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Table of contents :
PREFACE
INTRODUCTION
Chapter I. PROBLEMS OF MOOD IN SPANISH COMPLEMENTATION
1. Data
1.1. Difference of Meaning
1.2. Differences of Syntactic Behavior: Root Transformations
1.3. More Differences of Syntactic Behavior
2. Analyses of the Data
2.1. Different Underlying Structures
2.11. Different Matrix Verbs
2.12. Different Complementizers
2.13. Different Complement Clauses
2.14. Different Overall Sentential Structures
2.2. Identical Underlying Structures
2.21. Conditions on Rules
2.22. Rules of Complementization
3. Further Data
3.1. Unexpected Indicatives
3.2. Unexpected Subjunctives
Chapter II. THE RULE OF SUBJECT-RAISING
1. Data
2. Analyses of the Data
2.1. The Raising Analysis
2.2. The Equi-NP Deletion Analysis
2.3. The Subjectless Infinitive Analysis
2.4. Chomsky's Latest Analysis
2.5. The Simple Clause Analysis
3. Arguments in favor of Subject-raising
3.1. Subject-raising into Object
3.11. Some Remarks about Equi-NP Deletion
3.12. The Inclusion Constraint
3.13. Negation of Quantifiers
3.14. Pronominalization Constraint
3.15. Pseudo-clefts
3.16. Speaker-oriented Adverbs
3.2. Subject-raising into Subject
3.21. Nouns without Determiner
3.22. Selectional Restrictions
3.23. Non-referential NP's
3.24. Haber
3.25. Idioms
3.26. Duality of Structures
4. The Problem of Meaning
Chapter III. THE RULE OF NEGATIVE-RAISING
1. Data
2. Analyses of the Data
2.1. Syntactic Accounts
2.2. (Interpretive) Semantic Account
2.3. Lexical Account
3. Status of the Arguments for the Spanish Data
3.1. Negative Polarity Items
3.2. Multiple Negation
3.3. Pronominalization
3.4. A Classical Argument against Interpretivism
4. Meaning and the Rule of Neg-raising
4.1. Classes of Neg-raising Verbs
4.2. Unexpected Neg-raisers
Chapter IV. OPTIONAL RULES, PRAGMATICS AND MOOD
1. Pragmatic Differences are also Semantic Differences
2. The Problem of Meaning-preservingness of Transformations
3. Towards Explaining the Relationship among the Optional Transformations
3.1. Assertion and Complementation
3.2. The Negation of Assertion and Indicative Mood
3.3. The Problem of Semi-factives
3.4. A Possible Solution to the Problem of Mood
3.5. Indicative vs. Non-Indicative
3.6. Resistance to Transformations
Chapter V. EPILOGUE AND PROLOGUE
1. Mental Status of the Rules
2. Some Examples
2.1. Indicative vs. Subjunctive Insertion
2.2. Subject-raising
3. Towards Developing a "Recognition" Mechanism
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Linguistische Arbeiten

80

Herausgegeben von Herbert E. Brekle/ Hans Jürgen Heringer, Christian Rohrer, Heinz Vater und Otmar Werner

Gonxita Lieo

Some Optional Rules in Spanish Complementation Towards a study of the speaker's intent

Max Niemeyer Verlag Tübingen 1979

CIP-Kurzlitelaufnahme der Deutschen Bibliothek Lleó, Conxita: Some optional rules in Spanish complementation : towards a study of the speaker's intent / Conxita Lieo. — Tübingen : Niemeyer, 1979. (Linguistische Arbeiten ; 80) ISBN 3-484-10362-0

ISBN 3-484-10362-0 ©

ISSN 0344-6727

Max Niemeyer Verlag Tübingen 1979 Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Ohne ausdrückliche Genehmigung des Verlages ist es auch nicht gestattet, dieses Buch oder Teile daraus auf photomechanischem Wege zu vervielfältigen. Printed in Germany. Druck: fotokop Wilhelm weihert KG, Darmstadt.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

VII

INTRODUCTION

1

c h a p t e r I. PROBLEMS O F M O O D IN S PANISH C O M P L E M E N T A T I O N

4

1. D a t a

4

1.1. D i f f e r e n c e o f M e a n i n g 1.2. D i f f e r e n c e s o f S y n t a c t i c Behavior: R o o t T r a n s f o r m a t i o n s 1.3. M o r e D i f f e r e n c e s o f S y n t a c t i c Behavior 2. A n a l y s e s of the D a t a

11 16

2.1. D i f f e r e n t U n d e r l y i n g S t r u c t u r e s

16

2.11. D i f f e r e n t M a t r i x V e r b s 2.12. D i f f e r e n t C o m p l e m e n t i z e r s 2.13. D i f f e r e n t C o m p l e m e n t C l a u s e s 2.14. D i f f e r e n t Overall S entential S t r u c t u r e s 2.2. Identical U n d e r l y i n g S t r u c t u r e s

16 18 21 25 34

2.21. C o n d i t i o n s o n R u l e s 2.22. R u l e s o f C o m p l e m e n t i z a t i o n 3. F u r t h e r D a t a 3.1. U n e x p e c t e d I n d i c a t i v e s 3.2. U n e x p e c t e d S u b j u n c t i v e s C h a p t e r II. T H E R U L E O F S U B J E C T - R A I S I N G 1.

5 7

Data

38 46 46 50 55 55

2. A n a l y s e s of the D a t a 2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 2.4. 2.5.

34

The Raising Analysis The Equi-NP Deletion Analysis The Subjectless Infinitive Analysis Chomsky's Latest Analysis The Simple Clause Analysis..

3. A r g u m e n t s in favor of S u b j e c t - r a i s i n g 3.1. S u b j e c t - r a i s i n g into O b j e c t 3.11. 3.12. 3.13. 3.14. 3.15. 3.16.

S o m e R e m a r k s a b o u t Equi-NP D e l e t i o n The Inclusion Constraint Negation of Quantifiers Pronominalization Constraint Pseudo-clefts Speaker-oriented Adverbs

57 57 61 62 63 64 64 64 64 66 74 79 83 85

VI 3.2. Subject-raising into S u b j e c t 3.21. 3.22. 3.23. 3.24. 3.25. 3.26.

Nouns without Determiner Selectional Restrictions Non-referential NP's Haber Idioms Duality of S tructures

4. The Problem of Meaning chapter III. THE RULE O F NEGATIVE-RAISING

86 87 88 91 91 94 95 97 103

1. Data

103

2. Analyses of the D a t a

106

2.1. Syntactic Accounts 2.2. (Interpretive) S e m a n t i c Account

106 114

2.3. Lexical Account

118

3. Status of the Arguments for the S p a n i s h Data

121

3.1. Negative Polarity Items 3.2. Multiple Negation 3.3. Pronominalization 3.4. A Classical Argument against Interpretivism 4. Meaning and the Rule of Neg-raising

121 132 138 139 142

4.1. Classes of Neg-raising Verbs 4.2. Unexpected Neg-raisers Chapter IV. OPTIONAL RULES, PRAGMATICS AND MOOD

142 145 152

1. Pragmatic Differences are also Semantic Differences

152

2. The Problem of Meaning-preservingness of Transformations

158

3. Towards Explaining the Relationship among the Optional Transformations

163

3.1. 3.2. 3.3. 3.4. 3.5. 3.6.

163 166 168 175 180 183

Assertion a n d Complementation The Negation of Assertion and Indicative Mood The Problem of S emi-factives A Possible S o l u t i o n to the Problem of M o o d Indicative vs. Non-Indicative Resistance to Transformations

Chapter V. EPILOGUE AND PROLOGUE

186

1. Mental Status of the R u l e s

186

2. S o m e Examples

188

2.1. Indicative vs. S u b j u n c t i v e Insertion 2.2. Subject-raising

189 191

3. Towards Developing a "Recognition" Mechanism

194

BIHLIOGRAJEHY

197

PREFACE

This book is a slightly revised version of my doctoral dissertation,completed in April 1978 and submitted to the University of Washington, as a partial requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The revision has consisted almost exclusively in the shortening of certain parts (especially the Introduction), according to the reoarmendation made by Prof. Christian Rohrer, after reading the original version. I am very grateful to Prof. Sol Saporta and Prof. Heles Contreras, who encouraged my work, not only as members of the doctoral dissertation ocmtiittee but as personal friends, too. Sol Saporta stimulated me, especially at the initial steps and Heles Contreras patiently kept a long correspondence with me, making many valuable suggestions and encouraging me to go on. I am also grateful to Prof. Frederick Nevmeyer, who as member of the dissertation ccnmittee contributed mostly at the final stages. Needless to say, they do not all agree with my ideas; in fact, I thank them too, for the many conversations vre maintained on our disagreements, which forced me to make my position -more explicit. My acknowledgment to Prof. Gustav Ineichen, who made the first moves for the publication of this book. I am indebted to him and to the other Professors of the Seminar für Botanische Philologie at the Universität Göttingen for a free semester which alleged me to finish the Dissertation; and to the Graduate School of the University of Washington, which granted me a W. W. Stout Fellowship to complete the Degree. Finally, I thank Miguel Angel Rubio, who being a biologist often left his bacteria wating in order to discuss with me problems related to the thesis, or to "merely" give me the courage to go on. My deep gratitude to Karola Weingarten who diligently typed this final version of the manuscript. Conxita Lieo

INTRCOUCTICN

In the last ten years, there has been a growing feeling of "crisis" within what might be called theoretical linguistics or "formal" grarrmar. After the early sixties, when matters seemed to be quite settled—especially in the U.S.—about what a grarrmar should look like, "present-day understanding of grarrmar is sufficiently restricted so that we can know pretty well in advance that any set of proposed formal rules will be in part wrong, in part arbitrary, and in part ad hoc," which "reveals the unsettled and experimental character of present-day granmar proposals." (Postal, 1977:153f). The problem which in this situation faces the linguist is, as G. Lakoff, Postal and Ross "in a no doubt never-to-be-written paper" put it, "what to do until the rules acme." (Postal, 1972: 168). One of the possible answers says: to present "various arguments and arguments against arguments seeking to support or disoonfirm this or that claim, or this or that claim about a claim about English granmar." (Postal, 1972: 168). In a way, one could view a large part of this Dissertation (chapters IIII) as following Postal's suggestion, with respect to Spanish granmar. But I do not consider Postal's answer satisfactory; nor would I consider ray work sufficient in any respect, if I had done only that. For this goal restricts linguistics to the writing of formal grammars, independently of the real "usage" which language is put to. The majority of people live under the pressure of language which is manipulated and "poluted" (Bolinger, 1976: 185ff) by the same group of people that owns newspapers, T.V. stations, radio stations, universities, schools, movie houses, etc., i.e., that is the main producer of linguistic messages. It is rather obvious that we, linguists, who devote our lives to the "study of language" have there a vast field of study. Why not to devote our efforts to what Bolinger (1976: 186) calls the "ecology of language", i.e., to unmasking the kind of manipulation viiich is exercised on people through language? One of the main goals of the study of language oould thus be providing people with a means of defending themselves against the manipulation, control and pressure which is exerted upon them through

2 language. This Dissertation is a first attempt at serving this purpose. The goal I have set myself is to investigate the applicability of certain syntactic rules from the granmar of Spanish to the analysis of texts (written performances) . The rules considered are Mood-Insertion, Subject-Raising and NegRaising, all of which share the feature of being considered "optional," at least frcm a syntactic point of view. Now, these transformations should not change meaning, if we are to adopt the Katz-Postal hypothesis; but it is clear that pairs of sentences whose difference consists only in the application of one of the rules do show sane difference in meaning, be it considered semantic or pragmatic. A "recognition" mechanism can thus be developed which applies to a text and shews certain "intention" which the speaker (car writer) had in uttering the message the way he or she did: that is, in those points in which the speaker (or writer) had a choice between applying one of the optional rules or not—or applying Indicative vs. Subjunctive in the case of Mood-Insertion—he or she decided one way or the other, according to certain effects he or she wanted to produce in the hearer (or reader). The problem with which I was next confronted is that the three rules just mentioned could not be taken for granted, since not all analyses of Spanish would accept them. Most of the thesis is thus devoted to oanpare different kinds of analyses—and the theories on which such analyses are based—of the crucial data. The thesis is, therefore, divided into two parts: the first and largest part (chapters I, II, III and IV) shows the superiority of a granmar of Spanish which incorporates the rules in question, over grammars that do not include them; the last part (chapter V) suggests h w the "recognition" device referred to in the last paragraph should be developed. Chapter I presents couples of sentences whose matrix verbs are assertives and whose complement clauses appear either in the Indicative or in the Subjunctive; different analyses of the data are discussed and an analysis vfliich postulates a rule of Mood (Indicative or Subjunctive) Insertion is preferred. Chapter II considers couples of sentences which differ in the following way: one sentence has two finite verbs, one in the complement clause and the other in the matrix clause, where the other sentence has one single finite verb, followed by an Infinitive, an Adjective Phrase or a Noun Phrase• It is concluded that out of all possible analyses proposed to account for the latter type of sentence, the best is the one which postulates a rule of Subjectraising. Chapter III presents couples of sentences, sane having the negation

3

in the complement clause and sane in the matrix, discusses different alternative analyses and concludes that the best description is the one which postulates a rule of Neg-raising to account for the latter type of sentence. In these three chapters, the basis for postulating the rules is mainly of a syntactic character. Chapter IV discusses the problem of meaning-preservingness of transformations, confronting it with the fact that the rules discussed have some kind of semantic or "pragmatic" import. It is concluded that the Katz-Postal principle should be restricted. This chapter tries also to advance an explanation for the relationship between the meaning import of the rules and certain aspects of syntactic behavior: a main break is shewn to operate between certain sentences (especially those whose matrix verb is assertive) with complement clauses in the Indicative, on the one hand, and sentences with the complement clause in the Subjunctive, subject-raised sentences and neg-raised sentences, on the other. Finally, chapter V shows how the three rules previously incorporated into the grammar of Spanish—Indicative vs. Subjunctive Insertion, Subject-raising and Neg-raising—can be applied to certain Spanish texts—drawn from the Press of the forties—to unmask the writer's intentions in producing the message the way it has been produced. I propose this chapter as a possible line of research to be further developed. It is the shortest chapter, but I consider it the most important of all, because of what I have briefly suggested above as one of the main goals of linguistics and because I agree with Morgan (1977: 281) that "the purpose of the linguist's enterprise is to discover the system of principles used by hearers to arrive at conclusions about a speaker's intentions—or, looked at frcm the other end, about whether a given sentence is likely to be successful as a way of having a hearer recognize one's intentions."

I.

PROBLEMS CF MOOD IN SPANISH COMPLEMENTATION

1.

DATA. We are going to deal with a class of predicates of the Spanish

language, which allcw complement clauses in the Indicative as well as in the Subjunctive, as for example: (1) a. Parece que tiene muoho dinero b. Parece que tenga muaho dinero (2) a. Max no oree que la CIA participó en el golpe chileno b. Max no cree que la CIA participara en el golpe chileno Among the verbs showing the same behavior we have: admitir, suponer¡ no ser verdad, and others.They all seem to constitute a subclass within the class of so-called assertives, and most of than tend to allow the Subjunctive rather than the Indicative when they are negated or questioned. Sane of those which need not be negated in order to allcw both Moods in the ccrnplement include a negative meaning in thenO : (3) a. Ricardo niega que eu hijo ee anarquista b. Ricardo niega que su hijo sea anarquista (4) a. Rodolfo duda que su mujer lo engana b. Rodolfo duda que su mujer lo engane Examples (3) und (4) are fren Ph. Klein (1977: 9), vto proposes that these verbs be analyzed "as a oonbination of NEX5 and an assertive predicate. That is, dudar 'doubt' will be decanposed semantically into creer que no 'believe

1

The predicates which allow both Indicative and Subjunctive in the complement clause and which do not have anything to do with NEG are only a few: in fact, there do not seem to be many more than the ones I have just given, i.e., parecer, admitir and suponer. In the case of parecer, though, the subjunctive is quite restricted, as shown by the following example: (i) a. Les parece que tiene mucho dinero b. "Les parece que tenga mucho dinero Sentence (ia) is grammatical, while (ib) is not, their only difference from example (1) in the text being the occurrence of les in (i).

5 that not', negar 'deny' into afirmar que no 'affirm that not', etc." We leave open the question of whether all of these verbs can be analyzed into NEG plus something else (which seems rather improbable in view of verbs like admitir or suponer), and address ourselves new to the problem of the difference in meaning between the (a) and (b) sentences above. 1.1

DIFFERENCE OF MEANING

Let us take, for instance, the sentences in (2): (2a) implies semehew that the speaker is convinced that the CIA played a role in the Chilean coup, while (2b) does not imply it. Rivero (1971) interprets the difference between sentences similar to these as one of presupposition. For instance, on the basis of examples like the following: C5) a. Loe corredores no oreen que el belga ganó la carrera b. Los corredores no oreen que el belga ganara la carrera she argues that in (5b) "there is no presupposition on the part of the speaker about the truth of the ccnplement. The speaker has a neutral attitude and simply reports what the runners believe," while in (5a) "the speaker presupposes that the complement is true, that is, that the Belgian did truly win the race." (Rivero, 1971: 307, emphasis mine.) That there is sane kind of difference between the (a) and (b) sentences seems quite clear to me, if we take into account that not all posible continuations of one of them fits equally well the other: (1) c. ?Parece que tiene mucho dinero, pero es más pobre que una rata d. Parece que tenga mucho dinero, pero es más pobre que una rata (2) c. ?Max no cree que la CIA participó en el golpe chileno} y desde luego yo tampoco lo creo d. Max no cree que la CIA participara en el golpe chileno¡ y desde luego yo tampoco lo creo What does not seem to be so clear is that the difference is adequately characterized as one of presupposition. As Klein (1974: 79) says, Rivero "does not share the standard linguistic notion of presupposition [...]. Moreover, and regrettably, Rivero ncwhere offers a characterization of her own understanding of the term." It might be to the point to test Rivero's assertion, in order to see whether or not presupposition is involved here. Leaving aside the innumerable problems with this concept, we could apply sane of the tests which have been proposed to decide on the issue:

6

a)

2

Contradiction test: A presupposes B only if the conjunction of A

with not B and the internal negation of A with not B are contradictory. (This test is implied in most definitions of "logical presupposition.") In our sentence (1a), A = pareoe que tiene mucho dinevo, and B = tiene mucho dinero, therefore: A and -B = parece que tiene mucho dinero y no tiene mucho dinero -A and -B = no parece que tiene mucho dinero y no tiene mucho dinero, which does not seem contradictory. Nevertheless, this test (which is equivalent to Austin's original negation test) is not always fully reliable, and for our examples is not always useful, since many matrix verbs under discussion must already be negated in order for them to admit both Indicative or Subjunctive (such is the case with creer of our example (2)) . b.

The "possibly" test:3 If A merely entails B, "It is possible that A"

entails "It is possible that B," while if A presupposes B, then "It is possible that A" entails B itself, not just "It is possible that B." Thus, in cur sentence (1a), "Es posible que parezca que tiene mucho dinero" does not entail "tiene mucho dinero," but just "es posible que tenga mucho dinero,"^ since the following sentence is perfectly normal: (6) Es posible que parezca que tiene mucho dinero, pero es más pobre que una rata If B (i.e., "tiene mucho dinero") itself were entailed by the first part of sentence (6), we would expect a contradiction to ccme out frcm the whole of (6), as in (7), (7) ?Es posible que sea una lástima que el periquito se haya muerto, pero el periquito está vivito y coleando where the first part of the sentence entails that "el periquito se ha muerto" —due to the occurrence of ser una lástima, which is a factive verb. Hence, the difference in acceptability between (6) and (7) shews that only entailment is involved in (6)

2

From Shenaut

(1975: 500).

3

See L. Karttunen

4

Notice that here the verb form is tenga (Subjunctive) instead of tiene (Indicative), due to the matrix verb es posible. This alternation is automatic and does not affect the argument.

(1971) for the following two tests.

7 c) The "if" test: In entailment, A uttered as the antecedent of a hypothetical statement only ocrrmits the speaker to a belief that B might be right; when presupposition is involved, the speaker is carmitted to the truth of B. Thus, in our example (1a), if we use A as the antecedent of a hypothetical clause, as in: (8)

Si parece que tiene mucho dinero, debe ser norteamericana

we cannot conclude that she "has a lot of money," but only that she "might have a lot of money." Likewise, in sentence (9), where we use (2a) as an antecedent of a hypothetical clause, (9)

Si Max no oree que la CIA participó en el golpe chileno, deberemos hacer una investigación a fondo

even though the speaker implies that the CIA might have been involved in the Chilean coup, he does not assert that it did. Therefore, it is not presupposition which is involved in these examples, but rather entailment. All this shews that Klein is right in contending that it is not presupposition which is involved here, but I do not think that he is right when he further claims, following a suggestion made by Terrell (1974: fn. 10), that the complements in the Indicative, which are claimed to be presupposed by Rivero, are in fact asserted. The evidence he gives in favor of this proposal is of a syntactic nature, and we will consider it next. 1.2

DIFFERENCES OF SYNTACTIC BEHAVIOR: ROOT TRANSFORMATIONS Complement Preposing. Klein (1974: 81) says that "the declarative sen-

tences claimed by Rivero to have presupposed ocrnplemsnts all allcw root transformations, a principal indication of assertedness, in their complements." This is shown by examples (10) and (11): (10) a. Le parece que viene manana b. Viene manana, le parece (11) a. Mi hermano cree que no entiendes palabra de francés b. No entiendes palabra de francés, cree mi hermano Sentences (10a) und (11a) can undergo Complement Preposing, as shown by the (b) cases. On the other hand, non-assertive predicates do not allow Complement Preposing, as is shewn by the following examples from Klein (1974: 62f) :

8 Es posible") Dudo I (12) a. -Es lástima J Basta J

b.

que el brujo niegue su petición

es posible dudo "El brujo < ^g^rá r8U petiaiím, es lástima basta

The problem with this analysis, though, is that not many of the verbs given by Klein in order to disprove Rivero's claim of presupposition can appear followed by the Subjunctive (e.g., areer when non-negated), so that they cannot constitute contrastive structures of Indicative vs. Subjunctive, in which the Indicative but not the Subjunctive would undergo the rule. On the other hand, predicates such as NEG + areer, which allow both Indicative and Subjunctive, cannot undergo Complacent Preposing, neither with the complement in the Indicative nor in the Subjunctive, as shown by the following example: (13) a. "La CIA participo en el golpe ohileno, no aree Max b. "La CIA participara en el golpe ahileno, no aree Max The same is true of other verbs like dudar. As shewn in (12), Complement Preposing is not allowed with dudar, when its complement is in the Subjunctive; but neither is it possible with the complement in the Indicative. See what happens when we apply such a transformation to (4a): (14) "Su mujer lo engana, duda Rodolfo There are, though, a few verbs for which Klein's claim seems to be valid. Namely, non-negated pareaer and admitir do allow Complement Preposing when the complement clause is in the Indicative, and do not allow it with the complement clause in the Subjunctive, as shown by the following examples, as well as by example (10): (15) a. Tiene mucho dinero, parece b. "Tengarnuahodinero, parece (16) a. Santiago es un oportunista, admite Vladimir b. "Santiago sea un oportunista, admite Vladimir

9

In (15) and (16), the (a) sentences have the complement clause in the Indicative and allow Complement Preposing, while the (b) sentences, with the complement clause in the Subjunctive, do not. VP Preposing. According to Klein (1974: 82), these verbs claimed by Rivero to involve presupposition allow other root transformations, like VP Preposing; such would be the case with creer and pareaer, as shewn by the following example: 'a Ana le parece) Ana cree (17) a. Susi espera que Ana la acompañe, pero Ana supone > Ana admite Ana sospecha que acompañarla no puede Supposedly, with verbs which are non-assertives, VP Preposing is not allowed: (17) b. "Susi espera que Ana la acompane, pero Ana que acompanarla (no) pueda The problem, though—as in the case of Complement Preposing—is that in many of the environments which allow the distinction between Indicative and Subjunctive (e.g., when NEG occurs, as in NEE + creer)VP Preposing is not allowed either: (18) a. ?Susi espera que Ana la acompane, pero Ana

¿¿¿fj