Social Welfare Responses in a Neoliberal Era : Policies, Practices, and Social Problems [1 ed.] 9789004384118, 9789004323926

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Social Welfare Responses in a Neoliberal Era

Studies in Critical Social Sciences Series Editor David Fasenfest (Wayne State University)

volume 132

Critical Global Studies Series Editor Ricardo A. Dello Buono (Manhattan College, New York) Editorial Board José Bell Lara (University of Havana, Cuba) Walden Bello (State University of New York at Binghamton, usa and University of the Philippines, Philippines) Samuel Cohn (Texas A & M University, usa) Ximena de la Barra (South American Dialogue, Chile/Spain) Víctor M. Figueroa (Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas, Mexico) Marco A. Gandásegui, Jr., (Universidad de Panamá, Panama) Ligaya Lindio-McGovern (Indiana University-Kokomo, usa) Daphne Phillips (University of West Indies, Trinidad and Tobago) Jon Shefner (University of Tennessee-Knoxville, usa) Teivo Teivainen (Universidad de Helsinki, Finland and Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, Peru) Henry Veltmeyer (Saint Mary’s University, Nova Scotia, Canada and Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas, Mexico) Peter Waterman (Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, Netherlands) † (1936–2017)

volume 8 The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/cgs

Social Welfare Responses in a Neoliberal Era Policies, Practices, and Social Problems Edited by

Mia Arp Fallov Cory Blad

leiden | boston

Cover illustration: Untitled. Courtesy of Kevin Turner. The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available online at http://catalog.loc.gov lc record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2018048822

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. ISSN 1573-4234 ISBN 978-90-04-32392-6 (hardback) ISBN 978-90-04-38411-8 (e-book) Copyright 2019 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi, Brill Sense, Hotei Publishing, mentis Verlag, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh and Wilhelm Fink Verlag. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents List of Figures and Tables  vii Notes on Contributors  ix 1

Social Welfare Responses in a Neoliberal Era: Adaptive Responses, Sustained Need, and Exacerbated Hardships  1 Cory Blad and Mia Arp Fallov

2

Crisis Neoliberalism and the Social Welfare State: Structural Challenges and Policy Responses  18 Ricardo A. Dello Buono

3

Searching for Saviors: Economic Adversities and the Challenge of Political Legitimacy in the Neoliberal Era  44 Cory Blad

4

Welfare Regime, Neoliberal Transformation, and Social Exclusion in Mexico, 1980–2015  72 Lukasz Czarnecki and Delfino Vargas Chanes

5

Protest and the Politics of Unemployment Insurance: Reforming Welfare States in Times of Austerity  88 Rossella Ciccia and César Guzmán-Concha

6

We Need to Focus on the Resources: Struggling with Neoliberal Economic Rationales in Social Work with Children and Families  119 Maria Appel Nissen

7

Collective Action, Collective Impact and Community Foundations: The Emerging Role of Local Institution Building in an Era of Globalization and Declining Social Safety Nets  137 Frank Ridzi

8

Social Work in and around the Home: Using Home as a Site to Promote Inclusion  160 Mia Arp Fallov and Maria Appel Nissen

9

Potentiality, Development Ideals, and Realities of Social Work  182 Pia Ringø

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Contents

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Youth Experiencing Poverty in a Neoliberal Canadian Context: Understanding Systems Access from the Experiences of Young People and Frontline Staff  203 Naomi Nichols and Jayne Malenfant

11

Youth Responses to Neoliberal Erosion of Solidarity  224 Vibeke Bak Nielsen

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Social Welfare Responses and Professional Resilience in a (Post) Neoliberal Era: How to Understand the Dangers and Potentials of Today  246 Mia Arp Fallov and Cory Blad References  261 Index  288

Figures and Tables Figures 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 8.1 8.2 11.1 11.2

Recurrent Systemic Crises  23 Ongoing State Reproduction  24 Organized Popular Resistance  25 Investigating Pivotal Moments in the Social Welfare Reform Process  26 National and European Union Elections, Percentage of Total Votes  55 Comparative Migration  56 Comparative Income Inequality: Percent Share of Overall Income  57 Comparative Rents, Rent Ratio  60 Comparative Housing Affordability, Rent and Income Ratios  60 Comparative Household Debt, Percent of Net Disposable Income  62 Comparative Household Disposable Income, Annual Rate of Change  63 Finland, Industrial/Services Employment by Sex  65 Sweden, Industrial/Services Employment by Sex  65 Minimum Wage in Mexican Pesos, 1982–2015  79 Evolution of Income Poverty, 1990–2014  81 Evolution of Total and Per Capita Income Household Gini Coefficient: Mexico, 1984–2014  83 Annual Average Growth Income of Deciles D10 and Gini  85 Changes in Universalism of Unemployment Insurance, 1990–2005  103 Generosity of Unemployment Insurance, 1990  104 Generosity of Unemployment Insurance, 2005  105 Index Of Change in Unemployment Insurance, 1990–2005  106 Frequency of Protest Events per Country, 1990–2005  107 Example of Statistics Made on the Basis of Home Visits, 1940  165 Dimensions of Home Interventions  179 Reflexive Action Positions to Everyday Social Problems and Personal Challenges  234 Reflexive Rooms of Manoeuvring  239

Tables 4.1 Gini Coefficients Estimated Using Different Methodologies  83 4.2 Annual Growth Total Income Household Ratio by Three Groups of Deciles, México, 1984–2014  84 5.1 Measures, Sources and Calibration of Independent Variables  97

viii 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 7.1 7.2

Figures and Tables Index of Generosity of Unemployment Insurance  102 Index of Universalism of Entitlements of Unemployment Insurance  103 Truth Table: The Contexts of Retrenchment (Step 1)  109 Truth Table: Configurations of Resilience (Step 2)  111 Truth Table: Configurations of Retrenchment (Step 2)  113 Raw Data, 1990–2005  117 Three Local Community Comparative Cases: Social Welfare Responses  149 Three Local Community Comparative Cases: Weaknesses and Opportunities  158

Notes on Contributors Maria Appel Nissen Ph.D. in Sociology, is Associate Professor in Social Work at Department of Sociology and Social Work, Aalborg University, Denmark. Her research is focused on social work practice and knowledge, social policy and social work concerning vulnerable families, qualitative research and sociological analysis. She is the head of Bachelor in Social Work and Master in Knowledge Based Social Work and Editor of Nordic Social Work Research. Mia Arp Fallov Ph.D. in Sociology, is Associate Professor of Social Integration and Social Policy Strategies, Department of Sociology and Social Work, Aalborg University, Denmark. Her research covers welfare policy, urban sociology, social work, and social theory. Vibeke Bak Nielsen Ph.D., is a social worker and researcher in Social Work Studies. She is a teacher and researcher in the Department of Sociology and Social Work, Aalborg University, Denmark. Her research focuses on social work at a frontline perspective in relation to youth unemployment. The changes in social work during the last 20 years and the processes of change identified in citizenship responses to the erosion of solidarity in relation to political changes in the Nordic welfare state. Cory Blad Ph.D., is Professor and Chair of Sociology at Manhattan College. His work focuses on the impact of political economic change on nationalist politics and cultural political mobilization. His recent work includes “Faustian States: Nationalist Politics and the Problem of Legitimacy in the Neoliberal Era” in Global Culture: Theories, Paradigms, Actions, edited by Vincenzo Mele and Marina Vujnovic (Brill, 2016) and “Course Corrections and Failed Rationales: How Comparative Advantage and Debt Are Used to Legitimate Austerity in Africa and Latin America” with Samuel Oloruntoba and Jon Shefner in Third World Quarterly (38:4, pp. 822–843, online 29 Feb. 2016). Rossella Ciccia Ph.D., is Lecturer in Social Policy at Queen’s University Belfast and Marie Sklodowska-Curie Fellow at Scuola Normale Superiore, Florence. Her research

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focuses on comparative social policy analysis with a particular emphasis on issues relating to policy reforms, civil society, work, employment, social inequalities, gender and care. Lukasz Czarnecki Ph.D. in Political and Social Science from National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) and a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Strasbourg, is a researcher at the University Program for Asian and African Studies (UNAM). His areas of research include inequalities and poverty in comparative perspective in Latin America, Asia and Africa. He is a member of the National System of Researchers (SNI in Spanish), National Council of Science and Technology (CONACYT) in Mexico. Ricardo A. Dello Buono Ph.D., is Professor of Sociology at Manhattan College in New York City. His work has spanned across a broad range of social problems and the sociology of development, with a regional emphasis on Latin America. He is active in the Society for the Study of Social Problems (SSSP), the Association for Humanist Sociology (AHS), the International Sociological Association (ISA) and the Latin American Studies Association (LASA). He currently serves as Latin American and Caribbean Editor for the Sage journal Critical Sociology. César Guzmán-Concha Ph.D. in Sociology, is an independent researcher and consultant. He is currently a visiting scholar at the Center of Social Movement Studies (COSMOS), Scuola Normale Superiore, Italy. His research covers issues in comparative social movements, civil society and political participation, with a focus on the effects of activism on the policy-making process in sectors such as higher education, social assistance and unemployment benefits. Jayne Malenfant is a doctoral student in the department of Integrated Studies in Education at McGill University, in Montréal, Canada. Her work has focused on youth, autonomy and activism in Canada, as well as informal education networks. She currently explores educational access for youth experiencing homelessness in the context of precarious labor markets. Naomi Nichols Ph.D., is an assistant professor in the department of Integrated Studies in Education at McGill University, Montréal, Canada. Nichols’ research activities and

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publications span the areas of youth homelessness; youth justice; alternative education and safe schools; inter-organizational relations in the youth sector; “youth at risk,” and community-academic research collaborations. Frank Ridzi Ph.D. in Sociology, Masters in Public Administration (MPA), is Associate Professor of Sociology at Le Moyne College and Vice President of Community Investment at the Central New York Community Foundation. His research covers public policy, philanthropy applied data analysis and nonprofits. Pia Ringø Ph.D. in Sociology and Social Work, is Associate Professor in Social Work at Aalborg University. She is a part of the research project ‘Views on Human Being in Social Work – Welfare Policies, Technologies and Knowledge’. Her research focuses on the connection between understandings of social problems, ontological models, neo-liberalism, knowledge and practice in social work with people within the fields of psychiatry and disability. Delfino Vargas Chanes Ph.D., is Professor of Development Studies at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). He received his Doctorate in Sociology from Iowa State University (ISU), and his master’s degrees in Sociology and Statistics (ISU) and Bachelor of Mathematics (UNAM). He is registered in the National System of Researchers, Level II, his areas include the study of inequality, poverty and advanced methodologies for social research.

Chapter 1

Social Welfare Responses in a Neoliberal Era: Adaptive Responses, Sustained Need, and Exacerbated Hardships Cory Blad and Mia Arp Fallov ”I1: “I think that we all got hit over the head with the economy. We are to write down what it cost, how much in relation to this intervention, and so on”. I2:” and what do we then save…” I1 “Yes, and what we save. I think that we all have this economical focus and then we reflect on this Peter what is it that he needs and what does he say himself, and what do those around him say. Then I think regarding the [economic question] then we must take that fight later on”. I2:” But we have to take it, since it is super important that our view of humans is not all of the sudden directed towards the economy and efforts to save. It becomes imperative to hold on to what and how we think, and why we are here, and what our job is. Sometimes, this becomes hard to do because those up above are so extremely focused on how much you saved in this case or that. You nearly do not dare to propose that this person; he costs a bit more, because he needs something extra. Therefore, it is important to hold on to our view of human beings…” I3: “Yes, and our professionality” ( focus group among social workers, Denmark) nissen, fallov and ringø, 2018

Neoliberalism has profoundly transformed public and political understandings of social welfare and social services in advanced capitalist countries, as is also apparent in the opening exchange from a focus group among social workers in Denmark.1 This is a seemingly common and uncontroversial statement – but how? We know quite a bit about structural changes, ideological structures, and policy changes as a result of neoliberalization, but how have those ­changes impacted social welfare practitioners and the respective populations they serve? More to the point, how have practitioners and publics negotiated evolving neoliberal political economic environments? 1 See chapter by Ringø in this volume.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���9 | doi:10.1163/9789004384118_002

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This book examines contemporary social welfare practices and the conditions in which they exist. More to the point, we examine the ways in which social welfare practices have adapted to the demands of neoliberalism, the dominant political economic ideological paradigm influencing policy, practice, and understandings of social problems in a transatlantic context. But why another book on the challenges facing the welfare state in the neoliberal era? We argue that there are two main reasons to continue looking into the nexus of neoliberalism and social welfare provision. First, neoliberalization is neither uniform, nor universal and the effects of market-oriented reforms in social welfare policies and practices vary widely with regards to both time and place (Hall and Lamont, 2013). To discuss the effects of neoliberalism without a sensitivity to the variable ways in which respective state and local actors have integrated these reforms seems presumptuous, at best, and empirically irresponsible, at worst. Beyond the implementation and effects of neoliberalization2 on social welfare provision, the ideology, itself, is defined and understood differently depending on when and where the definition is put forth – not to mention the respective audience who must logically consume and legitimate (or at least accept) the implementation of political economic reform that alters past policy conditions and dramatically impacts social welfare provision (Peck, Theodore, and Brenner, 2010). This collection emphasizes the variability of both neoliberalization and the ways in which neoliberal pressures have resulted in altered ways of meeting social welfare requirements in a comparative regional context. Second, the past preoccupation with questions surrounding the “death of the welfare state” or any number of proclamations declaring the “death” of some paradigmatic condition or institution often obfuscate the fact that structural influences rarely destroy, but rather motivate hybridization and adaptation. Much ink has been spilled highlighting the negative conditions of neoliberalization including exacerbated income and wealth inequalities, wage stagnation, and increased costs of living, which illustrates an obvious reality: While neoliberalization may discourage social welfare provision in a broad sense, it actually deepens (not to mention expands) its necessity. Put another way, despite the goals and efforts of many neoliberal proponents to reduce social spending, reduce “entitlements,” and individualize the effects of 2 The term “neoliberalization” is an amorphous one and has been rightly criticized for a lack of definitional and operational clarity (Venugopol, 2015; Eriksen et al., 2015), however it does create a narrative link to the myriad processes related to contemporary economic liberalization and marketization initiatives that serve as the primary goals for neoliberal proponents. As such, we use the term “neoliberalization” as a general, albeit flawed, descriptive term meant to efficiently denote processes related to these initiatives and reforms.

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less regulated capitalism, the sustaining (or often worsening) adverse material conditions of broad cross-sections of respective national populations also sustains demand for social welfare assistance. As such, social welfare practices must persist but also adapt to an environment that ironically demands social welfare provision, but simultaneously under-resources and problematizes its practice. How then is social welfare practiced in a hostile neoliberal context? How are practices adapted to these contradictory demands in order to meet sustained needs, while also adjusting to changed policy and procedural demands, as well as possible shifts in the cultural and practical expectations of their clients. We employ a somewhat broad definition of social welfare, encompassing both policies and practices designed to ameliorate the adversities faced by vulnerable groups in advanced capitalist societies. The breadth of activities that fall under this umbrella can include social policy, practices of social work, local community work, and social assistance programs. While much of our emphasis is on public (i.e., state) programs, the adaptations wrought largely by neoliberalization mean that roles have changed between state, market, and civil society, thus making sensitivity to private and public-private collaborations necessary.3 Before introducing these contributions, however, it is necessary to first establish the problematic nature of social welfare change in a neoliberal context. 1

Social Welfare in the Neoliberal Era

Given the substantial volume of work on the corrosive effects of marketoriented political reforms on welfare state institutions and provision, the previous question of why another book on social welfare is needed seems reasonable. While broad claims of neoliberal-driven welfare state retrenchment giving way to more complicated analytical understandings of both retrenchment (Swank, 2002) and neoliberalization (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Hartman, 2005), there is strong evidence that neoliberalization is accompanied by 3 It is important to note that while our goal is the examination of social welfare adaptation as a result of neoliberalization, we are not advocating a quiescent approach to theoretical orientation. That is, our investigation of adaptive practices is empirically-driven and, as will be discussed in the concluding chapter, the problems associated with these adaptations are taken up in each chapter. The empirical focus of the book inhibits theorization of adaptive practices in favor of articulation of the complexity of the practices, themselves. This focus should not be understood as disinterest in theoretical development nor as advocacy for a more functionalist understanding of adaptive practices.

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significant change in social welfare institutions, scale, and provision. This, of course, brings us back to our original question. The contemporary era of neoliberal ideological dominance is generally understood as distinct from, but inspired by, its ideological origins in the Austrian School and later with Milton Friedman and his disciples from the University of Chicago (Dean, 2014). The emergence of this political ideology championing market deregulation and dramatic reductions in state regulatory capacities is certainly hegemonic, but this belies a clear lack of uniformity and selective integration that is largely driven by the negative impact liberalization policies have on broad swaths of national populations. The emphasis on the reduction of state regulatory authority was always uneven and often problematic in times of financial crisis (see Weiss, 2003; Pierson, 2002; Esping-Andersen, 1996), but illustrative of the goals of neoliberal proponents that centers on maximization of growth and the conditioning of labor to achieve that end. Social welfare provisions were often seen as artificial intrusions on labor markets and as disincentivizing mechanisms that reduced the size of labor markets, thus theoretically increasing the cost of labor in respective locales (Jessop, 2000). The ideological elevation of market autonomy and simultaneous efforts to restrict state regulation of those same market mechanisms was rooted in demands for increased economic growth accompanied by theoretical (and impossible) promises of shared material benefits. The demonstrated inability for not only neoliberal capitalism, but capitalism, itself, to meet these latter promises sustains the popular need for social service provision (e.g., Polanyi, 2001; Clarke and Newman, 2012). In terms of policy implementation, the history of neoliberal reforms essentially begins with the 1973 Chilean coup that allowed broad implementation of what would become neoliberal reforms guided by monetarist and neoclassical ideas developed at the University of Chicago. These free market, anti-regulation policies came at a time of systemic crisis as the Bretton Woods system was ended in 1971 and a system of floating exchange rates implemented in the same year as the Chilean coup. This “new” framework of monetarist, free market liberal capitalism (termed “neoliberalism,” largely by critics) was quickly promoted as a corrective to the economic stagnation of the post-Bretton Woods 1970s and embraced by successive governments in Great Britain and the United States by the early 1980s. The policy paradigm spread unevenly with rapid integration in New Zealand and Turkey (one democratic, one through military coup) by 1984, but far more resistance and incremental integration in societies with strong traditions of welfare capitalism such as those in Scandinavia. These were direct efforts to promote growth through deregulation, but also to enact disciplinary strategies that would restrict and alter social service

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­ rovision for the purpose of expanding labor market participation and privap tizing aspects of social service delivery. The apparent ubiquity of neoliberalization prompted many to make broadly applicable conclusions centering on the decline of social welfare, state authority, and the overall retrenchment of social welfare practices and policies. The problem is that the relationship between neoliberal ideology, policy paradigms and social work creates a diverse constellation of possibilities. Early neoliberalization in the United States and United Kingdom laid an ideological foundation for market liberalization and the supremacy of private capital growth, while the pace of such ideological conditioning was far more languid in more social democratic countries such as Canada, Sweden, and France. Similarly, privatization and liberalization initiatives in the 1990s and 2000s appeared to quicken in social democratic bastions (e.g., Sweden) while seemingly stalling in Latin America. This volume seeks to highlight the regional variability of neoliberalization experiences through the examination of cases that somewhat reflect the country-level distinctions among neoliberalizing states. The geographic diversity reflected in these cases is certainly not comprehensive but does offer an opportunity to understand uneven neoliberalization as a consequence of not only political and ideological influence, but also that of spatial locality, local socio-political cultures, and time. This collection engages this longstanding question based on the understanding that neoliberalization is a multifaceted and uneven condition. More to the point, the collection broadens the conceptual understanding of social welfare by focusing on the public nature of social welfare practice. This intentional emphasis on diversity in the form of social welfare practice is, of course, inspired by the aforementioned trend in studies of neoliberalization and welfare capitalism, but distinct in its emphasis on alterations in the public practice or welfare provision. Put another way, the public context of social welfare practice has been significantly altered by the integration of neoliberal ideologies, practices, and policies that reduces the very notion of a universalist, public system of social welfare in advanced capitalist societies. The mélange of public, private, and semi-private social welfare practices examined in this book are cases in point that illustrate the corrosive impact of neoliberal ideology on notions of shared, universal benefits in respective societies. Similarly, this project is designed to bridge the often-latent divide between examinations of political economic structures and social service practice to gain a deeper understanding of how neoliberalization impacts social work beyond dichotomous debates over retrenchment. In that sense, this is a collection attempting to construct a contextualization of social work in uneven and varied neoliberal political economies. Clearly, the structural ­contradictions

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i­nherent in liberalized forms of capitalism work to complicate social conditions; specifically, the tendency to exacerbate material inequalities, deepen financial hardships, and demand the reduction state authority in a variety of fields (Harvey, 2011). The irony of this latter insistence on the reduction of state regulatory authority belies the deep need for state institutional support for not only legitimating neoliberal governance in the face of sustained hardships but also to rescue financial institutions during periods of inevitable financial crises. Liberal capitalism has not historically shown a capacity for either selfregulation nor the ability to function without state support. This mitigating relationship exists despite neoliberal aspirations of unregulated market capitalism. Indeed, the ideological promotion of market solutions to all problems, economic and social, is skillfully employed and faithfully defended by neoliberal proponents. The assumption of markets as panacea has pervaded both government and popular conversations (to varying degrees, of course) to the extent that Bourdieu describes neoliberalism as doxa (Bourdieu, 2003; 1998) or a normative, unquestioned ideology. The paradigmatic nature of neoliberalism may appear to be truly universal in national public politics… or is it? The most recent global recession (emerging in 2007–2008) illuminated two trends already well in motion. The first is the fundamental flaw in neoliberal advocacy, namely, the claim that market fundamentalism could somehow reverse requisite capitalist tendency toward inequality4 and “float all boats”. The ability for market fundamentalist proponents to justify this claim in a popular and political sense has been eroding for some time. Anti-liberalization mobilization throughout Latin America in the early 2000s brought about actual political change (the tide of which may, itself, be turning), inequality protests in Europe, North America, and elsewhere in the advanced capitalist world and the nearly global anti-austerity protests after 2008 were rooted in a distinct popular distrust of market-oriented assumptions. Secondly, the efficacy of non-traditional political actors and formerly irrelevant nationalist parties has played a significant role in disrupting the ideological status quo. This reactionary anti-globalization is similarly based in a popular distrust of market fundamentalist ideology and assumptions. The combination of these two trends has led some to argue that we are entering a “post-neoliberal” period in which the ideology is declining in hegemonic authority (see Altvater, 2009; Springer, 2015).

4 This is, of course, a fundamental Marxian observation, but one that has also been reconciled in the work of liberal proponents such as Mises (2000[1955]).

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The question of a “post-neoliberal” moment or transition is nascent and contentious, but there is no doubt that decades of neoliberalization have wrought a powerful reaction as material hardships and the effects of worsening income and wealth inequalities negatively impact large portions of populations throughout the advanced capitalist world. Post-neoliberalism implies a move beyond neoliberal ideologies and policies; however, there is little evidence that this has happened. Neoliberalism is clearly being challenged in a popular sense, but policy frameworks maintain adherence to neoliberal goals and alternatives have proven either non-existent or unsustainable. More to the point, emphases on systemic and structural trends often conflicts with microlevel practice. While we may be able to observe structural contradictions in real time, the capacity for neoliberalism to continue to influence cultural and vocational practice remains salient. The structural changes and alterations in social welfare practices illustrate ways in which the micro-level realities persist despite ideological proclamations or policy changes. In short, the need for social welfare intervention persists (or is exacerbated) as neoliberal policy initiatives alter, weaken, or eliminate the mechanisms for social service delivery. This set of contradictions centers on the underlying project of attempting to socially legitimate what is essentially a political project. Great efforts have been made to chronicle the ideological (Hall, 1988; Desai, 2005) and political (Jessop, 2002; Peck, 2010) promotion of neoliberalism but far less on the languid integration of neoliberal ideology into cultural and vocational practice. There are, of course, outstanding studies of cultural aspects of neoliberalization (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2001; Yúdice, 2003) as well as examinations of how neoliberal ideology has pervaded institutional practices (Giroux, 2002; Pasura, 2014). Given the antithetical centrality of public services and social welfare to the neoliberal project, it stands to reason that we will find significant changes in social service practice as a result of neoliberalization. The purpose of this volume is less to defend this claim but rather to articulate and demonstrate how neoliberal ideological logic has pervaded, or is mitigated by, public and social services practices. 2

Diverse Experiences of Social Welfare in the Neoliberal Era

The national cases chronicled here are designed to highlight the commonality of the neoliberalization experience, while also remaining sensitive to the diverse and uneven integration of neoliberal ideology. This latter point is an essential one in terms of developing an accurate understanding of the overt and subtle integration of a paradigmatic ideology into national social

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c­ onsciousness. National governments embraced (or rejected) aspects of neoliberal ideology at different times and in idiosyncratic ways. Early neoliberalization efforts found in the United States and the United Kingdom contrast with more recent neoliberalization efforts in Scandinavia. More to the point, national political economic realities create distinct pressures and challenges that national governments, structurally encouraged to embrace so-called neoliberal reforms, must negotiate while attempting to either defend social democratic/social protectionist policies or promote neoliberal alternatives. While it can be argued that neoliberalism contains a unified logic that seeks to minimize state regulatory capacities, reduce public authority in areas of social spending, and champion market-oriented social practices over publicly provided services embodied in any number of privatization initiatives, the reality of neoliberal-oriented policy implementation is far more complex. As such, it remains necessary to understand the broad structural pressures imposed and conditions created as societies embrace neoliberal reforms, but it is equally necessary to remain sensitive to the fact that such reforms are neither uniform nor universal. To that end, the question becomes oriented towards how the common (neoliberalism) is integrated into the particular (social service practice). Our emphasis on countries with both early and late records of neoliberal reform is intentional and allows for insights into the ways in which rapid or languid neoliberalization effects differ in addition to highlighting national distinctions. This corresponds with our earlier stated goal of highlighting the various ways in which neoliberalization (and its impacts of social welfare practices) varies by location and historical moment. While the neoliberalization process and experience varies by country, other vertical alterations within countries denote other time-oriented variables in neoliberal authority. Put more simply, the argument that neoliberalization is uneven geographically is true, but so too is the temporal variability both between countries (early and late) and variations within countries (such as the ebb and flow of neoliberal ideological dominance in Latin America). Similarly, such comparisons allow for better understanding of how neoliberalization has created common conditions that must be negotiated by social workers, public officials, and, of course, respective public citizens. This approach also circumvents problematic notions of retrenchment that pose particular problems with regards to studying the effects of neoliberalism on social welfare funding and spending. In short, the notion that spending on social programs in neoliberal countries has universally decreased is empirically inconsistent (Swank, 2001; Rodrik, 1997a; DeGrauwe and Polan, 2005; Baldacci et al., 2008). There are clear data showing the negative impact of ­neoliberalization on social spending, particularly in the Global South

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(Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001), although the variability of both neoliberal adherence and national political economic context problematizes a general claim of broad social spending retrenchment during the neoliberal era (Molyneux, 2008). For instance, in Scandinavia the issue is not the size of public spending, which have stayed more or less on the same level, but rather the changed relations between the sectors placing more and more emphasis on more welfare for less resources and changing relations between public, private and semi-­private welfare providers (Nissen, 2017). We argue that social welfare must be understood in an adaptive context, rather than focusing on perceived retrenchment or irrelevance. As such, our focus on adaptive social welfare p ­ ractices and processes as a result of neoliberalization provides a more practical way of understanding both the pressures of neoliberalism and the sustained, and necessary role, of social welfare provision in advanced capitalist societies. 3

Social Welfare and Neoliberal Ideology

The debate over welfare state retrenchment is, in the end, a superficial one. Regardless of inflationary spending or uneven retrenchment leading to macroeconomic conclusions of welfare state resilience, the form of public assistance and the funding for that assistance has clearly shifted. While funding for social assistance programs such as health care, education, and others may remain stable in some countries, the burden for funding these programs has moved away from finance and productive capital and increasingly placed the cost burdens on labor (Rodrik, 1997b). Privatization initiatives serve as excellent examples of this formative shift as large scale social programs such as retirement and education become increasingly payer-funded (public pensions shifting to individual investment accounts, for instance) or remain publicly funded but shift to private capital control such as in the cases of charter schools in the United States. The point here is that the presence, absence, or scope of state welfare retrenchment in terms of spending obfuscates the fact that neoliberalization initiatives work to shift public programs towards the individualization of formerly collective, community-oriented services. These quiet changes are more politically viable in countries with standing traditions and popular support for social welfare programs, such as in Scandinavia. The Nordic Model continues to be celebrated, particularly in the post-recession era, as a shining example of the possibility of regulatory capitalism that enables both economic growth and a more equitable distribution of capital resources among national ­populations.

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However various financial crises in the 1990s ushered in a series of neoliberal reforms throughout Scandinavia (Mjøset, 2011; Sippola, 2012). From rapid market liberalization in Iceland and Sweden, to more subtle variations in Norway and Finland, to labor “flexi-curity” in Denmark, social democratic states illustrate both the uneven nature of neoliberalization as well as the capacity for neoliberal reforms to gradually shift emphasis on social welfare practices from the reduction of material inequality and the more equitable distribution of capital resources to creating socio-economic conditions singularly focused on facilitating capital accumulation. Merja Jutila sums up this process in her study of Finnish neoliberalization in the 1990s: “The process has not been one of obvious assaults on the welfare state, but rather a slow deterioration of social transfers and starving of the public services ever since” (2011: 198). By focusing on the ways in which social welfare practice has changed, this volume allows for a more local understanding of the ways in which neoliberalism has influenced, and indeed changed, the social relationship between public welfare providers and respective populations. Neoliberalization is more than simply policy changes, it is a broadly integrative ideological process that seeks to transform not only government actions (policy), but also promote individualization for the purpose of promoting entrepreneurial self-interest and minimizing the regulatory capacity of collectivist organizations such as labor unions or traditional social welfare constituencies. The goal of this volume is to highlight the myriad ways in which social welfare practice has been influenced and altered as a consequence of both (a) an ideological requisite to minimize economic protectionist demands through a reduction in the efficacy of state institutions designed to mitigate such protectionist demands while at the same time (b) exacerbating requisite material inequalities and financial hardships resulting from market liberalization. Of equal importance, however, is the question of agency in the process of integrating neoliberal ideology and policy practices. Are we seeing a top-down process of neoliberal imposition on both social welfare practitioners and angry publics or is the contemporary condition and historical development more complicated in terms of culpability? Do social service practitioners simply do as they are told, or do they become neoliberal proponents through their actions and behaviors? Are changes in social welfare practice the product of both governmental elites as well as those who do undertake the actual process of social work? How might this reorientation alter our understanding of the nature and influence of neoliberalization? More to the point, what becomes of respective national populations who continue to demand social service intervention and social welfare protections? Often assumed to be passive recipients or exploited masses, might the

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­ egemony of neoliberal thought create upward pressures on social service h practitioners to alter and shift the nature of their work? In other words, have there been changes in the demands of respective public populations that alter their relationship with both the idea of state-led, public service provision as well as the actual delivery of such services? Our goal in this book is to problematize the notion of universal neoliberalization and to highlight the myriad variations in how social welfare practices and conditions are negotiated in the contemporary neoliberal era. While we firmly agree that neoliberal ideological integration has had a universally transformative impact on understandings of social welfare, we continue to ask how local populations have understood and negotiated these transformative pressures. 4

Changed Relationships between Social Welfare Professionals and Citizens

While neoliberalization does nothing to reduce the need for social welfare (quite the opposite), it does influence the relationship between social workers and an increasingly individualized public. If such a shift has occurred, how does it influence the relationship between social workers and clients? States and citizens? Political parties and legitimating constituencies? Brown defines neoliberalization as the dissemination of the model of the market to all spheres, and that states as well as citizens now have to imitate the behavior of firms (Brown, 2015). This does not mean that all spheres are monetized but that the role model of homo economicus has permeated not only social welfare departments, but also expectations of citizens. This is evident in the way that social policy is now dominated by the belief that economic incentives will move clients towards independence from publicly financed income transfers. Even in the previously generous Scandinavian countries known for their elaborate welfare security, more public transfers have fallen under the ideological debate keen on making work pay and therefore cutting back on benefit levels and tightening eligibility criteria (Seim, 2014). It is evident in the way governments structure social work practice to employ methods that translate practices into the language of economics and metrical measurement and subordinate questions of need to budgetary requirements. The most telling examples of this is how the needs of vulnerable children are subordinated to budget concerns as the cheapest placement methods are chosen, or placement out of the home is postponed in order for expenses to fall under the next budget year. This pressures social workers to show flexibility and inventiveness in order to meet the

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needs of vulnerable children. Pressure is on social workers not only to find the best solution within tight budgets, but moreover to think of social problems in economic terms, that is how do we deal with issues and problems effectively in ways that makes the life of children more economical and profitable in the long run (Nissen, 2017). However, as the contributions in this book show, policy discourse focusing on the downward distribution of cost-burdens in order to render more welfare for the same (or reduced) amount of funding does not eradicate questions of need. Rather, it places social workers in impossible positions where they are increasingly unable to meet the needs of clients in search of assistance or where they have to choose between those deemed most in need. Moreover, they have to do this in political climates that stigmatize those in need and questions their moral worth (Clarke and Newman, 2012). Increasingly, questions of need are measured against whether and to what extent populations in need contribute to society and therefore questions issues of collective solidarity. Welfare measures become targeted and welfare benefits become conditional even in Scandinavian countries previously known for their universal rights. Welfare rights are now intimately intertwined with punitive measures for those parts of the populations not adhering to the demands of citizenship, who cannot live up to the demands of active participation, or those who end up on a criminal path (Cummins, 2016; Wacquant, 2009). It is of outmost importance that we investigate the role of social work and social welfare in these new forms of more conditional welfare and that we understand them, not simply as a return to previous philanthropic forms of welfare in which the needy was distinguished from the rest (Villadsen, 2008), but as new hybrids between neoliberal, neoconservative and nationalist welfare rationalities (Swank and Betz, 2003).5 The goal of this volume is to develop a deeper understanding of how new ways of thinking about social welfare and the role of social work develop in different national neoliberal contexts. Empowerment of the self-governing citizen is a core concern in social welfare in the neoliberal era. Many of the contributions of this volume touch upon how social welfare professionals have to perform the role of facilitating and controlling self-governing welfare recipients. Empowerment is in present times not about helping the citizen establish agendas to challenge structural injustices, but rather processes in which the citizen is molded and their habitus orchestrated into governable subjects (Fallov, 2013). What Miller and Rose (2008) terms “governing at a distance” concomitantly requires the government of proximity of those groups that do not have the capacities assumed 5 Also, see chapter by Blad in this volume.

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­ ecessary for self-governance. On the one hand, such developments individun alize welfare concerns by emphasizing individual problems and plans of action, and by focusing on the development of potentials and resources in the individual. One the other hand, these new forms of government inscribe the individual in particular collective forms. Social welfare professionals have to facilitate not only individual plans of action but foster the enhancement of networks and community settings in which such plans can come into reality. Vulnerable family networks are instrumentalized in the social welfare of the child, neighborhood groups are asked to take responsibility for their own local area and to help support the integration of newly arrived groups in society, extended relations are called forth to help with the daily chores of people with mental disabilities. The point here is that social welfare not only depends on the empowerment of individuals and local groups but is also expected to facilitate this participatory form of welfare and more to the point, to measure and control it. The contributions in this book investigate how this participatory welfare take on different form and apply varying strategies across contexts and welfare areas. 5

Structure of the Book

Our intention with this book is to move beyond the tendency to narrate the impact of neoliberalization as a simple history of welfare decline. Although analysis of welfare policies and the changes to their ideological basis is important, not everything works out as planned, as Foucault once so eloquently put it (Foucault, 2000). Rationalities change, become de-assembled and reassembled in their transformation into practice. It is the claim of this book that we need to gain knowledge of the hybrid qualities of neoliberal rationalities – not as one thing that in any simple and linear fashion changes and metastasizes into something else entirely, but rather in the specific and context dependent mutations that have sustained neoliberalism as a hegemonic discourse; as a symbolic and material power to see and change the world in its image. Therefore, we have in this volume focused on what we see as the three main dimensions to investigate – social welfare policies, social welfare practices and the way that social problems are engaged in different national and social welfare contexts. The book is comprised of two primary sections: In the first section the contributions investigate historical and present policy development. The chapters in this section stay on the macro level and for the most part analyze social welfare policies in a comparative perspective. This section examines not only the

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consequences of decades of neoliberal reform, but also how we are to understand contemporary shifts. Nikolas Rose argues that we should analyze recent developments as a shift from the government of freedom to the government of liberty, although still not think of these developments as uniform or paradigmatic. Moreover, that we should be mindful of how government of liberty interacts with issues of security and control and thus much more than previously flirts with authoritarian governance (Rose, 2017). The issues of how authoritarian government and issues related to security and control are similarly present in the chapters in this first section. In the second chapter, Dello Buono investigates how neoliberal reform in a cross-national perspective challenges the way we previously have thought about welfare models, when even the Scandinavian Social Democratic models experience retrenchments. He discusses how a critical dialectical approach is the best to analyze how changes to welfare are linked to the contradictions of capitalist social relations and the responses of social movements to policy changes. The dialectical approach seeks to elevate the role of organized praxis in defense of the social welfare state as an explanatory framework for the historically unfolding dynamics of social welfare reform situated in the context of advanced neoliberal crisis. Dello Buono shows how these relations have resulted in varied results in terms of welfare reform and patterns of welfare retrenchment across the Atlantic. He discusses the possibilities and necessity of resistance from the social welfare professionals and how it matters. In the third chapter, Blad continues the cross-national comparison of changes to social welfare policies, but focuses on two Scandinavian cases, namely Finland and Sweden. He investigates how increasing inequalities and economic hardship exacerbate precarious conditions and contribute to the rise of nationalist politics. By revisiting Polanyi’s concept of double movement and his idea of the mediating state combined with understanding neoliberalism as a form of Bordieuan doxa, Blad analyzes how we might understand the recent rise of nationalist parties in the two countries. He argues that nationalist parties can gain a different form of political legitimacy than traditional labor parties and therefore fit well in the vacuum left behind when what is considered “necessary” neoliberal reforms. This revisit to Polanyi provides a much relevant platform to discuss the relationship between social welfare, capitalist developments, and political legitimacy in more nuanced ways – a discussion that is much needed when faced with the political turmoil across Europe. Czarnecki and Vargas-Chanes focus on neoliberal transformations and social exclusion in Mexico from 1980–2015 in Chapter 4. Looking across the areas of education, health services, employment, poverty, and income inequality, they show how neoliberal reforms across these social welfare sectors can be

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divided into two periods: The first from 1980 to 1989, and the second from 1990s to present day. They argue that their analysis of the second phase supports the claim of an end to neoliberal reform and the emergence of a post-neoliberal era. However, this change is dubious in that sustained neoliberal practices prevent new reforms from dealing with the challenges of material hardship and ever rising inequalities in Mexico. They point to the crucial role of civil society in influencing the direction of future policy reform. In Chapter 5, focus shifts to a cross-national comparison of the conditions under which social protest influence welfare reform. Ciccia and GuzmánConcha perform a two-step fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis to investigate the interplay between problem pressures, political institutions, protest, and electoral politics on changes in unemployment insurance in 20 western economies from 1990–2005. Through this analysis they identify five contexts of retrenchment characterized by different intensities and combinations of problem pressures. Their findings indicate that the configuration of political systems seems to have a conditional influence on the effects of social protests. They point to the importance of considering specific interactions between electoral politics and different forms of political participation in national contexts, like the other chapters in this section. In the second section we move from policy to social welfare practice. The two chapters in this section focus on the organizational context of social welfare practice in the neoliberal era; however, each examines different aspects of practice in distinct national contexts. In Chapter 6, Nissen presents a qualitative study of social work with children and their families in Denmark. She argues that the neoliberal focus on ideas and incentives to provide cost-effective social services necessitates a focus on resources in everyday social work. She analyzes how social workers recognize, embrace but also transform these neoliberal ideas by insisting on ideas of well being, equality, and solidarity. Nissen’s contribution therefore highlights the on-going struggle (following Luhmann, and beyond the Danish case presented here) between narrow views of social problems promoted by economic rationales and broader views of social problems which do not reduce problems to issues of individual failure. Ridzi’s contribution in Chapter 7 explores the strengths and weaknesses of collective action, collective impact, and community foundations as three responses to welfare state retrenchment and examine how, collectively, they each have potential to help address one another’s critical weaknesses. Throughout the study, he utilizes a qualitative study of literacy community impact ­foundations and ethnographic studies of collective action and ­community foundations. He argues Collective Action, Collective Impact and Community Foundations represent a trio of adaptations that have flourished perhaps in

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part due to the challenges of neoliberal welfare state retrenchment. Though they will not replace the welfare state, they do offer new ways for local voices and community needs to make themselves heard. Subsequent chapters move even closer to practice and the way social welfare practitioners approach social problems in a neoliberal era. Through four chapters the authors cover different aspects of social welfare practices in historical and contemporary contexts, as well as in different national settings. These chapters are each built on extensive ethnographic examinations of social welfare practice and analyze developments of how social problems are understood and addressed in a neoliberal era. How social welfare practitioners negotiate experiences of hardship and how citizens deal with the demands of active participation are mutual issues in the four chapters. In Chapter 8, Fallov and Nissen focus on how interventions in and around the home have been central to the development of social work. They analyze data from Danish social work with families at risk and community work. The chapter seeks to understand how Social Democratic approaches to welfare have negotiated a balance between individualistic and collectivistic strategies for inclusion through interventions in the homes of families, and how social welfare practice historically and contemporaneously “have worked the home” (Ferguson, 2016). They argue that there is a shift in emphasis between the different dimensions of interventions in the home and that intervening in the affective relations becomes more salient. They discuss how recent developments in the interventions in and around the home can be seen as individualization of situations of precariousness, but at the same time, moreover, as a way to develop new collectivistic responses to material and social hardship, and potential transformative politics. In Chapter 9, Ringø analyzes how new concepts are introduced in social work among people with disabilities and mental illnesses across groups of residents who previously were categorized as belonging to different target groups. She argues that an idea of potentialization is becoming more common in Danish social work, leading to a focus on what citizen can do, as opposed to being helpless or resource-poor. Moreover, as a result that even the weakest groups are viewed as in possession of resources, which can be activated and harnessed within their social networks. She proposes that neoliberal reform of the field leads to a post-ontological space for rehabilitation that leaves little room for the institutional and structural mechanisms behind individual suffering and social problems. Her chapter demonstrates how neoliberal reform entails particular views of human beings (and implications related to human nature) and their problems, which leads to struggles internally among social workers in their understanding of the distribution of responsibility between professionals and citizens.

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Precarity and vulnerability are likewise the themes of the two chapters that follow, however focus is here on young people outside of the labor market and education. In Chapter 10, Nichols and Malenfant combine their data from ethnographic studies of urban youth and young, rurally-based anarchists in Canada, respectively. Their goal is to analyze how young people are engaged by the social welfare system in Canada and how the system deals with the particular social problems of these vulnerable young people. They show how youth experience difficulties in accessing help and that many points of access to the social welfare systems are closed to them; moreover, that young peoples’ experiences increasingly are shaped by punitive measures and experiences of poverty. They argue for a more people-centered approach in the social welfare systems, and one which allows for other more interactive and collective forms of knowledge to flourish. Similar arguments are put forward by Bak Nielsen in Chapter 11, where she draws evidence from qualitative research with vulnerable youth in urban Denmark. Her data shows how the young people in her study navigate between potential qualifying and dis-qualifying understandings of who they are in both productive and precarious positions dealing with the paradoxical structures, conflicting expectations, and rationalities in their encounters with the welfare state institutions. She discusses the maneuverability that is enabled by these different positions and how such an analysis focused on youth adaptation makes it possible to challenge dominant perspectives in social work of young people shaped by decades of active labor market policies. In the concluding chapter Fallov and Blad draws the contributions together. They argue that we must understand the impact of neoliberalism on social welfare in context and time dependent ways. That it is in the varieties of social welfare that we might find the responses to the intended and unintended consequences of neoliberal reform of social welfare. They propose that there are both potentials and dangers involved in recent developments; that is dangers from an individualizing social policy which punish the poor and target migrant populations and potentials in the new forms of solidarity and emergent forms of knowledge in social welfare practice. They conclude by discussing the possibilities of building on from what Hall and Lamont (2013) terms social resilience to develop concepts of professional resilience in order to move beyond neoliberal agendas. A focus on resilience allows us to think of social welfare not simply as a reactive practice subordinated the dominance of economic concerns, but as a proactive force in many peoples’ lives and in bringing to the fore nuanced ways of dealing with the social problems, social policy ideologies and their impact on social welfare practice. This would be one step to move beyond what Foucault terms the anesthetic effect of government reform on social work and acknowledge the emergence of not only new forms of practice but also burgeoning forms of resistance.

Chapter 2

Crisis Neoliberalism and the Social Welfare State: Structural Challenges and Policy Responses Ricardo A. Dello Buono “Every mode of social metabolic reproduction has its historical limits objectively defined in comprehensive epochal terms.” istván mészáros, 2017: 12

A specter is haunting Europe — the specter of right wing populism.1 The continent’s struggling social democratic parties, mired in the contradictions of their broken promises for a Social European Model, have found their electoral bases being threatened by far right-populist forces thriving on xenophobia and a revival of ultra-nationalist sentiments long thought extinct. This rocky road for Social Europe was of course largely preconfigured by the neoliberal design embedded in the EU’s foundational architecture. At the crucial historical moment when it mattered, the broad popular opposition to adhesion proved too weak and disorganized to resist its imposition. Across the Atlantic, US “exceptionalism” has proved to be no exception to the same pernicious tendencies towards social and institutional crisis. The cumulative effects of deep neoliberal governance, cemented into place by alternating Republican and Democratic administrations, have for nearly four decades waged a nearly continuous attack on the exceptionally weak social contract established during the “New Deal” and “Great Society” eras. The rightpopulist opportunity presented itself amidst a malaise of establishment politics and change-resistant party machineries, yielding an insurgent outsider candidacy steeped in xenophobia and nationalist rhetoric. The electoral victory of Donald Trump, while precarious in the vote totals, capped a campaign that proved superior in electoral cunning even if dismal by every other measure. The resulting installation of a murky deep state apparatus managed to open deep fissures in a previously resilient image of US institutional stability. For most of the previous century, the fortunes of rightist forces on both sides of the Atlantic rode on the back of periodic bouts of prolonged employment 1 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the Third International Sociological Association (isa) Forum in Vienna, 14 July 2016.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���9 | doi:10.1163/9789004384118_003

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and fiscal crises. In the first decades of the 21st century, an especially vicious variety of right-populism re-emerged against the global backdrop of persistent recession and sharp migratory dislocations. Even as new chords of xenophobic nationalism were struck to the tune of an alter-right, “anti-globalist” rhetoric, the signature state role of restoring profits remains scarcely concealed. Right-populist governments in practice have opted away from established redistributionist schemes and fledgling attempts to boost aggregate demand via mass consumption. The chronic rediscovery of a “supply side” strategy relies upon expanded military and big infrastructure spending, reduced environmental and other palliative regulations on capital, while increasing “competitiveness” through a reduction of real wages. The formula for the latter has largely relied upon increasing the “flexibility” of the labor force and deepening reductions of social welfare spending. This became the proven path to undoing class concessions made by capital to labor in previous generations of collective bargaining and liberal/social democratic initiatives. The new right-nationalist “appeal” on both sides of the Atlantic seeks legitimacy through the restoration of “national capital” to its former glory. The tone is to defy encroaching “globalist” interests alleged to have been opportunistically favored by predecessor governments. The main “protection” offered to labor consists of state promises to combat excessive immigration portrayed as a destructive competition for jobs and a fiscal drain on social welfare. It is clear that the dramatic rise of right wing populism represents one important aspect of crisis neoliberalism. This political and economic crisis phase of global capitalist development forms the structural backdrop of a global drama in which a sustained current of social welfare retrenchment continues to deepen. As a systemic crisis of the 21st century capitalist world order, it has simultaneously bore witness to unprecedented levels of social inequality, thereby decreasing the probability of sustaining this motion free of major social conflict. The present work explores how this structural crisis stands to shape social welfare policy making and the modalities of social welfare provision. All signs seem to be pointing towards a shrinking dichotomy of welfare models across the Atlantic divide. As further cuts in Federal welfare spending looms over the United States, the deep risks posed by this “weak welfare” model becomes ever more apparent if it were to emerge as the new standard for Europe. Sociological common sense would suggest that discontent over the unraveling of previously negotiated social contracts is likely to intensify in this unfolding context. Drastic reforms of programs established by earlier popular struggles for social protection seem poised to generate popular resistance that will deepen the instability of crisis neoliberalism, paving the way to even more dramatic political

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events in the foreseeable future. Such dynamics must be placed more squarely on the table in contemplating the formidable challenges facing the social welfare state. The theoretical framework offered in this chapter hopes to identify the strategic nodal points in need of deeper investigation by critical analysts. 1

A Theoretical Framework for Confronting Social Welfare Reform

Neoliberalism as a policy regime arose out of structural problems encountered in the development of the core capitalist countries. The effect of neoliberal restructuring across the whole range of social welfare state configurations has been dramatic and the subject of much analysis. Now that neoliberal regimes themselves are caught in a deepening crisis that has intensified in the course of the second decade of the 21st century, the battle lines around preserving social inclusion and an acceptable standard of living for the lowest income sectors are once more being drawn. The struggle for maintaining and universalizing social welfare is a historical process likewise born out of the contradictions of capitalist social relations. The built-in conflictual dynamic that shaped the construction of a comprehensive social welfare state has revolved around diverse forms of organized resistance to asymmetrical social class relations. This resistance has conditioned the forms and modalities in which state policies have been employed to mollify and survive larger systemic crises. Social movement responses to these policy dynamics have further helped shape the overall development of social welfare reforms (expansive or retreatist) and there is a growing albeit still insufficient literature to conceptualize the modalities of how that happens. A dialectical approach to this problem can help capture the totality of these interconnections (Dello Buono, 2015a). This begins with consideration of the structurally defined moments that shape the push for social welfare reform. Such reforms are by their nature conflictual within the larger social class drama since they directly place demands on the social distribution of surplus. State policy responses, bound by their social class character, must in some way negotiate the social movement pressures that impede or otherwise complicate the implementation of new welfare regimes. In a certain sense, the neoliberal mantra famously attributed to Margaret Thatcher, i.e., “that there is no alternative” was partially correct. The global dynamics of advancing capitalism made it systemically impossible not to respond to the developing capitalist contradictions of the latter 20th Century. The core centers of global capital had no alternative but to seek out another configuration for the reproduction of capitalist social relations in order to restore the formerly expansive rates of profit. Of course, Thatcher’s obvious ­untruth was

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to assert that the particular neoliberal restructuring that ultimately emerged was the “only possible” re-configuration. The fact is and remains that the policy alternatives were many and the choice was consciously made to put the big squeeze on those least equipped to resist. In this context, the burden is on critical analysts to ponder this ongoing drama of state reproduction of capital accumulation while standing firm with the values of solidarity, egalitarianism and in defense of a comprehensive and universally accessible social safety net for those on the receiving end of crisisprone capitalist development. It means doing research than can help inform and empower focal points of resistance in strategic ways that can most favorably affect or alter the outcome of state policy making. The critical dialectical approach being advocated here emphasizes the need for grasping the totality of the process under study so that the interrelationships of its parts can be examined as they evolve over time. Such an approach likewise presupposes the inherently conflictual nature of social processes within a capitalist context, viewing any particular social configuration as a “temporary fix” to a systemically irresolvable contradiction that fuels permanent instability and an underlying need for constant re-organization. This is clearly useful in looking at state dilemmas related to social welfare arrangements. The notable characteristic of the capitalist state is its dual role in reproducing the underlying system of social relations while legitimating its own role as mediator for the system’s contentious aspects, particularly in the regulation of wealth distribution. In fulfilling this role of mediation, capitalist state institutions must respond to the organized praxis of social movements that condition to a discernable extent the overall effectiveness and viability of state policy interventions. Various theorists have argued forcefully for the importance of looking dialectically at historical social processes for the purpose of critical analysis. While Marx’s formulation of historical materialism is generally taken as the starting point of this approach, successive generations of neo-Marxist theory have debated how to best employ its underlying premises. Those who stressed the more subjective, Hegelian roots of the early-Marx most typically associated with the work of Lukacs (1971) and Gramsci (1971) emphasized the importance of theorizing praxis while structural Marxist theory (e.g., Althusser and Balibar, 2016; Althusser, 1969; Polantzas, 1973; et al., forcefully pursued the later-Marx’s concerns with structural determination as applicable to the conditions of 20th century. Both of these currents were critical in their approach but their diametrically opposed positions further exacerbated the structure verses agency debate that ultimately contributed to the waning influence of both schools of thought by the turn of the century. Some scholars of the dialectical approach have insisted on the need to resolve the structure verses agency debate such as Jessop (2005; 2016). Jessop’s

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“Strategic Relational Approach” (sra) stresses the need to mirror and relate structure and agency to each other “in a complex and multi-layered ontology, so that appropriate analyses of structurally differentiated actors, within particular structure-conjunctures, may be articulated” (Las Heras, 2017: 2). It’s true that this current of thought advances an important discussion often too readily dismissed as a “chicken and egg” argument over conceptual primacy. Nevertheless, I concur with the insightful critique of the sra offered by Las Heras (2017) in which he demonstrates how Jessop overplays the structuralist factors at the expense of agency, thus sidestepping the task of explaining exactly how popular pushback matters. Las Heras further points out that Jessop glosses over the positional importance of critical researchers by his failure to adequately contemplate how their approach also matters, exerting a potential impact upon social struggles. This leads to a de facto conservative ontology that can actually inhibit emancipatory agency (Las Heras, 2017: 15). I have weighed in on this ontological debate elsewhere, stressing the need to recapture the agency-praxis side of the dialectical approach (Dello Buono, 2015b) and pointing to the failure of contemporary social constructionist attempts to adequately do so (Dello Buono, 2015a). Drawing upon the pioneering critical sociology of law approach of William Chambliss and the critical social movements approach of A. Kathryn Stout, the dialectical approach which I advocate places greater stress upon the contradictions of state policy-making as it is situated within the larger relations of the political economy and driven by the structurally delimited dynamics of social protest and resistance (see Stout, Dello Buono and Chambliss, 2004). While this approach makes no claim to solve the continuing ontological debate surrounding agency verses structure, it instead focuses on the practical application of dialectical insights with an avowed affinity for critical research that can auspiciously address emancipatory concerns. In this light, an essential factor in constructing a critical approach to welfare reform is to situate it in the first instance within the historically evolving context of the larger political economy. This amounts to linking up with the ebbs and flows of the systemic structural crisis (see Figure 2.1). Since this crisis is a permanent one, so too is the threat to the social welfare state and all the more so as the contradictions of accumulation become articulated in an increasingly interconnected global economy. As global capital drives to continually expand, its efforts are contradictory and tend to repeatedly arch back to a crisis that cannot be decisively resolved but only putatively suppressed through periodical economic re-organization (Dello Buono, 2015b). A paradigmatic example was the movement away from Keynesian policies and towards liberalization that began amidst the crisis of profitability of

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economic expansion

economic reorganization e.g. shift towards neoliberal globalization

e.g. metabolic character of capitalist accumulation

tendency towards crisis

e.g. mid-1970s global recession

Figure 2.1 Recurrent Systemic Crises.

the 1970s. The partial flip back towards neo-Keynesian stimulus spending during the post-2008 economic repression is another. Once the process of welfare reform is anchored in its contradictory structural context, the conflictual dynamics that surround state attempts at reorganization can be drawn out in sharper relief. The shifting terrain of state dilemmas that surround it are easier to understand, the impact of new state interventions are easier to detect and the false promises being made by state authorities and political opposition parties alike are rendered more transparent. (See Figure 2.2) These kinds of analysis can prove pivotal for informing social movement platforms and help avoid misplaced concessions or illusory palliatives strategically aimed at pacifying or neutralizing popular resistance to particular restructuration regimes. States are not “free” to implement new policies as they see fit but rather must also continue to legitimate their own rule just as they fulfill their role in reproducing capitalist expansion. As the state seeks to lessen its social spending burden out of economic necessity, it must also establish new bases of legitimacy since capitalism lacks the ability to legitimate itself (Blad, 2011). Seen in this light, the nature of state dilemmas are twofold since they must manage the structural pressures created by the articulation of national economies in the global order while at the same time managing popular resistance

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interventions enacted e.g. reduced social spending, economic stimulus programs, reconf igured state institutions, privatization schemes, etc.

structural contradictions e.g. low growth/economic contraction, declining rates of profit, fiscal deficits, debt crisis, weak aggregate demand, etc.

policy dilemmas e.g. negotiating state spending, managing inf lation, resolving labor conf licts, etc. Figure 2.2 Ongoing State Reproduction.

that arises in the face of increasing social inequalities and state retreats from its social welfare responsibilities. This analysis helps to explain why right-wing nationalism on both sides of the Atlantic has rode the wave of a reactionary legitimating consensus that builds on the undercurrents of restricted rights of citizenship/residence and an economic apartheid of goods and services distribution. It seems especially dedicated to displaced and disaffected sectors of the traditional working class in appealing to a nationalist restoration of some lost “golden age” of racial and gendered exclusion. In order to ultimately prove worthy of its name, the critical analysis proposed here must ultimately become channeled into strategic perspectives that can more directly inform social movement praxis. The premise is that social welfare advocates workers and popular movements working at the frontlines of excluded communities can enjoy better results of their efforts, just as the organization innovations created out of the ongoing struggles of these communities can provide dialogical insights that enrich the sociological lexicon of popular resistance and social change. There is no question that increasing globalization has altered the previous scenario of structural linkages and in so doing has unleashed powerful

Crisis Neoliberalism and the Social Welfare State

strategic mobilization reorganization e.g. building new community-based institutions, organizing consumer boycotts, etc.

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social movement praxis e.g. creation of oppositional locations, responses to exclusionary, exploitative processes

organizational dilemmas e.g. cooptation by political parties, criminalization of protest, etc. Figure 2.3 Organized Popular Resistance.

d­ ynamics that generate new dilemmas for state authorities. These dilemmas have, just as in the past, helped to incubate all sorts of new social movements, some progressive and others extremely reactionary. Such organizing dynamics of such movements, not only class-based, but also those immersed in race, gender, age, and religious cleavages, have helped shaped the rise and evolution of modern social welfare institutions. (See Figure 2.3) Social movements of whatever political stripe can essentially be understood as organized expressions of resistance that respond in order to counteract social forces that adversely affect the material and/or perceived wellbeing of its members. Organized resistance as a product of such dynamics tends to unfold at uneven rhythms and contain only the potential for unity and effectively coordinated actions (Stout and Dello Buono, 1991: 345). The nature and extent of social change resulting from the dynamic interplay between social movement praxis and state reproduction varies considerably. While the nature of capitalist rule has placed substantial limits on the extent to which organized popular resistance can shape the outcome of state social policy dilemmas, most commonly restricted to electoral and representative mechanisms, it is nevertheless clear that capitalist states everywhere have been unable to implement ongoing reforms “exactly as they please.” Social welfare reform is a particular case in

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systemic economic reorganization

state policy dilemmas

social movement praxis

Figure 2.4 Investigating Pivotal Moments in the Social Welfare Reform Process.

point and there is an emerging literature aimed at exploring the precise modalities through which the praxis of social movements shapes the outcome of attempted reforms. To the extent that social movement praxis creates or intensifies emergent dilemmas for state reproduction, this is due to movement supporters being on the receiving end of ongoing attempts of systemic re-organization, such praxis forms an integral part of the ongoing dialectic of the social welfare reform process. (See Figure 2.4) The larger theoretical framework posited here aims to re-position research on social welfare reform more squarely at the pivotal, nodal points of the social dialectic of capitalist reproduction and recurring crises. 2

Structural Crisis and Retrenchment under the Guise of Competitiveness

Once ensconced in the literature regarding the economic downturn of 2008, any analyst will quickly gather that it is both large and contentious. The instinctual approach of mainstream economists is to view all crises as conjunctural downturns, products of one or another imbalance and “distortions” that can be ameliorated if not ultimately overcome with a variety of state policy measures. Other, more critical views posit that the persistent recession that

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began to afflict both the US and Europe around 2008 was nothing short of a continuation of the persistent accumulation crisis that developed in the 1970s, a mounting structural challenge which forced the global systemic turn towards neoliberalism (Mészáros, 2005). Prior to the 1970s crisis, the transatlantic consensus of even many critical thinkers (e.g., the Frankfurt School) was that capitalism had registered an historic achievement of affluence that had somehow outrun the structural contradictions originally posited by Karl Marx’s analysis formulated in the 19th century. These points of view became manifestly challenged by the global crisis of the 1970s which in retrospect can be now be seen as an historical marker for a structural crisis of capital coming up against its absolute limits (Mészáros, 2009; Dello Buono, 2015b: 134). What is even more apparent is that the crisis of the 1970s proved to be a “structuring crisis,” i.e., a generalized crisis in accumulation that forces structural reconfigurations aimed at the restoration of the rate of profit achieved in earlier periods (Aglietta, 2012). The shift towards neoliberalism enthusiastically abandoned the remedial mechanisms of earlier eras dominated by Keynesian/Fordist regimes of state mechanisms of regulation and incremental redistribution. These policies focused on opening up the ­global economic arteries for unrestricted flows of capital that could restore previous levels of investment while facilitating the rolling back of accumulated concessions erected out the contentious class negotiations of the preceding epoch. The epochal changes implemented on an unprecedented global scale and with a velocity never before witnessed in history, driven by an imperial “Washington Consensus” and fueled by the technological advances in infrastructure associated with the most recent wave of transportation innovations and digitalized communications, represented a bold offensive on the part of capital. A surging transnationalization of production provided a new lease on life, reliving the glory of earlier, more savage periods of capital expansion, this time spurring a false sense of capital triumphant and an “end of history” (De la Barra and Dello Buono, 2009: 240–242). The impressive wave of re-organized global capitalist expansion swept through virtually all remaining corners of the world into an integrated logic of hierarchically arranged accumulation. The rise of China as a world superpower demonstrated that a variety of institutional ­configurations could accompany the expansive wave, at the same time displaying a rapid growth in social inequality that rivaled capitalist countries anywhere. In old Europe and the United States alike, comprehensive social welfare approaches became politically defined as a “problem” under neoliberalism, placing the social safety net of the most advanced capitalist countries

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in an ­increasingly stigmatized category where it faced a persistent threat of ­reorganization and contraction. With one element after another of comprehensive welfare being blamed for undermining competitiveness in practically every national context, the persistent failure of global capital to restore profits to rates deemed sufficient would eventually fuel the global race to the bottom currently being experienced on both sides of the Atlantic. There were of course vast differences in the ideological formulas employed to package the desired reductions in social spending. Overall, however, it seems clear that neoliberal capitalism everywhere had the effect of redrawing the structural limits of state welfare spending and public perceptions of the welfare state. 3

US Welfare Reform under Neoliberalism

None of this is to suggest that the US and Europe navigated their respective shifts to neoliberalism in an identical manner. Nor could this have been immediately possible given the large divergence of their respective systems of social welfare. In the US, the national welfare state has long suffered from precarious legitimacy, in the first place owing to its schizophrenic and often chaotic organization across federal and state authorities. Large differences have always existed across states with respect to social welfare spending. This pattern remained substantially intact following the US Civil War of the 1860s where its distinctively racialized character across the northern/southern states divide remained sharply imprinted. Ideological resistance in the South to ­Federal social subsidies remained strong after the Civil War up until the great depression of the 1930s. Only then did large-scale Federal social welfare schemes win mass approval, first during the New Deal (mid-1930s) and then later when urban ­conflicts erupted amidst “two separate societies,” ushering in a significant booster shot of federal social welfare expansion of the “Great Society” (mid-1960s). The arrival of neoliberalism to the US quickly accelerated during the era of the 1980s, coinciding with the stigmatization of welfare programs in toto. This was best symbolized by Ronald Reagan’s consecutive administrations that applied executive, legislative and judicial pressure to debilitate historically weak mechanisms of income distribution and anti-discrimination policies while specifically targeting New Deal/Great Society welfare schemes as wasteful, inefficient and “discriminatory” against a historically privileged white majority. Reagan’s implementation of neoliberalism gave priority to reducing the size of the federal government and cutting taxes in order to encourage economic growth. In practice, this meant cutting back the social welfare state and

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d­ ramatically increasing the military establishment. Reagan Republicanism provided a crucial first step towards welfare reform by weakening its relatively soft ideological supports and creating a major fiscal crisis by engaging in a de facto military Keynesianism (Issac and Leicht, 1997). The two Reagan terms also presided over one of the largest spikes of military spending in US history in direct contradiction to professed Republican Party goals of fiscal responsibility (Bartels, 1991). At the time of Reagan’s election in 1980, official figures claim that social program spending reached 53% of US federal spending, up from 1/3 in 1968, while at the time of Clinton’s election in 1992, social spending had reached 56% (2011: 1). The main supports of the “exceptionalist” US social safety net included the OldAge, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (oasdi), know more commonly as “Social Security” and by far the largest Federal program. However, the program that most symbolized “welfare” in the United States was the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (afdc) that was in effect from 1935–1996. afdc established Federal grants to fund a cash transfer program for low-income families with children, administered by the individual states. Other core programs included the Federal Unemployment Insurance, and the Federal Food Stamp Program, re-named the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (snap) in 2008. The anti-welfare political momentum under Reagan persisted through the George Bush, Sr. administration and into the Democratic administration of William Clinton whose “New Democratic” platform contained the political supports necessary to enact the most lethal blow to the US social welfare state since its creation in the New Deal. In Clinton’s first State of the Union Address, he promised to “end welfare as we know it” so as to “make welfare a second chance, not a way of life…shifting the emphasis from dependence to empowerment” (Clinton, 2006). Against the wishes of many in his own party but tweaked with Republican support, Clinton shut down the afdc program and replaced it with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (tanf) program. Officially, the Clinton Administration cloaked the welfare reform as “replacing social welfare with a work-based social policy” while at the same time advocating for a major expansion in medical coverage. In the end, it completely failed in accomplishing the latter while delivering only on the most conservative aspects of welfare reform, including requiring work for basic relief benefits, the imposition of time limits on relief benefits and increasing the flexibility of states to enact policies that inevitably tended to reinforce historical patterns of social exclusion. In essence, this Clinton administration reform went well beyond Reagan’s “one-dimensional retrenchment strategy” (Schuldes, 2011: 54) that emphasized restricting eligibility to as to cut “waste and fraud” alleged to be rampant, thereby establishing more fundamental limitations on the extent of relief.

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Clinton’s welfare reform bill cut food stamp benefits by $24 billion, denied immigrant eligibility for food stamps, restricted social security eligibility for disabled immigrants and children, and cut federal funding for social services and child nutrition programs. It replaced afdc with block grants to the states that would ensure no growth in spending over a five-year period. With no ­mandate for minimum requirements pertaining to either eligibility or benefit levels, it did contain a five-year lifetime limit on receipt of benefits and a requirement that fifty percent of each state’s caseload would need to be working for benefits by 2002 (Clayton and Pontusson, 1998: 87). As the impact of recession was being felt by 2007 throughout the US, the increasing devolution of Federal responsibilities to the states had resulted in a steady decrease of child coverage despite increasing needs due to the spike in poverty. As one rigorous study convincingly showed, the deepening welfare reform process amounted to a “fundamental restructuring [that] dramatically reduced the capacity of this particular program (tanf) to reach its target population: poor women with children” (Bentele and Nicoli, 2012: 227; 258). A series of disastrous and expensive war adventures that subsequently ­developed under the Bush (Jr.) administrations had the effect of badly increasing U.S. federal deficits across the eight years of Republican rule. Despite incremental increases in Federal funding consistent with a concerted attempt to stimulate the macro-economy, the two consecutive terms of Democratic Party administration that followed did relatively little to rectify the overall trajectory of the US welfare s­ ystem. The only significant exception was the Obama ­administration’s delivery on the Clinton era promise of expanding broader access to health care with the passage of the Affordable Care Act of 2010 (Daguerre, 2017). Falling well short of Comprehensive Universal Guaranteed Health Care, Obama’s signature achievement essentially kept the existing structures of US health care intact and turned to Federal subsidies to support an individual mandate to purchase health insurance. The stubbornly long recession inherited by Obama was followed by an excruciatingly slow recovery. This and other factors helped fuel massive resistance to the Obama Administrations modest attempts to incrementally expand existing welfare programs and to defend the Federal Health Exchange insurance program set up under the Affordable Care Act (aca). With the “Tea Party” faction of the Republican opposition seizing on “Obamacare” as its rallying cry, the terrain was softened up for further steps backwards. The 2016 Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton was soon conceding the need to reform the aca and championing the “successful” welfare reforms earlier signed by her husband while the Republican candidate Trump was calling for an immediate repeal of the aca. By 2016, the “success” of tanf created by the Clinton reform had led

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to a reduction of cash assistance recipients to 23% of those known to be living in poverty, down from 68% in 1996 (Floyd, Pavetti and Schott, 2017). This contraction of social welfare expenditure, designed and supported by conservative Republicans and opportunistically signed into law by a Democratic president despite stiff opposition by many in his party, exceeded the most ambitious goals first proposed by the Reagan administration of the 1980s. Almost immediately after taking office in 2017, the Trump administration took aim at the aca. After just one year in office, Trump managed to significantly weaken the solvency of aca, eliminating the individual mandate and undermining the viability of its market-based architecture. In his State of the Union address in 2018, he outlined his administration’s intention to repeal all other recent expansions in social welfare and target the Medicaid program through further devolution of Federal authority to the States in 2018 and the instatement of a work requirement for maintaining Medicaid eligibility. The template for this radical reform would be none other than the Clinton welfare reform of the afdc, using the same logic to reduce the scope of all remaining core welfare programs (Newkirk, 2018). 4

Neoliberalizing Social Europe

On the European side, the Thatcher administration in Great Britain proved to be the beachhead of neoliberal retrenchment. The longstanding presence of a labor party, a feature that stood in sharp contrast with the US, did not suffice to arrest a substantial cutback and reformulation of the British social welfare state. Through the 1980s, Thatcher’s neoliberalization of the British economy was accompanied with substantial cuts in pensions, sharply reduced income replacement in the face of unemployment alongside of greater eligibility restrictions, and deep cuts in housing support, child support and health care expenditure, this while privatization was initiated in a variety of service provision areas (Clayton and Pontusson, 1998: 85–86). In the early 1990s, the British Conservative government initiated a series of measures to promote labor force participation among disabled people while otherwise reducing their welfare benefits, something that was to be developed in a more comprehensive way by the Labour government that followed (Hyde, 2000). The reform process was posited as an effort to reduce fiscal burdens on the British state while reinforcing the work ethic, productivity and ultimately increase economic competitiveness (Hyde, 2000: 327–328). This trend continued to deepen, ultimately resulting in a restructured form of social welfare delivery that was systemically rather than programmatically reformed (Bochel

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and Powell, 2016). In short, social welfare services became less comprehensive, with greater user participation; its restructuring driven by fiscal deficit reduction imperatives, with an emphasis on devolution relative to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and a generalized aim of reducing the role of the state alongside public-private partnerships (Birrell and Gray, 2017: 242–243). Serving as a much greater contrast to the minimalist and precariously legitimate system of US welfare is the Nordic Welfare State, a universal and solidarity-based model that gained worldwide fame and respect for offering comprehensive coverage to the entire population while enjoying widespread legitimacy. As an institution born of capitalist social relations, the Nordic model is fundamentally linked to earnings through employment that achieved its consolidated character in the post-WWII era and enjoyed further expansion during the 1960s. Unlike the US case, however, comprehensive welfare in the Nordic countries was more integral to its nation-building objective and could likewise be distinguished by its relatively homogenous populations during the formative period when a significant portion of its immigration remained intraNordic in composition (Brockmann and Hagelund, 2012). It is nevertheless true that the oil shocks of the 1970s and resulting international recession were also felt in Scandinavia. With pro-employment policies in place thanks to the strong positioning of Nordic labor unions, the jobless rate was less pronounced than in the US even as high rates of inflation and monetary devaluations took place. Growing financial integration was matched up with the global trend of deregulation by the early 1980s, opening up Scandinavia’s economies ever further (Jonung, 2008). In Denmark, fiscal conservatives responded to the crisis by calling attention to the budgetary strain associated with welfare spending in times of fiscal stress that accompanied low growth and increased unemployment. For their part, social democratic parties struggled to ease spending while remaining ideologically committed to the original goals of the social welfare state. By the early 1990s, however, economic crisis had once again reared its head in Scandinavia as its economies waded far into the uncharted territory of financial liberalization. In Sweden, high unemployment and state budgetary deficits surged in 1993 (Borevi, 2012: 60). As Norway embarked on financial liberalization, it felt structural pressure on account of the fluctuating prices of petroleum. For its part, Denmark had already become more integrated with international markets decades earlier and so further deregulation was less dramatic. This notwithstanding, its growth also stalled with unemployment reaching 9% in the early 1990s (Jonung, 2008: 576). The legacy of financial liberalization made it impossible for the Nordic countries to any longer avoid the social impact of the larger ups and downs

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of the global economy, just as it led to structural changes that significantly degraded their historically more egalitarian distribution of wealth. A mid-1990s usrisd study of Scandinavia dedicated to reflecting on the “Future of the Welfare State” summed up the situation in the following way: Many analysts have linked the poor performance of the Nordic economies to their welfare states. The generous entitlements are expensive and, it is argued, they have made the Scandinavian economies uncompetitive. This problem has been accentuated by the processes of economic internationalization and European integration, which make international competitiveness all the more imperative. This critical view of the Nordic welfare states appears to have found some acceptance even among their principal architects, the Social Democrats and trade unions, as they have recently agreed to cuts in some entitlements, such as lowering replacement rates and introducing waiting days for benefits. Moreover, trade unionists and Social Democrats, in Scandinavia and elsewhere in Europe, have expressed fears that the long-term result of the 1992 initiative would be to reduce welfare state provisions to the lowest common denominator within the European Union. stephens, 1995: 1

At their peak expression, the distinguishing characteristics of the Scandinavian welfare state were their public organization and administration by the state, reflecting concerns for comprehensive and universal coverage, and easy qualifying conditions by virtue of citizenship or even merely by residence. Further, the emphasis on wage earnings-related benefits with employment as a top priority combined to produce a redistributive regime that favored greater egalitarianism (Stephens, 1995: 6–7). At the same time, the Scandinavian countries opted to rely far less on non-Nordic laborers in contrast to other European economies. This had significant effects on encouraging greater participation of women in their labor markets that brought along with it expansive social policies (maternity leave, day care, etc.) to ensure their ability to participate. The stronger trade union movements in Sweden and Norway, relative to Denmark reflected the historical profile of each country’s exports, with the latter more tied to agrarian exports and small-craft industries. The political outcome was a more precarious commitment to trade union priorities in Danish social democracy with greater needs of alliances with more conservative sectors. For much of the 1980s, conservative Nordic political forces did not take aim squarely at the social welfare state as they struggled to avoid vindication of

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the assertions being made by their Social Democratic opponents. They did put into effect, however, pro-business policies designed to stimulate economic growth at the expense of the longstanding historical commitment to a more egalitarian distribution of wealth that by any capitalist standard had been impressive. Illustrative were the “Third Road” reforms of Sweden during the mid-1980s where Social Democrats preached the need to navigate between unsustainable socialist policies and unbearable Thatcherist policies, using currency devaluation and some additional fiscal measures to reduce real wages and redistribute income to capital. This had been preceded by lengthy debates in which conservatives argued for privatization of social services in order to increase their quality and efficiency. A temporary upturn in gdp and fall in unemployment allowed Swedish Social Democrats to successfully campaign and win re-election in 1988 on promises of new vacation and parental leave expansions as the tangible payoff for recent sacrifices, all of which was promptly thrown out the window as the economy began to fall out in 1989. The Swedish tax reform of 1989–90 enacted by the ruling Social Democrats who were by then teamed up with Liberals squarely aimed to reduce taxation on those in the upper income brackets (Stephens, 1995: 15). This was followed by a wave of austerity measures that included a wage freeze and ban on strikes. While the predictable popular response was to punish and bring down the Social Democratic government, it was quickly re-instated with support from the Liberal Party and empowered to deepen the austerity program and a change of position in favor of supporting Sweden’s joining the European Community. This latter move would eventually cement into place the reduction of real wages just as it granted capital a muchdesired competitiveness to fuel exports. Further measures taken to curtail and eventually eliminate centralized collective bargaining fueled the historical unraveling of tripartite negotiations, dealing capital an ever more powerful hand. As the crisis deepened, cuts in welfare entitlements were rolled out in the face of conservative arguments that the economy was now in “structural deficit” and that the golden era of social welfare entitlement had effectively begun its protracted slide downhill (Stephens, 1995: 16). Norway’s position differed somewhat given its significant petroleum asset as this made it relatively less beholden to foreign capital. Its main structural vulnerability, however, was its subjection to fluctuations in global oil prices. The net effect was that Norway was able to avoid the sharp cutbacks under austerity that were forced upon Sweden during the 1990s. In contrast, Denmark had to rely upon its agricultural export base and experienced the need to cut entitlements even earlier than Sweden. Notwithstanding the considerable skill in which these cutbacks were engineered, Denmark was under

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greater pressure from increasing unemployment that inevitably placed its social ­welfare programs under tight limits. Just like the Sweden and Norway (Karlsen, 2018), Denmark would prove to be ill equipped to confront the challenges that immigration would bring to the continent after the turn of the century (Jönsson and Kojan, 2017). Taken as a whole, the Nordic countries have increasingly experienced fiscal pressure that force a turn towards greater efficiency in social service delivery as the expense of the universalism that their welfare model achieved at its peak expression (Greve, 2016). Legitimacy for maintaining the resilient Nordic welfare state has been steadily chafed under the chronic inability of the social democratic administrations to keep their promises and avoiding the situation of having to preside over cutback and retrenchment. Greater experimentation with workfare was no longer a complete stranger in Norway by the early 1990s (Gilbert and Van Voorhis, 2001). As additional fiscal pressures posed by the European migration crisis continued to mount, the structural fissures in the portion of Europe that had most closely approximated universal and comprehensive social safety nets were being showcased by violent albeit isolated outbreaks in predominantly first and second generational immigrant neighborhoods in Sweden (Peterson, Thörn and Wahlström, 2018). 5

Neoliberal Europe verses Social Europe

Since its inception in 1993 and the creation of The Stability and Growth Pact of 1997, the European Union has sought to enforce common parameters of macro-economic regulation designed to enhance the interests of capital under the guise of increasing the competitiveness of individual members and the regional economy as a whole. Measures designed to better manage recurring economic crises across the member states, including the “Six Pack” of macroeconomic policies adopted in 2011, and the “Euro Plus Pact” all aimed to encourage restructuration in terms that could enhance economic competitiveness by uniformly suppressing real and social wages. The “European Semester” that sets macroeconomic objectives for each EU member as well as the “bailout agreements” or rescue deals all ultimately revolved around a logic of structural adjustment to be achieved via reducing wages, rolling back public services and lessening social protection (Petmesidou and Guillén, 2014: 296). Given the reluctant experience of reform in the Nordic countries, it is now more generally clear that the European Social Model became re-engineered by austerity Europe. The brunt of the burden created by this structural renovation now has to be shouldered by those sectors least suited to bear it.

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The European Social Model as envisioned by social democratic parties of all stripes was ­historically constituted as an alternative to US-style, wild western capitalism. As the European Union assumed its consolidated form, largely in defiance of a fragmented and weakened European Left, its suppositions were interlaced with institutional features that openly sought to firmly integrate European national economies with capital-friendly aims of a consolidated and revitalized European power bloc (Martinsen and Vollard, 2014). With the European crisis of 2008, “social Europe” met “austerity Europe” as EU conservative and social democratic policy makers alike set down to reproduce the neoliberal logic that increasingly opened their economies to global participation and enhanced “competitiveness.” All of this had the net effect to begin to cement into place the “temporary” policies aimed at the reduction of real wages and social spending. In the early, ascendant phase of neoliberal restructuring, this “obsession” formed part of an overall reduction of the role of the state in economic affairs (Mazzocchi, 2016). The enhanced capital mobility that resulted from neoliberal policies further fueled an already active competition for reducing taxation. This new fiscal reality effectively fed back into the imperative to further “rationalize” the social welfare regimes of European n ­ ations. The massive contradiction that this embodied for social Europe can be found in the fact that increasingly open global competition requires a strong state and high social welfare spending in order to cushion the adverse effects on the affected social sectors. As the drive for global competitiveness was thrust upon the European continent, the consolidation of “austerity Europe” threatened the ideological legitimacy of social democracy. What response could social democrats now offer in the face of these structural shifts in favor of capital? In the initial drive towards neoliberalization, the answer increasingly amounted to nothing. Worse yet, social democrats in power seemingly led the charge headlong into exclusionary policies, from Blair’s “New Labour” to France, Spain, Italy and on across the whole geographical and political axes of the continent. Hence, the stage was meticulously set for the surge of an “alt-right populism” that now accords space for an ultra-right presence in state policy-making. As orthodox neoliberalism itself began to crumble under the weight of steep recessionary pressures that capped the end of the 21st century’s first decade, various governments turned back to Keynesian-style state stimulus programs in order to weather the deep recession. As Mazzocchi (2016) argues, the increasing inability to contain intensifying social pressures leads to diminished political support for global openness and increasing anti-establishment demands for economic nationalism, with Brexit symbolizing the first conquest of Euroskepticism (Mazzocchi, 2016: 66). If the unbridled pursuit of ­competitiveness

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generally aligns with anti-EU and pro-protectionist sentiments, it also rings true that the cumulative effect of the “obsession” was an eminently unsustainable redistribution of wealth from the bottom to the top. Emblematic of a global system in crisis, the second decade of the 21st century has set the stage for a major showdown. Will this period be remembered as the one in which the European social model came crashing down? What is certain is that the drama is taking place under shifting political conditions marked by a highly disorganized popular resistance that continues to frustrate the electoral aspirations of social democratic/liberal parties. Persistent migratory upheavals continue to intensify the seismic political shift to the right with ever-greater influence of right wing, “anti-establishment” populists. The political stalemate seems destined to place unprecedented stress on comprehensive social welfare all across social Europe, even in its once unquestioned bastion in the Nordic states. As we have already seen, a similar motion stands to degrade still further the historically weak and chronically underfunded social safety net in the United States. 6

From Social Welfare Safety Nets to Human Capital: Resistance Matters

As social welfare policy-making transits through successive waves of crisis, it structurally generates the seeds of opposition. The praxis of social forces seeking to arrest and resist social welfare reform enjoys a growing literature (e.g., Powell, 2017; Sparks, 2016; Schram, 2015; Orlowski, 2014), including some of the work in the current volume. Historically, organized labor has been a major actor and first line of defense in opposition to social welfare retrenchment. Declining trade union membership under conditions of selective deindustrialization has limited the ability of its members to stage decisive actions to halt welfare reform measures in many areas, although union-organized resistance remains particularly effective in some countries including France and Southern Europe (Schmidt, 2013). At the same time, trade union power has not always been wielded to oppose social welfare reform since it constitutes a major bargaining chip in forming larger alliances and signing on to larger social pacts (Ebbinghouse and Naumann, 2018). Other oppositional sources have ranged across a variety of new social movement organizations where the ultimate key to successful impact rests in the capacity of social movement leaderships to effectively steer intersectoral alliances under an anti-neoliberal umbrella. The resulting pressure can constrain the state and potentially alter its course of managing an ever more precarious

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accumulation crisis (Clark, Heron-Hruby, and Landon-Hays, 2014). Coalitions that have emerged to confront the human rights violations being experienced by waves of displaced peoples have, subject to the manifold weaknesses of ngo structures, come to play an increasing role in mounting resistance to crisis neoliberalism. Important alliances have developed between immigrant rights communities via transnational ties that have interlaced with sympathetic lay and religious institutions in movement building that have in other eras opposed military interventionism and nuclear armament (Miller, 2012: 214). Amidst this panorama of resistance is the often-undervalued quarter of praxis found in the organized efforts of social practitioners (Vickers, 2016). The whole constellation of modern social work practice arose in large part as a response to the structurally flawed nature of capitalist social relations and its inability to provide for the basic needs of systemically excluded social sectors. Many social activists were eventually assimilated in social service through its professionally and bureaucratically regulated channels of social activism. It is no historical coincidence that various organized expressions of “radical social work” developed throughout the 1960s-70s in reaction to a shifting structural process wrapped up with an evolving reform process of the welfare state, however unequally experienced across the globe. Within the institutionally delimited location of social work practice as conventionally defined, a persistent and illustrative “moral ambiguity” has long haunted the social work establishment, essentially revolving around the practitioner’s role of keeping socially excluded sectors alive while at the same time unwillingly serving to protect the dominant exclusionary system from political challenges from below. The structural shifts associated with the neoliberal period gestated in the 1970’s promoted policies emphasizing financial stability, budgetary restraint, and pro-market policies that mandated a fundamental restructuring of existing public sectors. It notably had the dual effect of recasting social work in a supporting role for the commodification of social service delivery at the same time that social disparities were objectively increasing at virtually all social levels. Ever more commodified, the structurally mandated reforms of social service delivery became more fully synchronized during the Blair/Clinton period in a harmful, inverted manner where just as social needs were dramatically expanding out of an accelerating deindustrialization and restructured through more flexible labor markets, the scope of services was being systematically scaled back. The corresponding transformation of social work practice included its suppression as a responsibility of state service delivery systems wherever possible, pushing in favor of its re-organization under the auspices of private international charities, faith-based based organizations and other non-governmental

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agencies. Ironically, much the leadership of traditional political forces aligned with the popular sectors was absorbed into these ngo’s, depriving the traditional bases of resistance with their most talented leadership assets. In many areas, it took decades for social movement organizations seeking to resist neoliberalism to regain their former momentum (Nadasen, 2014: 231–240). The global shift to “human capital approaches” under neoliberalism promoted small-scale micro-credit, small-business and related “innovations” ultimately designed to transform the poor and disenfranchised into “more ­attractive” commodities for capital exploitation (Palier and Hay, 2017). In the new world being remade in the image of its own internal logic, exploitation itself was re-conceptualized at the solution rather than the causal factor of social exclusion, producing a kind of “exclusionary inclusion” (Gubrium et al., 2017). While services everywhere become targeted for sharp reductions or elimination depending on the surrounding political conditions and operative matrix of disorganized popular resistance, the very idea of comprehensive social service approaches designed to establish a basic safety net and guarantee a baseline standard of living becomes blamed as the cause for perpetuating their clients’ lack of competitiveness. In short, the new imperative that globalized re-structuring sought to impose upon the institutions of social welfare shifted the emphasis away from protection aimed to addressing structured social disparities, moving instead towards making vulnerable populations more competitive in the new world order. The neoliberal model was completely dominated by a “one-dimensional logic” in this sense, seeking to re-cast the entire new globalized setting within the lexicon of capitalist expansion (De la Barra and Dello Buono, 2009). Neoliberal reforms of the welfare state meant placing social service delivery on a “fair playing field” for private and ideally transnational corporate access. The envisioned transition was from public, to private-public partnership to fully private enterprise as a sequential project for synchronizing local settings to the dictates of global capital. The level of popular protest and resistance to the new model has of course varied as recent scholarship has demonstrated. Tsatsanis (2009) suggests that even in European countries where neoliberalism managed to cultivate significant popularity, particularly in the face of new “security” issues and riding on the back of a perceived immigrant “threat,” there has still been considerable pushback. Countries such as Switzerland and Denmark, finer distinctions notwithstanding, witnessed considerable resistance to the overall neoliberal model with a majority still seeing it more in problematic terms than as an attractive solution (Frederiksen, 2018). This is consistent with broader political analyses on both sides of the Atlantic that have seen right populism make inroads in

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longstanding bastion regions of the left through the propagation of a clumsily constructed façade of “anti-capitalism” against a dismal structural backdrop of economic displacement (Saull, 2015). The larger dynamic of system and resistance that I describe here demarcates a logical space for social worker practitioners to work out their commitment to positive social change. Social workers can choose in organized fashion to support popular resistance to the established relations of power by subverting the reactionary aspects of their own professional discourse (Shdaimah and McGarry, 2017). This opens the door to embracing the collectively constructed discourses of popular social justice while actively supporting in their practice the legitimate demands put forward by community and social movement organizations (Howard, 2017). It also invites a substantial margin of heat since social workers may be among the first perceived as potentially dangerous by state authorities on account of their pivotal, frontline social location. Simpson (2018) makes this clear in the case of the UK: There is nothing new about political and radical approaches to social work being attacked… echoed at that time by Virginia Bottomley’s claim that ‘there will be no place for trendy theories or the theory that ‘-isms’ or ‘-ologies’ come before common sense and practical skills in social work education’… [there has been] a sustained attack upon social work and its educators, as further Government intervention dramatically changed the education landscape. Private providers were introduced along with extensive support for its flagship fast-track programmes, even though both were subject to criticism; not just from the social work academy, but also from inspections… More recent interventions have seen the closure of The College of Social Work, largely on financial grounds… and, the most recent plan for a new regulatory body which will focus upon new knowledge and skills statements for social work. I would argue that these policies, taken together, form a largely unprecedented attack on social work, or perhaps more significantly upon a form of social work which refuses to accept the Government’s dominant individualistic agenda. simpson, 2018: 61–62

The continuing crisis of neoliberalism implies the need for transforming the way that social work practice is engaged and it is here that academic institutions in the field can play a pivotal role. Intersectional and critical feminist approaches, for example, have built upon Freire and others in revitalizing ­social practitioner concepts of empowerment since it unites critical consciousness and reflexive awareness in practical action aimed at social ­transformation

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(Schoeneman, 2017). Just as 1970s feminism argued that the “personal is ­political,” critical social work theory asserts that the “clinical is political” as it moves on further to challenge oppressive social arrangements. Through active engagement and transcendence of these conditions, a collective dialogue armed with dialogical conscientization can help fuel transformative collective action. Progressive social service practitioners at work within this process can strive to both deploy and selectively cede their own professional power in common cause with progressive social change. This ultimately signifies active opposition to the reactionary politicization of the practice of social work that works to the disadvantage of those who are the intended beneficiaries (Gwilym, 2017). 7 Conclusion To understand the ebbs and flows of social welfare reform, it is essential to make the connections between the larger political economy and the state policy dilemmas that result. The present work has argued that critical analysis of social welfare reform must also begin to triangulate these factors with the praxis of social movement activities as they react to and engage with reform implementation. As Andreotti and Mingione aptly state, the “shifting forms and features this new welfare and this new system of rights will take depend highly on the mobilisation and activation of citizens within new emancipation movements…this is an issue that is a crucial focus for research and debate on the perspectives of welfare systems in industrialised countries” (2016: 263). It is clear that orienting critical analysis towards praxis does not signify an idealistic attempt to solve irresolvable contradictions that are deeply embedded in capitalist social relations. Rather, it should be aimed at empowering resistance and informing ongoing social struggles out of a conjunctural analysis of key moments of structural realignment as they present themselves. There is no question that the institutions of social welfare serve reproductive and social control roles that historically helped to stabilize the contradictory process of accumulation under capitalism. However, structural Marxist theory tended to overemphasize that truth at the expense of recognizing the hard fought gains on the part of organized labor and other social movement actors, including social practitioners in the field who were demanding the expansion of coverage and quality of the social welfare state in towards satisfaction of pressing social needs (Matthews, 2018). The dialectical approach proposed in this study seeks to elevate the role of organized praxis in defense of the social welfare state as an explanatory framework for the historically

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unfolding dynamics of social welfare reform within the structural confines of capitalist social relations, particularly as situated in the context of advanced neoliberal crises. The emphasis on praxis seeks to substantially focus on engagement with the organized resistance of diverse communities as they confront a systemic state abandonment of social welfare responsibilities and a relentless political expropriation of the rights of the most vulnerable sectors. Social and community-based movements working on the frontlines of those communities most affected by crisis neoliberalism seek by necessity to secure a baseline of social justice for excluded sectors. The periodical outbreak of violence around strained social welfare systems from Sweden to the UK suggests that resistance is never far from re-emerging in the face of erratic reform and cutbacks in social protection (Mikkelsen and Nyzell, 2018). As suggested earlier in this work, the Nordic Welfare State was a historical point of reference in comprehensive social welfare services. It still serves as a marker for the rest of Europe and North America where austerity pressures have exerted a destructive impact upon much less developed welfare states (Plehwe, 2017). Nordic states first assumed responsibility for efficient and equitable provision of essential social services as an underlying premise for systemic reproduction, created out of a collectively negotiated and highly regulated social contract. It is precisely that kind of social contract that has been targeted for reduction throughout the current crisis even as any eventual recovery worth of its name will ultimately require its re-constitution. As crisis neoliberalism became confronted with massive migratory dislocations, we have seen that an upsurge of right wing populism gained currency across both sides of the Atlantic. This in turn further eroded traditional bonds of social solidarity with those unable to achieve a full insertion into organized social welfare systems as they became increasingly tied to the vagaries of formal sector employment. The continuing “drift” of crisis conditions that expose new vulnerabilities left unaddressed by continually reformed welfare state policies has promoted a layering of vestige and substitute programs that become blended into a dwindling institutional mix (Hacker, 2004). This often involves either non-public alternatives, meager supplements to public welfare institutions, or conversion of existing programs, using their infrastructure to accomplish newly reduced welfare policy aims. The re-organization of social welfare as we knew it has been the outcome of ascendant conservative and fledgling social democratic governments alike. This convergence born of neoliberal restructuration fueled a deepening popular disaffection that has helped undermine establishment electoral p ­ olitics

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while revealing ever more clearly the incapacity of neoliberal states to offer any real solution for affected communities. The re-organization and effective defense of popular interests now falls entirely upon the resurrection of a progressive agenda, one predicated upon the organized social movements of actors capable of confronting the neoliberal debacle of unsustainable social polarization and de-universalized social welfare reform.

Chapter 3

Searching for Saviors: Economic Adversities and the Challenge of Political Legitimacy in the Neoliberal Era Cory Blad “Your parents might have done it with just one job, but now you’re ­working for less and twice as hard.” Tomorrow’s Industry, dropkick murphys

The embedded liberal promise of material security, embodied in various forms of advanced capitalist middle class construction, has obviously given way to post-Keynesian, neoliberal realities. From worsening economic – and subsequent social – inequality (e.g., Blank, 2011) to an emergent precariat (Standing, 2011; see also Munck, 2013), the voluminous collection of studies ­articulating the curious contemporary phenomenon of economic insecurity for large portions of respective populations during an era of unprecedented economic growth. That neoliberalization has contradictory outcomes is neither in dispute nor a novel observation. The question here becomes centered on the e­ ffects of this differential growth and deepening inequality. As advanced capitalist societies see larger portions of respective populations gain fewer benefits from national economic growth, how might other social institutions – such as democratic processes – be impacted? This chapter examines the growth of economic adversity during the neoliberal era and argues that the specific conditions of neoliberal reform indirectly contribute to the rise of nationalist political rhetoric and the strategic integration of nationalism as a means to obtain political legitimacy in the neoliberal era. In essence, the deepening of material hardship is a consequence of state-led neoliberalization, which places specific constraints on those same state actors and institutions expected, by respective constituencies, to mitigating socioeconomic hardships. As a result, sitting or prospective political actors are increasingly unable to address constituent demands for economic protection through economic means (or at least, those not amenable to market demands) and therefore seek alternative means to justify electoral support. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���9 | doi:10.1163/9789004384118_004

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The purpose of this study is to highlight the hardship conditions that underlie neoliberal growth and make the case for an indirect link between these hardships conditions, decreasing confidence in state capacities to resolve said adversities, and the commensurate (re)rise of nationalist political legitimation. I argue that a direct effect of the (re)ascendency of nationalist political legitimation is the further deterioration of state level economic protections. That is, nationalist or other non-economic legitimation strategies may rhetorically integrate the language of protectionism in various ways, but cannot (nor have shown a willingness) to alter market-oriented neoliberal reforms in any way that would ameliorate hardship conditions in respective national states. To that end, the comparison below focuses on cases (Finland and Sweden) in which levels of economic protectionism are purportedly high and the adverse effects of neoliberalization supposedly mitigated by the “Nordic Model” of welfare capitalism.1 The cases of Finland and Sweden are compared below for two primary ­reasons. First, both are exemplars of the Nordic Model of welfare capitalism – specifically designed to mitigate inevitable economic disparities that are requisite aspects of capitalist societies. Second, both countries are experiencing increased support for respective nationalist parties. These parties are not allied with each other (in fact, can often be adversarial),2 have distinct party histories, and exist within distinct national political climates. Sweden and Finland have similar political economic characteristics but differ in other social and demographic realities, including immigration trends and populations. However, both the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) and the Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset) have emerged as influential members of respective parliaments based on the integration of a monolithic national cultural definition, notably through public aversion – often hostility – to immigration, migrant cultures, and migrants, themselves.

1 See the chapter by Nissen in this volume. 2 While there is certainly political cooperation between so-called nationalist parties in the European Parliament – particularly in the Europe of Nations and Freedom (enf) voting block, there are still significant practical divisions and efforts toward disassociation within this party type. The single eup representative of the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) is a member of the Europe for Freedom and Direct Democracy (efdd) block, while the Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset) and the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti) are members of yet another allied block, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ecr). More to the point, the Finns Party actively distances themselves from nationalist-oriented parties such as the Sweden Democrats (Author’s interview, June 2014; Forsell and Rosendahl, 2017) in an effort to legitimize the party as more than tertiary.

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Given the idiosyncratic nature of national politics (even in Scandinavia) and the unique realities of respective immigration (i.e., massive disparities between Swedish (high) and Finnish (low) levels of immigration), it seems reasonable to question whether singular reactions to levels of immigration, specifically the recent refugee crisis, is really at the heart of this resurgence of European nationalist politics. Yet, the consistent and public anti-immigrant and anti-refugee rhetoric coming from these political parties is impossible to ignore (see Taggart, 1995). At the same time, attention to national debt crises and the aftermath of the most recent global recession have encouraged some to understand nationalist political parties as a commensurate reaction since 2008 (see Bosco and Verney, 2012). I discount neither the impact of immigration and the recent increase in refugee populations throughout select countries in Europe nor the negative impact of the recession on local populations as influential factors in nationalist political efficacy. Quite the opposite, in fact, as I believe both have served as catalysts for contemporary nationalist political support. However, I do argue that attention to these two temporal/episodic factors obfuscates the underlying political economic foundation for nationalist political ascendency. Specifically, I argue that material adversities resulting from neoliberal political economic reforms have created cumulative conditions of economic adversity for specific portions of national populations, which have coupled with the decreased capacity of political organizations/actors to mitigate these adversities through traditional (i.e., Keynesian) economic protectionist means. As such, both sustained and deepening economic adversities and an emergent crisis of neoliberal political legitimacy has created a political opportunity for formerly irrelevant parties and ideologies. In short, the impact of recent population migrations and economic crisis certainly contribute to the contemporary popularity of nationalist political parties and actors; however, the economic and political effects of neoliberalization provided the conditional foundation for the rise of nationalist political efficacy.3 This chapter offers a theoretical framework designed to explain the link between neoliberalization and nationalist political efficacy, primarily through a conceptual synthesis of the Polanyian double movement and Bourdieu’s understanding of doxa. The advantages of this synthetic approach as a holistic complement to alternative explanations are subsequently presented. The comparative cases of neoliberalization and nationalist politics in Finland and Sweden are then examined through this analytical lens. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the challenges of both theorizing nationalist 3 See the chapter by Czarnecki and Vargas Chanes in this volume.

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­ olitics and the danger of ignoring the underlying causes for this episodic rise p of n ­ ationalist and populist politics. 1

Explaining Nationalist Political Efficacy: A Brief Synthesis of Polanyi and Bourdieu

The problem of nationalist politics is as much one of definition as it is of national distinction. This is the essence of Walker Conner’s methodological critique: “Even when one restricts nation to its proper, non-political meaning of a human collectivity, the ambiguity surrounding its nature is not thereby evaporated” (1978: 378). Divisions between so-called “primordial” (cf. Herder and in a more contemporary sense, David Smith) and civic (cf. Renan and contemporary exemplars such as Anderson and Gellner) understandings of nationalism are compounded by additional issues such as methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2003) and nationalist political utility (Brubaker, 1996). With consensus elusive on understanding and defining the nature of nationalism, it seems reasonable to wonder whether a theory of nationalist politics might be equally tenuous. The issue, of course, is the distinctive nature of respective nationalist history, content, experience, and legitimation. While nationalisms differ, the utility of the concept is common with regards to legitimating state institutions and political actors. The integration of nationalism as a means to legitimate state-building efforts is well chronicled (Schulze, 1994; Hobsbawm, 1992); however, the postwar era is best defined by the ebb of nationalism as a primary means of practical political legitimation. The rise of the state as an economic regulator and (sometimes) protector during the Keynesian embedded liberal era functioned as a strategic means of national legitimation thus “rendering nationalism obsolete” (Brubaker, 1996: 1). The return of nationalism as a means of mobilizing and legitimating political activities appears to have caught most observers by surprise. Like studies of nationalism, there is no consensus on what counts as nationalist politics, what motivates the rise of nationalist politics, or even how to adequately define the phenomenon. Variously understood as populist or “radical right,” nationalist politics is often understood as a phenomenon rooted in reactionary conservatism, although even among these political parties there are examples of progressive economic platforms. If there is a common finding with regards to studies of so-called “radical right” parties it is that there can really be no consistent definition of what constitutes a “radical right” party nor what motivates its ascendency (Norris, 2005).

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Norris (2005) and Mudde (2007) offer comprehensive overviews of political and sociological literature that both frame as “supply and demand” categories of explanation. Essentially, “demand-side” explanations privilege structural conditions and motivations as primary causal factors. For example, the “New Social Cleavage thesis” builds on the work of scholars such as Betz (1994), Betz and Immerfall (1998) and Ignazi (2003) arguing that political economic and social structural changes (deindustrialization, for example) create conditions that further divide respective populations and facilitate reactionary, right-wing parties who monopolize on these social divisions. Holmes (2000) offers a nuanced version of this perspective with his concept of “integralism,” which is based on an understanding of rapid socio-political economic change (“fast capitalism”) creating latent opportunities for historically rooted “integral” interests based on specific notion of European identity. Others argue that these cleavages and shifts have promoted a significant backlash against the cosmopolitanism and diverse migration that defined the post-1960s Atlantic world (Gibson, 2002; Pettigrew, 1998). Kitschelt (1995) offers a synthetic version of this theoretical perspective in which he argues that social changes create political opportunities that political parties are positioned and willing to exploit. In this sense, far right parties are outside of the cosmopolitan paradigm and willing to take advantage of social change (in this case demographic diversification) in order to offer an exclusionary alternative. Kitschelt’s perspective forms a convenient bridge between the demand (structural) perspectives and more agency-oriented supply perspectives. The latter focuses on various aspects of party behavior and adjustment. These perspectives are reflective of both political opportunity and rational choice biases that emphasize the importance of organizational decision-making and party strategy (Art, 2011; Dalton, 2009; Rydgren, 2005). The pragmatic political emphases of these perspectives are clear – political parties and organizations seek to alter strategy and orient platforms with regards to party competition and other conditional political factors. Thus, nationalist politics is a strategic choice and not necessarily the causal outcome of deeper social and/or political economic structures. The political bias of these perspectives offers significant insights into the mechanical processes that influence party positions as well as viable explanations for the intentionality of nationalist politics as a strategic choice. The problem of course, is that this singular emphasis on political factors reduces the capacity to integrate extra-political social structural factors and can reduce explanation of both parties and the phenomenon of broad nationalist integration as episodic and local actor choices.

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In short, this move away from structural influences minimizes the ability to theorize the phenomenon of nationalist politics, while simultaneously enhancing the capacity to study national political mechanics. The ability to more specifically study party strategy is valuable, but I would argue that it must be integrated with more conditional factors – specifically, material economic factors – in order to create a more useful holistic understanding of a truly global phenomenon. The categorization of explanatory “far right/populist” literature into demand/supply is efficient but limiting. The construction and inevitable deconstruction of each theoretical perspective serves to highlight the problems with each and clouds the possibility of integration.4 The tendency toward monocausal explanation (certainly inclusive of more than this particular literature) belies the fact that political strategy must be accepted as an empirical reality but so to must political economic conditions. This essay offers a synthetic, yet admittedly structurally biased, way of understanding the rise of nationalist political efficacy in the contemporary neoliberal era by focusing on the conditions that influence strategic political options. I argue that a conceptual focus on political legitimation offers a means to retain a focus on the importance of political agency while also ensuring sensitivity to the conditions of local legitimation and supra-national political economic structures that influence those respective conditions. This approach can (a) better reflect the diversity of nationalist political parties/actors by focusing on local, conditional factors that influence strategic legitimation and thus (b) theorize nationalist politics as a strategic political reaction to altered conditions of legitimation, regardless of national uniqueness and idiosyncratic conditions. 2 The Double Movement and Neoliberal Doxa The theoretical synthesis presented here is built on two complementary concepts: the Polanyian double movement and Bourdieu’s conceptualization of neoliberal doxa. In sum, Polanyi argues that modern capitalist societal relationships are rooted in a tension between capitalists desiring minimal regulation and maximized profit potential and national populations seeking protections 4 To be fair, both Norris (2005) and Mudde (2007) appear to understand this problem quite well. The problem of theoretical categorization and monocausal bias is a systemic social scientific problem and certainly not limited to this discussion. The larger point being made here is that this brief accounting of literature in this particular subfield is a problem in and of itself – while all demand and supply perspectives may not supply the desired singular explanation, elements of each might.

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from the inevitable inequalities and material adversities resulting from market liberalization (Polanyi, 2001 [1944]: 79). As liberalization enhances capital accumulation it also historically exacerbates material adversities and deepens already existing economic inequalities (Harvey, 2010) The perpetual desire to expand profit is a fundamental logic of capitalism, however the consequences of increased profit invariably create downward pressures on non-beneficiaries (i.e., labor) in the form of wage stagnation, job loss, but also through increased costs of living (housing, education, health care, etc.…). Liberalization can enhance profit through the deregulation of existing protections such as labor and housing regulations, but it can also encourage the creation of new profit opportunities through the commodification of formerly public goods/services through privatization. Obviously, in both cases national populations can experience adverse material conditions during periods of liberalization through productive deregulation (often followed by wage stagnation or “downsizing”) and simultaneous cost of living increases exacerbated through processes such as privatization.5 In the Polanyian sense, the structural motivations to maximize profit often result in deep conflicts with populations directly impacted (say through job losses) or unable to absorb profit generating cost increases. This tension between beneficiaries and larger national populations is fundamentally economic, yet the dynamics of the double movement play out in largely political arenas. Capitalism itself is a political project, but liberalization requires policy intentionality (or “planning” in Polanyi’s terms on the part of the state (Polanyi, 2001[1944]: 147, 216)). Any process of liberalization implies that regulations exist, and thus political will/control is necessary for any process of deregulation to take place. Similarly, the role of the state in enacting/reenacting protectionist regulation designed to mitigate the adverse effects of unrestricted capital accumulation is also contingent on political will and action. As such, both ends of the double movement are based on vested interests channeled through political institutions. Capitalist interests demand that the state liberalize for the purpose of expanding profit opportunities and national populations demand material protections from adverse conditions exacerbated by liberalization (Polanyi, 2001[1944]: 142). Meeting these countervailing demands becomes the basis for political legitimation in a modern capitalist context. Polanyi’s capitalist state is understood as a mediating institution that manages this tension 5 Both production deregulation and privatization are used as examples of possible liberalization outcomes. These are possibly (however likely) outcomes, but certainly not the only way that liberalization can create adverse material effects while t the same time facilitating profit accumulation.

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and maintains capitalist legitimacy by meeting the demands of both constituent groups.6 Material inequality is a requisite of capitalism (Mises, 2000[1955]; Lowi, 2005; Harvey, 2010) and liberalization of production and markets exacerbates those disparities. The historical rise of protectionist legislation and welfare policies are the result of political actors attempting to mitigate adverse conditions resulting from liberalization initiatives (Polanyi, 2001[1944]: 151). In this way, Polanyi explains both the role of the state in maintaining ­capitalist systemic legitimacy, as well as the contradictory dynamics of that ­legitimation. During the postwar period of Keynesian embedded liberalism, Polanyi’s understanding of a functional double movement was embodied in the form of the welfare state (Offe, 1985; Holmwood, 2000). High economic growth was matched with a Fordist emphasis on enhancing the consumptive capacities of national populations. Relatively high wages were matched by publicly mitigated costs of living through state subsidization of education, health care, infrastructure among many other areas, to substantially expand (if not create) a middle-class consumptive base in advanced capitalist societies (Cohen, 2003). In Polanyian terms, significant portions of national populations were thus “protected” through mediated liberalization, but more importantly economically stable in large part due to the efforts of the state. Conversely, rapid postwar economic growth7 was enough to pacify capital interests for a time, although ongoing efforts to liberalize global trade (gatt) belied a longer-term strategic view and reinforces the constant pressures within the double movement. When crises inevitably arose in the 1970s, an ideological and political alternative centered on growth through liberalization was in place to reorient 6 The Polanyian concept of the double movement essentially theorizes that the central tension in capitalists societies is between those who advocate for increased liberalization of markets (i.e., moving toward more laissez-faire, deregulated markets) and national populations demanding protection from the adverse effects of market liberalization (Polanyi, 2001[1944], 79-80). Put simply, the tendency of liberal market capitalism to prioritize growth at the expense of labor and social impact (for instance, the motivation to depress wages and increase costs as a vulgar means to maximize profit will create adverse material pressures on ­respective populations). This desire to maximize profit and prioritize growth conflicts with populations who may not benefit from market liberalization and in fact benefit more from increasing market regulation (price controls, wage regulation, etc…). As such, the natural tendency of capitalism is conflictual, requiring state intervention to both promote economic growth while at the same time protecting national populations from excesses and overextensions of that same growth ethos and effect (Polanyi, 2001[1944], 145-148, 162). The articulation of the double movement has long been recognized as a foundational concept in relation to welfare capitalist theory (Holmwood, 2000). 7 By some estimates, oecd real gdp growth averaged 4-5% from 1950 through 1970 (Marglin, 1992, 1).

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the double movement back in favor of liberalization (Duménil and Lévy, 2011; Harvey, 2005). Neoliberalism, rooted in neoclassical refutations of Keynesian economic theory, has gradually chipped away at the ideological notion of the state as a protectionist institution, which has facilitated the practice of productive and market liberalization on an incrementally global scale. The result of this expansion of liberal capitalism on a global scale has been substantial (albeit regionally-specific) economic growth (particularly from the 1990s until 2008) and simultaneous increases in economic inequality and cost burdens for liberalizing nations (Frank, 2013; Kenworthy and Pontusson, 2005). In short, neoliberalization serves as an acceleration of normal capitalist tendencies: Expansions of profit built on the back of worsening adversities and cost burdens for majority populations, or what Portes referred to as “immiserating growth” (Portes, 1997; Shefner et al., 2006). The political problem, as Polanyi noted, is one of maintaining legitimation within the context of differential benefits – as conditions amenable to capital accumulation conflict with worsening material conditions for large national constituencies, non-beneficiary populations can withdraw legitimating political support if demands for social protection are not met. Many have pointed to the role of ideology in maintaining a level of popular support for capitalism in general (e.g., Lukacs, Althusser); however, a more dynamic understanding of ideological influence comes in the form of Bourdieu’s notion of doxa. Bourdieu’s understanding of doxa is predicated on a reflexive relationship between respective populations and political power that is mitigated by subjective interpretations of both objective and manipulated (read: ideological) knowledge (Bourdieu, 1977: 6, 164). Specific knowledge is (nearly) unanimously and uncritically accepted as “self-evident and undisputed” (such as in the case of traditions) (Bourdieu, 1977: 164). This normative acceptance of broad social “truth” is an active process in which the habitus of respective social actors is both constructed and reinforced through regular discourse informing respective fields where this doxa represents an ideological context in which decisions, policies, and strategies can be built (Bourdieu, 1977: 167). Key to this understanding is the intentionality of doxic– power relationships determine the ascendance and viability of specific forms of knowledge over other competing forms. As Bourdieu puts it: In class societies, in which the definition of the social world is at stake in overt or latent class struggle, the drawing of the line between the field of opinion, of that which is explicitly questioned, and the field of doxa, of that which is beyond question… is itself a fundamental objective at stake

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in that form of class struggle which is the struggle for the imposition of the dominant systems of classification. bourdieu, 1977: 169

Bourdieu’s later work on neoliberalism features this understanding of doxa prominently.8 Not only does he (along with sympathetic collaborators) understand the ideology to be an intentionally disseminated and promoted form of knowledge (Bourdieu, 1998; Desai, 2006; Wacquant, 2010) that has become an unchallenged field in which politics must now be negotiated (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2001), but also that this paradigmatic environment influences the reflexive definitions of political power/authority (Chopra, 2003: 430). In this sense, the discursive promotion of neoliberal ideals (failure of the state/economic protectionism, prominence of the market, individualism, etc.…) become translated upwards as constituent populations repeat and reaffirm these neoliberal talking points, actively constructing a broader neoliberal doxa.9 Within this context, it becomes more and more difficult – both ideologically and practically – to maintain protectionist policies and platforms, particularly when state protectionist capacities have become decreasingly viable and liberalized global capitalism promotes market solutions over public alternatives. This is an ironic outcome when we juxtapose doxa with the double movement: Popular incorporation of the individualism and marketization of neoliberalism creates a political climate that encourages political convergence around neoliberal goals, while those same neoliberal goals worsen material conditions for large portions of those respective populations. 8 Bourdieu’s understanding of doxa certainly shifts from his earliest version based primarily in traditional societies to more reflexive versions in “modern” societies. The underlying dynamics, however, remain applicable – specifically, the subjective processes of knowledge integration and its relationship to larger structural fields. Myles (2004) offers an excellent critical overview of the shifts in conceptual definition and utility. 9 More to the point, Bourdieu’s notion of doxa is one rooted in dynamic and contentious power relationships. The apparent passivity in which national populations embrace dominant ideologies and normative beliefs obfuscates the intentionality of doxic origins – that is, the appearance of a priori assumptions is an illusion. The quiescent integration of dominant norms and beliefs is neither organic nor passive, rather rooted in pre-existing power dynamics and motivations. Perhaps a more explicit way of understanding the intentionality of Bourdieu’s conceptualization of doxa is found in Gaventa’s (1980) third dimension of power, in which quiescent acceptance is not the product of passive populations, but rather historically manufactured through myth, normative discourse, and rewarded/punished actions. The product of third dimensional power dynamics is often the integration of belief structures encouraged by groups in positions of power which manifests in quiescent acceptance of powerlessness, active support for groups in power (i.e., participatory self-subordination), or sustained resistance to unequal power relationships.

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In other words, the context of the double movement is sustained as increased liberalization exacerbates material adversities for large portions of national populations. The problem in the contemporary era, however, is that the basis of the countermovement (economic protection) and the mediating role of the state are disrupted by the dominance of neoliberal doxa – in the minds of many, there is no alternative to market fundamentalism (Jessop and Sum, 2013). This situation has profound implications for political l­egitimation  – if the structural dynamics of the double movement remain intact, but the ­protectionist role of the state weakened, how then is political legitimacy maintained? I argue that the centrality of economic protectionist demands is essential in understanding the resurgence of nationalist politics. Within the context of willful neoliberal policies or constraints imposed by neoliberal adherence, the utility of economic protectionism is either rejected by respective parties/actors or weakened in terms of efficacy by existing neoliberal structural constraints. This climate of neoliberal doxa conditions/constraints combined with worsening material conditions for large national constituencies that are often formerly privileged (i.e., white, male, middle class) creates substantial problems with regards to legitimating political actors and parties. This creates the need to seek out alternative means of political legitimation, which are readily available to parties and actors closely aligned to nationalist symbols and rhetoric or those willing to revise national cultural definitions. In this sense, nationalist politics become a means to political legitimation within neoliberal doxa. Of course, not every party will embrace nationalist politics and every national context is unique with regards to the extent of neoliberalization; similarly, some countries have experienced drastic increases in inequality and immiseration, while others have not. How are we then to understand the relationship between neoliberalism and nationalist politics given such national conditional distinctions? To that point, the cases of Finland and Sweden are juxtaposed with regards to (a) support for nationalist political parties, (b) extent of material economic hardships in the specific context of (c) altered political economic conditions (specifically, gendered deindustrialization, service occupations, educational attainment). These cases offer an opportunity to examine the influence of economic protectionist decline in a part of the world supposedly shielded from the effects of neoliberalization. The following sections first problematize the role of general inequality and immigration as causal explanations for nationalist political efficacy, then specifically examines the context of material economic shift and change in those who support each respective nationalist party.

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3

The Rise of Nationalist Politics in Finland and Sweden

The rise of the Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset) and the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) has been both dramatic and surprising. Both were viewed as largely irrelevant tertiary parties until the latter part of the 2000s. The Finns Party emerged from the ashes of the Finnish Rural Party in 1995 and languished until 2011 when the party not only breached the 5% electoral ceiling but also became the third largest party in the Finnish Parliament with 19.1% of the vote and 39 members of parliament. Although the Perussuomalaiset saw their share of votes decrease in 2015, they entered Parliament as the second largest by seats and joined the governing coalition. Their success in European Parliamentary elections is perhaps even more consistent (see Figure 3.1). The Sweden Democrats have no formal political pedigree and many of its early members had explicit connections with various neo-Nazi and national socialist groups (Widfeldt, 2014; Rydgren, 2006). The party underwent a series of moderating reforms in the 1990s to broaden its appeal and create distance from its neo-fascist roots, but it wasn’t until the 2006 general election that the party seemed to marshal increases in electoral support. Since 2006, the Sverigedemokraterna have increased their percentage of total votes from three to thirteen percent in the 2014 Swedish General Election (Figure 3.1). Since 2014, support for the Sverigedemokraterna has seemingly increased with recent poll support reaching twenty percent nationally (The Local, 2015). 25 Finns Party (National Parliament)

20

Sweden Democrats (National Parliament)

15 10

Finns Party (eup)

5

Sweden Democrats (eup) 2015

2014

2011

2010

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2003

2002

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1998

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Figure 3.1 National and European Union Elections, Percentage of Total Votes. Source: Statistics Finland, Elections (www.stat.fi/til/ vaa_en.html) and Statistics Sweden, General Elections (www .statistikdatabasen.scb.se)

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Both parties have been buoyed by specific conditions – in the case of the Finns, strong anti-EU rhetoric and opposition to the regional bailout of ­Portugal is generally pointed to as the foundation for electoral success in 2011 (bbc, 2011), while the recent refugee crisis in Europe – acutely felt in Sweden – ­appears to have anecdotally driven support for the Sweden Democrats (Greenwood, 2015). While both specific conditions are (relatively) unique to each respective country, neither offers a consistent causal explanation for the rise each respective nationalist party. Sweden is not a Eurozone member and has a long history of euroskepticism that certainly predates any rise in nationalist political support. This distinction is even more profound with regards to immigration in Finland, which has seen increases in overall immigration, but with relatively low numbers in comparison with Sweden (and many other migrants receiving states, see Figure 3.2). These inconsistencies belie the fact that in both cases, nationalist political rhetoric is increasingly effective in terms of mobilizing electoral support. A closer look at the constituent support for both parties illustrates the centrality of material adversity and perceived declines in economic protectionist ­capacities. The bases for both are predominantly male and have strong s­ upport from constituents who identify as “blue collar” or “working class” (svt, 2014; 160000 140000 120000 100000 Finland Immigration 80000 60000

Finland Net Migration Sweden Immigration Sweden Net Migration

40000 20000

199 0 199 2 199 4 199 6 199 8 20 00 20 02 20 04 20 06 20 08 20 10 20 12 20 14

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Figure 3.2 Comparative Migration. Source:Statistics Finland, Migration (www.stat.fi/til/muutl/ index_en.html) and Statistics Sweden, Migrations (www.statistikdata basen.scb.se)

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Rahkonen, 2011; Towns et al., 2014, 244; Kestilä-Kekkonen and Söderlund, 2014, 654). The overrepresentation of young, male, undereducated voters is not unique to the Finns and Sweden Democrat parties and consistent with other national support for nationalist parties (Immerzeel et al., 2015). I argue that this constituency highlights the effects of neoliberalization – the decline of protected manufacturing, increased privatization, and increased cost burdens coupled with persisting patriarchal assumptions about male economic and familial roles (Towns et al., 2014; Mulinari and Neergaard, 2014). This context is easily exploited by those reviving past nationalist themes and highlighting “better days lost,” as it were. The fundamental context of this contemporary rise in nationalist support is a commensurate development of neoliberal doxa that simultaneously advocates for the decline of protections that reinforced middle class growth, while at the same time limiting the policy capacities of formerly protectionist political actors and parties. The problem, however, is how to understand the adverse effects of neoliberalization – income stagnation, declining social services, increased household costs – in societies supposedly protected from such changes. I argue that a closer look at the sources of perceived economic hardships (increased costs of living, debt burdens, and educational attainment) in the context of shifts to service-oriented employment and lingering assumptions of patriarchal privilege combine to facilitate an audience for nationalist, reactionary political efficacy.

Finland

Sweden 40

40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 2000 2005 2010 2015

Fourth 20% Highest 10% Highest 20% Lowest 20% Lowest 10% Second 20%

35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 2000

2005

2010

2015

Figure 3.3 Comparative Income Inequality: Percent Share of Overall Income. Source: World Bank Databank (databank.worldbank.org)

Fourth 20% Highest 10% Highest 20% Lowest 20% Lowest 10% Second 20%

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Neoliberalization and Economic Protectionist Decline

Finland and Sweden are models for alleviating many (certainly not all) of the material adversities that I argue underlie the rise of nationalist political efficacy. Both countries (along with their Scandinavian neighbors) consistently rank among the lowest with regards to within country income inequality (Keeley, 2015) and highest with regards to social welfare provisions (Brandal et al., 2013). As a result, the countries appear somewhat immune to the larger global trend of worsening income inequality. In fact, income inequality has been relatively stable in both countries (see Figure 3.3). Percentage shares of income for the highest earners in Finland slightly decreased from 10% in 2004 to 9.8% in 2013, with a similar decrease in Sweden over the same timeframe (9.9% to 9.2%). The third through fifth income quintiles in Finland either showed nominal increases or stability over the same 2004-2013 timeframe, which the same income quintiles in ­Sweden showing similar patterns (Eurostat, 2014). This consistency with regards to income inequality is striking in the neoliberal era and highlights the inconclusive nature of general inequality as a causal explanation for nationalist political efficacy. Having said that, both countries are impacted by neoliberalization, albeit in relatively distinct ways. The economic crisis on the early 1990s accelerated liberalization processes, albeit in a more incremental way – increasing income-contingent contributions, reducing social service funding, and deceasing state revenues through systematic tax cuts (Moisio, 2008). Others have noted a specific shift in rhetoric that privileges corporatization and competitiveness over strong state protectionism (Alasuutari and Rasimus, 2009; see also Alasuutari, 2004). Jutila correctly highlights the dual impact of liberalization – marketization increasing profit and therefore costs of living (i.e., through increased housing costs) yet stagnating or even decreasing (in the case of student benefits) social benefits. As social benefits fail to keep up with increased household costs, vulnerable populations are increasingly at risk even as growth accelerates (Jutila, 2011). Swedish neoliberalization has followed a similar path with acceleration occurring in the 1990s, however the pace and scope of Swedish liberalization far outpaces that of its Nordic neighbors. Ryner (2004), like Alasuutari, identifies rhetorical trends underscoring the shift to marketization and denigrating state regulation, while other collaborative work identifies trends in the marketization of pensions in the same time frame (Belfrage and Ryner, 2009). Other common trends highlight shifts in housing from increased costs to differential housing opportunities and increased gentrification (Christophers, 2013; Hedin, 2012). Swedish neoliberalization has proven so rapid that the Economist ­recently commented that, “Milton Friedman would be more at home in ­Stockholm than

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in Washington, D.C.” (Economist, 2013). These are just a sample of scholarship on clear neoliberalization trends in Finland and Sweden, yet they highlight the common problem of neoliberalization: A market environment that privileges profit accumulation at the expense of increased cost burdens for large portions of respective populations. These increased cost burdens – and the lack of political will to actually mitigate these adversities – are a more concrete manifestation of the effects of neoliberalization and offer a means to better understand collective motivation with regards to political legitimation. Attention to specific categorical adversities such as housing, debt and changes in employment structures offer a more effective means of identifying the centrality of economic protection in political legitimation. 4.1 Housing Housing costs in both countries have risen in significant but distinct ways. The purchase price of homes in Sweden has risen dramatically following 2008 and has recently surpassed pre-recession prices (oecd). Buying a home in ­Sweden is an increasingly expensive proposition with prices rising 144 percent between 2000 and 2015, with recession-sensitive increases of 76 percent from 2005 to 2015 (Statistics Sweden, author’s calculations). Finnish home prices have shown more gradual growth overall but still experiencing a 26 percent increase in nominal home prices throughout the country between 2005 and 2015 (Statistics Finland, author’s calculations). Rental prices have also shown long-term increases with much more comparative consistency. Both have increased significantly between 1995 and 2015 with Finland (58%) outpacing Sweden (50%) in terms of rental cost increases (oecd). Figure 3.4 illustrates the consistent growth in rental costs since 1995. At first glance, it appears that the housing burden in Sweden is more onerous than that of Finland, due largely to the pace of home price increases in the former. This assumption is somewhat reinforced by other manipulated statistics designed to highlight cost differentials between purchasing and renting a home (price to rent ratio) and home purchase affordability (price to income ratio). As seen in Figure 3.5, Finnish housing affordability (price to income ratio) stabilizes in the post–recession era while Swedish trends highlight more recent problems in terms of affordability. Similarly, increases in price to rent ratios encourage respective populations to rent as opposed to buy, pushing particularly younger, prospective first-time homeowners into rental markets which are both equity neutral and more consistently expensive in terms of ­annual increases in rental costs.

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130 120 110 100

Rent (Finland) Rent (Sweden)

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2013

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2003

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1999

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Figure 3.4 Comparative Rents, Rent Ratio. Source: oecd Statistics (stats.oecd.org) 180 Standardized Price to Rent Ratio (Finland)

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Standardized Price to Rent Ratio (Sweden)

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Standardized Price to Income Ratio (Finland)

80 60

Standardized Price to Income Ratio (Sweden) 2015

2013

2 01 1

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2007

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2001

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Figure 3.5 Comparative Housing Affordability, Rent and Income Ratios. Source: oecd Statistics (stats.oecd.org)

Put another way, housing cost increases are not simply episodic burdens – the decreasing ability for younger and underprivileged populations to enter the home purchase market keeps them in lucrative (for property owners) rental markets and compounds the problem of attaining equity-producing homes in the future.

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These challenges regarding housing affordability and constantly rising rental costs is also contingent on aspects of income and costs of living that either contribute or detract from housing affordability. Overall wages have increased, as is normal in advanced capitalist states, yet the pace of wage increases to keep pace with rising housing and purchasing costs has not kept pace. The mean annual increase in wages between 2005 and 2014 in Finland was .9 percent, while Sweden saw average increases of 1.6 percent (oecd Stats). If we compare these data with the same mean annual changes in respective consumer price index (cpi) data, we find mean annual increases in Finland cpi at 1.7 percent, while Sweden saw a 1.08 percent increase in cpi over the 2005 to 2015 period (oecd Stats, author’s calculations). This comparison highlights the complexity of experienced costs – while Finnish home affordability may paint a picture of stability, wage increases have not kept pace with increased overall consumer costs over the past ten years. Similarly, while Swedish wages have increased more than annual cpi increases (on average) exorbitant housing costs place significant downward pressures on particularly vulnerable portions of the Swedish population. As rent increases are consistent in both countries, if becomes apparent that housing costs are increasingly problematic despite distinctions between respective national markets. The impact of rising housing costs is, of course relative to income and wealth and has a disproportionate impact on less affluent populations. This is especially true of youth populations both in terms of affordability challenges and subsequent increases in youth homelessness.10 4.2 Debt Rising housing costs are certainly primary contributors to household financial insecurity, but these costs are complicated by the fact that increased housing expenditures are directly linked to increases in household debt (Oikarinen, 2011) – this is also the case in both Sweden and Finland (Turk, 2015; Marrez and Pontuch, 2013). Rising debt occurring simultaneously with increased housing costs is not a surprise, nor need it be necessarily debilitating in terms of household finances; however, the combination of low wage growth and increased costs has resulted in a larger portion of household income servicing household debt. As seen in Figure 3.6, household debt as a percentage of net disposable income has risen significantly in both cases – with Swedish growth outpacing that of Finland in both consistency and scope. There are distinct trends that highlight expansion of household debt in both countries. Sweden has experienced approximately 94 percent growth in debt as a percentage of household disposable income between 1995 and 2014, with Finland only slightly behind at 79 percent in the same timeframe. 10

See Bak Nielsen and Nichols and Malenfant in this volume.

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Household Debt (% of Net Disposable Income) (Finland)

120 100

Household Debt (% of Net Disposable Income) (Sweden)

80 60

15

20

199

5 199 7 199 9 20 01 20 03 20 05 20 07 20 09 20 11 20 13

40

Figure 3.6 Comparative Household Debt, Percent of Net Disposable Income. Source: oecd Statistics (stats.oecd.org)

It should be noted, however, that in the aggregate both cases are remarkably similar with mean annual increases in Sweden reaching 3.6 percent and Finnish household debt growth at 3.2 percent. Overall, Swedish household debt is both more burdensome and consistent with regards to growth, although postrecession growth in Finland (28%) has significantly outpaced that of Swedish (18%) household debt between 2005 and 2014 (oecd Stats, author’s calculations). While unique national economic contexts certainly create distinct temporal moments, the common trend of increased household debt is essential to note particularly within the context of debt burden among impoverished or underprivileged households – the cost of servicing personal consumer debt is higher among such populations.11 The rising household debt burden in both countries is compounded, in many cases, by languid growth in disposable income. Annual rates of change in disposable income (controlled for expenditure) show clear downward trends in the Finnish case, while Swedish data show more stable longitudinal trends, but substantial annual variability (see Figure 3.7). 11

There is a substantial literature on the relationship between debt, the cost of debt servicing, and socioeconomic status. There is strong consensus that lower socioeconomic status makes household debt more expensive for respective households and thus exacerbates financial adversity (Bird et al., 1999; Pressman and Scott, 2009; Sierminska, 2014).

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Real Net Household Disposable Income Deflated by Final Consumption (Finland)

5 4 3

Real Net Household Disposable Income Deflated by Final Consumption (Sweden)

2 1 0 –1

15

20

199

5 199 7 199 9 20 01 20 03 20 05 20 07 20 09 20 11 20 13

–2

Figure 3.7 Comparative Household Disposable Income, Annual Rate of Change. Source: oecd Statistics (stats.oecd.org)

Measurements of the mean annual change in this measure of disposable income highlights these differential trends with Sweden showing an average change of 20 percent between 2005 and 2015, while Finnish average change in disposable income is nearly negative 70 percent over the same timeframe. Once again, differentiation may lead some to conclude a distinction with regards to perceived economic security between the two cases but the cost of housing and other expenditures in Sweden is measurably higher and thus reducing the impact of higher per capita rates of disposable income growth. The combination of disposable income fluctuations and increased debt burdens illustrate the trend towards household financial insecurity in both cases. The point here, of course, is that the increase in household indebtedness is relative to the capacity to service increased debt burdens – as costs outpace income, that burden becomes an increasingly contentious barrier to economic security. 4.3 Employment and Educational Changes The context of perceived economic adversity in these neoliberalizing econo­ mies is multifaceted and certainly not comprehensively documented here. Food, fuel, health care, retirement, and a host of other possible measures of ‑­economic comfort/security are ignored in this descriptive analysis. The selected measures (housing and debt) provide a broad yet significant means to e­ xamine

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the interrelated nature of increased costs for more than just ­impoverished populations – in other words, increases in housing and debt expenditures are substantial concerns for working and middle-class populations as they are for other households decreasingly able to absorb such cost increases. The third categorical area is specifically oriented toward the context of income and demographic change: Who is able to afford cost increases and who is vulnerable? Keys to this category are aspects of employment type (specifically, service and manufacturing occupational categories), commensurate tertiary educational attainment, as well as gender differentiation in both areas. The data from both Finland and Sweden are remarkably consistent. On average, general industrial and manufacturing production decreased annually in both cases. Swedish industrial production as a value-added percent of gdp has decreased .7 percent annually since 1980, with manufacturing decreasing at a slighter fast rate of .9 percent on average. Finland has experienced average annual ­industrial decline of nearly 1 percent with manufacturing also declining at a faster rate at 1.2 percent (World Bank Databank, author’s calculations). These declines have accelerated in manufacturing but at a slightly slower pace with regards to general industrial production. Between 1995 and 2014, respective industry and manufacturing declined at annual rates of .6 and 1.1 in S­ weden and .9 percent and 1.6 percent in Finland (World Bank Databank, author’s calculations). This clear decline in industry and manufacturing is similar to trends ‑throughout the advanced capitalist world as national economies in affluent countries shift to service orientated occupations (Alderson, 2015). This shift is somewhat bifurcated with the highest growth in service employment in low skill, low wage sectors, while high skill, high wage sectors (technology, ­communications, etc.…) offering upward economic mobility, most often with the requisite of a tertiary (or higher) education. The data presented in Figures 3.8 and 3.9 do not reflect this bifurcation and thus are limited measures, but ones that ‑highlight a specific trend in both employment and education. Regardless of salary/wages, employment in service sectors is increasing while opposite trends in industrial sectors is declining. If we assume that at least a portion of service sector employment growth is in high skill/high wage ‑employment we can also assume that those skills are commonly obtained in conjunction with tertiary education degrees. In fact, the acquisition of isced 6 (Bachelor’s Degree equivalence) degrees in both Finland and Sweden has grown considerably since the 1980s. The ­annual increase in isced 6 graduates in Finland averages 4.4 percent since 1980, with Swedish growth at 3.7 percent. The number of graduates in both countries accelerated between 1995 and 2005 to 5.1 percent in Finland and 4.7 in Sweden.

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Industry (% of total employment)

90 80

Industry, male (% of male employment)

70 60

Industry, female (% of female employment)

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Services (% of total employment)

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Services, female (% of female employment)

10 2013

2010

2007

2004

2001

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0

Services, male (% of male employment)

Figure 3.8 Finland, Industrial/Services Employment by Sex. Source: OECD Statistics (stats.oecd.org)

100

Industry (% of total employment)

90 80

Industry, male (% of male employment)

70 60

Industry, female (% of female employment)

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Services, female (% of female employment)

10 2013

2010

2007

2004

2001

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1995

1992

1989

1986

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Services, male (% of male employment)

Figure 3.9 Sweden, Industrial/Services Employment by Sex. Source: OECD Statistics (stats.oecd.org)

It should be noted, that growth in tertiary graduates has slowed since 2008 with average annual growth declining to 4.9 percent in Finland and 3.1 percent in Sweden (Statistics Finland (a) and Statistics Sweden (a), respectively, ­author’s calculations).

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Not only has there been an increase in overall tertiary graduates, but the demographic pace of change has been quite telling. In Finland, more women than men obtain isced 6 degrees with Finnish women beginning to outpace men in 2001 (Statistics Finland (a)). In Sweden, men still obtain university degrees in higher numbers than women; however, the growth in female isced graduation has increased dramatically with average annual increases among female graduates at 8.2 percent (compared to 3.4 percent increases for men). Growth for both groups similarly slowed in the post-recession era with women graduating with annual increases of 5.2 percent (compared to 1.9 percent for men) (Statistics Sweden (a), author’s calculations). The point here is that increased overall rates of university graduation reflect the importance of tertiary degrees in obtaining higher waged/salaried employment (or at least the perception of such an effect), but more to the point, these increases highlight significant shifts in both employment trends and the role of tertiary degrees in terms of accessing higher incomes in this service/ knowledge economy context. As shown in Figures 3.8 and 3.9, the decline of industrial employment and rise of service-oriented employment has specific characteristics when controlled for sex. The traditional predominance of men in industrial employment and subsequent sector decline is significant, particularly given aforementioned trends in tertiary education as well as lower numbers of men working in expanding service sector employment. These postindustrial trends are, of course, in place well before any contemporary nationalist political rhetoric, which is the point: The conditions that lead to increased efficacy of national political rhetoric are both historical and cumulative. There is little political opportunity for the Perussuomalaiset or Sverigedemokraterna without the commensurate decline in industrial and manufacturing employment and the eventual inability for social democratic parties to meet now-increasing demands for protection from the adversities of economic change (i.e., deindustrialization). As such, the longitudinal trajectory of manufactoring decline and declining economic protectionist politics are gradual – these shifts contribute to, but are not deterministic of, conditions that make nationalist political efficacy viable. The shift of voters from social democratic and labor parties to more exclusionary nationalist parties is not confined to Finland and Sweden and the trend is certainly not a direct one (see Evans and Mellon, 2016), but the decreasing ability of social democratic and labor parties to meet rising economic protectionist demands from particular constituencies over time decreases confidence within formerly reliable consituencies. These votors have often abandonded social democratic and labor parties for conservative or other tertiary options (such

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as ­aforementioned nationalist parties), but the key here is limited protectionist capacities of formerly protectionist parties. The point here is an indirect one: Men with lower levels of educational attainment are disproportionately supportive of both the Sweden Democrats and Finns Party. I would argue that these data – showing patriarchal dominance in declining employment sectors highlight historical and structural tendencies that contribute to the conditions influencing these demographic shifts. 5

Economic Adversities and Shifts in Political Opportunities

The cumulative effect of maturing neoliberalism increases economic insecurity for large portions of respective populations. The context of increased growth in domestic markets (not to mention the effects of liberalized international trade) has driven up costs in key areas such as housing. As a result of increased cost burdens, households have turned to increased consumer credit to maintain levels of consumption in advanced capitalist economies. These conditions (primarily increases in cost of living) impact populations differently depending on the local capacity to absorb such increases – clearly, for households with languid, stagnant, or declining incomes, the rate of cost increases will quickly outpace the ability to afford said increases. The intensity of these localized cost burdens is contingent on the level of economic protectionism in a respective national economy. Obviously, the Nordic states’ popular embrace of a collective model of welfare capitalism purports to create a buffer against the harshest requisite aspects of capital accumulation. Strong state support for housing, educational costs, health care, retirement, childcare and far more highlight areas where the state has met national protectionist demands (in the Polanyian sense) and mitigated the effects of capitalism in the face of constant pressures to liberalize. The reality in Finland and Sweden is, as previously illustrated, better defined as neoliberalizing societies somewhat late to the party. While there are clear differences in terms of cost of housing, household debt and context of educational attainment and employment, but the common trends toward increased costs and decreased national economic protections are clear. As both Scandinavian countries have followed the path demanded by an encroaching neoliberal doxa, the increased financial burden of rapidly rising housing costs and expanding debt burdens creates substantial strain among households ill-prepared to absorb these increases – while such increases are lauded by political and economic proponents as elements of positive c­ apital

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growth. In other words, the increasing financial adversity faced by households in Finland and Sweden (or throughout the neoliberal advanced capitalist world) is viewed as an unfortunate, yet inevitable, consequence of “free markets”.12 Regardless of the veracity of this claim, the reality of household financial insecurity leads populations to the conclusion that Polanyi accurately predicted: In capitalist societies, increasing costs and stagnating/declining disposable income will engender demands for protection from the causes of such adversities. It is the causal mechanisms that become the point of much ideological investment on the part of liberal capitalist proponents. The construction of a neoliberal doxa in which non-market alternatives are broadly understood as antithetical to the very existence of capitalism and “freedom.” In this ideological environment, political will to engage in meaningful economic protectionism erodes – even in welfare state exemplars. The growing sense that t­raditional political parties are unwilling or unable to mitigate household financial burdens becomes the root for the phenomenon of both nationalist politics and the growing sentiment that traditional political parties are failed projects (Dalton, 1999; Nye et al., 1997). In both Finland and Sweden, Social Democratic Parties (sdp) have intentionally moved to integrate neoliberal ideals into both ruling policies and party platforms (Kuisma and Ryner, 2012; Rydgren, 2006: 43). This neoliberal convergence leaves many traditional labor/sdp voters with limited options with regards to parties willing or able to meet economic protectionist demands. This “hollowing out” of social democratic parties identified by Poulantzas in the nascent days of neoliberalism highlights the central political problem of economic legitimation in an era that discourages exactly that (Poulantzas, 1978; Bruff, 2015). The imbrication of neoliberal policies and reforms by labor and social democratic parties has gradually weakened the capacity of those parties to meet the inevitable social protectionist demands of national populations through more efficacious economic means. The slow weakening of social democratic parties as economic protectionist parties invariably leads to a withdrawal of popular support, which then reinforces neoliberal ideology as an increasingly doxic social belief. This is particularly true in the context of the post 2008 crisis when many were calling for an alternative to the neoliberal 12

This conclusion is consistent with the observations of liberal capitalist proponents such as Mises (2000 [1955]), who opined that income and wealth inequalities were “an essential feature of the market economy” (62). In this sense, liberal capitalist defenses of systemic inequalities rest on the idea of such adversities incentivizing labor, production, and investment.

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model and others proclaiming the arrival of a “postneoliberal era” (Altvater, 2009; Springer, 2015). Despite clear evidence of the overall failure of deregulation and the sustained myth of self-regulating markets as well as broadly exacerbated material adversities, neoliberal reforms have strengthened in much of the advanced capitalist word. This can be explained by several factors such as the rapid rhetorical mobilization of neoliberal proponents and their ability to rhetorically “blame” public debt and social spending for the crisis (Walby, 2015) or the structural constraints such as budget and spending caps that discouraged or disallowed non-austerity solutions to budget crisis and declining services (Peck, 2010). But perhaps the most influential cause of neoliberal ideological survival is the languid neoliberalization of parties formerly legitimated based on their economic protectionist foundations. As Magnus Ryner puts it: “­Accompanying the loss of neoliberalism’s hegemonic aura is the absence of social democracy as an effective political agent” (2010: 554). Nationalist politics, in essence, offers a strategic means of circumventing the nature of legitimation in neoliberal societies. The potential impact of this strategic shift away from economic means of meeting protectionist demands is significant for welfare capitalism. This has the potential to enable short-term political legitimation, particularly in the absence of a viable social democratic alternative, but at the cost of ignoring the underlying financial hardships experienced by respective neoliberal populations. More to the point, the absence of protectionist alternative that actually mitigates financial hardships increases the likelihood that neoliberalism remains politically dominant. Thus, the downward pressure experienced by even Nordic countries has the potential to be sustained and even intensified in the post-crisis era. 6 Conclusion The combination of neoliberal doxa constraints and declining confidence in political actor/organizational protectionist capacities creates significant political opportunities for actors and organizations with alternative legitimation strategies, such as exclusionary nationalism. The high level or variability of nationalist political parties with regards to economic protectionist policy – the Finns have a stated social democratic platform, while the Sweden Democrats seems to have no clear economic platform, preferring to maintain a centrist position – belies the larger doxic context of neoliberalism: Political parties can now gain legitimating support by focusing on non-economic issues such as national identity, and migration. This is a primary reason for the lack of

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e­ conomic policy consensus among so-called nationalist parties – attention to ­non-economic issues become proxy rhetorical correctives with underlying economic hardships. In other words, the lack of clear economic protectionist policies is less important for nationalist politics due to the assumption that economic prosperity will return once causal conditions of change – ­immigration, demographic change, and/or a decline in traditional national values – are reduced or eliminated. The threshold for nationalist parties to meet economic protectionist demands is different than that of social democratic and labor parties: The latter have only economic protectionism as a legitimizing electoral strategy, while nationalist parties are able to mask their inability to meet those same protectionist demands by continuing to argue that their failures are really the result of other pre-existing social conditions (i.e., immigration, etc…). In this sense, these parties cannot be defined as either protectionist or neoliberal – but they remain constrained by the same neoliberal constraints as other parties. In relation to neoliberal ideology, these parties provide a near perfect model for obtaining electoral legitimacy while ignoring structural economic factors that influence financial adversities in the first place. In other words, nationalist politics offers an alternative model for political legitimation in an environment in which liberal capitalist ideology is dominant and remains unchallenged. As I have suggested in other work, wherever you find neoliberalization you will also find increased elements of nationalist politics (Blad, 2012). The perils of this legitimation strategy are obvious. Nationalist political rhetoric or policies do nothing to mitigate the effects of exacerbated inequality or differential hardships in respective economies. In fact, such policies often have negative economic effects due to the deepening of neoliberal ideologies and continued evisceration of state protectionist capacities. Regardless of whether a nationalist actor or party is supportive of neoliberal political economic policies, the amenability of nationalist rhetorical platforms to a neoliberal political context acts as a disincentive to engage in struggles for protectionism when liberal capitalist legitimation (and financial support) can be obtained by adhering to neoliberal doxa while attempting to placate national populations with increasing calls to obey nationalist symbolic trends. The common constituent demographics of nationalist party supporters – undereducated, male, young – reflect populations vulnerable to economic change, least able to afford cost of living increases, yet most capable of connecting to a “lost” patriarchal past in which race and gender underscore past material comforts and household economic security. Recent efforts in Finland to institute a basic income level for all Finns is showing early promise (Independent, 2017), but it remains to be seen whether

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this form of household financial support is capable of addressing the adversities exacerbated by Finnish neoliberalization. More so, it remains to be seen whether such a basic income strategy is sustainable in the context of an ordoliberal European Union, of which Finland is a member. Still, this is the type of economic strategy necessary to address real household and individual material hardships and provide a policy foundation for an actual post-neoliberal alternative. In the absence of such a material alternative, non-economic alternatives such as nationalisms based on exclusionary cultural protectionism often proliferate. More to the point, the rhetorical foundation of this political legitimation strategy is problematic due to eventual inability to resolve root economic adversities demanded by national populations. Nationalist political parties lose support once in office if they are unable to demonstrate the capacity to enact perceptible change (Heinisch, 2003). In the context of neoliberal governance, that change must include more equitable benefits in terms of wages or consumptive affordability. As these distributive goals are antithetical to the neoliberal political project, the likelihood that nationalist politicians and parties will magically correct growing economic adversities seems poor. At the same time, the efficacy of these actors and parties to obtain popular support and legitimation in a neoliberal context is significant. While these ideologies and strategies may be practically incapable of addressing real local economic adversity, their rhetorical capacity to win support in an era hostile to traditional, economic protectionist, means of political legitimation must be better understood. In this sense, the support of vulnerable populations for political rhetoric offering a return to past privilege, yet offering almost no practical means of improving economic prospects is at least analytically comprehensible.

Chapter 4

Welfare Regime, Neoliberal Transformation, and Social Exclusion in Mexico, 1980–2015 Lukasz Czarnecki and Delfino Vargas Chanes 1 Introduction We can distinguish two periods in the transformation México’s economy: the first took place after Second World War, when the neoliberal transformation in Mexico occurred after 1950, the “thirty glorious years” of the stabilizing development model (desarrollo estabilizador), a state-centered model that emerged from the Mexican Constitution of 1917. The second period starts in the middle of 80s, when Mexican economy was market-centered, with little influence from the State, known as the neoliberal stage, when the collective actions were diminished, and the State focused more on individual achievements. During the neoliberal stage, the structural adjustment programs and market reforms were introduced with the administration of President Miguel de la Madrid (1983–1988). However, the first agreement with the International Monetary Fund was signed in the late 1970s, Mexican state and society were transformed by the implementation of neoliberal policies starting in the 1980s. In this chapter, we address the question of what are the effects of neoliberal policies on the Mexican welfare regime? The central hypothesis is that during the period 1980–2015 the social development model has been transformed into welfare state model of social exclusion (cepal, 2007; Cordera and Provencio, 2017). Between 2008 to 2014, the ­incidence of poverty remained practically the same, ranging from 41.2 to 46.2%, lack of access to social security ranging from 64.7 to 58.5% in the same period (coneval, 2011). On the other hand, increased levels of income inequality prevailed in the last three decades, ranging from 0.445 to 0.493 between 1984 and 2014 (Cortes and Vargas, 2017: 49). Overall, we observed no improvements in access to education, health services and labour rights that ­created a condition of social exclusion, as well as increased inequality. The dream of the neoliberal era for creating further expectations of improvements in the economy have failed. The Mexican welfare state model produced social exclusion (EspingAndersen, 1999), which is considered to be a “capability deprivation” (Sen, © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���9 | doi:10.1163/9789004384118_005

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2000) that breaks down “social ties” between members of society (Saraví, 2006). The c­ ontemporary preoccupation with social exclusion, likewise in Europe, “appears very much like an echo of the ‘social question’ that permeated debates in the 1930s” (Esping-Andersen, 2002: 2). However, Latin America, as the world’s most unequal region, provides a different perspective and dimensions of welfare state studies in terms of inequalities (Czarnecki, Sáenz, and Balleza, 2014). Massive exclusion, assistance program of alleged inclusion, and extreme deteriorated conditions for surviving in terms of health access, education, labor, and social security have been characterized Mexico as well as other Latin American countries. Most of these countries implemented the neoliberal polices in the 1980s. This paper first discusses the limitations of the concept of the welfare state in Mexico. We then explain the social exclusion process analyzing education, health, employment, poverty, and income inequality. The analysis is based on a theoretical and empirical evaluation of such policies in terms of access to education, health care and labor rights. The welfare state framework in México was established by introducing these rights to public education (Article 3), access to health services (Article 4) as well as social security and labor rights (Article 123). Besides, the chapter analyses poverty and inequalities as a direct effect of application of neoliberal policies. 2

Welfare State and Neoliberal Transformation

Mexico has contributory and non-contributory instruments of welfare policy. Contributory instruments include the Mexican Institute of Social Security (imss, Instituto Mexicano de Seguro Social, in Spanish), created in 1943, Institute of Security and Social Services for State Workers (issste, Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales para los Trabajadores del Estado, in Spanish) created in 1959, and pemex for Mexican Petroleum (Petroleos Mexicanos, in Spanish). Moreover, in 2006, the Mexican government implemented a new public insurance program (Seguro Médico Popular) for low-income persons. Among different noncontributory programs there are Prospera-Social Inclusion program, transformed from Oportunidades in 2014, Pension Universal, a federal program for all elderly persons, and, on the local level, an unconditioned transfer for the elderly, implemented in Mexico City by Institute for the Care of Older Adults (iaam) of Mexico City. Cecchini and Martínez (2012: 75) argued that in Mexico “non-contributory social protection has been strengthened over the course of nearly two decades, in particular through Mexico’s education, health and nutrition program (formerly called progresa and

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r­ enamed Oportunidades), which is the cornerstone of many social assistance and promotion initiatives”. Contributory instruments of welfare instruments are based on labor status. In that context, the Article 3 of the Constitution was the most discussed during the constituent period 1916–1917. The Article 3 established the principle of free and secular education as a conduct of the State. Regarding the Article 4, everyone has the right to health protection. As far as the Article 123 is concerned, the right to work, together with the right to strike for workers was established. Afterwards, the model of welfare state was influenced by the government of Lazaro Cardenas and impacts of the Beveridge report (Moreno Salazar, Ortiz Guerrero, and Marrufo Heredia, 2004). The welfare state extended the idea of social benefits to all citizens. The Mexican president Lazaro Cardenas (1934– 1940) developed social assistance and health programs to strengthen labor rights (Navarro, 1984). He promoted a central position of the State in the economy and society by expropriation of petroleum in 1938, among other actions. As far as the Beveridge report is concerned, it impacted on social security strategies that occurred in the fifties. Lack of efficient contributory instruments of welfare protection during the neoliberal period was fulfilled by non-contributory instruments promoted both by national and international organizations. 3 Education We explain in this section how the neoliberal policies have permeated the education system. The access to education was granted by the constitution of 1857 and 1917. In 1934, the constitution established that the State is responsible for providing elementary, secondary, and technical education and that the orientation “that the State provides is socialist” (insp, 2011). However, in 1946 the president Ávila Camacho suppressed the word “socialist” from the Article 3 with the phrase “all education that the State provides will be free” (insp, 2011). More changes regarding the free access to education occurred since then. By 1950, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek from the Austrian School were invited to Mexico and convinced several Mexican investors at the time, that the economic (and education) model needed a revision. Von Mises stated: What Mexico needs is capital, either its own or abroad. The renunciation to the national debt and the expropriation of foreign investments discourage the foreign investor (…). The abandonment of these practices

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is the first requirement for economic regeneration of the country (…). The only way to improve the economic situation of Mexico is through economic liberalism. mises, 1998: 12–13; cited in Romero Sotelo, 2011: 32

It was clear that the seeds of neoliberalism were planted during this visit. At the same time, a group of businessmen headed by Raúl Bailleres were interested in founding new schools with this approach, and the future of the education with a neoliberal approach was delineated. This group founded Instituto Tecnológico de México that later in 1962 president Adolfo López Mateos signed a decree providing the autonomy to this institution. Since then, it was named Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (itam). This institution created the seedbed of young people with a high technical level in economics with an approach according with the philosophy of its creators. At the same time, changes in the economy were in progress. It was the political economic recommendations from the International Monetary Fund, accepted by President Miguel de la Madrid in 1983, that impacted significantly on the orientation of private education in Mexico. For example, government expenses were reduced and as one consequence, the number of students in basic education was reduced. In 1992 the North American Free Trade Agreement (nafta) was signed with the US and Canada, facilitating private sector to invest in education while deemphasizing state responsibility to provide education. In 1994 Mexico became part of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (oecd), opening Mexico to further neoliberal educational policy recommendations that basically diminish the responsibilities of the state in this matter (Aboites, 2012: 371–372). The reform on Education was approved in 2013, this reform primarily targets teachers and dismantles all kind of syndicalism. That meant that the reform primarily intervened in labor’s character and that it did not touch upon the important issues of transforming public education into a modern and inclusive one. With this reform education was reduced to teacher labor relations, as stated by Keck: “In this context, the present reform’s move to dismantle the collective identity of teachers and atomize their labour relations through mechanism of individual evaluation […] Whilst teacher’s security in Mexico had traditionally been a function of inalienable contractual relation between the state and teacher, arbitrated by power of the teacher unions, the current education proposes to weaken this contractual arrangement and to move toward a teacher security rooted in performance.” (2015: 3)

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It became clear that neoliberal policies dismantled education from state responsibilities. At the same time, it should be emphasized that trade unions in the education sector are among the strongest labor unions in Mexico. There are two headquarters: Trade Union of Education Workers (snte, Sindicato ­Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación, in Spanish) and the National Coordination of School Workers (cnte, Coordinadora Nacional de Trabajadores de la Enseñanza, in Spanish). Traditionally, the snte is a corporate organization, which has a direct relationship with the party pri. In 1989 there was a change in leadership; Carlos Jongitud Carlos Barrios was replaced by a charismatic teacher from Chiapas, Elba Esther Gordillo, in 2013, then accused of corruption and subsequently jailed. The second organization (cnte) has been constituted as an actor that antagonizes within the snte itself and as the instrument of representation and management of the teaching profession dissent. Currently it maintains an important presence only in four entities: Oaxaca, Michoacán, Guerrero, and Chiapas (Bensunsan and Tapia, 2013: 558). The ambivalent attitudes towards education union became fundaments of the educational policy. The cnte, created in the seventies, now opposed to the official snte, carries out constant demonstrations and rallies in the context of the dramatic situation of the education system. In July 2016, cnte organized massive protests in different Mexican states, traditionally among the southern, but for the first time, in Nuevo León and its capital, Monterrey, which is considered the richest Mexican state. The protests were organized in support of the Nochixtlan’s massacre that occurred on June 19, 2016 in Oaxaca state when 9 people died ­during clashes between federal forces and students’ and teachers’ organizations. What came out from these protests is a decomposition of the fragile Mexican educational system that remains an “explosive zone”. 4 Health The origin of the social security system is rooted in Article 123 of the constitution of 1917 when workers’ rights were established, and some states incorporated voluntary social security programs (Gutierrez, 2002). These rights were institutionalized in 1943 when imss, issste, pemex were created to provide social security programs. The government made changes to the health system but most of the changes made were inefficient. The next administration ­during the 1950s the Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia (ssa) undertook several urgent tasks (like family planning, malaria control, infant-mother care, and environmental issues). Nevertheless, these changes created a problem for many families that did not reach health care benefits. The health problems

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i­ ncreased, so another modification was needed. The number of affiliates to the social security system increased in the 1960s and 1970s and the ssa became more disorganized and lost its orientation (Flamand, 1997). With the changes proposed, the access to health care was not solved as an increased number of families remained without coverage. During 1980s, the neoliberal approach proposed a decentralization model to solve the lack of access to health care for the poor population. Miguel de la Madrid introduced a new model granting municipalities the right to administer social security services. The State decided to decentralize these decisions to the municipalities with no budget. Problems emerged immediately as many municipalities did not have enough money to operate these programs. The reason being that the State had no money for health care, and other programs either, due to the compromises for paying the external debt, the State used the money from other sources to accomplish this goal. As a result, the new decentralization of health care model failed. A similar pattern emerged in other Latin American countries that faced a similar situation at that time, the State chose to decentralize the health system in México, after the imf promoted programs of structural adjustment and ­imposed limits to the social expenses. Health care was one of the programs that was not part of the government agenda (Homedes and Ugalde, 2008: 30). A new decentralization program was applied in the 1990s during Ernesto Zedillo’s presidency (1994–2000). After failing to solve the problem of lack of health coverage, he promoted a second approach of decentralization of the health system under the umbrella of “New Federalism.” This decentralization followed recommendations from the World Bank to give each secretariat the power to provide health services to its population, some progress was made by creating a new idea of health coverage, called “Seguro Médico Popular” but it was evident that at the end of this administration there were many unfinished tasks to create a program that could work in practice, such as the impossibility of fusing all systems (e.g., issste, imss, pemex, ssa, etc.) into one. During the Vicente Fox administration (2000–2006), this approach was renamed “Cooperative Federalism.” Again, the World Bank collaborated with the Mexican government designing the reforms needed, this neoliberal approach was called “structured pluralism.” With this approach, health care users would be able to choose the provider they want, and the providers would need to respond to ssa laws and regulations. No agreement in this regard was possible between ssa and all agencies involved and thus they were not able to make a fusion of all systems (Homedes and Ugalde, 2008: 36–38). The Seguro Médico Popular (SP) emerged with the idea of creating a single health care system that could cover about 50% of the population. However, the amount of resources

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d­ edicated to health care of México is just about 5.6% of gdp, when compared to other countries like Chile, Colombia and Uruguay with a similar development level to México, which allocate about 7.2, 9.6 and 10.9% of gdp to health care, respectively (Gómez Dantés and Ortiz, 2004). A similar experience was carried out in Colombia, where the “Seguro Medico” is an actual solution to health care coverage for the poor (Frenk, Gómez-Dantés, and Knaul, 2009). In theory, the proponents of Seguro Popular said, seven years ago, that by 2010 the entire Mexican population would be covered by this health care system. However, it is unknown if the users have real access to this service, or even more pregnant what the quality is of the services provided by independent sources. In summary, in 30 years of decentralization history of the health system proposed by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, there has been little effect in the quality of the services provided, inequality has increased and there is no transparency in the use of resources (Homedes and Ugalde, 2008: 40). Health inequalities together with educational inequalities aggravate labor inequalities, analyzed in the next paragraph. 5

Employment and Work Conditions

Another area in which to explore the effects of neoliberalism in México is labor market conditions. From the historical perspective, we can distinguish two significant stages regarding the labor market: 1) the first that is marked by the effects of the ii World War and 2) the second period is after the 1980s with the initiation of the neoliberal approaches to the economies and its effects ten years later (Cota Yañez and Navarro Alvarado, 2015: 212). Both stages are explained as follows; the first one is related to the developmentalist measures applied to Latin America during the 1940s when the rural population began migrating to urban areas searching for new opportunities. According to the developmental approach these migrations were essential to promote a labor surplus in support of industrialization processes in the country (Ramírez and Guevara, 2006). However, during the 1970s this migration process coincided with the beginning of a crisis. There was no employment to give because the industry did not grow up to absorb such workforce (Abdala, 2001). During the 1990s the structural adjustments promoted by the imf and globalization itself had deleterious consequences in the labor market. The labor market was split into two: the primary labor market with higher wages, better work conditions, and ascending mobility, whereas the secondary market is characterized by low salaries, bad work conditions, and unstable employment (Salazar and Azamar Alonso, 2014: 189).

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We observed that after 1990, the neoliberal model negatively impacted wages, with rapid decline in earnings from 1984 to 2015 (Figure 4.1). Neoliberal policy has no redistributive wage mechanism and focuses more on macroeconomic measures designed to control inflation, regardless of the quality of employment (Salazar and Azamar Alonso, 2014: 204). The labor reform in 2012 followed the World Bank suggestions to make more flexible working conditions, and lower paid jobs. The contracts foreseen in the Federal Labor Law (Ley Federal del Trabajo) exclude the creation of permanent job conditions and allow outsourcing as a way of temporary labor relation with contractors (about 180 days) with no obligation to be contracted again (Velasco Arregui, 2016). Better paying jobs have positive effects on subjective wellbeing, health education and higher self-esteem (Porcile, Dutra, and Meirelles, 2007: 474; Ros, 2000). In addition, policies oriented to pay real wages have several positive effects: 1) increases workers’ productivity and increases levels of consumption (Basu, 1984:96); 2) workers have better access to education and increases attitudes toward learning (Ranis and Stewart, 2002: 20); 3) better salaries elicit more dedication at work (Ros, 2000: 320); and 4) as Fanjzylber (1989) suggests, growing real wages provide the kind of social environment for innovation and support for social change.1 Minimum wage in México, 1982–2015

350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

Figure 4.1 Minimum Wage in Mexican Pesos, 1982–2015. Source: Own elaboration based on sat and inegi. National Price Index from 2010 was used to deflate 1 A decent pay promotes dignity to human beings, allowing workers to spend more time to their social environments (e.g, families, communities). A higher level of human dignity is

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In conclusion to this section of the chapter, we argue that the Mexican welfare State regime based on transformation social rights show the detrimental effects of neoliberalism in terms of education, health, and employment status. Direct implications of these policies implemented by technocratic and international experts from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund have increased the gaps of inequalities and poverty. 6 Poverty The phenomenon of poverty has increased in the last 30 years, particularly during the neoliberal era, 1980–2015 (Cárdenas, 2015: 17). As a result, the United Nations Development Programme proposed Sustainable Development Goals (sdg) that includes 17 goals, and poverty reduction in all forms is the first priority for all countries (undp, 2015). In many countries, income is the most common measure of poverty ­(Bourguignon, 2006). This approach was replaced in 1992, when México adopted a multidimensional method for measuring poverty with the following definition: “A person is considered multidimensional poor when the exercise of at least one of her social rights is not guaranteed and if he/she also has an income that is insufficient to buy the goods and services required to fully satisfy his/her needs.” (coneval, 2011: 37). This definition combines two dimensions: income and deprivation: “the economic wellbeing space identifies the population with an income insufficient to acquire the goods and services required to satisfy its needs. The social rights space identifies the population with at least one social deprivation in the indicators associated with this space.” (coneval, 2011: 38). Ten years later, the Advisory Committee for Poverty Measurement (Consejo Técnico para la Medición de la Pobreza, ctpm) adopted a multidimensional approach and proposed three poverty lines that count the incidence of the number of people with insufficient income according with the following criteria: 1) food poverty, not having enough income to cover basic food needs; 2) social rights poverty, not having enough income to cover food, health, education, clothing, shoes, housing and transport; and 3) patrimonial poverty, not having enough income to cover need for food, which is the closest line that compares to the sdg (ctmp, 2002). As stated in Cortés, Ochoa, Vargas, and Yaschine (2017a), Mexico experimented with measurement variations of poverty during

positively associated with the likelihood of having more innovations, in the same rate as human capital increases.

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1990–2015, depending on the economic impacts to the Mexican market,2 but comparing 1992 and 2014, there is practically no change for the three poverty lines. The incidence of patrimony changes from 53.1% to 55.1%, social rights poverty from 29.7% to 29.1% and food poverty from 21.4 to 20.5 (see Figure 4.2). The level of incidence of poverty has practically remained unchanged, suggesting that there is no explicit interest in solving this problem by consecutive Mexican governments. As suggested by Cortes, Ochoa, Vargas and Yashine: It is essential to contribute to generating an economic context with stability, greater growth, more and better jobs, that allows a recovery of l­ abor income and, thus, increase the income of households. At the same time, it is imperative to extend the exercise of social rights by the population to reduce even more substantively their social deficiencies (2017a). 80 70

69 63.7

60 50

46.9

40 30 20 10 0

53.6

53.1 52.4

37.4 29.7 30 21.4 21.2

50

47.2 47

41.7

47.8

26.9 20

24.7 24.7 17.4 18.2

55.1

42.9

33.3 31.8 24.1

51.1 52.3

20.9

28 25.5 26.6

29.1

Food poverty Social rights poverty Patrimony poverty

20.5 18.6 18.8 19.7

14

1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

Figure 4.2 Evolution of Income Poverty, 1990–2014. Source: Cortes and Vargas (2017) 2 In 2002, CONEVAL established the first official methodology for measuring poverty in Mexico, based multidimensional aspects rather than income only approach. Based on this methodology, the federal government proposed three poverty lines: Food that corresponded to a threshold below which there was insufficient income to cover basic food needs; Capacity that included the income required to cover food, health and education; and Patrimony, which also added clothing, shoes, housing and transport (sedesol, 2002). This methodology was used as an official parameter to monitor the evolution of poverty in the country between 2002 and 2008, although comparable information exists for the period 1992–2014.

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There is no actual social policy for reducing poverty, only social programs to restrain poverty in Mexico, this a consequence of the application of neoliberal policies. It is imperative to generate economic growth, increase ­salaries, have an actual redistributive policy to overcome poverty incidence. The more-­ market/less-state model showed that as a result of this policy income inequality has increased from 1980 to 2014. As another consequence, the next section explains why the worst combination of high poverty incidences and high levels of income inequality have stopped the productivity in México, as a heritage of neoliberalism in México. 7 Inequality We have commented at the beginning of this chapter that there are clearly two stages of the economic model in Mexico: the first corresponds to the stabilizing development model (desarrollo estabilizador), that basically underlines more-state/less-market intervention and the second, the neoliberal model that underlines more-market/less-state intervention. The next question is what is the impact of these two models in terms of inequality in México? One way to address this question is comparing the two stages in terms of the Gini coefficients. However, no data is available to previous years from the stabilizing development model, the only form of estimating the Gini coefficients is by using different data sources. Two authors addressed this issue: (Hernandez Laos, 1992: 88) estimated Gini coefficients using Banco de Mexico survey in 1968 and inegi in 1977, on the other hand, (Cortes and Vargas, 2017: 6) estimated these coefficients using different methodologies and the results are shown in Table 4.1. This table illustrates the Gini coefficients estimated in 1963, 1968 and 1977 with different methodologies, but ended with similar results. We observe, that the period of the stabilizing model (prior to 1984) showed some decrease in inequality from the range 0.523–0.541 to 0.496–0.462 in 1963 and 1977, respectively. However, for the second stage, from 1984 to 2014, when the neoliberal model was imposed, no efforts can be seen to correct the inequality produced within this economic model. Figure 4.3 shows that the Gini coefficient remains the same with an apparent decay from 2000 to 2014. Cortés, Ochoa, Vargas, and Yaschine (2017b) underline that, in spite of a perceived an apparent reduction of total income after 2000 the coefficient remains higher (.508) in 2014 compared to 1984 (0.489). In other words, the structural changes promoted by the World Bank, imf along with the administrations from 1984 to date, did not contribute to decrease inequality or reducing poverty. The continuous crisis of the 90s and 00s

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Welfare Regime, Neoliberal Transformation & Social Exclusion Table 4.1 Gini Coefficients Estimated Using Different Methodologies

Source

1963

1968

1977

Cortes & Vargas (2017) Hernandez Laos (1992)

0.523 0.541

0.498 0.498

0.496 0.462

source: cortes and vargas (2017). using banco de méxico and inegi data

caused an economic collapse. The apparent decrease of inequality after 2000 (López-Calva and Lustig, 2010) cannot be associated with new structural changes (Cortes and Vargas, 2017). The problem is that some authors claim that, “between 2000 and 2010, the Gini coefficient declined in 13 of 17 Latin American Countries… [in particular the case of] Argentina, Brazil and Mexico suggest two main phenomena underline this trend: a fall in premium to skilled labor and more progressive government transfers.” (Lustig, López-Calva, and Ortíz-Juarez, 2012). In the case of México, this change is apparent because the decile D10 loses its relative contribution to the income distribution, but the deciles D1 to D4 remain the same. The participation on the D10 was valid only for the years after 2000.

0.60

Gini coefficient

0.55

0.40

0.45

0.489

0.508

0.445

0.451

86 19 88 19 90 19 92 19 94 19 96 19 98 20 00 20 02 20 04 20 06 20 08 20 10 20 12 20 14

19

19

84

0.40

Total income Gini

Per capita income Gini

Figure 4.3 Evolution of Total and Per Capita Income Household Gini Coefficient: Mexico, 1984–2014. Source: Informe de Desarrollo 2015 PUED UNAM, based on CONEVAL estimations for 1992–2012 and PUED estimations for 2014

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We ask ourselves, what was the impact of the neoliberal model in Mexico from 1984 to 2014 regarding the income inequality? Table 4.2 shows the growth rate of deciles D1 to D4 (low income), D5 to D9 (middle income) and D10 alone (high income), divided in three periods. The first (1984–1989) corresponds to the transition of the stabilizing development model, the grow rate of deciles D1-D4 was 2.2, and for D10 was 9.97. For the second period (1989–2000) the D1-D4 rate increases to 3.03 and D10 decays to 3.75, but for period 2002–2014, the rate for D1-D4 is 2.58 and for D10 is 1.76. From an inequality perspective, things are going in the correct direction when we observe that decile D10 decreases,3 but there is a problem when we compare the same period with the Gini coefficients. Gini coefficients do not show the same tendency for the same periods, the average for the first period is 0.464, which corresponds to the transition to the neoliberal model; the Gini average for the second increased to 0.481; the Gini average for the third period is 0.459, which is practically the same to the first period. This means that the Gini coefficient followed an inverted U pattern in the three decades (see Figure 4.4). Furthermore, the Gini coefficient for 2014 is still large in 2014, compared to 1984 (Cortes et al., 2017b).4 The fiscal reform in Mexico was not designed to have a distributive effect of economic wealth. There is a need to study the forces that account for inequality, (e.g., the market labor policy, human capital, remittances from Mexicans in Table 4.2 Annual Growth Total Income Household Ratio by Three Groups of Deciles, México, 1984–2014

Households’ Deciles

1984–1989

1989–2000

2002–2014

Deciles D1–D4 Deciles D5–D9 Decile D10 Total Gini (average)

2.17 2.80 9.97 4.81 0.464

3.03 3.65 3.75 3.59 0.481

2.58 1.56 1.63 1.76 0.459

source: Adapted from Cortes et al. (2017b), using national household income survey data 3 If the decile D10 decreases this could suggest that the amount of rich people is decreasing. 4 The distribution of high income by focusing only to deciles 10 of income distribution is not enough. The Gini index can explain a different story. The Gini coefficient is considered large, suggesting that a big inequality prevails in México in the neoliberal era.

Welfare Regime, Neoliberal Transformation & Social Exclusion 12 Growth ratio

10 8 6 4 2 0

1984–1989

1989–2000 Decile D10

2002–2014

85 0.485 0.480 0.475 0.470 0.465 0.460 0.455 0.450 0.445

Gini (average)

Figure 4.4 Annual Average Growth Income of Deciles D10 and Gini. Source: Adapted from Cortes et al. (2017b), using National Household Income Survey data

the US, or the social policy itself). There was a new government from 2000 to 2012 with a different political sign (Partido Acción Nacional, pan) that wanted to consolidate the labour and fiscal reform that vanished due to lack of support of the parliament. México experienced poor economic growth from 2001 to 2003 prior to the gdp increasing to 3.7% by 2006 (Cortes and Vargas, 2017). Current expectations of gdp growth, depending on the sources, average 2.1% for the following 6 years (World Bank, oecd, Banco de México). The future looks dark. In summary, during the stabilizing developing model that was oriented toward more-state/less-market model, the inequality decreased. However, during the neoliberal era, characterized by more-market/less-state model, inequality increased. 8

Where Are We Now?

We have outlined two development models: the first is the stabilized development model, which occurred between the 1940s to the 1980s, and is characterized with more state/less market. The second is the neoliberal model since the early 1980s to date, which in turn can be subdivided into two phases: the first from 1980s to 1989 and the second from 1990 to date (approximately). The actual neoliberal model gave some possible responses from its designers to overcome economic, political, and social problems in the following decades after 1980. However, in the second period, particularly after several crises starting with the “tequila crisis” in 1994, the imf, WB, and the government, implemented ­structural reforms to correct the “imperfections” produced by the model. Analyzing this second phase, the idea of the end of neoliberalism is

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supported. Therefore, these crisis accounts for the hypothesis of the beginning of post neoliberalism. A revised welfare state could provide better answers to inequality, with a new policy for income distribution, increase human capital ­formation, and more effective social policies to reduce poverty, improve labor conditions for workers, and better health (Ross, 2000). However, the post neoliberal model is conducted within strong neoliberal roots. In that context, non-government institutions developed programs agendas to promote state responsibility and state intervention. It is the case of the incide Social which is “Citizenship initiative and Social Development” non-government civil association that seeks to contribute to social development, respect for human rights and democracy in Mexico, through research and its impact on public policies. The association’s president Clara Jusidman is a f­ormer federal and local official who contributes development ideas and agenda topics such as human rights, urban violence, social development, and political participation, all considered to be relevant issues for public policy. Jusidman stressed the importance to “promote the incorporation of the human rights approach into the social agenda and to contribute to the debate on the operationalization of the human rights approach in the design, implementation and evaluation of social policy” (Jusidman, 2012: 6). The inequalities remain in the neoliberal and post neoliberal periods in spite of multiple efforts undertaken by national and international forces in Mexico. We are in the crucial moment when civil society has to be more present and have more impacts on the government’s changes and implement new challenges, as the next year, 2018, is the year of presidential elections. 9 Conclusion The 100-year anniversary of Mexican constitution, 1917–2017, implies critical research and analysis of social rights in contemporary Mexico. This constitution established a system of social rights protection, unique in the world. As far as education was concerned, it established free, laic, and public principles of educational access. In terms of employment and workers’ rights, it established system of protection, which created fundaments of welfare policies until 80s. Then began the implementation of neoliberal ideas due to paradigm change following the Washington Consensus supported by the World Bank and International Monetary Funds. In theory, the neoliberal model as proposed by its proponents would ­generate economic growth and prosperity for all the world. However, the impacts of neoliberalism in Mexico had detrimental consequences in salaries, health, employment conditions, education, among other substantive areas. For ­example,

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increases in salaries, after 1980 have been always under inflation rates, the quality of jobs has decreased with no social network, the lack of increase of formal jobs have decreased the national income and poverty. In the case of health services, we observe several negative effects, as imposed by the structural reforms imposed by the imf and WB. The decentralization policy in the health system, has no tangible benefits for the population. One important issue to resolve is that Seguro Popular still has several challenges to overcome, there no evidence that these changes provide good quality access to health care to the population in need. Poverty rates showed no decrease in 30 years, the neoliberal model did not accomplish the goal to spread good conditions and benefits for all. Instead of the economic and social policy, the state implemented Cash Conditional Programs (ccp) focused on poor people and in this context, in women empowerment. progresa-Oportunidades (1997–2014) was a conditional transfer program focused on education, health, and alimentation. The administration of president Peña Nieto introduced the extended program, “prospera: social inclusion” in terms of financial, labor and productive inclusive mechanism. Nevertheless, again as it was in the case of progresa, the new paradigm “social inclusion” is established only to attract loans from the World Bank and other international institutions. According to official evaluation, provided by CONEVAL), after two decades of human capital paradigm and four years of social inclusion scheme, the number of people living in a condition of poverty is one of the biggest in the region of Latin America and the Caribbean countries. Moreover, the minimum wage is equivalent to 4 usd per day (120 usd per month) since 2017. Technocrats in the principal financial institution of Mexico, like the Bank of Mexico (Banxico in Spanish) and the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, shcp in Spanish), coming from private economic school (like itam) are more concerned about inflation pressure and macroeconomic indices than focusing on improving social conditions. For many of them, the decision to raise the minimum wage to 4 usd since 2017 was even too much. As we showed in the chapter, the overwhelming inequalities are constantly experienced by the majority of the Mexican population. The Gini coefficient is bigger after implementation of PROGRESA-Oportunidades, 1997–2014, which scored 0.508 in 2014 comparing 0.489 in 1984. New research is needed to extend the present analysis building on the richness and implementation of new methodologies for measuring wealth and systems of reproducing inequalities. Moreover, there is a pending agenda of research on tax elusion and evasion that is beyond this work.

Chapter 5

Protest and the Politics of Unemployment Insurance: Reforming Welfare States in Times of Austerity Rossella Ciccia and César Guzmán-Concha 1 Introduction1, 2 Fiscal austerity and changing societal conditions have put welfare states under increased pressure for reforms. Many countries have undergone processes of radical transformations of their welfare states, and in many others social protections are threatened by the diffusion of austerity politics (Van Kersbergen and Vis, 2013). Previous studies show that reform trajectories have varied considerably across social policy sectors and countries, and range from retrenchment to restructuring to stability and expansion (Pennings, 2005; Starke, 2006). Explanations of these different policy responses have generally emphasized the effect of political parties’ behavior and electoral dynamics (Esping-­ Andersen, 1990; Korpi, 1983; Pierson, 1996). In particular, recent debates have focused on the enduring importance of political ideologies and partisan politics, but few studies investigate the effect of non-electoral forms of political participation such as protest movements, strikes and demonstrations on social policy reform. Yet, citizens engage in politics in different ways and voting is only one of the means that they use to express their political preferences (Fourcade and Schofer, 2016). A notable feature of the current historical period is the diminishing electoral participation of marginalized social groups (the unemployed, the young and the poor) whose interests and needs are poorly represented by traditional actors such as political parties and unions. Declining voter turnout among those groups can further diminishes political parties’ willingness to take their issues on board and risks to cement divisions between insiders and outsiders (Offe, 2013). In this context, protests are routinely used to draw attention to social problems and put pressure on public authorities. 1 This research has received support under the European Commission’s 7th Framework ­Programme (FP7/2013-2017) under grant agreement n°312691, InGRID – Inclusive Growth Research Infrastructure Diffusion. 2 Both authors contributed equally to this work.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���9 | doi:10.1163/9789004384118_006

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These p ­ rotests represent a reaction not only to welfare cutbacks but also to a political situation in which institutions are perceived to be closed to the demands of particular groups of citizens. As social conflict is becoming more diffused in advanced societies, protest has also gained legitimacy as an element of the democratic game through which citizens express their political preferences (Rucht, 2007). Therefore, it is important to expand the analytical frameworks used to explain processes of change of welfare states to include non-institutional forms of political participation and their influence on patterns of social policy reform. Do protests produce policy impacts? What is the relationship between electoral and protest politics? These classical questions of social movement studies have received limited attention in comparative welfare state research. In this chapter, we contend that social policy reform is shaped by the broader configuration of the polity, in particular by the ways in which contentious and institutional politics interact and shape each other. If citizens by voting confer resources to political actors, who depend on those resources for their legitimacy, political protest can also put pressure on governments and political parties and increases the legitimacy of the allies of protest movements in the political arena (Hutter and Vliegenthart, 2016). To incorporate the study of protest in the analysis of social policy reform, we adopt a policy centered and configurational approach. Welfare states embody different approaches to different social risks (e.g. old age, unemployment, and sickness), and political dynamics – constellations of actors, alliances, and oppositions – concerning reform outputs are likely to differ not only across countries but also between policy sectors (Ciccia, 2017). In order to take this into account, our analysis will focus only on the reform of unemployment insurance. While this choice necessarily narrows the scope of this investigation from the whole of the welfare state to a single policy, it provides greater understanding of specific effects and reform dynamics concerning an area of social policy that has typically targeted outsiders and is the object of much contention across western economies (Giugni, 2010). Economic globalization, fiscal austerity, demographic and economic transformations represent important drivers of social policies reform. Yet, national responses to these structural processes have been varied and there is little evidence of significant convergence across welfare states (Swank, 2002). Several studies show that both social policy reform outputs and the impact of protest movements are contingent on contextual factors such as pre-existing policy legacies, the state capacity for reform, and the configuration of power and structure of political alliances (Beramendi, Häusermann, Kitschelt, and Kriesi, 2015; Giugni, 2004). To analyze the interaction between these contextual

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conditions, protest, and other political factors, we use a two-step fuzzy sets qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to analyze changes in unemployment insurance in 20 western economies in the period 1990–2005. In the first step, we investigate macro-structural conditions describing different contexts of problem pressures and state capacity for reforms. In the second step, we focus on how these problems are filtered down by political actors and institutions to produce different reform outputs. The focus of this investigation is on the interplay between problem pressures, protest, and electoral politics in shaping different trajectories of reforms. In the next sections, we start by reviewing the state of the art on theories of welfare state change, and then move on to discuss the implications of literature on political participation and social movements for the analysis of social policy reform. Next, we illustrate the data and methods used and the results of the two-step analysis. Finally, this chapter concludes by discussing the implication of our findings for the analysis of welfare state change. 2

Explaining Welfare State Change: The Politics of Expansion and Retrenchment

In order to understand the interaction of contextual and political factors shaping diverse trajectories of unemployment insurance reform, we first turn to the vast literature on processes of welfare states change. At their origins, these studies were mostly concerned with explaining different national trajectories of welfare state development. The power resource theory is probably the leading approach to this issue (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi, 1983). Power resource theorists view the expansion of welfare states as the result of distributive struggles among classes. In particular, generous social policies are considered the result of the presence of strong political coalitions between left-wing parties and trade unions and other facilitating institutions such as a centralized corporatist industrial relation system. Therefore, this theory posits that institutionalized political conflict has replaced less institutionalized and unorganized social conflict in modern welfare states since class struggles are now mainly channeled through parliamentary politics and peacefully resolved through redistributive policies (Korpi, 1983). This theory has undergone many refinements but still provides the core theoretical underpinnings to explain cross-national differences in social programs during the three decades following World War ii. The end of the Golden Age of welfare state expansion is marked by the emergence of new problem pressures deriving from macro-structural changes such

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as economic globalization, changing family structures, fiscal austerity, and mass unemployment (Ferrera, 2008; Huber and Stephens, 2001). These contextual factors act as drivers of change, which need to be articulated into political systems by political actors to produce diverse cross-national dynamics of policy change. The publication of Paul Pierson’s seminal work (1996; 2001) and the idea of a ‘new politics’ of the welfare state considerably shifted the field by putting forward the idea that the politics of retrenchment is qualitatively different from old expansionary politics. He contends that while the old politics was about governments claiming credit for expansionary measures, the new politics of retrenchment is about political parties trying to avoid blame for unpopular reforms. In this context, partisan differences between political parties cease to matter, rather retrenchment is pursued by governments of different colors by adopting strategies of compensation, division, and obfuscation to avoid being blamed by voters. Drawing on historical institutionalism, Pierson also argues that the trajectories of welfare states are also influenced by existing social policies since these have created constituencies of beneficiaries and interest groups which curtail the possibilities of significant cutbacks, and especially with regard to core schemes (pensions, healthcare). The new politics theory has dominated debates about welfare state retrenchment, but evidence about the supposed decline of partisan differences remains contradictory. Many studies found an effect of party ideology on social policy outputs since the 1970s (Garrett and Mitchell, 2001; Huber and Stephens, 2001; Kittel and Obinger, 2003; Swank, 2002), although others showed the presence of significant effects with regard to specific policies (Allan and Scruggs, 2004; Korpi and Palme, 2003). While these mixed results are in part an artifact driven by the use of different measures and modeling strategies, the issue about whether and how partisanship still matters remains a contested question in comparative welfare state research. New institutionalist approaches argue that the effect of partisan differences needs also to be seen in the context of existing political institutions (Huber et al., 1993). In this view, partisan effects should be stronger in systems with fewer veto points and a strong concentration of legislative power in the executive. Conversely, systems characterized by many veto points would favor the preservation of the status quo by rendering more difficult any attempt to alter existing social policies regardless of the color of government (Kühner, 2010). Opposition parties and interest groups should thus become more influential, and the effect of partisan differences more difficult to determine, in situations of dispersion of power. This brief review of theories of the welfare state shows that, in spite of all their differences, the main approaches used to explain processes of welfare state change have only focused on the behaviour of political parties and other

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institutional actors (unions, employers). In the next section, we turn to the literature on protest and unconventional forms of political participation to understand their effect on the reform of welfare states. 3

Protest and Its Effects on the Reform of Welfare States

While the classical literature on political participation treated different forms of political activity (e.g. voting, civic engagement, lobbying, protest) as relatively exclusive from each other, more recent studies acknowledge that citizens and organizations normally combine various forms in their repertoire of action and that the boundaries between those forms are not as clear cut as one would imagine (Fourcade and Schofer, 2016). At the individual level, protest is a growing channel of political expression, and people that participate in protests are also likely to engage in conventional forms of political activism (Norris, Walgrave, and Van Aelst, 2005). At the level of organizations, it is not uncommon for protest movements to evolve into more institutionalized forms such political parties to realize their goals, while political parties and other institutional actors often resort to unconventional forms of participation (e.g. demonstrations) to promote their issues. Because of their different pathways into modernity and nationhood, countries exhibit different institutionalized models of political behaviors. Treating different forms of political activity as a series of discrete object neglects precisely how the entire field of politics itself is structured differently across nations (Fourcade and Schofer, 2016). In some countries, politics is mainly channeled through corporatist institutions based on membership and collective negotiations (Scandinavian countries), in others social conflict is more visible and demonstrations, protests or even forms of political violence are considerate more legitimate political means by the broader society (e.g. France, Italy). Therefore, the exclusive focus of welfare state analyses on party politics leaves out important sources of political influence on social policy reform. The impact of protest on public policies and the state remains a contested issue in the literature in spite of the considerable amount of research that has been to date dedicated to this topic. Indeed, it is not easy to assess the effects of protest given the multitude of independent, intervening, and dependent factors that come into play and the fact that this field still suffers from the lack of systematic comparative data (Rucht, 2007). A further problem concerns what should count as outcomes of protest movements since ­often they produce unintended effects that go beyond their immediate goals– such as modifying voting behavior, creating counter-movements or triggering

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r­ epression. Nonetheless, the belief that political decisions and public policies can be changed through collective action remains an important reason why people engage in protests. Social policies produce collective goods, which simultaneously advantage and disadvantage various social groups. As such, they are fields of contention that reveal the distributive preferences of authorities and express power relations between various actors. There is a substantial literature investigating the conditions under which social movements produce policy impacts (Amenta, Caren, Chiarello, and Su, 2010; Gamson, 1990; Giugni, 2004; Giugni, McAdam, and Tilly, 1999; Goldstone and Tilly, 2001; Schumaker, 1975; Soule and Olzak, 2004). Although few of these studies analyze social policies (Amenta, 2006; Amenta, Caren and Olasky, 2005; Piven and Cloward, 1979), this literature offers interesting insight into the ways in which protest might influence policy reform. In pursuing their goals, social movements engage in different actions (and strategies) intended to influence the decisions of public authorities and obtain concessions. These strategies range from lobbying to more or less disruptive forms of public demonstrations and less frequently political violence. Schumaker (1974) was among the first to conceptualize the conditions under which public authorities are responsive to protesters, distinguishing among the internal characteristics of movements and those of the environment in which they act. Subsequent research developed around these lines of investigation. Early works have in particular looked at the organizational characteristics of movements (Gamson, 1990) and the extent to which disruption increases or not the impacts of movements in policymaking (Piven and Cloward, 1979; Tarrow, 1989). The disruption vs. moderation debate is one of the key issues of investigation of this literature. Another important strand of research has instead focused on the characteristics of the political environment and the opportunities or constraints faced by protesters (Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi, Duyvendak, Giugni, and Koopmans, 1995). A major contribution of the political process approach is that the outcomes of protest are shaped by the broader political and institutional context in which it takes place. Among the various dimensions of political opportunity identified by this literature, the structure of political alliances and pre-existing political institutions appear particularly relevant for the study of the policy impacts of protest movement (Giugni, 2004). The existence of a relationship between contentious and institutional politics represents one of the core ideas of much theorizing in social movement literature (e.g. political process or political opportunity structure theory), and there has been an increased interest in recent years in the ways in which these two political arenas interact and shape each other (McAdam and Tarrow, 2010). Protest movements generally lack the power to force public authorities to­

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satisfy their claims. The extent of their influence on the decision-making process depends foremost on their ability to forge alliances or enter into bargaining with opponents within the institutional arena (Amenta, Caren, and Olasky, 2005; Giugni, 2004; Kolb, 2007). According to the classic approach inspired by the democratic pluralist theory, political parties respond to their constituencies. Moreover, we can expect that politicians will be more likely to concede to protests when the ideology of political parties approximates those of protesters and their claims (Kriesi, Duyvendak, Giugni, and Koopmans, 1995). There is a certain consensus that party ideology influences the chance of protestors to find satisfaction for their claims. The large majority of protests that are reported in the media demand economically left-wing solutions to certain problems. Hence, left-wing parties should be more likely to respond positively to protest movements because of their shared goals and because of fears of the electoral consequences related to ignoring the claims of people who are likely to belong to their constituencies. However, previous studies also show that left-wing ­parties could be more responsive to protest movements when not in power since they are less bound by the various constraints that governments need to take into account, while protests can also offer them ammunition with which to attack the government (Hutter and Vliegenthart, 2016; Kriesi, Duyvendak, Giugni, and Koopmans, 1995). When it comes to social policy reform, political parties’ decisions will also be constrained by the capacity of the state to deliver collective benefits or to redistribute the costs of cutbacks (Pierson, 1996). The extent to which this is influenced by political ideological parties remains a contested issue (Pierson, 1996; Korpi and Palme, 2003). In addition to these political hurdles, political institutions also shape the extent to which protests are able to influence reform outputs (Kriesi, Duyvendak, Giugni, and Koopmans, 1995). The historical configuration of the state figures prominently both in social policy and social movement literature as a factor influencing policy outputs. The neo-institutional perspectives identify veto points as crucial determinants of the potential for policy change. Veto points are defined as constitutional features that impede far-reaching reforms by making it difficult to implement decisions based on narrow majorities. Therefore, a high number of veto points favors the status quo and would hinder reforms regardless of their direction (Kühner, 2010). However, veto points also disperse political power and offer multiple points of influence on policymaking (Huber, Ragin, and Stephens, 1993). In this situation, protesters could avail themselves of additional points of leverage for their action (e.g. sympathetic bureaucrats, a favorable judicial or constitutional courts), which would strengthen their ability to influence reform outputs. The systematic analysis of

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the various ways in which protesters interact with actors occupying positions of power within state structures is still an underexplored area of research. The literature on social movements reviewed here shows that the effect of protest is often not linear or clear-cut, rather it is generally contingent on other factors of the broader political and institutional environment in which movements act. While the study of protest in comparative perspective is a growing area of research, most previous works consist of case studies searching for the variables most conductive to social movement outcomes regardless of context. In this study, we use a comparative approach in order to disentangle contextual effects and identify contingent sequences of factors leading or impeding an effect of protest. In the next section, we illustrate the data and method used to analyze change in unemployment insurance in 20 western economies between 1990 and 2005, a period before the onset of the financial crises characterized by increased internal and international pressures on welfare states. 4

Data and Methods

4.1 A Two-step Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis We use two-step fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (two-step fsQCA) (Schneider and Wagemann, 2006) to investigate the influence of economic and political factors in shaping the trajectories of unemployment insurance reform. The countries included in this analysis are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. Previous studies using pooled time-series cross-sectional analysis have identified a net effect of protest on welfare state change (Bailey, 2015), but these analyses have not specifically investigated how this relationship is altered by contextual and political factors, nor have they specifically addressed the interaction between protest, partisanship and other political variables. We employ qualitative comparative analysis (qca) to address these issues. qca is a set-theoretic method that aims to detect set relations between condition sets and outcome set. These relationships are interpreted in terms of n ­ ecessity – if the outcome is always present when the condition is also present  – and sufficiency – if the condition is always present when the outcome is also present. These principles are used to identify causally complex patterns of causation such as asymmetrical and conjunctural causal relations and equifinal solutions (Ragin, 2000). It is because of these principles that qca has found wide

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application in the analysis of contextual and joint effects in studies of social policy and political sociology (Amenta and Poulsen, 1996; Guzmán-Concha, 2015; Pennings, 2005). Here, we adopt Schneider and Wagemann’s (2006) two-step fsQCA. This procedure, which was developed to deal with the problems of limited diversity (too many variables, too few cases), is based on the distinction between different sets of conditions which are progressively entered in the analysis. Although, Schneider and Wagemann’s approach was originally grounded in a temporal dimension, we believe that this method can be more broadly adopted to investigate the relationship between any theoretically distinct and conceptually rooted set of factors. In this analysis, we differentiate between contextual (macro-structural phenomena) and political factors (political actors and institutions filtering the effects of these transformations). In the first step, we analyze socio-economic structures describing different contexts of problem pressures and state capacity for reforms (trade openness, financial openness, divergence in economic growth rates, unemployment rate, and budget deficit). In the second step, we investigate the configuration of political actors and institutions (frequency of protest, left cabinets, union density, corporatism, veto points). The goal of this analysis is to identify particular combinations of problem pressures and political factors producing resilience or retrenchment in unemployment insurance across countries. By combining these two levels of analysis, this study aims to move away from claims of linearity to examine the ways in which the nexus between protest, parties and social policy may be sensitive to context conditions. To perform this analysis, we need to transform the raw data into fuzzy scores through a process of calibration of sets. This calibration establishes three thresholds (fully in, intermediate, fully out) allowing us to establish qualitative differences between cases by determining degrees of membership in each particular set (Ragin, 2000). Table 5.1 details information about the variables, sources and thresholds used for the independent variables3. In what follows, we illustrate in greater detail the approach used to measure changes in unemployment insurance and protest.

3 Information about the raw data used in this analysis can be found in Table 5.7 at the end of the chapter.

Protest and the Politics of Unemployment Insurance Table 5.1

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Measures, Sources and Calibration of Independent Variables

CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES (PROBLEM PRESSURES) Variable

Definition and source

Measure and calibration

ECOPEN

Economic openness as measured by the kof Index of Globalization, sub index: ‘economic globalization’. This sub index combines data on actual flows of trade (percent of gdp), foreign direct investment (percent of gdp), income payments to foreign nationals (percent of gdp), and restrictions (hidden import barriers, mean tariff rate, taxes on international trade, and capital account restrictions). Source: Dreher, Axel, Noel Gaston, and Pim Martens 2008, Measuring Globalization – Gauging its Consequences, New York, Springer.

Each of the component variables is transformed into an index on a scale of one to hundred, where hundred is the maximum value for a specific variable in the 1970– 2012 period and one is the minimum value. Higher values denote greater globalization. To transform these values in fuzzy scores we use the average of the 20 countries in the sample as crossover point and ±1 standard deviation to define the ‘fully in’ (i.e. countries with relatively high economic openness), and ‘fully out’ (countries with relatively low economic openness) thresholds. Thresholds: Fully in: 87.13; Crossover: 75.92; Fully out: 64.71

BUDEFICIT

Ratio of the annual general government deficit relative to gross domestic product (gdp). Source: oecd, National Accounts (June 2016)

To determine the extent to which certain level of budget deficit create problem pressure, we use the Maastricht criteria,which can be considered the expression of the dominant paradigm for fiscal policies in advanced economies since the 1990s. Accordingly, deficits greater than -3.5 percent are ‘fully in’ this set (i.e. countries with a severe deficit problem), while countries with zero deficits are considered ‘fully out’ (i.e. no deficit problem) this set. The crossover point is set at -3.0, the Maastricht criteria. Thresholds: Fully in: 0; Crossover: -3.0; Fully out: -3.5

UNEMPLOY

Unemployment rate (number of unemployed people as a percentage of the labour force) Source: Armingeon, Klaus, Christian Isler, Laura Knöpfel, David Weisstanner and Sarah Engler, 2016, Comparative Political Data Set 1960–2014, Bern: Institute of Political Science, University of Berne.

To transform unemployment rates in fuzzy scores we use the average of the 20 countries of the sample as crossover point, and ±1 standard deviation to define the ‘fully in’ (i.e. countries with relatively high unemployment), and ‘fully out’ (countries with relatively low unemployment) thresholds.

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Table 5.1

Measures, Sources and Calibration of Independent Variables (cont.)

CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES (PROBLEM PRESSURES) Variable

Definition and source

Measure and calibration Thresholds: Fully in: 10.20; Crossover: 7.30; Fully out: 4.51

DIVGROWTH

Divergent growth is defined as the difference between the growth of a country in a given year and the average growth of the 20 economies included in the dataset plus Greece. Source: oecd Quarterly gdp (September 2015)

To transform these figures in fuzzy scores we use the average of the 20 countries of the sample as crossover point, and ±1 standard deviation to define the ‘fully in’ (i.e. countries with relatively high economic growth), and ‘fully out’ (countries with relatively low economic growth) thresholds. Thresholds: Fully in: -1.11; Crossover: 0.00; Fully out: 1.11

POLITICAL VARIABLES PROTEST

Frequency of events of non-institutional politics. Source: Banks, Arthur S., Wilson, Kenneth A., 2016, Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive. Databanks International, Jerusalem, Israel. See http:// www.cntsdata.com/

To establish the crossover point distinguishing countries with high/low levels of protests, we use the trimmed average, i.e. average that excludes the extreme values (France, 61 events; Portugal and Finland, 1 event). We use ±1 standard deviation to obtain the ‘fully in’ (i.e. countries with high levels of protest in the period), and ‘fully out’ (i.e. countries with low levels of protest) thresholds Thresholds: Fully in: 30; Crossover: 11.6; Fully out: 4

UNION

Union density as percentage of the active labour force enrolled in trade unions. Source: Armingeon, Klaus, Christian Isler, Laura Knöpfel, David Weisstanner and Sarah Engler, 2016, Comparative Political Data Set 1960–2014, Bern: Institute of Political Science, University of Berne.

We use the average of the 20 countries of the sample as crossover point, and ±1 standard deviation to define the ‘fully in’ (i.e. countries with high union density), and ‘fully out’ (i.e. countries with low union density) thresholds. Thresholds: Fully in: 57.72; Crossover: 37.12; Fully out:16.52

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CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES (PROBLEM PRESSURES) Variable

Definition and source

Measure and calibration

LEFTCAB

Cabinet posts of social democratic and other left parties in percentage of total cabinet posts weighted by the number of days in office in a given year. Source: Armingeon, Klaus, Christian Isler, Laura Knöpfel, David Weisstanner and Sarah Engler, 2016, Comparative Political Data Set 1960–2014, Bern: Institute of Political Science, Universsity of Berne.

The crossover point between high/low levels of predominance of the left in government is set in 50%. The  ‘fully  in’  and  ‘fully  out’  thresholds  are set  at 95%  and 5%  of  the  period. Thresholds: Fully in: 95; Crossover: 50; Fully out: 5

CORP

We used Jahn’s Index of corporatism. Corporatist arrangements are defined by the author as encompassing three conceptual aspects: 1) an agreement forged by compromise between conflicting interest organizations; 2) mediated by the state; 3) including the scope of its implementation. Jahn’s index considers eight aspects: 1) Organizational structure of collective actors; 2) Structure of work council representation; 3) Rights of work councils Function; 4) Government intervention in wage bargaining; 5) Dominant level of wage bargaining; 6) Involvement of unions and employers in government decisions; 7) Coordination of wage bargaining; 8) Mandatory extension of collective agreements. To obtain an index of corporatism, Jahn performed a factor analysis with these eight items described above and summed the z-scores of each item. He further calculated the five-year average of the index to account for the fact that change in one year could be counterbalanced in the next year. Source: Jahn, D. (2014). ‘Changing the Guard: Trends in Corporatist Arrangements in 42 Highly Industrialized Societies from 1960 to 2010’. Socio-Economic Review, 14 (1): 47–71.

Since Jahn’s index of corporatism is based on z scores, the crossover point is set at the average value (0), and ±1 standard deviation are used to define the ‘fully in’ (high corporatism) and ‘fully out’ (low corporatism) thresholds. Thresholds: Fully in: 1; Crossover: 0; Fully out: -1

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Table 5.1

Measures, Sources and Calibration of Independent Variables (cont.)

CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES (PROBLEM PRESSURES) Variable

Definition and source

Measure and calibration

VETOPOINT

Number of constitutional veto points, This indicator ranges from 0 to 11 veto including the following: points. The crossover threshold is set at − Federalism (0 = no, 1 = weak, 2 = strong) the average number of veto points in the − Presidential system (0 = parliamentary, dataset (4.5), and the ‘fully in’ and ‘fully out’ 1 = president or collegial executive) thresholds are set at 10.5 and 0.5 respectively. − Electoral system (0 = proportional Thresholds: representation, 1 = modified Fully in: 10.5; Crossover: 4.5; Fully out: 0.5 proportional representation, 2 = single member, simple plurality systems) − Strength of bicameralism (0 = no second chamber or second chamber with very weak powers, 1 = weak bicameralism, 2 = strong bicameralism) − Referendum (0 = none or infrequent, 1 = frequent) − Judicial review (0 = no, 1 = yes) − Authoritarian legacies. Type of political regime in 1900: 1) ‘Full’ democracies (suffrage for all adult males and cabinet responsibility to parliament or elected president); 2) Cabinet responsibility but significant portion of the adult male population without suffrage rights; 3) ‘Neo absolutist’ governments in which the principle of cabinet responsibility to the parliamentary majority has not been established. Source: Brady, D, Huber E. and Stephens J.D., Comparative Welfare States Dataset, University of North Carolina and wzb Berlin Social Science Center, 2014

The Dependent Variable: Measuring Change in Unemployment Insurance Studies of retrenchment are divided on how retrenchment should be defined and measured (Green-Pedersen, 2004; Starke, 2006; Swank, 2002). Although it is not possible to provide a detailed review of this vast literature, we illustrate 4.2

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here some of the debates informing our measure reform of unemployment insurance. These issues concern, in particular, the level of analysis and the indicators and dimensions chosen to measure social policy change. While the majority of studies of welfare state expansion rely on aggregate measures of welfare state change, studies of retrenchment increasingly pay attention also to dynamics within specific policy sectors (Starke, 2006). Several studies adopting this more disaggregated approach have shown that trends in social policy reform differ across sectors and are subject to different constellations of factors within a single country (Pennings, 2005; Swank, 2002). In this view, policy-centered approaches appear better equipped to analyzing the dynamics of change since political decisions and reforms typically concern single programs and only rarely affect the entire welfare state (Hinrichs, 2000). Similarly, the literature on the outcomes of social movements has mostly focused on single policies to study the political consequences of movement organizations, recognizing that their impact is – among other things – dependent on the type of issue targeted by movements (Giugni, 2004). Another advantage of disaggregated approaches is that they generally yield more accurate measures of the extent of reforms since they are not affected by compensation effects between policy sectors (e.g. an expansion of family policy accompanied by simultaneous retrenchment of unemployment insurance), which produce an impression of overall stability and mask the real extent of change taking place. Given these considerations, the choice of a policy-centered approach focusing on unemployment insurance in this study entails clear advantages in terms of both measurement accuracy and analytical strategy. The second object of debate concerns the type of data to be used in the analysis of retrenchment. Aggregate expenditure data is the most commonly used measure in studies of welfare state change. Although this data is not without advantages, it has several limitations when dealing with retrenchment. In particular, many reforms are designed to have gradual effects, which are not immediately reflected in spending figures, while cutbacks such as tightened eligibility or shorter benefit duration are not easily captured by expenditure data (Green-Pedersen, 2004). More importantly for our analysis, changes in social expenditures are driven as much by increased social needs (e.g. growing unemployment) as by political decisions. The other commonly used approach relies on the institutional characteristics of social rights such as legal definitions of benefit levels, duration, and eligibility conditions. Although also not without its problems, the social rights approach has the advantage that ­changes in entitlement and eligibility conditions are more easily traced back to political decisions. This approach was pioneered by Walter Korpi (1989) and the compilation of the Social Citizenship Indicator Program (scip), which

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made possible the systematic assessment of social rights variation for a large number of social programs and countries. In particular, this dataset contains information on many characteristics of unemployment insurance (e.g. replacement rates, duration, eligibility conditions), and thus provides a more comprehensive view of the multidimensionality of this social policy and its reform than expenditure data. In this analysis, we define retrenchment here as political decisions that cutback unemployment benefits and focus on changes concerning three types of institutional characteristics of policies – universalism, replacement rates and duration of entitlements – in order to provide a comprehensive picture of retrenchment across countries. We use data of the Social Citizenship Indicator Programme to construct a composite index of change of unemployment considering two dimensions. The first dimension concerns the extent to which unemployment insurance is a universal entitlement, i.e. not tied to past contributions or economic need. This measure considers three aspects – qualifying ratio, length of contribution period and presence of means test – and varies between 0 and 3. The maximum score is obtained when the benefit is not tied to past contributions, when the contribution period is shorter and when the benefit is not tied to income thresholds. The construction of this index is detailed in Table 5.2. Figure 5.1 shows changes in universalism between 1990 and 2015. Few countries have rendered their policies more difficult to access for claimants (Denmark, France, Finland, Sweden, Spain, The Netherlands, and Switzerland), while only Canada, Ireland and Portugal have made unemployment insurance more universalistic. The majority of countries have remained stable on this aspect.

Table 5.2 Index of Universalism of Entitlements of Unemployment Insurance

Aspect Qualifying ratio Length of the contribution period (months) Means tested

Measure 1- (contribution period/ reference period) 0–51 = 1 52–75 = 0.5 ≥76 = 0 Yes = 0; No = 1

Source: Author’s calculations

Maximum Score 1 1 1

103

Protest and the Politics of Unemployment Insurance 0.40

ie pt

be ja p uk ca n

at

it nz l

de au s us a no

se fr

nl fi

ch dk

0.00

es

0.20

–0.20

–0.40

–0.60

–0.80 Figure 5.1 Changes in Universalism of Unemployment Insurance, 1990–2005. Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Social ­C itizenship Indicator Programme (SCIP)

The second measure considers the generosity of unemployment insurance in terms of replacement rates and duration of the entitlement. We construct an additive index of generosity, which considers the average net replacement rate and the duration of the benefit (Table 5.3). Table 5.3 Index of Generosity of Unemployment Insurance

Aspect Average net replacement rates

Maximum duration of benefit (n. of weeks)

Source: Author’s calculations

Measure ≥70 = 2 0.60–0.69 = 1.5 0.45–0.59 = 1 0.31–0.44 = 0.5 ≤.30 = 0 ≥104 weeks = 2 54–103 = 1.5 53 = 1 27–52 = 0.5 ≤26 = 0

Maximum 2

2

104

Ciccia and Guzmán-Concha 1990

2.5 DE CH JAP

Replacement rates

2.0

FI NL SE NO

CAN

1.5 USA

1.0

IE AUS BE FR

AT

NZL

.5 IT

.0

–.5

ES DK

–.5

.0

UK

.5

1.0 Duration

1.5

2.0

2.5

Figure 5.2 Generosity of Unemployment Insurance, 1990. Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Social Citizenship Indicator Programme (SCIP)

This index varies between 0 and 4 with higher values indicating more generous unemployment benefits, i.e. higher replacement rates for longer period of time. By combining these two aspects, we can identify four distinct worlds of unemployment insurance, each with its own distinct logics of risk protection: long-term unemployment (I quadrant), short-term unemployment (ii quad.), minimal (iii quad.) and residual protections (iv quad). Comparing ­countries’ position between 1990 and 2005 (Figures 5.2 and 5.3), we can observe that changes to these aspects have mostly been residual (within-world), with only few paradigmatic changes to the underlying principles of unemployment insurance (between-world). Ireland, Japan, and the Netherlands are paradigmatic cases of retrenchment, while Italy is the only case of paradigmatic expansion. A number of patterns of change can be observed. Japan is the only country that introduced cuts to both replacement rates and duration, while in the majority of countries cutbacks have concerned only one of these aspects. Some countries have made their unemployment insurance available for s­ horter periods

105

Protest and the Politics of Unemployment Insurance 2005 2.5

Replacement rates

PT CH FR SE

NL DE IT

2.0 USA

1.5

JAP

1.0

FI NO CAN AT

BE

IE

.5

AUS NZL

UK

.0

–.5

DK

–.5

.0

.5

1.0 Duration

1.5

2.0

2.5

Figure 5.3 Generosity of Unemployment Insurance, 2005. Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Social Citizenship Indicator Programme (SCIP)

of time (Spain, France, United Kingdom, Canada), but few countries considerably so (Netherlands). Other countries have moderately reduced the level of benefits, but only in Ireland and Japan was this amount significant (around 25 per cent). Austria, Belgium, Sweden, Germany, and Portugal have not modified the generosity of their policies. Our final composite index of change in unemployment insurance combines information on changes occurred between 1990 and 2005 on generosity and universalism. As shown in Figure 5.4, ten countries scaled back unemployment insurance (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain and the United Kingdom) during this period, five (Italy, France, Portugal, Switzerland and the United States) have considerably expanded provisions and five have not experienced significant changes (Austria, Belgium, Germany, New Zealand and Sweden). The thresholds used to calibrate this variable are 1 (fully in), -0.1 (crossover), -1(fully out), so that both expansion and stability are considered cases of resilience of unemployment insurance.

106

Ciccia and Guzmán-Concha

3.00 2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 –0.50

p dk nl

ja

es

ie

fi aus no uk can se

at be de nzl ch pt

fr usa it

–1.00 –1.50 –2.00 Figure 5.4 Index of Change in Unemployment Insurance, 1990–2005. Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Social Citizenship Indicator Programme (SCIP)

4.3 Measuring Protest The measurement of protest is a controversial topic and various types of data have been used to this purpose, in particular individual level survey data on participation in various forms of protests (demonstrations, boycotts, petitions, occupations) and newspaper data about protest events. In spite of some limitations due to differential coverage of countries and types of events (Ortiz, ­Myers, Walls, and Diaz, 2005), newspaper data has the advantage for this analysis that protest events must generally gain visibility in the media to put pressure on political authorities. Moreover, data on actual protest events provides information that is sensitive to sudden changes in socio-economic or political conditions that might trigger significant increments of protest. We use the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive to measure protests across countries (Banks and Wilson, 2016). This dataset provides information on the frequency of protest events that appeared on the New York Times in the period examined. This is an aggregate measure which does not distinguishes protest events based on the issues raised or the claims made, but it is among the few crossnational measures available for comparative analyses and has been widely used in other comparative studies. This measure allows us to gauge the extent to which protest are a regular feature of the repertoire of action and political

107

Protest and the Politics of Unemployment Insurance

participation in a given country. Therefore, while we cannot assess the direct relationship between particular protest events and specific policy responses through this data, we can use it to investigate the extent to which the presence of contentious modes of political participation – i.e. a higher frequency of protests – affects political systems and produces a cumulative effect on the trajectories of social policy reform. We use six of the indicators included in this dataset: assassinations (domestic1), general strikes (domestic2), guerrilla warfare (domestic3), riots (domestic6), revolutions (domestic7), and anti-government demonstrations (domestic8)4. We do not assign weights to specific components, but sum ­frequencies for each of these indicators to construct a comprehensive measure of the number of protest events in each country per year. Our final measure of protest sums the yearly frequency for each country in the period 1990–2005 (Figure 5.5). The number of protest events varies from 62 in France to only 1 in 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

fi

pt

no

se

ch aus dk

nl nzl ie

p t ja a

be can it

de usa es

uk

fr

Figure 5.5 Frequency of Protest Events per Country, 1990–2005. Source: Author’s calculations based on Banks and Wilson, 2016 4 The definitions of each component provided by the cnts (User Manual, 2014, 12) is as follows: 1) assassinations (domestic1), any politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a high government official or politician; 2) general Strikes (domestic2), any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national government policies or authority; 3) guerrilla warfare (domestic3), any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and

108

Ciccia and Guzmán-Concha

Portugal and Finland. The general cross-national trends observable here are similar to those described in other studies using survey data such as the World Value Survey (Bailey, 2015; F­ ourcade and Schofer, 2016). The thresholds used to calibrate this set are 30 (fully in), 11.6 (intermediate) and 4 (fully out). 5 Results The test of necessity reveals that none of the contextual and political conditions are necessary for the occurrence of the outcome ‘resilience’ (consistency ≤0.90). Resilience is defined here as the presence of stable or increased social provisions for the unemployed. In the next sections, we illustrate the results of the analysis of sufficiency. 5.1 Step 1: The Contexts of Retrenchment The first step consists of the analysis of contextual factors (economic openness, unemployment, budget deficits, and divergence in economic growth rates). The outcome here is set to ‘retrenchment’ (or ‘no-resilience’) since this analysis aims at identifying particular combinations of problem pressures inducing cutbacks in unemployment insurance5. In this phase, we consider all the rows in the truth table that lead to the outcome and do not establish a minimum threshold for consistency levels (Schneider and Wagemann, 2006). Logical remainders are not used in the minimization of the truth table. While further minimization would have allowed for a more parsimonious solution, this would have come at the risk of oversimplifying the diversity of contexts of problem pressure. Hence, we adopted a conservative approach and chose the complex solution. Table 5.4 shows five contexts of retrenchment. These combinations of contextual conditions exhibit varying levels of coverage (from 0.28 to 0.63), but overall high consistency levels. All contexts with the exception of C3 include both cases that implemented cuts and other that did not, showing that, as

aimed at the overthrow of the present regime; 4) riots (domestic6), any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force; 5) revolutions (domestic7), any illegal or forced change in the top government elite, any attempt at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the central government; 6) anti-government demonstrations (domestic8), any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature. 5 Once we identify those rows with cases leading to the outcome ‘resilience’, we obtain exactly the same combinations of conditions as a result of the minimization by setting the outcome to ‘retrenchment’ (no-resilience).

109

Protest and the Politics of Unemployment Insurance Table 5.4 Truth Table: The Contexts of Retrenchment (Step 1)

Configuration C1:

ECOPEN*budeficit

C2:

ecopen*unemploy *BUDEFICIT divgrowth*UNEMPLOY *budeficit ecopen*DIVGROWTH *BUDEFICIT

C3: C4:

C5:

ECOPEN*DIVGROWTH *unemploy

Cases Ireland, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland, Finland, Norway, New Zealand, Canada Japan, United States, United Kingdom Ireland, Spain, Australia, Canada Japan, Germany, Italy, France, United Kingdom Switzerland, Denmark, Austria, Sweden, Portugal

Coverage Consistency 0.63

0.82

0.28

0.78

0.39

0.99

0.33

0.63

0.34

0.76

Note: Uppercase characters indicate the presence of the characteristic; lowercases indicate the absence. Symbol * indicates the logical connector ‘and’. Countries in bold refer to cases with scores above 0.50 in the outcome resilience. Source: Author’s calculations

e­ xpected, countries responded differently to similar combination of problem pressures. The translation of these problems into policy outputs will depend crucially on their interplay with political actors and institutions, which represent the focus of the next step of this analysis. The first context (C1) combines high economic openness to global markets and the absence of budget deficits. C1 includes almost two-thirds of cases. C2 refers to a context of high budget deficit with low levels of economic openness and unemployment. This context includes the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan. C3 is a context of high unemployment and low divergent growth (i.e. countries with above average economic performance) and small budget deficits. This is the only context covering only cases of retrenchment and includes Ireland, Spain, Australia, and Canada. C4 combines high divergent growth (i.e. countries with below average economic growth), high budget deficits and relatively low levels of economic openness. C4 includes the four largest European economies (Germany, Italy, France, and the UK) .

110

Ciccia and Guzmán-Concha

and Japan. C5 shows high ­levels of divergent growth and economic openness and low unemployment rates, and includes mostly cases of no retrenchment (Austria, Denmark, Sweden, and Portugal). We can also observe that not all these contexts entail the same level of problem pressure. For instance, C3 generates greater and more direct pressure to cutback unemployment insurance due to the increased social spending generated by high unemployment levels. Conversely, budget deficits (C2) or economic globalization (C1) may constrain governments’ policy agenda, but do not per se promote the reform of unemployment insurance. We can also observe that a number of countries (Austria, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom) are covered by more than one of these formulas and are thus exposed to multiple contexts of problem pressures. We expect that more severe contextual conditions will put greater pressure on governments to implement cuts, and that opposition to retrenchment will find more resistance in such contexts. 5.2 Step 2: The Political Conditions of Resilience and Retrenchment Having determined the different contexts of problem pressures, we examine in this second step whether the political variables included in our model are able to discriminate between cases of retrenchment and resilience of unemployment insurance. Thus, we initially set the outcome to ‘resilience’ and run four models for each combination of contextual conditions plus the five political variables. C3 is excluded from this analysis as it covers only cases of retrenchment. Similarly, to step 1, we adopt a conservative approach and consider only the complex solution but set the consistency threshold ≥ 0.70. Table 5 shows that there are nine combinations producing resilience of unemployment insurance within the four contexts. These solutions show significantly high consistency scores (0-75-0.99) and coverage rates between 20–30 percent. The solutions presented are highly consistent with our expectations since all cases of resilience are included in one of these combinations. Canada is the only contradiction in these results, i.e. a case with a low fuzzy score in the outcome but a high fuzzy score in the combination. The various patterns identified here can be summarized around two main explanatory arguments, which emphasize the relative importance of either protests or corporatist arrangements in resisting problem pressures promoting retrenchment depending on contextual conditions. Political institutions such as constitutional veto points have also played a role in hindering reforms in contexts of moderate problem pressures. The presence of protests contributes to explain the resilience of unemployment provisions in three large European economies (Germany, France, and Italy). These countries share the same contextual factors – e­ conomic

111

Protest and the Politics of Unemployment Insurance Table 5.5 Truth Table: Configurations of Resilience (Step 2)

Combinations

Cases

Coverage Consistency

F1: C1*protest*union *leftcab*corp F2: C1*protest*UNION *CORP*VETOPOINT F3: C2*union*leftcab*corp *VETOPOINT F4: C4*PROTEST*union *leftcab*corp*vetopoint F5: C4*PROTEST*union *leftcab*corp*VETOPOINT F6: C5*protest*union *leftcab*CORP*vetopoint F7: C5*protest*union *leftcab*corp*VETOPOINT F8: C5*protest*UNION *LEFTCAB*CORP*vetopoint F9: C5*protest*UNION *leftcab*CORP*VETOPOINT

Switzerland, New Zealand, Canada Austria, Belgium

0.24

0.79

0.29

0.75

United States

0.20

0.82

France

0.21

0.73

Germany, Italy

0.23

0.88

Portugal

0.21

0.82

Switzerland

0.21

0.99

Sweden

0.23

0.79

Austria

0.22

0.79

Note: Uppercase characters indicate the presence of the characteristic; lowercases indicate the absence. Symbol * indicates the logical connector ‘and’. Countries in bold refer to cases with scores above 0.50 in the outcome resilience. Source: Author’s calculations

stagnation, limited dependence on global markets and large budget deficits (C4). The two formulas here (F4, F5) can be further minimized as C4*PROTEST*union*leftcab*corp, which shows that protests are an effective tool to resist retrenchment when corporatist institutions are weak and left parties are in opposition in a context of high problem pressures. According to Hutter and Vliegenthart (2016) left-wing parties in opposition are more likely to act as allies of protest movements in the political arena when they are less bound by the normal constrains that governments need to take into account and can exploit protests as political ammunitions to oppose government. In the context of economic openness and stagnant growth (C5), we find four combinations of political conditions explaining resilience (F6, F7, F8, F9). These patterns are all characterized by the absence of protest and d­ ifferent

112

Ciccia and Guzmán-Concha

c­ ombinations of other political variables. In Switzerland, this outcome was achieved because of the presence of veto points limiting government ability to implement reforms. Sweden instead presents the classical power-resource argument according to which coalitions of left-wing parties in power and unions and ­encompassing corporatist arrangements have preserved provisions for the unemployed. In Austria and Portugal, the presence of the left in opposition combines with corporatist institutions. These three formulas (F6, F8, F9) can be further simplified as C5*protest*CORP, which shows that corporatist institutions enable resistance to retrenchment in the context of global market pressure and slow economic growth. Protests are not very frequent in this context since social conflict is already regulated through consociative institutions and regular negotiations between institutional actors representing different interests (employers, unions). The case of Belgium (F2) shows also a positive effect of corporatism on resilience in the context of high economic openness and low budget deficit (C1), thus the final formula can be also as written as C5+C1*(protest*CORP)6. The formulas F3 and F7 corroborate instead the political institutions argument (Huber, Ragin, and Stephens, 1993). In context of moderate problem pressures such as large budget deficit (C2) or economic openness and stagnant growth (C5), constitutional veto points have hindered the implementation of reforms in the United States and Switzerland in the absence of other political conditions (low protest, weak unions, and corporatism). Finally, the first formula (F1) explains resilience in contexts of high levels of economic openness (C1). This combination does not include any of the political factors, which we hypothesize to hinder retrenchment, yet retrenchment did not occur. As noted above, C1 presents one of the weakest contexts of problem pressures, which could explain the stability of this policy in New Zealand. It is interesting to notice that the context C1 includes the largest number of cases (11), yet the incorporation of political conditions successfully excludes the majority of the cases of retrenchment and enables to distinguish two political patterns of resilience (F1, F2). We further examine our dataset by analyzing the negation of the outcome, i.e. retrenchment. Again, we do not introduce logical remainders in the minimization of the truth table. We run five models for the five combinations of ­contextual conditions (C3 is now reintroduced) and establish a consistency threshold of 0.80. Table 5.6 shows that cases of retrenchment can be explained by ten combinations, which present very high consistency levels (0.86–0.99) and coverage which ranges from 8 to 41 percent of cases. We observe the ­presence of four contradictions in the results (Belgium, Austria, New Zealand, and Sweden). 6 Symbol ‘+’ is interpreted as the logical connector ‘or’, in qca terms.

113

Protest and the Politics of Unemployment Insurance Table 5.6 Truth Table: Configurations of Retrenchment (Step 2)

Combinations

Cases

Cov.

Cons.

F10:

C1*protest*UNION *CORP

Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Belgium, Ireland, Norway, Austria

0.41

0.86

F11:

C1*protest*union*leftcab *vetopoint

Netherlands, New Zealand

0.24

0.94

F12:

C2*protest*union*leftcab*corp* VETOPOINT

Japan

0.13

0.94

F13:

C2*PROTEST*union*LEFTCAB* corp*vetopoint

United Kingdom

0.08

0.93

F14:

protest*UNION*leftcab*CORP* vetopoint

Ireland, Finland, Denmark

0.36

0.96

F15:

C3*protest*union*leftcab*corp* VETOPOINT

Australia, Canada

0.14

0.99

F16:

C3*PROTEST*union*LEFTCAB* CORP*VETOPOINT

Spain

0.08

0.99

F17:

C4*protest*union*leftcab*corp* VETOPOINT

Japan

0.14

0.90

F18:

protest*UNION*CORP*vetopoint

Norway, Finland, Ireland, Denmark, Sweden

0.42

0.94

F19:

C5*protest*UNION*leftcab *CORP

Denmark, Austria

0.19

0.91

Note: Uppercase characters indicate presence of the characteristic; lowercases indicate absence. Symbol * indicates logical connector ‘and’. Countries in bold refer to cases with scores above 0.50 in retrenchment (no-resilience). Source: Author’s calculations

These results show that the lack of significant protests appears as a necessary condition in eight combinations (F10, F11, F12, F14, F15, F17, F18, F19), while retrenchment occurred in spite of high levels of protest in the United Kingdom and Spain (F13, F16). These protests occurred in difficult economic times of large budget deficits and high unemployment (C2, C3) and when leftwing parties were in power. These two formulas can be further simplified as,

114

Ciccia and Guzmán-Concha

C2+C3*(PROTEST*union*LEFTCAB) showing that left-wing parties in power and weak unions are sufficient conditions of retrenchment in contexts of high problem pressures despite high levels of protest. While left-wing parties in opposition may benefit in electoral terms in lending support to protestors, once in government they are constrained by existing policies and other forces. According to Green-Pedersen (2001), governments nowadays face a dilemma between electoral blame for welfare state retrenchment or for economic downturns. In the face of economic difficulties, retrenchment will thus occur if a large consensus emerges between political parties in framing these measures as an economic necessity and/or as a remedy to policy failures (e.g. taking away benefits from underserving groups). Such consensus is more likely to emerge when the left governs or participate in government since there will be no political party left to offer any serious alternatives to retrenchment (Green-Pedersen, 2001). In the age of permanent austerity, left-wing parties are thus not necessarily allied of protest movements and tend to be more supportive of their claims when at the opposition than when in power (Hutter and Vliegenthart, 2016). The results in table 5.6 also demonstrate that similar configurations of political conditions produce very different outcomes in different contexts. Therefore, a high number of veto points and dispersion of power in the absence of other favorable political conditions did not hinder the implementation of cutbacks in contexts of high unemployment (F15), large budget deficits (F12) and slow economic growth and deficits (F17). These formulas can be further simplified as C2+C3+C4*(protest*union*leftcab*corp*VETOPOINT). Similarly, corporatism, which was a strong explanatory factor of resilience in the context of stagnant and open economies (C1, C5), is not effective in stopping retrenchment across the board. The combinations F10, F14, F18, and F19 show that corporatism and strong unions were not sufficient factors to stop, and in fact might have played an active role in the retrenchment of unemployment insurance in Ireland, Denmark, Finland, and Norway. No contextual condition was included in F14 and F18. These four formulas can be further minimized as, protest*UNION*CORP, which covers countries with high union membership and in which unions have often played an important role in managing unemployment insurance. Anderson (2001) argues that in corporatist polities as those included in these formulas, a different logic of retrenchment applies. In these countries, unions and employers can become crucial actors of ­retrenchment– especially when they finance and administer unemployment funds –to deal with policy dysfunctionalities endangering the survival of welfare state systems, they have contributed to develop and in which they play a pivotal role. Thus, under harsh economic conditions, unions can engage in strategies of ‘negotiated adaption’ in order to preserve the system in the long run.

Protest and the Politics of Unemployment Insurance

115

Finally, the formula F11 shows that lack of protest movements, few veto points, and weak unions and left-wing parties, in the context of economic openness and small budget deficit, explain retrenchment in the Netherlands. According to Green-Pedersen (2001), retrenchment was favored in this country by a particular dynamics of party competition and by the pivotal role of the Christian Democratic Appeal (cda) centre-party in producing a party consensus about retrenchment, which allowed the government to frame retrenchment as an economic necessity. 6 Conclusion The aim of this chapter was to incorporate the study of protest and its interaction with institutional politics in discussions of social policy reform. We adopted a comparative approach to study the interplay of problem pressures, protest, and institutional politics in the reform of unemployment insurance in 20 advanced economies between 1990 and 2005. Our analysis identifies five contexts of retrenchments characterized by different combinations and intensity of problem pressures (step 1). In each context, with the exception of those characterized by high unemployment, we find both cases of retrenchment and resilience. This confirms that while these issues represent important drivers of change, it is only when they combine with particular configuration of political systems and actors (step 2) that reforms are made. Our findings show that protests, corporatism, and pre-existing political institutions have all played a role in resisting retrenchment in different contexts. Protests were an important factor enabling resistance to retrenchment in periods when the left was prevalently at the opposition in countries (France, Italy, and Germany) that were facing harsh contexts of problem pressures, but did not stop cutbacks under left-wing governments in contexts of high unemployment and large budget deficit (Spain, United Kingdom). Political partisanship plays an important role in determining the responsiveness of governments to protest in the age of permanent austerity. In the face of intense protest mobilization, governments are more likely to avoid implementing cutbacks when left-wing parties are at the opposition and can be more sympathetic to the demands of protestors. Conversely, governments are less responsive to protests when the left is in government since there will be no political actors left to propose alternatives to the idea of retrenchment as a necessity to avoid economic downturns. Indeed, the emergence of populist political actors in countries such as Spain, Greece, or the Netherlands in the last decade represents also a response to the perceived closeness of traditional political actors to demands of social protection.

116

Ciccia and Guzmán-Concha

The effect of corporatism on the reform of unemployment insurance was also shaped by the interplay of problem pressures and political conditions. While corporatist institutions effectively hindered retrenchment in economies (Austria, Belgium, Sweden, Portugal) facing contexts of moderate problem pressure (slow economic growth and/or high economic openness), it became instead a precondition of retrenchment in countries were unions were strong and/or actively involved in administering unemployment insurance (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway) (Anderson, 2001). Similarly, a high number of veto points hindered reforms in contexts of moderate problem pressures but did not stop retrenchment in contexts of greater and more direct pressure on unemployment insurance such as those entailing high unemployment, large budget deficit or slow economic growth. This study has some limitations. The findings presented here hold only for a specific policy field – unemployment insurance – and the incorporation of more and diverse social policies is needed to fully understand the effect of protest on the reform of welfare states. Aggregate approaches focusing on the whole of the welfare state and disaggregate policy approaches must also be more strongly and systematically connected to provide a comprehensive understanding of processes of change including potential tensions and interactions between policy sectors (Ciccia, 2017). Similarly, given the comparative nature of our analysis, we could not appraise here the detailed mechanisms trough which protests have shaped social policy reforms in particular cases. Nonetheless, our findings have larger implication for welfare state and social movement research and the opportunities of cross-fertilization between them. These results contribute to shed light on the contextual and political conditions under which political institutions are responsive to protest movements and show that explanatory frameworks based on single factors (problem pressures, political institutions, and political ideology) are inadequate to account for the different cross-national trajectories of welfare states. Although each of these perspectives explains a part of the reform dynamics of unemployment insurance, it is only their interrelations that enable us to grasp the situated and contextual logics of reforms. Protest politics matter for social policies, but its influence is shaped by contextual conditions and the broader configuration of polities including institutional politics factors such as political ideologies and dynamics of party competition. Scholarship of the welfare state will advance best if scholars will continue to think through the interactions between electoral politics, contexts and other forms of political participation including unconventional ones across a variety of regions, issues, and policy sectors.

78.10

45.43

79.77

91.04

77.76

66.81

67.87

64.22

Japan

Austria

Belgium

Canada

Greece

Italy

Germany

90.03

Netherlands

93.49

83.25

Denmark

NewZealand

70.55

Australia

Ireland

83.74

85.81

78.57

Norway

Switzerland

76.72

Sweden

-0.31

80.14

Finland

Portugal

-0.85

-1.15

0.16

0.00

-0.45

-0.15

-1.17

4.10

0.51

0.15

-0.44

0.67

-1.15

-0.36

0.51

-0.24

Divergent Growth

Economic Openness

Country

Table 5.7 Raw Data, 1990–2005

8.34

9.62

9.57

8.67

8.18

4.03

3.75

9.16

6.90

4.79

6.15

7.74

3.02

6.95

4.43

6.56

10.81

Unemployment

-3.42

-3.70

-6.76

-2.32

-1.49

-2.84

-6.17

1.11

0.91

-1.61

0.28

-1.30

-1.77

-0.54

8.75

-4.47

0.04

Budget Deficit

30.00

22.00

19.00

11.00

9.00

8.00

7.00

4.00

3.00

3.00

3.00

3.00

2.00

2.00

2.00

1.00

1.00

Protest

27.33

36.33

29.64

32.53

53.27

39.16

22.59

43.17

27.54

23.51

74.94

31.50

21.36

81.38

56.11

24.05

76.46

Union Density

44.54

25.59

65.31

0.00

52.63

30.43

6.26

12.18

43.12

33.11

41.60

38.70

28.57

81.20

54.42

32.60

37.37

Left Cabinets

0.96

0.24

0.37

-1.58

1.28

1.94

-0.99

0.46

-1.01

1.37

0.92

-0.19

-0.35

1.01

1.24

0.28

1.45

8.00

5.75

4.00

6.00

4.81

5.00

6.00

3.00

1.50

3.00

4.00

6.00

7.00

4.00

2.00

4.00

3.00

Corporatism Veto Points

Protest and the Politics of Unemployment Insurance

117

66.28

UnitedKingdom

France

-0.59

-0.15

0.44

0.47

Divergent Growth

9.24

6.88

15.34

5.52

Unemployment

Source: Data sources indicated in Table 5.1

74.11

71.06

Spain

60.50

Economic Openness

UnitedStates

Country

Table 5.7 Raw Data, 1990–2005 (cont.)

-3.40

-3.28

-1.98

-3.56

Budget Deficit

61.00

39.00

39.00

31.00

Protest

8.61

32.96

15.88

13.72

Union Density

46.02

54.18

50.29

0.00

Left Cabinets

-0.16

-1.76

0.32

-1.73

4.00

4.00

5.00

9.00

Corporatism Veto Points

118 Ciccia and Guzmán-Concha

Chapter 6

We Need to Focus on the Resources: Struggling with Neoliberal Economic Rationales in Social Work with Children and Families Maria Appel Nissen 1 Introduction This chapter offers an exploration of what welfare rationales are currently expressed in the policy context of social services as well as in the practices of social work with children and their families in Denmark.1 Historically, economic rationales related to the promotion of wealth have been an integral part of the shaping of the Nordic welfare states. Although the relation between rationales of wealth and welfare is far from unambiguous, it is generally agreed that the reconciliation of conflicts arising from increased competitive structures in the market through agreements between employers, unions and the state has played a decisive role. Ideals of full employment, shared responsibilities and income regulations enabled a flexible labor market adaptable to shifting economic conjectures, political stability, and security through compensations for loss of income. It also enabled the backing of tax financed universal welfare services underpinning the development of an extensive well-educated, healthy, and productive work force. Thus, a welfare rationale concerned with mobilizing resources for welfare for the purpose of both economic productivity and equality has been in the heart of the shaping of the Nordic welfare states closely linked to ambitions of promoting the well-being of in principle all citizens (e.g., Esping-Andersen, 1990; Kautto et al., 2002; Nissen et al., 2015; Fallov et al., 2017). However, by exploring the contemporary policy contexts of social services as well as practices of social work, we might learn something about how such a welfare rationale may become challenged and what kind of struggle this entail in the everyday practices of mobilizing resources for welfare. 1 The exploration is based on a qualitative study of social work with children and their families. The study is part of a wider research project Views on human beings in social work – ­welfare policies, technologies and knowledge of human beings also including field work exploring social work related to unemployment, mental illness, families and local communities. Across all fields of social work, the focus on mobilizing resources is significant. This chapter draws on empirical material showing how social workers seek to mobilize resources trough conversations and meetings. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���9 | doi:10.1163/9789004384118_007

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The chapter shows that in the case of Denmark, hitherto well-established welfare rationales are currently challenged by an increased political receptiveness to a neoliberal economic rationale making the possibilities for mobilizing resources for welfare, and in particular equality, more dependent on economic productivity on the labor market. In the policy context of social services, this is expressed in an intensified focus on cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit with regard to social services for children with special needs and their families. This need to focus on resources is recognized and embraced in the practices of social work, but social workers also seek to transform neoliberal economic rationales into broader welfare rationales concerned with well-being, equality, and solidarity. This can be viewed as a struggle for viewing human life and welfare from a broader point of view than such economic rationales allow. Thus, struggle is here perceived as ways of broadening possibilities for solidarity seeking to change the perceptions and eventually negations or misrecognitions of economic, social, and material limits to inclusion and structural and systemic problems of inequality (Luhmann, 1990; Bourdieu, 2000; Luhmann, 2012; Hagen, 1999). In social work this struggle involves discovering and mobilizing social and systemic resources in a way that can be expressed in questions such as: Who are you close to? Can you overcome lack of resources and conflicts for the purpose of helping the child? How can we help include the child collectively? However, since the backcloth for this focus on resources is economic rationales subordinating ideals of equality, the material disadvantages of children with special needs and their families, as well as the broader systemic conditions and barriers for promoting equality can be negated. Negation is here perceived as exclusion of certain alternatives due to systemic indifference thus often combined with a distribution of problems and responsibilities to individuals (Luhmann, 2012). Therefore, at the end of the chapter the struggle and potential negations at play in the practices of social work are used as a lever for a critique, challenging the dominance of a neoliberal economic rationale in the Danish welfare state. But before reaching so far, let’s begin by exploring what welfare rationales are currently at play in the policy context of social services. 2

Neoliberal Economic Rationales in the Policy Context of Social Services

In Denmark, providing for and taking care of children has historically been considered a responsibility of parents (Ketschner, 2014).2 At the same time, 2 This is grounded in an ideal of full employment as stated in the Constitutional Act: “In order to advance the public interest, efforts shall be made to guarantee work for every able-bodied

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mobilizing resources for family oriented welfare services has been an important aspect of the shaping of the welfare state expressed in the development of universal benefits and services for families enabling productivity and welfare (e.g. maternity leave, health care, child allowances, daycare and schooling) as well as special benefits for single providers and low income families (e.g. special child allowances, rent and cash subsidies), both grounded in ideals of equality (cf., Gilbert et al., 2011). Thus, mobilizing resources for increasing both economic productivity and equality has permeated family policies and social policies, regardless of the parents’ productivity on the labor market. This ideal of equality has also enabled backing of extensive social services for children with special needs. For many years, the purpose of such services has been to “create the best possible conditions for childhood among children and young people with special needs so that they despite individual difficulties can obtain the same possibilities for personal development and health as their peers” (Act on Social Services, 2010). However, during the last 10 years, this broad and deeply founded ideal of equality has become challenged by at least two interconnected developments. Firstly, in 2007 a large municipality reform launched by the LiberalConservative government (2001–2011) made municipalities responsible for the provision of social security and employment services, separated from social services and less influenced by the unions (Møller et al., 2008). This systemic change allowed social security and employment services to become even more profoundly shaped by ideas of workfare underpinned by economic incentives for moving people closer to the labor market through activation and corresponding sanctions (cf., Broadkin and Marston, 2013). Secondly, and almost simultaneously, the rationality of employment services and the generosity of social security became contested often based in moral indignation and skepticism towards the rationality, activity and honesty of recipients, or social workers assumed to being too soft on “passive” recipients. The neoliberal party Liberal Alliance played an important part in setting this agenda being a strong proponent for reducing social security. Recently this agenda has been embraced by the Liberal government (2015-present) by launching a social security reform reducing the total amount of benefits social security recipients can receive. This has consequences for single providers and low-income families previously entitled to special benefits and indicates how mobilizing resources grounded in ideals of equality has become more dependent on economic citizen on terms that will secure his existence” (§ 75, 1) However, in Section 2 it is also stated that “Any person, unable to support himself or his dependents shall, where no other person is responsible for his or their maintenance, be entitled to receive public assistance, provided that he shall comply with the obligations imposed by statute in such respect”.

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­ roductivity on the labor market. Together, these two developments indicate p an increased receptiveness to a neoliberal economic rationale; a rationale concerned with holding the market sacred based on an assumption that actors fundamentally are and therefore should be motivated by the possibility to maximize economic benefit in the market. It legitimizes forms of governance impelling this rationality on actors and systems assumed to contradict this notion, inspired by the mechanisms and language of the market (Hagen, 2006; Mudge, 2008; Holborow, 2015). With regard to social services for children with special needs and their ­families, this neoliberal economic rationale was expressed in the implementation of a purchaser-supplier-model as a part of the 2007 municipality reform (Kommunernes Landsforening, 2006). This enabled a stronger focus on the cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit of social services. Later, in 2012 a report ­ordered by the Social Ministry and made by the consultancy company Rambøll Management argued that children who have received social services are likely to become an economic deficit instead of a surplus measured by the difference between tax revenues and the cost of social security and services over a life course (Rambøll, 2012). Based on this report, the Social Democratic social minister stated, “There is good economy in good lives and very bad economy in bad lives” and argued for a stopping of ineffective services (Nissen, 2017). This focus on becoming a profitable adult was already reflected in a recent rephrasing of the purpose of social services for children with special needs now with the aim to “ensure that children and young people can obtain the same possibilities for personal development, health and an independent adulthood as their peers” (Act on Social Services, 2011). This rephrasing conveyed a subtle shift from focusing on “conditions for childhood” and compensation for “individual difficulties” to a focus on creating possibilities for an adult life independent of public assistance. The recent policy context is reflected in current visions for the development of social services launched by the National association of municipalities: Vulnerable children – The future is theirs (Kommunernes Landsforening, 2015). Today, municipalities are encouraged to organize social services with a reference to cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit. Furthermore, it is recommended that social service provision is based on a common logic focusing on replacing long term expensive out of home services provided by professionals with in home services utilizing resources in the family network. Based in the Rambøll report the argument is that such services are more effective with regard to resembling an ordinary life: There is a significant potential for vulnerable children and young people and therefore also a significant socio-economic potential, if we,

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the m ­ unicipalities take our starting point in the most recent research. It points out that the most effective services are those that resemble a childhood in an ordinary family. This requires that municipalities organize social services as temporary ‘pit stops’ on the way back to the general area of welfare and to a wider extent use placement in the home of relatives and network. kommunernes landsforening, 2015: 36

Thus, today a strong rationale is the potentiality of a return on investment. Now the question is if this rationale is at play in the practices of social work with children and their families, and if so, how? 3

“We Need to Focus on the Resources”

Today, a significant trend among municipalities is to strive to find ways to keep the child in the “ordinary” environment by mobilizing resources in the family network or among other local actors in the general area of welfare e.g. the child’s school. This also goes for children, where there are professional and legal grounds for placing the child outside home.3 In some municipalities, this has resulted in the use of specialized social workers exploring if it is possible to provide intensive, flexible, and less expensive in home services combined with using resources in the family network as an alternative to out of home placement. These social workers characterize this focus on resources in the family network as a “break” with previous social work with children and their families. They are quite aware that this break is partly caused by a stronger focus on economic rationality spurring municipalities to provide better and more cost-effective services without using more resources:

3 In Denmark the legal grounds for placing a child outside home is based on a distinction between voluntary and forced placement, and in a professional investigation of the conditions of the child with regard to development, behavior, schooling, health, leisure activities, friendships and other matters of relevance. However legislatively, the criteria for forced placement are most precisely described. Forced placement can be used when there is an “obvious risk that the child or the health and development of the child and the young person will suffer severe harm due to 1) insufficient care or treatment of the child or the young person, 2) violation, that the child or the young person has been exposed to, 3) problems of substance abuse, criminal behaviour or other massive social difficulties of the child or young person or 4) other behavioral problems or problems of adaption” (Act on Social Services § 58).

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Susanne: The whole idea about network has swept over the social services for two reasons, I think. 1. It is cheaper, and 2. There is no research saying that children get better by living in a foster family. Martin: If there is no evidence that placements work, and at the same time, what we do is cheaper, we get a political context saying yeah! And in many ways, this fits very well with social work, where at least some of us for a long time have asked why do we place children, when it doesn’t work? Asger: But it is also about believing this is possible, and luckily it turns out to be less expensive. I think this is why it is on the crest of the waves. Along with the Purchaser-supplier-model, one could see that it only costs a tenth, and then there is even research saying better results, why not man? I doubt it had gone so fast in Denmark, if it had been a little more expensive, just a little. The excerpt shows how social workers think that this new “wave” can fit well with what they consider good social work. But next to speaking very positively about this focus on resources, there is also a critical reflection, in particular by Asger, indicating how it is also a necessity based in a strong focus on costeffectiveness (“if it had been a little more expensive”). Thus, there is also a need to focus on resources. In addition, the notion about “believing this is possible” indicates that social work with children with special needs and their families might involve a struggle. This becomes even more visible in the following excerpt, where some other social workers reflect on changes in the way social work is perceived and conducted: Anne: I think there is a change in thinking now. We think more in terms of the family, and what can be solved in the family than we have ever done before. If you have worked in this for a long time, you previously referred to Act on social security, where we as professionals took over and knew what was best. Now we involve the families much more. The idea is that everyone should take responsibility for one self and ones’ relatives. Katrine: It is a trend that you should focus on what can be changed, or where the resources are. There is a societal flow in this. Those who have resources should give something to those who have not. There have never been so many volunteers doing good for others. So, I guess this is a change in our views on human beings. And still you also have another trend saying people must fend for themselves. It is their own fault if they are on social security. So, there is this human approach, and then there is the other: Well they are on social security. It is their problem.

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Maria: So, focusing on resources does not mean withdrawing from helping? Anne: No! As if we had decided they must fend for themselves with their own resources? [Laughs] Katrine: It is about working with the resources inherent in all people and making them visible. Ditte: It is a balance because there are also problems. This is why we get these cases. So, we need to keep an eye on them too. There are both resources and some problems. Morten: But we have moved away from previous ways of working with the network. Many worries were just passed on to the social worker, who ­became the sole responsible for acting. Now we have become good at facilitating a process where the solution is shared. This is not about not wanting to take responsibility but about asking, how we can solve this together? Maria: But are there not variations in terms of how strong or thin the network is? Katrine: Yes, but we believe the resources can appear. Although there are variations in terms of what the social workers emphasize, they generally describe the focus on resources as a new way of recognizing, involving, and working together with the families, making human resources visible and promoting the value of family members being responsible for and taking care of each other. They also emphasize the value of promoting shared solutions and collective action concerning the child’s welfare by involving other actors in the family and the professional network around the child. Finally, they reflect how it is also important to remember that even though all people have resources, there are also sometimes “problems” with regard to the well being of the child. This welfare rationale is put in contrast to an individualistic approach to people dependent on social security, the idea that it is their own fault and that they should fend for themselves. However, by making this contrast it is also indicated that such an individualistic approach towards people not participating in the labor market may play a role in social work with children with special needs and their families. When asked if this focus on resources may involve a withdrawal from help, Anne disassociates from this perspective with laughter emphasizing that if so, this is definitely not something they have decided. However, when asked what happens if the family network is thin and there is a lack of resources, Katrine responds that even so, “we believe the resources can appear”. Together, this indicates how the need to focus on resources is entangled in a dilemma stemming from conflicts in the policy context, and potentially involves a struggle with regard to upholding traditional rationales

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of welfare related to equality e.g. as expressed in previous ideals of compensating for unequal “conditions in childhood” and “individual difficulties”. If such a struggle is at play, it should be visible in the practices of social work. 4

Who Are You Close to?

When a family is assigned to special social workers, it is based on the preliminary investigation of a case worker, indicating a worry for the child’s wellbeing. The social workers often begin by exploring the family network. This involves home visits. The following is a condensed excerpt of such a visit. The visited parent is a mother and single provider of 6 children, 4 of them living at home. The child considered in need of social services is 10 years old, and a main cause of the case is that the child does not regularly attend school and is roaming. The school has reported the child. The mother sometimes finds the child difficult, and she wonders if the child has adhd. On previous visits the family network has been mapped on a poster: The social worker (SW) puts the poster mapping the family network on the table. “This is how your family looks”, she says, “Today it is about finding those you are close to”. “What do mean by close?” the mother asks. SW suggests, “It is those you talk with about your children, your life, what is troubling, someone you are confident with”. Then they go through the persons mapped on the poster. The mother thinks that the child’s grandmother is too authoritarian. The child has a relation to the father, but she doubts it is for the “best of the child”, because he has had a drinking problem, and has been “unstable”. The mother has a good relation to her sister, but she lives far away. Some other relatives are mentioned, but they seldom see each other. The “ties” are not close. SW asks, “Who is the closest?” The mother tells about a couple. “How are they a resource for you?” the SW asks. The mother tells about their life, their child diagnosed with adhd, how the woman is a friend and a helpful person. The SW asks, if their relationship is “equal”? The mother says “yes”. “Why is she not here today?” SW asks. The mother explains that she intended to but had a problem of transportation. Other friends are mentioned, and the SW repeatedly asks, “How are they good for you?” The mother mentions how they are offering help and how they do things together such as going to the park or flea markets. The SW says this is important; going out gives “energy”. The mother then tells about her internship, which is a part of her activation program. “I feel I am growing”, she says, and speaks positively about her boss. He is “supportive”, has “trust” in her and

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gives her “responsibility” and “self-confidence”. The SW asks, if she has the possibility to go out on her own. “Not much”, the mother says, “I am mostly at home with friends”. “Suddenly I come to think of how lucky I am to have so many friends”, she says. The SW backs her up saying “It is all about finding that network”. She thinks the mother has a “big and good network”, which is important in an “ordinary life” and when something is “troubling”. The “resources” may work as a “relief”, and as far as she can see, there are “quite a few resources”. She suggests a “network meeting” is arranged and asks the mother to think about whom to invite. The excerpt exemplifies how social workers focus on, explore, discover, and thus do an effort to make resources visible. The resources looked for and valued are those that stem from relations in the family network. More specifically, relations that are close in the sense of being based in understanding, trust, confidence, and shared experiences constituting “ties” are considered a resource. Such relations are not necessarily dependent on biological kinship, but on care and a willingness to help. If being of such a quality, they are viewed as a resource providing e.g. stability, relief, energy, personal growth, self-confidence, all considered important for living an “ordinary life” despite “troubles”. Thus, social relations, and in particular close relations, are considered important for individual well-being and for overcoming troubling things in life. More specifically, the social worker explores if the child’s difficulties with regard to schooling and eventually the mother’s need for relief can be compensated by using the resources of the family network. On the one hand, this refers to broader welfare rationales concerned with needs and human well-being. For example, after the meeting, the social worker says: “I don’t care so much about diagnoses, because even if you have a diagnosis, you are a human being with some needs”. On the other hand, this also refers to the responsibilities of the parent for supporting the well-being of the child, independently and regardless of the need for psychiatric and social assistance. Thus, the focus on resources is also concerned with what families can do by themselves. In this case, making resources visible is not a struggle (“quite a few resources”). However, this is not always the case. Then how do social workers mobilize resources and what struggles does this entail? 5

Can You Overcome Scarce Resources and Conflicts for the Purpose of Helping the Child?

A commonly used forum for mobilizing resources is a network meeting. In the following, two examples of such meetings are explored. They show, how

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­ obilizing resources in the family network is not an easy task and can be a m struggle. Family ties are not always close, and the family network may be burdened with conflicts or troubled conditions. Thus, mobilizing resources requires families to overcome scarce resources and conflicts for the purpose of helping the child. The first example is from a network meeting concerning a toddler. The mother, who has been a single provider since the birth of the child, has lately suffered from a mental break down and was temporarily committed to a mental hospital. Consequently, and because the mother has a small network, an out of home placement was considered. However, the social workers discovered that the father, supported by relatives and friends, is willing to engage in the child’s life. Therefore, at the previous meeting it was agreed that the mother, the father, the father’s mother, and a woman friend of the mother should make a 3 weeks plan for sharing the responsibility of taking care of the child thereby providing the mother with relief. This is what the network meeting is about. At the beginning, one of the social workers (SW1) says: “Have you talked about it?”, “Who takes care of the child?”, “When is the shift, and where?” It appears that the family has only made a plan for 10 days. SW1 starts writing the dates with corresponding names. Meanwhile the following dialogue occurs: Mother’s woman friend asks father, “Are you ready to take for example one week, if one of us gets sick?” SW1 backs her up: “You [father] have to keep a track on the plan. You cannot beg off because you feel bad or are going on holiday, so it is a very relevant question”. “No of course, you can’t do that if you have a child”, father’s mother says. The father says, “There are a lot of things you can do with a little child. The child also gets a whole new network”. There is some talk about how it is to be a parent, and at some point, the parents start to discuss how they prefer to do things. SW1 says, “We are looking for you to take responsibility and we believe you can, but it is also about what kind of parenthood you wish for the future. And you have to match expectations so that the child gets the experience my parents are here for me”. In relation to this the other social worker (SW2) says, “We plan to make a story with the child about everything that has happened. Mother got sick, then father came, then there was a network who wanted you. Because there are different stories and it is about getting a shared history”. Now the mother starts to cry. “Why did you start crying?” SW2 asks. “I came to think about how he has to think about what has happened”, she says. “The child needs it. You have been there for him. You have done a huge work until now”, SW1 says. Now father’s mother

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says: “I have this little dream, if we could go on a little holiday”. SW2 says: “We can talk about this later. You [father’s mother] have to be able to come home, even if you are on holiday, because it is about safety, and you [father] must ask for help.” The dialogue shows that due to illness, mobilizing resources for taking care of the child becomes necessary. However, the parents and relatives don’t know each other. The ties are not close. The parents have no experience in cooperating. The father has not previously had any contact with the child, and father’s mother, who is supposed to back up the father, seems very concerned about the possibility of going on a holiday. Mobilizing resources is done through a combination of ascribing responsibility to the parents and the network, while at the same time showing patience and sensitivity towards the situation of the family. For example, after the meeting the social workers talk about how there is still a need to build trust between the parents, and that it is about trying out step by step if they can support each other with a focus on “what is best for the child”. The expectation is not that this will happen overnight. Therefore, the family has also been assigned social and psychiatric services. But at some point, it should happen. The social workers emphasize the importance of how the mother’s health develops, and that the network turns out to be strong enough. The second example is also about mobilizing resources for taking care of the child. In this case the mother is also a single provider of a boy in ­pre-preparatory class. Due to troubles with partners, overload and stress the mother has occasionally left the child unsupervised. At a previous meeting, a plan for taking care of the child providing the mother with relief was made, involving relatives and a woman friend picking up the boy from school and taking care of him until after the evening meal. Now since last meeting there have been troubles. Apparently, the mother changes the plan, with the result that the boy has to stay in care longer or overnight. At some point during the meeting, this becomes a pressing issue revealing how help from relatives is associated with conflicts. Short, interruptive, loud exchanges of words close to an argument among the family members occur: Mother’s sister says that the boy is “happy” when picked up at school, but when mother turns out not to be at home as planned “he gets sad”. “I have texted every time”, mother says. Mother’s sister keeps saying she [the mother] doesn’t come home and plans are changed. With tears in her eyes, she suggests that, “she might need some relief”. Now mother raises

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her voice and says that they have “always discriminated against her”. She has always been the “one to blame”, “you don’t help, and if you help, it is not a help”, she says, “You just want to control”. A lot of talk follows. It is clearly that the family members feel sorry for the boy. Mother says, “they have always thought a lot about me”. The SW urges them “to focus on how it is to be the child”, “evidently mother needs help, but she has to be ready”, she says. “Yes, and I am not ready!” mother adds. Now grandmother says: “My family cannot accept this”, “I have my life”, “She needs relief, but my family cannot provide it”, “she just thinks, we think her life is wrong”. The SW urges them to “breathe” and suggests a break. After the break, the focus is on plans. There is a task of tidying up the boy’s room crammed with things. Mother’s sister is willing to help but needs help from someone with a car. She is chronically ill and uses crutches. Mother states, “I am not going to be there!” Both the woman friend and mother’s sister agree to help taking care of the child. The daughter agrees too, although on sick leave due to stress after having suffered from embolus. The SW asks, “Who can go with the boy to leisure activities?” After a few seconds, she suggests that the family counselor takes care of this. Both examples show how mobilizing resources is a struggle when ties are not close and eventually overburdened with conflicts. Mobilizing resources is about building trust and capacity to corporate and overcome troubles for the sake of the child. The resources to be mobilized are resources for taking care of the child’s needs e.g. the need for safety, for care, for schooling and leisure activities and for stable and close relations. However, and closely related to this, the examples also show that this struggle is deeply embedded in the disadvantages of the family members including their struggles for overcoming various other troubles. In the examples, those disadvantages stem from being a single provider suffering from e.g. loneliness, overload, stress, or mental illness in families where ties are not close, are burdened with conflicts or other troubles such as health problems. Mobilizing resources becomes a question of overcoming scarce resources and conflicts for the purpose of helping and ensuring the well-being of the child. While this refers to a broad welfare rationale concerning the child it also puts a pressure on the families constituting a potential negation of their social and material conditions. As if the social workers are aware of this, compensating social services are also provided when grounded in the child’s possibilities for development e.g. help to include leisure activities (“the family counselor takes care of this”). Such forms of compensation also work as a lever for promoting shared solutions and collective action, as we shall see in the following.

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How Can We Help Include the Child Collectively?

A major concern regarding the child’s wellbeing is inclusion to schooling and education for the purpose of promoting possibilities for independent adulthood based on labor market participation instead of social security. This focus on moving towards a “good” life of economic productivity is more significantly at play when the child is closer to 18. This is illustrated in the following excerpt from a network meeting concerning a 17-year old girl. However, in this case the well-being of the young person, considered a precondition to productivity, works as a lever for mobilizing various resources, including economic resources, and shared solutions: The meeting is about “education, work and well-being”. The parents worry that the girl can’t meet with expectations. The SW asks the girl “is there something good you would like to happen in the future?” The girl says “Nothing” but tells that she “hates to wait for the bus”. The personal advisor (PA) tells that, “she has bad experiences with school”, has been “bullied” and is “behind”. The case worker (CW) backs him up. The girl has “many resources” but has experienced many “defeats” and is sometimes “sad” and “resigns”. The SW suggests, “Maybe school is not what is best in the first place?” The educational advisor (EA) doesn’t know the girl. “You might not want to talk with me, nothing personal, I know, but because of my function”, she says. After a break, the girl says that she thought talking with the EA was optional. The SW asks the girl gently “What would you like to happen?” “I don’t know” she says. The mother asks, “Is there a program that fits her? She really just wants a job”. The SW asks the girl, “Would a program be good for your well-being? Do you know what wellbeing is?” The girl suggests, “That you fit in?” The mother adds, “It is about feeling good when you get up and go home”. The SW and the PA suggest a program not too “stressful”. The EA suggests a program without exams 2 days per week, then gradually more. But how is this possible, when the girl doesn’t want to take the bus? The mother suggests, “Maybe she could get a moped license?” The girl seems to cheer up. The cost of a license is discussed. The parents think they can afford it. However, the mother notes that the girl would like to earn money. When no one responds, she repeats, “She really just wants to earn money”. The EA says this is only possible working at a production school 37 hours per week. “Honestly, I am also a bit tired of paying for her cigarettes”, the mother says. Then the CW says she is willing find out if a small internship allowance can be provided.

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What the excerpt shows is that it is possible to use a welfare rationale concerned with past and present well-being as a lever for shared solutions and as counter balance to a strict focus on economic productivity at the labor market. Due to bad experiences with schooling (“bullying”) an individual program “not too stressful” is set up. In addition, it is recognized how a tight family economy can influence possibilities and constitute a pressure for earning money. Therefore, until the child is 18, and if not capable of studying or working 100 percent a small allowance can be provided. However, it is important to note that this is not automatically provided. It is a compensation that works in exchange of the parent’s willingness to find money for a moped license. Thus, mobilizing resources is possible through shared solutions and vice versa. However, this is not always the case; sometimes it is a struggle that doesn't succeed. We shall return to the mother visited at home. After the home visit a network meeting is set up among six adults from the family network, the social worker, the case worker, and professionals from the school. The meeting takes place at the child’s school, and according to the social worker, the purpose is to have a conversation about worries, what works, resources and actions. As noted earlier, the school reported the child grounded in absence from school, and at the meeting eight professionals from the school are present: a school psychologist, teachers, a pedagogue, a school social worker, a school nurse, and the vice principal. During the session, it becomes clear that there are different perceptions of the cause to the child’s absence and therefore also different perceptions of who is responsible for mobilizing resources: One perception put forward by the mother is, that the child is well-functioning when being in a “one-to-one contact”, but among many people she gets “restless”, “angry” and sometimes “fierce”. The mother worries that the child feels “excluded” in school. A woman friend backs her up. Another perception is put forward by the school. It is recognized that the child has difficulties being in a teaching situation with many children. She often sits alone behind a screen wearing ear muffs. However, all the school professionals strongly indicate that something is wrong in the family and in the mothers backing of schooling. For example, the vice principal notes the child has been absent 20 pct. since first day of school. The class teacher notes, that the child’s things are always in a mess the schoolbag filled with all sorts of odds and ends. Another teacher tells that the child says, “I can’t sit here alone, I can’t be together with the others”, but suggests that she has learned to say so at home. When she is absent from school, it is obvious that getting friends is difficult. A pedagogue notes that the child sometimes withdraws from playing, as if she

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“­worries about what is going on at home”. After the break the SW encourage the participants: “How can we make the child feel happy about going to school?” She “pictures a girl who seeks contact, has difficulties being together with many people, but has many competences”. However, the school argues that the actions of the family are decisive. The woman friend argues that the child needs to be in a smaller class, where earmuffs are not necessary. To this, the school psychologist says: “It is absolutely normal with earmuffs and screens today, she is not the only one, and she is far from being in the target group for special class”. She requests the family to “speak positively about school”. Since the school does not show responsibility for the child’s wellbeing in school, the SW asks if the father can help taking the child to school. The parents are willing to talk about it. The example shows how the social worker tries to mobilize resources within the systems and among professionals, using well-being as a lever for promoting shared solutions. However, in this case it is a struggle. The school as a general welfare area is urged to include more children previously assigned to expensive special classes with the result that the use of screens and earmuffs has become “normal” no longer constituting a legitimate explanation for children feeling different, isolated, or experiencing problems of getting friends. Equality is perceived as fitting into and thinking “positively” about the conditions of a normal school day. Therefore, the school does not respond to the social workers question: How can we make the child feel happy about going to school? Rather the school thinks this is a problem concerning parental skills and the child’s individual difficulties, which should be handled through social services. Therefore, no shared solutions are reached. Only the parents are asked and agree to corporate with regard to making the child attend school. This exemplifies a systemic negation and distribution of responsibilities to individuals. The school does not recognize how schooling conditions may also influence the well-being of the child e.g. creating a sense of being not normal or isolated. Thus, creating possibilities for inclusion to an “ordinary life” within the general area of welfare may be a struggle. 7

Concluding Reflections: The Struggle, the Negation, and the Challenge

How is it possible to understand the struggle at play in the practices of social work? Mobilizing resources in and around disadvantaged families is a

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­ istorically constituted function of social work going at least back to the 19th h century. Embedded in this function were both moral concerns about social order and ideals of reform (Philp, 1979; Donzelot, 1997). In Denmark, this was expressed in the institutionalization and professionalization of social work through the Mothers Relief in 1939. The purpose of Mothers relief was to prevent illegal abortion through promoting motherhood, childbirth and a healthy population. However, the social workers were also engaged in and managed to set a social political agenda concerned with inequalities, economic hardship, lack of opportunities for education and decent work and the well-being of single mothers and low income families (Brunse, 2015; Nissen, 2016; Fallov et al., 2017). The struggle currently at play in social work practice has some resonance in this historically founded agenda. Social workers are still preoccupied with mobilizing resources in and around disadvantaged families. However, in the everyday practices the resources in focus are primarily those that stem from the family network or can be mobilized through corporation with systems and professionals in the child’s immediate environment with a strong focus on the child’s well-being, safety, personal development, schooling, education, or other forms of preparation for an independent adulthood. When grounded in the child’s needs and by using well-being as a lever, it is possible to mobilize social, systemic, and economic resources expressed in questions such as: Who are you close to? Can you overcome lack of resources and conflicts for the purpose of helping the child? How can we help include the child collectively? However, and based on the examples, one can argue that this focus to some extent displaces and constitutes a potential negation of a social political agenda concerning inequality and the disadvantages of some families - that is the socio-economic and material conditions hindering well-being. In the examples, this potential negation lays in the persistent effort to mobilize resources for taking care of the child, despite being a single parent on social security, provider of many children, suffering from overload, stress, and/or mental illness, and despite scarce relations and networks burdened with conflicts or other troubles such as health problems. The social workers seem to be aware of and show sensitivity to this, e.g. by acknowledging that mobilizing resources take time, by providing social services and by being willing to apply for minor economic compensations. However, since economic resources are to a wide extent connected to employment services and possibilities for productivity at the labor market, and because of the strong focus on economic rationality and cost-effectiveness expressed in the very need to focus on resources, there is a risk that conditions related to inequalities, economic hardship and material deprivation become negated in social work with children with special needs and their families.

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In the Nordic countries the problems of, causes of and solutions to inequalities have been structurally incorporated in the welfare state through compensations and institutionalization of extensive welfare services. Thus, one ­cannot say that inequalities have completely failed to be recognized. However, current developments show how ideals of equality cannot be taken for granted and are continuously contested expressed in struggles concerning recognition of possibilities for solidarity and limits to inclusion as well as forms of misrecognition and negation (Luhmann, 1990; Bourdieu, 2000; Luhmann 2012; Hagen, 1999). The political receptiveness to neoliberal economic rationales makes mobilizing resources for welfare more dependent on economic productivity on the labor market. Social security, employment services and social services are still provided, but the provision of social services to children with special needs and their families has become more dependent on the capacity to mobilize resources despite economic and material troubles. On a certain level this can be perceived as a form of governmentality and responsibilization of disadvantaged families impelling them to view themselves as holding resources that should be mobilized for the purpose of enabling the wellbeing, welfare, and future productivity of the child in adult life (Foucault, 2000; Rose, 1999). However, the promotion of well-being may also be associated with broader ideas of and sensitivities to the misrecognized troubles in life (Bourdieu, 2000), and how such troubles are also related to systemic limitations and forms of negation with regard to taking the life world into account (Habermas, 1984; Luhmann, 2012). From this point of view, the struggle is not only related to governance and the ordering of lives, but also to a more fundamental conflict concerning how human life is valued. With regard to the latter, efforts to mobilize resources for well-being can also be viewed as way of seeking to safeguard values of equality in a policy context where welfare is increasingly viewed in the light of economic rationality, productivity and notions of cost-effectiveness adhering to a competitive capitalist (labor) market (Cerny, 1997; Castell, 2000; Jessop, 2002). If so, the struggles for mobilizing resources in social work may also work as a lever for a broader critique and responses to neoliberalism. The current struggle within social work both indicate an increased receptiveness to and ways of counter balancing and forming social policy responses to a strict neoliberal economic rationale. What is struggled for is the need for well-being, equality, and solidarity in contrast to leaving people to fend for themselves thinking that being dependent on others is shameful, a result of individual failure and thus an individual problem. This is also a struggle for recognition of how anyone can become vulnerable, e.g. due to illness, loss of work, and/or of social relations, and thus how economic, material, and social

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resources are commonly important for overcoming troubles in life. Finally it is a struggle for believing and making social work possible in times where even a social democratic minister is capable of reducing visions of social policy to a simple distinction between a “bad life” and a “good life” by means of an economic rationale and the potential of creating a surplus between tax revenues and the cost of social security and services over a life course.

Chapter 7

Collective Action, Collective Impact and Community Foundations: The Emerging Role of Local Institution Building in an Era of Globalization and Declining Social Safety Nets Frank Ridzi 1 Introduction In the neoliberal era social welfare policy has experienced a variety of strains due to the growing competition of global markets. The result is that federal safety nets seem to be receding just as local communities find themselves most in need and facing worldwide dynamics that seem to shift the locus of control well beyond their geographic borders. In response, some communities have looked to the tools of the past for answers while others have explored the potential for new tools that can help local communities survive within and respond to global trends. In this paper I explore three types of local movements that have been gaining popularity, sometimes in tandem with each other and other times on their own. Collective action, collective impact, and community foundations have all been implicated as potential responses to federal welfare state retrenchment. In the following pages I first explore this national and ­international paradigm of neoliberal safety net restructuring as it presently manifests itself within the United States. I then explore for each of these approaches how they have been implicated in this welfare state retrenchment and what their approach looks like both theoretically and concretely on the ground in local communities. Finally, I explore how each of these three approaches, when deployed in concert with each other can be seen to offer critical components that address one another’s major shortcomings. While it is not likely that, even taken together, these three increasingly popular approaches can backfill the retrenchment of federal governments, they can serve as a starting place for reasserting the importance of local self-determination within a global future.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���9 | doi:10.1163/9789004384118_008

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2 The US in International Context In terms of terrain, nations across the world are struggling to redefine and renegotiate what their welfare states offer, whom they protect and how as we seem to have entered a phase of history in which anything in the welfare state is up for grabs. Hosseini Faradonbeh and Gills (2016) suggest that a time of crisis has emerged as capitalist relations have excessively globalized and resulted in a world of interdependent and rival capitalist systems. As a result, a globalist discourse is now in disarray and there’s a push to bring the nation state or territory back into the center of both analysis and politics. Ricardo Dello Buono (2016) suggests that the social welfare state is in a crisis mode facing fault lines of suburban angst that we see in places such as Sweden’s riots of 2013. The result is a social welfare state in crisis mode-why? As Cory Blad (2016) points out, the cultural project of neoliberalism is to enhance and support capital accumulation most pertinently through ideologically withdrawing the state as a protectionist institution. In other words, by cutting back on welfare state provisions you compel more people into the workforce, expand labor pools, decrease wages, and hence increase capital accumulation (see Ridzi, 2009). Neoliberalism has, at the same time it weakens welfare states’ abilities to respond to social problems, caused the social problems to grow. Outsourcing and offshoring have disrupted historical employment patterns, as well as gender and family life dynamics, as gendered service jobs and high and low skill pockets of pay develop in unforeseen ways leaving many unpredictably employed and decimating large swaths of nations. One need only look at rust belt cities in the United States to see how globalization has left entire communities defenseless against global currents. In such cases implementing a stronger welfare state no longer has a corrective effect as it is now both unfeasible given a diminished tax base and may likely exacerbate the problem by serving as a magnet for the world’s growing population of economic migrants and refugees. Neoliberalism has been like a shift in plate tectonics that has caused scholars of the social world to rethink the borders and terrain of social welfare statism. In terms of borders, nations that were squarely identified as in the camp of mature welfare states have begun to challenge their own heritage as alternative visions have arisen in Scandinavian nations seeking a less generous approach. Scharmer and Kaufer (2013: 76) see the progression of the world as having moved backwards during neoliberalism. Each nation however has experienced this phenomenon in its own context. The US has a history of fostering a “diversified portfolio” of human services

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that, unlike Scandinavian nations where the vast majority of social workers are employed by the government, includes the non-profit field as a major partner (Smith and Lipsky, 1993). Former president George H.W. Bush (senior) perhaps most famously characterized this in his “thousand points of light” speech as he articulated how nonprofits and civil society would step in as government retrenches to fill the gap, much as a thousand separate points of light working collectively to address society’s major social needs (Bush, 1988). In this sense collective action, collective impact and community foundations can be seen as part of this nonprofit tradition of filling in gaps left where government services fall short. 3

Method and Approach

In recent years we have seen local protests to globalization such as Brexit and the popularity of Bernie Sanders. As Perry and Mazany write: The irony here, as we suggested earlier, is that as the networks of community have grown and become more complex, even leading to a less physical, technology-driven “space of flow” (Castells 2000), the role of the physical local (either urban or rural) has become all the more important, if for no other reason than the national and even local governments have drifted away in their historic institutional responsibilities. perry and mazany, 2014: 12

Within this context communities are turning more and more to local anchor institutions and looking for local saviors as potentially protective extra local governing authorities retreat in the face of complex global pressures. For these reasons I ground this analysis in local sites of study. Drawing on a national survey of 65 literacy-focused collective impact ­organizations and 45 national and local funders (including 15 community foundations) as well as long term ethnographic (participant and participant observation) and interview data collected from over two dozen collective action groups, collective impact structures and community foundations nationally, I explore similarities and differences between collective action, collective impact, and community foundations. In particular, I explore how these initiatives originate to address social problems that the government cannot or will not solve, and how they involve community buy-in of various strata of people (i.e. grasstips, grassroots).

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Collective Action as a Local Social Welfare Response in a Neoliberal Era

Collective action has been a mainstay of responses to social welfare retrenchments in the past. Dating back to the work of Piven and Cloward (1971, 1979) we see that public protests, mass defiance, demonstrations, and general displays of discontent by grassroots concerned citizens have been an effective means to encouraging governments to shift their priorities away from market favorability toward protectionism. Indeed, this is a key component of what Polanyi and others (Blad, 2011) have conceptualized as one half of a shifting pendulum between market liberalization and market protectionism. 4.1 What It Looks Like Theoretically Theoretically, collective action would seem to follow in the footsteps of community organizers such as Saul Alinsky (1971) and new grassroots coalitions that have emerged to address welfare retrenchment specifically (Reese, 2011). Alinsky sought to find ways to rally and empower those left out of the economy to rise up and demand that they are noticed. In some sense this may be some of the energy behind rises in populist movements such as that of socialist Bernie Sanders, who have burst onto the scene as a new force to be reckoned with and have re-claimed welfare state terms such as liberal and socialist that used to be politically anathema for mainline candidates. 4.2 What It Looks Like on the Ground On the ground such efforts at collective action work toward drawing attention to unmet needs. As Reese (2011) has documented, they manifest themselves as campaigns, such as those in Wisconsin and California through which activists applied lobbying pressure in combination with traditional tools of protests and public awareness raising. Through such efforts collective action was able to unite community residents who identified as poor, feminist, immigrant and even union member to make their voices heard. Though there were successes for certain, they were uneven and strategies that worked in some communities failed in others. On local levels we see neighborhood rallies and welfare and anti-policing demonstrations, born out of frustration and a desire to be heard, but, as with the welfare rights activism that Reese (2011) studied, we often see that these groups fail to take the mainstream and seldom gain access to the levers of power. This fact perhaps helps to explain some of the rise in popularity of collective impact. In my research, collective action groups can be characterized by an overarching focus on awareness and ensuring that the perspectives of community

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residents were heard and their feelings of being slighted by larger institutions treated as legitimate and valid concerns. Most often there was an emphasis on negative interactions. For instance, in one case working with a welfare rights organization there was an emphasis on the lack of dignity that was felt by a welfare applicant. She felt she was being talked down to by a welfare office worker. The main emphasis was expressing her frustration and trying to share with others in the general public and through awareness raising events how demeaning this experience was. There was very little traction when they reached out to the welfare office itself. This was unsurprising given the combative relationship that existed between the formal institutions of government and these very grassroots efforts. The collective action groups tended to see themselves as watchdogs on government and advocates for the disenfranchised. This carried through in other instances as well, such as a community forum about poverty in which local community residents seemed to derive their greatest satisfaction from putting elected officials on the spot and holding them accountable for larger community problems related to poverty, even if there was no clear solution as part of the conversation. In another instance, when a speaker from another community was invited to talk about poverty issues some community residents expressed to me a frustration with “poverty pimps” as corrupt local actors who were out for themselves and simply seeking to attract grant money to keep themselves employed while not really helping the community and simply amounting to bureaucratic waste of government money meant to help poor residents. This conversation seemed purposefully loud enough for others to hear and while several others in the mixed company of neighborhood, nonprofit and other community leaders seemed to politely discount this as a marginal opinion, it seemed to be directed at making sure those in authority knew that people in the community were watching and calling them to task for their actions. On another occasion, a similar dynamic led to a tense standoff when a grassroots community representative basically called out an institutional leader in the community and said that the whole way that the group was going about things would be unrecognizable to a poor member of the community. This meeting ended with frustration and tension on both sides and a lack of clear direction for productively moving forward. In yet another instance a community organizer began rallying neighbors to respond to environmental racism in the form of toxins that were concentrated in low income neighborhoods. In this case, the strategy was to culminate in a public rally bringing awareness to this issue and calling on a solution. As with the other examples above these efforts were not launched along with concrete plans in which residents and those who held institutional ­levels

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of power and authority within the community could collaboratively work together toward a solution. In many senses the actions of collective action groups I encountered resonated with Saul Alinsky style approaches such as where he stated, “The job of the organizer is to maneuver and bait the establishment so that it will publicly attack him as a ‘dangerous enemy.’” (Alinsky, 1971: 100). In such cases the end game is to have them react negatively and hence invite others to join in. However, this paradigm is constrained by what can be accomplished through direct confrontation. It is limited by its inhibition of a complementary component that involves working within the social apparatus to transform how it works for the betterment of individual residents. 5

Collective Impact as a Local Social Welfare Response in a Neoliberal Era

In the US a new paradigm to embody the “thousand points of light” metaphor has emerged over the recent decade in the form of the collective impact approach. Though community collaboration is not new and has a rich history in the US, the collective impact approach has in a sense rebranded community collaboration that focuses on working across organizational boundaries (i.e. breaking down silos). In general, the collective impact framework provides a checklist of critical components that schools, hospitals, departments of social services, foundations, colleges, and a variety of other nonprofits would do well to accomplish if they wish to achieve community triumph over any number of social problems. In this approach, a template has been provided for communities seeking to take fate into their own hands when trying to reduce poverty, increase school graduations or eliminate gun violence. 5.1 What It Looks Like Theoretically In recent years, collective impact, also known as community coalitions, has seen a rise in popularity as a means to addressing persistent community needs (Ridzi and Doughty, 2017). Much like collective action, there is an emphasis on working together toward a common goal. However, and quite distinct from collective action, collective impact tends to cast a much broader net when ­conceptualizing stakeholders and as a result such efforts tend to bring together multiple institutions across varying sectors including non-profit organizations, funders, government, business, and citizens. The thinking is that the community can solve some of its most intractable social problems (such as poverty, unemployment and failing schools) by achieving the following components (see Kania and Kramer, 2011):

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1.

All participants have a common agenda for change including a shared understanding of the problem and a joint approach to solving it through agreed upon actions. 2. Collecting data and measuring results consistently across all the participants ensures shared measurement for alignment and accountability. 3. A plan of action that outlines and coordinates mutually reinforcing activities for each participant. 4. Open and continuous communication is needed across the many players to build trust, assure mutual objectives, and create common motivation. 5. A backbone organization(s) with “staff and specific set of skills to serve the entire initiative and coordinate participating organizations and agencies.”1 While collective impact has all the appearances of something new, many in the field see it as simply a re-packaging of age-old tactics. As Henig et al. assert: While “collective impact,” as a specific form of collaboration, has a discernible origin, cross-sector collaboration in the provision of supports and services for children has such a long history in the United States that it is difficult to say exactly when it began. All manner of contemporary cross-sector efforts working to improve outcomes for children trace their own origins to the settlement houses at the end of the 19th century. And we can draw a through-line from the settlements to present-day initiatives that should provide new efforts with a rich past on which to build. 2015: 7–8

As they go on to explain, the collective impact movement builds on previous milestones including episodic periods in which the American population has re-discovered poverty and, much like in the current moment of wild globalization, people have come to see poverty as happening often through no fault of the individual. The settlement house movement itself, which began in England and migrated to the US, was also a milestone departure from state-run efforts, which Black churches helped to spread across the nation (Henig et al., 2015). Also, the Charity Organization Societies (that emerged in England) are another past example that can be seen as having a persisting influence as an ancestor of collective impact in their focus on attacking the systemic cycle of poverty and relying on the collection of centralized records and emphasis on data.

1 See Collaboration for Impact, Retrieved online April 21, 2017 from http://www.collaborationforimpact.com/collective-impact/)

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In recent times, Comprehensive Community Initiatives (ccis) emerged as perhaps the most recent forerunner of the collective impact movement. ­“During the 1990s (and early 2000s), a variety of new large-scale place-based cross sector initiatives, collectively often referred to as “comprehensive community initiatives” (ccis), were also proliferating and could be found in nearly every major American city. ccis were organized around principles of ­comprehensive community change, organizational collaboration, and citizen participation, and sought no less than “fundamental transformation of poor neighborhoods and the people who lived there” (Kubisch, 1996).” (from Henig et al., 2015: 15). 5.2 What It Looks Like on the Ground In the words of one author, collective impact or community coalitions have become “all the rage,” since, “every community has one by now or one is most certainly coming to a community near you” (Kaye, 2001: 269). Collective impact takes many forms beginning with their founding. Among the communities I examined some have been started by a few individuals such as retired teachers gathering in the library to discuss local problems of illiteracy. Others have been launched by local foundations or local government elected officials. The goal is typically to address a chronic social problem that has some manifestation in the local community. Unlike collective action which becomes visible in public events and rallies that focus on drawing attention to unmet needs, much of the work of collective impact happens it more formal and professional settings such as boardrooms and community forums that are held during the workday and include a cast of actors whose day jobs typically involve running local institutions such as libraries, schools, human services agencies, and ­philanthropic foundations. The work is also different from that of collective action. Instead of trying to get those in power to listen to needs experienced by community residents, collective impact efforts tend to be dominated by those in power who are trying to figure out how to tweak the services they deliver and policies they rely on so that they better serve the needs of people living in the community. Collective impact groups, though they aspire to have community resident input, are more driven by community needs that they see in data such as those produced by the US Census Bureau or the community health department or housing agencies. The champions of these efforts are less likely to be vocal neighbors and more often are agencies that notice such things as a spike in lead poisoning among low income families, a concentration of poverty in a particular part of town, or dismal high school graduation rates. As a result, these groups set to work with a series of meetings in which they seek to lay out a community plan and pull together all of the necessary governmental, nonprofit, and f­unding

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partners needed to carry it out. In some communities this takes the form of new preschool programming, new public awareness campaigns about the hazards of lead paint, or efforts to have schools work more closely with other human services providers. Meeting with, participating in and interviewing people about collective impact often lead me to talk to executive directors of such efforts and the other community leaders who were part of these coalitions. It was striking to me that, in contrast to collective action, members of these groups were not drawn to participate by any particular need of a single resident. In fact, it seemed that most of these community leaders did not firsthand know the name of anyone who was particularly suffering from the problem that they gathered to address. Rather the community problem such as poverty or illiteracy was brought to their attention by some sort of community data or report. In one instance a local foundation authored a report about the challenges of poverty facing their community and supplied a variety of data to construct a narrative about what was happening and why. In other cases, consultants were called in to author reports about the current state of things and to map community assets and needs. There was a genuine and heartfelt desire to see community improvement, but it was typically not on the immediate personal level and more at a level of goodwill toward the community in general. In some cases, actual community members were brought into the fold and in one instance a former prisoner shared about his challenges obtaining identification that was needed to find work after he was released from prison. This led to much engaged discussion about how this type of dilemma could be avoided in the future as other ex-cons sought to re-join the workforce. Having leading government officials at the table made this discussion seem particularly promising. This type of engagement with residents in planning, however, seemed to be more of an exception to the rule. Sometimes members of these collective impact structures decided to create programming that related to the community problem being addressed. However, more often, organizations did not have the financial and other resources to create new programming, so they instead focused on making sure that the other community organizations were aware of the programs that they did offer and could look for opportunities to advertise their services to the clients of other organizations. In some instances, we could see government departments offering support to the programming started by other member organizations and in many cases these groups could actually chart progress in terms of community statistics improving. However, it was never really clear whether actual community residents knew much about these efforts or had a perspective on whether they were successful. In one community, for instance, there was both a grass-root and a collective impact effort focusing on the same area and the two ­organizations

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only occasionally found opportunities to coordinate their work. While collective impact groups often gathered the attention of the broader community and local newspapers, sustainability was always an issue and these groups felt caught between a rock and a hard place when it came to secure additional funds. As one shared, the task of reaching out to grant-makers for continued funding was extremely difficult because they did not actually provide a direct service to community residents. It was a case in which funders were happy to pay for direct programming but not the community-wide coordination of that programming. 6

Community Foundations as a Local Social Welfare Response in a Neoliberal Era

A third local response to shifting currents of globalization can be seen in the community foundation movement, which seeks to use the global market system to ensure local prosperity. While many see this as an innovation in the area of philanthropy, which itself has a rich history in the United States of providing for community needs, others such as Walkenhorst (2010), conceptualize community foundations as a concept that has grown in popularity precisely because of shifting social welfare policies that have retreated from their traditional assurances of support and left a vacuum, which organizations, such as community foundations, have sought to fill. As Walkenhorst writes: The widespread shift from long standing social welfare policies to new forms of public-private partnership is encouraging the globalization of the community foundation concept. Increasingly, the responsibility of national and local governments for the funding and delivery of social services has devolved either to private, for profit institutions or not-forprofit, civil-society-oriented organizations that operate outside the traditional public and private sectors. These developments, as well as the communications revolution of the past two decades, have prompted a tremendous increase in the number and growth of civil society organizations all over the world—a phenomenon that has been described as a “global associational revolution.” Community foundations are part of this “global associational revolution,” and they are at the core of the search for a new balance between the state and civil society. They are strategically positioned to strengthen community capacity by fostering local philanthropy and civic engagement. walkenhorst, 2010: 7–8

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While this is framed as part of an international phenomenon, like collective action and collective impact, community foundations are also a local response. 6.1 What It Looks Like Theoretically Unlike other forms of civil society, community foundations, like collective impact structures, have been on the rise. Beginning just over 100 years ago, three quarters of all community foundations in the United States did not exist before 1980 (Leonard, 2014:108, Perry and Mazany, 2014: 12). Community foundations are a unique structure in that their espoused role includes, among other things, building “a bridge between donors and community” (Oliphant, 2014: 62) because of their dual function of raising donations and then investing them in the stock market in order to return the profits to the home community in perpetuity. As Slutsky and Hurwitz (2014: 91–92) have put it, “the purpose of community foundations is to build a permanent nonprofit institution that both honors donor intent and flexibly responds to community needs over the long term.” Leaders in the community foundation field have argued that they should take an increased role in building consensus around solving critical community issues, and furthermore, that those around the decision-making table should include not only the wealthy, but also the poor (Carson, 2014: 45). 6.2 What It Looks Like on the Ground On the ground, community foundations look much like many other philanthropic organizations. As with other funders such as the Gates Foundation, the Carnegie Foundation, or the Ford Foundation they make grants in order to fund efforts that they see as being a public benefit. However, community foundations are distinctive in that they do not make grants nationally but rather within very specifically defined local geographic areas such as a city, or a county and in some cases even a state. As such, they are patently local and are often seen as community “anchor institutions” that, much like institutions of higher education such as colleges or institutions of healthcare such as hospitals, will never uproot and relocate because of their mission. This makes such “anchor institutions” distinctive in an era of globalization in which many international businesses relocate, often without warning, leaving the communities in which they have resided with a crisis as people lose jobs and the secondary economy of restaurants, housing and other commodities struggles to adapt (Mazany and Perry 2014). On a day-to-day basis, my research reveals, community foundations can be seen making grants to nonprofits in a variety of ways. Perhaps the most commonly noticed is that of responsive grantmaking in which nonprofit organizations apply to community foundations for funding to launch a new program, expand an existing one or build some sort of structural capacity into their work

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through the purchase of new equipment such as buildings and vehicles (see Kramer 2009). In this approach to grantmaking we see a premium placed on the value that nonprofit organizations bring to the community by being the ones closest to the residents that they serve (and hence the most able to act in ­entrepreneurial ways to address the needs they witness among their clients). In some ways, this can be seen as an organic and ever evolving response to a shifting safety net in which new and unforeseen holes in the net are constantly emerging. A second way that we see community foundations acting in their communities is through working to help scale up programs that they come to recognize as being highly effective. These can be programs that the foundation staffs themselves identify or ones that come to their attention through their responsive grantmaking. The goal here is to try to maximize community benefit by finding what works and expanding it to ensure that as many members of the community experience its benefits as possible. This is not completely unlike some of the federal government’s efforts to pilot certain welfare and jobtraining programs in select sites before scaling them up if they are deemed successful. A third way that my research has found community foundations are active is in building the professionalism of the nonprofit community they serve through offering training programs, workshops or even scholarships for nonprofit staff members to attend conferences or trainings that are held by their respective professional associations. In this way, community foundations live out their anchor role and seek to fill some of the void left by reduced government services through increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the nonprofits that seek to fill in where government services end (see also Kramer 2009). Interestingly, I found that a fourth common area of activity for community foundations is in funding the work of collective impact efforts themselves (Kramer, 2009). While some community foundations may fund projects that work in the area of grassroots organizing, this is much less common than actually funding the work of collective impact coalitions (See Table 7.1). Often this support comes in the form of grants to underwrite the salaries of collective impact backbone staff or funding for the coalition to offer professional development sessions on its own and even funding to help collective impact groups launch new programs in areas where they have discerned that there is a gap between the services offered by nonprofit and government institutions and the community’s need. Oftentimes, these are collaborative programs that can be run by the various nonprofit organizations in the community and serve to increase the social capital and civic engagement of community members. In the course of my research it became clear that each community foundation was quite unique in many ways, but that they also shared many ­commonalities. Poverty is something that many address, and they tend to

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Three Local Community Comparative Cases: Social Welfare Responses

Approach

Collective Action

Collective Impact

A way to

organize ­community residents

coordinate ­collaboration among organizations

Community Foundations build a charitable community endowment

Coordinates Action Shared Local or Shared interests of Based On Identity Interests of organizations individuals

Shared interests of donors and grantseekers

Structure

community organizing strategy

nonprofit or less formal affiliation

a nonprofit organization

Trajectory

experiencing a resurgence

rising in popularity extended growth, at a crossroads

What it looks like on the ground

Informal after hours neighborhood meetings to rally residents around an agenda

formal meetings of organization leaders during the ­business day to work on ­addressing shared goals for community improvement

day time and after hours separate meetings with donors and grant seekers to match opportunities for local grantmaking with donor intent

What each offers the accountability to the levers of power bridge between others everyday life in high wealth and need need areas

be ­systematic in their focus. A few for instance took an equity lens looking at how those most vulnerable, particularly because of race, suffer from poverty. As such, one framed its grantmaking to schools as a response to racial equity since children of color were disproportionally concentrated in failing schools. Another framed its work in fostering safe and healthy housing as a matter of equity since the poor and non-white disproportionately suffered from inadequate housing. In all of these cases, however, the foundations were not themselves doing this direct service work. Rather, they were investing in

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other groups who do this work as part of their portfolio. As foundation staff would say, “we are not in the business of running programs.” This does not mean that they cannot encourage new and existing groups to focus on their priorities. One foundation, for instance issued a report that has become its community’s clarion call to action. They were not immune to collective action critique just because they do not run programs directly, however. One foundation was sternly criticized for being a top-down approach. In another community, a foundation staff member was publicly criticized for not being closer to the problem and hence not being able to understand the issue. This seemed to be less about personalities and more about social positioning; one member of this exchange was seen as being in a powerful and privileged position in contrast to the collective action proponent’s close to the ground experience among the people who are suffering. 7

Solving Each Other’s Problems

Collective action, collective impact, and community foundations have all had their individual successes and have developed proud traditions but they each have critical challenges that the others can help them address. To date, their efforts have been somewhat confined to the scales on which they operate. This is not to say that they have not collaborated because in many cases they have. However, the work of collective action has been largely confined to the scale of the grass roots residents, collective impact has found its greatest resonance at the higher scale level of grass tips community leaders and community foundations have found their greatest success in engaging with wealthy community members and leveraging their resources in a global investment market place. It is probably safe to say that each of these trending local responses to global change has greater aspirations than they have achieved so far. In this section I explore how creating a greater synergy among these three types of local institutions promises to help them to better leverage one another to bring about the change they hope to see. 7.1 Major Weaknesses of and Opportunities for Collective Action In general, collective action has been limited by its lack of access to power holders which would be a much more direct pathway to bring about the changes that its adherents seek. Collective impact can help to address this need because its constituents tend to be the same power holders that could bring about concrete change for the community. Such synergies could be created if collective action social movements as entities were awarded their place at the table in

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collective impact efforts. If their membership could be represented efficiently this way they would garner a direct pipeline to the levers of power. Indeed, the grassroots strengths of collective action are also a weakness. While the identity politics on which it is built offers legitimacy to community residents, they often fail to resonate with those in power at the helm of community nonprofit, government and political organizations. However, where collective action fails in this regard, collective impact has found its own niche. Collective impact appeals to a more neoliberal friendly identity that is more likely to be held by those whom neoliberalism and a globalizing economy has empowered- leaders of community institutions and businesses etc. who have wealth and authority to make change. More specifically it appeals to their identity as problem solvers on behalf of the masses and their belief in the power of measurement and rational program implementation science and bureaucratic professionalism (as opposed to the blunt force of masses arising in a power struggle to demand solutions to their problems). To be successful, social movements have always had to appeal to and be in touch with the lived realities of those on the ground. In this regard collective impact is no different, except that it is not as close to the ground. It is still on the ground and in the weeds, but it focuses more on grass tips than on the grass roots. Furthermore, it espouses a new form of identity politics that emphasizes cross-sector collaboration. In the words of Scharmer and Kaufer (2013:55) “The most significant change at the beginning of this century has been the creation of platforms for crosssector cooperation that enable change-makers to gather, become aware of and understand the evolution of the whole system and consequently to act from impulses that, originate from that shared awareness” (Scharmer and Kaufer, 2013: 55). While many of the social problems of the day seem reminiscent of the past (such as poverty, lack of education, poor housing and violence) what seems to have changed with the emergence of collective impact’s prominence is the identity of who feels compelled to act, what they attempt to do, where they do it, when they do it, why they do it and how. Identity politics in the United States have often hinged on key personal characteristics such as race, sex, religion, or sexuality. Here we see an evolution of collective action along the lines of socioeconomic status. More specifically, we see the momentum of collective action shifting from being largely in the domain of lower classes of oppressed and into the domain of those whom the globalizing neoliberal economy seem to have favored, at least in relative terms. Whereas in the past we might expect collective action and traditional social movements to be comprised of local community residents or the constituencies served by nonprofits or government welfare offices, as the research

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f­indings shared above reveal, today’s collective impact adherents are more likely to include nonprofit directors and mid to upper level staff of government agencies or nonprofit programs, not to mention their board members, and even elected officials and their designees. Indeed, this is not by happenstance since my research finds that the targeted audience is no longer local informal ­neighborhood leaders or neighbors with the potential to become leaders, but rather those who have made community leadership a career and have risen to ­levels of influence and authority within nonprofits, businesses, and government. Accompanying this shift in audience/adherents is a shift in the actual unit of participation for collective action. While residents are not explicitly or even intentionally excluded, the core participants that collective impact seeks to bring to the table is organizations. To some extent geographical boundaries have given way to organizational boundaries. In the past social movements may have experienced confusion or disjunctures when shifting or expanding from one geographic neighborhood to another. Under this new paradigm, my data suggest, the confusion is sometimes felt when people who are members shift from one organization to another. Perhaps they played a leading role by virtue of their former position at a funding foundation, fiscal sponsor of the collective impact structure, or government office. In such cases shifting to a new job or severing ties from their previous organization causes a role confusion such that collective impact structures have to do the emotion work of discerning whether it was the individual’s personality and skill set or the office that they held that is most important to the collective impact enterprise. Perhaps shockingly, given all of these divergences, both social movements and grass tips collective impact efforts are often addressing the same needs and would likely claim success at the same outcomes. While I have explored elsewhere some of the challenges raised by social movements’ distrust of government statistics (and conversely the tendency of collective impact efforts to overemphasize the role of community indicators) (Ridzi, 2017) at their core both types of movements would measure success by the improved quality of daily life of community residents. In order to be successful, both would want to see systems change and the chances both types of movements would have to see the successes come to fruition would likely be multiplied exponentially if a single movement were to embody the best of both collective action social movements and collective impact. Collective impact has a direct line to the very things that social movements have often felt intentionally excluded from – the levers to make lasting, positive community change. Susan Dreyfus is considered by some to be today’s heir to both Jane Adams’ settlement house movement and Mary Richmond’s work as part of the Charity Organization Society

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(cos) movement and an eventual founding mother of the social work field. Dreyfus is president and ceo of the Alliance for Strong Families and Communities, the U.S.’s largest network of human-serving organizations formed by combining these two traditions. Fittingly, given the origins of the US social work profession, she advocates that nothing will change if we “focus only on trying to change people one at a time and not change the context in which they live their daily lives” (Dreyfus, 2015: 1). Instead, she argues: “We need to align our policies, daily practice, regulatory, and fiscal actions with current science and data that show that reducing toxic stressors will increase economic vitality through our greatest asset—our people” (Dreyfus, 2015: 1). In other words, the “four levers—policy, practice, regulatory and fiscal” that she argues are needed are the same things that grassroots organizations notoriously have little to no control over (Dreyfus, 2015: 1). Following from this fourth lever of power, fiscal, there is opportunity for growth in terms of philanthropic funding beyond that of government. Collective action, while it has stayed away from funding (often to avoid being coopted by the strings that would be attached to funding) can certainly benefit from the legitimacy that having funders involved could bring. Funders, especially community foundations are often seen as neutral or objective conveners because they are not themselves competing for funding. As a result, they have cultivated over the years a social capital because they are seen as acting out of the community’s interest rather than out of self-interest. Where collective action efforts and community foundations are able to find common ground, this synergy can help collective action groups to distance themselves from their stereotype among detractors as self-interested rabble simply demanding a bigger piece of the pie for themselves. 7.2 Major Weaknesses of and Opportunities for Collective Impact Collective impact efforts certainly have their strengths, but they also have their weaknesses. One key point is that their grass tips posture has left them open to criticism for becoming alienated from the community members they are designed to serve. Though they aspire to have community residents at the helm, in day-to-day reality they often have trouble maintaining a direct line of communication to community members, let alone active participation by residents and people who do not also have an identity as a nonprofit or other form of community leader. This points out a pre-disposition of collective impact efforts toward recruitment of community power brokers and those who can pull the levers of both small and large “P” policy change, funding, and governmental authority.

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As a result, collective impact structures tend to have the very powerful membership that social movements often lack in their efforts to be inclusive of ­neighborhood, community or other individuals who feel oftentimes personally disenfranchised. Ironically, a major criticism of collective impact efforts is that they have been largely unable to involve the very people of which social movements have been comprised. Hence, collective impact has gained a reputation for ­being somewhat disconnected from the everyday concrete lived experiences of those who most suffer from the social problems they are trying to solve. This may be in part due to the deployment of different strategies. Social movements used community organizers and were based on the theories of Saul Alinsky and others who use door-to-door approaches, charismatic personalities, and a focus on equity to draw people out of their day-to-day routine and into the community organizing realm. Collective impact efforts are much more likely to hire consultants that run convening events and offer technical assistance to groups of well-connected community leaders. The goal is to get elected officials, business ceos, and university presidents to attend intense discussion sessions. This work is informed by the concepts of collective impact, implementation science and community indicator projects that point out social problems and track community efforts to improve them (Ridzi, 2017). While collective impact goals are lofty, this effort, like many before it, suffers from one critical weakness, a top-heavy leadership that, though trying hard to include the voices of the community, can end up being lead more by professionals and community leaders than residents. This Achilles heel, combined with a notorious difficulty in clearly defining outcomes, or being able to measure any movement in them given modest investment of resources, has led to the eventual fading away of such efforts and their funders in the past. Henig et al. (2015: 17) sum up the dilemma well in reflecting on the past experience of cci’s that is just as relevant as a critique of today’s collective impact: ccis put a premium on community participation, both for ensuring community input and leadership in planning and for building community capacity to meet the needs of the neighborhood, but this proved difficult (Traynor, 2007). While there was variation from place to place, resident participation was often limited and episodic, and the initiatives were often dominated by foundation and agency representatives. Community residents were typically low-income people of color, many of them without experience with forums and methods used by the initiatives, which were nearly always run by white professionals. Another common issue was that short-term grassroots objectives conflicted with the long-term

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goals of the professionals. And the initiatives did not provide sufficient funding or supports dedicated specifically to community building. chaskin, 2000

It is perhaps here in the lack of grassroots support that we see the most marked difference between collective impact efforts of the past and the U.S. tradition of social movements. As Butterfoss has outlined, whereas grassroots organizing consists of building leadership from scratch where none had previously been, coalition efforts often “seek to unite existing groups, such as churches, schools, and civic associations, to pursue a common agenda more effectively. Because coalitions often rely on existing leadership, they are sometimes derisively called grass tips organizing (Grohol, 2005)” (Butterfoss, 2007: 10). Social movements, by contrast with top-down efforts, traditionally do not have trouble engaging with grassroots community residents precisely because they have emerged from those individuals (Reese, 2011). Furthermore, emotion has played a key role in their coalescence. Communication of grievances and the general sharing of discontent has been the fundamental bonding agent that has led many individuals to bind together to take political action (Jasper, 2011). This phenomenon and a recent report by The Chronicle of Philanthropy suggest that there is truth in the theory that greater exposure leads to greater ­generosity (Stern, 2013). This bodes well for finding a common ground between collective action and collective impact. The collective impact movement seems to be learning and moving in the direction of greater focus on a key hallmark of collective action social movements since its founders, John Kania and Mark Kramer recently added a sixth component of equity to their model: As simple, straightforward, and intuitive as that sounds, we are learning that just and fair inclusion for all—regardless of race, gender, ability, religion, ethnicity, or sexual orientation—doesn’t just “happen” most of the time when people engage in collective impact efforts. Even with the best of intentions, it is not inevitable. Without purposefully bringing an equity lens to bear on every aspect of the collective impact process, practitioners inevitably miss opportunities to seek out, recognize, and purposefully resolve inequities in their local context that can block the change they seek to achieve. kania and kramer, 2015

As adherents to collective impact reflect upon this, the historically elitist tendencies have become somewhat more evident and realization has increased that there is a need to be more inclusive and concerned with the voice or

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at least the experience of those suffering from social inequities (McAfee, 2015). This can start with how they measure success including things such as ­disaggregating impact assessment data according to disadvantaged groups as has been urged in social welfare policy (Ridzi, 2009). On the opposite end of the spectrum, collective impact would be nothing without its funders, and in my research, I have seen this in case after case where community foundations take the lead in funding what few other types of ­philanthropy want to fund: collaboration. It is relatively easy for collective impact efforts to find funding for programs that they jointly sponsor that directly serve community residents. However, a critical need that is often overlooked and very unpopular for funding is the ongoing coordination work of the backbone institution that calls the meetings, organizes the agendas, and ensures that the community action plan is written and followed. 7.3 Major Weaknesses of and Opportunities for Community Foundations While community foundations may seem above the fray since they are not themselves in need of funding and they have ongoing relationships with both donors and nonprofits, they are not without their challenges (See Table 7.2). First and foremost, community foundations themselves lack the staff power to make much change in the community on their own. They must rely on community partners such as collective impact organizations to be the action takers to live out the vision that they have for their funding’s community impact. In addition, the philanthropic world has become more critical of itself for failing to facilitate connection between residents and stakeholders affected by community issues. This is a key matter highlighted by the U.S. Council on Foundations in its manual on community leadership (Council on Foundations, 2008). This is an area where collective action partners would certainly strengthen the work of community foundations and their accountability to day-to day community needs. However, fully aligning with collective action social movements is not entirely unproblematic since such movements often call for major challenges to the societal status quo from which many in a typical community foundation’s donor pools have likely benefited. As Hilary Gilbert has noted, community foundations are part of a larger field of philanthropy that wrestles with change for the better without upsetting the status quo that is the engine for such community foundation wealth in the first place: Should philanthropy uphold or challenge the status quo? I’ve always seen the role and purpose of [community foundations] as being one of brokerage between the two positions. We stand of necessity with a foot

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in both camps, and it is our specific function to interpret each side to the other and make them intelligible. A [community foundation] that plants itself squarely on one side or the other will betray its mission. We serve mutually incompatible constituencies—proponents of social change versus upholders of the status quo. All over the world, I suspect, people in [community foundations] are deliberately muddying waters in order to satisfy both at once. It’s what we’re good at, and if we leaned too far in either direction we’d stop being [community foundations] and become something else. As cited in ruesga, 2014: 136

Some communities have different layers of routine community convening at the upper echelons of community leadership as well as the mid-level and professional levels. In order to enhance grassroots feedback some funders have become members of organizations such as the Funding Exchange Network or fex which is a group of progressive-leaning community foundations that focus on “radical political and social activism” by disseminating technical assistance and best practices information to organizations who also seek to work toward “social justice and human dignity” (Dellinger, 2006: 1). As some have described them, they work, “to locate the most radical community programs and projects across America and link them to wealthy donors, thereby leveraging private wealth to achieve egalitarian and collectivist political and social goals” (Dellinger, 2006: 2). In the assessment of Funding Exchange executive director Ellen Gurzinsky, “community foundations joining the Funding Exchange ‘are at the forefront of virtually every contemporary movement for social change. They provide essential resources for both urban and rural organizing. They fund the arts and culture as organizing tools. They directly support efforts to stave off the erosion of hard-won gains in affirmative action and immigration policies. And they respond to emergency issues as well as contribute to the long-term infrastructure needs of their grassroots grantees’” (Dellinger, 2006: 2). While rare, this approach is not unique (Dellinger, 2006); philanthropy has run the gamut from agitator to status quo. The Gamelial Foundation discusses using an “agitational” style in their national Leadership Training (Gamelial, 2010). Some Community Foundations advocate heavy political action that goes even as far as taking out political ads against the sitting governor. While national themes are visible, Ostrander (1995) points out how board sensibilities and foundation makeup involve funders in local power dynamics in very situated ways.

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Table 7.2 Three Local Community Comparative Cases: Weaknesses and Opportunities

Approach

Collective Action

Collective Impact

In need of access to power holders to make systems change

*Can offer ­Collective ­Action access to ­leaders of community institutions

*Can offer Collective Impact a connection to residents

In need of equity lens and accountability to residents

Meeting Each Other’s Needs

In need of funding

Community Foundations

*Can offer funding for ­Collective Impact efforts

*Can connect Community In need of action takers Foundations with orgato fund that align with nizations situated to take foundation vision action in the community *Can provide ­Community ­Foundations with a forum for ­engaging residents and stakeholders

CF Leads Says ­community ­leadership needs to facilitate connection between residents and stakeholders affected by community issues

In need of funding and legitimacy

*Can provide ­funding for community ­organizing and public acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the concerns that collective action identifies

Note: * indicates something that can be provided. Lacking the * indicates something that is needed.

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8 Conclusion Collective impact is the new buzzword among funders including not only national but also local and community foundations. It is a new response of foundations and other grass tips organizations to the challenges of globalization and social welfare state retrenchment, but also a work in progress that can learn much from the rich history of social movements. Furthermore, as anchor institutions that naturally span the borderlands between a community’s wellto-do and disempowered political minorities, community foundations hold a unique position of potential for combining both collective action and collective impact into a more holistic movement. While the world is increasingly global, the local remains a salient point of organization. As Noland and Newton (2014: 76) argue, community is still at its heart geographically defined in many ways. They assert that, “America’s political system is geo-tagged” such that a person who lives in Florida can’t vote in the New York election and much of the daily communication, commuting, education, eating, sleeping and worshiping all happens in a geographic area. As such what Noland and Newton (2014: 76) call “place making” remains a very important thing whether it has to do with building social capital or encouraging civic pride in such a way that people feel connected to where they live. As we see in the case of all three phenomena above, the importance of the local is being re-asserted in the face of and despite a narrative of globalization. Specifically, within the U.S. this is characterized by a neoliberalization that has produced a rising gap between those who have thrived and those who have felt left behind. Despite this rising gap the U.S. tradition of democratic voting means that the residents of a community, with their ballot box power can never be fully left behind. They simply need new ways to make their will heard such that their individual voices do not get drowned out within the broader venue of neoliberal globalization. We have heard the adage that “all politics is local” but in the face of neoliberalism the old “third spaces” (Oldenburg, 1989) of local political and civic engagement have seemed to diminish (Putnam, 2000). Collective Action, Collective Impact and Community Foundations represent a trio of adaptations that have occurred and have flourished perhaps in part due to the challenges of neoliberal welfare state retrenchment. Though they will not replace the welfare state, they do offer new ways for local voices to make themselves heard in addressing community needs and shaping the politics that will guide the governments of the future.

Chapter 8

Social Work in and around the Home: Using Home as a Site to Promote Inclusion Mia Arp Fallov and Maria Appel Nissen 1 Introduction This chapter offers an exploration in to how the home and the local milieu are activated as sites of intervention in social work with families at risk and local community work with the purpose of promoting inclusion underpinned by shifting ideas of what is considered a normal orderly life. Where early social work interventions in and around the home were primarily concerned with creating home as a space for dwelling and the amelioration of material wellbeing of the working-class family living in poverty, contemporary interventions are primarily concerned with creating family relations and practices enabling individual inclusion in society emphasizing mobility and participation. Such shifting ideas reflect an ambiguity or tension inherent in the Danish welfare state with regard to how inclusion is approached. On the one hand, the notion of class, inequality, and the need to combat poverty has been at the core in the shaping of the Social democratic welfare state. On the other hand, this notion has also had a strong subtext of normalization and discipline problematizing cultural practices of the working class through ideas of individual freedom, empowerment, and self-realization (Villadsen, 2005). The way this ambiguity between collective and individualistic approaches to inclusion is balanced becomes pivotal in understanding responses to and potential consequences of neoliberal trends. Neoliberalism emphasizes the rationality and responsibility of the individual, rather than collective rationality and responsibility for solving social problems including problems of inclusion (Hagen, 2006). The question is, how does a Social democratic welfare state respond to this and what may be the consequences? One way to address this question is to explore how welfare rationales are unfolded in social work interventions in and around the homes of families. It is well known that interventions in and around the homes of families are bearer of ideological constructions pertaining to ideas of social order as well as the distribution of responsibilities between the state, the market, and the family in particular the parents (Donzelot, 1979; Nissen, 2017b). Furthermore, interventions in the home can be considered a

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classical technology of social work (Ferguson, 2009). Therefore, by exploring how social work in and around the home is unfolded we might discover how broader ambiguities and trends concerning collective and individualistic approaches to inclusion is approached and enacted in social work practice, and what potential consequences this may have. Our chapter is based on data and analyses from a historical document study including political and professional documents such as the journal The Social Worker as well as data and analysis from a multi-sited ethnographic field study in social work with vulnerable families and local community work in Denmark respectively. In this chapter, we focus on the practices involved when social work “work the home” (Ferguson, 2018).1 More specifically our exploration is three folded. First, we lay out how interventions in the home historically have been related to social work with vulnerable families and local community work creating home as a site for promoting inclusion. From the 1930s and up until the shaping of the welfare state in the 1960s, promoting inclusion shifted from focusing on practical and material guidance in everyday practices around the home using the daily chores of the mother as an entrance point, to focusing increasingly on the social and affective relations between individual members of the family as well as between the family and the local environment. We argue here in line with the recent affective turn, emphasizing how the enactment of government rationalities and forms of citizenship are dependent on particular forms of intervention in the affective relations between individuals and between individuals and the state (Di Gregorio and Merolli, 2016; Fortier, 2016). Secondly, and with this historical back cloth, we will explore contemporary differences and similarities between social work with vulnerable families and local community as forms of interventions that “work the home”. Although adhering to different forms of authority and legal mandates, in combination they make it possible for social workers to work the home in multiple ways seeking to promote individual change and inclusion by facilitating mobility, participation and the utilization of social relations. Thirdly, we analyze how interventions in and around the home relate to processes of normalizing with a strong focus on risk and individual responsibilization. In the concluding discussion we will discuss if, and if so how, this can be 1 The chapter draws on material from an on-going research project, “Views on human beings – welfare policies, technologies and knowledge of humans in social work”, www.menneskesyn .aau.dk, When bringing data from social work with families and local community work in dialogue with each other we create a dialogue between two different however historically intertwined traditions in social work, enabling us to understand how home has been and is a key site for intervention and for creating inclusion not the least because families with social problems often are concentrated in the most deprived and vulnerable neighbourhoods.

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viewed as a response to neoliberal trends. However, before entering this exploration, we will briefly reflect on how social work interventions in and around home can be perceived in a Danish context. 2

Exploring Social Work in and around the Home in a Danish Context

When exploring home as a site of social work intervention aiming at promoting inclusion it is important to consider how we perceive home, and how ideas about the home is related to promoting inclusion. Home is connected to forms of identification and place attachment as well as ideological constructions of home such as ideas of the perfect home, gender divisions of labor, and so on (Jupp, 2017; Mallett, 2004). Cuba and Hummon argue in their classic article that place identity is an important dimension of our identity, and that it involves affiliation with some places and the dis-identification with other places. Moreover, that feeling at home can stretch across several loci from the dwelling to the neighborhood to the region (Cuba and Hummon, 1993), and that identification varies across the life cycle. Phenomenologically, feeling at home can be understood as connected more to the path than the place (Ingold, 2008) and with what Buttimer have termed the centering between home and reaching out (Buttimer, 1980; Fallov, Jørgensen, and Knudsen, 2013). Looking at home as a site of intervention we take into account historically variations and complex relations to home, which involves everyday routines and mobility in and around the home. Moreover, we see constructions of home as shaped by the meeting between habitat and habitus, and interventions in the home as bearer of cultural constructions with implications for relations of class and social differentiations (Bourdieu, 2005). This also means that home is not a uniform site but shaped by broader and prevailing discourses and understandings in a specific context. Thus, promoting inclusion through the home can also be viewed as a distribution of collective responsibilities regarding possibilities for inclusion and risks of exclusion in society (cf., Luhmann, 2012). Historically and in the shaping of the Danish Social democratic welfare state, housing and a home of a certain material standard was viewed as a public good to defend based on ideas of equality and the right to live under good conditions independently of market interests and economic differences pertaining to class: It is of upmost importance for the individual as well as for society, that good conditions are created for the life of the family. The speedy development in the Modern society involves for many a feeling of insecurity and powerlessness. This increases the demands to family and home. Society has an obligation to promote the building of residencies that combines

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quality with spaciousness and the lowest possible resources. We must get rid of financial speculation in residences… the human right that a good residence is must not be compromised by private business interests. ­Everybody has the right to their own residence no matter family situation and age. Difficult economic conditions should not prevent that the family comes to dwell under healthy and good conditions. The political program of the Social Democrats 19612

However, and as the quote indicates, seeing housing and the home as a public good was also related to the ideal of having the right to one’s “own residence”. Parallel to ideas of de-commodification, approaches to housing was also embedded in normative ideas about the good home; a private, spacious, good, healthy, and safe place for the dwelling of the working class. It is therefore not surprising how today’s Danish housing field is Janus faced in that it is built around the duality of housing as a public good and the political underpinning of the privately own house (Andersen, Hovgaard, and Jensen, 2000; Pløger, 2000). This duality has resulted in a large publicly funded social housing sector and a politically regulated private rented housing marked as well as beneficial tax conditions for privately owned houses. However, the discourse of ensuring housing for even more vulnerable groups has been a continuous theme in the Danish welfare debate. It reveals the duality or ambiguity of modern welfare, as Bourdieu has termed the left hand in the shape of social workers, local community workers and other welfare professionals attempt to mediate on the consequences of the right hand ensuring the rights of the market (Bourdieu, 1999). Interventions in the home can on the one hand be seen as a welfare response to political and economic forces segregating housing markets and creating situations of precariousness for vulnerable families. On the other hand, professional intervention that “work the home” may also be used to extend the scope of this left hand, making local communities and families even more responsible for individual inclusion by extending professional control in the most private spheres of families (Winter and Cree, 2016), consequently holding the market “sacred” (Mudge, 2008). This duality, and thus openness with regard to how collective and individualistic approaches are balanced, is mirrored in the present-day plans for local community work, as the below example illustrate: The main aim of the neighbourhood regeneration plan is that [name of the area] becomes a safe and well-functioning and attractive residential 2 All citations are translated from Danish to English by the authors.

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area, where residents thrive individually and collectively with good conditions for community and the good home… Field K, neighbourhood regeneration plan 2016

With such a reference to both private and collective spheres, both individual and collective conditions and responsibilities, it is worth exploring shifting approaches to inclusion. We will begin by looking back at how home early ­became a site for intervention and promoting inclusion. 3

Making Home a Site for Intervention: From Overcoming Poverty to a Focus on Affective and Social Relations

The earliest narratives of social workers working the home are concerned with home visits by Mothers’ Relief. Mothers’ Relief was institutionalized across all major cities in Denmark in the end of the 1930es and was closely tied to the establishment of a social work educational program in Copenhagen. The purpose was to provide counseling and help to pregnant women seeking to reduce the number of illegal abortions, encouraging motherhood and preparing for the role as mother. Help was provided at the Mothers’ relief’s offices, but also outside (travelling social workers), and often included home visits in various phases. Already from these early accounts, we see that the home visit has a dual function of providing practical counseling and help to families as well as supplying the social worker with information of the conditions and ways of living in the families. Home visits were meticulously planned before hand and thus a strategic practice. The social worker was keeping a journal of their home visit with pre-set categories and already here it was noted how filling in such forms demanded that the social worker needed to provide her own personal judgment in order to give a full account of the conditions that the family was living under (Journal of Social Worker 1939, (Socialrådgiveren, 1939, December 5th)). As part of the burgeoning professionalization of the social worker in the same period, social workers discussed among themselves how that the home visits had to be a professional practice and delimited from the practices of the philanthropic organizations. They supported this through systematic accounts of and statistics on their practices, as well as statistical information on the inhabitants, which in some instances were passed on to doctors working to improve health and premature deaths of children in deprived neighborhoods (Nissen, 2017). The development of such statistical methods and technologies were likewise an international trend in early social work (Seltzer and Haldar, 2015; Villadsen and Turner, 2016). Below in Figure 8.1 is an example of the statistics made by a social worker of the time.

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Figure 8.1 Example of Statistics Made on the Basis of Home Visits, 1940. source: skovgaard-petersen, socialrådgiveren, nr. 10 1940, 3

The same social worker relays how the use of home visits became a wide spread technology in the local child welfare authorities. She explains how home visits involves practices that extend beyond the home to gather information from in particular other professionals working in the same area whereas using information from neighbors was regarded potentially indiscrete: One visit is too delicate grounds for a recommendation, and therefore the collection of information from neighbors, police, doctor, and other institutions is necessary. I have only made use of information from neighbors to a limited extend, since applicants ask for discretion…. Som Socialhjælper paa et Socialkontor” [as social assistant on a social office] af Kirsten Skovgaard-Petersen, Socialrådgiveren, 1940, 3

More specifically, it was the mother and housewife who became the entrance point for home visits (and to a large extend this is true today as well, as we will see from below). In some cases, a home consultant was granted (Skalts and Nørgaard, 1982: 59). The home consultants narrate how they on their visits not only council in relation to hygiene, airing out, using less soap, keeping a budget, but also help out with daily material practices: …but I had to get into the home, when it was difficult for the housewife dealing with household budgets I had the opportunity to offer my help.

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At the first visit, I got information on the family size, income, expenses, health and so on. Only few places I encountered a hostile response, and in these instances, it was usually the husband who did not want interference. In most cases, I was able to convince them that it was not a case of interference or control, but guidance…since then, I have visited the house wives approximately every week and guided them in household matters and problems: cleaning, laundry, cheap and right cooking, children’s nourishment, conserving, shopping and so on. In some instances, where the house wife was not practiced in shopping I have been shopping with her, for example, in relation to buying a big piece of meat, and then in her kitchen guided her in relation to making the most out of this piece…. mathiesen, socialrådgiveren, 1941: 10

The home consultant provided intensive one to one guidance over a period and working in the home was concerned with the material conditions for living healthy despite poverty urging the housewife to use money in a rational way compensating for and overcoming poverty. In doing this it was noticed, how willing the housewife was in receiving help, how well they adhered to the guidance and their reactions to home consultant’s teachings (Mathiesen, in Socialrådgiveren, 1941: 10). Similarly, a social worker relayed in relation to how the Jane Addams House’s practices involved supporting community life that “the genius factor in the work is not the existence of the program as such, but the way she has accomplished to relay the work to the residents themselves; they come with suggestions, and it is them that the realization of the program depends on…” (Skovgaard-Petersen, Socialrådgiveren, 1939: 3–4, emphasis in original). These early accounts illustrate how home visits were not simply a question of amelioration of bad housing conditions, and desperation in families, but were also used to prepare families to take charge of their situation and improve the living conditions of the neighborhood. Social workers supplemented then home visits with courses in household economy, nourishment, how to raise children, and so on. Thus, intertwined in the practices of working not only in but also around the home were also disciplining and normalizing practices seeking to enable the residents to help themselves (Fallov, 2013; Winter and Cree, 2016). Thus, parallel to the practices of the Mothers Relief, the Settlement movement established local counseling offices in inner Copenhagen offering activities for children and youth, and counseling for mothers and families. Whereas, the early social workers tried to distance themselves from philanthropy and what they viewed as non-professional practice, the house visits performed by the Settlement volunteers had a more explicit normative goal of upholding the family, as shown below:

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…the most effort is placed in the cases relating to marital issues, especially when it concerns families with smaller children. When a client c­ ontacts us in relation to marital difficulties, often with a strong wish for an immediate separation, the office always contacts the spouse in order to start cooperation, and if needs be collaborating with the priest or doctor… as an important element of the case a number of house visits are performed. It is often the case that separation can be avoided, if only the case is initiated before contact to the official authorities…. Account from the practices of the Settlement, Socialrådgiveren, 1954: 66

The home visits of the Settlement movement intervened then in the affective relations established in the homes, not only between spouses, but likewise, between parents and children, and between neighbors. They intervened to prevent loneliness and despair, which was viewed as tied to the rise of the modern city, and isolation in individual homes, and thus addressed new forms of social and affective poverty”, which was also reflected in an increased focus on family counseling. Consequently, home was used as a site for promoting new forms of inclusion and preventing risks of exclusion. In the first fifty years, the practices of the Settlement movement followed an explicit Christian sentiment about the values of families, the dangers of alcohol and substance abuse, and so on. But later in the 1960es and 1970es, Christian values became more of a backcloth as the Settlement, together with other experiments in relation to local community development, became more explicitly involved in political agitation for ensuring the right to the good home and the betterment of living conditions in deprived neighborhoods. This involved both political advocacy in relation to slum clearance and empowerment practices involved in a burgeoning development of professional concepts of local community work in a Danish context. Here an example of the early conceptualization of community development methods: …you send a social worker in to a neighborhood and through this person try to break with the apathy of the people living in this area, attempting to get them involved and engaged in their life and the situation of their local environment. The result can be – and I am not saying that it will be – that the social worker assists in describing and overview the problems, in order for apathy to be transferred into confidence in the tasks involved in getting something out of one’s existence”. dam, socialrådgiveren, 1964: 167

The methods initiated here then work through intervening in the affective relations between residents and their neighborhood facilitating active

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e­ ngagement and at the same time pathologizing “apathy” as a type of affect that is considered illegitimate (de Wilde and Duyvendak, 2016; Fortier, 2010) Local community work is in these debates conceptualized as the “midwife” for helping people to change their life around, and the social worker has to juggle going from door to door activating individuals and setting activities in motion that lift the neighborhood as such – often by motivating people to get involved and thus included in the immediate environment around their home, thereby ­extending relations and affective practices to the neighborhood. In both local community work and social work with families there is, thus, a turn to the environment and an ecological understanding of the relation ­between the individual and social problems. In local community work, professional concepts were developed and in social work with families, family counseling centers in vulnerable areas doing outreach work and home visits were established (Kühl and Ottesen, Socialrådgiveren, 1961: 7). Data from these were sent to the Danish Social Research Institute forming the basis of an institutionalized understanding of “problem families”, mainly defined by unemployment and children with behavioral and/or schooling problems, and what inflicted on their prognoses. The above has shown that the history of local community work and social work with families are intertwined. In both forms of social work, the initial phase was focused on practical and material guidance in the everyday practices around the home using the daily chores of the mother as their entrance point to engaging with and seeking ways of overcoming social problems of the families mainly poverty. In the later phases, attention moved to the relation between the families and their local environment, and to counseling the affective relations of the family rather than the material and practical daily chores. Together this shows a shift in approaches to promoting inclusion which seems to go beyond more recent neoliberal trends; a shift which became initiated and made possible almost simultaneously with making the home a site for social work intervention on the relations between the family and the local milieu. 4

Multiple Ways of Working the Home: In Depth and Complex Interventions

In the above, we have established how interventions in and around the home has been a central point in the development of both social work with families and local community work through time, and how their practices at some points have been more or less intertwined. In this section, we will draw out ­contemporary differences in the way the two forms of social work approach intervention in the home. Today, they have very different organizational

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a­ ttachments and thus different levels of authority in their access to people’s homes. Despite these differences, in both forms of social work, access to the home is instrumentalized as way to gain different forms of knowledge about families at risk and survey neighborhoods. In local community work, the professionals have no authority and no legal mandate to invite themselves into people’s homes. There is a strong discourse among the local community work professionals about having respect for people’s private sphere and that they have to be conscious of working in and around people’s homes. …We are not spies running around keeping an eye on things… you have to be humble about the fact that it is their home, but then again, I get a lot of input and information out of it. Some of it you can use, others not. Local community worker, Field K

Keeping a distance to people’s private sphere fits with the prevailing discourse that emphasizes how residents should get to know, through leaflets and letters, what activities are on offer and then approach themselves. But in some cases, this more distant approach, refusing to go from door to door, results in the presence of activities that no one attends. Another local community worker expresses how that the role of not being an authority figure gives the local community worker another set of tools to work with people’s voluntary engagement in their local environment. …you can say that we do not have any authority, and in that sense, we are not dangerous. We are there on their terms. I can only do what they allow me to do…this whole setting of our visiting them makes a difference. We do not have any authority and we can work with the local environment and build bridges to the surroundings…That we can work with networks, the local, and work with people’s resources in relation to the voluntary part is a fantastic tool. It is about finding out that “I can contribute with something in relation to my neighbors”. Local community worker, Field S

Entry to the homes plays a key role gathering information about the residents and local community workers use both an informal tactic and a more explicit strategy in this regard. They gather information and input when they move more informally around helping the residents with everyday matters, at the same time as they more consciously aim to go from door to door gathering information about, for example, families with children. As the above cited ­local community worker explains it, gathering information about the 120

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f­amilies that they did not know anything about was as much about creating contact with them as gaining knowledge of their needs. Not everyone wants to ­participate – “you should be able to live here happily without knowing us”. Mapping the neighborhood and surveying the residents comes not only from interviewing people, but also from gaining entry to people’s homes through other professionals. In one of our case areas, local community workers walked around with the craftsmen that were surveying people’s homes before they were renovated. They fill in a form with notes. The local community worker doing the registering explains in an interview: …it is about getting out there to see what there is. In that way, you will be able to spot things that you would not normally spot, but it is a balance, since you cannot interfere in people’s lives. But some people are not very good at asking for help… I: what do you see when you are out doing this pre-registration? IP: I cannot help but notice how people live, if there is very dirty for instance. Not that I have noticed any alarming instances of that yet. If there are children, I would react instantly. Especially, if they live incredibly amount of people in one home…they live many people in very little room, but that is the conditions that they face…. Local community worker, Field T

Getting access alongside craftsmen renovating, or health professionals offering services, local community workers gain knowledge about who lives in their area and the types of social problems they face such as overcrowding or the lack of facilities or resources to maintain their homes. Doing these types of surveys, they cross into the liminal space of their legal mandate but defend this by claiming that in this way they get access to people who would not have joined any of the voluntary activities that the community workers facilitate on their own accord. This is a well-known dilemma of local community work that it is the strongest parts of the resident population that participate and become visible for the professionals (Fallov, 2013). In another area, a local community worker working especially with refugees in the neighborhood explains how visiting the home opens an affective space that widens the horizon of help that she can provide for these families: You do not need to be in people’s homes for very long before you get to know who they are…this is also because I work with refugees… It is nice to get into the homes of refugees to see if they have the energy to furnish their home and so on…They can be embarrassed about not having many things in their home, that they do not speak the language or that the

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children behave differently, or they eat another type of food, or a great number of other things. There are a lot of stuff that fills their heads, so to speak. When I come into their home, then there is an acceptance of that this is fine; I can take of my shoes, tea with a lot of sugar is lovely. Then are you visiting me [at the community center] then you get to build these forms of bridges. You get to open some doors that would not otherwise have been opened and shown things that you would not otherwise have been shown…Then I can approach them if they come to the counselling sessions, or one thing or the other. Then they start to see the possibilities outside their door. Local community worker, Field H

Accessing the homes of refugees, which in Denmark now must survive on a very reduced benefit rate called the integration benefit, enables the local community worker not only to gain knowledge of the problems that each family might face, but also to negotiate cultural barriers. The home works here as a mediating site establishing immediate acceptance and relations, which otherwise would have taken the local community worker a lot of work to achieve. Therefore, the home is a tool in and of itself, as it becomes the immediate marker of who you are. Making yourself comfortable drinking tea in the home then brakes down a lot of unspoken barriers (Mallett, 2004; Winther, 2006). Moreover, accessing the home enables the local community worker to establish relations that opens other possibilities for helping the families such as counseling, giving away food, participating in network building activities. The home becomes the site of drawing the families out of their home – out from their insulation built by feeling ashamed of not living up to what is conceived as the "normal standards" of society. Similar ways of using the home visit as a way of opening the affective space is also found in social work with vulnerable families. However, the purpose of doing this is not first and foremost to draw the family out of their home. Rather it is to explore whether the home, the family relations, and the atmosphere support the welfare of the child or not. In case of worries, the social workers explore if the families are enmeshed in networks that out of care may provide a basic safety net for the child or various forms of practical and emotional relief, or if professional assistance is required. In exploring this, home visits are used strategically to map the network of the families. The below excerpt from observation notes from a home visit show how the social worker build a relation to the mother and her child by making the mother speak more freely about her network: The social worker is visiting the home of a mother of 6 children [of which only four lives at home]. The purpose of the meeting is to explore the

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family network to see if some relief regarding one of the younger children can be provided. The school has reported that the child is regularly absent from school. The family lives in a 3½ room apartment in a block of flats in a social housing area. The social worker rings the bell, and the child opens the door and invites us in. While taking off our coats and shoes, the child tells that it is her birthday and that she has a pet, she would like to show us. The mother welcomes us and invites us into the living room which is light and nicely decorated. The child joins us, carrying her pet, leading to some small talk about the pet and some new furniture in the living room. The mother invites us to the dinner table set with coffee, water, and cake. After a bit of talk we sit down. The child joins us. The social worker initiates the conversation by putting two papers on the table: One big piece of paper with a drawing of circles and lines illustrating the family network and another smaller piece of paper with a drawing resembling a spider web. The social worker talks a bit with the child about the big piece of paper and there is some conversation about changes in the family network. At some point the social workers says: “This is how your family looks”. Then she tells, that this time it is about finding the people “you are close to”; those you “talk to about your children, your life, if something is troubling, someone you are confident with”. The child leaves the table. The main part of the meeting is concerned with this issue: The social worker mentions all people from the big piece of paper one by one, and asks for example: “How is the relation?”, “What do you do, when you are together?”, “How does it feel and work out?”, “How are they good to you?”. During this process, the mother tells in detail about her family and her network, often going back and forward in time indicating how the relation has developed, dwelling on certain people and incidents in her life. At one point, she gets emotionally touched and sheds a tear. The social worker alternately places the persons in the spider web, indicating how close they are to the family in the center, and makes notes on a paper. Most of the time, the child is not around but now and then she interrupts the conversation asking a few questions. Observations notes from a home visit

In the above example, the social worker “works” her way into the home (Ferguson, 2018), by engaging in the child’s pet and small talk, before settling down for coffee and the meeting commences. This establishes an informal atmosphere reflected in the way the child spontaneously joins the conversation. The social worker arrives prepared having made a network chart of the family based on earlier meetings with the mother. The materials of the charts and papers

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a­ llow the social worker to direct the conversation, but in an informal manner among coffee cups and settees. The setting creates a particular atmosphere (Ferguson, 2018), which is sustaining the relations between the social worker and the mother and is conducive to the mother’s narration of what each of her network relations do for her and for her family. By visiting the home, the social worker gains not only a narrative but also a socio-material experience of the atmosphere of the home; knowledge of the relation between the child and the mother, confirms suspicions of that the child is allowed to be truant from school, and thus also how the family manage in relation to the immediate environment of the child. The home visit enables an informal conversation between the mother and the social worker, which would quite possibly have played out differently in the material settings of the offices of the family services. This informality does not eliminate the formal dimensions of the home visit as a way of getting a sense of and knowledge about the home and the basic safety of the child. Thus, in cases, where there is a worry for the child, where home visits cannot be conducted informally, and where the family is reluctant or unable to share their inner world, the home visit are made with force. In those cases, the home, the socio-material atmosphere, the affective relations, and how the family manages the environment are mapped out with a clear reference to the legal grounds for the most intrusive intervention in the family possible that is placement of the child outside home: A special team of social workers discuss the recent developments in a case. Last week some of them visited a mother with 3 children in their home. The mother is originally from a country in Africa. 3 years ago, the family case was closed. At that time, the mother seemed “happy and sparkling”, and for a period the family went back to their ‘home country’. However, some months ago alarming reports came in, and as a part of the case worker’s investigation, the family was assigned to in home family treatment three times a week resulting in a report indicating many challenges, both in the family but also regarding the behavior and wellbeing of the children. The report gave some grounds for a placement outside home but was also ambiguous. Therefore, the case worker offered the mother to corporate with this special team of social workers focusing on ensuring the safety of the children. The home visit last week was the second effort to initiate such a corporation. During the visit, the social workers felt that it was difficult to know if the mother understood what it was all about. The mother was carrying a big jacket, was wearing a cap back to front, a big garb, and several bags. Compared to some years ago, she seemed completely different. When asked about her feelings about

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all this, she reacted only by saying “Wrrruu! (Observation notes from a conference meeting). While local community work utilizes the home visit to draw families out of their homes to join activities in the neighborhood, social work with families use the home visit to observe the immediate milieu of the child and to establish relations of trust that make families reveal more of their private relations and their inner worlds, worries and strengths, or in the last instance safeguard the safety of the children. The two forms of social work utilize home visits, in this way, in their different strategies to create welfare responses to the precarious positions of particular families. Home visits become a technology to govern families’ affective relations, either by aligning them with what is conceived to a normal life in the family home promoting the child’s inclusion, or with ideas of participation, mobility, and inclusion in relation to activities around the neighborhood. Despite these differences a common effort in both local community work and social work is to make individuals utilize all social networks available. 5

Preventing Risks: Responsibilization through Participation

In this third part of the chapter, it is shown how interventions in the home is used to connect citizens and families with local milieus and thus to enmesh individuals in social networks and relations of care in order to make their daily lives better. We show that interventions in the home, although driven in both local community work and social work with vulnerable families by a wish to help families in need, are formed by the aim of normalizing the families in relation to the discourse of the good life (Foucault, 2007a; Foucault, 2000; Winter and Cree, 2016). It becomes clear that these interventions also connect the site of the home to professional networks. Thus, the home as a local pocket of order is enmeshed in extended professional care in the local milieus, for example, the school, the day care institution, the health visitor and so on. We have illustrated above how local community workers often use other local professionals in order to get access to the homes. In some instances, this takes the form of partnerships in which the school and the local community work professionals make a common project to help families deemed in need of more individual guidance in relation to parenthood and competencies needed in order to support children in their schooling. In one of our case areas, the local schools have regular meetings in which they identify families at risk, or which they are concerned about in relation to truancy and lack of parent engagement

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in the children’s schooling. Lists of these families are then relayed to the local community professional who make home visits to the families: I see that I have more time for dialogue and less of an authoritarian approach. I think that I have more opportunity to listen to the needs of the families and support them, since I do not have to live up to the demands that the school must meet. …I can paint with a larger paint brush, so to speak. I can invite the families in relation to the projects that we have running. I can see how I can intervene in the problems families face related to their children’s well-being, academic development, truancy and so on by for example helping them to structure their free time better, which can have a positive effect on the child. Or if you can help the parents with different offers than they have been used to and through this articulate the needs of the child. This could, for example be by including them in the Mindspringoffer [parent network] as a way to be included in a network of likeminded parents. Through such interventions they could achieve a better way to navigate their interaction with the school and the local authority…” Local community worker, Field H

Home visits are used here to support families that are viewed in need of developing parenting competencies in relation to what is expected in a normal Danish family. In this way, home visits become a central site in what Dean terms culture governance (Dean, 2003), in which cultural norms and competencies that are deemed necessary for inclusion is transmitted to the individual family. In many instances, then, it is the culture of the families that are addressed rather than their social problems related for example to lack of economic resources or access to the labor market. Albeit this is not always so, and it would be too simple to characterize the effort of the local community workers as being simply about culture governance with no attention to the economic deprivation of some of the families living in the vulnerable neighborhoods. In some instances, they train the families to be able to engage more strategically with the authorities, for example, by helping them with applying for payment exemption, or reduced rates on school fares, day care payments etc. In another of our case areas, a local community worker narrates how she through a health visitor got in contact with a refugee family who had just received their residence permits. …We got to talk with her about nutrition…because her husband he was into eating white bread and so on, and then we thought that he can eat the white bread and then you [the housewife] and the children should eat differently. Then the women in the neighbourhood started to collect

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for her…she put one of these trolleys out in the front and then every Friday it was full of meat and bread and so on…and then it looked like she had done the shopping. It is about pride, because there was so much on their home front, and the relation she had to her husband to which she did not feel like they were living really like husband and wife…then we got this Turkish family which had these resources and a child in the same age group to become mentor for them, and they did these house visits… Local community worker, Field G

Later, she narrates how they taught her what to buy for birthday parties, what to serve for class mates that came visiting, and how to involve the network in assisting with picking up children when she was doing her night shifts. It is remarkable how similar this narrative is to the home consultant’s narration of home visits from the 1940s, outlined above, in that it becomes the house wife that is the entry point to the family life at home, and that the practices involve teaching them how to navigate shopping and so on in situations with very few means. Moreover, there are many similarities between the local community worker’s intervention in the affective relations of the family and that of the social worker working with children at risk in that these inward-looking practices are coupled with efforts to establish relations to a broader network improving everyday coping and social mobility for the sake of the child. This is work where the relation between the family and the environment is at play, in particular the child’s school, everyday life and leisure activities, and where affective relations are continuously an object of observation and negotiation. The example is from a network meeting with the school, where the reasons for the child’s absence from school are discussed: The professionals from the school recognize that the child has difficulties being in a teaching situation with many children. She often sits alone behind a screen wearing ear muffs. However, they also argue that something is wrong in the family’s way of thinking about schooling. The vice principal notes the child has been absent 20 percent since the first day of school. The class teacher notes, that the child’s things are always in a mess the schoolbag filled with all sorts of odds and ends. Another teacher relays how the child says, “I can’t sit here alone, I can’t be together with the others”, but suggests that she has learned to say so at home. Another teacher tells that even though the child doesn’t think she has any friends, she has been capable of pointing out quite a few with whom she “could picture herself with”, but when she is absent it is difficult. The school nurse notes that the child doesn’t seem to get breakfast, has gained too much weight, and is focused on things that hurt. “Is this a quest for

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a­ ttention?” she asks. The pedagogue notes that the child sometimes withdraws from playing, as if she “worries about what is going on at home”. After the break, the social worker chairing the meeting encourages the participants to make suggestions for how to increase the well-being of the child. She “pictures a girl who seeks contact, has difficulties being together with many people, but has many competences”. However, the school representatives argue that what “happens in the family” and the “backing from home” is decisive. At this point the mother objects by saying that it is not easy to force children to eat breakfast. As a response, a school social worker suggests that the mother learn about adhd pedagogy. The Social worker chairing the meeting asks the father, if he can take the child to school a couple of time every week. Since the father lives outside the city and doesn’t have a car, this requires taking a public bus. However, he agrees to do so. Observation notes from network meeting

Narratives of different professionals of the child’s affective relations to others and to schooling are relayed here all suggesting that the home setting is important for achieving the appropriate form of engagement in the social environment in school, and that the responsibilization of the mother and eventually also the father will perhaps improve the development of the child’s welfare and relation to schooling and as such prevent risk of exclusion. Training the family in and around the home is not only about parenting competencies but can be about mundane everyday mobility around the neighborhood. As the local community worker explains in this example: …otherwise I am just caring, for example, there can be women who never get out of the door, and then I do these exercises. These women would for example not leave [name of local area] and then I say to them how would you feel if I stood at the corner of [name of adjacent area] and greeted you. In this way, I train them in competencies [of mobility]. For example, I make two maps for them over the two neighbourhoods and then say to them that if you want to engage with me in this project you need to figure these two maps out. Today you go there on the map and put the two maps on the fridge. It is banal in a way, but… Local community worker, Field G

The local community worker intervenes in the women’s practices in and around their home by suggested mundane practices that will improve their mobility and draw them out of their homes. From a Foucauldian perspective (Foucault, 1977; Foucault, 2007b), this is an example of the relation between

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disciplining power and practices of security. It is relations of disciplining power in the sense of drilling corporeal practices of mobility into these women with the goal of making these women less isolated in their homes, and practices of security ensuring that these women engage in the circularity of urban living engaging in the urban economy and minimizing risk of what is conceived to be dangerous parallel societies. However, this interpretation cannot stand alone, since practices involved in the above examples are relations of care which intervene in the multiple daily problems that vulnerable families face living in deprived neighborhoods. Social workers’ practices can then also be seen as intervention in the experiences of precarity that these families face, and especially by engaging with the women negotiating the complex relations of class, gender, and ethnicity which in some instances become barriers for women. It might be useful to see these forms of practices in the domestic space not simply as normalization, but also as forms of support of everyday activism which by enmeshing the women in affective webs of care and teaching them coping competencies has the future potential of jumping scale (Jupp, 2017). Focusing on everyday coping is the first necessary step in a transformative politics, which not only make the troubles of vulnerable families in terms of providing food, safety, academic development and so on visible. These forms of practices facilitate the development of competencies necessary for social mobility and the development of the competencies needed for inclusion on other fields of society such as education, labor market and so on. 6

Concluding Discussion: Working the Home as a Response or Consequence of Neoliberal Trends?

Interventions in and around the home have been central to the practices of social work since its earliest days. We have by bringing together data from two different forms of social work; that is social work with families and local community work shown how home becomes a central site in both, sometimes in overlapping and parallel ways, sometimes in different ways. Home becomes a central site of both forms of social work to gather knowledge and information about families at risk and the conditions people live in in deprived neighborhoods. These forms of knowledge have been central to the professionalization of social work. Moreover, they indicate the complexities of the situations that social workers engage with in their daily practices. We have shown that the two forms of social work have different ways of accessing the homes and different legal mandate, which have led to different strategies in relation to the balance between voluntary and professional engagement with the homes. Crossing the

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boundaries of home and working in the liminal space between the private and the public space enable the social worker to make visible conditions and constraints people face in order to maintain a home in situations of precarity, but also the complexities that are involved in the relationships in and around the home. We suggest viewing interventions in and around the home as having at least three different dimensions; family, materiality, and environment (see Figure 8.2 below). Through its historical development in the forms of social work, interventions in the home has moved from primarily intervening in the daily material practices of the home and the family structure to intervening more from the other angle, that is, from the affective relations of the family and their ­relations to the local environment and extended networks. Home has always been approached as including several nested loci; the dwelling, the immediate surroundings and the neighborhood, but today focus is more intensively on the connections between the home as a pocket of local order and its emotional, relational, practical, and professional relations to the outside. Or what Buttimer terms the “reaching out”. In local community work, this takes the form of interventions to draw families out and especially isolated mothers into activities outside the home. While in social work with families at risk reaching out is a question of ensuring that families are enmeshed in networks which will assist in ensuring security and development in the practices going on in and around the home. We have shown in the above how interventions in and around the home become an element in the governance of families at risk by directing “the terms within which existence will and will not be possible” (Butler, 2002 in Fallov, 2010). Intervening in the home by teaching families what food that is Family Affective relations

Atmosphere

Home Environment

practice

Materiality

Figure 8.2 Dimensions of Home Interventions. Source: Developed by the authors for the present chapter.

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c­ onsidered to be more nutritious, what to serve at birthday parties or who should tidy up the children’s rooms are ways of normalizing families to what is considered to be good and healthy family life in and around the home. From a Foucauldian perspective, this can be viewed as relations between disciplinary power and practices of security, by training families in what is culturally conceived as normal family life, and by drawing the family out in to the activities in the surrounding areas and city. As such interventions in the home tends to displace the social problems of these families by engaging in culture governance and individual guidance and counselling with the goal of securing social cohesion and individual well-being rather than the elimination of precarious living conditions. It is worth noting in this regard, that social work in and around the home in a Danish context has been less radical or shaped by activism compared to social work in other European contexts. This is at least in part due to how poverty has been reduced (although certainly not eliminated) with the development of the social democratic welfare state and the role that housing as a public good has played in this. In some ways, this particular contextual feature has legitimized the professional intervention in the home to a greater extent than what is known in other contexts. Professionals can in the Danish context build on relations of trust, which enable them to extend professional care relations in to the far reaches of affective private relations at home. At the same time, such relations permit professionals to draw otherwise isolated families into professional webs of care offering responses to the harsh sites of workfare states in the neoliberal era. We want to argue that interventions in the home extends the scope and depth of welfare interventions by seeking to make individuals responsible for their own welfare not only in a material but also in an affective sense, and not only in but also around the home. In that sense, interventions in and around the home is a politics of responsibility (Newman, 2017) working on how the individual should “feel” responsible through intervening in the site of the home and its affective atmospheres. At the same time, interventions in the affective relations of the home is also a response of social work practitioners to contemporary condition as they cannot ameliorate poverty or change the structural causes of it. Instead they respond by mediating in the ­meaningfulness of e­ veryday experiences of precariousness through establishing bridging relations to institutionalized webs of care, and by intervening in the affective relations in the home, both in order to widen or open avenues of inclusion. The development of collective responses to social problems thus paradoxically and simultaneously opens for individualized interventions in and around the home, which to some extent blurs the amelioration of material and structural conditions. It is possible that neoliberalism contributes to a further blurring

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of material and structural conditions and that the way contemporary ways of working the home is a consequence of neoliberal trends. However, the opposite might also be possible. Interventions and efforts to promote inclusion by mobilizing the affective relations not only in but also around the home, but also in the social, professional, and institutional networks of precarious families can also be viewed as a way of searching for new collective counter responses to neoliberal trends. This is only half the story, though, as this response in the form of interventions in and around the home also should be viewed as part of a transformative politics in which social work make the complexity of everyday experience of social problems and precarity visible. Interventions in and around the home have the potential to engage with the complex relations between gender, ethnicity, and culture, which are not only important in relation to newly arrived parts of the population, but similarly in relation to families living in homes with what is conceived to be abnormal conditions. Interventions in and around the home might be a way to engage with contemporaneous issues relating to how class is played out at home.

Chapter 9

Potentiality, Development Ideals, and Realities of Social Work Pia Ringø 1 Introduction Today the problem is defined in social work as the inherent tendency to provide too much stability, habitual behavior, and inertia in the life worlds of vulnerable people. My argument is that the vision of potentialization is currently expressing itself through a series of concepts in social work. The vision of ­potentialization is in part (1) an organizational and management tool, a neoliberal management technological vision that is expressed in the political plans, in diagnostic tools, in referrals and that is implemented in social work with the citizens, and (2) a notion of what the citizen’s problem is, ontologically speaking, and how the problem and the condition can be altered. Potentialization is defined by others as the effort to continually transgress existing realities and perhaps even potential ones (Costea et al., 2012; Staunæs, 2011). With the effort to transgress existing realities, social workers and people with severe illnesses are expected to ignore the present problem through a focus on “the non-pathological” part: resources, empowerment, and the will to imagine “the future of the future” and “the desirable present of the present” (Andersen and Poors, 2016). The aspiration to abolish previous understandings of welfare as they have developed in Denmark over the past 40–50 years is central to this development. But what is the news in relation to social work? In this chapter, I approach this question by showing (1) how neoliberal ideas of potentionalization influences the perception as well as the concrete distribution of social problems and (2) how ideas of potentionalization influences the concrete practices of welfare services and welfare professionals in the encounter with citizens with in the fields of psychiatry and social work with people with disabilities. 2

Method/Case Description

The fields of psychiatry and social work with people with disabilities, are home to some of the most vulnerable and system dependent individuals in © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���9 | doi:10.1163/9789004384118_010

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society. They will often be fully or partially dependent on social efforts, assistance, and economic support in parts of or for the duration of their life. They are ill, many of them have chronic and progressive diseases with no chance of recovery, and for many a series of social problems have followed in the wake of the functional handicap as they lack the energy to nurture networks, participate in children’s pastimes, mind their homes, and secure a healthy relation to the family children and networks. Thus, whether functional handicaps are of a physical or a psychological nature, they affect whole families, children, and loved ones. The chapter presents examples from the administrative practice where the efforts to change the attitude to welfare with people with severe illnesses have unfolded as a new view of human beings according to which “Permanent states such as dementia, paralysis, progressive diseased, or aging are no obstacle for rehabilitative work” (Social worker, Psychiatry and Disabilities, 2016: 12). In continuation of this the chapter describes the thoughts of the social workers in the frontlines who embrace the new non-determinate focus on potentiality, and of those social workers who do not. It is based on a multi-sited ­qualitative study of social work in Denmark. Three different municipalities with a series of efforts in the fields of psychiatry and social work with people with disabilities were chosen around the country. Here, participant observation, focus group interviews, and both ethnographic and semi-structured interviews were conducted. All participants as well as the locations of the ­projects have been anonymized. For this book, all quotes have been translated into English. At the same time, this chapter also goes beyond the examples presented. Thus, the examples are chosen as representative examples in the sense that they say something more general about the field, the society, and the global development of which they are a part. The examples from the fields of psychiatry and social work with people with disabilities has therefore been supplemented with relevant examples from other areas of social work for example employment interventions for people with psychiatric diagnoses and in job-centers (Ringø, 2016; Hansen and Ingemann, 2016). 3

The Development of Neoliberal Knowledge about Social Problems

The year 2016 has been characterized by the need for a relatively new government in Denmark to develop new policies, implement new legislation, and set a new course for the development of the Danish welfare state. The past year has seen extensive reforms in the field of social work. The changes have been rather dramatic and the focus of much political debate, as well as having a significant impact on the professionals in the field and perhaps even more so

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on the citizens to whom the reforms apply. The Danish annual Social report (­Social årsrapport, 2016) states that the reforms themselves as well as the debates about them have been lacking in factual knowledge, research, and substantial professional evaluations of the impact the reforms will have on the people to whom they will apply and on social policies and our future welfare state in general (Social annual rapport, 2016). The Nordic welfare policy paradigm previously representing the welfare state as a collective safety structure is losing ground. In the 1990s just as scholars such as Esping-Andersen (1990) have indicated characteristics of the Nordic welfare states, the Nordic governments began to endorse new ideas about national competitiveness, and economic productivity. The new ideas seemed to comprise fundamental elements of past policies, such as universalism and redistribution, and at a more fundamental level these ideas seemed to comprise the ontological models and knowledge previously used to understand and explain social problems in modern societies (Kananen, 2014; Ringø, 2016). I have previously discussed how knowledge about humans, social problems, and societies change and have specifically assumed the shape of a minor social political interest in what I define as depth-ontological models (Ringø, 2012; Ringø et al., 2017). These are represented in scientific explanations of how external demands, inequality, dysfunctional families, school pressure, loneliness, poor living conditions, restrictions etc., are or can be, generative mechanisms that enable human suffering, distress, and social problems (Ringø, 2013). I have previously described this development as a movement from depths to surfaces in social work (Ringø 2012). The depth-ontological knowledge concerns itself with the underlying mechanisms that generate human suffering and social problems. Overweight, stress, abuse, hyper-activities are in this term symptoms of underlying complex generative mechanisms and not just simple individual diagnoses. Knowledge must therefore uncover those intransitive societal, social, psychological, biological mechanisms and the relations between them through integrative complex models. While uncovering those mechanisms it becomes clear that human suffering and social problems are more than individual problems. In continuation of this insight and knowledge, the initiatives in society and social work must at the same time point towards building up initiatives and knowledge that strengthen the collective understandings, solidarity, and initiatives (Lorenz, 1996). The depth-ontological models which focused on generative mechanisms that enable or produce the social problems and functional handicaps were closely connected to the fundamental idea that society’s welfare institutions must be designed in a way that took into account the social and societal causes of the problems, functional handicaps, and dissatisfaction

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of the individual. After wwii, the welfare state was developed as a p ­ reventative and compensational institution that repaired and picked up its citizens when they fell, compensated, and protected them. The interplay between the social, political, and scientific knowledge of human beings with functional problems (social, psychological, biological), has developed through history. From a monocausal biological model in the beginning of the 20th century, which explained human behavior and problems primarily through biological explanations, to more complex ontological models that viewed human beings as ­individuals in a society of social conditions after wwii (Ringø et al., 2017). The latter had a focus on the forces and mechanisms that influenced the social, material, and psychological quality of life eventually causing social p ­ roblems. Since the late 1970s, during the 1980s and the 1990s in Denmark, this complex ontological model was gradually excluded from political ideas of welfare. Decentralization, individualization, responsibilization, activation and the promotion of innovation within the public sector became new neoliberal strategies. This change signifies that political ideas of welfare have not in general (in fact only for a short period) been informed by complex ontological models offering psychological, social, societal, and biological explanations that aim to understand why people may develop social problems, become ill, disabled or ‘unproductive’ (Ringø, 2013). During the 1980s, welfare institutions were criticized for being a liability to Denmark’s competitiveness, and new reforms were implemented. Subsequently, a new societal structure with fewer individual rights and more individual obligations began to develop. As a consequence of this, several r­esearchers have pointed out how structural unemployment transforms into a question of the ability and willingness of the individual to go the extra mile, move, develop, and find a job (Beck, 1992; Petersen, 2016). The Danish job activation reform of the labor market in the early 1990s was a symbol of a development towards seeing work not only as a right, but as an obligation. This development continues to this day. It has become increasingly difficult for citizens who are vulnerable, ill, and unfit to work to be granted the right to unemployment benefits, sickness benefits, cash benefits, or early retirement benefits (Kaspersen and Nørgaard, 2015). Social policies and social work have historically concerned themselves with questions of equality and equal conditions for participation in society and inclusion. Since the beginning of the welfare state, it has been the ambition for society to take care of its weakest citizens, ensure equal opportunities, and create an extensive safety net – a system of security. Since the early 1980s, not only in Denmark, but also in other liberal democracies, the creation of a lower

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class of ‘system dependent’ citizens have been challenged through a criticism of the dependence on social benefits and the retention in what has later been ­described as passivizing client roles and concepts of disabilities that saw people with disabilities as invalids of no value to society. The criticism of the welfare state came from the right wing and left wing alike. In the 1970s, dependence and passivity was seen as a key problem that was a direct result of the so-called welfare mentality and the passivizing way of distributing benefits and services (e.g., oecd, 1988). It became essential for social work to avoid system dependence and to tune into any, and all ways of making citizens more self-reliant. Among the most important instruments available to the state in the development of an active welfare state is an economically and moral-­psychologically driven agenda that emphasizes the individual’s responsibility for participating in the solution of collective challenges – quid pro quo (The Danish government / Regeringen, 2014). A series of concepts characterize this development: recovery, empowerment, mastery, flow-circles, rehabilitation, resourcefulness, independence, influence, and self-reliance. The concepts share a basis in the idea of empowering the marginalized, the sick, the weak, the poor. The concepts have had an extreme positive resonance among politicians, decision makers and social workers in recent years and have spread from political thinking and programs of action to psychiatric plans and plans involving disabilities and on to the practice. The idea is that the sick, the marginalized, people with disabilities can be empowered and that through active participations in the changes of their conditions they can be actively included in society. Victimization has been replaced by expectations of participation, equality, and responsibility. The idea draws from the participatory aspects of the democratic tradition, but in practice entails the danger of an individualistic downside as a result of a lack of depth-ontological understanding of the dialectics between individual and society (Ringø, 2016). 4

Keeping the Future Open

Neoliberalism and neoliberal forms of governance seem to penetrate the Nordic welfare states. This is visible as a general orientation towards reforming the public sector and welfare services with a reference to the needs of a continued focus on adaptability, change and innovation. Potentialization is described by Andersen and Pors (2016) as the creation of possibilities for renewal beyond our present conceptions. The goal is to create organizations as well as

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humans capable of adapting to something we do not yet imagine as possible, ­something less expensive and more efficient (Andersen and Poors, 2016; Costea et al., 2012; Staunæs, 2011). Andersen and Pors (2016) suggest that a consequence might be that welfare organizations no longer perceive the uncertainty of the future simply as a risk that needs to be contained or removed, but as a resource for keeping possibilities open in processes of decision-making. The neoliberal forms of governance points towards that if we are to mobilize all of society’s potential resources, welfare institutions (social work) must become more adaptable, more user friendly, more market oriented, and more responsibilizing. The institutions must deliver quality in social work, and they must do so efficiently (The Danish commission of productivity / Produktivitets kommissionen). Today, in what we define as the neo liberal era the life project of the individual has been set free and individualized in new ways, and the observation and explanations of the threats to the productivity of the individual (defects, illness, suffering, and distress) initially takes the shape of symptom descriptions and classifications in the present. In the broad field study with focus at views of human beings in social work, it became clear that the development has continued to find future solutions through development goals that constantly transcend ‘the present’ through motivated ideas of ‘being able to’ and ‘being willing to’ repair, or through learning, change the individual dysfunctional and unproductive functional problems (Ethnographic fieldnotes, Psychiatric institution). The current development of the potential individual makes it possible to establish new functional categories that transcend previous diagnostic target group demarcations for example through new ‘learning groups’ and ‘recovery schools’ consisting of a mix of users with different diagnoses. This also changes the demand for knowledge in social work from specialized to more generalized knowledge about how to ‘learn’ or ‘recover’ (Ethnographic notes, Psychiatric institution). I will elaborate on this later. Through a focus on personal resources, the possibilities for development, and the learning potential of the individual, a focus on the future seems to be maintained in social work through requirements for continuous development. The application of potentiality is part of a development in social work where time, as it is described by the German sociologist Hartmut Rosa (2014), is part of the management of society. The most important thing is that the individual must not be passive or stop moving but must continue to set new goals for future development. Danish researchers such as Ove Kaj Pedersen (2015) and Anders Petersen (2016) discuss the way the welfare model has developed from a Danish welfare state into a competitive state, market state, and performance society. And the present has been described by Rasmus Willig as characterized by high speed in

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all areas of life, which forces everyone to run faster to keep up (Willig, 2014).1 More specifically, in psychiatry and social work with people with disabilities, potentiality is related to concepts such as ­rehabilitation, recovery, resources, network, activation, participation, and inclusion. The following section concerns itself with this. 5

Psychiatry and Handicaps: Rehabilitation and Potentiality

In social work with citizens with physical or psychological, cognitive, and/or communicative functional handicaps a ”rehabilitation paradigm” is gaining ground. The rehabilitation paradigm is described as a movement away from an old or an obsolete view of human nature in the fields of psychiatry and disabilities. In the master plan in a Danish municipality it says: The Master Plan has contributed to do away with an obsolete view of human nature, which has been unaware of the development potential in the individual citizen. Several sources report that the old system has placed the citizens in a state of ‘acquired helplessness’ with its focus on care and nursing in accordance with the diagnosis. These are new roles for citizens and system alike – thus we are currently speaking of a paradigm shift, a transformation, like a journey into an unknown land. Evaluation of Masterplan, 2015: 11

The specific contents and the concrete application of concepts such as rehabilitation, learning and competence development are concepts that have made their way into political discourses which all express a form of potentiality in social work and a way of rethinking welfare and the role of the citizens. It is, as it is described in the masterplan in a Danish municipality: “a farewell to an obsolete view of human nature and approach to the citizen as a passive recipient of assistance and support, and a transformation into a new view of human nature according to which the citizen is an active player with the potential to learn and develop” (Masterplan Department of Social Efforts / Social og Tilbud, 2012: 5). The evaluation of the masterplan for the municipality (2014) states that: 1 The basis for the performance society can be found in general societal development tendencies in the 1960s with youth rebellion, women’s liberation, and increasing individualization as significant catalysts. Thus, the emergence of the performance society is a liberation project (Petersen, 2016; Dean, 1999, 2007; Ringø, 2012).

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The view of the citizens and their needs has changed into a movement towards a normal life with an increased focus on recovery, rehabilitation, and de-institutionalization. At the same time, cuts and increasing ­expense pressures are part of everyday life. Evaluation of masterplan, May 2015: 25–26

The distribution model for the same municipality states that: The view of human nature behind the masterplan means that the citizen must be given the least invasive offer possible, which focuses on what the citizen can manage on their own. The efforts take their starting point in the citizens’ needs rather than a narrower target group thinking […]. This means that the effort with the individual citizen is designed in a way that is oriented by learning and development […]. The point is that the development perspective be ever present so that the individual citizen receives support that facilitates a management of their own lives. Distribution model municipality, October 2015: 2–3

The Directorate of Social Services pamphlet about rehabilitation states that “rather than compensating for functional handicaps, illnesses, and limitations faced by the individual, social work must focus in resources, opportunities, and hope” (Directorate of Social Services, 2012). One important element in this development is the development of the social rules and prohibitions of the disciplinary society over an expectation of having an obligation and up to the current idea of having the ability (Petersen, 2016; Andersen, 2009). The positive modal verb can become dominant in the performance society as an expression of the idea that anything is potentially possible. This changes the responsibility of the state and the part of vulnerable people’s lives that the state must take care of or be responsible for. The shift towards ideals of more active citizens is partially about a decentralization of responsibility. If anything potentially is possible, then it depends on the individual will to empower (Dean, 1999; Cruikshank, 1999). Thus, the individual is expected to create, model, explore their own life options, wishes, and goals in life. The potentiality of the word ‘can’ is generally related to concepts such as flexibility, adaptability, and motivation (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005; Petersen 2016). The tendency is very similar across the country’s municipalities, efforts, and domains. In the following, I will examine how ‘potentiality’ is implemented and influences the work with people in the fields of psychiatry and disabilities. What is interesting is how social work implements and works with potentiality in the form of competence development, learning, resources, opportunities,

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and hope in a rehabilitation strategy for people with social problems, mental illness, and handicaps. The Concept of Learning, and Economic and Moral-psychological States of Dependence The present view of human nature in social work focuses on the idea that chronic (progressive) illnesses, as for example: acquired brain damage, ­dementia, paralysis, and sclerosis are not an obstacle for rehabilitative work. Social work focuses in the present rehabilitation paradigm less on the functional or social problems the citizens in need of help carry with them, or what their background and life history is, but more on how citizens can mobilize their own or their networks’ resources in order to create better and more desirable independent futures (Kananen, 2014). As stated by an administrative advisor in a public administrative department for disabilities: 5.1

Your ability to help yourself does not depend on life conditions. Rehabilitation reflects your ability to tackle the things in the past and in your everyday life that make it difficult to live an independent life. It is fundamentally a question of learning. Social worker psychiatry/disabilities

The increased focus on learning indicates that despite a functional handicap, illness, or social problem, something about the individual can be influenced, repaired, or changed. Learning becomes an option for all people. Gordon and Fraser (1994) define this kind of learning as a focus at the individual’s moralpsychological constitution and will to develop and learn. Working with influencing “the non-pathological” of the individual across previous classifications and diagnoses indicates, that the individual can learn, and that people can be made to acknowledge their common identity as potentially learning individuals who assume the identity of active citizens and participants in social political reforms and psychiatric plans or plans for people with disabilities despite their functional handicaps. This creates a quantitative increase in the potential capacity for action in social work: The professionals need to see that they are supposed to teach these citizens something, because if not, we are adding to their disabilities, and that is no good, […] It is no good if they cannot figure out when they are supposed to wash up, for example…. On the contrary, we very much only look at the non-pathological part of things. We kind of work along two tracks, one is the disease or whatever you call it, the ­vulnerability,

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and the other is level of functionality and learning, e.g. in relation to washing themselves, doing laundry etc. and developing according to the parameters which indicate that you are capable of taking care of yourself. Social worker, 2016

Since these are citizens with functional handicaps because of illness, social problems, and disabilities, the social efforts seem to displace the perspective in a way that directs the efforts at commonly defined areas for learning that transcend the specific illness or functional handicap of the individual. The social worker or administrative advisor seldom makes detailed inquiries into the complex network of causes behind the suffering of the citizen. On the contrary, what is of paramount importance is to track down what measures most probably will make a difference for the citizens’ future recovery. Potentialization is here expressed as “the effort to continually transgress existing realities”, through a focus on resources, empowerment, and the will to imagine “the future of the future” and “the desirable present of the present”, for example, defined as self-reliance in relation to everyday chores such as washing dishes, grocery shopping, laundry. Thus, a key element in the transformation of the public sector is that social work should capacitate and rehabilitate rather than treat and compensate. The resources and issues of the citizen are examined, the functionality level is determined – focus on developing the citizen’s competences in an effort to render the individual citizen capable of leading a life as close to normal as ­possible – Everyday life must be designed with a view to the future and a focus on learning – The citizen’s needs are best addressed through the use of minimal resources – Development and testing of methods in relation to the involvement of the community. Farewell to an obsolete view of human nature and approach to the citizen as a passive recipient of assistance and support – transformation into a new view of human nature according to which the citizen is an active player with the potential to learn and develop. Masterplan, 2012

In order to retain a focus on development, some Danish municipalities sharpen the focus on result based documentation. For the group of citizens with severe functional handicaps, it can be difficult, and not always meaningful, to establish goals for development. In that context, the concepts of ‘thin and thick slices’ are introduced. ‘Thin slices’ are the term for goals and plans of action for those individual for whom the potential for development is virtually non-existent.

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We have this belief, we believe that the citizen should not be locked in the social institution or initiative the citizen walks in with, but that they should be moved out of their flow circle continuously through documentation and development goals (Development consultant, Disabilities/Psychiatry, 2016). Therefore, development goals, however minimal, are set. As mentioned initially: Social work and management are in this sense not seen as a question of providing stability in a changeable world, or in the lives of vulnerable and exposed people. In the ethnographic field material, the problem is the ­inherent tendency to provide too much stability, habitual behavior, and inertia (field-notes ref..). This development is evident in the frontline professionals’ descriptions of the development in a drop-in center in a medium-sized Danish provincial town: But the drop-in center has also become an institution where you say ‘OK, well what is it you need to work on then, is it small talk you need to get better at?’ So, we try to think in development wherever we can. In order to make this not just a place where you come in and you eat your meal, and then you leave. Maybe just a tiny goal to say just one thing [to someone else] maybe before you pay for your coffee or something. Those are very thin slices, we think in very thin slices. It’s something. I mean, the tiniest step is development too. So now we need to think in learning instead. So, management have also done something to simply change the whole structure. So now there have to be goals if a person is to use the drop-in centre and the person should be able to see clearly what the use is of this whole thing. Counselor psychiatry/disabilities, 2016

This creates a new environment for organizations and professionals characterized by potentialization as a way to create possibilities for change, which simultaneously sets forward processes of actualizing this potentiality and exploring “the potentiality of potentialities”. The most important thing is that the individual continues to set up new future development goals. Forgetting the past, even the present diagnosis, or the existing level of functionality, becomes at least as important as imagining possible futures different from the miserable one that you are placed in. Factual aspects of functional handicaps, illness, and social problems become subject to what Andersen and Poors define as the temporal dimension for purposes of increased flexibility and innovation (Andersen and Poors, 2016). In continuation of this, new solutions for management and social work arise as well as a shift in focus to human resources and potentiality instead of human issues and problems, through a focus on learning and on what is defined as the ‘non-pathological part’ of the individual.

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6 Economy The ideas of the potential individual are closely connected to the economy of the public sector, in which there is an emphasis on the need for people with mental illnesses and disabilities to be rehabilitated to a larger degree of ­independence (i.e., independence from public and professional efforts in a way that makes it possible to reduce expenses for the cost-intensive groups): The problem is that when new reforms are introduced, they always come with cuts, and that has been the case since 2012 when the masterplan was ­introduced. The masterplan was not meant as a cut, but there was a cut right after, now they are introducing the distribution model, which in and of itself could be very good because the money goes where the citizen is, but that too is immediately followed by a cut. It does no good to introduce a model where the money follows the citizen is if there is no money. Development consultant, Municipality, 2016

The way to control and reduce the expenses of cost-intensive groups in the fields of psychiatry and disabilities is based on a fundamental expectation that citizens must be more self-reliant or take care of more things on their own through networks or volunteers. Such new categories are necessary for the specific practice regimes or welfare state solutions to be possible. In that way, politics, management, and management technological solutions are closely connected to ontological knowledge about individual, society, and social problems. Thus, the group of people with psychiatric illnesses or disabilities are portrayed as resourceful individuals who can develop and move away from previous dependence on legally ensured and compensational strategies. Our most important job is to make ourselves expendable, or to make us, what’s the word, so that they can manage without us, right, so that’s, you can say, the professionals we employ, they shouldn’t, they have to be so good at not interfering so much, so they make themselves expendable, ok, and yeah, not dependent. They have to get only exactly what they need and nothing more, I mean they should get exactly the help they need, what it takes to give them a push. And not a minute more. Counselor psychiatry/disabilities, 2016

The effect may be a form of organization continually stressing and exhausting itself by taking more and more (future) possibilities into account while doing away with past routines; a strategy of forgetting, making room for potentialization (Andersen and Poors, 2016). Anything is potentially possible: there is

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an abundance of positivity, optimism about change and eagerness to develop, which sheds a very special light on competence development (Petersen, 2016; Ehrenberg, 1991). With the title of his book La culte de la performance (The Cult of Performance), Ehrenberg marks how the individual’s performance within certain parameters is elevated as the most desirable thing of all in current times (Ehrenberg, 1991). If we apply this point to the current trends in the fields of psychiatry/disabilities, it is the will to develop, the performance, the change towards greater self-reliance that is acknowledged and seen as valuable to society (Cruickshank, 1999). The shift towards ideals of more active citizens is partially about a decentralization of responsibility through extensive reforms of especially the public institutions, but it is also about involving economy, market, and community in the solution of different tasks. 7

Involving Network, Relatives, and Volunteers in the Solution of Welfare Tasks

In the fields of psychiatry and disabilities in Denmark in the years 2016 and 2017, there is an evident expectation that the community must contribute to solving the problems of the welfare state through volunteer work. At the same time there is also an expectation that close relatives and the potential networks of vulnerable citizens can be part of the solution of problems and in terms of practical house work, in-home care, or accompanying measures. In that connection, there are arguments for the use of volunteers as the one thing that could ensure that the welfare available today will also be available in the future. The increased focus on activating networks, relatives, and volunteers in the solution of welfare tasks shakes a long-standing unwritten contract ­according to which relatives, networks, and volunteers are a supplement to, rather than a replacement for social work and public-sector employees (Ringø, 2017). There is a decentralization of responsibility from the state to the expanse of the decentral institutions, from institutions to the social workers, and from the social workers to local communities and volunteers, and eventually from relatives and networks to the individual him/herself. In other words, today we are seeing the continuation of decentralization of the psychiatric efforts which in the 1980s emerged as a part of a market oriented organizational structure, which Dean (2007) later described as a development where management technologies seek to render the institutional spaces self-regulating and responsible through ideals of empowerment and self-management (Dean, 1999). On the one hand, neoliberal management works by making contracts, consulting, negotiating, even empowering, and activating the types of capacity

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for action, freedom, choice, ownership, and responsibilization that is exerted by ­individuals and professionals in the respective organizations, and on the other hand, norms, standards, result indicators, quality control, and best practice criteria are installed to monitor, measure and make the performances of the different agents calculable. […] we have dynamic progressive employees, who are maybe sometimes overworked [..] they have to be innovative and we need to get some welfare technology on the table. And at the same time, they must be measured for effect and must find the right methods that work. I mean, I think that is evident in social work these days. That it’s characterized by a paradox. And it actually permeates the whole system, all the way from a management perspective, but of course, also through to employees and to the citizens. The way we are always trying to measure whether our efforts have any effect. And I think that is doing something to our fields right now. That thinking. Finding the best methods. The best approaches. What we can measure as effective. Social worker, 2016

This ambivalence is specified by Dean (1999) as a distinction between ’action technologies’ and ‘performance technologies’ – as two different, but related strategies to transform expertise and exert behavioral regulation amongst citizens and professionals. The action technologies seek to make the institutional spaces self-regulating and the employees responsible through ideals of empowerment and self-management while new technologies establish them as centers of calculation and new types of formal rationality (Dean, 1999). Specifically, management efforts express the same tendency towards central management and regulation through budget administration, result contracts, cooperation agreements, ever more instruments of measurement and evaluation, and on the other hand an increased decentralization of responsibility through self-help initiatives and increased focus on rehabilitation, resources, potentiality, and involvement of networks and local communities as an institutionalized practice in social work. In this context, the potential individual is a person who acts autonomously, take advantage of his or her network, and is not dependent on the system. 8

The Right to Equality, or the Right to Inequality?

The development in the fields of psychiatry and disabilities has its roots in the disability political controversies and discussions about what people with

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functional handicaps are and ought to be. In terms of disability politics there has been a clear connection between the right to social benefits and the ­dissolution of all expectations of being of value to others in society (Campbell and Oliver, 1996; Thomas, 2007). The disability political movements from 1965– 1980 focused their attention on this type of exclusion of people with functional handicaps in the knowledge that a conflict with acquired rights might arise if people with disabilities were to be seen as people who were to be part of society on the same terms as others. The movement was torn between two opposing considerations: On one side were the collective fight for legally ensured support and compensation for disabilities and on the other side, there was a fight to ensure that people with functional handicaps should be seen as individuals who, despite the need for compensations, were still of value to society (Thomas, 2007). The view of human nature that we see today, which hails potentiality, participation, and resources is partially a challenge of stigmatizing expectations of people with mental illnesses and disabilities as people who are incapable of development, but it is also a challenge of acquired legally ensured support and compensation for handicap and loss of function. This development divides the waters and worries a series of employees on the frontlines, citizens, and relatives, while some social workers find the development to be positive. Field notes from a meeting with administrative advisors in a large Danish municipality state: It has been scientifically proven that there is a lot you can do yourself. We shouldn’t hold the citizens’ hands too much; a minimum of support is good. People with mental illness are capable. Taking care of themselves makes them happy. Cuts have been good for us – we used to ‘hold the citizens’ hands’ too much. Now they need to use their networks more. We are equals. I too have to save up money when I want to go on vacation. I too have to do the dishes. No one is going to come around to do my dishes. It is positive that we believe that the citizens can develop. That we give them a little push. Field notes psychiatry/disabilities, 2016

The more skeptical social workers said: Today we talk about vulnerable citizens as moochers and as though we fail them if we don’t pressure them to do more on their own, to take responsibility for their own actions and happiness. Whether they are capable or not. Social worker in the field of psychiatry and disability administration, 2016

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Another social worked commented: There are a lot of good things about the development, it’s good that we believe in these people. Believe that they can develop. But I wish we could stay in the middle of the road, because now we’re not allowed to compensate for anything at all anymore. I think it is unfair that the weakest citizens can’t get help for everyday chores, for a life where they’re compensated for their loss of function so that they have just a minimum of energy in life for other things aside from cleaning. A life without all these demands and expectations. It’s not for their sake that we’re always talking about learning. It’s nonsense when we say that. Social worker, 2016

While another social worker said: We can talk about development without it meaning that they have to be able to perform the same way that we can. So, the criteria for success that they are subject to are criteria according to which they’ll always underperform compared to others – but they must use their resources to get out into normal jobs that just don’t exist, and don’t fit their handicaps. And we sanction them if they don’t. I think it’s crazy. Social worker, 2016

It has become increasingly difficult for citizens who are vulnerable, ill, and unfit to work to be granted the right to unemployment benefits, sickness benefits, cash benefits, or early retirement benefits. Some social workers express worries about the development, while other social workers express an optimism about the idea of empowering the marginalized, the sick, the weak, the poor through learning and active participations in the changes of their conditions. In the above examples, the more skeptical social workers confront the realities of the lives of people with functional handicaps with the political visions and ideologies. Equality, it is mentioned, is gained through an understanding and an acceptance of that some people are different, disabled, with a less amount of resources. The generative mechanisms highlighted are different in the above examples. The first examples highlight development, nudging “if we just give them a little push”, and learning as plausible mechanisms in social work. The latter examples describe the need to look at more complex generative mechanisms in peoples’ lives and if needed compensate for the handicap to save the peoples’ resources for more important goals in life than l­aundry and doing the dishes (for example being a good mom, getting out of the house).

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Surfaces in Social Work

Traditionally objectification through diagnosis and categories creates certain problem understandings and views of human nature and specific processes of subjectification and individual possible courses of action. Therefore, diagnoses and categories have politically been interesting on several levels. The focus of public administration has often been to diagnose a problem (for example an illness or a social problem) and to prescribe a service that matches the problem (Andersen and Poors, 2016). By retaining a focus on the future of the future it becomes possible to establish new functionally categories that transcend a previous diagnostic target group demarcation. An essential step in the fields of psychiatry and disabilities has been the shift from a focus on causes and generative mechanisms underlying the problem, to a focus on what the citizen can manage (resources) and potentials for learning, development, and goals. In the following, I approach this by showing how potentionalization seems to implicit influence the services, independent of the problem definitions in practice. In the field study, it seems like the work with potentialization in social work practice means that communication and understanding of the problem could rely on depth-ontological understandings of generative mechanisms, but that this knowledge is under pressure while defining the services that matches the problem. An example is from a social institution for adolescents with mental disabilities and psychiatric diagnoses: It makes no sense to start talking about education and work if the tiny little platform that that needs to rest on is that the person is homeless, has been through sexual abuse, has no friends, has no money or no anything, then it makes no sense for me to try to build a whole lot of stuff on top of that because that’s too much pressure, the platform won’t hold.2 Interview, social institution for adolescents with mental disabilities and psychiatric diagnoses

The professionals define a set of complex problems underlying people´s behavior. The fieldwork exemplifies how the specification of the young people´s virtual problems, could become translated into something different for example, homelessness, sexual assaults, no money, no friends. What is interesting is how this complex knowledge of causes and generative mechanisms underlying people’s behavior is a prominent part of the problem definition among the professionals in the institutions. But even though the depth-ontological 2 This fieldstudy is made by Andreas Møller Jørgensen.

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knowledge seems to exist in the institutions it seems like the services offered is in line with the more general tendencies in social work; a focus at learning, individuality, resources, being active, even though some of the professionals express a skeptical reflection in the team-meeting: [We have to compromise] But the compromise also means that we’re spending a lot of money to no avail […]. And then we get them into a new activation, which also fails. So, it’s a lot of money spent on these pseudoefforts. Keeping them activated because that’s what we’re supposed to do. It needs to look good. It’s numbers, it’s papers. Now they’re activated. But no one is saying anything about whether it’s working or not. They’re just activated. Notes from group-Interview, social institution for adolescents with mental disabilities and psychiatric diagnoses

The more complex definitions of the problems of people in the area turn towards pre-defined solutions of being active. Limiting social problems to the micro-individual spheres as a result of the focus of neoliberalism a human capital development in turn of being active complicates furthermore social, structural, or depth-ontological change and solidarity. Another example of problem definitions is the method for reviewing adults vum (In Danish: Voksen Udrednings Metoden).3 vum is a method that supports review and case work in the area of adults with social problems and adults with functional handicaps. At the current time, the method has been put into use in many Danish municipalities. One purpose of vum is to ensure resource focused case work and uniformity in the review. vum focuses on what the citizen can and cannot do, and where there is potential for development. To ensure a focus on resources, the intention is not to pay too much attention to the problem in the cases and to conduct a professional evaluation that aims towards the future. Like icf4, vum is interactive, circular, and cause-neutral, and is expected to enable a focus on how citizens can live their everyday lives in the present and in the future. In the specific programs, the citizens are described as people with resources that can be mobilized through common efforts and common groupings that transcend diagnostic differences and barriers. To sum up, there is a need to ask whether the application of the notion of potentiality means: 3 vum Voksen Udrednings Metoden is a tool to make mesurements of functionallity, the scientific rationales are similar to icf The International Classification of Functionality. 4 The International Classification of Functionality (icf) is the who framework for measuring health and disability at both individual and population levels.

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1.

That competence development is translated exclusively into individual self-reliance, learning and reflexivity (in the field of psychiatry and handicap in terms of everyday chores: cleaning, laundry, personal hygiene etc.), and thus is not linked to a depth-ontological understanding of the (social) problem and functional handicap; 2. That rehabilitation, competence development, and potentiality mean that the focus is exclusively given to ‘the non-pathological part’, resources and the general learning potential that pertains to independence of the social systems without a dedicated specialized individual competence development aimed at the individual, cognitive, communicative, mental, or physical functional problems, and the structures and mechanisms that influence on the individual level of functionality; 3. If there is a compensation for loss of function so that the citizen can work with meaningful competence development of the things that contribute to what the citizen defines as ’the good life’ (being a good mom, getting out of the house etc.); 4. If depth ontological knowledge in practice through management technologies are translated into simple services that matches the neoliberal definitions, for example, learning, cognitive self-reflection, rehabilitation, responsibility through network and the individual will to empower. An important point from a workshop for people with acquired brain damage, was that the development and the very positive focus on competence development which, on the one hand, brought about hope for this group and on the other hand came with a disadvantage as a result of the extent, strength, and spread of new forms of rehabilitation. A social worker writes on a yellow postit slip to the workshop on behalf of ‘her’ client: All of these things are ok, but he (the client) just doesn’t have the strength both to clean and to follow resource programs, be social, network, set up development goals at the drop-in center, and focus on resources and take part in recovery programs and all sorts of things – it’s like the systems don’t communicate and all the systems, independently of each other, want some development and self-reliance. Social worker at workshop, 2016

A relative at the same workshop said: XX can unload the dishwasher, clean, do laundry, go to the drop-in center, take the bus, wash himself, but he can’t do all of those things, he has to choose. He has a finite amount of strength, and he can only use it

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once. It’s not about learning. It’s about the fact that he has a functional ­handicap and a lack of strength. He experiences cognitive and physical exhaustion because of this functional handicap. Fieldnotes, participant workshop, 2016

10 Conclusion In the neoliberal discourse, ideas of the potential person are connected to ideas of preserving a good and productive society. Rehabilitation, belief in ­development potential, and competence development as replacements for compensational strategies are, in the areas of psychiatry and disabilities, part of this development. There has been a general tendency to focus on the areas where there is a potential for development. In order to ensure a focus on resources, it is the intention to make sure the social problem and the functional handicap, is not given too much attention in the cases and that the professional evaluation is aimed towards the future. The concrete programs reinvent the weakest, most vulnerable citizens with mental illnesses or disabilities as categories that are now in possession of resources that can be mobilized. The positive modal verb can become dominant and becomes an expression of the idea that anything is potentially possible. This changes the responsibility of the state and the part of vulnerable people’s lives that the state must take care of or be responsible for. In conclusion, there is a lot of knowledge connected to this development. In the future, it will be interesting to see if steps are taken to ensure that the economic situation and need for the municipalities to create more s­ elf-reliant and independent citizens do not become a goal in itself. Moreover, how the rehabilitation and competence development that could develop the individual’s functional handicap, whether it is cognitive, communicative, physical, or social, are developed? What seem important to recognize is that the client has a background that makes the social efforts hopeless if these generative mechanisms are not recognized. The client has in some cases a finite amount of strength, and they can only use the resources and energy once. It’s not always about learning. It’s also about the facts that the clients have complex social problems, maybe a functional handicap and a lack of strength. The pressing question is how we can approach the work with these conditions in social work, and on this question the attitudes amongst the frontline employees were divided into different camps. The idea of potential individual enables certain forms of knowledge in practice and crucially excludes knowledge of ‘the determined individual’. In my interpretation, the determined individual

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is a person who is influenced, enabled, and created in an interaction between structural, biological, contextual generative mechanisms. Apparently, this individual does not exist in current policies, but does exist in some form in social practices. This means that the view that people’s possible actions, subject positions, and opportunities in life are shaped by and dependent on that person’s social, biological, and psychological constitution and life conditions seems to exist among front-line social workers. This view of human beings is often translated, sometimes unconsciously, while the professionals are expected to prescribe a service that matches the problem. People have become post-ontological in the sense that the past, ideas of the functional handicap, problem, or disease-promoting factors plays a less important part in the organizational or directive foundation of social work. The individual is described as a person who can always potentially learn, reflect, and develop whatever their condition, and this potential for development is the major focus of social work in these years. If we look at this development as different kinds of ontological knowledge, we see some displacements in our assumptions about the social realities, in our assumptions about the relationship between society and individual, how society is structured and how it changes, and in our assumptions about how that makes ‘social issues’ emerge and become problems or how they are changed. This process establishes a post-ontological space for rehabilitation and general models on ‘the surface’ where it is possible to work with generalized knowledge about learning, rehabilitation, and competence development. The development of neoliberal policies transformed the debt-ontological focus of structural and institutional mechanisms behind social problems to the individually based rehabilitation. In any case, we must assume that for the future the neoliberal rehabilitation reforms will increase socioeconomic, political, and cultural gaps between the people who are able to participate in the active workforce and those who are not.

Chapter 10

Youth Experiencing Poverty in a Neoliberal Canadian Context: Understanding Systems Access from the Experiences of Young People and Frontline Staff Naomi Nichols and Jayne Malenfant Scholars of contemporary Western government have noted how changes in public policy and program delivery reflect a shift in political rationalities from welfarism to neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005; Miller and Rose, 2008; Saint-Martin, 2013; Shields and Evans, 1998). Welfarism worked under the assumption that the activities of government should be directed towards the betterment of economic and social life for citizens; neoliberalism, on the other hand, rests on the belief that the state “[represents] an unnatural intrusion into the workings of the market” (Clarke and Newman, 1997: 14). Neoliberal economics and values have been depicted as an inevitable reaction to a sluggish and unresponsive welfare state (Clarke and Newman, 1997; Bradford 2000; Smith and Orsini, 2007; Downing, 2012; Banting and Myles, 2013; Jenson, 2013). The political, economic, policy, programmatic and ideological shifts associated with the neoliberal global capitalist turn, which has been re-shaping social life for the last 30 years, have had a profound impact on the lives of people growing up during this same period of time. Our chapter explores how the political-economic relations associated with global-capitalism and neoliberalism appear in and structure young people’s lives. We are particularly interested in the ways that political-economic relations operating in and through public institutions make it difficult for young people to live the lives they desire. The chapter is framed by a conceptualization of governance (neoliberal or otherwise) as a textually organized relation that is accomplished in the coordinated actions of people as they go about their everyday work (Griffith and Smith, 2014; Nichols and Griffith, 2009). In other words, our interest is not in a theorization of the changing political-economic relations of the state; rather, we are interested in how these shifts become evident in relations among actual people at particular moments in time. We will first look at the experiences of young people over two studies to see how their everyday work is organized by these neoliberal shifts and follow with stories from service-providers and

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professionals who are working with these youths. These different perspectives allow for a multi-level approach to understanding how the social and political economic context in Canada shapes young people’s lives. The chapter represents a conversation across two research projects, conducted with different research objectives and sociological orientations, but sharing an interest in understanding how young people experience and seek to mediate poverty, housing precarity and food scarcity. Malenfant’s research was conducted with young people, living in rural contexts across the province of Ontario in Canada. It sought to understand how young people cultivate and participate in “off-the-grid,” do-it-yourself (diy) social networks. In contrast, Nichols’ research was conducted with young people living in economically disadvantaged and racialized neighborhoods in Canada’s largest urban ­centre – also in Ontario. Her project sought to understand how institutional responses to community and school safety shape the life work of young people who ­become its objects. Our research – conducted in different places and with different foci – ­illuminates how neoliberal rationalities, managerial technologies, and public sector restructuring contour young people’s everyday lives and sense-making practices. In Nichols’ research young people described experiences of punitive state interventions (e.g., policing and surveillance) and reduced access to state resources (e.g., publicly funded education). Unable to rely on the state for economic or social security, they saw property-ownership and capital accumulation as the key to a good life. In sharp contrast, the young people in Malenfant’s study were critical of (and avoided) the cash economy, inherently linking it to systems of the state, which they found inaccessible and oppressive. The two rather different groups have two different strategies for overcoming poverty, hardship, and job insecurity for young people. Common across both projects is a sense among the young people we interviewed (e.g., racialized, economically disadvantaged, housing precarious youth) that they do not fit in – and will not be well served by – the current ­political-institutional order. We wondered how these young people, who live in different settings and who participate differently in intersecting processes of racialization, gender, and class, came to the shared conclusion that state policies and interventions are not designed to work for them. Our analysis demonstrates how the generalized managerial technologies and market ethos, which guide state activities, produce, and depend on abstracted conceptualizations of youth and generalized ideas about what young people need that are at-odds with the material conditions of participants’ lives. Young people’s experiences of disillusionment are shaped by socially organized disjunctures between the actual conditions of their lives and the technologies for ­producing

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(from these actualities) the accounting and accountability metrics, which enable the management of a neoliberal public sector. Across our distinctive projects, which took place in different socio-cultural and geographic contexts, the young people we interviewed expressed a common sense of exclusion, marked by phrases like, “I don’t fit;” “there is no place for me;” and “the state doesn’t care.” Young people, working hard to survive on the edges of – and sometimes outside of – the current social and politicaleconomic order of life shared a diminished faith in state policies, programs, interventions, and institutions. In Malenfant’s study, young people’s distrust of the state was evident in their concerted efforts to conduct their lives outside of formal institutional and economic structures; in Nichols’ study, young people’s reduced faith in public life and institutions was apparent in their turn towards economic individualism and street economies. 1

Sociological Approach and Methods

This research is informed by the sociological approach, institutional ethnography (Campbell and Gregor, 2002; Smith, 1990a, 1990b, 1999; 2002; 2005). An institutional ethnographic approach allows researchers and their collaborators to discover how people’s experiences in one setting are hooked into complexes of social action, shaped by and shaping how others elsewhere are also working. Institutional ethnography begins with what people know and have experienced and seeks to understand how it happens that they know and experience the world as they do. It is the appropriate method of inquiry for a study, which seeks to understand how neoliberal reforms coordinate the social relations of young people’s lives and consequently the ways young people make sense of their experiences in the world. We are particularly interested in the experiences of young people who have suffered under Canada’s “redistributive fade” (Banting and Myles, 2013) – that is, the shifting economic and social policies of the eighties and nineties, which resulted in enhanced market freedom within and beyond the nation-state coupled with welfare retrenchment and a weakened tax-transfer system. This chapter begins with the experiences of some of the one-in-six Canadians earning below poverty level (Downing, 2012) – in this case, youth experiencing poverty and housing insecurity in rural areas and urban neighborhoods.1 1 Canada is large country with a relatively small population (approximately 35 million), largely concentrated in one of three urban centres: Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver. Less than a quarter of the population (19%) lives in rural areas (fewer than 1000 residents, with less than

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Nichols’ research is a community-based study of the inter-institutional response to school and community safety. It begins in the standpoints of young people living in designated vulnerable neighborhoods (Neighborhood Improvement Areas or nias) in Toronto, Ontario and navigating Youth Justice and Safe Schools processes. Almost none of the youth in Nichols’ study identified as white. Almost all of them suggested that a little money in their pockets would make life easier for them. The research draws on qualitative data collected through 48 in-depth interviews with youth2 who live and/or attend school in a racialized urban neighborhood; 15 in-depth interviews with youth in detention or custody; focus group conversations and/or interviews with 48 professionals who work with youth; and the insights and experiential knowledge of nine additional youth researchers hired over two summers. As is common in institutional ethnographic research, the interviews focused on people’s work – that is, the things they do that take time and energy and that directly and indirectly hook people into relations of capital and exchange (Nichols, 2014; Griffith and Smith, 2005; Smith, 2005). Interviews with young people, focused on the unpaid work they are doing in schools, in police stations, social housing and as they move through their neighborhoods, as well as their work to make money. Interviews with adult practitioners focused on their paid work with youth. Malenfant’s research is a traditional ethnography of youth living in poverty in isolated rural locales across Ontario. Like an institutional ethnography, the research began with Malenfant’s attempt to document the experiences of young people “fleeing” urban environments – where many experienced housing precarity and economic hardship – in order to live “off the grid.” But unlike an institutional ethnography, Malenfant did not seek to discover how young people’s lives were socially organized to unfold as they have. Based on eight indepth interviews, participant observation and analysis of various online and print texts, Malenfant’s research highlighted young people’s feelings of frustration navigating state-run social assistance systems, their attempts to build “alternative” rural spaces to live in, as well as their work to create and manage texts (such as zines and blogs) through which they cultivated and participated in dialogues about “do-it-yourself” (diy) culture. The majority of the young people who participated were white, and roughly half came from middle-class 400 people per square km) (Statistics Canada, 2011). Canada is a parliamentary democracy, comprised of one federal, ten provincial and three territorial governments (Parliament of Canada, n.d.). Ontario is Canada’s most populous province. 2 The projects upon which this chapter is based were both approved by university Research Ethics Processes. Pseudonyms are used.

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families. One of the young people Malenfant interviewed (Jazz) identifies as gender-queer. As such, we use the pronouns “they, their” in this chapter when referencing Jazz’s experiences. To produce this chapter, we began by talking with one another about the research we had done and how young people talked to us, and each other, about making, using, needing, or spending money. While the two projects were initiated with different foci, our shared use of ethnographic methods means that we approached interviewing with a set of topics to explore with participants, rather than pre-determined and scripted questions. Our relational approach to interviewing, coupled with our shared focus on young people’s experiences of institutional and economic marginalization, allowed us to generate data, which were commensurable across the two projects. Analytically, we sought to discover how global economic discourses and public sector restructuring efforts appear in and shape the things young people experience, do, and say. To advance this analytic objective, we gathered, shared, and discussed any data where people’s talk suggested or revealed any aspect of the workings of the neoliberal state and/or the social relations comprising the political economy. We added sub-codes to previously coded data to enable a finer-grained analytic engagement with the work and to begin to track connections and differences across the two studies. From here, we located and analyzed the institutional and policy texts that coordinate people’s experiences. The goal in analyzing interview data for an institutional ethnography is to make visible the ways ruling or governing relations influence how people are living their lives (McCoy, 2006). 2

Navigating a Neoliberal Public Sphere

The young people Malenfant interviewed framed their rejection of formal institutional and economic structures as a conscious choice to “get out” and leave cities. Our analysis complicates traditional notions of personal choice, revealing how choice making is a socially organized relation. Young people in Malenfant’s study linked their difficulties making ends meet with urban life. These difficulties were seen by young people as resulting from a system that was inaccessible, ineffective, and designed to be exclusive. Like young people in Nichols’ earlier research on the institutional mediation of youth homelessness (2008; 2014); young people in Malenfant’s study described frustration with the wait-times associated with the eligibility assessment process required for a person to access and receive social assistance through Ontario Works (OW), and even greater difficulty accessing additional funds through the Ontario ­Disability Support Program (odsp).

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One person’s work to secure welfare and another’s efforts to monitor and evaluate people’s eligibility for welfare are actual things they do – work they undertake – to make ends meet. Through a series of institutional processes of abstraction, their ordinary work is commodified to enable reporting and external management. Methods for rendering public sector work calculable in e­ conomic terms require modes of translation, which abstract from the particularities of people’s lives and experiences to create the general accounts and terms, which enable standardized modes of service delivery, tracking and comparing across actual and diverse lives and experiences. The emphasis on accounting or counting in frontline agencies represents what Martin and Lynch (2009) describe as “numero-politics,” where various calculative practices are seen to be “embedded in disciplined fields, systems of registration and surveillance, technological checks and verifications” (244). The production of institutional files and reports in terms of targets, benchmarks, directives, and ­indicators frame (Noy, 2009) what types of problems can be addressed, what services can be offered, what work can be measured, and how work is managed. As a young person named Jazz observed: I come back to “real life” and I try to get welfare and I can’t. And I’m trying to get odsp,3 and I can’t because I’m not actually considered disabled. You just have all of these little formalities and things that you have to do and that’s when you’re like “man, I’m angry about this!” … It’s fucking power. Like my welfare got cut off, well not cut off but they took a bunch of my welfare money away. They’re totally not recognizing that my rent is more than what they’re giving me, and it’s messing me up. I’m just reminded of all the things that I hate about what capitalism has done to so many people. In this interview, Jazz explains that they needed expensive medication for a diagnosed bipolar disorder. Unsuccessful applications to odsp led them to believe that they were not “actually considered disabled” enough to be eligible for the disability support program (which provides greater financial assistance than welfare). Critical of, and dependent on, a highly commodified pharmaceutical market for their medication and faced with the growing gap between the rising cost of housing and stagnation of social assistance benefits, 3 Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP), a government-funded financial support for individuals living with a disability, is one of two forms of the province of Ontario’s social assistance. The other is Ontario Works (OW), which offers financial and healthcare assistance for low-income residents who are unemployed or underemployed.

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Jazz interpreted their experiences of poverty and exclusion as an outcome of capitalism. Jazz recognized the problem was “the system” and its articulation with capitalism, but neither “the system” nor capitalism are explicated in the account as actual material (textually mediated) processes that a person could figure out and navigate. Jazz’s critique of the broader systems of capitalism does not aid them in navigating the confusing processes of accessing state social assistance programs. For the redistributive capacity of the state to be realized, people need to understand how the welfare system works – the processes and rationalities it depends on to function – and use this knowledge to get what they want/need. Of course, knowing how to get the system to work in the ways that you need is not the same as ensuring the equitable redistribution of public resources and opportunities; but the immediate and resolvable problem that Jazz illuminates is the inaccessibility of social assistance to those who depend on it. Efforts to report on and manage public sector performance through institutional monitoring and auditing processes have re-shaped the frontlines of service provision across the public sphere (Griffith and Smith, 2014). Public sector performance, in this context, is not evidenced by ease of access to welfare for people living in poverty, nor the redistributive capacity of the state; performance is evidenced by the degree to which assessment and monitoring activities at particular OW offices comply with provincial directives set for this work. Public sector performance directives are evaluated through accounting mechanisms, whereby the delivery and management of public funds occurs through extensive reviews of financial and other records (e.g., medical records and official diagnostic documents) (Nichols, 2014). In other words, it is not that Jazz is “not considered disabled” enough to be eligible for odsp; the problem is that they lack the institutional documentation (e.g., written medical diagnoses and other formal diagnostic accounts), which enable external verification and monitoring of their mental illness and associated economic needs. Materially, public sector performance management is accomplished in the textually organized work routines of actual people. These are the social practices through which public accountability and risk management are produced through ­inter-institutional documentation, accounting, and reporting mechanisms. They are material processes that a researcher can ethnographically bring into view for/with participants. In Nichols’ current research, a young woman (Tanisha) explained that she became ineligible for welfare when she stopped going to school. She stopped going to school – in a very expensive downtown neighborhood – when the only places she could afford to stay were in the North-West part of this large

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city, where there is limited access to public transit. Her story reveals a common organizational disjuncture, which shapes young people’s efforts to remain housed and economically independent, particularly in large urban centers. Tanisha explains: I was going to school at [X Caring and Safe Schools Program], and because of my distance and stuff I had to be going to school and stuff to get OW. And I was a youth and all this stuff, so they cut it, right? So, for a long time, I wasn't getting it. NN: So, you stopped going to school because of the distance, and so then they cut your OW. T: Mm hmm … And I was trying to tell them that I needed a school in the West End, but what they were telling me is I couldn't change to a public board because I'm a Catholic student. And there was just so much things, so I was just so stressed out. I don't have anywhere to sleep sometimes. I was going to school hungry, with no food and stuff. So, I just stopped ­going to school NN: And then you lost your OW. Because Tanisha was attending a Safe Schools Program for suspended and expelled youth, she could not simply move to a new school in the West end when this was where she found housing. She needed the school board to negotiate a transfer to another similar program. Unfortunately, due to recent program closures (field notes, 2014), there were no available West-end programs. Rather than seeking to eliminate the geographic barriers that made it difficult for Tanisha to get to school in her Catholic school board (e.g., by helping ­Tanisha figure out how to enroll in the public school board), a directive to monitor young people’s school attendance as a condition for welfare eligibility for young people under 18 years of age4 coordinated Tanisha’s OW worker’s response to the problem of her poor attendance, and she was deemed ineligible for welfare. Once her OW funds were revoked, the cost of transportation made school participation impossible. Her days and nights were consumed by efforts to survive. Out of desperation, Tanisha participated in informal transactional economies to ensure she had a place to sleep each night. Some nights were spent in stairwells. Given her negative experiences attempting to seek supports through traditional bureaucratic channels, Tanisha was reluctant to engage with the shelter system. 4 OW workers are required to “maintain an appropriate level of ongoing documentation and monitoring of attendance at school or training for each student” (Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services, 2001b, form #2221, 15).

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As Tanisha and the OW worker engaged technologies for managing the provision of welfare, they acquired abstract institutional identities that enabled the translation of actual material relations between people into categories that facilitated state-driven financial reporting and auditing practices. Managerial accounting processes require and produce generalized and abstracted accounts of complex interactions between actual people. The bureaucratic processes through which Tanisha becomes an applicant and later recipient of welfare, insert her into an institutionally mediated relation whereby only particular aspects of her life are deemed institutionally relevant and actionable. An OW administrator’s job is not to ensure people like Tanisha have access to the things they need to thrive, but to “monitor” a welfare-recipient’s ongoing eligibility for social assistance (Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services, 2001b). The management of monitoring and reporting procedures allow for comparison of service delivery performance across sites, enabling the demonstration of public sector accountability to a public of taxpayers. But these calculative processes depend on and produce abstracted categories of people (e.g., applicants, recipients), disconnected from the actual conditions of young people’s lives, which shape their dependence on welfare in the first place. Lack of access to state resources shape young people’s lack of faith in the public sector – it’s policies, programs, and institutions. Across both projects, young people turned to informal “under-the-table” economies to secure their livelihoods and actively sought to avoid public institutions and processes that were not designed to meet their needs. But while the participants in Malenfant’s study attempted to eschew city life and market participation in favor of a bucolic rural ideal and a diy existence, the young people in Nichols’ study remained in urban centers, seeking emancipation through participation in ­formal and informal markets (e.g., working in the drug trade and purchasing high-end clothes). However, in both cases, these approaches often fell short of liberating youth from having to navigate complicated state systems of assistance. 3

Seeking Alternatives to Capitalism and the State

The young people in Malenfant’s study built a critique of cities, which they associated with capitalism, the market economy, and neoliberal values. On the other hand, they imagined rural spaces as removed from neoliberal capitalist influences. While some lived in rural spaces in order to meet their basic needs and survive (e.g., moving to a commune in the “bush” when not able to find work in the city), the majority were able to carry out piecework and stay with

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friends or members of their activist communities in small towns. They saw rural life as a way to escape the structures and activities that had shaped their lives in cities – efforts to access welfare, find employment, and live the “right” way. Rejecting state institutions such as social assistance and homeless shelters, young people cultivated and sought out alternate forms of support including collective living, pooling resources, and utilizing what one youth, Conan, described as “capitalist waste” (including garbage, scrap materials, empty buildings, or discarded food). Conan shared goods from dumpster diving and food from community organizations such as Food Not Bombs with others in his network and saw participation in these alternative modes of survival as working to create links of support for others who had difficulty accessing state resources such as OW. Although dumpster diving is legal in Canada, individuals can be (and in Malenfant’s study often describe being) charged under the Trespass to Property Act (Section 2 (i) and (ii) 1990) if they are finding items on private property. Dumpsters and other sites where food can be found are covered by this Act, as they are situated on the property of grocery or convenience stores. Under Canada’s Food and Drugs Act, stores are prohibited to sell any food, which “consists in whole or in part of any filthy, putrid, disgusting, rotten, decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable substance” or is otherwise “unfit for human consumption” (Food and Drugs Act, 1984). As a result, the food which Conan was utilizing to ensure he could eat (when unable to afford nourishment otherwise) represents a legal risk for the establishment, and it is in their best interests to manage this by preventing the consumption of any goods deemed “­unfit.” While property owners distributing food (such as grocery stores) may be relinquished of liability when they “distribute donated food to another person” under a variety of provincial acts (e.g. Ontario’s Donation of Food Act, 1994)) these enterprises are otherwise liable for “any injury or death caused by the consumption of the food” (Donation of Food Act, 1994). Despite the risks associated with salvaging (both in terms of “contaminated” food or legal action), Conan believed that living on “capitalist waste” was a more predictable strategy than relying on the province’s social assistance program, Ontario Works or OW. Conan was explicit in his position that state-­ funded welfare was unreliable and difficult to access, referencing numerous occasions when his funds had been “cut off” for one reason or another. He saw these experiences as inevitable because – like Jazz – he was never quite sure why the funding was revoked. Jazz and Conan shared a fear of suddenly being “cut off” from welfare supports. These young people alluded to nefarious ­bureaucratic mechanisms through which welfare was governed, and believed decision-making processes were intentionally hidden from them by

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i­ndividual welfare employees – as in, “they decided I wasn’t eligible” or “they don’t understand.” Young people who participated in Nichols’ earlier study about the institutional mediation of youth homelessness used very similar language to refer to bureaucratic decision-making processes that were organized outside their direct fields of view. They explained reduced access to state-resources as a function of a lack of care between individuals – as in “my worker hates me” – or as resulting from unexplained policy barriers (e.g., “my worker told me it was policy”). Not unlike a theorization of the problems created by capitalism, conceiving of reduced access to state resources as an inter-personal problem does not allow young people to see how social and institutional relations are organized to produce the exclusionary outcomes young people experience. In this section, we have sought to connect the dots between the actual practices of young people, the operations of public sector, legal and commercial organizations, and the political-economic organization of global-capitalism more broadly. In the next section we illuminate how young people’s efforts to participate in and benefit from market-based economies are shaped by these same social relations (i.e., neoliberal rationalities and public sector accountability/ performance management strategies). 4

Labor Market Shifts, Public Sector Reforms, Poverty and Education

Across both studies, young people’s experiences of making and needing money, as well as their adherence to or rejection of dominant global-capitalist and neoliberal ideals (e.g., about individualism and the importance of accumulating wealth and property) are produced in the context of their actual experiences attending schools and participating in other public sector institutions, which have been subject to public sector restructuring. In addition to their heavy engagement with public sector institutions (like welfare and public education), young people are among the hardest hit by shifts away from state-led policy, redistribution, and programmatic initiatives to ensure full employment among working-aged individuals. The labor market, alone, has failed to “provide sufficient numbers of adequate, sustaining employment opportunities” (Burke and Sheilds, 2000: 101) for youth. Young people have borne the brunt of increased service-sector ­development, distinguished by poorly compensated, impermanent, and unpredictable positions. Across other sectors, young people are also increasingly only able to obtain full-time hours through a series of part-time employment contracts – often with little opportunity for upward mobility or permanence

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(Burke and Sheilds, 2000). Further, the relationship between education and labor-­market participation continues to change with young people having ­increasing d­ ifficulty translating educational experiences into labor market ­opportunities (Burke and Sheilds, 2000). A young woman in Malenfant’s study (Harlow) described her work to navigate her parents’ expectations for her life, with poor job prospects and the demands of student loan repayment schedules. Coupled with the demands of debt management, Harlow’s experiences since completing university have also been shaped by mounting pressures felt by middle-and working-class families, experiencing the loss of full and permanent middle-class employment opportunities (Banting and Myles, 2013). Harlow’s middle-class parents pushed her to pursue post-secondary education in order to secure employment in a job market where university degrees and other forms of credentialing are required for effective participation in a competitive labor market (Green and Townsend, 2013). However, given the increasing demand for “skilled labor,” young people struggle to translate a generalist undergraduate degree into concrete labormarket opportunities. Harlow explained that she was unable to meet her parents’ expectations that she would share their middle-class lifestyle —characterized by property ownership and a long-term career – because there were simply “no jobs.” osap (Ontario Student Assistant Programs) loan repayment programs begin six months after graduation, unless a young person enrolls in another post-secondary program (osap, 2016). The repayment program assumes a generalized and stable labor market trajectory that is at-odds with the shift to flexible, parttime, and non-permanent employment. Although individuals may apply for repayment assistance in the form of interest forgiveness, this assistance is not available to individuals who are earning more than $1,684 a month in reportable income (osap, 2016). Unstable employment conditions, characteristic of contract and shift-based work mean that a young person’s monthly income often varies – the consequence being that their eligibility for interest relief is also variable. Unfortunately, the repayment assistance program is not designed to accommodate these shifts. If reportable income exceeds the eligible maximum, individuals are no longer qualified for “zero affordable payment” (osap, 2016). Maintaining eligibility for the repayment support program therefore requires ongoing efforts to ensure that one’s monthly reportable income does not exceed the maximum. When people do not ensure their income falls below $1,684 a month, they are deemed ineligible to apply for repayment assistance again and

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are required to pay the interest on their loan.5 For most, the i­ nterest represents more than the additional funds made through employment – r­ endering them unable to make rent or afford food. Harlow’s accounts reveal how public sector and market restructuring shape the materiality of young people’s lives in diverse ways, with a significant unifying consequence being diminished faith in the state and state-initiatives. 5

Going to School vs. Making Money

Quite unlike the anti-capitalist sentiments shared by the participants in Malenfant’s study, many young people who participated in Nichols’ research described money as the singular thing, which would alleviate their stress and make life a little easier. Growing up under conditions of acute poverty, money promised a way to transcend their current circumstances. When Nichols asked Omar, what would make his life easier, he quickly responded: If I was rich … if like I could live like a property owner, like, I could live in like a big house somewhere and not be around these areas … If any black youth can have something like that, because that's the most problem out here with gangbanging and selling drugs, because where they live, they have to help their mother, they have to do this. It's not they want to, they have to, like you know? So, if I ever win the lottery… Like I would be at the mall every day, chill with my friends, we could live the life, go on vacation, chill with my family, kick back, just relax. But in these times, there's none of that. Across most of the interviews for Nichols’ current project, young people identified money as central to improving their lives. When a youth researcher probed another young person (Dominic) about his financial situation, Dominic admits: “I just want money … I want to buy my own stuff. I don't want to ask my mom for no money or nothing. I just want to have my own shit.”

5 Harlow reported that OSAP took money directly from her bank account to cover interest repayment when she exceeded the maximum, making it impossible for her to pay her rent. Malenfant’s personal experiences with OSAP echo Harlow’s. Official publicly available OSAP documents, however, do not reference this process.

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These young people’s reverence for capitalist narratives are shaped by the same forces, which underpin other young people’s adherence to anti-capitalist and diy scripts. While the young people in our two projects lived very different lives – shaped, in large part, by their participation in social relations of race and class – they shared feelings of frustration and uncertainty about their futures, and described days and nights shaped by profound experiences of stress and exhaustion. They also shared a skepticism about state interventions, which shaped their adherence to and rejection of capitalist modes of work and thought. Different from the experiences of Harlow, Jazz, and Conan (all white youth), the young people in Nichols current work describe the involvement of the state in their lives as a simultaneous abandonment (e.g., in terms of the quality of subsidized housing) and surveillance (e.g., in terms of the activities of child protection services and the police). Among Youth-Of-Color, objectified knowledge about race and class intersect in their analyses of the failures of the state, manifesting in a shared view that the state doesn’t care about poor Black youth. While this analysis is largely produced in the context of young people’s engagement with the police, it also shapes how they interpret and work with other public sector institutions. While they saw formal education as providing access to labor market opportunities within the formal economy in general (which the research continues to bare out— e.g., Green and Townsend, 2013), they were skeptical that these general trends reflected the particularities of their own lives. Furthermore, young people’s immediate and acute experiences of poverty often mean they eschewed the possibility of increased income in the future, for the guarantee of money in the present to provide them with the things they needed for survival. Across Nichols’ study, and particularly among young people she interviewed while detained or incarcerated in jail, young people contrasted their experiences of the biting effects of poverty with their desires for the material goods, property ownership, and financial gain that capitalism promises. During an interview in a youth jail, a young man named Kayden explained that he had “stopped going to school grade 8. I went to grade 8 for a couple of months.” When asked why he stopped going to school, he explained he was: Just getting money. Didn’t want to go to school. First, I got robberies, stealing stuff. Around my area there’s a lot of rich people. You know there’s small buildings, that’s where I lived… How it was, kids weren’t tryna be bad”. kayden

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Like other youth we interviewed, Kayden was not “tryna be bad;” he was “just getting money.” In the face of profound inequality, and limited labor market opportunities, young people participated in street-level economies (e.g., stealing and/or selling things in unregulated markets). Their efforts to make money often coincided with decreased involvement in school. Because young people are required by law to remain in school until they are 18 years of age (Ontario Education Act), schools respond by disciplining youth for failing to attend and ultimately placing them in adult or alternative education programs. With the delivery of social assistance, eligibility for welfare and participation in job-training and job-seeking activities are monitored indicators of accountability and performance; in education, attendance records, standardized test results, credit accrual and graduation rates are monitored indicators of school performance. Neither approach to performance management and accountability enables a timely and targeted public sector response to young people’s acute experiences of poverty. 6

Metrics, Educational Accountability and Student Success

Alongside increasing income polarization (Burke and Sheilds, 2000; Banting and Myles, 2013), there have been simultaneous moves across the public sector to standardize service delivery (including education) in order to enable market-driven management of public sector resources. Educational contexts are exemplary spaces where youth encounter increasingly neoliberal forms of standardized measurement that impact their lives. In education, reforms began with the introduction of a standardized curriculum in the 1990s (Sears, 2000), followed by the introduction of standardized testing and other standardized academic achievement measures to track and compare school performance between schools, provinces, and globally (Lankshear and Nobel, 2011; Nichols and Griffith, 2009). Comparison is central to performance evaluation in the public sector, including schools (Frasier Institute, 2016); but as we demonstrated earlier in this chapter, comparison of public sector performance across actual sites of activity requires methods for transforming diverse circumstances into generalized abstractions. Methods of abstraction and calculation enable commensurability of performance across diverse settings. In the context of increasing income polarization, the gap between the general service delivery model offered by the public sector and the actual circumstances of young people’s lives continues to widen. Three of the metrics used to track and compare school performance are attendance, credit accumulation and graduate rates. During an interview,

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­ atricia, a Student Success6 teacher, recounted how a recent visit from a School P Board representative focused exclusively on the school’s underwhelming ­performance metrics. The Ministry of Education (2015) in Ontario has articulated a goal of 85 percent graduation rate and a 75 percent student pass rate on Education Quality and Accountability Office (eqao) standardized testing results. These are the desired results, against which the performance of Ontario’s public schools is assessed. The School Board representative was concerned “because the graduation rate was low. Like they look at how many credits per/ student by 16 [years of age], right, and then how many make 24 by Grade 11 and duh-duh-duh. And so, we're below every time. We're below, we're below, we're below” (Patricia, interview). International interest in literacy development as an indicator of national economic development has shaped a proliferation of tools for measuring and comparing the academic performance of individuals, schools, school boards, regions, and nations (Lankshear and Knobel, 2011). The School Board representative’s targeted focus on credit accumulation is shaped by: the 2014 provincial policy document, Achieving Excellence: Renewed Vision for Excellent in Education in Ontario; stated provincial goals for improving standardized literacy and numeracy test results and graduation rates; and Patricia’s schools continued inability to meet the graduation targets that the province has set. This narrow focus is frustrating to Patricia, who recognizes a disconnect between her formal role as a Student Success teacher with a mandate to improve academic achievement (as demonstrated by credit-accrual, testing and graduation rates), and the actual organization of her work with students who come to her with a range of legal, social, health, economic and academic issues that require her support. She observed that the metrics – and the policies put in place to influence them (e.g., punitive attendance policies) – do not address the underlying economic disparities that underpin young people’s involvement in illegal local economies nor people’s everyday/every night struggles to avoid eviction, ensure there is food for everyone to eat, and to participate relations of consumption, which typify urban adolescence. When the School Board representative asked her to explain the school’s poor results, Patricia tells the interviewer she

6 Alongside the provincial Learning to 18 reforms, which changed the upper limit for mandatory education to 18 years of age, the province of in Ontario created the Student Success Strategy. Two key initiatives associated with the strategy were the development of Student Success programs, facilitated by Student Success teachers.

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was pissed. Like why is that happening? Why is that happening? Because Breanna's got a tumor and Lynn's pregnant and Carlos is depressed … and so-and-so's up on murder charges, and … if you want to know the thing that I think that all the kids have in common and maybe this is not a very good perspective because I only see the kids that are at-risk, but I would say the overlying cause, the one thing that these kids have in common is poverty. (Emphasis in original) Patricia rhymes off a list of health, social and economic reasons why her school experiences below-average credit accrual rates. Poverty causes poor mental and physical health (World Health Organization, 2004; World Bank, 2014). The relationship between poverty and poor health is not simply a theoretical or statistical connection. It is apparent in actual ordinary things young people do daily and nightly in the living of their lives. Many of the young people we interviewed talked about how they navigate their mothers’ unhappiness and stress because she can’t pay their bills; others talked about their own stress to make ends meet and avoid eviction. Young people observed their mothers going without food and told us what it is like to wake up to empty fridges and cupboards or vermin-infested social housing complexes. Further, those involved in the informal street economies talked about the physical and emotional toll a body feels when one is never being able let her or his guard down – even at home. In turn, poor mental and physical health makes it difficult to sustain financial security through labor market participation (World Health Organization, 2004; World Bank, 2014). A public sector effort to measure and manage institutional performance cannot logically use the academic trajectories of students as its central metric unless the actual material circumstances of the students’ lives are also held constant. Given well-documented income polarization – especially in large urban centers – which produces vast differences in the social and economic organization of young people’s lives, school performance data is not meant to be used to draw comparisons between schools, but to generate a year-over-year comparison of individual schools to “see if the school is improving” (Fraser Institute, 2016: 4). While this might be the stated objective of the exercise, the Fraser Institute Report Card presents individual school performance results for the entire province in a single document, enabling (and even encouraging) any member of the public to compare performance results within and across school boards and districts. Some school boards have developed and implemented indexes through which they rank school vulnerability (e.g., the Learning Opportunities Index or loi) and use these rankings to account for resource-related decisions. On

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the one hand, these indexes are designed to enable equitable fund-distribution processes; on the other hand, some of the interventions the funds support are punitive (e.g., school police officers; surveillance cameras; and the distribution of divisional policing support resources). The other difficulty is that the use of neighborhood-level socio-economic indicators to create eligibility criteria for social programs, means resources are inaccessible to young people whose individual circumstances differ from neighborhood- or school-level data. Kora, a school board youth worker, observes how the loi rankings pushed the school where she worked out of the eligibility window for a summer employment ­program that young people in the neighborhood needed: So, they had summer caretakers, and these students would work alongside with the caretakers in the school. It was fantastic pay. It was very structured. They got whmis training. They got work experience … but our school is no longer eligible to apply for any of that … The board has something called the loi [Learning Opportunities Index] … and they did a reorganization of how to rank the loi … And when they did the reorganization, we dropped closer to the bottom [in the rankings]. I guess it had something to do with, like, when they look at our community here, the community is not reflective of the school population. Even though we have a lot of pockets of public housing that end up coming here, so low income families and those kind of struggles and stuff like that, all of the residential area here, where we have many, many, many single family dwellings of incomes that are higher, those are not kids that come to our school. Those are retired families. And so, whatever they changed in that criteria, changed us so we were no longer eligible for that [youth employment opportunity]. In much the same way that the Fraser Institute report card is framed as an objective measure of school improvement, the loi is presented as able to measure “relative need” across the school board and compare “all schools on exactly the same set of data collected in a consistent, reliable, and objective manner” (tdsb, 2014: 1). Increasingly, public sector decision- and policy-­ making processes are organized in relation to quantitative measures of need (e.g., the percentage of families in a student’s neighborhood whose income is at or less than half the median income in the city) and/or quantitative differences in institutional performance (e.g., the Fraser Institute report card findings). As relations are reorganized to enable the collection and use of various descriptive and evaluative data, further technologies are produced to enable people to store, sort, interpret and use the vast amounts of data being g­ enerated.

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The various recording practices, and the content of what is recorded, shape conduct and thought towards particular ends (Miller and Rose, 2008). The use of a particular index or scale shapes what people pay attention to – that is, they observe specific details, while disregarding or failing to take notice of others – and how they interpret what they observe. For both the youth and the workers discussed above, the use of these technologies limit how they are able to engage with and get what they need from public sector institutions. 7

Is There a Role for the State to Play in the Administration of People’s Lives?

Teachers and social workers are critical of the use of narrowly constructed quantitative eligibility criteria to determine and justify the distribution of state resources. Despite this critique, they recognize that state intervention is required to enable formal labor market participation among the youth they work with, who actively desire labor market opportunities. When asked what would help schools make a difference in the lives of young people, Patricia explained that one of the things schools need is: “funding to be able to put programs together that would help support job readiness stuff or access to some kind of employment.” Students initially came to her program because they are struggling academically; but in conversation with them, she learned “a lot of kids looking for work, a lot of kids need a résumé now, today.” She goes on to explain that when a young person becomes comfortable with her, “they start talking, and if you're really going to help a kid, you can't help but help – you know – you got to deal with some of their issues.” When probed by the interviewer about the most common issues students are facing, Patricia observed that as often as they come with academic concerns, they come to her with questions about employment: “even like a kid I don't know very well will say, ‘Can you help me with my resume?’” Another educator (Tony, who works in an alternative program) observes that beyond helping youth access the other public resources that they need, “the second biggest thing … is getting the kids jobs. Youth unemployment is through the ceiling right now, and our kids don't present well … We need employers who will give these kids chances.” Across our interviews with youth-serving professionals, people suggested young people need employment opportunities. Young people also indicated that what they need and want is money in their pockets. An inability to transcend subsistence or survival economics clearly takes a toll on people’s health and wellness and experiences of inclusion in civic life. But alongside people’s suggestions that labor market opportunities represent a viable solution the

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complex social, institutional, and political-economic forces acting on and through people’s lives, there is also a sense the market is an insufficient mediator of people’s livelihoods. 8 Conclusion Young people are growing up in a particular time and place, where the distribution of economic and other resources is already and increasingly unequal. The market does not hold the answers to historically situated economic and social inequalities. The idealized impartial market upheld as the objective determinant of social and economic outcomes cannot attend to historically situated differences in the material contexts of people’s lives. The market can only serve as an objective mechanism if the contexts of people’s participation are equal – that is, where access to employment, education, property, and other direct and indirect forms of capital are universally accessible (Harvey, 2005). In our understanding of the experiences discussed above, there are points of access into increasingly neoliberally structured social programming, which are closed to many youths. While young people may be trying to participate in the market through gaining employment, education or securing stable housing, they are often hitting walls, which lead to the development of complex, and often only marginally successful, survival strategies. Whether these involve eschewing traditional forms of employment and expectations, attempting to survive off “capitalist waste,” or entering the informal economy through participating in selling drugs in order to support oneself and one’s family, young people are increasingly doing work to combat their exclusion from programs which may have once offered support from economic, social, and housing precarity. Often, they are facing punitive measures, including the refusal of financial support, as a direct result of the ways poverty is organizing their daily lives. Despite neoliberal shifts focusing on the restructuring or defunding of government programs, there is clearly a role for the state to play in ensuring equitable access to labor-market opportunities, as well as other state resources such as publicly funded education. One way this may be imagined is through looking at the concept of the social economy. The social economy is understood as a space that exists between the state and the market, falling into some kind of realm of “civil society”, and may allow for policy which “places people, their communities, and ecosystems at the centre of the public policy paradigm for Canada’s future” (Amyot et al., 2012). A move towards a social economy suggests one way in which the struggles and frustrations discussed above can inform the development and

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implementation of government policy. Social economic approaches to policy development can serve to integrate multiple levels of concern (e.g., social welfare, economic factors, and environmental issues) (Amyot et al., 2012). A social economic perspective aims to address varying levels of integrated issues and the complex policies that affect the day-to-day lives of actual people. Through focusing on the concerns of those living within these systems, the approach is meant to inform a “people-centered” (Downing, 2012: x) policy shift. A peoplecentered approach to public policy making and service delivery might take its cues from an institutional ethnographic approach to research. Researchers and/or policy analysts would begin with what people know and have experienced about a complex of institutional processes or services. From here, participants could collectively identify the problems people face in getting their needs met, and then work with researchers to figure out how institutional policies, practices, and procedures are shaping their experiences. Once the problematic processes have been identified, an empirical case for reforms can be made. Although policy-making and implementation represent important social change tools, there are clearly things to be done at the level of actual individuals living their lives differently, in order to resist participating in the processes of abstraction and alienation, which make participating in neoliberal capitalist states possible and even desirable. Young people in Malenfant’s study actively resisted the bureaucratic and individualizing practices of the state and state-led policies for the administration and management of human life by creating and circulating alternative scripts and resources to other young ­people across Canada. These young people were cultivating communities across varied spaces built around the circulation of anarchist texts (mainly in the form of zines) focusing on diy practices, resources, and ideas. These zines were cheap to produce and circulate. They could be shared online or in person. Unlike policies which depend on the use of nominalizations, which obscure the presence of people as active concerting subjects, the zines were written as person-to-­person how-to guides on growing food, dumpster diving, building homes and raising children. They emphasized the formations of communities in order to support one another, often based around rural agricultural projects or attempts to work outside of government structures they saw as inherently violent. These texts allowed for a shared knowledge of alternative ways to “­survive” and were acknowledged as radical and political acts.

Chapter 11

Youth Responses to Neoliberal Erosion of Solidarity Vibeke Bak Nielsen 1

What is the Problem?

In spring 2015, I had the privilege of giving a lecture about social work in a Nordic welfare state context at a College in the Bronx, New York. I was at that time in the very beginning of my analytical thoughts concerning my thesis (Bak Nielsen, 2017) about unemployed and socially vulnerable young people at the margin of the Danish society. I had the opportunity to present some of the thoughts, I had done working with my empirical material, about how these young people act on the social situation, they are facing. The target group for my Ph.D. research project is a group of young people, whom I have also been working with during my 20 years as a social worker. A group of young people at the age of 18 to 29, who in relation to their unemployment in the Danish welfare system is categorized as having other social problems, that makes it difficult for them to connect to education and work. Young people who in their everyday life are struggling with different degrees of complex social problems and personal challenges; poverty, homelessness, lack of education, dyslexia, anxiety, depression, adhd, substance abuse, violence, and crime. They receive cash benefit against demands for participation in activation projects or unpaid internship. At the end of my presentation of my preliminary empirical observations, one of the students in an evening social work class, a young black man raised his hand for a comment: “Maybe they just have to get older, grow up and learn, what it means to do education, have a job and make an effort in life?” He could have said, “What is the problem?” And it became clear to me, that some of these students knew very well the importance of poverty, social problems, and personal challenges I was talking about, but without having access to the same health care opportunities, cash benefit and financed education as the group of young people in my research. Young Americans struggling to have an education and find their way in life. Working in the daytime and doing their studies in the evening. So, what was the problem? The question related to a dominant neoliberal discourse, which also can be identified in a Nordic welfare context, when it comes to political and institutional understandings of and solutions to the challenges these young people are facing. In these understandings, the reasons why this group of young p ­ eople © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���9 | doi:10.1163/9789004384118_012

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has difficulty holding on to education and work are related to their behavior, upbringing, and capability in their early school life, learning gaps, and lack of socialization. Moreover, to the need to “grow up” and distance themselves from risk behavior as responsible adults, self-supporting and active citizens not only in their own life but in relation to their society as well. This chapter focuses on how a group of unemployed young people in potentially marginalized positions in relation to education, work, and participation in society in general respond to a neoliberal erosion of the solidarity project that characterizes the Nordic welfare state model (Lorenz, 2005, 2006) and argue, that young people, on the one hand, have become self-responsible citizens, perfect neoliberal self-empowered acting subjects (Cruikshank, 1999). At the same time, these young people act in ambivalent positions between potentially qualifying and potentially disqualifying actions. Dealing with these ambivalent and precarious positions, the young people challenges the individualized understandings of the social problems and personal challenges they are facing, as well as the solutions to these problems and challenges. They do so in their resistance to the institutional understandings, understandings that individualize young people’s social problems in relation to unemployment and are dominated by neoliberal impact on social work practice in categories, expectations, and requirements, which leaves more problematized aspects of young people’s lives in the shadows in favor of a more competitive and labor market-oriented perspective on their problems. Young people’s resistance that can be identified empirically in a dialectical, cooperative, and communal ways of handling the situation, they are facing. The chapter draws on the empirical analyzes of my thesis, and the structure of the chapter is initiated by a presentation of the research methods and analytical design of the research project. This presentation is followed by an explanation of the neoliberal changes and perspectives on the erosion of solidarity in social work encounters with this group of young people. Looking at the responses from the young people to these changes, I will try to answer not only, what the problem is, but also if there is anything in the Danish welfare system that triggers particular responses to the neoliberal loss of solidarity, and how can these responses inform productive potentials of social work encounters with these young people? 2

Research Methods and Analytical Design

The research project takes form of a case study and is based on a qualitative and exploratory collection of data. The principal research method used is ­qualitative interview. Informal conversations and participant observations are

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also an integral part of the study. I have interviewed 16 young people over a period of ten months. I got access to them at two different activation programs, and I have visited them in their home, activation program, community centers, or where they felt safe. Beside that I had informal conversations with around 20 young people in participating observations at an activation project, where I participated in some of the activities (making re-cycle bags) for a period of three months. The study is data driven, and the participant’s narrative descriptions of individual social practices, situations and interactions are central to the development and use of analytical concepts. By making use of narrative descriptions, the study takes a pragmatic stance, as it lies in the intersection between biographical narrative (Riessman, 2008; Holstein and Gubrium, 2009) and short narratives (Bamberg, 2007; Olesen and Eskelinen, 2011; Olesen, 2016), in which the analytical attention is drawn to not only the person’s observations about his or her own experiences over time, but also possibly unperceived aspects (Olesen, 2016) of young people’s observations of their thoughts and actions in everyday situations that evolve from the young people’s accounts (Scott and Lyman, 1968). In Scott and­ Lyman’s understandings accounts are explanations, excuses and justifications used by the individual to create some kind of cohesion and meaning in their life. The study’s interpretive framework is inspired by the quest in ethnomethodology (Have, 2004) to elucidate how life is lived through different situations and interactions in everyday life. It takes the form as a both pragmatic and constructive (Brinkmann, 2012) as well as a critical approach (Bueno, 2013; Ringø 2016) to knowledge. Critical in that sense, that the gaze of the special, different, and surprising in reality of the life actual lived is pursued and developed. The concept of positioning is drawn from Davies and Harrés (1990; 2014). It is used in the study to analyze the young people’s accounts for their approach to a range of action contexts that are embedded to different social practices in their everyday life and into which the young people position themselves in the justifications of their participation, motivations, and intentions in different action contexts. Action contexts are defined here as the young people’s organization of practices in certain objective-means connections in their efforts to handle the problems they are facing. The action contexts are unlike social practices rooted in time and place, where the person participates from a certain position (Mørck, 2007) It means that the action context is evaluated from a firsthand perspective and not only from different social, cultural, and institutional values and norms relevant to the social practices in which the action context is embedded.

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Action contexts are empirically identified in interactions where the person, in accounting for his or her reactions, tries to distance themselves from further disqualification in relation to education and employment, achieve some degree of control and influence and various forms of clarification of their capability in terms of education and employment (Bak Nielsen, 2017). 3

The Erosion of Solidarity

The objectives as well as the means of the Nordic welfare state in relation to youth unemployment have changed during the last 20 years (Torfing, 2004; Pless, 2009; Katznelson et al., 2015), and the group of unemployed young people with social problems and personal challenges other than unemployment and lack of education has become bigger and more social differentiated (Katznelson et al., 2015) since the financial crisis in 2008. This paragraph will explain some of the impacts of these changes. In the Danish welfare planning during the 1970s and up to the early 1990 concerning youth unemployment, there was a strong faith in developing social work and early preventive activities. Introducing and supporting young people into extraordinary learning projects that in a meaningful and realistic noncompeting manner should help the unemployed young people to get access to labor market. Those, who had social problems or personal challenges other than unemployment and lack of education, should have access to the necessary treatment, counseling, personal and social support as either individuals or in a family context as well. The faith in an early preventive perspective in handling social problems in relation to youth unemployment comes under pressure as a consequence of a general rising unemployment in the 1980. The primary purpose of social work is no longer giving access to counseling, treatment, social and personal support and to create preventive opportunities that meaningfully can increase the unemployed chances for ordinary employment, but to increase the flexibility of the labor supply side. More over the main focus was no longer to qualify, help and support young people in their efforts to get access to labor market. The main focus was now on the need to increase labor supply side. If young people do not find a job themselves, they are sent to different forms of unpaid activation project to show, that they are willing to work and sanctioned, if they do not show up and participate. Various intertwined processes are at stake in social work in relation to youth unemployment: First of all, there is a change in social work with unemployed young people towards different forms of activation projects and

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sanctions, market supply and competitive efforts in addressing the problems and challenges in young people’s everyday lives. Education and employmentoriented social work must ensure positive and progressive interaction processes between the unemployed young people’s behavior and society. It is increasingly expected that the young people will be part of these interaction processes by individual reflective risk management in relation to challenges and ­opportunities in a search for personal well-being and a coherent plan for their education and working life (Konkowlewsky, 2011). Secondly, management technologies and instruments are gradually introduced to ensure these interaction processes. It was decided by law, that methods in social work must ensure that the view is less aimed at young people’s problems and more their resources – an approach that proves productive in the sense that it stimulates special skills and leaves others more problematic or, in a labor-market perspective, irrelevant conditions in the shadow (Caswell et al., 2010). Related to this, social work is facing substantial changes in going from a client-oriented perspective to a more administrative perspective (Baadsgaard et al., 2014; Jørgensen et al., 2015). New case management methods are crucial to what can be said about what and how to deal with young people’s unemployment, problems, and objective opportunities. Intertwined in these changes are the familiarization and individualization of the problems and challenges these young people are facing, which can be identified from a traditional “case-work” perspective in social work (Payne, 2005; Hutchinson and Oltedal, 2006; Petterson, 2009). An individual oriented perspective where the behaviors of unemployed young people managing their everyday life as unemployed are problematized and categorized as incompetence or lack of motivation and constrains in the personality of the young people (Glavind Bo, 2011; Juberg, 2015). Problems to be solved with a strategy aimed at the individual (Glavind Bo, 2011). A family-oriented perspective based on a classical socialization theory and the perception that primary, crucial socialization takes place in the family. In this perspective, other social and cultural contexts, institutions, and structures of responsibility are exempted from the young people’s socialization, as the family is considered as the most crucial socializing agents. The personal life and well being of the young people are primarily seen as family responsibilities (Glavind Bo, 2011; Nissen, 2005, 2011). If a young person does not relate to his paragraph and underlines these rationales, it is expressions of the young person’s displacement and lack of recognition of the problems associated with the person’s socialization and learning difficulties Therefore, it is the young person that has to be transformed and in their meeting with social work referred to personal development, activation and change of behavior with the aim of reaching a more

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r­ ealistic awareness of the challenges and opportunities in relation to education and work (Mik Meyer, 2004; Katznelson, 2004; Glavind Bo, 2011). One of the consequences of these intertwined processes is that youth ­unemployment and the risk of social problems in relation to youth unemployment discourse have ceased to exist as a structural problem in the Danish society. But at the same time the proportion of young people without work and education rises in Denmark as well as across all of Europe after the financial crisis in 2008, although in the Danish case not as pronounced as in the Southern European countries. Parallel to the rise in youth unemployment in Denmark has been both a reduction of the cash benefit to young people and a gradual retraction of availability and introduction of stricter rules regarding sanction if not showing willingness to work and participating in the different forms of activation project as required. The rationale behind the welfare state is no longer decommodification of citizens (Esping-Andersen, 1990), defined as benefits and assistance systems that protect an individual’s standard of living independent of success in the labor market, but rather a recommodification, where the citizen’s self-reliance is stressed through labor market participation. The key question is no longer how to ensure that people without economic deprivation can go in and out of work and in times of unemployment can get qualified to other kinds of jobs, but rather how to organize the welfare systems so the unemployed as soon as possible return to work and contribute to the competing aspects in the labor market. What has happened is a neoliberal erosion of the solidarity project as a central part of the understandings of the Nordic welfare state, and the rising of a new social order where the social responsibility of the welfare state increasingly has been transferred to the market, civil society and the individual (Lorenz, 2001, 2005; van Ewijk, 2010; Konkowlewsky, 2011). However, there are contextual differences among the European countries in relation to how supportive the social work systems are, when it comes to financial support, as well as forcing or mentoring young people with different social problems into the educational system. Although social work in Denmark still focuses on various forms of supportive efforts, the reduced cash benefit and the use of threat and sanctions have an impact on everyday life of a group of unemployed young people, who in addition to unemployment are struggling with complex social problems, such as the increasing difficultly for young people to find affordable homes. At the same time, they withdraw in periods from the requirements and control of social systems because they find it difficult to identify with the understandings they are offered in relation to the problems they are facing and the solutions available (Bak Nielsen, 2017). In those periods,

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they are financially left to themselves and the socio-economic networks they have available (Katznelson et al., 2015; Bak Nielsen, 2017). In the years after the financial crisis, non-governmental organizations (ngo) in Denmark reacted to the rising negative implications of reduced cash benefits and the use of threat and sanctions. The homeless counting from The Danish National Social Research Center (sfi) shows a rise of 80 percent in the number of homeless young people at the age of 18–24 years in the period 2008–2013. ngos such as Kirkens Korshær and WeShelter report meeting a rising number of young people in their homeless shelters, pointing at the combination of the reduced cash benefit, the use of threat and sanctions and the fact that the labor market, as well as the educations systems, fails to find room for and include a growing group of young people with a complexity of social problems and personal challenges in addition to their unemployment (Rådet for Socialt udsatte, 2013). 4

Responses to Changes in the Social Order

In studying the responses to these changes from the perspective of a group of young people at the margins of society, I have found that they on the one hand account to their unemployment as politically expected and what is the political normative imperative. They are living the narrative about being responsible and accountable in focusing their attention on education and employment in their effort to cope with the social situation in which, they are located. Many have not completed but undergone different forms of further education. Some have completed but have not succeeded in getting a job. Many have had different short-term jobs. They have all participated in various activation projects. And in periods, where they are confronted with economic sanctions, they are oriented towards help from family or ngo, until they feel ready to fulfill the requirements from the employment services. On the other hand, they resist and challenge the individualized requirements and understandings of the problems as well as the solutions. Looking at the consequences of these responses in relation to social work, as they appear in these young people’s accounts, I will try to answer not only the question raised that spring evening in Bronx, New York (“what is the problem?”), but also consider what we can learn from these responses. I now turn to the narratives of a group of young people on the margin of society who are searching for treatment in the health care system, social counseling, and support within as well as beyond the boundaries of the social welfare system while searching for educational opportunities and work

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opportunities (Bak Nielsen, 2017). Young people, while often failing to succeed in education and work as expected, live the narrative about being responsible and accountable. Juliane is one of them. She is 24 years old and talks about her childhood being characterized by social instability, a father who drank too much, divorce, poverty, and the need to take care of her younger siblings. She has a high school degree but because of a period of depression and anxiety, she is not furthering her education and is out of job. I met her at an activation program where her main goal is job searching: It is important to show, that you even bother to do something and not just gives a shit. Then you get no help at all. I sat at my half-sister’s home and cried many times, because I do not know how to move on. But I am very conscientious, and I know that, if I do not contribute, then it is the way in these systems, they will not help you. (Interview with Juliane) Juliane participates in reading and writing classes at the activation project. Even though reading and writing is not a major problem for her, she knows she must show that she is willing to do something and contribute to becoming a better potential employee. At the same time, she does not expect to get any support, unless she participates in the classes as she applies for jobs. In doing so, she depends on the help she can get from her half-sister, who helps Juliane find relevant jobs and write applications. In the long run, Juliane hopes to get the needed counseling from the social welfare system if she does not succeed in obtaining jobs. The help of her half-sister is also essential as she has assisted in accessing relevant care and treatment for her depression, which is a prerequisite for participating in the activation program and in the long run getting access to social counseling (Bak Nielsen, 2017: 126). Juliane is one example in a group of young people who, in addition to unemployment, are struggling with a complexity of social problems but take action and seek meaningful and realistic access to recognition and clarification of their capacity to act, learn and work in contexts that are embedded in social practices within and beyond the boundaries of the social welfare system (Bak Nielsen, 2017). At the same time, they distance themselves from the individualization of their challenges. They do so by relating their accounts for the challenges not only to their early family life and upbringing, early school life, socialization and learning gabs, but also to a series of structural, contextual, and conceptual limitations in society and social work. They are clearly relating their situation to social and personal circumstances that occurred throughout their

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adolescent and early adult years. Circumstances in life, lack of jobs, sickness, accidents, loss, and grief, that have caused different kinds of ruptures in their everyday life, which in turn have created education and employment related challenges. (Bak Nielsen, 2017). They feel very much left to themselves in their quest for ways to clarify what they are capable of and what kind of opportunities they have to strengthen their prospects in relation to education and work. They comment on, how they are often confronted by external understandings of what kind of person they are, with which they cannot identify. There is a disconnect between social understandings of the problems they are facing and their understandings of both the problems and potential solutions. And they do not feel invited to contribute to the construction of any of these understandings. Morten is 28 years old and from an early age has experienced depression. He has completed three years of university studies but is very unsure about returning to university after almost two years of recovering from depression. He feels very much left on his own in this decision and in figuring out what kind of support he needs to succeed in finishing his studies. He tells me, that the social counselor has always taken for granted that he will return to university and has never asked him what kind of support he needs to succeed. It has just been a question about getting fit again. Morten is sure that he will not succeed if he does not get additional support. He just does not know how and in what form that support should be. He has tried to talk about it, but he does not feel the social counselor finds it relevant. They have never asked, whether I am going back to university. We have never talked about other possibilities. And I don’t know, what it should be, but it also seems quite confusing. And nobody has ever asked me, what kind of support I need going back to university. It is, as if they already have certain ideas about, who we are, and what our problems are without even asking…I don’t know, it is as we don’t exist as persons…. (Interview with Morten) In dealing with this feeling of being left on their own, young people are accounting for their reactions to the challenges as active responsible and participating citizen in their orientation towards action context embedded in social practice within as well as beyond the social welfare system. And in doing so, they are giving access to a productive contextual resource approach or strength perspective in social work (Saleebey, 2002; Healy, 2009). This perspective is more consistent with that of young people’s accounts that emphasize more structural and contextual barriers, rather than an approach that mainly

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focuses on young people’s individual challenges in gaining access to education and work. Ehmet is 22 years old. He was born in Croatia and came to Denmark with his parents as refugees when he was three years old. When I met him, he had been in and out of jobs the last three to four years. He discusses his encounters with the employment system and the thoughts he has about his opportunities to earn his own money, which is a very important value in his life: I’ve done some wrong things in my life. Something I have regretted, something is just a part of life. But I’m actually good at cooking, and I know something about computers, but today you have to have exam papers on everything. And I can’t give them that. I should probably have started doing some kind of education after primary school, but I’m not good at school… […] … They tell me, I must go to school, and when I say, I don’t want to, they say, but you must. Then I tell them, that I want a job and earn my own money, and I need their help to find an internship. Just try to help me, but do not throw me into a room with 25 other youngsters, where we have to sit all day looking at a computer searching for jobs. It doesn’t change anything, and I can do that at home. But that’s all you get. Then I am just thinking, fuck them. (Interview with Ehmet) The perspective of these young people provides a contribution to knowledge about structural as well as contextual aspects of their encounters with the welfare system. Structural aspects can be identified in their accounting of ­problems in getting access to permanent jobs, education, internships with long-term job opportunities and relevant health care. Contextual aspects can be identified in their accounting of meeting with certain external (social) conceptualizations and understandings of their problems and the solutions to these problems. Conceptualizations and understandings with which they cannot themselves identify and feel as though they did not participate in constructing, particularly in terms of employment and social services. In their search for recognition and further clarification of resources and capabilities, they are oriented toward action contexts embedded to different social practices both within and beyond social welfare systems. Analytically I have identified four different reflexive positions in young people’s orientation towards different action contexts: negotiation, autonomy, adapting and withdrawal (see Figure 11.1). Empirically I will in my presentation of these positions introduce you to Ina. Ina is 28 years old. She has a High School degree and has been in and out of social benefit and activation programs during the last ten years. The four different reflexive positions can be identified over time in her narratives a­ ccounting

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Orientation towards action contexts beyond the employmentand wellfare sysytem

NEGOTIATING

AUTONOMOUS

Low

High

Service searching inside the employmentand wellfare system ADAPTING

WITHDRAWN

Low Figure 11.1 Reflexive Positions in Orientation towards Action Contexts in Young People’s ­Accounts of their Reactions to the Social Problems and Personal Challenges in their Everyday Life. Source: nielsen, 2017: 187

for her reactions to the problems she has been facing, and her efforts to clarify her way to further education and employment as a responsible and active citizen. She has had periods of depressions, that over time has altered her way in life. And she has had a hard time finding support in her efforts and desire to do education. In presenting the positions, Ina’s accounts for her reactions will empirically show, how these positions can be analytically identified in the responses of the young people. The negotiating position is characterized by a high degree of orientation toward action contexts within as well as beyond welfare systems. Action contexts target recognition and clarification of the opportunities for ordinary education and employment and the expansion of the sphere of action in this clarification of their potentials and opportunities. In this position, they mobilize different forms of capital (Bourdieu, 1986) including mental, social, cultural,

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and, for some, also financial resources beyond cash benefits, often in the form of borrowed or given money from family members. In this position, they have an opinion about which options are desirable and realistic and it involves preferably different actors in the considerations. They often act strategically in relation to the opportunities and solutions that are assessed as realistic and desirable. They negotiate in different ways, more or less openly and directly, relating to their opportunities by being able to formulate wishes, expectations and demands on themselves and the environment both within and beyond the welfare systems. I often pretend that I can do more, than I am capable of. It gives me the opportunity to do the things, I would like to do. It gives me the opportunity to say, if I can have my parents to pay for this course, can I then keep my social benefit during my participation in the course? Even though it is not always allowed, the counselor has given me the opportunity because I present myself as capable of doing, what is needed. But I often end up having to do both. When I went to the art class three days in a week, art classes can’t be approved as activation, my parents paid the fee, but I also had to participate in the activation program the last two days of the week. That is required to have social benefit. And that is too much. I did it, but it always ends up with me being tired and depressed. (Interview with Ina) The autonomous position is characterized by a high degree of orientation toward action contexts beyond welfare systems and a low degree of service searching (Bleiklie, 1997). In this position, young people are to a great extent oriented towards employment and self-support. Ordinary educational training is at this position associated with different forms of difficulties and limitations, which means, that young people in this position finds it difficult to get access to as well as complete educational training. It does not mean that he/she does not want an education rather it simply means that the person in this position does not always make realistic assessments with regards to educational opportunities being addressed in welfare systems. In the autonomous position, the young person draws on various forms of capital (Bourdieu, 1986). However, the attention and mobilization of resources is especially directed to social resources where he or she draws on their network, family, friends and acquaintances or activities and relationships in associations (ngo) beyond welfare system requirements and control in addressing the challenges in their everyday life and trying to find ways away from further disqualifying conceptions and understandings. In this position, young people have a more spontaneous look at various solutions and the assessment of which solutions

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are realistic in the long run. They are less targeted at specific solutions than in a negotiating position. These young people often resist the demands and expectations of welfare systems. They often experience various sanctions in their public financial support, which in different ways are mitigated by finding short-term jobs on day-to-day bases, undeclared work or otherwise financing life by hustling through everyday life, which at times can include criminal activities. I have been in and out of social benefit since High School. In periods, when I have had the strength to work, I have taken short time jobs. You see, I am 28 years old, and it is a struggle to find any kind of support, that can help me in clarifying my way to further education. I have met nothing but struggle. And then I look for these short term jobs that nobody else wants. But it has always ended up with a period of depression. I have had periods without any money. In these periods my boyfriend supports me, until I am better. But then what? …[…]… I have searched for support in our local church. They have these volunteer programs for young people. I think, I was too old, but the counselor was very nice. He really tried to help me. But everything ends at the Jobcenter. You have to do everything by yourself. Then maybe you get help. (Interview with Ina) The adapting position is characterized by a high degree of service searching and a low degree of orientation towards action contexts beyond the welfare systems. Young people in this position target ordinary education and employment but find it difficult to find available opportunities. In this position, he or she has difficulty finding solutions to different challenges or limitations ­associated with education or employment as realistic solutions. In mobilizing resources, the young person adapts to welfare system requirements and expectations, which will determine the evaluation of capital as relevant in meeting welfare systems demands for performances. In this position, the young person considers how he or she has adapted to the expectations and requirements of welfare system in a search for access to clarification of potentials and realistic opportunities. At the same time young people in this position often comment on, how they see themselves as captured in specific understandings of their problems and solutions to these problems. Understandings that they cannot always themselves identify with. Now I am at this activation program. I have had a long period, where I have just tried to become better. Before that I had a job as a cleaning assistant every morning and every evening. I had that job for almost half a

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year. But I was all alone, and my employee was always angry at me, because she said, I didn’t do as expected. I had to stop. It was too hard. Then I didn’t get any money. My boyfriend tried to help. But then my mother said that I had to go to the Jobcenter to get some help. Now I have my social benefit, and I am at this activation program every day. But I don’t know what to do here. They say that I am too clever to be here, because I have a High School degree. But I need to be here, if I’ll have my social benefit. I don’t really know, what else to do. (Interview with Ina) The withdrawn position is characterized by a low degree of orientation towards action contexts both within and beyond the welfare system. Young people find it difficult to meet welfare systems requirements and expectations. They have frequently lost confidence in the capabilities of activation programs and find it difficult to identify options that may be available beyond welfare systems. They often find themselves in a powerless or ambivalent situation where they cannot discern realistic or desirable solutions. They live in this position on the margins of potential social networks both within and beyond the welfare system in requirement-free environments. In this position, the young person often must deal with the welfare system sanctions as a consequence of the failure to meet the society’s demands and expectations in order to receive financial public assistance. They hustle through everyday life, borrowing, making “pay-back-services” and sleep on couches. For young people in this position, ngos become increasingly necessary. To a certain extent ngos have the opportunity to cover basic material needs or give access to different kind of assistance in the form of counseling and support in everyday life. I am often so sad and afraid, that nothing will change. It has been like this for 10 years, and nothing has really changed. People say that everything is possible, if you work hard. I have worked hard. But look at me. I am in the same place as I was 10 years ago. Nothing has changed. I don’t know what to do. I have been so ashamed about myself, that I haven’t succeed in anything. Then I just stay at home. I haven’t told anybody, because nobody really understands. (Interview with Ina) The various positions do not correspond to certain roles, identities, or types. Empirically, the positions are identified in mixed forms in the young people’s reflections as fluctuations between different action contexts in their reactions and accounts for their reactions to the challenges. And within the social processes and communicative mechanisms, with which these shifts of positions

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are associated, the young people create reflexive room to maneuver. Room in which they do not merely adapt to the dominant structural, contextual, and institutional conceptions and understandings, but also seek to influence (re) constructions of conceptions and understandings of reasons and solutions as these unfold in the different everyday interactions. The analysis of reflexive positions in young people’s considerations of their reactions could in fact add up to a typology. However, central to the analysis of young people’s accounts are the processes, movements, and variations in the young people’s intentionality (Juberg, 2015) in their reactions to challenges and the reflexive room of maneuvering that arises in the young people’s ­accounts of their reactions in dealing with such challenges. “Tentative” intentionality both spontaneous and targeted (Juberg, 2015) figures at the same time in young people’s accounts of their reactions to the challenges and opportunities they encounter in various interactions of everyday life. In the conceptualization of “tentative life” Juberg (2015) goes beyond an understanding of the instability in young people’s behavior as risk behavior, which is often seen in youth social work (Follesø et al., 2016). The conceptualization of “tentative lives” gives access to a more productive concept of different forms of intentionality than the concept of risk. Such a perspective reveals that young people maneuver themselves in highly tentative ways both targeted, spontaneous, and pre-reflective forms of intentionality and notions of respectability (Juberg, 2015). Central to the young people’s reactions are their search for change in the sense that they orient themselves to action contexts, where they not only manage to mobilize different forms of (capital) skills and competencies, but where these skills and competencies are also transformed into the notions of what, they want to be capable of. This comes to the fore when they try to connect what they are capable of in one action context to what they want to be capable of in another action context (Bak Nielsen, 2017: 202). In acting across different action contexts embedded in different social practices and connecting different forms capability, young people are acting dialectically – being and becoming at the same time (Vygotsky, 1978; Holzman, 2009). A typology of four types corresponding to the four positions will only contribute to further categorization of young people’s behavior. Where the potential of young people’s understandings, motivations, intentions (Juberg, 2015) and ability to act (Mørck, 2007) are overlooked in positions where multiple positions are in play at the same time. In this context of trying to identify and learn from the responses of these young people it is important to note that while the processes between different action contexts embedded in various forms of social practices gather around particular positions, and one position thus can be more pronounced than other positions in the young people’s

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accounts, there are even more positions in play at the same time in these ­assemblies of positions (Bak Nielsen, 2017: 203). These assemblies of positions are illustrated in Figure 11.2 below: Juliane, who has told us that she gets most of the support she needs from her half-sister, has also told me that she draws on what she learned from a former mentor during the last year of High School in relation to the need of having some kind of routines and structure in her daily life. The skills and competencies she has mobilized in these interactions with the mentor and her half-sister is what she draws on in dealing with the challenges she is facing in her everyday life without employment. Doing that, she takes an autonomous position, but at the same time adapts to the requirements in her encounters with the welfare system. In this way, she does what is expected and required in order to receive financial support. Showing that she, within as well as beyond the welfare system, is an active, motivated and a self-supporting citizen, she is negotiating her way to counseling and support in relation to getting access to an internship if needed in the long run. At times Juliane has withdrawn from encounters with the welfare services, as well as finding it difficult to be a part of action contexts in social practices beyond welfare services because of depression and anxiety. Orientation towards action contexts beyond the employmentand welfare sysytem High NEGOTIATING

AUTONOMOUS

High

Low Service searching inside the employmentand welfare system WITHDRAWN

ADAPTING LOW

Figure 11.2 Reflexive Rooms of Manoeuvring. Source: bak nielsen, 2017: 187

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Juliane tells us that these periods are not occurring that often anymore and she thinks that is because she now has a close relationship with her sister who helps her prevent these periods of heavy depression and anxiety. In accounting for her reactions to the challenges she is facing in relation to unemployment and the risk of depression, Juliane moves between various reflexive positions in relation to the various forms of action contexts to which she is oriented. Doing so enables her intentions and motivation to have tentative and changeable manners. In their search for coherence and meaning, young people are oriented towards the importance of social belonging in action contexts embedded in different social practices and forms of communities, social activity, and relations. Here they find recognition and access to further clarification of their capability and potentials. They are trying to combine what they are capable of in one action context to what they wish to be capable of in other action contexts. In these social processes and communicative mechanisms young people are learning and developing in a non- instrumental and decommodified way of learning (Holzman, 2006). In acting dialectically (Vygotsky, 1978; Holzman, 2009) a productive perspective is emerging in young people’s tentative intentionality (Juberg, 2015) and search for belonging. The impact of social belonging on young people’s efforts to combine mobilization of various forms of capital and capability in different action contexts emerges in all of the young people’s narratives. I have chosen Juliane’s narrative as an empirical example of the potential impact of social belonging. She tells about how the meeting with a girlfriend and her family, when she was 15 years old changed her thoughts about, what she is capable of. When I met Christine, many things changed. She came from a loving family. They talked and listened to each other. They gave each other hugs. I was not used to that. They have taught me physical contact with hugs and so. And I spent time with her mother. She also has had a troubled childhood, and we could somehow relate to each other. But now she has an education, husband, and children. I might also end up with that one day, even though I’ve been through some of the things, I’ve been through. They live in a completely different way, than I’ve been used to. They are positive and relax more. They talk about things…. [..] … I once dreamed getting an High School degree, but there were so many subjects I had not done in elementary school, so I didn’t think it would be realistic, but I still had the dream. There is nobody in my family who has a High School degree. And that meant a lot to me, that I ended up proving, that I could do it, even though it was a struggle. I got the opportunity to improve my

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exams from elementary school, and it gave access to High School. It made me really proud, and I could see my mother was proud. Had I not met Christine and been invited into her family, so it might never have happened. They have supported me and taught me so much about, how life can be lived. (Interview with Juliane) In their orientation towards action context embedded in various forms of social practices and communities, a group of unemployed young people with a complexity of social problems and personal challenges are challenging and confronting the processes in social work of building relationships. Building relationships with this group of young people to a great extent rely on the social worker’s cooperation with the young person and other professionals. Cooperation that relates to dominant professional perceptions and understandings of the reasons and solutions to the social problems and personal challenges young people are facing and to a lesser extent on the young person’s performance and mobilization of resources and capacity to act beyond a p ­ rofessional related space, conceptions, and understandings (Bak Nielsen, 2017). 5

Precarious Positions

The tentative, inconsistent, ambivalent, and sometimes chaotic behavior in young people’s efforts to handle unemployment, lack of education and social problems is often regarded as risk behavior. Risk refers to the understanding that a group of young people is in potentially unsafe and social threatening situations in their relation to society and their behavior potentially complicates a realistic and desirable solution to the social problems and personal challenges in their lives. The concept of risk is, like the concept of vulnerability, connected to a variety of personal and social circumstances in the lives of young people: mental health, substance abuse, family situation, social network, social structures, and economic conditions. The conceptual ambiguity means that young people at risk in social work as well as in the public debate are often associated with having difficulty mastering compulsory education, having complicated relationships with friends and family, are unemployed and do not complete secondary or further education. The concept of risk is as well as the concept of vulnerability at times used in social work with a certain truism in order to diffuse an extensive social diagnostic of disturbed, unstable and unmotivated behavior linked to young people, who are unemployed, have not completed secondary education or have other social problems and personal challenges (Follesø et al., 2016).

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The risk concept identifies and supports certain understandings and interpretations of the young people’s behavior that point to specific solutions to, how the challenges in young people’s lives can be solved, in order to prevent the risk of disqualification, marginalization and exclusion. Understandings and interpretations of young people’s lives and behavior that does not always correlate with the young people’s own accounts of the life they live, the different social practices to which they are oriented, the resources they mobilize in different action contexts and forms of communities, the ideas they have about themselves their possible future and the problems and challenges and possibilities they encounter in everyday life related to education and work. The young people in this study (Bak Nielsen, 2017) do not conceptualize their own behavior as risk behavior, unstable and unmotivated. Even in the periods in which they have had a hard time, they consider and account for how they have tried to mobilize a certain amount of control, responsibility, and capacity to act in handling the challenges in their everyday life. They reveal how their orientation towards different action contexts is embedded in different forms of communities, social activities, practices, and processes. But they also consider how they feel left alone and may feel insecure in the decisions they take. They consider the ambivalence they feel, when they try to act on their own or seek help but meet certain conceptions and understandings of who they are, what challenges and opportunities they have. Conceptions and understandings, they may have difficulty identifying themselves with. These feelings are compounded by not being invited to participate in the social constructions of the conceptions of who they are and the understandings of the reasons and solutions to the social, educational and employment situation they are in. The precarious emergence in the young people’s considerations of lack of participation and loss of solidarity (Lorenz, 2005, 2006) in the conceptual constructions of, who they are and the understandings of the reasons and solutions to the challenges, they are facing, as they look for ways to be a part of the construction of these understandings trying to find recognition and clarification of their capabilities. They are at the same time trying to combine what they are capable of in one social practice to what they would like to be capable of in action contexts embedded in other social practices. Their hustling is identified not only in relation to recouping basic material needs, it also relates to having a minimum of influence and control in their lives, being recognized in what they are capable of, and what they want to pursue.

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Ina has a dream about becoming a gardener and during the summer works in her parent’s garden. Meeting the counselor at the Jobcenter she asks for an internship in relation to gardening. Then I would like an internship in a flower shop or something like that. So, I was sent to a garden center, where I was told to clean, and I did so for two weeks. Then I said that it was not what we had agreed at all. We agreed that I should help in the garden center, but it didn’t change. I did the cleaning for two weeks, and then I just stopped. And for some time, we lived by my boyfriend’s salary. (Interview with Ina) The precariousness emerges in this kind of hustling as uncertain attempts to find paths to influence and control in their life within and beyond the limitations, control, and sanctions of the welfare system. For periods of time, some of them end up undertaking precarious jobs in short-term recruitments with precarious conditions. They are seeking admission to educational institution where they are eligible for state financed education support even though they do not feel confident they can complete the education. Actions that give them a sense of influence and control in their life and gives them a sanctuary from the requirements, the control and sanctions that confront them in the welfare systems (Bak Nielsen, 2017). The precariousness in all of these situations is identified in the young people’s fluctuation between the various action contexts as uncertainty and ambivalence in their tentative and explorative, reflexive positions, where this group of young people are constantly located between potentially qualifying and potentially disqualifying positions in society. Risky feelings associated with their considerations of the loss of solidarity; a loss that emerges in their considerations of the conceptions and understandings of their challenges and opportunities they face in welfare systems and their accounts on their reactions on these conceptions and understandings. Uncertainty emerges as paradoxical structures in their encounter with the welfare institutions where this group of young people experience how they, on the one hand, are left to themselves in the individualized address of the social problems and personal challenges in their everyday life. And on the other hand, they are in the welfare institutions offered certain understandings of the solutions and opportunities in dealing with the social problems and personal challenges, they are facing. Conflicting expectations and requirements in regard to this group of young people means that they find it difficult

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to identify with these but sanctioned if they fail to meet them. In these interpretations of both productive and precarious positions and the ratio of potentially qualifying and disqualifying positions, the risky elements in the young people’s accounts emerge then less as risky behavior and more as risky feelings in the young p ­ eople’s considerations and reflections of the uncertainty and ­ambivalence from the loss of solidarity in the social situation and their encounter with paradoxical structures and conflicting institutional rationalities. 6 Conclusion So, looking back at that question from the young man that early spring evening in Bronx, New York, what is then the problem, and what can we learn from the responses to this problem from a group of young people at the margins of society? The problem can be identified as related to the numerical rise of unemployed young people, who are facing a new social order, where neoliberalism erodes the solidarity of welfare societies. A social order where the political and institutional objectives and means in the welfare system have become destructive goals and where a bigger and more social differentiated group of young people, having other kinds of social problems and personal challenges than unemployment, reacts in productive as well as precarious positions in relation to education, work, and citizenship. Moreover, these young people have in their responses to the political discourses, objectives and means on the one hand adapted to a narrative of what is politically expected of them in terms of being an active, responsible, and accountable citizen. On the other hand, they resist and challenge the political and institutional understandings of the reasons and solutions to the social problems and personal challenges they are facing in life. Meaning that they, in their accounting, relay their reasoning for their thinking and acting and point at different structural and contextual limitations in getting access to the educational, personal, and social support they need. They point at the need for a feeling of social belonging in mobilizing different forms of capital, skills, and competencies in a dialectical understanding of learning and development – being and becoming at the same time. They are acting as if the welfare system does not exist trying to find personal, social, and sometimes economic kinds of material assistance beyond the welfare system. In accounting for their reactions, they are resisting and confronting the social order in social work constructions dominated by individualized conceptions and understandings. They do this through their orientation towards the meaning and importance of social belonging in illuminating their

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resources, capability, and potentials. In their search for recognition and further clarification they are trying to find a way to surpass further disqualification, acting as human beings with properties who make demands in responding and changing their reality. They are responding as participating citizen who act, seek influence, and challenge the dominating political and institutional individualized understandings of the social problems and personal challenges in their everyday life being young and unemployed. A pragmatic understanding of the impact of these young people’s responses to neoliberal changes and erosion of solidarity is the understanding that they have become the perfect neoliberal self-empowered acting subject (­Cruickshank, 1999). A more critical impact is the identification of dialectical, cooperative and community oriented processes and mechanism in the responses. Despite the loss of solidarity in the encounters with welfare systems, the welfare system triggers a citizenship perspective, that emerges in the young people’s resistance against the individualized understandings, as participation and orientation towards action contexts, rooted in a diversity of social practices both within as well as beyond welfare systems, in which young people interpret, improvise, and transform their everyday lives. In this understanding of citizenship, young people contribute to social transformation in dynamic dialectical mechanisms embedded in everyday interactions across different systems, structures, and contexts, in which opportunities, rights and obligations are continually negotiated and transformed. Where new productive understandings of developing communities and solidarity are potentially emerging (Bak Nielsen, 2017: 235–236).

Chapter 12

Social Welfare Responses and Professional Resilience in a (Post)Neoliberal Era: How to Understand the Dangers and Potentials of Today Mia Arp Fallov and Cory Blad “The problem, you see, is one for the subject who acts - the subject of action through which the real is transformed. If prisons and punitive mechanisms are transformed, it won’t be because a plan of reform has found its way into the heads of the social workers; it will be when all those who have a stake in that reality, all those people have come into collision with each other and themselves, run into dead ends, problems and impossibilities, been through conflicts and confrontations – when critique has been played out in the real, not when reformers have realized their ideas.” foucault, 2000: 237

We wanted with this book to investigate neoliberal reform as it is played out in practical reality; that is how it is experienced by the social welfare professionals who have a stake in this reality and who come into confrontation and collision with each other, with citizens and neoliberal reformers. Clearly, much has been written about the rationalities of reform and how to understand and conceptualize the neoliberal era (Hall and Lamont, 2013; Larner, 2003; Peck and Tickell, 2002; Peck, Theodore, and Brenner, 2010; Rose, 2017). In this concluding chapter we will draw the contributions together to show the myriad ways in which neoliberal reforms have prompted shifts in respective social welfare regimes, paying particular attention to ways in which social welfare professionals respond to the pressures of retrenchment and desire to minimize welfare initiatives and place the burdens of increasing hardships on respective citizens. We will start by discussing how to understand the ways practices have changed in order to draw out commonalities and differences across the contributions. In the second section of this chapter, we tease out different types of social welfare responses. In this section we focus both on responses directed at the policy level and the types of responses emerging from the practice of social welfare professionals – mirroring the different sections of the book. We argue that simply viewing social welfare professionals as passive puppets of marketization forces left with the only option of tidying up after neoliberal

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���9 | doi:10.1163/9789004384118_013

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r­ ationalities of effectiveness and individualization is a too simple (and erroneous) way to approach and understand changes in social welfare practices in the Western world today. This leads to the third section of the chapter, in which we discuss both the potential dangers for social welfare in a (post)neoliberal era (Peck et al., 2010; Altvater, 2009) and the potential for social welfare practitioners to produce and support the emergence of new forms of solidarity and collective responses/alternatives. This discussion of alternatives is not to present another celebrating language of resources and potentials in the face of hardship. Rather it is to pose a first step on a possibly long journey in inventing a language of social welfare alternatives. By language we are not here thinking of it as something simply as a symbolic conceptualization of the world, but rather as a lived language of ways of understanding and acting in the world. As outlined in the introduction; neoliberalism is not only a set of practices under the banner of retrenchment and marketization; it is an ideology and a dominant discourse ­advocating marketized solutions and the ideal of homo economicus into ever more areas of society and individual worldviews (Brown, 2015; Jessop, 2004; Sum, 2004). Neoliberalism as an assemblage of discourse and practices encourages the individualization of social problems and the legitimacy of other-thanstate centered solutions. Too often social welfare finds itself curled in a corner by a language of necessity driven by economic rationales, pushed to the position of dealing with the shame of “unproductive” populations. This book seeks to deliver some tentative responses, and by doing this point to where we might go to restore the position of social welfare; not as an antithesis of economic prosperity and competition, but as a necessary complement and partner. It is time to revive the insights of Polanyi who argued for the complicity of welfare in providing necessary infrastructure and legitimization for economic growth (Sandbrook, 2011).1 Social resilience in the face of changing conditions for wellbeing and welfare is possible but do not depend on the individual alone (Hall and Lamont, 2013). Social welfare professionals have a sustained role to play in providing infrastructure and legitimacy for alternatives and in supporting the development of a different view and language of how to deal with the social problems of our times. As Polanyi observed, liberal capitalism is unable to resolve its tendency to exacerbate material hardships, which makes social welfare provision more necessary in economically liberalizing societies. The real question becomes how the two positions reconcile in such an environment. The concluding section of this chapter takes up this discussion.

1 See also Blad, Chapter 3 and Dello Buono, Chapter 2 in this volume.

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How Have Social Welfare Practices Changed in the Neoliberal Era?

A common theme across the contributions is that the reduction in entitlements spurs new practices. Social work and social welfare practices have always been oriented to the amelioration of need. This is undoubtedly true as it is also shown in the historical analysis of practices in and around the home by Fallov and Nissen (Chapter 8). But even though the end goal of practices has stayed the same, it is important to consider how this goal is influenced by and is adjusted according to the transformations in processes and dimensions of practices. Fallov and Nissen argue that practices related to interventions in and around the home changed focus from the materiality and practices of the mother to intervening in affective relations in the home. Social welfare professionals in community work and social work with vulnerable families in the context of Denmark intervene in the home by crossing the liminal space ­between public and private space. This liminal position enables the professionals to make visible conditions and constraints people face in the light of precarity. Practices of intervention in and around the home are focused in local community work on drawing otherwise isolated mothers (and families) into activities outside the home by building relations and bridges to what goes on in the surrounding environment. At the same time, social welfare professionals work to ensure that families are enmeshed in networks of care, which will assist in ensuring security around vulnerable children. Such practices then change welfare by engaging in what Newman (2017) terms a politics of responsibility. Thereby, elaborating on the themes of making the citizen active and responsible for their own government (Fallov, 2013; Miller and Rose, 2008) by demanding that they govern their emotional states in ways deemed legitimate. Focusing on the interactive dimension of the practices involved in the interventions in and around the home means that social welfare extends its scope and depth by making individuals responsible not only in a material but also in an affective sense (see Jupp, Pykett, and Smith, 2017 for more cases on affective governance). In the neoliberal era, where the government of welfare depends on the self-governing individual, this means an extra focus on the relation to one self and the ways one controls and express emotion and affective states of being. Practice alteration in response to conditions of precarity is likewise central to the contributions of Nichols and Malenfant (Chapter 10) and Ringø (­Chapter 9), albeit from differing perspectives. Nichols and Malenfant show, by conjoining two studies of urban and rural Canadian youth in precarious situations, how youth experience a disconnect from the policies and practices intended to drive them closer to education and work. Moreover, that the

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­ erformance technologies dominating the public sector emphasize this feeling p of disparity as they bring about an emphasis on metric and accountable practices which do not fit with the complexity of the young people’s situation. In both settings, then, young people feel excluded and, due to mistrust and alienation, seek alternative economies as strategic practices in dealing with situations of hardship. Similar strategies are portrayed in Bak Nielsen’s (­Chapter 11) contribution as she outlines how vulnerable young people in a Danish context feel a loss of solidarity and in many way similar experiences of exclusion as the ones outlined in the Canadian context. Moreover, similar to Nichols and Malenfant’s analysis, Bak Nielsen shows how young people engage in strategic practices of hustling which in one way can be interpreted as the young people fulfilling the system desires for active and self-empowered subject, but on the other hand should also be seen as an expression of the precarity in which they find themselves. The professionals on the other hand, are caught between recognizing the complex ways that economic hardship shape young people’s lives and enabling difficulties in engaging a sustained educational or employment trajectory. The latter proves deeply influential in how practitioners approach this contradiction, encouraging neoliberal conformity in order to secure continued funding. Ringø argues that the shift towards potentiality (Åkerstrøm Andersen and Grønbæk Pors, 2016) in social welfare practices means that the object of the practices changes from the determined individual to the undermined individual. Social welfare practices then focus on rehabilitation, learning and the development of competencies rather than compensation for disabilities and dysfunctionalities. Emphasis is on the individual to enhance independence from social systems, on forms of intervention which can proceed without specialized knowledge of the individual, cognitive, communicative, and physical functional problems and the structures and mechanisms that influence individual levels of functionality. Nevertheless, she also shows that social welfare professionals, despite being pressured to think in potentialities, are conscious and reflective about the barriers for individuals directed constantly towards the future in a simple goal-directed way. This indicates that complex and indepth knowledge of individual and collective problems do persist as a part of social welfare professional practice despite management emphasis on how to change such barriers into being potential resources. The pressure to focus on resources and the creative practices that social welfare professionals engage in to conjure resources where none were previously found is outlined in Nissen’s contribution (Chapter 6). She argues that social work with families has shifted to engage in strategic practices that raise resources primarily from the family network or in the children’s immediate

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environment. Although these practices are developed with the contribution and cooperation of social welfare professionals, Nissen argues that these same professionals have the potential to negate the social political agenda concerning inequality and disadvantages in families experiencing different forms of hardship. Negation is here perceived as exclusion of certain alternatives due to systemic indifference thus often combined with a distribution of problems and responsibilities to individuals (Luhmann, 2012). Social welfare professionals attempt to mobilize resources among the most vulnerable families, single parents, families enduring long time illness, and in some ways these efforts negate the hardship generated by the socio-economic structures and misrecognize social allocation of ressources across space (Bourdieu, 2000). The rationale for this focus on mobilizing resources is a dominant discourse that emphasizes the need for cost effectiveness across the family services. We then see that everyday practices of social welfare professionals across national contexts represent forms of struggle, as the pressure to adjust to what is articulated as need for cost-effectiveness and economic rationales drives them to look away from vulnerable people’s precarious situations. But as Nissen argues, professionals find strategies for including a form of sensitivity to the life world and valuation of human worth in their practical tactics of assistance. What is common moreover, is that knowledge of the difficulties disadvantaged young people and families face emerges in the fissures of an otherwise hard economically driven surface dominated by performance targets. We will return to the possible responses this generate in the following section. New organizational practices are another common theme across the contributions. In Ridzi’s contribution (Chapter 7) he demonstrates that attempting to find alternative forms of organization outside the state in the form of community action, community impact, and collective funding cannot fill the gap of welfare retrenchment in the context of the United States. He argues that collective action, although representing the new localism of today rooting interventions in the needs and engagement of communities, are more likely to reach professionals in the non-profit sector and government agencies than local informal neighborhood leaders. Ridzi shows that community impact while representing a local initiative that can anchor responses in local needs often have democratic challenges. Community foundations while representing an alternative to state and market cannot stand on their own and need help in the form of funding and professional assistance in order to provide sustained change in local communities. Although such practices of finding alternatives to state or market funding is more explicit and widely used in the US context, similar findings have been reported also in a European context (Amin, Cameron, and Hudson, 2002; Fallov, 2013).

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Ringø argues (Chapter 9) that the strategy to engage with alternatives to state driven funding means an increased focus on utilizing volunteer networks in social welfare practices. She argues that they a) should be seen as technologies of decentralization and self-reliance; and b) as symbolic of the continuous movement involved in utilizing potentials for change. A different take on networks and their role comes out in both Nichols and Malenfant’s and Bak Nielsen’s contributions (Chapters 10 and 11). In respective Canadian and Danish contexts, they show how young people in what are considered to be vulnerable positions chose alternative forms of inclusion than the path paved by ­social welfare professionals. Nichols and Malenfant show for example how young people cultivate alternative DIY communities built around alternative anarchist scripts, which is a long way from the official road to inclusion, which goes through formal education or jobs. But as Bak Nielsen argues, these forms of networks provide essential forms of solidarity and support in risky situations. 2

Responses to Social Policy Reform and Responses from Social Welfare Practices in a Neoliberal Era?

It is clear from the above that we do not understand the only option for social welfare to be a passive practice of letting the economic winds sweep over an ever more barren ground. Rather, what we see in our own contexts, and across the contributions to this book, is that social welfare practices are developing varied forms of responses. Some of them are less visible like the smallest shoots only giving the ground its green tint, more implicit in their practices, or having small range impact. But even the smallest tips of grass can break the hardest of surfaces and emerge in the most unexpected places. We will, therefore, deal with responses both at the level of policy and opposition, as well as responses springing from different forms of social welfare practice. In this section, we will outline different forms of responses as they emerge throughout the contributions, before pointing to the potentials and dangers facing social welfare in the following section. When we think of responses it is often outright protest that springs to mind. In some contexts, protest is effectively silenced by curtailing the power of professional organizations and professional knowledge (see Chapter 4 by Csarnecki and Vargas Chanes). Ciccia and Guzmán-Concha (Chapter 5) study the effect that non-electoral forms of political participation such as protest movements, strikes, and demonstrations have on social policy reform and more explicitly on unemployment insurance policies in 20 advanced economies. Their findings show that protest does have a role to play in the resistance to

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r­ etrenchment in periods of high unemployment. They find that protests are more likely to have an effect in countries with a left-wing opposition, as they will be more sympathetic to the demands of the protestors. What they show, interestingly enough, is that protest does not have the same effect in countries where the left wing is in government. They argue that this is because there will be no political actors left to propose alternatives to the ideas of retrenchment and cutbacks. They show, moreover, that corporatism and thus what would seem easy alliances between protest movements and political power has no simple relation to policy reform. In some countries they have studied (Austria, Belgium, Sweden, and Portugal) corporatism helps to hinder reform and cutbacks, whereas in other instances (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and Norway) corporatism became a precondition of retrenchment. What they conclude is that no single factor (problem pressures, political institutions, and political ideology) is enough to account for varieties in welfare trajectories. It is the interrelations between these factors, which is the key to understand the situated and contextual logic of reform. Dello Buono argues in Chapter 2 that to understand social welfare reform we must triangulate connections between political economy and state policy dilemmas with social movement activities. Otherwise, we might risk losing sight of the hard-fought struggles of organized labor, social movements and social practitioners. These efforts are the crux of the social contract and the target of recent neoliberal reform of even Nordic welfare states. Blad shows in Chapter 3 with respect to Finland and Sweden, the complexities of the political situation in a matured neoliberal era. Even in countries that should be exemplars of social protectionism, economic crises had its effect on increasing hardship and rising living costs. The presence of robust social welfare structures in Nordic capitalist states mitigates but does not remove the central tendencies of capitalism in generating income disparities and wealth inequalities. As noted in the introduction to this volume, the sustained presence of liberalizing pressures and worsening material hardships sustain popular demands for some form of material protection from these adverse conditions (particularly, wage stagnation, job loss, or rising costs of living). From this Polanyian perspective, the connection between social democratic and labor parties is an expected political outcome, with these parties playing a traditional role in mitigating the impacts of market liberalization and addressing actually-existing material needs with actually-existing protectionist policies and practices. The onset of neoliberal reforms in Sweden and Finland, particularly following the 1990s, resulted in a decrease in the will and capacities for these parties to meet material protectionist demands, which exacerbated material hardships for those in particularly vulnerable positions, including

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those struggling to adjust to the long decline of manufacturing employment. The hollowing out of the social democratic policy responses to hardship conditions faced by their constituents, Blad argues, lead to the rise of nationalist protectionist alternatives that prove difficult to classify in terms of political economic orientation. Some are avowedly neoliberal, while others are rhetorically protectionist. The point here, however, is that in the political context of neoliberalism, the actual ability to address popular material needs through traditional protectionist means is reduced. These nationalist parties represent a response, but not an alternative, to the prevailing neoliberal hegemonic demand for reform/reduction of social welfare systems. Although Ciccia and Guzmán-Concha’s study is focused on a specific policy field, it is likely that their findings reflect a more general truth about the complex relation between protest, political contexts, and policy reform. Reform, or the lack thereof, comes about through complex interactions between many different political, organizational, and symbolic factors. The types of responses chronicled in the contributions to this book do not necessarily engage directly with policy or ask for policy reform. This is quite possibly because social ­welfare and especially social work needs to keep its thoughts and methods relatively autonomous from policy and structural context in order to keep its mediating capacity (Lorenz, 2004). This does not mean that we should look away from the way that practice offers different types of responses to policy reforms, as they provide us with forms of reflection about the complex ways that social welfare practice responses might initiate change, perform particular forms of “sociatry” (Branco, 2016), reproduce particular paths, or mediate between reductive views on human beings. Social welfare practice has the potential and commitment to work with alternatives to the view on the productive human being presented mainly in the sense of homo faber or homo economicus at different policy scales as they engage with human beings and the complexities of everyday life (Fallov, Nissen, Kjærulff, Ringø, and Birk, 2017). The reason for this is that new ways of seeing and reflecting about the conditions, problems and precarity in social welfare practice might have the potential to jump scale (Jupp, 2017) from everyday life and social welfare practice to policy articulation at national levels. That is, social welfare professionals and social welfare organizations can provide people with the support necessary to bring forward needs in debates on policy scales,2 or by providing new forms of language change the social welfare professions from within. Fallov and Nissen discuss in their contribution (Chapter 8) how social work does not simply adhere to a disciplinary regime by bringing about what is considered to be ­normal 2 See Ridzi in Chapter 7 of this volume.

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forms of existence for families otherwise at risk. The same practices have the potential to form part of a transformative politics. That is, when practicing social workers intervene in the mundane activities going on at home they make visible complex issues of the intersecting of class, gender, and ethnicity that would otherwise be concealed as the guise of non-compliance to ideals of productiveness or active citizenship. Families are in many countries experiencing increasing hardship in relation to provide food, safety, or academic opportunities for their children and we have a better chance of gaining knowledge of the ways such forms of need are related to cultural understandings associated with class and ethnicity by studying the micro practices of social welfare professionals in their interaction with people in and around their homes or their local environments. This would require a more people-centered approach to social welfare such as that taken by Nichols and Malenfant in their contribution (Chapter 10). This approach would take its cue from ethnographic research and consider both how people experience the complex relations between poverty, poor health and social risks associated with crime or eviction as well as how strategies for dealing with such experiences shape their meeting with social welfare professionals. A people-centered approach to social welfare would start with the difficulties people face and thus, have a better chance at delivering services that would meet the needs of people in spite of having chosen alternative ways of living – as demonstrated by the youth in their study. Moreover, such an ­approach would not result in metric abstraction to meet the needs of management, or alienation of the people they serve, as well as the professionals themselves. However, the space for taking findings from research into the practice of social welfare remains limited. Ringø argues for example (Chapter 9) that management plans in Danish psychiatry effectively prevent such forms of knowledge as they strive to push the sector into thinking about potentiality and learning closely connected to economic rationales. However, she also finds that voices do persist within the field of practice, which attempt to translate their practically based experiences and knowledge of social problems into concepts that are recognized by policy makers and other groups of professionals. On a more anecdotal note, a colleague of one of the authors described how she, because of the critical implications of her research into the hardship of minority ethnic families, was excluded from official policy channels in the Ministry. As the years have passed, and new generations of civil servants have populated the halls of influence, they had forgotten why she was considered persona non grata and once again she has been invited to teach the civil servants and policy makers of the complex issues of integration and inclusion of minority ethnic populations. As she claims: “this provides me with a unique

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opportunity to change policy and understandings from within”. This anecdote, although context specific, has nonetheless the message that knowledge of ­research, built on the experiences of social welfare professionals and their interactions with citizens, can form an alternative language and way of perceiving people and the problems they face – and that such knowledge might find cracks in the concrete from which it might grow. Nissen argues (Chapter 6) that social work professionals struggle to provide meaning in situations where people are under pressure and that new forms of meaningfulness can be levers to mobilize resources where none are otherwise found. This is a struggle for recognition of the arbitrariness of suffering (Bourdieu, 1999; 2000) and the misrecognitions that attach shame to the individual and the street-level bureaucrat working to alleviate the effects of states’ neoliberal hand. Or as Nissen explains it: …a struggle for believing and making social work possible in times where even a Social Democratic Minister is capable of reducing visions of social policy to a simple distinction between a “bad life” and a “good life” by means of economic rationale and the potential of creating a surplus between tax revenues and the cost of social security and services over a life course. nissen, Chapter 6: 144

Social Welfare in the Post-neoliberal Era – What Are the Potentials and Possible Dangers This volume works to describe the ways in which social welfare policy and practices have changed and identify the causal factors that have prompted these changes under the amorphous label of the “neoliberal era.” Clearly there are identified and demonstrable policies and ideological structures that can be termed “neoliberal” (Harvey, 2005; Peck and Tickell, 2007) and more evidence to highlight the corrosive impact neoliberalization has on social welfare in advanced capitalist societies (Kingfisher, 2013; Clarke, 2007; Esping-Andersen, 1996), but in a post-2008 capitalist world it becomes increasingly necessary to question whether the very context of this conversation is relevant. That is, following the deep recession in Europe and North America the political viability of neoliberalism and indeed that of regulatory retrenchment and pernicious fiscal inequality was actively questioned. For many, the dominance of neoliberal ideals and practices was laid bare by the excesses and expansive collapse of financial sectors throughout the affluent world. More to the point, many argued that the public failures of deregulation and vulgar marketization were so apparent that a new form of post-neoliberal 2.1

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governance must emerge (Altvater 2009; Farmer and Noonan 2011). Ranging from the promotion of neo-Keynesian alternatives to socialist resistance and resource nationalist models proliferating in Latin America, the time certainly appeared right for the decline of neoliberal dominance and a paradigmatic shift to a more stable and distributive post-neoliberal set of policy proscriptions (Peck et al., 2010). The problem is, of course, that this neoliberal decline has not happened. The expansion of austerity policies as a “corrective” to crisis conditions in Europe and North America, the steady march of deregulation and privatization initiatives, and a rightward shift in Latin American state leadership seem to imply not a retrenchment of neoliberal initiatives but perhaps an expansion. This would certainly offer anecdotal evidence that claims of neoliberalism’s demise are premature. Conversely, there is also evidence pointing to an increased emphasis on economic protectionism, particularly in the context of democratic politics. Subnational secessionist movements in Europe and beyond, Brexit, and the most recent United States presidential election that prominently featured economic protectionist themes in both Democratic and Republican rhetoric all point to the increased public attention to conditions long recognized by social welfare practitioners, scholars, and broad swaths of national populations. The exacerbation of material hardships in the midst of neoliberal economic growth – often, stagnating wages and downwardly distributed costs – is both a common condition and a broad motivator of those demanding relief from public officials (Wisman, 2013; Dean, 2012). The result is, as Peck (2010) states, a form of “zombie neoliberalism” in which ideological and political (creative) adaptation becomes undesirable or a political liability, but practical implementation of market-deferential policies and liberalization initiatives continues unabated. In this sense, political and institutional action appears nearly automatic – a perverse manifestation of Thatcher’s proclamation that “there is no alternative.” If not in mind, in practice neoliberalism continues as the lack of alternative policy paradigms and weakened regulatory mechanisms prove ineffective in attempts to limit market fundamentalism (Block and Somers, 2014) or at least provide sought after relief. It is in this context that our initial question remains not only relevant, but important. The persistence and exacerbation of economic hardships also sustains demands for relief from these adversities – in other words, Polanyi’s double movement continues to define tension and competing demands in the neoliberal (or post-neoliberal) era. Market beneficiaries and proponents continue to push for deregulation and liberalization initiatives, while those same laissez-faire conditions encourage social protectionist demands from populations impacted by rising costs and stagnating capacities to meet those costs.

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Whether we are in a post-neoliberal era or not, the conditions necessitating mitigation of the adversities of liberal capitalism remain unchanged. The underlying tendency toward inequality and rising costs associated with ­neoliberal conditionality create distinct pressures for those in most vulnerable positions and sustain the role and active work of the many social work practitioners chronicled in this volume. However, the tendency within neoliberalizing societies is to scale vulnerability upwards into working and middle-class populations. Increasingly it is these groups that find themselves experiencing sustained economic hardship or face financial adversities for the first time. Long-term economic change (deindustrialization) and more recent shifts in labor market control (i.e., employer control over labor costs) creates work lives that are often defined by their increasing impermanence of employment, stagnating real wages, and struggles to meet costs of living. While social welfare practice is essentially focused on the most vulnerable, changes wrought by neoliberalization impact broad cross-sections of respective populations making it important to understand how structural motivations and popular (individual and local) reactions to those motivations enable changes either as a result of or in response to neoliberalization (Yúdice, 2003; Lomnitz and Melnick 1991). As such, the contemporary debate over a shift to a post-neoliberal era is possibly incorrect but certainly irrelevant in the context of this volume. Postneoliberalism implies a qualitative shift in both ideological and structural (i.e., policy) neoliberalism; as shown in the chapters in this volume, that does not appear to be the case. We would agree that what we generally refer to as neoliberalism is variable in national contexts and has changed over time (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Peck and Tickell, 2002), but the impact of marketization on respective societies is clear in both history and the contemporary. As shown in the previous chapters, evidence of sustained neoliberal impact is found in adverse economic conditions (Blad; Csarnecki and Vargas Chanes; Dello Buono), social welfare practice (Fallov and Nissen; Bak Nielsen; Ridzi), as well as the interaction between national populations and state actors/institutions (Fallov and Nissen; Nissen; Ciccia and Guzmán-Concha; Ringø; Nichols and Malenfant). In the very least, the legacy of neoliberal ideology and practice continues to be integrated, perhaps in a subconscious (zombie-like) manner. At worst, neoliberalism, already lacking mechanisms to deal with self-generated economic crises, is growing more entrenched on the back of increased authoritarian implementation of failed ideals (Bruff, 2014). Or as Rose (2017) argues, we live in a time of increased vulnerability and where the government of freedom is intertwined with the need for security and control. The danger facing us in these times is that the spread of authoritarian populism leads to a legitimization of an e­ mphasis on liberty, which entails control of individual

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and collective ­passions and will in order for the citizens to conduct themselves in what is considered a lawful way. Focus on security means not simply punitive measures for those that do not live up to the norms of society or to the goals of active citizenship, but also that the strategies of authoritarian populism spreads even to policy actors who previously have opposed such measures. This is visible, when issues of migrant control get to be the crux of negotiation in Danish political debates on the yearly budget agreement, or when Polish reforms of the division of power get legitimized through issues of national security and especially migrant control. Authoritarian populism and nationalist movements are dangerous not only because they shift policy emphasis, but also because they move the borders of what it is legitimate to think and say. “Unwanted” populations in the form of migrant groups, asylum seekers and people dependent on welfare are increasingly stigmatized in public debates and national media, and such discourses have the potential to shift grounds for solidarity and undermine what we traditionally thought of social welfare.3 However, as should also be clear from the above, the contributions in this volume also indicate a range of social welfare responses to the mutating and metamorphic qualities of neoliberal reform pressures. Social welfare responses take many different shapes from experiments with Social Investment State initiatives that provide alternative interactions between states, markets, and civil society (Morel, Palier, and Palme, 2012), instances of direct protest, sustained forms of recognition and the development of new discourses and ways of understanding hardship, as well as the complexities of the experiences of social problems and situated lives of people today. In that way, responses are directed at the dominance of economic rationales for social welfare, at the influx of market logics in social welfare practices, and towards the individualization of social problems and erosion of collective solidarities and solutions. The potentials of today lie in the creativity and reflexivity of social welfare professionals.4 It is a creativity which rests in the person-centered knowledge, mentioned above, or what Philp in his important article designated as a specific form of knowledge for social work produced through the relational engagement between social workers and clients – in the spaces between the poor and the powerful (Philp, 1979). Such forms of knowledge let the social worker see beyond the surfaces of social problems (Ringø Chapter 9) or see other forms of solutions and forms of collective solidarity (Bak Nielsen, Chapter 11; Nichols and Malenfant, Chapter 10). Social welfare professionals produce, through practice, forms of knowledge that are necessary in the struggle against the 3 See Nissen in Chapter 6 of this volume. 4 See the respective chapters of Nissen, Fallov and Nissen, and Ridzi in this volume.

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individualizing and marketized solutions of neoliberal welfare. A productive struggle based on such forms of knowledge might be what can generate the identity for social welfare in the future (Hyslop, 2018). Moreover, such forms of knowledge shape alternative paths as they facilitate understanding and support for collective forms of solidarity, which neoliberal rationalities fail to understand (Nissen, 2017). People can choose to act collectively not simply out of an idea of individual utility, or altruism but because they reflect that such act would be beneficial for society and thus the individual. A path to shaping alternatives might be through a focus on collective rationality and rational solidarity combining ideals of inclusion with both collective and individual responsibilities (Nissen, 2017: 71). Fortunately, there is a wealth of evidence illustrating how new social movements engage with these forms of solidarity, for example, in relation to the reception of newly arrived migrants, in situations of environmental disasters, or in the establishment of alternative forms of social economies. This provides hope in a time, which at times seem rather bleak. Such forms of ­collective solidarity are a dimension in what Hall and Lamont term social resilience: “the capacity of groups of people bound together in an organization, class, racial groups, community, or nation to sustain and advance their well-being in the face of challenges to it” (2013: 2). Social resilience denotes here an active and creative process in which people assemble a variety of tools and resources to sustain their well being. In many ways, this concept of social resilience is parallel to the considerations of Sampson in his development of the concept of “collective efficacy” (Sampson, 2011) to understand local collective behavior and action in an age where structural forces have specific and localized effects (Sampson, 2017). Hall and Lamont (2013) argue that social resilience is both a response to and a product of the neoliberal tendency to demand the instrumentalization of community and individual resources (and a similar argument is made in (Rose, 2017). The contributions to this book, and the above discussions, indicate that social welfare professionals now and in the future play significant roles in the development of such forms of social resilience. Moreover, that what we then in tandem could designate something we might term “professional resilience”. The latter to denote the capacity to support and develop such social resilience, and such a capacity originates in the insistence of professional autonomy in the face of dominant management forms, of continuing reflection not only over best possible methods of professional practice, but reflexivity related to anti-reductionist view of human beings; their resources, worth and social problems. Professional resilience like this demands not only creativity but bravery, to stand tall in the harsh winds of authoritarian populism and social policy retrenchment in the neoliberal era.

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Index Abdala, E. 78 Aboites, H. 75 accounting 49, 205, 208–209, 227, 232–233, 240, 244 accounts, young people’s 226, 230, 232, 237–238, 244 action contexts 226–27, 232–245 activation programs 126, 226, 231, 233–236 activation projects 224, 226–231 Act on Social Services 121–123 adolescents 198–199, 232 adversities 3, 45, 46, 52, 59, 66, 68, 71, 256–257 affective relations 16, 161, 167–168, 173–174, 176, 179–181, 248 age 25, 114, 117, 163, 217–218, 224, 230, 259 agencies 10, 22, 39, 77, 143–144 Aglietta, M. 27 Alasuutari, P. 58 Alinsky, S.D. 140, 142, 155 Allan, J.P. 91 alternatives 7, 114, 117, 120, 247, 250–253 Altvater, E. 6, 69, 247, 256 Amenta, E. 93–94, 96 ambivalence 195, 242–244 Amin, A. 250 Amiridis, K. 182, 186 Amyot, S. 222–223 analysis, critical 21, 24, 41 anchor institutions 147, 159 Andersen, J. 163 Anderson, K.M. 114, 118 Andersen, N. 182, 186, 192–193, 198, 249 apathy 167–68 applicants 165, 211 approach, individualistic 125, 160–163 assistance, social 74, 127, 207–212, 217 authoritarian populism 257–259 authority 93, 107–108, 141–142, 152–153, 161, 169, 175 public 8, 88, 93 Azamar Alonso, A. 78–79

Baadsgaard, K. 228 Bailey, D.J. 95, 108 Bak Nielsen, V. 17, 61, 224, 227, 229–32, 238–239, 241–243, 245, 249, 251, 257–258 Baldacci, E. 8 Balleza, E. 73 Bamberg, M. 226 Banks, A.S. 98, 106 Banting, K. 203, 205, 214, 217 Basu, K. 79 Beck, U. 185 behavior 10–11, 88, 123, 173, 198, 225, 228, 241–242, 244 Belfrage, C. 58 Belgium 95, 105, 109, 111–113, 115, 118, 252 Benedict, C. 8 benefits 30, 33, 44, 51, 87, 102–103, 105, 114, 121, 148, 154, 213, 229 social 58, 74, 185, 196, 233–236 Bensusán, G. 76 Bentele, K.G. 30 Beramendi, P. 89 Berliner, P. 237, 241 Betz, H.G. 12, 48 Bird, E.J. 62n Birk, R.H. 253 Birrell, D. 32 Blad, C. 12n, 14, 23, 44, 70, 138, 140, 247n, 252–253, 257 Blank, R. 44 Bleiklie, I. 234 Bochel, H. 31 Boltanski, L. 189 Borevi, K. 32 Bosco, A. 46 Bourdieu, P. 6, 46–47, 49, 52–53, 120, 135, 162–163, 234–235, 250, 255 Bourguignon, F. 6 Branco, F.J. 253 Brandal, N. 58 Bratburg, O. 58 Brenner, N. 2–3, 246, 257 Brinkman, S. 226

Index Broadkin, E. 121 Brown, W. 11, 247 Brubaker, R. 47 Bruff, I. 68, 257 Brunse, M.H. 134 budget deficits 96–97, 108–110, 117 large 111–114, 117–118 building relationships 241 Bush, G.H.W. 29, 139 Buttimer, A. 162, 179 calibration 96–100 Cameron, A. 250 Campbell, J. 196, 205 capacity 6–7, 10, 12, 30, 37, 48–49, 63, 68, 71, 130, 135, 241, 242, 259 capital 19, 27, 34–36, 74, 76, 234–236, 237, 240, 244 resources 9–10 capitalism 20, 23, 27, 50–52, 67–68, 208–209, 211–213, 271, 276–277 capitalist 14, 20, 32, 34, 38, 41–42 care 125, 127–130, 171, 174, 178, 180, 185, 188, 189, 191, 193, 231 Cárdenas, C. 80 Caren, N. 93–94 cases 5, 45, 54, 62–63, 96, 108–113, 145, 166, 173, 201 case worker (cw) 126, 131–132, 173 cash benefits 229–230 Castells, M. 139 Caswell, D. 228 challenges 145, 157–158, 224–225, 228–229, 231–232, 235, 237, 239–240, 242–243 change in unemployment insurance 15, 90, 95, 105–106 Cecchini, S. 73 cepal. 72 Cerny, P.G. 135 Chiapello, È. 189 Chiarello, E. 93 child 13, 120, 123, 125–35, 171–77 children 30, 119–124, 126, 134, 166–167, 171, 173, 175–176 and families 119 Chopra, R. 53 Christophers, B. 58 Ciccia, R. 15, 89, 118, 251, 253, 257, 261

289 citizens 11–12, 16, 88–89, 182, 188–91, 193, 195–196, 199–200 active 189–190, 194, 225, 234 individual 188–189, 191 citizenship 12, 33, 161, 244–245 claims 6–7, 13, 15, 22, 68, 83, 94, 96, 106, 114, 254, 256 clarification 227, 231, 233–234, 236, 240, 242, 245 Clarke, J. 4, 12, 203, 255 class 90, 133, 160, 162, 178, 181, 204, 216, 231, 254, 259 Clayton, R. 30–31 clients 3, 11–12, 39, 145, 148, 200–201, 258 Cloward, R. 93, 140 Coffé, H. 57 Cohen, L. 51 collective action 15, 72, 93, 125, 130, 137, 139–45, 147, 149, 150–57, 159, 250 collective action groups 139–142, 154 collective impact 137–159 efforts 144–145, 148, 151, 153–157 structures 139, 145, 147, 153–154 Comaroff, J. 7 communities 42, 140–148, 150–151, 155, 157, 159, 220, 223, 242 foundations 15, 137, 139, 146–151, 154, 157–59, 250 leaders 141, 145, 154–155 local 119, 137, 144, 161, 163, 175, 194–195, 250 residents 141, 144, 146, 149, 151, 153–155, 157 compensations 91, 119, 122, 130, 132, 135, 196, 200, 249 competence development 188–189, 194, 200–202 competencies 174–175, 177–178, 237–239, 244 competitiveness 19, 26, 28, 35–36, 39, 58 complexities 3, 61, 178–179, 181, 231, 249, 252–253, 258 conceptions 237, 241–243 concepts 47–48, 182, 185–186, 188–191, 222, 226, 241, 259 professional 167–168 conceptualizations 203, 233, 237

290 conditions 21, 48–49, 56, 66–67, 93, 95–96, 113–114, 133–134, 164, 248 adverse 50–51, 252 good 87, 162, 163–164 structural 48, 180–81 coneval 72, 80, 81n, 87 conflicts 7, 50, 119–120, 125, 127–30, 134, 196, 246 constitution 74, 76, 86 contact 129, 133, 167, 170, 175, 177 contexts 13, 54, 57, 67, 71, 108–110, 112, 114, 117–118, 251, 255, 256 political 124, 253 Contexts of Retrenchment 15, 108–109 contextual conditions 110, 112, 114, 118 combinations of 108, 110 continuation 27, 183–184, 192, 194 contradictions 14, 18, 20, 22, 110, 112, 249 contrast 32–34, 125, 135, 145, 151, 156, 204 control 13–14, 137, 154, 166, 193, 227, 229, 235, 242–243, 257 conversation 132, 141, 172–73, 204, 221, 255 Cordera, R. 72, 265–66 corporatism 96, 99, 112, 114, 117–118, 252 corporatist arrangements 99, 110, 112 Cortés 72, 80–85 cost burdens, increased 57, 59, 67 cost-effectiveness 120, 122, 124, 134, 250 Costea, B. 182, 186 costs 1, 4, 51, 58, 61, 62, 64, 67, 69–70, 94, 124, 131, 256, 257 increased 2, 50, 57–58, 61, 64, 67 rental 59 rising 208, 252, 256–57 Cota Yañez, R. 78 Council on Foundations 157 counseling 164, 166, 168, 171, 227, 231, 236, 239 countries 8–9, 58–59, 61, 80, 97–98, 102, 104–107, 109, 117, 252 creativity 258–259, 269 crisis 22, 26–27, 32, 34, 37, 68–69, 138 crisis neoliberalism 19 Crossover 97–100, 105 crossover point 97–99 Cruikshank, B. 189, 225 Crump, N. 182, 186 ctmp. 80 Cuba, L. 162

Index Cummins, I. 12 cutbacks 31, 34–35, 42, 94, 101, 114, 252 Czarnecki, L. 14, 46n, 73 Davies, B. 226 Dalton, R.J. 48, 68 Danish context 162, 167, 180, 249, 251 Daguerre, A 30 de la Barra, X. 27, 39 de Wilde, M. 168 Dean 4, 175, 187, 189, 194–195, 256 debt 59, 61–63 Decile D 10, 83–94 decisions, political 93, 101–102 DeGrauwe, P. 8 Dellinger, J. 158 Dello Buono, R.A. 14, 20, 22, 25, 27, 39, 138, 252, 257 demands 2–4, 11–12, 16, 20, 51–52, 117, 214, 234–235, 245, 252 Denmark 1, 32–35, 109–110, 113–115, 118–120, 183, 185, 229 depression 28, 224, 231–234, 239–240 deregulation 4, 32, 50, 69, 255–256 Desai, R. 7, 53 development 122–123, 180, 185–189, 191–192, 196–197, 200–202, 259 personal 121–122, 134, 228 recent 14, 16–17, 173 social 86 development goals 80, 187, 192, 200 deviation, standard 97–99 Diaz, M.E. 106 diagnoses 127, 187–190, 198 psychiatric 183, 198–199 dialectical approach 14, 20–22, 41 differences, partisan 91 difficulties 207, 235, 249–250 difficulties being 132–133, 176–177 DiGregorio, M. 161 Directorate of Social Services 189 disabilities 182–183, 185–86, 188–191, 193–196, 198–199, 201 mental 13, 198–199 disposable income 61–63, 68 doctors 164–165, 167 Donation of Food Act 212 Donzelot, J. 134, 160

Index double movement 14, 46, 49–54, 256 Downing, R. 203, 205, 223 doxa 6, 46, 52–53 Dreyfus 153–154 drop-in center 192, 200 Duménil, G. 52 duration 101–105, 183 Dutra, M.V. 79 Duyvendak 93–94, 168 dynamics 20, 25, 50, 101, 118 ea (educational advisor) 131 Ebbinghaus, B. 37 economic adversities 44, 46, 67, 71 growth, slow 112, 114, 118 openness 108–110, 112 protection 44–45, 54, 59 rationales 15, 119–120, 122, 135–136, 247, 250, 254–255, 258 Economist 58–59 economy 1, 32, 34, 36, 72, 74–75, 78, 193–194 social 222, 259 education 73–75, 80, 86, 217–218, 224, 227, 230, 233–235, 241 educational advisor (ea) 131 Education Act 217 educational attainment 54, 57, 67 Education and employment-oriented social work 228 education and work 198, 224–225, 229, 231–232, 242, 248 education system 74, 76 eligibility conditions 101–102 employees 195–196, 236 employment 32–33, 63–64, 78–79, 119–120, 212–213, 221–222, 227, 234–236 female 65 male 65 services 121, 134–135, 230 total 65 empowerment 12–13, 29, 40, 160, 182, 186, 191, 194–195 entitlements 2, 33, 34, 101–103 environment, local 161, 167–169, 179, 254 equality 15, 119–121, 126, 133, 135, 162, 185–186, 195, 197 era, post-neoliberal 15, 255, 257

291 Eriksen, T.H. 2n Eskelinen, L. 226 Esping-Andersen, G. 4, 72–73, 88, 90, 119, 184 ethnography, institutional 205–207 Europe 14, 27–28, 33, 35, 42, 45–46, 255–256 austerity 35–36 Social Model 35–37 European Union 33, 35–36 Evans, G. 66, 203 everyday life 189–191, 224, 226, 228–229, 232, 235–237, 239, 242–243, 253 evolution 25, 81, 83, 152 exploration 119, 160–162 Eyre, J. 57 Fallov, M.A. 1, 12, 16–17, 119, 134, 162, 166, 170, 179, 248, 250, 253, 257–258 families 119–130, 133, 161, 163–164, 166–81, 240–41 disadvantaged 133–134 homes of 16, 160 low income 121, 134, 144, 220 low-income 29, 121 vulnerable 161, 163, 171, 174, 178, 248, 250 family network 122–123, 125–128, 132, 134, 172, 249 Farmer, S. 256 Fanjzylber, F. 79 father 126, 128–129, 133, 177, 231 Ferguson 16, 161, 172–173 Ferrera, M. 91 fields 40–41, 52, 91–93, 169–171, 175–176, 182–183, 194–195 financial support 70–71, 222, 229, 239 Finland 56–66, 71, 113–115, 252 and Sweden 14, 45, 54, 58–59, 64, 66–68, 252 nationalist politics in 46, 55 Parliament of 45, 55 Finns Party 45, 55, 67 Flamand, L. 77 Follesø, R. 237, 241 food 63, 80–81, 171, 178–179, 210, 212, 215, 218–219, 254 Food and Drugs Act 212 food poverty 80–81 formulas 19, 110–114

292 Forsell, T. 45n Fortier, A. 161, 168 Fourcade, M. 88, 92, 108 Foucault, M. 13, 17, 135, 174, 177, 246 foundations 56, 142, 149–151, 155, 157–158 Fraser, N. 190 Fraser Institute 219–220 Frederiksen, M. 39 Freire, P. 40 Frenk, J. 78 frustration 140–141, 207, 216, 222 fully in 97–100 fully out 97–99 functional handicaps 183–184, 189–192, 195–97, 199–202 functionality 190, 192, 199–200, 249 funders 142, 146–147, 154–156, 158 funding 9, 12, 144, 146–148, 150, 154–155, 157, 212, 221, 249–251 exchange 158 Gamson, W.A. 93 Garrett, G. 91 Gaventa, J. 53n generative mechanisms 184, 197–198, 201 generosity 102–103, 105, 121, 156 Gibson, R. 48 Gills, B. 2 Gini coefficients 82–84, 87 girl 131, 133, 177 Giroux, H. 7 Giugni, M. 89, 93–94, 101 Glavind Bo 228–229 Glick, N. 47 globalization 97, 137–139, 146–147, 158–159 goals 2–4, 8, 10–12, 92–93, 178, 180, 189, 191–192, 248 Gómez-Dantés, O. 78 Gordon, L. 190 graduation rates 217–218 grants 147–148 Gray, A.M. 32 Green-Pedersen, C. 96, 101, 114, 117 Greenwood, P. 56 Griffith, A.I. 203, 206, 209, 217 groups 53, 75, 140–141, 145–146, 191, 193, 225, 227, 229, 241, 243, 257, 259 growth 4, 30, 32, 44, 58, 61–62, 65–66, 68, 115–116

Index Gubrium J.F. 226 Guevara, D.A. 78 Guillen, A.M. 35 Gutierrez, A. 76 Guzmán-Concha, C. 96, 251, 253 Habermas, J. 135 Hacker, J.S. 42 Hagen 120, 122, 135, 160 Hagstrom, P.A. 62n Haldar, M. 164 Hall, P.A. 2, 17, 246–247, 259 Hall, S. 7 handicaps 188–189, 196–197, 200 Harré, R. 226 Harlow 214–216 Hartman, Y. 3 Harvey, D. 6, 50–52, 203, 222, 255 Häusermann, S. 89 Have, P.T. 226 Hedin, K. 58 health 73, 76, 80–81, 86–87, 121–123, 164–165, 218–219 care 9, 30, 50–51, 63, 67, 73, 77–78, 87, 121, 233 services 14, 72–73, 77, 87 system 76–78, 87 Healy, K. 232 Heikkila, M. 119 Heinisch, R. 71 help families 174 Henig 143–144, 155 Hernandez Laos, E. 7, 83 high unemployment 32, 109, 113–114, 117–118, 252 Hobsbawm, E.J. 47 Holborow, M. 122 holiday 128–129 Holmwood, J. 51 Holstein, J.A. 226 Holzman 238, 240, 272 home 16, 58–59, 123, 126, 129, 131–133, 160–83, 226, 248, 254 consultants 165–166 good 163–164, 167 placement 123, 128 services 122–123 Homedes, N. 77–78 homeless 198, 230

293

Index homelessness 198, 224 shelters 212, 230 Hosseini Faradonbeh, S.A. 2 house 163, 166–167, 176, 197, 200 household debt 61–62, 67 households 61, 63–64, 67–68, 70–71, 81, 84 housewife 165–166, 175 housing 58–59, 63–64, 67, 80–81, 147, 152, 162–163, 204, 208, 210 costs 59–61, 63, 67 Hovgaard, G. 163 Huber 91, 94, 100, 112, 272 Hudson, R. 250 Hummon, D.M. 162 Hutchinson, G.S. 228 Hutter, S. 89, 111, 114 Hvinden, B. 119 Hyde, M. 31 Hyslop, I. 259 identity politics 151–152 ideological 7, 51–52, 256–257 Ignazi, P. 48 illnesses 129, 135, 182–183, 187, 189–192, 198 Immerfall, S. 48 Immerzeel, T. 57 immigration 32, 35, 45–46, 54, 56, 70 implementation 2, 20, 72, 86, 87, 99, 112, 114, 122, 223, 256 inclusion 130–31, 133, 135, 160–162, 164, 167, 174–175, 178, 180–181, 185, 251 promoting 160–162, 164, 168 income 7, 57–58, 61, 64, 68, 80–81, 119, 165, 214, 220 income distribution 28, 83–84, 86 income inequality 14, 58, 72–73, 82, 84 Income Ratios 59–60 Independent Variables 96–98, 100 individuals 144, 149, 154, 156, 161, 195–196, 208, 212–214, 218, 248–250 Industrial/Services Employment 65 Industry 44, 64–65, 78 inequality 73, 78, 80, 82–87, 134–35, 250, 257 Informe 265–266, 285 innovations 39, 79–80, 146, 185–186, 192 institutions 25, 32, 75, 89–90, 96, 147, 187, 192, 194, 198–199, 205, 211, 273–274 corporatist 92, 111–112, 118 social 44, 191, 198–199

intentionality 48, 52–53, 237 internship 126, 233, 239, 243 interventions 16, 160–163, 168, 174–175, 178–181, 204–205, 248 interviews 206, 208, 215–218, 231–237, 241, 243 Japan 95, 104–105, 109–110, 113, 115 Jasper, J.M. 156 Jazz 207–209, 212, 216 Jensen, S. 163 Jenson, J. 203 Jessop 4, 7, 21, 54, 135, 247 jobs 1, 19, 79, 87, 142, 144, 147, 224, 227, 229–233, 236 Jonung, L. 32 Jørgensen, A. 198n Jørgensen, H. 228 Juberg 228, 237–238, 240 Juliane 231, 239–241 Jupp, E. 162, 178, 248, 253 Jusidman, C. 86 Jutila, M. 10, 58 Kananen, J. 184, 190 Kania, J. 142, 156 Karlsson, E. 57 Kaspersen, L.B. 185 Katznelson, N. 227, 229–230 Kaufman, R.R. 9 Kautto, M. 119 Kaye, G. 144 Keck, C.S 75 Keeley, B. 58 Kenworthy, L. 52 Kestilä-Kekkonen, E. 57 Ketschner, K. 120 Keynesian 46–47, 51–52 kids 216, 219–221 King, D. 68 Kitschelt, H. 89 Kittel, B. 91 Kjærulff, J. 253 Knaul, F.M. 78 Knobel, M. 217–218 knowledge 17, 52–53, 169–171, 173, 178, 184, 198–199, 201, 254–255, 258–59 Knudsen, L.B. 162 Kommunernes Landsforening 122–123

294 Koopmans, R. 93–94 Korpi, W. 88, 90–91, 94 Kramer, M. 142, 148, 156 Kriesi, H. 89, 93–94 Kühner, D.S. 91, 94 Kuisma, M. 68 Laidlaw, J. 2n labor 4, 9–10, 19, 31, 50–51, 68, 73, 87, 135, 162, 225 labor market 4, 78, 120–122, 125, 132, 134–135, 175, 178, 185, 227, 229–230 labor market opportunities 214, 216, 221 labor parties 31, 66, 70, 252 Lamont, M. 2, 17, 246–247, 259 Lankshear, C. 217–218 Larner, W. 246 laundry 166, 191, 197, 200 learning 156, 187–192, 197–202, 240, 244, 249, 254 leftcab 111–114 legitimacy 19, 23, 32, 35, 89, 150–151, 154, 247 political 14, 44, 46, 54 Leonard, J. 147 levers 120, 130–135, 149, 153–154, 255 Lévy, D. 52 liberalization 22, 50–52, 58 life 126–127, 130–131, 135–136, 167–168, 172, 197, 215, 224, 226, 233, 243 ordinary 122, 127, 133 social 203 Lipsky, M. 139 local community work 3, 160–163, 167–170, 174, 178–179, 248 local community worker 163, 169–171, 174–177 logical connector 109, 111–113 Lomnitz, L. 257 López-Calva 83 Lorenz, W. 184, 225, 229, 242, 253 Lowi, T. 51 Luhmann, N. 120, 135, 162, 250 Lustig, N. 83 Mair, J 2n Malenfant, J. 17, 61n, 204–207, 211–212, 214–215, 223, 248–249, 251, 254, 257–258 Mallett, S. 162–171

Index management 76, 187, 189, 192–193, 195, 205, 209, 211, 217, 223, 249, 254 Mazany, T. 139, 147 market 3, 6, 11, 51, 53, 119, 122, 160, 163, 187, 194, 215, 222, 258 free 4, 68 marketization 53, 58, 247, 257 market liberalization 5, 10, 50–52, 140, 252 Marklund, S. 119 Markussen, A.M. 228 Martin, K. 2n Martínez, R. 73 Marston, G. 121 masterplan 188–89, 191, 193 matches 198, 200, 202 material conditions 52–54, 130, 166, 204 Mazany, T. 139, 147 Mazzocchi, R. 36 Meirelles, A.J.A. 79 Mellon, J. 66 Melnick, A. 257 Merolli, J.L. 161 Mészáros, I. 27, 276 methodologies 81–83 Mexico 14–15, 72–73, 75, 77–80, 82–85 minimization 108, 112 Mitchell, D. 91 mitigate 10, 45–46, 50–51, 59, 69–70 mobility 160–162, 174, 177–78 mobilizing resources 119–121, 123, 127–30, 132–135, 236, 250 modalities 19–20, 26 model, stabilizing development 72, 82, 84 money 77, 131–132, 193, 196, 198–199, 206, 215–217, 233–236 monitoring 209–211 Mørck, L.L. 226, 238 Mortensen, M. 228 mother 126–32, 161, 164–166, 168, 171–173, 177, 215, 219, 236, 240–241, 248 father’s 128–29 Mother’s sister 129–130 movements 22, 25, 93, 101, 153, 155, 157, 184, 188, 196, 237 municipalities 77, 121–123, 183, 188–189, 201 Myles, J. 203, 205, 214, 217 national governments 8 nationalism 44–47, 71

295

Index nationalist 44–47, 49, 54, 56–58, 66, 69–71  6, 14, 45, 57, 67, 70, 253 politics 14, 46–49, 54, 68–70 national populations 9, 46, 49–51, 53–54, 68, 70–71 nations 45, 47, 92, 138, 143, 218, 259 nature 3, 10–11, 23, 25, 47, 58, 69 human 16, 188–191, 196, 198 Naumann, E. 37 Navarro Alvarado, A. 78 negation 112, 120, 133, 135, 250 Neidel, A. 237, 241 neighborhood 141, 144, 154–155, 162, 166–168, 170, 174, 177, 179, 206, 220 neighbors 153, 165, 167, 169 neoliberal 1, 6, 46, 68, 70, 75, 120, 122, 203, 205, 253, 255–256 approach 75, 77–78 doxa 49, 53–54, 57, 68, 70 era 1–3, 7, 9, 11–13, 15–17, 44, 84–85, 246, 248 goals 7, 53 ideology 5, 7, 9–10, 68, 70, 257 model 39, 79, 82, 84, 87 policies 36, 54, 68, 72–74, 76, 79, 82, 202 proponents 2, 4, 6, 10, 69 reforms 4, 8, 10, 14–17, 44, 69, 246, 252 transformation 14, 72–73 trends 160, 162, 178, 181 neoliberalism 1–2, 6–8, 27–28, 69, 138, 203, 257 neoliberalization 2–3, 5, 7–8, 10–11, 13, 44, 46, 52, 54, 58–59, 257 effects of 2, 54, 57, 59 result of 1, 3, 7, 9 Net Disposable Income 62 Netherlands 95, 104–105, 109, 113, 115, 117 network meeting 127–128, 131–132, 176–177 networks 123–125, 127–129, 171–172, 175–176, 193–195, 200, 251 Newman, J. 4, 12, 203, 255 Newton, E. 159 ngos 39, 230, 235–236 Nichols, N. 17, 61n, 203, 206–207, 209, 213, 215–217 Nicoli, L.T. 30

Nissen, M.A. 1, 9, 12, 15–16, 45n, 119, 122, 134, 160, 164, 228, 248–250, 253, 255, 257, 258n, 259 Noland, M. 159 nonprofits 139, 141–142, 144, 147–149, 152–154, 157 Noonan, S. 256 Nordic countries 32, 35, 69, 135 Nordic welfare states 32–33, 42, 119, 184, 186, 229, 252 Nørgaard, J. 185 Norris, P. 47, 39, 92 Nørup, I. 228 Norway 10, 32–35, 95, 105, 109, 113–115, 118, 252 Nye, J. 68 Obinger, H. 91 obsolete 188, 191 Ochoa, S. 80–82 odsp 207–209 oecd 51, 59, 61–62, 75, 85, 97–98, 186 Offe, C. 51, 88 Oikarinen, E. 61 Olasky, S.J. 93–94 Oldenburg, R. 159 Olesen, S.P. 226 Oliphant, G. 147 Oliver, M. 196 Oltedal, S. 228 Ontario 204, 206, 208, 210, 218 Ontario Disability Support Program 207–208 Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services 210–211 Ontario Works. See ow opposition 37, 56, 89, 108, 110–112, 114, 117, 251 organizations 69, 76, 92, 143, 145–146, 149–150, 153, 158–159, 186, 192–193 nonprofit 147–49 organizing 25, 148, 150, 155–156, 222 Ortiz, D. 74, 78, 106 Ortíz-Juarez, E. 83 Ostrander, S. 158 ow (Ontario Works) 207–208, 210, 212 pa (personal advisor) 131 pace 5, 58–59, 61

296 Parliament of Canada 206n Palme, J. 91, 94, 258 parents 44, 120–121, 126–129, 131, 133, 160, 167, 175, 214, 233–234 participants 133, 139, 143, 177, 183, 190, 204, 207, 211, 215, 223, 226 participation 31, 33, 160–161, 174, 185–186, 211–212, 216–217, 224–226 parties 29, 31, 45–46, 48, 54–57, 67–71 left-wing 90, 94, 111–114, 117 social democratic 18, 32, 36, 66, 68 Pasdirtz, G. 52 Pasura, R. 7 Payne, M. 228 Peck, J. 2, 7, 69, 246–247, 255–257 Pennings, P. 88, 96, 101 performance 33, 75, 194–195, 209, 217–218, 236 performance society 187, 189 Perry, D. 139, 147 personal advisor (pa) 131, 263 personal challenges 224–225, 227, 230, 238, 241, 243–245 perspectivas 266, 271 perspectives 41, 48, 118, 140, 145, 225–226, 228, 230, 232–233, 237 Perussuomalaiset (Finns Party) 45, 55, 66 Petmesidou, M. 35 Petterson, U. 228 Pettigrew, T.F. 48 philanthropy 146, 156–158, 166 Philp, M. 134, 258 Pierson, P. 4, 88, 91, 94 Piven, ff. 93, 140 plans 13, 128–130, 143, 163, 186, 190–191, 246 Pless, M. 227 Katznelson, N. 227, 229–230 Pløger, J. 163 Ploug, N. 119 Polan, M. 8 Polanyi, K. 4, 14, 47, 49–52, 68, 140, 247, 256 policies 2–3, 5, 7, 27, 70, 79–80, 102, 154, 222–223, 253 public 86, 92–93, 203, 223 policy reform 15, 252–253 sectors 89, 101, 118 political

Index actors 47, 51, 54, 57, 89–91, 96, 109, 117, 252 conditions 37, 106, 108, 111–112, 114, 118 economic relations 203 efficacy 46, 49, 57–58, 66 factors 48, 90, 95–96, 112 institutions 15, 50, 94, 110, 118, 252 legitimation 45, 47, 49–50, 54, 59, 70–71 participation 15, 86, 89–90, 92, 106–8, 118 parties 25, 46–48, 54, 69, 71, 88–92, 94, 114 traditional 68 political variables 95, 98, 110, 112 politics 43, 88, 90, 92 institutional 89, 93, 117 new 91 Pontusson, J. 30–31 popularity 137, 139–140, 142, 146, 149 populations 7, 12, 45, 50–52, 68, 70, 77, 80–81, 87, 205 respective 1, 10, 44, 48, 51–53, 59, 67, 257 Porcile, G. 79 Pors, J.G. 186, 249 Portes, A. 52 Portugal 56, 95, 98, 103, 105, 107, 109–112, 115, 118, 252 positions 12, 17, 34, 53, 74, 104, 153, 157, 212, 226, 233–238, 247 autonomous 234–235, 239 reflexive 233, 237, 240, 243 potentiality 182–183, 185, 187–193, 195, 197, 199–201, 249, 254 potentialization 16 Poulantzas, N. 68 Poulsen, J.D. 96 poverty 30–31, 80–81, 86–87, 141–143, 145, 148–49, 166, 204, 219, 224 acute experiences of 216–217 social rights 80–81 power 53, 75, 77, 93–95, 112–114, 144, 150–152 practices social service 5, 7–8 strategic 164, 249 praxis 21, 37–38, 41–42 social movement 24–26 precarity 17, 178–179, 181, 248–249, 253 Pressman, S. 62n

Index pressure 9, 11–12, 35, 37, 88–89, 106, 110, 130, 132, 196, 198, 246, 249–250 privatization 5, 31, 34, 50 problem definitions 198–199 problem pressures 15, 90, 96–100, 108, 110, 112, 117–118, 252 contexts of 90, 96, 108, 110 high 111, 114 interplay of 117–118 moderate 110, 112, 118 problems 49, 77, 123, 124–26, 151, 192, 194, 198–199, 202, 225, 228, 232–233, 244 deficit 97 productivity 31, 79, 82, 121–122, 131, 134–135, 187 economic 119–121, 131–132, 135, 184 professional resilience 259 professionals 132–134, 155, 169–170, 176–177, 192–193, 195, 198–199, 250, 254 profit 20, 27, 50, 52, 147 maximize 50–51 programming 145–146 programs 3, 9, 29, 77, 131, 145, 148, 151, 157, 166, 205, 210–211, 221–222 projects 5, 158, 175, 177, 183, 204, 206–207, 211, 216 protection 19, 39, 51, 57, 66, 68, 86 protectionist 57, 69–70, 253 economic demands 10, 54, 68, 70 protest 76, 88–96, 98, 106–7, 110–15, 117, 251–53 effect of 95, 118 high levels of 98, 113–114 movements 88–89, 92–94, 114, 117–118, 251–252 social 15, 22, 270 protesters 93–95 Provencio, E. 72 providers, single 121, 126, 128–130 province 204, 208, 212, 217–219 provision 3–5, 121, 143 psychiatry 182–183, 188, 196, 200 psychiatry and disabilities 188–189, 193–195, 198, 201 public sector institutions 213, 216, 221 Putnam, R.D. 159 Pykett, J. 248

297 Rådet for Socialt Udsatte 230 Ragin, C. 94–96, 112 Rambøll Management 122 Ramírez, M.A. 78 Ranis, G. 79 Rasimus, A. 58 rate 27–28, 64, 66–67, 80, 84 rationales 119, 122–123, 228–229, 250 rationalities 17, 121–122, 160, 209, 246–247 reactions 7, 38, 89, 166, 227, 232, 234, 237, 240, 243–244, 257 Rebell, M.A. 143–44, 155 recognition 135, 228, 231, 233, 240, 242, 245, 255, 258 reduction 4, 6, 10, 19, 28, 31, 34, 36, 82, 229, 248 Reese, E. 140, 156 Reflexive Rooms 237, 239 reforms 2, 19–20, 75, 88–90, 92, 101–102, 112, 117–118, 183–184, 246 rehabilitation 16, 186, 188–189, 190, 195, 200–202, 249 relations 127, 166–169, 171, 173–174, 176–182, 225, 227, 229, 240, 242–244 complex 162, 178, 181, 253–254 relationship 5, 11, 14, 53–54, 62, 89, 93, 95–96, 107, 126, 179, 214, 219 relatives 123–124, 126, 128–129, 194, 196 relief 29, 127–130, 172, 256 rent 59–61, 121, 208, 215 Rent Ratio 59–60 reorganization 23, 28, 38, 42–43, 220 replacement rates 102–105 residents 16, 141, 145, 148, 150, 153–155, 157, 159, 164, 166–167, 169–170 resilience 17, 108, 110–112, 114, 117 social 17, 247, 259 resistance 14, 17, 20–22, 37–42, 110, 112 resources 89, 119–125, 127, 130–131, 134–135, 189, 197, 199, 223, 259 economic 131, 134, 175 focus on 15, 120, 123–125, 127, 134, 191, 199–201, 249 mobilize 133–135, 250, 255 responses 148–149, 177–178, 180–181, 230, 244–246, 251, 253, 257–259 responsibility 120, 124–125, 127–128, 133, 160, 195–196, 200–201, 248, 250

298 responsibility (cont.) cabinet 100 decentralization of 189, 194 retrenchment 3, 5, 88, 90–91, 96, 101–102, 108–10, 112–114, 117, 246, 247 Ridzi, F. 15, 138, 142, 153, 155–156, 250, 253n, 257–258 Riehl, C.J. 143–144, 155 Riessman, C.K. 226 right parties, radical 47 rights, social 80–81, 86, 101 Ringø, P. 1, 16, 183–88, 194, 226, 248–249, 251, 253–254, 257–258 rising housing costs 61, 67 risk 16, 19, 160–162, 174, 176–179, 240–242, 252, 254 Rodrik, D. 8–9 Romero Sotelo, M.E 75 Ros, J. 79 Rose, N. 135, 203, 221, 246, 248, 257, 259 Rosendahl, J. 45n Rucht, D. 89, 92 Rydgren, J. 48, 55, 68 Ryner, M. 58, 68 Sáenz, M. 73 Safe Schools Program 210 safety 129–130, 134, 173–174, 178, 254 Salazar, C.A. 78–79 Saleebey, D. 232 sample 59, 97–98 Sampson, R.J. 259 sanctions 121, 197, 228–230, 235, 243 Sandbrook, R. 247 Sanjeev, G. 8 Saraví, G.A. 73 Saull, R. 40 Scandinavia 4, 8–10, 32–33, 46 Schneider, C.Q. 95–96, 108 Schofer, E. 88, 92, 108 school 129, 131–133, 172, 174–177, 206, 209–210, 216–218, 220 child’s 123, 132, 176 elementary 240–41 school boards 210, 218–220 schooling 121, 123, 127, 130–132, 134, 174, 176–177 school performance 217 school psychologist 132–133

Index Schuldes, M. 29 scores, fuzzy 96–98 Scott, R.H. 226 screens 132–133, 176 Scruggs, L. 91 sectors, public 185–186, 191, 193, 204–205, 207, 211, 213, 215, 217, 249 security 14, 119, 178–180, 185, 248, 257–58 sedesol 81 Segura-Ubiergo, A. 9 Seim, S. 11 Seltzer, M. 164 Sen, A. 72 sensitivity 2–3, 49, 129, 134–135, 250 service delivery, social 5, 7, 35, 38–39 services 38–39, 63–66, 78, 80, 120–122, 143–145, 198 service searching 234–235, 238–239 Settlement movement 166–167 shaping 90, 95, 119, 121, 159–162, 205, 223 Shefner, J. 52 Sheilds, J. 213–214, 217 shifts 9, 11, 14, 53, 57–58, 66–67, 137–138, 153, 168, 203, 213–214 shopping 166, 176 Sierminska, E. 62n Sippola, M. 10 slices, thin 191–192 Smith, F.M. 248 Smith, D.E. 205–206, 209 social change 24–25, 48, 79, 157–158 social democratic 34, 66, 69–70, 99, 122, 252 welfare state 160, 180 social democrats 33–34, 36, 163 Social Europe 18, 35–37 social movements 14, 21, 25, 90, 93, 95, 101, 151–157, 159 social policies 85–87, 89, 93–94, 96, 118, 121, 184–185 existing 91 social policy reform 88–90, 92, 94, 101, 107, 117, 251 social practices 202, 209, 226, 231–233, 238–242, 245 social problems 15–16, 138, 155, 168, 180, 183–185, 190, 199, 224, 227, 229, 258 social problems and personal challenges 225, 227, 241, 243–245 complex 201, 224, 229

299

Index individualization of 247–258 complexity of 230, 241 social relations 14, 20–21, 32, 38, 41–42, 127, 135, 161, 164, 205, 207, 213, 216 social security 29, 73, 121, 124–125, 131, 134–135, 204 social service practitioners 10–11 social services 1, 119–124, 126, 133–135, 189, 210–211 policy context of 119–120 social spending 2, 8, 28–29, 36, 69 social welfare 3, 5, 7, 11–14, 17, 19–20, 247–248, 254–255, 258 practices 2–3, 5, 7–8, 10–11, 15–17, 248–249, 251, 253, 257 professionals 12–14, 246–247, 249–255, 258–259 reform 14, 20, 25–26, 37, 41–42, 252 process 26 state 18–25, 27–29, 31–33, 41, 138 social work 16, 40, 119–120, 124, 133–36, 161, 168–69, 174, 178–95, 197–99, 227–228 encounters 225 exploring 119, 162 home 286 interventions 160, 162, 168 practice 11, 38, 40, 134, 161, 198, 225, 282 practitioners 180, 257 social worker (sw) 11–12, 40, 123–134, 164– 68, 171–173, 177–178, 183, 191, 196–197 chairing 177 social workers 11–12, 124–129, 132, 134, 164, 166–167, 171–173, 197 skeptical 196–197 special team of 173 socialrådgiveren 164, 166–167 Socialstyrelsen 166–167 society 12–13, 72–74, 162, 185–187, 196, 202, 225, 230 Söderlund, P. 57 solidarity 15, 17, 120, 135, 224–225, 227, 229, 241–245, 258–259 collective 12, 258–259 solutions 39, 110, 141–42, 186–187, 194, 224– 225, 229–230, 235–236, 241–242, 258 shared 131–133 Soule, S.A. 93 source text 55, 65, 83, 100, 102–107, 150, 165, 179

Spain 36, 95, 102, 105, 109, 113, 116–117 Springer, S. 6, 69, 97 Standing, G. 44 Starke, P. 88, 96, 101 State dilemmas 21, 23 policies 20–21, 204–205 resources 204, 213, 221–222 retrenchment 16, 159 Statistics Canada 206n Statistics Finland 56, 59, 65–66 Statistics Sweden 56, 59, 65–66 status quo 91, 94, 157–158 Staunæs, D. 182, 186 Stephens, J.D. 33–34, 91, 94, 100, 112 Stern, K. 156 Stewart, F. 79 Stout, A.K. 22, 25 students 75–76, 210, 218–221, 224 Student Success 217–218 stuff 171, 198, 210, 215, 220 Sum, N. 54, 247 support 40, 54–56, 71, 78–79, 145–146, 212, 222, 232, 235, 239, 259 ensured 196 sw. See social worker sw1 128 sw2 128–29 Swank, D. 3, 8, 12, 89, 91, 96, 101, 285 Sweden 5, 32–35, 45, 56, 58–68, 105, 109–110, 112–13, 252 Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden ­Democrats) 45, 55, 57, 66, 69 Switzerland 39, 95, 102, 105, 109–112, 115 symbol 109, 111–113, 185 systems 77, 86–87, 91, 133–134, 182, 185, 188, 195, 200, 204, 207–209 table, truth 108–113 Taggart, P. 46 Tapia, L.A. 76 teachers 75–76, 132, 176, 218 tension 49–51, 141, 160, 256 The Local 55 Theodore, N. 2–3, 246, 257 Theoretically 140–142, 147 theory 40, 47, 78, 86, 90, 156 Thomas, C. 196 Thorsen, D.E. 58

300 thresholds 70, 81, 96, 97–100, 105, 108 Thuesen, S. 228 Tickell, A. 246, 255, 257 timeframe 58, 61, 63 Torfing, J. 227 Toronto 205–6 Towns, A. 57 track 128, 190–191, 217 transcend 187, 191, 198–199, 215 transition 7, 84 treatment 123, 227, 230–231 trends 5–6, 31, 58, 63–64, 66, 83, 101, 124, 161 troubles 127, 129–130, 134–136, 178 Tsatsanis, E. 39 Turk, R.A. 61 Turner, B.S. 164 Ugalde, A. 77–78 unemployment 31–32, 34, 102, 108–109, 113–114, 117–118, 224–225, 227, 229–231, 240–241, 244, 252 unemployment insurance 88–91, 95–97, 101–11, 113–117, 118 generosity of 103–105 reform of 89–90, 95, 110, 117–118 unions 31, 88, 92, 99, 111–114, 118–119, 121 weak 112, 114, 117 United Kingdom 5, 95, 105, 109–110, 113, 117 United States 4–5, 8–9, 27, 29, 105, 109, 111–112, 137–138, 143, 146–147 universalism 35, 102–103, 105, 184 use of threat 229–230 Van Aelst, P. 92 van der Lippe, T. 57 Van Ewijk, H. 229 Van Kersbergen, K. 88 Vargas, D. 72, 80–83, 85, 251–257 variations 8, 10, 125, 155, 162, 237 Velasco Arregui, E. 79 Venugopal, R. 2n Verney, S. 46 veto points 91, 94, 96, 100, 111–114, 117 Villadsen, K. 12, 160, 164 Vis, B. 88 Vliegenthart, R. 89, 111, 114 volunteers 124, 193–194

Index vulnerable children 11–12, 122, 248 Vygotsky, L. 238, 240 Wacquant, L. 12, 53 Wagemann, C. 95–96, 108 wages 33, 61, 71, 138 Walby, S. 69 Walgrave, S. 92 Walkenhorst, P. 146 Walls, E. 106 waves 24, 34, 37–38, 124 weaknesses 15, 151, 154, 157 wealth 33–34, 37, 61, 119, 149, 152, 259 Weiss, L. 4 welfare 12–14, 29, 119–121, 135, 182, 208–209, 211–212, 247 capitalism 4–5, 45, 67, 69 general area of 123, 133 institutions 185, 187, 243 policies, social 2, 13–14, 19, 137, 146, 156, 255 political ideas of 185 provision, social 2–4, 9, 19, 58, 247 rationales 119–120, 125, 127, 132, 160 reform 14, 22–23, 29 services 135, 182, 186, 239 state change 90–91, 95, 101 states 73–74, 88–89, 91–92, 118, 138, 184, 229 system requirements 235–236 systems 41, 229, 233–236, 239, 243–245 social 17, 42, 230–233, 253 tasks, solution of 194 welfarism 203 well-being 119–120, 126–127, 130–131, 133–135, 175, 177, 247, 259 Widfeldt, A. 55 Wild, R. 62n Wilson, K.A. 98, 106 Wimmer, A. 47 Winter, K. 163, 166, 174 Winther, I.W. 171 Wisman, J.D. 256 Wolff, J.R. 143–44, 155 World Bank Databank 57, 64, 98 World Health Organization 219 women 30, 33, 66, 175, 177–178 workers 24, 74, 76, 79, 86, 132, 221

301

Index workshop 148, 200 world 13, 27, 54, 73, 86, 138, 146, 157, 159, 205, 247 advanced capitalist 6–7, 64, 68 worries 125–126, 132–133, 171, 173–174, 177, 196–197 Yaschine, I. 80–82 young people 17, 122, 203–207, 211–217, 219, 222, 225–38, 240–242, 249

experiences of 203, 205–206 group of 224–225, 230–231, 241, 243–244 unemployed 225, 227–229, 241, 244 youth 166, 204–206, 210, 212–213, 217, 221–222, 237, 254 homelessness 61, 207, 213 unemployment 221, 227, 229 Yúdice, G. 7, 257 Zelikow, P. 68