Social Movements, Indigenous Politics and Democratisation in Guatemala, 1985-1996 [1 ed.] 9789047433071, 9789004165526

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Social Movements, Indigenous Politics and Democratisation in Guatemala, 1985–1996

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Cedla Latin America Studies Volume 95 Edited by

Michiel Baud, (Chair) Cedla Pitou van Dijck Cedla Anthony Bebbington, University of Manchester Edward F. Fischer, Vanderbilt University Anthony L. Hall, London School of Economics and Political Science Barbara Potthast, Universität zu Köln Eduardo Silva, University of Missouri at St. Louis Patricio Silva, Universiteit Leiden Rachel Sieder, University of London Cedla Centrum voor Studie en Documentatie van Latijns Amerika Centro de Estudios y Documentación Latinoamericanos Centro de Estudos e Documentação Latino-Americanos Centre for Latin American Research and Documentation The Centre for Latin American Research and Documentation (Cedla) conducts social science and history research, offers university courses, and has a specialised library for the study of the region. The Centre also publishes monographs and a journal on Latin America. Keizersgracht 395-397 1016 EK Amsterdam The Netherlands / Países Bajos www.cedla.uva.nl

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Social Movements, Indigenous Politics and Democratisation in Guatemala, 1985–1996 By

Roddy Brett

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2008

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This book was first published as “Movimiento Social, Etnicidad y Democratización en Guatemala, 1985–1996”. This book is printed on acid-free paper. A C.I.P. record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

ISSN 572-6401 ISBN 978 90 04 16552 6 Copyright 2008 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill Academic Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands

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For my mother, Andrea Brett For the solidarity in struggle that she taught me

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CONTENTS List of Acronyms .......................................................................

ix

Map One ...................................................................................

xii

Acknowledgement ......................................................................

xiii

Introduction Social Movements, Indigenous Politics And Democratisation In Guatemala, 1985–1996 .........................

1

Chapter One Civil Society And Social Movements: Some Theoretical Considerations .........................................

9

Chapter Two

The Democratic Transition .............................

33

The Emergence of Indigenous Politics ........

59

Chapter Four Demanding Human Rights in A Violent Democracy: Indigenous Participation in El Consejo De Comunidades Etnicas ............................................................

79

Chapter Five La Coordinadora Nacional Indígena Y Campesina and the Indigenous Struggle for Land ..............

111

Chapter Six Indigenous Mobilisation in La Defensoría Maya: Indigenous Politics and the Recovery of Mayan Culture ...................................................................................

149

Conclusions Social Movements, Indigenous Politics and Democratisation in Guatemala, 1985–1996 .........................

185

Appendix A ................................................................................

211

Appendix B ................................................................................

212

Chapter Three

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viii

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contents

Cited Sources and Bibliography ................................................ Newspapers and News Journals ............................................

215 225

Index ..........................................................................................

227

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AIDPI ACPD AEU ALMG ANN ANC APM CACIF CALDH CCDA CCPP CDHG CEH CERIGUA CERJ CIA CLOC CNOC CNR CNPs COCADI COCEI COMG COMS CONADEHGUA

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Acuerdo sobre la Identidad y los Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas Asamblea Consultiva de las Poblaciones Desarraigadas Asociación de Estudiantes Universitarios Academia de Lenguas Mayas de Guatemala Alianza Nueva Nación Asociación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas Asamblea Permanente del Pueblo Maya Comité Coordinador de Asociaciones Agrícolas, Comerciales, Industriales y Financieras Centro para la Acción Legal en Derechos Humanos Comité Campesino del Altiplano Comisiones Permanentes de Refugiados Comisión de Derechos Humanos de Guatemala Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico Centro Exterior de Reportes Informativos sobre Guatemala Consejo de Comunidades Étnicas—Runujel Junam Central Intelligence Agency Congreso Latinoamericano de Organizaciones del Campo Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas Comisión Nacional de Reconciliación Comisiones Nacionales Permanentes Coordinadora Kaqchikel para el Desarrollo Indígena Coalición de Obreros y Campesinos del Istmo Consejo de Organizaciones Mayas de Guatemala Coordinación de Organizaciones Mayas de Sololá Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos de Guatemala

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x CONAGRO CONAMPRO CONAVIGUA CONFECOOP CONFREGUA COPAZ COCIPAZ CONDEG CONIC CONTIERRA COPAZ COPMAGUA COPREDEH CPR CSC CSJ CTC CUC CUSG CVDC DCG EGP EIU EMP EU FAMDEGUA FAR FDNG FESOC FEDECAMPO FM FMM FMS FONAPAZ FONATIERRA

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list of acronyms Coordinadora Nacional Agropecuaria Coordinadora Nacional de Pequeños y Medianos Productores Coordinadora Nacional de Viudas de Guatemala Confederación Guatemalteca de Confederaciones Cooperativas Conferencia de Religiosos de Guatemala Comisión Gubernamental para la Paz Coordinadora Civil por la Paz Consejo Nacional de Desplazados de Guatemala Coordinadora Nacional Indígena y Campesina Oficina Presidencial para Asistencia Legal y Resolución de Conflictos de la Tierra Comisión Presidencial de la Paz Coordinación de Organizaciones del Pueblo Maya de Guatemala Comisión Presidencial de Derechos Humanos Comunidades de Población en Resistencia Coordinadora de Sectores Civiles Corte Suprema de Justicia Central de Trabajadores del Campo Comité de Unidad Campesina Confederación de Unidad Sindical de Guatemala Comités Voluntarios de Defensa Civil Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres Economist Intelligence Unit Estado Mayor Presidencial European Union Familiares de Detenidos y Desaparecidos de Guatemala Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes Frente Democrático Nueva Guatemala Federación Sindical, Obrera y Campesina Federación Campesina y Popular Foro Multi-Sectorial Fundación Myrna Mack Foro Multi-Sectorial Social Fondo Nacional para la Paz Fondo Nacional para la Tierra

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list of acronyms FRG G-2 GAM IAHRC ILO IMF INC INTA IUCM MAS MINUGUA MLN MP ODHA OAS ORPA PAC PAN PDH PGT PMA PN PNC PNUD REMHI RUOG S-5 SEGEPLAN TSE UASP UCN UN UNAGRO UNSITRAGUA URNG USAID USAC

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xi

Frente Republicano Guatemalteco Inteligencia Militar Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo Inter-American Human Rights Court International Labour Organisation International Monetary Fund Instancia Nacional de Consenso Instituto Nacional de Transformación Agraria Instancia de Unidad y Consenso Maya Movimiento de Acción Solidaria Misión de Naciones Unidas para la Verificación de los Derechos Humanos en Guatemala Movimiento de Liberación Nacional Ministerio Público Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado Organisation of American States Organización del Pueblo en Armas Patrullas de la Autodefensa Civil Partido de Avanzada Nacional Procuraduría de Derechos Humanos Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajadores Policía Militar Ambulante Policía Nacional Policía Nacional Civil Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo Proyecto Interdiocesano, Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica Representación Unitaria de la Oposición Guatemalteca Military-Civilian Affairs Unit Secretaría General de Planificacón Económica Tribunal Supremo Electoral Unión de Acción Sindical y Popular Unión del Centro Nacional United Nations Unión Nacional de Agricultores Unión Sindical de Trabajadores de Guatemala Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca United States Agency for International Development Universidad de San Carlos

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xii

map

S

ie

rr

a

de

Sierra

S

los

Cu

chu

I

mat

E

de Chamá

Sierra

de S

ruz anta C

anes

R R

A M

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A

D

R

E

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This book represents the fruit of a prolonged period of academic research that began in Cambridge, England, in 1993, which has been informed and strengthened by thirteen years of work in human rights and indigenous rights advocacy in Europe and Latin America. As a consequence, I owe my thanks to a broad array of people. First, I would like to thank Rachel Sieder and James Dunkerley, who gave their initial backing to this research over ten years ago and who subsequently gave me ceaseless encouragement and moral, intellectual and practical support. Their dedication, enthusiasm and good humour were invaluable to the completion of the research. Special thanks also go to Rachel Sieder for her discerning and judicious comments on drafts and ideas and for her insight into the development of the research. Thanks also go to Victor Bulmer-Thomas and Joe Foweraker for important help in the theoretical conceptualisation of research presented here. This book would not have been possible without the extensive contributions of a great many people in Guatemala who gave generously of their experience, knowledge, energy and support. Moreover, they freely shared with me their stories and their lives. Special thanks go to all my friends and colleagues from El Consejo de Comunidades Étnicas, Runujel Junam (CERJ), from La Defensoría Maya and from La Coordinadora Nacional Indígena y Campesina (CONIC) who gave this book its substance. I hope the research will be of interest to them, although it cannot begin to do justice to the inspirational work that they have carried out with extraordinary courage in the face of grave adversity. In particular, I would like to express my gratitude to Amílcar Méndez, Juan León de Alvarado, Rigoberto Monteros, Miguel Sucuqui, Rafael Chanchavac Cux, Pedro Esquina and Juan Tiney. Thanks also go to Gustavo Peralta, Belter Hernández, Justina Tzoc, Antonio Argueta, Victória Cunes, Miguel Tum, Leticia Velásquez, Isabel Solis, Juan Ventura and Tomás Sen for their companionship and assistance. I am also extremely grateful to the other members of CERJ, CONIC and Defensoría Maya in the capital city and in the comunidades del campo who unreservedly shared their time and homes with me, without question or reserve.

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xiv

acknowledgements

Special acknowledgement goes to all of my interviewees—indigenous activists, members of the popular movement, trade unionists, members of non-governmental organisations, United Nations functionaries, members of Guatemalan political parties, State officials, members of the military, political analysts and researchers. The wisdom and support that these people offered has helped to shape the research. I would like to express my appreciation to the ex-congressional deputies and activists of El Frente Democrático Nueva Guatemala for extending to me their facilities and resources during fieldwork in 1997 and 1998. In addition, members of La Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas and La Confederación de Unidad Sindical de Guatemala gave me companionship during long hours discussing the shape of social struggle in Guatemala. Many friends and colleagues helped me to put this book together, with comments and ideas, and conversations and discussion throughout the development of the manuscript. In particular, I would like to thank Santiago Bastos, Ted Fischer, Felipe Girón, Paul Seils, David Holiday, Antonio Delgado Duarte, Alessandro Preti, Paul Farrow, Bayard Roberts and Lars Fure. I would also like to thank Harry Cobb, Andrew Scott, Simon White, Rosy Cave, Hannah Roberts, Sarah Kee and Ross Birbeck for their important support. The Economic and Social Research Council funded initial fieldwork in Guatemala and the Department of Political Studies at Queen Mary College provided an indispensable grant and a teaching assistantship during the difficult moments of conceptual analysis of the research. My thanks to Diana Coole, Ken Young and Pilar Domingo and to the other members of the Department for their support and interest. Thanks also go to the community at the Institute of Latin American Studies, where the vigorous academic and political debate. I would also like to acknowledge the support of Cathy McIlwaine and Caroline Moser, with whom I worked on a World Bank and Swedish International Development Agency Project. The exchanges that I had with staff at the International Secretariat of Amnesty International in London and with members of the Guatemala Solidarity Network also compounded my awareness of the issues at stake and kept me focused upon the political importance of academic research. I would like to thank Jack Duvall, Peter Ackerman, Luisa Ortiz Pérez and my other friends at the International Centre on non-Violent Conflict for their important support and extraordinary inspiration. A special acknowledgement also goes to my dear friends and colleagues

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acknowledgements

xv

Edelberto Torres-Rivas and Anders Kompass, for their extraordinary support and incisive comments on this research. Very special thanks go to Gabriela Contreras for her intellectual support and her unconditional moral encouragement in those inevitably difficult moments. Finally and emphatically, this book would not have been possible without the strength and support of my family, unrelenting in their generosity and patience and their constant encouragement. I am particularly indebted to my late mother, Andrea, and to my sister.

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INTRODUCTION: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, INDIGENOUS POLITICS AND DEMOCRATISATION IN GUATEMALA, 1985–1996 The visibility and political impact of indigenous peoples throughout Latin America has grown considerably during the last two decades, and indigenous peoples have struggled successfully to become important political actors within civil society, political society and the State. Perhaps the most significant recent development has been the Presidential triumph in Bolivia of Aymara indigenous leader Evo Morales in 2005. However, smaller though very significant battles have been won in many other countries in the region, culminating in constitutional reforms that seek to consecrate indigenous peoples rights,1 important resolutions by the Inter-American Human Rights Court in favour of the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples, incremental and differentiated indigenous participation in the State and political parties, and an increasingly present indigenous movement that has sought to unify its expressions through the three Continental Summits for the Indigenous Peoples and Nationalities of Abya Yala that have been held since 2004 in Latin America.2 There are between 35 and 40 million indigenous peoples living in Latin America, 90 per cent of whom live in Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru. In Guatemala, the political mobilisation of indigenous activists in Guatemala has reflected patterns elsewhere on the continent. Out of a total population of approximately 13,250,000, estimates vary as to the ethnic composition of Guatemala’s population. Conservative figures estimate the indigenous population at approximately 40 per cent of the population and the non-indigenous or ladino population at 60 per cent (which can include indigenous people that no longer practice indigenous customs, or speak indigenous languages). However most figures cited agree that Guatemala’s indigenous peoples See Van Cott (1999) for an important discussion of this process. For detailed discussion of the historical development of indigenous movements, their relationship with the Latin American state and the international and regional contexts in which this process was situated, see Assies and Hoekema (1994), Bengoa (2000), Brysk (1996; 2000), CEPAL (2006), Díaz Polanco (1997), Plant (1998), Stavenhagen (1996), Urban and Scherzer (1991), Van Cott (1994), Yashar (1997a). 1 2

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introduction

actually constitute the majority of the population. Guatemala’s indigenous population is made up of Maya, Garífuna and Xinca peoples, the latter two groups populating the Caribbean and Eastern parts of Guatemala respectively, and the Maya concentrated in the highland regions and urban areas of the country, due to the rural exile initiated in the 1980s. The Maya population itself includes twenty-two ethnic groups and constitutes over 90 per cent of the indigenous population, while it is estimated that only approximately 197 people speak Xinca.3 Within Guatemala, income distribution and levels of development and social exclusion follow an acute ethnic bias. Rated by the World Bank as a lower-middle income country, Guatemala is third behind Haiti and Nicaragua in terms of the lowest regional levels of poverty. Whilst 26.5 per cent of the ladino population live below the UN defined poverty line, only 10.5 per cent of the indigenous population live above this line. Moreover, those departments with the highest indigenous populations, including Alta and Baja Verapaz, Quiché, Sololá and Huehuetenango, remain the areas of the highest incidence of both social exclusion and conflict over land distribution (PNUD 2005). As is widely known, indigenous peoples in Guatemala have historically suffered from systematically lower indices of human development. Marginalisation and social and economic exclusion of the indigenous population has been manifest in all areas of social life, including in the health and education sectors, and resulted in higher levels of maternal and infant mortality and poverty/extreme poverty. Significantly, in the last three years there has been an increase in extreme poverty from 16% to 21%, the brunt of which has been borne by indigenous communities. This pattern is an exception to the tendency in most other areas of human development in which, during the last five years, there has been an incremental improvement in said indices. However, and importantly, the general tendency continues to demonstrate that indigenous peoples, and in particular indigenous women, enjoy far lower levels of human development than the ladino population (PNUD 2005). My academic engagement with Guatemala began one March morning in Cambridge, England, in 1993, seemingly by accident. Through the post, I received from an ex-colleague the manifesto of the Quinientos 3 The twenty-two Mayan languages and groups are the following: Chuj; Akateko; Jakalteko; Q’anjob’al; Ixil; Uspanteko; Tektiteko; Awakateko; Sipakapense; Takaneko; Mam; Tzutujil; Kaqchiqel; Sakapulteko; Q’eqchi; Achi; Poqomchi’; Pokoman; K’iche’; Itza; Chortí; Maya-Mopan.

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3

Años de Resistencia (Five Hundred Years of Resistance) Campaign. Two years earlier in October 1991, the Campaign, a coalition of Latin American popular organisations established to protest against the planned celebrations in 1992 for the so-called Discovery of America, had carried out its second continental meeting in Quetzaltenango, Guatemala’s second city. The manifesto I received documented this meeting, and was accompanied by materials and testimonies describing Guatemala’s genocide,4 and the egregious human rights violations ongoing in the country at the time. However, something stood out despite this outrageous violence, something that was not easy to let go of. In the face of ongoing brutal military and paramilitary repercussions, civil society organisations, in many cases constituted by indigenous peoples, victims as they were of the state-sponsored violence, were mobilising with an increasing intensity against the human rights meltdown and Guatemala’s severely restrictive and vicious civilian democracy. These new social actors were seeking to put an end to the current violence and demanding answers to the violence of the past. This book is the result then of the process which began that March morning and was consolidated that same summer when, inspired and intrigued by these developments, I made my first visit to Guatemala to carry out postgraduate research. What had caught my attention in 1993, continued to do so as the Guatemalan government, military and insurgent army—the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (Unidad Nacional Revolucionaria Guatemalateca, URNG)—moved slowly towards establishing formal peace negotiations to end the internal armed conflict. My interest lay not in the role that elite groups played in the peace process, but rather in the ways in which historically excluded social and political actors, direct victims of the genocide and political violence of the internal armed conflict, were seeking to impact upon this process. The present book seeks to explain the complex patterns of collective action that emerged during Guatemala’s process of democratisation, specifically between 1985 and 1996, a decade characterised by trauma and upheaval, which gradually brought with it incremental sociopolitical transformation and reform as the country moved slowly and

4 A broad range of analysts have defined Guatemala’s counter-insurgency campaign as genocidal, including Arias (1984), Brett (2007, forthcoming), CEH (1999), Falla (1988), Jonas (1991), ODHA (1998), Sandford (2003), Schirmer (1998), URNG (1983).

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introduction

unsurely along the path toward democratisation. I began the research for this book in September 1996, several months before the signing of the Accord for a Firm and Lasting Peace in December of that same year. The Accord for a Firm and Lasting Peace represented the final in a series of peace accords that marked the end of the process of direct negotiations between the government and the URNG, and its signing brought with it the closure of Guatemala’s thirty-six year internal armed conflict. However, the process of democratisation had begun over ten years earlier when, with the election of Vinicio Arévalo Cerezo to the Presidency in 1985, Guatemalans elected a civilian government for the first time since the administration of César Méndez Montenegro (1966–1970). The chronological parameters for the book then are marked by the return to civilian government in 1985, with Cerezo taking office in January 1986, and the end of the internal armed conflict in 1996, which frames the process of democratisation within the context of a completed, although albeit nominal political transition and concluded peace negotiations. The initial field research was carried out during 1997 and 1998, in a post-war socio-political context shaped by the experiences of political, social and cultural “continuity” and “rupture” (Dunkerley 1988: 657) precipitated by democratisation within the arenas of civil society, political society and the state. In the wake of the political transition, civil society, weak and disarticulated after the genocidal counterinsurgency campaigns of the early 1980s, gradually emerged as a collective actor during the process of democratisation, culminating in the participation of a consultative body of civil society organisations, the Civil Society Assembly, La Asamblea de la Sociedad Civil (ASC), in the peace negotiations. This “resurrection of civil society” took place only after the end of authoritarian rule, in contrast to those social mobilisations that occurred in the Southern Cone, for example. The collective action that emerged in Guatemala was diverse and contingent and a wide range of civil actors mobilised across civil society, building upon historical experiences and existing social networks and forging new patterns of collective action. Importantly, as the political violence of the internal armed conflict began slowly to cede to procedural democratic norms and practices, collective action became increasingly subject to the new rules of the democratic game, precipitating and necessitating changes within the objectives and strategies of social movements. After the return to civilian rule, in the early stages of democratisation in Guatemala, patterns of social mobilisation reflected the activity of

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5

organisations such as Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo under authoritarian rule in Argentina.5 Popular actors constituted a broad human rights movement that engaged with issues arising from the political violence of the internal armed conflict and the ongoing repression and violations of fundamental human rights, which continued under civilian rule. Importantly, unlike the human rights movements in Chile and Argentina, in Guatemala many social movement activists were indigenous, due overwhelmingly to the fact that the political violence, and emphatically the genocide carried out between 1981 and 1983, had been directed principally toward the country’s high proportion indigenous population. In this regard, the United-Nations sponsored Historical Clarification Commission concluded in its final report, Guatemala: Memory of Silence, that 83 per cent of the victims of the conflict were indigenous, and that the State had perpetrated acts of genocide in at least four regions of the country (CEH 1999). As democratisation advanced, bringing with it important socio-political changes, including a comparative decrease in the systematic political violence, and as a continental-wide network of indigenous peoples began to impose itself on the regional political agenda, so actors in Guatemala gradually prioritised aspects of their struggle that pertained to their indigenous identity, demands emanating from and addressing the historical exclusion that they had suffered. In this context, a key feature of the struggles of social movements in Guatemala has been an increasingly self-conscious indigenous politics and articulation of an indigenous rights agenda. It is this process of evolutive change within Guatemala’s social movement that is of key importance to the research presented here. This study then analyses collective action in Guatemala through the framework of social movement theory. To date, comparatively little has been written about collective action in Guatemala within the discipline of political science, despite the mobilisation of a wide range of social movements in response to the brutal internal armed conflict and accompanying repression and an increasingly visible indigenous movement.6 Rather, the vast majority of studies on Guatemala’s indigenous See Brysk (1994); Jelin (1994); Navarro (1989). Scholars of Latin American social movements have focused predominantly upon areas such as Brazil (Foweraker and Landman 1997; Dagnino 1998; Paoli and da Silva Telles 1998), Mexico (Foweraker and Landman 1997; Rubin 1998), Peru (Starn 1992; 1999) and the Southern Cone (Brysk 1994; Jelin 1994; Mainwaring and Viola 1984; Navarro 1989; Schild 1998). An important exception to this tendency is the skilled and groundbreaking analysis of collective action and indigenous movements by Yashar 5 6

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peoples and indigenous movements have approached the field from the discipline of social or cultural anthropology.7 Moreover, historically the overwhelming majority of scholarship has sought to understand the role of elite actors in democratisation processes.8 This study presents a different perspective: the role of indigenous actors in the political processes undergirding and shaping Guatemala’s democratic transition. The research addresses three principal questions that can help us to understand collective action more clearly. Firstly, how and why civil actors mobilised collectively during the democratic transition in Guatemala. Secondly, how collective action evolved as democratisation advanced. Thirdly, what impact such collective action actually had upon democratisation in Guatemala. The book addresses these issues by presenting detailed case studies of three social movements that were member organisations of the popular movement: The Council of Ethnic Communities, El Consejo de Comunidades Étnicas, Runujel Junam (CERJ), The National Indigenous and Peasant Coordination, La Coordinadora Nacional Indígena y Campesina (CONIC), and Defensoría Maya. The human rights organisation CERJ was formed in 1988 in the highland department of El Quiché to protest against forced recruitment into the paramilitary civilian patrols and armed forces and to provide legal assistance to indigenous populations suffering human rights violations carried out by these groups. The campesino organisation CONIC was (2005). Yashar includes the Guatemalan case in her excellent analysis of the rise of indigenous movements in the regional Latin American context. 7 See for example Bastos and Camus (1993; 1995; 2003), Cojtí (1997), Esquit (2003), Gálvez et al (1997), Warren (1992; 1993; 1998; 1998a), Watanabe (1992; 1995), Wilson (1991; 1993; 1995). 8 The discussion distinguishes elite actors as the “principal decision-makers in the largest or most resource-rich political, governmental, economic, military, professional, communications and cultural organisations and movements in society”, who are able to “affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially” (Burton, Gunther and Higley 1992: 8). These actors may belong either to the state or to civil society. However, many social movements depend upon the privileged access to networks of actors, education and material resources to which their leadership is privy. Furthermore, the role of organic intellectuals and vanguardism within popular mobilisation is well documented. However, elite actors and the elites of popular movements are different because the latter do not “affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially” to the same extent. Despite their privileged position vis-á-vis the members of their organisations and many other individuals in civil society, they do not possess the same level of privilege to or influence upon the principal areas of decision-making. Elite state actors (government/military/state institutions), elites from political society (political elites), elite civil actors (members of conservative business groups and pressure groups) and “popular” elite actors operating in popular movement organisations are treated here as analytically distinct.

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7

created in 1992, initially operating on the southern coast and in the Western Highlands. CONIC focused its platforms upon the recovery of land of indigenous and ladino campesinos, the protection of their labour rights, including the right to strike and payment of their wages and the strengthening of Mayan culture. Defensoría Maya emerged in 1993, formed through the merger of two human rights networks in the highland departments of El Quiché and Sololá. The organisation initially offered legal support to indigenous people suffering human rights violations, but its long-term objective was the promotion and protection of the collective rights of indigenous peoples, specifically through the revitalisation of the indigenous justice system and, in parallel, the reconstruction of indigenous local authority structures. The organisations were selected as case studies for several reasons. CERJ has been one of the most important human rights organisations in Guatemala. It was one of the first organisations to emerge after the end of military rule and was one of the most active and internationally recognised organisations during the initial stages of popular movement activity, which was characterised by mobilisation around issues of fundamental human rights and protest-based political activity. CONIC and Defensoría Maya emerged in the later stages of democratisation when organisations began to build upon their initial definitions of human rights, articulate broader configurations of rights within their political platforms and engage to varying degrees with formal mechanisms of political inclusion. While the Comité de Unidad Campesina (CUC) was the first campesino organisation in Guatemala, establishing an important precedent that shaped subsequent popular organisation, CONIC has been the most influential and important campesino organisation in Guatemala since the return to civilian government, whilst Defensoría Maya has been key in establishing questions of indigenous justice administration as part of the national political agenda. Finally, the platforms of all three organisations represented aspects central to democratisation in Guatemala: human rights and the rule of law (CERJ); economic rights and agrarian issues (CONIC); and indigenous cultural rights, in particular political participation and the administration of the indigenous justice (legal) system (Defensoría Maya). The chapters that follow analyse the evolution of social movement politics in Guatemala between 1985 and 1996. Chapter 1 briefly presents the analytical framework used in the book, an approach that combines social movements and civil society theory, in order to understand collective action in the Guatemalan context. Chapter 2 provides

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introduction

historical analysis of the democratic transition between 1985 and 1996, with reference to the development of the role of civil society as a collective political actor both within the formal mechanisms of the peace process and independently from them. Here we see the evolution of popular mobilisation from a movement based predominantly upon protest articulated through a narrow human rights discourse and practices into one characterised by proposal and broader interpretations and articulations of human rights. The case studies, presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, address the three main research questions of the book, by plotting the historical development of each organisation in the context of democratisation. The analyses document the transformations in organisational strategies, platforms, allegiances and identity and the configurations of rights that they articulated and detail the differentiated and context-specific gains that the movements achieved with regard to their objectives. Finally, Chapter 7 draws together the specificities of each case study. The discussion traces how the organisations adapted to, were changed by and impacted upon the process of democratisation in distinct ways. Of major concern is how the movements interpreted and framed their grievances and demands and adapted their strategies as they sought to represent the evolving needs of their social base and assert continuing political influence within the socio-political environment that accompanied and determined democratisation. The discussion of these issues contributes to the broader scholarship upon collective action and social movements.

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CHAPTER ONE

CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS The evolution of popular mobilisation in Guatemala was shaped by the interplay between actors’ strategic choices and (changing) domestic, regional and international socio-political conditions. Significantly, it was these conditions that presented both opportunities and obstacles to social movement actors and which consequently played a role in influencing the nature of collective action and the political repertoires of social movements. Perhaps, above all, four factors in particular framed the different political options that were available to movement actors and thus shaped the strategic choices that actors made: the return to civilian government in 1986; the internationalised peace process in Guatemala that unfolded in the country after 1987; the regional shift towards democratisation; and the increasing visibility and mobilisation of organised networks of indigenous actors throughout Latin America, actors who gradually articulated an indigenous rights discourse. Of paramount importance to the analysis of how collective action took shape and how social movements impacted upon and were influenced by Guatemala’s democratisation process, therefore, is a detailed account of the historical conditions within which such movements operated. However, our account of the political history of Guatemala during this turbulent time must be supported and strengthened by a theoretical discussion of civil society, social movements and human rights, presented in this chapter. This dual-centred (empirical-theoretical) approach can deepen our understanding of collective action in Guatemala and contribute to the broader scholarship on social movements. In the elaboration of the analytical framework used to guide this research, an integral approach has been adopted that seeks to understand the whys and hows behind the nature and outcome of collective action in Guatemala and an analysis of the fields of contestation of power within which social movement mobilisation took place, principally in the arena of civil society. By understanding the connections between the broader socio-political context in which collective action evolved in Guatemala, the reasons why and the forms through which social actors mobilised,

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and the spaces in which such actions were articulated, we will present a comprehensive analysis of how, as the democratic transition unfolded and domestic and international socio-political conditions changed, collective action itself evolved. These considerations allow us to build up a comprehensive picture of the motivations that determine why it is that normal and seemingly powerless human beings confront brutal and apparently impenetrable structures of power, the forms they choose through which to mobilise, the actions that they carry out in pursuit of their goals, and the outcomes of these processes. However, mobilisation itself relies upon communication, both between members of a social movement and, importantly, outwards, towards the State, civil society and political society, in short, a movement’s “audience”. An important part of our discussion here, therefore, is an analysis of the different discursive frameworks and political identities that social movement actors employed in Guatemala as a means of interpreting and expressing their grievances and, subsequently, articulating their demands towards broader society. In this regard, a critical aspect of social movement politics in Latin America in general, and Guatemala in particular, has been the framing of movements’ demands through an evolving language of rights. In the case of Guatemala, as we shall see, the politics of human rights has played a decisive role in movement politics. Civil Society, Social Movements and the Latin American Context In the context of post-Cold War Latin America, the term “civil society” has represented a staging ground for conceptual misdemeanours. In its broadest definition which is applied here, the term civil society refers to the space of social interaction between the individual and the State, comprising the non-State arena of market-regulated, privately controlled and voluntarily organised bodies, interest groups, cultural organisations and institutions, as opposed to the military, policing, legal, administrative, productive and cultural organs of the state.1 In our understanding of civil society, therefore, it is necessary to emphasise the complex and 1 In this study, the State is understood as a bounded territorial entity constituted by a set of institutions linked to, though distinct from, civil society and political society that has secured the monopoly of legitimate force and executes governmental policy. The State is not understood as a neutral arbiter and is perceived of as a historically contingent and multi-dimensional network of institutions, actors and sectoral interests.

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potentially contradictory nature of civil society and to include distinct dimensions, such as the economic (market), legal and political (public sphere), and social (associational) fields.2 Here we understand civil society as a historically contingent formation that evolves over time,3 which is highly diverse and comprises a wide array of actors, including popular and commercial sectors, in pursuit of their interests with potentially conflicting political and ideological concerns. As Foweraker has pointed out, social movements are a constituent part of civil society, but they cannot be equated with civil society, nor are they necessarily representative of it (1995: 6). Much recent literature has documented the contested character of civil society, indicating its political, social, ideological and cultural diversity and critiquing any suppositions that it may be conflict-free and inherently democratic and virtuous.4 Analysts have also sought to demonstrate how civil society varies geographically, both within and between countries. The context within which social movements emerged in Guatemala after 1985 was characterised by a fractured, fragmented and internally contradictory civil society, militarised by the armed conflict, and silenced by the state-led repression. Whilst social movements sought to adopt a pro-democratising, pluralizing and emancipatory role in the relative political space afforded by the return to civilian government, other elements of civil society, such as the conservative Catholic Church, and acutely conservative private sector groups remained staunchly anti-communist and counterinsurgent, and resisted movements’ democratising tendencies. The Guatemalan experience then sheds some light upon the apparently popular, anti-state or pro-democratising character of civil society in the 1970s and 1980s in Eastern Europe and Latin America, whilst at the same time clarifying its highly diverse and sometimes contradictory nature. The political, social and economic conditions of the transition and the legacy of the internal armed conflict determined the highly fractured appearance of broader Guatemalan civil society after the return to civilian rule, a context within which social movements slowly and

2 See Bobbio (1989: 22), Ehrenberg (1999: 144), Fine (1992), Hann (1995: 179), Keane (1988a: 1), McIlwaine (1998: 652), Sachikonye (1995). 3 For example Foweraker (1995), Giner (1995: 322), Keane (1998: 7), Pérez-Díaz (1995: 80). 4 Including Carothers (2000), Fine and Rai (1997), Kallick (1996), McIlwaine (1998; 1998a) and Pearce (1997).

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cautiously emerged. Almost immediately, the arena of civil society became a key field where movements’ struggles for democracy and for the restoration and promotion of a wide spectrum of rights took place, as had been the case in other Latin American countries. However, of critical importance to social movement actors were the growing interrelationships between and interdependency of the civil, political and State spheres, despite their clearly distinct function and role, a phenomenon identified by Keane in his important volume on civil society and the state in Europe (1988). Movement actors sought to engage with these distinct spheres, extending their struggles towards the state and political society, in an increasingly complex operational logic. Our understanding of Guatemalan civil society, therefore, and the contingent and interrelated forms through which social movements have operated, acknowledges the fact that the civil society, political society5 and the state spheres are indeed discrete entities, whilst emphasising the importance of the interaction and connections between them, interactions that, in the case of Guatemala, proved to be crucial fields of contestation for social movements. By differentiating between civil society, political society and the state, we can, moreover, discern what Cohen and Arato describe as the “dual organisational logic” of social movements (1992: 523). Social movements have a “dual logic” or “dualistic character”, wherein they struggle for the defence and democratisation of civil society, at the same time as struggling for the democratisation and expansion of political society. Demonstrating a dualistic character, as we shall see, in the case of Guatemala, social movements increasingly employed a “politics of identity”, seeking to redefine “cultural norms, individual and collective identities and appropriate social roles, modes of interpretation and the form and content of discourses”. Simultaneously, however, move-

5 According to Cohen and Arato, political society is the network of parties, political organisations and political publics (parliaments) in a society (1992: ix). Political parties play a mediating role between civil society and the State. They perform “the functions of selecting, aggregating and transmitting demands originating in civil society and which will become objects of political decision” (Bobbio 1989 25). As Mouzelis argues, “political parties, particularly in democratic parliamentary contexts, will be considered as the major organisational means for articulating civil society interests with the state” (1995: 225–226). Political society is understood as being constituted by political parties at national, regional and local levels, and by those bodies that allow for their interaction, such as parliaments or assemblies. Political parties are key to aggregating the demands of civil actors and projecting them towards the State, although they are separate from the associations and non-state institutions of civil society and from the State itself.

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ments also engaged in what Cohen and Arato define as the “politics of inclusion”, initiatives aimed at democratising and expanding political society,6 through the achievement of inclusion in political society, effective representation by it and for the recognition of new members of it. Finally, movements also adopted a “politics of influence”, aiming to alter “the universe of political discourse to accommodate new needinterpretations, new identities, and new norms” (1992: 526). As social movements came to play a crucial role in democratisation processes in Eastern Europe and Latin America, principally during the last phases of the Cold War and in its aftermath, theorising and developing “the politics of civil society” became a vital concern for the Latin American Left and popular sectors. The rethinking of Leftist politics in Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s, which was hastened by the political and military defeats suffered by the regional Left, was strongly influenced by Gramscian thought. This reassessment by the Left had implications for the ways in which civil society, political society and the State, and importantly the relationships between them, were understood and articulated. It was also a factor that, in part, shaped collective mobilisation in the region, as Dagnino has pointed out (1998: 47–56). The repercussions of the crisis within the Soviet Union in the 1980s reinforced the developments that were taking place in Latin America, where actors were questioning the efficacy and appropriacy of MarxistLeninist paradigms of social action. In many countries in the region, the waning political efficacy of class as a rationale for collective action and disillusionment with both insurgent strategies and traditional Marxism, led actors to search for alternative collective forms and ways of doing politics. Such a reassessment was intensified by the particular struggles in which actors were engaged that, in turn, were shaped by state-civil relations within authoritarian regimes in Latin America, where political participation and public spaces were severely restricted (Dagnino; 1998: 37–41). In the 1970s and 1980s, civil society began to play a role in opposing authoritarian regimes in the region, as a broad range of social movements developed out of the civil sphere in response to the violence of military dictatorships and the lack of public services provided by

6 As well as democratising and expanding social relations within civil society and political society, Cohen and Arato also argue that movements must democratise “political and economic institutions”—what they call the “politics of reform” (1992: 526).

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these regimes. In the early stages these included human rights movements that challenged the legitimacy of the state and demanded military accountability and the cessation of state-sponsored violence. In many cases, such as Las Madres in Argentina, women’s organisations were key to these movements, precipitating the politicisation of hitherto private arenas, such as the family. As regime transformation took place, other issues and political actors began to emerge with platforms oriented toward the extension and consolidation of democracy. In 1992, during preparations for the Columbus quincentenary, indigenous movements appeared across the continent challenging the prevalent form of liberal democratic governance in the region. In this context, the position of union and class-based political movements as the historical vehicle of the oppositional and popular sectors very gradually began to lose its primacy, ceding to movements with more particularist platforms and political identities, for example those based on gender or ethnicity. This process was of central importance to the evolution of social movements in Guatemala, as we shall discuss further below. It is this context that informed and influenced the evolution of social movements in Guatemala, as the country became part of the wave of social mobilisation sweeping the region, demonstrating a paradigmatic shift in the nature of political action. A further aspect of the reassessment of Leftist politics, rooted in Gramscian thought and important to the civil society debate, was the questioning of the role of the state in social transformation. Analysts such as Dagnino have detailed how actors began to dispute the efficacy of a “frontal” attack on the state by the left and shift toward the acceptance of the arena of civil society as generative and constitutive of oppositional discourse and practice and, therefore, as key to the process of social transformation itself. Such a rethinking allowed the concept of the “political” to be expanded and introduced the “plurality of power relations”. What was “political” became linked to and embedded within everyday social relations as the “expansion of the political establishes new parameters for reflecting on the relations between culture and politics” (Dagnino, 1998: 38). Civil society, as the arena where hegemony was constituted and contested, became a key arena of social struggle, a terrain for political action in the Gramscian sense.7 In Dagnino’s words:

7 See Bobbio (1988; 1989) for a detailed examination of Gramsci’s contribution to the development of Leftist discourse and practice.

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Revolution is envisaged as the process of building of a new hegemony, which implies the world conception, the role of ideas and culture assumes a positive character . . . power (is not) a “thing” to be seized, but . . . a relationship among social forces that must be transformed (1998: 37).

Social movements in Guatemala: theoretical considerations In Guatemala, the social movements that emerged during the democratic transition shared characteristics with movements that developed in other Latin American countries. However, unlike in other countries on the continent, organisation had not been possible under the military governments and regimes of the 1970s and 1980s, due to the absolute ferocity of the genocidal counterinsurgency and the accompanying systematically brutal response to political organisation. In Guatemala, a generation of activists, teachers, union members, university professors and political party members, opponents of the military regimes, was wiped out almost in its entirety during the conflict, and particularly between the 1970s and 1980s. In the indigenous highlands, entire villages were burnt off the face of the map, women, children and men massacred, tortured and disappeared and women and young girls raped as part of the counterinsurgency campaign. With the turn towards civilian government and the relative opening that the end of dictatorship afforded, activists, many of whom had been victims of the political repression and violence perpetrated by the state during the internal armed conflict, began to organise collectively. As had been the case in other countries in the region, these people were excluded systematically from formal political structures. The platforms articulated by the popular mobilisations that emerged within the less restrictive political space of post-authoritarian Guatemala were shaped initially by past and ongoing political violence and violations of fundamental human rights. Over time, however, as the violence diminished and regional and national developments seeped into the undergirding conceptual and discursive framework of collective action, social movements’ platforms and rights articulations evolved, becoming intimately linked to the social formations and material conditions that had determined the historical marginalisation and socio-economic exclusion of the indigenous population. As a result, in Guatemala, and other countries such as Brazil, movements began to broaden their definitions of human rights away from demands based predominantly upon universal-individual human rights, such as the basic right to life, toward the inclusion of more specific rights or particular claims, for

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example socio-economic rights, collective and specific cultural rights and gender rights. In this regard, movements’ discourse began to include what Kymlicka has called an approach based upon “differentiated rights” and “differentiated citizenship”, in short, struggles for the simultaneous recognition of the right to equality and the right to difference (1995; 1995a). Such changes were also linked to the wider transformation of Leftist politics as the Cold War era came to an end and the popular sector in Latin America developed a more particularist politics. A decreasing resistance shown by the Guatemalan State to adhere to the minimum standards established in the international normative human rights framework accompanied democratisation, resulting as it did from domestic and international pressure. In the context of the internationally monitored peace process where the guarantee of rights became an increasingly central aspect of democratisation, social movements gradually articulated platforms then that combined an emphasis upon universal human, civil and political rights and specific, collective and cultural rights. The presence of the “international rights regime” (Sieder and Witchell 2001: 204)8 and “transnational advocacy networks”9 in Guatemala reinforced this process. Transnational human rights networks played a critical role in the Guatemala’s democratic transition and, in particular, in supporting social movements within the country. TNAs worked by linking with domestic movements in order to pressure target actors, in this case the Guatemalan state, to comply with its international and domestic obligations and with international standards. TNAs in Guatemala were active because channels between domestic movements and the state were blocked, impeded and ineffective in resolving conflicts. Popular organisations engaged with international organisations and institutions, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, after the transition to elected civilian rule, taking advantage of their capacity to

8 See the work of Brysk (1994; 1993; 2000), Cleary (1997), Keck and Sikkink (1998), Risse et al. (2000) and Ropp and Sikkink (2000) on the concept of the international rights regime. 9 Keck and Sikkink define transnational advocacy networks (TNAs) as networks of activists whose formation and activity is guided by the centrality of “principled ideas or values”. The major actors in TNAs include: 1) international and domestic governmental research and advocacy organisations; 2) local social movements; 3) foundations; 4) the media; 5) churches, trade unions, consumer organisations and intellectuals; 6) parts of regional and intergovernmental organisations; 7) parts of the executive and/or parliamentary branches of governments (1998: 1).

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pressure the state with regard to human rights protection issues. The international human rights regime was particularly active and influential, with many local organisations linking with such networks due to the initially unreceptive domestic environment. As democratisation advanced, what Brysk (2000) terms the “international Indian rights movement”, a transnational multi-level social movement based upon the assertion of an indigenous identity and the practice of identity politics, played a role in strengthening the development of social movements in Guatemala. The social movements that first emerged in Guatemala in the mid1980s represented what Tarrow has defined as “collective challenges by people with common purpose and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities. . . . to exploit political opportunities, create collective identities, bring people together in organisations, and mobilise them against more powerful opponents” (1994:3–4). In this regard, in the case of Guatemala, the basis of social movements may be defined as sustained contentious collective action. For Tarrow, collective action becomes contentious “when it is used by people who lack regular access to institutions, act in the name of new or unaccepted claims, and behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others” (1994: 4). In the context of the return to civilian government in Guatemala, collective action increasingly included the symbolic politics of protest, such as demonstrations and political theatre aimed at the state, civil and political realms and, as the transition advanced, negotiation and engagement with the state. In Guatemala, as elsewhere on the continent, social movements were characterised then by the execution of sustained collective action, the search for alternative lifestyles, platforms that demanded the realisation of traditional and/or new rights claims, and their non-elite status. Importantly, discussions of the class or economic characteristics of movement participants have remained open for discussion, given the dramatic dissimilarity in the contexts where social movements have arisen. Most notably, this distinction has rested on the contextual factors that differentiate movements in the North and West (middle-class participants), and the South and East (popular/working-class members).10 In the Guatemalan case, whilst in many cases leaders may have been

10 For further discussion of this phenomena, see Fuentes and Gunder Frank (1989: 179 and Offe 1985: 835–840).

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educated professionals, including teachers and lawyers, the mass social base of movements has been principally constituted by working-class or peasant participants, the majority of whom were indigenous. As was also the case throughout Latin America, Guatemalan social movements formed in direct response to the activity of the authoritarian state. The closure of channels of political representation, the lack of provision of state services and state-sponsored political violence directed frequently at civil society precipitated the emergence of a diverse range of social mobilisations.11 Collective action was oriented towards the state at local and national levels in an attempt to secure fundamental human rights and broader citizenship rights, the realisation of which has been a core aim of social movements. In seeking to realise their objectives, as democratisation unfolded, movements had to negotiate with the state, the entity charged with the legal obligation to protect human rights, although in many cases the principal violator of those rights. This strategy has shifted, as Foweraker has pointed out (1998: 277), as military regimes were superseded by civilian democracies. In Guatemala, the main factor that precipitated such a change in strategy was not the return to civilian rule, however, but rather, the advances that were brought by the peace process and by democratisation more broadly. Importantly, social movements in Guatemala faced a dilemma in this regard. Negotiation with the state and participation in the institutions of political society, such as political parties, has continually raised the question of their possible co-option and consequent demobilisation.12 It has been argued that as democratic rules and procedure become the norm, movements may decline and become marginalised from policy-making due to their incapacity to institutionalise the degree of representation that they had previously attained during their moment of mass mobilisation and protest (Foweraker 1998: 280–282). In this regard, an important question remains whether participation in formal state and political party structures is the right price to pay for creation of agile political actors (Foweraker 1998: 179). As we shall see from the studies presented in this book, this question is highly complex and multi-faceted, and is of direct relevance to social

11 See Alvarez et al. (1998), Brysk (1994), Escobar and Alvarez [eds.] (1992), Foweraker (1995, 1998) Foweraker and Landman (1997) and Oxhorn (1995) for important contributions to the scholarship on Latin American social movements. 12 Cohen and Arato (1992), Foweraker (1998) and Sachikonye (1995) present important discussions of this process.

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movements in the Guatemalan context. As the democratic transition advanced in Guatemala, and as participation in formal mechanisms for political participation, such as the Civil Society Assembly and political parties, became viable options for social movements actors, a question of crucial relevance for social movements increasingly became whether (and how) to engage with the state and formal political channels. Of critical concern for social movements were the trade-offs that they had to make between maintaining their autonomy and negotiating with the state or participating in state-sponsored mechanisms of political inclusion or political parties. As the case studies illustrate, a guiding question in the Guatemalan context was which strategies would allow movements to precipitate a greater long-term influence and to retain their own political agendas. The strategic choices made by the social movements analysed in this book demonstrate how the decision to participate was determined, in part, by the degree of political will shown by elite actors as they engage with democratic norms and practices, and the extent to which they might accede to limitations upon the forms and processes through which they historically exercised power. An integral theoretical approach Historically, three approaches to analysing social movements have predominated in the literature: resource mobilisation theory, identity-oriented or new social movement approaches, and the political process model of collective action. Resource mobilisation theory can tell us, above all, about the how of collective action. The literature focuses on the strategies that movements employ to mobilise internal and external resources and how the mobilisation of resources may be facilitated or obstructed by considerations such as leadership, social networks, external structures and cultural factors.13 Initially, analysis emphasised the importance of the rational, self-interested and purposive factors behind actors’ participation in social movements, arguing that individuals would weigh up the costs and benefits before participating in collective action. However, with time, scholars criticised this approach, arguing that participating individuals were not only concerned with economic gain, but that other factors influenced mobilisation. Personal advantage, group solidarity,

13

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See for example McCarthy and Zald (1973).

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commitment to principles and belonging, correctly became important issues to take into account when evaluating the motivations behind participation in social movements. A further advance in this approach to movement politics came with the contribution that collective ties and group interest also represented important elements of collective action and mobilisation. In this regard, actors were not solely radically individualist, but embedded in social networks and became committed to group goals and collective identity. These theoretical approaches can lead us some way toward an understanding of social movement politics in Guatemala, but in and of themselves do not represent an adequate framework, telling us, in fact, only a partial story. In order to complement those theories that can tell us about the hows of collective action in Guatemala, it is important to develop an approach that also takes into account the problems of collective identity and solidarity; what we might call the why behind collective action. Identity oriented approaches have focused on the cultural, ideological and identity-based factors of mobilisation. Social movement scholars have argued that increasingly technocratic and bureaucratic forms of intervention by the welfare state infringed upon actors’ capacities to organise themselves, and that state control reached beyond the political sphere and into areas of consumption, services and social relations.14 New social movements theory then, which was developed in response to the ecological and environmental movements in Western Europe, resulted from the broadening and irreversibility of forms of domination and deprivation, as individuals sought to regain control over their collective and individual identity.15 Whilst some scholars16 have rightly challenged the degree of newness of these movements, collective action here is not apparently tied to class interests, a principal reason why such movements are defined as new, but revolves around issues, such as quality of life, gender, age, locality.17 Of major concern is how common interests and grievances are recognised, interpreted and framed. The new social movement approach has been adopted by many scholars in their efforts to interpret Latin American social movements in the 1970s, See for example D’Anieri, Ernst and Kier (1990) Melucci (1985; 1988), Offe (1985), Touraine (1985). 15 D’Anieri et al. (1990: 445–448). 16 For example D’Anieri et al. (1990), Foweraker (1995) and Mainwaring and Viola (1984). 17 See D’Anieri et al. (1990: 445–447), Eder (1985: 874), Melucci (1985: 789–797, 1988a: 246–253), Offe (1985: 830–831). 14

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1980s and 1990s. Of importance for this study is the manner in which the new social movements approach takes into account the formulation and representation of collective and political identities as central to the formation and evolution of social movements, as we shall see below. In the case of Guatemala, an essentialised indigenous identity increasingly became a lens through which movement strategies and platforms were articulated, as actors strategically developed an identity politics, a process that gained purchase and legitimacy given broader socio-political developments in the region. The political process model developed by McAdam et al. (1996) and Tarrow (1994) presents perhaps the most persuasive account of the when of collective action through the concept of political opportunity structure, by identifying how changes in the broader political system may precipitate mobilisation. Scholars have utilised the concept of political opportunity structure to analyse movements in different contexts, either analysing single movements or protest cycles or looking more broadly at same-issue movements across national contexts.18 However, what is important here is the central tenet that “social movements and revolutions are shaped by the broader set of political constraints and opportunities unique to the national context in which they are embedded”.19 Whilst distinct authors emphasise different elements in their analyses, in general the following factors appear to be key characteristics for defining the political opportunity structure: the relative openness/closure of the institutionalised political system; the stability of polity-level elite alignments; the presence/absence of elite allies; the state’s capacity/propensity for repression.20 Each analytical approach addresses important questions concerning mobilisation. However, some recent literature has sought to develop an integral approach to social movement analysis, rather than emphasising a single aspect of movement development, the approach that is favoured here.21 Thus, a synthetic approach will take into account mobilising and organisational structures, political opportunity approaches, and identity-oriented approaches or “collective processes of interpretation,

18 Brockett (1991) and Kitschelt (1986) have made important contributions to this literature. 19 McAdam et al. (1996a: 3). 20 Brockett (1991), McAdam (1996), Tarrow (1994). 21 McAdam et al. (1996), Miller (2000 and Zirakzadeh (1997), for example, have presented very convincing arguments for this integrative approach.

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attribution and social construction that mediate between opportunity and action” (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996a: 2). Consequently, here a focus upon the relationships between resources and organisation is combined with a concern with culture, ideology and the construction and interpretation of meanings. While the wider socio-political environment played a key role in the evolution of collective action in Guatemala, the study emphasises the domestic factors of political opportunity, whilst indicating certain external factors, due above all to the emphasis of the research. The research also seeks to bridge the divide between approaches that emphasise the structural aspects of collective action and those that emphasise agency-based and cultural aspects of mobilisation. In short, the case of Guatemala may help us to understand the connections between the external and internal political opportunities presented to movements and how the actions and decisions of social movement actors within this environment may shape their success and achievements. In this regard, it is important to understand how the social movement actor “both actively constructs and is constrained by a world of social meanings rooted in specific historic contexts and based in the experiences and identities of race, gender, class and nationality. Within these contexts, the new actor identifies and constructs the meanings that designate the relevance for mobilisation of grievances, resources and opportunities (McClurg Mueller 1992: 21–22; emphasis added). Collective frames of action Whilst the hows and whys of collective action are fundamental for our understanding of social movement mobilisation in Guatemala, our analysis also takes into account the forms through which movement actors communicate between themselves and with their wider audience. Common symbols that provide a framework through which experiences can be interpreted and named, and out of which collective identity can be generated, are critical for social mobilisation. A movement is not only about structural factors, such as social networks and organisational strength, but also ideology (beliefs, values and meanings), as Snow and Benford have argued (1992: 136). Through the politics of “signification”, social movements carry and construct new meanings, and amplify, extend and transform old ones, what may be understood

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as “an active, process-derived phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction” (1992: 136).22 It is crucial that movements choose symbols that reflect the beliefs of movement participants, resonate with their cultural and daily experiences and express their demands. At the same time, those symbols should also “speak to” “official” culture, both national and international. In this way, a movement’s goals and the way in which they are articulated are clearly linked to the identity and experiences of its social base and to the wider socio-political environment. Significantly, Tarrow has defined this process as “frame alignment”, arguing that it is here where the significance of culture for social movements is located (1994: 122–125). In the case of Guatemala, indigenous identity became a key terrain of contestation and aspect of movement politics as the democratic transition advanced, a terrain that resonated with social movement members’ own daily experiences, and also found echo in broader regional developments, and most significantly in the guiding principles and conceptual tenets of the internationalised Guatemalan peace process. Demands were made, therefore, on the grounds of indigenous rights to entitlement. Moreover, as democratisation advanced, indigenous identity politics gained an important legitimacy and undergirding legal framework through the ratification by the Guatemalan State of International Labour Organisation Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries and the signing of the Accord Concerning the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples. It is here then, that we shall observe a clear relationship between political opportunity structure and the strategic decisions taken by social movement actors relating to movement identity and frame alignment. Culture is created and challenged by movements, because the frames that are used may contribute to the creation of alternative political cultures, or at least diffuse into official political culture. Movements compete

22 Tarrow has noted a similar process: “Movements frame their collective action around cultural symbols that are selectively chosen from a cultural tool-chest and creatively converted into collective action frames by movement entrepreneurs. . . . Social movements are deeply involved in the work of naming experiences, connecting them to other grievances, and constructing larger frames of meaning that will resonate with a population’s cultural predispositions and communicate a uniform message to powerholders and others” (1994: 119–122).

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with the state, the media, their opponents and other movements to describe their experiences and win recognition of their framings. Symbols may take hold over the long term—through consensus formation and mobilisation—and the short term—by transforming popular culture through collective action.23 For Tarrow, the most far-reaching effects of movements are those that are more long-term, namely “slow and incremental changes in political culture”, changes in collective action frames, repertoires and policy agendas and the political socialisation of participants, their politicisation and empowerment (1994: 184). These longer term transformations and impact were key in the Guatemalan context, as we shall see below. Scholars have observed that a collective action frame of action may become a master frame, which will provide a framework for others to use and build upon or broaden.24 Tarrow gives the example of the American Civil Rights movement, which, through developing the concept of rights, laid a template through which other groups could develop a language and symbolism of resistance and claims to entitlement (1994: 127). Master frames and collective action frames emerge during what scholars describe as a cycle of protest,25 a “phase of heightened conflict and contention across the social system”, which includes the rapid and widespread (social and geographic) diffusion of collective action from the more to less mobilised sectors and the creation of new repertoires of protest. Cycles of protest are tied to the wider socio-political environment: the opening, diffusion and closure of political opportunities are important factors in determining the duration of a cycle. For a frame and a master frame to be effective, receptive political opportunity structure is essential, as Tarrow has correctly pointed out. During this time, new or transformed collective action frames may develop, and there will be sequences of interaction between challengers and authorities (Tarrow 1994: 153–155).

23 See the work of Tarrow (1994: 122–125) and Zald (1996: 270) for important analyses of this phenomenon. 24 Tarrow (1994; 1996) and Snow and Benford (1992). 25 For example Snow and Benford (1992), Tarrow (1994) and McAdam et al. (1996a).

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Social movements and human rights In the case of Guatemala, the master frame for collective action was based upon fundamental and universal human rights, a frame that was, over time, broadened to include wider conceptualisations of rights, in particular the collective and specific rights of indigenous peoples.26 The evolutive development of framings of human rights in the case of Guatemala is important because it helps us to understand that, whilst internationally recognised definitions of human rights are a key point of reference, human rights themselves are historically contingent: actors operationalise particular definitions of rights as strategic elements in their socio-political, economic and cultural struggles according to context. In other words, the “naturalness” of human rights should be challenged by locating the discourse within specific historical and cultural contexts and recognising that it is situated within and created by relations of power and social struggle.27 In the words of Sieder and Witchell, human rights are not fixed, but rather are “continually negotiated in specific social and historical contexts” (2001: 204).28 Consequently, in

26 Human rights represent equal and inalienable rights that permit citizens to hold the State or other citizens to account for violations of those aspects of social life that are understood to represent the minimum requirements for a life of dignity. The practice of human rights is a meta-political system or normative framework based on morals and ethics that are supported and conceptually and legally undergirded by a system of national and international legislation, binding for those countries that have ratified such legislation. Within the United Nations system, pivotal instruments include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Social and Economic Rights. Other international systems central to the protection of human rights and relevant for this study include the Inter-American system, comprised of the Inter-American Commission and Inter-American Court, a central instrument of which is the American Declaration of Human Rights. Furthermore, human rights are recognised in national constitutions, including, as we shall see below, the 1985 Political Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala. 27 The argument presented by Norberto Bobbio in The Age of Rights coincides with such interpretations. Bobbio argues that rights started as philosophical theories then developed into enacted rights (through the US Declaration of Independence and documents of the French Revolution). According to Bobbio, so-called “natural” rights are in fact “historic” rights, which arise from specific conditions, and are established gradually. Such rights are not static, but developed in parallel with modernism and the individualistic perception of society, evolving from the (negative) right to liberty, to (positive) political rights, to social rights (which involve new demands and needs), and finally to universally positive human rights, which were consolidated with the formulation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 (1996: 18). 28 Richard Wilson’s work is central to this discussion: “civil, political, social and human rights are all claims for powers by competing social groups, and such rights are

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this book, human rights are understood as individually or collectively oriented, negotiated and contingent rights-based demands to entitlement to guarantee the minimum conditions for a life of dignity, which are linked to and created by social struggles. How movements understand human rights is key to the demands they articulate, as is the way in which their opponents conceptualise human rights and confer legitimacy upon different conceptualisations of human rights. The conceptualisation of human rights and the accompanying degree to which demands for such rights were accepted by the state became a key field of struggle and contestation for social movements in Guatemala. An analysis of how social movements understood and claimed their rights, a process that subsequently determined how they framed their demands, must be central in our understanding of their politics, therefore. As the case studies will clearly illustrate, social movements in Guatemala built upon the initial master frame of human rights in distinct ways, and to varying effects, broadening and deepening their initial articulations and definitions of human rights as they sought to maintain political influence in a changing socio-political environment. However, these conceptualisations met with different degrees of institutional acceptance or closure, according to the perceptions of elite actors. In short, some rights were more negotiable than others during Guatemala’s peace process, depending on the perceptions of elite actors regarding their possible impact on structural conditions and historical configurations of economic and political power. Finally, in Guatemala, as elsewhere, it is important to differentiate between social movement activists, according to when they “appear”. The first activists to emerge during the beginning of the Guatemalan cycle of protest, Tarrow’s “early risers” (1994: 7), were characterised by platforms and strategies that were more closely tied to the initial master frame of fundamental universal human rights. As the democratic transition advanced and the cycle of protest evolved, however, differences developed between the “early risers” and later movements, concerning their strategies, identities and movement ideology. The “early risers” had articulated platforms tied intimately to demands based upon fundamental individual and universal human rights, due principally to the continually transformed as the result of struggles over political, symbolic or economic resources within a state and a transnational context . . . . rights are not natural . . . . Instead they are the creation of political struggles between social classes and serve as an indicator of the balance of power” (1997: 17; emphasis added).

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context in which they emerged and the demands that they prioritised. Later movements, however, influenced by the changing socio-political environment and the changing political opportunity structure, began to articulate broader concepts of human rights, including the specific and collective human rights of indigenous peoples. These elements have been key to the evolution of indigenous politics in Guatemala, as we shall see in the case studies. The effects of social movements A final important consideration in this chapter is the question of how we might identify and understand the impact of social movements. Scholarship on democratic transition and consolidation has considered the extent to which a democratic and active civil society may or may not contribute to the generation of political democracy.29 However, social movement literature has taken these debates further, examining the extent to which collective action within the arena of civil society, particularly through its engagement with political society and the State, may contribute to the democratisation of the civil, political and state arenas. This debate, of key importance to the Guatemalan context, has become increasingly visible in recent years, given that, after in some cases over two decades of democratic politics, social mobilisations increasingly appear to command a less visible role than they had during political transition and the beginnings of the return to democracy. Analysts, such as Jelin (1995: 79), have reassessed the optimism of the early scholarship on social movements, in many cases in light of movements’ limited social and economic gains and their modest impact upon the politico-institutional realm in the new democracies. In this context, much recent literature has focused on the importance of the arena of civil society to the practices and achievements of social movements. It is argued that the activity of social movements may contribute to the generation of democratic norms, behaviour and practices in civil society. In other words, the activities of social movements can transform political culture within civil society,30 contributing to the broader 29 See for example Mainwaring, O’Donnell and Valenzuela (1992) and O’Donnell et al. (1986). 30 In the present research, the definition of political culture adopted is that proposed by Mainwaring and Viola in their classic study of social movements in Latin America (1984). Political culture refers to those political values that form the foundations of

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process of democratisation. As a result, analysts have begun to view the arena of civil society not only as the “terrain” of collective action, but, significantly, as its “target” (Cohen and Arato 1992: 509, 526; Dagnino 1998: 56; Foweraker 1995: 21). The debate concerning the relationship between civil society and democratisation takes on acute importance for Guatemala, not only because of the generalised social mobilisations that emerged after 1985, but also because civil society, as an albeit broad “sector”, was given a formal role in the peace negotiations in Guatemala, a development that was unprecedented in the region. In the Guatemalan case, it is possible to employ the historically made distinction between the effects of movements in the politico-institutional realm and in the arena of civil society. In the former case, movement impact may range from contributing to or precipitating state level institutional change to the formulation or transformation of public policy and the introduction of legislation. In the latter case, influence may be asserted through the transformation of political culture and the democratisation of social relations,31 what has been defined by Alvarez, Escobar and Dagnnino (1992; 1998) as the “making of culture” by movements. Recent literature has tended to emphasise the “cultural” aspects of social movements above their “political-institutional” influence, given the limited impact that movements have had in the politico-institutional arena.32 Some scholars have attempted successfully to document both aspects of change, for example Brysk’s study of Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, The Politics of Human Rights in Argentina: Protest, Change and Democratisation (1994). What is clear across the wide-ranging literature, however, is that there appears to be a consensus that movements are more likely to effect enduring, yet incremental change in political

political discourse and determine how reality is understood. Such values are embodied in political discourse and practices, and, while not always perceived consciously, might be formulated for instrumental purposes. The values that form the basis of political discourse and practice are historically contingent and may evolve over time, although are not unilinear. These values are linked to socio-economic life, although not solely tied to class status (1984: 18). 31 See the work by Alvarez et al. [eds.] (1998), Brysk (1994), Cohen and Arato (1992), Dagnino (1998), Escobar and Alvarez (1992), Foweraker (1995; 1998) and Tarrow (1994) for further discussion of this issue. 32 An important exception to this is the work by Foweraker and Landman (1997) Citizenship Rights and Social Movements, A Comparative and Statistical Analysis. The study examines the relationship between citizenship rights, social movements and democracy in Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Spain.

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culture and within civil society than in State and political institutions and structures of domination. A key aspect of the “making of culture” by social movements lies in their capacity to generate what many scholars describe as a “culture of rights”. Collective action frames have been important to this process. The struggles of social movements challenge and transform dominant political cultures and reconstitute the regime of rights by pressuring for and reactivating already existing rights and creating new concepts of rights.33 In this context, Foweraker and Landman have aptly described social movements as “schools of rights . . . with the process of organisation, mobilisation and strategic choice creating the means for a popular education in rights” (1997: 227). As we shall see from the case studies, the activity of social movement activists in Guatemala led to their and other citizens becoming aware of their rights, a process that actually led to further mobilisation and broader rights demands, and to the increasing consolidation of a “rights culture”, as Foweraker and Landman observed elsewhere on the continent. Guatemalan social movements played a key role in “creating culture” and as schools of rights. In particular, movements broadened their initial narrow understanding of human rights to include broader rights, such as economic, social and cultural rights, including specific and collective rights, extending the conceptual foundations of this rights culture. As in countries such as Argentina, the impact that such movement politics had on the normative understanding of and practices related to human rights within broader society was extremely limited, as we shall see below. A further key observation by Foweraker and Landman is worthy of mention here, specifically that it is collective action that wins the rights of citizenship and, importantly, that the struggles of social movements are key to closing the gap between the formal rights of citizenship, what they call “rights-in-principle”, and the actual “reach of the law”, experienced as “rights-in-practice” (1997: 21). Mendez, O’Donnell and Pinheiro (1999), document this gap between constitutionally guaranteed rights and their everyday practice by citizens across a wide range of countries and social arenas. In the context of the Latin American democracies, and of particular relevance for the case of Guatemala,

33 See Alvarez et al. (1998: 2–4), Dagnino 1998: 47–53) and Foweraker and Landman (1997).

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where rights continued to violated under democratic rule, Pinheiro has signalled the importance of civil society organisations, in short, how they may “monitor state compliance with international standards, help promote changes in institutions, and challenge institutions in the interests of human rights (1999: 14). In Guatemala, social movements played a role in pressuring the state to respect and protect human rights and the rights of citizenship. It is in this regard that Guatemalan social movements contributed to the creation of a “culture of rights”, a process of paramount importance in the construction of democracy and the reinvigoration of citizenship in the country. What was key here was the potential “aspect of empowerment of individuals and their associations” (O’Donnell 1999: 323) that the knowledge of the “right to have rights” (Dagnino 1998: 50) and the assertion of rights provided to the poor and marginalised sectors of society, as we shall see from the case studies. The Guatemalan popular movement The following chapters document changing patterns of collective action within the Guatemalan popular movement, or movimiento popular during democratisation, and the impact of the popular movement upon democratisation itself. The term popular movement in this context signifies a coalition of social movements that are one component of Guatemalan civil society, a civil society that is highly diverse and frequently represents contradictory interests. These movements are linked together both through co-ordinating structures, or instancias, and informally through their common goals, strategies, practices, discourse and identities as popular, oppositional and non-elite civil actors. The popular movement broadly emerged during the cycle of protest that occurred in Guatemala between 1985 and 1996. This cycle of protest took two major and, in some cases parallel, political forms: informal collective action and protest (1985–1993) and collective action that was linked to the national level peace process (1994–1996). The latter took place through institutions that allowed civil society organisations to make proposals for the peace accords to be signed between the government and the URNG guerrilla army, such as the Asamblea de la Sociedad Civil. The popular movement in Guatemala underwent similar changes to those in other Latin American countries throughout the 1980s and 1990s. However, such changes were not the result of

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the shift from authoritarian to democratic rule: social movements in Guatemala only re-emerged after the return to democracy in 1986, albeit within a “schizophrenic state” in extremis.34 The political evolution of collective mobilisation is examined by means of three specific case studies. Each organisation, while part of the wider popular movement as a whole, followed a different historical trajectory. Key to analysis is an investigation of the different strategies that the organisations adopted in order to pursue their distinct objectives. Clearly, the aims of social movements, and the wider receptivity of the state, political society and civil society respectively to them—factors that themselves changed over time—determined the strategies that the organisations embraced and the identities that they articulated. Movements’ success depended upon the ways in which they were able to interact with, and mobilise their resources and interpret and frame their grievances within the wider socio-political environment of democratisation. Analysis here centres on the relationship between social movements and the master frame of human rights. As democratisation advanced between 1986 and 1996, the concept of human rights was broadened in particular toward inclusion of claims to entitlement based upon collective and specific (indigenous) cultural rights. This development was linked to the domestic and international climate, the strategies of social movements, and the historical antecedents of racism and authoritarianism. As we shall see, the case studies suggest that, despite the creativity and strategic choices of movement actors, certain configurations of rights were more negotiable than others within the context of the internationalised peace process.

34 O’Donnell has argued that in certain contexts, such as the new democracies in Latin America and Eastern Europe, the non-institutionalised nature of political democracy permits and encourages the combination of authoritarian and democratic characteristics in the state and wider society (1993: 1361). He has defined these states as “schizophrenic states” where “democratic legality”, “publicness” and citizenship “fade away at the frontiers of various regions and class, gender and ethnic relations”. Rather than universal citizenship, such states support a regime of “low-intensity citizenship” (1993: 1361).

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CHAPTER TWO

THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION In this chapter we present a historical discussion of the democratic transition in Guatemala, analysing the relationship between civil actors and the process of democratic transition. Of central concern here is how the specific mechanisms and norms of civil inclusion instituted through the peace process, such as the National Reconciliation Commission (La Comisión Nacional de Reconciliación, CNR), established in 1989, and the Civil Society Assembly (Asamblea de la Sociedad Civil, ASC) set up in 1994, permitted civil society participation in the democratisation process and impacted upon the social movements themselves. Background Democratisation in Guatemala was composed of two distinct, though inter-related processes. First, the political transition, which began in 1982 and ended in 1985 with national presidential and legislative elections and a Constituent Assembly that led to a new Constitution and the transfer of power from direct military government to elected civilian rule in January 1986. This first moment brought with it neither the consolidation of the rule of law, nor adherence by the State to international human rights standards protecting minimal human rights guarantees. Rather, this first process represented a military strategy to guarantee institutional survival in a context of economic crisis and political pariah status in the international arena. Second, between the late 1980s and early 1990s, an internationally sponsored peace process began between the government and military and the guerrilla army, the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG), which included an institutionalised role for civil society organisations. The peace process, which analysts such as Jonas have described as representing the political terrain upon which competing sectoral agendas for peace were fought out (2000: 44), can be divided into two phases: indirect negotiations (1987–1990) and direct negotiations (1991–1996), as Azpuru (1999) has stated.

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Both the political transition and the peace process were initiated before the end of the internal armed conflict between the military and the URNG. Within these dual processes, elite state, political, military and private sector actors and the URNG interacted with each other and with non-elite civil actors through formal political mechanisms and channels in pursuit of their sectoral interests. However, and significantly, civil actors also attempted to influence the national agenda for peace through informal political means, essentially through the practice of symbolic politics and by linking with transnational advocacy networks to extend and strengthen their national struggles. Viewed in comparative perspective, Guatemala’s process of democratisation is distinct from other Latin American transitions. Civil society did not take part in the political transition or the initial period of liberalisation, both of which were elite-driven. Contrary to the processes of political transition that took place, for example, in Argentina and Chile, civil society organisation did not occur until the late 1980s, after democratisation had begun and a nominal civilian government had been in place for several years. The lack of participation by civil actors in the political transition, which was only challenged with the emergence of popular organisations after 1987, meant that the norms of political engagement under which elite and oppositional actors interacted remained unstable until the early 1990s, when developments within the continent-wide popular movement, the increasing momentum of the regional peace plan, Esquipulas II, and the broad social consensus articulated in reaction to the attempted auto-golpe by Jorge Serrano in 1993 presented political opportunities that contributed to the stabilisation of the rules of the game. The most salient factor that led to a closer alignment of sectoral norms of political engagement, however, was the initiation of the peace process after the beginning of 1994. The development of the peace process and the instruments that resulted from it and its effects on civil society, political society and the state shaped popular repertoires of protest and the political forms that civil actors utilised in pursuit of their goals. This culminated in a closer relationship between organised civil society, political society and the state, leading, in some cases, to a shift in the strategies of social movements, or at worst a decline in popular mobilisation.

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The political transition, 1982–1985 The early 1980s was a period of economic recession and instability in Guatemala, as it was in other Latin American countries, such as Mexico, Argentina, Chile and Brazil.1 Economic instability in Latin America was characterised by a growing current account deficit—approximately $40 billion by 1981—capital flight, high annual average inflation rates, major debt problems in many countries and the regional debt crisis in 1982 (Bulmer-Thomas 1995: 364; 373; 423; Dietz 1995: 13–15). Countries in the region experienced a cumulative average decline in per capita income of ten per cent during the 1980s (Fishlow 1990: 61; Frieden 2000: xii). In Central America, recession came after the “watershed” year of 1979 that, according to Bulmer-Thomas, represented “the most severe economic and political crisis perhaps this century”, and after which advances in fiscal and agrarian reform were made “in all republics except Guatemala” (1987: 291; 268).2 Trade between Central American countries had peaked at the end of the 1970s and thereafter declined due to political upheaval, decline in private sector confidence, low international prices for key regional export commodities and a reduction in loans from international institutions.3 In Guatemala, the years between 1980 and 1985 were characterised by falling GDP, growing unemployment and underemployment and downturns across the productive sectors. Exports from Guatemala declined by 32 per cent between 1980 and 1985. As international oil prices rose from the end of the 1970s, the terms of Guatemala’s trade shifted and the current account deficit grew from $35 million in 1977 to $573 million in 1981. While the labour force was continually increasing over this time, unemployment and underemployment grew from 713,783 in 1981 to 1,142,321 in 1986, reflecting a growth from 32.7 per cent to 44.2 per cent of the labour force. Significantly, underemployment was a severe problem, particularly acute in rural areas. Guerrilla activity in Nicaragua and Guatemala led to a decline in private sector confidence in the countries during the 1980s, precipitating a decline in investment

See Jonas (2000: 219), McCleary (1999: 4–6), Skidmore and Smith (1984: 10–11). See Bulmer-Thomas (1987) for a comprehensive analysis of Central America’s economic history between 1920 and the 1980s. 3 See the reports of the Economist Intelligence Unit (1986; 1987; 1988; 1989; 1993; 1994) for a detailed account of these processes. 1 2

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and growing capital flight. Between 1980 and 1985, capital flight from Central America reached $4 billion. Exacerbating this, government spending and tax income as a percentage of GDP in Guatemala have been amongst the lowest in the hemisphere. In 1984 tax income was 5.3 per cent of GDP in Guatemala, averaging between 12 and 31 per cent elsewhere in Central America. Indirect taxes accounted for 83 per cent of the total tax income (EIU 1986: 7–21; 1987: 23). At the beginning of the 1980s, the economic recession combined with a series of other factors to precipitate an acute crisis of governability. These factors included the perceived imminent threat of revolutionary victory prior to the strategic defeat of the guerrilla in 1982, the rise in guerrilla forces and civil support base of the insurgents, particularly in the indigenous western and north-western highlands, growing public social struggles and demands, fraudulent elections and increasing state corruption. The historical tension between the private sector and the military, which had become acute in the 1970s when the military began to stake its claim as an autonomous and semi-professional institution and began to encroach upon the economic interests of the private sector elite, exacerbated this situation (McCleary 1999: 2–16). With domestic revenue from tax extremely sparse, the military depended upon external military and economic support from the Middle East, Asia, and South and North America in order to fund their counter-insurgency operations. However, extreme levels of state-sanctioned political violence at this time meant that Guatemala’s international image had become increasingly negative and relations between the United States and Guatemala were strained. Under the Carter administration, Washington reduced military aid to Guatemala, withdrawing it completely in 1977. Political and economic instability made the need for domestic reorganisation a priority and it was in this context that the political transition was initiated in 1982. The 1982–85 political transition from military to civilian rule was an elite-led process, although there is some discrepancy concerning which actors were most instrumental in this process, with emphasis being placed either upon the role of the military4 or that of the organised private sector.5 With the exception of elite organisations such as El Comité Coordinador de Asociaciones Agrícolas, Comerciales, Industriales

4 See for example Cotjí (1995), Dunkerley (1994), Jonas (1990), Schirmer (1998), Sieder and Dunkerley (1994) and Trudeau (1993). 5 Principally McCleary (1997; 1999).

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y Financieras (CACIF), organised civil society did not play a role in the political transition. Popular organisations remained underground at this time as a result of the ongoing political violence and the “resurrection of civil society” did not occur until after the political transition. As Schirmer has brilliantly documented, the political transition took place as a means of regaining international legitimacy, reconciling the military and the private sector and retaining the military’s political prerogative within the context of legal civilian governance (1998: 31). For Schirmer, it was through el proyecto político-militar, implemented in April 1982 through El Plan Nacional de Seguridad y Desarrollo that Guatemala was returned to civilian rule.6 The plan was designed by experienced high-level military officers including General Lobos Zamora and General Alejandro Gramajo. It began with the assumption of the presidency by the evangelist General Efraín Rios Montt through a military coup on 23 March 1982 and was to end with the installation of civilian rule, with a key role retained for the military. However, Rios Montt was himself deposed through a military coup on 8 August 1983, due allegedly to his divergence from the military project, and General Mejía Victores was imposed as the president who would return Guatemala to civilian rule.7 It was during the political administration of General Romeo Lucas García (1978–1982) and the military regime of General Efraín Ríos Montt (1982–1983) that the most egregious human rights violations took place, and the genocide against the indigenous Maya population was executed.8 The elite-led political transition, which contained very little democratic substance and, according to Schirmer instituted a “repressive democracy” (ibid.), resulted from the dynamic between a military project aiming to reinstate constitutionality as a means of ensuring institutional survival and pressures from the organised private sector to defend and expand their interests in the face of a domestic economic and political crisis, changing market conditions and a negative international image

See Black, Jamail and Stoltz Chinchilla (1984), Barry (1986), Brett (2007a), Painter (1987), Carmack (1988) and Manz (1988) for analysis of military-state-civil society relations in the 1980s. 7 General Gramajo affirmed this to me in a personal interview, Guatemala City, 7/9/98. 8 See Brett (2005; 2007a, forthcoming) and Brett and Delgado (2005) for detailed discussions of political violence, genocide and racism in Guatemala. 6

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that impeded external trade and investment.9 However, the ensuing peace process increasingly included the participation of civil actors, including the popular movement, and was profoundly influenced by the international community. In short, from the point of view of Guatemala’s elite groups, the peace process consolidated an unwanted and unexpected democratisation process, democratisation by accident, a key factor that has determined the subsequent partial nature of democratic consolidation. In June 1984, the National Constituent Assembly was called to discuss the reform of the Constitution with the consultation of three political parties, the rightist Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (MLN), the Unión del Centro Nacional (UCN) and the Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca (DCG). The new Constitution established the Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office (Procuraduría de Derechos Humanos, PDH), the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), the Supreme Court of Justice and the Constitutional Court, instruments that would later be a focus of organised civil society. The new Constitution of 1985 was a contradictory document, returning Guatemala to constitutional rule whilst legalising counterinsurgency measures.10 It served, however, to legitimise the political transition and between 1984 and 1985, the military gradually withdrew from directly governing. Civil society reorganisation and the beginnings of national dialogue under Cerezo The political transition came to an end in December 1985, when Vinicio Cerezo of the DCG was elected to office, winning 68 per cent in the second round of voting; Cerezo assumed the Presidency in January 1986. Out of the eligible voters, 55.8 per cent did not vote, suggesting that they were either not registered, had abstained or cast invalid ballots. No political party was explicitly banned from taking part in the election. However, no left-of-centre party participated and the platforms of those parties that did take part were largely indistinguishable, failing to propose economic reforms or engage with debates concerning the posi-

9 Rachel McCleary (1997; 1999) has also emphasised the role of national elites in the political transition, focusing principally upon the organised private sector, particularly CACIF. 10 See Brett and Delgado (2005) for an analysis of the 1985 Political Constitution.

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tion of the military. Perhaps logically, all parties supported the military line that the “subversives must be eliminated”. The elections themselves were restrictive and did not represent broad sectors of the Guatemalan population, characterised as they were by low voter turnout, uniformity of the electoral competition and the narrow spectrum of political representation in the 1985 elections.11 The weak relationship between political parties and civil society, exacerbated by the military’s targeting of popular activists that had worked with the DCG in the highlands in the early 1980s, partially accounted for both the low voter turnout and the lack of leftist representation and mobilisation during this time. The decimation of the popular movement during the counterinsurgency was a further critical factor in the narrow ideological and participatory spectrum of the 1985 elections. Moreover, given that the armed conflict continued while elections took place, the appearance of the reform of the military and integration of the insurgents into political life on the agenda of political parties at this time was unlikely. The political party system and, initially, civil society organisations, remained weak under the Cerezo government, which signified above all a continuismo of the military project under a civilian administration characterised by continued military control and unable or unwilling to put an end to political violence. In this context, it soon became evident that Cerezo could not distance himself from the military project, and he became increasingly tied to the “Thesis of National Stability”, the strategy developed by Gramajo and others to institutionalise the military within the framework of civilian rule. Basic freedoms, such as freedom of association and of the press remained limited, though perhaps less so than under military rule, and human rights violations increased during 1986. Civil activity in the first stages of the new government was thus limited. Moreover, given continuing economic difficulties, due in part to prior economic mismanagement, the inheritance Cerezo received from the preceding military regimes, and the lack of unity between military, economic and political elites, political stability remained elusive under the Cerezo government. During his first year in office, the economy was still partially suffering the repercussions of the currency crisis initiated with the collapse of the Quetzal after 1984. It was in this context that the need to address the social costs of the conflict began to emerge,

11 See WOLA (1985), Jonas (1991), Trudeau (1993) and Schirmer (1998) for analysis of the 1985 elections.

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although it was only after 1987 that, with important exceptions such as the Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo (GAM), social movements began to reorganise, with platforms directed against past and continuing human rights violations and economic welfare issues. The shift to civilian rule did allow civil activists a space to reorganise, despite continuing military control and the continuation of counterinsurgency policies. The signing of Esquipulas II in August 1987, the Framework Agreement for a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America, under the initiative of Costa Rican President Oscar Arias, provided an institutional framework for the promotion of peace and national reconciliation, in spite of adverse reactions from conservative domestic sectors.12 Furthermore, the agreement tied Guatemala into a regional peace-building initiative and, by raising expectations internationally, gave domestic actors legitimate space for manoeuvre. Whilst the political transition and initial return to civilian government did not institutionalise human rights guarantees or secure channels of participation, it did at least lay the foundations for the restructuring of the popular movement. Popular activists took advantage of elite-led processes by appropriating the newly instituted democratic structures and by gradually internationalising their struggle. These experiences fed into the peace process, demonstrating that, through strategic mobilisation, civil organisations were able to take advantage of the return to civilian rule and, in that context, exercise some influence, even under adverse conditions. The first meeting between the government and the URNG took place in October 1987, during the indirect phase of peace negotiations (1987–91), in the face of the censure of political parties on the far right. The URNG, the government and military observers unsurprisingly maintained maximalist positions and no concrete results emerged. However, in compliance with Esquipulas II, the government in the same month ratified the Comisión Nacional de Reconciliación (CNR) to promote reconciliation through a national dialogue. The CNR had a representative from each of the eleven political parties, a representative from the Guatemalan Bishop’s Conference and one prominent citizen as delegates. Under the impetus of the Catholic Church’s delegate Bishop Quezada Toruño, a national dialogue was called for in 1988

12 See Dario Moreno (1994) for a detailed discussion of the political significance of Esquipulas II.

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and was inaugurated in February 1989. The Grand National Dialogue, representing the first engagement of civil actors in the peace process, was comprised of forty-seven organisations and eighty-four delegates, representing the government, academics, business groups, religious groups, journalists, popular organisations, labour organisations and professionals. However, CACIF and the Unión Nacional Agropecuaria de Guatemala (UNAGRO), the most conservative private sector organisations boycotted the Grand Dialogue, insisting it was unrepresentative. The main themes discussed later became integral to the peace process: demilitarisation, the demobilisation of the URNG, socio-economic issues, human rights and indigenous issues. Significantly it was this initiative that set the precedent for civil participation in the peace process and raised the profile of civil demands and the confidence of civil actors. In this context, civil actors began to reorganise. The CUC resurfaced after 1986, divided and weakened after years of clandestinity. Many local church based groups began to come together with a popular agenda, particularly in the highland region around Santa Cruz del Quiché,13 and the trade union confederation the Unidad de Acción Sindical y Popular (UASP) was formed in May 1988. The UASP was a conglomerate of popular organisations, at first mainly unions that brought together urban and rural activists, linking the capital city with a rural social base. The union Unidad Sindical de Trabajadores de Guatemala (UNSITRAGUA) was also formed at this time. The first movements to emerge then after 1986 were oriented toward traditional leftist politics and focused on the capital city and agro-export dominated southern coast. It is significant that the first popular organisations to emerge in Guatemala were church and union organisations. Organising through unions had a strong historical precedent and had represented the historical form of popular mobilisation prior to and, when possible, during the armed conflict.14 Furthermore, given the wider international climate, notably the context of the Cold War, sindicalismo remained the predominant form of popular oppositional struggle. Progressive church organisations had a similar historical precedent, particularly in the rural areas of the country, having emerged in the 1960s through Catholic

Interview, Isabella López, Defensoría Maya, Guatemala City, 26/5/98. See Levenson-Estrada (1994) for a detailed analysis of the Guatemalan trade union movement between 1954 and 1985. 13

14

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Base community mobilisation tied to the development of liberation theology in the region. However, whilst the church continued to play a key role in democratisation after 1986, the union movement was to lose impetus as the popular movement adapted to the changing global context and the developing peace process. Within the relative opening of political space and as a result of the URNG’s desire to develop a political wing by encouraging and supporting the creation of civil organisations, other social movements began to emerge in both urban and rural areas. However, these organisations moved away from the previous paradigm of civil organising, especially in the rural areas affected by the internal armed conflict. Groups emerged that built on the networks and activity initiated in the 1960s and 1970s by Catholic liberation theology groups, politicised local committees and radicalised peasant groups. These organisations appeared directly in response to the violence, framing their demands within a human rights discourse, supported by the 1985 Constitution and international human rights law. Organisations such as the widows’ group Coordinación Nacional de Viudas de Guatemala (CONAVIGUA), CERJ and the Consejo Nacional de Desplazados de Guatemala (CONDEG) were heterodox, combining demands for peace, social justice, human rights and the rule of law, authentic democracy and gender issues. The majority of victims of the state-sponsored violence had been indigenous, adding an important dynamic to the protests and bringing indigenous people into the national political arena. As the 1990 election year began, President Cerezo made what appeared to be a critical concession concerning negotiations with the URNG. In February he announced that the government would enter into dialogue with the guerrilla without their prior disarmament. This decision was related to the forthcoming election and the need to improve Guatemala’s international image. More widely, it was also linked to the end of the Cold War. However, the impetus of the process of democratisation and the military weakness of the URNG also permitted elite economic, military and political actors to be confident about the extent to which an armed URNG in reality would threaten their sectoral interests. In March 1990, a meeting was held in Oslo, Norway, between the URNG and the CNR. This meeting was critical in legitimising and setting the precedent for civil participation in the ensuing process of negotiation and in securing a negotiated settlement to the conflict. The Basic Agreement for the Search for Peace approved meetings between

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the URNG, the CNR and diverse social sectors; specifically political parties, the organised private sector, the religious sector, labour and popular groups and small and medium business, co-operatives and academics. It stipulated that these be followed by a high-level process of negotiation between the military, government and the URNG. The meetings resulted in four jointly signed declarations, Escorial, Quito, Metepec and Atlixco, stating that the said sectors should take part in the definition of reforms that would bring an end to the conflict and address its origins. Moreover, as a consequence, the issues of human rights, the military, political participation, social justice and the origins of the conflict had gained a space on the national agenda for peace. The issues of indigenous rights and socio-economic rights had additionally been discussed. These themes would feature strongly in the platforms of civil society organisations, their legitimacy in part enhanced by the new national agenda and the recognition of an increasingly important international legal arena and rights regime. Convergence within organised civil society under the Serrano Administration Jorge Serrano of the Movimiento de Acción Solidaria party (MAS) gained 68 per cent in the second round of the 1990 elections, assuming the presidency on 6 January 1991, importantly signifying the first transfer of power between civilians in Guatemalan history. Serrano had indicated the possibility of pursuing a negotiated settlement to the armed conflict in his campaign. However, MAS only obtained fourteen out of 116 seats in congress, meaning that he needed political allies in order to govern effectively. Serrano’s main political alliance was with the Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN), a new party with direct links with the private sector that, for the first time, directly engaged in electoral politics. No left-wing party took part in the elections and, as in 1985, the electoral process was not endorsed by the insurgency. Perhaps due to his tenuous position as president, Serrano attempted to assert his mark on the peace process and upon national political life from an early stage. Firstly, he moved to subordinate the military institution to civilian authority by removing officers, including his Defence Minister, the Army Chief of Staff and the commander of the air force, and demanding that the military be accountable in cases of human rights violations in which military personnel had been implicated. Secondly, he became personally involved in high-profile human rights cases, such

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as that of the murdered US citizen Michael Devine, interventions that resulted in trials of military personnel.15 Thirdly, he established the Comisión Presidencial para los Derechos Humanos (COPREDEH). Finally, in April 1991 he proposed direct negotiations with the guerrilla through his “Initiative for a Complete National Peace”.16 Although this proposal did not include the issues that had been agreed upon through the Oslo process and insisted on the non-negotiable position of the military, the URNG agreed to meet with the military and government. The presidency of Serrano therefore marks the beginning of the phase of direct negotiations in the peace process. The first meeting between the government and the URNG took place in Mexico on 26 April 1991, ending with the signing of the Agreement on the Procedure for the Search for Peace by Political Means, known as the Mexico Accord. This defined the negotiation agenda, confirmed the role of the United Nations as mediator in the peace process, and effectively locked the two parties to the conflict into the negotiating process. It was determined that the agenda of the negotiations would include the following themes: democratisation and human rights, strengthening of civilian power and the role of the army in a democratic society, the identity and rights of indigenous peoples, constitutional reforms and electoral reforms, socio-economic issues, the agrarian situation, resettlement of the populations displaced by the armed conflict, the incorporation of the URNG into political society, ceasefire arrangements, schedule for the implementation and verification of the accords, the signing of the Firm and Lasting Peace Agreement and demobilisation. Subsequently, on 25 July 1991, the Querétaro Agreement was signed, setting out a basic framework for future discussion. Significantly, many of these issues were included as platforms by the increasingly visible popular movement, implying a vindication of their objectives at the same time as demonstrating the adaptability of the popular movement to the political opportunities presented by the peace process. As the peace process continued, Serrano’s presidency became further isolated through confrontations with the media, growing demands for participation by civil society, acute levels of corruption and a lack of political transparency, accountability and impartiality. Tensions between

See Jonas (2000: 25–46) for a detailed discussion of this issue. I am grateful to Edgar Gutiérrez for this information, interview, Guatemala City, 30/10/98. 15 16

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the government and the private sector also persisted. With almost complete erosion of his legitimacy and facing growing charges of corruption, Serrano orchestrated an auto-golpe on 25 May 1993, suspending Congress, the Constitution, the Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Constitutional Court. The self-coup was immediately repudiated by domestic political actors across the institutional and ideological spectrum. The international community, including Germany, Mexico and, in particular, the United States, played a key role. Moreover, the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, United Nations, Organisation of American States and the European Union all expressed concern.17 The United States threatened to withdraw trade, military and economic funding and Guatemala’s special status under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) unless constitutional order was restored. In the days following the coup, the US froze Guatemala’s international credit and rescinded the country’s general system of trading and preference status. Such pressure had a significant influence on elite actors, including the political, military and, importantly, the economic elite, and contributed to the fostering of elite unity in the face of Serrano’s coup and to the formation of effective internal opposition to him. Moreover, it suggested the need for a response to the crisis that would convince the international community to maintain its support for Guatemala’s stalled peace process.18 Civil society actors took advantage of this political opportunity. The Strategic Committee of CACIF renamed itself El Foro Multisectorial (FM) and formed a pressure group together with the union Central General de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CGTG) and the Confederación Guatemalteca de Confederaciones Cooperativas (CONFECOOP), pursuing various tactics to oppose Serrano. Gradually, representatives of the political parties joined the unions, co-operatives and private sector organisations. The popular movement acted quickly, forming the Foro Multisectorial Social (FMS), comprised of popular and union organisations, church organisations, indigenous organisations and student groups, basing themselves at the University of San Carlos. As the self-coup unfolded, members of the FM

17 The OAS visited Guatemala in an attempt to resolve the crisis on 29 May, 1993. 18 See Jonas (2000: 42) and McCleary (1999: 118–121). Interviewees in Guatemala also verified this information, including Edgar Gutiérrez (Personal Interview, 11/11/98) and Rafael Chanchavac Cux (Personal Interview, 3/12/98).

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came together with some members of the FMS to form the Instancia Nacional de Consenso (INC) on 30 May, including representatives of the Central de Trabajadores del Campo (CTC), the Confederación de Unidad Sindical de Guatemala (CUSG) and the president of CONFECOOP. This body worked to oppose Serrano further, publishing “A Proposal on the Procedure for the Return to Constitutionality in the Country”. The INC was a conglomeration of groups most likely under the direction of CACIF. Over time, the INC, at the behest of the private sector organisations, managed to persuade factions of the military to give it support in opposing Serrano and his political clique. The withdrawal of military support from Serrano eventually ensured his climbdown and the election by Congress of a new temporary President on 4 June. Critically, this elite settlement, which included some members of the popular left, although not the URNG, did not include key human rights activists such as Helen Mack (sister of the assassinated anthropologist Myrna Mack and head of the Mack Foundation), the Catholic Church and Peace Nobel Rigoberta Menchú. Its express purpose was the restoration of the constitutional order, which it achieved through a pacted elite settlement that excluded the popular and indigenous groups, which explains why McCleary defines it as “incomplete” (1999: 188–89). Moreover, although some groups did attempt to join the INC in the latter stages, they did so with the purpose of achieving wider structural transformation and socio-economic reforms, aims that were consistent with their own organisational objectives and that went beyond the INC’s original purpose. As other analysts have argued, the INC, an ideologically broad anti-authoritarian non-violent civilian movement, and the settlement that it instigated with the military played a critical role in restoring constitutional order. Moreover, the INC represented the first time that diverse sectors had come together voluntarily with the common objective of defending constitutional rule. The INC also united the two most prominent elites in Guatemala, the military and the private sector, after years of tension. Whilst, as McCleary has argued, the elite settlement closed off the option for the return to authoritarian rule and demonstrated the importance of democratic institutions in the resolution of political conflicts (1999: 187), the pacted agreement did not preclude the continuation of future military influence upon political outcomes and decision-making. Moreover, once its mandate was achieved the INC was dissolved, allowing political elites to recover control with the elec-

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tion of former Human Rights Ombudsman Ramiro de León Carpio to the presidency by Congress. Despite the division of the INC between indigenous and popular groups seeking to institute wider reforms and those groups that merely sought the return of constitutional order, the INC created informal networks of communication and social capital between civil actors. The process also arguably raised popular consciousness and confidence and provided further experience of collective mobilisation for the popular movement. Critically, with the PAN party already in congress and in the wake of CACIF’s actions to defend the constitutional order, the private sector both gained prestige from the process and strengthened its presence at the national political level. Of utmost importance was the increased protagonism of civil society as a whole, further securing its formal presence in the ensuing phases of direct negotiations and heightening its legitimacy as a political actor. The presidency of Ramiro de León Carpio and the formalisation of civil society participation After the Serrano coup, the peace process became increasingly irreversible, as prominent elite groups redefined their relationship to each other and civil society became further involved in the negotiations. This process culminated in an elite settlement, the reconfiguration of private sector politics as part of the electoral system, and pressures on all sides to participate in a broad negotiated closure of the conflict: in short, a national agenda for peace was carved out. There was, however, no agreement upon the normative and operative definition of democracy and the human rights that would undergird it. As the dissolution of the INC demonstrated, understandings of peace were not homogeneous, but rather were sectorally determined. The election of the former Human Rights Ombudsman Ramiro de León Carpio to the presidency gave further legitimacy to the process of democratisation, as he defined the peace negotiations as state policy. De León Carpio announced his “Proposal for Restarting the Peace Process” in July 1993, and established the Comisión Gubernamental para la Paz (COPAZ) as the body that would replace the CNR and carry through the negotiations, to be headed by Héctor Rosada. This division also set the precedent for discussions of substantive and operative themes, respectively. Civil society would have no part in discussions

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concerning the timetabling and implementation of agreements, nor would it participate in the process of demobilisation of the guerrilla and other military-related issues. However, the proposal did not get off the ground and in the following months no progress was made. This was exacerbated by continuing political violence and human rights violations, particularly in rural areas, and the murder of Jorge Carpío Nicolle, the president’s cousin and leader of the UCN at the beginning of July.19 This killing, although attributed to common crime, sent a direct message to the president that he was not in control of the military and that his own position was not unchallengeable.20 The murder took place in the context of De León Carpio’s suspension of the military draft and his disbanding of the military commissioners, the “civilian” contacts between the military and the PACs in rural areas, responsible for many human rights atrocities, including allegedly the murder of Carpío Nicolle. However, by January 1994, the peace process was back on track. An agenda that included substantive and operative themes was agreed together with UN intervention and mediation and verification of the accords. The establishment of a group of “friendly” countries to facilitate negotiations and provide assurances, recognition by the military and URNG of civilian interests over and above military interests and the importance of national reconciliation through broad social participation became fundamental underpinning concepts of this process. Under these conditions, in January 1994 the Framework Agreement for the Re-initiation of the Peace Accords was signed, with the agreement of the parties to accelerate the process, scheduling talks to be completed by the end of 1994. Jean Arnault, the UN observer, became the UN mediator. The group of friendly countries included Spain, Colombia, the US, Mexico, Norway and Venezuela. Importantly, this accord established the body through which civil society would participate in the peace negotiations, La Asamblea de la Sociedad Civil (ASC).21

19 During the period leading up to the signing of the Global Accord on Human Rights, journalists, human rights activists, and members of the judiciary were targeted by death threats and murders. Two days after the signing of the accord, Eduardo Epaminondas González Dubón, the President of the Constitutional Court was murdered. See Amnesty International (AMR 34/02: 1998) for details. 20 Interview, Edgar Gutiérrez, Guatemala City, 11/11/98 21 The ASC was constituted of 69 delegates and 55 organisations, representing women’s, business, indigenous, campesino, church, human rights and displaced people’s groups (see appendix 1).

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This body, made up of the sectors from the Oslo process and representatives of the increasingly dynamic indigenous organisations, had the role of formulating consensus positions on the substantive themes, transmitting non-binding recommendations to the parties and the UN and considering and endorsing the bilateral agreements as national commitments.22 The establishment of the ASC is of central importance for our analysis of social movements, although evaluation of its significance and role is complex. Whilst it represented an institution to facilitate the role of civil society actors, which was unprecedented in regional peace processes, it did so on a consultative level, the ASC’s proposals being non-binding. The participation of a wide spectrum of social sectors in the assembly, crossing generational, ethnic, gender, religious, geographical and ideological ties, the latter through the inclusion of unions, popular groups and more culturalist Mayan organisations, gave the body a broadly representative nature. However, the absence of CACIF highlighted the acute divisions within civil society, demonstrating its diversity and potentially conflictive nature and suggesting the existence of two “civil societies”. It also emphasised the differences between the private sector and popular movement that had surfaced in 1993 within the INC. If this did not challenge the representativity of the ASC in relation to civil society as a whole, it did substantially weaken its capacity to influence the negotiations. In addition, peasant groups were unwilling to become involved in the ASC and it was only in late 1995 during discussions over socio-economic issues that the peasant co-ordinating group La Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas (CNOC) was included.23 The creation of the Coordinación de Organizaciones del Pueblo Maya de Guatemala (COPMAGUA), however, as the body that would represent indigenous peoples in the ASC, gained a prominent position within the assembly. The ASC raised the level and profile of popular and indigenous politics and participation in the peace process, making such demands central to the developing national agenda for peace.

See Krzanaric (1999) for an analysis of the role of the ASC in the peace process. CNOC was formed in 1993 as a co-ordinating body for campesino organisations and incorporated the following national organisations: La Coordinadora Nacional Indígena y Campesina (CONIC), El Comité de Unidad Campesina (CUC), La Coordinación Nacional de Desplazados de Guatemala (CONDEG), Coordinadora Nacional de Pequeños y Medianos Productores (CONAMPRO). 22 23

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Organisations drew up proposals that were forwarded to the representative of their sector for discussion, such as COPMAGUA for indigenous proposals. Once this proposal was agreed upon it was forwarded to the ASC for discussion and ratification. This final proposal then went to the mesa de negociación for discussion by the parties, the government and the URNG. This process was, however, accompanied by informal processes of negotiation and dialogue that reinforced the proposals and tied the ASC’s documents more closely to the final documents. Before forwarding proposals to the mesa, representatives and members of the ASC would frequently meet with their contacts in the URNG to discuss the content of the accords. The aim was to maintain high stakes and expectations at the mesa. Whilst the URNG may have had a certain space for making proposals to the ASC then, civil groups were also consulted concerning approaches and strategies that the URNG would utilise at the negotiating table.24 Progress in the negotiations Under De León Carpio important progress in the peace process took place, which brought political opportunities that were key to the evolution of collective action. Of particular importance were two specific peace accords. The Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights was signed on 29 March 1994. The accord tied the government into reaffirming and carrying out its human rights commitments under the 1985 Constitution, strengthening judicial institutions and the PDH, updating criminal codes to combat impunity, regulating arms and paramilitary groups, guaranteeing freedom of movement and association, ending forced recruitment, protecting human rights activists and compensating and/or assisting victims of human rights violations. A further important aspect was the establishment of the UN Human Rights Verification Mission (MINUGUA) to support and monitor the negotiation process and guarantee safety. The mission prioritised the rights to integrity and security of the person, individual liberty, due process, freedom of expression, freedom of movement, freedom of association and political rights.

24

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Interview, Pablo Ceto, FUNDAMAYA and URNG, Guatemala City, 17/10/98.

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This accord was crucial in that it came into immediate effect, although MINUGUA was not installed until November 1994, when the level of human rights violations that had increased since the beginning of 1994 began to decline. The presence of MINUGUA vindicated the policies and platforms of human rights organisations, raised their legitimacy and gave them a further instrument with which to combat impunity and address present and past human rights violations, even though the “neutrality” of MINUGUA gradually eroded the initial trust of many popular organisations. The Human Rights Accord legitimised the language of human rights that social movements had been “speaking” since their re-emergence and reinforced the master frame of human rights as the dominant discourse of the popular movement. Along with the political activity of social movements, and the wider cumulative effects of the return to electoral rule and the peace process, it also served to demonstrate the importance of human rights discourse and practice to democratisation in Guatemala. One further agreement, The Agreement Concerning the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples (AIDPI), was signed under the De León Carpio government on 31 March 1995. This was perhaps one of the most important accords for the civilian, specifically indigenous population, and had a profound impact upon the path taken by the peace negotiations and the path followed by collective action. The content of the AIDPI, based very much on the International Labour Organisation Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries,25 differed very little from the ASC proposal for the accord.26 Whilst this was, in part, due to the hardening of the URNG after capitulation to the government and military over previous accords, including the accord to establish the Historical Clarification Commission, and to an effort by the guerrilla to raise its profile with the indigenous population, other factors also played a role. The continental popular and indigenous mobilisation and the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Rigoberta Menchú in 1992 contributed to the increasing prominence of indigenous leaders and movements, of both culturalist (Mayanista) and popular tendencies, at local and national

25 ILO Convention 169 was signed by the Guatemalan State in 1995 and ratified in 1996. 26 See Plant (1998) for a detailed discussion of this accord.

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level.27 Furthermore, the shift away from traditional leftist politics and the growing popular interest in particularist politics (political platforms articulated around specific issues such as gender, ethnicity, environment, locale) was an important factor. In particular, the interest shown by international funding agencies and human rights groups, as well as the UN, in indigenous rights and identity after the end of the Cold War provided a receptive socio-political climate for the articulation of claims for political and economic entitlement based on ethnicity and indigenous identity. In this context, national popular organisations had begun to shift toward combining fundamental human rights with broader indigenous rights platforms. Movements began to rethink basic interpretations of human rights, so crucial during the early stages of democratisation, extending them to include claims to entitlement based upon their indigenous identity. This was accelerated by the contact between popular organisations and Mayanistas facilitated through COPMAGUA and the legitimacy conferred upon such platforms by the AIDPI and ILO 169. Protest politics combined with formalised participation in the negotiations, which raised the confidence of indigenous activists and placed political pressure on the national agenda, imbuing it with an indigenous rights dimension. Indigenous groups saw this accord, which was to come into effect after the final accord was signed—except for those elements that related to human rights issues, which were of immediate effect—as a success, despite the mesa’s rejection of indigenous political autonomy. With the signing of the accord, many popular and indigenous groups began to work upon the issues it contained, to prepare for the commissions it stipulated and disseminate the contents to their supporters in the rural areas through popular education initiatives.28 This perhaps took a certain impetus away from the ASC, reflected in its lack of protaganism concerning the next accord that addressed socio-economic issues. The AIDPI, however, further reinforced the prominence of rights issues in the peace process and as a instrument of civil society organisations,

27 See Brysk (2000) and Kearney (1996) for further discussion of the regional context. 28 The accord created five commissions, three of which were bipartite (of equal government and indigenous representation), to work on educational reform, political reform and participation and rights related to indigenous peoples’ lands. The other two non-parity commissions were to work on the officialisation of indigenous languages and the definition and preservation of sacred places.

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reinforcing the discourse of human rights with indigenous rights issues. It also marked a key moment in the practice of the popular movement, where the (human rights) politics of the “early risers” would be broadened with an indigenous rights orientation. The short presidential term under De León Carpio ended with elections at the end of 1995. These elections were significant because of the participation of a left-wing party, the Frente Democrático Nueva Guatemala (FDNG) and the unprecedented encouragement to the electorate to vote given by the URNG and by Rigoberta Menchú. This action by the representatives of the revolutionary and popular left, and the participation of the FDNG in the elections, gave credence and legitimacy to the electoral and democratic processes and signalled the left’s willingness to join the political life of the country. Moreover, with the credibility of the electoral process not an issue in the elections, all parties took a position on the peace process and the peace accords, recognising them as commitments of State. The winning party, PAN, placed indigenous issues on its campaigning platform. Clearly, the inclusion of civil society in the peace negotiations had increased over this time, becoming yet more complex. This had been, for the most part, accompanied by continuing protest politics, but the preoccupation with the dissemination of the indigenous accord, candidature of many popular leaders in the elections and the weakening of the ASC as a result of the election results, challenged this. Moreover, in this context the election of a president with strong ties to the private sector elite consolidated the latter’s presence in national politics and contributed to a crisis in the peasant sector of the popular movement that came to challenge the unity of popular movement politics. The administration of Alvaro Arzú Alvaro Arzú, previous Mayor of Guatemala City, became President in January 1996. However, the FDNG gained 8 per cent of the vote and six congressional seats, an important foothold for the popular movement and political left in the legislature, especially given that this was their first appearance as a party and in light of their lack of funds and electoral experience. A further important development for the popular opposition in the election, in particular for the indigenous movement, was the winning of local municipalities through participation in Comités Cívicos. A notable example was the winning of the mayoralty of Quetzaltenango,

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the second city of Guatemala, by indigenous leader Rigoberto Quemé Chay. These results signified an important extension of civil society actors into political society at national, regional and local levels. Whilst social movements had previously focused upon the utilisation of state mechanisms and multi-level lobbying as a means to achieve organisational objectives, they henceforth pursued prescriptive and proposal-based engagement. The creation of the FDNG demonstrated that some sectors of the popular movement, with the notable exception of the campesino movement, did not reject participation in political society. The presence of a party with links to both the popular movement and the guerrilla in Congress also made the eventual transformation of the URNG into a political party more likely. A political party through which oppositional civil actors were represented and could channel their demands at national level signified was, moreover, a major achievement for the popular movement and the URNG, from whom the FDNG received at least tacit support. However, the accession to Congress of popular movement leaders as FDNG deputies implied trade-offs. In some cases, the popular movements with which deputies were involved were weakened. The activity of other leaders in the FDNG during the run-up to the elections had a similar effect on those organisations with which individuals were involved, both because of the absence of important activists and because of the mobilisation of their grass roots supporters in the election campaign. The peace process did not falter and the PAN administration affirmed, along with the URNG, that talks would restart a month later in February. Furthermore, Arzú announced that he and a team of advisers had been holding secret meetings with the URNG in Italy since the previous December, whilst he was a presidential candidate. Under Arzú the peace negotiations accelerated and the final accord was signed before the end of the year. By March the URNG had announced a ceasefire and the military had ceased counter-insurgency operations. Arzú initiated an offensive against organised crime in which several military officers were implicated and subsequently resigned. The acceleration of the peace process also took place because, under Arzú, both the military and the private sector had a trustworthy representative in the executive, whom they suspected would not threaten their interests and who was able to secure funding commitments from the international community. The signing of the Agreement on Socio-Economic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation at the start of May affirmed this. The accord presented a formula to modernise the Guatemalan state and economy

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through enhancing the role of the state in distributional and social issues via a framework of market-oriented policies. It stipulated the increase in the tax burden and the increase in campesinos’ access to credit through a trust fund and bank credits, and increased marketing and technical assistance, thus facilitating the purchase and development, rather than the redistribution of land. The accord also agreed to raise the percentage of the GDP allotted to education and health by 50 per cent by the end of 1999, to reallocate budgetary spending to social services and strengthen the social security system. A concession of 100,000 hectares of land was allotted to poor families and it was agreed to spend $50 million annually on rural infrastructural improvement. The document also established instruments for the resolution of land conflicts, mechanisms of compensation and the creation of channels to ensure popular participation in socio-economic policy-making. Finally, it was agreed to make the tax system more progressive and to raise the overall tax burden as a percentage of GDP by 50 per cent by 2000 (from 8 per to 12 per cent). Importantly, the Accord was severely criticised by the peasant movement, as we shall see below, principally because it did not establish mechanisms for the redistribution of land, one of the major causes of the conflict. In the Army Day Celebrations on 30 June, the “institutional” line of the military was consolidated in promotions and reassignments, suggesting further convergence between prominent elites. On 24 July, Congress abolished military courts and in the first week of August, the National Demobilisation Plan began, wherein PACs began to hand over their weapons. On 19 September, the Accord on Strengthening Civilian Power and the Role of the Army in a Democratic Society was signed in Puebla, Mexico. This accord agreed to restrict the duties of the armed forces to the defence of the nation’s sovereignty and the protection of its borders, to abolish the PACs (a process partially begun in 1991 under the Querétaro agreement), the Presidential Guard (Estado Mayor Principal—EMP) and the Mobile Military Police (Policía Militar Ambulante—PMA) and to cut the army’s budget and size by 33 per cent. The accord also agreed the establishment of a national civilian police force. It aimed to strengthen the rule of law, democratic institutions, including the justice system, and civilian oversight and to dismantle the mechanisms of the counter-insurgency that had been responsible for gross violations of human rights—important platforms of several social movement organisations.

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These measures demonstrated unequivocal concessions by the military, at least on paper and in terms of their prescriptive nature. It is important to note, however, that efforts toward demilitarisation had been initiated under the De León Carpio administration. Furthermore, participation in the PACs had declined since 1994, as a partial result of PAC members denouncing the patrols with the legal assistance of popular movement organisations such as CERJ and the support of international non-governmental organisations such as Amnesty International and the Kennedy Centre for Human Rights. In October 1996, the peace process was almost derailed due to an incident implicating the high level command of one of the URNG’s factions, the Organización Revolucionaria del Pueblo en Armas (ORPA) in the attempted kidnapping of 86-year-old Olga Novella, a member of one of Guatemala’s wealthiest families and a relative of President Arzú. The incident became public two weeks later and was included as Illustrative Case 103 in the CEH (1999). The silence of the UN during the process, the complicity of ORPA and the difficulties experienced by the government proved problematic, although not insurmountable and the head of ORPA, Rodrigo Asturias subsequently resigned from the negotiating table. All parties involved, including the URNG, the government and, notably, MINUGUA, suffered a loss of legitimacy and the URNG’s bargaining power at the negotiating table was considerably weakened. Despite this setback, two further accords were signed within five days of each other in December 1996, the Accord on Constitutional Reforms and the Electoral System, and the Accord on the Basis for the Incorporation of the URNG into Legal Life, signed in Madrid. With the signing of the Accord for a Firm and Lasting Peace in Guatemala on 29 December 1996, the internal armed conflict came to an end. Whilst problems lay ahead in relation to the implementation of the agreements, the direct phase of the negotiated settlement had been successfully completed. Civil society organisations had been involved in the consultation process of the accords, assigned various responsibilities in the next stage of the process and in some cases had achieved significant influence (such as in the case of the AIDPI). They also experienced notable setbacks, such as the Socio-Economic Accord, the Truth Commission and the National Law of Reconciliation, a result of their own their weakness, URNG capitulation and elite intransigence. Inclusion in the complex of institutions that provided for civil inclusion in the peace process and in the political system had contradictory consequences, giving popular civil society the capacity to represent

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itself in congress whilst weakening and, in part, demobilising various of its sectors. Furthermore, the solidifying of elite unity between the private sector and the military and the emergence of a party machine to represent the private sector whilst facilitating the end to the conflict reinforced and legitimised both the institutions of democracy and the position of the historical elite within that system.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE EMERGENCE OF INDIGENOUS POLITICS Historical patterns of mobilisation Indigenous politics in Guatemala has been a highly diverse political practice shaped by the historically contingent needs and demands of social actors and the context in which they have mobilised. Indigenous political mobilisation is not exclusively a recent phenomenon, however, but rather is rooted in the movements of the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1970s various options for indigenous political participation existed at different levels of Guatemalan society. Peasant leagues, local committees and Acción Católica1 provided spaces for community participation. The first popular movement, the Comité Unidad de Campesino (CUC), was formed officially on 1 May 1978, influenced by liberation theology and focusing on labour rights and the minimum salary, its activity concentrated upon the departments of El Quiché and Chimaltenango and in the southern coast plantations. The organisation, including both ladino and indigenous campesino members, although with a principally indigenous leadership, became a critical element in the development of popular mobilisation after the return to civilian rule, despite its decimation by state security forces in the early 1980s. This was because many of its surviving members later participated in and assisted in the formation of diverse organisations of the popular movement. Furthermore, with the exception of Quetzaltenango, there was only very limited scope for indigenous actors to engage with political parties, concentrated in the most part in the departmental capitals.2 The formation of the guerrilla army the Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP) in El Quiché in 1973 provided an alternative option for

Acción Católica (Catholic Action) was a Catholic Church project that was based on the teachings of liberation theology. Through its programmes and popular education, catechists taught popular political and historical education, rights and technical programmes to rural and urban populations. 2 See Bastos and Camus (1993); Gálvez Borrell and Esquit Chay (1997) and Grandin (2000) for a detailed examination of the historical relationship between indigenous activism and political parties. 1

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indigenous people to engage in political mobilisation: the revolutionary left. Over time, the massive incorporation of indigenous people from the altiplano into the EGP precipitated the beginnings of the debate concerning the “ethnic question” within the guerrilla.3 Facing revolutionary and popular mobilisation, the state and economic elites responded through the security apparatus and the military with a brutal and generalised state-led repression. By the end of the 1970s this took an extreme form as civil organisations, co-operatives and peasant leagues became the focus of a political violence in which thousands of leaders were killed.4 This resulted in the disbanding or forced clandestinity of civil organisations and the exile of many Guatemalans.5 At the time of the return to civilian rule in 1986, civil actors were characterised by their previous experiences of mobilisation, mainly at the local level, around both popular and culturalist platforms. By 1986, the counterinsurgency violence and the clandestinity of civil activity that had resulted from it had severed the albeit weak links between popular actors and political parties that had been established during the 1970s, in particular those with the Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca (DCG). The former strength of the DCG within indigenous communities, manifest in the selection of indigenous mayors for the party principally in the western highlands, also suffered from this process. Due to the ferocity of the counterinsurgency, the political opening did not immediately reactivate the DCG’s indigenous support base. One manifestation of this was the low voter-turnout of the 1985 elections. However, building on the trans-community networks constructed in the 1960s, wider political allegiances had been fostered, for example through the CUC. These experiences brought indigenous actors into contact with ladinos and also influenced the evolution of a diverse indigenous politics with two distinct tendencies, the culturalist or pan-

3 See Brett (2007a, forthcoming) for a discussion of the relationship between indigenous communities, the military and the guerrilla insurgency and the political violence of the internal armed conflict in the department of El Quiché between 1972 and 1984. 4 This was symbolised dramatically by the firebombing of the peaceful occupation of the Spanish embassy in January 1980, in which 37 people were killed (including Vicente Tum Pérez, the father of Rigoberta Menchú Tum). 5 As May (1999: 69) observes, the development of clandestine practices within organisations such as the CUC was one of the principal ways in which the political violence shaped the internal structure of popular movement organisations at this time.

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Mayanist movement and popular movement. These two tendencies have become increasingly interdependent over time, and particularly as a result of the developments accompanying the peace process, demonstrating increasingly shared indigenous rights based platforms and, although to a lesser extent, strategies. Pan-Mayanism has been a movement led by professional Mayan academics and scholars that has been focused on recovering Mayan culture through educational reform, the recovery and preservation of Mayan linguistics and scholarship and the revitalisation of Mayan historiography and, over time, the promotion of collective and specific indigenous rights.6 In contrast, the popular movement has been constituted of social movement organisations that were initially linked closely to the insurgency and leftist discourse; in fact, many of these organisations were established as a political wing of the guerrilla.7 This movement focused its platforms and discourse upon human rights, the reform of the state, the preservation and promotion of indigenous culture and the recuperation of the rights of indigenous peoples. The latter has increasingly prioritised claims to entitlement based upon indigenous identity. Bastos and Camus term these two tendencies mayanistas (culturalists) and populares respectively (1993; 1995). These two tendencies together constitute the Guatemalan indigenous movement. Significantly, the “cultural” demands of the mayanistas have often masked real political goals, goals that address inherently structural issues, such as bilingual education. Increasingly, these goals are less covert, as the mayanistas have begun to take on an indigenous rights discourse aimed at overtly 6 See Warren (1998; 1998a) and Fischer and McKenna Brown (1996) for analysis of pan-Mayanism. 7 The story of the relationship between indigenous organisations and the revolutionary left is complicated, in part because it was contingent upon the individuals, locale and organisations involved, and not least because actors understandably remain reluctant to share information about their relationship with the guerrillas. In the late 1990s, when initial research for this study was carried out, social actors remained highly cautious, and the information that was freely available about links between the popular movement and the insurgency was limited. Significantly, whilst the popular movement was never armed or militarised, the full story of its development in the 1980s suggests historical links to the URNG that built upon the collaboration between the EGP and the CUC and extended institutionally the participation of indigenous activists in the guerrilla that had begun in the 1970s; this participation in the guerrilla was both voluntary and obligatory, depending on the context. Different organisations had distinct relationships with the guerrilla and each faction of the guerrilla had relationships with its own particular movements and did not normally venture into the territory of other organisations. This translated into the lack of co-operation between popular movements within individual communities that were supported by different guerrilla factions.

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political goals such as decentralisation and political self-determination. Interestingly, as we shall see in the case studies, the populares over time strategically adopted a pan-Mayanist language, both in an attempt to mask their own political goals, but also as a means of linking in to the broader political opportunity structure, particularly in the Latin American region, which has become increasingly receptive to rights demands framed in terms of ethnic entitlement. Competition for cooperation funds from the international community also enhanced this process, as we shall see. The discourse of human rights and indigenous actors The socio-political and economic climate remained insecure and only slightly less unsympathetic to expressions of dissent with the return of civilian rule in 1986, and high levels of human rights violations perpetrated by the Guatemalan State persisted under Cerezo. The instruments of counter-insurgency had permeated all levels of civil society, especially in the rural areas where the genocide had been carried out, leaving communities brutalised and embedded in a culture of fear and distrust. It was in this context that the discourse of human rights became the main instrument for popular opposition, demonstrating the contingent nature of the discourses employed by the popular movement. Using human rights as a framework for their collective action, organisations focused on the legal dimensions of the state by pressuring for the compliance with national and international human rights obligations. As this process gained momentum, it led to the gradual strengthening of the rule of law and incremental beginning of the establishment of a “culture of rights”. As we have already seen, organisations lobbied around the newly drafted 1985 Constitution and the instruments that it had established, such as the Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office (PDH), and international human rights instruments. Importantly, while the climate between 1978 and 1984 had not been at all conducive or receptive to the politics of human rights, by 1986 this had begun to shift slightly, at least in terms of the adoption of democratic language and discourse.8

8 To the contrary, many interviewees expressed that “to speak about rights would bring death, because the military and other state agents would accuse you of being a guerrilla, and would give you what they thought was the appropriate punishment,

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Utilising the PDH, victims of the grave violations that had been carried out during the conflict sought to find out what had happened to their families during the conflict. In the mid-1980s then, civil actors, many of whom were indigenous, began to use human rights as a way of understanding and investigating what had happened in the past, as a way of reclaiming their personal and collective histories and as a means to try to prevent the state from continuing its violent and repressive policies under democratic rule. Providing a legitimate language through which people could articulate their past and present grievances, the framework of human rights was used both to protect and to search for justice, as a formal way to understand the past and to address the present. However, civil action was not limited by or to articles of the 1985 Constitution. The rearticulation of civil society in a sense had begun in 1984 with the courageous activity of El Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo (GAM). GAM was an organisation made up of the widows and families of the “disappeared”, like Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo in Argentina. It had a ladino leadership and a largely indigenous social base. GAM pressured the government for the return of family members using the slogan “vivos los llevaron, vivos los queremos”, “alive you took them, alive we want them returned”. GAM was the first organisation to employ a strategy of working with the PDH (as CERJ and other organisations were to do a few years later), at the same time as carrying out demonstrations, campos pagados and using graffiti. A further strategy was to foster allegiances with international human rights organisations such as Americas Watch and Amnesty International and to lobby the United Nations to try to obtain international condemnation of the activity of the Guatemalan government and military. The platforms and identity of GAM and the human rights organisations that emerged after the election of the Cerezo government changed the previous paradigm upon which civil organisations had been based in Guatemala. These organisations also represented the “early risers” of the Guatemalan cycle of protest. The popular agenda had evolved in relation to the specific objectives of the movements involved (the cessation and resolution of human rights violations) and to the domestic context (the provision of new institutions through which to claim human rights and a limited political opening). Moreover, movements had death”. Member of CERJ. Anonymous interview, Santa Cruz del Quiché, April 1998.

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adapted to the international and national socio-political environment, which was conducive to the articulation of popular struggle framed in terms of individual human rights. Consequently, social movements were able to maximise their domestic effect. The change in movement identity and impetus occurred in part because of material factors, such as the comparative ineffectiveness of the union movement within Guatemala, its having been weakened substantially during the conflict, and the growing antipathy of the international context to trade union politics. However, we must also give credit to the new social actors and the way that they articulated themselves politically. What evolved was a movement with the capacity to mobilise a mass base around issues with which the population (victims) was able to identify and that would resonate with official culture in civil society and the state, both nationally and internationally. The stakes had to be high enough to bring the members into the public sphere and for them to risk a great deal for their involvement. The first movements that developed after GAM focused similarly upon the redressing of grievances suffered by the grass roots of the organisation. Constituted by individuals seeking redress, the first organisations to emerge out of the political opening demanded the resolution of problems that they themselves had suffered or were suffering. What this also came to signify was that, since the political violence and repression had been directed above all towards the indigenous population, although some leaders were ladino the vast majority of the social base of these organisations was indigenous.9 Popular organisations during this time did not articulate specifically indigenous political platforms. Human rights was understood rather within a limited framework of universal, individual rights. Los quinientos años de resistencia: convergence and fracture in indigenous politics By 1990 the indigenous movement, comprising both popularistas and mayanistas, had developed sufficiently to generate public space and

9 In this context the following popular organisations emerged: GAM in 1984; CUC, re-emerging in the mid-1980s; the Coordinadora Nacional de Viudas de Guatemala (CONAVIGUA) in 1988; CERJ in 1988; the Consejo Nacional de Desplazados de Guatemala (CONDEG) in 1989; the Comisiones Permanentes de Refugiados (CCPP) in 1989.

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debate and it began to launch its most effective activity in preparation for the 1992 “celebrations”. Furthermore, the popular movement had begun to distance itself from the guerrilla, generating a slightly greater degree of autonomy for the movement. As the political space afforded to the popular movement permitted the diversification of social actors, the re-emergence of the mayanista tendency and the creation of wider networks of indigenous actors,10 the political platforms of civil actors began to develop. The favourable international context, shaped by the end of the Cold War and the rise in indigenous politics elsewhere, including in Europe, encouraged a politics that emphasised cultural issues. Past experience had taught civil actors that demands based on socio-economic issues brought violent state responses. To claim marginalisation and oppression on cultural grounds in the post-Cold War context within a nation-state that had treated class-based opposition with a ferocious and unrelenting brutality appeared initially more politically effective and less dangerous than claims based on grounds of economic exclusion. This way of thinking may also have distanced some actors from the guerrilla. Additionally, political experience led to the growth of confidence and the political sophistication of civil actors, initiating the diversification of their programmes. By 1990 then the organisations of the popular movement, whose demands had been framed within the master frame of human rights, and influenced by their close relationship with the URNG, began to shift their focus in line with the changing socio-political context and partial transformation of actors’ immediate needs. Although their leaders and social base remained the same for the most part, organisations began to extend their basic definitions of human rights to include indigenous aspects of their identity as integral to them; in short, their specific and collective rights as indigenous peoples. Although with the permeation of indigenous discourse into organised civil society the division between the popular movement and the culturalists persisted, the preparations for the Segundo Encuentro Continental de la Campaña de Los Quinientos Años de Resistencia in Quetzaltenango, Guatemala in October 1991, led to partial convergence between the tendencies. The borrowing by the popularistas of the platform calling for a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and

10 As a result both of experiences of Guatemalans in exile, the presence of Guatemalans at the United Nations and the continental-wide emergence of indigenous actors.

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pluri-lingual Guatemalan nation-state, a policy previously articulated solely by the mayanistas, was significant in this regard. This occurred publicly for the first time during the Encuentro and was perhaps the most important and unifying element of indigenous politics in Guatemala. It signified not only a change in the previous calls for the structural transformation of the nation-state articulated by the popularistas (and reflecting the language of the predominantly ladino-led URNG), but the adoption by the indigenous movement in general of an expanded concept of rights, taking into account indigenous rights and shifting towards economic, social and cultural rights. The Encuentro was a key historical moment in the development of indigenous politics in Guatemala and in the assumption of an indigenous politics by the popular movement. It brought together the popularistas and mayanistas within a context where other indigenous and popular movements from throughout Latin America were present, and consolidated the relationship between Guatemalan social movements and the transnational indigenous rights movement. However, consensus between these tendencies was far from reached. Given that the Coordinadora Majawil Q’ij, El Nuevo Amanecer, had been formed to oversee the campaign by CUC, CONDEG, GAM, CERJ, CONAVIGUA amongst others, the Encuentro was very much dominated, in fact it had been organised by popularista groups.11 Whilst popularista groups saw the experience of the meeting as having been on the whole positive, many mayanistas saw it as negative, understanding it as having addressed and emphasised classist rather than ethnic or cultural issues. They left with the feeling of having been marginalised by the popularistas, and with the criticism that the populares had cynically “borrowed” their discourse and platforms in order to take advantage of the opportunities that the Encuentro afforded.12

11 Importantly many of the same groups that assumed the co-ordinating duties for the campaign had come together in 1989 to form the Coordinadora de Sectores Surgidos por la Represión y la Impunidad (that had developed out of the Comisión de Damnificadas por la Violencia and was later to become the Asociación Coordinadora de la Población Desarraigada, the ACPD), that carried out its first national conference in July 1991. Clearly the relationship between these groups, most of which had some sort of link with the URNG, was close and by January 1992 they had produced a written document of proposals for the imminent peace negotiations. 12 The charge of opportunism is constantly levelled at indigenous popular groups in Guatemala, by a range of social actors including ladinos on the left, mayanistas and state sectors. Whilst there may be very real material and political capital to be made from assuming an indigenous discourse and identity, given the changing material

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The importance of the meeting must not, however, be underplayed, at least insofar as it presented a meeting point for both tendencies and allowed tensions and differences to be aired. The campaign claimed to represent all the marginalised peoples of the continent and presented a forum through which a united front against the continent’s neo-liberal administrations could be articulated. This suggested that the possibility might exist for a national allegiance between indigenous tendencies based if nothing else upon the recognition of a common enemy. The campaign also brought international legitimacy both to the popular campaign for peace and, critically, to indigenous politics in Latin America and importantly Guatemala, during a politically unstable period, enhanced as it was by the presence of visiting dignitaries such as Danielle Mitterand. The national and international socio-political climate reinforced processes taking place in Guatemala and precipitated further events critical to the evolution of indigenous politics shortly after the Encuentro. In 1992 Rigoberta Menchú, supported in the most part by popularistas, won the Nobel Peace Prize. Furthermore, the United Nations designated 1993 the Year of Indigenous Peoples, within a wider context of the First Decade of Indigenous Peoples starting from 1993. These processes led to the intensification of the presence of indigenous actors in the national political arena, and perhaps began to make it clear to indigenous groups that at least a superficial unity was necessary in order to maximise their impact. A further element was the re-articulation in 1993 of Majawil Q’ij, an organisation that in part developed out of the popularista agenda and membership, but that began to take on further elements of the mayanista political discourse. It seemed that until this point it was the popularistas who were learning from the mayanistas. The final element that contributed to recognition of the need for indigenous unity (but by no means its achievement) was the attempted auto-golpe by Serrano in May 1993. As stated in the previous chapter, diverse social sectors including both indigenous tendencies came together temporarily to contest Serrano’s actions. Yet divisions within the mayanistas and popularistas were such that they formed two separate entities, the Asamblea Permanente del Pueblo Maya (APM) and the Instancia de Unidad y Consenso Maya (IUCM) respectively. However,

conditions previously described, this charge is somewhat reductionist. See Bastos and Camus (1993) and Warren (1998).

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by 1993 each tendency had been in contact with the other and the popularistas had begun to borrow language and discourse from the mayanistas. 1992 and beyond: The peace process and the changing of paradigms The Encuentro was the turning point for the indigenous movement in Guatemala, symbolising the point from which the popular movement became increasingly characterised by indigenous politics and influenced by the discourse and platforms of the culturalist policies of the mayanistas. From 1993 onwards, three main developments took place that consolidated this process: the emergence of new organisations that combined popular and Mayanist tendencies; the formation of new institutions and a changing socio-political context that occurred as a result of the peace process and negotiations; and the elections at the end of 1995. The two main co-ordinating bodies formed after 1993, the Asamblea Permanente del Pueblo Maya (APM) and the Instancia de Unidad y Consenso Maya (IUCM) consolidated the national presence of a wideranging and diverse indigenous movement. These were strengthened by the re-articulation of Majawil Q’ij that was constituted mainly of indigenous actors from popular organisations such as CUC and CONDEG. However, with the changing socio-political climate, indigenous activists who had been in exile during the conflict began to return to Guatemala, becoming involved in Majawil Q’ij and in the other popular organisations. It was these actors, as well as other activists engaged in the mayanista tendency that began to propel the indigenous movement forward. Returning with experience in the UN Working Group on Indigenous Peoples and with knowledge of indigenous activism in Canada were Juan León Alvarado and Francisco Calí, the former a founding member of the CUC, the latter a former member of the Comité Campesino del Altiplano (CCDA), almost all of whose members had been assassinated by the military during the conflict. These activists later became key players in the peace process and in the institutions that were set up after the final accord was signed. With experience of international lobbying and forms of organisation and discourse utilised by indigenous groups in North America, they had access to broad-reaching transnational advocacy and indigenous rights networks that provided them with

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intellectual and financial support and guidance. The involvement of these activists was critical to the discourse that the popular movement adapted after the re-articulation of Majawil Q’ij. These developments demonstrated the adaptability of the popular movement to the changing socio-political conjuncture, as actors transformed their agendas in line with the shifting national and regional context. Social movements began to adopt different configurations of rights and widen their original interpretations of human rights, some movements extending the meaning of human rights to include collective and specific rights as claims to entitlement and economic and social rights issues, such as the right to land. At the same time, the changes in the socio-political context significantly affected the class-ethnicity dynamic of the popular movement, introducing a more indigenous-led agenda into the movement as a whole and heightening the visibility of indigenous actors at the national level. This process would later influence the path of the peace process. Organisations began to utilise the concept of indigenous rights far more pervasively after 1993, arguing that such rights were integral to their human rights—although the utilisation by the popular movement of collective cultural rights would only really arrive with the creation of Defensoría Maya, as we shall see below. A final development in this regard came with the ongoing shift towards indigenous politics within the campesino movement that had been precipitated by the formation of the Coordinadora Nacional Indígena y Campesina (CONIC) in 1992, through a split in the CUC, as the CONIC case study will illustrate. The accelerated presence of indigenous organisations was consolidated by the socio-political changes that accompanied the democratisation process. It is important to note that the fact that social movements had indigenous names, or included indigenous words in their names was a significant change, forcing political actors to pronounce indigenous words in a national political arena—a notable breakthrough in Guatemala. Whilst the accords of 1991 and 1993 affirmed the inclusion of the discussion of indigenous themes in the national peace-building agenda, the most notable development after 1993 was the growing autonomy of the increasingly indigenous rights oriented popular movement and its relationship with the culturalista movement. The involvement of the URNG in the negotiation process meant that it was less able to impose control over the gradually more assertive popular movement, although it continued to attempt to shape the agenda of the popular movement, even up until the middle of 1995.

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As we have already seen, a key factor in the consolidation of the indigenous movement came from the political opportunities provided by the peace process and the growing links that the movement had to international (indigenous) advocacy networks. These factors contributed to the increasing strength and visibility of the indigenous movement.13 A key moment in this process came with the formation of the Asamblea de la Sociedad Civil (ASC) in 1994, and, in particular, the creation of the Coordinadora de Organizaciones del Pueblo Maya de Guatemala (COPMAGUA). At the same time, the negotiations for the AIDPI brought the two tendencies of the indigenous movement closer together, as they worked together in the ASC to finalise COPMAGUA’s proposal for the accord. Immediately after the signing of the AIDPI, popular indigenous organisations began disseminating its content through educational programmes at all levels and initiated training programmes of their members to include the conceptual frameworks and content of the accord. At the same time they sought to develop the ideational frameworks and policies that would be used in the commissions proposed by the accord. Mayanist groups, similarly, began to work on the educational and constitutional reforms. As a result, on top of the human rights discourse that they had articulated, all organisations within the popular movement began to adopt the culturalist language of the accord, validated in the discourse of international funding institutions and NGOs. At the levels of both civil society and the state, therefore, the language of rights—including human rights and indigenous rights—was being spoken. People were becoming aware of their rights, as a result of the cumulative activity of social movements and the changes that were taking place due to the return to civilian democracy and the internationalised peace process. Just as social movements were speaking the language of human rights and indigenous rights and teaching their members the practice of such rights, so elite actors in the state, political and civil realms were also affected by these discourses. The language of rights was spoken by the media and political parties, and given a space in the peace negotiations. Utilisation of the state legal system and the PDH, although to minimal effect, further contributed

13 This was also enhanced by the presence of a diverse range of Mayan journalists writing in the main national newspapers, such as Sam Colop (Siglo Veintiuno) and Eduardo Zapeta (Prensa Libre).

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to an awareness of rights and to pressure to adhere to the rule of law. These factors led, critically, to the generation of a “rights culture”, a culture that would remain only partially consolidated, however. Nevertheless, not all configurations of rights were equally tenable or negotiable, despite organisations’ broadening of their original interpretations of the master frame of human rights to include socio-economic and indigenous rights to entitlement. The historical pattern of state responses to mobilisation around socio-economic and land issues had been one of violence and repression, economic and political elites historically averse to making concessions in these spheres. Moreover, democratisation in Guatemala was unfolding within the wider post-Cold War neo-liberal climate that showed little sympathy for such ideas. The negotiation of socio-economic rights and issues was consequently severely restricted. In contrast, claims to entitlement based upon indigenous identity appeared less threatening to elite interests, and were bolstered by the increasingly effective indigenous movement that was operating within a favourable international and national context. The master frame of human rights was broadened and transformed incontrovertibly with the signing of the AIDPI and the ratification of ILO 169 and the institutionalisation of indigenous rights into the national agenda for peace. This proved to be a dramatic turning point in the class-ethnicity dynamic that had shaped popular organisation in the past, by consolidating the presence of indigenous rights as a field of social struggle, to a degree, over and above that of class/socio-economics. Significantly, the framing of economic issues themselves was also reworked, as organisations began to articulate such issues, including land ownership, as elements relating to indigenous rights to entitlement. The shift of political activity and resources to negotiation and dissemination of the AIDPI, however, partially sidelined both the issues that remained to be discussed in the peace negotiations, including the socio-economic accord, and those organisations that sought social transformation upon such terms. Despite this, the “early risers” continued to play a role in popular politics, as did the language of fundamental individual and universal human rights, a process that was assured by the continuing presence of MINUGUA and the activity of organisations like GAM, CERJ and CONAVIGUA in relation to human rights violations. However, changes in the socio-political context and the broadening of original interpretations of human rights that accompanied them both opened the possibilities for, and, in fact, necessitated changes in the strategies and identities of social movements.

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The remaining accords were signed after the election of Alvaro Arzú at the beginning of 1996, with the final accord signed in December 1996. Of particular relevance to the popular movement was the Accord Concerning Socio-Economic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation, signed in May. With indigenous organisations concentrating upon the follow-up to and dissemination of AIDPI, less protagonism occurred around this accord. Moreover, whilst the campesino movement had mobilised independently of the popular movement in the run-up to the discussions for the socio-economic accord, carrying out land invasions and demonstrations and, as a result, gaining title to land both in the Altiplano and on the South Coast, its participation in the ASC was comparatively minimal. This was because campesino leaders anticipated that they would not achieve their primary objectives of land reform through participation in such formal channels, despite their framing land issues in the language of human rights and indigenous rights to entitlement. Moreover, after internal conflicts concerning relationships with the guerrilla, most notably the case of the split within CUC that led to the formation of CONIC, campesino leaders were suspicious of forming relationships with other social actors. Although Justo Mendoza, a member of CONIC, did take part in the discussions in the ASC concerning the accord as a representative of the campesino sector, the campesino movement did not focus its attention upon these channels. Although they issued campos pagados expressing their demands for and concerns over the land situation, organisations concentrated upon continued activism and use of legal channels to obtain land at the community and regional level. The campesino movement had also eschewed engagement with electoral politics during the 1995 elections and, significantly, despite several offers, no member of the campesino movement leadership stood as a candidate for the FDNG, nor did they, in contrast with the other popular movement organisations, support the political campaign substantially at local or national level.14 The ASC did not include land reform as a proposal for the socioeconomic accord and, as previously discussed, the signed accord was weak and ceded little to the platforms and demands of campesino organisations. The weakness of the socio-economic accord resulted, in part, from capitulation of the URNG, the failure of the campesino

14 I am grateful to Rafael Chanchavac Cux and Rigoberto Monteros of CONIC for this information. Interviews, Guatemala City, October–November 1998.

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movement’s strategy of jornadas and its lack of effective participation in the ASC. The lack of radical popular movement protagonism around issues such as land reform in the wake of AIDPI also had an impact. However, whilst the historical recalcitrance of the elite private sector with regard to land redistribution made the achievement of campesino demands unlikely, the most effective constraint upon the achievement of substantial gain in the accord resulted from the pressure of the economic elite, in particular CACIF, upon the parties to the negotiation. Significantly, the relationship between the governing party, PAN, and the agrarian elite, despite the former’s pro-peace agenda, consolidated the political influence of the agrarian elite at this time in the peace process, limiting the likelihood of concessions to the popular movement. This was enhanced by the relative consensus with regard to sectoral agendas and interests that had been reached between the military and the private sector after the attempted auto-golpe by Serrano. An important and immediate consequence of the socio-economic accord was the further shift towards an indigenous orientation within the platforms and identity of campesino organisations within the popular movement, such as CONIC and CUC. This process intensified particularly with CONIC’s attempts to rebuild its relationship with other popular movement groups after its effective isolation. This took place after several activists and police agents were killed during attempted land evictions, prompting the government to claim that the campesino movement had broken the national agenda for peace. Changes linked to the formal political arena The space for the participation of the popular and indigenous movements institutionalised through the peace process linked into changes in the formal political realm with the elections of 1995. All parties participating in the elections agreed to the continuation of the negotiation process and the accords effectively became accords of the Guatemalan state. Moreover, the FDNG, a popular party with links to the URNG, took part in the elections and gained six seats in Congress, half of which were occupied by women, two of whom were indigenous and who were part of the political initiative Nukup Ajpop.15 The number of indigenous 15 This included the Maya-K’iche’ deputy Manuela Alvarado and the Kaqchikel Rosalina Tuyuc, the ex-leader of CONAVIGUA.

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deputies from the other parties, the Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG) and the Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN) also increased so that each had at least one indigenous deputy. Furthermore, the FDNG fielded an indigenous vice-presidential candidate, Juan León Alvarado. Whilst no profound advances in political party practices towards indigenous peoples’ rights resulted from this inclusion, as said deputies did not participate directly as representatives of indigenous peoples, these advances demonstrated an important development for indigenous people within the formal political realm. Finally, the fielding of candidates through Comités Cívicos at the municipal level also demonstrated important gains by indigenous peoples within the formal political realm. The indigenous movement, made up of two distinct though increasingly interrelated tendencies, had, by 1995, secured involvement in the peace negotiations, through the ASC, and augmented this through a more formal engagement in political society, through participation in national and local politics. This process, although partially linked to the participation of indigenous actors in the political parties formed in the 1970s, had certain characteristics. First, at the national level through the FDNG it was supported—albeit at a distance—by a guerrilla organisation that had begun to re-evaluate its approach to the “ethnic question”. This was manifest, above all, in its strong support for the proposals of the civil sector for the AIDPI. Second, formal engagement in political channels also received tacit support from the mayanista tendency and direct support from the now indigenous rights oriented popular movement. Third, despite these links, the specific policies of the indigenous movement, the most characteristic of which was the proposal for a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and pluri-lingual nation-state, did not have a considerable impact on the activity of the FDNG or on political society in general. This was because indigenous deputies of the FDNG, despite their links with Nukup Ajpop, were involved in a ladino-led formal party structure with minimal bargaining power that was confronted by a large majority held by the governing party. Fourth, despite the above gains and increase in indigenous political party activism, rural areas remained under-represented with respect to indigenous political participation. The increase of indigenous formal political participation did not lead to sustained calls for the formation of an indigenous party. This was partially because of the continuing lack of confidence that most of organised (and unorganised) civil society, especially the indigenous population, had in political parties, demonstrated by the high abstention rate in the 1995 elections.

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After the elections, indigenous activists returned to their organisations in preparation for work in the commissions set up through the peace accords. In some cases, such as CERJ and Defensoría Maya, electoral participation had affected the level of mobilisation and daily work that the organisations had been engaged with. The temporarily demobilising effect of electoral participation by social movements evidenced the need for organised civil actors to assess the trade-offs between maintaining autonomy from formal structures of political inclusion, such as political parties, and engaging with such structures as a means of pursuing popular organisational and sectoral objectives and agendas. This implied the need to re-strategise and rebuild rural constituencies and to assess the trade-offs between formal political participation and popular mobilisation. However, the profile of the popular movement, the general goals of which were, in large part, shared by the FDNG, had been raised through the formation and success of the party in the 1995 elections. The popular movement and democratisation Patterns of collective action changed in Guatemala after the return to civilian governance. The shift toward an indigenous rights perspective and orientation within popular politics took place as the master frame of human rights was broadened by social movements to include claims to entitlement framed through indigenous identity. During democratisation, movements demanded the compliance with the rule of law and the protection of their constitutional rights by the state, at the same time as seeking to secure a diverse range of “new” rights configurations. The discourses and practice of human rights and the rights of indigenous people were identified as fundamental to the peace process and became key to the emerging culture of rights. Movements sought to present socio-economic claims as integral to their human rights and indigenous rights. This strategy was unsuccessful in garnering widespread support from national elites and in influencing the peace process, in which the negotiation of socio-economic issues was restricted to a neo-liberal political framework that diverged substantially from and belied the platforms of campesino movements. Although they did not profoundly affect political society and the state, the discourses of human rights and indigenous politics permeated deeply into civil society, causing wide-ranging permutations in the ways

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in which civil actors engaged in politics. A major part of this change was the blurring or, at the very least, the questioning of the class/ethnicity divide. Whilst the widely accepted historical distinction made by Bastos and Camus (1993; 1995) between organizaciones populares indígenas and instituciones Mayas was appropriate in the past, it is now necessary to rethink the ways in which we understand and categorise the indigenous movement. Specifically, up to 1993 it was appropriate to argue that popularistas prioritised a socio-economic and class framework whilst mayanistas argued for the centrality of a socio-political analysis based on ethnic stratification for understanding and subsequently redressing the inequalities and grievances existent in Guatemalan society. This analytical distinction now needs to be refined. Distinctions based on strategy and social constituency still continued to differentiate popularista and mayanista movements. However, events and socio-political processes in the early 1990s brought the previously distinct camps closer together. Socio-political and cultural developments meant that the platforms of indigenous organisations became less polarised, at the same time as setting the conditions for a hybrid indigenous movement to evolve. It has been argued here that a new third tendency appears to be developing out of the popularistas that shares some historical elements and political strategies with them. Furthermore, many of the people in organisations of this new tendency may, in the past, have been members of popularista organisations. This tendency has borrowed elements of its identity, discourse and objectives from the mayanistas, resulting in a synthesis of culturalist and socio-economic demands, articulated by an organisation with a mass base. A clear example of this has been the organisation Defensoría Maya. During the cycle of protest in Guatemala, as popular actors became increasingly subject to the norms of political engagement established by the return to electoral democracy and the peace process, the purchase of a limited human rights framework as a political instrument lessened. Consequently, social movements widened their interpretation of human rights and indigenous rights became gradually more pivotal as a means to articulate social struggle. Indigenous actors achieved varying degrees of success by utilising a variety of political channels as the opportunity arose. The employment of conventional forms of popular mobilisation was augmented by participation in institutions established through the peace negotiations and in electoral politics, demonstrating how actors extended their struggles within civil society to include what Cohen and Arato define as the “politics of inclusion” (1992: 526). In this regard,

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the protest politics of “early risers” that focused on limited definitions of human rights were transformed. The norms of political engagement ushered in by this process, however, implied certain trade-offs, necessitating a shift in the strategies employed by the popular opposition which, in some instances, challenged the capacity of civil actors to sustain previous levels of mobilisation. The following chapters examine how the broadening of the master frame of human rights and the shift towards an indigenous politics within the popular movement affected individual organisations, tracing the development of these movements in parallel with democratisation. The case studies assess the extent to which the strategies, discourses and platforms of social movements evolved as democratisation unfolded.

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CHAPTER FOUR

DEMANDING HUMAN RIGHTS IN A VIOLENT DEMOCRACY: INDIGENOUS PARTICIPATION IN EL CONSEJO DE COMUNIDADES ÉTNICAS This chapter documents the first case study, detailing the historical development of the indigenous human rights organisation El Consejo de Comunidades Étnicas—Runujel Junam (CERJ). Here we outline the evolution of CERJ’s political platforms, identity, objectives, political strategies and structure within the context of the Guatemalan process of democratisation and within the theoretical framework previously presented. The social movement is examined in light of the three factors that, as indicated in chapter three, have played a major role in shaping the development of Guatemala’s indigenous movement: the historical context of the organisation’s evolution; the particular concept of rights that it articulated; and its interpretation of the class/ethnicity dichotomy within its political platforms. The domestic socio-political context in which CERJ developed was central to shaping the organisational identity that it articulated and the concept of rights through which it framed its claims to entitlement. CERJ was one of the first popular organisations to emerge after the return to civilian rule, one of the principal “early riser” movements. It emerged at a stage when social movements were most concerned with redressing the effects of the past and continuing political violence, its demands, as those of other organisations, centring on the protection of basic human rights, equal human rights for the indigenous population and the demilitarisation of indigenous communities. Its struggle was not focused upon socio-economic issues, although after the final peace accord was signed, CERJ began to develop a political discourse that did address broader issues of development. Furthermore, whilst CERJ’s discourse was transformed by the pervasive orientation towards indigenous politics within the popular movement in the post-cold war context, its practices were not affected considerably. This is largely because of the persistent problem of human rights violations in rural Guatemala and the organisation’s consistent prioritisation of this element of its platform.

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chapter four 1988–1993: The emergence and formation of CERJ CERJ and the other human rights organisations emerged as products of the repression and the inconceivable levels of violence that resulted from the scorched earth policies and extermination policies during the 1980s. People wanted me to be the voice or spokesperson for this population, and I assumed the commitment, identifying myself as a ladino with conscience. I organised the people together through a strategy of popular education in human rights. I would teach them what are human rights, what they meant, where they came from and who had the responsibility of guaranteeing them. We thought that we should give our organisation a name, and we had the idea of calling it Runujel Junam, meaning “we are all equal” in the Maya-K’iche’ language. This name was inspired by article four of the Guatemalan Constitution that establishes that all Guatemalans are equal before the law, as well as from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, where it says that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.1

CERJ emerged out of the northern municipality of Santa Cruz del Quiché in 1988, in the highland department of El Quiché. It was one of the first national indigenous popular organisations publicly to take advantage of the political space afforded by the return to civilian government. Following the initiative of Amílcar Méndez, a ladino teacher from the municipality of Santa Cruz del Quiché, the organisation developed in reaction to the rural population’s experiences of violence and intimidation that had been a central part of the counter-insurgency policies begun by the military in the late 1970s.2 According to a 1991 CERJ publication, its mandate was “to struggle for the respect of human rights, by utilising material and, when necessary, human resources to save the lives of defenceless people”.3 CERJ’s initial demands were focused upon the instruments of the counter-insurgency that still determined to a considerable extent the lives of Guatemalans in 1988. They called for an end to forced recruitment in the military and the cessation of human rights violations carried out against the civilian population by military and paramilitary organisations. CERJ’s main political platform, however, called for State recogni1 Amílcar Méndez, founder of CERJ and ex- deputy for the FDNG. Interview, Guatemala City, 11/12/98. 2 According to a CERJ mission statement: “the organisation was formed due to the constant death threats, harassment, intimidation, accusations, as well as the forced recruitment into the military and social inequality”, Guatemala City (1994: 6). 3 CERJ Publication, El Consejo de Comunidades Étnicas Runujel Junam, Guatemala City (1991: 2).

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tion of the voluntary nature of the Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil (PAC). Méndez began organising from his house in El Quiché when he wrote denuncias or complaints against forced military service in the Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil (PAC) for indigenous campesinos, many of whom were illiterate. As more families in different communities became aware of Méndez’s work and the number of individuals willing to denounce the PAC openly grew, the idea to form an organisation evolved and on 31 July 1988, CERJ became public. CERJ claimed to represent indigenous victims of the internal armed conflict and repression, at first in the department of El Quiché and later in other departments of Guatemala. The department of El Quiché was profoundly affected by the internal armed conflict.4 The majority indigenous population had suffered in the extreme both from the genocidal scorched earth policies of the counter-insurgency executed under Generals Lucas García and Rios Montt, at its height between 1980–1982, and from the continued State violence and repression directed toward the civilian population in its aftermath. They continued to suffer human rights violations under the civilian regime of Vinicio Cerezo.5 The individuals that made up CERJ’s social base, therefore, were initially from the Maya-K’iche’ ethnic group. CERJ was the first popular movement organisation publicly to open a regional office outside of the capital in a conflictive and highly militarised area, which involved great personal risk for those involved. It was, however, with extreme courage and a sense of unity that individuals were able to confront such personal risk and begin to demand that the protection of their human rights. The civil patrol system was initiated under General Lucas García6 in late 1981 and institutionalised under General Efraín Rios Montt in 1983 through the counter-insurgency campaign “beans and bullets”. In 4 Of the 422 massacres cited in the REMHI report the majority, some 263, took place in the department of El Quiché; Guatemala City (1998: 4). 5 As of 1998, CERJ was working in the following eight departments and 30 municipalities: El Quiché: Chajul; Nebaj; Cunén; Sacapulas; San Pedro Jocopilas; San Antonio Ilotenango; Santa Cruz del Quiché; Chiché; Chinique; Zacualpa; San Andrés Sajcabaja; Chichicastenango; Totonicapán: Santa María Chiquimula; Santa Lucía la Reforma; Sololá: Sololá; Nahuala; San Andrés Semetabaj; Santa Catarina Ixtahuacan; Suchitepequez: Santo Tomás la Unión; San Pablo Jocopilas; Alta Verapaz: San Cristóbal; Tactíc; Fray Bartolomé de las Casas; Cobán; Cahabón; Baja Verapaz (Salamá): Purulá; Chiquimula: Camotán; Jocotán; Guatemala: Guatemala; San Marcos: San Miguel Ixtahuacán. 6 General Benedicto Lucas García made the first reference to the civil patrols publicly when he referred to the organisation and training of peasant militias (Prensa Libre, November 18/11/81).

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1986, the government and the military renamed the PAC Comités Voluntarios de Defensa Civil (CVDC) through Decreto-Ley 19–86, conceived by General Oscar Humberto Mejía Víctores, Minister of Defence. It was this law that, whilst legitimising the civil patrols, provided CERJ with a legal base upon which to campaign against the PAC. In short, the decree recognised the voluntary nature of the PAC. Later, civil patrols were referred to as Comités de Defensa Civil in Decreto-Ley 26–86. By redefining the civil patrols in this way the military was attempting to redetermine their role within a democratic State.7 In order to organise and mobilise sufficient individuals for the PAC, the military attempted to build upon previous community networks and structures, focusing upon community leaders or the military commissioners, established in the 1960s as the “eyes and ears” of the military within communities. The PAC also came to take the place of the civilian authorities within rural communities, effectively placing the majority of rural Guatemalans under direct military authority (Popkin 1996: 44). Military commissioners often organised the civil patrols and supervised their activities, giving these individuals an unprecedented power to intimidate and control the rural population that persisted long after the scorched earth policies of the 1980s.

In most instances the civil patrols consisted of all the able-bodied male members of each community. According to the REMHI report, official figures concerning numbers in the PAC do not exist, although it is estimated that by 1982–3 they consisted of approximately 900,000 male campesinos (almost 10 per cent of the entire population). Under the Cerezo government membership in the PAC fell to 500,000 (1986–90) and about 375,000 remained in 1995 (ODHAG 1999: 14). Under the control of the army, service in the PAC, although voluntary in theory, became obligatory and was developed as a means of controlling the rural population. Community members were assigned the task of policing their own communities and defending them from the guerrilla. As Popkin states “In areas of guerrilla presence, community members were obliged to form civil patrols to assist the army in defending communities from guerrilla attack. The patrols were also intended to win villagers allegiance by delivering basic necessities to communities” (1996: 7). The PAC, a critical element of the military’s counter-insurgency project, provided the link between the military and rural indigenous communities. The jefes de las PAC and the comisionado militar (often the same person) served as the point of interface between the rural civilian population and the military and became the principal civil actors through which military policy and ideology were executed and disseminated. Moreover, the civil patrols were also “a cost effective system for sentry duty and repression that was not onerous for the army or government since they were unpaid and usually unarmed. Moreover they also became a forced labour supply in many areas, particularly in the areas of provisions and the building of infrastructure. In the war economy, the creation of the civil patrols also enabled the army to redistribute troops to other areas” (ODHAG 1999: 14). 7

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Those who did not participate in the patrol were accused of being guerrillas, sowing the seeds of distrust and division in rural communities. People were encouraged to denounce their neighbours, family or friends if they felt that they had a reason to do so. Denunciations of collaboration with the guerrilla to the army or PAC occurred not only if individuals felt they had reason to do so, but even in cases when they did not, in order to demonstrate that they were not aligned to the insurgency. Additionally, denunciations at times followed the pattern of family or inter-personal disputes wherein an individual might denounce another community member in order to settle pre-existing grievances or out of personal interest. For the most part under military supervision, accompanying the military, the PAC became one of the instruments of massacres and individual and selective killings of those accused of collaboration with or participation in the insurgency in rural Guatemala. Not to participate in the PAC was interpreted by the military and those already patrolling as tacit support for the guerrilla, therefore non-participation placed oneself and one’s family at great risk. Once in the PAC many patrollers were obliged to take part in atrocities and human rights abuses; at times not to have done so placed the patroller’s own life at risk.8 As the Robert F. Kennedy report Institutional Violence: Civil Patrols in Guatemala, 1993–4 documents The army gave patrollers licence to act on the assumption that anyone who did not actively support the government troops was an enemy. Those who opposed the patrols were attacked, killed or exiled, leaving, after more than a decade, a strong, well-organised and pro-military structure in communities throughout the country (1994: 9).

The relationship between the indigenous population and the PAC was complex, however. For example many campesinos would patrol at the same time as actively participating in popular organisations that, amongst other things, supported platforms that proposed demilitarisation. Various times in and around the municipality of Chupol, El Quiché, interviewees stated “Yes, we were members of the PAC. We

8 The REMHI report states that in its testimonies, civil patrols were responsible for 12.76 per cent of all incidents documented and military commissioners 7.44 per cent. Civil patrols are identified as having perpetrated 18.12 per cent of massacres and military commissioners 5.38 per cent. In combination the PAC and military commissioners were responsible for one in every four collective murders (ODHAG 1999: 14).

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patrolled when we are told to. But, in reality, in our hearts we were always with CERJ”.9 Reactions to the PAC and strategies utilised to confront patrolling varied according to locale and to the activity of particular civil patrols. For example, ex-patrollers in Chupol and members of CERJ claimed that the PAC carried out very few abuses in the municipality, whereas in aldeas (villages) such as Sacpulup and Pajuliboy the PAC was implicated in a significant number of human rights abuses.10 Miguel Tum, a Regional Co-ordinator and long-term member of CERJ explained the strategies that his community had made use of: We had our own initiatives. For example, we used to put the national flag on our houses, to show how patriótico we were. We would sing how we were the patria, the fatherland, and that we would always be with the army, that we stood by their sides. Almost all the houses in my village put up flags. In this way, many lives were saved. No one would confront the army. If the army told us we had to patrol for a whole day and night, then we did it. Inside, we were against this, we were resisting, but of course we remained silent. When the army asked us for firewood, for tortillas, or for water, then we gave it to them. We would never go alone to bring firewood, because the army would often grab people if they were on their own, “disappear” them. So we would go together, sometimes up to twenty people would go. And then, after six o’clock at night, no one would go out, because we knew what could happen.11

State-sponsored institutions did exist through which the civilian population could represent themselves legally in cases of human rights violations. Both the Public Prosecutor’s Office (MP) and the Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office (PDH), established in the 1985 Political Constitution, had representatives in Santa Cruz del Quiché at this time. Moreover, the 1985 Constitution guaranteed the equality of all citizens (articles one and four) and the illegality of forced recruitment

Interviews (anonymous) with CERJ members, April 1998, Chupol, El Quiché. The interviewees did not claim to understand exactly the reasons why people did or did not patrol, or why some patrols were more brutal than others. Many claimed that it depended on the history of local division and external relationships, the extent of guerrilla presence and military intimidation and the extent of social cohesion and sense of community in the area. For a detailed analysis of this with particular reference to Aguacatán, Huehuetenango, see Kobrak (1997). 11 Interview, Guatemala City, 10/3/98. These strategies reflect the mechanisms employed by peasants in South East Asia to confront the unequal power relations between themselves and their landlords, famously termed “weapons of the weak” by James Scott (1985: v). 9

10

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into military groups (article 34), as did international declarations and treaties ratified by the Guatemalan State. However, illiteracy, political violence against those who opposed the status quo, fear, institutionalised impunity and discrimination meant that those seeking redress for human rights violations could not in reality avail themselves of State resources, rather that they might be subject to further violence themselves if they were to do so. Méndez suggested that the ineffectiveness of the civilian administration and State authorities was pivotal to the formation of CERJ. As a non-State organisation that actively sought to represent victims of human rights violations with which the indigenous population at community level could more readily identify,12 CERJ was able to develop a loyal indigenous social base for whom it provided moral and legal support. By mobilising the indigenous population en masse, CERJ sought to lobby State institutions to fulfil their constitutional mandate and to protect the legally guaranteed human rights of this population. The mobilisation around instruments such as the 1985 Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights anchored CERJ in national and international law, and became critical in tying the organisation into transnational advocacy networks based around human rights. Significantly, CERJ successfully secured support for its work from the Kennedy Centre for Human Rights, the French government and organisations such as Amnesty International. Until 1994, CERJ linked forced recruitment into the PAC with the violation of the basic human rights of indigenous people, including the right to free association. The socio-political climate was receptive to claims to entitlement framed in terms of individual human rights. However, as the peace process progressed and overt State-sponsored political violence began to decline, the discourse of fundamental human rights held decreasing purchase as an instrument of social struggle. As a result, CERJ began to present forced recruitment into the PAC as a factor that prevented indigenous people from working their land, what they described as an integral part of their culture, and that the PAC usurped their own traditional authority structures. Activists claimed

12 Many members of CERJ, including the leadership, had suffered human rights violations; the social base and the leadership except for Amílcar Méndez was almost entirely indigenous and the organisation followed a policy of translation. Furthermore, the name of the organisation was in the K’iche’ language and located in the department of El Quiché.

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that the direct consequence of forced recruitment into the PAC was the dissolution of indigenous culture, as well as the violation of the human rights of indigenous people. However, while a certain discursive shift was discernible, the organisation continued to prioritise individual human rights, and its practice changed very little. In taking on the language of indigenous politics and linking human rights violations to indigenous culture in this way, CERJ only partially adapted its policies to the changing socio-political conjuncture. This was because central demands remained relevant until the dissolution of the PAC and, moreover, because since its early emergence, CERJ had always tied its identity and practices very closely to the discourse of individual human rights—a factor that was manifest in its name, Runujel Junam. The consolidation of CERJ When CERJ emerged publicly in 1988, several other organisations existed which represented the civilian population legally and politically before the state. Various organised labour groups gave trade union provision for the representation of workers13 and the CUC represented campesinos in labour and land disputes. However, the Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo (GAM) appeared to follow the most similar policy line to CERJ, based as it was in the protection of fundamental human rights and the abolition of the PAC. While GAM shared various characteristics with CERJ, namely that it was a human rights organisation with an indigenous social base that focused on some of the immediate consequences of the internal armed conflict and repression, it did not address the same needs as CERJ. Until the emergence of CERJ, no other organisation was concerned directly with the issue of the civil patrols, although CUC had at least included the abolition of the PAC in its platforms. Social movements at this time constituted a broad human rights movement that appealed to a wide range of interests. Each organisation followed its own specific line and attracted its own distinct social base. People joined those groups that they felt most closely addressed their priorities and with whom they most closely identified.

13 Such as the Confederación de Unidad Sindical de Guatemala (CUSG) formed in 1984.

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The fact that different human rights organisations were allied to different factions of the URNG may have additionally shaped community participation in specific human rights groups. This suggests that any pre-existing relationship with the guerrilla and/or the location of a community influenced the choices that organising communities faced.14 The precise historical relationship between CERJ and the guerrilla was difficult to ascertain during fieldwork, given the delicate nature of the subject and that many of the original members of CERJ remained in positions of leadership and, therefore, were not as yet willing to discuss such historically-sensitive issues. The organisation, and in particular Méndez, has historically suffered from accusations by the state and the military of collaboration with the insurgency, a phenomenon that was exacerbated by CERJ’s formation in the department of El Quiché, a stronghold of the EGP. Whilst in anonymous interviews members at both local and leadership levels of the organisation revealed that they had personally had contact with the URNG, the extent to which the policies and activities of CERJ were guerrilla-directed was less clear cut. Some members in the department of El Quiché revealed how they had given food and shelter to the insurgents and, at times, had carried out propaganda for them or participated in their meetings. However, many denied all knowledge of a relationship between themselves and the URNG, stressing that the demands of the civilian popular movement were distinct from those of an armed insurgency, claims refuted by other social movement activists elsewhere. Some members indicated that in the later stages of democratisation, whilst CERJ participated in the ASC, contact took place between themselves and the URNG, as both groups made suggestions to the other concerning the contents of the peace accords. However, the tacit mutual support between both parties regarding overall objectives and policy was clear, although it became less intimate as democratisation progressed and the insurgents became more entrenched in the peace negotiations. A further factor important for understanding why individuals joined specific popular organisations concerned whether or not the organisation was clandestine. Interviewees claimed that the emergence of a

14 The regions where the different guerrilla factions were active were the following: EGP: El Quiché, the Verapaces; ORPA: Sololá, Huehuetenango, Chimaltenango, San Marcos; PGT: Eastern Guatemala, Guatemala City; FAR: Petén, Alta Verapaz.

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new organisation that was not clandestine, whilst still presenting acute risks to personal safety, gave them the opportunity to organise within a group that at that point did not suffer from a historical stigma, such as the CUC. Moreover, the fact that CERJ was not clandestine meant that they were able to carry out critical work such as the writing of denuncias and the lobbying of State institutions openly.15 The most common reason given for joining CERJ was the need for legal or moral support. People heard of the organisation through family or friends, or through their local priest, and thus joined after deciding that it was CERJ that could most appropriately assist them, particularly with regard to the issue of the civil patrols. The initial structure of CERJ When the organisation emerged in 1988 it had no formalised structure as such, merely an informal junta de coordinación. This consisted of the founders of CERJ, Amílcar Méndez, Miguel Sucuquí and Justina Tzoc.16 Each had a personal history of mobilisation and organisation. Tzoc had been a member of CUC and, after long deliberation, had joined CERJ because it was concerned with those human rights issues that were for her a priority. The fact that CERJ was not a clandestine organisation was also important for her. Sucuquí, on the other hand, had worked as a health promoter in his community of Sacpulup in El Quiché and had been involved in attempts to prevent the civil patrol and military commissioner from “disappearing” or threatening individuals accused of collaboration with the guerrilla. As with many members of CERJ, he had been persecuted for opposing the work of the civil patrol and consequently explained “I am a victim and witness of the violence”.17 All but one of the individuals in the CERJ’s junta co-ordinadora in 1988 were indigenous victims of human rights violations from rural Guatemala. They were all from El Quiché and they were able to read and write in Spanish. Each had been involved in community organising, either through local committees or through Acción Católica, and had

Justina Tzoc, co-founder of CERJ. Interview, Guatemala City, 8/5/98. Except for Amílcar Méndez the co-founders of CERJ were from the Maya- K’iche’ linguistic group. Miguel Sucuquí and Justina Tzoc are still working for CERJ. 17 Miguel Sucuquí, interview, Guatemala City, 6/5/98. 15 16

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experienced an event which had politicised them. For Sucuquí it had been the earthquake of 1976.18 This transformation had, in part, been due to having come into contact with people who lived outside of his vicinity and had wider knowledge of Guatemala but with whom Sucuquí felt he shared common experiences. The feeling of commonality was a fundamental factor that reinforced the cohesion between members of CERJ, as with other social movements. The recognition that one had suffered and the ability to articulate that suffering through a shared political form and language played a critical part in CERJ’s capacity to mobilise its social base. With respect to this, the development and appropriation of the human rights discourse at all levels by CERJ and the simple process of telling people their rights and recognising their grievances proved to be a crucial strategy. According to interviewees, it was Amílcar Méndez with whom the impetus for the organisation lay, and who directed the activity of CERJ in a personalistic or caudillo-like manner.19 The organisation’s focus upon the ladino Méndez as its mainstay was, however, to have repercussions when he became a congressional deputy in 1995, as discussed below. Although the remaining members of the junta participated fully in the activity and development of the organisation, it was very much in the hands of Méndez that policy decisions rested. Caudillo-like leadership has been an element common to social movements in Guatemala, with members at all levels generally mobilising around a single leader. These figures include both men and women, such as Méndez, Juan León Alvarado (Defensoría Maya), Rosalina Tuyuc (CONAVIGUA), Nineth Montenegro (GAM) and Rosario Pu (CUC). Apart from the junta, the structure of CERJ remained very much undefined until 1994. Rather than electing delegates from each community where CERJ worked, an individual or group of individuals would assume responsibility for each area or each case. The position of General Co-ordinator, occupied by Méndez, was complemented by those of Regional Co-ordinators, a post with responsibility for a specific geographical area.20 At least until 1992, the organisation was largely

Miguel Sucuquí, interview, Guatemala City, 7/5/98. Interviews and informal discussions with Miguel Sucuquí, Justina Tzoc and Gustavo Peralta (March–May 1998). 20 Details of the structure of CERJ prior to 1994 are scarce. It appears that the aforementioned posts, General Co-ordinator and Regional Co-ordinators were the only defined positions, with the financial and policy matters being decided by the junta. 18 19

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reactive, spending most of its time responding to specific events or cases. Consequently, CERJ was not overly concerned with the formalisation of its structure until 1994, when external events dictated otherwise. CERJ claimed that its social base included both indigenous men and women. However, before 199421 when, due to necessity, CERJ had focused its work upon fundamental human rights violations, objectives other than demilitarisation were not pursued. Because the civil patrols were made up of male members of the community, many of those whom CERJ represented were male. In its initial phases, the organisation was consequently somewhat male-focused, although women also joined CERJ as victims of human rights violations and abuses. This contrasts with the work of groups such as CONAVIGUA and GAM, whose work was focused principally upon and with women. As time went on, however, CERJ, as other organisations, began increasingly to move toward a more consolidated and formalised representation of women with the development of a project that specifically focused on indigenous women, as we shall see below. Strategies and objectives Lack of funding and the acute levels of human rights violations were factors that explained the reactive nature of CERJ’s work and its continuing use of the discourse of human rights. Until 1993, the organisation concentrated on lobbying State institutions concerning specific cases and denouncing cases, as well as a strategic carrying out of symbolic politics, through demonstrations, press releases, urgent actions or campos pagados as soon after the event as possible. CERJ augmented this activity with informal popular education in human rights at the community level, attempting to generate a social base educated in human rights that, according to Gustavo Peralta, one of CERJ’s lawyers, could make use of “law as an arm, or critical instrument”.22 However, until 1993 the organisation had no formal programme of training. Between 1988 and 1993, CERJ’s activity was characterised by a lack of pro-active policy. Using a strategy of legal and political pressure, CERJ called for respect for the Guatemalan Constitution in practice,

21 In 1994 CERJ won its first external funds from an international agency designated for a specific project. 22 Interview, Guatemala City, 13/2/98.

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focusing upon demilitarisation and consolidation of the rule of law, rather than socio-economic issues. Based as they were on existing law, these demands did not appear particularly challenging. However, given the socio-political context and the historical reactions of the Guatemalan State to popular mobilisation, insistence that the State should relate to its citizenry in a different manner, defend their human rights, was a radical demand. Furthermore, by remaining relatively unstructured and interpretative in its strategies, and developing its work according to specific cases, the organisation permitted itself a space within which to adapt to different situations. As stated by Gustavo Peralta. We planned our political activities in relation to specific situations. For each action, there was a particular reaction. Initially then, perhaps we didn’t have a uniform or single political strategy, but rather our work was reactive and contextual.23

According to Gustavo Peralta and Belter Hernández Cuellar, no attempts were made to legalise CERJ at this time. This was an intentional strategy that meant that CERJ could only base itself in the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association. As Peralta stated “If we had tried to legalise our organisation at that time, we would have had to give the names of all of our members. They would have killed all of us. Show our faces publicly would have meant certain death”.24 Between 1988 and 1993 CERJ maintained a high profile in the human rights movement, working within instancias, or coalitions, and with individual organizaciones populares that were concerned with human rights issues, such as GAM and CONAVIGUA.25 It employed a joint policy of political and legal pressure upon the Guatemalan government, calling for demilitarisation and cessation of human rights violations. According to Justina Tzoc, work within instancias was critical for individual organisations and for the human rights sector in general because, through presence and force of numbers, it forced the State to take notice of civil actors and gave groups “significantly stronger leverage”.26 Interview, Guatemala City, 13/2/98. Interview, Guatemala City, 9/2/98. 25 During this time CERJ was a member of the following instancias: Unidad de Acción Sindical y Popular (UASP—1989); Sectores Surgidos por la Represión y la Damnificación y la Impunidad (1990); Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CONADEHGUA—1991). In addition The First Conference of the Victims of Violence and Impunity took place in July 1991, with the participation of CERJ, GAM, CONAVIGUA, CONDEG, CCPP, CPR. 26 Interview, Guatemala City, 8/5/98. 23 24

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Work in instancias, whilst running the risk of potential conflicts, usually meant the sharing of information and co-ordination of resources in events such as demonstrations. It usually precluded working together on specific cases and ended once the specific event was terminated. Through a delegate, CERJ would have weekly meetings with instancias such as UASP to co-ordinate national level campaigns. Within the communities, however, CERJ would not work closely with other organisations, given that their mandates and interests, whilst based in human rights work, focused upon different issues. Joint work in communities, when it did happen, was always temporary, contingent upon the specific issues of a case and would cease once the case had been closed. CERJ’s own work meant visiting communities that had shown interest in it and reading the relevant articles of the Constitution, explaining to the community members present that participation in the civil patrol was voluntary and that the rights of patrollers who wanted to leave the PAC were protected by national laws. CERJ also co-ordinated work with different embassies, lobbying and visiting them with the aim of persuading the countries that they represented to pressure the Guatemalan State to comply with national laws and internationally bound obligations. Additionally, many international volunteers worked with CERJ, accompanying members in their everyday work in communities and in the offices in El Quiché and later the capital. Both these issues demonstrate the extent to which CERJ successfully engaged with transnational advocacy networks and the international rights regime. By articulating the needs of its social base through an emerging international discourse of human rights and pursuing political platforms based on international human rights law and existing constitutional guarantees and legal mechanisms, CERJ was able comparatively quickly to gain international recognition and national prominence. Specifically acting on behalf of the victims of the repression and violence in rural Guatemala who were almost wholly indigenous, CERJ consistently petitioned the MP and the PDH, denouncing human rights violations and presenting writs of habeas corpus (exhibiciones personales) for those individuals who had allegedly been kidnapped or “disappeared”. More generally, CERJ used the Constitution and the legal system as recourses with which to lobby and pressure the State with a “morality politics” embodied in the demands of victims of the violence for legal justice (with regard to the resolution of their specific cases and respect for their constitutional rights). This combination of high profile political and legal pressure with a moral politics of embarrassment became the

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mainstay of CERJ’s political programme and proved highly effective in garnering external support. CERJ was able to effect incremental change within the communities in which it worked in relation to the changing behaviour and norms of social actors and, significantly, the exit of many indigenous actors from the PAC. The changes in rural communities during the late 1980s and early 1990s were due to a combination of the work of individual organisations and the overall cumulative pressure of the human rights movement and to the effects of democratisation more generally. However, in interviews some members stated that CERJ had been directly instrumental in the shift in power relations that had taken place within some communities and the perceptible change in attitude that some authorities had undergone.27 CERJ used the official legal system, derecho positivo, for cases involving the indigenous population, rather than promoting culturally specific forms of administration of justice, such as derecho indígena (indigenous law). There were various reasons for this. Firstly, CERJ was not an organisation that sought objectives articulated within a specific or collective cultural rights framework. It was concerned with the universal and individual human rights framed in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Guatemalan Constitution. Such rights were also highly effective at the time as a means of pressuring the Guatemalan State over human rights violations and securing international recognition for such platforms. Secondly, CERJ developed before the consolidation of an indigenous politics. Its priorities concerned the immediate effects of the conflict. The configuration of rights and interpretation of human rights and citizenship rights that CERJ articulated was determined, therefore, by its historical context and by the needs of its constituency. In short, the socio-political climate that shaped the concept of rights that CERJ employed did not include questions of specific or collective cultural rights or multi-cultural or differentiated citizenship. Debates on citizenship were generally confined to issues of participation, representation, and universal civil and political rights—not inclusion on the basis of cultural identity, which would emerge later on in the peace process. 27 Given the remobilisation of the PAC during 2002 under the government of Alfonso Portillo, it is important to analyse to what degree said transformations actually had a profound and enduring impact. See Sáenz de Tejada (2004) for an analysis of this phenomenon.

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chapter four The growth of CERJ and the development of human rights discourse

Critical to the formation of CERJ was the articulation of human rights as a political platform. Experiences varied in relation to when individuals had first heard of the term, although in general it appears to have become currency among members of CERJ at leadership and community level during the 1980s. Members of CERJ’s social base in some villages surrounding Chupol, such as Las Trampas and Pajuliboy, claimed to have encountered the concept of human rights first through organisations that were working in their communities before the violence began, in particular CUC; others (in Sacpulup) through their experiences with the guerrilla. Yet others, in more remote villages such as Panciaq, stated that they first heard people speaking of human rights after the violence, as late as 1985. This contrasts with long-term members of CERJ’s Junta Coordinadora such as Amílcar Méndez, who claimed initially to have heard of derechos humanos during the administration of US President Jimmy Carter (1976–80). In spite of the dangers to members of CERJ,28 the organisation persisted in advocating its human rights platform, although between 1989 and 1990 threats to members of the organisation increased, making continued activity in El Quiché precarious. This included the kidnapping of four CERJ members in April 1989. In January 1992, Amílcar Méndez went into temporary exile to the United States due to continued threats against himself and his family, returning in November 1992. In that same year, Méndez, on behalf of CERJ, was awarded the John F. Kennedy Memorial Prize for Human Rights and the Jimmy Carter Prize for Human Rights, tying CERJ further into the international network of human rights organisations and its discourse. This link, which determined to a degree the language that CERJ articulated, was critical during the early 1990s, but later restricted the organisation once human rights violations decreased and the civil patrols were disbanded. What this suggests is that links between social movements and transnational advocacy networks shift over time and may lose their value if, once conditions change and objectives are at least partially met, the social movement in question 28 Thirty-five members of the organisation have been killed between 1988 and the present day. A significantly larger number have suffered from death threats and violations of their rights, including Miguel Sucuqui Mejía, Amílcar Méndez, Justina Tzoc and Belter Hernández Cuellar.

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does not adapt its discourse and practice to the changing socio-political climate, which may include broadening the network of international organisations with which it interrelates. By 1996, CERJ had struggled for human rights for eight years and it was not able to adapt its historically formed identity and contingent political practices sufficiently. This contributed to its difficulty in appropriating the discourse and practice of indigenous politics. The raising of CERJ’s (inter-) national profile that winning the prizes signified, along with the prominence of the organizaciones populares in the continental-wide campaign, contributed to the process of consolidating the role for human rights organisations within the emerging agenda for peace. However, although CERJ was to a certain degree linked to the emerging indigenous politics of the popular movement, connecting its demands to wider continental and domestic struggles for indigenous rights, this did not considerably transform its policies nor discourse at this stage, both of which remained tied to individual and universal human rights.29 A more immediate result of the North American prizes was that CERJ was able to sustain itself with the prize money that accompanied the awards. Moreover, the international recognition and status stood CERJ in good stead in its subsequent applications for further international funding. External developments and CERJ The early stages of democratisation and the informal nature of the peace process between 1988 and 1993 shaped the identity, objectives and strategies of CERJ. The organisation participated in the Comisión Nacional de Reconciliación (1990), demonstrating the albeit limited formalisation of its role in democratisation. CERJ’s policies were also partially vindicated by the presence of human rights as an issue on the agenda for peace, determined in the Basic Agreement for the Search for Peace (Oslo 1990) and consolidated in the Mexico Agreement (April 1991) and Querétaro Agreement ( July 1991). Whilst the role of the CNR was important in establishing a precedent for the participation of civil society in setting the agenda for peace and

29

In contrast, for example, to CONIC (see chapter five).

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securing the acceptance of a future consultative role for civil actors in the peace negotiations, its effect on CERJ as an organisation was minimal.30 Moreover, CERJ’s effect on the CNR seems similarly to have been less than dramatic. The wider effects of the creation of the CNR on the status and participation of civil society as a whole were significant, but it is difficult to ascertain whether CERJ was able to affect an independent impact within the CNR. At the level of policy, CERJ claimed that it contributed along with the participation of other civil groups to elements that were adopted as part of the agenda to be followed—such as human rights issues, indigenous issues and issues concerning demilitarisation. In addition, CERJ did not undergo structural changes with the creation of the CNR. Most civil participation, organisational change and discernible impact in relation to the CNR took place at the level of instancias. The general demands of civil society, including issues of human rights and indigenous identity and rights were advanced and consolidated as a result of the development of the CNR. By the end of 1993, utilising formal political channels, legal mechanisms and other political means, the impact of CERJ at community and national level was significant, although the civil patrol system and its social, cultural and economic legacies persisted along with high levels of impunity.31 It had influenced informal political participation and recourse to the legal system as a means through which indigenous people could resolve conflict and address human rights violations. Furthermore, it had contributed to the debate concerning demilitarisation and the consolidation of the rule of law. Moreover, with the activity of other organisations, CERJ had contributed to the generation of a culture in which the language and practice of human rights, both at local and national level, and the operationalisation of the legal system and constitutional guarantees became key to social movement struggles and to the democratisation process. CERJ’s role in the peace process at this stage was informal, as formalised mechanisms of inclusion for civil society organisations, with the exception of the CNR, had not yet been created. Whilst CERJ

30 Delegates for the Representación Unitaria de la Oposición Guatemalteca (RUOG) and Comisión de Derechos Humanos de Guatemala (CDHG) returned from exile to participate in the CNR, signifying at least a superficial conferral of legitimacy upon civil politics and opening of political space. 31 Lacking its own legal department, CERJ had used the legal teams of other popular organisations, although by the end of 1993 had not won a legal case.

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had remained relatively autonomous from the State and political society, this was challenged after 1994 and was to have both positive and negative consequences for the organisation. Both independently and as part of the popular movement, CERJ underwent internal changes in order to adapt to the developing peace process. In this context, 1994 was a pivotal year. 1994–1996: Human rights and the formal peace-building agenda In 1994 CERJ received external support for the formation of an Asesoría Jurídica, a legal team that allowed the organisation to prosecute cases.32 This changed CERJ’s work considerably. The development of the Asesoría Jurídica was a logical step—CERJ’s work in the past lobbying state institutions had been concerned with bringing cases of human rights violations to trial, but due to its lack of a legal team, it had not succeeded in so doing.33 With the formation of an Asesoría Jurídica, CERJ was able to increase its support within communities by directly pursuing more formal means of redress in relation to human rights violations.34 The project provided funding for two full time lawyers. It stipulated that the organisation have a formal structure, including a junta de coordinación,35 a coordinación nacional,36 promotores de derechos humanos y asuntos legales37 and a secretary. This meant that CERJ had to formalise its The support came from an international donor agency, IBIS Denmark. CERJ had tried to bring cases to court, but without the technical work of a legal team it had consistently failed: “Without a legal team, work was very hard. We would go to the MP’s office or to the PDH hoping that there had been some advance in the case, but knowing that in reality there wouldn’t have been”. Interview, Peter Barwick, London (12/2/99). CERJ did use the legal teams of other groups but only won its first case in 1994, with the support of the Conferencia de Religiosos de Guatemala (CONFREGUA). 34 See Table One for a list of CERJ’s legal cases between 1994 and 1997. 35 Responsible for taking the major policy decisions of the organisations in response to the necessities of the social base. 36 Made up of the secretary, the Asesoría Política and one of the members of the Asesoría Jurídica. The responsibility of the CN was to respond to urgent situations concerning funding, specific cases and policy decisions. 37 Human rights and legal promoters acted as the pivotal point between the organisation and its social base, maintaining awareness of the needs of the social base and educating it in human rights issues, historical perspectives on Guatemala, the laws and Constitution of the country and personal/communication skills. The work of the promoters was a key stage in the generation of a community’s knowledge of their rights. 32

33

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structure and establish regulated internal positions. The project also demanded periodic reporting to document how the money was spent, explain the work carried out and assess CERJ’s understanding of the effects and overall impact of the project. The developments aimed to increase the accountability and transparency of the organisation. The lawyers, one male and one female, that were taken on were ladinos, increasing the number of non-indigenous key figures within CERJ. Whilst interviews with indigenous members of CERJ suggested that this move had not been ill-judged,38 increasing the proportion of ladinos at national level raised further questions concerning the way in which CERJ was an indigenous organisation.39 Nonetheless, with the Asesoría Jurídica, CERJ continued to represent indigenous Guatemalans before the state. With the development of the peace process, although human rights violations continued, CERJ was able to secure the capacity to follow up the denuncias that it filed with the MP and PDH. According to Miguel Sucuquí: Before we had a legal team, we were only really able to give first aid in this regard. We carried out administrative work focused upon putting an end to the violence and to demand the protection of different people. It was administrative and political, but not legal. However, with the lawyers, we were able to begin following up the specific cases we had been supporting. As a result, our work changed profoundly.40

After 1994 CERJ’s work increased. The lawyers concerned themselves with going to the State entities to pressure them into correctly applying the law and constantly filed denuncias. When appropriate, cases would be followed up and the lawyers would go to trial. However, the success rate of the cases was not high (see Table 1). The majority of these cases, from the information available between 40 per cent and 65 per cent, involved PAC members as the perpetrators of the crimes concerned, although they did not necessarily deal directly with forced recruitment into the military or civil patrols. CERJ pursued a multi-faceted approach as regards the PAC, increasing lobbying activity

38 Including Miguel Sucuquí, Miguel Tum and Justina Tzoc and various members of the grass roots membership. 39 Several members of Mayanist organisations and of other self-defined indigenous organisations had raised doubts over CERJ’s being an indigenous organisation. They had based this in part on the number of ladinos within its leadership. 40 Miguel Sucuqui. Interview, Guatemala City, 7/5/98.

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at community and national level. The cases were directed toward all PAC victims and, as such, did not discriminate on grounds of gender, ethnicity or age. All of the cases, except for the case that involved threats made to Amílcar Méndez, involved indigenous people. Approximately 30 per cent of the cases involved women as the plaintiff. A further consequence of the formation of the Asesoría Jurídica was that it released the other national level personnel of CERJ to carry out different work. This meant that, in accordance with the prerequisites of the funding project, CERJ was able to establish formal posts of Coordinadores Regionales. Established in four regions, the co-ordinators’ work consisted of maintaining the relationship with the community leaders responsible for mobilisation and casework in the communities. This period marked, therefore, the significant development of CERJ’s activity to include a more national mandate and the organisation’s work expanded out of El Quiché and Totonicapán, into three other regions: Sololá, Cobán and Chiquimula. During this time CERJ’s social base expanded, as individuals heard of the successes of the organisation in other communities and the climate of the peace process afforded a more stable political space—although the increase in CERJ’s resources may also have contributed to its capacity to broaden its workload. The organisations’ work pattern was as follows. Once a problem arose in a community the representatives would inform the office of CERJ, either in Santa Cruz del Quiché or in Guatemala City.41 The co-ordinators would travel to the community and assess the problem. If it could be dealt with legally (as could the vast majority of cases), it would be passed on to the Asesoría Jurídica who would begin legal proceedings. This consisted of filing a denuncia and following up the case and, where possible, if perpetrators were apprehended, the lawyers would prepare a criminal or civil case to be heard before the courts.42 These changes in CERJ’s structure and mode of operation were accompanied by external transformations in Guatemala. A crucial development was the creation of the Asamblea de la Sociedad Civil (ASC) through the Framework Accord signed in January 1994. As a member of the Instancia de Unidad y Consenso Maya (IUCM), CERJ

41 CERJ had obtained offices in Santa Cruz del Quiché in early 1989 and in Guatemala City by 1992. 42 Reform of the Penal Procedures Code in 1994 introduced oral trials.

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participated in the La Coordinación de Organizaciones del Pueblo Maya de Guatemala (COPMAGUA), the body that had been established to represent Maya, Garífuna and Xinca organisations in the ASC. CERJ’s specific role in this process, however, was less determinable than the overall participation of civil society organisations. CERJ attended meetings of the various instancias in which it was represented, and its participation was combined with that of other organisations, although three members of CERJ (all male) actively participated in the negotiations over the content of the accords in the ASC: Miguel Sucuquí, Amílcar Méndez and Miguel Tum. All members of CERJ, including its delegates to the instancias during this time, stated unequivocally that they had only been part of a broader political process within civil society. According to them, it was this collective participation, rather than the specific activity of any single organisation, that accounted for the impact of civil society on democratisation (which included the content of the accords and, more generally, the generation of a democratic climate). The Acuerdo Global de Derechos Humanos, signed on 29 March 1994, institutionalised the immediate monitoring and verification of the human rights situation, vindicating and honouring many of the platforms and work of the human rights sector, including CERJ. The government, at least on paper, agreed to guarantee full observance of human rights and improve mechanisms for their protection. Specific to the work of CERJ were guarantees against illegal security groups and paramilitary and clandestine organisations, the guarantee of freedom of association and movement and the ending of compulsory military service. Whilst human rights abuses continued after the accord was signed, indirectly the content of the accord strengthened CERJ’s work. Moreover, by defining the role of the United Nations to verify human rights violations, the Global Accord extended the instruments that CERJ was able to utilise to reinforce its work. Added to the State institutions that CERJ could utilise to pressure for State compliance with its obligations and to seek resolution and justice in cases of human rights violations, it was able to use the UN Verification Mission, MINUGUA.43 Members of CERJ stated how with the arrival of MINUGUA they felt that their platforms had been legitimised and that their work had a further base

43 It must be noted that the peace accords are not superior to Guatemalan national law nor were they legally binding. The approval of the Framework Law for the Peace Accords in 2006 went some way to remedying this.

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for support. They did, however, make clear that the non-interventionist mandate of MINUGUA prevented it from acting in a proactive manner that would have enhanced the work of the popular sector. Furthermore, the Mincho case and other more locally based issues that arose in CERJ communities eroded the popular movement’s initially positive support of MINUGUA.44 The language of human rights spoken by CERJ and the popular movement was, however, institutionalised through the Global Accord and the presence of MINUGUA, representing further factors in the cumulative expansion of the rights culture that accompanied democratisation. Two other accords related directly to the work of CERJ. In the first place, the Acuerdo de la Identidad y los Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas (AIDPI) signed on 31 March 1995. This accord was largely shaped by the proposals of the ASC, and consequently contained a strong component of what had been put forward by the civil sector.45 The content of the accord related directly to wider issues of discrimination against the rights and identity of the indigenous population. Its conceptual framework and content reflected CERJ’s demands to ensure the equality of the indigenous population and the respect of their human rights. Furthermore, given the shift in organisational discourse that took place after 1994, the accord also mirrored CERJ’s calls for the preservation of indigenous culture and authority structures. The negotiations and signing of the AIDPI, along with the ratification of ILO 169 in 1996, were key to the process through which the master frame of human rights and movements’ definitions of human rights would be broadened increasingly after 1995. Such a process problematised the platforms and practices of CERJ, an “early riser” organisation closely tied to the original human rights politics of the late 1980s. A further accord, The Agreement concerning the Strengthening of Civilian Power and the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society, signed 19 September 1996, related directly to CERJ’s specific policy platforms. This was the accord through which the dismantling 44 Interviews with members of the national personnel and with members of the organisation’s social base in the department of El Quiché, January-April 1998. 45 Francisco Calí, an indigenous activist who has participated in the UN Working Group on Indigenous Peoples and now heads the indigenous team at CALDH, suggested that the strength of the AIDPI was not coincidental (interview, Guatemala City, 15/5/98). Rather, the weakness of the accord establishing the relatively ineffectual truth commission (CEH) had meant that elite State actors had needed to make concessions in other areas.

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of the counterinsurgency mechanisms and the demilitarisation of State and society were addressed. Its overall framework was based on the modernisation and strengthening of the State, citizen and State security, the reform of the justice system and the reconstitution of citizen power through the exercise of a broad range of rights and duties, covering political, economic, social, judicial and cultural aspects. It called for the repeal of the civil patrol legislation, the demobilisation and disarming of the PAC within thirty days of the signing of the final peace accord and for an end to forced conscription, although some measures had already been taken with regard to these issues by previous administrations. For CERJ this was a significant vindication of its work, and demonstrated perhaps the most evident link between the formal agenda for peace and the organisation’s platforms. Clearly, however, it was the overall pressure of the human rights movement and international actors that had played a role in this development, and not the work of CERJ alone. The existence of the accords reinforced CERJ’s resolve in relation to its work and provided the organisation with a further instrument. Hence once the peace accords were signed in 1996 CERJ, like many other organisations, took it upon itself to divulge the accords to its social base, many of whom had heard of the accords but knew very little about them. CERJ developed a programme through which the promotores de derechos humanos would disseminate the accords. Perhaps an inevitable result of the wider political allegiances that had been generated as a result of the peace negotiations, and of the content of the accords themselves, was the development of an increasingly more indigenous political discourse in the platforms of CERJ. After employing very few references to el Pueblo Maya and similar discourse prior to 1994, CERJ began to develop its platforms in this direction once it became involved in the formal agenda for peace building and after it had begun to interact with Mayan/indigenous groups other than those in the popular movement. Therefore, whilst continuing to emphasise human rights as a platform, CERJ shifted its focus strategically towards The vindication of the rights of the Maya People at all levels, proposing indigenous unity as a means of defending the identity and historical and cultural integrity of the Maya People, in order to raise the morale of said people, and defend their traditions and customs as a root of the social fabric (CERJ 1996: 13).

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CERJ broadened its programmatic objectives based on the PAC to include these issues, seeking to put an end to racial prejudice and the historical discrimination against the Pueblo Maya, and an end to the direct and indirect genocide that “mean the physical and biological destruction of indigenous peoples” (CERJ 1996: 3). Furthermore, it demanded that after 500 years of exploitation the Pueblo Maya could obtain full participation in the state. CERJ extended its defence of human rights to the defence of the cultural rights of indigenous people, at least on paper. It also called for the investigation into and preservation and promotion of Mayan culture. Finally it committed itself to the struggle for Mayan participation in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the country—so that Mayan’s voices could be heard in the decision-making processes of the state (CERJ 1996: 8). In this way, CERJ broadened its understanding of human rights to include wider socio-political issues and began to press for the protection of cultural rights, at the same time as demanding that the state safeguard the civil and political rights of the indigenous population. However, the understanding and articulation of cultural rights by CERJ was very limited, and did not extend to a critical and serious engagement with the concepts of specific and collective rights or differentiated citizenship. The organisation’s activities between 1994 and 1996 did not vary radically from previous work, although it took on wider issues relating to indigenous identity and claims to entitlement based upon this conceptual framework of rights. After 1994, although CERJ began to talk about a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and pluri-lingual state, its practices suggested that it had not fully adapted the discourse that it was employing. CERJ had expanded the number of ladinos that it employed at a national level, had continued its work using derecho positivo (state law), and lent its support to the candidacy of Amílcar Méndez as deputy for El Quiché. However, it had also become affiliated to various instancias that represented Mayan organisations, was participating increasingly in and carrying out workshops addressing Mayan/indigenous culture and had shifted its political discourse somewhat in the direction of an identity-based politics. Moreover, CERJ’s national co-ordination committee and its grass roots membership were, as ever, almost wholly indigenous. A further external event that profoundly affected CERJ was the election of 1995. Although there had been a second election since Guatemala’s return to civilian government, it was the election of 1995,

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with the participation of the left popular wing party the FDNG, which included a wider spectrum of political parties. Those organisations, such as GAM (Nineth Montenegro), CONAVIGUA, (Rosalina Tuyuc), Defensoría Maya ( Juan León de Alvarado) and CERJ (Amílcar Méndez) with members involved in the national elections played an important role in the electoral campaign of the FDNG. For example, CERJ mobilised its social base in El Quiché, involving them in rallies, workshops, political meetings and activities to promote the candidature of Méndez. According to Justina Tzoc, “this was very costly for the organisation’s social base, including in time and, in some cases, money”.46 Méndez subsequently won the seat in Congress for El Quiché in the election and immediately changed his position from General Coordinator of CERJ to become part of the Asesoría Política, his seat in Congress effectively preventing him from asserting an instrumental role in the work and direction of CERJ. This was an important step as for the first time an indigenous activist, Miguel Sucuqui, became General Co-ordinator of CERJ. Clearly other activists had been involved in the development of CERJ over time, the most significant continuing to be Miguel Sucuquí, Justina Tzoc and Miguel Tum. However, CERJ did not shake its historical dependence upon the charismatic figure of Méndez when he joined congress. The effects of Méndez’s election were not wholly positive and the organisation lost direction in the early months of 1996, as it adjusted to the absence of its principal political activist. Moreover, although CERJ now had some direct access to political society, the political weakness of the FDNG and weak links between (organised) civil society and political parties more generally, and the historical closure of the formal political system to broader progressive agendas, meant that immediate gains for the organisation as a whole or for its social base were not forthcoming. Rather, the trade-off for CERJ was the raising of its profile with Méndez’s election, the representation of the popular movement generally within political society and the slow contribution to the generation of a climate of democratisation brought by the inclusion of the political left within national politics. Other popular movement activists suggested that the gaining of the six seats in congress in 1995 by the FDNG did not affect their work. The presence of a popular party in congress did

46

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Interview, Guatemala City, 7/5/98.

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mean, however, a further resource and support and contributed to the strengthening of procedural democracy in Guatemala.47 For CERJ, Méndez’s election did have some positive consequences. It meant that he was able to introduce specific issues directly into congress that were of concern to CERJ. For example, he was able to confront the government directly in relation to land claims for families that had had their land taken from them in a compulsory purchase order by the El Quiché military base during the conflict. The impact, however, was minimal, and families were not given their land back until several years later. In important respects the situation for Méndez and CERJ changed significantly between 1988 and 1996. Official accusations of guerrilla collaboration had diminished since CERJ’s emergence and since the government and the URNG had begun negotiations. Civil society, including popular indigenous and Mayan organisations, had participated in the formal peace building agenda via the ASC, affecting the agenda in the areas of human rights, the rights and identity of indigenous peoples, demilitarisation, and the role of civil society and the armed forces in a democracy. Importantly, the election of Méndez to Congress represented an achievement for CERJ and for the popular movement as a whole. The formation of the FDNG also represented a key point in the path of democratisation, although the long-term concern would remain whether social movements could thereafter maintain prior levels of mobilisation and benefit from the presence of a left wing party in national politics. The absolute recalcitrance and weakness of the political system has meant the impact of popular organisations within and upon political parties has remained severely limited and negligible to this day. By 1996, the pressure of international actors, the impact of the negotiations and the changes in the attitude of the military (influenced in part by the decreasing threat of the guerrilla) and the activity of organisations such as CERJ had contributed to a general decrease in military activity and levels of militarisation. Moreover, CERJ had influenced the demobilisation of indigenous populations from the civil patrols in specific rural communities, notably in El Quiché. Many communities had already stopped patrolling and, on 24 June 1996, the

47 Organisations consulted included CONIC, CTC, CUSG, CNOC, ACPD, Defensoría Maya.

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then-Minister of Defence General Julio Balconi announced a government plan to dismantle and disarm the civil patrol system, an attempt, in part, to gain political capital by pre-empting the announcement of the Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society, signed in September. The political alternatives for Guatemalans improved as of 1995/6, although human rights violations persisted. This was most evident in the achievement of the FDNG of legal representation in congress and the election of indigenous mayors through Comités Cívicos, consolidating formal indigenous political participation in rural and urban Guatemala, in spite of the continuing difficulty to impact profoundly and meaningfully within the political system. The relationship between the popular movement, and CERJ in particular, and the government and State legal system was extended through the election of Méndez to congress, CERJ’s participation in the ASC and the implementation of more formal legal pressure upon the justice system via the work of the asesoría jurídica. CERJ’s demands continued to be focused upon universal citizenship, however. These contrasted with demands of other organisations such as Defensoría Maya for a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and pluri-lingual state, a proposal that called for a radically different form of nation-state and for a multi-cultural or differentiated citizenship based upon claims to entitlement stemming from specific cultural identities. By 1996 CERJ had evolved into a more formal organisation with an expanding membership and formalised structure. Its work was further recognised internationally through receiving the prize given by the Consultative Assembly for Human Rights of the Republic of France in 1995. CERJ’s discourse had become increasingly oriented towards indigenous rights and identity, although it continued to emphasise political platforms that prioritised respect for the universal rights of a specific population. Out of its core leadership of five,48 four were indigenous (one an indigenous woman) and one was a ladino. In relation to gender, by 1996 women still only accounted for 30 per cent of the total number of plaintiffs in the organisation’s legal cases. With the signing of the peace accords CERJ had managed to maintain its distinct policy platforms and certain autonomy from the state.

48

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Justina Tzoc; Miguel Sucuquí; Miguel Tum; Juan Diego Chumil; Amílcar Méndez.

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The events after the signing of the peace, however, complicated matters significantly, as the fulfilment of CERJ’s demands and the declining level of human rights violations linked to military and paramilitary groups challenged the receptivity of the international funding community toward CERJ’s platforms, platforms that it was not able to adapt adequately to the changing context. Human rights discourse and democratisation in Guatemala The main focus of CERJ when it was established was to respond to demands for the cessation of human rights violations, with particular reference to the PAC and forced recruitment in the military. Here, CERJ articulated a limited definition of human rights, namely the right to life, liberty and freedom of association of (principally) the indigenous population, rights that were guaranteed in the Guatemalan Constitution and the UN Declaration of Human Rights. The configuration of rights that CERJ articulated broadened with democratisation, as the organisation began to include the cultural rights and citizenship rights of the indigenous population in its platforms. CERJ’s achievements must be seen within the wider accomplishments of the popular movement. These were evident in the politico-institutional arena (the reduction of military control over civilian authorities), the juridical domain (strengthening of the rule of law and participation in the legal system), and the realm of civil society (the demilitarisation of rural Guatemala). By 1996, they were also contributing to the generation of a culture of rights, by precipitating changes in the politico-cultural realm with regard to the generation of respect for human rights and civilian political culture. The signing of the peace accords presented CERJ with a policy dilemma as, in theory, the organisation’s main objective was met through the peace accords with the demobilisation of the PAC. The contradictions of pursuing a distinct human rights agenda within a nominally democratised State, where the fundamental root causes of the armed conflict—the land question, extreme poverty and marginalisation—had not been adequately addressed, further contributed to CERJ’s dilemma. In this context, social movements were obliged to rethink their strategies in order to retain relevance for their social base, while ensuring continued international funding and domestic political purchase. This was most manifest through the increasingly indigenous orientation of

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political platforms. CERJ continued to insist on the cessation of human rights violations at the same time as broadening its understanding of this concept to include a certain recognition of economic rights and cultural rights and by paying superficial attention to the concept of a differentiated citizenship in Guatemala. The signing of the peace clearly shifted the relationship between human rights organisations and their national and international public. Within an emerging democracy where human rights violations, although less frequent, still persisted, and the original causes of the internal armed conflict had been only minimally addressed and far from resolved, organisations appeared to have less success in utilising the original master frame of human rights to consolidate economic and political support nationally and internationally. The growing resonance of claims to entitlement articulated through indigenous identity contributed to this process. A key question became how movements could address the interests of and “speak to” their social base, whilst “speaking to” “official” culture as a means of maintaining support and political relevance. CERJ attempted to “reframe” the issues that it sought to represent by extending the human rights language that it had historically employed to include claims to entitlement based upon indigenous identity and rights, a development that was not wholly successful. CERJ’s incapacity to escape from its historical identity and augment existing sources of funding were key here. As the peace negotiations progressed, bringing a stabilisation of the rules of political engagement and legitimate channels through which civil society actors were able to participate in the national peace building agenda, traditional political channels regained the initiative. The participation of popular civil actors here served to legitimise this process. However, the historical weakness of the relationship between political parties and civil society, exacerbated by the armed conflict, limited the viability of this option. CERJ’s historical objectives became less relevant to its social base, as social exclusion and poverty and the historical legacy of the violence superseded military and paramilitary perpetrated human rights violations. For CERJ this implied the need to adapt its strategies and objectives in order to secure funds from international agencies, now comparatively less concerned with projects concerning these types of human rights violations. Such adaptation was also necessary to command a presence within a political arena and socio-political climate determined more by political platforms oriented towards indigenous issues. However, CERJ’s historical mission to combat human rights viola-

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tions and incapacity to adapt effectively, now pursued in a context less receptive to such demands, and the centralisation of policy formulation around Amílcar Méndez, who, despite his sympathies with the indigenous population, was not a great advocate of indigenous rights claims to entitlement, considerably hindered this process of adaptation. The socio-political climate out of which CERJ developed further shaped the particular form of indigenous politics and the concept of rights that it employed. Specifically, CERJ emerged very early on in Guatemala’s cycle of protest, almost half a decade before the Quinientos Años de Resistencia campaign and was led by a ladino. At this time the civilian government was still only into its second year, the peace negotiations were at a very early stage with all parties pursuing a maximalist line and human rights violations remained very much a part of everyday life, in both the urban and rural areas of Guatemala. Importantly, the popular movement was emerging from clandestinity and the effects of the violence of the 1980s. As a result it was weak and not well-organised and lacked political experience and a publicly consolidated and unified front. The return to civilian rule meant that individuals and groups were able to begin to address their most immediate needs with less fear of reprisals. At that time, these were very much tied to the cessation of human rights violations, the protection of fundamental human rights and the attempt to reconstruct communities that had been militarised as a consequence of the armed conflict. From its formation, CERJ presented itself as an indigenous popular organisation, promoting and protecting the human rights of indigenous Guatemalans in particular. It sought to represent this population politically and legally before the Guatemalan State and demanded that the State to some degree recognise and address the specific demands of the indigenous population. This meant that CERJ pursued universalist demands for human rights, directed toward the necessities of a particular population. CERJ prioritised the needs of the majority Maya indigenous population with regard to demilitarisation over and above socio-economic issues. CERJ utilised notions of indigenous identity less through a selfconscious articulation of cultural politics than through an implicit acceptance that those whom it represented were indigenous, precisely because it was this population that had suffered from the systematic violation of their human rights during the conflict. Whilst CERJ was aware of the indigenous constituency on whose behalf it was acting, hence the name Consejo de Comunidades Étnicas, and whilst it emphasised

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the mission statement “the struggle for the vindication of the rights of the indigenous population”,49 initially such rights were not addressed to nor derived from the specific or collective rights of a peoples. After 1994, the discussion of culture or indigenous rights within CERJ was foregrounded in its policies and discourse, and its understanding of human rights broadened, with the diversification of alliances amongst social movements and the structural and perceptual changes that accompanied the peace process in Guatemala. The end of the Cold War and the rise in indigenous politics throughout the continent heightened this process. While CERJ appropriated an indigenous discourse, the organisation’s activities did not markedly change, however. This suggests that the turn towards an indigenous politics by popular organisations and the successful extension of the master frame of human rights were dependent upon movements’ capacities to adapt to the shifting sociopolitical conjuncture and the compatibility of their previous platforms and external relationships with these changes. Table 1 Type of Case: Extra-Judicial Execution Disappearance Kidnapping Death Threat Attack Rape Detention Eviction Corruption Total:

49 50

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CERJ: Legal Cases (1994–1997)50 1994

1995

1996

1997

2

5 (2)

5

5

1 1

1 2 1 2

1 5

1 14

2 10 3 1 1 20

3 3 1 2 1 1 18

CERJ mission publication, Guatemala City (1988: 1). A number in brackets signifies a resolved case that concluded in a prosecution.

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CHAPTER FIVE

LA COORDINADORA NACIONAL INDÍGENA Y CAMPESINA AND THE INDIGENOUS STRUGGLE FOR LAND This chapter presents the second case study by analysing the historical development of La Coordinadora Nacional Indígena y Campesina (CONIC), an indigenous campesino organisation that formed with the intention of working on the issues of land and cultural identity. Central to this chapter is an examination of the factors that shaped the evolution of CONIC’s politics, detailing how the organisation’s objectives, political strategies, identity, structure and wider relationships evolved since its formation in 1992. The analysis reflects the framework adopted in other chapters, describing the effects upon the organisation of the wider socio-political context and documenting the configuration of rights that the organisation articulated. Of particular importance to this case study is the treatment of the class/ethnicity dichotomy. CONIC emerged later on in the cycle of protest, five years after CERJ, in July 1992. The organisation had four main objectives, these being the return of campesinos’ land;1 the promotion of labour rights; the defence of human rights; and the recovery of Mayan culture. The promotion of human rights was a primary element within CONIC’s work from its formation. This was evident in the group’s condemnation of human rights violations, with particular reference to abuses carried out by the civil patrols. CONIC is not and has not, however, been definable as a human rights organisation and was not one of the early riser movements in Guatemala. Its policies were not directed exclusively toward the indigenous population, although CONIC defined itself as representative of indigenous people and, over time, issued statements oriented toward los derechos indígenas. From its formation CONIC adopted a multidimensional framework of rights, including

1 This being principally land that had been taken from campesino communities (to which families had title) by the government during the liberal period after 1871; land taken from campesinos from the start of the twentieth century by finca owners ( finqueros) and the military; and land that had been appropriated from campesino communities during the period of the internal armed conflict, predominantly by the military and by finqueros.

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basic human rights, collective and specific indigenous rights, legal and historic rights. Significantly, CONIC stated that economic rights were key to its understanding of peasants’ human rights, a proposition that built upon articles thirty-nine and forty-one of the Guatemalan Constitution (1985) that guaranteed private property as a human right and recognised the protection of the right to property. According to one member of CONIC: For us as peasant farmers, socio-economic rights are integral to our human rights, as consecrated in the Guatemalan Political Constitution. If we cannot eat or work the land, then how can we live? So if our socioeconomic rights are not protected, are violated, then we believe that as indigenous and ladino peasants our human rights are not in tact, are not fully exercised or respected.2

The main point of differentiation between CONIC and other indigenous organisations was that it defined itself as an indigenous and campesino organisation. This meant that historically CONIC represented the campesino sector, which includes both indigenous and ladinos involved in agriculture as smallholders, landless peasants or as labourers in the plantation farms in the north and north-western highlands or on the south coast. However, the indigenous population has, historically, been the most profoundly affected by land expropriations and landlessness. Furthermore, due to the group’s primary focus upon “the struggle to recuperate la Madre Tierra (mother earth)”, a predicament that has not been confined to any one ethnic group but rather has concerned all campesinos, the leadership and membership of CONIC included ladinos and indígenas, since its formation. In 1998, for example, Miguel Chitic Perez, a member of staff in the national office of CONIC, claimed that 70% of the local members of CONIC were indigenous and 30% ladino, whilst at the level of national leadership, the figures were 90% and 10% respectively.3 CONIC’s policies have been focused upon work-related issues (land, salaries and labour rights) around which both ethnic groups mobilised. CONIC developed its own form of indigenous politics, while attempting to represent politically and legally the ladino population, defining the organisation’s ladino members as “poor ladinos”. It appears that the qualifier poor acted to distinguish CONIC members from other ladinos elsewhere. Moreover, members of CONIC, when interviewed about the 2 3

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Interview, Rigoberto Monteros, Guatemala City, 29/10/98. Interview, Guatemala City, 6/10/98.

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ladino membership, consistently emphasised that many non-indigenous members had indigenous origins—for example that ladinos from fincas on the south coast were descendants of Maya-K’iche’ families. Finally, whilst CONIC emphasised the consequences of landlessness for the indigenous population within an indigenous rights framework, the effects upon the ladino population were confined to being expressed within socio-economic terms, whilst the effects upon indigenous peasants were seen as relating to racial discrimination and effects upon their cultural rights, as we shall see below.4 Land claims Guatemala’s system of land tenure is the most unequal in Latin America, and has historically been a major cause of social tension, poverty, exclusion and division.5 Analysts have claimed that the structural and political problematic underlying the land issue was a root cause of the country’s internal armed conflict. This situation persists despite the state’s obligation through the Political Constitution of 1985 to strengthen co-operative ownership through technical and financial aid and encouraging rural support programmes for peasants (article 119). Moreover, the state is also obliged to provide specific protection for communal or co-operative forms of land tenancy by giving credit and technical assistance and by ensuring security of possession (article 67). Article 67 of the Constitution also recognises the right of indigenous communities to collective and private systems of land administration. The land problem in Guatemala is, however, highly complex, and constituted by a series of interrelated factors. A principle problem relates to the acutely unequal nature of land distribution. Of Guatemala’s 10.8 million hectares of land, 5.2 million are considered arable. Whilst

4 Almost 50 per cent of latifundios (large farms), are located in the south coast departments of Escuintla and Suchitepéquez, and the Atlantic region of Izabal. Small landholdings are concentrated in central Sacatepéquez and Chimaltenango, and the western highland departments of Sololá, San Marcos, Huehuetenango, El Quiché, Quetzaltenango, and Totonicapán. It is these departments that have the highest percentage indigenous population and the highest incidence of social exclusion. 5 Writing in 1987, Bulmer-Thomas observed that “In Guatemala…the question of land reform remains critical; either it must be implemented or the government must adopt policies (as in Costa Rica) which will prevent a further erosion of the small-scale sector and further increases in social tension” (1987: 283). For Bulmer-Thomas, the question of land reform remained “explosive” in Guatemala, in comparison with other Central American republics (1987: 292).

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only 2.8 million hectares of this land are cultivated, approximately 2.4 million hectares are idle or underused. A considerable proportion of the remaining 5.6 million hectares of land is cultivable, although not highly fertile. According to the Fourth National Agrarian Census of 2003, 1.9% of producers possess farms of more than 44.8 Hectares (1 Hectare is the same as 10,000 square metres). As a result, this means that 56.6% of cultivable land in Guatemala lies in the hands of 1.9% of producers. Furthermore, 45.2% of producers in the country own farms of less than one Hectare, which represents 3.2% of the area of the country. The majority of the population excluded from land ownership are indigenous peasants. Rural communities, the majority of which are inhabited by indigenous peasants, suffered from the expropriation of their lands during three major historical periods: the colonial period, the Liberal revolution and during the internal armed conflict. The Spanish Crown and Church expropriated Land during the colonial period. The expropriation continued from the 1870s when the Liberal reformist programme of President Justo Rufino Barrios assumed office. Land was taken from peasants, as well as from the Church, by non-indigenous landowners, many of whom were foreign settlers who subsequently acquired land titles in their own names, leaving many campesinos in possession of the original colonial or early republican documents. The only attempt in Guatemala’s history to address this situation took place during the reformist government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán (1951–1954), with the approval by Congress in June 1952 of Decree 900, the Agrarian Reform Law. This legislation established the mechanisms for the expropriation of idle land from large holdings and the subsequent distribution to eligible recipients. The expropriations began in January 1953 and the number of peasant families that benefited from this process reached approximately 100,000. However, with the overthrow of Arbenz in June 1954 through a CIA-orchestrated coup, 99% of the lands expropriated were returned to their original owners and the legislation was abolished.6 The spectre of land reform has since haunted economic and political elites in Guatemala, with the issue never ceasing to provoke violent reactions throughout the country, as elite groups seek to defend their economic interests and peasant organisations struggle to achieve minimal levels of survival. 6 See Brett (forthcoming, 2008) for an analysis of the 1954 counter-revolution and its implications for and impact upon human rights in Guatemala.

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A second interrelated factor of the land problematic and the subsequent conflictivity that has been precipitated by this problem is the lack of legal security (certeza juridical) that peasants and small-farmers have over their land. Whilst many peasants have possessed titles to their land, there has historically been a grave manipulation of the documentation relating to land, and many land holdings are the subject of two or three different land titles, thus causing serious disputes. Such conflicts in many cases occur because local authorities have handed over titles to the same land holding to finqueros due to intimidation or harassment, or in many cases corruption. In this context, not only are the actual titles in dispute, but also the actual quantity of land to which the titles refer: in many cases the actual lands referred to in a land title differ. Perhaps a third important issue has been the under-registration of land; in the department of Totonicapán, for example, only approximately 18% of land is legally registered, whilst land privately owned far exceeds this figure. In this regard, whilst land is registered in different property registries, many times it may be registered to different owners, or simply, in some cases, not registered at all. Acute confusion, therefore, exists over to whom land holdings belong. Almost without exception, small land farmers and peasants are the victims of such disputes, although it must be said that many such conflicts actually occur between peasant farmers. The land problem varies according to area. In northern Guatemala, in the departments of Baja and Alta Verapaz, San Marcos in the west, and on the southern coast, land has been concentrated in coffee, cardamom, fruit, livestock (cattle and horses), cotton and sugar production. Large farms have both permanent workers, mozos colonos, who live on the finca in extreme poverty, in many cases without basic services, infrastructure and resources such as electricity, water, medical centres and schools, and seasonal labourers who stay for the duration of the harvest. Mozos colonos are given a small plot of land by the finquero to supplement the extremely low salaries that they are paid.7 In many cases, labourers are owed wages going back up to forty years, including the benefits that they are owed, holiday pay and accumulated services. However, almost without exception, workers do not have labour contracts, making such claims difficult. Moreover, workers do not on the whole receive health and social security protection, although finqueros are legally 7 Whilst in 2007 the government-set minimum salary in the campo was Q42.60, around $5.60 a day, this was rarely adhered to.

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obliged to provide this as well as education and health services. Lack of educational provision means that the majority of labourers on fincas are illiterate and speak only their indigenous language. Concerningly, the lack of labour rights extends to workers’ being “sold” as part of the finca when it is purchased and to the common occurrence that workers do not receive severance pay if they are sacked. When workers are dismissed they are effectively evicted from their land, to which they have no legal recourse. Lacking labour contracts, the majority of seasonal labourers come from the highland departments of Guatemala in order to supplement their income. Lack of land and employment opportunities and the fact that markets for their own produce are either non-existent or pay only minimal prices make this obligatory for many peasants, particularly indigenous peasants. A further problem on the fincas has been the use of chemical pesticides and fertilizers that has resulted in illnesses and in some cases the deaths of campesinos. The extension and isolation of the fincas and the traditional power of the finqueros (including their ties to the army and the past custom of keeping their own private militia), corruption and the outright power of the finqueros has meant that assistance from local authorities has been rare and difficult to orchestrate. Moreover, this has meant that organising politically on fincas has been a dangerous enterprise. The problem in the Guatemalan highlands relates more to the lack and subsequent overuse of poor quality land, to which land-owning campesinos have historically been confined. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that fincas in these areas have continually grown, absorbing more of the land of communities and individuals. Moreover, recent population growth has further aggravated the problem of lack of land, resulting in migration to urban areas of the country and increasing immiseration.8 New land problems The internal armed conflict (1960–1996) generated new, highly complex problems in relation to the land situation. These problems resulted from the massive internal displacement and the refugee problem of

8 Population growth in Guatemala for the period 2000–2005 reached 2.6% (UNDP 2005). This contrasts with an average of per annum population growth of 1.7% in the Latin American and Caribbean region.

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the late 1970s and early 1980s, caused by the repression, massacres and the scorched earth policy of the counter-insurgency. The temporary abandonment of lands by campesinos, most of whom were indigenous, caused a shift in the social constitution of land ownership on a dramatic scale. According to CONIC problems varied. In some cases the army invited civil patrollers and military commissioners to occupy abandoned lands. When the displaced tried to return to their lands in the 1990s, they found them occupied by PAC and military commissioners who refused to hand them back. In other cases both the military and finqueros took advantage of the repression and scorched earth policies to usurp lands from peasants who had fled the violence. In some cases, massacres were actually carried out to rid land holdings of a population and clear the way for national development projects. In other cases, landless families, sent by the army to areas where land had been abandoned precisely to cause rifts within communities, occupied lands temporarily abandoned by the refugees and the displaced. In some cases, by 2007, they had lived on these lands for over twenty years and felt that they should now be the legal owners. Whilst, in some cases land take-overs may have resulted from historical conflicts between families or from actions motivated more by personal interest than militarisation, army and PAC involvement was significant in many cases. 1992: El Comité de Unidad Campesina and the historical antecedents to CONIC The main factors that led to the creation of CONIC were connected to the split that took place in June/July 1992 in the Comité de Unidad Campesina (CUC). The development of the platforms, objectives, discourse and strategies of CONIC was influenced by and intrinsically related to that of CUC. Moreover, many of the actors of CONIC had previously been members of CUC; over half of the 22 founder members of CONIC had been involved in the CUC.9 The exact nature of the problems that led to the division in CUC and the subsequent formation of CONIC is complex and sensitive, coming as it did from a crisis that affected the popular movement and 9 For a detailed summary of the history of the CUC and an analysis of its importance for the popular movement, see the REMHI report (ODHA 1998).

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the URNG between 1992 and 1993. At this time, various leaders left the Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres, one of the four armed factions of the URNG, including Rigoberta Menchú and Juan León Alvarado, and they shifted their attention towards popular activism. According to Bastos, several of these leaders subsequently formed the Asamblea Permanente Maya (APM).10 A variety of other contributing factors that brought together organisational, personal and historical considerations further accounted for the process. According to Pedro Esquina of CONIC,11 in 1992 members of the EGP attempted to restrict the autonomy of CUC and take over the organisation. The split within CUC that led to the formation of CONIC took place due to differences of opinions of national leaders concerning this matter. It is widely accepted that, at least in the early years, CUC had a relationship with the EGP. Esquina and other members of CONIC were very specific about a division between leaders within the CUC that took place over a particular issue, namely, whether leaders supported the EGP’s line relating to the possibility of CUC’s directly negotiating with the government in relation to land and labour rights. Esquina claims that it was this shift in EGP policy that prompted the shift in attitude of several national leaders toward the guerrilla’s role in the organisation. What is evident is that by 1992, some members of CUC were openly opposing the EGP. The formation of CONIC, which eventually took place in July 1992, occurred approximately six months after the split with CUC. At this time, the Quinientos Años de Resistencia campaign was permeating Guatemala, eight months after the Encuentro that had been held in Quetzaltenango in October 1991. Accompanying this development were the beginnings of the broadening of the master frame of human rights and the process of a shift in orientation towards indigenous peoples’ rights within the popular movement, leading, over time, to the elevation of indigenous rights to an equal footing with human rights as political instruments of the popular movement. This process took place within the context of the increasing weakness of the union

Personal communication, October 2005. Treasurer of CUC, 1997–9. Interview, Guatemala City, 3/12/98. All the other interviewees from CONIC across the organisational spectrum supported the assertions made in this statement. All interviewees indicated that the formation of CONIC had taken place because of a division within CUC relating to a problem with the guerrilla. 10 11

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movement. The concept of human rights had begun to dominate the discourse and practice of the popular movement, over and above socio-economic issues and rights, and would gradually be compounded by claims to entitlement based upon ethnicity and indigenous identity. These issues, in turn, became integral features of the peace process. This affected activists within CUC who had long-standing grievances with the representation of the indigenous population within CUC and, importantly, within the EGP. It is also possible, however, that activists perceived that, given the changing climate and the internal difficulties within CUC, it was necessary to change the direction of the politics of the campesino movement. Whilst CUC had discussed indigenous themes, it did so from a nonindigenous perspective, tying the question of culture and ethnicity to the Marxist struggle. This was perhaps due as much to the paradigm of struggle dominant at the time, as to the policy choices of those actors involved in CUC. However, according to members of CONIC who split from CUC, the indigenous perspective of social struggle that they later adopted was not compatible with a Marxist conceptualisation of identity.12 It was perhaps only with the development of the concept of indigenous rights as a political instrument that actors in CUC were able to articulate this opposition. Consequently, those actors that were instrumental in the split presented indigenous issues as a further rationale for this occurrence, as the question of indigenous participation and culture became an important platform within CONIC. A further possible reason for the division in CUC was the organisation’s comparative weakness, both in relation to its own past experience and to other popular organisations at the time. CUC had not been comparatively less politically effective since its re-emergence after 1985. It was working with land and labour issues, but the new context appeared to demand a different approach. Moreover, CUC was tarnished by its old image and the accusations of links with the guerrilla. CONIC was an organisation with a far more indigenous image that stressed its autonomy and sought to address the root causes of the land problem, rather than dealing with the symptoms of landlessness—factors that were meant intentionally to contrast with CUC.

12 I am grateful to Pedro Esquina for this information. Interview, Guatemala City, 3/12/98.

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Whilst CUC had worked mainly in the altiplano areas of El Quiché, Huehuetenango and the Verapaces and on the south coast, areas in which the EGP had been active, the main leaders who initiated the break away from CUC and were integral in the formation of CONIC were from Santiago Atitlán, Sololá. This suggests that the split had very localised roots. Pedro Esquina and Juan Tiney had both been brought up and shared their political experiences in Santiago. Both Esquina and Tiney were Tzutujil Maya who, in addition to Tzutujil, spoke Kaqchikel, the more dominant language of the area, and Spanish. Importantly, both were well-respected local and national leaders and, as activists, had been instrumental in the successful movement to evict the military after the massacre of indigenous activists in Santiago Atitlán in December 1990.13 Although in the altiplano, the area around Lake Atitlán in the department of Sololá was traditionally the area in which the Organización Revolucionaria del Pueblo en Armas (ORPA) had been active. Esquina and Tiney shared experiences of political organisation that contrasted to those of activists in CUC who were from areas such as El Quiché. This is not to suggest that the division necessarily had roots within a conflict of interests between the EGP and the ORPA, but that different political experiences and perspectives played a role in the division of CUC. In short, Esquina and Tiney were both linked to the historical activism that had taken place around the lake and that was very much shaped by indigenous politics.14 Moreover, landlessness was an important issue in the area, due to the presence of fincas both around the lake and in the area of the Boca Costa, immediately to the south of Santiago Atitlán. CONIC began immediately to work on land issues in Sololá, focusing on the municipalities of San Jorge La Laguna and San Juan La Laguna. 1992–1995: The emergence and consolidation of CONIC In the months after Esquina and Tiney split from CUC, individuals and organised communities, some of which had prior relations with CUC, approached them on several occasions. This occurred because the two leaders had been very popular within the organisation and had been 13 14

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See Carlsen (1997) for a detailed account of the history of Santiago Atitlán. See chapter six.

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effective as organisers, and had built up a loyal social base, although, according to all interviewees, they had not expressly intended to form another organisation. Those campesinos that were members of CUC complained to Esquina and Tiney that the organisation was not addressing their long-term problems concerning land and, importantly, that no other organisation existed that could resolve their land disputes. As increasing numbers of campesinos sought out Esquina and Tiney, it became apparent to them that the formation of an organisation that represented campesinos in relation to the problem of landlessness was becoming urgent.15 Three particular communities, Santa Inés, Nueva Cajolá and Atzlan, all in the department of Retalhuleu, had acute land problems over which they had been negotiating with the State body the Instituto Nacional de Transformación Agraria (INTA) for some time. It was the needs of these and other communities that prompted a national meeting between the ex-leaders of CUC and representatives of the communities that had approached Esquina and Tiney. On 16 July 1992, six months after the split from CUC, a meeting took place in Santa Inés, Retalhuleu. Interviewees who were present claim that it was called to discuss the problem of landlessness, rather than with the aim of creating a national campesino organisation. However, the demands articulated at the meeting and the will of those involved determined that the formation of a national campesino organisation was the only viable option. The result was the creation of CONIC. The orientation of CONIC’s policies toward ladino and indigenous campesinos was reflected in the organisation’s founding membership. Of the twenty-two founders, over half were indigenous campesinos from communities in rural Guatemala.16 Of the ladino founders, two were lawyers from poor ladino families residing in Guatemala City (Antonio and Claudia Argueta), the remainder being campesinos. Although the membership of CONIC widened after 1992, the majority

15 I am grateful to Pedro Esquina and Rigoberto Monteros of CONIC for the information in this section. Interviews, Guatemala City, 3/12/98 and 29/10/98 respectively. 16 The founders of CONIC were follows: Nicolas Saquif Sosof, Jose Calí, Pedro Yaxon, Alberto Orozco, Pedro Esquina, Miguel Perez, Juan Tiney (from Sololá); Cruz Vail, Eulalio Vail, Damian Vail, Maximiliano Perez, Pedro Lopez, Pascual Lucas (Quetzaltenango); Rafael Chanchavac Cux, Rigoberto Monteros, Daniel Huinil, Santiago Vail (Retalhuleu); Nicolas Ventura, Isabel Solis, Juana Vasquez (El Quiché); Claudia Argueta, Antonio Argueta (Guatemala). Those names in italics were previously members of CUC.

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of the founder members remained in the organisation, frequently participating at leadership level. For example, Rigoberto Monteros and Rafael Chanchavac Cux, both ladinos from fincas on the south coast and ex-members of CUC, became key activists and contributors to the organisation’s development. Both grew up on fincas and became involved in union organising at an early age, joining CUC in the late 1980s. In contrast, two of the female founder members, Isabel Solis and Juana Vasquez, the first of whom had previously been involved in CUC, experienced the repression in the highlands and had common experiences of suffering that continued to link them to their ethnic group as Maya-K’iche’. All members of CONIC, except Hugo Rodriguez and Otto Mendoza, the two ladino agronomists and the organisation’s lawyers, Antonio Argueta, Claudia Argueta and José Luis Muños, were campesinos. Each had suffered the experience of landlessness or intense shortage of land or rural poverty and marginalisation. Importantly, the indigenous campesinos in CONIC had suffered an additional ethnic discrimination that ladinos had not experienced. Additionally, many indigenous campesinos from the highlands were direct victims of the counter-insurgency of the 1980s and the continuing repression of the 1990s. CONIC was established to represent campesinos politically and legally in relation to land and labour issues. It was, therefore, necessary to maintain a non-ethnically exclusive policy, as campesinos included both indigenous and ladino actors; hence, the organisation called itself campesino. However, the organisation emphasised its indigenous base. Activists in CONIC were aware that utilising the term indígena in the organisation’s name, and in its internal statute drafted in 1993,17 would situate it within a widely recognised rights discourse, permitting members of CONIC to claim rights relating to them as indigenous people. By articulating its policies within the framework of indigenous rights, CONIC was able to utilise a legal instrument—specifically the rights of indigenous peoples referred to in the 1985 Constitution (articles 57 and 58)—and to operationalise a discourse increasingly resonant for the international community. Given the general socio-political climate in 1992, both nationally and internationally, the struggle for the rights of poor campesinos, regardless of their ethnic origin, may have gar-

17

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Estatuto Interno, Guatemala City (1997).

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nered less acknowledgement and support internationally than policies that included a specific ethnic orientation. Moreover, by using the term indigenous, CONIC attempted to appeal to the population most affected by landlessness. The organisation also operationalised the discourse of human rights, emphasising both the ongoing human rights violations suffered by the campesino population and the importance of socio-economic rights to the exercise of their human rights. In this way, CONIC sought to contribute to the general process of strengthening the rule of law and the legal guarantees of the civil population, an enterprise that characterised the activity of the popular movement as a whole, by focusing on the State’s legal instruments as a means through which campesinos could claim their rights. The initial structure of CONIC At the meeting that took place on 16 July, activists, representing the Maya-K’iché’, Kaqchikel, Mam, Tzutujil and Spanish linguistic groups, and later the Q’eqchi’, Achi and Poqomchi’ groups, elected a junta directiva, named la comisión de seguimiento to oversee the development of the organisation and decided on the name CONIC. This junta remained in de facto control until the first national assembly of CONIC took place, exactly a year later, when the structure of the organisation was formalised. The junta included Esquina, Tiney and Antonio Argueta, who later became the co-ordinator of CONIC’s legal commission, having worked previously with CUC in a similar role. The organisation’s informal structure was directed by the junta from offices in Guatemala City, with the twenty-two founders acting as CONIC’s representatives, both locally and nationally. CONIC began without independent finance, members working voluntarily except for minimal support for the first year provided by The Guatemalan Confederation of the Religious (CONFREGUA). The organisation elected to remain autonomous from State, political, guerrilla and other popular groups. A community was assisted only if it was not already organised through an alternative national organisation. Once this was ascertained, the community would be given a six-month trial period to ensure will on the part of its members and to make certain that no other national links existed, regulations that were formalised in the organisation’s statute. CONIC did not want to appear

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as if it were appropriating CUC communities—a process that would have encroached upon the organisation’s principle of autonomy. Reactions to the creation of CONIC from the Serrano government, political parties, the military and CACIF were equally negative and such attitudes continued throughout the peace process. These sectors levied charges that CONIC was manipulated by the guerrilla and threatened national stability.18 The assembly of July 1992 decided the organisation’s main objectives: the recuperation of land, the respect for labour rights, the adherence to accepted standards of human rights for the campesino population and the recovery of Mayan culture—the recuperation of land being a primary means to achieve this objective. Consistent with the rationale for its formation, CONIC focused its first struggles on the recuperation of land for the communities of Atzlán, Nueva Cajolá, Santa Inés and San Jorge la Laguna, Sololá. Shortly afterwards the organisation carried out its first public activity, organising a high-profile march of campesinos from Quetzaltenango, arriving at the central park in the capital on 21 July to protest about the land problem, focusing the activity specifically upon the community of Cajolá, Quetzaltenango. Residents had been attempting to resolve the problem in Cajolá for several years, initially organising independently and later with CUC, whose support they renounced when CONIC was formed. CONIC’s objective was to assist the community in their struggle to retrieve expropriated land from the Finca Pampas del Horizonte, Retalhuleu, land that had been promised to them by a former owner of the finca who had handed over the land titles to the community half a century before. With the support of CONIC, the community sought to resolve this problem by asserting their legal and historic rights to the land. The demonstration began peacefully but became violent when soldiers attempted to evict the campesinos from the square in front of the National Palace.19 The campesinos, lacking anywhere else to go, were given refuge in the National University of San Carlos, where they resided for three months with a strong contingent of international

18 Interviews, Pedro Esquina and Rafael Chanchavac Cux, Guatemala City, 3/12/98. 19 The incident was filmed by national television and images of military brutality against the campesinos broadcast. Several people, including indigenous women and children, were killed, and many others injured.

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accompaniment. The demonstration signalled a change in the form of campesino politics and placed land issues in the public forum for the first time in many years. CONIC combined mass political protest with legal strategies. The latter at first consisted of comprehensive research carried out by CONIC’s legal team to ensure that the land did belong to the community of Cajolá and that, if the case were to go to court, CONIC would be fully prepared with material proof of land ownership. This activity also signalled the beginning of CONIC’s first distinct political strategy of combining legal pressure and high-level public political pressure with negotiation, either directly with landowners or through INTA. This strategy continued until early 1995 and was successful in retrieving some land—albeit a limited amount. From its inception CONIC implemented strategies that took account of the historical, geographical and political factors involved in each case. The first few years of activity were not determined by a formalised national strategic plan, except for the overall objective of attaining land and labour rights. CONIC’s work tended to be more reactive to particular community developments. A three-fold strategic process linked most cases. The initial phase of the activity involved attempting to secure dialogue with the parties involved, such as INTA or the finca owners. Through its lawyers, CONIC sat down with the finquero or INTA in order to negotiate a tract of land that the campesinos could either occupy permanently or purchase. High-level political pressure followed, usually through demonstrations or marches to attempt to steer the parties to the negotiating table if they were unwilling. Usually after this second stage CONIC renewed political and legal pressure in order to obtain compliance with the settlement achieved or, when negotiations did not result in a settlement, to push for further concessions on the part of INTA or the finquero. According to CONIC, a key element in this strategy was, and has continued to be the inclusion of the community in the resolution of its problems. In this regard, from its formation in 1992, CONIC provided training and education to its members and communities around legal issues and laws, the rights of indigenous and campesino populations, and political training. Whilst CONIC offered support to communities, campesinos involved were obliged to form a local comité pro-tierra or a local junta directiva in their community and to participate at every stage of negotiation with the members of CONIC.

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In the case of Cajolá, between July and December 1992, CONIC carried out a very high profile campaign, including demonstrations and two meetings with the government, and a meeting in the National Palace with then-President Serrano. Through political and legal pressure and dialogue with INTA, CONIC secured forty cabellerías of land in December 1992 for the campesinos from Cajolá, forming the present community of Nueva Cajolá. This was the first success of CONIC and an important achievement for the campesino movement in general. Arguably, the case set a precedent for the campesino movement, demonstrating that land could be won through organised political activity. During the first year of organisation CONIC increased the communities it represented from six to thirty-six, notably in the departments of Alta and Baja Verapaz, areas that were dominated by coffee and cardamom fincas. Moreover, finqueros in this area were among the most conservative; social mobilisation concerning land issues and the change it could bring were slow and dangerous. The penetration of CONIC into northern Guatemala was seen by the organisation as an important step, and the organisation since, and certainly up until 1998, focused much of its activity in Cobán, Alta Verapaz. CONIC celebrated its first anniversary with a six-fold increase in membership and the recuperation of approximately forty-six cabellerías of land. With the growing membership and the receipt of independent funding from Japanese and Australian international agencies, CONIC formalised its structure at the organisation’s First National Assembly in July 1993. The formalisation of CONIC’s structure Approximately six hundred members participated in CONIC’s first national assembly in July 1993. Most significantly, the assembly ratified the organisation’s comprehensive internal statute that formally established the organisation’s structure, objectives and work principles. Structurally, the organisation was constituted in the following manner: the asamblea nacional (AN), the maximum authority, decided and ratified all major decisions in relation to policy, external relations and organisational principles and activity. CONIC insisted upon the capacity and importance of its leaders, attempting to carry out a comprehensive training programme established in 1993 oriented toward all its members, both leadership and social base. Moreover, this attitude shaped the organic structure of the organisation with the intention of facilitating a communicative relationship between base and leadership.

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The AN was formally made up of several elected members of each community of CONIC, with a mandate to meet once a year.20 It elected the different entities of which CONIC was constituted, including the Consejo de Dirección Nacional (CDN), the former comisión de seguimiento. The CDN, meeting every week, consisted of eleven posts: co-ordinator, sub-co-ordinator; secretary; vice-secretary; treasurer; vice-treasurer; and five representatives of the base. The CDN oversaw the running of the national office in the capital and implemented the policies ratified by the AN. The CDN also participated in the monthly meetings of the work commissions. CONIC also had a Comisión Ejecutiva, made up of the co-ordinator, the secretary and the treasurer. This entity acted in emergencies if urgent decisions were required. The AN also elected the Consejo de Dirección Municipal (CDM), a body of approximately one hundred members (one representative from each municipality where CONIC works), meeting every three months to discuss developments in the regions. Similarly, the AN elected the Consejo de Comunidades Nacional, a body that consisted of one or two members from each of CONIC’s communities. This entity met every six months to assess progress in relation to the work carried out in the campo and to evaluate the development of the campesinos’ needs. The AN was also given responsibility for electing the nine comisiones de trabajo of CONIC. Each commission had a co-ordinator and a support team. The organisation began with commissions focusing on the following issues: agriculture; training; finance; external relations; publicity; legal issues; women21 and local promoters. Each commission would report every three months to the CDN and meet independently each month in order to elaborate a plan of work for the following month. This culminated in the creation of an end-of-year plan to assess the previous year and set aims for the following year. The commission of promotores, “the backbone of the organisation”,22 was a critical element of the CONIC. Over time, the commission was formalised to consist of twelve promoters who had received legal and political training in relation to the peace accords, the Guatemalan Constitution, human rights, campesino and indigenous rights and various This was changed at the fifth national assembly to meeting every two years. The formal commission for women was established in 1994, although from 1993 El Equipo de Mujeres had been formed with the purpose of evaluating and campaigning for the rights and necessities of campesino women. By 1994, there were four women working in the national office, out of a staff of approximately thirty. 22 Isabel Solis. Interview, Guatemala City, 18/10/98. 20 21

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international treaties pertaining to human rights, economic rights and indigenous rights, such as the International Pact on Economic and Social Rights and ILO Convention 169. The promoters were the link between the office and the base and were pivotal in training and educating CONIC’s social base, informing them about the socio-political climate and teaching them their rights as guaranteed by the Constitution and other legally binding documents. The promotores also co-ordinated political activities locally. Finally, the AN elected the Consejo Consultivo Nacional (CCN). This was a body of two members from each work region or department that met twice every month with the CDN in order to maintain links between the leadership and the social base. From its emergence, CONIC instituted a variety of mechanisms to facilitate communication between the leadership and the membership. The structure in fact remained virtually unchanged, at least up until the end of the 1990s, allowing for a dynamic relationship between the central office and the social base, consolidated through the monthly meetings between the CDN and various other entities. In such meetings, the leadership continually encouraged its members to be critical, disciplined and constructive, both of themselves and of other members and leaders of CONIC. This was evident in the meetings between members at all levels of the organisation; dissent was freely expressed by members and encouraged by leaders. The organisation’s insistence upon disciplined and constructive behaviour and upon the ability to dissent developed out of the prior experiences of members who were involved with CUC when dissent was at times strongly discouraged.23 A final aspect concerning the issue of accountability is that, up until 1998, CONIC always worked from a single office in Guatemala City. Whilst the lack of regional offices may have adversely affected the organisation, due to the possible isolation it may have generated between the office and the base, no interviewees in the countryside or the city perceived this as a major problem. Many stressed that the local promoters were crucial as they attempted to visit the communities with which they were working at least every two months. Moreover, the leadership also travelled frequently to the regions in order to visit local communities. This was assisted by the occasional rotation of CDN meetings to areas outside of the city.

23

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Interview, Pedro Esquina, Guatemala City, 3/12/98.

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The informal activity and political development of CONIC The period between 1992 and the beginning of 1995 was characterised by the gradual evolution of CONIC as a political force within the popular movement. With long term funding projects underway and the organisation’s structure relatively consolidated by 1993, CONIC began to develop its political strategy to recover land for campesinos. Antonio Argueta, Pedro Esquina and Juan Tiney were mainly responsible for this process. In conjunction with promoting campesinos’ historic and legal rights to land as a means to pressure finca owners or the government into dialogue, CONIC implemented a further strategy. In the large fincas, mainly in the north, where many mozos colonos lived, CONIC began to pressure the owners for the payment of campesinos’ wages and bonuses that, in some cases, had not been paid for up to forty years. This amounted to a very large sum of money. In general the finqueros claimed to be unable to pay. In response CONIC proposed that the finquero hand over land to the campesinos that was of equivalent value to their unpaid salaries. This strategy was combined with political and legal pressure in an attempt to force the parties into dialogue, such as campos pagados, demonstrations and marches, both locally and in the capital. At the same time, CONIC continued to attempt to secure land purchases via the INTA. This strategy was operationalised from 1993 within a framework that emphasised the importance of socio-economic rights as integral to campesinos’ human rights and insisted upon the intrinsic cultural value of land for the indigenous population, reflecting the discourse and rights consecrated through the relevant international normative framework relative to indigenous peoples and economic, social and cultural rights. The strategy also stressed that community development for indigenous peoples must take place on their own cultural and ideological terms. Land was claimed to be an integral attribute of Mayan culture; this was illustrated by appropriating elements of a perceived Mayan identity, such as utilising images of Mayan gods and quoting tracts from the Popul Wuh (the K’ichés’ sacred text) in CONIC publications, carrying out Mayan ceremonies, adhering to the Mayan calendrical system in its ceremonial and political timetable, and emphasising particular cultural attributes as being relevant to present day Mayans.24 By combining 24 Within this, CONIC has generally selected motifs and cultural signifiers that have a direct relationship to agricultural production (sowing and harvesting of crops) and

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fundamental human rights with a framework that emphasised the collective and specific rights of indigenous peoples and, consequently, extended the master frame of human rights, CONIC hybridised the conventional repertoire of political struggle for material needs. This strategy, at least initially, appeared to achieve a comparatively high level of success in terms of returning land to previously landless campesinos. However, the organisation continued to talk about derechos universales e individuales y derechos indígenas throughout this period, escalating its claims for wider (indigenous) rights toward the beginning of 1995. Furthermore, accompanying the organisation’s activities was constant reference to the need for an agrarian reform to be carried out in Guatemala in order to facilitate a more equal distribution of land. The recuperation of land for campesinos affected the strategies and objectives of CONIC in an important way. As communities began to obtain land, so their needs changed. CONIC’s social base began to be divided along the lines of communities with land and those without. As a consequence, the organisation developed a dual approach, its activity in relation to campesinos with land directed toward the rebuilding of the community, through the provision of education, infrastructure and development. This progression was perceived by CONIC as crucial to the organisation’s aim of rescuing Mayan culture, evidenced in its long-term political slogan: si rescatamos la tierra, rescatamos la cultura—“if we rescue our land, we rescue our culture”. The provision of funding from international agencies became vital for the reconstruction of those communities that obtained land. CONIC also maintained pressure upon the government, through campos pagados, demonstrations and the like, in order to push for state support of new communities and the creation of a fairer marketing system. Demands for mechanisms through which campesinos could sell their produce and develop sustainable enterprises were of particular importance to communities that had purchased their land and been left with large debts. In the case of Nueva Cajolá, it had accrued a debt of Q30 million (around $ USD 4,000,000 in 2007), despite the previous agreement made with the finca owner.

products (maize and beans) and the Mother Earth (the Mayan gods of agriculture, the sky, the wind).

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External developments and the beginnings of organisational change With the celebration of its second anniversary in Quetzaltenango in July 1994, CONIC’s membership continued to increase.25 The asamblea maintained its position of not seeking to legalise the organisation through the attainment of personalidad jurídica, as a means of protecting its members. The asamblea general additionally upheld the previous ejes de lucha and political strategies. Developments in wider Guatemalan society affected the environment in which CONIC was operating. In March 1994, the Global Accord was signed, initiating the presence of MINUGUA and raising the profile of an internationalised human rights discourse. Whilst on the one hand the Global Accord increased the profile of human rights organisations and provided them with a further tool with which to lobby the government, the accord also symbolised the beginnings of the formal peace process through which CONIC was unable to secure its political objectives. Arguably, and notwithstanding their importance, the accord set the precedent for the prioritisation of universal and individual (civil and political) human rights issues in the peace process over and above socio-economic issues. The exclusion of socio-economic issues from official definitions of human rights in the peace process was not, however, unexpected, given that most interpretations of human rights do not include this aspect as integral to basic human rights. Moreover, given the historical prominence of the economic elite within Guatemalan politics, movement around these issues, in particular land, was unlikely. The accord also established the ASC as a consultative body to the mesa de negociación. However, according to members of CONIC, the organisation did not participate substantially in the ASC from the very outset. The process by which other popular organisations took part indirectly in the peace negotiations, and through which the national agenda for peace became the focus of attention for the popular movement, in short through participation in the ASC, left CONIC somewhat marginalised, although this was not without some positive consequences.

25 By 1994, CONIC represented sixty-five communities and had extended into the following departments: Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz, Retalhuleu, Escuintla, Sololá, Quetzaltenango, Huehuetenango, El Quiché and Sacatepequez. This meant that the organisation now additionally worked among the Chuj and Mam indigenous groups. Its membership was alleged to be 10,000.

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Whilst indigenous and human rights organisations, via COPMAGUA, were seeking the realisation of their own objectives and simultaneously engaging with the national agenda for peace, CONIC continued to focus its attention upon community level work. CONIC chose not to engage as closely with the formal mechanisms of the peace process as did other organisations. Such a decision was influenced by CONIC’s principal of autonomy. The organisation also anticipated that the parties at the mesa negociadora might not make concessions over land issues. The comparative effectiveness of CONIC in terms of securing land throughout this period was also linked to the fact that the landowning elite was concerned with the outcome of the peace process in general, rather than solely with the return of land at the level of individual cases. CONIC continued its strategy of assisting communities in the recovery of their land, achieving further success in Atzlán and San Cayetano, both in Retalhuleu, in early 1994. Toward the end of 1994, however, CONIC’s strategies to negotiate at a general level concerning land and labour issues with the Ministry of Labour, INTA and the Cámara del Agro, the umbrella organisation of the rural private sector, were failing. As a result, in early 1995 CONIC presented a strategic plan of action internally and to La Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinos (CNOC).26 La Jornada Nacional por la Recuperación de la Madre Tierra, initiated in the first months of 1995, signalled an important stage in CONIC’s political development and the second strategic stage of its struggle. However, whilst demonstrating short-term successes, this strategy exacerbated the tension between CONIC and the popular movement and between CONIC and the actors at the mesa and CACIF, leaving the organisation relatively isolated.

26 La Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinos (CNOC) emerged in 1993, and was in a sense the equivalent of COPMAGUA for campesino organisations. Its impact, however, was in no way comparable to that of COPMAGUA, and, significantly, it did not possess an official mandate within the peace negotiations, as COPMAGUA had.

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1995–1996: Las Jornadas Nacionales por la Recuperación de la Madre Tierra According to all members interviewed at the national leadership level,27 and as evidenced in the reports from the national assemblies held in 1995 and 1996, CONIC did not participate to any great degree in the ASC or COPMAGUA.28 The contents of the Accord Concerning SocioEconomic Issues and the Agrarian Situation do not demonstrate the effective influence of the campesino sector. This was due to CONIC’s preference for continuing to work with its social base for the recovery of land and also to its preconceptions concerning the limited power of these entities, which prevented its extensive participation. Moreover, and perhaps more significantly, the negotiation of issues such as land and labour rights and entitlement were limited in the peace process, meaning that talks were unlikely to bring about broad changes in the status quo. Land and labour rights were discussed solely within a neoliberal framework, which, for example, confined discussions over the creation of mechanisms for the redistribution of land to its purchase rather than to the formulation of agrarian reform policies. These factors, combined with the recalcitrance shown by the Cámara del Agro and INTA in responding to CONIC, led to the decision to raise the scale of protest concerning the land issue at the end of 1994 and strategically to refrain from focusing resources upon the formal mechanisms of participation. Rather than continuing the policy of assisting isolated communities in their pursuit of land, with the support of CNOC and UASP,29 CONIC elaborated a co-ordinated national plan to recuperate land from fincas. A dramatic shift in strategy, termed the first Jornada Nacional por la Recuperación de la Madre Tierra, was implemented at the start of 1995. Whilst support from CNOC and UASP reinforced this action, it was on the initiative of CONIC that the plan’s success rested. CNOC was the equivalent of COPMAGUA for Guatemala’s campesino organisations. Its effect, however, was not comparable and, moreover, unlike COPMAGUA, it had no official powers of consultation concerning the content of the peace accords, a further demonstration

27 Including Pedro Esquina; Rigoberto Monteros, Alberto Orozco; Isabel Solis; Rafael Chanchavac Cux (Interviews held October–December 1998). 28 It did have representation through CNOC within the ASC and COPMAGUA. The representative was the Maya-K’iche’ activist, Justo Mendoza. 29 Of which CONIC had been a member since 1992.

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of the distancing of campesino groups from the institutional level of the negotiations. In the election year of 1995, human rights violations declined and the indigenous movement achieved a substantial gain through the AIDPI signed in March. What CONIC continued to confront, however, was rural poverty and the unequal distribution of land, issues that, despite being framed in cultural rights terms, were unequivocally socio-economic. After a series of press releases in January concerning the continuation of human rights violations and the problems of landlessness and economic instability for the rural population, the first jornada took place between February and May 1995. Aimed at orchestrating the mass recovery of land, this was carried out at national, regional and community levels. The main activities were land invasions, proposals to INTA, demonstrations, roadblocks, and pressure against local authorities regarding return of campesino lands (CONIC 1995: 17). This strategy was, for the most part, the work of Pedro Esquina, Antonio Argueta and Juan Tiney. It consisted of in-depth research carried out in relation to every land occupation, in order to make certain that campesinos had a legal basis for occupying the land. This had been assisted by the formulation of the Departamento Histórico-Jurídico of CONIC, coordinated by José Luis Muñoz. Whilst political pressure in relation to a wide spectrum of issues had occurred many times in the past, the most conspicuous activity which threatened economic and political stability and challenged the peace process was the occupation of fincas throughout Guatemala. The action culminated in the mobilisation of communities of the other member organisations of CNOC in the occupying of fincas. Almost fifty per cent of CONIC’s social base and all of its leaders were involved in the three-month mobilisation. This eventually led to talks between CONIC, the government and finqueros, the latter grouped together through La Coordinadora Nacional Agropecuaria. The government formed two commissions, Problema de la Tierra and Problema Laboral and the negotiations concluded with the signing of various agreements between CONIC and the government concerning the handing over of land to the organisation.30

30 Resulting from the first jornada the members of aldea San Ignacio, San Marcos, occupied lands taken by Finca Unión Tacaná, resulting in a better level of organisation and, eventually, in the handing over of five cabellerías of land. In addition, other communities occupied lands from fincas, including Finca San Roque, Génova,

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The strategy achieved its short-term objectives: the recovery of land and the raising of the debate concerning campesino welfare at national level. The jornadas also illustrated CONIC’s capacity and will to engage in a comparatively successful engagement with the Guatemalan State, supplementing the pursuit of short-term political gain with strategies that sought to institute longer term change and legitimation and demonstrate CONIC’s adaptability. Before the end of the jornada, however, the AIDPI was signed, in a sense vindicating indigenous participation in the ASC and reinforcing a sense of unity within the indigenous movement. The content of the accord, which in most cases satisfied indigenous activists, was, moreover, appropriated by indigenous organisations, many of which began to concentrate upon the implications and dissemination of the accord. This process to a certain extent distracted indigenous organisations from subsequent protagonism around the issues involved in the socio-economic accord. CONIC publicly praised the AIDPI, but continued its community activism and political pressure at national level. Shortly afterwards, the negotiations for the Socio-Economic Accord began. These took up a certain amount of CONIC’s resources. However, CONIC’s pessimism concerning the potential efficacy of its participation, and the suspicion with which it had historically viewed external actors and institutions of both the State and civil society meant that it held back from concentrating its activities within the formal mechanisms of the peace process. Exaggerated perceptions of the gains it had achieved through the jornadas, and the effects that this may have had upon the attitudes of the parties at the mesa, perhaps exacerbated this process. In 1995, a shift in the discourse utilised by CONIC became apparent. The organisation continued to articulate its indigenous and campesino identity through rural symbology. This gave voice to those elements of Mayan cosmology and identity that related to agriculture, without alienating those campesinos that were not indigenous. Additionally, the discourse utilised by the organisation continued to combine universal human rights with collective and specific indigenous rights. This juxtaposition demonstrated that CONIC was still working toward the harmonisation between ethnic and class identities. However, although the term Maya had been utilised since the formation of the organisation,

Quetzaltenango, Finca la Labraña, Santo Domingo, Suchitepequez and various fincas in the Verapaces.

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the organisation was beginning to articulate a more self-conscious Mayan identity: For the Maya People, Mother Earth is the principal root of our culture and cosmovision. . . . The Maya are men and women of maize, produced by the earth, and from the earth must come the survival of the human being. Before cultivating the land, we ask Mother Earth for permission; we bury the placentas of those recently born uniting in this way our own essence with our spiritual and geographical surroundings. So, when indigenous peoples are evicted from a piece of land, as a family, or as a community, they are evicted from their own roots, their spiritual and geographical surroundings . . . CONIC’s struggle for Mother Earth not only seeks to improve the economic conditions for the poor campesino, but also to rescue the culture and spirituality of the Maya Peoples.31

This process was consolidated at the third Asamblea Nacional, celebrated in July 1995. The asamblea began with an elaborate Mayan ceremony and was introduced with words from the sacred Popul Vuh, implying notably Mayanist language.32 CONIC began to use the term Ixim Ulew (the Mayan name for Guatemala) liberally from this time onward, and training courses in Mayan culture were beginning to appear on the agenda of the comisión de formación. This shift in discourse demonstrated a clear relationship between the organisation’s identity and political strategies and the wider sociopolitical context. The appropriation of Mayanist language occurred in response to the discourse and conceptual framework that emerged from the negotiations for AIDPI and for ILO Convention 169 and the permeation more generally into civil society of ethnic discourse. Whilst CONIC reacted to this process, it also elaborated its own indigenous character, anticipating that the strategic use of Mayanist discourse might give the organisation some advantage, if not with Guatemalan State institutions then with international funding bodies. However, this shift did not imply an invention as such: many of CONIC’s leaders and members were indigenous and the language and ceremonies held considerable meaning for them. Consequently, the development of this discourse and evolution in the organisation’s identity were not 31 La Cuestión de la Tierra: Problema Estratégico para La Paz Social y La Democracia en Guatemala, Strategy Paper, published by La Coordinadora Nacional Indígena y Campesina, Guatemala (May 1996: 5). 32 Thanks to the Heart of the Heavens and of the Earth, we have obtained concrete results in our work: Gracias al corazón del cielo y corazón de la tierra, hemos obtenido logros concretos en nuestro trabajo.

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processes that were imposed only strategically from above, but rather demonstrated an important process of interaction between social actors, their strategically emphasised political identities and the political opportunities with which they were presented. During the following months CONIC continued to pressure the government over land, campesino rights and the peace process, carrying out demonstrations and placing press releases and campos pagados in the press. Between September and the end of October 1995, several months after the third assembly, CONIC orchestrated the second jornada, which continued the activities begun in February, increasing land take-overs, marches and resistance in fincas throughout Guatemala. Campesinos occupied Finca El Tablero, in San Marcos, Finca Rubel Hú, in El Estor, Izabal and Finca San Sebastián, Tucurú, Alta Verapaz. At the same time CONIC also increased its work in relation to denouncing human rights violations, pursuing a successful case with the support of the PDH and MINUGUA that culminated in the dissolution of the PAC in Aldea Hacienda Vieja, Quetzaltenango. During both jornadas the security forces attempted evictions from the occupied lands, although no fatalities occurred. The government also condemned the activity of CONIC through the media and press conferences, stating that CONIC was breaking the multi-sectoral peace to which all sectors, including the popular movement, the private sector, political parties, the military and the guerrilla were adhering. It was this constant pressure from the government, leading to accusations against CONIC that began to marginalise the organisation within the popular movement. Many within the popular movement feared a return to the highly repressive policies of the past if an organisation directly aggravated and threatened the interests of the politically and economically powerful sector. As a result human rights and indigenous organisations complied with the norms of political engagement that had developed as a consequence of the peace process and return to civilian democracy.33 Unlike other popular movement organisations, CONIC’s platforms of land distribution and its proactive measures were not confined exclusively to the accepted themes of discussion and negotiation (civil and political rights and some cultural rights) and parameters of civil

33 Members of CONIC confirmed this in interviews. For example Pedro Esquina and Rafael Chanchavac Cux (interviews between October and December 1998).

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protest that included opposition shaped through civil-State relations (the ASC; COPMAGUA; electoral participation) and symbolic protest (demonstrations; campos pagados). The signing of the AIDPI brought with it a certain measure of success for popular organisations and implied that organisations refocus their attention on the content of the accord, particularly as no official bodies existed through which the accords were to be disseminated. The general level of protagonism with regard to the remaining issues to be discussed in the peace process declined as groups began to disseminate the AIDPI. The partial attainment or vindication of at least some of their objectives meant that some organisations, for example CERJ and Defensoría Maya, were less involved in the activity of other groups, especially if these activities threatened the achievements that they themselves had gained. A climate of resignation regarding the potential gains to be achieved with the Socio-Economic Accord arguably reinforced the hegemony of an ethnic rights discourse. Finally, CONIC’s historical distance from other organisations and from the guerrilla meant that in an unstable context, other organisations were not enthusiastic in supporting CONIC, especially given that its policies were not entirely aligned to the other popular movement groups.34 The accusations from the right and criticism from the popular movement combined with the threat of violence by the security forces placed great pressure upon CONIC. However, the organisation terminated the second jornada, as planned, before the beginning of election month. Despite the problems that this entailed, it was perceived by CONIC as a success.35 Its effects on the landowning and political elite were less certain and the organisation had to wait several months before discovering whether the pressure that they had placed upon the government had worked in their favour during the discussions concerning the Socio-Economic Accord.

34 I am grateful to Pedro Esquina and Rigoberto Monteros and Miguel Chitic for this information (interviews 3/12/98, 29/10/98 and 6/10/98 respectively). 35 Due to the jornadas, CONIC had gained 28.5 cabellerías of land between 1995–1996.

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The elections of 1995 With the election to the presidency of Alvaro Arzú, himself from a landowning family with strong ties to CACIF, the peace negotiations began to regain impetus. Whilst individuals from various other organisations had taken part in the elections or had given their material support during the campaign for the FDNG, CONIC had remained outside of the process. CONIC’s autonomy extended to its turning down an offer for Congressional Deputy candidacy from the FDNG for Juan Tiney. Most interviewees were cynical about the political party system, stating that it had not done anything for the indigenous and campesino population and that its only interest was expressed during election campaigns. All interviewees stated that CONIC was more interested in supporting its communities than in getting involved in party politics. During the electoral campaign CONIC continued to lobby INTA and publish further campos pagados in the press, oriented around the recuperation of land. Under the Arzú administration, land evictions by the security forces recommenced, prompting a proliferation of press releases from CONIC in the first months of 1996 that were focused upon stopping the evictions and continuing human rights violations and the recovery of campesinos’ land. Accusations from the new government against CONIC continued, and rumours circulated about the release of arrest warrants for CONIC’s leaders. In this context, the confrontation between the government and security forces and CONIC on lands occupied by campesinos accelerated. This reached a critical level in February 1996 in two CONIC communities, El Tablero and Succuchum, where CONIC activists and members of the security forces were killed and others injured during attempted evictions. These two events, condemned by all social and popular sectors, exacerbated the problematic climate that surrounded the occupations on both sides of the political spectrum. As a result, the government was criticised by the UN and by popular sectors and CONIC by sectors of the right, by the political parties and by the popular movement. Given MINUGUA’s incapacity to prevent the deaths, the UN also suffered a loss of prestige. These fatalities were probably the turning point in CONIC’s radical strategies and, above all, led to abandonment of the jornadas in the following months. On 1 May, International Workers’ Day, CONIC joined UASP for a demonstration in Guatemala City that focused on campesino rights and stepped up CONIC’S demands for agrarian reform. Less than a

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week later, in the same week as the government restricted the right to strike,36 the Socio-Economic Accord was signed. The campesino sector had proposed mechanisms for the restructuring of land tenancy and the redistribution of land to the ASC for discussion on the Socio-Economic Accord, including recommendations concerning land use and private property. These proposals were unequivocally rejected by the ASC and did not reach the mesa. The accord signalled a blow to the objectives of the campesino movement and, specifically, to CONIC. The final accord made no provision for agrarian reform and whilst acknowledging the historic right of indigenous peoples to their land, made no mention of any measures through which this redistribution might be carried out other than through purchase of the land in question. This process contrasts starkly with the formulation of the indigenous accord that, whilst not containing provisions for political autonomy, took account of the majority of the proposals put forward by the ASC. According to Rafael Chanchavac Cux this was the case because The peace accords took into account indigenous issues and addressed the issue of ethnic discrimination because this did not touch or threaten the interests of landowners or the economically powerful elite. Whilst the recognition of the multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and pluri-lingual nationState is important, it does not deal with the land issue. Our proposals concerning land redistribution threatened the interests of the elite, however. For us, our culture comes from nature, comes from the land. But the government only talks and recognises ethnic identity, not the culture of land tenancy of indigenous peoples.37

CONIC had articulated its policies through a framework of indigenous rights, arguing that land was an intrinsic element of Mayan culture. However, the overtly socio-economic nature that these platforms represented meant that the efficacy of protest articulated through a cultural rights framework was limited. This demonstrates that constraints existed upon the impact of the operationalisation of indigenous rights as a means through which to claim entitlement in the Guatemalan democratic transition process. These were determined by the historical relationship between the popular movement and elite State, military and economic actors with regard to accepted repertoires of protest, the

36 On 23 May a law was passed in Congress that restricted public workers’ right to strike. This legislation was not supported by any other political parties in the legislative body. 37 Interview, Guatemala City, 3/12/98.

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parameters shaping civil society engagement within the negotiations, the definitions that parties used for human rights and the demands that were claimed through a framework of indigenous/cultural rights. It is highly likely that the ASC did not accept the proposals for agrarian reform because delegates anticipated the probability of their being rejected by the mesa. Moreover, given the historical social exclusion of the popular sector, civil actors were not keen on prejudicing the unprecedented gains that had already been made. Representation of the campesino sector in the ASC was weak in comparison with indigenous organisations and other sectors. CONIC’s arm’s-length approach was clearly determined by fear of co-option by guerrilla groups, State-level institutions and the organisation’s lack of involvement in the FDNG. CONIC opted for organisational autonomy rather than participation in the institutions of the peace process, judging its relative gains in land ownership and campesino mobilisation as sufficient trade-offs for the institutional constraints of civil inclusion. Moreover, in interviews all CONIC activists repeatedly stated that broader socio-economic gains would have been unlikely to emerge from formal participation, given the degree to which discussion of socio-economic issues was constrained during this stage of the peace process, both within the mesa and in wider society. CONIC praised the potential for further mobilisation provided by the general content of the Socio-Economic Accord, but publicly condemned the lack of provision for a reform of land tenure. This public condemnation was not well received either by the government or the popular movement. In a sense, the accord signalled the failure of CONIC’s strategy of jornadas, but also suggested the limited relevance of the formal State-sponsored, UN-sponsored and URNG-sponsored mechanisms of negotiation for the campesino population. A relevant question here was whether the land occupations had provoked the political and economic elite into employing more hard-line measures against campesinos. A related issue was whether the lack of consensus amongst popular groups over CONIC’s actions had weakened its bargaining position vis-à-vis the government. The organisation celebrated its fourth anniversary several months after the signing of the accord with the fourth meeting of the national assembly. At the meeting CONIC strongly praised the achievements of the jornada but continued to criticise the peace process. It agreed to push for the compliance of the government with the peace accords and maintain the struggle for land, agrarian reform, human rights

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and Mayan culture. Two new entities were also created, la Secretaría de la Mujer and la Asociación Nacional para la Juventud and it was agreed that an education and training centre for Mayans and campesinos be constructed by CONIC. These measures suggested that CONIC was attempting to widen its reach and to modernise its structure and strategic utilisation of identity. CONIC’s proposal to initiate work with Mayan priests was a parallel development in this regard. This was a reminder of the organisation’s journey toward a more self-conscious articulation of Mayan identity, a process that was reflected in its increasingly Mayanist language and that had accelerated in the wake of its failure to influence significantly the Socio-Economic Accord. At this time CONIC shifted toward adherence to the rules of political engagement in the peace process with which other popular movements had complied. The organisation had historically defined la paz and its relationship to the peace process on its own terms. After July 1996, there was a shift in CONIC’s discourse, reaffirming the organisation’s commitment to peace and reframing the terms through which it related to it. This change in discourse emphasised CONIC’s support of the peace process, and demonstrated the organisation’s use of the hegemonic terms and conceptual framing of the peace process. CONIC stated that it was not against the multi-sectoral peace, as had been claimed, but that its organisational policies did fit into this framework. As a result, CONIC publicly claimed to support the parties in the mesa in their pursuit of democratisation. Additionally, despite continual political pressure upon the government leading up to the signing of the final peace accord, CONIC signalled that there would be a significant change in its policies after the signing of the final peace accord. In October 1996, the organisation declared that it would no longer support land invasions, but rather would utilise the formal state-sponsored channels to be operationalised through the peace accords. Whilst this was a reaction to the obvious pressure upon CONIC from the government, security forces and, to a lesser extent, from the popular movement, the organisation also used this gesture of goodwill as a means to pressure the government and the URNG into signing the final peace accord, only two months later. Framing material claims through cultural rights The unstated consensus by which the actions of popular organisations tied to the ideological and strategic approach of the URNG appeared to

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be guided, namely that fundamental human rights and some indigenous rights were acceptable repertoires of protest whilst socio-economic issues were clearly taboo, even when framed in culturalist language, was challenged by CONIC. The organisation’s resulting isolation testifies to this. Whatever strategies CONIC had employed during the peace process, its impact within the formal State-sponsored channels of participation was likely to have been limited. However, in the case of CONIC, it is perhaps important to look at both “big” and “small” organisational objectives. CONIC did manage to attain land for campesinos and, in some cases, carry out successful prosecutions and increase the wages of rural workers. CONIC provided an unprecedented channel of informal local and regional-level political participation for the campesino population, including establishing mechanisms for the provision of land and, once land had been gained, programmes for rural development. The organisation’s impact upon the socio-economic and politico-cultural environment was not dependent upon formal state-sponsored mechanisms of inclusion in the peace process, but utilised pre-existing structures such as INTA and the legal system. In short, CONIC provided a channel through which campesinos could lobby for land from the private sector and the government, compensating for the lack of political, State or popular alternatives that had preceded it and providing moral, legal and financial support in such cases. The interests of the campesino population were advanced, placing their demands on the national agenda for peace and returning a dignity to campesino communities and identity: this was especially evident for indigenous campesinos. While CONIC was unsuccessful in generating a profound influence over the institutionalisation of socio-economic rights and institutional mechanisms related to land reform, through its training and education programmes and general activity the organisation did contribute to the discussion and elevation of the issues of human rights, indigenous rights and, particularly, economic rights, in wider society. In this way, the organisation contributed to the construction of a “culture of rights”. The support that CONIC gave to communities that had obtained land and were looking toward constructing infrastructure and articulating community projects was significant. In this context, CONIC assisted in community development by seeking state and agency funding for particular campesino communities. CONIC utilised a combination of human rights, class and indigenous political discourse in the pursuit of its objectives, employing certain mechanisms to differentiate its ladino and indigenous members, at the same time as distinguishing its ladino membership from wider ladino

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society. CONIC’s ethnically diverse membership meant that, in its early stages, it was obliged to foster a hybrid identity that represented campesinos from both ethnic groups. To a degree this limited the extent to which it was able to establish profound links with the indigenous movement. Although the organisation essentialised the relationship between land and ethnicity and utilised Mayan symbols in its political articulations, it could not do so unreservedly if it were to preserve close ties with its ladino members. Along with the historical pattern of land use and the lack of a specifically demarcated indigenous territory, this factor accounted for the organisation’s reluctance to claim land through a framework that called for the return of collective indigenous lands.38 CONIC utilised a framework of rights through which to claim land that emphasised campesinos’ human rights and their specific and collective cultural rights and historical and legal rights; the latter two being most significant in the organisation’s daily work. Along with the wider cumulative effect of democratisation and social mobilisation, these practices raised the level of the debate concerning the importance of the recognition and guarantee of human rights and indigenous rights to the developing national agenda for peace, as evidenced by the content of the Global Human Rights Accord and the AIDPI. CONIC’s specific mandate concerning the rights and land of the campesino population tied it more closely to the campesino and labour movement, rather than to the human rights and indigenous movement. As a result its closest allegiances lay with UASP and with CNOC, rather than with indigenous instancias such as the IUCM and COPMAGUA. The organisation’s mixed ethnic constitution also limited its participation in the transnational indigenous rights networks in which other organisations participated, an isolation that was exacerbated by the organisation’s insistence upon autonomy. Over time the political discourse through which CONIC framed its materialist demands became less immediately coincident with its material objectives, as ethnicity commanded an increasingly predominant

38 This is not incongruous with the demands of other highland indigenous groups in Latin America that, due to historical patterns of land use, have not, in general, sought the return of collective territory or title to land, focusing instead on community or individual ownership. This contrasts with lowland and Amazonian and Panamanian indigenous groups that have predominantly sought return of collective territories.

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presence in its political articulations. This was particularly relevant to the land issue. CONIC broadened the framework of rights that it employed, expanding its discourse of human rights, integral to which were the socio-economic rights of ladino and indigenous campesinos alike, to include the increasing employment of the language of cultural rights, in short the inclusion of economic, social and cultural rights. As socio-economic rights had been integral to human rights, so, for CONIC, land ownership became an essential aspect of indigenous identity. Land was presented as an intrinsic, essential and historically consistent element of indigenous culture, both materially, (“as a means through which our people can eat”), and symbolically (“we are men and women of maize”).39 As demonstrated, in its work CONIC predominantly demanded the legal and historical rights of campesinos to land using land titles and other strategies, over and above claims framed in the language of human rights, although it consistently utilised the latter discourse to frame the land issue during the peace process. Such a strategy came from a clear understanding of the relationship between distinct repertoires of struggle and the concessions that the Guatemalan State would be likely to make over socio-economic resources. The importance of indigenous rights and identity in CONIC’s political platforms was further underlined by the inclusion of the recovery of Mayan culture as one of the organisation’s four main objectives. CONIC implemented this policy by insisting on the recovery of land as an element critical to Mayan culture, by promoting the general recovery of Mayan culture (such as dress and language) and by giving courses in Mayan culture, particularly after 1996. CONIC’s membership in COPMAGUA and, nominally, in the indigenous movement in general, reinforced this dimension. Until 1996, CONIC maintained an indigenous/ethnic orientation to its policies that also accommodated a more radical stance on the land question and which articulated a less self-conscious Mayan cultural identity. However, the effects and events of the peace process and the wider permeation of indigenous rights discourse into civil society

39 La Cuestión de la Tierra: Problema Estratégico para La Paz Social y La Democracia en Guatemala, Strategy Paper, published by La Coordinadora Nacional Indígena y Campesina, Guatemala (May 1996: 4).

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more generally, profoundly affected CONIC.40 This meant that by 1996 CONIC had begun to adopt a far more self-conscious form of identity politics and, at least until the end of 1997, curbed its more radical stance and activities. Within CONIC an indigenous politics developed from the leadership as a strategy to ensure the acceptability and applicability of material demands. In interviews it became clear that actors at local level felt less need to emphasise their indigenous identity. People were aware, however, that being indigenous was one of the causes of their marginalisation and poverty. The argument articulated by members of CONIC at local and leadership levels was that indigenous people were almost by definition susceptible to material and ethnic exploitation and oppression. Various factors account for the evolution of CONIC’s indigenous rights and identity discourse. In the post-Cold War context, class politics were less resonant globally and, as described in chapter three, indigenous politics became increasingly more salient as a form of political protest. The year of CONIC’s formation, 1992, is significant here. Furthermore, the decreasing purchase of class discourse in Latin America, accelerated by the defeat of leftist insurgencies in the region, was exacerbated in Guatemala by the debilitation of the CUC, the first popular organisation to focus on land issues and the disarticulation of the union movement, a result of the violence that both suffered in the 1970s and 1980s. The potency of State and private sector opposition to the union and campesino sectors, executed brutally through the State security forces,41 and the campesino sector’s historical weakness in shaping the national political agenda influenced the shift toward the framing of material issues through an indigenous rights discourse. Such an approach was not incongruent with the historical and cultural experiences of the indigenous membership of CONIC. These factors established the precedent that platforms based openly upon socio-economic issues might be more threatening and less effective than those focused on the wider socio-political context and which employed a concept of rights that framed entitlement through cultural rights terms. Moreover, with the closure of the negotiation process to interpretations

40 I am grateful to Antonio Argueta and José Luis Muños for this information. Interview, Guatemala City, 12/10/98. 41 Such as the massacre of over 100 campesinos protesting over land issues in Panzós, Alta Verapaz in May 1978.

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of human rights that included economic rights as integral to human rights, CONIC increasingly framed its policies in terms calling for ethnic claims to entitlement over land within a multi-cultural nation-state. The socio-political climate of democratisation fostered and favoured the operationalisation of the discourse of human rights, which was later broadened to include claims to entitlement based upon indigenous rights and identity. These configurations of rights predominated over the negotiation of socio-economic issues and their utilisation as an effective framework for movement politics. Moreover, with official definitions of human rights excluding profound statements concerning economic welfare and entitlement, as evidenced in the Global Human Rights Accord, campesino movements shifted the terrain of struggle increasingly toward the arena of cultural rights. The development of the class/ethnicity dynamic was particularly visible in the periods immediately before and after the negotiation for the Accord Concerning Socio-Economic Issues and the Agrarian Situation and the signing of the final peace accord. This process demonstrates a direct correlation between social processes and events and the oscillation between class and ethnicity focused platforms. The lack of formal institutions relating to the land issue (except INTA) also partially determined CONIC’s strategies, as well as shaping its identity and objectives in the early stages of the peace process. CONIC employed direct actions and negotiations with finqueros and the INTA during this time as a means to obtain land and, in quantitative terms, secured the return of more land than it was able to do after the signing of the final peace accord. Furthermore, it intentionally remained relatively isolated from the forms of political organisation that the popular movement used to pressure the parties at the mesa, such as the ASC and COPMAGUA. However, the predominant interpretation of human rights, the strength of the AIDPI, the favourable socio-political climate, the general permeation of indigenous rights and identity discourse throughout civil society and its acceptance within the peace-building agenda precipitated a shift in CONIC’s identity and strategies. These factors were augmented by CONIC’s failure to effect a change in land distribution and reform through its hybrid political platforms and confrontational strategies. As a result, the organisation became increasingly self-consciously Mayanist after 1995 and, after 1996, began to diversify its allegiances and attempted to reinforce its links with the popular movement, at least temporarily attending meetings

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of COPMAGUA more regularly and working with other popular organisations in specific instances.42 CONIC also began to widen its international allegiances, participating in the Segundo Congreso Latinoamericano de Organizaciones del Campo (CLOC) in November 1997. Finally, the changing socio-political and politico-institutional contexts accompanying democratisation threatened CONIC’s historical autonomy, obliging it to accept established forms of civil inclusion within the negotiation process. CONIC obtained space for participation in the land commission set up through the peace accords through formal representation within CNOC. Moreover, after the final accord, its strategy initially concerning the recovery of land fell in line with the mechanisms established as a result of the peace process. CONIC began to utilise the Land Fund (FONATIERRA), the National Peace Fund (FONAPAZ), established to carry out developmental and infrastructural projects in areas designated as conflict zones and the Presidential Office for Legal Assistance and the Resolution of Land Conflicts (CONTIERRA), established in June 1997 to encourage dialogue between parties engaged in land conflicts, within the guidelines established in the peace accords. At the same time, it continued to follow up cases that had been the priority of INTA,43 and carried out demonstrations. The corresponding decline in the organisation’s effectiveness with regard to land acquisition raised the question of whether, for CONIC, participation in the formal channels of political participation established through the peace process and acceptance of the rules of the game were effective trade-offs for it to make. The case of CONIC raises important questions concerning the possible impact of organisations articulating socio-economic platforms in the Guatemalan peace process. While the socio-political environment, social formations and historical experience clearly constrained CONIC’s impact, the strategies of the organisation itself and the political practices of other social movements were further factors contributing to its limited impact on the State and wider society.

42 For example, working with CUC in relation to problems at Finca La Perla in the Ixil Triangle in May 1997, and co-ordinating with CUC, CONAVIGUA and Defensoría Maya in relation to elaborating wider Mayan cultural demands in January 1998. 43 Although INTA had lost its mandate in relation to the resolution of its previous cases.

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CHAPTER SIX

INDIGENOUS MOBILISATION IN LA DEFENSORÍA MAYA: INDIGENOUS POLITICS AND THE RECOVERY OF MAYAN CULTURE This chapter documents the historical emergence of the indigenous popular organisation La Defensoría Maya. It analyses the changes that have occurred in the policies, discourse, identity and strategy of Defensoría Maya, within the previously elaborated framework that assesses the influences upon the historical development of social movements in Guatemala. The relationship between the socio-political context in which Defensoría Maya emerged, the concept of rights that it articulated and its position vis-à-vis the class/ethnicity dichotomy is examined. It is argued that Defensoría Maya represents the emergence of a new tendency in Guatemala’s indigenous movement, combining the social constituency and historical legacy of the popular movement with the discourse and wider aims of the mayanistas. This tendency combines the discourses of universal individual human rights with collective and specific cultural rights. In addition to its struggle for the individual human rights of indigenous peoples, Defensoría Maya has pursued the collective rights of the Pueblo Maya, advocating the promotion and preservation of all aspects of indigenous culture as integral to the creation of a socially equitable democracy in Guatemala. Defensoría Maya has sought the political participation of indigenous Guatemalans within a multi-cultural, multiethnic and pluri-lingual nation-state with a national judicial system founded on cultural and legal pluralism. The organisation has focused its political platforms and activity on the recovery, recognition and application of the indigenous Mayan system for the administration of justice, derecho indígena, which it has termed Derecho Maya. Its objectives were the revival and officialisation of the Mayan legal system (later to become its principal objective), the revitalisation of indigenous authorities and the provision of mechanisms with which to resolve intra and inter-community conflicts for indigenous Guatemalans.1 1 See the influential work by Sieder (1997; 1998) that documents the relationship between indigenous law, local power and democratic transition in Guatemala.

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The national organisation Defensoría Maya developed out of two regionally based human rights networks active in the departments of Sololá and El Quiché in 1992. In April 1991, indigenous activists, including Tomás Sen, a K’iche’ Maya, and Ricardo Sului, a Kaqchikel, began to organise as a reaction to the kidnapping of a local activist in Sololá. Sen, originally from El Quiché, had been involved with CUC until the repression intensified in 1980 and he had begun to organise again after 1986. As the level of interest and participation increased, activists began to discuss the possibility of establishing a formal organisation. The prior emergence of other popular organisations elsewhere in Guatemala, such as CERJ, CONAVIGUA, CUC and CONDEG, and the experience and contacts that some of the local activists had with these groups set an important precedent and were critical elements in the eventual formation of a regional human rights organisation. Activists were able to learn from the discourse and structures employed in other organisations, make contact with pre-existing networks of organised individuals and connect with an increasingly visible continental indigenous movement. Furthermore, activists in Sololá, many of whom had long histories of personal involvement in local political mobilisation,2 gained access to information concerning the national and regional socio-political context and the politics of the popular movement at regional, national and international levels. As a result, local activism in Sololá was shaped by the discourses of human rights and indigenous rights and framed within the context of the Columbus quincentenary.3 It was within this context that the institutional precursors to Defensoría Maya developed in El Quiché and Sololá. La Red de Sololá, or Usaq’il Tinamit, meaning “Clarity of the People” in Kaqchikel, the predominant indigenous language of the region, was formed by the aforementioned key activists on 12 October, Día de la Raza (Columbus Day) and grew in the following months to include over thirty individuals.

Or had close ties with individuals who had been involved in such movements. I am grateful to Tomás Sen of Defensoría Maya for this information and analysis. Interviews Guatemala City, 11/6/98 and London, 15/6/99. 2 3

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In a public demonstration of over a thousand people in the main park in Sololá, activists demanded their rights as indigenous citizens and as the Pueblo Maya. The establishment of Usaq’il Tinamit on this day was highly symbolic, signifying indigenous protest against the Columbus celebrations and demonstrating the will of indigenous activists in Sololá to articulate an ethnicised politics of resistance. Moreover, the significance of the organisation’s Kaqchikel name, Usaq’il Tinamit, and the consciously expressed indigenous identity of the network indicated the extent to which the group took seriously its claim to have broken with preceding patterns of political organisation. This was characterised by a shift in the discourse of rights demanded by the organisation to include not only individual human rights, but also the collective and specific cultural rights of the Maya people. The formation of Usaq’il Tinamit took place, together with other events at the time, to register indigenous reaction to the Columbus celebrations, such as the Segundo Encuentro in Quetzaltenango, begun on the same day. The predominant form of indigenous politics in Guatemala at that time had resulted from a synthesis of strategic positions concerning the interpretation of ethnic and class factors in a post-Cold War setting. This involved an evolving concept of rights, elements of which originated in the international legal and political normative framework. Indigenous politics was a consequence of strategic, intentional and conditional choices of actors. From the beginning of the Quinientos Años campaign, the discourse and strategy of civil politics began to emphasise factors other than human rights and class struggle, namely cultural and identity politics. Usaq’il Tinamit called for the promotion and protection of the rights of the Mayan people by offering provision for legal representation and maintaining pressure upon local authorities to respect the 1985 Constitution, as did other organisations at the time. Run voluntarily, it aimed to denounce violations of human rights committed by the security forces and abuses committed by the civil patrols, and to assist communities in withdrawing from the PAC. Its intention and discourse, however, was different from other organisations; it insisted upon collective rights and emphasised the use of Mayan indigenous law. According to Tomás Sen, from its initiation Usaq’il Tinamit intended to resolve conflicts and human rights violations through the implementation of Mayan indigenous law, termed at the time in Sololá as el sistema de resolución de conflictos; this signified a notable development.

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The use of indigenous law to resolve local conflicts was initially difficult, due to the lack of receptivity by local authorities, the nature of the violations taking place (above all by the PAC and the military) and the predominance of the human rights discourse amongst popular activists. This meant that the network had to rely upon State law, derecho positivo, by presenting denuncias directly to State authorities (who insisted on recourse to state law to resolve conflicts). According to Sen, local authorities were not receptive to the articulation of cultural platforms by popular organisations, but were more amenable to demands framed in human rights terms.4 Moreover, the perception of the authorities was that the violations of rights that the organisation was attempting to resolve were so extreme as to cast some doubt upon the effective role of indigenous law to mediate in such cases. In this context, human rights discourse had more impact upon local and national authorities, given its prevalence at international and national level as a language of popular struggle, rather than opposition framed in cultural terms. Whilst indigenous law is a dynamic system that responds to the needs of the specific community and to the internal and external context within which the community is located, the transgressions with which Usaq’il Tinamit was dealing had no precedent in indigenous law. Abuses of rights and crimes such as intimidation, kidnapping and assassinations against civil actors by the military were allegedly beyond existing norms. Moreover, given the context of impunity within which the military acted, indigenous activists were unable to oblige military actors or civil patrollers to negotiate voluntarily with them. Usaq’il Tinamit therefore articulated culturalist platforms, whilst effectively carrying out the activities of a human rights network. However, its public focus on collective rights and the utilisation of the “Mayan legal system” as a means to resolve conflict, perhaps somewhat premature in the early years of the Serrano administration, were adapted to the changing socio-political context. The organisation developed and consolidated its policies once the context became more favourable, building a social base of several hundred indigenous activists, includ-

4 This is supported by interviews with other members of Defensoría Maya, for example Vicente Tuyuc (Guatemala City, 9/6/98) and Isabella Lopez (Guatemala City, 1/6/98).

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ing popular activists and ex-guerrillas from the department of Sololá who were victims of human rights violations and who did not belong to any other popular organisation. In this way the concept of rights that Usaq’il Tinamit articulated set a precedent and laid the basis for the policies of Defensoría Maya. Moreover, the network created the structural and intellectual framework for future indigenous organisation by Defensoría Maya in the area. Two months after the formation of Usaq’il Tinamit, the human rights network Rechq’a Tinamit, meaning “Force of the People” in the K’iche’ language, was formed. This voluntary organisation became public in Santa Cruz del Quiché on 10 December 1992, International Human Rights Day. Individuals from the network had been carrying out discussions with their counterparts in Sololá since October 1992, travelling between the two municipalities at least once every two weeks. The networks had personnel in common, enabling them to collaborate by sharing information and planning joint strategies. Moreover, Rechq’a Tinamit had similar aims and objectives to the Sololá organisation, advocating the promotion of human rights and the collective and specific rights of the Maya People. Importantly, whilst the needs of those who became involved in Rechq’a Tinamit were similar to those of the Sololá activists, there was a contrast in the structural conditions, historical memory and experience of indigenous actors in the two areas. The department of El Quiché had been in many ways the centre of the army’s counterinsurgency campaign and the political violence of the counterinsurgency had been more extreme and the effects of the conflict more exaggerated there than in Sololá. This meant that after 1985 when civil society organisations began to re-emerge, second to the capital, El Quiché was the focal point of the popular movement, specifically of the human rights movement. Many activists in the popular movement originated from the department. The popular movement that came out of El Quiché emerged in the late 1980s, when the principal objective of popular activism was the respect for basic rights to survival and the language of resistance was anchored within the (master frame) discourse of human rights. The resolution of ongoing human rights violations was the principle issue for activists in El Quiché. By 1992, in comparison with El Quiché, activists in Sololá had begun to engage with cultural issues to a greater extent, initiating the reconstruction of the region’s indigenous authorities, the alcaldía indígena,

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which had functioned until 1980 and which was reformed after 1992.5 Sololá maintained stronger community cohesion than El Quiché, due in part to having suffered less fierce repression. Moreover, Sololá appeared to have maintained many markers of indigenous cultural identity to a greater extent than El Quiché, manifest in the conspicuous use of traje by indigenous men, at least in the departmental capital. Finally, many members of the mayanista strain of the indigenous movement in Guatemala originate from Sololá, including some of the notable Mayan academics and linguists.6 This precedent of organising and cultural issues contrasts with the history of human rights and political mobilisation in El Quiché. The political practices focused on human rights issues and cultural issues that Usaq’il Tinamit and Rechq’a Tinamit represented were combined the following year, with the formation of Defensoría Maya’, “A human rights instrument for the defence and recognition of Mayan rights”.7 Whilst the different emphases of Usaq’il Tinamit and Rechq’a Tinamit did not overly affect the day to day organisation and activity of the two groups—both networks focused their work upon the cessation and resolution of human rights violations and supporting communities wishing to renounce the PAC—it did impact in other ways. As Defensoría Maya developed, the resolution of conflict in Sololá after 1995 was mostly carried out using Derecho Maya. The regional office developed substantial contact with other organisations and institutions in collaborative projects concerning cultural rights issues (mostly through the Coordinación de Organizaciones Mayas de Sololá (COMS) and the Alcaldía Indígena de Sololá. In contrast, the El Quiché office worked less with Derecho Maya, resolving conflict through official legal channels and maintaining links with other organizaciones populares. However, as international legal and political discourse began to incorporate indigenous issues to a considerable extent and as this normative framework began to take root in Guatemala, the concept of collective and specific cultural rights began to some extent to be taken into account, conferring legitimacy upon ethnic indigenous politics. Consequently, cultural platforms became more acceptable in Guatemala and a more discernible element in Defensoría Maya’s work. Furthermore, accompanying 5 See Autoridad y Gobierno Kaqchikel de Sololá, Ka’i’ajmaq, Guatemala City (March 1998), for a detailed discussion of this process. 6 See Kay Warren (1998; 1998a) for a detailed account. 7 ¿Que es la Defensoría Maya?, Guatemala City (1997: 5).

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the peace process, there was a reduction in human rights violations after 1994, leading to the diversification of the conflicts. As a result, Defensoría Maya began to engage with family conflicts, workers rights and land struggles. Accompanying this development was the growing presence of indigenous/ethnic claims to entitlement. On 19 October 1993, Defensoría Maya was formed out of Usaq’il Tinamit and Rechq’a Tinamit by actors including Juan León Alvarado and María Tzoc, both from El Quiché and co-founders of CUC, after problems arose regarding the funding of the two networks by the instancia Majawil Q’ij. According to Santiago Bastos, the formation of Defensoría Maya represented part of the reorganisation of the popular movement after the crisis between the popular movement and the EGP in 1992. For Bastos, it is important to understand that the appointment of León Alvarado in the National Coordinating Team of the organisation as a significant incident (personal communication, October 2005). Defensoría Maya’s formation in 1993 took place comparatively late in Guatemala’s cycle of protest, and it was one of the last national popular movement organisations to emerge. Consequently, the socio-political context within which the organisation appeared had changed since the late 1980s, when early riser movements such as CERJ were formed. The Cold War had ended four years earlier, signalling a profound rethinking of politics on the left. At an international level the presence of the discourse of indigenous/ethnic politics and of ethnic issues had increased dramatically. In addition, at a regional level, the invisibility of indigenous actors within many Latin American states had been seriously challenged by the Quinientos Años campaign. In Guatemala, socio-political and cultural conditions were characterised by some continuities and some sharp ruptures with the past. A strong military presence and the civil patrol system remained in place throughout rural Guatemala and impunity persisted within a framework of an ineffective and corrupt judicial system. Human rights violations directed toward the popular movement continued in both rural and urban Guatemala and, despite the functioning of the electoral system, political alternatives for the indigenous population remained constrained by corruption and lack of effective access. Furthermore, the peace process was held back by conservative elements within the Guatemalan elite who were unwilling to negotiate with the URNG unless their conditions of disarmament and surrender were first met. However, the Serrano auto-golpe in May 1993, repudiated by a wide spectrum of social sectors, demonstrated the possibility of dialogue

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between actors from different political and ideological positions and, importantly, highlighted the ability of civil society to mobilise effectively. Furthermore, the second meeting of the continental Quinientos Años campaign in Guatemala had affirmed the legitimacy of indigenous politics and ensured its presence was felt on the national peace-building agenda. This meeting also provided the opportunity for the populares and Mayanistas to have their first, albeit divisive, public exchange, but also propelled the popular movement towards a show of unity that began to be articulated around developing policies with an attention to ethnicity and indigenous peoples’ rights. The conferring of the Nobel Peace Prize upon Rigoberta Menchú reinforced these processes. The indigenous movement benefited greatly from this developing context. The most profound effect for Guatemala was perhaps the international and national recognition of the politics of identity which, by 1993, became a critical element in popular politics, marking the extension of the master frame of human rights to include specific and collective indigenous cultural rights. The prior emphasis on labour issues and class identity were further eroded as a result, making way for the possibility of the formation of an organisation such as Defensoría Maya, which was subsequently able to pursue objectives and employ a discourse that followed a more culturalist line. With the changes at this time came a move away from the general policies of the popular movement, toward more specific areas of work, allowing Defensoría Maya to focus upon the “recovery” (recuperación) of the Mayan legal system. According to Leticia Velásquez of Defensoría Maya, this change came about, in part, as a result of the political development of the popular movement. In an interview, Velásquez stated that individuals who had previously worked with CUC renounced its framework based around class several years later to begin to work with Defensoría Maya.8 Defensoría Maya also gained from the experiences of its founder members in other popular organisations in Guatemala and internationally, most specifically from those gained by Juan León Alvarado whilst he was in exile in Canada, and working in the United Nations. The popular movement developed as a result of the experiences that actors underwent as well as the effects of democratisation, including the return to civilian rule and the peace process. The most notable consequence

8 Leticia Velásquez, member of Defensoría Maya, interview, Guatemala City, 9/6/98.

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of this was the trajectory taken by the popular movement toward the practice of indigenous politics and the generalisation of demands for cultural rights. 1993–1994: The consolidation of Defensoría Maya Defensoría Maya was formed on Wajxaqíb Noo’j, the day of wisdom, intelligence and thought, according to the Mayan calendar. As its name suggests, Defensoría Maya was created as an instrument to defend, promote, disseminate and denounce the violations of the rights of the Maya population in Guatemala and to educate Mayans in human rights. When it began, the structure of the organisation was formalised through a junta directiva and five working commissions9 that were elected at the first annual general assembly, celebrated on the day of its formation in Guatemala City, and supported by activists in the regions of El Quiché and Sololá. The junta included Tomás Sen and Juan León Alvarado who had recently returned from exile. Defensoría Maya began its work with a small amount of funding from Majawil Q’ij. This covered the running costs of the main office in Guatemala City and provided sufficient funds to employ the organisation’s lawyer, Ovidio Paz, and give minimal support to the families of the junta directiva. The remainder of the individuals involved in the organisation worked voluntarily. The organisation’s objectives were similar to those of the two prior regional networks, but they had the advantage of being articulated by a national indigenous organisation directed by experienced activists within a more favourable socio-political context. In addition, the existence of the two national indigenous co-ordinating bodies, the Instancia de Unidad y Consenso Maya (IUCM—founded in 1993), of which Juan León Alvarado had been a founder member, and of Majawil Q’ij meant that there was a framework of organisational support within which Defensoría Maya could operate. The existence of these groups at national level in Guatemala in the aftermath of the Quinientos Años campaign provided an institutionalised presence for indigenous organisations and accorded them greater legitimacy. This extended the visibility of indigenous groups at the national level and added weight to the

9 These commissions included Commission of Education and Formation; Commission of Organisation; Commission of Publicity and Information; Commission of Finance and Projects; Commission of Legal Matters.

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proposal for indigenous issues to be included within the peace negotiations that had been first suggested in the accords signed in 1990 and 1991. This gave further relevance to Defensoría Maya’s platforms and was consolidated in 1994 with the creation of COPMAGUA, at which point indigenous participation in the peace process, and the indigenous rights orientation of the popular movement accelerated. Furthermore, the shift in language and thematic issues that this participation implied demonstrated the effective appropriation of the peace process by indigenous organisations in Guatemala. Defensoría Maya’s mandate was carried out by legally representing indigenous peoples before the law in their own language and, where possible, the organisation sought specifically to promote the recovery of Mayan culture by resolving conflicts through the utilisation of derecho indígena, or Derecho Maya in the terminology of Defensoría Maya. Defensoría Maya articulated a conceptual vision of Derecho Maya as being a mediatory, reparational and non-punitive system, the application of which contributed to the creation of harmonious community relations. In interviews, members of Defensoría Maya claimed that many indigenous Guatemalans had historically resolved community conflicts through the normative system of Derecho Maya, these ranging from theft to family disputes to land conflicts. In these areas, it had often taken precedence over state law. However, the resolution of certain crimes, such as murder or rape, had been restricted to State law, due to the insistence of state authorities upon the prevalence of the official system in such cases. In addition, in rural communities where, as a result of the internal armed conflict, indigenous authority structures were either forcibly displaced by the military or the civil patrols or voluntarily dissolved due to fear of the security forces or the PAC, the use of derecho indígena either became clandestine or ceased entirely. Hence Defensoría Maya’s policy of the recuperation of derecho indígena was integrally linked to the revitalisation of indigenous authority structures within indigenous communities in rural and urban settings. Interviewees insisted that they had always used Derecho Maya in their communities and that, for this reason, it was not necessary to train delegates considerably in its norms and procedures. Rather, training focused on ensuring that delegates were able to negotiate adequately between two conflicting parties, and were capable of drawing up the necessary documentation to officialise the case.10 However, conditions 10

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Santos Hernández, local delegate, Sololá. Interview, Sololá, 18/7/98.

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had changed as a result of the armed conflict. Elders who had previously applied derecho indígena in more cohesive and isolated communities did not implement the system promoted by Defensoría Maya, hence the need to train activists in the skills of negotiation. Moreover, it was foreseen that some of the cases that were to be resolved might include elements that had in the past not been present in indigenous communities and that cases might involve individuals from different areas, further factors that accounted for the importance of the training programmes. Significantly, it must be pointed out that, although the organisation was seeking to promote the recuperation of indigenous law, the members of the organisation themselves were not indigenous authorities as such, and that their work should not be perceived as replacing that of local traditional authorities. After 1994, the support base of Defensoría Maya grew extensively.11 Various factors accounted for this, including the effects of the peace process upon the structural and attitudinal impediments to indigenous participation in civil organisations; the growing political space brought with it a lessening of the fear to organise. Furthermore, the articulation of platforms emphasising indigenous cultural models based on pre-existing community structures, albeit dramatically affected by the internal armed conflict, facilitated the expansion of the organisation’s support base. Coupled with the articulation of human rights as a platform, Defensoría Maya’s emphasis upon the cultural values of the “Mayan People” provided a discourse and practice with which indigenous people were able to identify and to which they could relate their experiences of political, legal and social exclusion. According to Teresa Caal, “We have not worked with western concepts. We the Maya People have lost very much. We try to raise consciousness concerning how to revitalise our values and culture”.12 In this respect, whilst the organisation articulated general platforms to which indigenous people could relate, it also pursued platforms that advocated an authentic Mayan legal system and culture. Although most interviewees had heard of human rights prior to Derecho Maya, it was with the latter that they claimed to feel most comfortable, accommodating

11 Members of the organisation estimated that there were approximately 15,000 members in 1998. 12 Interview, Guatemala City, 2/6/98.

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human rights within what they felt to be their own cultural system and their own vision as Mayans.13 Organisational structure Initially, Defensoría Maya’s structure was not highly formalised. The Asamblea General, the maximum authority, met once a year. The asamblea was responsible for suggesting guidelines and proposals. It consisted of five delegates from each municipality where the organisation worked, elected at mini-assemblies by the communities involved in the organisation. The asamblea was responsible for electing two delegates from each region that usually met every few months, where the delegates would keep the main office informed of any cases, problems or developments in the regions. The delegates were responsible for maintaining work in the regions, mediating cases of conflict resolution where Derecho Maya was used, and co-ordinating with the lawyer in cases that utilised State law, meaning that they often had to travel to the capital. Delegates were also in charge of developing the organisation’s work in other communities. The idea was to ensure that delegates were capable of giving legal advice to those that sought assistance. This meant that in the early stages of Defensoría Maya’s work, delegates shouldered a wide range of duties and had to undertake extensive travelling. The asamblea general also elected the members of the junta directiva and the co-ordinators of the five commissions. The commissions were charged with carrying out the ideas and proposals put forward by the asamblea general and the delegates in the five specific areas of work, meeting fortnightly to co-ordinate and report on their activity. The junta met twice weekly, acting as the co-ordinating committee of Defensoría Maya, overseeing the general activity, converting proposals from the base into policy platforms and taking emergency decisions when necessary. The structure was not formalised in the early stages of the organisation. However, the capacity of the asamblea general to put forward proposals and the accountability of elected members to this entity suggests that Defensoría Maya was keen to institutionalise mechanisms to ensure effective representation. The organisation was on paper keen

13 Interviews with members of Defensoría Maya, Guatemala City, June 1998. Ovidio Paz affirmed this to me in an interview, Guatemala City, 3/6/98.

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to create a non-vertical structure and acknowledged the importance of maintaining a good relationship between the national leadership, based mainly in the capital although constantly travelling to the regional offices, and members at leadership and community level in the regions. As Teresa Caal stated: The communities are the roots of the organisation. They ask us and they tell us what to do. We visit the communities and in this way understand their needs and how they think as people. They are like machetes, clearing the path for the Maya People.14

Although the majority of delegates and other elected members were men, indigenous women were represented at higher levels of office by the co-founder María Tzoc and, in 1994, by Teresa Caal.15 As the organisation developed, more women became involved at national leadership level,16 and Defensoría Maya began to work more specifically around women’s issues. This resulted in the institution of projects such as the consolidation of equal rights for indigenous women (1994), and the political participation of indigenous women at all levels of society (1996). Since its formation, a further important element was the all-indigenous membership of Defensoría Maya. By the end of 1994, the organisation represented the three indigenous groups of Sololá, the Ixil ethnic group and Mam and Chuj from Huehuetenango. At this time the K’iche’ and Kaqchikel groups were the most prominently represented. By 1995, the amount of ethnic groups represented by Defensoría Maya had increased. This contrasted with CERJ, whose leadership included ladinos and with CONIC, where both the leadership and membership were constituted of ladino and indigenous communities and individuals. Furthermore, from its emergence, the self-conscious, all-indigenous nature of Defensoría Maya marked it out from the other indigenous and campesino popular movement organisations and legitimised and strengthened its demands based in indigenous rights claims to entitlement.

Interview, Guatemala City, 2/6/98. Teresa Caal, a Poqomchi’ Maya from Alta Verapaz, who joined in 1994, had been the women’s co-ordinator with Majawil Q’ij. 16 By 1998, three indigenous women were included at the level of national leadership: Leticia Velásquez (projects and funding), Isabel López (legal matters) and Teresa Caal (women’s issues). 14

15

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Defensoría Maya was led by a charismatic leader who was pivotal to its political, ideational and operational development, a characteristic the organisation shared with other social movements in Guatemala, including CERJ (Amílcar Méndez), CONAVIGUA (Rosalina Tuyuc), GAM (Nineth Montenegro), and CONIC ( Juan Tiney). Whilst the presence of such an individual figure provided a certain focus and fortified civil mobilisation in a context of continuing political violence and weakened social networks in both rural and urban areas, at times it severely constrained broader activist participation. Moreover, during periods when León Alvarado was absent from Defensoría Maya, most notably during campaigning for the 1995 elections and consultational visits to the UN, the organisation lost impetus and direction, questioning the efficacy of the organisation’s reliance upon individual activists. However, the role played by León Alvarado in widening and consolidating Defensoría Maya’s membership was of significant importance. León Alvarado, a Maya-K’iche’ from an aldea close to Santa Cruz del Quiché, is a highly experienced indigenous activist. His father, who was kidnapped and disappeared by the military, was involved in community politics, as was León Alvarado himself from an early age. He was a member and co-founder of the CUC and, from 1978, an announcer for Radio Quiché. In the early 1980s he went into exile, living in both Canada and Mexico. A critical element in León Alvarado’s experience was his work outside Guatemala in the areas of human rights and indigenous rights. This included undertaking projects within the General Assembly of the United Nations (1986–93) and participating in discussions of the UN Working Group for Indigenous Populations and in the sub-Commission of Minorities in relation to the defence of Mayan rights (1991–3). When he returned to Guatemala in 1993 he immediately became involved in the post-Quinientos Años indigenous popular movement, working for Majawil Q’ij (1992–4), co-founding the IUCM (1993) and COPMAGUA (1994) and acting as a delegate for COPMAGUA to the ASC (1994). In 1995, he was co-founder of the Frente Nacional de Organizaciones de Derechos Humanos de Guatemala and was co-founder of the Maya Political Initiative “Nukuj Ajpop”. Importantly, León Alvarado also engaged with the formal political process, in 1995 assuming the role of acting Vice President of the FDNG and Vice Presidential Candidate for the party in the general elections of 1995. He continued this work as a member of the Political Council of Transition of the FDNG in 1996. His presence in the junta

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directiva of Defensoría Maya in 1993 was highly advantageous for the organisation’s development. He brought with him experience from the initial phases of popular mobilisation in Guatemala. This was enriched by his time in exile in Mexico, where issues concerning identity politics were common in scholarly circles and, importantly, from Canada, where ethnic and identity politics were high on the political agenda. In the latter context León Alvarado was able to engage with North American Native Indians in dialogue concerning self-determination, federalism and multi-culturalism. These factors shaped the later platforms of Defensoría Maya. León Alvarado’s work at the UN meant that he came into contact with other indigenous peoples who had undergone similar experiences. Involvement in an institutionalised setting in which actors engaged with the discourse of the collective and specific cultural rights of Indigenous Peoples laid the basis for the organisation’s future conceptualisation and practice of indigenous rights. Moreover, according to León Alvarado, such interaction and experience, framed through international legal rights and discourse, strengthened his resolve regarding the irreversibility of the process to secure the rights of the indigenous population.17 In short, knowledge of the right to have rights was an important stage in the activity of the indigenous movement and of the popular movement during democratisation and was accompanied by a shift in the discourse employed by the popular movement. Hence, collective and specific cultural rights and references to differentiated forms of citizenship became integral elements of popular struggle that augmented demands for the realisation of individual human rights. Defensoría Maya and informal participation in the peace process During the initial phase of its formation, from 1993 until the creation of the ASC in 1994, Defensoría Maya was concerned with anchoring its policies within the national political arena, consolidating its social base and developing its political platforms. This was because of the group’s need to stabilise its own structure and organisation and because civil participation in the peace process had not yet been consolidated. Moreover, the institutions that later formalised civil participation in the

17

Interview, Guatemala City, 11/12/98.

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process of democratisation had not yet been created. As with CERJ and CONIC, in its early stages the organisation engaged in community level activism, focusing on a range of rights issues and, in the case of Defensoría Maya the promotion of Derecho Maya, in an attempt to represent its social base politically and legally before the State. In addition, Defensoría Maya participated in the wider popular movement. This included participating in demonstrations, marches and lobbying the State and international bodies with regard to issues of political violence, the rule of law, social justice and ethnic discrimination. Given that, as with the popular movement in general, Defensoría Maya’s role in the peace process was not formalised until 1994, its initial stage, and that of the other organisations, was characterised by informal peace-building initiatives. Defensoría Maya attempted to build up its social base by visiting rural communities. This included the communities in which members had previously worked, spent time or had contact with. Members of the organisation travelled to communities and explained to people their rights with regard to the 1985 Constitution and international treaties and clarified that the organisation existed to defend these rights and to help facilitate the functioning of Derecho Maya and the authority systems that had previously presided over it. In other cases, word of Defensoría Maya spread between communities or individuals that had become involved in the organisation to those who were not organised. Within a few weeks of its foundation, Defensoría Maya started to work in the department of Huehuetenango, an area profoundly affected by the internal armed conflict. The organisation provided free legal support to victims of human rights violations through its lawyer, Ovidio Paz, who had been employed in 1993 to work specifically within the framework of derecho positivo. Paz, a Kaqchikel Maya from the department of Chimaltenango, spent his first year working from the main office in the capital, as well as travelling to Sololá, El Quiché and Huehuetenango to meet with local delegates. Many of these meetings concerned individual and community renunciation of the PAC. Most meetings ended with his writing a denuncia that was subsequently presented to the local authorities by the local delegates. This work was crucial, providing a free and accessible legal service to indigenous peoples in their own language who were marginalised from the State system and were not able to afford the expensive legal fees that lawyers charged. In this respect, whilst the organisation

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did not employ class-based discourse,18 nor did its work focus directly upon socio-economic issues, Defensoría Maya was in a sense engaging with the some of the causal and symptomatic factors of poverty. Interviewees explained that they had joined the organisation both to gain access to legal advice and to take part in a movement that sought to revitalise indigenous communities and give them “a voice”; an important consequence of this was a growing feeling of “dignity”.19 Locally, Defensoría Maya’s legal work mostly consisted of writing and presenting denuncias to local authorities and pressuring authorities to comply with legal norms, rights guarantees and the Constitution. The organisation also carried out collaborative projects with other popular organisations, such as CERJ, CONAVIGUA and CUC. A notable example of this was the mobilisation of Defensoría Maya’s base in conjunction with that of other groups around the case of Candido Noriega, a civil patroller accused of authoring and participating in a massacre in El Quiché during the early 1980s. In this case, and others like it, and in pursuit of its more general objectives, the organisation carried out demonstrations and published campos pagados in the national press, carrying out conventional forms of symbolic politics.20 Whilst the objective of Defensoría Maya had been to utilise Derecho Maya to resolve conflicts that predominantly involved human rights violations, the nature of the cases in the organisation’s initial phases and the socio-political context meant that most were resolved through State law. In addition material conditions were such that individuals appeared to be more concerned with the resolution of cases of human rights violations than with problems of a less immediate priority. However, by 1994–5, human rights violations began to decline, permitting communities to make use of the legal service provided by Defensoría Maya to resolve other conflicts, such as intra-family conflicts, theft or community conflicts over land. Over time, the utilisation of Derecho Maya became better known and accepted by state authorities. This demonstrates how democratisation at the national level, brought by the gradual 18 In the sparse material available from the early stages of Defensoría Maya, there are few references to class or socio-economic issues. This is interesting to note considering that a high percentage of the organisation’s founders were involved in the CUC and Majawil Q’ij—two organisations with close ties to the EGP. 19 Interviews with members of Defensoría Maya (May–June 1998). 20 These organisations published joint campos pagados in Prensa Libre between January and May 1994.

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stabilisation of electoral democracy and continuing peace negotiations, of which indigenous issues were a part, had partially permeated the municipal and community levels, precipitating certain attitudinal and practical changes with regard to indigenous issues. The national process in which indigenous rights claims to entitlement were becoming more evident and indigenous groups gaining a stronger foothold at national level, in particular with the formation of COPMAGUA, underlined this. As a result, Defensoría Maya was able to establish a presence at a local, regional and national level, and the nature of the cases addressed by the organisation widened. A final point to note concerning the informal peace-building projects of Defensoría Maya was its insistence upon the importance of recuperating local indigenous authorities. Whilst this did not necessarily tie into the wider national democratisation process as such, it was important both as an end in itself and as a foundation from which to promote the future political participation of indigenous people, both locally and nationally. The organisation argued for the revitalisation of indigenous authorities, firstly, from a rights perspective, namely that indigenous people had the right to their own culturally specific authority structures that had been destroyed in the conflict; secondly, from a legal perspective, namely that indigenous authorities were critical for the effective functioning of the Mayan legal system; and thirdly, from a political perspective, namely that the reconstruction of indigenous authorities at a local level and their construction at a national level was essential for the creation of a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and pluri-lingual nationstate in which indigenous peoples could participate politically. These issues gained prominence in the platforms of Defensoría Maya as the organisation developed. The seeds of change: MINUGUA and the Asamblea de la Sociedad Civil With the developments in the peace process that took place from the beginning of 1994, changing institutional arrangements brought political instruments through which civil actors could participate in the transition process. Civil society organisations appropriated these instruments in order to reinforce their own policies and further the realisation of their objectives. This meant that the role of Defensoría Maya began to shift from being predominantly informal to engaging directly with State structures and elite military, political, economic and guerrilla actors.

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In January 1994 the Framework Agreement was signed, establishing the creation of the ASC. Within the ASC, COPMAGUA negotiated on behalf of indigenous organisations. Juan León Alvarado was a cofounder of COPMAGUA and became one of the instancia’s delegates to the ASC. This allowed for a direct participation of the membership of Defensoría Maya within the peace negotiations, which, however, also took away important human resources. At the end of March the Global Human Rights Agreement was signed, placing human rights at the core of the transition and legitimising the presence of the UN Mission to verify and monitor the peace process. This provided greater space for all popular organisations, including Defensoría Maya. In a favourable international context, the partial stabilisation of the peace process, the provision of an institutionalised space for the participation of civil society in this process, and within this the specific recognition of the role of indigenous peoples, together with the legitimised presence of the international community, gave confidence to and provided political opportunities for indigenous actors. Moreover, the acknowledgement of an accord that related specifically to Guatemala’s indigenous population contributed to the growing determination of indigenous actors to pressure for participation in the peace process, taking into account their specific cultural platforms. In combination with the formalisation of Defensoría Maya’s strategies, the organisation also began to develop its relationships with other political actors, most notably in Sololá, where it began to co-ordinate with other popular organisations through COMS and with the Alcaldía Indígena in the municipality. In late 1994, Defensoría Maya’s work was further assisted by the achievement of its first financial independence through long term funding received from the Canadian Embassy. As a result of this project Defensoría Maya was also able to consolidate its work and formalise its organisational structure, paying salaries to the lawyer and providing partial funding for local delegates. The initial period of development of Defensoría Maya saw it shift from being a national organisation that practised community based activism around human rights issues and cultural issues into a group engaged actively with the formal mechanisms of the peace process, contributing as they did to broader democratisation. With this process, and international developments in the legal and political conceptualisation and framing of rights, came the elaboration of the organisation’s cultural policies and the seeds of a political discourse and practice that

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sought the political participation of indigenous actors within a multicultural, multi-ethnic and pluri-lingual state. The growing independence of indigenous actors from the URNG, accompanying the increasing questioning of traditional leftist political platforms, and developments linked to the peace process accelerated this process. In the words of Vicente Tuyuc: Before 1994, we were not really conscious of being indigenous. During my time in the revolutionary uprising, when the struggle was between rich and poor, the indigenous struggle was sidelined. We were impregnated with the class revolution, it was seen as far more important than the indigenous struggle, that ethnic issues.21

Relationships with the guerrilla and the class-ethnicity dynamic The exact relationship between the URNG and Defensoría Maya is difficult to discern. Some members of the organisation at regional and national leadership level, for example Vicente Tuyuc, confirmed prior personal involvement with the insurgency before joining Defensoría Maya. Other members at the community level of the organisation mentioned individual experiences of collaboration with the guerrilla, similar to those described by activists in CERJ. Other members stated anonymously how insurgents and ex-insurgents in Sololá and El Quiché had been critical to the formation and initial stages of the two regional groups and Defensoría Maya through the provision of communication networks, resources and information. Furthermore, Juan León Alvarado indicated that at times there had been informal and context-specific communication between the organisation and the insurgency in the early stages of organisation, regarding demonstration and other activism at regional and national level. However, all activists confirmed that the organisation had attempted to remain autonomous from the guerrilla and had consistently followed its own political agenda, refusing to work closely with the URNG on policy matters. An important element here are the histories of individual actors and how they shed light upon the wider relationship between the revolutionary left and the popular movement. León Alvarado and Maria Tzoc, important activists in the organisation, had been key players in the creation of CUC in 1978. The political formation of these two K’iche’ 21

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Interview, Guatemala City, 9/6/98.

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Maya had begun, therefore, through campesino movement organisation around class issues that retained a minimal focus on ethnicity, in an organisation closely tied to the URNG. Whilst León Alvarado had gone into exile, Maria Tzoc had lived for various years in the Comunidades de Población en Resistencia (CPRs), displaced communities that had fled their homes during the internal armed conflict because of the counterinsurgency violence, establishing clandestine communities in the Ixcán and Sierra regions of Guatemala.22 In 1993, both León Alvarado and Tzoc had become involved in the culturally oriented Majawil Q’ij. Furthermore, other national level figures such as Lucas Tzoc, who joined Defensoría Maya in 1995, and Vicente Tuyuc had been activists in the URNG. Reflecting the opinions of León Alvarado and Maria Tzoc, both stated in interviews that they had felt it necessary to elaborate on the struggle around indigenous rights that had begun to emerge nationally and at the continental level around the time of the Quinientos Años campaign. Tuyuc perceived limitations to the interpretation of the indigenous question that were predominant in the Marxist-oriented doctrines of the insurgency and, as a Kaqchikel Maya, had wanted to widen his own terms of engagement in the popular struggle.23 In spite of various developments in the guerrilla’s treatment of the indigenous question, signifying that it had become an issue of internal debate and that the leadership was becoming receptive to cultural issues, both Lucas Tzoc and Tuyuc explained that the URNG had continued to eschew engagement with a more culturally determined framework of struggle and discourse of indigenous rights and had been predominantly ladino-led. As a result, they had felt it necessary to move away from the insurgency and toward an organisation that had begun to develop these questions, whilst still retaining its popular roots through its historical ties with the CUC and the CPRs. Defensoría Maya therefore represented an alternative aspect of the popular struggle for activists who had begun to organise politically around class-based issues and, over time, had developed their terms of political engagement as personal experiences and processes

22 The military pursued these communities, accusing them of being populated by guerrilla insurgents, meaning that they were effectively itinerant, obliged to avoid military bombing campaigns and offensives. They became public after 1994. See Brett (2007a, forthcoming; chapter five) for a detailed discussion of the CPRs. 23 Interview, Guatemala City, 8/9/98.

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of self-awareness linked with wider changes in the socio-political environment. As the parameters of social struggle changed to include the specific and collective cultural rights of indigenous peoples, actors began to link this newly dominant rights discourse to their individual and collective needs that were gradually developing as human rights violations declined and political opportunities appeared. As a result, Defensoría Maya focused on the preservation of Mayan culture and the pluralisation of the legal system, linking this platform to needs at the community level—including cheap and effective legal representation and the revitalisation of local authority structures and to a changing socio-political context, in which some indigenous leaders, disillusioned with the prioritisation of socio-economic issues, had begun to mobilise around ethnicity and indigenous rights. In this way, the initial human rights activity of the organisation was augmented by work focused around cultural issues. As such work began in earnest, most evidently after 1995, it complemented the discourse of indigenous rights that had, from the organisation’s inception, accompanied its utilisation of the language of fundamental human rights. This clearly demonstrates how terms of struggle are contingent upon actors’ perceptions, structural conditions and strategic choices. In this way, popular mobilisation is not static, but rather activists adapt to changing conditions, implying the transformative nature of indigenous identity and political movements. 1995–6: The expansion of Defensoría Maya and the clarification of the terms of indigenous integration By the end of 1995, Defensoría Maya had begun to work in 10 regions, establishing offices in each area with the assistance of increased financial aid projects from Norway, Japan and Australia.24 Between 1995 and 1996, Defensoría Maya held two general assemblies, in which it elected to maintain its prior objectives and consolidated its structure to accommodate a growing membership that had reached 10,000. Furthermore,

24 Offices had been established in Uspantán, Nebaj, Santa Cruz, Sololá, Chisec, San Miguel Chicaj, Chimaltenango, Rabinal, Huehuetenango and Chichicastenango. This covered the K’iche’, Ixil, Kaqchikel, Tzutijil, Achi’, Q’eqchi’, Chuj and Mam ethnic groups. The offices ranged from large co-ordinating centres (Sololá) to small offices run out of delegates’ homes (San Miguel Chicaj).

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several key activists joined the organisation. Francisco Raymundo,25 a well-known indigenous leader and key spokesperson from the CPRs in the Sierra, Vicente Tuyuc, ex-EGP activist and brother of Rosalina Tuyuc (the leader of CONAVIGUA), and Isabella Lopez, a trainee indigenous lawyer from El Quiché had joined by the end of 1995. The gender balance of the leadership had become more equalised by the end of 1996 and the number of female regional delegates had risen to three. In 1995 a change took place in the socio-political climate and developments accompanying the peace process brought a transformation in the practices of popular political engagement from the symbolic politics of protest to (include) the politics of negotiation and proposal. Defensoría Maya, although lacking personalidad jurídica, began to engage with the wider national political arena and the formal mechanisms of the process of democratisation. The organisation broadened its political strategies by becoming involved in drafting proposals for the peace accords through its membership in COPMAGUA. León Alvarado was one of the co-ordinator of COPMAGUA and also acted as a representative for COPMAGUA to the ASC. An expansion of its political discourse paralleled the organisation’s changing political strategies. This was evident in Defensoría Maya’s increasing prioritisation of indigenous rights claims to entitlement, which reflected the general shift in the predominant paradigm of popular resistance accompanying the peace process, to which the negotiation for and signing of the AIDPI was critical. In short, the language of popular politics evolved from the predominant master frame of universal human rights toward the emphatic articulation of indigenous politics. In its publications the organisation began to intensify language referring to Mayan identity and cosmology and, notably, to emphasise that the Maya were a Pueblo and not, as they had been termed in the ASC, a sector, potentially building the foundation for any future negotiation of self-determination within international legal frameworks. Moreover, in its political demands, Defensoría Maya began to include further references to self-determination, collective cultural rights, political autonomy and historical grievances suffered by the Maya, all elements that were 25 Raymundo’s presence became crucial in the following years, particularly as León de Alvarado’s work with Defensoría Maya was expanded by the commitments of both the organisation and the indigenous movement more generally to the formal mechanisms set up through the peace negotiations.

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included in COPMAGUA’s proposals to the ASC for the AIDPI. This demonstrated an important process of political learning and an evolving relationship between formal channels of inclusion and specific organisational platforms during democratisation. A further concrete example of this was the turning point in the language used to refer to derecho indígena. Most interviewees in Defensoría Maya stated that they had come into contact with the term Derecho Maya from 1994/5 onwards. During this time, the negotiations for the content of AIDPI and the prolonged pressure upon the Arzú government for the ratification of ILO Convention 169 (in which Defensoría Maya played a part) were taking place. The politicisation of derecho indígena and its re-naming as Derecho Maya in this context corresponded to the changing discourse of rights and the legitimisation of the presence of the indigenous agenda for peace in the national arena. Furthermore, from 1995 onwards Defensoría Maya began to make concrete demands for a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and pluri-lingual state, of which the pluralisation of the legal system was an integral part. Both these issues had been elements in the discussions for the AIDPI; whilst such demands had been evident prior to 1995, they became core elements of Defensoría Maya’s political platforms after this date. Within this framework, which emphasised the political participation of indigenous actors and the recuperation of indigenous authorities as being essential to a functioning multi-cultural democracy, Defensoría Maya began to focus consistently on the ethnic constitution of the Guatemalan nation-state. In addition to its focus upon the future constitution of the Guatemalan nation-state, the organisation began to emphasise the historical exploitation of the Pueblo Maya, a project that had been a key component of the Quinientos Años campaign. Being a relatively young organisation, it was also crucial that Defensoría Maya did not concentrate on the formal negotiations for peace to the exclusion of its social base. Clearly, no matter how informed the organisation’s social base may have been about its role in the peace process, if Defensoría Maya began to neglect the rural population it ran the risk of alienating its members. This was a matter not only of how the organisation framed the grievances of its social base, but also of the daily work that it did in the communities. In general, policy decisions had to be finely balanced between reacting to conjunctural conditions and maintaining resources for and attention on its social base. As a result, policy in 1995 continued to address the resolution of local community conflicts, whilst the level of discussion concern-

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ing the peace negotiations increased. As stated above, the decline in human rights abuses by 1995 meant that other types of conflicts were brought to the regional offices of Defensoría Maya. These conflicts related less to the violence of the counterinsurgency than to its effects on indigenous communities and were allegedly more appropriate for resolution through Derecho Maya than human rights violations by military groups had been. Moreover, the increasing presence of indigenous organisations, both locally and nationally, and the cumulative effect of their activity, meant that local legal authorities were more tolerant of the demands of indigenous organisations, including those seeking the application of indigenous forms of justice administration. However, and significantly, what became evident in several interviews with justice operators, such as judges, in the department of El Quiché, was that the apparent will of such judges to sanction or support the resolution of conflicts through indigenous law as opposed to an insistence on State law, was less the result of tolerance towards indigenous culture, than a decision that would mean less work for State authorities. By 1995 the overall impact of the peace process meant that perpetrators of violence could not assume entirely that their actions would be met with complete impunity. This partial increase in accountability to the legal system, at least on paper, resulted in part from the pressure of social movements. Such a development reflected the comparative success that organisations had had in focusing their activity on the legal dimensions of the state, such as the protection of constitutional and legal rights and the general utilisation of the legal system by civil actors, both indigenous and ladino. As CERJ and CONIC had done in different ways, so Defensoría Maya focused on the legal dimensions of the state. For Defensoría Maya, this meant that it was increasingly able to force negotiations between parties in relation to the resolution of conflicts, relating both to human rights and more general issues through the application of Derecho Maya. However, this also meant that the organisation was more able to succeed in cases that were tried through State law. Importantly, because of the organisation’s structure, wherein a responsive leadership was kept in constant touch with the demands and needs of its social base via the local delegates, the potential difficulties of engaging with the formal peace process were substantially reduced during 1995. The introduction of additional activists into the organisation assisted this. According to members of Defensoría Maya, during the negotiations over the content of the peace accords, the organisation sought

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consultation with its base in the form of regular meetings with the delegates who, in turn, met with local members of the organisation. Whilst interviewees could not be specific as to particular elements that were included in the proposals, they did insist on the efficacy and significance of this process of dialogue between the organisation and its social base. This may have contributed to the lack of distance between membership and leadership during 1995. According to interviewees, in 1996 work in the countryside weakened, however, due to the heavy workload of delegates.26 As a result, Defensoría Maya called a further general assembly in November 1996 to restructure the organisation. The asamblea general remained as the maximum authority. However, to strengthen the position of local delegates and lessen the demands on them, the Consejo de Delegados Nacional (CDN) was formally created. This consisted of two delegates from each region who met formally for three days each month for training (in Derecho Maya and in State law) and presented reports and established plans of work for the following month. Hence only two delegates from each area, who received family support, were required to leave the regions each month, allowing the other delegates to concentrate on the work in the regions. Delegates were taught about the State legal process and indigenous law, and received training in issues such as human rights, indigenous rights and political history. Part of their mandate included passing on this information to the social base of the organisation in workshops and, as a result, educating members in the communities in a wide range of issues relating to the law, the political system and rights awareness. Along with the more general cumulative effects of the peace process, both nationally and at the local level, the popular education carried out by Defensoría Maya, and other social movements, raised peoples’ awareness of their rights. Moreover, it meant that such a language began to be currency amongst a population that had historically been marginalised from socio-political and legal processes. The commissions of the organisation remained unchanged in 1996, except for the creation of support teams to assist the work of each commission. Finally, the organisation created the Consejo Co-ordinadora Ejecutiva (CCE). This consisted of five elected members to co-ordinate the dayto-day running of the organisation and direct and develop policy. The creation of a stable structure delineated work in a clearer manner and

26

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Interviews carried out in Guatemala City (May–June 1998).

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in part began to lay the basis for the alleviation of the problems that the organisation had been experiencing in the countryside. Further factors also contributed to the temporary decline in rural participation and mobilisation toward the end of 1996. The negotiations for the indigenous accord took place until the middle of 1995. After this, many members of Defensoría Maya’s social base mobilised, unofficially, as activists for the newly formed FDNG, for which León Alvarado was Vice Presidential candidate. Although the FDNG won six seats in Congress, León Alvarado was not elected to the vice-presidency. The relationship with the Frente meant unofficial publicity for Defensoría Maya and ensured that there was a minimal increase in the organisation’s base. However, the peace process and the developments it brought dispersed the energy of many activists in rural and urban areas and absorbed peoples’ efforts to a substantial degree. Activists were also tired after the negotiations for the AIDPI, the political pressure for the ratification of the ILO Convention 169 and the run-up to the 1995 election. A final issue is that, after the signing of AIDPI in March 1995, activists in Defensoría Maya concentrated their efforts on this accord, disseminating its contents throughout all levels of the organisation. Hence, although in 1995 few problems occurred as a result of the beginnings of the organisation’s formal engagement in the peace process, by 1996 problems had arisen, albeit temporarily. This suggests difficulties in assuming a role in State-sponsored mechanisms of participation in the Guatemalan peace process that, in the case of Defensoría Maya, were mainly related to the temporary relocation of resources away from traditional forms of popular mobilisation and into more formalised mechanisms. In the short term it was possible to resolve this problem, although it resurfaced after the signing of the peace accords. This inevitably raised the question as to whether it was entirely effective politically for popular organisations to take part in the negotiations for the content of the accords through institutions such as the ASC. In short, the question became to what extent might popular organisations participate in the formal structures of the peace process and in political society in a manner that allowed them to maintain their autonomy and their own policies and objectives, whilst contributing formally to the national agenda for peace.

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chapter six Defensoría Maya and formal participation The strategy of the State and the military specifically in the 1980s was brutal repression against communities . . . As a consequence, our policy as organisations was one of survival, of demonstrations and political pressure, until the conflict calmed somewhat. With the beginning of negotiations, the mentalidad changed to a degree, and small spaces began to open up, bringing with them the first important changes. A culture of dialogue, of negotiation began to be evident. Now it is important to engage with this new culture, these new opportunities, whilst maintaining at the same time levels of political pressure and mobilisation.27

The shift toward negotiation was perceived by many in the popular movement as being only the first step in a much longer process. Political pressure was maintained locally and nationally around specific issues, such as the civil patrols and the cessation of human rights violations, and more general issues, such as the ratification of ILO Convention 169. Organisations mobilised both independently and through the instancias to which they belonged. Formal participation took place at the same time as local activism in the communities where Defensoría Maya worked and where acute problems persisted, and whilst Defensoría Maya worked with other human rights and indigenous organisations in relation to the content of the peace accords. The accords with which the organisation was mainly concerned were the AIDPI, the Strengthening of Civilian Power and, to a lesser extent, the Accord Concerning Socio-Economic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation. The content of the AIDPI very closely resembled the proposals that COPMAGUA had put forward, and included specific reference to the respect for derecho indígena within a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and pluri-lingual nation-state. The general parity between the AIDPI and the proposals of the ASC signalled a success for the indigenous movement, for Defensoría Maya and for León Alvarado personally who had spent a great deal of time involved in this process. The proposals for political self-determination and autonomy, however, were rejected by the ASC and did not reach the mesa de negociación. Similarly, although the Socio-Economic Accord referred to measures to include the access of indigenous peoples to land and mechanisms of development, the main issue that pertained to indigenous peoples was the redistribution of land via an agrarian reform. This issue was not included in the accord or in 27

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Juan León de Alvarado, interview, Guatemala City, 18/11/98.

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the proposals of the ASC. Moreover, Defensoría Maya did not engage in such broad protagonism with regard to the latter accord as it had done for the AIDPI. Rather, it elected to focus upon dissemination of the AIDPI and preparation for the follow-up to it. Indigenous activists in Defensoría Maya seemingly entered the phase of negotiation with an open mind, not expecting that the accords would solve their problems, merely that they might provide more instruments and create spaces for alternative means of struggle that indigenous peoples could appropriate. Their pragmatic approach was vindicated by events after the accords were signed. The language and concepts in the accords and the experience gained from negotiation were critical to the political development of the indigenous movement. Moreover, the accords generated further spaces within Guatemala for indigenous peoples to contest their historical marginalisation from the State and contributed to a growing assurance of indigenous peoples of their rights. The work of organisations such as Defensoría Maya in disseminating the accords among individuals in rural communities ensured that informal spaces for political contestation were broadened. A crucial element was the way in which organisations adapted to the peace accords, changing their work to include the dissemination of the accords and utilising the concepts and institutions, such as MINUGUA, that developed out of the peace process as a further instrument in their political strategy. Whilst attitudes to the mission within the indigenous movement ranged from support for its work to criticism of its limited mandate, in rural areas it was used as a point of pressure by social movements. For example in Nebaj, the delegate for Defensoría Maya explained how he would often go to MINUGUA to get the institutional stamp upon the actas that summarised a case in Derecho Maya. Whilst this did not have any official authority, it was used by the organisation to pressure unwilling parties to negotiate.28 The key question regarding formal indigenous participation in the peace process, however, is why the AIDPI was the accord most comprehensively influenced by civil society. One answer may be that the indigenous movement was highly effective in its lobbying skills: the concentration of indigenous organisations within a single co-ordinating body (COPMAGUA) and the gradual uniformisation of demands may

28

Interviews, Nebaj, El Quiché, June 1998.

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support this argument. In contrast, it may have been that the issue of culture was not perceived by the negotiating parties as representing a substantial threat to their interests. This would account, to a certain extent, for the lack of mobilisation by the right, including political parties, elite economic groups and the military in response to most indigenous demands at this time, with the exception of land reform and political autonomy, both of which implied possibly far reaching political, social and socio-economic repercussions and represented substantial threats to elite interests. Mobilisations around indigenous rights platforms may have a limited effect on broad structures of domination, depending upon the specific historical context in which they take place. Conservative elite actors may make concessions on cultural issues during a peace process in order to sideline potentially more threatening issues and historically marginalised actors. As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, due to their own weaknesses and strategies, and significantly as a result of the strength of the economic elite and the historical context in which negotiations took place, campesino organisations did not substantially influence the peace process in Guatemala. The popular movement did contribute to various aspects of democratisation. These included the generation of a culture of rights and the beginnings of the implementation of the rule of law, the comprehensive content of the Human Rights Accord and the AIDPI, successful resolution of particular legal cases, the achievements of the FDNG, and the increasing influence of indigenous actors on policy agendas and within institutions of the State and political society. However, whether these achievements will have the capacity to challenge broader structures of domination and to tackle extreme levels of poverty and racism is, as yet, uncertain. This begs the question as to whether the inclusion of civil and indigenous actors in the formal channels of the peace process and in political society was worth the decline in autonomy and decrease in political efficacy and mobilisation that some of them suffered as a result. Defensoría Maya and the FDNG We are in agreement that it is necessary to work in different ways, and that the political arena is another space for negotiation and pressure. For us, there is an important relationship with the FDNG, but it was not obligatory to vote for them in the elections. They did not represent us or our interests completely. It was not an indigenous party, and was

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not characterised by indigenous thought. It is inevitable that there is a relationship with a political party, and perhaps we can achieve more through representation and participation in a political party in Congress. Because in the end the State is not simply going to vanish. But we can at least humanise it.29

Defensoría Maya had a close relationship with the FDNG during the 1995 elections. The party was the logical choice for popular movement activists and, above all, León Alvarado was running as Vice Presidential candidate. Consequently, many members of Defensoría Maya worked to publicise the party before and during the elections and some, but by no means all members of the organisation’s social base voted for the Frente. This included leaders and members in the main office in Guatemala City and individuals at all levels of the organisation’s membership. Moreover, even up until 1998, many leaders including León Alvarado and Francisco Raymundo continued to work for the Frente during weekends. Since the elections of 1995, the social base of Defensoría Maya became educated in formal political issues. The leadership, however, insisted that voting was a personal and not an organisational matter. León Alvarado, Francisco Raymundo and Tomás Sen explained this many times to members and delegates, emphasising only that the PAN and the FRG and the other parties did not represent their interests. The most salient issue here concerns the trade-offs between social movement autonomy and engagement with political parties. As stated above, León Alvarado’s participation and subsequent defeat for the vice-presidency had repercussions upon rural mobilisation for Defensoría Maya the following year. Interviewees explained how in general the political history of Guatemala demonstrated an attitude of caution between indigenous actors and political parties, more on the part of the former than the latter. This, in turn, had created a weak political culture in relation to effective participation by and representation of indigenous peoples, with the possible exceptions of indigenous participation in political parties in the area of Quetzaltenango and indigenous membership in the DCG in the 1980s. Most activists interviewed thought it necessary to construct a relationship with a political party on some level, as the political sphere was another area of influence upon the State, perhaps the most direct. However, it was not clear what individuals had

29

Ovidio Paz, interview, Guatemala City, 20/7/98.

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learnt from Defensoría Maya’s experience with the Frente in the previous elections. It seemed that a positive attitude to the Frente prevailed in 1997/8, despite the obvious distance from almost all other parties. Given the partially debilitating effect of Defensoría Maya’s participation in the FDNG and the lack of power that the Frente had in Congress, and consequently the lack of real impact upon policy formulation and the national agenda, participation in the FDNG within political society did not in the long run prove to be highly effective. The signing of the peace and organisational development Events within the national peace process between 1995 and 1996, including the consolidation of the negotiations, the elections in 1995 and the signing of the final peace accord in December 1996, influenced the development of Defensoría Maya. Indigenous protagonism increased through Defensoría Maya’s activity at both formal and informal levels, and in particular through the ASC. It also had a close, although unofficial, relationship with the FDNG during the 1995 elections, a factor that further increased its membership and levels of mobilisation, in spite of a brief decline in 1996. Such a relationship demonstrates how Defensoría Maya developed its political strategies by engaging with political society as well as seeking to influence the state and civil society, a strategy that other popular movements such as CERJ and CONAVIGUA had also followed. The organisation, moreover, developed its policies, particularly as a result of its participation in the ASC and the formal peace process. After the signing of the final peace accord in December 1996, the resolution of legal cases using State law increased, demonstrating major achievements at local level and the further success of the organisation in seeking to ensure respect for the rule of law. Moreover, the quantity of cases resolved at local level using Derecho Maya grew. This took place as a result of pressure caused by the cumulative impact of the general effects of democratisation, an increasing international academic and political interest in indigenous legal systems, the increasing resonance of collective and specific cultural rights within the organisations of the international rights regime, and the perceived legitimacy with which actors utilising Derecho Maya felt that they were acting as a result of its inclusion in the AIDPI. Once more, it is important to underline here that members of the organisation were not indigenous authorities

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per se, but rather sought to revindicate a practice that such authorities had been carrying out for centuries within indigenous communities. Such activity contributed to the application and practice of indigenous law generally and enhanced the participation of indigenous Guatemalans within the socio-legal arena. Defensoría Maya also contributed to the general strengthening of indigenous authorities and general culture through the carrying out of Mayan spiritual ceremonies and its programmes to promote the preservation of indigenous languages that, as a result of the contents of the AIDPI, became part of its work after 1996. Moreover, the activity of Defensoría Maya as part of the indigenous movement raised the level of discussion concerning cultural issues, raising relative awareness of indigenous law within the State. As yet, however, it has not been officially recognised within the Constitution or the justice system and justice operators remain acutely resistant to its application. During this period, Defensoría Maya’s relationship within the formal peace process also deepened, as it became involved in the activities of a popular leftist party. Furthermore, activists at leadership level, including Juan León Alvarado, Francisco Raymundo, Tomás Sen and Ricardo Suluí began to participate in the implementation commissions set up through the peace accords after December 1996. The process of writing proposals for laws and negotiating with elite State and political actors gave indigenous actors, in general, and members of Defensoría Maya in particular, critical political experience and demonstrated important changes with regard to popular participation in policy development and decision-making at the national political level. However, the participation of key actors within these negotiations sidelined resources from the organisation.30 As a result, work with grass roots members was weakened with members’ participation in the activity of the commissions. Defensoría Maya’s experience, similar to that of CERJ and CONIC, underlines the importance of detailed investigation into the trade-offs a social movement must make with regard to its political development and autonomy during democratisation, and the effects that this may have on its level of mobilisation and political efficacy.

30 The voluntary nature of indigenous participation in these commissions exacerbated this. Participation in the commissions was the following: Juan León (constitutional reforms); Francisco Raymundo (land); Tomás Sen (derecho consuetudinario); Ricardo Sului (educational reform).

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chapter six Defensoría Maya and indigenous politics

As the democratic transition unfolded, Defensoría Maya’s objectives were broadened and a discernible shift in the organisation’s political strategies and discourse occurred, attributable to socio-political changes in Guatemala and beyond and to changes in the international language and conceptualisation of rights. In this context the instruments available to civil actors changed over time, imposing upon them and affording them with new political forms and frameworks for collective action. Significantly, as the peace process advanced and large-scale repression and human rights violations decreased, so the master frame of universal human rights as a rationale for political action began to lose its resonance. However, accompanying this process was a marked absence in significant improvement in the material living conditions and political representation of the majority indigenous population. During this time, it became clear to indigenous leaders that the continued articulation of the politics of universal human rights would not be sufficient to confront and overcome the new challenges that lay ahead in post-peace process Guatemala. This implied the need to rethink political strategies and discourse and, importantly, to restructure allegiances. The elaboration in the framing and procedural articulation of Defensoría Maya’s indigenous politics was evidenced by the organisation’s increasing use of the discourse of the specific and collective cultural rights of indigenous peoples on top of its initial employment of the master frame of human rights. The organisation expanded its objectives and included practices that sought to protect and guarantee the human rights of the indigenous population with a growing focus upon indigenous peoples’ cultural rights, demonstrated by demands for the legal recognition and utilisation of Derecho Maya. These changes also resulted from indigenous actors’ recognition of the advantages of the strategic articulation of an essentialised indigenous identity in the context of the post-Cold War global order. The organisation specifically employed a culturalist discourse in order to make claims for rights on the grounds of indigenous identity and ethnic entitlement, based predominantly on demands for a plural legal system within a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and pluri-lingual nation-state. It was, for Defensoría Maya, the ethnic composition of Guatemalan society that necessitated a plural legal system that took into account the cultural specificities of distinct ethnic groups with regard to forms of justice administration. Intrinsic to the recovery of indigenous

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law was also the revitalisation of indigenous authority structures and the political participation of indigenous people in such structures. In parallel with the evolution of its policies and political repertoire, Defensoría Maya broadened its strategies, combining symbolic protest with an increasing engagement with formal channels of political participation. It evolved from a regionally anchored network of human rights activists carrying out informal peace-building initiatives and providing a channel for informal political participation, into a national organisation with access to formal mechanisms of political participation and links to political society. In this enterprise it was comparatively successful, bringing about changes in the political norms and practices of indigenous Guatemalans at a local and regional level, raising the profile of the debate concerning indigenous peoples at national level and informing the content of the peace accords. Aspects of the creation of a culture of rights strengthened these changes in political culture. As part of the popular movement, Defensoría Maya contributed to the debate concerning demilitarisation, the institutionalisation of the rule of law, indigenous rights and the awareness of the right to have rights: such rights included fundamental human rights, specific and collective indigenous peoples’ rights and the differentiated rights of citizenship. The process of change within Defensoría Maya, part of a wider process of the increasing orientation towards indigenous rights within the popular movement in Guatemala, took place since the formation of the organisation. Critically, the evolution of the indigenous politics of Defensoría Maya demonstrated a significant development in the wider transformation of social movements in Guatemala. This was because it was an organisation whose membership, discourse, form of politics and wider social relations initially suggested it was an organización popular. However, Defensoría Maya did not fit comfortably within the categories of popular and Mayanist organisations previously utilised to characterize social movements in the country. In this way, the increasing orientation towards indigenous politics within the popular movement affected the historical formations of popular struggle to a considerable degree and challenged the ways in which it had historically been categorised.

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CONCLUSIONS

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, INDIGENOUS POLITICS AND DEMOCRATISATION IN GUATEMALA, 1985–1996 We are now in a position to evaluate how and why civil actors mobilised collectively during the democratic transition in Guatemala. Understanding how collective action evolved as democratisation unfolded and what impact collective action had upon the democratic transition, can allow us to draw broader lessons concerning movement politics elsewhere. Our analysis here has combined a focus upon how movement activists organised through social networks and strategically mobilised their resources with an examination of how they framed their demands, developed their repertoires and articulated their political identities as the democratic transition unfolded. In contrast to other cases in the region where widespread social mobilisation took place, such as Argentina and Chile, “the resurrection of civil society” in Guatemala occurred after the return to civilian rule and within a context shaped principally by the ensuing protracted, disjunctive and internationalised peace process, a context that differed from other countries on the continent and contributed to the particular dynamic of collective action in the country. However, many of the challenges that social movements faced and the changes that they underwent as they sought to maintain political influence reflected those of popular mobilisations elsewhere in Latin America, as they adapted to the shift from authoritarian to civilian rule. 1) Changing paradigms of popular mobilisation Organisational structure The context in which social movements emerge, the nature of a movement’s leadership and actors’ strategic choices are key interrelated factors that shape an organisation’s structure, the ways in which mobilisation takes places and its subsequent successes and failures. Both CONIC and Defensoría Maya developed out of pre-existing movements, suggesting that the actors’ prior experience of mobilisation contributed

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to their capacity to anticipate problems of over-centralisation. In the case of CERJ, although activists that later joined the organisation had participated in organisations such as CUC, the majority of national leaders had little prior experience when the movement was formed. This suggests why individual leadership played such a marked role in CERJ’s activities. Moreover, CERJ was formed in 1988, in the early stages of democratisation, when political violence against civil society organisations remained acute and generalised and the activity of social movements still presented a considerable threat to those actors involved. The conditions under which CERJ was formed were central to its organisational structure and practice, and clandestinity and centralisation became important factors in actors’ efforts to guarantee the survival of CERJ and its members. The organisation was not, however, able to cast off these initial characteristics once movement activity became more permissible by the early 1990s, as a result of the advancing democratic process. In contrast, CONIC and Defensoría Maya formed after 1992, in a less precarious and more favourable socio-political climate, meaning that they were less obliged to maintain a rigid, clandestine and hierarchical structure that might protect their members from violence carried out against them by the security forces and civil patrols. Brysk has argued that the constraints upon the human rights movement in Argentina that accompanied the return to democracy, and led subsequently to its increasing marginalisation, resulted from the nature of the movement itself, as well as the character of the “consolidating state” (1994: 19–20). While the conditions favourable for movement activity in Guatemala developed after the return to civilian democracy, and not as a direct consequence of the shift from authoritarian to civilian rule, the problems that movements faced as democratisation advanced, did result, in part, from the conditions under which they were formed. In this case, clandestinity and centralism were decisive factors in the development of movement politics. Political repertoires and practices The gradual decline in human rights violations that occurred parallel to democratisation, along with other factors, brought with it the gradual decrease in the political efficacy of a human rights discourse linked to individual universal human rights, although this became most pronounced after the signing of the Global Human Rights Accord and the presence of MINUGUA in 1994 and in the later stages of the cycle

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of protest. The repercussions of the Quinientos Años campaign in 1992 were key to the development of the indigenous movement, of which the popular movement was to become an integral part, and to the generation of a widespread indigenous politics. Indigenous organisations became visible at the national and regional level in Guatemala, reflecting processes elsewhere on the continent, and the profile and confidence of indigenous actors were raised with the conferral of the Nobel Peace Prize upon Rigoberta Menchú. The election of indigenous mayors and of indigenous congressional deputies in the 1995 elections strengthened this tendency. With the negotiations for and signing of the AIDPI, indigenous rights became a legitimate instrument of political and cultural struggle and indigenous politics became increasingly pervasive within social movement activity, superseding the earlier prioritisation of the politics of human rights and, prior to that, the trade union movement of the early 1980s. The wider socio-political environment was favourable to, indeed precipitated, the broadening of the master frame of human rights to include new concepts of rights: in this case, claims to entitlement based upon indigenous identity and ethnicity. What had begun as a movement of, in large part, indigenous victims of the internal armed conflict seeking the respect for their fundamental human rights and restoration of the Rule of Law, developed into a proactive network of indigenous activists employing symbolic politics and participating in formal political channels in order to claim an ever-wider spectrum of human rights to include economic, social and (specific and collective) cultural rights. The campesino movement and its pursuit of socio-economic rights and agrarian reform was also an integral part of the popular movement, although certain organisations remained somewhat distanced from the popular movement until the later stages of the cycle of protest. Here we see the significance of the observations made by McClurg Mueller (1992) and McCarthy et al. (1996: 15) for analysis of movement politics, who argue that that movements’ success is contingent upon how they interpret, shape and take advantage of external opportunities in the socio-political environment. In the words of McClurg Mueller: “the new actor identifies and constructs the meanings that designate the relevance for mobilisation of grievances, resources and opportunities” (1992: 21–22). This is of central relevance for social movement politics in Guatemala. The high component indigenous population in Guatemala, experiences of racism and extreme marginalisation, and the Guatemalan genocide made indigenous politics a distinct possibility and the case

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studies demonstrate how over time movements prioritised indigenous rights claims to entitlement and transformed the framework of rights that they employed. While wider socio-political processes contributed to the changes within the popular movement, individual organisations’ platforms were transformed in different ways and for distinct reasons. CERJ employed an indigenous rights framework due to the policy vacuum that resulted from its limited capacity to command funding once its demands were effectively achieved. CONIC and the campesino movement in general had little option but to mobilise a discourse based upon indigenous rights and identity due to the closure of the negotiation process to socio-economic demands and because of the potentially greater effect of such claims to entitlement. However, this strategy was not successful as a means through which to secure land reform or redistribution. The employment of indigenous politics as a framework through which movements might seek socio-political and economic transformation was, in this way, limited during the Guatemalan peace process. As with the other organisations, Defensoría Maya, a movement that spanned the popular-culturalist divide, increasingly adopted indigenous rights platforms as a reaction to the changing socio-political climate, but also because of its specific objectives. During democratisation social movements tended to essentialise Mayan culture. Within the political dynamic of the peace process, strategic cultural essentialism increasingly became the hegemonic form of movement politics, over and above that of the politics of human rights, extending the master frame of human rights that had been so critical to the politics of the early riser organisations. Contentious collective action and the master frame of human rights A wide range of social movements mobilised in Guatemala during the democratic transition in many cases, as was the case elsewhere in Latin America, in response to the activity of the state and the repercussions of the political violence of the internal armed conflict. These movements engaged in sustained contentious collective action, throughout the cycle of protest. However, as has been illustrated, movements evolved as democratisation developed, a result of the interaction between civil actors and the broader socio-political environment. As the cycle of protest advanced and changes occurred in wider society, organisations built upon the repertoires and identities of the movements that preceded them, signalling changes in their platforms, political discourses and concepts of rights.

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The cycle of protest in Guatemala took two major political forms: informal collective action and protest (1985–1993) and collective action linked to the national level peace process through institutions such as the ASC (1994–1996). This activity did to a degree overlap, however, after 1994. At the beginning of the cycle of protest when levels of political violence remained acute, activists sought respect for the rule of law and the resolution of immediate problems of personal security that arose from the internal armed conflict, such as disappearances and forced recruitment into the PAC, as well as answers to what had happened to their family and friends during the conflict. These early riser movements employed the master frame of human rights in their struggles, articulating a narrow concept of individual and universal human rights that emphasised elements such as the right to life and association, freedom from torture and arbitrary arrest and the right to liberty. Movements’ demands at this time were expressed through appeals to national and international law protecting universal human rights. Above all claims were made against the state and the PAC through state institutions such as the PDH and were reinforced by political pressure, such as marches and demonstrations. Much like Las Madres in Argentina and human rights movements in other Latin American countries, for example in Uruguay and Chile, early riser organisations constituted a human rights movement that reinforced its domestic activity through engagement in transnational advocacy networks. Movements interpreted and framed their grievances through the master frame of human rights that provided them with language and concepts that resonated with the lived experiences of their members and “spoke to” power holders at the national and international level, in short they successfully mobilised a collective frame of action. The wider climate was receptive to demands framed in the language of universal individual human rights and thus reinforced their political purchase in Guatemala. Movement activity was tied closely to the master frame of human rights, with organisations articulating narrow definitions of human rights up until the early 1990s. The rule of law remained weak, political violence continued and the material conditions for the majority of indigenous Guatemalans had not substantially improved; recourse to such platforms therefore continued. However, the exclusive employment of the politics of human rights at this time was not permissible as a means through which to articulate movement demands in the changing socio-political climate. Fundamentally, the increasing political space and changing political environment meant movements were increasingly able

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and obliged to express new demands and represent changing needs. It was in this context that CONIC and Defensoría Maya emerged, and the need to elaborate organisations’ narrow human rights discourse was identified by actors as a key strategic option. In the wake of the Quinientos Años campaign in 1992, as widespread state-sponsored human rights violations began in general to decline and new instruments such as the AIDPI and ILO 169 were negotiated and agreed, movements began to broaden their definitions of human rights, demand new concepts of rights and appropriate indigenous rights discourse, as the case studies demonstrate. While organisations did not immediately make use of ILO 169 as a legal instrument in their political struggles, in fact this was to come much later after 2002, “movement entrepreneurs” refashioned their political discourse and, importantly, re-aligned their frames of collective action, a process that mirrored the evolution of movement politics in other Latin American countries. The narrow understanding of human rights gave way to movements’ broader configurations of rights, including economic rights and the collective and specific cultural rights of the Mayan peoples. In the Guatemalan context, framing material claims through cultural rights also represented a strategy to veil an issue that had proved to be dangerous to those protesting around it: cultural rights appeared to be both more negotiable and less threatening than demands for socio-economic rights. The case studies have illustrated how this strategy was not entirely successful. Social movements in Guatemala therefore activated traditional configurations of rights, such as fundamental human rights, and generated new concepts of rights, a development that social movement scholars such as Alvarez et al. (1998: 2–4) and Dagnino (1998: 47–53) attribute to the activity of movements elsewhere in the region. These factors, in combination with wider developments precipitated by movement activity and by democratisation itself, such as the negotiation for and signing of the peace accords, contributed to the creation of a “culture of rights”; moreover, they were key to the broader successes of movement politics, as argued below. Accompanying these changes in rights platforms was the gradual emergence of indigenous identity as the predominant discourse through which to claim entitlement. Consequently, popular demands began to be read through an indigenous perspective and the organisations began to articulate a self-conscious indigenous identity. Movements that did not adapt their collective frame of action became limited by it, as the case of CERJ illustrates.

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Links with the international rights regime assisted social movements and reinforced their objectives. In the early stages of democratisation, the impact of the early riser human rights organisations was considerably reinforced by the international human rights regime. As democratisation advanced, such influence and assistance declined, and was superseded by the activity of the increasingly influential indigenous rights network, whose activity in Latin America had intensified dramatically since the end of the 1980s. Although these transnational advocacy networks served to advance the objectives of Guatemalan social movements, the campesino movement did not benefit from its weak ties with a frail international campesino movement. Nor, given the post-Cold War climate, was it able to link up with relevant networks of transnational actors; such actors—on the whole—did not engage with struggles oriented around material issues. In short, the socioeconomic issues with which organisations such as CONIC engaged were not central to “existing international norms and rules” or policy agendas, as human rights and indigenous issues were. As a result, the organisation was unable to gain substantially from contact with TNAs. Movement politics can be severely limited if organisations do not adapt to changing socio-political climates and develop alliances with actors as a means of taking advantage of any new political opportunities that such developments afford. Some social movements responded to democratisation by extending their claims for equality (universal human rights and the application of the rule of law) to include rights claims based upon difference (rights stemming from a group’s specificity), developing platforms seeking the consolidation of a “differentiated citizenship”. The case study organisations ultimately claimed entitlement founded upon their members’ indigenous identity, although CERJ’s strong ties to the early riser movement, domestically and through the international human rights regime, and its organisational rigidity limited its success here. The case of Defensoría Maya evidences how an apparently “popular” movement appropriated the discourse of a “culturalist” organisation and, in so doing, began to address what Jelin describes as the tension between “universal rights” and “cultural pluralism” (1995: 87). CONIC similarly adopted this approach, most markedly as a consequence of its representing both ladino and indigenous campesinos. Finally, the changes in human rights discourse and practice that took place in line with democratisation demonstrate how social movements themselves

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and, significantly, the definitions and configurations of rights that they articulate, are contingent upon historical context and linked to social struggle. As the socio-political climate changed, platforms for fundamental human rights were increasingly characterised by pressure for the generation of greater socio-economic equality, evidenced by demands for socio-economic rights, and by demands for wider definitions of rights, including specific and collective cultural rights. 2) Changing patterns of civil engagement As a cycle of protest advances, successful popular movement organisations develop the forms that their contentious collective action takes, taking advantage of new political opportunities and adapting to new forms of political participation. Such changes will shape the ways in which social movements interact and engage with other social actors. The case studies demonstrate how forms of collective action were moulded by the consolidation of the rules of political engagement that accompanied both the return to electoral democracy, after 1985, and the ensuing peace process. Social movements and the peace process At the beginning of the cycle of protest in 1985, and after the return to civilian government, movements operated within a “schizophrenic state” in extremis. Here, despite the façade of elected government, the military retained considerable influence, political violence—ostensibly against popular activists—was acute, and the rule of law, “publicness” and citizenship rights, remained unconsolidated and partial. As a result of the nature of the internal armed conflict and the continuing violence and repression, and due to the unrepresentative political party system at all levels of society, political space and channels for participation were severely restricted in the early years of civilian rule. Consequently, civil society in Guatemala, although weak and disarticulated, became a key terrain of social struggle in a climate where few other options existed through which a civil opposition could operate. Significantly, this process was gradually reinforced by the reassessment of Leftist politics rooted in Gramscian thought taking place in the region, reflecting similar developments in other Latin American countries during authoritarian rule, such as Argentina.

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The arena of civil society can be crucial, therefore, as a location for the generation and constitution of oppositional discourse that may accompany social movement activity. However, as later events would demonstrate, civil society remained far from homogeneous during democratisation. Rather, the diverse nature of civil society meant it encompassed both the popular “democratising” sector and ultra-conservative actors such as CACIF, between whom, despite their temporary unification during the Serrano crisis of 1993, conflicts would increasingly escalate over the meaning and scope of democracy and the nature of rights that would undergird it. As had been the case under military rule in Argentina, given the restricted socio-political environment, the first (early riser) movements to emerge were characterised principally by their use of symbolic political forms. In the mid-1980s, organisations such as GAM and CONAVIGUA carried out acts of political theatre including demonstrations, occupations and marches, similar to the activity of Las Madres in Argentina. These movements called for the return of their friends and family using the demand, “vivos se los llevaron, vivos los queremos”. Additionally, activists would physically search for victims of the sate-sponsored political violence by looking in morgues and in areas well known for the dumping of bodies. The organisations, from their inception, also sought to utilise institutions of the state, particularly the Ministerio Público and the Procuraduría de los Derechos Humanos, however weak, as a means through which to present cases of human rights violations and thus to hold the perpetrators to account. Mass mobilisation remained a defining feature of collective action even after the establishment of formal means of engagement with the peace process, such as the CNR in 1989, in which social movement actors participated with the aim of shaping the future path of the peace process through discussion of the issues that were later to become the main foundations of the negotiations. While the effect of individual organisations was not in itself dramatic, the overall effect of participation in the CNR raised the profile of civil society and signalled it as a potential sphere of influence in the peace process, a development that was consolidated with the formation of the ASC in 1994. Moreover, the discussions meant that the thematic platforms of the early risers, principally human rights and demilitarisation, were present from an early stage in the national dialogue for peace between the state, the URNG and civil actors. In short, social movements in Guatemala were

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gradually afforded an internationally monitored formal institutional framework through which to channel their political mobilisations, in contrast perhaps with Southern Cone countries. Whilst this presented organisations with an unprecedented political role, once the peace process came to a close, organisations were left once again to their own devices, in a context that, over time, tolerated them less and resisted their demands more effectively. However, political society still remained elusive as an arena that civil society activists might penetrate and over which they might exercise influence: the ties between popular activists and political parties were historically weak, and indigenous society in particular continued to be distanced from political parties. Consequently, until 1994, with the establishment of the ASC, the activity of social movements took place predominantly within civil society itself. However, such activity was focused upon precipitating changes within both civil and state arenas and social movements, almost without exception, directed their platforms toward the state. In this way, “the politics of civil society”, as Dagnino has defined it (1998: 47–56), was a critical concern in Guatemala, as movements articulated their struggles for democracy and for a wide range of rights within the arena of civil society. The pattern of social mobilisation in Guatemala suggests, as scholars have observed of social movements in Latin America and beyond, that during the cycle of protest civil society was both the “terrain” and the “target” of collective action. However, prior to 1994, collective action remained rooted in what Cohen and Arato have defined as the “politics of identity”. Whilst seeking the transformation of the state, political activity was focused upon redefining “cultural norms, individual and collective identities, appropriate social roles, modes of interpretation and the form and content of discourses” (1992: 526). The focus of collective action broadened as democratisation unfolded, in particular with the creation of the ASC and the elections of 1995. As the peace process advanced, it afforded civil actors increasing political space and channels for participation of which to take advantage. With the formation of the ASC, the predominant movement paradigm of informal collective action and protest was augmented by the beginnings of the formal participation by civil society, significantly, of the popular movement, in the peace process at a consultative level. As argued, this development signalled the initiation of the second phase of the cycle of protest in Guatemala, although informal collective action remained an integral part of movements’ political repertoires. During

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this phase, movements began to widen their sphere of focus through participation in the ASC and later through the extension of their work into the realm of political society. The Guatemalan case reveals important lessons for social movements keen on engaging with the state and formal mechanisms of political inclusion. Organisations achieved differing levels of success in impacting upon the content of the peace accords, a success that was itself contingent upon the wider cumulative effect of democratisation more generally. CERJ took part in the negotiations for the proposals for the peace accords and was represented by Miguel Sucuquí, Amílcar Méndez and Miguel Tum in the ASC. The broader work of CERJ did not suffer overtly from its engagement with the ASC, and activity at the community level continued due to the diligence of its lawyers, national personnel and local leaders in addressing its members’ continuing needs. Moreover, as a result of the pressure from the wider popular movement, and of the international human rights regime, CERJ’s platforms were vindicated by the content of the accords. Ironically, however, these successes, and the organisation’s incapacity to adapt effectively to the changes accompanying democratisation, later led to a crisis in the political activity of CERJ. The shift from the practice of the politics of human rights and its predominance as a political discourse to the practice of indigenous politics accompanying changing conditions in Guatemala aggravated this phenomenon. CONIC’s experience of formal political participation within the peace process was both less substantial and less productive than that of CERJ. During the early stages of the transition, it sought the recovery of land and labour rights and the resolution of labour conflicts through direct negotiation with finqueros or via INTA and employer representatives. This strategy was effective, as CONIC sought land in exchange for the unpaid wages of rural workers and the construction of infrastructure and the facilitation of productive activity in communities with land. CONIC also achieved the return of land through the jornadas. These successes, along with the organisation’s insistence on maintaining its autonomy were key factors that explained its decision not to mobilise to any great extent within the ASC. Furthermore, in light of the historical development of the campesino movement and the political influence that the economic elite had commanded, the organisation anticipated that the discussion of labour rights, socio-economic rights and agrarian reform in the peace process would be both limited and unlikely to yield significant gains. Notably, the proposal for land reform was rejected

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by the ASC, perhaps vindicating CONIC’s resignation. CONIC concentrated on its political mobilisation, a strategy that distanced it from the popular movement and led to allegations against the organisation from all social sectors. Until the closing stages of democratisation, CONIC did not adhere to the rules of political engagement established through the peace process—these being participation in the ASC; consensual politics; and adherence to the frameworks of human rights and indigenous rights. Rather, CONIC’s confrontational politics that eschewed contact with the ASC and later with political society, while linking to these frameworks of rights, insisted upon socio-economic rights to entitlement. Despite the relative closure of the peace process to negotiation over socio-economic issues, it is questionable whether CONIC’s strategy foreclosed the possibility of its achieving further gains via the peace process. Defensoría Maya’s experience within the formal mechanisms of the peace process was far from adverse. The precedent for indigenous participation in the peace process was established in the Framework Accord and subsequently institutionalised with the creation of COPMAGUA and its role in the ASC. Juan León Alvarado was a founder member of COPMAGUA and took part in the process of proposal formation as a delegate, generating an indirect link between Defensoría Maya and the negotiation process. Many of the proposals of COPMAGUA, including the strengthening and officialisation of indigenous law, the organisation’s principal platform, were included in the AIDPI and, as argued above, this increased confidence and unified groups across the indigenous political spectrum. However, proposals for indigenous political autonomy were not accepted in the AIDPI. The accord vindicated Defensoría Maya’s own political objectives and gave the organisation increased political purchase after the signing of the AIDPI. Defensoría Maya benefited from and took advantage of the favourable socio-political context that legitimised and reinforced the discourse of indigenous rights and identity as a platform for social struggle. The presence of international advocacy networks in both cases was an important reinforcing factor. Movement strategies and political participation The return to civilian democracy in 1985 did not precipitate immediate changes in the relationship between civil society and political society. Political society was historically weak, characterised by a political culture

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of narrow party political representation in which civil actors participated minimally and which the thirty-six year internal armed conflict only served to exacerbate. Such was the case despite the historical ties between the DCG and the popular sector and the participation of indigenous activists in the DCG in the 1970s, most notably in highland Guatemala. As described in chapter two, the political system only began to broaden its spectrum of representation considerably with the 1995 elections, perhaps the “foundational elections”, and the formation of the FDNG. Such incremental changes were logical given the historical weakness of political society and the ferocity of the political violence and repression. Moreover, direct negotiations between the government and the URNG only began in 1991 and the formal inclusion of a wider range of social actors in the negotiations only took place after 1994, the latter process serving to legitimise the platforms and demands of the popular sector. These developments contributed to the revitalisation of political society, linked as they were to broader democratisation brought by the peace process. The Guatemalan case provides ample evidence of the possible consequences of movement engagement with political society. Given historical conditions, the narrow ideological spectrum of political parties and the more radical demands that the popular movement proposed regarding democratisation, engagement with political parties was not a realistic option for social movements until the elections of 1995. Consequently, the relative closure of political society to popular struggle contributed to actors’ strategic emphasis upon the “politics of identity” until this time. After 1995, however, some social movements in Guatemala began to broaden their spheres of interest, elaborating what Cohen and Arato define as a “politics of inclusion”, by seeking participation in and representation and recognition by political society (1992: 526). The more open socio-political climate and the emergence and legitimisation of new social actors that accompanied the peace process, in particular of indigenous and human rights activists and women’s organisations such as CONAVIGUA, were key factors in providing movements with this opportunity. The heightened profile of the URNG and their gradual acceptance as a legitimate political actor were also critical to the formation of the FDNG. However, the ties between the popular movement and the URNG limited, to a degree, the breadth of the “politics of inclusion” that social movements articulated. The creation of the FDNG, in which social movements participated at both leadership and community level, meant that collective action began

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to take on what Cohen and Arato describe as a “dual organisational logic” (1992: 523). After 1995, movement struggles became oriented towards the democratisation and expansion of political society, as well as toward the democratisation of civil society. As the case studies demonstrate, organisations’ elaboration of the “politics of inclusion” was differentiated, due in large part to the strategic decisions that they made. Significantly, the changes that accompanied democratisation and the new opportunities that this afforded social movements both allowed and obliged them to widen their political reach. To varying degrees, during the second phase of the cycle of protest movements gradually articulated an integral strategy of the politics of identity, the politics of inclusion and the “politics of influence”. The latter approach saw movements seek to project “new need-interpretations” and “new norms” upon Guatemalan society. The engagement of social movement actors with political society yielded ambiguous results. Unprecedented mobilisation of civil actors saw them develop spaces alongside URNG activists, with the formation of the FDNG, and independently through the activity of the Comités Cívicos and the revitalisation of the alcaldías indígenas, particularly in Quetzaltenango. The election of popular movement leaders to Congress and the more localised initiatives demonstrated a clear expansion of political society and the identification of new social actors and issues at the national level, simultaneously raising the profile of the popular movement and opening spaces for wider political protagonism. However, the historical weakness of political society and its fragile links with civil society, and the FDNG’s minority status and incapacity to articulate an inclusive and viable national project, limited the scope for wide-ranging popular gains. Broader representation of civil society was also curtailed by CONIC’s decision not to participate in the FDNG. The engagement of civil actors in political society did, however, contribute to a broader and historically important process of the reconstitution and widening of the politics of consensus at the national level. Social movement activity within the politico-institutional sphere was not uniform, nor did it have a uniform impact upon social movements. Significantly, participation in political society removed key activists from the social movement for prolonged periods of time and consequently diminished the resources of distinct organisations to varying degrees. Whilst no significant generalised demobilisation resulted from engagement in political society, individual movements were affected differentially according to their own political strength and acumen. Significantly,

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more centralised organisations were less able to ride out the effects that the decline in organisational resources caused. The winning of seats in congress was an important success for the FDNG and, more generally, for the popular movement as a whole. It did not, however, have immediate tangible effects on the daily work of particular organisations, but rather contributed to the broader cumulative process of democratisation. Moreover, given that the participation of social movements in political society did not deliver a fatal blow to movement politics as such, the trade-offs appear to have been worth the achievement of an extended and more representative political society. The evolution of the popular movement during democratisation suggests that popular mobilisation developed from being defined predominantly by platforms of “protest” and by informal peace-building initiatives and political participation, to platforms of “proposal” articulated within formalised political structures and through inclusion in a popular leftist party (Fals Borda 1992: 304). However, this was not the case to the same degree for all movements. Actors within those organisations that participated in the ASC and in political society decided that it was worth taking the risk of making trade-offs—principally regarding organisational resources and autonomy—for the gains that they might potentially achieve from formal participation. Clearly, such organisations did not, in themselves, become political parties. Indeed, no single social movement formed a political party: the FDNG was formed from URNG and popular movement activists. Rather, movements channelled actors and resources in that direction, while at the same time, and subsequently, mobilising as social movements. Thus organisations were not obliged to undergo dramatic and long-term structural, strategic and ideological transformation; they were able to focus their activity and direct their organisational resources according to the socio-political climate: engagement was contingent and strategic.1 What is clear, therefore, is that social movements in Guatemala did not follow a linear model of development from non-institutional mass protest action to institutionalised party politics. In this way, the parallel employment of informal and formal activity during the second stage of the cycle of protest by CERJ and Defensoría Maya partially reflects the pattern of

1 The strength of the links between the URNG and popular movements shaped this process. The URNG was the most likely of social actors to form a political party, given its role in the peace process and its historical ties with the popular movement.

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mobilisation of the feminist movement, as documented by Cohen and Arato. As they observe: “Instead of conforming to the linear model of development, the feminist movement has shifted back and forth between mass action and political pressure, depending on the available political opportunities and the issue at hand” (1992: 558). Equally important as a factor in the longevity of a social movement is its capacity to reflect official cultures and discourse, whilst representing its social base. The Guatemalan case demonstrates how the congruence of an organisation’s platforms and the conceptualisations of rights that it articulated with those issues and rights that were central to democratisation were key factors. Human rights, indigenous rights and citizenship rights and issues such as demilitarisation, the rule of law and cultural recuperation were critical to the national agenda for peace that evolved during democratisation. While conflict between social actors existed regarding the scope of the changes proposed, the government, the URNG and some members of the political, military and economic elites and organisations of the popular movement came to share this agenda. The articulation of such issues was carried out through symbolic political protest, consensual politics (electoral politics) and negotiation (the ASC). The government, military and economic and political elites’ accused organisations, individuals or sectors of going against the peace process if they challenged or departed from the norms of political engagement created and imposed during the peace process. Despite the historical importance of the land issue in Guatemala, CONIC eschewed participation in the ASC and in the FDNG. While fears of co-option rooted in the organisation’s history shaped this strategy, resignation regarding the efficacy of formal participation was pervasive among CONIC members. Although CONIC employed the discourses of fundamental human rights and broader indigenous rights in its platforms, the principal aims of the campesino movement, in particular agrarian reform and socio-economic rights were not concomitant with the parameters of the peace process and the national agenda for peace. Elite-driven processes guided the transition, a feature that scholars on transition, such as O’Donnell et al. (1986) and Mainwaring (1992) observe for other regional cases. Consequently, the interests and attitudes of elite actors profoundly defined the national agenda for peace. The security of the landowning elite, in particular, was of paramount importance in the Guatemalan case, limiting any wide-ranging impact that the campesino movement might have had.

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The unwillingness of other popular movement actors to jeopardise the gains that they had made through the peace process meant that CONIC did not receive substantial support from other popular organisations, and partially accounted for the minimal mobilisation around the SocioEconomic Accord. The culmination of this predicament took place when the government, the URNG and, critically, the popular movement accused CONIC of confrontational political strategies, leading to its temporary marginalisation from the popular movement. CONIC was, therefore, not co-opted by its participation in formal mechanisms of inclusion. However, after the organisation rejected confrontational politics and adhered to the rules of engagement outlined above, which included more broadly acceptable discourses, concepts of rights and political practices, CONIC achieved less advances, raising the question of whether such capitulation served to weaken the organisation’s contentious collective action and leverage. In spite of this, CONIC did, in combination with the other case studies, contribute to the “politics of influence”. Agrarian reform and rural development issues did command presence on the national political agenda, albeit minimally, and unprecedented levels of campesino mobilisation did take place during the cycle of protest. For the popular movement as a whole, the adverse consequences of engagement in the formal institutions of the peace process and in political society were relatively minimal, and in most cases appeared to be an acceptable price to pay for the creation of new political actors. Declining levels of mobilisation were balanced by the achievement of wide-ranging peace accords and an unprecedented legitimate political space in congress. However, the weakness and lack of focus of the FDNG, entrenched anti-democratic practices within congress and the FDNG’s inability to formulate a coherent and comprehensive national project once its six members were elected, challenged the long-term efficacy of this strategy. Individual movements bore the brunt of institutional involvement and those that were politically fragile suffered more considerably than agile movements capable of effective adaptation and whose platforms were bolstered by a favourable sociopolitical environment. The discourses of universal human rights and indigenous rights to entitlement were central to the parameters that shaped the rules of engagement of the peace process, over and above the guarantee of socio-economic rights. As democratisation unfolded, the hegemonic articulation of the politics of human rights discourse gave way to the prioritisation of indigenous politics within the popular

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movement partially to the detriment of struggles based upon socioeconomic issues. Whether human rights and indigenous rights to entitlement have the capacity to challenge poverty and broader structural domination remains to be seen. Importantly, we must ask whether the struggle for the exercise and legal protection of economic, social and specific and collective cultural rights is able to confront effectively the structural remnants of colonialism, institutional racism and the causes and consequences of Guatemala’s internal armed conflict. 3) Social movements and their effects In a wide range of contexts, scholarship on social movements has demonstrated how movements have developed their political discourses and the framework of rights that they articulated and shifted their activity strategically between different social arenas in distinct ways as a means of sustaining their organisational survival and broadening their political influence. In Guatemala, movements sought to take advantage of and shape the opportunities that the democratic transition afforded by carrying out collective action within civil society, targeting their policies at and making proposals to the state and by channelling resources towards political society. The sequences of contingent and diverse interactions between movements and authorities during the cycle of protest precipitated differentiated effects within the politico-institutional realm and within the arena of civil society. The impact of collective action developed out of the integrated approach that many movements adopted. Social movements secured comparatively substantive gains within the formalised context of the internationally monitored peace process at local, regional and national level. CERJ assisted in the exit of indigenous actors from the civil patrol throughout rural Guatemala and in urban areas such as Santa Cruz del Quiché. The organisation resolved legal cases relating to widespread human rights violations and fostered the recuperation of civilian authority structures at community and municipal level. With the support of the international community, the human rights movement, in particular CERJ, played a role in the decision to end forced recruitment and abolish the PAC. In this way, the organisation contributed to the process of demilitarisation in Guatemala. CONIC failed to consolidate its demands concerning the redistribution of land, something that, notably, campesino groups have

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not achieved at any time since 1954.2 However, through its activities the organisation won an unprecedented amount of land from individual finqueros and recovered workers’ salaries, predominantly given over as land. CONIC also resolved the plight of some campesino communities with regard to development issues by providing assistance in areas such as irrigation and cultivation to those of its communities in possession of land. By insisting upon the formation of development committees in those communities in which it worked, CONIC’s practices served to regenerate authority structures at the local level. Defensoría Maya was successful in resolving legal cases pertaining to an increasingly broad range of conflicts, although initially the majority of cases concerned violations of fundamental human rights. The organisation employed state law, which reactivated the judicial system and the rule of law in rural and urban areas. In its later stages, Defensoría Maya utilised indigenous law, which led to the revitalisation of indigenous forms of justice administration and linked into the wider national debate concerning collective rights. The organisation also supported the revitalisation of indigenous political authority structures, especially in those areas that had been affected by the internal armed conflict, by working with those authorities and training community leaders. As a result of the structured nature of formal political participation in the peace process, popular movement organisations assisted in formulating the content of the peace accords through their consultative role in the ASC, institutionally unprecedented at the regional level. The participation of the ASC was restricted to the substantive themes of democratisation. Impact upon the accords was varied, contingent in large part upon the specific issue involved and the strategies and objectives of civil society organisations. Discussion over demilitarisation, human rights, indigenous rights and some citizenship rights precipitated broader civil society impact and was consolidated in the Human Rights accord, the Resettlement accord, the AIDPI and the Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society. However, civil actors had little influence upon issues pertaining to the socio-economic sphere, demonstrated by the weakness of the Socio-Economic Accord, and they held little sway over the accord establishing the CEH. Civil society 2 See Brett (2008, forthcoming), Gleijeses (1991), Handy (1994) and Yashar (1997; 1997b) for detailed political histories of the 1944–1954 period.

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organisations did not participate in the discussions concerning the Law of National Reconciliation, or amnesty, which ultimately limited the power of the judiciary to carry out prosecutions of perpetrators of violations during the conflict. While the influence of civil actors upon the peace accords was undoubtedly significant, it was subject to the parameters of the elite-led transition process and the themes that were negotiable therein. Frameworks of collective action that were permissible within this process governed the concepts of rights that civil actors could effectively articulate. The master frame of human rights was extended to include indigenous rights to entitlement, the employment of which served to advance the struggles of social movements during the peace process. The case of CONIC illustrates how economic rights were not negotiable as an aspect of universal human rights, however. Furthermore, during democratisation in Guatemala, some platforms that prioritised cultural issues considerably threatened the interests of political and economic elites and their impact was consequently restricted. CONIC’s unsuccessful framing of material claims through a cultural rights framework and the rejection of demands for indigenous political autonomy at the mesa demonstrated the limited capacity of demands based upon cultural rights to entitlement. Such framings, particularly economic, social and cultural rights, were subject to mediation by elite actors and, subsequently, had a limited effect on broad structures of domination, particularly given the specific historical context in which they emerged. In short, certain demands and configurations of rights were amplified through the ASC, over and above others: universal human rights, universal citizenship rights and certain limited indigenous rights won an unprecedented degree of institutional recognition. While the strategies of the campesino movement doubtless foreclosed the possibilities of its effecting broader long-term influence by its minimal participation in the ASC, demands that targeted the interests of the economic and political elite, particularly those relating to socio-economic transformation and the redistribution of political power, met with institutional closure and were effectively muted. The weakness of movements’ capacity to discuss socio-economic issues stemmed evidently from the most fundamental birth defect of Guatemala’s democratic transition, a birth defect that has severely limited the possibilities of consolidating a deep and stable democracy. In other words, the profound discussion and the accompanying negotiation of the land reform issue within the peace negotiations, one of the principal root causes of the internal

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armed conflict, was sacrificed as a means of minimising the anguish of economic and political elites, and maximising the possibilities of their presence at the negotiating table. The historically and ideologically determined parameters that framed democratisation in Guatemala severely impeded the capacities of agile movement activists to effect socio-economic transformation then. Some rights, it seems, are more negotiable than others. In many respects, the impact of social movements during democratisation in Guatemala reflects that of other movements elsewhere on the continent. Over and above the changes that took place in the politicoinstitutional realm as a result of social mobilisation during the cycle of protest, perhaps the most far-reaching effects of social movements in Guatemala have been “slow and incremental changes in political culture”, as scholars have observed for collective action elsewhere. The “dualistic” strategies of social movements combined activity within civil society and political society, contributing to the expansion and partial democratisation of these spheres. While the political efficacy of the FDNG was limited, its emergence broadened the ideological spectrum of political society and generated the increased engagement of civil actors in that arena. In this case, the “politics of inclusion” extended the parameters of political society and acted to strengthen links between civil society and the political arena, an outcome that Foweraker attributes to collective action (1998: 288). Within civil society, activists’ membership in social movements, and their participation in the reconstitution of civilian authorities that in some cases accompanied mobilisation, also strengthened political participation. Movement activity in the civil and political realms raised the confidence of historically marginalised indigenous and campesino actors and brought their sectoral concerns into the national political arena; in short it led to actors’ “empowerment” (Tarrow 1994: 184). This process in itself contributed to the revitalisation of indigenous and campesino identities, a development that Starn has noted with regard to the impact of the rondas movement in Peru (1992; 1999). A further manifestation of changes within political culture linked to the activity of social movements was the increasing engagement of previously excluded social actors with the legal mechanisms of the state, particularly in rural Guatemala. Collective action generated the gradual strengthening of the rule of law as organisations petitioned the Ministerio Público and the PDH as a means of resolving legal cases frequently pertaining to human rights violations. This process, along

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with the cumulative effect of democratisation, brought about a somewhat less resistant judicial system. Organisations attempted to prevent further violations and to secure the human rights guaranteed in national and international law, presenting them as claims against the state. Consequently, social movement struggles during the cycle of protest, framed in the language of rights, contributed to the reconstitution of a regime of rights. This aspect of movement politics in Guatemala reflects the phenomenon described by Foweraker and Landman, wherein the struggles of social movements seek to close the gap between “rightsin-principle” and “rights in practice” (1997: 21). Such activity initially focused on the reactivation of fundamental human rights and, as the socio-political environment changed, widened to include the activation of broader civil and political rights and specific and collective cultural rights. In this way, social movement activity was instrumental in the creation of a “culture of rights” in Guatemala, as it has been in other countries in the region. The generation of a rights culture was one of the principal aspects of the transformation of political culture that resulted from collective action and a fundamental way in which social movements “made culture” (Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Alvarez et al. 1998). Through the process of social mobilisation itself and the rights frames and political platforms that movements articulated, which included programmes of popular education, social movements in Guatemala acted as what Foweraker and Landman define as “schools of rights” (1997: 227). Collective action linked the debate concerning the importance of rights to democratisation, generated knowledge of the right to have rights as activists learnt from their experiences and precipitated broader rights claims as the transition advanced. This culture of rights, however, has remained severely limited in its scope and reach within Guatemalan society. Crucial to the development of a rights culture were the changing frames of action that social movements articulated and the developing configurations of rights that were integral to these frames. Social movements initially utilised the master frame of human rights to interpret and frame their grievances and to reconstruct meaning in their lives in the wake of genocide and in conditions of extreme poverty. However, as social conditions changed the efficacy of the discourse of universal human rights diminished somewhat, obliging movement entrepreneurs to realign their collective action frames. As had been the case elsewhere in Latin America, social movements strategically built upon the master

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frame of human rights, culminating in the development of a diverse indigenous politics. In Guatemala, the development of claims to entitlement based upon indigenous identity allowed activists to include a wider range of rights claims in their struggles, taking them beyond fundamental universal human rights and a limited spectrum of universal citizenship rights. Claims framed in the language of specific and collective cultural rights increased demands for “equality” with demands for entitlement emanating from “difference”. Changes were reflected in the development of organisational platforms and extended to the preservation of indigenous languages and culture; the officialisation of indigenous law; indigenous political autonomy and land ownership. Indigenous activists also sought to conceptualise and come to terms with the politicohistorical processes and events that took place during and before the internal armed conflict. A crucial part of this was the quest to resignify and transform dominant cultural conceptions and understandings of Guatemalan history, acknowledge the racist nature of the Guatemalan state and content to being indigenous. Organisations sought to assert a distinct reading of history since Columbus as five hundred years of resistance, rather than the discovery of the New World. Moreover, organisations challenged the cultural conceptions of the indigenous Guatemalan as Indian, basing their argument upon the international legal definition of indigenous peoples.3 Social mobilisation is contingent upon the wider socio-political environment. However, its path and impact are influenced by actors’ past experiences, the strategic choices that they make and their ability to take advantage of the opportunities that, in the case of Guatemala, were afforded by democratisation. The discourses of human rights and indigenous rights, themselves reinforced by favourable socio-political environments and opportunity structures and an active international rights regime, furnished activists with an increasingly diverse repertoire through which to interpret and express their shared grievances and struggles. However, as Foweraker and Landman have argued, the diffusion of such social struggles and the common demands that articulate them is contingent upon “active leadership and an equally active creation of rights claims”. In other words, the process through which social movements interpret and express their experiences and demands and

3

See Wilson (1995) and Brett (1997) for detailed examination of this process.

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project them toward wider society is key to the effective enunciation of a collective frame of action, and ultimately to movement impact. As Foweraker and Landman observe: “the discourse of rights. . . . only has meaning in the social movements that articulate it and make it politically potent” (1997: 34). As society changes, so movement identities and strategies themselves must change. However, as Brysk has argued for the case of Argentina, social mobilisation, and we would add the collective frames of action that accompany it, leave “a residue of new conceptual frameworks, historical reference points and repertoires for collective action” (1994: 152). At the close of the peace process in 1996, indigenous rights claims to entitlement took precedence over the discourse of universal human rights as the predominant language of movement struggle. However, in a country such as Guatemala, whose political history has been and continues to be determined to such an extent by acts of egregious violence and brutality, patterns of popular struggle are not irreversible, but rather contingent and strategic. After the murder of Bishop Juan Gerardi Conadera in April 1998 and in the run-up to the 1999 elections, when acts of political violence began to escalate once again, the prioritisation of the discourse and practice of the politics of human rights re-emerged, suggesting the residual, cyclical and contingent nature of social struggle. In the first half of the first decade of the twenty-first century, human rights discourse remains key to movement struggles, alongside new interpretations of rights, as everyday violence and rights violations continue to blight and traumatise Guatemalan society. Such developments raise the question of whether the changes in political culture precipitated by collective action, which appeared to outweigh its politico-institutional effects, have been sufficient in challenging broader structures of domination, and are therefore, politically sustainable in the long-term. Final considerations Although in historical perspective the developments in the politicoinstitutional sphere and the realm of political culture outlined above have been comparatively significant, their institutionalisation continues to remain elusive. In March 1999, a national referendum, or Consulta Popular, was held to approve changes to the Guatemalan Constitution to institutionalise the commitments set out in the peace accords. The package of amendments was rejected, posing a severe setback for social

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social movements, indigenous politics

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movements and pro-reformist sectors of civil society, strengthening anti-reformist and anti-democratic actors and the social formations of racism and discrimination and leaving reforms proposed in the peace accords unrealised. The “No” vote in the Consulta Popular also raised the question of whether democratisation in Guatemala was really taking root, or whether it was a process imposed from the outside, with little local ownership. Moreover, the disintegration of the FDNG prior to the 2000 elections demonstrated how the stable representation of new social actors and issues through party politics in Guatemala would be a long and arduous struggle. Given the historical proximity of the peace process, terminated only a decade ago, the long-term outcome of collective action is still under consideration, although the transformation of the norms, values and practices of political culture engendered by collective action remain thus far emphatically confined to a minority of social actors, as Brysk has documented for the case of Argentina (1994). Without the support of broader institutional and structural changes and widespread political will, it is doubtful whether such developments are sufficient to confront and overcome Guatemala’s exclusionary and violent political history. Significantly, many indigenous people voted against the constitutional changes proposed in the Consulta, demonstrating that it is the attitudes and behaviour of non-elite, as well as elite actors, and the factors that determine such attitudes, which must undergo dramatic changes, if Guatemala is to break with its authoritarian past and consolidate democracy. In the context of increasing acute, ethnically biased poverty, the lack of long-term impact by organisations pursuing socio-economic reform, both at the politico-institutional level and within political culture, raises the question of whether movement politics is able to challenge the structural aspects of prevailing socio-economic patterns of distribution. Given that collective action has remained a critical part of the lives of poor indigenous and ladinos in the wake of the democratisation process outlined here, a fundamental task of future scholarship will be to track the continuing path of social mobilisation in Guatemala. How will movements adapt to the challenges that lay ahead and how will they begin to confront the endemic structural difficulties of the past? In conclusion, a further lesson can be drawn from the Guatemalan case. Even with generalised levels of collective mobilisation, formal inclusion in the peace process and political party representation in Congress and in spite of unprecedented changes within the realm of political culture, social movements have as yet been unable to wield

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significant influence upon the structural and institutional foundations of authoritarianism and poverty rooted in the racist politics of Guatemala’s past. Moreover, as the first decade of the twenty-first century draws to a close, the indigenous movement has not yet consolidated an irreversible foothold in Guatemalan society. Whilst social transformation is an incremental and unpredictable process, contingent contentious collective action is insufficient to tackle the urgent problems that plague the everyday lives of poor and socially excluded Guatemalans. It is the role of policy-makers to formulate effective programmes that foster links between the changes occurring in political culture, principally based upon the recognition of the significance of rights provision to democratic practices, with broader institutional mechanisms that effectively guarantee the rights that underlie the daily experiences of social actors. Socio-economic rights, and more broadly all social economic and cultural rights, including the specific and collective rights of indigenous peoples, must be an integral aspect of such a policy and a fundamental undergirding framework of the democratic polity. Only then may we begin to challenge some of the factors that shape not only the lives of poor and marginalised Latin Americans, but that determine the capacity of civil society organisations to extend the scope of new democracies in the twenty-first century. The consolidation of those instruments that guarantee the realisation, exercise and protection of an integral framework of human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights, and that effectively hold state and non-state actors to account for their violation, must then be a central commitment of our actions and responsibilities as individuals and states.

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APPENDIX A

THE PEACE PROCESS: SIGNED AGREEMENTS 1 October 1994 – Framework Agreement for the Resumption of the Negotiating Process between the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca 29 March 1994 – Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights – Agreement on a Timetable for Negotiations of a Firm and Lasting Peace in Guatemala 17 June 1994 – Agreement on Resettlement of the Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed Conflict 23 June 1994 – The Agreement on the Establishment of the Commission to clarify past human rights violations and acts of violence that have caused Guatemalan population to suffer 31 March 1995 – Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples 5 June 1996 – Agreement Concerning Socio-economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation 19 September 1996 – Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society 4 December 1996 – Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire 7 December 1996. – Agreement on Constitutional Reforms and Electoral Regime 12 December 1996 – Agreement on the Basis for the Legal Integration of URNG 29 December 1996 – Agreement on the Implementation, Compliance and Verification Timetable for the Peace Agreements – Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace

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APPENDIX B

MEMBERSHIP ORGANIZATIONS OF LA ASAMBLEA DE LA SOCIEDAD CIVIL (ASC) The ASC included a President, a General Secretary (appointed by the President), twelve members of the Organising Committee and fifty-five representatives from eleven different civil society sectors, making up a total of sixty-nine people. The eleven sectors represented were: político; religioso; sindical y popular; cooperativista y microempresa; periodistas; mujeres; organizaciones no gubernamentales; centros de investigación; agrupaciones mayas; centros de tutela y promoción de los derechos humanos; el sector empresarial. The following organisations, amongst others, were represented directly in the ASC, or indirectly through membership in instancias: Asamblea Consultiva de las Poblaciones Desarraigadas (ACPD) Asociación de Estudiantes Universitarios (AEU) Centro para la Acción Legal en Derechos Humanos (CALDH) Comité Campesino del Altiplano (CCDA) Comisiones Permanentes de Refugiados (CCPP) Consejo de Comunidades Étnicas—Runujel Junam (CERJ) Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas (CNOC) Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos de Guatemala (CONADEHGUA) Coordinadora Nacional de Pequeños y Medianos Productores (CONAMPRO) Coordinadora Nacional de Viudas de Guatemala (CONAVIGUA) Confederación Guatemalteca de Confederaciones Cooperativas (CONFECOOP) Conferencia de Religiosos de Guatemala (CONFREGUA) Consejo Nacional de Desplazados de Guatemala (CONDEG) Coordinadora Nacional Indígena y Campesina (CONIC) Coordinación de Organizaciones del Pueblo Maya de Guatemala (COPMAGUA): which was constituted by: Academia de Lenguas Mayas de Guatemala (ALMG) Asamblea Permanente del Pueblo Maya (APM) Consejo de Organizaciones Mayas de Guatemala (COMG) Instancia de Unidad y Consenso Maya (IUCM) Comunidades de Población en Resistencia (CPR) Central de Trabajadores del Campo (CTC) Colectivo para la Promoción del Desarrollo Integral de la Mujer (COMPRODIMU)

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Comité de Unidad Campesina (CUC) Confederación de Unidad Sindical de Guatemala (CUSG) Defensoría Maya (DM) Familiares de Detenidos y Desaparecidos de Guatemala (FAMDEGUA) Fundación Myrna Mack (FMM) Fundación para la Paz, la Democracia, el Desarrollo (FUNDAPAZD) Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo (GAM) Instituto para la Democracia, el Desarrollo y la Paz (IDEPAZ) Majawil Q’ij Representación Unitaria de la Oposición Guatemalteca (RUOG) Unión de Acción Sindical y Popular (UASP) Unión del Pueblo Maya de Guatemala (UPMAG) Unión Sindical de Trabajadores de Guatemala (UNSITRAGUA)

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CITED SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY Interviews Anonymous interviews cited were carried out in El Quiché, Huehuetenango, the Verapaces and Sololá with local members of CERJ, CONIC AND Defensoría Maya. Albizurez, Miguel Angel (Familiares de Detenidos y Desaparecidos de Guatemala FAMDEGUA). Guatemala City, Sep-Oct 1998. Argueta, Antonio (CONIC). Guatemala City, 12/10/98. Barwick, Peter (Ex-MINUGUA Volunteer). London, 12/2/99. Bastos, Santiago (Facultad Latinoamericana para las Ciencias Sociales). Guatemala City, 10/10/2005. Caal, Teresa (Women’s Commission, Defensoría Maya). Guatemala City, 2/6/98 and 3/6/98. Calí, Francisco (CALDH and present President, Indian Treaty Council). Guatemala City, 15/5/98. Ceto, Pablo (FUNDAMAYA and present ANN congressional deputy). Guatemala City, 17/10/98. Chanchavac Cux, Rafael (Secretary, CONIC). Guatemala City, Oct-Nov 1998. Chitic Pérez, Miguel (CONIC). Guatemala City, 6/10/98. Cotjí Cuxil, Demetrio (present Vice-Minister of Education). Guatemala City, 9/9/98. Esquina, Pedro (Treasurer, CONIC). Guatemala City, 3/12/98. Gramajo Morales, General Héctor Alejandro (Ex-Minister of Defence). Guatemala City, 7/9/98. Gutiérrez, Edgar (Ex-Coordinator of REMHI and present Secretary of Strategic Issues, Guatemala). Guatemala City, 30/10/98 and 11/11/98. Hernández, Santos (Regional Delegate, Defensoría Maya). Sololá, 18/7/98. Hernández Cuellar, Belter (Legal Commission, CERJ). Guatemala City, Feb-March 1998. Juárez, Rigoberto (Coordinator of COPMAGUA). Guatemala City, 11/1/98. La Rue, Frank (Coordinator, CALDH). Guatemala City, 17/7/98. León de Alvarado, Juan (Coordinator of Defensoría Maya). Guatemala City, 18/11/98 and 10/12/98. Lopez, Isabella (Defensoría Maya). Guatemala City, 26/5/98 and 1/6/98. Mendez, Amílcar (Founder of CERJ and ex-congressional deputy FDNG). Guatemala City, 11/12/98. Monteros, Rigoberto (Vice-Secretary, CONIC). Guatemala City, 29/10/98 and 3/12/98. Muños, José Luis (CONIC). Guatemala City, 12/10/98. Orozco, Alberto (CONIC). Guatemala City, 18/10/98. Palencia Prado, Tania (Political Analyst). Guatemala City, 14/9/98. Paz, Ovidio (Legal Commission, Defensoría Maya). Guatemala City, 3/6/98 and 20/7/98. Peralta, Gustavo (Legal Commission, CERJ). Guatemala City, 9/2/98, 13/2/98 and 17/3/98. Sen, Tomás (Legal Commission, Defensoría Maya). Guatemala City, 11/6/98 and London, 15/6/99. Solis, Isabel (CONIC). Guatemala City, 18/10/98. Sucuqui, Miguel (Coordinator, CERJ). Guatemala City, 6/5/98 and 7/5/98.

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Tum, Miguel (Regional Coordinator, CERJ). Guatemala City, 10/3/98. Tuyuc, Vicente (Defensoría Maya). Guatemala City, 9/6/98 and 8/9/98. Tzoc, Justina (Regional Coordinator, CERJ). Guatemala City, 8/5/98. Tzoc, Lucas (Defensoría Maya). Guatemala City, 4/6/98. Tzoc, María (Defensoría Maya). Guatemala City, 4/6/98. Velásquez, Leticia (Defensoría Maya). Guatemala City, 9/6/98.

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INDEX Acción Católica 59, 88 Alta Verapaz 81, 87, 115, 126, 131, 137, 146, 161 Amnesty International xiv, 16, 48, 56, 63, 85 Argueta, Antonio, 121, 122, 123, 129, 134, 137, 146 Argueta, Claudia 121, 122, 137, Arnault, Jean 48 Arzú, Álvaro 53, 54, 56, 72, 139, 172 Asamblea de la Sociedad Civil 4, 30, 33, 48, 70, 99, 166, 213 Asamblea Permanente del Pueblo Maya 67, 68 Asturias, Rodrigo 56 Atzlán, Retalhuleu 124, 132 Baja Verapaz 2, 81, 126, 131 Balconi, Julio 106 Barrios, Justo Rufino 114 Caal, Teresa 159, 161 Cajolá, Quetzaltenango 121, 124, 125, 126, 130 Calí, Francisco 68, 116 Cámara del Agro 132, 133 Carter, James 36, 94 Central de Trabajadores del Campo 46 Central General de Trabajadores de Guatemala 45 Cerezo Arévalo, Vinicio 4, 19, 38, 81 Chanchavac Cux, Rafael 122, 140 Chichicastenango 81 Chimaltenango 60, 113, 164, 171 Chiquimula 81, 99 Chupol 83, 84, 94 Cobán 99, 126 Comisión Gubernamental para la Paz 47 Comisión Nacional de Reconciliación 34, 40, 95 Comisiones Permanentes de Refugiados 65 Comité Campesino del Altiplano 68 Comité Coordinador de Asociaciones Agrícolas, Comerciales, Industriales y

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Financieras 37, 38, 41, 45, 46, 47, 49, 73, 124, 132, 139, 193 Comité de Unidad Campesina 7, 50, 117, 124, 128, 146, 148, 150, 155, 156, 162, 165, 168, 169, 186 Comités Voluntarios de Defensa Civil 82 Confederación de Unidad Sindical de Guatemala xiv, 46, 86 Conferencia de Religiosos de Guatemala 96 Congreso Latinoamericano de Organizaciones Campesinas 148 Consejo de Comunidades Étnicas Runujel Junam xiii, 6, 7, 42, 56, 63, 64, 66, 71, 79, 80, 81, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 138, 150, 155, 151, 162, 164, 165, 168, 173, 180, 181, 186, 188, 190, 191, 195, 199, 202, 204 Consejo Nacional de Desplazados de Guatemala 43, 64 Constitutional Court 38, 45, 48 Coordinación de Organizaciones del Pueblo Maya de Guatemala 49, 100, 148, 158, 162, 166, 167, 171, 171, 176, 177, 196, 197 Coordinadora de Organizaciones del Pueblo Maya de Guatemala 70 Coordinadora Nacional Indígena y Campesina xiii, 6, 49, 69, 111, 112, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 145, 146, 147, 148, 161, 162, 164, 174, 181, 185, 186, 188, 190, 191, 195, 196, 198, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204 Coordinadora Majawil Q’ij 66 Coordinadora Nacional Agropecuaria 134 Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas 14, 49 Coordinadora Nacional de Viudas de Guatemala 42, 64, 66, 71, 73, 89,

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90, 91, 104, 148, 150, 162, 164, 171, 193, 198 de León Carpio, Ramiro 47, 48, 50, 51, 53, 56 Defensoría Maya xiii, 6, 7, 8, 42, 69, 75, 77, 89, 104, 105, 106, 138, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153m 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183 Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca 38, 39, 60, 179, 197 Edgar Gutiérrez 44, 45, 48 Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres 59, 60, 61, 87, 118, 119, 120, 165, 171 El Estor, Izabal 137 Escuintla 113, 131 Esquina, Pedro 120, 121, 123, 124, 129, 133, 134, 137 Fonatierra 148 Fondo Nacional para la Paz 148 Foro Multisectorial 45 Foro Multisectorial Social 45 Frente Democrático Nueva Guatemala xiv, 53, 54, 72, 73, 74, 75, 80, 104, 105, 106, 139, 141, 162, 175, 178, 179, 180, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 205, 209 Frente Republicano Guatemalteco 74, 179 Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes 87 Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo 40, 63, 64, 66, 71, 79, 86, 90, 91, 104, 162, 193 Huehuetenango 2, 84, 87, 113, 120, 131, 161, 164, 170 Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office 62, 63, 70, 84, 92, 97, 98, 137, 189, 193, 205 Human Rights Watch 16 Instancia de Unidad y Consenso Maya 67, 68, 99, 144, 157, 162 Instituto Nacional de Transformación Agraria 121, 125, 126, 129, 132, 133, 134, 139, 143, 147, 148 Ixcán 169

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Kennedy Centre for Human Rights, 56, 85 Lake Atitlán 120 Las Trampas 94 León Alvarado, Juan 68, 74, 89, 118, 155, 156, 157, 162, 163, 167, 168, 169, 171, 175, 176, 179, 181, 196 Lobos Zamora, Rodolfo 37 López, Isabella 41 Lucas García, Romeo 37, 81 Mack, Helen 46 Mack, Myrna 46 Majawil Qxij 66, 67, 68, 69, 155, 157, 161, 162, 165, 169 Mejía Víctores, Oscar Humberto 82 Menchú, Rigoberta 51, 53, 60, 67, 118, 156, 187 Méndez, Amílcar 80, 85, 88, 89, 94, 99, 100, 103, 104, 105, 106, 109, 162, 195 Méndez Montenegro, Julio César 4 Mendoza, Justo 105 Mendoza, Otto 72, 122 Misión de las Naciones Unidas para la Verificación 50, 51, 56, 71, 100, 101, 131, 137, 139, 166, 177, 186 Mitterand, Danielle 67 Montenegro, Nineth 89, 104, 162 Monteros, Rigoberto xiii, 72, 112, 121, 122, 133, Movimiento de Liberación Nacional 38 Muñoz, José Luis 34 National Demobilisation Plan 55 Nebaj, Quiché 81, 170, 177 Noriega, Cándido 165 Novella, Olga 56 Nueva Cajolá, Retalhuleu 121, 124, 125, 126, 130, Nukup Ajpop 73, 74 Organización Revolucionaria del Pueblo en Armas 56, 120 Pajuliboy 84, 94 Panciaq 94 Partido de Avanzada Nacional 43, 74 Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo 87 Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil 48, 55, 56, 81, 98

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index Paz, Ovidio 157, 160, 164 Peralta, Gustavo 89, 90, 91 Petén 87 Plan Nacional de Seguridad y Desarrollo 37 Policía Militar Ambulante 55 Portillo, Alfonso 98 Presidential Offi ce for Legal Assistance and the Resolution of Land Conflicts 148 Procuraduría de los Derechos Humanos 62, 63, 70, 84, 92, 97, 98, 137, 189, 193, 205 Pu, Rosario 89 Quemé Chay, Rigoberto 54 Quetzaltenango 3, 54, 59, 65, 113, 118, 121, 124, 131, 135, 137, 151, 179, 198 Quezada Toruño, Rodolfo 40 Quiché 2, 6, 7, 41, 59, 60, 63, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 92, 94, 99, 101, 103, 104, 105, 113, 120, 121, 131, 150, 153, 154, 155, 157, 162, 164, 165, 168, 171, 173, 177, 202 Raymundo, Francisco 171, 179, 181 Rechq´a Tinamit 153, 154, 155 Recuperation of Historical Memory Project (REMHI) 81, 82, 83, 117 Retalhuleu 121, 134, 131, 132 Ríos Montt, Efraín 37, 81 Rodríguez , Hugo 122 Rosada, Héctor 47 Sacpulup 84, 88, 94 San Cayetano, Retalhuleu 132 San Jorge La Laguna 120, 124 San Juan La Laguna 154 San Marcos 81, 87, 113, 115, 134, 137 Santa Cruz del Quiché 41, 63, 80, 81, 84, 99, 153, 162, 202

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229

Santa Inés, Retalhuleu 121, 124 Santiago Atitlán 120 Sen, Tomás 150, 151, 157, 179, 181 Serrano Elías, Jorge 34, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 67, 73, 124, 126, 153, 155 Solís, Isabel xiii, 121, 122, 127, 133 Sololá 2, 7, 81, 87, 99, 113, 120, 121, 124, 131, 150, 151, 153, 154, 157, 158, 161, 164, 167, 168, 170, Suchitepéquez 81, 113, 135 Sucuquí, Miguel 88, 89, 94, 98, 100, 104, 106 Sului, Ricardo 150, 181 Tiney, Juan 120, 121, 123, 129, 134, 139, 162 Totonicapán 99, 113, 115 Tucurú, Alta Verapaz 137 Tum, Miguel 84, 98, 100, 104, 106, 195 Tuyuc, Rosalina 73, 89, 104, 162, 171 Tuyuc, Vicente 168, 169, 171 Tzoc, Justina 88, 89, 91, 94, 98, 104 Tzoc, María 155, 161, 168, 169 Unidad de Acción Sindical y Popular 41, 91, 133, 139, 144 Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca 3, 4, 30, 33, 34, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 48, 50, 51, 53, 54, 56, 61, 65, 66, 69, 72, 73, 87, 105, 118, 141, 142, 155, 168, 169, 193, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201 Unidad Sindical de Trabajadores de Guatemala 41 Unión del Centro Nacional 38 Unión Nacional Agropecuaria de Guatemala 41 Usaqxil Tinamit 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155 Vásquez, Juana 121, 122 Velásquez, Leticia 156, 161

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