South Asian Regionalism: The Limits of Cooperation 9781529205152, 9781529205176, 9781529205169

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SOUTH ASIAN REGIONALISM The Limits of Cooperation Bhumitra Chakma

First published in Great Britain in 2020 by Bristol University Press 1–​9 Old Park Hill Bristol BS2 8BB UK t: +44 (0)117 954 5940 www.bristoluniversitypress.co.uk © Bristol University Press 2020 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​0515-​2 hardcover ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​0517-​6  ePub ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​0516-​9  ePdf The right of Bhumitra Chakma to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of Bristol University Press. Every reasonable effort has been made to obtain permission to reproduce copyrighted material. If, however, anyone knows of an oversight, please contact the publisher. The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the author and not of the University of Bristol or Bristol University Press. The University of Bristol and Bristol University Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication. Bristol University Press works to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race, disability, age and sexuality. Cover design by Liam Roberts Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY Bristol University Press uses environmentally responsible print partners

To my wife Muna

Contents List of Abbreviations

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Introduction 1 South Asia’s International Relations: A Historical Overview 2 The Idea of South Asia as a Region 3 The Origins of SAARC 4 The Formative Years: 1980–​92 5 SAARC after 1992: Disagreements and Differences 6 Beyond SAARC: Sub-​Regional and Trans-​Regional Cooperation 7 SAARC and the Limits of Cooperation in South Asia 8 International Relations Theory and South Asian Regionalism Conclusion

1 17

Notes References Index

39 57 79 99 121 137 155 169 181 211 235

v

List of Abbreviations ADB AIIB APEC ASA ASEAN BBIN BCIM-​EC

Asian Development Bank Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Asia–​Pacific Economic Cooperation Association of Southeast Asia Association of Southeast Asian Nations Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal Bangladesh–​ C hina–​ I ndia– ​ M yanmar Economic Corridor BIMSTEC Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-​Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation BIMST-​EC Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand Economic Cooperation BIST-​EC Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Thailand Economic Cooperation BJP Bharatya Janata Party BRI Belt and Road Initiative BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa CAA Citizenship Amendment Act CENTO Central Treaty Organization CoE Committee of Experts CPEC China–​Pakistan Economic Corridor CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty EEC European Economic Community EU European Union GCC Gulf Cooperation Council GDP Gross Domestic Product GEP Group of Eminent Persons GNP Gross National Product IGG Inter-​Governmental  Group IMF International Monetary Fund IOR Indian Ocean Region IPA Integrated Programme of Action

vi

newgenprepdf

List of Abbreviations

IR JeM JWG LDCs LeT LoC MDGs MFN MoP MoU MVA NAM NGOs NPT OBOR RCD SAARC SADF SAFTA SAGQ SAIC SAPTA SARC SASEC SAVE SEATO SNEP SRF STC TNC UN US USA USSR WTO

International Relations Jaish-​e-​Mohammed Joint Working Group Least Developed Countries Laskar-​e-​Toiba Line of Control Millennium Development Goals Most Favoured Nation Margin of Preference Memorandum of Understanding Motor Vehicle Agreement Non-​Aligned Movement Non-​Governmental Organizations Non-​Proliferation  Treaty One Belt One Road Regional Cooperation for Development South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation South Asian Development Fund South Asian Free Trade Area South Asian Growth Quadrangle SAARC Agricultural Information Centre SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement South Asian Regional Cooperation South Asia Sub-Regional Economic Cooperation SAARC Audio Visual Exchange Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Subterranean Nuclear Explosive Project SAARC Regional Fund SAARC Tuberculosis Centre Trade Negotiating Committee United Nations United States United States of America Union of Soviet Socialist Republics World Trade Organization

vii

Introduction The SAARC as a regional body has little to show in terms of matching with its foundational objectives and in terms of reaching its benefits to the people and institutions in the region. Mahendra P. Lama1 The 19th summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was scheduled to take place in November 2016 in Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital, but it was postponed2 due to tense bilateral relations between the two most powerful members of the organization  –​India and Pakistan.3 Although more than three years have passed since then, the summit is yet to be rescheduled due to the same reason for which the 2016 meeting was cancelled. As no visible sign of improvement in strained Indo–​Pakistani relations is visible, the summit is unlikely to take place in the foreseeable future. And, even if the summit is rescheduled, it is unlikely that SAARC will be as effective as those of other regional organizations, that is the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), unless fundamental changes occur in the region’s international relations. Except for a few low-​level functions at the SAARC secretariat in Kathmandu, the organization is largely stagnant now. Since 2016, the regional body has not undertaken any substantive work to advance regional cooperation for which it was created. Indeed, the postponement of summits in the past is only one manifestation of its shortcomings –​there are many other failings, as will be discussed in this book, which have prompted observers to raise questions about the relevance and the future of SAARC. Joining the global trend for regionalism, seven countries in South Asia –​Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri

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Lanka –​launched a regional organization (the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) in 1985.4 Since its inception, three and a half decades have passed; while it has accrued some intangible and low-​ level tangible benefits, it has yet to deliver substantive, visible material benefits to the people of the region. Most importantly, it has yet to realize the goals that were set out at its inception. SAARC has grown consistently over the years by extending its scope for cooperation, which gives an impression that it is a vibrant and successful regional institution. However, a careful assessment would indicate that its achievements, as one observer has put it, are mostly ‘on paper’.5 Indeed, South Asia is one of the least integrated regions of the world, particularly if it is compared with other regions, such as Europe, East Asia and South East Asia. It is even less integrated than sub-​Saharan Africa. While other regions have achieved greater success in building closer economic cooperation, South Asia has failed to do so. An example will highlight the point. Intra-​regional trade in South Asia accounts for a little over 5 per cent of the region’s total trade, which compares very poorly with other regions, that is 50 per cent in East Asia and the Pacific and 22 per cent in sub-​Saharan Africa.6 Growth in South Asian intra-​regional trade has improved very little in the past two and a half decades from 3.5 per cent in the early 1990s to about 5 per cent in the early 2010s.7 Looking at it from a slightly different angle, intra-​regional trade as a share of regional gross domestic product (GDP) also presents a poor picture for South Asia. It hovers around 1.0 per cent in South Asia, versus 2.6 per cent in sub-​Saharan Africa and about 11.0 per cent in East Asia and the Pacific, reflecting a low level of trade within South Asia relative to the size of the regional economies.8 The potential for intra-​regional trade in South Asia is far greater. It is estimated that total potential merchandise trade in the region may be about US$67 billion, almost three times the current trade value of US$23 billion.9 It means that South Asian countries trade more with the outside world than with themselves and SAARC has helped little to improve the situation. Consequently, SAARC has failed to enter into the imagination of the regional population as a vibrant organization. A World Bank survey of informed regional stakeholders in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal and Pakistan showed that most people are dissatisfied  with the state of cooperation in the region; the share of dissatisfied respondents was 72 per cent in Bangladesh and 85–​7 per cent in India, Nepal and Pakistan.10 As will be analysed in this book, there are many reasons for the poor performance of SAARC. However, at this stage it is pertinent to note

2

Introduction

that there has been a contradiction in the intended objectives and the mode of the organization’s operation. While the regional body was conceived in terms of regional cooperation and the resultant economic benefit to be had, its mode of operation was politico-​strategic. Rather than through the prism of economic benefit, SAARC actually functioned on the basis of politico-​strategic calculations of the member states. Prioritization of security over economic benefit has been at the  core of the organization’s inability to deliver concrete benefits to the people of the region. Also, it is arguable that leadership failure on the part of the two key states of the region, India and Pakistan, has been a key cause of the organization’s underachievement. Particularly, New Delhi’s role has been crucial in this regard. India, as the key state of South Asia, had the ability to make or break regionalism more than any other state in the region. In recent years, New Delhi appears to be prioritizing the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-​Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), a trans-​regional organization comprising five South Asian (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka) and two South East Asian (Myanmar and Thailand) states, over SAARC as the key instrument for regional cooperation.11 ‘Regionalism without Pakistan’ seems to be the approach that New Delhi has begun to pursue.12 The Bangladesh government holds a similar view that ‘SAARC is no longer suitable for regional development, [and] other platforms like BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-​Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) and BBIN (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal) hold greater potential’.13 The changing contour of India’s approach can be evidenced in the fact that although Narendra Modi invited SAARC leaders to the inauguration of his first term in 2014, for the inauguration of his second term in 2019 he invited the BIMSTEC leaders, signalling that New Delhi’s priority was changing. Furthermore, Modi invited BIMSTEC leaders to the outreach session of the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) summit in Goa in 2017, thus highlighting India’s modified approach towards regional cooperation and its pursuit of regionalism. Moreover, in recent years New Delhi and Dhaka have begun to prioritize a sub-​regional initiative –​the South Asian Growth Quadrangle (SAGQ) –​to pursue regionalism comprising Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal in place of SAARC, in view of the stagnant state of the latter organization. Intriguingly, the key question that arises is:  is SAARC finished? As will be discussed later, SAARC is not dead; it might be currently inactive, but the rationale for a regional institution has not evaporated

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and it is likely to be revived at a more opportune time.14. Arguably, an improved India–​Pakistan relationship can revive the regional body. There is no doubt that SAARC has failed to live up to its promise and its failings are glaringly visible, but its rationale is compelling nonetheless. Also, notwithstanding overwhelming dissatisfaction with the performance of SAARC, no state has yet withdrawn from the organization. The BIMSTEC and BBIN, which are touted in many quarters as alternatives, may serve as useful tools for economic cooperation, but they cannot replace SAARC for a variety of reasons. There are compelling civilizational, historical, political, strategic, economic and cultural arguments behind this. The fundamental rationale for a regional grouping still remains strong for which SAARC was initially created. Also, some member states, namely Nepal, fully support a revival of SAARC and have pressed to reschedule the postponed summit.15 Furthermore, it could be argued that notwithstanding its setbacks and a troublesome history, the organization has achieved some tangible and intangible achievements. For example, SAARC has adopted a convention on terrorism in which the member states were able to develop a common ‘definition’ of terrorism. This is significant given that others, including policy makers and academics, have found it difficult to agree on a common definition. There are other examples of its achievements, as will be illustrated in later chapters. Against the above backdrop, several questions are worth asking: What are the achievements of SAARC? What are the shortcomings of the organization? What are the reasons for and sources of its success and failure? Should South Asia do away with SAARC? If so, why? If not, then, what is the future pathway for the organization? This work explores the origins of South Asian regionalism, and seeks to illustrate the evolution, processes, outcomes and effects of SAARC. In accomplishing this, the book adopts a ‘process tracing’ method in which causal mechanisms or processes, events, actions, expectations and other intervening variables that link putative causes to observed effects are carefully examined.16 Two key objectives underscore the essence of the book. First, the work provides a comprehensive analysis of the organization’s origin, evolution and the sources of and reasons for its success and failures. Second, to help the analysis, the book engages theoretical frameworks about regionalism in International Relations (IR). While doing this, the book also assesses the efficacy of Western-​oriented IR theories in the non-​Western world.

4

Introduction

Regionalism and world politics: ‘A World of Regions’? Since the end of the Second World War, the importance of regionalism in world politics has continuously increased. Regions now constitute a separate category and a distinct level of analysis in the study of world politics in which it is argued that international relations may be conceived in terms of ‘A World of Regions’.17 The world has been regionalizing even more in recent years. Many scholars have announced the death of globalization and the rise of regional blocks in world politics.18 As the dust of the Second World War was settling, some European states began to contemplate the path of regional integration to forestall a repeat of the devastating war, initially launching the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 and then taking a more decisive step towards regional integration by signing the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which created the European Economic Community (EEC). With incremental steps in the following decades, the EEC has now transformed into the EU.19 The transformation of Europe with the EU at its core is spectacular, to say the least, in particular in contrast to what it was in the first half of the 20th century. The European model of regional integration was emulated by other regions of the world. Ten years after the creation of the EEC, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations was created in South East Asia by signing the Treaty of Bangkok in 1967.20 The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation grew out of this broader trend for regionalism at the global level. Hence, there has emerged a growing body of scholarship on region, regionalization and regionalism, thus making region a distinct level of analysis in IR.21 The analysis of this book is developed keeping this general trend in perspective. It appreciates the broader empirical trend for regionalism and engages recent scholarship on the issue, in particular the approaches to ‘new regionalism’.22

Regionalism and its varieties Although regionalism is conceived as a rubric idea, there are different understandings of regionalism. Furthermore, region, regionalization and regionalism are interrelated concepts, but their definitions remain contested; consequently, their relationship to each other is ambiguous. This ambiguity mainly derives from the contested nature of their definitions. Some clarification of their meanings is, therefore, necessary for a robust discussion on South Asian regionalism.

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A region is generally defined when a group of geographically proximate states come together for the purpose of cooperation based on cultural similarities or similar historical experiences or any other subjectively defined notions. A region can be built through state actions, but deregionalization can also happen when they pursue disengagement policies. In the case of South Asia, for example, during colonial times, the subcontinent was more a region than in the post-​colonial era. An effort was initiated in 1985 by the establishment of SAARC to redefine South Asia. The redefinition of the region continued when Afghanistan was inducted as a member of SAARC in 2007. Therefore, geography or territoriality does not solely determine the boundary of a region –​it is a construction or an ‘imagined community’ through the process of socialization. As Amitav Acharya has pointed out: ‘Regions are socially constructed rather than geographically or ethno-​socially preordained.’23 While the subjective notion of ‘imagination’ is important in defining region, the factor of geographical proximity cannot be overlooked. As T.V. Paul posits, a region can be defined ‘as a cluster of states that are proximate to each other and are interconnected in spatial, cultural and ideational terms in a significant and distinguishable manner’.24 Regionalization is the process of social interaction across state boundaries that leads to building a region. Such interaction may be formal or informal or it may be market driven by economic interactions. Regionalization and regionalism are closely interconnected concepts because both are related to the creation of region-​ness. However, while the former is more about the process, the latter connotes the consequences of that process. In other words, regionalism highlights the extent, level and the depth of region-​ness. The idea of regionalism has been present in some form in world history, but in the post-​Second World War era, it has evolved in two distinct phases. The phenomenon that developed in the 1950s and 1960s is generally conceived as ‘old’ regionalism. Theorization of this variety primarily developed in the context of European integration. From the 1980s onwards, a new wave of regional initiatives emerged which came to be known as ‘new regionalism’. It is both state and non-​state driven, while the old variety was primarily driven by state actors. Formal and informal channels of interaction are at play in the new wave in which globalization is a key variable and market plays an important role. Non-​governmental organizations (NGOs) also play an important role in this process. Put simply, both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-​up’ processes drive new regionalism. The design, structure, objectives, character and the process of regionalization are not similar in all regions of the world –​consequently

6

Introduction

they are bound to produce different kinds of regionalism. Andrew Hurrell has painstakingly sketched five categories of regionalism.25 They are discussed as follows: (i) The first is integration of societies within a region, which results from undirected processes of societal interactions. Earlier, it used to be regarded as ‘informal regionalism’ but it is now called ‘soft regionalism’. The Asia–​Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is generally referred to as a case of soft regionalism in which there exists a higher level of informal interdependence within the region than the rest of the world or other regions. Primarily, market forces drive this kind of regionalism in which firms play an important role. Furthermore, soft regionalism involves an increase in people-​to-​people contact, the growth of multiple channels and the rise of complex and dense social networks through which ideas, norms, knowledge and political attitude spread leading to the creation of a regional civil society. It reduces the monolith character of the state and creates autonomous spaces within and beyond the state. The state does not play a conscious or pivotal role in this kind of regionalization. Market forces can lead to growth triangles and economic corridors. (ii) The second category is the rise of regional awareness and identity. Regions are generally defined subjectively, which Adler has called ‘cognitive regions’. In this sense, regions are ‘imagined communities’. Meanings are given to political and other activities. Of course, the regional imagined community is different from the national imagined community. The former is ‘thin’ than the latter.26 In the construction of a regional imagined community, generally common factors, similarities or shared values are emphasized. Regional awareness or identity may also derive from a common external threat. Many regional initiatives have been undertaken based on this ground. (iii) Intergovernmental cooperation is a major form of regionalism. Generally, path-​dependent regional cooperation is undertaken through the conclusion of formal agreements although it involves informal cooperation as well. The level of cooperation may be high or low. Intergovernmental cooperation is generally conducted through the creation of a regime or institution although the structure of cooperation may be highly institutionalized like the EU or less institutionalized such as ASEAN. In the case of highly

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institutionalized cooperation, interaction is guided by strict rules and principles. The motives for this kind of regionalism may vary. In some cases, it can be a bargaining tool in a complex, globalizing world. In other cases, it can be due to the growth of dense interdependence with the geographically proximate states. Furthermore, the motive can be security. It can be for stabilizing a regional balance of power or institutionalizing confidence-​building measures, or it can be a strategy for negotiating a regional security regime. In this kind of regionalism, states play the pivotal role. (iv) The fourth type of regionalism is state-​promoted regional integration. It seeks regional economic integration and creates a customs union. It seeks to develop common policies at both micro and macro levels. A variety of this kind of regionalism exists depending on the scope, depth and level of institutionalization, and so on. The EU serves as a key example of this kind of regionalism. Of course, there are other examples as well. (v) The fifth category is regional cohesion. A key point here is that the first four categories can culminate in this type of regionalism in which a consolidated and cohesive regional unit can be evidenced. Indeed, it can be understood in two senses. In the first sense, the region plays a defining role in the relations between the states of the region and the rest of the world. Second, the region forms the organizing basis within the region across a range of issues. Regionalism from this standpoint is defined in terms of patterns and networks of interdependence. However, political significance of such regionalism ‘derives not from some absolute measure of interdependence, but from the extent to which that interdependence (and the possibility of its disruption) imposes significant potential or actual costs on important actors’.27 Regionalism with a character of regional cohesion imposes costs for outsiders. This category of regionalism is significant because outside state and non-​state actors have to adjust their policies in regionalist terms. It is important for regional actors because exclusion leads to loss of autonomy in foreign policy options across a range of important issues. Also, an important feature is how regional policy shapes the domestic policy of an individual state. There are different paths to regional cohesion. For example, Europe’s ultimate objective is to create a political community. It has gradually created or is creating supranational structures to achieve this goal. In this effort, there could be overlapping regimes.

8

Introduction

Given the varieties of regionalism as discussed in the preceding pages (pp 7–8), what kind of regionalism has South Asia promoted? The discussion in this sub-​section will provide a basis for analysing South Asia’s regionalism.

International relations theories and regionalism The work engages three mainstream IR theoretical perspectives –​neo-​ realism, neo-​liberal institutionalism and constructivism –​to illustrate South Asian regionalism. These IR theoretical perspectives provide competing explanations about the emergence, process, outcomes and effects of regionalism. The following is an overview of their key assumptions about the dynamics of regionalism. It also notes their limitations.

Neo-​realism Realists generally argue that regions are the product of power politics and regional order is either an outcome of balance-​of-​power politics or it is imposed by a hegemon.28 Regionalism, realist scholars contend, emerges in the context of systemic distribution of power and great power rivalry. According to T.V. Paul, there is a consensus among realists that the EU came into being due to the structural background of the time and the ASEAN emerged due to American military presence in the Pacific waters.29 In a realist account, balance of power is the key source of order and peace at both the systemic and sub-​systemic level.30 Neo-​realism posits that the systemic distribution of power determines regional configurations and regions, as ‘subordinate state system’, face ‘constant penetration by the Dominant System’.31 Great power intrusion in a region occurs in the form of competition, cooperation, dominance and disengagement, which all have implications for regional order and peace.32 Such intrusion affects contents (goals) and the conduct (techniques) of policy pursuits of regional actors and the pattern –​ enmity or amity –​of regional interactions. Regionalism rises when the structural background is favourable. Therefore, it is embedded in the global political structure and emerges because of global power politics. Put simply, systemic powers are the builders and keepers of regional order and configure the dynamics of regionalism. Neo-​realism also posits that regional unity may emerge from a need for alliance formation. Walt maintains that regional alliances are formed

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and regional cooperation becomes necessary for balancing purposes when powerful states pose a threat inside and outside a region.33 Andrew Hurrell, however, found a different power-​balancing pattern in ‘Third World’ regionalism. He maintains that those regional groupings are a ‘natural reaction to an anarchic world’ in which they either want to increase bargaining power at the international level or protect the region from external negative impacts.34 For example, the Non-​Aligned Movement (NAM) emerged to increase the bargaining power of the decolonized states in global political, economic and strategic affairs against the forces of bipolar world politics. Hegemonic stability theory posits that a powerful state imposes order because it commands respect and power.35 Merom points out that a leading or systemic power can dominate a region and can keep a region captive or engage in a contested relationship with other systemic actors.36 Regional order may also be imposed by a regional hegemon because it can prevent violent behaviour by another state and act as ‘regional paymaster, easing distributional tensions and thus smoothing the path of integration’.37 Economic and/​or geopolitical interests, including strengthening of military alliances, promoting stability in neighbouring countries, securing access to new markets, cheap labour, water or energy resources and so on, drive powerful states to facilitate the emergence of regionalism.38 Of course, powerful regional states do not always promote regionalism or act as hegemon.39 Brazil demonstrated ambivalence in pushing institution building in Latin America.40 India has aspirations of leadership but lacks strategies41 and, as will be discussed, demonstrated ambivalence in promoting regionalism. Realists do not consider international or regional institutions as intrinsically important. They view them as epiphenomenon of power politics among leading states and as instruments of state policy pursuits.42 Neo-​liberal institutionalists provide, as will be discussed later, a contrasting explanation about this issue. Neo-​realism advances formidable arguments about the emergence of regionalism and generally expects regional cooperation to promote the interests of powerful states. But critics point out that the theory fails to provide a nuanced explanation about the outcomes and effects of regionalism. It has little to say about how sustained regional cooperation is maintained.43 The role of process and its potential to redefine state interest is neglected by neo-​realist scholars, which is, as will be discussed later, emphasized by neo-​liberal institutionalism. Critics also indicate that neo-​realism privileges the structure at the expense of the agency. Arguably, the agency plays a pivotal role in

10

Introduction

shaping regionalism and its dynamics. Neo-​classical realism has tried to rectify this gap in the theory by reintroducing the agency,44 but it has yet to build a coherent theoretical framework and provide satisfactory analysis about the dynamics of regional international relations.45 Constructivism, as will be discussed later, is better placed to explain this dimension of regionalism.

Neo-​liberal institutionalism If neo-​realism is weak at explaining how regionalism contributes to peaceful transformation and how sustained regional cooperation is maintained, liberalism has a great deal to say about it. Indeed, a particular strength of liberal theory is its ability to explain why and how states maintain sustained cooperation and how peaceful transformation occurs. Based on the Kantian triad  –​democracy, economic interdependence and institutions, liberals argue that peace prevails when the three Kantian principles are present.46 In Europe, for example, these three core Kantian principles have played a pivotal role in transforming the region into a peaceful place.47 Building on the third principle of Kantian peace, neo-​liberal institutionalism posits that institutions play a pivotal role in the maintenance of regional cooperation and the building of a peaceful regional order. The theory acknowledges the importance of anarchy (similar to that of neo-​realism), but maintains that institutions help mitigate the impact of anarchy by addressing the collective action problem.48 Institutions provide information, reduce transaction cost, help settle distributional conflicts and solve the problem of cheating which mitigate the impact of anarchy and the security dilemma and increase incentives for cooperation.49 Hofmann and Merand argue that a dense web of institutions ‘creates differentiated multilateral cooperation, which minimizes the risk of zero-​sum politics’.50 Furthermore, institutions promote order by formalizing norms and rules, which creates certainty and predictability.51 Additionally, institutionalists contend that process redefines state preferences and interests, which increases the stakes of the actors in the institutional arrangement and the incentives for cooperation. Important yet, once initiated, institutions obtain a life of their own and gradually become autonomous and enduring. Institutionalism’s main strength is that it provides insights about the process and the outcome of regionalism. But it also has some limitations. First, it does not explain the emergence of regionalism. Second, it does not explain the persistence of national identities and

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its impacts on regionalism. The British decision to exit the EU has highlighted this point. Third, regional transformation and the building of a liberal order can be hampered by the meddling of external great powers.52 Neo-​liberal institutionalism does not take this factor into account. Fourth, while neo-​liberalism explains the causes of sustained cooperation and the outcome of regionalism, it fails to include domestic factors as sources of state interests and behaviour. It is because it views that state interests are formed by exogenous influence (this position is similar to that of neo-​realism). As will be discussed, constructivism provides a better explanation of this issue.

Constructivism Constructivism offers a contrasting perspective on regionalism and regional international relations to that of rationalist theories as previously discussed. Constructivists begin by arguing that there exists an ideational structure beyond the material structure in world or regional politics, which is determined by the intersubjective ideas of elites.53 The distribution of material power or a material condition alone does not determine this structure. As one analyst has maintained: ‘While material forces remain important, intersubjective factors, including ideas, culture and identities, play a determining, rather than secondary, role in foreign policy interactions.’54 Ideas, norms and identity are at the core of the constructivist argument in explaining the dynamics of regionalism. As Acharya has pointed out: Constructivists see ideas, norms and identity as playing a crucial role in regionalism. These elements shape expectations and facilitate cooperation through shared understandings of goals and outcomes. They act as cognitive factors that condition how new approaches to economic, political and security management are received. They also provide a yardstick for measuring the outcome of regionalism: the success or failure of regional institutions can be judged normatively rather than just on the basis of material indicators like free trade.55 ‘Norm entrepreneurs’56 are the key driver for norm diffusion, which occurs in two ways: localization and subsidiarity. Norm localization is ‘a process of idea transmission … [and] the active construction (through discourse, framing, grafting, and cultural selection) of foreign

12

Introduction

ideas by local actors which results in the former developing significant congruence with local beliefs and practices’.57 Also, local norms can travel and diffuse reversely, a process that Acharya calls ‘norm subsidiarity’.58 For example, norms developed in the Asia–​Pacific region have travelled around the world. Constructivists posit that norm diffusion plays a pivotal role in shaping regionalism. Constructivists view that identity matters greatly in international relations because it defines and redefines actors’ interests.59 Regionalism creates cross-​boundary awareness and a sense of region-​wide common identity or a ‘regional imagined community’ through transaction, interaction and socialization. Although the concept of ‘imagined community’ is coined by Benedict Anderson in a national context,60 it can be applied in the context of region building too. As James Mayall has pointed out, a regional identity will not be ‘an alternative doctrine to nationalism’, but it will be a ‘supplement to it’.61 A region, therefore, is not merely a group of proximate states –​it is a ‘cognitive’ idea.62 Constructivism provides the most nuanced explanation of regionalism.63 Its explanation about the positive effects is specifically noteworthy. However, the theory also has some limitations. First, it does not explain the rise of the phenomenon. Acharya maintains that constructivism is yet to provide an adequate explanation about the rise and dynamics of regional institutions; empirical works are still scarce and the constructivist agenda is yet to inspire works on regional institutions from a theoretical perspective.64 Second, it is questionable whether ideas develop purely from domestic sources without any influence of structural material conditions. Constructivists have yet to come up with a definitive answer to this issue. Third, constructivism only explains positive norms and their diffusion and peaceful aspects of regionalism. There are empirical cases where regionalism has failed to generate positive outcomes, and order is based on balance of power. South Asia is such a case.65 How does constructivism explain such empirical cases? Acharya points out that constructivism remains a somewhat linear perspective, predisposed against the study of crisis points in cooperation, which would explain the decline of institutions.66 Fourth, constructivism does not explain variations, that is differing elite perceptions within a region, which are bound to influence actors’ identity and interest. As the discussion on the three theoretical perspectives suggests, none can provide a comprehensive explanation about the dynamics of regionalism  –​its emergence, outcomes and effects. Neo-​realism is good at explaining its rise but weak at providing commentary on how sustained cooperation is maintained by states. It also has little

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to say about the outcomes and effects of this process. On the other hand, neo-​liberal institutionalism and constructivism do a better job at explaining the outcomes and effects of regional cooperation and integration, but both these theories do not account for the rise of regionalism. Neo-​liberals explain institutional dynamics better while constructivism offers a good account of the (positive) effects. So, what kind of regionalism does South Asia highlight? What character does it have? How do we explain it? What theoretical perspectives can we deploy to understand South Asian regionalism? This book will consider various accounts to address these issues in the context of South Asian regionalism.

Outline of the chapters Besides the Introduction and the Conclusion, the book has eight chapters. Chapter 1 provides an overview of South Asian international relations from 1947 onwards. It identifies its key trends and analyses the pattern of South Asian international relations. Arguably, the success or failure of a regional organization is a function of the structure and patterns –​amity or enmity –​of regional international relations. This chapter, therefore, lays the foundation for analysing the politics of South Asian regionalism, specifically its origin, evolution, outcomes and effects. Chapter 2 explains the complexities of defining a region. ‘Region’ is a contested idea and there is no consensus among scholars about it. This chapter illustrates the complexities of defining South Asia as a region and explains in what sense it should or should not be called a region. Chapter 3 explores the origins of SAARC and explains the politics behind it. Three specific variables are engaged in explaining the politics of the origins of SAARC: the role of systemic forces, the dynamics of regional international relations and the socio-​economic profile of the region and the regional states. It also explores another interesting aspect of the origin of SAARC; the initiative for a regional grouping was taken by Bangladesh, a middle-​sized state in the regional system, and not by India or Pakistan, the two most powerful states of the region. This chapter explains why Bangladesh took the initiative and how different regional states reacted to the Bangladeshi proposal. Chapter 4 analyses the evolution of the organization and the process of regionalism in its formative phase from 1980 to 1992. SAARC strived to consolidate regional integration by adopting the ‘spillover’ idea of neo-​functionalism, which it borrowed from the early days of European experience. The SAARC states started the process of

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Introduction

regionalism by focusing cooperation on non-​controversial, functional areas. The objective was to incrementally deepen regional cooperation and build a peaceful regional environment. Evidently, SAARC added many new areas of joint actions during this phase. A  noteworthy aspect of South Asian regionalism during this phase was that SAARC member states did not initially focus on core economic areas –​rather they based regional cooperation on functional areas only. Chapter 5 explains the evolution of the organization and its politics beyond the formative phase. The most important dimension in this context was the decision to initiate joint action in core economic areas such as trade in goods and services, investment, finance and so on. The flagship initiatives in this context were the conclusion of the SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) and the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) agreements. This chapter illustrates the political and economic impetus for moving towards that direction and the constraints to implement the two flagship agreements of this phase in SAARC’s evolution. By explaining the constraints to implement the two agreements, indeed it illustrates the growing differences and disagreements that have since culminated in the current stalemate within the organization. Chapter 6 analyses sub-​regional and trans-​regional cooperation that has developed within the framework of SAARC and beyond and their implications for South Asian regionalism. Within the framework of SAARC, the South Asian Growth Quadrangle (SAGQ), which came to be known as the ‘Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal’ (BBIN) initiative, was approved in the 1997 Male summit. To support the sub-​regional initiative, the Asian Development Bank initiated the ‘South Asia Sub-​Regional Economic Cooperation’ (SASEC). Beyond SAARC, the ‘Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar Economic Corridor’ (BCIM-​EC) and the ‘Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-​ Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation’ (BIMSTEC) have emerged, which are trans-regional in character. These initiatives have got implications for SAARC-​led regionalism, which are analysed in this chapter. Chapter 7 evaluates the performance of SAARC and the limits of South Asian regionalism. It analyses its achievements and failures. SAARC is largely viewed as a dysfunctional organization and its achievements are mostly ‘on paper’. However, it should be noted that SAARC has had some tangible achievements, which will be explored in this chapter. But, as will be analysed, its failures are more visible than its achievements. This chapter provides a nuanced, in-​depth analysis of the successes and failures of SAARC and their causes.

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Chapter 8 illustrates the theoretical implications of this study for IR theories and their assumptions about regionalism, which have been presented at the outset of this book. It assesses whether the theoretical assumptions of the three mainstream theories about the rise, process, outcomes and effects of regionalism can explain the South Asian case. As will be analysed, the assumptions of standard IR theories cannot be applied in the case of South Asian regionalism. So, what theoretical insights can we draw from this case? It also illustrates what the lessons of this study tell us about the state of IR theories in general. It is generally posited that the current IR theories are Western-​oriented and have been built based on the experiences of the West, hence there are questions about their universal applicability. Given such a context, there has developed a debate about a ‘Global IR’. Can the analysis of this study contribute to this debate? Finally, the Conclusion sums up the key points of this study and presents its major findings. It also seeks to illustrate the general implications of this work for regionalism studies. In a final sub-​section, the conclusion illustrates the debate about the future of SAARC.

16

1

South Asia’s International Relations: A Historical Overview Introduction The making or unmaking of a regional organization is a function of politics and the dynamics of that particular region’s international relations. Mohammed Ayoob, at the outset of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), argued that ‘the primacy of the political’ would determine the outcome of regionalism in South Asia and the following factors would play a crucial role in this context: (1) a common threat perception; (2) a common foreign policy orientation; (3) similar political ideologies; and (4) a consensus about the role of the pivotal regional power. He held a pessimistic outlook about the future of regional cooperation in South Asia based on his analysis of the four political variables and a comparative study of regionalism contextualizing the European Union (EU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). He concluded: South Asia, therefore, is destined in the foreseeable future to uneasily occupy the middle ground between regional polarization and regional cooperation-​shifting ever so marginally toward one pole or the other. To expect much more in terms of regional cooperation, particularly in the absence of the four critical variables we have identified, is to fly in the face of evidence.1 After three and a half decades, it appears that Ayoob could not have been more accurate. As posited in the Introduction and the analysis in the following chapters will make it clear that while SAARC started

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with much hope and the organization has achieved some tangible and intangible successes, it has largely failed to deliver the expected substantive material benefit. Therefore, it is arguable that the state of political relations of the regional states and their security perceptions, foreign policy behaviour, political ideologies and the ‘India factor’ have shaped the evolution of SAARC in the past three and a half decades. Given such a context, the key aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of South Asia’s international relations since 1947 and illustrates its key patterns and the determining factors. Such an analysis will pave the way for explaining the rise of the regionalist project in South Asia, its evolution, outcomes and effects. The forces that have shaped South Asian international relations can be clustered into two broad categories: regional and extra-​regional. They are not mutually exclusive, though; instead they are interrelated and function in an intertwined fashion, which determines the dynamics of the regional international relations. In terms of regional attributes, the factors that have shaped South Asian dynamics can be classified into two categories: structural and perceptual/​behavioural. A  key structural factor that determines the dynamics of the regional international relations is that South Asia is an Indo-​centric sub-​system.2 Geographically, India is the core state of the region and, except for Pakistan and Afghanistan,3 no two other South Asian states share land borders with each other, while India shares borders –​land or maritime –​with each of them. The Indian economy is much larger than the economies of all the South Asian states combined and its defence spending is much higher than that of all the regional states put together.4 Therefore, India’s foreign policy approach towards the regional states is a key driver of the dynamics of regional international relations. Responses from other states and their policy approaches towards India are also no less significant to shape the regional dynamics in South Asia; in particular, Pakistan’s policy approach and its challenge to the Indian power, which has led to a condition of ‘enduring rivalry’5 in South Asia. Arguably, the enduring rivalry of India and Pakistan has shaped the dynamics of the region’s international relations. Hence, notwithstanding India’s superiority in terms of power attributes, there exists a bipolar regional structure in South Asia.6 It is noteworthy that in the Pakistani strategy to challenge Indian supremacy there has been an extra-​regional dimension in the sense that Pakistan has persistently sought assistance from outside powers, that is the USA and China.7

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In the modern era, regions are not immune from the intrusion and influence of extra-​regional powers. This has become even more pronounced in an age of accelerated globalization. Arguably, all regional sub-​systems are ‘intrusive’ systems in which the intrusion of the systemic forces in regional affairs is pre-​ordained.8 South Asia is also an intrusive system and extra-​regional powers have traditionally played an important role in regional international relations. During the Cold War, tight bipolarity ensured the intrusion of systemic powers. In the post-​Cold War era as well, extra-​regional powers significantly influence the dynamics of regional international relations, including South Asia. Keeping the two sets of factors emanating from regional attributes and external forces in context, this chapter illustrates how regional international relations have evolved since decolonization in 1947 and the forces that have shaped this evolution. A caveat, however, needs to be offered here. It is not possible to provide minute details of the region’s international relations because of space limitations. It does, however, illustrate the major turning points and developments that have influenced these relations. Such an analysis will provide the basis for illustrating the origins, evolution and the outcomes of regionalism in South Asia. The concluding section assesses the key trends in the regional international relations and their broad implications for regionalism in South Asia.

Decolonization, birth pangs and the beginning of South Asia’s international relations Britain ended nearly 200  years of colonial rule in India in August 1947. Two independent states  –​India and Pakistan  –​were created at the end of colonial rule. Under the leadership of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, towards the end of colonial rule the Muslim League demanded a separate homeland for Indian Muslims arguing that Hindus and Muslims were two separate ‘nations’. Known as the ‘Two Nation Theory’ the ‘political idea of Pakistan’9 eventually culminated in the creation of the independent state of Pakistan and the independent state of India through partition in 1947.10 But the way that colonial India was divided into two states left a far-​reaching impact whose echoes reverberate even today. The end of colonial rule and the creation of the two states was a messy, bloody affair, which saw the largest mass migration in human history. About 15  million people were displaced and more than 1  million people were killed in partition violence.11 Partition controversies, particularly related to boundary demarcation, and violence left long-​ term consequences, which continued to affect interstate relations in

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the decades to come. Indeed, they still affect regional relationships. For example, the dispute over the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir has continued to shape the bilateral relationship between India and Pakistan and still remains as the central bone of contention for reconciliation.12 The two countries have fought three wars over Kashmir, which rather than solving the issue have complicated its resolution. All diplomatic initiatives thus far have failed to resolve the issue. As no obvious solution is in the offing, the issue, in all likelihood, will continue to shape India–​Pakistan relations in the years to come.

The worst beginning: the first Kashmir war India and Pakistan had a difficult beginning as independent states. Almost immediately after independence, the two countries went to war over Kashmir. At the time of the British withdrawal in August, the Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, remained undecided about the status of Kashmir whether to become an independent state or accede to either India or Pakistan. When Pashtun Laskars from North West Frontier Province advanced towards Kashmir to capture it by force, Maharaja Singh sought assistance from New Delhi. The Nehru government insisted that the Maharaja would need to accede to India to be eligible for military assistance. As a result, Maharaja Singh signed the accession document and New Delhi airlifted Indian soldiers to repulse the Laskars’ invasion. War broke out between India and Pakistan immediately after that.13 It continued for the next 14 months until a cease-​fire was brokered by the United Nations, which came into effect on 1 January 1949. The war was a consequence of the messy British withdrawal from India. This could be viewed as an early sign of what would become the future direction of their bilateral relationship. Indeed, the first Kashmir war set the tone for future Indo–​Pakistani relations. The two countries would fight two more wars (1965 and 1999) over Kashmir and confront numerous crises over the territory. To date, their bilateral relationship has remained hostage to the Kashmir dispute. It is arguable that the Kashmir dispute has greatly affected the dynamics of regional international relations and in turn the evolution of South Asian regionalism.

India and its neighbours: the initial years Following independence, New Delhi attempted to assert its influence in the neighbourhood. New Delhi’s policy approach in

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this regard derived from two key factors. First, from the beginning of independence (even before that), Indian political leaders believed that India was destined to be a great power. The country’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, had held such a view.14 Second, Indian political elites perceived that India was the successor state of British India and the country would undertake the predecessor’s international treaty and other obligations. Also, New Delhi adopted the defence and security doctrine and policy of British India following independence.15 In its approach, British India used to pursue a ‘forward defence’ doctrine and perceived that subcontinental security needed to be viewed from a holistic standpoint. Such an approach would become more apparent in the later decades, which would come to be known, as will be discussed on page 29, as the ‘Indian Doctrine’. It meant that from New Delhi’s standpoint, the Indian subcontinent was under its sphere of influence. Following the British withdrawal, India maintained a similar policy orientation towards the three Himalayan kingdoms –​Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. Despite Sikkim remaining nominally independent, it virtually became, similar to its status during colonial rule, a protectorate of India. New Delhi signed treaties with Nepal and Bhutan replacing the old treaties that were signed during colonial times. In 1949, India signed a friendship treaty with Bhutan (revised in 2007) in order to build a ‘special relationship’ with the Himalayan kingdom, which ensured Indian ‘guidance’ in Bhutan’s foreign and defence policy.16 Similarly, the 1950 ‘Treaty of Friendship and Peace’ between India and Nepal aimed to foster a ‘special relationship’ between the two countries.17 These meant that New Delhi had consolidated India’s position in the Himalayan frontier in the early years following independence. Following the British withdrawal, India and Sri Lanka built friendly relations. This amicable relationship was reflected in their non-​aligned foreign policy pursuits. The two countries played an important role in building the NAM in the 1950s and 1960s.18 In the early years of independence, India developed cordial relations with its immediate South Asian neighbours except Pakistan. The birth pangs and the first Kashmir war continued to shape the India–​Pakistan bilateral relationship in the 1950s. The perception of threat against each other continued to intensify throughout the decade. Pakistanis view that India’s political elites could not accept the partition of the subcontinent and the creation of Pakistan. Hence, New Delhi was determined to undo the Pakistani state and reabsorb it within the Indian Union. As a former Pakistani ambassador to

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India writes: ‘We perceive that the Indian leadership and a sizeable segment of its following continue to regard the formation of Pakistan as a historical error forced on India, that given the opportunity, they would like in some way to redress the situation.’19 Moreover, there was the unfinished business of the partition, that is Kashmir, which needed to be addressed to improve India–​Pakistan relations. These issues continued to shape the Pakistani approach towards India in the 1950s. Yet, the two countries found some reasons to cooperate. For example, the two countries signed the Delhi Pact in 1950 to safeguard minority rights in each other’s countries. In 1960, they signed the landmark Indus Water Treaty. Therefore, although the India–​Pakistan relationship was essentially conflictual in the 1950s, the two states also found grounds to work together where possible.

The Cold War and South Asia in the 1950s The South Asian international relations in the 1950s had been defined primarily in the context of enmity between India and Pakistan, which became entrenched due to the Cold War. In the 1950s, the intrusion of external powers in the context of intensifying Cold War rivalry was beginning to affect regional international relations. Following the end of the Second World War, as the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) intensified, they began to establish spheres of influence throughout the world. South Asia did not remain immune from Cold War politics. Consequently, New Delhi gradually began to lean towards the USSR and Pakistan began to build an alliance with the USA. Pakistan consolidated this by joining the American-​sponsored alliance framework  –​ SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) and CENTO (Central Treaty Organization or Baghdad Pact) –​in 1954 and 1955 respectively. In May 1954, Pakistan signed a mutual defence assistance agreement with the United States, which signalled the entry of the USA in South Asia as an offshore balancer.20 In 1959, Pakistan signed a bilateral cooperation agreement with the United States. A slew of agreements with outside powers in the 1950s put Pakistan firmly in the US camp during the Cold War.21 Pakistan’s alliance with the United States created strategic worries in India, which in turn pushed it towards the Soviet camp. The intrusion of the superpowers into South Asia would intensify the influence of extra-​regional powers to shape the dynamics of regional international relations in the years to come. Both countries would seek the assistance of their patron in their bid for strategic supremacy.

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South Asian international relations in the 1960s Three key developments defined the international relations of South Asia in the 1960s. First, during this decade China emerged as a more influential agent in terms of South Asian international relations. Previously, China had been viewed merely as a source of communist threat. From the mid-​1950s onwards, the border dispute between India and China began to escalate, which was complicated by the Dalai Lama’s asylum in India in the late 1950s. Tibet thereafter became a contributing factor in Sino–​Indian relations. Eventually, this increasingly strained relationship would lead the two countries to a brief border war in 1962.22 Washington and London got involved immediately after war broke out in October and, in its wake, New Delhi sought assistance from the West, particularly the USA and the UK.23 The key implication of this episode was that the intrusion of extra-​regional powers was on the rise in South Asian affairs. In the meantime, Pakistan moved to build a closer relationship with China, a development which would have long-​term consequences for South Asian international relations. More critically, it involved a secret nuclear alliance between Pakistan and China.24 Second, India and Pakistan fought the second Kashmir war in 1965. The origins of the war can be traced back to the unfinished business of the partition of India in 1947. Indeed, it can be viewed as an extension of the first Kashmir war. It was an attempt by Pakistan to seize the territory by military force, but it ended in a stalemate and the status quo was maintained.25 The Soviet Union mediated a cease-​fire, which led to the signing of the Tashkent agreement in January 1966.26 The war ensured that Kashmir would remain as a problematic issue in their relationship. It also implied that the Kashmir dispute would continue to impose a pattern of enmity in South Asian international relations and prolong the ‘enduring rivalry’ between India and Pakistan. Third, nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan took root in the 1960s, which added a new dimension to the troubled India–​Pakistan relationship, adversely affecting the regional environment. Although there was a duality in the Indian civilian nuclear power programme from the beginning, it took a new turn in the 1960s in view of China’s first nuclear test in 1964. The Chinese test triggered an intense nuclear debate in India in which it was argued that India needed a nuclear deterrent to counter the Chinese nuclear threat.27 In particular, this argument gained ground because it happened barely two years after the Sino–​Indian border war. Consequently, India undertook a clandestine nuclear explosive project, called the ‘subterranean nuclear explosive

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project’ (SNEP), which eventually culminated in the first nuclear test carried out by India in 1974.28 In the meantime, New Delhi adopted a nuclear policy in which the nuclear option was kept open. This policy was first manifested in New Delhi’s refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-​Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was concluded in 1968.29 Pakistan became suspicious of India’s nuclear activities and intentions in the 1960s. This suspicion arose in view of India’s commissioning of a plutonium reprocessing plant.30 It was further intensified when India refused to sign the NPT in 1968. Islamabad reacted to the Indian decision by refusing to sign the NPT. It meant that similar to India’s policy Pakistan had adopted a nuclear policy that kept the option to build nuclear weapons open. Against such a backdrop, Pakistan launched a clandestine nuclear weapons project in 1972 as a part of its ‘never again’ defence policy following the dismemberment of the country in the 1971 India–​Pakistan war.31 The nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan would intensify in the coming years and complicate regional international relations. There were no major developments in India’s relationships with its smaller neighbours that had an impact on regional international relations in a significant way. It was rather a case of continuity than disruption in their bilateral relationships. Arguably, the regional environment was primarily shaped by developments between India and Pakistan during the 1960s.

South Asia in the 1970s: the 1971 Bangladesh War and its aftermath Several major developments shaped the dynamics of regional international relations during this decade, which include: the break-​ up of Pakistan and the creation of independent Bangladesh in 1971; the merger of Sikkim with India in 1975; a bloody military coup in Bangladesh in 1975 that removed a pro-​India government in that country and installed a pro-​Pakistan and pro-​China government; and the installation of a non-​Congress government in India in 1977. In 1971, India and Pakistan fought the third war in which the eastern wing of Pakistan emerged as independent Bangladesh. The idea of Pakistan was challenging from the beginning not only because of the physical separation of the eastern wing from the rest of Pakistan with 1,000 miles of Indian territory in-​between, but also due to cultural differences between the two wings of the state. Except for the religion, that is Islam, there was virtually no cultural similarity between East and West Pakistan. So, when the Pakistani ruling elite undertook a

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homogenizing approach for ‘national integration’, it was viewed as ‘internal colonization’ by the Bengalis in East Pakistan.32 This was particularly evident in the language policy in which the ruling elite announced that ‘Urdu’ would be the state language of Pakistan. The Bengalis in East Pakistan protested it arguing that they constituted 56 per cent of the population of the country and Urdu was an alien language to them. Gradually the protest movement against the imposition of Urdu as the state language intensified and in 1951 the Pakistani authorities used force to disrupt the protest movement in which several people were killed.33 The language movement turned into a struggle for autonomy in the 1960s.34 Against the backdrop of an intensifying movement in East Pakistan, the Pakistan military launched a crackdown on the unarmed Bengalis on 25 March 1971, which pushed the autonomy movement into a secessionist war.35 The war continued for about nine months from March onwards until the surrender of the Pakistani armed forces on 16 December 1971. Although for most of the time during this period India only provided indirect support to the Bengali freedom fighters, on 4 December it directly intervened militarily in the war. Within two weeks, the Pakistani armed forces in East Pakistan surrendered to the combined command of the Indian forces and the Bengali freedom fighters,36 thereby paving the way for the rise of an independent state –​ Bangladesh. The war left formidable implications for the strategic landscape of the region and the region’s international relations in general. Before the break-​up of Pakistan and the rise of independent Bangladesh, India had to fight a two-​front war with Pakistan. The outcome of the 1971 war reversed this, which delivered a significant strategic advantage to India vis-​à-​vis Pakistan.37 India also consolidated its advantageous position vis-​à-​vis Pakistan, particularly on the Kashmir issue, by signing the Simla agreement in 1972. The agreement created the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir, which defined the de facto border between the two countries in Kashmir. The two countries also agreed to settle the Kashmir dispute through bilateral negotiations, a position that provided New Delhi a huge advantage.38 Similarly, New Delhi extracted some advantages from Pakistan by signing the tripartite Delhi agreement (India–​Bangladesh–​ Pakistan), which facilitated the repatriation of 90,000 Pakistani military personnel who surrendered in Dhaka in December 1971.39 The creation of Bangladesh added a new dimension to the already complex regional international relations. A  host of issues, that is repatriation of each other’s nationals, sharing of assets, war crimes and

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so on, made reconciliation between Bangladesh and Pakistan difficult.40 An atmosphere of reconciliation did emerge when Bangladesh’s prime minister, Mujibar Rahman, visited Pakistan in 1974 to attend the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC); it led to the recognition of Bangladesh as an independent state by Pakistan and Prime Minster Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in that year visited Dhaka. The bilateral relations between the two countries improved following a change of power in Dhaka in 1975 by a military coup in which an anti-​India government was installed to power.41 The Bangladesh–​Pakistan relationship would reverse when the Awami League would return to power in later years. India–​Pakistan relations sharply deteriorated in the wake of the Bangladesh War in 1971. The dismemberment of Pakistan was perceived by the Pakistani elite as unmistakeable proof that Indians could not accept the partition of India in 1947 and wanted to reabsorb Pakistan within the Indian Union at the earliest opportunity.42 Consequently, Pakistan overhauled its security and defence policy and adopted a strategy of ‘never again’, which meant that Islamabad would pursue such a policy that would prevent further dismemberment of the country by India in the future. The Bhutto government launched a clandestine nuclear weapons programme in 197243 and would strive to expeditiously seek the capability to build nuclear weapons. This would be further expedited following India’s nuclear explosion in 1974. Pakistan’s nuclear activities led to the imposition of nuclear-​related sanctions by the United States in the late 1970s through the Glenn–​ Symington Amendment.44 After the 1971 war, India–​Pakistan security rivalry intensified, which not only affected their bilateral relationship, but also regional international relations. Following the toppling of the pro-​India Awami League government in Dhaka, Bangladesh–​India relations deteriorated overnight, which intensified in the coming years.45 Concomitantly, Dhaka’s relations with Islamabad and Beijing improved. In a strategic context, India now began to confront a two-​front war scenario with Pakistan, which was exacerbated by a growing relationship between Bangladesh and China. With this development, India confronted challenges to its dominant position in South Asia. In 1975, the Himalayan kingdom of Sikkim merged with the Indian Union following a referendum. However, it raised questions about India’s role in ‘facilitating’ the merger.46 Although no overt controversy was visible as a result of the development, its general implications could not be underestimated. It created a psychological fear among the smaller states about India’s intention regarding their sovereign status.47 A key implication of this in the context of this study is that the smaller states

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immediately supported the Bangladesh proposal to establish a regional organization because such a body would strengthen their sovereignty vis-​à-​vis  India. The concern of the smaller states following the merger of Sikkim with India was slightly mitigated when a non-​Congress coalition was installed to power in India in 1977 and Morarji Desai became prime minister. It did pursue a benign foreign policy approach towards the smaller states of the region,48 which was a marked difference from the previous government led by Indira Gandhi. It also helped improve relations with Pakistan to some extent, although the fundamentals of their rivalry remained the same. In the 1970s, South Asia’s regional environment, therefore, was primarily shaped by the fallout of the break-​up of Pakistan in 1971. New Delhi’s relations with the smaller states fluctuated although the smaller states became more wary about their sovereignty following the merger of Sikkim with India in 1975.

Great powers, regional affairs and South Asia in the 1980s Two major trends dominated South Asian regional affairs in the 1980s. The first was the superpower rivalry in Afghanistan following the invasion of that country by the Soviet Union. The other was the attempt by India to consolidate its domination in South Asia. While the smaller states of the region could not effectively counter it, Pakistan put up resistance with assistance from extra-​regional powers. The intrusion of extra-​regional powers into South Asia became more visible and impactful in the 1980s. In December 1979, Soviet forces entered into Afghanistan by the ‘invitation’ of Kabul, which continued throughout the decade.49 It brought Cold War rivalry directly to the South Asia region. As soon as the Soviet forces entered Afghanistan, overnight Pakistan emerged as the frontline state in America’s proxy war against the Soviet Union. The earlier tension between the USA and Pakistan over the latter’s nuclear weapons programme went on the backburner and America began to overlook Pakistan’s nuclear activities. It had an impact on the nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan. More crucially, Washington provided significant military assistance to reward Pakistan for its help in the Afghan war including very advanced fighter aircraft –​F-​16.50 The US military assistance to Pakistan affected the conventional military balance between India and Pakistan, thus affecting the strategic rivalry of the two countries.51

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The Afghan war affected India–​Pakistan security and nuclear rivalry. When the Soviet forces entered Afghanistan, the United States immediately withheld the sanctions that were imposed on Pakistan under the Glenn–​Symington Amendment because the Soviet westward expansion emerged as a greater threat to the USA than its concerns over the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme. Utilizing America’s weakness, Pakistan expedited its nuclear development activities and by 1982 it acquired the capability to enrich uranium above 5 per cent.52 This prompted the American president, Ronald Reagan, to write to the Pakistani military ruler, General Ziaul Haq, not to cross the 5 per cent threshold of uranium enrichment.53 Although General Haq assured the US president that Pakistan would not cross the limit, subsequent evidence suggests that Pakistan crossed the threshold. In 1985, the US Congress passed a Pakistan-​specific counter-​proliferation law known as the Pressler Amendment, which stated that to release aid funds for Pakistan, the US president would have to certify to Congress that Pakistan was not building a nuclear bomb.54 From 1986 to 1990, each year the US president deceptively certified to Congress that Pakistan was not building a bomb to facilitate the release of assistance for Pakistan.55 The American president did so because Washington needed Pakistan’s help to fight the proxy war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Following the decision by Moscow to withdraw Soviet forces from Afghanistan, in 1990 the American president refused to provide certification to Congress, which led to the imposition of US sanctions on Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment. Both India and Pakistan developed their nuclear programmes in a competitive manner in the 1980s. In 1986–​87, the two countries became embroiled in a crisis over the military exercise of the Indian armed forces, codenamed ‘Brasstacks’. The Brasstacks crisis had a nuclear implication in which the Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan said in an interview that Pakistan had the capability to build a nuclear bomb.56 It elicited a sharp reaction from New Delhi, which vowed to take adequate measures against Pakistan’s nuclear threat.57 By the end of the 1980s, it is believed that both countries had acquired the capability to build all the components of a nuclear weapon although possibly they did not assemble any nuclear device at that point in time.58 The nuclear rivalry between the two countries highlighted an intensifying military and security competition, which had significant implications for regional international relations. It is arguable that the Cold War rivalry between the USA and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan had a direct impact on the Indo–Pakistani nuclear rivalry59 and regional international

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relations in general. The Cold War rivalry and extra-​regional powers had significantly aggravated relations between India and Pakistan. Although India from the time of its emergence as an independent state perceived the immediate neighbourhood and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) as its sphere of influence, it became more assertive to consolidate its position in the 1980s. For one thing, India traditionally sought to exercise power in order to maintain its position of influence in its immediate neighbourhood; in particular this was more apparent during the time of Indira Gandhi’s premiership.60 India’s greater assertiveness in the 1980s was primarily due to the growing influence of the USA and China in South Asia. At least three key developments reflected India’s assertive posture in South Asia in the 1980s. The first was New Delhi’s deployment of troops in Sri Lanka in 1987 as the guarantor of peace following a peace accord between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil separatists. New Delhi was unhappy with Colombo’s drift towards the West (and to some extent China) in its foreign policy in the 1980s. India used the Tamil issue to reverse the trend and reassert its influence over that country. For this, New Delhi tacitly supported the Tamil separatists in order to bring Colombo to the negotiating table and get a resolution of the ethnic conflict. Putting pressure on both the conflicting parties, New Delhi clinched a peace accord and, under the terms of the agreement, sent troops to Sri Lanka in 1987. However, New Delhi had to withdraw its forces in 1989 without realizing the mission’s objectives.61 The second development was India’s rapid response to Male’s request for assistance against a mercenary coup in the Maldives. New Delhi responded within 24 hours to the call and restored the Mamoon Abdul Gayoom regime.62 In 1989, a rift developed between New Delhi and Kathmandu because the latter was becoming closer to China, which, from India’s standpoint, would compromise India’s security interest in the Himalayan frontier. New Delhi virtually imposed an economic blockade on Nepal by closing all transit routes except one for external trade.63 These actions highlighted India’s approach towards its neighbours in the 1980s, which was termed as the ‘Indian Doctrine’. According to this doctrine, India would not interfere in the internal affairs of other South Asian states, but if any state needed assistance, they should ask for help from India and nobody else; a failure to do so would be viewed as anti-​Indian.64 Such an Indian approach towards its smaller neighbours was in general viewed by them as a threat to their political independence.65 In the 1980s, therefore, security issues mostly dominated interstate relations and regional international relations. While New Delhi

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perceived that its smaller neighbours were causing a security threat by building closer ties with extra-​regional powers at the cost of India, the smaller states viewed that the Indian approach towards them was inimical to their sovereign status. As can be evidenced, not only regional dynamics, but also the intrusion of external powers played a significant role in shaping South Asian international relations in the 1980s.

The end of the Cold War and South Asian international relations in the 1990s The end of the Cold War and the transformation of the international system brought significant changes to South Asian international relations. It allowed a realignment of forces in the region as both India and Pakistan lost the support they received from the superpowers during the Cold War. India lost the veto-​wielding support of the Soviet Union in the United Nations on issues such as Kashmir. Indeed, it was one of the key factors that sustained a closer relationship between India and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.66 Equally significantly, with the demise of the Soviet Union, India lost a reliable source of military equipment for its armed forces and it was uncertain whether Russia would supply arms on Moscow’s traditionally favourable terms. So, India found itself in an uncertain world because its military supplies were severely affected by it.67 Pakistan also found itself in an uncertain environment after the end of the Cold War. Indeed, Pakistan’s security status deteriorated in the new international environment. It not only lost America’s patronage, which it enjoyed throughout the Cold War era, in particular in the 1980s during the Afghan war, but also confronted America’s wrath for its nuclear programme. Although the USA overlooked Pakistan’s nuclear advance during the Afghan war, Washington imposed sanctions on Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment as soon as Moscow announced its decision to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan.68 Consequently, Pakistan’s security became vulnerable in a post-​Cold War environment. As India and Pakistan felt vulnerable in a post-​Cold War setting and were trying to adjust in a new strategic environment, the two countries became embroiled in a crisis in 1990 over the disputed territory of Kashmir, which had a nuclear implication. Against the backdrop of an intensifying insurgency in the Indian-​administered part of Kashmir, New Delhi alleged that Pakistan was instigating violence and giving weapons and other logistic support to the insurgents.69 A war of words between the two countries quickly pushed them to the threshold of a conflict. During the course of the crisis, they exchanged nuclear threats

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against each other. Fearing the crisis might escalate to the nuclear level, President Bush reportedly sent a delegation led by Robert Gates to South Asia to defuse the crisis (although both New Delhi and Islamabad denied it).70 Afterwards, the crisis was quietly brought under control. Some scholars viewed that it was the first nuclear crisis in South Asia in which nuclear deterrence seemed to have worked properly.71 It highlighted a heightened state of strategic tension and an intensified security rivalry between the two countries after the end of the Cold War. This security friction would intensify even further in the coming years, thus producing a precarious regional environment. The two countries would rely ever more on nuclear weapons for their security.

India and its smaller neighbours: the ‘Gujral Doctrine’ In the mid-​1990s, the Gujral government announced a new policy approach towards the smaller South Asian neighbours, which came to be known as the ‘Gujral Doctrine’.72 In this new policy approach New Delhi promised to pursue a programme of ‘non-​reciprocity’ and greater accommodation towards its smaller neighbours. Indeed, it was a response to the prevailing perception in the capitals of the smaller South Asian states in which they viewed India to be a ‘domineering power’ and threatened their sovereignty and political independence. It is noteworthy that such perceptions grew in smaller South Asian countries, as noted earlier, following the merger of Sikkim with the Indian Union in 1975. The Gujral government undertook a new approach against such a backdrop. But, the Gujral government did not survive for long and was replaced by another fragile coalition government. It did not alter the perception of the ruling elite in the South Asian states significantly. In other words, a perception of mistrust about Indian intentions still remained in the smaller states of the region. So, this culture of mistrust in regional international relations continued as before.

Nuclear weapons, India–​Pakistan security rivalry and South Asian international relations As noted previously, India and Pakistan felt more vulnerable following the end of the Cold War compared with the preceding era. In search of security in a transformed world, the two countries expeditiously developed their nuclear capabilities, which they perceived would enhance their security. Indeed, India–​Pakistan strategic rivalry and their

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nuclear stand-​off largely defined South Asian international relations in the post-​Cold War era. Evidently, India and Pakistan’s reliance on nuclear weapons for security grew following the 1990 Kashmir crisis. Their expeditious nuclear arms building and official statements manifested an emphasis on nuclear weapons in their security policy. In the early 1990s, Pakistan’s foreign secretary claimed that the country could build nuclear weapons although it would refrain from doing so.73 The opposition leader and ex-​ prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, also claimed that Pakistan had acquired the capability to build nuclear weapons.74 Similarly, it is believed that India was actively working on its nuclear deterrent.75 All these claims demonstrated that nuclear weapons had taken the centre-​stage in their security rivalry. Needless to mention that the Indo–​Pakistani nuclear stand-​off had defined the strategic environment of the region in the 1990s and the region’s international relations in general. The nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan was manifested in the global nuclear developments in the mid-​1990s, which also presents a glimpse of their rivalry and the nature of regional international relations generally. In 1995, the NPT came up for renewal in New  York in which the treaty was extended permanently. Both India and Pakistan again refused to sign the document citing their age-​old objection that it was a discriminatory document. In 1996, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was concluded and here again the two countries refused to sign the document despite both countries having participated in the negotiations.76 Importantly, they refused to sign the NPT and the CTBT on a tit-​for-​tat basis. In the lead up to the finalization of the CTBT, New Delhi undertook preparations for a nuclear test in December 1995 although it did not carry it out under tremendous pressure from Washington.77 New Delhi calculated that as the window of opportunity was fading fast in view of the finalization of the CTBT, India would first conduct a nuclear test and sign the CTBT as a nuclear weapons state. Reportedly, Pakistan also undertook preparations for a tit-​for-​tat nuclear explosion if India had tested a nuclear device.78 As New Delhi did not carry out the test, Islamabad reciprocated. Although the 1995 nuclear test plans were not implemented, India and Pakistan did conduct open nuclear tests in May 1998. When the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party won the general elections in early 1998, after forming the government they immediately embarked on preparations to conduct nuclear explosions, which they did on 11 and 13 May. In reaction to India’s action, Pakistan, after much soul-​ searching, conducted tit-​for-​tat nuclear tests on 28 and 30 May. The

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tests intensified nuclear tensions between the two countries, which immediately altered the South Asian regional landscape. The open introduction of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of India and Pakistan hardened their strategic rivalry. Rather than making their rivalry stable through deterrence, nuclear weapons had the opposite impact on their relationship.79 This became evident as crises between the two countries became more frequent in the years following the formal introduction of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of India and Pakistan.

The 1999 Kargil conflict Within a year, following the open nuclear tests, India and Pakistan became embroiled in a conflict over the disputed territory of Kashmir. The feud erupted when Pakistani irregular and regular forces crossed the LoC to occupy the hilltops in the Kargil region in the spring of 1999. When New Delhi became aware of the intrusion, it ordered its forces to evict the intruders. India and Pakistan fought a war under the nuclear shadow, which lasted for about two months.80 Although the conflict remained limited, there was the possibility that it could escalate into a large-​scale conventional war or even nuclear war.81 America played a crucial role to prevent further escalation through its deterrence diplomacy.82 This clash manifested that the strategic rivalry between India and Pakistan had become more entrenched and regional international relations were not immune from its impact.

The 2001–​02 military stand-​off between India and Pakistan A mere two years after the Kargil incident, India and Pakistan confronted an even more explosive crisis in 2001–​02. The crisis erupted when the members of the two Pakistan-​based terrorist outfits –​ Laskar-​e-​Toiba (LeT) and Jaish-​e-​Mohammed (JeM) –​stormed into the Indian parliament in December 2001, for which New Delhi blamed the Pakistani intelligence services. The Indian government immediately mobilized its troops towards the India–​Pakistan border. Pakistan counter-​mobilized its forces, thus triggering a tense military stand-​off which lasted for about ten months.83 Although the crisis did not lead to a full-​scale conventional war, thanks to America’s diplomatic intervention, it could have escalated, to the point of nuclear war.84 Again, the crisis highlighted that the strategic

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rivalry between India and Pakistan had become more entrenched and their relationship had become more crisis-​prone following the nuclear tests in 1998.

Composite dialogue between India and Pakistan Following the two crises –​the Kargil conflict and the 2001–​02 military stand-​off, India and Pakistan became engaged in a reconciliation process, known as the ‘composite dialogue’. They perhaps realized that they needed to reconcile in a nuclear environment, otherwise events could lead to nuclear catastrophe. The essence of the composite dialogue was that they would discuss all outstanding issues in a comprehensive manner in order to achieve reconciliation between the two countries and stabilize their relationship.85 After a series of meetings, although progress was made in several areas, ultimately it could not break the logjam of history which had been building up over the decades. Like many attempts in the past, this initiative also ended in failure.

The 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack In November 2008, members of Pakistan-​based terrorist outfit –​LeT –​ attacked India’s financial capital Mumbai. New Delhi alleged that Pakistan’s prime intelligence agency –​ISI –​was involved in the planning and the execution of the terrorist act although Pakistan denied it. The terrorists came to the shore of India by boat from Pakistan and carried out attacks in several places, including a famous hotel, a train station and a Jewish centre. The siege continued for several days and over 160 people were killed in the attacks.86 As soon as the attacks started, a military tension built up between the two countries. Eventually no major crisis erupted, and America was active through diplomatic channels to defuse the tension. The incident again reflected that India and Pakistan had become more prone to crisis following the introduction of nuclear weapons in their arsenals. The three crises discussed previously and the failure of the composite dialogue reflect that India–​Pakistan bilateral relations had become more precarious with the advent of nuclear weapons in their arsenals. As the most powerful states in the region, their hostility was bound to have an impact on the regional international relations. While South Asia still remained an ‘intrusive’ system, the role of extra-​ regional powers changed significantly after the end of the Cold war.

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In the Indo–​Pakistani crises, the USA was significant and played its diplomatic card even-​handedly87 although India–​US relations were steadily improving.

Contemporary South Asian international relations Three key developments should be kept in perspective while explaining contemporary South Asian international relations. The first is the rise of China as a global power and the country’s assertive external policy, in particular in its neighbourhood. China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) is a key element of its assertive external policy and it has huge implications for South Asian international relations. Second, the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to power in India in 2014 has heralded a new Indian regional approach. Third, the rise of Donald Trump to power in the USA and his administration’s new policy towards South Asia and Afghanistan has significant implications for the region’s international relations and peace and stability. The configuration of these external forces is having and will continue to have an impact on the region’s international relations. Although historically China has been a significant factor in South Asian international relations, its significance in recent years has enormously increased. China has been rising as a power for a while, but in recent years it has grown in confidence and has started to claim a bigger stake in global economic and political processes. Consequently, it has become more assertive in its external policy. A manifestation of its assertiveness can be witnessed in its launching of the ‘One Belt, One Road’ or the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ in 2013. Dubbed as the project of the century with a trillion-​dollar investment fund, the initiative aims to restructure the existing global economic and political order,88 although China claims it to be a connectivity and infrastructure building project. The China–​Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a key pilot of the BRI in which China is ready to invest about US$60 billion.89 New Delhi has opposed the CPEC because it runs through the disputed territory of Kashmir and does not respect India’s sovereignty.90 Not only in Pakistan, but also China is buying influence in other South Asian states and the IOR through the offer of investment and infrastructure building. In Sri Lanka, for example, China has made significant investment to build infrastructure and other developmental projects. Quite controversially, China has also taken over the Sri Lankan port of Hambantota for 99 years when Colombo failed to repay the loan it took to pursue the project.91 Similarly, China made a US$24 billion investment offer to Bangladesh when President Xi Jinping

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visited Dhaka in 2016.92 In addition to traditional defense cooperation, the economic relationship between the two countries has been growing in recent years, which has raised concerns in New Delhi.93 The Maldives may be a small island state but it has increasingly become a spot of intense India–​China rivalry for influence. In the past few years, China has gained significant influence on the island state at the cost of India in which the latter has traditionally maintained a strong influence. Recently that has been reversed after the election of a new president in April 2019. The Sino–​Indian bid for influence in the Maldives is set to continue in the coming years.94 Similarly, India–​China rivalry for influence is visible in Myanmar. Both India and China have made investment in Myanmar and are eager to maintain their influence on that country, as can be seen in the Rohingya refugee crisis.95 Instead of supporting Bangladesh on the issue, both countries have tacitly supported Myanmar. It has affected Bangladesh’s bilateral relations with the two countries. Beijing has made significant inroads in Nepal as well in recent years. Sino-​Nepalese relations have improved in the past years on the back of a Chinese offer of investment in Nepal at the cost of India’s influence in the Himalayan state.96 So, China has now emerged as a significant factor in South Asian international relations in view of its external assertiveness, which is particularly manifested in its BRI initiative. China’s global assertiveness in general and the drive towards the South Asian smaller states in particular has brought India and the USA closer to counter China’s growing influence in South Asia and the IOR.97 India–​Japan relations have also strengthened in view of China’s growing influence. To counter the BRI, the two countries have launched the Asia–​Africa Growth Corridor.98 A ‘Quad’ comprising the USA, Japan, Australia and India is also in the offing to counter China’s growing influence in the Indo–​ Pacific region.99 Put simply, there has been a realignment of forces recently, which has reconfigured South Asian international relations. In recent years, India has somewhat lost ground to China. When Narendra Modi came to power in 2014 in India, he apparently adopted a ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy in its foreign policy approach and invited the SAARC leaders to his inauguration. But since then things have not gone well for India; its relationship with Pakistan has seriously deteriorated after terrorist attacks in India by Pakistan-​based terrorist groups.100 The relationship took a serious turn when the Modi government abrogated the special status of Kashmir ingrained in article 370 of the Indian Constitution on 5 August 2019. Notwithstanding India and Bangladesh have been enjoying a period of good relations, in recent years, there has emerged an underlying tension because

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of the persistence of issues such as the Rohingya refugee crisis, the Teesta water treaty, anti-​Muslim movement in Assam, the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and so on.101 With the Maldives and Nepal, New Delhi’s relationship has been quite frosty for some years. There is tension as well in Indo–​Sri Lankan relations. Bhutan is on the crosshairs of the India–​China border stand-​off. Only with Afghanistan does New Delhi have a warm relationship.

Bangladesh–​Pakistan bilateral relations and regional international relations Bangladesh–​Pakistan relations have some implications for South Asia’s regional international relations because of its linkage with India–​Pakistan relations. Bangladesh–​Pakistan relations have seen ups and down over the decades depending on which political party was in power in Bangladesh.102 The military regimes in Bangladesh, that is from 1975 to 1990, had built better relations with Pakistan, which meant a deterioration in the relationship with India. Other times, when an Awami League government was in power in Bangladesh, Bangladesh–​Pakistan relations plummeted, but when the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (in coalition with Jaamat-​e-​Islami) was installed in power the opposite occurred. Since 2009, an Awami League government has been in power, which means a worsening of relations with Pakistan. It was manifested in 2016 when Bangladesh sided with India to boycott the 19th SAARC summit in Islamabad.103 In this context, Bangladesh–​Pakistan relations are significant for South Asian international relations and regionalism.

Conclusion As is evident, both regional and extra-​regional forces have shaped the evolution of South Asian international relations. They are not mutually exclusive; indeed, both set of forces have influenced regional affairs in an intertwined fashion. Both amity and enmity are evident in the history of South Asian international relations. South Asian states have cooperated with each other over many issue areas,104 which is visible even in the case of India and Pakistan. But arguably the prominent trend is enmity. A balance-​ of-​power approach is more dominant in the strategies of the key South Asian states than cooperation,105 which has defined the evolution of the region’s international relations over the decades. South Asia in general is known to be a region of ‘mistrust and conflict’. This has led a scholar to conclude that it is a region of ‘conflict unending’.106

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The pattern of hostility will help to explain the dynamics of regionalism in South Asia. The way that SAARC has evolved, as will be analysed in the following chapters, correlates with the evolution of South Asian international relations and its evolving patterns.

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2

The Idea of South Asia as a Region Introduction Defining ‘region’ in IR is controversial.1 Some scholars emphasize geographical proximity while others give importance to the cognitive and ideational factors, yet a third group seeks to combine the two perspectives to define a region. Earlier studies on region and regionalism generally highlighted geographical proximity as an essential criterion of a region.2 Today, many scholars also posit that ‘a region is firmly rooted in territorial space: a group of people living in a geographically bounded community, controlling a certain set of natural resources, and united through a certain set of cultural values and common bonds of social order forged by history’.3 Region-​ness, these scholars argue, is ‘the convergence of several dimensions’ such as ‘cultural affinity, political regimes, security arrangements and economic policies’, which generates ‘regional coherence within a particular geographic area’.4 The spatial factor is also considered important in contemporary studies on economic regionalism in which it is argued that economic regionalism primarily hinges ‘on the importance of geographic proximity’.5 Hence, ‘Geography’, as a scholar has concluded, ‘should not … be dismissed outright as a starting point for identification of regions’.6 Many scholars, however, find the essentialist, conventional view of defining a region primarily based on the ‘geographic proximity’ factor problematic because it presupposes an objective, static phenomenon, which ignores the dynamics of social and political forces. Scholars belonging to the constructivist school of thought, in particular, dismiss geographic proximity as a critical factor and define region in non-​ physical terms. They argue, countries sharing a communal identity comprise a region regardless of their location.7 According to Acharya,

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‘regions are not a geographic given, but are socially constructed, made and remade through interactions’.8 Peter J. Katzenstein similarly maintains that regions’ ‘geographic designations are not “real”, “natural” or “essential”, they are socially constructed and politically contested and thus open to change’.9 A third group of scholars seeks to combine the two perspectives and argues that members of a common region generally share cultural, economic, linguistic and political ties.10 Kym Anderson and Hege Norheim have noted that ‘while there is no ideal definition [of a region], pragmatism would suggest basing the definition on the major continents and subdividing them somewhat according to a combination of cultural, language, religious, and stage-​of-​ development criteria’.11 T.V. Paul also maintains that a region can be defined ‘as a cluster of states that are proximate to each other and are interconnected in spatial, cultural and ideational terms in a significant and distinguishable manner’.12 Keeping the aforementioned conceptual controversy in perspective, this chapter investigates the intricacies of defining South Asia as a region. Apparently, there should not be a controversy over the regional definition of South Asia because arguably it can be defined in terms of the region’s key institution –​the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) –​as all states in the subcontinent’s geographical area are members of the organization. A  closer scrutiny, however, would reveal that defining South Asia as a region in the context of SAARC is not as simple as it may appear. Also, as will be illustrated in this chapter, region building in recent decades through SAARC, instead of consolidating its region-​ness, has produced a multiplicity of discourses, narratives and meanings about South Asia as a region that has added new dimensions to the existing multiple ideas of the region. The complexities of defining South Asia as a region become particularly evident if it is viewed from ‘economic’, ‘security’ and ‘cultural’ standpoints. Importantly, these discourses, narratives and meanings are not necessarily symmetrical and compatible with each other although they coexist in a contradictory manner regionally and in national imaginations. And, they are contingent, fluid and subject to change over time. The chapter proceeds in the following manner. The next section explores the historical background to the rise of the term ‘South Asia’ to identify the region. Following it, the chapter analyses the meanings of and discourses about South Asia as an ‘economic region’, ‘security region’ and ‘cultural region’ and illustrates how region building through SAARC in the past decades has produced varied ideas of South Asia.

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Finally, key points of the analysis will be summarized, and its general implications will be briefly noted.

Historical background The term ‘South Asia’ entered the regional lexicon only recently; in particular it got an official stamp by the establishment of SAARC in the 1980s. Historically the term ‘India’ or ‘the Indian subcontinent’ was widely used primarily based on the idea of ‘civilizational unity’ and historical continuity although it encountered numerous contestations. The British colonial rule unified the erstwhile disparate areas of the subcontinent by expanding communication links (via road and rail), which injected a sense of unity, but the colonial policy of ‘divide and rule’ gave rise to the ‘politics of difference’, which not only resulted in the partition of India in 1947,13 but also left legacies that continued to negatively affect regional international relations, thus undermining the regional idea of South Asia. The term ‘South Asia’ was first used outside the region and hence has an exogenous origin, courtesy of research centres that were established in US universities following the end of the Second World War, particularly in the 1960s,14 and US State Department briefing documents on the region, that is The Subcontinent of South Asia of 1959.15 The term’s exogenous origin can also be located in Europe. For example, Germany’s Heidelberg University established the ‘South Asia Institute’ in 1962,16 although its mandate included all the countries of today’s South and South East Asia, implying that it meant ‘Southern Asia’. It was indeed consistent with the dominant narrative of the time in academic circles in which ‘Southern Asia’ covered both the regions of contemporary South and South East Asia.17 International institutions, such as the UN, World Bank, Asian Development Bank and so on and American research centres also began to use the term ‘South Asia’ in their documents, but they defined the region in their own ways by lumping it with Central Asia, part of West Asia or South East Asia. It is evident that the meaning of South Asia in those usages was imprecise and these usages had no or negligible impact on the initiatives of region building in later years. In terms of policy practices of the regional states, there was little indication of conceiving South Asia as a region before the late 1970s. Indeed, following the British withdrawal from the subcontinent, the thinking about regionalism/​region building was geographically expansive encompassing the whole Asian continent privileging the ideology of pan-​Asianism. Such an idea was particularly promoted by

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India. Even before colonial rule formally came to an end, independent India’s would-​be prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, convened the first Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi from 23 March to 2 April 1947 in which cooperation among Asian nations was sought. The objectives of that conference were ‘to bring together the leading men and women of Asia on a common platform to study the problems of common concern to the people of the continent, to focus attention on social, economic and cultural problems of the different countries of Asia, and to foster mutual contact and understanding’.18 At another Asian Relations Conference on Indonesia convened in January 1949 in New Delhi, a resolution called for the withdrawal of the Dutch forces from Indonesia and granting it complete independence. This call was made based on the spirit of Asian solidarity. The issue of pan-​Asian cooperation was also discussed at the Baguio Conference in the Philippines in May 1950 and then at the Colombo Powers Conference in April 1954. In 1955 at Bandung, Indonesia, an even larger Afro–​Asian solidarity and policy coordination plan –​ the Non-​Aligned Movement (NAM) –​was launched.19 Those pan-​ Asian regional cooperation and integration schemes failed because (1) they were founded on ‘hope’ without much substantive policy measures and (2) post-​colonial realities soon began to surface and consequently moved the focus of the newly independent states from regional integration to national security and economic development.20 Subsequently, region building in Asia began to be developed along sub-​regional lines, that is South East Asia, South Asia and so on, as they appeared more manageable and viable, implying that region building subsequently became more narrowly focussed and geographically confined. The discussion in this section highlights that although the term ‘South Asia’ was used exogenously before the 1970s, its meaning was indeterminate and varied. Indeed, there was little clarity in the meaning of the term in geographical, ideational, emotional and interactive senses. And such usages probably did not have or had little impact, if any, in defining South Asia as a region in later years.

SAARC, region building and the multiple narratives of South Asia The first-​generation Asian regionalism initiatives following the Second World War, as previously discussed, failed, but they paved the way for the rise of more narrowly focussed regionalist projects in Asia. The establishment of the South Asian Association for Regional

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Cooperation in 1985 was such a regionalist project.21 It was the first formal region-​building initiative in South Asia in which the term ‘South Asia’ became official and arguably emerged as the dominant term to define the region. Of course, by the time SAARC was formed, ‘South Asia’ was the only politically ‘neutral’ term that was acceptable to all regional states. Other competing terms, such as ‘Indian subcontinent’, ‘Bharatbarsha’ and so on, were not acceptable to all countries because they were associated with the name of a state (India). About three and a half decades have passed since the initiation of the regionalist project, but how much clarity has emerged in defining the region of South Asia? As the following analysis will highlight, the idea of South Asia remains as contested as ever and region building over the past three decades has produced even more competing narratives and discourses about the region. Apparently, SAARC appears to be an impressive regional organization in terms of the identified areas of cooperation, but it has failed to implement most of them, which has generated the view among scholars that SAARC’s achievements have been mostly ‘on paper’.22 While the more minor members of SAARC have generally been enthusiastic about the activities of the organization, India and Pakistan have shown varying degrees of interest in the regionalist project. Indeed, the clashing interests of the latter two states have primarily hindered the progress of SAARC. Currently, the organization has reached a stalemate and its latest summit meeting scheduled for November 2016 in Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital, had to be postponed due to a hostile relationship between the two most powerful members of the group –​India and Pakistan.23 There are many reasons behind SAARC’s failure to pull the regional states together to build a common region. Those factors will be discussed in the following chapters; however, one factor should be noted here because of its implications for the forthcoming analysis. A key structural barrier to successful regionalism in South Asia is the asymmetric nature of the regional sub-​system. India’s geographic size, economic strength, resource endowment and military might, which are larger than those of the regional states combined, make South Asia an essentially Indo-​centric region.24 Also, the country is centrally located in the region with land borders with most South Asian states (except the two island nations –​Sri Lanka and Maldives –​ and Afghanistan, which joined SAARC only in 2007) and no two original SAARC member states share land borders with each other. Such structural power asymmetry has inhibited regional cooperation. Thomas Thornton argues that in regional organizations it is difficult

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for ‘countries to establish balanced relations when one has a significant advantage in power over the other states’.25 The lack of progress in the regionalist project implies that the member states have failed to harmonize their competing visions and discourses about the region. Moreover, the SAARC process has added new dimensions to the pre-​existing multiple discourses and narratives. These discourses and narratives become more evident if we discuss the idea of South Asia in terms of an economic, security and cultural region. The following analysis presents greater details of those competing discourses. Importantly, these regional discourses have varied narratives and meanings, which are asymmetrical, incompatible and even opposed to each other although they coexist oddly at both the national and regional level. Also, these narratives and meanings are contingent and have changed over time.

Economic region South Asian states have contrasting ideas about economic region. SAARC could not pull them towards a common narrative in the past three and a half decades; indeed, the SAARC process has generated multiple discourses and interpretations about it. Even before the rise of SAARC, South Asian states had contrasting economic outlooks and ideas about economic region. India pursued a policy of mixed economy from the country’s independence to the early 1990s.26 During this period, New Delhi adopted import substitution as a key plank of its economic growth policy and strived to achieve economic self-​sufficiency. By pursuing such an economic policy, India indeed followed a policy of protectionism and deregionalization.27 Pakistan also pursued an import ​substitution policy before the formation of SAARC, but compared with India it was more outward-​ looking than seeking economic self-​sufficiency. Since its emergence as an independent state in 1947, Pakistan has been an economy of ‘boom and bust’.28 The ‘yo-​yo’ economy, as Akbar Zaidi puts it, has evolved in a way in which at times the economy grew at a spectacular pace while frequently plunging into economic downturn and crisis.29 Consistent with such a character of the economy, Pakistan’s discourse about economic region has fluctuated over the decades. Traditionally, Pakistan has looked beyond the region for economic growth, particularly towards the USA, China and the Middle East. Instead of cultivating regional economic linkages and intensifying economic interactions with the regional states, the country has sought economic opportunities beyond the region.

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Smaller states of the region pursued varied economic policies from socialist-​oriented mixed economy to import substitution and economic autarky before the establishment of SAARC. They were mostly dependent on external economic aid and were considerably outward-​looking instead of seeking trade and economic relationships with regional states. The reactions from the regional states to Bangladesh’s proposal for a regional organization also highlight their contrasting perspectives about South Asia as an economic region. Although the more minor regional states enthusiastically supported Bangladesh’s regional grouping proposal, the reactions from New Delhi and Islamabad were lukewarm, hesitant and cautious. Both, of course, eventually joined the organization. India joined it because ‘it did not want to be isolated further in the region’.30 Pakistan also joined the organization because it feared that if it did not do so, ‘it could be left out of the arrangement and become isolated in the region’.31 Both states, however, remained cautious about supporting the activities of the organization while the smaller states extended their wholehearted support to SAARC. Initially, many Indians viewed SAARC as an unnecessary organization for their country. Dixit claims that some people in India viewed that their country ‘does not need subcontinental regionalism because by itself it incorporates much of South Asia by economic strength, geopolitical prowess and miscellany’.32 Partha Ghosh, a noted Indian scholar on regional affairs, has concluded that South Asia as a region is ‘on the periphery of India’s consciousness’.33 Indian policy elites have traditionally viewed that SAARC could not offer the economic opportunities that India had been looking for,34 so New Delhi should not restrict itself to South Asia and must look beyond it by expanding the regional idea through connectivity, trade and investment to realize its ambition to be a global power. It implies that New Delhi essentially neglected economic regionalism in the formative years of SAARC. India abandoned its pre-​1990s economic growth model when the country faced a serious balance-​of-​payment crisis in 1991. The crisis forced New Delhi to undertake economic reforms. Consequently, New Delhi adopted an export-​led economic growth model and opened the Indian economy for foreign business.35 From that time onwards, India embraced globalization and integrated its economy with the global economy. Consistent with this trend, India’s economic outlook and its idea of economic region changed in the 1990s from what it was in the 1980s, which essentially sought to reverse the earlier policy of ‘deregionalization’ and the idea of ‘India equals South Asia’. While India embraced economic regionalism, it added new layers into it,

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thus moving towards the concept of what might be called a ‘layered economic region’. While it sought to reap the economic (and other) benefits of regionalism, simultaneously it expanded the regional idea to realize its economic, political and strategic objectives. By contrast, Islamabad’s strategy remained the same in that it was hesitant to deepen regional economic integration. The key reason for this is that politico-​strategic calculations guided the country’s approach towards SAARC, notwithstanding the fact that the country could gain significant economic benefits from regional economic cooperation.36 It is arguable that Pakistan has been a reluctant region builder and indeed a positive discourse on economic region is hardly visible in Pakistan’s policy approach towards the regional organization. The contrasting economic regional visions also became apparent when SAARC moved from functional issues to cooperation in substantive economic areas. In 1993, the SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) agreement was concluded, which aimed to promote intra-​SAARC trade. The agreement was viewed as a ‘significant achievement’ of the organization.37 Then, in another bold economic cooperation initiative, the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) agreement was signed in 2004, which aimed to create a regional free trade area by 2016 (which was not achieved due to a hostile relationship between India and Pakistan). While smaller states wholeheartedly supported the two initiatives, India and Pakistan could not extend full cooperation due to their strategic rivalry. It should, however, be noted that New Delhi was more supportive of the two initiatives while Islamabad could not extend full support due to its concern that they would lead to greater Indian influence in the region. The SAARC Motor Vehicle agreement at the 18th summit in 2014 in Kathmandu provides another example about contrasting economic regional visions of the South Asian states. The document was ready for signature at the summit, but right before the signing of the agreement Islamabad withdrew its support, thus scuppering the initiative. It meant that Islamabad’s economic region building was less important than its strategic anxiety relative to India. New Delhi’s changed thinking about economic regionalism was further reflected when it promoted the idea of a ‘Growth Triangle’ within SAARC. Borrowing from ASEAN, the idea was adopted at the 1997 Male SAARC summit, which paved the way for the creation of the BBIN ‘Growth Quadrangle’ in the eastern part of South Asia.38 This was an interesting addition to India’s concept of economic regionalism. New Delhi’s regional economic discourse from the early 1990s was influenced by the imperative of globalization and the need

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to expand the economic regional concept beyond its immediate neighbourhood. The expanded regional idea was clearly reflected in the adoption of the policy of ‘Look East’ (later ‘Act East’),39 which aimed to build connectivity, trade and investment relationships with the countries of East and South East Asia. Also, India’s participation in the ‘Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-​Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation’ (BIMSTEC), a trans-​regional initiative comprising Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand, further manifested New Delhi’s shifting discourse on economic region.40 BIMSTEC has now effectively replaced SAARC as New Delhi’s institution of choice for regional cooperation. India’s foreign secretary has stated that SAARC is a logjammed institution, so priority should be given to BIMSTEC.41 This was evident at the Goa BRICS summit in October 2016 when New Delhi invited BIMSTEC heads of state/​government, instead of SAARC leaders, to attend the outreach event. It also reflected current thinking in New Delhi about regionalism in which SAARC is deprioritized and other institutions are promoted that do not include Pakistan. Similarly, two other initiatives highlighted India’s changing idea of economic region. The first was the trans-​regional Kunming initiative (transformed into BCIM or ‘Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar’ group) of 1999, which initially was conceived as a non-​governmental initiative but later the governments of the four countries endorsed it to promote greater connectivity, trade and investment.42 It should, however, be noted that the BCIM initiative was principally pushed by China while New Delhi remained a cautious participant. The second was the ‘South Asia Sub-Regional Economic Cooperation’ (SASEC) comprising Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal and Sri Lanka, which was created in 2001. It aimed to broaden economic integration in the eastern part of South Asia, which was thought to be more effective than SAARC because the group did not include Pakistan. New Delhi has also taken significant steps to expand its idea of economic region to its West. India’s ‘Look West’ policy represents such a trend in its evolving idea of economic region. In recent years, India has employed significant diplomatic capital to build its West Asia engagement.43 New Delhi has not only consistently worked to build its economic relations with the Gulf States, but also has sought deeper economic relations with Afghanistan and Central Asian states via Iran. India’s investment to build the Iranian Chabahar port symbolizes this trend in the country’s ‘Look West’ policy.44 In recent years, Pakistan has deliberately de-​emphasized its regional engagement and strived to build economic relations with countries

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beyond its own region. Islamabad has now firmly put its economic future in its economic relationship with China. Pakistan signed a free trade agreement with China in 2006 (revised in 2019) and then initiated a US$56 billion investment initiative known as the China–​Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in 2015, which was a part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Pakistanis believe that CPEC will bring economic prosperity to their country.45 Besides its traditional economic links with the Gulf States, Islamabad is also striving to build economic ties with the Central Asian states as energy sources and an export market. Although smaller states generally have been enthusiastic supporters of SAARC, in recent years there have been changes in their outlooks as SAARC has failed to deliver tangible economic benefits, with the organization remaining hostage to Indo–​Pakistani rivalry. The initial narrative on economic regionalism has been modified in later years as smaller states began to pursue alternative forms of economic regionalism, as can be seen in the formation of BBIN, BIMSTEC, SASEC and BCIM, and their deepening of economic ties with an extra-​regional power  –​China  –​under the latter’s BRI initiative. Three diversions occurred here from the original idea of regionalism conceived under SAARC. The first is the rise of sub-​regionalism in the form of a ‘Growth Quadrangle’ (BBIN) in the eastern part of South Asia. The second is the rise of trans-​regional economic regionalism manifested in the formation of BIMSTEC and BCIM. The third is the rise of China’s economic footprint in South Asian smaller states, which has transformed their economic outlook. With these, the idea of South Asia as an economic region has been diluted from what was originally conceived by SAARC. The previous discussion highlights multiple, contrasting and evolving narratives about the economic region of South Asian states. India’s idea of economic region has multiple narratives and meanings that are manifested in its discourses on SAARC, ‘Growth Quadrangle’, ‘Act East’ policy, ‘Look West’ policy and trans-​regional cooperation (BIMSTEC, SASEC and BCIM). These narratives and definitions of South Asia as an economic region are fluid, indeterminate and overlapping, ranging from viewing itself as coterminous to the region to expanding the economic region to its east and west, and even on a global level. The narratives have transformed over the years and gradually there has emerged the concept of a ‘layered economic region’ in its discourses. Pakistan is not only a reluctant economic region builder, but also does not have a coherent idea about economic region. For one thing, Pakistan is ambivalent about its regional identity, which is evident in its

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contradictory claims of being a South Asian, West Asian or a Central Asian power at different historical junctures.46 Consequently, Pakistan has never had a coherent, consistent idea about economic region and its discourses on economic region manifest multiple narratives and meanings. Traditionally Pakistan has looked beyond South Asia to build economic connections instead of seeking closer economic ties with SAARC countries. The smaller states are the keen economic region builders and enthusiastic supporters of SAARC. As the economic region building through SAARC stalled, their outlooks and ideas also underwent changes in which they sought sub-​regional economic cooperation within South Asia, trans-​regional economic ties with East and South East Asia, and deepening economic ties with China. To summarize, SAARC could be the primary vehicle to build South Asian economic region and other ideas could be integrated within the core concept, but that did not happen. Instead, multiple ideas and discourses on economic regionalism have flourished in contemporary South Asia.

Security region The discourses and narratives about South Asia as a ‘security region’ are also varied. Three and a half decades of regionalism could not bring any coherence to the security outlooks and discourses of the regional states. The region’s status as a security region has remained as contested as ever. As discussed, South Asia is an Indo-​centric region. India’s regional security discourse is built on the perception of its pre-​eminence in South Asia. New Delhi equates India’s security with the region’s security and views the regional states as its legitimate security sphere. India inherited such a security framework from the British Raj in which the idea of the control of the Indian landmass and the Indian Ocean was emphasized.47 The British Raj’s strategic framework was adopted by independent India, which came to be known as the ‘Indian Doctrine’. The doctrine stipulates that India has no intention of intervening in the internal affairs of its neighbouring states, but if any South Asian country needs external security assistance, it should ask for help from India and no one else; a failure to do so is to be considered ‘anti-​Indian’.48 New Delhi operationalized its regional security doctrine on at least three occasions in the 1980s; in 1987 it undertook a peacekeeping operation in Sri Lanka in an attempt to resolve the ethno-​national conflict in the island

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state (although it failed); in 1988 it extended rapid military assistance to the Maldives at the request of Male; and in 1989–​90 it imposed an economic blockade on landlocked Nepal as the latter attempted to build closer strategic relations with China.49 The regional states strongly resent India’s regional security doctrine. They are concerned about India’s strategic motivations and the impact of power asymmetry on their status as sovereign political entities.50 Such concerns accentuated further following the merger of erstwhile independent Sikkim with the Indian Union in 1975. India’s neighbours have responded by adopting various strategies ranging from coming closer to India (bandwagoning) to building a cooperative security structure through SAARC to different forms of power balancing (that is external alignment). Pakistanis view that India is the key source of regional insecurity and the chief threat to Pakistan’s survival as a state. Since 1947, Pakistan has consistently maintained such a security discourse. To counter the perceived India threat, Pakistan employs a balance-​of-​power strategy.51 While it has stridently strived to maintain a military power balance, which has led it even to build nuclear weapons,52 it has traditionally looked outwards for military assistance, notably from the USA (during the Cold War) and China (particularly in the post-​Cold War era).53 In the 1950s, Pakistan became a member of the US-​sponsored alliance framework –​SEATO and CENTO. During the Cold War period, Pakistan relied on the USA to augment its military power (‘offshore balancing’54). From the 1960s onwards, Pakistan also cultivated a closer relationship with China, which became even closer after the end of the Cold War turning it into what Pakistanis call an ‘all weather friendship’.55 The opposing security discourses and policies of India and Pakistan have produced a complicated regional ‘security complex’.56 Their opposing security policies and strategic rivalry not only reflect their different visions of South Asia as a security region, but also have affected SAARC’s progress. Two narratives are apparent in the discourses of small SAARC members about security. First, they view that SAARC would help to overcome their security predicament vis-​à-​vis India and Pakistan (contextualizing Afghanistan) and consolidate their political sovereignty by creating a cooperative security structure. This is a key reason, in addition to the expectation of economic benefits, why smaller states wholeheartedly supported SAARC from the beginning. This perception of the smaller states can be contrasted with the perceptions of the two big member states of SAARC. As opposed

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to the first, the second narrative is that they need to pursue a policy of power balancing by fostering better relations with extra-​regional powers to countervail Indian and Pakistani power and safeguard their political sovereignty.57 Of course, Bhutan’s policy can be contrasted in this context, and it seems that Thimpu follows a ‘bandwagoning’ strategy by coming closer to India. Put simply, there are different discourses and narratives in the minor SAARC states about South Asia as a security region. The ‘China factor’ constitutes a contradiction in India’s regional security discourse. Although New Delhi‘s regional security doctrine is built on land and ocean control as if to demarcate the boundary of South Asia as a ‘security region’, its strategic planning has always included China as if it is part of South Asia’s security zone. For example, a key rationale for building nuclear weapons by India was the ‘China factor’ and its strategic planning has invariably factored China.58 Therefore, Indian narratives highlight multiple, even contradictory, meanings of South Asia as a security region. Pakistan advocates China’s membership in SAARC (which India opposes). Islamabad’s intention here is that if China becomes a member of SAARC it will give an advantage to Pakistan in its security rivalry with India. The previous discussion highlights contrasting ideas and narratives about South Asia as a security region. India’s security discourses have multiple narratives, but it is informed by realist orientation in which a power approach towards security is dominant. This framework is contradictory to the vision of a security region conceived by SAARC. Pakistan’s security policy is also realist-​oriented, but it is primarily based on the idea of countering Indian power. Similar to India, Pakistan’s security approach is also contradictory to that of SAARC. The security vision of SAARC is reflected in the perceptions of the smaller states, yet contradicting this position, some of them seek closer ties with external big powers in order to neutralize the impact of Indian and Pakistani power on their sovereignty.

Cultural region The discourses on culture, identity and belongingness in the South Asian states present contested narratives about South Asia as a cultural region. While India emphasizes the existence of a subcontinental cultural unity underpinned by civilizational and historical continuity, others emphasize the ‘politics of difference’ to demonstrate their distinct identity relative to India. This has to do with the politics

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of ‘nation building’ in the age of ‘nation-​state’ in the post-​colonial subcontinent. Sudipta Kaviraj maintains that state formation in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh makes it difficult ‘to think of South Asia as a space of emotional inhabitance’.59 As illustrated later, India and other states present contrasting narratives and meanings about South Asia as a cultural region. In the Indian view, the subcontinental culture is indivisible and unique, which is underpinned by civilizational and historical continuity. Notwithstanding the diversity of cultures, the dominant Indian narrative is that there is a coherence and unity in them (‘unity in diversity’). India’s former foreign minister, Salman Khurshid, has said: ‘India is less about territory and more about an idea … which includes multitude of languages and culture that we celebrate as a whole, like a bouquet of colourful flowers.’60 In support of the Indian narrative, numerous examples can be cited to highlight the existence of a well-​connected subcontinental cultural structure. Hindi, Bengali, Nepali, Pashtu, Punjabi, Sindhi, Tamil and Urdu are widely spoken in at least two countries of the region. Music and dance forms are a shared heritage of all the communities of the region and have region-​wide appeal. Bollywood films are popular throughout the region irrespective of national boundaries as well as among the diaspora South Asian population throughout the world, which produces a sense of ‘community’.61 Pakistani films and dramas are popular in some parts of India. Bengali films and dramas are reciprocally popular on both sides of Bengal. Nepali films, dramas and music are popular in parts of India and Bhutan. Tamil music, dramas, films and dance forms are popular in Sri Lanka and India. Therefore, cultural connections are well established among communities irrespective of national boundaries, implying that there is an overarching subcontinental culture in South Asia. SAARC meant to reinforce and strengthen this cultural structure and create a sense of community in the region. But the Indian narrative of ‘one civilization’ or ‘shared history’ is contested by others. The 1947 partition, the break-​up of Pakistan in 1971 and, in general, the arrival of the ‘nation-​state’ are manifestations of contestations to the Indian cultural narrative. The ‘politics of difference’ pursued by Pakistan and Bangladesh essentially means opposition to the Indian narrative of civilizational unity of the subcontinent and its historical continuity. Therefore, it is arguable that the idea of cultural unity in South Asia is hugely contested. Pakistan, as noted previously, has an identity problem; indeed, it is ‘confused about its identity’.62 The country’s identity crisis has

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several dimensions and many reasons, but it primarily derives from the interplay of two contradictory forces: (1) there is an overarching subcontinental culture that Pakistan cannot disown; (2) following its emergence as an independent state it needed to build a distinct identity that would differentiate it from India. The latter led it to pursue ‘politics of difference’ in search of a ‘national identity’. The Pakistani dilemma about identity goes back to its origin as an independent state in 1947. As it was carved out as a homeland for Indian Muslims, it needed to build an identity for the new nation. But Pakistanis were not certain about what kind of ‘identity’ they should construct. Some argued to base it on religion while others preferred a secular identity. After seven decades, Pakistanis have yet to resolve this dilemma. Another dimension of the Pakistani identity dilemma is that while it needed to build a distinct cultural identity as a nation-​state relative to India, Pakistanis found it challenging because of the existence of an overarching subcontinental culture. The region-​wide shared cultural output occurs daily by various means, particularly through film, music, dance and so on. Urdu, the national language of Pakistan, originated in Uttar Pradesh, which is now in India. Indeed, Urdu and Hindi are, as a researcher posits, one language.63 So, the cultural connections among the modern South Asian states are real and it is difficult to disentangle Pakistani culture from the overarching regional culture. Pakistan’s strategic rivalry with India intensifies its identity problem. Owing to this factor, Pakistan at times has identified itself with West Asia and other times with Central Asia. After the eastern wing seceded to become independent Bangladesh in 1971, Pakistan began to identity itself more with the Middle East and began to cultivate greater ties with the countries of that region deliberately downgrading its links with South Asia. In the 1970s Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto felt ‘the need for Pakistan to develop closer links with the Islamic world and to look towards the Middle East rather than elsewhere in Asia’.64 Indeed, Pakistani ambivalence about state identity and regional belongingness is set to continue in the future, along with further debate over South Asia’s cultural region-​ness. The smaller states of the region have a similar identity dilemma to that of Pakistan relating to the cultural region of South Asia although the manifestations of that dilemma are different in those countries. While the smaller states acknowledge the existence of cultural connections across the region, they prioritize and promote their own cultural identities to consolidate their sovereignty vis-​à-​vis India. The emergence of independent Bangladesh (‘another partition’) is interesting in the context of South Asia as a cultural region. While

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the creation of Pakistan in 1947 represented a ‘civilizational’ identity for ‘Indian Muslims’, Bangladesh’s emergence as an independent state disrupted that narrative, thus moving the new country towards a new ‘national cultural narrative’. Interestingly, the narrative was constructed to support ‘nation building’, which primarily aimed to consolidate the political sovereignty of the state. These cultural identity debates are set to continue in South Asia for the foreseeable future as part of the politics of the ‘nation-​state’ paradigm. A vibrant SAARC could reduce these debates to a degree and help to build a sense of ‘regional cultural community’, yet the ‘politics of difference’ will continue to disrupt this process.

Conclusion This chapter has explored the complexities of defining South Asia as a region. It has illustrated how SAARC has not only failed to bring any clarity to South Asia’s identity problem, but also has added new dimensions to the many existing conceptions of South Asia. The term ‘South Asia’ as a regional category was first used exogenously in America and Europe. In South Asia, the term firmly entered the official lexicon by the formation of SAARC in the 1980s. Before the rise of SAARC, regionalism in Asia was general and encompassed the whole Asian continent. In various efforts to establish pan-​Asian regionalism, India played a key role. But they were largely unsuccessful due to a variety of reasons, in particular because of a lack of clarity of purpose of those initiatives. Subsequently, regionalism emerged based on narrowly focussed areas emphasizing socio-​economic development rather than political solidarity based on anti-​colonial sentiment. SAARC emerged against such a backdrop in the 1980s. It was hoped that region building through SAARC would bring some clarity to South Asia’s regional character. As the analysis of this chapter has highlighted, this has not happened; instead new dimensions, as noted, have been added to the existing notions of South Asia. The narratives and meanings of region vary from country to country and even within a state. These discourses and narratives become clear if South Asia is explained in terms of an ‘economic’, ‘security’ and ‘cultural’ region. The South Asian states have different understandings of the region along these lines. Also, national narratives about the region, as analysed in this chapter, are incompatible with each other and they have evolved over time. For example, Indian understanding of South Asia as an ‘economic region’

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has moved from one discourse to another as reflected in its SAARC, sub-​regional, trans-​regional economic cooperation policies, which can be viewed in terms of a ‘layered economic region’. These Indian discourses are incompatible with those of Pakistan, as reflected in its West Asia and CPEC policies. In terms of ‘security region’, the Indian discourse is completely at odds with other states in the region. South Asia as a ‘cultural region’ also presents similar incompatibility in regional discourses as explained in the chapter. Put simply, there is no common narrative and definition of the region in the discourses of the South Asian states. It is interesting to contrast South Asian regional definition dilemmas with other regions such as Europe and South East Asia. These regions also have similar dilemmas along the same lines that have been illustrated in this chapter but they have overcome those dilemmas to a large degree by building successful regional cooperation. For example, South East Asian states had opposing security policies and had territorial disputes before the establishment of ASEAN, but no one raises them today because of maintaining ASEAN solidarity. The analysis of this chapter has implications for the debate about regional definition. As illustrated at the outset, there are three conceptual positions about the definition of region: (i) an essentialist position in which geographic proximity (space) is emphasized and a region or a regional grouping is conceived as a natural entity; (ii) a non-​physical definition in which it is conceived that regions are made, remade or unmade by interactions; and (iii) a third definition seeks to combine the two perspectives. The first perspective is problematic because the countries of eastern South Asia extended the economic region by creating BIMSTEC, BCIM, BBIN and SASEC, which included China (BCIM), Myanmar (BIMSTEC and BCIM) and Thailand (BIMSTEC). Furthermore, the inclusion of Afghanistan as SAARC’s 8th member in 2007 and the discussion of China becoming a member of SAARC in the 1990s made the geographic limit of the region changeable. The analysis of this chapter to some extent supports the arguments of the second conceptual perspective in the sense that regions are made, remade or unmade by the dynamics and patterns of interactions. But, as analysed in this chapter, SAARC has failed to build a common region, notwithstanding its existence for over three decades. The analysis highlights that the ideas and discourses of the region evolved over time, thus highlighting the contingent nature of regional definition and the fluid meanings of discourses.

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The third perspective is also problematic, primarily in spatial terms and in view of the peculiar realities of South Asia’s region-​building experience. The inclusion of new members (that is China) in SAARC will see a geographically expanded region, which will create new complexities for the organization. Put simply, South Asia is too complex to be clearly defined as a region.

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3

The Origins of SAARC Introduction The proposal for the establishment of a regional organization for cooperation in South Asia, similar to that of South East Asia,1 was initiated by Bangladesh in the late 1970s.2 After several years of informal and semi-​formal diplomacy led by Bangladesh, the ‘South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation’ (SAARC) was formally launched at the first ever summit of the seven South Asian states –​ Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka –​in Dhaka in December 1985. Before the creation of SAARC, there were previous initiatives for regional cooperation, as briefly noted in the preceding chapter, which were pan-​Asian in geographical scope and had different ideological orientations, aims and objectives. These initiatives went awry because Asian states could not agree on their structures, aims, modalities and ideological orientations. Subsequently, regionalism in Asia emerged along sub-​regional lines; that is South East Asia, South Asia and so on, and with narrower focus and scope. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was the first such initiative, which was launched by signing the Bangkok Treaty in 1967. SAARC is also a product of this evolutionary process of Asian regionalism. The establishment of a regional organization is essentially a political project. Generally, economic integration is presented as the key rationale for the creation of a regional body. It is posited here that notwithstanding its goals and rationale, it is politics that drives regionalism and the establishment of a regional organization. In the context of SAARC, it is, therefore, essential to explain the political subtext that drove its formation (and its evolution as will be illustrated in the following chapters). The analysis in this chapter is presented from such a standpoint.

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Arguably, three sets of factors are significant to explain the rise of a regional organization. The first set relates to the role of international systemic forces, which function in accordance with the structure of the international system. Second, the regional attributes and the structure of a regional system are significant in the rise and the evolution of a regional grouping. Third, the socio-​economic profile of a region and the regional states generally forms the basis of the formation of a regional organization. This chapter explores the rise of SAARC and explains the politics that produced it. It proceeds in the following manner. First, it discusses the evolution of Asian regionalism in the post-​Second World War era and how it paved the way for the rise of regionalism in South Asia. Second, it discusses the Bangladesh proposal for the establishment of a regional organization in South Asia and how it culminated in the formation of SAARC in 1985. Finally, it illustrates the politics and the factors that led to the creation of SAARC, contextualizing the three sets of factors as previously noted.

Historical background: the evolution of Asian regionalism To understand the rise of regionalism in South Asia, it is important to look back and illustrate the evolution of regionalism in Greater Asia. This is because regionalism in South Asia is an outcome of the evolutionary process of regionalism in the greater Asian region. Indeed, a discussion of the historical background of Asian regionalism will put the rise of regionalism in South Asia into proper perspective. As briefly noted in Chapter 2, before the formation of SAARC, pan-​Asian initiatives were undertaken to foster unity in terms of political and economic cooperation among Asian states. While the proposal for Asian unity has a long historical pedigree, post-​Second World War attempts to encourage Asian solidarity were undertaken against the background of decolonization under the auspices of the UN. The ideological basis of those attempts to establish Asian regionalism was pan-​Asianism in the initial years following the end of the Second World War. Decolonization was a crucial factor in this conception of Asian integration. Thinking about Asian regionalism can be observed long before the process of decolonization started after the Second World War. Some scholars make the argument that regionalism in Asia began to take root in pre-​colonial times, which can be evidenced in the substantive networks of connections that developed before the advent

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of colonialism; regionalization expanded rapidly with the introduction of colonial rule when capitalist expansion took place that led Asian regionalism towards a new direction.3 Some thinkers in Asia such as Rabindranath Tagore of India, Okakura Tenshin of Japan and Zhang Taiyan of China discussed Asian integration in cultural and civilizational contexts in the early 20th century.4 Documents show that Indian political leaders began to discuss Asian unity much earlier before their country became independent in 1947. For example, the Indian National Congress Party from 1928 onwards had occasionally raised the issue of forming an Asian Federation following the adoption of a resolution in this regard. In August 1945, India’s would-​be prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, proposed to set up ‘a South Asian Federation of India, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Burma’.5 A  month later, in September 1945, the All India Congress Committee in a resolution on Asian cooperation stated that a free India would ‘inevitably’ seek close and friendly associations with neighbouring countries. In particular, it would seek to develop common policies in defence, trade and economic and cultural development with China, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and Ceylon, as well as the countries of the Middle East.6 While Indian political leaders could only make proposals for Asian unity earlier, following independence in 1947 they had an opportunity to take concrete steps to materialize these proposals. Indian political leaders, however, were uncertain about the kind of regionalism they should seek. This uncertainty was evidenced when Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru stated at the Indian Parliament after the 1949 Asian Relations Conference on Indonesia: ‘We have not yet decided what the region of cooperation might be, because as I said a little while ago, India is interested in several regions of South Asia. Whether all should be grouped together or separately, we do not know. That is for us to consider together and to decide which is more feasible.’7 It appears that Nehru was interested in building a permanent structure for Asian cooperation and unity. Following the end of the Second World War, the UN undertook measures to give the right of self-​determination to the people of Asia (and elsewhere in the world) and began the process of decolonization.8 This process was supported by the two superpowers of the time –​the USA and the Soviet Union. Many independent states emerged in Asia and elsewhere through that process. Although these states became independent, their future was uncertain in political and economic terms. While many nations were yet to be free from colonial rule, there was the fear that the newly independent states would remain dependent

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on the colonial powers politically and economically, a phenomenon which came to be known as ‘neo-​colonialism’.9 It is against such a background that Asian regionalism emerged and evolved in the initial years following the end of the Second World War. Given such a context, Asian regionalism was initially conceived in the context of the greater Asian region, implying that initially Asian regionalism was geographically expansive and was influenced by the experience of colonialism and by the challenges of ‘nation-building’ in the newly emerged states. Pan-​Asian solidarity was the norm that guided attempts for Asian unity to safeguard their political and economic sovereignty from the threat of neo-​colonialism. Against such a background, India’s soon-​to-​be prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, convened the first Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi from 23 March to 2 April 1947 in which cooperation among Asian nations was extensively discussed. The key objective of that conference was ‘to bring together the leading men and women of Asia on a common platform to study the problems of common concern to the people of the continent, to focus attention on social, economic and cultural problems of the different countries of Asia, and to foster mutual contact and understanding’.10 S.W.R.D Bandaranaike, prime minister of Sri Lanka, advanced a more concrete proposal with ‘a federation of free and equal Asiatic countries’ with an Asiatic Secretariat; he set up a special committee with the support of Nehru for that purpose and along with Krishna Menon drew up a constitution for a very closely knit Asian organization.11 By 1949, Bandaranaike advocated ‘a mutual defence scheme for the South-​east Asian countries’.12 Indeed, the Sri Lankan leader was one of the key advocates of Asian regionalism in the early wave of regional cooperation in Asia. At the second Asian Relations Conference on Indonesia convened in January 1949 at New Delhi, a resolution was passed that called for the withdrawal of the Dutch forces from Indonesia and to grant it complete independence. Importantly, such a resolution was passed based on the spirit of Asian solidarity.13 The issue of Asia-​wide regional cooperation was also discussed at the Baguio Conference in the Philippines in May 1950, at the Colombo Plan meeting in July 1950 and at the Colombo Powers Conference in April 1954 at Colombo. At Baguio, participants discussed economic cooperation and the collective security of Asia.14 In 1955, at the Bandung (Indonesia) conference, which was larger than other previous conferences, Asian solidarity was specifically sought.15 While these conferences had an anti-​colonial element, there was also a recognition that only self-​reliance and multidimensional

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cooperation could help the newly independent states to really get rid of the legacies left by colonialism. By the mid-​1950s, the first-​generation attempts for Asian regionalism comprising the whole of Asia that sought to erect a formal structure and whose ideological basis was anti-​colonial pan-​Asianism (that is Asia for Asians) ended. While the spirit of decolonization created a sense of unity among newly independent states, it was tempered by several factors. First, it was affected by the rising intensity of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. As the rivalry between the two superpowers intensified, it became difficult for the newly independent states to remain united and foster unity for a variety of reasons. The bipolar structure of the international system pulled them towards the opposing power poles. Asia became a focus of the rivalry against the background of the spread of communism. This fear in the West accelerated following the communist takeover in China in 1949, which resulted in the intensification of Cold War rivalry between the two superpowers in Asia. And, linked to this, the newly independent states were vulnerable to the pressure of the superpowers and former colonial powers because they were politically and economically weak and to a large extent dependent on the global powers for survival as independent entities. So, what happened was that the foreign policies of the new states became oriented towards opposite power poles. Under such an international environment, regional unity became fragile and difficult to establish. Second, notwithstanding genuine intensions, these pan-​Asian regional cooperation and integration schemes failed because (1) they were based on ‘hope than reality’ and (2) post-​colonial realities moved the focus of the newly independent states from regional integration to national security and economic development.16 In such conditions, many Asian states sought the assistance of former colonial rulers and other Western and/​or communist states. Although the first-​g eneration attempts to build regionalism evaporated by the mid-​1950s, efforts for regional cooperation and integration continued in different forms. For example, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) was created in 1961 comprising Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia.17 The United States supported the creation of the ASA because the member states of the organization had an anti-​communist orientation. In July 1964, the ‘Regional Cooperation for Development’ (RCD) was created comprising Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, who constituted the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).18 The formation of the RCD was interesting because it manifested a new direction in Asian regionalism, which was essentially an organization

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to promote socio-​economic development of the member states, but it was supported by the United States. Two important observations can be made from these two cases. First, the geographic scope of the regional organizations was becoming narrower compared with the first-​generation schemes of regionalism in Asia. Second, both the organizations were the products of Cold War politics. It is evident that after the mid-​1950s, sub-​regions in Asia began to develop regionalism on a narrower basis than previously attempted. Geographically more confined and oriented towards socio-​economic development, these organizations signalled a new direction for Asian regionalism. The most important body in this context was the ASEAN, which was created in 1967 by signing the Bangkok Treaty. A  noteworthy point in this regard is that the demonstration effect of European regionalism influenced the decision of the South East Asian states to construct a regional organization, which, of course, was aided by the support of a systemic force –​the United States –​as it conformed with its ideological, strategic and economic interests in the region. Importantly, most of the ASEAN member states were either the members of SEATO or had close bilateral military ties with the USA and the UK.19 Since its inception, the ASEAN progressed incrementally and delivered tangible benefit to the people of the member states.20 Indian political leaders continued to advocate for regional cooperation for development in the aftermath of failed first-​generation pan-​Asian regionalism schemes. For example, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi raised the issue during her visits to Burma (27–​30 March 1969), Afghanistan (5–​10 June 1969) and Indonesia (28 June to 2 July 1969). The joint communiqué after her visit to Indonesia noted that the promotion of economic cooperation between Asian nations was necessary to further consolidate peace and stability in the region and to give meaningful expression to economic and special progress.21 In July 1969 Afghanistan proposed to India, Iran, the Soviet Union, Pakistan, Turkey and Nepal to build a regional transport network that would facilitate land transport and trade.22 The proposal did not succeed because of the differences of opinion about the project among the states of the region. Against the background of various proposals for regional cooperation over the years which went awry, Bangladesh’s President General Ziaur Rahman proposed in the late 1970s to build an ‘ASEAN-​ like’ organization in South Asia.23 After several years of persistent diplomacy, the proposal led to the formation of SAARC in 1985. As earlier discussion highlights, the formation of SAARC can be located in the evolutionary process of Asian regionalism. By the time of the

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establishment of SAARC, (sub-​)regional groupings had a socio-​ economic and developmental orientation moving away from the issues of colonialism and political problems. Another noteworthy point in this context is the demonstration effect of ASEAN’s success, which had a formidable impact on the South Asian states to form a regional grouping. As will be discussed, the Bangladesh proposal specifically noted the point that the South Asian regional organization would be ‘ASEAN-​like’.

Bangladesh’s proposal, diplomacy and the formal launching of SAARC Before making a formal proposal, General Ziaur Rahman began consultation informally with South Asian leaders during bilateral visits and at the sidelines of various international forums. The Bangladesh president visited Nepal, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka during 1977–​78 in which he discussed his intention to propose a regional organization in South Asia with the leaders of those countries. In the discussions, he emphasized the necessity of collective self-​reliance in a common quest for peace and development of all countries in the region.24 President Rahman was aware that India was the most important country to realize his plan to establish a regional organization in South Asia. In 1977, a non-​Congress government was installed into power in India following general elections, which was an opportunity to improve bilateral relations and discuss regional cooperation with the new leadership. The Bangladesh president went to New Delhi in December 1977 and discussed the issue of regional cooperation and the establishment of a regional organization with the new prime minister of India, Morarji Desai. In the following month, President Rahman discussed his plan with King Birendra of Nepal in Kathmandu. King Birendra not only supported his plan, he indeed echoed Bangladesh’s proposal for regional cooperation in South Asia in the inaugural speech to the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee, which met in Kathmandu in December 1977. He also discussed the issue with his South Asian counterparts in the sidelines of the meeting. The Nepalese king visited Dhaka in January 1978 when the two leaders further discussed the issue and agreed to work together on realizing the goal of establishing a regional organization in South Asia to promote the economic wellbeing of the regional population. President Rahman also discussed the idea of regional cooperation with the leaders of South Asian countries informally in the sidelines of

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the Commonwealth Summit in Lusaka (1979) and the NAM Summit in Havana (1979). Afterwards, the Bangladesh president visited Sri Lanka in November 1979 and discussed regional cooperation with Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayawardane. By now it was apparent that the build-​up towards regional cooperation was on a positive trajectory. President Rahman formally wrote to the South Asian leaders in May 1980 in which he not only applauded the recent developments that had created a ‘better climate of understanding’ but also underlined the urgency of institutional arrangement for regional cooperation.25 The use of the term ‘better climate of understanding’ in the proposal was interesting, by which it was possibly meant the change of political regimes in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. The smaller states of the region, that is Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives, enthusiastically supported the Bangladesh proposal for creating a regional organization for cooperation, notwithstanding some underlying apprehension about the fallout of such an association on their sovereignty and political independence. While they perceived that such an organization would be beneficial for them economically, they still had some apprehension whether this could curtail their status as independent political entities by consolidating India’s dominant position in the region. Intriguingly, there was the perception as well that such an organization could increase their collective bargaining vis-à-vis India. India and Pakistan, on the other hand, were lukewarm to the Bangladeshi proposal.26 This point will be analysed in greater detail later in this chapter, but suffice it to note here that clashing perceptions of interests in the proposed organization led the two countries to be lukewarm to the Bangladeshi initiative. New Delhi suspected that the regional states might be ‘ganging up’ against it while Islamabad feared that this might lead to greater Indian hegemony in the region. Eventually, of course, both the countries joined the organization because they did not want to be left out in regional diplomacy.27 After formally writing to the seven South Asian states, Bangladeshi diplomats carried out consultations with their South Asian counterparts, including foreign ministers, at the UN headquarters in New York from August to September 1980. Those consultations resulted in the agreement that Bangladesh would prepare the draft of a working paper which the foreign secretaries of South Asian countries would discuss at a meeting and suggest future action plans. In November 1980 Dhaka circulated a document, entitled ‘A Paper on the Proposal for Regional Cooperation in South Asia’.28 Some key points of the document are noteworthy.

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The paper proposed not to include security issues in the agenda of cooperation. Dhaka, after extensive consultation over the years, realized that the proposed regional organization would not go far if security and contentious political issues were included in its activities. The Bangladesh draft paper, sensitive to India’s and Pakistan’s concerns, did not include any reference to security issues and suggested only non-​ political and non-​controversial areas for regional unity. The Bangladesh proposal emphasized that the organization should not undertake joint action at the cost of the sovereignty of member states. The preliminary interactions and exchanges highlighted the attitudes of the regional states that regional cooperation should reflect the spirit of mutual trust and understanding while maintaining the principle of respect for sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and non-​interference in internal affairs of the member states.29 It is noteworthy here that while regional partnership was sought by the states, they were concerned about the fallout of such cooperation on their sovereignty. The document made a ‘forceful plea for promoting’ a climate of trust and confidence for greater political understanding. It noted that the uneven levels of development in the region should be taken into consideration while pursuing a collaborative agenda. It stressed the advantages of a regional approach to international problems, which collectively would promote the interest of the regional states at the international level. It pointed out that a ‘step by step’ move towards a summit meeting would be the realistic approach to follow and the heads of state/​government would be able to take up any contentious issues. The paper tentatively identified 11 areas to improve unity.30 Finally, it dealt with ‘the future possibility of an institutional framework for South Asia’.31 In general, all the South Asian states reacted positively to the Bangladesh proposal although India and Pakistan specifically noted their preference to hold official-​level meetings to lay the groundwork for ministerial-​level meetings. The foreign secretaries of the seven countries met for the first time in Colombo on 20–​3 April 1981. It was agreed that regional cooperation should be based on mutual trust, understanding and sympathetic appreciation of the national aspirations of all the countries involved. At that meeting, five broad areas were identified, which were: agriculture, rural development, telecommunication, weather and environment, and health and population control.32 A series of follow-​up meetings between 1980 and 1983 at the foreign-​secretary level (21–​3 April 1981, Colombo; 2–​4 November 1981, Kathmandu; 7–​8 August 1982, Islamabad;

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28–​30 March 1983, Dhaka) were held to further work out the modalities of cooperation. At these meetings, four more areas were added to the original list, which were:  communication and transportation, sports, arts and cinema, postal service, and scientific and technical cooperation.33 After laying down sufficient groundwork for regional cooperation at the foreign secretary-​level meetings, the process moved to the political level. The first political-​level meeting comprising the foreign ministers of the seven states took place in New Delhi on 1–​3 August 1983. At this meeting, the Declaration of South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC) was adopted, which also endorsed the ‘collective resolve of the Governments to pursue actively South Asian co-​operation’. Further, it launched the Integrated Program of Action (IPA) on mutually agreed areas of cooperation.34 Subsequently, three more meetings of the foreign ministers were held at Male (10–​11 July 1984), Thimpu (13–​14 May 1985) and Dhaka (5 December 1985) before the first summit took place in Dhaka in December 1985, which adopted the Charter of the organization, thus formally launching the regional body in South Asia. At the Dhaka foreign ministers’ meeting, the name of the organization was changed from SARC to South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

Why form SAARC? To explain the politics of the formation of a regional organization in South Asia, the role of the three sets of factors, as set out in the Introduction, need to be assessed: (1) the systemic forces; (2) regional power structure and regional international relations; and (3)  socio-​ economic profile of the region and the regional states.

Systemic forces and the rise of regionalism in South Asia The international environment and the structure of the international system, as postulated previously, play an important role in the rise of a regional organization. It is noted that US military power in the Pacific was important in the formation of the ASEAN and the support of the USA played a pivotal role in the rise of European regionalism. In both cases, the source of the rise of regionalism can be located in the bipolar structure of the international system and the Cold War that the two superpowers were engaged in. The key question here is what role did the systemic forces play in the rise of SAARC? It is posited that theoretically international systemic forces are bound to play at

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least some role in the rise of any regional organization, in particular during the Cold War era; in the rise of SAARC this role was marginal compared with the EU and the ASEAN. The argument that international systemic forces are bound to play some role in the dynamics of regional politics and in the rise of a regional organization derives from the intrusive nature of regional sub-​systems. As the Cold War rivalry intensified and globalization proceeded in the years following the Second World War, regional sub-​systems became ever more intrusive.35 South Asia was also not immune from such intrusion of extra-​regional powers.36 The role of the systemic powers in the rise of SAARC needs to be viewed from such a standpoint although, as noted, its role was marginal. It is primarily due to the fact that South Asia as a region was less important to the superpowers compared to other regions, i.e. Europe, East Asia etc., although each power strived to court South Asian states on its side in general. If Cold War rivalry was intense in South Asia, superpowers could be more intrusive in the region and could strive to build a coalition or regional organization to advance their interests in the same way that they did in Europe and South East Asia. Arguably, either the systemic powers were unconcerned about the rise of a regional organization in South Asia or at best they were uncertain about the impact of such an organization on Cold War rivalry. Either way, their role was minimal in the rise of SAARC. The two key states of South Asia –​India and Pakistan –​had supported opposing superpowers during the Cold War. If the two South Asian powers had been on the same side, it could have had a positive impact on the rise and the evolution of regionalism. That said, the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in the late 1970s might have had some impact on the decisions of the South Asian states to establish a regional organization at that particular juncture. In general, the South Asian states viewed the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union as destabilizing for the region. It might have played a role in establishing the process of building a regional organization.37 Although India was aligned with Moscow, there was a kind of nervousness about the Soviet invasion’s impact on Indian security. Islamabad thought that the invasion was a direct threat to the security and the integrity of Pakistan.38 In particular, the strategic calculations of India and Pakistan were significant in this context. Bokhari notes that after the Soviet forces entered Afghanistan in 1979, New Delhi calculated that the Bangladesh proposal did provide an opportunity to pull Pakistan away from an emerging Pakistan–​US–​China axis, while Pakistan hoped that India’s involvement in a South Asian cooperative framework might reduce the

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intensity of Indo–​Soviet collusion aimed at the integrity of Pakistan.39 Therefore, the threat perception that the Soviet invasion created in the South Asian states might have encouraged them to support the establishment of a regional organization in order to bring peace and stability to the region. Yet, it can be argued that notwithstanding this common threat to regional security, extra-​regional powers did not play a pivotal role in the establishment of SAARC because the regional states fundamentally aligned with opposite superpowers. Also, if the threat of communism to the South Asian states was overwhelming from within similar to that of most South East Asian states when the ASEAN was formed, it could garner support from the non-​communist powers to establish a regional organization. That was not the case in South Asia. From such a standpoint, the role of external powers in establishing SAARC was marginal. A few developments concerning extra-​regional powers should be noted here as well to ascertain the role of external powers in the formation of a regional organization in South Asia. In the late 1970s, US President Jimmy Carter and the British Prime Minister James Callaghan visited several major South Asian states (India, Pakistan and Bangladesh). Their visits might have contributed to the decisions of the South Asian states to favour a regional body. During their visits, they not only advocated for regional cooperation, but also hinted at possible assistance to realize that goal.40 The visits apparently had some contribution in establishing a positive environment in the region. In that way, it might have indirectly contributed to the establishment of SAARC. However, arguably that contribution, if any, was indirect and marginal. It was not the most crucial factor in establishing an organization in the region. From the previous discussion, it can be concluded that the role of the systemic powers, if any, was marginal in the origin of SAARC. However, their role was significant, as will be analysed in the following chapters, in the evolution of regionalism and its outcome in South Asia. The intrusion of the superpowers in the context of the Cold War influenced the ideological and foreign policy orientations of the regional states. It is generally assumed that these two factors are important in the success or failure of a regional organization.41 In terms of foreign policy orientation of the South Asian states, there was hardly any similarity, in particular between the two key states of the region –​ India and Pakistan. During the Cold War, India aligned with Moscow while Pakistan sided with Washington. Such intrusion intensified the rivalry between India and Pakistan, which in turn impaired regional cooperation. As noted earlier, Indo–​Pakistani rivalry has been at the

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core of SAARC’s underperformance and stalemate. Counterfactually, it could be argued that the outcome of SAARC could be different if foreign policy orientations of the two countries were similar. The success of ASEAN to a large extent is due to the similar foreign policy orientations of the member states. They aligned with the United States during the Cold War, which arguably had a positive impact on the rise, process and the outcome of regionalism in South East Asia. Therefore, it can be concluded that although South Asia was not immune from the influence of systemic forces as an intrusive sub-​ system, the role of external powers was marginal in the origin of SAARC. So, explanation about the creation of SAARC must be sought elsewhere.

Regional international relations and the rise of SAARC As discussed in Chapter 1, South Asia is a region of ‘enduring rivalry’ in which two key players are engaged in an intractable cycle of intense security competition. The rivalry was intense in the 1970s when the idea of a regional organization was mooted by Bangladesh. Arguably, such an environment of regional international relations was not conducive to promote cooperation and build a regional institution. So, the key question is how did SAARC emerge under such a climate? The enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan increased continually over the decades from the time of their emergence as independent states in 1947. They emerged amid bloody conflict, which sowed the seeds for mistrust and further feuds that would influence their relationship in the years to come. Immediately after the two states were born, they went to war over Kashmir,42 which determined the fate of their relationship that has continued to this day. In 1965, the two countries fought another war over Kashmir, which was ended after the Soviet Union brokered a ceasefire agreement.43 The third major war between the two countries broke out in 1971, which led to the break-​up of original Pakistan and the creation of independent Bangladesh out of former East Pakistan.44 India intervened militarily in the civil war between the eastern and western wings of the country, which further accelerated the pace of the hostilities. In the aftermath of the break-​up of Pakistan, a new dimension was added to their strategic competition –​nuclear rivalry. Islamabad launched a clandestine nuclear weapons programme in the war’s aftermath. India, it is noteworthy, began such a programme in the 1960s following the first Chinese nuclear test in October 1964.45 This would only serve to consolidate their hostile relationship and strategic rivalry. It is intriguing how the

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process of building a regional organization started in the 1970s against the backdrop of such Indo–​Pakistani rivalry. The Bangladesh–​India relationship was very cordial in the initial years following the independence of the former state in 1971 with the assistance of the latter.46 However, the relationship became very hostile after the pro-​India Mujibar Rahman government was toppled in Dhaka in 1975 in a military coup.47 The hostility between India and Bangladesh would accelerate in the second half of the 1970s and throughout the 1980s.48 However, the change of government in Dhaka in 1975 led to a reconciliation between Bangladesh and Pakistan. 49 This realignment of relationships involving India, Pakistan and Bangladesh intensified tension in regional international relations. The penetration of external superpowers into the region significantly affected the regional environment. New Delhi fostered close relations with Moscow; in particular, the relationship was significantly upgraded during the course of the 1971 Bangladesh War when India and the Soviet Union signed a Friendship Treaty.50 From 1971 onwards, India–​Soviet relations got closer and India became dependent on Moscow for political support and military hardware.51 On the other hand, American military assistance to Pakistan in the 1970s and the 1980s (also previously) was instrumental in maintaining a balance of power between India and Pakistan,52 which ensured the continuation and intensification of their strategic rivalry. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 profoundly affected the regional dynamics and the pace of India–​Pakistan security rivalry. American money and military hardware poured into Pakistan in the wake of the Soviet invasion, which greatly affected the Indo–​Pakistani arms race.53 Structurally, the South Asian sub-​system is asymmetric because of India’s overwhelming power position in the region. It is not only at the centre of the region, but also larger in terms of geographical, economic and military elements of power than the other states combined.54 This asymmetrical power structure is not conducive to a stable power relationship in the region. Furthermore, this asymmetry combined with the history of the creation of India and Pakistan make the rivalry of the two countries ‘enduring’ and difficult to overcome. In conjunction with this asymmetric structure, India’s security perception and regional approach make South Asian international relations unstable. India traditionally followed a security policy of treating its neighbourhood as its legitimate security sphere.55 It maintained a ‘forward defence’ policy, which it inherited from British colonial rule.56 Such a policy was feared by India’s smaller

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neighbours and thought as a challenge to their sovereignty and political independence.57 This fear was accelerated when Sikkim was merged with the Indian Union in 1975 through a referendum.58 Further, this fear was combined with traditional Indian policy of bilateralism (as opposed to multilateralism) with the neighbouring states, which led to a perception of apprehension about India in the neighbouring countries.59 Overall, a culture of hostility did exist in South Asian international relations in the 1970s and the 1980s, in particular between the major states of the region, when SAARC was in the process of formation. Such a regional environment had an impact on trade and economic relationships between the states of South Asia. In terms of trade and economic relations, South Asia was one of the least integrated regions of the world (and is still so). Intra-​regional trade has consistently been scarce in the history of South Asia. The traditional networks that the British built during colonial times were severed after the end of colonial rule and the rise of independent states of India and Pakistan. This condition was exacerbated by poor political relationships among the regional states. Deregionalization of regional trade was the trend in the post-​colonial era.60 The key point that can be deduced in terms of the regional environment in South Asia is that interstate relations were characterized by mistrust and hostility. Arguably, this culture was not conducive to build a regional organization to foster cooperation among regional states. Three factors, however, helped to overcome this impediment. The first was that by the late 1970s, regimes in the major South Asian states were changed, in particular in India and Pakistan. In 1977, Morarji Desai became prime minister of the Janata government, which was the first non-​Congress government in Indian political history. He pursued a policy of ‘benign bilateralism’ towards neighbouring states –​a marked departure from the policy of the previous Congress government. The Janata government took several steps to improve relations with neighbours.61 In Pakistan, General Ziaul Haq took over power from the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto-​led Pakistan’s Peoples Party government through a military coup. His positive response to the Bangladesh proposal might have been influenced by the fact that it could increase the legitimacy of his regime. In Sri Lanka, there was a change of political power when J.R. Jayewardene became president in 1978. In Bangladesh, General Ziaur Rahman took over power in 1975 through a military coup. These changes in the regimes of the South Asian states opened the door for some adjustment in their approaches towards each other. This environment was dubbed by Bangladesh as

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a ‘new climate of understanding’ in South Asia in the working paper for regional cooperation, which it circulated to South Asian states in November 1980. The second was the demonstration effect about the advantages of institutionalized regional unity in different parts of the world, in particular in Europe and South East Asia. As noted previously, General Ziaur Rahman intended to form an ‘ASEAN-​like’ organization when he proposed to establish a regional body in South Asia, which meant that the proposal was inspired by the success of ASEAN. Also, as will be discussed in the next chapter, SAARC adopted, following the footsteps of the EU’s early experience, a neo-​functional approach to promote regionalism. The third factor was the growing evidence that the regional states were losing out in the global context in the absence of a regional organization. An economic crisis in all states across the region was deepening in the 1970s due to the two OPEC-​induced oil crises (1973 and 1979) and other developments in the global economic environment. The South–​South cooperation was not going anywhere and it was evident that the South Asian states (and other developing countries) were losing out in the global economic order. Hence, the economic growth rate was faltering in the South Asian states. For example, in 1974–​75, the economic growth rate in the region was as low as 2.2 per cent, whereas the population was growing at a faster rate at 2.4 per cent.62 Given such a global context and its implications for South Asia, it was evident that the region was losing out in the absence of a regional organization while other regions of the world were building regional blocks for trade and other economic advantages.

Socio-​economic profile of the region and the regional states South Asia was one of the poorest regions of the world when SAARC was launched in the 1980s. Challenges of economic development in the post-​colonial era, de-​regionalization of trade after the emergence of independent states, internal turmoil and civil wars (that is in Pakistan in 1971 and in Sri Lanka in the 1970s and 1980s), faulty economic growth policy choices (that is India’s choice of mixed economic model, import-​ substitution policies of almost all South Asian states and so on) and aid dependency constrained the region’s socio-​economic progress. This was reflected in the per capita GNP of the regional states with Sri Lanka’s $400, Pakistan’s $350, India’s $300, and Bangladesh’s and Nepal’s $160 against the world’s average per capita GNP of $3,010 in the 1980s.63 Following the end of British colonial rule, the South Asian states faced huge challenges in building their nation-​states. The states were

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fragile in political, economic and social terms. In the aftermath of bloody partition in 1947, the politics of ‘nation-​state’ building ensured a deregionalization of trade, a departure from what it was during colonial times. It made an impact on the economic prospect of the South Asian states. India, the largest country in the region followed a policy of mixed economy in which socialism and capitalism were blended. Self-​ sufficiency was the main goal of the economic policy, which led to a policy of import substitution. These policy choices stagnated the economy and the Indian economy did not grow fast enough to deal with poverty, unemployment and issues relating to health and education. The Indian economy grew at a slower pace until economic reforms were undertaken in the early 1990s, a rate that famously came to be known as ‘the Hindu rate of growth’.64 Pakistan struggled to build its economy from the inception due to the lack of infrastructure and a proper industrial base. While there was a spur of economic growth in the 1960, thanks to its alignment with the USA and the American economic aid, it failed to maintain the growth momentum in the face of growing internal challenges. In particular, the military rule and the 1971 civil war severely constrained the growth of the Pakistani economy. The political economy of populist politics in the 1970s and the military takeover in 1977 further constrained economic growth. In the 1980s, although American economic assistance, which was provided against the backdrop of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, helped the Pakistani economy, it was largely negated by a faulty economic policy of ‘import substitution’. Another key problem of Pakistan had been its persistent dependence on extra-​regional powers and the lack of long-​term economic strategy.65 Bangladesh from the beginning confronted enormous political and economic challenges owing to factors related to its emergence through a bloody struggle. In the war of independence in 1971, the economic infrastructure was almost ruined and it was a gigantic task to rebuild it. Henry Kissinger, the former US Secretary of State, famously termed Bangladesh as a ‘bottomless basket’ and scholars took Bangladesh as a ‘test case of economic development’. 66 It confronted a ruinous famine in 1974 when thousands of people died.67 The installation of a military regime in 1975 did not help the economy. Also, the import-​substitution policy of the 1980s did not help economic expansion. The socio-​economic profile of Bangladesh was gloomy in the 1970s and the 1980s. The socio-​politico-​economic condition of other South Asian states was no better than the three countries as discussed.68 Indeed, poverty

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was endemic throughout the region. Other socio-​economic indicators such as education, child mortality, health and so on portrayed a dismal picture. All the states of the region were facing economic stagnation. As a whole, the region was at the lowest ebb of the world’s socio-​ economic ranking. The poor socio-​economic condition of the region in the 1970s and 1980s also meant that individual national efforts had failed to uplift the quality of life of their citizens. It demanded collective effort of the regional states for socio-​economic development. It is against such a backdrop that the regional organization was proposed. The initial thinking was that once the body was up and running, the hostility among the regional states would subside and the region would prosper economically through collective action.69 Indeed, the expectation of a socio-​economic uplift served as a strong driver for regional unity. This factor was amplified in its importance because of the demonstration effect of the success of the EU and ASEAN.

The primacy of the political As the previous discussion highlights, apparently economic compulsion was the most important driver of South Asian regionalism. However, careful analysis reveals that while the prospect of economic gain was the rationale for establishing a regional organization, it was the political and security considerations that influenced the decision of the regional states to establish SAARC. To explain this context, the following questions should be addressed. (1) Why did the idea of a regional organization receive lukewarm reception in India and Pakistan? (2)  Why did India and Pakistan join the organization notwithstanding initial hesitation? (3) Why did Bangladesh, not India or Pakistan, take the initiative to form a regional grouping? (4) Why did the smaller states of the region demonstrate enthusiasm in the formation of a regional body? India was lukewarm to the Bangladeshi proposal because it was not certain about the motivation of Bangladesh and the consequences of the creation of a regional organization on its interests. New Delhi suspected that Zia might have done it with the direction and support of the United States and China; hence, India adopted a cautious approach and maintained that ‘the proposal should be examined in depth in all its aspects before rushing into it’.70 Furthermore, New Delhi was worried that smaller states would regionalize bilateral issues and they might resort to collective bargaining by ‘ganging up’ against India. It is noteworthy that New Delhi

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traditionally relied on a policy of bilateralism to deal with the South Asian neighbours and avoided multilateralism. Additionally, New Delhi was apprehensive that a regional organization would neutralize its security policy of treating the neighbouring regional states as its security sphere.71 Consequently, India remained a reluctant and hesitant participant in SAARC from the beginning,72 which was reinforced by the Indian policy makers’ long-​held belief that SAARC could not offer substantive economic benefits to India. Pakistan’s hesitation about the Bangladesh proposal stemmed from its Indo-​phobia. It feared that this was an Indian ploy to bring all the regional states together against Pakistan. It also feared that it would institutionalize India’s dominance over the South Asia region.73 Mohanan notes that Islamabad’s worry was that a regional organization could ‘result in the economic and political domination of India in the region’.74 This would go against Pakistan’s long-​standing policy of strategic parity vis-​à-​vis India.75 Islamabad was also worried that it might weaken the country’s association with West Asian countries. Pakistan has always tried to project a West Asian identity in order to build closer economic ties with the Arab Gulf states. Furthermore, Islamabad feared that the proposed organization would further advance India’s strategic advantage at Pakistan’s cost and assist in establishing India’s economic dominance in the region by creating a regional market for its products and services. Notwithstanding hesitation, India and Pakistan did not reject the proposal. Instead, they explored the idea and waited until clarity emerged about the modalities of the organization. Indeed, both the states eventually joined the project primarily because of the fear of being left out of regional diplomacy rather than from the expectation that regional cooperation would substantively deliver economic or other benefits to them. India joined it because ‘it did not want to be isolated further in the region’,76 which would have implications for its security. Also, it did not want to be blamed for scuttling the nascent idea of regionalism. New Delhi feared that staying away would create more disadvantage than managing the uncertainties from within. Islamabad also feared that if it did not join the organization, ‘it could be left out of the arrangement and become isolated in the region’.77 It calculated that staying away would leave it out of the arrangement, further alienate Pakistan in regional diplomacy and facilitate India to work with the South Asian states to isolate Pakistan. Therefore, both India and Pakistan had reservations about the creation of SAARC; although they joined the organization, they both

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remained less committed to its activities, which would impede the progress of SAARC.78 It is intriguing that neither India nor Pakistan, the two major countries of the region, took the initiative to form SAARC. The reasons for India not taking the initiative were twofold. First, any proposal for a regional grouping by New Delhi would have raised suspicion in the region’s capitals about India’s motivations. Second, Indian policy elites traditionally maintained the view that such a body would not promote their country’s economic interests.79 Islamabad was also not in a position to propose a regional organization because it would have been rejected by New Delhi perceiving that Pakistan might be inspiring the regional states to gang up against India. Besides the obvious incentive of economic gains from regional cooperation, the Ziaur Rahman military regime had two other important reasons for taking the initiative. First, it was aimed at safeguarding the country’s political sovereignty in the face of India’s overwhelming power preponderance by bringing it into a regional institutional framework. The support of the smaller states of the region to the Bangladeshi proposal can be read in a similar manner.80 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Dhaka was feeling pressure from New Delhi following the military coup in Bangladesh in 1975, which toppled the pro-​India Mujibar Rahman government and brought General Ziaur Rahman into power.81 SAARC would not only bring a symbolic equality to all states across the region, but would also bind India into an institutional framework and rules that would neutralize the overwhelming Indian power supremacy and consolidate the political independence of the smaller states.82 It was very similar to that of the EU in which German power was binded to an institutional framework. Furthermore, it was thought that a regional body would enhance the bargaining position of the smaller states vis-​à-​vis India. As an observer has noted: the feeling among the smaller South Asian countries that a multilateral forum which includes them as well as India would (a) take some of the rough edges off their bilateral relationships with India, which have been uniformly uneasy and occasionally hostile, and (b)  would increase their capacity for collective bargaining vis-​à-​vis India on issues that hitherto have remained basically bilateral in character.83 Second, as a military ruler, Zia had a problem of legitimacy in his own country.84 To enhance the legitimacy of his rule, he undertook external

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measures such as building better relations with Muslim countries and China and playing an active role in international institutions and so on. Zia’s move to establish a regional organization could be viewed in such a light.85 Indeed, this is not inconsistent with the behaviour of other similar regimes in relation to regionalism. ‘Regime-​ boosting regionalism’ is not uncommon in international relations and authoritarian governments seek membership to regional organizations to ‘boost the sovereignty and legitimacy of their regimes’.86 Arguably, General Ziaul Haq had a similar problem like that of Bangladesh’s Rahman, so he might have been tempted to join SAARC by the motivation of furthering domestic legitimacy.

Conclusion Bangladesh took the initiative to build a regional organization in South Asia and first mooted the idea in the 1970s. After persistent diplomacy and consultation, SAARC was formally launched in 1985 at the first ever summit meeting of the South Asian leaders in Dhaka. SAARC is a product of the second-​generation regionalism in Asia. The first-​generation regionalism effort in Asia was ended by the mid-​1950s. The early effort of Asian regionalism was geographically expansive and pan-​Asian in its orientation. It was primarily driven by anti-​colonial sentiment. The second-​generation Asian regionalism was driven by the aspiration of socio-​economic development. The building of a regional body is essentially a political project. The drivers of SAARC can be explained in terms of three sets of factors. The first is that the international forces play an important role in the rise of a regional organization. South Asia as an intrusive system is bound to be affected by systemic forces. Notwithstanding this theoretical postulate, the analysis of this book highlights that systemic forces played a marginal role in the rise of SAARC. Second, the structure of the regional system and regional international relations play a crucial role in the rise of a regional organization. As discussed, South Asian structure and international relations may be characterized as ‘Indo-​ centric’ and essentially ‘conflictual’; hence, it was difficult to establish a regional body. However, what helped in facilitating the establishment of a regional organization was a change in regional environment due to changes in political regimes in major South Asian states, in particular in India, in the late 1970s. But as regional environment deteriorated afterwards, it hindered the progress of SAARC. Third, the socio-​ economic profile of the region and the regional states was significant in the rise of regionalism in South Asia. As South Asia had a poor

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socio-​economic profile and as there was an acknowledgement of failure in the individual national effort, so collective action was perceived to be the best way to ameliorate the situation. The very issues that caused the rise of regionalism in South Asia will drive its dynamics in the years to come.

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4

The Formative Years: 1980–​92 Introduction Bangladesh, after pursuing several years of informal and semi-​formal diplomacy for regional cooperation, formally approached the six South Asian states (Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) to establish an ‘ASEAN-​like’ association in South Asia in May 1980.1 In response to the proposal, the six South Asian states asked Bangladesh to prepare a working paper on regional cooperation. The Bangladesh government in November 1980 circulated a draft document, entitled ‘A Paper on the Proposal for Regional Cooperation in South Asia’.2 Afterwards, a series of meetings of foreign secretaries and foreign ministers took place in which various aspects of the organization and probable areas of cooperation were worked out. This initial process was culminated into the formal launching of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) at the first ever summit of the seven South Asian states in Dhaka in December 1985. Following it, various initiatives were undertaken to consolidate the modalities of SAARC, which roughly continued until 1992. The period from 1980 to 1992 is conceived as the ‘formative phase’ of the body. The organization strived to find a direction, identify probable areas of cooperation and build an institutional structure during this period.3 Notwithstanding inherent tension and reservations expressed by the regional states when the idea was mooted, as discussed in the preceding chapter, they agreed to establish SAARC in the mid-​1980s. There was the initial excitement that the organization would deliver concrete benefits to the member states and create a peaceful regional environment. A rapid expansion of the agenda of cooperation could be evidenced in the initial years following the formal launching of the body. SAARC also concluded several important conventions to deal with the pressing issues of the region during this period. A permanent

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secretariat was established in 1987 in Kathmandu for the coordination of SAARC’s activities. While the activities and the expanding agenda of cooperation reflected the potential of the organization, an undercurrent of tension within the grouping did continue. As discussed in the preceding chapter, the preliminary interactions and exchanges to build SAARC revealed strong mutual mistrust and inherent tension among the regional states owing to a variety of reasons. The smaller states of the region initially had two apparently contradictory perspectives about the association. While they were uncertain about the fallout of the organization on their ‘sovereignty’ and political independence, it was also viewed that binding the larger states into an institutional framework could strengthen their sovereignty in the long run. The two dominant states –​India and Pakistan –​were concerned about the consequences of cooperation within an institutional framework. India and Pakistan were lukewarm about the Bangladesh proposal to establish a regional organization. New Delhi was concerned about whether this was a ploy to ‘gang up’ against India, while Pakistan’s concern was that the establishment of a regional grouping would institutionalize India’s domination in the region. What all this meant was that rather than being purely guided by economic logic, the member states were cautious and viewed their cooperation through the prism of political and security interest. Given such a context, the South Asian states, following the European integration process, adopted (neo-​)functionalism as its approach for regional unity.4 The expectation was that cooperation in functional areas would ‘spillover’ in other areas of cooperation, leading to regional integration in South Asia. This chapter explores the formative politics of SAARC from its conceptualization to consolidation (1980–​92). It discusses the expansion of the agenda of cooperation, illustrates its achievements, constraints and failures. However, it starts with a discussion on the neo-​ functional basis of SAARC, which defined the politics of formative years of regionalism in South Asia.

The neo-​functional basis of SAARC In the formative years, SAARC as a regional organization was firmly grounded on the theoretical idea of (neo-​)functionalism, which it borrowed from the theory and practice of European integration.5 Given this context, the following illustrates the theory of neo-​functionalism and explains why SAARC adopted this approach to build regionalism.

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The theory of neo-​functionalism was developed in the context of European integration bor rowing from two pre-​e xisting theories  –​ pluralism and functionalism.6 Originally, functionalism developed on the idea that international integration delivers collective governance and builds ‘material interdependence’ among states, which creates an internal dynamic of its own as states integrate in limited functional, technical and/​or economic areas.7 The framework posits that international agencies are created to meet human needs and operate based on knowledge and expertise. Building on the work of David Mitrany on functionalism, neo-​functionalism pays attention to the process of integration and regional cooperation. Neo-​functionalism also borrowed the functionalist idea that international cooperation aims to scale economies in the provision of public goods. There are differences between the two theories. The key focus of functionalism is international integration, which is developed in the context of the functions of international agencies, but the focus of neo-​ functionalism is regional integration process (specifically European). Also, while functionalism posits that the only feasible way to bypass state sovereignty is by transferring specific state functions to specialized international agencies, neo-​functionalism by contrast emphasizes the potential for deeper and broader governance at the regional level.8 It is also noteworthy that neo-​functionalism emphasizes the direction of regional integration over its outcome. According to Bergmann and Niemann, the key assumptions of neo-​functionalism are as follows:9 (1)  integration is understood as a process, which evolves over time and gets its own dynamic; (2)  regional integration is characterized by multiple, diverse and changing actors, especially supranational ones, who also build coalitions across governments/​bureaucracies; (3) decisions are taken by rational and self-​interested actors, who have the capacity to learn from their experiences in cooperative decision making and also change their preferences; and (4)  incremental decision making is given primacy over grand designs where seemingly marginal adjustments are often driven by the unintended consequences of previous decisions, which is defined by the idea of ‘spillover’. Indeed, the idea of ‘spillover’ occupies a central place in the theory of neo-​functionalism. Three types of spillover pressures are generally conceptualized in the theory:  functional, political and cultivated. Functional spillover happens because the goals of cooperation can only be achieved by taking further integrative actions.10 It is because of the pressure created by the interdependence of policy sectors and issue areas.11 Political spillover occurs because political elites feel pressure

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to make adjustments by shifting their expectations, political activities and even loyalties to a new power centre, which promote further integration, thus adding a political stimulus to the process.12 Non-​ governmental elites also put pressure on the political elites for further integration.13 Cultivated spillover takes place when supranational institutions increase their own powers and become agents of integration and change. Once established, those institutions get a life of their own and become difficult to control by those who created them. Indeed, supranational activism could be a source of regional integration and they hold various tools at their disposal to influence the integration process by, for example, acting as policy entrepreneurs or helping to lift agreements beyond the lowest common denominator.14 Finally, it is noteworthy that the neo-​functional pathway of integration is a path-​dependency process. As already noted, neo-​functionalism is focussed on the direction of the process rather than the outcome; hence, path dependency is the causal driver of regional integration.15 A careful scrutiny of the politics of the formative years of SAARC clearly highlights the reasons for adopting some ideas of neo-​ functionalism. Bangladesh’s initial proposal for regional cooperation that Dhaka sent in May 1980 stated that ‘the beginning of co-​ operation on a regional basis may be a positive force in generating a climate of harmony’ in the region.16 In addition to ‘generating a climate of harmony’, Bangladesh also suggested a gradual approach for regional cooperation. Indeed, the working paper on regional unity that Bangladesh circulated to the South Asian states proposed that a ‘calculated and step-​by-​step approach’ should be followed and ‘controversial political domain should be avoided and non-​controversial areas of culture, science and technology should be considered for interaction as a modest beginning’ in order to promote ‘a climate of trust and confidence’.17 It, therefore, manifested a neo-​functionalist proposition. The reasons why Bangladesh proposed such an approach are not difficult to discern. As discussed in Chapter 1, South Asia since decolonization has been a region of mistrust and ‘conflict unending’ in which regional cooperation was a difficult proposition. Given such a context, it was assumed that the way forward was to adopt a gradual and step-b​ y-s​ tep approach.18 The neo-​functionalist idea of cooperation at a limited scale on functional areas was the most realistic framework to initiate the regionalist project. Otherwise, the organization could not even take off the ground. Overtime, the spillover effect of functional cooperation, it was assumed, would lead to deeper cooperation and regional integration.

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The Bangladesh proposal and its aftermath Following the formal proposal that Bangladesh made in May 1980, the regional states, as discussed in the preceding chapter, reacted differently based on their reading of the possible fallout of creating a regional organization in South Asia. To briefly reiterate, the smaller states, that is Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka, while had some uncertainty about the fallout of the organization on their identities as independent political actors generally supported the proposal perceiving that it could bring economic benefit to them and consolidate their sovereign status in the long run. India and Pakistan, the two most powerful states in the region, were circumspect and cautious because they were not certain about the fallout of regional level cooperation and the formation of a regional organization on them. India feared whether this was a Pakistani ploy to ‘gang up’ against New Delhi. The Indian government was also concerned that it would introduce multilateralism in regional international affairs and erode its advantage, which it used to gain through bilateralism. Pakistan’s reaction to the Bangladesh proposal was lukewarm because it feared that it would consolidate India’s ‘hegemony’ in South Asia and put Pakistan at a disadvantage. Indeed, the reactions demonstrated a high degree of mistrust among the regional states. The exchanges and interactions in the wake of the Bangladesh proposal highlighted the wariness of the South Asian states, on the one hand, and the perceived need of cooperation, on the other. After Bangladesh made a formal proposal, quiet diplomatic consultations went on among South Asian diplomats and foreign ministers at the UN headquarters in New York in the period from August to September 1980 in which it was agreed that Bangladesh would prepare the draft of a working paper on regional cooperation that would be discussed by the foreign secretaries of the seven South Asian states at a meeting. Dhaka prepared the draft working paper and circulated it in November 1980. The paper, respecting Indian and Pakistani sensitivities, avoided any reference to controversial security and political matters. Only non-​political and non-​controversial areas for cooperation were proposed.19 Bangladesh’s persistent diplomatic engagement resulted in the first foreign secretary-​level meeting of the seven South Asian states on 21–​3 April 1981 in Colombo. It was an important development in the history of South Asia as the region was apparently moving towards a new direction away from the conflictual relations of the past. In terms of a substantive outcome, the meeting was significant

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because the foreign secretaries agreed to cooperate in a range of areas.20 Hopes of a better regional future were raised at the outcome of the meeting, which was reflected in the statement of Bangladesh foreign secretary S.A.M.S. Kibria who stated that it was ‘an occasion of historic significance. For the first time … the representatives of seven nations of South Asia are formally assembled to consider the proposal for cooperation on a regional basis for the common good of the peoples of the region.’21 Behind this hope, a closer scrutiny, however, reveals that there were apprehensions over the possibility of Indian domination. Also, there was a division between the smaller states, on the one hand, and India and Pakistan, on the other, about institutionalizing the regional cooperation scheme. Neither Pakistan nor India favoured the creation of any institutional arrangement at this stage.22 The two countries were cautious and wanted a ‘step-​by-​step’ approach ‘without forcing the pace’. As Pakistan’s foreign secretary Riaz Piracha stated: ‘we should make sure that there is not too much sail on a very small hull. … Let us build the structure of cooperation brick by brick and on solid and secure foundation for then alone will it endure.’23 The India–​Pakistan cautious approach prevailed as the joint communiqué stated that regional cooperation should begin with functional arrangements. Further, the communiqué noted that the principle of ‘unanimity’ would be practised in the pursuit of regional cooperation, which bestowed veto right to all states. Additionally, it was decided that ‘bilateral’ and ‘contentious’ issues would not be brought for discussion. Very importantly, a separation of political and economic issues was made and it was noted in the communiqué that only economic issues would come under the purview of regional cooperation. Five Study Groups were set up to explore the scope and potential for cooperation in five sectors and five countries were given the responsibility for their coordination: (1) Agriculture (Bangladesh); (2) Rural Development (Sri Lanka); (3)  Telecommunications (Pakistan); (4)  Meteorology (India); and (5)  Health and Population Activities (Nepal). The coordinating countries were asked to submit recommendations at the next foreign secretaries meeting. In addition to the aforementioned step, a ‘Committee of the Whole’ was set up to identify and report on other potential areas of cooperation which comprised senior officials of the seven countries with Sri Lanka as the coordinator. Several important conclusions can be drawn from the first foreign secretary-​level meeting: (1) there was a difference of opinion about the structure of regional cooperation among the regional states; (2) there were reservations and concerns about regional cooperation;

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and (3) it started at a low base with a plan of cooperation on non-​ controversial issues. The meeting was important because it set the tone and the direction of the organization. It largely conformed to the theoretical ideas of neo-​functionalism, as noted previously. The first foreign secretary-​level meeting was followed up by the second meeting on 2–​4 November 1981 in Kathmandu in which they reviewed the progress that was made since the Colombo meeting and reiterated that regional cooperation was ‘beneficial, desirable and necessary’.24 Some quick progress was evident at this meeting. The foreign secretaries reviewed and endorsed the recommendations of the five Study Groups that were set up at the first meeting and agreed the modalities to implement the recommendations. At this meeting, the Study Groups were renamed as ‘Working Groups’ with rotating chairship. The main task of the Working Groups was to draw up comprehensive programmes of action. The foreign secretaries expanded the areas of study by adding three additional sectors to the list of five, which were decided at the first meeting. They were: (1) Transport; (2) Postal Services; and (3) Scientific and Technical Cooperation. The Maldives, Bhutan and Pakistan were made responsible to head the studies respectively. The ‘Committee of the Whole’ presented a report on the potential areas of cooperation, which the foreign secretaries endorsed. Importantly, it was decided that the discussion would move to the political level by holding a meeting of the foreign ministers before the end of 1982 (it actually took place in August 1983). Notwithstanding positive outcomes from this meeting, the disagreement over the institutionalization of regional cooperation and the holding of a summit persisted. As noted already, the disagreement over the institutionalization of regional cooperation arose in the first meeting in which smaller states of the region desired an institutional framework while India and Pakistan viewed that it should not be done in haste. The continuation of this difference of opinion was observed in the second meeting. And, like the first meeting, India and Pakistan prevailed over the issue. The progress and challenges were reflected in the statement of Bangladesh foreign secretary Humayun Rashid Chowdhury who applauded the remarkable ‘degree of mutual accommodation that was reached despite differences and constraints in national perception and orientation of the individual countries’ and noted that ‘the concept of regional cooperation had reached a take off stage’, but cautioned that in the absence of an institutional framework, regional cooperation would be ‘relegated to the realm of the ideal’.25

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More progress towards regional cooperation was made at the third foreign secretary-​level meeting in Islamabad on 7–​9 August 1982. The foreign secretaries endorsed the reports of the five Working Groups. They also endorsed the reports of the three Study Groups, which were set up in the last meeting and converted into Working Groups. Two more sectors were added to the list of study: (1) Sports, Art, and Culture; and (2) Planning and Development.26 The ‘Committee of the Whole’ was asked to: (1) prepare an integrated programme of action in the agreed areas of cooperation based on the recommendations submitted by the Working Groups; (2)  recommend modalities and mechanisms for the implementation, coordination and monitoring of the agreed programme of action; and (3)  indicate the financial implications of the short-​term component of the integrated programme of action and recommend funding modalities and arrangements for its long-​term component.27 While concrete progress was evident in several foreign secretaries’ meetings for regional cooperation, the inherent tensions among the regional states persisted. This was specifically reflected in the statement of the Pakistani foreign minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan who inaugurated the third foreign secretaries’ meeting. The foreign minister reaffirmed Pakistan’s commitment to ‘the concept of regional cooperation as an important vehicle for the establishment of mutual confidence and promotion of good neighbourly relations in the region’ but cautioned against ‘overoptimism’ and ‘dramatic breakthroughs as borne out by ASEAN and EEC, which has confirmed the wisdom of step-​by-​step approach’.28 It implied that the old tension still existed while they were moving ahead with the collaborative scheme. The fourth and final foreign secretary-​level meeting before the process moved to the political level took place in Dhaka on 28–​30 March 1983. The primary objective of this meeting was to prepare the groundwork for holding the foreign minister-​level meeting in August 1983 in New Delhi. At this meeting, the foreign secretaries of the seven South Asian states endorsed the recommendations of the ‘Committee of the Whole’ on the ‘Integrated Programme of Action’ (IPA) and decided that the recommendations would be formally launched at the ministerial meeting. The meeting also discussed the mechanisms for implementing the IPA. Further, the foreign secretaries agreed that the member states would fund the IPA and a foreign secretarial-​level committee would be set up to coordinate and monitor the implementation of the programme. The step-​by-​step approach took concrete shape for regional cooperation at the Dhaka foreign secretaries’ meeting. Now the

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seven South Asian states were confident that a regional cooperation programme could be launched at the political level. That confidence was reflected in the inaugural address of the Bangladesh foreign minister A.R. Shamsud-​Doha in which he expressed the belief that the endeavour towards South Asian regional cooperation had passed from the critical stage of ‘preparatory build-​up’ to a ‘phase of implementation’ by creating a ‘climate of trust and goodwill’.29 After three years of official-​level discussions, the focus shifted to the political level by holding the first foreign ministers’ meeting in New Delhi on 1–​3 August 1983. At this meeting, ‘the Declaration of South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC)’ was adopted. The meeting endorsed the ‘collective resolve of the Governments to pursue actively South Asian co-​operation’. The declaration noted that the initiation of regional cooperation was ‘beneficial, desirable and necessary’, which would not only promote socio-​economic development and collective self-​reliance, it would also contribute to the establishment of ‘friendship, amity and understanding among their peoples’ and enhance ‘mutual trust, understanding, sympathetic appreciation of the national aspirations of the countries of the region’.30 Several important decisions were taken at this meeting to move regional cooperation forward. First, it launched the IPA on mutually agreed areas of cooperation covering agriculture, health, transport, telecommunication, meteorology, cultural affairs and sports.31 Second, the foreign ministers agreed that only multilateral issues would be discussed in the cooperative framework and bilateral issues would be avoided. Third, the ministers endorsed the principle of unanimity in decision making within the organization. Fourth, in the absence of a permanent secretariat at this time, the foreign secretaries would function as a committee to approve specific projects, allocate funds and oversee their implementation. Fifth, to expedite the process of regional cooperation, the foreign ministers decided to meet at least once a year.32 This was a milestone in the process of regionalism in South Asia. Within a short span of time, the process advanced quickly from the May 1981 meeting to the August 1983 foreign ministers’ meeting, notwithstanding mistrust and formidable problems in interstate relations. For example, when the New Delhi foreign ministers meeting took place, the Indo–​Sri Lanka bilateral relationship was severely strained due to the Tamil ethnic problem. Yet the Sri Lankan foreign minister attended the meeting, which manifested Sri Lanka’s commitment to regional cooperation and the ability to overcome difficult bilateral relations with India. Of course, it also highlighted the

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vulnerability of the emerging organization that it could be derailed due to the spillover effect of domestic crisis. This reality of South Asia was reflected in the address of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi who noted South Asia to be a ‘troubled region’ and stated: ‘I am glad we are making a beginning. We have our political differences but economic cooperation will give a strong impetus to closer friendship and greater stability in South Asia.’33 Also, the meeting could not agree to a summit, notwithstanding favoured by smaller states, which highlighted the cautious approach of India and Pakistan and their conditional support to the fledgling organization. Subsequently, three more meetings of the foreign ministers were held at Male (10–​11 July 1984), Thimpu (13–​14 May 1985)  and Dhaka (5 December 1985)  before the first summit took place in Dhaka in December 1985. At the Male meeting on 10–​11 July 1984, the foreign ministers reviewed the progress in the work of the organization since the first meeting in New Delhi and set out a plan for the future. Also, they reviewed the recommendations of the first and second meetings of the Standing Committee of Foreign Secretaries held at New Delhi on 27–​9 February 1984 and at Male on 7–​8 July 1984. They endorsed the recommendations and gave directions for the future activities. At the Thimpu meeting on 13–​ 14 May 1985, the foreign ministers reviewed the progress of the organization’s work and endorsed the recommendations from the standing committee meetings since the Male meeting. The Dhaka foreign ministers meeting on 5 July 1985 was the final preparatory meeting before the first summit was held on 7–​8 December 1985. At the Dhaka foreign ministers’ meeting, the name of the organization was changed from SARC to SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation). Bangladesh’s diplomacy appears to be successful in realizing the initial objective of the formation of an ‘ASEAN-​like’ organization in South Asia. The diplomacy that had gone on thus far succeeded in ensuring a consensus on the modalities of regional cooperation in the meetings and interactions from 1980 to 1985. Based on the neo-​functionalist idea of ‘spillover’, the South Asian states adopted ‘developmental regionalism’34 for regional cooperation. The neo-​functional basis of regionalism in South Asia was specifically reflected in the address of the Indian prime minister’s speech, as previously quoted, at the first foreign ministers’ meeting in New Delhi. Also, importantly, it was assumed that regionalism was not an end itself; it should be viewed as a means for greater goals, which would also inform the latter process of regionalism that proceeded in the wake of the first summit in 1985.

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Beneath the agreement to establish a regional organization, the preceding analysis reveals an inherent mistrust and suspicion within the organization, in particular that mistrust appears to be strong between the two most powerful members of the organization  –​ India and Pakistan. As will be apparent, this mistrust will continue notwithstanding their cooperation, which ultimately would stall the regionalist project. The implication of this is that the neo-​functionalist approach that the organization adopted failed to overcome the mistrust. The spillover impact of functional cooperation that the member states envisaged failed to produce the desired result in all three dimensions, that is economy, political and cultivated.

Formal launching of SAARC and the politics of regionalism, 1985–​92 The first ever summit of the seven South Asian states, as noted previously, was held in December 1985 in which the organization was formally launched and the Charter of the organization was adopted, which set out rules for its operation and its organizational structure. An evaluation of the modalities of SAARC enshrined in its Charter makes it clear that neo-​functional cooperation would be the guiding principle of its operation and controversial political issues would not come under the purview of the Association’s deliberations. A good starting point, therefore, would be an analysis of the Charter of the organization to understand and explain the neo-​functional basis of SAARC and the politics of regionalism in South Asia in the ensuing years.

The Charter The Charter provides the guidance and lays out the structure for pursing regional cooperation in South Asia. Several features of the document are significant.35 • It prioritizes ‘active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields’. • Such collaboration would contribute to the building of ‘mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one another’s problems’. • Contentious issues would be kept out of the purview of SAARC’s deliberations.36 • Consensus would be the mode of decision making of the organization.

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The Charter set out the key objectives of SAARC as follows: • to improve quality of life of the citizens through economic growth, social progress and cultural development; • to promote collective self-​reliance among the member states; • to pursue effective collaboration in international forums; and • to cooperate with all the states and major international bodies.37 These key features and objectives of the Charter provide an insight about the nature of regional cooperation that the regional states intended to pursue. While it highlighted that SAARC would pursue developmental regionalism, it also demonstrated its limits. It is based on the principle of ‘lowest common denominator’ and gave veto power to each member of the Association. Arguably, without such a modus operandi, it was possible that the organization could not even take off the ground. The stipulation of such a cooperative structure is primarily due to the conflictual nature of South Asian international relations. Hence, the South Asian leaders decided that a modest beginning with a focus on developmental regionalism would be the most pragmatic way forward. By adopting such an approach, SAARC indeed embraced the idea of neo-​functionalism as discussed at the outset of this chapter. Some subtle, but important, changes in the modalities of the organization since the circulation of the Bangladesh working paper in November 1980 (and the ‘Declaration of SARC’ adopted by the foreign ministers of the seven South Asian states) also highlight the politics of regionalism in the initial phase. The SAARC Charter and the ‘Declaration of SARC’ are different in two important ways. First, in the Preamble and Article II, the principles of ‘non-​use of force’ and ‘peaceful settlement of all disputes’ have been added, which did not exist in the 1983 declaration. These principles featured (without ‘all’ in the second expression) in the initial Bangladesh working paper circulated in November 1980. But these principles were dropped in the Colombo foreign secretaries meeting in 1981. Hence, there was no mention of those principles in the 1983 declaration. They were brought back in the Charter in 1985. Second, in the 1985 Charter, a ‘Council of Ministers’ (Article IV) and a Secretariat of the Association (without deciding its location), which was opposed by India and Pakistan earlier, were created.38 More than any other things it actually highlighted the cautious approach and careful considerations of the regional states regarding regional cooperation.

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Organizational structure In the initial phase of consultation at the foreign secretary and foreign minister levels, an organizational structure gradually took shape. It was finalized in 1985, which stood as follows: The Summit:  This is the apex body of the Association in its organizational structure comprising the heads of state/​government who, according to the Charter, would meet annually. Major decisions relating to the organization are taken at this level. As of late 2019, although theoretically there should have been 34 summits, only 18 SAARC summits have taken place thus far. Some annual summits had to be postponed, as will be discussed later for a variety of reasons. It is specifically noteworthy that since 2014 no SAARC summit has taken place. The 19th summit was scheduled to be held in Islamabad in November 2016, but it was postponed due to the frosty relationship between India and Pakistan. The Council of Ministers: This is the second tier of the organization in its decision-​making structure comprising the foreign ministers of the member states and generally meets twice a year. The Committee may also meet in extraordinary sessions by agreement. The Council is responsible for formulating policies, reviewing progress, deciding new areas of cooperation, establishing additional mechanisms as deemed necessary and deciding on other matters of general interest to the Association. While the Council can make decisions on wide-​ ranging areas, the most important decisions are left for the heads of government/​state. The Standing Committee: Below the Council of Ministers in the decision-​making structure of SAARC is the Standing Committee, which is comprised of the foreign secretaries of the member states and meets as often as deemed necessary. It is responsible for:  (1) monitoring and coordination of programmes; (2) approval of projects and programmes and issues of financing; (3)  determining inter-​ sectoral priorities; (4) mobilizing regional and external resources; and (5) identifying new areas of cooperation. The Standing Committee submits its reports to the Council of Ministers. It may set up Action Committees comprising members from at least two states for the implementation of projects. The Standing Committee is assisted by a Programme Committee, which comprises senior officials of the member states and is responsible for scrutinizing the budget of the Secretariat, finalizing the calendar of activities and dealing with any other matter assigned to it by the Standing

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Committee. Additionally, the Programme Committee considers the reports of the Technical Committees, SAARC Regional Centres and the SAARC Audio Visual Exchange (SAVE) Committee and their recommendations. After reviewing those reports, they submit their recommendations to the Standing Committee. The Technical Committees:  The Technical Committees are constituted comprising officials of the member states when they are deemed necessary. They formulate specialized programmes and projects in their respective fields under the IPA. SAARC has a viable decision-​making structure and appears to be competent to realize the goals of the organization. However, as will be discussed, it was not enough to produce the desired outcomes.

Evolution of SAARC from 1985 to 1992 Following the formal launch of the organization at the first summit in Dhaka in 1985, the agenda of cooperation rapidly expanded in the ensuing years. Until 1992, during the rest of the formative years, it added an array of areas to the agenda of cooperation, which was impressive. However, they remained mostly unimplemented, as will be discussed. At the 1st summit in Dhaka in December 1985, some steps were taken to advance the agenda of cooperation other than the approval of the SAARC Charter and the formal launch of the organization. Among many other decisions, a decision concerning terrorism was significant. It was decided at the first summit that the Standing Committee would set up a Study Group to examine the problem of terrorism as all the member states of the organization were affected by this. It was an important decision considering that if a consensus on the issue could be found, it would significantly affect interstate relations in South Asia and the regional environment could be vastly improved to facilitate regional cooperation. Another decision at the first summit on drug use and its trafficking was significant. It was decided that the issue would be studied in a similar fashion to that of terrorism.39 Given that the use of drugs was increasing alarmingly in the region, a regional approach could prevent South Asian societies from this social menace. The 2nd SAARC summit took place in Bangalore, India, on 16–​17 November 1986. At this summit, the leaders agreed to launch a South Asian Broadcasting Programme covering both radio and television. It was also decided that people-​to-​people contacts would be increased for which the leaders authorized the relevant bodies to take appropriate steps. In particular, tourism was emphasized and it was agreed that

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national governments would work together to facilitate limited convertibility of national currencies for tourists.40 Furthermore, it was felt that there should be more exchange of students, scholars and researchers of the organization’s member states. The leaders viewed that greater access to reliable and up-​to-​date information on technical, scientific and developmental matters would help create a congenial environment for cooperation. Hence, it was decided that a SAARC Documentation Centre would be created in which information about the organization and the region would be readily available. The summit adopted the Memorandum of Understanding to establish the SAARC Secretariat in Kathmandu. At the summit, the necessity to act against terrorism was again emphasized.41 The 3rd SAARC summit was held in Kathmandu in November 1987. At this summit, the South Asian leaders attempted to inject a new sense of direction to the organization in order to reinvigorate regional cooperation. At the summit, natural disasters emerged as a priority area as the region was (and still is) disaster-​prone. The leaders decided to form a Commission to study the causes and consequences of natural disasters in South Asia and the ways to mitigate their impact. Furthermore, the summit gave some attention to the issue of environment and decided that the previously noted Commission would study the ways and means of environmental protection and preservation.42 The leaders of the organization launched the SAVE programme at this summit. Very importantly, the South Asian states signed an agreement to establish a ‘South Asia Food Security Reserve’, which became operational on 12 August 1988. Another significant development at the summit was that the South Asian states signed the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism.43 It is noteworthy that a decision in this regard was taken at the first summit in Dhaka in 1985. The 4th SAARC summit was held on 29–​31 December 1988 in Islamabad. At this summit, the year 1989 was announced as the ‘SAARC Year for Combating Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking’. The primary objective was to raise awareness about the menace of drugs in the region. The leaders agreed to prepare and implement national programmes to deal with the problem in addition to regional-​level efforts. The summit also paid attention to the issue of girl children and announced 1990 as the SAARC Year of the Girl Child.44 This summit also decided to establish a SAARC Agricultural Information Centre. Among other issues, the summit declaration emphasized the need to include education as an area of cooperation. A  technical committee was established, headed by Bangladesh, to look at the

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issue of education. Additionally, it was decided to establish a SAARC Centre for Human Resource Development, which would be located in Pakistan.45 The 5th SAARC summit took place on 21–​3 November 1990 in Male, the capital of the Maldives. It was decided to launch the Special SAARC Travel Document to exempt holders from visas for travel within the region. Those who would be eligible to use this facility would be: supreme court judges, members of national parliaments, and heads of national academic institutions, their spouses and dependent children. The summit decided to launch a study on the feasibility of joint ventures on handicraft and cottage industries by the member states. Also, it was decided that a SAARC Tuberculosis Centre in Nepal and a SAARC documentation centre in India would be established. Additionally, the SAARC Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances was signed at Male. The summit launched the ‘Scheme for the Promotion of Organized Tourism’ and appreciated the proposal for institutionalized cooperation among the tourist industries of the SAARC countries. Such cooperation was expected to popularize tourism in the region and increase tourists not only from the region, but also beyond it. The summit resolved that the Secretary General of the organization would take steps to increase interactions among federations or associations of journalists, news agencies and mass media of the region.46 Furthermore, it was announced that 1991–​2000 would be the SAARC Decade of the Girl Child, noting that the leaders were deeply moved by the appeal of the SAARC Girl Children for love and care and the right to childhood. The SAARC leaders resolved that they would prioritize the welfare of children, in particular girl children, in the agenda of cooperation. Additionally, the 1991 was announced as the ‘SAARC Year of Shelter’, 1992 as the ‘SAARC Year of the Environment’ and 1993 as the ‘SAARC Year of Disabled Persons’. The member states vowed to take appropriate steps to observe the years and coordinate their programmes.47 The 6th SAARC summit was held on 21 December 1991 in Colombo. This summit emphasized the issue of scientific and technological cooperation and decided to institutionalize it. It welcomed the proposal for the establishment of a networking arrangement between research and development centres of the member states which would be an important step for advancing cooperation in the field of technology. Furthermore, it appreciated the steps for organized study tours, workshops and seminars in various areas of science and technology.

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At the summit, the SAARC leaders reviewed various reports and proposals submitted by the member countries to make SAARC more functional and effective. They also reviewed the suggestion of the IPA committees to expand the areas of cooperation. The summit decided to form an independent South Asian Commission on Poverty Alleviation consisting of eminent persons from SAARC countries. Member states agreed to set up the Inter-​Governmental Group (IGG) to study trade liberalization within the region and examine the idea of SAPTA proposed by Sri Lanka. It was agreed that a report in this regard would be submitted to the Committee on Economic Cooperation. A Committee on Environment was also established.48 This account of the decisions made at the summit meetings during the formative phase highlights that SAARC added an array of areas in its list of cooperation during the period under discussion. New areas of regional cooperation were consistently added, which portrays SAARC as a dynamic and successful regional organization. However, as will be illustrated later, the organization could not implement most of them and failed to produce a substantive outcome. The core of SAARC activities was focussed on the IPA, consisting of technical committees on the agreed areas of cooperation. Adding new initiatives under the IPA over the years were piling up the activities to be accomplished. Gradually, it became clear that the organization needed to concentrate on delivering the agenda rather than adding further items to its growing list. Hence, the IPA was streamlined and the number of technical committees was reduced from 11 to 7, mainly through the amalgamation of the different sectors covered by various Technical Committees and eliminating overlapping, duplication and waste. The seven Technical Committees under the IPA covered: 1 . Agriculture and Rural Development 2. Communications and Transport 3. Social Development 4. Environment, Meteorology and Forestry 5. Science and Technology 6. Human Resources Development 7. Energy The key objective of streamlining the Technical Committees was to enhance efficiency to realize the goals of the IPA and the organization as a whole. While this was a good move, it demonstrated that the organization was lagging behind in terms of actual delivery of benefits.

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Two important conventions were signed during the formative phase of the organization, which manifested the achievements of SAARC and its dynamics in the formative phase. They were: (1) SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism 1987; and (2) the SAARC Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1990. Arguably, they were immensely significant initiatives because these two issues were important for all member states of SAARC. Additionally, two important regional centres49 were established, which highlighted the achievements of SAARC during the initial years of its operation. They were: • SAARC Agricultural Information Centre (SAIC), which was created in 1988 to exchange relevant technical information about agricultural research at the national level. • SAARC Tuberculosis Centre (STC), which was established in 1992 and whose main objective was to work towards controlling and preventing TB in the region through the coordinated efforts of the National TB Programmes of the SAARC member states. Like the two conventions noted previously, these two centres (three others as will be discussed later) were immensely important given their relevance for the whole region. These are significant for all the member states of the organization. Hence, they should be viewed as a mark of achievement that SAARC made during its formative phase. It should also be noted here that SAARC took initiatives to integrate the private sector into the process of regional integration.50 Arguably, without such initiatives, the organization was unlikely to realize its full potential. However, their impact in building regionalism was marginal.

Conclusion This chapter has explained the politics of the formative phase of SAARC from 1980 to 1992. The concept of neo-functionalism guided cooperation during this phase of SAARC’s operation which was borrowed from the theory and practice of the early years of European integration. Bangladesh took the initiative to form an ‘ASEAN-​like’ regional organization in South Asia. The preliminary consultations were done in the late 1970s through informal and semi-​formal diplomacy. When Bangladesh found these consultations positive, it made a formal proposal to establish a regional organization in May 1980. Bangladesh subsequently produced a working paper on regional cooperation on the

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request of the regional states and circulated it in November 1980. In it, Bangladesh was sensitive to the concerns of India and Pakistan and avoided suggesting any politically sensitive issues from the suggested list of cooperation. The idea of neo-​functionalism, hence, took root in South Asian regionalism as Dhaka proposed cooperation in technical and non-​controversial areas. Bangladesh’s diplomatic initiative and the proposal for regional cooperation led to the holding of four substantive foreign secretary-​ level meetings (five including one for the final preparation of the summit in December 1985 right before the event) and three foreign minister-​level meetings before the organization was formally launched at the first ever summit of the South Asian states in December 1985 in Dhaka. In 1983, the consultation started at the political level from the official level and at the first foreign ministers’ meeting in August of that year in New Delhi, the organization under the name of ‘South Asian Regional Cooperation’ was launched. The name was changed right before the first summit at the third foreign ministers’ meeting in Dhaka to ‘South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation’. At the first foreign ministers’ meeting, the IPA was launched, thus provisionally beginning regional cooperation in South Asia. The consultations, exchanges, interactions and activities that went on during this period at various levels made it clear that the organization would start its journey on the basis of functional cooperation. It was assumed that this was the most realistic strategy given the state of regional international relations characterized by mutual mistrust and hostility. It was assumed that if functional cooperation could deliver mutual benefit, it would build confidence and regional cooperation could move to a higher level. After the formal launch of the Association in 1985, the member states took steps to consolidate the organization. During this period, like the preceding years, cooperation was kept at the technical and functional level. Also, an important feature of the politics of regionalism during this phase was that the member states added a vast amount of functional areas to the list of cooperation. The question remains whether they added too much to the list without concentrating on the challenges of their implementation. There were successes and failures of regional cooperation during this period. It could be evidenced that there was enthusiasm about SAARC as wide-​ranging areas were included in the agenda. Also, importantly, two conventions were signed and two regional centres were created to address some common issues of the regional states, which should be viewed as important achievements of the organization.

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However, questions remain about the practicality of the regionalism during this period because the areas of cooperation that were identified remained mostly unimplemented. While on paper this was an impressive performance, but in practice it was doubtful whether the organization delivered much benefit to the people of the region. Therefore, while the agenda of cooperation was impressive and some success might be identified, the failures were more glaringly evident as the Association entered into a new phase after 1992. Importantly, a careful analysis of the politics of the formative phase of South Asian regionalism would indicate that while the states were apparently cooperating, the undercurrent of security and strategic concerns of the member states never went away. It was evident that cooperative efforts on the part of the member states were there, but indeed they were pursuing the cooperation through the lens of security and strategic considerations. Particularly, this was the case in the context of India and Pakistan. Therefore, it is apparent that the neo-​functional approach that was adopted did not help to overcome the challenges of regional cooperation in order to deepen regional integration. Indeed, the state of bilateral relationships determined the outcome of regionalism, which would become more prominent in the years to come.

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SAARC after 1992: Disagreements and Differences SAARC today faces multiple challenges:  It is arguably spread too thin, it faces problems of delivery, it is prone to obstructionism by individual member states, and it lacks a brand identity. Brookings Institution1

Introduction SAARC moved to a new phase in the early 1990s by undertaking efforts for regional integration2 and starting cooperation in core economic areas such as trade in goods and services, investment, finance and so on. While ‘intra-​regional trade was earlier not included within the area of cooperation of SAARC, mainly due to the political overtones’,3 with the dawn of the 1990s it was apparent that the organization would need to move cooperation from functional areas to the core economic areas if SAARC was to be viable and deliver substantive benefit to the people of South Asia. At the Male summit in 1990, the SAARC leaders made the ‘in principle’ decision to move the regional cooperation to core economic areas. The first substantive step in this regard was taken in 1993 with the signing of the SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA), thus opening a new chapter in the evolution of SAARC. The agreement was characterized as a ‘significant achievement’.4 The trading arrangement was upgraded by the conclusion of the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) agreement in 2004, which by historical measure was an ambitious economic plan for the region. In the meantime, SAARC added new areas in the agenda of cooperation.

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Initiating cooperation in core economic areas essentially meant a transformation from neo-​functionalism to ‘peace through trade, economic and financial cooperation’. While neo-​functionalism as a framework of cooperation was not abandoned, cooperation in core economic areas certainly signalled an upgraded stage of regionalism in South Asia, which should be a natural process in its evolution.5 Indeed, cooperation (or lack of it) in core economic areas primarily defined the character of the organization after 1992. Notwithstanding the ambitious programme SAARC adopted during the second phase of its evolution, this period also experienced disagreements and differences. This became vividly evident when SAARC failed to implement the SAFTA by the stipulated time that it set when the agreement was signed. The free trade agreement was meant to be fully functional by 2016; the member states not only failed to meet the deadline, but also the SAARC summit in November that year was cancelled due to political discord between India and Pakistan. Since then, the activities of the organization have remained stalled. It is uncertain when the summit will be rescheduled. In the meantime, some members of the organization, principally India, have sought alternative forms of regionalism beyond SAARC. Members of SAARC in the eastern part of South Asia have now begun to emphasize the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-​Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN) initiative as alternative forms of regionalism, bypassing SAARC. The rise of the alternative forms of regionalism will be discussed in the next chapter, but suffice to say that the search for alternative forms of regionalism(/​sub-​regionalism) have implications for SAARC and its future direction. It retains the potential to redefine the politics of regionalism in South Asia. The key objective of this chapter is to explain the evolution of SAARC in the post-​formative phase from 1992 to present by explaining the process, key trends and other putative variables. It starts with a discussion on the summit meetings and their outcomes to highlight the progress of SAARC. As will be observed, the decisions at SAARC summits were impressive, which covered many important areas of common concerns of the SAARC member states. It also discusses the conventions and various agreements that were signed and the regional centres that were created in order to advance regional cooperation. Following it, the chapter discusses the SAPTA and SAFTA agreements, the two flagship initiatives of the organization during this phase of its evolution. It explains the rise of disagreements

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and differences over these two agreements as well as discord in general within SAARC. It ends with a brief conclusion summarizing the key points of this chapter.

SAARC summits after 1992 and their outcomes Although the 7th SAARC summit was to be held in 1992 in accordance with the provision of the Charter, it was held in Dhaka on 10–​11 April 1993. The most important achievement of this summit was the signing of the SAPTA agreement, which, as noted previously, marked the beginning of a new chapter in the evolution of SAARC through which the organization began cooperation in core economic areas. It was also agreed that poverty would be eliminated from the region by 2002 and a specific strategy was adopted to achieve this goal. Furthermore, the summit stressed the need to give high priority to the enactment of enabling legislation at the national level to give effect to the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism (which was signed in 1987). The leaders pledged that every effort would be made to finalize national legislation on terrorism before the next summit. Furthermore, the meeting welcomed the idea of an Association of SAARC Speakers and Parliamentarians and emphasized the need for greater people-​to-​people contact.6 The 8th SAARC summit was organized in New Delhi on 2–​4 May 1995. The summit formalized the first round of preferential trade negotiations under SAPTA and urged the parties to ratify the arrangement and operationalize it. It endorsed the establishment of a three-​window South Asian Development Fund (SADF) merging two pre-​existing funds –​the SAARC Fund for Regional Projects and the SAARC Regional Fund, while opening a third window for social development and infrastructure building. The summit declared 1996 as SAARC Year of Literacy. It was decided that the organization would coordinate among regional states to have a collective SAARC position on trade and other issues of common concerns at various international fora in order to enhance the profile of the organization and preserve the regional states’ international interests.7 The 9th SAARC summit was held on 12–​14 May 1997 in Male, the Maldives. Importantly, the summit established a Group of Eminent Persons to prepare an appraisal of the success and failures of the organization and suggest appropriate measures to make it more effective. It should be noted that it was formed against the backdrop of SAARC’s underperformance and inability to deliver substantive

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benefits after more than a decade of its existence. It was resolved that tariff reduction in regional trade would be taken up at the third round of SAPTA negotiations. The summit also stressed the development of infrastructure and additional communication networks to facilitate trade in the region. The leaders welcomed the decision by SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industries to convene annually an Economic Cooperation Conference in conjunction with the annual meeting of SAARC Commerce Ministers and SAARC Trade Fair. It also noted the creation of SADF in 1996 with its headquarters in Dhaka. Furthermore, it noted the establishment of the SAARC Terrorist Offences Monitoring Desk and the SAARC Drug Offences Monitoring Desk in Colombo. At this summit, Bangladesh proposed to establish a SAARC Growth Quadrangle in eastern South Asia under Article 7 of the SAARC Charter, which was endorsed by the SAARC leaders.8 The 10th SAARC summit took place in Colombo on 29–​31 July 1998. The finance ministers of the member states were directed to reduce the domestic content of the Rules of Origin to expedite the process of SAPTA implementation. The summit stressed the need to move towards a more ambitious trading arrangement by concluding an agreement to create a regional free trade area. It agreed to form a Committee of Experts with specific Terms of Reference to draft a comprehensive treaty to create a free trade area in South Asia. The summit decided to promote trade-​creating joint ventures, investment and trade in services to enhance economic cooperation. The SAARC leaders felt that regional cooperation could be enhanced because of South Asia’s shared cultural heritage, values and ideals. Furthermore, the summit felt the need to draft a SAARC social Charter for comprehensive development and welfare of the South Asian societies.9 The 11th SAARC summit was organized after a gap of four years on 4–​6 January 2002 in Kathmandu. The SAARC leaders instructed the Secretary General to prepare a regional investment framework through consultation to meet the investment needs of the member states. It was noted that the member states should take appropriate measures to prevent terrorist financing by criminalizing collection of funds and prevent terrorists from organizing any activities directed against other states. This was an important reminder about the necessity of fully implementing the convention on the suppression of terrorism, which was signed in 1987. Importantly, this summit adopted the ‘SAARC Additional Protocol on the Suppression of Terrorism’. The SAARC leaders resolved that they would develop a South Asian

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common position on important international issues. They decided to establish a SAARC Award for outstanding contribution in the field of peace, development and poverty alleviation in the SAARC region. The summit leaders requested the Nepalese government to prepare a concept paper on the award. Finally, the South Asian leaders expressed the desire to establish a South Asian Economic Union in the region.10 The 12th SAARC summit was held in Islamabad on 4–​6 January 2004. Very importantly, the SAARC leaders expressed satisfaction at the progress of the implementation of the SAPTA agreement and endorsed the agreement on the ‘South Asian Free Trade Area’. At this summit, a decision was taken to increase energy cooperation and establish a South Asian energy ring. The Working Group on Energy was made responsible to implement the decision. It was decided that 2005 would be observed as the SAARC Year of Tourism.11 The 13th SAARC summit was organized in Dhaka on 12–​13 November 2005. One of the important decisions of this summit was the endorsement of the SAARC development goals. It also endorsed the recommendations of the South Asia Commission on Poverty Alleviation. The SAARC leaders emphasized that the South Asia Poverty Alleviation Fund would function under the SAARC Development Fund. Furthermore, the summit decided that SAARC finance ministers would meet every first quarter after every summit and also on the sidelines of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank annual meetings. Furthermore, it was decided that the finance ministers would collectively monitor macro-​economic developments and outlook for South Asia. They would also monitor the achievement of SAARC Development Goals and strive to relate them to Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Additionally, the finance ministers were instructed to assess the investment climate, foreign capital inflows, financial sector reforms and other probable areas of cooperation. At the Dhaka summit, it was decided that SAFTA would come into effect from 1 January 2006 and negotiations for this should be completed by November 2005. The following agreements were signed at this summit: (i) The Agreement on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters; (ii) the Agreement on the Establishment of SAARC Arbitration Council; and (iii) the Limited Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation and Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters. India proposed the establishment of a regional food bank. The SAARC leaders declared the decade from 2006 to 2015 as the SAARC Decade of Poverty Alleviation. The Additional Protocol on Terrorism was ratified at the summit.12

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The 14th SAARC summit was held in New Delhi on 3–​4 April 2007. The joining of Afghanistan as a new member of SAARC was approved at this summit. China, Japan, the United States and the European Union were endorsed as observers of the organization. This summit emphasized the importance of connectivity in deepening regional integration. The SAARC leaders directed the Inter-​ governmental Group on Transport to develop sub-​regional and regional projects on connectivity utilizing the recommendations of the SAARC Regional Multimodal Transport Study. They recommended that the Group should prepare appropriate regional agreements on this.13 In March 2007, the first energy dialogue was initiated in New Delhi. The SAARC leaders declared 2007 as the Year of Green South Asia. Importantly, the SAARC members by the time of the summit had endorsed the SAFTA, which the SAARC leaders welcomed.14 The 15th SAARC summit took place in Colombo on 1–​3 August 2008. At this summit, the SAARC leaders decided that each member state would lead a sub-​regional or a regional project in order to expedite the process of regional cooperation. They emphasized the establishment of effective telecommunication connectivity. They also stressed the necessity of establishing regional grid, pipeline and development of regional hydropower potential. The summit noted that for connectivity the organization should focus on the implementation of the SAARC Multi-​Modal Transport Network.15 The 16th SAARC summit was held on 28–​9 April 2010 in Thimpu. This year marked the 25th anniversary of SAARC. At this summit, the SAARC leaders emphasized the issue of ‘climate change’ in their deliberations (the summit was entitled –​‘Towards Green and Happy South Asia’). Two agreements were signed at the summit. The first agreement was on the environment in which the SAARC states agreed to take a united stand on the issue of climate change at the United Nations Climate Change Conference, which was to begin in Cancun, Mexico in December 2010. It was noted that any global agreement on climate change should be based on the UN Framework Convention and the Bali action plan. The second agreement was on trade in services, which aimed at making SAFTA more effective.16 An Inter-​governmental Expert Group on Climate Change to develop a clear policy direction and guidance was formed at the summit. This was done under the SAARC Plan of Action on Climate Change. The SAARC leaders at this summit approved the operation of the SADF with a capital of US$300 million.17 The 17th SAARC summit was held on 10–​11 November 2011 in Addu city, Maldives. The summit decided to conclude the Regional

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Railways Agreement. They instructed to convene the Expert Group Meeting on the Motor Vehicles Agreement before the next Session of the Council of Ministers. The SAARC leaders also directed the trial run of a container train connecting Bangladesh–​India–​Nepal. Additionally, they directed the Secretary General to ensure the completion of the preparatory work of the Indian Ocean Cargo and Passenger Ferry Service. They instructed the Secretary General to conduct a feasibility study on the project by the end of 2011 and take steps to launch the Service.18 The 18th SAARC summit was held on 26–​7 November 2014 in Kathmandu. At this meeting the SAARC leaders pledged to realize the goal of South Asian Economic Union in a phased and planned manner, through the creation of a Free Trade Area, a Customs Union, a Common Market, and a Common Economic and Monetary Union. Also, they pledged to simplify free trade in goods and services. Furthermore, the SAARC leaders agreed to strengthen the Social Window of the SDF and operationalize its Economic Window and Infrastructure Window. Welcoming the signing of the SAARC Framework Agreement for Energy Cooperation (Electricity), the summit directed the relevant SAARC bodies to develop mechanisms to identify regional and sub-​regional projects in the area of power generation, transmission and power trade. SAARC agreed to establish the SAARC Environment and Disaster Management Centre and the 2016 was declared as the SAARC Year of Cultural Heritage.19 The 2014 Kathmandu summit was the last meeting that the South Asian heads of state/​government met. The 19th summit was scheduled to be held in November 2016 in Islamabad. But, due to deteriorating India–​Pakistan relations, as noted, this was postponed. It is uncertain when the summit will be rescheduled. Since 2016, the activities of the organization have remained largely stalled. The previous discussion portrays the evolutionary dynamic of SAARC and the key decisions that the organization took at the summits. Indeed, at the decision-​making level, the performance of the organization was impressive. As can be evidenced, SAARC decided to undertake wide-​ranging areas of cooperation, from connectivity to infrastructure to energy development to regional trade in goods and services. Most importantly, during this phase of its evolution, SAARC initiated cooperation in core economic areas, that is trade, finance, investment and so on. Indeed, the initiation of cooperation in core economic areas was the defining feature of the organization’s evolution after 1992. The rationale for initiating collective action in those areas was that SAARC

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had passed several years in its formative phase based on cooperation in functional areas and it was time to move towards a new direction to deliver visible, substantive benefits to the people of the region. The move to enter into a new phase started with the ‘in principle’ decision at the 1990 Male summit to begin collaboration in core economic areas and then by forming the Committee on Economic Cooperation comprising Trade/​Commerce Secretaries of SAARC Member States in 1991. It was mandated to formulate and oversee implementation of specific measures, policies and programmes to strengthen and enhance intra-​regional cooperation in the fields of trade and economic relations. The committee met from time to time to expedite the process. Its role became important in view of the new economic and trade agreements that were signed in the ensuing years, first starting with the SAPTA agreement in 1993 and then by signing the SAFTA agreement in 2004. Not only the beginning of regional collective action in core economic areas, specifically the signing of the SAPTA and SAFTA agreements, the organization added many new areas of cooperation during this phase of its evolution as discussed. While they looked impressive, it is questionable, as will be discussed, whether the SAARC states could implement them and deliver substantive benefits to the people of the region.

SAARC conventions, centres and agreements The signing of several conventions and agreements and the establishment of a number of regional centres covering important regional issues shed light on the organization’s programme of activities in the second phase of its evolution.20 These were important areas of regional cooperation SAARC identified that could potentially make visible contributions to the welfare of the regional population. SAARC has established the following regional centres: (1) SAARC Agricultural Centre, Dhaka; (2)  SAARC Energy Centre (SEC), Islamabad; (3)  SAARC Cultural Centre, Colombo; (4)  SAARC Tuberculosis and HIV/​AIDS Centre, Kathmandu; and (5) SAARC Disaster Management Centre, New Delhi. These centres are immensely important in their own right. Their importance lies in the fact that the issues that the centres cover need regional collaboration. Therefore, these centres could play a critical role in promoting the welfare of the people of the region. SAARC has signed seven conventions. As discussed in the preceding chapter, during the formative phase two conventions were signed

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covering two immensely pressing regional issues which included: (1) SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism; (2)  SAARC Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. In the second phase, the organization concluded five conventions including:  (1) SAARC Convention on Regional Agreements for the Promotion of Child Welfare in South Asia; (2) SAARC Convention on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution; (3) Additional Protocol to the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism (originally signed in 1987); (4)  SAARC Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters; and (5) SAARC Convention on Cooperation on Environment. As can be evidenced these conventions covered some of the pressing issues of common concern of the regional states. At least on paper, they could be viewed as important achievements of SAARC. Also, SAARC has signed the following agreements: (1) Agreement on Establishing the SAARC Food Security Reserve; (2) Agreement on SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA); (3) Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA); (4) SAARC Agreement on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters; (5) SAARC Limited Multilateral Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation and Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters; (6) Agreement on Establishing the SAARC Food Bank; (7) Protocol of Accession of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA); (8) SAARC Agreement on Trade in Services (SATIS); (9)  SAARC Agreement on Multilateral Arrangement on Recognition of Conformity Assessment; (10) Agreement on Establishing the SAARC Seed Bank; (11) SAARC Agreement on Rapid Response to Natural Disasters; and (12) SAARC Agreement on Implementation of Regional Standards. As can be observed, the conventions and various agreements that SAARC has concluded and the regional centres it has established are impressive and cover many areas of regional importance. Most importantly, these issues are concerns of all the regional states. However, as will be evaluated in Chapter 7, notwithstanding those impressive achievements on paper and documentation, they largely have remained unrealized and unimplemented. Arguably, the successful implementation of the conventions and agreements could deliver huge tangible benefits to the people of the regional states and SAARC could be a successful regional organization. But the state of political relationships among the regional states and the dynamics of regional international relations have hindered the implementation of those important regional programmes.

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Cooperation in core economic areas As noted, the defining feature of SAARC in the post-​formative phase was the initiation of cooperation in core economic areas besides collaboration in purely functional areas. This sub-​section analyses this new dimension of SAARC, particularly focusing on two of its flagship programmes, the SAPTA and SAFTA agreements.

The SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement The conclusion of the SAARC Trading Arrangement agreement was the first step to initiate regional cooperation in core economic areas. At the Male summit in 1990, the SAARC leaders decided, in principle, to undertake measure for trade liberalization. At the 6th summit in Colombo, an inter-​governmental group (IGG) was set up to study the issue and recommend the framework of a preferential trading regime. After extensive consultation, the IGG submitted its report in due course, which paved the way for the conclusion of the SAPTA agreement in 1993 at the Dhaka summit. Several reasons can be discerned for the conclusion of the SAPTA agreement. First, to sustain the momentum of SAARC and deliver tangible benefits to the people of South Asia, the SAARC leaders had to initiate cooperation in core economic areas. In particular, this was necessary given the sluggish pace of the delivery of benefits in the formative phase of regionalism when cooperation was fostered only on functional areas. Second, the early 1990s was an era of regional trading arrangement at the global level. Many such trading arrangements were in place by that time from which they were reaping economic and trade benefits. South Asia was one of the few regions that was lacking such a trading arrangement. So, it was a natural choice for the SAARC states to start trading arrangement to boost intra-​regional trade in South Asia. Third, in the early 1990s, major South Asian states adopted economic liberalization policies, which incentivized to create regional preferential trading arrangement. Fourth, at that time, the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations on a ‘Most Favoured Nations’ (MNF) agreement were at the final stage, hence it was felt that the SAARC states would benefit from having a regional preferential trading arrangement and taking a common stance at the WTO negotiations on global trading issues.21 The basic principles under which SAPTA would operate were: • overall reciprocity and mutuality of advantages so as to benefit all Contracting States equitably by taking into account their respective

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level of economic and industrial development, the pattern of their external trade, and trade and tariff policies and systems; • negotiation of tariff reforms step by step, improved and extended in successive stages through periodic reviews; • recognition of the special needs of the Least Developed Contracting States and agreement on concrete preferential measures in their favour; and • inclusion of all products, manufactures and commodities in their raw, semi-​processed and processed forms.22 The SAPTA came into force in December 1995 after the conclusion of the first round of negotiations in April 1995. Since then three more rounds were concluded and tariff concessions were exchanged on about 5,000 products. As set out in the operating principles, in implementing the agreement, the step-​by-​step approach was followed and each round of negotiation contributed to an incremental reduction of tariffs and other constraints. The number of products for tariff concession was progressively increased from one round to the next. However, while doing so, a distinction was made between the least developed countries (LDCs) –​Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives and Nepal and other developing member states –​India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. In this context, an approach of ‘request and offer’ was followed in which the exporting party came up with a ‘country-​specific’ request list of exportable products on which it would seek preferential market access. The other party would then make an offer on the products from the ‘request list’ and agree to the extent of tariff concessions in view of ‘Margin of Preference’ (MoP). At the end of each round, the offers that were made to one party would be multilateralized by offering the same to all SAARC member states. The regional LDCs were given concessions on a large number of products with considerable MoP without reciprocal concessions under the ‘special and differential treatment’ provision of the SAPTA. The four rounds of trade negotiations made some positive impact, albeit limited, on intra-​regional trade. Also, the SAPTA agreement was useful in terms of South Asian states agreeing to a regional position at the WTO’s MFN negotiations. Hirantha, based on panel trade data from 1996 to 2002 for SAPTA, found the ex-​ante welfare effect of the regional trade agreements and noted that it had significant trade creation effect on member countries while trade diversion effect was negligible.23 However, questions remain with regard to the effectiveness of the SAPTA. Although some benefits could be visible from the

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arrangement, the intra-​regional trade remained modest compared with huge potential that existed in South Asia. Despite four rounds of negotiations, the SAPTA member states could not agree on various issues and demonstrated a general reluctance to compromise and maintained some level of protectionism. They also maintained various non-​tariff barriers, which hampered the growth of intra-​regional trade under SAPTA. Put simply, SAPTA’s shortcomings were due to structural and policy related factors including:  (1) persistence of protectionist tendencies and policies in the SAARC member states;24 (2) lack of substantial tariff reduction measures; (3) exclusion of several large sectors of trade from tariff reduction; (4) structural constraints that included fewer export items and low export capability of the LDCs, lack of investment due to low savings rate, technological backwardness, lack of backward-​forward linkages of the industries; and (5) political tension between member states of SAARC. In particular, the political factor played a crucial role in preventing the smooth implementation of the SAPTA agreement.

The South Asian Free Trade Area agreement The SAPTA agreement may be viewed as a transition to a ‘Trade Liberalization Programme’ from the previous approach of functional cooperation. However, it was soon realized that the South Asian states needed to go beyond a preferential trading arrangement in order to move towards higher levels of trade and economic cooperation in the region for which the removal of tariff, para-​tariff and non-​tariff barriers was necessary. At the 16th session of the Council of Ministers in December 1995 in New Delhi, it was agreed that they would go beyond preferential trading arrangement in the future. At the 9th SAARC summit in Male in 1997, it was decided that a free trade area in South Asia would be created. At the next summit in Colombo in July 1998, the leaders of the SAARC countries set up a Committee of Experts (CoE) to draft a comprehensive treaty framework for creating a free trade area in the region. In doing so, the CoE was instructed to take into account asymmetries in development within the region and set realistic and achievable goals. At the 11th summit in Kathmandu in January 2002, the SAARC leaders directed the Council of Ministers to finalize the text of the Draft Treaty Framework by the end of 2002. They also directed the ministers to expeditiously take steps for reducing tariff and non-​tariff barriers and removing structural impediments to free trade. The SAFTA agreement was finally signed on 6 January 2004 during the 12th summit in Islamabad.

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The CoE concluded negotiations on various issues related to the agreement in December 2005 and the SAFTA came into force on 1 January 2006. However, there was a delay in the commencement of trade liberalization programme due to procedural requirements for ratification of the Agreement. Hence, tariff reduction programme actually commenced from 1 July. The Agreement contained various provisions regarding the sensitive lists, Rules of Origin, mechanism for compensation of revenue losses for the LDCs and areas for technical assistance for the LDCs and so on. It provided Special and Differential Treatment for the LDCs in the process of the implementation of the agreement. In the first phase (to be completed by January 2008), the terms of SAFTA required India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka to reduce tariff rates to 20 per cent and Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and the Maldives (the LDCs) to 30 per cent. In the second phase, tariffs would be further reduced to 0–​5 per cent by January 2013 for Pakistan and India, by January 2014 for Sri Lanka and by January 2015 for the LDCs. Each member state would prepare and maintain a list of sensitive products for which tariffs would not be reduced. The LDCs maintained longer sensitive lists than the non-​LDCs as per the ‘special and differential treatment’ provisions of the agreement. According to the agreement, the Sensitive Lists would be reviewed and revised in every four years or earlier with a view to reducing the number of items for free trade within the region. Scholars made different predictions about the effect of SAFTA. For example, Sengupta and Banik opined that SAFTA would have significant welfare effects on other member countries but very small impact on India.25 On the other hand, Kemal concluded that the SAFTA was likely to provide long-​term benefits at the expense of short-​term costs and there existed great potential for free trade among the SAARC member countries.26 Similarly, Pitigala held that SAFTA could influence the trade flows among member countries positively because they were natural trading partners.27 Raihan maintained that there would be trade creation effects among member countries through SAPTA and SAFTA, but infrastructure development could do more than trade liberalization.28 Although the scheme generated huge enthusiasm in many quarters, it failed to live up to the promise that it initially had. The South Asian states failed to meet the deadline to implement the SAFTA agreement. Not only did the SAARC member states fail to make the agreement fully functional by 2016 as was stipulated, but also the organization has remained in stasis ever since.

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There are many reasons for the non-​implementation of the SAFTA agreement. First, the protectionist tendency in all South Asian states was apparently strong, which prevented them from fully committing to the SAFTA agreement. Second, not only tariff barriers, but also the SAARC states visibly and invisibly maintained non-​tariff and para-​tariff barriers, which had negative impact on intra-​regional trade growth. Third, the SAARC states maintained long negative lists, which hampered the implementation of the SAFTA agreement. They demonstrated a non-​compromising attitude about it. Fourth, most crucially political relationships among the regional states, particularly between India and Pakistan, were not conducive to implement the SAFTA agreement and increase economic interdependence. Indeed, the Indo–​Pakistani relationship has gradually deteriorated since the late 1990s, which has critically affected the process of SAFTA implementation and has caused its eventual demise.

Sub-​regionalism and trans-​regional cooperation Another significant development in this phase of the evolution of SAARC was the rise of sub-​regionalism and trans-​regional cooperation, which has significant implications for regionalism promoted by SAARC. While this dimension of South Asian regionalism will be illustrated in greater detail in the next chapter, its key trends are briefly noted as follows in view of the analysis provided throughout this chapter. At the 1997 Male SAARC summit, the concept of a growth zone was endorsed, which led to the creation of the South Asian Growth Quadrangle comprising Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal. Its chief aim was to boost cooperation in the areas of environment, power and energy, trade and investment, transport and tourism in the eastern part of South Asia.29 Although it has made some progress, particularly in the area of connectivity, it does not appear that it has lived up to its full potential. Following the endorsement of the SAGQ at the Male summit in 1997, the issue of funding of the BBIN projects was discussed at some length because it held the key to the success of the initiative. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) showed interest in it and, after some deliberations, the Manila-​based bank came up with a plan in March 2001, which came to be known as the South Asia Sub-​Regional Economic Cooperation (SASEC).30 The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-​Sectoral, Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), a trans-​regional organization

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comprising Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand, was created in 1997. It has a secretariat in Dhaka and it aims to boost cooperation in the areas of trade and investment, technology, transport and communications, energy, tourism and fisheries. A framework agreement to create a BIMSTEC free trade area was signed in 2004. To implement it, a Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC) was also established with Thailand as its permanent chair. Thus far, BIMSTEC has not made much impact in boosting cooperation, let alone creating a free trade area among the member states. The Bangladesh–​China–​India–​Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-​EC) is a trans-​regional connectivity and trade initiative to foster greater economic integration in the defined areas of the four states. It started with the convening of an informal meeting of civil society institutions and government officials of China and Myanmar in 1999 in Kunming, the capital of China’s Yunnan province. The Kunming Initiative was transformed into the ‘BCIM Forum for Regional Cooperation’ to carry on the dialogue process and to realize the key objective set forth in the first meeting. The scheme is currently in a state of dormancy because of the differences of opinion about its objectives between the two largest members of the initiative –​ India and China. The implications of the rise of sub-​regionalism and trans-​regional cooperation for SAARC are substantive and long-​term. It is noteworthy that due to the stalemate in SAARC, India and Bangladesh are seeking alternative forms of regionalism. It will significantly affect the future of SAARC.

The rise of differences and disagreements While this phase saw many decisions at various levels and particularly at the summit level as discussed previously, and the beginning of cooperation in core economic areas, it also experienced the rise of serious differences and disagreements that eventually led to the current state of paralysis in the activities of the organization. As noted, the activities of SAARC have remained stagnant since the postponement of the 19th summit in 2016. SAARC from its inception had two contradictory trends. One was the desire to enhance economic development and welfare through regional cooperation similar to that of other regions, that is South East Asia and Europe. The other was the invisible emphasis on the politico-​strategic calculations to pursue regional cooperation. While the first produced an impressive agenda of cooperation, the second constrained its implementation and

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led to the rise of differences and disagreements among the member states. The accumulation of differences and disagreements over the years finally came to a head in the second decade of the 21st century, which halted the activities of SAARC. In the following paragraphs, the escalation of differences and disagreements and their manifestations and causes are explained. A caveat needs to be made here to explain these causes. The differences and disagreements can rather be best appreciated if they are viewed as outcomes of the patterns of regional international relations.31 It should also be noted that the patterns of regional international relations would be primarily defined by the state of the relationship between India and Pakistan. The following discussion will demonstrate how the patterns of regional international relations have influenced the behaviour of the SAARC member states and how they have affected the progress of SAARC. While in the first phase of the evolution of the organization the cancellation of summits was rather infrequent as discussed in Chapter 4, they became frequent during the second phase of the evolution of the organization. According to the Charter of the organization, summits would be held annually. In the past three and a half decades only 18 SAARC summits have taken place, about 50 per cent of the required holding of the events. While there were many reasons for the cancellation of SAARC summits, the most important factor was the political differences between member states, particularly between India and Pakistan.32 The cancellation of SAARC summits has become even more frequent in the recent past, thus highlighting serious increase in political differences between the member states. For example, since 2014, no SAARC summit has taken place. As things stand now, this trend may continue in the foreseeable future, thus highlighting the reality that the organization is under deep crisis. Even more serious manifestation of differences and discord can be evidenced in the inability of the SAARC member states to implement the two flagship trade agreements: SAPTA and SAFTA. While they could agree on the modalities of the agreements, they failed to implement them. The economic benefits of the SAPTA and SAFTA agreements, as discussed, were clearly evident. It could deliver concrete economic benefit to the SAARC states and protect their international interests by coming together on trade issues. But eventually, they could not implement the two flagship initiatives that could define the future of regionalism in South Asia. What it highlighted was that the member states prioritized the politico-​strategic issues than economic cooperation in pursuing the two agreements. It also raised questions

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about the political commitment of the SAARC member states to drive the economic agenda of the organization. Similarly, many other important initiatives went awry because of political differences between the member states. One example would highlight this trend within SAARC. A  SAARC Motor Vehicle Agreement (MVA) was finalized to be signed at the 18th summit in 2014 in Kathmandu. It was initiated by New Delhi as a priority item in order to build connectivity and take full benefit of the SAFTA. But in the final moment Pakistan pulled the plug by refusing to sign the MVA. Islamabad did not provide a clear explanation about its decision although it said that it was not ready to go ahead with such an agreement at that stage. It is not difficult to discern the cause of the Pakistani decision. It was reluctant to create connectivity at a large scale for the fear that it would have an impact on its strategic priorities vis-​à-​vis India. It was also not ready to open trade routes between India and Afghanistan through the Pakistani territory. Similarly, Pakistan refused to associate itself with the India-​led SAARC satellite project. When discussion was initiated about the project, India and Pakistan could not agree on the modalities of the initiative. India, given its expertise and experience in this field, volunteered to pursue the project on its own and deliver its service to the fellow SAARC members. Islamabad insisted that it should be a project of the organization, hence other SAARC members should also participate in its development. Eventually, India went ahead with the work of the project without involving Pakistan. The key reason for the two states to behave in this manner was the strategic sensitivity that they had involving the project.33 India feared that it might have to share its technology while Pakistan feared that it might help India to spy on its sky. The strategic mistrust primarily guided their approach towards the project. Many such instances of disagreement can be noted. But the key question is how do we make a sense of this increase in differences and disagreements, which led to institutional decline in South Asia. As noted previously, notwithstanding huge expectation, the neo-​ functional approach during the formative phase could not produce the desired outcome due to the persistence of a conflictual pattern of international relations in South Asia. Due to this, the SAARC member states were pursuing regional cooperation based on politico-​strategic considerations rather than the expectation of economic gains. They, of course, desired economic gains, but politico-​strategic interests overrode such desire. The same pattern continued in the second phase

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of the evolution of the organization. The security rivalry between the two largest members of the organization even increased after the end of the Cold War because both India and Pakistan lost their superpower patron at the dawn of the 1990s and relied more on their own capabilities. It exacerbated the regional security dilemma. The Soviet Union imploded with the demise of the Cold War and New Delhi lost the key supplier of its military hardware. America became hostile to Pakistan over its nuclear programme; indeed, the USA imposed sanctions on Pakistan applying the Pressler Amendment, a Pakistan-​specific law adopted by US Congress in 1985.34 Given such a context, India and Pakistan became more vulnerable after the Cold War. It was against such a context that both the states became more dependent on nuclear weapons for their security.35 The two countries confronted a crisis over the disputed territory of Kashmir in 1990, which further exacerbated their strategic fears. It can be observed, their strategic and nuclear rivalry became more intense in the 1990s, which culminated in the nuclear tests carried out by the two states in 1998.36 As the two countries became more security conscious, their politico-​strategic considerations became even more rigorous while fostering cooperation under SAARC. In the 1990s, there were fluctuations in the relationships between the smaller states and India. There was a trend of improving relationships between New Delhi and its smaller neighbours when I.K. Gujral became prime minister of India in 1997,37 but his tenure was short lived. Similarly, Pakistan’s relationships with South Asian states also fluctuated in the 1990s. India’s and Pakistan’s relationships with the smaller states, however, did not determine the patterns of the regional international relations. They were determined by the relationship of the two major states of the region, which affected the dynamics of regionalism. In 1999, the two countries became embroiled in a small, but intense, war over Kashmir, generally known as the ‘Kargil conflict’.38 Then as a continuation of the Indo–​Pakistani saga, the militaries of the two countries stood eye ball to eye ball in a tense military stand-​off after Pakistan-​based militant groups –​Laskar-​e-​Toiba and Jaish-​e-​Mohamed –​attacked the Indian Parliament in New Delhi in late 2001, which could escalate to a full-​scale conventional war with nuclear implications.39 The two episodes demonstrated not only the tense security relationship of the two states, but also highlighted the reasons for their emphasis on the politico-​security considerations in their regional engagement. The 1990s also saw the rise of non-​state actors as a key factor in the Indo–​Pakistani security and strategic relationship. One dimension of

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that was the Pakistani support given to the Kashmiri militancy. The second dimension was the use of non-​state actors in carrying out terrorist violence elsewhere in India, that is terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008. Pakistan’s use of non-​state militant groups against India was consolidated under the shield of nuclear weapons.40 The rise of non-​ state actors as a factor in Indo–​Pakistani relations would significantly influence the dynamics of SAARC in later years. The SAPTA agreement was concluded in 1993 against the background of trade liberalization policies of the major South Asian states in the early 1990s. While some positive outcome and gains were made, eventually they were lost as the strategic rivalry between India and Pakistan intensified. As discussed in Chapter 1 (pp 30–1), the strategic rivalry between India and Pakistan in the 1990s gradually intensified, which forced them to prioritize strategic concerns over the expected gains of SAPTA. SAARC still strived to eke out its relevance by concluding an agreement on a free trade area –​SAFTA –​in 2004. Importantly, the signing of this agreement coincided with the onset of a reconciliation process between India and Pakistan known as the ‘composite dialogue’.41 However, it soon confronted the reality of intense Indo–​Pakistani security rivalry. In November 2008, Pakistan-​ based militant groups carried out terrorist attacks on the Indian financial capital of Mumbai and killed over 160 people,42 which derailed the process of composite dialogue for a normalization of relations between the two countries. Although SAARC and the SAFTA survived the terrorist attack on Mumbai, SAARC gradually began to lose its steam in the ensuing years against the background of further deterioration of India–​Pakistan relations. The Pakistan-​based non-​state actors carried out an attack at an Indian airbase in Pathankot on 1 January 2016. When the militants again struck in Uri, Kashmir, on 18 September 2016, New Delhi reacted to this by cancelling its participation at the forthcoming Islamabad summit in November. New Delhi also convinced Bangladesh, Bhutan and Afghanistan to boycott the Islamabad summit, which forced Pakistan to postpone the event. Bangladesh’s decision to side with India was important because it manifested a deterioration of Bangladesh–​Pakistan relations. Since 2009, the Bangladesh–​Pakistan relationship has been on a downward trajectory. This had an impact on the process of SAARC. The activities of SAARC have remained stalled since the postponement of the 2016 summit. A terrorist attack at Pulwama in Kashmir in February 2019 has further complicated the revival of the SAARC process. Against the background of such a regional environment, while the SAARC process barely survived, it failed to make sufficient progress as

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was expected of the organization. Occasional SAARC summits were held and many decisions were taken as discussed, but it was apparent that SAARC was limping. In particular, this was clearly manifested in the inability of the SAARC states to implement the key flagship agreement –​the SAFTA –​by 2016 as was stipulated in the document. While there were various reasons for the non-​implementation of the SAFTA agreement, ranging from protectionist policies of the SAARC member states to structural factors to various tariff and non-​ tariff barriers, the key reason was the political discord between India and Pakistan. Political differences, arguably, hardened their policies towards the SAFTA. Some other developments have further complicated the prospect for the revival of the SAARC process. Against the background of Indo–​ Pakistani strategic discord and as SAARC stalled, alternative thinking about regionalism emerged in India and other states of eastern South Asia.43 A decisive shift in this regard occurred in New Delhi against the background of intensifying strategic rivalry and several terrorist incidents in India carried out by Pakistan-​based terrorist groups. This was amplified by the refusal of Pakistan to endorse the SAARC MVA, which was proposed by India and was at the final stage of signing at the 18th summit in 2014 at Kathmandu. While SAARC endorsed the idea of a Growth Quadrangle in eastern South Asia, which later came to be known as the BBIN initiative, it remained mostly dormant for many years. In recent years, the BBIN initiative has become more pro-​active with a number of projects, in particular in the areas of connectivity and trade development. Now, the SAARC MVA has been taken up as a project by the BBIN. It implied that India was emphasizing the BBIN projects in view of the stagnancy of SAARC. Furthermore, New Delhi has shifted its focus to another trans-​regional organization –​ BIMSTEC.44 As will be discussed in the next chapter, this has now effectively replaced SAARC as India’s preferred organization for regionalism. It has got huge implications for the future of SAARC.

Conclusion This chapter has examined the evolution of SAARC from 1993 to the present and evaluated the success and failures of the organization. It has also explained the causes of its failure. During this period, SAARC has broadened the areas of cooperation. Most importantly, in this phase SAARC initiated cooperation in core economic areas. It is the most important feature of the activities of the organization during the second phase of its evolution. It differentiated

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SAARC from the previous phase. The two most important agreements that were signed in the second phase were the SAPTA and SAFTA with an eventual objective of creating a free market and an economic union in South Asia similar to that of Europe. While some gains were made in the second phase of the evolution of SAARC, its failures are more apparent. Looking at the agenda of cooperation, SAARC looks like an impressive organization because it has added new items to this agenda over the years and lofty promises have been made at the summits, but its agenda has remained largely unimplemented. While there are many reasons for this, the key reason is the political differences among the regional states, particularly between India and Pakistan. They viewed cooperation within the framework of SAARC as a security function. Economic gains were subservient to this concern. Consequently, the organization failed to make progress and remained hostage to the political discord of the member states. The current stalled state of SAARC, as noted, is the manifestation of this malaise within the organization. For a variety of reasons, SAARC faces a daunting future as analysed in this chapter. As noted, since the postponement of the SAARC summit in 2016, it has remained largely dysfunctional. When the summit will be rescheduled is unknown. Even if it is rescheduled, it can be argued given its past experience, the association will limp in a similar fashion to that of the past unless structural barriers to the organization are removed. SAARC needs a new approach to become vibrant.

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6

Beyond SAARC: Sub-​Regional and Trans-​Regional Cooperation Introduction Beyond SAARC, sub-​regional and trans-​regional initiatives1 to foster economic cooperation represent two other dimensions of regionalism in South Asia. The politics behind the rise of sub-​regionalism and trans-​ regionalism is significant because of their implications for SAARC. Arguably, they may be viewed either as complementary or dilutional to SAARC-​led regionalism. Initiatives such as the South Asian Growth Quadrangle (SAGQ) or the BBIN (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal) initiative grew within the context of SAARC. Theoretically, there could be other growth triangles or quadrangles within SAARC, such as a growth triangle comprising Afghanistan, India and Pakistan in western South Asia or another one comprising India, the Maldives and Sri Lanka in the southern part of the region. Such initiatives can be viewed complementary to SAARC-​centred regionalism. On the other hand, the Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-​EC) and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-​Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) are trans-​regional initiatives to foster closer economic relations among the member states, which are different from the sub-​regional bodies noted previously because they include states beyond the traditionally defined boundary of the South Asian region. Two key questions arise from this. What do they imply to regionalism conceived in SAARC? Are they complementary or dilutional to SAARC-​centric regionalism? This chapter has two key objectives. First, it explores the origins, aims and objectives, structures and dynamics of those sub-​regional and trans-​regional initiatives. Second, it illustrates their implications for SAARC-​centred regionalism.

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The South Asian Growth Quadrangle Inspired by the success of the growth triangles in South East Asia,2 some South Asian states sought to take similar initiatives within SAARC in the 1990s to spur economic growth and reap benefits of greater economic interdependence. The SAGQ in eastern South Asia is such a sub-​regional body within SAARC comprising Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal which was approved by the SAARC Council of Ministers at a meeting in May 1996 in Male, the capital of the Maldives, and then it was formally endorsed at the 9th SAARC summit in April 1997. The SAGQ, also known as the BBIN initiative, seeks to build connectivity in eastern South Asia in order to create an integrated market and enhance intra-​regional trade, investment, tourism and communication.3 The officials of the four countries meet from time to time to formulate, implement and review quadrilateral agreements in areas of mutual interests. It operates on the basis of identifying specific projects and implementing them on a sustained basis. For this, a Joint Working Group (JWG) has been set up to oversee the works of the body and monitor the implementation of the BBIN agenda. The body has identified the development of energy resources as a key area of its activities. The eastern part of South Asia has huge potential to advance sub-​regional cooperation in the energy sector and spur economic growth. Its potential specifically lies in the fact that Nepal and Bhutan are hydro energy-​abundant states while Bangladesh and India are energy-​deficient; hence, there is a huge scope for energy trade in the BBIN sub-​region.4 Indeed, some steps have been undertaken to develop hydropower projects in Bhutan and Nepal and build transmission infrastructure to transfer electricity to India and Bangladesh.5 As well as in the energy sector, the group is seeking complementarities to increase sub-​regional trade and economic cooperation.6 Because of close geographical proximity, there is huge scope to increase trade and an integrated market in the sub-​region.7 With such an objective in mind, the four countries are working to build connectivity and infrastructure in order to expand trade in their sub-​region. Works are underway to build land and river ports throughout the BBIN sub-​ region to create connectivity and integrate the market.8 Collaboration in this context came through bilateral and multilateral initiatives. For example, the transit agreement between Bangladesh and India has been integrated into the multilateral framework under the BBIN.9 In 2015, the BBIN sub-​regional MVA was concluded at the BBIN

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transport ministers’ conference.10 Bangladesh, India and Nepal have ratified the agreement although Bhutan is yet to do so.11 The Bhutanese government has asked the other signatories to the treaty to go ahead with the implementation of the agreement. It wishes to join the programme at a future date when the Bhutanese parliament ratifies the document.12 Bangladesh, India and Nepal in the meantime have taken some steps to implement the motor vehicle connectivity project.13 Following the endorsement of the SAGQ at the Male summit in 1997, the issue of funding of the BBIN projects was discussed at some length because it held the key to the success of the initiative. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) showed interest in it and, after some deliberations, the Manila-​based bank came up with a funding plan in March 2001 under the initiative –​the South Asia Sub-​Regional Economic Cooperation (SASEC).14 Under the SASEC funding plan, several specific connectivity projects have been identified to build rail, highway and maritime networks in the BBIN sub-​region. A BBIN project, for example, has been identified to establish connectivity between West Bengal and the seven states in India’s north-​east.15 Another plan aimed to connect Bhutan, Nepal and northern Indian states with ports in the Bay of Bengal.16 Various such projects have been undertaken to create connectivity throughout the sub-​region. While some progress has been made in the past decades since the SAGQ was launched in 1997, a careful scrutiny of its outcome would make it apparent that the initiative has failed to realize its full potential.17 There are several reasons for this. First, the BBIN could not build a clear mechanism to implement its agenda. Although the JWG has been set up, it has functioned on an ad hoc basis rather than on the basis of a clear institutional mechanism. In absence of an institutional mechanism, the BBIN projects have occasionally fallen victim to the poor interstate relations between the member states. Second, there is no clear funding mechanism to implement the BBIN projects. Although many projects were funded by the ADB under the SASEC programme, they were not enough to integrate the regional market and spur economic growth in the sub-​region. Third, there was hesitancy, lack of political will and less than total commitment to the BBIN agenda from the governments of the four states for a variety of reasons. At times, the smaller states were found to be uncertain about the fallout of the BBIN projects on their sovereignty and political independence. The concern in the capitals of the smaller states has been whether cooperative projects under the BBIN would

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undermine their political independence by enhancing Indian influence. This issue became even more potent when an ‘anti-​Indian’ government was in power; in particular, this could be evidenced in Bangladesh and to a lesser extent in Nepal. For example, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and Jaamat-​i-​Islami coalition government from 2001 to 2006 and the military-​backed ‘caretaker’ government in Bangladesh in 2007–​08 maintained some distance from New Delhi and demonstrated sensitivity on the issue of sovereignty when dealing with New Delhi. It could be evidenced that the building of greater connectivity in the sub-​region was not a priority for Dhaka during the tenure of the aforementioned governments. One can observe a similar trend, albeit to a lesser extent compared with Bangladesh, in the case of Nepal. In general, India has traditionally been a big factor in the domestic politics of the smaller South Asian states. The BBIN initiative following its inception turned occasionally into a domestic political issue in Bangladesh and Nepal involving India, which impeded the progress of the sub-​regional grouping. One example highlights this point. New Delhi has been seeking a transit route from its mainland to the north-​eastern region through Bangladesh for decades, but the issue from time to time became a victim of the country’s domestic political dynamics.18 Hence, the smaller states pursued a cautious approach towards the BBIN in which they wanted to reap the benefit of economic cooperation while remaining hesitant because of the concern that it would have an adverse impact on their sovereignty and political independence. Similarly, on New Delhi’s part, the same kind of hesitancy and bureaucratic lethargy could be seen in pursuing the BBIN agenda. Indeed, New Delhi’s hesitancy and lack of political will derived from the fact that traditionally India viewed regionalism and sub-​regionalism in South Asia from a geo-​strategic standpoint rather than through the prism of economic gains. Fourth, flowing from the preceding point, it can also be viewed as a leadership failure on the part of India to make the BBIN initiative a success. As the key state of the group it should have been the responsibility of India to lead the BBIN process. But it failed to deliver such a leadership. It is intriguing why New Delhi demonstrated hesitancy in pursuing the BBIN agenda because of the apparent benefit a successful BBIN initiative could deliver to it. As noted previously, for several decades New Delhi has been seeking transit facility via Bangladesh and the use of Bangladesh ports for the seven impoverished states of its north-​east region but failed to obtain it because of domestic political dynamics in that country and ups and down in the bilateral relationship. The successful

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implementation of the BBIN projects could circumvent Bangladesh’s historical opposition to provide the transit facility. Similarly, the BBIN initiative could be a vehicle to implement one of India’s flagship foreign policy initiatives, the ‘Act East’ policy. Through this policy India intended to build connectivity with East and South East Asian countries. The BBIN projects could help New Delhi to successfully implement the country’s ‘Act East’ policy. Also, the BBIN initiative was consistent with its ‘neighbourhood first’ policy, which New Delhi has been emphasizing in the recent past.19 So, the hesitancy and indecisiveness on the part of India not to take a pro-​active role in the implementation of the BBIN projects is self-​defeating. Indeed, it is arguable that a sluggish BBIN process is a leadership failure on the part of India as it is the key state within the group with the ability and resources to make the BBIN a successful enterprise. Finally, although all the SAARC member states endorsed the BBIN initiative in 1997, Pakistan and Sri Lanka had implicit reservations about it. It might have an indirect impact on the approaches of some BBIN member states towards the activities of the grouping. The BBIN initiative has got implications for SAARC-​centred regionalism in South Asia. The sub-​regional initiative could complement South Asian regionalism provided that the initiative was successfully pursued in conjunction with a dynamic and well-​ functioning SAARC. But the complementarity of the regional and sub-​regional initiatives has failed to realize its potential because of the insufficient progress of the two groupings. In recent years, a counter-​complementary trend has emerged in the activities of the BBIN. Compared with previous years, recently New Delhi has become a bit more active in pursuing the BBIN agenda. Two key reasons for this can be discerned. First, New Delhi is working on the assumption that the BBIN is a partial substitute to the stagnant SAARC. For example, instead of SAARC motor vehicle connectivity, the Indian government is now promoting a BBIN motor vehicle connectivity project. Furthermore, as noted previously, New Delhi is now promoting the BBIN and other trans-​regional initiatives, that is the BIMSTEC, as the key instruments of regionalism. Second, India’s pro-​active posture in the BBIN is also due to the China factor through which India is seeking to counter the Chinese intrusion in its backyard through the BRI. Therefore, it is arguable that the BBIN has emerged as a divergent force to SAARC-​led regionalism. Like New Delhi, in recent years Dhaka has also been viewing the BBIN initiative as a partial substitute to the stalled SAARC. In particular, such a perception has gained ground in view of frosty

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Bangladesh–​Pakistan relations since the current Awami League government came to power in 2009. From such a standpoint instead of being a complementary force, the BBIN initiative is gradually becoming a dilutional force to SAARC-​centred regionalism.

The Bangladesh–​China–​India–​Myanmar Economic Corridor The Bangladesh–​China–​India–​Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-​ EC) is a trans-​regional connectivity and trade initiative to foster greater economic integration in the defined areas of the four states. The idea for such an initiative was first discussed in China’s Yunnan province in the 1990s, in which it was posited that south-​western China, eastern India and the whole of Myanmar and Bangladesh could form a ‘zone’ to kickstart sub-​regional economic cooperation on the basis of several essential and common characteristics.20 Similar discussions took place in Dhaka in which a prominent Bangladeshi political economist provided compelling analysis about the benefits of regional cooperation in two of his seminal works21 in which he argued that notwithstanding the confines of the present-​day political boundaries, closer cooperation among the countries of the BCIM region through multi-​modal transport connectivity, infrastructure development and other supportive projects would spur economic growth and alleviate poverty.22 Those discussions resulted in the convening of an informal meeting of civil society institutions and government officials in Kunming, the capital of China’s Yunnan province, in 1999 in which the Centre for Policy Dialogue from Bangladesh, Centre for Policy Research from India, Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences from China and the Ministry of Trade from Myanmar participated. Known as the ‘Kunming Initiative’, the gathering stressed that such dialogue and interactions would highlight the benefits of regional cooperation through connectivity and could attract greater attention from the respective governments of the participants. At the meeting it was also viewed that inter-​governmental collaboration would hold the key to successful sub-​regional cooperation. Mustafizur Rahman, who was actively involved in the Kunming process, has recalled: The objective of the Kunming initiative was to create an opportunity for key stakeholders from the four countries to come together to discuss and identify initiatives that could contribute to deepening of cooperation among the four BCIM countries, in various areas. The vision of the

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Kunming initiative was to gradually steer the endeavour from an essentially civil society (Track II) one to an intergovernmental (Track I) one.23 The Kunming Initiative was subsequently transformed into the ‘BCIM Forum for Regional Cooperation’ to continue the dialogue process and realize the key objectives set forth in the first meeting. The 11 BCIM forums that took place over the years provided an appropriate platform to highlight the benefits of cooperation and integration. The relevant stakeholders discussed regional trade and economic growth in the BCIM region, identified specific sectors and projects to promote cooperation and made recommendations to build necessary institutions.24 At the forums, academics and experts, trade and business leaders, members of parliament and government officials participated which raised public awareness about the economic opportunities that the BCIM region had. A  notable development in this regard was the formation of the BCIM Business Council, which contributed enormously to attract the attention of the respective governments. Consequently, as was envisaged originally, the governments of the four states began to show interest in the potential for cooperation that the forums discussed and began to send officials to the meetings. In 2013, a car rally from Kunming to Kolkata was organized to demonstrate the feasibility of road connectivity.25 Since then, it became an annual occurrence over the years to highlight the point, which helped in raising public awareness.26 An important impetus in the process came when Chinese Premier Li Kequiang met Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during a visit to India in 2013 in which they discussed the possibility of a trade corridor. The joint statement issued at the end of the visit stated that they had agreed to establish ‘a Joint Study Group on strengthening connectivity in the BCIM region for closer economic, trade and people-​to-​people linkages and initiating the development of a BCIM Economic Corridor’.27 The process got further impetus when Manmohan Singh visited China in October 2013, during which Kunming and Kolkata were announced as sister cities. The momentum continued when the first meeting of the BCIM-​EC joint study group was held in December 2013 in Kunming, which officially set the mechanism to promote cooperation among the BCIM countries.28 The Kunming process thus formally transformed into the BCIM-​EC. The four governments agreed that the corridor would run from Kunming to Kolkata linking Mandalay in Myanmar and Dhaka and Chittagong in Bangladesh. They would be connected by rail, road, water and

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air, which would transform the region into an integrated economic zone. The spirit of promoting cooperation under the BCIM started by Manmohan Singh was initially maintained by the Narendra Modi government after coming to power in 2014 as was evident in the joint statement after Modi’s visit to China in 2015.29 But, New Delhi, as will be discussed, later changed its stance on the issue. Two specific objectives have primarily driven the BCIM-​EC since its inception. The first is the economic integration of the sub-​region that would also contribute to the integration of the greater Asian region. The second is the development of the border regions of the four member states of the initiative.30 Initially, the key focus of the organization was on trade, transport and tourism, which later turned into trade, transport and energy.31 Rahman has noted: The idea driving the proposed BCIM initiative was that, by drawing on respective comparative advantages, all the four BCIM countries could expect to make significant gains through operationalisation of the economic corridor, sub-​regional cooperation within the BCIM, and BCIM-​ wide economic cooperation. These gains are envisaged to accrue from greater market access for goods, services and energy, elimination of non-​tariff barriers, better trade facilitation, investment in infrastructure development, joint exploration and development of mineral, water, and other natural resources, development of value and supply chains based on comparative advantages, by translating comparative advantages into competitive advantages, and through closer people to people contact.32 In general, it was conceived that the corridor would deliver numerous economic benefits to the four countries. It would create infrastructure and industrial zones along the way. As labour cost was rising in China, the industrial zones could reap the benefits of the relocation of Chinese industries. It could lead to industrialization in Myanmar, Bangladesh and eastern India. Also, the corridor would facilitate greater market access to South East Asia and create a bridge between South and South East Asia. Its potential could be even greater because it is located at the centre of three free trade zones:  the ASEAN Free Trade Area, ASEAN–​China Free Trade Area and the ASEAN–​India Free Trade Area. Indeed, the BCIM-​EC connects the three free trade areas. The economic potential of the BCIM-​EC was huge,33 but the initiative became a victim of the geopolitical and geo-​economic rivalry

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between the two key members of the initiative –​China and India. Compared with its potential, it achieved very little and largely failed to realize the key objectives of the initiative. As noted previously, until early 2015, New Delhi demonstrated its eagerness to pursue the project. Subsequently, the Indian government downgraded its involvement in the initiative because China included the corridor in its BRI project.34 It is noteworthy that New Delhi did not endorse the BRI,35 which led India to downgrade its involvement in the BCIM-​EC. Subsequently, Beijing delisted the BCIM-​EC from the corridors of BRI,36 but it did not help in allaying India’s concern. The geopolitical rivalry of the two Asian powers has prevented the initiative from realizing its full potential. Yhome notes that BCIM projects are driven more by political and strategic considerations than economic ones.37 The BCIM has implications for South Asian regionalism. It extends the idea of South Asian regionalism beyond its traditional boundary, thus affecting the traditional conceptualization of South Asia as a region.38 Arguably, it dilutes the idea of regional identity promoted by SAARC and it makes the SAARC-​led regionalism translucent. The issue has been exacerbated by the stalemate of SAARC in recent years. Of course, the BCIM-​EC itself has become stagnant as well. Therefore, the impact of BCIM-​EC on South Asian regionalism will depend on how things transpire in the coming years.

The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-​Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation Notwithstanding enormous potential, the Bay of Bengal region is less integrated today in terms of economic interdependence than it was 50 years ago.39 The interdependence that the Bay of Bengal region had earlier was gradually lost in the process of sovereignty building by the newly independent states following the end of colonial rule. It happened as the states adjacent to the Bay of Bengal followed a divergent path of political, socio-​economic and security development and built alliances with opposing superpowers. The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-​Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) initiative may be viewed as an attempt to reverse that process in the post-​colonial era and build a system of interdependence for socio-​economic, political and security development in the Bay region in a rapidly changing Asian environment. The BIMSTEC was initially constituted as the Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Thailand Economic Cooperation (BIST-​EC) in Bangkok by signing a framework agreement on 6 June 1997. It aimed to

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‘establish a firm foundation for common action to promote subregional cooperation in the areas of trade, investment, technological exchange and other interrelated areas in a spirit of equality and partnership and thereby contribute towards peace, progress and prosperity in their common region’.40 It combined several policy orientations of the group members: (1) the traditional interest of Sri Lanka and Bangladesh to establish linkages with ASEAN; (2) New Delhi’s pursuit of ‘Look East’/​ ’Act East’ policy; and (3) Thailand’s interest in pursuing a ‘Look West’ policy. Importantly, the initiative highlighted the changing contour of South Asian regionalism beyond SAARC. In December 1997, Myanmar joined the BIST-​EC, thus making it BIMST-​EC. Nepal became an observer of the organization in 1998 and, in February 2004, Nepal and Bhutan joined the BIMST-​EC as its full member. At the first summit meeting of the organization on 31 July 2004, the organization was renamed as the BIMSTEC comprising seven member states. At the first summit, the seven member states signed the BIMSTEC Free Trade Area framework agreement to expand trade and investment between them and with other countries. A  Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC) was established to expedite negotiations for trade in goods and services. Thailand was chosen as the permanent chair of the TNC. Since its inception, the organization has prioritized the creation of economic and other forms of connectivity and infrastructure in the Bay of Bengal region to realize its chief goals. It has identified 14 priority areas and has established centres for priority sectors to boost cooperation among the member states. Priority sectors included: transport and communication, tourism, counter terrorism and transnational crime, environment and disaster management, energy, public health, agriculture, trade and investment, technology, fisheries, people-​to-​people contact, poverty alleviation, climate change and cultural cooperation. To coordinate its various projects and activities, a permanent secretariat was established in Dhaka in 2014. In December 2017, BIMSTEC discussed a draft agreement on coastal shipping within 20 nautical miles of the coastline in the region in order to boost trade between member states. Although BIMSTEC has been in existence for more than two decades, the progress towards building a vibrant Bay of Bengal regional identity has been slow. The process of regionalization has not progressed as was expected. Thus far, it has attracted minimal public imagination. It is still an organization with huge potential.41 In particular, BIMSTEC

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has been very slow to demonstrate vibrancy as it has been sidelined as a policy priority by key stakeholders, that is India, for a variety of reasons. Regional and global geopolitical rivalries have also hindered its progress by affecting the policy priorities of the member states. Moreover, intra-​member relations in some cases have not been helpful; for example, the Rohingya issue between Bangladesh and Myanmar has affected bilateral relations between the two countries, thus indirectly affecting the activities of the BIMSTEC. However, after years of stagnation, BIMSTEC seems to be on the cusp of receiving renewed attention in recent years due to several developments concerning Asian strategic politics and South Asian regionalism. In particular, the renewed attention can be seen in New Delhi’s changed approach towards the organization. From 2016 onwards, BIMSTEC began to receive greater attention from the policy elites of the member states. It was evident in the high-​level engagement of the organization. In 2017, ministerial and senior official-​level meetings were organized for the first time since 2014. For example, a meeting of the BIMSTEC security chiefs took place in New Delhi in March 2017. After a gap of several years, the 4th summit took place in February 2018. More importantly, in October 2016, the first BIMSTEC leaders’ retreat took place in Goa in conjunction with a BRICS-​BIMSTEC outreach summit, which signalled, as will be discussed, a change in New Delhi’s approach towards regionalism and the Bay of Bengal-​based regional cooperation. The outcome document of the Goa meeting stated that the member states would ‘work collectively towards making BIMSTEC stronger, more effective, and result oriented’, and utilize ‘geographical contiguity, abundant natural and human resources, rich historical linkages and shared cultural heritage’ towards making ‘BIMSTEC the ideal platform to promote peace, stability and prosperity in the region’.42 The key reason for the reinvigoration of interest of the member states of the grouping is the rethinking of their approach triggered by regional developments. Bangladesh has always been, primarily driven by its location, a keen promoter of regional cooperation. It is worth noting that Bangladesh promoted the idea of SAARC in the 1970s and 1980s. As that organization stalled, Dhaka shifted its energy towards promoting sub-​regional and trans-​regional cooperation. Dhaka’s keen interest in the works of BCIM and BBIN exemplifies this enthusiasm. Bangladesh has taken great strides in promoting BIMSTEC in recent years as other members of the organization have demonstrated their enthusiasm in building Bay of Bengal regionalism. Inherent in Bangladesh’s strategy is also the consideration that multilateralism is

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good to advance its interest in view of overwhelming Indian power and dominance. For Nepal and Bhutan, BIMSTEC offers a way to mitigate their landlocked condition. They have demonstrated pragmatism in supporting the works of BIMSTEC to expand their international outlet through the Bay of Bengal. For Nepal, it would neutralize, at least to a limited extent, India’s domineering presence and influence. Sri Lanka generally views BIMSTEC as a way to connect with South East Asia. For one, Colombo in the past demonstrated an interest in becoming a member of the ASEAN. The BIMSTEC would provide an opportunity to build strong economic and cultural ties with South East Asia. For Myanmar and Thailand, BIMSTEC offers an opportunity to rebuild and expand economic cooperation with the Bay of Bengal states to their west. It is also consistent with their ‘Look West’ policies. A careful scrutiny would also reveal that a strong BIMSTEC could play an important role in neutralizing China’s overbearing presence through the BRI and the pressure that accompanies it. Arguably, at the core of BIMSTEC’s recent flurry of activities is New Delhi’s renewed interest in the organization owing to its change of approach towards regionalism. India’s Minster for External Affairs has stated that New Delhi finds ‘virtue’ in BIMSTEC.43 A key contributing factor to New Delhi’s renewed interest in the BIMSTEC is the stagnation in pursuing regional cooperation through SAARC. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi seems to be rethinking the country’s regional cooperation strategy in the aftermath of the 18th SAARC summit in Kathmandu in 2014, following Pakistan’s last-​minute withdrawal of support for a SAARC MVA. The first signal came when the Indian prime minister stated at the summit that ‘there is a new awakening in South Asia; a new recognition of inter-​linked destinies; and a new belief in shared opportunities’ and these opportunities must be realized ‘through SAARC or outside it’ either ‘among us all or some of us’.44 New Delhi’s rethinking about its regional cooperation further consolidated when the Modi government refused to attend the 19th SAARC summit in Islamabad in November 2016 against the backdrop of worsening bilateral relations between India and Pakistan. It is in this context that the BIMSTEC appeared to be an appropriate vehicle for India to promote regional cooperation. Hence, India has moved its focus of regional cooperation, at least for now, eastwards to address the ‘Pakistan problem’ in regionalism. Also, importantly, China is not a member of BIMSTEC, which encouraged India to embrace the organization as an appropriate vehicle to pursue regionalism. Xavier

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has noted that ‘SAARC is in suspension but may be called back into service if Islamabad is willing to promote regionalism’.45 India’s renewed interest in the BIMSTEC is complemented by Modi’s ‘Act East’ and ‘Neighbourhood First’ policies. At the 20th anniversary of the formation of the BIMSTEC, Indian Prime Minister Modi stated: ‘For India, it is a natural platform to fulfil our key foreign policy priorities of ‘Neighbourhood First’ and ‘Act East.’46 New Delhi has also found the BIMSTEC as a way to fight China’s growing presence in its adjacent areas through the BRI. Indeed, India is placing ‘unprecedented emphasis’ on BIMSTEC and other connectivity projects to connect the country with South East Asia in response to China’s inroad into South Asia and adjacent areas.47 New Delhi’s renewed interest in the BIMSTEC can also be traced to its realization of lost economic opportunities. Indeed, New Delhi of late has realized that the ‘lack of importance given to BIMSTEC has seriously affected ... [the country’s] economic and strategic agenda’.48 New Delhi sees clear economic gain in BIMSTEC cooperation now, particularly in the context of the growing economies of Bangladesh, Myanmar and Thailand.49 This factor is combined with the fact that the organization is the genuine bridge between South and South East Asia. Furthermore, BIMSTEC serves significant economic and strategic interests in relation to India’s north-​eastern region. Indeed, BIMSTEC can serve as a vehicle to overcome the challenges of economic development of north-​east India imposed by its isolated geography. The BIMSTEC economic cooperation could link the isolated region with the Bay of Bengal via Bangladesh and Myanmar.50 Put simply, the potential of economic development in north-​east India through BIMSTEC is enormous. Although the BIMSTEC has emerged as a vehicle of choice for regionalism in the eastern part of South Asia, it will face financial, logistical and manpower challenges in becoming a vibrant organization and hub for the regional states. The Secretariat is poorly staffed and does not have the technical expertise to initiate projects that could bring economic transformation to the BIMSTEC region. Although 14 working groups have been set up, they are yet to produce substantive outcomes. The renewed enthusiasm about the organization still remains on holding meetings, seminars, workshops and discussions. BIMSTEC has a long way to travel to realize its full potential. A vibrant BIMSTEC may redefine the regional definition of South and South East Asia. If a sense of community can be built around the Bay of Bengal region, the definition of South and South East Asia as regions will be significantly affected. The traditional, SAARC-​led

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definition of the South Asian region will be diluted or blurred. Before the 1950s, South and South East Asia did not emerge as separate regions, rather there was a loose sense of community around the Bay of Bengal area. That loose sense of identity can return with a vibrant BIMSTEC, thus making a dilutional effect on SAARC-led regionalism.

Conclusion This chapter has explored regional cooperation in the region beyond SAARC. Specifically, it has illustrated the cases of the South Asian Growth Quadrangle and South Asian Sub-​regional Cooperation within the framework of SAARC. Two trans-​regional initiatives  –​ the Bangladesh–​China–​India–​Myanmar Economic Corridor and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-​Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation –​have also been analysed. The SAGQ (more popularly known as the BBIN initiative) was originally endorsed by SAARC at the 1997 Male summit. The idea of such a growth zone was borrowed from the growth triangles of South East Asia, which served as formidable vehicles for economic growth. The BBIN growth quadrangle aimed to spur such economic growth in the eastern part of South Asia. But the initiative failed to realize its key objectives primarily because of total political commitment from the four member states. In particular, it can be argued that India failed to provide a leadership role in driving the initiative towards a viable path. Also, the group failed to develop a modus operandi and build a funding mechanism to implement its projects. The Asian Development Bank extended financial support to the BBIN initiative under the SASEC funding programme, but it was not enough to drive the BBIN agenda. Furthermore, bureaucratic inertia, lack of coordination and, above all, the lack of sufficient political capital stalled the work of the initiative. Only recently, New Delhi has become slightly pro-​active in pursuing the BBIN economic agenda against the backdrop of a stalled SAARC. The BCIM-​E C, comprising Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar, originally began its operation as a non-​governmental or semi-​governmental initiative in the late 1990s. Subsequently, it was endorsed formally and taken up by the governments of the four states. It aimed to build connectivity and infrastructure in the defined regions of the four states and create an integrated market. While there was considerable enthusiasm from various stakeholders, particularly from civil society members, it failed to realize its full potential due to Sino–​ Indian geopolitical rivalry.

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The BIMSTEC was established in 1997 to initiate cooperation in diverse economic sectors among the member states. While its economic agenda was impressive, it failed to implement its programmes. Like the preceding initiatives, the lack of sufficient political commitment from the member states impeded its progress. The organization theoretically should have been more active because it has only one regional big power  –​India. But New Delhi failed to provide a leadership role to guide BIMSTEC towards a thriving path. Only in recent years has the organization become slightly pro-​active, primarily due to a stalled SAARC. Also, it was due to India and Bangladesh’s decision to prioritize the BIMSTEC over SAARC. But the organization has yet to find a sustainable foothold for the future that will deliver substantive outcomes. So far, it remains an institution that can potentially become a vehicle for regional economic cooperation. Finally, the important question is: what do extra-​SAARC initiatives imply for SAARC-​led South Asian regionalism? Several implications are noteworthy. First, the BBIN initiative was originally meant to reinforce SAARC-​led regionalism, but SAARC has stalled due to Indo–​Pakistani rivalry, which has contributed to the rise of the BBIN as an alternative form of regionalism (sub-​regionalism) to some members of SAARC. It has generated new discourses and narratives about regionalism. From such a standpoint, the BBIN has become a dilutional force to SAARC-​led regionalism. The impact of BCIM and BIMSTEC is more dilutional to SAARC-​ led South Asian regionalism. As noted previously, in recent years India and Bangladesh have sought to promote BIMSTEC as an alternative to SAARC. The implication of this for SAARC-​led regionalism is clear: new discourses and narratives are on the rise in the eastern part of South Asia. A revived SAARC can reverse this dilutional trend. But given that the Indo–​Pakistani conflict is set to continue in the foreseeable future, the alternative form of regionalism will fill the empty space and enter into the public consciousness. That trend is underway to some extent as can be seen in the call for building a ‘Bay of Bengal Community’.51 As noted in Chapter 2, regionalism as well as the idea of region is not a fixed one; it may change over time. The longer the stalemate in SAARC continues, the more entrenched the alternative discourses about regionalism will be.

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SAARC and the Limits of Cooperation in South Asia Whatever happens or fails to happen in the context of South Asian cooperation is inextricably woven into the matrix of Indo–​Pakistani relations. Imtiaz H. Bokhari1

Introduction Being inspired primarily by the success of the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Bangladesh’s late president General Ziaur Rahman took the initiative of establishing an ‘ASEAN-like’ regional organization in South Asia in the late 1970s. The Bangladeshi leader formally wrote to his South Asian counterparts on the issue in May 1980 and dispatched a working paper on regional cooperation in November of that year.2 The Bangladesh government’s vigorous informal and semi-​formal diplomacy paved the way for the holding of the first meeting of the foreign secretaries of the seven South Asian states in 1981 in Colombo to discuss the Bangladeshi proposal. They agreed to work together on this and hold further meetings in the future. The foreign secretaries held four more exploratory meetings before the discussion moved to the political level and the foreign ministers of the seven South Asian states held their first meeting in August 1983 in New Delhi in which they adopted the declaration of ‘South Asian Regional Cooperation’ (SARC). The foreign ministers also adopted the ‘Integrated Programme of Action’ (IPA) at this meeting with a set of areas agreed upon for cooperation. After several rounds of foreign ministers’ meetings, the first ever summit of South Asian states took place in December 1985 in Dhaka in which they adopted

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the Charter of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), thus formally launching the organization. There was enthusiasm all around about the potential of SAARC when it was launched. As one of the poorest regions of the world and with low per capita income and standard of living, it was thought that the organization would elevate millions out of poverty and push towards better living standards. Also, it was expected that economic integration and interdependence would contribute to the rise of a peaceful regional environment leaving behind its traditional conflictual past. To lead the region towards that path, the SAARC leaders adopted, following the early pathway of European regionalism, the neo-​functional approach for regional cooperation. The enthusiasm about the Association could be evidenced in the rapid expansion of the IPA and the agenda of cooperation. Former Sri Lankan President Kumara Ranatunga compared SAARC as a massive tree that has grown branches very rapidly.3 Two distinct phases can be discerned in the evolution of SAARC. In the formative phase, which roughly extends from 1980 to 1992, regional cooperation was primarily organized based on the ‘spillover’ idea of neo-​functionalism in which they concentrated collaboration only on low-​level functional areas that were non-​controversial. In the second phase, SAARC went beyond functional areas and launched cooperation in core economic areas, such as trade in goods and services, investment, finance and so on. Indeed, absence and presence of collaboration in core economic areas defined the character of the two phases of SAARC’s evolution. Looking at the IPA and the agenda of cooperation, SAARC appears to be an impressive regional grouping. However, its achievements are mostly, as a scholar put it, ‘on paper’.4 Indeed, the organization’s activities have been mostly limited to holding meetings, seminars, workshops and training and adding new areas to the agenda of cooperation rather than focusing on their delivery. These were useful activities in many ways; in particular summit meetings provided a platform for the leaders to communicate on numerous issues. In some cases, they were useful to resolve interstate disputes and crises. However, they were not enough to build successful regionalism. SAARC has not delivered substantive benefits to the people of the region given its huge potential and the enthusiasm that was evident at its beginning. Many observers view that it was inherently a dysfunctional grouping, which came to a full circle when the 19th SAARC summit was postponed due to perennial India–​Pakistan discord. Indeed, this was the latest postponement in a series of setbacks in holding summits. As per the

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Charter of the organization, summits should be held annually and, therefore, 35 summits should have taken place since 1985; so far only 18 SAARC summits have been held.5 Since 2013, only one summit has been organized, implying that the problems with the Association have accelerated in recent years. Given the current state of India–​Pakistan relations, it is uncertain when the 19th summit will take place and the activities of the organization will be revived. In the meantime, due to a mostly inactive SAARC, ‘for India and a select number of South Asian countries the idea of sub-​regional cooperation is fast emerging as an effective substitute for SAARC’.6 Also, in recent years a trans-​ regional organization –​the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-​Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC)  –​has elicited significant attention as an alternative form of regionalism. The key objective of this chapter is to provide an assessment of the performance of SAARC in the past three and a half decades. As posited, SAARC’s underperformance is more apparent than its achievements. It will explore the reasons for its underperformance and explain how and why it has moved from essentially a promising organization to one that has become stalled.

Assessment Although the dysfunctional aspect of SAARC is more visible, it is not that the organization did not achieve anything. As will be discussed, at one level SAARC’s achievements are not insignificant. But most observers universally agree that the failures of the regional grouping are far greater than its achievements. There are many reasons for this, which partly relate to the structural weaknesses of the organization as well as policy preferences of the member states.

Achievements What is known as South Asia today was more integrated during the time of colonial rule. There was a sense of identity throughout the Indian subcontinent at that time. Amid the many negative aspects of colonialism, one positive outcome was that British colonial rule brought some kind of unity to the Indian subcontinent by building networks of communication and by introducing a lingua franca  –​ English.7 South Asia went through a process of massive deregionalization following the end of colonial rule in 1947 and the rise of independent ‘nation-​states’, which was exacerbated through the Indo–​Pakistani ‘enduring rivalry’ and occasional wars.8 Whatever

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communication networks survived in the initial years following decolonization, they were lost as India–​Pakistan relations gradually deteriorated and their security rivalry intensified. The formation of SAARC in a sense was a project to revive those networks and communication channels in order to build regionalism and foster closer economic and social relations. While SAARC failed to achieve its key objectives –​in particular, to bring about economic integration –​it revived an incipient sense of regional identity (that is ‘South Asianness’). As discussed in Chapters  4 and 5, SAARC emphasized people-​to-​people contact and launched specific projects towards that end. A subset of this emphasis were integrated projects to increase tourism in the region and a coordinated action plan by the tourist agencies of SAARC member states. SAARC observed 2006 as the South Asian Year of Tourism. While SAARC failed to realize its full potential in the context of people-​to-​people contact, it must be noted that various initiatives helped in building an incipient sense of common South Asian identity. New discourses and narratives were developed around it over the years. Also, important in this context was the establishment of the South Asian University (located in New Delhi) in 2010 by SAARC.9 Its impact might not be immediately visible, but in the longer run projects like this could play an instrumental role in fostering a South Asian identity. Similarly, the SAARC Audio-​Visual Exchange (SAVE) initiative was also an important collaborative project that could contribute immensely to building a sense of regional identity. It can be argued that the building of a nascent sense of regional identity by SAARC is an achievement. It is an intangible achievement, but its long-​term economic, social, political and security impact is significant. Although SAARC is inactive now, it will not remain so forever and the organization is highly likely to become more active at some stage in the future. Regional identity discourses will gain further impetus at that point in time. As will be analysed in the Conclusion, SAARC is still relevant and is likely to become active again for a variety of reasons. Notwithstanding serious limitations of SAARC due to political differences among member states, as noted in Chapter 5, SAARC’s achievements in some areas can be evidenced. If the IPA could be fully implemented, SAARC could emerge as an incredibly successful regional organization. While the organization failed to fully implement the IPA and many of its agreed areas of cooperation, some concrete achievements in some areas are noteworthy. For example, regional joint action on agriculture and agricultural research and information sharing has made an impact on food production in the region. The

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SAARC Agriculture Centre in this context has made a significant contribution to the SAARC member states. In terms of poverty alleviation, SAARC has made some concrete contributions.10 Similarly, with regards to communication and connectivity, some progress is evident. This is particularly visible in the context of various projects under the South Asian Growth Quadrangle (SAGQ) or the BBIN initiative in the eastern part of the region. While the works that were carried out under the IPA cannot be quantified in terms of success, arguably some achievements are undeniable. In the formative phase of the organization’s evolution, SAARC adopted a neo-​functional approach. There were two objectives in adopting the approach:  (1) an incremental deepening of regional cooperation; and (2)  to create a peaceful regional environment through functional cooperation. While the organization visibly failed to make progress on the second objective, it made some progress on the first one. As discussed in Chapter 4, SAARC rapidly expanded its agenda of cooperation in the formative phase. While it failed to implement the bulk of the agenda items, some progress in some areas, as noted, was made. The conclusion of two conventions in the formative phase is particularly noteworthy. The first one was on terrorism and the second convention was on drug abuse and drug trafficking. Both the issues were tremendously significant for all regional states. While the South Asian states could not live up fully to the promise of the conventions, some progress in both contexts should be acknowledged. Also, less appreciated are some collaborative works in non-​ controversial and functional areas, which have made significant contributions to the region. For example, several SAARC initiatives such as data sharing on meteorology, disaster management, agricultural research, environment, disease control (tuberculosis, HIV/​AIDS) and so on have made significant contributions to the welfare of the regional population. The SAARC satellite project is an example of useful collaboration in this regard as well. It must be emphasized that this is a useful collaboration in numerous ways. The SAARC satellite was launched in May 2017. Although Pakistan has refused to participate in it, all other SAARC members have joined the project and are reaping the benefits. Among many benefits that the SAARC satellite delivers, the most significant is the weather forecast, which is useful for farmers in rural areas to plan for crop production. It is also useful to allow time to prepare for any incoming natural disasters –​cyclones, for example. The SAARC Social Charter is also significant, which has the potential to revolutionize many aspects of South Asian societies. It will ensure

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the role of the civil societies in promoting social justice and equality in South Asian states. As discussed in Chapter  5, SAARC moved to a new phase after 1992 by initiating cooperation in core economic areas, that is trade in goods and services, investment, finance and so on. The flagship initiatives in this regard were the signing of the SAPTA and SAFTA agreements. Here again, the South Asian states failed to implement the two agreements. Yet, some progress was made in this context, which is suppressed under the weight of its failure. For example, in terms of trade liberalization, some progress was achieved and regional trade at least marginally increased. As discussed previously, SAARC member states were allowed to maintain sensitive lists on products that they were not ready to trade freely. In the SAFTA agreement, it was agreed that these lists would be gradually reduced. While it is true that the parties could not reduce them to zero, the South Asian states significantly reduced the number of items since the agreement came into force in 2006. The South Asia Growth Quadrangle or the BBIN initiative has also achieved some success in eastern South Asia. The sub-​regional MVA is a positive example in this context in which the four eastern South Asian states have signed an agreement to increase communication networks in the region. Although Bhutan has yet to ratify the agreement, the three other parties have done so and work on this is already underway on a small scale. Also, the BBIN initiative has kickstarted energy trading in the eastern sub-​region of South Asia, which is contributing towards the sub-​region’s economic development. Indeed, energy trade in the BBIN region has been identified as a growth area with tremendous potential.11 Similarly, the establishment of border haats (markets) under the BBIN initiative is delivering significant tangible benefits to the local population.12 While these are small initiatives, their tangible benefits are noteworthy. They provide economic benefit to the local population on both sides of the border, thus helping to create good will among people. As discussed in Chapter 1, South Asia is a region of mistrust and ‘conflict unending’. India and Pakistan are embroiled in an ‘enduring rivalry’.13 The two countries have fought four wars and faced numerous crises over the seven decades as independent states following the end of colonial rule. Other South Asian states have not fought against each other, but South Asia has seen a pattern of continual enmity in interstate relationships. Given such a context, SAARC did provide a platform in which it was possible to discuss such issues when they arose. While the SAARC Charter does not allow for discussion of

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controversial issues formally, it does not, however, prevent informal discussion on the sidelines of SAARC meetings, particularly during summits. There is evidence to show that South Asian leaders were informally engaged in discussions during summits and other meetings to resolve issues. More significantly, this has happened in the case of India and Pakistan in which the leaders of the two states were found to be seeking improvements in bilateral relations and diffusing tensions. Overall, this has been a very useful informal diplomatic platform for India and Pakistan in view of their enduring rivalry and conflict-​prone relationship.14 The Kashmir issue has occasionally led the two countries to military stand-​offs. To diffuse such crises, the two South Asian states have occasionally used the SAARC platform to address the issue.15 So, although neo-​functionalism, as discussed previously, was not successful in its objective to create a peaceful regional atmosphere, to a limited extent SAARC was helpful in averting crises. As Bokhari has noted, the utility of SAARC lies in the simple fact that, at the very least, SAARC is necessary to ensure that South Asian countries remain a diplomatic priority for one another.16 SAARC has signed several important conventions. The convention on terrorism, in particular, is significant, which not only defines terrorism, it also lays out measures to tackle it. Originally, it was signed in 1987 and was modified in 2004 by adding additional protocols. This was an important achievement given that terrorism is a controversial issue worldwide; even its definition is controversial. South Asia is abundant with terrorist groups and Indo–​Pakistani tension has a link to this; so, the convention is important because it provides a framework to address the problem. Similarly, the conventions on drug use and trafficking and women are important initiatives in the history of SAARC. They have contributed to the policy prioritization of the regional states on those issues. Various national-​level policy initiatives can be attributed to those conventions. Although South Asian states have produced the largest number of women heads of state/​government, it remains one of the most male-​centric regions of the world. Similarly, drug use and trafficking are a region-​wide problem for South Asia and the issue affects all states within the region. If SAARC member states could implement the promises of the conventions fully, it could change the social landscape of the region.

Failures Notwithstanding achievements in some areas as discussed previously, SAARC is more known for its failures. The analysis in the preceding

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chapters highlights that SAARC’s shortcomings are more apparent than its achievements. Most analysts agree that SAARC is largely a failed organization. It looks impressive on paper, but its record is very poor in terms of implementing the agenda of cooperation and realizing its objectives. SAARC consistently expanded areas of collective action over the years, but it failed to deliver on them and most programmes have remained unimplemented. Sri Lanka’s president’s assertion at the 1997 SAARC summit was apt in this context: ‘Does the proliferation of activities in the last decade signify anything more than the growth of barren foliage in a vast tree? What fruit has SAARC truly borne? Do we need to prune those activities which do not bring any significant yield and more carefully nurture others that do?’17 The list of failures in implementing the identified areas of cooperation is long. The following discussion focuses on some aspects of its failure.

The failure of neo-functionalism A key failure of SAARC has been its inability to implement the goal of neo-​functionalism upon which the organization was built in its formative years. As discussed in Chapter 3, the conceptual basis of the organization was the neo-​functionalist notion of ‘spillover’, which it borrowed from the theory and practice of European integration. As analysed in that chapter, while this was the most practical approach SAARC could have adopted, the member states failed spectacularly to implement it. By adopting this approach, SAARC member states put controversial issues aside, but they could not overcome political differences based on functional cooperation. Although the organization demonstrated impressive progress in terms of adding new joint ​action items to the agenda, these remained mostly unimplemented. Related to this, the IPA could provide a boost to the idea of neo-​ functionalism by implementing its programmes, which could advance regionalism towards a positive direction.18 However, the IPA agenda remained mostly unrealized. It was thought that its implementation would not be hugely difficult since they were non-​controversial and issues of ‘low-​politics’. The SAARC members even failed to implement them, which to a large extent defined the future direction of the organization. Some other areas can also be noted to clarify this point. In 1991, when Bangladesh was hit by a devastating cyclone, the SAARC Food Security Reserve could not be utilized. It highlighted that the problem was not only political, but also logistical and managerial. The organization could not build appropriate mechanisms to deal with issues

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pertaining to its activities. When the Convention on Suppression of Terrorism was concluded in 1987 and adopted an additional protocol in 2004, it was hailed as a great achievement. Over the years, it has become abundantly clear that it has not generated much substantive benefit because India and Pakistan have failed to follow the terms of the convention. New Delhi has consistently alleged that Pakistan has used terrorism as a strategic tool vis-​à-​vis India.19 While Islamabad has denied the allegation, it has been found that Pakistan-​based terrorist groups have carried out attacks on India on many occasions. The controversy over the issue between India and Pakistan has highlighted that the SAARC convention on terrorism has made little impact to address the issue.

The second phase of SAARC and failure to implement SAPTA and SAFTA It was always on the cards that the cooperative agenda would move up and joint action would be initiated in core economic areas on top of the functional areas. SAARC leaders were aware of this from the beginning. As discussed in Chapter 4, SAARC leaders began to move towards that direction by noting it at the declaration of the 1990 SAARC summit. In 1993, the SAPTA agreement was signed and in 2004 it was replaced by a more ambitious agreement by concluding the SAFTA. Although SAFTA was scheduled to be fully operational by 2016, this has evidently not happened. Before delving into the causes of the failure to implement the two flagship agreements, it is important to consider the regional environment under which SAARC began cooperation in core economic areas. The decision to move to the core economic areas was taken against the background that cooperation in functional areas was not delivering tangible benefits, primarily due to political discord among the member states. If the organization was to remain viable it was necessary to expedite and deepen the process of economic integration. This could be achieved only by beginning cooperation in trade, investment and finance. However, as will be analysed, notwithstanding such a rationale, the attempt failed to reinvigorate the fortunes of the organization for the same reasons that the neo-​functional approach did not produce a positive outcome. The flagship initiatives in the second phase of SAARC’s evolution were the SAPTA and SAFTA agreements, which, as noted, the SAARC states could not implement. There were many reasons for this. A key reason for the failure to implement the agreements was the protectionist

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policies already in place. Each state maintained a sensitive list on which they were reluctant to conduct free trade. It served as a formidable barrier to the implementation of the SAFTA agreement. These lists hampered trade liberalization in the region and the creation of a free trade area. It undermined the purpose of SAFTA. The SAFTA signatories generally maintained high tariffs on a considerable number of items including the ones on the sensitive lists. Also, they had a para-​tariff on a range of items, which hampered the effectiveness of SAFTA. Additionally, the South Asian states maintained non-​tariff barriers, which were against trade expansion in the region. Moreover, some other factors, both real and perceived, could be found in South Asia that were against trade liberalization in the region. They arose from the lack of information about regulations, rules and other information about trade practices of fellow SAFTA signatories. But the most important cause of the non-​implementation of the SAPTA and SAFTA agreements was the political differences of the regional states. While they were negotiating for trade preferences and tariff reduction, the underlying considerations were politico-​ strategic in nature. This was particularly evident in the case of India and Pakistan. In that sense the expected trade benefit was subservient to the strategic considerations of the two states. For example, India provided MFN status to Pakistan in 1996 as a concession under the framework of SAPTA; Pakistan never reciprocated this. Therefore, there was a conspicuous absence of political will of the SAARC states to implement the two core trade agreements, which could redefine the progress of SAARC. As an observer lamented: ‘These countries are natural partners for trade and commerce and it is disheartening that so many opportunities, so well-​articulated on paper, remain wishes rather than reality.’20 The consequence of the non-​implementation of the two key agreements was that intra-​regional trade remained minimal. When the SAPTA agreement became effective in 1995, intra-​regional trade was 3 per cent and, six years later, India’s trade within South Asia accounted for only 4 per cent of its total global trade and Pakistan’s trade in the region was merely 3 per cent of its overall trade.21 Intra-​ regional trade did not improve after the SAFTA agreement came into force; in the early 2010s intra-​regional trade was below 5 per cent, a figure which was a fraction of that compared with Europe (60 per cent) and East Asia (35 per cent).22 Another initiative –​the SAARC MVA –​which could boost the objectives of SAPTA and SAFTA, failed to make headway although it was nearly signed at the 2014 Kathmandu summit. It was an important

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initiative because communication could increase people-​to-​people contact and improve the chances of the enforcement of SAPTA and SAFTA. The MVA was vetoed by Pakistan at the last moment, notwithstanding giving its nod initially. Arguably the MVA could be an important step towards building a strong framework for regionalism and a vehicle to accelerate this process. Over the years SAARC signed a number of MoUs with international inter-​governmental agencies and various other collaborative agreements, but ‘the aggregate effect of these agreements has been rather limited’23 because those agreements remained unenforced. The key reason for this is the lack of a proper institutional mechanism and appropriate channel of communication among the SAARC member states. The summit is the apex policy-​making body of SAARC –​not only in terms of policy making and giving direction to the organization, but also it is significant, as discussed, as a way to diffuse tensions and resolve conflict between member states. It provides a platform for leaders to meet at the sidelines to discuss differences and resolve dispute. Notwithstanding such advantages, SAARC has failed to hold top-level meetings on a regular basis in accordance with the provision of the Charter. According to the Charter, the SAARC summit should be held annually. Theoretically, there should have been 35 such meetings since 1985, but so far only 18 summits have been held. There have been many reasons why SAARC could not hold regular summits, with the most important one being the political discord existing between regional states. If regular meetings of the heads of government/state could have been held, many issues could have been resolved at the highest level. In the current juncture of India–​Pakistan tensions, a summit-​level meeting could have been very useful. Compared with the overall performance of SAARC, the SAGQ, popularly known as the BBIN initiative, has performed relatively better. The SAGQ was approved in 1997. Since then, more than two decades have passed and some achievements have been made in the sub-​regional connectivity project and power trade. The MVA at the sub-​regional level was undertaken in 2015 as the SAARC MVA initiative did not get approval at the 18th SAARC summit in 2014 due to Pakistan’s veto. The SAGQ MVA has been ratified by Bangladesh, India and Nepal although Bhutan is yet to do so. On power trade under the BBIN, some progress has been made, but it is far away from realizing its full potential. Therefore, it is apparent that although the BBIN initiative has made some progress, its achievements are negligible compared with its huge potential.

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The limits of cooperation in South Asia Notwithstanding its huge potential, SAARC has not developed regionalism in the way that it was expected. From the outset it attempted to emulate the success of ASEAN. Compared with the ASEAN, its success remains even less than modest. Today, the bilateral relationship between the two most powerful members of the organization –​India and Pakistan –​is at its lowest ebb. This led to the cancelation of the Islamabad SAARC summit in 2016. It is uncertain when the cancelled summit will be rescheduled given the current trajectory of their bilateral relations. So, the intriguing question is how has SAARC come to be in this state and why has it underperformed? Several factors account for this, some of which are structural and some are non-​structural and technical. The following discussion illustrates the reasons for SAARC’s underperformance.

Structural factors South Asia is a classic case where structural power asymmetry inhibits cooperation. Thomas Thornton argues that in regional organizations it is difficult for ‘countries to establish balanced relations when one has a significant advantage in power over the other states’.24 South Asia is a typical example of this situation where India is overwhelmingly predominant. Indeed, as I  argued elsewhere, a regional security dilemma and mistrust in South Asia persist because of ‘the asymmetric distribution of power in the region and by the perceptions of the regional states that such a distribution does not ensure their national security’.25 South Asia is an Indo-​centric region26 and power asymmetry plays a huge role in the region’s international relations. India is much larger in terms of geographical size, economic strength, resource endowment and military capabilities than all other states in the region combined. This structural asymmetry is accentuated by the fact that India is centrally located in the region, having land borders with most South Asian states (except the two island nations  –​Sri Lanka and Maldives –​and Afghanistan, which only joined SAARC in 2007) and no two original SAARC members share land borders with each other. Given this structural power asymmetry, smaller South Asian states perceive that India constitutes a key threat to their political survival.27 Against such a backdrop, it is difficult to foster cohesion and build successful regionalism. Shelton Kodikara argues that South Asia’s regional security dilemma and mistrust arise from the fact that ‘the region is militarily

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Indo-​centric in character’, and hence the security strategies of the regional states are incongruent and in opposition to each other. He elaborates: ‘The fundamental security problem of South Asia is seen as one in which the states peripheral to India seek a maximisation of security vis-​à-​vis India while India itself seeks to regionalise security within a sub-​continental framework’.28 And the problem is that the asymmetry in the regional distribution of power is likely to increase in the coming years as India is poised to rise economically and politically on the global stage. The US National Intelligence Council’s 2020 project projected China and India to rise on the global stage and emphatically concluded that their emergence ‘as the new major global players –​similar to the rise of Germany in the 19th century and the United States in the early 20th century –​will transform the geopolitical landscape, with impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous two countries’.29 A bigger power gap between India and the regional states is likely to make the South Asian security dilemma more intractable. The impact of power asymmetry on regional cooperation is accentuated by India’s traditional policy approach of bilateralism towards its smaller neighbours. Traditionally, New Delhi has preferred bilateralism over multilateralism in its dealings with South Asian neighbours because it gives it an advantage in bargaining diplomacy. Indeed, bilateralism has always trumped multilateralism in India’s regional diplomacy.30 Such a policy is derived from its security doctrine –​the so-​called ‘Indian Doctrine’ –​a South Asian version of the Monroe Doctrine, in which New Delhi views its periphery as India’s security sphere.31 The Indian government has consistently attempted to utilize its central position in the regional system to promote its interests. As noted previously, the smaller states fear India as a key threat to their survival as independent political entities. And, New Delhi has done little to ally such fears except for some occasional overtures.32 Indeed, India’s behaviour in the past has been consistently ‘arrogant and uncompromising’ towards its neighbours.33 It is arguable that without resolving intra-​mural conflicts, SAARC’s mission seems virtually impossible.34

Non-​structural factors Several non-​structural factors may be discerned for the underperformance of SAARC. Some are (mis-​)perceptual, some are technical and yet some others are deliberate policy choices made by SAARC member states. They are as follows.

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First, the two most powerful members of SAARC  –​India and Pakistan –​lack a genuine political commitment to the organization. Although the smaller states of the region with some apprehension supported SAARC, India and Pakistan never extended such support to the regional body. As noted previously, when the proposal for a regional organization was mooted by Bangladesh, it got a lukewarm reception in New Delhi and Islamabad. Although they joined the association, they were at best half-​hearted in their commitment, which impeded the progress of regional cooperation. While Pakistan was concerned about the consolidation of Indian dominance in the region through SAARC, India was worried about the prospect of collective bargaining by the smaller states through the organization. Furthermore, New Delhi always remained doubtful whether SAARC could bring substantive economic benefit to the country. Similarly, Pakistan was fearful that SAARC might erode its West Asian identity and proximity to the Gulf states, which might harm its economic interest. Put simply, there has been a conspicuous absence of Indian and Pakistani political will, which affected the implementation of the agreed agenda of cooperation. Second, Pakistan’s India-​obsession and its military’s dominance in security and foreign-​policy making have led Islamabad to pursue the role of a spoiler in SAARC. Islamabad has traditionally emphasized strategic balance and sought outside help to maintain a balance of power vis-​à-​vis India.35 The consequence of such a policy pursuit is not only a downgrading of its political commitment to SAARC, but also using the organization as a bargaining tool for its strategic objectives. For example, at the 18th summit meeting at Kathmandu, the SAARC MVA was finalized and, just at the last minute, Islamabad refused to sign it. The reason for this was clear –​its strategic hostility with India. Third, stemming from these factors, SAARC member states viewed the operation of SAARC through a prism of security rather than through a lens of genuine economic cooperation. In a South Asian environment where sovereignty and security concerns take a pre-​ eminent position and hence issues of ‘high-​politics’ dominate the pattern of regional international relations and issues of ‘low-​politics’ are easily overridden, consequently, since the inception of SAARC, there has been a duality in the approaches of the member states. For this, they employed strategies of power balancing rather than strategies of cooperation.36 Fourth, the progress of SAARC has also been impeded by the lack of a dispute settlement mechanism. From the beginning, contentious

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issues were put aside from the deliberations of SAARC. It was thought that such an approach was necessary to get the organization off the ground, and in the course of time, the organization would overcome the disputes through ‘spill-​over’ effects. But clearly that did not happen; rather, SAARC has remained hostage to interstate disputes. So, SAARC needs a dispute settlement mechanism if the organization is to make progress.37 Fifth, SAARC’s institutional structure is weak, which affects its performance. The SAARC Secretariat virtually does not have any input in promoting regional cooperation. Its role is limited to the coordination of activities and making arrangements for meetings. Institutional working is also problematic because the directors of the Secretariat represent their own countries’ national interests and they do not independently initiate any new activities to promote regionalism.38 In 1998, the Group of Eminent Persons (GEP) report identified this problem and recommended to strengthen the Secretariat. The GEP also recommended to introduce a new system of appointing the Secretary General and directors on the basis of merit, of course giving due regard to equitable representation of the member states.39 But nothing has been done to facilitate this and the Secretariat remains weak as ever. Sixth, the issue of funding has affected the works of SAARC. Although there is a mechanism for the membership fee, there is no clear provision about how various agreed projects would be funded. This is a key reason why most projects have remained ‘on paper’ without implementation. Seventh, a key cause of SAARC’s underperformance is the issue of leadership and the responsibilities of the major member states of the organization. Arguably, the responsibility of the major states is more than the smaller states in pursuing regionalism. Major states can make and unmake regionalism. In the case of SAARC, the major states disrupted the potential of the regional organization. Not only the security interests of the two states overrode their economic interests in SAARC, but also they never took the organization seriously. Also, arguably they could conceive their security interests through SAARC in which they could invest political capital to build a peaceful regional environment. But India and Pakistan did not take that path. While India and Pakistan’s lack of leadership failed regionalism in South Asia, the responsibility of the former should be greater because of its pre-​eminent position in the South Asian system and overwhelming power attributes vis-​à-​vis the others combined. A  key problem in this regard is the Indian perception in which India never thought of SAARC as a useful grouping to further

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its interest, in particular in the realm of economics.40 It should be reiterated, as discussed in Chapter 3, that New Delhi’s initial reaction to Bangladesh’s proposal for a regional organization was whether it was a Pakistani ploy to ‘gang up’ the regional states against India. Notably, it did not perceive such a body in terms of economic benefit. In particular, the bureaucracy did not perceive SAARC to be a useful organization for India’s economic interests.41 India shifted its perception in the early 1990s when it agreed to sign up to the SAPTA and later SAFTA. According to Muni, India began to seriously consider the utility of SAARC after 2010, but that did not work either as can be seen from various developments, that is SAFTA could not be fully enforced by 2016 as was envisaged in the agreement.42 In the meantime, the intensification of India–​Pakistan tensions has stalled SAARC in recent years. India’s commitment to regionalism also remains questionable because of its lack of leadership to drive the BBIN initiative, which does not have a ‘Pakistan problem’. New Delhi has traditionally viewed Pakistan as the ‘spoiler’ of regionalism and an impediment to the progress of SAARC. The BBIN initiative does not include Pakistan, so New Delhi should have promoted sub-​regionalism with full commitment. But it remains questionable whether New Delhi has done so. A careful scrutiny of the two decades of the BBIN’s operation demonstrates that the initiative has not delivered much substantive outcome.

Conclusion This chapter has evaluated the performance of SAARC. It has concluded that while SAARC has achieved limited success in some areas, its failures are far more substantive and visible. ‘On paper’ it is an impressive regional organization, but in reality, its achievements are far less and without much tangible outcome. SAARC’s achievements can be observed in the realm of intangible gains. For example, it has built an incipient sense of regional identity. There was a sense of commonality during the colonial era, which was lost during the post-​colonial state and nation-​building processes. The construction of separate national identities relative to regional identity was the key norm during this period. SAARC was an attempt to reconstruct that common identity in a new way keeping national identities separate. From such a standpoint, SAARC produced a nascent sense of regional identity. Arguably, a strong regional cohesion could have a positive impact on regional environment.

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SAARC has also delivered some tangible benefits in some areas, that is agriculture and rural development, disaster management, meteorology and so on. The gains in those areas were negligible in the grand scheme of SAARC and could have been more substantive and impactful. Yet, they highlight that the organization did manage to deliver some benefits to the people of South Asia, notwithstanding the political challenges that it confronted. But the failures are more glaring. The organization has been inactive since the postponement of the 19th summit in 2016 and it is unknown when the summit will be rescheduled. SAARC could not hold regular summits primarily due to political discord. While it added numerous areas of cooperation to the agenda, it failed to implement them. Indeed, the organization faltered from its inception. It based its foundation on the European idea of ‘neo-​functionalism’ in which the expectation was that an incremental increase in the functional areas of cooperation would deepen regional integration and create a peaceful regional environment. It failed spectacularly to implement its foundational approach and this failure has left long-​term consequences for the organization. After 1992, SAARC launched cooperation in core economic areas such as trade in goods and services, investment, finance and so on. This attempt also failed spectacularly as can be observed in its inability to enforce the SAFTA agreement by the stipulated date of 2016. The SAPTA and SAFTA agreements were signed with much hope and enthusiasm, but the SAARC member states failed to implement them. Intra-​regional trade remains bogged down below 5 per cent, which highlights the failure of cooperation in core economic areas. Overall, the goals of the organization have remained unfulfilled. The IPA agenda has remained merely ‘on paper’ and has not delivered substantive benefit to the population of the region as a whole. The Secretariat also remains mostly dysfunctional and has not provided any real input to advance the cause of regionalism. Many reasons can be discerned for the poor state that SAARC finds itself in. Some reasons are structural and some are technical and non-​structural. The regional security dilemma is alive and kicking owing to a variety of reasons. One structural reason is that South Asia’s power distribution is asymmetrical. India is predominant in the South Asian sub-​system, which is not helpful in terms of trying to establish a more balanced relationship between SAARC member states. In such a landscape, regionalism is difficult to flourish unless the dominant state does not undertake measures to alleviate the structural constraints of joint action. India, as the dominant player, has failed to do so.

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The political commitment of SAARC member states remains questionable because they have prioritized the ‘high politics’ of national security over the ‘low politics’ of economics in their approach towards SAARC. This is a key cause of SAARC’s inability to make substantive progress. In particular, the two major states –​India and Pakistan –​have failed to demonstrate a genuine political commitment to SAARC. Finally, the leadership of India and Pakistan, in particular the former, is a key cause of SAARC’s failure to make headway. Their responsibilities are greater than the other member states. From such a standpoint, it is a leadership failure on the part of these two key countries that has led to the current stalemate in the organization.

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8

International Relations Theory and South Asian Regionalism Introduction As discussed in the Introduction, three theoretical approaches are generally employed from the standpoint of IR to explain the origin, process, outcome and effect of regionalism.1 Neo-​realism is considered to be apt in explaining the origins of regionalism. This explanation is particularly drawn by examining the cases of regionalism in Europe and South East Asia in which it is argued that bipolar rivalry and the influence of US power and support helped to establish the EU and ASEAN.2 Neo-​liberal institutionalism is generally viewed as the applicable explanatory framework for the process and outcome of regional integration. This theoretical approach has been aptly applied to explain the dynamics and the process of European integration and ASEAN regionalism.3 Theorists have generally employed the constructivist framework to explain the effects of regionalism. In this context too, the cases of Europe and South East Asia have been closely studied and the constructivist insights have been aptly used.4 This chapter aims to assess whether these theoretical insights can be used in the case of South Asian regionalism. While looking at South Asia’s integration experience from such a standpoint, this chapter also seeks to assess the general applicability of the three mainstream IR theories, which are essentially Western-​oriented in nature, in the context of South Asia or broadly the non-​Western world. The analysis here is developed in view of the debate about a ‘Global IR’,5 which has emerged recently in IR theorizing. This chapter is divided into two sections. First, it analyses the utility of the three mainstream perspectives –​neo-​realism, neo-​liberal institutionalism and constructivism –​in analysing the origin, process,

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outcome and effect of South Asian regionalism. Second, it assesses the implications of the analyses of the first section for IR in general and seeks to contribute in the debate about a ‘Global IR’.

International relations theories and South Asian regionalism This sub-​section analyses the origin, process and the outcome of South Asian regionalism in light of IR theoretical insights. The following is an analysis on: (1) whether the origin of South Asian regionalism can be explained in terms of neo-​realism; (2)  whether the insights of neo-​liberal institutionalism can be used to explain the process and outcome of South Asian regionalism; and (3) whether constructivism is apt in explaining the effects of South Asian regional cooperation.

Neo-​realism and the rise of regionalism in South Asia Neo-​realism is generally credited with the ability to explain the rise of regionalism. The key argument of this theory about its emergence is that global political dynamics enforced by the systemic distribution of power is the main source of regionalism. Katzenstein has shown how ‘American imperium’ against the backdrop of its global contest with the Soviet Union contributed to the emergence of regionalism in Europe and South East Asia.6 The influence of systemic forces is viewed as preordained because of the ‘intrusive’ nature of the regional systems. Due to bipolarity and globalization, no regional system was immune from the influences of external superpowers during the Cold War although the extent of their influence, as illustrated in Chapter 1, was dependent on their degree of interest. Given such a context, the superpowers built or supported regional organizations during the Cold War as a part of their global strategy and for their own interests in various parts of the world. Their bipolar rivalry forced them to follow a strategy in which they sought regional alliances or the establishment of regional organizations to consolidate their influence. Western Europe, South East Asia, Latin America, the Arabian Gulf and so on were such cases in which the USA actively supported the creation of regional organizations. A second set of neo-​realist argument derives from ‘hegemonic stability’ theory in which it is argued that a hegemon generally establishes a regional organization for its own interest.7 It does so in order to maintain its influence and the hegemon can either be a systemic or regional power that can impose its authority.

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In the case of South Asia, neo-​realism’s explanatory power about origins of regionalism appears to be limited because the rise of South Asian regionalism was primarily driven by endogenous regional and national-​level factors rather than by the support or encouragement of extra-​regional forces.8 As discussed in Chapter 3, it was a ‘developmental regionalism’ that typified ‘new regionalism’ and was driven by region-​wide socio-​economic underdevelopment and endemic poverty. Also, it was noted that changes of political regimes in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, the major regional states and a (temporary) improvement in regional environment played a facilitating role in initiating the regionalist project in the 1980s. As illustrated in Chapter 1, traditionally South Asia had been a region of mistrust and ‘unending conflict’ under which the establishment of a regional organization was a difficult proposition. Hence, the changes of regimes in the major states created a relatively favourable environment to establish a regional grouping. Yet, arguably, it was only a facilitating factor, albeit an important one, in the pursuit of ‘developmental regionalism’ which was the compelling driver of SAARC. As discussed in Chapter 3, the domestic-​level political motivation may have contributed to the rise of SAARC. For example, as illustrated in Chapter  3, the Bangladesh president, General Ziaur Rahman, might have initiated the idea of establishing a regional organization to boost his regime’s domestic political legitimacy. It is noteworthy that General Rahman came to power through a military coup and hence his political legitimacy was in question. In the quest for legitimacy he became assertive in the country’s external policy. This assertiveness was visible in the country’s UN diplomacy and in the pursuit of a closer relationship with the Islamic world and China.9 This became more important in view of the fact that the military regime was gradually ‘civilianizing’ at that point of time. The proposal for establishing a regional organization was a part of this policy. From such a standpoint, SAARC is a case of ‘regime-​booster’ regionalism. Also, he had ambitions for international leadership, in particular in the context of leadership in the Global South, which led him to pursue an assertive foreign policy in general. Apparently, his personal ambition was combined with the issue of political legitimacy, which motivated him to propose the setting up of a regional organization. Pakistan’s president, General Ziaul Haq, might have had a similar motivation to that of his Bangladeshi counterpart to support the Bangladeshi proposal to establish a regional organization in South Asia. He also came to power through a military coup in 1977 and had a problem

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of legitimacy at home. Indeed, such ‘regime-​booster regionalism’, as studies show, is not uncommon in the world.10 Arguably, the role of systemic powers in the rise of regionalism in South Asia was very limited. Except as an ‘intrusive system’, the role of the systemic powers was marginal, implying that if there was any influence of the systemic forces, it was only general and no systemic power did actively support the establishment of SAARC. It was primarily due to the fact that the region was not an active zone of bipolar rivalry of the systemic powers. South Asia’s importance to the superpowers, it should be noted, was relatively peripheral compared with Europe or South East Asia. Cold War rivalry might have some indirect impact on the rise of SAARC in view of the Afghan war in the 1980s. When the Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, it dramatically altered the strategic landscape of South Asia. It ushered in a tense regional strategic environment. All countries within the region felt that the Soviet invasion had affected, to varying degrees, their national security. Islamabad viewed that it had directly threatened the country’s security. Moreover, it feared that it would strengthen the Indo–​Soviet alliance, which would make Pakistan’s security even more precarious. On the other hand, New Delhi feared that it would promote a US–​China–​ Pakistan axis, which would increase India’s security vulnerability. In such a landscape, both India and Pakistan, as illustrated in Chapter 3, felt that the establishment of a regional organization could promote stability and improve the regional security environment. In this sense, Cold War rivalry in Afghanistan played an indirect role in the rise of regionalism in South Asia. Yet, it was marginal and did not play a significant role in the rise of SAARC. Overall, it could be argued that the neo-​realist proposition about the rise of regionalism does not hold in the context of South Asia. As can be evidenced, neither of the superpowers actively promoted the establishment of SAARC. The relative importance of Cold War rivalry in Afghanistan was minimal compared with other drivers in the rise of South Asian regionalism. As illustrated in Chapter 3 (pp 72–4), the socio-​economic profile of the region and the developmental pressure was its key driver. Neo-​realism also posits that a hegemon can create and sustain a regional organization for its own interests. As noted in the Introduction, in an environment where there is a hegemon, that state can provide ‘hegemonic stability’. This happens because other states follow the hegemon out of ‘respect’ or fear of coercion. As systemic powers were not actively engaged in South Asian affairs, India is virtually the region’s

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hegemon by virtue of its geographical size, resource endowment, economic size and military capability.11 However, evidently India has not sought to deliver hegemonic stability or build a regional organization in South Asia. As noted in Chapter  3, New Delhi was lukewarm when Bangladesh mooted the idea of regionalism in the late 1970s and formally proposed the establishment of a regional grouping in May 1980. New Delhi was suspicious whether this was a Pakistani ploy to incite the regional states to ‘gang up’ against India. It also viewed that the establishment of such an association was not suitable for its economic interests. Eventually it joined the organization due to the fear that it would isolate India in regional diplomacy. However, it remained very cautious in its approach towards SAARC. As illustrated in the preceding chapters, SAARC has not been in the ‘consciousness’ of the Indian elites. This has only changed in the second decade of the 21st century and more recently in view of China’s BRI. As illustrated in Chapter 7, SAARC’s failure was due, at least partly, to the lack of Indian leadership to promote regionalism in South Asia. Therefore, arguably the origin of SAARC cannot be explained through the theoretical prism of neo-​realism as its origin was driven by endogenous factors and not by systemic power rivalry. Certainly, SAARC came into existence primarily in response to domestic political and economic needs of the South Asian countries and such domestic factors will continue to determine its continuity.12 It also implies that in the agency–​structure debate, the former prevails in explaining the case of South Asian regionalism, implying that neo-​realism’s explanatory power is indeed limited in the case of the origin of SAARC.

Neo-​liberal institutionalism and the process and outcome of South Asian regionalism In IR theoretical literature, although neo-​realism is generally viewed to be useful in explaining the origins of regionalism, its explanatory power is limited regarding its process and outcome. The theory maintains that although powerful states create regional organizations for their own interests, they are generally reluctant to delegate authority to regional institutions and are unlikely to move beyond inter-​governmental regional cooperation.13 In other words, neo-​ realism is less useful in explaining the evolution and process as well as the outcome of regionalism. Contrastingly, neo-​liberal institutionalism is generally assumed to be more apt in explaining the process and outcome of regionalism. The theory can provide explanations about the mechanism of sustained

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cooperation and the outcome of peaceful transformation. In the case of the EU, for example, the neo-​functional approach gradually deepened regional cooperation. The institutions within the EU played a pivotal role in driving the process in which gradually deepening cooperation with institutional inputs let to greater regional integration. The same process can be observed in the case of South East Asia in which the ASEAN implemented a tentative joint-​action approach in selected areas and then incrementally deepened regional cooperation. In both cases, the path dependency was the mechanism to guide the process of regionalism although they evidently differed on the role of institutions. The outcome of this process in both cases is that it produced a peaceful regional environment. The incremental deepening of cooperation and the gradual rise of a peaceful environment went hand in hand in Europe and South East Asia. The discussions in Chapters  4 and 5 highlight that SAARC, replicating the EU and ASEAN, adopted a path-​d ependency approach. As noted in Chapter 4, Bangladesh proposed to create an ‘ASEAN-​like’ organization in South Asia following its approach to regionalism. Various documents also highlight that, as illustrated in Chapter 4, SAARC adopted the spillover idea of neo-​functionalism, borrowing from the pathway of European integration in the initial phase to build regionalism. The EU built strong institutions to drive the path-​dependency process of regional integration. By contrast, the ASEAN process of regional integration was less institutionally driven. Instead, the South East Asian states put less emphasis on institutions and relied on inter-​governmentalism in which they cooperated based on the principle of ‘lowest common denominator’. The ASEAN established a secretariat, but its role was more focussed on the coordination of activities rather than providing the policy input needed to drive the process of regionalism. Based on the analysis provided in Chapters 4 and 5, it is apparent that SAARC followed the ASEAN approach of path dependency in the process of regionalism. Like ASEAN, it established a secretariat, but its role has been minimum. It has served as the coordinating agency of SAARC and has not provided any policy input in driving the process of regionalism in South Asia. Like ASEAN, it has followed inter-​ governmentalism and the principle of ‘lowest common denominator’ in initiating cooperation. SAARC began the process of regionalism by emphasizing cooperation at the functional level. The expectation was that the spillover effect of collaboration in functional areas would gradually

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deepen regionalization and remove mistrust among the member states, thus moving the region towards a peaceful environment. Following its formal launch in 1985, many new areas were added in the agenda of cooperation over the years. As if to follow the path-​dependency process, SAARC initiated, as illustrated in Chapter 5, the process of regional integration in core economic areas in the early 1990s. Although SAARC broadly followed the path-​dependency approach of the EU and ASEAN, this produced different outcomes in South Asia. While the two organizations were successful in producing positive outcomes by building closer regional integration and creating a peaceful regional environment through the path-​dependency process, SAARC has failed to achieve such results. Now the question is why the EU and the ASEAN could produce an outcome by following the path-​dependency process as neo-​liberal institutionalism predicted, but SAARC failed to do so. As illustrated in Chapter 7, several factors accounted for the failure of SAARC to produce a positive outcome through the path-​dependency process. The key problem was that the SAARC member states primarily used the politico-​strategic prism rather than the expectation of economic benefits to drive the process of regional cooperation. While socio-​ economic development was the key factor to establish SAARC, the member states relied on politico-​strategic considerations to guide their policies to drive the process of regionalism. As illustrated in Chapter 4, to overcome the politico-​strategic constraints of regionalism, the SAARC states adopted the neo-​functional approach and began cooperation on non-​controversial, low-​level functional areas. But they could not overcome the barriers imposed by politico-​strategic factors. Hence, the path-​dependency approach did not work in the case of South Asia, thus producing a completely different outcome. Its manifestation can be observed in the fact that intra-​regional trade has remained very low compared with Europe and South East Asia14 and intra-​mural conflicts, principally between India and Pakistan, have persisted to date at the same level or more since SAARC was established. As noted earlier, SAARC is at a complete standstill now following the postponement of the 19th SAARC summit in 2016 due to Indo–​Pakistani political discord. Pakistan’s prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, acknowledged the inability of SAARC to deliver a positive outcome in his observation on the 31st anniversary of the adoption of the organization’s Charter in the following words: ‘While SAARC has … survived, it has not triumphed as had been envisaged, falling behind on the commitments and the promises that we had set out to achieve: progress and prosperity for the common good of our people’.15

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Neo-​liberal institutionalism’s two key claims about the mechanism of sustained cooperation and a linear progression towards a positive outcome, therefore, cannot be applied in the context of South Asian regionalism. Specifically, the theory’s limitations have been exposed on its two key claims that (1) institution creates incentives for cooperation and (2)  institution helps mitigate the effects of the security dilemma and produces peaceful outcomes (that is a peaceful environment). SAARC introduced lofty ideas and set an impressive agenda for cooperation. But it failed to materialize these plans due to political discord among the regional states. A cursory glance at the dynamics of the region’s international relations since the establishment of SAARC highlights that the ‘high politics’ of strategic issues rather than the ‘low politics’ of economic and cultural matters have dominated interstate relations in the region. New Delhi and Islamabad saw regional cooperation primarily through the prism of strategic cost and benefit (‘relative’ gains) instead of collective economic benefit (‘absolute’ gains). It is arguable that essentially a zero-​sum mentality persisted in their engagement with each other as the perception of hostility was so well entrenched. Under such conditions, it is difficult to see how the institution (that is SAARC) could neutralize the regional security dilemma and lead the region towards a sustainable path of cooperation. Another problem of SAARC was that non-​state actors and business entities played a marginal role in promoting regional cooperation and advancing the liberal agenda. People-​to-​people contact was also minimal.16 By contrast, non-​state actors, business people and interaction at the societal level were important in driving the integration process of Europe and South East Asia. In the case of SAARC, the activities of regional cooperation were strictly controlled by the national governments. SAARC followed a top-​down process, which prevented non-​state actors from playing the role of enablers for regional cooperation. Market and society were not involved in the process of South Asian regionalism. In this context, neo-​liberal institutionalist theory, therefore, suffers from at least two limitations in the case of SAARC. First, it wrongly assumed that sustained cooperation could be achieved without addressing the political problems of the region; two, it was wrong to assume that SAARC could succeed without mobilizing non-​state actors.17 As the previous discussion highlights, neo-​liberal institutionalist theory cannot be applied to explain the process of regionalism in South Asia. Paradoxically, some precepts of neo-​realism are applicable to explain this process. As noted, SAARC member states used

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the politico-​strategic prism to drive regional cooperation, which impeded the progress of regional integration and produced a negative outcome contrary to the theoretical prediction assumed in neo-​liberal institutionalism. The spillover impact of functional cooperation was not successful because it could not overcome the constraints that were inherent in the region’s political environment. And, such an approach was not enough to overcome the impediment imposed by the entrenched regional security dilemma. Even attempts at cooperation in core economic areas such as trade in goods and services, investment and so on were not enough to overcome those constraints.

Constructivism and South Asian regionalism Constructivism provides nuanced analyses about how regions build security communities (effects) based on shared goals and ideas through regionalism and institution building. Ideas, norms and identity are at the core of constructivist argument in explaining the dynamics of regionalism. Cognitively, they condition how new approaches to economic, political and security management are conceived and acted upon. Identity matters because it defines and redefines actors’ interests. Regionalism creates cross-​boundary awareness and a sense of region-​ wide common identity or a ‘regional imagined community’ through transaction, interaction and socialization. Through positive effects of identity, norm and values, a region can build a regional security community, thus ensuring a peaceful regional environment. Based on the analysis presented in the preceding chapters, it can be posited that the power of ideas, norms and identity has played a limited role in the dynamics of South Asian regionalism. Regionalism in South Asia was a quest for a new identity against the background of post-​partition hostility, countervailing forces, immense diversity, intra-​regional conflicts and the challenges of globalization. Policy elites of the region took the initiative of regional cooperation to reimagine and reorganize the region’s political, social, economic, strategic and cultural spaces. Although South Asian regionalism created a ‘thin’ sense of regional identity, it failed to overcome the forces of national identities and the mutual hostility of the regional states. The ‘enduring rivalry’ between India and Pakistan and the persistence of the regional security dilemma, which defined the regional international relations as illustrated in Chapter 1, prevailed over the power of new identity that was fostered by SAARC. Importantly, the drive for a new regional identity could not redefine the interests of the regional states. Therefore, it negates a key assumption of constructivism in the context of South

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Asian regionalism. Also, it is evident that while the idea of ‘spillover’ in neo-​functionalism did make a positive impact on the process of regionalism in Europe and South East Asia, it failed to make an impact in the case of South Asia. Here again, evidently such ideas could not neutralize the power of the regional security dilemma. Also, SAARC has failed to localize international norms or build its own norm for region building. There were opportunities to build norms around which it was possible to promote regionalism in South Asia. For example, a journalist has posited that SAARC could build a common ground based on Buddhism to foster regional cooperation, because all the member countries of SAARC share a Buddhist heritage.18 But it does not appear that SAARC has built any positive norm of its own in the past three decades or borrowed from elsewhere to move regional cooperation forward. Similarly, Mahatma Gandhi’s idea of ‘non-​violence’ or the traditional idea of ‘Panchsheel’ (five principles) could be utilized. By contrast, South East Asia, for example, was able to utilize or build norm around ‘Asian values’, that is ‘informality’, ‘non-​interference’ and so on, which was effective in driving ASEAN regionalism. But in the case of SAARC such a norm-​ building exercise was absent. The norm factor, therefore, was largely ineffective in South Asia. It can be posited that it was primarily due to political disagreement among the SAARC member states. It highlights constructivism’s limited applicability in the case of South Asian regionalism. However, South Asia can be a good comparative case to examine the differential impacts of identity and norm on regionalism. As can be observed, Europe and South East Asia have produced different effects of norm and identity. South Asia can also be a good case study about institutional decline in the context of regionalism. As noted in the Introduction, a major weakness of constructivism is that it is a theory of linear progression and it does not explain the decline of regional institutions. South Asian regionalism validates this criticism about constructivism and this can serve as an important case study from such a standpoint. The theoretical implication of the South Asian experience, therefore, can be valuable to reassess the theoretical precepts of constructivism. Also, as noted in the Introduction, another criticism of constructivism is that it only explains positive norms and their diffusion and peaceful aspects of regionalism. There are empirical cases where regionalism has failed to generate positive effects. In those cases, regional orders have depended on the mechanism of balance of power. South Asia is such a case.19 Therefore, South Asia may be a valuable case in theory building.

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Notwithstanding the initial enthusiasm and an expansive agenda of cooperation, SAARC proved to be ineffective in implementing it. The impact of this was that the organization failed to build a regional political/​security community and transform the regional environment. Overall, South Asia presents a theoretical anomaly in terms of the power of predictability of key IR theories regarding regionalism. Neo-​realism is generally assumed to be apt in explaining the rise of regionalism in Europe and South East Asia, but the theory fails to explain the origin of South Asia’s regionalism because its rise was primarily driven by endogenous factors. Similarly, neo-​liberal institutionalism and constructivism are generally assumed to be good at explaining the process, outcome and effects of regionalism, but in the case of South Asia their applicability is limited. In contrast, South Asia’s regionalism is driven by the logic of power. New Delhi and Islamabad have emphasized the balance of power in their approach towards each other, which has led them to a vigorous arms race.20 Notwithstanding the adoption of some confidence-​building measures, it does not appear that they have pursued a cooperative approach to security. The intrusion of extra-​regional superpowers into the region has exacerbated the problem as they aligned with the region’s competing states, thus reinforcing the balance-​of-​power strategies of India and Pakistan. Therefore, the involvement of superpowers in South Asia inhibited the progress of SAARC.

‘Global IR’ and South Asia Some general implications for IR theory can be deduced from the aforementioned insights and the analysis of this study. As posited, the mainstream IR theoretical perspectives about regionalism cannot be applied in the case of South Asian regionalism. While the theoretical precepts of mainstream IR theories about the origins, process, outcome and effects of regionalism in Europe and South East Asia have been used, their explanatory power is questionable in the context of South Asia. This issue leads us to a broader question about the universal applicability of the existing IR theoretical perspectives. The analysis of this study, therefore, can generate useful insights about the limits of contemporary IR theories. In the past decade or so, a new debate has arisen about IR theorization.21 The mainstream IR theories –​realism, liberalism and constructivism –​are generally conceived as ‘Western-​oriented’, which have been developed based on the experience and context of the

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Western states.22 Hence, this context puts an inherent limit on their universal applicability. Given such a context, IR theorization is now going through some soul-​searching in which there is a call for a ‘Global IR’.23 The argument here is that the existing IR theoretical approaches cannot be applied universally because of their Western orientation. The experience and context of the non-​Western parts of the world is different. Hence, in the theory building of IR, the experience and context of the non-​Western world needs to be taken into account to enhance the universal applicability of IR theory. Even within the non-​Western world, there are variations in terms of experience and context. So, these experiences and contexts should be consciously accommodated in order to build a ‘Global IR’. The issue of a ‘Global IR’ has been debated in the past decade. While there is still a long way to go to build a ‘Global IR’, some efforts are noteworthy. For example, the ‘theory of relationality’ has attracted some attention in this context, which posits that culture matters and theory construction depends on the background knowledge of a cultural community. Departing from the Western concept of individual rationality, the theory contends that relationality should be at the core of IR theory in which international relations should be defined as ongoing interactions, international actors be viewed as actors-​in-​relations and processes be understood as relations in motion, which are ontologically significant.24 Inherent in this argument is the perspective that actors base their actions on relations in which they need to compete and compromise. From the standpoint of Islamic international relations, a researcher has argued that Western theories have inherent limits in explaining the context of Islamic international relations; hence, new theorization is essential to accommodate the experience of the Islamic world.25 While a ‘Global IR’ is not about abandoning the Western IR, its main objective should be to create an inclusive IR with theoretical and analytical plurality.26 Most important, hence, is the issue of ‘inclusiveness’ of different experiences in order to generate a ‘Global IR’. In light of the preceding discussion, South Asia can provide useful insight about advancing the agenda of ‘Global IR’. As previously illustrated, in the specific context of South Asian regionalism, the existing theoretical perspectives have their limitations. The South Asian experience of regionalism and its experience of regional international relations may prove useful for building a ‘Global IR’.

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Conclusion This chapter has analysed the implications of findings of this study for existing IR theoretical perspectives about regionalism. Based on the analysis of this study it can be concluded that South Asia presents a theoretical anomaly. As illustrated, standard IR theories are credited with the ability to explain the origin, process, outcome and effects of regionalism. It is noted that neo-​realism is good at explaining the origins of regionalism; neo-​liberal institutionalism is apt at explaining the process and outcome of regional integration; and constructivism is suitable to explain the effects of regional cooperation. These theoretical assumptions do not hold in the case of South Asia. South Asia rather presents contradictory assumptions about the origin, process, outcome and effects of regionalism. As previously illustrated, neo-​realism is unable to explain the origin of SAARC, while contrarily it is good at explaining the process and evolution of SAARC and the reasons for a poor outcome. Neo-​liberal institutionalism is not suitable for explaining the process and outcome of South Asian regionalism. As previously noted, instead neo-​realism explains it better. Like two other theoretical approaches, constructivism cannot be applied in the context of South Asia to explain the effects of three and half decades of regional cooperation. Therefore, it can be posited that new theoretical tools are needed to explain South Asian regionalism as the existing theoretical precepts and assumptions are not applicable. This study can contribute in reassessing the theoretical assumptions about regionalism. Finally, it is illustrated that this work can generate some insights about the essence of a new IR. Therefore, its findings can be useful for advancing the agenda of ‘Global IR’.

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Conclusion SAARC is still relevant. Khaled Ahmed1 This study has explored the politics of regionalism in South Asia. It has illustrated the politics of its origins and evolution by following a ‘process-​tracing’ approach in which it has explained the causal mechanisms of its evolution and analysed its processes, events, actions, expectations and other intervening variables that linked putative causes to observed effects. It has also analysed the outcome and effects of regionalism in South Asia. To contextualize the study, it is developed against the background of the place of regionalism and regional international relations in world politics. South Asian regionalism was developed as a consequence of the development of regionalism in other parts of the world.2 It can be located in the evolutionary process of regionalism in the greater Asian region. As this study is essentially informed by the scholarship of IR, it has tested the key theoretical claims of the mainstream IR theories about regionalism in which it is claimed that neo-​realism is good at explaining the origins of regionalism, neo-​liberal institutionalism is apt at explaining its process and outcome, and constructivism provides insights about the effects of regional cooperation. The study in Chapter 1 explored the regional international relations of South Asia and illustrated its key trends and patterns from 1947 to date. This chapter laid the foundation for the analysis of the politics of regionalism in South Asia in the subsequent chapters. Arguably, the establishment of a regional organization is a political project and its dynamics are essentially determined by the patterns of interstate relationships in the given region. As illustrated, a pattern of conflict has been the dominant feature of South Asia’s international relations

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since decolonization and the rise of independent states. More specifically, the enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan has shaped the dynamics of the region’s international relations. As analysed in Chapter 6, the proliferation of differences and disagreements within SAARC that eventually stalled its activities with the cancellation of the 19th summit in Islamabad in 2016 was due to Indo–​Pakistani politico-​strategic discord. The study in Chapter 2 illustrated the contested nature of defining a ‘region’. Arguably, what constitutes a ‘South Asia region’ is a difficult question. Is it a geographic entity with a fixed boundary? Or, is it a changeable phenomenon? Moreover, the complexities of defining the South Asia region compounds if different prisms are used; for example, it is one thing if South Asia is defined from the standpoint of culture, but it is another if an economic or security prism is used to define the region. These complexities have significant implications for understanding the politics of South Asian regionalism. In the broader context, South Asian regionalism can be located in the second wave of Asian integration process, which is generally characterized as ‘new regionalism’. In the first wave of Asian regionalism following the beginning of the process of decolonization, the key aim was to foster political unity among the newly decolonized states in order to safeguard sovereignty and ensure politico-​economic security. These efforts were geographically expansive encompassing roughly the whole Asian continent and it was based on the ideological drive of ‘pan-​Asianism’. The first wave of pan-​Asian regionalism waned by the middle of the 1950s. Subsequently, regionalism in Asia began to develop along geographically confined sub-​regional lines, that is South East Asia, South Asia and so on, and with a different set of objectives such as socio-​economic development that is generally characterized as ‘developmental regionalism’. The rise of this phenomenon in South Asia can be located in this evolutionary process of Asian regionalism. Indeed, the formation of SAARC represented ‘new regionalism’ and its original character could be defined in terms of socio-economic development. The former president of Bangladesh, General Ziaur Rahman, mooted the idea of establishing an ‘ASEAN-​like’ regional institution in South Asia in the late 1970s and began informal and semi-​formal discussions with his South Asian counterparts at bilateral visits and at the sidelines of international gatherings, that is Commonwealth meetings, NAM summits, UN General Assembly sessions and so on. When he found that the responses from the fellow South Asian leaders were broadly positive, he formally proposed to establish a regional organization in May 1980

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and sent out ‘A Paper on South Asian Regional Cooperation’ outlining the structure and modalities of the proposed initiative in November of the same year. Different states of the region reacted differently to the Bangladeshi proposal. While the smaller states of the region were broadly positive notwithstanding some reservations, India and Pakistan were lukewarm about the proposal. New Delhi feared that it might be a Pakistani ploy to ‘gang up’ against India while Islamabad was concerned that this would further consolidate India’s dominance in the region. Both the states, however, eventually joined the organization fearing that staying away would lead to isolation in regional diplomacy. After more consultations, the foreign secretaries of the seven South Asian states –​Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka –​met in Colombo in April 1981 to formally discuss the Bangladeshi proposal. At that meeting, a broad agreement emerged about the setting up of a regional Association. They also agreed on the probable areas of cooperation. After several more meetings, the process was upgraded at the political level by holding the first foreign ministers’ meeting in August 1983 in New Delhi in which the ‘Declaration on South Asian Regional Cooperation’ was adopted. After some more exploratory meetings, the process culminated in the first ever summit of the South Asian leaders in Dhaka in December 1985 in which the ‘South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation’ was formally launched and its Charter was adopted. In view of this, the key question that arises is: what factors led to the rise of regionalism in South Asia? This issue is addressed in light of the following three key factors:  (1) systemic forces; (2)  regional international relations; and (3) socio-​economic profile of the region and the regional states. As posited in the theoretical sub-​section of the Introduction, the rise of regionalism is a function of superpower politics and the European and South East Asian regionalisms are generally explained from such a standpoint. As an ‘intrusive sub-​system’, there might be some general influence, but systemic forces were peripheral in the rise of SAARC. It was primarily due to the fact that South Asia was not an important region for either of the superpowers during the Cold War, so neither the USA nor the USSR actively promoted the formation of a regional organization in South Asia. So, unlike the way that the formation of the EEC and ASEAN was influenced by the United States, SAARC did not receive any backing from either of the superpowers. In terms of regional international relations, the South Asian environment was not conducive to establish a regional institution due to the prevailing pattern of relations among the regional states. As

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discussed in Chapter 1, South Asia has maintained a consistent pattern of hostility in regional international relations since decolonization. Under such a condition, it was difficult to establish a regional organization. In this pattern of hostility, there was a slight improvement in interstate relations in the late 1970s due to a change of governments in the major South Asian states, that is India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. It was under such a slightly improved political landscape that Bangladesh proposed the setting up of a regional grouping, which helped in the eventual development of SAARC. However, as can be observed, the Association was subsequently undermined by the deteriorating political landscape, specifically due to increased hostility between India and Pakistan. When the idea of regionalism was mooted by Bangladesh in the late 1970s, South Asia was one of the poorest regions of the world. The socio-​economic profile of the regional states placed South Asia at the bottom in terms of global ranking. Bangladesh argued that regionalism was a growing trend in global politics and other regions were coming together to protect their international interests, hence South Asia should follow suit to protect and promote the collective interest of the South Asian states globally. Moreover, individual national efforts had not worked in terms of socio-​economic development, so collective regional effort was vital given the region’s poor socio-​economic profile. As a result, Bangladesh’s initial proposal highlighted the need for an ‘ASEAN-​like’ regional organization. As analysed in Chapter  3, the poor socio-​economic prolife of the region and the regional states was the most important driver of regionalism in South Asia. Therefore, the initiation of SAARC represented the beginning of ‘developmental regionalism’ in this impoverished region. In the process, a slight improvement in the political landscape in the late 1970s, as noted, was an opportune time to propose and eventually establish the regional organization. Besides this, it is important to note that some other factors might have partially influenced the rise of regionalism in South Asia. The proposal for establishing a regional organization by the Bangladesh president might have been influenced by the consideration that it would enhance his legitimacy domestically as he came to power through a military coup. The Pakistani military ruler, General Ziaul Haq, might have had similar motivation to support the establishment of SAARC. In that sense, the formation of SAARC was, at least partly, a case of ‘regime-​booster’ regionalism. Two distinct phases can be discerned in the evolution of SAARC. In the formative phase, which roughly extended from 1980 to 1992,

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SAARC sought to consolidate itself as a functioning institution, set the agenda for cooperation and chart a pathway for regional unity. In doing this, SAARC adopted, following the footsteps of the EU and the ASEAN, a neo-​functional approach to build regionalism. This made sense because of the hostile pattern of South Asian international relations. Otherwise, the grouping could not even have got off the ground. Through the neo-​functional approach, it was expected that collaboration in low-​level functional areas would ‘spillover’ into new areas of cooperation and deepen the regionalization process, incrementally enhancing economic interdependence among regional states and producing a peaceful regional environment. It is evident that the areas of cooperation were rapidly extended and the ‘Integrated Programme of Action’ (IPA) was put into action. It highlighted that there was enthusiasm for the prospect of regional cooperation and the future of SAARC. However, the neo-​functional approach could hardly dent the entrenched pattern of hostility in regional international relations, which had a negative impact on the performance of the organization. After 1992, SAARC entered into a new phase when it expanded regional cooperation beyond functional areas and kickstarted joint action in core economic sectors, that is trade in goods and services, investment, finance and so on. Indeed, the beginning of collaboration in core economic areas defined the character of SAARC in the second phase and distinguished it from the formative years. In this phase, two flagship initiatives were undertaken. The first one was the signing of the ‘SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement’ (SAPTA) agreement in 1993. The second was the signing of the ‘South Asian Free Trade Area’ (SAFTA) agreement in 2004. Although these were important initiatives, the SAARC member states could not fully implement them as was stipulated in the documents. This was due to differences and disagreements among the regional states. Indeed, this phase marked a period of growing differences and discord, which brought the organization to a standstill. The SAFTA agreement was meant to be implemented by 2016, which the SAARC member states failed to facilitate. Furthermore, the 19th SAARC summit in Islamabad in November 2016 had to be cancelled due to political discord between India and Pakistan. Since then, SAARC has remained inactive. As of early 2020, there is no indication of when the cancelled summit will be rescheduled. Given the state of current India–​Pakistan relations, it is unlikely that things will improve in the foreseeable future and it remains to be seen when the activities of SAARC will be revived.

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However, the unexpected outbreak of COVID-​19 in early 2020 may prove to be helpful in this regard. At New Delhi’s initiative, SAARC leaders held a video conference on 15 March 2020 for a coordinated regional approach to tackle the virus, in which Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi proposed a regional fund to tackle the disease and provided a $10 million initial fund.3 Indeed, the conference delivered a political signal to revive the stalled organization.4 It might lead to the rescheduling of the 19th SAARC summit. How should we evaluate the performance of SAARC as a regional organization? Based on the analysis in Chapters 4 and 5, following the ‘process-​tracing’ method it can be posited that while some achievements of SAARC can be observed, on balance, its failures are glaring. SAARC built a nascent sense of regional identity. This is important in the broader historical context of the subcontinent. During colonial rule, the sense of regional identity and unity was stronger than the time of the nation-​states. After decolonization, as the nation-​states evolved in South Asia, a process of deregionalization was set off in the region, which had an impact on regional trade and socio-​economic development. SAARC was an effort to foster a sense of regional unity and identity against this trend. Also, SAARC provided a platform for regional diplomacy, which was important in view of the hostile pattern of South Asian international relations. In some cases, leaders diffused immediate crises on the sidelines of SAARC summits. SAARC made some gains in substantive areas, which can be seen in the activities of the IPA, regional centres and some other regional initiatives, that is people-​to-people contacts, tourism and so on. The projects facilitated by various conventions also highlighted substantive gains made by the organization. But its failures are far more glaring than its achievements. SAARC extended its agenda for joint action but could not implement the vast majority of these items. Hence, SAARC’s achievements remained mostly on paper. As noted, an important indication of SAARC’s failure was the cancellation of the 19th summit, which is yet to be rescheduled. The key question here is:  why did SAARC fail to produce the expected gains? There are structural and policy-​relevant factors for this. The structural power asymmetry of the region has played a negative role in the performance of SAARC. But, as analysed in Chapters 4, 5 and 7, the interstate political discord, particularly between India and Pakistan, was at the core of the organization’s failure. Although a neo-​ functional approach was adopted to gradually overcome such discord, it failed to make a dent on the entrenched ‘enduring rivalry’ between India and Pakistan. In the second phase of SAARC’s evolution, the

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attempt to overcome such political discord through cooperation in core economic areas and by deepening economic interdependence also failed. It implied that politico-​strategic considerations primarily won out over the expectation of any economic gain. Furthermore, India’s lack of leadership can be viewed as a cause of SAARC’s poor performance. The organization’s failure can be explained from two standpoints. First, from the beginning there were concerns among regional states about India and its dominant position in the region.5 India failed to allay this fear. Second, before 2010, India held the view that SAARC was neither economically beneficial nor useful to fulfil its global ambition. Indeed, India was a reluctant member of the organization from the outset. Its perception of SAARC changed after 2010 when it realized that it needed to be accepted as a power near home if it wanted to fulfil its ambition of becoming a global power. Furthermore, India has compelling economic interest in promoting regional cooperation.6 Another causal factor in bringing change in India’s perception of SAARC and the region was the gradual rise of China’s footprint in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. China’s BRI further enhanced India’s attention to the region as it intensified the geo-​economic rivalry between the two Asian powers.7 Therefore, India’s leadership role was absent in driving SAARC towards success. Additionally, the SAARC Secretariat could not make any policies to advance regional cooperation. Its main role has been to coordinate various activities of the organization. The Association did not have a clear funding mechanism that was necessary to make it effective. So, what kind of regionalism does the South Asian experience represent? As discussed in the Introduction, there are various forms of regionalism in the world. As analysed, SAARC could be viewed as ‘developmental regionalism’ because the key rationale for the creation of SAARC was the socio-​economic development of the regional population (although the policies of the member states towards SAARC were guided by politico-​strategic considerations instead of expected economic gains, as discussed). While its foundational character was ‘new regionalism’, SAARC failed to integrate market and society in the regionalization process, which undermined the regionalist project. Instead of ‘bottom-​up’ process as new regionalism would advocate, SAARC’s modus operandi was ‘top-​down’ in which the governments of the member states maintained control over the process of regionalization. In that sense, ‘inter-​governmentalism’ explains South Asian regionalism better than any other conceptual framework. South Asia experienced the rise of sub-​regionalism under the framework of SAARC and trans-​regional cooperation beyond SAARC in the past

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two decades. At the 1997 Male summit, the concept of a ‘growth zone’ was endorsed, which paved the way for the rise of the ‘South Asian Growth Quadrangle’ (SAGQ) comprising Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (also known as the BBIN initiative). To support the BBIN projects, the Asian Development Bank launched the ‘South Asia Sub-​Regional Economic Cooperation’ (SASEC) in March 2001. While some activities of the BBIN are visible, the group has failed to realize its potential. In the past decades, two other trans-​regional initiatives can be observed. The Bangladesh–​China–​India–​Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-​ EC) was initially launched as an initiative of civil society groups as well as governmental agencies (of Yunnan Province and Myanmar) in 1999, which was taken up later by the governments of the four states. It has not made much headway since it was made a formal inter-​governmental initiative because of Sino–​Indian differences. Another trans-regional initiative –​the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-​Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) –​comprising two South East Asian states (Thailand and Myanmar) and five South Asian states (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka) was launched in 1997. It established a secretariat in Dhaka and aimed to boost cooperation in the areas of trade and investment, technology, transport and communication, energy, tourism and fisheries. A framework agreement to create a BIMSTEC free trade area was signed in 2004. To implement it, a Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC) was also established with Thailand as its permanent chair. Notwithstanding the group’s huge potential, it has not produced much substantive outcome. In general, it can be posited that those sub-​regional and transregional initiatives have got implications for regionalism conceived under the initiative of SAARC. They may be viewed as enabler, that is the BBIN initiative, or diluter, that is BCIM, BIMSTEC, of SAARC-​led regionalism. As SAARC has remained stalled over the past several years, New Delhi and Dhaka have indicated a desire to pursue alternative forms of regionalism through these sub-​regional and trans-​regional initiatives. It may affect the future of the only region-​ wide organization in South Asia. Finally, the implications of this study have been analysed for the theoretical positions of the mainstream IR theories about regionalism and for IR theory in general. Neo-​realism is generally thought to be good at explaining the rise of regionalism in which it is posited that the formation of a regional organization is a function of the balance-​of-​ power politics pursued by the superpowers. The rise of regionalism in Europe and South East Asia has been explained from such a standpoint. Neo-​liberal institutionalism is viewed as appropriate for explaining

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the process and outcome of regional cooperation. Constructivism is apt at explaining the effect of regional integration. Against these theoretical claims, it is evident that these conceptual assumptions are inapplicable to explain the origin, evolution, process, outcome and the effect of regionalism in South Asia. The origin of SAARC can be attributed to regional forces rather than systemic forces, which makes the neo-​realist assumption invalid in the context of South Asia. Institutionalized cooperation did not help to overcome hostility and deepen regional unity, which makes the neo-​liberal institutionalist assumption inappropriate in the context of South Asia. In a similar fashion, institutionalized cooperation did not result in a change to the regional political landscape. The way that neo-​liberal institutionalist theory explains the process of sustained cooperation in Europe and South East Asia is not applicable in South Asia. Regionalism could not produce an effect by fundamentally altering the existing arrangement nor could it alter regional identity by moving it towards the creation of a regional security/​political community. So, the constructivist assumption about regionalism is inapplicable in South Asia as well. However, it can be argued that the experience of South Asian regionalism can be useful to theorize why institutions decline in a region or why the process of progression can be reversed in the context of institutionalized cooperation. Overall, the South Asian case can generate some useful insights to strengthen the theoretical assumptions about regionalism. This study has got general implications for IR theory, in particular in view of the current debate about ‘Global IR’. This work has demonstrated how Western-​oriented IR theories cannot explain international relations in the non-​Western world. Therefore, this research can contribute in some way to the agenda of ‘Global IR’.

Whither SAARC? This study has posited that although SAARC has achieved some gains, its failings are more visible and substantive. In particular, in the recent past, more doubts are being cast about the ability of the organization to achieve anything substantive. As noted, since the cancellation of the 19th SAARC summit in Islamabad, the regional body has stagnated. Moreover, India and some states in the eastern part of South Asia are emphasizing alternative forms of regionalism by focusing on the BIMSTEC, BCIM, BBIN and so on.8 Against such a background, many observers have begun to question whether SAARC has a viable future. Those views hold

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that as Indo–​Pakistani relations remain frozen, it is unlikely that the organization will be revived. The Indo–​Pakistani bilateral relationship has been and is currently hostage to the Kashmir dispute. Realistically, it is unlikely that there is a workable framework to resolve the Kashmir dispute in the foreseeable future. Hence, some believe that it is time to forget SAARC and move forwards with alternative pathways to facilitate regionalism. Of course, there are others who argue in favour of SAARC. Nepal is currently pushing for the rescheduling of the SAARC summit, which was cancelled in 2016. Kathmandu is keen to revive SAARC as soon as possible. Also, the Nepalese prime minster has posited that the BIMSTEC cannot replace SAARC.9 Notwithstanding the fact that SAARC is currently inactive, there are reasons to believe that the organization will have to be revived. The fundamental rationale of SAARC for which it was built still remains valid and compelling. South Asia needs a regional institution to move forward. Regionalism is a global trend and regional protectionism in international trade is a phenomenon that is undeniable. Going against it implies that South Asian states would lose out in terms of global trade. Having such an Association will facilitate the South Asian states to promote their international economic interests in a collective manner, as other regional organizations do. The benefit of collective action at the regional level is obvious, which was a key driver behind the formation of SAARC. This rationale still holds –​not only in terms of regional trade that SAARC states would benefit from, but also by addressing the key issues of regional governance, such as environmental crisis, drugs, terrorism and so on, via SAARC.10 It was amply demonstrated when the SAARC leaders held a video conference to launch joint regional effort to tackle coronavirus when it broke out in early 2020. Furthermore, a deepening in economic cooperation and regional integration can have a critical impact on the political landscape. As analysed in Chapter 1, South Asia has traditionally maintained a pattern of hostility in interstate relationships. To break this cycle of hostile relations, SAARC can provide an alternative pathway. Furthermore, New Delhi will find it challenging to fulfil its ambition of becoming a global power without reconciling with its neighbours. The cultural and civilizational argument is even more compelling to revive SAARC. The common cultural and civilizational bond of the people of South Asia can be a key source of regional cooperation and build a regional identity.

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The Indo–​Pakistani hostility is no doubt long-​standing and the Kashmir dispute has proved to be intractable. But the key point here is that the two countries cannot remain hostile forever. They are neighbours and cannot do away with each other even if they so wish.11 The point that is most important here is that Pakistan has remained an underachieving country because of its hostility with India. In a similar vein, India’s aspiration to play a global role will always be held back until and unless it reconciles with Pakistan. So, there are powerful arguments for Indo–​Pakistani reconciliation. It is only a matter of time before the two countries reconcile and live in a peaceful neighbourhood. In creating this, SAARC may play a pivotal role. Finally, it is important to point out that regional cooperation is ultimately a function of politics and political stakes. The SAARC states need to be incentivized to invest more political capital into the peace and stability of the region. To realize that objective SAARC can play a key role. Only a peaceful regional environment can ensure the prosperity and welfare of the people. The statement of Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad is apt in this context: [I]‌f a country is very poor, then it may think of invading another country in order to get the wealth of another country. But if countries have prospered, they have invested … to see that there is stability in the region … And we believe that if the whole of this region can become prosperous, then we would all have invested in it to maintain stability and peace … [This] would make us very much aware of the need to avoid conflict. And I  think this is happening in Southeast Asia and in East Asia.12 Therefore, these are all compelling reasons why SAARC could be reinstated at an opportune time in the future.

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Notes Introduction 1

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8

Mahendra P. Lama, ‘SAARC Programs and Activities: Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation’, in Sadiq Ahmed, Saman Kelegama and Ejaj Ghani, eds, Promoting Economic Cooperation in South Asia: beyond SAFTA (New Delhi: Sage, 2010). Indeed, this was not the first time that the annual summit was postponed. It was the latest episode in a series of summit postponement since the inception of SAARC in 1985. In its 35-​year history, only 18 summits had taken place, notwithstanding the organization’s Charter provided that summits would be held annually. In the past, summits had to be postponed for a variety of reasons, but most of them were postponed due to political tension between the two most powerful members of the organization –​India and Pakistan. It highlights a troublesome history for SAARC and its uncertain future. For a discussion on SAARC’s summit postponement, see Manzoor Ahmad, ‘SAARC Summits 1985–​2016: The Cancellation Phenomenon’, IPRI Journal, vol 17, no 1 (Winter 2017), pp 43–​71. Reportedly, it was postponed due to the refusal of India, Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Bhutan to participate at the meeting, alleging that Pakistan was fomenting terrorism in the neighbouring countries and interfering in their internal affairs. See, ‘Saarc summit in Pakistan postponed after member states pull out’, Dawn, 28 September 2016. Following in the footsteps of Bangladesh, Bhutan and Afghanistan, Sri Lanka also alleged that Pakistan was fomenting terrorism but explicitly did not say that it would not participate at the summit. Apparently New Delhi influenced other states to pull out of the summit. The real reason for pulling out of the summit was India’s decision not to take part in the summit following a terrorist attack in Uri by Pakistan-​based terrorists on 18 September 2019. See, ‘Uri attack fallout: India pulls out of SAARC summit in Islamabad’, The Indian Express, 27 September 2016. SAARC now has eight members with the inclusion of Afghanistan as a full member of the organization in 2007. Kishore Dash, ‘The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation in South Asia’, Pacific Affairs, vol 9, no 2 (1996), p 188. Sanjay Kathuria and Priya Mathur, ‘South Asia: A Work in Progress’, in Sanjay Kathuria, ed, A Glass Half Full:  The Promise of Regional Trade in South Asia (Washington DC: World Bank, 2018), p 28. Bhumitra Chakma, ed, South Asia in Transition: Democracy, Political Economy and Security (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p 89. Kathuria and Mathur, ‘South Asia: A Work in Progress’, p 28.

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11

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22 23

24

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27 28

Kathuria and Mathur, ‘South Asia: A Work in Progress’, p 28. Bhutan was a slight exception at 42 per cent satisfaction rate. The survey comprising 384 stakeholders across the six countries was conducted via face-​to-​face interviews in 2014. See, Kathuria and Mathur, ‘South Asia: A Work in Progress’, p 27. The BJP manifesto of 2019 Indian general elections noted this. Reflecting this leaning towards BIMSTEC, India invited BIMSTEC leaders to the inauguration of the Modi government after winning the 2019 general elections. Smruti S. Pattanaik, ‘Sub-​regionalism as New Regionalism in South Asia: India’s Role’, Strategic Analysis, vol 40, no 3 (2016), pp 210–​17. Rudroneel Ghosh, ‘SAARC Is Dead! Long Live SAARC!’, Times of India, 14 October 2018. Following the unexpected outbreak of COVID-​19 in early 2020, New Delhi convened a video conference of SAARC leaders to tackle the pandemic through collective efforts of the South Asian states. On this, see Shyam Saran, ‘COVID-​19 nudges India to pursue regional cooperation through both SAARC and BIMSTEC,’ The Indian Express, 20 March 2020. Geeta Mohan, ‘BIMSTEC cannot replace SAARC: Nepal’s PM KP Sharma Oli’, India Today, 1 June 2019. Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005). Peter J. Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2005). Michael O’Sullivan, The Levelling: What’s Next After Globalisation (New York: Public Affairs, 2019). On the evolution of the EU, see Ivan T.  Berend, The History of European Integration:  A New Perspective (London:  Routledge 2016); Wolfram Kaiser and Antonio Varsori, eds, European Union History: Themes and Debates (Springer 2016). Donald Weatherbee, ASEAN’s Half Century: A Political History of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019). Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium; Tanja A. Borzel and Thomas Risse, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2016); Fredrik Soderbaum and Timothy M. Shaw, Theories of New Regionalism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Timothy M.  Shaw et  al, eds, The Ashgate Research Companion to Regionalism (Oxon: Routledge, 2016); Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Soderbaum and Shaw, Theories of New Regionalism. Amitav Acharya, ‘Comparative Regionalism: A Field Whose Time Has Come?’, The International Spectator, vol 47, no 1 (April 2012), p 12. T.V. Paul, ed, International Relations Theory and Regional Transformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p 4. Andrew Hurrell, ‘Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective’, in Louise Fawcet and Andrew Hurrell, eds, Regionalism in World Politics (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1995), pp 37–​73. James Mayall, ‘National Identity and the Revival of Regionalism’, in Louise Fawcet and Andrew Hurrell, eds, Regionalism in World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp 169–​98. Hurrell, ‘Regionalism in Theoretical perspective’, p 44. Douglas Lemke, Regions of War and Peace (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2002).

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34 35

36

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43 44

45 46

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Paul, International Relations Theory and Regional Transformation, p 9; on this point, also see, Lloyd Gruber, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). Joseph M. Greico, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America and Non-​Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press, 1990); Michael Mastanduno, ‘A Realist View:  Three Images of the Coming International Order’, in T.V. Paul and John A.  Hall, eds, International Order and the Future of World Politics (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp 19–​40; for a theoretical perspective, see T.V. Paul, James Wirtz and Michel Fortmann, eds, Balance of Power Theory and Practice in the 21st Century (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004). Michael Brecher, ‘International Relations and Asian Studies:  The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia’, World Politics, vol 15, no 2 (1963), p 228. Benjamin Miller and Korina Kagan, ‘The Greater Powers and Regional Conflicts: Eastern Europe and the Balkans from the Post-​Napoleonic Era to the Post-​Cold War Era’, International Studies Quarterly, vol 41, no 1 (March 1997), pp  51–​85. Stephen M.  Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press, 1987). Hurrell, ‘Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective’, p 49. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Gil Merom, ‘Realist Hypothesis on Regional Peace’, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol 26, no 1 (March 2001). Walter Mattli, ‘Explaining Regional Integration Outcomes’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol 6, no 1 (1999), p 15; also, Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987). Agata Antkiewicz and John Whalley, ‘China’s New Trade Agreement’, World Economy, vol 28, no 10 (2005), pp 1539–​57; Katharina P. Coleman, International Organization and Peace Enforcement:  The Politics of International Legitimacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Sandra Destradi, ‘Regional Powers and Their Strategies: Empire, Hegemony, and Leadership’, Review of International Studies, vol 36, no 4 (2019), pp 903–​30. Matias Spektor, ‘Brazil:  The Underlying Ideas of Regional Policy’, in Daniel Flemes, ed, Regional Leadership in the Global System: Ideas, Interests and Strategies of Regional Powers (Farmhouse: Ashgate, 2010), pp 191–​204. Sandra Destradi, Indian Foreign Policy and Security Policy in South Asia:  Regional Power Strategies (London: Routledge, 2012). Susan Strange, ‘Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis’, International Organization, vol 36, no 2 (1982), pp 479–​96; John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, International Security, vol 19, no 3 (Winter 1994–​95), pp  5–​49. Hurrell, ‘Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective’, p 53. Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro and Steven E. Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). Paul, International Relations Theory and Regional Transformation, p 11. Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997). Walter Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration:  Europe and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

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49

50

51

52

53

54 55 56

57

58

59

60

61 62

63

64 65

66

Lisa L.  Martin and Beth A.  Simmons, ‘Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions’, International Organization, vol 52, no 4 (Autumn 1998), pp 729–​57. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, CA: Princeton University Press, 1984). Stephanie C. Hoffmann and Frederic Merand, ‘Regional organizations a la carte: the effects of institutional elasticity’, in T.V. Paul, International Relations Theory and Regional Transformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p 134. Lisa L.  Martin, ‘An Institutionalist View:  International Institutions and State Strategies’, in Paul and Hall, International Order and the Future of World Politics, p 91. Benjamin Miller, States, Nations and the Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1999); Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia:  ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (London:  Routledge, 2001); Amitav Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009); Craig Parson, A Certain Idea of Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003). Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, p 4. Acharya, ‘Comparative Regionalism: A Field Whose Time Has Come?’, pp 9–​10. Martha Finnemore, National Interest and International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996). Amitav Acharya, Rethinking Power, Institutions and Ideas in World Politics: Whose IR? (London: Routledge, 2014), p 187. Amitav Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011). Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It’, International Organization, vol 46, no 2 (1992), pp 391–​425. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: Verso, 1983). Mayall, ‘National Identity and the Revival of Regionalism’, p 191. Adler used the term ‘cognitive regions’ to highlight that they are subjectively constructed and exist in such a manner. See, Emanuel Adler, ‘Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol 26, no 2 (1977), pp 249–​77. Sorpong Peou, ‘Realism and constructivism in Southeast Asian security today: a review essay’, The Pacific Review, vol 15, no 1 (2010), pp 119–​38. Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, p 4. For a discussion on how balance of power functions in South Asia, see T.V. Paul, ‘Why Has the India–​Pakistan Rivalry Been so Enduring? Power Asymmetry and an Intractable Conflict’, Security Studies, vol 15, no 4 (October 2006), pp 600–​30. Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, p 4.

Chapter 1 1

Mohammed Ayoob, ‘The Primacy of the Political:  South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC) in Comparative Perspective’, Asian Survey, vol 25, no 4 (April 1985), pp 443–​57.

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Devin T.  Hagerty, South Asia In World Politics (USA:  Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2005). Before Afghanistan became a member of SAARC, the country was generally not viewed as a South Asian state. According to SIPRI, in 2018, Central and South Asia’s total military expenditure was US$85.9 billion of which India’s military expenditure was US$66.5 billion and Pakistan’s spending was US$11.4 billion. See, ‘Trends in World’s Military Expenditure, 2018’; available at: https://​www.sipri.org/​sites/​default/​files/​2019-​ 04/​fs_​1904_​milex_​2018.pdf (accessed 30 August 2019). T.V. Paul, ed, The India–​Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). The South Asian sub-​system may be viewed as a bipolar structure because nuclear weapons in the arsenals of India and Pakistan introduced a sort of strategic parity between them. It is argued that since1990 the Indo–​Pakistani nuclear deterrence has been in place. See, Devin T. Hagerty, ‘Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo–​Pakistani Crisis’, International Security, vol 20, no 3 (1995), pp 79–​114. The United States has been the ‘offshore balancer’ by supporting Pakistan and supplying arms, which roughly sustained power balance between India and Pakistan. See, Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Rudolph, eds, Making U.S. Foreign Policy Toward South Asia: Regional Imperative and the Imperial Presidency (IN: Indiana University Press, 2008). Michael Brecher, ‘International Relations and Asian Studies:  The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia’, World Politics, vol 15, no 2 (1963), pp 213–​35. Faisal Devji, Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea (New York: C. Hurst and Co, 2013). The idea of Pakistan was conceived in the Lahore declaration, which was announced at the conference of the Muslim League in 1940. From that time onwards, the Muslim League pursued a politics of partition. There were some efforts for Hindu-​ Muslim unity, but towards the end of British rule, communal riots and violence made the partition almost inevitable. The leaders of the Indian National Congress were not receptive to the idea of a partition, but eventually they had to accept it because of the rise in bloodshed. H.V. Hudson, The Great Divide: Britain-​India–​ Pakistan (New York: Atheneum, 1971). William Dalrymple, ‘The Great Divide: The Violent Legacy of Indian Partition’, The New Yorker, 22 June 2015. For a discussion on this point, see Kunal Mukherjee (2016) ‘Indo-​Pak Relations and the Kashmir Problem: From 1947 to the Present Day’, Journal of Borderlands Studies, 31:4, 497–​520; Robert G.  Wirsing, India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute (London:  Palgrave Macmillan, 1998); Sumit Ganguly, ed, The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect (London: Routledge 2003). On the origins of the first Kashmir war, see Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo–​Pakistani Conflicts Since 1947 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); Sisir Gupta, Kashmir: A  Study in India–​Pakistan Relations (London: Asia Publishing House, 1966). Such a view was reflected in his writings. See, Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (New Delhi: Penguin Books, new edition 2004). Lorne J. Kavic, India’s Quest for Security: Defence Policies, 1947–​1965 (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1967). Syed Aziz al-​Ahsan and Bhumitra Chakma, ‘Bhutan’s Foreign Policy: Cautious Self-​Assertion?’ Asian Survey, vol 32, no 11 (November 1993), pp 1043–​54.

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Sangeeta Thapliyal, ‘India and Nepal Treaty of 1950: The Continuing Discourse’, India Quarterly, vol 68, no 2 (2012), pp 119–​33. Itty Abraham, ‘From Bandung to NAM: Non-​alignment and Indian Foreign Policy, 1947–​65’, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, vol 46, no 2 (2008), pp 195–​219; Devdutt, ‘Non-​alignment and India’, The Indian Journal of Political Science, vol 23, no 1/​4 (1962), pp 380–​97. On the evolution of Sri Lanka’s policy of non-​alignment, see Shelton U. Kodikara, ‘Major Trends in Sri Lanka’s Non-​Alignment Policy after 1956’, Asian Survey, vol 13, no 12 (1973), pp 1121–​36. Sajjad Hyder, Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Reflections of an Ambassador (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1987), pp 74–​5. The document –​‘United States-​Pakistan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (May 19, 1954)’ –​can be found in Middle East Journal, vol 8, no 3 (Summer 1954), pp 338–​40. Mohammed Ayub Khan, ‘The Pakistan–​American Alliance’, Foreign Affairs, vol 42, no 2 (January 1964). Amit R. Das Gupta and Lorenz M. Luthi, eds, The Sino–​Indian War of 1962: New Perspectives (New Delhi: Routledge India, 2019). Michael Brecher, ‘Non-​Alignment Under Stress: The West and the India–​China Border War’, Pacific Affairs, vol 52, no 4 (1979), pp 612–​30. Bhumitra Chakma, Strategic Dynamics and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in South Asia (Bern: Peter Lang, 2004). Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia. ‘Tashkent Declaration’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India; available at: https://​mea.gov.in/​bilateral-​documents.htm?dtl/​5993/​Tashkent+Declaration (accessed 1 September 2019). Bhumitra Chakma, ‘Toward Pokhran II: Explaining India’s Nuclearisation Process’, Modern Asian Studies, vol 39, no 1 (February 2005), pp 189–​236. Chakma, ‘Toward Pokhran II Explaining India’s Nuclearisation Process’. Chakma, Strategic Dynamics and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in South Asia. Bhumitra Chakma, ‘Road to Chagai: Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme, Its Sources and Motivations’, Modern Asian Studies (Cambridge), vol 36, no 4 (October 2002), pp 871–​912. Chakma, ‘Road to Chagai:  Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme, Its Sources and Motivations’. Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan:  Failure in National Integration (New  York:  Columbia University Press, 1972). A theoretical discussion on ‘internal colonialism’ can be found in Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development (CA: University of California Press 1975). Anwar Dil and Alia Dil, Bengali Language Movement and Creation of Bangladesh (Dhaka: Adom Publication, 2011). The six-​point movement was launched in 1966 to press the Pakistani government for autonomy. On this, see Moudud Ahmed, Bangladesh: Constitutional Quest for Autonomy 1950–​1971 (Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 1991). Talukdar Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath (Dacca: Bangladesh Books International, 1980). Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis: India–​Pakistan–​Bangladesh (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1975). For example, a key strategic advantage was that with the emergence of independent Bangladesh India would not have to fight a two-​front war vis-​à-​vis Pakistan.

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For the agreement, see ‘The India–​Pakistan Simla agreement, 3 July 1972’, Survival, vol 14, no 5 (2008), p 242; available at: https://​www.tandfonline.com/​doi/​abs/​ 10.1080/​00396337208441358 (accessed 9 July 2019). G.W. Chowdhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Major Powers (New York: The Free Press, 1975). Syed Serajul Islam, ‘Bangladesh–​Pakistan Relations: From Conflict to Cooperation’, in Emajuddin Ahmed, ed, Foreign Policy of Bangladesh: A Small State’s Imperative (Dacca: University Press Ltd, 1984), pp 52–​63. Islam, ‘Bangladesh–​Pakistan Relations: From Conflict to Cooperation’. Hyder, Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Reflections of an Ambassador. Chakma, ‘Road to Chagai:  Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme, Its Sources and Motivations’. Bhumitra Chakma, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Programme: Past and Future’, in Olav Njolstad, ed, Nuclear Proliferation and International Order: Challenges to the Non-​Proliferation Treaty (London: Routledge in association with the Norwegian Nobel Institute, 2010), p 30. ‘Indo–​Bangladesh Relations and Coup in 1975 –​Part-​II’, Asian Tribune, 5 August 2007; available at: http://​www.asiantribune.com/​node/​6818 (accessed 9 July 2019). Indeed, a first-​hand account of an officer of the Indian main intelligence agency –​RAW –​confirmed the pursuit of such an operation. See, G.B.S. Sidhu, Sikkim: Dawn of Democracy (Gurgaon: Penguin Random House India, 2018). Bhumitra Chakma, ‘South Asia’s Realist Fascination and the Alternatives’, Contemporary Security Policy, vol 30, no 3 (December 2009), pp 395–​420. S.D. Muni, ‘India’s “Beneficial Bilateralism” in South Asia’, India Quarterly, vol 35, no 4 (1979), pp 417–​33; A.G. Noorani, ‘Foreign Policy of the Janata Party Government’, Asian Affairs: An American Review, vol 5, no 4 (1978), pp 216–​28. Artemy Kalinovsky, ‘Decision-​Making and the Soviet War in Afghanistan: From Intervention to Withdrawal’, Journal of Cold War Studies, vol 11, no 4 (2009), pp  46–​73. Babar Ali, ‘Pak–​US Military Relationship in 1980s’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol 22, no 14 (1987), pp 588–​90. Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, ‘The Making of US Foreign Policy for South Asia: Offshore Balancing in Historical Perspective’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol 41, no 8 (2006), pp 703–​9. This is the threshold for the industrial use of enriched uranium. Chakma, Strategic Dynamics and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in South Asia. Steven Greenhouse, ‘Senators Seek Full Cutoff of Arms to Pakistan’, The New York Times, 8 March 1992; available at: https://​www.nytimes.com/1​ 992/0​ 3/0​ 8/w ​ orld/​ senators-​seek-​full-​cutoff-​of-​arms-​to-​pakistan.html (accessed 9 July 2019). Chakma, Strategic Dynamics and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in South Asia. The interview was taken by a veteran Indian journalist, Kuldip Nyar, on 10 February 1984. It was published in Urdu daily Nawa-​i-​Waqt. An English version was reprinted in Defence Journal (Karachi), vol X, no 4 (1984), p 41. George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb:  The Impact on Global Proliferation (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2001). Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation. Chakma, Strategic Dynamics and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in South Asia. Surjit Mansingh, India’s Search for Power: Indira Gandhi’s Foreign Policy, 1966–​1982 (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1984).

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Sandra Destradi, ‘India and Sri Lanka’s Civil War: The Failure of Regional Conflict Management’, Asian Survey, vol 52, no 3 (May/​June 2012), pp 595–​616. Devin T. Hagerty, ‘India’s Regional Security Doctrine’, Asian Survey, vol 31, no 4 (April 1991), pp 351–​63. Niranjan Koirala, ‘Nepal in 1989: A Very Difficult Year’, Asian Survey, vol 30, no 2 (Feb 1990), pp 136–​43. Bhabani Sen Gupta, ‘The Indian Doctrine’, India Today, 31 August 1983, p 20. Chakma, ‘South Asia’s Realist Fascination and the Alternatives’. Ramesh Thakur, ‘India and the Soviet Union: Conjunctions and Disjunctions of Interests’, Asian Survey, vol 31, no 9 (1991), pp 826–​46. Ramesh Thakur, ‘The Impact of the Soviet Collapse on Military Relations with India’, Europe-​Asia Studies, vol 45, no 5 (1993), pp 831–​50. Feroz H.  Khan, Eating Grass:  The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012). Rajat Ganguly, ‘India, Pakistan and the Kashmir insurgency: causes, dynamics and prospects for resolution’, Asian Studies Review, vol 25, no 3 (2003), pp 309–​34. Seymour M. Hersh, ‘On the Nuclear Edge’, The New Yorker, 29 March 1993, p 64. Hagerty, ‘Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo–​Pakistani Crisis’, pp  107–​8. Padmaja Murthy, ‘The Gujral Doctrine and beyond’, Strategic Analysis, vol 23, no 4 (1999), pp 639–​52. The News, 10 February 1992. The Muslim, 24 August 1994. Manoj Joshi, ‘Doctrine for the Bomb’, The Morning Sun (Dhaka), 6 January 1994; Akhtar Majeed, ‘India Must Opt for the Bomb’, The Times of India, 2 September 1994; Amar Zutshi, ‘Nuclear Strategy: India’s Policy of Deterrence’, The Statesman, 25 November 1994. Chakma, Strategic Dynamics and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in South Asia. Chakma, ‘Toward Pokhran II: Explaining India’s Nuclearisation Process’. Chakma, ‘Road to Chagai’. Bhumitra Chakma, South Asia’s Nuclear Security (London: Routledge, 2015). Bhumitra Chakma, ‘Escalation Control, Deterrence Diplomacy and U.S. Role in South Asia’s Nuclear Crises’, Contemporary Security Policy, vol 33, no 3 (December 2012), pp 554–​76. Peter R. Lavoy, ed, Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Chakma, ‘Escalation Control, Deterrence Diplomacy and U.S. Role in South Asia’s Nuclear Crises’. Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India–​Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2005). Ganguly and Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India–​Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons. Ashutosh Misra, ‘An audit of the India–​Pakistan peace process’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol 61, no 4 (2007), pp 506–​28. RAND, ‘The Lessons of Mumbai’; available at: https://​www.rand.org/​content/​ dam/​rand/​pubs/​occasional_​papers/​2009/​RAND_​OP249.pdf (accessed 10 July 2019). For a discussion on this, see Chakma, ‘Escalation Control, Deterrence Diplomacy and U.S. Role in South Asia’s Nuclear Crises’.

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Bhumitra Chakma, ‘The BRI and India’s Neighbourhood’, Strategic Analysis, vol 43, no 3 (2019), pp 183–​6. Mohammad Amir Rana, ‘The geoeconomics of CPEC’, Dawn, 7 April 2019. Montgomery Blah, ‘China’s Belt and Road Initiative and India’s Concerns’, Strategic Analysis, vol 42, no 4 (2018), pp 313–​32. Maria Abi-​Habib, ‘How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port’, The New York Times, 25 June 2018. ‘Bangladesh, China sign 27 deals as President Xi visits Dhaka’, bdnews24.com, 14 October 2016. Bhumitra Chakma, ‘The BRI and Sino–​Indian Geo-​Economic Competition in Bangladesh: Coping Strategy of a Small State’, Strategic Analysis, vol 43, no 3 (2019), pp 227–​39. Niharika Mandhana, ‘Trouble in Paradise:  China–​India Rivalry Plays Out in Maldives’, The Wall Street Journal, 6 March 2018. Both China and India have not put pressure on the Myanmar government to resolve the crisis because of the fear that the other party can take advantage in courting Myanmar. Bhadra Sharma and Kai Schultz, ‘Xi Jinping Comes to Nepal Bearing Investments, and India Is Watching’, The New York Times, 12 October 2019. Avinandan Choudhury and P. Moorthy, ‘Strategic-​Maritime Triangle in the Indian Ocean:  An Emerging Indo–​US Naval Entente?’, India Quarterly, vol 74, no 3 (2018), pp 305–​25. Ruchita Beri, ‘Asia Africa Growth Corridor: Toward a Shared Philosophy’, IDSA Commentary, January–​June 2017; available at:  https://​idsa.in/​africatrends/​asia-​ africa-​growth-​corridor-​rberi (accessed 12 July 2019). Ashok Rai, ‘Quadrilateral Security Dialogue 2 (Quad 2.0) –​a credible strategic construct or mere “foam in the ocean”?’, Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India, vol 4, no 2 (2018), pp 138–​48. Terrorists carried out attack in Uri in 2016, in Pathankot in 2016, and Pulwama in 2019. Currently there is some discontent about India within the Bangladesh government on the three issues noted previously. The Teesta agreement has been hanging for many years, notwithstanding India’s repeated assurance. The Bangladesh government and the people in general are not happy with New Delhi’s stance and the lack of support on the Rohingya issue. On the migrant issue in Assam, there is concern in many circles within Bangladesh about the fallout of the crisis on the country. In particular, the CAA has now emerged as a key challenge in their bilateral relationship. See, ‘Reassure Dhaka; bring ties back on track’ (editorial), Hindustan Times, 14 January 2020. Zahid Shahab Ahmed and Musharaf Zahoor, ‘Bangladesh–​Pakistan relations: hostage to a traumatic past’, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, vol 57, no 1 (2019), pp  31–​51. ‘Bangladesh, Bhutan pull out of SAARC summit’, The Hindu, 28 September 2016. Notwithstanding enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan and difficult interstate relations among regional states of South Asia, there are elements of cooperation among them. For example, the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 highlights such a case of cooperation between India and Pakistan. For an exploration on this, see Chetan Kumar, ‘A Chronology of Cooperation: 1947–​1995’, in Kanti P. Bajpai et al, Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar, 1995).

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Chakma, ‘South Asia’s Realist Fascination and the Alternatives’. Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending:  India–​Pakistan Tensions Since 1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).

Chapter 2

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An earlier version of this chapter was published in the Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, vol 14, no 2 (2018), pp 189–​205. Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, ‘The New Wave of Regionalism’, International Organization, vol 53, no 3 (Summer 1999), p 590. Joseph S.  Nye, Peace in Parts:  Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization (New York: Little, Brown, 1971). Bjorn Hettne and Fredrik Soderbaum, ‘Theorising the Rise of Regionness’, New Political Economy, vol 5, no 3 (December 2000), p 14. Bjorn Hettne, Andras Inotai and Osvaldo Sunkel, ‘Editors’ Introduction’, in Bjorn Hettne, Andras Inotai and Osvaldo Sunkel, eds, Comparing Regionalisms: Implications for Global Development (Houndsmills: Palgrave, 2001), p xxviii. Mansfield and Milner, ‘The New Wave of Regionalism’, p 590. Rick Fawn, ‘ “Regions” and their study: wherefrom, what for and whereto’, Review of International Studies, vol 35, no S1 (February 2009), p 16. Charles A.  Kupchan, ‘Regionalizing Europe’s Security:  The Case for a New Mitteleuropa’, in Edward D.  Mansfield and Helen V.  Milner, eds, The Political Economy of Regionalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp 209–​38. Amitav Acharya, ‘Comparative Regionalism: A Field Whose Time Has Come?’, The International Spectator, vol 47, no 1 (April 2012). Peter J. Katzenstein, ‘Introduction: Asian Regionalism in Comparative Perspective’, in Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi, eds, Network Power: Japan and Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), p 7. Karl W. Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kahn, Maurice Lee, Jr, Martin Lichterman, Raymond E. Lindgren, Francis L. Lowenheim, and Richard W. Van Wagenen, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1957); Nye, Jr, Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization; Bruce M. Russett, International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology (Chicago, IL: Rand-​McNally, 1967); William R. Thompson, ‘The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and Propositional Inventory’, International Studies Quarterly, vol 17, no 1 (1973), pp 89–​117. Kym Anderson and Hege Norheim, ‘History, Geography, and Regional Economic Integration’, in Kym Anderson and Richard Blackhurst, eds, Regional Integration and the Global Trading System (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), p 26. T.V. Paul, ed, International Relations Theory and Regional Transformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p 4. On the partition (although largely from British perspective), see H.V. Hudson, The Great Divide: Britain-​India–​Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1985); for an Indian perspective on the impact of British colonialism, see Shashi Tharoor, Inglorious Empire What the British Did to India (London: Hurst & Company, 2017). Benjamin B. Cohen, ‘The Study of Indian History in the US Academy’, India Review, vol 5, no 1 (2006), pp 148–​9.

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Aminah Mohammad-​Arif, ‘Introduction, Imaginations and Constructions of South Asia:  An Enchanting Abstraction?’, Samaj:  South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, vol 10 (2014). Partha S. Ghosh, ‘An Enigma that is South Asia: India versus the Region’, Asia–​ Pacific Review, vol 20, no 1 (2013), p 103. Various scholarly works support this classification. For example, Michael Brecher in an article in the journal World Politics, which was published in 1963, used the term ‘Southern Asia’, which incorporated today’s South East Asian countries as well as the South Asian states. See, Michael Brecher, ‘International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia’, World Politics, vol 15, no 2 (January 1963), pp 213–​35. Indian Council of World Affairs, ‘Asian Relations Conference’; available at: http://​ icwadelhi.info/​asianrelationsconference/ (accessed 14 January 2017).​ George McTurman Kahin, The Asian-​African Conference (New  York:  Cornell University Press, 1956). Kripa Sridharan, ‘SAARC and Evolving Asian Regionalism’, in S.D. Muni, ed, The Emerging Dimensions of SAARC (New Delhi: Foundation Books, 2010), p 293. Bangladesh took the initiative to establish an ‘institutional arrangement’ for regional cooperation. In the late 1970s, it began discussions with the South Asian states for a regional grouping and the president of Bangladesh formally wrote to his South Asian counterparts in May 1980 for an ‘ASEAN-​like’ regional organization, which culminated in the formal launch of SAARC in December 1985. For details on the origins of SAARC, see S.D. Muni and Anuradha Muni, Regional Cooperation in South Asia (New Delhi: National Publishing House, 1984); Bhabani Sen Gupta, Regional Cooperation and Development in South Asia, vol 1 (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1986); Emajuddin Ahmed, SARC: Seeds of Harmony (Dhaka: University Press Ltd, 1985). Kishore Dash. ‘The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation in South Asia’, Pacific Affairs, vol 69, no 2 (1996), p 188. ‘Islamabad announces postponement of 19th SAARC summit’, The Express Tribune, 30 September 2016. Shelton U. Kodikara, Strategic Factors in Interstate Relations in South Asia, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, no 19, a publication of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, the Research School of Pacific Studies and the Australian National University, Canberra, 1979; available at: http://​sdsc.bellschool.anu.edu.au/​sites/​ default/​files/​publications/​attachments/​2016-​03/​sdsc-​kodikara.pdf (accessed 24 November 2019). Thomas Perry Thornton, ‘Regional Organizations in Conflict Management’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol 518, no 1 (1991), p 135. For a discussion on the evolution of the Indian economy, see Francine R. Frankel, India’s Political Economy: The Gradual Revolution (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006). C. Raja Mohan, ‘Undoing the economic partition’, The Indian Express, 16 August 2017. Niaz Murtaza, ‘Booms and Busts’, Dawn, 24 October 2017; Amjad Rashid, ‘Economy: Boom or Bust?’, Dawn, 7 May 2017; also see, Mathew McCartney, ‘Pakistan, Growth, Dependency and Crisis’, The Lahore Journal of Economics, vol 16 (September 2011), pp 71–​94; Mathew McCartney, Pakistan –​The Political Economy of Growth, Stagnation and the State: 1951–​2009 (London: Routledge, 2013).

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S. Akbar Zaidi, ‘Different Governments, Same Problems:  Pakistan’s Economy 1999–​2013’, in Bhumitra Chakma, ed, South Asia in Transition: Democracy, Political Economy and Security (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), pp 109–​26. B. Mohanan, The Politics of Regionalism in South Asia (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, 1992), p 5. Imtiaz H.  Bokhari, ‘South Asian Regional Co-​operation:  Progress, Problems, Potentials, and Prospects’, Asian Survey, vol 25, no 4 (1985), p 374. Kanak Mani Dixit, ‘Federalism on the Road: Region and Regionalism’, in Adil Najam and Moeed Yusuf, eds, South Asia 2060:  Envisioning Regional Futures (London: Anthem Press, 2013), p 32. Partha S.  Ghosh, ‘Region without Regionalism:  Cooperation in South Asia’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol LI, no 32 (6 August 2016), pp 114–​21. S.D. Muni and Rajshrre Jetly, ‘SAARC Prospects: The Changing Dimensions’, in S.D. Muni, ed, The Emerging Dimensions of SAARC (New Delhi: Foundation Books, 2010), p 25. Although the 1991 economic reforms are conceived to be the consequence of the balance-​of-​payment crisis, the change was gradually taking shape in the 1980s. See, Atul Kohli, ‘Politics of Economic Growth in India, 1980–​2005: Part I: The 1980s’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol 41, no 13 (1–​7 April 2006), pp 1251–​9; Atul Kohli, ‘Politics of Economic Growth in India, 1980–​2005: Part II: The 1990s and Beyond’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol 41, no 14 (8–​14 April 2006), pp 1361–​70. For a general discussion on economic benefits of regional cooperation in South Asia, see Sadiq Ahmed, Saman Kelegama and Ejaz Ghani, eds, Promoting Economic Cooperation in South Asia: Beyond SAFTA (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2010). Lawrence Saez, The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC): An emerging collaborative architecture (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p 66. On this, see Vikas Kumar, ‘Sub-​Regionalism in South Asia: A Case Study of the Bangladesh–​Bhutan–​Nepal–​India Motor Vehicles Agreement’, Strategic Analysis, vol 41, no 1 (2017), pp 1–​13. During the time of previous UPA government, the policy was dubbed as ‘Look East’, which was rephrased as ‘Act East’ when the NDA government took over power in 2014. It was done to prioritize the country’s engagement with East and South East Asian countries. See, Danielle Rajendram, ‘India’s new Asia–​Pacific strategy: Modi acts East’, Lowy Institute, December 2014; available at: https://​ www.lowyinstitute.org/​sites/​default/​f iles/​indias-​new-​Asia-​Pacific-​strategy-​ modi-​acts-​east.pdf (accessed 3 November 2017); Manmohini Kaul and Anushree Chakraborty, eds, India’s Look East to Act East Policy: Tracking the Opportunities and Challenges in the Indo–​Pacific (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2016). For a brief but useful discussion on the evolution of BIMSTEC, see Sampa Kundu, ‘BIMSTEC at 20: Hopes and Apprehensions’, the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, 20 June 2017; available at: http://​www.idsa.in/​idsacomments/​bimstec-​ at-​20-​hopes-​and-​apprehensions_​skundu_​200617 ‘SAARC is a “jammed” vehicle, Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar Says’, Times of India, 26 October 2017; available at: https://​timesofindia.indiatimes.com/​india/​saarc-​is-​ a-j​ ammed-v​ ehicle-​foreign-​secretary-​s-​jaishankar-​says/​articleshow/​61247718.cms On BCIM, see Swaran Singh and Zhu Cuiping, eds, BCIM  Economic Corridor: Chinese and Indian Perspectives (New Delhi: Adroit Publishers, 2017). For an insightful analysis on India’s ‘Look West’ policy, see Sanjaya Baru, ‘The Sprouting of the “Look West” Policy’, The Hindu, 29 March 2016; also see,

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Jyotika Teckchandani, ‘Modi’s Emerging Look West Policy’, The Pioneer, 19 November 2016. ‘Chabahar takeoff’, The Indian Express, 25 May 2016; D. Suba Chandran, ‘India and Kabul play new round in Great Game:  Chabahar’, The Indian Express, 31 October 2017. Reports and op ed pieces in the Pakistani newspapers manifest such an expectation. For example, see Zamir Ahmed Awan, ‘Understanding the China–​Pakistan Economic Corridor’, The Express Tribune, 16 June 2017. Of course, there are opposing views as well regarding the extent of benefit from the CPEC, see Shahid Kardar, ‘Understanding CPEC’, Dawn, 17 July 2017; ‘One-​way street: CPEC more about expanding China’s growth than benefit for Pakistan’, Dawn, 2 August 2017. S. Akbar Zaidi, ‘South Asia? West Asia? Pakistan: Location, Identity’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol 44, no 10 (7–13 March 2009). Lorne J. Kavic, India’s Quest for Security: Defence Policies, 1947–​1965 (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1967). Bhabani Sen Gupta, ‘The Indian Doctrine’, India Today, 31 August 1983, p 20. For details on those episodes, see Devin T. Hagerty, ‘India’s Regional Security Doctrine’, Asian Survey, vol 31, no 4 (April 1991), pp 351–​63. Bhumitra Chakma, ‘South Asia’s Realist Fascination and the Alternatives’, Contemporary Security Policy, vol 30, no 3 (December 2009), pp 395–​420. Chakma, ‘South Asia’s Realist Fascination and the Alternatives’. Bhumitra Chakma, ‘Road to Chagai: Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme, Its Sources and Motivations’, Modern Asian Studies (Cambridge), vol 36, no 4 (October 2002), pp 871–​912. Not only Pakistan, but also India followed a similar path by aligning with the Soviet Union during the Cold War era to augment its diplomatic and military power. South Asia thus turned into an intrusive system in which foreign powers intruded into the region’s international relations. See, Brecher, ‘International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia’. It is noteworthy that it went against India’s regional security doctrine, thus contradicting and complicating India’s discourse on South Asia as a security region. For a historical overview of Pakistan’s dependence on US support through a policy of offshore balancing, see Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, ‘The Making of US Foreign Policy for South Asia: Offshore Balancing in Historical Perspective’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol 41, no 8 (January 2006), pp 703–​9. On Pakistan–​China relations, see Ghulam Ali, China–​Pakistan Relations:  A Historical Analysis (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2017); Andrew Small, The China–​Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics (London: C. Hurst and Co Publisher Ltd, 2015). On the South Asian security complex, see Barry Buzan and Gowher Rizvi, South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1986); Barry Buzan, ‘The South Asian Security Complex in a Decentring World Order: Reconsidering Region and Power Ten Years On’, International Studies, vol 48, no 1 (2011), pp 1–​19. Although India–​Pakistan strategic rivalry has primarily shaped the structure of the South Asian security complex, the intrusion of extra-​ regional powers has greatly influenced the security relationship of the two states and the structure of the region’s security complex. See, Sten Rynning, South Asia and the Great Powers:  International Relations and Regional Security (London:  I.B. Tauris, 2017). While China historically has been a significant factor, in recent years,

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China’s footprint has increased in South Asia as a security actor, thus affecting the regional security complex. Chakma, ‘South Asia’s Realist Fascination and the Alternatives’. For a discussion on India’s motives to build nuclear weapons, see Bhumitra Chakma, Strategic Dynamics and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in South Asia (Bern:  Peter Lang, 2004). Sudipta Kaviraj, ‘A Strange Love of the Land: Identity, Poetry and Politics in the (Un)Making of South Asia’, Samaj: South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, vol 10 (2014). ‘Idea of India incomplete without Jammu and Kashmir: Salman Khurshid’, The Indian Express, 27 August 2017. Mohammad-​Arif, ‘Introduction, Imaginations and Constructions of South Asia: An Enchanting Abstraction?’. Kamila Hyat, ‘Progress, identity and confusion’, The News International, 26 October 2017. Shazia Hasan, ‘Urdu and Hindi are one language, says scholar’, Dawn, 2 March 2017. Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1998), p 235.

Chapter 3 1

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The draft proposal that Bangladesh circulated for the establishment of a regional organization in South Asia mentioned this. It highlighted two things. First, ASEAN was thought as the framework for a regional organization in South Asia. Second, the demonstration effect of a regional organization in a neighbouring region was an important factor in the rise of SAARC. For a general discussion on the origins of SAARC, see Emajuddin Ahmed, SARC:  Seeds of Harmony (Dacca:  University Press Limited, 1985); S.D. Muni and Anuradha Muni, Regional Co-​operation in South Asia (New Delhi: National Publishing House, 1984). Prasenjit Duara, ‘Asian Redux: Conceptualizing a Region for Our Time’, The Journal of Asian Studies, vol 69, no 4 (November 2010), pp 963–​83. Duara, ‘Asian Redux: Conceptualizing a Region for Our Time’, p 969. Muni and Muni, Regional Cooperation in South Asia. Interestingly, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives were not included in the proposal because it was thought that they were unviable as political entities. Also, South Asia is defined here in a larger context than the way South Asia is defined today. Debendra Kumar Das, SAARC:  Regional Co-​operation and Development (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1992), p 15. Quoted in Muni and Muni, Regional Co-​operation in South Asia, p 12. Eva-​Maria Muschik, ‘Managing the world: The United Nations, decolonization, and the strange triumph of state sovereignty in the 1950s and 1960s’, Journal of Global History, vol 23, no 1 (2018), pp 121–​44. Nagesh Rao, ‘ “Neocolonialism” or “Globalization”?: Postcolonial Theory and the Demands of Political Economy’, Interdisciplinary Literary Studies, vol 1, no 2 (2000), pp 165–​84. Indian Council of World Affairs, ‘Asian Relations Conference’; available at: http://​ icwadelhi.info/​asianrelationsconference/ (accessed 14 January 2017).​ Mohan Kashikar, SAARC: Its Genesis, Development and Prospects (Mumbai: Himalaya Publishing House, 2000), p 47.

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21 22 23

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‘Mahindra Werake S.W.R.D Bandaranaike’s Concept of Regionalism’ in Charanjit Chanana, ed, South Asia: The Changing Environment (New Delhi: MERB Bookshelf, 1979), pp 95–​9. Bhumitra Chakma, ‘SAARC and region-​building: is South Asia a region?’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, vol 14, no 2 (2018), pp 189–​205. Muni and Muni, Regional Cooperation in South Asia, p 24. Andrew Phillips, ‘Beyond Bandung: the 1955 Asian-​African Conference and its legacies for international order’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol 70, no 4 (2016), pp 329–​41. Kripa Sridharan, ‘SAARC and Evolving Asian Regionalism’, in S.D. Muni, ed, The Emerging Dimensions of SAARC (New Delhi: Foundation Books, 2010), p 293. Vincent K. Pollard, ‘ASA and ASEAN, 1961–​1967: Southeast Asian Regionalism’, Asian Survey, vol 10, no 3 (1970), pp 244–​55. The RCD was dissolved in 1979. It was replaced by Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in 1985. For a discussion on the origins of the RCD and its evolution, see Behçet Kemal Yeşilbursa, ‘The Formation of RCD: Regional Cooperation for Development’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol 45, no 4 (2009), pp 637–​60. Muni and Muni, Regional Co-​operation in South Asia, p 15. Bilson Kurus, ‘Understanding ASEAN: Benefits and Raison D’Etre’, Asian Survey, vol 33, no 8 (1993), pp 819–​31. Muni and Muni, Regional Co-​operation in South Asia. Muni and Muni, Regional Co-​operation in South Asia. Kishore Dash, ‘The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation in South Asia’, Pacific Affairs, vol 69, no 2 (Summer 1996), p 186. Muni and Muni, Regional Cooperation in South Asia. Pramod Kumar Mishra, ‘Toward a Framework of South Asian Regional Cooperation: Colombo to Kathmandu’, Foreign Affairs Report, vol 31 (12 December 1982), p 213. Ahmed, SARC: Seeds of Harmony. This point will be elaborated in greater detail later. Ahmed, SARC: Seeds of Harmony. Davinder Kumar Madaan, ‘SAARC:  Origin and Development’, in Verinder Grover, ed, Encyclopaedia of SAARC Nations, vol 1 (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1997), pp 634–​6. Ahmed, SARC: Seeds of Harmony. For a discussion on the ‘Bangladesh Working Paper’, see Mishra, ‘Toward a Framework of South Asian Regional Cooperation: Colombo to Kathmandu’. Ahmed, SARC: Seeds of Harmony, p 17. Ahmed, SARC: Seeds of Harmony. Muni and Muni, Regional Cooperation in South Asia. Karl Kaiser, ‘The Interaction of Regional Subsystems: Some Preliminary Notes on Recurrent Patterns and the Role of Superpowers’, World Politics, vol 21, no 1 (1968), pp 84–​107. For a discussion on South Asia and why and how the USA is an intrusive systemic power, see Bhumitra Chakma, ‘Escalation Control, Deterrence Diplomacy and U.S. Role in South Asia’s Nuclear Crises’, Contemporary Security Policy, vol 33, no 3 (December 2012), pp 554–​76. Imtiaz H.  Bokhari, ‘South Asian Regional Cooperation:  Progress, Problems, Potential, and Prospects’, Asian Survey, vol 25, no 4 (April 1985), pp 371–​90.

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40 41

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51

52

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Marvin G. Weinbaum, ‘War and Peace in Afghanistan: The Pakistani Role’, Middle East Journal, vol 45, no 1 (1991), pp 71–​85. Bokhari, ‘South Asian Regional Cooperation: Progress, Problems, Potential, and Prospects’, pp 374–​5. Carter and Callaghan visited South Asia in January 1978. Mohammed Ayoob, ‘The Primacy of the Political:  South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC) in Comparative Perspective’, Asian Survey, vol 25, no 4 (April 1985), pp 443–​57. For a critical review of the first Kashmir war, see Shuja Nawaz, ‘The First Kashmir War Revisited’, India Review, vol 7, no 2 (2008), pp 115–​54. For a discussion on this issue, see Ian Clark, ‘The USSR and the Tashkent Conference: a Reinterpretation Ten Years After’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol 23, no 2 (1977), pp 207–​18. Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1990). For a discussion on the origins of India and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programmes, see Bhumitra Chakma, Strategic Dynamics and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in South Asia (Bern: Peter Lang, 2004). On India’s role in the 1971 Bangladesh War, see Sukhwant Singh, India’s War Since Independence: The Liberation of Bangladesh, vol 1 (New Delhi: Spantech and Lancer, 1997). Bhumitra Chakma, ‘Demilitarization: the Bangladesh Experience’, in Rajesh Basrur and Kartik Bommakanti, eds, Demilitarising the State: The South and Southeast Asian Experience (Singapore:  S. Rajaratnam School of International Affairs, Nanyang Technological University, 2012), pp 33–​55. On Bangladesh–​India relations in the early 1980s, see Ishtiaq Hossain, ‘Bangladesh–​ India Relations:  Issues and Problems’, Asian Survey, vol 21, no 11 (1981), pp 1115–​28. Zahid Shahab Ahmed and Musharaf Zahoor, ‘Bangladesh–​Pakistan relations: hostage to a traumatic past’, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, vol 5, no 1 (2019), pp  31–​51. On the background of this treaty, see Ashok Kapur, ‘Indo–​Soviet Treaty and the Emerging Asian Balance’, Asian Survey, vol 12, no 6 (1972), pp 463–​74. Ramesh Thakur, ‘India and the Soviet Union: Conjunctions and Disjunctions of Interests’, Asian Survey, vol 31, no 9 (1991), pp 826–​46. Lloyd L. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, ‘The Making of US Foreign Policy for South Asia: Offshore Balancing in Historical Perspective’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol 41, no 8 (2006), pp 703–​9. Babar Ali, ‘Pak–​US Military Relationship in 1980s’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol 22, no 14 (1987), pp 588–​90. Shelton Kodikara, Strategic Factors in Interstate Relations in South Asia, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, no 19, a publication of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, the Research School of Pacific Studies and the Australian National University, Canberra, 1979; available at: http://​sdsc.bellschool.anu.edu.au/​sites/​ default/​files/​publications/​attachments/​2016-​03/​sdsc-​kodikara.pdf (accessed 16 September 2019). For a discussion on this, see Bhumitra Chakma, ‘South Asia’s Realist Fascination and the Alternatives’, Contemporary Security Policy, vol 30, no 3 (December 2009), pp 395–​420. Kodikara, ‘Strategic Factors in Interstate Relations in South Asia’.

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66 67 68

69

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71 72

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74 75 76 77

78

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Chakma, ‘South Asia’s Realist Fascination and the Alternatives’. ‘Sikkim Votes to End Monarchy, Merge with India’, The New  York Times, 16 April 1975. Chakma, ‘South Asia’s Realist Fascination and the Alternatives’. C. Raja Mohan, ‘Undoing the economic partition’, The Indian Express, 16 August 2017. A.G. Noorani, ‘Foreign Policy of the Janata Party Government’, Asian Affairs: An American Review, vol 5, no 4 (1978), pp 216–​28. Muni and Muni, Regional Cooperation in South Asia, p 21. Mukesh K. Kayathwal, ‘SAARC and Economic Cooperation’, Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, vol 5, no 1/​2, Special Issue on South Asia (1992), p 48. Dani Rodrik and Arvind Subramanian. ‘From “Hindu Growth” to Productivity Surge: The Mystery of the Indian Growth Transition’, IMF Staff Papers, vol 52, no 2 (2005), pp 193–​228. Matthew McCartney, ‘Pakistan, Growth, Dependency, and Crisis’, The Lahore Journal of Economics, vol 16: SE (September 2011), pp 71–​94. Just Faaland, Bangladesh: The Test Case of Development (London: C. Hurst, 1976). The government figure was 27,000 dead, but unofficially it was 1.8 million. It should, however, be noted that Sri Lanka was performing better than any other South Asian states. In this sense, neo-​functionalism was the framework that was adopted to launch SAARC. See, Ahmed, SARC: Seeds of Harmony. B. Mohanan, The Politics of Regionalism in South Asia (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, 1992), p 4. Bhabani Sen Gupta, ‘The Indian Doctrine’, India Today, 31 August 2003. S.D. Muni, ‘India in SAARC: A Reluctant Policy Maker’, in Bjorn Hettne, Andras Inotai and Osvaldo Sunkel, National Perspectives on the New Regionalism in the South, vol 3, (London: Macmillan, 1998). Bokhari, ‘South Asian Regional Cooperation: Progress, Problems, Potential, and Prospects’, p 374. Mohanan, The Politics of Regionalism in South Asia, p 4. Chakma, ‘South Asia’s Realist Fascination’ Mohanan, The Politics of Regionalism in South Asia, p 5. Bokhari, ‘South Asian Regional Co-​operation: Process, Problems, Potentials and Prospects’, p 374. Partha S. Ghosh, ‘An Enigma that is South Asia: India versus the Region’, Asia–​ Pacific Review, vol 20, no 1 (2013), p 101. S.D. Muni and Rajshree Jetly, ‘SAARC Prospects: The Changing Dimensions’, in S.D. Muni, ed, The Emerging Dimensions of SAARC (New Delhi: Foundation Books, 2010), p 25 Mohanan, The Politics of Regionalism in South Asia, p 3. For example, New Delhi was assisting an insurgent group in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, a district in the south-​eastern part of the country, to put pressure on the Zia regime. For a discussion on Bangladesh–​India relations in the 1970s and early 1980s, see Hossain, ‘Bangladesh–​India Relations: Issues and Problems’. Interestingly, the SAARC Charter states that the member states would ‘respect for the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, national independence, non-​use of force and non-​interference in the internal affairs of other States and peaceful settlement of all disputes’. See, the SAARC Charter, SAARC Secretariat; access at: http://​saarc-​sec.org/​SAARC-​Charter/​5/​

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Ayoob, ‘The Primacy of the Political: South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC) in Comparative Perspective’, p 443. On General Zia’s legitimacy problem, see Rounaq Jahan, ed, Bangladesh: Promise and Performance (London: Zed Books, 2000). Of course, Mohammed Ayoob thought that two functioning democracies in the region, that is India and Sri Lanka, could be an impediment to build a successful regional organization because of the apprehension the non-​democratic states might have on the demonstration effects of those democracies. Therefore, instead of creating legitimacy, the proposal to create a regional organization might create trouble for the Zia regime. See, Ayoob, ‘The Primacy of the Political’, p 452. Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp 363–​4; also, Fredrik Soderbaum, The Political Economy of Regionalism: The Case of Southern Africa (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

Chapter 4 1 2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

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Emajuddin Ahmed, SARC: Seeds of Harmony (Dacca: University Press Ltd, 1984). Pramod Kumar Mishra, ‘Toward a Framework of South Asian Regional Cooperation: Colombo to Kathmandu’, Foreign Affairs Report, vol 31, 12 December 1982, p 213. From 1993 onwards, a new phase of the organization began with the introduction of cooperation in financial, trade and formal economic sectors tentatively moving away from the initial approach that the organization adopted, first with the signing of the SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) in 1993. Ahmed, SARC:  Seeds of Harmony. While the documents noted the term ‘functionalism’, the European integration was based on the idea of ‘neo-​functionalism’. This author is familiar with the initial discussions that were held in Bangladesh in the 1980s in which the idea of functionalism appeared to be the key conceptual approach that was suggested. Various seminars, workshops, consultations and brain-​ storming sessions were held to discuss the budding idea of regional cooperation in South Asia. On reflection it seems that the discussion and the modalities that were set were based on partial understanding of the theory and practice of European integration. It should be noted that there is a difference in the concept of functionalism and neo-​functionalism and the European integration project actually adopted the latter perspective. Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, ‘Grand theories of European integration in the twenty-​first century’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol 26, no 8 (2019), pp 1113–​33. David Mitrany, The Progress of International Government (London:  G. Allen and Unwin, 1933), p 101. Hooghe and Marks, ‘Grand theories of European integration in the twenty-​first century’. Julian Bergmann and Arne Niemann, ‘Theories of European Integration and their Contribution to the Study of European Foreign Policy’, paper presented at the 8th Pan-​European Conference on International Relations, Warsaw, 2013; available at: https://p​ dfs.semanticscholar.org/3​ a92/c​ 6ba0f6223d86d561b619aae0e5d74010 07c.pdf (accessed 10 September 2019). L.N. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1963), p 10.

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Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950–​1957 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958), pp 297, 383. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration. Haas, The Uniting of Europe. Ernst B. Haas, ‘International integration: the European and the universal process’, International Organization, vol 15, no 3 (1961), pp 366–​92; Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation State (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964). P. Pierson, ‘The path to European integration: a historical institutionalist analysis’, Comparative Political Studies, vol 29, no 2 (1996), pp 123–​63. Quoted in Kirit Bhaumik, ‘Dacca’s initiative’, World Focus, vol 3, no 3 (March 1982), p 10. B. Mohanan, The Politics of Regionalism in South Asia (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, 1992), p 7. Davinder Kumar Madaan, ‘SAARC: Origin and Development’, in Verinder Grover, ed, Encyclopaedia of SAARC Nations, vol 1 (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1997). Mishra, ‘Toward a Framework of South Asian Regional Cooperation: Colombo to Kathmandu’. Greater details about the outcome of the meeting can be found in Samina Ahmed, ‘South Asian Regional Cooperation’, Regional Studies (Islamabad), vol 1, no 3 (Summer 1983). Quoted in Imtiaz H.  Bokhari, ‘South Asian Regional Cooperation:  Progress, Problems, Potential, and Prospects’, Asian Survey, vol 25, no 4 (April 1985), p 375. Bokhari, ‘South Asian Regional Cooperation: Progress, Problems, Potential, and Prospects’. Quoted in Bokhari, ‘South Asian Regional Cooperation:  Progress, Problems, Potential, and Prospects’. ‘Second meeting of foreign secretaries of South Asian countries, Kathmandu –​2–​4 November 1981’, Joint Communiqué, India Quarterly, vol 40, no 3–​4 (1984), pp 348–​50. Quoted in Bokhari, ‘South Asian Regional Cooperation:  Progress, Problems, Potential, and Prospects’. The Rising Nepal, 11 August 1982. The Bangladesh Observer, 11 August 1982. Pakistan Times, 8 August 1982. Quoted in Bokhari, ‘South Asian Regional Cooperation:  Progress, Problems, Potential, and Prospects’. ‘SARC Declaration, 2 August 1983’, India Quarterly, vol 40, no 3–​4 (1984), pp  365–​7. Significantly, trade and industrialization were not covered in the areas of cooperation. Analysts were quick to note on this point that this decision ‘takes the birth of SARC one step ahead of ASEAN which started far less ambitiously and was originally limited to the meeting of officials only’. See, Dilip Bobb, ‘Harbingers of Hope’, India Today, 31 August 1983. Dilip Bobb, ‘Harbingers of Hope’. Ahmed, SARC: Seeds of Harmony. For the document, see ‘The SAARC Charter’, SAARC Secretariat; available at:  http://​saarc-​sec.org/​SAARC-​Charter/​5/​. It is important to point out that political and security areas were deliberately excluded, which had implications for its conceptual foundation as well as its future.

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This was done in view of the hard realities of the regional international relations. It meant that political and security areas were deliberately excluded from the purview of the activities of the organization. ‘The SAARC Charter’, SAARC Secretariat; access at:  http://​saarc-​sec.org/​ SAARC-​Charter/​5/​ On this point, see Mujtaba Razvi, ‘South Asia and the SAARC’, Pakistan Horizon, vol 39, no 1 (1986), p 125. ‘Dhaka Declaration’, SAARC Secretariat; available at:  http://​saarc-​sec.org/​ uploads/​digital_​library_​document/​01-​Dhaka-​1stSummit1985.pdf (accessed 25 November 2918). ‘Bangalore Declaration’, SAARC Secretariat; available at:  http://​saarc-​sec.org/​ uploads/d​ igital_​library_​document/​02-​Bangalore-2​ ndSummit1986_2​ .pdf (accessed 9 October 2018). ‘Bangalore Declaration’, SAARC Secretariat; available at:  http://​saarc-​sec.org/​ uploads/d​ igital_​library_​document/​02-​Bangalore-2​ ndSummit1986_2​ .pdf (accessed 9 October 2018). ‘Kathmandu Declaration’, SAARC Secretariat; available at: http://​saarc-​sec.org/​ uploads/d​ igital_​library_​document/​03-​Kathmandu-​3rdSummit1987.pdf (accessed 9 October 2019). The agreement was ratified quite quickly by the regional states and came into effect on 22 August 1988. Very importantly, the South Asian states agreed to a definition of terrorism, which was in itself an important achievement. An important achievement though, the South Asian states later failed to act on it. ‘Islamabad Declaration’, SAARC Secretariat; available at:  http://​saarc-​sec.org/​ uploads/​digital_​library_​document/​04-​Islamabad-​4thSummit1988.pdf (accessed 9 October 2019). ‘Islamabad Declaration’, 4th SAARC summit. ‘Male Declaration’, SAARC Secretariat; available at:  http://​saarc-​sec.org/​ uploads/​digital_​library_​document/​05-​Maldives-​5thSummit1990.pdf (accessed 9 October 2019). ‘Male Declaration’, 5th SAARC summit. ‘Colombo Declaration’, 6th SAARC summit, SAARC Secretariat; available at:  http://​saarc-​sec.org/​uploads/​digital_​library_​document/​06-​COLOMBO-​ 6thSummit1991.pdf (accessed 9 October 2019. SAARC has established five regional centres covering five areas. I have noted here only two because they were created during the period under discussion. The rest of the regional centres will be discussed in the next chapter. An example in this regard is the creation of SAARC Chamber of Business and Commerce comprising business and commerce federations of all member states.

Chapter 5 1

‘What next for SAARC?’, Brookings India, 17 November 2016; available at:  https:// ​ w ww.brookings.edu/​ events/​ w hat-​ n ext-​ f or-​ s aarc/​ (accessed 22 September 2019).

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Shakeel Ahmad Ramay and Mohammad Hamza Abbas, ‘South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) and Implications for Pakistan’, Working Paper no 138 (Islamabad:  Sustainable Development Policy Institute, October 2013); available at:  https://​sdpi.org/​publications/​f iles/​SOUTH_​ASIAN_​FREE_​TRADE_​ AGREEMENT_​(SAFTA)_​AND_​IMPLICATIONS_​FOR_​PAKISTAN_​(W%20-​ %20138).pdf (accessed 22 September 2019). Mukesh K. Kayathwal, ‘SAARC and Economic Cooperation’, Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, vol 5, no 1/​2 (1992), p 53. Lawrence Saez, The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC): An Emerging Collaborative Architecture (London:  Palgrave Macmillan, Routledge, 2011), p 66. With this transformation, SAARC indeed was following the evolutionary experience of the European Union, which evolved from the European Economic Community (EEC) to European Community. By this, the EEC moved beyond neo-​functionalism to a new stage of regional integration. ‘Seventh SAARC Summit Declaration’; available at:  http://​saarc-​sec.org/​ uploads/​digital_​library_​document/​07-​Dhaka-​7thSummit1993.pdf (accessed 19 September 2019). ‘Eighth SAARC Summit’ declaration; available at:  https://​www.saarclaw.org/​ uploads-​saarc/​saarc/​3263b0282c_​FILE.pdf (accessed 19 September 2019). ‘Declaration of the Ninth SAARC Summit, Male’; available at: http://​saarc-​sec. org/u ​ ploads/​digital_​library_​document/​09_​-_​ M ​ aldives_-​ _​ 9​ th_S​ ummit_1​ 997.pdf (accessed 19 September 2019). ‘Declaration of the Tenth SAARC Summit’; available at:  http://​saarc-​sec.org/​ uploads/​digital_​library_​document/​10_​-​_​Colombo_​-​_​10th_​Summit_​1998.pdf (accessed 19 September 2019). ‘Declaration of the eleventh SAARC summit’; available at: http://​saarc-​sec.org/​ uploads/​digital_​library_​document/​11-​_​Kathmandu_​11th_​Summit_​2002.pdf (accessed 19 September 2019). ‘Islamabad Declaration’ (2004); available at: http://​saarc-​sec.org/​uploads/​digital_​ library_d​ ocument/1​ 2_-​ _​ I​ slamabad_-​ 1​ 2th_S​ AARC_​Summit,_​4-​6_​January_​2004. pdf (accessed 19 September 2019). ‘Dhaka Declaration, 2005; available at:  http://​saarc-​sec.org/​uploads/​digital_​ library_d​ ocument/​13_​-_​ D ​ haka_​-_​ 1​ 3th_​Summit_1​ 2-1​ 3_N ​ ov_2​ 005.pdf (accessed 19 September 2019). Declaration of the Fourteenth SAARC Summit’; available at: https://​www.mea. gov.in/​press-​releases.htm?dtl/​2378/​Declaration+of+the+Fourteenth+SAARC+ Summit (accessed 19 September 2019). ‘Declaration of the Fourteenth SAARC Summit’; available at: https://​www.mea. gov.in/​press-​releases.htm?dtl/​2378/​Declaration+of+the+Fourteenth+SAARC+ Summit (accessed 19 September 2019). ‘Fifteenth SAARC Summit’; available at:  http://​saarc-​sec.org/​uploads/​digital_​ library_​document/​15_​-​_​Colombo,_​15th_​Summit_​2-​3_​August_​2008_​-​_​for_​ printing.pdf (accessed 19 September 2019). It should be noted that SAFTA only covered trade in goods before this agreement. ‘Sixteenth SAARC Summit’; available at:  http://​ s aarc-​ s ec.org/​ u ploads/​ digital_​library_​document/​16thSummit-​Declaration29April10.pdf (accessed 19 September 2019).

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‘Seventeenth SAARC Summit Addu Declaration’; available at: https://​mea.gov. in/b​ ilateral-d​ ocuments.htm?dtl/​16124/​Seventeenth+SAARC+Summit+Addu+ Declaration++Building+Bridges (accessed 19 September 2019). ‘Kathmandu Declaration’ (2014); available at:  https://​mea.gov.in/​bilateral-​ documents.htm?dtl/​24375/​KATHMANDU+DECLARATION+Eighteenth+ SAARC+Summit+Kathmandu+Nepal+2627+November+2014 (accessed 19 September 2019). On the conventions and agreements, see ‘Compilation of SAARC Charter/​ Conventions/​A greements (1985–​2 016)’, SAARC Secretariat; available at:  http://​saarc-​sec.org/​download/​publications/​compilation_​of_​Charter,_​conv_​ 20161227112809.pdf (accessed 26 October 2019). S. Narayan, ‘SAARC and South Asian Economic Integration’, in S.D. Muni, ed, The Emerging Dimensions of SAARC (New Delhi: Foundation Books, 2010), p 37. ‘SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA)’; available at:  http://​ www.worldtradelaw.net/​fta/​agreements/​saptafta.pdf.download (accessed 20 September 2019). Seekkuwa Wasam Hirantha, ‘From SAPTA to SAFTA: gravity analysis of South Asian free trade’, Department of Economics, Nagoya University, Japan, 2003; available at: https://​www.etsg.org/​ETSG2004/​Papers/​hirantha.pdf (accessed 28 October 2019). They include trade barriers, inadequate trade facilitation mechanisms and regulated investment regimes. Nitish Sengupta and Arindam Banik, ‘Regional trade and investment:  case of SAARC’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol 32, no 46 (1997), pp 2930–​1. A.R. Kemal, ‘Exploring Pakistan’s regional economic cooperation potential’, The Pakistan Development Review, vol 43, no 4 (2004), pp 313–​34. Nihal Pitigala, ‘What does regional trade in South Asia reveal about future trade integration? Some Empirical Evidence’, World Bank Policy Research, working paper 3497 (March 2005); available at:  file://​/​C:/​Users/​pratm/​Downloads/​ What_​Does_​Regional_​Trade_​in_​South_​Asia_​Reveal_​abou.pdf (accessed 28 October 2019). Selim Raihan, ‘SAFTA and the South Asian countries: quantitative assessments of potential implications’, MPRA Paper 37884, University Library of Munich, Germany, 2012; available at: https://m ​ pra.ub.uni-m ​ uenchen.de/​37884/​1/​MPRA_​ paper_​37884.pdf (accessed 28 October 2019). For a discussion on sub-​regionalism, see Vikash Kumar, ‘Sub-​Regionalism in South Asia: A Case Study of the Bangladesh–​Bhutan–​Nepal–​India Motor Vehicle Agreement’, Strategic Analysis, vol 41, no 1 (2017), pp 1–​13. Although SASEC was initially conceived in terms of the four BBIN states, the Maldives and Sri Lanka were inducted into it in March 2014. The patterns of South Asia’s international relations have been discussed in Chapter 1. Manzoor Ahmad, ‘SAARC Summits 1985–​2016: The Cancellation Phenomenon’, IPRI Journal, vol 17, no 1 (Winter 2017), pp 43–​71. ‘FO explains why Pakistan quits SAARC satellite project’, Dawn, 6 May 2017. Bhumitra Chakma, Strategic Dynamics and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in South Asia (Bern: Peter Lang, 2004). Chakma, Strategic Dynamics and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in South Asia. Chakma, Strategic Dynamics and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in South Asia. Padmaja Murthy, ‘The Gujral Doctrine and beyond’, Strategic Analysis, vol 23, no 4 (1999), pp 639–​52.

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Peter R. Lavoy, ed, Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, ‘US Crisis Management in South Asia’s Twin Peaks Crisis’, Report 57, The Stimson Centre, 2006; available at: https://​www. stimson.org/​sites/​default/​files/​file-​attachments/​Twin_P ​ eaks_C ​ risis.pdf (access 21 October 2019). S. Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, ‘The Jihad Paradox:  Pakistan and Islamist Militancy in South Asia’, International Security, vol 37, no 1 (2012), pp 111–​41. For a discussion on this, see P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Stephen P.  Cohen, eds, Four Crises and a Peace Process (Washington, DC:  Brookings Institution, 2007); Sajad Padder, ‘The Composite Dialogue between India and Pakistan:  Structure, Process and Agency’, Heidelberg Working paper no 65 (February 2012); available at: http://​archiv.ub.uni-​heidelberg.de/​volltextserver/​ 13143/​1/​Heidelberg_​Papers_​65_​Padder.pdf (accessed 23 October 2019). Gethin Chamberlain, ‘Mumbai terror attacks: Nightmare in the lap of luxury’, The Guardian, 30 November 2008. Smruti S. Pattanaik, ‘Sub-​regionalism as New Regionalism in South Asia: India’s Role’, Strategic Analysis, vol 40, no 3 (2016), pp 210–​17. In its manifesto in the 2019 Indian general elections, the BJP stated that they would prioritize BIMSTEC over SAARC. They won the election and formed the government. It is apparent that the party has kept its manifesto pledge so far which is set to continue at least in the foreseeable future.

Chapter 6 1

2

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4

5

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Trans-​regional initiatives are a growing trend in Asia. See, K. Yhome and Rajeev Ranjan Chaturvedy, eds, Emerging Trans-​regional Corridors: South and Southeast Asia, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, 2017; available at:  https://​www. orfonline.org/​wp-​content/​uploads/​2017/​01/​GP-O ​ RF-T ​ ransregional-C ​ orridors. pdf (accessed 3 November 2019); Harkan Neadan Toppo, ‘India’s Interests in Emerging Subregional Cooperation:  Opportunities and Challenges’, Jadavpur Journal of International Relations, vol 20, no 1 (2016), pp 33–​64. For a discussion on this, see Seiji F.  Naya and Karen Eggleston Lee, ‘The characteristics of Asia–​Pacific growth triangles’, Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, vol 1, no 1 (1996), pp 123–​9. For a discussion on the BBIN initiative, see Ashish Shukla, ‘Sub-​regional Cooperation under BBIN Framework: An Analysis’, Issue Brief, Indian Council of World Affairs, 4 January 2019; available at:  https://​icwa.in/​pdfs/​IB/​2014/​ BBINFrameworkIB04012019.pdf (accessed 30 July 2019). V.P. Haran, ‘Water and hydropower cooperation in BBIN countries: policies and way forward’, International Journal of Water Resources Development (published online 28 August 2018), pp 1–​15; available at: https://​www.tandfonline.com/​doi/​pdf/​ 10.1080/​07900627.2018.1503076?needAccess=true (accessed 4 August 2019). Mahendra Lama, ‘BBIN Initiatives: Options for Cross-​Border Energy Exchange’, ORF Issue Brief, no 137, April 2016; available at: https://w ​ ww.orfonline.org/w ​ p-​ content/​uploads/​2016/​04/​Issue-​Brief_​137_​MLama.pdf (accessed 29 July 2019). Parthapratim Pal, ‘Intra-​BBIN Trade: Opportunities and Challenges’, Issue Brief, Issue no 135 (March 2016); available at: https://​www.orfonline.org/​wp-​content/​ uploads/​2016/​03/​ORF-​Issue-​Brief_​135.pdf (accessed 4 August 2019).

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Pal, ‘Intra-​BBIN Trade: Opportunities and Challenges’. Kayes Mohammad Sohel, ‘Three more land ports in the offing under BBIN initiative’, Dhaka Tribune, 26 September 2016; ‘Nakugaon Land Port to be used for BBIN transit’, bdnews24.com, 18 June 2015. Smruti S. Pattanaik, ‘Pegging Sub-​regionalism with Bilateralism’, The Daily Star, 9 June 2015; available at: https://​www.thedailystar.net/​op-​ed/​politics/​pegging-​ sub-​regionalism-​bilateralism-​94120 (accessed 20 July 2019). The agreement was originally formulated at the 18th summit at Kathmandu in November 2014, but it could not be concluded due to Pakistan’s last minute refusal to sign it. The Bhutanese parliament has failed to ratify it because of the fear that it would be damaging to the country’s environment. See, ‘Won’t be able to ratify BBIN motor vehicle pact: Bhutan’, The Economic Times, 28 April 2017. Pratim Ranjan Bose, ‘Bhutan says exit from BBIN motor vehicle pact is temporary’, BusinessLine, 11 January 2018. ‘BBIN Motor Vehicle Agreement Unlocks Northeast India, Grows South Asian Business Linkages’, India Briefing, 27 October 2017; available at:  https://​www. india-​briefing.com/​news/​bbin-​motor-​vehicle-​agreement-​unlocks-​northeast-​ india-​10941.html/​ (accessed 5 August 2019). Although SASEC was initially conceived in terms of the four BBIN states, the Maldives and Sri Lanka were inducted into it in March 2014. Samudra Gupta Kashyap, ‘Through Bangladesh, a development shortcut for Northeast’, The Indian Express, 30 November 2015. For a discussion on this, see Vikash Kumar, ‘Sub-​Regionalism in South Asia: A Case Study of the Bangladesh–​Bhutan–​Nepal–​India Motor Vehicles Agreement’, Strategic Analysis, vol 41, no 1 (2017), pp 1–​13. Selim Raihan, ‘Sub-​regional cooperation can be the answer’, The Daily Star, 2 October 2016. India has traditionally been an important factor in Bangladesh’s domestic politics. Indeed, the Bangladesh polity may be divided into two groups: one group is ‘pro-​ India’ and the other one is ‘anti-​India’. The transit issue has been a victim of the Bangladesh politics. For a general discussion on the impact of this division in the Bangladesh politics and its impact on domestic politics, see Bhumitra Chakma, ‘Demilitarization:  the Bangladesh Experience’, in Rajesh Basrur and Kartik Bommakanti, eds, Demilitarising the State: The South and Southeast Asian Experience (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Affairs, Nanyang Technological University, 2012), pp 33–​55. Aryaman Bhatnagar and Ritika Passi, eds, Neighbourhood First: Navigating Ties under Modi (New Delhi: Global Policy Journal and Observer Research Foundation, 2016). Patricia Uberoi, ‘The BCIM Forum: Retrospect and Prospect’ Working Paper no 1, 2013, Institute of Chinese Studies, New Delhi; available at: https://​www.icsin. org/​uploads/​2015/​04/​12/​df72872d10c0497dadfb52322bafd900.pdf (accessed 2 August 2019). Rehman Sobhan, Transforming Eastern South Asia: Building Growth Zones for Economic Cooperation (Dhaka: University Press Ltd, 1999); Rehman Sobhan, Rediscovering the Southern Silk Route: Integrating Asia’s Transport Infrastructure (Dhaka: University Press Ltd, 2000). Mustafizur Rahman, ‘BCIM-​economic corridor: An emerging opportunity’, The Daily Star, 15 March 2014. Rahman, ‘BCIM-​economic corridor: An emerging opportunity’.

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Saibal Dasgupta, ‘Plan for economic corridor linking India to China approved’, Times of India, 20 December 2013. ‘Kolkata-​Kunming rally begins’, The Hindu, 23 February 2013; available at http://​www.thehindu.com/​news/​international/​kolkatakunming-​rally-​begins/​ article4446805.ece (accessed 26 November 2019). Syed Sajjad Ali, ‘Four-​nation connect in friendship car rally’, The Hindu, 28 November 2018. ‘Joint Statement on the State Visit of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to India’, 20 May 2013; available at: https://​mea.gov.in/​bilateral-​documents.htm?dtl/​21723/​ Joint+Statement+on+the+State+Visit+of+Chinese++Li+Keqiang+to+India (accessed 26 November 2019). ‘BCIM corridor gets push after first official-​level talks in China’, The Hindu, 21 December, 2013; available at:  http://​www.thehindu.com/​news/​ international/​world/​bcim-​corridor-​gets-​push-​after-​first-​officiallevel-​talks-​in-​ china/​article5483848.ece (accessed 26 November 2019). ‘Joint Statement between the India and China during Prime Minister’s visit to China’, 15 May 2015, Press Information Bureau, Government of India; available at http:// ​ p ib.nic.in/ ​ n ewsite/ ​ P rintRelease.aspx?relid=121755 (accessed 26 November 2019). K. Yhome, ‘The BCIM economic corridor:  Prospects and challenges’, Commentary, 10 February 2017; available at: https://​www.orfonline.org/​research/​ the-b​ cim-e​ conomic-c​ orridor-p​ rospects-a​ nd-c​ hallenges/​ (accessed 1 August 2019). Uberoi, ‘The BCIM Forum: Retrospect and Prospect’. Rahman, ‘BCIM-​economic corridor: An emerging opportunity’. Nafees Imtiaz Islam, Mohammad Monir Hossain and Sabiha Matin, ‘Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-​EC): Next Window for Economic Development in Asia’, Daffodil International University Journal of Business and Economics, vol 9, no 1 (2015), pp 131–​49. Beijing identified the BCIM-​EC as one of the six corridors in the BRI project. Bhumitra Chakma, ‘The BRI and India’s Neighbourhood’, Strategic Analysis, vol 43, no 3 (2019), pp 183–​6. Atul Aneja, ‘Bangladesh–​China–​India–​Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor no longer listed under BRI umbrella’, The Hindu, 28 April 2019. Yhome, ‘The BCIM economic corridor: Prospects and Challenges’. Chapter 2 of this book presents a discussion on this issue. Constantino Xavier, ‘Bridging the Bay of Bengal: Toward a Stronger BIMSTEC’, Carnegie India, February 2018; available at: https://​carnegieendowment.org/​files/​ CP_​325_​Xavier_​Bay_​of_​Bengal_​INLINE.pdf (accessed 28 July 2019). World Intellectual Property Organization, ‘Framework Agreement on the BIMST-​ EC Free Trade Area and its Protocol and the Declaration Establishing the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-​Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation’, June 1997, http://​www.wipo.int/​wipolex/​en/​other_​treaties/​text.jsp?file_​id=173501, quoted in Xavier, ‘Bridging the Bay of Bengal: Toward a Stronger BIMSTEC’. Xavier, ‘Bridging the Bay of Bengal: Toward a Stronger BIMSTEC’. Government of India, Prime Minister’s Office, Press Information Bureau, ‘BIMSTEC Leaders’ Retreat 2016 Outcome Document’, 17 October 2016; available at: http://​pib.nic.in/​newsite/​PrintRelease.aspx?relid=151717 (accessed 26 November 2019).

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47 48

49 50 51

‘New Delhi sees “virtue” in Bay of Bengal grouping BIMSTEC’, bdnews24.com, 24 July 2019; available at: https://​bdnews24.com/​economy/​2019/​07/​24/​india-​ sees-​virtue-​in-​bay-​of-​bengal-​g rouping-​bimstec (accessed 29 July 2019). Narendra Modi, ‘Prime Minister’s Speech at 2014 SAARC Summit in Nepal’, 26 November 2014; available at:  http:// ​ w ww.narendramodi.in/​ t ext-​ o f-​ prime-​ministers-​speech-​at-​2014-​saarc-​summit-​in-​nepal-​6941 (accessed 26 November 2019). Xavier, ‘Bridging the Bay of Bengal: Toward a Stronger BIMSTEC’. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, ‘Prime Minister’s Message on 20th Anniversary of Establishment of BIMSTEC, 6 June 2017; available at: http://​ www.mea.gov.in/ ​ S peeches- ​ S tatements.htm?dtl/​ 2 8514/​ P rime_​ M inisters_​ message_​on_​20th_​anniversary_​of_​establishment_​of_​BIMSTEC (accessed 26 November 2019). Xavier, ‘Bridging the Bay of Bengal: Toward a Stronger BIMSTEC’. Seshadri Chari, ‘Strengthening BIMSTEC Secretariat’, in BIMSTEC: The Road Ahead, Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS), 2016, p 11; available at:  https://​www.ris.org.in/​sites/​default/​files/​BIMSTEC%20 Report%20%283%29.pdf (accessed 26 November 2019). Xavier, ‘Bridging the Bay of Bengal: Toward a Stronger BIMSTEC’. Quoted in Xavier, ‘Bridging the Bay of Bengal: Toward a Stronger BIMSTEC’. For example, there has been a call for building a ‘Bay of Bengal community’ around the Bay. See, Xavier, ‘Bridging the Bay of Bengal: Toward a Stronger BIMSTEC’. In general, a flurry of new research activities on the potential of the BIMSTEC indicates this trend.

Chapter 7 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

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Imtiaz H.  Bokhari, ‘South Asian Regional Cooperation:  Progress, Problems, Potential, and Prospects’, Asian Survey, vol 25, no 4 (April 1985), p 371. Pramod Kumar Mishra, ‘Toward a Framework of South Asian Regional Cooperation: Colombo to Kathmandu’, Foreign Affairs Report, vol 31, 12 December 1982, p 213. Saman Kelegama, ‘Strengthening SAARC’s institutional structure’, The Daily Star, 8 March 2015. Dash notes that this is the general view among observers. See, Kishore Dash, ‘The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation in South Asia’, Pacific Affairs, vol 9, no 2 (1996), p 188. For a discussion on the postponement of SAARC summits, see Manzoor Ahmad, ‘SAARC Summits 1985–​2016: The Cancellation Phenomenon’, IPRI Journal, vol 17, no 1 (Winter 2017), pp 43–​71. Garima Sahdev and Geetanjali Nataraj, ‘Sub-​regionalism is superseding a stagnant SAARC’, EASTASIFORUM, 23 February 2019; available at:  https://​www. eastasiaforum.org/​2019/​02/​23/​sub-​regionalism-i​ s-s​ uperseding-a​ -s​ tagnant-s​ aarc/​ (accessed 26 August 2019). It is noteworthy that the English language is one of the official languages of India today. Since 1947, India and Pakistan have fought four wars (1947–​48, 1965, 1971 and 1999) and went through frequent crises. The two countries have yet to reconcile. Asif Bin Ali, ‘In Which Direction is South Asian University Headed?’, The Daily Star, 24 October 2019.

206

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‘SAARC comes out with poverty profile’, The Economic Times, 2 October 2013. Mahendra Lama, ‘BBIN Initiatives: Options for Cross-​Border Energy Exchange’, ORF Issue Brief, no 137, April 2016; available at: https://w ​ ww.orfonline.org/w ​ p-​ content/​uploads/​2016/​04/​Issue-​Brief_​137_​MLama.pdf (accessed 29 July 2019). For a discussion on border haats, see Pallab Bhattacharya, ‘Two new borders haats in the offing’, The Daily Star, 15 May 2019; ‘Bangladesh–​India Border Haats and their Impacts on Poverty Reduction’, CUTS Project Brief, August 2015; available at: https://​www.cuts-​citee.org/​pdf/​Bangladesh-​India_​Border_​Haats_​and_​their_​ Impacts_​on_​Poverty_​Reduction.pdf (accessed 21 October 2019). T.V. Paul, ‘Why Has the India–​Pakistan Rivalry Been so Enduring? Power Asymmetry and an Intractable Conflict’, Security Studies, vol 15, no 4 (October 2006), pp 600–​30. T.V. Paul, ed, The India–​Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005). For a discussion on this, see Manzoor Ahmad Naazer, ‘SAARC Summit Diplomacy and Its Impact on Indo–​Pakistan Relations (1985–​2014)’, FWU Journal of Social Sciences, Part-​1, vol 12, no 1 (Summer 2018), pp 67–​75. Altaf Pervez, ‘The death of SAARC for whose interest’ (in Bangla), Prothom Alo, 26 August 2019. Imtiaz H. Bokhari, ‘South Asian Regional Cooperation’, p 371. Quoted in Kelegama, ‘Strengthening SAARC’s institutional structure’. Mahendra P. Lama, ‘SAARC Integrated Programme of Action: Towards More Effective Cooperation’, South Asian Survey, vol 5, no 1 (1998), pp 39–​56. For a scholarly discussion on this, see S. Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, ‘The Jihad Paradox: Pakistan and Islamist Militancy in South Asia’, International Security, vol 37, no 1 (2012), pp 111–​41. S. Narayan, ‘SAARC and South Asian Economic Integration’, in S.D. Muni, ed, The Emerging Dimensions of SAARC (New Delhi: Foundation Books, 2010), p 49. ‘The Unmagnificent Seven’, The Economist, 24 January 2002; http://​www. economist.com/​displaystory.cfm?story_​id=954547 World Bank, ‘The Potential for Intra-​regional Trade for South Asia’, 24 May 2016; available at: https://​www.worldbank.org/​en/​news/​infographic/​2016/​05/​ 24/​the-​potential-​of-​intra-​regional-​trade-​for-​south-​asia Lawrence Saez, The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC): An emerging collaborative architecture (London:  Palgrave Macmillan, Routledge, 2011), p 42. Thomas P Thornton, ‘Regional Organizations in Conflict Management’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol 518, (November 1991), p 135. Bhumitra Chakma, ‘South Asia’s Realist Fascination and the Alternatives’, Contemporary Security Policy, vol 30, no 3 (December 2009), pp 395–​420. For an analysis of this point, see Shelton U. Kodikara, Strategic Factors in Interstate Relations in South Asia, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, No 19, a publication of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, the Research School of Pacific Studies and the Australian National University, Canberra, 1979; available at: http://s​ dsc.bellschool.anu.edu.au/s​ ites/d​ efault/fi ​ les/p​ ublications/a​ ttachments/​ 2016-​03/​sdsc-​kodikara.pdf Chakma, ‘South Asia’s Realist Fascination and the Alternatives’. Shelton U.  Kodikara, ed, External Compulsions of South Asian Politics (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993), p 8.

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38 39

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US National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2004); available at http://​www.foia.cia.gov/​ 2020/​2020.pdf W.P.S. Sidhu and Shruti Godbole, ‘Neighbourhood first:  Bilateralism trumps regionalism’, Brookings India; available at:  http://​www.brookings.in/​in-​focus/​ neighbourhood-​first-​bilateralism-​trumps-​regionalism/ (accessed 14 January 2017).​ Devin T. Hagerty, ‘India’s Regional Security Doctrine, Asian Survey, vol 31, no 4 (April 1991), pp 351–​63. One such example is the so-​called ‘Gujral Doctrine’. When Inder K. Gujral became prime minister for a brief period from April 1997 to March 1998, he adopted a policy of ‘non-​reciprocity’ toward India’s smaller neighbours. For a discussion on the Gujral doctrine, see Padmaja Murthy, ‘The Gujral Doctrine and Beyond’, Strategic Analysis, vol 23, no 4 (1999), pp 639–​52. Howard Schaffer and Teresita Schaffer, ‘Better Neighbours? India and South Asian Regional Politics’, SAIS Review, vol 18, no 1 (Winter–​Spring 1998), p 111. Ananya Mukherjee Reed, ‘Regionalization in South Asia: Theory and Practice’, Pacific Affairs, vol 70, no 2 (Summer 1999), p 244. For a historical overview of Pakistan’s dependence on US support through a policy of offshore balancing, see Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, ‘The Making of US Foreign Policy for South Asia: Offshore Balancing in Historical Perspective’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol 41, no 8 (January 2006), pp 703–​9. Chakma, ‘South Asia’s realist fascination and the alternatives’. Akmal Hussain, ‘The Politics of Regional Cooperation in South Asia: SAARC and Regional Order’, in Bhumitra Chakma, ed, South Asia in Transition: Democracy, Political Economy and Security (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp 230–​46. Saez, The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, p 26. SAARC, SAARC Vision Beyond the Year 2000: Report of the SAARC Group of Eminent Persons Established by the Ninth SAARC Summit (New Delhi:  Shipra Publications, 1999). S.D. Muni, ed, The Emerging Dimensions of SAARC (New Delhi:  Foundation Books, 2010). Partha S.  Ghosh, ‘Region without Regionalism:  Cooperation in South Asia’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol LI, no 32 (6 August 2016), pp 114–​21. The SAFTA, which was concluded in 2004, set 2016 to fully implement the agreement.

Chapter 8 1

2

3

It should be noted that there are other theoretical frameworks that are used to illustrate regionalism. For example, in the case of European integration, approaches such as ‘inter-​governmentalism’, federalism and so on are used. This chapter is not taking them into account because the analysis here is built primarily from the standpoint of IR. Also, these theoretical perspectives can broadly be incorporated within the frameworks of the three theoretical approaches that are discussed in this chapter. T.V. Paul, ed, International Relations Theory and Regional Transformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). This point is illustrated in the Introduction.

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Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (London: Routledge, 2001). Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, The Making of Global International Relations: Origins and Evolution of IR at Its Centenary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019). Peter J. Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005). Gil Merom, ‘Realist Hypothesis on Regional Peace’, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol 26, no 1 (March 2001). Emajuddin Ahmed, SARC:  Seeds of Harmony (Dacca:  University Press Ltd, 1984), p 9. For a discussion on Bangladesh foreign policy under the Zia regime, see S.R. Chakravarty, ed, Foreign Policy of Bangladesh (New Delhi:  Har-​Anand Publications, 1994). For a general discussion on how authoritarian rulers promote regionalism to boost their regimes, see Alexander Libman and Anastassia V. Obydenkova, ‘Understanding Authoritarian Regionalism’, Journal of Democracy, vol 29, no 4 (2018), pp 151–​65. It should be noted that although India has an overwhelming power preponderance compared to all states of the region combined, Pakistan has successfully challenged the Indian preponderance, particularly through ‘offshore balancing’ in which it received outside assistance to balance out the Indian power. After the introduction of nuclear weapons in the arsenal of Pakistan, the regional structure has become, as illustrated earlier, a sort of bipolar system. Kishore Dash, ‘The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation in South Asia’, Pacific Affairs, vol 69, no 2 (Summer 1996), p 189. Tanja A.  Borzel, ‘Theorizing Regionalism:  Cooperation, Integration, and Governance’, in Tanja A. Borzel and Thomas Risse, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism. In the early 2010s, intra-​regional trade in South Asia was around 5 per cent compared with Europe’s 65 per cent and South East Asia’s 36 per cent. See, Bhumitra Chakma, South Asia in Transition: Democracy, Political Economy and Security (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). ‘SAARC has ‘survived’ not ‘triumphed’:  Nawaz Sharif ’, Indian Express, 8 December 2016. For a discussion on this point, see Imtiaz Ahmed and Meghna Guhathakurta, SAARC: Beyond State-​centric Cooperation (Dhaka: Centre for Social Studies, 1992). Ananya Mukherjee Reed, ‘Regionalization in South Asia: Theory and Praxis’, Pacific Affairs, vol 70, no 2 (1997), p 214. Jawed Naqvi, ‘How Buddhism Connects SAARC’, Dawn, 6 December 2016. For a discussion on how balance of power functions in South Asia, see T.V. Paul, ‘Why Has the India–​Pakistan Rivalry Been so Enduring? Power Asymmetry and an Intractable Conflict’, Security Studies, vol 15, no 4 (October 2006), pp 600–​30. On the India–​Pakistan arms race, see Chapter 4 of Bhumitra Chakma, South Asia’s Nuclear Security (London: Routledge, 2015), pp 83–​102. Amitav Acharya, ‘Theorising the international relations of Asia:  necessity or indulgence?’ Some reflections’, The Pacific Review, vol 30, no 6 (2017), pp 816–​28. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, ‘Why is there no non-​Western international relations theory? An introduction’, International Relations of the Asia–​Pacific, vol 7, no 3 (September 2007), pp 287–​312. Acharya, ’Theorising the international relations of Asia: necessity or indulgence? Some reflections’.

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25

26

Yaqing Qin, ‘A Relational Theory of World Politics’, International Studies Review, vol 18, no 1 (2016), pp 33–​47; Yaqing Qin, A Relational Theory of World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). Mohammed Nuruzzaman, ‘Western and Islamic International Theories:  A Comparative Analysis’, International Studies, vol 55, no 2 (2018), pp 106–​29. Acharya, ‘Theorising the international relations of Asia: necessity or indulgence? Some reflections’.

Conclusion 1 2

3

4 5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

Khaled Ahmed, ‘Why SAARC is still relevant’, The Indian Express, 12 January 2019. For example, the Bangladesh proposal to establish a regional organization in South Asia specifically noted to form an ‘ASEAN-​like’ association, which implied that the demonstration effect of regionalism elsewhere was a causal factor in the rise of SAARC. Also, as analysed in Chapter 4, SAARC adopted neo-​functionalism, borrowing from the theory and practice of European integration, as the basis of regional cooperation that highlighted the demonstration effect of regionalism in other parts of the world in the formation and process of SAARC. ‘Narendra Modi proposes SAARC fund to tackle coronavirus, lays stress on joint efforts,’ The Economic Times, 15 March 2020 S.D. Muni, ‘India has done well to revive SAARC,’ Hindustan Times, 16 March 2020. Manorama Kohli, ‘India and South Asian Regional Cooperation’, Indian Journal of Political Science, vol 49, no 3 (1988), pp 301–​11. Rajiv Kumar, ‘Is A Successful SAARC An Imperative For India?’ in Rafiq Dossani, Daniel C. Sneider and Vikram Sood, eds, Does South Asia Exist? Prospects for Regional Integration (Stanford:  The Walter H.  Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center, 2010), pp 99–​114. Bhumitra Chakma, ‘The BRI and India’s Neighbourhood’, Strategic Analysis, vol 43, no 3 (2019), pp 183–​6. ‘Excluding Pakistan, India backs sub-​regional economic bloc’, The News International, 9 September 2019. Geeta Mohan, ‘BIMSTEC cannot replace SAARC: Nepal’s pm KP Sharma Oli’, India Today, 1 June 2019. Shyam Saran, ‘South Asia’s Mounting Ecological Challenge: Regional Cooperation is the Only Answer’ in Rajiv Kumar and Omita Goyal, eds, Thirty Years of SAARC: Society, Culture and Development (New Delhi: Sage, 2016), pp 53–​64. This was acknowledged by the former Indian prime minister, Manmohan Singh. For this, see Nageshwar Patnaik, ‘We can choose our friends … not our neighbours’, The Economic Times, 29 August 2006. Quezon City Radio Filipinas in English, 4 February 1994, in FBIS, Daily Report East Asia, 7 February 1994, pp 59–​60, quoted in Sheldon W. Simon, ‘Realism and neoliberalism: international relations theory and Southeast Asian security’, The Pacific Review, vol 8, no 1 (1995), pp 19–​20.

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234

Index 1971 India–​Pakistan war  24, 26 see also Bangladesh war of independence 2001–​02 military stand-​off  33, 34, 116 20th century  5, 59 21st century  159 A absolute gain  162 Acharya, Amitav  6, 12, 13, 39 ‘Act East’, India’s policy of  47, 48, 125, 130, 133, 192 ADB  15, 41, 103, 112, 123, 134, 176 Addu city  104 Adler, Emanuel  7, 184 Afghanistan  Soviet invasion of  27, 70, 73 superpower rivalry  27 war  27, 28, 30, 158 Afro–​Asian solidarity  42 agency–​structure debate  159 alliance  156 formation  9 military  10 Pakistan–​China nuclear  23 Pakistan–​United States  22 America  see US/​A Anderson, Benedict  13 see also imagined community Anderson, Kym  40 APEC  7 arms race, India–​Pakistan  70, 165 Article 370 (of Indian constitution)  36 ASA  61 ASEAN  1, 5, 7, 9, 17, 46, 55, 57, 62, 63, 66–​9, 72, 74, 79, 86, 88, 96, 128, 130, 132, 137, 148, 155, 160, 161, 164, 170–​3, 191, 194, 199, 210 free trade area  128 see also Bangkok Treaty ASEAN–​China Free Trade Area  128 ASEAN–​India Free Trade Area  128 Asia–​Africa Growth Corridor  36

Asia–​Pacific  13 Asia–​Pacific Economic Cooperation  see APEC Asian Development Bank  see ADB Asian Federation  59, 60 South  59 Asian Relations Conference  1947  42, 60 1949  42, 59, 60 Asian solidarity  42, 58, 60 Asian values  164 Assam  189 anti-​Muslim movement  37 Association of Southeast Asia  see ASA Association of Southeast Asian Nations  see ASEAN Australia  36 Awami League  26 government  37, 126 Ayoob, Mohammed  17, 198 B Baghdad Pact  22 Bagui Conference  42, 60 balance of power  9, 13, 37, 50, 70, 150, 176 regional  8, 164 Bali Action Plan  104 Bandaranaike, S.W.R.D.  60 Bandung  42, 60 bandwagoning  50, 51 Bangalore  92 Bangkok  129 Bangkok Treaty  5, 57, 61 Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal  see BBIN Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar Economic Corridor  see BCIM-​EC Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand Economic Cooperation  see BIMST-​EC

235

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Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Thailand Economic Cooperation  see BIST-​EC Bangladesh Nationalist Party  37, 124 Bangladesh War of Independence  24, 26, 70, 73 see also 1971 India–​Pakistan war Banik, Arindam  111 Bay of Bengal  123, 130–​5 Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-​ Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation  see BIMSTEC BBIN  3, 4, 15, 46, 48, 55, 100, 112, 118, 121–​6, 131, 134, 135, 141, 142, 147, 152, 176, 177 BBIN Growth Quadrangle  see SAGQ BCIM-​EC  15, 47, 48, 55, 113, 121, 126–​9, 131, 134, 135, 176, 177 Beijing  26, 36, 129 Belt and Road Initiative  see BRI Bengali (language)  52 Bengali freedom fighters  52 Bergmann, Julian  81 Bharatbarsha  43 Bharatiya Janata Party  see BJP Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali  26, 53, 71 bilateralism, India’s policy of  71, 75, 83, 149 BIMST-​EC  130 BIMSTEC  3, 4, 15, 47, 48, 55, 100, 112, 113, 118, 121, 125, 129–​35, 139, 176–​8, 182, 203 bipolarity  61, 66, 155, 156, 158, 209 tight  19 Birendra Bir Bikram Shah, King  63 BIST-​EC  129, 130 BJP  32, 35, 182, 203 Bokhari, Imtiaz H.  67, 143 Bollywood  52 ‘boom and bust’ economy  44 border dispute  India–​China  23 border haat  142 bottom-​up process  6, 175 Brasstacks  28 Brazil  10 Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa  see BRICS Brecher, Michael  191 BRI  35, 36, 48, 125, 129, 132, 133, 159, 175 BRICS  3 summit  47, 131 Britain  19 British  20, 41, 70, 71, 139, 185 India  21 Raj  49 Buddhism  164, 165

Burma  59, 62 see also Myanmar Bush Sr, George  31 C CAA  37, 189 Callaghan, James  68 Cancun, Mexico  104 Carter, Jimmy  68 CENTO  22, 50, 61 Central Asia  41, 47–​9, 53 Central Treaty Organization  see CENTO Centre for Policy Dialogue  126 Centre for Policy Research  126 Ceylon  59 Chabahar port  47 China  18, 23, 26, 29, 35, 36, 44, 47, 48, 50, 51, 55, 56, 59, 61, 74, 77, 104, 125, 127–​9, 132–​4, 149, 157, 159, 175, 189, 194 nuclear test  23, 69 ‘China factor’  51 China–​Pakistan Economic Corridor  see CPEC Chittagong  127 Chowdhury, Humayun Rashid  85 Citizenship Amendment Act  see CAA climate change  104 ‘cognitive region’  7, 184 Cold War  19, 22, 27, 29, 50, 61, 62, 66–​9, 156, 158, 171, 193 end of  30, 31, 34, 50, 116 post-​  19, 30, 32, 50 collective action problem  11 Colombo  29, 35, 60, 83, 85, 90, 94, 102, 104, 106, 108, 110, 132, 137, 171 Colombo Plan  60, 63, 65 Colombo Powers Conference  42, 60 colonialism  59, 61, 63 ‘Committee of the Whole’  84–​6 Commonwealth  64, 170 communist threat  68 China as a source of  23 composite dialogue  34, 117 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty  see CTBT confidence-​building measures  8, 165 constructivism  9, 11–​14, 39, 155, 156, 164, 165, 167, 169, 177 COVID-​19  174, 182 CPEC  35, 48, 55 CTBT  32 custom union  8 D Dalai Lama  23 decolonization  19, 58, 59, 61, 82, 140, 170, 172, 174

236

Index

Delhi Pact  22 democracy  11 deregionalization  6, 44, 45, 71–​3, 139, 174 Desai, Morarji  27, 63, 71 ‘developmental regionalism’  88, 90, 157, 170, 172, 175 Dhaka  3, 26, 36, 65, 66, 82, 86, 88, 92, 97, 101–​3, 106, 108, 124–​7, 130, 131, 137, 171, 176 ‘divide and rule’  41 Dixit, J.N.  45 Doha, A.R. Shamsud  87 Dutch  42, 60

‘Growth Triangle’  7, 46, 121, 122, 134 Gujral Doctrine  31, 208 Gujral, Inder K.  116, 208 Gulf Cooperation Council  see GCC

E East Asia  2, 47, 49, 67, 125, 146, 176, 179, 192 East Pakistan  25 economic reforms  India  45, 73 EEC  5, 86, 171, 201 see also EU ‘enduring rivalry’  18, 23, 69, 70, 139, 142, 143, 163, 170, 174, 189 EU  1, 5, 7–​9, 12, 17, 67, 72, 74, 76, 104, 137, 155, 160, 161, 173, 201 Europe  2, 5, 8, 11, 41, 54, 55, 62, 66, 72, 80, 81, 96, 113, 119, 144, 146, 155, 156, 158, 160–​2, 164, 165, 171, 176, 177 European Coal and Steel Community  5 European Economic Community  see EEC European Union  see EU export-​led economic growth model  45 F F-​16 fighter aircraft  27 federalism  208 ‘forward defence’ doctrine  21, 70 functionalism  81, 99, 106, 108, 110, 198 G Gandhi, Indira  27, 29, 62, 88 Gandhi, Mahatma  164 Gates, Robert  31 Gayoom, Mamoon Abdul  29 GCC  17 Germany  41, 76, 149 Ghosh, Partha S.  45 Glenn–​Symington Amendment  26, 28 ‘Global IR’  16, 155, 165, 166, 177 globalization  5, 6, 19, 45, 46, 67, 156, 163 Goa  47, 131

H Hambantota port  35 Haq, Ziaul  28, 71, 77, 157, 172 Havana  64 hegemon  systemic  9 regional  10 hegemonic stability  10, 156, 158, 159 Heidelberg University  41 Hindi  52, 53 ‘Hindu rate of growth’  73 Hirantha, Seekkuwa Wasam  109 Hoffmann, Stephanie C.  11 Hurrell, Andrew  7, 10 I IGG  95, 104, 108 imagined community  national  7, 13 regional  6, 7, 13, 163 import substitution  44, 45, 72, 73 ‘India factor’  18 ‘Indian Doctrine’  21, 29, 49, 51, 149 Indian National Congress  59, 185 Indian Ocean  49, 105 Indian Ocean Region  see IOR Indian parliament  33, 59 Indo-​centric  18, 43, 49, 77, 148 Indo–​Pacific  36 Indo–​Soviet  alliance  158 friendship treaty  70 Indonesia  42, 60, 62 Indus Water Treaty  22, 189 Integrated Programme of Action see IPA Inter-​Governmental Group  see IGG Inter-​governmentalism  160, 175, 208 Inter-​Services-​Intelligence  see ISI interdependence  8, 81, 111, 112, 122, 138, 173 economic  11, 129 ‘internal colonization’  25 intrusive system  19, 34, 67, 69, 77, 156, 158, 171, 193 IOR  29, 35, 36, 175 IPA  66, 86, 87, 92, 95, 97, 137, 138, 140, 141, 144, 153, 173, 174 Iran  47, 59, 61, 62 Iraq  59 ISI  34

237

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Islamabad  1, 26, 31, 32, 37, 43, 45, 46, 48, 51, 64, 65, 67, 69, 75, 86, 91, 93, 103, 105, 106, 110, 115, 117, 132, 133, 145, 148, 150, 158, 162, 165, 170, 171, 173, 177 Islamic world  53, 157, 166 J Jaamat-​e-​Islami  37, 124 Jaish-​e-​Mohammed  see JeM Jammu and Kashmir  see Kashmir Japan  36, 104 Jayawardene, J.R.  64, 71 JeM  33, 116 Jinnah, Mohammed Ali  19 Jinping, Xi  35 Joint Working Group  see JWG JWG  122–​3 K Kabul  27 Kantian triad  11 Kargil conflict  33, 34, 116 Kashmir  20, 35, 36, 117 1990 crisis  30, 32, 116 dispute  20, 22, 25, 30, 33, 116, 143, 178, 179 war  first  20, 21, 23, 69 second  23, 69 Kathmandu  1, 29, 46, 63, 65, 80, 85, 93, 102, 115, 118, 132, 146, 150, 178 Katzenstein, Peter J.  40, 156 Kaviraj, Sudipta  52 Kemal, A.R.  111 Kequiang, Li  127 Khan, A.Q.  28 Khan, Sahabzada Yaqub  86 Khurshid, Salman  52 Kibria, S.A.M.S.  84 Kissinger, Henry  73 Kodikara, Shelton  148 Kolkata  127 Kunming  47, 113, 127 L Lahore declaration  185 Laskar-​e-​Toiba  see LeT Latin America  10, 156 ‘layered economic region’, idea of  46, 48, 55 LDCs  109–​11 Least Developed Countries  see LDCs LeT  33, 34, 116 Line of Control  see LoC LoC  25, 33

London  23 ‘Look East’, India’s policy of  see ‘Act East’, India’s policy of ‘Look West’  India’s policy of  47, 48 Myanmar policy of  132 Thailand’s policy of  130, 132 M Malaya  59 Malaysia  61, 179 male  29, 46, 50, 66, 88, 94, 99, 101, 106, 108, 110, 112, 122, 123, 134, 176 Mandalay  127 Manila  123 Mayall, James  13 Menon, Krishna  60 Merand, Frederic  11 Merom Gil  10 MFN  108, 109, 146 Middle East  44, 53, 59 see also West Asia Millennium Development Goals  103 Mitrany, David  81 Modi, Narendra  3, 36, 128, 132, 133, 174, 182 Mohamad, Mahatir  179 Mohanan, B.  75 Monroe Doctrine  149 Moscow  28, 30, 67, 68, 70 Most Favoured Nation  see MFN motor vehicle agreement  see MVA multilateralism  71, 75, 83, 131, 149 Mumbai  2008 terrorist attack  34, 117 Muni, S.D.  152 Muslim League  19, 185 mutual defence agreement  22 MVA  105 BBIN  122, 125, 142, 147 SAARC  46, 115, 118, 132, 146, 147, 150 Myanmar  36, 47, 55, 113, 127, 128, 130, 132–​4, 176, 189 Ministry of Trade  126 N NAM  10, 21, 42, 64, 170 nationalism  13 NDA (national democratic alliance) government  192 Nehru, Jawaharlal  21, 42, 59, 60 government  20 ‘Neighbourhood First’  36, 125, 133 neo-​classical realism  11 neo-​colonialism  60

238

Index

neo-​functionalism  14, 72, 80–​2, 85, 88–​90, 96–​8, 100, 115, 138, 141, 143–​5, 153, 160, 161, 164, 173, 174, 198, 201, 210 see also spillover neo-​liberal institutionalism  9–​12, 14, 155, 156, 159, 161–​3, 165, 167, 169, 176, 177 neo-​realism  9–​13, 155, 156, 158, 159, 162, 165, 167, 169, 176, 177 Nepali  52 New York  32, 64, 83 NGO  6 Niemann, Arne  81 non-​governmental organization  see NGO non-​state actors  6, 8, 117, 162 non-​violence  164 non-​Western world  4, 155, 166, 177 Norheim, Hege  40 norm  entrepreneur  12 localization  12 subsidiarity  12, 13 North East India  123, 124, 133 North West Frontier Province  20 NPT  24, 32 nuclear deterrence  31 Nuclear Non-​Proliferation Treaty  see NPT nuclear option  24 nuclear test  India  first  24, 26 in 1998  32, 34, 116 Pakistan  32, 34, 116 O offshore balance  22, 50, 185, 209 OIC  26 One Belt One Road  see BRI OPEC  72 Organization of the Islamic Conference  see OIC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries  see OPEC P Pacific, the  2, 66 Pakistan–​China free trade agreement  48 Pakistan–​US bilateral cooperation agreement  22 Pakistan–​US–​China axis  67 pan-​Asianism  41, 42, 58, 61, 170 Panchsheel  164 partition  of India  19, 21–​3, 26, 41, 52, 73, 185 post-​  163

second  53 Pashtu  52 Pashtun Laskars  20 path dependency  7, 82, 160, 161 Pathankot  117, 189 Paul, T.V.  6, 9, 40 people-​to-​people contact  7, 92, 101, 127, 128, 130, 140, 147, 162, 174 Philippines  42, 61 Piracha, Riaz  84 Pitigala, Nihal  111 pluralism  80 plutonium reprocessing plant  India’s commissioning of  24 political community  Europe as a  8 ‘politics of difference’  41, 51–​4 post-​colonial  6, 42, 71, 72 Pressler Amendment  28, 30, 116 process tracing method  4, 169, 174 protectionism  44, 110, 112, 118, 145, 146, 178 proxy war  28 Pulwama  117, 189 Punjabi  52 Q Quad  36 R Rahman, Mujibar  26 government  70, 76 Rahman, Mustafizur  126, 128 Rahman, Ziaur  62, 63, 64, 71, 72, 74, 76, 77, 137, 157, 170, 198 Raihan, Selim  111 Ranatunga, Kumara  138 RCD  61 Reagan, Ronald  28 ‘regime-​boosting regionalism’  77, 157, 158, 172 regional block  5 Regional Cooperation for Development  see RCD regional order  9–​11 regional security doctrine, Indian  see ‘Indian Doctrine’ regionalism  informal  7 new  5, 170, 175 old  6 soft  7 Third World  10 relationality, theory of  166 relative gain  162 Rohingya refugee crisis  36, 37, 131, 189 rule of origin  111

239

SOUTH ASIAN REGIONALISM

Russia  30 see also Soviet Union S SAARC Agricultural Information Centre  see SAIC SAARC Audio Visual Exchange  see SAVE SAARC Centre for Human Resource Development  94 SAARC Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances  94, 96, 107, 141, 143 SAARC Documentation Centre  93, 94 SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement  see SAPTA SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism  93, 96, 101, 102, 107, 141, 143, 145 SAARC satellite project  115, 141 SAARC Social Charter  102, 141 SAARC Tuberculosis Centre  see STC SAFTA  15, 46, 99, 100, 103, 104, 106–​8, 110–​12, 114, 115, 117–​19, 142, 145–​7, 152, 153, 173 SAGQ  3, 15, 46, 102, 112, 118, 121–​3, 134, 141, 142, 147, 176 SAIC  93, 96, 106, 140, 141 SAPTA  15, 46, 95, 99–​103, 106–​11, 114, 117, 119, 142, 145–​7, 152, 153, 173, 198 SASEC  15, 47, 48, 55, 112, 123, 134, 176 SAVE  92, 93, 140 SEATO  22, 50, 62 Second World War  5, 42, 67 end of  22, 58–​60 post-​  6, 58 security complex  50, 193, 194 security dilemma  11, 116, 148, 149, 153, 162–​4 security regime  8 self-​determination  59 Sengupta, Nitish  111 Sharif, Nawaz  32, 161 Sikkim  21, 24, 26, 27, 31, 50, 71 protectorate of India  21 Simla agreement  25 Sindhi  52 Singh, Hari  20 Singh, Manmohan  127, 128 Sino–​Indian border war  23 SIPRI  185 SNEP  23–​4 South Asia food security  93 South Asia Institute  41 South Asia Sub-​Regional Economic Cooperation  see SASEC

South Asian Commission on Poverty Alleviation  95, 103 South Asian Economic Union  103, 105, 119 South Asian Free Trade Area  see SAFTA South Asian Growth Quadrangle  see SAGQ South Asian University  140 South East Asia  2–​5, 41, 42, 47, 49, 55, 57, 60, 62, 67–​9, 72, 113, 122, 125, 128, 132–​4, 155, 156, 158, 160–​2, 164–​5, 170, 171, 176, 177, 179, 191, 192 South–​South cooperation  72 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization  see SEATO Soviet Union  22, 23, 27, 28, 30, 59, 61, 62, 67–​70, 116, 156, 158, 171, 193 spillover  14, 80–​2, 88, 89, 138, 144, 151, 160, 163, 164, 173 STC  94, 96, 106 sub-​Saharan Africa  2 subordinate state system  9 ‘subterranean nuclear explosive project’  see SNEP supranational  8, 81, 82 T Tagore, Rabindranath  59 Taiyan, Zhang  59 Tamil  52 separatism  29, 87 Tashkent agreement  23 Teesta water treaty  37, 189 Tenshin, Okakura  59 terrorism  4, 92, 93, 141, 145, 178, 181, 200 see also SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism Thailand  47, 55, 61, 113, 129, 130, 132, 133, 176 Thimpu  51, 66, 88, 104 Thornton, Thomas  43, 148 Tibet  23 TNC  113, 130, 176 top-​down process  6, 162, 175 Track I  127 Track II  127 Trade Negotiating Committee  see TNC transit treaty  India–​Bangladesh  122, 124, 125, 204 ‘Treaty of Friendship and Peace’  between India and Bhutan  21 between India and Nepal  21 tripartite Delhi agreement  25 Trump, Donald  35 Turkey  61, 62 ‘two-​nation theory’  19

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Index

U UK  23, 62 UN  20, 30, 41, 58, 59, 64, 83, 104, 157, 170 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  see Soviet Union United Nations  see UN United States  see US/​A ‘unity in diversity’  52 UPA (United Progressive Alliance) government  192 uranium enrichment  28 Urdu  25, 52–​3 Uri  117, 181, 189 US/​A  18, 22, 23, 26–​9, 32–​6, 44, 50, 54, 59, 61, 62, 66, 69, 70, 73, 74, 104, 116, 149, 155, 156, 171, 185 Congress  28 State Department  41 universities  41 US–​China–​Pakistan axis  158 USSR  see Soviet Union Uttar Pradesh  53

W Walt, Stephen  9 Washington  23, 27, 28, 30, 32, 68 West Asia  41, 47, 49, 53, 55, 75, 150 see also Middle East West Bengal  123 World Bank  2, 41, 103 World Trade Organization  see WTO WTO  108–​9 X Xavier, Constantino  132 Y Yhome, K.  129 Yunnan  Academy of Social Sciences  126 province  126, 176 Z Zaidi, S. Akbar  44 zero-​sum politics  11, 162

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