Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning: The Confucius Institute Project 9781783098064

Citation preview

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

MULTILINGUAL MATTERS Series Editors: John Edwards, St. Francis Xavier University, Canada and Dalhousie University, Canada and Leigh Oakes, Queen Mary, University of London, UK. Multilingual Matters series publishes books on bilingualism, bilingual education, immersion education, second language learning, language policy, multiculturalism. The editor is particularly interested in ‘macro’ level studies of language policies, language maintenance, language shift, language revival and language planning. Books in the series discuss the relationship between language in a broad sense and larger cultural issues, particularly identity related ones. Full details of all the books in this series and of all our other publications can be found on http://www.multilingual-matters.com, or by writing to Multilingual Matters, St Nicholas House, 31-34 High Street, Bristol BS1 2AW, UK.

MULTILINGUAL MATTERS: 167

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning The Confucius Institute Project

Jeffrey Gil

MULTILINGUAL MATTERS Bristol • Blue Ridge Summit

DOI: 10.21832/GIL8057 Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. Gil, Jeffrey, author. Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning: The Confucius Institute Project/Jeffrey Gil. Bristol; Blue Ridge Summit: Multilingual Matters, [2017] | Series: Multilingual Matters: 167 | Includes bibliographical references and index. LCCN 2016054518| ISBN 9781783098057 (hbk : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781783098071 (epub) | ISBN 9781783098088 (kindle) | ISBN 9781783098064 (Pdf) LCSH: Chinese language–Study and teaching–Foreign speakers. | Language and culture–China. | China–Social life and customs. | Chinese language–History. | Chinese language–Globalization. LCC PL1065 .G45 2017 | DDC 306.44/951–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc. gov/2016054518 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue entry for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN-13: 978-1-78309-805-7 (hbk) Multilingual Matters UK: St Nicholas House, 31-34 High Street, Bristol BS1 2AW, UK. USA: NBN, Blue Ridge Summit, PA, USA. Website: www.multilingual-matters.com Twitter: Multi_Ling_Mat Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/multilingualmatters Blog: www.channelviewpublications.wordpress.com Copyright © 2017 Jeffrey Gil. All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the publisher. The policy of Multilingual Matters/Channel View Publications is to use papers that are natural, renewable and recyclable products, made from wood grown in sustainable forests. In the manufacturing process of our books, and to further support our policy, preference is given to printers that have FSC and PEFC Chain of Custody certification. The FSC and/or PEFC logos will appear on those books where full certification has been granted to the printer concerned. Typeset by Deanta Global Publishing Services Limited. Printed and bound in the UK by the CPI Books Group Ltd. Printed and bound in the US by Edwards Brothers Malloy, Inc.

Contents

Tables Conventions for Chinese Terms and Chinese Names Acknowledgements 1

Introduction: Language, Culture and China’s Rise in a Globalising World Introduction Chinese Language and Culture in the World: Brief Historical Background Chinese Culture as a Source of Soft Power Language Planning and Policy in World Politics: External Language Spread The Confucius Institute Project Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms Volunteer teachers and state-sponsored teachers Chinese Bridge competitions A Framework for Mapping and Evaluating the Confucius Institute Project Mapping the Confucius Institute Project Organisational documents Media reports Academic literature Interviews and survey Evaluating the Confucius Institute Project Interviews Survey Organisational documents, media reports and academic literature

v

ix xi xiii 1 1 2 5 6 8 9 9 10 12 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16

vi

Contents

Summarising the Confucius Institute Project and Discussing Implications Plan of the Book 2

3

Chinese Culture Goes Global: Soft Power and the Promotion of Chinese Language Learning Introduction Soft Power in Contemporary World Politics Reasons for China’s Interest in Soft Power Soft power as a requirement for great power status Soft power as the main arena of competition in world politics Interest of other East Asian countries in soft power Similarities of soft power to past practices in China’s world politics and principles in Chinese thought Soft power as necessary for the domestic legitimacy of the CCP Soft power to counter the ‘China threat’ theory China’s View of Soft Power Scope and applications of soft power Sources of soft power Centrality of culture to soft power The Role of Chinese Language Learning The Confucius Institute Project: Origins and Background Conclusion Mapping the Confucius Institute Project: High Extensity, Intensity and Velocity Introduction Extensity Intensity Velocity Comparisons of Extensity, Intensity and Velocity Reasons for High Extensity, Intensity and Velocity Conclusion

16 18 21 21 21 24 24 25 26

26 28 29 30 30 30 31 32 33 40 44 44 44 45 47 48 50 54

Contents

4

5

Evaluating the Confucius Institute Project: Impact at the State-to-State Level Introduction The State-to-State Level Recent Trends in China’s Relations with Countries with Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms China’s relations with the USA China’s relations with Japan China’s relations with Australia Influence on Other Countries’ Language and Culture Promotion Activities Reasons for Limited Impact at the State-to-State Level The nature of language and culture as sources of soft power in world politics Governments’ concerns about the Confucius Institute project Conclusion Evaluating the Confucius Institute Project: Impact at the Society-to-Society Level Introduction The Society-to-Society Level Chinese Language Teaching and Learning Attitudes Towards and Perceptions of China China and world opinion polls Views from the interviews and survey Chinese Culture and China as a Country Societal Reactions as Impediments to the Confucius Institute Project Concerns of universities and academics Concerns of the media Concerns of the general public Considering Concerns about the Confucius Institute Project Consequences of Concerns about the Confucius Institute Project

vii

56 56 57 57 57 58 60 61 62 62 63 65 67 67 67 68 71 72 74 77 80 80 81 82 83 87

viii

6

Contents

Practical and Organisational Issues as Impediments to the Confucius Institute Project Relationship between Confucius Institutes/ Confucius Classrooms and existing Chinese departments and programmes Quality of teaching staff Sustainability Dealing with Practical and Organisational Issues Conclusion

89 92 93 94 95

Conclusions and Implications Introduction The Confucius Institute Project: A Diffused Global Project Implications Implications for China Implications for schools and universities Implications for governments Implications for researchers Final Remarks

97 97 97 98 98 101 102 103 105

References Interviews Index

106 123 124

89

Tables

Table 1.1 Number of volunteer teachers posted overseas, 2006–2015

9

Table 1.2 Number of state-sponsored teachers posted overseas, 2006–2015

10

Table 1.3 Mapping, evaluating and discussing the implications of the Confucius Institute project

17

Table 2.1 Funding for main aspects of Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms worldwide, 2009–2015

36

Table 2.2 Total expenditure on the Confucius Institute project, 2007–2015

37

Table 3.1 Chinese language classes and cultural activities, 2007–2015

46

Table 3.2 Increase in the extensity and intensity of the Confucius Institute project, 2008–2015

48

Table 3.3 Comparison of the Confucius Institute project, British Council, Alliance Française, Goethe Institute, Dante Alighieri Society and Cervantes Institute

49

Table 5.1 BBC World Service Poll results, 2005–2014

73

Table 5.2 Pew Global Attitudes Project survey results, 2005–2015

73

ix

Conventions for Chinese Terms and Chinese Names

Throughout this book I present important Chinese terms in Chinese characters, the Pinyin Romanisation system (汉语拼音 hànyǔ pīnyīn) and English on their first use within the text. All subsequent uses of the same term are presented in English only. I present Chinese personal names according to the Chinese custom of placing the family name first followed by the given name. All Chinese personal names, as well as place names, are spelt according to the Pinyin Romanisation system.

xi

Acknowledgements

Many people provided help and assistance in the preparation of this book. Firstly, I would like to thank the participants in this study for their time and cooperation, which made my research possible. Much of the research and writing of this book was undertaken during two periods of study leave in 2010 and 2013. I thank Flinders University for providing these opportunities to concentrate on my research. I also undertook two fieldwork trips to China while on study leave, during which I visited several institutions and spoke to several people about my research. I will not name these institutions or people in order to maintain their anonymity, but I am grateful to them all for their assistance. I would also like to thank the following people for the various kinds of assistance they provided: the anonymous reviewer provided useful comments and suggestions on the whole manuscript; Gwendolyn Campbell read and commented on drafts of Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5; Stefano Bona located and translated information about the Dante Alighieri Society; Eric Bouvet assisted with the translation of information about the Alliance Française; and Anna Roderick and Kim Eggleton at Multilingual Matters commissioned the book and responded to my queries during the writing and publication process. The biggest thanks must go to my family, who offered support and encouragement throughout the writing of this book. In particular, my wife Lin Han (林函) has been a constant source of understanding, reassurance and advice, even though she has had her own research to work on. Han also read and commented on drafts of most of the chapters of this book, either in whole or in part. Our son Alexander provided many welcome and often entertaining distractions from the writing process. While I was writing this book, we also discovered we would soon have another son joining our family, and Nicholas is indeed a welcome addition. This book is dedicated to my wonderful wife and sons. Finally, parts of this book draw on my previously published works. Chapters 1 and 6 are substantially revised and expanded versions of Gil, J. (2010) How should applied linguists respond to the rise of China? In E. Morrell and M.D. Barr (eds) Crises and Opportunities: Proceedings of the 18th

xiii

xiv

Acknowledgements

Biennial Conference of the ASAA, 2010, Adelaide, Australia. Canberra: Asian Studies Association of Australia (ASAA) Inc. and the University of Adelaide (ISBN 978-0-7258-1136-5). Sections of Chapters 2 and 4 are based on Gil, J. (2009) China’s Confucius Institute project: Language and soft power in world politics. The Global Studies Journal 2 (1), 59–72 (Common Ground Publishing). Chapter 3 and sections of Chapters 4 and 5 are revised and updated versions of Gil, J. (2015) China’s cultural projection: A discussion of the Confucius Institutes. China: An International Journal 13 (1), 200–226 (NUS Press). Some sections in Chapters 1, 2 and 6 also draw on this article. Chapters 3 and 6 include some material from Gil, J. (2014) An exploratory study of why language learners opt for Chinese and its competitiveness as a world language. Journal of the Chinese Language Teachers Association 49 (1), 51–93 (The Chinese Language Teachers Association). I would like to thank the publishers for permission to reprint this material.

1 Introduction: Language, Culture and China’s Rise in a Globalising World Introduction China’s rise, or more accurately re-emergence, is occurring in a world political system which is arguably more complex than that faced by any previous rising power (Buzan & Cox, 2013; C.R. Jin, 2013). A distinguishing feature of the contemporary world political system is the accelerating processes of globalisation, or the deepening, expanding and intensifying of interconnections across the world. These interconnections are constituted through the global flows of people, objects, images, ideas and information in almost all dimensions of life, from the public to the private (McGrew, 1992; Scholte, 2005). One of the most easily noticeable and experienced dimensions of globalisation, however, is the cultural dimension, manifested in global flows of languages, films, music, food and religions, to give just a few examples. These and other elements of culture have, of course, long flowed around the world, but this now happens on a far larger and more significant scale, facilitated by improvements in transportation and communications technology. It is possible to argue that ‘[t]here is no historical equivalent of the global reach and volume of cultural traffic’ we experience today (Held et al., 1999: 327). Global cultural flows show considerable diversity in their content, origins and directions, meaning that it is more fitting to think in terms of cultural globalisations, rather than cultural globalisation (Hopper, 2007). This notion of many different cultural globalisations applies to China’s experience. China’s embrace of the current phase of globalisation as a means of facilitating its modernisation and development has exposed it to a range of global cultural flows originating from outside China, yet China also sees globalisation as an opportunity to advance its own influence and interests, and has set about promoting elements of Chinese culture throughout the world. This book maps and evaluates one aspect of China’s participation in cultural globalisations, its worldwide promotion of Chinese language learning through the Confucius Institute project. As the Confucius Institute project recently celebrated its 10th anniversary with World Confucius Institute Day, held on 27 September 2014, now seems an

1

2

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

appropriate time to undertake this task. This introductory chapter charts the terrain of my investigation of the Confucius Institute project. It begins with a brief historical background to China’s participation in cultural globalisations, particularly as it applies to language. It then discusses how the promotion of Chinese language and culture connects to China’s efforts to employ soft power to facilitate its rise in the contemporary world political system. Finally, it presents the central questions this book addresses and the methods used to do so.

Chinese Language and Culture in the World: Brief Historical Background The world political system can be thought of as ‘the broad pattern of political, economic, and other interrelationships that impact world affairs’ (Rochester, 2010: 33). As Hopper (2007) points out, global cultural flows take place within the established structures, practices and relationships of the world political system, and it is therefore necessary to consider how the nature of this system and China’s position within it have seen it oscillate between being a major centre of global cultural flows to other parts of the world, and predominantly a receiver of such flows from elsewhere. Throughout much of history, China was one of the world’s most powerful and advanced countries. It was at the top of a hierarchical pattern of relations covering much of Asia known as the tribute system or the Chinese world order (Kang, 2007; Kim, 2008). China considered itself superior to other peoples, whom it ranked according to how closely they followed Chinese culture, and Chinese superiority was in turn recognised by the other Asian countries within the tribute system (Gregory, 2003; Westad, 2012). As Mackerras (1998: 12) explains, ‘[t]he essence of the system was that surrounding countries sent in tribute to the Chinese emperor and paid him homage as the ruler of the region’s most powerful country’. While the tribute system was stronger during some periods than others, the interactions within it were mutually beneficial and it produced remarkably stable relations with few wars between the countries involved (Kang, 2007, 2012). Because of China’s position, the Chinese language and culture were very influential. From approximately the third century CE to the second half of the 1900s, scholars and officials in Korea, Japan and Vietnam adopted Chinese characters as the medium of scholarly and official communication, despite their spoken languages being unrelated to and very different from Chinese. Chinese characters also became the basis for the development of written scripts for these languages, and all of them adopted a substantial amount of Chinese vocabulary (Ostler, 2005; Snow, 2010). This occurred because these countries regarded China as the most advanced and civilised of all countries, and sought to emulate it.

Introduction: Language, Culture and China’s Rise in a Globalising World

3

The Chinese language was spread to Southeast Asia through migrations, trade and military expeditions, many of which created long-standing and even permanent Chinese communities (Ostler, 2005; van de Ven, 2002). These communities played an important role in facilitating trade and other interactions between China and Southeast Asian countries, and there is some suggestion that Chinese characters were used as the lingua franca of trade during the first half of the 15th century (van de Ven, 2002). China was connected to the wider world through trade routes such as the Silk Road, which reached as far as Europe. These connections helped Chinese language and culture become sources of fascination for people in Europe, conveyed through the stories of travellers, traders, missionaries and envoys (d’Hooghe, 2011; Nederveen Pieterse, 2009). The learning of Chinese by some European missionaries, scholars and government officials began in the 16th century, the best-known example being Matteo Ricci, the Jesuit priest who, during many years of residence in China, became proficient in Chinese, devised a Romanisation system for Chinese characters and compiled a dictionary. By the 18th century, European research on the Chinese language was quite extensive, focusing in particular on the origins of Chinese characters and compiling Chinese books (Y. He & G.H. Xu, 2000; Kane, 2006). The tribute system, and China’s position as the major centre of global cultural flows, was, however, heavily challenged by the growing influence of Europe. Improvements in oceanic transportation enabled European countries to extend their influence around the world through exploration, trade and colonialisation from the 16th century, and in the 18th century the process of industrialisation furthered these activities by conferring significant military, economic, organisational and technological advantages (Keylor, 1992; Nadkarni, 2013).1 Importantly, these countries operated within the very different state-based system, which had developed in Europe out of a range of complex economic, religious, social, technological and military trends which favoured the state as a means of organising political communities (Buzan & Little, 2000; Ray & Kaarbo, 2005; Shimko, 2008). At first, China dealt with Europeans in the same way as it did with the peoples within the tribute system and, up until the middle of the 19th century, was able to resist their encroachments, allowing only limited contact and trade, confined to the port cities of Guangzhou and Macao (Gong, 1984; Gregory, 2003). This state of affairs changed with the Opium War of 1839–1842, in which Britain used military force to make China agree to its demands for increased and less restricted trade and diplomatic interaction, and legal protection of its citizens. At the conclusion of the Opium War, China was compelled to sign the Treaty of Nanjing, the first of a number of unequal treaties with European countries (and later the USA and Japan). Such treaties granted various rights and privileges to European countries, and also required China to recognise the legal equality of China

4

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

and other countries, and allow the stationing of foreign diplomats in Beijing on a permanent basis (Gregory, 2003; Roberts, 2006; Wright, 2011). The tributary countries also needed to deal with European countries. They were similarly compelled to open to trade and diplomacy, and in some cases became formal colonies. With the collapse of the tribute system, China went from being ‘a world unto itself’ to merely one part of the state-based system (S.S. Zhao, 1997: 30). The Chinese language and culture consequently lost much of their previous prestige and attraction, both within China and the former tributary countries. In fact, many Chinese intellectuals and officials of the late 19th and early 20th centuries believed that the Chinese language had to be reformed, and argued for the creation of a national standard language, based on the everyday spoken form of Chinese, to facilitate education, administration, literacy and national unity (P. Chen, 1999; Gao, 2000; Norman, 1988). Some, such as the prominent writers Lu Xun and Chen Duxiu, advocated replacing Chinese characters with an alphabetic script, while Qian Xuantong, a philologist and professor of literature, went as far as to suggest that Chinese should be replaced by Esperanto (Gao, 2000; Moser, 2016; Ramsey, 1987). At the same time, the languages of European countries, particularly English, were widely perceived as the most useful vehicles for accessing the knowledge, ideas and technology required to prosper in the world. The first Chinese government foreign languages college, known as the Tongwen Guan (同文馆 tόngwén guǎn) or College of Translators, opened in 1862 in Beijing for the purpose of preparing interpreters and translators to work in the government. Its language curriculum consisted of only English at first, but later expanded to include Russian, French, German and Japanese (Hung, 2002; Ross, 1992). China’s struggle to transform itself into a modern state continued throughout the rest of the 19th century and much of the 20th century. This was a chaotic and tumultuous time, which included the 1911 revolution which overthrew the monarchy, and the 1949 revolution which brought to power the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Foreign languages, again most notably English, continued to be seen as essential to modernisation, and became a central part of China’s education system, although there were considerable fluctuations in policies on foreign language education and official and popular attitudes towards them (Gil & B. Adamson, 2011). Although Europe had clearly established itself as the major centre of global cultural flows, interest in Chinese language and culture did not dissipate entirely. The first Chinese language courses at Western universities were established in 1871 at Yale University in the USA, and in 1917 at the School of Oriental Arabic and Semitic Studies (SOAS) in Britain. Chinese language learning also experienced something of an upsurge during World War II due to the need for interpreters in the American military (Tsung & Cruickshank, 2011; Xing, 2006). Nevertheless, the turmoil of this period

Introduction: Language, Culture and China’s Rise in a Globalising World

5

meant that the ‘downturn in the country’s cultural attractiveness abroad continued into the late 20th century’ (Ding & Saunders, 2006: 14). A key event in reviving the appeal of Chinese language and culture was the implementation of the reform and opening-up policy (改革开放 政策 gǎigé kāifàng zhèngcè) in the late 1970s under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. This policy aimed to transform China into a modern, developed and capable country, and proved to be remarkably successful. Indeed, while it cannot be said that China has regained its central position in the world, it is nevertheless a rapidly rising power, and a country to which every other country must give due attention (Buzan, 2010; Nathan & Scobell, 2012). This has led to a dramatic increase in interest in learning Chinese. According to the estimates of some scholars, there may now be as many as 100 million people learning Chinese as a foreign language worldwide, and numerous schools, universities and private providers offer Chinese language courses (Y.C. Wu, 2010).2 There has also been a corresponding increase in the volume and variety of Chinese language textbooks, teaching materials and learning aids, as well as academic research into the teaching and learning of Chinese (Duff & D. Li, 2004; J.J. Lu & Y.X. Zhao, 2011; Xing, 2006). The Chinese government has recognised this situation as an opportunity to use language as an important resource to help achieve its goals in world politics.

Chinese Culture as a Source of Soft Power China still faces a plethora of complex challenges. Its overarching goal in world politics is therefore to create and sustain an external environment which will allow it to focus on resolving its domestic challenges; continue its development and modernisation; and gain acceptance of its rise. Such an external environment will also facilitate a range of related and more specific sub-goals, including securing sufficient natural resources; building a group of allies sharing its disdain for outside interference in a country’s internal affairs; and reducing support for Taiwan from other actors (Y. Deng, 2009; Lampton, 2008; Medeiros, 2009). Many scholars have argued that soft power is increasingly important in the contemporary world political system, where a state needs to engage with and gain the support of a diverse range of actors, including other states, intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), multinational corporations (MNCs) and publics, and where the use of force is increasingly seen as illegitimate (see, for example, Aysha, 2005; Held, 2004; Hill & Beadle, 2014; Nye, 2004, 2011; Oğuzlu, 2007; Pastor, 1999). This position has been widely accepted by government officials, academics and journalists throughout China, to the extent that soft power is now a central element in China’s approach to world politics (Y. Deng, 2009; Lampton, 2008; J. Wang, 2011). The essence of soft power

6

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

is that China seeks to achieve its goals in world politics through using its power resources to attract, persuade, co-opt and appeal to other actors, rather than relying on coercion and inducement alone (Nye, 2004, 2011).3 Among its various power resources which could be used in this way, China accords great importance to culture. Of course, cultures are diverse and multifaceted, and not all elements of Chinese culture are seen as suitable for these purposes. China consequently emphasises those elements it believes the rest of the world will find most enjoyable, interesting and admirable, while ignoring or playing down others, including those it deems to be subversive (X.G. Deng & L.N. Zhang, 2009; d’Hooghe, 2007; M.J. Li, 2009a). Chinese culture for these purposes refers to ‘an amalgam of Confucian social and political values, folk and high customs and art, and the Chinese language’ (Wuthnow, 2008: 9), or in other words mainstream Han Chinese culture. There are other global cultural flows emanating from China which are not based on this culture, and which are outside the initiatives established by the Chinese government, including, for example, the global campaigns of ethnic minorities such as the Tibetans, Uygurs and Miao (Mackerras, 2003). This book concentrates on global cultural flows which have their origins in the initiatives established by the Chinese government or, in other words, its cultural diplomacy. Cull (2008: 33) defines cultural diplomacy as ‘an actor’s attempt to manage the international environment through making its cultural resources and achievements known overseas and/or facilitating cultural transmission abroad’. China has put a range of these in place, which have focused almost exclusively on aspects of traditional Chinese culture, especially literature, philosophy, medicine, architecture, cuisine and martial arts (d’Hooghe, 2007; H.Y. Wang & Y.C. Lu, 2008). The most prominent element of China’s cultural diplomacy, however, is the promotion of the Chinese language.

Language Planning and Policy in World Politics: External Language Spread Language planning is any activity undertaken by a particular actor, most commonly a government, intended to change people’s behaviour in terms of the form, function or acquisition of language (Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997; Lo Bianco, 2004). Language planning requires the development of language policy, or a ‘body of ideas, laws, regulations, rules and practices intended to achieve the planned language change’ (Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997: xi).4 Morgan (2014: 116) highlights the fact that language planning frequently occurs when a ‘nation is being formed or reconfigured in some way’. China’s embrace of soft power represents an attempt to reshape

Introduction: Language, Culture and China’s Rise in a Globalising World

7

China and its external environment, and it is here that language becomes most clearly intertwined with the rise of China. Specifically, China has focused on external language spread. External language spread can be thought of as policies and activities aimed at the learning and teaching of a state’s language in other polities outside the state’s borders and beyond its authority (Ammon, 1992; Liddicoat, 2013). External language spread is often conducted by quasi-governmental organisations or NGOs, and consists of mechanisms such as the provision of opportunities for language learning in various modes of delivery, support for language teaching and learning in education systems and cultural appreciation activities, all carried out in other countries (Ager, 2001, 2005; Liddicoat, 2013). These mechanisms all stem from the belief that language learning can be used as a means to ‘foster a favourable image in order to ensure greater power for the state in international relations’ (Ager, 2001: 179). This kind of external language spread, with its clear connections to world politics, started in European countries in the late 19th century with the establishment of organisations such as the Alliance Française and the Dante Alighieri Society (Ostler, 2010; Totaro-Genevois, 2005). China, by comparison, is a latecomer, having only established such an organisation in the late 20th century and commenced a concerted effort at external language spread in the early years of the 21st century. China’s external language spread is conducted through the Office of Chinese Language Council International (国家汉办 guόjiā hànbàn), commonly referred to by its abbreviated Chinese name, Hanban (汉办 hànbàn). Hanban operates directly under the Ministry of Education and its membership consists of representatives from 12 ministries and commissions, many of which play important roles in China’s politics and policy development. These ministries and commissions are: the General Office of the State Council, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Finance, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Culture, the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (China Radio International), the State Press and Publications Administration, the State Council Information Office and the State Language Commission (Hanban, n.d. a; D.P. Wang & B. Adamson, 2014).5 A member of the Politburo and government vice premier, Liu Yandong, is chair of Hanban’s board of directors, and Hanban’s director general is Xu Lin, a member of the State Council.6 According to its website, Hanban’s (n.d. b) mission is to ‘provide Chinese language and culture teaching resources and services to each country of the world, satisfy the needs of overseas learners of Chinese to the utmost and to make a contribution to the joint construction of a multicultural and harmonious world’. In line with this mission, Hanban’s main functions are to:

8

• • • • • • •

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

support each country to develop Chinese language education in educational institutions of all types and levels, and the spread of Chinese culture to all countries; set up, improve and promote international standards for Chinese language teachers, Chinese as a foreign language education and a common curriculum for Chinese as a foreign language education; select, train and send abroad Chinese language teachers and volunteers; develop and implement the Chinese proficiency test; implement the ‘Confucius China Studies Programme’ and support the conduct of China studies; organise and manage the Confucius Institute Scholarship and carry out important activities such as the ‘Chinese Bridge’ competitions; establish a multidimensional platform including an international Chinese language education network, television and broadcasting, and provide digital resources. (Hanban, n.d. b)

While Hanban has conducted various activities to support Chinese language teaching and learning since its creation in 1987, these have entered a new phase with China’s emphasis on soft power (H.Q. Zhao & J.B. Huang, 2010).

The Confucius Institute Project Nederveen Pieterse (2009: 16–17) defines global projects as the actions of people, groups, organisations and governments which ‘seek to shape global conditions’. China’s external language spread can be considered a global project because it is intended to contribute to the creation of a favourable external environment through fostering positive images of China; understanding of China’s domestic and international situation; respect for China as a nation; and sympathy for China’s positions and goals in world politics (d’Hooghe, 2007; Lampton, 2008; J. Wang, 2011; Wuthnow, 2008). I refer to China’s external language spread efforts collectively as the ‘Confucius Institute project’. The Confucius Institute project consists of several external language spread mechanisms, namely: the establishment of Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms in cooperation with foreign education institutions; posting volunteer and state-sponsored Chinese language teachers to teaching positions overseas; and coordinating the international Chinese Bridge Chinese language competitions. The reason I refer to these as the Confucius Institute project is because the Confucius Institute is the main mechanism for promoting Chinese language learning, and is often integrated with the other mechanisms. For example, many Confucius Institutes receive both state-sponsored and volunteer teachers, and coordinate the Chinese Bridge competitions. Each of the external

Introduction: Language, Culture and China’s Rise in a Globalising World

9

language spread mechanisms which make up the Confucius Institute project is briefly described below.

Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms The Confucius Institute (孔子学院 kǒngzǐ xuéyuàn) is a Chinese language and culture institution set up most commonly as a partnership between Hanban, a Chinese university and a university in the host country (Hanban, n.d. c). Following the establishment of a pilot Confucius Institute in Tashkent, Uzbekistan in mid-2004, the first Confucius Institute officially opened on 21 November 2004 in Seoul, South Korea (W. Li & H. Zhu, 2014). Since this time, Confucius Institutes have conducted various activities, including Chinese language teaching, teacher training, proficiency testing and arranging study in China (Hanban, n.d. c). The Confucius Classroom (孔子学堂 kǒngzǐ xuétáng) supports Chinese language courses in primary and secondary schools in various ways. They are usually linked to a Confucius Institute (Starr, 2009).

Volunteer teachers and state-sponsored teachers Volunteers for overseas teaching positions are recruited under two programmes. The first of these, the Volunteer Chinese Language Teacher Programme (汉语教师志愿者项目 hànyǔ jiàoshī zhìyuànzhě xiàngmù), established in 2004, recruits volunteers from within China and posts them to teaching positions overseas. Hanban covers the costs of volunteers’ preposting training, travel expenses, accommodation, insurance and a monthly living allowance (Hanban, n.d. d).7 As Table 1.1 shows, the number of these volunteer teachers is significant, with a total of 34,733 posted overseas from Table 1.1 Number of volunteer teachers posted overseas, 2006–2015 Year

Number of volunteer teachers

Number of countries receiving volunteers

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

1050 1445 2000 2740 3099 3472 3981 5660 5724 5562

34 42 No data available 71 81 81 90 95 112 118

Sources: Hanban (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015a).

10

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

Table 1.2 Number of state-sponsored teachers posted overseas, 2006–2015 Year

Number of state-sponsored teachers

Number of countries receiving state-sponsored teachers

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

1004 1532 1401 2060 3000 3343 4001 5800 (includes directors and teachers) 6300 (includes directors and teachers) 7062 (includes directors and teachers)

80 104 No data available 109 114 123 128 No data available 139 144

Sources: Hanban (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015a).

2006 to 2015, and over 100 countries having received them. The second programme, known as the Overseas Volunteer Chinese Teacher Programme (汉语教师海外志愿者项目 hànyǔ jiàoshī hǎiwài zhìyuànzhě xiàngmù), was established in 2006 and recruits volunteers who reside outside of China to teach in their country of residence. Participants in this programme are expected to have a Chinese-language teaching qualification recognised by their country of residence or experience and skills in teaching Chinese, as well as meeting a range of other requirements (Hanban, n.d. e).8 State-sponsored teachers (公派汉语教师 gōngpài hànyǔ jiàoshī) and advisers (汉语教学顾问 hànyǔ jiàoxué gùwén) are also dispatched to ministries of education, universities, high schools and primary schools around the world. State-sponsored teachers must be qualified teachers with more than two years’ experience teaching Chinese as a foreign language, Chinese language, a foreign language or education at a primary school, secondary school or university (Hanban, n.d. f).9 While the number of state-sponsored teachers posted overseas fluctuates from year to year, it is nevertheless noteworthy. Table 1.2 shows that a total of 35,503 state-sponsored teachers were dispatched to more than 100 countries in the years 2006 to 2015.

Chinese Bridge competitions Another aspect of the promotion of Chinese language learning is the Chinese Bridge Chinese language competitions (汉语桥中文比赛 hànyǔ qiáo zhōngwén bǐsài). There are versions of this competition for university students, held annually since 2002, and secondary school students, held annually since 2008, and overseas students studying in China, also held annually since 2008. Preliminary rounds of the university- and secondarylevel Chinese Bridge are held in countries around the world, and finals are

Introduction: Language, Culture and China’s Rise in a Globalising World

11

held in China. The Chinese Bridge for students studying in China is held in China in conjunction with China Central Television (CCTV), which broadcasts the final rounds (Hanban, n.d. g). Competitions are based around themes which aim to encourage greater understanding and promote positive images of China, such as ‘China in the New Century’ and ‘China: A Multinational Country’, which were both themes of the university-level Chinese Bridge (China Daily, 2003; People’s Daily, 2006). These competitions attract a large number of participants. For example, in 2014 alone, more than 100,000 people participated in the three versions of the Chinese Bridge competitions (Hanban, 2014). The Confucius Institute project is clearly a very significant phenomenon. In this book I seek to answer the following three questions: • • •

What are the current dimensions of the Confucius Institute project? What contribution has the Confucius Institute project made to shaping China’s external environment? What are the implications of the above for those involved with and/ or interested in the Confucius Institute project (i.e. China, schools and universities, governments and researchers)?

I use the historical analysis approach to address these questions. The historical analysis approach involves presenting a macro-level account of a language planning and policy issue in a particular polity. It can demonstrate the sociopolitical influences on the language planning and policy issue in question and track its development and impact across time. There are also ample sources of data available to do so (Baldauf, 2010; D.C. Johnson, 2013; Payne, 2013). Examples of studies using the historical analysis approach can be found in several edited collections covering various countries and regions (Baldauf & Kaplan, 2004; Kaplan & Baldauf, 2005, 2008 among others) as well as numerous articles published in the journal Current Issues in Language Planning. There is currently no such account of the Confucius Institute project in the existing literature, however, and this is the gap this book fills. As the Confucius Institute project is not confined to a single country or region of the world, the polity in this case is the world as a whole. In other words, I investigate the Confucius Institute project on the global scale during the period from 2004 to 2015. While it is predominantly concerned with the macro-level, the historical analysis approach does not preclude the use of micro-level data to add detail and provide illustration of language planning and policy issues (Kaplan & Baldauf, 2008; Payne, 2013), and I do this at various points in this book. However, I do not claim to provide a definitive account of the Confucius Institute project in all places, nor a fine-grained analysis of any individual aspect of it, such as a specific Confucius Institute or Confucius Classroom. Instead, I identify the major issues and themes to have emerged from the Confucius Institute project so

12

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

far and provide examples of them. The precise manifestation of these issues and themes will of course vary from country to country and from one Confucius Institute or Confucius Classroom to another, but the issues and themes themselves are relevant to the Confucius Institute project as a whole. In addition, I have endeavoured to present enough detail to enable readers to decide whether the book’s findings are applicable to contexts with which they are familiar. While this is not a comparative work, I also highlight similarities and differences between the Confucius Institute project and other language and culture promotion organisations at various points in the book where they serve to illuminate particular characteristics of the Confucius Institute project or more general points about the promotion of language and culture in world politics. Producing such an account of the Confucius Institute project requires an analytical framework capable of systematically mapping its dimensions and evaluating its outcomes.

A Framework for Mapping and Evaluating the Confucius Institute Project Held et al. (1999) have developed the best known framework for studying global flows of various kinds, and I have adapted it for use in this book because it allows us to produce a quantitative and qualitative investigation of global projects. Held et al.’s (1999) framework consists of four components: extensity, which refers to the geographical coverage of a global project; intensity, which refers to the volume of a global project; velocity, which refers to the speed at which a global project occurs; and impact, which refers to the consequences or outcomes of a global project.

Mapping the Confucius Institute Project The first three of these components are used to map the dimensions of the Confucius Institute project and therefore address the book’s first question. The main sources used to do this are: organisational documents, media reports and academic literature produced across the time period covered in this book. These are supplemented by interviews with people involved with the Confucius Institute project and a survey of Chinese language learners.

Organisational documents Particular emphasis is given to Hanban annual reports and information from Hanban’s website. These sources are valuable not only because they contain readily available information about the extensity, intensity and velocity of the Confucius Institute project, but also because they are

Introduction: Language, Culture and China’s Rise in a Globalising World

13

produced within the country from which the global cultural flows in question originate, and therefore need to be considered in this study for the insights they can provide (Abram, 2003; Eriksen, 2003).

Media reports Del Valle and Villa (2006) point out that media reports are useful sources because they provide information about the content of language policies, how they are represented and how people react to them. I have been collecting media reports about the Confucius Institute project from China and other countries since the early 2000s, and I draw on many of them here.

Academic literature There is now a growing body of academic literature which looks at the Confucius Institute project from a variety of disciplinary perspectives. These include international relations (see, for example, Gill & Y.Z. Huang, 2006; Paradise, 2009), education (see, for example, K. King, 2010; Yang, 2010; H.Q. Zhao & J.B. Huang, 2010), management and organisation (see, for example, H.C. Li et al., 2009), economics (see, for example, Lien & Co, 2013; Lien et al., 2012) and applied linguistics (see, for example, W. Li & H. Zhu, 2014; Starr, 2009; Wheeler, 2014). Again, I have been collecting such works since the early 2000s and have used many of them in this book. I also draw on the large body of work on China and soft power in general. Several book-length works on the Confucius Institute project have also been published in recent years. Stephen Hoare-Vance’s (2010) The Confucius Institutes and China’s Evolving Foreign Policy deserves recognition as the first of these but it is not without its problems. It is based on a master’s thesis and published by LAP Lambert Academic Publishing, a non-academic press which locates theses online, solicits their authors to publish with them and then sells the material, often at high prices. There is no peer-review or proofreading process involved. The book itself is also not very well written with a considerable amount of grammatical errors. Another book, Marshall Sahlins’ Confucius Institutes: Academic Malware, published in 2015, presents a very critical view of the Confucius Institute project and China’s reasons for undertaking it. This book does contain some useful information about the various concerns which have been raised about the Confucius Institute project and is itself an example of the reactions it has prompted among academics. However, it is largely written in a series of bullet points and is a total of 65 pages. As such, Sahlins presents a shopping list of criticisms and concerns rather than a balanced assessment of the Confucius Institute project. A third notable book is Confucius and Crisis in American Universities: Culture, Capital, and Diplomacy in U.S. Public Higher Education

14

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

(Stambach, 2014). Stambach adopts an ethnographic approach to explore the operation of a small number of Confucius Institutes in the USA and their connection to their host universities and wider communities. This book contains valuable insights into the day-to-day workings of the Confucius Institute project, some of which I cite here. The most comprehensive work so far is Chinese Public Diplomacy: The Rise of the Confucius Institute (Hartig, 2016). It is a very thoughtful discussion of the Confucius Institute project and covers some of the issues I discuss in this book. Importantly, however, it does not view it as an exercise in external language spread, and deals primarily with Confucius Institutes in Australia and Germany.

Interviews and survey The findings from these sources are supported by interviews with Confucius Institute staff; staff members of Chinese universities with responsibilities for managing their university’s involvement with Confucius Institutes and experience working in these Confucius Institutes; and university Chinese language teachers, as well as a survey of Chinese language learners. Further details of the interviews and survey are given below, but for now it suffices to say they are used to provide specific details and illustrations of the extensity, intensity and velocity of the Confucius Institute project.

Evaluating the Confucius Institute Project The fourth component of Held et al.’s (1999) framework is used to evaluate the contribution of the Confucius Institute project towards creating China’s desired external environment. When discussing impact, it is important to draw a distinction between the impact of the Confucius Institute project at the state-to-state level and its impact at the societyto-society level. The state-to-state level refers to interactions and relations among governments, while the society-to-society level refers to interactions and relations among non-government actors (Shambaugh, 2008). This is important because, as mentioned above, the contemporary world political system consists of more actors than just states. Distinguishing between impact at the state-to-state level and society-to-society level therefore gives a fuller and more accurate picture of the contribution of the Confucius Institute project to shaping China’s desired external environment. When evaluating the impact of the Confucius Institute project at the state-tostate level, I consider its influence on the policies and actions of foreign governments. At the society-to-society level, I focus on the influence of the Confucius Institute project on Chinese language teaching and learning, understanding of China and attitudes towards China, as well as the factors which may limit the Confucius Institute project’s impact.

Introduction: Language, Culture and China’s Rise in a Globalising World

15

The main sources used to evaluate the impact of the Confucius Institute project are the interviews and survey of Chinese language learners, conducted in 2010, 2013 and 2015. These sources are supplemented by the organisational documents, media reports and academic literature discussed above.

Interviews I conducted a total of 15 interviews in Australia and China. In Australia, I interviewed seven staff members at Confucius Institutes, five of whom were directors, one deputy director and one holding a teaching position at the time of the interviews. These interviews were conducted in person or via telephone. I also interviewed in person three Chinese language teachers working at universities. Finally, I interviewed, via email, a Chinese language teacher at a secondary school with a recently established Confucius Classroom. This teacher was heavily involved in the establishment of the Confucius Classroom and would be spending part of her time working on its activities into the future. In China, I interviewed two staff members from Chinese universities who have responsibilities for managing their university’s involvement with Confucius Institutes and experience working in these Confucius Institutes. I was also privileged to interview a well-known scholar from a Chinese research institute with extensive expertise in applied linguistics and a Chinese language teacher with considerable experience teaching Chinese at university level in China and overseas. These interviews were conducted in person. All interviews were semi-structured and revolved around interviewees’ experiences with Confucius Institutes, teaching Chinese language, and views and opinions of the Confucius Institute project. These interviewees possess a range of knowledge about and experience of the issues I investigate in this book. All interviewees are anonymous and are not identified by name or institution. Confucius Institute staff are referred to as ‘CI Interviewee’, staff at Chinese universities are referred to as ‘CU Interviewee’, the scholar from the Chinese research institute is referred to as ‘CS Interviewee’, Chinese language teachers from universities are referred to as ‘CLT Interviewee’ and the Chinese language teacher from the secondary school with a Confucius Classroom is referred to as ‘CC Interviewee’.

Survey The survey of the views and experiences of Chinese language learners was conducted through a questionnaire. The questionnaire consisted of three parts: Studying Chinese, which contained questions about participants’ experiences learning Chinese; Attitudes towards China, which contained questions about participants’ views of China; and China’s Promotion of

16

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

Chinese Language Learning, which contained questions about participants’ knowledge of and opinions about China’s promotion of Chinese language learning. I distributed this questionnaire to Chinese language students in Australia and China with the assistance of Confucius Institute and university staff. A total of 20 Chinese language learners responded. Of these, five were enrolled in Chinese language courses at Australian universities, and they completed the questionnaire electronically via email. The other 15 Chinese language learners were enrolled in a Chinese language course at a university in Beijing, China, and completed the questionnaire on paper during a regular class session. Students are likewise anonymous, referred to only by number and country of study. For example, ‘CLL 20, China’, refers to Chinese Language Learner 20, country of study China. Very few studies of the Confucius Institute project include students’ views, making the survey a virtually unique aspect of this book.

Organisational documents, media reports and academic literature Organisational documents, media reports and academic literature are used in a supporting role to evaluate impact. This is in order to connect the micro-level perspective of participants’ views and experiences of the Confucius Institute project to the macro-level perspective of the Confucius Institute project across the globe. Together, the analysis of these sources addresses the book’s second question.

Summarising the Confucius Institute Project and Discussing Implications An overall picture of the Confucius Institute project can be gained by combining the framework’s components to produce four different types of global project, modelled after Held et al.’s (1999) types of globalisation. These are thick global projects, diffused global projects, expansive global projects and thin global projects. A thick global project is characterised by high extensity, intensity, velocity and impact of global cultural flows. A diffused global project is characterised by global cultural flows with high extensity, intensity and velocity, but which have little impact. An expansive global project is characterised by high extensity and high impact, but low intensity and low velocity of global cultural flows. The final possibility is a thin global project, characterised by high extensity and low intensity, velocity and impact of global cultural flows (Held et al., 1999). This summation of the findings about the Confucius Institute project provides the basis for drawing out implications, and therefore addresses the book’s third question. The conceptual and methodological approach I have described here is represented in Table 1.3.

Introduction: Language, Culture and China’s Rise in a Globalising World

17

Table 1.3 Mapping, evaluating and discussing the implications of the Confucius Institute project What are the current dimensions of the Confucius Institute project? Extensity Geographical coverage of the Confucius Institute project Intensity Volume of the Confucius Institute project Velocity Speed of the Confucius Institute project What contribution has the Confucius Institute project made to shaping China’s external environment? Impact Consequences or outcomes of the Confucius Institute project State-to-state level Influence of the Confucius Institute project on policies and actions of foreign governments Society-to-society level Influence of the Confucius Institute project on Chinese language teaching and learning, understanding of China, attitudes towards China Factors limiting the Confucius Institute project What are the implications of the above for those involved with and/or interested in the Confucius Institute project? Classification of the Confucius Institute project as a: Thick global project High extensity, intensity velocity and impact Diffused global project High extensity, intensity and velocity, low impact Expansive global project High extensity and impact, low intensity and velocity Thin global project High extensity, low intensity, velocity and impact Discussion of what this means for: China Schools and universities Governments Researchers

Sources Main: Academic literature, media reports, internet documents Supporting: Interviews, survey Sources Main: Interviews, survey Supporting: Academic literature, media reports, internet documents

Sources Findings from above

18

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

Plan of the Book Each of the proceeding chapters in this book explores in detail one of the areas introduced here. Chapter 2 sets the Confucius Institute project within the context of China’s effort to shape and improve its external environment through soft power. It explores the reasons why China has chosen to purse a soft power strategy and highlights the importance attached to the Chinese language as a source of soft power. Chapter 3 then charts the current scale and scope of the Confucius Institute project, showing how it covers much of the world; consists of a large number of Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms; conducts many activities; and exhibits a rapid rate of growth. Importantly, this chapter argues that the Confucius Institute project has been greatly facilitated by the widespread demand for Chinese language learning. Chapters 4 and 5 address the question of what contribution the Confucius Institute project has made to shaping an external environment favourable to China. Chapter 4 discusses the Confucius Institute project’s impact at the stateto-state level. It shows the Confucius Institute project is not currently influencing the policies and actions of other countries, with the exception that it has had some influence on other countries’ promotion of language and culture. This is because of the nature of language and culture as sources of soft power and governments’ concerns about the Confucius Institute Project. Shifting the focus to the society-to-society level, Chapter 5 argues that the Confucius Institute project has made a significant contribution to the teaching and learning of Chinese, and in doing so has helped facilitate understandings of China, particularly in a cultural sense. However, this has not necessarily resulted in more positive dispositions towards China. This chapter also shows that there are a range of factors which may limit the Confucius Institute project’s capacity to carry out its activities, including concerns regarding its nature and intentions, and various practical and organisational issues. Chapter 6, the concluding chapter, summarises the main findings of the book and discusses their implications for China, schools and universities, governments and researchers. My discussion of implications is intended to improve the outcomes of the Confucius Institute project for those involved with and/or interested in it, something which existing works do not do.

Notes (1)

(2)

Many of these developments did, however, originate in China, and were assimilated or adapted by European countries. These include gunpowder, the gun, the cannon and various mining and production techniques. For a detailed discussion see Hobson (2004, 2012). This further attests to China’s status as the major centre of global cultural flows up until the 19th century. Chinese is also learnt as a second language by members of ethnic minority groups in China and Taiwan and residents of former colonies such as Hong Kong

Introduction: Language, Culture and China’s Rise in a Globalising World

19

and Singapore, and as a community or heritage language in Chinese diaspora communities around the world (Tsung & Cruickshank, 2011). These Chinese language learning contexts are not dealt with in this book as they are not the focus of the Confucius Institute project. (3) This is not to say that China has abandoned coercion and inducement. Hill and Beadle (2014) and Nye (2011) remind us that soft power alone is insufficient for a state to operate in the contemporary world political system and cannot solve every problem a state faces. This is why I regard soft power as a central element in China’s approach to world politics, not the central element. (4) Governments are by no means the only actors who engage in language planning and develop language policy. Language planning and policy can be found in families, businesses and various associations and organisations. Comprehensive overviews of language planning and policy can be found in Kaplan and Balduaf (1997) and Spolsky (2012). (5) When I began researching the Confucius Institute project, Hanban’s official Chinese name was 国家汉语国际推广领导小组办公室 (guόjiā hànyǔ guόjì tuīguǎng lǐngdǎo xiǎozǔ bàngōngshì) and the English translation was the National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language. This was since changed to 国家汉办 (guόjiā hànbàn), and the English translation to the Office of Chinese Language Council International. Paradise (2009) suggests this change in the English translation may have been due to concerns over of the connotations of the word ‘national’. More recently still, the name 孔子学院总部/国家汉办 (kǒngzǐ xuéyuàn zǒngbù/guόjiā hànbàn), or in English Confucius Institute Headquarters (Hanban), appears on the Hanban website and many Hanban documents. It is also interesting to note that Hanban’s website no longer contains details of all 12 ministries and commissions, listing instead only the Ministry of Education. The issue of the connection between the Confucius Institute project and the Chinese government will be discussed in greater detail at various points in this book, particularly in Chapters 4 and 5. (6) In China, the CCP apparatus and government apparatus are closely interlinked, meaning China’s political system is best described as a ‘party-state’ system (S.J. Guo, 2013: 131). Within this arrangement, the CCP is the dominant force and the real power holder in China. While in theory subordinate to the National Party Congress (NPC), the Central Committee (CC) and the Secretariat within the CCP apparatus, the Politburo is in reality ‘the command headquarters of the party’ (Lieberthal, 2004: 175). It consists of approximately 14–25 members, all of whom simultaneously hold government positions and have responsibility over a particular area, such as education or economics (Lieberthal, 2004; Saich, 2015). The members of the Politburo in turn choose a small number of individuals, usually fewer than ten, to make up the Politburo Standing Committee. The Politburo, and more particularly the Politburo Standing Committee, make all of the important decisions regarding China’s political and policy direction, although both are increasingly obliged to consider advice from various government ministries (Dreyer, 2000; Lanteigne, 2013; Saich, 2015). The State Council ‘is the executive branch of the government’, and can be thought of as the equivalent to a cabinet (S.J. Guo, 2013: 145). Its main responsibilities are the preparation of legislation, issuance and implementation of decisions and administration of all government ministries. The State Council also has a range of offices, commissions and agencies devoted to issues such as Chinese language and foreign language publishing, environmental protection and science and technology. Many members of the Politburo are also members of the State Council (S.J. Guo, 2013; Perkins, 1999). (7) Participants in this programme can be teachers, postgraduate students or recent graduates with a major in teaching Chinese as a foreign language. They must

20

(8)

(9)

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

be aged between 22 and 50; possess Chinese citizenship; be of good health and character; have a devotion to serving others; have a passion for teaching Chinese; have no criminal record; have a Modern Standard Chinese or Putonghua (普通话 pǔtōnghuà) level of 2A or higher; and an English language level of College English Band 4 or above (Hanban, n.d. d). Proficiency in Putonghua is measured by the Putonghua Proficiency Test or PSC (普通话水平测试 pǔtōnghuà shuǐpíng cèshì), a test developed by the State Language Commission during the 1980s and 1990s (Lam, 2005). Based on information from the State Language Commission, Lam (2005: 41) describes Level 2A as ‘[b]asically correct pronunciation. Natural intonation. Fluent expression. Occasional errors in pronouncing a few difficult sounds. Very few errors in vocabulary and grammar. Loss of marks within 13%’. The College English Test Band 4 (CET-4) is an English-language test which all non-English major students in Chinese universities are required to pass in order to receive their degrees. This test includes sections on listening comprehension, reading comprehension, vocabulary and grammar structures (Feng, 2009; M.H. Li, 2012; Y.Q. Wang, 1999; Yao, 1993). To be eligible for the Overseas Chinese Teacher Programme, participants must have a willingness to teach Chinese as a volunteer; be devoted to serving others; have at least an undergraduate degree; have sufficient proficiency in the language and culture of their country of residence to communicate and interact appropriately in work and everyday situations; speak Modern Standard Chinese; be between 22 and 60 years of age; be in good health; have no association with the Falun Gong (法轮功 fǎlúngōng) or other illegal organisations; and have no criminal record. For readers unfamiliar with the organisation, the Falun Gong was founded by Li Hongzhi in May 1992 in China’s Jilin Province. Within several years it had expanded within China and internationally. Members of the Falun Gong maintain it is a loose-knit group for the practice of meditation and spiritual cultivation exercises, while the Chinese government claims it is a highly structured and well-funded organisation intent on challenging the government and disrupting social order (C.S.C. Chan, 2004; Tong, 2002). On 25 April 1999, more than 10,000 Falun Gong practitioners staged a demonstration at the Zhongnanhai compound (中南海 zhōngnánhǎi), which contains the residences of high-ranking CCP and government officials and the offices of several important CCP and government organs, in central Beijing. A few months later, on 22 July 1999, the Falun Gong was officially banned in China (Tong, 2002). For more on the history and development of the Falun Gong and the Chinese government’s policy towards it, see C.S.C. Chan (2004) and Tong (2002). State-sponsored teachers must be Chinese citizens; be of good health and character; have no criminal record; be under 50 years of age (or where teachers have ability in a less commonly spoken language required for their work no older than 55); have a willingness to teach Chinese; be responsible and devoted to serving others; have good teaching, management and administration skills; be able to adapt to life in a foreign country; have a Modern Standard Chinese level of 2A or higher; and speak the language of the country in which they will teach fluently. Hanban also gives particular preference to those with experience in teaching a second language and overseas experience (Hanban, n.d. f).

2 Chinese Culture Goes Global: Soft Power and the Promotion of Chinese Language Learning Introduction Since the early 21st century, China has taken a more active approach to the processes of globalisation, one which emphasises proactive attempts to shape and improve its external environment (Lanteigne, 2013; S.S. Zhao, 2012). This approach is aptly termed ‘going out’ or ‘going global’ (走出去 zǒu chūqù). Culture is an important dimension of the going global approach, as demonstrated by the numerous international festivals, art exhibitions, sporting events and musical performances that have been conducted in recent years (Lai, 2012b).1 The common thread to these activities is that ‘China will take the initiative in presenting itself to the world’ (W.F. Zhang, 2012: 623).2 As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Confucius Institute project constitutes a significant global project within this approach, and stems largely from China’s interest in soft power. This chapter articulates the connections between the Confucius Institute project and soft power. It begins with a discussion of the role of soft power in world politics and the reasons why China is interested in it. It then describes China’s view of soft power with a focus on what makes it distinctive in terms of the scope and applications of soft power, sources of soft power and the perceived centrality of culture to soft power. This is followed by a more specific discussion of how the Chinese government, academics and media conceive of the Chinese language as a source of soft power. Finally, the chapter provides some necessary background to the Confucius Institute project in order to allow later chapters to map and evaluate it.

Soft Power in Contemporary World Politics Power is widely seen to be one of the most important and central concepts in the field of world politics (Hill, 2016; Ray & Kaarbo, 2005). Yet, as Griffiths and O’Callaghan (2002: 253) say, ‘power defies any attempts at rigorous, scientific assessment’. This is largely because the term ‘power’ has been used in a variety of ways and applied to a range of activities.

21

22

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

In the context of world politics, power can be defined generally as the ability to control or influence other actors and the outcomes of events (Griffiths & O’Callaghan, 2002; Shimko, 2008). Jones (1985: 245) provides a definition of power along these lines as ‘the ability of an actor on the international stage to use tangible and intangible resources and assets in such a way as to influence the outcomes of international events to its own satisfaction’. Broadly speaking, there are three ways in which states may do this: coercion (the use of force and sanctions), inducement (the use of material rewards and payments) and attraction (Lampton, 2008; Nye, 2004). Joseph S. Nye Jr. (1990) first coined the term ‘soft power’ to refer to attraction, and discussed the idea in several subsequent works. He defines and explains soft power as follows: A country may achieve its preferred outcomes in world politics because other countries want to emulate it or have agreed to a system that produces such effects. In this sense, it is just as important to set the agenda and attract others in world politics as it is to force others to change in particular situations. This aspect of power – that is, getting others to want what you want – might be called attractive, or soft power behavior. (Nye, 2005: 61 italics in original) According to Nye (2004, 2005, 2008) a state’s soft power derives from three main intangible resources: (i) culture; (ii) domestic values, policies and institutions; and (iii) foreign policy. Aspects of a state’s culture, such as movies, sports, popular music and various kinds of artistic performances, are seen as carriers of images and messages about a state’s values which can be attractive and appealing to others. In addition, the education of foreign students and academic exchange programmes can also expose those who participate to a state’s ideas and values. In regard to a state’s domestic policies and institutions, Nye (2004) argues that if these accurately reflect a state’s ideals and values, and its government behaves in accordance with these ideals and values in its administration of the state, it will present an attractive model to others. Examples of areas where this may apply include healthcare, education, environmental protection, and law and order. The content and manner of conduct of a state’s foreign policy are similarly seen as potential sources of attraction. In regard to the content of foreign policy, Nye (2004: 61) explains that an approach to world politics which consists of ‘[p]olicies based on broadly inclusive and far-sighted definitions of the national interest are easier to make attractive to others than policies that take a narrow and myopic perspective’. Furthermore, if a state seeks to implement its policies through consultation and joint action with others, and acts with humility and respect towards other actors, it is likely to enhance its attractiveness and appeal (Nye, 2004). Soft power therefore contrasts with the other two forms of power – often referred to as hard

Chinese Culture Goes Global: Soft Power and the Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

23

power – in the sense that other actors do what a state possessing soft power wants them to do because they perceive that state and its goals to be legitimate, not because they are forced to, or rewarded for, doing so. In this way, a state with soft power can achieve its goals in world politics without incurring the costs associated with coercion and inducement (Nye, 2004; Oğuzlu, 2007), although soft power is by no means cost free (Hill & Beadle, 2014), as we will see later in this chapter. While Nye’s conceptualisation of soft power has been broadly accepted, there have also been some criticisms of it (see Lai, 2012a; M.J. Li, 2009a; Zheng & C. Zhang, 2012 for useful summaries of such criticisms). Many of these criticisms have focused in particular on Nye’s resource-based approach to soft power. As shown above, in Nye’s original description of soft power, soft power was something that resided in power resources. In other words, the nature or characteristics of a power resource determined whether it produced soft or hard power. Accordingly, military and economic resources create hard power, while culture, values, institutions and policies create soft power (Nye, 2004). Several scholars note, however, that culture, values, institutions and policies are not inherently or automatically attractive and appealing, and can just as easily cause repulsion and resentment. This is particularly the case if such resources are seen as a danger or a threat to a country’s own culture, values, institutions and policies (X.G. Deng & L.N. Zhang, 2009; Hill & Beadle, 2014; M.J. Li, 2009a). For example, despite their popularity in many places, elements of American popular culture such as movies, television programmes and music, which often portray materialism, individualism and liberal attitudes towards sex and gender, have been found to be considerably less popular and even disliked in places such as the Middle East and South Asia (Chiozza, 2007; Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007). It should be noted that Nye (2004: 12) does acknowledge such issues when he says that ‘American films that make the United States attractive in China or Latin America may have the opposite effect and actually reduce American soft power in Saudi Arabia or Pakistan’. However, he does emphasise the benefits of culture, values, institutions and policies as resources for soft power far more than their potential drawbacks. In addition, attraction and appeal are not limited to culture, values, institutions and policies only, as other resources can also be attractive and appealing. Lai (2012a) provides an apt example: It is possible that other people or nations are attracted to the United States for its military might, economic prowess, and trade opportunities, or for technological advancement, not merely for its pop culture, values, and diplomacy, and look to the United States as a worthy leader. Arguably, it is even more likely that other peoples and nations respect the United States as a consequence of these hard power resources rather than the three soft power resources Nye noted. (Lai, 2012a: 5)

24

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

In light of these issues, the focus of discussion has shifted to behaviour, or how states use their various resources to create soft power, rather than the resources themselves. M.J. Li (2009a: 7), for example, argues that any power resource, including economic and military resources, can be used to create soft power providing the resource is used in a way that is attractive, appealing or persuasive to others. He therefore prefers the term ‘soft use of power’ to ‘soft power’. Accordingly, the use of any kind of power resource to ‘attract, appeal, persuade, and co-opt’ (M.J. Li, 2009a: 8) can be seen as the soft use of power. While there was some acknowledgement of these issues in Nye’s earlier works, his later works incorporate a similar idea to the soft use of power approach much more explicitly. He states in his book The Future of Power that ‘[m]any types of resources can contribute to soft power, but that does not mean that soft power is any type of behavior’ (Nye, 2011: 20, italics in original). This perspective on soft power is gaining currency, and I adopt it in this book’s discussion of China’s approach to soft power.

Reasons for China’s Interest in Soft Power The notion of soft power is arguably more popular in East Asia than anywhere else in the world (S.J. Lee & Melissen, 2011). This is particularly so in China, where the term ‘soft power’ has become ubiquitous in academic and policy circles, especially since the late 1990s and early 2000s, and issues such as the nature, sources and uses of soft power are vigorously discussed and debated (Cho & Jeong, 2008; Shambaugh, 2013; H.Y. Wang & Y.C. Lu, 2008).3 By way of illustration of this popularity, Lai (2012a) reports that by the end of 2010 there were in excess of 14 million Chinese websites using the term ‘soft power’, and M.J. Li (2008) reports that the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) database contained 1211 articles on soft power from Chinese journals and periodicals for the years 1994–2007. China has embraced soft power for six main reasons, each of which is explained below.

Soft power as a requirement for great power status The overall success of China’s economic development and modernisation has instilled confidence that China can become a great power (M.J. Li, 2012; S.S. Zhao, 2013).4 There has in fact been much official, academic and popular discussion in recent years about how China can achieve and maintain great power status in the contemporary world political system. For example, the ninth collective study session of the Politburo in November 2003 focused on the history and development of nine great powers from the 15th century to the present day – Portugal, Spain, Holland, France, Great Britain, Germany, Russia, Japan and the USA – to derive lessons for China’s own rise. In November 2006, CCTV Channel 2, a channel devoted to finance

Chinese Culture Goes Global: Soft Power and the Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

25

and economics programmes, broadcast what proved to be an immensely popular documentary titled The Rise of the Great Powers (大国崛起 dàguό juéqǐ) on the same topic as the Politburo collective study session and was reportedly in the main balanced, accurate and thoughtful in its presentation of each country’s story (Shambaugh, 2013; Zakaria, 2009; W.H. Zhang, 2010). The Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) also produces an annual report on China’s standing in the world (M.J. Li, 2012). A common theme throughout such discussions is that great powers require comprehensive national power (综合国力 zōnghé guόlì), a concept developed in the late 1990s which guides China’s understanding of and thinking about power (Cho & Jeong, 2008; Lampton, 2008; Pillsbury, 2000). Comprehensive national power is the combination, or aggregate package, of a state’s power. It consists of a number of components, namely, the economy, the military, science and technology, education, natural resources, territory, culture, domestic governance, diplomacy and international influence. A true great power, in the Chinese view, needs to be strong across all of these components, thus having ample resources to use for coercion, inducement and attraction, and the option to select the most appropriate way(s) of accomplishing its goals (Lampton, 2008; Pillsbury, 2000; Shambaugh, 2013). While all of the components of comprehensive national power are therefore considered important, China recognises that building soft power through attraction has not received sufficient attention given its significance in the 21st-century world, and is often viewed as the ‘weak link’ in China’s pursuit of comprehensive national power (M.J. Li, 2012: 41). China’s economic growth has provided it with the necessary resources to address this perceived shortcoming through funding various initiatives aimed at cultivating soft power (Lai, 2012a; S.J. Lee & Melissen, 2011; Y.W. Wang, 2008).

Soft power as the main arena of competition in world politics Related to the perceived importance of soft power for attaining and maintaining great power status is the view that soft power is the real arena of competition in world politics today. Since the end of the Cold War, the USA has been dominant economically, technologically and militarily (Yahuda, 2004). China, by and large, accepts the reality of this state of affairs and does not presently seek to challenge the USA via major warfare, which many Chinese analysts believe has lost much of its relevance and viability in an era characterised mainly by the desire to pursue peace and development (B.S. Glaser & Murphy, 2009; Medeiros, 2009). Instead, culture, values, ideology, beliefs, norms and institutions are considered more useful for influencing outcomes and shaping a desirable external environment (M.J. Li, 2008; Lynch, 2013; H.Y. Wang & Y.C. Lu, 2008). It is here that China sees itself as able to compete effectively with other countries, especially since the USA’s international appeal and attraction have declined since the early 2000s as a result of its wars in Iraq and

26

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

Afghanistan; difficulties in its handling of relations with some countries such as Iran and North Korea; and its financial crisis (Kurlantzick, 2007; Nathan & Scobell, 2012; Yahuda, 2004). In particular, Chinese philosophical and religious traditions such as Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism, are seen as offering alternatives to the Western values and ideology which have heavily influenced the nature of the contemporary world and potential solutions to pressing global issues (M.J. Li, 2009b).

Interest of other East Asian countries in soft power China has also carefully observed the attempts of other East Asian countries to use soft power in world politics. Japan was the first of the East Asian countries to do so, prompted by the constitutional constraints on the development of its military power and concerns that its long-term economic stagnation may severely reduce its relevance and influence in world politics (S.W. Lee, 2011; J. Sun, 2013). Japan has consequently put much effort into promoting its culture – most obviously elements of its popular culture such as anime, manga comics, music and computer games – around the world (S.W. Lee, 2011; Otmazgin, 2008). South Korea, as a small country possessing limited resources in comparison with its much larger neighbours, believes it can use soft power to accomplish goals it would not be able to accomplish through other means (S.W. Lee, 2011; J. Sun, 2013). The widespread popularity of South Korean television dramas, music, fashion and food, especially in Asia, has become known as the ‘Korean Wave’. The South Korean government has supported the development of such cultural products, as well as a number of other initiatives, such as increased participation in multilateral forums and humanitarian operations, and increased allocations of official development assistance (ODA) (S.W. Lee, 2011). Taiwan has also shown an interest in soft power as a means to expand its international standing and engagement with important international issues. The establishment of two democracypromoting institutions, the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (TFD) and the Democratic Pacific Union (DPU), and cultural and academic exchanges are some examples of this approach (H.Y. Wang & Y.C. Lu, 2008).5 Given the rivalries and sometimes tense relations of the region, it is not surprising that China does not want to be eclipsed by the activities of other countries (H.Y. Wang & Y.C. Lu, 2008; Yahuda, 2004).

Similarities of soft power to past practices in China’s world politics and principles in Chinese thought Another reason for China’s interest in soft power is its similarities with past practices in the way China managed its relations with the rest of the world. In the tribute system era, as discussed above, China saw

Chinese Culture Goes Global: Soft Power and the Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

27

itself as culturally superior to all other peoples and nations. This view led China to seek to use its cultural resources to shape a favourable external environment, either through co-optation into the Chinese world order or through the attraction of China’s example (Swaine & Tellis, 2000; S.S. Zhao, 1997). For instance, China established authority over the areas inhabited by non-Han Chinese peoples around its borders by granting local leaders the title and position of vassal of the Chinese emperor to ensure their loyalty (Nathan & Scobell, 2012; Swaine & Tellis, 2000). China also had considerable influence in Korea, Japan and Vietnam due to the attraction of its poetry, music, clothing, architecture and system of government and administration, all of which these countries imitated and adopted to varying degrees (Gregory, 2003; Nathan & Scobell, 2012). Chinese civilisation was also widely seen as having much to offer Western countries during the 17th and 18th centuries, and some scholars and intellectuals such as Leibniz and Voltaire saw China as a potential model for the West in terms of ethics, law and politics (Gregory, 2003). These practices were seen to allow China to concentrate on its domestic challenges (Swaine & Tellis, 2000), bearing obvious similarities to contemporary China’s approach.6 Similarly, the notion of soft power resembles key ideas and principles in certain strands of classical Chinese philosophy and strategic thought. For example, Confucius discussed at length the principle of governing through moral example rather than force. Mencius, a later philosopher who made a considerable contribution to the Confucian tradition, similarly distinguished between ‘the kingly way’ (王道 wáng dào) of governing through virtue and ‘the hegemon’s way’ (霸道 bà dào) of governing through military power and clever scheming (Van Norden, 2008, 2011; H.Y. Wang & Y.C. Lu, 2008). In terms of managing relations with other states, as Barr (2011: 26) summarises, ‘Confucianism, in general, advocated that a state should obtain its leadership status by setting an example, and avoiding the forceful imposition of values on others’. Some aspects of the work of the Warring States era (403–221 BCE) military strategist Sun Zi also bear a likeness to soft power, albeit within the context of discussing the conduct of military campaigns. For instance, Sun Zi placed a high value on subduing one’s enemy’s forces without fighting (不战而屈人之兵 bù zhàn ér qū rén zhī bīng), which he considered to be ‘the true pinnacle of excellence’ (Sawyer, 1994: 177). This could be achieved through an ‘appeal to the enemy’s rationality, morality, values and aspiration’ (Barr, 2011: 26). Sun Zi also believed that the possession of wisdom, credibility and benevolence, in addition to courage and strictness, were essential characteristics of the ideal commander (Sawyer, 1994). These similarities with China’s own philosophical and strategic traditions further enhance the appeal of soft power.

28

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

Soft power as necessary for the domestic legitimacy of the CCP Soft power also plays an important role in supporting and enhancing the domestic legitimacy of the CCP regime. The CCP’s legitimacy, based originally on its claim to have transformed China into a strong and unified country after the so-called ‘century of national humiliation’ (百 年国耻 bǎinián guόchǐ ) lasting from the beginning of the Opium War in 1839 to the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, suffered a number of serious blows in the ensuing decades. These include the economic, human and environmental costs resulting from the Great Leap Forward of the late 1950s; the widespread damage and chaos to almost all aspects of life and society caused by the Cultural Revolution of the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s; the shift away from socialism following the initiation of the reform and opening-up era of the late 1970s; and the collapse of communist regimes in most other parts of the world in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Callahan, 2010; W.F. Zhang, 2012; S.S. Zhao, 2004). To address its legitimacy problem, the CCP has sought to ensure the population’s loyalty and support through fostering a kind of nationalism based on providing economic prosperity and political stability domestically, and standing up for China’s interests and pursuing greater status internationally (Z.M. Chen, 2005; Shirk, 2008; S.S. Zhao, 2004). S.S. Zhao (2009: 240) describes this kind of nationalism as ‘an instrument of the communist state to bolster the faith of the Chinese people in a troubled political system and to hold the country together during a period of rapid and turbulent transformation from a communist to a postcommunist [sic] society’. This in turn places additional importance on China’s efforts to accomplish its goals and protect its interests in world politics, as W.F. Zhang (2012) explains: China’s further opening up allowed its people more opportunities to interact with the outside world, which raised their expectation of governmental performance. Beijing’s performance on the world stage, such as relations with other countries and status in the world community, became new indicators for Chinese people to judge the legitimacy of their government. Thus, China’s rapid integration into the world made it important for Chinese leaders to succeed on the international front in order to succeed on the home front. (W.F. Zhang, 2012: 620) A good international reputation and a positive international image of China both increase the public’s confidence in the CCP and facilitate acceptance of its rule. On the other hand, criticisms of China by other actors, including foreign governments, the world media and NGOs, can

Chinese Culture Goes Global: Soft Power and the Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

29

cause the public to become discontented with the government and its performance, especially when criticisms relate to particularly sensitive issues such as the status of Taiwan, China’s handling of Tibet and relations with Japan (Shirk, 2008; W.F. Zhang, 2007). China cannot achieve a good international reputation and positive international image through coercion and inducement alone; it also requires soft power (W.F. Zhang, 2012).

Soft power to counter the ‘China threat’ theory Perhaps most significantly, however, China’s experiences with the use of force, such as sending warships to disputed areas of the South China Sea and launching missiles into the Taiwan Strait during the mid-1990s, only antagonised and alienated other countries while failing to achieve China’s desired outcomes (A. Goldstein, 2003; Kurlantzick, 2006). As a result, China has paid much greater attention to others’ reactions to its rise and has become particularly concerned about the ‘China threat’ theory. The ‘China threat’ theory, proposed in various forms by scholars such as Bernstein and Munro (1997), Gertz (2002), Huntington (1996), Kagan (2008) and Mearsheimer (2001, 2006, 2010), holds that China’s growing power and influence are a serious danger to the stability and integrity of the world political system and that China’s rise will cause major conflict and possibly even war with the USA and its allies.7 Such ideas have gained some traction in the world media and among some foreign publics and governments. This is potentially very damaging to China because if it is widely perceived as aggressive or threatening other actors will be less likely to cooperate with it and more likely to work against it, either individually or through coordinated efforts (Y. Deng, 2008). Some scholars, such W.F. Zhang (2007), argue that some recent events and developments can in fact be linked to the ‘China threat’ theory. These include calls for the USA to enact a containment policy against China as it did against the Soviet Union; the USA’s strengthening of its alliance with Japan; and the USA’s successful opposition to the European Union’s (EU) proposal to lift its arms embargo on China. China believes that the ‘China threat’ theory can be countered, and other actors consequently reassured about its rise, through developing its soft power. A common view among Chinese leaders, government officials and academics is that this can be done by using soft power to present a benign and acceptable image of China to the world, increase understanding of China and diminish stereotypes of China (Garrison, 2005; Nathan & Scobell, 2012; H.Y. Wang & Y.C. Lu, 2008). This combination of developments within China and its interactions with the rest of the world has resulted in China’s interest in soft power. In embracing soft power, however, China has also developed its own view

30

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

of the concept, which has both commonalities with and differences from Nye’s original proposal.

China’s View of Soft Power The Chinese view of soft power is largely consistent with the definition put forward by Nye. According to H.Y. Wang and Y.C. Lu (2008: 427), Chinese scholars generally define soft power as ‘intangible, non-quantifiable, non-material or spiritual power’ and ‘the ability to persuade others with reason and to convince others with moral principles’. Nevertheless, the Chinese view of soft power also has its own distinctive characteristics. These can be seen in three areas: the scope and applications of soft power; the sources of soft power; and the centrality of culture to soft power.

Scope and applications of soft power In Nye’s work, soft power applies primarily to states and their conduct at the state-to-state level of world politics, at least in earlier works. For example, although Nye (2004) does say that a variety of non-state actors such as NGOs, organised religions, IGOs and terrorist organisations possess soft power, he discusses how they use soft power to influence the policies of states or mobilise public opposition towards their policies. He does not discuss the use of soft power within these organisations. The Chinese view, in contrast, regards soft power as applicable to domestic and local politics as well as world politics (Lai, 2012a; Zheng & C. Zhang, 2012). Here, soft power is considered important for strengthening national identity and ethnic unity through the attraction and acceptance of Han Chinese culture. These are seen as important for China’s own development and progress, rather than making China more appealing to the outside world (Barr, 2011; H.Y. Wang & Y.C. Lu, 2008). In a later work, Nye (2011) does, however, acknowledge similar uses of soft power.

Sources of soft power In terms of the sources of soft power, China emphasises different aspects of two of the sources that Nye proposed, namely, culture and domestic values, policies and institutions. More will be said about culture in the next section, but for now it is important to note that China emphasises its traditional culture as a source of attraction, rather than its contemporary culture. Aspects of traditional culture which have received attention include Chinese literature, philosophy, Chinese medicine, art, architecture, cuisine and martial arts. This contrasts with Nye’s (2004) treatment which concentrates mainly on contemporary culture, as demonstrated by his list of potentially attractive aspects of culture mentioned earlier.

Chinese Culture Goes Global: Soft Power and the Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

31

The emphasis in terms of domestic values, policies and institutions is on China’s economic model rather than its political ideals. In particular, China’s model of rapid economic development under firm state control is believed to be attractive to other nations, especially developing countries (Gill & Y.Z. Huang, 2006; Kurlantzick, 2007). Here, it is important to note that while the Chinese government and some scholars see the country’s economic model as potentially attractive, the government has not adopted the term ‘Beijing Consensus’, sometimes used to describe China’s model of development (Cho & Jeong, 2008; Zheng & C. Zhang, 2012).8 In addition, China’s view of soft power includes sources that Nye did not consider as sources of soft power, but rather as inducement, namely, trade, aid and investment (Kurlantzick, 2006). These are regarded as sources of soft power because, in the Chinese view, ‘their purpose is not to reward but to create a positive image of the donor, and thus influence the recipient’s attitudes’ (Kivimäki, 2014: 424–425).

Centrality of culture to soft power Considering culture features in many of the reasons for China’s interest in soft power, it is not surprising that culture has a central place in China’s conception of soft power. In fact, M.J. Li (2008, 2009b) concludes on the basis of a review of the Chinese discourse on soft power that culture is generally seen as the most important source of China’s soft power. This is primarily because traditional Chinese culture has ‘a long history, and a wide range of traditions, symbols and textual records’ (M.J. Li, 2008: 292). This view of soft power has also been accepted by China’s leadership and has thus far had the most impact on policy making (B.S. Glaser & Murphy, 2009). This is shown by statements and activities from high levels of the government and the CCP. The 13th collective study session of the Politburo in May 2004, for example, emphasised the need for China to draw on its traditional culture for enhancing its soft power (Lai, 2012a). Similar sentiments were expressed by then President and CCP Chairman Hu Jintao in his work report to the 17th CCP Congress in October 2007 in which he said that ‘[c]ulture has increasingly become an important source of national cohesion and creativity and an important factor in the competition of overall national strength’, and that China needed to ‘enhance the country’s cultural soft power’ (cited in B.S. Glaser & Murphy, 2009: 16). A further collective study session of the Politburo in July 2010 again highlighted the importance of culture, while Article 9 of the 12th Five Year Plan (2011– 2015) urged the development and promotion of culture domestically and internationally as a means to increase China’s soft power (Lai, 2012a). Nye’s work, on the other hand, does not see culture as the most important source of soft power. In fact, Nye says very little about the relative importance of culture, domestic values, policies and institutions and foreign policy, other than to note that a government is likely to

32

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

have more influence over foreign policy. As he explains, ‘[a]ll three are important, but policy substance and style are both the most volatile and the most susceptible to government control’ (Nye, 2004: 68). Considering the Chinese government has explicitly accepted the view that culture is the most important source of soft power, it is also interesting to note that Nye (2004, 2011) sees culture, and popular culture in particular, as largely beyond the control of governments. This view of soft power will be returned to later in this book, particularly the discussion in Chapter 6 of the implications of the Confucius Institute project. We now turn to how Chinese language learning fits into China’s interest in and view of soft power.

The Role of Chinese Language Learning Language ideology can be defined as the sets of beliefs, opinions, perceptions and feelings about language and its use. These can relate to the form, function, status, value and quality of language (Ajsic & McGroarty, 2015; Field & Kroskrity, 2009; McGroarty, 2010; Pan, 2015). It is important to take these into account because the beliefs, opinions, perceptions and feelings of those involved with language planning and policy influence both its design and practice (Liddicoat & Taylor-Leech, 2015; McGroarty, 2010). In the case of China’s external language spread, there is evidence to suggest that the Chinese language is widely seen as a conduit through which knowledge and understanding of Chinese culture and China itself can be transmitted to the world. This view is reflected in statements by various government officials. A National People’s Congress (NPC) deputy, Hu Youqing, for example, said that the promotion of Chinese language learning ‘can help build up our national strength and should be taken as a way to develop our country’s soft power’ (cited in Kurlantzick, 2007: 67),9 while the former vice mayor of Shanghai, Yan Juanqi, explained that ‘to promote Chinese learning overseas is beneficial to the revival and the spreading of traditional Chinese culture, to the projection of a benign image of China on the international stage, as well as to the expansion of China’s influence in the world’ (cited in X.H. Cheng, 2009: 115). At the March 2006 Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), CPPCC member and former director of the State Council Press Office Zhao Qizheng said China should strengthen its international promotion of Chinese because ‘you can win the hearts and minds of those who are attracted to your language and culture’ (cited in Xu, 2007: 11). More recently, CPPCC member Jin Li said ‘[i]f foreigners know more about the Chinese language, it gets easier for them to know and accept the nation’ (cited in People’s Daily, 2013).10 Many Chinese scholars also see language as an important resource. Such views are significant because, as Lanteigne (2013) points out,

Chinese Culture Goes Global: Soft Power and the Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

33

the academic community has become an important influence on the development of China’s approach to world politics. J.M. Lu (2004: 5), for example, describes the teaching of Chinese as a foreign language as ‘a national mission’, while L.X. Jin (2006) suggests that one third of China’s national defence spending should be allocated to the teaching of Chinese as a foreign language because it will have the same benefits for China’s security as spending it on soldiers. According to Y.D. Chen (2006), language is a medium through which people can understand a country’s policies and ways of thinking, making language promotion an important way of influencing others’ perceptions of and beliefs about a country. Similarly, Mo (2009: 23) argues that promoting Chinese language learning can play an important role in China’s rise because ‘at the same time as teaching Chinese, we also promote Chinese culture and show the world’s people that China is a nation which respects culture and desires peaceful development; it is this peaceful and harmonious culture which leads China to develop and rise’. Another such view is expressed by Z.L. Wang (2008), who believes one purpose of teaching Chinese is to encourage understanding of China and Chinese culture; communication between China and the world; and friendship, which has become increasingly important since China began to engage with the world more actively. The Chinese media have similar views on the value of language. According to D.P. Wang and B. Adamson (2014), the media often portray the widespread interest in Chinese language learning in general, and Confucius Institutes in particular, ‘as a successful national cause and a significant achievement in winning hearts and minds in the global community’. Media reports of this nature are not difficult to find. The China Daily, for example, has carried reports such as ‘Chinese-language contest links China to the world’ (China Daily, 2003), ‘Spreading the right word to the world’ (China Daily, 2014a) and ‘Celebrating 10 years of Confucius Institute’ [sic] (China Daily, 2014b). The People’s Daily, another major Chinese newspaper, has featured reports such as ‘Demand for Chinese language learning increasing rapidly’ (People’s Daily, 2007a) and ‘Confucius Institutes help spread Chinese language, culture globally’ (People’s Daily, 2008).

The Confucius Institute Project: Origins and Background The Confucius Institute project is obviously grounded in the language ideology described above. Interestingly, however, only a few decades ago, Confucius and Confucianism were objects of severe criticism. They were seen as feudal, backward and reactionary, and widely held to be responsible for China’s calamitous experiences during the 19th and early 20th centuries. In recent years though, both have experienced a major resurgence of official

34

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

and popular interest and support (Bell, 2008). The Chinese leadership has drawn selectively from Confucianism both as an inspiration and justification for some of its policies and ideologies, including the concepts of Harmonious Society (和谐社会 héxié shèhuì) and Harmonious World (和谐世界 héxié shìjiè), while television programmes and books about Confucianism are very popular with the Chinese public (Barr, 2011; Blanchard & S.J. Guo, 2008). As Nathan and Scobell (2012: 322) put it, Confucius is ‘now seen to personify Chinese values of harmony, community, and deference’. Against this background, Confucius was chosen as the namesake and figurehead of China’s promotion of Chinese language learning, supposedly at the suggestion of then state councillor Chen Zhili in March 2004, although there is some conjecture as to the exact role that Chen played (Hartig, 2016; D.P. Wang & B. Adamson, 2014). Hanban’s (2006) own explanation for the naming of Confucius Institutes is worth quoting at length as it demonstrates the importance of Confucius to the Confucius Institute project and the images and values China is attempting to project through it: Why did we adopt Confucius’ name for these institutes whose aim is to provide facilities for learning Chinese language and culture? The reason is that Confucius, a contemporary of Sakyamuni, is a historically significant figure in our culture. He is regarded as the greatest teacher of all time in the hearts of Chinese people. He was the philosopher who taught people to treat others with respect and propriety, to co-exist with nature, and be based on the current surroundings while striving for a better future. Confucius’ enduring teachings include: ‘Do not impose upon others what you do not desire yourself’; ‘Help others establish what you wish to establish yourself, help others achieve something you wish to achieve yourself’; ‘All who are encompassed within the Four Seas are brothers’; ‘Harmony is the most valuable of all things’; ‘When walking in the company of other men, there must be one I can learn something from; I shall pick out his merits to follow and his shortcomings for reference to overcome my own’; ‘A gentleman unites with people of principle and never follows others blindly; A petty man follows others blindly without regard to principles’; ‘A cultivated person honours his betters and is tolerant of the multitude; he is full of praise for the good while taking pity on the unrefined’. These and many more of his teachings are still observed by the Chinese people today as guiding principles for getting along with other people. The teachings in The Analects also include: ‘Every day, I examine myself many times on three counts: Have I tried my utmost to help others? Have I been honest to my friends? Have I diligently reviewed the instructions from the Master?’ ‘Man has been destined to die since time immemorial. But if people lose their trust in the government then the country has lost

Chinese Culture Goes Global: Soft Power and the Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

35

its basis’. ‘Study hard and never feel contented, and never be tired of teaching others’. ‘A refined person cultivates himself and thereby brings peace and security to his fellow beings’. ‘Worries will soon appear if one gives no thought to a long-term plan’. ‘A gentleman sets strict demands on himself while a petty man sets strict demands on others’. These sayings have been the standard of self-cultivation for the Chinese people for generations. (Hanban, 2006: 13–14) However, as K.K. Chan and Hunter (2012: 145) point out, beyond the name ‘a Confucius Institute is an institute with little to do with Confucius’. A Confucius Institute, as mentioned in Chapter 1, is in fact a non-profit education institute established through the cooperation of China and a foreign country (Hanban, n.d. c). The most common model is for Confucius Institutes to be set up as partnerships between Hanban, a Chinese university and a foreign university, although they can also be set up as partnerships with other kinds of institution or organisation (Paradise, 2009).11 An important point to note here is that the exact way that Confucius Institutes operate and the activities they conduct vary, although, broadly speaking, they share a focus on Chinese language and/or culture. Some Confucius Institutes focus on other areas such as business, science or traditional Chinese medicine. As CI Interviewee 4 said, ‘the purpose of the Confucius Institute depends on your perspective. And it’s formulated in different ways’. The usual process for establishing a Confucius Institute is that the Chinese and foreign universities jointly develop an application which is submitted to Hanban’s Confucius Institute Headquarters. If the application is approved, Hanban and the foreign university agree to provide equal funding for the Confucius Institute, which is usually set up on a five-year contract to begin with. A common arrangement is that Hanban provides start-up funding, annual funding of US$100,000 for the duration of the contract, teaching material and teaching staff, while the foreign university provides physical resources such as office space and management staff (Barr, 2011; Hartig, 2012a; Starr, 2009; H.Q. Zhao & J.B. Huang, 2010). According to the Confucius Institute staff I interviewed, Confucius Institutes can also apply to Hanban for additional funding for specific projects, and Hanban sometimes offers funding for specific projects such as the development of textbooks to suit local conditions and participation in book exhibitions (CI Interviewee 1; CI Interviewee 2; CI Interviewee 3; CI Interviewee 4; CI Interviewee 5). Operating on a similar model to Confucius Institutes are Confucius Classrooms, which aim to provide expertise and resources for Chinese language courses in primary and secondary schools, usually by connecting them to a Confucius Institute. Confucius Classrooms are also partly funded by the Confucius Institute to which they are linked, and may

36

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

Table 2.1 Funding for main aspects of Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms worldwide, 2009–2015

Year

Start-up funding (US$)

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total

19,240,081 9,469,000 8,504,000 9,652,000 11,002,000 7,501,000 6,727,000 72,095,081

Operational funding (US$) 67,695,139 37,572,000 41,691,000 63,788,000 88,684,000 220,484,000 228,979,000 748,893,139

Salaries of Chinese staff (US$) 41,358,644 28,864,000 53,384,000 72,728,000 105,459,000 No data available No data available 301,793,644

Book donations/ teaching materials (US$) 7,933,891 5,383,000 7,301,000 3,809,000 4,980,000 3,269,000 3,080,000 35,755,891

Sources: Hanban (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015a).

apply for funding for their teaching and other activities (CC Interviewee 1; Barr, 2011; Starr, 2009).12 According to Jean Zhang, the Administrative and Programme Coordinator of Confucius Classrooms at the Confucius Institute at La Trobe University in Melbourne, Australia, schools which host a Confucius Classroom receive AU$10,000 (US$7,659) in upfront funding, and books and other materials to the value of approximately AU$10,000 (US$7,659) every year (Munro, 2016). Table 2.1 shows the amount of money spent on the main aspects of the funding arrangements – that is start-up funding; operational funding; salaries for Chinese directors, teachers and volunteers; and book donations/ development of teaching materials – for Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms around the world for the years for which consistent data are available in Hanban’s annual reports.13 In addition, Hanban also funds various other aspects of the Confucius Institute project which vary from year to year. These include funding for Confucius Institute Day celebrations, lecture tours, exhibitions of teaching materials, development of Chinese language learning computer software, conferences and student performances. As all Hanban annual reports from 2007 onwards give a figure for total expenditure, Table 2.2 presents total expenditure for the years 2007–2015. Comparisons with the expenditure of other language and culture promotion organisations may make this seem like a relatively small amount of money. For example, the British Council’s expenditure for 2014–2015 was £972 million or US$1,282,456,800 (British Council, 2015), which is considerably more than Hanban’s annual expenditure and only US$486,430,348 less than its total expenditure on the Confucius Institute project for the years 2007–2015. The German government also reportedly

Chinese Culture Goes Global: Soft Power and the Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

37

Table 2.2 Total expenditure on the Confucius Institute project, 2007–2015 Year

Total expenditure (US$)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total

69,381,537 123,608,797 188,212,814 137,761,000 164,103,000 196,330,000 278,371,000 300,265,000 310,854,000 1,768,887,148

Sources: Hanban (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015a).

spent approximately €215 million (US$238,101,750) on the Goethe Institute in 2015 (Hartig, 2016). With the exception of the years 2013, 2014 and 2015, this too is more than Hanban’s annual expenditure on the Confucius Institute project. However, it is important to keep in mind that China is not yet at the same level of development as Britain or Germany. As the World Bank (2016) points out, although ‘China recently became the second largest economy and is increasingly playing an important and influential role in the global economy’, it nevertheless ‘remains a developing country (its per capita income is still a fraction of that in advanced countries) and its market reforms are incomplete’. As of 2010, 11.2% of China’s population were living on less than US$2 a day (World Bank, n.d.). Under these circumstances, the amount of funding that Hanban provides is in fact quite significant. Official statements and involvement with the Confucius Institute project reflect the same views on the Chinese language described above, and further demonstrate China’s commitment to it. According to former CCP propaganda chief and Politburo member Li Changchun, for example, Confucius Institutes are ‘an important part of China’s overseas propaganda set-up’ (The Economist, 2009).14 In his congratulatory letter on World Confucius Institute Day, Chinese President Xi Jinping wrote: During the past 10 years, Confucius Institutes have been vigorously providing Chinese language teaching and cultural exchange activities, playing an important role in promoting mutual learning between and among various civilizations in the world and strengthening mutual understanding and friendship between Chinese people and peoples of other countries. You have devoted tremendous passion and efforts to enhancing the dissemination of culture and knowledge as well as

38

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

heart-to-heart communication between human beings. It is an endeavor of great significance. […] Confucius Institutes belong to China, and they also belong to the world. [The] Chinese government and people will consistently support the growth of Confucius Institutes. (Cited in Hanban, 2014) Similarly, Li Keqiang, the Premier of China, wrote: Since the first Confucius Institute was established 10 years ago, it has made teaching Chinese language and introducing Chinese culture its mission, took into account local circumstances and needs, played a significant role in boosting people-to-people exchange between China and other countries and promoting mutual understanding and friendship between Chinese people and citizens of other countries. I wish that Confucius Institutes will act in accordance with the motto of ‘mutual respect, friendly discussion, equality and mutual benefit’, stick to a model of collaboration between Chinese and foreign educational institutions, constantly improve the quality of teaching and level of administration, deepen the blending of Chinese and foreign culture, inherit and carry forward the concept of ‘harmony is most precious’ and ‘harmony without uniformity’, and make even greater contributions to enhancing the world civilization diversity and the harmonious development of peoples from all countries. (Cited in Hanban, 2014) High-ranking government officials have also often attended the international Confucius Institute Conferences and visited Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms around the world. Former President Hu Jintao, for example, did this on a number of occasions (Lai, 2012b; W. Li & H. Zhu, 2014). More recently, President Xi Jinping attended the opening ceremony of the 2015 UK Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms Annual Conference and personally unveiled the plaque for the world’s 1000th Confucius Classroom (China Daily, 2015). Xi also made a speech which expressed similar sentiments to his congratulatory letter cited above. Hanban (2015a) summarised this speech as follows: President Xi Jinping delivered an important speech in which he stated that Confucius Institutes serve as important platforms to help the world know China; Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms have played an active role in facilitating people around the world to learn the Chinese language and understand the Chinese culture, and they have also made great contributions to people-to-people exchanges between China and other countries as well as the development of diverse and colorful world civilizations. President Xi Jinping expressed again the support of the Chinese government for Confucius Institutes

Chinese Culture Goes Global: Soft Power and the Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

39

and hoped that Confucius Institutes would do more to disseminate culture, link hearts, and promote the diversity of world civilizations. (Hanban, 2015a: 3) According to Confucius Institute staff, the promotion of Chinese language learning through the Confucius Institute project is seen by China, at least in part, as one means of contributing to a more favourable external environment. CI Interviewee 3 explained: A very explicit purpose is the teaching of Chinese language, and the expectation, I guess, that if you can get people learning the language they will learn something about your culture, its history and contemporary affairs, etc. And very clearly, the Chinese, they read the Western press, they know they’re portrayed in a certain way, and they probably think that their portrayal is neither accurate nor up-to-date. And therefore to try to reach into communities and improve general awareness and understanding is a desirable object. This view was echoed by CI Interviewee 2: Why do they want to do it? I suppose, people say it’s because they want to spread soft power, they want to promote themselves, like you know, Australia funds [the] Centre for Australian Studies in China in Shanghai, in Fujian, in Beijing, and the Alliance Française, the Goethe Institute, the British Council, the American Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, all these kinds of things, or Endowment for Democracy, you name it. Though I think in the case of China, apart from these things that everyone wants to do, I think the Chinese do think, my understanding, from the government to the Chinese elite, they do think [the] Chinese are misunderstood. That might be wrong, but that’s what they think. They think by promoting the learning of language and culture, China will be understood better. CI Interviewee 6 explained this with reference to the Chinese notion of harmony: Because in our own country, in China’s culture, we believe that harmony is very important, but if people do not understand each other, it will cause some conflicts or misunderstandings, and this will not be good for the peace of the whole world, so by promoting these kinds of relationships [so] that people know more about other countries’ things, that will be better for different peoples to get that harmony. Similarly, CU Interviewee 1 said:

40

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

The Confucius Institute is to help foreigners understand China. China can’t wait for foreigners to come to China for understanding because it will take too long; China has to promote itself. The 2008 Olympics mascots, the Fuwa [福娃 fúwá, literally meaning good luck dolls and also known in English as the Friendlies], were all plant eating animals, Chinese people are peaceful but don’t promote themselves, so the Confucius Institute is to let the world know about this.15 CU Interviewee 2 also felt that the purpose of the Confucius Institute project was to increase understanding of and dispel any misunderstandings about China. CC Interviewee 1, in comments echoing Hanban’s description of the Confucius Institute project cited above, saw the Confucius Institute project as a means of establishing an image or representation of China in the international community: Confucius was a very famous Chinese teacher in the history of China and also a famous philosopher who influenced and still influences the people in China and the people in the rest of the world. So this project named after ‘Confucius’ seems [to be] aiming to create a cultural reference point and ‘identity card’. Bruen (2013: 100–101) has described language policies as ‘instruments and initiatives capable of moving us from where we are to where we would like to be’. The views presented here make it clear that China places much importance on the Confucius Institute project, and sees it in these terms.

Conclusion Tollefson and Tsui (2007) aptly remind us that language policies are connected to broader political agendas. This chapter has explored the factors which have shaped the Confucius Institute project, an exercise in external language spread, and has shown that it is inextricably linked to China’s interest in soft power. It can be rightly regarded as ‘part of a new, systematic effort to increase China’s attractiveness and influence through language and culture’ (Lampton, 2008: 157). With this groundwork in place, the next three chapters will explore the Confucius Institute project in greater detail, with Chapter 3 mapping its dimensions, Chapter 4 evaluating its impact at the state-to-state level and Chapter 5 evaluating its impact at the society-to-society level.

Notes (1)

The going global approach includes additional elements other than culture, namely, seeking out energy resources around the world; investing and purchasing assets around the world through Chinese companies; and building an international

Chinese Culture Goes Global: Soft Power and the Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

41

media presence through foreign language broadcasting, publication and advertising (Knight, 2008; Y.Y. Lu, 2012; Z.Q Zhu, 2013). These are not considered here. (2) In addition to its ‘going global’ approach, China has also made use of a ‘please come in’ (请进来 qǐng jìnlái) approach to promote its culture (X.H. Cheng, 2009; Y.C. Wu, 2010). The ‘please come in’ approach, according to W.F. Zhang (2012: 623), means ‘China will open its door to the outside world and welcome people from abroad to experience China for themselves, and hopefully even support what is going on in the country’. Examples of this approach include hosting major international events such as the 2008 Beijing Olympics and 2010 Shanghai World Expo; providing scholarships for foreign students to study in China; and organising visits for foreign journalists (Y.C. Wu, 2010; W.F. Zhang, 2012). The ‘please come in’ approach is not discussed here as my focus is China’s promotional activities outside of China itself. (3) There are four Chinese terms for soft power: 软实力 ruǎn shílì, 软权力 ruǎn quánlì, 软力量 ruǎn lìliàng and 软国力 ruǎn guόlì (Cho & Jeong, 2008; B.S. Glaser & Murphy, 2009; Shambaugh, 2013; H.Y. Wang & Y.C. Lu, 2008). While each of these terms contains the Chinese word for soft, 软 ruǎn, the other components have somewhat different meanings: 实力 shílì refers to the possession of strength and the capability to use it; 权力 quánlì refers to the right or authority to do things; 力量 lìliàng refers to physical force or strength; and 国力 guόlì refers to a country’s power or strength (Barr, 2011; Shambaugh, 2013). Of these four terms, 软实力 ruǎn shílì is the most common, and has been used in official government documents and speeches, but its use is by no means universal (Cho & Jeong, 2008; B.S. Glaser & Murphy, 2009; Shambaugh, 2013; H.Y. Wang & Y.C. Lu, 2008). (4) Great powers are usually defined as those states with the most power and influence in the world political system and who are the most active actors in this system (Copper, 2013; J.S. Goldstein, 2013; Griffiths & O’Callaghan, 2002; Lemke, 2005). However, there is no general agreement on the number of great powers or which states qualify as great powers (Copper, 2013; Griffiths & O’Callaghan, 2002). Some scholars consider China as a great power already (for example Nathan & Scobell, 2012) while others believe it is yet to attain great power status (for example B.J. Zhang, 2009). For a detailed discussion of the definition of a great power and which states in the contemporary world political system qualify as great powers, see Buzan (2004, 2011). (5) For further details of soft power in other East Asian contexts, see Fukushima’s (2011) discussion of Japan; S.J. Lee’s (2011) discussion of South Korea; and Y.H. Chu’s (2011) discussion of Taiwan. (6) This is not to say that China did not use force to shape and maintain its desired external environment. The use of force, either alongside or instead of the practices described here, was in fact quite frequent throughout the tribute system era. The point of this section is to highlight that ideas and practices similar to the contemporary concept of soft power have a long and important history in China’s relations and interactions with other countries and peoples. For discussions of the use of force throughout Chinese history, see A.I. Johnson (1995) and Swaine and Tellis (2000). (7) While this basic idea is common to all forms of the ‘China threat’ theory, there are some differences in focus, emphasis and analysis between such scholars. For a review of the various forms of the ‘China threat’ theory, see, for example, Broomfield (2003), Y. Deng (2008) and Roy (1996). For interesting and balanced critiques of the ‘China threat’ theory, see Al-Rodhan (2007) and C. Glaser (2011). (8) Joshua Cooper Ramo (2004) coined the term ‘Beijing Consensus’ to refer to China’s economic and political policies and directions. It was intended to highlight the difference between China’s model of development and the ‘Washington

42

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12) (13)

(14)

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

Consensus’ based on development through democracy and neoliberal economic principles (Cho & Jeong, 2008). For a review and critique of the Beijing Consensus, see Kennedy (2010). According to the Constitution, the NPC is the most powerful state organ in China. It has a total membership of around 3000 delegates who meet annually, and a Standing Committee of approximately 150, who meet regularly and act on behalf of the full NPC when it is not in session (Lieberthal, 2004; G.L. Liu, 2011; Saich, 2015). In theory, the NPC has extensive powers, including the power to amend the Constitution; make laws; elect the president, vice president and chairman of the Central Military Commission, the president of the Supreme People’s Court and the procurator general; approve the president’s nomination for premier; and approve the premier’s nominations for vice premiers, state councillors and ministers. The NPC also reviews and approves the national budget and economic development plan (G.L. Liu, 2011; Saich, 2015). In reality, however, the NPC mainly functions to approve decisions (including those regarding appointments) already made by the CCP leadership, usually doing so without making any significant changes (G.L. Liu, 2011). The CPPCC is a ‘political advisory body’ with members from the CCP, eight other political parties and individuals with no links to any party (G.L. Liu, 2011: 69). It is chaired by a member of the Politburo Standing Committee (see Note 6 in Chapter 1) and meets annually (Saich, 2015). The main purpose of the CPPCC is to offer the CCP and NPC advice and suggestions, and according to Saich (2015: 125) it has in recent times evolved into ‘a more lively forum for discussion and policy suggestions on prominent social, economic and foreign policy affairs’. The CPPCC is believed to have some influence on government policy, at least in areas of lower priority and importance, but nevertheless remains subordinate to the CCP leadership (S.J. Guo, 2013; Saich, 2015). The other possible models are Confucius Institutes run completely by Hanban’s Confucius Institute Headquarters and Confucius Institutes run entirely by the host country under licence from the Confucius Institute Headquarters. These kinds of Confucius Institutes are, however, quite rare. See Starr (2009) for a more detailed discussion of the various models. An example of a Confucius Institute set up with an organisation other than a Chinese university is the Queensland University of Technology Confucius Institute (Brisbane, Australia) which is partnered with the Jiangsu Provincial Department of Education. Here again other models are also possible. See, for example, the discussion of German Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms in Hartig (2010). The 2006 Hanban Annual Report does not include details of expenditure. The 2007 and 2008 annual reports list ‘construction of Confucius Institutes’ (孔子学院建设 kǒngzǐ xuéyuàn jiànshè). It is unclear whether this refers to start-up funding only or start-up funding and operational funding. The amounts listed are RMB¥213,370,000 (US$34,121,185) for 2006 and RMB¥390,027,000 (US$62,371,390) for 2007 (Hanban, 2006, 2007). Salaries for volunteers are included from 2010 onwards; however, the 2014 and 2015 annual reports do not list salaries at all. Book donations became ‘development and promotion of the instruction materials’ in the 2011 annual report and ‘development and distribution of teaching materials’ from 2012 onwards. This quote has often been presented as evidence of sinister motives behind the Confucius Institute project. Examples of this can be found in Robertson (2011) and Sahlins (2015). However, it is important to note that the Chinese term for propaganda, 宣传 xuānchuán, does not have the negative connotations it does in English. Its meaning is closer to ‘dissemination of information’ or ‘publicity’.

Chinese Culture Goes Global: Soft Power and the Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

43

Shambaugh (2013) also points out that Chinese officials and academics regularly use the terms ‘soft power’, ‘public diplomacy’ and ‘external publicity’ interchangeably. Therefore, this statement fits with the idea of promoting Chinese language learning for fostering positive images of China, understanding China’s domestic and international situation, respect for China as a nation and sympathy for China’s positions and goals in world politics. (15) The Five Friendlies were launched as the official mascots at an event at the Workers’ Gymnasium on 11 November 2005 to mark the 1000 day countdown to the opening ceremony of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. The Friendlies represented a fish, a panda, a Tibetan antelope, a swallow and the Olympic flame, and their designs were inspired by the styles and symbolism of traditional Chinese art as well as the colours of the Olympic rings (China.org, 2005; Chinese-Tools, 2005). According to one website, ‘the Five Friendlies will serve as the Official Mascots of [the] Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, carrying a message of friendship and peace – and blessings from China – to children all over the world’ (Chinese-Tools, 2005). The blessings that the Friendlies were intended to embody were the traditional Chinese good wishes for prosperity, happiness, passion, health and good luck (China.org, 2005). This is another example of how China draws on its traditional culture in its cultural diplomacy. However, the Friendlies were not necessarily wellreceived domestically or internationally. In China, they were often linked to the calamitous and tragic events of 2008, such as the Sichuan Province earthquakes, protests during the Olympic torch relay, unrest in Tibet, a serious train crash in Shandong Province and floods in southern China. Some international audiences were confused about what the Friendlies were supposed to be and some created parody versions of them (Eimer, 2008; Fowler, 2008).

3 Mapping the Confucius Institute Project: High Extensity, Intensity and Velocity Introduction As of the end of December 2015, the Confucius Institute project consisted of 500 Confucius Institutes and 1000 Confucius Classrooms (Hanban, 2015a). This chapter will first map the dimensions of the Confucius Institute project to show that it exhibits high extensity, as it covers much of the world; high intensity, as both the number of Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms and the volume of their activities are considerable; and high velocity, as all of this has occurred in just over a decade. These three components are discussed separately for the sake of clarity, although they do overlap to a certain extent. It then offers a bird’s eye view comparison with some of the world’s other language and culture promotion organisations in order to demonstrate the significance of the extensity, intensity and velocity of the Confucius Institute project. This chapter’s key argument is that the Confucius Institute project has been able to reach its current dimensions largely due to the widespread interest in Chinese language learning throughout the world.

Extensity The extensity, or geographical coverage, of the Confucius Institute project is remarkable. Confucius Institutes currently exist in 126 countries and regions. 32 of these countries and regions are in Asia, 32 in Africa, 40 in Europe, 19 in the Americas and 3 in Oceania (Hanban, 2015a). Confucius Classrooms can be found in 72 of the countries and regions with Confucius Institutes, of which 18 are in Asia, 14 are in Africa, 28 are in Europe, 8 are in the Americas and 4 are in Oceania. There are also eight countries, namely Comoros, Burma/Myanmar, Mali, Tunisia, Vanuatu, Grenada, Lesotho and the Cook Islands, which have Confucius Classrooms but no Confucius Institutes. Interestingly, the European Union (EU) is also listed on Hanban’s website as having a Confucius Classroom. This appears

44

Mapping the Confucius Institute Project: High Extensity, Intensity and Velocity

45

to refer to the Confucius Classroom established at the European Schools in Brussels. Altogether, this means the Confucius Institute project has at least a minimal presence in 135 of the world’s countries and regions (Hanban, 2015a, 2015b, n.d. c). In addition, a radio-based Confucius Institute and an online Confucius Institute are currently in operation, and a television-based Confucius Institute is under development (People’s Daily, 2007b). The radio-based Confucius Institute was jointly established by Hanban and China Radio International (CRI) in 2007, and broadcasts online and wirelessly in more than 40 languages (Hanban, 2007, 2008). The online Confucius Institute is described as ‘an online platform with integrated resources for teaching, training, and experiencing culture’ (Hanban, 2013: 7). It was available in 46 languages by the end of 2012, and had a total of 8 million users by 2015 (Hanban, 2012, 2015a). Together, the radio-based and online Confucius Institutes have reportedly reached 149 countries (Luo, 2009, 2011).

Intensity In regard to intensity, the amount of Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms is also considerable, with a combined total of 1500. The world’s 500 Confucius Institutes are divided as follows: 111 in Asia, 46 in Africa, 167 in Europe, 158 in the Americas and 18 in Oceania. As for Confucius Classrooms, Asia has 90, Africa 23, Europe 257, the Americas 544 and Oceania 86 (Hanban, 2015a). Another aspect of intensity is the high volume of activities conducted by Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms. While it should be noted here that there is a time lag between the establishment of a Confucius Institute or Confucius Classroom and when it actually commences conducting activities and that some Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms conduct few activities (Hartig, 2016; Jensen, 2012), the number of Chinese language classes and cultural activities which have been conducted is nevertheless very high. These are summarised in Table 3.1. Hanban reports that in 2007, over 1,200 Chinese language classes in various modes of delivery were conducted for some 46,000 students. There were also over 900 cultural activities, including more than 500 lectures about China and more than 400 exhibitions and festivals, which were attended by over 1 million people (Hanban, 2007). In 2008, Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms ran a total of 6,000 Chinese language classes for more than 130,000 students. In the same year, 1.4 million people participated in the cultural activities conducted by Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms (Hanban, 2008). In 2009, some 9,000 Chinese language classes were held for 260,000 students, and 7,500 cultural activities were participated in by more than 3 million people, while in 2010, Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms conducted over

46

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

Table 3.1 Chinese language classes and cultural activities, 2007–2015

Year

Chinese language classes

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

1,200+ 6,000 9,000 18,000+ 24,000 34,000 40,000 ≈67,000

46,000 130,000+ 260,000 360,000 500,000+ 655,000 850,000 1.11 million

2015

≈72,000

1.394 million

Participants

Cultural activities

Participants

900+ No data available 7,500 10,000+ 13,000 16,000+ 20,000+ 30,000

1 million+ 1.4 million 3 million+ 5 million+ 7.22 million 9.48 million 9.2 million 10 million+ (applies to World Confucius Institute Day activities only) No data available

36,000

Sources: Hanban (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015a); Luo & X. Guo (2012).

18,000 Chinese language classes for 360,000 students, and over 10,000 cultural activities for more than 5 million people (Hanban, 2009, 2010). The following year, 24,000 Chinese language classes for over 500,000 students were conducted, as well as 13,000 cultural activities, which were participated in by 7.22 million people (Hanban, 2011; Luo & X. Guo, 2012). During 2012, 34,000 Chinese language classes were conducted for 655,000 students, and over 16,000 cultural activities were held, with 9.48 million people participating (Hanban, 2012). A total of 40,000 Chinese language classes, and more than 20,000 cultural activities, were held in 2013. That year’s Chinese language classes had a total of 850,000 students, while 9.2 million people took part in the year’s cultural activities (Hanban, 2013). In 2014, Hanban reports that approximately 67,000 Chinese language classes were conducted for 1.11 million students, and 30,000 cultural activities were held. Of particular note are those activities held in relation to World Confucius Institute Day which consisted of over 3000 cultural activities and performances attended by over 10 million people (Hanban, 2014). Approximately 72,000 Chinese language classes for 1.394 million students and 36,000 cultural activities were conducted in 2015 (Hanban, 2015a).1 This is clearly a very significant amount of Chinese language classes and cultural activities, making the Confucius Institute project very active around the world. It is important to note, however, that the kinds of Chinese language teaching and cultural activities conducted by Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms differ. To give some examples from Australia, some Confucius Institutes run courses for the general public; some assist with the existing Chinese language programme of the host university; some

Mapping the Confucius Institute Project: High Extensity, Intensity and Velocity

47

support teachers in local schools through providing books, workshops and professional development; and some do a combination of some or all of these activities (CI Interviewee 1; CI Interviewee 2; CI Interviewee 3; CI Interviewee 4; CI Interviewee 5; CI Interviewee 6; CI Interviewee 7). Other language-related activities mentioned by Confucius Institute staff include organising translation and interpretation services, administering the Chinese Proficiency Test (HSK) (汉语水平考试 hànyǔ shuǐpíng kǎoshì) and coordinating the Chinese Bridge language competitions (CI Interviewee 1; CI Interviewee 3; CI Interviewee 5). Cultural activities include public lecturers on China-related topics; courses on calligraphy, tea ceremonies and painting; film screenings; opera performances; student and staff exchange programmes with Chinese universities; and tours of China for school principals (CI Interviewee 1; CI Interviewee 2; CI Interviewee 3; CI Interviewee 4; CI Interviewee 5). In regard to Confucius Classrooms, CC Interviewee 1 explained that the following activities had been specified in the agreement to establish the Confucius Classroom at her school: teaching Chinese language (the school has an existing Chinese language programme); conducting the Youth Chinese Test (YCT) (中小学生汉语考试 zhōng xiǎo xuéshēng hànyǔ kǎoshì); organising exchange programmes with secondary schools in China; and conducting cultural activities of various kinds.2

Velocity Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the Confucius Institute project, however, is the velocity, or speed, at which it has occurred. The Confucius Institute project began in 2004 and in just over a decade has reached the proportions described above. Its velocity was such that in the first few years of the project, a new Confucius Institute opened every four days on average (X.H. Cheng, 2009; Y.H. Wu, 2009; H.Q. Zhao & J.B. Huang, 2010). In addition, both the extensity and intensity of the Confucius Institute project have increased rapidly, as Table 3.2 demonstrates. In 2008, for example, there were 249 Confucius Institutes and 56 Confucius Classrooms in 78 countries and regions, representing an increase of 47 Confucius Institutes and 35 Confucius Classrooms, and 14 countries and regions, from the previous year (Hanban, 2008; Luo, 2009). By the end of 2009, there were 282 Confucius Institutes and 272 Confucius Classrooms in 88 countries and regions, an increase of 33 Confucius Institutes and 216 Confucius Classrooms, and 10 countries and regions (Hanban, 2009). A further 40 Confucius Institutes and 97 Confucius Classrooms, and 8 countries and regions, were added during the year 2010, for a total of 322 Confucius Institutes and 369 Confucius Classrooms in 96 countries and regions (Hanban, 2010). Another 36 Confucius Institutes and 131 Confucius Classrooms were established in 2011, so that by the end of that year there

48

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

Table 3.2 Increase in the extensity and intensity of the Confucius Institute project, 2008–2015

Year

Total Confucius Institutes and Classrooms

Countries and regions

2008 305 78 2009 554 88 2010 691 96 2011 858 105 2012 935 108 2013 1086 120 2014 1326 126 2015 1500 135 Average annual increase, 2008–2015 Confucius Institutes and Classrooms: 159.62 Confucius Institutes: 37.25 Confucius Classrooms: 122.37 Countries and regions: 8.87

Increase in Confucius Institutes and Classrooms

Increase in countries and regions

82 249 137 167 77 151 240 174

14 10 8 9 3 12 6 9

Sources: Hanban (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015a); Luo (2009); Luo & X. Guo (2012).

were 358 Confucius Institutes and 500 Confucius Classrooms across 105 countries and regions (Hanban, 2011; Luo & X. Guo, 2012). The year 2012 saw the establishment of 42 Confucius Institutes and 35 Confucius Classrooms, for a worldwide total of 400 and 535, respectively, and the addition of 3 countries and regions, for a total of 108 (Hanban, 2012). A further 40 Confucius Institutes and 111 Confucius Classrooms were added in 2013, as were 12 countries and regions (Hanban, 2013). During 2014, another 35 Confucius Institutes, 205 Confucius Classrooms and 6 countries and regions were added, while 2015 saw the establishment of 25 new Confucius Institutes and 149 new Confucius Classrooms across 9 countries and regions. This gives an average annual increase of just over 37 Confucius Institutes, just over 122 Confucius Classrooms and just under 9 countries and regions for the years 2008–2015.3

Comparisons of Extensity, Intensity and Velocity The high extensity, intensity and velocity of the Confucius Institute project becomes even more obvious when compared to the language and culture promotion organisations of other countries. Table 3.3 presents a comparison of the Confucius Institute project and some of the other major language and culture promotion organisations in the world.

Mapping the Confucius Institute Project: High Extensity, Intensity and Velocity

49

Table 3.3 Comparison of the Confucius Institute project, British Council, Alliance Française, Goethe Institute, Dante Alighieri Society and Cervantes Institute Organisation Confucius Institute project

British Council Alliance Française Goethe Institute Dante Alighieri Society Cervantes Institute

Institutes/centres/ offices/branches 1500 (500 Confucius Institutes; 1000 Confucius Classrooms) 200+ 819 159 423 78

Countries/regions

Years (to 2015)

135

11

100+ 137 98 Approximately 60 45

81 132 64 126 24

Sources: Alliance Française (n.d.); British Council (2016); Goethe Institut (2016); Hanban (2015a); Instituto Cervantes (n.d.); Società Dante Alighieri (n.d.).

The British Council (2016), for example, has established over 200 offices in more than 100 countries over 81 years. The Confucius Institute project is clearly ahead in terms of extensity, intensity and velocity.4 The Alliance Française (n.d.), which has established 819 centres in 137 countries over 132 years, is the closest of the 5 other organisations to the Confucius Institute project in terms of intensity, and surpasses it in terms of extensity. However, as the oldest of the language and culture promotion organisations, it has developed at a considerably slower velocity than the Confucius Institute project. Similarly, the Dante Alighieri Society, which is almost as old as the Alliance Française, lags behind the Confucius Institute project in terms of extensity, covering approximately half the number of countries and regions, and intensity, with approximately one third as many branches (Società Dante Alighieri, n.d.). The Goethe Institute (2016) is the second furthest behind the Confucius Institute project in terms of extensity, covering 98 countries, and intensity, with 159 institutes. It is also considerably behind in terms of velocity, having existed for 64 years. The Cervantes Institute, while new by comparison to the other language and culture promotion organisations discussed here, has still existed for more than twice as long as the Confucius Institute project. With 78 centres across 45 countries (Instituto Cervantes, n.d.), it is the furthest behind the Confucius Institute in terms of extensity and intensity. Ostler (2010) concluded that by 2010 the Confucius Institute project was the world’s second biggest language and culture promotion organisation behind the Alliance Française. Today, this situation has changed somewhat, as the figures presented above demonstrate. The Confucius Institute project has surpassed all of these organisations in terms of intensity and velocity, and remains behind the Alliance Française

50

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

only in terms of extensity. 5 If current trends continue, it is likely that the Confucius Institute project will soon surpass the Alliance Française.

Reasons for High Extensity, Intensity and Velocity China’s ‘go global’ approach is certainly an important reason for the current dimensions of the Confucius Institute project, but, as hinted at above, it is only part of the explanation. Ostler (2010) argues that there is nothing to suggest that the promotion of a language leads people to learn it if they did not already want to do so. It is not difficult to find examples of this. In the case of the promotion of Spanish, Mar-Molinero (2004, 2006a, 2006b) argues that the work of the Cervantes Institute is aided by the association of Spanish with various aspects of popular culture such as Latino popular music, dance and fashion, which have received considerable attention since the late 1990s and early 2000s, as well as tourism to Spanishspeaking countries and perceived business opportunities available in some Spanish-speaking countries. Another example is English, currently acquired by large numbers of people around the world because it is widely perceived as advantageous and even essential for formal pursuits such as accessing knowledge, employment and education, and informal pursuits such as enjoying popular culture. García (2010: 409) summarises the situation as ‘English spreads because it has increasingly become synonymous with globalization and with the economic and technological progress that accompanies it’. This undoubtedly contributes to the British Council’s efforts as Hill and Beadle (2014) have argued. In the case of the Confucius Institute project, a key question is what leads people to learn Chinese? Here again, it is important to consider the language ideologies which influence the promotion of Chinese, but this time it is the beliefs, opinions, perceptions and feelings about Chinese of those who learn it. According to the Chinese language teachers interviewed for this study, their students were learning Chinese for the following reasons: China’s development; the influence of the Chinese economy; increased job opportunities for Chinese speakers; and growing trade and other links between China and other countries (CLT Interviewee 1; CLT Interviewee 2; CLT Interviewee 3; CLT Interviewee 4). This was supported by the students themselves who gave a variety of reasons for learning Chinese, but those mentioned most often were employment opportunities and job requirements and the importance of the Chinese language in today’s world. This was further supported by a thematic analysis of responses to questions in the Studying Chinese section of the student survey, which also revealed that participants’ main reasons for learning Chinese were the perceived importance of China in the world, China’s economic development and the number of speakers of Chinese in the world. I have presented this analysis in detail elsewhere (Gil, 2014), so

Mapping the Confucius Institute Project: High Extensity, Intensity and Velocity

51

I will show only a few representative examples here. Student responses to the question ‘Do you think the ability to speak Chinese will become more important in the future? Why/why not?’, for instance, included: If China maintains its economic growth it is likely to become a new superpower and will present a lot of job opportunities for foreigners who speak Chinese. (CLL 2, Australia) Yes, because China is becoming a[n] undeniable world power. (CLL 8, China) Maybe. Chinese people are half of the world population (almost). You definitely have to meet Chinese persons when you start working. (CLL 20, China) Similar perceptions of the Chinese language were evident in responses to the question ‘Would you recommend learning Chinese to your friends and family? Why/why not?’: Yes, because it is interesting and challenging and provides future opportunities. (CLL 1, Australia) I would. It’s the most widespread language nowadays. (CLL 6, China) Yes! It’s the future number 1 language especially after university to find a better job. (CLL 7, China) Maybe. If they want to work at any international company. (CLL 17, China) In contrast to these reasons, the Confucius Institute project itself did not play a significant role in these students’ decision to learn the Chinese language. When asked if they were aware of any of the ways in which China promotes Chinese language learning around the world, nine students reported that they did know of one or more ways in which China does so, nine students reported that they were not aware of any of China’s promotional activities and two students did not respond to the question. Of those students who were aware of China’s promotion of Chinese language learning, five mentioned Confucius Institutes in their responses, although not always by their correct name: The Confucius Institute; competitions such as the ‘Chinese Bridge’ speaking competition. (CLL 4, Australia) The Confucius Institute. (CLL 5, Australia) Yes. [The] Confucius Institute offer[s] scholarship[s] from different places in [the] USA and Canada. (CLL 7, China) Confucius [Institute]. (CLL 9, China) Embassies and cultural centres and other schools like the Confucius ones. (CLL 18, China)

52

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

Similar views regarding the important role that interest in Chinese language learning plays in the Confucius Institute project were also expressed by CI Interviewees. CI Interviewee 5 explained this in some detail: [M]y understanding is that China hasn’t decided to set up institutes at all. China has said that it will consider applications from people who may wish to set up Confucius Institutes. China has never established a Confucius Institute. I think that’s very important to understand. I think that they have agreed to support applications in some cases and refuse others. So it’s in fact a request which China is prepared to fund. So the question might be turned around, and they’ve said they have to be set up in universities, why would someone apply? So I think it’s who’s creating the action here, and the assumption […] from people often is, why is China setting up – they don’t. They fund, they’ll fund them if there is a request, so clearly, however, then the question is why would they provide funds for a request? I think it’s clear that they want to promote their language. Clearly in the Pacific Rim you have three major languages, Mandarin, Spanish and English, in the same way as the Cervantes Institutes are established for the promotion of Spanish language, the Confucius Institutes are established to promote – and there is mileage for the Chinese government to have its language better spoken and understood in the world for various pragmatic reasons, various issues around trade and so forth, economies, and also that it will become probably accepted at some stage as one of the world languages, official languages. I think there’s also the notion that China wants to be better understood and often places are better understood by virtue of their language. You don’t understand a place unless you understand its language, therefore its modes of thought, therefore its thinking patterns, so I think there’s a desire for that to happen. I think there’s also a very long history in China that the Chinese feel rightly very proud of and they may feel that’s not well understood. And the Confucius Institutes might provide an opportunity to do that. But on the other side, as I said, the question is really why are people applying? And they’re clearly applying for reasons of helping their citizens to better understand China, to better develop their language. There’s a set of resources that are available and they seek to use those. I think you can’t consider one without the other because there’s clearly a motive in providing resources, clearly, on behalf of the Chinese, so you can ask the question why. But equally, you’ve got to say why are people asking for those resources? There are now three hundred and something Confucius Institutes [at the time of the interview], why have there been three hundred applications? And as I understand it, more and more and more. Then if you couple that with all the Confucius

Mapping the Confucius Institute Project: High Extensity, Intensity and Velocity

53

Classrooms, the question is why are people wanting them? It’s not a one way street with regard to motives, it’s clearly a balance. Similarly, CI Interviewee 1 described the reasoning for China’s promotion of Chinese language learning, including the Confucius Institute project, as follows: I think first, well, as far as I know, there is a demand, not urgently from Western countries like Australia but from Third World countries where people want to, where the market is there for Chinese language instruction but they couldn’t find or couldn’t afford to employ enough teachers and they lack teaching resources, teacher training opportunities, etc. And China offers this kind of assistance to those universities, those countries which want support. And again, I think it’s a fact China doesn’t volunteer offering assistance to other universities, I mean to universities in other countries. They receive applications and every university works in the best interest of its own institution; if we think it’s good for us, we submit our application, if we think we don’t need it, or we’re not interested, we simply wouldn’t have submitted our application. I [think] that’s the misunderstanding, that’s a widespread misunderstanding that [the] Chinese side imposed something; that’s not the case, it’s far from being true. A previous section demonstrated that the largest and fastest growth has been with the Confucius Classrooms, and here too we can see the role of interest in Chinese language learning. CI Interviewee 3 commented that in the case of Australia: People are interested, especially in education circles. They are really interested in the [Confucius] Institute, and the concept of the Confucius Classroom, what is it, can we get one, because most schools that have not been teaching Chinese realise that they really need to think about it, and the question then is well, if we think about it, what kind of assistance can we get, given acute shortage of trained teachers? CC Interviewee 1 supported this view, saying: I think we are very lucky to have [a] Confucius Classroom set up in our school. It will strengthen our Chinese programme in the school curriculum and also help to promote Chinese language learning, not only in our school but also in the whole northern region of [name of city]. The figures cited above suggest that this is likely also to be the case in other countries.

54

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

This is not to say that the Confucius Institute project has had nothing to do with people learning Chinese. It undoubtedly provides opportunities and resources to do so, as the comments presented here suggest and as I will argue further in Chapter 5. However, it has not made people want to learn Chinese where no desire to do so already existed. This supports Liddicoat’s (2013) argument that the promotion of a language can only work if the people such activities are aimed at actually wish to learn the language. Like any other language promotion effort, China’s Confucius Institute project ‘requires the active consent of those it seeks to influence’ and this desire to learn the language is generated by ‘the power of the language on the international stage’ (Liddicoat, 2013: 197). Indeed, without the widespread interest in the Chinese language – generated primarily by China’s economy and importance in the world – it is unlikely that the Confucius Institute project would have reached its current dimensions or been able to offer the range and number of Chinese language classes and cultural activities discussed above. Here it is worth bearing in mind that China’s original aim was 100 Confucius Institutes worldwide by 2010 (Yang, 2010). This was later revised to a total of 1000 Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms by 2020 (China Daily, 2010; Shambaugh, 2013), a goal which has already been reached due to the demand for Chinese language learning.

Conclusion This chapter has shown that the Confucius Institute project’s dimensions extend well beyond China itself, consistent with China’s ‘go global’ approach. The Confucius Institute project clearly shows high extensity, intensity and velocity, but this has been considerably facilitated by the widespread and pre-existing interest in learning the Chinese language. This suggests that the Confucius Institute project could make a contribution to creating the kind of external environment China desires. However, as several scholars have pointed out, the impact of any language policy is complex, multifaceted and often unpredictable (Farrell & Kun, 2007; Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997; Liddicoat, 2013; Ricento & Hornberger, 1996). We will see in the next two chapters how this applies to the Confucius Institute project.

Notes (1)

(2)

This section begins from 2007 because this is the first year for which such data are available. The 2006 Hanban annual report does not give figures for Chinese language classes and cultural activities and the number of participants for each. Annual reports are not available for 2004 or 2005. The HSK is a standardised test developed by the Beijing Language Institute (now Beijing Language and Culture University) in the 1980s. It was designed to assess the Chinese language proficiency of foreign learners of Chinese, overseas Chinese and ethnic minorities in China. The HSK was first offered in China in 1990 and

Mapping the Confucius Institute Project: High Extensity, Intensity and Velocity

55

internationally in 1991 (Beijing Language and Culture University, 2014; Lam, 2005). In addition to the two versions of the HSK mentioned here, there is also the HSK Speaking Test (HSKK) (汉语水平口语考试 hànyǔ shuǐpíng kǒuyǔ kǎoshì) and the Business Chinese Test (BCT) (商务汉语考试 shāngwù hànyǔ kǎoshì). The combined number of test takers for all four versions of the HSK test has been significant in recent years and has also been increasing. For example, there were 334,000 test takers in 2012, 372,000 in 2013, 430,000 in 2014 and 503,700 in 2015 (Hanban, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015a). Currently, 944 test centres exist in 120 countries and regions, and 322 test centres are able to offer internet-based versions of these tests (Hanban, 2015a). (3) This section begins from 2008 because this is the year from which consistent data are available. The 2006 and 2007 Hanban annual reports do not give separate figures for Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms, and annual reports are not available for 2004 or 2005 as mentioned above. (4) These figures are updated or revised from those presented in Ostler (2010) using information from the various organisations’ websites. The British Council website does not give exact figures for the number of offices and countries. Ostler’s (2010) figures were 233 offices in 107 countries, while Ngamsang and Walsh (2013) state there were 218 offices in 110 countries as of 2012. Due to the lack of exact figures, I have used these figures to compare the extensity of the British Council to the extensity of the Confucius Institute project. The Dante Alighieri Society similarly does not give an exact number of countries. Ostler (2010) also says the Alliance Franҫaise has 1071 schools in 133 countries, but this does not match the figures from the Alliance Franҫaise website. I have used the figures from the Alliance Franҫaise website for my comparisons here. (5) There are, of course, differences in the organisational structure and funding arrangements of these language and culture promotion organisations which may contribute to the differences in their extensity, intensity and velocity. For example, while branches of the Dante Alighieri Society can apply for annual grants from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to fund the teaching of their own Italian courses and to support the teaching of Italian in schools, each branch is run by volunteers with only teachers and some administrative staff receiving payment (Stefano Bona, personal communication). A detailed discussion of such differences is beyond the scope of this book. Similarly, an evaluation of their impact is also not possible. Both would, however, be suitable topics for future research, and I take this up in Chapter 6.

4 Evaluating the Confucius Institute Project: Impact at the State-to-State Level Introduction Like all global cultural flows, the Confucius Institute project enters into and interacts with local contexts and conditions across the world (Hopper, 2007; Tomlinson, 1999, 2007), and it is these interactions which determine its impact. However, evaluating the impact of the Confucius Institute project is a complicated task for several reasons. First of all, there is no universally accepted method to establish whether the activities conducted through the Confucius Institute project really do benefit China in world politics. Secondly, it is difficult to distinguish the impact of the Confucius Institute project from the impact of China’s other cultural diplomacy initiatives in particular, and its economic and political activities in general. A further complication is that because the Confucius Institute project is still quite new, its impacts may not yet be apparent (Y.Z. Huang & Ding, 2006; Paradise, 2009). This was in fact mentioned by some of the interviewees. CI Interviewee 3, for example, pointed out that his Confucius Institute had been operating for five years, while the other Confucius Institutes in Australia had been operating for one to three years at most, at the time of the interview. In his view, ‘it’s probably too early to say anything very dogmatic’ about the possible impacts of the Confucius Institute project. Similarly, CI Interviewee 4 noted that Confucius Institutes ‘haven’t been around long enough’ and ‘the history of the Confucius Institute is too short’, while CU Interviewee 1 said that not enough time had passed to say whether the Confucius Institute project has had an effect on China’s international relations, and that it is also only one of a number of means through which China is trying to make people more friendly towards it. The issue of time is especially apparent in comparison with the other language and culture promotion organisations discussed in Chapter 3: the Alliance Française was founded in 1883; the Dante Alighieri Society in 1889; the British Council in 1934; the Goethe Institute in 1951; and the Cervantes Institute in 1991 (Ostler, 2010; Totaro-Genevois, 2005). Indeed, evaluating the impact of the Confucius Institute project is a pertinent example of Cull’s (2008: 44) statement that ‘[a]ttempts to evaluate cultural 56

Evaluating the Confucius Institute Project: Impact at the State-to-State Level

57

diplomacy can seem like a forester running out every morning to see how far his trees have grown overnight’. With these caveats to the framework for evaluating the Confucius Institute project that I outlined in Chapter 1 in mind, this chapter evaluates its impact at the state-to-state level. It argues that the Confucius Institute project is not currently influencing the policies and actions of other countries, except for being one factor in the creation of language and culture promotion organisations and activities. This limited impact is due to the nature of language and culture in world politics and governments’ concerns about the Confucius Institute project.

The State-to-State Level As will be recalled, the contemporary world political system is based primarily around states, each possessing the following defining characteristics: a set territory with defined borders; a permanent population; a government with the sole authority to make and enforce policy and law within its territory and over its population; and recognition from other states of its legal equality and independence, or sovereignty, in world politics (Jackson & Sørensen, 2013). The state-to-state level thus refers to interactions and relations among governments (Shambaugh, 2008). It is important to consider the impact of the Confucius Institute project at this level because, as Liddicoat (2013: 195) says, ‘external language spread policies have been typically an element of foreign policy and constitute a response through education to foreign policy needs’. To what extent, then, has the Confucius Institute project met China’s foreign policy needs?

Recent Trends in China’s Relations with Countries with Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms An additional complication arises in addressing this question, namely that information about the attitudes and thought processes of foreign policy decision makers is not commonly or easily available (Hill & Beadle, 2014). I therefore look at recent trends in China’s relations with a selection of countries to see if its goals have been furthered since the establishment of Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms. As China sees its relations with the world’s major powers and its neighbours in the Asia Pacific region as particularly important, I do this with three such countries, the USA, Japan and Australia.

China’s relations with the USA Because the USA is currently the world’s sole superpower, China will need its cooperation to achieve all of its goals in world politics. The USA’s

58

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

superpower status also means it can influence other countries’ reactions to China through means such as increasing its engagement with its Asian and other allies, using its position on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and being more actively involved in international issues of concern to China (Foot, 2006; S.S. Zhao, 2013). China therefore needs to work to shape its external environment to its own liking while avoiding negative reactions to and interference with such efforts from the USA (Lampton, 2001; G.L. Liu, 2008). While China and the USA certainly have a range of common interests, many contentious issues remain in this relationship, and these seem to indicate that the 109 Confucius Institutes and 494 Confucius Classrooms established in the USA (Hanban, 2015a), more than in any other country, have had little influence. Most significantly, the USA continues to support Taiwan militarily and in other ways (McDougall, 2007; Sutter, 2005). In late January 2010, for example, the USA made a US$6.4 billion arms sale to Taiwan (S.S. Zhao, 2013). In late 2011, the USA announced a new foreign policy direction called the Pacific Pivot or Pivot to Asia, which involved concentrating its overseas military deployments in the Asia Pacific region. This policy is widely seen to be the result of the USA’s concerns about China, in particular the belief that China had become more assertive and aggressive in its interactions in the region in recent years (Jerdén, 2014; McDougall, 2014). This suggests that the Confucius Institute project is not shifting views towards China’s positions. Interestingly, the Pivot to Asia also required the cooperation of the USA’s allies, including Australia, South Korea, some Southeast Asian countries and Japan (Jerdén, 2014), suggesting that this is a common trend across the region. China has also experienced difficulties securing resources in its dealings with the USA. In mid-2005, for example, some members of the US Congress threatened to take action against a takeover bid from the largely stateowned China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) for major American oil company Unocal. These threats ultimately led CNOOC to withdraw its bid (Y.Z. Huang & Ding, 2006).

China’s relations with Japan Despite significant economic ties, China’s relationship with Japan, a country with 14 Confucius Institutes and 9 Confucius Classrooms (Hanban, 2015a), is difficult and somewhat ambiguous in many respects, including mutual concerns over military modernisation, suspicion of each other’s intentions, territorial disputes and relations with Taiwan (J.Y.S. Cheng, 2001; Sutter, 2005). Takeuchi (2014: 8) goes as far as to say that the Sino-Japanese relationship is ‘one of the tensest among the most important bilateral international relationships in the world’.

Evaluating the Confucius Institute Project: Impact at the State-to-State Level

59

Managing this relationship well is therefore essential to a number of China’s goals, including its overarching goal of establishing a favourable external environment and the more specific goal of reducing support for Taiwan. China has not made significant progress towards achieving its goals in this relationship since the establishment of Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms. The most obvious issue is the dispute over the sovereignty of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, which both China and Japan claim as their territory. These islands are important because they are located on strategic shipping lines and have significant fishery resources as well as potentially significant reserves of oil and natural gas (So & Y.W. Chu, 2016). This dispute has a long history, going back to Japan’s annexation of these islands following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. Although China believed that the 1943 Cairo Declaration and the 1947 Potsdam Declaration resolved the issue in its favour, Japan did not accept this outcome, and the USA took over administration of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands due to the civil war occurring in China at the time. In 1972, the USA handed over the islands to Japan (Heberer, 2014). This dispute has continued to flare in recent years. For example, in 2012, the governor of Tokyo planned to use Tokyo metropolitan government funds to purchase the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands from a private Japanese owner and construct a lighthouse and pier in an attempt to convince other countries of Japan’s sovereignty claims. In response, the Japanese government decided to purchase them instead on the grounds that this would arouse less negative reaction as it did not intend to conduct any construction (Heberer, 2014; Takeuchi, 2014). In 2013, Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo declared that Japan considered its sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands ‘non-negotiable’ and would adopt a ‘tough stance’ towards China’s position (Heberer, 2014: 122). The Annual Japan Defence White Paper of the same year was also heavily critical of China’s position on this issue (Heberer, 2014). No resolution has yet been reached, let alone one completely in China’s favour. In addition, like the USA, Japan also officially accepts the one China policy, but continues to maintain economic and other links with Taiwan. China’s main concerns are with the 1996 US–Japan Joint Security Declaration and Japan’s involvement in theatre missile defence, both of which indicate that Japan may become involved in a conflict between China and Taiwan (McDougall, 2007; Roy, 2004). Rather than steadfastly adopting China’s position on the Taiwan issue as China would like, Japan has instead taken an ambiguous position on the nature and extent of its potential involvement in a crisis over Taiwan (Roy, 2004), which has continued in the years since the establishment of its Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms. In this relationship, then, the Confucius Institute project seems not to have contributed to furthering China’s goals.

60

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

China’s relations with Australia In contrast to its relationship with Japan, China has a generally positive political and economic relationship with Australia, and the two countries have no direct conflicts (W.H. Liu & Hao, 2014; Mackerras, 2004). China is particularly interested in Australia’s natural resources and, as J. Zhang (2007: 93) says, the country’s ‘sound legal system, stable political, social, and economic conditions, and its relative proximity’ all make dealing with Australia especially attractive for China. Nevertheless, China must compete with other Asian states such as Japan, South Korea and India for access to Australia’s natural resources (Lampton, 2008; Wesley, 2007). Another concern for China is to prevent Australia from becoming excessively close to the USA, especially in the context of a potential confrontation with China (W.H. Liu & Hao, 2014). While there has certainly been much trade in natural resources, the Australian government has in recent times expressed deep concern over Chinese state-owned companies investing in and potentially owning significant stakes in Australian resources companies. Indeed, Australia has been reluctant to allow such investment and is ambiguous about the terms on which it will do so. For example, the Chinese company Minmetals’ bid for 100% of OZ Minerals was rejected on security grounds because the Prominent Hill mine, a major OZ Minerals asset, is located in the Woomera Prohibited Area weapons testing range. The Australian government indicated that it would only reconsider its position if this mine was not included in the deal. In another case, China’s Hunan Valin was granted permission to take a 17.55% stake in Fortescue only under strict conditions relating to its appointee to Fortescue’s board, while the government delayed its decision on Chinalco’s US$19.5 billion bid for an 18% stake in Rio Tinto for a considerable period of time due to concerns regarding provisions allowing Chinalco to appoint board members, Chinalco’s close links to the Chinese government and control of key mining assets which would result from the deal (The Australian, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d).1 Australia’s connections to the USA have also progressed more than those with China. The 2009 Defence White Paper suggested that China may become a threat to Australia in the near future and recommended a significant naval build-up to counter this (Mackerras, 2014). Australia also announced in 2011 that US Marine Corp troops would be stationed in Darwin on six-month training rotations and there would also be increased rotations of US Air Force aircraft (Bisley, 2013). While the 2013 Defence White Paper reversed the negative view of China (Mackerras, 2014), Australia still appears much closer to the USA than to China. This would indicate that Australia’s 14 Confucius Institutes and 55 Confucius Classrooms (Hanban, 2015a) have not influenced the relationship. This is significant

Evaluating the Confucius Institute Project: Impact at the State-to-State Level

61

as it suggests that, even in positive bilateral relationships, the Confucius Institute project has had limited impact at the state-to-state level.

Influence on Other Countries’ Language and Culture Promotion Activities There is, however, one area in which the Confucius Institute project has had some influence on what other states do. As I explained in Chapter 2, China’s interest in soft power was driven in part by the soft power activities of other East Asian countries and a desire not to be left behind. Similarly, China’s own soft power initiatives, and the Confucius Institute project in particular, have attracted much attention from other countries. For example, Hall (2012) argues that India’s recent efforts to develop and use soft power are partly a reaction to China’s efforts and concerns over their potential impact. The Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) has recently expanded its activities with a focus on language and culture through the establishment of Indian Cultural Centres abroad. According to its website, there are currently 35 such centres and plans for 15 more in the near future. They conduct various activities such as dance, singing, music, yoga and Hindi classes, and lectures and seminars about India. Depending on the Indian Cultural Centre’s location, such activities may cater to the local Indian diaspora or people from non-Indian backgrounds (Hall, 2012; Indian Council for Cultural Relations, 2016a). The ICCR also funds short-term and long-term Chairs of Indian Studies at foreign universities. Approximately half of these chairs are for the teaching of Hindi and other Indian languages (Hall, 2012; Indian Council for Cultural Relations, 2016b). In 2007, South Korea began establishing King Sejong Institutes to teach Korean language and culture around the world through the provision of Korean classes, Korean teachers, an online learning platform and a Korean speaking contest; development of teaching materials; and conduct of various cultural activities (King Sejong Institute Foundation, 2015a, 2015b). There are obvious similarities between the activities of the King Sejong Institute and the Confucius Institute project, and the fact that they are named after a king who was an adherent to Confucianism and the inventor of the Korean alphabet could also be argued to be inspired by the naming of the Confucius Institute after Confucius. The president of the King Sejong Institute Foundation, Song Hyangkeun, describes the purpose of the King Sejong Institutes as ‘Korea will become a friend of all the people around the world through KSI’, and that the institutes would ‘take the lead in an effort to spread the scent of Korean language and culture across the globe’ (King Sejong Institute Foundation, 2015a). By 2015 there were 140 King Sejong Institutes in 54 countries (King Sejong Institute Foundation, 2015b). H.Y. Wang and Y.C. Lu (2008) argue that China’s activities are also a factor in Taiwan’s interest in soft power. Since 2008, Taiwan has emphasised

62

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

culture in its soft power initiatives, and has attempted to portray itself as the ‘preserver of traditional Chinese culture’ (Rawnsley, 2012: 129). One means of implementing this is through the Taiwan Academy, an organisation under the Ministry of Culture. Its core areas of activity are teaching Chinese language with a particular emphasis on promoting the use of traditional characters, stimulating Taiwan Studies and Sinology and promoting Taiwan’s culture (Taiwan Academy, 2016a). There are now 11 Taiwan Academy centres in 9 countries (Taiwan Academy, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d). The Confucius Institute project has contributed to the perception that an organisation to promote language and culture is a necessity in today’s world.

Reasons for Limited Impact at the State-to-State Level The examples of China’s international relations presented in this chapter, although far from exhaustive, indicate that the Confucius Institute project is not currently influencing the policies and actions of other countries, other than being one instigation to conduct language and culture promotion activities. In other words, the Confucius Institute project is not leading governments to acquiesce to China’s goals at the state-to-state level. The explanation for this lies in the nature of language and culture as sources of soft power in world politics and governments’ concerns about the Confucius Institute project.

The nature of language and culture as sources of soft power in world politics In discussing the limitations of soft power, Nye (2004, 2011) has argued that attraction is more likely to result in general influence rather than the achievement of specific goals or policy outcomes. Here, there are similarities between the Confucius Institute project’s promotion of Chinese language and culture and other instances of the impact of language and culture in world politics. In discussing the influence of American popular culture on the USA’s international relations, for example, Zheng and C. Zhang (2012: 26) conclude that ‘popular culture, although it is welcomed by many people, does not have significant implications for foreign policy-making and state behaviour’. In a study of Japanese soft power in East and Southeast Asia, Otmazgin (2008) argues that the benefits that Japan gains from the popularity of its music, movies, television programmes, computer games, comics, etc. are confined to shaping cultural markets and creating a positive image of Japan. That is to say that the attractiveness of Japanese popular culture helps determine what products are available to buy and contributes to consumers of such products developing positive attitudes towards Japan, but does not result in Japan having any actual influence or control over the policies and actions of the states of the region (Otmazgin, 2008). Likewise,

Evaluating the Confucius Institute Project: Impact at the State-to-State Level

63

S.J. Lee (2011) argues that South Korean popular culture has had an influence on the popular cultures of other East Asian states but doubts whether this has helped South Korea achieve any of its desired policy outcomes. India too has considerable popular and traditional cultural resources including music, film, food and yoga, but again these have not been decisive factors in the country’s participation in world politics. As Mukherjee (2014: 46) says, ‘one is hard pressed to identify a significant role played by soft power in India’s diplomatic gains since the early 1990s’. Another point is that the promotion of language and culture, like any soft power initiative, can be undermined or damaged by a state’s behaviour in other areas. This is particularly relevant to China because several scholars have argued that its attraction and appeal are constrained by factors such as official corruption, censorship, human rights issues, relations with dictatorial regimes in various countries and environmental degradation (Blanchard & F.J. Lu, 2012; Courmont, 2013; Gill & Y.Z. Huang, 2006; Nye, 2013). As Lai (2012a: 16) says, ‘[w]hen international developments expose the sharp differences between China and other nations over critical issues and when China cannot take action deemed necessary by the international community, no soft power initiatives can suffice to avoid the international damage of China’s image’. Nye (2013) provides an even more explicit and pertinent example, explaining that establishing ‘a Confucius Institute in Manila to teach Chinese [language and] culture might help produce soft power, but it is less likely to do so in a context where China has just bullied the Philippines over possession of Scarborough Reef’.

Governments’ concerns about the Confucius Institute project It is not surprising, then, that concerns about the Confucius Institute project have been raised by governments in several countries. In 2008, for example, a member of the Swedish Parliament, Göran Lindblad, felt strongly enough about alleged insidious links between the Nordic Confucius Institute and the Chinese Embassy to raise the issue during a parliamentary session (Starr, 2009). The Indian government has also expressed concerns that Confucius Institutes are propaganda tools of the Chinese government. In 2005, an agreement to establish a Confucius Institute at Jawaharlal Nehru University was signed, but the severity of the concerns surrounding it eventually resulted in the government refusing to give approval for it to proceed. Two years later, a Confucius Institute was planned for Vellore Institute of Technology, but this was badged as a Chinese language centre, not a Confucius Institute, although it was still established with the involvement of Hanban and a Chinese university (Hall & Smith, 2013; Kasturi, 2013; Narayana Murthi, 2009). A Confucius Institute has since opened at Mumbai University and one is planned for Manipal University, but both will be subject to the condition the Chinese government has no

64

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

direct role, and there will also be stricter visa conditions for teaching staff from China than would apply to those from other countries engaged in similar activities. As an Indian diplomat said, ‘This isn’t an unconditional, open invitation to China, [w]e want cultural exchanges between the two nations, but we also have concerns that we don’t with the US, the UK, France or any of the other European nations’ (Kasturi, 2013). In the USA, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee questioned then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton about why a significant number of Confucius Institutes had been established in the USA and why the USA was not able to do something equivalent in China during a US Congressional in 2010 (Barr, 2011). More recently, a congressional hearing into the question ‘Is academic freedom threatened by Chinese influence on US universities?’ was held in December 2014. This event featured much discussion of Confucius Institutes and their role in American universities, including whether they were restricting discussion of sensitive topics and spreading pro-China propaganda (Painter, 2014). The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) is also reportedly exploring the possibility that some of the country’s Confucius Institutes could be used for intelligence gathering, although no evidence of this has yet been found (Shambaugh, 2013). In December 2015 in Australia, then Greens party member John Kaye put questions about the establishment and operation of Confucius Classrooms to the New South Wales (NSW) minister for education in a session of the state’s parliament. Later, the Greens’ acting education spokesman David Shoebridge told a reporter, ‘[t]hese classes might be free to Treasury, but they are paid for by exposing children to a foreign government’s propaganda machine’, and expressed concern that ‘[m]ost Confucius Classrooms operate with no department official having any idea what is being taught or how disputed issues such as human rights and contested territories are handled’ (Munro, 2016). Other language and culture promotion organisations have not been subject to such concerns. I performed online searches for government concerns or criticisms of the Alliance Française, Dante Alighieri Society, British Council, Goethe Institute, Cervantes Institute, Japan Foundation, King Sejong Institutes, Indian Cultural Centres and Taiwan Academy, but did not find anything. In fact, in several cases the search results displayed media reports and/or academic articles about the Confucius Institute project. Obviously the Confucius Institute project is viewed differently from the language and culture promotion organisations of other countries. This is because China itself is viewed differently from other countries. In discussing the roots of anti-American sentiment, Keohane and Katzenstein (2007) draw a useful distinction between reactions to what America is, by which they mean the nature and characteristics of the country itself, and reactions to what America does, by which they mean its policies and how they affect other actors. This distinction is helpful to explain why

Evaluating the Confucius Institute Project: Impact at the State-to-State Level

65

there has been widespread concern among governments about the Confucius Institute project but not other language and culture promotion organisations. While what China does certainly plays a role as the examples in the previous section attest, the more significant issue is what China is. Concerns about the Confucius Institute project stem not from the fact that it promotes Chinese language and culture but from the fact that it is associated with the Chinese government. China is a communist country that has followed a very different path towards modernisation than Western countries and has different views on important global issues. This is even more obvious when one considers the government links of other language and culture promotion organisations. For example, the governing body of the Cervantes Institute includes the king and president of Spain, and the governing body itself forms part of the management body, which consists of representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport, Ministry of Home Affairs and the Treasury. This management body is responsible for the approval of the Cervantes Institute’s plans and projects, and its membership has been described as ‘being at the heart of the Spanish Government’ (MarMolinero, 2006a: 87). The Alliance Française is affiliated with the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Culture, and each Alliance Française centre cooperates with the French embassy in its host country to carry out its activities (R. Adamson, 2007). Similarly, the Japan Foundation is supervised by the Cultural Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has limited veto powers over its activities. The president of the Japan Foundation is also appointed by the foreign minister (Hirataka, 1992; Ogawa, 2009). I am not suggesting a direct link between concerns about the Confucius Institute project and policy decisions on China. Nevertheless, these concerns stem from governments’ perceptions of China and likely feed into foreign policy decision-making. I will reflect further on the implications of these points in Chapter 6.

Conclusion Nye (2004: 34) proposed that for soft power to be helpful in achieving a state’s goals, ‘the objective measure of potential soft power has to be attractive in the eyes of specific audiences, and that attraction must influence policy outcomes’. For the Confucius Institute project to contribute to achieving China’s goals at the state-to-state level, Chinese language and culture must be attractive to policymakers in other countries and this in turn must lead them to develop and implement policies in line with China’s goals. This chapter has shown that this is not happening at present, and the Confucius Institute project has furthermore raised concerns among a number of governments, as well as prompting them to establish their own language and culture promotion initiatives. This raises doubts about the

66

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

veracity of language and culture promotion in world politics. However, given that Chapter 3 demonstrated the widespread interest in Chinese language learning, we should not discount that the Confucius Institute project could have an impact at the society-to-society level.

Note (1)

In June 2009 Rio Tinto withdrew from its agreement with Chinalco and accepted an offer from Anglo-Australian mining company BHP Billiton. This meant the Australian government did not have to make a decision about the Chinalco agreement (W.H. Liu & Hao, 2014).

5 Evaluating the Confucius Institute Project: Impact at the Society-to-Society Level Introduction This chapter complements the previous one by evaluating the impact of the Confucius Institute project at the society-to-society level. It argues that the Confucius Institute project has made a significant contribution to the teaching and learning of Chinese, and in doing so has helped facilitate understandings of China, particularly in a cultural sense. However, this has not necessarily resulted in more positive dispositions towards China as a country or polity. This chapter also contends that there are various factors which may limit the Confucius Institute project’s capacity to carry out its activities, and consequently constrain its impact at the society-tosociety level. These are concerns regarding the nature of the Confucius Institute project and practical and organisational issues affecting its actual operation.

The Society-to-Society Level There are a growing number and range of non-state actors who play an important role in the world political system, including NGOs, MNCs, community organisations, professional associations, universities, media organisations, publics and prominent individuals. Such actors are important for two reasons. Firstly, they create connections and relations which link countries together in significant and ongoing ways, such as through trade, tourism and education, which are important aspects of how countries interact with each other. Shambaugh (2008) refers to these interactions as foreign relations to distinguish them from the foreign policy conducted between governments. Secondly, although these actors have a less central role in the world political system than states, states nevertheless need to consult with them in order to devise policies, reach consensus with them to gain acceptance and legitimacy for policies, and secure their cooperation to implement policies (Jackson & Sørensen, 2013; Shambaugh, 2008). It is necessary to look at the society-to-society level when evaluating the impact of the Confucius Institute project because external language spread

67

68

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

is primarily aimed at and implemented by actors at this level. As it is not possible to cover all of the actors at the society-to-society level, I focus mainly on universities, the media and the general public, which have had the greatest involvement with and reactions to the Confucius Institute project.

Chinese Language Teaching and Learning There was general agreement among interviewees that the Confucius Institute project makes a valuable contribution to Chinese language teaching and learning through the provision of: teaching materials and resources; teaching staff from either the Chinese partner university or Hanban; language classes for the general public; support and development of teachers and language courses in schools; and assistance for existing language courses in universities. In regard to resources, for example, CI Interviewee 1 said, ‘we get more than 3000 books, journals and also DVDs which are very useful in our classroom teaching’. This interviewee also explained that the teaching staff provided by Hanban could make an important contribution to teaching because ‘we are short of teaching hours, we are short of enough staff doing classroom teaching and these Chinese teachers from China are very helpful in that regard’. CI Interviewee 3 similarly described the Confucius Institute project as ‘the only ready-made source of help’ for Chinese language teaching and explained how schools and universities could benefit through the development of Confucius Classrooms: In the long run, the only way, it seems to me, that universities can hope to increase the overall enrolment of students studying Chinese at university level, is through much broader enrolment in school and its maintenance through to Year 12, and that has really to come through the Confucius Classrooms. The schools can actually get teaching assistants, or volunteers, to come and support it because the teachers aren’t available here. […] to register formally as a teacher is quite difficult, so if you can get volunteers who come out and support existing teaching staff in schools, it’s a way of overcoming the shortage with native speakers. And I think, in the long run, if you’re starting in primary, feeding into secondary and senior high schools and then into universities, the only way to build the volume is going to be that way, and I think in that sense, the Confucius Institutes can be of very great assistance. In the same vein, CI Interviewee 5 explained how the activities of his Confucius Institute maintain and develop student enrolment in Chinese language courses:

Evaluating the Confucius Institute Project: Impact at the Society-to-Society Level

69

[T]he work we are doing in schools, strengthening teachers both in their language and pedagogy, is crucial for developing the language. Students in schools walk away from language learning if the quality of the teaching is no good, if the resources aren’t any good. The history of language teaching reveals that everywhere. So by strengthening the teaching and the resources that they have, we impact on the number of students who study the language. The provision of enrichment days, cultural days, activity days, call it whatever, intensive learning through immersion programmes, whatever you want to do in that regard, all develops in students a richer understanding of the language and therefore that desire to stay connected with it rather than see it just like another subject. This was also supported by CC Interviewee 1, who cited the important role of parental attitudes towards language learning in maintaining and supporting language study: I think if younger students become more interested in learning Chinese language and learning more about Chinese culture through the Confucius Classroom, they will inform their parents of their positive learning, and therefore their parents would be more confident that their child will benefit from Chinese language learning. CU Interviewee 2 claimed that the Confucius Institute in Havana, Cuba, where she had worked, had made a very significant contribution to the teaching and learning of Chinese because, prior to its establishment, there was only a Chinese institute run by the local Chinese community. The Confucius Institute allowed teachers and principals to go to China for training and also allowed a wide range of people to learn Chinese. In her words, without the Confucius Institute, studying in China was ‘just a dream’. CI Interviewee 4 felt that Confucius Institutes contributed to Chinese language learning and teaching by ‘finding their place’ among the existing Chinese programmes offered by schools, universities, and adult education providers. This was especially important where there was ‘a mature market’ for Chinese language learning. As such, Confucius Institutes could play a complementary role to such programmes: If you have a properly run language department [at a university], they would go at a few times the speed that you could do with a small, low level course, with low hours per week, from a Confucius Institute. If you run proper language courses in a university system for undergraduates, you would have around four, five, or more hours per week of face-toface teaching, depending on what system you use. You would go very

70

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

fast. You have by now in fact something that Confucius Institutes don’t have, which is a nearly global acceptance of one specific set of textbooks. In a way that should basically satisfy the high end demand – that is people who have time to work, who are bright, who are not yet tied down by professional obligations – through the university. The Confucius Institute kind of caters for demand around that; that is people who want less pressure, who have less time and who come to evening courses. There is a huge difference if you teach two hours in the evening once a week as compared to three two-hour sessions a week in the morning with undergraduates. They are different markets altogether. CU Interviewee 1 expressed a similar idea, emphasising that the contribution of Confucius Institutes to the teaching and learning of Chinese varied from country to country depending on the state of Chinese language education. She used her experiences in Korea as an example: In Korea, there is already a lot of Chinese language teaching. It starts in high school; there are lots of Chinese students; there are lots of people belonging to China’s Korean ethnic minority; and lots of Chinese women marry Korean men. So the main purpose of the Confucius Institute is not teaching and learning Chinese. It is to help the university develop its Chinese department. But in Africa and Europe, teaching and learning Chinese is the main purpose. Chinese language teachers also felt Confucius Institutes made useful contributions to their students’ learning through running activities such as conversation groups, speeches and competitions that were not part of their university courses (CLT Interviewee 1; CLT Interviewee 3; CLT Interviewee 4). CLT Interviewee 1 said, for example, ‘they’ve carried out lots of activities such as conversation groups and cultural activities for students to participate in, [and] that’s something that we wouldn’t have time to do, and they’ve done lots of that’. CLT Interviewee 4 said the Confucius Institute’s activities created an encouraging ‘atmosphere’ for student learning, and gave the Chinese Bridge competition as one example: So usually the Confucius Institute organises the area competition first and then they select the champions [and] the person who won the second prize, they send them to China, they provide the funding so that certainly promote[s] the language teaching and learning, so when students become outstanding in this learning, they get encouraged, they get the scholarship, they get free trips to China. So they are very good examples, and the kind of power, I mean the example, is a big encouragement, so students would follow, and that’s so exciting, so

Evaluating the Confucius Institute Project: Impact at the Society-to-Society Level

71

[the] organisation [of such activities] help[s] you achieve your goal, so I think in that way they promote the language teaching and learning a lot. Similar examples can be found in other contexts too. K. King (2010), for example, explains that the Confucius Institute in Nairobi, Kenya, has enabled Chinese language study to degree level; provided opportunities for student study and staff exchanges with the partner university in China; facilitated the establishment of links with other universities in China; and funded the construction of a language laboratory, with plans to upgrade teaching rooms with IT equipment. Associate Professor Michael Hill, director of the Center for Asian Studies and the Programme in Chinese at the University of South Carolina, USA, explained how the establishment of a Confucius Institute in cooperation with Beijing Language and Culture University had allowed his university to expand its range of Chinese language courses. He said, ‘[w]ithout the [Confucius Institute], I don’t see how we could offer our current array of courses. Moreover, there’s no question in my mind that our students have benefited from working with experienced instructors from our partner school’ (Levine et al., 2014). Many schools in the US state of Pennsylvania which lacked the resources to employ a Chinese language teacher have instead been able to offer Chinese through interactive learning videos accessed through satellite technology provided by the University of Pittsburgh Confucius Institute (Jensen, 2012). Stambach (2014) also points out that some Confucius Institutes have Chinese language libraries which are available to the public as well as university staff and students.

Attitudes Towards and Perceptions of China It might be expected that Chinese language learners would have more positive attitudes towards and perceptions of China. This is because some studies have suggested that learning a language can have a significant effect on learners’ attitudes towards and perceptions of the speakers of the language, the culture associated with the language and the societies in which the language is spoken (see the discussions in Ellis, 1994 and Moran, 2001 for example). The benefits China could derive from this should not be underestimated, as some Chinese language learners may one day be in positions of power and influence. In fact, some foreign students who studied in China have obtained such positions. Citing figures from China’s Ministry of Education, Lampton (2008) says that over 30 former students who undertook studies in China have ministerial positions in their own countries; more than 10 have served as their country’s ambassadors to China; 30 have high-level positions in their country’s embassies in China; 120 are associate professors or professors; and hundreds work in cultural,

72

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

economic and trade entities involved with China. China’s intention, as reflected in the statements from government officials, academics, the media and various interviewees cited in Chapter 2, is to create, through the Confucius Institute project, a large number of sympathetic people dispersed around the world. To what extent has the Confucius Institute project achieved this?

China and world opinion polls World opinion polls are a useful source of data on attitudes towards and perceptions of China. Polls such as the BBC World Service Poll and the Pew Global Attitudes Project survey cover a number of countries and are conducted on a regular basis. Such polls are by no means perfect but, as Hall and Smith (2013) point out, they cannot be ignored and there is as yet no alternative for effectively capturing attitudes and perceptions on a large scale. There are by now numerous examples of studies of China and other countries which use poll data (see, for example, Hall, 2012; Hall & Smith, 2013; Nye, 2004; Rawnsley, 2012), making them a widely accepted source. I use BBC World Service Polls and Pew Global Attitudes Project surveys, and supplement these with examples from the interviews and student survey. The BBC World Service Poll asks participants whether they think China is having a mainly positive or mainly negative influence in the world. Poll results from 2005 to 2014 show that views of China’s influence in the world have remained fairly consistent over the time the Confucius Institute project has been in operation. While there was some variation in the number of countries surveyed during this time, Table 5.1 shows the percentage of people who believed China has a mainly positive influence in the world hovered around the low- to mid-forties and never exceeded 50%. The average percentage was 43.7%. It is interesting to compare these percentages to the increases in the extensity and intensity of the Confucius Institute project presented in Chapter 3. For example, in 2009 when 249 new Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms were established, the most for the years covered in Chapter 3, the percentage of people who believed China had a mainly positive influence in the world was just 39%, although it should be noted the poll was conducted in January. In 2010, when 50% of people saw China’s influence as mainly positive, only 77 new Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms were established, the least for the years covered. Similarly, when 240 Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms were established in 2014, only 41% saw China’s influence as mainly positive. The Pew Global Attitudes Project survey asks a more general question, namely ‘Do you have a favourable or unfavourable view of China?’ Table 5.2

Evaluating the Confucius Institute Project: Impact at the Society-to-Society Level

73

Table 5.1 BBC World Service Poll results, 2005–2014 Year

Percentage for China’s influence mainly positive (%)

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average

48 45 42 47 39 41 44 50 40 41 43.7

Sources: BBC World Service Poll (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014).

shows opinions towards China were reasonably positive in 2005, with an average of nearly 56% across the countries surveyed expressing favourable views, and favourable views found in the majority of countries surveyed. Favourable views then declined to just over 43% by 2008, before recovering slightly then declining again to just over 46% in 2012. Favourable views increased again in 2013, 2014 and 2015, although they have not returned to 2005 levels. Again, there is a decline in favourable views of China evident in some of the years in which there were major increases in the extensity and intensity of the Confucius Institute project. Table 5.2 Pew Global Attitudes Project survey results, 2005–2015

Year

Number of countries/regions with favourable opinion of China above 50% (excluding China)

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

9 out of 14 8 out of 12 15 out of 36 6 out of 20 9 out of 21 9 out of 20 13 out of 20 6 out of 19 19 out of 39 21 out of 43 25 out of 39

Source: Pew Research Center (2016)

Average percentage expressing favourable opinion of China (excluding China) (%) 55.78 53.66 51.75 43.45 47.61 50.25 52.35 46.15 51.89 50.88 54.10

74

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

In both the case of views of China’s influence in the world and favourable views of China, it is of course important to remember the difficulties of isolating the impact of the Confucius Institute project on attitudes towards and perceptions of China from China’s many other activities and behaviours. However, Xie and Page (2013) have produced a useful analysis of the Pew Global Attitudes Project survey from the year 2007, which covered the largest number of countries by the time of their study. They examined the impact of five factors on favourable views of China: a country’s strategic ties with China; the similarity of a country’s political system to China’s; a country’s level of economic and social development; a country’s amount of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI); and a country’s number of Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms. The number of Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms in a country had no significant impact on favourable views of China. In other words, the presence of Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms did not increase the percentage of the population with favourable views of China. The only factor which did have a significant impact was a country’s level of economic and social development. To be specific, the higher a country’s level of economic and social development, the less favourable its view of China (Xie & Page, 2013). Other factors therefore appear more important in shaping favourable views of China and its role in the world than the Confucius Institute project. Further dimensions of attitudes towards and perceptions of China can be found in the interviews and student survey.

Views from the interviews and survey There were in fact mixed views as to whether the Confucius Institute project has had any influence on attitudes towards and perceptions of China. CLT Interviewee 2, for example, believed that China promotes Chinese language learning around the world to facilitate understanding of and communication with China, and felt this could be successful. He gave the following explanation: China is also promoting English. English [language teaching] begins in Grade 1 of primary school. This is because China needs to understand the world and communicate with it. Other countries also need to understand China. If you speak Chinese you can understand China. CU Interviewee 1 felt learning Chinese could help people gain a different perspective on China because: If you don’t understand Chinese you have to rely on what the foreign or outside media say about China. If you understand Chinese you can see what China says about itself.

Evaluating the Confucius Institute Project: Impact at the Society-to-Society Level

75

CI Interviewee 2, on the other hand, was clearly sceptical about the link between learning Chinese and developing a positive disposition towards China: To be able to speak the language does not necessarily mean [one is] proChina. [Former Australian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister] Kevin Rudd was like this, he’s not pro-China; he speaks Chinese, he’s in no way pro-China. If anything he’s probably pro-Taiwan. So one has to be careful because some people have this understanding oh, if you teach Chinese language then you brainwash them to become Chinese. Well, if that is the case, how about the fact that everybody speaks English, and so what? So everyone is what, a Western[er]? No. CC Interviewee 1 also thought that learning Chinese in and of itself would not have a significant effect on students’ attitudes towards China, and that this was in fact not relevant in students’ minds: Unless students have been informed by their parents consistently at home, learning Chinese language would not affect too much their attitude towards China as a country. What students care about is whether it is fun or not. CI Interviewee 5 expressed a similar view when asked if the activities his Confucius Institute conducts had any influence on peoples’ attitudes towards China: I suppose I have a bit of a difficulty about this notion are people more positive or negative. I’m not quite sure what that means so I’d want to stay away from that and talk about the notions of providing better understandings for people. When you provide better understandings for people they may be positively influenced or they may be negatively influenced. A classic example of that is you read in the press, say, ‘China is developing its economy at a huge rate’, you know you read this, for some people it’s a positive experience, for other people it’s a negative experience because they get frightened of it. A lot of that depends on their personal dispositions in other walks of life. So I think it’s simplistic to talk about relationships or activities that a Confucius Institute might do that create positive or negative – I’d want to stay away from all that and talk about the understandings that they create for people and the opportunities that they create for people. Whether they’re then seen as positive or negative is dependent upon a whole range of other things associated with their lives. These comments relate back to themes in CU Interviewee 1’s comments, as he went on to say:

76

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

I think by themselves Confucius Institutes can’t create positive or negative views of anything. They can create understandings for people but, as I said, how those understandings are translated into attitudes, beliefs, feeling towards China is dependent on a whole range of other things in the society, the media being a key factor. This is supported by responses to the student survey, which showed a range of views of China. For example, in response to the question ‘Do you think China plays a positive role in the world?’, 10 students expressed agreement, 2 expressed disagreement, 4 said China plays both positive and negative roles, 3 were unsure and 1 did not respond to the question. Examples of responses expressing agreement include: China’s vast production capabilities allow for many products to be made at reasonable prices and this aids many countries. (CLL 1, Australia) Yes, because a lot is imported from China. (CLL 19, China) It helps to develop [the] world economy. (CLL 6, China) Of course, every culture, especially one as old and rich as China, is positive. (CLL 8, China) Yes, I think China’s people [are] an example of constant and hardwork[ing] people. (CLL 11, China). In some ways, yes. They contribute wonderful culture and rich history, and many products for the U[united] S[tates] and other countries! Their people are also wonderful and caring and helpful overall. (CLL 12, China) Increasingly, yes. It still behaves in quite a reactionary, almost petulant way sometimes (like the recent stand-off with Japan over the collision between fishing and naval boats) but it is mostly level-headed in its behaviour. It generally doesn’t seek to impose its will in areas outside of its own backyard. (CLL 4, Australia) Examples of responses expressing disagreement include: Not yet! They are very hungry and they do whatever they want until they calm down. (CLL 7, China) No. Pollution and discrimination. (CLL 3, Australia) Students who felt China played both a positive and a negative role in the world explained, for example: China can contribute positively to the world through strengthening the world economy, however, their pollution of the environment is unacceptable. (CLL 2, Australia) Yes → Chinese are hard workers → look [at] the economy

Evaluating the Confucius Institute Project: Impact at the Society-to-Society Level

77

No → too many people → pollution and not a good example regarding human rights. (CLL 20, China) Positive for the USA – credit owner Neutral for Europe – positive for trading – negative for small countries. (CLL 13, China) One student who expressed uncertainty in response to this question gave an interesting answer: Not sure, but offering more choices and chances other than the West. (CLL 5, Australia) The other two, CLL 14, China and CLL 16, China, simply wrote ‘I don’t know’ as their responses.

Chinese Culture and China as a Country An interesting feature of the above responses is that most of those which expressed agreement focused on the economy, culture or people, rather than China as a country or political entity. People’s perceptions of a country do indeed have many dimensions – including economic, cultural and political – and perceptions can vary along these dimensions (Xie & Page, 2013). Katzenstein and Keohane (2007) take this point further in their discussion of why the USA is viewed both positively and negatively. They aptly describe the USA as a polyvalent, or multifaceted country, with diverse characteristics, including its political system, culture and values. Some of these will be considered attractive while others will not. This applies equally well to students’ views of China where the economy, culture and people are regarded positively, and pollution and human rights are regarded negatively. In a similar vein, some Confucius Institute staff suggested Confucius Institutes could beneficially influence knowledge and understanding of Chinese culture, but not necessarily of China as a country or political entity. CI Interviewee 1 explained: I think we promote better understanding in the local community of the Chinese culture. For example, we have a public lecture series on Chinese culture. The first lecture was on traditional Chinese medicine. And the response was extremely positive. People are asking for more. I mean local Australian[s] who didn’t know much about Chinese medicine and how we could benefit from it, the response was very, very positive, very, very enthusiastic. I don’t know whether [this had a positive influence on local Australians’ attitudes] towards China but definitely they have a better understanding of Chinese culture through the activities we have been organising.

78

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

CI Interviewee 4 drew this distinction explicitly: if your question [about the influence of Confucius Institutes on attitudes towards China] is the political question, then no, I don’t think so, that is not what programmes are there for. If you ask from a cultural perspective, I would say hopefully yes. The fact that we staged some opera performances of a very good classical Kunqu [昆曲 kūnqǔ] troupe, with thousands of people turning up, would hopefully have had some influence in terms of presenting to people and showing people something that is a well-preserved, traditional, high-class example of Chinese culture. In that sense, yes – that is part of why you are doing outreach from the university – you want to have an influence on people’s perceptions, on things that you select for that purpose. But that is something different from talking about political influence.1 CC Interviewee 1 was unsure whether Confucius Classrooms had influenced attitudes towards China but did suggest they may contribute to generating interest in China. She explained that ‘a few parents from my school have been very curious about when their child can go to see China through the Confucius Classroom projects. It seems that they are fascinated about China’. Further support for the distinction between Chinese culture and China as a country or political entity can be found in student responses to the question ‘Has learning Chinese changed your perception of China?’, to which nine students answered ‘no’, eight ‘yes’, two ‘maybe’ and one did not respond. Here again the ‘yes’ responses related to culture, people and enhanced understanding of China, as demonstrated by these examples: Yes, the symbolism of their characters has explained why their culture seems to be based on symbolism in everyday life. (CLL 8, China) Simply learning character[s] and radical calligraphy gives an insight into the history [of] China. (CLL 2, Australia) Yes, further understand its culture, especially Confucianism. (CLL 5, Australia) Yes, now more than before, I like Chinese people. (CLL 10, China) Yes; I like China more now; I understand it better. (CLL 14, China) I’ve only just begun to study, but it’s started to show me even more how diverse China is (range of dialects). Also, the plethora of terms for family members underscores the value of family in China. (CLL 15, China) To be honest I didn’t know a lot at all about China before I went there, beyond the CCP/KMT war, Tiananmen Square and some general history about ancient China. I didn’t have much of an opinion about

Evaluating the Confucius Institute Project: Impact at the Society-to-Society Level

79

China one way or the other. Learning Chinese has certainly taught me a fair bit about China, and I would say has made me more aware of just what China is. It is a very complex country, and I think that learning Chinese has taught me that China is far too complex to pigeon hole as a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ country. (CLL 4, Australia) There are some similarities between the responses to the student survey and the 2012 BBC World Service Poll which detailed influences on views of China. It found that China’s economy, products and services was the most common reason why those surveyed believed China had a mainly positive influence in the world (51%). Interestingly, this was also the most common reason given by those who believed China had a mainly negative influence in the world (30%), followed by the way China treats its people (27%) and China’s foreign policy (25%) (BBC World Service Poll, 2012). Learning Chinese does not automatically, or necessarily, create more positive dispositions towards China. This is also the case with other languages. The Japan Foundation’s Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Programme brings young people from various countries to work as assistant language teachers (ALTs) in Japanese schools with the idea that they will develop positive dispositions towards Japan through sustained interaction with Japanese people and culture and return home as advocates of Japan. However, McConnell (2008) reports that although the JET Programme participants he interviewed generally had a greater knowledge and understanding of Japan and expressed fondness for Japanese culture and people, they were not on the whole more supportive of the Japanese government, and some were in fact very critical of it and its policies. More generally, it is worth expanding on CI Interviewee 2’s point about the use of English in the world. English is learnt and used to various extents by over one billion people, but this has not resulted in the widespread adoption of native English-speaking cultures such as British or American. In fact, one of the defining features of English as a global language is that people use it to express a range of different cultures, identities, values and ideas, and create distinct varieties of the language which serve their own purposes (Modiano, 2001; Park & Wee, 2012). The same would occur as more people acquire Chinese. This can in fact be observed with the spread of Modern Standard Chinese within China resulting in new forms of the standard language (Moser, 2016). In addition, the use of English does not imply agreement with the policies and actions of native English-speaking countries. As Yang (2001) points out, English is the sole official language of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), yet ASEAN cannot be reasonably described as a pro-American or pro-British organisation. Learning Chinese would similarly not result in agreement with everything China does in world politics.

80

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

Societal Reactions as Impediments to the Confucius Institute Project Liddicoat and Taylor-Leech (2014) point out that language policies can encounter resistance by the various actors who are affected by them. The Confucius Institute project has been described as ‘possibly [the] most controversial example of Chinese soft power’ (Barr, 2011: 62), and while this applies to the state-to-state level as shown in the last chapter, the biggest reactions have been at the society-to-society level. Concerns have been raised about the Confucius Institute project by universities and academics, the media and the general public in many parts of the world.

Concerns of universities and academics Academics have raised concerns about the Confucius Institute project from its early days and have continued to do so into more recent times. In Sweden, for example, staff at Stockholm University accused the Chinese embassy of using the university’s Nordic Confucius Institute to conduct political surveillance and secret propaganda activities, as well as to restrict research on politically sensitive issues relating to China (Starr, 2009). In April 2014, over 100 staff members of the University of Chicago signed a petition arguing that having a Confucius Institute meant that the university was in effect allowing Hanban to control the hiring of staff, course content and course offerings. The petition also requested the university’s Senate Council to vote not to renew the contract for the Confucius Institute (Redden, 2014; The Australian, 2014). Similarly, in June 2014, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) issued a report arguing that Confucius Institutes represent a significant threat to academic freedom and potentially allow the Chinese government to gain control over the curriculum and teaching. According to the AAUP, ‘North American universities permit Confucius Institutes to advance a state agenda in the recruitment and control of academic staff, in the choice of curriculum, and in the restriction of debate’. The AAUP urged all universities to close their Confucius Institutes unless they could renegotiate their agreements with Hanban in such a way that would guarantee such issues would not occur (American Association of University Professors, 2014). Meanwhile, a teacher at the University of McMaster’s Confucius Institute in Canada filed a complaint with the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario because working at the Confucius Institute meant she had to hide her membership with the Falun Gong (The Australian, 2014). In Australia, too, some academics have argued that Confucius Institutes are a potential threat to academic freedom. For example, while Chey (2008) acknowledges the benefits of the resources provided to Chinese language

Evaluating the Confucius Institute Project: Impact at the Society-to-Society Level

81

teaching, she argues that Confucius Institutes’ activities should be kept separate from those of university Chinese departments because they could function to restrict teaching and research on sensitive topics and push proChina views. New Zealand-based academic Anne-Marie Brady (2008: 165) similarly argues that the location of Confucius Institutes within universities permits ‘Chinese authorities to have an element of control over the study of China and Chinese language at these Western universities that they would not normally have’, and warns that ‘[m]any cash-strapped universities welcome the extra funding and resources that the Confucius Institute can offer, without realizing the potential cost to freedom of speech and association’. Lionel M. Jensen (2012: 282), an academic in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Notre Dame, echoes this concern when he says ‘the placement of [Confucius Institutes] within the centers, departments, and institutes of public and private universities is without precedent and threatens the independent pursuit of research that is the enabling premise of higher education’ (emphasis in original). The strongest expression of these concerns is from Sahlins (2015), who describes the Confucius Institutes as ‘academic malware’. Elsewhere, Japan’s Confucius Institutes are all located in private universities, not the Imperial, or national universities. The Imperial universities have reportedly rejected all requests from Chinese universities to establish Confucius Institutes (Barr, 2011; Ngamsang & Walsh, 2013), also suggesting such concerns. Another such example comes from Kenya’s University of Nairobi, where staff believed that the Confucius Institute was operating with insufficient management and direction from the university and could also potentially restrict research into China’s role in Kenya’s economy (Wheeler, 2014). Taking a broader perspective, Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas (2013) have argued that the proliferation of Confucius Institutes may result in Chinese being granted greater status than other languages and becoming a requirement for participation in a number of domains, in much the same way as currently occurs with English.

Concerns of the media There have been many media reports regarding the Confucius Institute project, with some of the best-known media outlets from around the world, including the BBC, Guardian, The New York Times, Bloomberg, The Economist and The Chronicle of Higher Education, carrying such reports on various issues and events (D.P. Wang & B. Adamson, 2014). Although their volume means it is impossible to discuss them all here, a few representative examples will be given to demonstrate the main themes of such reports. An article suggesting that the Confucius Institute project was being used for industrial espionage, obtaining intellectual property and conducting surveillance of the local Chinese population appeared in Canada’s

82

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

The National Post while the USA’s Christian Science Monitor ran an article heavily critical of what it saw as an inappropriate connection between the Confucius Institute project and the Chinese government (Barr, 2011). One Australian journalist, writing in the national newspaper The Australian, has also suggested that the presence of Confucius Institutes in the country’s universities could ultimately ‘compromise our educational institutions, and our core values’ (The Australian, 2009e). A similar sentiment was expressed in a report on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s (ABC) website about the NSW Department of Education’s plan to increase the number of Confucius Classrooms in the state’s schools. According to Robertson (2011), ‘[t]he Chinese money comes with a few Chinese communist rules, like no talking politics, democracy, freedom of expression, and human rights in China. That’s if it’s a good day. If it’s a bad day, Australian children may be taught things about those subjects that run counter to our values’. An editorial in Canada’s The Globe and Mail (2014) described the Confucius Institutes ‘as little more than a long arm of the Chinese state, pushing its political agenda under the guise of simple language instruction’.

Concerns of the general public A public protest against the Confucius Institute project took place in the Los Angeles suburb of Hacienda Heights, where some parents strongly objected to the establishment of a Confucius Classroom for the local schools on the grounds that it would expose students to propaganda in the form of teaching materials and influence their thoughts and views. The parents carried signs with the slogan ‘America, Not Confucius’ (Barr, 2011). Another public protest occurred in Toronto, Canada, in 2014 over the establishment of a Confucius Institute which would provide Chinese classes to Toronto District School Board (TDSB) schools through Confucius Classrooms. A YouTube video of the protest shows participants carrying signs such as ‘TDSB Stop Confucius Institute!’, ‘Say No to Confucius Institute’, ‘Don’t Poison Your Kids and Mine With Communism!’, ‘No Communist CI in TDSB’, ‘I Don’t Want Communist Chinese Textbook’ and ‘Kids Before $$$$’ (Mahonen, 2014). TDSB trustees also reportedly received large volumes of emails and telephone calls from parents expressing their concerns over how Confucius Institute teachers would deal with politically sensitive topics (Alphonso & Howlett, 2014; Howlett & Alphonso, 2014). Internet discussion forums and social media platforms also contain similar comments and criticisms about the Confucius Institute project. In Australia, for example, there is a Facebook page called ‘Say No to Confucius Institutes and Classes in Australia’ which invites people to sign an online petition asking the federal minister for education to ban Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms. Other such examples can be seen in the comments sections of the online articles cited above.

Evaluating the Confucius Institute Project: Impact at the Society-to-Society Level

83

Clearly, the Confucius Institute project has not been accepted everywhere, nor has it been viewed as unequivocally beneficial. The main concerns common to the actors discussed here are that it could undermine academic freedom, be used to spread propaganda and allow the Chinese government to gain undue influence. Once again, concerns of this nature are largely unique to the Confucius Institute project, especially the involvement of the media and general public. The concerns and criticisms I found of other language and culture promotion organisations are confined to the academic realm. These include R. Adamson’s (2007) argument that the Alliance Française’s increasing reliance on government funding has resulted in it losing some independence in terms of the activities it conducts, and Mar-Molinero’s (2006a, 2006b) argument that the work of the Cervantes Institute should be considered as a case of linguistic imperialism because it promotes Spain’s standard variety of Spanish and its associated cultural practices over other varieties and cultural practices. Phillipson (1992) has also strongly criticised the British Council’s role in the global spread of English. However, when I performed online searches for concerns and criticisms of the Alliance Française, Dante Alighieri Society, British Council, Goethe Institute, Cervantes Institute, Japan Foundation, King Sejong Institutes, Indian Cultural Centres and Taiwan Academy, no results relevant to the society-to-society level were generated. As with the search reported in the previous chapter, the results in most instances displayed media reports and/or academic articles about the Confucius Institute project. The important question here is whether there are any grounds for such concerns.

Considering Concerns about the Confucius Institute Project Confucius Institute staff felt such concerns were baseless, with one interviewee describing them as ‘absolute rubbish’ (CI Interviewee 3), and another as ‘utter nonsense’ (CI Interviewee 5). CI Interviewee 4 pointed out that in his city, concerns had been raised before a Confucius Institute had actually opened, and those raising the concerns were not involved with the Confucius Institute in any way. CI Interviewee 2 similarly expressed the opinion that concerns were due to a lack of knowledge about what Confucius Institutes are and what they do: Well [concerns are] justified in the sense that you don’t know what it is about. But if you do, then they shouldn’t be worried about it. But they don’t know though. They think this is [a] Chinese government propaganda arm, you know, Chinese influence penetrating the university, or you know, there’s a scheme, that [was] worked out in darkness, that kind of thing.

84

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

On the commonly raised issue of propaganda through language teaching, one interviewee commented: [I]f you look at the sort of material that they [Hanban] provide, and everyone knows the curriculums are basically under the control of education authorities, except maybe in the private schools and even there it’s prescribed to a certain extent, if you look at the actual content, they are as innocent as strawberries. They look like the language teaching material for any other language you might want to pick up from a democratic parliamentary state. And if I compare it to the material when I learnt Chinese myself 30 years ago, then textbook availability was very limited anyway, and if it was sourced from the mainland, which was certainly the most affordable, it all was about locomotives and factories and things like that, not outwardly propagandist in any real sense, but it reflected the society at the time, where it all was about workers and farmers and what have you. Now it’s just about everyday life and everyday life anywhere. (CI Interviewee 3) In regard to interference with or influence on universities, CI Interviewees also emphasised that curriculums and programmes were controlled by the universities themselves, not Hanban or the Chinese government. Examples of comments include: I’ve heard concerns to do with interference, I think that’s the media, nonsense from where I sit. I can say that’s utter nonsense. There has never been an attempt by any Chinese authority, organisation, to influence what we might do. And you have to go back to the application, it is an application, you apply. They are set within universities, they are set within university organisations, to imply that there may be some way by which the university is influenced by that, from where I sit, as I said, is nonsense. What else might people be concerned about? Learning Chinese language? I don’t understand that. There has been in my book no influence in any way. There may be motives on the part of those who do raise issues. It might be personal, to do with their own personal orientations, it might be to do with their own political orientations, there may be self-interest in making these comments. The only comment I’d have is just give me the evidence. I haven’t seen any evidence. (CI Interviewee 5) I think there is a misunderstanding among some people in the local community about the nature of this Confucius Institute. And I think [it] would be good to make it crystal clear to people that [the] Confucius Institute in Australian universities is first and foremost in the hands of Australians, in the hands of Australian universities. All directors of Confucius Institutes are full-time employees of Australian universities.

Evaluating the Confucius Institute Project: Impact at the Society-to-Society Level

85

It’s not [a] Chinese institution, it’s not a Chinese promoting institution stationed abroad staffed by [the] Chinese Ministry of Education. It’s far from it; it has nothing to do with it at all. It’s very similar to the situation where, for example, [the] Korean government, Japanese government, provides, for example, two five-year teaching fellowships. You can use the money in whatever way [you] want, as long as it’s in conformity with the basic [principle] which is to promote the language and culture, but we want to do it anyway. (CI Interviewee 1) Of course, one has to be careful whether the Chinese actually get to influence the curriculum of teaching at the universities. So people like me have to be careful about that. If that is not going to happen, if we want to do what we want to do anyway, and we have our own curriculum, our own mission, our own purpose, then it should be OK. I don’t see how they can influence our curriculum. I mean, like textbooks for instance, individual universities can use their own textbooks, individual academics can use their own textbooks. It’s never influenced by anybody. (CI Interviewee 2) CC Interviewee 1 emphasised that the main purpose of the Confucius Classroom was Chinese language teaching and was clearly more concerned with the practicalities of its implementation, an issue which will be discussed in further detail later in this chapter: I don’t think people should be concerned about Confucius Classrooms. Confucius Institutes aim to provide university level students with more chances to study Chinese language while [the] Confucius Classroom is to support our younger students to have the same opportunities, therefore they can experience the authentic learning through exchange programmes or different activities much earlier. The concept of this project is for sure 100% relating to our students’ learning, however, whether it is successful or not is more [dependent] on how this project is operated. These interviewees present convincing rebuttals to the various concerns commonly raised about the Confucius Institute project and, as they are directly involved with its day-to-day operations, their voices must carry additional weight. Perhaps the only concern with some basis is put forward in Hartig’s (2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2016) studies of Confucius Institutes in Germany and Australia, which suggested that there was an implicit understanding among staff that Confucius Institutes could not conduct activities on sensitive topics such as Taiwan, Tibet, the Tiananmen Square Massacre and the Falun Gong, or invite Chinese dissidents to appear at their Confucius Institute. He quotes one director of a Confucius Institute in Australia as saying ‘[t]here

86

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

are no restrictions, but obviously if I would pay the Dalai Lama to come to Australia with Hanban money they would not be happy. You don’t have to be a genius to know that’ (Hartig, 2012b: 267). Another two directors in the same study expressed reluctance to be involved with Falun Gong members or conduct events supportive of the Falun Gong (Hartig, 2012b). Similarly, Stephen I. Levine, a former professor of Chinese history and politics, wrote to more than 200 Confucius Institute directors requesting they hold an event such as a public lecture or roundtable discussion to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre. He claims to have received a supportive response from only one director, and no response at all from the others (Levine et al., 2014). It should also be noted that in the same article, Mary Gallagher, associate professor of political science and director of the Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Richard H. Rogel Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan, explains that the University of Michigan’s Confucius Institute did co-sponsor an event to mark this anniversary and has also co-sponsored a number of screenings of films banned in China (Levine et al., 2014). I attended a presentation given by the well-known Chinese scholar Wang Hui titled ‘The “Tibetan Question” between East and West’, sponsored by the University of Adelaide’s Confucius Institute as part of the Asian Studies Association of Australia (ASAA) 18th Biennial Conference in July 2010. Wang Hui’s presentation was wide ranging and included the suggestion that China should revise its system of granting autonomy to provinces and other administrative units (for example prefectures, counties and villages) based on the ethnicity of the population and instead base it on the level of socio-economic development of a province or other administrative unit. This is quite a provocative idea as autonomy for ethnic minorities has been part of CCP policy since before it even came to power (Mackerras, 1995; Zhou, 2003).2 The presentation was followed by lively discussion of this and other issues raised, and there was no attempt to restrict discussion. The fact that this presentation was badged as the Confucius Institute Public Lecture suggests there is scope to discuss sensitive issues. I was invited to present on a panel called ‘Confucius Institutes: Then, Now and Tomorrow’ during the 9th International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS9) in 2015. This panel was organised by the University of Adelaide’s Confucius Institute and was one of its regular China Briefings series of public lectures. My presentation covered the controversies surrounding the Confucius Institute project, as did those of the other participants to various extents. Again, there was a lively discussion and no attempt to restrict what presenters or audience members said. Similarly, Stambach (2014) participated in history classes conducted at an American Confucius Institute and found that while they presented Chinese history and culture from a Chinese perspective, they were not propagandistic.

Evaluating the Confucius Institute Project: Impact at the Society-to-Society Level

87

On the other hand, Barr (2011) does describe two cases where the activities of Confucius Institutes do seem to have been affected by sensitive topics. The first of these is the Confucius Institute at the British Columbia Institute of Technology’s refusal to allow a reporter from the Epoch Times newspaper, founded by the Falun Gong, to attend the news conference announcing the opening of the Confucius Institute. The second is the University of Tel Aviv’s closure of an exhibition of art works by members of the Falun Gong, supposedly because of concerns that the university would lose the Confucius Institute’s Chinese language classes, scholarships and conferences. The sensible conclusion to draw here is that there are some constraints on what Confucius Institutes are able to do in relation to some sensitive topics, but that in the main the concerns commonly raised about the Confucius Institute project are not valid.

Consequences of Concerns about the Confucius Institute Project Nevertheless, the fact that such concerns exist could in itself have a limiting effect on the Confucius Institute project. As CI Interviewee 2 said, ‘people are suspicious and that kind of suspicion, that kind of attitude, might be poisonous’. This view was echoed by CS Interviewee 1 who explained: The idea behind the Confucius Institute is not bad – many people want to learn Chinese and through the Confucius Institute you can get help to teach Chinese, so in itself it’s not a bad idea to do the promotion of Chinese through the Confucius Institute. But you must promote it in a way that’s acceptable to the local community. People are suspicious and think there’s a motive behind it. The Confucius Institute is trying to copy the Goethe Institute which also has a government connection, but the government connection is invisible. With the Confucius Institute the government connection is visible. Even though there’s not a political motive, people think there is, and get suspicious. Indeed, H.Y. Wang (2005) draws on studies in the field of psychology to explain that negative images of a country are more likely to be accepted than positive ones, especially when a country is already perceived in a negative way. Similarly, Y. Deng (2008) draws on psychological studies to argue that once people have formed a schema, or consistent set of beliefs about a country, they tend to ignore any information which does not fit their views and only accept information which is consistent with their existing views. In this way, negative views of a country are preserved and persist, regardless of the actual evidence. This has potentially serious

88

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

implications, given that the Confucius Institute project is in part driven by a desire to change negative views of China held abroad, and may mean the Confucius Institute project will ultimately face a struggle to change people’s attitudes towards and perceptions of China. There is already some evidence that the Confucius Institute project is suffering from the kind of negative perceptions discussed here. For example, the University of Chicago decided to put negotiations to renew the contract for its Confucius Institute on hold in September 2014 and let the contract expire in October 2014, thus discontinuing its Confucius Institute (Belkin, 2014; UChicago News, 2014). The University of Chicago cited as the reason for this Hanban’s response to the staff petition, saying ‘recently published comments about UChicago in an article about the director-general of Hanban are incompatible with a continued equal partnership’ (UChicago News, 2014). Pennsylvania State University has also decided to close its Confucius Institute. The College of Liberal Arts dean, Dr Susan Welch, explained this was because ‘[s]everal of our goals are not consistent with those of the Office of Chinese Language Council International, known as the Hanban, which provides support to Confucius Institutes throughout the world’ (The Australian, 2014). The former director of the Pennsylvania State University Confucius Institute, Eric Hayot, similarly told the Wall Street Journal that the controversies around the Confucius Institute project in recent times ‘have made the overall situation for [Confucius Institutes] much less attractive than it once was’ (Belkin, 2014). It is interesting to note, however, that neither university gave any specific examples of interference or other concerns in their public statements. Another closure occurred at the University of McMaster over the case described above, and the TDSB also withdrew from its arrangement to establish Confucius Classrooms (Howlett & Alphonso, 2014; The Australian, 2014). In other cases, some universities have refused to establish Confucius Institutes and accept other forms of assistance from Hanban. The University of Manitoba, in Canada, for example, declined to set up a Confucius Institute due to concerns over academic freedom, while Cornell University in the USA has done likewise (The Australian, 2014; D.P. Wang & B. Adamson, 2014). Similarly, Stanford University and Hanban could not reach an agreement over Hanban’s US$4 million offer to sponsor a Confucius Institute professorship in Sinology due to such concerns, but did eventually agree to use the money for a professorship in classical Chinese poetry (D.P. Wang & B. Adamson, 2014). Here again, the main source of negative reactions to the Confucius Institute project is what China is. Clearly, these issues need to be addressed, and Chapter 6 offers some suggestions for doing so. For now, however, another impediment to the Confucius Institute project must be discussed.

Evaluating the Confucius Institute Project: Impact at the Society-to-Society Level

89

Practical and Organisational Issues as Impediments to the Confucius Institute Project Many studies have shown that practical and organisational issues can affect the success of language teaching and learning initiatives (de Kretser & Spence-Brown, 2010; Firdaus, 2013; Lo Bianco, 2009). A number of such issues apply to the Confucius Institute project and may limit its effectiveness in carrying out Chinese language teaching and cultural activities, and therefore its impact.

Relationship between Confucius Institutes/Confucius Classrooms and existing Chinese departments and programmes The relationship between Confucius Institutes and university Chinese departments, at least in some cases, is not entirely clear, as one CI Interviewee explained: Probably I should qualify what I am about to say by noting that it’s my view, rather than necessarily the university’s view, but I think, and I think this is a view probably, at least partly shared by other Confucius Institutes in Australia, that the universities that host them tend not really yet to have worked out precisely what their expectations of the [Confucius] Institutes are. And I say that because I think that while they are all happy to host them, and probably regard it as a badge of honour to have one, they also expect, well, they don’t want competition with their Asian studies students, so they don’t want fishing in the same pond for people who would otherwise do Chinese in the faculties. They also feel that somehow the [Confucius] Institutes should contribute to the academic life of the university, perhaps through research and things, which frankly we’re not able to do, and I don’t think Hanban even wants us to do, at least in [the] early years. If one were much longer established and had a much greater staff and a much more secure foundation, maybe, but it would be [of] secondary importance, I think, to them. (CI Interviewee 3) Such issues came about because ‘I think it’s just that people didn’t talk them through to be honest’ (CI Interviewee 3). A lack of clarity regarding expectations and institutional guidance was also mentioned by CC Interviewee 1 in relation to the process of establishing a Confucius Classroom: So far what I have experienced with the Confucius Classroom project was the preparation of its opening ceremony. I found there is little direct

90

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

support I can receive from my school unless I explicitly ask for help. I am the only Chinese teacher at school [at] this moment and I normally have to figure out what help and support I need as things go. So the whole task has been very time consuming and it is on top of my normal teaching load. This year I have been given a teaching line [reduction in classes] to work on this C[onfucius] C[lassroom], hopefully it will work better in terms of time. But I think we need more teaching staff or assistance when the whole project really starts to work. The relationship between Confucius Institutes and existing Chinese departments was also raised by some of the Chinese language teachers. CLT Interviewee 1, for example, said that while the large amount of activities offered by the Confucius Institute in her university were useful for student learning, it was also potentially overshadowing the university department: I’ve heard some staff [say] that they’ve overheard some conversations from students on the bus and some students say, ‘Oh, I want to learn Chinese’, and another student said, ‘Oh yeah, Confucius Institute teaches Chinese’. So now, because so many staff from the Confucius Institute are helping us teach the language, although we do the main part and they do part of the tutoring, but because their image is so big and they’ve done so many activities, students have this misconception that it is the Confucius Institute, rather than the [name of university department], that is offering Chinese courses. And that’s a bit of a worry in fact. Another aspect of the relationship between Confucius Institutes and Chinese departments was a perceived lack of communication and cooperation between the two. CLT Interviewee 4 explained that while she felt the Confucius Institute at her current university worked well with the Chinese department, she had worked previously in a university where this was not the case. One example of this was the administration of student scholarships for study in China: You know I used to work in [name of university]. I certainly felt some negative effect there because [the] Confucius Institute and [name of university department], these two institutions are not within one kind of management, you know what I mean? [They are] separate institutions. When [their management and operation are] separate, lots of things they have to do it, I mean the kind of cooperation between teachers of Chinese, the academics, and the Confucius Institute, it’s like [the] Confucius Institute becomes the contacting point. Anything from China, the information, the scholarship information and the field trips organised to China, all [goes] through [the] Confucius Institute. That’s the window, when they have any information they go to the Confucius

Evaluating the Confucius Institute Project: Impact at the Society-to-Society Level

91

Institute. When I was working there, the thing is, as a teacher of Chinese, I seldom get information regarding all these opportunities for students. I felt it’s kind of, [the] Confucius Institute organised activities for my students, I don’t know anything about it. And when they select students who go to China, I don’t have a say. What I mean is, I know them, I teach them, I should have, at least, play[ed] a role to recommend them. […] [T]he kind of cooperation [between these two institutions] is not managed ideally, if you know what I mean. Another example was teachers sent from the Confucius Institute’s partner university in China: [T]hey sent a teacher, you know the Confucius Institute always have a partner institution in China, they like to send their teachers overseas to be trained in an English-speaking country [in] the way to teach Chinese. But when that teacher was sent to the [name of university], this person belongs to the Confucius Institute. This teacher is teaching community class in the evening, [but] not allowed to do tutoring in [name of university department] with us, she didn’t learn anything. She loves to come to [name of university department] and teach with us as part of the training, this academic scholar exchange, but the Confucius Institute said this scholar comes to the Confucius Institute, [and] can’t do any teaching work with [name of university department]. So this kind of thing, that would be the drawbacks, would be the disadvantages, because this teacher’s not happy. And she wants to be trained, she wants to be one of us, but because of the arrangement, she doesn’t have the chance to work with us and she’s not happy only doing maybe two hours [of] teaching or four hours [of] teaching in [the] evening to nondegree students. (CLT Interviewee 4) This is a similar situation to that reported by Stambach (2014) who found that teachers working at Confucius Institutes had little knowledge of or involvement with the Chinese language and area studies programmes of the university departments. In a somewhat different situation from the examples discussed so far, Wheeler (2014) describes how some staff members at the University of Nairobi, Kenya, highlighted as a major issue the significant difference in attention and resources given to Chinese language courses over courses in African languages. They cited the fact that the Confucius Institute had ample resources and equipment, while the Department of Languages and Linguistics had only limited and low-quality facilities. The organisational status of Confucius Institutes is also an issue in other contexts. In 2011, for example, all Confucius Institutes in Russia were deemed to be illegal because they did not follow the correct procedures for gaining registration with the Russian Ministry of Education, including

92

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

submitting the curriculum and qualifications of teaching staff. A Confucius Institute in North Africa also reportedly became a commercial enterprise after staff at the Chinese Embassy switched its affiliation from a university to a private language school part-owned by friends of the embassy staff. This Confucius Institute now receives funding from Hanban and student fees from its language courses (K.K. Chan & Hunter, 2012). These are, of course, somewhat extreme cases, but they nevertheless highlight the potential for organisational arrangements to become serious issues.

Quality of teaching staff There has in fact been much discussion of the teachers provided by Hanban and Chinese partner universities. Starr (2009), for example, describes how many of the teachers sent to European countries are illprepared for the realities of teaching in such contexts, especially in terms of managing classroom behaviour. Such issues may be due to the training that teachers receive in China, which tends to focus on the linguistic comparison of Chinese and English; techniques for teaching pronunciation, vocabulary and grammar; and the use of multimedia technologies in the classroom, rather than the characteristics and learning styles of learners and the characteristics of the Chinese language teaching and learning context in various countries (W. Li & H. Zhu, 2014). Indeed, one teacher at the University of Nairobi told Wheeler (2014) that the pre-posting training did not contain any information about Africa, while Stambach (2014) reports that the Chinese language classes she took part in at a Confucius Institute in the USA were taught in a very teacher-fronted manner which students sometimes found intimidating.3 K.K. Chan and Hunter (2012) have suggested additional explanations for issues regarding the quality of such teachers, including that they may lack teaching experience because they are commonly recent graduates or junior staff at Chinese partner universities; they may have other motivations for taking up teaching positions such as career advancement and the desire to experience living overseas; and many may be unwilling to accept postings in developing countries where living and working conditions are poor. The interviewees in this study generally felt that such teachers played an important role in Chinese language teaching; however, some issues still need to be addressed, particularly in relation to expected duties, workloads and employment conditions. One CLT Interviewee explained: [I]f we do need a tutor, our priority is the Confucius Institute because the Chinese government pays for it and you can save School money so we have the pressure of working with staff from the Confucius Institute, which I do not mind, but then that means that we cannot choose our tutors and the Confucius Institute does not always provide

Evaluating the Confucius Institute Project: Impact at the Society-to-Society Level

93

competent, very good tutors. For example, if we are entitled to have a tutor for two hours, if without [the] Confucius Institute we can find the best tutor we can and the university pays for the tutor. And one hour [of teaching] equals three hours [of] work, one hour [of] marking, one hour [of] preparation, and one hour [of] delivering, so you can ask the tutor to do lots of marking based on that contract with the university. But now because the staff from the Confucius Institute are contracted by the Chinese government and they are paid actually a really small wage, but then we’re not allowed to pay them, so then the amount of work they do is definitely less than what a tutor would do. So now if I’m still entitled to two hours, but I’m required to work with staff from the Confucius Institute, so I should end up doing more work because I have to do the marking. I can’t ask them to do a lot of marking that I could ask another tutor to do, and also, I have to do all the preparation as well instead of asking, if it were a different tutor, then I could ask the tutor to do some of the preparation as well but now because we’re not paying them that much and we don’t really have a clear contract with them, it’s all very vague. Basically you get some help but we end up doing more work so that’s a worry. (CLT Interviewee 1) These issues are potentially very serious given the number of teaching staff sent to Confucius Institutes, Confucius Classrooms and schools around the world (see Chapter 2).

Sustainability A final issue is that the Confucius Institute project depends on China’s willingness and capability to support it. If it were to lose these there would be serious consequences for Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms, as one interviewee explained: [T]he Confucius Institute might not be sustainable. If the Chinese economy collapses, or the Chinese leadership changes, they can’t supply the funding that we ask for this kind of activity, it will cease to exist, cease to exist. In a few years, it might not be there. I think that’s quite possible. (CI Interviewee 2) As shown in Chapter 2, the funding China provides for the Confucius Institute project is substantial, especially considering China itself is still developing, and this may have an impact on its future. Indeed, Shambaugh (2013) reports that, in a 2010 interview, Hanban Director General Xu Lin explained that Hanban was under pressure to keep its budget allocation from the Ministry of Finance in the face of arguments that the money would be better spent on resolving China’s many domestic challenges. Such opinions

94

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

also exist among the Chinese general public, with many people criticising the Confucius Institute project on blogs and social media. A common theme in such commentaries is that the Confucius Institute project is ‘bestowing lavish foreign aid on already privileged Western students – even as many back home [in China] continue to lack the basics’ (Ruan, 2014). A particular instance of this was the reaction to the establishment of the online Confucius Institute. The contract to set up and service the website, worth US$5.7 million, was awarded by the Ministry of Finance to a subsidiary company of Hanban, headed by a then senior member of Hanban staff. Many saw this as outright corruption (Hartig, 2016). Another aspect of sustainability is that much of the interest in Chinese language learning is due to China’s political and economic prominence, and if China’s status in the world political system was to change significantly, there would be a decrease in this interest. A similar trend occurred with Japanese language learning in Australia. From the late 1980s to the mid1990s, there was very widespread interest in Japanese prompted by Japan’s economic growth. However, the number of Japanese language learners declined noticeably as Japan’s economy stagnated over the next two decades (de Kretser & Spence-Brown, 2010; Lo Bianco, 2009). At around the same time, there was also a decline in interest in Indonesia due to the effect of events such as the Asian financial crisis and the Bali bombings on perceptions of Indonesia and the desirability of Indonesian as a foreign language (Firdaus, 2013; Slaughter, 2007). Without continued demand for Chinese language learning, the Confucius Institute project will not expand beyond its current dimensions and may even lose ground. Sustainability is potentially the most serious of the practical and organisational issues facing the Confucius Institute project because if language teaching and cultural activities cannot be carried out effectively, it is unlikely that the Confucius Institute project will continue making the contributions discussed above. As one Chinese scholar has said, the worldwide ‘Confucius Institute fever’ (孔子学院热 kǒngzǐ xuéyuàn rè) needs to be carefully considered and much thought given to strategies for ensuring that the Confucius Institute project is sustainable into the future (Y.H. Wu, 2009). CU Interviewee 2 also believed that the Confucius Institute project had developed too fast, with a focus on quantity rather than quality. If the Confucius Institute project was to continue into the future, a shift in focus to quality would be necessary to ensure the Confucius Institute project did not, in her words, ‘just stop’.

Dealing with Practical and Organisational Issues Practical and organisational issues are not of course unique to the Confucius Institute project, and other language and culture promotion organisations have also experienced some of the issues discussed here. For example, in the USA, the National Association for Korean Schools (NAKS)

Evaluating the Confucius Institute Project: Impact at the Society-to-Society Level

95

has complained about the establishment of King Sejong Institutes in areas where there is already ample provision of Korean language education and the potential for students and teachers to opt to study and work, respectively, through the King Sejong Institute instead of the existing schools. According to a statement from the Northern California branch of the NAKS, ‘The King Sejong Institutes should be established based on the region’s needs, not where many Korean schools are already offering similar programs based on their know-how built up over the decades’ (Chung, 2013). In another example of overlapping interests, some UK education providers have complained that the British Council takes on contracts for English language teaching and teacher training work instead of facilitating private companies to do so as is part of its mandate (Elledge, 2012). The Japan Foundation’s JET Programme has also suffered from a range of practical and organisational issues. These include inadequate preparation of schools to host ALTs, the constraints of the entrance examination on ALTs’ classroom teaching practice and additional workloads for teachers charged with working with ALTs (McConnell, 2008). All of the practical and organisational issues discussed in this chapter may well derive from the newness of the Confucius Institute project, and Hanban is certainly giving them ample attention. As one interviewee pointed out, Hanban had been ‘very flexible in adjusting to local realities’ and used the Regional Conferences of Confucius Institutes as ‘important vehicles for reviewing experience, genuinely seeking feed-back [sic] from the participating C[onfucius] I[nstitiutes] and adjusting where possible’ (CI Interviewee 3, email). Such conferences do address important practical and organisational issues. The theme of the 5th Confucius Institute Conference, for example, was the sustainable development of Confucius Institutes, while the 8th Confucius Institute Conference, held in Beijing in December 2013, included sessions called ‘Confucius Institute Planning and University Development – Serve the Colleges’ (孔子学院规划与大学发展 – 为各学院服务 kǒngzǐ xuéyuàn guīhuà yǔ dàxué fāzhǎn – wèi gè xuéyuàn fúwù) and ‘Confucius Institute Planning and University Development – Serve the Community’ (孔子学院规划与大学发展 – 为社区服务 kǒngzǐ xuéyuàn guīhuà yǔ dàxué fāzhǎn – wèi shèqū fúwù) (Hanban, n.d. h; Luo, 2011). Returning to the JET Programme, McConnell (2008) details how the Japanese government revised and adjusted programme policies in response to participants’ concerns so that it now runs much more smoothly than in its early years. The issues with the Confucius Institute project will likewise be resolved, or at least lessened, in time.

Conclusion The Confucius Institute project has had a complex impact at the societyto-society level. On the one hand, it has contributed to Chinese language teaching and learning both through making new opportunities available

96

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

and enhancing existing ones. On the other hand, its influence on attitudes towards and perceptions of China has been somewhat ambiguous, and confined to increasing understandings of China. It has also encountered more resistance than other language and culture promotion initiatives and faces a number of practical and organisational issues. Combined with Chapter 4’s discussion of the impact at the state-to-state level, this indicates that, for the moment at least, the Confucius Institute project has had an uncertain and limited impact on creating the kind of external environment that China desires.

Notes (1)

(2)

(3)

Kunqu is a kind of Chinese opera which was first developed around the city of Suzhou during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). It features singing, dancing and poetic dialogue. Performers wear elaborate costumes and make-up, and are accompanied by an orchestra playing traditional Chinese instruments (Perkins, 1999). The development of the CCP’s policy towards ethnic minorities can be traced as far back as its Second National Congress, held in July 1922. The Second National Congress Declaration acknowledged that the ethnic minorities should be granted autonomy within the Chinese state (Zhou, 2003). During the era of the Chinese Soviet Republic (also known as the Jiangxi Soviet because it was based in China’s Jiangxi province), the CCP went further. Article 14 of the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic, adopted in November 1931, recognised that ethnic minorities had the right to self-determination and could secede from China to establish their own independent states. The CCP later reversed its position on secession due largely to the need to fight against the Japanese invasion in areas of China inhabited by ethnic Mongolians, but still advocated regional autonomy for ethnic minorities. In today’s China, autonomy essentially means that ethnic minorities exercise some degree of political power within the country’s ethnic minority areas. They are able to have members of the relevant ethnic minority in government positions, have the right to maintain and use their own languages and cultural traditions; and are entitled to various concessions and exemptions in areas such as education and family planning (B.G. He, 2005; Mackerras, 1995; Zhou, 2003). For a brief overview and critique of such policies, see Y. Sun (2014). According to Hanban (n.d. d), volunteers in the Volunteer Chinese Language Teacher Programme receive 300–600 class hours of training, covering areas such as Chinese language teaching skills and classroom management; teaching observation and practice; the use of teaching materials and internet resources; the nature of teaching overseas; contemporary China’s situation; Chinese cultural talents; orientation to the host country; the language of the host country; and intercultural communication. The examples in this section suggest that this training does not always cover all of these areas in practice and/or does not provide adequate preparation for teaching overseas.

6 Conclusions and Implications Introduction The rise of China has been called ‘the single most important development in the post-Cold War world’ (R. Li, 1999: 443). This book has viewed this undoubtedly significant development from the perspective of cultural globalisations, specifically China’s promotion of Chinese language learning through the Confucius Institute project. This concluding chapter firstly summarises the major findings of the book by returning to the framework for analysing the Confucius Institute project presented in Chapter 1. The second task of this chapter is to highlight some important implications of my study for those involved with and/or interested in the Confucius Institute project. Specifically, I draw out and discuss implications for China, schools and universities, governments and researchers.

The Confucius Institute Project: A Diffused Global Project The adapted version of Held et al.’s (1999) framework used in this book presents four distinct types of global project: thick global projects (those with high extensity, intensity, velocity and impact); diffused global projects (those with high extensity, intensity and velocity, but low impact); expansive global projects (those with high extensity and high impact but low intensity and low velocity); and thin global projects (those with high extensity and low intensity, velocity and impact). The concepts of extensity, intensity and velocity were used to map the dimensions of the Confucius Institute project. The findings of this book show that it displays high extensity as it covers much of the world; high intensity as the number of Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms and the volume of their activities is substantial; and high velocity as all of this has occurred in just over a decade. The concept of impact was used to evaluate the contribution of the Confucius Institute project to creating China’s desired external environment at both the state-to-state and the society-to-society levels. The findings of this book show that at the state-to-state level, the Confucius Institute project does not currently appear to be influencing the policies and actions of other countries, nor leading governments to unhesitatingly comply with China’s goals. At the society-to-society level, the Confucius Institute project has made a valuable contribution to Chinese language teaching

97

98

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

and learning through the provision of teaching materials and resources; teaching staff; language classes for the general public; support and professional development for teachers and language courses in schools; and assistance for existing language courses in universities. Such activities have also helped facilitate understandings of China, particularly in a cultural sense. Importantly, however, this has not necessarily resulted in more positive dispositions towards China. Another significant finding in regard to impact is that there are a number of factors which place limits on the effectiveness of the Confucius Institute project. These are the widespread concerns regarding the nature of Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms and the practical and organisational issues of the relationship between Confucius Institutes/Confucius Classrooms and existing Chinese departments and programmes; the quality of teaching staff supplied by Hanban and Chinese partner universities; and sustainability. Taken together, these findings mean the Confucius Institute project fits the definition of a diffused global project. This is similar to Shambaugh’s (2013) argument that China has achieved a global presence but not global influence. In other words, China has a considerable profile, or visibility, across much of the world but has relatively little influence over what other actors actually do.

Implications The Confucius Institute project is still a work in progress and this presents an opportunity for all those involved with and/or interested in it to work to improve its outcomes. It is with this in mind that this chapter now turns to the implications of this study for China, schools and universities, governments and researchers.

Implications for China China has a legitimate right to promote its language and culture, just like any other country in the world. Such promotion also fulfils a demand for Chinese language teaching and learning, and has obvious benefits in this area, as discussed in detail in Chapter 5. However, the benefits China accrues from this are likely to remain limited under the current model. This should be cause for concern for China, given the amount of money, resources and effort it has expended on the Confucius Institute project. Cull (2008) emphasises that states must consider feedback on their cultural diplomacy activities and use this to revise their policies. There is certainly evidence that China does seek and respond to feedback from Confucius Institute staff through channels such as the Confucius Institute Conferences, and uses such feedback to address at least some of the practical and organisational issues discussed in Chapter 5. However, wider concerns from those outside the Confucius Institute project have remained

Conclusions and Implications

99

largely unaddressed. Most prominent among these at both the state-tostate and society-to-society levels are reactions to the connection between the Confucius Institute project and the Chinese government. As cultural diplomacy generally suffers when it is seen as too closely connected to the government (Cull, 2008), China needs to revise its promotion of Chinese language learning in light of this issue. As far-reaching political reforms seem unlikely in the short to medium term, there will not be drastic changes to what China is. However, there are still changes which China could implement to alleviate the problems of the reactions to the connection of the Confucius Institute project to the government.1 Some Chinese scholars have suggested that the Chinese government should provide funding for the promotion of Chinese language and culture but not have any direct role or involvement in such activities (see, for example,L.X. Jin, 2006). CS Interviewee 1 also echoed these suggestions in his comparison with the German Goethe Institute. He further recommended that educational institutions work collaboratively to develop projects related to Chinese language teaching and learning and apply to China for funding. Such a model, according to this interviewee, would help alleviate concerns of Chinese government involvement and make the promotion of Chinese language learning more acceptable to people abroad. These suggestions do indeed have a lot in common with the way that Germany promotes it language and culture. According to Ammon (1992), the actual design and conduct of German language teaching and the provision of assistance for German language teaching are handled by private organisations, with the government only providing funding and a fairly low-level of coordination in the form of regular meetings and consultations through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ division of Foreign Cultural Policy. All language and culture promoting organisations do nevertheless have contracts with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which gives the Ministry some say in issues such as the establishment, continuation and staffing of language and culture promoting institutes overseas (Ager, 2001; Ammon, 1992). For this reason, the organisations responsible for Germany’s language and culture promotion are called ‘mediating organisations’ because they function as a bridge between the government’s language and culture promotion policies and the audiences at which such policies are aimed (Ammon, 1992: 40). While this is not completely dissimilar to the way that China promotes its language and culture, China would be better served by moving closer to a ‘mediating organisations’ model. An obvious way to do this would be to establish a fund or endowment for Chinese language learning and teaching initiatives which would be open for applications from schools, universities, community groups and individuals worldwide, and be administered by Hanban.2 This would allow for a very broad range of activities relating to Chinese language learning and teaching, and create a less obvious, and therefore less concerning, government connection to such

100

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

activities. For example, staff at a university may submit an application for funding to establish an online Chinese language course. If the application was successful, Hanban would provide the funding but the design, implementation and conduct of the online course would be completely done by the university staff. A school which lacks the resources to employ a Chinese language teacher could also apply for funding to do so, but the selection process would be entirely handled by the school. This would not mean an end to the Confucius Institute project – the establishment of Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms would remain one of the initiatives for which funding is provided – but would imply a broader focus to China’s promotional activities. In addition, Hanban positions could be given to academics, teachers, business people and private citizens rather than solely government and party personnel. This too would help address perceptions of undue government involvement without significantly changing the mission or work of Hanban. There is some support for ideas along these lines within China, which increases their chances of working. CPPCC member Jin Li, for example, has argued that ‘[t]o further spread Chinese culture, it is of great importance for government and private institutions to work together’ because ‘[i]f the government is the only agent promoting Chinese culture overseas, Western people will dislike it because they will regard it as propaganda. It is also impossible for private institutions to act as the only ambassadors promoting culture in other nations, since they usually lack resources such as capital’ (cited in People’s Daily, 2013). More broadly, another issue worth reflecting on is China’s emphasis on traditional culture in its cultural diplomacy. As discussed in Chapter 2, this is a unique aspect of China’s view of soft power. China certainly has a rich traditional culture to draw on, and much of it is already popular worldwide. It therefore makes sense for this to be China’s focus and many of the cultural activities conducted through the Confucius Institute project are indeed about traditional culture. However, it is also somewhat unusual, as much of other states’ cultural diplomacy today focuses on popular culture, including several other East Asian states. Some states are also attempting to focus their cultural diplomacy on projecting an image of themselves as economically and technologically advanced (see, for example, Mark’s 2010 discussion of New Zealand and Canada). Liang (2012: 684–685) sees the focus on traditional culture as a particular weaknesses of China’s approach, saying ‘the fact that China has to rely on Confucian social and political values as the standard-bearer of its soft-power projection is an admission that it lacks an attractive contemporary culture’. This is an interesting point as there is in fact a significant amount of popular culture products, including news, publications, television programmes, movies and internet content, available in Chinese internationally (Goh & Lim, 2010; Y.C. Wu, 2010). Many of these are,

Conclusions and Implications

101

however, used predominantly by overseas Chinese communities, and their use beyond this is questionable (X.G. Deng & L.N. Zhang, 2009). As Lampton (2008) has argued, popular culture products created elsewhere are still far more influential than China’s, especially as English remains the main language of the world’s books, newspapers, movies, television programmes and popular music. Y. Deng (2009: 71) makes a particularly telling comment about Chinese popular culture when he says that despite the world’s growing interest in China, ‘one can hardly speak of a distinct Chinese brand of popular culture that rivals that of the United States’. This should not be taken to mean that traditional culture has no place in cultural diplomacy or that cultural diplomacy based primarily on popular culture would automatically be more successful. Nevertheless, an excessive focus on traditional culture is insufficient, and an appropriate balance between traditional and popular culture is likely to yield better results.

Implications for schools and universities Schools and universities who make use of the Confucius Institute project also have an important role to play. Schools and universities should carefully consider what they want their Confucius Institute or Confucius Classroom to do. This will entail, in line with CI Interviewee 4’s and CU Interviewee 1’s comments, considering the current state of Chinese language teaching and learning in their context and devising a way to complement this. The specialisation of Confucius Institutes is a promising trend in this direction and could also help increase their sustainability. Some examples of specialisation in Confucius Institutes include a tourism Confucius Institute at Griffith University (Gold Coast, Australia), a Chinese medicine Confucius Institute at RMIT University (Melbourne, Australia), an economics and business administration Confucius Institute at the Athens University of Economics and Business (Athens, Greece), a Chinese dance, performance and arts Confucius Institute at Goldsmiths University of London (London, England) and a Chinese opera Confucius Institute at Binghamton University, State University of New York (Binghamton, USA). Other Confucius Institutes have focused on providing Chinese language training for government personnel and public servants, such as Chiang Mai University (Chiang Mai, Thailand), which offers three-month training courses to public servants, and Al Azhar Indonesia University (Jakarta, Indonesia), which offers two-month training courses to officials in the Ministry of Trade (Luo & X. Guo, 2012). These specialisations derive from the existing areas of expertise and the strength of the host universities and/or the Chinese partner universities, and as such contribute to fitting in with existing Chinese language offerings. Relatedly, Confucius Institutes should pursue collaborations with other language and culture promotion organisations. Collaboration already occurs between several

102

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

of the European language and culture promotion organisations such as the Alliance Franҫaise, Dante Alighieri Society and Goethe Institute (R. Adamson, 2007). This would make the Confucius Institute project more sustainable by sharing resources and may also help to reduce negative reactions due to the willingness of a long-established and well-regarded organisation to work with a Confucius Institute. It will be equally important for schools and universities to establish clear guidelines for how their Confucius Institute or Confucius Classroom will relate to and interact with any existing Chinese department and staff to avoid the kinds of issues described by CLT Interviewees 1 and 4 and CI Interviewee 3. This will mean demarcating the responsibilities and duties of each and ensuring clear lines of communication between them. Some of the issues which will need to be discussed include the nature of the Chinese language courses offered and their target audiences; the administration of scholarships; and the location and duties of teaching staff supplied by Hanban and the Chinese partner university. Once such arrangements are in place, they will need to be clearly communicated to staff and students.

Implications for governments One line of thinking within debates on how governments should respond to China’s rise is that they should accommodate China’s interests in areas where they match their own interests while simultaneously acting to ensure that China does not dominate in undesirable ways (B.G. He, 2012; McDougall, 2012, 2014). How could this kind of ‘selective accommodation policy and strategy’, as B.G. He (2012: 53) terms it, be applied to the Confucius Institute project? Firstly, governments should recognise China’s desire to promote its language and culture and have both respected and appreciated around the world. Recognition should also be given to the fact that, as China’s power grows, the Chinese language will grow in its use and status around the world, possibly eventually reaching a similar situation to English.3 This recognition does seem to be occurring to various extents, with many governments around the world implementing policies to equip their citizens with proficiency in Chinese. These include the South Korean government’s recommendation that all two- and four-year universities offer Chinese majors (Y.X. Zhang, 2005); the Thai government’s announcement that all public schools should teach Chinese (Kurlantzick, 2007); the American government’s inclusion of Chinese (along with Arabic, Hindi, Japanese, Korean, Persian, Russian and Turkish) in the National Flagship Language Initiative (NFLI) and the College Board’s introduction of the AP Chinese Language and Culture program (Goh & Lim, 2010; Zhou, 2011); and the Australian government’s prioritisation of Chinese (along with Japanese, Indonesian, Korean and more recently Hindi) in the National Asian

Conclusions and Implications

103

Languages and Studies in Australian Schools (NALSAS) plan and the National Asian Languages and Studies in Schools Program (NALSSP) (Lo Bianco, 2012; Slaughter, 2011).4 These policies have not always achieved their aims, however, and while there are many factors involved, their sometimes limited success is in no small part due to a lack of sufficient and consistent funding and provision of resources (see, for example, S.C. Wang, 2007 for a discussion of the USA and G.Q. Liu & Lo Bianco, 2007 for a discussion of Australia). The Confucius Institute project offers a readily available source of support for Chinese language teaching and learning, and as provision of Chinese language education is in the interests of governments and their citizens, governments should make use of the Confucius Institute project in their language planning and policy. The usefulness of the Confucius Institute project could be enhanced by using it in conjunction with the recommendations made above for schools and universities. Accommodation does not mean that there will be no disagreements or differences with China (Y. Deng & F.L. Wang, 1999). While there is no evidence that the most serious concerns about the Confucius Institute project are well founded, it has attracted controversy and caused concern among governments and other actors in many countries, as shown in Chapters 4 and 5. This will influence the extent to which language planning and policy can draw on the Confucius Institute project because governments not only act based on their own concerns and perceptions but also need to take into account those of their citizens. As McDougall (2012) says, governments need to respond to China’s rise in a way that their citizens find acceptable. Governments should raise any concerns with China and advocate for changes to the Confucius Institute project which would make it more acceptable to them and their citizens. A useful starting point would be the suggestions I outlined in the previous section. Christensen (1999: 247) argues that ‘[t]he most important normative pressure that can be applied to China is defining for Beijing what it would take for China to be considered by the other great powers as a respected member of the great power club’. The approach described here of recognising China’s desire for greater respect of its language and culture while at the same time specifying reasonable adjustments to how it goes about promoting them reflects this idea, and will result in an arrangement for using the Confucius Institute project which is suitable for both governments and citizens.

Implications for researchers Further research is needed on various aspects of the Confucius Institute project. Firstly, more work is needed to demonstrate how the Confucius Institute project is manifested in specific contexts. Examples of this type of research would include studies of the operation of Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms in particular cities, schools or communities;

104

Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning

studies of learners’ experiences of learning Chinese through provisions afforded by the Confucius Institute project and their attitudes towards and perceptions of China; and studies of community attitudes towards and perceptions of the Confucius Institute project. Including a broader range of participants in these studies, such as university administrators and government officials (in both China and Confucius Institute/Confucius Classroom host countries) and parents of Chinese language learners, would give a more comprehensive picture of the Confucius Institute project and its impacts. Where possible, these studies should also adopt a longitudinal approach in order to track and analyse any changes in the operation of Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms, as well as in the views of those involved with them. Such studies should be conducted across a range of countries so as to allow for comparisons and contrasts. Secondly, and at a broader level, there is further need for comparisons of the Confucius Institute project and other language and culture promotion organisations. This could be done through applying the analytical framework used in this book to map and evaluate the Confucius Institute project to other cases and adding further detail where necessary. For example, while Chapter 3 made brief comparisons of extensity, intensity and velocity, specific examples of the operation of other language and culture promotion organisations would provide a fuller picture. Similarly, Chapters 4 and 5 drew on examples from other language and culture promotion organisations but comparisons of impact were beyond the scope of this book. It would be valuable to know whether, for example, the Alliance Franҫaise, Dante Alighieri Society, British Council, Goethe Institute or Cervantes Institute have had a greater or lesser impact than the Confucius Institute project and the reasons for this. The findings of such research will also provide useful ideas for enhancing the outcomes of the promotion of language and culture. Researchers also need to use their findings to benefit those involved with and/or with an interest in the Confucius Institute project. This essentially means making the findings of their investigations available and understandable to audiences such as teachers, students, parents, school and university administrators and policymakers. This can be achieved by writing for non-specialist publications in addition to academic ones, as suggested by Bygate (2004). In relation to the Confucius Institute project, some obvious outlets include newspapers, teachers’ journals and newsletters, and online discussion forums aimed at teachers, language learners and policymakers. As well as writing for such outlets, researchers can also be available to provide comment to and appear in the media. This could include interviews on television and radio programmes about language and/or China related topics. Participation in public meetings and consultation processes are similarly useful avenues. Researchers could, for example, explain their research to the parents and citizens committee meeting of a school considering setting up a Confucius Classroom, or make submissions to government inquiries into curriculum development

Conclusions and Implications

105

or relations with China. There are now useful sources of advice and suggestions which researchers should consult, such as K.A. King (2015) and Rickford (2015) on managing media appearances and communicating with general audiences, and Freeman Field (2015) on engaging with schools and communities. The important point is that researchers act in ways which result in research flowing back to those who need it in a form that is comprehensible and useful to them. In this way, researchers can also identify what aspects of the Confucius Institute project work well and what aspects do not work well, and on this basis recommend courses of action which they feel will enhance the benefits for all stakeholders.

Final Remarks The Confucius Institute project has generated considerable interest and debate in many areas of the world in just over a decade of existence, and will likely continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Despite this attention, there is still a relatively small – although rapidly growing – body of academic work on the Confucius Institute project, making it a significant yet understudied phenomenon. As such, it offers rich and varied research prospects which will contribute to furthering our understanding of China’s rise and its impact on the world.

Notes (1)

(2)

(3) (4)

While the merits of the various arguments around political reform are beyond the scope of this book, it is worth noting that political reform in and of itself would not necessarily improve the outcomes for China. Kupchan (2012) argues that factors such as a country’s geographic location, strategic interests, socio-economic situation, position in the world political system and religious orientation all play a greater role in determining its policies and actions than its political system. In particular, a democratic government in China would likely need to be more responsive to nationalistic sentiments, especially in regards to Tibet, territorial disputes and relations with Taiwan, Japan and the USA (F.L. Wang, 1999). As F.L. Wang (1999: 35) says, a democratic government, ‘free from the debilitating concerns for its own survival but likely driven by popular emotions, could make the rising Chinese power a much more assertive, impatient, belligerent, even aggressive force, at least during the unstable period of fast ascendance to the ranks of a world-class power’. Shambaugh (2013: 247) considers it ‘curious that China has yet to discover the potential of making large endowments to universities and think tanks abroad’ and believes ‘it probably will not be long before Beijing does so’. His prediction is not specifically or solely related to Chinese language teaching and learning, but certainly fits with what I suggest here, and is another option for China to consider. For a discussion of the global use and status of Chinese and a comparison with the global use and status of English, see Gil (2011, 2014). Korean was removed as a priority language in the NALSSP and replaced by Hindi. It was later reinstated following a campaign from community groups and scholarly and professional associations.

References Abram, S. (2003) Anthropologies in policies, anthropologies in places: Reflections on fieldwork ‘in’ documents and policies. In T.H. Eriksen (ed.) Globalisation: Studies in Anthropology (pp. 138–157). London: Pluto Press. Adamson, R. (2007) The Defence of French: A Language in Crisis? Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. Ager, D. (2001) Motivation in Language Planning and Language Policy. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. Ager, D. (2005) Prestige and image planning. In E. Hinkel (ed.) Handbook of Research in Second Language Teaching and Learning (pp. 1035–1054). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Ajsic, A. and McGroarty, M. (2015) Mapping language ideologies. In F.M. Hult and D.C. Johnson (eds) Research Methods in Language Policy and Planning: A Practical Guide (pp. 181–192). Chichester: Wiley Blackwell. Alliance Française (n.d.) Alliances françaises dans le monde [Alliance Françaises in the world]. See www.fondation-alliancefr.org/?cat=1 (accessed 9 August 2016). Alphonso, C. and Howlett, K. (2014) Toronto school board seeks to end China deal. The Globe and Mail, 17 July. See www.theglobeandmail.com/news/toronto/ toronto-school-board-seeks-end-to-china-deal/article19651681/ (accessed 14 September 2016). Al-Rodhan, K.R. (2007) A critique of the China threat theory: A systematic analysis. Asian Perspective 31 (3), 41–66. American Association of University Professors. (2014) On partnerships with foreign governments: The case of Confucius Institutes. See www.aaup.org/file/Confucius_ Institutes_0.pdf (accessed 15 January 2015). Ammon, U. (1992) The Federal Republic of Germany’s policy of spreading German. International Journal of the Sociology of Language 95, 33–50. Aysha, E.E. (2005) September 11 and the Middle East failure of US ‘soft power’: Globalisation contra Americanisation in the ‘new’ US century. International Relations 19 (2), 193–210. Baldauf, R.B. (2010) Methodologies for policy and planning. In R.B. Kaplan (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Applied Linguistics (2nd edn; pp. 437–451). New York: Oxford University Press. Baldauf, R.B. and Kaplan, R.B. (eds) (2004) Language Planning and Policy in Africa, Volume 1: Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique and South Africa. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. Barr, M. (2011) Who’s Afraid of China? The Challenge of Chinese Soft Power. London: Zed Books. BBC World Service Poll (2005) 22-nation poll shows China viewed positively by most countries including its Asian Neighbors. See www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/China/ China_Mar05/China_Mar05_rpt.pdf (accessed 23 September 2016). BBC World Service Poll (2006) Global poll: Iran seen as playing negative role. See www. globescan.com/news_archives/bbc06-3/index.html (accessed 23 September 2016). BBC World Service Poll (2007) Israel and Iran share most negative ratings in global poll. See http://worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/mar07/BBC_ViewsCountries_Mar07_ pr.pdf (accessed 23 September 2016). BBC World Service Poll (2008) Global views of USA improve. See www.worldpublicopinion. org/pipa/pdf/apr08/BBCEvals_Apr08_rpt.pdf (accessed 23 September 2016).

106

References

107

BBC World Service Poll (2009) Views of China and Russia decline in global poll. See http://worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/feb09/BBCEvals_Feb09_rpt.pdf (accessed 23 September 2016). BBC World Service Poll (2010) Global views of United States improve while other countries decline. See www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pipa/pdf/apr10/BBCViews_Apr10_ rpt.pdf (accessed 23 September 2016). BBC World Service Poll (2011) Positive views of Brazil on the rise in 2011 BBC country rating poll. See www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/mar11/BBCEvals_Mar11_ rpt.pdf (accessed 23 September 2016). BBC World Service Poll (2012) Views of Europe slide sharply in global poll, while views of China improve. See www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/may12/BBCEvals_ May12_rpt.pdf (19 December 2013). BBC World Service Poll (2013) Views of China and India slide while UK’s ratings climb: Global poll. See http://globescan.com/images/images/pressreleases/bbc2013_ country_ratings/2013_country_rating_poll_bbc_globescan.pdf (accessed 23 September 2016). BBC World Service Poll (2014) Negative views of Russia on the rise: Global poll. See http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/country-rating-poll.pdf (accessed 23 September 2016). Beijing Language and Culture University (2014) HSK test centre. See http://english.blcu. edu.cn/art/2012/5/16/art_249_3286.html (accessed 13 January 2015). Belkin, D. (2014) Penn State latest school to drop China’s Confucius Institute. Wall Street Journal, 1 October 2014. See www.wsj.com/articles/penn-state-latest-school-todrop-chinas-confucius-institute-1412196655 (accessed 15 January 2015). Bell, D.A. (2008) China’s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Bernstein, R. and Munro, R.H. (1997) The Coming Conflict with China. New York: Alfred A. Knoff. Bisley, N. (2013) ‘An ally for all the years to come’: Why Australia is not a conflicted US ally. Australian Journal of International Affairs 67 (4), 403–418. Blanchard, J.M.F. and Guo, S.J. (2008) Introduction: ‘Harmonious World’ and China’s new foreign policy. In J.M.F. Blanchard and S.J. Guo (eds) ‘Harmonious World’ and China’s New Foreign Policy (pp. 1–19). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Blanchard, J.M.F. and Lu, F.J. (2012) Thinking hard about soft power: A review and critique of the literature on China and soft power. Asian Perspective 36 (4), 565–589. Brady, A.M. (2008) Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. British Council (2015) Annual Report 2014–2015. See www.britishcouncil.org/sites/ default/files/annual-report-2014-2015.pdf (accessed 15 January 2016). British Council (2016) Our organisation. See www.britishcouncil.org/organisation (accessed 9 August 2016). Broomfield, E.V. (2003) Perceptions of danger: The China threat theory. Journal of Contemporary China 12 (35), 265–284. Bruen, J. (2013) Towards a national policy for languages in education: The case of Ireland. European Journal of Language Policy 5 (1), 99–114. Buzan, B. (2004) The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge: Polity Press. Buzan, B. (2010) China in international society: Is ‘peaceful rise’ possible? The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3 (1), 5–36. Buzan, B. (2011) A world order without superpowers: Decentred globalism. International Relations 25 (1), 3–25. Buzan, B. and Cox, M. (2013) China and the US: Comparable cases of ‘peaceful rise’? The Chinese Journal of International Politics 6 (2), 109–132.

108

References

Buzan, B. and Little, R. (2000) International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations. New York: Oxford University Press. Bygate, M. (2004) Some current trends in applied linguistics: Towards a generic view. AILA Review 17 (1), 6–22. Callahan, W.A. (2010) China: The Pessoptimist Nation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chan, C.S.C. (2004) The Falun Gong in China: A sociological perspective. The China Quarterly 179, 665–683. Chan, K.K. and Hunter, A. (2012) Religion, culture, and Confucius Institutes in China’s foreign policy. In E. Kavalski (ed.) The Ashgate Research Companion to Chinese Foreign Policy (pp. 135–149). Farnham: Ashgate. Chen, P. (1999) Modern Chinese: History and Sociolinguistics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chen, Y.D. (2006) 论文化软权力的边界 [On the scope of cultural soft power]. 现代国际关系 [Contemporary International Relations] 1, 57–63. Chen, Z.M. (2005) Nationalism, internationalism and Chinese foreign policy. Journal of Contemporary China 14 (42), 35–53. Cheng, J.Y.S. (2001) China’s foreign policy in the beginning of the twenty-first century. In X.B. Hu and G. Lin (eds) Transition Towards Post-Deng China (pp. 271–302). Singapore: Singapore University Press. Cheng, X.H. (2009) Education: The intellectual base of China’s soft power. In M.J. Li (ed.) Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics (pp. 103–123). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Chey, J. (2008) Chinese ‘soft power’, cultural diplomacy and the Confucius Institutes. The Sydney Papers 20 (1), 33–46. China Daily (2003) Chinese-language contest links China to the world. See www. chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-12/12/content_289906.htm (accessed 4 July 2008). China Daily (2010) Confucius Institutes enhance China’s international image. See www. chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2010-04/23/content_9764910.htm (accessed 19 August 2016). China Daily (2014a) Spreading the right word to the world. See http://usa.chinadaily. com.cn/epaper/2014-10/27/content_18809400.htm (23 January 2015). China Daily (2014b) Celebrating 10 years of Confucius Institute [sic]. See http:// usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2014-12/30/content_19202558.htm (23 January 2015). China Daily (2015) Xi hails role of Confucius Institutes. See www.chinadaily.com.cn/ world/2015xivisituk/2015-10/23/content_22259972.htm (accessed 12 August 2016). China.org (2005) Getting ready for the Games. See www.china.org.cn/english/ olympic/148584.htm (accessed 28 January 2015). Chinese Tools (2005) The official mascots. See www.chinese-tools.com/beijing2008/ fuwa.html (accessed 28 January 2015). Chiozza, G. (2007) Disaggregating anti-Americanism: An analysis of individual attitudes towards the United States. In P.J. Katzenstein and R.O. Keohane (eds) Anti-Americanisms in World Politics (pp. 93–126). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Cho, Y.N. and Jeong, J.H. (2008) China’s soft power: Discussions, resources, and prospects. Asian Survey 48 (3), 453–472. Christensen, T.J. (1999) Pride, pressure, and politics: The roots of China’s worldview. In Y. Deng and F.L. Wang (eds) In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World (pp. 239–256). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Chu, Y.H. (2011) Taiwan’s soft power and the future of cross-strait relations: Can the tail wag the dog? In S.J. Lee and J. Melissen (eds) Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia (pp. 117–137). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Chung, A.Y. (2013) Sejong Institutes in turf war in US. The Korea Times, 24 July. See www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/culture/2013/07/316_139866.html (accessed 31 August 2016).

References

109

Copper, J.F. (2013) Is war likely between the great powers? Yes. In P.M. Haas and J.A. Hird (eds) Controversies in Globalization: Contending Approaches to International Relations (2nd edn; pp. 249–268). Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press. Courmont, B. (2013) What implications for Chinese soft power: Charm offensive or new hegemony? Pacific Focus 28 (3), 343–364. Cull, N.J. (2008) Public diplomacy: Taxonomies and histories. The Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science 616 (1), 31–54. de Kretser, A. and Spence-Brown, R. (2010) The Current State of Japanese Language Education in Australian Schools. Melbourne: Education Services Australia. Del Valle, J. and Villa, L. (2006) Spanish in Brazil: Language policy, business, and cultural propaganda. Language Policy 5 (4), 369–392. Deng, X.G. and Zhang, L.N. (2009) China’s cultural exports and its growing cultural power in the world. In M.J. Li (ed.) Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics (pp. 143–162). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Deng, Y. (2008) China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Deng, Y. (2009) The new hard realities: ‘Soft power’ and China in transition. In M.J. Li (ed.) Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics (pp. 63–81). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Deng, Y. and Wang, F.L. (1999) Introduction: Toward an understanding of China’s worldview. In Y. Deng and F.L. Wang (eds) In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World (pp. 1–19). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Ding, S. and Saunders, R.A. (2006) Talking up China: An analysis of China’s rising cultural power and global promotion of the Chinese language. East Asia 23 (2), 3–33. d’Hooghe, I. (2007) Public diplomacy in the People’s Republic of China. In J. Melissen (ed.) The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations (pp. 88–105). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. d’Hooghe, I. (2011) The limits of China’s soft power in Europe: Beijing’s public diplomacy puzzle. In S.J. Lee and J. Melissen (eds) Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia (pp. 163–190). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Dreyer, J.T. (2000) China’s Political System: Modernization and Tradition (3rd edn). Basingstoke: Macmillan. Duff, P.A. and Li, D. (2004) Issues in Mandarin language instruction: Theory, research and practice. System 32 (3), 443–456. Eimer, D. (2008) Beijing Olympic Fuwa mascots ‘have cursed’ China in unlucky 2008. Telegraph, 21 June. See www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/2168554/ Beijing- Olympic-Fuwa-mascots-have-cursed- China-in-unlucky-2008.html (accessed 28 January 2015). Elledge, J. (2012) The British Council: Friend or foe? Guardian, 9 October. See www. theguardian.com/education/2012/oct/08/british-council-education-training (accessed 21 September 2016). Ellis, R. (1994) The Study of Second Language Acquisition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Eriksen, T.H. (2003) Introduction. In T.H. Eriksen (ed.) Globalisation: Studies in Anthropology (pp. 1–17). London: Pluto Press. Farrell, T.S.C. and Kun, S.T.K. (2007) Language policy, language teachers’ beliefs, and classroom practices. Applied Linguistics 29 (3), 381–403. Feng, A. (2009) English in China: Convergence and divergence in policy and practice. AILA Review 22, 85–102. Field, M.C. and Kroskrity, P.V. (2009) Introduction: Revealing Native American language ideologies. In P.V. Kroskrity and M.C. Field (eds) Native American Language Ideologies: Beliefs, Practices, and Struggles in Indian Country (pp. 4–28). Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press.

110

References

Firdaus (2013) Indonesian language education in Australia: Politics, policies and responses. Asian Studies Review 37 (1), 24–41. Foot, R. (2006) Chinese strategies in a US-hegemonic global order: Accommodating and hedging. International Affairs 82 (1), 77–94. Fowler, G.A. (2008) Here’s another Olympic sport: Skewering the mascots. The Wall Street Journal, 23 July. See www.wsj.com/articles/SB121677560339275779 (accessed 28 January 2015). Freeman Field, R. (2015) Interacting with schools and communities. In F.M. Hult and D.C. Johnson (eds) Research Methods in Language Policy and Planning: A Practical Guide (pp. 235–239). Chichester: Wiley Blackwell. Fukushima, A. (2011) Modern Japan and the quest for attractive power. In S.J. Lee and J. Melissen (eds) Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia (pp. 65–89). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Gao, M.B.C.F. (2000) Mandarin Chinese: An Introduction. Melbourne: Oxford University Press. García, O. (2010) Language spread and its study in the twenty-first century. In R.B. Kaplan (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Applied Linguistics (2nd edn; pp. 398–411). New York: Oxford University Press. Garrison, J.A. (2005) China’s prudent cultivation of ‘soft’ power and implications for U.S. policy in East Asia. Asian Affairs 32 (1), 25–30. Gertz, B. (2002) The China Threat: How the People’s Republic Targets America. Washington, DC: Regnery. Gil, J. (2011) A comparison of the global status of English and Chinese: Towards a new global language? English Today 27 (1), 52–59. Gil, J. (2014) An exploratory study of why language learners opt for Chinese and its competitiveness as a world language. Journal of the Chinese Language Teachers Association 49 (1), 51–93. Gil, J. and Adamson, B. (2011) The English language in mainland China: A sociolinguistic profile. In A. Feng (ed.) English Language Education across Greater China (pp. 23–45). Bristol: Multilingual Matters. Gill, B. and Huang, Y.Z. (2006) Sources and limits of Chinese ‘soft power’. Survival 48 (2), 17–36. Glaser, B.S. and Murphy, M.E. (2009) Soft power with Chinese characteristics: The ongoing debate. In C. McGiffert (ed.) Chinese Soft Power and its Implications for the United States: Competition and Cooperation in the Developing World (pp. 10–26). Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies. Glaser, C. (2011) Will China’s rise lead to war? Why realism does not mean pessimism. Foreign Affairs 90 (2), 80–91. Goethe Institut (2016) Locations. See www.goethe.de/en/wwt.html (accessed 9 August 2016). Goh, Y.S. and Lim, S.L. (2010) Global Mandarin. In V. Vaish (ed.) Globalization of Language and Culture in Asia: The Impact of Globalization Processes on Language (pp. 14–33). London: Continuum. Goldstein, A. (2003) An emerging China’s emerging grand strategy: A neo-Bismarckian turn? In G.J. Ikenberry and M. Mastanduno (eds) International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific (pp. 57–106). New York: Columbia University Press. Goldstein, J.S. (2013) Is war likely between the great powers? No. In P.M. Haas and J.A. Hird (eds) Controversies in Globalization: Contending Approaches to International Relations (2nd edn; pp. 268–277). Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press. Gong, G.W. (1984) China’s entry into international society. In H. Bull and A. Watson (eds) The Expansion of International Society (pp. 171–183). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Gregory, J.S. (2003) The West and China Since 1500. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

References

111

Griffiths, M. and O’Callaghan, T. (2002) International Relations: The Key Concepts. London: Routledge. Guo, S.J. (2013) Chinese Politics and Government: Power, Ideology, and Organization. New York: Routledge. Hall, I. (2012) India’s new public diplomacy: Soft power and the limits of government action. Asian Survey 52 (6), 1089–1110. Hall, I. and Smith, F. (2013) The struggle for soft power in Asia: Public diplomacy and regional competition. Asian Security 9 (1), 1–18. Hanban (2006) The Office of Chinese Language Council International Annual Report 2006. See www.hanban.org/report/pdf/2006_final.pdf (accessed 27 March 2014). Hanban (2007) Confucius Institute Headquarters and the Office of Chinese Language Council International (Hanban) 2007 Annual Report. See www.hanban.org/report/pdf/2007_ final.pdf (accessed 27 March 2014). Hanban (2008) Hanban (Confucius Institute Headquarters) 2008 Annual Report. See www. hanban.org/report/pdf/2008_final.pdf (accessed 27 March 2014). Hanban (2009) Hanban (Confucius Institute Headquarters) 2009 Annual Report. See www. hanban.org/report/pdf/2009_final.pdf (accessed 27 March 2014). Hanban (2010) Hanban (Confucius Institute Headquarters) 2010 Annual Report. See www. hanban.org/report/pdf/2010_final.pdf (accessed 27 March 2014). Hanban (2011) Hanban (Confucius Institute Headquarters) 2011 Annual Report. See www. hanban.org/report/pdf/2011_final.pdf (accessed 27 March 2014). Hanban (2012) Confucius Institute Headquarters (Hanban) 2012 Annual Report. See www. hanban.org/report/pdf/2012.pdf (accessed 27 March 2014). Hanban (2013) Confucius Institute Annual Development Report 2013. See www.hanban.org/ report/pdf/2013.pdf (accessed 8 September 2014). Hanban (2014) Confucius Institute Annual Development Report 2014. See www.hanban.edu. cn/report/2014.pdf (accessed 7 May 2015). Hanban (2015a) Confucius Institute Annual Development Report 2015. See www.hanban.edu. cn/report/2015.pdf (accessed 8 August 2016). Hanban (2015b) Chinese Vice Premier Liu Yandong and EU Commissioner Tibor Navracsics inaugurate Confucius Classroom at European Schools (Brussels) at the third meeting of China-EU HPPD. See http://english.hanban.org/article/2015-09/22/ content_616476.htm (accessed 30 September 2016). Hanban (n.d. a) Composition of the Chinese Language Council International. See www. hanban.org/en_hanban/gywm.php (accessed 19 June 2008). Hanban (n.d. b) 关于我们：国家汉办 [About us: Hanban]. See www.hanban.org/hb/ (accessed 10 February 2015). Hanban (n.d. c) 孔子学院/课堂：关于孔子学院/课堂 [Confucius Institutes/Classrooms: About Confucius Institutes/Classrooms]. See www.hanban.edu.cn/confuciousinstitutes/ node_10961.htm (accessed 8 August 2016). Hanban (n.d. d) 志愿者：汉语教师志愿者 [Volunteers: Volunteer Chinese language teachers]. See www.hanban.org/volunteers/node_9654.htm (accessed 10 February 2015). Hanban (n.d. e) 志愿者：汉语教师海外志愿者 [Volunteers: Overseas volunteer Chinese teachers]. See www.hanban.org/volunteers/node_9652.htm (accessed 10 February 2015). Hanban (n.d. f) 汉语教师：公派汉语教师 [Chinese teachers: State-sponsored Chinese teachers]. See www.hanban.org/teachers/node_9753.htm (accessed 10 February 2015). Hanban (n.d. g) 汉语桥：关于‘汉语桥’ [Chinese Bridge: About ‘Chinese Bridge’]. See www.hanban.org/chinesebridge/node_7489.htm (accessed 10 February 2015). Hanban (n.d. h) 第八届孔子学院大会 [The 8th Confucius Institute Conference]. See www.chinesecio.com/conference/8/ (accessed 10 December 2014).

112

References

Hartig, F. (2010) Confusion about Confucius Institutes: Soft power push or conspiracy? A case study of Germany. In E. Morrell and M.D. Barr (eds) Crises and Opportunities: Proceedings of the 18th Biennial Conference of the ASAA, 2010, Adelaide, Australia (pp. 1–14). Canberra: Asian Studies Association of Australia (ASAA) Inc. and the University of Adelaide: ISBN 978-0-7258-1136-5. See http://pandora.nla.gov. au/pan/124461/20110211-1446/asaa.asn.au/ASAA2010/papers/Hartig-Falk.pdf (accessed 7 February 2011). Hartig, F. (2012a) Confucius Institutes and the rise of China. Journal of Chinese Political Science 17 (1), 53–76. Hartig, F. (2012b) Cultural diplomacy with Chinese characteristics: The case of Confucius Institutes in Australia. Communication, Politics & Culture 45 (2), 256–276. Hartig, F. (2016) Chinese Public Diplomacy: The Rise of the Confucius Institute. London: Routledge. He, B.G. (2005) Minority rights with Chinese characteristics. In W. Kymlicka and B.G. He (eds) Multiculturalism in Asia (pp. 56–79). New York: Oxford University Press. He, B.G. (2012) Politics of accommodation of the rise of China: The case of Australia. Journal of Contemporary China 21 (73), 53–70. He, Y. and Xu, G.H. (2000) 国外汉学史 [A History of Foreign Sinology]. Shanghai: Shanghai Foreign Language Education Press. Heberer, T. (2014) China in 2013: The Chinese dream’s domestic and foreign policy shifts. Asian Survey 54 (1), 113–128. Held, D. (2004) Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus. Cambridge: Polity Press. Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D. and Perraton, J. (1999) Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hill, C. (2016) Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century (2nd edn). London: Palgrave. Hill, C. and Beadle, S. (2014) The Art of Attraction: Soft Power and the UK’s Role in the World. London: British Academy. See http://cdn.mashreghnews.ir/files/fa/ news/1393/3/3/587960_579.pdf (accessed 21 July 2016). Hirataka, F. (1992) Language-spread policy of Japan. International Journal of the Sociology of Language 95, 93–108. Hoare-Vance, S. (2010) The Confucius Institutes and China’s Evolving Foreign Policy. Saarbrucken: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing. Hobson, J.M. (2004) The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hobson, J.M. (2012) Orientalization in globalization: A sociology of the promiscuous architecture of globalization, c. 500–2010. In J. Nederveen Pieterse and J.T. Kim (eds) Globalization and development in East Asia (pp. 12–35). New York: Routledge. Hopper, P. (2007) Understanding Cultural Globalization. Cambridge: Polity Press. Howlett, K. and Alphonso, C. (2014) TDSB votes to officially cut ties with Confucius Institute. The Globe and Mail, 29 October. See www.theglobeandmail.com/ news/toronto/toronto-school-board-votes-to-sever-ties-to-confucius-institute/ article21376636/ (accessed 14 September 2016). Huang, Y.Z. and Ding, S. (2006) Dragon’s underbelly: An analysis of China’s soft power. East Asia 23 (4), 22–44. Hung, E. (2002) Translation and English in twentieth-century China. World Englishes 21 (2), 326–335. Huntington, S.P. (1996) The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster. Indian Council for Cultural Relations (2016a) ICCR’s centres abroad. See www.iccr.gov. in/content/iccrs-centres-abroad-1 (accessed 30 August 2016). Indian Council for Cultural Relations (2016b) ICCR chair abroad. See www.iccr.gov.in/ content/iccr-chair-abroad (accessed 30 August 2016).

References

113

Instituto Cervantes (n.d.) Guía del Instituto Cervantes [Guide to the Cervantes Institute]. See www.cervantes.es/imagenes/File/guias/guia_instituto_cervantes_2012-espanol. pdf (accessed 9 August 2016). Jackson, R. and Sørensen, G. (2013) Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches (5th edn). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jensen, L.M. (2012) Culture industry, power, and the spectacle of China’s ‘Confucius Institutes’. In T.B. Weston and L.M. Jensen (eds) China In and Beyond the Headlines (pp. 271–299). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Jerdén, B. (2014) The assertive China narrative: Why it is wrong and how so many still bought into it. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 7 (1), 47–88. Jin, C.R. (2013) International structure and China’s strategy and options. In X.M. Huang and R.G. Patman (eds) China and the International System: Becoming a World Power (pp. 57–68). London: Routledge. Jin, L.X. (2006) 试论汉语国际推广的国家策略和学科策略 [The state and disciplinary strategies for the global promotion of the Chinese language]. 华东师范大学学报（哲 学社学版）[ Journal of East China Normal University (Philosophy and Social Science)] 38 (4), 97–103. Johnson, A.I. (1995) Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Johnson, D.C. (2013) Language Policy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Jones, W.S. (1985) The Logic of International Relations (5th edn). Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company. Kagan, R. (2008) The Return of History and the End of Dreams. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Kane, D. (2006) The Chinese Language: Its History and Current Usage. Singapore: Tuttle Publishing. Kang, D.C. (2007) China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia. New York: Columbia University Press. Kang, D. (2012) East Asia when China was at the centre: The tribute system in early modern East Asia. In M. Beeson and R. Stubbs (eds) Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism (pp. 58–73). London: Routledge. Kaplan, R.B. and Baldauf, R.B. (1997) Language Planning: From Practice to Theory. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. Kaplan, R.B. and Baldauf, R.B. (eds) (2005) Language Planning and Policy in Europe, Volume 1: Hungary, Finland and Sweden. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. Kaplan, R.B. and Baldauf, R.B. (eds) (2008) Language Planning and Policy in Asia, Volume 1: Japan, Nepal and Taiwan and Chinese Characters. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. Kasturi, C.S. (2013) Confucius centres welcome, with rider. Telegraph, 25 July. See www. telegraphindia.com/1130725/jsp/frontpage/story _17154874.jsp#.V8jHFk3r348 (accessed 1 September 2016). Katzenstein, P.J. and Keohane, R.O. (2007) Conclusion: Anti-Americanisms and the polyvalence of America. In P.J. Katzenstein and R.O. Keohane (eds) Anti-Americanisms in World Politics (pp. 306–316). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Kennedy, S. (2010) The myth of the Beijing Consensus. Journal of Contemporary China 19 (65), 461–477. Keohane, R.O. and Katzenstein, P.J. (2007) Introduction: The politics of antiAmericanisms. In P.J. Katzenstein and R.O. Keohane (eds) Anti-Americanisms in World Politics (pp. 1–6). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Keylor, W.R. (1992) The Twentieth Century World: An International History (2nd edn). New York: Oxford University Press. Kim, S.S. (2008) The evolving Asian system: Three transformations. In D. Shambaugh and M. Yahuda (eds) International Relations of Asia (pp. 35–56). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

114

References

King, K. (2010) China’s cooperation in education and training with Kenya: A different model? International Journal of Educational Development 30 (5), 488–496. King, K.A. (2015) Managing media appearances. In F.M. Hult and D.C. Johnson (eds) Research Methods in Language Policy and Planning: A Practical Guide (pp. 248–252). Chichester: Wiley Blackwell. King Sejong Institute Foundation (2015a) Introduction to King Sejong Institute Foundation. See http://eng.ksif.or.kr/business/down/201502%20KSIF%20 Brochure_English.pdf (accessed 30 August 2016). King Sejong Institute Foundation (2015b) King Sejong Institute Magazine, Volume 5, July 2015. See http://eng.ksif.or.kr/intro/down/201507_5th_SejongHakdang_letter. pdf (accessed 30 August 2016). Kivimäki, T. (2014) Soft power and global governance with Chinese characteristics. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 7 (4), 421–447. Knight, N. (2008) Imaging Globalisation in China: Debates on Ideology, Politics and Culture. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Kupchan, C.A. (2012) No One’s World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn. New York: Oxford University Press. Kurlantzick, J. (2006) China’s charm offensive in Southeast Asia. Current History 105 (692), 270–276. Kurlantzick, J. (2007) Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. Lai, H.Y. (2012a) Introduction: The soft power concept and a rising China. In H.Y. Lai and Y.Y. Lu (eds) China’s Soft Power and International Relations (pp. 1–20). London: Routledge. Lai, H.Y. (2012b) China’s cultural diplomacy: Going for soft power. In H.Y. Lai and Y.Y. Lu (eds) China’s Soft Power and International Relations (pp. 83–103). London: Routledge. Lam, A.S.L. (2005) Language Education in China: Policy and Experience from 1949. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Lampton, D.M. (2001) Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.–China Relations, 1989– 2000. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Lampton, D.M. (2008) The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Lanteigne, M. (2013) Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction (2nd edn). London: Routledge. Lee, S.J. (2011) South Korean soft power and how South Korea views the soft power of others. In S.J. Lee and J. Melissen (eds) Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia (pp. 139–161). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Lee, S.J. and Melissen, J. (2011) Introduction. In S.J. Lee and J. Melissen (eds) Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia (pp. 2–9). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Lee, S.W. (2011) The theory and reality of soft power: Practical approaches in East Asia. In S.J. Lee and J. Melissen (eds) Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia (pp. 11–32). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Lemke, D. (2005) Great powers. In M. Griffiths (ed.) Encyclopedia of International Relations and Global Politics (pp. 349–352). London: Routledge. Levine, S.I., Mecacci, M., Hill, M., Zha, D.J., Hanson, S.E. and Gallagher, M. (2014) The debate over Confucius Institutes in the United States: A ChinaFile conversation on the promises and perils of partnering with Beijing on education. Foreign Policy, 11 July. See http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/11/the-debate-over-confucius-institutesin-the-united-states/?wp_login_redirect=0 (accessed 15 January 2015). Li, H.C., Mirmirani, S. and Ilacqua, J. (2009) Confucius Institutes: Distributed leadership and knowledge sharing in a worldwide network. The Learning Organization 16 (6), 469–482.

References

115

Li, M.H. (2012) English curriculum in higher education in China for non-English majors. In J. Ruan and C.B. Leung (eds) Perspectives on Teaching and Learning English Literacy in China (pp. 105–114). Dordrecht: Springer Science+Buisness Media. Li, M.J. (2008) China debates soft power. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 2 (2), 287–308. Li, M.J. (2009a) Soft power: Nurture not nature. In M.J. Li (ed.) Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics (pp. 1–18). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Li, M.J. (2009b) Soft power in Chinese discourse: Popularity and prospect. In M.J. Li (ed.) Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics (pp. 21–43). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Li, M.J. (2012) International status: China’s pursuit of a comprehensive superpower status. In E. Kavalski (ed.) The Ashgate Research Companion to Chinese Foreign Policy (pp. 33–45). Farnham: Ashgate. Li, R. (1999) The China challenge: Theoretical perspectives and policy implications. Journal of Contemporary China 8 (22), 443–476. Li, W. and Zhu, H. (2014) Geopolitics and the changing hierarchies of the Chinese language: Implications for policy and practice of Chinese teaching in Britain. The Modern Language Journal 98 (1), 326–339. Liang, W. (2012) China’s soft power in Africa: Is economic power sufficient? Asian Perspective 36 (4), 667–692. Liddicoat, A.J. (2013) Language-in-Education Policies: The Discursive Construction of Intercultural Relations. Bristol: Multilingual Matters. Liddicoat, A.J. and Taylor-Leech, K. (2014) Micro language planning for multilingual education: Agency in local contexts. Current Issues in Language Planning 15 (3), 237–244. Liddicoat, A.J. and Taylor-Leech, K. (2015) Multilingual education: The role of language ideologies and attitudes. Current Issues in Language Planning 16 (1–2), 1–7. Lieberthal, K. (2004) Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform (2nd edn). New York: W.W. Norton & Company. Lien, D. and Co, C.Y. (2013) The effect of Confucius Institutes on US exports to China: A state level analysis. International Review of Economics and Finance 27, 566–571. Lien, D., Oh, C.H. and Selmier, W.T. (2012) Confucius Institute effects on China’s trade and FDI: Isn’t it delightful when folks afar study Hanyu? International Review of Economics and Finance 21 (1), 147–155. Liu, G.L. (2008) Domestic sources of China’s emerging grand strategy. Journal of Asian and African Studies 43 (5), 543–561. Liu, G.L. (2011) Politics and Government in China. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. Liu, G.Q. and Lo Bianco, J. (2007) Teaching Chinese, teaching in Chinese and teaching the Chinese. Language Policy 6 (1), 95–117. Liu, W.H. and Hao, Y.F. (2014) Australia in China’s grand strategy. Asian Survey 54 (2), 367–394. Lo Bianco, J. (2004) Language planning as applied linguistics. In A. Davies and C. Elder (eds) The Handbook of Applied Linguistics (pp. 738–762). Malden, MA: Blackwell. Lo Bianco, J. (2009) Return of the good times? Japanese teaching today. Japanese Studies 29 (3), 331–336. Lo Bianco, J. (2012) Afterword: Tempted by targets, tempered by results. Australian Review of Applied Linguistics 35 (3), 359–361. Lu, J.J. and Zhao, Y.X. (2011) Teaching Chinese as a foreign language in China: A profile. In L. Tsung and K. Cruickshank (eds) Teaching and Learning Chinese in Global Contexts: Multimodality and Literacy in the New Media Age (pp. 118–130). London: Continuum. Lu, J.M. (2004) 增强学科意识，发展对外汉语教学 [Improve the recognition and development of Chinese language education]. 世界汉语教学 [Chinese Teaching in the World] 1, 5–10.

116

References

Lu, Y.Y. (2012) Challenges for China’s international communication. In H.Y. Lai and Y.Y. Lu (eds) China’s Soft Power and International Relations (pp. 104–120). London: Routledge. Luo, F. (2009) 汉语国际传播 [The international promotion of Chinese]. In Language Situation in China Team (ed.) 中国语言生活状况报告2008 [Language Situation in China: 2008] (pp. 45–63). Beijing: Commercial Press. Luo, F. (2011) 汉语国际传播状况 [The situation of the international promotion of Chinese]. In Language Situation in China Team (ed.) 中国语言生活状况报告2011 [Language Situation in China: 2011] (pp. 91–97). Beijing: Commercial Press. Luo, F. and Guo, X. (2012) 汉语国际传播状况 [The situation of the international promotion of Chinese]. In Language Situation in China Team (ed.) 中国语言生活状况 报告2012 [Language Situation in China: 2012] (pp. 85–92). Beijing: Commercial Press. Lynch, D.C. (2013) Securitizing culture in Chinese foreign policy debates: Implications for interpreting China’s rise. Asian Survey 53 (4), 629–652. Mackerras, C. (1995) China’s Minority Cultures: Identities and Integration Since 1912. Melbourne: Longman. Mackerras, C. (1998) China in Transformation 1900–1949. London: Longman. Mackerras, C. (2003) China’s Ethnic Minorities and Globalisation. London: Routledge Curzon. Mackerras, C. (2004) The Australia–China relationship: A partnership of equals? In N. Thomas (ed.) Re-orienting Australia-China Relations 1972 to the Present (pp. 15–33). Aldershot: Ashgate. Mackerras, C. (2014) China and the Australia–U.S. relationship: A historical perspective. Asian Survey 54 (2), 223–246. Mahonen, M. (2014) Toronto protest against Confucius Institute [Video file], 14 June. See www.youtube.com/watch?v=EE-RmOQjkgA (accessed 15 September 2016). Mark, S.L. (2010) Rethinking cultural diplomacy: The cultural diplomacy of New Zealand, the Canadian Federation and Quebec. Political Science 62 (1), 62–83. Mar-Molinero, C. (2004) Spanish as a world language: Language and identity in a global era. Spanish in Context 1 (1), 3–20. Mar-Molinero, C. (2006a) The European linguistic legacy in a global era: Linguistic imperialism, Spanish and the Instituto Cervantes. In C. Mar-Molinero and P. Stevenson (eds) Language Ideologies, Policies and Practices: Language and the Future of Europe (pp. 76–88). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Mar-Molinero, C. (2006b) Forces of globalization in the Spanish-speaking world: Linguistic imperialism or grassroots adaptation. In C. Mar-Molinero and M. Stewart (eds) Globalization and Language in the Spanish Speaking World: Macro and Micro Perspectives (pp. 8–26). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. McConnell, D.L. (2008) Japan’s image problem and the soft power solution: The JET Program as cultural diplomacy. In Y. Watanabe and D.L. McConnell (eds) Soft Power Superpowers: Cultural and National Assets of Japan and the United States (pp. 18–33). Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. McDougall, D. (2007) Asia Pacific in World Politics. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. McDougall, D. (2012) Responses to ‘rising China’ in the East Asian region: Soft balancing with accommodation. Journal of Contemporary China 21 (73), 1–17. McDougall, D. (2014) Australian strategies in response to China’s rise: The relevance of the United States. Asian Survey 54 (2), 319–342. McGrew, A. (1992) A global society? In S. Hall, D. Held and A. McGrew (eds) Modernity and its Futures (pp. 61–116). Cambridge: Polity Press. McGroarty, M.E. (2010) Language and ideologies. In N.H. Hornberger and S.L. McKay (eds) Sociolinguistics and Language Education (pp. 3–39). Bristol: Multilingual Matters. Mearsheimer, J.J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

References

117

Mearsheimer, J.J. (2006) China’s unpeaceful rise. Current History 105 (690), 160–162. Mearsheimer, J.J. (2010) The gathering storm: China’s challenge to US power in Asia. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3 (4), 381–396. Medeiros, E.S. (2009) China’s International Behavior: Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification. Santa Monica, CA: Rand. Mo, J.L. (2009) 孔子学院与世界主要语言文化推广机构的比较研究 [A comparative study of Confucius Institutes and the world’s main language and culture promotion institutions].云南师范大学学报（对外汉语教学与研究版）[ Journal of Yunnan Normal University (Chinese Language Education and Research edition)] 7 (5), 21–27. Modiano, M. (2001) Linguistic imperialism, cultural integrity, and EIL. ELT Journal 55 (4), 339–346. Moran, P.R. (2001) Teaching Culture: Perspectives in Practice. Boston, MA: Heinle & Heinle. Morgan, M.H. (2014) Speech Communities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Moser, D. (2016) A Billion Voices: China’s Search for a Common Language. Melbourne: Penguin. Mukherjee, R. (2014) The false promise of India’s soft power. Geopolitics, History, and International Relations 6 (1), 46–62. Munro, K. (2016) Behind Confucius Classrooms: The Chinese government agency teaching NSW school students. The Sydney Morning Herald, 29 May. See www. smh.com.au/nsw/behind-confucius-classrooms-the-chinese-government-agencyteaching-nsw-school-students-20160525-gp3882.html (26 August 2016). Nadkarni, V. (2013) Introduction. In V. Nadkarni and N.C. Noonan (eds) Emerging Powers in a Comparative Perspective: The Political and Economic Rise of the BRIC Countries (pp. 1–21). London: Bloomsbury Academic. Narayana Murthi, V. (2009) Chinese language centre at Vellore Institute of Technology. The New Indian Express, 7 April. See www.newindianexpress.com/states/tamil_ nadu/article55422.ece (accessed 1 September 2016). Nathan, A.J. and Scobell, A. (2012) China’s Search for Security. New York: Columbia University Press. Nederveen Pieterse, J. (2009) Globalization and Culture: Global Mélange (2nd edn). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Ngamsang, S. and Walsh, J. (2013) Confucius Institutes as instruments of soft power: Comparison with international rivals. Journal of Education and Vocational Research 4 (10), 302–310. Norman, J. (1988) Chinese. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nye, J.S. (1990) Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: Basic Books. Nye, J.S. (2004) Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs. Nye, J.S. (2005) Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History (5th edn). New York: Pearson Longman. Nye, J.S. (2008) Public diplomacy and soft power. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, 94–109. Nye, J.S. (2011) The Future of Power. New York: Public Affairs. Nye, J.S. (2013) What China and Russia don’t get about soft power. Foreign Policy, 29 April. See www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_ don_t_get_about_soft_power#sthash.deFDikEZ.HDSGdliD.dpbs (accessed 16 December 2013). Ogawa, T. (2009) Origin and development of Japan’s public diplomacy. In N. Snow and P.M. Taylor (eds) Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy (pp. 270–281). New York: Routledge. Oğuzlu, T. (2007) Soft power in Turkish foreign policy. Australian Journal of International Affairs 61 (1), 81–97.

118

References

Ostler, N. (2005) Empires of the Word: A Language History of the World. New York: HarperCollins. Ostler, N. (2010) The Last Lingua Franca: English Until the Return of Babel. New York: Walker Publishing Company. Otmazgin, N.K. (2008) Contesting soft power: Japanese popular culture in East and Southeast Asia. International Relations of the Asia Pacific 8 (1), 73–101. Painter, H. (2014) Doubts about the integrity of Confucius Institutes lead to mounting criticism. The John William Pope Centre for Higher Education Policy, 15 December. See www.popecenter.org/2014/12/doubts-about-the-integrity-of-confucius-instituteslead-to-mounting-criticism/ (accessed 3 September 2016). Pan, L. (2015) English as a Global Language in China: Deconstructing the Ideological Discourses of English in Language Education. Dordrecht: Springer. Paradise, J.F. (2009) China and international harmony: The role of Confucius Institutes in bolstering Beijing’s soft power. Asian Survey 49 (4), 647–669. Park, J.S.Y. and Wee, L. (2012) Markets of English: Linguistic Capital and Language Policy in a Globalizing World. New York: Routledge. Pastor, R.A. (1999) The great powers in the twentieth century: From dawn to dusk. In R.A. Pastor (ed.) A Century’s Journey: How the Great Powers Shape the World (pp. 1–31). New York: Basic Books. Payne, M. (2013) Qualitative research in language planning and policy. In C.A. Chapelle (ed.) The Encyclopedia of Applied Linguistics (pp. 1–6). Malden, MA: Blackwell. People’s Daily (2006) Hundred [sic] of foreigners to strive for ‘Chinese language envoy’ in Beijing. See http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200607/19/eng20060719_28436.html (accessed 19 July 2006). People’s Daily (2007a) Demand for Chinese language learning increasing rapidly. See http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200706/06/print20070606_381473.html (accessed 8 June 2007). People’s Daily (2007b) China opens first Confucius Institute on air to offer Chinese language teaching. See http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/6316491.html (accessed 6 July 2008). People’s Daily (2008) Confucius Institutes help spread Chinese language, culture globally. See http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90782/90873/6551128.html (accessed 2 February 2009). People’s Daily (2013) Govt effort needed to promote culture. See http://en.people. cn/90782/8166321.html (accessed 23 January 2015). Perkins, D. (1999) Encyclopedia of China: The Essential Reference to China, its History and Culture. New York: Checkmark Books. Pew Research Center (2016) Opinion of China: Do you have a favorable or unfavorable view of China? – Percent responding favorable all years measured. See www. pewglobal.org/database/indicator/24/survey/all/ (accessed 23 September 2016). Phillipson, R. (1992) Linguistic Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Phillipson, R. and Skutnabb-Kangas, T. (2013) Linguistic imperialism and endangered languages. In T.K. Bhatia and W.C. Ritchie (eds) The Handbook of Bilingualism and Multilingualism (2nd edn; pp. 495–515). Malden, MA: Blackwell. Pillsbury, M. (2000) China Debates the Future Security Environment. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press. Ramo, J.C. (2004) The Beijing Consensus: Notes on the New Physics of Chinese Power. London: The Foreign Policy Centre. Ramsey, S.R. (1987) The Languages of China. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Rawnsley, G. (2012) Approaches to soft power and public diplomacy in China and Taiwan. The Journal of International Communication 18 (2), 121–135. Ray, J.L. and Kaarbo, J. (2005) Global Politics (8th edn). Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company.

References

119

Redden, E. (2014) Chicago to close Confucius Institute. Inside Higher Ed, 26 September. See www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/09/26/chicago-severs-ties- chinesegovernment-funded-confucius-institute (accessed 15 January 2015). Ricento, T.K. and Hornberger, N.H. (1996) Unpeeling the onion: Language planning and policy and the ELT professional. TESOL Quarterly 30 (3), 401–427. Rickford, J.R. (2015) Participating in policy debates about language. In F.M. Hult and D.C. Johnson (eds) Research Methods in Language Policy and Planning: A Practical Guide (pp. 240–243). Chichester: Wiley Blackwell. Roberts, J.A.G. (2006) A History of China (2nd edn). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Robertson, M. (2011) Confucius say: Generous gifts hide ethical compromise. ABC News, 2 March. See www.abc.net.au/news/2011-03-02/chinarobertson/44588 (accessed 13 July 2016). Rochester, J.M. (2010) Fundamental Principles of International Relations. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Ross, H. (1992) Foreign language education as a barometer of modernization. In R. Hayhoe (ed.) Education and Modernization: The Chinese Experience (pp. 239–254). Oxford: Pergamon Press. Roy, D. (1996) The ‘China threat’ issue: Major arguments. Asian Survey 36 (8), 758–771. Roy, D. (2004) Stirring samurai, disapproving dragon: Japan’s growing security activity and Sino-Japan relations. Asian Affairs: An American Review 31 (2), 86–101. Ruan, L. (2014) Chinese doubt their own soft power venture. Foreign Policy, 17 October. See http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/17/chinese-doubt-their-own-soft-powerventure/ (accessed 15 January 2015). Sahlins, M. (2015) Confucius Institutes: Academic Malware. Chicago, IL: Prickly Paradigm Press. Saich, T. (2015) Governance and Politics of China (4th edn). London: Palgrave. Sawyer, R.D. (1994) Sun-tzu: The Art of War. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Scholte, J.A. (2005) Globalization: A Critical Introduction (2nd edn). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Shambaugh, D. (2008) International relations in Asia: The two-level game. In D. Shambaugh and M. Yahuda (eds) International Relations of Asia (pp. 3–31). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Shambaugh, D. (2013) China Goes Global: The Partial Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Shimko, K.L. (2008) International Relations: Perspectives and Controversies (2nd edn). Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company. Shirk, S.L. (2008) China: Fragile Superpower. New York: Oxford University Press. Slaughter, Y. (2007) The rise and fall of Indonesian in Australian schools: Implications for language policy and planning. Asian Studies Review 31 (3), 301–322. Slaughter, Y. (2011) Bringing Asia to the home front: The Australian experience of Asian language education through national policy. In C. Norrby and J. Hajek (eds) Uniformity and Diversity in Language Policy: Global Perspectives (pp. 157–173). Bristol: Multilingual Matters. Snow, D. (2010) Diglossia in East Asia. Journal of Asian Pacific Communication 20 (1), 124–151. So, A.Y. and Chu, Y.W. (2016) The Global Rise of China. Cambridge: Polity Press. Società Dante Alighieri (n.d.) Chi siamo – La Società Dante Alighieri [About us – The Dante Alighieri Society]. See http://ladante.it/chi-siamo.html (accessed 9 August 2015). Spolsky, B. (ed.) (2012) The Cambridge Handbook of Language Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stambach, A. (2014) Confucius and Crisis in American Universities: Culture, Capital, and Diplomacy in U.S. Public Higher Education. New York: Routledge.

120

References

Starr, D. (2009) Chinese language education in Europe: The Confucius Institutes. European Journal of Education 44 (1), 65–82. Sun, J. (2013) Soft power’s rise and fall in East Asia. Current History 112 (755), 217–223. Sun, Y. (2014) The roots of China’s ethnic conflicts. Current History 113 (764), 231–237. Sutter, R.G. (2005) China’s Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Swaine, M.D. and Tellis, A.J. (2000) Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future. Santa Monica, CA: Rand. Taiwan Academy (2016a) About the Academy. See http://english.moc.gov.tw/article/ index.php?sn=2721 (accessed 31 August 2016). Taiwan Academy (2016b) Overseas locations: Asia. See http://english.moc.gov.tw/dir/ index.php?sn=2960 (accessed 31 August 2016). Taiwan Academy (2016c) Overseas locations: Europe. See http://english.moc.gov.tw/dir/ index.php?sn=2969 (accessed 31 August 2016). Taiwan Academy (2016d) Overseas locations: North America. See http://english.moc. gov.tw/dir/index.php?sn=2965 (accessed 31 August 2016). Takeuchi, H. (2014) Sino-Japanese relations: Power, interdependence, and domestic politics. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 14 (1), 7–32. The Australian (2008a) Canberra wary of Chinese resources play. See www.theaustralian. news.com.au/story/0,,23710981-30538,00.html (accessed 21 August 2008). The Australian (2008b) Canberra’s dilemma as China’s demand grows for our resourcerich land. See www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,,23978090-30538,00.html (accessed 21 August 2008). The Australian (2009a) China mine bid for OZ Minerals fails security test. See www. theaustralian.news.com.au/business/story/0,,25253459-36418,00.html (accessed 28 March 2009). The Australian (2009b) Fortescue, Valin get FIRB approval. See www.theaustralian.news. com.au/business/story/0,,25270398-36418,00.html (accessed 31 March 2009). The Australian (2009c) Deal delay leads broker to suggest dumping Rio shares. See www. theaustralian.news.com.au/business/story/0,,25281535-36418,00.html (accessed 3 April 2009). The Australian (2009d) Political drama surrounds Chinalco’s Rio bid. See www. theaustralian.news.com.au/business/story/0,,25344263-30538,00.html (accessed 17 April 2009). The Australian (2009e) Critical assessment too close to call. See www.theaustralian.com. au/higher-education/opinion-analysis/critical-assessment-too-close-to-call/storye6frgcko-1225768573332 (accessed 2 September 2009). The Australian (2014) Second US university drops China’s Confucius Institute. See http:// www.theaustralian.com.au/business/business-spectator/second-us-universitydrops-chinas-confucius-institute/news-story/7b1b228a208549a5b5521b4feae037d7 (accessed 17 November 2014) The Globe and Mail (2014) Confucius Institute: Chinese for ‘conflict of interest’? See http://license.icopyright.net/user/viewFreeUse.act?fuid=MjMxNjU0NzA%3D (accessed 14 September 2016). The Economist (2009) A message from Confucius. See www.economist.com/ node/14678507 (accessed 27 December 2013). Tollefson, J.W. and Tsui, A.B.M. (2007) Issues in language policy, culture, and identity. In A.B.M. Tsui and J.W. Tollefson (eds) Language Policy, Culture, and Identity in Asian Contexts (pp. 259–270). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Tomlinson, J. (1999) Globalization and Culture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

References

121

Tomlinson, J. (2007) Globalization and cultural analysis. In D. Held and A. McGrew (eds) Globalization Theory: Approaches and Controversies (pp. 148–168). Cambridge: Polity Press. Tong, J. (2002) An organizational analysis of the Falun Gong: Structure, communications, financing. The China Quarterly 171, 636–660. Totaro-Genevois, M. (2005) Cultural and Linguistic Policy Abroad: The Italian Experience. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. Tsung, L. and Cruickshank, K. (2011) Emerging trends and issues in teaching and learning Chinese. In L. Tsung and K. Cruickshank (eds) Teaching and Learning Chinese in Global Contexts: Multimodality and Literacy in the New Media Age (pp. 1–10). London: Continuum. UChicago News (2014) Statement
on the Confucius Institute at the University of Chicago. See http://news.uchicago.edu/article/2014/09/25/statement-confuciusinstitute-university-chicago (accessed 15 January 2015). van de Ven, H. (2002) The onrush of modern globalization in China. In A.G. Hopkins (ed.) Globalization in World History (pp. 167–195). New York: W.W. Norton & Company. Van Norden, B.W. (2008) Mengzi with Selections from Traditional Commentaries. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company. Van Norden, B.W. (2011) Introduction to Classical Chinese Philosophy. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company. Wang, D.P. and Adamson, B. (2014) War and peace: Perceptions of Confucius Institutes in China and USA. The Asia-Pacific Education Researcher. Online first. Wang, F.L. (1999) Self-image and strategic intentions: National confidence and political insecurity. In Y. Deng and F.L. Wang (eds) In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World (pp. 21–45). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Wang, H.Y. (2005) National image building and Chinese foreign policy. In Y. Deng and F.L. Wang (eds) China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy (pp. 73–102). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Wang, H.Y. and Lu, Y.C. (2008) The conception of soft power and its policy implications: A comparative study of China and Taiwan. Journal of Contemporary China 17 (56), 425–447. Wang, J. (2011) Introduction: China’s search for soft power. In J. Wang (ed.) Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy Through Communication (pp. 1–18). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Wang, S.C. (2007) Building societal capital: Chinese in the US. Language Policy 6 (1), 27–52. Wang, Y.Q. (1999) College English in China. English Today 15 (1), 45–51. Wang, Y.W. (2008) Public diplomacy and the rise of Chinese soft power. The Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science 616 (1), 257–273. Wang, Z.L. (2008) 传统文化与对外汉语教学 [Traditional Culture and Chinese as a Foreign Language Education]. Xiamen: Xiamen University Press. Westad, O.A. (2012) Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750. London: The Bodley Head. Wesley, M. (2007) Australia-China. In B. Taylor (ed.) Australia as an Asia Pacific Regional Power: Friendship in Flux? (pp. 60–79). London: Routledge. Wheeler, A. (2014) Cultural diplomacy, language planning, and the case of the University of Nairobi Confucius Institute. Journal of Asian and African Studies 49 (1), 49–63. World Bank (2016) China: Overview. See www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/ overview (accessed 29 July 2016). World Bank (n.d.) China: Poverty headcount ration, at $1.90 a day. See http://povertydata. worldbank.org/poverty/country/CHN (accessed 31 May 2016).

122

References

Wright, D.C. (2011) The History of China (2nd edn). Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood. Wu, Y.C. (2010) 汉语国际传播：新加坡视角 [The International Promotion of Chinese: A Singaporean Perspective]. Beijing: Commercial Press. Wu, Y.H. (2009) 关于孔子学院整体可吃素发展的一个战略设想 [A strategic plan for the sustainable development of Confucius Institutes]. 云南师范大学学报（对外汉语教 学与研究版）[ Journal of Yunnan Normal University (Chinese Language Education and Research edition)] 7 (1), 23–26. Wuthnow, J. (2008) The concept of soft power in China’s strategic discourse. Issues & Studies 44 (2), 1–28. Xie, T. and Page, B.I. (2013) What affects China’s national image? A cross-national study of public opinion. Journal of Contemporary China 22 (83), 850–867. Xing, J.Z. (2006) Teaching and Learning Chinese as a Foreign Language: A Pedagogical Grammar. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Xu, J. (2007) 语言规划与语言教育 [Language Planning and Language Education]. Shanghai: Xuelin Press. Yahuda, M. (2004) The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific (2nd edn). London: Routledge Curzon. Yang, R. (2001) An obstacle or a useful tool? The role of the English language in internationalizing Chinese universities. Journal of Studies in International Education 5 (4), 341–358. Yang, R. (2010) Soft power and higher education: An examination of China’s Confucius Institutes. Globalisation, Societies and Education 8 (2), 235–245. Yao, X. (1993) Foreign languages in China’s higher education. Language Learning Journal 7, 74–77. Zakaria, F. (2009) The Post-American World and the Rise of the Rest. London: Penguin. Zhang, B.J. (2009) Overview: The evolution of China’s diplomacy and foreign relations in the era of reform, 1976–2005. In Y.F. Hao, C.X.G. Wei and L. Dittmer (eds) Challenges to Chinese Foreign Policy: Diplomacy, Globalization, and the Next World Power (pp. 15–33). Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky. Zhang, J. (2007) Australia and China: Towards a strategic partnership? In J. Cotton and J. Ravenhill (eds) Trading on Alliance Security: Australia in World Affairs 2001–2005 (pp. 89–111). Melbourne: Oxford University Press. Zhang, W.F. (2007) Tapping soft power: Managing China’s ‘peaceful rise’ and the implications for the world. In S.J. Guo and S.P. Hua (eds) New Dimensions of Chinese Foreign Policy (pp. 109–131). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Zhang, W.F. (2012) Has Beijing started to bare its teeth? China’s tapping of soft power revisited. Asian Perspective 36 (4), 615–639. Zhang, W.H. (2010) China’s cultural future: From soft power to comprehensive national power. International Journal of Cultural Policy 16 (4), 383–402. Zhang, Y.X. (2005) 韩国大学中文教学现状探索 [An exploration of the present situation of Chinese language teaching in South Korean universities]. 国际汉语教学动态与研究 [Trends and Research in International Chinese Language Teaching] 1, 46–51. Zhao, H.Q. and Huang, J.B. (2010) China’s policy of Chinese as a foreign language and the use of overseas Confucius Institutes. Educational Research for Policy and Practice 9 (2), 127–142. Zhao, S.S. (1997) Power Competition in East Asia: From the Old Chinese World Order to PostCold War Regional Multipolarity. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Zhao, S.S. (2004) A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Zhao, S.S. (2009) Between rhetoric and pragmatism: Nationalism as a driving force of Chinese foreign policy. In Y.F. Hao, C.X.G. Wei and L. Dittmer (eds) Challenges to Chinese Foreign Policy: Diplomacy, Globalization, and the Next World Power (pp. 239– 252). Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky.

References

123

Zhao, S.S. (2012) China’s foreign policy as a rising power in the early twenty-first century: The struggle between taoguangyanghui and assertiveness. In H.Y. Lai and Y.Y. Lu (eds) China’s Soft Power and International Relations (pp. 191–211). London: Routledge. Zhao, S.S. (2013) China: A reluctant global power in the search for its rightful place. In V. Nadkarni and N.C. Noonan (eds) Emerging Powers in a Comparative Perspective: The Political and Economic Rise of the BRIC Countries (pp. 101–130). London: Bloomsbury Academic. Zheng, Y.N. and Zhang, C. (2012) ‘Soft power’ and Chinese soft power. In H.Y. Lai and Y.Y. Lu (eds) China’s Soft Power and International Relations (pp. 21–38). London: Routledge. Zhou, M.L. (2003) Multilingualism in China: The Politics of Writing Reforms for Minority Languages 1949–2002. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Zhou, M. (2011) Globalization and language order: Teaching Chinese as a foreign language in the United States. In L. Tsung and K. Cruickshank (eds) Teaching and Learning Chinese in Global Contexts: Multimodality and Literacy in the New Media Age (pp. 131–149). London: Continuum. Zhu, Z.Q. (2013) China’s New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies and Significance (2nd edn). Farnham: Ashgate.

Interviews Confucius Classroom (CC) staff interview CC Interviewee 1, interview conducted 9 March 2015

Confucius Institute (CI) staff interviews CI Interviewee 1, interview conducted 6 August 2010 CI Interviewee 2, interview conducted 9 August 2010 CI Interviewee 3, interview conducted 13 August 2010; email 3 September 2010 CI Interviewee 4, interview conducted 13 August 2010 CI Interviewee 5, interview conducted 8 October 2010 CI Interviewee 6, interview conducted 8 October 2010 CI Interviewee 7, interview conducted 8 October 2010

Chinese language teacher (CLT) interviews CLT Interviewee 1, interview conducted 27 August 2010 CLT Interviewee 2, interview conducted 14 September 2010 CLT Interviewee 3, interview conducted 8 October 2010 CLT Interviewee 4, interview conducted 11 October 2010

Chinese scholar (CS) interview CS Interviewee 1, interview conducted 7 November 2013

Chinese university (CU) staff interviews CU Interviewee 1, interview conducted 4 November 2013 CU Interviewee 2, interview conducted 4 November 2013

Index 2008 Beijing Olympics 40, 43n15

British Council 36, 49, 49t, 50, 55n4, 56, 64, 83, 95, 104 Bruen, J. 40 Business Chinese Test (BCT) 55n2 Bygate, M. 104

Abe Shinzo 59 academic literature 13–14, 16 Adamson, B. 33 Adamson, R. 83 Ager, D. 7 Alliance Française 49, 49t, 55n4, 56, 64, 65, 83, 101, 104 American Association of University Professors (AAUP) 80 Ammon, U. 99 ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) 79 Asian Studies Association of Australia (ASAA) 86 Australia Asian languages learning 102–3, 105n4 China’s relations with 60–1 Chinese language teaching 102–3 concerns about Confucius Institutes 80–1, 82, 84–6 Confucius Classrooms 64, 82 Confucius Institutes 101 Japanese language learning 94 relations with USA 60 University of Adelaide 86 The Australian 82, 88 Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) 82

Canada British Columbia Institute of Technology 87 concerns about Confucius Institutes 80, 81–2, 88 The Globe and Mail 82 McMaster University 80, 88 The National Post 81–2 University of Manitoba 88 CCP see Chinese Communist Party Cervantes Institute 49, 49t, 50, 56, 64, 65, 83, 104 Chan, K.K. 35, 92 Chen Duxiu 4 Chen, Y.D. 33 Chen Zhili 34 Cheng, X.H. 32 Chey, J. 80–1 China: attitudes towards and perceptions of 71–7, 96 views from interviews and student survey 74–7 world opinion polls 72–4 China Daily 33 China Radio International (CRI) 45 ‘China threat’ theory 29–30, 41n7 Chinalco 60, 66n1 Chinese Bridge competitions 10–11, 70–1 Chinese characters 2, 3, 4 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 4, 19n6, 28–9 ethnic minorities policy 86, 96n2 Chinese culture and CCP 19n6 and China as a country 77–9 defined 6 future status 100–1 Han Chinese culture 6, 30 historical background 2–5

Baldauf, R.B. 6 Barr, M. 27, 80, 87 BBC World Service Poll 72, 73t, 79 Beadle, S. 19n3, 50 ‘Beijing Consensus’ 31, 41–2n8 Beijing Language Institute 54n2 Belkin, D. 88 Bernstein, R. 29 BHP Billiton 66n1 Brady, A. M. 81 Britain Chinese language courses 4 Confucius Institutes 101

124

Index

as source of soft power 5–6, 19n3, 30, 31–2, 100 Chinese government 19n6, 31 and CCP 28 and Confucius Institutues 38–9, 63–4, 65, 83 political reform 99, 105n1 see also cultural diplomacy Chinese language in the world historical background 2–5 use and status 102–3 Chinese language learning 3, 4–5, 32–3, 68–71 Chinese names xi Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference see CPPCC Chinese Proficiency Test (HSK) 47, 54–5n2 Speaking Test (HSKK) 55n2 Chinese terminology xi, 41n3 Christensen, T.J. 103 Christian Science Monitor 82 Chung, A.Y. 95 Clinton, Hillary 64 CNOOC (China National Offshore Oil Corporation) 58 Confucius and Confucianism 27, 33–5, 40 Confucius Classrooms 9, 35–6, 44–5, 64, 82 and existing Chinese departments/ programmes 89–92 funding 35–6, 36t Confucius Institute project 1–2, 8–12 Chinese Bridge competitions 10–11, 70–1 diffused global project 98 origins and background 33–40 framework for study 12–16, 17t, 97 funding 36, 37t historical analysis approach 11–12 name 34–5 and soft power 21 state-sponsored teachers 10, 10t, 20n9 volunteer teachers 9, 9t, 10, 19–20n7–8 see also Confucius Classrooms; Confucius Institutes; evaluating the Confucius Institute project; implications of the Confucius Institute project; mapping the Confucius Institute project; summarising the Confucius Institute project

125

Confucius Institutes 9, 44 and existing Chinese departments/ programmes 89–92 funding 36t models 35, 42n11 radio and online 45, 94 specialisation 101 CPPCC (Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference) 32, 42n10, 100 CRI (China Radio International) 45 Cull, N.J. 6, 56–7, 98 cultural activities 47 cultural diplomacy defined 6 feedback 98–100, 105n2 popular culture 100–1 traditional culture 30, 100, 101 cultural globalisations 1 see also ‘going global’ approach; ‘please come in’ approach Cultural Revolution 28 Dante Alighieri Society 49, 49t, 55n4, 55n5, 56, 64, 83, 101, 104 Del Valle, J. 13 Deng Xiaoping 5 Deng, Y. 87, 101 Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 59 diffused global projects 16, 97, 98 Ding, S. 5 economic development 31 The Economist 37 English language 4, 20n7, 50, 52, 74, 79, 101 see also British Council Epoch Times 87 evaluating the Confucius Institute project 14–15 documents, reports and literature 16 interviews 15 society-to-society level 14 state-to-state level 14 survey 15–16 see also impact at society-to-society level; impact at state-to-state level expansive global projects 16, 97 extensity 12, 44–5, 48t, 97 Falun Gong 20n8, 80, 86, 87 force, use of 41n6

126

Index

foreign language education in China 4 foreign policy 57 see also impact at state-to-state level; implications of the Confucius Institute project Fortescue 60 Freeman Field, R. 105 French language 4 see also Alliance Française Gallagher, M. 86 García, O. 50 Germany Confucius Institutes 85 global status of German 4 see also Goethe Institute Gertz, B. 29 Gil, J. 50 Glaser, B.S. 31 global projects 8, 16, 97, 98 globalisation 1 Goethe Institute 37, 49, 49t, 56, 64, 83, 99, 101, 104 ‘going global’ approach 21, 40–1n1, 50 Great Leap Forward 28 great powers 24–5, 41n4 Greece: Confucius Institutes 101 Griffiths, M. 21 Guo, S.J. 19n6 Hall, I. 61, 72 Han Chinese culture 6, 30 Hanban (Office of Chinese Language Council International) 7–8, 45, 88, 93 feedback 95, 99–100 naming of the Confucius Institute project 34–5 reports and information 12–13, 36, 42n13 terminology 19n5 Hartig, F. 14, 85–6 Hayot, Eric 88 He, B.G. 102 Heberer, T. 59 Held, D. et al. 1, 12, 14, 16, 97 Hill, C. 19n3, 50 Hill, Michael 71 historical analysis approach 11–12 Hoare-Vance, S. 13 Hopper, P. 2 HSK (Chinese Proficiency Test) 47, 54–5n2

Speaking Test (HSKK) 55n2 Hu Jintao 31, 38 Hu Youqing 32 Hunan Valin 60 Hunter, A. 35, 92 Huntington, S.P. 29 ICCR (Indian Council for Cultural Relations) 61 impact at society-to-society level 12, 14, 67, 97–8 attitudes towards and perceptions of China 71–7, 96 Chinese culture and China as a country 77–9 Chinese language teaching and learning 68–71 concerns 83–8, 98 existing Chinese departments/ programmes 89–92 interviews and student survey 74–7 non-state actors 67–8 practical and organisational issues 89–95 societal reactions as impediments 80–3 sustainability 93–4 teaching staff quality 92–3 world opinion polls 72–4 impact at state-to-state level 12, 14, 56–7, 97 China’s relations with Australia 60–1 China’s relations with Japan 29, 58–9, 105n1 China’s relations with USA 57–8, 105n1 foreign policy 57 governments’ concerns 63–6 influence on others’ language/culture promotion activities 61–2 language and culture as sources of soft power 62–3 reasons for limited impact 62–6 implications of the Confucius Institute project 98 for China 98–101 for governments 102–3 for researchers 103–4 for schools and universities 101–2 India Confucius Institutes 63–4 global status of Hindi 61, 102 interest in soft power 63

Index

Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) 61 Indian Cultural Centres 64, 83 Indonesia Confucius Institutes 101 global status of Indonesian 94, 102 Japanese language learning 94 intensity 12, 45–7, 46t, 48t, 97 international treaties 3–4 interviews 14, 15 Israel: University of Tel Aviv 87 Italian language see Dante Alighieri Society Japan China’s relations with 29, 58–9, 105n1 Confucius Institutes 81, 85 Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 59 global status of Japanese 4, 94, 95, 102 influence of China 27 interest in soft power 26, 62 links with Taiwan 59 Japan Foundation 64, 65, 83 Jensen, L.M. 81 JET (Japan Exchange and Teaching) Programme 79, 95 Jin Li 32, 100 Jin, L.X. 33 Jones, W.S. 22 Kagan, R. 29 Kaplan, R.B. 6 Kasturi, C.S. 64 Katzenstein, P.J. 64, 75 Kaye, John 64 Kenya: University of Nairobi 71, 81, 91, 92 Keohane, R.O. 64, 75 King, K. 71 King, K.A. 105 King Sejong Institute Foundation 61, 64, 83, 95 Kivimäki, T. 31 Korea Chinese language teaching 70, 85, 102 global status of Korean language 61, 94–5, 102, 105n4 influence of China 27 interest in soft power 26, 63 see also King Sejong Institute Foundation Kupchan, C.A. 105n1 Kurlantzick, J. 32

127

Lai, H.Y. 23, 24, 63 Lam, A.S.L. 20n7 Lampton, D.M. 40, 71, 101 language ideology 32 language planning and policy 6–8, 40, 80 external language spread 7, 8, 32 Lanteigne, M. 32–3 Lee, S.J. 63 Leibniz, G.W. 27 Levine, S.I. et al. 71, 86 Li Changchun 37, 42n14 Li Hongzhi 20n8 Li Keqiang 38 Li, M.J. 24, 31 Li, R. 97 Liang, W. 100 Liddicoat, A.J. 54, 57, 80 Lieberthal, K. 19n6 Lindblad, Göran 63 Liu Yandong 7 Lu, J.M. 33 Lu Xun 4 Lu, Y.C. 30, 61 McConnell, D.L. 79, 95 McDougall, D. 103 mapping the Confucius Institute project 12, 44 academic literature 13–14 comparisons of extensity, intensity, velocity 48–50, 49t extensity 12, 44–5, 48t intensity 12, 45–7, 46t, 48t interviews and survey 14 media reports 13 organisational documents 12–13 reasons for high extensity, intensity, velocity 50–4, 97 velocity 12, 47–8, 97 Mar-Molinero, C. 50, 65, 83 Mark, S.L. 100 Mearsheimer, J.J. 29 media concerns about Confucius Institute project 81–2 reports 13, 16 Mencius 27 Minmetals 60 Mo, J.L. 33 Modern Standard Chinese 79 Morgan, M.H. 6 Mukherjee, R. 63

128

Index

Munro, K. 64 Munro, R.H. 29 Murphy, M.E. 31 Nathan, A.J. 34 National Asian Languages and Studies in Australian Schools (NALSAS) 102–3 National Asian Languages and Studies in Schools Program (NALSSP) 103, 105n4 National Association for Korean Schools (NAKS) 94–5 National Party Congress (NPC) 19n6, 32, 42n9 nationalism 28 Nederveen Pieterse, J. 8 New Zealand: concerns about Confucius Institutes 81 Ngamsang, S. 55n4 North Africa: Confucius Institutes 92 Nye, J.S. 19n3, 22, 23, 24, 30, 31–2, 62, 63, 65 O’Callaghan, T. 21 Office of Chinese Language Council International see Hanban Opium War (1839–1842) 3 organisational documents 12–13, 16 Ostler, N. 49, 50, 55n4 Otmazgin, N.K. 62 Overseas Volunteer Chinese Language Teacher Programme 10, 20n8 OZ Minerals 60 Page, B.I. 74 People’s Daily 32, 33, 100 People’s Republic of China (PRC) 28 Pew Global Attitudes Project survey 72, 73, 73t, 74 Philippines–China relations 63 Phillipson, R. 81, 83 ‘please come in’ approach 41n2 Politburo 19n6, 24, 31 Politburo Standing Committee 19n6 political system of China 19n6 power comprehensive national power 25 defined 21–2 great power status 24–5, 41n4 see also soft power PRC (People’s Republic of China) 28

public concerns about Confucius Institute project 82–3 Qian Xuantong 4 Ramo, J.C. 41–2n8 Rawnsley, G. 62 research 103–4 Ricci, Matteo 3 Rickford, J.R. 105 Rio Tinto 60, 66n1 Robertson, M. 42n14, 82 Rochester, J.M. 2 Ruan, L. 94 Rudd, Kevin 75 Russia Confucius Institutes 91–2 global status of Russian 4, 102 Sahlins, M. 13, 42n14, 81 Saunders, R.A. 5 Sawyer, R.D. 27 schools and universities concerns about Confucius Institute project 80–1 role of Confucius Institutes 101–2 Scobell, A. 34 Shambaugh, D. 43n14, 67, 93, 98, 105n2 Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) 25 Shoebridge, D. 64 Skutnabb-Kangas, T. 81 Smith, F. 72 soft power 5 Chinese culture as source of 5–6, 19n3, 30, 31–2, 100 in contemporary world politics 21–4, 62–3 defined 22–3, 30 see also soft power: China’s interest in; soft power: China’s view of soft power: China’s interest in 24 Chinese terminology 41n3 to counter ‘China threat’ theory 29–30, 41n7 interest of other East Asian countries 26 as main arena of competition in world politics 25–6 as necessary for domestic legitimacy of CCP 28–9

Index

as requirement for great power status 24–5 similarities to China’s past world politics 26–7 soft power: China’s view of 30 centrality of culture to soft power 31–2 role of Chinese language learning 32–3 scope and applications of soft power 30 sources of soft power 30–1 Song Hyangkeun 61 Spanish language see Cervantes Institute Stambach, A. 13–14, 71, 86, 91, 92 Starr, D. 42n11, 80, 92 State Council 19n6 summarising the Confucius Institute project 16, 17t, 97–8 see also implications of the Confucius Institute project Sun Zi 27 surveys 14, 15–16 Sweden concerns about Confucius Institutes 63, 80 Stockholm University Nordic Confucius Institute 63, 80 Taiwan China’s relations with 29, 58 interest in soft power 26, 61–2 Japanese links with 59 US support for 58 Taiwan Academy 62, 64, 83 Takeuchi, H. 58 Taylor-Leech, K. 80 teachers Overseas Volunteer Chinese Language Teacher Programme 10, 20n8 quality 92–3 state-sponsored teachers 10, 10t, 20n9 Volunteer Chinese Language Teacher Programme 9, 9t, 10, 19–20n7, 96n3 Thailand Chinese language teaching 102 Confucius Institutes 101 thick global projects 16, 97 thin global projects 16, 97 Tibet 29, 86, 105n1 Tollefson, J.W. 40

129

trade 3 Treaty of Nanjing 3 tribute system 2, 3, 4, 26–7 Tsui, A.B.M. 40 United Nations Security Council 58 Unocal 58 USA China’s relations with 57–8, 105n1 Chinese language teaching 4, 71, 102 Chinese relations with 29, 57–8 concerns about Confucius Institutes 80, 82 Confucius Institutes 64, 71, 101 Cornell University 88 Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 59 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 64 Korean Schools 94–5 National Flagship Language Initiative (NFLI) 102 Pennsylvania State University 88 Pivot to Asia 58 power of 25–6 relations with Australia 60 Stanford University 88 University of Chicago 80, 88 University of Michigan 86 US–Japan Joint Security Declaration 59 velocity 12, 47–8, 97 Vietnam: influence of China 27 Villa, L. 13 Voltaire 27 Volunteer Chinese Language Teacher Programme 9, 9t, 10, 19–20n7, 96n3 Wall Street Journal 88 Walsh, J. 55n4 Wang, D.P. 33 Wang, F.L. 105n1 Wang Hui 86 Wang, H.Y. 30, 61, 87 Wang, Z.L. 33 Welch, Dr Susan 88 Wheeler, A. 91, 92 World Bank 37 world opinion polls 72–4 world political system 2 Wu, Y.H. 94 Wuthnow, J. 6

130

Index

Xi Jinping 37–9 Xie, T. 74 Xu, J. 32 Xu Lin 7, 93 Yan Juanqi 32 Yang, R. 54, 79 Youth Chinese Test (YCT) 47

Zhang, C. 62 Zhang, J. 60 Zhang, Jean 36 Zhang, W.F. 21, 28, 29, 41n2 Zhao Qizheng 32 Zhao, S.S. 4, 28 Zheng, Y.N. 62