Socio-Cultural Construction of Recognition : The Discursive Representation of Islam and Muslims in the British Christian News Media [1 ed.] 9781443851046, 9781443849364

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Socio-Cultural Construction of Recognition

Socio-Cultural Construction of Recognition: The Discursive Representation of Islam and Muslims in the British Christian News Media

By

Gabriel Faimau

Socio-Cultural Construction of Recognition: The Discursive Representation of Islam and Muslims in the British Christian News Media, by Gabriel Faimau This book first published 2013 Cambridge Scholars Publishing 12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2013 by Gabriel Faimau All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-4936-7, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-4936-4

To Alexandra ‘Maxela’ Faimau, ngwanake, who inspires me to appreciate the beauty of life and the dignity of diversity.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface ....................................................................................................... ix Foreword ................................................................................................... xi Professor Tariq Modood Introduction ................................................................................................ 1 1. Theoretical and Empirical Challenge 2. British Christian News Media 3. Empirical Data and Discourse Analysis 4. The Book in Outline Chapter One .............................................................................................. 15 British Media Discourses on Islam and Muslims 1. Framing Islam and Muslims in the Media 2. British Media and Islam 3. British Media and British Muslims 4. Summary and a Way Forward Chapter Two ............................................................................................. 39 Framing the Politics of Recognition: A Theoretical Approach 1. Framing the Politics of Recognition 2. Recognition: Discourse and Power Relations 3. Recognition and the Representations of Other Cultures 4. Respect for Religion and Recognition of Religious Minorities 5. Media and the Discursive Construction of Recognition 6. Representing Islam and Muslims 7. Summary Chapter Three ........................................................................................... 71 Representing Islam and Muslims in the Context of Interfaith Dialogue 1. The Emergence of dialogue between Christians and Muslims 2. Christians and Muslims: Dialogic Encounter 3. Discussion 4. Summary

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Chapter Four ........................................................................................... 101 Narrating Islam and Muslims within the Discourse of ‘Islamic Terrorism’ 1. Contextualising the Discursive Tradition of ‘Islamic Terrorism’ 2. Representing Islam and Muslims in the context of terrorism 3. Discussion: Recognition and the Question of Boundaries 4. Summary Chapter Five ........................................................................................... 127 Islam and Muslims through the Lens of ‘Christian Persecution’ 1. Persecution’ Discourse 2. Christian Persecution and the Portrayal of Islam and Muslims 3. Discussion: Christian Persecution and (Mis)Recognition 4. Summary Chapter Six ............................................................................................. 149 British Muslims in the British Christian Media 1. British Muslims and the Question of Identity Formation 2. British Muslims and Integration into British society 3. Discussion: Identity Affirmation, Historical Parallels and Reciprocal Argument 4. Summary Chapter Seven......................................................................................... 177 Conclusion 1. Islam and Muslims in the British Christian Print Media 2. Islam and Muslims in the British Christian Media and the British Mainstream Media: A Comparison 3. Reconsidering the Theoretical Framework 4. Notes on the Political Theory of Recognition 5. Recognition and Further Studies Bibliography ........................................................................................... 201 List of Internet Websites......................................................................... 219

PREFACE

In what ways are Islam and Muslims represented in the British Christian media? How do such representations contribute to the (mis)recognition of Islam and Muslims? This book responds to these questions by discursively exploring various discourses in the British Christian news media that lead to the representations of Islam and Muslim, from the perspective of the political theory of recognition. This is indicated by the amount of documents and also the qualitative representations that focus on the discourses of interfaith dialogue, Islamic terrorism, Christian persecution and British Muslims. These discourses suggest that the representations of Islam and Muslims take multiple forms. Such multiple forms indicate how complex cultural and religious encounter is, and how complex the British Christian news media representations of Islam and Muslims are. Analysis presented in this book shows that the representations of Islam and Muslims follow three scenarios. Firstly, by appealing to the sameness, an equivalential identity is created by weakening internal differences, while articulating the equivalent elements in the relationships between Islam and Christianity. Secondly, by absolutising the boundaries, differences become non-negotiable boundary markings through which Islam and Muslims are represented as a ‘total other’. Thirdly, the production of ‘another other’ occurs when the ‘near other’ is represented by narrowing the boundaries, following the argument that engaging in dialogue with Islam is a falsification of Christianity. Consequently, those who take the road of dialogue are represented as ‘another other’. Since my analysis is developed in the light of the political theory of recognition, I also argue that the political theory of recognition provides a more dialogical way in the study of socio-cultural representations than other post-colonial discourses, because it offers a frame within which to deal with both the ‘similarities’ and the ‘differences’. Here, recognition opens the door for the repositioning and the expanding of boundaries, and misrecognition may provoke a move towards the absolutising of boundaries or the production of ‘another other.’ Employing this theory, however, one needs to further explore the difference between respect and recognition, the dynamics of dialogue and recognition, the place of socio-

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cultural memory and the questions of risk and danger, trust and confidence. The study presented in this book was part of my doctoral research project, conducted at the University of Bristol in the United Kingdom from 2007 to 2011. Some portions of chapters 3 and 5 of this book have appeared in my previous journal articles, particularly in Journalism Studies (2011) and Journal of Intercultural Studies (2013). I would like to express my sincere thanks to the University of Bristol for awarding me an Overseas Research Scholarship (ORS) award that enabled me to conduct this study. My gratitude goes to the Society of the Divine Word (SVD) for sponsoring and financing my first year of the MPhil/PhD programme. I am greatly indebted to Professor Tariq Modood who oversaw my doctoral research and offered me invaluable advice, comments and suggestions. I am grateful to Professor Thomas Osborne, Professor Paul Statham, Professor Gavin D’Costa, Dr Kieran Flanagan and Dr John Fox for their intellectual support that shaped my initial ideas and arguments. My appreciation goes to Dr Elizabeth Poole and Dr Terese O’Toole for offering me helpful suggestions during my PhD viva in 2011. I would like to thank Professor Adam Seligman, the Director of the International Summer School on Religion and Public Life (ISSRPL), for introducing me to the practical pedagogy of living together differently. I also thank Dr Owen Nkobi Pansiri, Dr Jonatan Lassa, Dr Dominggus Elcid Lie, Dr David Montgomery and Dr Hanna Wei for the discussion I had with them. I am grateful for the support I received from my colleagues at the Department of Sociology, University of Botswana. I wish to thank Marion Morgan for her careful reading of my drafts. She also shaped my arguments through our regular discussions on a great number of issues related to this book. I would like to thank my immediate superiors for their encouragement when I was still a member of the Society of the Divine Word (SVD), particularly Rev. Felix Kadek Sunartha SVD and Rev. Martin Anggut SVD. My appreciation also goes to my friends, particularly Nico Lobo Ratu, Rudy Montadas, Mike Egan, Jijimon Alakalam, Beny Mali, Frans De Sales Lake, Benignus Wego, Modesta Lingga and Emanuel Prasson Krova, who have made my time of studies easier through their friendship. Finally, I must thank Lynne Mosomane, Lesego Mentari Faimau, my mother, brothers and sisters whose vital support has been most encouraging. They have been a constant source of inspiration. Alexandra ‘Maxela’ Faimau has inspired me to appreciate the beauty of life and dignity of diversity. To her, I dedicate this piece of work.

FOREWORD TARIQ MODOOD

Gabriel Faimau’s study of the representation of Islam and Muslims in some of the Christian media in Britain comes up with a surprising conclusion. It finds that Muslims are more sympathetically and less negatively portrayed there than in the mainstream British newspapers (as revealed by various studies). One of the reasons this is surprising is that there is a general image that religious groups, such as Christians and Muslims, are hostile to each other, and it is the ‘secularists’ that maintain the peace. In a country like Britain, apparently the group that religious minorities have most to worry about are Christians, especially Anglicans, who want to continue to hold on to their privileges, while secularists, so the story goes, being more fair-minded and neutral between religions, are the main hope for Muslims if they do not wish to be dominated by Christians. This image and the self-serving secularist arguments that feed off it are far from the truth. A feature of English society is the adversarial culture which characterises its politics, law courts, industrial relations, interrogative journalism, public intellectuals and even academia. Hence it is quite striking that an aspect of modern England/Britain is a sense that different religions, meaning in particular people of different religions should not be too critical or disdainful of each other, nor too selfpromoting. Political activists may be as condemnatory of each other as they choose, and secularists should keep alive the health of our culture by being offensive to religious people. But religious people should treat each other with respect, certainly civility, and co-exist in harmony. A source of this is a memory of religious strife (religion having caused the only civil war and regicide in English history) but it has come to have a positive side too. Britain has a culture of Christian ecumenicism, which more recently has developed into inter-faith dialogue and cooperation, most of which is not on theological or metaphysical subtleties but on civic and political matters such as calming community tensions and campaigning for antidiscrimination legislation. This – in contrast to the alarm and fear that went viral on the social media – was displayed in the inter-religious civic

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solidarity after the murder of the British soldier, Drummer Lee Rigby, in London in May, 2013. This fostering of inter-faith mutual awareness and harmony, however, goes beyond religious leadership or indeed people of faith, and is certainly not a private matter. Secular schools, often staffed by agnostics and atheists, who struggle to find staff willing to meet the statutory duty of providing daily Christian worship enthusiastically display art and stories from Islam or Hinduism, and celebrate Eid and Diwali as well as Christmas, as do some local governments. While there is considerable controversy around the niqab and the burka, the presumption is that religious people, with whatever signs of faith they feel obliged to display, have to be welcomed into all the institutions of society and state. The Jewish kippa, the Sikh turban and the Islamic hijab have been incorporated into the uniforms of the armed services, the police forces and the apparel of judges amongst others. It will have been noticed that in describing certain sensibilities about religion in the last paragraph, I have gone beyond describing the attitudes of Anglicans or Christians or religious people but describe the broader culture. Indeed, this broad culture of toleration, good-will and mutual respect is not simply a product of religion and is not only not confined to religious people but is at least partly shaped by an English or British secularism.1 By ‘secularism’ I do not mean anything to do with atheism or metaphysics but the political culture; nor do I mean a political ideology, rather, the practice of political secularism. This historical practice in which, explicitly or implicitly, organised religion is treated as a potential public good or national resource (not just a private benefit), which the state can in some circumstances assist to realise. This can take the form of an input into a legislative forum, such as the House of Lords, on moral and welfare issues; but also to being social partners to the state in the delivery of education, health and care services; building social capital; and churches belonging to ‘the people’. So that even those who do not attend them, or even sign up to their doctrines, feel they have a right to use them for weddings and funerals. Faced with an emergent multi-faith situation or where there is a political will to incorporate previously marginalised faiths and sects and challenge the privileged status of some religions, the context-sensitive and conservationist response may be to pluralise the state-religion link rather than sever it. This indeed is what is happening in Britain and elsewhere despite critics on both the Left and the Right, especially among the radical secularists and the Islamophobic populists. In relation to the British case one can see this pluralizing or multiculturalising in a number of incremental, ad hoc and experimental steps. For example, some years ago

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Prince Charles, the heir to the throne and to the office of Supreme Governor of the Church of England, let it be known he would as a monarch prefer the title ‘Defender of Faith’ to the historic title ‘Defender of the Faith’.2 More recently, in 2004, the Queen used her Christmas television and radio broadcast (an important national occasion, especially for the older generation, on the most important Christian day of the year) to affirm the religious diversity of Britain. Her message was, in the words of Grace Davie: ‘Religious diversity is something which enriches society; it should be seen as a strength, not a threat; the broadcast moreover was accompanied by shots of the Queen visiting a Sikh temple and a Muslim center. It is important to put these remarks in context. The affirmation of diversity as such is not a new idea in British society; what is new is the gradual recognition that religious differences should be foregrounded in such affirmations.’3 If such examples are regarded as merely symbolic then one should note how British governments have felt the need to create multi-faith consultative bodies. The Conservatives created an Inner Cities Religious Council in 1992, chaired by a junior minister, which was replaced by New Labour in 2006 with a body with a much broader remit: the Faith Communities Consultative Council. Moreover, the new Department of Communities and Local Government, which is represented in the Cabinet, has a division devoted to faith communities. The Coalition government that came to power in 2010 has maintained this. In fact, going further, Prime Minister Cameron, who has confessed to not being a steadfast believer, recently made a major speech arguing that Britons should not be shy of asserting that Britain is a Christian country.4 While many secularists protested, the speech was welcomed by the chair of the Mosque and Community Affairs Committee of the Muslim Council of Britain, Sheikh Ibrahim Mogra.5 This idea that religion is beneficial both for indviduals and society, then, is not a view confined to government and is far from being a ‘topdown’ view. Indeed, the newly established minority religions, including Muslims, have an attitude of respect for religion in general and not just for their own faith and so contribute to the culture of religious toleration, mutual respect and public institutional accommodation. Reporting on a Gallup World Poll, Mogahed and Nyiri write of Muslims in Paris and London that their ‘expectations of respect for Islam and its symbols extends to an expectation of respect for religion in general’ and add that recently ‘Shahid Malik, a British Muslim MP, even complained about what he called the “policy wonks” who wished to strip the public sphere of all Christian religious symbols’.6 I think the presence of a ‘weak’

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Anglican establishment (not merely symbolic) that is willing to take its mission to serve the country seriously enough to want to incorporate new minority faith communities in its vision of the country and its sense of responsibilities is a potential resource for multiculturalism and the integration of Muslims in Britain. Faimau’s study suggests that a positive view of Muslims is more likely to be found in Anglican and Christian media than it is in the mainstream print media and so an interfaith understanding may indeed be experienced by some as a Christian duty.

Notes 1

T. Modood, Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea, Second Edition, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2013. 2 D. Dimbley, Prince of Wales: A Biography, London, Little Brown, 1994, p. 528. 3 G. Davie, ‘Pluralism, tolerance and democracy: Theory and practice in Europe’, in T. Banchoff, ed., Democracy and the New Religious Pluralism, New York, Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 232-33. 4 See http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/king-james-bible 5 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-16231223 6 D. Mogahed and Z. Nyiri, ‘Reinventing integration: Muslims in the West’, Harvard International Review, volume 29, number 2, 2007, p. 2. http://www.harvardir.org/articles/1619/

INTRODUCTION

1. Theoretical and Empirical Challenge Over the past few decades, media coverage has emerged as one of our primary sources of knowledge about Islam and Muslims (Poole, 2002; Richardson, 2004, 2007). More than just being a medium for distributing knowledge about Islam and Muslims, media coverage carries a heavyweight influence in terms of framing and shaping our knowledge and, to a certain extent, discourses and attitudes towards Islam and Muslims. As early as 1981, Edward W. Said published his book, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World, which captured public attention, particularly in academic and policy circles, concerning how Islam and Muslims are constructed and represented by the media (Abu-Laban, 2001; Brennan, 2001). In this work, Said conceded that media coverage has portrayed Islam negatively, and closely associated Muslims with militancy, danger and anti-Western sentiment. According to Said, media coverage “has given consumers of news the sense that they have understood Islam without at the same time intimating to them that a great deal in this energetic coverage is based on far from objective material” (Said, 1997[1981]: li). As a result, projection of Muslims as the new dangerous enemy and ‘the subversive other’ to the West is unavoidable. Islam then is perceived as “a trojan horse in the heart of Europe with a deadly cargo of ‘fundamentalist’ religiosity” (Lewis, 2002: 1). In 1997, the Runnymede Trust echoed a similar tendency of negativising Islam and stereotyping Muslims through the publication of Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All, through which Islamophobia refers to “dread or hatred of Islam – and, therefore, to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims” (Runnymede Trust, 1997: 1). The events of 11 September 2001 have accelerated the media portrayal of Islam and Muslims. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, there have been a growing number of studies and publications, particularly concerning the British media representations of Islam and Muslims, as seen in the works of John E. Richardson (2001, 2004, 2006, 2007), Elizabeth Poole (2002, 2004), Ameli et al. (2007), Amir Saeed (2007) and Moore et al. (2008). As far as a theoretical framework is concerned, these studies have relied

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Introduction

heavily on theories such as Orientalism, clash of civilisations, cultural racism and Islamophobia. All these studies have focused on the Western media representations of Islam and Muslims. In contemporary Western societies, Muslims have been considered as a minority group. Though belonging to an ethnic minority group, many have argued that events such as the Rushdie Affair and the Honeyford Affair in the 1980s have pushed Islam onto the national stage and linked (British) Muslims to some negative associations. This condition leads to perceptions of Muslims as the ‘Other’ that is quite threatening to British society (Raza, 1991; Lewis, 1994; Poole, 2000, 2002). According to Poole, the idea of Muslims as a ‘threat’ to British society is framed in the following ways: “that Muslims are a threat to security in the UK due to their involvement in deviant activities; that Muslims are a threat to British mainstream values and thus provoke integrative concerns; that there are inherent cultural differences between Muslims and the host community which create tensions in interpersonal relations; that Muslims are increasingly making their presence felt in the public sphere” (Poole, 2000).

Being ‘other’, just like other ethnic minority groups, Muslims have faced many disadvantages, for example in employment, market choices and higher education (Modood et al., 1997; Modood and Acland (eds.), 1998; Poole, 2002). Social and political theorists have argued that in the context of a multicultural society in our globalised world, recognition has been a struggle for minority groups (Taylor, 1994, 1995; Fraser, 2003; Honneth, 1995, 2003; Parekh, 2001; Modood, 2007a). Struggle for recognition has emerged as an important issue in the last three decades or so, based on questions of cultural identities and social status. As far as the public sphere is concerned, media discourse has played a key role in the negotiation, contestation and struggle for recognition of various minority cultures or groups, including the representations of Islam and Muslims in the media. While Britain has long been perceived as a Christian nation (Nicholls, 1967; Newbigin, 1998; Greenslade, 2005; Glover, 2009), many believe that British media coverage makes a considerable contribution to the perception of Islam as ‘the Other’ by constructing and circulating the perception of Islam as synonymous with religious hysteria, a fundamentalist threat, violent attacks and terrorism (Runnymede Trust, 1997; Richardson, 2001, 2004, 2006, 2007; Poole, 2002; Saeed, 2007; Moore et al., 2008).

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Despite the growing attention paid to the representations of Islam in the media, two important issues have been relatively neglected in existing scholarly studies. Firstly, previous studies have focused on the mainstream (secular) media representations of Islam and Muslims. To my knowledge, there has been no significant research or attention devoted to the discursive construction of Islam and Muslims in the British Christian media. Secondly, as indicated above, the studies on the representations of Islam and Muslims in the media have arguably relied on the paradigms developed in various post-colonial social theories such as ‘Orientalism’, ‘clash of civilisations’, ‘cultural racism’, and ‘Islamophobia’. These theoretical approaches indeed provide useful insights and critical tools for analysing the social condition we live in. However, these theories have clearly been developed upon the empirical premise that media discourse has the power to control and maintain unjust social representations of other cultures. The problem is that the ideological baggage of domination and control dominates these theories to the point that the control paradigm becomes inadequate for the complex challenges faced by a multicultural society (McNair, 2006). This book is an attempt to respond to these challenges. Firstly, while a range of studies have been devoted to the British mainstream or secular media representations of Islam and Muslims (Richardson, 2001, 2004, 2006, 2007; Poole, 2002, 2004; Ameli et al., 2007; Saeed, 2007; Moore et al., 2008), it could be argued that a sociological effort to study and analyse the representations of Islam and Muslims in the British Christian media is a timely contribution. One may reason that the British Christian media has a relatively small readership. Nevertheless, given the fact that religious belief plays a significant role in shaping people’s identity and worldview, one can argue that discourses or narratives in the religious media may shape people’s thinking and their knowledge about other cultures or religions. Or, as pointed out by Modood (2007a: 76), in the context of Britain, religion may be weak in civil society but churches (or religion) “can be a source of political criticism and action.” Moreover, the association of religious media with a particular religious tradition or religious movement may indicate that discourses in the religious media echo the religious principles of those religious traditions and movements. This is because the Christian news media also draw from many ecclesial documents, reports and reflections. Besides, the religious media play the role of translating religion into political thinking or politics into religious ideas for the internalisation of their customers, to the extent that the religious media shape the political thinking of their audience or readership (Newman and Smith, 2007). Therefore, taking the British Christian media

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Introduction

as its focus, this study proposes to fill the gap created by the absence of sociological research on Islam and Muslims constructed, reconstructed and represented in the religious media. From this perspective, this study is developed to facilitate a deeper understanding of public discourses and narratives on Islam and Muslims, as represented in the media with a religious background. This means that analysis of the British Christian news media contributes to our understanding of various discourses concerning the relationship between Islam and Christianity, the encounter between people with religious and cultural backgrounds and the role of media in shaping Christian perceptions of people from other religions or religious movements. Secondly, while acknowledging the valuable insights of previous studies on the media representations of Islam and Muslims, conducted using the conceptual frameworks drawn from post-colonial social theories, this study takes a different turn in analysing the British Christian media representations of Islam and Muslims through the lens of the politics of recognition as a theoretical framework. The politics of recognition has emerged as an influential social and political theory in the wake of the politics of multiculturalism (Taylor, 1994, 1995; Fraser, 2003; Honneth, 1995, 2003; Thompson, 2006; Modood, 2007a). As a conceptual framework, the politics of recognition shifts the analytical focus from ideological control, exclusivity and conflict to the possibility of openness to diversity, inclusive dialogue, and the relational formation of identities and the struggle for social justice. The basic argument for turning to the politics of recognition is that the language of the media representations of Islam and Muslims “can be explained partially but can never be reduced to merely a language of domination and control” (McNair, 2006). Representations of Islam and Muslims also have a discursive-interpretative dimension, since they are shaped by the social contexts in which they are produced, reproduced and sustained. The premise here is that the political theory of recognition offers a relational bridge-building model for use in analysing the production of knowledge about cultures in a multicultural society. This means that by turning to the politics of recognition, arguments in this study are developed around the notion of recognition and misrecognition in relation to the dialogic element of human sociality and the struggles for justice. Therefore, rather than relying on a conflictual model of analysis, this study develops an innovative framework based on a dialogic model of analysis. Since the topic of representations of Islam and Muslims in the British Christian media also covers the politics of representation and media coverage, theoretical insights are also drawn

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from the theories of discourse, power relations, hegemonic struggle, representational knowledge and media studies. My aim is, therefore, to contribute both conceptually and empirically to the questions concerning the media representations of Islam and Muslims, by identifying the ways in which knowledge about Islam and Muslim is produced, reproduced and sustained in the British Christian news media, by comparing various representations of Islam and Muslims in the British secular media and the British Christian media, and by providing empirical evidence regarding the use of the politics of recognition in an empirical study.

2. British Christian News Media In order to study the representations of Islam and Muslims and the socio-cultural construction of (mis)recognition in the British Christian media, I consulted existing materials published from 1998 to 2007 in four British Christian print media: Church Times, The Tablet, Evangelicals Now and Evangelical Times. The choice of this time frame indicates a reference to the events of 11 September 2001, based on the argument that the 9/11 events have often been considered as a turning point in the global representation of Islam and Muslims. I therefore chose to include in this study a few years before and a few years after the 9/11 events. During this period of time, there were other Islam-related events such as the Bali bombings, the Iraq war, the hijab affair in France, the Madrid bombings, the 7/7 London bombings, the Danish Cartoons, the Regensburg lecture by Pope Benedict XVI and the letter from 138 Muslim scholars to the Pope and Christian leaders around the world. Having the 9/11 events as the central point of reference also indicates the context of this study and the temporal frame of the data. Church Times, The Tablet, Evangelicals Now and Evangelical Times were selected as the sample of this study based upon access and prominence. Articles published in the mainstream British newspapers can generally be gathered from databases such as the Lexis Nexis database. Unlike the mainstream newspapers, British religious newspapers are not available in the Lexis Nexis database. As a result, in gathering the data sample, I relied on British Christian news media websites. Since access to the study sample is very significant, I chose these four print media on the

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basis that their articles are available online on their websites.1 I took into account the idea of comparability in choosing the study samples. By choosing four newspapers associated with different churches, this study allows for the possibility of comparing the published texts with one another. While access and point of comparability are very significant, it is important to point out that Church Times, The Tablet, Evangelicals Now and Evangelical Times are prominent newspapers associated with different churches, as I will explain later. Besides, contributors to these papers are, in general, public figures and public intellectuals such as religious leaders, politicians, columnists, journalists and academics. Additionally, in relation to the issues of Islam and Muslims, Church Times and The Tablet give space for the contributions of Muslim intellectuals and commentators. This indicates that the articles published in the studied media also contribute to and influence various public and policy debates. I use the phrase “British Christian news media”, since the studied media are all published in the United Kingdom and are associated with certain churches or, at least, with Christian faith. Church Times is best associated with the Church of England (or Anglicanism), The Tablet with the Roman Catholic Church and Evangelicals Now and Evangelical Times with the Evangelical churches or Evangelical movement in various churches. Church Times and The Tablet are weekly papers, while Evangelicals Now and Evangelical Times are published monthly. Church Times does not have any readership data. However, information obtained from the subscription controller of Church Times in 2010 indicated that Church Times has 10,500 postal subscribers. The website of Church Times indicates that the paper was founded in 1863 and it has now become “the world’s leading Anglican weekly newspaper”. The Tablet was audited by the Audit Bureau Circulations (ABC) in 2009 with a circulation of 21,978 over 150 countries. This paper is also mailed directly to 18,430 households. Information provided by the Marketing Manager of The Tablet in 2010 indicated that The Tablet is “published ‘for intelligent Catholics’ who seek information on religious affairs, politics, society, literature and the arts in the light of Catholic principles and belief”. The circulation figures of Evangelicals Now in 2011 were 6,750 with a readership that was about double that of the circulation figures. Evangelical Times is “Britain’s leading non-denominational evangelical Christian newspaper” containing “news, comment and articles of interest to Christians from all backgrounds.” An e-mail received from the 1

The websites of the studied media: http://www.churchtimes.co.uk (Church Times), http://www.thetablet.co.uk (The Tablet), http://www.e-n.org.uk (Evangelicals Now) and http://www.evangelical-times.org (Evangelical Times).

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chairman of the Evangelical Times management board in 2010 indicated that this paper did not have readership data.

3. Empirical Data and Discourse Analysis Production of media texts indeed reflects events and discourses in society, but it is also influenced by the media as institutions. There is, therefore, a relationship between media as an institution and society. Among scholars, Stuart Allan has introduced the notion of ‘news culture’ to facilitate critical attempts in understanding the relation between news production and society. According to Allan, “[t]he concept of ‘news culture’….resists the analytical separation of the ‘cultural’ from the ‘economic’ and the ‘political’ prefigured by the media-society dichotomy” (2004: 4). This is to say that news production is not only a cultural production but also an economic production, in the sense that news becomes a commodity to be sold and bought and an object of policy formation, due to the influence of news in the political sphere. In plain words, the publication of newspapers is “an industry and a business” (Richardson, 2004: 34). This means that ‘news culture’ is shaped by significant issues such as ownership, funding and patterns of employment (Fowler, 1991; Richardson, 2004: chapter 2). The importance of addressing these issues lies in the fact that objectivity in news production cannot be separated from the forces that shape the various ways in which news is manufactured. Following Allan’s concept, it could be pointed out here that the studied media also have their ‘news culture’. Church Times is run by a Council of Management, under the company name of Hymns Ancient & Modern Ltd. As already indicated, Church Times is independent from the Church of England hierarchy, although it is associated with this church. The Tablet is owned and run by The Tablet Publishing Company Ltd. Like Church Times, although The Tablet is associated with the Roman Catholic Church, it is also independent of the Catholic hierarchy. Evangelicals Now is a registered charity and a company limited by guarantee. This paper has “a board of directors who are appointed by and accountable to a group of 30 members who are the equivalent of shareholders in a company that trades for profit, but they do not hold any shares”. Evangelical Times is owned by its shareholders. The papers sampled in this study are funded through advertisements and paid subscriptions. Church Times and The Tablet have staff members who are particularly responsible for marketing and advertising. While relying on contributors for opinion pieces and feature articles,

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these four print media employ their own journalists for news reporting. Besides this, they also publish news items provided by Christian news agencies and organisations such as Aid to the Church in Need, Barnabas Fund or Compass Direct News. The description provided here clearly indicates that the studied media are managed independently, with their own patterns of employment, funding, and marketing and advertising strategies. It should be noted here that there are a number of limitations in my choice of studied media. Firstly, while these papers are associated with certain churches, they cannot be considered as the official voice of those churches. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that claims made in religious media cannot simply be isolated from various discourses within religious institutions. This does not necessarily mean that claims in religious media are the official voice of religious institutions, but rather an echo of common discourses that might circulate within various churches and society at large. Secondly, throughout this study, phrases such as “British Christian news media” or “British Christian papers” are often used. The choice of these papers, however, is not based on the idea of representing British Christian media outlets as a whole. Similarly, the choice of ‘an Anglican paper’ or ‘a Catholic paper’ does not mean that the chosen paper represents all the media outlets associated with the Church of England or Roman Catholicism. What this study is interested in is the variety of discourses on Islam and Muslims. By choosing these papers, attention is paid to the various perspectives of three different ‘traditions’, namely the Church of England, the Roman Catholic Church and the Evangelical Churches. It is assumed here that the chosen papers do indeed reproduce the discourses of ‘the faith community’ with which they associated, while at the same time they also produce and construct their particular readings and (re)presentations of the discourses and narratives circulated in society at large (Poole, 2002: 23). I also gathered additional data from 4 official Christian websites in the UK. While this study is based on the data gathered from four Christian newspapers, data from the four official Christian websites are used to place the primary data in the context of various dominant discourses, and this plays a very important role in my interpretation of the studied texts. This is to say that the additional data from the websites illuminate my ways of interpreting the studied texts and of comparing the dominant discourses in relation to Islam and Muslims across the studied media. The chosen websites include those of the Church of England and the

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Archbishop of Canterbury, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales and the Evangelical Alliance UK.2 My analysis of the existing materials in the chosen news media included editorials, featured articles, news reports and columns about Islam and Muslims. An article was only included in the analysis when it clearly refers to Islam and/or Muslims in the headline or in the text. The identification of how Islam and Muslims are characterised was determined on the basis of the article as a whole. Therefore, articles which only refer to Islam and/or Muslims in passing, without any relation to the main issues, were excluded (see also Richardson, 2004: xvi-xviii). For the purpose of this study, 1,357 articles were coded. Details of the articles per paper can be seen in Table 1: Table 1: Primary Data

Name of Print Media

Frequency

Percentage

Church Times

496

36.55%

The Tablet

327

24.10%

Evangelicals Now

344

25.35%

Evangelical Times

190

14%

Total 1357

100%

During the data coding, four themes and dominant issues clearly emerged. Interestingly, the emergence of these key issues reflects the dominant themes dealt with in previous studies, particularly studies conducted by World Economic Forum (2008) and Kerry Moore et al. (2008). For the purpose of data analysis, these key themes provide a context and focus for further analysis that forms four empirical chapters of

2

Here are the addresses of the chosen websites respectively: http://www. cofe.anglican.org, http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org, http://www.catholicew.org.uk and http://www.eauk.org

10

Introduction

this study. The themes and key areas emerging from the studied texts include: 1. Interreligious and intercultural dialogue. This included the initiatives towards interreligious dialogue such as ecumenical meetings, discussion on ethical issues and general discussions on interreligious or intercultural dialogue. 2. Terrorism and religious fundamentalism. This key area included articles and reports on terrorism in general, ‘war on terror’, religious fundamentalism and events labelled as ‘terrorist attacks or bombing’. 3. Christian persecution. This element focused on reports concerning the persecution of Christians in Muslim-majority countries, including the application of Sharia Law and its consequences for non-Muslim citizens. This is the only theme that did not appear in the studies of World Economic Forum (2008) and Moore et al. (2008). 4. Politics, citizenship and integration. This included discussion of Muslims as an ethnic minority, the politics of multiculturalism, the social/political integration of British Muslims within British society, and Christian – Muslim relations in the United Kingdom. By having the above focuses as the contexts in which further analysis is grounded, attention is given to how a discursive construction of Islam and Muslims and constructed knowledge about Islam and Muslims is circulated in the British Christian media across those focuses. A qualitative analysis was applied as a tool for interpreting the underlying meaning associated with the representations of Islam and Muslims in the studied media. This means that the articles published in the studied media are considered as a tool for constructing what Islam is and who Muslims are and, at the same time, what Christianity is and who Christians are. While this promises a wide range of research on Muslims and the knowledge of Islam, as perceived and circulated in the British Christian media, attention was also paid to the rhetorical strategies of the articles in representing Islam and Muslims. The methodological approach employed in the analysis falls broadly under the framework of discourse analysis (DA), an academic movement that investigates and aims at illustrating a relationship between the text and its context, social conditions, ideologies and power-relations (Blommaert, 2005; Richardson, 2007). Following Fairclough (1992: chapter 3), by employing discourse analysis to analyse language use as a social practice, discourse is seen in two related ways. Firstly, discourse is a mode of action or representation exercised through written or spoken texts and visual

Socio-Cultural Construction of Recognition

11

messages (Dijk, 2000). In considering the discursive phenomenon of representation, the term ‘representation’ will be emphasised throughout the study because it refers to the power of the media and the writers to speak for the public about Islam and Muslims (Rattansi, 1994:58). Secondly, discourse is dialectically related to social structure. This means that social structure, on the one hand, is a basic condition for social practice and therefore, through its various systems such as systems of classifications and norms, social structure shapes discourse at a societal level (Fairclough, 1992: 64). On the other hand, discourse plays a role in constituting and constructing the world. According to Fairclough, the socially constitutive aspect of discourse operates in the ways social identities are constructed and social relationships between people are enacted and negotiated, and in the production and constitution of systems of knowledge and belief (Fairclough, 1992: chapter 3; see also Wodak, 1995: 208). In the present study, discourse analysis is used to examine the representations of Islam and Muslims in the British Christian media by uncovering the significance of the construction of social identities and social relationships, and the production of knowledge about Islam and Muslims through the narratives of written texts published in the studied papers and websites and spoken texts gathered through a series of interviews. It is therefore assumed here that the media have the power to influence and reinforce the attitudes, values and beliefs of their audience, readership and viewership.3 Taking into account these two related ways of understanding discourse, it could be argued that a discursive event is coshaped by the context in which it is produced and the social structure or institution within which it appears (Kuhar, 2006: 125). The use of this method of analysis may be challenged with the argument that discourse analysis seems to offer floating arguments without proposing a clear position as regards what is being argued for or what is being defended. In the case of this study, one may argue that analysing the representation of Islam is not always ‘an affirmation of Islam’. Or, in other words, a discursive critical analysis of how Islam and Muslims are represented does not necessarily lead to a ‘liberating interpretation’ or representation of Islam and Muslims (Sayyid, 2003: 35). Considering such criticisms, it should be stated here that discourse analysis is used more 3

Although the media shape the attitudes and beliefs of their audience, it should be pointed out here that the audience also has power to influence media production, because the audience is the media’s market. Denis McQuail’s study, for example, indicates that planning of media production and selling to advertisers are determined by “audience size; composition; patterns of demand, use, and satisfaction” (1997: 136; see also Ruddock, 2001).

12

Introduction

narrowly in this study. This means that rather than using the framework to analyse the structure and details of language use which is normally applied in linguistics, discourse analysis is used to examine the social practice aspect of language use, as expressed in written and spoken texts. Here, what is being examined is how language use functions in constructing people’s knowledge and versions of the social world and in making sense of themselves and their social worlds, such that meanings are created and (re)produced and identities are formed (Tonkiss, 1998: 246; Burck, 2005: 248). Particular attention is given to the narratives and labels used in the texts (Winkler, 2006: 8-11; Jackson, 2007: 394). Besides, the analysis also includes a critical view that offers a fairly balanced consideration of the issues discussed. As a point of comparison, the study compares, on the one hand, the representations of Islam and Muslims in the British Christian media and the British mainstream media (based upon previous studies). On the other hand, the study compares the representations of Islam and Muslims in the studied papers. By focusing on the British Christian media and comparatively examining the ways of representing Islam and Muslims in various Christian media, this study is expected to uncover a number of discursive constructions of Islam and Muslims in the media discourse, the knowledge production of Islam and Muslims and the role of the media in contributing to the recognition and misrecognition of various cultures, particularly Islam and Muslims. In the analysis, names for communities such as ‘Christians’, ‘Catholics’, ‘Anglicans’, ‘Evangelicals’ or ‘Muslims’ are used in a very broad manner to indicate a group of people’s membership of a faith community, or a worldview and belief system which a group of people subscribe to and identity with, and through which a collective identity is normally formed. The same applies to terms such as ‘Christianity’, ‘Roman Catholicism’ or ‘Islam’. Since these are used in their broadest terms, it cannot simply be assumed that Christianity (let alone Anglicanism or Evangelicalism) and Islam are monolithic. These religious traditions also have internal diversity. Clearly, this way of using the terms tends to fall into generalisation. Nevertheless, such a move is understandable on the grounds that the purpose of using the terms in their broadest way is to allow the flow of analysis and to avoid the tendency of being too detailed in matters of describing terminologies.

Socio-Cultural Construction of Recognition

13

4. The Book in Outline The book is divided into 7 chapters. Drawing on previous academic research and critical insights into the British media representations of Islam and Muslims, chapter 1 provides an overview of the common frameworks that have been used in previous studies such as ‘Orientalism’, ‘clash of civilisations’, ‘racism’ and ‘Islamophobia’, and indicates how these common frameworks are employed in the analysis of British media discourses on Islam and Muslims. By relying heavily on the studies that have been conducted, this chapter aims to review the general discourses in the British mainstream media representations of Islam and Muslims. In doing so, it provides a basis for comparing the discourses and accounts of Islam and Muslims in the British Christian media and the British mainstream media. This chapter also points out the limitations of the use of various theories in the study of media representations of Islam and Muslims. Responding to the limitations of the frameworks outlined in chapter 1, I turn to the political theory of recognition in chapter 2. This chapter presents the significance of the political theory of recognition and its possible use in the study of the representations of Islam and Muslims in the media. The notion of recognition is also discussed in relation to the constitution of knowledge among cultures, discourse, power relations, hegemonic struggle and the discursive feature of recognition in the media discourse. A theoretical clarification of the terms ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslim’ is included in this chapter. The following 4 chapters deal with the findings and discuss them in the light of the theoretical framework. Chapter 3 explores how Islam and Muslims are represented in the context of interreligious or intercultural dialogue. Focusing on the representations of Islam and Muslims in the context of reports and articles on terrorism, chapter 4 examines the labels, terms, narratives and knowledge production of ‘Islamic terrorism’ in the studied materials. Chapter 5 focuses on the findings that relate to reports on the persecution of Christians in places where Muslims are in the majority. Chapter 6 takes a different turn, focusing on the various ways of representing Islam and Muslims in the context of Britain. A conclusion follows in chapter 7. In this concluding chapter, a summary of the findings is presented, followed by a comparison between the representations of Islam and Muslims in the British mainstream media and the British Christian media. Finally, the findings are related to the theoretical framework accompanied by some considerations and further notes on the political theory of recognition.

CHAPTER ONE BRITISH MEDIA DISCOURSES ON ISLAM AND MUSLIMS

This chapter traces the discourses on Islam and Muslims in the British mainstream media. Firstly, it aims to identify the frameworks that have been used in previous studies on the media representations of Islam and Muslims; secondly, it provides a general account of British media discourses on Islam and Muslims. This will also provide a basis for comparing the discourses on Islam and Muslims in the British Christian media and the British mainstream media. In presenting the representations of Islam and Muslims in the British secular media, this chapter relies heavily on existing scholarly studies. Therefore, rather than discussing the representations of Islam and Muslims in the British media per se, this chapter deals more with the findings of previous studies and the theoretical frameworks that illuminate those studies. Since it is a general account, the term ‘British media’ is used in a very broad sense, encompassing both print and electronic media. An overview of the common frameworks used in the academic studies surrounding the topic of the media and Islam will be presented in the first section. As the account progresses, the use of the frameworks in the studies of the media representations of Islam and Muslims in other countries will be outlined in a very general way. The second section provides a closer look at the studies on the British media and Islam. Thirdly, special attention is paid to the British media representations of British Muslims.

1. Framing Islam and Muslims in the Media a) The Approach of Orientalism In his notable book entitled Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World, first published in 1981, Edward W. Said voiced concerns surrounding the coverage of Islam and Muslims in the media. Central to Said’s arguments is the notion that an Orientalist assumption has dominated the development of how the

16

Chapter One

media and experts determine how we see Islam and the rest of the world. According to this Orientalist framework, Islam and the rest of the world are constructed in such a way as to be defined according to Western categories, ways and styles of thinking. In fact, Said had already developed this argument in his earlier and famously discussed work entitled Orientalism, first published in 1978. In this work, Said points out that Orientalism exaggerates differences in a way which leads to Oriental (including Muslim) societies being homogenised and simplified in ways that reflect the West’s interest in them. This has profound implications in the creation of binary oppositions that distinguish the ‘familiar’ for Europe, the West, ‘us’ and the ‘strange’ for the Orient, the East, ‘them’ (Said, 2003[1978]: 43). Therefore, there is a link between the power of the West and the knowledge of the Oriental, simply because this knowledge provides a fundamental reason for the West to celebrate its network of power. Or, as Mutman puts it, “If Orientalist knowledge is linked with colonial/imperial economic and political powers, this is because they cannot be the powers they are without the knowledge of the Orient and the Oriental, while, at the same time, the production of this knowledge is unthinkable without the support and the context that the network of power provides” (1993:167).

According to Said, the mental operation of representing Oriental societies within the framework of Orientalist discourse works the same way in representing Islam and Muslims. He argues that the European representation of Muslims has always been “a way of controlling the redoubtable Orient” (Said, 2003[1978]: 60-69; see also Masuzawa, 2005: Ch. 6). With Christianity attached to the Western societies, Islam and Muslims are often represented using a Christian framework. In fact, as noted by Said, Orientalism was initially attached to Christianity as part of a missionary interest and activities in controlling “the other” with knowledge. Consequently, even in attempts to understand Islam, Christian frameworks are normally used in characterising or categorising Islam and Muslims. The simple example concerning this point is the use of the term ‘Mohammedanism’ as a name for Islam and ‘Mohammedists’ for Muslims. This use of terms precisely follows the way the terms ‘Christianity’ and ‘Christians’ derive from ‘Christ’. The implication is that Islam is not understood from within, since it is understood through the window of Christianity. This leads to the further implication that “Islam became an image….whose function was not so much to represent Islam in itself as to represent it for the medieval Christian” (Said, 2003[1978]: 60). Indeed, categorising Islam through the frame of Christianity has profound

British Media Discourses on Islam and Muslims

17

consequences. Here, Islam is not only seen as ‘the other’ to the West but also ‘the other religion’ to Christianity (Saeed, 2007: 453). Moreover, the history of Christianity is often used in analysing the presence of Islam. Take the notion of enlightenment as an example. Often, the attachment of Christianity to the West and the enlightenment process experienced by Christianity are used to motivate the need for an Islamic enlightenment. One of the best examples of the voices proposing this argument is Pim Fortuyn, the late Dutch pundit and politician, who also published Against the Islamization of Our Culture in 1997. According to Fortuyn, Islam is incompatible with what he calls ‘Judeo-Christian humanistic culture’. Elaborating this argument in an interview, he argues that “Christianity and Judaism have gone through the process of enlightenment, making them creative and constructive elements in society. That didn’t happen in Islam. There is a tension between the values of modern society and the principles of Islam” (cited in Bunzl, 2007: 38). The problem with Fortuyn’s assessment is that there is no clear answer to the question of the grounds on which Islam should go through the process of enlightenment, as experienced by Christianity and Judaism. Should the experiences of Christianity and Judaism serve as a point of reference in the discussion of Islam? It is interesting that Fortuyn uses the notion of enlightenment to support the claim of tension between Islam and the values of modern society. The problem here is that there is no explicit explanation as to whether or not the values of modern society are at the same time also the values of ‘enlightened Christianity or Judaism’. This brings us to Said’s observation in Covering Islam. According to Said, even though Islam is often categorised by the West using a Christian framework, the West in fact has used Christianity for its own purposes on the ground. Here is his argument: “[W]e must immediately note that it is always the West, and not Christianity, that seems pitted against Islam. Why? Because the assumption is that whereas ‘the West’ is greater than and has surpassed the stage of Christianity, its principal religion, the world of Islam….is still mired in religion, primitivity and backwardness” (Said, 1997[1981]: 10).

Part of the way Islam is represented derives from Western knowledge of Islam. While diagnosing the dominating framework within Western knowledge of other societies, Said points out a cultural antipathy of the West, which leads to the ‘negativisation’ of other cultures, and of Islam in particular. “For many reasons…” Said says, “knowledge of Islam and of Islamic peoples has generally proceeded not only from dominance and confrontation but also from cultural antipathy. Today Islam is defined

18

Chapter One

negatively as that with which the West is radically at odds, and this tension establishes a framework radically limiting knowledge of Islam” (1997[1981]: 163). The idea of Islam as ‘a way of life’ and a lived experience for Muslims is therefore left out. Islam is understood more as a political or cultural movement rather than a religious belief. The knowledge of others in this case assumes “the absence of others”. The analysis offered by Montgomery Watt illustrates this point. Watt’s works advocate the need for the West to distinguish between fundamentalist, traditionalist and liberal Muslims, and the need for Muslims to rethink some basic and central concepts of Islam such as ijtihad, the process of interpreting Islam’s legal sources, the Qur’an and the Sunnah. According to Watt, the historic Western perception of Muslims maintains the idea that Islam is false and a deliberate perversion of truth, a religion which spreads by violence and the sword, a religion of self-indulgence and Muhammad is the Anti-Christ (1991: 85-86; see also Ahmed, 1992: 181). This said-perception again confirms a competing culture or religion to Islam. This is to say that the West, with its religion, considers itself as a society that, in contrast with Islam, has a genuine truth, spreads with love and has Christ as its central figure. Critically, one may argue that by presenting the Orient in a negative way, the Orient becomes an instrument of identity construction, allowing the West to maintain, or even reinforce, its control and dominating power. Or, in Said’s own words, “European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self” (2003[1978]: 3). In examining the representations of Islam and Muslims in various Western media, several scholars have built on the framework of Orientalism, including Edward W. Said himself. Concentrating on the American media, in Covering Islam Said contends that the media indeed provides the opportunity to know more about Islam, Muslims and the Muslim world. However, by using a negative lens in representing Islam and Muslims, “Americans have scant opportunity to view the Islamic world except reductively, coercively, oppositionally” (Said, 1997[1981]: 55). This has the consequence of shaping the mind of both Americans and Muslims in the Islamic world. According to Said, “[t]o Westerners and Americans, ‘Islam’ represents a resurgent atavism, which suggests…the destruction of….the democratic order in the Western world. For a great many Muslims,…. ‘Islam’ stands for a reactive counter-response to this first image of Islam as a threat” (Said, 1997[1981]: 55). At least as a term, far from being religious, ‘Islam’ becomes a sort of political and ideological cover that represents the idea of threat, violence, conflict or war for the West, and a counter-response to the West for the Islamic

British Media Discourses on Islam and Muslims

19

world. Another study on the media representations of Islam and Muslims in Slovenia after the 9/11 events also identifies a tendency to employ ‘wethey’ discourse, which derives from Orientalist discourse. Lucija Bošnick, who conducted the study, concluded that “the West created its own, western image of Islam that suits and matches the political and psychological needs of the West” (cited in Kuhar, 2006: 132). The use of Orientalist discourse often includes associations of Islam with the Arab world. When covering the war and political conflicts in the Middle East, the media tend to build a report or argument based on the association of Islam with the Arab world (Muscati, 2003; Abrahamian, 2003; Richardson, 2004: chapter 3; Mishra, 2008). The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait or Iraq-Kuwait war in 1990, for example, is framed in the media as “another example where the West had to intervene to save Arabs from their own barbaric nature” (Muscati, 2002: 136; cited in Mishra, 2008: 159).

b) “Clash of Civilisation” Theory While Said uses the Orientalist discourse to explain how knowledge about ‘the other’ determines power over ‘the other’, Samuel P. Huntington later formulated the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis in his most quoted and influential article, entitled ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, which was first published in Foreign Affairs in 1993, and later developed into a book with the same title but without the question mark. The heart of Huntington’s argument is that in the post-cold war world, the primary source of conflict will be the cultural and religious identities of people because a clash or a conflict is a product of the difference. According to Huntington, of all the objective elements which define civilisations, the most important is usually religion. He then predicts that the basis for conflict in the twentyfirst century is the clash between the West and Islam (2002[1996]: 42 and 207-211). Supporting this claim, he indicates that Islam is a serious and real threat in military, demographic and socio-religious terms, with a hope that is epitomised in the idea of ‘Islam is the solution’ as a fundamental slogan (Huntington, 2002[1996]: 109). This clash, as Huntington understands it, is a product of difference, particularly the Muslim concept of Islam as a way of life transcending and uniting religion and politics versus the Western Christian concept of the separate ideas of God and Caesar. When the article first appeared, according to Abrahamian, political scientists and the intellectual community dismissed the thesis as counterproductive, curious, strange, wrong and dangerously misleading,

20

Chapter One

on the grounds that in the post-cold war world, international politics are still made by governments. This means that governments do not pursue cultural interests but state and national interests. After all, states control civilisations. Consequently, if there is a clash, it should be a clash of interests, not of cultures (Abrahamian, 2003; Klausen, 2005). However, following the 9/11 attacks, Huntington’s hypothesis triumphed. Among politicians, commentators, journalists and theorists, many believe that what we witnessed in the 9/11 events and its aftermath was a ‘clash of civilisations’: a battle between two civilisations, Western and Islamic (Halliday, 2002; Asani, 2003; Rai, 2006; Fox and Sandler, 2006). The media discursively used the clash of civilisations to frame the events in the context of Western civilisation ‘threatened’ by ‘the other’, particularly Islam. Islam, the Islamic world and Muslims are then perceived as the main and real threat to Western civilisation. On the political stage, the clash of civilisations hypothesis provides a place for a show of force. In the wake of the 9/11 events, the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ became a powerful political discourse, particularly through the speeches of George W. Bush, the then President of the United States of America. In his speeches following the 9/11 events, he proclaimed that “they are targeting our way of life”; “they have attacked America because we are freedom’s home and defenders”1; “they are Islamist extremists . . . they hate our freedom . . . they want to drive Christians and Jews out of the vast regions of Asia and Africa”.2 Following the 9/11 events, referring to the terrorists, President Bush made a famous declaration that “you are either with us or against us”. He then continued that “there was no room for neutrality in the war against terrorism”.3 After this famous statement, a new discourse emerged in the public sphere including media reports, namely a ‘war on terrorism’. President Bush made it clear that the war on terrorism is not a war against Islam. However, his decision to use the word ‘crusade’ in a speech delivered on 16 September 2001 did not only remind the public of the

1

President Bush’s speech at the National Day of Prayer, 14 September 2001, retrieved from http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/gwbush911prayer& memorialaddress.htm. Accessed on 28th February 2009. 2 President Bush’s speech at the Joint Session of Congress, 20 September 2001, retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked /transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html. Accessed on 28th February 2009. 3 See http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/11/06/gen.attack.on.terror. Accessed on 15th November 2008.

British Media Discourses on Islam and Muslims

21

events which had happened centuries ago,4 but also opened up the historical wound in the relations of Muslims and Christians. The power, the context and the historical turning point which the speech represented unavoidably provoked comparisons with other historical ‘call to arms’ speeches, such as the speech at Clermont by Pope Urban II (1095) launching the first crusade, or the speech at the Reichstag by Adolf Hitler (1938) prior to Germany’s annexation of Austria (Graham et al., 2004: 200). As the public discourse was developed around the notion of ‘war on terror’, the tendency to associate Islam with terrorism and violence became unavoidable. What is often forgotten is the underlying subtext of President Bush’s discourse, namely its double-standard or paradoxical meaning. Analysts such as Slavoj Žižek point out this paradox and double standard in the use of competing ideas, of the kind seen in the remarks of President Bush. One example can be given here. In his address on Sunday 7 October 2001, following the start of the U.S. military strikes on targets in Afghanistan, President Bush quoted a letter from a fourth-grader, the daughter of a soldier. In her letter to the president, this young girl wrote: “As much as I don’t want my Dad to fight, I’m willing to give him to you”. Having quoted the letter, Bush continued: “This is a precious gift. The greatest she could give. This young girl knows what America is all about. Since September 11, an entire generation of young Americans has gained new understanding of the value of freedom, and its cost in duty and in sacrifice.”5 Commenting on this, Žižek asked us to imagine the same event in reverse, with an Afghan girl saying the same thing. Žižek went on to argue that “we would immediately say: ‘What cynicism, what fundamentalism, what manipulations of small children.’…What shocks us in others we ourselves also do in a way” (Reul and Deichmann, 2001). It could be concluded that there is no room for neutrality when competing forces clash in the forms of binary oppositions, or when such forces direct socio-political discourses.

c) Theories of Racism Besides Orientalism and the clash of civilisations hypothesis, theories of racism have also provided a framework for studies on Islam and 4

In this speech, President Bush said, “This crusade, this war on terrorism is gonna take a while. And the American people must be patient.” See, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/16/gen.bush.terrorism. Accessed on 28th ebruary 2009. 5 See http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/10/07/ret.bush.transcript/index.html. Accessed on 28th February 2009.

22

Chapter One

Muslim communities, particularly in Western societies. Generally, theories of racism have two central characteristics (Rattansi, 1994: 54). The first characteristic relies on a biological definition, through which a population is defined according to various common features such as skin colour, hair type or shape of nose and skull. The second characteristic attempts to develop a hierarchy of races, through which some are represented as racially superior or inferior to others. Anthias (1995: 288) indicates that earlier studies seem to frame the notion of racism around “a natural relation between an essence attributed to a human population, whether biological or cultural, and social outcomes that do, will or should flow from this”. However, as pointed out by Gilroy (1992: 53), ‘new racism’ has successfully distanced itself from the notions of biological or cultural inferiority, and has instead created a link between race, nationhood, patriotism and nationalism. This obviously leads to a form of ‘cultural racism’ within which undesirable groups are not “conceptualized in explicit racial terms, but as Others more generally”. Anthias even goes further, claiming that as groups, ‘others’ are “endowed with fixed, unchanging and negative characteristics, and subjected to relations of inferiorisation and exclusion” (Anthias, 1995: 294; cited also in Richardson, 2004: 2). Anthias’s claim seems to exaggerate the notion of ‘fixedness’ in relation to cultural racism. The claim can also be challenged on the grounds that society is not a static entity and, therefore, that any idea or discourse is always entitled to a flexible process that allows dialectics, counter discourses or examples. However, Anthias is right to point out that when a certain group is excluded from the discourses of national belonging and identity, that group tends to be inferiorised and negativised. With regard to Muslims, the Runnymede Trust indicated that Muslims have been seen through the lens of cultural racism. In a publication which is commonly known as ‘the Parekh Report’, the Trust developed an analysis based on the racism frame. Racism in this context is more broadly defined to include prejudices over a religious group. In their report, the Runnymede Trust indicates that “The essential point to stress is that over centuries all racisms have had – and continue to have – two separate but intertwining strands. One uses physical or biologically derived signs as a way of recognizing difference – skin colour, hair, features, body type, and so on. The other uses cultural features, such as ways of life, customs, language, religion and stress…. Most Muslims are recognized by physical features as well as by their culture and religion, and the biological and cultural strands in anti-Muslim racism are often impossible to disentangle” (Runnymede Trust, 2000: 62).

British Media Discourses on Islam and Muslims

23

To give an example, a study by Liz Fekete indicates that in the wake of the 9/11 events, cultural racisms expanded to encompass ‘xeno-racism’ and ‘administrative racism’. She notes this expansion in an interesting article entitled “Racial Profiling and the War on Terror” (2006), in which she observes that in the EU, registered data in the Schengen Information System (SIS) has been extended to include not only personal data on asylum seekers, but also on foreigners. While this move signifies ‘a new form of administrative racism’, the notion of ‘War on Terror’ has been used by European security services to profile other groups perceived as a threat. This means that, “since Islam represents ‘threat’ within Europe, the EU and member states are building up ‘risk profiles’ of Muslim residents, even though they may be citizens” (Fekete, 2006: 36). However, on a discursive level, the application of cultural racism’s notion on Muslims is often questioned, as it is based upon the assumption that unlike gender, race and sexuality, which are involuntary categories of birth, Muslim identities are voluntarily chosen because they are religious identities. While this assumption is a fair one, in some respects, what is being forgotten, as pointed out by Meer and Modood (2009), is that no one chooses to be born “into a Muslim family” or “into a society where to look like a Muslim or to be a Muslim creates suspicion, hostility, or failure to get the job you applied for”.

d) The Notion of Islamophobia Another framework that is closely related to cultural racism is the notion of Islamophobia. When the Runnymede Trust published its report entitled Islamophobia: a challenge for us all in 1997, the term ‘Islamophobia’ was used within the frame of cultural racism that provokes racial, cultural and religious harassments, violence and attacks (Runnymede Trust, 1997: chapter 6). In fact, the term itself was used with some reservation. However, deriving from the use of other terms such as ‘xenophobia’ and ‘europhobia’, the term ‘Islamophobia’ was used with reference to “dread or hatred of Islam – and, therefore, to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims” or simply to an “unfounded hostility towards Islam” (Runnymede Trust, 1997: 1 and 4). Today, it is still debatable whether or not the term Islamophobia is useful in identifying contemporary prejudices or stereotypes towards Muslims. According to Meer and Modood (2009), the debate around the notion of Islamophobia has been shaped by questions of the basic arguments involved in determining whether hostility is ‘founded’ or ‘unfounded’, and by criticisms of the term ‘Islamophobia’ as an

24

Chapter One

insufficient one, either because it neglects the aggressive side of discrimination or misses the real point about what is being attacked.6 Social anthropologist Pnina Werbner points out another way of seeing Islamophobia, namely as “an incapacity to cope not only with difference but with resemblance”. For Werbner, “Islamophobia may be conceived of as a very post-modern kind of fear”, in which Islam is seen as a threat “not simply to the uneducated working class or petit bourgeoisie”, but also as “a threat to the intellectuals and elites in Western society”. This is because, for the fearful elites, the presence, or at least the discourse, around Islam is considered to be clashing with the current intellectual trend, which is leaning towards anti-essentialism and relativism (Werbner, 2005: 8). In explaining the notion of Islamophobia, the Runnymede report proposes 8 characteristic views of Islam, by differentiating two different views, called ‘open’ and ‘closed’ views of Islam.7 While offering a general summary of Islamophobia via these 8 views, chapter four of the Runnymede report on Islamophobia is dedicated to the media coverage of Islam and Muslims, in particular. The report points out that negative references to Islam are routinely reflected and perpetuated in statements, remarks, editorials, columns, articles, reader’s letters, cartoons and the reporting of events widely circulated in both the broadsheet and tabloid press, nationally and locally. In a study on Islamophobia in Slovenian media representations of Islam and Muslims after the 9/11 events, Sreþo Dragoš finds that the 9/11 events were not, in fact, the cause of intolerance towards Muslims in Slovenia, because Islamophobia was already present in Slovenia before the events of 9/11. He contends that the media plays a big role in sustaining Islamophobia, but that “Islamophobia is created, or

6

This criticism is proposed by Halliday who argues that Islamophobia is misleading because ‘It misses the point about what it is that is being attacked: “Islam” as a religion was the enemy in the past: in the crusades or the reconquista. It is not the enemy now [....] The attack now is not against Islam as a faith but against Muslims as a people, the latter grouping together all, especially immigrants, who might be covered by the term’ (Halliday, 1999: 898, cited in Meer and Modood, 2009: 341). 7 The eight distinctions of closed and open views of Islam include: (1) Islam is seen as monolithic and static, or as diverse and dynamic; (2) Islam is seen as other and separate, or as similar and interdependent; (3) Islam is seen as inferior or as different but equal; (4) Islam is seen as an aggressive enemy, or as a cooperative partner; (5) Muslims are seen as manipulative, or as sincere; (6) Muslims criticisms of ‘the West’ are rejected, or debated; (7) discriminatory behaviour against Muslims is defended, or opposed; and (8) anti-Muslim hostility is accepted as natural and normal or as problematic (The Runnymede Trust, 1997:4-5).

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generated, primarily in the field of politics, and that the media operate as the reproducers of this intolerance” (cited in Kuhar, 2006: 133).

e) The Media and Newsworthiness I have presented some theoretical frames commonly employed in studies of the media representations of Islam and Muslims. These frames include the approaches of Orientalism, the clash of civilisations, cultural racism and Islamophobia. Before proceeding further, a comment has to be made here concerning the media and newsworthiness. As far as media coverage is concerned, one of the defining factors for a news item is the notion of newsworthiness. Media and journalism studies inform us about factors that determine the newsworthiness of an event. Without going deeper into discussing this issue, I will briefly turn to Johan Galtung and Mari Holmboe Ruge’ classic essay, published in 1965, entitled “The Structure of Foreign News”, in order to provide a basic understanding of a common hypotheses of news reporting, particularly in the context of the media coverage of Islam and Muslims. In this classic essay, Galtung and Ruge suggest that there are some basic and fundamental factors that support the newsworthiness of an issue or an event. There are two fundamental factors that can be considered here. The first concerns the negativity of the news. The formula of this factor is that the more negative the event in its consequences, the more probable that it will become a news item. Interestingly, Galtung and Ruge also suggest a correlation between this formula and the distance of the event. This correlation is seen in their hypothesis that a negative event is more likely to be reported if the event occurs at a cultural distance from the society in which the news is reported. The other factor concerns the highlighting of stereotypes. This factor follows the formula that the more closely a journalistic report reproduces the common stereotypes of a particular people, the greater the likelihood that it will be highlighted in a news report (Galtung and Ruge, 1965; UNESCO, 1974:163; Karim, 2006: 116). Said’s Covering Islam clearly echoes these hypotheses, especially when he argues that the intense focus on Muslims and Islam in the western media is characterised by “a more highly exaggerated stereotyping and belligerent hostility” (Said, 1997[1981]: xi). Such portrayals often exist without context, because media reports seldom provide the historical, cultural or social backgrounds that accompany negative portrayals of Muslims, especially when the event takes place in a country which is distant from the country where it is reported in the media.

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2. British Media and Islam Studies on the British media reveal the use of the above frames in representing Islam. One of the common findings is the application of textual binary oppositions. The studies of Richardson (2001, 2004, 2007), Poole (2002), Ameli et al. (2007) and Moore et al. (2008) on British media reports of Islam demonstrate how the polarised binary system, as analysed in Said’s Orientalism and maintained in Huntington’s clash of civilisations, has been used in British media reports on Islam and Muslims. Examining the 1997 media coverage of Islam in four British newspapers, Poole indicates that the cultural clash used in the British Media is constructed through a number of textual binary oppositions, such as freedom versus constraint, rationality versus irrationality and morality versus immorality (Poole, 2002: 111-114; see also Halliday, 2002: 45-47). In these textual binary oppositions, the former term represents the West and the latter represents ‘the rest’ or, more precisely, Islam. This is clearly shown in the media’s specific lexical choices, addressing the audience inclusively as ‘we’, in opposition with ‘they’. In a similar way, Richardson (2001) indicates the use of a binary strategy in the media reports through which Islam is presented as the opponent of ‘democracy’ and ‘modernity’. His study on the ‘Letters to the Editor’, printed in the British broadsheet press as a response to various articles and reports on Islam strongly, supports this claim. According to Richardson, when argumentation opposes ‘Islam’ with ‘democracy’ or ‘Modernity’, the antithesis simultaneously excludes and debases Islam and Muslims, reducing ‘It’ and ‘Them’ to a ‘sub-’, or perhaps ‘pre-Western’ position. He then points out that ‘Letters to the Editor’ published in the British broadsheet press often critically include stereotypical themes such as ‘foreign’, ‘medieval’ and ‘barbaric’ to illustrate the connection between Islam and ‘undemocratic’ civil society. The use of the clash of civilisations hypothesis to understand the 9/11 events has overwhelmed media broadcasting, reports and analysis. Writing in The Guardian8, Jonathan Freedland comments on how the 9/11 events have displaced the notion of global capitalism, which was much discussed previously, with panic over the prospect of a ‘clash of civilisations’. Since the public discourses relate the events with Islam and Muslims, he then points out that racism is no longer a tension between black and white. With the prejudices over Islam after 9/11, “the imagined threat today is of 8

See, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/sep/04/september11.usa3. Accessed on 20th February 2009.

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a Muslim enemy within”. Following his discussion on how the reassertion of religion has given a new face to the discourse of racism, Freedland continues, “The thought that an act of such horror could be fuelled by religious anger sent people rushing back to texts they had once ignored. The Koran became a US bestseller, as people learned anew that religion was not just a private matter for individuals but one with grave public implications.” Following the political discourse after the 9/11 events, the framing of the phrase ‘war on terror’ quickly became popular, first on the political stage and later, when it was widely popularised by the media. While the introduction of the phrase captures the attention of the public, the terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorists’ are, in fact, not really new. The issue of ‘terrorism’ has played a significant role in political life and in international relations since the end of the 1960s. The Arabic term irhabiyaa and the Persian term irhab, which refer to terrorism, were commonly used at that time (Halliday, 2002: 70). However, the term ‘terrorism’ became more popular when politicians and journalists publicly introduced and used the term ‘Islamic terrorists’ following the 9/11 attacks. In using this term, media reports provide a context for a military intervention framed in the phrase of ‘the war on terrorism’. The problem is that if the 9/11 events are political violence, is terrorism a useful category for understanding political violence? Responding to this question, Sayyid considers the development of the discourse of ‘war on terrorism’ as an articulation of ‘international community’ as an entity that stands as opposition to terrorism, with any charge of terrorism being used to “exclude states or peoples from membership of ‘international community’ and thus from being protected by the provisions of international law” (Sayyid, 2003: x). Besides the term ‘Islamic terrorists’, media and experts have used variant expressions such as ‘Islamic fundamentalists’, ‘Islamists’, ‘radical Islamists’ and ordinary ‘Muslims’. Francis Fukuyama points out that there are significant distinctions in these terms (2006: 69-70). Though these terms can be defined in various ways, the distinction presented by Fukuyama reasonably represents the common understanding of the terms. According to Fukuyama, ‘Islamic fundamentalists’ act from religious motives in order to revive imagined earlier religious practices. ‘Islamists’ emphasise political goals and want to bring religion into the political arena. S. Sayyid discusses the use of Islamic metaphors for political gain and defines Islamists as “those who use Islamic metaphors to narrate their political projects” (Sayyid, 2003: 157). ‘Radical Islamists’ are often also called ‘jihadists’. They tend to develop an idea of gaining political goals which includes the use of violence to achieve such goals. These terms

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have been widely used in media discourses on Islam and Muslims, and this includes mainstream discourse in the British media. A study on the ‘Images of Islam in the UK’, conducted by Kerry Moore et al. (2008), indicates that since the 9/11 events, nouns such as extremist, Islamist, suicide bomber and militant and adjectives such as radical, fanatical, fundamentalist, extremist and militant are often associated with Islam and Muslims in media reports. The use of such terms echoes the famous term ‘Islamism’. Generally, this term has been used by Muslim and nonMuslim scholars to refer to movements and ideologies that are related to the revival of Islam and its political realisation. However, Sayyid quickly reminds us that it would be wrong to suggest that “Islamism is a totally cohesive and agreed upon discourse”, since Islamism has many variations with various Islamist movements. Rather than considering Islamism as a name for radical political movements, he suggests that Islamism is “a new terrain of ethical, cultural, political and social action” (2003: 157). Besides Islamism, other terms have also been circulated within academic writings such as political Islam, Islamic fundamentalism, Islamist purism and Islamofascism (Steger, 2008: 219-220). Within the discourse of the war on terrorism, one individual has become the centre of attention: Osama bin Laden. Articles and reports featuring Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda appear frequently in the British media and in the world news. In dealing with this individual, since the 9/11 events, reports and articles in the British media featuring bin Laden and al-Qaeda have referred to Islam and Muslims. As a result, people in general have made the assumption that those who are under suspicion of terrorism are Muslims, and have been conditioned to think that all or most terrorists are Muslims (Poole, 2002). In the case of bin Laden, rather than being presented as an individual, he is constructed in such a way as to represent a certain kind of world: a world of violence and terrorism. Here, he is imagined as a concept or an idea, simply because he personifies or embodies a world of threats, violence and certainly terrorism. According to Poole, the characterisation of bin Laden, constructed in acres of newsprint, tells us little about him and rather more about the culturalpolitical context in which the coverage was formulated. Consequently, the desire and process of knowing about ‘the Other’ results in his demonization, and he is elevated to a mythical status (Poole, 2002: 4). Unfortunately, as a consequence of the media reports, the public assume that bin Laden represents a monolithic Islam, or even that Islam is synonymous with bin Laden. By relating him to Islam and Muslims, the media coverage and reports therefore produce and sustain a kind of knowledge in which Muslims are closely linked with terrorism. On the one

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hand, this construction produces, reproduces and sustains knowledge of bin Laden and terrorism as two sides of one coin, and mentioning this individual’s name is like presenting to the public a world of threat, fear and violence. On the other hand, the problem is that by closely associating Islam with terrorism on the level of discourse, bin Laden is represented as if he is the face or the personification of Islam. The association of Islam with threat, violence and terrorism is not really new, as far as the history of the encounter between Islam and Christianity is concerned. In the thirteenth century, the crusader and polemicist Oliver of Paderborn claimed that “Islam began by the sword, was maintained by the sword, and by the sword would be ended” (Daniel, 1960: 127). Western Christians have also maintained the belief that “Islam was invented by men whose motives and character were to be deplored, and propagated by the sword” (Hourani, 1991: 10). The ‘war on terrorism’ discourse seems to re-echo these claims. With the underlying assumption that those who are under suspicion of terrorism are Muslims, the media often represent Islam in relation to negative actions, particularly terrorism and violence. In his study, Richardson observes that fear of Islam is often formulated in British media reports with negative references such as violence, threat and terrorism. This suggests that Islam and Muslims are being linked, intentionally or otherwise, to negative social action (Richardson, 2001; 2007: 18). Though the war on terrorism is not described as a war on Islam, this phrase has become associated with a discourse which always refers to Islam. By continual reference to ‘Muslim and Islamic terrorists’, the perpetrators of terrorism come to be seen as products of a fanatical strain of Islam. As a result, the associated negative behaviour is seen to evolve out of something inherent in the religion, rendering any Muslim a potential terrorist (Knightly, 2001, cited in Peach, 2006). Here, media reports on the discourse of war on terror reinforce, in the imagination, a perception which equates Islam with violence and terrorism, and as therefore deserving a counter-war.

3. British Media and British Muslims This section turns to the British media reports on Islam and British Muslims. The public interest in Islam and Muslims in the context of Britain has been very significant, partly because of the many global events related to Islam and Muslims. The cultural politics of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ or ‘West’ versus ‘Islam’ in the news discourse in fact help to “create and reinforce the fears of what are predominantly white audiences toward other ethnic groups” (Allan, 2004:149). In Britain, the construction of

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Islam and Muslims through the Oriental construction of the Other or the clash of civilisations hypothesis and the discourse of ‘war on terror’ has created, constituted and developed the discourse of ‘Islamophobia’. The Runnymede Trust report (1997) indicates that examples such as the Honeyford affair, the Rushdie affair and issues such as halal meat in schools and the Gulf War have pushed Islam into the national arena, within which unfounded hostility towards Islam and fear of Islam takes shape, in the form of Islamophobic symptoms or attacks. Islamophobia is mainly characterised by the belief that all or most Muslims are religious fanatics, have violent tendencies towards non-Muslims, and reject such concepts as equality, tolerance and democracy (Sayid, 2006: 1). In relation to the media representations of Islam and Muslims, these Islamophobic symptoms are indeed well displayed as pointed out in various studies. In illustrating how the British media promote the Islamophobic symptom, Sayid (2006) mentions the following two examples. Firstly, in 2003, when the Home Office produced a poster about alleged deceit and dishonesty amongst people seeking asylum, concerns were illustrated by focusing on someone with a Muslim name. Secondly, an end-of-year article in the Sunday Times magazine on ‘Inhumanity to Man’ focused, in four of its five examples, on actions by Muslims. In fact, fear of Islam was demonstrably present long before the 9/11 events in the British media. Allegations of Islamic fundamentalism as a seed for Islamophobia appeared in a very influential article written by Anthony Burgess, published in the Observer (27 September 1981), in which Muslims were alleged to be using their religion as a strategic, political and military advantage rather than as a religious faith and as a way of life shaped by a comprehensive legal tradition (Runnymede Trust, 1997; Sayid, 2006). In the case of the ‘Honeyford affair’ in the mid-1980s, the reactions of Muslims attracted national media interest, and images of angry and violent crowds were flashed across the nation’s television channels over and over again. The term ‘fundamentalist’ then entered the journalistic lexicon as a description of British Muslims (Lewis, 2002: 3). The Economist later stated that “Islam is per se fundamentalist” (4 April 1992, cited in Richardson, 2001: 147). Poole points out that “the media as an instrument of public ideology demonises Islam, portraying it as a threat to Western interests, thus reproducing, producing and sustaining the ideology necessary to subjugate Muslims” (Poole, 2002: 17). The pattern of sustaining Islamophobic discourse in prejudices and stereotypes about Islam and Muslims seems to employ the same strategy or model, pointing fingers to various cases and attacks. This is to say that knowledge circulation of Islam and Muslims in the British media maintains a certain

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pattern, in which various cases and affairs are used as a justification for producing and sustaining prejudices and stereotypes. Kerry Moore et al. also conducted a study on the representation of British Muslims in the national print news media from 2000 to 2008, which included a content analysis, an analysis of images and a series of case studies (2008). In this study, they found that around two thirds of the coverage of British Muslims focused on Muslims as “a threat (in relation to terrorism), a problem (in terms of differences in values) or both (Muslim extremism in general)” (Moore et al., 2008: 3). This negative coverage also influences the assessment of Islam in the media. The study found that negative representations of Islam outnumber positive assessments by more than four to one. Images of Muslims in the studied print media focus on the cultural/religious differences in which Muslims are depicted to have engaged in religious practice, in a way non-Muslims rarely are. While the study found more equal proportions in images of non-Muslim men and women, it also found that Muslim men were far more visible than Muslim women in the images published in the studied print media. In the case studies focused on the notions of ‘war on terror’, ‘cultural/religious differences’ and ‘Muslim extremism’, the study indicated that a number of stories were framed within the context of the perceived threat and fear of Islam. These various negative representations of Islam and Muslims, as presented above, go along with the tendency to homogenise Muslims. Muslims in the British media are often represented in an ethnically undifferentiated way (The Economist, 2002; The Guardian, 2005; Peach, 2006). In events such as the Rushdie Affair, 9/11 attacks, the 7/7 London bombings and the Madrid bombings, the British media refer to British Muslims as if they were a single community. This tendency to homogenise Muslims is maintained in the British mainstream press. Poole makes this point when she stresses that “the increasing visibility of Muslims to nonMuslims in the UK in a global mediated world, within which Muslims are homogenised, has resulted in their construction as a threat to nonMuslims” (2002: 22). This tendency certainly ignores, at least, the ethnically and culturally heterogeneous elements of Muslims and the diversity within Islam. Beside the homogenisation and negativisation of Muslims, there is also a noted tendency towards the exclusion of Muslims from public discourse. In noting this tendency, Richardson argues that the exclusion of Muslims from the constructed ‘Britishness’ is achieved using one of two methods (2001: 113-120). The first method is the split between ‘British’ and ‘nonBritish’. Through this method, boundaries through which British Muslim

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communities are classified as ‘non-British’ groups and therefore defined as ‘foreigner-other” are created discursively. The texts analysed by Richardson demonstrate the structured expressions which exclude ‘Them’ from the in-group, ‘the British’. The second method uses the explicit split based on a framework created around the idea of values. Analysing texts in the British media, Richardson points out that claims of science, capitalism, individualism and democracy as Western or British values in some texts tend to explicitly highlight a sort of ideological conflict, through the claim of the absence of these values in ‘other societies’. This is clearly seen when the texts present the West and Islam as engaged in a battle for, or over, modernity. As the argument goes, the West is represented as the supporter of modernity while Muslims are depicted as a group of people humiliated by modernism. Moreover, religion is often used as an explanatory factor in the motivation of certain actions. In the case of the wearing of hijab, for example, the hijab is used as an indication of the Islamic-ness of either the theme or the actors. Islam is then identified as ‘other values’, to the extent that “their ‘Islamic-ness’ is used to divide ‘Them’ from ‘Us’.” This means that while these methods distance one group called ‘Us’ from another group called ‘Muslims’, they also exclude the opinions of British Muslims from the media discourse. Richardson’s argument points out the basic assumptions held by the media concerning their audience. Following his analysis, it is likely that the media assume that their audiences have more or less the same background, face the same realities and probably have the same way of interpreting such realities. This interpretation echoes Said’s argument, in analysing US media reports on Islam. According to Said, while the media strive to have the same audience, there is a strong assumption that the audience is ruled by “a uniform set of assumptions about reality”. Having such a way of thinking, Islam is pictured as uniform and in some ways reductive and monochromatic (Said, 1997[1981]:49). The assumption held by the media, that to a certain extent their audience has a single background, creates a hegemonic stance through which a certain culture, group or people is considered as the dominant culture and others are seen as sub-cultures. Here the media create their own elites, in which the elites consist of their own defined-audience, and the rest are the non-elites. Often, prejudices, discriminations and legitimisation of hegemonic power are identified as a result of excluding minority cultures or ethnic minority groups in the discourse of nation, national identity and the construction of national culture. From the perspective of racism, Richardson argues that “the reporting of the broadsheet press is dominated by racist assumptions and outputs” (Richardson, 2004: xvi). When Islam is

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reported, Richardson notes that the central dominant idea that drives the media representation of Islam and Muslims is the notion that “Muslims are essentially barbarians in need of (Our) civilization” (Richardson, 2004: 230). The same claim has been made by Robert Miles, in his earlier argument that European representations of the Islamic world made extensive use of images of barbarism and sexuality in the context of a Christian/heathen dichotomy (Miles, 1989: 34-35). As a result, the actions of Muslims are usually framed around this central dominant idea. Thus, on the one hand, in the case of less negative reporting contexts, Muslim social actions and activities are not publicly recognised as what Muslims do/are. On the other hand, in negative reporting contexts, Muslims are “marked out and rhetorically ‘Other-ed’” (Richardson, 2004: 231). The negativisation of Muslims has consequences, whether through the tendency to exclude them from the notion of Britishness or through racial tones. In the case of Muslims, such approaches clearly affect the process of internal identity formation, particularly among young Muslims. Ansari identifies this problem when he argues that “made to feel different and excluded, many British Muslims, especially the youth, found a valuable resource and alternative forms of identification in ‘religion’” (Ansari, 2004: 9). The issue itself is indeed more complex than Ansari indicates. This is because the question of Muslims, in relation to the notion of integration into British society, includes a range of issues. As pointed out by Modood and Ahmad, the issues range from “the anxiety about terrorist cells and networks recruiting alienated young Muslims”, to the question of Muslims’ willingness to be loyal “to the British state rather than to the transnational Muslim leaders and causes” and to the commitment of Muslims to what are considered to be core British values such as “freedom, tolerance, democracy, sexual equality and secularism” (2007: 188). The method of excluding and racialising Muslims echoes the findings that the media representation of ethnic minority is ‘a double-sided blade’. On the one hand, the media creates the ‘invisibility of minorities’ by marginalising their voices. On the other hand, the actual representation is often constructed in the forms of negative discourses or in a stereotyped context (Campbell, 1995; Ameli et al., 2007: 8). One critical note should be added here. The idea of marginalising the voice of ethnic minority groups does not necessarily mean silencing them in a repressive way. What the findings propose is that the voice of ethnic minority is marginalised because there is very little space for them in the public sphere to voice their concerns. With regard to the representation of Islam and Muslims in the British media, such a conclusion seems to generalise,

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or to a certain extent exaggerate, the whole idea. In the context of Britain, a number of scholars and prominent Muslims have been involved in the public sphere, discussing the struggles and the rights of ethnic minority groups including Muslims, although their involvement cannot be claimed as an act on behalf of Muslims. Given the fact that most studies found that the British media tend to negativise Islam and Muslims in their reporting, one may ask: do studies on British media representation of Islam also fall into the trap of generalising ‘the media representations’ of Islam and Muslims? Or are British media representations of Islam and Muslims really negative? Do British media develop their own version of Islam and therefore define what Islam is and who Muslims are? In fact, the British media do make efforts to counteract negative stereotypes through various features, supplements and programmes on Islam and British Muslims. A number of examples can be given here. In the wake of the 9/11 events, news media such as The Observer, Evening Standard, or the Independent published opinion editorials by Muslim intellectuals, not only concerned with the attack on American soil but also with denouncing the ideas of the ‘fanatics’, describing Muslim revolutionaries as ‘fascists’ and ‘xenophobes’ (Modood and Ahmad, 2007: 189-190). The Guardian included a series of positive features answering some key questions about Islam in 2001, and provided a supplement called ‘British Islam Week’ on 17-21 June 2002. Channel Four presented an ‘Islam Season’ in 2002. Besides, as noted by Poole, in 2001 the Guardian also improved its coverage by giving voice to a range of commentators such as Edward Said, Samuel Huntington, Ziauddin Sardar, Umberto Eco, Faisal Bodi, Salman Rushdie, Tariq Modood and Hugo Young (Poole, 2002:4-5). Moreover, Muslim intellectuals and ‘moderate’ Muslims have also been dealing with various questions faced by Muslims, such as the urgency of reinterpreting and rereading Islam in relation to “tolerance, equality and compassion”; “a restoration of the thirst for knowledge and rational inquiry” in medieval Muslim societies; “a re-centring Islam around piety and spirituality; and “a ‘reformation’ that would make Islam compatible with individual conscience, science and secularism” (Modood and Ahmad, 2007: 190). Even though these attempts sent a positive gesture and provided a better understanding of Islam, they were not fully successful. Fauzia Ahmad (2006: 976) observes that many British Muslims criticised Channel Four’s ‘Islam Season’ for reinforcing reductive stereotypes and attempting to create controversy with the allegation of terrorist links to Islam. Among British Muslims, Islamophobic symptoms and attacks, partly promoted by the media, are basically considered to be the product of

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ignorance and the perpetuation of misconceptions about Islam within which the media fail to modify offensive terminology on Islam (Ahmad, 2006:974-976). The other quite interesting argument is the strategy of leaving out the spiritual dimension of Islam as a way of life. It has been argued that efforts and attempts to counteract negative stereotypes of Islam often ignore the spiritual dimension of Islam, since they there is much more of a focus on the political issues in dealing with Islam. This kind of strategy again confirms the hypothesis proposed by Galtung and Ruge that, in general, the more negative an issue is the more likely it is to be included as a news item.

4. Summary and a Way Forward This chapter has presented a wide range of frameworks used in the study of British media representations of Islam and Muslims, including Orientalism, the clash of civilisations, cultural racism and Islamophobia. In many cases, a binary system underlines the applications of these frameworks. Using this system, Islam and Muslims are represented in a context of competing ideas such as West-rest, civilised-uncivilised and rational-irrational, in which the former is considered as powerful, superior, modern, good and as representing the West, and the latter as powerless, inferior, evil, barbaric, and as representing ‘the Other’ or, precisely, Islam. Based upon this approach, media reports and coverage often critically include stereotypical themes such as ‘foreign’, ‘medieval’ and ‘barbaric’ to illustrate the connection between Islam and ‘undemocratic’ civil society. Islam, then, is related to and equated with terrorism. Consequently, Islam and Muslims are linked to negative social action, and the public construct the idea, which produces and sustains knowledge, that those who are under suspicion of terrorism must be Muslims. As far as the study of representation of Islam and Muslims is concerned, scholars have applied the above frameworks in research into British media representations of Islam through a range of discourses. Firstly, there is a strong tendency that when argumentation opposes ‘Islam’ with ‘democracy’ or ‘modernity’, the antithesis simultaneously excludes and debases Islam and Muslims. Secondly, where Osama bin Laden is covered, he is presented more as a personification of an idea or a concept of threat and violence. By associating him with Islam, there is a tendency that bin Laden is perceived simply as a representative of Islam. Islam is then associated with terrorism, under the basic assumption that those who are under suspicion of terrorism are Muslims. Thirdly, in British media reports, fear of Islam is often formulated through negative

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references such as violence, threat and conflict. By continually being referred to as ‘Muslims and Islamic terrorists’, the perpetrators come to be seen as products of a fanatical strain of Islam (Knightly, 2001, cited in Peach, 2006). The application of the above various frameworks affects the representations of British Muslims in the British media in two notable and related ways, namely, hegemonisation and homogenisation of Muslims. The hegemonisation employs various frameworks, with a clear result in the reinforcement of Western power over Muslims. Here, British Muslims are represented as ‘foreigners’ on the one hand and as having ‘un-British’ values on the other hand. The former points to the exclusion of British Muslims from the discourse of Britishness, through the split between ‘British’ and ‘non-British’ as indicated by Richardson, and the latter identifies British Muslims as holders of ‘other values’ simply because ‘their Islamic-ness’ separates ‘Them’ from ‘Us’. Islamophobic attacks, for example, often lead to the questioning of attempts by Muslims to preserve their culture, and they also condition the dominant society to pose the question of what ‘being British’ means, and even to challenge Muslims to choose between ‘the British way’ and ‘the terrorist way’. The homogenisation of British Muslims can be observed in the tendency to see British Muslims as a monolithic and single community. Poole makes this point when she stresses that the “mainstream press displays a high degree of homogeneity in themes associated with Islam” (Poole, 2002: 99). These studies seem to indicate that, in general, the British media portray Islam and (British) Muslims in a negative way. This can be challenged and charged as an attempt to generalise the media representations of Islam and Muslims, so it is important to note media attempts to counteract these stereotypical representations. The Guardian and Channel Four, for example, have provided spaces for discourses on Islam giving voice to a range of Islamic commentators. However, as studies have revealed, certain stereotypes have not been challenged enough, and often the spiritual dimension of Islam is ignored. Common frames that have been used in studies of the representations of Islam and Muslims as presented in this chapter certainly develop a conflictual model of analysis. This model of analysis tends to see power as control and domination. Certainly, a binary way of thinking is one of the main features of this model of analysis. In Looking White People in the Eye, Sherene H. Razack observes that scholars play important roles in sustaining the colonial formulas, by actively producing and reproducing the binary opposition of the civilised or liberated and the oppressed (1998:6 and chapter 4). Of course, a conflictual model of analysis provides

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a tool for understanding the complexity of various social conflicts. Moreover, it provides academic insights and an analytical tool which serves to uncover the hidden repressive or oppressive power in the relations of individuals or groups. However, it is surely the case that cultural encounter cannot be limited to conflict. In other words, cultural encounter often goes beyond conflict because it is also about dialogic relationships and dialogic formations through which alliances and relational identities are established. Moreover, society is a very complex entity. It is not static or fixed in a clashing context, but changes according to its own dynamism. Since it is complex and dynamic, society cannot just simply be painted in terms of binary oppositions. This is to say that a binary style of thinking is often inadequate for the complex challenges faced by a multicultural society (McNair, 2006). This is indeed an interesting academic challenge. The following chapters take up the challenge of analysing the representations of Islam and Muslims in the British Christian media in a different way, through the theoretical frame of the political theory of recognition, in order to give space to the possible dialogic transformation and mutual encounter of individuals, people and cultures. One of the main features of the political theory of recognition is its fluidity in moving beyond conflict, in order to engage people in dialogue within the socio cultural and political sphere, and to understand power not only as domination but also as relationship. Therefore, a modified political theory of recognition will be developed in chapter 2, as a theoretical framework for studying the discourses of Islam and Muslims in various texts published in the British Christian media.

CHAPTER TWO FRAMING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION: A THEORETICAL APPROACH

The previous chapter indicated the problems with the binary style of thinking that has been employed in various studies of the media representations of Islam and Muslims. It also argued for a turn to the political theory of recognition. ‘Recognition’ has gained a lot of attention over recent years, as one of the key concepts in analysing various social problems and conflicts in a multicultural society. In the late twentieth century, when social and political conflicts seemed to present a global challenge, the struggle and demand for recognition of difference has played a central role in various social, cultural and political movements, under the banners of nationality, ethnicity, race, gender, sexuality and even religion (Fraser, 2000). With the increasing attention to these themes, ‘recognition’ has emerged as an influential concept in contemporary social, moral and political theories. While the notion of recognition has been developed conceptually by moral philosophers and political theorists in order to address social problems and the challenges of multicultural society, it is surprising that less attention has been given to its empirical use, particularly in studying the representations of other cultures in the media. Yet, as pointed out by Charles Taylor, mass media is one of our common spaces, where people meet to discuss matters of interest for the benefit of society (1995: 259; 2007: 185). This chapter aims at outlining the theoretical framework that informs this study, based on the understanding of recognition that has been elaborated in a scholarly way, particularly by Charles Taylor, Axel Honneth, Nancy Fraser, Zali Gurevitch and Tariq Modood. The goal is to articulate and outline recognition, in order to arrive at a conceptual framework that will shape my arguments and conclusions. Since this study deals with the complexity of the media representation of Islam and Muslim, a ‘modified’ political theory of recognition is developed, by also taking into account theoretical insights from the theory of discourse and

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power relations, sociology of knowledge, and media and communication studies.

1. Framing the Politics of Recognition In 1992, Charles Taylor delivered his analysis on ‘The Politics of Recognition’ as the inaugural address at the Princeton University Centre for Human Values. As noted by Simon Thompson, the publication of Taylor’s work “began the contemporary revival of interest in this subject” and “remains the single most influential work on the politics of recognition in modern political theory” through which discussions underline a shift “from ideas of class, equality, economy and nation towards those of identity, difference, culture and ethnicity” (Thompson, 2006: 3 and 10). Though the politics of recognition has been an influential contemporary political theory, at least since the 1990s, in fact the idea of recognition itself arises as a basic concept in classical social theories. Among classical sociologists, Durkheim insists on a pre-contractual solidarity that points to the importance of mutual recognition as a basic medium of social integration (Heidegren, 2004). Taylor’s concept of recognition is profoundly influenced and shaped by G.W.F. Hegel, through his concept of self-consciousness or self-realisation. In his Phenomenology of Mind, published in 1807, Hegel points out that recognition plays a fundamental role in the development of selfconsciousness. According to Hegel, the development of self-consciousness follows certain stages of conflict, including the famous notion of the dialectical relationship of mastery and bondage in which the master maintains his mastery and at the same time surrenders his chance of recognition, while the slave holds fast to his relation to the master and his master’s recognition. For Hegel, mutual recognition requires absolute independence and freedom. The fight for mutual recognition is therefore a life and death struggle. This struggle will only end when all the demands for mutual recognition are reconciled in a harmony or reciprocal equilibrium, because it is only by the liberation of the slave that the master too becomes completely free and independent (Hegel, 2007[1807]: 150164). Hegel’s account certainly influences Taylor, particularly in the argument that recognition by others determines the formation of identity and self-consciousness. Taylor claims that recognition plays a vital role in the discovery and construction of personal and collective identity, since “the development of an ideal of inwardly generated identity gives a new importance to recognition” (Taylor, 1994: 34). In other words, recognition

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is a vital human need, and in order to be a fully formed human being, one needs recognition from others through dialogue and dialogic formation of identity. To explain such a claim, he makes a distinction between two spheres in which the discourse of recognition operates: the intimate sphere and the public sphere.

a) Recognition and the Intimate Sphere In the intimate sphere, the discourse of recognition deals with the discovery and construction of both individual and collective identity. According to Taylor, the discovery of identity does not happen in isolation; it is (and has to be) negotiated through a continuing dialogue and struggle with others. In other words, dialogue with others is the basis for recognition. How does Taylor develop the notion of dialogue and dialogic formation of identity as the foundation for the politics of recognition? Since the answer to this question shapes Taylor’s idea of dialogue and recognition, it is worth quoting at length here: “The crucial feature of human life is its fundamentally dialogical character. We become full human agents, capable of understanding ourselves, and hence of defining our identity, through our acquisition of rich human languages of expression…..But we learn these modes of expression through exchanges with others. People do not acquire the languages needed for self-definition on their own. Rather, we are introduced to them through interaction with others who matter to us –what George Herbert Mead called ‘significant others.’ The genesis of the human mind is in this sense not monological, not something each person accomplishes on his or her own, but dialogical. Moreover, this is not just a fact about genesis, which can be ignored later on. We don’t just learn the languages in dialogue and then go on to use them for our own purposes. We are of course expected to develop our own opinions, outlook, stances toward things, and to a considerable degree through solitary reflection. But this is not how things work with important issues, like the definition of our identity. We define our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the things our significant others want to see in us.” (Taylor, 1994: 32-33; emphasis added).

The above quoted passage offers three important sets of related assumptions. Firstly, dialogue is the precondition of identity formation or construction. Or, in other words, struggle in dialogue is a condition for recognition (Gurevitch, 2001). This means that recognition happens in a dialogical framework, or, as Gurevitch puts it, “the ethics of recognition is conversation bound” (2001: 95). How is dialogue as a condition for recognition related to identity formation? In the context of a pluralistic

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society, identity always becomes a central issue. Identity is people’s source of meaning and experience (Castells, 1997: 6). Since identity relates to meaning and experience, its construction determines the way people think about ‘who they are’, ‘where they are coming from’, ‘how they should live and try to live their lives according to the answers they find most plausible’ (Berger, 1981; Ackerman, 1989: 5; Giddens, 1991; Taylor, 1994: 33; Markell, 2003: 1). The process of answering such questions is a process of defining and redefining both individual and collective identity through the dialogical encounter with others. In other words, identity construction always takes place in a context of relationship, dialogue and exchanges with others. For Taylor, open dialogue and relationships are the key loci and a tool of self-discovery and self-affirmation in the culture of authenticity (Taylor, 1994: 36). Taylor’s idea echoes Mikhail Bakhtin’s reflection on the dialogic nature of ‘the self’ or subject. For Bakhtin, the ‘self’ is dynamic and continually constituted in the dialogic frame of ‘I’ and a world of others. In this dialogism, the capacity for consciousness is therefore based on an otherness which explains the relation between ‘I’ and others through which “the assertion of the otherness of the other” creates “the possibility of a recognition of his otherness” (Holquist, 1990: 18; Roberts, 1989: 116). What Bakhtin suggests concerning the dynamic and dialogic nature of the self is interesting. Here, ‘I’ is not a silent ‘I’, neither is ‘the other’ a silent ‘other’ and the self/other relation is always an event, based on their dialogic relationship. That is why, for Bakhtin, ‘self’ can never be a selfsufficient construct. Since the self is fundamentally in a relation with the other, dialogue helps human beings to understand how other relationships work. Through dialogue between the self and other, meaning is produced simultaneously but differently, since both the self and the other occupy the same space. The dialogic nature of the ‘self’ shapes human existence and therefore, for Bakhtin, existence is essentially dialogic. In Bakhtin’s own words, “Life by its very nature is dialogic. To live means to participate in dialogue: to ask questions, to heed, to respond, to agree, and so forth. In this dialogue a person participates wholly and throughout his whole life….” (Bakhtin, 1984: 293; Gardiner, 1992: 31). Consequently, separation from the other can only result in the loss of self: “To be means to communicate. Absolute death (non-being) is the state of being unheard, unrecognized” (Bakhtin, 1984: 287; Gardiner, 1992: 28). It could be argued here that dialogue creates a possibility for the assertion of the space between the self and other and that it is, therefore, a precondition for identity construction. This is understandable since, in the dialogic relationship, two outcomes can be expected: a consciousness that

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explains ones’ own limits (‘the I-for-myself’) and a consciousness of self that is alienated from ‘me’ by which the ‘I’ sees himself through the eyes of others (‘the-not-I-in-me’) and vice versa (Bakhtin, 1981: 34-35; Holquist, 1990: 22). Dialogue is therefore central to identity construction. Moreover, the nature of dialogue also bears within it the seeds of hope, since it insures that ‘no man is an island’ and that human existence is not a lonely event, but part of a larger whole of coexistence (Holquist, 1990: 38). Through dialogue, identity is negotiated and the dialogical relations with others provide the context within which identity construction and negotiation takes place. In other words, dialogue defines “the dignity of the differences” (Sacks, 2002); OR to quote Taylor, “my own identity crucially depends on my dialogical relations with others” (1994: 34). In practical terms, how is the struggle for recognition through dialogue exercised? Steps towards recognition are made through speaking and listening. Gurevitch develops this argument, when he contends that “[T]he presence of the self and the presence of the Other are conveyed through the exchange of utterances….The bond of recognition is produced by bringing oneself into the knowledge of the Other through speech, thus committing the Other to enter into the relation” (Gurevitch, 1990: 183 and186). Here, dialogue does not become a moment of ‘talk-talk’ but rather ‘talk-silence-talk’ (Gurevitch, 2001: 94), through which the moment of silence for listening also becomes an essential communicative act in the whole process of dialogue. Secondly, dialogue assumes human languages as the media for mutual understanding. Language is central to human life and, in terms of powerfully shaping the ways in which humans interact, its use is always social and political. Moreover, it is a domain in which our knowledge, understanding and interpretation of the social world is actively created and shaped. “Language use exists in a kind of dialogue with society: language is produced by society and…. it goes on to help recreate it. Language first represents social realities and second contributes to the production and reproduction of social reality or social life” (Richardson, 2007: 10). The term ‘human languages’, as suggested by Taylor, also covers all forms of human expression, such as art, gesture and music. Language itself is essentially dialogical and intersubjective, and leads to mutual understanding. Bakhtin’s principle provides insights into seeing the dialogical aspect of languages as the engine of social relations. Holquist notes that the principle of dialogue proposed by Bakhtin is, primarily, an epistemology in which dialogism exploits the nature of language as a modelling system for the nature of existence and social relations (Holquist, 1990: 33). The

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dialogic nature of language enables understanding of the expressions and the intentions of language users. In the words of Bakhtin, “[T]o understand another person’s utterance means to orient oneself with respect to it, to find the proper place for it in the corresponding context. For each word of the utterance that we are in process of understanding, we, as it were, lay down a set of our own answering words. The greater their number and weight, the deeper and more substantial our understanding will be….Any true understanding is dialogic in nature. Understanding is to utterance as one line of a dialogue is to the next” (cited in Wertsch, 1991: 54 and Gardiner, 1992: 15).

Through language use, dialogue becomes a means for mutual understanding that enriches what Taylor calls recognition. Within this frame, the self and the other are not two separate entities; instead they are always in relationship. The conclusion is clear: if language is essentially social, and if it is essential in shaping human social interaction, then human existence cannot escape from the social relations through which recognising each other becomes crucial. Thirdly, the negotiation of identity is always in dialogue with the things our significant others want to see in us. In other words, the common challenges and problems we face together in coexistence are the motivations for dialogue and recognition. As far as human nature is concerned, the problem remains how to build a strong bridge between the notion of shared humanity and differences. Moreover, there is always a price to pay in investing in dialogue and identity construction, if we consider the condition that we can only join the dialogue if we can manage to speak to one another without falsifying our primary commitments to different values, or even to ways of thinking (Ackerman, 1989). This makes sense because the initiative for dialogue requires the courage to get out of oneself in order to meet others. The act of getting out of oneself in order to meet others is risky, because it also threatens ‘the status quo’ or existence of oneself; it bears the capacity of silencing or being silenced with the possibility of aggression or even insult, accompanied by fear or shame or guilt (Gurevitch, 2001). This is what Hegel explains in his discussion of how consciousness splits in the tensions and struggles of the Slave, who strives for recognition, and the Master who must go through a sort of self-negation (Hegel, 2007[1807]). The encounter between the Master and the Slave is, therefore, a decisive moment of “two ‘Selves’ who have become ‘Other’ but must hold on to their unity and supersede that moment, that is, supersede the other and their own threatening Otherness” (Gurevitch, 2001: 90). In a broader sense, as Gurevitch argues, dialogue is a tool for breaking the silence because it deals with how we

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reflect on our shared humanity, without denying the differences or how the differences are taken into account, without isolating or neglecting our shared humanity. Within the sociological circle, the general explanation described above indicates the descriptive mode of dialogue. In this descriptive mode of dialogue, the emphasis is directed towards the commonality and unification of the world. This means that dialogue is proposed in search of a common ground and a common purpose. The problem with this emphasis is that it has the tendency to take the notions of commonality and unity for granted, by assuming that strangeness, difference and opposition can simply be overcome through dialogue, without being critical of the possibility of a split in the dialogue or other problems involving factors such as ideologies, beliefs or institutional power (Guveritch, 2001: 88; see also Cissna and Anderson, 2002: 9-11). Indeed, commonality or common ground is a key point in the identity negotiation through dialogue. However, dialogue is nevertheless also a critical and corrective tool. As Bakhtin (1981) argues, as a corrective and critical instrument, dialogue offers the possibility of redeeming a distorted social condition characterised by monologic, authoritarian and totalistic forms. Moreover, it also becomes a tool for communicative action in Habermasian terms. This means that dialogue opens the space for reasoning, for correcting distorted opinions and for the execution of rationality, ethics and enlightenment (Habermas, 1984; Gurevitch, 2001: 88).

b) Recognition and the Public Sphere When JĦrgen Habermas discussed the notion of the public sphere, he intended to link the private sphere and the ‘Sphere of Public Authority’ (Habermas, 1989; Salvatore, 2007). As a concept, the public sphere “rests on the idea of acting, arguing, and deliberating in common in ways that are legitimated through a rational pursuit of collective interest, which also implies a fair degree of transparence of communication among the actors in the process” (Salvatore, 2007: 7). In other words, it is “a discursive space in which individuals and groups congregate to discuss matters of mutual interest and, where possible, to reach a common judgment” (Hauser, 1998: 86). In his writings, Charles Taylor often uses the term ‘public sphere’ to mean a kind of common space “in which people who never meet understand themselves to be engaged in discussion, and capable of reaching a common mind” (1995: 262, 2007: 185-189). He then expands this basic definition, to include a variety of media, when he describes the public sphere as “a common space in which the members of

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society are deemed to meet through a variety of media (print, electronic) and also face-to-face encounters to discuss matters of common interest; and thus to be able to form a common mind about those matters” (1995: 259; 2007: 185). Based on the above basic understandings of the public sphere, recognition at the level of the public sphere relates to how recognition is discussed as a matter of common interest in a reasoning society. Taylor explains what he means with two related concepts, namely the politics of equal dignity or the politics of universalism, and the politics of equal respect or the politics of difference (Taylor, 1994; Thompson, 2006: chapters 3-4; Modood, 2007a: 51-53). In formulating the principles of these two concepts, Taylor argues that “[W]ith the politics of equal dignity, what is established is meant to be universally the same, an identical basket of rights and immunities; with the politics of difference, what we are asked to recognize is the unique identity of this individual or group, their distinctness from everyone else” (Taylor 1994: 38). For Taylor, our sense of dignity depends on a recognition of the universal status of human beings as moral agents, and our sense of self-worth depends upon recognition of the value of the particular form of human life (Taylor, 1994: 37-38; Schaap, 2004: 525). Taylor’s politics of universalism is founded on the fundamental principle of the “equal dignity for all citizens” and based on “the idea that all humans are equally worthy of respect” (1994: 38 and 41). This means that the politics of equal dignity refers to a universal human potential, what people have in common or people’s shared humanity. With the focus on the commonality and the universal potential among human beings, the politics of equal dignity denies the legitimacy of any judgement based on skin colour or gender. Recognition of dignity is a celebration of humanity because dignity is a part of humanity that cannot be taken away, and protection of the fundamental rights of human beings is an important means of securing and guaranteeing this dignity. This includes basic rights such as the right to life, to personal liberty and to freedom of opinion (Abbey, 2000: 128; Thompson, 2006: 46). The second notion, the politics of difference, refers to an understanding of the differences between traditions and individuals leading towards equal respect. The notion of equal respect relates to the idea of authenticity, which originated in the Romantic movement with the main argument that each human being has an original way of being human. According to Taylor, “There is a certain way of being human, that is my way. I am called upon to live my life in this way and not in imitation of anyone else’s life” (Taylor, 1994: 30). Negotiation of differences in leading towards

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equal respect therefore affirms the moral significance of human beings as social beings. Just as each human being has his/her own way of being, cultures too are unique. A positive dialogic engagement between one culture and other cultures would bring with it a new moral vocabulary of comparison for a judgment of worth (Heidegren, 2004: 974). What is interesting in Taylor’s model of recognition is that he does not bother much about the practical mechanisms of recognition. He is more interested in the conditions under which recognition is, or can be, produced. As already mentioned, central to the Taylorian politics of recognition is the thesis that identity is partly shaped by recognition and that the absence of recognition, often through the misrecognition of others, causes real damage and distortion for a person or group of people. Taylor acknowledges that the absence of recognition manifests itself in various forms. For Taylor, “nonrecognition or misrecognition…can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, reduced mode of being. Beyond simple lack of respect, it can inflict a grievous wound, saddling people with crippling self-hatred” (Taylor, 1994: 25). Taylor’s idea of relating recognition with human identity has generated discussions among scholars. Like Taylor, Axel Honneth contends that recognition is “a vital human need” which accompanies “the intersubjective nature of human beings” (Honneth, 2003: 145). Here, recognition is understood as a matter of self-realisation through an on-going dialogical process in Hegelian terms. What is important here is the interaction of oneself with others. For Honneth, “we owe our integrity….to the receipt of approval or recognition from other persons. Denial of recognition…is injurious because it impairs…persons in their positive understanding of self – an understanding acquired by intersubjective means” (Honneth, 1992: 188189). He then suggests that recognition is the key to unlocking social injustice as a whole, since the harm done by misrecognition is the worst form of social injustice (Honneth, 2003: 133; Kompridis, 2007: 278). However, the following problem remains: how can the misrecognised groups secure recognition? This is an important question, and is raised by Bhikhu Parekh. According to Parekh, Taylor “seems to think that the dominant group can be rationally persuaded to change its views of them by intellectual argument and moral appeal” (Parekh, 2000: 342-343). Indeed, the understanding of recognition and the consequence of misrecognition, as proposed by Taylor and Honneth, is basically rooted in the understanding of the politics of difference. It is true that this understanding provides a base for an identity formation of various cultures in a multicultural society driven by a condition of equal respect. Moreover, it

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urges a relation among cultures, since identity formation is conditioned by an ongoing dialogue with other cultures.

c) Recognition: Between Identity Model and Status Model Nancy Fraser is perhaps the most critical voice towards the identity model of recognition, as it is developed by Taylor and Honneth. According to Fraser, the problem with the identity model of recognition is that when we deal with society at large, the consequence of nonrecognition or misrecognition seems to be more of a psychological state. As a result, it is Fraser’s assessment that Taylor and Honneth are proponents of recognition as a matter of self-realisation. Taking a different stance, Fraser considers recognition to be a matter of justice, in which the argument should operate on the idea that “it is unjust that some individuals and groups are denied the status of full partners in social interaction simply as a consequence of institutionalized patterns of cultural value in whose construction they have not equally participated and which disparage their distinctive characteristics or the distinctive characteristics assigned to them” (Fraser, 2003: 29).

Since recognition is a matter of justice, it should be treated as an issue of social status. Here, the issue at hand is the question of how institutional barriers are removed in order to enable individual members of society to fully participate in the society. Based on this argument, equality becomes the principle that governs the struggle for recognition. It is only when equality of status is observed that a reciprocal recognition can take place. These arguments reversely indicate that misrecognition occurs when the “institutionalised patterns of cultural value” become barriers for some members of society or some groups, by preventing them from participating in the life of the society. Thus, for Fraser, “[T]o be misrecognized,… is not simply to be thought ill of, looked down on, or devalued in others’ conscious attitudes or mental beliefs. It is rather to be denied the status of a full partner in social interaction and prevented from participating as a peer in social life” (Fraser, 1998: 141, see also Fraser, 2003: 29). Based on this contention, in Fraserian terms, issues such as racial profiling, exclusion of same-sex partnerships and the stigmatisation of single mothers should be understood in terms of an inequality regulated by an institutionalised pattern of value. Fraser then suggests that to have recognition in order, the aim is not only to repair physical or psychological damage, but also to overcome subordination. By overcoming this subordination, the subordinated party becomes a full partner in social life,

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or, as suggested by Modood, a full and equal citizen, guided by the principle of multicultural citizenship (2007a: chapter 6, 2007b). It is clear that in this argument, Fraser shifts from a culturalist interpretation of recognition, based on the Hegelian model of self-consciousness, to an inclusive interpretation that treats recognition as a question of social status, particularly the status of individual group members as full partners in social interaction. This line of argument is also proposed by Morag Patrick in her own criticisms concerning moral significance in the dialogic engagement of cultures, through which she criticises the liberal focus on rights and the neglect of the sociocultural status of recognition. Patrick’s criticism is based upon the argument that “[S]ometimes the motivation for struggle originates in the need for a changed (emancipated) self-image. Here we are dealing with the problems that arise when a social group experiences the absence of social rather than legal recognition. The liberal focus on rights should not obscure our view of the political significance of feeling esteemed within a sociocultural environment” (Patrick, 2002: 36).

Should we then separate the identity model and the status model of recognition? I would argue that while an analysis of the differences between these two models is philosophically interesting, there is a dynamic interplay between them through which identity construction and socio-political status are core units of recognition. This is to say that the status of full partner in social interaction shapes the construction of identity, and the realisation of identity through dialogic formation leads to a recognition which leads to full participation in society. It is reasonable to stress that Taylor and Honneth are primarily concerned with esteem and cultural recognition. However, they do not neglect the notion of rights in relation to recognition, as far as the politics of difference or equal respect is concerned. When reflecting on the dynamic of democratic exclusion, Taylor argues for a more inclusive approach when we talk about ‘the people’ in a society. According to Taylor, for a society to be really democratic, there must be some sense of collective entity that provides opportunities for different people or groups to participate in a democratic society, or at least to feel that they are part of the ‘we’ in a society (Abbey, 2003: 119). Therefore, Taylor argues that “[T]he idea that one ought to suppress one’s difference for the sake of fitting in to the dominant mood has been considerably eroded. Feminists, cultural minorities, homosexuals and religious groups all demand that the reigning formula be modified to

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accommodate them, rather than the other way around” (Taylor, 1998: 149). As far as the framework is concerned, the difference between the identity model (Taylor and Honneth) and the status model (Fraser) is that while the status model of recognition in Fraser’s approach provides a more critical approach for “overcoming subordination by establishing the misrecognized party as a full member of society, capable of participating on a par with the rest” (Fraser, 2000: 113), the identity model proposed by Taylor and Honneth provides a more relational approach, through its dialogic principle in the struggle for recognition. These theorists, however, embrace the similar argument that the production and reproduction of social life should be normatively governed by “the imperative of mutual recognition” (Honneth, 1995: 92). In this context of the struggle for recognition, identity formation and status cannot be separated. In fact, they are complementary. In other words, it could be argued that recognition assumes both a dialogical identity formation and a status as a full partner in social interaction. Or, as Tariq Modood puts it: “[I]dentities and cultures are important because they are important to the bearers of those identities, people who are members of our society, fellow citizens, and so have to be included into the polity in ways consistent with respect and equality….Of course the giving of a new public status to an identity group is not just to legitimize their presence and to include them in the self-definition of one’s society or country; it is also to allow them to influence the attitudes, mores and practice of the rest of society” (Modood, 2007a: 66-68).

2. Recognition: Discourse and Power Relations Having indicated the crucial relationship between identity formation and a dialogic approach towards the status of full partner or equal citizen in a social relationship within the regime of recognition, another challenging question emerges: who or what determines identity formation and the status of full partnership? This question brings us to the issue of discourse and power relations. The significance of discourse and power relations lies in the fact that this study deals with the discursive texts produced in the British Christian media. Michel Foucault is one of the most quoted scholars in the debate concerning discourse and power relations. In his works, Foucault is concerned with discursive practices as a system that creates possibilities for gaining knowledge. This view of discourse involves seeing discourse as actively constructing society in various dimensions, such as objects of knowledge, social subjects and

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social relationships (Foucault, 1980; Philip, 1985: 69; Fairclough, 1992: 39). But, what exactly does Foucault mean by ‘discourse’? Even though Foucault understands discourse in terms of statements and an analytical focus that involve “a logical analysis of propositions, a grammatical analysis of sentences, a psychological or contextual analysis of formulations” (1972: 107-108), his attention is more focused on the sociohistorical variability of language use. Therefore, for Foucault, discourse refers to ways of thinking and speaking about aspects of reality that makes knowledge possible. In order to explain how discourse makes knowledge possible, Foucault argues that “effects of truth are produced within discourses” (1980: 118). By ‘truth’ Foucault refers to a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements. Interestingly, he then relates knowledge to power on the basis of the premise that power works within discourses. For Foucault, “truth is linked to systems of power which produce and sustain it” (1980: 133). He even declares that “discourse is the power which is to be seized” (1984: 110). Foucault himself does not see power as a repressive concept. Rather, he considers power as a productive concept based on the argument that power does not dominate those who are subject to it but incorporates, shapes and ‘retools’ them to fit in with its needs (Fairclough, 1992: 50). According to Foucault, “What makes power hold good… is simply the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on us a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse” (1980: 119). Foucault’s understanding of discourse is certainly different from that of the structuralist approach. Structuralism views discourse as representing ‘the real’. Foucault suggests a more provocative meaning: discourse does not merely represent the world, it produces the world. In this sense, discourses constitute an object of interest or, in other words, discourses are “practices that systematically form the objects of which we speak” (Foucault, 1972: 49, 1980: 118; Bryman, 2004: 369-378; Kroll-Smith and Gunter, 2005: 349). Discourse is therefore concerned with “establishing one version of the world in the face of competing versions” (Gill, 2000: 176). Furthermore, this discourse even establishes a world of the West in competition with a world of Islam or the rest of the world (Huntington, 1996). Due to this understanding, Foucault concludes that the history which bears us has the form of a war rather than that of a language. In other words, history is determined by relations of power, not relations of meaning (1980: 114). Foucault clearly places discourse at the heart of social practices and process.

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The question is how knowledge works, after its production within discourse. One of the characteristics of knowledge within discourse is that it allows only “certain ways of thinking about reality” and therefore it “can be used to exclude knowledge from others” (Cheek, 2004: 1142-3). In other words, knowledge within discourse has the power to marginalise the knowledge of others. Why? When knowledge exercises its power, it then turns status, monopolised by a particular way of thinking, into ‘truth’. Foucault himself believes that “we are subjected to the production of truth through power, and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth” (1980: 93). Discourses therefore determine “what can be thought and said and thought, but also about who can speak, when, and with what authority; and, conversely, who cannot” (Ball, 1990: 2). In the Foucauldian notion of discourse, as explored above, power works within discourses. How do we understand the notion of power relations within discourse? Discursive practices are social and political practices in which power is articulated and exercised. This brings us to the notion of hegemony. Among scholars, Laclau and Mouffe develop a theoretico-political discussion on hegemony as “the central category of political analysis”, rooted in the Gramscian analysis of hegemony (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001[1985]: ix-x). However, they move away from two key aspects of Gramsci’s thought, namely that hegemonic subjects are necessarily constituted on the plane of the fundamental classes and that every social formation structures itself around a single hegemonic centre. For Laclau and Mouffe, the general field of the emergence of hegemony is a field where ‘elements’ have not crystallised into ‘moments’, in which an element refers to any difference that is not discursively articulated, and a moment refers to the differential positions that appear articulated within a discourse. In time when every element has been reduced to a moment, all identity is relational and all relations have a necessary character (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001[1985]: chapter 3). According to Laclau and Mouffe, as far as power relations are concerned, hegemonic struggle determines relational identities. Here, hegemonic struggle refers to the constant attempt to negotiate instability and inequality, in order to construct or sustain relational identities. This struggle involves the whole system of culture, economy, politics and ideology. Hegemony, therefore, is not a model of top-down impositions of power, but a model that features multiple groups engaged in discursive activity, “each with its own types and degrees of power, in a dialectic relationship that produces control through negotiation and accommodation” (Evans, 2002: 313). This means that hegemonic struggle involves the articulation or rearticulation of the elements of identity, leading to the

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possibility of creating collective action. In this sense, discourse becomes a system of differential entities that enables hegemonic struggle and provides the discursive conditions for the emergence of a collective action, directed towards struggling against inequalities and challenging relations of subordination (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001 [1985]: 153; Fairclough, 1995: 91-96). The concept of hegemonic struggle therefore provides a way of analysing and understanding social practices within which discursive practices belong, in terms of relational identity and a negotiation of power relations, towards a full partnership in social relationships.

3. Recognition and the Representations of Other Cultures Following the above discussion on discourse and power relations within the struggle for articulating relational identities, one may argue that knowledge about the presence of others and other cultures in a majority culture plays a fundamental role in determining recognition and/or misrecognition. This section pays attention to how such knowledge affects the representations of others or other cultures, and how knowledge directs our thoughts and words about people or a group of people around us. Within the philosophy of social science and sociology of knowledge, the foundational character of knowledge once dominated the epistemological tradition following the rise of positivism (Taylor, 1995; Pera, 2000). The main concern of the foundationalist argument is the validity of knowledge claims. Addressing the epistemology that directs our thoughts, Charles Taylor revisits the discussion around the notion of knowledge in relation to philosophy and social science. According to Taylor, the foundationalist approach is part of the old epistemology that concentrates on reason without considering the social context of its production. Moving from the foundationalist character of knowledge, Taylor identifies a wider conception within the epistemological tradition that focuses on the understanding of knowledge and its interpretation. Within this conception, knowledge is seen as the correct representation of an independent reality, or, in other words, as the inner depiction of an outer reality (Taylor, 1995: 2-3). Interpreting this popular conception, Taylor considers two models of knowledge that have influenced philosophical reflection and social scientific inquiry, namely the participational model and the representational model. The participational model, traditionally derived from the works of Aristotle, is based on the idea that when we come to know something, the mind (nous) becomes one with the object of thought. This means that the mind participates in the being of the known object, rather than simply

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depicting it. The problem with this model is that everything depends on the observed object. The alternative is the representational model. This model contends that science or real knowledge “does not simply consist of congruence between ideas in the mind and the reality outside. If the object of my musings happens to coincide with real events in the world, this doesn’t give me knowledge of them” (Taylor, 1995: 4). What is needed is a reflexive turn that includes an examination of the foundation of knowledge. Through the encounter of people from different cultural and religious backgrounds, scholarly literatures within the interpretative paradigm have taken into account the representational view of knowledge in analysing the production of knowledge about other cultures in a multicultural society. As far as knowledge production is concerned, the reflexive turn to the representational view of knowledge is influenced mainly by historical experience, social events and context. This way of reasoning is in fact the basis of the interpretative tradition, which expresses the view that all knowledge about human society is historical knowledge, and that understanding is subject to judgement and interpretation (Gadamer, 1975; Said, 1981: 162). The reason is that the centrality of the social context in the process of knowledge production frames the possible social dynamism of knowledge. Or, as Arthur Child puts it, “if it is true that thought has a social basis and origin, then all mental activities are socially based” (cited in Curtis and Petras, 1970: 19). The representational view of knowledge therefore promotes the premises that knowledge has to be understood representationally, and whatever we think, say and write represents a knowledge claim on a certain world or species (Taylor, 1995). Since the representational view of knowledge considers the importance of historical events and the social context, the common knowledge of ordinary people plays an important role towards the cultivation of mutual recognition. Taylor explains this common knowledge through the notion of the social imaginary. For Taylor, the social imaginary is neither social theory nor ideology. Instead, the social imaginary is an implicit background that explains the way ordinary people ‘imagine’ their social surroundings through the creation and distribution of images, stories and legends. Moreover, the social imaginary creates a common understanding which makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy (Taylor, 2007: 171-172). Reading the Taylorian understanding of social imaginary, one finds much the same idea , formulated using different terms, in the work of other social theorists, such as Durkheim’s collective representation (Paleotti, 2000), Moscovici’s social representation (Moscovici, 2008), van Dijk’s social cognition (Dijk, 1994) or Bourdieu’s

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prereflexive framework (Steger, 2008). The social imaginary in this sense explains how people make sense of the ordinary things which surround them. Since the idea of representation will be used throughout this book, I will briefly turn to a theoretical explanation of the constructionist approach to representation developed by Stuart Hall (1997). According to Hall, in the constructionist approach to representation, ‘it is not the material world which conveys meaning; it is the language system or whatever system we are using to represent our concepts. It is social actors who use the conceptual systems of their culture and the linguist and other representational systems to construct meaning, to make the world meaningful and to communicate about that world meaningfully to others” (1997: 25).

This means that representation can be studied constructively if dominant discourses in language use and spoken word texts are unpacked or uncovered. In relation to dominant discourses in the representation of cultures in the media, Ameli et al. (2007) identify three interrelated discourses: ethnocentric discourse, domination discourse and demonisation discourse (2007: 12). Ethnocentric discourse normally focuses on self or group identification, as seen in the formulation of ‘us’ versus ‘them’. Domination discourse relates to power and influence. For example, the idea of superiority is usually attached to ‘We’ while inferiority is attached to ‘others’. Demonisation discourse refers to various ways of distorting or even destroying a reality. The clear result of this model of discourse can be seen in the misrepresentation of cultures. Ameli et al. identify these structural discourses, though I would add another, relational discourse, based on the idea of recognition as presented earlier in this chapter: Relational discourse is about the power of forming an alliance, based on dialogic formation in the encounter of cultures. Based on the constructionist approach to representation and structural discourses presented here, I would argue that any study of the representation of various cultures, such as the representation of Islam and Muslims in the media, should uncover not only the conflictual but also the relational orientation of various dominant discourses. As far as knowledge is concerned, representation of other cultures in the public sphere forms and produces a knowledge claim on those cultures. When the relation between the politics of recognition and knowledge about other cultures is taken into account, representational knowledge creates two possible outcomes: recognition and misrecognition of other cultures. On the one hand, recognition of other cultures should be driven

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by the politics of equal dignity and equal respect of differences. On the other hand, misrecognition or non-recognition of other cultures “can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression” and can imprison other cultures in a false, distorted and reduced mode of culture (Taylor, 1994: 25). Struggle for recognition, as suggested by Nancy Fraser, aims to counter demeaning representations of other cultures, and supports a public sphere conducive to a more dialogic formation of identity, towards a well-functioning civil society. However, the problem is to identify a standard in judging the recognition or misrecognition of cultures. Often, it is assumed that recognition or misrecognition is the product of cultural judgement through which cultures are judged according to standards normally associated with a majority culture. This is what Fraser calls “institutionalized patterns of cultural value” (2003: 29). Obviously, this creates a problem of only recognising ‘the similarity’ while misrecognising ‘the difference’ among cultures. If dialogic formation of identity is the basis for an ongoing struggle or a process of recognition, how can the similarities and differences among cultures be bridged? Within the frame of politics of recognition, there are two main radical approaches to addressing this problem (Ackerman, 1989; Parekh, 2000: chapter 4; Modood, 2005a: chapter 9). Firstly, a supreme and unifying value, accessed and accepted by all, is posited as the basis and point of departure for dialogue by trumping primary differences. Often, this supreme and unifying value is called a global ethic or a global responsibility. In fact, as indicated by Parekh, this idea is embraced in the philosophy of moral monism with the view that since moral values are derived from human nature, and since human nature is universally common, we can arrive not only at moral values but also at the best way of combining them. The problem is, how global is a global ethic or a global responsibility if the basic differences are left out? Is a universal moral value possible? According to Bhikhu Parekh (2000), moral monism ignores the logical fact that deriving moral values from human nature alone is impossible. The second approach suggests a compromise of translating various moral and value categories into an uncontroversial framework for the assessment of public life. Here, cultures are relativised by isolating their uniqueness, thus weakening the possibility of searching for a universal value among cultures. This approach is normally known as relativism. Relativism rests on the argument that since moral values are culturally embedded, they are relative to each society, and the search for a universal moral value is therefore logically irrelevant. If dialogue is to be achieved, there should be a compromise among cultures. The problem with this suggestion is how

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certain compromises could be possible without considering both a unifying idea and cultural differences. In assessing these two approaches, Ackerman argues that when disagreements arise one or another dimension of the moral truth, we should neither search for some common values that will ignore this disagreement, and nor should we try to translate it into some neutral framework. He goes on to suggest that we should simply say nothing at all to the problem of different moral stands, and take the moral ideals that divide us off the dialogic or conversational agenda. Instead, dialogue is used for pragmatically productive purposes in which we can identify normative premises we all find reasonable (Ackerman, 1989: 16). Marcello Pera approaches the problem differently (Pera, 2006: 8-27). According to Pera, the notion that sets of values cannot be judged by comparison to one another has no solid grounds. He argues that this notion derives from two main sets of reasons: firstly, cultural theories, conceptual universes, language games, or worldviews cannot be measured in terms of each other; secondly, certain concepts are intrinsically paradoxical, especially concepts that are related to values, such as state, democracy, and faith. For Pera, a judgement of whether culture A is better than B does not require a meta-criterion that is common to both A and B. There is a distinction between ‘making a judgement’ and ‘making a decision’ in the cultural encounter. Pera then contends that there should be a distinction between affirming a value thesis of the form ‘A culture is better than B culture’ and taking the political stand ‘to follow A culture’ or ‘to fight against B culture’. The error of logic normally compounds the error of thinking that the thesis ‘A culture is better than B culture’ assumes the clash between the two cultures. He then suggests that dialogue is necessary, so long as the members of A and B cultures remain open to each other’s criticism. In proposing the idea of a pragmatic solution, Ackerman makes a good point. However, his suggestion to leave out the notion of a unifying value and the primary differences in dialogue should be questioned. In a society characterised by a pluralistic way of thinking, beliefs and values, the best way of giving a chance to the possibility of solving the problems and challenges of coexistence is by a public engagement that enables people to talk to one another on those encountered issues. It could be argued here that while a pragmatic solution sets the goal of dialogue, a unifying value offers a starting point and a spirit of dialogue. Pera’s argument points out that if we consider the idea that there must be good reasons to say and believe that a certain culture is better than another and that saying one culture is better than another does not necessarily assume a clash of

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cultures and close the doors to cultural respect, dialogue and tolerance. The problem, however, lies in the debate around the questions of who actually has the power to define the notion of universal values and claim ownership of them. Moreover, the debate raises the question: what criteria do we need in order to develop a moral evaluation of the cultural differences? Bhikhu Parekh approaches the problem by pointing to the dialectical interplay between the universal and the particular in the identity formation of human beings (Parekh, 2000: chapter 4; Modood, 2005a: chapter 9). In Parekh’s view, “human beings approach one another on the assumption that they are similar enough to be intelligible and make a dialogue possible, and different enough to be puzzling and make a dialogue necessary.” Their similarities and differences are both important and dialectically related. Human identity is constructed and shaped by the relational dialectic between similarities and differences and between the universal and the particular. A more satisfactory way to arrive at universal values, without neglecting or falsifying differences, is through a crosscultural dialogue. The cross-cultural dialogue “brings together different historical experiences and cultural sensibilities, and ensures that we appreciate human beings in all their richness and that the values we arrive at are as genuinely universal as is humanly possible” (Parekh, 2000: 128). The purpose of cross-cultural dialogue and thus of the struggle for recognition, therefore, is not to achieve an agreement but rather to develop a shared position on the genuine universal and human values.

4. Respect for Religion and Recognition of Religious Minorities Since this study also deals with religion, we may now ask: what is the place of religion within the politics of recognition? One of the problems in the political theory of recognition is the tension between the demand for equal recognition for individuals and the demand for cultural recognition (Galeotti, 2002: 197-209; Connolly et al., 2007). When discussing Charles Taylor’s notion of recognition, Connolly et al. argue that Taylor does not discuss the difficulty of “the sometimes ambivalent relationship that individuals have to ‘culture’” (2007: 5). What they do not really explore is the fact that Taylor has discussed elsewhere how individuals relate to their culture and to religion, and that this relationship determines how these individuals see themselves. In his essay, “Inescapable Frameworks”, Taylor argues that the self exists through its immersion in a certain inescapable framework. Within this framework, the self invokes meaning, discovers a sense of life and articulates the meanings received through

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language or other forms of expression (Taylor, 1989: 3-19; Elshtain, 2008). This framework is central because without it the self is threatened by “a terrifying emptiness, a kind of vertigo, or even a fracturing of our world and body-space” (Taylor, 1989: 18). What Taylor means by ‘the framework’ is the fact that the self was born into a place, a culture or a religion which shapes or inform one’s identity. In many cases, one cannot choose to be born into a certain framework. Even when a value is claimed to be a universal value, this value is first accepted or learnt from, and in, a certain community or a certain framework (Sacks, 2002). This means that there is an inseparable relationship between a community and frameworks that guide a community. In the modern discussion of multiculturalism, some have argued that unlike race or gender, religion is a matter of choice and that being a Christian or being a Muslim is therefore about ‘chosen beliefs’ (Meer and Modood, 2009: 345). If this argument of choice is accepted, the choice itself still relates to identity, because it faces the same basic question of identity: “who or what is the ‘I’ that does the choosing?” (Sacks, 2007: 160). Any attempt to answer this question cannot escape from the fact that “I define who I am by defining where I speak from, ….in social space…and….in the space of moral and spiritual orientation within which my most important defining relations are lived out” (Taylor, 1989: 35). Although Taylor does not really develop what recognising religion may mean in relation to individuals and communities, he clearly argues that “we all need recognition to hold our identity” (2007: 137). If religion shapes people’s personal and social/collective identity, does religion then deserve to be given respect? Commenting on Taylor’s proposition of recognition, Habermas contends that in fact the tension is not really about the competition between the protection of collective identities and equal rights for individuals. Instead, the argument for respecting culture or religion should be based on the integrity of people’s traditions. According to Habermas, “the demand for respect is aimed not so much at equalizing living conditions as it is at protecting the integrity of the traditions and forms of life in which members of groups that have been discriminated against can recognize themselves” (1994: 110). What Habermas offers here is a normative argument that takes into consideration the dynamics of disrespect and discrimination. What he means is that a failure of cultural recognition opens the door for social discrimination on the one hand, and that social discrimination in turn reinforces cultural disrespect or cultural misrecognition on the other hand. With regard to religion, these two components play a central part, because religion deals not only with people’s sense of believing but also sense of belonging (Davie, 1999; Berger et al., 2008). Religious persecution, for example, is

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often reinforced by both misrecognition of culture or religion and social discrimination. While Habermas considers the consequence of cultural disrespect or misrecognition, a more elaborate argument for respect of religion is provided by Tariq Modood. His argument can be quoted at length here: “…valuing of religion and respect for the religion of others, even while not requiring participation, is based on a sense that religion is a good in itself, is a fundamental good and part of our humanity at a personal, social and civilizational level: it is an ethical good and so to be respected as a feature of human character just as we might respect truth-seeking, the cultivation of the intellect or the imagination or artistic creativity or self-discipline not just because of its utility or truth” (2010: 12).

In this argument, Modood points out the basic feature of what religion offers to society and how respect for religion is necessary because religion is part of humanity. Or as Taylor puts it, for many, religion is “the source of the values that animated both family and society” (2007: 506). This means that respecting an individual or a community cannot be separated from respecting their beliefs, traditions and way of life. The arguments of Habermas and Modood are essential, if we consider the role of religion in the politics of modern society. Take international relations as an example. In their book, Bringing Religion into International Relations, Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler (2006) argue that religion has been ignored, particularly in the area of international relations. They acknowledge that religion may not be the driving force in world politics. However, for Fox and Sandler, given the current condition of the 21st century, international relations cannot ignore the centrality of religion. This is because religion influences people’s worldviews, is an aspect of identity and is a source of legitimacy. Moreover, religion is very often associated with formal institutions and, therefore, has an influence in the political process (Fox and Sandler, 2006: 2-3). In a different way, Ulrich Beck argues that there is an urgent need for a change of perspective from the idea that “religion has ceased to play any role in world politics” to the assertion that “religion plays a key role in world politics” (2010: 166). On that note, one point needs further consideration: the place of religion in secular society. This is a very broad issue that needs to be studied independently, but for the purposes of this study, I will only discuss some basic considerations. Discussion on religion in a secular society has been shaped by the notion of the separation between religion

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and state.1 This separation is meant to distinguish between “the public realm of citizens and public policies, and the private realm of belief and worship” (Modood, 2007a: 72). However, the idea of ‘separation’ between religion and state is indeed a contested idea, because one needs to clarify what ‘separation’ really means. Responding to this question, Modood (2007a: 72-84; 2010) explores two modes of separation: radical or ideological secularism and moderate secularism. Radical secularism proposes an absolute separation between religion and state on the grounds that organised religions pose a threat to liberal democracy (see also Buruma, 2010: 2). The problem with this model is that it produces, or at least gives rise to, a totalitarian approach to controlling and regulating aspects of the public and private life of citizens. Moderate secularism acknowledges the separation between religion and state but understands ‘authority’ in a different way by proposing a “relative autonomy of politics so that political authority, public reasoning and citizenship does not depend upon shared religious conviction and motivation” (Modood, 2007a: 73). Although European countries have different histories, European secularism has largely been shaped by a compromise with religion and therefore in many countries, moderate secularism has become a western mainstream secularism (Modood, 2010; Buruma, 2010). What then does ‘respect for religion’ mean in the context of a moderate secularism? In a moderate secularist society, commitment to secularism does not mean excluding religious groups from participating in a secular society or ruling out an extension of multicultural equality to all citizens including those of religious minority groups (Modood, 2007a: 71). In this regard, respect for religion includes recognising religious minorities. The reason why recognising religious groups, including religious minorities, is essential is that it becomes a way of countering the possible hegemony of intolerant secularists, and therefore gives more space to a genuine pluralism (Modood, 2010: 12). In short, respect for religion means recognising the religious traditions that inform and form people’s lives, and therefore counters the possible hegemonic social discrimination born out of cultural or religious disrespect or misrecognition.

1

Charles Taylor provides a different way of understanding secularism. According to Taylor, “We think that secularism (or laïcité) has to do with the relation of the state and religion; whereas in fact it has to do with the (correct) response of the democratic state to diversity” (Kim, 2009).

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5. Media and the Discursive Construction of Recognition As indicated earlier, the lack of political recognition of cultural minority identities and social status represents a core problem of injustices towards minorities. Such injustices are basically rooted in social patterns of representation, interpretation, and communication such as cultural domination, non-recognition or misrecognition or disrespect as seen in various stereotypes, prejudices, racism and more recently Islamophobia (Fraser, 2003). Nevertheless, the philosophical foundation of political recognition also advances the possibility of dialogue among cultures. The premise I am following is that the politics of recognition offers a route into a ‘bridge-building’ process among peoples and cultures through an ongoing dialogic formation of identity-building and the acceptance of subordinated parties as full partners in social interaction. How are such social patterns of representation, interpretation and communication produced and sustained? Recognition and misrecognition are basically discursive because they are expressed, confirmed and distributed through texts, talks and images, such as everyday conversations, board meetings, job interviews, policies, laws, parliamentary debates, political propaganda, textbooks, scholarly articles, movies, TV programmes and news reports in the press, among hundreds of other genres (Dijk, 2000). In the public sphere, media discourse can be seen as one of the social resources through which such discursive construction of recognition or misrecognition of cultural differences are produced, reproduced and sustained. Such a claim is reasonable since, through exposure to the media, people overcome traditional barriers which stand in the way of gaining knowledge. The media shapes people’s understanding and directs their behaviour, including their attitudes towards people of different cultures. Therefore, as McLuhan puts it, the media can be seen as a correlate of the inclusive power of technology to direct the various extensions of the human mind and body (McLuhan, 2003[1965]). I have already mentioned the possible discursive infrastructure of recognition and misrecognition in media discourse. I will turn briefly to Marshall McLuhan and Walter J. Ong, two prominent scholars in the area of media and human communication, in order to clearly locate this point. In his very important book Understanding Media, Marshall McLuhan gives a very interesting account of the personal and social consequences of media in social life, including the representational knowledge which the media produces and sustains. McLuhan argues that in the operational and practical fact of media in modern culture, the medium is the message (McLuhan, 2003[1965]: 19). Walter J. Ong later calls the McLuhan’s idea

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the ‘medium’ model and builds his new account of human communication on the basic premise that every communication demands anticipated feedback (Ong, 1988: 175-177). Ong distinguishes two basic ideas, namely medium without message and medium with message. As medium without message, the media is seen simply as a tool. Ong argues that “thinking of a ‘medium’ of communication or of ‘media’ of communication suggests that communication is a pipeline transfer of units of material called ‘information’ from one place to another” (Ong, 1988: 176). Here, a unit of information is encoded and put into one end of the pipe or the medium. From the one end of the pipe or the medium, the ‘information’ proceeds to the other end, where consumers decode and restore it. The media information is therefore moved from a sender to its consumers. This means that viewership and readership are receivers. On the other hand, the medium is the message because “it is the medium that shapes and controls the scale and form of human association and action” (McLuhan, 2003[1965]: 20). Moreover, “media groups engage in a discourse among themselves, each positioning itself in relation to the others and in response to political agendas, community orientation and other critical factors” (Evans, 2002: 311).When we consider the notion of recognition or misrecognition of cultural difference, it could be argued that on one hand, the media plays an important role in extending the representations of other cultures, and on the other hand that media groups, as corporate institutions, discursively deal with their own agenda, including their views and ideology (see also Poole, 2002). These representations are prevalent, whether in intercultural dialogue and in positive representations of others, or in prejudicial structures, stereotypes and negative images of others. Thus, following McLuhan, as media consumers, viewership or readership, “we become what we behold” which in turn can also mean that “we become what we do not behold” (McLuhan, 2003[1965]: 45). This statement indicates not only the media’s powerful influence but also the media’s role in determining various political, social and cultural practices, to the extent that we tend to believe in the common idea that what is not in the media does not exist. Media discourse plays a very important role in the production of recognition and misrecognition, because the media deal with language use with “a direct result of and a formative influence upon social beliefs, values, ideology and power formations” (Richardson, 2004: 53). This brings us to the discursive aspect of journalistic texts. Generally, it is acknowledged that journalism is produced by journalists working in specific organisations with particular discursive practices. This is to say that journalism is basically discursive because journalistic texts deal with

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language use that represents “opinion statements….embedded in argumentation that makes them more or less defensible, reasonable, justifiable or legitimate as conclusions” (van Dijk, 1997: 24; cited in Richardson, 2004: 228). Moreover, as far as representation is concerned, journalistic discourse offers its ‘version’ of an event through reasonable or justifiable claims, and therefore becomes one of the social resources through which the knowledge and understanding about the world is produced, reproduced and sustained. The creation of their version of an event is very significant because it represents the discursive production of ‘a world’, as suggested by Foucault. Take ethnic minorities as an example. According to van Dijk, people routinely refer to news media as their sources, or even as their authority, concerning their knowledge or opinions about minority groups (1987: 153-164). If we accept that news media produce their version of an event and persuade the audience to accept this version through various arguments and justifications (Richardson, 2004: 228-229), then such a process cannot be separated from ‘ideologies’ that govern those arguments and justifications. In other words, journalistic discourse is accompanied by ‘ideological’ hegemonisation. In this sense, Poole is right when she argues that the news media “reproduce the dominant ideologies of the society of which they are a part” and that “they also construct their own ‘meanings’ (norms and values) through signifying practices” (2002: 23). Poole’s suggestion echoes the argument of Stuart Hall when he contends that professional journalism tends to produce and reproduce “dominant definitions” within a society while at the same time maintaining the choice of formats, images and the staging of debates. This is because professional journalism is also linked to “the structure of access” that includes selecting and defining the situation of representations (Hall, 1996: 136-137). These assessments indeed indicate the hegemonic operation within journalistic discourse. Nevertheless, it could be argued that journalistic discourse is not only socially constructed but also culturally shared (Petersson, 2006). Firstly, it is socially constructed because the production of journalistic texts relates to representing an event, a culture or even a community. Therefore, misrecognition can be part of the whole idea of journalistic representation. What should be noted is that, as generally acknowledged, representation is not a reality in itself, even though an objective way of representing a reality can be achieved. Secondly, journalistic discourse is also culturally shared because the discourse itself can become an instrument that distributes the meaning of beliefs and cultural practices, and therefore offers ways towards the possibility of mutual understanding. This certainly implies that ‘hegemonic struggle’ also operates within

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journalistic discourse, in the sense that it does not only produce dominant ‘ideologies’ but also articulates the negotiation of relational identities within the society, as argued by Laclau and Mouffe.

6. Representing Islam and Muslims The questions surrounding the representation of Islam and Muslims in the media fall under the category of representational knowledge. In relation to the media, representational knowledge is very influential, because it shapes the way people perceive Islam and Muslims even though ‘the truth’ about Islam and Muslims may, in reality, be different. Or, as already pointed out, representation or perception are not realities, although there is a possibility of producing an objective representation or perception. What do the terms ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslim’ mean? The terms ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslim’ have indeed been used uncritically in various studies. Very often, the terms are used as if they are already understood and as if the general public knows what these terms represent. Since this study deals with the representation of ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslims’, a basic clarification of how these terms operate will certainly illuminate further analysis. In his book, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (2004), Olivier Roy poses the following questions: “Whom do we call a Muslim? A mosque-goer, the child of Muslim parents, somebody with a specific ethnic background (an Arab, a Pakistani) or who shares with another a specific culture? What is Islam? A set of beliefs based on a revealed book, a culture linked to a historical civilization? A set of norms and values that can be adapted to different cultures? An inherited legacy based on a common origin?” (Roy, 2004: 21).

In a similar way to Roy, Nasar Meer unpacks these terms by questioning what is really meant when Islam is talked about: “Is it solely a religion whose first prophet was Adam and last prophet was Mohammed? Is it a state of peace achieved through surrender to God, or is it a political and cultural movement? What is meant by the phrase that ‘Islam is a way of life’? And can we distinguish Islam as a name of a religion, from the adjective ‘Islamic’, the noun ‘Muslim’? (Meer, 2010: 58)

In short, we can ask whether the term ‘Islam’ refers to a religion, a religious belief, a civilisation or a political and cultural movement. We can also ask whether Muslims are an ethnic, racial or religious group.

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Researchers such as Olivier Roy and Nasar Meer have offered interesting analyses of these questions. This section will only deal with these terms in the context of the studies of the media representation of Islam and Muslims. The best approach is to turn to “what a billion Muslims really think”. Gallup polls in 2001 and 2005-2007 indicated that the majority of Muslims in Muslim-majority countries say that “religion is an important part of their daily lives… [Islam] is a spiritual mental map that offers a sense of meaning, guidance, purpose, and hope” (Esposito and Mogahed, 2007: 5-6). In other words, Muslims regard Islam as “a core life value” that influences their cultures and traditions. Besides, throughout history, Islam has contributed significantly to the formation of politics and civilisation. Therefore, Esposito and Mogahed note that “religion and society and faith and power are closely bound and intertwined in Islam. Throughout much of history, to be a Muslim was not simply to belong to a faith community or mosque but to live in an Islamic community/state, governed by Islamic law” (2007: 26-27). Based on the above account, the term ‘Islam’ refers to various concepts such as religion, civilisation and world view. Similarly, the term ‘Muslim’ is designated to those who believe in Islam as ‘a way of life’ and those who belong to a faith community. One could note here how these terms cover both an internal system of belief in a religion, and the socio-political expression of faith or religious belief. Given the fact that the expression of belief or faith has social, cultural and political consequences, it makes sense to assume a discursive multiplicity of positions in the understanding of these terms. How do we understand this discursive multiplicity? Perhaps the Saussurean distinction between a signifier and a signified, as developed by S. Sayyid to explain the term ‘Islam’, provides the right perspective from which to approach this question, and to lay a foundation on how the terms ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslim’ are used, including their use in this study (Sayyid, 2003: 41-46). The saussurean theory of the sign is based on the proposition that “a sign without a concept is a theoretical impossibility” (Sayyid, 2003: 41). This proposition signals two fundamental elements in which a signifier refers to the sound image, and a signified to the concept and meaning that explains the sound image. A signifier can have many signifieds, but it certainly never exists without a signified because otherwise it would be a mere sound without any meaning. In relation to the present discussion, it could be pointed out that Islam is a signifier with a set of signifieds because of its relationship to concepts such as ‘Muslim’, Qur’an, civilisation, religion or worldview. Here, the relationship between Islam and a certain signified depends on the context in which the signifier and

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the signified are expounded. Consequently, even though Islam is articulated in relation to many things, these signifieds actually are related to each other or, as Sayyid points out, the signifier (in this case Islam) is found in ‘articulated networks’. For Sayyid, “the content of Islam is provided by the contestation between past and present reinterpretations….What is extraordinary about Islam is that, although it can be used to articulate so many divergent positions, it maintains its specificity – it remains ‘Islam’” (2003: 43-44). What is, then, the specificity of Islam? Islam’s specificity lies in the fact that it founds a community, namely, the ummah or Muslim community. Therefore, it makes sense to say that Muslims, as argued by Sayyid, do not only subscribe to Islam but also identify and actualise themselves in Islam. We can now turn to the use of the term ‘Muslim’. Classification of Muslims is unavoidable in contemporary discussion. For example, in the wake of the 9/11 events, there has been a dualistic classification of Muslims, as seen in the terms ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ Muslims (Poole, 2002; Richardson, 2004; Modood and Ahmad, 2007; Meer, 2010). This classification is not always accompanied by a clear definition. According to Modood and Ahmad (2007), ‘moderate Muslim’ is a relational term because it only makes sense when it is contrasted to ‘non-moderate’ or ‘radical’ Muslim. This relational term is used in response to the 9/11 events, but also in defining the relationship between Muslims and ‘the West’. Besides this, in another typology, Muslims are classified as ‘progressive’ and ‘nonprogressive’ Muslims. This classification is normally related to defining the lines of thought among Muslim scholars and intellectuals (GĘrlach, 2006; Modood and Ahmad, 2007). Others have used modernity as a basis for classifying Muslims. Attaullah Siddiqui of the Islamic Foundation in Leicester, as quoted by Riddel (2004: 18), proposes a three-fold split between modernists, traditionalists and revivalists. This typology has been used by other scholars, such as Douglas Pratt (1999) and Andrew Rippin (2001). Generally, the term ‘Muslim modernisers’ refers to those who follow the method of interpreting Islamic texts to fit a modern context. The term ‘Muslim traditionalists’ is used to describe those who reason from faith and Islamic principles but are guided by the primacy of the traditional authority of ulemma. The third term, ‘Muslim revivalists’ or sometimes ‘Islamists’, refers to those who use the Qur’an as the filter of all discussions while envisioning a community governed by the Shari’a (Riddell, 2004: 19; Modood and Ahmad, 2007: 194).2 2

There are also other classifications that basically echo these three categories (Watt, 1991: 85-86; Ahmed, 1992: 181). Adding to these 3 categories, Pratt (1999) adds the fourth category of ‘pragmatic secularists’. Modood and Ahmad (2007:

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The variety of classifications is pointed out here as a basis upon which to argue that the politics of representing Islam and Muslims also includes the development of classification of Muslims. In a scholarly study, categories are certainly useful as analytical tools. However, categories are also divisive in the sense that once they are used to define a person or a group, this person or group is then associated with a particular understanding, as assigned to the particular category. In the context of politics of recognition, designated associations may often provoke what Nancy Fraser calls an ‘institutionalised pattern of cultural value’, which in turn opens the possibilities for prejudices and stereotypes. The whole point, for the purpose of this study, is that by indicating how the terms ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslim’ are used, a basic theoretical enterprise is developed on the basis that representational knowledge cannot be separated from how the signifier is found in the ‘articulated networks’ of the signifieds and in terms of how categories function contextually in defining issues at hand.

7. Summary The politics of recognition has emerged as an influential contemporary social and political theories. Indeed, the notion of recognition is understood as one of the driving forces behind the cultural formation of identity and the political struggle for social status with the demand for equal dignity and equal respect. In a multicultural society, misrecognising minority identities and status in society represents the core problem of injustice. The politics of recognition offers a route into a ‘bridge-building’ process among peoples and cultures, through an ongoing dialogic formation of identity-building and social status. Since recognition assumes dialogue as a precondition for identity formation and social status as afull partner or equal citizen, discourse, power relations and knowledge about the presence of others or other cultures play a fundamental role in determining recognition or misrecognition. Media discourse is a social resource through which recognition and misrecognition can be produced, reproduced and sustained. Within the frame of how knowledge operates, the representation of Islam and Muslims certainly falls into the domain of representational knowledge. Therefore, representational knowledge of Islam and Muslims offers perceptions about Islam and Muslims. This representational knowledge, however, cannot be separated from how Islam is situated in the ‘articulated networks’ of its signifieds such as ‘Muslim’, 194) point out 4 positions: ‘traditional Islam’, ‘modernist Islam’, ‘philosophical Muslim’ and ‘existential Muslim’.

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‘religion’, ‘civilisation’ or ‘worldview’. This includes contexts in which the relation between Islam as a signifier with its signifieds is articulated. In presenting the findings of the following chapters, arguments and conclusions will be located within the dialogic framework of recognition, with the focus on how Islam and Muslims are represented in the British Christian media, or how the knowledge about Islam and Muslims is discursively produced or reproduced.

CHAPTER THREE REPRESENTING ISLAM AND MUSLIMS IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERFAITH DIALOGUE

One of the dominant discourses through which Islam and Muslims are represented in the British Christian media is the discourse of interreligious or interfaith dialogue. This dominant discourse has formed a central focus in the British Christian media representation of Islam and Muslims. As indicated in the theoretical framework, dialogue is a central theme in the politics of recognition. The phrase ‘interreligious or interfaith dialogue’ is often challenged with various questions. For example, theologian Michael Barnes raises the following questions: “what happens to faith when it becomes interfaith? How does the language of faith speak to another faith and learn from it?” (Barnes, 2006: 48). It is not the purpose of this chapter to address such questions. In this chapter, the phrase ‘interfaith dialogue’ is used to mean the space and room for dialogue between Christians and Muslims, based on their beliefs and faith. What is more important is that this chapter is designed not to answer the questions around interfaith dialogue but rather to answer the questions of how Islam and Muslims are represented within the discourse of interfaith/interreligious encounter. The focus, therefore, will be on the narratives about and labels of Islam and Muslims in the British Christian media, in the context of the interreligious dialogue discourse.

1. The Emergence of dialogue between Christians and Muslims Before proceeding further, I will briefly explore the notion of interfaith dialogue, particularly Christian-Muslim dialogue, from a historical perspective. One of the facts we encounter today is the meeting of people from different religious beliefs or religious traditions in a pluralistic world. In fact, this pluralism must not be limited only to considerations framed in terms of religious traditions. Internally, there has been a pluralistic view within a single religious tradition as well. This means that considering a

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religious tradition simply as a monolithic tradition would certainly ignore the various views within a tradition, and would therefore deny the richness of any one religious tradition. For example, Christianity is the name of a religious tradition, but it does not imply that there is only a single Christian church. The same applies to Islam. Within academic studies, the reality of religious pluralism was first realised as a discourse, at least in Western societies, through the publications of the works of Friedrich Max Müller (1823-1900), particularly Comparative Mythology (1856) and Introduction to the Science of Religion (1873). With the publication of Müller’s works, Western Christians in the late 19th century came to realise that religious pluralism cannot be taken for granted, as seen in the old saying: ‘they who know one, know none’. Olaf Schumann, for example, argues that up until 1910, Christian writers, particularly theologians, did not believe that the meeting of different religious traditions would be an important theme for reflection, at least within and from a Christian perspective. They even considered that religions outside the Western world would weaken and die, following the challenge of the times, secularisation and modern views of the world. Schumann goes on to argue that Christian evangelisation during that period of time can in some ways be seen as a project that fosters the demise of other religious traditions (Schumann, 1996; see also Sperber, 2000). As already pointed out, before the 1960s, Christian churches including the Roman Catholic Church had already realised that the encounter between Christianity and other religions could not be taken for granted. Recognising this fact, churches were prompted by an urgent call for serious reflection on the presence of other religions. The presence of other religions then became a ‘hot’ issue, and a topic was much discussed in the World Mission Conferences, organised by the International Missionary Council from 1928. Even so, what was being discussed was not particularly directed towards ideas and initiatives for dialogue with other religions. Instead, the participants were merely alarmed by a general reading of the presence of other religions which raised the possibility for developing a strategy or ‘missionary agenda’ for Christian churches in this encounter. Apart from the theological concerns regarding other religions, during these conferences there was a growing openness to considerations of ‘spiritual values in other religions’ (Sperber, 2000: 7). As one might expect, the term ‘spiritual values’ certainly refers to a Christian framing of how and what values might be categorised as ‘spiritual’. Meanwhile, at the beginning of the 1960s, many academics turned to the East and their religious traditions. Along with the economic epistemology, a critical thesis arises: “one cannot buy a new product

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without analysing carefully the making of the product” (Schumann, 1996). While Christianity’s experience of the presence of other religions in the first half of the 20th century was framed to consider merely the ‘spiritual values in other religions’, in the second half of the 20th century, Christian churches including the Roman Catholic Church arrived at another stage of reflection: dialogue with other religions was indeed necessary, important and urgent. The second Vatican Council of the Roman Catholic Church has popularly been acknowledged as a turning point, as far as the notion of interreligious dialogue is concerned. The reflections on the presence of other religions during the Second Vatican Council were documented in one of its declarations entitled Nostra Aetate, the Latin expression for ‘In Our Time’, proclaimed on 28 October 1965. This declaration could be described as the Magna Carta for the Roman Catholic Church’s position regarding non-Christian religions. Indeed, the notion of interreligious dialogue was born out of these developments, and interreligious dialogue has since become a popular discourse. In 1967 a consultative meeting of the World Council of Churches (WCC) discussed the idea of ‘Christian Dialogue with Men from Other Faiths’. ‘More experience of dialogue’ was then recommended in order to deal with the old questions of the position of other religions and the teaching of Christianity (Sperber, 2000: 9). In the Roman Catholic Church, the spirit of Nostra Aetate was developed in various Vatican documents and messages after the Second Vatican Council. Moreover, before the proclamation of Nostra Aetate, Pope Paul VI had already instituted a Secretariat for Non-Christians in 1964. This secretariat was later renamed the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue (PCID) by the late Pope John Paul II in 1988. The dialogue between Christians and Muslims has been developed through this framing of interreligious dialogue. In fact, Nostra Aetate of the Second Vatican Council dedicates a few paragraphs to addressing Islam and Muslims. On Islam and Muslims, Nostra Aetate declares: “The Church regards with esteem also the Moslems. They adore the one God, living and subsisting in Himself; merciful and all-powerful, the Creator of heaven and earth, who has spoken to men; they take pains to submit wholeheartedly to even His inscrutable decrees, just as Abraham, with whom the faith of Islam takes pleasure in linking itself, submitted to God” (Abbot (ed.), 1967; Hornsby-Smith, 1991).

The above brief account of the notion of Christian-Muslim dialogue gives the impression that the encounter of Islam and Christianity is ‘a new thing’ or ‘something new’ (Pratt, 2005). It is true that the initiative for

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‘formal’ interreligious dialogue, both as a discourse and a practice, was only introduced in the mid-20th century. However, Christian dialogue with Islam and Muslims was not a sort of dialogue with the ‘Other’ hitherto unknown to Christians. Unlike the encounter of Columbus with ‘a new Other in a new discovered world’ that he did not know before, Christians in the 20th century encountered Muslims as ‘an Other’ they had already known (The Tablet 9 July 2005). The late Pope John Paul II was aware of this when he stated the commitment to ecumenism, in his encyclical Ut Unum Sint, that the result of dialogue is “a brotherhood rediscovered.” This brief account of the encounter between Islam and Christianity, and the emergence of the notion of interreligious dialogue, particularly Christian-Muslim dialogue, cannot be considered as a full account of the rich historical encounter between these two religions and people of faith. It nevertheless provides a basic insight, prior to presenting findings concerning the representation of Islam and Muslims in the British Christian media in the following section. It could be mentioned here that generally speaking, as indicated by the theologian Michael Barnes SJ, Christianity has seen Islam in three ways: judgement, heresy and fulfilment.1 In the idea of judgement, Islam is seen as a judgement from God upon the disunity of the Church. In other words, Islam is here to challenge the Church to move towards greater unity. The second way considers Islam as a Christian heresy, particularly during the time of John of Damascus and medieval Christianity, through which Islam was considered as a criticism of Christianity for its insistence that God has revealed himself in Jesus. Here, there is a sort of element of perceiving Islam as heresy. The third, Islam as fulfilment, sounds more positive. According to this idea, Islam is regarded as the fulfilment of God’s promises to Ismail as written in the book of Genesis.

2. Christians and Muslims: Dialogic Encounter The findings of the representation of Islam and Muslims within the context of interfaith dialogue or religious encounter in the British Christian media will be presented in this section. This includes the notions of dialogue of life and deeds, theological dialogue and dialogue of spiritual experience (Fitzgerald, 2000). These forms of dialogue relate to each other. Before analysing this theme, I shall briefly present the distribution of the texts in the studied media with reference to interreligious dialogue.

1

From my conversation with Fr. Michael Barnes S.J., on 21st May 2009.

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a) Distribution of Media Texts with Reference to Interreligious Dialogue As indicated earlier, the notion of interreligious dialogue is one of the main features of the representation of Islam and Muslims in the studied media. Table 2 reveals that there are 284 texts that specifically focus on this feature or 21% of the total texts included in this study. Of these texts, 130 articles can be found in Church Times, 89 articles in The Tablet, 37 in Evangelicals Now and 28 in Evangelical Times. Thematically, the focus of interreligious dialogue in the studied media includes reports or articles on ecumenical and interfaith meetings (116 texts), ethical issues and social justice (47 texts), general discussion on interreligious dialogue (102 texts) and issues around cultural traditions (19 texts). Table 2: Distribution of Texts with Reference to Interreligious Dialogue Name of Media Church Times The Tablet Evangelicals Now Evangelical Times Total

Count 130 89 37 28 284

% of Main Focus (N=284) 45.8% 31.3% 13% 9.9% 100%

% of Total Sample (N=1357) 9.6% 6.6% 2.7% 2.1% 21%

On the question of whether or not dialogue, meetings of religious leaders and prayer for peace are included in the articles, the data indicates that 310 texts report on these issues. There is a difference here because in some cases information on dialogue or meetings is included in reporting, even though the article may not necessarily focus on the discourse of interreligious dialogue. Of these 310 texts, 146 texts in particular cite Islam or Muslims or Islam-related events as the main factor for the initiatives of interreligious dialogue or prayer meetings. Given the fact that interreligious dialogue occupies 21% of the published articles in the studied media, it could be argued that these media do have an interest in reporting on this topic. This interest goes along with the main characterisation of Islam or Muslims. In the context of interfaith discourse Islam is generally addressed as a religion or a way of life, and Muslims are characterised as potential partners with shared values. Moreover, the interest of the studied media in reporting on the issue of interfaith dialogue indicates that this issue has indeed been a significant discourse in the relations between Islam and Christianity or Muslims and

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Christians. This is particularly notable considering the fact that this discourse is not dealt with in previous studies of the representations of Islam and Muslims in the British mainstream media, although it is mentioned in passing (Poole, 2002: 77-78). Two major studies, conducted by Elizabeth Poole (2002) and John E. Richardson (2004), provide no indication of the centrality of this discourse in the mainstream media. The centrality of this discourse in the British Christian media therefore indicates its importance, as far as the relationship between Muslims and Christians is concerned. The following sections will discuss the significance of this discourse in depth.

b) Dialogue of Life and Deeds As far as the encounter of Christians and Muslims is concerned, one question which normally arises in discussion is: on what basis should a dialogue between Christians and Muslims be developed? The Tablet published an interview with the Vienna Catholic Cardinal, Christoph SchĘnborn, in its edition of 17 April 2004. During this interview, The Tablet’s reporter asked the Cardinal a question regarding what he considers more important: theological dialogue or the building up of personal relationships at a simple human level. Responding to this question, Cardinal SchĘnborn of Vienna replied that friendship is the key. Quoting a biblical account of the Good Samaritan, he then continued that the Good Samaritan “was not a Muslim, but he was a foreigner….. There is no stronger language than this, this truly human and Christian understanding and love for your neighbour in respect and in truth”. In what ways do the British Christian media represent Islam and Muslims through the reports and discourse of the dialogue of life? The Church Times published an article by Canon Dr Andrew Wingate of Leicester on 9 June 2006 entitled “Dialogue reinforces distinctiveness: Interfaith encounter can strengthen our faith”. Writing from a Christian perspective, Wingate argues that “close meeting with imams can be a time of learning, of realisation of Christian distinctiveness, and of growing mutual respect”. To illustrate his point, he referred to some encounters with Muslims, some personal and some by a Christian community. He gave an account of the chaplaincy training developed by the Islamic Foundation in Leicester, in which Christians form half of the advisory group. Through this training programme, he could see that “Imams and lay chaplains learn, through placement with Christian chaplains, of the obligation to be available to all, not only to Muslims. They learn of the distinctive roles of being teachers and leaders of prayer for Muslims, and

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to offer a listening ear, where appropriate, beyond their own community.” He then continued to argue that meeting with Muslims would be a good opportunity for teaching and learning, by pointing to the experience of running a regular dialogue group of Christians and Muslims in Leicester. At the time of the Danish cartoon controversy, a Muslim imam in the group shared his opinion in response to the controversy. A female member of the clergy then spoke to Dr Wingate, regarding the balanced reflection of the imam. Dr Wingate reported her as saying: “I cannot always agree with his views, but his carefully thought-through belief brings an assurance of integrity, which commands nothing but respect. In those difficult circumstances, I felt that I had sat at the feet of a holy man. I told him so.” In the above account, first of all, it is interesting to see how a member of the Christian clergy represents a Muslim imam as ‘a holy man.’ This representation takes place in a religious set-up, because her idea of ‘a holy man’ certainly comes from her own Christian perspective. However, sociologically speaking, what is involved here is not a discussion of what or who a holy man is, but the ability to give room and space for a balanced discourse on the actual issues faced by the society, such as the Danish cartoon controversy. Another argument would be that the ability of this ordained Christian woman to call her Muslim imam counterpart ‘a holy man’ signals openness from a member of the Christian clergy to learn from the Muslim imam. Moreover, following Wingate’s argument, dialogue is not only a window to know about Islam and Muslims, but a window to know more about one’s own belief. Here, Muslims are seen as partners in teaching and learning from each other. In other words, through her encounter with Muslims, Muslims now become part of the formation of her own Christian identity and belief on the one hand, and of her effort to enlarge her world of understanding of Islam and Muslims through her appreciation of the Muslim imam on the other. The idea of Muslims as partners to Christians is also a dominant discourse in The Tablet. However, The Tablet often takes a slightly different approach, in presenting more on the historical facts about the partnership between Islam and the West or Christianity, and what Islamic civilisation has contributed to Christian and Western civilisations. In an editorial entitled ‘What we owe to Islam’ (29 September 2001), The Tablet’s editor suggests that “there is no incompatibility between Islamic civilisation and Western civilisation… Islam and the West are partners”. The idea that ‘the West and Islam are partners’ is maintained both in the editorials and in the articles published during the period of this study. Having considered the West and Islam as partners, The Tablet highlights

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what the West and Christianity owe to Islam in various editorials and articles. This is clearly expressed in the following extracts: “Islam set standards of tolerance that Christianity never even aspired to…; Muslim Europe was the only place where Jews felt safe; Christendom received its early education in medicine, architecture, science, mathematics and many other areas from the Muslim world; Europe was reconnected to the philosophical traditions of the classical era through the Muslim world…without Islam, there would have been no Aquinas, Newton, no rocket science, no computers, no modern civilisation at all” (Editorial, 29 September 2001). “Where would the normative philosophy of the Catholic Church, Thomism, be without Aquinas’s introduction to Aristotle via Islamic scholars like Averroes? Where European science, mathematics, medicine, architecture? Far from being incompatible with it, an Islamic presence in Europe would reunite broken parts of Europe’s religious heritage” (Editorial, 7 December 2002).

The Church Times and The Tablet devote a substantial number of pages to the effort to find common ground between Islam and Christianity or Muslims and Christians. Community meetings, community projects, youth projects, prayer meetings, sport and social events involving Muslims and Christians are often reported in both papers. In the case of political campaigns, for example, faith groups are reported to have prepared lists of questions and issues to be raised with candidates for political office. This initiative involves faith groups, and the issues raised are those faced in common by people of all faith such as marriage, race relations, agricultural systems, asylum seekers, refugees and environmental issues (Church Times 1 June 2001). On the leadership level, religious leaders often come together to either support or critically question some ‘policy proposals’, such as the move against human cloning during the human cloning debate in 2001. In substance, the critical questions of religious leaders concerning government policy proposals have always been the same, namely the questions surrounding the philosophical and ethical implications of policies relating to human life and to social and ethical issues. The same idea of a partnership between Christians and Muslims also appears in Evangelicals Now. However, this paper narrows its representation of Muslims as partners of Christians, focusing on the social issues within society with reference to the moral and ethical implications, which also appear in the Church Times and The Tablet. Through such issues, Evangelicals Now suggests that Christians, particularly evangelicals,

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find a common ground with Muslims. This is clearly expressed in the following quotation: “Muslims are discovering an affinity with evangelical Christians in social ethics, and especially in opposition to sexual perversion and immorality. Since Muslims are 'fundamentalists' in the sense evangelicals are, there is no suggestion of syncretism, but they are calling for collaboration in the social sphere” (Evangelicals Now August 1998).

Having represented Muslims as partners in tackling social problems, articles in Evangelicals Now go on to portray the determination of Muslims in facing some critical socio-moral issues. In an article that urges local communities to get involved and make a difference in society, published in the edition of September 2000, Colin Hart argues for building alliances with others, particularly Muslims. Hart goes on to argue that “working with others who share your views is vital......There may be some issues where you can work with those of other faiths. In Birmingham it has been Muslim groups which have fought kerb-crawling and prostitution, even spurring the police into action”. This argument does not only indicate that Muslims are potential partners and allies as far as the social problems are concerned. The writer basically develops the argument for alliances, based on shared views, and Muslims are therefore represented as those “who share views with Christians”. Furthermore, the writer indicates the special role of Muslims in communities, such as Birmingham, in tackling some of the moral issues in the community which have also been a concern of the evangelical communities. Interestingly, not all the articles in Evangelicals Now suggest a partnership with Muslims in facing the social issues per se. Some articles indicate that the idea of working together with Muslims is often developed in the context of Christian evangelism and efforts to convert Muslims to Christianity through the idea of ‘presenting Christ in Muslim terms’ (Evangelicals Now February 1999). This is to say that ‘partnership’ or ‘dialogue’ is considered as a way of evangelising, or of presenting Christianity; or as a means for converting Muslims. This idea is not common in the Church Times and The Tablet. Graham Heaps’ article entitled “Reaching Our Muslim Neighbours”, published in Evangelicals Now May 2001, clearly echoes this claim. Throughout the article, Heaps of the Gospel Missionary Union uses phrases such as “reaching Muslims for Christ”, “to make Christ known among them [Muslims]”, “bringing Muslims to faith in Christ” and “to win Asians to Christ”. The use of these phrases is accompanied by a number of statements about Islam and Muslims such as “many Muslims are happy to talk about their life-

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dominating faith”; “their [Muslim] minds steeped in ritualism and false doctrine”; “Islam is the mortar of their society and the bedrock of their lives”; “Mosque men exert considerable power over the minds and hearts of almost all in the community”; “they are taught that apostasy is the greatest sin and warned against the seductive efforts of Christian missionaries”. These statements create two different types of world, a world of Christianity with ‘the right doctrine’ and its ‘Christian missionaries’ and Islam with ‘the false doctrine’ and its stand against the ‘efforts of Christian missionaries’. Following the argument in the article, the effort to reach Muslims is therefore seen as an effort to bring Muslims to Christianity. Heaps describes the methods through which Muslims can be reached, namely direct mailings of leaflets and booklets to Muslim homes, sending challenging literature on the Gospel by post, provision of Christian materials written by those who have experiences of talking to Muslims and training of local believers to make contacts with Muslim neighbours, work colleagues, shop owners, taxi drivers and “challenge them with the gospel of Christ”. Of course this example is not meant to imply that any effort to reach Muslims for the purposes of working hand in hand to face social issues and challenges is always an effort to convert Muslims to Christianity. The speech of Sir Fred Catherwood, who represented Evangelicals at a forum in Kazakhstan in 2001 to discuss religious liberty, serves as a good example (Evangelicals Now May 2001). In his speech, Sir Fred urged the Evangelicals to work together with Muslims in order to deal with the social problems faced by difference communities. He said: “We do not have to become Muslims and they do not have to become Christians. But we can and should work together as citizens of the same city facing the same problems. Hostility helps no one but those who are hostile to all religious faith. And there are plenty of those today.” The above examples indicate that Muslims are represented in the context of two different types of narratives. The first concentrates merely on how Muslims and Christians work together when facing the same challenges. The other is a narrative of Christian evangelism through which Islam and Muslims are framed. As a result, working together for a common cause is also seen as a means of introducing or presenting Christianity to Muslims. The appeal to the common ground between Islam and Christianity, particularly in facing the same social issues and problems, is a common approach taken in the interfaith dialogue approaches. Religious leaders, including the top officials, often endorse this approach by urging people to focus “more on the common good and on the values that had shaped a

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nation – and less on cultural diversity”.2 While endorsing this approach, some religious leaders and interfaith activists interviewed in this study consider the appeal to the common good as a way of dealing with misperceptions and misunderstanding of people of one faith regarding those from different traditions. The idea of partnership, particularly in social issues, seems to be a strong idea in the British Christian media. Interestingly, however, this idea is hardly found in Evangelical Times. As far as Islam and Muslims are concerned, Evangelical Times seems to concentrate more on the theological encounter than on the issues presented earlier. This will be explored further in the following section.

c) Framing Islam within the Theological Discourse Mapping the Theological Dialogue Ways through which Islam and Muslims are represented within the discourse of theological dialogue have a central place in the British Christian media. One year after Pope Benedict’s lecture in Regensburg in September 2006, 138 Muslim scholars and leaders released and sent out a letter to the Pope and other Christian leaders around the world. The letter, entitled A Common Word between Us and You, was released on Thursday, 11 October 2007 but dated 13 October 2007.3 Based on its signatories, could be argued that the letter represents the voices of Muslims around the world. Indeed, the signatories represent over 43 nations across the globe. Among the signatories are great muftis, religious leaders, scholars and academics. At the heart of the letter is an invitation from the Muslim leaders around the world for Christians “to come together with Muslims” for (theological) dialogue, on the basis of the two commandments of love for God and neighbour, as found in Jewish, Christian and Muslim scriptures. The significance of this letter can be seen in the various Christian responses reported in the British Christian media. Articles in the British Christian media generally call the initiative “a new departure” and “an invitation to interreligious dialogue” (The Tablet), “a necessary step on the road to world peace” (The Tablet), “a new and important development” (Evangelical Alliance), a ‘first positive step towards dialogue’ or ‘a first step in search for a common basis” (Church Times), “the first widely represented theological response by Muslims to Christian 2

This remark is part of a sermon given by Dr Sentamu, the Archbishop of York (quoted in Church Times 29 December 2006). 3 See the Official Common Word website: http://www.acommonword.com/index.php?lang=en

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invitations to dialogue since the time of the Second Vatican Council in 1965” (The Tablet), “an encouraging sign for dialogue to overcome prejudices” (The Tablet). In response to the letter, the British Christian media (Church Times, The Tablet and Evangelical Times), reported that 300 Christian scholars, mainly Protestant but including Catholic scholars from the United States, welcomed the initiative and signed a document apologising to Muslims for the Crusades and for the repercussions of the War on Terror. Among the Christian leaders who received the letter, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan Williams, was the first head of a Christian Church to respond, describing it as “indicative of the relationship for which we yearn in all parts of the world”, thus setting the tone for later positive responses (The Tablet, 8 December 2007). His response was later followed by ‘a commentary’ on the letter of the Muslim scholars, sent and published in July 2008. In December 2007, Pope Benedict XVI of the Roman Catholic Church responded through the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue with an invitation to Muslim scholars to meet with the Roman Catholic leaders, in order to ‘explore ways of promoting world peace in common with both their faiths’ (Church Times 7 December 2007). The meeting was later held at the Vatican, on 4-6 November 2008, with delegations of 28 from each side. This meeting, which was largely publicised as the first ‘Catholic-Muslim Forum’, ended in a joint declaration declaring that “religious minorities have a right to ‘practise their faith in private and public’ and to have their own houses of worship” (The Tablet, 15 November 2008). While this meeting was largely considered as ‘a significant step forward for dialogue’, one note should be made here concerning the early response from the Vatican towards the idea of dialogue, proposed by the Muslim scholars in ‘A Common Word’. Even though the Vatican welcomed and appreciated the initiative for dialogue, it was critical of the idea of ‘theological dialogue’ proposed by the Muslim scholars, on the grounds of fundamental theological differences and the possibility of being trapped into theological relativism (see also, Lumbard, 2009). In a letter sent to Prince Ghazi bin Muhammad bin Talal of Jordan on 19 November 2007, Cardinal Tarcisio Bertone, the Vatican Secretary of State, expressed Pope Benedict’s ‘deep appreciation’ for the Muslim’s open letter. However, the Cardinal does not mention the idea of ‘theological dialogue’. Instead, he stressed a dialogue based on respect for human dignity, “objective knowledge of the religion of the other” and the promotion of “mutual respect and acceptance” among young Christians and Muslims. The Vatican officials clearly maintained this position. As

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reported in The Tablet on 8 December 2007, when speaking to Vatican Radio in December 2007, the president of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, Cardinal Jean-Louis Tauran, said: “It is important to avoid relativism, avoid saying that basically all religions are the same and it’s the same God”. While this warning is clearly a response to the letter of the Muslim scholars that echoes the common theological themes in the Bible and the Qur’an, the Cardinal’s remarks go along with the favourite theme of Pope Benedict XVI: “What we say is that all seekers of God have the same dignity. That is the sense of interreligious dialogue”. Instead of theological dialogue, Cardinal Tauran argues for a sharing of ideas about human rights and the principle of reciprocity: “If Muslims have mosques for praying and practising their faith in Europe, that’s completely normal. It should be the same for Christians living in majorityMuslim countries”. The UK Evangelical Alliance provided a positive response to the letter of the Muslim scholars. While welcoming it as a ‘new and important development’, The Rev Joel Edwards, the then General Director of the UK Evangelical Alliance, expressed the same concerns as those pointed out by Cardinal Tauran of the Roman Catholic Church regarding theological dialogue and the urgency of working together towards the common issues faced by faith communities. Edwards argues that any dialogue must also include a common concern for religious liberties. He is therefore critical of exclusive theological claims ‘in a culture where convictions are often presented as a political liability’ and instead promotes the argument for searching together the ways in which “faith works with communities to tackle the intractable problems of our day in which politicians cannot” (Evangelical Alliance website, July 2008).4 Like the Church Times and The Tablet, Evangelical Times dedicated two articles to responding to the letter of 138 Muslim scholars, in their editions of January and February 2008.5 However, unlike the other British Christian media, Evangelical Times voices a more critical view. In an article entitled ‘Muslim leaders court Christians’, published in January 2008, Evangelical Times noted the public stances of the signatories without further explanation, by claiming that ‘some of the signatories are Muslim leaders well known for moderation and peaceful intentions’ and some ‘have made aggressive statements in favour of global jihad’.

4

The response of the Revd. Joel Edwards was published in Evangelical Alliance website and also in the Church Times. 5 I include two articles of Evangelical Times published in January and February 2008, since these articles are a direct response to the ‘Common Word’ letter.

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Interestingly, while applauding the conciliatory tone of the responses to the letter from some Christian leaders, the article critically points out that “what has not been mentioned in all these responses is the absolute uniqueness of Jesus Christ as God’s only way of salvation.......We do not call upon Muslims and Jews to bow before Christianity, but all men everywhere to repent of sin and bow before the Lord Jesus Christ” (Evangelical Times January 2008)

According to the article, this claim is ‘non-negotiable’. Such a claim was explored further in a long article published in the edition of February 2008, entitled ‘A common word?’—with a question mark—in which a question was posed to the Evangelicals: “What are Evangelicals to make of this approach and what is our position on the broader issue of interfaith dialogue—especially when the possibility of world peace is offered as a prize?” This article then questioned the genuine nature of the intentions of the Muslim leaders for ‘dialogue leading to greater interfaith understanding’, based on a response to ‘A Common Word’ written by Patrick Sookhdeo. In his response, Sookhdeo argues that “the letter is simply part of an ongoing effort to Islamise the Christian world.....a radical revolutionary change in Christianity is demanded in exchange of superficial change of emphasis in Islamic perceptions”. Sookhdeo’s assessment clearly provides the basis for the views expressed by the writer of ‘A common word?’ in Evangelical Times, who concludes that “basically, the letter demands Christian subordination to Islamic doctrine, offering peaceful co-existence between the religions in return. It is the logic of conquest and subjection.” Two Types of Claim Indeed, articles in the British Christian media often make theological claims, as far as the relationship with Islam and Muslims is concerned. Based on the tone, the claims can be classified into two types: dialogic approach and exclusive superior claim. Dialogic Approach In the dialogic approach, the claim is made in order to inform the readers and form the knowledge of the readers concerning the basic differences between the religions. Such information and formation therefore clarify some basic differences, in support of efforts for mutual understanding. This is to say that clarification of theological differences equip people of different faiths with the necessary information and knowledge about the religion of others, and therefore provide a platform

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for further dialogue. From the data in this study, it is found that these differences are presented in a certain way, in order to provide basic knowledge and information for the readers, for example, through the discussion of monotheism, the Qur’an and other religious practices. The following quotations illustrate this point: “An examination of the Islamic texts quickly shows that the two faiths have much in common, in areas such as their understanding of a transcendent God, prayer, prophets, angels, charity and a range of other beliefs. However, a key area of difference poses a substantial hurdle, namely the respective views of the Cross, a concept which lies at the very heart of Christian belief” (Evangelicals Now March 2001). “For Muslims the Qur'an is the unmediated word of God, not simply the message of the Prophet. It "descended" on Muhammad from God and is therefore not susceptible to interpretation in the same way as the Christian Bible” (The Tablet 8 September 2007).

Nevertheless, some practices in Islam are often evaluated through the practices in Christianity. While one may argue that this approach is taken to make things easier for the readers, who presumably are Christians, it could also be argued that interpreting Islam through Christian terms would leave out the essential meaning of the basic ideas in Islam for Muslims. The discussion of Muslim interpretation of the Qur’an often follows this strategy. In an article entitled ‘Which one is Islam?’, published in Evangelicals Now December 2007, Peter Cotterell attempted to describe how Muslims deal with the interpretation of the Qur’an. According to Cotterell, “...some parts of the Qur’an contradict other parts. To solve this they have the doctrine of ‘abrogation’: any verse of the Qur’an can cancel out, abrogate, any verse that was written earlier.” The approach can also be seen in the attempts to develop the parallels between Christian and Muslim terminologies. A featured article headlined ‘Presenting Christ in Muslim terms’, published in the edition of Evangelicals Now February 1999, claims that “Christians share common ground with Muslims and that common ground is their faith in God.” The article then went on to discuss some cases of Christian theological terms that can be easily paralleled with Islamic terms and attributes for God. A number of articles in The Tablet and Church Times use the same approach. The use of Islamic terms is often contextualised or translated into Christian terms, indicating that the readers or majority of the readers are Christians. For example, the word ‘seminary’, an educational institution for religious training in Christianity, is used to replace ‘madrasah’, an Islamic educational institution. This translation may help

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the readers to understand, or at least imagine, the idea of ‘madrasah’. The problem, however, is that the ‘transfer’ of terms does not always mean an accurate transfer of meaning. As a result, Islamic practices are here represented through Christian or Catholic practices, and the understanding of particular religious practices in Islamic formation is therefore developed through the understanding of practices in Christian or Catholic Churches. To clarify this point, we can take the interpretation of the Qur’anic teaching in madrasah as an example. The Tablet published an article by Daniel Madigan, in the edition of 10 November 2001, entitled ‘Islam’s Televangelist’, in which Madigan also discussed the interpretation of the Qur’an. In this article, the teaching of the Qur’an in a madrasah is judged using the common practice, norm and understanding of biblical exegesis in the Christian seminaries. As a result, practices in Islam were compared to certain practices in Christianity. While using such a comparison may be informative and helpful for the readers, the discourse here nevertheless only projects the teachings of the Christian Bible and how Christians read and understand the Bible. Having made the above comparison, Madigan further interprets the training of Muslim clerics. He argues that “people speak loosely of Muslim clerics, but these men are not ordained. They are trained. The recognition of their authority comes first from their teachers and then from the public who seek their opinions.” This assessment certainly presents basic differences in clerical formation and in how authority is gained in Christianity and Islam. However, by saying that the Muslim clerics are not ‘ordained’, readers would certainly think of the idea of priestly or Episcopal ordinations in Christian churches. On the one hand, this offers a piece of information concerning the difference in clerical authority in Christianity and Islam, but on the other hand, it could be interpreted that without ordination, the authority of a cleric is not complete, at least in the Christian imagination. The writer then leads the readers to what he calls ‘the very dispersed notion of authority’ in the Muslim world and Muslim clerics. To explain the possible outcome of such a characterisation, the writer suggested a soft-lesson, using a Pakistani saying: “Nim hakim khatra-e-jan. Nim mulla khatra-e-iman”, which means “a half-baked doctor is a danger to your life, a half-baked mullah is a danger to your faith”. What is clear here is that by transferring the Islamic terms to Christian terms, or by comparing Islamic practices to Christian practices, these texts use the ‘language’ that can be easily understood by the readership. However, this comparative move often leads to ambivalent conclusions about Islam or Islamic practices, even though the representation may not be meant to be negative or ambivalent.

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The different forms of representing Islam in the British Christian media strongly indicate that like Islam, there is internal pluralism within Christianity. Christians share Christ as the central figure of their faith, but express their faith through different spiritual traditions, doctrines and moral teachings. This means that theological claims are probably necessary for mutual understanding, particularly in terms of the theological position of religions, but not in order to ‘solve’ differences. As far as Christian and Muslim relations are concerned, theological dialogue has the potential to divide Christian churches on some theological issues while unifying some with Muslims. Take the interpretation of the religious figures in the Holy Scriptures (Bible and the Qur’an) as an example. When the figure of Jesus or Isa in Islam is considered, this would bring both religions – Christianity and Islam - together since Muslims also highly respect Isa as a messenger of God. One can certainly ask: is the Qur’anic Isa the same figure as the biblical Jesus? While this question invites further study, at least we know that Christians and Muslims can enter into dialogue through their common respect of the figure of Jesus or Isa. Although this would easily bring Muslims and Christians together, there are issues that divide Christians on the one hand and unite some Christians with Muslims on the other hand. The best example to illustrate this is the figure and the role of the Virgin Mary. In an article entitled ‘Making sense of Mary’ published in The Tablet, 21 May 2005, Sarah Jane Boss describes the division of Churches concerning the role and status of the Virgin Mary: “When Catholics hold interfaith dialogue with Muslims, one of the first topics to be discussed is the veneration given to the Virgin Mary in the two traditions. Teaching about Mary is seen as something that unites, rather than divides Catholicism and Islam; yet among Christians, the practices of Marian doctrine and devotion have generally been read as clear indicators of the differences between Catholics and Protestants”.

Exclusive claim The exclusive superior claim is different. In the exclusive approach, a claim is made to point out a difference. However, judging from the tone, such a claim is presented as a claim to superiority over the other, thereby ridiculing the difference to the point that claims turn into a sort of ‘fight’ for “who really owns the ‘true’ God”. This type of claim is displayed in a number of published articles, particularly in Evangelicals Now and Evangelical Times. Often, the claims are framed through the discussion of the Prophet Muhammad, the Qur’an and some basic principles of Islam. From the studied media, the following claims can be included on the list:

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“Islam wholly underestimates both the holiness of God and the offensiveness of sin”; “Muhammad was not a systematic theologian”; “Islam is clearly a militant threat to the cause of Christ”; “Islam is the world’s largest cult”; “the god of Islam ordains fighting, war, punishment by crucifixion and amputation”; and “false religion, especially resurgent Islam, is rife”; “in Islam stealing is no great sin provided nobody catches you! In Christ, people discover genuine honesty”; “He [Allah] has never become a human being and given himself for us. If Allah does not give himself sacrificially for others then why should we? Only Jesus Christ makes sense of love”6. The exclusive superior approach explained here also incorporates a critical view of other churches’ ‘policy’ or ‘approach’ to interfaith dialogue, through which interfaith dialogue is merely seen as a strategy for compromising basic Christian theological positions or Christian beliefs, or even accusations of ‘falsifying Christian gospel’, ‘betraying the gospel’ or promoting ‘a total negation of the gospel’. Following the events of 11 September 2001, the Evangelical Times published a critical article in the editions of March and April 2002, entitled ‘Islam and the Vatican’, written by Richard Bennet and Robert J. Nicholson. This article is a response to the statements made by Pope John Paul II, when he travelled to Kazakhstan in September 2001 despite post-9/11 concerns.7 In this article, the writers critically evaluate the idea of the Church’s relationship with Muslims promoted by the Roman Catholic Church (and other Christian churches), calling it “the Vatican’s policy of approval towards Islam.” Again this evaluation is a very theological one, addressing the Vatican’s approach to Islam based on the idea of ‘the Abrahamic faith’. The writers then argued that “Rome thus believes that the One God of Holy Scripture is also the God of Islam… …The biblical commandment not to venerate any strange god has been broken by Rome in order to give Muslims credit for holding to the faith of Abraham” (Evangelical Times March 2002). The article goes on to claim that Rome “accepts Islam as a valid religion”, “the Roman and Islamic systems….are totalitarian…they promote the synthesis 6

Evangelicals Now August 2002 and December 2007; Evangelical Times March 2000, January 2002, March 2002, May 2004, September 2004 and December 2006. 7 This article is a response to the statements of Pope John Paul II in a sermon delivered on 23 September 2001 during his visit to Kazakhstan. On the absolute oneness of God, the Pope stated that “this is a truth which Christians inherited from the children of Israel and which they share with Muslims: it is faith in the one God…”. On the idea of love, he argued: “This ‘logic of love’ is what he holds out to us, asking us to live it above all through generosity to those in need. It is a logic which can bring together Christians and Muslims…”.

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of spiritual and civil power, both in their doctrine and by their cultic practices”, “the pope, the politicians, and the Muslims continue to keep the history of Islam, and the war-like teaching of the Qur’an, under wraps”, “the Roman Catholic Church still plays chameleon – for since Vatican Council II, she has embraced Islam, calling praiseworthy that which she once denounced as evil and worthy of destruction by war”. As stated earlier, the approach taken by some articles in Evangelical Times is based on the context of evangelisation. What Bennet and Nicholson argue throughout their article echoes the concern that ‘Roman Catholic and Orthodox Churches …did little to share the gospel with Muslims” (Evangelical Times April 2004).

d) Dialogue of Religious Experience If theological positions seem to divide the British Christian media in representing Islam, there is relative unity in representing Islam, as far as its spiritual side is concerned. When discussing the presence of Muslims in Europe, and Europe’s response to the presence of Muslims, Tariq Ramadan points to the centrality of spirituality. According to Ramadan, “The real question is about spirituality. If the presence of Muslims leads Europeans to think about who they are and what they believe in, that has to be positive” (quoted in Quesne, 2000). Indeed, one of the areas through which Islam and Muslims are represented in the British Christian media is the dialogue of religious experience. Reports in the British Christian media indicate how Christians have also learned from the spiritual richness of Islam through their encounter with Muslims or Islamic culture. Among the Islamic spiritual pillars, the traditions of daily prayers, the month of Ramadan and pilgrimage to Mecca are widely covered in the British Christian media.8 In an interesting article entitled ‘Why Muslims keep the greater fast”, Ted Harrison explains the tradition of Muslim Ramadan as the Holy Month for fasting, study and prayer (Church Times 28 September 2007). Throughout the article, Harrison carefully but interestingly describes the tradition of Ramadan, its purposes and its spiritual merits. Having presented these, he turns to the practice of Lenten time within Christianity. He then claims that “the observance of Ramadan puts the normal Christian observance of Lent to shame.” Why? He argues that the intense spiritual focus makes Ramadan so special that for the 8

The Church Times 12 October 2001, published articles of three Muslims writers, Ataullah Siddiqui, Mohammad Siddiqui and Dilwair Hussain, through which, among other things, they discussed the basics and basis of Islam, the pillars of Islam and the idea of worship in Islam.

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whole month, daily life is shaped by the fast. He described the whole idea by simply presenting Islamic practice during Ramadan: “From dawn to sunset, they abstained from eating and drinking. They needed to rise extra early in the morning to say the first prayers of the day and eat breakfast. At sunset, they broke the fast — usually in the traditional way with a date and a drink of water. Then came prayers, a family or communal meal, and an evening recitation from the Qur’an.”

Through this article, Harrison did not only present the holy month of Ramadan and its spiritual merits to the Christian readers: he, in fact, challenges Christians to learn from various spiritual exercises within Islam. Openness for spiritual dialogue can also be seen in the gestures of Christian leaders and churches in sending messages to the worldwide Muslim community at the end of Ramadan. Muslim’s fidelity to daily prayers is often used by some Christian writers to encourage their own fellow Christians to appreciate the time for prayers. Among Christian leaders, Pope John Paul II expressed public admiration for the Muslim’s fidelity to prayer (Paul II, 1995: 92). These examples indicate that when spiritual dialogue is taken into consideration, the underlying tone of the representation of Islam and Muslims is more positive.

3. Discussion Looking at what I have presented, it could be argued that within the discourse of interfaith dialogue, representations of Islam and Muslims form three basic approaches: firstly, appeal to the sameness, secondly, production of ‘another other’ and, thirdly, absolutisation of boundaries.9

a) Appeal to the Sameness Appeal to the sameness or similarity is embraced as one of the ways Christians develop in their encounter with Muslims. It is evident that this idea is well expressed in the articles published in the studied British Christian media, by pointing at the importance of the relations between Islam and Christianity from a historical perspective, the common 9

The article of Adam B. Seligman (2008) entitled “Living Together Differently” provides some basic ideas in developing these three basic approaches. Seligman explored some of the ideas in this article during the International Summer School on Religion and Public Life hosted by the University of Birmingham and the Birmingham Faith Leaders Group, 11 – 21 July 2009. I was one of the fellows of this summer school programme.

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challenges faced by all, the fact that both Christians and Muslims take their inspiration from a spiritual resource called ‘faith in God’ and the idea of human dignity and shared human rights. Based on these, the present and future encounter of Christians and Muslims is ideally considered as a moment of ‘teaching and learning’ from each other. For these reasons, Muslims and Christians are represented as partners. This label of being a ‘partner’ becomes clear in the ways Muslims and Christians are facing common social issues and problems hand in hand. The British Christian media highlight the commonality of Muslims and Christians in their ‘faith in God’. What is clear from the findings is that when the appeal to sameness becomes a strategy, Islam and Muslims are, for the most part, represented positively. The question is, when the idea of “the West and Islam as partners” is constructed, what does this really mean? As indicated in chapter 2, discourse implicitly embodies certain views, knowledge, beliefs and even particular ‘positions’ for the subjects addressed in the discursive practice (Fairclough, 1995). The studied texts also embody views, knowledge, belief and positions regarding the West and Islam. Since texts produce knowledge, the construction of Islam as a (or the) partner of the West raises two perspectives. Firstly, the idea that “the West and Islam are partners” assumes that both the West and Islam are two entities that could share power, particularly in the face of common challenges. This perspective proposes a unity of power between the West and Islam. Secondly, the idea that “the West and Islam are partners” is an attempt to produce a common identity within which both the West and Islam assert themselves in their differences. These two perspectives highlight how power relations control knowledge production in discourse practice. The first perspective is derived from Foucault’s analysis of power relations within discourse, when he responds to the theory of sovereignty and operators of domination (Foucault, 2003: 43-62). Sovereignty, in Foucault’s view, is the theory that goes from subject to subject, and which establishes the political relationship between subject and subject. The first perspective of power relations in the idea that “the West and Islam are partners” can be seen through the lens of this theory of sovereignty, within which both the West and Islam are seen as subjects. However, power in this ‘subject-to-subject’ cycle is employed much more in terms of capacities, possibilities and potentials (see also Lash, 2007: 59-61). To say that “the West and Islam are partners” means establishing a unity between the possibilities and power of the West and Islam, in order to form a unity of power. This unity of power (as partners) produces legitimacy for both the West and Islam. In

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other words, within discourse, in establishing the thesis that “the West and Islam are partners”, The Tablet attempts to show that power can be constituted, and that only a unity of power between the West and Islam could best confront terrorism. The second perspective articulates the idea of hegemonic struggle in discourse, within which the thesis of “the West and Islam are partners” suggests an alliance between the two. How is the partnership or alliance between the West and Islam created? In the strategy of appealing to the sameness for further formation of alliance, what is being developed is a strategy which Laclau and Mouffe called the ‘logic of equivalence’ (2001[1985]). The logic of equivalence functions by creating equivalential identities. In this case, Christians and Muslims create an equivalential identity by seeing themselves as ‘people of faith in God’ or ‘partners in facing the social problems and challenges’. What happens here is that through the articulation of equivalent elements, or what is common between Islam and Christianity or Muslims and Christians, the possibility of an interchangeability of elements is increased (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001[1985]; see also Andersen, 2003: 60-61). This does not necessarily mean that those who are bound by an equivalential identity have only a single identity. They may be common in one or more aspects, but certainly different in others. In a project that applies the logic of equivalence, such as the encounter between Muslims and Christians, internal differences are weakened. In the case discussed here, elements of social issues and ‘the same’ faith in God are experienced by both Christian and Muslim communities, and therefore an equivalent identity is created. In the light of the political theory of recognition, it could be argued that by appealing to commonality or sameness, recognition is achieved by weakening the internal differences while broadening what is common and similar. The appeal to the common aspects or the sameness provides a relatively easy way for Christians to recognise Islam and Muslims and to represent them positively. However, the strategy of appealing to the sameness raises two basic and fundamental conceptual questions. Firstly, is there such a thing as commonality? In fact, there is no such thing as commonality per se. What we have is a commonality ‘with regard to something’, for example, with regard to ‘common social issues’, ‘faith in God’ or ‘basic human rights and human dignity’. This is to say that the commonality itself cannot stand alone. The commonality always points at something. From the findings, the commonality of Muslims and Christians is framed around the notion of common challenges and faith in God. Considering this commonality, we may ask: how does religious belief play its part in this context of commonality? First of all, one may suggest that

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religious resources equip people of faith to identify social challenges and to form a common ethic based on the idea of shared humanity while at the same time responding to the challenges as a ‘religious’ responsibility. Here, religious beliefs, practices and traditions which are constitutive in the traditions of religions enable the flow of inspirations from which community initiatives and community organisation start. Religious resources, in this case, become a motivating factor for voluntary initiatives and actions. Secondly, the fact that religious communities find common grounds for common purposes supports the idea that the vast majority of people, including people of faith, are subject to a global ethic. Moreover, “their experience of the moral life is rooted in the virtues, social practices and traditions of their communities grounded in the world’s main religions, however imperfectly they may live this out” (Thomas, 2001). Thus, religious resources offer the possibility for voluntary dialogue and efforts towards recognising each other. This, however, can be questioned further: do we really need interreligious dialogue or even recognition, if in fact there are similarities in Islam and Christianity and similarities found and faced by both Muslims and Christians? In this case, one might say that “no, we don’t need a dialogue between religions (or civilisations), we need a bond of political solidarity between those who struggle for justice” (Zizek, 2009).This is true when the idea of common purposes, such as tackling social challenges or injustice, is considered. However, people of faith often develop their ideas and responses to societal problems from their religious point of view, based on their religious resources or spirituality. For example, people of faith often use the argument of faith as a motivation or inspirational source for working hard to solve the problem of social injustice and other moral challenges (Grodz, 2007). Dialogue of religions in this sense means sharing the sameness, or sharing what is common to religions. In this context, respect for the other is based on ‘the other’s willingness’ to participate in facing the same common challenges for the same common purposes. The second issue with regard to the appeal to sameness is the problem of differences. What happens when the differences are not taken into account for the sake of appealing to commonality? From the data, learning from the differences in the dialogic process is not well addressed in the British Christian media. Indeed, initiatives and activities such as ‘Building Bridge seminars,’ various Muslim-Christian Forums and meetings of religious leaders are widely reported, but the content of the dialogue of discourse is seldom publicised in the studied papers, except in the websites of the Church of England and the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales and UK Evangelical Alliance.

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Turning back to the above question, an argument can be made here that by appealing to the sameness without backing it up with a knowledge and understanding of difference, the encounter or social interaction between Christians and Muslims seems to rely heavily on ‘trust’ among them. According to Adam B. Seligman, trust is what is needed to maintain an interaction when knowledge of the differences is lacking (1997). It should be noted, however, that knowledge of differences does not always require a complete understanding of differences. This brings us to an argument made by Zali Gurevitch that ‘the ability to not understand, rather than the ability to understand the other, is posited as crucial to the dialogic process” (Gurevitch, 1989: 161). What does Gurevitch mean by ‘the ability to not understand?’

Figure 1: The Circle of Understanding (Source: Gurevitch, 1989: 164)

As seen in Figure 1 above, I will here present Gurevitch’s circle of understanding, in order to illustrate the problem of appealing to sameness while neglecting the constructive power of differences. Generally, when we consider the notion of understanding, we are normally limited to the move from A to B: a move from the ‘inability to understand’ to the ‘ability to understand’. Here, we remove our inability to understand by seeking knowledge that equips us with the ability to understand by gathering information, perceptions and explanations. However, it often happens that “when we are in B, we are in fact in C.” Why? In this case, ‘understanding’ is a shortcut which conceals our inability to understand by taking others and ourselves for granted. What happens now is that with the presence of C, another situation is created, that is, the ability to not understand in D. The D position does not necessarily mean that the other cannot be explained. What is necessary here is that ‘the otherness of the other’ is revealed and therefore liberates it from the interpreter’s perspective of interpretation. In other words, according to Gurevitch, what

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is needed is not additional information and explanation, but the willingness and the ability to familiarise oneself with the strangeness of the Other. This is what Michael Barnes calls “the intimacy of distance” (2006) Or, as Cissna and Anderson put it: “a dialogue partner assumes not only that the other person is different….but is different in strange…ways. Strangeness means the other cannot be reduced to an adjusted person of a ‘me’; there is always more…..Such strangeness is not necessarily a threat, but is as often an invitation for learning” (Cissna and Anderson, 2002: 10). According to Gurevitch, the strategy of having the ability to not understand certainly has two major implications, as far as the process of understanding in relationships is concerned: firstly, it relates to the recognition and conception of the other in the eyes of the self; secondly, it has implications for the way in which one sees oneself in the eyes of the other. The whole process requires one to move towards the other and to allow the strangeness of the other to become internalised. Therefore, shifting oneself towards the other, and taking on the other’s role, allows one to gain both a new understanding of the other and a new understanding of the self (Gurevitch, 1989: 163-164). Those who have been involved in the interfaith dialogue often call this move ‘the silence of faith’ (Barnes, 2002: x-xi). This means that ‘the Other’ indeed represents a difference. However, ‘the Other’ is a potential friend, so long as there is enough trust to enable the possibility for dialogue. When the appeal to commonality includes within it the ability to not understand, the enacted social interaction relies on trust. “Trust is necessary when the other, or the actions of the other, are unknowable. And the other is unknowable when we cannot impute or predict behaviour, when there is no underlying structure which would allow such prediction” (Seligman, 1997: 106). In other words, the moment of ‘having the ability to not understand’ is a moment of ‘growing old together’ (Gurevitch, 1998: 163). In the context of political theory or recognition, trust is necessary for the purpose of dialogic formation.

b) The production of ‘Another Other’ From the analysis of the representation of Islam and Muslims, particularly within a theological discourse, we notice two things: the production of another other, and the absolutisation of boundaries. This section will concentrate on the production of another other. The format of producing another other is framed, in particular, through the acknowledgement of religious figures within both Christianity and Islam. Firstly, Muslims and Catholics would find a way of having an

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equivalential identity through the acknowledgement of the Virgin Mary or Maryam within both Islam and Roman Catholicism. This formation of equivalential identity produces, at the same time, another other, namely Christians from other denominations who have different theological consideration of the Virgin Mary or Maryam. The second way of producing another other is stronger than the first. This can be seen in the claims made in the Evangelical Times concerning Roman Catholicism and Islam. As indicated in the findings, while some articles in Evangelical Times point out that ‘Islam is a false religion’ (an Other), this claim consequently portrays the effort to enter into dialogue with Islam and Muslims as ‘a falsification’ of Christian belief. This claim is particularly addressed to the Roman Catholic Church. Following the logic of these claims, Islam becomes ‘an other’ and because of its efforts to reach Islam and Muslims, Roman Catholicism becomes ‘another other.’ In this case, on one hand, Islam becomes ‘an other’ simply because it is totally different from Christianity and becomes ‘an unknown other’ or ‘a different other’ representing ‘a dangerous face’. On the other hand, Roman Catholicism becomes ‘another other’ simply because its version of Christianity, particularly when dealing with Islam, is not the version known and embraced at least by those who argue that Roman Catholicism promotes a negation of the Christian gospel. Roman Catholicism therefore becomes ‘another other’ representing ‘a face of risk’ to the nonnegotiable stand of faith. The production of ‘another other’ in the representation of Islam and Muslims here reminds us of Sigmund Freud’s notion of the ‘narcissism of the small difference’. Through this notion, Freud makes an argument that often the threat to a person’s identity does not only come from a totally different and far off other. Rather, it also comes from the ‘near other’, namely from those who are similar in so many ways but not in some particular attributes, which then achieve ‘an iconic standing as representing all that is different and threatening and so must be destroyed’ (Freud, 2002; Dalal, 2002: 36-37; Seligman, 2008: 2889). This is to say that when internal differences become a threat, the production of ‘another other’ is taken up as a strategy. Recognition does not, therefore, always mean respecting the other that is totally different. It also has to deal with the ‘near other’. This is normally called ‘intrareligious dialogue’. This model of dialogue channels the internal conversation towards communicating the differences between the traditions, views, texts, teachings and practices within any one religion (Kramer, 1990). A theoretical insight that can be drawn from the production of ‘another other’ is that recognition is not similar to respect

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for otherness, even though respect can be considered as a form of recognition. Muslims do not need to recognise Jesus Christ as the Saviour of the world. Equally, Christians cannot be expected to recognise Prophet Muhammad in the same way Muslims recognise the Prophet. Having said that, the only thing we can achieve in the dialogic position is to respect one another, including respecting the belief of a group based on the premise that “faith is supremely important, and therefore every man must be allowed to live by the faith which seems true to him” (Sacks, 2002: 199).

c) Absolutisation of Boundaries The third way in which Islam and Muslims are represented is through the absolutisation of boundaries. In this mode of representation, boundaries are nonnegotiable simply because they are absolutised. The demonstration of the absolutisation of boundaries becomes clear when ‘the uniqueness of Jesus Christ’ in the Christian faith is proposed as the central argument to be considered in any dialogic effort with Islam and Muslims. What is interesting here is that absolutisation of boundaries emerges in two circumstances. Firstly, it emerges when differences are objectionable (Seligman, 2008). This means that differences are nonnegotiable and are therefore absolutised. Secondly, the absolutisation of boundaries emerges when one’s uniqueness is stressed as a point of departure, while at the same time ignoring ‘the other’s uniqueness’. Responses to the letter of 138 Muslim scholars and various theological claims in the articles published particularly in Evangelical Times clearly demonstrate this notion of absolutising the boundaries. If Gurevitch’s circle of understanding is considered in this context, absolutisation of boundaries falls under C: the inability to not understand. It may even go further, to the extreme that knowledge and ‘understanding’ is not required at, all once boundaries are absolutised. In this context, recognition and dialogic formation are certainly challenged. Here, one’s world is ‘a locked world’ that cannot be opened to ‘the other’. What is followed here is the view that “faith is supremely important, and therefore all men must have the one true faith” (Sacks, 2002: 199). According to this proposition, recognition would only be possible if there were a submission of one culture or one faith to another. The least that can be achieved is a sort of ‘racism of cultural difference’, as seen by Slavoj Zizek, in which ‘respect for otherness’ follows the idea that “I want my culture, you can have yours” (Reul and Deichmann, 2001). The worst that can be expected is that this proposition will often be accompanied by efforts to demonise the

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other’s belief. The further danger of an absolutised boundary approach to the other would occur if this absolutisation were turned into an ideology based on the premise that goes like this: ‘Those who do not share my worldview, my belief or faith do not share humanity. At best they are second-class citizens” (see Sacks, 2002: 45). Considering the role of the media in this case, it could be argued that the media play an important role in socialising the absolutisation of boundaries, not only by indicating the difference between Christianity and Islam, but also by pointing out that such differences are nonnegotiable and cannot be bridged. In the light of the theory that informs this study, a radical absolutisation of differences certainly puts humanity at risk. Within a condition of the absolutisation of differences, a change of perspective becomes essential, which creates room not only for familiarising oneself with ‘the strangeness’ of the other, but also for moving from exclusive claims in relation to faith to a more inclusive claim, as indicated in the logic that faith is very important and therefore people deserve respect for what they believe in.

4. Summary The encounter between Christianity and Islam or Christians and Muslims has a long history. While there have been efforts towards dialogue in this encounter, Christian efforts to engage in interreligious dialogue only began to occur in the mid-20th century. Within the context of the interfaith encounter between Christians and Muslims, the British Christian media represent Islam and Muslims in various ways. In general terms, firstly, Muslims are represented as partners based on a common shared humanity and the common social issues that cry out for an ethical social responsibility from both Christians and Muslims. When the appeal to commonality is made, Muslims are generally represented in a favourable way. Secondly, Muslims are represented through a (re)production of another other. Here, Muslims are seen as a different other and at the same time, efforts from some Christian churches to engage in dialogue with Muslims are seen by other Christian churches as efforts to ‘falsify’ the true gospel. Islam then becomes the other, and Churches that develop efforts for dialogue become ‘another other’ or ‘the near other’. Thirdly, Islam is considered to be completely different and these differences are considered objectionable. In this strategy, boundaries or differences are absolutised. In the absolutisation of the boundaries, recognition is clearly challenged. Recognition is possible when there is a willingness to move from the view that ‘faith is supremely important, and therefore all men

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must have the one true faith’, to a new proposition that ‘faith is supremely important, and therefore every man must be allowed to live by the faith which seems true to him’ (Sacks, 2002: 199). Misrecognition certainly occurs when boundaries are absolutised. However, this does not mean that the idea of a common or shared humanity can be taken for granted. Of course, holding onto what is common is necessary in order to make living together practically possible (Church Times 11 May 2001). I would further argue that misrecognition occurs not only when boundaries are absolutised, but also when differences are taken for granted on the grounds of the assumption of common shared ideas or positions. This can be avoided by developing an ‘ability to understand’ and ‘ability to not understand’ the other in Gurevitch’s terms, that is, the ability to recognise the uniqueness of the other. In the ability to understand and to not understand, one’s world is enlarged by developing a space for the other through which differences are accepted without hostility.

CHAPTER FOUR NARRATING ISLAM AND MUSLIMS WITHIN THE DISCOURSE OF ‘ISLAMIC TERRORISM’

The flow of analysis and publications on the events of 11 September 2001 has been remarkable. Central to this is the idea that “Islam was at the heart of the events of September 11” (Ahmed, 2003: 31). Eric Hobsbawm said that “when people face what nothing in their past has prepared them for, they grope for words to name the unknown, even if they can neither define nor understand it” (1996: 287; quoted in Steger, 2008: viii). Indeed, the term ‘Islamic terrorism’, with ‘Islamic terrorists’ as its actors, has dominated the public discourse. With the emergence of this discourse, academics have returned to the subject of terrorism, as seen in the various publications on the topic. On the political stage and in media discourse, the term ‘Islamic terrorism’ becomes a frame for various political narratives, labels and metaphors. The use of this term in the media and in the political analysis of various events opens a door through which one cannot avoid the association of Islam and Muslims with terrorism. As argued by John E. Richardson, “terrorism is a perpetual feature of press representation and discussion about Islam and Muslims” (2004: 130). Taking terrorism as the context within which Islam and Muslims are represented, this chapter is not meant to present a theoretical concept of terrorism or the underlying causes of terrorism. Instead, it will pay particular attention to the assumptions, narratives and labels through which Islam and Muslims are represented.

1. Contextualising the Discursive Tradition of ‘Islamic Terrorism’ The term ‘Islamic terrorism’ has certainly captured public attention following the 9/11 events. There are several contexts through which the discourse of ‘Islamic terrorism’ is framed. Firstly, the notion of ‘Islamic

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terrorism’ derives from a broader notion of ‘religious terrorism’ and ‘religious fundamentalism’. As a term, ‘religious fundamentalism’ has been used as an academic category to explain a belief that holds strictly to a set of religious principles and is critical of attempts to compromise or negotiate such principles within the context of modern social life. Historically, the term ‘religious fundamentalism’ derives from the American Christian experience. It is based on a series of volumes called The Fundamentals, written by conservative Christian theologians and published between 1910 and 1915 in defence of biblical inerrancy, at a time when this was being challenged by other conflicting views, such as the contextual approach or the social Gospel (Weinberg and Pedahzur (eds), 2004: 4). Over time, the term ‘religious fundamentalism’ has come to be used to describe a narrow way of interpreting a religious belief. In the 1990s, the term ‘fundamentalism’ had become ‘a slippery concept….a word that has come to be associated almost automatically with Islam’ (Said, 1997[1981]: xvi). How has the term ‘Islamic terrorism’ emerged as a subject related to ‘religious terrorism’ or ‘religious fundamentalism’? David Rapoport’s seminal article, published in 1984, plays an important role in shaping ‘religious terrorism’ as an academic subject. In the article, Rapoport traces the return of academics to the subject of terrorism, following a revival of terrorist activity in the centre of the Western world, as seen in the variety of journal articles and publications on the subject since the 1970s. By analysing the detail of three groups often cited to illustrate the lineage of terrorism, namely the Thugs, the Assassins and the Zealots-Sicarii, Rapoport contends that sacred or holy terrors are different from other modern political terrors. By operating on the grounds of religious belief, “sacred terror…..never disappeared altogether, and there are signs that it is reviving in new and unusual forms.” Why? Rapoport argues that “the holy terrorist believes that only a transcendent purpose which fulfils the meaning of the universe can justify terror, and that the deity reveals at some early moment in time both the end and means and may even participate in the process as well” (Rapoport, 1984: 659). Taking into account Rapoport’s genealogy of ‘sacred or holy terror’, it could be argued that the notion ‘Islamic terrorism’ emerges from the studies of religious terrorism. Secondly, the discourse of ‘Islamic terrorism’ has been rooted in the underlying premises of studies on the Middle East and Arab culture and religion. Central to this discursive tradition is Edward W. Said’s mostcelebrated book Orientalism, first published in 1978, already discussed in chapter 1. In relation to the notion of terrorism, according to Said,

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“European interest in Islam derived not from curiosity but from fear of a monotheistic, culturally and militarily formidable competitor to Christianity” (2003[1978]: 344). The use of the term ‘Muslim fundamentalism’ signals how the term is used in the studies of Middle East, Arab culture and Islam. Events such as the 1972 Munich massacre, the 1973 oil shocks, the 1979 Iranian revolution and embassy hostage crisis, the Rushdie affair, and kidnappings and hijackings in the 1980s have largely shaped academic studies on the Middle East and Arab culture (Jackson, 2007: 399). Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations is also a good example. Describing a massive number of Muslims turning to Islam as a source of identity, meaning and hope, Huntington argues that “Islamic ‘fundamentalism’ …is only one component in the much more extensive revival of Islamic ideas, practices, and rhetoric and the rededication to Islam by Muslim populations” (Huntington, 2002[1996]: 110). Thirdly, the discourse of ‘Islamic terrorism’ derives from the studies of racism, cultural stereotypes and media representations of Islam and Muslims. As indicated in chapter 1, one of the areas of academic studies that employ these theories is the study of the media representations of Islam and Muslims. Before the 9/11 events occurred, news media had already focused on Muslims and Islam with a highly exaggerated stereotyping and a belligerent association of Islam and Muslims with terrorism and religious hysteria, as critically analysed by Edward W. Said: “….much of what one reads and sees in the media about Islam represents the aggression as coming from Islam because that is what “Islam” is. Local and concrete circumstances are thus obliterated. In other words, covering Islam is a one-sided activity that obscures what ‘we’ do, and highlights instead what Muslims and Arabs by their very flawed nature are” (1997[1981]: xxii).

Bernard Lewis makes a somewhat similar observation. According to Lewis, “until the revolution in Iran, there was a steadfast refusal on the part of the Western media to recognize that religion was still a force in the Muslim world. Since then, there has been a tendency to move to the opposite extreme…” (Lewis, 1993: 135). With the tendency of (Western) media reports to associate Islam and Muslims with extremism and fanaticism, it could be argued that media representations have played a significant role in the framing of the discursive term ‘Islamic terrorism’. Fourthly, the discourse of ‘Islamic terrorism’ draws on the studies of “the regressive and antagonistic manifestations of political Islam” as “the mobilization of Islamic identity in pursuit of particular objectives of public policy, both within an Islamic society and in its relations with other

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societies” (An-Na’im, 1999: 103). This is normally related to countries that adopt aspects or certain aspects of Islam, for example in countries such as Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and Sudan, and in certain cultural institutions and political processes such as the presence of monarchies in Jordan and Morocco, and in certain religious institutions in many Islamic countries such as the National Fatwa Council in Malaysia or the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) in Indonesia (An-Na’im, 1999). Related to this notion of regressive and antagonistic manifestations of political Islam is the rise of secular regimes and ideologies in Islamic societies. AnNa’im gives the example of how secular nationalist projects, in countries such as Egypt under Nasser and Iraq under Saddam Hussein, have brought a large amount of suffering to the people and at the same time have undermined the security of others beyond their borders. S. Sayyid (2003) describes the rise and the consequences of these secular nationalist projects differently. For Sayyid, these projects make use of two related strategies. Firstly, the centrality of Islam is strongly articulated in the projects by bringing Islam into opposition with the West. The strategy of opposing Islam with the West is here used to articulate the centrality of Islam on the one hand, and to reject the superiority of the West on the other hand. Secondly, after two world wars and decolonisation, these projects have taken into consideration the fact that the West is no longer superior and there is therefore a relative balance between the West and Islam in the global process. In short, the discourse of ‘Islamic terrorism’ draws on the assumptions, narratives and labels that are used in the discussion, comments and analysis concerning political Islam.

2. Representing Islam and Muslims in the context of terrorism Having presented the contexts of the production of the ‘Islamic terrorism’ discourse, I will now proceed to the representation of Islam and Muslims in the studied media, in the context of ‘Islamic terrorism’. I will briefly discuss the frequency of coverage on terrorism in the studied media, which will lead to the presentation of the narratives of Islam and Muslims in relation to the discourse of ‘Islamic terrorism’.

a) Distribution of Texts with Reference to Terrorism The discourse of terrorism and religious fundamentalism is central in previous studies of the representations of Islam and Muslims in the British mainstream media (Poole, 2002; Richardson, 2004). John E. Richardson

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indicates that “[R]eferences to violence, religious extremism and acts of terrorism committed by individuals and groups calling themselves ‘Muslim’ are legion when the broadsheet press ‘cover’ Islam” (2004: 78). The data of this study also indicates that the British Christian media have terrorism and religious fundamentalism as a main focus in their reporting or analysis. Of the total sample data (N=1357), there are 353 texts with specific reference to terrorism and religious fundamentalism. This means that 26% of the data sample focuses on terrorism and religious fundamentalism. As Table 3 reveals, various words such as ‘jihadists’, ‘bombers’, ‘extremists’, ‘radicals’, ‘bandits’ and ‘rebels’ are often accompanied by explanatory terms such as ‘Islamic’, ‘Islamist’ or ‘Muslim’. This finding goes along with other studies on the British mainstream media (Poole, 2002; Richardson, 2004; Moore et al., 2008). This way of framing the phrases can be interpreted as a way of associating Islam and Muslims with terrorism, fundamentalism or jihadism. The use of adjectives such as ‘radical’, ‘fundamentalist’, ‘extremist’ clearly dominates. These types of adjective are used in 433 texts (N=1357). Other adjectives such as ‘moderate’, ‘mainstream’ or ‘ordinary’ are, relatively, less frequently used. This may reflect the general public’s use of the terms, given the fact that these terms are generally used in reporting or analysis without further explanation of what they really mean. With this is mind, the following sections will engage in an analysis of how Islam and Muslims are represented in the context of ‘Islamic terrorism’. Table 3: Various Terms Used in the British Christian Media Church Times Islamic jihadists Extremists Suicide bombers Islamist extremist Muslim terrorists Islamist preacher Muslim bandits Muslim rebels

The Tablet Fanatical Islamic terrorists Islamic jihadists Muslim fundamentalists Islamic fundamentalists Islamic extremists Suicide bombers Radical Islamists Islamic militants Militant Muslims Radical preacher Islamist imam Islamic hardliners Islamic fighters Jihadist kidnappers

Evangelicals Now Islamic extremists Muslim extremists Islamist radicals Islamic militants Jihad fighters Radical Muslims Radical Islamists Islamic fundamentalists Muslim fundamentalists Militant Islam Suicide bombers Islamic warriors Muslim jihad warriors Muslim attackers Muslim terrorists

Evangelical Times Fundamentalist Muslims Islamic extremists Martyr-murderers Muslim terrorists

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b) Islam and ‘Islamic Terrorism’ When Islam and Muslims are represented in the context of ‘Islamic terrorism’ discourse in the British Christian media, four main narratives appear prominently: (1) Islam is an antagonist to the West; (2) Islam is considered as an ‘ideology’ that inspires radicalism and violence; (3) A narrative of the spreading of Islam and the conquest of Christianity; (4) Islam needs to undergo an Islamic reformation and enlightenment. Islam as antagonist to the West The idea of ‘clash’ (and encounter) between Islam and the Christian West has a long history, as briefly presented in Chapter 3. This narrative nevertheless continues to illustrate the relationship between Islam and the West. A similar line of narrative is also found in the British Christian media, with an assumption centred on the notion that violence and terrorism occur because Islamic civilisation is incompatible with Western civilisation. In short, Islam is represented as an antagonist to the West and as involved in a clash with the West. This assumption is not surprising, since it has been echoed in a great number of studies; some of these were presented in chapter 1. However, bearing in mind that this study is dealing with the Christian media, articles that describe the incompatibility of Islamic civilisation with Western civilisation mostly narrate this notion of incompatibility from a Christian perspective, even though very often such views cannot be simply isolated from those of the general public. The Tablet’s texts present the narrative of clash between Islam and the West in a moderate way, usually by quoting voices from various sources. In its edition of 17 November 2001, The Tablet published an interesting featured article by Sagarika Ghose, entitled ‘Inside the mind of militant Islam’. Describing a visit to the town of Deoband in Uttar Pradesh, India, the writer makes the point that “it is hard to believe that this remote and primitive place gave birth to the Taliban’s anti-Western Islamic ideology”. What is interesting about the article is that within the setting of a madrasah, the writer presents many views expressed by those trained in the madrasah. Needless to say, most of the voices are critical of the West. This can be seen in the following statements: “The British wanted to change our inner selves, to make us Christian in heart and mind”; “They [the British] wanted to make us ashamed of who we were. But we stood up and faced them”; “Only by uniting under the banner of Islam could the Muslims counter the threat of Western imperialism”; “If a Muslim is being attacked…another Muslim will definitely go to his defence”; “America has still not proved that it was Osama who was behind it [9/11

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attacks]….This is a Yehudi plot”; “A Muslim will never be anybody’s slave.” These voices generally illustrate a rejection of Western power. The idea of clash is therefore not simply an imagined discourse. As an idea, at least, it has been embraced by the grassroots Muslim populations such as those in the ‘little, remote and primitive town of Deoband’ in India. Articles in Evangelicals Now employ the narrative of Islamic and Western clashes in a different way. In an article published in the edition of February 2002, John Azumah develops a ‘discursive move’ by firstly presenting the public discussion about the negative representation of Islam and Muslims in the Western public and the media. He then emphasises the need to educate people about Islam. However, this emphasis is presented simply as a point of departure, before turning to Islam and Muslims. Reversing the term ‘Islamophobia’, Azumah uses the label ‘Westophobia’ to argue that “there is just as much, if not more, ignorance, stereotyping, demonising” in the Muslim and the Arab world about “non-Muslims in general and Jews, Christians and Westerners in particular”. This account does not only put the notion of ‘Islamophobia’ into question, but places two worlds on a screen. By producing a comparative effect, the writer drives the readers to consider the scale of ignorance and xenophobic tendencies accumulated in these two competing worlds: Islam versus the West and Christianity. The framing of ‘Islamic terrorism’ through ‘the clash of civilisations’ assumption is critically and consistently challenged, particularly by The Tablet. Responding to the political comments and media analysis of the 9/11 events that epitomise the argument of the ‘clash of civilisations’, an editorial of The Tablet 29 September 2001 critically points out that the use of this hypothesis is risky and dangerous. This editorial then continues: “there is no incompatibility between Islamic civilisation and Western civilisation….Islam and the West are partners”. This claim is based on historical facts, such as the contribution of the Muslim world to philosophy, architecture, mathematics and many other areas. The influence of the Muslim writers on the philosophy and theology of Thomas Aquinas is also acknowledged as support for the claim. These historical facts, according to the editorial, serve as a reminder of what the West owes to Islam. Responding to the discourse of terrorism, Islam is represented and produced in The Tablet as “a major player on the side of good against evil” and “much more part of the solution than it is part of the problem”. Through the idea that ‘the West and Islam are partners’, The Tablet allows for criticism of the notion that Western culture is superior to other cultures. Ann Wroe’s column (15 September 2001) echoes this point,

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when she argues that “whenever Islamic fundamentalists attack the West….we quickly say that our values must be defended….Yet the West’s ‘values’ can also be cynical, superficial and degraded”. Similarly, Conor Gearty (22 September 2001) criticises the way the West seeks not just a monopoly of the world’s resources but also of its morality: “When we kill, it is counter-terrorism; when they do, it is mindless violence”. The Tablet’s critique of the clash of civilisations hypothesis, and its proposal that ‘the West and Islam are partners’ are a strategic response to terrorism and to the perception of Islam as a threat. However, in fairness, articles in The Tablet do not ignore various violent events. As far as the representations of Islam and Muslim through the lens of terrorism is concerned, there are two different explanations developed in The Tablet, either economic or religious and cultural. According to the first explanation, terrorism is considered as a reaction to the modern West and the systematic poverty of the rest of the world. The proponents of this argument suggest that al-Qaida and its associates have hijacked “the cause of the poor, or at least of poor Muslims, presenting them as trodden under the cruel feet of the rich West”, within which their violent motivations are “fuelled by the belief that governments do not care about what happens to the poor”. The second explanation takes a different approach, by considering terrorism as “a cultural and religious response to secular materialism”, based on the argument that the economic analysis of terrorist attacks fits neither the profile of the hijackers nor of Osama bin Laden. For this reason, it is contended that terrorist attacks are reactions to the Western secular materialism that threatens developing countries both religiously and culturally. This threat indicates a dilemma faced by developing countries concerning whether they should reject their own culture for the purpose of gaining equality in power, like the West, or keep their own cultural and religious traditions but remain weak materially. Terrorist attack is seen as a product of this dilemma. The rejection of the clash of civilisations analysis is accompanied by a critical response to the declaration of a ‘war on terror’, based on the argument that the idea of ‘war on terror’ would only justify what the attackers did and would therefore provoke more wars. According to an editorial of The Tablet published on 16 September 2006, “the fundamental objection to the war on terror thesis… is that it has been allowed to dictate policy, usually the wrong policy, often a disastrous one.” The invasion of Iraq was cited as an example of a disastrous policy. The following quotations echo how The Tablet’s texts develop the argument of opposing the concept of a ‘war on terror’:

Narrating Islam and Muslims within the Discourse of ‘Islamic Terrorism’ 109 “….it is a dangerous mistake to speak of a ‘war on terrorism’ at all. The word ‘war’….dignifies the attackers as combatants an d legitimises their criminal acts. It also incites the users of the word to offer a warlike response” (Editorial, 3 November 2001). “….the more Muslim and Arab public opinion can be turned against the Americans, and the more the West can be made to entertain suspicions of Islam, the easier life becomes for al-Qaida” (Editorial, 19 October 2002).

Following the arguments presented here, it could be pointed out that while ‘Islam as an antagonist to the West’ is assumed in some of the articles in the British Christian media, critical arguments are also developed which challenge this assumption, including the critical approach to the rhetoric of a ‘war on terror’. The assumption of Islam as an ideology that inspires radicalism and violence The narrative of Islam and Muslims around the notion of ‘Islamic terrorism’ is also based upon the assumption that Islam is an ‘ideology’ that demands total submission from its followers, that forcefully imposes its ideology on the world, and that therefore allows for the use of terror and violence in order to defend and spread its ideology. Based on this assumption, violence is perceived as ‘the ugly side of Islam’. In its edition of March 2002, Evangelicals Now published an opinion article entitled ‘The Islamic agenda and its blueprints’. According to the writer, “Islam is a religion but it would be most misleading to stop at that. The heart of Islamic teaching is that religion is not just a part of life, but life is a tiny part of religion. Thus everything in life is dominated by this religion.” This extract clearly shows how the assumption of Islam as an ideology is held alongside the striking conclusion that a submission to such an ideology means that ‘life is simply a tiny part of religion’. The writer then goes on to argue that “it was his [Prophet Muhammad] mission….to change the existing society into an Islamic society….Islam grants radical Muslims a mandate…to change the existing society into an Islamic society….to make Islam supreme, and thus dominate every aspect of society.” Following this logic, one would easily conclude that Islam gives space for radicalism for the sake of its domination over other societies. Another article, published in the same paper in November 2006, echoes the same idea: “…the painful truth is that terrorism and violence are fundamental components of Islam….Islam, without bloodiness and savage brutality, simply is not Islam. Islam without the spilling of blood would wither and die.” One may

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recall here the controversial statement of Samuel P. Huntington that “Islam has bloody borders” (2002[1996]: 254-258). The concepts of ‘dhimmitude’, the interpretation of ‘dar al-Islam versus dar al-Harb’, ‘umma’ and ‘jihad’ are often used to justify the assumption of Islam as an ideology. Mark Durie’s article in Evangelicals Now in January 2003 offers a justification of this assumption. According to Durie, “dar al-Islam or House of Islam” in fact includes many nonMuslims. The institution of the dhimma or ‘pact protection’ is meant for those who refuse to convert to Islam. The dhimma is granted by the conquerors as one possible outcome of military jihad. It guarantees religious freedom but, in return, the dhimmis or the people of the pact are required to pay tribute and tax in perpetuity to the Muslim umma. This means that the dhimmis are required to adopt a position of humble servitude to the umma. Durie’s analysis seems to be accepted by many analysts, particularly in Evangelicals Now, who claim that for Muslims, Islam is viewed as ‘a religion of masters and rulers’ and Christianity is viewed as ‘a religion of an inferior class of people and slaves’ to the extent that ‘the dhimmi Christians’ find it difficult to critique or oppose the Islamic view of Islam’s domination. Discussions on the ‘Islamisation of Europe’ or ‘Muslim’s attempt to recapture Europe’ are generally centred upon the framework of Islam as an ideology. Following the events of 11 September 2001, Evangelical Times published a long article on its main page entitled “September 11”. This article also uses the notion of “dar-al-harb” versus “dar-al-Islam”, as explained above. Using this framework, Errol Hulse, the article writer, argues: “We must understand that this doctrine is alive and well in the 21st century. Satan, the first liar and murderer, is ultimately the architect of the disaster of 11 September”. What is interesting is how the writer represents Islam. Expanding the framework of dar-al-harb versus dar-al-Islam in reading the 9/11 events, Hulse calls for attention to the fact that “scripture further warns us against false religion. Muslim spokesmen all over the world have claimed that the terrorists were not real Muslims but ‘secular Muslims’. But that is contradicted by the instructions given to the terrorists before they carried out their attacks….This is false religion, not secular idealism”. An article in Evangelical Times November 2006 goes further, claiming that Islam is the primary cause of the violent activities and terrorist attacks. Furthermore, it predicts that “until the fundamental fallacies of Islam are seen for what they are, our pluralistic multiculturalists will continue to live in a state of denial”. The same claim appears again in another article, published in January 2007, which states boldly that “…..the problem of Islamic terrorism is rooted in the

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fundamental fallacies of Islam itself”. To justify the arguments that violence is religiously motivated in Islam, a number of articles use the strategy of selecting Qur’anic verses to depict the notion of ‘violence in the Quran’. In his article entitled ‘Violence in the Qur’an’ published in Evangelicals Now February 2006, Patrick Sookhdeo provides a long list of Qur’anic verses to make the point that “the Qur’an includes a strand of passages extolling violence and jihad which have always served as justification for Muslims involved in such actions down through the ages.” This list is formulated in such a way as to leave the impression that the Qur’an endorses ‘a defensive fighting’, allows ‘initiatives for attacks’, provides ‘an unconditional command to fight all unbelievers’, grants ‘a permission to attack Jews and Christians’, describes ‘general duty of jihad and rewards for those who die for jihad’, and allows people to ‘strike terror in hearts of infidel enemy’. Using selections of Qur’anic verses to confirm the notion of violence in Islam cannot be found in either Church Times or The Tablet. The assumption of the spreading of Islam and the conquest of Christianity The Regensburg lecture on 12 September 2006 by Pope Benedict XVI is perhaps the most discussed event concerning the relationship between Christianity and Islam to occur after the 9/11 events. At the heart of the Pope’s lecture is the synthesis between faith and reason in the idea of logos, which means both reason and word. Based on the premise that God is rational, and therefore that human beings are rational beings, the Pope contends that religion and rationality are intrinsically connected and religion and violence are therefore incompatible. Consequently, “violence occurs in religions when faith and reason are not properly correlated or brought into a relationship of complementarity” (Carrol, 2006: 10). To illustrate this point, the Pope quotes a few lines from a ‘dialogue’ between the Byzantine Emperor Manuel II Paleologus and an educated Persian Muslim in the winter of 1391: “Show me just what Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached” (Pope Benedict XVI, 2006: 133). While the Pope’s argument that ‘violence enters into life when faith is detached from reason’ might be celebrated as academically challenging and philosophically stimulating, or “the first one that really understands the fuller dimensions of what our time is intellectually about” (Schall, 2007: 9), the Pope’s choice, in quoting these lines, leaves open the misinterpretation that Islam is a religion which commits itself entirely to

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faith, rather than synthesising faith with reason, and that therefore it is a fanatical rather than a rational religion (Nirenberg, 2008: 8). In fairness, the Pope indeed makes a fair point that religion and violence are incompatible. But, if the intention was to illustrate this point, there are enough examples throughout the history of Christianity: for instance, the ‘full and free permission’ granted by Pope Saint Nicholas V in the fifteenth century to Alfonso V of Portugal, a Christian King, to invade and capture the Saracens, the pagans and other enemies of Christ and Christianity (Pachuau, 2004). The Tablet’s editorial of 22 September 2006 calls the Pope’s quotation above ‘regrettable.’ While regretting the quotation itself, writers in The Tablet seize the controversy as a teachable moment, and argue for more dialogue between Christians and Muslims. Inspired by the controversy surrounding the Pope’s lecture, The Tablet published a survey on Christian-Muslim relations. The majority of Christians (53.59%) who took part in the survey felt that Pope Benedict should not have quoted the remark of the Byzantine Emperor Manuel II that associates Islam with violence. In the same survey, 78.62% of the participants believed that the controversy had damaged Christian-Muslim relations in the short term, but only 17.59% agreed that the controversy had done lasting damage. Besides the controversy of the Regensburg lecture, the assumption that ‘Islamic terrorism’ is religiously motivated for the spreading of Islam and the conquering of Christianity appears to be accommodated in the studied media. In the edition of Evangelicals Now from November 2001, Lisbet Diers published an article based on various responses to the 9/11 terror attacks. While presenting these responses, Diers contends that violence is part of the spreading of Islam: “In the early days of Islam, the faith was indeed spread by the sword. Those who would not embrace Islam were killed. The same thing is happening today in Indonesia, where at least 8,000 Christians have been forcibly converted to Islam by well-armed Islamic extremists. Any who refused were killed”.

Diers’ assessment in this extract does place ‘what is happening today in Indonesia’ in any context. What is interesting is that the narrative of violence for the spreading of Islam is here accompanied by the narrative of Christian persecution. The notion that violence is religiously motivated for the spreading of Islam and the conquest of Christianity can be found in various statements in Evangelical Times, such as ‘Islam is the world’s largest cult’; ‘Islam is always at war with non-Islam’; ‘Jihad is missionary duty’. The same

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notion appears in Church Times and The Tablet. However, most of the articles in these two print media are international news reports related to international events with a strong sense of Christian persecution, and these will be discussed in chapter 5. For the purpose of the present section, one thing that can be noticed is that in Church Times and The Tablet, the ambivalent and critical views of Islam are often represented through the voice of ‘quoted sources.’ The following extracts illustrate this point: ‘Ten years ago the Muslims declared a jihad….They justify it from the Qur’an. They have a plan to conquer the land of Southern Sudan, to kill the people, or make slaves of them” (A report in Church Times 17 July 1998, quoting the Rt. Revd. Daniel Deng, an Anglican Bishop in Sudan). “The Catholic Church respects authentic Islam, the Islam that prays and is concerned for those in need….God is never made the hostage of human ambition….Hatred, fanaticism and terrorism profane the name of God and disfigure the true image of man” (A news report in The Tablet 29 September 2001, quoting Pope John Paul II). “I think that we are at war with Islam. And there’s no middle ground in wars….There is no moderate Islam. There are Muslims who are passive, who don’t all follow the rules of Islam, but there’s really only one Islam, defined as submission to the will of God” (A report in Church Times 19 October 2007, quoting the former Dutch MP Ayaah Hirsi Ali).

The claim that Islam needs to undergo a reformation and enlightenment Another claim that associates Islam with terrorism derives from the idea that Islam has not yet undergone a reformation and an enlightenment process. In fact, there is no single article in the studied news media that is particularly dedicated to this claim. However, some premises in various articles indicate an underlying proposition that religious extremism would possibly be solved if Islam were to undergo a reformation and enlightenment, as experienced by Christianity. This idea is built upon various premises directed to the characterisation of Islam such as, ‘Islam keeps its people gripped in ignorance, fear and fatalism’; ‘lack of intellectual curiosity is inherent in Islam’; ‘Islamic theology fails to make an intellectually coherent accommodation of modernity’; ‘tensions in the Muslim community will only be solved when “Islam has matured” by developing some of the doctrines associated with liberal Christianity’; ‘reasonable religion at its best can make a telling contribution to society’; ‘extremes in Islam were simply a sign of its youth…it would mature over the centuries, as Christianity had done’.

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An article in Church Times published on 13 January 2006 puts forward an argument that the great Islamic philosophers such as Ibn-Sina and IbnRushd influenced Thomas Aquinas and led to the Renaissance, the Enlightenment and the modern world. However, the writer then points out that “this avenue of exploration was closed off to Muslims, who were required to believe in effect that everything necessary to be known was to be found in the Qur’an, a book produced in the seventh century in the deserts of Arabia.” Another article published earlier, in Church Times 27 June 2003, indicates a similar idea, by posing this challenging question: “Can Islamic scholarship recapture the spirit of intellectual enquiry, break out of the carapace of tradition, and develop ideas of social justice in the global battle against poverty, disease and prejudice?” The idea of Islamic reformation and enlightenment also appears when a source is quoted, as seen for example in a Church Times article on 16 September 2005, which quotes Salman Rushdie’s call for Islam to undergo a reformation and enlightenment. The argument for an Islamic enlightenment is also suggested in some of The Tablet’s articles. In 1998, when the Iranian government disassociated itself from the fatwa (Islamic jurisprudence) pronounced by the Ayatollah Khomeini against Salman Rushdie, The Tablet’s correspondent for the Middle East, Trevor Mostyn, published a piece in The Tablet on 3 October 1998. In this article, Mostyn discusses the battle between ‘hardliners and pragmatists’ in Islamic countries concerning the fatwas. He then ended the article by concluding: “There is much realpolitik and political opportunism in the Rushdie saga. Sadly, it looks as if the groups jockeying for power in Iran and in Pakistan will find it a convenient weapon until Islam, traditionally a tolerant religion, moves into a new age of enlightenment.” Surprisingly, an urge for an Islamic enlightenment cannot be found in either Evangelicals Now or Evangelical Times. In fact, articles in both newspapers are quite critical of the Enlightenment project. This can be seen in the following extracts: “Our problem of values…is specifically related to the Enlightenment and its misguided understanding of science….it represents an ideal that is meaningless, a programme that is futile, and a policy that is unjust…… that the humanism of the Enlightenment left us with insufficient grounds upon which to rest morality and meaning is now clear…” (Evangelicals Now December 1998). “Certainly, during the long reign of the Enlightenment, Westerners came to look askance at all religious authority — rejecting any limitation on how

Narrating Islam and Muslims within the Discourse of ‘Islamic Terrorism’ 115 we think or act, whether imposed by the church, the Bible, or even God himself!” (Evangelical Times August 2007).

This does not necessarily mean that articles in The Tablet and Church Times are not critical of the notion of a reformation and enlightenment of Islam. For example, responding to Salman Rushdie’s call for Islam to undergo a reformation and enlightenment, the article in Church Times 16 September 2005 quoted earlier challenges to Rushdie’s call by contending that “the idea that the Reformation provides a route through what Mr Rushdie regards as the besetting sins of contemporary religion….is hard to sustain, given the way in which the Reformation intensified many of these hatreds.” This article also brings the call for an Islamic enlightenment into question by arguing that “buried within the appeal to the Enlightenment is another dodgy historical narrative that posits the dark ages of superstition as redeemed by the light of reason. The ‘dark ages’ is a cheap gibe on preEnlightenment Christianity, which actually produced much light, beauty, and wisdom….” This line of argument echoes the criticisms made by the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan Williams, who argued that we cannot rely on humanist Enlightenment, because it has a poor history in Europe, when humanity was insulted and obscured. Even so, the Archbishop recommends the secular state as a model for Islamic countries contending that “this was the best hope for avoiding extremism”. The Tablet’s articles develop more or less similar arguments. In the controversy over the banning of headscarves in French schools, James Roberts, in his article in The Tablet 22 January 2005, called the ban a continuation of the Enlightenment project. Scott Thomas’ article in The Tablet 6 October 2001 goes further, arguing that the West and Islam cannot live together if “the West simply expects Muslims to exchange the beliefs, practices, and traditions which are constitutive of Islamic communities for those of Western liberalism, which appears to be what many people expect in the West.”

c) Muslims and the Discourse of ‘Islamic Terrorism’ The representation of Muslims in the context of ‘Islamic terrorism’ discourse is closely shaped by the underlying assumptions about Islam in relation to terrorism. How are Muslims represented within the context of terrorism? When the notion of ‘Islamic terrorism’ is discussed in general terms, Muslims are represented in several ways, as we shall see in the following sections.

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Muslims as ‘victims’ of the hijackers of Islam Within the discourse of Islamic terrorism, Muslims are represented as ‘victims’ of those who have hijacked Islam as a vehicle for political gain. A news report in The Tablet 24 November 2001 quotes the then British Prime Minister Tony Blair, saying that Osama bin Laden must not be allowed to hijack Islam: “…bin Laden has hijacked more than Islam, he has hijacked the very issues the West should have considered before the first bomb was dropped on Afghanistan.” The British Christian media often mention that some revivalist Muslim movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jamaat-e-Islami (Church Times), AlMuhajiroun (Evangelicals Now) and radical Islamicists inspired by Wahhabism (The Tablet) are responsible for the hijacking of Islam. A good example of this way of representing Muslims is the argument of Dr John Sentamu, the Archbishop of York, when he delivered a Presidential Address during the General Synod of the Church of England in 2007. In his address, Sentamu argues: “Our fear of terrorism can lead us to false conclusions about our Muslim neighbours. The challenge we face isn’t about moderate Muslims versus so-called radicalised Muslims; the challenge is about Islam being used for quasi-political ends……” (Church Times 13 July 2007). In a slightly different way, Dr Rowan Williams, the Archbishop of Canterbury, characterises suicide-bombing as the fruit of a blasphemous lack of trust in God. Preaching to the General Synod in York Minster in July 2006, the Archbishop reflected on the events of the London bombings on 7 July 2005. He argued that “people of faith have had to try and come to terms with the horrible fact that there are those who want to serve their God, and their idea of justice, by organised slaughter and suicide. They want to display strength; they want to secure their vision by force and to clothe suicide with the spiritual power of martyrdom….” (Church Times 14 July 2006). It is interesting to note here that ‘religious language’ is mainly used to interpret ‘terrorism’ and to represent Muslims. Another example is an article in Evangelicals Now February 2005 that urges its readers to stand against injustice, while reminding them about the danger of a backlash against the Muslim community through the discussion of terrorism. The writer states that “there is a terrible danger of a backlash against the Muslim community. As Christians we must stand clearly against such injustice. The bombers do carry out their atrocities in the name of Allah. But the majority of Muslims are peace-loving, ordinary people.” The semantic move applied here, as seen in the use of the conjunction ‘but’, is interesting because with this move, ‘the bombers’ are separated from the majority of Muslims.

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The Tablet has a different strategy, ‘alienating’ the terrorists not only from the Muslim community, but also from society at large. The way it deals with ‘Osama bin Laden’ is a good example. The arguments against the ‘clash of civilisations’ hypothesis and ‘war on terror’ in The Tablet are clearly related to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida. One of The Tablet editorials (8 October 2005) even calls Osama bin Laden ‘the best friend’ of the clash of civilisations analysis since this analysis “precisely describes the ideological conflict that al-Qaida is trying to bring about by fomenting terrorism, in the name of Islam, against the West”. In order to avoid the association between Islam and terrorism and to limit the influence of ‘bin Laden’s factor’ in the notion of terrorism, the editorials and articles in The Tablet address Osama bin Laden using various terms and phrases: ‘an engineer-turned-warrior’, ‘rich, determined and ruthless’, ‘a televangelist’, ‘agitator’, ‘a particular ‘half-baked’ mullah’ and ‘a propagandist’. In addressing terrorism in this way, The Tablet portrays bin Laden and alQaida as the enemy of both the West and Islam. While the above view of the hijacking of Islam is supported in Church Times, The Tablet and some articles in Evangelicals Now, other articles in Evangelicals Now openly criticise this view. A writer of an article published in the edition of February 2002 argues that it is misleading simply to claim that Islam is misinterpreted and is misrepresented by a group of people identified as terrorists. The following extract explains this argument: “It is misleading and downright propaganda….to continue harping that Bin Laden or the Taliban….are renegades who are misinterpreting and misrepresenting Islam. The truth is that Islam has two faces that can be categorised broadly as the Meccan and Medinan, pacifist and triumphalist, inclusivist and exclusivist, liberative and oppressive, and peaceful and militant….As things stand now in orthodox or official Islamic teaching, it is the Medinan, triumphalist, exclusivist, oppressive and militant Islam that is seen as the correct version.”

Muslims as ‘victims’ of stereotypes and prejudices Another way of representing Muslims appears in the claim that they are ‘victims’ of stereotypes and prejudices born out of the public association of Islam with violence and of Muslims with violent attacks. In this representation, hostility towards Muslims is seen not only as a threat to Muslims but also a threat to wider society. Respect for the uniqueness and sacredness of ‘the other’ is considered the best way to tackle this societal disturbance. The article of Hugh Rayment-Pickard published in

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the Church Times 6 January 2006 clearly illuminates this mode of representation. In this article, he strongly argues that .

“the simple failure to respect the otherness of others is at the root of all human violence and oppression: instead of regarding every individual as the centre of a world of perception and feeling, we lump people together into abstract, non-human categories: ‘foreigners’, ‘Muslims’, ‘asylumseekers’, ‘terrorists’…..The only way to build a true knowledge of humanity is to see every human subject as unique and sacred.”

Pejorative ways of characterising Muslims, as seen in the term ‘Islamo-fascist’, is also criticised. Paul Valley, in his article published in Church Times 8 September 2006, argues that the term ‘Islamo-fascist’ introduced by George W. Bush, the then US president, has been a short sighted ploy, because “linking Islam with a pejorative term only adds to the misunderstanding of Islam.” An editorial of The Tablet 17 June 2006 echoes the same concern regarding terrorism, calling it the whole community’s concern and therefore calling for solidarity with Muslims: “this is not just a Muslim problem. It concerns the whole community. The antidote to Muslim alienation is to make the Muslim population know it is not alone, and all other communities stand alongside it.” Muslims as ‘innocent’ people With regard to terrorism, Muslims are often represented as ‘innocent’ people. A year after the London bombings, a writer in Church Times (7 July 2006) reflects on the events in relation to Muslims. Central to this reflection is the argument that “they [Muslims] want nothing to do with bombers or with a culture of greed and self-seeking affluence. They passionately believe in the kind of foot-wash in service that we all know can change the world.” Furthermore, the portrayal of Muslims is also shaped by defining terrorism as a criminal act. Those involved in terrorist acts are therefore portrayed as criminals. Using this strategy, terrorism is portrayed as an act that has nothing to do with Islam and Muslims. John Sentamu for example is quoted saying: “Jihadists are criminals. In our law, inciting mass murder is criminal. The majority of Muslims don’t agree with them”. While considering the ‘innocence’ of the majority of Muslims, there are also suggestions that Muslims have a responsibility to condemn terrorism and call out those involved in terrorist attacks, as Sentamu puts it: “the Muslim faith has a job to do, restating its position and its complete abhorrence of this kind of behaviour [militancy]…”

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Linking Muslims to violence There is, however, a vocal strand of generalisation that links Muslims to violence, or makes a claim that ‘the extremists are hailed as heroes by many Muslims’ (Evangelical Times February 2002). In a report published in Church Times 31 July 1998, the Rt. Revd. Josiah Idowu-Fearon, Bishop of Kaduna in Nigeria was quoted as saying that there is no such thing as a moderate Muslim: “Muslims will die for their faith and they will kill for it…. Lying in the interests of the faith is allowed by the Qur’an.” Another article in Evangelical Times January 2002 states that it can be dangerous to criticise Islam. This danger is labelled a ‘paranoid behaviour’ of Muslims. The writer argues that “Muslims often treat opponents with something less than kindness….Such paranoid behaviour renders Islam resistant to selfevaluation and exposes its internal deficiencies”. John Azumah, who was quoted earlier, makes an argument that Muslims need to be educated about their own religion (Evangelical Times February 2002). For Azumah, “the Muslims have to take responsibility to undertake a critical view of themselves and their religion. After all it is Muslims and not Westerners who tarnish the image of Islam by carrying out suicide bombings, crashing passenger jets into buildings and throwing acid at young girls to disfigure them permanently for not wearing the veil, all in the name of Allah”.

3. Discussion: Recognition and the Question of Boundaries I have presented various ways through which Islam and Muslims are represented in the context of ‘Islamic terrorism’. As we have seen, the discourse of Islamic terrorism has a dual effect in the representations of Islam and Muslims. On the one hand, it is argued that Muslims have nothing to do with terrorism and that Islam is simply hijacked by some violent attackers. On the other hand, some take another extreme way, in blaming Islam as an ideology that inspires radicalism and by associating Muslims and their religion with any violent attacks. These two strategies are counterproductive, simply because they seem to be guided by either a relativist approach or cultural fear. They do not offer any possible way of dealing with the issues of terrorism at hand and, to make matters worse, they even provoke more wars, as indicated in The Tablet, given the fact that discourses embody the power to dictate and shape policies. If narratives shape our views, then a productive way of dealing with terrorism discourse has to include the political will to engage people, groups or all communities to respond critically to the issues at hand, such as terrorism or violent attacks. This art of engaging people has its ultimate

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basis in the value choice that is in favour of conversation, dialogic formation, tolerance, mutuality and solidarity, with the basic premise that given the choice, all human beings “prefer to live in conditions of security, respect, health, prosperity, and peace” (Pera, 2006: 22). What do the representations of Islam and Muslims in the context of terrorism discourse tell us in the light of the political theory of recognition? The central assumption of the politics of recognition holds that everybody or every group needs respect and recognition because of their uniqueness, difference or ‘specialness’. Misrecognition or nonrecognition has the consequence of damaging self-identity, and of closing the door to full participation in a broader society. Misrecognition limits the capacity to grow and to participate in the life of society. While the questions of identity and social status form a basic concern in the politics of (mis)recognition, the study findings suggest that recognition and misrecognition of Islam and Muslims are also driven not only by cultural differentiation but also by attempts to redefine and reposition boundaries, and by the quest to make sense of the cultural content of ‘the others’. Richard Jackson proposes two criticisms of the ‘Islamic terrorism’ discourse. For Jackson, this discourse “is predicated on a number of highly problematic and contestable labels, assumptions and narratives” and “functions politically to naturalize and legitimize particular forms of knowledge and political practices” (2007: 412). I would advance this argument by proposing that, more than they do to Islam as a religion or way of life per se, the narratives of ‘Islamic terrorism’ in which the representations of Islam and Muslims are situated say more about our society, in the sense that boundary making both suggests perceptions about the other but also promotes interaction with the other. In the case where perceptions affect social relationships, what is needed is the creation of a new expansion in the public sphere that includes the repositioning of boundaries. Discussions of these differences are often conditioned by boundaries and cultural content. Based on this proposition, the analysis of sociologist Andreas Wimmer (2008, 2009), on the making and unmaking of ethnic boundaries, is very relevant to the interpretation of the findings, in terms of situating a possibility for a dialogic formation and socio-cultural recognition. Wimmer’s analysis is based upon the ideas of Johann Gottfried Herder and Fredrik Barth. The Norwegian anthropologist Fredrik Barth has a famous dictum that “it is the boundary that matters in ethnic relations and not the ‘cultural stuff’ they enclose” (Barth, 1969: 15; cited in Wimmer, 2008: 982). Barth’s proposition raises a critical view over the analysis of the eighteenth century philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder,

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who suggests that ethnic groups are basically characterised by a shared culture (Wimmer, 2009). In the Herderian world, ethnic groups reflect the landscape of cultural differences, representing both similarities and differences of language, religiosity and gender. On this view, cultural differences are defined on the basis of whether or not they are closed to each other. The Barthian world is different. For Barth, the difference between ethnic groups is marked and maintained by a boundary and, therefore, what is important in any study of ethnic relations is “how the ethnic boundary between A and B was inscribed onto a landscape of continuous cultural transitions” (Wimmer, 2009: 250). Here, actors within an ethnic group establish the boundaries of their group subjectively and therefore develop specific markers that differentiate them from other ethnic groups. Indeed, the articles in the British Christian media cover both cultural differentiation and the problem of defining the boundaries in their representations of Islam and Muslims. In fact, human and group relations in a society are often defined following the line of cultural differentiation and boundaries. Therefore, it is fair to argue that terrorism discourse says more about our society at large. As far as the British Christian media representation of Islam and Muslims in the context of terrorism is concerned, following Andreas Wimmer (2008), we can identify at least 3 ways of making boundaries and dealing with cultural differentiation: boundary expansion, boundary narrowing and boundary repositioning.

a) The Strategy of Expanding Boundaries In this strategy, actors in relationships with each other shift the boundaries, by creating a new expansion with new categories and new interpretations. This expansion is meant not only to create a larger group out of smaller groups, but also to form a new collective narrative that binds the smaller groups together. The adoption of the ‘clash of civilisations’ theory as an assumption for situating the rise of ‘Islamic terrorism’ can be considered as an attempt to draw a line using the idea that boundaries do matter. Clash occurs not only when one crosses the boundary of ‘the other’, but also when one cannot accommodate ‘the way of other’s life and thinking’. The reinforcement of the idea that Islamic civilisation is compatible with that of the Western civilisation can be seen as a perfect example of a strategic expansion of boundaries within a new, collective narrative (see also Menuchin, 2006). By expanding the discourse to cover a larger area, this strategy not only considers Islam and the West as partners, but also proposes the narrative that indeed the

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Islamic and Western civilisations are compatible. This is achieved by defining and redefining the relationship between these two civilisations, often by pointing to their positive historical encounter and the contribution of one civilisation to other’s progress. The expansion of boundaries also includes the redefining of ‘we’ to include more people or groups, as suggested by Richard Rorty (1999; Bauer 2007) and therefore expanding solidarity, trust and mutuality (Selligman, 2008). This expansion and redefining of boundaries assumes the willingness of all parties to involve and to be involved in conversation or dialogue. This is to say that in order to achieve the possibility of redefining or restructuring the boundaries, as argued by Rorty, argument, discussion, conversation and exchange are needed. In the absence of a fixed truth, or political certainty, openness to the ability to assume progressive possibilities through dialogue is needed (Rorty, 1999; Bauer, 2007). The death of conversation or dialogue therefore contributes not only to the absolutisation of boundaries, as explained in chapter 4, but also to the closing of the door to understanding. This framework is certainly accommodative towards dialogic formation and recognition.

b) The Strategy of Narrowing Boundaries Opposed to the expanded boundary is the strategy of promoting narrower boundaries than those that have been already socially established. From our findings, we can see that in the social landscape, there are two established groups: Islam and the West or Islam and Christianity. In the strategy of narrowing the boundaries, already established groups are seen as related while defining the rest with other names or considering them outsiders. The ways of separating the terrorists and defining them as ‘hijackers of Islam’ or simply criminals can be interpreted as a way of narrowing the boundaries of Islam and the West or Islam and Christianity. This includes the way of representing Muslims as ‘victims’ of the terrorists and ‘victims’ of the fanatics of other religions. Among established groups, the strategy of narrowing boundaries also implies the possibility of excluding the other, based on the creation of a hierarchal order. From the findings, this can be seen in what we may call a ‘pick-what-you-like’ way of reading the Qur’an. This selective style is actually used by both Muslims and non-Muslims, as indicated by Akbar S. Ahmed. In relation to violence, according to Ahmed, “the Muslims would argue that violence against Jews and Christians is allowed; the nonMuslims would point to this line and say it confirms the hatred of Muslims against others. They imply that the idea of fighting against Islam is

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therefore justified” (Ahmed, 2003: 11). Often the use of hierarchical order in reading social relationships can maintain and even provoke a parade of deep-rooted prejudices. Interpreting the misunderstanding of Islam following the 9/11 events, Akbar S. Ahmed argues that “the debate on Islam that is in full cry in the West since September 11 is too often little more than a parading of deep-rooted prejudices’. One of the deep-rooted misrepresentations of Islam is the association of Islam with ‘sword’. The association of Islam with ‘sword’ that forms the assumption that “Islam is spread by sword” is not a new assumption. It has been a (re)constructed narrative in the Christian and Western imagination. Therefore, it would not be an exaggeration to argue that this association is an extension of deeprooted misperceptions of Islam. As far as this study is concerned, this might lead us towards questions such as ‘who speaks for Islam’, ‘what makes Islam Islam’ or ‘what makes the Muslims Muslims’ (Waardenburg, 2003: 429; Esposito and Mogahed, 2007). In this case, there are two important issues that are often neglected. Firstly, fixed prejudices and the mental construction of Islam or Islamic civilisation do not often correspond to reality. Sometimes, fixed prejudices go along with one’s constructs of the other’s religion or culture. Jacques Waardenburg argues that the Christian construct of Islam is less fixed than “the construct that most Muslims have of Christianity” (Waardenburg, 2003: 432). Our findings, however, suggest that in some cases (some) Christians still hold onto the fixed prejudices of Islam and Muslims, which have been constructed since the 7th century. Or one may say that we inherit and expand our ancestors’ deep prejudices, or that we are simply born in an environment conditioned by deep-rooted misperceptions. This does not go unchallenged. The semantic moves shown in the study findings, where personal contact with Muslims provides a different ‘impression’ from that of the public portrayal of Islam and Muslims, insightfully promises that developing contact and being in dialogue with ‘the others’ would lead to mutual understanding. Secondly, the belief of the Muslim silent majority in the teachings of Islam is often not taken into consideration. As an example, we can take the latest Gallup research study which produces the publication of Who Speaks for Islam?. The study indicates that many Muslims regard religion as “a primary marker of identity, a source of meaning and guidance, consolation and community, and essential to their progress” (Esposito and Mogahed, 2007: 6). The possibility of dialogic formation in this strategy would depend on the willingness of the parties involved to negotiate their boundaries.

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c) The Strategy of Repositioning Boundaries Lastly, a group repositions itself within an existing hierarchical boundary system. Within a multicultural society, the repositioning strategy is often called assimilation or integration. The move indicated in the response to the discourse of ‘the war on terror’ is a strategy aiming at both repositioning the narrative on terrorism and countering the dangerous steps that may be taken on the political stage by proclaiming a ‘war on terror’. In this repositioning strategy, Islam is not an issue. The real issue is the consequence of the political discourse and its effect on real political life. The logic here is quite simple: when the discourse of ‘war on terror’ is executed in real political life, it ‘dignifies’ the attackers by justifying what they did and ‘dictates’ policy, leading to disastrous consequences. Instead of ‘war on terror’, the discourse is repositioned in order to have ‘Muslims as part of the solution’ when dealing with terrorist attacks. Repositioning therefore opens the door for dialogue that leads to recognition.

4. Summary As a discourse, ‘Islamic terrorism’ derives from the studies of religious terrorism or fundamentalism, of Middles East, Arab and Islamic culture, of racism and media representations of Islam and Muslims, and of the manifestations of political Islam. Articles in the British Christian media represent Islam and Muslims through the narrative of ‘Islamic terrorism’. The study findings indicate that within the British Christian media, this narrative has been developed following the assumptions that Islam is an antagonist to the West, that Islam is an ideology that inspires violence and radicalism, that violence is a means for spreading Islam and conquering Christianity, and that Islam is in need of a reformation and enlightenment. While these assumptions indicate an unfavourable approach to Islam, various articles in the British Christian media reinforce these assumptions while some critically challenge them. In cases such as the notion of a clash of civilisations between Islam and the West, there is a consistency in challenging this assumption. The representations of Muslims within the discourse of ‘Islamic terrorism’ generally depend on individual articles. This is to say that a general claim of consistent representations of Muslims in a Christian newspaper cannot be made. From the individual articles, Muslims are represented as ‘victims’ of the hijackers of Islam and as ‘victims’ of stereotypes and prejudices. Some individual articles, however, reinforce a generalisation by associating Muslims in general with terrorist attacks.

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Considering the ways through which Islam and Muslims are represented in the British Christian media within the discourse of ‘Islamic terrorism’, one could argue that the narratives of ‘Islamic terrorism’ in which the representations of Islam and Muslims are situated say more about the way boundaries are created or defined in our society and the way we deal with human relations than they do about Islam as a religion or way of life per se. Dialogic formation and socio-cultural (mis)recognition would depend not only on the way boundaries are expanded or narrowed, but also on the ways cultural or religious groups reposition themselves in both political discourse and real political life. For Muslims and Christians, Islam and Christianity may deal with the meaning of life, but in the sociopolitical sphere the relationship between Muslims and Christians cannot be separated from the dynamism of the relational system that makes dialogic and socio-cultural recognition possible.

CHAPTER FIVE ISLAM AND MUSLIMS THROUGH THE LENS OF ‘CHRISTIAN PERSECUTION’

This chapter focuses on another dominant discourse within the British Christian News Media: ‘Christian persecution’. The phrase ‘Christian persecution’ is used because it is widely referred to in reporting and discussions of the relationship between Muslims and Christians in Muslim-majority countries. The chapter will pay particular attention to the following questions: In what ways does the persecution of Christians occur in Muslim-majority countries and how do the British Christian media represent Islam and Muslims in the context of ‘Christian persecution’? How can Christian persecution be located within the framework of the political theory of recognition? By approaching these questions, this chapter aims to present the narratives of Christian persecution and the representations of Islam and Muslims through the lens of such narratives.

1. Persecution’ Discourse a) General picture of ‘Religious Persecution’ Social science literature often classifies ‘religious persecution’ as a specific form of social conflict and ‘Christian persecution’ as a form of ‘religious persecution’ (Coffey, 2000; Barret and Johnson, 2001; Hertzke, 2004; Grim and Finke, 2007). As acknowledged by Grim and Finke (2007), theories of social conflict have been well-developed within social science. However, they note that most theories dealing with social conflicts do not take into account religious persecution in relation to social conflicts. Based on this claim, in order to understand how religious persecution occurs they develop a model with the central thesis that “the attempt to regulate cultural and religious consensus within countries results in greater religious persecution” and “less regulation prevents

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persecution by ensuring fair competition for all religions within a society” (2007: 634 and 636). The notion of regulation of religion analysed by Grim and Finke is based on the religious economies theory with a basic premise that “regulating religion restricts the supply of religion by changing the incentives and opportunities for religious producers” (2007: 636). For Grim and Finke, regulation of religion is normally shaped by two related forces: government and social regulatory forces. Government regulation of religion can be defined as “the restrictions placed on the practice, profession, or selection of religion by the official laws, policies, or administrative actions of the state”, while social regulation of religion refers to “the restriction placed on the practice, profession, or selection of religion by other religious groups, associations, or the culture at large” (2007: 645 [italics original]). Government regulation of religion takes various forms, including the restriction of religious practices and beliefs, the exercise of control over religious groups or individuals, the prohibition of conversion and the application of laws that favour only a dominant religion or some religions. The social regulation of religion is normally mobilised in the form of threat and intimidation against followers of other religious beliefs by private individuals, organisations and socio-religious groups (Pew Forum, 2009: 6 and 17). Although the government and social regulation of religion can be distinguished, they are related. The reason is that, very often, the government regulation of religion is a reaction to the social force mobilised by members or groups of a dominant religion on the one hand, and the social regulation of religion becomes a response in favouring or opposing the government regulatory force on the other hand. The consequence in the regulation of religion is that when social and government regulation of religion increases, religious persecution increases (Grim and Finke, 2007: 638). Generally, religious persecution is defined in various ways, including “any hardship endured because of one’s religion” or persecution in terms of martyrdom (Coffey, 2000; Hertzke, 2004). In this chapter, persecution is understood in a broad sense that includes both symbolic and material threat or abuse (Stephen et al., 2002), in which symbolic threat or abuse refers to abuses and threat which endanger the worldview, the values, standards and attitudes of certain groups while material threat or abuse refer to physical and material well-being, including any discrimination and restriction of the political and economic participation of other or certain groups. In the light of the regulation of religion model, Grim and Finke developed an analysis of religious persecution based upon the 2006

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International Religious Freedom Reports. In this study, they found that religious persecution is apparent in every region of the globe and religious persecution is present regardless of the predominant religion in a country (2007: 643-644). Nevertheless, they found that, geographically, religious persecution is far more prevalent in Middle Eastern and South Asian countries. Moreover, their study indicates that in 2006, high-level persecution with more than 1,000 persons being persecuted is “present in 40 percent of Muslim-majority countries compared to 3.9 percent of Christian-majority countries” (2007: 643). Grim and Finke argue that the regulation of religion explains these findings: religious persecution is high in Muslim-majority countries because where the percentage of Muslim population in a country is higher, the regulation of religion increases in the form of the application of Shari’a Law and restrictions on religious freedom. Grim and Finke’s findings go along with global reports on religious freedom and restrictions of religion published by institutions, such as the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life and the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. In its 2009 report, the Pew Forum indicates that government restrictions are high or very high in Muslimmajority countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Algeria, Sudan, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia. The constitution of Afghanistan, for example, protects the right of its citizens to choose and to practise a religion other than Islam. However, the constitution maintains a measure of protection by stating that “no law can be contrary to the sacred religion of Islam” and by instructing judges to rule according to Shari’a Law if no specific Afghan law applies to a case. The same report points out that the social restriction of religion is also high or very high in the same countries (Pew Forum, 2009: 6-8 and 1718). The above examples, based on the reports on religious restrictions and freedom, seem to suggest that in the contemporary condition, government and social regulation of religion that increases religious persecution is greater in Muslim-majority countries. However, it cannot be concluded that religious persecution can only be found in Muslim-majority countries. Indeed, the 2009 report of the Pew Forum on Religious and Public life and the 2010 report on International Religious Freedom also classify countries such as China, India, Burma and North Korea as countries of particular concern, or countries with high or very high government and social restrictions on religion. Although Grim and Finke found that government and social regulations increase as the percentage of Muslims in a country rises, and decline as the percentage of Christians in a country increases,

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they rightly acknowledge that “religious persecution happens regardless of dominant religion” (2007: 652). In other words, religious persecution does not belong exclusively to a certain religion. Consider, for example, if the same theory of religious economies were applied to measure the regulatory forces of religion during the time of the Crusades, the Inquisition or the Holocaust. This would surely give us a different picture, one based on conditions different from those of the early 21st century. Or, with some modifications, it would be interesting to see how ‘regulation of religion’ contributed to the increase of Islamophobic prejudices, abuses and attacks over the years (see also chapter 2). The point is that government and social regulation of religion can open the door to possibilities that lead to attacks, abuse and discrimination of people based on their religion, regardless of the dominant religion of a society. In this condition, religious outgroups are often viewed as threats and forces are therefore mobilised to control them. Consequently, this reinforces “negative social attitudes toward those religious outgroups” (Wike and Grim, 2010: 8)

b) Christian Persecution and Christian Identity Formation As already indicated, Christian persecution is a form of religious persecution. Historically, the notion of ‘Christian persecution’ is probably as old as Christianity itself. This includes persecutions by non-Christians but also persecutions ‘among’ those who call themselves Christians, who come from different denominations as seen during the reformation (Coffey, 2000). Some Christian-associated organisations indicate that “today 200 million Christians suffer for their faith, many of them facing murder and other forms of violence” (ACN, 2008: 5). In a report on Christians who were oppressed for their faith during the period of 20072008, Aid to the Church in Need (ACN), a Catholic charity organisation, raises a great concern regarding “the rising tide of extremism in a number of Islamic countries” in which “the persecution towards non-Muslims and especially Christians is so severe that the Church’s very survival is now under threat” (ACN, 2008: 6). The ACN report on the persecution of Christians in Muslim-majority countries echoes, in many ways, the points analysed in the notion of regulation of religion, such as the application of Shari’a Law and social pressure for the restriction of religious freedom. Both government and social regulation of religion in Muslim-majority countries affect the rights of Christians through various forms of abuse, discrimination, intimidation and denial of rights, such as little or no protection in court, extra taxation, discrimination in the workplace, pressure to convert to Islam, pressure to comply with a strict dress code

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and the charge of proselytism (ACN, 2008: 7). Moreover, persecution includes the pain of loss in the form of murder cases, violence, the closing of churches and other Christian facilities, eviction of Christians from their homes, the death penalty threat for converts from Islam to Christianity and pressure to convert to Islam. The above brief account sheds some light on modern-day Christian persecution. It is important, however, to note that as a discourse, persecution of Christians is often related to the construction of Christian identity. Writing in the third century, Tertullian linked the Christian persecution of the time to the expansion of the Christian faith and Christian identity formation. He famously coins this popular saying: “semen est sanguis Christianorum”, which means “the blood of Christians is the seed of the church”. ‘Christian persecution’ has been part of a religious vocabulary in Christianity that is often used in the negotiation of Christian identity. In fact, the idea of Christian persecution is deeply rooted in the teaching of Christianity as a religion. Elizabeth A. Castelli, a leading expert on the narrative of Christian persecution, points out that “indeed, Christianity itself is founded upon an archetype of religiopolitical persecution, the execution of Jesus by the Romans” (2008: 161; see also Castelli, 2004). How exactly does persecution shape Christian identity construction? In the Christian discourse, persecution is often considered as either the fulfilment of ‘the divine call’ or the revelation of who a Christian is (or should be). The actual persecutions therefore become memorable events, because they form ‘Christian stories’ through the coding and decoding of such events for the purpose of Christian formation over generations, such as the publications of the lives of martyrs. This process may be called the formation of Christian ‘cultural memory’ because, as argued by Jan Assmann, as a social phenomenon our memory is socially conditioned. This means that the contents and the use of memory are determined by our social relationship (Assmann, 2006; Castelli 2004: chapter 1). Here, the events of persecution become what Assmann calls ‘communicative memory’, because the stories of these events create emotional ties to the extent that in the act of remembering, Christians do not just descend into the depth of their “own most intimate inner life”, but they “introduce an order and a structure into that internal life that are socially conditioned” (2006: 1-2). This order and structure enables members of a community to preserve their culturally memorable events and (re)tell them from generation to generation. Since these events involve suffering, to use the term of Johann Baptist Metz, this communicative memory of persecution becomes a ‘memoria passionis’ that requires not only ‘a forward-looking

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solidarity’ but also ‘a backward-looking solidarity’, in terms of considering the ‘suffering of our forefathers’ (FrĘchtling, 2002: 46). Memory and social bonds indeed relate to each other. The premises proposed by Maurice Halbwachs and Friedrich Nietzsche explain precisely the link between memory and social bonds. Just as Halbwachs argues that “people need bonds in order to develop a memory and to be able to remember”, it is also true that “people need a memory in order to be able to form bonds” as contended by Nietzsche (Assmann, 2006: 5). In the Christian cultural memory, community bonds enable Christians to remember events of persecution, but at the same time memory of persecution forms and sustains their community bonds. Persecution is therefore told not as ‘someone else’s story’ but as ‘one’s own story’ (Sacks, 2007: 114-118). Since ‘Christian persecution’ is a powerful narrative in Christianity, quite often ‘memory of suffering’ becomes a powerful symbolic resource for socio-political movements. The problem is that in some extreme cases, particularly in the U.S. political context, the idea of ‘persecution’ is sometimes played over and over again in defining a political condition. Elizabeth Castelli argues that the trend of over mobilising the language of religious persecution in the political debate produces the so-called ‘persecution complex’. The problem with this complex is that it can provide “the dangerously bruised egos of a massive movement that sees itself as a victimized minority” or a special community that is defined by its religiosity (Castelli, 2008). The view that persecution shapes the identity formation of Christian communities may be unique. However, it cannot be claimed that Christianity is alone in claiming persecution as a narrative that shapes its adherents’ identity. Other religions also have their own views on suffering for one’s own faith. Indeed, this chapter focuses only on the discourses of the British Christian media on Islam and Muslims through the lens of Christian persecution. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the idea of martyrdom, or dying for one’s faith, also has a special place in Islam (Afsaruddin, 2006).

2. Christian Persecution and the Portrayal of Islam and Muslims The previous section explained persecution as a consequence of religious restrictions and the discourse of Christian persecution, in relation to Christian identity construction. Keeping in mind how actual persecution and persecution as discourse play a crucial role in the representation of

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Islam and Muslims, this section will present findings based on the journalistic texts of the studied media.

a) Distribution of Texts with Reference to Christian Persecution ‘Christian persecution’ is clearly a dominant discourse in the British Christian media. Of 1357 articles included for analysis in this study, 605 articles, or 44.6% of the data sample, focus on reports and analysis around the topic of Christian persecution. This certainly signals the significance and the possibility of seeing Islam and Muslims through the lens of this discourse. From 605 texts that focus on Christian persecution, 261 texts are published in Evangelicals Now and 116 texts in Evangelical Times. Church Times and The Tablet give fair attention to the discourse of Christian persecution, with 118 texts published in Church Times and 110 in The Tablet. Part of the reason why reports on Christian persecution appear more in the evangelical media is that these media pay more attention to the spreading of the Christian faith and principles than to other political issues. While the discourse of Christian persecution is very broad, texts in the studied media focus particular attention on the hostility of Muslims towards Christians or other groups, particularly in the Muslim-majority countries, with 374 texts discussing this issue. Most of these texts are international reports within the setting of countries such as Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Sudan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Malaysia and Indonesia. Although the Philippines is not a Muslim-majority country, there is an overwhelming number of reports, in relation to violent acts, on the Muslim groups in Mindanao in the studied media. Interestingly, there is also a small number of reports on the hostility of Christians or other groups towards Muslims.

b) Representing Christian Persecution As far as the study data is concerned, there are a number of contexts through which Islam and Muslims are discussed in relation to the persecution of Christians. This includes government and social regulation of religion, the question of “guilty by association” and issues around conversion.

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Government Regulation of Religion and Christian Persecution Reports in the studied media often claim that the persecution of Christians is a consequence of the application of Islamic Shari’a Law in a number of Muslim-majority countries or the proposal of certain regulations that restrict the religious freedom of minority groups. These include court rulings, especially the ruling over converts from Islam to Christianity, the registration of religions including membership lists, the government banning translations of the Bible, the requirement for permission to build a church and the enforcement of Islamic dress code. Countries like Malaysia and Indonesia guarantee freedom of worship. However, building a church requires specific permission in Indonesia and, in the case of Malaysia, the constitution states that “all ethnic Malays are Muslim and subject to Sharia Law”. In Saudi Arabia, religious freedom is rejected and the country adopts the Qur’an as the only constitution and the Shari’a as its basic law (ACN, 2008: 84). Among the many cases of persecution of Christians on the basis of government regulation of religion that have caused international outcry are the death sentence handed down to Ayub Masih in Pakistan in 1998 for blasphemy; the case of Dr John Joseph, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Faisalabad in Pakistan who shot himself dead in 1998 in protest against blasphemy charges against Christians; a death sentence by stoning for Amina Lawal in Nigeria, who was accused of adultery in 2003; and the death penalty handed down to Abdul Rahman of Afghanistan, who converted from Islam to Christianity in 2006. Reporting on the above cases and many others, the studied media express similar critical views of the application of Shari’a Law, while calling for the protection of minority groups including Christians. This is prompted by the argument that the application of Islamic law may in itself be meant to protect all citizens, but a Christian can easily be accused of blasphemy by a Muslim. This allegation can in turn lead to persecution and the death penalty or assassination in custody. In the case of blasphemy law in Pakistan, the studied news media raise concerns and criticise it on the grounds that minority communities are victimised by this law, under which “insulting Muhammad carries the death sentence and desecrating the Qur’an life imprisonment”. According to Lawrence Saldanha, the Archbishop of Lahore, “the blasphemy law allows people to make accusations with too little evidence, which is putting religious minorities at risk.” Since many Christians have suffered and died because of the application of the blasphemy law in Pakistan, an article in The Tablet 19 November 2005 calls this law “a sword of Damocles hanging over the head of every Pakistani Christian”. In 2006, the Justice and Peace

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Commission of Pakistan's Catholic Church reported that 700 people have been charged under this law since it was tightened in 1986, and more than 20 have subsequently died, some in custody. The same criticism is also addressed to the Malaysian government’s proposal, in 2001, to legislate ‘re-education for converts’ by detaining Muslim converts to Christianity in rehabilitation centres in order to “restore their faith”. While these cases are reported as evidence for of the victimisation of religious minority groups, what is not really reported is the extent to which various laws in the Muslim-majority countries offer protection to religious minority groups. Moreover, there is a tendency to developing generalisations, as if Christians were always ‘victims’ in Muslim-majority countries. This may confirm the classic argument that the newsworthiness of an issue is often determined by the negativity of the news, following the formula that the more negative the event in its consequences, the more probable that it will become a news item (Galtung and Ruge, 1965). Thematically, within the context of government regulation of religion, at least two points stand out: ‘Islamisation’ as ‘annihilation of Christians’ and discrimination of Christians as ‘second class citizens’. The following quotations illustrate these points: “…being a Christian is viewed here [Nigeria] by government officials and Muslim leaders as a crime….The public schools do not teach Christian religious knowledge while Muslim children enjoy Islamic education from Muslim teachers who are being paid from government coffers, and taxpayers money” (Evangelicals Now April 1998). “Non-Muslims were denied or sacked from public-service jobs such as those in the judiciary and police….and Christians employed by Muslims were forced to convert to Islam or lose their jobs” (The Tablet 27 March 2004). “Ever since Islam was founded…, there have been Christian communities living as minorities in Muslim-majority contexts. Their circumstances have varied at different times and in different places, but almost always the Christians experience some degree of discrimination or hostility. This…arises from some of the teaching of Islam” (Evangelical Times February 2006).

The quotations above indicate the involvement of government officials in discriminatory practices against Christians. Besides, the studied media indicate that the regulation of religion also creates injustice in the forms of discrimination, hostility and inequality. Ironically, as seen in one of the quotations above, the unjust discrimination experienced by Christians is credited to ‘some of the teaching of Islam’. Discursively, Islam is now

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represented as a teaching that inspires hostility towards Christians, and is therefore viewed as having a problem ontologically. Even though the studied media point out the loophole whereby government regulation of religion can be applied over-zealously by local bodies or by individuals in a number of Muslim-majority countries, they also report on diplomacy at the state level for the protection of Christians in Muslim-majority countries. The studied newspapers do not shy away from reporting the actions of governments or officials in Muslim-majority countries that are clearly in favour of Christians. This can be seen in the reports of a 2007 high court ruling in Pakistan, which rejected a petition by Muslim extremists and allow the continuation of the reconstruction of a church, on the grounds that Muslims are permitted to build mosques in Christian countries. A report in Church Times from 30 May 1998 indicates that Christians are not alone in their protests against the blasphemy law in Pakistan. Muslims too, particularly British Muslims, call for the reform of the law, in fact. This is evident in a letter sent by Khadin Hussain, the general secretary of the Council of Mosques in Bradford, to Nawaz Sharif, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, stating that “we [British Muslims] believe it is a proper thing for the Pakistan government to legislate in order to protect all faiths against slander, falsification and ridicule” (Church Times 30 May 1998). Social Regulation of Religion and Christian Persecution Within the studied news media, social regulation of religion includes religious conflicts and various mass mobilisations that ultimately provoke violence and hostility of Muslims against Christians. Generally, reports include a number of related forms of persecution: killing and maiming of Christians (including physical and emotional abuse), destruction of property such as the burning of churches, schools and convents, and pressure on Christians to convert to Islam. Among the acts of killing, a number of cases attracted international attention, such as the murder of Irish missionary Rufus Halley in Mindanao, the Philippines (2001), the killing of Protestant Minister, Emmanuel Allah Dita, in Pakistan (2001) and the murder of Andrea Santoro, an Italian Missionary priest, by a Turkish Muslim in the wake of the Muhammad Cartoons (2006). Ironically, among these victims, some actually dedicated their lives to the dialogue between Christians and Muslims. For example, the reports indicate that Halley, who had worked for more than 20 years promoting unity between Christians and Muslims in a region torn apart by separatist conflict in Mindanao in the Philippines, was in fact killed when he returned home from a Christian-Muslim meeting. A similar account is

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given about Santoro, “who had been frank in his admiration of Islam” because he had actually “discovered the face of Islam in practice” (Jenkins, 2007: 267). While these acts of violence are widely reported, the studied media relate the cases only to a number of groups called fundamentalists, Muslim jihadists and militants, extremist Muslims or Muslim youths. This classification is interesting in the sense that while providing a general picture of Muslims persecuting Christians, the reports specify groups that persecute Christians, distinguishing them from other Muslims. This model of representation can be seen in phrases used to describe these groups: “they are not real Muslims because they do not understand their own faith”, or “the extremist Muslim is not an authentic Muslim” or “they are not peaceful Muslims” or “un-enlightened Muslims”. An article of The Tablet, published in the edition of 19 November 2005, goes further when it explains that “often the same groups who target Christian communities are engaged in a wider struggle against the more moderate Muslim authorities, whose authority they reject.” Nevertheless, the escalation of religious conflict often results in simply generalising a perception of a community. This happens most frequently in long conflicts, such as the long ethno-religious conflict between Muslims and Christians in the Northern part of Nigeria. This long conflict, which has already resulted in the death of over 3 million people and has inflicted vast psychological and material damage, seems to have shaped people’s minds, including the perceptions of Christians towards Muslims (Salawu, 2010). Reports in the studied media on this conflict generally depict Muslims unfavourably: they are perceived as aggressive, dangerous and suspicious of Christians. The remarks made by Josiah Idowu-Fearon, Bishop of Kaduna in Nigeria, in an interview published in Church Times on 31 July 1998, clearly explains this point. In this interview, he argues that the most difficult task for Christians is to understand how the minds of Muslims work. For Idowu-Fearon, Muslims see Christians as fuel for their fire and the only thing that can save Christians is to embrace Islam. He even goes further by claiming that even with the moderate and friendly Muslims, “we know underneath that, if anything happens, they can kill”. A clear consequence of the social regulation of religion, through the misuse of the application of laws not accommodative to minority groups including Christians, is that it can produce a culture of intimidation through which Christians are pressurised to become Muslims, or to convert to Islam. Such intimidation occurs in the context of various relationships such as those among neighbours, between a business owner and employees and between radical groups and vulnerable Christians.

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Intimidation and pressure for conversion certainly deny people’s right to religious freedom. Moreover, such intimidation and pressure often go further, to the denial of people’s right to live. In many cases, many Christians suffer and die because of their objection to the intimidating pressure to convert to Islam. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that in some cases, the intimidation does not come out of the blue. The intimidation may be a reaction to accusations, sometimes accurate, that Christians try to convert Muslims to Christianity. In terms of discursive representation, accounts of intimidating pressure to convert from Muslims towards Christians are generally accompanied by reports on the firm stance taken by Christians to be faithful to their faith. Here ‘persecution’ is represented as part of the politics of being Christian, including the construction of Christian identity. This appears particularly in the use of various phrases in describing Christian persecution, such as ‘the cost of discipleship’, ‘the cost of Christianity’, ‘the cost of embracing Christ’, or ‘[being] martyred for Christ’.1 Christian Persecution for Being “Guilty by Association” Part of the reason why Christians are persecuted and experience abuse and hostility in a number of Islamic countries is the tendency of Muslims to associate Christianity and Christians with the West, particularly the United States of America. In this association, Christians then are seen as ‘spies’ or ‘agents’ for the USA. Besides, Christians, regardless of their ethnic backgrounds, are also related to the ‘burden’ of the past, such as in the case of the Crusade or colonisation. These associations bring great consequences, as a result of which many Christians suffered and died when ‘the war on terror’ was proclaimed and the US announced military action in Iraq and Afghanistan. A great number of reports in the studied media point out that the Iraq war has had another ‘legacy’ for many Iraqi Christians: that of increasing their suffering under the violent attacks of Muslim extremists, including the pressure to choose between converting to Islam or dying for being/remaining Christians. The words of Archbishop Louis Sako of Kirkuk in Iraq clearly explain the situation: “In Iraq Christians are dying, the Church is disappearing under continued persecution, threats and violence carried out by extremists who are leaving us no choice: conversion or exile.” One of the most reported cases concerning the persecution of Christians in relation to the Iraq war is the killing in 2007 of 1

See reports in Evangelicals Now August 2000, June 2004, November 2005, February 2006 and June 2007; Evangelical Times March 2002 and June 2004.

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Ragheed Gani, an Iraqi priest, and three sub-deacons. Due to the persecution in this context of war, displacement becomes an unintended consequence, and many Iraqi Christians have to flee to a safe place. The ACN report indicates that in 1987, an official census in Iraq recorded a total of 1.4 million Christians, but that by mid-2008 there were less than 400,000, since a high proportion of these had fled their homes seeking a safe life abroad, particularly in the West (ACN, 2008: 8). Interestingly, the studied media also give critical accounts of the debates about certain Christian activities among Muslim communities in Iraq, which raise the question of converting Muslims to Christianity. These activities include bringing humanitarian aid containing with Bible or providing food packages that include a verse from the Bible. Generally, the reports specify American Evangelical churches, American evangelists and Christian development agencies as groups involved in such activities. At first glance, one may suggest that these reports represent Muslims and Muslim communities as ‘victims’ or ‘targets’ of Christian activities aiming at conversion. Nevertheless, as a matter of representation, the same pattern, that of creating news image from a world event, is clearly followed. In this sense, the concern produced in the critical accounts of the studied media towards Christian activities is not about Islam and Muslims as ‘victims’ per se but rather about the ‘sensitivity’ of Muslims and the lives of Christians. This can be seen in a report of Evangelicals Now May 2005, which presents the controversy surrounding Christian activities among Iraqi Muslim communities, while adding that “there is much sensitivity among Muslims regarding Christian mission related with development work”. The use of language focusing on the ‘sensitivity’ of Muslims in this narrative represents Muslims unfavourably. In this sense, the main narrative in the studied media reports is neither about questions around Christian activities of converting Muslims, nor about Muslims becoming ‘targets’ by Christian missionaries, but rather about the persecution of minority Christians and the social regulation of religion which limits the space of Christian evangelism. Conversion, Converts and Persecution The studied media strongly indicate that conversion is one of the important issues relating to persecution. Besides conversion, proselytism is another issue referring to attempts or efforts to convert people to a certain religion. This was an issue discussed during the Lambeth Conference in 1998, especially in the discussion concerning Christian and Muslim relations. As reported in Church Times on 7 August 1998, this conference recommended that when relating to people of other faiths,

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Christians should avoid targeting individuals or specific groups for conversion. For this reason, the conference highlights the point that “while conversion was valued, proselytism was unacceptable”. The recommendation includes a statement that “there was no place in the Anglican communion for material inducements, psychological pressure, or the targeting of individuals or groups”. Nevertheless, the principle of reciprocity was also cited, while pointing out the value of the argument that people of all faiths should have basic human freedoms, including religious freedoms. Roman Catholicism has the same approach when dealing with evangelisation. Michael L. Fitzgerald, the former head of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, is known as a critic of proselytism, based on the argument that proselytism simply alienates people culturally (Fitzgerald, 1997). With regard to conversion, the Anglican Communion and Roman Catholicism seem to adopt a similar approach, in considering evangelisation as “bearing witness to the essentials of the Christian message” (Fitzgerald, 1997; Fitzgerald and Borelli, 2006). Therefore, as acknowledged in the 1998 Lambeth Conference, “Christians bore witness, while conversion was up to God” (Church Times 7 August 1998). This stance is certainly different from the approaches of some Evangelical Churches. The studied media indicate that evangelisation and conversion go hand in hand. As a matter of representation, Muslims are generally defined as those who resist evangelisation. Very often, they are represented as those who ‘force’ Christians to convert to Islam or ‘force’ converts to return to Islam. The word ‘force’ is the most used word. This can be seen in statements such as “Christians are Islamised by force”, Christians are forced “to move to a Muslim controlled-area”, “to acknowledge the supremacy of Islam”, “to convert to Islam or to face execution and death”, “to marry a Muslim”, or “to flee” away from one’s home, village or country. The same description is used to describe Muslim actions towards converts. While the use of force to intimidate Christians is pointed out in the studied media, the portrayal of a ‘forceful face of Islam or Muslims’ is sometimes problematic, particularly when the violent acts of some Muslims are related ontologically to what Islam is. Christian churches consider conversion as the fruit of evangelisation. While stories of conversion are the subject of independent research, in relation to Christian persecution, the question is: what consequences do the converts from Islam to Christianity face in a Muslim-majority context as seen in the reports of the studied news media? The immediate consequences faced by the converts undoubtedly include what Johan Galtung calls ‘desocialisation’ and ‘resocialisation’ (1996: 197). Reports

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indicate that the converts from Islam to Christianity are normally ‘desocialised’ from their families, relatives, societies and even their countries. The desocialisation of the converts also carries problems such as intimidation, alienation and isolation. Here the converts are represented as being forced by their family members or former coreligionists to abandon ‘the new/strange religion’ in order to return to Islam. Desocialisation goes along with resocialisation. In the case of converts, being desocialised, they now stand at the door of a new world, namely the Christian world and its communities. Here they go through an experience of resocialisation in this new world. Evangelicals Now reported in June 1998 that after being converted, a former Muslim cleric in Egypt was taken to a hiding place while being nourished by his Christian teacher and other caring believers. Other reports indicate that new converts are resocialised by adopting a ‘Christian name’. Resocialisation relates to the question of identity formation and the negotiation of the new identity. In its edition of February 2007, Evangelical Times ran a story of a former Muslim imam in Gambia who converted to Christianity. Having converted to Christianity, “his family and community cut him off both financially and domestically, hoping to force him back to Islam” (desocialisation). He then socialised himself within his ‘new Christian life’ and eventually became a Christian pastor. Later, he set up a small church for converted Muslims. This report explains that ‘having suffered at the time of his own conversion, he understands what his fellow Christians are going through”. Setting up this church for converts can be interpreted as the formation of a community through which desocialised converts may find ‘a new belongingness’ that shapes their new identity. The words of this Gambian pastor to his community members illuminate this point: “I know how tough it is for anyone leaving Islam, they will be cast out…..We are Christ’s ambassadors, and mustn’t give Christianity a bad name by behaviour that is considered wrong in our Community”. The reports on desocialisation and resocialisation carry various representations of Islam and Muslims. The following statements are quoted from the converts: “Muslims are so quick to blame Christians for anything bad”, “We can’t fool around as converted Muslims – we know we can be killed at any time”, “the Koran is not from God”, “In Islam we have circumcision….I wanted now in obedience to take that step of baptism and openly become a Christian”, “My previous life [as a Muslim] was totally dead. As a mullah, we always had a compromising attitude. We could even lie in certain situations”. These statements confirm scholarly studies on conversion that point out the tendency of using the voice of the converts to speak against their

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former religions and co-religionists (Zebiri, 2008). However, as far as the media representation is concerned, it could be argued that in the British Christian media reports, the representation of Islam and Muslims is solely informed by the hostility towards Christians in Muslim-majority countries. This model of representation suggests that the only way to know Islam and Muslims is through the way Christians are unfairly treated in Muslimmajority countries. In other words, the image of Islam and Muslims in this model does not function to represent Islam and Muslims for Islam and Muslims, but to represent Islam and Muslims for Christianity and Christians.

3. Discussion: Christian Persecution and (Mis)Recognition In the previous sections I have discussed the notion of Christian persecution, how persecution of Christians occurs in Muslim-majority countries and what the narrative of persecution tells us about the representation of Islam and Muslims. Considering the fact that this study deals with the data drawn from the British Christian media, a certain degree of bias in the representation of Islam and Muslims is not surprising, although some non-Christian affiliated organisations such as the Pew Forum and the US State Department also provide relatively similar accounts to that of the British Christian media concerning Christian persecution in Muslim-majority countries. To what extent can the findings be located within the frame of the politics of recognition?

a) Persecution, Identity and Recognition Religious persecution, including persecution of Christians in Muslimmajority countries, is no doubt a catastrophe and certainly “a human rights disaster” (ACN, 2008: 3). While a great number of cases receive public attention and international outcry, there are also many cases that go unreported, except in the Christian media. Throughout the presentation of findings, the notion of Christian persecution is accompanied with stories and discourses on conversion and efforts ‘to preach’ one’s faith. Considering the theoretical framework of recognition, we can notice that issues surrounding Christian persecution relate to the question of identity. Earlier in this chapter, it was pointed out that the narrative of persecution is closely related to the identity formation of Christians. In the context of the whole study, however, it is significant to ask: how do we understand this central role of identity in relation to (Christian) persecution? As this chapter explains, from the perspective of Christians, persecution is

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certainly a form of misrecognising their religious identity, and for converts from Islam to Christianity, conversion involves “a change of religious identity” that requires both desocialisation and resocialisation. From a different point of view, acts of evangelisation or the presence of Christians in Muslim-majority countries can also be seen as ‘a threat’ to Islamic identity. While it could be argued that government regulation of religion is certainly incompatible with religious freedom, or the rights of Christians to express their religious identity which leads to persecution, a Christian presence in a Muslim-majority context remains a threat that can escalate fear (Elshtain, 2008: 89). This sense of threat can be explained in two ways: fear of small numbers (Appadurai, 2006) and fear of visibility (Ramadan, 2009), which in turn lead to resistance to diversity. Discussing the first explanation, Arjun Appadurai argues that the majority’s fear of the small numbers of a minority normally occurs in the social mobilisation that turns “a benign social identity into a predatory identity” (Appadurai, 2006: 51). According to Appadurai, “predatory identities are almost always majoritarian identities….[T]hey are claims about cultural majorities that seek to be exclusively or exhaustively linked with the identity of the nation…..The discourse of these mobilized majorities often has within it the idea that it could be itself turned into a minority unless another minority disappears…” (2006: 51-52).

The latter explanation, fear of visibility, is argued by Tariq Ramadan (2009). Pointing to various Islamophobic attacks, and the tendency in Europe to associate Islam with various controversial debates such as violence and extremism, Ramadan argues that underneath these attacks, there is a clear message: “we do not trust you and the best Muslim for us is the Muslim we cannot see”. The presence of Christians and symbols of Christianity such as the cross, places of worship, convents or Christian centres can be seen as a threatening visibility of Christianity. To the majority, this visibility is threatening, particularly as the arguments are often related to the values of majority, cultural roots or identity and the issue of Christianisation and ‘colonisation’. The outcome is similar to that of the fear of small numbers: violent attacks or abuse against Christians. Besides the proposal to amend or reform laws in Muslim-majority countries, dialogue is often proposed as a way of dealing with Muslim and Christian relations. Nevertheless, when dealing with persecution or the intimidating abuse of Christians, the fundamental question remains: how is dialogue made possible? Indeed, as stressed by Archbishop Rowan Williams, in his talk at the International Islamic University in Islamabad during his visit to Pakistan in 2005, dialogue is so far the best way to reach

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understanding, as far as Muslim and Christian relationship in Muslimmajority countries is concerned. According to Williams, “Dialogue is not debate; dialogue is not proselytism; dialogue is not the attempt to persuade; dialogue is not negotiation. When I enter into dialogue with a person from another religious tradition . . . I am not out to secure agreement, but to secure understanding.” While dialogue is certainly central, like tolerance, dialogue as an approach in dealing with the differences can be easily charged as “a cover story for hegemony” (Elshtain, 2008: 95). The point, however, is that dialogue opens a space for bringing people into the public sphere to engage in the search of what binds them together and how to live together differently, guided by a mutual understanding. This means that within the context of a nation-state characterised by a multicultural condition, “civility is a code for minimizing friction between strangers” (Sacks, 2007: 162). Moreover, since citizenship is the meeting point of people from different backgrounds, as argued by Tariq Modood, “multicultural citizenship” amplifies the politics of being a dialogic community (2007a: 122-128; 2007b). This multicultural citizenship, according to Modood, is directed by three basic features. Firstly, citizenship is pluralistic in the sense that each part of the plurality has a right to be part of the whole society and to speak for itself and its vision for a functioning society. Secondly, citizenship is multilogical, in the sense that the concerned parties allow for different views “to qualify each other, overlap, synthesize, be modified in the light of having to co-exist with that of others”. Thirdly, citizenship is dispersed, on the grounds that action and power cannot be monopolistically concentrated, but rather used to give space for fellow citizens to engage equally not only in law and politics but also in civic debates and actions across the socio-political field. This means that people’s civic status allows them to engage as fellow citizens although they come from different backgrounds, including different religious backgrounds. Or, as the late John Paul II puts it: “When in a society citizens accept one another in their respective religious beliefs, it is easier to foster among them the effective recognition of other human rights and an understanding of the values on which a peaceful and productive coexistence is based” (quoted in Elshtain, 2008: 99). The notions of civility as a normative approach and multicultural citizenship as a political approach in dealing with the differences are certainly promising, if we consider the fact that in a globalised world, multifaithism seems to be the future for many nations.

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b) Representation and the Question of (Mis)Recognition Although this chapter focuses on Christian persecution in Muslimmajority countries, we also need to remind ourselves that the history of Christianity has also gone through various episodes of persecuting ‘the other’ based on their beliefs. Among these episodes we can mention antiSemitism, the Crusades and the period of missionary expansion of Christianity (Hick, 2000). These historical episodes inform us that persecution of other people based on their beliefs cannot be simply associated with a particular religion or community of faith. While the historical past exemplified in these episodes often becomes a burden for modern dialogue among people of faith, it makes only a little sense to argue that historical episodes should lead people away from supporting religious freedom or engaging in dialogue among communities (Elshtain, 2008: 103). Moreover, historical legacies are not always shaped by conflicts but also by encounters. Therefore, as stated by Archbishop Rowan Williams, “if we forget the history we have in common, we will lose our future together”. The representation of Islam and Muslims through the lens of Christian persecution offers two challenging but also competing paradigmatic models through which we can critically view the political perspective of recognition and misrecognition. The first paradigmatic model is evangelisation, with its main proposition that the whole world must be evangelised. Evangelisation thus means globalising Christianity. The process of globalising Christianity assumes two possible narratives of misrecognition. Firstly, the narrative of ‘not’ recognising ‘the other’ occurs because of the belief that ‘God is on our side’. Since ‘God is on our side’, there is a need to bring ‘this God’ to ‘the other’. Secondly, misrecognition occurs when the notion of evangelisation is framed within the narrative that ‘Muslims are against us’. This narrative is developed through constructing a religious identity by putting a great emphasis on the gap between ‘our’ religious identity and the religious identity of the ‘Other’ (Menuchin, 2006). Within this frame, misrecognition leads to either ignoring ‘the other’ or ‘proselytising’ the other. These narratives explain why the notion of ‘Christian persecution’ carries a powerful emotional appeal. It therefore makes sense that ‘persecution of Christians’ unites various Christian denominations and leaves open a small possibility for the production of ‘another other’, as identified in chapter 4. Of course, evangelisation cannot just be simplified or viewed negatively, given the fact that, at least in the past four decades, there has been a movement in many churches to view evangelisation as engaging in mutual dialogue and understanding with others and other cultures (Dupuis, 1997; see also

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chapter 4). The point addressed here is that attempts at globalising Christianity through evangelisation involve cultural encounter with its various consequences, including the possibility of misrepresenting others and other religions or cultures. Based on the findings, it could be argued that the opposite of evangelisation or evangelism is not Islamisation but, rather, that it is religious territorialisation. This is the second paradigmatic model. The notion of religious territorialisation derives from the construction of state territorialisation following the global colonial expansion, as explained by sociologist Jose Casanova (2001: 428-430; 2007). According to Casanova, in this territorialisation, every space, piece of land and territorial waters are appropriated within the fixed boundaries of nation-states. Consequently, people are also territorialised. The logic of territorialisation has the consequence that being a citizen of a nation-state defines ‘the legality’ of a person, or as Casanova puts it, “outside the state, no legal person” or “extra stato nulla persona” (2001: 428). The same model of territorialisation occurs in religion. In fact, this model clearly echoes a version of the old principle embraced in Christianity that “extra ecclesia nulla salus” or “outside the church, no salvation”. By territorialising a religion, a certain space is appropriated by a certain religion. Therefore, the expulsion of those who belong to a different religion becomes the only choice in order to maintain or defend a territory. Within this paradigmatic model, according to Casanova, “religious minorities caught in the wrong confessional territory were offered not secular toleration, much less freedom of religion, but the ‘freedom’ to emigrate” (2001, 2007). Among other things, the paradigmatic model of religious territorialisation explains the regulation of religion and the occurrence of Christian persecution. Considering these paradigmatic models, one may ask the question of whether evangelisation assumes territorial expansion or whether territorialisation assumes religious expansion. While these questions need further exploration, I would contend that both models contain a risk, in the sense that they deal with the negotiation of identity and can therefore lead to either recognition or misrecognition, depending on how all parties voluntarily engage in a mutual dialogue towards a mutual understanding. In this context, the call for a reciprocal approach makes sense. The more challenging aspect of these paradigmatic models is the possibility of being trapped in a binary portrayal, with nearly no space for negotiation. The findings presented earlier suggest that in the context of persecution, people’s perception can be simply formed and informed by a common binary way of thinking. The discursive implication here is that on the one hand a generalising move is developed, as if Christians were a legitimate

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target for persecution for Muslims. On the other hand, persecution is principally needed not only as a consequence of evangelisation, but also to make the Christian identity construction more meaningful. Here, misrecognition occurs when parties involved merely operate in their own territories, with the consequence that one’s territory remains an unfamiliar territory to the other. Achieving recognition, therefore, requires a dialogic space in which one can familiarise oneself with the strangeness of the other (Gurevitch, 1989) because, as suggested by Mikhail Bakhtin, only when space is given for the assertion of the ‘otherness of the other’ does recognition of his/her otherness become possible (Holquist, 1990: 18).

4. Summary The persecution of Christians in Muslim-majority countries occurs within the frame of government regulation of religion, social regulation of religion, the question of being guilty by association and conversion. Within the government regulation of religion, the application of Islamic Law and other regulations does not only restrict religious freedom but also leads to violent attacks or abuse against Christians, including killings or impositions of the death penalty. The persecution of Christians that is provoked by the social regulation of religion is often a reaction or response to the government restriction of religion. Sometimes, restrictions of religion tend to be used for social mobilisation against Christians, including the misuse of the laws. Persecution also occurs in the context of armed conflicts, such as in the cases of the Iraq and Afghan wars. It often happens that Christians have to pay the price simply because they are associated with the West, or considered as ‘spies’ or supporters of the USA. Moreover, the historical past appears to be a burden within which Christians are perceived as ‘the infidel crusaders’. Conversion is also an issue, as far as the presence of Christians in Muslim-majority countries is concerned. With regard to conversion, persecution happens in three ways: Christians are forced to convert to Islam, Christians are accused of converting Muslims to Christianity and converts from Islam to Christianity are forced to ‘restore’ their Islamic faith or else face violent action or death. While expressing a relatively similar approach to the reporting of Christian persecution, the studied media also include reports on the call to reform the laws that marginalise minority groups and the call for religious freedom in Muslim-majority countries. Moreover, the studied media are critical of the efforts of some Christian organisations to convert Muslims. In terms of representation, as might be expected, Islam and Muslims are,

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in general, represented unfavourably within the context of Christian persecution. Persecution is clearly related to the question of identity when it is located within the frame of politics of recognition. From the point of view of the persecuted, persecution can be considered as misrecognition based on “fear of small numbers” (Appadurai, 2006) or “fear of visibility” (Ramadan, 2009). From a different point of view, when Muslims are overly seen through the lens of persecution, misrecognition of Islam and Muslims can occur on the basis of two complementary claims: “God is on our side [Christianity]” and “Muslims are against us” or “Islam is the threat and challenge of evangelisation”. Recognition becomes difficult when realities are painted in black and white through which Islam and Muslims are portrayed as ‘the unchosen ones’ or the dangerous other, and Christianity and Christians or converts from Islam to Christianity are seen as ‘the chosen ones’ and the heroes of Christian faith. Recognition becomes possible when space is given for asserting the ‘strangeness’ or the ‘otherness’ of the other. Within this discourse, for a possibility of negotiating the difference, the idea of dialogue and multicultural citizenship provide an appeal for a reasoning society that respects and recognises its citizens, including their specialness.

CHAPTER SIX BRITISH MUSLIMS IN THE BRITISH CHRISTIAN MEDIA

Previous chapters have focused on the dominant discourses of interfaith dialogue, terrorism and Christian persecution. This chapter focuses particularly on the representations of British Muslims. With this focus, the presentation of findings and analysis will be shaped by the discourse of being Muslim in British society and, in some cases, in Europe. While this is a contested discourse and has many different aspects, this chapter covers only the various ways of discussing the idea in relation to the British Christian media.

1. British Muslims and the Question of Identity Formation Historically, Muslims have been present in Britain for at least 300 years. Even though the growth of the Muslim population has been quite significant since the 1970s, scholarly studies normally classify Muslims as an ethnic or a religious minority group. This classification, however, cannot be understood in terms of a single group, but rather in “a much more plural and nuanced way” (Modood, 2007a: 104). Modood suggests that the category ‘Muslim’ is as internally diverse as other group categories such as ‘British’ or ‘Christian’, but that it is a useful classification for identifying ‘visible minorities’ in a pluralistic society (Modood, 2005a). According to the data from the 2001 census, the total Muslim population in Britain was 1.6 million, comprising 3% of the total population and 52% of the non-Christian religious population. A survey, published in The Times in January 2009, indicated that the Muslim population in the UK had grown to 2.4 million. However, another report on the size and distribution of the world’s Muslim population, published by The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life in October 2009, indicated that “the United Kingdom is home to fewer than 2 million Muslims, about 3% of its total population” (2009: 21).

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One of the most important questions in the politics of being Muslim in British society is the question of British Muslim identity. In the introductory chapter of his 2004 book ‘The Infidel Within’: Muslims in Britain since 1800, Humayun Ansari posed this fundamental question: “Is there a British Muslim identity?” He then argued that key moments, such as the Honeyford affair in the mid-1980s, The Satanic Verses controversy and the Gulf War in the late 1980s and early 1990s have framed Muslims to be imagined as outsiders, excluded from the essential notions of ‘Britishness’. However, in the 1980s, “British Muslims began confronting this established notion of identity through the celebration of difference and construction of new so-called hybrid identities. Their ways of imagining identity involved challenging the reductionist explanations of community belonging apparent in discourses on ‘Britishness’ and in equally homogenous imaginings of ‘the Muslim community’” (Ansari, 2004: 1).

This does not only confirm the point that identity formation is multidimensional, but also indicates a crucial argument that in the modern context of a multicultural society, “identities are more fluid” in the sense that people may identify themselves with an ethnic or a religious group but at the same time there are many different ways for them to define and express their identity (Modood, 2007a: 105-106). Following this understanding, it can be contended that sometimes the notion of prioritisation in defining one’s identity, to say the least, is not really relevant in the context of a pluralistic society. This is because very often the framing of a question that assumes prioritisation such as “Are you British first or a Muslim first” does not provide sufficient creative space for narrating or discussing the ways through which people identify themselves or even define their identity in wider society. Besides, the answer to such a question depends on the context within which it is asked. In other words, questions pertaining to people’s association with a group or groups depend on how a question is framed, and the conditions that may frame the answer. But, generally, as pointed out by Ziaudddin Sardar, “identities are always contested and negotiated. They require give and take. The question of Muslim identity has two basic components. One has to be addressed to Britain as a whole; the other to the Muslim community itself” (2005). On the basis of this assessment, Sardar then proposes a strong argument that “Muslims can be loyal to Britain only by being loyal to their own worldview. And Britain can only become a genuinely pluralistic and multicultural society by providing the Muslim community with enough space to express itself the way it chooses.” The use of the

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term ‘worldview’ in this argument is very significant, because it points to the multidimensional character of identity formation that includes various fundamental aspects such as religious belief, cultural tradition or ideological component. These are the very aspects that normally shape a person’s or a group’s knowledge, understanding and interpretation of their world. In this sense, for a practical and political co-existence, a call for social cohesiveness should go alongside a commitment to giving space for the respect of various cultural or religious identities. Discussion of British perceptions of national identity, or the notion of ‘being British’, often dominates the discussion around what it means to be a British Muslim. Increasing cultural diversity in British society creates what Elizabeth Poole calls ‘insecurities’ particularly through the emphasis in press coverage on cultural differences (Poole, 2002: 186). While it could be questioned whether or not there is a British Muslim identity. as pointed out by Ansari, the question of Britishness relates to the question of the national identity and the construction of national culture. In her study, Poole finds that through homogenisation of Muslims in media discourses, there is a strong indication that when Muslims preserve their culture, this is interpreted as separatism and a threat to ‘traditional British’ values (Poole, 2002: 22). Poole continues to contend that this leads to the perception that since Muslims have their ‘Islamicness’, then they do not have the characteristics of ‘Britishness’. Here, one may ask what ‘Britishness’ or ‘being British’ really mean. There has been a tendency to define the term through a single frame of homogenous culture, religion, ethnic group, skin colour and language. In the question of Britishness, indeed, some have noted that ‘Britishness’ is often associated with homogenous ‘Whiteness’. This can be seen, for example, in the remark of Charles Moore, the former editor of The Times newspaper: “Britain is basically English speaking, Christian and white, and if one starts to think it might become basically Urdu speaking and Muslim and brown, one gets frightened” (Greenslade, 2005: 6, cited also in Saeed, 2007: 445). Tariq Modood, however, notes that ‘British’ is “a problematic and declining feature of identification among some white people” especially among young people, many Irish in Britain and Scottish in Scotland (2005a: 196). Elsewhere, he contends that the term itself still remains problematic at the discursive level, with different arguments from both right and left. On the right, Britishness is understood on the basis of the notion that “non-white people are not really British and that Muslims are an alien wedge”. Meanwhile, on the left, some argue that rallying round the idea of Britain and defining oneself in terms of a normative concept of Britishness is wrong on the basis that such attempts reinforce racism or elitism and that

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“the goal of seeking to be British….is silly and dangerous, and indeed demeaning to the newly settled groups among the population” (Modood, 2005b). With this brief background on the discussion of British Muslims and the question of identity, I will now proceed with the presentation of findings. Ultimately, I hope to integrate the findings with the politics of recognition which frames this whole study.

2. British Muslims and Integration into British society As far as the representation of Islam and British Muslims is concerned, there are four related narratives in the studied papers: the question of integration and the critique of multiculturalism, faith schools and the advancement of integration, Muslim and Christian relations in Britain and the reciprocity argument. Before discussing these narratives, I will briefly explore the frequency of coverage of Islam and British Muslims in the studied media.

a) Distribution of Texts with Reference to Islam and British Muslims The frequency of coverage of Islam and British Muslims is smaller, relatively, than the coverage of Islam and Muslims in relation to international events. Of the total texts included in this study (N=1357), there are only 115 texts that specifically refer to Islam and Muslims in a British context. Most of these texts are published in Church Times (60 texts or 52.2%) and The Tablet (34 texts or 29.6%). Studies on the British mainstream media indicate otherwise: Islam and British Muslims occupy a larger volume of coverage in British mainstream media reporting. The study of Moore et al. (2008) on the representations of British Muslims in the British media from 2000 to the end of May 2008, for example, indicates that during the period of their study, there were around 23,000 stories related to British Muslims. The small volume of reporting on British Muslims in the British Christian media is not really surprising. The main reason is that the British Christian media seem to be more interested in reporting about minority Christians living in Muslim-majority countries, as indicated in chapters 4 and 5, while assuming that their readerships are mostly Christians. Therefore, international events occupy more space in these media in comparison to the local coverage of British Muslims. Besides, given the fact the studied media are weekly and monthly print

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media, it makes sense to expect a smaller volume of coverage than in the daily papers. Even though the number of texts is relatively small in quantitative terms, thematically the issues of Islam and British Muslims raised in the studied papers reflect the public issues in Britain that generally appear in the British Christian media. This includes issues around Islam-related events in Britain such as the events of 7 July 2005 and the discussion of the veil, the question of Muslim integration into British society, the politics of multiculturalism and particular reports concerning faith-based schools. There is, however, a theme that is addressed more in the British Christian media, as compared to the British mainstream media, namely the interfaith initiatives in the British context. Based on the importance of these themes, a discursive analysis promises a better understanding of how Islam and British Muslims are represented. The following sections will deal with this analysis.

b) Integration and Multiculturalism Critique of multiculturalism The question of British Muslim integration into British society is formulated around the notion of ‘Britishness’ or ‘being British’ and the politics of multiculturalism. An article by Patricia Chadwick, published in Church Times on 6 October 2000, summarises the attitudes towards multiculturalism. First, there are those who argue that multiculturalism is a threat to the values and culture of Western society, particularly Christianity. Second, there are those who argue that all those who wish to live in Britain “must be assimilated, accept the norms of this society, and adapt their customs to fit in with British culture”. Third, there are those who are in favour of integration, and suggest that people of other cultures can maintain their own cultures and traditions while recognising the majority culture. In short, there are various segments for understanding multiculturalism and a vision for a multiethnic Britain. It should be clarified here that the political idea of multiculturalism is based upon the argument of recognising group difference “within the public sphere of laws, policies, democratic discourses and the terms of a shared citizenship and national identity” (Modood, 2007a: 2). What does recognising group difference within the notion of multiculturalism really mean? As contended by Modood, recognition of group difference assumes the right to integrate with the dominant culture but, at the same time, the right to preserve one’s uniqueness. This is because participation in the public

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culture makes the exercise of citizenship effective, and recognition of a group’s difference makes integration more possible. Therefore, although there is always a tension between the ideas of participating in the public culture and cultivating minority identities, the balanced pragmatic way of dealing with such a tension is “finding and cultivating points of common ground” (Modood, 1997: 20). In his book Islam in Britain: past, present and the future, Mohammad S. Raza explains the streams of assimilationist, isolationist and integrationist thinking with regard to the views of British Muslims about the majority community around them (1991). Without critically discussing this model of classification, for the purposes of the presentation of the current findings, our data indicate that articles in the studied media give greater attention to ‘integrationist’ and ‘isolationist’ streams. The events of 9/11 and the bombings in Bali, Madrid and London are often used as a basis. The 7/7 London bombings accelerated a critical view of the integrationist and separatist approaches. Interestingly, the representation of Muslims in this context is narrowed, and aimed only at ‘young British Muslims’. In relation to the politics of multiculturalism, the involvement of ‘young British Muslims’, born and bred in Britain, in the London bombings is considered to be the result of the failure of multiculturalism. A number of editorials in The Tablet go even further, naming the young British Muslims as ‘orphans of multiculturalism’ or ‘cultural orphans’. The explanation given to back up this claim sounds very sociological. According to these articles, young British Muslims or Asians are in a transition period where they find it difficult to follow the culture of their parents but at the same time are not yet ready to integrate with British culture. This brings out the question of identity or the sense of self which is generally validated by membership of a group, or affiliation with a culture or religion. When religious identity is considered, “Muslim identity and British identity have been felt not as complementary but as pulling in opposite directions”. In search of identity, they find the umma concept (Muslim community) to be the one which can provide an answer to the question of their Islamic identity. The following extracts from The Tablet articulate these points: “The revelation of the failure of multiculturalism following the 7 July bombs was particularly shocking because the British born and bred bombers had appeared to be well educated and perfectly integrated, socially and professionally….[I]n fact, multiculturalism is less of an ideology than a pragmatic solution….[I]t led to the ambiguous and lax policy towards extremist Muslim leaders” (Editorial, 17 September 2005).

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“We have a generation of young Muslims who are in a sense the orphans of multiculturalism, identifying with neither their parent community nor the wider British community. A few of them have succumbed to the offer of a new sense of identity as members of the so-called…“world Muslim nation” or ummah….” (Editorial, 2 September 2006).

Some articles in Church Times offer a different analysis from that of The Tablet, mainly focusing on ‘Islam’ as a belief system. In the wake of the violent riots in France in 2005, Peter Riddell published an article in Church Times, on 18 November 2005, entitled “France is still right about race integration”, in which he argues that “despite the violent riots, the French opposition to British-style multiculturalism is still the correct way to go”. While acknowledging the efforts of some Muslim organisations to condemn the violent acts, Riddell asks, “So why were Muslim youths at the heart of the problems?” Responding to this question, he contends that “[T]he answer lies in a recognition of the incompatibility between the Islamic faith, which sees itself as applying in all areas of life and society, and the secular states of Europe, which are founded on the notion that religious faith belongs to the private domain.” In the context of Britain, he then suggests that for British Muslims to be better integrated, “it may even be necessary to monitor Muslim immigration until such time as the existing minority community is more effectively interwoven into the fabric of British society, and is more accepting of majority values.” The argument proposed here certainly opens a debate on the question of Islam and the secular state. What the writer does not consider is the fact that Muslim scholars, such as Tariq Ramadan and Abdullahi Ahmed An Na’im, have pointed out in their works that to suggest the incompatibility between Islam and the secular state reflects a narrow interpretation of Islam (Ramadan, 2004; An-Na’im, 2008). Moreover, as reflected by Abdullah Saeed, the most important trend taken by Muslim communities today in Western societies is the active way in which they negotiate their faith and culture within the context of local culture. In terms of religious belief, Muslims “are dealing with areas such as rethinking Islam; Muslim identity, Islamic norms and values in the western context, itjihad and the reinterpretation of key Islamic texts, citizenship, functioning in a secular environment, and what it means to be both western and Muslim” (Saeed, 2009: 212). On an empirical level, the 2009 Gallup Poll on “Islam and Integration” even found that most European Muslims adapt to national political structures. The poll suggested that in Germany and Britain, Muslims have more confidence in the courts and the national governments than the general German and British publics (see Bowen, 2010). Based on these arguments, it becomes clear that the suggestion of developing ‘a

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monitoring system’ on Muslim immigration is unrealistic because it will fuel stereotypes and prejudices, and make the integration process more difficult. The Question of loyalty Another issue raised in the discussion of integration is the question of loyalty, based on the argument that integration is necessary to avoid a dual loyalty. An article in Church Times on 3 November 2006 stated that “essentially, the fear of Islam arises from the fear that Muslims are not loyal to the same things as the rest of us.” The issue of loyalty is accompanied by an argument that integration is often threatened by the mindset of separation. Here, the issue of values becomes a central point. An article published in Church Times on 24 November 2006 points out that “our society has always been embedded in Christian values; once you have pulled the anchor up there is a danger that our society moves with the prevailing wind.” The writer then continues, “In the British Muslim community, there is a segment that aims for a parallel existence, deriving from a mindset of separation. This is typically accompanied by a discourse that is very hostile to the host society. Moreover, and even more ironically, such hostility is often directed at Christianity — the very faith that promotes the attitude of welcoming the stranger.”

A different article, published in the same edition of the Church Times, takes the further step of defining such a segment within the Muslim communities. According to this article, “those Muslims who see the majority society as an adversary are typically those reading straight from the page of their holy books. They are committed to calling for the implementation of shariah law among British Muslims”. The Charge of Islamisation of British society Perhaps the line of argument that is most striking in this context of discussion is the idea that the Islamisation of British society has now emerged. This line of argument cannot be found in the articles of Church Times and The Tablet, except in a few quotations of Patrick Sookhdeo, who “warns churches in Britain to guard against pressure from Islam before it is too late” and argues that “churches could lose their buildings if they invite Muslims to worship in them”. Our data suggest that the charge of Islamisation of European or British society is more developed in the articles of Evangelicals Now and Evangelical Times, compared to that of

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Church Times and The Tablet. An article of Sookhdeo appears in Evangelicals Now October 2005 entitled “The Islamisation of Europe”. In this article, he observes that Europe is currently undergoing a rapid process of change in which “Muslims make their presence felt in politics, economics, law, education and the media.” He then suggests that within this rapid transformation, “Islam takes its place……often as the dominant player. This is not purely, or even primarily, a matter of numbers, but is more a matter of control over the structures of society. It does not happen by chance, but is the result of a careful and deliberate strategy by certain Muslim leaders.” According to Sookhdeo, Britain is also going through the same gradual transformation that allows Muslims to Islamise many aspects of life, also affecting the life of non-Muslims. To support this claim, he cites the examples of hallal meat, the wearing of the veil, Islamic law practice, numerous concessions for British Muslims in education and an increasing number of university posts being funded from Saudi Arabia and other Muslim countries. He then makes a claim that the ultimate goal in all these processes is to take control of society. The notion of Islamisation of Europe or Britain is also discussed in Evangelical Times. In the edition of January 2007, Evangelical Times puts a headline on its main page proclaiming “Wake up to Islam”. This was a long report on a conference at Westminster Chapel on 16 November 2006 attended by three hundred Evangelicals. The purpose of the conference itself, as stated in this report, was “to inform and warn about the rapid progress of Islamisation in the UK”. According to this report, most British Muslims are moderates. However, the report claimed that the fact that most Muslims are moderates has not prevented “an accelerating radicalisation of young British Muslims.” While acknowledging the diversity of the Muslim population, it was reported that British Muslims “achieve unity of strategy and action that Christians find hard to emulate” because “they want a territory” in order to increase their “sacred space” with an ultimate goal that “the whole world is a mosque”. Moreover, the report continues by making the claim that there is an ongoing strategy to impact UK culture with ‘Islamic consciousness’ that prepares the way for Islamising various societal institutions such as educational, legal, medical and financial systems. Islam is then characterised as “aggressive and spiritually impoverished ideology”. Unsurprisingly, the proposed solution sounds very evangelical, encouraging the Evangelicals “to take concerted action to plant Christ-proclaiming churches in the Islamic heartlands of Britain”. In fairness, as acknowledged by Bassam Tibi, there is a claim, by one Muslim religious leader, that Europe for Muslim immigrants is dar al-

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Islam (house of Islam). While rejecting this idea, Tibi argues that “there is a place for Islam in Europe as a religious belief, however with a pluralist set-up and not by making out of Europe dar al-Islam (Tibi, 2005: 191192). Tibi’s argument is also echoed by Abdullahi An-Na’im (2008). Turning back to our discussion, how do we consider the arguments made, particularly in the evangelical media, about the rapid development of the Islamisation of Europe and Britain? First of all, responding to the concerns about churches being turned into mosques, perhaps the answer of Brother Andrew, who is in charge of the Open Doors, can be quoted here. In an interview published in Evangelicals Now in March 2005, he was quoted as saying that “[I]n our countries, Islam is not a threat as yet but it is a challenge that we are not accepting. If we do not accept a challenge, it turns into a threat. Sometimes people come to my office and they are very upset: ‘Oh, the Muslims have bought another empty church, and they have converted it into a mosque, isn't that terrible!’ No, that's not terrible, what's terrible is that the church was empty.”

Second, on a broader level, analysts have argued that the contention of the Islamisation of Europe or Britain is basically born out of a culture of fear that contains both the fear of losing the ‘status quo’ and the fear of change, simply because for the West today, the present is worse than the past, while the future is uncertain and, at the same time, ‘the White man’s burden seems to have transformed to the White man’s loneliness’. Or, to use Sayyid’s term, what we witness today is the intensity of “the decentring of the West” (2003: vi). Arjun Appadurai discusses the notion of cultural fear from a different perspective, calling it “fear of small numbers” and claims that “minorities are the major site for displacing the anxieties of many states about their own minority or marginality (real or imagined) in a world of a few megastates, of unruly economic flows and compromised sovereignties. Minorities…are metaphors and reminders of the betrayal of the classical national project” (Appadurai, 2006: 43).

Analysts like Philip Jenkins make a fair observation, in relating the question of Islamisation to that of religion in society. For Jenkins, Europe’s transition to a multifaith society in fact offers important lessons about “the nature of the great faiths and of the changing faces of Christianity” (2007: 283). This is to say that great religions, including Islam and Christianity, have the ability to adapt in a new environment, and believers are capable of living together and learning from each other. A

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Archbishop Rowan Williams makes a somewhat similar point when he observes that “Europe’s distinctive identity…is a ‘liberal’ identity….But the crucial point for the Christian is the conviction that this ‘liberal’ identity is threatened if it does not have, or is unaware of, that perpetual partner which reminds it that it is under higher judgement. Unless the liberal state is engaged in a continuing dialogue with the religious community, it loses its essential liberalism. It becomes simply dogmatically secular, insisting that religious faith be publicly invisible; or it becomes chaotically pluralist, with no proper account of its legitimacy except the positivist one (the state is the agency that happens to have the monopoly of force)” (Williams, 2005; cited also in Jenkins, 2007: 272).

Integration and Muslim Schools Discussion of Muslim schools in Britain relates to the question of integration into British society. The use of the term ‘faith schools’ has in fact mutated from ‘church schools’ or ‘denominational schools’, and the introduction of the term ‘faith schools’ in 2001 is a clear public acknowledgement of the multifaith condition in Britain. The Association of Muslim Schools (AMS) was established on 14 November 1992. Since then, there has been a campaign for state-supported Muslim schools. In 1997, a breakthrough occurred with the British government decision to grant funding, for the first time, to two Muslim schools: the Islamia Primary School in London and the Al-Furqan Primary School in Birmingham. Church Times and The Tablet dedicated a significant number of articles to responding to this event, seeing it as a matter of social justice. Following this event, on 6 February 1998, Church Times published an opinion article entitled “Seen from an Islamic perspective”, written by Ibrahim Hewitt, the Development Officer for the Association of Muslim State Schools. Hewitt argues that “these schools make sense on educational grounds….Questions asked about our schools illustrate the degree of ignorance and prejudice (or both) that surrounds the whole concept of full time education for and by Muslims”. He continues, “We believe children learn more if they are comfortable in their school environment. Sadly, in many state schools young Muslims are under pressure to abandon their faith and conform to the acceptable norm”. Hewitt’s argument is based on the idea of social justice, but also on the need for environments where young Muslims can nurture their Islamic faith and identities. A news report in The Tablet, on 17 January 1998, stated that Catholic educationists welcomed the government’s decision. Richard Zipfel of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales

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was quoted as saying that “far from isolating Muslims from the mainstream of society, it is an effective way of drawing them into the system, as it was with Catholic Schools”. An article in Evangelical Times March 1998, however, offered an unfavourable view of the government’s decision by quoting Rev. David Streater, Secretary of the Church Society, who argued that “Islam is probably more evangelistic than Christianity itself, and this could be seen as a foot in the door”. Faith-based schools cannot avoid public scrutiny. Even so, on the question of integration, Muslim schools have been scrutinised more than other faith-based schools. A good number of articles in Church Times and The Tablet present the negative views of the general public concerning Muslim schools, and propose various arguments attempting to debunk such views. Generally, negative views about Muslims schools are based on the arguments that Muslim schools help to entrench social and cultural divisions, encourage the separatist approach, are lacking intellectual curiosity, promote ignorance, hatred, isolation and even fundamentalism. I present here two cases covered in the studied media: the remark of the Chief Inspector of Schools, David Bell in January 2005 and the arguments of Kenneth Baker in relation to the passing of the Education and Inspection Bill in 2006. Firstly, in a remark made in January 2005, David Bell argued that the increasing number of independent faith-based schools could threaten the social cohesion of British society. He warned some Muslim schools in particular that they “must adapt their curriculum to ensure that it provides pupils with a broad general knowledge of public institutions and services in England, and helps them to acquire an appreciation of and respect for other cultures in a way that promotes tolerance and harmony”. The studied media, particularly Church Times and The Tablet, note that a number of religious leaders and educators indeed came up to defend the faith-based schools, particularly the Muslim schools. Canon John Hall, the Chief Education Officer for the Church of England, points out in his article published in Church Times, on 11 February 2005, that a charge similar to Bell’s is often promoted by the media, underlining the notion that “Muslims cannot really be British, and that Muslim schools can therefore promote only division and segregation”. Judging such a notion, Hall stresses that this kind of charge against Muslim schools is not that different from attitudes towards Roman Catholics and towards Roman Catholic schools in the past. He argues that “[I]t is true that Roman Catholic schools have made a major contribution to the community and cohesion in Britain by giving their pupils a good education based on Catholic belief and values. They have not promoted segregation….What was true in the past of Catholic schools could be true

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in the future of Muslim schools”. Hall’s point is not merely a historical parallel between Catholic schools and Muslim schools. He also challenges the untested assumption that if Muslims sent their children to public schools, these children would be well-integrated as a result. Secondly, during the Education and Inspections Bill debate in 2006, Kenneth Baker called for more inclusion in faith schools. Just before the bill returned to the House of Lords for debate on 17 October 2006, Church Times published Lord Baker’s opinion article entitled “Act now to stop ‘social disaster’ of faith schools”, in its 29 September 2006 edition. In the article, Lord Baker explained his argument for more inclusion in schools with a religious character: “For most of our country’s [Britain’s] history, the only faith schools supported by the state were Anglican and Roman Catholic. But the argument grew, over time, that other faiths should also be allowed their schools, and in 1997 the Government welcomed applications for new, exclusive faith schools. This…was mistake….[T]here are now two Sikh, one Hindu, one Greek Orthodox, six Muslim, and several Jewish faith schools. All of these are exclusive…. The selection criteria of Muslim schools make it absolutely clear that they will accept only children of the Muslim faith”.

Lord Baker then relates ‘the exclusiveness’ of Muslim schools to the notion of extremism. Again, Canon John Hall responds that Lord Baker’s fears cannot be justified. He backs up this response by suggesting that what drives young Muslims to extremism or to terrorism is “...a profound sense of dislocation from the surrounding community. That sense of dislocation is not likely to be fuelled by education at a school where the faith and values cohere with those of the family and the worshipping community. It could be fuelled, however, by education at a school that treated pupils’ Muslim faith and values as of marginal importance, or required them to be left at the school gate. Moreover, a national policy that refused the inclusion of Muslim schools in the maintained system….would enhance the risk by effectively demonstrating that it is difficult to be fully British and fully Muslim.”

Canon Hall has consistently held a position which is critical of those who associate Muslim schools with extremism and terrorism. In an article published in Church Times on 26 August 2005 in the wake of 7/7 events, entitled “Muslim schools are a good thing” he explains that on the basis of his visits to minority-faith schools, he knows that the minority-faith schools are admirable in their aims and ethos. Mohamed Mukadam, the chairman of the Association of Muslim Schools, makes a similar claim.

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According to Mukadam, young Muslims need “a stable environment in order to develop their identity as Muslim in a creative way. The bombers went to state schools, not Muslim schools. We are not in the business of turning out little terrorists”. The AMS, as reported in Church Times on 29 September 2006, was aware of the public impression that “Muslim schools are isolationist and fuelled by a fundamentalist agenda”. This organisation launched its own community cohesion programme, designed to help young Muslims and other young people who are challenged by the identity dilemma around the issue of ‘Englishness’ and ‘Britishness’. In the same edition, Church Times published an opinion article by Mukadam, in which he contends that “most clear-thinking people would accept that schools can only be considered as good if they produce good citizens. Muslim schools……produce good citizens of this country”. According to Mukadam, this argument is based upon the reports and assessment records of Ofsted, which indicate clearly that Muslim schools successfully address the problems associated with faith and identity, nurture a high level of discipline and respect, have high level achievement and that graduates from faith schools tend to be better at integrating and participating in college, university, and in the workplace. The above discussion indicates how complicated the question of integration is in relation to faith-based schools. It is also interesting to ask how integration can be measured. Canon Alan Billings wrote an article in the Church Times, published on 29 September 2006, in which he presents and discusses the first findings of the Burnley Project survey of Lancaster University in 2006 on young people’s social attitudes. This survey involved two groups of students from two schools: 125 young white people from a school in Burnley and 159 from a school in Blackburn which is 96% Asian and almost exclusively Muslim. Billings’s article was entitled “A new generation of supremacists”. The findings of the survey are quite surprising in terms of measuring a general appreciation of the differences. On the one hand, the survey indicates that 96% of the Asian young people said that they had received a religious upbringing and had embraced fundamental liberal values which included respect for others, a willingness to listen and a willingness to learn about the faith of others. On the other hand, the survey indicated that the white young people showed considerable intolerance, such as a reluctance to learn about other faiths. Based on the data, Billings makes the important point that “if we assume that the values and opinions of the young people reflect those of their families, then it seems reasonable to suggest that the great majority of British Muslims are at home with British values of tolerance, fairness, and respect for the law and for democracy.”

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This indicates that it is arguably naïve only to address the question of integration in terms of faith-based schools or ethnic minority groups. While integration needs a clear definition, assuming that certain citizens are well integrated can lead to a certain degree of exclusion of various segments from the public space and the dictation of public policies, and encourage stereotypes and prejudices. Tackling the Stereotyping of Muslims The studied media, particularly Church Times and The Tablet, consistently report on the disadvantages to Muslims, including the stereotypes and prejudices experienced by Muslims while remaining critical of young Muslims involved in various violent attacks. In the previous section, we noted the first two voluntary aided Muslim schools. These papers reported that the fight of Muslims for state-funded Muslim schools provides an example of the many disadvantages experienced by Muslims. In a report published in its edition of 5 October 2001, Church Times claimed that during the first half of the 1990s, the government opened the door for independent schools to apply to become grantmaintained. While the applications of a few schools were approved, none of the Muslim schools’ applications were approved until the end of the 1990s. With the emergence of the ‘Islamic terrorism’ discourse, hostility towards Muslims increased. Following the events of 9/11 and 7/7 bombings, the public and the mainstream media clearly referred to Islam as a threat, as pointed out in chapters 2 and 5. British Muslims undeniably experienced various prejudices, stereotypes, Islamophobic attacks and even horror and condemnation as Islamic terrorism discourse dominated the socio-political sphere. The mainstream media clearly separated the great majority of British Muslims from the terrorists, but continued publishing negative images of Islam. In its edition of 29 September 2009, The Tablet published an article by Ahmed Versi, the editor of the Muslim News. In this article, Versi shares what mainstream Muslims in Britain experience. He points out that after the attacks on the US twin towers, hate was directed towards Muslims and hundreds became victims of Islamophobic attacks. Giving details, Versi describes the hostility towards Muslims as follows: “They are verbally abused, called ‘murderers’, ‘killers’….Many have been physically attacked….Mosques have been firebombed, bricks and pigs’ heads thrown through their windows”. The same kind of attacks intensified following the 7/7 London bombings. In a situation in which Muslims face various Islamophobic attacks, articles in The Tablet share solidarity with Muslims in calling what Islam

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and British Muslims go through ‘alienation’. Interestingly, when alienation and Islamophobic attacks on British Muslims are addressed, articles in The Tablet employ a historical analogy by comparing the experiences of British Muslims and the experience of Catholics experiencing prejudices, stereotypes and attacks in the past. By referring to Catholicism’s experience in Britain, articles in The Tablet suggest that Catholicism’s experience of how “a faith community established itself in a protestant state” could be a model for acceptance and respect of Muslims in Britain and also a model for British Muslims to learn how to integrate within British society. Therefore, the suggestion is that Islam and British Muslims could learn from the experience of Catholicism and British Catholics, and that Catholics could help and sympathise with Muslims with regard to the notion of integration into British society and values. The following quotations precisely echo this idea: “Catholics, who have suffered from that intolerance in the past, should sympathise with them [Muslims]. The integration of Catholics into mainstream British society may also offer a lesson as to how it is possible for a religious minority to assimilate” (The Tablet’s editorial, 10 January 2004). “As the Muslim community faces barely concealed suspicion or even downright disgust, it seems that the only other community to have stood in that place in Britain is Catholic ….[F]or several centuries Catholics were regarded as the agents of a foreign power, their loyalty to the British state was questioned…What many British Muslims want to know is: how did Catholicism make itself British?” (The Tablet’s editorial, 30 July 2005).

Based on these historical parallels, articles in The Tablet argue for ‘a British model of Islam’. This proposal mainly deals with the ‘instruction of faith’ in which articles in The Tablet advocate the need for ‘Britisheducated role-models to lead and to instruct’ young British Muslims in faith. In saying this, The Tablet’s texts point to what they call ‘ill-trained imams’ imported from other countries or ‘imams for British mosques from the Indian sub-continent’. The solution proposed is ‘to give future imams’ a British-style education. Reports in Evangelicals Now and Evangelical Times take a slightly different approach. Evangelical Times published a report in August 2001 about the violence by young Muslims towards non-Muslim pensioners in Oldham, headlined “Islamophobia in Oldham.” This report points out that the police took little action in this case, because of political correctness. Having stated this, the reporter expresses the opinion that “Muslims must recognise that not all ‘islamophobic stereotypes’ are unjustified.” To

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support this argument, the reporter presents some claims. First, Christian witness is banned in many Muslim countries, yet British Muslim leaders rarely condemn such practices. Second, Oldham’s Muslim violence and ‘no-go’ areas fuel images of Muslims as violent bigots. Third, whereas the earlier immigrant generation was passive in the face of racist abuse, contemporary Muslim youth retaliates. Fourth, the Mullahs are unable to relate to the special problems and temptations faced by British Muslim youth. Responding to the notion of ‘Islamophobia’, Evangelicals Now dedicate more space to the discussion of this term by proposing counterterms such as ‘Westophobia’ and ‘Churchophobia’. An article published in November 2000, for example, states that “…the phenomenon of Islamophobia cannot be divorced from the prevalence of Westophobia in Muslim countries and among Muslims in Britain….Westophobia also leads on to another similarly understudied phobia - Churchophobia.” From the above presentation, it is clear that articles in Church Times and The Tablet offer more sympathy to Muslims who experience prejudice and stereotyping. These two papers also give space to Muslim writers. Articles in Evangelicals Now and Evangelical Times give more attention to how Westophobia and Churchophobia have developed within the Muslim communities, while suggesting that some ‘Islamophobic stereotypes’ can be justified.

c) Christian and Muslim Relations The representation of Islam and Muslims within the discourse of interfaith dialogue has already been discussed in Chapter 3. This section concentrates specifically on initiatives to strengthen Christian and Muslim relations in Britain. A general list of various initiatives concerning Christian and Muslim relations can be seen in Table 4. The initiatives to strengthen Christian and Muslim relations take various forms, such as conferences, debates, seminars, multifaith meetings and joint statements by religious leaders. At the grassroots level, there have been community meetings, communal worship and Christian-Muslim community organising.

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Table 4: A selection of various initiatives concerning Christian and Muslim relations DATE

TOPIC

EVENT, PLACE AND PARTICIPANTS

Oct 1998

“People of Faith in Britain Today and Tomorrow”

An organised conference by the Faith and Society Group held at the Islamic Foundation in Leicestershire, attended by Christians and Muslims.

Oct 1999

“Seeking the Common Good”

An organised annual meeting by the Faith and Society Group held in Birmingham, attended by Christians and Muslims.

Oct 2000

“Faiths in Society: A Challenge to Policy Makers”

An organised conference by the Faith and Society Group held at the Carlisle Business Centre in Bradford.

2001

Establishment of a joint Christian-Muslim Planning Group at Lambeth Palace, London.

2002-2003

The Christian-Muslim Planning Group conducted a series of visits to various cities and towns in England.

Jan 2002

“Christians and Muslims Face to Face”

The ‘Building Bridges’ Seminar held at Lambeth Palace in London, attended by 40 prominent Christians and Muslims.

Mar 2003

Multifaith meeting called by the Watford International Faith Association.

Apr 2003

The ‘Building Bridges’ Seminar held in Qatar, attended by 15 Christian scholars and 15 Muslim scholars.

Jun 2003

“Faith-full Citizens: Christians and Muslims in Britain”

An organised conference by the Faith and Society Group held at the London Central Mosque and Islamic Cultural Centre in London.

2003

Catholic-Shi’a dialogue conference held at the Jesuit Heythrop College in London and Ampleforth Abbey.

Jan 2004

The establishment of Christian-Muslim Forum.

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May 2005

The ‘Building Bridges’ Seminar held in Sarajevo.

2006

The Formation of Christian-Muslim Dialogue Group in Bradford.

Mar 2006

“Justice and Rights”

The “Building Bridges” Seminar held in Washington DC.

Nov 2006

Imams and Ministers Conference (organised by the Christian-Muslim Forum).

Jan 2007

Christian-Muslim Women’s Retreat (organised by the Christian-Muslim Forum).

Dec 2007

The “Building Bridges” Seminar held in Singapore

The websites of the Church of England, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales and the UK Evangelical Alliance publish various documents concerning ChristianMuslim relations. Among others, there are materials that cover basic information about Islam, introduction to dialogue with Muslims and practical guidelines when visiting a mosque. Besides, structurally these churches form various interfaith dialogue committees on every level, including the appointment of Diocesan Interfaith Relations Advisers, particularly within the Church of England and the Catholic Church. The Church of England, for example, states the purpose of “Interfaith Relations and Presence and Engagement” in this manner: “The Church of England, in partnership with other Christian churches, seeks to build up good relations with people of other faith traditions, and where possible to cooperate with them in service to society.” The Roman Catholic Church develops the notion of interfaith dialogue on essentially the same basis. One gesture of the Catholic Church that is quite notable is the Pope’s regular Eid greetings, addressed to Muslims all over the world at the end of the Month of Ramadan. This message normally reaches the Muslim community, the mosques and local community organisations. The notion of interfaith dialogue has also captured the attention of Evangelical Churches. The Revd. Joel Edward, the former General Director of the UK Evangelical Alliance, addressed this in a 2008 interview: “I think we are still afraid of inter-faith dialogue. Ecumenism is now an old hat, although a very significant number of Evangelicals are involved in

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The importance of Christian-Muslim relations is noticeable in the British Christian media, in reports on interreligious meetings or conferences and articles on the interreligious dialogue in Britain. The 1998 Lambeth Conference of the Anglican Communion gave particular attention to other faiths, including Islam. In a news report concerning the conference, published in Church Times on 7 August 1998, it is stated that “dialogue remained necessary, and it was not just for academics nor even religious leaders, but neighbours and work colleagues”. The purpose of dialogue is often questioned, particularly when dialogue involves believers of different religions and religious traditions. The same report indicates that the Lambeth conference acknowledged that there could be no ‘mission’ without dialogue, and that conversion was valued but that proselytism was unacceptable. In fact, one of the resolutions proposed by the interfaith team in the Lambeth 1998 conference was that “there is no place in the Anglican communion for material inducements, psychological pressure, or the targeting of individuals or groups”. Indeed, many have argued that rather than theological dialogue, attempts for interfaith dialogue should give more attention to personal relationships at the human level, based on respect for human dignity. The argument behind this proposal is that there are so many differences to be dealt with in theological dialogue and that theological dialogue may even create a trap for falling into religious or cultural relativism. Perhaps the letter of 138 Muslim scholars in 2007 addressed to Pope Benedict XVI and Christian leaders is one modern major initiative from the Muslim world for a theological dialogue between Muslims and Christians. The studied media pay a great deal of attention to this letter, as discussed in Chapter 3. Compared to Church Times and The Tablet, it is only Evangelicals Now and Evangelical Times that cover the debates between Muslims and Christians (Evangelicals) on a number of occasions and meetings. This includes the debates between Jay Smith and Sheikh Omar Bakri Muhammad of Al-Muhajiroun in November 1999, Keith Small and Shabir Ali in March 2000 and Jay Smith and Azzam Tamimi of the London-based 1

This interview was published in the Christian Today. Available online at http://www.christiantoday.co.uk/article/joel.edwards.on.agenda.for.change.and.reh abilitating.evangelicalism/18688.htm

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Institute of Islamic Political Thought in January 2003. The debates cover the theological stands but also address the past ‘encounter’ or ‘conflict’ between Muslims and Christians. These debates seem to be a matter of stating the stand taken by a religion, in this case Christianity and Islam, rather than finding common ground for dialogue. This does not necessarily mean that there is no effort to seek more positive dialogue. In a report headlined “Meetings for better understanding” in its January 2005 edition, Evangelicals Now reports that there have been a number of helpful meetings between Christians and Muslims, including a meeting with an imam in London. The report explained that the discussion was held in a friendly atmosphere, in order to find an ecumenical dialogue or interfaith dialogue towards mutual understanding on various issues, such as marriage and doctrine. The coverage of such debates explains the approach taken by Christian evangelicals. In general, it could be pointed out here that Churches develop their own ways or policies concerning the Christian-Muslim interaction (Riddell, 2004: 211-213). Generally, traditional and liberal protestant churches represented in the World Council of Churches and the Roman Catholic Church engage with Muslim communities but tend to ignore interaction with radical Muslim groups. Only Christian evangelicals choose to develop traditional missions and engage in debates with radical Islamists, as already explained, although it is not always clear for what purpose these debates were organised.

d) The argument of reciprocity In dealing with British or European Muslims, the argument of reciprocity is included in the reports and articles of all the studied media. This argument is often used by high level leaders of Christian churches. The point of this argument is based upon the idea of religious freedom, and therefore calls for advocacy on behalf of Christian minorities in Muslim-majority countries. Cardinal Francis Arinze of the Catholic Church, the former president of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, argues that “The right to religious freedom…applies wherever there is human being. People of the majority religion in a country should not therefore deny to religious minorities in that country the very freedom of religion that they claim for their coreligionists in another country where they are in the minority. This is what reciprocity is all about. In order to build for peace, we need the acceptance and practice of reciprocity” (Arinze, 2002: 134; cited in Riddell 181).

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Cardinal Arinze’s concerns were also the concern of the former Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr George Carey, who explains that “During my time as archbishop, this was my constant refrain – that the welcome we have given to Muslims in the West, with the accompanying freedom to worship freely and build their mosques, should be reciprocated in Muslim lands” (cited in Riddell 2004: 181). Indeed, the articles in the studied media are critical of the hostility of Muslims towards Christians in Muslim-majority countries, as already presented in chapter 6. In voicing the intolerant attacks towards Christians, the studied media employ the reciprocity argument as a reminder, particularly for Muslim communities in Britain or in the West, on the grounds that “Western and Christian acceptance of Muslim religious freedom requires Muslims to recognise Christian religious freedom”. In the wake of global protests responding to Pope Benedict’s Regensburg lecture, an editorial in The Tablet on 23 September 2006 uses the reciprocity argument to argue for more mutual understanding. This editorial proposes that “just as Catholics should try to understand Islamic sensibilities, Muslims should be prepared to answer painful and difficult questions. They also need to heed the Pope’s justifiable request for more reciprocity: religious freedom for Muslims in the West must be matched by religious freedom for Christians in the East”. The argument of reciprocity is also used when immigration and the spreading of Islamic faith are discussed. Responding to these issues, particularly in the context of Italy, Giacomo Cappuzzi, the emeritus Bishop of Lodi in Italy contends: “Let them [Muslims] come to Italy. Their intention to spread Islam is their right too, just as we Christians have the right to proclaim Christ throughout the world” (The Tablet 21 October 2000). In the wake of the plan to build a mosque in the Northern Italian town of Lodi in 2000, the then Vatican Secretary of State, Cardinal Angelo Sodano, expressed a relatively similar argument to that of Cappuzzi. Sodano argues that “Muslims have the right to build a mosque in the Northern Italian town of Lodi….but Christians have an equal right to build Churches in Saudi Arabia….. So far this is not possible” (The Tablet 28 October 2000). Very often the reciprocal argument is addressed to Muslim leaders or scholars in Britain. In the events of the teddy row in Sudan, an article in Church Times on 7 December 2007 argues that this event represents a unique moment for Muslim leaders in Britain “to behave as if they were British as much as they were Muslim”. In other words, the writer of this article considers that Muslim leaders have a moral responsibility to address the row. Articles in Evangelicals Now take the reciprocal argument to another level when discussing the notion of Islamophobia

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versus Westophobia or Churchophobia, as pointed out earlier. The argument developed in these articles is that Islamophobia cannot be ‘divorced’ from Westophobia or Churchophobia in Muslim countries and among Muslims in Britain, for a number of reasons: Muslim phobic criticism of the West goes far beyond opposition to Western policies towards the Muslim world; discrimination of Christian minorities in Islamic countries are not addressed seriously by Muslim leaders in the West; Christians in Muslim-majority countries are not given the same rights and freedom as those enjoyed by Muslim minorities in the West. The reciprocal argument can certainly facilitate efforts to bring peaceful coexistence on a global level. Besides, the voice of Western or Christian advocacy for the rights of minority groups and religious freedom in Muslim-majority countries is understandable. However, such an argument cannot be used in reverse, to justify the idea that since Christians in Muslim-majority countries do not enjoy religious freedom, then Muslims in Western societies should be denied their rights. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im suggests that the call for upholding all human rights, including religious freedom, should be ‘a global joint-venture’ through which “religious freedom can neither be advanced in isolation of other fundamental human rights nor sustained by imperial imposition” (2010). Similarly, the call for Muslim leaders or scholars in the West for advocacy on behalf of Christians in Muslim-majority countries does make sense. However, such a call should be accompanied by a clear understanding that Islam is not a monolithic religion as, just like Christianity, it is internally diverse. Moreover, the efforts and the challenges faced by Muslim reformists in the West are often overlooked. What the general public does not fully realise is the fact that reformist Muslim thinkers and leaders often go through various unfavourable challenges inside and outside Muslim communities. Take Tariq Ramadan, one of the most prominent Muslim thinkers in Western society, as an example. Outside of Muslim communities, he was once described as ‘the Muslim Martin Luther’ but also as an ‘Islamic militant’. Others see him as an ‘open’ and ‘moderate’ Muslim while some see him as a potential ‘supporter of terrorism’ or ‘extremist’. Within Muslim communities, he even faces charges such as being called “akafir (disbeliever), a murtad (apostate) or an impostor, seeking to adulterate Islam and destroy it from within” (Ramadan, 2010). In short, the reciprocal argument needs to take into account both cultural or religious structure, and the motivation that lies behind a reciprocal demand.

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3. Discussion: Identity Affirmation, Historical Parallels and Reciprocal Argument The representation of Islam and British Muslims in the British Christian media raises the following questions: Does recognition require identity affirmation? Is recognition easier when two or more communities share historical parallels? Is reciprocity a requirement to advance recognition?

a) Identity Affirmation As already indicated, particularly in chapter 3, Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth argue that our identities require recognition by others and “are formed in dialogue with others, in agreement or struggle with their recognition of us” (Taylor, 1992: 45-46; see also Honneth, 1995). In fact, recognition and dialogue involve an ongoing process, to the point that the more intense the process, the more internalised the differences become, and therefore the uniqueness of the other is embraced and understood (see also chapter 4). However, in order to recognise the identity of the other, the affirmation of one’s identity is necessary. In the context of this study, it could be argued that recognition of British Muslim identity also requires the affirmation of cultural identity in Britain. In other words, the process of integration requires recognition of British Muslim identity but at the same time an affirmation of British cultural identity. The words of Michael Nazir-Ali, the Bishop of Rochester, capture this idea when he argues for the balance between integration and respect for cultural and religious diversity: “It’s not so much for the Churches, but for the nation as a whole, including the Government and Parliament, to recognise the roots of British society. It is impossible to appreciate other cultures or religions unless British roots are also recognised.” This balance is necessary because the absence of cultural identity affirmation and the emergence of ignorance towards cultural and religious diversity make both recognition and dialogue impossible. The affirmation of cultural identity and respect for diversity are not new ideas to British society and Islam. Theoretically, British society has the potential for accommodating and being able to integrate various groups and communities, while giving them a space to live in with their own identities. David Martin makes an interesting observation when he analyses the entry into modernity of Protestant and Catholic countries (Martin, 1978: Chapter 2; see also Baum, 2009: 24-26). In his analysis, Martin argues that since Protestantism has many churches and internal

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divisions, protestant societies therefore exemplify pluralism and do not produce hostility towards various denominations. Catholicism, in contrast, has the tendency to foster totality. This means that when a single doctrine is rejected, what is rejected is not only this single doctrine but the whole system. Following this theory, it could be argued that as a ‘protestant’ society, Britain has the potential to give space to pluralism, and therefore the potential for the integration of different communities. Historically, Islam has the same record of openness to different circumstances, cultures and environment. As indicated by Khalil Samir Khalil, “Islam was strongest and able to conquer when, in the 10th century, it opened itself to other cultures, in particular Greek culture, assimilating it and surpassing it. It thus offered the world its contribution in almost all sectors of knowledge, from philosophy to medicine, from technology to astronomy, etc.” (2006).

b) Historical Parallels Considering the stereotypes and prejudices of Muslims and the experience of Muslims in general, the studied media, particularly Church Times and The Tablet, offer a historical parallel between the experience of Muslims in today’s Britain and Catholics in the past. How can these historical parallels be considered in relation to the question of integration? In fact the historical parallels between these communities do not only involve the integration of Muslims into British society. Gregory Baum (2009) develops an argument that as far as a religious response to modernity is considered, Islam and Muslims today in fact go through a similar experience to that which the Catholic Church has gone through. According to Baum, in the 19th century this church objected to the ideas of modernity and human liberty. The reason for this was that approving modernity appeared to simply mean providing and making room for people in error. In other words, the refusal of modernity and human liberty was seen as the right way to rescue people from error. But after the universal declaration of human rights by the UN, under the leadership of Pope John XXIII, this church decided to reread its Holy texts and the signs of the times in order to affirm the high dignity of human kind. The Tablet’s editorial on 8 July 2006 echoes the same argument, concerning the renewal within Catholicism: “A hundred years ago, convinced that the modern world was a threat, the Church then - like fundamentalist Muslims now - was implacably opposed to democracy, religious tolerance and human rights. Now, thanks to the teachings of the Second Vatican Council and Pope John XXIII, it has no hesitation in standing up for them.”

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In fact, Tariq Ramadan identifies a similar tendency in Islam, when he states that over the past thirteen centuries, most Islamic scholars and Muslims around the world have adapted to new environments and changing times including integrating aspects of new cultures, producing legal opinions for the latest scientific or technological challenges, while remaining strictly devoted to Islamic fundamental principles (Ramadan, 2010). The point here is that religious communities, both Muslim and Catholic, have historically proven their ability to adapt and renew themselves to the context of the times, not by compromising their fundamental principles and belief but by rereading and reinterpreting their Holy texts and their religious traditions. In this sense, the point made in The Tablet that Muslims ‘learn’ from the Catholic experience may sound hegemonic, but in fact it offers an example of the ability of religious communities to renew their understandings and to reread ‘their Holy Books’ in a new environment, based on the idea that a new situation presents a new context, and certainly presents new questions.

c) Rethinking the Reciprocal Argument From the above discussion, we can see the relation between recognition and aspects such as identity affirmation and the historical parallels experienced by various communities. In our present condition, the relation between Islam and the West is often characterised in terms of the discussion about religious freedom, particularly in Muslim-majority countries. From the articles of the studied media, we can see that the reciprocal argument is often proposed by religious and political leaders in the West as a call for Muslims and Muslim leaders/scholars to play a more prominent role in advocacy on behalf of Christians in the Muslim-majority countries. How do we consider the reciprocal argument in relation to the question of recognition? Axel Honneth points out that in Hegelian terms, “the reproduction of social life is governed by the imperative of mutual recognition, because one can develop a practical relation-to-self only when one has learned to view oneself, from the normative perspective of one’s partners in interaction, as their social addressee” (1995: 92). This means that “recognition is worthless if it does not come from someone whom one views as deserving recognition” (1995: xviii). To make this imperative mutual recognition possible, according to Honneth, an obligation to reciprocity has to be built into the social relationship. This obligation requires, but does not force, the subjects to recognise one another (1995: 37-38). Honneth’s suggestion for an obligation to reciprocity seems to

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make sense, if agents or subjects involved in a social relationship are governed by the same structure or sphere. What complicates the reciprocal argument in the context of this discussion is that the reciprocal demand is addressed to Muslims and Muslim leaders assuming that Islam has a single structure, or at least a single governing system to facilitate a reciprocal concern. What one may suggest is that reciprocity should not be an obligation, or should not be built into demands for recognition, but rather a moral argument or normative call for advancing global harmony and peaceful co-existence, including advocacy for rights such as religious freedom. The reason is that if reciprocity becomes an obligation, it may turn to be a basis for misrecognition, non-recognition or a justification of stereotypes and prejudices. To give an example, if reciprocity becomes an obligation, one may argue that since Christians in Muslim-majority countries do not enjoy religious freedom, the same freedoms for Muslims in the West should be denied. The question is, what criterion is needed in order to make the reciprocal argument function? According to John Rawls, “the criterion of reciprocity requires that when those terms are proposed as the most reasonable terms of fair cooperation, those proposing them must also think it at least reasonable for others to accept them, as free and equal citizens, and not as dominated or manipulated, or under the pressure of an inferior political or social position” (Rawls, 1999: 137). Here, reciprocity cannot be exclusively used as a condition for recognising ‘the other’. Reciprocity must be discovered in an on-going dialogue that gives room for both struggles and demands for recognition.

4. Summary Since identity and social status require recognition in a continuing dialogue, this dialogue may turn the struggle for recognition into what Gurevitch calls ‘the duel for recognition’ (1994) or what McLuskie understands as ‘consequential critical discourse’ (2007: 20). Therefore, it could be argued that if identities and social status are formed through dialogue, then identity affirmation provides a basis for recognition. Historical parallels may inform us about the potential of various communities for adapting and integrating in a new environment. It should be noted, however, that while historical parallels are normally inspirational, the history of a certain community cannot be used as a measure for the possible success story of other communities’ integration. Even so, considering the dynamism of our society, as argued by Charles Taylor, the discovery of identity does not happen in isolation but is negotiated “through dialogue, partly overt, partly internalized, with other”

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(1992: 47). This means that recognition is possible when communities have the space for cultural negotiation and the space to reread and renew cultural contents. Moreover, the discourse of historical parallels of cultures or communities may mediate the struggles for recognition. Taking into account these negotiations in dialogue, reciprocal demand is indeed needed in social relationships. Nevertheless, it cannot be turned into an obligation for the purpose of recognition. The best that can be achieved is that this argument becomes a moral argument for the advancement of a more dialogic space which is appreciative of cultural diversity.

CHAPTER SEVEN CONCLUSION

This study has sought to address the representations of Islam and Muslims in the light of the political theory of recognition. In so doing, it has documented and examined the ways through which Islam and Muslims are represented in the British Christian print media. Moreover, it has articulated how recognition and misrecognition of Islam and Muslims occur within various discourses or narratives, particularly interfaith dialogue (chapter 3), Islamic terrorism (chapter 4), Christian persecution (chapter 5) and British Muslims (chapter 6). In this concluding chapter, I will summarise the ways within which Islam and Muslims are represented in the studied media. In a very general way, a comparison of the representations of Islam and Muslims between the studied media and the British mainstream media will also be presented based on previous studies, as explored in chapter 1. Finally, this concluding chapter will also reflect on the use of the political theory of (mis)recognition that frames this study.

1. Islam and Muslims in the British Christian Print Media From the data and the analysis presented throughout this study, it can be pointed out that there is a significant representation of Islam and Muslims in the British Christian print media. This can be seen in the amount of documents that include reports and discussions about Islam and Muslims and also in the qualitative representations of Islam and Muslims particularly in the discourses that have been the main focuses of this study: interfaith dialogue, Islamic terrorism, Christian persecution and British Muslims. With these various discourses, one may note that the representations of Islam and Muslims in the British Christian media take multiple forms, depending on the discourses within which Islam and Muslims are represented. This is to say that there is no single way of portraying Islam and Muslims. Such multiple forms indicate how complex cultural and religious encounter is, and how complex the representations of Islam and Muslims are. This complexity can be seen in the following general ideas: within the context of interfaith dialogue, the idea of an

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alliance between Muslims and Christians is very strong (chapter 3); Muslims are considered as ‘victims’ in the discourse of terrorism (chapter 4); reversely, Christians are seen as ‘victims’ in their relations to Muslims in Muslim-majority countries where Christians experience persecution (chapter 5); and (British) Muslims are represented favourably when the notion of integration into British society is reported or discussed (chapter 6). This indicates that social interaction is complex, as are the representations of Islam and Muslims in the British Christian media. Theoretically, this complexity provides more space to engage with the questions of perceptions and social interactions without restricting the scope of questions regarding representations of other cultures. Therefore, within the context of representational knowledge, the dilemma between perceptions and social interactions cannot simply be resolved by using the Hegelian approach (Beck, 2010: 191) or by a binary way of thinking that generally shapes the basic premise of theories such as Orientalism, clash of civilisations, racism and Islamophobia. What this study offers is a model of modified recognition that provides an illuminating approach to dealing with the complexity of perceptions and social interactions, by taking into account the contexts of discursive representation, hegemonic struggle and power relations, through which recognition includes a complex strategy of dealing with equivalential identities, demands for recognition and social discrimination. Moreover, this study indicates the significance of religion in the current social interaction and that any political consideration of how different peoples live together cannot ignore the role of religion, not only because religion provides a sense of identity for people but also because religion is part of humanity (Modood, 2010; Beck, 2010). Generally, articles in Church Times and The Tablet express relatively similar ideas in various discourses and so do articles in Evangelicals Now and Evangelical Times even though in cases such as struggles for social justice or moral issues, articles in all the studied media take relatively similar positions. This is probably because Church Times and The Tablet are associated with churches that tend primarily to engage with the majority Muslim traditionalists and modernisers, while Evangelicals Now and Evangelical Times are associated with evangelical Christians that maintain the priority of traditional evangelism, including direct efforts for converting and direct response to the Muslim radical minority (Riddell, 2004: 212-213). Due to this stance, Evangelical Christians are sometimes perceived as Christian ‘hard-liners’. When dealing with Islam and Muslims, texts in Church Times and The Tablet clearly give more focus to seeking common ground with mainstream Muslims and to the question of

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what unites Islam and Christianity or Islam and Western civilisation. Here, by producing the discourse that “Islam and the West are partners”, respect and recognition are not only extended to Muslims but also to Islam, providing a sense of identity and a “spiritual mental map that offers a sense of meaning, guidance, purpose, and hope” for Muslims (Esposito and Mogahed, 2007: 6). Although, in a number of cases, attention is also given to seeking common ground, texts in Evangelicals Now and Evangelical Times tend to explore ‘otherness’, ‘error’ and ‘threat’ and so seem to be more interested in a ‘radical version of Islam’ or Muslim radicals, not for the sake of dialogue but to ‘better know the enemy’. As indicated in the introductory chapter, ideas presented in the articles of the studied media may reflect the approach of various churches towards Islam and Muslims. However, the arguments presented in the articles of the studied media are in no way representative of the official position of these churches towards Islam and Muslims. The official documents of these churches in relation to Islam and Muslims deserve a different study, one that may offer a better understanding on their official position towards Islam and Muslims. The present study is restricted to the representations of Islam and Muslims in the British Christian print media, although documents published in the websites of the Church of England, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales and the UK Evangelical Alliance are also used as secondary data. From the empirical chapters of this study, a number of points stand out as the main findings. These findings will be grouped according to the main focus through which Islam and Muslims are represented.

a) The Discourse of Interfaith Dialogue First, generally, articles in Church Times and The Tablet promote the notion of interfaith or interreligious dialogue, particularly between Christians and Muslims. Dialogue is basically seen as a window for knowing or understanding Islam and Muslims and also as a window for gaining more knowledge and understanding about the Christian faith. Responding to the global events through which Islam and Muslims are at the centre of the Western public sphere, dialogue is seen as a necessity by strongly following the premise that Islam and the West or Islam and Christianity are partners. This idea is supported by the argument that historically, Christendom received its early education in various areas from Islamic civilisation, and Muslim scholars such as Ibn Sina or Avicenna and Ibn Rushd or Averroes shaped the philosophical and

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theological writings of Christian scholars such as Thomas Aquinas. Moreover, there is a strong argument in the articles of Church Times and The Tablet for a search for common ground between Islam and Christianity. Articles in Evangelicals Now and Evangelical Times also propose a search for common ground without calling it an interfaith or interreligious dialogue. However, these papers narrow the interpretation of common ground to a focus on ethical or moral issues. The same theme appears in Church Times and The Tablet. When these issues are discussed, articles in all the studied media are sympathetic towards Islam and Muslims. Islam and Muslims are, therefore, represented in a more favourable way. Second, Church Times and The Tablet regularly report on the interfaith dialogue efforts developed by the Church of England, the Roman Catholic Church and other churches. There are also reports on the initiatives taken by Muslims, such as the well-known letter of 138 Muslim scholars addressed to the Pope and Christian leaders in 2007. In the context of Britain, two major initiatives can be mentioned: the 1998 Lambeth Conference of the Anglican Communion and the ‘Building Bridges’ seminars. In the 1998 Lambeth Conference of the Anglican Communion, interfaith dialogue became a central topic, with special attention given to Muslim and Christian relations. The ‘Building Bridges’ Seminars initiated by the Archbishop of Canterbury have been a unique annual series, bringing Muslim and Christian scholars together in the intensive study of religious texts. On a global level, the late Pope John Paul II of the Roman Catholic Church invited 200 religious leaders from various religions to a ‘pilgrimage for peace’ in Assisi, Italy, on 23 January 2002. At this gathering, religious leaders publicly condemned violence, while stating their commitment to peaceful coexistence Third, while finding common ground on ethical issues and social justice brings Christians and Muslims together, the discourse of ‘interfaith dialogue’ clearly divides. Articles in Church Times and The Tablet embrace the notion of interfaith dialogue as a way forward to maintain a fruitful encounter between Christians and Muslims. This approach seems to be inspired by development of the interfaith dialogue initiatives in the World Council of Churches and the Roman Catholic Church over the years. Articles in Evangelicals Now and Evangelical Times take a different stance, using the argument that Christianity is ‘the true’ religion while representing Islam as ‘a false’ religion. Within this context, Islam and Prophet Muhammad are generally represented unfavourably. This model of representing Islam has consequences when the approach of other Churches, particularly the Roman Catholic Church, to an engagement in

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dialogue with Islam and Muslims is taken into account. This step towards dialogue is branded in a number of articles in Evangelical Times as ‘Vatican’s approval of Islam’ or ‘a falsification of Christianity’. Consequently, the dialogic approach is rejected, based on the argument that “true Christians have to share the Gospel with Muslims” and that by promoting a dialogue with Islam and Muslims, the Roman Catholic Church “did little to bring the Gospel to Muslims”. In 2007, the letter of 138 Muslim scholars addressed to the Pope and Christian leaders all over the world entitled “A Common Word between Us and You” was warmly welcomed by Church Times and The Tablet as a new and important development in the relations between Islam and Christianity or between Muslims and Christians. However, a number of articles in Evangelical Times considered this letter to be part of an ‘ongoing effort to Islamise the Christian world’. Fourth, Church Times and The Tablet provide space for articles, including those written by Muslim writers, which discuss the basic teachings, principles and tradition of Islam. A number of articles also explain various Islamic practices such as the call for prayer, the Holy Month of Ramadan and the recitation of the Holy Qur’an. In relation to Islam, Evangelicals Now and Evangelical Times provide more space for the discussion of theological issues, including dogma and doctrines, generally in a comparative way. These papers also report the debates between evangelicals and radical groups in Islam. The purpose of these debates, however, is unclear, or at least is not stated. Reports on these debates and the content of debates cannot be found in the Church Times and The Tablet. When theological dialogue is considered, discussion of religious figures can unite Muslims and Christians, but can also divide Christian churches within themselves. For example, Christians and Muslims find a meeting point when they talk about Jesus or Isa. The case is different in the discussion of the Blessed Virgin Mary or Maryam. On this point, Catholics find it easy to engage with Muslims but Roman Catholicism and other Christian churches have different internal responses and positions with regard to the Blessed Virgin Mary. Fifth, there is a tendency in all the studied print media to transfer ‘Christian terms’ in order to understand various Islamic practices. While other studied media use the transfer of terminology in passing, articles in The Tablet and Church Times regularly use this approach, particularly in ‘comparing’ seminary to madrassah, the Christian Lenten season to the Holy Month of Ramadan or the idea of sacrament to the Qur’anic recitation. The ‘transfer’ of terminologies is not always followed by an accurate transfer of meaning. Here, Islamic practices are represented

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through a Christian framework, and the understanding of particular religious practices in Islamic formation is developed through the understanding of Christian practices. As a result, there are comparative approaches through which Islam is unfavourably or at least ambivalently represented. For example, when Muslim clerics are represented as men who are not ordained, in the Christian imagination, this may be understood as incomplete authority, since ordination is closely related to the authority of a religious leader in Christianity.

b) The Discourse of ‘Islamic Terrorism’ First, the studied media use terms such as Islamic jihadists, Muslim terrorists, Muslim extremists, Muslim fundamentalists or Islamic radicals when discussing ‘Islamic terrorism’. However, when dealing with acts of terrorism, articles in Church Times and The Tablet are critical towards acts of violence, while avoiding a general association of terrorism with Islam and Muslims. This is achieved by consistently countering the notion of the incompatibility between Islamic and Western civilisations. This position is taken, particularly in the editorials of The Tablet, in response to the discourse of ‘war on terror’, based on the argument that the discourse of ‘war on terror’ does not only justify terrorist attacks but also provokes more wars and dictates domestic and foreign policies. Within the discourse of terrorism, articles in Evangelicals Now and Evangelical Times consider Islam as a religious ideology with a specific “agenda and blueprint that demands total submission of its followers and forcefully imposes its ideology on the world” and therefore allows for the use of terror and violence in order to defend and spread the ideology. Qur’anic verses are often quoted to prove that the Holy Qur’an supports violence. Second, within the discourse of Islamic terrorism, Church Times, The Tablet and Evangelicals Now generally consider Muslims as victims of the hijackers of Islam for political gain. They are also represented as victims of injustice, stereotypes and prejudices born out of the public association of Islam and Muslims with violence, violent attacks and terrorism. This model of representation reflects the general concern towards Muslims, particularly British Muslims. In general, within the discourse of terrorism, the studied media represent Muslims as ‘innocent, peace loving and ordinary people”. In separating the radicals from the rest of Muslims, these papers strategically develop a way of delegitimising the radical networks and therefore separate them from Muslims. Only a number of articles in Evangelical Times represent Muslims unfavourably, in claiming that the extremists are usually hailed as heroes by many Muslims. Moreover, it is

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suggested that Muslims need to be more responsible, by undertaking a critical view of themselves and their religion. Third, drawing on the notions of enlightenment and reformation, articles in the studied media suggest that Islam needs to undergo renewal and reformation. Some articles in Church Times and The Tablet go further, suggesting that Islam needs to go through a process of enlightenment, in the sense of giving space to reason and public discourses in order to recapture the spirit of intellectual enquiry and to gain maturity in faith. An urge for an Islamic enlightenment cannot be found in either Evangelicals Now or Evangelical Times. The reason used in the articles of these papers is based on the argument that enlightenment misguides the understanding of science, and does not provide sufficient grounds for morality and the meaning of life. The articles of Church Times and The Tablet are also critical of the model of enlightenment which only gives space to reason while dismissing the notion of faith. The model that is favourably accepted is the idea of enlightenment in terms of relating faith with reason. Moreover, these articles consider an enlightenment process to be a positive step on the way to a secular state, and a secular state is arguably seen as the best hope and form of government for avoiding extremism. What is meant by ‘secular state’ here is not the liberal or republican model of a secular state, but rather an accommodative model in which “organised religion is treated as a potential public good and/or national resource”, as argued by Modood (2010: 6; see also Tibi, 2005: 191-192). Fourth, Islamophobia emerges as an important issue arising out of various stereotypes, prejudices and hostility towards Muslims, particularly in Western societies. As previously mentioned, this study is limited to the representation of Islam and Muslims in the British Christian media. Therefore, negative stereotypes and prejudices of Muslims towards Christianity and Christians or the Western world are not discussed. Evangelicals Now and Evangelical Times are the only print media that publish articles which consider how Muslims have also developed stereotypes and prejudices towards Christians, Christianity and the Western world. Terms such as Westophobia or Churchophobia are used to explain various examples of hostilities by Muslims towards Christians and Western societies. In short, when dealing with the representation of Islam and Muslims, these print media consider a kind of ‘clash of stereotypes’ within which Islamophobia is challenged with an opposite notion of Westophobia and Churchophobia.

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c) The Discourse of ‘Christian Persecution’ First, in the discourse of Christian persecution, the hostility of Muslims towards Christians dominates the reports of the studied media, particularly the international news. This is related to the reports of religious conflicts or Christian persecution in Muslim-majority countries such as Middle Eastern countries, Northern parts of Nigeria, Sudan, Pakistan, Afghanistan Indonesia and Malaysia. The government regulation of religion is generally applied in some Muslim-majority countries. Within this model of regulation, the application of Islamic Law and other regulations does not only restrict religious freedom but also leads to violent attacks or abuse against Christians and converts from Islam to Christianity, including killings or death penalties. The application of Shari’a Law and Blasphemy Law is particularly seen as a form of Islamisation. It is also criticised for its misuse by Muslims who accuse non-Muslims of blasphemy, even though the case itself may not have any relationship per se to blasphemy. Muslims who are claimed to have misused the law to accuse a non-Muslim are normally unnamed while the non-Muslim ‘victims’, in this case Christians, are usually mentioned by name. This discourse seems to unite all the studied media in their reporting, even though reports in Church Times and The Tablet are often accompanied by quoting Muslim sources or stating further initiatives of dialogue for conflict resolutions. Second, the persecution of Christians that is provoked by the social regulation of religion is often a reaction or response to the government restriction of religion. Sometimes, restrictions of religion tend to be used for social mobilisation against Christians, including the misuse of the law. Reports on the hostility towards Christians include reports on killing, rape cases, forced circumcision, forced genital mutilation, acts of forcing Christian women to marry Muslim men, acts of terrorising converts to Christianity, the burning or bombing of churches, schools, convents and hospitals, and kidnappings. This hostility towards Christians is often attributed to groups such as Muslim jihad warriors, extremist Muslims, Muslim fundamentalists or Muslim youths. Generally, Islam and Muslims are represented unfavourably in this context, following a general perception that “Muslims are against Christians”. Here, Muslims are represented as those who refuse Christian evangelisation and who force Christians to convert to Islam or converts to return to Islam. Third, persecution also occurs in the context of armed conflicts such as in the cases of the Iraq and Afghan wars. In such cases, Christians are often associated with the West or are considered as ‘spies’ or supporters of the USA. The past relationship between Islam and Christianity often contributes to the persecution of Christians. In the context of persecution,

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Christians are therefore considered ‘infidel crusaders’. Conversion is also a big issue that provokes the persecution of Christians. Generally, persecution happens in three ways: Christians are forced to convert to Islam, Christians are accused of converting Muslims to Christianity and converts from Islam to Christianity are forced to ‘restore’ their Islamic faith or face violent actions including death. Interestingly, the studied media are also critical of the efforts of some Christian organisations to convert Muslims. Moreover, there are also attempts of balanced reporting on efforts shown by various Muslim organisations or Muslim leaders in defending Christians or minority groups or speaking out against Muslim militants, and generally encouraging people not to blame Muslims per se for the acts of militants.

d) Islam and British Muslims First, the representations of Islam and British Muslims are framed within the discussion of integration and multiculturalism. Articles in the studied media, particularly in Church Times and The Tablet, generally reject multiculturalism, based on the argument that multiculturalism encourages segregation and racism. Interestingly, these articles maintain the argument of integration of Muslims into British society and defend the rights of Muslims for a socio-cultural space to express their cultural and religious uniqueness. This proposition is backed up by the suggestion that what Muslims now go through - from the question of integration into British society to various prejudices, stereotypes and Islamophobic attacks - is similar to what British Catholics have gone through in the past. On a broader level, these articles even consider the question of Islam and modernity as a question similar to that faced by Roman Catholicism in the 19th century. Based on these historical perspectives, these articles suggest that as a religion, Islam also has the ability to adapt to a new environment while being faithful to its core message. According to these articles, this historical parallel calls for a Christian responsibility to sympathise with Muslims and offers a lesson for Muslims to learn from the Catholics how to integrate into British society. For the possibility of integration, these articles further propose a British style of educating Muslim imams. The historical parallel between the Catholic and Muslim experiences cannot be found in the articles of Evangelicals Now and Evangelical Times. Second, in relation to the notion of faith-based schools, this study found that Anglican and Catholic leaders support the presence of Muslim schools, as expressed in a number of articles in Church Times and The Tablet. These leaders argue that faith-based schools have proved to

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advance the integration of people into British society. It is then suggested that having Muslims schools can facilitate a reliable process of Muslim integration into British society. While articles in Church Times and The Tablet are more sympathetic towards the presence of Islam and Muslims in Britain, articles in Evangelicals Now and Evangelical Times question this presence and relate it to the claim of Islamisation of Britain and Europe. Judging from the tone, however, the idea of Islamisation in these articles is clearly framed in political terms, as seen in the claim that Muslims are ‘conquering Europe’. Interestingly, even though Islamisation is seen as a political move of Muslims to conquer Britain and Europe, articles of Evangelicals Now and Evangelical Times normally turn back to ‘evangelisation’ as a solution, by suggesting that the Islamisation of Britain or Europe can only be faced by ‘bringing the Gospel to Muslims’ or ‘bringing Muslims or Asians to Christ and Christianity’. The notion of Islamisation also appears in some reports of The Tablet, but with a different interpretation. According to these reports, if Islamisation is an act of spreading the Islamic faith, Muslims then have a right to spread their faith just as Christians also have their rights to spread the Christian faith. The conclusion is that Muslims in Muslim-majority countries should also give room for Christians to spread their faith, echoing the argument of reciprocity. Third, Church Times and The Tablet regularly give voice to Muslim writers and commentators such as Irshad Manji, Ibrahim Hewitt, Zaki Badawi, Ataullah Siddiqui, Mohammad Siddiqui, Dilwar Hussain, Shabbier Akhtar, Mohammed Mukadam, Ahmed Versi, Mona Siddiqui, Hazhir Reimourian, Sayyed Nadeem Kazmi, Abdal-Hakim Murad and Amanullah De Sondy. These writers provide comments and analysis on various issues such as the basic principles of Islam, the pillars of Islam, the teaching, the worship and religious practices in Islam, and discussions on various issues including terrorism, interfaith dialogue and Muslim schools. The willingness of these papers to give voice to Muslim writers, commentators and analysts can be interpreted as a positive gesture for a continuing dialogue with Muslims, through which Muslim writers can express the internal voice and perspectives of Muslim communities on various issues to Christian audience.

2. Islam and Muslims in the British Christian Media and the British Mainstream Media: A Comparison The previous section has presented a comparative analysis on the representations of Islam and Muslims among the studied media. This

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section focuses on comparing the representations of Islam and Muslims in the British Christian news media with that of the British mainstream media. Since this study focuses on the British Christian media, attempts to compare the representations of Islam and Muslims in the British mainstream media and the British Christian media rely on previous studies on the representations of Islam and Muslims in British media, as discussed in chapter 1. For this reason, the comparison drawn here is a very general picture. A further comparative study focusing on the representations of Islam and Muslims in the British Christian media and British mainstream media will certainly provide a more detailed picture. Nevertheless, the main aim of the comparative points drawn here is to illustrate ‘the specialness’ of the ways in which British Christian media represent Islam and Muslims. The first thing that is clear is that there is a significant amount of reports or documents and discussions on Islam and Muslims within both the British Christian print media and the British mainstream media. This certainly reflects the on-going public debates on Islam following the global events such as the 9/11 events and the bombings in Bali, Madrid and London, that brought Islam and Muslims to the international stage. Second, compared to the British mainstream media, the British Christian print media focus more on Islam as a religion and Muslims as those who follow the teachings of Islam. Therefore, articles in the British Christian news media often present theological claims or statements. These claims and statements are seldom found in the British mainstream media. In fairness, the British mainstream media also represent Islam as a religion or a way of life, for example, in the Guardian’s public awareness about Islam in its supplement called ‘British Islam Week’ in 2002 (Ahmad, 2006). Besides, the British mainstream media present positive features of Muslim cultures (Poole, 2002: 5). However, as far as the representation of Islam is concerned, Islam is approached more as an ideology or at least a religion that inspires radicalisation, as indicated in the studies of Richardson (2001, 2004, 2006), Poole (2002) and Moore et al. (2008). This tone of representation does appear in the British Christian media but it is limited to a number of claims in the articles of Evangelicals Now and Evangelical Times. Third, the notion that Islam and the West are partners appears more in the British Christian print media, particularly the articles of Church Times and The Tablet. The narrative of ‘interfaith dialogue’ appears as one of the dominant narratives in the British Christian print media. The contribution of Islam to the Western civilisations is generally used as an argument to support the idea of historical partnership between Islam and Western

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civilisation. Besides, there are significant reports on the dialogue initiatives between Christian or Catholic communities with Muslim communities in Britain. Generally, the British mainstream media represent Islam in a ‘clash’ with the West and as the opponent of democracy and modernity, with various stereotypical claims about Islam and Muslims such as ‘foreign’, ‘medieval’ and ‘barbaric’. Fourth, in their study, Kerry Moore et al. indicate that within the British national print media, British Muslims are commonly linked to the threat of terrorism; Islam is represented as dangerous, backward or irrational; Islam is part of multiculturalism; Islam is represented through the lens of a ‘clash of civilisation’ between Islam and the West; and Islam is considered a threat to a British way of life (Moore et al., 2008: 14). British Christian media give space for the discussion of Islam in relation to terrorism. However, the association of Islam or Muslims with threat has relatively no space in Church Times and The Tablet, except in the reports of religious freedom and Christian persecution. The notion of Islamisation of Britain and Europe appears only in a number of articles in Evangelical Times and Evangelicals Now. In relation to the notion of ‘multiculturalism’, articles in the studied media take the same position as the British mainstream media by ‘associating’ Islam with multiculturalism. Generally, as indicated earlier, the articles in the studied media oppose the notion of ‘multiculturalism’. Nevertheless, these articles, particularly those of Church Times and The Tablet, include a call for the integration of Muslims into British society while defending the rights of Muslims to express the uniqueness of their cultures and religion. Here, the notion of ‘multiculturalism’ is opposed, yet the underlying argument for defending the rights of Muslims clearly resonates with the arguments of multiculturalism. Rather than using the label of ‘multiculturalism’, texts in Church Times and The Tablet prefer to use the phrase ‘interreligious or interfaith dialogue’. Fifth, the difference in the contextual emphasis of the reports or discussions on Islam and Muslims is noticeable. The emphasis of the British Christian news media in representing Islam and Muslims lies in the notion of encounter between Islam and Christianity or Muslims and Christians. Muslims are usually represented unfavourably when international news concerning religious freedom and the persecution of Christians in Muslim-majority countries is reported. In this context, the studied media have relatively similar voices. Studies on the British mainstream media show that the framework of reporting usually places the emphasis on violence, conflict and the social tensions concerning the questions of loyalty and belonging in British society. Moreover, the British mainstream media give more attention to various global events involving terrorism,

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bombings and wars. This emphasis consequently associates Islam and Muslims with violence and conflicts. The British Christian media do report on terrorism and violent events involving Muslim youth in Britain. However, those involved in these events are normally isolated from the rest of Muslims, avoiding the generalisation of linking Muslims to the threat of terrorism or violence. Like the British mainstream media, articles in the British Christian news media generally use phrases such as Islamic fundamentalist, Muslim jihadist, Muslim terrorist or radicals in their reporting. Sixth, both the British mainstream media and the British Christian news media give space to reports on the stereotypes and prejudices experienced by British Muslims. The tone of the reports, however, is different. In her study, Elizabeth Poole found that the patterns of the representation of British Muslims in the British media “legitimize current social relations of dominance, power structures and therefore continuing patterns of discrimination. Muslims are predominantly excluded from Britishness” (2002: 259). This sense of excluding British Muslims is rarely found in the studied media. In the case of Muslim schools, the British Christian media, particularly Church Times and The Tablet, publish articles that are very supportive. High level Christian leaders often call for the integration of Muslims into British society and publicly acknowledge the contribution of people of faith including Muslims for a functioning society. Similarly, a public call for sympathy with Muslims in relation to various prejudices and stereotypes signals a positive willingness to fight against discrimination. A special reference to the experience of other religious community in integrating to British society does not only signal the capacity of religious communities to adapt to a new environment but also becomes a public statement for including British Muslims in the journey of creating a society where people can live together differently. This reference appears particularly The Tablet and Church Times. Seventh, the findings of this study indicate that Church Times and The Tablet give voice to Muslim writers. Besides, these papers quote Muslim sources in their reporting on various issues, including the reports on Christian persecution. This approach is also used in the British mainstream media (Poole, 2002: 5).

3. Reconsidering the Theoretical Framework As indicated, the empirical study of the representations of Islam and Muslims in the British Christian print media is developed in the light of the political theory of recognition. According to Charles Taylor, “the

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struggle for recognition can find only one satisfactory solution, and that is a regime of reciprocal recognition” (Taylor, 1994: 50, emphasis added). The reciprocal argument in the encounter between Christianity and Islam or Christians and Muslims characterises the representations of Islam and Muslims in the British Christian print media. While reciprocal argument is strongly suggested in the studied media, this study only focuses on one side in the dialogue or multilogue, namely Christians, not Muslims. Another study focusing on the side of Muslims would provide a better way of discussing the notion of reciprocal argument. Nevertheless, the reciprocal argument can be seen as an important aspect in social interaction, given the fact that this argument clearly focuses both on winning and on giving respect and recognition. In other words, reciprocity can become a political tool directed towards political solidarity. While this ideal of reciprocal recognition is advocated in the British Christian media, in the context of the whole study, the political theory of recognition has illuminated this study analytically and normatively. Analytically, the theory becomes a tool to analyse the socio-cultural dynamics of the encounter between Christians and Muslims, how the dialogic process takes place, the (religious) language and the discourses that characterise the encounter and the attitudes that lead to various ways of representing Islam and Muslims. Normatively, the theory has the appeal of envisioning a well-functioning society that is nurtured and shaped by dialogue and reciprocal exchange as a basis for identity construction and for struggling towards social justice. This normative appeal is accompanied by a fundamental philosophical consideration, as stated by Bhikhu Parekh, that human beings “are similar enough to be intelligible and make a dialogue possible, and different enough to be puzzling and make a dialogue necessary” (2000: 128). Since the whole process includes both identity construction and the struggle for social justice in society, reciprocal recognition can be seen as socio-cultural recognition. In this sense, the political theory of recognition offers a more dialogical way in the study of socio-cultural representations than theories such as Orientalism, ‘Clash of Civilisations’, Cultural Racism and Islamophobia. Homi K. Bhabha once suggested that “an important feature of colonial discourse is its dependence on the concept of ‘fixity’ in the ideological construction of otherness” (2009: 94). If Bhabha’s suggestion is accepted, then one may argue that the political theory of recognition has fluidity as an important feature through which a social relationship is characterised by a dialogic formation or, as suggested by Taylor and Gurevitch, recognition is conversation bound. In this feature, the relationship shifts from the tendency to define reality in black

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and white images to a dialogic formation mediated by an ongoing process of participatory and communicative conversation. These points are evident, particularly in the discussion of the representation of Islam and Muslims in the context of interreligious dialogue and the integration of Muslims into British society, whereby the fluidity feature of recognition can be seen in the hegemonic struggle to form an alliance by weakening the internal differences in order to form equivalential identities, as suggested by Laclau and Mouffe. Moreover, this feature highlights the point made by Foucault that power is not a repressive but a productive concept. This means that power does not dominate those who are subject to it but incorporates them, shapes and ‘retools’ them to fit in with the needs in social interaction, including the forming of knowledge and understanding of those involved in dialogic relationships (Fairclough, 1992; see also, Faimau, 2011).To what extent do the conceptual and normative arguments of the political theory of recognition shape this study? The politics of recognition, at least on a Taylorian understanding, appeals to two interlinked logics: equal dignity and equal respect, as explained in chapter 2 (Taylor, 1994: 45; see also Modood, 2008). The logic of equal dignity is based on the idea of universal human potential and the commonality of people’s shared humanity. Since this commonality characterises the dignity of all human beings, then every human being should be recognised on the basis that he/she has a dignity equal to that of all others. The politics of equal respect is related to the fact that even though human beings have equal dignity, every human being is unique and is therefore different from others. In order to negotiate the differences in social relationships, people deserve respect for what makes them unique and different from others. In other words, the advance of recognition requires equal respect among people. These two logics have in fact shaped the current discourse of ethnic relations and human rights. South African jurist Albie Sachs, for example, argues that “human rights include both the right to be the same as everyone else and the right to be different from everyone else” (quoted in Blau and Moncada, 2009: 496). Both equal dignity and equal respect shape the identity and status of a person or a group of people. Therefore, it makes sense to suggest that as a vital human need, recognition requires an on-going dialogic process. In order words, recognition assumes dialogue in which identity construction, struggle for social justice and acknowledgement of people’s status take place. As indicated in chapter 2, the identity model of recognition is often criticised for neglecting the ‘status’ of people within a society or a community. Any analysis on the recognition of the rights of people, or in

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this case minority groups, should take into account the importance both of identity construction and the status of people even though these notions of identity and status are still open for philosophical debate and critical discussion. This is because identity and status are core units of recognition. Whereas identity relates to the space for expressing one’s uniqueness in relation to others, status relates to the space for having access to social justice: in the words of Barbara Hobson, “recognition struggles are about collective representations constructed around a shared identity that contest social hierarchies in arenas of power” (2003: 15). Consequently, misrecognition includes both the distortion of identity and the denial of people’s access to justice in a society. Both the conceptual and the normative sense of this theory illuminate this study, particularly by addressing the ‘similarities’ and the ‘differences’ between Islam and Christianity or Christians and Muslims. As already mentioned, these notions are the core dimensions of the politics of recognition from which the notions of equal dignity and equal respect are derived. Theoretically, one may suggest that ‘sameness’ and ‘differences’ appear to be the ends of recognition. However, I would suggest that, considering the dynamic interplay between commonalities and differences on the practical level of social relationships, these are contested notions Keeping this in mind, and following the analysis in this study, it is hopefully clear that the representations of Islam and Muslims in the British Christian print media follow three main scenarios: appeal to commonality, absolutisation of differences and the production of another other. Even though these scenarios have already been explained in detail in chapter 3, in this conclusion I will draw on these scenarios in the broader context of the whole study. Firstly, the scenario of appealing to what is common or appealing to sameness is embraced as a way through which Christians develop their encounter with Muslims. This scenario is strongly expressed in the articles published in the studied media. There are a number of points on which this scenario relies: the common ground between Muslims and Christians based on their faith in God, the historical contribution of Islamic civilisation towards the western civilisation and Christianity, the struggle to face social injustices, ethical issues and common challenges, questions of human dignity and shared humanity and the historical parallel between the Catholic experience in Britain and the current experience of British Muslims. For these reasons, Muslims and Christians are recognised as partners. In this scenario, Islam and Muslims are normally represented in a favourable way. What happens here is that in the appeal to sameness, recognition is achieved by creating an equivalential identity. By articulating

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the equivalent elements or what is common between Islam and Christianity or Muslims and Christians, the possibility of an interchangeability of elements is increased (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001[1985]; Andersen, 2003: 60-61). What then happens with the differences? In the scenario of appealing to sameness, differences are treated in a number of ways: differences are ‘ignored’ or at least are taken for granted; differences are minimised or weakened by expanding the space of common ground; differences are internalised to the extent that the strangeness of the dialogue partner is understood (Gurevitch, 1989: 163). If differences determine the boundaries, it can be pointed out here that the boundaries are dealt with either by ‘ignoring’ their existence or by expanding and repositioning the boundaries. Secondly, in the scenario of absolutising the differences, differences become boundary markings (see chapter 4). Often, differences are considered non-negotiable and objectionable (Seligman, 2008). In fact, the term ‘non-negotiable’ in relation to Christian faith is used in the articles of Evangelical Times when the notion of dialogue between Christians and Muslims is discussed (see chapter 3). In other words, differences are fixed. Following this logic, one may suggest that recognition and misrecognition include boundary-makings. These non-negotiable boundaries are demonstrated in the articles of the studied evangelical media in particular, through which ‘the uniqueness of Jesus Christ and Christianity’ is proposed as the central argument for denying or at least ignoring the possibility of developing dialogic effort with Islam and Muslims. Since the boundary is non-negotiable, Islam is claimed as ‘a false religion’. The absolutisation of boundaries also includes territorialisation of religion, as demonstrated in chapter 6, following a strong proposition such as the old proposition that “there is no salvation outside the church”. Due to this absolutisation strategy, evangelisation is embraced as the best strategic way “to bring Muslims to Christ” or “to bring Asians to Christianity”. Within the frame of recognition or misrecogntion, this scenario represents the rest as ‘the total other’ based on two arguments: “God is on our side because we are the chosen ones” and “Muslims are against us” (see chapter 5). In these arguments, the other is represented as ‘the unchosen’ and ‘the enemy’. Here, the construction of identity puts great emphasis on the gap between ‘our religious’ identity and ‘their religious’ identity (Menuchin, 2006). Within this frame, misrecognition leads to either the ignoring of ‘the other’ or ‘proselytising’ the other. The stereotypes and prejudices experienced by Muslims and the claim of Islamisation of Britain and Europe are, in a sense, results of this scenario. Therefore, it could be argued that misrecognition also takes place through religious

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institutions. In the context of the politics of recognition, however, it should be pointed out that the problem with the absolutisation of boundaries is the assumption that “the points of difference are comprehensive and the conflict irreconcilable” (Sniderman and Hangendoorn, 2007: 9). Such an assumption certainly ignores the complexity of the realities we face in society, which include the complexity of people’s life principles and choices. Sniderman and Hangendoorn correctly point out this complexity when they argue that the area of agreement is generally larger than the points of difference. In this sense, recognition requires various ways of expanding and repositioning boundaries. Thirdly, the scenario of producing ‘another other’ is used when the ‘near other’ is represented. The production of ‘another other’ is normally driven by what Sigmund Freud calls the ‘narcissism of small difference’ (Seligman, 2008: 2889). Here, boundaries are narrowed. In this scenario, the dialogic approach of some churches towards Islam and Muslims is seen as a form of falsification of Christianity. In this study, such a claim is particularly addressed to Roman Catholicism. This claim departs from the charge that ‘Islam is a false religion’. Since Islam is a false religion, any dialogic approach towards Islam becomes an act of falsifying Christianity. Logically, therefore, Islam becomes ‘an other’ and Roman Catholicism is represented as ‘another other.’ In this case, Islam becomes ‘an other’ simply because it is totally different from Christianity, and Roman Catholicism becomes ‘another other’ because it represents ‘a face of risk’ to the non-negotiable stance of Christian faith. Consequently, dialogic encounter becomes difficult, or is at least challenged, because both ‘the other’ and ‘another other’ who are produced discursively are silenced through the claim of falsifying what is believed to be ‘the only truth’. Based on the above discussion, it could be argued that as far as representational knowledge among cultures is concerned, the political theory of recognition offers a more illuminating approach to the study of the media representation of Islam and Muslims compared with theories such as Orientalism, clash of civilisations, racism and Islamophobia. This is because the strength of the modified political theory of recognition lies in a fluidity that leads to conversation, dialogue and hegemonic struggle guided by the logics of equivalence. Moreover, as this study indicates, like our society, there is no ‘fixedness’ in the relationship of cultures. While this relationship itself is complex, it is not static but flexible. The political theory of recognition that takes into account the power of discourse and hegemonic struggle offers an approach within which identity and social status are dialogued on the grounds that any idea or discourse is always

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entitled to a flexible process that allows for dialectics, counter discourses and dialogic formation.

4. Notes on the Political Theory of Recognition The above scenarios indicate how the political theory of recognition can be used as an analytical tool for an empirical study. Nevertheless, there are at least four aspects which need further theoretical and empirical research and exploration. Firstly, both Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth seem to use the notions of recognition and respect interchangeably. This study indicates that recognition is different from respect in the context of religious belief. Christians do not need to recognise Prophet Mohammad as a prophet, but they can maintain a respect for Muslims who believe that Mohammad is the Prophet and Messenger of Allah (God). The same thing applies to Muslims. They do not need to recognise Jesus as the Son of God and Saviour even though they recognise him as one of the prophets, but they can develop a respect for Christians who develop their faith founded on the creed that Jesus is the Son of God and their Saviour. Although the notions of recognition and respect are practically different, in essence respect and recognition relate to each other. Moreover, the understanding of respect and recognition depends on the underlying epistemic assumption. Axel Honneth relates the notion of recognition and respect to the idea of love, by referring to loving ‘the other’ for who they are. The idea of love here is related to the notion of recognising and respecting one’s or a group’s uniqueness. From this study, it can be pointed out that the idea of recognition and respect in relation to the idea of love is shaky, as far as the internal logic that governs the principle of a group is concerned. Take the logic within the evangelical communities as an example. When the idea of love is taken into account, the evangelical understanding operates on an epistemic approach following the logic that respect and love for the other must be expressed in the initiatives of drawing them to “a taste of truth” that is experienced by the Evangelicals (Seligman, 2004: 56). Peter L. Berger gave the following example of one of the missionary statements of the Southern Baptist Church in the US in the late 1990s: “Go out and convert the Jews”. Responding to this statement, a number of American Jewish organisations pointed out its antiSemitic tone. The response of the Southern Baptists to the charge of being anti-Semitic was logical within their own scheme: “we would be antiSemitic if we didn’t do so because otherwise we would be excluding Jews from salvation” (see Seligman, 2004: 56). Here, the argument of recognition and respect needs to take into account the logic that operates in

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the schemes of various communities. This means that internally, statements such as “bringing Muslims to Christ” or “presenting Christ to Muslims” may be understood as moves of respect and love, in Honneth’s terms. My argument here is that any analysis of recognition and respect should also critically unpack the underlying epistemology that governs the internal logic of a community. To put it more strongly, recognition and respect also require “epistemic modesty”, in the sense of giving space to ‘the ability to not understand’, as suggested by Gurevitch (1989). Therefore, it makes sense to stress the idea that dialogue is central in the politics of recognition, on the grounds that in dialogue all parties involved are equal conversational partners. Secondly, the centrality of dialogue in relation to identity and recognition is often challenged with the following question: is recognition the end of dialogue or is dialogue the end of recognition? In my opinion, the problem with this form of question is that it disconnects dialogue and recognition, treating them as if they were totally separate notions. Moreover, it undermines the dynamic relation between the struggle for recognition and the importance of dialogue. This is to say that recognition goes along with dialogue because “the ethics of recognition is conversation bound” (Gurevitch, 2001: 95). This dynamic relation confirms that dialogue and recognition take place in an ongoing process, not only because identity construction and struggle for justice do not happen in a single process, but also because a social relationship in itself is complex. This precisely explains the importance of the public sphere for discussions regarding common concerns, because recognition is basically a matter of common interest in a reasoning society, as advocated by Charles Taylor. As a theory, politics of recognition therefore deals with both process and state or becoming and being. This means that it provides a tool for identifying and understanding the reality of misrecognition or injustice to the extent that it offers a vision of a social relationship that is based on a dialogic process through which identities are affirmed and injustices are dealt with. Thirdly, where is the place and what is the role of memory within the process of dialogue and recognition or misrecognition? Indeed the centrality of identity and status in the politics of recognition brings us to the question of memory because identity and status also have their source in socio-cultural memory. Chapter 5 demonstrated how Christian memory of persecution forms the identity construction of Christian communities. This memory plays a vital role in the way Islam and Muslims are represented through the lens of a Christian persecution in Muslim-majority countries. Considering this point, it can be suggested that memory shapes

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the process of dialogue and recognition or misrecognition. The Crusades events, for example, have shaped both Western and Islamic memory and therefore influence the struggle in the encounter between Western and Islamic civilisations. In other words, dialogic process and recognition require a negotiation of cultural memory. Memory of conflicts and positive encounter, however, can be a positive force for dialogic partners in their struggles to find common ground, as indicated in this study. In this case, historical parallels experienced by different communities and historic contributions of one civilisation to the other can be seen as sources that may open the doors for a dialogic process and recognition. Moreover, intercultural dialogue opens up possibilities of bringing together different historical experiences and cultural sensibilities, as argued by Bhikhu Parekh in his book Rethinking Multiculturalism (2000). Lastly, among many other elements, the notions of risk and fear, trust and confidence need to be explored further, at least empirically, in relation to the political theory of recognition (Seligman, 1997, 2008; Connolly, 2007). These notions are also basic elements that accompany dialogic encounter. From this study, we see that the rejection of efforts to engage in a dialogic encounter with Islam and Muslims precisely explains the notion of risk and fear, and to some extent trust and confidence, because dialogic encounter is considered as a ‘relativisation’ of one’s faith. The underlying logic here is shaped by the understanding that this negotiation is risky and dangerous to one’s faith. This perception is understandable, considering the fact that dialogue implies power relations and dialogic encounter requires the willingness to get out of oneself in order to meet the other. The problem with this logic is that the dialogic encounter is seen merely as a medium in which religious belief is imposed. This is precisely what reciprocal recognition opposes. In reciprocal recognition, dialogic encounter shifts from the question of imposed ideology or religious belief to the possibility of egalitarian plurality and multiplicity (Gurevitch, 2001: 89-90). Themes such as risk, fear, trust and confidence are some of the basic elements in social relationships that currently shape various theoretical developments in the arena of social theory. A further theoretical exploration of these elements in relation to dialogic encounter will provide a better understanding of how recognition and misrecognition operate on a practical level.

5. Recognition and Further Studies The dialogic tone in the studied media indicates that the encounter between Islam and Christianity or Muslims and Christians does not have

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to be interpreted as a clash of civilisations or cultures, but rather as the basic human desire to engage in conversation and dialogue. As this study showed, there is indeed an emphasis on boundaries. To some extent, the boundaries are even absolutised. However, such an emphasis is born of a general fear of the possibility of losing a religious identity, rather than merely an expression of racist and discriminatory fantasy or an Islamophobic imagination. Indeed, the emphasis on boundaries has a consequence of misrecognition, in which boundaries function to wrongly mischaracterise or misrepresent the culture or the belief of other people and therefore deny the possibility of engaging in a conversation. However, this study demonstrates that there is a clear indication of the struggle to expand and reposition the boundaries by considering or widening the equivalential identity, and through considerable efforts to find the common ground which defines the social relationship. In this sense, boundary can be defined in a Heideggerian manner: “A boundary is not that at which something stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the boundary is that from which something begins its precensing” (quoted in Bhabha, 2009: 1) As pointed out by Nancy Fraser (2003: 9-11), the political theory of recognition has a philosophical and a political reference. Philosophically, it refers to a normative paradigm through which dialogic formation shapes both identity construction and the encounter between people with different backgrounds. Politically, it refers to the struggles and social movements of people for social justice. This study has explored the various ways through which Islam and Muslims are represented in the British Christian media. Moreover, it has indicated how the British Christian public sphere has also become an open space for the narratives of engaging in dialogue with Islam and an important medium for conveying matters concerning the relations between Christians and Muslims, as well as an invaluable forum for discussions around Islam and British Muslims. This certainly involves questions about the nature of religious identity, possible conflicts of interests, social movements for mutual understanding and calls for reciprocal recognition. It also involves the call for stating and restating various religious assumptions and positions in the encounter between Christianity and Islam. The variety of the above points reflects the complexity of cultural and religious encounter. As explored in chapter 1, post-colonial theories seem to be dominated by a binary way of thinking, particularly in terms of the question of the social representation of cultures and religions. The political theory of recognition goes beyond this style, by providing a paradigm that is shaped philosophically and politically by room for dialogue, negotiation of boundaries and a moral statement of the possibility of living together

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differently. Moreover, it provides a tool for dealing with both commonalities and differences. Indeed, this theory cries out for further development, as indicated in the four aspects noted above. While this study has fulfilled its aims, empirically it has also provided a context for further studies, particularly on the social phenomenon of the representations of cultures and religions or believers and non-believers in different ethnic or religious media. If recognition opens the door for expanding and repositioning boundaries, and if misrecognition provokes a move for absolutising boundaries, then the choice of following the path of recognition promises a creative encounter in which one does not only learn about other people, cultures or religions, but also learns more about his/her community, culture and religion. Similarly, if mass media is one of the common spaces where members of the society meet to discuss matters of interest for the benefit of the society (Taylor, 1995: 259), then struggles to create a reasoning and functioning society depend on how recognition and misrecognition shape the representation of diverse communities, cultures and religions.

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LIST OF INTERNET WEBSITES

http://www.acommonword.com/ http://www.al-bab.com/ http://www.americanrhetoric.com/ http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org http://archives.cnn.com http://www.asianews.it/ http://www.barnabasfund.org/ http://blogs.ssrc.org/ http://bostonreview.net/ http://www.catholic-ew.org.uk http://www.cccb.org/ http://www.channel4.com/ http://www.christianmuslimforum.org http://www.christiantoday.co.uk/ http://www.churchtimes.co.uk http://www.cofe.anglican.org/ http://www.dailymail.co.uk/ http://edition.cnn.com/ http://www.eauk.org http://www.e-n.org.uk/ http://www.evangelical-times.org http://www.guardian.co.uk/ http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ http://www.independent.co.uk/ http://www.thejakartapost.com/ http://www.lancs.ac.uk/fass/religstudies/activities/329/ http://www.lambethconference.org/ http://www.mcb.org.uk http://mediawatch.mirovni-institut.si/ http://natcath.org/NCR_Online/ http://www.newstatesman.com/ http://www.opendemocracy.net/ http://www.opendoorsuk.org/ http://pewforum.org/ http://www.salaam.co.uk

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List of Internet Websites

http://www.spiked-online.com/ http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/ http://www.statistics.gov.uk/ http://www.thetablet.co.uk http://www.time.com/ http://www.timesonline.co.uk/ http://www.vatican.va/ http://www.washingtonpost.com/ http://www.worldevangelicals.org/