scholars as being an exhibition of a masculinised nuclear state by the right wing Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) government ruling India then (Das, 2007). The anti-nuclear activism by women was voiced through seminars, articles, debates and discussions in educational institutions and public forums. The anti-nuclear stand post Pokhran test was mostly related to the securitization of the society through possession of nuclear weapons. Women activists in India have felt a gendered connotation attached to achieving security through nuclear weapons which is particularly patriarchal in imagery and message. Das (2007) also brings to attention the

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differences between women anti-nuclear activists in the context of India. On the one hand, there are academicians, environmentalists, etc., who challenge the nuclear state from a scholarly perspective and on the other hand, there are middle class women based in semi urban area who overcome the patriarchal structures of their home to participate in anti-nuclear protests if and when possible. Both are many times not synced in their opinions and motives for joining the anti-nuclear movement. Drawing parallels from anti-nuclear protests in Germany, UK, France, Belgium, etc., significant attention has been paid to the role of participating women in these movements. Women’s participation in anti-nuclear movements has been attributed to many reasons. Eschle (2013) pieces together six different explanations to understand feminist tendencies in understanding anti-nuclear discourse—‘maternalist, anti-violence, cultaralist, materialist, cosmopolitan, cosmological’. ‘Maternalist’ approach refers to the maternal nature of women which by its natural tendency opposes any destruction wrought upon the earth due to nuclear technology (Eschle, 2013). ‘Anti-violence’ discourse depicts the opposition to the intention of the use of nuclear technology to harm and hurt which is in continuation to other forms of violence perpetuated by mostly males during wars or even the practise of domestic violence, etc. ‘Cultaralist’ discourse mainly focuses on the depiction of nuclear weapons as embodying patriarchal values in many possible ways (Eschle, 2013, 2018). ‘Materialist’ discourse focuses on the grievances of women that states and governments prioritise wars and weapons production (nuclear weapons here) over other issues of well being related to women. The grievance also includes the ‘deleterious harm on women’s bodies’, due to nuclear weapons along with health and environment (Eschle, 2013). ‘Cosmopolitan’ discourse emphasises the absence of women in institutions and governments that gets to decide on nuclear policy making. In other words ‘exclusion of women from defence and political establishments of a nuclear state’ (Eschle, 2013). Finally, ‘cosmological’ discourse emphasises the concept of ‘eco feminism’ that links women’s connectedness with nature that influences their decisions and life choices. Women have been known for many active campaigns against nuclear technology through peace camps and blockades in US and Europe mainly during the cold war period when nuclear arms race was at its peak (Litmanen, 1998). Noted among them is Greenham common camp in UK (Laware, 2004). Another remarkable example is the Faslane peace

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camp in UK which depicts the day to day insecurity of living near a nuclear facility (Eschle, 2016). In the case of Faslane, the nuclear facility is military in nature, nevertheless, an important message the campers bring to attention is the (in)security of common people who live near a nuclear facility on a daily basis, be it even the workers of these facilities. Eschle (2018) interviewed fifteen campers in Faslane peace camp, seven of whom were women. This also makes this case similar to people protesting against nuclear power plants. To be residing near a nuclear power plant was considered dangerous post Chernobyl disaster. This example makes antinuclear protests indifferent to whether the cause is military or energy. However, RAND Corporation (Daubert & Moran, 1985) in US has carried out an extensive study on the differences between the motivations for anti-nuclear protest movements focusing on military and energy establishments in the US. According to the report, both forms of protest have been found to have overlapped though many anti-nuclear weapons protestors initially were supporters of nuclear energy. With time, plans of the expansion of nuclear energy overtook the fears and uncertainties associated with nuclear technology, and nuclear weapons.

Women and Development Discourse: Case of Nuclear Technology Residing near a nuclear power plant can add to the insecurity of women along with many others. Women’s link with their surroundings and environment is considered an important concept in eco-feminism (Allison, 2017). The presence of a nuclear power plant near their residence adds to the fear and uncertainty to their daily life. Middle and low income group women mostly stay at home and care for their children, therefore, any knowledge of a nearby nuclear power plant unsettles them. As it was seen in the case of Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan in 2011, nuclear disaster has been accompanied with a necessity to evacuate the nearby cities located near the nuclear power plant. Same was witnessed in the case of Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986. In most government planning, women’s participation and women’s inclusion is considered an effective tool for achieving overall development of the society. Despite such promises, when it comes to nuclear energy, inclusion of women as a participant in development process is easily sidelined, not only in South Asia but also around the world. This is evident

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in the discussion in the following section that captures the low participation of women not only in nuclear science, research development and nuclear industry but also in policy making on energy and environmental aspects. Most of the time, a proposal for a new energy generation plant (nuclear or other) is based on the argument of an enhanced lifestyle with constant electricity supply. Especially women are targeted to be its beneficiary because more energy generation can reduce the domestic labour, making life easy and comfortable. However, the word development is misleading here when it comes to understanding nuclear energy and women’s protests against it. The thrust towards environmentally sustainable development has been brought to the mainstream discourse now as can be seen in United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UNSDGs). The advocates of nuclear energy consider nuclear technology important in the energy mix because of its low carbon usage and low carbon burning. However, despite that, nuclear energy remains much debated across countries from time to time. Fukushima Daiichi accident in 2011 brought back glimpses of human incapacities in handling nuclear tragedies and accidents. Nuclear accidents have left an important imprint on nuclear technology being chosen as an energy source by governments. Nevertheless, interest in nuclear energy does not fade. Especially developing countries have found this technology enticing despite limitations and difficulties associated with its extremities. Focusing on South Asia, the data below depicts nuclear reactors in three countries of South Asia for generation of nuclear energy (Table 12.1). The anti-nuclear sentiments in India or South Asia in general are more likely to get subdued over development goals. In this case, women’s Table 12.1 Nuclear reactors in use and under construction Country

India Pakistan Bangladesh

Operational reactors (no of units)

22 5

Net capacity MW(e)

Reactors under construction

Net capacity MW(e)

6255 1318

7 2 2

4825 2028 2160

Nuclear electricity supplied in 2019 TW (h)

Nuclear electricity supplied in percentage

40.7 9.1

3.2 6.6

Source IAEA URL: PRIS - Home (iaea.org) Nuclear Power Reactors in the World IAEA Reference data series no.2

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anti-nuclear sentiments can be explained with two factors. One factor coincides with the ‘materialist’ argument discussed before that restrains governments from prioritising issues of women development over other issues. In this case, huge investments and money spent on the establishment of a nuclear power plant is in competition with other programmes directed at women’s well being. For example, the concept of ‘gender budgeting’ introduced by the government of India in 2005–2006 which included particular earmarking of budget allocation in favour of women is not applicable for energy sector (Raman, 2021). The other factor is attempting to achieve development in tune with sustainability which remains a contested matter as will be discussed in the next section. This concept is close to the concept of ‘eco-feminism’ which places women and nature being close to each other and experiencing subjugation by men since a long time. Developments in nuclear technology are also considered a manifestation of this subjugation (Allison, 2017).

Case of Kudankulam: Concerns of Women Protestors Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) is a nuclear power plant based in Kudankulam, inside Tirunelveli district of Tamil Nadu state of India. People’s Movement Against Nuclear Energy (PMNAE) emerged as an anti-nuclear protesting group against KNPP, with S.P. Udayakumar as its leader and chief co-ordinator. The protests were based in the village Idinthakarai, around 5 km away from the nuclear power plant (NPP) (IANS, 2013). The people’s movement was trying to bring to attention the concerns of the fishermen community residing near KNPP within five to ten kilometres radius. The movement demanded government authorities to divulge details about disaster preparedness in the event of accidents, whenever the NPP become operational. The protest was also against nuclear energy due to the harm it brings to nature and environment as well as the bureaucratic apathy towards people affected by it. The protests challenged government and scientific establishments to answer their concerns. Women’s participation especially from the village area remains to be unplugged in a detailed way. Their roles and presence were mainly supportive as depicted scarcely through sources and accounted by witnesses who were present during this movement (Gerald, 2013). In one such account, women were seen to be holding prayers inside churches as the anti KNPP movement was going on (Gerald, 2013).

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One of the major concerns in Kudankulam nuclear protest sites among people of all genders was drawn from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident post Tsunami in 2011. A strong interlinkage existed between the nuclear power plant and the proximity of human residences for Kudankulam and Fukushima. Xuan Bien Do (2019) highlights the migration patterns of people post Fukushima accident in detail. This study highlights the plight of people suffering critical decision making during migration arising out of a technological disaster. Among the people migrating out of their residences, it was reported that women (30– 40 years) and children showed active tendency for moving out. There were also cases of people (especially men in 45–59 and elderly aged 75 or older) not inclined to leave their city due to multiple reasons (Do, 2019). It is also to be noted that, in such ‘technological disaster induced migrations’, the main motive of moving out remains exposure to radiation post-accident and other uncertainties ensuing due to it (Do, 2019). A strong parallel can be drawn to the insecurity of women and children in the case of evacuation, if such a scenario emerged in KNPP as well. Most of the concerns of people residing near KNPP were centred around nuclear accidents (Tiwary, 2017). Fishermen communities were also concerned with livelihood issues as fish catches were expected to be affected by the release of used warm water from the KNPP. Along with that media reports on Fukushima accident in Japan raised alarm for them manifold. The people who got affected from Fukushima accident, especially those residing within 10–30 km range of the Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) had to experience migrations and evacuations, both temporary and permanent. A study by Do (2019) suggests that the importance of women and children’s safety in case of nuclear accidents remains of paramount concern to them. This concern of acting timely and appropriately for safety in the event of a nuclear accident has driven women’s concern in anti-nuclear protests in KNPP too. Drawing from the few interviews taken from Idinthakarai village in the year 2017, women residents have acknowledged that everyday living with an impending threat comprised of a psychological threat along with a physical threat to them (Tiwary, 2017). Women in the lower and middle income group households near KNPP were mostly involved in care giving to family members and staying at home. In such a group, dealing with uncertainty appeared hard and protest against the nuclear power plant was driven by this fear (Tiwary, 2017).

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Evacuation and migration in the event of an accident can lead to multiple socio-economic hardships for people in general and women in particular. Among these, one important element is that of receiving right health care for people who were exposed to nuclear radiations. In the long run, the threats emanating from the radiation exposure are forgotten and not tabulated well. The incidents of cancer and other health hazards are not accounted well. In the case of anti KNPP protests, women participants were particularly worried about effects on their health due to exposure to radiation. Nelkin (1981) also highlights that the core reason for anti NPP protests by women is not because of their increased aversion to risks or increased concern for environment in comparison to men, but because of their concern for health for themselves and their family members. Similar concern from radiation exposure and the probability of increased cancer reporting near KNPP was accepted by everyone residing in Idinthakarai as a serious concern (Tiwary, 2017). This also included the exposure of radiation not only after accidents but also radiation experienced on daily basis. Such concerns regarding radiations were generally dismissed as being mild and un-harmful to health by government authorities. However, such blatant dismissals have left a deeper impact on people’s trust levels. In the case of radiation, women’s concerns were voiced strongly by their male counterparts too. Apart from that, other aspects which especially affected women were the allegation of being anti-development cast upon them by media and other sections of society, especially government agencies, scientific community, etc. (Tiwary, 2017). The women interviewed were upset with the media narrative against them as well as the high handed manner in which the government was treating genuine concerns related to their lives. While the leaders of the anti KNPP movement, mostly male members were mainly focused on the AERB (Atomic Energy Regulatory Board) guidelines and the loopholes in it. It is to be noted that the uncertainty surrounding the ways in which KNPP and nuclear disasters associated with it can affect daily lives of people residing near KNPP has been used by the authorities to bulldoze over people’s concerns so as to achieve early restart of the KNPP. The major area of concern for protestors of KNPP was the unavailability of accurate information. Another major concern was with respect to the inability to deal with situations arising out of a nuclear plant accident or disaster. Though Fukushima nuclear accident was fresh in the memory of people, Chernobyl and the Three Mile Island accident was also to be taken as an important parameter for deciding how effective strategies can

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be made in order to handle nuclear accidents and disasters. The three major nuclear accidents and lessons learnt from them were very much on people’s mind during protests. The basic reason for experiencing insecurity against KNPP was related to the disaster preparedness itself. As people were acclimatised with more information in dealing with nuclear accidents, if and when it arises, the more insecure it made them. The government and the authorities were found providing assurances for the safety of the nuclear reactor as well as the preparedness in place to deal with residents’ safety dwelling in the nearby area in case accidents occur. In both the cases, the mistrust with regard to the bureaucratic and technical set-up and infrastructure that needed to be put up in place to achieve safety goals were hard to be dissipated. When it came to women, the bureaucratic and the technical set-up appeared exclusionary towards them completely. It can be related to the ways in which life was promoted and advertised after the operationalisation of the Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), in general, which was mostly positive in nature for everyone. No specific outreach programme was conducted for women. Also, having women workforce inside the nuclear power plant was not greatly encouraged. This left the image of KNPP as a scientific, bureaucratic, technical masculinised structure that is not only exclusionary to women but also hostile. Women were promised a better life on the basis of the new mode of employment that the new NPP would be able to generate for the male dwellers of the villages and cities nearby. And though, the living conditions and monetary benefits were focused upon families as a whole, no incentives were offered to women in particular. The safety assurances lacked the ability to connect with the concerns of women which were centred on health and environmental safeguards. The simple question of how health and environment can be put to jeopardy by the mere presence and operationalisation of the NPP cannot be plainly dismissed. However, in most cases, the authorities denied to admit the problems associated with the NPP, which are related to health and environment. It is considered to be accounted for because of the research and innovation that was invested upon the reactor safety and which was considered unquestionable (Tiwary, 2017). The optimism associated with reactor safety is attributed to the research activities invested in making of the latest generation of the reactor that is to be used in the NPP. In the case of the KNPP too, the reactor safety formed the fundamental assurance that authorities provided

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in response to people’s concerns. Most of the concerns of reactor safety therefore cannot be addressed as it remains untested, if it is new. However, in the case of KNPP, the assurances of reactor safety could not convince the general public, as it was already in public knowledge that Russia was assisting India for the restart of KNPP. The accident of Chernobyl as well as the problems related to it was available for activists and intelligentsia to raise doubts over the claims of the Indian authority. Another important factor for anti-nuclear movements around the world has been transnationalism. The knowledge regarding the fallout of nuclear accidents were available for people to share. The feminist movement against nuclear technology has benefited from the transnational knowledge and women’s solidarity against the forceful use of this technology both in the military form and in the energy form. In both forms, women have registered their strong reservations against nuclear technology. Anti-nuclear social movements and feminist social movements have both been transnational in nature and also overlapping.

Attitude of Women Towards Nuclear Energy in Comparison to Men: Knowledge and Exclusion One reason why women are considered to be opposing nuclear energy and not getting easily convinced of its benefits is attributed to the knowledge gap that exists between men and women when it comes to understanding nuclear technology (Roberts, 2016). Low women’s participation in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) field is already an important area of concern. Biases against women working in the knowledge industry are already prevalent and practised rampantly, for they are considered less equal (Puaca, 2014). This section will explore if the optimism over usage of nuclear technology witnesses a gender gap too. Women’s participation in nuclear scientific enterprise that works for nuclear industry and nuclear research can be taken into account to understand this aspect. According to data available with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), women make up only 22.4% of the workforce in the nuclear sector (Gaspar & Dubertrand, 2019). It is also acknowledged that the increased participation of women in nuclear field will enhance the trust deficit in nuclear technology witnessed due to male dominance in this field (Gaspar & Dubertrand, 2019). A number of public outreach programmes have been held by IAEA and other nuclear agencies of different countries to highlight the contributions of women in

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the nuclear field (IAEA, 2019) but they also acknowledge that the need to undertake these initiatives is purely due to the prevailing gender gap in the nuclear field, that includes both the knowledge sector and industry. Among others, one notable fact is the presence of women in leadership positions vs. presence of women in technical positions (Pagoaga Ruiz de La Illa, 2019). It is the low presence of women in nuclear technical fields that makes the entire nuclear set-up very masculinised and hence unappealing and distrustful to women. The presence of women in a nuclear power plant as a workforce needs to be accounted for in order to understand nuclear safety with a gendered angle. In Western societies, especially in the US, a number of research and survey-based opinion polls regarding acceptance and dismissal of nuclear energy has been conducted from time to time to assess the reasons for larger participation of women in anti-nuclear movements (Brody, 1984; Nelkin, 1981; Solomon et al., 1989). Significant notice was taken by the nuclear industry and a dedicated effort was launched to bring women under the fold. A pro-nuclear women’s organisation (NEW—newer than NOW) was launched by an industry led body The Atomic Industrial Forum to enhance women’s knowledge on nuclear energy as far back as 1979 (Nelkin, 1981). In the case of KNPP, the women residing near the KNPP are less educated and oppose the power plant on the basis of livelihood issues for themselves as well as for their male earning members of family. The substantial contribution in opinion formation of the protesting women is played by the protest leaders of the anti KNPP movement, who were all male. Among the interviews conducted in Idinthakarai, women agreed to have followed the education provided by the anti-nuclear activists, who were primarily male and whom they believed completely (Tiwary, 2017). This tendency of women following the male leaders of anti KNPP movement is also seen as misguided by government authorities who use it to dismiss women’s participation against NPP as it appears to lack women’s own independent stand. They do not consider women as an important group who needs to be taken into confidence separately for generating positive opinion around NPP in general. An interesting study (Kuklinski et al., 1982) highlights the crucial role played by a ‘trusted reference group’ in disseminating information to people with ‘less knowledge’ on complex and sophisticated topics like nuclear energy. These reference groups enjoy credibility and popularity owing to their ‘trust-worthiness and effective communication’ among the people they work with. In the

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case of KNPP, leaders of PMNAE movement came out as an effective ‘reference group’ for generating awareness among women. Though the committees formed to represent people’s concerns to government authorities were all male, women participating in anti KNPP movement believed that their concerns were carried well in higher platforms by the leaders of PMNAE movement (Tiwary, 2017). Talking about the difference in attitude towards nuclear energy between men and women, Brody (1984) while talking in the context of America, says that ‘men favour nuclear energy as they acquire the central position in technical, economic, political sphere’ of different fields and hence the need for more energy is appreciated by them in contrast to women. For women on the other hand ‘safety’ concerns overrun ‘economic benefits’. In his study, Brody (1984) empirically tries to capture the reasons for women’s resistance to nuclear energy and compares it to men, especially by citing the results of surveys conducted in those US households which are located near a proposed nuclear power plant. He finds that the ‘tradeoff between economic benefits vs safety’ is the guiding principle of why men support nuclear energy and why women oppose nuclear energy in comparison to the other gender. Though the results are not conclusive enough to be generalised, it leaves an important imprint on causes and reasons for women’s and men’s different attitudes towards nuclear energy or nuclear technology in general. Coming to difference in knowledge level affecting people’s choice over nuclear energy, some studies (Kuklinski et al., 1982) depict that an increased knowledge on complex issues like nuclear energy, involving intricacies of technology, society and environment works in the affirmative, implying that high knowledge level of general public in public discourse encourages people to undertake informed and calculated risks. This makes people more agreeable to nuclear energy. The attempt to change negative attitudes of people towards nuclear energy through public communication initiatives has been undertaken by governments around the world to ensure smooth transition to energy change, but in the case of KNPP such initiatives did not enjoy the support of villagers. Public hearings organised by local governing authorities to address the concerns of villagers could not connect to them especially because of its technical nature (Tiwary, 2017). In the case of KNPP, such discussions have not been deemed important at all by authorities. The thrust was to restart the KNPP at any cost and most of the negative public opinion

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was dismissed as being anti-development in total as villagers were considered less educated to be able to put up questions to the authorities. It would be interesting to understand how increased information on nuclear knowledge would affect women’s attitude in comparison to men’s attitude. Still, studies pointed out in earlier sections do show few differences in ways men and women think and choose nuclear energy. However, it needs to be seen if the results of those studies can be replicated elsewhere, especially in the context of South Asia.

Conclusion The above study attempts to address the limitations in qualitative study of grass root participation of women in anti-nuclear movements in the global south. By taking a case study of a nuclear power plant in India, the study tries to capture the reasons behind the dismissal of women’s concerns against nuclear energy. It tries to address the causes of women’s concerns about nuclear energy emanating from the gap in nuclear knowledge possessed by women in the village sector. However, the study does not define what can be accurately called a nuclear knowledge, it loosely understands nuclear knowledge as being in possession of any form of information that can build trust among the community who reside near the NPP. The study also seeks to ask further question on how increased women’s participation in nuclear knowledge sector and industry sector will improve women’s connectedness towards solving trust issues with nuclear energy. The present study however does not prove conclusively, that any such initiative will address the fears and concerns of anti-nuclear sentiments associated with NPP, especially with regard to women residing in villages. The fundamental concern of risks associated with health and environment, livelihood will not fade with any of these initiatives. An attempt has been made through this study to keep women’s concerns in the centre, especially because their participation in context of KNPP still needs to be highlighted and discussed more through more studies. In the context of western countries, women’s defiance in challenging nuclear technology has been accorded importance. The puzzle around their zeal and commitment towards anti-nuclear protest movements has remained. Different possible explanations have been drawn from a number of standpoints but similar studies have been missing in the global south. In this context, it is important to undertake and develop better approaches to understand and document women’s concerns towards

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nuclear energy. Another important factor that this study highlights is the trust reposed by women protestors towards the leaders of the KNPP movement who were all male. Most anti-protest movements seem to have generated confidence in women to question and challenge not only patriarchal structures of families but also institutions and the state. Women have felt a sense of freedom in being able to find their voice during such movements. But in the case of anti KNPP movement, women’s knowledge and information flowed through a number of sources, example media, leaders of PMNAE, public and state authorities. However, the influence of the leaders of anti KNPP movement, though mostly male, remained positive and trustworthy to all participating women. This result shows that addressing concerns of protesting women by increasing the visibility of women participants in favour of nuclear energy, for example in nuclear research, women workforce inside NPP at technical or policy making roles may not always play a very significant role in winning their trust in favour of nuclear energy. Nuclear energy may remain a cause of concern and threat to villagers, particularly to women residing near the NPP.

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CHAPTER 13

Anti-caste Movement and Rise of Dalit Women’s Voices from South Asia Judith Anne Lal

South Asian society remains largely patriarchal and casteist. In this paper, we will be analysing some historical anecdotes for referencing as well as doing a brief comparative analysis of the contemporary socio-economic status of Dalit women in India vis-à-vis their access to rights. Secondly, it is argued that the feminist discourse is now experiencing change and evolution as women and other gender identity (individuals) voice their own experiences, especially in South Asia which negates the universal category of ‘one feminist experience’. Further, we would be looking at the pertinent rise of the anti-caste movement and the emergence of Dalit women’s activism. Finally, the paper builds on the theoretical framework of personal experiences of Dalit women as well the convergence of solidarity between movements and groups who faced similar forms of discrimination across the world owing to their identity within the intersectional identity discourse.

J. A. Lal (B) Christ (Deemed to be University) Delhi NCR, Ghaziabad, India e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Ojha and P. Jaiswal (eds.), South Asian Women and International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9426-5_13

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Background Mostly, people affected by inequalities, repression, and violence are from socially excluded groups. In the context of the South Asian region, discrimination largely refers to experiences of discrimination based on caste, ethnicity, religious and gender identities; with variations in specific forms across the different country contexts (Pal, 2015). Over the centuries, patriarchy and casteism have been the main cause of gross human rights violations and exploitation of the oppressed groups and women in South Asia. The mobilization of the oppressed and exploited sections of the society—the peasants, Dalits, women and many others of which Jotiba Phule had spoken of; had occurred on a large scale between 1920 and 1930s under varying leaderships and varying ideologies (Omvedt, 2011). Historically, since the eighteenth century, significant voices of resistance have emerged against casteist and patriarchal practices. The work of Jotiba Phule, Savitri Phule and Fatima Sheikh in Pune for the education of girls from the Untouchable and Muslim communities gained support in the society. They did receive backlash from the dominant caste men who perceived themselves as the ‘protectors of culture and a code of conduct in the society’. Despite the tough odds and the difficult struggle, these two exemplary women realized the importance of educating girls. This continued intervention became an important narrative for change in the eighteenth century. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar poignantly analysed in his speeches the issue of graded inequality and its impact on communities. He started to gain community support for his vision that focused on education and outright condemnation of discriminatory practices based on caste hierarchy. He gave a call to all the oppressed castes to get ‘education, to agitate and to organize’. This threefold pathway led to galvanizing of the oppressed communities. The self-respect movement led in the South by EV Ramasamy, revered as Periyar, and others was again a strong anticaste movement that also pioneered women’s rights with leaders such as Annai Meenambal. Periyar, and others, strongly condemned castebased inequality and subjugation by caste Hindus. Dravidian leaders, in their conferences, strongly claimed of being the original inhabitants of the Indian subcontinent. These conferences were organized by the Adi-Dravida, Adi-Andhra, Adi-Karnataka and Ad-Dharm in Punjab and they claimed to be the original inhabitants (Omvedt, 2011). These leaders challenged the caste system and the systemic exploitation of the

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untouchables by the dominant communities. With the country gaining independence, most of the focus went towards the larger issues of governance, security and economy, while the social fabric still remained rigged of social injustice. Independent India’s Constitution enshrined the rights of all citizens based on the values of justice, equality and freedom. Dr. Ambedkar had a key role to play in advocating for equality in the new independent India and the idea of ‘one man, one vote’ became the basis of institutionalizing equality in the new republic, along with the enactment of constitutional safeguards in the form of reservations for the historically exploited communities, and other minorities. Thus, the socially marginalized communities (oppressed communities) received Constitutional recognition and were referred to as ‘Scheduled Castes’, ‘Scheduled Tribes’ and other backward castes. 1 Despite over 70 years of independence and the constitutional and legislative safeguards, Dalits2 continue to face caste-based discrimination and violence, and are forced into caste-based slavery (begar) which is a form of bonded labour. Dalit women and children are specifically used as debt slaves in brick kilns, workers in agricultural land and textile industries. Dalits continue to perform menial and degrading jobs and are mainly involved in manual scavenging,3 cleaning dry latrines and engaged in sanitation work—cleaning sewers/manholes (continuation of hereditary occupation wherein the Dalits are performing the dirty work). Many of them have lost their lives in the manholes (sewage). Living in segregated spaces or in slums, with severely restricted access to public and private services of housing, water, sanitation, health, education and employment continue to be challenges for the marginalized communities at large. All these practices are purely linked to the notions of purity and pollution, leading to a huge gap between the general population and Dalit 1 These sections received Constitutional safeguards in the way of introducing positive discrimination for their socio-economic and political empowerment. This significant social change was envisaged by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar the anti- caste crusader and other prominent women and men who were part of the Drafting of the Indian Constitution and of the anti-caste movement at the ground. 2 Dalits is a term that emerged to refer to those who belong to the Shudra and AtiShudra caste. They were referred as broken people. However, the usage of the term Dalit has evolved to signify the collective strength of the communities. 3 Practice of manually cleaning and carrying human excreta and cleaning sewage by members of the community.

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communities (Asia Dalit Rights Forum, 2015). The anti-caste movement again gained momentum during the 1970s with the formation of the Dalit Panthers Party, a radical group of Dalit youth from Maharashtra who came together due to the increased atrocity on Dalit communities, especially violence against Dalit women and girls. The Dalit Panthers movement became a radical movement and it raised key issues of assertion of Dalit identity and political emancipation of the former untouchables. Yet, the movement did not systematically emphasize on the leadership of Dalit women in their own ranks or communities. In this background, the activism led by Dalit women has not been documented well or their ideas have been appropriated by male leaders in the movement as they took control of the public spaces and stages. With the turn of events and more education within the female sections of the community, the change did happen as women started to emerge; raising key issues of sexism and patriarchy within the Dalit community and the larger society.

Contextual Analysis and Socio-Economic Impact Dr. B.R. Ambedkar states that the caste system is essentially graded inequality of caste groups; ‘it is thus not just about division of labour but also division of labourers’. Caste identity has become so strong that it does impact social relations in contemporary times. Even as Indians migrate to another country, they do carry their caste identity and the memory attached to it. Caste has international and transnational dimensions and is a South Asian phenomenon. 201 million Indians, 5 million Bangladeshis, 3.5 million Nepalis, 2 million Pakistanis and 4–5 million Sri Lankans are affected by caste-based stratification of the society (Aloysius et al., 2015). Caste system has the concept of ‘purity and pollution’ which is deeply rooted in social interactions, practices and economic relations among communities. This historical marginalization of the Shudras; being positioned at the bottom of ‘Varna Vyavastha’—caste social order; and the atishudras being cast out of the caste order has resulted in their social exclusion and economic marginalization. This social stratification based on ‘birth’ within the different caste groups, marking certain occupations to specific castes, with emphasis on the concepts of ‘purity and pollution’ with hierarchized economic and social status as a way of life, has paved the way for centuries of exclusion, poverty, denial of rights and dignity and levelled discriminatory practices against those pushed into the lowest strata of the caste ladder, especially in India, Nepal and Bangladesh.

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Thus, we see that the communities affected by caste, with an economic aspect to it, are discriminated on the basis of the ‘“birth” into a specific caste and are assigned work in accordance to their birth’. These assigned tasks are ‘considered low or polluting to be performed by other groups of the higher caste ladder’. In this context, Dalit women and tribal women face double discrimination, owing to their status of being Dalit or Adivasi and women. According to the 2011 population census, the sex ratio in postindependent India reveals a decline. In the year 2011, the sex ratio was 943:1000 which shows a decline in the female population from 1951 when the sex ratio stood at 946:1000 (Social Statistics Division, GOI). With respect to literacy rate, the female literacy rate has changed from 53.7% in 2001 to 64.6% in 2011. However, the male literacy rate has increased sharply from 75.3 in 2001 to 80.9% in 2011. This indicates that female literacy still lags behind. When it comes to SC females, literacy is 56.46% while SC males are at 75.17%. For tribal population, it is even lower with ST females at 49.36% and literacy among ST males standing at 68.51%. The difference in literacy rates between general women and SC and ST women remains stark. The gap in literacy rates between general women and SC women stood at 12% and an even larger gap of 23.5% exists between the literacy rates of general and ST women. This points towards a wide gap in educational skill sets among the population groups and thereby increasing the chances of women from the marginalized groups ending up in low paid jobs mostly in unorganized sectors; where they are prone to violence and exploitation. Further, the long-standing demand for passing the Women’s Reservation Bill (33% reservation of women in Union legislature) continues to be pending discussion in the Indian parliament since 2010. A quick view of the consecutive general elections in India gives a clear picture of the lower representation of women in the political sphere. The number of women members in the Rajya Sabha has decreased from 31 in 2014 to 27 in 2021. There are 79 women members in the Lok Sabha, with only 12 elected Dalit women representatives. Dalit women do not form even one per cent of the representation. The statistics reveals the interconnectedness of patriarchy, caste, and power, restricting the political mobility of women and especially women from Dalit, Adivasi and minority groups in these spaces. Decentralization did assist Dalit and Adivasi women with the 73rd and 74th amendments that focused on strengthening the democratically elected local bodies. Reservation of seats for scheduled

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castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST), was mandated in proportion to their total population in a Panchayat area. Out of these reserved seats, 1/3 of seats were mandated for women belonging to these historically discriminated groups. This has led to the entry of Dalit women into local governance. However, the process of decentralization has failed to tackle many deep-rooted issues, such as the unequal power relationships and societal differences, the intersectional aspect of caste and patriarchy at the grass root level. Despite getting elected, many instances have been reported where Dalit women Pradhans are not respected and are not allowed to function with independence. They have faced caste and gender-based discrimination in the panchayats and the meetings (Madala, 2020; Nagaraj, 2021).

Post-independence Anti-caste Movements and Women As mentioned earlier, the movement to educate women of all castes, led by Savitribai Phule and Jotibai Phule gained a certain amount of traction during the colonial period. Post-independence, a large number of the women leaders of the women’s movement in the country were offered positions of authority in the government, however, the only issue that was deemed to be worthy of national concern was maintaining the integrity of the nation. Furthermore, under the attempt of forging a modern understanding of the Indian State, no other identity other than the identity of being a citizen of the country was allowed. In the process, the immediate identities of those of caste, class, gender and ethnicity were considered to be secondary to the overarching nationalist agenda. Consequently, the social and economic change for equality and freedom were side-lined in the country. It was only after the Committee on the Status of Women (CSW) and the subsequent Women’s conferences, and a resolution of the Ministry of Education and Social Welfare in 1971 came out with ‘Towards Equality’, that the women’s movement was jolted back into action. As the statistics provided information contrary to the belief that was prevalent among the middle-class women of that period, who led the women’s movement prior to the nationalist movement. A majority of the women’s movement during the independence struggle focused on being the ideal Indian woman as also propagated by M. K. Gandhi. Also, the women’s movement was influenced by the Leftist Movement, which recognized Marxist analysis of oppression and exploitation of workers or

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labourers on the basis of class. In the political space that the left politics had created, caste issues were brushed under the carpet whereas the class took the limelight. The feminist movement in the country post-independence branched out of the left, which then built not just theoretical frameworks but also frameworks under which movements functioned. However, at the grass root level, the peasant women had their own form of action that reinterpreted tradition more actively but more often remained within the framework of the Hindu discourse; Jaggi was a peasant in the Oudh Kisan Sabha and was supported by the founder Baba Ramchandra which led to the formation of the Kisanin Sabha which focused on women’s land rights and attacking male polygamy (Omvedt, 2011). The decade of 1970s witnessed at the global level parallel rights-based social movements; they were a mix of silent, peaceful as well as militant struggles that were fought against discrimination and social exclusion. In the US, the Civil rights movement gained momentum around the same time, similarly, the Anti-Apartheid movement intensified in South Africa. This was the time that India also witnessed the rise of divergent movements with varying leaders on the question of social and economic disparity due to caste hierarchy. There were leaders like Kanshi Ram, AK Roy, Jai Prakash Narayan leading the movements though completely in different contexts and realities. These movements led to the rise of consciousness among the masses. The ‘unique journey’ that A K Roy called for led to the numerous youth going into villages, new activists rose from the masses, social turmoil increased as economic pressure mounted and new voices rose and groups and organizations formed (Omvedt, 2011). It was during this time itself in 1972 that the Dalit Panthers group was formed by the Dalit youth. The Dalit Panthers constructed a whole new political debate and led to the assertion of Dalit identity, leading to the emergence of writers and activists from the group. The Dalit panthers thus, defined ‘Dalits’ as members of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, neo Buddhists, working people, landless, poor peasants, women and all those who are exploited economically, politically and in the name of religion. During this time, Ambedkarite organizations began to be formed across villages. Spreading Ambedkar’s ideology and contributions became a mission for the Dalit Panthers, and other leaders to take forward. The Bahujan Samaj Party was formed in UP, with the goal to organize the Dalit, Other Backward classes, and Minorities people together against dividing forces.

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Theorizing Caste and Dalit Feminist Frameworks in International Relations There is not much debate in IR on the issue of caste. However, there have been attempts to analyse caste and race within the same framework of analysis as done by Louis Dumont, Andre Beteille and many others. The critical difference being that, the way that caste is understood is vastly different from the understanding of race. With respect to the way race is understood, there would be clear demarcations on the basis of one’s skin colour or some demonstrable criteria, the same could not be said about caste, for there are no biological factors separating one caste from the other. Though the similarity here is mostly on the aspect of bloodline as both race and caste emphasized on the purity of races or qualities ascribed as being superior to the other. Caste has not been analysed much with race given the specific phenomena of ‘discrimination and the concept of purity and pollution’ was majorly viewed as an Indian or Hindu religious phenomenon. However, this view can be challenged in the present time as new communities have been identified globally who share similar experiences of oppression, violence and exploitation at the behest of other powerful communities. These communities face discrimination, segregation and are stigmatized as unholy and engaged in menial jobs. For instance, the Burakumin (or Buraku) in Japan, Al-Akhdam in Yemen (these communities are engaged in unclean occupations, garbage collections, sanitation and cleaning drains), different groups in Africa—Somali (in Somali the Midigan form the largest outcaste group, with subdivisions in clans called the Madhiban, MaxaedGargaarte, Muuse-Darye, Tumaal, Yibir, Mahaad and Howle and these groups are stigmatized as being unholy and polluting), Senegal—the most hierarchical communities is the Wolof of Senegal and the Neeno fall at the bottom of the caste ladder, as well as communities in Mali, Mauritania, Chad and Burkino Faso; Quilombo in Brazil and the Roma communities in parts of Eastern Europe. These communities are identified as DWD communities; i.e. communities facing discrimination based on work and descent. Another important transnational issue is caste among the Indian Diaspora in UK, US and Diasporas in different parts of Africa. As people of Indian descent or from South Asian countries migrated to other countries, they took their memory of caste belongingness. Hence, they continued to perform their caste roles. The practice of endogamous

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marriages is still being followed in the UK, US and especially in East Africa within the Indian Diasporic communities. The continuation of endogamous marriages is key to upholding caste identity; this is very much practised even in the South African Indian diaspora even though many migrated in different capacities, as indentured labourers (mostly from the former untouchable community across religious lines), or as free passenger Indians (most traders and from the dominant community). They have still maintained their caste identities. This is how caste belongingness has remained strong over the centuries even in transnational spaces. Therefore, new methods of analysis are the need of the hour as we have identified similar experiences of discrimination faced by groups of people not limited to India or South Asia. On the contrary, discrimination based on work and descent is a global, transnational phenomenon that needs to be studied and understood at that level. This is now being recognized by the United Nations, in many treaties as well by the Special Rapporteurs. There is a shift of analysis as similar groups face untouchability, segregation and are made to do menial work globally. Hence, it is argued that the interconnectedness and similarities of experiences based on segregated living, involvement in menial works and untouchability which was limited to be viewed as an Indian reality is not true. The need is to recognize these issues as having global significance and study at that level for better understanding.

Dalit Feminist Framework and Convergence with Intersectional Lens In International Relations, feminist theories initially perceived women as one universal category. Much of the analysis of woman’s oppression was also based on Marxist analysis of capitalism and historical materialism. Also, within the South Asian context, the feminist movement largely stemmed from the Leftist-Marxist stand basing the analysis of the oppression of women in class and patriarchy. The leftist feminist circles never accepted ‘caste’ as a structure of oppression of Dalit women. Though in academia and activism there was a lot of debate around the subaltern category majorly highlighting the plight of tribals in India with no leadership of tribals being built. However, this has now begun to change with Dalit women challenging this analysis and bringing their own experiences

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of discrimination, segregation and violence to discussion. The rootedness of Brahmanical patriarchy is internalized as even dominant caste women practice inequality and oppression against Dalit women. Thus, Dalit women’s experiences differ from those of dominant caste women. The experiences of oppression, violence and exploitation faced by Dalit women, men and children are significant points of analysis to highlight the difference based on ‘caste’. Dalit women activists have tried to build international alliances with black women and women from other discriminated communities as they identify the similarities of experiences. Therefore, this experience framework that is being narrated by Dalit academicians and activists over the years is a methodological solution to build the experience framework of discriminated communities as a theory in International Relations. Kimberly Crenshaw, the theorist who coined the concept of ‘intersectionality’ and the proponent of the Critical Race theory put this concept which looks at the rights and positioning of women from the multilayered lens of intersectional identities. The critical race theory, therefore states that all women are not treated equally nor are women affected in the same manner. The degree of oppression or exploitation is much more for black women, as they are doubly discriminated against due to their race and gender. Hence the critical race theory and the conceptual of analysis of intersectionality as propounded by Kimberly Shaw is appropriate to theorize and evolve the Dalit feminist framework; as the experience of intersectional identity is what clearly stands out in the crux of analysis. The dynamics of intersectional identities of caste, gender, race and class play a significant role in social interactions and positioning. Ruth Manorama emphasizes that caste and gender intersectionality has to be taken into account when understanding the positioning of Dalit Women. Dalit women’s vulnerability is not just due to their gender but also due to their birth into a specific caste. These complex interactions of multiple factors, shape different women’s lives differently. In the case of Dalit women, it requires an analysis of how caste, class and gender intersect to manifest into targeted violence towards women and girls and their communities (CEDAW NGO Alternate Report, 2014). Therefore, coming back to the framework of experiences, most of the activism and the revival of Dalit intellectualism are based on the framework of personal experiences and this is now being revived by Dalit intellectuals and activists. This is true in the case of Baba Saheb Ambedkar, Kanshi Ram, Dalit intellectuals such as Urmila Pawar, KanchaIlliah and others as

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their activism was largely influenced by their own experiences of exclusion and discrimination. Now the Dalit academicians and civil society are building the narrative of personal experiences of the community and elaborating on their way of life and putting forth the idea of Dalit culture as different and predating the Brahmanical Hindu fold. Emergence of Dalit Women’s Leadership and Rise of Dalit Feminism The emergence of Dalit Women’s collectives is a progressive development. Dalit feminists are using their own agency to build solidarity with Black feminists and other excluded groups. Dalit feminists have identified the similarities of experiences of oppression and subjugation with Black Women. And hence approve of the theoretical framework as provided by the Critical Race theory especially identifying with the ‘intersectionality’ of the several identities as a cause of subjugation. In the Dalit women’s positioning their personal, social, economic and political interactions are influenced by their intersectional identity of being a woman, and coming from the exploited and the so-called untouchable community. This new development has provided a new dimension of analysis based on the critical race theory. Therefore, Dalit women and their agency in identifying, building solidarity and convergence with Black Feminists in transnational spaces have expanded the purview of intersectional theoretical analysis. In doing so, Dalit Feminism has carved the niche‘ of the intersectionality of caste and gender in the lives of Dalit women, and has also questioned patriarchy within the Dalit movement. The emergence of autonomous Dalit Women’s organizations from the 1980s onwards, though very minimal in number, challenged patriarchy in the Dalit movement. One can draw parallels to the challenge of the male hegemony in the Black Panther Party. Black feminists themselves challenged the male hegemony in the Civil rights movement and the hegemony of white, educated, middle-class women in the women’s movement. Patricia Hill Collins in her work has critiqued extensively the Civil Rights movement as it was observed that all of the leaders were Black men and they were occupying the public spaces of debates and speeches. The Dalit Panther movement which also has its genesis in the Black Panther movement did not really take up the case of gender understanding and sensitivity initially. The autonomous Dalit Women’s Organisations also began to challenge casteism in the Left movements as they were mainly headed by Brahmanical women. It is this lack of revision of the political

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and epistemological understandings of knowledge, that feminist politics and the politics of caste are being held guilty of, not just from an immediate contemporary perspective but also from a historical understanding of how the political movements in both the spheres worked. This issue of segregation and differentiation in the feminist movement has made the issue of caste inside the feminist movement of the country to be, solely the responsibility of Dalit Women. However, by the late 1980s, Dalit women and other backward caste women and feminists from South India were making themselves heard. They tried to redefine anti-brahmin traditions, took Sita as a ‘symbol of oppression rather than an ideal’; and argued that the Ramayana represented the triumph of patriarchy. Ruth Manorama organized slum dwellers in Karnataka and spoke of the triple oppression; focusing on Brahmanism as a major factor in women’s oppression and she did not spare the Dalit Movement led by Dalit Men. Ruth Manorama and other women formed the National Federation of Dalit Women in 1990s and Flavia Agnes and Razia Patel rightly called out the Hindu Hegemony in the Women’s Movement (Omvedt, 2013). A few Dalit women like Ruth Manorama grabbed the opportunity to represent Dalit women at the Beijing Conference and she raised the issue of caste. The solidarity that is being developed between Dalit women and black women is not something new. It’s been strengthened and evolving in transnational spaces nourished by a common quest for justice, equality and freedom of women or trans persons who were oppressed on the basis of their identity.

Emergent Debate on Caste Issue at Global Forums International mechanisms such as the UN Human Rights Treaty and Conventions have been drafted to tackle Human Rights violations globally by making states signatories. They call for periodic status report submissions by the states. Dalit groups working on caste-based discrimination and violence have been successful in engaging at the global level on the issue of caste-based discrimination (CBD) as a ‘human rights concern’. These efforts have been possible with the Dalit leadership coming together, and the systematic documentation of the experiences of violations and exclusion from the ground. National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR), a campaign formed in 1998 by Dalit activists and academicians emerged as a grass root movement; with leadership

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emerging from different states to address the caste question, rising castebased violence and the impact on the lives of Dalit communities. NCDHR drafted the black paper, a report on the status of the Human Rights of Dalits. This report was submitted by the delegation led by NCDHR to the then PM Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee on 1 January 2000. Since then there are continuous efforts in raising the plight of the community and monitoring the implementation of the Prevention of Atrocities Act. The most crucial initial engagement by the Dalit groups was at the ‘World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance’ at Durban. Popularly known as the Durban conference, it was held in August 2001. This was a moment wherein Dalit groups highlighted the caste issue and their main submission was to highlight the concern of ‘caste discrimination as a form of human rights violation in India, and other South Asian states’. The delegation was led by Dalit groups from across the states with documented evidence of the occurrence of caste-based atrocities and discrimination in the present day. The delegation at the conference campaigned the cause of ‘Dalit Rights as Human Rights’ and demanded for recognition of caste-based discrimination as a violation of Human Rights of Dalits in the South Asian region, as similar practices were reported by Dalit activists from Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and parts of Pakistan. As the question of caste was raised at the Durban conference it was refuted by the Indian state as well as by academicians in the Indian subcontinent, calling it a political stunt. The Indian state refuted the comparison between racial discrimination and caste-based discrimination. Though in a press statement, the state accepted the prevalence of caste-based discriminatory practices. Dalit civil society groups reiterated caste-based discrimination is a form of structural oppression based on birth and therefore, the caste matter has to be put into the perspective of structural oppression on a group of people especially setting those at the margins to acute poverty, exclusion and want. The eminent voice of Durga Sob, a Dalit feminist from Nepal raised the question of caste-based discrimination and atrocity faced by Dalits. She, being from the community, started to intervene in cases of caste-based assaults and established Feminist Dalit Organization (FEDO) to intervene in cases officially and engaged with the community and the government to ensure the rights of the community are protected. The Dalits in Nepal face discrimination as the society follows the caste-based order. Similar experiences are faced by marginalized communities in other countries across the world, based on caste or even race or other identities.

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As a result of the recognition of the global commonalities in oppressive structures, the term ‘Discrimination based on Work and Descent’ has evolved to be an umbrella term that recognizes discrimination and marginalization experienced by groups of people on account of their race, ethnicity and including caste. Most of the engagement has been around the recognition of the similarities of the nature of oppression faced by Dalits in South Asia, Romas in Eastern Europe, Buraku people in Japan, the Osu Nigeria’s Igbo community, certain tribes in Senegal and Mauritania as highlighted. Emergence of Global Solidarity Groups The emergence of the United Nations NGO Forums and reporting mechanisms available for civil society provided a platform for civil society actors to interact and build solidarity movements for social change, equality, freedom and justice for all at the global level. In the new millennium, a lot of work and research on Anti-caste movements and racial discrimination is accessible. Hence, even local communities have found ways to reach out to the global network and build solidarity. One such attempt has been the #BlackLivesMatter movement that developed as a Campaign in 2013 by three Black women—Alicia Garza, Patrisse Cullors and Opal Tometi. This movement began as a response to the acquittal of Trayvon Martin’s murderer, George Zimmerman. The BLM movement has grown as a political and ideological intervention to counter the targeting of Black lives by vigilante white groups and calls out white supremacy in fighting racism. The BLM is an assertion of celebrating the contribution of Black people and their humanity. The killing of George Peery Floyd in 2020 sparked global outcry as the entire incident was recorded by a teenage girl and uploaded. This led to the conviction of the police officer for the murder of Flyod. However, there have been many other killings and assaults on Black women and men who have not received justice. A similar situation prevails in India and other South Asian countries wherein impunity is enjoyed by the dominant community as they are in decisionmaking positions. The ‘Dalit Lives Matter’ movement began in solidarity with the BLM movement in recognizing the similar targeting of Dalit men, women and children. With the Hathras case4 in September 2020, 4 A19 year old Dalit girl was gang raped and brutally assaulted in a field of a village in Hathras, by dominant caste men. The girl was found by her mother and brother in the

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Angela Davis, a philosopher and political activist from US emphasized the need to forge meaningful international solidarity at this time of global outcry against the structures of white supremacy and casteist-Brahmanical patriarchy and called for ‘Black Lives Matter’, ‘Dalit Lives Matter’ and ‘Muslim Lives Matter’.

Conclusion Dalit groups’ representation in transnational spaces has been very significant as they have visibalized the caste issue and it’s presence globally which has impacted aspects of socio-economic development, and civil and political rights of those affected. Dalit women’s groups have reached out to communities with similar experiences of segregation, occupational stratification and exclusion based not only in South Asia but also in Europe, Africa and Latin America. The coming together of communities across national boundaries is a significant development and is a crucial aspect of International Relations from a Human rights perspective and for International Human Rights Law to recognize these injustices done globally. Secondly, Dalit feminism is evolving its theoretical basis by studying the similarities in Dr. Ambedkar’s writings and speeches as well as the issue of intersectionality as developed by Crenshaw. Dalit Women as Ambedkarites have been able to carve out ways to flag out these issues of discrimination and social injustice being done to Dalit women in South Asia. They are collectively calling out the patriarchal and casteist institutions and structures at the governance level, and international mechanisms and are breaking the caste and gender hierarchy of power in their own way. The unfinished task is to build a powerful united force of Bahujan (all the minorities together) to counter the forces of caste hierarchy that continue to divide and control the political, social and economic aspects. The attempts are made to link similar intersectional experiences of discrimination faced by Dalit women with Black women and those discriminated field, her tongue was bleeding and she was half covered. They managed to take her to the local hospital, but she was shifted to the city hospital as her condition was very bad. The police were not at all supportive to the family. It was only with the videos being uploaded by a family member that the nation came to know about the brutal case. The police was also involved in burning the body of the girl without the consent of the family members. The dominant caste men in the region with political affluence began to conduct meetings to show their prowess, and blatant caste positioning.

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against on similar lines from other communities. This alliance is essential to build solidarities at the global level as well as to initiate an academic discourse on these similar experiences. This much-needed discourse has to be recognized as part of international relations theorization.

References Aloysius, I., Nayar, A., & Divakar, P. (Eds.). (2015). Annihilate caste and structural inequalities in implementing the 2030 agenda. Ambedkar, B. R. (2007). Annihilation of caste. Speech Prepared in 1936 for a meeting at the Jat Pat Todak Mandal, anti-caste organization in Lahore. Later published by Critical Quest, as Edition 1, 2007. Asia Dalit Rights Forum. (2015). Annihilate caste and structural inequalities in implementing the 2030 agenda, UN sustainable development goals 2030. https://regionsrefocus.org/app/uploads/2019/11/Annihilate-Casteand-Structural-Inequalities.pdf CEDAW NGO Alternate Report. (2014). Report of special rapporteur on violence against women (VAW), its causes and consequences, mission to India. https://UNdoc.A/HRC/26/38/Add.1www.ohchr.org/EN/HRB odies/HRC/Regularsession/Session26/pages/listreports.aspx Chakravarti, U. (1993). Conceptualizing Brahmanical patriarchy in early India. Economic and Political Weekly, 579–585. Collins, P. H. (1990 [1989]). The social construction of black feminist thought. Signs: The Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 14(4), 745–773. Crenshaw, K. W. (1991, July). Mapping the margins intersectionality, identity politics and violence against women of color. Stanford Law Review, 43(6), 1241–1299. Dalit Adivasi Budget Analysis 2019–2020. National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights. Dalit ArthikAdhikarAndolan. Desai, N., Mazumdar, V., & Bhansali, K. (2003). From women’s education to women’s studies. In D. Jain & P. Rajput (Eds.), Narratives from the women’s studies family (pp. 44–77). Sage. Divakar & Varghese, J. Towards a unifying global identity: A framework on discrimination based on work and descent, including caste. National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights. http://www.ncdhr.org.in/wpcontent/ uploads/2018/12/648455134Global-report-single-page-format.pdf Geetha, V. (2007). Theorising feminism. STREE. Gupte, M. (2013). The concept of honour. Economic and Political Weekly, 48(18), 72–81. Hooks, b. (1986). Sisterhood: Political solidarity between women. Feminist Review, 23(1), 152–138.

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Kandasamy, M. (2007). On caste and patriarchy: An interview with Ruth Manorama. Young Feminists. https://youngfeminists.wordpress.com/2007/ 12/27/on-caste-and-patriarchy-an-interview-with-ruth-manorama/ Madala, J. (2020, October 12). ‘This is new-age untouchability’: Pudukkottai Dalit woman chairman alleges caste discrimination after name left out from credits. The New Indian Express. https://www.newindianexpress.com/states/ tamil-nadu/2020/oct/12/this-is-new-age-untouchabilitypudukkottai-dalitwoman-chairman-alleges-caste-discrimination-after-na-2209367.html Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. Cumulative data of recorded crimes by National Crime Record Bureau (NCRB), Crimes in India Reports from 2006–2017–2019. Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation Government of India. Social Statistics Division, Central Statistics Office, Women and Men in India (A statistical compilation of Gender related Indicators in India), 2018-20th Issue. Mosko, S. M. (1994, November). Transformation of Dumont: The hierarchical, the sacred and the profane in India and ancient Hawaii. Journal of History and Anthropology, 7 (1–4), 19–86. Nagaraj, A. (2021, January 4). Denied a chair, Dalit women confront discrimination on Indian village councils. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-india-women-politics-idUSKBN2991QK Omvedt, G. (2013 [2011]). Understanding caste, from Buddha to Ambedkar and beyond. Orient Black Swan Pvt. Ltd. Pal, G. (2015). Dalit Human rights in South Asia. Regional Synthesis Report. Raj, R. (2013, May 4). Dalit women as political agents. Economic and Political Weekly, 48(18), 56–63. Rege, S. (1998, October 31). Dalit women talk differently. Economic and Political Weekly, 33(44), 39–46. Sacks, K. (1983). Three Engels revisited: Women, organisation of production and private property. Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, 3(4), 385–401. Still, C. (2015). Women’s education, marriage, honour and the new Dalit housewife. In C. Still (Ed.), Dalit women: Honour and patriarchy in South India (pp. 146–161). Social Science Press. Wylie, A. (2004). Why standpoint matters. In S. Harding (Ed.). The feminist standpoint reader. Routledge.

CHAPTER 14

The Other Movement: Women’s Activism in Kashmir Sehar Iqbal

Like Kashmir itself, Kashmiri women continue to be misrepresented by politicians, academics and mainstream media. On the one hand, the narrative being pushed forward by politicians in India, like Amit Shah in his speech to the Indian Parliament on 5 August 2021 portrays Kashmiri women as “shackled” by a lack of opportunities in life because of the “backwardness” and violence in Jammu and Kashmir. Shah and his colleagues in the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party have been consistently pushing this false narrative of liberating Kashmiri women from oppression in order to justify the Indian government tightening its administrative control over the valley, the dismemberment of Jammu and Kashmir’s constitutionally secured autonomy and its downgrading to a Union territory. According to Nitasha Kaul (2019), “In this framework, Indians must develop Kashmir the way it wants, Indians must liberate Kashmiri women… and Kashmiri consent matters little”’.

S. Iqbal (B) Jammu and Kashmir, India e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Ojha and P. Jaiswal (eds.), South Asian Women and International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9426-5_14

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Despite these attempts, activism by Kashmiri women continues to be a hugely under-researched area and one that has the power to shatter the “oppressed emancipated” binary that continues to obscure Kashmiri women and their roles in their society. This paper is an attempt to represent the wider location of women’s activism in Kashmir, looking at it as a movement of women from diverse economic, religious and educational backgrounds. It looks at the strategy of research and recording of rights violations, collectivisation of women, grassroots action and public protest adopted by Kashmiri women activists and how it interacts with a militaristic hyper-masculinised environment and deepening state control.

Methodology The main conceptual frameworks used in this study derive from feminist theory and narrative theory that together define lived experiences of women as essential to understanding social structures, functions and their interplay and evolution. The gendered lens uses looks at gender as performative, i.e. doing as being. Judith Butler defines this as a “reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects that it names” (Butler, 1993: 2). Accordingly, persons who self-identify as Kashmiri women activists (according to their socially conditioned understanding of gender and agency) have been interviewed and their lived experiences recorded. Having said that, those who self-identify as Kashmiri women activists are by no means a homogenous group. Apart from educational attainments, economic position and social mobility, they also differ in terms of intersectional identity and ideology. Therefore, this paper includes interviews with Sikh, Sunni and Shia Muslim and Gujjar women activists working in Kashmir. A prominent Kashmiri Pandit activist was contacted but she could not give time for an interview due to pressing engagements. Eight interviews have been conducted with Kashmiri women and one with a Kashmiri man over a period of two months. These diverse experiences of activism have been used to foreground the nuances in community needs and how women’s activism has responded to these.

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Gendered Manifestations of Conflict in Jammu and Kashmir Jammu and Kashmir has been profoundly affected by an armed uprising that began in the wake of the rigged state assembly elections of 1987. Young Kashmiri Muslim men from working-class backgrounds, deeply disillusioned by the state electoral process controlled by New Delhi, started a mass movement characterised by the armed struggle against the Indian State and street protests/demonstrations. Together these comprised the Tehreek or Movement for the independence of Jammu and Kashmir from India which many saw as a continuation of the 1930s struggle against the monarchical rule. The Tehreek had spread to all parts of the state by the 1990s, though participation across ethnic and religious groups was by no means uniform. While the armed struggle was mainly carried out by men and street protests dominated by women (particularly from the mid-1990s onwards), the gendered roles of men and women within the Tehreek were not rigidly fixed. For example, Parashar (2011) observes that women trained, armed, and acted as militants and there were reports of a women-only training camp in Pakistan-administered part of Kashmir. “The ranks of major guerilla outfits such as Hizb ul Mujahideen and the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, primarily comprised men. Nevertheless, they also had women’s wings – Binatul Islam and Muslim Khawateen Markaz respectively” (Anjum, 2011). Similarly, men also came out to protest against the government and the excesses of Indian paramilitary and military forces. However, the agency and leadership provided by women during the Tehreek as militants and protestors were largely invisibilised by the print and electronic media covering Kashmir regularly throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Even within the Tehreek intelligentsia imagining the Kashmiri nation, the omission of Kashmiri women continued, even though women reproduce nations biologically, culturally and even symbolically (Yuval-Davis, 1993). Instead, the media and intelligentsia continued to portray Kashmiri women simply as “nurturers”, feeding and nursing (male) militants or as “victims” of sexual violence, disability, and the loss of male family members. As Aaliya Anjum (2011) observes, “Relegating women’s engagement in conflict situations to the passive space of victimhood is an anticipated outcome of the unequal distribution of power in gender relations. However, this narrative obfuscates their role as active participants,

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which is of equal, if not greater, significance – and which has increasingly become an accentuating facet of their participation during the recent years of the conflict”. This phenomenon isn’t unique to Kashmir. According to Sjoberg and Gentry (2007) communities across the world women who participate in violence are not featured in public narratives, “because their stories do not resonate with these inherited images of femininity, violent women are marginalized in political discourse”. Their choices are rarely seen as choices, and, when they are, they are characterised as apolitical. Their tales are sensationalised and fetishised in the gendered narratives that replace or substitute for their actual accounts. Stories of women’s violence through their own eyes necessarily interrogate the ideal–typical understandings of what women are, which threatens the gendered order at all levels of politics (Sjoberg & Gentry, 2007: 51). Journalists and academics have largely limited their portrayal of Kashmiri women to victims of violence (especially sexual violence and the loss of male family members to conflict). While the seriousness and continued use of sexual violence as a weapon used to punish and “dishonour” Kashmiri women (and through them their families and community) cannot be overstated, it is important to see women’s participation in the Tehreek as active and formative as opposed to simply auxiliary or passive. As Malik (2019) observes “Kashmiri women are not accidental victims but political agents in the struggle for self- determination. They are vehement opponents of patriarchy in its cultural and statist manifestations”. Kashmiri women have headed separatist organisations and pursued their agenda politically. For example, “Yasmeen Raja and Zamruda Habib head the two factions of the MKM, and Asiya Andrabi chairs Dukhtarane-Millat , Fareeda Dar (Fareeda Behenji) heads the Jammu and Kashmir Mass Movement, which also is a member organisation of the Hurriyat. All of these women have served multiple years in jail for overt or covert support for the independence movement and are constantly harassed by the Indian security apparatus because of their political involvement. They come from middle-class backgrounds and chose to give up a possible life of comfort for risk and tribulations” (Anjum, 2011). “Women are often the ones who are given the social role of intergenerational transmitters of cultural traditions, customs, songs, cuisine, and, of course, the mother tongue”’ (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1983: 63) In Kashmir, women and girls from diverse backgrounds have symbolically and culturally kept alive the

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idea of a Kashmiri nation since 1989, through their writing, art, photography, poetry or wanwun (folk songs) glorifying the imagined nation and those martyred for its freedom. In academia, Kashmiri women have attempted to site the activism of Kashmiri women historically into the political landscape of Jammu and Kashmir through the twentieth century. The works of Shazia Malik, Inshah Malik, Nyla Ali Khan, Ather Zia, Aaliya Anjum, Ashwaq Masoodi, Nitasha Kaul and others, have sought to include voices of Kashmiri women in the construction of narratives about them in politics, society and the media. This demonstrates that when nuanced representations of Kashmiri women appear, they are authored by Kashmiri women themselves. Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1989) provide a framework for understanding this multifaceted participation of women in nationalism. According to them women have essential and mutually reinforcing roles in nation-building as “biological producers of new national members, symbols of national difference, carriers and creators of cultural narratives, agents enforcing the boundaries of the nation, active participants in national movements” (1989: 7–8). Reductionist portrayals of Kashmiri women that ignore this enduring participation are attempts to pigeonhole the complex lived experiences of Kashmiri women into the “oppressed or emancipated” duality created by Western academia. International Relations scholars from the global South like Kumari Jayawardena challenged this duality through her study of indigenous feminist movements in India, Sri Lanka, China, Iran, Egypt, Indonesia, Turkey, Japan, Vietnam, Korea and the Philippines. In her influential book, Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World (1986), she argued that feminism in these countries was not a transplant from Western countries but had evolved from local culture and the indigenous struggles of women as part of nationalist movements. Similarly, activism by Kashmiri women can also be seen as a form of indigenous struggle, a way for Kashmiri women to form networks, occupy public spaces, shape discourse and access for their fellow Kashmiris.

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Characteristics of Kashmiri Women’s Activism As noted before, the following account is based on first-hand interviews conducted in Kashmir for the purpose of this research. Long History of Women’s Activism According to Saudia Khan, an activist working on prison reform in Srinagar, “Women’s activism is not new in Kashmir, it has been active since the 1920s. Even though activism by Kashmiri women from the working classes has been pioneering, especially in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, women activists from the elite class got more media coverage in the past. From the 1990s this changed. Women were at the forefront of public activism, demanding justice for human rights violations and the print media started covering their mass protests. Now, we have a whole new generation of educated and emancipated women from all walks of life like academicians, writers, poets, doctors, social workers, lawyers, educationists and even students involved in activism. And it is the activism of Kashmiri women in the past that gives us immense inspiration for our struggles today”. In the early 1900s, as the valley of Kashmir reeled under the aftermath of successive famines in the past three decades, the Maharaja’s restrictions on the movement and price of shali (unhusked rice) led women to protest against the government for the first time. According to M. Shamsuddin (98) who was a tenant in the house of one of the protest leaders in Maisuma in the 1930s, “My landlady, known fondly as Kalle Ded (the wise mother) was the leader of the food protests in the neighbourhood. She told me that in the 1910s and 1920s, women were afraid of another famine due to shortages created by the government. This prompted them to action. They would gather in the streets with empty earthen utensils from their homes and beat them with wooden ladles in the streets shouting ‘Batto Batto, katyi chukh batto?’ (Rice! Rice! Where are you, beloved rice?”). This was followed by a violent response from the Dogra State and cyclical protests against the princely rule in the 1930s and 1940s which sustained over decades of turbulent history. Like Saudia, many women activists and protestors draw inspiration from this history of women’s activism in their work and lives. According to Dr. Bindya Bali (38), a Kashmiri Sikh doctor and activist at the forefront of the valley’s COVID-19 response, “Kashmiri women have never

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been confined to homes. Throughout history we have confronted injustice, whether in the streets or in our work. We owe it to the memory of countless courageous women from all communities in Kashmir to continue to work for our society. Today we may be working on the wards or in remote villages, our identity as Kashmiri women activists binds us together”. Conflict as a Direct Cause of Activism Conflict and the insecurity it generates, is constantly in the background and affects everything including women’s activism. For many activists it is the reason they got into activism in the first place. As, Dr. Shakira Ali (38), an activist for women’s health access, observes “Conflicts often force women to organise themselves to safeguard basic necessities and to carry out activities related to our daily lives, for example, education and healthcare. Conflict affects every aspect of our life. Be it our mental state or our choice of profession conflict has a direct bearing on our lives. The mental trauma people in Kashmiri society face because of living in a conflict zone inspired me to become a doctor. I wanted to help”. Similarly, Saima Anjum (24) an activist from the Gujjar community identifies the recent phase of the conflict as a direct cause for her work. “My journey as an activist started in 2019 when Article 370 was abrogated, our voices were choked, and I realised how our marginalised community is suffering badly. There were eviction drives by government officials where members of my community were assaulted and driven out of pastureland they have occupied for generations. That is when I started raising my voice for my community”. Similarly, the conflict also increases the scope of women’s activism. According to Mantasha Binti Rashid (38), a gender justice activist, “In conflict the work of women activists increases manifold. There are conflict specific cases and issues that need to be catered to like widows, half widows and orphans. The structure of many households is disrupted by the killing of the main breadwinner and women need to be provided options for sustainable livelihoods and shelter”. Because conflict disrupts social structures and kinship networks beyond the capacity to regenerate internally, women, children and the elderly have increased difficulty in getting access to basic amenities like economic support, shelter and means of livelihood. The local community takes care of these vulnerable groups in the first few months but after that, NGOs or activist networks need

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to step in for providing long-term support. Often, women activists find it easier to talk to women and children in need of support and establish what they need. Activism Through Experiential Affiliation Anjum (2011) observes that the conflict in Kashmir that started in the late 1980s was directly responsible for the emergence of the “victim-activist” woman. Though the term victim is itself problematic, Anjum gives useful examples of some notable Kashmiri women activists in her analysis. Most prominent is internationally renowned human rights activist, Parveena Ahanger, who founded the Association of parents of Disappeared Persons (APDP) in 1994 after her son was taken by Indian paramilitary forces and never seen again. Zamruda Habib who spent five years in jail used her own experience to launch the Association of Kashmiri Prisoners, a platform to support other Kashmiri political prisoners. She said of her experience, “During my stay in prison, on a court hearing date, I met other Kashmiri prisoners who complained that no one was speaking up for them. We promised each other that whoever would get released first would work for other Kashmiri prisoners. So the Association of Kashmiri Prisoners was a promise I made to another Kashmiri prisoner when I was behind bars. As part of my work, I would go meet these prisoners, sometimes during their court hearing dates. I would go to their homes and meet their families to express solidarity and share their grief, because I had been through a similar ordeal” (Surangya, 2019). In both cases, these were uniquely feminine forms of activism- linking people who had similar experiences into a horizontal, interconnected, activist network. Reardon (2014: 66) defines this “feminine mode” of social constructs as “based on a kinship model of (hierarchically) less structured organisations designed for the fulfilment of needs of those in kinship networks. The(ir) values … tend to be familial, nurturing and inclusive”. In the case of APDP and AKP the kinship is more experiential than strictly sociological, i.e. identifying those who have gone through a similar experience as kin and then reaching out to take care of their needs. Work on Diverse Issues According to Dr. Shakira, the past two decades have been marked by the rise in women’s activism “There has been a slow and gradual yet noticeable change, as brave young female voices have emerged from the patriarchal and conservative mindset and raised their voice against the challenges

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and difficulties that make up the lives of people in the valley”. Her reference to patriarchal family structures that dominate Jammu and Kashmir, holds true across communities. Women’s activism has addressed the problems of women and girls particularly their access to economic resources, sustainable livelihoods and experiences of gender-based violence (GBV). Saudia says, “I feel women’s activism in Kashmir has so far largely been focussed on women’s issues and have rarely traversed the boundaries to other social issues. A woman speaking for a woman’s cause is ok for our society to understand, but she may not get so much space if she delves in other issues of importance. Women bureaucrats too for instance are often posted in seemingly softer responsibilities of ‘social welfare’ etc. So, there is a bias which persists”. Other Kashmiri activists disagree. According to Dr. Khairunnisa Aga, an activist from the Shia community working on gender inclusivity, child rights and interfaith dialogue, “The frequent occurrence of natural disasters and calls for help surfacing on social media answered by Kashmiri women activists have opened the eyes and hearts of people towards women’s activism. There is more acceptance of female activists but only till their work remains in the social sphere. Political activism by women is looked down upon”. Similarly, Nawal Ali (32) an activist working on demilitarisation and rehabilitation of conflict victims observes, “I think women’s activism has grown and even broadened in terms of its nature with many women taking up activism role in different issue areas. We now work on everything from gender justice to rural development, from disaster response to shelter”. Women activists have been particularly visible during the large-scale flooding in Kashmir in September 2014 where they distributed relief, helped in rehabilitation and found footholds in rural and urban communities. Many women founded and run their own non-governmental organisations and trusts, others work in NGOs headed by men or through student volunteer networks. Conflict and State Surveillance as an Obstacle to Activism Conflict acts not only as a catalyst for women’s activism in Kashmir but also as an obstacle. The insecurity it generates makes it harder for women to be working away from their home or neighbourhood. Saudia notes that “Conflict brings its own insecurities and uncertainties and not to mention the perils and dangers of working for men as well as women activists. Frequent shutdowns, protests on the streets, violence and killings

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have had a huge impact on lives of people in Kashmir. Exposure to violence daily does bring in stress and psychological problems which for activists often get un-addressed as they are constantly working and may ignore their own mental health in the process. Concerns for personal safety also persist”. Dr. Bindya Bali agrees, “The conflict creates uncertainties for women activists and a lot of security threats. Even doctors and ambulances have been attacked in the past. Our families are constantly worried for us”. The government also restricts public movement and communication, placing additional burdens on activists. Saima says that “Conflict increases our challenges but government restrictions increase them more. Restrictions on movement, internet blackouts and suspension of mobile phone services imposed by the government make it difficult for us to reach areas where help is needed and communicate. The Gujjar community which I belong to, lives in far flung areas and it is hard enough to reach them even without the restrictions. With them, it becomes a struggle to reach a particular area that needs immediate help”. Women activists like Saima find it harder than their male counterparts to get access to government-issued curfew passes, making it harder for them to move freely. Another major obstacle Kashmiri women activists face is widespread state surveillance. According to academic and activist Athar Zia “State surveillance… impedes mobility and gathering data” (Qureshi, 2018). Since August 2019 when the constitutional autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir was taken away arbitrarily, the region has been downgraded from a state to a Union Territory administered directly by the central government, state surveillance on activists and journalists has increased, with many being regularly detained and incarcerated. Women journalists, like Anja Niedringhaus, Courage in Journalism award winner Masarat Zahra, have also not been spared. Sabiya Dar who works for the APDP has also spoken about the impediments the state places on Kashmiri women activists, “We face too many challenges from the state whenever we try to help them [half widows] financially, legally, psychologically, medically or even educationally” (Qureshi, 2018). “Legislation[s] like the Sedition Act, the Official Secrets Act, and Unlawful Activities Prevention Act leave room for great abuses. The Sedition Act has been misused greatly to quiet dissent; from 35 cases in 2016, cases under it rose to 70 in 2018, and both, the Law Commission of India and the Supreme Court have warned against its misuse” (Prasad, 2021). With government authorities

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cracking down on non-governmental organisations, women activists fear greater state surveillance impeding their work. But they are determined to carry on says Tabish, “Our duty is to the most vulnerable in our society, we have to continue working”. Suspicion by Society According to Mantasha, “Kashmiri society views activism by women in a negative way. In Kashmir there is suspicion for activists in general and female activists in particular. People feel that activists are planted by state agencies or have some political agenda. To some extent this is understandable because in a conflict, trust is a major casualty. In an atmosphere where human lives are at stake every day, the instinct of self- preservation makes people look inward. They find it hard to trust each other and to believe anyone who talks about common interest above self-interest”. Nawal Ali agrees, “The society does not see women activists with the respect they deserve, they are seen as women who have crossed societal boundaries and gone on to a wrong track”. Dr. Bindya Bali also makes an interesting observation, “I think it is easier for activists like me, working in the medical field. If I go to a village and set up a medical camp for women, the people there give me a lot of respect and cooperation. A doctor is seen to have a beneficial social role and people accept that. This is not true for my other activist friends. If they go to a village to document a case or to give relief after a disaster, they face resistance”. In fact, Kashmiri society widely accepts women in the roles of teachers, nurses and even doctors. The first girls’ school was started by English missionaries in 1895 in Fateh Kadal and the first hospital for women was built in 1897 at Nawa kadal. Though initially staffed by non-locals, by the 1930s and 1940s Kashmiri women were working as nurses and teachers in these institutions. Similarly, the state of Jammu and Kashmir reserved fifty per cent of all seats in medical education for women since the 1980s. As such, women in these roles are seen in large numbers in schools and hospitals which has brought wider recognition of their work. Though women’s protests have been continuing since the 1900s, women’s activism around gender-based violence, legal rights and providing relief/rehabilitation on a large scale is relatively more recent. This is why it does not have the same recognition from society. Coupled with the suspicion that is endemic to areas with long-running conflict, it makes the work of women activists particularly difficult.

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Familial and Societal Pressures Due to NGOs and activist networks in Kashmir receiving very little institutional funding, a lot of activists work from project to project. This often creates financial uncertainties for activists, both men and women. But the familial and social pressures on female activists are different. For them particularly, the lack of a secure paycheck and the nature of the work that takes them from community to community is seen as unacceptable. Parents are often against their work. As Nawal observes, “My family was not supportive in the beginning but after a lot of fights, arguments and conditioning I have internalised in them the kind of work I do”. Mantasha agrees, “My family has come to a point where they have no option but to support me. From conflict to acceptance, it has been a long journey and there is a lot of support from my family now. Now they respect what I do, and they know that I give a lot of time and energy to my activism. This is by no means the case for my friends who are activists. They are pressured to leave activism and get married because their parents feel activism is an unstable profession”. Even Saudia, who has studied social work, faced initial pressure from her parents to find a regular nine-to-five job. “My family was a bit unsure when I chose to study Social work in University, but by and by when they saw that I had my heart in the work, they too felt this is the right choice for me. And today, after working in this field for more than a decade, my parents and husband understand that my work can lead to me coming late in the evenings, or getting mentally and physically stressed out, but they keep supporting me and take care of my kids when I am not around. They say that I am fortunate to be able to find a profession in which I find satisfaction of my heart and also the blessings of people. At times they have felt concerned for my physical security as well, but that is all part of the whole life a social worker/activist leads”. As Saudia observes even when the family is supportive, safety is always a concern for families of activists. This can lead to restrictions being placed on women activists due to fears for their safety. Dr. Khairunnisa observes, “My family supports my work, but they get worried, particularly when my work takes me far from home to communities they don’t know well. They try to discourage such visits and often justify their objections from a religious point of view”. Similarly, even prospective in-laws or prospective husbands pressure women activists to leave their work and stay home. They view women’s activism as more of a hobby than a serious career choice and discourage

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activism after marriage. Saima concurs, “A lot of my colleagues have been told by their fiancées to leave their work. For some, before the wedding the fiancée and in-laws agree to them continuing their work but afterwards, they either directly forbid them from working or they [activists] gradually leave their work due to the added pressure of domestic chores on top of family disapproval”. Saima’s remark highlights the contextual reality of sexual violence against Kashmiri women that often puts women activists and their families in opposition to each other with the family looking at the women foremost as a symbol of family honour that needs to be “protected”. Unfortunately, this puts restrictions on the work of even women activists who document cases of sexual violence in Kashmir. Given their gender, women activists are more approachable to women survivors of sexual violence. Tabish Nabi (30), an activist who has documented cases of sexual violence in the valley observes, “Women find it easier to speak to other women, especially when it comes to relating experiences that invoke trauma and fear at the hands of men. Even in front of the best trained male psychologists or activists, women do not speak as freely as they do with us”. Tabish’s experience underscores the key role women activists like her can play in documenting cases of sexual violence. Anonymity/Low Profile According to Ather Zia, “Many Human Right defenders prefer being unnamed since it helps them work in anonymity and without being unduly penalized by the state agencies, which can include routine harassment or even incarceration” (Qureshi, 2018). This is true for other women activists as well, who prefer working in anonymity or keeping a low profile socially. Many stay away from award ceremonies or social media fearing backlash or increased government surveillance. Dr. Khairunnisa says, “Nine tenths of the work we do as activists is outside media coverage. We work locally and the communities know our work. Whenever the need arises, they contact us and we meet their needs without creating a circus around it. The people we help appreciate this and the word-of-mouth spreads further. It makes our work more community-led and effective”. Many women activists like Saudia believe that the work is its own reward, “Activism is all about advocating for rights of people, connecting to people and standing up for what is just. As long as I can continue to do this, I do not need anything else”.

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Conclusion Kashmiri women activists are breaking new ground with their work, bringing about social change from the ground up. However, despite the rise in coverage and diversity, Kashmiri women’s activism is far from homogenous. For women activists in Kashmir, “intersectional positionalities of religion, class, locality, age, education, and family background strongly affect their access to activist work and the obstacles confronting them” (Brannlund, 2015). At the same time, their work lacks public recognition and financial support precisely because Kashmiri civil society is itself gendered. Most often, organisations headed by men have more access to these donations as they form closed networks mobilising donations through mutual referrals. Ironically, a lot of these male-headed organisations collect donations in the names of thousands of “faceless women victims”, widows and orphaned girls. Similarly, the state structure that has powers to restrict the movements and funding of activists is also gendered. Officials put more restrictions on the free movement of women activists who typically have less access to curfew passes than their male counterparts. Women activists also face obstacles like threats to personal safety, family pressures, and societal pressures in addition to suspicion and resistance. Despite these myriad challenges, they continue to work for change at the grassroots level on a variety of issues. Their work deserves respect and recognition as a rightsbased movement. As Tabish says, “We can stand for the rights of the deprived and the vulnerable today, but our work is not finished till they can stand for their own rights tomorrow and for the rights of others like them after that”.

References Anjum, A. (2011, August 2). The militant in her: Women and resistance. Al Jazeera. Available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/8/2/themilitant-in-her-women-and-resistance Anthias, F., & Yuval-Davis, N. (1983). Contextualizing feminism: Ethnic, gender and class divisions. Feminist Review, 15, 62–75. Anthias, F., & Yuval Davis, N. (1989). Woman, nation, state. St. Martin’s Press. Brannlund. (2015). Narrating in/security: Women’s activism in Kashmir (Unpublished Thesis submitted to The School of Political Science and Sociology). University of Galway, Ireland. Butler, J. (1993). Bodies that matter: On the discursive limits of sex. Routledge.

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Jayawardena, K. (1986). Feminism and nationalism in the third world. Zed Books. Kaul, N. (2019, August 13). Kashmir is under the heel of India’s colonialism. Foreign Policy. Available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/ 13/kashmir-is-under-the-heel-of-indias-colonialism/ Malik, I. (2019). Conclusion. In: Muslim women, agency and resistance politics. Palgrave Pivot. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95330-4_5 Parashar, S. (2011). Gender, Jihad, and Jingoism: Women as erpetrators, planners, and patrons of militancy in Kashmir. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism., 34(4), 295–317. Prasad, A. (2021, October 17). The Fascist Strongarming of the media: The Case of Masarat Zahra. Feminist In India. Available at The Fascist Strongarming of the Media: The case of Journalist Masrat Zahra (feminisminindia.com) Qureshi, F. (2018, February 9). Agents of change: Kashmir’s new generation of women activists. The Citizen. Available at Agents of Change: Kashmir’s New Generation of Women Activists (thecitizen.in) Reardon, B. (2014). Key texts in gender and peace. Springer Briefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice, Texts and Protocols, Volume 27. Sjoberg, L., & Gentry, C. E. (2007). Mothers, monsters, whores: Women’s violence in global politics. Zed Books. Surangya. (2019, January 28). Of five years behind bars as a Kashmiri political prisoner. People’s Dispatch. Available at https://peoplesdispatch.org/2019/ 01/28/of-five-years-behind-bars-as-a-kashmiri-political-prisoner/ Yuval-Davis, N. (1993). Gender and nation. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 16(4), 621–632.

CHAPTER 15

Exploring the Contested and Controversial Nature of the Sex Industry in India: Experiential Encounters by Sex-Workers from the Periphery Shriya Patnaik

The policing of prostitution across the world has evoked a multitude of contentious legislations historically, with a diverse range of positions ranging from moralistic condemnation, abolition, criminalization, decriminalization, and legalization, to civil society organization. The international humanitarian arena via the United Nations’ approach over the years alike, has been characterized by certain temporal disruptions, which though in the interwar period was shaped by racial civilizational hierarchies by colonial powers, have in recent years taken a turn towards a more bottom-up approach focusing on the rights of sex-workers along with inclusive public health frameworks. This paper critically analyses

S. Patnaik (B) Department of International History, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Ojha and P. Jaiswal (eds.), South Asian Women and International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9426-5_15

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India’s approach to prostitution. In doing so, while it problematizes certain law enforcement mechanisms that have been complicit in violating various forms of sex-workers’ bodily autonomy or dignity of life, it juxtaposes this alongside inclusive global humanitarian conventions that have in the contemporaneous years, propagated representative modalities of emancipation and integration into civil society.1 Subsequently, the latter part of the paper traces temporal shifts in the International Labour Organization’s approach to the sex industry, in the transition from the colonial to the postcolonial. In doing so, while it critically examines some of the Eurocentric legacies that have shaped its institutional workings historically, it also traces the ILO’s contemporaneous transition towards a rights-centric approach in the twenty-first century that has been influenced by feminist lobbies and NGOs from the Global South. It conclusively advocates for the application of such rights-based frameworks for sex-workers in the Indian context, instead of criminalizing paradigms that have historically been complicit in endangering their bodily autonomy and freedoms. The final section of the paper references some movements from civil society in India, which emerge as effective case-in-points towards deploying a non-stigmatizing approach to the commercial sex industry. In suggesting improvements to the legal regime surrounding such disenfranchised actors, the paper thus argues that state approaches should deploy inclusive human rights principles towards better-integrating sexworkers into civil society. These should include incorporation of their lived perspectives alongside a consideration of their volition, agency, and dignity in the making of legislation that affects their futures. I also wish to make a conceptual clarification here. Although the terms ‘prostitute’ and ‘prostitution’ have been historically invoked to refer to the sex industry and its affiliated actors, I am aware of their problematic and stigmatizing connotations. This paper instead attempts to use the terms ‘sex-worker’ or ‘sexual commerce’ in certain places to avoid the epistemological violence inflicted by normative nomenclatures. However, for the purposes of historical consistency, the colonial, postcolonial as well

1 This chapter draws in places from the author’s previous works which include a blog on LSE site (Patnaik, Shriya [2021] The invisible voices of India’s informal sector sex workers. South Asia @ LSE [22 March 2021]. Blog Entry.) and a news article on Geneva Graduate Institute site (https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/communications/news/missing-lifestories-indias-sex-workers).

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as international usage of the terms ‘prostitute’ and ‘prostitution’ need to be invoked to refer to the evolution of the industry and subsequent regulation policies in the domains of law and policy-making. I do emphasize that the paper applies these terms along a neutral, non-normative vein, as per their historical usage in legal and policy discourses.

Indian Laws and Policies on Sex-Work The legal statute governing the rights of sex-workers and trafficked persons in India is The Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act (1956), amended in 1986 as The Immoral Traffic Prevention Act (ITPA). While this Act allows sex-workers to conduct their trade in private sites, they cannot legally seek customers in public spaces or engage in organized services. Although prostitution in India per se is permissible, a plethora of activities surrounding it like the operation of brothels, pimping, pandering, and street solicitation, are illegal. Despite the existence of red-light districts, the question of sex-workers’ human rights remains ambiguous. They are not safeguarded by labour laws or trade unions but can seek rescue and rehabilitation in state-sanctioned shelters. Additionally, under the ITPA, as prostitution is predominantly conceptualized through the lens of trafficking/exploitation, it precludes an understanding of sex-work as a legitimate form of labour.2 Since male prostitution is unrecognized/disallowed under Indian laws, this article deals primarily with female perspectives. From a human rights perspective, the implementation of the ITPA by law enforcement agencies has created a plethora of issues for sex-workers. While its clauses allow the police to arrest prostitutes or pimps who work

2 Although the current laws regulating the ‘selling of sexual services for money’ is legal, under specific circumstances, while it a punishable offense if carried out in public (this includes pimping, street solicitation, kerb-crawling i.e., soliciting sex at roadside corners, or paid sex in brothels or hotels. Under Indian laws on prostitution, the selling of sex is legally permissible in private residences of the sex-worker or client, while illegal in public sites. The use of private residences by the prostitute or client, is an unregulated domain, which complicates this scenario even further. Furthermore, The Immoral Traffic Prevention Act, conflates ‘Trafficking’ with ‘Prostitution’ as inter-related and synonymous phenomena, and is intended as a means of limiting and eventually abolishing prostitution in India by criminalising various aspects of sex-work. Refer to The Immoral Traffic Prevention Act 1956: https://www.refworld.org/docid/54c210604.html.

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in brothels in close proximity to public places, the law enables a criminalizing over a humanitarian approach. Moreover, over-sensationalized accounts adopted in nationalist policy paradigms can result in a simplified public perception of all prostitutes in binaristic terms of victimized or deviant subjects, and the police as heroes, bolstering patriarchal power structures along with the moralistic disciplining of the state. Take for example a woman who works as a sex-worker on the side to pay for college. A brothel raid could constitute the source of stigmatization as her work is now exposed to family, acquaintances, and wider society. Such structural barriers and institutional constraints facing sex-workers, explicate how in controlling their bodily autonomy under the provisions of ITPA, law enforcement organizations seek to discipline gendered minorities in establishing pedagogical norms of respectable citizenship. Arbitrarily implemented measures like brothel raids, and forceful rehabilitation amidst other forms of societal othering, can additionally lead even well-intentioned officials to continue the objectification, essentialization, reification, and traumatization of persons who are rescued, culminating in a questionable precedent that recovery can solely be achieved through close regulation and surveillance in governmental shelters. The ITPA concurrently penalizes family members who live off the earnings of a prostitute, thereby not taking into consideration the intersectional causal factors that propel a turn towards sexual commerce. In 2014, the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Human Rights Council observed limits to the current Indian legislation and a lack of rights-based approaches thereof: ‘Sex-workers in India are exposed to a range of abuse including physical attacks and harassment by clients, family members, the community and state authorities; they are forcibly detained and rehabilitated and consistently lack legal protection; and they face challenges in gaining access to essential health services, including for treatment of HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases’. It also problematized some of the limits of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act which conflates ‘Trafficking’ with ‘Prostitution’ in that the law de facto criminalizes sex-work. The UNHRC instead suggested measures to ‘ensure that measures to address trafficking in persons do not overshadow the need for effective measures to protect the human rights of sexworkers’. (UNHRC, 2014). In offering potential benchmarks towards enabling a more emancipatory approach, the Rapporteur’s Report emphasized upon: a recognition of the profession along a non-criminalizing vein, dignity of labour, adequate protection against police harassment,

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along with adequate provisions of healthcare, and equal opportunities in the societal order. It also stated the complications of conflating all forms of Trafficking crudely with Prostitution, in that this precludes an element of volition as well as negates other instances of trafficking like those of labour trafficking, child labour, and bonded labour in sweatshops. The Report further noted the presence of a penalizing model in India that treated sex-workers as criminals over citizens, in tandem with ideologies of moral judgement that consequently affected their rehabilitation. Here, the consent of sex-workers in rehabilitation measures was mostly disregarded, and upon ‘rescue’ women were involuntarily incarcerated in medical centres or correction facilities, which many resented. Finally, the Report offered recommendations to strengthen sex-workers’ right to justice. These include: Firstly, the formation of communitybased organizations and labour collectives towards awareness-building; Secondly, participation of sex-workers themselves in the formulation of policies pertaining to their lives, primarily in the public health domain of HIV/STI campaigns; Thirdly, free legal aid services in cases of exploitation; Fourthly, sensitization their situation factors and adequate protection under National Human Rights Instruments (NHRIs) (UNHRC, 2014). Against this backdrop of the various forms of systemic and institutionalized discrimination afflicting sex-workers in India today, it is vital to reference some constitutional alongside international provisions that guarantee all Indian citizens the right to work with dignity, alongside seek redressal in cases of harassment. The Supreme Court of India in its landmark judgement of Budhadev Karmaskar vs. State of West Bengal (2011), ruled and recognized that all humans possess the basic rights to life and dignity of labour, which extended to prostitutes. In invoking Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, the judgement further took cognizance of the volition of sex-workers in their right to choose their profession under suitable environments, or opt for rehabilitation, none of which could however be coerced upon them.3 Thereafter, despite the illegal or discriminated status accorded to sexworkers in various nations across the world, the United Nations has promoted an experiential and non-discriminatory approach towards sexworkers, in recent decades. Although it recognizes penalties for the 3 Supreme Court of India, Budhadev Karmaskar vs. State of West Bengal (14 February 2011): https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1302025/.

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practice of trafficking and coerced sexual exploitation, UN conventions demarcate a distinction between sex trafficking from other forms of consensual sexual labour. They note that an inclusion of subjects’ choices and bodily autonomy should be made integral in the formulation of policies regarding their futures. Take for example the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) that observes how the moralistic regulation of prostitution across countries has accorded an illegal status accorded to workers, making them vulnerable to a violation of human rights principles, unequal protection under the law, and/or a lack of safe working conditions (CEDAW, 1992). The UNDP and ILO analogously recommend ‘the necessary enactments to provide sex-workers with rights that are enforceable by law, like the right to safety, occupational health, and also the right of participation in the development process of laying down the health and safety standards at workplace’.4 However, despite the aforesaid paradigms for inclusion, the rights of sex-workers in India in the recent decades remain abysmal, with subjects viewed primarily from the lens of sexual deviance, moral turpitude, or as agents of social disorder. Their exclusion from respectable civil society has culminated in a form of gentrification and segregation from public life, where they have been pushed to red-light districts in urban centres like Sonagachi in Kolkata, Kamthipura in Mumbai, or G.B. Road in Delhi. Despite being some of the largest red-light districts in Asia, these localities are frequently viewed as sites of crime, disease, public disorder, and social nuisance in the public imagination. The oppressive instruments of law enforcement agencies via brothel raids, forced medical check-ups, or other forms of police harassment, reinscribe some of the many challenges afflicting sex-workers, resulting in pervasive societal othering (UNHRC, 2014). At this juncture, a historical reference to Indian constitutional provisions towards safeguarding the rights of such marginalized groups in the early independence years, necessitates mention. Rohit De in his book A People’s Constitution discusses how non-elite, subaltern women like prostitutes frequently invoked clauses of the constitution to secure their rights as equal and legitimate workers of society in postcolonial India. Although 4 ILO Recommendation concerning HIV and AIDS and the World of Work [No 200] (Geneva: ILO Archives, 2010): https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/hiv-aids/WCMS_1 94088/lang--en/index.htm.

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female nationalist leaders like Muthulaksmi Reddy and Durgabai Deshmukh condemned the sex industry as a form of degradation against women, the 1950s was a period marked by sex-workers like Husna Bai who petitioned against various forms of systemic discrimination against them in courts. In invoking constitutionality to practise their rights to freedom of trade and profession, they argued in courts that The Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act impinged upon their fundamental rights to practise their profession, otherwise guaranteed under Article 19 of the Indian Constitution (De, 2018). To historically conceptualize the stigmatized status of prostitutes in India, we also need to ascertain the legacies of the colonial state, in its inscribed punitive mechanisms historically, via the Indian Penal Code (implemented in 1860). The imperial policing of sexuality across the British Empire primarily arose out of a need to counter the moral disorder that divergent sexual practices in colonies posed to patriarchal gender relations and family structures in Britain. In Eurocentric civilizing mission discourses, non-domesticated women were constructed as an archetype of social deviance, criminality, backwardness, and superstition, deemed intrinsic to oriental cultures. They also posed a direct threat to puritanical gendered norms of domesticity, passive sexuality, and patriarchy that were being safeguarded in nineteenth-century Britain against an emergent feminist consciousness (Levine, 2004). Furthermore, it is pertinent to take cognizance of the global dimension of imperial power constituted through prostitution reform in India, as policy-makers in Britain sought to actively champion the cause of prostitution reform in the 1920s in light of India’s membership to the League of Nations, and also to consolidate forms of colonial governmentality premised on its benevolent protection of native women, by which Britain could maintain a veneer of civilizational supremacy on international humanitarian stages (Legg, 2014). In colonial classifications, the two dichotomized representations of the prostitute either as a victim of abuse or a sexually immoral profiteer, thereafter stripped women of the autonomy to define their vocational status on their own terms, even when their daily lives contested state nomenclatures (Mitra, 2020). Moreover, Indian nationalists imbibed conjugal matrimony as the sole, respectable vanguard for sexual behaviors, whereby the legacy of imperial gendered norms was normalized and institutionalized in the making of the independent Indian nation, in what Ashis Nandy terms ‘the psychological impact of colonialism’ (Nandy, 1988). The dangers that gendered minorities

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posed to the national project justified coercive and oftentimes intrusive projects of bodily disciplining. The correction of women’s sexualities thus constituted the epistemological and ontological principle against which pedagogical ideals of respectable citizenship were constructed in the independent nation-state (Mani, 1998). The female members of the Indian Constituent Assembly alike echoed such viewpoints. Take for instance Article 6 of the All India Women’s Conference, which reiterated the role of women towards maintaining the nation’s moral character, along with declaring the practice of prostitution as a societal evil (Sinha, 1999). Against such aspects of historical disenfranchisement, the constitutional remedies invoked by sex-workers like Husna Bai in the early independence years, thereby herald a noteworthy shift. In the decades of the 1950s and 1960s, certain sex-workers achieved limited nature of success in making direct appeals to Central and State Governments in the form of petitions to allow them to practise their profession, on grounds of circumstantial conditions or financial duress. Though not all were successful in courts, this nevertheless delineates their self-representation as well as the circumscribed nature of legal safeguards that have characterized India’s complex approach to prostitution historically. As established by De: In addition to being publicly defiant Husna Bai departed from the prevalent strategies of peers by taking advantage of the constitutional discourse, which allowed her to challenge the very fundamentals of the law... Husna Bai claimed her right to a trade and a profession, guaranteed to her under the Constitution, by stating that prostitution was her hereditary trade, and her only means of livelihood. She claimed freedom for her entire class rather than asking for an individual exemption from the law. (De, 2018)

Such voices and contestations from the margins, thus epitomize the heterogenous socio-political configurations of sex-worker rights, as well as the diverse historical subjectivities of such subaltern subjects in India. They further elucidate the invocation of constitutional provisions as redressal for the rights of marginalized actors, along with the mutating contours of intersectional feminist mobilization in South Asia, across temporal disjunctures.

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Deconstructing Myths surrounding Prostitution and Trafficking Discourses Notwithstanding the above factors, it has been historically difficult to get sexual rights onto the human rights agenda in India. As discussed above, the blueprint for rehabilitation projects or public health initiatives often becomes the grounds for criminalizing gendered minorities over improving their life circumstance under the garb of women’s rights (Rao, 2003). Additionally, it is pertinent to allude to some theoretical scholarship on this topic, which establishes the significance of deploying a bottom-up, intersectional framework of analysis. John Frederick critically evaluates the narrative of the ‘Rescue Myth’, which has intrinsically shaped initiatives on law enforcement, public policy, healthcare interventions, and social worker rescue projects. Alluding to the large nexus of sex-trafficking occurring across the Nepal-India border into brothels in Mumbai, here the victim is presented as a naive, vulnerable girl who is drugged, duped, sold, and raped against her will, subsequently rescued by governmental organizations who chart the course of her rehabilitation and reform. This assumes a highly gendered heteronormative vision of sexuality along that of colonial epistemologies, in bifurcating between a passive female victim and highly masculinized male perpetrator. This narrative is accompanied by a diverse array of problems. It presupposes the discourse of the patriarchal state assuming the welfare function of rescuing the poor, hapless victim (inevitably a female) who is sold or trafficked against her will. These generalized portrayals negate instances of willed cross-border migration out of socio-economic circumstances, via crudely equating all forms of cross-border trafficking with sex-trafficking alone. Such mythical imageries ultimately invoke notions of the coercion and victimhood of women and children (synonymously presented as vulnerable groups devoid of agency) towards mobilizing humanitarian support, reinforcing mechanisms of state protection, alongside strengthening law enforcement agencies that further restrict subjects’ freedom of movement and bodily autonomy. Such an approach can also lead well-intentioned NGOs to continue the objectification, reification, and re-traumatization of rescued persons, culminating in a dangerous precedent that it is only through close regulation and surveillance in state-sanctioned shelters that women’s recovery can be achieved (Frederick, 2016). Conceivably so, the ‘Rescue-Myth’ narrative hyperbolically presents the brothel as a site of crime instead of a workplace, which can erroneously

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present all forms of sexual commerce as immoral, and prolong a cycle of abuse by taking a criminalizing approach to rescue/rehabilitation. This could also prove to be counter-productive to the efforts of sex-worker unions, NGOs, or HIV support groups. Besides, it robs the woman of her agency or the desire to construct a happy future for herself, devoid of the patronizing role of the state. Post rescue, the sex-worker or trafficked person cannot become a regular employee/worker, carry forward with a happy marriage, or become a role model for other women. She has to fit into the typified account of the psychologically damaged figure whose identity is solely marked by her former occupational role as a sex-worker. The patronizing rhetoric of saving the victim becomes an oversimplification as it takes a homogenous approach to analysing the multiple operating forces at play. Consequently, in controlling sex-workers’ bodily autonomy (often associated with networks of crime and deviance), the state seeks to discipline gendered minorities in establishing its pedagogical norms of citizenship as well as its control over informal economies of sexual commerce. This also brings up another fundamental question: spaces surrounding sexual economies in the public versus private domain. What if such acts had been carried out in private homes instead of public sites? Under current Indian laws on prostitution, the selling of sex is legally permissible in private residences of the sex-worker or client, while illegal in public spaces like brothels and street solicitation. The use of private residences by the prostitute or client, is an unregulated domain, which complicates this scenario even further. Moreover, the ITPA coalesces Trafficking with Prostitution as an inter-related and synonymous phenomena, and is intended as a means of limiting and eventually abolishing prostitution in India by gradually criminalising various aspects of sex-work. Such policy mediations concurrently disregard complexities in situational settings with regards to causal factors propelling a turn towards sexual commerce and instead legitimize a punitive policing mechanism that merely projects the brothel as a site of crime, thereby disregarding other forms of informal sex-work that take place on the street or in private spaces. They further pay scarce attention to issues of human rights, public health, social hygiene, and/or women’s empowerment.5 5 In India, although the current laws regulating the “selling of sexual services for money” is legal, under specific circumstances, while it a punishable offense if carried out in public (this includes pimping, street solicitation, kerb-crawling, or paid sex in brothels

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These above-stated myths postulate how the welfare paradigm is used to present the nation-state as the guardian of women’s rights, in which the abduction/trafficking of women is synonymous with a direct assault on state power as the protector of the rights of its subjects. In this, the rescue of women accordingly becomes tantamount to the enterprise of nation-building. The idea of cleansing the contaminated woman’s body becomes central to nationalist discourse, in which the sexual capacity of the sex-worker has to be appropriated as the nation’s attempt of self-legitimization and moral purification. Alluding to the Rescue-Myth discourse, if a woman chooses to become a sex-worker on her own will, she then defies the moral values of the nation-state. The articulation of pedagogical norms of citizenship through the story of the rescued survivor is therein inherently linked with the appropriation of women’s sexualities, which in turn ontologically determine the frontiers of respectable identities and legitimate subjecthood. This unravels not only the gendering of the nation as a masculine space but also the depiction of an ideal woman along ideological terms. It is ironic that in an effort to assert itself as a protector, the state itself became an abductor forcibly removing women from brothels, separating them from their children, and dictating their lives, bodies, and sexualities (Frederick, 2016). The writings of Carole Vance and Dina Francesca Haynes reveal a second myth to writing the discourse of trafficking becomes through the lens of ‘Melodrama’. Vance recounts how most sex-trafficking documentaries (predominantly award-winning ones like The Selling of Innocents depicting the flesh trade between Nepal and Mumbai brothels), mobilize emotional support from the viewer through their sensationalized, oversimplified accounts. This genre of ‘Melomentary’ here does have certain uses. Its urgency and emotive appeal can galvanize public support and fundraising endeavours. It can also be vital for governments and NGOs to inform campaigns towards women’s rights. Nonetheless, it is misleading for a multitude of factors. ‘Trafficking’ is a fluid term that takes on a myriad of forms (kidnapping, drugs-related, smuggling, servitude, minor or hotels. The use of private residences by the prostitute or client, is an unregulated domain, which complicates this scenario even further. Moreover, the All India Suppression of Immoral Traffic Act (SITA), conflates Trafficking with Prostitution as inter-related and synonymous phenomena, and is intended as a means of limiting and eventually abolishing prostitution in India by gradually criminalising various aspects of sex-work. Refer to The Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act 1956: http://www.protectionproject.org/wp-content/ uploads/2010/09/India_Acts_1986.pdf.

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trafficking, indentured labour, debt bondage, agricultural labour, etc.), transgressing merely sex-trafficking. Over-emphasizing on sex-trafficking that takes on a gendered nature (restricted to girls and women alone), can exclude its multifaceted nature: namely the complexities in coalescing Trafficking with Prostitution, women’s volition in light of life-alternatives, and a simplistic ‘good vs. evil’ narrative strategy in exaggerating aspects of horrific perpetrator-abuse vs. victim-suffering. This disregards bottom-up forms of mobilization like Self-Help Groups, peer education, awarenessbuilding, healthcare coverage, LGBTQ emancipation, in addition to collective action by sex-workers themselves against police brutality and state corruption. Finally, it departs from a rights-enhancing lens of action and instead yields to protectionist patriarchal interventions, whereby the contextual analysis of sex-work becomes restricted to individual villains and state saviours, rather than an assessment of the structural conditions sustaining it (Vance, 1984). Moreover, in such depictions, the narrative of suffering is exaggerated as means of evoking sympathy along lines of imageries of victimization and female sexual innocence, which have little grounding in facts or situational contexts, therein unleashing forms of propaganda and public misinformation. This characterizes many over-hyped journalistic portrayals, which while leading to urgency of action, limit response mechanisms based on comprehensive analyses. Their skewed causal evaluation of the problem at hand alongside rudimentary solutions to trafficking in equating superstar personalities as human rights activists, can distort a holistic understanding of the problem, as well as preclude the passage of effective legislations. As policy-makers sometimes include celebrities to fundraising events or congressional hearings to increase their own visibility in the public, this too can perpetuate a lopsided agenda that equates social change primarily with celebrity association towards humanitarian efforts (Haynes, 2014). Vance aptly states, ‘By definition, protectionist interventions that aim to rescue the victim, with no consultation about the remedies desired by differently situated people, are patronizing, as well as ineffective, since the remedy is generated solely by the sensibility of the rescuer’ (Vance, 2012).

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Alternative, Inclusive and Non-stigmatizing Paradigms In lieu of the limitations of the aforesaid trafficking and prostitution frameworks, Anne Gallagher (Adviser to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Manager of OHCHR’s Anti-trafficking Program)6 takes cognizance of the merits of a bottom-up, inclusive approach of integrating individual voices and experiential accounts. This could lead to better prevention, interception, rehabilitation, and integration efforts. Her use of case studies and interviews, provides a useful lens for absorbing the diversity of survivors’ experience through the voices of trafficked persons, sex-workers, and migrant laborers. She discusses how it is this experiential aspect that has largely been rendered moot in most regional, national, and international efforts. However, while individual stories provide a potent tool to delve into survivor experiences, one needs to be sensitive to the ways in which they are used, for misrepresentation can facilitate acts of epistemological and ontological exploitation. In conducting interviews, it therein becomes crucial to protect the safety and psychological health of survivors along lines of the WHO Ethical and Safety Recommendations for Interviewing Trafficked Women (Gallagher, 2001). In drawing lessons for the issue of sex-workers’ rights, it would be useful to assimilate such an inclusive approach vis-à-vis encapsulating the lived experiences of women themselves towards devising comprehensive healthcare, education, and other social security benefits. Taking into account the nature of constraints in the Indian context, it would also be useful to look at some alternative transnational approaches. The Sex-workers Project at the American ‘Urban Justice Center’ is an initiative that provides client-centred legal and social services to individuals who engage in sex-work, (regardless of whether they do so by choice, circumstance, or coercion), alongside taking an approach that is grounded in human rights, harm reduction along with incorporating the real-life experiences of trafficked persons towards debunking mythical representations that result in faulty interventions. In its 2009 Report, it

6 Anne Gallagher is Adviser on Trafficking to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Manager of OHCHR’s Anti-trafficking Program. She has worked with the United Nations since 1992 and has been involved in a range of mandates including economic, social, and cultural rights; the human rights of women; human rights training for the police and peacekeepers; and other global human rights institutions.

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surveys the dubitable implications of forced brothel raids and rescue operations, resulting in subsequent proceedings of punishment and forceful rehabilitation rather than securing humanitarian solutions. It further exposes how inclusion of the living conditions and situational factors of sex-workers themselves, can better inform issues of consent, coercion, bodily autonomy, and societal integration. Based on insider insights, such bottom-up approaches repudiate criminalization systems towards sex-work, many of which are rooted in brothel raids, police harassment, and forceful abduction in further violating subjects’ rights. Most abolitionist positions even that of well-intentioned NGOs, can therefore result in a denial of choice, in a complete erasure of the sex-worker’s agency. In such circumstances, it would be useful to take cognizance of the resilience of some survivors in wanting to move forward and create a new life, find jobs, and construct an identity for themselves, beyond that of the sex-worker, which their association as a degraded prostitute in the criminalization lobby, does little to ensure.7 As established by anthropologist Patty Kelly, ‘The raids on clandestine prostitutes and the control of prostitution in general are expressions of power that reinforce already existing inequalities of gender and class… It is a way to harass poor women and men through detention and the gathering of information, and to create the illusion of the control of visible prostitution by the state’ (Kelly, 2008: 62). Along a similar vein, in suggesting improvements to the international legal regime surrounding trafficking and sex-work, Anne Gallagher acknowledges how it is paramount that human rights protocols by nations should not discipline adult consensual prostitution at the risk of minimizing human rights principles. She highlights some of these principles as: lack of gendered discrimination upon rehabilitation, the rights of shelter detainees to dignity, legal counsel, autonomy of movement, adequate healthcare including counselling and psychological services, and Monitoring & Evaluation mechanisms that are free from political interference (Gallagher & Pearson, 2008). She further critiques the United States trafficking protocol i.e. the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) influencing global standards and international border regulations, which discounts the distinct intersectional subjectivities of actors from the Global South, and replicates patterns of oppression that it seeks to 7 Sex-workers Project, “The Use of Raids to Fight Trafficking in Persons” (2009): https://sexworkersproject.org/publications/reports/raids-and-trafficking/

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remedy. In proposing a Tier-based countrywide monitoring of trafficking, while imposing sanctions on less developed systems and downgrading countries with legalized prostitution, the Act does little to incorporate the experiential accounts of subjects themselves in the making of laws pertaining to their lives (Gallagher, 2010). Alicia Peters correspondingly articulates limits to the TVPA’s norms on trafficking, in that while the presence of fraudulent recruitment is insufficient to prove the existence of labour trafficking, the standards of proof for sex-trafficking are much lower (Peters, 2015).

League of Nations + United Nations Frameworks in the Colonial Period The penultimate part of this paper turns to the historical evolution of the ILO’s approach to sex-worker rights, along with offers potential solutions for the Indian context against emergent undercurrents of global humanitarian discourses. This sub-section analogously traces temporal shifts in the ILO’s present-day approach to prostitution, in the transition from the colonial to the postcolonial. In doing so, while it problematizes some of the Eurocentric legacies that have shaped its institutional workings historically, it also traces the ILO’s recent transition to rightscentric paradigms in the twenty-first century, which have been influenced by feminist lobbies, civil society movements, and NGOs from the Global South. It is pertinent to start this section with a discussion of the formative policies of the League of Nations in the interwar years, and its successor the United Nations. The issue of trafficking in women in children, particularly that of European women, emerged as prime grounds for some of the League’s foreign policy deliberations, especially in the aftermath of panic surrounding the White Slave Traffic. A nineteenth-century drive aimed at protecting the trafficking of white women particularly, this constituted the origins of trafficking and prostitution protocols in the international arena.8 In the League’s anti-traffic committees of the 1920s and 1930s, it emerges that the socio-economic contexts that drove women to seek earnings from various forms of sexual commerce were 8 League of Nations Advisory Committee on Traffic in Women and Children (hereafter referred to as ‘Committee’), Minutes of the Ninth Session, Eighth Meeting, Geneva, 5 April 1930, 49, LNA C.246M.121.1930.IV.

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acknowledged.9 Its deliberations that were largely framed by colonial ruling elites, Christian missionaries, or abolitionist lobbies, nevertheless conceptualised of ‘prostitution’ as a necessary evil over a legitimate form of work that drove women towards an ‘immoral life’, and correspondingly asked member-states to respond to ‘the particular evils caused by present circumstances’.10 The moralistic underpinnings shaping the formation of prostitution policies at the League’s and subsequent ILO’s deliberations, soon extended to the domain of native women as colonial powers sought to position their civilizational supremacy premised on protecting colonized women from their intrinsically barbaric cultures, along oriental despotism ideologies. This was also in line with consolidating the humanitarian dimension of imperial power projected through the protection of Indian women, as policy-makers in Britain sought to actively champion the cause of prostitution legislations in the 1920s in light of India’s membership to the League of Nations, and to consolidate forms of colonial governmentality premised on its benevolent protection of native women. In projecting the benign nature of colonizing social customs upon colonized worlds, along Eurocentric racialized bio-politics, Britain could therein maintain a veneer of civilizational supremacy on international humanitarian stages. These, along with measures like the abolition of Sati (Widow Immolation) and Child Marriage, emerged as a metonym of the social evils of traditional societies like India, thereby justifying the imposition of colonial rule as a form of benevolent paternalism (Tambe, 2009). The writings of Lata Mani (Ibid) and Andrea Major (2006) on Sati (the practice of widow immolation), offer a useful theoretical lens for understanding the limits of the colonial versus nationalistic debate over women’s bodies. They elucidate the limits of both orientalist and nationalist positions on sexual regulation vis-a-vis their disregard for the actual woman’s experiences or alternatives in her life circumstances. The former body of scholarship underscores how Eurocentric discourses on women’s 9 Committee, Minutes of the Thirteen Session, Second Meeting, Geneva, 4 April 1934, 16–27, 26–27, LNA CTFE/13th Session/PV. 10 “The moral protection of young women drawn up by the International Labour Office,” in Prevention of Prostitution: A Study of Preventive Measures, Especially Those which Affect Minors (Geneva, League of Nations Advisory Committee on Social Questions, 15 May 1939), 60–61, LNA, CQS/A/19(a).

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rights across the ‘respectable’ spaces of humanitarian reform in the colonial period, are replete with generalized/stereotyped descriptions of indigenous women victimized under the innate, social practices of Hindu culture, and incapable of exercising rational control over their lives. Intervention along Western enlightenment principles was deemed necessary to defend women from the ‘inner, essential, identity of the East’, whereby European liberalists were acting on behalf of Indian women in need of their protection. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s argument of ‘White men saving brown women from brown men’, critiques the projected colonial intermediation on humanitarian grounds,11 which shaped transnational initiatives on the disciplining of women’s bodies across the shared spaces of Empires. Such abolitionist attitudes towards women’s sexual agency negated the indexical register of women’s lived experiences, in the process. Conversely, nationalist historiographies across the nineteenth and twentieth century alike, fall trap to the patriarchal language of ‘protection’ over the bodies of native women, which continued to impede women’s agency and experiential encounters. From the native perspective, women fell into the realm of the domestic realm of the home, and gendered issues were to be situated within the frontiers of the family and community alone. While missionaries viewed the act of Sati as a violation of the law that infringed upon civil liberties in the public sphere, Hindu traditionalists viewed Sati as a private, domestic custom, upon which European interference was not to be tolerated. In their fight against imperialist forces, the issue of Sati was used to define the boundaries of a select terrain of cultural nationalism, whereby control over women’s bodies remained under the sole jurisdiction of the nation’s men alone. The norms of sexual propriety were hereby to be situated within a nationalist interpretive framework of anti-colonial identity-politics, in which the issue of women’s rights was strategically utilized to justify social concerns for self-determination and self-rule.12

11 Spivak critiques such universalist and essentialist teleologies, which may not be applicable across pluralistic cultures, and reproduce the patterns of oppression they purportedly critique. Refer to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?”, in Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory, ed. Patrick Williams & Laura Chrisman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 66–111. 12 Here, Hindu nationalists felt that women’s decisions fell under their area of authority and a foreign intruder was not in a position to encroach upon age-old cultural practices. Refer to Andrea Major, “Self-determined Sacrifices? Victimhood and Volition in British

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Thereafter, in the aftermath of the war years and the emergence of the ILO as the international body to safeguard workers’ rights, the issue of prostitution emerged as a major arena of deliberation for the Indian delegation, both for colonial and nationalist administrators. As a result of the moralistic frameworks guiding its predecessor i.e. the League’s workings, the ILO in the early twentieth century promoted itself as a crucial player in supervising female labour. While radical for its times in that it advocated for women’s rights to be safeguarded through their financial autonomy outside of domestic household labour, in its contribution to the Committee’s Study on the ‘Prevention of Prostitution’, its findings however stated that certain avenues of employment like jobs in the sex trade, in bars, dance halls or other publicly licentious places ‘may cause moral danger’.13 It consequently advocated three key measures aimed at providing dignity for female labour along a protectionist paradigm: ‘regulation of women’s placing operations, protection in the workplace, and protection of female workers during their spare time’.14 However, it is important to note that on no account were the League’s and ILO’s attitudes monolithic or straightforward in nature. They were marked by historical inconsistencies, shifts, and constant disagreements amidst imperial member-nations. This is especially because some of its leading signatories like imperial Britain were marked by the sanctioning of a select form of prostitution in colonies like India to pander to the sexual needs of the military in cantonment areas. The writings of Ashwini Tambe and Kenneth Ballhatchet illustrate the racial hierarchies governing the nature of selective, institutionalized prostitution across the British Empire. Inspite of the criminalization of native prostitution, Tambe explores how European prostitution acquired a legitimized status in India’s newly stratified sexual order from the 1900s. Methodologically reliant on a diversity of sources including League of Nations reports, travel accounts, anecdotal evidence, census surveys, missionary perspectives, police reports and social workers’ records, she critiques both

Constructions of Sati in the Rajput States, 1830–60”, History and Anthropology 17, no. 4 (2006): pp. 315–316. 13 Committee, Minutes of the Fifteenth Session, Fifth Meeting, Geneva, 22 April 1936, 4, LNA CTFE/15th Session/PV.5. 14 Committee, Minutes of the Third Session, Geneva, 7–11 April 1924, 83, LNA C.217.M.71.1924.IV.

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colonial and international anti-trafficking discourses, in that they selectively allowed for the operation of the sex trade to meet the sexual needs of Europeans in colonies as well as prevent fears of mixed-race progeny. Imperial anxieties about racial intermixing allowed for a sanctioning of ‘white’ sex-work as a necessary evil, albeit fostered the transportation of prostitutes from across Europe who accorded greater rights than their native counterparts. This ran counter to the efforts of missionary organizations advocating for the abolition of prostitution, which explicates how ruling elites were much more motivated towards controlling interracial sexual recreation in colonies than sex-work in the Metropole. Tambe studies how paradoxically enough, international anti-trafficking efforts consolidated rather than undermined such relations of coercive protection, mainly because they were largely shaped by the efforts of imperial powers. In a strange historical contradiction, the League of Nations’ anti-trafficking measures in the 1920s were marked by instances of encouraging member-states to focus on cross-national cases and thirdparty procurers, while overlooking groups of women who were deemed sufficiently ‘pure’ like those living under patriarchal familial structures or monitored by a male guardian. This concomitantly echoed a linear understanding of trafficking as being restricted to brothels alone, along with a myopic vision that the transportation of European women for purposes of sex-work occurred along lines of voluntary migration (Tambe, 2005). Analogously, Ballhatchet (1980) demarcates the processes by which colonial reforms on prostitution and concubinage fit into a larger pattern of racialized and gendered dominance of colonial elites to subjugate nonWestern populations in mapping mechanisms of social control that had previously been deployed in Britain. The emergent definition of prostitution as a necessary evil in colonies, was a central trope in maintaining a civilizational yardstick of difference between the respectable, western woman from her depraved South Asian counterpart. The institutional apparatus surrounding women’s rights and humanitarian interventions thus needs to be ascertained in light of such Eurocentric genealogies surrounding orientalist, prostitution discourses.

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Evolution of the ILO’s Approach to a Rights-Centric Approach on Empowering Sex-Workers in the Twenty-First Century This paper now moves to a discussion of shifts in the ILO’s presentday policies in its approach to sex-work: one that is largely foregrounded in the rights of workers, public health efforts in acknowledging them as equal and legitimate participants in HIV/STI awareness and prevention drives, and finally the prevention of a punitive framework of regulation. A detailed discussion of the causal factors behind such shifts is beyond the thematic scope of the paper; here, I instead focus on the implications of these emergent policies. As the ILO has in recent decades, taken a more bottom-up up approach to sex-worker rights that is focused on the inclusive participation of such historically stigmatized actors in a departure from historically criminalizing frameworks, the paper now turns to this aspect. In an influential yet controversial 1998 Report titled The Sex Sector: The Economic and Social Bases of Prostitution in Southeast Asia, the International Labour Organization calls for an economic recognition of the sex industry as a legitimate form of labour, as well as advocates for a recognition of the causal/situational factors that lead impoverished women in low-income regions to seek avenues to sustain themselves and their families (Lim, 1998). It also denotes a key aspect of choice in that the discourse on Trafficking should not be conflated with Prostitution, and that not all instances of sex-work can be typified along descriptions of sexual exploitation or coercion. ‘For those adult individuals who freely chose sex-work, the policy concerns should focus on improving their working conditions and social protection, and on ensuring that they are entitled to the same labour rights and benefits as other workers’ (Lim, 1998: 212). Owing to their insights on the need for safe and consensual practices, it recommends their integration into forms of social activism and HIV/STI campaigns. In collating oral testimonies from sex-workers, further discourages over-sensationalized narratives that often accompany media stories, as they detract from a comprehensive understanding of the problem at hand and instead rest on emotive, ideologically charged interventions. Many current studies which highlight ‘the pathetic stories of individual prostitutes’ and focus on coercion and deceit tend ‘to sensationalize the issues and to evoke moralistic, rather than practical responses’ (Lim, 1998: 2). The Report also draws a demarcating

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line between minor labour and sexual exploitation from willed instances of consensual sex-work, particularly in light of a lack of alternative or better employment options from marginalized actors. This recognition of a rights-based and bottom-up approach rooted in workers’ choice and bodily autonomy, signals a discernible shift from its historical moralistic disciplining parameters. However, the ILO in its 1998 Report stops short of taking an explicit stance on prostitution legalization and instead leaves the question of legislation to be a national issue, contingent on the individual policies of countries. This nonetheless epitomizes a significant shift in its recognition of the sex industry based on workers’ volition and a departure from age-old moralistic disciplining and/or criminalizing approaches that have historically characterized the international developmental arena. The aforesaid criteria provide a useful frame of reference into the application of inclusive and representative standards in the rehabilitation of disenfranchised subjects, who are located at the margins of civil society. They inform human rights interventions that consider and contextualize women’s choice, bodily autonomy, and situational backgrounds. Additionally, such holistic frameworks could go a long way in providing learning lessons for the implementation of rescue and rehabilitation projects in India. In light of certain global humanitarian rights-based approaches such as the ones discussed above, the paper now turns to a discussion of the specificities of the Indian context. Here, Svati Shah’s literature on the structural conditions of urban spaces that determine the nature of sexual commerce, is instructive. In tracing the urban ‘pull’ factor of cities that plays a definitive role in attracting poor, vulnerable groups, she showcases the spatial dynamics and geo-political settings shaping sex-work. Consequently, the financial centre of Mumbai that facilitates an exodus of rural migrant workers with limited education and skillsets who finding no better financial prospects, get dragged into indentured labour and/or sexual commerce as a survival strategy. Shah additionally unpacks the violent politics of regulation as the local police sporadically harass sex-workers towards protecting bourgeoise, respectable residential areas, in tandem with real estate agents who are sanctioned to arbitrarily check the residential quarters of suspects. Her study deconstructs sexworkers through their multiple subjectivities; hence contesting linear analyses through binaries of choice/coercion, victimization/protection, and

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instead traces nuances like rural-urban migration, lack of unskilled/semiskilled labour opportunities, informal daily-wage markets, along with the various instrumentalities of state-sponsored violence (Shah, 2014). This paper finally turns to a discussion of the voices and lived experiential accounts of sex-workers in India, and a need to incorporate such occluded voices from civil society into the historical record.

Indian NGOs Working Towards Change: Notable Case Studies of Civil Society Movements Experiential accounts from the prostitution industry itself debunk many of the humanitarian myths surrounding policy and developmental discourses. In advocating for comprehensive recommendations towards improving policy deliberations and humanitarian legislations for gendered minorities, it is noteworthy to look at some such grassroots-level community initiatives in India. One such example is that of Durbar Mahila Samanwaya Committee, an NGO in West Bengal working towards identifying and challenging underlying socio-structural factors that perpetuate issues of societal stigma, material deprivation and civil society exclusion against sex-workers. Its social activists (many of them sex-workers themselves) strive towards demanding: the dignity of sexual labour, addressal of HIV/STIs infecting the community, awareness strategies and empowerment campaigns, as an inevitable first step towards eliminating the widespread gender discrimination characterizing their sector. Durbar workers also advocate the legalization of the prostitution industry in India as they believe that its clandestine, underground nature enhances networks of crime, drugs, and simultaneous workers’ stigmatization. Its film-project, Tales of the Night Fairies records the life stories of former sex-workers in Kolkata’s Sonagachi district towards exploring the collective organization of marginalized groups together with feminist non-abolitionist NGOs to advocate for their legal and healthcare rights. It was featured on international platforms like the Asian Film Festival in Rome, Association for Women’s Rights in Development International Forum in Mexico, and the San Francisco Sex-worker Film Festival, subsequently mobilizing feminist organizations globally towards sex-worker rights (Kempadoo, 2016). Moreover, Durbar workers effectively use performative culture as a cogent means to embody subversion and organize Nukkad Naataks (i.e. Street Plays), Carnivals, Music and Dance shows towards building awareness on the various problems afflicting

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them, along with the need to adopt a humanitarian over criminalizing paradigm. Especially against the disenfranchised status of such actors located at the margins of civil society today, such grassroots movements of resistance exemplify important signifiers of women’s bodily autonomy and occupational freedom. This is an empowering approach that could potentially abate the societal stigmatization of actors, done in dichotomized terms of deviance or victimization. Moreover, in demanding legal recognition as legitimate workers instead of being mute, passive objects of moralistic disciplining ideologies that constitute their impoverishment, Durbar activists demand occupational safeguards especially regulation from exploitation, particularly that of trafficking and prostitution of minors. Through their slogan ‘Sex-work is real work, we demand workers’ rights’, they argue that the formation of trade unions and self-regulatory boards would help eradicate many of the adversities that the clandestine nature of the industry creates.15 Similarly, Sampada Grameen Mahila Sanstha (SANGRAM ) and Veshya Anyay Mukti Parishad (VAMP ) in the states of Maharashtra and Karnataka, are rights-based, collective action NGOs that promote insider community participation as an intrinsic measure towards providing nonintrusive healthcare paradigms. These NGOs have designed empowerment programs like the formation of Self-Help Groups, whereby members can collectively negotiate loans with financial institutions towards skill development programs.16 They have also been instrumental in articulating the many predicaments faced by sex-workers, thereby positing the need for social security redressals and a recourse from arbitrary arrests/detention that have allowed for many forms of extortion by law enforcement agencies. Take, for instance, the perspectives noted by a VAMP social worker: A sex-worker with speech and hearing impairment was detained in an observation home after a brothel raid and produced in court after four months. We were present at the court when she told the judge that she wished to return home and did not want to be kept in the observation home. To our shock the judge declared in an open court, "She has come 15 Durbar Mahila Samanwaya Committee [DMSC]: https://durbar.org/. 16 Sampada Grameen Mahila Sanstha [SANGRAM]: https://www.sangram.org/.

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from the gutter and wants to return to the gutter. She will not listen." What justice can we expect from courts which treat us in such a demeaning manner?17

There are many such observations of the rampant violence, legal structural constraints, or the penalization of family members living on the earnings of prostitution, which has pushed sex-workers in India towards the fringes of respectable society. The role of the aforesaid narratives to account for the missing voices of marginalised groups, cannot be discounted. They help record complex modalities of subversive agency, resistance, and mobilization that contest mainstream development models. As analysed by Urvashi Butalia and Veena Das, in conditions of structural violence the recollection of suppressed silences can also serve functions of catharsis and emotional unburdening, especially for historically underrepresented groups. The value of oral histories is useful in recording the life circumstances of subaltern actors, many of which are absent from the visible pages of history, towards reconceptualizing limits to the makings of national and international human rights protocols. Even though, quantifiable/statistical data hold value, they fail to account for the lived experiences of sex-workers alongside their complex historical subjectivities.18 Such lost voices elucidate pluralistic facets of historical subjectivities, human experiences, and bottom-up adaptation, which can contest the top-down, arbitrary nature of state policing measures, and are therefore important to recuperate in the implementation of policies.

Conclusion In conclusion therefore, this paper has problematized some of the limits surrounding prostitution discourses in India with respect to rights-based frameworks advocated by international humanitarian paradigms. It has critically analysed the evolution of the prostitution industry in India by 17 Veshya Anyay Mukti Parishad (VAMP): https://www.nswp.org/members/asia-andthe-pacific/vamp-veshya-anyay-mukti-parishad. 18 See Urvashi Butalia, The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India

(Durham: Duke University Press, 2000); Veena Das, “Specificities: Official Narratives, Rumour, and the Social Production of Hate,” Social Identities 4, no. 1 (1998): pp. 109–130; Veena Das, “The Act of Witnessing: Violence, Poisonous Knowledge and Subjectivity,” in Violence and Subjectivity, ed. Veena Das et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

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considering some of the structural barriers facing its workers, and successively illustrated grassroots-level activist movements that advocate for their inclusion into civil society. It elucidates how developmental projects in India have historically relegated questions of female sexuality to the margins, in criminalizing concomitant groups of gendered minorities over ameliorating their life circumstances. It therefore suggests a more representative approach that considers the willed agency, bodily autonomy, and freedoms of analogous groups of disenfranchised actors. An inclusion of these occluded life stories can inform a profound change of discourse that includes the voices and empirical accounts of India’s informal-sector workers, alongside advocates for a more representative approach that takes into account their situational circumstances in the making of humanitarian protocols. By unpacking the experiential life stories of such marginalized actors, this paper has therefore encapsulated the intersectional concerns of gendered activisms from the Global South, as well as attempted to inform feminist epistemologies by incorporating the silenced histories of such subaltern actors.

References Ballhatchet, K. (1980). Race, sex, and class under the Raj: Race, sex, and class under the Raj: Imperial attitudes and policies and their critics. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. CEDAW. (1992). UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), CEDAW General Recommendations Nos. 19, Article 6. Adopted at the Eleventh Session, 1992. De, R. (2018). The case of the honest prostitute: Sex, work, and freedom in the Indian constitution. In A people’s constitution: The everyday life of law in the Indian Republic. Princeton University Press. Frederick, J. (2016). The myth of Nepal-to-India sex trafficking: Its creation, its maintenance, and its influence on anti-trafficking interventions. In K. Kempadoo, J. Sanghera, & B. Pattanaik (Eds.), Trafficking and prostitution reconsidered: New perspectives on migration, sex-work, and human rights. Routledge. Gallagher, A. (2001). Human rights and the new UN protocols on trafficking and migrant smuggling: A preliminary analysis. Human Rights Quarterly., 23(4), 975–1004. Gallagher, A., & Pearson, E. (2008). Detention of trafficked persons in shelters: A legal and policy analysis. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10. 2139/ssrn.1239745

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Gallagher, A. (2010). Improving the effectiveness of the international law of human trafficking: A vision for the future of the US trafficking in persons reports. Human Rights Review, 12(3), 381–400. Dina, H. F. (2014). The celebritization of human trafficking. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 653(1), 25–45. Kelly, P. (2008). Lydia’s open door: Inside Mexico’s most modern Brothel. University of California Press. Kempadoo, K. (2016). Introduction: Abolitionism, criminal justice, and transnational feminism. In K. Kempadoo, J. Sanghera, & B. Pattanaik (Eds.), Trafficking and prostitution reconsidered: New perspectives on migration, sex-work, and human rights. Routledge. Legg, S. (2014). Prostitution and the ends of empire: Scale, governmentalities and interwar India. Duke University Press. Levine, P. (2004). A multitude of unchaste women: Prostitution in the British Empire. Journal of Women’s History, 15(4), 159–163. Lim, L. L. (Ed.). (1998). The sex sector: The economic and social bases of prostitution in Southeast Asia. ILO Report. Major, A. (2006). Self-determined sacrifices? Victimhood and volition in British constructions of Sati in the Rajput states, 1830–60. History and Anthropology, 17 (4), 313–325. Mani, L. (1998). Contentious traditions the debate on Sati in colonial India. University of California Press. Mitra, D. (2020). Indian sex life. Princeton University Press. Nandy, A. (1988). The intimate enemy: Loss and recovery of self under colonialism. Oxford University Press. Peters, W. A. (2015). Responding to human trafficking. University of Pennsylvania Press. Rao, A. (2003). Understanding Sirasgaon: Notes towards conceptualizing the role of law, caste and gender in India. In A. Rao (Ed.), Gender & caste. Kali for Women. Shah, P. S. (2014). Street corner secrets. Duke University Press. Sinha, M. (1999). Suffragism and internationalism: The enfranchisement of British and Indian women under an imperial state. The Indian Economic & Social History Review, 36(4), 461–484. Tambe, A. (2005). The elusive Ingénue: A transnational feminist analysis of European prostitution in colonial Bombay. Gender & Society, 19(2), 160–179. Tambe, A. (2009). Codes of misconduct: Regulating prostitution in late colonial Bombay. University of Minnesota Press. UNHRC. (2014). Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its causes and consequences: Mission to India. Rasheeda Manjoo, Human Rights Council, 26th Session, A/HRC/26/38/Add. 1. Vance, S. C. (1984). Pleasure and danger: Exploring female sexuality. Routledge & K. Paul.

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Vance, S. C. (2012). Innocence and experience: Melodramatic narratives of sex trafficking and their consequences for law and policy. History of the Present, 2(2), 200–218.

CHAPTER 16

Minority Community Women’s Struggles Against Gender Unjust Religious Personal Laws in India and Bangladesh Maitree Devi

This article sets out an analysis of minority community women’s legal struggles with reference to the religious personal laws in India and Bangladesh. Furthermore, this article is based on the study of seven women rights organisations in India and eight women rights organisations in Bangladesh as well as based on extensive individual case studies from both countries. The research involved interviews, conversations and discussions with women activists from various backgrounds through extensive fieldwork. This chapter highlights the themes and threads that stood out in the conversations, interviews and discussions with women in India and Bangladesh.

M. Devi (B) Centre for Comparative Politics & Political Theory, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Ojha and P. Jaiswal (eds.), South Asian Women and International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9426-5_16

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India This study focuses on the role and agency individual Muslim woman have exercised in their choices and decision-making capabilities, in choosing mediators and strategies for their struggles. This study further charts the changes in Muslim women’s struggles and negotiations regarding rights and entitlements since India came into being as a nation state, a temporal dynamic that other studies reviewed so far do not take into account. Following are the significant findings of this study: Muslim Women’s Self-Interest and Bargaining Power A reasonably large number of Muslim women approach different informal judicial institutions as opposed to the ones of the state, against the discrimination and oppression they face in their family and community, confronting Muslim Personal Law. In the Muslim public sphere, Muslim women are becoming increasingly prominent. During our interviews, women activists told me that during training sessions, campaigns and counselling sessions, women meet up with other women and discuss and learn about the options and techniques accessible to them. Women between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five raise their voices vehemently against the inequality they face in the home. They intervene vehemently when their husband and in-laws tell lies in front of the female Qazis in the sharia adalat . The increased awareness in their early age can be the reason behind it. They are aware of the options they have, whom to go to with their grievances and what are their rights. However, in my study it has been observed that very few women after forty years of age are coming up with their grievances in these organisations. The experience of living half of their lives tolerating the discrimination, lack of security, uncertainty of the future and lack of awareness in the rural background, might be restraining them from taking actions against the oppression they are facing. Legal Pluralism: Unofficial Judicial Institutions as Productive Space for Litigation The number of women who approach the courts, police station and other state authorities when faced with oppression or discrimination, is relatively small in comparison to those approaching sharia adalat , darul qaza or

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any other religious authority. It is rarely that Muslim women go directly to file a civil suit or make a criminal complaint against husbands and in-laws, unless desperate and led by a women’s organisation, NGO or a family member who is familiar with the police or judicial system. Further, most women find court procedures too costly, in money and in time. Thus, the pluralistic legal systems comprised of less formal and unofficial dispute settlement bodies of the community provide the common grass-root level Muslim women, comfort space and quicker solutions. Female Qazis and Counsellors Conducting Sharia Adalat or Counselling: A Structural Change Muslim women’s organisations have long held the belief that maledominated boards of NGOs ignore the voice of women and fail to address women’s issues and grievances related to Muslim Personal Law which is not a true reflection of the intention of the Quran and its mentioned rights for women. These women’s organisations provide a space for structural change, allowing Muslim women to speak out against unequal personal law clauses (along with customary practises), as well as statecommunity repression that denied them equal opportunity and gender justice, which they claim the larger women’s movement could not provide for them. Nevertheless, most of the Muslim women’s organisations and NGOs also maintain contacts with progressive-minded (male) Qazis and Imams and seek their cooperation. Activists of Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan (BMMA) and CORO for Literacy explain that these progressive Qazis are also making their own networks towards developing relationships with these women’s organisations, mostly for their economic purposes. They are being supported by women’s organisations to get scholarships and to continue their livelihoods with regular incomes. It is pertinent to inform here that the Muslim women’s rights-based organisations and NGOs, I studied do welcome women from all religious communities to come to them with their complaints, as the goal of promoting gender equality cannot be sectarian. Muslim Women’s Experience of Civil Courts The reality of Muslim women’s historically disadvantaged position in the domestic and overall social situation impacts the treatment towards them by the court system. Muslim women are able to achieve only limited

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success in comparison to their hopes and expectations in courts, police stations and in the other state institutions. Muslim women are awarded meagre and minimal alimony and maintenance amounts in the courts, and face long delays in resolving cases and receiving justice. Further, they do not have equal rights to matrimonial property (or natal property). In both Bandra and Thane family courts, women litigants informed me that for more than three or four years, their maintenance cases have been going on. There is a huge distinction between the written law and the law as it is practised, in terms of what the law actually does, when women seek relief from the courts against discrimination and oppression they face in their family. Women are regularly encouraged to withdraw their demand for property share or accept a reduction in the amount of maintenance, allowance. The attitude of the lawyers, and judges is responsible for the difficulty women face in availing justice in legal arena. Eminent lawyer Flavia Agnes however says that a good legal strategy can bring justice to women (Interview, Flavia Agnes; July, 2019). Still, it is argued by the women litigants that the judiciary always believes what a man says in contrast to the distressed deserted woman regarding his earnings when they decide the maintenance amount for her and her children. The gender power asymmetries in men and women are manifested and the burden of adjustment and compromise falls primarily on women. Patterns of Oppression of Muslim Women The nature and source of discrimination and oppression that eventually leads to a case being filed in sharia adalat , in women’s organisations providing counselling sessions, or in the family court follow particular patterns. Litigants’ complaints about in-laws, particularly mother-in-law and sister-in-law, are common; husbands and in-laws complain about her neglect of, or poor skills in, housekeeping, cooking or childcare, her arguing with or talking back to them, and failing to show sufficient respect and obedience towards husband’s parents; litigants’ complaints also include dowry harassment. Women are harassed based on the number or quality of dowry items acquired by their in-laws, and is exposed to demands for further money and commodities from their natal home. The failure of her family to have provided sufficient dowry at the time of marriage or refusal due to inability to meet further monetary demands (cash for setting up new business, buying vehicle or household appliances, acquiring land and building house; or asking to sell natal house property

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and give cash, and financing husband to secure work in the Middle East or Gulf states), were frequently cited by women as causing mistreatment by husband and in-laws. Women in this sample are usually living away from their spouses or have been abandoned with their children after being kicked out of the house. Most women were only married for a brief time before getting kicked out. Further, women are given all the household work to do, prevented from spending time alone with husbands, and forbidden from visiting her natal house on festivals or in times of illness. Women complainants also informed that their husband complained that they visit their natal homes too often or without informing them and without securing permission. Also, women were told that there is a lot of intervention of their natal family members in their life. Another set of common complaints in these cases are being taunted for food, refusing to provide adequate or any food, suspicions held by a husband towards his wife, as well as charges of adultery, spying on her, stalking her whenever she left the house (even on legitimate and authorised outings), following her to her place of employment and creating a public scene, demanding her to quit job in case of working women, despite her earning being the family’s main source of income, misappropriating her jewellery or other possessions. Other common allegations against the husband include contracting other marriages without informing the previous wife or wives, alcoholism and gambling. The case studies and shalish sessions (under all the women organisations) discussed in this study, reflect in most of the cases that conflict with the husband’s mother, sister and other female in-laws often led to marital problems, even when the couple’s relationship had started off on a solid footing. Both psychological and physical abuse of wives by husbands and in-laws are frequently reported in the complaints by the women interviewed in sharia adalat , counselling sessions and in family courts. Verbal harassment is being reported to have escalated to physical abuse in the matter of time, and eventually led to throw the woman out of the house, stopped giving any allowance or maintenance, and sending back to the members of her natal house. Economic and Social Status of Muslim Women Litigants The majority of litigants and complainants belong to the lower-middle income strata. Their husbands are employed in low-paying occupations - tailor, weaver (zari work); auto, cab, taxi and truck driver; call centre

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employee; salesman, traders of small business and low-ranking government servants. Some of the women interviewed are employed outside the home, working as cleaners, house caretakers, selling clothes and cosmetics house to house, working as tailor, working as paid activist in NGO or voluntary organisations and so on. Some who had been separated, deserted by their husbands for a long time are intermittently earning small amounts doing home-based work of embroidery, sewing, preparing food items and taking tuition. Most of these women pronounced their marriages as having been arranged by their parents or family members. Most of these women are educated till school standard. A lot of time the prospective in-law’s family provided false or misleading information about the groom and themselves, on their income, employment and previous marital history. Also natal families failed to check the credentials and veracity of the information provided to them. Most of these women were married off and became mothers before they were eighteen years old. The case studies show that the educated women were married off to less educated men than them. Further, at the grass-root level, a girl’s education was not continued and they were not being encouraged to study more than school standard and were married off. In the case of boys, they by themselves did not want to continue their studies and dropped out of school before finishing, even if their parents wanted them to study. The ‘mehr’ amount offered is negligible for all the women in the sample I collected, and despite ‘mehr’ supposedly handed over to bride promptly at the time of wedding, majority of woman in the sample had not received it at the time of their wedding. They cited that the amount of ‘mehr’ has been decided by their male family members. Further, deep concerns about female modesty puts hindrances by the community and the family to Muslim women from seeking public employment, outside home. These structural factors are as influential as ideology made by community male leaders in keeping women in an economically dependent role, and under the protection and guidance of male family members, which resulted in them having a lack of education, job skills and experience and no respect in the family. This leaves them no other choice than to be economically dependent on the male family members and hence they ended up tolerating violence in the family. Moreover, strong gender preference is evident in the case studies. In most of the cases, the husband and in-law’s family ask for the child’s custody only when it is a male child. Besides, women were discriminated against, tortured and abandoned due

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to giving birth to female child or children. A woman is solely accused and blamed for giving birth to a girl child. Muslim men mostly denied providing any allowance, expenses, maintenance beyond the iddat period, if their ex-wives are not having any children with them. Moreover, the maintenance demands made in the family courts and sharia adalat led by lawyers, counsellors and female Qazis rarely include divorced women’s alimony for her; mostly the amount includes children’s support expenses only. There is hardly any challenge that has been posed by the lawyers in the family courts and female Qazis in the sharia adalat organisations to counter this practice. Family Members as Muslim Women’s Support System Most separated and divorced Muslim women, facing discrimination and oppression by in-laws received emotional support as opposed to financial support from their parents and siblings, and other natal family members, once the latter became aware that they were experiencing marital problems. The family members helped the woman to confront her husband and in-laws, brought her and her children back to their home, tried to get some help from a community committee, Jamaat, or Qazi, sharia adalat , family court or accompanied her to police station to file a complaint. Muslim Women’s Rights Organisations and Mainstream Women’s Movement: An Analysis Through a survey conducted in 1998, in 1999, the Muslim Women Rights Network was formed, which was a vibrant collective, working for Muslim women’s rights. However, before the Network, Muslim women’s organisations were existing and working for Muslim women’s in their respective capacities. More than twenty organisations used to meet regularly and have discussions on various issues faced by Muslim women. The Network took up four or five issues on Muslim women’s matrimonial rights- maintenance, polygamy, triple talaq, ‘halala’ and custody of children, under the customary practice of Muslim family law, where Muslim women were discriminated recurrently. Network’s raising voice about Muslim women’s equal property rights, maintenance and other rights and entitlements, posed a threat to the Muslim male-headed organisations. Eventually the Network broke away. However, it did set a benchmark and milestone to take forward the demands made and fight the battle

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against discrimination and oppression faced by Muslim women under the Muslim Personal Law. The Network created a lot of noise regarding the inequality around Muslim Personal Law. Network was on news because of their work and voices raised against Personal Law and its discrimination against women. Difference of Opinion Among Women’s Organisations Working for Muslim Women In the discussed findings there are women’s organisations that are publicly making persistent demands for the reform of Muslim Personal Law and gender just laws for Muslim women. Though there are difference of opinion; for instance, BMMA is asking for the reform on the basis of the rights and clauses being referred to in the Quran. Others like Bebaak Collective, CORO for Literacy, Parcham are claiming the reform on the basis of Indian Constitutional rights as referred in the articles and preamble and going beyond the boundaries set by Quranic values. Further, Majlis is demanding uniformity of existing laws for Muslim women rather than going for new reform-based laws. The Majlis is opposed to codified Muslim law because it believes that there is greater room for judges to interpret uncodified Muslim law because there are no strict structures. Criminalising the Triple Talaq Practice- Different Stands and Views The organisations are also divided in terms of their opinions on criminalising triple talaq practice. The organisations like Bebaak Collective, CORO for Literacy and Aawaaz-e-Niswaan (A-e-N) are questioning the rationality of making triple talaq a criminal offence and how a woman would benefit in receiving her entitlements (maintenance, allowance) when the maintenance provider is in jail or behind the bar. Bebaak Collective opines that the law should be in favour of maintenance, property share for Muslim women if she is divorced orally. A-e-N questions the controlling and rigidity in the law for women, but not for men in the Muslim Personal Law. They argue that men in order to continue their control on their privilege come out with different kinds of law and practice, and take out different kinds of fatwas according to their will. The organisation believes that Muslim women mostly do not want divorce; and in the case of instant triple talaq by the husband, the Domestic

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Violence Act is there to get the residential right and can challenge the instant triple talaq by taking help of the law, she can fight her case and get some allowance. But the criminalisation of triple talaq would result in the imprisonment of the Muslim man for three to four years and in such cases where would the woman go? Who will give maintenance, expenses for her and her children? There is no financial arrangement for these women by the government, when their husbands are behind the bar. Majlis argued that criminalisation of triple talaq is not the solution; they opine that Muslim women’s discrimination is responsible for lack of awareness, poverty and lack of education and not because of the personal law or customary practices. The Majlis claims that the Supreme Court, as well as numerous high courts around the country, have previously deemed instantaneous and arbitrary triple talaq unconstitutional based on Quranic mandates. Some of them (lawyer Nausheen Yusuf, lawyer Veena Gowda) also think that conservative religious bodies are no more aggressive than they were earlier, regarding their point of view on women’s rights. BMMA positioned itself as a proponent of the Triple Talaq Law, claiming that it will provide justice and equality to the victim woman. They believe that without deterrent, a law is pointless. Zakia Soman points out that in other cases any violation of civil law is a criminal offence, or else there is no effectiveness of it. On the basis of the cases coming to them, BMMA points out that triple talaq has been taking place despite the Supreme Court judgement banning it. Hence, only giving a judgement on triple talaq is not enough or the final solution. In this context when a law is being made and it is being violated, there should be punitive action against the person who violates it (Soman, 2019; Soman & Niaz, 2018). Lack of Support for Muslim Women’s Organisations In general, Muslim women’s organisations that I studied question the lack of support they have received from mainstream Indian women’s movements who feel constrained in raising questions about Muslim patriarchy because of the overall climate of rising Hindu majoritarianism. Grass root level organisations like BMMA, CORO for Literacy, Parcham stated that for Muslim women’s rights they experience lack of support and feel they are not on an equal footing in the mainstream women’s movement. First of all, these women organisations are operating in their specific political terrain and ideology. Second, ‘reform from

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within’ argument does not include women’s voices and demands for their rights and entitlements against the oppression or discrimination they are facing in the boundary of Muslim Personal Law. Muslim women’s rights and entitlements have been sacrificed to the ‘greater cause’ of community rights, with Muslim communities presenting their group rights as incompatible with and opposing Muslim women’s rights. Bebaak Collective, A-e-N, Forum Against Oppression Of Women (FAOW) (and also BMMA to some extent) believe that many community leaders’ and progressive women’s organisations’ thoughts are influenced by prevalent socio-cultural presumptions stemming from religious traditions that continue to view women as dependent on men. Furthermore, the state’s current political beliefs have put a question mark towards the sincerity and the ulterior motives behind the steps being taken recently for Muslim (and overall) women’s advancement. Moreover, there is tremendous lack of resource for some of these women organisations, who took a firm decision to not become an NGO, facing obstacles to carry on the voluntary work and service among women. Constant Comparison of Muslim Women’s Experience of Discrimination with Hindu Women There are organisations, activists and lawyers (Majlis, CORO for Literacy; lawyer Nausheen Yusuf of Majlis; Veena Gowda, women rights lawyer), who (in the interviews) in their arguments always made a comparison of Muslim women’s experiences of discrimination with that of women governed by Hindu Personal Law. When it comes to reform, my research raises an important question: why is it necessary to always compare with other community women who are enduring discrimination or oppression? Even when women from other community’s face discrimination and oppression, the frequency, validity and severity of the witnessed or experienced oppression, violence and discrimination in their personal law that Muslim women face does not diminish. At the same time, comparing Muslim women’s oppression to that of other communities does not help them resolve their grievances, misery and despair. Even if women from other communities endure oppression and discrimination, why should Muslim women be subjected to the same?

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Common Ground in Views The common ground where all the women’s organisations and activists are agreeing to is that legal reforms offer rights and entitlements against the oppression and discrimination women are facing, however, it will not be enough unless other social changes like economic independence, education and other important rights as an equal citizen of the state accompany it. Progressive rights for women in Quran like ‘ekrarnama’ (bond or agreement in the time of wedding) and deciding the ‘mehr’ amount by herself are not given to them in actuality, making it difficult to execute in favour of women. A woman in the family and community is not in a position to set conditions for herself in the marriage, or ask for gold, property, bigger amount in her ‘mehr’, as her position in the family and community are decided by her economic reliance on her male family members (in the both natal and in-laws house) where she has been seen as a burden.

Bangladesh This study intends to counter the existing view that women necessarily suffer silently when faced with deprivation. Even in the understanding of deprivation, there is an inadequacy or a limitation studies on Hindu women’s rights and entitlements in Bangladesh suffer from—they consider ‘land’ as the only form of property; or Uniform Family Code is the only parameter and benchmark for equal, just and modern society and legal platform for minority women in Bangladesh. Furthermore, when it comes to minority women’s rights and equal opportunities, the argument that the most important factor in Hindu women’s subordination and discrimination is their status and position in society as defined by their personal laws generalises minority women as a homogeneous group and ignores the role of social, economic, regional and other factors. This current study analysed the types of entitlements made available to Hindu women; reaction and perception of the male kin, family members, community, state and so on, regarding women’s rights; and the nature of Hindu women’s struggle to acquire and access her rights and entitlements. This study focused in the framework of understanding of the relationship between ‘gender and entitlement’ and interrogates the processes of institutionalisation of gender practices in family-kinship, the society and the state. This study has furthered the line of argument that

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existing research tends to overlook, viz., the diverse character (heterogeneity) in women’s opinions, views, selection of agency, the limitations of their choices and the reasons behind the same. Following are the significant findings of this study: Rights and Entitlements Status of Hindu Women in Bangladesh The organisation of Bengali Hindu women has a gendered component. They do face a double-edged domination from both religious and gender perspectives. Nevertheless, only a small number of Hindu women approach the different judicial institutions, and out of that small number, majority approach informal dispute settlement bodies as opposed to the state bodies. However, the number of Hindu women litigants approaching different judicial institutions has been increased in last two decades than before. The case studies prove that majority of the cases being filed in the different informal dispute settlement institutions and organisations, and in family courts by Hindu women are for maintenance, restoring conjugal life, separate residence and judicial separation; against abandonment, polygamy, domestic violence and dowry harassment, committed by husband and in-laws. Hindu Women’s Self-Interest and Bargaining Power According to this study, Hindu women are becoming increasingly visible in the public domain and raising their voices against the oppression, prejudice and injustice they face in their homes and communities. In the rural background as well, Hindu women are increasingly raising their voices against the violence, discrimination and oppression, undergone by them. They seek legal assistance in these informal dispute settlement bodies, run by women and human rights organisations. The reason behind it can be the awareness programmes and availability of aid; neutral, fair and quick support and service, provided by these organisations, for woman in distress, in the rural background. Legal Pluralism: Unofficial Judicial Institutions as Productive Space for Litigation The number of Hindu women who approach the courts, police station and other state authorities when faced with oppression or discrimination

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is relatively small in comparison to those approaching unofficial dispute settlement bodies or any other non-government authority. It is rarely that Hindu women go directly to file a civil suit or making a criminal complaint against their husbands and in-laws, unless they are desperate as it is too costly and time consuming. Like in the case of Indian Muslim women, a range of other less formal and unofficial dispute settlement bodies (inside and outside the community) provide the common grassroot level Hindu women a productive and comfort space, and quicker solutions. It can be argued that the informal dispute settlement bodies are more successful in achieving the rights and entitlements for women, and providing justice to the women litigants in comparison to the family courts. Further, these informal dispute settlement bodies are much quicker in comparison to the family courts towards providing solution and justice to the Hindu women (and other women) litigants in distress. The rate of solving the cases is higher too in these bodies. Hindu Women’s Experience of Civil Courts The only legal remedy afforded by the ‘Hindu Married Women’s Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act of 1946’ in Bangladesh is that the Act allows for the distressed wife’s separate residence and maintenance. The right of a Hindu wife to be maintained by her husband is based on the existence of the marital bond itself. However, in order to be entitled to such maintenance, a Hindu woman must reside and cohabit with her husband, and if she lives separately for no legitimate cause, her entitlement is suspended. This study perceives that the historically disadvantaged position of grass-root level Hindu women in the domestic and overall social situation in Bangladesh, do impact the treatment towards them by the court. This study finds that Hindu women in Bangladesh face difficulty in availing the provisions being given in law. They are regularly encouraged to withdraw property claims or reduce the amount of maintenance or allowance. In comparison to Muslim women in India (and Bangladesh), Hindu women in Bangladesh have received minimal maintenance or alimony amount orders in courts (and other unofficial legal institutions). In short, Hindu women are being awarded meagre and minimal alimony and maintenance amounts in the courts, and face long delays in resolving cases, in receiving justice; further they do not have any (direct) rights to matrimonial property or natal property.

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In the family courts, women litigants stated that it is more than five to six years (and sometimes even ten to twelve years, when an appeal was filed by the opponent party) since their maintenance cases are going on. Mostly the opponent party or respondent (the husband) appeals or reappeals against the court decree on maintenance amount. In the dispute settlement bodies in women organisations and human rights organisations the maintenance amount for Hindu women claimed are meagre too (however, a little better in comparison to family court amounts). For instance, in Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK), the counsellors in shalish were asking the complainants or litigants for claiming only 10,000 BD Taka per month as maintenance amount from their husbands, despite opponents being from sound economic backgrounds. Undeniably, 10,000 BD Taka per month is not sufficient to survive in Bangladesh if the litigant is not economically independent and has children to raise alone. Mostly, these bodies or family courts push for lump sum amount payment at once for some years, from the opponent party. Patterns of Oppression of Hindu Women The nature and source of the discrimination and oppression that led to the filing of a case in an informal conflict resolution body of an organisation or in a family court follow particular patterns. Women’ allegations of psychological and physical abuse by husbands and in-laws are common in case studies, as well as in interviews with women in informal dispute resolution bodies, counselling sessions and family courts. Husbands and in-laws complained and alleged her neglect of, or poor skills in housekeeping, cooking or childcare, her arguing with or talking back to them, and failing to show sufficient respect and obedience towards husband or husband’s parents, similar to Muslim women in India. Litigants’ complaints also referred to tremendous dowry harassment. Women are harassed based on the number or quality of dowry items received by their in-laws, and they are exposed to demands for further money and commodities from their natal family. The failure of the woman’s family to provide sufficient dowry at the time of marriage, or refusal owing to the inability to satisfy additional monetary demands, was widely mentioned by women for husband and in-law perpetrated violence and mistreatment. The majority of the women in my sample lived separately from their husbands, have been kicked out of the family, and have been abandoned with their children. Women who have filed complaints say their husbands

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have complained about their visiting their natal places too frequently or without telling and obtaining permission. Women were also informed that their natal family members are heavily involved in their married lives. Another common complaint in these cases was being taunted for food, the refusal to provide adequate or any food, the husband’s suspicion of his wife and accusations of adultery, spying on her, demanding she quit her job if she is working, despite her earnings being the family’s main source of income, and mortgaging or misappropriating her jewellery or other belongings. Other common allegations against the husband include contracting other marriages without informing the previous wife or wives, addiction, alcoholism and gambling. Conflict with the husband’s mother, sister and other female in-laws often led to marital problems, even when the couple’s relationship had started off on a solid footing. Verbal harassment is being reported to have escalated to physical abuse in the matter of time, and eventually led to the woman being thrown out of the house, or stopping of her allowance or maintenance, and even sending her back to the natal house. Economic and Social Status of Hindu Women Litigants It was found in this study that the majority of Hindu women litigants and complainants in unofficial dispute settlement bodies do belong to the lower-middle- and middle-income strata. Some of the women interviewed are employed outside the home, working as teachers, cleaners, house caretakers, working as tailor, working as paid activist in NGO or voluntary organisations or in government projects in the rural sector. Although some who had been separated, deserted by their husbands for a long time are having intermittent small earnings doing home-based work of embroidery, sewing, preparing food items, taking tuition and so on. Most of these women are educated till school standard and pronounced their marriages as having been arranged by their parents. Some of them also got married to the Muslim men by their own choice. In the rural background, the case studies of my research show that the Hindu women litigants mostly experienced child marriages. Case studies show that the educated women are married off to men less educated (or men with no formal education at all) than them. Further, at the grass-root level, a girl’s education is not continued and they are not being encouraged to study more than school or college standard (in Bangladesh class eleven and twelve are considered as college level) and are married off. Women are

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being discriminated, tortured, abandoned and solely accused and blamed for giving birth to a girl child. Further, Hindu widow women are heavily stigmatised in their community. Moreover, in urban background, when a Hindu woman (mostly from middle class family) takes judicial separation from their husband, after violent familial disputes, are heavily stigmatised too by their community and society. They mostly stay single till their lifetime, as they anticipate encountering the same oppression and discrimination in the second marriage. Hindu women are seeking public employment outside home; however, the structural factors are as influential as ideology made by family and community in keeping women in an economically dependent role, and under the protection and guidance of a male family member. Some of the litigants in case studies informed their earned full monthly salary being taken away regularly, by their husbands or in-laws. The case studies express that the economic dependency of Hindu women makes them tolerate the violence against them in the family and they are thoroughly cheated in receiving their entitlements. In the case studies, it has been also found that most of these economically dependent Hindu women, despite facing violence and oppression by their husband and in-laws, want to go back to their husband to restore their conjugal life. Discrimination and Inequality Against Women in Hindu Personal Law Hindu women in Bangladesh are unable to establish their marriage and obligate their spouse or ex-husband to compensate them with maintenance due to the lack of required marriage registration. Due to the fact that Hindu Personal law or statutory law in Bangladesh does not mandate marriage registration, concerns about the existence of marriage, the authenticity or proof of marriage have arisen in numerous occasions in front of the judiciary because of a lack of paperwork. As a result, Hindu women were stripped of their few official rights due to the lack of any formal proof of marriage like—for separate residence and maintenance, being a Hindu widow seeking a pension after her husband’s death; when a child’s guardianship is contested; or when a wife abandoned by her husband seeks rights and entitlements for herself and her children. Due to the ‘optional’ position of the Hindu Marriage Registration Law of 2012, it has been discovered that Hindus only register their marriages when they are required to do so—for example, when applying for a visa to travel

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abroad, when being transferred, or for any other employment-related cause. In this study, it was discovered that 99% of Hindu women litigants’ marriages were not registered. The majority of these women belong to the Dalit community and come from economically disadvantaged backgrounds. Furthermore, even if a Hindu woman is harshly treated, physically tormented or abandoned, she has no recourse and is unable to opt out of her marriage. She is not allowed to seek the dissolution of her marriage under any circumstances. Despite the existence of the Hindu Widow’s Remarriage Act of 1856, a Hindu widow is almost never allowed to remarry, even after her husband’s death. A Hindu male, unlike a woman, in Bangladesh, continues to enjoy the discretion of limitless polygamy. A Hindu man can have as many wives as he wants, however, a Hindu woman must follow monogamy because there is no polyandry. As a result, a Hindu man in Bangladesh may abandon or desert his wife or wives and marry multiple times. The wife or wives, on the other hand, remain wedded to that one man and are unable to divorce him. According to the case studies in this research, Hindu men abandon their wives at will and marry for the second or third time. Many members in the Hindu faith have devised ways to escape out of marriage in recent years, usually by swearing an affidavit (which does not have any legal value as such). As first and second parties, the husband and wife sign a written agreement indicating that their marriage has ended owing to irreconcilable differences, that they have reached an agreement, and that they have jointly agreed to end their marriage. The parties then marry other people. Furthermore, in the presence of a son, a Hindu woman in Bangladesh is absolutely barred from inheriting. When a man dies with only one or more daughters and no male issue, the right to inherit rests solely with her or them having a son or being capable of giving birth to one. If and when a woman inherits, she will always have a limited estate. The possessor of a limited interest, as opposed to an absolute interest, has the right to enjoy the property for the rest of her life but no power of alienation. Her entitlement to her husband’s property is subject to limits on the sale, gift and will transfer of such property. Limited interest also means that after her death, the property will go to her husband’s heirs rather than her own. The case studies of this research show that Hindu women in Bangladesh hardly have property or land ownership, by themselves. It is clear from the above discussion on the basis of field work findings

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that the grass-root Hindu woman are suffering because of the current inheritance law and more importantly as evident in my findings, they are in favour of reform. Obviously, the excuse of religion as stated by the government before the CEDAW Committee in the past thirty years or so for non-reform is clearly not a bar in the eye of the grass-root Hindu women. Nevertheless, a recent verdict (on 2 September, 2020) by the High Court in Bangladesh, dismissing a petition filed in 2004, announced that Hindu widow will have inheritance rights to all properties (ancestral and self-acquired) of their husband as a successor. Further the judgement (Jatindra Nath Mandal Vs. Gouri Das, 2004) ensured both agricultural and non-agricultural properties of husband, for a Hindu widow woman (The Tribune, 2020). Hindu (Male) Community Leaders and Family Men It is pertinent to discuss here that the Hindu lawyers in family courts and in other courts are not much in favour of divorce and property rights for Hindu women. They are not entertaining the clients too regarding the same. Most of these Hindu lawyers in the Family Courts, High Courts and Supreme Courts are part of the male leadership of Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council (HBCUC) or other conservative Hindu male groups. My study confirms the fact that majority of the Hindu (male) community leaders and family men are against any initiative by the state or government, and believe that Hindu women should not acquire any property rights from their parents because it will increase conversion and migration to the majority community. According to them, in Bangladesh, Hindu women are vulnerable to forceful conversion to Islam by Muslim men. In this process their properties further get transferred to the majority community, as they are already forcefully getting evicted from their property or land, especially in rural areas. They have further argued that facilitating property rights and divorce option for Hindu women will result in increasing divorce rate, breaking of family ties, in great extent. Therefore, we see that Hindu women’s rights and entitlements in Bangladesh, have been subordinated to the ‘greater cause’ of community rights, and the Hindu communities in question have presented their group rights as conflicting with and in opposition to Hindu women’s rights and entitlements.

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Bangladesh Government’s Unequal Policies and Non-Intervention The state or government’s unwillingness in enforcing change in customary practices and traditions of the minority communities on the one hand, and the Hindu community leaders’ opposition towards their community women’s rights and entitlements (and to move away from religious customary practices) on the other hand, have made Hindu women’s status unequal. This proves the ignorance and lack of understanding by the state towards the fact that inequality in private sphere would result to inequality and non-existence in public spheres too for minority women. Nature of Struggle and Negotiation of Hindu Women in Bangladesh The case studies show that Hindu women abandoned by husbands or came out from violent marriage and staying separately, with divorce options not being there, fought legal battle and took legal helps (under the provision of life-time maintenance from husband) in the family courts and unofficial dispute settlement bodies to obtain maintenance for them and their children from their ex-husbands. Regarding maintenance, for Hindu women sometimes legal help just failed or did not work as they could not prove their marital status with their husbands, from whom they are seeking maintenance, in absence of any marriage registration. In Bangladesh, recent case studies show that increasing numbers of Hindu women, especially married, are now claiming or intending to claim their property shares. Hindu women who succeeded in maintenance claims, the battle still continued for many of them to ensure that their husbands actually pay what they were legally entitled to get. As a last resort, in these cases, women who were economically dependent sought relief from legal aids and unofficial dispute settlement bodies of the women’s rights organisations, or family courts to acquire maintenance rights from their husbands. They also have taken police help, and even village or area level mediation through shalish against domestic violence, arbitrary marital dissolution, desertion and non-payment of maintenance. To sum up, it can be argued undoubtedly that poverty, no formal education, no property and entitlement rights, no legal security, economic dependency are the main reasons behind the discrimination, injustice and oppression faced by Hindu women in Bangladesh.

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Women’s Movements in Bangladesh By opposing gender discrimination in the political, social and economic realms, Bangladeshi women’s movement activists have earned important benefits in achieving gender justice. Since independence, their demands for change have resulted in considerable changes in governmental policies. Despite significant diversity, women’s organisations in Bangladesh are working together in unity on major issues on women’s rights and entitlements, against the oppression, women are facing in the society. Further, in the interviews, the small grass-root level and new women organisations and groups confirmed the cooperation and collaboration between them and the established eminent women’s organisations in Bangladesh. They have been extended assistance, cooperation and recognition by these large experienced women’s organisations to reach their goals, in the women’s movement. These grass-root level small and new women’s organisations maintain that they felt secure in the space of their struggle and were provided the required support by other women’s organisations from time to time. Non-religious and Secular Legal Aid Bodies The women organisations in Bangladesh do firmly believe in providing non-religious or secular legal aid or arbitration to all categories of women, irrespective of religion, caste, creed and ethnicity. Therefore, it has been found in my study that these organisations do not provide any legal assistance, mediation, consultation or settlement under any religious codes, and there is no formal affiliation with them and any sharia adalat , religious boards, Imams or Maulanas, clerics or priest from any religious faith. This in turn supports the unfound status of exclusive Hindu women or Muslim women organisations, in Bangladesh, who are entirely working for Hindu women or any particular religious community women, in my study. It can be argued that the amendments or progressive reforms in Muslim Personal Law in Bangladesh, and the presence of civil laws for the Muslim women, have smoothed or enabled these women organisations to promote their values or principles in regards to solving the cases or disputes, non-religiously. Nonetheless, many women’s organisations believe in intervening through community mobilisation and development, as well as promoting awareness of gender and social justice concerns. They

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keep an eye on local shalish processes and keep track of human rights breaches in the places where they work. Uniform Family Code- Debates and Movements With respect to the debates and movements around Uniform Family Code in Bangladesh, there is hardly any assertion or apprehension from the women’s groups or by the progressive feminists that in drawing up and ratifying the formulated code (in 1993) would be an imposition of majoritarian religious standards on minority communities. Feminists in Bangladesh believe that the disparities in legal treatment under the state’s pluralist religious legal system are the root cause of gender inequalities in the personal laws of different religious communities in Bangladesh. The demand for a secular Uniform Family Code for all citizens, regardless of sex, religion or ethnicity, containing the ideals of equality provisions of the Constitution, as well as international safeguards in all aspects relating to personal realms, has gained traction in this tangle of issues. Traditionalists, on the other hand, have voiced significant opposition to the desire for a unified code, believing that religious laws are divine revelations that no one has the ability to change. Nevertheless, this study, after talking to the respondents, does perceive that in the rural level where the women organisations have their branches, women (or men) hardly are aware about UFC, which make it primarily an urban movement. However, recently women’s organisations are fighting for necessary reforms against the specific unequal clauses of different religious personal laws for minority women rather than the UFC. Women’s movements have encountered enormous challenges in advocating for a legal system that guarantees equal rights for women, with the greatest resistance coming from the communities themselves and male leadership. De-radicalisation of the Present Women’s Movement Because of the polarisation of civil society and increased marginalisation within mainstream politics, women’s movement actors have become overly reliant on personal relationships (which has de-radicalised the movement on a number of issues) with state bureaucracy and policy actors to exert influence and advance gender equity concerns in policy spaces. It also raises the question of whether relying on personal networks is a viable tactic when the movement’s class composition and political elite

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shifts. These developments have sparked debate within the feminist movement about how feminist organisations should position themselves in this changing and challenging environment. On the other hand, the state has been recognised as a significant participant in shaping the movement’s overall shape. The responses and strategies of women’s movements have been heavily influenced by their complicated and ambivalent relationship with the state, which has resulted in both fractures and bridges across the organisations. It has been noticed that progressive women’s organisations’ interactions with the current government (a believer in the values of the 1971 liberation war and freedom struggle) are multifaceted. However, on the other hand, the new leadership in the women’s wing of HBCUC perceives this current government as their best ally. They believe that this government being in power will help them to achieve the reformed legal platform for Hindu women in Bangladesh against the discriminatory Hindu Personal Law. According to them, Awami League being in power consecutively for three times has established feelings of stability, security and safety in the minority community. They think this security felt by the minority community has brought some of the male leadership of Hindu community in favour of or supporting their cause and movement for Hindu women’s rights and entitlements. NGO-Isation—Impact on Women’s Movement Though the NGO-isation of the movement has some positive effects in terms of capacity-building and expanding the reach of women’s rights organisations, it cannot be denied that it has undermined the movement’s sovereignty. Given its excessive policy focus, efforts to match donorfunded agendas in the post-NGOised phase, it has sparked doubts within the movement about whether the movement has been depoliticised. The rise of the NGO sector and donor money for ‘Women in Development (WID)’ programmes, on the other hand, has been contended by major actors in the women’s movements as expanding the movement’s appeal and having a favourable impact when dealing with the state. However, this is a double-edged sword, as projecting and NGO-ising women’s rights organisations resulted in the movement’s ideals becoming less radical. Furthermore, when it comes to global economic transformations, women’s rights actors have not actively engaged in the debate on economic justice concerns like housing, safe cities and public spaces, safe

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and low cost public transportation, work place safety, decent job opportunities, measures to address sexual harassment in both public (including digital) and private spheres, reducing the burden of unpaid care, along with other basic human rights concerns, for women.

Conclusion This study demonstrates that to provide a productive space for litigation, and effective, quicker solutions to problems of grass-root level women, women’s organisations in India and Bangladesh have set up a range of informal and unofficial dispute settlement bodies. In the context of Bangladesh, with the accessibility of social justice lawyers and free legal advocacy facilities, these women’s organisations have generated a propoor litigation environment and made a difference in terms of achieving legal empowerment and mobilisation for economically susceptible and marginalised women. Minority community women in India and Bangladesh have not endured their deprivation in silence and have not only fought for their rights but also strategised their actions, despite the limitations of their circumstances and the options available to them, choosing to optimise the same. They have received their rights and entitlements (in whatever limited portion it may be) against all sorts of obstacles and the discrimination in the socio-economic private and public sphere through customary practice, perception and gendered state policies and legislation. Finally, this study confirms that by providing a productive and comfortable space for litigation, and effective solutions to problems of grass-root level women, these women’s organisations in India and Bangladesh have presented a challenge to well-entrenched male-led religious groups in the community, traditionally seen as the sole decision makers.

References Agnes, F. (2019). Lawyer, Majlis, Interview by author, Voice Recording, Mumbai, July 4. Gowda, V. (2019). Lawyer, Interview by author, Voice Recording, Mumbai, July 7. Soman, Z., & Noorjehan, S. N. (2018). Amid politicisation of triple talaq, let’s not forget why the law is really needed, The Wire, https://thewire.in/law/ instant-triple-talaq-law-muslim-women-politicisation

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The Tribune, (2020). In historic verdict, Bangladesh hindu widows to get share of husbands’ properties, Dhaka, September 3, https://www.tribunein dia.com/news/nation/in-historic-verdict-bangladesh-hindu-widows-to-getshare-of-husbands-properties-135738 Yusuf, N. (2019). Lawyer, Majlis, Interview by author, Voice Recording, Mumbai, June 21.

CHAPTER 17

Populism as a Gendered Phenomenon in South Asia Manish Jung Pulami

Populism, more than a half-century ago, was doubted about its nature and existence. One of the reasons for this was because populism was considered to be a morally and politically charged term to stigmatise and delegitimise appeals to “the people” against “the elite”, often by characterising such appeals as precarious, controlling, and manipulative (Brubaker, 2017). However, the theoretical people-centric component of populism has made the present-day populism distinct from mere political discontent (Spruy et al., 2016). Today, no region of the globe has not been touched by waves of populism, especially since 2010 (Eberle, 2019). In a decade, populism has brought to the world the election of Donald Trump (which eventually resulted in ‘Trump-style populism’) and Brexit (Pinto, 2018). Along with these, the world witnessed the rise of far rightwing political parties in Germany and populist parties in countries like

M. J. Pulami (B) Department of International Relations, South Asian University, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Ojha and P. Jaiswal (eds.), South Asian Women and International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9426-5_17

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Austria, Brazil, Italy, Indonesia and Poland. Some reports suggest a significant number of populist leaders in power around the world, prominently in Latin America and Eastern and Central Europe (Funke et al., 2020; Kyle & Gultchin, 2018). In this time frame, the world has recognised several forms of populisms, including cultural, socio-economic and antiestablishment populisms, among which cultural populists constitute the majority of all populist leaders (Kyle & Gultchin, 2018). This surge of populism in the globe has impacted not only the politics, economics and international affairs but also the everyday lives of people. One of the regions of the world with a significant change in politics compared to the 1980s and 1990s is South Asia. One of the changing phenomena is the emerging populist narratives and politics in the region (Kaul & Vajpeyi, 2020). The characteristics of populism in South Asia differ from country to country and political party to another. It is common for the leaders in the region to target the minorities or “others”, appealing to the sentiments among the marginalised groups (Anand, 2016). This act of emotionalism as an act of populist narratives can be observed among South Asian countries (Banerjee, 2012). In addition, South Asian populism is also characterised by the promise of economic success and prosperity (Kaul & Vajpeyi, 2020). These populist phenomena can be historically traced to the present politics in most countries in South Asia. As the increasing trend of populism in the world, the academic sector has done significant research on populism which has envisioned the society as a divide between the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite” (Mudde, 2004: 543). Although the study on populism has been significant in the field of political science, and new insights and deeper understandings have been drawn through the researches, the relationship between populism and women is relatively under-researched (Bhopal, 1997; Kaul & Vajpeyi, 2020; Kyle & Gultchin, 2018). According to the established scholarship, the populist political narratives have shown an expression of resentment against conventional politics working against the will of the people, a globalised economic system responsible for increasing the gap between rich and poor, multiculturalism and pluralism undermining the pure identity. However, the gender dimension (focus on women) of these populist political phenomena has always been related to the right-wing political parties, and examination of the gender roles is significant through an intersectional approach which has opened doors to new questions (Eberle, 2019).

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In contrast to the under-researched subject of populism and gender, populist discourses in various times urge to break the gender roles dictated by patriarchy and encourage women to be vocal, engage in activism and leadership (Bhopal, 1997). Some scholars have presented populism as a gendered phenomenon (Banerjee, 2012; Bhopal, 1997; Omvedt, 2005). In political affairs, especially in the contemporary period, populism has been empowered by the notion of sexism and masculine aggressiveness (Brubaker, 2017). The anti-immigrant sentiments among the populists can be characterised by debate on immigration and gender, particularly the portrayal of women at risk (Eberle, 2019). However, in several parts of the world, populism has waged wars against women and LGBTIQ+ communities, where the populist agendas have been filled with patriarchal bias, anti-feminist, and anti- LGBTQI + agendas (Eberle, 2019). Some populist narratives have even reinforced and naturalised the racial and sexual boundaries of democracy (Omvedt, 2005). Moreover, some of the populist leaders have used gender narratives to advance the nativist-populist agendas. This can mainly be observed against the immigrants, where the immigrants can be depicted as risk (Newth, 2021). However, the populist agendas also instrumentalise the women’s rights schemas. In some cases, it has also been observed that women also join the populist political communities for good or a wrong reason depending upon the ideology of the party in relation to gender (Donà, 2020).

Methodology/Framework As the article focuses on the gendered notion of populism in the political discourse in South Asia, the study uses different approaches for this purpose. There has been no known measuring parameter for gendered populist narratives and the article discusses different cases over different time periods. Primarily, the article uses the content analysis method in examining the gendered populist content in the political speeches, comments and remarks by the political leaders. This article considers the gendered populist content in South Asia as a thin ideology comprising of two elements. The study is based on Ernesto Laclau’s notion of populism, which he explains that it is neither a constitutive movement nor an ideological orientation but is instead an identifiable structuring of political logic. For him, populism is the logic of “the people”, but not an ideology (Laclau, 2005: 117). He parallelised “the people” with the

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empty signifier, which can be filled with any content where the populist in today’s world has filled it with the historical context, crises, and ideologies (Palonen, 2019). Based on his theoretical reasoning, the article makes the analysis that the South Asian people are constructed with an inherent meaning of gender coming from the traditional ideology and are used to expand prevalent gender differences and construct political agendas. The unit of analysis in the article is the political discourse and narratives from the political leaders of South Asia. This unit of analysis is taken because it gives a clear understanding of gender bias and patriarchal thought present in South Asia, and it is reasonable and comparable across countries over time. The article has observed gendered populism as a latent construct embedded by the traditional patriarchal structures to identify and deconstruct the portrayal of women as a mere object in the regional political narrative.

Gendered Populist Discourse The gender discourse mainly focuses on the meaning of gender, gender equality, women’s rights and participation (Omvedt, 2005). The populist discourse theoretically, as what Laclau described, can be used in this agenda of gender politics for women to become more vocal, involved in activism and leadership as well. However, the populist discourse and practice in the world unambiguously present a clear and explicit desire to restore and represent the roles circumscribed by patriarchy (Donà, 2020). It can be seen that there are gender features in modern populist politics but they hardly represent women as an agenda, and instead, gender roles are explicitly highlighted (Sofos, 2020). In the populist discourse, there has been the politics of machismo, and the relationship between populism and an amalgamation of masculine aggressiveness and sexism is vocal in today’s international and domestic politics (Loffler et al., 2020). Many populist narratives from the far-right political parties or populist leaders now in the world are grounded with the notion of fascism that promotes masculinity over feminine character and enhances misogyny (Meret & Siim, 2013). These expressions of machismo characteristics by many of the populist leaders in the world today is believed to be an outcome of “aggressive capitalism and entrepreneurship” (Banerjee, 2012). These gendered narratives not only have undermined women but it has also discriminated against the marginalised populations (Kaul & Vajpeyi, 2020). Similarly, the populist narratives have mainly represented

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traditional patriarchal roles and symbolised women as mere instruments of men and focused on their maternal roles, especially religious texts have been utilised to institutionalise and reinforce the gender roles and restrain women to domestic areas (Abi-Hassan, 2017). The populist narratives have always been gender-biassed and focused on patriarchy, and they have been anti-feminist and anti-LGBTIQ + in different parts of the world (Pappas et al., 2009). Many populist discourses have underestimated and undervalued women’s reproductive and social rights and delegitimising homosexual rights (Kaul & Vajpeyi, 2020). Moreover, the populist narratives tend to reinstate the traditional gender roles and the importance of family and marriage (Bardhan, 1986). Particularly, populism in contemporary times has waged war against women manifesting misogynist notions and even violence against women (Donà, 2020). These narratives have deliberately portrayed man as the guardians and protectors of women; also, these narratives explain that women are not safe in the public domain (Kyle & Gultchin, 2018). Thus, these discourses have implanted both men and women with a cold mentality that endangers women and legitimises the culture of violence against women, and also threatens women to seek protection and encourages men to safeguard women (Loffler et al., 2020). The political parties and leaders use the discourse and practice of populism to forward nativist-populist agendas (Newth, 2021). Through the populist anti-immigrant sentiments, the immigrants are also being affected where the gendered notion of immigrants where the politics of picture comes into place for the immigrant women and similarly, the immigrant men are portrayed as a risk for society (Newth, 2021). This populist narrative also extends to international interventions and military support to countries where these humanitarian notions carry a masculine character of saving the other feminine population (Engeli, 2020). The populist discourses have targeted mainly women primarily from Muslim communities, and have instrumentalised women’s rights (Anand, 2016). More interestingly, the women too have joined the far-right populist organisations. The women who join these gendered populist organisations are religious or evangelical women who wish to climb up to have power to stop abortion, promote and protect marriages (Sofos, 2020). In some parts of the world, women also support these gendered notions of populism in order to promote women’s interest and at the same time protect patriarchy, putting themselves into a dilemma of fighting for women’s rights and equality and at the same time enhancing the

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discrimination among the sexes (Spruy et al., 2016). Therefore, populism as a gendered phenomenon is complex and ambiguous. These populist discourses highly emphasise promoting and restoring the gender roles demarcated by traditional patriarchy (Loffler et al., 2020).

Women and Politics in South Asia When analysing women in South Asia, issue of marriages, dowries, domestic labour, domestic finance, education, employment, and status comes along with it. The women in this region can be categorised into two groups. First are the traditional women who work within the household sphere of “private patriarchy” and have submitted themselves through marriages and dowries; and second are the independent and educated women who have exchanged private patriarchy for the sake of “public patriarchy” and hence, subordinate status in the labour market (Bhopal, 1997). This homogeneity of the situation of women is inevitable among the South Asian women though there is heterogeneity in the class, religion, culture and space (Banerjee, 2012). As a region, South Asia comprises eight nations with diverse sociocultural and ethnic populations, religions, legal frameworks, and political forces that impact women. The region is characterised as the “patriarch belt” (Caldwell, 1982) with the subordinate social and economic status of women with little or no access to property rights (Bardhan, 1986). These patriarchal ideologies in the region have shadowed women and hindered the growth and capabilities of women; other areas of hindered participation of women are work and politics, where they face unequal treatment and even violence (Saxena, 2016). Most of the women in South Asia are limited predominantly to reproductive work, nurturing children and household maintenance, which are not counted as economic and hence not monetarily valued. The region is dominated by the historical roles, spaces and stereotypes of male as the “provider” and female as the “caregiver” (Strachan et al., 2015). These traditional gender roles have influenced the demographic balance as well. Ranging from survival issues, health concerns, and education, women’s participation and share have been minimal. Though South Asia has been a region with a difficult situation for women, it has had relatively large number of women leaders who became head of the states, which include Indira Gandhi, Sheikh Hasina, Benazir Bhutto, Srimavo Bandaranaike, Chandrika Kumaratunga

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(Omvedt, 2005), and Bidhya Devi Bhandari. Other than the head of states, some of the influential women figures in South Asian politics include Jayalalitha, Hina Rubani Khar, Fawzia Koofi, Dorji Choden, Dunta Maumoon, and several others (Bukhari, 2021). However, the general level of women’s participation in politics among South Asian women is very low due to the constraints of mobility and roles defined by the socio-cultural traditions (Strachan et al., 2015). There is very little female participation in the productive sectors of the country. There are constitutional provisions in South Asian countries to secure and increase the participation of women in mainstream politics (Bukhari, 2021). However, although strong women have driven South Asian politics, when a South Asian ever remembers them, an image gets into an individual’s mind—a strong woman wearing a flaunting sari but what an individual miss in that image is a strong woman being surrounded by all men, telling them what to do and what not to. Patriarchal society in South Asia has created a particular image of men and women, which has been further endorsed by culture, religion and practices (Bukhari, 2021). Alike all over the world, these feminine images in the region include weak, fragile, and powerless depictions, whereas the masculine images include ideas like strength and power. Moreover, society has recognised the masculine role to support, in some case, “support” but primarily “suppress” the feminine role (Chakraborty, 2014). Therefore, in the South Asian political discourse, these “support” and “suppress” narratives play an essential role regarding women (Chakraborty, 2014). The populist gender politics in the region is driven by the “support” discourse, where the political leaders have mostly portrayed women as a group that is always at risk (Abi-Hassan, 2017). The images of women that these narratives picture mostly show empathy and help towards women. This phenomenon drives the whole populist gender politics, and political leaders have secured their positions in mainstream politics through these agendas (Bukhari, 2021). To some extent, these narratives have helped for women empowerment, support, equality and participation; however, knowingly or unknowingly, this masculine nature of politics reiterated by populist discourse has always contributed to the suppression of women in the region (Bhopal, 1997). Furthermore, these populist driven gender politics in South Asia has been endorsed and reinforced by traditional thinking (Sofos, 2020). Therefore, to view women, politics, and populism in South Asia simultaneously, it is essential to dissect the societal anatomy plagued by traditional masculine superiority and feminine inferiority. Furthermore,

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this societal machinery has been used by the political leaders and parties through populist narratives and discourses.

Women and Gendered Populism in South Asia In South Asia, the populist wave in the present times have restored the specific gender roles demarcated by the traditional patriarchy. However, on a positive note, it has also summoned South Asian women to be more vocal and participatory in leadership or political leadership. Nevertheless, the image depicted by the populist narratives of the South Asian women is not particularly uplifting but is degrading and demoralising for women and other minority communities (Kaul & Vajpeyi, 2020). Significantly, there has been an attack by the populists on the foundations of gender roles of women, and particularly a group of women, either it is Muslim women or women from minority groups (Banerjee, 2012). In South Asia, populism and sexism have a higher amalgamation resulting in masculine aggressiveness (Anand, 2016). This amalgamation can be observed to a great extent in the biggest democracy in the world — India (Banerjee, 2012). The top political leaders, who are populists, have proven the fact that populism is a gendered phenomenon in South Asia. A remark came from Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2015 towards Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina that, “Despite being a woman, she has declared zero tolerance for terrorism” [emphasis added] (The Hindu, 2015). This commentary towards his Bangladeshi counterpart is the consequence of the populist characterisation of women as a mere signifier (Bukhari, 2021). This implies that the South Asian patriarchy deems women to be a leader as unusual and undeserving somehow. Not only the present Bangladeshi Prime Minister, previously even former Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi also suffered the same fate when VHP leader Acharya Giriraj Kishore mentioned in 2005 that “She [Indira Gandhi] divided Pakistan into two. She was the only man in her cabinet. She acted like a He-man” (The Outlook, 2005). These instances demonstrate the sexist thinking among the Indian populist discourse, who think that for a woman to be a good leader, she has to be “manly” (Banerjee, 2012). The Indian PM Modi has repeatedly claimed to have a “56-inch chest” (The Hindu, 2019) during his election campaigns and attacks his political opponent Rahul Gandhi as a “hybrid calf of a Jersey Cow” (The Hindustan Times, 2009) and Shashi Tharoor’s former wife Sunanda

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Tharoor is described by him as a “50 crore girlfriend” (The Times of India, 2012). Further, his silence towards Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh’s (RSS) attitude towards women where they assign male cadres as “Swayamsevak” (volunteer) and female cadres as “Sevika” (servant) is also problematic (McDonnell & Cabrera, 2018). Also, Indian-right wing, Hindu nationalist volunteer organisations have been vocal towards imposing dress and moral codes for women and they stand against love, inter-caste and inter-communal marriages (Kinnvall, 2019). However, it is to be noted that not only PM Narendra Modi, but the Indian political spectrum is full of gendered populists. Rahul Gandhi, in response to PM Modi’s unwillingness to speak up on controversial issues, said that “[…] a chowkidar with 56-inch chest [PM Modi] ran away from people, and hid behind a woman saying “Sitharaman ji, defend me” [emphasis added] (India Today, 2019). This undeniably symptomatic reflexive sexism by Rahul Gandhi depicts the position of women in India, where populist narratives use women as an image for men to shame them or characterise their incapability or incapacity. Another Indian political leader Mulayam Singh Yadav once said, “She [Mayawati] is so beautiful that everyone wants to rape her” (Saxena, 2016), and Lalu Prasad Yadav promised that Bihar’s road would be smooth as Hema Malini’s cheeks (Saxena, 2016). In the midst of such populist narratives, female politicians have to turn themselves to “Didi”, “Behenji” (both meaning elder sister) and “Amma” (mother) to depict themselves as commanding and affable at the same time (Bukhari, 2021). Similarly, in Nepal, politicians who like to whim populist narratives among the people have reiterated some sexist and slanderous remarks. In the attacks during the intra-party conflict inside the Nepal Communist Party in 2021, lawmaker Raghuji Pant commented that a singer and lawmaker Komal Oli became a parliamentarian and central committee member by “pulling up her sari and showing her calf” (The Kathmandu Post, 2021). Also, when former lawmaker Sarita Giri was expelled from the Samajbadi Party and consequently from the Parliament after speaking against the constitution amendment bill to update the map on Nepal’s national emblem, it was seen by many as a gender biassed decision (Aryal, 2020). Likewise, as populists have waged war against women in South Asia, the LGBTIQ+ community has also come under attack (Sofos, 2020). For these sexual minorities, the gendered narratives have been used by the populists to undermine their rights and freedom. The hyper-masculinity in South Asian men have put themselves among the

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people who should protect and provide women (Banerjee, 2012). These notions are further summed up by the importance of “family” in South Asian society (Sofos, 2020). In South Asia, it is considered necessary in whichever religion to continue the family or family legacy, which could be only done through a birth of a male child in the family. Thus, this concept has attacked the notion of same-sex marriage because of their inability to reproduce the family (Kinnvall, 2019). The growing gendered nature of ethnonationalism in India through Hindutva (Kinnvall, 2019) or increasing demand of Nepal as a Hindu state has valorised traditional stereotypes and demoralised LGBTIQ+ communities. These growing religious notions are very much gendered and encourage patriarchy, sexism and heterosexist values that lead to oppression of the LGBTIQ+ communities. For Dalit women, this Hindutva notion has repeatedly targeted them with Brahminical–patriarchal ideas (Anand, 2016). This populist wave can also be observed in the present politics in Pakistan. Populism as a gendered phenomenon was clear when Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan made a populist remark saying that rise in sexual assault cases was due to how women dress (The Conversation, 2021). He further blamed women facing these sexual violence as following the Western culture and advised the women to observe the “purdah” system (Zakar et al., 2018). His comments previously have also focused on the family as the backbone of the society in Pakistan, and had blamed Westernisation and media content on several occasions for breaking down family values (The Conversation , 2021). In South Asia, nativism in populism is intensely connected to gender, and gender roles are highly connected to the ideology of nationalism (Anand, 2016). These gendered notions of populism in the region have demarcated the “nation’s women” from “other” women and as well as from the “other” men (Donà, 2020). This has generated among the men inside the state a feeling of protection of “our women” from the “other” (Abi-Hassan, 2017). An illustration of nativist gendered populism can be given by analysing Hindu nationalistic explanation of Muslim men as “hyper-masculine threats to the Hindu women” (Anand, 2016). Another example of this nativism induced gendered populism is in the case of Rohingya refugees in India. They have been depicted in the media by the political leaders as threats to the women in the region. These gendered populist narratives based on nativism in South Asia have led to the securitisation of women and refugee through state policy (Win, 2018).

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Consequently, these populist narratives have implanted among the women the fear of autonomy and negatively affected the socio-economic conditions and freedom of women in the region. In relating “Hindutva” with “muscular nationalism”, it is the reaction to the “hyper-masculine” to resist Hindu political presence and discourse (Banerjee, 2012), this notion has helped to paint the Muslim minority communities, especially the Muslim man against the Hindu women with the same brush of Islamophobia (Anand, 2016). Not only Muslim men but Muslim women have also been portrayed as a threat and over-productive (Anand, 2016: 50). In contrast to the Muslim women representation in a Hindu majority state like India, the portrayal of women in Afghanistan by the gendered populist political narrative is different. Women’s representation in politics in Afghanistan in the 1990s was very low because of the Taliban rule (Franks, 2007). In 1989, the Mujahedeen issued a fatwa which ordered the assassination of women engaged in humanitarian assistances (Kandiyoti, 2005). Later the women were ordered to wear a hijab and forbidden to attend the schools. In 1992, after the struggle for power between several misogynistic groups, Mujahedeen suspended the constitution of the country and declared a religious decree preventing women from holding government and broadcasting jobs (Kandiyoti, 2009). Later, the Taliban even discarded the freedom of movement of women. Taliban’s religiously backed gendered populist narrative resulted in a situation by which women in Afghanistan were said to be in a “captivity scenario” (Slotkin, 1973) or a “women and children-protected-by statesmen” scenario (Enloe, 1992: 96). Moreover, the Western media portrayal also have pictured women in Afghanistan to be an object or were not covered as the main story (Slotkin, 1973). Recently after the withdrawal of US-troops and resurgence of Taliban in Afghanistan in 2021, Taliban allowed girls back to school and let them complete their primary education to gain public support and secure external aid from international community, and importantly their recognition as a legitimate government (Barr, 2021). The Taliban spokesperson Zabiullah Mujahid reiterated “our sisters, our men have the same rights” (Barr, 2021). However, they have been rooted to their previous gendered narrative based on religion, and are anticipated to supress women of Afghanistan in the coming days. The policies adopted by them do not show what they have deliberated for women’s education (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2021). Likewise, from the ruins of the civil war, Sri Lankan politics, the peace building process, and state building have experienced populist

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waves (Goonewardena, 2020). These populist waves in Sri Lankan politics also have gendered characteristics (Gaul, 2020). In Sri Lanka, gendered populist characteristics include embracing authoritarian populism highlighting a “strong man” approach through the use of ethno-nationalist elements. An instance of the gendered phenomenon in Sri Lankan politics is former President Mahinda Rajapaksa (Gaul, 2020). His populist style included legitimising his rule by portraying himself as a “man of people” (Gaul, 2020). Thus, his populist politics has been plagued with the patriarchal notion, where a “man” of the ordinary people seems to legitimise him and portray him stronger than others who could bring peace, stability, and development in the nation. These gendered populist instances are only few pictures of gendered populist politics in South Asia. As a part of the “patriarch belt”, populist or not, most political narratives in the region originate from very patriarchal thinking, which particularly undermines women. This dominating patriarchal thinking not only has suppressed women, these have been enhanced by populist politics where political leaders and narratives have reiterated a masculine discourse knowingly or unknowingly and thereby suppressing women voices in the region.

Conclusion Populism is a gendered phenomenon, particularly in South Asia. Populism can also be taken as a particular style of politics in this “patriarchal belt” where the leaders have used this traditional thinking to equip their narrative with gendered notions. In this region, nationalism, culture and religion have provided populism with the opportunity to use gender as a tool to further populist agendas. The populist agenda as a gendered phenomenon have furthered the populist leaders’ schemas of racism and xenophobia. Moreover, the gendered populist discourse has resulted in an appeal for a strong state and strong “man” leaders (Kinnvall, 2019). Particularly, India has seen the emergence of such populist gendered narratives. The emergence of Hindu nationalism through the mobilisation of the idea of Hindutva has added to this gendered populism in India (Banerjee, 2012). This gendered populist agenda has been extended broadly by the present Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his ruling party Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (McDonnell & Cabrera, 2018). Not only the Indian PM but other leaders have also been involved in publicly expressing such populist narratives undermining women and

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reinstating the traditional gender roles (Anand, 2016). This has also generated a gendered notion regarding the Muslims, immigrants and refugees (Anand, 2016). Likewise, such gendered populist narratives have also been observed in other South Asian states. Masculine politics has been at the forefront in Nepal with demoralising and dominating narratives towards women. Similarly, Pakistani politics, with the rise of Imran Khan as Prime Minister, has been plagued by gendered populist narratives. This is true of the politics of other South Asian countries like Sri Lanka and Afghanistan. In South Asia, there have been various attempts to politically, socially and economically empower women and gender politics plays an essential role in securing gender equality among the sexes. Rise of populism undermines such efforts by reinstating traditional gender roles in society.

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Index

0–9 73rd Constitutional amendment, 24 9/11 attacks, 89 A Aawaaz-e-Niswaan (A-e-N), 289, 296 Abdul Kalam, A.P.J., 92 academic/practitioner, 6, 13 Act East policy, 95 Adivasi women, 231 Afghanistan, 40, 67, 71, 89, 93, 94, 116, 117, 141, 189–191, 201, 323, 325 agency of women, 10 Agnes, Flavia, 238, 292 Ahanger, Parveena, 252 AIADMK, 178 Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK), 289, 302 AK Abdul Momen, 98 AK Roy, 233 Al-Akhdam, 234 Ali, Begum Shareefah Hamid, 155 All India Trinamool Congress (TMC), 174, 175 All India Women’s Conference, 268

Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), 196, 197 Ambassadors, 7, 8, 12, 67, 74, 124, 140, 141, 144, 151, 152, 154, 164, 165, 167 Ambedkar, B.R., 177, 228–230, 233, 236, 241 anarchy, 153, 160 Andrabi, Asiya, 248 Anjum, Aaliya, 247, 249 anti-apartheid movement, 139, 233 anti-caste movements, 227, 228, 230, 240 anti-nuclear activism, 212 anti-nuclear movements, 4, 17, 209–211, 213, 220, 221, 223 anti-nuclear protests, 209–214, 216, 217, 223 Ardhnarishwar, 15, 91–93, 97, 99, 100 Argentina, 91 Arthashastra, 93 Arunatilaka, Himalee, 8 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit, 67

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 A. Ojha and P. Jaiswal (eds.), South Asian Women and International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9426-5

329

330

INDEX

Association of parents of Disappeared Persons (APDP), 252, 254 Australia, 88–91 the Australia Group, 90 Austria, 314 authoritarian neoliberalism, 87 Ayoob, Mohammad, 70

B Badal, Harsimrat Kaur, 180 Bahujan Samaj Party, 176, 233 Bai, Husna, 267, 268 Bandarnaike, S., 23 Banerjee, Mamata, 96, 173, 174, 176, 182 Bangladesh, 15, 18, 23, 27, 28, 35, 38, 40, 41, 54, 84, 91, 93–101, 105, 113, 115, 126, 135, 147, 172, 176, 189–191, 201, 210, 215, 230, 239, 289, 299–311 Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Forum (BCIM), 95 Basu, Rumki, 29 Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), 95 Bebaak Collective, 296, 298 Behra, Navneeta Chadha, 29 Beijing Declaration, 35, 69, 72 Beijing Principles, 118 Beteille, Andre, 234 Bharat, Akhand, 15, 91–94, 97, 99, 100 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 89, 245, 324 Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan (BMMA), 291, 296–298 Bhasin, Kamla, 27 Bhutan, 93, 176, 189, 192, 201

Bhutto, Benazir, 16, 23, 41, 72–74, 115, 136, 141, 143, 172, 198, 318 Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali, 88, 141 Bidhya Devi Bhandari, 319 billiard ball, 3 binaries, binary thinking, 6, 99, 153, 158–160, 281 Binatul Islam, 247 Black feminism, Black feminists, 54, 237 Black Lives Matter movement, 241 Black Panther Party, 237 Black women, 17, 236–238, 240, 241 “body of the diplomat”, 152, 153, 166 Bosnia, 143 “boudoir diplomacy”, 153 Brazil, 234, 314 Brexit, 313 Buddhists, 93, 233 Burakumin (Buraku), 234 Butalia, Urvashi, 27, 40, 284 Butler, Judith, 246

C Canada, 66, 91, 108 Care economy, 159 Care ethics, 13 caste based discrimination (CBD), 228, 229, 238, 239 caste violence, 55 Chakravarti, Uma, 54 Chami, Nandini, 87 Chanakya, 43, 93 Chandoke, Neera, 29 chemical or biological weapons, 89 Chenoy, Anuradha M., 5, 14, 28–30 Chernobyl accident, 211 Child marriage, 175, 186, 192, 193, 198, 199, 201, 276, 303

INDEX

China, 84, 88–90, 94, 96, 99, 151, 152, 158, 162–167, 176, 249 Chinese Studies, 26 Chipko movement, 198 Chittagong Hill Tracts, 27 Choden, Dorji, 319 Citizenship Amendment Act, 94, 100 Civil rights movement, 233, 237 class, 4, 6, 35, 41, 51, 60, 86, 98, 114, 116, 136, 138, 140, 147, 148, 156, 175, 177, 179, 186, 196, 198, 201, 202, 213, 232, 233, 235–237, 247, 248, 250, 258, 268, 274, 303, 304, 309, 318 climate change, 68, 78 Clinton, Bill, 89 Clinton, Hillary, 67 Cold War, 50, 71, 84, 111, 120, 137, 141, 146, 148, 213 Cold War bipolarity, 138 colonial governmentality, 267, 276 colonialism, 135, 138, 189, 267 colonisation of knowledge production, 33 Commonwealth, 139, 142, 145 Complete Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 89 conflict resolution, 16, 59, 68, 69, 186–188, 190, 302 Congress party, 138, 139, 173, 174 Connell, R.W., 87, 92, 100 Constructivism, 53 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 5, 69, 70, 72, 196, 266, 306 conversations around theory and practice of international relations, 14

331

core, 34, 36, 37, 39, 42, 45, 72, 86, 107, 108, 110, 112, 123, 185, 186, 189, 218 core-periphery analysis, 35, 36, 45 CORO for Literacy, 291, 296–298 Costa Rica, 88 The Council for Social Relations, 29 Council of Islamic Ideology (CII), 75, 76 COVID-19 pandemic, 30, 127, 192 Crenshaw, Kimberlé, 54 critical race theory, 236, 237 cross-border human trafficking, 85 customary laws, 55 Czech Republic, 91 D Dalit feminist, Dalit feminists, 234–237, 239 Dalit Lives Matter movement, 240, 241 Dalit Panthers Party, 230 Dalit women, 17, 56, 182, 227, 229–232, 235–238, 241, 322 Dalit women activism, 227 Dar, Fareeda, 248 darul qaza, 290 Das, Veena, 284 De Alwais, Malathi, 28 Decolonisation of knowledge, 45 deconstruction of women as a universal category, 58 de-feminize, 34, 37 de Mel, Nilufer, 28 democratisation, 61 Denmark, 7, 88 Deo, Neelam, 7, 9 Deshmukh, Durgabai, 267 diaspora, 85, 234, 235 difference politics, 52, 59 diplomacy, 7–9, 11–13, 25, 50, 51, 54, 65, 66, 84, 107, 109, 113,

332

INDEX

114, 116, 118, 119, 124–126, 152–156, 158–162, 165, 166, 180–182, 185, 186, 190, 202 diplomatic careers, 8, 160 diplomatic corps, 1, 7, 8 disciplinary deafness, 45 discourses on development, 57 discrimination based on work and descent, 234, 235, 240 disintegration of the Soviet Union, 84 DMK, 178, 179 domestic/international, 6 Double Othering, 157 Dravidian, 179, 228 Dukhtaran-e-Millat , 248 Dumont, Louis, 234 Durbar Mahila Samanwaya Committee (DMSC), 282, 283 Dutt, Gargi, 26 E Egypt, 249 Elstain, Jean Bethke, 51 Enloe, Cynthia, 5, 26, 34, 38, 51, 66, 106, 151, 160, 180, 323 environmental degradation, 57, 85 epistemic violence, 37 epistemological frameworks, 14 ethnicity, 4, 51, 58, 114, 156, 186, 202, 228, 232, 240, 308, 309 everyday experiences, 6 everyday lives, 14, 60, 314 exclusion, 36, 37, 69, 87, 166, 230, 233, 237–239, 241, 266, 282 exclusion of women, 36, 43, 166, 172, 211, 213 experiential life-stories, 18 F Fadiman, Ann, 141 false binaries, 6

family laws, 55 Faslane peace camp, 214 female Qazis , 290, 291, 295 female sexuality, 285 femininity, feminine, 50, 51, 83, 86, 92, 93, 99, 106, 152–154, 156, 157, 159–161, 165, 166, 172, 173, 179–181, 199, 201, 248, 252, 316, 317, 319 Feminist Dalit Organization (FEDO), 239 feminist discourse, 50, 54, 58, 227 feminist epistemological paradigm, 4 feminist epistemologies, 2–4, 6, 30, 285 feminist foreign policy (FFP), 15, 30, 66–68, 71, 72, 75–79, 107–109, 117–120, 122, 124, 126, 127 feminist international assistance policy, 67 feminist international relations (IR) theory, 107 feminist knowledge, 23, 190 feminist lens, 28, 29, 36, 38, 40, 41, 119 feminist mainstreaming, 34 femme fatale, 152, 162, 164–166 Fernando, Nimalko, 28 Five-Continent Six-Nation Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament in 1986, 89 forced invisibility of women, 36 Fortuna, 153 France, 66, 67, 91, 108, 213 Fukushima accident, 211, 217 Fukuyama, Francis, 154 G Galbraith, Peter, 141 Gambari, Ibrahim, 145 Gandhi, Indira, 16, 23, 41, 88, 115, 136, 138, 140–142, 147,

INDEX

172–174, 178, 181, 198, 318, 320 Gandhi, Mahatma, 138, 156 Gandhi, Rahul, 320, 321 Gandhi, Rajiv, 89, 142 Gender and International Relations, 5, 14, 29 Gender-based foreign policy agenda, 66 gender-based violence (GBV), 55, 67, 69, 127, 253, 255 gender discourse, 57, 316 gendered foreign policy, 29 gendered global economy, 56 gendered invisibility, 37 gendered nationalism, 157 Gendered Networking/Performance, 9 gendered phenomenon, 18, 315, 318, 320, 322, 324 gendered populism, 316, 320, 322, 324 gendered relationships, 51, 52, 59 gendered security, 26 gendered thinking, 27 gender equality, 35, 36, 50, 55, 65–67, 70, 73, 74, 77, 107, 127, 186–188, 190, 192, 194, 196, 197, 291, 316, 325 gender inequality, 43, 55, 56, 70, 118, 198 gender lens, 6, 14, 15, 51, 91, 99 gender mainstreaming, 34–36, 116, 190 gender-neutral, 12, 35, 86 gender pay gap, 53, 57 gender power relations, 124 gender relations, 29, 51, 53–55, 58, 172, 201, 247, 267 gender roles, 50, 51, 53, 69, 123, 154, 185, 210, 314–318, 320, 322, 325

333

genders/sexes, 3 gender-sensitive, 35, 108, 158, 166 gender stereotypes, 24, 106, 156, 197 gender studies, 35, 56, 57 gender symbolism, 122 General Ne Win, 144 Germany, 88, 141, 213, 313 Giri, Sarita, 321 global feminist discourse, 50 Global North, 36, 45, 159, 189, 210 global solidarity networks, 17 Global South, 5, 12, 18, 23, 36, 37, 44, 55, 70, 108, 149, 159, 189, 210, 212, 223, 249, 262, 274, 275, 285 good hostess, 25 Gopinath, Meenakshi, 28 Goswami, Roshmi, 29 Greenham common camp, 213 Gujjar, 246, 251, 254 Gurumurthy, Anita, 87 H Habib, Zamruda, 248, 252 Hans, Asha, 28 hard security, 113, 114 Hasina, Begum, 23 Hasina, Sheikh, 96, 97, 115, 136, 172, 176, 318, 320 hegemonic masculinity, 15, 43, 87, 88, 91, 92, 97, 99, 100, 151, 158 heteronormative knowledge, 4 heteronormative knowledge systems, 17 heteronormative masculine imagery, 11 heteronormative power, 3 Heterosexual Hindu men, 86 heterosexual men, 3 heterosexual warrior masculinity, 152, 157, 158, 162, 165

334

INDEX

High Politics, 2, 5, 36, 172, 173, 181, 182 Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council (HBCUC), 306 Hindu majoritarianism, 297 Hindu Marriage Registration Law of 2012, Bangladesh, 304 Hindu Married Women’s Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act of 1946, 301 Hindutva, 15, 93, 100, 322–324 Hindutva masculinity, 91, 92, 97, 98 historical subjectivities, 268, 284 HIV, 264, 265, 270, 280, 282 Hizb ul Mujahideen, 247 Hobbes, T., 153, 160 honey trapping, 161, 165 Hudood Ordinance, 74, 76 Human Development Index, 117 humanitarianism, 107, 119, 124 human rights, 69, 72–74, 118, 125, 139, 144, 181, 190, 192, 194, 228, 238, 239, 241, 250, 252, 262–264, 266, 269, 270, 272–274, 281, 284, 300, 302, 309 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 74 human security, 30, 41, 42, 111, 112, 119, 120, 188 human trafficking, 112 husbands of diplomats, 10 Hussain, Abida, 74 hyper-masculinisation, 40 hyper-masculinised, 246 hypersexual, 157, 165, 167 I idealism, 139 identity politics, 51, 176 Idinthakarai, 210, 216–218, 221 Igbo community, 240

Illiah, Kancha, 236 The Immoral Traffic Prevention Act (ITPA), 263, 264, 270 imperialism, 137, 138, 146 inclusivity, inclusive, 4, 15, 46, 52, 53, 60, 77, 85, 117, 119, 122, 127, 177, 189, 253, 261, 262, 273, 280, 281 India, 6, 10, 12, 15, 17, 18, 25, 27, 30, 35, 38, 40, 42, 43, 54, 56, 71, 83–86, 88–101, 106, 109, 111–113, 115–117, 126, 135, 138–142, 144–147, 149, 152, 154, 155, 157, 158, 162–167, 172–176, 178, 180–182, 189, 193, 196, 198, 201, 210, 212, 215, 216, 220, 223, 227, 229–231, 233, 235, 239, 240, 245, 247, 249, 262–270, 276, 278, 281, 282, 284, 285, 289, 290, 302, 311, 320–324 Indian Council of World Affairs, 25 Indian Foreign Service, 9, 25, 36, 155, 180 Indian Institute of Defense Analysis, 26 The Indian School of International Studies, 25 India-US nuclear deal, 15, 84, 88, 90, 91, 101 Indonesia, 154, 249, 314 informal economies, 53, 270 inheritance laws, 55, 306 inside-outside, 172, 177 interdisciplinarity, 35 internal security, 85 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 90, 212, 220 The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), 91

INDEX

International Court of Justice (ICJ), 145 International Labour Organization (ILO), 56, 262, 280 International Monetary Fund, 71 International Women’s Day, 165 international women’s movements, 24, 27 interpretative method, 53 intersectionality, 35, 50–53, 60, 123, 201, 202, 236, 237, 241 interstate conflicts, 72, 112 inter-state narratives, 17 intersubjective meanings, 53, 59 invisibility of women’s work, 36, 53, 152 invisible labour’ of high politics, 7 Iran, 89, 90, 93, 249 Israel, 89, 139 Italy, 140, 314 IWIR (Indian Women in International Relations), 38

J Jago Nari Unnayon Sangsta (JNUS), 192 Jahangir, Asma, 74 Jahan, Rounaq, 34, 38, 41 Jains, 93 Jaishankar, S., 98 Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, 247 Japan, 7, 89, 91, 154, 212, 214, 217, 234, 240, 249 Jawaharlal Nehru University, 26 Jayalalithaa, 173, 178, 179 Jayawardane, Sunila, 28 Jayawardena, K., 27, 54, 249 Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces (2017), 85

335

K Kanshiram, 176 Kanyashree scheme, 175 Kargil war of 1999, 89 Karnataka, 238, 283 Kashmir, 17, 78, 89, 90, 93, 106, 141, 142, 245–257 Kashmiri women, 17, 245–255, 257, 258 Kaul, Nitasha, 245, 249 Kazakhstan, 91 Khan, Imran, 73, 322, 325 Khan, Nyla Ali, 249 Khar, Hina Rubani, 319 Khatak, Saba Gul, 27 Kissinger, Henry, 141 knowledge production, 2, 3, 33, 35, 37, 39, 41, 43, 54, 59, 200 knowledge traditions, 59, 61 Komal Oli, 321 Koofi, Fawzia, 319 Korea, 91, 249 Kudankulam nuclear power plant (KNPP), 210, 216 Kumaratunga, Chandrika, 115, 318 Kumari, Ranjana, 29 Kyi, Aung San Suu, 16, 136, 137, 143, 144

L labour laws, 55, 57, 263 Laclau, Ernesto, 315, 316 Lady Ambassador, 12 Lai, Zhou En, 141 League of Nations, 267, 275, 276, 278, 279 Lepcha community, 99 LGBTIQ+, 315, 321, 322 LGBTQIA2S+, 3, 12 liberalism, 53, 200 Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir, 89

336

INDEX

lived realities, 14, 37–39 Look East Policy, 95 LTTE, 28, 179

M Machiavelli, N., 3, 38, 153, 160 Mahajan, Sumitra, 180 Maharashtra, 230, 283 Majlis, 296–298 Maldives, 189, 194, 201 male-centric, 54, 151, 152, 155, 158, 166, 185 male dominated domain, 200 male hegemony, 37, 237 male scholars, 26, 182 Male Spouses, 9 malestream, 43 Malik, Inshah, 249 Malik, Shazia, 249 Malini, Hema, 321 Manchanda, Rita, 28, 42 Manipur, 29 Manorama, Ruth, 236, 238 Maoist movement, 25, 54 marginalisation of women, 114 marginality, 6 masculine construction of diplomacy, 9 masculine entrepreneurialism, 87 masculine policies, 34 masculine state, 83, 99 masculinist approaches, 5 masculinity, 2, 10, 14, 24, 28, 49–51, 55, 92, 96, 98–100, 124, 152–154, 156, 159, 165, 166, 172, 199, 200, 316 Masoodi, Ashwaq, 249 maternal, 213, 317 maternal thinking, 86 Maumoon, Dunta, 319 Mayawati, 173, 176, 177, 182

Mazumdar, Veena, 26 Mearsheimer, John J., 53 Meenambal, Annai, 228 mehr, 294, 299 Mehta, Hansa, 155 Menon, Lakshmi, 155 Menon, Nivedita, 54, 55 Menon, Ritu, 27 Mexico, 66, 67, 108, 282 MG Ramachandran (MGR), 178 Midigan, 234 migration, 106, 114, 120, 121, 161, 217, 218, 269, 279, 282, 306 militarism, militarist, 5, 14, 15, 23, 26–28, 30, 55, 66, 86, 87, 100 military expenditure, 111 Missile Technology Control Regime, 90 Modi, Narendra, 85, 95, 97, 98, 320, 321, 324 Mohsin, Amena, 27, 40 Mongolia, 91 moralism, 139 multiple existences, 3 Muslim Khawateen Markaz, 247 Muslim Lives Matter, 241 Muslim masculinity, 99 Muslim patriarchy, 297 Muslim Personal Law, 290, 291, 296, 298, 308 Muslim Women Rights Network, 295 Muthamma, C.B., 25, 155 Myanmar, 93, 135, 136, 144, 145, 147, 149, 193 N Namibia, 91 Nandy, Ashis, 267 Narain, Seema, 43 Narayan, Jai Prakash, 233 National Action Plan (NAP) on UNSCR 1325, 56, 116

INDEX

National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR), 238 National Federation of Dalit Women, 238 nationalism, 15, 27, 66, 95, 157, 158, 162, 249, 277, 322, 324 National League for Democracy (NLD), 144 national security, 15, 41, 42, 50, 59, 83–89, 91–93, 97, 100, 101, 153 National Security Strategy, 85 nativism, 322 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 84, 138 neorealist, 49, 108 Nepal, 6–8, 11, 13, 16, 24, 28, 29, 54, 56, 93, 106, 109, 113, 115–117, 144, 151, 162–166, 176, 189, 190, 194, 195, 201, 230, 239, 321, 322, 325 Nepram, Binalakshmi, 29 Neupane, Yogamaya, 194 Nixon, Richard, 139 No First Use (NFU), 89, 93, 94 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 137 non-military threats, 85 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 89 non-state actors, 3 non-traditional security, 112, 113, 120, 121 non-western, 34, 37, 41, 43–45, 58, 59, 279 Nordic Women Mediators (NWM) Network, 189 Norway, 66, 88 nuclear disarmament, 89 nuclear energy, 88, 91, 210–212, 214–216, 220–224 Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), 210, 214, 216, 217, 219, 221–223 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), 90 nuclear technology, 92, 209–213, 215, 220, 222, 223

337

nuclear tests, 40, 84, 88–91, 212 nuclear weapon, 88, 89, 92, 93, 210, 212–214 O object/subject, 6 Oli, Khadga Prasad Sharma, 151 oral histories, 284 P pacifism, 108 Pakistan, 15, 27, 28, 35, 40, 54, 69–79, 89, 90, 93, 94, 105, 106, 115, 116, 126, 135, 141–144, 146–149, 172, 189, 190, 195, 196, 210, 239, 320, 322 Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), 73, 141 Pandit, Kashmiri, 246 Pandit, Vijayalaxmi, 140 Pant, Raghuji, 321 Parasher, Swati, 29 Parcham, 296, 297 partition of India, 40, 54 Patel, Razia, 238 patriarchy, patriarchal, 3, 8, 11, 23–26, 28, 30, 51, 55, 56, 60, 86, 87, 106, 113, 115, 120, 123, 126, 127, 135, 145, 148, 158, 172, 178, 180, 181, 189, 191, 192, 194, 195, 197, 198, 200, 201, 212, 213, 224, 227, 228, 230–232, 235, 237, 238, 241, 248, 252, 264, 267, 269, 272, 277, 279, 315–320, 322, 324 Pawar, Urmila, 236 peacebuilding, 42, 56, 70, 77, 89, 106, 187, 189 people-to-people contact, 40 perception of threat, 50, 59, 60, 163 performative, 60, 246, 282

338

INDEX

periphery, 6, 34–36, 39, 42, 45, 85, 87 Permanent Representatives of the United Nations (PRUN), 155 personal/political, 6 Phadnis, Urmila, 26 Philippines, 249 Phule, Jotiba, 228 Phule, Jyotirao, 177 Phule, Savitri, 228 pluralism, 53, 60, 61, 85, 314 plurality of voices, 60 Pokhran, 91, 212 Pokhran nuclear tests, 212 Poland, 314 popular struggles, 24 populism, 4, 18, 313–320, 322, 324, 325 populist discourse, 315–320, 324 positive peace, 40 positivism, 5 post-Cold War, 50, 120, 146 post-modernist feminist, 58 pragmatism, 139, 142 pregnant body, 11 President Mahinda Rajapaksa, 324 private/public, 6 private patriarchy, 318 privileged white male, 59 process tracing, 109 professional diplomacy, 25 professional diplomats, 25 prostitution, 4, 17, 261–264, 266–270, 273–276, 278, 279, 281–284 psychoanalytical feminism, 159 public patriarchy, 318 public performance of diplomacy, 13 public-private, 172 Q Qazis , 290, 291, 295

quantitative studies, 6, 7 queer’ future in diplomacy, 12 R race, 35, 56, 58, 79, 110, 114, 156, 157, 166, 186, 213, 234, 236, 239, 240 racism, 123, 157, 167, 240, 324 Rajagopalan, Swarna, 28 Raja, Yasmeen, 248 Ramasamy, EV (Periyar), 228 RAND Corporation, 214 Rao, Narasimha, 89 Rao, Nirupama, 36, 124 Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh’s (RSS), 321 Ray, Ayesha, 29 Ray, Renuka, 155 Realism, 26, 36, 42, 50, 53, 70, 153 reconciliation commissions, 29 Reddy, Muthulaksmi, 267 reflectivist approach, 53, 59 religion, 4, 6, 18, 76, 79, 116, 136, 186, 233, 258, 306, 308, 309, 318, 319, 322–324 Rescue-Myth’ narrative, 269 revisionist states, 94 rights of women, 40, 65, 66, 68, 77 Rohingyas, 146, 147 Roma communities, 234 Russia, 90, 91, 220 S Sahgal, Nayantara, 140 Sami-ul-Haq, Maulana, 76 Sampada Grameen Mahila Sanstha (SANGRAM ), 283 Samuel, Kumudini, 28 Sapru House, 25 Sassen, Saskia, 56 Sati, 276

INDEX

Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar, 93 School of International Studies, 25, 26, 29 secularism, 138 security studies, 2, 25 seductress, 151, 152, 158, 162, 164, 166 Self-Help Groups, 272, 283 self-respect movement, 228 Seth, Manju, 7–10 sex industry, 262, 267, 280, 281 sexual assaults, 56, 322 sexual commerce, 262, 264, 270, 275, 281 sexuality, 55, 156, 158, 160, 161, 166, 167, 186, 202, 267, 269 sexual violence, 55, 56, 106, 190, 247, 248, 257, 322 sex-workers, 261–268, 270–275, 280–284 Shah, Amit, 99, 245 Shakya, Anjan, 7, 11, 13 sharia adalat , 290–293, 295, 308 Shastri, Lal Bahadur, 88 Sheikh, Fatima, 228 Shia, 246, 253 Siddiqa, Ayesha, 27 Siegal, Mark, 141 Sikhs, 93 Sikkink, Kathryn, 56 Singapore, 89 Singh, Manmohan, 84, 85, 96 Singh, Shweta, 29 Sinha, Meera, 26 situated knowledge, 3, 4, 6, 13 situatedness, 42–44 Sob, Durga, 239 socially constructed, 50, 59 soft areas’ of governance, 65 soft conflicts, 186 soft power, 7, 10, 87, 108 soft-security, 114

339

soft’ subject areas, 2 Somali, 234 South Africa, 139, 233 South Asia, 1, 2, 4–8, 10–18, 23, 25–30, 34, 35, 37–42, 44, 49, 51–53, 56–58, 60, 78, 84, 85, 94, 106, 108–114, 117–127, 135, 162, 163, 167, 172, 182, 189, 191, 195, 198, 199, 201, 214, 215, 223, 228, 235, 240, 241, 268, 314–316, 318–322, 324, 325 South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC), 100 South Asian Families, 11 South Asian IR community, 4 South Asian University, 29 South Asian women’s voices, 1, 18 South Asian women academics in IR, 14 South Asian women diplomats, 6, 8, 12, 13 South Korea, 91 Soviet Union, 74, 84, 139, 141, 145 Spain, 108 Speaking about Women in international relations’, 14 Spivak, Gayatri, 54, 277 spouses’ club, 10 Sri Lanka, 6, 13, 23, 28, 54, 56, 91, 115, 116, 135, 136, 172, 189, 196, 201, 239, 249, 324, 325 Srinagar, 250 Standpoint Feminism, 37, 41 state building, 42, 323 State of Nature, 153, 160 state patriarchy, 23, 25, 55, 56 state security, 42, 45 Steins, Jill, 58 STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics), 220

340

INDEX

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 111 strategic community, 30 structural violence, 37, 56, 60, 119, 284 subaltern, 3, 38, 44, 176, 177, 235, 268, 284, 285 subaltern realism, 70, 71 subaltern women, 34, 176, 266 subjective, 4, 6, 13 sub-state narratives, 17 Sunni, 246 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), 73, 187 sustainable peace, 42, 119, 189, 192 Swaraj, Sushma, 173, 180, 198 Sweden, 7, 66, 88, 108

T Tamil Women, 56 Teesta Barrage Irrigation Project (TBIP), 94 Teesta River, 15, 84, 94–99, 101, 176 Tehreek, 247, 248 Thakurta, Meghna Guha, 27 Thakur, Vineet, 29 Thapa, Rita, 28 Tharoor, Shashi, 320 theory/practice, 6 the third gender, 86, 87, 101 Thomas, Sanjana, 87 Tibet, 93 Tickner, Anne J., 5, 26, 37, 43, 50, 51, 53, 54, 119, 153, 160, 166, 199 Tipaimukh Dam, 94 toxic masculinity, 2, 124 “traditional civil servant masculinity”, 153 traditional security, 2, 111, 113, 114, 116, 119

transdisciplinary, 17 transnational nature of marginalization, 17 transnational women’s movements, 5 triple talaq, 295–297 Trudeau, Justin, 67 Trump, Donald, 90, 313 Turkey, 249 U UN Commission on the Status of Women, 155 UN Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, 90 UN Decade for Women, 5 UNICEF, 76, 198 United Kingdom, 88, 91 United Nations, 69, 72, 73, 138, 143, 145, 154, 182, 188, 235, 261, 265, 275 United Nations Committee on the Status of Women, 67 United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, 5, 108, 188 United States of America, 40 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 72, 155 UN Security Council, 56, 68, 155 UN Women, 28, 29, 69, 187, 192, 196, 201 Upreti, B.R., 29, 195 US hegemony, 84 V Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, 92, 239 Value-driven’ foreign policy, 77 Veshya Anyay Mukti Parishad (VAMP ), 283 VHP, 320

INDEX

Vietnam, 91, 249 violence against women, 39, 40, 72, 87, 106, 108, 192, 317 virtù, 160 Vishkanya, 166

W Wadhwa, Deepa, 7, 10, 12 Wallström, Margot, 66 War on Terror, 71, 195 Wassenaar Arrangement, 90 Wazed, Hasena, 198 West-centric, 38 Western family system, 12 white male privilege, 154 Wives’ Associations, 9 wives of diplomats, 7, 9 Wolof of Senegal, 234 woman diplomat, 10, 151 Women Action Forum (WAF), 74 women and security, 26 women as a universal category, 53, 58, 60 Women Diplomat Bodies, 11 women Heads of State, 33, 41 Women in international relations speaking’, 14 Women in Security, Conflict Management and Peace (WISCOMP), 28 women insurgents, 56 women in war and peace, 28 women leaders, 16, 24, 34, 41, 42, 73, 115, 135, 136, 148, 172, 173, 176, 182, 232, 318 Women, Peace, and Security Index (WPSI), 190 Women, Peace and Security (WPS), 68, 108

341

women’s activism, 17, 39, 74, 246, 250–253, 255, 256 women’s bodies, 25, 27, 160, 213, 276, 277 women scholars, 2, 26, 27, 38, 143, 182 women’s movements, 5, 24, 27, 52, 196, 232, 237, 297, 308–310 women’s participation, 24, 28, 105, 109, 115, 116, 125, 138, 172, 187, 188, 190, 192, 197, 202, 209–211, 213, 214, 216, 220, 221, 223, 248, 318, 319 women’s representation, 16, 25, 55, 86, 116, 122, 126, 155, 186, 188, 190, 191, 197, 201, 323 Women’s Studies, 26, 27, 29, 35 women’s writing on international relations, 14 ‘World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance’, Durban, 239 World Conference on Women, Beijing, 1995, 69, 188 Y Yadav, Mulayam Singh, 321 Yadav, Pramod, 6 Yami, Hisla, 28 Yanqi, Hou, 16, 151, 152, 157, 158, 162, 164–167 Yemen, 191, 234 Youngs, Gillian, 38 Z Zia, Ather, 249, 254, 257 Zia, Khalida, 23 Zia-Ul-Haq, 74