Social Movements and Public Policies in Southern European Cities [1st ed.] 9783030527532, 9783030527549

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Urban and Landscape Perspectives

Laura Fregolent Oriol Nel·lo Editors

Social Movements and Public Policies in Southern European Cities

Urban and Landscape Perspectives Volume 21

Series Editor Giovanni Maciocco, Palazzo del Pou Salit, Università di Sassari, Alghero, Sassari, Italy

Urban and Landscape Perspectives is a series which aims at nurturing theoretic reflection on the city and the territory and working out and applying methods and techniques for improving our physical and social landscapes. The main issue in the series is developed around the projectual dimension, with the objective of visualising both the city and the territory from a particular viewpoint, which singles out the territorial dimension as the city’s space of communication and negotiation. The series will face emerging problems that characterise the dynamics of city development, like the new, fresh relations between urban societies and physical space, the right to the city, urban equity, the project for the physical city as a means to reveal civitas, signs of new social cohesiveness, the sense of contemporary public space and the sustainability of urban development. Concerned with advancing theories on the city, the series resolves to welcome articles that feature a pluralism of disciplinary contributions studying formal and informal practices on the project for the city and seeking conceptual and operative categories capable of understanding and facing the problems inherent in the profound transformations of contemporary urban landscapes. More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/7906

Laura Fregolent  •  Oriol Nel·lo Editors

Social Movements and Public Policies in Southern European Cities

Editors Laura Fregolent Department of Architecture and Arts Università Iuav di Venezia Venezia, Italy

Oriol Nel·lo Geography Department Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Bellaterra, Spain

Urban and Landscape Perspectives ISBN 978-3-030-52753-2    ISBN 978-3-030-52754-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52754-9 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

1 Introduction: Social Change, Political Discontent, and Urban Movements in Southern European Cities��������������������������    1 Laura Fregolent and Oriol Nel·lo Part I Urban Challenges and Collective Action 2 Urban Movements and the Challenges of the European City ������������   15 Oriol Nel·lo 3 From Protest to Program Berlin’s Anti-­gentrification-­Movement Since Reunification����������������������������������������������������������������������������������   33 Andrej Holm 4 Making Sense of (New) Social Mobilisations, Conflicts and Contention in the Tourist City: A Typology ����������������������������������   53 Claire Colomb and Johannes Novy 5 The City, Local Conflicts and Public Policies����������������������������������������   75 Francesco Indovina Part II Urban Movements, Unity in Diversity 6 “The City Belongs to Us!”: Claiming Social Rights and Urban Citizenship in the Face of Urban Renewal Programs in a Mediterranean French City ������������������������������������������   91 David Giband 7 Social Innovation Against Socio-spatial Segregation: The Case of Catalonia������������������������������������������������������������������������������  113 Ismael Blanco 8 Can Social Innovation Transform Local Governments? The Experience of Naples������������������������������������������������������������������������  137 Elena Ostanel v

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9 Fighting Against Monocultures: Wine-­Growing and Tourism in the Veneto Region��������������������������������������������������������������������������������  151 Matteo Basso and Laura Fregolent 10 The Reconfiguration of Urban Movements and Politics in Lisbon ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  167 João Seixas and António Brito Guterres

Chapter 1

Introduction: Social Change, Political Discontent, and Urban Movements in Southern European Cities Laura Fregolent and Oriol Nel·lo

1.1  T  he Evolution of the Mediterranean Metropolis: Inequality, Segregation, Expansion, and Diversity Since the beginning of the economic crisis of 2008, social inequality in the European countries of the Mediterranean has grown significantly. In Italy, Greece, and Spain, the differences in the general distribution of income have increased, as well as the population living below the poverty line and the distance between the most affluent and the most vulnerable social groups. The ratio between the percentage of income perceived by the most favored quintile of the population and the most disadvantaged, for example, has passed between 2007 and 2016 from 5.6 to 6.0 in Greece, from 5.2 to 5.9 in Italy, and from 5.2 to 6.5 in Spain. These are notable increases, especially in the Spanish case, much higher than the average of the OECD countries (OECD 2019). Thus, with the notable exception of Portugal, the Mediterranean countries are today among the most unequal in the European Union. In urban areas, this dynamic has had the effect of deteriorating the living conditions of an important part of the population and aggravating residential segregation (Tammaru et al. 2016). As is well known, the ability of each individual or household to choose a place of residence depends essentially on their disposable income and on real estate prices. In a context of raising inequality, the ability to choose social groups with higher resources, as is logical, increases with respect to the rest of the population. The evolution of the real estate market, from the financial bubble of the first years of the twenty-first century to the subsequent depression and the sinking L. Fregolent Department of Architecture and Arts, Università Iuav di Venezia, Venezia, Italy e-mail: [email protected] O. Nel·lo (*) Geography Department, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Bellaterra, Spain e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Fregolent, O. Nel·lo (eds.), Social Movements and Public Policies in Southern European Cities, Urban and Landscape Perspectives 21, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52754-9_1

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of the possibilities of accessing credit (Burriel 2008; Fregolent and Torri 2018; Seixas et  al. 2019; Cecchini et  al. 2019), has favored this dynamic. Thus, in the Mediterranean metropolis, social groups with lower incomes are increasingly confined to those parts of urban areas where prices are relatively lower whereas the more affluent sectors concentrate in areas with better services and higher quality of life. In this way, residential segregation becomes a factor that contributes to reproduce and expand social inequalities (Oberti and Preteceille 2016). The rise in social inequality and urban segregation has coincided with another particularly striking dynamic: the mutation of the physical form of Mediterranean cities. Throughout history, these had been characterized by their relatively high density and physical compactness. However, in recent decades the Mediterranean metropolises have not only tended to expand rapidly over the space, but they have done so in a much higher proportion than other European urban areas. This has been shown by a recent study on the evolution of the expansion of urbanization between 1992 and 2013 in 20 European cities, 12 located north of the 46th parallel (that of Lyon) and 8 to the south. By using night satellite images of the Earth, the study shows how 9 of the 10 cities with less expansion in terms of urban luminosity surface are north of this line, and 7 of those with greater expansion are south. Among the Mediterranean metropolises Lyon, Madrid, Marseille, Milan, Rome, and Naples practically double their extension in terms of urban night luminosity, while Lisbon triples it (Nel·lo et  al. 2017). These changes in urban morphology often involve occupation of soils of great agricultural value and environmental importance, as another study has shown based on the analysis of 66 metropolises of Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, and Greece (Zambon et  al. 2018). Likewise, the effects of urban dispersion on mobility, the cost of services, and energy consumption can hardly be underestimated (EEA 2016). From the point of view of urban government, the expansion of the Mediterranean metropolis involves a third feature to which the works included in this volume refer repeatedly: the administrative fragmentation of urban areas. Indeed, the expansion of the metropolis has meant that each of these now includes a high number of local administrations: 57 communes in Lyon, 18 concelhos and 36 freguesias in Lisbon, 164 municipis and 7 comarques in Barcelona, to name just a few examples. To cope with this situation, it would have been necessary to establish coordination, planning, and governance mechanisms of metropolitan scope, but with the (partial) exception of the French case, attempts to implement such solutions in the Mediterranean metropolis have not been undertaken or have been crowned with rather limited success (Tomàs 2015). Again, this situation entails high costs of efficiency, sustainability, democracy, and accountability. In particular, the combination of residential segregation, urban expansion, and administrative fragmentation has deleterious effects for social policies. This is mainly due to the paradox resulting from the fact that social groups with lower incomes are concentrated in municipalities with greater urban deficits, worse services, and lower resources, while the more affluent depend on rather well-endowed local governments. As we will see, the scarcity of metropolitan solidarity and co-responsibility schemes is at the base of a good part of the problems referred to in the contributions that make up this volume.

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A fourth feature characterizes the evolution of Mediterranean metropolises: their position makes them particularly sensitive to the dynamics of global change. On the one hand, from an environmental point of view, the Mediterranean basin is specially exposed to the consequences of global warming and climate change: the alteration of the rain cycle, the increase in atmospheric temperature, and the temperature of the seawater are the most visible aspects of this process. This is already significantly affecting the living conditions in the metropolises of the area. To give an example: in Madrid, between 1971 and 2017, the annual number of tropical nights (Tmin>20 ° C) has gone from slightly less than 10 to more than 50 and in Alicante from less than 30 to about 90 (AEMT 2019). On the other hand, from the economic and social point of view, the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean are some of the regions on the planet where the differences in terms of relative wealth are highest. The GDP per capita of Italy ($ 32,747  in 2017 data) or of Spain ($ 28,354) is between 7 and 11 times higher than that of Libya ($ 3942), Tunisia ($ 3475), Algeria ($ 4055), or Morocco ($ 3070) (UN 2019). This, together with the demographic asymmetry and the absence of effective instruments of solidarity between the two areas, implies a significant migratory pressure. In 2018, about 134,000 migrants and refugees arrived in Europe through the Mediterranean: 60,000 to Spain, 46,000 to Greece, and 23,000 to Italy. This situation causes a great number of tragedies on a daily basis, as shown the fact that in the same year 2160 people died trying to reach Europe (Lo Piccolo and Todaro 2019). However, migratory flows greatly increase the diversity of the population and the cosmopolitan nature of the European Mediterranean metropolises: in cities such as Milan or Barcelona, approximately one in five residents is of foreign nationality (Comuniverso 2019; IDESCAT 2019).

1.2  T  he Withdrawal of the State and the Crisis of Urban Policies The increase in inequality and residential segregation is causing an objective worsening of the living conditions of a significant part of the population in the European Mediterranean countries (Albertos and Sánchez 2014; Fregolent and Savino 2014; Brekke et al. 2014; Seixas 2013). In large cities, this is particularly tangible in job insecurity, reduction of household income, difficulties in accessing housing, energy poverty, and even to adequate access to food. Many of these problems affect not only the most disadvantaged social sectors but also the middle classes that see their living conditions and future expectations worsen. The uncertainties associated with climate change and demographic dynamics contribute in a relevant way to complicate the picture. Thus, in European Mediterranean countries, as in so many other regions of the world, the city, which has traditionally been considered a space for social redistribution, tends to fragment, to become more unequal, denying a good part of its population the promises of well-being and individual freedom, as well as the possibility of developing autonomous life projects (Nel·lo 2015).

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These dynamics have often been explained as the result of the financial crisis that began in 2008. This would confer the present situation a temporary and to some extent transitory nature. However, the current evolution of Mediterranean societies and cities responds rather to deep and long-term historical transformations (Fontana 2013; Streeck 2014). As is known, Western European societies had developed from the end of World War II on the basis of a set of pacts according to which the working classes accepted existing production relations in exchange for a series of social guarantees and the promise of a continuous increase in the level of well-being (Judt 2010). This involved the construction of the Welfare State, which, in the urban sphere, had the right to housing, the improvement of public transport, and the provision of services as the main corollary. From this would derive what Bernardo Secchi called “the best tradition of European urbanism,” that which has allowed the distance between the living conditions of rich and poor in the city to be less than what separates them in terms of income (Secchi 2013). As known, in some of the European Mediterranean countries – Portugal, Spain, Greece – the construction of the Welfare State consolidated later than in the rest of Western Europe, due to the authoritarian dictatorships that ruled them for long years. Thus, in these countries, the Welfare State gained strength especially since the mid-1970s, just in the moment when the bases of this system were beginning to be put in question in other parts of Europe. Indeed, it was at this time that the coincidence of various factors – technological innovations, the possibilities of capital circulation, the decline of the Soviet bloc – decisively altered the balance of forces between capital and labor and allowed the beginning of the revision of the pacts reached at the end of World War II. For the historical reasons mentioned, the wave of neoliberal policies arrived somewhat later in the European Mediterranean countries. However, it ended up affecting them fully after the beginning of the economic crisis and the imposition of the so-called austerity policies, which, in the case of Portugal and Greece, were implemented under the direct control of the European Union and international financial institutions. In this context, traditional urban policies have entered into a deep crisis. In the same way that the State gradually renounces to regulate the labor market, to guarantee pensions, and to provide basic services, management, and public leadership in urban areas recedes. In part, this dynamic comes from the inadequacy of administrative structures to the new territorial realities, to which reference has already been made (Seixas and Albet 2012). Nevertheless, the crisis in urban policies stems mainly from the change in the agenda and political orientation of governments. Thus, more and more often, in the Mediterranean cities, the trend toward the commodification of public services, the privatization of urban space, and the subordination of urban planning to private interests has become widespread. The result is particularly visible in the field of housing, a sphere in which the financialization of real estate markets, together with the decline in social housing policies, has ended up making access to housing increasingly difficult for very extensive sectors. The situation is particularly pressing in Spain, a country heavily hit by the real estate bubble of the 1996–2007 period, and in Portugal, where in recent years there have been a very rapid increase in housing prices.

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According to the mainstream economic thought and the directives of the European Union, the way out of the current problems in the cities and countries of the European Mediterranean should not be so much a strengthening of public policies as an improvement of their competitiveness in the context global. The competition would lead to an increase in productivity and this would allow attracting investments, creating jobs, and increasing consumption. Undoubtedly, the cities of the European Mediterranean have some important assets in this area: a relatively well-trained workforce, a tertiary economy, integration into the European market, and an urban heritage of great value. However, the competitiveness of European Mediterranean cities is diminished by two factors: first, the progressive shift of the global trade and financial flows to the East that leaves the Mediterranean basin in an increasingly peripheral position and, second, the loss of positions in the world urban system. According to the United Nations (2019) World Urban Prospects, no city in the European Mediterranean countries is among the 33 megacities in the world (agglomerations with more than 10 million inhabitants). Among the 48 large cities (between 5 and 10 million) would be Madrid and Barcelona, in the 57th and 72nd positions of the world ranking and rapidly losing places. Cities like Rome, Milan, Naples, Turin, Athens, Marseille, or Lisbon would be considered “medium size by global standards,” at the same level as the Moroccan cities of Casablanca, Rabat, Fez, or Tangier, for example. Again, this evolution contrasts with the demographic increase of other Mediterranean metropolis (Cairo and Istanbul already occupied in 2018 the 6th and 15th place in the world ranking) and, above all, of other Asian, African, and Latin American agglomerations (UN 2019). It can be argued that demographic factors are not, in any way, the sole determinant of competitiveness. However, it is indisputable that the cities of the European Mediterranean, which have traditionally considered themselves one of the main foci of the global urbanization process, are today confronted with the competition of other cities that have enormous development potential. The attempts undertaken in recent years to try to compensate for the loss of competitiveness through the reduction of labor rights, wage cuts, the limitation of public services, and tax benefits to companies, in addition to undermine the well-being of the population, have had a very debatable success from the macroeconomic point of view.

1.3  Political Discontent and Urban Social Movements The increase in inequality in European Mediterranean cities is therefore the result of the combination of the action of market forces that exclude and of State policies that – due to disability or reluctance – fail to include. In fact, in Greece, Italy, Spain, and, perhaps to a lesser extent, in Portugal, the public authorities admit that they will not be able to continue fulfilling the promises of the social state and often offer a pathetic image of submission to economic powers. It is therefore not surprising

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that, given this resignation of responsibilities, the prestige of state institutions is today put in question by broad layers of the population (Bauman 2008). To the discredit generated by the inability of the State to keep its social promises joins the discontent derived from the difficulty of complying with the political principles on which the democratic institutions are theoretically based. In fact, the increase in social inequality already constitutes, in the eyes of a large part of the population, a confutation to the principle of democratic equality (Dahl 2007; Stiglitz 2012). As if this were not enough, it becomes evident every day that a small minority of the population – the one with the most resources – can easily escape the obligations, fiscal and other, that affect the rest of the citizens (Urry 2014). Likewise, the permanent interference of international financial institutions  – International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank, European Union – in the policies of the States shows that the decisions of institutions with a low democratic legitimacy are imposed on the governments elected by citizens (Streeck 2014). Finally, the lack of viable alternatives to existing power relations and prevailing policies contributes to delegitimize the political system and highlights the scarce relevance of the citizens’ vote (Traverso 2019). It is not surprising, then, that in European Mediterranean countries, as in the rest of the continent, political discontent and distrust of institutions grows. This discontent is expressed firstly in the disinterest and estrangement of an important part of the population from institutional politics, as well as the rise of political forces located at the extremes of the political spectrum: Podemos, Bloco d’Esquerda, and Syriza, on one side, Vox, Lega, Font National, or Golden Dawn, on the other. The fact that some of these forces have ended up conquering relevant positions in the parliament, government, and local institutions of their respective States indicates the magnitude of their strength. However, the change in political attitudes and electoral behaviors are not the only expressions of political turmoil. In addition, new forms of collective action are emerging that can lead to the formation of powerful social movements (Fregolent 2014; Nel·lo 2015; Velegrakis and Kosyfologou 2019). As Sidney Tarrow explained in his influential work on social movements (Tarrow 1998), these arise from the combination of two circumstances: when the worsening of living conditions (or expectations about them) is such that ordinary people decide to take their destiny into their own hands, and when it is perceived that there are real opportunities to change it. Under these conditions, sectors of the population can gather and organize, usually outside the institutional channels, and, once aware of their common interest, undertake collective actions to achieve common objectives. Due to the widespread social discontent, in recent years Mediterranean countries have known multiple examples of this type of collective action: from the occupations of public spaces against austerity policies (indignados in Spain, Systagma square in Athens) to the movement of the gilets jaunes in France or the massive demonstrations in favor of independence in Catalonia. In many European countries, people’s unrest and anxiety are today being channeled and utilized by far-right, nationalist, and xenophobic political forces. Given the presence that fascism and the authoritarian right had throughout the twentieth century in Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece, it is particularly pertinent to ask about

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the importance and historical significance of this fact. Enzo Traverso has underlined the analogies of the current situation with that which allowed the rise of historical fascisms. On the one hand, the existence of a strong economic crisis that has hit not only the most disadvantaged sectors but also the middle classes, on the other, the presence of a great international disorder at the end of a long global contest (Traverso 2019). However, the same historian points out that there are very significant differences between historical fascisms and current authoritarian movements: the latter do not resort systematically and daily to violence, cannot have anti-communism as a cohesive element, and are lacking in the utopian dimension that had characterized their predecessors. Finally, it is undeniable that xenophobia and racism constitute an element of continuity, even when anti-Semitism has been replaced by Islamophobia. Notwithstanding, in a good part of the Southern European cities another type of response to the worsening of living conditions and the intensification of insecurity has emerged, a response that moves away from both the uncritical and fatalistic assumption of the effects of capitalist globalization and the attempt to respond to it through authoritarianism, isolationism, or xenophobia. We refer to experiences of collective action that are expressed through urban practices and movements that, while trying to alleviate the consequences of the economic situation on the most disadvantaged sectors of the population, claim citizen rights and try alternative forms of organization. They constitute responses to the social problem of an inclusive and supportive nature, not exclusive and particularist. These initiatives are essentially based on three pillars: citizen solidarity and social innovation, defense of common goods, and the demand for the right to the city (Nel·lo 2015). Among the myriad experiences of this kind that have emerged in recent years are to be counted, first of all, the practices aimed at alleviating the worsening of living conditions. Those who promote them try to provide goods and services outside the dominant mechanisms of the State and the market, through forms of collective work, neighborhood collaboration, cooperative organization, and others. These initiatives, that have often been called social innovation (MacCallum et  al. 2009; Moulaert et al. 2013), have been of remarkable importance in many Mediterranean cities to mitigate the effects of the economic crisis on the population. Similarly, movements in defense of common property and the collective management of public space, landscape heritage, and natural resources (water, energy) have proliferated in the face of the pressures toward their squandering and privatization. Several authors have interpreted these experiences as expressions of the defense of common goods threatened by the logic of commodification (Hardt and Negri 2009; Mattei 2011; Dardot and Laval 2014). Thirdly, given the reduction of social rights, a good number of initiatives aim at defending the right to housing, urban facilities, and social services. These are initiatives that not only have the city as a field of action, but whose main objective is the very right to the city, that is, the claim to live in cities that offer decent and equitable living conditions to all their inhabitants, irrespective of the income and the area in which they live (Annunziata and Lees 2016; Lefebvre 1968; Harvey 2013). One of the most interesting aspects of these movements is their relationship with public institutions, in particular with local governments. In the last years, they have

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shown a remarkable capacity to condition the agenda and forms of government in many Mediterranean cities – from Valencia to Naples and Thessaloniki – promoting greater attention to social issues and the involvement of citizens in designing and managing public policies (Blanco and Gomà 2016). In some cases – especially in large Spanish cities such as Barcelona, Madrid, Cádiz, or La Coruña – the strength of the movements has been such that it has allowed them to access the city government. The results of these experiences have been varied, but they are an example of the potential of what has come to be called new municipalism (Castro 2019; Nel·lo 2019). In the current situation of European Mediterranean cities (and of the continent as a whole), the evolution of collective, solidarity, and inclusive responses to social problems is of crucial importance. Its extension and consolidation may contribute to promoting a plausible alternative both to the submission of public powers to economic interests and to the emerging post-fascism. However, it is clear that the movements defending the freedoms and rights of citizens must face important limitations, both in terms of their capacity for social mobilization and their ability to enhance public policies. Moreover, to consolidate their progress, they must be able not only to resist attacks on citizen rights but also to conceive and offer alternatives for a more equitable, democratic, and sustainable future. To study the potentialities and limitations of these movements, the essays included in this volume are dedicated.

1.4  The Contents of This Volume This book has its origin in the seminar “Social movements and public policies in European Cities” held at the IUAV University in Venice in May 2017. The meeting, organized by the editors of the volume, was attended by researchers and activists from Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, all moved by both academic interest and the willingness to contribute, as far as possible, to the impulse of transformative social movements. Since then, many of the participants have kept in touch and from this exchange the essays gathered in this volume have emerged. The book consists of two parts. In the first, contributions related to urban problems and collective action in Europe as a whole are gathered. This first part opens with a chapter by Oriol Nel·lo on the challenges of the European city and the response of urban social movements; it explores the relationship between the rise of collective action and the changes that the form, function, cohesion, and governance of the Mediterranean city is experiencing. Below are two contributions on urban movements related to housing and tourism, respectively. The first, the work of sociologist Andrej Holm, deals with conflicts over access to housing and the problem of urban segregation. As is known, access to housing is of crucial importance in urban segregation processes that affect European cities. In recent years, the financialization of the real estate market and the increase in social inequalities have contributed to the problem. It is therefore not surprising that today in a large number of European

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cities the development of urban movements is closely related to the housing problem. One of the most striking cases in this field is that of the city of Berlin, in which innovative regulations regarding rent regulation have been recently approved. The chapter specifically refers to this case, but its reflections are easily generalizable to other cities  – such as Lisbon, Madrid, Barcelona, Milan, or Athens  – where the movement for the right to housing has acquired particular importance in recent decades. The second contribution, by Claire Colomb, and Johannes Novy, deals with conflicts related to the impact of tourism in cities. Based on a broad overview of the case studies the authors analyze the emergence of urban movements related to the impact of tourism on public space, housing, employment, commerce, and the image of cities. The first part of the book closes with the chapter of the urban planner Francesco Indovina, which deals with the relationship of urban movements with political parties, trade unions, and public institutions. The capacity of these instances when channeling social dissent is of key importance in explaining the emergence and significance of collective action. However, it is a matter too often forgotten in studies of urban movements. The second part contains a set of studies on social practices and urban movements in five cities in southern Europe: Perpignan, Barcelona, Naples, Venice, and Lisbon. The purpose of this part of the book is to illustrate the way in which the contradictions and tensions derived from the dynamics described above find an answer in urban movements in a number of Southern European cities. The cases included are relevant for the study of the relationship between collective action, on the one hand, and urban planning, segregation, social innovation, economic specialization, and the integration of the city into global dynamics, the other. The case of Perpignan is studied by geographer David Giband based on the struggles for the planning and administration of social housing neighborhoods in this city in southern France. The author shows how, in a context of national crisis of peripheral urban areas (banlieues), marginalized urban communities organize themselves to oppose urban projects affecting their living space. For his part, the political scientist Ismael Blanco analyzes the relationship between urban segregation and social innovation in Barcelona and Catalonia. Blanco, director of the Institute of Government and Public Policies of the Autonomous University of Barcelona, shows how social innovation practices closely relate to social capital and, therefore, tend to appear more in the middle-income neighborhoods than in low-income areas. Elena Ostanel again addresses the subject of social innovation in the case of Naples, a city described by some authors as an urban laboratory of social innovation in this field. Based on the study of several of these experiences, Ostanel analyzes its interrelationship with institutions and local governance. Next, Laura Fregolent and Matteo Basso study territorial conflicts in Venice and its region derived from the economic hyper-specialization in tourism and wine production. Finally, João Seixas and Antonio Brito Guterres explain the recent transformation of Lisbon as a result of the internationalization of the city, analyzing the social contradictions and urban movements that have arisen from it.

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References Agencia Estatal de Meteorología (2019) Efectos del cambio climático en España. http://www. aemet.es/es/noticias/2019/03/Efectos_del_cambio_climatico_en_espanha Albertos JM, Sánchez JL (eds) (2014) Geografía de la crisis económica en España. Universitat de València, Valencia Annunziata S, Lees L (2016) Resisting “austerity gentrification” and displacement in Southern Europe. Sociol Res Online 21(3):1–8. https://doi.org/10.5153/sro.4033 Bauman Z (2008) Archipiélago de excepciones. CCCB, Barcelona Blanco I, Gomà R (2016) El municipalisme del bé comú. Icaria, Barcelona Brekke J, Dalakoglou D, Filippidis C, Vradis A (eds) (2014) Crisis-scapes: Athens and beyond. Crisis-scapes.net, Athens Burriel E (2008) La “década prodigiosa” del urbanismo español (1997–2006). Scripta Nova: Revista electrónica de geografía y ciencias sociales, p 270 Castro M (2019) Barcelona en Comú: the municipalist movement to seize the institutions. In: Lang M, König C-D, Regelmann A-C (eds) Alternatives in a world of crisis. Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, Brussels Cecchini M, Zambon I, Salvati L (2019) Housing and the city: a spatial analysis of residential building activity and the socio-demographic background in a Mediterranean City, 1990–2017. Sustainability 11(2):375. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11020375 Comuniverso (2019) Comuni per popolazione straniera. http://www.comuniverso.it/index.cfm Dahl R (2007) On political equality. Yale University Press, New Haven/London Dardot P, Laval C (2014) Commun. Essai sur la révolution au XXIe siècle. La Découverte, Paris European Environment Agency (2016) Urban sprawl in Europe. EEA, Luxemburg Fontana J (2013) El futuro es un país extraño. Una reflexión sobre la crisis social a comienzos del siglo XXI. Pasado y Presente, Barcelona Fregolent L (ed) (2014) Conflitti e territorio. FrancoAngeli, Milano Fregolent L, Savino M (eds) (2014) Città e politiche in tempi di crisi. FrancoAngeli, Milano Fregolent L, Torri R (2018) L’Italia senza casa. Bisogni emergenti e politiche per l’abitare. FrancoAngeli, Milano Hardt M, Negri T (2009) Commonwealth. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Harvey D (2013) Rebel cities. From the right to the city to the urban revolution. Verso, London IDESCAT (2019) Població resident per nacionalitat. Barcelona. https://www.idescat.cat/emex/?i d=080193&lang=es#h40 Judt T (2010) Ill Fares the land: a treatise on our present discontents. Penguin Press, New York Lefebvre H (1968) Le droit à la ville. Anthropos, Paris Lo Piccolo F, Todaro V (2019) Flujos migratorios y territorios europeos: entre permanencia y cambio. Una mirada desde Italia. Ciudad y Territorio Estudios Territoriales 200:393–402 MacCallum D, Vicari Haddock S, Moulaert F (2009) Social innovation and territorial development. Ashgate, Oxon Mattei U (2011) Beni comuni. Un manifesto. Laterza, Bari Moulaert F, MacCallum D, Mehmood A, Hamdouch A (2013) The international handbook on social innovation. Collective action, social learning and transdisciplinary research. Edward Arnold, Cheltenham Nel·lo O (2015) La ciudad en movimiento. Crisis social y respuesta ciudadana. Díaz & Santos, Madrid Nel·lo O (2019) Legado, declive y vigencia de los Ayuntamientos del Cambio. https://www.eldiario. es/tribunaabierta/Legado-declive-vigencia-Ayuntamientos-Cambio_6_906819334.html Nel·lo O, López J, Martín J, Checa J (2017) Energy and urban form. The growth of European cities on the basis of night-time brightness. Land Use Policy 61:103–112. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. landusepol.2016.11.007 Oberti M, Preteceille E (2016) La ségrégation urbaine. la Découverte, Paris

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OECD (2019) Key indicators on the distribution of household disposable income and poverty, 2007, 2015 and 2016 or most recent year. https://www.oecd.org/social/soc/IDD-Key-Indicators.xlsx Secchi B (2013) La città dei ricchi e la città dei poveri. Laterza, Bari Seixas J (2013) A cidade na encrucilhada: repensar a cidade e a sua politica. Afrontamento, Lisboa Seixas J, Albet A (eds) (2012) Urban governance in Southern Europe. Routledge, London Seixas J, Tulumello S, Allegretti G (2019) Lisboa em transição profunda e desequilibrada. Habitação, imobiliário e política urbana no sul da Europa e na era digital. Cadernos Metropolitanos São Paulo 21(44):221–251 Stiglitz J (2012) The price of inequality: how today’s divided society endangers our future. W.W. Norton & Company, New York/London Streeck W (2014) Buying time: the delayed crisis of democratic capitalism. Verso, London Tammaru T, Marcinczak S, van Ham M, Musterd S, S. (eds) (2016) Socio-economic segregation in European capital cities. East meets West. Routledge, New York Tarrow S (1998) Power in movement: social movements and contentious politics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Tomàs M (2015) Metropolitan governance in Europe: challenges & models, European metropolitan authorities, AMB, February Traverso E (2019) The new faces of fascism. Populism and the far right. Verso, London United Nations (2019) World urbanization prospects, 2018. https://population.un.org/wup/ Publications/ Urry J (2014) Offshoring. Polity Press, Cambridge Velegrakis G, Kosyfologou A (2019) Athens and Thessaloniki: bottom-up solidarity alternatives in times of crisis. In: Lang M, König C-D, Regelmann A-D (eds) Alternatives in a World of crisis. Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, Brussels Zambon I, Benedetti A, Ferrara C, Salvati L (2018) Soil matters? A multivariate analysis of socioeconomic constraints to urban expansion in Mediterranean Europe. Ecol Econ 146:173–183. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2017.10.015 Laura Fregolent  Architect and urban planner. Department of Architecture and Arts, Università Iuav di Venezia. Co-Director Archivio di Studi Urbani e Regionali. Author: Conflitti e territorio (Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2014); Città e politiche in tempi di crisi, (Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2014); Growing Compact (Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2016). Oriol Nel·lo  Geographer. Department of Geography, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Author: La ciudad en movimiento (Madrid, Díaz & Pons, 2015), Cities in the 21st Century (New York, Routledge, 2016, with R. Mele), Barrios y Crisis. Crisis económica, segregación urbana e innovación social en Cataluña (Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch, 2018, with I. Blanco).

Part I

Urban Challenges and Collective Action

Chapter 2

Urban Movements and the Challenges of the European City Oriol Nel·lo

2.1  Social Crisis, Urban Crisis The tensions experienced by European societies in the early twenty-first century have primarily emerged from urban areas. Cities provide the stage for technological innovation and economic transformation, but also the context in which increased inequality and poverty are most keenly felt. This is hardly surprising, as the urbanization of society has been one of the defining features of contemporary European history. This process – marked by a drive to concentrate populations and activities, followed by an expansion of urban networks and lifestyles – has shaped and consolidated the functional and economic preeminence of cities throughout the European territory (Lefebvre 1970; Brenner 2014). It is understandable, therefore, that the social and political crises which are engulfing Europe coincide with a profound urban crisis. In fact, both these crises are different expressions of a single underlying transformation: the transition of contemporary capitalist societies to hitherto unknown futures. Generally speaking, this transition is characterized by growing economic instability, automatization of work, struggles for natural resources, exacerbation of social inequalities, and the dangers of climate change (Streeck 2014; Frase 2014). In the urban arena, these dynamics correspond with a crisis in the traditional form of the city and configuration of global urban networks, as well as profound internal social divisions and difficulties for urban governance. In this context, the current institutional frameworks show signs of exhaustion. In the first decades of this century, many European countries have witnessed disruptive political attitudes and electoral behavior that express both the dissatisfaction and

O. Nel·lo (*) Geography Department, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Bellaterra, Spain e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Fregolent, O. Nel·lo (eds.), Social Movements and Public Policies in Southern European Cities, Urban and Landscape Perspectives 21, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52754-9_2

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fears of large sectors of the population. This is a relatively new phenomenon, and it is giving rise to extremely varied social practices and political manifestations. On the one hand, self-organization initiatives have emerged to palliate the effects of the crisis and attempt to supply underprivileged citizens with access to goods and services that both the State and the market are failing to provide (Moulaert 2013). On the other hand, mass movements of discontent have sprung up, with a variety of political expressions, ranging from radical anti-capitalism to an intensification of nationalism, racism, and xenophobia (Nel·lo 2015). In spatial terms, these movements and social practices are distinguished by their eminently urban character. The most obvious expression of this is the proliferation within cities of what Tarrow (1998) has called “disruptive political practices.” The occupations of squares by the indignados in Spain in the spring of 2011; the incidents in Syntagma Square in Athens; the mass demonstrations of the pro-­ independence movement in Catalonia; and the repeated disorders created by the gilets jaunes in France constitute clear examples of this urban unrest. Over and above spectacular events of this kind, however, cities are also providing a more muted setting for the spread of socially innovative practices and initiatives for new forms of local government based on building power from the bottom up, both within and outside formal institutions (Blanco and Gomà 2016). European cities therefore provide the ideal stage for social conflicts and expressions of discontent, as well as for innovative social practice, but in many cases social movements and practices use the city not only as a stage but also as the crux of their demands. In other words, they seek to change the living conditions and physical realities that largely define a city: housing, public space, mobility, the environment. Thus, today’s expressions of public discontent in Europe are urban not only because of their setting but also, in many cases, because of the nature of their motives and aims (Nel·lo 2015). These circumstances frequently turn them into authentic urban social movements (Castells 1983; Harvey 2012). Accordingly, any analysis of these movements (the main subject of this book) requires an understanding of the main challenges currently faced by European cities.1 This is the subject of the present chapter, which has as main objectives the identification of these urban challenges and a discussion of their relationship with social movements. Apart from the present introduction, the chapter is divided into five sections. The first addresses the crisis in urban form, i.e., the causes and consequences of the process that has made the city a reality that is difficult to demarcate, not only in scientific terms but also as a political setting and subject. The next section looks at the integration of European cities into worldwide urban networks, giving rise to dependency and a relative loss of weight in the global hierarchy. The third section explores the cities’ increasing social fragmentation, mainly due to increasing disparities in income. The following section examines the challenges that

1  In this respect, see the essay Nel·lo (2018) “Los cuatro retos de la ciudad europea,” published in ESADE Informe económico y financiero, which we shall follow, to some extent, in the following paragraphs.

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the combined changes in a city’s morphology, networks, and society represent for its governance. Finally, the fifth section briefly outlines some of the main aspects of the relationship between urban movements and the geographical characteristics of the political discontent in Europe. The chapter then closes with a few brief conclusions. As we shall see, the thread of the argument is illustrated by examples that mostly pertain to the city de Barcelona.

2.2  The End of the City? The first mutation affecting urban movements is derived from changes in the very form of the city. A few years ago, Leonardo Benevolo, one of the most outstanding investigators of the history of the European city (Benevolo 2008), published a long reflection about the significance of its various transformations in recent decades. In conversation with Francesco Erbani, Benevolo, by then an elderly man, expressed his perplexity at the changes in progress: We were accustomed to attribute certain characteristics to the city, the first being that a city has a more or less defined form, which is modified over the course of time, is extended, but continues to be recognizable and contains elements that distinguish it from the non-city, from the territory with no construction, or with very little construction. This observation could be valid, broadly speaking, until a few decades ago – not many, barely two or three – (at least in Italy, and even more so in other European countries). Since then, it has started to become increasingly less valid. The city has exceeded its confines and invaded the surrounding territory, which, despite not having fully taken on an urban character, is now no longer clearly different from the city. (Benevolo and Erbani 2011)

In fact, what the great Italian historian was pointing out is the paradox whereby the advance of the urbanization process has ended up destroying the very notion of the city (Harvey 1996). It is indeed the case that urban form had traditionally been characterized by being dense, closed, and demarcated with respect to its surroundings. The city was thus, by definition, a high-density settlement surrounded by large uninhabited or rural spaces. In Europe, however, these characteristics started to be definitively undermined at the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the emergence of the modern state and economic transformations combined, on the one hand, to put an end to the diversity of the jurisdictions of the ancien régime and, on the other, trigger a rapid increase in the urban population. It was at this point that the city, now free from legal obstacles and physical perimeter walls, began to expand over a territory. The speed and forcefulness of this expansion often amazed contemporary commentators, even in the first few decades. In 1845, for example, the young Friedrich Engels wrote: A town such as London, where a man may wander for hours together without reaching the beginning of the end, without meeting the slightest hind which could lead to the inference

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Nevertheless, for a long period  – which in Europe’s case stretched from the Napoleonic Wars until the end of the Second World War – the city could still be perceived as a differentiated reality, as a space distinguished by a form (dense and compact), by functions (secondary and tertiary), and by lifestyles (proper to the urban classes). Nowadays, each of these distinguishing traits has become blurred. Firstly, the generalization of the use of the car, public transport and ICT has given rise to an extraordinary extension of urban areas, often to the point of absorbing an entire regional territory. Moreover, urbanization has tended to spread and urban lifestyles have ended up penetrating whole societies, including those that live in what were once the remotest of rural areas. The traditional distinction between city and country, between urban and rural, has become so blurred that it is undiscernible in scientific terms. It is this situation that has led authors like Benevolo to speak of the “fine della città.” Other writers have tried to conceptualize the phenomenon in less negative terms, such as the “città diffusa” (Indovina), “regional urbanization” (Soja), and “extended urbanization” (Brenner). Some have even questioned the relevance of trying to define and demarcate the city as an object of study and instead advocate the need to analyze urbanization as a process (Harvey). The crisis of the traditional urban form does not, however, involve merely problems of perception and analysis, for it also entails serious political and administrative difficulties. It is true that spatial integration has facilitated access to consumer goods, services, training, and information for all citizens. It is also true that the abolition of the barriers between former urban and rural spaces has contributed to the spread of material well-being and that the integration of regional territories has endowed them with functional cohesion, political weight, and financial allure. Notwithstanding these undoubted advances, the transmutation of urban form has given rise to a series of new problems. The most visible of these, in environmental terms, is the way that land is being consumed: it has been estimated, for example, that, of the 800,000 acres comprising the Metropolitan Region of Barcelona, urban uses accounted for barely 50,000 acres in 1956; 50 years later, these uses now occupied more than 200,000 acres. Thus, in half a century urbanized land has multiplied by 4, with a subsequent fragmentation of open spaces and reduction in biodiversity (Nel·lo and López 2016). This phenomenon is common to many European countries, but at the moment it particularly affects some of those on the Mediterranean Basin, which, paradoxically, had been most clearly characterized by the compactness of their urban form. Furthermore, the extension of urban areas and the dispersion of urbanization have increased the population’s mobility requirements, with a subsequent rise in energy and infrastructural costs. According to the latest survey of young people in Catalonia, for example, half the journeys undertaken by the population aged between 15 and 34 have a destination in a municipality other than the one in which they

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reside (Nel·lo and Gomà 2018). Finally, as we shall see below, social segregation in the newly integrated urban spaces acts now on a metropolitan scale, making redistributive policies difficult to implement. “Can our cities survive?”, asked the urbanist Josep Lluís Sert in the early 1940s (Sert 1942), a time when the great American epic of the urban sprawl was just beginning and was yet to be reproduced in so many places elsewhere. In Europe, three quarters of a century later, the mutation of urban form, and its associated problems, forces us to pose the question in different terms, as it is not only the city that has been plunged into crisis by the prevailing urban dynamics but also the very concept of the city itself. The evolution of urban form has therefore thrown up significant questions about sustainability and functionality, but the potentials and limitations of the urban movements are likewise interrogated by spatial changes. In Europe, the great transformative social movements of the last two centuries have inevitably emerged within the context of a city: from the Paris Commune to the Tragic Week in Barcelona, from the Revolution in Petersburg to the Spartacist uprising in Berlin, from the insurrection in Budapest to May 1968 in Paris and Prague. In territorial terms, the restricted outreach of urbanization at the time of these events endowed them with very specific urban traits. As the city was still a conglomeration of secondary and tertiary activities, or an island in a sea of rurality (Gambi 1990), the social movements derived from it inevitably reflected these spatially circumscribed characteristics. Historically, these self-­ same characteristics have explained the limitations  – and failures  – of these movements. Their spatial concentration made them easier to suppress, while also contributing to the phobia of the city that characterized reactionary thinking in many European countries over much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Williams 1973; Nel·lo 2013). At the same time, however, the territorially specific nature of these urban movements also provided a source of cohesion and facilitated the spread of ideas, the organization of social practices, and the configuration of political subjects. Today, the conditions are different. The evolution of the urban form and networks has led to a (relative) homogenization of the living conditions and social problems found within an entire territory. These dynamics also propitiate an unprecedented spatial dissemination of the demands and practices of social movements, not only regionally and nationally but also on a global scale. As the distinction between city and country fades, so the social groups that had played prominent roles in the transformative movements of European cities have changed, and the possibilities of urban areas becoming political subjects are hampered by the difficulties in defining a city. Thus, on the one hand, spatial dynamics facilitate the spread of urban movements over a territory, but on the other hand they can dilute these movements’ specificity and weaken the base that provides their support.

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2.3  The Tribulations of the City in a (Partially) Open World The second challenge currently facing European urban areas is derived not so much from their morphological transformation but rather from their integration into (and dependence on) networks that are becoming increasingly complex and wide-­ ranging. This process had already been perceptively foreseen in a famous passage in the Communist Manifesto of 1848. Marx and Engels argued that the prodigious changes introduced into the economic system by the bourgeoisie triggered the emergence of large cities that caused the urban population to exceed the rural one and the city to dominate the country. On this basis, they posited a thought-provoking parallel between the urbanization process and the worldwide extension of relationships of capitalist production: Just as it [capitalist development] has made the country dependent on the town, so has it made barbarian and semi-barbarian countries dependent on the civilized ones, nations of peasants on nations of bourgeois, the East on the West. (Marx and Engels 1848)

A century and a half later, this diagnosis, which at the time could have seemed a fanciful exaggeration, has not only been fully validated but has also substantially altered the frames of reference. Just as it now proves difficult to distinguish between city and country, it is also hard to define the categories of “nations of peasants” and “nations of bourgeois.” This is because the contemporary urbanization process, which had one of its main foci in Europe, has spread all over the world. Thus, as the progressive extension of capitalist relationships of production and exchange began to configure what Wallerstein called the “world system,” urbanization has become the predominant form of settlement in every continent. Indeed, for a long period, urbanization on a planetary level represented a solution for European societies and cities to their problems of excessive population growth. They thus used a global resource – the exodus of migrants to other continents – to solve the local problems arising from their demographic transition. It is worth noting, by the way, that this measure is now being denied societies and cities in Africa, Asia, and Latin America that are experiencing similar demographic phenomena. As Zigmunt Bauman has observed, these places are urged to find local solutions to problems with global origins, however slim the chances of success (Bauman 2008). Be that as it may, the worldwide expansion of urbanization and the integration of European cities into a worldwide network now pose three types of challenge: competition from newly emerging rivals, the risks of delocalizing economic activities, and the reality of internal diversity. In effect, although European cities had long been able to consider themselves the indisputable top rank of the global urban system, the worldwide urbanization process has given rise to new realities capable of toppling them from this position. Of the 27 urban areas that will have a population in excess of 10 million inhabitants in 2025, according to UN forecasts, only two of these will be European (London and Moscow), whereas Asia will have 14, Latin America 6, and Africa 3 (UN 2015). The case of Barcelona can serve to illustrate these trends. Whereas in 1950 Barcelona and its metropolitan area had 1.8 million inhabitants and constituted the 30th most

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populated urban conglomeration in the world, in 2015 its population of five million earned it 70th place in the world rankings – and by 2030 it is expected to be in 89th position. It could be argued, and rightly so, that demographic volume does not necessarily guarantee a preeminent position in the global urban system in economic, political, and scientific terms. Nevertheless, the evolution of world trade and the patterns for hubs of manufacturing, and even science and technology, all suggest that European cities are facing stiff competition on several fronts – from cities that many Europeans would have trouble finding on a map. The most obvious repercussion of this trend is the relocation of assets, services, and industry. Thus, in a world characterized by technological changes and institutional transformations that have dramatically lowered transport costs and trading tariff barriers, European cities have seen a substantial part of their former activities shifted elsewhere. It is clear that this is particularly true of industrial production. Many of the European cities that ushered in the Industrial Revolution two centuries ago now find their manufacturing sector reduced to a small presence that involves only a fraction of the total workforce. It is not just industry, however, that has relocated. In a context of virtually unrestricted movement of capital, financial assets have also tended to move elsewhere. According to John Urry (2014), almost a third of the world’s wealth is now allocated in tax havens – thereby depriving European cities (and states) of a substantial portion of their fiscal revenue. Finally, full integration into global networks has increased the diversity to be found within European cities. Incomers – immigrants, tourists, political refugees, expats who do not consider themselves immigrants, students, etc. – are now competing for urban space with other more stable populations. As a result, migratory movements and transient uses of territory have taken on a fundamental importance. In Barcelona, for example, despite the city’s long history of immigration, as recently as 1996 barely 1 in 50 registered inhabitants had a foreign nationality, but by 2016 this figure was 1 in 6: in 20 years, the number of foreigner residents in the city has risen from 29,000 to 266,000.2 Meanwhile, the number of nights spent by tourists in Barcelona has gone up from slightly less than 4 million in 1990 to 32 million in 2016 (a third of these in tourist apartments).3 The volatility of the urban population has therefore soared to unprecedented heights, resulting in tensions in the job and property markets. The integration of European cities into global networks has created great opportunities, by opening them up to worldwide flows of employment, finance, and information, and deepening the population’s cultural complexity and cosmopolitanism. It has been argued that this situation could represent a way toward achieving a more  Ajuntament de Barcelona (Barcelona City Hall), Padró d’habitants (population census). http:// www.bcn.cat/estadistica/catala/ties/tpob/pad/ine/a2016/nacio/t0101.htm 3  Ajuntament de Barcelona (Barcelona City Hall), Estadístiques del turisme. Barcelona: ciutat i entorn (Tourism statistics. Barcelona: the city and its surroundings) https://ajuntament.barcelona. cat/turisme/sites/default/files/documents/170522_estadistiques_petites_definitiu.pdf 2

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open, and maybe more caring, world. At the moment, however, this phenomenon is setting European cities challenges that cannot be lightly dismissed: the relative loss of centrality, the relocation of industry and wealth, the transformation of social structures, and the need to manage internal diversity. As regards urban movements, the internationalization of cities’ economies has established a basic contradiction. Whereas a city’s life is increasingly determined by international flows of capital, goods, information, and people, urban movements have, by definition, a local base. It has therefore sometimes been said that while urban movements can, in the present circumstances, effectively pose the essential questions affecting the future of our societies, they cannot do so on the appropriate scale, or with the appropriate means (Castells 1983). There are also two further factors that serve to highlight the negative impact of globalization on the effectiveness of the urban movements. Firstly, the asymmetry between, on the one hand, capital’s increasing capacity to move around and, on the other, urban movements rooted in their respective territories has decisively tilted the balance of power in favor of the former. Secondly, cities’ increased exposure to external influences and diversification of their population have helped trigger, as a reaction, an upsurge in local, identity-based feelings of all kinds. It is also true, however, that the integration of cities into ever broader and denser networks is providing opportunities to urban movements. These opportunities include, on the one hand, the capacity to disseminate information, communicate their grievances, and propagate their aims. There is also a possibility of attempting a coordinated response to elements now operating at ease on a supralocal level, i.e., the big corporations and financial entities. Whereas in the nineteenth century, the rise of imperialism and the internationalization of capital gave rise to the Workers’ Internationals, in the twenty-first century the pernicious effects inherent in globalization for a significant proportion of the population could be counterweighted by the emergence of what have been called new “networks of indignation and hope” (Castells 2015).

2.4  Something That Fine People Should Not Hear Mentioned In the early years of the contemporary urbanization process, the city was notable for the presence of extreme social inequalities. In the mid-nineteenth century, when the engineer Ildefons Cerdà assembled the statistical data for his urban expansion project in Barcelona, he discovered that the life expectancy at birth of the “wealthy class” was double that of the “poor or day-labourer class,” whose members barely reached the age of 20 on average, due to the high rate of child mortality. Of those who did survive to adult age, the mean life of a lawyer or clergyman was 20 years more than that of a weaver, who would die, on average, at around the age of 44 (Cerdà 1867). The living conditions in industrial cities were, for most people, so impoverished and squalid that, as Dickens (1854) noted in Hard Times, “a fine lady […] could

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scarcely bear to hear the place mentioned.” Revolutionary thinkers argued that urban living conditions resulting from capitalist development could never be improved as long as that system endured. As Engels commented: In reality the bourgeoisie has only one method of solving the housing question after its fashion – that is to say, of solving it in such a way that the solution continually reproduces the question anew. […] The breeding places of disease, the infamous holes and cellars in which the capitalist mode of production confines our workers night after night, are not abolished; they are merely shifted elsewhere! The same economic necessity which produced them in the first place, produces them in the next place also. As long as the capitalist mode of production continues to exist, it is folly to hope for an isolated solution of the housing question or of any other social question affecting the fate of the workers. The solution lies in the abolition of the capitalist mode of production and the appropriation of all the means of life and labour by the working class itself. (Engels 1872)

In spite of this indictment, it cannot be denied that living conditions in European cities have substantially improved over the course of the last hundred years – and that these improvements have affected the urban population as a whole, including its less privileged subsections. In Western European countries, these changes became particularly obvious after the adjustments following the Second World War. This was when – after the Russian Revolution, the rise and fall of fascism, the two world wars – the working classes were offered the promise of continued improvement in well-being and a series of guarantees in terms of education, healthcare, and services for the elderly, in exchange for acceptance of the prevailing social relationships. This social pact, which gave rise to a welfare state in most Western European countries, had a series of urban corollaries: the right to decent housing, public transport, high-quality public spaces and facilities, basic supplies of water and electricity. These elements marked the development of what Bernardo Secchi has called best tradition of European urban planning, which, by imposing regulations, standards, and specific actions, has bestowed on the city: material conditions in which rich and poor choose to – or are obliged to – live with less distance between each other than the differences between their respective incomes and assets. (Secchi 2013)

The application of these policies determined – for good and for bad – the governance of most Western European for over three decades. Their predominance began to subside in the late 1970s, coinciding with the drive toward economic globalization and deregulatory policies (which have held sway ever since). This transition, as has been explained many times, marked a collapse in the rules that had fed the illusion that the material progress of European societies would inevitably be accompanied by a continued improvement in the living conditions of the population as a whole (Judt 2011; Fontana 2013). The increase in social inequalities inherent in these developments has particularly manifested itself in cities in the intensification of the phenomenon of urban segregation: the tendency of social groups to separate themselves within an urban space in accordance with, among other factors, their capacity to operate in the real

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estate markets. The studies undertaken to date have shown that this trend has become generalized in most European capitals (Tammaru et al. 2016). The effects of segregation on urban cohesion have inspired an intense academic debate. It is not the case, as it has sometimes been claimed, that the machinations of the property market, and the ensuing segregation, are the main cause of social inequalities. Nor is it true that a land-owning class is tormenting a society that would otherwise be both equalitarian and prosperous. Inequality has structural origins that can be primarily explained in terms of the distribution of income and wealth, and of fiscal systems and the (de)regulation of labor relations. However, it is also undeniable that the existence of profound spatial differences within European cities – due to deterioration in the quality of life and access to services of certain social groups – is in itself a factor that consolidates and exacerbates inequalities. Once again, Barcelona provides a good illustration in this respect. Here, the longevity of the dictatorship of General Franco (1939–1975) led to a delay in the introduction of redistributive urban policies in Spain, compared to other European countries. So, by the time their widespread implementation had begun in Spanish cities, in the late 1970s, these policies were increasingly being called into question in many West European countries. Be that as it may, in Barcelona their development over a quarter of a century coincided with a significant reduction in inequalities, both between social groups and between the territories that make up its metropolitan area (Subirats 2012). In the last decade, however, metropolitan Barcelona has witnessed a rise in inequalities, with a subsequent rise in poverty and situations of material deprivation that had once seemed to be definitively relegated to the past. As in so many other European cities, this dynamic has resulted in increased spatial segregation of social groups in Barcelona. It should be noted that this is the consequence of both a concentration of low-income populations in certain neighborhoods and municipalities and a trend among more well-off groups to settle in other areas. One recent study of segregation has, for example, demonstrated that in Catalonia nearly 700,000 people live in census tracts characterized by a confluence of high levels of unemployment and inhabitants of foreign origin, as well as low property prices and cramped living conditions  – all of which are associated with low income. At the other extreme, more than 600,000 people live in census tracts characterized by the opposite situation. It is as if the Catalan urban system contained within it two separate, largish cities (the sizes of Zaragoza and Málaga, for example) that are socially and spatially separate from each other, one with a very low level of income, the other with an income well above average (Blanco and Nel·lo 2018). In his General Theory, Ildefons Cerdà warned that: Besides being absurd, it would be an extremely serious mistake with dire consequences to want to establish a city in which the various classes of population whom it is destined to serve should occupy districts or neighbourhoods or streets that are separated and distinct on the basis of class or category. (Cerdà 1867)

The fact is, however, this “serious mistake” described by Cerdà is now being consolidated in the major European cities, thereby entrenching and exacerbating

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social inequalities. This dynamic, and the economic, social, and political challenges derived from it, undoubtedly represent one of the prime challenges currently confronting European cities. The problem of inequality and segregation has had a direct impact on urban movements. The decline in the living conditions of the more underprivileged social sectors – coupled with the fears sparked in the middle classes by the encroachment of inequalities – is unquestionably one of the driving forces behind the rise of social movements and community practices of all kind in today’s Europe. As stated above, these practices range from collective initiatives aimed at assuaging the effects of the crisis to innovative experiments focusing on the defense of social rights. It must be pointed out, however, that these activities do not always lead to greater equity between urban social groups. In fact, it is increasingly the case that fearful and frustrated sectors of the urban population mobilize with the express purpose of excluding possible beneficiaries (immigrants, refugees, ethnic minorities) from public assistance and social benefits. Furthermore, the very possibility of reclaiming rights, and making them count, depends on a capacity to organize and get a message across – a capacity that is obviously not evenly distributed or homogeneous over a territory. Thus, urban protests and campaigns can sometimes have the paradoxical effect of increasing – rather than reducing – inequalities (Blanco et al. 2016).

2.5  The Need for Urban Government, and Its Limitations We can see that the deep and rapid changes currently experienced by European cities are affecting their form, function, and internal cohesion. They are giving rise to huge dilemmas that are crucial to the well-being of the urban population and, indeed, of Europe as a whole. On the environmental front: How to put a stop to the squandering of land and fragmentation of natural spaces? How to guarantee the supply and quality of water and energy? How to adapt to the consequences of climate change and mitigate its effects? On the economic front: How to maintain industrial production in the face of relocation process? How to confront the progressive loss of centrality in the global urban network? How to prevent finance capital from altering the way cities operate to such an extent that they become unlivable? Finally, with respect to social cohesion: How to curb the processes of segregation and their effects? How to guarantee that the whole population has access to basic services? How to manage cohabitation in an increasingly diverse urban society? This is a daunting list of challenges that encapsulates the problems and opportunities of our society on an urban scale. The difficulties facing urban areas cannot be resolved exclusively in the local arena, but they have to be tackled first and foremost by cities themselves. There is therefore obviously a need for collective visions and for legal, financial, administrative, and planning instruments capable of driving these visions forward and giving them form. These instruments are the tools required to govern a city.

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The European city is, however, currently experiencing profound problems in this respect. These are derived partly from the complexity of the agenda of issues to be tackled, and partly from the discredit that has befallen public institutions and politicians on various fronts  – but the problems of governability also spring from the physical transformation of the city itself. As we have seen, urban areas have experienced an unprecedented expansion. As a result, urbanization has leapt across administrative to include a large number of settlements (each with their own administration) in a single functional urban unit. This process has engendered the paradox that we have repeatedly referred to: by breaking its physical and functional boundaries, the city has incorporated a host of administrative boundaries. The city without boundaries thus becomes the city of boundaries (Nel·lo 1999). While it is true that the existence of disparate administrative entities does give a voice and representation to each of the territories within a metropolis, generally speaking administrative fragmentation has a harmful effect on urban management. This is particularly evident in the cases of transport, city planning, and environmental management. The situation is just as clear in terms of social policies: as we have seen, the low-income population ends up being primarily concentrated in areas with the greatest planning deficiencies and the lowest-quality services. Moreover, these poorer areas have less funds available to remedy this situation, so the combination of administrative fragmentation and urban segregation creates an almost insurmountable obstacle to redistributive policies on a local scale. Barcelona again provides a clear illustration of this phenomenon. Way back in 1979 – almost four decades ago – Pasqual Maragall, the mayor behind the city’s famous transformation in the 1980s and 1990s, had warned that its future would play out as much (or even more) outside its narrow municipal boundaries as within them: “The city of Barcelona is now almost a fiction” (Maragall 1979; Nel·lo 2019). Since then, the functionally integrated metropolitan space has expanded to incorporate not only the nominal metropolitan area but also a territory embracing over 3200 sq. km that contains more than two thirds of the population of Catalonia and generates an equivalent proportion of its GDP. This territory is also characterized by its administrative complexity, as it plays host to no less than 164 municipalities, 7 administrative levels, and an array of agencies and public and para-public companies. The effects of this lack of coordination of Barcelona’s metropolitan reality in terms of management, planning, and representativity are all too well known, but Barcelona is far from being an exception in the European context and instead serves as an example of a broader picture. Excessive administrative fragmentation has become a distinguishing trait of the European metropolis: on the one hand, this weakens cities when they have to interact with corporations, agents, and institutions, and, on the other, it hinders the possibilities of tackling the challenges mentioned above. The lack of a balanced, functional system of government is thus far more than a mere administrative problem – it is, above all, a highly political issue. In the future, however, various factors could come into play to modify the situation and instill a certain degree of hope. The first of these is what Michael Keating has termed the rescaling of European politics (Keating 2009): the crisis of the nation-state triggered by globalization and European integration could enable cities

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and regions to take on a bigger role as political and institutional players. Secondly, the financial crisis has propitiated an upsurge in innovative urban practices and a new municipal spirit that facilitates the creation of new agendas and new policies on a city scale (Harvey 2012; Blanco and Gomà 2016). Not surprisingly, both citizen-­ led initiatives and urban government are making significant efforts to construct new forms of coordination on a European scale.

2.6  “Geographies of Discontent” and the Urban Movements The challenges described above provide the context in which most of the cities on the continent are witnessing the emergence of disruptive political attitudes and electoral behavior referred to at the start of this chapter. The changes in political attitudes in recent years have been evident in various episodes of very different kinds. The most visible examples include the resistance to the imposition of austerity measures in several European countries at the height of the financial crisis (Greece, Spain, Portugal), the emergence of the gilets jaunes in France, and the independence movements in some territories (Scotland, 2017; Catalonia, 2017). Unrest has also been expressed in the ballot box in various ways. On the one hand, it has sparked the rise of progressive forces that defied the traditional parties (Syriza in Greece, Podemos in Spain), but on the other hand it has given a renewed impetus to parties and movements on the extreme right (present in most of the national parliaments, and in government in countries like Hungary, the Czech Republic and Austria). There have also been other votes that have clearly altered the status quo (referendums on Brexit in the United Kingdom and on constitutional reform in Italy, both in 2016). We are clearly dealing here with a diverse range of phenomena whose complexity defy all simplifications, whether they seek to herald a pure civic dynamism destined to drive forward progressive politics “from below” or whether they try to stigmatize them with labels such as “populism” and “irrationalism.” Such simplifications belie the fact that the motivations behind these changes in political attitudes are varied and can even be contradictory. Nonetheless, the literature has identified some common structural causes that can enhance our understanding of the prevailing political dynamics (Nel·lo and Gomà 2018): (a) The increase in social and economic inequalities has highlighted the contradiction between the democratic principle of equality for all and the social reality. The growing disparity in access to income, services, and well-being can be seen, in practical terms, as a permanent affront to basic democratic values. This increase in inequalities is hitting with particular force not only the most vulnerable social groups but also sectors of the middle classes who are witnessing a gradual erosion of the securities of the Welfare State, a degradation of their living conditions, and a deterioration in the future prospects of both this and subsequent generations (Dahl 2007; Stiglitz 2012; Milanovic 2016).

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(b) The evidence that the tiny minority of the population that possess the majority of financial assets can elude and even flout states’ legal and fiscal regulations by relocating their activities and capital and thereby evading their tax obligations. This situation contrasts sharply with the circumstances and living conditions of the vast majority of the population whose life prospects are closely linked to specific territories (Urry 2014). (c) The growing importance acquired by both national and international economic and political organizations unencumbered by the usual mechanisms of representative systems, such as central banks and bodies promoting competition. These organizations often impose their own criteria, even if these override the preferences expressed by citizens in the ballot box, thus strengthening the perception in large parts of the population that electoral participation counts for nothing. The resentment triggered by such constraints on democracy have heavily contributed to the discrediting of supranational organizations, to localist and nationalist impulses and the spread of xenophobic sentiments (Streeck 2016). (d) The absence, in short, of any plausible, organized, and comprehensive alternatives to the prevailing power relationships in both the economic and social spheres (Traverso 2016). This lack of an overarching narrative foments people’s individualization and their search for solidarity not in bonds of class or gender but in, above all, affinities of a generational, cultural, or territorial nature. As a result, the expressions of discontent tend to become disparate and lack coherence, sometimes to the extent of triggering attitudes and behavior that, objectively speaking, run contrary to the interests of the social groups that adopt them. Thus, the traditional social movements, based on the contradictions of class interests, the struggle for gender equality or conflicts over the commons and the environment, are being gradually replaced by revolts based on irritation and social fears, devoid of leadership or programs. The classic intermediary bodies – left-wing parties, trade unions – have therefore tended to lose strength and find themselves supplanted by opportunistic, nationalistic, or openly reactionary forces (Judt 2011; Traverso 2019). Furthermore, various authors have emphasized the importance of spatial variables in the evolution of social discontent and political disaffection with institutions and traditional parties. They have traced the origins of social movements to, for example, the opposition between “la France périphérique” and the Parisian metropolis (Guilluy 2014), between the former industrial peripheries in Britain and the great tertiary hub of London (McCann 2016), between the Italian mezzogiorno and the more prosperous regions of North and central Italy, or between the interior counties of Catalonia and the metropolis of Barcelona. Thus, from a spatial viewpoint, discontent would be the expression of “the revenge of the places that don’t matter” (Rodríguez Pose 2018). This would establish a general territorial pattern, detectable both in Europe and beyond, a “reaction” which, in the words of Andrés Rodríguez Pose (2018):

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pitches not so much the rich against the poor, as would have been envisaged by those focusing on interpersonal inequality (i.e., Piketty 2013), but lagging and/or declining regions against more prosperous ones. (Gordon 2018; Rodríguez Pose 2018)

Accordingly, territorial factors would endow the protests that are now mushrooming throughout Europe with a mixed status, somewhere between a jacquerie and an anti-digital, anti-cosmopolitan Luddism. These interpretations have been criticized, however, by other authors who have stressed the eminently urban nature of the protests and insisted that their origins lie, above all, in the increase in inequalities, the growing precariousness of the labor market, and the rolling back of the welfare state. It would be these factors, which are acutely felt in urban areas that are scaring and exasperating a considerable component of the less privileged social groups, from the poor to the middle classes. This argument was expressed as a rebuttal of the “binary” opposition between “la France périphérique” and the metropolis: all the research indicates that today’s major social fractures are rooted in the heart of the urbanized world and run through it on very fine scales. The cities – whether large, medium or small – are at one and the same time places that favour both the concentration of wealth and the entrenchment of poverty. (Béhar et al. 2018)

From this perspective, any understanding of the spatial characteristics of discontent should be based, above all, on an analysis of both the distribution of the social groups over the space and, therefore, the mechanisms of social segregation. This would require the adoption of a more social and urban approach to the study of urban social movements and their political expressions – an approach that is, surprisingly, becoming less and less habitual.

2.7  Conclusions European cities are currently faced with enormous challenges that affect urban form and the very definition of the city, as well as its insertion into urban networks, its internal cohesion, and its governance. Furthermore, due to the historical evolution of European societies these challenges must be confronted today in a context of growing discontent and political instability. These factors must be taken into consideration in any analysis of the potentials and limitations of the urban social movements in Europe. In this chapter we have seen, firstly, how changes in the urban morphology have affected the urban movements. On the one hand, the spread of urban conditions, communications, and lifestyles makes it easier for movements to extend themselves over an entire territory, thereby freeing themselves from the spatially confined circumstances that had historically been one of their distinctive features. On the other hand, however, the blurring of the distinction between urban and rural space, between urban and nonurban social structures, entails a risk of diluting the

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specificity of these movements and erasing the boundaries of what had once been their characteristic social base. Secondly, we have analyzed the relationship between the urban movements and the growing integration of cities in global urban networks. Thus, there was an examination of how the asymmetry between the virtually unrestricted mobility of capital and the local nature of the urban movements now represents one of the main causes of their weakness. Consequently, even when these movements have the capacity to bring to the table crucial aspects of the evolution of contemporary societies, they have difficulties in doing so on an adequate scale or with sufficient means. It is also true, however, that the integration of networks provides movements with possibilities to disseminate their postulates and coordinate themselves on a supralocal scale. Their capacity to translate their action to bigger scales, by combining local action with supralocal coordination, thus becomes a key issue. Thirdly, the chapter explored the relationship between urban movements and social inequalities. The increase in inequalities and situations of social exclusion is clearly one of the main driving forces behind the rise of the social movements in European cities. This affects a good part of the population, from both the more vulnerable groups to the middle classes who fearfully observe the undermining of the bases of a hard-won well-being. However, the fact that the movements objectively originate from inequalities does not mean that they always foster advances toward greater equality. On the one hand, the social groups’ varying capacity to mobilize can bring advantages to citizens who, in difficult situations, possess the greatest social capital. On the other hand, there is a growing presence of practices and movements that specifically demand the withholding of social benefits from specific groups of citizens, after scapegoating them as being responsible for the overall difficulties. Fourthly, we have discussed the way in which the crisis in urban government can have an impact on politics and citizens’ capacity for organization. We saw how the increasing administrative fragmentation of urban areas clearly hampers the development of effective policies on urban sustainability, functionality, and solidarity. Fragmentation also poses problems of accountability and administrative transparency that make it difficult for urban movements to oversee public authorities and make their demands heard. Nevertheless, fragmentation also enhances the proximity of administrations to citizens, which, in principle, increases the movements’ capacity to have an impact on local government. Finally, the chapter examined the relationship between the urban movements and the growing discontent among sectors of European society with respect to institutions and the political status quo. This situation undoubtedly provides a breeding ground for the development of urban social movements  – as evidenced by their proliferation in many European cities in recent years. However, the capacity of the current urban movements and their actions to effectively organize this discontent is debatable. It is hard to see how discontent with complex, structural origins can be addressed in the absence of comprehensive programs and supra-local organizational capacity. Moreover, interpretations that fail to explain the roots of this discontent in terms of contradictions between social groups but instead focus on territorial “resentment” and “revenge” surely do little to advance either our understanding or any progressive political organization of the urban social movements.

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In conclusion, the evolution of European cities is providing the urban social movements with opportunities to become powerful agents of change. At the same time, it also imposes many limitations on their capacity to act, and this situation can lure them toward tendencies that are clearly regressive in nature. In this context, these movements can become instruments for progress toward greater equality and fuller democracy, but they can also be sidelined or, even worse, connive in the application of discriminatory and authoritarian policies. The direction which they ultimately take largely depends on who has the ability to understand their nature and the capacity to guide them one way or the other.

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Keating M (2009) Rescaling the European state: the making of territory and the rise of the Meso. Oxford University Press, Oxford Lefebvre H (1970) La révolution urbaine. Gallimard, Paris Maragall P (1979) El àrea metropolitana: una ocasión histórica. La Corporación como punto de partida. La Vanguardia, 19 August Marx K, Engels F (1848) Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei. Verso, London. (2012) McCann P (2016) The UK regional-national economic problem: geography, globalisation and governance. Routledge, London Milanovic B (2016) Global inequality: a new approach for the age of globalization. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Moulaert F (2013) The international handbook on social innovation: collective action, social learning and transdisciplinary research. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham Nel·lo O (1999) Los confines de la ciudad sin confines. In: Monclús FJ (ed) La ciudad dispersa. Barcelona, CCCB Nel·lo O (2013) Barcelona y Cataluña: las raíces del debate sobre el policentrismo del sistema urbano catalán. Ciudad y Territorio. Estudios Territoriales XLV:176 Nel·lo O (2015) La ciudad en movimiento: crisis social y respuesta ciudadana. Díaz & Pons, Madrid Nel·lo O (2018) Los cuatro retos de la ciudad europea, Informe económico y financiero. ESADE 22:21–31 Nel·lo O (2019) La città di Pasqual Maragall. FrancoAngeli, Milano Nel·lo O, Gomà A (2018) Territori. Diversitat espacial en els hàbits i condicions de vida juvenils: el paper clau de la segregació residencial. In: Serracant P (ed) Enquesta de Joventut de Catalunya 2017. Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona Nel·lo O, López J (2016) El procés d’urbanització. In: Giner S, Homs O (eds) Raó de Catalunya. La societat catalana al segle XXI. Enciclopèdia Catalana, Barcelona Piketty T (2013) Le capital au XXIe siècle. Seuil, Paris Rodríguez Pose A (2018) The revenge of the places that don’t matter (and what to do about it). Camb J Reg Econ Soc 11:189–209 Secchi B (2013) La città dei ricchi e la città dei poveri. Laterza, Bari Sert JL (1942) Can our cities survive? An ABC of urban problems their analysis, their solutions based on the proposals formulated by the C.I.A.M. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Stiglitz J (2012) The price of inequality: how today’s divided society endangers our future. W.W. Norton & Company, New York Streeck W (2014) How will capitalism end? New Left Rev 87:35–64 Streeck W (2016) Buying time: the delayed crisis of democratic capitalism. Verso, London Subirats M (2012) Barcelona: de la necessitat a la llibertat. Les classes socials al tombant del segle XXI. l’Avenç, Barcelona Tammaru T, Marcinczak S, van Ham M, Musterd S (eds) (2016) Socio-economic segregation in European capital cities. East Meets West. Routledge, New York Tarrow S (1998) Power in movement: social movements and contentious politics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Traverso E (2016) Malinconia di sinistra. Una tradizione nascosta. Feltrinelli, Milano Traverso E (2019) The new faces of fascism. Populism and the far right. Verso, London UN – United Nations (2015) World urbanization prospects. The 2014 revision. https://esa.un.org/ unpd/wup/publications/files/wup2014-highlights.pdf Urry J (2014) Offshoring. Polity, Cambridge Williams R (1973) The country and the city. Oxford University Press, New York Oriol Nel·lo  Geographer. Department of Geography, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Author: La ciudad en movimiento (Madrid, Díaz & Pons, 2015), Cities in the 21st Century (New York, Routledge, 2016, with R. Mele), Barrios y Crisis. Crisis económica, segregación urbana e innovación social en Cataluña (Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch, 2018, with I. Blanco).

Chapter 3

From Protest to Program Berlin’s Anti-­ gentrification-­Movement Since Reunificat ion Andrej Holm

More than 20,000 people joined the demonstration Widersetzen – Gemeinsam gegen Verdrängung und Mietenwahnsinn (“Stand up together against displacement and rent price madness”) in Berlin on April 14, 2018. It was the largest tenant mobilization since 1992, when around 20,000 participants demonstrated under the slogan Wir Bleiben Alle (“We’re all staying put”) against the abolition of rent control and the restitution of housing stock to private landlords in East Germany. More than 25 years elapsed between both demonstrations, but the issue seems to be the same: Berlin’s tenants mobilize against rent increases and displacement pressure. In order to understand this return of tenant protest in Berlin, it is necessary to have a closer look at urban changes, real estate dynamics, and housing policies in Berlin. According to the early works of Manuel Castells (1975, 1983), urban social movements can be considered as indicators for urban conflicts and a source for urban research. The social movements in the cities are relevant for social analysis of cities because they are “contradictory systems of social practice, which are based on specific contradictions of the urban problem and which question the established order” (Castells 1975, 31). This chapter will show that protest focused analysis has the potential to identify the main conflicts of urban development and at the same time to discover the structural frames of housing conditions. To achieve these purposes the chapter will answer the following questions: What kind of urban problems were highlighted by the two strong protest mobilizations and which aspects of the established order were questioned by the tenant activism? What are the conditions for successful interventions from below? How could grassroots initiatives become a part of a A. Holm (*) Department of Social Sciences (Urban and Regional Sociology), Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Fregolent, O. Nel·lo (eds.), Social Movements and Public Policies in Southern European Cities, Urban and Landscape Perspectives 21, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52754-9_3

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municipalist policy making under the rule of a progressive political majority in a city like Berlin? Housing in Berlin was always a contested field and an issue picked up by protest mobilizations, even in the period before the reunification of Germany when the city was in an exceptional situation and West Berlin government could rely on relatively abundant resources. This chapter discusses the relations and interdependencies between grassroots protests and policy making in the field of housing since the reunification at the beginning of 1990s. In the first part the chapter provides a brief overview of the history of housing-related conflicts since the beginning of the 1990s. Starting with the early renewal activities in East Berlin, followed by the neoliberal dismantling of housing policies in the years around the millennium and the emergence of a housing crisis during the last years, the chapter will highlight various stages of urban development. Each of these stages has created different conditions for the development of urban social movements, from the moment of the reunification of the city until the recent adoption of the limitations to the increase of the rents approved in 2019. In the second part the chapter will compare and analyze the experience of grassroots mobilizations in Berlin as far as their political influence on the housing policy agenda is concerned in the different phases of this period.

3.1  H  ousing in Berlin: From State-Led Gentrification to Comprehensive Housing Crisis In many descriptions of urban changes in Berlin since the reunification, there is the image that while in the 1990s Berlin was a “charming and unfinished city” (Blecha 2014) and had a highly regulated and relaxed housing market, now it has become a city under severe market pressure, rent increase, and displacement. This general picture is consistent with data on rent prices and the high share of social and public housing. However, it is to be taken into account that housing was always contested and especially East Berlin’s inner-city neighborhoods were already affected by gentrification during the 1990s.

3.1.1  T  he Transformation of Housing Policies After Reunification During the early 1990s, the evolution of housing conditions in East Berlin was determined by two overlapping processes. On the one hand, the whole system of housing was transformed from a state-organized housing provision under the conditions of a socialist economy into a market-based system of housing under capitalist conditions. On the other hand, the devastated inner city neighborhoods

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became an object of urban renewal after 60 years of disinvestment (Häußermann 1996; Wielgohs 1996; Glock and Keller 2001). With the abolishing of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) the mode of public managed housing was challenged by the process of reunification. Especially the inner-city neighborhoods with their historical building stock were strongly affected by the process of re-privatization. One central aspect of the Unification Treaty between the governments of West Germany and the GDR was the restauration of private ownership and the reintroduction of a market economy in East Germany. In respect to housing, these principles implied a total restitution of all property to their former owners or their heirs and the adoption of the Western system of rent regulation. Because of the age of housing stock – nearly all buildings in the inner-city neighborhoods were constructed before 1949  – and the fact that nearly all inhabitants were tenants, reunification changed the housing conditions completely. Until the end of the 1990s more than 60% of all buildings were restituted to private landlords and the formation of rent prices followed market rules and rose to a level four times higher than in 1990 (Hinrichs 1999; Glock et al. 2001). This trend of privatization and marketization was aggravated by the fact that most of the restituted buildings were sold to professional landlords after the restitution. Studies from the 1990s show that most recipients of restitution sold their buildings during the first 9 months after the restitution (Reimann 1997). As a result of this dynamics the property structure changed twice during a short period at the beginning of the 1990s and generated a structure of professional landlords with real economic incentives to utilize the housing stock in East Berlin’s inner-city neighborhoods (Häußermann et al. 2002, 72). As far as urban political protest is concerned, the all-embracing agency of rent increase by law and the feeling of comprehensive changes in the neighborhood and housing system became a substantial lever for a wide mobilization across different classes and milieus at the beginning of the 1990s. Despite the strong grassroots mobilization in 1992, the campaign against the rent increase by law was not successful. In the shadow of the great social transformations in the course of reunification, both the issue of housing and a spatially limited initiative were too marginal to have a real impact on policy making. Nevertheless, the mobilization had a long-term impact on the tenant organization in Berlin. In addition to the experience that a powerful grassroots mobilization without established political parties is possible, the campaign Wir bleiben alle! (“We’re all staying put”) created an anti-displacement narrative that had to shape the self-conception of tenant protests for many years. Moreover, during the weeks of mobilization, especially in the neighborhoods of Prenzlauer Berg, a network of activists emerged that in the coming years could be reactivated many times for local campaigns and interventions (Bernt and Holm 1998). Since the mid-1990s the housing issue in Berlin was heavily conditioned by megalomaniac and highly optimistic expectations sustained by local government and real estate companies about Berlin’s future development as new German Capital. The hype included a perception of a strong population growth from

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3.5 million to 5 million people over the next 10 years. Based on this belief extensive redevelopment projects (reconstruction of the Friedrichstraße into a major business street), new constructions sites (development of a new central business district at Potsdamer Platz), and the construction of more than 100,000 residential units in the urban outskirts fostered a local growth coalition for the “New Berlin” (Strom 1996; Häußermann and Strom 1994; Colomb 2011). At the same time, for many neighborhoods in East Berlin’s inner-city large-scale renewal zones were established in which extensive modernization work was initially carried out with public subsidies. The administrative and personnel structures of the small-scale urban renewal experiences in West Berlin were “copied and pasted” on to the East (Bernt 2003). However, unlike the former urban renewal areas in the West, it was established from the outset that a large part of the renovation work should be financed by private investors. The proportion of publicly supported modernization measures decreased in the second half of the 1990s, so that a system of market-like renewal was implemented. In terms of rent prices and displacement this way of organizing urban renewal meant that many tenants were forced to leave their homes because of the rising housing costs. In many renewal areas the activists from the “Wir Bleiben Alle” campaign organized neighborhood initiatives to oppose gentrification and displacement with a mix of grassroots protest, legal support for tenants, and intervention in local political debates. Many activists participated in the so-called Betroffenenvertretungen (local representatives of affected residents) which were intended as formal institutions of participation in the designated urban renewal areas. The local representatives not only took advantage of the opportunities to obtain early information and to give opinions on specific projects but also to discuss fundamental issues of renewal policy with the administration. Based on their coordinated und long-standing mobilization, the initiatives in Prenzlauer Berg and other neighborhoods were also able to enforce rental limits for privately financed modernizations in 1995. The rent cap limited rent increases to levels of socially affordable rental prices after modernizations and protected many households from being displaced. Landlords initially accepted this requirement because they calculated their investments with favorable tax reductions. After the tax incentives expired, landlords sued in court against the requirement and managed to repeal the rent cap regulation in 2004 (Holm 2006, 2011a).

3.1.2  N  eoliberal Dismantling of Berlin’s Housing Policies Since the Year 2000 Around the year 2000 the housing and urban development in Berlin was affected by a strong fiscal crisis and the stagnation of population. Instead of the expected population boom, the number of inhabitants shrank from 3.47  million (1991) to

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3.38  million (2000). During the same period the housing stock rose with nearly 140,000 newly constructed housing units to 1.86 million. In relation to the number of 1.82 million households the housing provision rate was quite high and real estate experts discussed vacancy as the major problem of the housing market. Untouched by these general market conditions, the privately financed urban renewal in East Berlin inner city neighborhoods strengthened heavy rent increases and the displacement of tenants in some neighborhoods in Prenzlauer Berg and Mitte. Studies in the renewal areas of Prenzlauer Berg have found that between 1993 and 2008 over 80% of the inhabitants were expelled from these territories. The modernization activities were the main displacement factor. After modernization without public funding, only 25% of the tenants remained in their houses – more had to move out years after the renovation because the rents continued to rise (Holm 2013; Nowak 2017). The gentrification in Prenzlauer Berg in the years around the millennium was a strongly controversial issue. In particular the administration and planning institutions responsible for the urban renewal process strongly criticized young researchers and activists for using the term “gentrification” because this word exposed all the social promises of the careful urban renewal policies in Berlin (Bernt and Holm 2009). Despite the dramatic changes in the renewal areas, the tenant protest remained limited because of the many opportunities to find affordable housing outside the renewal areas in nearby neighborhoods. Almost all political decisions on housing after the year 2000 were determined by austerity pressure. Due to the city’s economic decline, public mismanagement at all levels of administration, and the state bank’s (Berliner Bankgesellschaft) risky financial transactions during the 1990s Berlin’s, public debt grew to more than 65 billion Euros (Krätke 2004; Ugarte Chacón 2012; Lebuhn 2015). No matter who formed the different government coalitions, since the collapse of the bank consortium in 2001, austerity management became the central goal of local politics. This hegemony of austerity was used in most fields of urban policies to enforce neoliberal regulations and to cut down on the instruments of former welfare systems. In the field of housing the budget crisis was used to legitimize a sellout of around 220,000 housing units from public companies and to enforce a stronger economic orientation in their management, to cut all housing subsidies, and to bleed housing and planning resources at all levels of administration by reducing the staff (Uffer 2011, 2013). Compared to the structure of the housing market at the beginning of the 1990s the number of regulated housing (public and social housing) decreased from 750,000 (1991) to 380,000 (2010) and instead of 51 percent only 23 percent of the rental housing stock subjected to social obligations (Holm 2016). The bulk of privatizations was transacted under the red-red government coalition between Social democrats and the Left Party (2011 until 2011). There was no substantial opposition to it in the local parliament, and only few organizations and initiatives criticized the privatization policy in public. Because of the still relaxed housing market there was little real grassroots opposition to the sellout of Berlin public housing resources. Although tenant organizations such as the Berliner MieterGemeinschaft (“Berlin tenant community”), together with trade unions, organized conferences, and petitions against privatization, it was not possible to

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mobilize a strong protest movement on the streets (Berliner MieterGemeinschaft 2006; Holm 2011b). After the financial crisis in 2008/2009 Berlin’s housing market was affected by a strong influx of international capital looking out for profitable investment opportunities. Financial investors and institutional funds dominated real estate activities and heavily contributed to the increase in property prices. Undeveloped land prices rose from 422 €/m2 (2008) to 2055 €/m2 (2017) and developed properties from 11,498 €/m2 (2008) to 4432 €/m2 (2017) (GAA Berlin 2018). Despite the economic model to calculate an increase in value, high property costs had to be refinanced by revenues from the management of the buildings. Because the German rent law protects rent prices for long-term tenancies better than in the case of new contracts, many new landlords are trying to push out old tenants in order to obtain a higher rental income or to sell the unit as a condominium at a higher price. The new composition and expectations of landlords is enforcing a new composition of neighborhoods by displacing long-term inhabitants from their dwellings. Gentrification and displacement have become a city-wide problem for many tenants and protection against displacement, and the preservation of low rent prices in neighborhoods with gentrification pressure is one of the most important challenges for the housing policy in Berlin. Due to the ongoing growth of population during the last decade (320,000 inhabitants between 2008 and 2017) and a deficit of housing constructions (only 81,000 new housing units between 2008 and 2017), Berlin’s housing policy must overcome a deficit of around 200,000 housing units by the year 2030 (Amt für Statistik 2018; Sen 2018). At the moment the lack of affordable housing stands at around 150,000 housing units. In this context, the challenge consists in the enforcement and enabling of the production of affordable housing on a relevant scale (Holm 2018). An effect of the rapidly worsening housing crisis in the city was that of a new generation of rent-political protests. From 2010 on, the first mobilizations were directed against large-scale projects such as the investment project MediaSpree and individual controversial luxury buildings in the inner-city neighborhoods. They were led mainly by organized house communities, which shaped the image of the protests (Dohnke 2013; Lebuhn 2017). Twenty-five years later the housing market situation seems to be completely different from the beginning of the 1990s. In contrast to the large dilapidated housing stock in East Berlin with a strong need for urban renewal, the physical quality of the old housing stock is now much better after many years of public and private investment. Instead of the state-led rent increase by law, the rent price became more and more a result of market rules. And against the backdrop of spatially differentiated housing changes (rent increase in East Berlin, gentrification pressure in East Berlin’s inner city neighborhoods), the current housing crisis is a city-wide problem. One thing remains unchanged: for thousands of tenants the fear of losing their homes and the experience of strong rent increases provoke a feeling similar to being in danger of displacement.

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In this context, more than 150 micro collectives of tenants organized a kind of house battle against their landlords with a mix of legal strategies, public actions, and militant protest. Initiatives such as Kotti & Co. or the Bündnis Zwangsräumungen verhindern! (“Prevent Forced Evictions!”), mobilized with great perseverance, became the flagships of the protests that are also visible in the media. Kotti & Co is a tenant initiative in a social housing estate (located directly at Kottbusser Tor in Berlin Kreuzberg) which has been protesting against the rent increases in their subsidized apartments since 2012 (Hamann et al. 2018; Bock et al. 2018; Vollmer 2015, 2018). For many years, it has been the first successful housing initiative that links the housing issue to issues of migration and racial discrimination. The Bündnis Zwangsräumungen verhindern! mobilization was based on international experience in the fight against forced evictions and tried to support those affected by promoting self-organization, focusing above all on direct action. The initiative is best known for the successful blockades against forced evictions at the end of 2012 (Maruschke 2014, 81; Ordóñez et al. 2015). But the strength of the current tenant political protest lies not in the spectacular actions and media coverage of individual initiatives, but rather in the diverse breadth of organized house communities, which are now spread all over the city. These micro collectives of people directly affected give the protest a very high legitimacy. These collectives no longer correspond to expert or activist’s talk about the tenants or for the tenants but they are formed by the tenants themselves. This self-empowerment is the central difference to the mobilizations of the past and in this respect ultimately follows on from the “Wir bleiben Alle!” mobilizations (“We’re all staying put”) of the early 1990s. The spatially and organizationally fragmented tenant protests of the past few years have temporarily coalesced into collectively organized movements, which in some areas have developed stable working structures. Different associations and initiatives in social housing have worked on a series of suggestions for reform and securing affordable rents in the long term. Starting with the Initiative Stadt Neu Denken (Rethinking the City Initiative) (2014), concrete regulations were proposed at a round table for a new approach to public housing. Tenant action groups in state-­ owned housing associations have pushed through what are now binding tenant-­ friendly agreements in association with the Berlin state and housing organizations. In 2015, a tenant referendum for a “Law on the Realignment of Social Housing Provision in Berlin” was successfully initiated by a broad affiliation of tenant action groups and later adopted in large part by the administration of Berlin under the form of the “Berlin Housing Provision Act” (Wohnraumversorgungsgesetz Berlin) (Braun 2015). This new generation of tenant and anti-eviction protest gained new public and political attention for the housing question. After years of denial, the political parties in Berlin can no longer ignore the problem of housing and especially the Left party and the Greens started a stronger cooperation with tenant protest groups and grassroots initiatives between 2011 and 2016 during the time of the government coalition between Social Democrats and Christian Democrats (“Great Coalition”). They supported the demands of the protest with parliamentary questions and

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proposals, and especially the Left Party was able to regain the confidence they had lost from the privatization policy in the 2000s.

3.1.3  R  e-emergence of Progressive Housing Policies Since 2016 Since 2016, with the changeover of the governing coalition at the end of 2016 to the “Red-Red-Green” (SPD, Left Party, Greens) alliance, significant demands from the tenant protests were adopted into the government’s program. Ahead of the election for the Berlin Parliament in September 2016, the future coalition partners had already developed closer cooperation with a series of tenants’ initiatives. While the Greens and the Left Party as parties of the opposition coordinated aspects of their parliamentary work with social movements, the SPD was forced to cooperate with a successful petition for the first stage of the Tenant Referendum. The Left Party introduced the slogan “The city belongs to you” in the election campaign posters and tried to put that promise into practice after the election. During the coalition negotiations, individual emissaries of the parties were in discussion with tenant activists from housing groups, neighborhood groups, and specific subjects involved in the campaigns. The latter were able to influence the goals of the coalition to the point of the phrasing of specific passages of the government program. The opening toward an urban society, as promised during the election campaign, was initially realized and the authorship of the “street” has become visible in the government program. Under the heading “Affordable Housing for All,” the new coalition’s political goals for housing were detailed in more than ten pages of the coalition agreement (Coalition Agreement 2016). The central demands of the urban political movements of recent years with respect to housing encompass the following objectives and will likely influence the design of housing policy in the future. Real Estate Policy  Until now, real estate was mainly regarded as an instrument of debt liquidation and arranged accordingly by resorting to a policy of selling to the highest bidder. In the future, the sustainable and strategic management of urban land should be pursued as a goal. Public land for housing construction should be solely given to state-owned housing associations, cooperatives, and social housing associations. The allocation criteria for sales or lease agreements are to be shaped in such a manner that 30% to 50% of the inhabitable space created falls under rent controls and offers tenancy protection. For the establishment of new building sites, the model of cooperative site development will be applied in order to force private companies to offer at least 30% of the inhabitable space as rent controlled and tenancy protected units. Social Housing  The remaining housing stock of around 100,000 social housing units from earlier funding periods is to be protected for a long term from premature

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termination of their social housing status. A comprehensive reform also aims to reduce rent levels and to orientate them according to the tenants’ income. Picking up the claim to municipalize the social housing stock, pilot projects should be promoted with the acquisition of privately owned social housing through residents’ cooperatives. Public Housing  According to the conditions of the coalition agreement, the six state-owned housing associations with their approximately 300,000  units should, from now on, become the central pillar of social housing supply; 60% of the tenancy agreements for this stock should be given to low-income households (below the threshold for housing benefits, in accordance with the certificate of eligibility for housing). Rent rises should be limited to 2% p.a. and the costs of refurbishment are only admissible up to 6% of the annual rent. With these agreements, the future government program also took on board the demands of tenant initiatives such as Tenants Forum Pankow and the Rent Referendum. Securing Housing and Protection Against Displacement  Another key area of future housing policy lies in the more rigorous application of instruments based in tenancy and urban planning law to protect against displacement and to limit property speculation. The abuse of apartments as holiday lets and vacancies should be more strongly sanctioned than before (for instance by limiting or forbidding change of usage). For future demolition permits, there should be regulations in place for appropriate replacement of housing. Furthermore, a charter to protect neighborhoods, regulations for conversions, and municipal rights to take over private properties are to be extended and designed more effectively. Here, too, the demands of neighborhood initiatives, support groups for those affected, and tenancy rights organizations have been adopted by the new government coalition. Since the new coalition came into government in 2016, first steps have been taken in the realization of a new housing policy. However, the realization of many of these plans has been delayed due to the slow moving wheels of the administration, initial tensions between the coalition partners, and the resistance of housing companies to put into practice new obligations. These difficulties demonstrate how important the work and the protests of a whole set of initiatives and grassroots movements are in seeding up processes of change and law reforms. Even under the conditions of a progressive government the following rule applies: only political pressure from below, the calling out of grievances, and the highlighting of solutions can secure a solution for social housing supply. Many of the previous demands from tenant initiatives could be incorporated into the government program because the protest of previous years did not restrain claiming for abstract goals (“Right to housing,” “No displacement,” “No return on rent”), but had developed very concrete and actionable sets of proposals for a new housing policy in a variety of fields. The way from protest to program was less a strategic decision than the result of the need to find quick and concrete solutions to

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the many individual conflicts in which tenant groups wanted to defend their right to housing. Since the Red-Red-Green government took office, the previous relationship between movement and government has changed. Until now, it has been a matter of demanding, complaining, and appeals, now an invitation for an active shaping of policies in practice had to be put forward. However, the evaluation of this cooperation and its results have been contradictory. On the one hand, there are examples of collaborations that would have been impossible in the past. On the other hand, there are many situations in which the classic top-down relationship between movement and government continues. Five different levels of collaboration that can be described: –– Project-related cooperation: Some experiences like the municipalization of a former social housing estate (“Neues Kreuzberger Zentrum”) and the enforcement of the preemptive rights of municipal administrations in social protection areas are prime examples for project-related cooperation, mostly based on an atmosphere of trust and personal relationships between activists and politicians at the managerial level of administration. Contrasting examples, like the ongoing prevention of a grassroots initiated housing project in the inner city neighborhood Wedding (“ps wedding project”), obstructed by many years of non-decisions prove that personal relations and open canals for communication are not always guarantees for better results. –– Opening of expert rounds for initiatives: For many years, housing activists have criticized the government’s unilateral occupation of advisory panels with representatives of business and lobbying associations and have demanded to bring to an end a real estate exploitation coalition. Under the new administration, several expert bodies have been explicitly open to representatives of cooperatives, initiatives, and critical science. This expansion changes the mood and contents in such rounds but is not a guarantee of the social alignment of results. In many cases, the new experts are overwhelmed with participation in such bodies because they have little experience with this type of negotiation and they cannot resort to a professional network of support in order to provide well-founded positions to all the issues discussed in such circles. The access to a background committee does not break the uneven distribution of knowledge and resources. –– Training for administration: In many fields of urban and housing policy, the cooperation between grassroots initiatives and administrations also fail on the lack of translation between ideas from below and the framework of action from above. In the tradition of advocacy planning, there are some strategies for translating the movement demands into administratively feasible programs. Under the red-red-green government, this relationship has been reversed in several fields of policy. For example, initiatives from the DIY-construction scene with a lot of experience in dealing with hereditary building rights were commissioned to organize a workshop for the administration in order to put the new property policies into practice (Brahm and Darr 2018). Another strategy was tested for the district administration in the borough Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg.

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Here, the Councilor for Housing offered all employees of the authority to count their attendance to events organized by grassroots initiatives as working hours in order to motivate as many officials as possible to participate. –– Extended co-drawing of legislative procedures: In normal procedures, legislative proposals or new regulations are drawn up by the responsible department of administration and then given to other departments for examination (so-called co-drawing). It is only after this co-drawing that proposals are brought to Parliament, where they will be discussed in the relevant committees and finally voted on. The scope for a fundamental change in the proposals is limited because, even under a progressive governing coalition, there is a relatively large loyalty to government-led administrations. In order to minimize public criticism and achieve better results, initiatives were involved in the discussions on laws and regulations on a case-by-case basis at an early stage. Such early consultation, for example, has enabled the Senator for Urban Development and Housing to obstruct an inadequate blueprint to reform social housing from the administration and to open a new round of discussion on this issue. Together with the tenant experts and representatives of the governing parties, new guidelines for the reform act have been developed. In other cases, such as the decision of new housing subsidy directives, such early inclusion was omitted, so that, following the decision of the directives, there was criticism from the cooperatives, of all things. –– Impulses through street protest: In addition to the new forms of cooperation, under red-red-green government the relationship between movement and government is also characterized by classic protest mobilizations. Unlike earlier times, this protest is not just repelled as a complaint and criticism but is being used by sections of the coalition as an opportunity to speed up reform processes. For example, a series of squatting in late May 2018 spurred intense discussion between governing parties about how to handle squatting. The so-called Berlin line, which provides for eviction within 24 h, has since been relaxed. Squatting is not officially tolerated in Berlin, but the agreement of the coalition partners currently provides for a case-by-case examination of each new occupation. Criminalization of squatting has also become more complicated because since the decision of a misuse of housing prohibition act, the vacancy of dwellings for more than 6 months is no longer allowed. A house occupation in such conditions could be seen favorably as an administrative assistance to implement the new regulation. In summary, the reign of Red-Red-Green can be considered as an actual U-turn on housing policy: Public investment instead of austerity, expansion of the public housing companies instead of privatization, prohibition of misappropriation of housing and preemption rights in social protection areas instead of the red carpet for investors. Even if social provision deficits cannot be remedied in a short period of time, the new housing policy points in the right direction. Even the relationship between movement and government has also a changed contour and has moments of municipalism. The relation between activists and the

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heads of departments and to politicians is much more open than in the past, but in many fields the decisions are still taken inside the old network of public companies, institutions, and administrations. Examples such as the political gridlock caused by reforming the social housing law, the prevention of grassroots initiated housing projects like the “ps wedding project,” by many years of non-decisions, the resolutions of a new program for modernization without consultation of housing groups demonstrate that the Berlin culture of governing is far from being a collaborative mode of co-production.

3.2  G  overning by Protest: Grassroots Influence on Housing Policy In Berlin and other cities, we can observe an ongoing process of contestation in the field of housing including strong waves of protest mobilization. In line with Peter Marcuse’s work, we could ask about the real effects and scope of grassroots protest in relation to policy changes and transformative shifts in the field of housing (Marcuse 2012). The protests in Berlin show above all that activists were always right with their assessments. The early warnings of gentrification in the East Berlin redevelopment areas were overtaken by reality. The votes that vehemently opposed the privatization of dwellings received confirmation of their correctness a decade later. All those who warned against a sell-off of the city in the face of investor-driven planning of major projects like MediaSpree have been proved right in the face of massive financialization of housing during the last years. But unfortunately being right is not an indicator of the success of social movements, but rather a testimony to the failure of the mobilizations themselves. In his inspiring work on urban social movements and urban contestations Manuel Castells states his belief that grassroots mobilization could have the potential to change the living conditions in our cities. While he sees urban planning and urban politics not as an “instrument of social change, but only an instrument of domination, integration and regulation of contradictions” (Castells 1975, 36), his view on protest mobilization is much more optimistic. Castells understands urban movements as “real source of change and renewal of the city” (Ibid., 36). He interprets them as (new) expressions of conflict, which make the promise of another city and another society visible by exercising “new ways to manage everyday life collectively” (Ibid., 123). Instead of the typical format of social movement research to analyze constellations, resources, and political opportunity structures to understand social mobilization, Castells places the social, political and cultural effects of urban movements at the center of his research interest. But not every protest can shift the social power relations. In this context, Castells defines three structural factors for successful urban movements. He sees the starting point of every social movement in a “clear social occasion” in which “existing

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interests are directly facing… and no possible negotiation” appears (Castells 1975, 58). As a second condition, he designates a “Social base who […] understands that she can only rely on herself” (Ibid.). Finally, Castells sees a third aspect for the success of urban protest in the presence of a political organization, whose activists “take over the coordination and explanation of the struggles” (Ibid., 59). Although the role of political cadres does not appear to be exaggerated from today’s perspective, Manuel Castells believes that only an embedding of the local protest events into fundamental societal contradictions can be a mobilization able to transform concrete demands into a social movement. Using the suggestions by Manuel Castells, I will compare the transformative power of the strong tenant mobilization in Berlin in the early 1990s and the late 2010s and describe the social occasion of the protest, the social base of the mobilization, and the relation to other players in the political arena.

3.2.1  Social Occasion of Protest The success of mobilization of the “Wir Bleiben Alle” campaign at the beginning of the 1990s had a lot to do with the perception of the housing question in the GDR. To be sure, in the former situation, housing problems existed, especially when accessing an apartment or satisfying wishes to move – but the idea that such an existential affair as to have a place to live could be determined by economic criteria was simply outside the imagination of many. The deep-rooted moral economy of housing as part of a social infrastructure in East Germany was confronted with the market realities of the West. The rent increases decided by the government in the far away capital Bonn were perceived as a breach of this social self-evident belief. The tenant protest was strongly linked to the question of reunification and focused on the social cost of the transformation into a market society. However, it was precisely this connection to the Reunification process that pushed the tenant movement into a socially marginalized position. Like the protests of the East German workers in the companies privatized by the “Treuhand” (para-governmental institution responsible for the destruction and privatization of East Germany’s industry), the mobilizations never had a chance to win social majorities and had to fail in the shadow of the triumphalism of Reunification. The acerbity of the current protests also derives from an outrage in the face of a backdrop that endangers aspects of urban life that hitherto had been considered obvious. Irrespective of whether it is a matter of freedom in Prenzlauer Berg, clubs at the spree, or tenants in social housing, in the past all of them had been able to feel themselves as a natural part of the inner city. With the exception of the East Berlin redevelopment areas, there were virtually no rent increases in Berlin until the turn of the millennium, and despite some evictions of occupied houses, subculture and self-organzied house projects became an integral part of Berlin's city centre. Today's connection of the Berlin housing market to international real estate markets call into

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question the self-evident ness of these experiences. Because there is a still vivid memory of other development paths in Berlin, the changes trigger protest. This change of previously obvious securities also hits the tenants living in the social housing. Here the residents had assumed that they would remain on a permanent social rental development, which is now being fundamentally challenged with rental increases and the cost of rental madness. As at the moment of the reunification shock in the early 1990s, the supposedly normal market-economy mechanisms are not accepted by many as normal. The self-conception that a city should be organized differently from market mechanisms was then, and is today, the source of the protest. But the call for more public responsibility on the housing question can be claimed today with much more legitimacy against a rampant financial capitalism than against the German state during the Reunification.

3.2.2  Social Base of Protest The broad social spectrum of mobilization has been described in many articles as a specific quality of the “Wir Bleiben Alle” protests of 1992 (Rada 1997; Bernt and Holm 1998). Compared to other protest events during the 1990s – like antifascist mobilizations or protest of the squatter movement  – the Wir Bleiben Alle demonstration was attended by all those neighbors who otherwise saw other public protests at most from the windows. Wir Bleiben Alle was neither a scene mobilization nor party politics, but a real grassroots protest that owed its social diversity to a general concern. The political decision by the Bundestag to adapt the rents in East Germany to the Western level (Mietenüberleitungsgesetz, MÜG) could be seen as a housing political exception, because all tenants in East Germany were affected simultaneously by considerable rent increases. In this context, the character of a nationwide and comprehensive rent increase was regarded as a central reason why the individualization tendencies that were normally common in housing issues could be broken up. Today, the geography of citywide rent increases in Berlin, the omnipresent fear of being displaced, and the fact that even relatively high income groups are struggling with a rising rent burden and limited access to housing have created a situation comparable to the early 1990s. Rent and housing issues are no longer a private matter but permanent topics in everyday conversations and local reporting. The housing issue has once again crept into the center of the everyday life experiences of many and can be regarded as a gravitational point of the social question. In both moments of strong tenant protest, the citizens directly affected were at the heart of the mobilization, and this provided a high level of public legitimacy to their rebellion.

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3.2.3  Presence of Political Organization A main feature of the Wir Bleiben Alle protests at the beginning of the 1990s was the political character of the grassroots movement. Despite clear political demands (withdrawal of the administrative rent increases!), the mobilization of tenants from the city districts was independent of party-political influence. Party representatives could take part in the preparatory meetings as private persons, but a formal cooperation was excluded. According to the prevailing conception at that time, contact with politics should take place according to the conditions defined by the movement. Entering the political arena was always self-determined and found its expression as a rally in front of the Town Hall, as a public discussion event with the then Federal Minister of Construction Klaus Töpfer in a fully occupied Church in Prenzlauer Berg or as a bus ride from East Berlin pensioners to the Federal Ministry of Housing in Bonn, to name but a few examples. The tenants received party-­ political support almost exclusively from the PDS, the successor party of the ruling party in the GDR (SED) and the precursor of the Left Party, which, however, had only a marginal position in the German party system. Ultimately, the rental protest of the early 1990s also failed because of a spatial mismatch between concentrated mobilization in East Berlin’s inner-city districts and the political addressees at the federal level. As much as political independence was the strength of the mobilization, without a connection to a political organization, the protest lacked continuity and the high level of activity dissolved into decentralized activities in several East Berliner neighborhoods. Like 25 years ago, the current tenant protest is also a result of misguided policies and the majority of the mobilizing groups have little hope in the political players and procedures. The new generation of tenant mobilization could be seen as an act of self-empowerment like the protest 25 years ago. Independent from party political organizations the current protest became visible as demonstrations on the street, as many micro collectives in direct confrontation with their landlords and as an unparalleled intrusion into the political arena. As in the early 1990s, the current protests of grassroots initiatives are being borne out, and not even institutional tenant organizations play a role in organizing and shaping protests. Despite the fragmented internal structure of the protests and the spatial dispersion throughout the city, it has been possible to convey the impression of a common movement. In particular, the rental referendum, the large demonstrations, and the permanent presence of tenant political conflicts in the press have helped to develop the protests into a political factor in urban life despite a lack of organization. Policy proposals by the Left Party and the Greens cannot be developed at present without or even against tenant initiatives. Even if the active groups are not directly involved in all policy processes, they have attained the status of a silent veto power, the positions of which must always be considered. The current relationship between government and movement reaches moments of a municipalist constellation, since even without institutionalized cooperation, several housing policy decisions arise

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directly from the demands of the citizen’s initiatives, or tenant experts are involved in the design of instruments.

3.2.4  Transformative Housing Mobilization To regard protest movements as the engine of change, as Manuel Castells proposes implies regarding the crises of the system, which the protests reflect and produce, as a prerequisite for a transformation. If so, Berlin has excellent prerequisites for a profound change in urban and housing policy. In just two decades, Berlin has become the capital of the crisis. Since 2010, three moments of crisis have overlapped in the city: a financial crisis, a housing crisis and a crisis of the political system. Financial Crisis  With a public debt of around 60 billion Euros, Berlin is one of the most indebted cities in Europe. Like in many other cities around the world public debts have become a tool to legitimize a strong and fast process of neoliberal transformation. Jamie Pack calls it “austerity urbanism” when the inherent necessity for public austerity is used for deep cuts in the remnants of social welfare as well as for the reorganization of power relations. Berlin’s austerity policy has involved savings and cutbacks at all levels of administration, the privatization of infrastructure and public housing, as well as the sale of public ground at the highest prices. Housing Crisis  Demographic change, financialized and speculative investment strategies, and abandoning the commitment to social housing policy have led to a drastic rent increase. Gentrification is no longer confined to individual neighborhoods but has become the new mainstream trend for most areas of the urban core. The shortage of public and social housing has resulted in the lack of affordable housing of around 300,000 housing units for people with low income. Once Berlin was considered a city with a relaxed housing market and to be the most affordable European metropole  – today Berlin can be seen as a place of comprehensive housing crisis. Political Crisis  No matter who formed the different government coalitions since the collapse of the bank consortium in 2001, austerity management became the central goal of local politics. This hegemony of austerity was used in all fields of urban policies to enforce neoliberal regulations and to cut down the instruments of existing welfare systems. With typical TINA reactions – There Is No Alternative – most social and political movements for the protection of social rights and public infrastructure were ignored or blamed by politicians and media as unrealistic and irresponsible. Policymaking and the production of hegemony was firmly in the hands of a real-estate-coalition made up of real-estate companies, professional landlords, neoliberal think-tanks, and the ruling parties in Berlin. The evidence of the housing crisis in the city was denied. For many years, it was contested in public debates that the massive displacement in urban renewal areas in East Berlin could

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be considered “gentrification.” In spite of all these negative developments, a new generation of grassroots tenant protest growth during the last years created up to 150 micro collectives in order to protect neighbors’ rights to housing against their landlords. However, for many years such initiatives were ignored by most politicians with the argument that they were only single cases in a generally relaxed market environment. This escape from reality by the political elites provoked a deep mistrust of the political system and since the year 2000 boosted a political self-perception of protest and movements as elements outside and against the system. The orientation toward self-organization (“You have to do everything yourself”) was less based on ideological positions than on experience in and with the political system in Berlin. Since the wave of international investments after the financial crisis, many of the DIY-subcultural projects, artists, the scene of electronic club music, urban gardeners, young architects with their experimental projects became aware of the loss of opportunities and the ongoing pressure against their projects. In reaction to this situation the former self-referred activities became more and more politicized. The participation of music clubs in the mobilization against the waterfront development project “MediaSpree” in 2009, the foundation of the critical network of artists Haben und Brauchen (“to have and to need”), and the Initiative Stadt neu denken (“Rethink the City”) in 2011 are expressions of a (re)politization. Berlin’s urban social movement today is based on a mix. On the one hand, the movement tries to defend social needs and to seek immediate solutions through the self-organized grassroots tenant collectives. On the other hand, the experiences and capacities of self-organization by political protest groups and the willingness to co-produce and re-produce the city by DIY-activists, artists, and architects. The orientation to social need and solutions, the mode of self-organization, and the skills to co-produce a city constitute core-elements of a municipalist agenda against the backdrop of Berlin’s fragmented structure of protest, mobilization, and projects. Pushed by the necessity to achieve social rights in many contested houses, to protect tenants from eviction, to enforce use of the space for free cultural activities, and to defend green spaces against exploitation by market and state, more and more activities are directed toward changing specific aspects of policies at a local level. These developments have changed the relation between activists and administration and between political protest and policy program during the last 7 years. Many grassroots groups entered the political arena without giving up their grassroots identity. The “Round Table on Properties,” the referendum for “100 percent Tempelhofer Feld,” the Conference on Social Housing, and the Tenant Referendum for a Housing Provision Law could be seen as activities to implement grassroots claims from below in institutional contexts. At round tables, in expert groups, and in negotiations with the administration, activists are becoming part of the political arena at all levels of the political system. The orientation toward commons, social rights, and co-management by grassroots groups has defined the political standards of housing and urban politics for future governments.

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Comparing the two peaks of tenant-political protest mobilization in Berlin shows that Castells conditions for a successful protest provide a meaningful framework of analysis to examine the scope and potentiality of social mobilizations in the city. A clear social occasion, a socially anchored mobilization, and a political organization that can explain the protest concerns and translate them into demands are prerequisites for a successful influence on housing policy. In the current phase of the Berlin tenant protests, the combination of a permanent confrontation in several conflicts with landlords, the self-empowerment of citizenship in the city political arena, and the ability to formulate concrete proposals is changing the city from below more than any other movements have managed over the past 30 years.

References Amt für Statistik (2018) Fort – und Zuzüge über die Bezirks – und Landesgrenzen in Berlin, 2008 bis 2017, nach Anzahl der Personen und Bezirken. Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg, Berlin Bernt M (2003) Rübergeklappt. Die „Behutsame Stadterneuerung“ im Berlin der 90er Jahre. Schelzky & Jeep, Berlin Bernt M, Holm A (1998) Wir bleiben alle? In: StadtRat (Hg.), Umkämpfte Räume. Hamburg, Berlin, Göttingen: Verlag Libertäre Assoziation und Verlag der Buchläden Schwarze Risse – Rote Straße, pp 141–167 Bernt M, Holm A (2009) Is it or is it not? The conceptualisation of Gentrification and Displacement and its Political Implications in the Case of Berlin-Prenzlauer Berg. In: CITY Special Issue (Cities for People, Not for Profit), 13(2–3), 312–324 Blecha T (2014) Berlin in the 1990s: the charm of the unfinished. Goethe-Institut. https://www. goethe.de/en/kul/mol/20440295.html?fbclid=IwAR3AgCmNsJ4A8BU7H-ACKmDPrsFFrSNA_YyggA8QBHOEHc1IMkHwcVXZpyI Bock C, Pappenberger U, Stollmann J (eds) (2018) Das Kotti-Prinzip. Urbane Komplizenschaften zwischen Räumen, Menschen, Zeit, Wissen und Dingen. Ruby Press, Berlin Brahm D, Darr C (2018) Erbbaurechte in Berlin. Dokumentation der Expertenwerkstatt, vom 01.12.2017. Veranstaltet von der Initiative Stadt neu Denken und der Stiftung Trias in Zusammenarbeit mit der Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Wohnen. Erbbaurechtswerkstatt, Berlin Braun S (2015) Grassroots push law to ease Berlin housing crisis, in DW. http://www.dw.com/en/ grassroots-push-law-to-ease-berlin-housing-crisis/a-18520497 Castells M (1975) Kampf in den Städten. Gesellschaftliche Widersprüche und politische Macht. VSA, Westberlin Castells M (1983) The city and the grassroots. Edward Arnold, London Coalition Agreement (SPD, Die Linke, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) (2016) Berlin gemeinsam gestalten. Solidarisch. Nachhaltig. Weltoffen. Koalitionsvereinbarung 2016–2021. https:// www.berlin.de/rbmskzl/_assets/rbm/161116-koalitionsvertrag-final.pdf Colomb C (2011) Staging the new Berlin. Place marketing and the politics of urban reinvention post-1989. Routledge, London Dohnke J (2013) Spree riverbanks for everyone! What remains of ‘Sink Mediaspree’? In: Bernt M et  al (eds) The Berlin reader. A compendium on urban change and activism. transcript, Bielefeld, pp 261–274 GAA Berlin (Gutachterausschuss für Grundstückswerte) (2018) Immobilienmarktbericht Berlin 2017/2018. GAA, Berlin

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Glock B, Keller C (2001) Restitution und Stadtentwicklung: Zu den sozialräumlichen Folgen der Restitution in suburbanen und innerstädtischen Gebieten. In: Deben L, van de Ven J (eds) Berlin und Amsterdam. Globalisierung und Segregation. Het Spinhuis, Amsterdam, pp 92–109 Glock B, Häußermann H, Keller C (2001) Die sozialen Konsequenzen der Restitution von Grundeigentum in Deutschland und Polen. Berl J Soziol 11(4):533–550 Hamann U, Kaltenborn S, Kotti & Co (2018) und deswegen sind wir hier…. Spector Books, Leipzig Häußermann H (1996) From the socialist to the capitalist city: experiences from Germany. In: Andrusz G, Harloe M, Szelenyi I (eds) Cities after socialism. Blackwell-Wiley, Oxford/ Cambridge, pp 214–231 Häußermann H, Strom E (1994) Berlin: the once and future capital. Int J Urban Reg Res 18(2):335–346 Häußermann H, Holm A, Zunzer D (2002) Stadterneuerung in der Berliner Republik. Modernisierung in Berlin-Prenzlauer Berg. Reihe: Stadt, Raum und Gesellschaft, Bd. 16. Opladen: Leske + Budrich Hinrichs W (1999) Entwicklung der Wohnverhältnisse in Ost- und Westdeutschland in den neunziger Jahren, WZB discussion paper, No. FS III 99–409. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin Holm A (2006) Urban renewal and the end of social housing. The roll out of neoliberalism in East Berlin’s Prenzlauer Berg. Soc Justice 33(3):114–128 Holm A (2011a) Gentrification in Berlin. Neue Investitionsstrategien und lokale Konflikte. In: Hermann HUA (ed) Die Besonderheit des Städtischen. Entwicklungslinien der Stadt(soziologie). VS Verlag, Wiesbaden, pp 213–232 Holm A (2011b) Wohnungspolitik der rot-roten Regierungskoalition in Berlin. In: Holm A et al (eds) Linke Metropolenpolitik. Erfahrungen und Perspektiven am Beispiel Berlin. Westfälisches Dampfboot, Münster, pp 92–112 Holm A (2013) Berlin’s gentrification mainstream. In: Bernt M et al (eds) The Berlin reader. A compendium on urban change and activism. transcript-Verlag, Bielefeld, pp 171–187 Holm A (2016) (Un)sozialer Wohnungsbau. Schwerpunkt der Berliner Verdrängungsdynamik. In: Berliner Hefte zu Geschichte und Gegenwart der Stadt, Die Legende vom Sozialen Wohnungsbau, vol 2, pp 13–99 Holm A (2018) Soziale Wohnversorgung. Eine Analyse der Wohnverhältnisse und Versor-­ gungsbedarfe im Bezirk Mitte von Berlin. Studie im Auftrag des Bezirksamtes Mitte von Berlin. BA Mitte, Berlin Initiative Stadt Neudenken (2014) Runder Tisch zur Neuausrichtung der Berliner Liegenschaftspolitik. http://stadt-neudenken.tumblr.com/Runder%20Tisch Krätke S (2004) City of talents? Berlin’s regional economy, Socio-spatial fabric and “worst practice” urban governance. Int J Urban Reg Res 28(3):511–529 Lebuhn H (2015) Neoliberalization in post-wall Berlin. Understanding the city through crisis. Crit Plann J 22:99–118 Lebuhn H (2017) Shifting struggles over public space and goods in Berlin. Urban activism between protest and participation. In: Hou J, Knierbein S (Hgs) City (Un)Silenced. Urban protest and public space in the age of shrinking democracy. Routledge, London, pp 145–155 Marcuse P (2012) Reforms, radical reforms, transformative claims. In: Peter Marcuse’s Blog. http:// pmarcuse.wordpress.com/2012/03/25/11-blog-11-reforms-radical-reformstransformativeclaims Maruschke R (2014) Community Organizing. Zwischen Revolution und Herrschaftssicherung. Eine kritische Einführung. edition assemblage, Münster MieterGemeinschaft B (2006) Privatisierung in Berlin. Bericht zur Konferenz am 11(02):2006. https://www.bmgev.de/politik/archiv/privatisierung/konfserenz-dokumentation/bericht.html Nowak P (2017) Wie aus WBA „Wir bleiben alle!“ wurde. Von den Anfängen der Mieterselbstorganisierung in Prenzlauer Berg bis hin zu großflächigen Protesten. In: MieterEcho, 392 (12/2017). https://www.bmgev.de/mieterecho/archiv/2017/me-single/article/ wie-aus-wba-wir-bleiben-alle-wurde.html

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Ordóñez V, Feenstra RA Tormey RA (2015) Citizens against austeritya comparative reflection on Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca (PAH) and Bündnis Zwangsräumung Verhindern (BZV). Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de filosofía, política y humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, pp 133–154 Rada U (1997) Hauptstadt der Verdrängung. Berliner Zukunft zwischen Kiez und Metropole. Assoziation A, Berlin/Hamburg Reimann B (1997) Restitution. Verfahren, Umfang und Folgen des vermögensrechtlichen Grundsatzes für die Stadtentwicklung und Wohnungsversorgung in Ostdeutschland. In: Schäfer U (ed) Städtische Strukturen im Wandel. Opladen, Leske + Budrich, pp 15–117 Sen SW (2018) Der Wohnungsmarkt Berlin und die aktuellen politischen Herausforderungen. Vortragsfolien von StS Sebastian Scheel beim Sebastian Scheel beim IBB-Wohn-Dialog Berlin am 6. Dezember 2018 Strom E (1996) In search of the growth coalition: American urban theories and the redevelopment of Berlin. Urban Aff Rev 31(4):455–481 Uffer S (2011) The uneven development of Berlin’s housing provision, PhD thesis at LSE, London Uffer S (2013) The uneven development of Berlin’s housing provision. Institutional investment and its consequences on the city and its tenants. In: Holm A, Grell B, Bernt M (eds) The Berlin reader. A compendium on urban change and activism. transcript-Verlag, Bielefeld, pp 155–170 Ugarte Chacón B (2012) Berlin Bank Skandal. Eine Studie zu den Vorgängen um die Bankgesellschaft Berlin. Westfälisches Dampfboot, Münster Vollmer L (2015) Die Mieter_innenbewegung in Berlin zwischen lokalen Konflikten und globalen Widersprüchen. SozialGeschichte online 17:51–82 Vollmer L (2018) Strategien gegen Gentrifzierung. Schmetterling Verlag, Stuttgart Wielgohs J (1996) Privatisierung versus marktwirtschaftliche Reformpolitik. Optionen der Entstaatlichung des öffentlichen Mietwohnungssektors in Transformationsgesellschaften. In: Wiesenthal H (ed) Einheit als Privileg. Campus, Frankfurt/New York, pp 348–408 Andrej Holm  Sociologist. Department of Social Sciences, Humboldt-Universität, Berlin. Author: Berlin Reader: A Compendium on Urban Change and Activism (Berlin, Transcript Verlag, 2014, with M. Bernt and B. Grell); Mietenwahnsinn: Warum Wohnen immer teurer wird und wer davon profitiert (Berlin, Knaur eBook, 2014).

Chapter 4

Making Sense of (New) Social Mobilisations, Conflicts and Contention in the Tourist City: A Typology Claire Colomb and Johannes Novy

4.1  Introduction: An “Anti-tourism” Backlash in (European) Cities? Over the past years, visible manifestations of social discontent against the impacts of tourism on urban spaces have been on the rise in European cities, both in small “heritage cities” like Venice or Dubrovnik, and in larger metropolises like Berlin, Amsterdam or Barcelona. The local, national and international media have been replete with reports of graffiti, posters and banners urging tourists to “go home”, as well as of demonstrations and protest actions by local residents becoming increasingly vocal against the “touristification” of their neighbourhoods (e.g. Coldwell 2017). Such expressions of discontent have not been limited to European cities, as we will see. Are we witnessing, as phrased in the New York Times, a global “revolt against tourism” (Becker 2015) particularly visible in cities? Is there a spread of what some commentators and politicians have pejoratively called “anti-tourism”, “tourism-phobia” or “tourist-phobia”1 – and is it intellectually honest and empirically sound to subsume such recent social mobilisations under those labels?

 The neologism turismofobia was reportedly coined in 2007 by Spanish tourism scholar Antonio Donaire, who criticised the rise of “anti-tourism” sentiments in social, media and academic circles in Spain (Yanes 2017). In parallel, the concept of “touristofobia” was also used by urban anthropologist Manuel Delgado in an opinion piece in the Spanish newspaper El País in 2008. Those terms have since been increasingly used in the media in various languages (Milano 2017).

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C. Colomb (*) Bartlett School of Planning, University College London, London, UK e-mail: [email protected] J. Novy School of Architecture and Cities, University of Westminster, London, UK e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Fregolent, O. Nel·lo (eds.), Social Movements and Public Policies in Southern European Cities, Urban and Landscape Perspectives 21, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52754-9_4

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The recent intensification and geographical spread of manifestations of protest, discontent and resistance around the impacts of the visitor economy on cities2 seems to point to an increasing politicisation “from below” of what had been, so far, a nonor minor issue in urban political struggles (Novy and Colomb 2016, 2019). While tourism is a generator of economic wealth, its negative impacts and side effects have been increasingly problematised and contested by individuals and groups who have started to mobilise collectively around various issues. Yet the rise of tourism as a source of contention and social mobilisations in cities had, until recently, received little systematic attention, neither in social movement studies nor in urban studies nor in tourism studies.3 This chapter aims to offer an international comparative perspective on the issue through an exploratory analysis and preliminary typology of the social mobilisations and forms of collective action which have emerged around the impacts of the visitor economy on urban spaces and dwellers – in European cities and beyond. In the first part of the chapter, we contextualise those social mobilisations and forms of collective action by discussing what major new trends and factors can potentially explain their proliferation in recent years. In the second part, we seek to account for the variety and heterogeneity of emerging social mobilisations and forms of collective action around tourism by proposing a preliminary, broad typology. We conclude by outlining briefly the public policy responses to these developments, and by sketching directions for a cross-disciplinary, comparative research agenda around the social mobilisations generated by the impacts of urban tourism and other forms of mobility and place consumption on cities.

4.2  Tourism as a Bone of Contention: Factors and Trends In long-standing “hyper-touristified” cities such as Venice, groups have been campaigning for decades to protect the urban fabric, resident population and socio-­ economic life from the negative impacts of mass tourism. It is therefore important to identify what are the new contextual factors and trends which may explain the recent intensification and spread of social mobilisations related to the impacts of the visitor economy in many cities. As discussed in the next section, such mobilisations are not uniform in nature and cannot be explained by a single set of causes. But we argued elsewhere that a number of factors have contributed to their spread (Novy and Colomb 2016, 2019). 2  We use the expression “visitor economy” to refer to the fact that it is not just traditional “leisure tourists” who visit cities, but all sorts of visitors “making a visit to a main destination outside his/ her usual environment for less than a year for any main purpose [including] holidays, leisure and recreation, business, health, education or other purposes” (IRTS 2008, quoted in: ONS 2012). 3  In non-urban environments such as coastal areas, islands, natural and cultural heritage sites, conflicts around the environmental, cultural and social equity impacts of the visitor economy on local communities had attracted academic attention much earlier, since the 1970s (e.g. Boissevain 1996).

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In short, tourism has become an object of contention and mobilisation due to sharp quantitative and qualitative changes in urban tourism and individual mobility patterns – there is more of it, in a wider range of urban destinations, spreading to previously “untouched” neighbourhoods, and taking new forms. In addition, while tourism growth has been quasi systematically prioritised in urban development agendas, it is often not managed or not regulated enough – or it is governed in the interest of a narrow range of economic actors (Novy and Colomb 2019). Finally, its impacts on urban spaces have been entangled with, or reinforced by, broader processes of socio-spatial restructuring in cities facilitated by globalisation, neoliberalisation and financialisation trends, which may themselves be the objects of social contestation. Owing to lower transport costs (in particular cheaper air travel), to changes in consumption patterns in the Global North and to the expansion of middle- and upper-income groups (and their demand for travel and leisure) in fast-developing or emerging economies of the Global South, urban tourism is one of the fastest growing segments of the global travel market (Bock 2015). A steady increase in tourist numbers has been witnessed not just in traditional historic cities such as Rome or Paris, but also in other cities which until the 1990s were not attracting mass visitor flows, such as Berlin or Barcelona. This has recently generated concerns and debates about “over-tourism” (Goodwin 2017), or the saturation of particular spaces and neighbourhoods due to mass tourist flows. With the increasing presence and concentration of visitors, the potential for social conflicts increases, as the adverse impacts and negative externalities of tourism become more prevalent and visible. These may include immediate impacts that disrupt daily life (e.g. noise, litter, traffic congestion, disorderly behaviour, occupation of public space), as well as more structural impacts generated by the impact of tourism demand and supply on land uses, housing markets and the commercial fabric of a city (Novy and Colomb 2016). The growth of tourism often fuels a changing demand for goods and services, which is rapidly appropriated by local entrepreneurs or external investors to make a profit from the visitor economy. This leads to changing land- and building uses, from grocery stores serving local needs to shops or entertainment venues mostly targeting visitors, from long-term residential units to short-term holiday rentals. This process is often referred to as “touristification” or “tourism gentrification” (Gotham 2005a; Gravari-Barbas and Guinand 2017) and entails residential displacement, commercial displacement and cultural displacement (Cócola Gant 2018).4 Moreover, the forms which these increasing visitor flows have taken, and their geography within cities, have changed. First, several recent trends transforming

4  The link between tourism and gentrification (both residential and commercial) is complex. Tourism is often one of many factors that fuel changes in urban residential markets and provoke displacement and dispossession, alongside rent deregulations, changes in housing tenures (e.g. decline in social housing), socio-demographic changes as well as private- or public sector-led regeneration projects. This raises methodological and empirical challenges in distinguishing between the specific impacts of tourism and the impacts of other dynamics shaping urban and neighbourhood change.

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contemporary tourism, such as the increase of “nightlife tourism”, “party tourism” or “alcotourism” (Bell 2008), or the growth of cruise ship tourism (UNWTO 2010; Klein and Sitter 2016), raise considerable potential for conflicts in cities affected by them, as discussed later. Second, as analysed in depth by two decades of research in tourism geography and sociology, tourism practices intersect and overlap with other forms of place consumption, mobility, temporary migration, work and leisure, and the notion of the “tourist” as a distinguishable entity has been called into question (see debates around the “de-differentiation of tourism and everyday life” in: McCabe 2005; Uriely 2005; Hannam 2009; Larsen 2008). The growing international mobility of university students or business travellers, the increase in second home-ownership as well as the increasingly flexible working practices of relatively autonomous workers in the cultural and knowledge industries have led to new forms of temporary mobility and residence whereby a person can spend a few weeks in a city and simultaneously combine study, work and “leisure” tourism. These multiple, combined forms of mobility and transience have visible impacts on urban spaces, housing markets and socio-economic relations in the city (Novy 2019). In cities, the steady growth in, and changing nature of, visitor flows has been accompanied by the expansion of the geographical spread of these flows across urban space: they are no longer confined to “tourist bubbles” and conventional tourist attractions (Judd and Fainstein 1999). This has been captured by tourism scholars with terms such as “new (urban) tourism”, “post-tourism”, “alternative tourism” or “tourism off the beaten track” (Maitland and Newman 2009). These trends have been accompanied by the changing geography of “internal tourism” (Maitland 2010, 178), that is, the place consumption practices of the resident population. Consequently, areas with few conventional tourist attractions have become, in the 1990s and 2000s, increasingly desirable sites of tourism, leisure and consumption by visitors and residents alike (e.g. the districts of Kreuzberg and Neukölln in Berlin (Novy 2011), Shoreditch and Brick Lane in London (Shaw et al. 2004) or “slums” and “favelas” in South African and Brazilian cities (Frenzel et al. 2012; Broudehoux 2016)). The expansion of visitor flows to these areas has significant consequences for their existing dwellers and users and may become contested, in particular because such areas are often affected by broader forces of urban change, such as gentrification pressures. Some of the qualitative transformations mentioned above have been facilitated by the internet, social media and new mobile technologies (Hannam et  al. 2014; Bock 2015) which have acted as “disruptive innovations” (Guttentag 2015; Dredge and Gyimóthy 2015). One particular development has generated much controversy and social struggles over the past decade: the emergence of online, so-called sharing economy platforms – the most well-known being Airbnb created in 2008 – which allow individual owners and tenants to rent their home, or part thereof, to visitors for short-term periods of time. In cities such as Los Angeles, New Orleans, San Francisco, New York, Barcelona, Lisbon or Venice, there are signs that the proliferation of short-term accommodation opportunities fuelled by such platforms has contributed to a decline in the housing

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stock available for long-term occupation and an increase in rental prices in neighbourhoods already affected by gentrification processes (see inter alia Barron et al. 2017 on the USA; Schäfer and Hirsch 2017 on Berlin; Gurran and Phibbs 2017 on Sydney; Wachsmuth et  al. 2017 on Canada; Cócola Gant 2016a on Barcelona; Cócola Gant 2016b). This has generated protests and collective demands by a variety of actors (from residents’ associations and housing rights advocacy groups to established economic interests like the hotel industry) for more regulation of short-­ term rentals (Aguilera et al. 2019). The above-mentioned quantitative increase in tourism flows and qualitative changes in patterns of tourism, mobility and place consumption have taken place in a context where tourism growth has been prioritised at all costs in many cities’ political agendas. The promotion of tourism as a driver of economic development by local political and economic elites is nothing new: the state (national, regional and local) has often played a prominent role in the production of tourist destinations since the emergence of modern forms of mass tourism in Europe in the earlier part of the twentieth century. Many scholars have shown how, in European and North American cities, tourism – alongside the consumption, cultural and leisure industries – has acquired a more central place in urban agendas since the late 1970s, as part of a broader shift towards “entrepreneurial urban governance” (Harvey 1989) and post-industrial economies (Judd and Fainstein 1999; Fainstein et al. 2003; Selby 2004; Spirou 2011). The post-2008 economic and financial crisis and subsequent “austerity politics” have tended to reinforce the priority given to tourism as a key sector of the urban economy in many cities, particularly in Southern Europe (Mendes 2018) and in other “peripheral economies” (Cócola Gant 2018).5 Historically, however, the role of the local state has in many cities been limited to providing a suitable environment for private tourism operators to thrive (Hall and Jenkins 2004), without much of an “explicit tourism management policy that goes beyond promotion” (Van der Borg et al. 1996, 316). There has often been a lack of political will, or a lack of capacity, by local governments to regulate the changing land uses which arise from the above-mentioned processes of touristification. Tourism is often presented by local elites as an automatically “good thing” which generates growth and jobs. This “depoliticisation” of tourism (Novy 2016) has been compounded by the neoliberalising shift witnessed in various aspects of urban governance and public policies in many cities, characterised by the “(partial) destruction of existing institutional arrangements and political compromises through 5  One could question whether these developments are more applicable to some geographical contexts than others, as existing analyses of the shift towards leisure, consumption and tourism in (Anglophone) urban political economy are overwhelmingly rooted in the experience of large European and North American cities. Yet there are increasingly less national and local governments which do not aspire to develop tourism in some way. In Central and Latin America, local and national governments began as early as the late 1970s to encourage the redevelopment of historic city centres for tourism consumption, a process which has been reinforced over the past two decades (Janoschka et al. 2014). Strategies of consumption-driven economic development have also been adopted in a number of globalizing cities, such as Dubai (Elsheshtawy 2009), Singapore and other large cities in South-East Asia (Chang 1997; Luger 2016).

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market-oriented reform initiatives, and the creation of a new infrastructure for market-­ oriented economic growth, commodification, and the rule of capital” (Brenner and Theodore 2002, 362). When it comes to tourism, neoliberalisation processes have included the outsourcing of the governance of tourism to private bodies or tourism marketing organisations; the favourable regulatory or tax conditions offered to major tourism industry actors (e.g. hotel chains) without consideration of the potential opportunity costs; the weak regulation of new practices such as short-term holiday rentals; the privatisation of the profits generated by tourism; and the absence, or weakening, of mechanisms of “value capture” which would help spread its benefits or tackle its adverse side effects (e.g. the “tourist tax”, which in many cities does not exist or is rarely used to fund social infrastructure) (Novy and Colomb 2019). Additionally, urban tourism has over the past decade become increasingly entangled with broader processes of financialisation of housing markets (Aalbers 2016) – often encouraged or weakly regulated – by national and local policy-makers. This is illustrated by the increasing trend for domestic and international investors to store surplus capital in the residential market of tourist destinations, in particular in “peripheral economies” (Cócola Gant 2018), as second homes and short-term rentals represent a safe investment or a highly profitable investment asset category. In recent years, the opportunity costs which the prioritisation of tourism in urban development agendas entails, as well as the lack of strategic (public) governance of tourism, have been increasingly questioned by a variety of actors in cities, as discussed in the next section. But tourism flows are only one driver of urban change, closely intertwined with other forces and processes of socio-spatial restructuring in cities, which may themselves be subject to contestation: rent deregulations, changes in (public) housing provision, welfare state restructuring, speculative real estate developments as well as private- or public sector-led regeneration schemes, among others. In the 2000s, a number of scholars identified the emergence of new types of urban social movements and coalitions contesting the increasing predominance of exchange value over use value in the production of the built environment, and the consequences of the neoliberal shift in urban governance witnessed in many cities (Koehler and Wissen 2003; Leitner et al. 2006; Brenner et al. 2012; Mayer 2009, 2013; Mayer et al. 2017). As we will subsequently discuss, it is in this context that many (albeit not all) recent social mobilisations around tourism-related issues in cities have to be analysed: it is not only urban tourism but rather the city itself and its uneven and unequitable socio-spatial transformation that have become increasingly politicised in recent years (Miller and Nicholls 2013).

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4.3  T  he “Politicisation from Below” of the Visitor Economy: An Exploratory Typology of Social Mobilisations and Collective Action in (Tourist) Cities In this section we review the various ways in which community groups, residents and other local actors have mobilised collectively to contest and challenge the impacts of the visitor economy in a number of cities of Europe and North America and, to a lesser extent, Asia and South America. We do not claim to offer an exhaustive or representative sample of such forms of social mobilisations and collective action at the global scale. Our aim is instead to offer a preliminary comparative typology to try and illuminate their diverse and heterogeneous nature, and put to test the notion of “tourism-phobia” which has become widely used in the media (Milano 2017). The typology can hopefully be used, refined and critiqued by other scholars in the future. It was generated in a grounded, incremental way by reviewing a variety of cases of social mobilisations and forms of collective action around tourism or tourism-related issues,6 and comparing their thematic focus and claims (multi-focal versus single-issue mobilisations); their scale (city-wide or more localised); their embeddedness in, or articulation with, other urban social mobilisations focusing on broader urban issues; and the “reactive” or “transformative” nature of their agenda. We identified and conceptualised five broad types described in turn in what follows.

6  To the authors’ knowledge, there is to date no international comparative review published in the languages we reviewed (English, Spanish, German and French) on the diverse social mobilisations that have emerged in response to tourism’s ascendancy in cities. The empirical materials from which we have built the typology are derived from three sources: first, the in-depth literature review and editorial work done jointly by both authors to bring to fruition an edited book which explores the diversity of struggles, social conflicts and mobilisations around urban tourism (Colomb and Novy 2016), with contributions from sociologists, geographers, anthropologists, political scientists, planners and architects, covering more than 16 cities in Europe, North America, South America and Asia. The book did not include a comparative, cross-cutting analysis of all the cases covered in it: this was subsequently developed after its publication to produce the typology presented in this chapter. This was complemented by additional case-study materials from ongoing research carried out by the first author (Claire Colomb) on the politicisation and conflicts surrounding the proliferation of short-term holiday rentals in more than ten European cities (in collaboration with Thomas Aguilera, Francesca Artioli and Tatiana Moreira de Souza), and on social mobilisations around tourism in Barcelona, and from research carried out by the second author (Johannes Novy) on the contested role of tourism in local politics, urban development and planning in European and North American cities.

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4.3.1  N  ew “Purpose-Built” Social Mobilisations: Tourism and “Touristification” as the Central Object of Protest The formation of new coalitions in urban social movements often results from a particular threat which acts as a “structural push” (Nicholls 2008). In many localities, the growing visitor economy has increasingly been perceived as a “threat” by some actors or groups – either in its own right, or because it crystallises discontent with a combination of processes of urban change not just caused by tourism per se. There are consequently a small, yet growing number of cities where new “purpose-­ built” social mobilisations or coalitions have emerged, in which tourism and “touristification” are the central object of protest. In this broad category, one can distinguish between single-issue mobilisations and broader, multi-focal ones. Single-issue protests may focus on a particularly “over-used” area or site of contention (as illustrated by the conflicts around the enclosure and privatisation of the Park Güell in Barcelona analysed by Arias-Sans and Russo 2016). They are also often directed against particular kinds of tourism (or tourists). Two examples illustrate this. First, there has been a rise of protests against alcohol-fuelled “party tourism”, which has become increasingly contested in recent years in cities like Amsterdam (O’Leary 2018), Budapest (Smith et al. 2018) or Barcelona (Nofre et al. 2018). Second, cruise tourism has in many cities become the subject of mounting public concern and controversy, in particular in relation to its harmful environmental impacts and lack of widespread benefits for local communities (see the No Grandi Navi campaign against large cruise ships in Venice analysed by Vianello 2016). In a small number of cities, residents’ associations and other grassroots initiatives have, over the past 5 years, joined forces to start new social mobilisations or coalitions focusing on the impacts of tourism on their city as a whole, in a more encompassing manner than single-area or single-issue campaigns. The most prominent example is the Assemblea de Barris per un Turisme Sostenible (Assembly of Neighbourhoods for a Sustainable Tourism) (ABTS) set up in Barcelona in 2015 (Fernández Medrano and Pardo Rivacoba 2017) as a network of quite heterogeneous residents’ associations, local campaigns and grassroots organisations. Its activists frame the tourism-related issues they are concerned with (e.g. the proliferation of short-term holiday rentals, the congestion and commodification of public space, the loss of traditional retail, the damaging impacts of cruise ships) within a broader critique of Barcelona’s urban development model and are often involved in other campaigns or social movements around housing rights or anti-gentrification struggles. Similarly, the recently set up network of grassroots organisations Morar em Lisboa (Living in Lisbon) explicitly embeds its questioning of Lisbon’s model of tourism development within a broader critique of the housing, land-use planning and foreign investment policies of the national and local governments, calling for “another Lisbon development paradigm as a shared and socially diversified territory” (Morar em Lisboa 2017, n.p.). The movement takes issue with the intricate

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interplay between financialisation, touristification and gentrification processes in the transformation of Lisbon (Cócola Gant 2018; Mendes 2018). Unsurprisingly, therefore, in some cases oppositional movements challenging tourism in cities consist of groups and individuals who target tourism because of the capitalist political economy that underlies it, for example in Spain, where activists close to “anti-capitalist” or “radical leftist” movements have been an important driver of some recent actions (Hughes 2018). Many of the younger activists involved in Southern European mobilisations around touristification have also started their socio-political activities within the constellation of post-2008, crisis-driven social movements (such as the 15M movement in Spain, Nel·lo 2015). However, not all grassroots groups or movements that have in recent years attacked the politics underlying tourism development in cities are explicitly espousing a radical, anti-­ capitalist agenda. In cities where networks of grassroots organisations or mobilisations have formed around tourism, such as Barcelona or Berlin, there are noticeable differences and variations within their members in terms of the degree of “critical positioning” vis-à-vis tourism and capitalist urban development processes. But activists have agreed across their differences on a set of concrete demands to the local (and sometimes regional or national) state, for example demands for regulation (e.g. moratoria on hotel construction, ban on the conversion of residential units into tourist flats and effective enforcement; protection of traditional shops) and for taxation (e.g. creation of a tourist tax where it does not exist). They may also target tourism industry actors, for example through demands for better labour conditions (see Peters (2016) on the hotel workers’ struggle for living wage ordinances in Santa Monica), or lobbying for less intrusive and more environmentally and socially “sustainable” practices (as in the case of the cruise ship industry in Venice, see Vianello 2016). The new coalitions referred to above have often adopted broad slogans and mottos which have become popular in a variety of other urban social movements over the past decade, such as the fight for the urban “commons” or the “right to the city” (Harvey 2012; Swyngedouw 2015). In Venice, the No Grandi Navi – Laguna Bene Comune campaign adopted the vocabulary of the “commons” as a rallying cry, influenced by a nation-wide Italian social mobilisation against the planned privatisation of water supply services in 2011 which adopted the term “commons” as a slogan (Vianello 2016) (see also: Arias-Sans and Russo (2016) on the use of the term in some of Barcelona’s tourism-related mobilisations). The concept of the “right to the city” (originally coined by Henri Lefebvre 1996[1968]), as a right both to use urban space and to participate in its social and political production, has also been used by activists in Venice, Berlin or Barcelona (Hughes 2018), to raise the question of who has a “right” to live in, and enjoy, the city, its urban spaces and the socio-economic benefits of the visitor economy in an era of global mobility. However, it would be incorrect to state that all the tourism-related social mobilisations witnessed in various cities around the world frame their struggle within progressive meta-narratives such as the “commons” or the “right to the city”. Many do not, as illustrated below. As noted by Uitermark et  al. (2012, 2547–2548), “one problematic aspect of the prominence of the right-to-the-city frame within academic

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circles is the tendency to project the frame on social movements which may or may not … call for a “right to the city” or an “urban revolution”, meaning the frame becomes “part interpretation, part distortion”.

4.3.2  T  he Integration of Tourism-Related Issues into Existing Forms of Citizens’ Activism and Urban Social Movements In many cities, tourism is not per se the focus of new social mobilisations formed on purpose, but instead, some of its impacts have gradually become problematised as part of existing contestations of other processes of urban change. This comes from individuals or groups already collectively mobilised around particular urban issues or public problems. In Prague, for example, a city whose historic centre has undergone an archetypal process of rapid “touristification” in the 1990s and 2000s (Dumbrovská 2017), new forms of civic engagement and social mobilisations surrounding urban issues have gradually emerged in the post-socialist era. Within broader demands for heritage conservation, better management of public space and the “right to stay put” of existing residents, they have gradually integrated claims related to certain negative aspects of the visitor economy (e.g. “Segway tourism” or “party tourism”) into their agenda (Pixová and Sládek 2016). In other cities, the politicisation of urban tourism’s impacts has come from individuals or groups already collectively mobilised around housing rights and gentrification (e.g. in New Orleans, Toronto or Berlin). San Francisco is a case in point, a city where corporate-­ led “touristification” and housing deregulation measures have intensified pre-­ existing processes of evictions and displacement (Opillard 2015, 2016). In response to the relaxation of the regulation of short-term holiday rentals by the city authorities, in November 2014 two housing collectives (the Anti-Eviction Mapping Project and Eviction Free San Francisco) called for a protest against “the Airbnb takeover of San Francisco” and formed an Anti-Displacement Coalition which successfully pushed for the organisation of a municipal ballot initiative to toughen the regulation of such rentals (in which they failed to obtain majority support). Tourism-related issues can be integrated into existing social mobilisations against the hegemonic urban development model adopted by urban elites, of which the visitor economy is often a key part. Where local governments have resorted to mega-­ events as an economic development strategy, this has increasingly been contested through, for example, social mobilisations contesting Olympic projects at the early stage of bidding or planning (Lauermann 2016). In Brazil, the public investments made, and authoritarian policy measures taken by, the Federal, state and local governments to prepare urban spaces ahead of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympic Games (Sánchez and Broudehoux 2013) generated a series of protests particularly vivid in 2013. Local branches of the Popular Committee of the FIFA World Cup Victims (COPAC) brought together various existing social

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movements (favela residents’ associations, lower- and middle-class neighbourhood associations and anti-capitalist movements) against the consequences of the event – and tourism-led redevelopment the strategies pursued in Brazilian cities (Capanema Alvares et al. 2016). As previously mentioned, however, not all forms of urban activism and social mobilisations which have integrated tourism-related issues into their claims readily slot into such a framework of analysis. Some are not so much embedded within transformative, radical or critical urban agendas challenging socio-spatial inequalities, uneven power relations or neoliberal urban governance, as they are driven by relatively self-centred concerns. In Paris, for example, there is no “anti-tourism” movement embedded within a broader anti-gentrification or housing rights agenda, but instead, middle- and upper-class residents have incorporated tourism-related “nuisances” (e.g. noise from bar terraces, concentration of tourist buses) into claims for the defence of their “quality of life” (Gravari-Barbas and Jacquot 2016). Pinkster and Boterman (2017, 458), in their study on gentrification, urban tourism and “privileged discontent” in Amsterdam’s canal district, also highlight the particularly vocal role of “upper-middle-class residents express[ing] their frustration about tourism-­related nuisances and developments”. Not to recognise that the defence of individual interests around private property values, immediate amenity and quality of life (i.e. what has been often labelled as “NIMBYism”, Not In My Back Yard, in urban studies) is at play in some mobilisations would be naïve. This is not to say that only self-interest is driving them, as they can also be inspired by a genuine concern for the identity and integrity of local communities and their everyday life. However, some social mobilisations can be motivated by “NIMBYist” tendencies, or even, in some cases, plain nativism, and sometimes hostile or xenophobic undercurrents against unwanted “strangers” who are seen as threatening. Recent developments in central Istanbul illustrate this. In the 2000s, several neighbourhoods of the Beyoğlu district had witnessed the opening of hostels and cafés serving alcohol and playing music, run by socially liberal Turkish entrepreneurs. They served the demand of both tourists and secular Turks. These establishments have recently been forced to close down under pressures from the current party in government, the AKP, supported by a conservative, religiously observant segment of the local population aligned with its ideology (Kızıldere and Günay 2016). This shows that sometimes, the backlash against tourists is linked with geopolitical and identity-related tensions, as discussed below.7

7  An interesting counter-example worth mentioning here is that in some of the European and NorthAmerican cities where vocal coalitions of grassroots initiatives have emerged against the adverse impacts of mass tourism – and have been accused of intolerance against visitors and “strangers” – many of the individual activists and organisations involved come from Left-wing social movements or political traditions which have been defending the welcoming of migrants and refugees in their city (e.g. in San Francisco, Berlin or Barcelona).

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4.3.3  D  istributive Conflicts Between Social Groups Around the Benefits of the Visitor Economy In various contexts, forms of collective action surrounding urban tourism are not the expression of social mobilisations contesting the impacts of touristification and urban restructuring processes, but instead, conflicts arise between particular social groups about who can  – and should  – reap the benefits generated by the visitor economy. The growth of urban tourism has equity impacts: its benefits and costs are unevenly spread between individuals, social groups, economic actors and geographical areas. Tourism development often amplifies existing class inequalities within cities, as profits are disproportionably reaped by large chains, local elites, property owners or agile entrepreneurs, while many adverse effects disproportionately impact low-income, and other disadvantaged, social groups (Fainstein et al. 2003), or only benefit them through precarious, low-paid jobs in exploitative working conditions. This can lead to power struggles and forms of collective action of one group against, or in competition with, others – especially in economies highly dependent on tourist income, undergoing a recession, or in deprived areas where “poverty tourism” has emerged, as discussed by Broudehoux (2016) in her analysis of “favela tourism” in Rio de Janeiro. In cities where historical or highly visited neighbourhoods are home to a large, socially mixed resident and working population, different categories of local residents and workers can enter into conflicts with one another over the material benefits to be captured from the visitor economy. In a traditional lilong neighbourhood of Shanghai, which has seen an influx of both tourists and young entrepreneurs opening small, unlicensed cafés and design stores on its narrow alleyways, tensions have arisen between long-standing, older residents and recently arrived, younger residents over the unequal distribution of benefits from that growing micro-­economy (Arkaraprasertkul 2016). In Buenos Aires, the San Telmo street market has become the theatre of conflicts between different categories of artisans, antique dealers and street vendors who compete for the material advantages derived from the visitor economy: tourism reshapes not only the relationship between “visitors” and “residents”, but also existing forms of social stratification and social and cultural capital between residents (Lederman 2016). In European cities where strong grassroots social mobilisations have emerged around the proliferation of short-term rentals, tensions and conflicts have been witnessed between various individuals, local residents and interest groups who are supporting or opposing the practice (Aguilera et al. 2019).

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4.3.4  W  hen Urban Tourism Is Entangled with Ethno-nationalist Conflicts In societies and cities marked by ethno-nationalist conflicts, the presence of tourism has the capacity to exacerbate or mitigate existing or latent conflicts seemingly unrelated to tourism in the first place (Bereskin 2016). These conflicts can be among social groups, and/or between particular groups and the state. In Belfast, government tourism policies since the mid-1980s have exacerbated the economic, spatial and symbolic exclusion of the Catholic, and low-income Protestant communities who have most suffered from the legacy of “the Troubles”. But sidelined communities have mobilised collectively to create alternative tourism offers to challenge “official” tourism services and narratives, cultivate group recognition and secure economic benefits, as shown by Bereskin (2016). Tourism has consequently created a new field of interaction between the city’s Catholic and Protestant communities, at times provoking cultural identity contests and competition between grassroots initiatives, and at other times providing opportunities for intergroup contact and cooperation. The role that tourism plays in nation-building and the creation of national symbols has been analysed by various scholars (e.g. in the Asian context, Richter 1989). That its contestations can also be related to struggles surrounding national identity construction is perhaps less well researched. Recent protests against the “tourism wave” from mainland China in Hong Kong exemplify this. Hong Kong has experienced an acute surge in the number of mainland Chinese tourists and day-trippers, with visible consequences on Hongkongers’ daily life. This has generated street protests and “anti-mainlanders” sentiments among part of the Hong Kong population, a phenomenon which can only be understood in the context of broader social mobilisations around identity politics, the relationship between the People’s Republic of China and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and the rise of localist and nativist sentiments among the population of the Hong Kong city-state (Garrett 2016; see also: Rowen 2016).

4.3.5  I nvisible or Absent Collective Mobilisations? Infra-­politics, Subversion and Alternative Narratives of Place in the Tourist City While many of the above-mentioned manifestations involve structured or visible forms of collective mobilisation, other types of social practices which do not strictly fall into this category can be considered as forms of protest and resistance in the tourist city. In some cities, micro-practices of resistance, adaptation or subversion develop in response to the presence and impacts of tourism flows in particular urban spaces, what Gravari-Barbas and Jacquot (2016) refer to as a form of “micro”- or “infra-politics”. This can be expressed through changes in daily mobility practices

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(residents avoiding tourist concentrations), changes in consumption habits (stopping the use “touristified” venues) or the alternative use or re-appropriation of “over-used” tourist spaces by individuals or groups. Through the concept of “guerilla tourism” (based on de Certeau’s notion of “going off the pathway”), Luger (2016) shows how in Singapore, the aggregation of individual practices of space appropriation in a Chinese cemetery threatened with demolition – combined with a nascent social mobilisation to defend it – have challenged the government’s official tourism promotion agenda. Such practices of “quiet encroachment” (Luger 2016, 15) can be linked to Bayat’s concept (2013) of “social non-movements”, through which the fragmented but similar activities of large numbers of ordinary people lacking formal leadership and organisational structures nonetheless seek to bring about social and political change (i.e. “non-­ collective actors” engaged in “collective action”). In a related fashion, “protest” against mainstream forms of urban tourism can take the form of artistic or cultural projects, or alternative tours and displays, which propose a different reading of “place”, heritage and local culture – what Gotham refers to as “tourism from below” (2005b). In many cities, alternative tours have been organised for both residents and visitors by artists, NGOs or community groups, for example tours led by homeless people and “corruption tours” in Prague (Pixová and Sládek 2016), tours of “ethnic” neighbourhoods by migrant cultural associations in Paris (Gravari-Barbas and Jacquot 2016) or tours of Athens’ rich network of post-crisis grassroots initiatives, what Ioannides et  al. (2016) call the “consumption of resistance”. In that vein, some authors have analysed how urban social movements and alternative grassroots projects have become – willingly or not – an object of tourism, for example through participatory “solidarity visits” by external activists and volunteers (see Fraeser 2016 on Hamburg’s Gängeviertel). Activists may use (certain kinds of) tourism to their benefit, sometimes to challenge, oppose and even subvert the dominant workings of mass, corporate tourism. At the same time, this very process may become contested by other activists or local residents as an unwanted form of “commodification” of alternative forms of social organisation and collective mobilisation. As argued by Owens in her analysis of how the Amsterdam squatters’ movement first resisted tourism, but then accommodated new tourism practices, tourism “has both the power to radicalize and depoliticize movements. Likewise, movements can both repel and attract tourists” (2008, 43).

4.4  Conclusion This chapter has offered a preliminary typology of the social mobilisations and forms of collective action which have emerged in response to tourism’s ascendancy in European cities and beyond, and discussed some of the broad factors and trends which may explain their rise. Simplistic labels such as “tourism-phobia” have been increasingly used to pejoratively refer to grassroots manifestations of discontent

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with the negative impacts of mass tourism (Milano 2017), which are regularly accused of being hypocritical, self-serving, parochial or even xenophobic. Such accusations are often inflated by representatives of the tourism industry, the media or policy-makers to discredit local concerns and stifle public debate about conflictual issues. As shown by the variety of mobilisations mentioned in this chapter, it would be intellectually dishonest and empirically fraught to subsume them under such a label. Mobilisations differ from city to city, as well as within cities, and are internally more heterogeneous and complex than is often assumed. They rarely target tourists as such (which does not prevent derogatory slogans, graffiti or attacks on material property). The claims made by many mobilisations are not so much “anti-tourists” as they are critical of the “tourism industry” and of their city government’s approach towards tourism management, in particular the perceived lack of regulation of its negative externalities. Many of these manifestations of protest consequently have to be understood as part of the broader transformation of urban conflicts and urban social movements more generally, in the context of changing forms of (urban) capitalism, the recomposition of the state and new patterns of urban governance. Nevertheless, we have also shown that not all social mobilisations around tourism fit the characteristics of progressive or radical coalitions against new forms of “neoliberal urban governance” and for the “right to the city”. We have argued elsewhere (Novy and Colomb 2019) that four types of responses by policy-makers and the tourism industry are emerging in the face of new social mobilisations and forms of collective action around tourism in cities: (i) the “ignore and do nothing” approach, that is a continuation of “business as usual” prioritising tourism growth; (ii) attempts to delegitimise critiques and social protests by casting them as “tourism-phobic”, reactionary, dangerous for economic prosperity and/or self-centred; (iii) smaller adjustments in policy and symbolic gestures that seek to mitigate selected impacts and/or make tourism more “sustainable” without questioning its overall growth and footprint8; (iv) more substantial political actions and policy responses aimed at changing the governance of tourism in its procedural and/ or substantive aspects. There are only few examples of the latter: the Barcelona case is the most salient, where civic activism has successfully begun to challenge the hegemonic narrative of previous pro-tourism urban regimes in the context of local political change (Russo and Scarnato 2018). Since the mid-2000s, residents’ associations had increasingly campaigned around the negative impacts of tourism on their neighbourhoods. The 8  This corresponds to the responses recently articulated by some tourism industry players who have taken notice of the challenges and conflicts which too much tourism creates. The 2017 UNWTO & WTM Ministers’ Summit was, for example dedicated to the issue of “overtourism”. From the perspective of those actors, growth is, as Taleb Rifai (UNWTO 2017) put it at the above-mentioned summit, “not the enemy; it’s how we manage it that counts”. “Over-tourism” is reduced to a problem of lack of management and regulation (see the symbolic measures taken in 2018 by the municipal government of Venice to contain mass tourism flows through access gates channelling pedestrian flows to key sites, Brunton 2018). The fact that all destinations have a maximum carrying capacity in terms of infrastructure and resources is left out from the discussion.

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May 2015 municipal election provided a window of opportunity for mobilised residents to shape the local political agenda in a context where tourism had eventually become a “hot topic”. The new citizen platform Barcelona en Comú (Eizaguirre et al. 2017) took many of the grassroots demands on board in the “tourism” part of its manifesto, which promised to tackle socio-economic inequality, guarantee basic social rights and access to housing, democratise local governance and promote a change in the city’s urban economic development model, in particular the governance of tourism. Barcelona en Comú won a tight victory, obtaining 11 out of 41 councillors’ seats. Unsurprisingly, the implementation of its political agenda proved challenging, given its minority position. Nevertheless a number of measures were taken to signal an apparent change in tourism policy. The participation of the city in a bid for the Winter Olympic Games 2016 was withdrawn. In July 2015, a one-year moratorium on the approval of new hotel construction and new licenses for tourist apartments was voted. In January 2017 the Tourism Department of the City Council produced a Strategic Tourism Plan – a real attempt at developing an integrated and cross-sectorial tourism policy. Its preamble stressed “the importance of governing tourism to guarantee the general interest of the city” and enable “the conciliation between visits and tourist practices with permanent living in the city” (Ajuntament de Barcelona 2017, 5). In parallel, the Urban Planning Department prepared a Special Plan for Tourist Accommodation (PEUAT) to curb the growth of short-term rentals in the city, and increased its inspection and enforcement activities. The actual effects on the ground of those measures are not yet clear and remain contested by multiple actors (Aguilera et al. 2019). While the Barcelona government has been, since 2015, sympathetic to grassroots movements and has taken steps to attempt to “govern” tourism for the greater good of the city’s residents, the reality of increasing tourist flows seems unstoppable and many of its side effects or adverse impacts seem difficult to regulate, control or tame. The combination of trends discussed in the first part of this chapter creates the preconditions for social mobilisations to occur, but more detailed research is needed to explain why they take place in some cities and not in others, by paying attention to specific national and local political, economic, social and institutional factors, as well as to “the political opportunity structures for urban social movements represented by factors such as the nature of urban redevelopment processes, the decision-­ making models employed in transformations of the urban space, and the general socio-economic context within which the city is embedded” (Andretta et al. 2015, 203). The scale of visitor flows in relation to a city’s size might be a key variable, but not only. The “politicisation from below” of urban tourism is not systematic, and has not happened (yet) in many urban destinations. In times of economic crisis, unemployment and austerity, for a majority of urban dwellers the perception of the positive impacts of tourism may actually increase (Garau-Vadell et al. 2018), even if local manifestations of contestation and resistance emerge among some segments of the local population. We cannot therefore speak of a global “revolt against tourism” (Becker 2015). This being said, in today’s interconnected world, the consequences of increasing visitor flows on cities, their urban fabric, housing markets, public

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spaces and social relations, are significant, for good and for bad. This requires more engagement with the complex, conflictual and political nature of tourism in cities, with the social mobilisations arising from intensified tourism flows, and with the impact of such mobilisations on public policies, market processes, tourism practices or social relations in the cities concerned. To address those issues, there needs to be more dialogue between scholars working on urban social movements, mobility, tourism, urban socio-spatial change (in particular housing) and urban politics – that is, linkages between the broad, inter-disciplinary fields of “social movement studies”, “urban studies” and “tourism studies”.9

References Aalbers M (2016) The financialization of housing. A political economy approach. Routledge, London Aguilera T, Artioli F, Colomb C (2019) Explaining the diversity of policy responses to platform-­ mediated short-term rentals in European cities: a comparison of Barcelona, Paris and Milan. Environ Plan A:1–24. https://doi.org/10.1177/0308518X19862286 Ajuntament de Barcelona (2017) Turisme 2020 Barcelona. Una estratègia col·lectiva per un turisme sostenible. Direcció de Turisme, Barcelona Andretta M, Piazza G, Subirats A (2015) Urban dynamics and social movements. In: Della PD, Diani M (eds) The Oxford handbook of social movements. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 200–218 Arias-Sans A, Russo AP (2016) The right to Gaudí. What can we learn from the commoning of Park Güell, Barcelona? In: Colomb C, Novy J (eds) Protest and resistance in the tourist city. Routledge, London, pp 247–263 Arkaraprasertkul N (2016) The abrupt rise (and fall) of creative entrepreneurs: socio-economic change, the visitor economy and social conflict in a traditional neighbourhood of Shanghai. In: Colomb C, Novy J (eds) Protest and resistance in the tourist city. Routledge, London, pp 282–301 Barron K, Kung E, Proserpio D (2017) The sharing economy and housing affordability: evidence from Airbnb, SSRN scholarly paper ID 3006832. Social Science Research Network, Rochester. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3006832 Bayat A (2013) Life as politics: how ordinary people change the Middle East. Stanford University Press, Stanford Becker E (2015, July 17) The revolt against tourism. New  York Times. https://www.nytimes. com/2015/07/19/opinion/sunday/the-revolt-against-tourism.html Bell D (2008) Destination drinking: toward a research agenda on alcotourism. Drugs Educ Prev Policy 15(3):291–304. https://doi.org/10.1080/09687630801934089 Bereskin E (2016) Tourism provision as protest in “post-conflict” Belfast. In: Colomb C, Novy J (eds) Protest and resistance in the tourist city. Routledge, London, pp 152–170

9  Interesting issues of “positionality” and “research ethics” arise: as researchers are also tourists in their free time and “temporary city users” when doing field work in locations other than their own place of residence, they too contribute to the processes at play in tourist cities (e.g. by renting an Airbnb apartment). But researchers are also sometimes urban activists who are engaged in collective mobilisations around the contentious issues evoked here, which raises the potential for creative and helpful forms of participatory action research or scholarly activism.

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Bock K (2015) The changing nature of city tourism and its possible implications for the future of cities. Eur J Futures Res 3(1):1–8. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40309-015-0078-5 Boissevain J (ed) (1996) Coping with tourists: European reactions to mass tourism. Berghahn Books, New York Brenner N, Theodore N (2002) Cities and the geographies of “actually existing of neoliberalism”. Antipode 34(3):349–379. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8330.00246 Brenner N, Marcuse P, Mayer M (eds) (2012) Cities for people, not for profit. Routledge, London Broudehoux AM (2016) Favela tourism: negotiating visitors, socio-economic benefits, image and representation in pre-Olympics Rio de Janeiro. In: Colomb C, Novy J (eds) Protest and resistance in the tourist city. Routledge, London, pp 191–209 Brunton J (2018, May 1) Venice poised to segregate tourists as city braces itself for May Day “invasion”. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/travel/2018/may/01/ venice-to-segregate-tourists-in-may-day-overcrowding Capanema Alvares L, Mol Bessa AS, Pinto Barbosa T, Machado de Castro Simão K (2016) Attracting international tourism through mega-events and the birth of a conflict culture in Belo Horizonte. In: Colomb C, Novy J (eds) Protest and resistance in the tourist city. Routledge, London, pp 227–246 Chang TC (1997) From “Instant Asia” to “Multi-faceted jewel”: urban imaging strategies and tourism development in Singapore. Urban Geogr 18(6):542–562. https://doi. org/10.2747/0272-3638.18.6.542 Cócola Gant A (2016a) Apartamentos turísticos, hoteles y desplazamiento de población. www. agustincocolagant.net Cócola Gant A (2016b) Holiday rentals: the new gentrification battlefront. Sociol Res Online 21(3):112–120. http://www.socresonline.org.uk/21/3/10.html Cócola Gant A (2018) Tourism gentrification. In: Lees L, Phillips M (eds) Handbook of gentrification studies. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham/Northampton, pp 281–293 Coldwell W (2017, August 10) First Venice and Barcelona: now anti-tourism marches spread across Europe. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/travel/2017/aug/10/ anti-tourism-marches-spread-across-europe-venice-barcelona Colomb C, Novy J (eds) (2016) Protest and resistance in the tourist city. Routledge, London Dredge D, Gyimóthy S (2015) The collaborative economy and tourism: critical perspectives, questionable claims and silenced voices. Tour Recreat Res 40(3):286–302. https://doi.org/10.108 0/02508281.2015.1086076 Dumbrovská V (2017) Urban tourism development in Prague: from tourist mecca to tourist ghetto. In: Bellini N, Pasquinelli C (eds) Tourism in the city. Towards an integrative agenda on urban tourism. Springer, Cham, pp 275–283 Eizaguirre S, Pradel-Miquel M, García M (2017) Citizenship practices and democratic governance: “Barcelona en Comú” as an urban citizenship confluence promoting a new policy agenda. Citizsh Stud 21(4):425–439. https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2017.1307609 Elsheshtawy Y (2009) Dubai: behind an urban spectacle. Routledge, London Fainstein S, Hoffman L, Judd D (2003) Introduction. In: Hoffman L, Fainstein S, Judd D (eds) Cities and visitors: regulating people, markets, and city space. Blackwell, Oxford, pp 1–20 Fernández Medrano H, Pardo Rivacoba D (2017) La lucha por el decrecimiento turístico: El caso de Barcelona. Ecología Política, 52. http://www.ecologiapolitica.info/novaweb2/?p=6808 Fraeser N (2016) “Fantasies of antithesis”: assessing Hamburg’s Gängeviertel as a tourist attraction. In: Colomb C, Novy J (eds) Protest and resistance in the tourist city. Routledge, London, pp 320–339 Frenzel F, Koens K, Steinbrink M (eds) (2012) Slum tourism: poverty, power and ethics. Routledge, London

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Uitermark J, Nicholls W, Loopmans M (2012) Cities and social movements: theorizing beyond the right to the city. Environ Plan A 44(11):2546–2554. https://doi.org/10.1068/a44301 UNWTO UN World Tourism Organization (2010) Cruise tourism. Current situation and trends. https://www.e-unwto.org/doi/abs/10.18111/9789284413645 UNWTO UN World Tourism Organization (2017) Communities’ protests over tourism, a wake­up call to the sector. Press release 17120. www.media.unwto.org/press-release/2017-11-08/ communities-protests-over-tourism-wake-call-sector Uriely N (2005) The tourist experience: conceptual developments. Ann Tour Res 32(1):199–216. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.annals.2004.07.008 Van der Borg J, Costa P, Gotti G (1996) Tourism in European heritage cities. Ann Tour Res 23(2):306–321. https://doi.org/10.1016/0160-7383(95)00065-8 Vianello M (2016) The “No Grandi Navi” campaign. Protests against cruise tourism in Venice. In: Colomb C, Novy J (eds) Protest and resistance in the tourist city. Routledge, London, pp 171–190 Wachsmuth D, Kerrigan D, Chaney D, Shillolo A (2017) Short-term cities: Airbnb’s impact on Canadian housing markets. McGill University: School of Urban Planning, Montreal Yanes S (2017, August 15) Operación turismofobia. Cinco Días - El País Economía. https://cincodias.elpais.com/cincodias/2017/08/14/companias/1502723297_610226.html Claire Colomb  Professor of Urban Studies and Planning. Faculty of the Built Environment, Bartlett School of Planning, University College London. Johannes Novy  Senior Lecturer in Planning. School of Architecture and Cities, University of Westminster.

Chapter 5

The City, Local Conflicts and Public Policies Francesco Indovina

5.1  The Emergence and Significance of Local Conflicts Two basic types of conflict were known in the past: the ones related to labour rights and the ones related to political rights. The first refers to conflicts concerning the work relationship (basically retribution) and the second to “government policies” on specific issues (e.g. “housing”, “education”). However, from the 1960s onwards this precedent was disrupted by the eruption of “local” conflicts, which diverged from the previous ones not only in their objectives, but above all for the emergence of a conflict course that was not always centralistic and for the direct participation of social subjects, both in steering and organising the forms of the conflict, but also in pinpointing the objectives. These conflicts took the name of “social conflict”, “local conflict” or “urban conflict” (Nel·lo 2016; Fregolent 2015). It should be said, as shall be seen, that relationships exist between these local conflicts and the others which we may call general conflicts. Local urban conflicts can be interpreted as the expression of two different situations: on the one hand, they express a “hardship” (lack of housing at suitable prices, lack of green spaces, disorganised public transport, lack of services, etc.) and, in doing so, raise questions requiring specific solutions. From another point of view, they denote a weakening of the city as an “ideological apparatus”, namely the weakening of the urban organisation and structure in determining and conditioning the actual ways in which the social subjects use the city. A phenomenon that, at the moment it appears as “conflict”, constitutes a demand for a new, different city (it will be seen later that the conflict is not the only way in which this weakening of the ideological apparatus of the city becomes manifest). In both cases “government

F. Indovina (*) Università di Sassari, Alghero, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Fregolent, O. Nel·lo (eds.), Social Movements and Public Policies in Southern European Cities, Urban and Landscape Perspectives 21, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52754-9_5

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institutions” are still identified as the antagonist or, if so desired, as the reference point. The reference to “government institutions” raises various problems and shows some contradictions. For if, on the one hand, a certain generalised indifference to “politics” can be singled out, on the other, to take as interlocutor the institutions, namely the organs producing “politics” and to expect that the decisions of these institutions will provide solutions to the demands the conflicts express, highlights a contradiction: the refusal of politics, while from politics solutions are expected. It is like shouting in the streets “we don’t care who is governing, but the government must deal with the issues we propose”. This approach implies a technocratic vision of government, just the opposite of a political vision. In effect, no one can imagine that the solutions to questions posed by social struggles could be “technical” or solved via technical mechanisms; every possible solution will actually express “partial” interests and from this viewpoint such things as the political expression of the government, in what place, in what period and with what institutions, are not insignificant. It is interesting to reflect on the transformation of the “subjects” who in the past were identified in conflicts: simplifying, one may observe that class conflicts have been replaced by a conflict between the “people” and government institutions, a government no longer seen as “capital lackeys”, capital being the main subject of every decision, but as composed of a “class” (often judged incapable and corrupt) that has to find solutions to the hardship manifested by the conflict. A transformation of political decision into technical decision is not valid for every situation, but as a technical and devoid solution of any reflection on the social outcome, it is able to not cause discrimination. The age-old experience of politics tells us a different story: every political choice has rewarded certain social strata and penalised others. These observations are clearly a simplification; within social struggles the awareness of relations between classes and ranks is often firmly present, and often the awareness that the conflict is of a “political” kind is not lacking, but the rejection of (or at least indifference to) politics, a very widespread sentiment, results in awareness of the basic antagonisms being lost. So in the end, technical solutions are chased after that ignore, partly or totally, the social interests that need to be targeted to achieve the objectives. The possible consequences of these and similar attitudes are serious. Through indifference politics is placed in the hands of those commonly called “strong powers”, who are capable of constant, continuous pressure; while the conflict “torments the government”, its explosions are not constant and continuous. In the material sphere of living conditions the consequences are the widening of the gap of inequality (economic, social and cultural). This is one, among many, of the manifestations of the disease of democracy: a woman surrounded by a number of doctors suggesting different therapies, while it is clear that they are all inclined towards facilitating her death. It is a case of questions of great importance that end up seeming to be elements of distraction instead of basic issues regarding political character and commitment.

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As stated, the conflict undoubtedly expresses discomfort, but one must reflect on the fact that this discomfort is not only manifested in different ways, as is obvious, but also poses, as far as its solution is concerned, a complex political question. One point of view is prevailing more and more in the development (and practice) of antagonistic political thought that considers the direct, autonomous action of citizens the solution to the issue; the conflict is not only a way of expressing discomfort but mechanisms start up within it that can resolve, albeit partially, the issue itself. In the past the most tangible and advanced experiences placed single “local conflicts” within a “general” conflictual situation and they found the way to turn a form of struggle into a solution in order to achieve their targets. These are methods that were used during trade union struggles, where, for example, assembly line workers would slow down the rhythm, considered unsustainable. In a context of mass politicisation, these practices moved into the social urban struggles. Suffice it to recall the occupation of empty houses, but above all self-reduction in rents, electricity or telephone bills, as well as the transformation of abandoned areas into playgrounds, etc. If, on the one hand, there is no doubt about the importance of this type of direct intervention by citizens, on the other, the context elements to be considered are not insignificant. For it is these that determine the importance and success of citizen action. In a context of general political and trade union conflicts and numerous social conflicts, all more or less politically unified in their basic inspiration (which does not mean managed by a single “organising mind”, be it party or trade union), each single conflict contributes to creating a positive climate of support for every other conflict, generating a successful situation. If we consider the hardship caused by the lack of housing at suitable prices for the weakest social layers, this would generate, in a general conflict situation, various ways and forms of expression: on one side forms of general struggle (demonstrations, strikes, etc.) claiming the need for a new housing policy and, on the other, direct citizen action occupying empty houses or self-reducing rents, etc. One type of action would support the other, and the two together would organise a method of political intervention in the tangible situation. But if the general conflict were inexistent, while the direct action of some of the citizens might to some extent be alive, we could certainly suppose that the latter (in changing forms on an ad hoc basis) would be “defeated”, that is would not manage to establish a change in housing policy. The current situation does not seem to show signs of general unrest, that is a conflictual situation that challenges the order of society, whereas the initiative of groups of citizens on many questions that could come under the general heading “environment” (meaning life environment) appears much more organised (one might maintain too organised) (Indovina 2017). It should be emphasised that general conflictual movements and local social movements are linked by a certain interdependence, even if this is not always manifest. By this is meant that a general conflict, with great mobilisation of people, even when it peters out, leaves significant signs in all the subjects that often tend to organise local conflicts of a smaller size but strictly connected with some specific hardship. What is more unlikely, as shall be seen below, is the opposite, namely that

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local conflicts, including large ones, end up generating general conflicts. There is a problem of organisation, of subjectivity tending towards a sort of independence of the single conflict, since politics can, albeit in a partial way, intervene to mitigate, if not eliminate, the hardship at the origin of the conflict.

5.2  Local Conflicts and General Struggles In all European countries, but not just them, there are hundreds of groups that deal with specific issues: apart from housing, also green areas, social integration, reception, culture, education, etc. Moreover, there is no lack of groups that set themselves up to avoid being forced to pay the prices for basic necessities charged by the large commercial organisations by getting directly in contact with the producers (direct purchase groups). All these actions are devoid of a general conflictual context, and we are not just referring to the lack of coordination between these conflicts so much as to the political climate and temperature of the individual country. The reference to a “general conflict” does not look so much at the ways of producing the conflict as at the existence of a “general” attitude which considers change the outcome of conflict and struggle, and therefore at the existence of political and trade union reference points attentive to the outbreak of single struggles. It cannot be ignored that within the recent economic crisis expressions of “antagonism towards the social system” arose; suffice it to think of the Spanish indignados, or the movements against Wall Street in the USA.  However, their admission into the intermediate political bodies (political parties and trade unions) so as to convert the people’s indignation into transformative action was weak (this took place in Spain, though moderately considering the vastness of the movement, but there was no similar reaction in the USA). This hiatus between single social struggles and general conflict is a condition the single social struggles have to adhere to; it is a situation of pre-established context. But it must be noted that, not infrequently, the single groups active in their social struggles do not intend participating in building up a political climate of general conflict; they end up denying the validity of any action seeking for a general transformation, caring only for their specific matter. This attitude is due to a variety of reasons: it is often explicit evidence of lack of faith in “politics”; because they are incapable of mobilisation on a vaster scale; because the objective of a general transformation of society seems impossible, or due to a precise choice of ways of conducting the political struggle. These and other possible reasons end up being negative, also as regards the objectives they give themselves; it is choice lacking in a positive outlet. This is by no means a criticism of the many forms and objectives of social struggles. They all carry out important functions, both on the level of mobilisation of social forces and as a true expression of hardship; on the contrary, this conflictual effervescence could not but be evaluated positively, especially by those proponents of social transformation. However, their lack of willingness for wider

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transformation processes remains critical. We might speak of a “waste of struggle”, if these local conflicts did not generate some consequence at the level of citizens’ awareness. But it cannot be ignored that any political option for transformation that did not consider these innumerable initiatives as instruments fit for general change would be suffering from political short-sightedness. Past experience confirms that social struggles in the shadow of general conflict action may not only thrive better but also achieve their own specific objectives more easily, just as every general conflict (even if on specific themes such as housing or the quality of the environment) finds support and strength in “local conflict” initiatives. The ambivalence of these local actions (local, specific social conflict on single issues) is very clear. They may be the framework of possible general action (general and specific conflicts at single times), resulting in the creation of favourable conditions for a close relationship between “local” (in the wide sense) and “general”, and determining a situation of reciprocal support. Or they may, on the contrary, end up meeting, in the best cases, the demands of small groups but be totally unproductive for any, even small, transformation. There are many examples, from conflicts that dissolve due to a lack of social and political fuelling to the apparent victory tangibly frustrated in its management due to lack of political attention. In other cases the closure of the “group” with respect to other situations or to politics results in a sort of group egoism emerging. No one wins on their own, not even a small united group; each struggle, be it small or large, local or general, needs support and to belong to a generally shared transformation plan, to be linked with similar actions, or, to put it briefly, needs a context that will integrate it and give it strength. Forms of conflict express the awareness (or instinctiveness) of the need that to obtain results it is necessary to act together for a common purpose. Where together obviously does not have a generic meaning but refers to the specific conditions (of time and place) and where the common purpose emerges from the situations of hardship. The general conflict has its numbers not just in a large group of social subjects involved (the majority) but also in a project to transform society; local conflicts, precisely because they put specific problems under tension, cannot but involve a large but not vast social group. What it seems important to avoid is the identification of the “little group” with the revolutionary avant-garde, the centre of development of a strategy of revolutionary struggle. Instead we must be fully aware that we are faced with a possible mass process that knows how to grasp the hardships of society, using them as an instrument of mobilisation and struggle, without excluding the possibility of collaborating in wider mobilisation for (partial or general) social transformation. The relations that, as has been seen, link social struggles with a general conflict, cause a situation where innumerable local conflicts are noted but general conflicts are rare appear to be a contradiction. It is as if the two kinds of conflict belonged to two different worlds. But perhaps this really is the case: hardships can produce a whole series of local social conflicts; they are fuelled by the issue that is implementing the settlement of the actual hardship, while remaining, I exaggerate, indifferent

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to the other single forms of hardship as an expression and manifestation of discomfort. The general conflict, in a certain sense, assumes that only a change in society will enable the various forms and manifestations of the discomfort to be faced. The problem of the lack of a general conflict, it should be said, cannot be attributed to the groups, associations, etc. that pursue local claims on single themes, but the fact remains that conflictual, let us call it, availability (which is observed in local conflicts) does not manage to coagulate within a general conflict. We are talking about a crucial matter that has to do, it is usually said, with the transformations of society; an explanation that explains little, each transformation in the past having been the “midwife” of great conflicts. It has more to do with the transformation of politics than with social transformations. The ways of “doing” politics have got used to the mass media behavioural models: no longer a relationship between people but solely and exclusively advertising. This may sometimes prove successful but mostly leaves the “apparent” interlocutors indifferent; to speak, linger and discuss with a small or large group of people is not the same thing as speaking to millions of listeners through the media. The effect has been the crisis of the intermediate bodies of politics (political parties and trade unions), the decline in the idea that it may be possible to transform society together. Of course there are the great transformations in work organisation, from the impact of the new technologies, the change in lifestyles, the idea that one’s own adventure is a risky exercise without a safety-­ net and the cuts in services and social protection in all countries, with class identity becoming meaningless. All questions that need to be compacted in a single interpretation highlighting the great transformations in “form” but with supervision of the social relationship of production of a capitalist type. It should also be said that more recently it has been possible to pick out a new tendency in which the attention of social groups on single aspects of everyday social life has taken on the search for a solution rather than a conflictual nature. In these cases, in contrast to the past, the solution is not the outcome of direct activity by the group (e.g. the occupation of empty houses) but rather a “technical solution” that is within the mechanisms typical of local administration. As for the aspects regarding the city this tendency appears as a “technical activity” guided by specialists; basically, committed citizens who have singled out a dissatisfactory situation with the help of specialists (almost always volunteers) find answers that maybe provide a temporary solution to the discomfort, with a demonstrative character. It is assumed that these initiatives, very often absolutely temporary, constitute suggestions for the governing bodies of the city – partial, temporary suggestions that might indicate the way towards definitive solutions. Local conflicts, both in the form just mentioned and in the more traditional one of conflictual expression of a hardship, end up building relations with government action that are more or less direct and positive and can influence public policies. But this will be dealt with later.

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5.3  The Decline of the City as Ideological Apparatus The second question raised at the beginning, namely the weakening of the functioning and organisation of the city as an ideological apparatus, seems no less important than the previous ones. If, on the one hand, social struggles, including local and partial ones, are in themselves a challenge to the urban order (Indovina 2017) enforced, on the other, it is observed daily that the use citizens make of the city is no longer subject to former constraints. Everyone’s city is the prerequisite of the urban ideological apparatus: the statement affirms the inexistence of constraints (administrative, political, juridical, etc.) on the use of the whole city; but this right of use has tangibly proved to be denied due to the existence of social and economic constraints. In effect, the absence of juridical and administrative constraints has been offset by very strong social constraints, which in the past worked very well. The right to use cities was solved, in actual fact, by a very limited use of space: with reference to large cities there are surveys that show how some people, especially women, had never left their own neighbourhood; to leave one’s neighbourhood was only possible for limited actions, like work, study or other undertakings of the kind. Basically, the settling of families and individuals on the grounds of their capacity to afford the costs of living in each district of the city (family income/cost of housing ratio) also defined, in a certain sense, the perimeter and boundaries of that enjoyment of the city in its entirety. The strength of the ideological apparatus lay indeed in the uselessness of institutional “constraints” given that the social constraints linked with the organisation and functioning of the city worked perfectly well. Today, for cultural reasons, due to a tendency towards social assertiveness, what was a formula (everyone’s city) has, within certain limits of which we will speak, turned into reality. While as regards settlement, it is the cost of housing in relation to the capacity of individuals and families to pay that dictates the conditions and possibilities of such settlement, this does not determine the city’s space for use. The economic constraint that determines the possibility to settle not only remains but has perhaps grown stronger due to the increase in unequality: the “market” is still in charge and constitutes the fundamental instrument for putting “each in his place”, namely the place he can occupy in relation to his social condition. But the novelty is that this settlement determines less and less the perimeter of use of the city. As far as the use of the city is concerned (we will come back to the term “use”), this has indeed expanded, and housing settlement does not define the territory of use of the city. Boundaries have been broken, with a firm refusal of partial urban life: the city with its differences, the city with its important places, with its lights, its shop windows, has become not only a subject of desire but also of experience for a large part of the urban population. It is above all the new generations, but not only they, who seek “social redemption”, at least outwardly: these people, often forced and obliged to settle in marginal areas or at least where the urban context seems poorer, lacking in services and decaying, together with immigrants, the homeless, beggars, etc., are spreading throughout the city, breaking down the geographical

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borders defined by the different social conditions. The social geography of the city has been damaged, at least partly and temporarily, with a substantial change in the actual structure of the city. The centre of the city is less and less the city’s nice drawing-room, having been transformed, continuing with the metaphor of the house, to become the dining-­ room, the resting-room, the play-room, etc. A new geography of uses of the city is thus determined, a new economic geography and a new geography of services (above all commercial), where high and low quality of life coexist close to each other, juxtaposed at the service of a fluctuating mass, ever less clustered according to social conditions. One might classify the phenomenon as a greater democratisation of the city, thus an extremely positive fact. But on careful analysis the matter appears in a different light, not just due to the lack of adaptation of urban policies to this new situation, but because it is taking place under the patronage of the market (which, as is well known, constitutes a mechanism of discrimination). One could be forgiven for thinking that this new use of the city heralds the realisation of the right to the city, but this right has nothing to do with the phenomenon being observed, which is increasingly becoming a phenomenon of commodification of the urban condition, exactly the opposite of what Lefebvre hoped for. This author, when speaking of right to the city, was referring to something quite different: Among these rights being formed there is also the right to the city, not to the ancient city but to urban life, to renewed centrality, to places of encounter and exchange, rhythms of life and ways of using time that enable full, complete use of moments, places, etc. The announcement and realisation of urban life as the kingdom of use (of socialisation and meeting, etc., freed from an exchange value) require full control of the sphere of economy (exchange value, market and goods). (Lefebvre 2014)

What should be wished for, when referring to the right to the city is the full deployment of the use value when using the city, that is use released from any exchange value. The phenomenon we are witnessing seems to be characterised by the prevalence of the exchange value, namely “goods”, observation of them, for looking is strictly associated with breaking the boundaries of settlement; not indeed the complete use of places, the organisation of a new, wider-reaching sociality, for it is not work that is the subject of attention but the product. Social phenomena are not devoid of contradictions. In the phenomena being dealt with, it is possible to perceive, on the one hand, the break between the morphology of places and their use (the urban condition), once strictly connected (the collapse of boundaries has this meaning), but on the other, it is impossible not to see how this break ends up being determined by the process of commodification. We mean to maintain that when the conditioning of city organisation has broken down, he who crosses the boundaries, even with a spirit of achievement, ends up coming under the spell of the “products”. It is not impossible that the displays of violence (vandalism) that often accompany the breakdown of socio-morphological patterns of the city also be interpreted as “disappointment”; the conquest reveals itself devoid of content, the result is unsatisfactory, the hope has not materialised, the emancipation sought has failed, all that is left is anger.

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In many cases this situation ends up generating additional hardships that are added to the traditional ones, while in other cases “political power” gives rise to the production of administrative vetoes with the respective penalties (ban on begging, drinking, “camping”, playing instruments, acting in the street, etc.) that transform what was an ideological apparatus into a repressive one. There is no doubt that the city is traversed, in this phase of time, by a very complex weave of antagonistic issues. Urban dynamics have greatly been determined by the emergence of hardships and new needs, both in a conflictual form and as actual transformations of their functioning, and in most cases a certain ineptitude to grasp the trends of transformations on the part of the institutions must be observed. Thus the reference is to a crisis situation, crisis in functioning, crisis in meaning, crisis in public policies. The phenomena that have to be handled, whether they show themselves through conflicts or smoulder under the embers in an apparent situation of conflictual stagnation (transformations in economy, unemployment, extra-­ community immigration, which constitutes beyond all reality the focal point of right-wing politics, the growing exacerbation of the distribution of wealth, emerging poverty, the frequent invasion of tourists and visitors summoned by events and promotions that instead of reducing the meagre sustainability of cities increases inconveniences, etc.), require analysis and reflection on the relationship between social dynamics and city. From these consequent actions should be triggered, not just in the urban sphere, but in terms of a committed path in an intellectual and political arena – not very attractive for politicians (neither for most of their accompanying technicians).

5.4  The Limits of Urban Policies Governments are often ignorant of the real situation of social hardships in the city. But they cannot fail to the emergencies the city expresses through social conflicts and struggles. Therefore it is not surprising that in recent years governments have intensified processes of intervention in cities, also encouraged by the EU. The city, as such, has become a subject of policies; significantly the city is taken as an engine of growth and development, and action on the city appears as the key element for future development. While the EU strongly pushes in this direction, the various countries find themselves faced with a variety of situations. So the search for “good practices” becomes often the choice to solve problems, forgetting that good practices are based on specific conditions of time and place, and that social-economic situations and institutional organisations cannot be transferred to other places and other times. In Italy, the policies that have been activated are innumerable, going from the “National plan for cities” to the “National operative plan for metropolitan cities”, the “Extraordinary programme for urban redevelopment and the safety of the

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suburbs” and so on.1 These policies may contain many good intentions, reasonable amounts of resources made available, but they collide against drawn-out mechanisms, attribution criteria not always easy to interpret, the request for executive projects that local administrations did not have available and were not able to set up (except, obviously, for the largest, best-equipped cities), etc. Cities become more and more the subject of policies, but the urban condition is left out of focus, with the contradictions this carelessness creates. In this situation, policies aim to recover and upgrade the city, but leave unchanged socio-economic process and neglect the changes that have occurred and continue to occur in the social structure, in people’s heads, in the use of the city and in their needs and desires and their political attitude. The current moment needs radical solutions aiming to transform the economic structure, the social relations of production and power relations. Instead of this, urban policies are limited, at best, to putting forward a neo-reformist response (very often not activated) that does not grasp the needs of the moment and above all does not grasp the demands emerging from the hardships expressed by social struggles. The innovations of this reformism aim to maintain the status quo and in particular to exclude any idea of radical transformation. This way they become mostly conservation policies often seasoned with mystifying formulations (of the type: better a lower salary than no salary).

5.5  T  he Relationship Between Local Conflicts and Institutions Social struggles, if well motivated, well supported, well organised and continuous over time, could not but influence specific urban policies. One can basically assume that non-occasional social struggles can have a notable weight on forcing urban policies to tackle the demands expressed. The hypothesis is put forward that social urban struggles that are objectively and subjectively well characterised can manage to overcome the resistance of administrative “politics” and government of the city, which very often consider conflicts just as a “disturbance” and at the same time are incompetent to address the problems the conflicts express. If it were true that social conflicts could be seen as the way (the only or at least prevalent way) in which an effective hardship manifests itself and therefore convey a specific political request, listening would be a fundamental function for those responsible for governing the city. Actually, politics appears to be deaf: conflicts are mostly seen in a negative light and considered a nuisance, the expression of non-­ constructive antagonism and usually responsible for the failure of many good actions that government authorities had the courage to carry out. However, in some 1  This cannot be the place for a detailed analysis of these and other policies. For a detailed analysis of their nature, effects and implicit issues, refer to the Second report on cities (2017) and the Third report on cities (2018), produced by Urban@it – Centro nazionale di studi per le politiche urbane, edited by the publisher il Mulino.

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cases politics plays at “relaunching” and asks the organised conflict not only to express and manifest the hardship but also to work out a suitable “solution” to surmount it. It is not impossible that social movements be able occasionally to point out the solution to problems the struggles are contending with, but also in this case the “government” remains in charge of implementation of the solutions identified. It can be observed that the general conflict has a threshold (its extension, participation, duration, ways of being conducted, etc.) beyond which it comes considerably under government choices, comparison tables are set up, and solutions studied (all obviously accompanied by moments of repression); the nature and strength of the conflict, in these cases, imposes recourse to pacts. On the contrary, government institutions very often appear to be deaf to local conflicts (one might say that the choice in this case is to “let them stew in their own juices”). This is strange especially with regard to local government because it seems clear that the reference point for local conflicts cannot but be the local administrations; the hardships they interpret are born on the territory of single local governments, who are the “closest” to the social subjects conducting the struggle. Moreover, hardships quite often have their origins in errors, non-compliance, incapacity of local administrators to cope carefully with governing the city. For this situation to be changed, however, it would seem necessary that the many social urban struggles manage to find moments of integration and to develop common political strategies, something that is not simple or straightforward given the prevalent individualism claimed by each single conflict and the lack of opportunities for dialogue. Fragmentation of the conflict matches the fragmentation of the capacity to have an impact. Furthermore, local administrations make use of the scarceness of resources available to them, undoubtedly a real fact, but very often set against an expenditure budget that, rather than looking at the needs and hardships of the population, aims at spectacularisation (if not something worse). It should also be emphasised that in the present state (indirectly conflictual) initiatives tend to arise by which the population finds a solution to some hardships, maybe based on “target practice” or maybe using resources made available by the public administration (like the opening of urban vegetable plots, playgrounds for toddlers, forms of support for children with difficulties in studying, etc.).

5.6  S  eeking Ways of Cooperation Between Local Movements and Institutions Apart from rare exceptions, (local and national) institutions do not put transformations as their objectives. Among the verbs that may define government action: to supervise, to manage transformations and to promote transformations, it is the first that is mostly in use. To supervise, though this is about a necessary government function, is used in the sense of routine, of maintaining the given situation, the least effort in updating and

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the minimum capacity for imagination. It is an attitude that clashes with urban dynamics, with the continuous variations in the situation (also as an effect of recurring crises), with technological transformations or with the changes in lifestyles which inevitably lead such government action to be inconsistent in the face of the needs. These phenomena are often identified as those that make planning “useless”, planning understood as the application of abstract models with no encounter with reality; they should all the more be taken as significant elements not just of “government of the city” but also of its administration. When (general and local) conflicts take on features of intolerance of government action, then the action, defined as administrative, goes mad and it is at this point that it very often produces measures that are frequently senseless, on the one hand repressive and on the other fired by imagination dominated by the mainstream ideology (politics of events, liberalisation, the involvement of private entities, etc.). It is hoped that these problems will be solved by these “novelties”, but above all that citizens will be distracted. In actual fact, collectively these measures end up worsening the specific situations and determining new situations of hardship (and often new conflicts), above all because no attention is given to the interrelation between different phenomena and because the effects each provision generates are not measured. Local institutions present a strong tendency to place themselves in the administrative current; having said this, it should not be denied that it is possible to find significant cases of what has been defined as managing transformations, a position worthy of attention also for the positive stance it takes with regard to conflicts (we are not dealing with a hypothetical institution that could and wishes to promote social transformations – revolutions are never institutional). It is assumed that social conflicts are one of the expressions of demand for transformation; they are themselves manifestations of transformation, but for a positive outcome such transformations underway (whether supported by struggles or not) need to be managed, something possible only for a political institution that has its ears to the ground. We need to get rid of an extremist attitude of diffidence: the public management of transformations induced by social conflicts should not lead to diffidence and suspicion; we need to be cautious, careful and not immediately think that by intervening the intention is to eliminate the conflicts and not their causes (this can also happen). For a democratic, progressive and intelligent public administration the solution cannot be to eliminate the conflict but, rather, to aim to remove the hardship that is generating the conflict. Public institutions tend more and more to operate not with “great plans” but with partial policies (housing, transport, education, health, etc.). Praise of pragmatism in this sense is wasted, as is that for realism, but the dangers risked with this fragmentation are well known (lack of coordination, contradictions, duplication, inefficiency, etc.). The situation would be different if these single policies were built up as parts of a general strategy, namely of an overall perspective of government of the city attentive to the population’s hardships. But we do not intend discussing this here. Specific sectorial policies may in some way be an answer when we find ourselves faced with a social conflict of a general nature (as has always arisen in past

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experience; think of the different provisions coping with hardships over housing). The use of the expression “in some way” means to take into account that social struggles very often have “radical” objectives, while public policies tend to have a “conservative” nature. This is so even when they innovate government mechanisms: specific sectorial policies are rarely able to take on the radical content of the objectives. They may in some way intervene in the redistribution mechanisms but can do little to foster structural transformations. However, when several local conflicts have a common subject, such as housing, or when a wide range of local conflicts exists also on various problems and issues, then specific public policies may be appropriate and necessary. Even though they do not always prove effective, for whether they refer to a single or to several different matters, local conflicts feed on local specificities2 (social, cultural, organisational and political in the strict sense, etc.) that may create friction with institutional intervention. Here is where the political intelligence of the local government has to find the right ways to relate with local movements. This is not an easy task, because while local conflicts require specific political interventions suited to resolving hardship situations, local movements are jealous of their autonomy and diffident towards the institutions. There cannot be “general rules”; the reference to the intelligence and imagination of government on the one hand and the specificity of conflicts on the other does not allow guidelines that are valid for each and every conflict, but particular attention should be paid to eliminating possibilities of friction. The administration has to find a suitable solution and eliminate (or at least try to eliminate) every form of diffidence towards it (being aware that past experience may be a good reason for nurturing this diffidence). For this purpose local government could set up small intervention groups, with the necessary skills for the problem that has arisen, which would not be a direct product of the institutions but a link between the subjects involved in the emerging conflict and the institutions. Agreement on a possible platform should be shared by the conflict groups and the institutions, and in this sphere the intervention group should play the role of mediator aiming at the agreement. An aspect about which conflict groups are very sensitive is the expropriation of the objectives of their struggles and the solutions they have thought up. To avoid this risk the intervention groups should seek answers to the problems in close association with the conflict groups, discussing alternatives, possible solutions, etc. These solutions should be sought bearing in mind the legislation in force, the resources available and obviously the matters brought up by the conflicts. Legislation is always modifiable, but resources appear to be a defining matter; their adequacy, though taking into account the State’s fiscal crisis, is clearly an important political indicator for clarifying the positive attitude of the institutions. 2  It would be sufficient to analyse the different solutions adopted by many local administrations to increase the housing offer at controlled prices, to understand that the problem is not so much to develop a sort of handbook of good practices, as to apply intelligence and creativity to analysing the specific single situations and finding the most suitable solution.

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Finally, there is a very important passage that gives rise to an advanced form of democracy. The management of the implementation process, as well as management of the solution, must involve, in ways that are possible and desirable, a part of the conflict group. While I do not believe in forms of direct democracy, I consider that forms of delegative democracy need innovation consisting, to put it briefly, of a cross between direct and delegative democracy and between bureaucratic operativity and citizens’ action. Management of this type may generate contradictions that are not negligible. For example, pinpointing the solution may generate a weakening of the conflict, thus weakening political demand; it may cause internal disputes in the conflict group between those who accept the idea of the procedure previously indicated and those who consider (rightly, to some extent) that conflicts do not provide solutions but only raise questions; political differences of a general order between the group in conflict and the government of institutions. The ability to overcome these problems will depend in an important part on the quality of consent and democratic quality the local administration has achieved as regards the population. It is obvious, from the point of view maintained here, that such partial solutions need to be embedded into a strategy of and for the city. Urban government cannot pass through a disjointed system of solutions independent of each other but requires weaving together a clear and defined pattern for the future.

References Fregolent L (ed) (2015) Conflitti e territorio. FrancoAngeli, Milano Indovina F (2017) Ordine e disordine nella città contemporanea. FrancoAngeli, Milano Lefebvre H (2014) Il diritto alla città. Ombre Corte, Milano. (Originally published as Le droit à la ville, 1968. Paris: Anthropos) Nel·lo O (2016) La città in movimento. Crisi sociale e risposta dei cittadini. Edicampus, Roma Urban@it – Centro nazionale di studi per le politiche urbane (2017) Secondo Rapporto sulle città. Le agende urbane delle città italiane. il Mulino, Bologna Urban@it – Centro nazionale di studi per le politiche urbane (2018) Terzo Rapporto sulle città. Mind the gap. Il distacco tra politiche e città. il Mulino, Bologna Francesco Indovina  Urban planner. Department of Architecture, Design and Urban Planning, Università di Sassari. Author: La metropoli europea. Una prospettiva (Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2014); Ordine e disordine nella città contemporanea (Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2017).

Part II

Urban Movements, Unity in Diversity

Chapter 6

“The City Belongs to Us!”: Claiming Social Rights and Urban Citizenship in the Face of Urban Renewal Programs in a Mediterranean French City David Giband

During the last decade, the emergence of urban social movements such as the Occupy Wall Street, the Indignados, and Taksim Park protests nurtured an important literature in social sciences (Nichols 2009; Castaneda 2012; Fahmi 2009). These contributions emphasize the role of networked social movements and the emergence of hybrid spaces based on large-scale mobilizations which in some cases became emblematic (Castells 2012). Using mobile and Wi-Fi technologies, social movements transformed local contests into more global spaces of mobilization and audience. However, if a large amount of literature has examined networked social movements, only a few studies have paid attention to less visible, low network-­ connected social movements, with little media coverage occurring in deprived neighborhoods. There, mostly poor and sometimes undocumented residents, facing urban renewal and regeneration programs, contest, mobilize, and organize. In the context of neoliberal transformations of the city, where neoliberal market mechanisms transform cities into economic assets, deprived neighborhoods are clear targets for urban regeneration (Wilson 2004). Entrepreneurial strategies led by public and private stakeholders focus on deprived neighborhoods not only in central locations – according to gentrification agendas – but also on peripheral neighborhoods, some of them concentrating on major public housing complexes (Giband 2018). Rooted in the dismantling of the welfare state, policies of residualization of public housing intend to transmute the face, the landscape and the populations of these deprived urban areas. In the name of social mix, urban renewal programs engage in the vast restructuring of these spaces, alternating demolition, rebuilding, reshaping urban forms, and producing new socially and residentially mixed neighborhoods. In the production of the neoliberal city, these spaces appear as subaltern spaces populated by what Loic Wacquant called the “urban-outcasts” (Wacquant D. Giband (*) UMR Art-Dev., University of Perpignan, Perpignan, France e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Fregolent, O. Nel·lo (eds.), Social Movements and Public Policies in Southern European Cities, Urban and Landscape Perspectives 21, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52754-9_6

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2008): an underclass relegated to large peripheral public housing complexes and stigmatized by mass unemployment, casualization of work, delinquency, and immigration background. Denied by local authorities as legitimate partners or trapped into procedures of residents’ participation, these inhabitants are seen as unable to mobilize and incapable of implementing political and social competencies in the urban scene. But far from the figure of depoliticized inhabitants who are unable to act, residents of deprived neighborhoods show an unexpected ability to contest, mobilize, and act. This is particularly true in the French banlieue, where during the last decade deprived public housing neighborhoods witnessed important social movements. Threatened with demolition and removal implemented through urban renewal programs, groups of residents have organized local resistance and used institutional arenas and urban planning procedures in order to promote forms of urban citizenship (Donzelot 2009). These groups of residents not only opposed major urban policies, but they managed to renegotiate and influence their implementation. Their action can be seen as the basis for further mobilizations and political movements. It contributes as well to make visible les quartiers populaires (poor neighborhoods) on the political scene. A form of urban citizenship has emerged, embedded in residents’ capabilities to mobilize their local knowledge and spatiality, to make visible the outcasts’ movement, and to contest and impact goals and objectives of urban policies. Based on case studies located in a southern French city (Perpignan), this chapter aims to discuss residents’ capacities to manage innovative forms of urban citizenship on behalf of the contestations of urban renewal policies. Unlike current connected social movements, these mobilizations can be understood as low noise mobilizations, hardly visible, rooted in daily socio-spatial practices led by traditionally concealed and marginalized populations. Our hypothesis is that fearing the dismantlement of their neighborhood, which they perceive as an injustice, residents of deprived social housing neighborhoods contest and organize resistance. They show abilities to mobilize local resources, to build capabilities and produce social and political innovations in order to impact objectives, procedures, and management of major national urban policies devoted to breaking up the so-called French ghettoes. We will first present the national and local context of urban renewal programs in the French banlieues, the implementation of which occurred in a post-riot context, urging authorities to deal with local activists and residents. Then, through a case study in an “ordinary city” (Perpignan), we will examine how these residents use their own skills and local knowledge (user expertise) to define a regime of proximity and deal with long-term urban projects based on a regime of uncertainty; user expertise is the sum of acquired and transmitted skills, of know-how and expertise in the uses of daily urban spaces, private spaces, networks, and social relations of proximity (Bonnet 2006). Finally, we will discuss the social and political incidences of these urban social movements rooted in the daily space and in what Carrel et al. (2009) described as an “urban democracy by intermittency.”

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6.1  Riots in la banlieue? Urban Outcasts, Social Contest, and Urban Policy in Crisis During the last 10 years, deprived neighborhoods of the French banlieue have witnessed important social movements while policies dedicated to these spaces (la politique de la ville) were facing crises and successive changes. 2005’s riots and violent contestations by groups of young adults paved the way for more discrete and low noise collective mobilizations by inhabitants denouncing injustice and asking for more urban citizenship.

6.1.1  A National Urban Policy in Crisis La banlieue is a term used to describe large and disadvantaged peripheral public housing complexes located in first and second suburban rings of large cities. They house the country’s poorest and most downtrodden. The term banlieue itself is deceptive. On the one hand, it merely designates an urbanized area on the outskirts of a large city. On the other hand, the term refers to urban deprivation, illiteracy, segregation, poverty, drugs and crime, large immigrant families concentrated in public housing complexes. (Body-Gendrot 2010, 657)

As a space of urban deprivation, la banlieue presents an image of deteriorated large public housing projects with a landscape inherited from the modern architecture tradition, mostly the combination of degraded open spaces and buildings. Hosting 8% of the French population, the banlieue public housing complexes now concentrate 60% of the French households living in poverty. The unemployment rate is three times as high as the national rate (27% vs 10% national average in 2017) and inhabitants suffer from spatial isolation due to a lack of public transport and public amenities. Symbol of a French mode of urban deprivation and segregation, the banlieue public housing complexes have been specific targets of national policies since the end of the 1970s: la politique de la ville (Vieillard-Baron 2013). This priority urban area policy is a set of social and housing programs devoted to dealing with these specific neighborhoods. It has locally articulated national public policies in education, housing, culture, policing, youth, and employment according to the French welfare state model (Chaline 2010). In the early 2000s, la politique de la ville entered in crisis. Despite more than 20 years of massive public investments in social and urban redevelopment, the situation worsened. Many observers denounced the failure of this policy and the worsening of segregation, poverty, and isolation among banlieue inhabitants. In 2003, under the auspices of a national urban renewal program (PNRU1), a vast reform was

 Program National de Rénovation Urbaine.

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launched in order to “radically deal with these ghettos.”2 PNRU induced the production of new residential spaces and new injunctions: dismantlement of social housing complexes, social mixing, decentralized governance. Under the Chirac (2002–2007) and Sarkozy administrations (2007–2012), the French state published the City Orientation and Programming Act (2003), a reform of this national policy (Epstein 2013). A first deregulation/privatization agenda was set, consisting of an urban renewal program (PNRU), focusing on social and spatial restructuring for 490 neighborhoods in the French banlieues according to neoliberal norms (Desjardins 2008). This program (PNRU) foresaw the demolition of half of the public housing complexes, to be replaced by private housing. 137,000 housing units in 450 neighborhoods were targeted for demolition, 130,000 for housing rehabilitation, and 341,000 private housing units were to be built. The remaking of the banlieue follows neoliberal perspectives. It seeks to enhance the attractiveness of urban regions in opening peripheral public housing spaces to urban entrepreneurialism by facilitating “constructive” social and cultural changes. The Sarkozy administration (2007–2012) claimed to control and police the “scum” living in public housing and to open the banlieue to the middle classes. A “middle sizing process” was expected: in this way those turbulent spaces and inhabitants would conform to social, economic, and moral middle class norms and give financial added value to these once deprived urban spaces. Forecasting the demolition of half of the public housing stock, the implantation of the PNRU unleashed the fury of the banlieue, with unprecedented riots in November 2005. In less than 3 weeks, most of the large public housing complexes were the scene of violent riots, first in the Parisian suburbs then in most of large metropolitan areas (Lyon, Rennes, Strasbourg, Lille) (Mucchielli et al. 2010). Obviously, the 2005’s riots are not only the results of urban renewal programs. Some other factors such as high levels of poverty, concentration of populations with an immigration background and a mass youth unemployment rate played a significant role. However, according to the academic literature, a correlation exists between the location of the riots and neighborhoods concerned by urban renewal plans (Lagrange 2007). Threats of expulsions and forced removals were seen by inhabitants as an additional risk reinforcing their social vulnerability. Symbols of the failure of the politique de la ville (Bacqué and Denjean 2006), 2005’s riots were witness to the crisis of a major national urban policy.

 Introduction to the City Orientation and programming Act (2003).

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6.1.2  B  ehind 2005’s Riots, Social Contests, and Low Noise Mobilizations Usually, for planners and authorities, residents of these neighborhoods are considered unable to mobilize, ranging on a scale from resignation to episodic violence. The processes of stigmatization and relegation have fostered the widespread notion that the banlieue’s inhabitants are to be considered marginalized groups, unable to mobilize, contest, propose, and act, in other words to be citizens. However, in the wake of the riots, a new institutional context emerged. Fears of further violence urged local and national authorities to react. In 2006, a social cohesion plan (CUCS) was added to the PNRU, institutionalizing a variety of possibilities for public participation locally and combining social issues with urban renewal plans (education, access to public transportation). Participation of inhabitants is part of the stated intentions of the PNRU. But, as it has been explained: If we perceive a growing awareness by institutions and municipalities about the deficiencies of the ‘real’ public participation, the solutions set in place are limited in most cases to validation meetings in order to ratify decisions taken well in advance. (Deboulet and Lelévrier 2014, 14)

Participation is limited to public information while cooperation means approval and adherence to official urban renewal projects by inhabitants. Set in a context of neoliberal urban policies, participatory procedures rapidly led to tensions with inhabitants. This is so because “participatory procedures that try to conciliate managerial objectives of public policies improvement with a political objective of democratisation answer a process of neoliberalisation” (Deboulet and Lelévrier 2014, 15). PNRU and the implementation of procedures for public participation are locally contested and depicted as a participatory trap denying a true legitimacy to inhabitants. The post-riot period thus witnessed a myriad of unexpected social mobilizations claiming new forms of citizenship, led by people once considered as not able to act (non-French citizens, poorly educated, mostly non-registered on voting lists), characterized by their social afflictions (unemployment, illiteracy, school dropout, violence). This participatory gap, between stated intentions and reality, nurtured mistrust and indignation. The indignation emerged from the claim of the inhabitants to be considered as legitimate stakeholders and “true citizens,” from the demand for information regarding demolitions, the refusal of social mixing, and the need to act outside official procedures. In the whole country, groups of poor inhabitants organized local protests, denouncing social injustice and opposing the goals and objectives of PNRU. Protests were especially visible in Paris, Toulouse, Montpellier, and Strasbourg. In the Parisian banlieues, as in many others banlieues threatened by demolition and removal, groups of residents organized local resistance and denounced urban planning tools and procedures implemented by urban renewal programs as a trap where officials tried to isolate the inhabitants. In many suburban localities, mobilization happens outside official participatory arenas in daily spaces (building lobbies, community centers, parks, public spaces,

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schools) where inhabitants mobilize against demolition and in favor of the improvement of their living conditions. There, low noise mobilizations and collective actions are structured and then used by activists to negotiate with officials. New forms of involvement are deployed in these daily spaces where inhabitants gain users’ expertise, local knowledge, and the techniques of collective mobilization. Inhabitants use their local knowledge nurtured in such informal arenas to locally contest and negotiate with planners about demolition and urban renewal plans. In Argenteuil and Poissy, Deboulet and Lelévrier (2014) observed how poor inhabitants, mostly foreign and illiterate residents, directly deal with architects, planners, and technicians to contest demolitions using technical expertise beside their users’ expertise. A substantial shift arises in the activists’ domain of focus avoiding urban renewal official procedures and building their own political arena and expertise. Many authors noted a diversification of skills and competences used by inhabitants in their opposition to demolition (Berry-Chikhaoui and Medina 2014). These oppositions occurred in places of (daily) resistance where mobilization, concertation, and counter-­proposal were made. Contests of urban renewal programs mobilize four levels of opposition (Deboulet 2010): a social criticism of housing policies denouncing demolition in a national context of shortage of public housing; criticism of urban policies denouncing the prevalent choices – a spatial handling of la banlieue rather than a social one; critics underlining the waste of public money due to massive demolition and rebuilding; criticism about the lack of “true” public cooperation. These movements taking place in deprived public housing complexes and led by the so-called marginalized citizens are part of the current reemergence of the “right to the city” motto (Mayer 2012). They also mark a novel type of coalition among the most deprived places in the city that “create a real challenge for neoliberal planners, politicians and developers” (Mayer 2012, 65).

6.2  T  he City Belongs to Us! Urban Social Mobilizations and Innovations in Perpignan Inhabitants’ contests and mobilizations do not only occur in huge public housing complexes located in big French metropolitan areas, especially in the Parisian banlieue. Far away from the national political scene and media attention, medium-sized towns have witnessed active forms of inhabitants’ contestation of PNRU.  In the southern part of the country, Perpignan is a relevant case study revealing a spatial anchoring of such urban social movements, residents’ capabilities embedded in a regime of proximity and a capacity to deal with regimes of uncertainty. Perpignan is a medium-sized city with a population of just over 120,000 in 2018. Close to the border with Spain, it has Catalan origins and a population characterized by ethnic diversity.

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6.2.1  T  he Perpignan Urban Renewal Plan: National Expectations and Local Challenges In Perpignan, citizens’ mobilization occurs in a specific context. On the one hand, the city is historically structured by a strong social and ethnic partition of the urban space with minority groups (North-Africans, Africans, Gypsies) embedded in deprived districts (Le Vernet district in the northern part of the city, and Saint Jacques in the center city). In this Mediterranean French city,3 characterized by poverty and unemployment,4 70% of the urban area public housing is concentrated, mainly populated by two distinct groups. A first group with a North African immigration background lives in the large public housing complexes in the Vernet district (northern periphery of the city), while a second group, mainly Gypsy people, lives in small scattered and deteriorated public housing dwellings in Le Vernet district and in Saint Jacques (center city, Fig. 6.1). On the other hand, the implementation of PNRU occurred in the aftermath of the violent riots in May 2005  in the Gypsy and North African districts of the city (Giband 2006). The PNRU now has to face a critical situation in a post-riot context where tensions for affordable housing are strong. The challenge is of crucial importance for the city mayor who is also the president of the national authority in charge of PNRU.  For this conservative municipality, the PNRU objectives are not only political. The Perpignan PNRU serves as a national example and has a demonstrative value in the implementation of a renewed politique de la ville. The local urban renewal program focuses on two main objectives. First, it seeks to significantly reduce the residential density in the public housing complexes by demolishing 531 dwellings mainly in the Vernet district, opening up these once isolated districts to the rest of the city. Second, the purpose is to ease social mix, by building 581 new private single family housing units and by removing former social housing tenants to other locations. Three hundred and eighty families, mainly with an immigration background, are to be removed to other cities in the urban area. The plan aims “to reinforce social link and citizenship through residential mixing and the implementation of new community and public facilities and amenities.”5 The objectives consist in “significantly reduce the share of public housing,”6 seen as harmful to the whole city social cohesion, and “to rebuild these districts differently” by introducing individual and private housing in order to revitalize these places with new amenities and new residents. Thus quantified, the objectives of social mixing are part of a vast urban plan alternating gentrification in the central districts of the

 125,000 inhabitants in 2010.  Perpignan is ranked fourth French poorest city (31.5% of the city population live below the poverty line in 2015). 5  In program de la rénovation urbaine, Convention partenariale Ville de Perpignan & Agence Nationale de la rénovation Urbaine, p. 6. 6  Ibidem. 3 4

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Fig. 6.1  Location of the three neighborhoods

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city and new residential developments for the middle classes in these former public housing districts.

6.2.2  “We Don’t Want No Social Mixing!” Set up in the fall of 2005, PNRU rapidly raised the concern and growing hostility of poor residents. The implementation of PNRU happened only a few months after the riots in a context depicted by the newspaper Le Monde as “unextinguished burning fire.”7 Understood as an explicit tool for “de-ethnicization” of public housing districts, social mixing and procedures for public participation set by the PNRU were rapidly contested in the three affected districts (Fig. 6.1). The injunction for social mixing faced two major pitfalls. First, an ethnical pitfall through the positioning of poor and minority residents against mixing. This position is justified by a territorial ethnicity based on the rhetoric: “us against them,” Moroccans from Le Vernet, Gypsies from Nouveau Logis district against white French middle classes. This opposition was formalized by a community leader in the Clodion-Torcatis district: “we don’t want no social mixing! We’re already mixed here, we have in the neighborhood: North-Africans, Africans, Gypsies, Turkish, and so on.”8 Secondly, there is a residential pitfall. Residents also opposed procedures of public participation set in place. The lack of public concern and of true public participation led to grievances regarding the denial of the residents’ skills and more widely of their status of citizens. Residents complained about being invisible and not being considered as legitimate stakeholders by PNRU officials. Public participation procedures were denounced as a trap: “they asked us to look at beautiful plans, images and PowerPoints but we ain’t no fools!”9 The lack of consideration felt in public participation procedures by stigmatized residents (such as Moroccans and Gypsies) paved the way for a growing feeling of social injustice and neglect. In Perpignan, mobilization was built both on conflicts with local authorities and on residents’ capacities to utilize spaces of discussion opened by PNRU officials and develop their own strategies, negotiate, and formulate their goals. Based on a 10-year period of observation (2005–2015), our hypothesis is that social movements operate here inside an in-between, both inside and outside circuits of concertation and public participation, most of the time through small informal places where contest and public discussion occur (community centers, public spaces, building lobbies, public meetings, schools, etc.). It takes shape according to diverse temporalities and spatialities, partly depending on PNRU projects, in a

7  In Le Monde, June 10th 2005, “Perpignan, un brasier mal éteint”, A. Chemin (https://www.lemonde.fr/a-la-une/article/2005/06/10/perpignan-un-brasier-mal-eteint_660551_3208.html). 8  Quoted by the author, interviewed in January 2008. 9  Interview with residents, Cité de Clodion, March 2017.

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Fig. 6.2  Local dynamics

permanent tension between an administrated citizenship (deployed and promoted by the procedure’s urban planning) and a contested and engaged urban citizenship. Our approach uses three concepts to understand the dynamics of local mobilizations and innovations: regime of proximity, regime of uncertainty, and residents’ capabilities (Fig. 6.2). Mobilizations and contests are first locally rooted and embedded in daily spaces threatened by public actions. Facing a threat (demolition, removal of their home and spaces of living), residents decided to contest and oppose what is perceived as a danger and an injustice. Threats to daily and familiar spaces and places are the basis for regimes of involvement, which are very different in nature from other types of social and political mobilizations quoted in scientific literature. In these deprived neighborhoods – where residents for many reasons are less likely to get involved in official political scenes and arenas – engagement is embedded in local spaces and in familiar places defining regimes of proximity. Thus, regimes of proximity can be understood as the capacity for residents to involve and to mobilize, inside familiar and ordinary local spaces, resources for action, contestation, and negotiation and to manage a cooperative contestation (Thevenot 1999). These regimes of proximity are built on personal and collective attachments to places, to a sense of place and belonging, to collective identities and space imaginaries. In these regimes of proximity, residents, mostly poor households with an immigration (or a minority) background, find two resources for their mobilization: territorial ethnicity and users’ expertise (Fig.  6.2). Territorial ethnicity has been defined by Françoise Lorcerie (2009) as a social configuration embedded in a local space (a territory) in which social characteristics of this space (concentration of poverty, unemployment, social and ethnic stigmatization) are combined with

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subjective elements (ethnical visibility, cultural identity). Territorial ethnicity is claimed by many residents and is part of collective representations in most of banlieue’s neighborhoods. Many districts in Perpignan are defined by ethnic identity. Districts such as Nouveau Logis or Saint Jacques are represented by a Gypsy or a North African identity, inherited from the city history, choices from the group and policies of housing. In a city where social groups are embedded and attached to urban spaces, territorial ethnicity is a major key to understanding both local spaces and collective mobilization. Secondly, mobilizations have to deal with a regime of uncertainty. Indeed, the time span of the urban renewal plan (8 years) produces uncertainty, time variations in both the implementation and contest of the urban renewal plan, but also in the time frame of the residents’ mobilization. In this regime of uncertainty, residents’ mobilization depends on many contingencies due to multiple and complex temporalities (temporality of the project, of stakeholders, of local politics). Thus, social mobilizations here are a long-term trend alternating between phases of mobilization, waiting times, and dead times. Thirdly, we consider that poor and segregated residents of these deprived neighborhoods show capabilities to contest, to mobilize, and to propose alternative plans. Such capabilities, anchored in daily lives and user skills, are the basis for political innovations and the promotion of urban citizenship.

6.2.3  T  he Tale of Three Neighborhoods: Contestations, Social Mobilizations, and Urban Policies in Crisis Three districts have been investigated in Perpignan (Fig. 6.1): a large public housing complex (Clodion-Torcatis) – hosting populations with various backgrounds (first and second generation immigrants) – a blighted Gypsy social housing district (Cité Nouveau Logis Les Pins) and a devastated condominium building housing people with a Moroccan background (Baléares Rois de Majorque). Three forms of contest and social mobilization arise from people locally considered as “urban outcasts” and stigmatized by poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, and dependency on welfare. A large number of them are legally considered and not registered on the voting list and depicted as unable to mobilize. In each of these districts, mobilization is rooted in an emotional involvement taking shape in a claim for recognition of their double status as city dwellers and citizens. This claim leads to contests, position statements about the urban renewal plan, and counter proposals. Behind opposition to demolitions, removals of residents and urban restructuring plans, appears the refusal of social mixing understood as a risk of residential downgrading. Each of these three case studies is the focus of specific social mobilization, diversely impacting official urban renewal plans and the whole administrative apparatus dedicated to these plans. All of them unveil alternative forms of residents’ participation and citizenship.

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 aléares Rois de Majorque: Innovations Through Critical Cooperation B and Strategy of Colonization Baléares Rois de Majorque (BRM) is a housing complex of devastated condominiums for which the urban renewal program plans to redesign public places and to renew half of the housing stock in order to host new residents. This neighborhood houses a majority of immigrants from Morocco, mainly newly arrived immigrants. BRM suffers from blighted housing and poorly maintained common parts of the buildings and neglected public spaces. In 2006, the tenants took the opportunity of PNRU public meetings to call into question the city plan. Public meetings and procedures of residents’ participation were transformed by tenants into a political arena in which they contest the initial plan approved by city official and by the housing complex owner. In these meetings, from 2007 to 2010, with the help of social workers and of an interpreter, tenants diverted tools deployed by city officials (such as the concertation procedures, the shared urban diagnostic) to oppose the city project. After a phase of tension and confrontation with city officials, a residents group was set up. They first used informal neighborhood places to meet, to inform, and to mobilize residents. Building entrances, community gardens, the community center, and school entrances were used as meeting places for debates and dialogues. In these places, information circulated and was shared. Mobilization occurring on the basis of daily contacts and information allowing it to reach a wider audience. Women, especially mothers, were specific targets of this mobilization through contacts in places of daily routine where discussions take place. Secondly, a strategy of colonization of public meetings to institute a collective contestation was set in place. Each of the PNRU public meetings was attended by more than 100 residents. Using their knowledge of the local space, mobilizing new resources (such as the making of their own housing diagnosis), they contested the city plan proposal, they opened discussions on unplanned topics (building renovation, end of social mixing, new connections with the surrounding neighborhoods) and the necessity to defend a local identity rooted in a territorial ethnicity. The experiential learning in these procedures of concertation helped residents to gain new skills (in urban planning, project management, negotiation) and to claim their territorial ethnicity. Denouncing a de-ethnicization plan, aiming to break community support networks embedded in the local space, and highlighting the ethnic dimension of this district (“it is a Moroccan neighborhood”), they forced city officials to reconsider the initial plan. One of the major issues concerns 85 housing units devoted to middle class newcomers, cornerstone of the social mixing objectives. These objectives face a strong territorial resistance on ethnic grounds, claimed by residents who consider non-­ Moroccan newcomers as competition and a threat. New settlements are presented as disruptive for the identity and the social cohesion. A large reformulation of the plan and its goals (end of social mixing) is finally established: reconsideration of the initial diagnosis and reformulation of the participation process including residents’ demands to new forms of “shared diagnosis” and mutual analysis procedures; consideration for residents’ issues (new bus routes, inclusion in the city master plan, renovation of open spaces); and implementation of an “auto-rehabilitation plan,”

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involving residents in the technical and housing allocation processes. Finally, a housing committee, largely open to residents’ representatives, was set in place assuring them that the 85 rehabilitated housing units will match residents’ expectations. Clodion-Torcatis: Counter Proposals and Claims to Be Heard Clodion and Torcatis were two social housing complexes where PNRU aimed to demolish 184 housing units (three buildings in ten), and to diversify the housing stock by building 100 individual and private housing units for middle classes. The city also justified the project by the need to restructure the urban fabric of this neighborhood. A large urban restructuring was planned by the PNRU: new urban facilities were to be built (a commercial mall, a school of nursing) and a new avenue would pass through the neighborhood. Located at the entrance to the city of Perpignan, the neighborhood occupies a strategic position between areas under gentrification in the center city and residential developments in the suburban area. In this social housing complex, 30% of the population live below the poverty line, and most of the inhabitants have an immigration background (mainly from North Africa, Africa, and Turkey). Most of the neighborhood associations reported their hostility to the project led by the city, and, in 2008, they denounced the risk that it would change the social cohesion of the neighborhood. They refused and strongly rejected social mixing objectives, the urban restructuring, and the proposals of re-housing outside the neighborhood. “We don’t want to be mixed or restructured! Mix will change the equilibrium of the neighborhood. We want our gardens to be well maintained, we want the city to improve our parking lots and our building lobbies. We don’t want no residential development here, we’re gonna lose this place’s soul. Most of the people live here for 10, 20 or 30 years.”10 Facing city departments and urban planners’ refusal to open discussion on the demolition and restructuring issues (“you have already been consulted”11), ten local associations joined together and managed their own urban and social analysis (Fig. 6.2). They refused to take part in the procedures of participation organized by the city planning department on the basis of a denial of their skills and residents’ capacities. Using technical arguments (“PNRU’s issues are too technical to be discussed with residents”12), the urban planners intended to limit the participation of residents to unimportant matters (i.e., form of vegetation for the community garden), keeping major problems (demolition, rehousing) out of the public debate. “It’s a closed arena where things are already decided. They just want to inform us and ask us to shut up our mouths!”13

 Interview with Mireille, Neighborhood activist, February 2008.  PNRU project officer, cited by residents, February 2008. 12  Interview with the PNRU project officer, March 2008. 13  Ibidem. 10 11

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Moreover, residents’ mobilization is also rooted in the claim to be considered as legitimate stakeholders and true citizens. Encompassing French citizens and foreigners, groups of residents refused to be considered second-class citizens. As city dwellers, they asked to be heard as legitimate partners with competencies, including technical ones. Secondly, they managed to build up their own urban and social diagnosis, by using their own criteria based on the analysis of daily life and uses of place by residents. By using their own data collection, they contested the city objectives of social and residential mixing, claiming that there was sufficient social mixing in the neighborhood (only 29% of the population was poor compared to 39% of the whole city). This counter diagnosis included issues of vital importance for the residents’ daily needs as well: maintenance of gardens and lobbies, rehabilitation of housings instead of the demolition of buildings, way of living, and importance of improving the quality of the public places. They also contested the making of a new avenue, seen as a factor of spatial division and asked to be part of the re-housing committee. Residents both contested the objectives and the tools of the PNRU, aware that their mobilization focused on the end of demolition and their claim to be heard as true citizens. Facing municipal opposition and refusal to access official data and information, they used tactics of ruse (obtaining information through national urban agencies) and delayed the implementation of the plan. While dealing with private partners and fearing a national media coverage of the contest, city officials included residents’ parameters in their urban and social diagnosis. Designed as a strategic site by city officials, the neighborhood restructuring plan was subject to substantial changes. On the one hand, residents succeeded in limiting the removal of residents to outside the neighborhood, but they did not succeed in becoming involved in the removal committee. On the other hand, new facilities were built while residential developments were finally located on the periphery of the neighborhood. Nouveau Logis Les Pins: Women’ Indignation and Claim for Citizenship Nouveau Logis les Pins (NLLP) is a public housing complex built in the 1970s to house nomad gypsies in the northern part of the city, now surrounded by industrial parks (Fig. 6.1). Hosting 80% of Gypsy families, NLLP is the poorest public housing complex in Perpignan. Ninety percent of dwellers are unemployed, 75% are illiterate, and 80% of households live below the poverty line. Substandard housing is here the norm, homes are overcrowded (young couples live in caravans in poor conditions), and the neighborhood has been abandoned by public policies for decades: some streets are still unpaved and a rubbish dump occupies the main public square. The PNRU plans to gradually demolish substandard housings, to relocate Gypsy residents elsewhere, and to turn this neighborhood into commercial and industrial land. The city plans are considered as the ethnic relegation of a population historically segregated and marginalized in what is locally depicted as a Gypsy ghetto.

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Driven by the neighborhood women’s association, a group of Gypsy residents, helped by social workers, contested the city plans at the end of 2005. Indignation and the lack of consideration from public authorities fuelled anger and contest. Facing city officials’ indifference, women got the support of the French State representative (le Préfet). In 2006 this public officer  – concerned about the dramatic situation of these inhabitants – forced the city to review the initial plans and allocate one million euros to an emergency plan. Forced by the State representative, the city and the public housing authority in charge of the housing complex modified the plan but refused to deal with inhabitants’ requests. They proposed to rehabilitate the community center, to pave unpaved streets, and to build a sports facility. These proposals provoked anger and indignation. Asking for 30 new housings and for a rehabilitation plan, residents expressed their disagreement with a new city plan denying their ethnicity. Ethnicity and territorial ethnicity are highlighted by residents to denounce a denial of their status as city dwellers and French citizens. “We are Gypsy and residents in this city for centuries. We are French and city dwellers and Gypsies!”14 Mobilization thus coalesced into an informal group joining members of the women’s association, social workers of the community center, and a few inhabitants concerned about the future of the community. With the help of activists from other neighborhoods, they used the community center as the focus of the mobilizations. Venue for mobilization and contest, the community center is also used to revive a local memory valuating the history of Gypsy in the neighborhood, the history of local urban struggles and contests. This was the opportunity to mobilize other residents in order for them to express their concerns. They reported poor living conditions, overcrowded dwellings, and a devastated urban environment. Inviting city and state representatives, they diverted public meetings (on other topics) to impose their issues (demands for new housings). Using a tactic of constant pressure on city officials, they also occupied public meetings at the city hall. Finally, they obtained the planning of procedures of public participation in which they mobilized their local knowledge to value a specific way of living and dwelling. Using user’ expertise, they raised the issues on the Gypsy traditional way of living underlining the importance of residential proximity as the base of social networks and solidarity for the group. After 2 years of constant pressure and contests, the public housing authority and the city agreed to build 35 new houses and to rehabilitate half of the housing complex.

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 Interview with residents, Cité Nouveau Logis Les Pins, February 2017.

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6.3  Hybridization and Reformulation of Urban Policies Beyond contestations and the reformulations of a major public policy by “unexpected citizens,” these social mobilizations question both the nature of the residents’ mobilization and the capacity of adaptation of urban public policies.

6.3.1  Beyond Social Mobilization, Urban Citizenship The three examples analyzed here invite us to reconsider the figure of the urban outcasts and their capacity to mobilize and act. Instead of the invisible residents depicted by neoliberal dogmas, they appear as urban citizens with capabilities. Users’ experience and diversion of institutional tools lead to the construction of negotiable items (social mixing, demolition, new bus routes, and so on), allowing in many cases the reformulation of social mixing goals. Residents act as strategist-­ citizens, not limited to claiming their right to housing but they are also able to be cunning, to negotiate, to delay, to argue, to propose, and to impose their view. Poor residents mobilize through a spatial involvement in their living spaces, revealing other forms of citizenship. In their mobilization these residents claim urban citizenship more than an abstract right to the city: they seek alternative forms of involvement and belonging in the city. This form of citizenship, disconnected from national belonging, refers to ethnic minorities that do not so much fight for new political rights such as associational rights (cultural, religious, regarding their housing condition). As we have seen, these city dwellers, traditionally excluded from traditional national rights, by mobilizing, expressing new requirements, and requesting rights in relation with their life condition and their urban experience, define new political arenas. This urban citizenship is anchored in a spatial dimension in which mobilization takes place in a daily network of micro-spaces and familiar places, birthplace of diverse forms of involvement and social innovation on both neighborhood and city scale. Therefore, social mobilization here is to be understood as a process of spatial involvement in familiar, public, nearby places and spaces. Mobilization relies on local knowledge and residents’ skills “understood as a capacity to consider a specific situation, to judge what is right and to express a position in public” (Deboulet 2010). In these three examples, mobilization occurred because of the awareness of the necessity to do the right thing. Mobilizations seem to rely on three types of residents’ capacities: the capacity to oppose, to delay, to contest; the capacity to mobilize diverse resources inside daily spaces and familiar places; and the capacity to reformulate and negotiate. Obviously, urban citizenship results from the improvement of skills that residents are able to mobilize in a specific time and space. But occurring mainly during urban conflicts, linked to urban redevelopment actions, these labile and fragile forms of spatial mobilization happen intermittently

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(Carrel et al. 2009). Mobilization is thus unstable, intermittent, and highly dependent on institutional agendas.

6.3.2  U  rban Policies Between Crisis and Adaptation: An Institutional Tinkering We have seen as well how, when facing conflicts, city officials have to reformulate goals and objectives of their urban renewal plans and are bound to deal with residents. In Baléares Rois de Majorque, the deal led to abandoning the initial project and the objectives of social mixing. The plan gave place to a partnership with community representatives and to a tacit form of co-management. In NLLP, residents’ mobilization is clearly understood as a social risk. Under residents’ pressure and fearing further riots, city officials favor a new plan leaving room for territorial ethnicity to the detriment of prior goals such as the economic development. In Clodion-­ Torcatis, the situation is a little different due to a higher land value. But conflicts, tactics of ruse, and skills deployed by residents explain a partial renegotiation of the initial objectives. Obviously, in a context of turmoil, urban renewal policies look like institutional tinkering. Another strategy appears which aims less to introduce middle classes to these turbulent spaces, and more to ensure the necessary conditions for a balanced mix in the city housing sector according to local issues. The purpose is then for city officials to invest and facilitate social changes in some districts (gentrification in the city center and in some strategic locations such as Clodion-Torcatis) and elsewhere ensuring conditions for social peace (NLLP and Baléares). Public actions facing residents’ hostility are constructed according to local issues and are highly dependent on circumstances. Beyond initial rhetoric and injunctions valuating social mixing, the public actions implemented have revealed the failure of social mixing ambitions. Social mixing, as the cornerstone of the urban renewal plan, has been abandoned. In 2010, the term “social mixing” disappeared from official documents and plans. However, more than a reformulation of public policies, a hybridization is under way. Many scholars have noted that in neoliberal times urban policies and governance tend to be hybrid and reactive, showing “a place-specific reflexiveness in response to situated, unpredictable conditions and circumstances” (Wilson et al. 2015, 12). Beyond recognition of users’ expertise and legitimacy, the reformulation of diagnosis tools and the institutional rhetoric on shared practices (valuating the virtues of local democracy and proximity in urban planning) also reveal a capacity to adapt and to hybridize. On the one hand, shared planning and the enlargement of procedures of participation are an act of depoliticization of residents’ actions. The intention is to tone down resident’s anger and limit residents’ claims to spheres of unpolitical issues (quality of public spaces for instance). On the other hand, since 2008 a context of public austerity and the lack of private financing also explain the

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weak resistance of local authorities and a capacity to negotiate. The reluctance of private stakeholders to invest in poor marginalized neighborhoods is another explanatory factor. Indeed, the real estate crisis of the late 2000s seriously impacts the city’s capacity to finance and to manage urban renewal plans. Deals with residents and community representatives are a short-term “patch and paint” strategy. It eases public disinvestments in some deprived neighborhoods where public action is limited to very few changes without influence on the conditions of urban deprivation and segregation. In 2015, the second phase of PNRU in Perpignan showed two major changes: social mixing objectives were limited to a vague promise and public investments for deprived neighborhoods were massively reallocated to the center city districts and to places considered as more valuables by private investors.

6.3.3  A  Matter of Scales: From Neighborhood Involvement to Political Action However, mobilization against the PNRU not only reveals residents’ capacity to contest and oppose urban renewal plans on a neighborhood scale. Facing public disinvestments, many of the residents’ groups joined and organized themselves in March 2017  in a citywide organization named “Perpignan, la ville est à nous” (“Perpignan, the city belongs to us!”). The ambition was to make the voice of deprived neighborhoods better heard both on a local and national scale. On the national scene, this movement joined the national network of banlieue popular neighborhoods: ACLFEU. This umbrella organization joined a number of groups and tried to make deprived neighborhood issues and people both visible and heard. The movement “Perpignan, la ville est à nous” was structured after the 2015 municipal election. The National Front collected 46% of the votes in Perpignan, revealing a major fracture between the French middle classes and the rest of the city. In this poor and fragmented Mediterranean city, increasing votes for the National front boosted political mobilization in the deprived neighborhoods. The score of the National Front acted as a warning signal regarding the non-representation of inhabitants from the deprived neighborhoods and the necessity to be visible. The purpose of the association was to shift the claims from the public housing areas to the entire city under an umbrella of social movements. This change of scale is presented by local activists as a political alternative: “There is no other alternative than a political takeover by those who are concerned by their own fight in mobilizing the reality of local resources and energies.”15 In changing scale, the movement integrates new claims (social inequalities, women’s rights, ethnic discrimination, education inequalities, fight against the National Front) and ambitions to challenge traditional parties. In 2017, a series of occupations of public spaces was launched in the city, Nos traces dans la ville (our tracks 15

 See: https://www.facebook.com/Perpignan-la-ville-est-%C3%A0-Nous-763586100476642/

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in the city), highlighting the presence of the (once) invisible citizens and asking for more social justice.

6.3.4  P  ostface: Citizens’ Vigilance and International Media Coverage In 2018, following the agenda of the second phase of PNRU, the city of Perpignan planned to demolish 50 substandard housings in a central Gypsy neighborhood (Saint-Jacques). A collective of inhabitants (Gypsies and North African people), sponsored by “Perpignan la ville est à nous,” opposed new demolitions, got the support of the French State representative (le Préfet), and gained the attention of the New York Times.16 The international media coverage helped stop the demolitions and led to the reformulation of the urban renewal plan according to a territorial ethnicity and legitimacy. In this district, presented by the French National Institute for Statistic as the poorest district in France (with 70% of the population living below the poverty line, with a Gypsy identity), poor and mostly illiterate residents mobilize, contest, and negotiate with authority. As a local activist recently pointed out: “The withdrawal of excavators in Saint Jacques is not only the result of today’s opposition and media coverage. It relies both on the lessons learnt from past mobilizations and on today’s state of citizens’ vigilance.”17

6.4  Conclusion Social contests, mobilizations, and political innovations are not the prerogative of big and globalized cities where neoliberal politics and their urban agendas (gentrification, internationalization, competitive urban environment) set the scene for alternative social movements. In Europe, far from global metropolises (such as Paris, London, Madrid, or Barcelona), medium-sized cities (mostly peripheral to the UE economic core) are also facing the emergence of urban social movements. Here, as the Perpignan example suggests, social movements can be depicted as low noise, discrete, led by those who for a long time have been considered as urban outcasts, mostly invisible on local and national political scenes. Relegated to deprived and peripheral neighborhoods, through innovative spatial and social practices – revealing the importance of spatial anchorage and of resident’s skills embedded in daily

 Adam Nossiter, “Catalan Gypsies, Unique and Embattled, Resist as Homes Are Reduced to Rubble”, in New York Times, August 18, 2018 (https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/18/world/ europe/catalan-gypsies-perpignan-france.html). 17  Interview, August 2018. 16

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routines  – local residents have organized and re-invented forms of urban citizenship. Perpignan is not an isolated example. Many studies have reported similar movements in medium-sized cities, such as Montpellier (France) where marginalized residents of a deprived district successfully opposed a demolition agenda, redefined goals and limits of social mixing practices that led to a politicization of the movement (Berry-Chikhaoui and Medina 2014). Based on a regime of proximity, such social movements gained the authorities’ attention facilitating a reformulation of urban plans and modifying urban planners’ practices through the (partial) co-­ production of urban policies. Beyond contests and local involvement in their neighborhood, as the Perpignan example shows, residents and local activists of deprived neighborhoods are getting organized at national level, making visible and audible la banlieue’s people and their challenges. These mobilizations facilitate the reconnection of residents with politics and the claim for a differentiated form of citizenship in la banlieue. It is also the base for a reorientation of urban development policies and for social innovations in terms of management, organization, and involvement. Even if the results of such movements are still uncertain, they reveal specific and innovative forms of citizenship. An urban citizenship that is not rooted in national belonging and the polling lists, but mostly defined according to daily use and territorial belonging that many scholars identify as the basis for a new “urban citizenship” (Holston 2008). An urban citizenship differs from legal citizenship and is grounded in a preferential relationship with urban spaces by those who are excluded (non-voting persons, people with an immigration background, minority groups, etc.). It takes the shape of an “insurgent citizenship” (Holston 2008), based on what French philosopher Marcel Gauchet called a pluralist, minority, and identity counter project (Gauchet 1998). These forms of social innovations question the political nature of such movements and their capacities to transform spaces of urban marginality and political neglect into spaces of alternative citizenship. Indeed, these movements seem to face two obstacles. Firstly, as Wilson et  al. (2015, 12) pointed out, neoliberal governances are reactive and show “a place specific reflexiveness in response to situated, unpredicted conditions and circumstances” (Wilson et al. 2015, 12). The hybridization of practices implemented by PNRU officials as an answer to residents’ claims is a good example of this adaptation capacity, one that opens the way to a soft new urban management in which integration of citizens’ norms and values can be seen as an alibi for disinvestments. Secondly, the difficult survival of urban movements, permanently subject to a regime of uncertainty and to demobilization. The regime of uncertainty set the rules for the local political game: long-term planning, time variation for mobilization. Many factors thus modulate residents’ involvement and limit its achievement. Nonetheless, in merging in a more political type of protest

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and organization, as under the umbrella Perpignan, la ville est à nous!,18 these groups gain in visibility and audience both on the local, national, and international scenes.

References Bacqué M, Denjean J (2006) Les émeutes urbaines, signe d’échec de la politique de la ville? Mouvements 44(2):115–120. https://doi.org/10.3917/mouv.044.0115 Berry-Chikhaoui I, Medina L (2014) La mixité sociale dans la rénovation urbaine: une aspiration des habitants? La copropriété du Petit Bard à Montpellier. In: Deboulet A, Lelévrier C (dir) Rénovation urbaine en Europe: quelles pratiques? Quels effets? Presses universitaires de Rennes, Rennes, pp 269–279 Body-Gendrot S (2010) Police marginality, racial logics and discriminations in the Banlieue of France. Ethn Racial Stud 33(4):656–674. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870903348646 Bonnet M (2006) L’expertise d’usage des habitants, une impossible reconnaissance? Economie et Humanisme 365:61–63 Carrel M, Neveu C, Ion J (eds) (2009) Les intermittences de la démocratie. Formes d’action et visibilités citoyennes dans la ville. L’Harmattan, Paris Castaneda E (2012) The indignados of Spain: a precedent to occupy Wall street. Soc Mov Stud 11(3–4):309–319. https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2012.708830 Castells M (2012) Networks of outrage and hope. Social movements in the internet age. Polity, Cambridge Chaline C (2010) Les politiques de la ville. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris Deboulet A (2010) La rénovation urbaine entre enjeux citadins et engagements citoyens, Rapport de recherche pour le PUCA. PUCA, Paris Deboulet A, Lelévrier C (2014) Introduction: la renovation urbaine sous le regard des chercheurs. In: Deboulet A, Lelévrier C (dir) Rénovations urbaines en Europe. Presses Universitaires de Rennes, Rennes Desjardins X (2008) Le logement social au temps du néolibéralisme. Métropoles 4. http://journals. openedition.org/metropoles/3022 Donzelot J (2009) Vers une citoyenneté urbaine? Éditions Rue d’Ulm, Paris Epstein R (2013) La Rénovation urbaine. Presses de Sciences Po, Paris Fahmi S (2009) Bloggers’ street movement and the right to the city. (Re)claiming Cairo’s real and virtual “spaces of freedom”. Environ Urban 21(1):89–107. https://doi. org/10.1177/0956247809103006 Gauchet M (1998) La religion dans la démocratie: parcours de la laïcité. Gallimard, Paris Giband D (2006) Les événements de Perpignan: la fin d’un système géopolitique. Hérodote 120:177–190. https://doi.org/10.3917/her.120.0177 Giband D (2018) Housing the Banlieue in global times. French public housing policies and spaces between neo-liberalization and hybridization. In: Jonas A, Miller B, Ward K, Wilson D (eds) Spaces of urban politics. Routledge, New York, pp 217–228 Holston J (2008) Insurgent citizenship: disjunctions of democracy and modernity in Brazil. Princeton University Press, Princeton Lagrange H (2007) Emeutes, rénovation urbaine et aliénations politiques, Notes & Documents. OSC, Paris

  See the Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/Perpignan-la-ville-est-%C3%A0-Nous763586100476642/

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Lorcerie F (2009) L’école, son territoire et l’ethnicité. Revue Projet 312(5):64–71. https://doi. org/10.3917/pro.312.0064 Mayer M (2012) The right to the city in urban social movements. In: Brenner N, Marcuse P, Mayer M (eds) Cities for people, not for profit. Routeledge, London, pp 65–88 Mucchielli L, Olive JL, Giband D (eds) (2010) État d’émeutes, États d’exception, retour sur la question centrale des périphéries. Presses Universitaires de Perpignan, Perpignan Nichols WJ (2009) Place, networks, space: theorizing the geographies of social movements. Trans Inst Br Geogr 34(1):78–93. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2009.00331.x Thevenot L (1999) Faire entendre sa voix. Régime d’engagement dans les mouvements sociaux. Mouvements 3:73–82 Vieillard-Baron H (2013) Banlieues et périphéries – Des singularités françaises aux réalités mondiales. Hachette, Paris Wacquant L (2008) Urban outcasts: a comparative sociology of advanced marginality. Polity, New York Wilson D (2004) Toward a contingent urban neoliberalism. Urban Geogr 25(8):771–783. https:// doi.org/10.2747/0272-3638.25.8.771 Wilson D, Miraftab F, Salo K (2015) Introduction. In: Wilson D, Miraftab F, Salo K (eds) Cities and inequalities in a global and neoliberal world. Routledge, London, pp 1–13 David Giband  Geographer. Department of Geography and Urban Spatial Planning, Université Via Domitia, Perpignan. Author: État d’émeutes, État d’exception: Retour à la question centrale des périphéries (Perpignan, Presses Universitaries, 2010, with J-L. Olive and L. Mucchielli); Les villes de la diversité. Territoires du vivre ensemble (Paris, Anthropos, 2011).

Chapter 7

Social Innovation Against Socio-spatial Segregation: The Case of Catalonia Ismael Blanco

In recent years, we have witnessed the development of a political and academic discourse that, from different perspectives, points out the importance of innovative social action as a response to the challenges of the crisis and the so-called epochal change. Thus, we are told that addressing challenges such as climate change, the aging of the population, the precariousness of employment, or the growing financial difficulties of the Welfare State requires the development of innovative solutions in which citizens are expected to play a fundamental role. Conversely, trust in public institutions to correct the social and environmental imbalances generated by the market economy has dramatically diminished in recent years. As a result, more and more voices are stressing the importance of social innovation for the future and present well-being of our societies (Mulgan 2007). It is within the framework of this type of reflection that we must frame the current importance of concepts such as social innovation, the “participatory society,” the “Big Society,” and the “urban commons.” Although conceptually very diverse, all these notions underscore the need for greater social involvement in the development of alternatives to traditional modes of action in both the public and the private spheres. This chapter summarizes the analytical and methodological approaches and the main results of a line of research in which we have explored the role of social innovation as a strategy for combating one of the fundamental problems of contemporary European societies, that is, socio-spatial segregation. Focusing on the case of Catalonia and the Barcelona Metropolitan Area in particular, our research highlights how the economic crisis that began in 2008 has led to a significant increase in socio-­ spatial segregation in this region. By so doing, our study underscores the spatial dimension of the increase in social inequalities caused by the economic crisis and its strong impact on disadvantaged urban areas. In this context, the main goal of our research is to investigate the role of social innovation as a factor for social transformation in vulnerable neighborhoods, and more generally, as a strategy for socio-­ spatial cohesion (Pradel and García, 2018; Blanco and Nel·lo 2017).

I. Blanco (*) IGOP – Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Bellaterra, Spain e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Fregolent, O. Nel·lo (eds.), Social Movements and Public Policies in Southern European Cities, Urban and Landscape Perspectives 21, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52754-9_7

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This line of research has represented an opportunity to deepen the discussion on the meaning of social innovation, the type of methodologies that allow us to approach it, and the role it can play in the context of the crisis. On this basis, the chapter problematizes the role of social innovation as a strategy for urban social cohesion and its particular role in the context of vulnerable urban areas. The evidence gathered, as we will see, points to apparently contradictory results: on the one hand, the study highlights the difficulties in developing social innovation processes in disadvantaged urban areas marked by the absence of social capital; at the same time, however, when comparing the recent trajectories of this type of urban area, we highlight how those communities with a greater degree of community organization have greater capacity to resist the social effects of the crisis. The processes of horizontal cooperation and community self-organization that lie behind social innovation, therefore, seem to be an important ingredient for the amelioration of the living conditions among the poorer urban communities and, in more general terms, for the building of fairer and more cohesive urban societies. The role of public institutions, however, continues to be of great importance, among other reasons, because of their potential role as facilitators of community organizing processes in those areas with a greater scarcity of the social capital that social innovation needs in order to flourish. The first part of the chapter explains our conceptual approach to the phenomenon of social innovation. In the second part, we investigate the importance of social innovation as a strategy to reduce socio-spatial segregation. In the third part, we explain and justify the methodologies that we have used to understand the relationship between the dynamics of socio-spatial segregation and social innovation. In the fourth part, we present some of the main results of the line of research we have undertaken. Finally, we highlight what we consider to be the main theoretical and methodological implications of the work carried out.

7.1  Social Innovation: What Are We (Not) Talking About? While its use has clearly increased in recent years, the notion of social innovation remains subject to some ambiguities and conceptual discrepancies. As Martínez and Subirats (2014) point out, the different conceptions of social innovation that we find in academic and institutional literature imply different accents in the role of the different actors and in the type of objectives to be achieved. Certain currents of literature, for example, tend to represent social innovation as a space of hybridization between public, private, and social actors, in such a way that the practices analyzed under this conceptual lens usually coincide with what other authors call collaborative governance (Ansell and Gash 2008; Sullivan and Skelcher 2002). Other definitions emphasize the role of social innovation as an alternative to the State and the Market, underscoring the need for a social action autonomous from both the public and private spheres agents.

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Besides, the transformative or disruptive value attributed to social innovation can also be very variable: while some authors explicitly speak of social innovation as a process that involves a significant transformation of power relations (Moulaert 2010), some of the examples commonly cited in the literature seem to contain a much more limited reduced transformative potential. In fact, as we shall see later, for some authors, social innovation may even be a concept used and promoted by neoliberalism to legitimize the decline of the public sector and ensure the primacy of the market. Within the framework of such a diversity of definitions, the one offered by the Bureau of European Policy Advisers, an organization linked to the European Commission, is particularly relevant. In its definition, social innovation is described as “new ideas, products, services or models that meet social needs (more effectively than alternatives) and in turn create new social relationships or collaborations” (BEPA 2010, 26). In other words, social innovation initiatives aim not only to “develop innovative solutions, but also new forms of organization and interaction to address social issues” (ibid. 2010, 26). Although this definition raises some important questions that we will tackle below, it allows us to identify some basic aspects of social innovation that are echoed in our own research. Thus, from our point of view, social innovation can be characterized by the following fundamental features: (a) Citizen leadership in social practices. Although this does not preclude institutional support or interaction with the market actors, social innovation initiatives must be initiated or led by citizens to be defined as such. (b) Focus on the satisfaction of social (collective) needs. In reality, these needs can be very diverse, including those of a basic nature such as housing, employment, food, or access to energy, as well as more sophisticated needs such as organic food, renewable energies, free Internet access or the enjoyment of public space. Social innovation, in any case, is “social” not only because of its participatory nature, but also because it is fundamentally oriented toward the satisfaction of social needs. (c) Cooperation as a strategy for the achievement of shared aims. Access to the goods or services produced by social innovation practices is achieved through peer-to-peer collaboration, and not as a concession from public authorities or as a product acquired in the market. (d) The promotion of alternatives to the dominant modes of provision of goods and services both in the market and in the public-institutional spheres. Thus, beyond the satisfaction of shared needs, this type of practice tends to constitute areas of demand and promotion of alternatives to the dominant models of consumption and production in society. The definition offered brings us closer to the field of notions and practices such as the cooperative and solidarity economy, community action, or the urban commons, which we consider as part of the same conceptual family of social innovation. However, it should be recognized that each of these concepts is part of different

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political and theoretical traditions. In this sense, several voices have been very critical with the use of the notion of social innovation, raising different kinds of objections that refer not only to its vague meaning, but also to its alleged ideological connotations. To proceed, we must refer to these criticisms and establish a dialogue with them before continuing to put forward our own conception of social innovation. The first of these objections refers to the very notion of innovation and makes reference to the fact that the type of initiatives that we normally refer to as socially innovative cannot, strictly speaking, be regarded as a novelty. Initiatives such as housing cooperatives, consumer cooperatives, or labor cooperatives are part of a long tradition promoted by progressive social movements over the last century and beyond (Martinelli 2010). For this reason, some people question their innovative character. In this sense, it can be argued that the notion of innovation should not be assimilated with that of novelty, but rather with that of alternativity. Social innovation is not innovative in the sense that it necessarily constitutes new forms of social action, but rather in that it promotes alternatives to the dominant modes of organization, production, and consumption in a given space-time context. The second criticism concerns the lack of recognition of conflict as an engine of social change. It has been argued that by placing the emphasis on cooperative relations among citizens as a way of satisfying collective needs, social innovation diverts our attention away from the key issues of conflict and social inequality (Miró 2015). While it is true that this is a very widespread perspective, it should be noted that some significant currents of literature emphasize the conception of social innovation as a strategy for the empowerment of vulnerable and excluded social groups and as a strategy for the transformation of power relations (see below), and therefore assimilate the notion of social innovation with that of social transformation. In more general terms, as mentioned above, social innovation not only promotes spaces for citizen cooperation to satisfy shared needs but also promotes social awareness of the collective nature of problems and their possible alternatives (Blanco and León 2017). Historically, many of the processes of social innovation, in fact, entail radical challenges to the status quo. Finally, and as we have already pointed out, social innovation has also been accused of being a concept at the service of neoliberal ideology, insofar as it would supposedly contributes to justifying cuts in the public sector and a retreat in the social responsibilities of the State. Thus, social innovation is often seen as a legitimizing or disguising notion of austerity policies promoted by neoliberalism. Once again, it must be admitted that, in its dominant version, the justification for social innovation is based on the assumption of austerity as an inevitable and indisputable practice, in such a way that the need for cooperative practices among citizens is associated with the “inevitability” of the public-institutional setback. However, in the face of this criticism, which is not without reason, it is necessary to oppose those alternative visions that highlight the value of social innovation as a strategy for reformulating the public sphere – a public sphere understood from this perspective as a hybrid space in which public-community collaboration or coproduction represents a radical alternative to the privatization and the commodification of public services.

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In any case, there is no doubt that social innovation is an umbrella concept that encompasses extremely heterogeneous ideas, notions, and practices and that, in this sense, constitutes an arena in which to confront conflicting political and social projects. Certainly, there is a neoliberal conception of social innovation that enshrines novelty, sanitizes conflict, and promotes the privatization of social welfare. But there is also an alternative conception, which places social innovation in the trajectory of struggle of progressive social movements, underlines the conflictual and alternative value of cooperative practices, and claims the development of a social economy. It is from this second normative perspective that we use and claim the value of social innovation.

7.2  S  ocial Innovation in the Face of Socio-spatial Inequality: Theoretical Considerations As mentioned above, literature has tended to highlight the special value of this type of collaborative citizen practice in a context where the inequities and exclusions generated by the market are accelerating and the mistrust toward the corrective capacities of public institutions is growing. In the line of these reflections, it is worth mentioning, for example, the contributions of authors such as Leadbeater (1997), for whom one of the main reasons for social innovation must be “to respond more effectively to a series of social problems which the Welfare State is not prepared to confront” (Leadbeater 1997, 12). According to this vision, social innovation should contribute to the very sustainability of the Welfare State: All societies with developed social protection systems are slowly destroying historical welfare rights, in an attempt to reduce their costs […] Innovation is the only hope we have of maintaining the quality of welfare and reducing its costs. An innovative and efficient welfare system must be able to do more to contribute to the economic health of society as a whole. (Leadbeater 1997, 13)

The basic idea, then, is that if the state can no longer respond to multiple social demands, it is society itself that has to self-organize, thus contributing in a decisive manner to responding to these demands. This argument seems to be particularly relevant for the most vulnerable social groups and urban areas, for whom the effects of the crisis are more intense and the limits of the Market and traditional forms of public intervention are more evident. Authors such as Oosterlynck et al. (2013, 2) have called this perspective the “grassroots approach to social innovation,” an approach that is focused on: those practices circumscribed in local contexts […] that help socially excluded people and impoverished social groups and individuals to satisfy basic social needs for which they cannot find adequate solutions either in the private market or in macro-welfare policies. (Oosterlynck et al. 2013, 2)

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The SINGOCOM project, coordinated by Frank Moulaert and funded by the European Commission under the 5th Framework Programme, has contributed decisively to the theorization of this approach (see Moulaert et  al. 2010). Thus, the characteristics of this grassroots approach to social innovation, with which our line of research establishes an explicit dialogue, are as follows: –– First, according to this definition, the main objective of social innovation is the satisfaction of alienated human needs, that is, needs that are not met as a result of dynamics of social exclusion. Social exclusion “may refer to deprivation of material needs (poverty, homelessness), but also of social needs (limited access to education and health), and policies (denial of citizenship, non-access to decision-­making)” (ibid., 54). “It is the spatial concentration of exclusion factors and the reaction to them,” says Moulaert (2010, 11), “that acts as a catalyst for the search for alternatives.” –– Secondly, according to this conception, social innovation implies the empowerment of previously excluded social groups, in such a way that it constitutes a process in which previously demobilized and silenced social groups gain awareness of the social nature of their needs and rights, and collectively articulate their demands on the basis of new organizational capacities. Social innovation practices, according to Moulaert and Nussbaumer (2005), constitute processes of social learning, awareness, collective action, and mobilization. –– Thirdly, social innovation implies substantial changes in power relations, something that can occur “between social groups, between levels of government, and between civil society, the State and the Market” (González et al. 2010, 55). More specifically, the hope is that social innovation processes will help to counteract preexisting power inequalities in favor of the weakest social groups and the most disadvantaged neighborhoods, thereby reinforcing social inclusion and the democratization of public governance. The context of the economic crisis and the subsequent austerity policies reinforce the relevance of this approach. The crisis has accelerated social inequalities all across Europe and it has had a strong impact on the living conditions of the most vulnerable urban communities. The capacity of the public sector to deal with the social problems of cities has dramatically diminished as a consequence of budgetary restrictions imposed by austerity policies. More and more, different kinds of political and academic discourses highlight the need for innovative solutions to the socio-spatial challenges triggered by the crisis, particularly among the most vulnerable social groups and urban areas. Against this backdrop, the active engagement of communities is seen as a fundamental strategy of social transformation and community resilience (Parés et  al. 2018). It is in dialogue with this approach that we put forward the main goals and research questions of our study.

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7.3  A  nalysis of the Socio-spatial Dimension of Social Innovation: Methodological Considerations The main goal of the line of research presented here has been to offer a panoramic view of social innovation practices in Catalonia and in the Barcelona Metropolitan Area and to understand its social and spatial bases and its contribution to the social transformation of disadvantaged communities in the context of the economic and social crisis. Thus, the key questions that have guided our study are: –– First, what kind of innovative social practices emerge in the context of the crisis – what aims do they pursue, what themes do they cover, and what organizational forms do they take? Is there evidence that the context of the crisis and austerity has triggered the development of innovative solutions to social problems on behalf of the citizens? –– Second, where do innovative social practices take place and who leads them? In particular, what weight do they have in the context of socially disadvantaged urban areas? Of particular concern in this research is to what extent the development of this kind of initiative is homogeneously widespread across the urban space or if it rather concentrates in particular areas – and in that regard case, what are the socio-spatial patterns of social innovation. –– What can we expect from social innovation initiatives as a strategy to combat socio-spatial inequalities? Do we have evidence to confirm that social innovation does primarily respond to the needs of the most vulnerable social groups, thereby compensating for the inequalities generated by the market and the public sector, or does it rather reinforce preexisting socio-spatial inequalities? If so in what way? A review of recent literature on social innovation shows that the predominant research methodology in this field has been qualitative case study – usually single case studies focusing on practices that are particularly significant in their social context and with rather positive results, with the aim of contributing to the exemplification of the benefits of social innovation. The value of this type of case study is indisputable, in that it allows us to understand the nature of the social transformations that social innovation can generate and the processes by which it can provoke such transformations. However, we consider this type of methodological approach to be insufficient for the analysis of the role of social innovation as a strategy for correcting socio-spatial inequalities. Our line of research does not renounce to case studies, but places them within a strategy of methodological triangulation based on the combined use of three main methodologies: the mapping of social innovation, the online survey, and the comparative case studies. In asking about the specific role of social innovation as a strategy for combating social and spatial segregation, the development of the research has also required us to collect and analyze data on the phenomenon of socio-spatial segregation itself. Segregation analysis has been carried out using statistical and cartographic techniques. All these research techniques (statistical and cartographical analysis of

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segregation, mapping of social innovation, online survey to social innovation practices, and case study comparison) are explained in more detail as follows (Blanco and Nel·lo 2018).

7.3.1  Statistical and Cartographical Analysis of Urban Segregation In our study, we have conceptualized urban segregation as the tendency of different social groups to live in different urban areas according to their income level or other related variables such as origins, ethnicity, and age (see Donat 2017). Urban segregation can be understood as the spatial manifestation of social inequalities. The literature, though, has also underscored the importance of spatial factors in the reproduction of social inequalities (Marcuse 2009; Soja 2010). We therefore see the phenomenon of urban segregation as both a reflection and a factor of reproduction of socio-spatial inequalities in cities, being the existence of disadvantaged neighborhoods one of its most concerning consequences. In order to study this phenomenon in Catalonia, we have undertaken a statistical analysis of the evolution of a set of indicators strongly related to the spatial distribution of income: the first two relate to the socioeconomic condition of the unemployment rate in the population, percentage of foreign population – and the other two relate to urban conditions – rateable value and average size of dwellings.1 The analysis of each of these four variables is conducted for more than 5000 census tracts2 of Catalonia and for the period 2001–2012.3 On the basis of such data, we have undertaken three types of analysis: –– First, the elaboration of a spatial segregation index (ISS) that expresses the relationship between the normal distribution of each variable and the one actually observed (Maurin 2004).4 1  Regrettably, information on the average income is not available in Catalonia at the census tract level. However, we have conducted a regression analysis for the 180 municipalities with more than 5000 inhabitants in Catalonia through which we check the correlation between the income level of each municipality and our four variables. The analysis confirms the strong significance of the correlation (Adjusted R2 > 0′97). 2  A census tract (secció censal) is a statistical unit established with the purpose of collecting official data on population, economic activity, and other variables. Each municipality can be divided into a number of census tracts, but this cannot extend over municipal boundaries. 3  The main sources of information for our variables are the Housing and Population Census of 2001 and 2001, as well as the data offered by the regional government of Catalonia (Generalitat de Catalunya) on the characteristics of housing and unemployment per census tracks. 4  Statistically speaking, the ISS = σ_rσ_ℕ Where:

σr = the standard deviation of the distribution of the observed variable σℕ = the standard deviation of the normal distribution of the observed variable

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–– Second, the observation of the percentage of census tracts located at the bottom and the top deciles of the distribution of each variable, compared to its average value.5 The comparison between these values for each variable in different years allows us to observe the evolution of the spatial polarization of such variables over time. –– Finally, we have undertaken a cartographical analysis that enables us to represent in the map of Catalonia the spatial accumulation of extreme values (bottom and top deciles for each variable). Through such analysis, we can observe the location of areas with extremely positive and negative values in each of four variables and their evolution over time, detecting spatial (dis)continuities, the relative spatial magnitude of such areas, and their correspondence to the municipal map.

7.3.2  Mapping Social Innovation Our line of research is also based on the construction of a Map of Social Innovation in Catalonia in which we identify and geo-reference more than 700 practices that we consider representative of social innovation in our times. The Social Innovation Map groups the identified experiences into four main categories and eight subcategories: –– Citizen solidarity: processes of citizen collaboration such as time banks and local anti-eviction assemblies –– Space, environment, and energy: social innovation practices related to the urban environment that promote more sustainable forms of access, use, and management of resources such as urban gardens, renewable energy cooperatives, and community-managed telecommunications networks –– Economy and alternative consumption: projects that encourage the horizontal exchange of products or promote alternative consumption spaces, including projects financed by ethical banking, the social and solidarity economy, and agro-­ ecological product consumption cooperatives –– Self-managed spaces that promote the civic and autonomous management of buildings, facilities, and urban spaces in disuse The Map of Social Innovation in Catalonia has recently been complemented with the Map of Social Innovation in the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona, prepared with the same type of information sources. The main novelty of this second map, however, is the type of practices collected, much more varied than in the first case. On this occasion, we have established a new dividing line between three main thematic SSI is =1 when the observed distribution corresponds completely to the normal distribution; it is 1 when the observed distribution is less homogeneous than the normal. For more details on the methodology used in this part of the study see Donat (2017) and Nel·lo and Blanco (2018). 5  Thresholds for each variable have been determined by the rank x ± 1.28σ.

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axes in which social innovation can develop, within which we identify six specific categories, some of which coincide with the Map of Social Innovation in Catalonia: –– The thematic axis of the Right to the City includes those practices that are oriented toward spatial issues such as housing, the reappropriation of urban spaces by citizens, and the production and supply of energy and telecommunications. –– The Economies of the Common Good axis groups together practices that focus on themes such as work, finance, consumption, and food. –– Finally, the axis Coexistence, care, and diversity includes practices oriented to social issues such as education, culture, upbringing, and health. Furthermore, this second map has drawn a distinction between two main types of social innovation according to the general objectives to which they respond, a distinction that seems to us to be of great analytical relevance within the framework of the general discussion on the social function of social innovation. Thus, on the one hand, we have identified those initiatives that are directly aimed at promoting an alternative model in basic aspects of the socioeconomic system such as food consumption, access to housing, the use and management of public spaces, energy consumption, work, care, and education. On the other hand, we have differentiated those other initiatives whose main objective is to combat the social impacts of the crisis and austerity, defending basic social rights such as housing, food, work, and public health. The data from the different maps of social innovation produced have been cross-­ referenced with data on urban segregation and urban vulnerability constructed within the framework of the same line of research. A highly interesting exercise in this regard, as we will show in the results section, has been the overlapping of the social innovation maps and the maps of urban segregation and vulnerability, which has permitted us to analyze cartographically to what extent the different types of social innovation initiatives are developed in the urban areas with the greatest social needs.

7.3.3  The Online Survey of Social Innovation Initiatives Another tool used to investigate social innovation has been an online survey that has allowed us to better understand aspects such as the origins, objectives, organizational forms, and types of relationships that social innovation initiatives establish between them and with their social and institutional environment. Specifically, we have designed a survey with the open-source online survey software LimeSurvey, which has been distributed via email to the social innovation initiatives identified in the Map of Social Innovation in Catalonia. Of the 710 geolocated initiatives up to April 2015, we managed to collect e-mail addresses of 529 experiences, 482 satisfactory e-mails were sent and 37.2% of the e-mails sent were opened. In the end, we received 107 responses. Using the online survey tool has exposed our sample to the risks of self-selection bias. However, it should be noted

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that the final composition of those who responded to the survey was very similar to the universe of experiences gathered in the Map of Social Innovation in Catalonia, both from a thematic and a territorial point of view.

7.3.4  The Comparative Case Study Finally, as we have advanced, our line of research has also used the case study methodology. At the beginning of the study we carried out a comparative analysis of six case studies corresponding to different peripheral urban areas of different cities in Catalonia: Ciutat Meridiana (Barcelona); Bellvitge (L’Hospitalet), Palau i Rocafonda (Mataró); Pardinyes (Lleida); and the municipality of Salt (Girona). These urban areas were selected on the basis of a combination of similarity and dissimilarity criteria. In terms of similarities, all of them share the fact that they are disadvantaged urban areas located in the metropolitan peripheries and with similar historical trajectories, as they were built mainly in the context of urban growth in the 1950s and 1960s. In terms of differences, these are areas with different community dynamics, some with intense levels of participation and public-community collaboration and others with much more fragmented social fabric and in which relations between the public and community sectors have usually been more conflictive. The comparative analysis of these cases has been carried out through the triangulation of different data collection techniques: documentary sources, in-depth interviews, and direct observation of citizen mobilizations. In doing so, we have analyzed the particularities of the effects of the crisis in each area, the responses offered by the administration and local communities, and the importance of participation and public-community collaboration as a factor of resistance to the crisis.

7.4  M  ain Results: Crisis, Socio-spatial Segregation, and Social Innovation in Catalonia and the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona As we have just mentioned, our research has investigated the role of social innovation as a strategy to fight against the growing socio-spatial polarization caused by the economic crisis. The answer to this research question has forced us to conduct what are in fact two parallel studies, one on the evolutionary dynamics of socio-­ spatial segregation and the other on socio-spatial patterns of social innovation in Catalonia  – with a particular focus on the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona. Following, we present the main results of each of these two parts of the study, highlighting the points of connection between them and the value of the integrated analysis of their results.

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7.4.1  E  volutionary Patterns of Socio-spatial Segregation in Catalonia The first observation that stems from the statistical analysis of segregation in Catalonia is that at the beginning of the period under study (2001), levels of spatial segregation were already significant (Table 7.1). In part, this can be interpreted as a reflection of the structural character of urban segregation. Complementarily, the significance of spatial segregation in 2001, especially of the foreigner population, can also be interpreted as the result of the combination of two phenomena the origins of which date back to the second half of the 1990s: the evolution of the real estate market prices, which went through a rapid increase since 1996; and the demographic growth, largely due to strong immigration flows.6 As Nel·lo explains “the combination of these two factors […] gave rise, on the one hand, to the re-­emergence of substandard housing situations (especially as a result of overcrowding) and, on the other hand, to the concentration of social groups with lesser purchasing power in places where housing was relatively more affordable” (Nel·lo 2010, 690). The second observation is that, despite their importance, levels of urban segregation in Catalonia in 2001 were significantly lower than in neighbor countries like France (see also Table 7.1). This can be explained by the fact that since the end of the 1970s, the arrival of democracy in Catalonia (as in the rest of Spain) entailed the possibility to satisfy the claims for which the grassroots movements had fought for years in many neighborhoods and cities. Thus, significant improvements in the socio-spatial conditions of deprived urban areas took place, as a result of the urban renewal policies undertaken by local governments, the strengthening of social policies, and the general improvement of the living conditions in the country (Nel·lo 2010). Another relevant factor that paradoxically accounts for Catalonia’s (relatively) low levels of segregation is the scarcity of social housing compared with countries like France – where the concentration of such types of housing in the cities’ outskirts has accentuated the residential segregation of the poorer population (Maurin 2004).

Table 7.1  Indexes of spatial segregation in France 2002 and Catalonia, 2001–2012 (unemployed population and foreigner population) Unemployed population Foreigner population

France 2002 1,8 3,3

Catalonia 2001 1,1 1,8

Catalonia 2012 1,2 2,6

Source: Maurin (2004) (Data from France)

6  For an overview on the evolution of the real estate market in Spain and in the metropolitan region of Barcelona during this period see respectively Burriel (2008). For the evolution of migration flows in Catalonia in the same period see Domingo (2014).

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The third and most important observation of our study is that urban segregation in Catalonia has increased sharply since the beginning of this century. If urban variables (rateable value and average size of dwellings) have remained relatively stable, socio-demographic and socioeconomic indicators point to a significant growth of socio-spatial polarization (Table 7.2). In the period 2001–2012, census tracts with extreme percentages (very high and very low) of foreign population have increased their relative weight by 18 percentage points, whereas those with a very high/very low percentage of unemployed population have increased by 14 percentage points. More than half of the census tracks (60%) had very high or very low levels of foreign population in 2012, while in 2001 they only accounted for 42%. The percentage of areas with very high/low levels of unemployment also increased significantly, although the polarization of this variable is not so sharp. Therefore, our data suggest that the intensification of socio-spatial polarization in Catalonia mainly reflects the uneven spatial distribution of both the unemployment population and foreign population (mostly coming from developing countries and arriving in the period 1996–2007). On the basis of the same data, the fourth observation of our study is that the increase of urban segregation in this period has not only occurred as a consequence of the growing segregation of the poor but also as a result of the spatial separation of the wealthy. The percentage of census tracts with the lowest levels of foreign population (which generally correspond to the wealthiest areas) is 16 points higher than those areas with the highest levels of migrant population, and the percentage of census tracts with extremely low values of foreign population increased much faster than the ones with very high values. The same pattern can be observed in the rest of the variables, although differences are lower. The significance of the segregation of upper-income population can also be observed through the maps of urban segregation. Figure 7.1 shows the results for the metropolitan region of Barcelona, an area of 3230 km2, home to five million people, which represents around two thirds of the Catalan population: the green areas represent the census tracts that concentrate extremely “positive” values in 1, 2, 3, or 4 of our variables (i.e., low levels of immigration; low levels of unemployment; large dwelling surface; and high rateable values), whereas the red spots correspond to the most disadvantaged communities (with high levels of immigration; high unemployment; small-size dwellings; and low rateable values). Green areas are not only more numerous but also more extensive than the red ones, basically as a result of their lower population density. A last observation stemming from the maps is that spatial segregation does not only occur at an intra-municipal but also at an inter-municipal level. Many of the upper-income areas of the metropolitan region of Barcelona, for example, correspond to middle-size and small-size municipalities close to the main urban centers, with high-quality public and private services and very good accessibility both by public transport and private car. As explained by Nel·lo, this phenomenon entails serious redistribution problems, as:

Foreign population Lower Upper 2001 1.228 942 2012 1.970 1.054 Difference # 742 112 Difference % 60% 12% Weight/#Tot. 24% 18% 2001 Weight/#Tot. 39% 21% 2012 Source: Own elaboration Upper 438 631 193 44% 8% 12%

Unemployment Lower 169 753 584 346% 4%

14%

20%

Rateable value Lower 1.183 1.102 −81 −7% 22% 15%

Higher 894 839 −55 −6% 16% 20%

Average size of dwellings Lower 1.009 1.093 84 8% 19%

Table 7.2  Census tracts with extreme values relating foreign population, unemployment, rateable value, and size of dwellings. Catalonia, 2001 and 2012

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Fig. 7.1  Evolution of higher-income and lower-income segregation in the Metropolitan Region of Barcelona. (Source: Own elaboration)

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Fig. 7.1 (continued)

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municipalities with the biggest urban deficits and the greatest needs in terms of social services tend to have a more limited fiscal base, while areas where these needs are lower have more resources as a result of their capacity to levy fiscal charges. (Nel·lo 2010, 688)

The available statistical data do not allow us to isolate the effects of the crisis on urban segregation dynamics, since they encompass a broader period (2001–2012). However, the qualitative studies we have carried out in different disadvantaged neighborhoods provide us with some complementary information of great value. More concretely, the comparison between our case studies shows the dramatic effects of the concentration of the migrant population in some of the most vulnerable urban areas of the metropolitan areas of Catalonia. During the years of the housing bubble, the relatively better-off households of the poorer neighborhoods saw the opportunity to sell their dwellings and to move out to wealthier areas. The voids left behind by the better-off families were occupied in many cases by lower-income families (mainly immigrants) that, despite their low salaries, took advantage of the great accessibility of bank credits to purchase a dwelling. This process of population replacement entailed that in areas like Ciutat Meridiana, for example, the percentage of foreign population grew from 5% to 40% in only 5 years (2001–2006). The crisis hit especially households belonging to the social strata that had concentrated in areas like Ciutat Meridiana (Palomera 2014; Blanco and León 2017). All in all, the residential transformations provoked by the housing bubble paved the way for a growing socio-spatial polarization in Catalonia. Such polarization has increased in recent years as a consequence of the uneven distribution of the social costs of the crisis.

7.4.2  Evolutionary Patterns of Social Innovation The integrated analysis of the results of the social innovation mapping, the online survey, and the comparative case studies allows us to identify the following patterns of social innovation in Catalonia and in the Barcelona Metropolitan Area in the context of the crisis, patterns that, in turn, allow us to discuss their empirical value as a strategy for combating social and spatial inequalities. First, with regard to the evolutionary dynamics of social innovation, our research shows a rapid proliferation of cooperative  initiatives experiences during the years of crisis in Catalonia (Fig. 7.2). Most of the cases experiences identified in our different maps have their origins in the context of the economic crisis that began in 2008 and, in particular, from 2011 on. The latter leads us to consider that the proliferation of experiences of social innovation may be linked to the intensification of austerity policies and the deterioration of social conditions in the country, but also to the mobilizing impulse that the emergence of the 15 M movement and its decentralization process in the neighborhoods implieds. These two phenomena are in fact closely linked and seem to contextualize the dynamics of the expansion of social innovation.

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Fig. 7.2  Year of creation of social innovation experiences. (Source: Own elaboration)

Second, our studies indicate that the majority of social innovation initiatives experiare made up of small social groups that, through social cooperation, not only seek to satisfy shared needs but also to establish community ties among their members and promote alternatives of consumption, production, and relationship with the social environment (Fig. 7.2). In this sense, although they do not include prioritizing a direct impact on public decision-making, they do conceive themselves as promoters of alternatives for the development of more participatory, inclusive, and sustainable societies. The data from the Map of Social Innovation of the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona, as explained before, allow us to distinguish between those practices oriented toward the promotion of alternatives and those that aim for combating the social consequences of the crisis (poverty, social exclusion, work precariousness, unemployment, etc.). Our data indicate that most of the social innovation initiatives (86.2%) prioritize the promotion of alternatives, mostly through practices of cooperation at the community level, while only 13.8% conceive themselves as a strategy to protect social rights affected by austerity (Fig. 7.3). Regardless of their aims, in most of cases, the micro-community nature of these initiatives is partially offset by the articulation of inter-organizational networks and the role of bringing together supralocal organizational platforms such as the Xarxa de Economia Social i Solidària (XES, Social and Solidarity Economy Network), the Plataforma d’Afectats per la Hipoteca (PAH, Anti-evictions Platform), or the Som Energia cooperative (We Are Energy). Third, our line of research highlights that most of these experiences tend to take place in urban areas of medium social status, or at least in areas other than those of greater vulnerability and wealth. This varies according to the type of initiative: those oriented toward the protection of social rights  – like the local assemblies against housing evictions – tend to concentrate in the most vulnerable areas, whereas those that aim for the promotion of residential, food, and energy alternatives, for ences

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Fig. 7.3  Importance of your objectives. (Source: Own elaboration)

Fig. 7.4  Location of social innovation initiatives in the Metropolitan Region of Barcelona. (Source: Own elaboration)

instance, are much more frequent in areas of middle status. All in all, the number of initiatives is significantly greater in areas not affected by high levels of segregation, as can be observed both in Fig. 7.4 and Table 7.3. The concepts of need and capacity as explanatory factors of collective action help us to interpret this result. In urban areas with higher incomes, there may be a high capacity for collective action, related to the high socio-educational levels of

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Table 7.3  Absolute and relative number of practices of social innovation in upper-income and lower-income segregation areas. Catalonia 2014 Region Alt Pirineu and Aran Barcelona Metropolitan Comarques Centrals Comarques Gironines Ponent Camp de Tarragona Terres de l’Ebre Total

A 38 8 9 4 5 64

B 9 450 42 50 21 37 5 614

C 2 14 5 5 1 3 30

D 2 52 13 14 5 5 3 94

E 11 502 55 64 26 42 8 708

F 18,2% 10,4% 23,6% 21,9% 19,2% 11,9% 37,5% 13,3%

G 18,2% 2,8% 9,1% 7,8% 3,8% 0,0% 37,5% 4,2%

Source: Own elaboration A = Upper-income segregation areas B = Areas without extreme segregation values C = Lower-income segregation areas D = Total practices in extreme segregation areas E = Total practices social innovation % practices in high segregation areas F = % practices in high segregation areas G = % practices in lower income segregation areas

their inhabitants, but there is no intense need for social innovation. This is mainly due to the fact that its inhabitants can satisfy their needs (food, health, education, residential, etc.) by acquiring them in the conventional market, and probably to the fact that satisfaction with the performance of public institutions tends to be higher. In the most disadvantaged urban areas, on the other hand, social needs are more pressing, but nevertheless the capacities for collective action are lower. As recognized by Moulaert et al. (2010, 11) elements such as “the long history of ‘disintegration’, marked by the absence of enabling economic circuits, the fragmentation of social capital, the ruptures in traditional labour relations […], the loss of quality in collective action and in public provision systems,” among others, impose serious limits on social innovation in urban areas and among the most disadvantaged social groups. Fourth, our research also highlights the importance of social and community organization and public-community partnerships as a factor of resilience to the crisis. By comparing the recent trajectories of the cases analyzed, we can establish a clear dividing line between two types of urban areas. On the one hand, those areas with lower levels of self-esteem and community identification, with a weak and fragmented associative fabric, and in which relations between associations and public administrations are marked by conflict. On the other hand, those areas in which, despite the socioeconomic difficulties of their residents, there is a high degree of attachment of the population to the territory, an attachment that feeds back on a rich and dynamic associative fabric, and on close cooperative relations between local entities and public services. The capacity for community resilience in the context of the crisis has been clearly greater in neighborhoods with a higher degree of social organization (Parés et al. 2018).

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In short, we could conclude from our research that social innovation, constituted by cooperative and alternative practices, has clearly been on the increase in recent years, but that its socio-spatial distribution has been very unequal, so much so that it has shown serious difficulties in flourishing in the most disadvantaged urban socio-spatial areas. However, when comparing the trajectories of different types of disadvantaged urban areas, we have been able to see how, in fact, those with a greater degree of social organization and a greater tradition of public-community cooperation have shown themselves to be much more resilient. Community attachment, solidarity links, the capacity to articulate collective demands, and the development of collaborative dynamics with public services significantly increase the capacities of the most disadvantaged communities to deal with the social consequences of the crisis and precariousness.

7.5  Theoretical, Methodological, and Political Lessons The line of research that we have explained in this chapter allows us to highlight three main types of learning. On a theoretical level, the research has highlighted the need to go deeper into what we might call the social dimension of social innovation. Paradoxically, such a dimension has tended to be overlooked in studies of social innovation, assuming, erroneously, that it will occur spontaneously where social needs are most intense. Our study has highlighted something that has long been evident from studies of political participation, namely that capacities for collective action are very unevenly distributed among different social groups and are generally smaller among vulnerable and excluded groups. It is therefore necessary to deepen the reflection on the relationship between inequality and social innovation, recognizing that, in the absence of compensatory factors, social innovation can become a reproductive (and not a corrective) factor of social inequality. At the methodological level, we have highlighted the need to go beyond the classic qualitative studies of best practices. Our line of research has highlighted the interest of combining different methodological approaches, each one with its limits and potential, but definitely complementary to each other. The mapping of social innovation has proved to be a particularly useful tool for understanding the socio-­ spatial dimension of citizen cooperation practices, particularly when overlaid with statistical and cartographic analyses of urban segregation and vulnerability. However, the limits of this approach are significant: cartographic analysis does not allow us to deepen our knowledge of the practices identified, nor does it allow us to understand the nature of the social transformations that they can generate. The combination of cartographic analysis with survey methodology and comparative case studies has therefore proved particularly useful. Finally, the results of this research also provide some important policy lessons, lessons that concern not only institutional actors but also social movements. These lessons can be summarized in three key ideas:

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1. The recognition of the growing importance of cooperation, solidarity, and self-­ management as strategies for generating social welfare in the face of the exclusionary dynamics of the market and the limits of traditional forms of public intervention. 2. The emphasis on the particular value of community organization and the innovative practices unfolding from it in the context of the most socially disadvantaged communities. 3. The need for both public authorities and social movements to focus their efforts on promoting social innovation processes among those communities where it is more difficult for such processes to emerge autonomously, but where the need for innovative responses to the crisis and precariousness is greatest. We need more social innovation, but we cannot expect it to emerge always where it is most needed, and so we must help to build the capacity for collective action where situations of precariousness and vulnerability make it more difficult.

References Ansell C, Gash A (2008) Collaborative governance in theory and practice. J Public Adm Res Theory 18(4):543–571. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/num032 BEPA – Bureau of European Policy Advisors (2010) Empowering people, driving change. Social innovation in European Union. http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/publications_pdf/social_innovation.pdf Blanco I, León M (2017) Social innovation, reciprocity and contentious politics: facing the socio-­ urban crisis in Ciutat Meridiana, Barcelona. Urban Stud LIV (9):2172–2188. https://doi. org/10.1177/0042098016659044 Blanco I, Nel·lo O (2017) Can social innovation be the answer? The role of citizen action in face of increasing socio-spatial segregation. Territorio 83:7–16. https://doi.org/10.3280/ TR2017-083001 Blanco I, Nel·lo O (2018) Barrios y crisis. Crisis económica, segregación urbana e innovación social en Cataluña. Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia Burriel E (2008) La “década prodigiosa” del urbanismo español (1997-2006). Scripta Nova: Revista electrónica de geografía y ciencias sociales, 270 Domingo A (2014) Catalunya al mirall de la inmigració. Demografia i identitat nacional. L’Avenç, Barcelona Donat C (2017) Crisis, ciclo económico y segregación urbana en la región metropolitana de Barcelona. Archivio di Studi Urbani e Regionali 118:1–25. https://doi.org/10.3280/ ASUR2017-118S10 González S, Moulaert F, Martinelli F (2010) ALMOIN: how to analyse social innovation at the local level? In: Moulaert F, Martinelli F, Swyngedouw E, González S (eds) Can neighbourhoods save the city? Community development and social innovation. Routledge, London, pp 49–67 Maurin E (2004) Le Ghetto français, enquête sur le séparatisme social. La République des idées, Seuil Leadbeater C (1997) The rise of the social entrepreneur. NESTA, London Marcuse P (2009) Spatial justice. Derivative but causal of social justice. Spatial Justice, 1. http:// www.jssj.org/

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Martinelli F (2010) Historical roots of social change: philosophies and movements. In: Moulaert F, Martinelli F, Swyngedouw E, González S (eds) Can neighbourhoods save the city? Community development and social innovation. Routledge, London, pp 17–48 Martínez R, Subirats J (2014) Innovación social: ¿más sociedad o más mercado? In: Abad F (ed) Dentro de 15 años ¿escenarios improbables? LID Editorial, Madrid Miró (2015) ¿Por qué le llamamos innovación social a lo que vivimos como auto-gestión? In: Subirats J, García-Bernardos A (eds) Innovación social y políticas urbanas en España. Barcelona, Icària Moulaert F (2010) Social innovation and community development: concepts, theories and challenges. In: Moulaert F, Martinelli F, Swyngedouw E, González S (eds) Can neighbourhoods save the city? Community development and social innovation. Routledge, London, pp 4–16 Moulaert FY, Nussbaumer J (2005) Defining the social economy and its governance at the neighbourhood level: a methodological reflection. Urban Stud 42(11):2071–2088. https://doi. org/10.1080/420980500279752 Moulaert F, Martinelli F, Swyngedouw E, González S (2010) Can neighbourhoods save the city? Community development and social innovation. Routledge, London Mulgan G (2007) Social innovation: what it is, why it matters and how it can be accelerated? The Young Foundation, London Nel·lo, O (2010) The challenges of urban renewal. Ten lessons from the catalan experience. Análise Social 197:685–715. http://www.scielo.mec.pt/scielo. php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0003-25732010000400005&lng=pt&tlng=en Oosterlynck S, Kazepov Y, Novy A, Cools P, Barberis E, Wukovitsch F, Saruis T (2013) The butterfly and the elephant: local social innovation, the welfare state and new poverty dynamics. http://improve-research.eu Palomera J (2014) How did finance capital infiltrate the world of the urban poor? Homeownership and social fragmentation in a Spanish neighbourhood. Int J Urban Reg Res 38(1):218–235. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.12055 Parés M, Blanco I, Fernández C (2018) Facing the great recession in deprived neighbourhoods: how civic capacity contributes to urban resilience. City Community 17(1):65–86. https://doi. org/10.1111/cico.12287 Pradel M, García M (Eds) (2018) El momento de la ciudadanía. Innovación social y gobernanza urbana. La Catarata, Barcelona Soja EW (2010) Seeking spatial justice. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis Sullivan H, Skelcher C (2002) Working across boundaries: collaboration in public services. Palgrave, London Ismael Blanco  Political scientist. Department of Political Science, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Director, Institute of Government and Public Policies (IGOP). Author: El municipalisme del bé comú (Barcelona, Icaria, 2016, with R. Gomà); Barrios y Crisis. Crisis económica, segregación urbana e innovación social en Cataluña (Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch, 2018 with O. Nel·lo)

Chapter 8

Can Social Innovation Transform Local Governments? The Experience of Naples Elena Ostanel

8.1  Introduction Although it first appeared as a concept in the late 1990s, under the impulse of a pervasive political and academic discourse, social innovation has slowly morphed into a catchphrase, a somewhat fancy solution that sounds like it can be an easy fix to many different societal issues. With social innovation both policy makers and scholars have mostly referred to a powerful tool that local societies have at their disposal to create new solutions to unfulfilled socio-spatial needs when the State is retreating. In 2011 the President of the European Commission Barroso launched the “Social Innovation Europe” initiative, defining social innovation a “pivotal instrument to meet unmet social needs and improving social outcomes; social innovation is for the people and with the people. It is about solidarity and responsibility. It is good for society and it enhances society’s capacity to act.” From that moment, social innovation has strongly entered in the public debate inspiring many EU policies (such as the “Europe 2020 Strategy”) and consequently national and local practices. Scholars have concurred that social innovation is a tool that can promote social inclusion and counter or overcome conservative forces that strengthen or preserve situations of social exclusion (Moulaert et al. 2013). They also agreed that it is both an instrument and an outcome, a process that has the potential to transform social and power relations to create new opportunities for marginal populations (Gerometta et al. 2005; Oosterlynck et al. 2013). However, since its origin, social innovation has not been a neutral concept. Encouraging bottom-up, community-led initiatives, social innovation can easily be used as a convenient approach to justify the retreat of the welfare State. Jamie Peck E. Ostanel (*) Marie Curie fellowship, Università Iuav di Venezia, Venezia, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Fregolent, O. Nel·lo (eds.), Social Movements and Public Policies in Southern European Cities, Urban and Landscape Perspectives 21, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52754-9_8

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et al. (2013) warned the many risks of uncritical thinking about social innovation. For example, there is the risk of instrumentalizing social innovation to justify the reduction of the role of the State and the consequent privatization of different urban services in the name of a more effective community-based action. There is also the risk of creating “fast,” seemingly highly replicable and communicable intervention types, de facto launching a “policy of good practices” that could be transplanted everywhere regardless of the social and institutional contexts (Peck et al. 2013). Other scholars have gone further in criticizing social innovation as a force that can be used to commodify citizenship activation (Caffentzis 2010; Swyngedouw 2005). Others have still pointed out that social innovation does not necessarily take place in the most disadvantaged areas, but rather depends largely on the social capital of the population. In this way, social innovation practices do not necessarily contribute to reducing social inequalities, but could even contribute to increasing them (Blanco and Nel·lo 2017). By analyzing the case study of Naples, Italy, this Chapter1 aims at investigating the complex relationship between community-led initiatives implemented to respond to new or unmet social needs that used to be provided by the State or its local agencies and the local government, particularly in the process of regeneration of underused public buildings. The case of Naples seems to be particularly interesting due to the adoption of a specific “Declaration on Civic Uses” as a framework for the protection of urban commons. In the case of Naples, the “Civic Use” framework has been adopted particularly due to the activism of squatting movements in a regenerated space named Ex Asilo Filangieri. This Chapter argues that social innovation is a highly contextual social and political process that has the potential to act in changing the relationship among different stakeholders involved in the policy making. So conceived, social innovation can enhance the sociopolitical capabilities of local societies (Gerometta et al. 2005) to sustain process of change in the public action and to support the design of more respondent local societies (Gonzales and Healey 2005). In this practice, I argue, conflict and collaboration are more and more becoming mutually reinforcing elements of an ongoing political process, where conflict is not only an unavoidable but also a necessary aspect of participation and engagement (Martinelli 2010; Watson 2018; Ostanel and Attili 2018). Spaces of regeneration of underused public building are perfect sites to assess how real-life scenarios of social innovation act both in changing institutions and the functioning of community-based activism. The research here presented has been conducted by using a multi-method approach: besides a literature review on social innovation particularly applied to urban planning, in-depth interviews with key stakeholders both at community-based (activists in Ex Asilo Filangieri) and at institutional level (policy officers in the Municipality of Naples) have been conducted. Policy documents, Municipal 1  The article is the result of the research conducted within the Project NEIGHBOURCHANGE that has received funding from the European Commission under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Individual Fellowships, Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, project NEIGHBOURCHANGE grant agreement n. 707726.

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resolutions, as well as the material produced by the Ex Asilo have been analyzed to investigate the relation between the community-based initiatives and the local government in the regeneration of the underused public building. The next section is a review of the main literature on social innovation in urban planning theory and practice. Then, the case study of Naples is presented by analyzing in a timeline the dynamic relation between community-based activation in Ex Asilo Filangieri and the Municipality of Naples. At the end, concluding remarks are offered to critically discuss the capacity of social innovation of supporting formal and informal institutional change as well as changing forms of community-based activation themselves.

8.2  W  hat if Social Innovation Transforms Local Governments? In urban studies, social innovation has for many years been deeply embedded in the work of European scholars (Moulaert et al. 2013; Servillo and Van der Broek 2012; Bailey and Pill 2014). By social innovation scholars would mainly mean voluntary, non-statutory, citizens or community-led initiatives implemented to respond to community services or public goods that used to be provided by the State or its local agencies. Social innovation has widely been regarded both by the academic and policy urban development discourses as a positive tool that could enhance the sociopolitical capabilities of local societies (Gerometta et al. 2005) and to sustain innovative assets of multilevel governance for territorial development (Moulaert et al. 2013). The accepted understanding of social innovation paints a picture of success. However, it has been grossly oversimplified giving the impression that the outcomes of social innovative initiatives both at community and institutional level are unchallenged and unproblematic. The current body of research has most of the time taken for granted the idea that social innovation produces positive outcomes for a wide range of problems around exclusion, deprivation, lack of well-being or responding to neighborhood change and disadvantage even without any policy backing by local governments. This is potentially a very damaging misconception. In fact, the European Commission actually argued that socially innovative actions, even if successfully initiated and carried out by individuals and communities, failed to sustain themselves and continue being effective in the absence of clear strategic policy backing by local authorities (EC 2017). In this analysis, I consider social innovation as a laboratory for sociopolitical transformation able to impact simultaneously on processes of institutional learning and change as well as on the community-based activation’s functioning. Social innovation is considered here as a complex social and political process embedded where community-based activation and local institutions meet, collaborate, or conflict.

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Some scholars have warned of the risk of considering social innovation as a “vehicular idea” for practices of depoliticization when applied to social and urban settings (Swyngedouw 2010). To overcome this risk, some other scholars have considered social innovation as productive in experimenting with new ways of “doing politics” and contributing to the design of bottom-linked governance mechanism (Garcia 2010). Thanks to the agency of more empowered local communities, they argue social innovation can build “new institutions” (DeFillippis et al. 2006) to better respond to new or unmet social needs. This strand of the literature considers sociopolitical transformation at local level as essential to empower communities to call for more responsive local authorities (Novy and Leubolt 2005; Garcia 2016; Ostanel and Attili 2018; Swyngedouw 2009). In this sense, the relation between community-based activation and the local government produces a reciprocal process of learning both from the bottom and the top. The new wave of community-based activation to respond to new or unmet social and spatial needs can also support the idea that new modes of thought and practices are needed to shift what was once considered as natural, some of the outmoded assumptions embedded in the culture of Western planning (Sandercock 2004). We currently do not know if there is the possibility of social transformation, of a process of public learning that results in permanent shifts in values both in communities and institutions thanks to social innovation initiatives. But for sure there is the need for a new “planning imagination” (Sandercock 2004): a planning practice that is not regulatory, rule bound, procedure driven, obsessed with order and certainty. But at the same time one that does not use the capacity of communities to organize as an excuse to build an ideology of the unplanned that justifies the absence of the State in finding progressive solutions for a whole range of problems of exclusion, deprivation, and lack of well-being. In order to advance on the abovementioned discussion, it is important to analyze to what extent and under which conditions social innovation can impact the processes of sociopolitical transformations at local level. Some key research questions that should be answered are to what extent and under which condition social innovation can support processes of institutional change, thus creating more respondent local governments.

8.3  N  aples as a Laboratory for Social Innovation in Southern Europe Based on these premises, the case study of Naples is presented here. Naples has been considered a front runner at European level considering its capacity to develop dedicated and innovative policies for the reactivation of empty or underused public buildings. Main strengths and weakness of the policy process will be discussed, in order to critically understand the elements that are supporting or preventing durable, transparent, and sustainable change in how local institutions respond to new or

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unmet social and spatial needs. When comparing Naples with other experiences, it is to be remembered that Naples is the third largest city in Italy after Rome and Milan. Almost one million people live within the city limits and the metropolitan area has a population of between 3.1 and 4.4 million people according to the different definitions used. As a city that has maintained a not always easy relationship with the state administration, Naples has a long and complex history of formation and decline of citizen solidarity networks (Laino 2012). As Capone pointed out, what Naples is experimenting today around urban commons is the result of a long cultural and political process that began after the referendum battle to avoid the privatization of water supply in 2011 (Mattei and Quarta 2014). In Naples, he argues, we have witnessed a new wave of communities of inhabitants, committees, collectives, and networks reacting to environmental devastation, the alienation of the public properties, as well as re-signifying urban and periurban space through new forms of sociability (Preterossi and Capone 2018). At the same time, in 2011, Luigi de Magistris was elected mayor of Naples. Since the very beginning, the new mayor, who had worked for many years as a prosecutor of the republic pursuing corruption cases, decided to recognize the commons’ protection in the Statute of the Municipality, giving the sense that the requests made in the last years could be taken into account at the institutional level. Naples was the first Municipality in Italy re-publicizing the water supply after the result of the national referendum: the ABC (Acqua Bene Comune) public company was created in 2013 to manage the water supply at city level. In this specific political context, diverse community movements were activated at city level. Beside the community movement involved in advocating for environmental protection, some others involved the artistic, cultural, and theatrical workers to advocate for the need of defining a new management system of urban commons (see Sect. 8.4). The city of Naples witnessed a specific form of social movements able to go beyond traditional belonging toward a more open participation structure and methods of action. Moreover, the alliance between so diverse community movements seems to have the capacity to advocate for a different relationship with local institutions: a social action more driven to use its autonomy to change the institutions’ functioning and agenda instead of contesting their own existence (Capone 2017).

8.4  Ex Asilo Filangieri in Naples The Ex Asilo Filangieri in Naples seems to be an appropriate case study to assess the potential of social innovation in support process of sociopolitical transformation at local level. In the case of Naples, the squatting movement active in the regeneration of the Ex Asilo Filangieri contributed to change the local government’s functioning and, during the process, it has modified its own mission and organizational structure.

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In 2012, part of the community movement involving artistic, cultural, and theatrical workers, which had already occupied some important cultural locations (such as the Teatro Valle in Rome), began to recognize the Ex Asilo Filangieri as a potentially significant experimental space. At the time, the Ex Asilo was destined to become headquarters for the “Universal Forum of Cultures.” The idea that coagulated around occupation of the Ex Asilo Filangieri was to give life to a new space for accessible cultural production in the city, while defining a process for altering theories and practices regulating the management of urban commons in Italy up until that point. Be inspired by the squatting experience of Teatro Valle in Rome, the Ex Asilo community felt the need to create a regulatory model for the space that did not only consider the needs of artists, and that was not organized according to traditional association, foundation, or cooperative models. That is to say, their goal was not only to obtain municipally licensed rights to the Ex Asilo, but rather to experiment a new form of collaboration between social movement and local administration that could be replicated in the future with regard to other spaces in Naples and in different cities. Occupation began in 2012, when the Ex Asilo community began drafting its “Regulations for the Collective Use of the Ex Asilo Filangieri.” These regulations ratify the “collective use of space,” which the authors identify as a testing ground for new strategies in the (theoretical) interpretation and (practical) management of an urban regeneration project involving abandoned public property. The characteristics that define the type of civic use contemplated can be found within the Regulation text, which insert some innovation both in the Municipal-­ community-­based relationship and in the space management. As an example, the right to access favors external usage; guarantee of the right to participate is verified by a committee which includes municipal staff; any profit made must be reinvested in the care and upkeep of the structure, no special usage rights or credits are to be conceded to the owner; responsibility is shifted from “who” decides to “how” the decisions are made; activities proposed will not be selected on the basis of content (as is the case in artistic direction), rather according to the sustainability of projects based on criteria of self-organization and time exchange. The relationship between the social movement occupying the Ex Asilo and public administration can be analyzed by taking into consideration the various administrative steps leading to the approval of the “Civic Use” (commoning) policy in Naples. The main milestones of this process are the following: (a) In City Council Decision 797, 7 July 2011, the Council approved a proposal for modification of the Municipal Statutes to recognize the legal category of “commons” as part of the “goals and fundamental values of the Municipality.” In line with this decision, within the same year, a specific (political) department dedicated to safeguarding the Commons was created. (b) City Council Decision 400, 28 May 2012, sets the guidelines for the Ex Asilo’s usage destination, as a place for use in the cultural sector, as well as an experimental ground for the fruition and elaboration of participatory democracy in the

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cultural sector. Thus, for the first time, official recognition is made of the fact that an occupied space can be used to experiment forms of participatory democracy. (c) Between 2013 and 2014, the Neapolitan municipality issued a series of decisions regarding the identification of municipal property to be allocated as commons. City Council Decision 17, 18 January 2013, proposes Council approval of the principles to be used in the management of urban commons. City Council Decision 258, 24 April 2014, widens the definition of applicable commons to include property that is used in part. City Council Decision 259 decrees that in the case of private property in a state of abandonment compromising décor, as well as hygienic and environmental conditions, the Municipality can take control of the property. Nevertheless, up to this point, administrative rationale in Naples basically remained unchanged: in order to be able to make use of abandoned municipal property the municipality interacted with a subject who had defined a specific interest, through a convention defining reciprocal obligations (Buonanno 2018). (d) This logic was modified on 9 March 2015, when the City Council emended its original decision to admit the introduction of “declaration of civic and collective use within commons management.” Subsequently, City Council Decision 893 of 29 December 2015 identified the Ex Asilo Filangieri as a commons. The measure recognizes a self-governed method for the creation of a regulatory system, contained in the Declaration of Collective Use drawn up by the community, that gives life to the Ex Asilo. Approval of this decision indicates the administration’s commitment to finding a way to identify and make use of commons that makes explicit reference to [self-defined] commons regulations or other forms of civic self-organization. (e) Again in 2015, another City Council Decision worked to further clarify this framework: civic uses are described as an innovative model of governance for municipal spaces where forms of self-regulation are put into play, through a structured system of rules for access, as well as activity planning and organization. (f) City Council Decision 446 of 1 June 2016 replicated this model for seven other spaces in the city, recognizing these as emerging commons, perceived by the community as settings for civic development. In parallel to the work of local government, the movement occupying the Ex Asilo began defining its specific structural organization. The ecosystem of the Ex Asilo is centered upon open assemblies holding decisional power, as well as Thematic Planning Tables, made up of thematic working groups, in which practical and organizational issues are dealt with. As regards decisional processes, the assemblies can be described as an experimentation in consensus decision-making. It is important to specify that the concept of “consensus” here is not intended as a final unanimous vote, but rather as a direction toward which to tend, in full awareness, that all participants could never be in complete agreement on all proposals.

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Among the basic agreements regulating assemblies is the distinction between “residents,” that is, those who have participated in a certain number of assemblies and have applied for this status; “guests” who participate in a given discussion to put forward a proposal but who do not regularly frequent the space; and “users” of the Ex Asilo, who occasionally transit in the space and make use of its activities. The assemblies all meet each week, though they differ in their approaches and in the nature of the decisions to be made: (a) The operational assembly deals with hosting issues and the discussion of new proposals which cannot be assigned to any specific working group, either due to their complexity or the subject matter involved. (b) The directional assembly hosts discussion on the space’s general political lines. (c) The planning assembly deals with practical organization and logistics (also in terms of date setting) for the activities of the coming month. Over time, the working groups themselves have developed a more complex internal organization and some of them have internal subdivisions. In a few cases, a distance from general assembly dynamics has taken place, creating some problems of clarity and a distance from the general sense of the experimentation (Cucca 2018). The financial resources the Ex Asilo draws upon to continue its activities mainly come from two sources. The first is the Municipality of Naples, which takes care of ordinary and extraordinary maintenance costs, as well as cleaning costs. There are also forms of self-funding: events, workshops, and residencies finance themselves using the works of residents and donations made by those who come into contact with the space. Economic sustainability is monitored through the concept of “civic revenue generation,” that is “the economic value of the cultural production generated through processes of self-governance, both able to promote the gathering, structuring and growth of members of the artistic and cultural production chain; and contribute to the progress and social cohesion of the neighborhood and of the city” (City Council Decision 446 of 1 June 2016). The most relevant aspect of this Neapolitan case study would thus seem to lie in the role a regenerated and occupied space such as the Ex Asilo has played in defining a new model of governance for the urban commons, which recognizes the civic use value of such spaces. It is interesting to note that the “communing” of this building came about without any institutional framework, and its value was first self-­ defined from within, then transported without. Another exceptional feature in this example can be found in the role of local government as appraiser of the value generated by this space for the general public. This example illustrates a high level of consciousness on the part of the Municipality, whose inclusive approach in the face of an important social experiment is enacted through the approval of related City Council resolutions. At the same time some of the most relevant critique of this approach is about the partisan nature of the “Civic Uses” declaration that seems to be driven by a strong political alliance between social movements and the actual majority governing the city of

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Naples, de facto excluding other kind of community-based organizations from the same recognition. The example also illustrates what the occupying movement has grasped: their Regulations for Collective Use is not an internal charter regulating an association, but rather a tool that a very heterogeneous group of people created in order to declare that the use intended for the property is, indeed, a “commons.” Beyond its regulations, the Ex Asilo has also created a practical system through which to reach its goal: the organization of a weekly general assembly, in which 30 to 70 people participate; the creation of eight thematic working groups meeting regularly and involving five to 30 people each; activity programming that aims to interact with neighborhood residents, not only creative and artistic circles. A constant – if complicated – effort to render the Ex Asilo accessible to different audiences but firmly ratified in principles is laid out by the Declaration, such as anti-­ racism and anti-fascism. One perceives the effort to avoid pure artistic experimentation, in favor of certain neighborhood initiatives or projects directed toward the general public. Even if the community giving life to the Ex Asilo is in no way neutral, it is not exclusive, and constantly strives to open itself to the different. Nevertheless, the publicness of the urban regeneration process is in question, considering that participation to public life is mostly performed by specific segments of the society, particularly in spaces where the activation is supported by political persuasion.

8.5  Concluding Remarks In this chapter, we have considered social innovation as a laboratory for sociopolitical transformation able to impact simultaneously on processes of institutional learning and change as well as on the community-based activation’s functioning. Social innovation is a complex social and political process embedded where community-­ based activation and local institutions meet, collaborate, or conflict. Community-­ based initiatives can be productive in experimenting with new ways of “doing politics” and contributing to the design of bottom-linked governance mechanism (Garcia 2010) that are then able to impact in process of institutional learning and consequent change. Thanks to the agency of more empowered local communities, social innovation can first of all build “new institutions” (DeFillippis et al. 2006) to better respond to new or unmet social needs but at the same time call for more responsive local authorities contributing to institutional learning and change (Novy and Leubolt 2005; Garcia 2016; Ostanel and Attili 2018). In this sense, the relation between community-based activation and the local government produces a reciprocal process of learning both “from the bottom and the top.” In Naples the squatted space of Ex Asilo Filangieri has been the one facilitating the process of learning in the local government. The case of Ex Asilo supports the idea that it is possible to recognize the “Civic Use” in the process of regeneration of

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empty public properties. The peculiarity of the Civic Use stands in the willingness of the public authority to maintain the property and the management of the public buildings, renouncing to a devolution that is usually stated by a management agreement with community-based organizations. The activation of Ex Asilo Filangieri has pushed for the recognition of the public responsibility in the regeneration and management of public properties. The terminology “Civic Use” coined in Naples is conceived differently from the process that has brought different Italian cities to an approval of Regulations of Urban Commons in other Italian cities. The most radical difference lies in an idea of public usage without a government authority determining regulatory content, instead favoring self-regulation. In this framework, the term “direct administration” is used to define another, complementary power related to the use of regenerated municipal property: the power of a community to propose a body of legislation for itself, defined through a declaration of usage which does not only regulate access but details management rules for the space. We are thus describing an audience of lawmakers who “regulate through withdrawing,” choosing to abdicate a good part of their directional role to become facilitators for decisional processes which are deeply anchored in the community itself. This type of facilitation may well be a vector for expanding the horizons of the “forms” and “limits” with which a community exerts its self-determination, creating fertile grounds for possible future evolution. The case of Naples tells about a specific form of co-production (Voorberg et  al. 2015; Osborne 2006; Kleinhans 2017) between the local governments and community-based organizations in the rehabilitation of empty public properties. But beside points of innovation, some weaknesses can also be discussed. First of all, the durability of the policy process can be questioned. In Naples the alliance between the squatting movements and the local government seems to be strongly politically driven. Differently from what happened in other Italian cities like Bologna, where a specific set of policies and urban agencies (the Urban Center, today transformed in the Foundation for Urban Innovation) have been settled, in Naples the recognition of Civic Use is mostly supported by the Mayor and its political apparatus, without a long-lasting organizational change in the public administration’s functioning. This attitude could have a negative impact on the sustainability of the policy process. The activation of Ex Asilo Finalgieri supported the formation of a dedicated unit in the administration department to protect urban commons, but its long-lasting capacity has to be proven if the political context will be change in the future years. We should also remember that the alliance among diverse community movements active in Naples is today working to support the insertion of “civic uses” in the planning practice at city level. Regulatory planning, they argue, should recognize the use of “civic uses and urban commons.” In this sense, an innovation that today is recognized by Municipal declarations – dependent from the political willingness of the local government – could become integral part of the planning tools and mechanisms (Capone 2019). This concept has been recently (March 2019) used in the Municipal Urban Plan (PUC). The planning document states that urban planning should capitalize on the

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active participation in the urban commons management in order to build a vision of the public city even with a condition of austerity (Franzese 2019). From another point of view, also the publicness of the regeneration experience can be discussed. Given the efforts of Ex Asilo to be open to different publics, as highlighted in the previous section, the case of Naples warns about the risk of defining “entre nous” regeneration processes without a strong impact on enlarging social and spatial rights to different publics from the ones that were active in the regeneration process. Another important aspect is about the evaluation of the public value produced by the regenerated spaces. The Neapolitan Municipality has not yet defined a monitoring and evaluation system able to publicly assess the public character of the services delivered. The monitoring system is today delegated to communities active in the regeneration process, overlooking the capacity of community-led initiatives to be inclusive by nature. This chapter has meant to go beyond the tendency to keep institution and local communities (differently organized) separate in social innovation research. This approach has overlooked the role of both local communities and institutions in processes of social innovation (Cassiers and Kesteloot 2012). Ex Asilo Filangieri has demonstrated to possess an intermediate character (Massari 2018) in which diverse local actors engage, by organizing in communities of practice and creating potentially innovative collaboration ecosystems with a simultaneous impact both on institutions and community-based stakeholders. The analysis has therefore contributed to frame social innovation as a constant creation, transformation, and dynamism triggered by interactions (positive and/or conflictual) by a diverse set of actors that together transform urban space and service provision, in some cases expanding the capacity of urban policies to respond to most contemporary challenges and solicitations. In the need for a “new planning imagination”, spaces of social innovation can be considered as on the ground laboratories where to design more effective planning instruments able to deal with a stronger social and spatial complexity.

References Bailey N, Pill M (2014) The potential for neighbourhood regeneration in a period of austerity: changing forms of neighbourhood governance in two cities. J Urban Regen Renewal 7(2):150–163(14) Blanco I, Nel·lo O (2017) Can social innovation be the answer? The role of citizen action in face of increasing socio-spatial segregation. Territorio 83:7–16. https://doi.org/10.3280/ TR2017-083001 Buonanno R (2018) Beni Comuni Urbani emergenti a Napoli Thesis, Master U-Rise, Università Iuav di Venezia Caffentzis G (2010) The future of “the commons”: neoliberalism’s “Plan B” or the original disaccumulation of capital? New Formations 69:23–41. https://doi.org/10.3898/NEWF.69.01.2010 Capone N (2017) The concrete Utopia of the commons. The right of Civic and collective use of public (and private) goods. Philosophy Kitchen, 4

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Capone N (2019) Usi (collettivi) in Lessico della crisi e del possibile. Cento lemmi per praticare il presente. In: Dubosc FO (ed) Lessico della crisi e del possibile. Cento lemmi per praticare il presente. Edizioni SEB27, Torino Cassiers T, Kesteloot C (2012) Socio-spatial inequalities and social cohesion in European cities. Urban Stud 49(9):1909–1924. https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098012444888 Cucca I (2018) Il caso dell’Asilo a Napoli: quale valutazione possibile?, Thesis, Master U-Rise, Università Iuav di Venezia DeFillippis J, Fischer R, Shragge E (2006) Neither romance nor regulation: re-evaluating community. Int J Urban Reg Res 30:673–689. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2427.2006.00680.x EC  – Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (2017) Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative Innovation Union, SEC(2010) 1161. https://ec.europa.eu/research/ innovation-union/pdf/ innovation-union-communication-brochure_en.pdf Franzese A (2019) Reading the city through the lens of urban standards. The case of Ponticelli, East Naples, Paper presented at AESOP Conference 2019 “Planning for transitions”, 9–13 July, Venice Garcia M (2010) The breakdown of Spanish urban growth model: social and territorial effects of the global crisis. Int J Urban Reg Res 34(4):967–980. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1468-2427.2010.01015.x Garcia M (2016) Citizenship practices and urban governance in European cities. Urban Stud 43(4):745–765. https://doi.org/10.1080/00420980600597491 Gerometta J, Haussermann H, Longo G (2005) Social innovation and civil society in urban governance: strategies for an inclusive city. Urban Stud 42(11):2007–2021. https://doi. org/10.1080/00420980500279851 Gonzales S, Healey P (2005) A sociological institutionalist approach to the study of innovation in governance capacity. Urban Stud 42(11):2055–2069. https://doi. org/10.1080/00420980500279778 Kleinhans R (2017) False promises of co-production in neighbourhood regeneration: the case of Dutch community enterprises. Public Manag Rev 19(10):1–19. https://doi.org/10.108 0/14719037.2017.1287941 Laino G (2012) Il fuoco nel cuore e il diavolo in corpo. La partecipazione come attivazione sociale. FrancoAngeli, Milano Martinelli F (2010) Historical roots of social change: philosophies and movements. In: Moulaert F, Martinelli F, Swyngedouw E, Gonzalez S (eds) Can neighbourhoods save the city? Community development and social innovation. Routledge, London Massari M (2018) Social innovation: from practices to new territorial development models. In: Schröder J, Carta M, Ferretti M, Lino B (eds) Dynamics of periphery. Atlas for emerging creative resilient habitats. Jovis, Berlin, pp 274–281 Mattei U, Quarta A (2014) L’acqua e il suo diritto. Ediesse, Roma Moulaert F, MacCallum D, Mehmood A, Hamdouch A (2013) The international handbook on social innovation, collective action, social learning and transdisciplinary research. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham Novy A, Leubolt B (2005) Participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre: social innovation and the dialectical relationship of state and civil society. Urban Stud 42(11):2023–2036. https://doi. org/10.1080/00420980500279828 Oosterlynck S, Kazepov Y, Novy A, Cools P, Barberis E, Wukovitsch F, Sarius T, Leubolt B (2013) The butterfly and the elephant: local social innovation, the welfare state and new poverty dynamics. Improve working papers, 13(03) Osborne SP (2006) The new public governance? J Public Manag Rev 8(3):377–387. https://doi. org/10.1080/14719030600853022 Ostanel E, Attili G (2018) Powers and terrains of ambiguity in the field of urban self-organization today. Ital J Urban Stud. https://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/TU/article/view/14444 Peck J, Nik T, Brenner N (2013) Neoliberal urbanism redux? Int J Urban Reg Res 37(3):1091–1099. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.12066

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Preterossi G, Capone N (2018) I beni comuni. L’inaspettata riscoperta degli usi collettivi. La scuola di Pitagora Editrice, Napoli Sandercock L (2004) Towards a planning imagination for the 21st century. J Am Plan Assoc 70(2):133–141. https://doi.org/10.1080/01944360408976368 Servillo LA, Van der Broek P (2012) The social construction of planning system. A strategic relational institutionalist approach. Plan Pract Res 27(1):41–61. https://doi.org/10.1080/0269745 9.2012.661179 Swyngedouw E (2005) Governance innovation and the citizen: the Janus face of governance-­ beyond-­the-state. Urban Stud 42(11):1991–2006. https://doi.org/10.1080/00420980500279869 Swyngedouw E (2009) The antinomies of the postpolitical city: in search of a democratic politics of environmental production. Int J Urban Reg Res 33(3):601–620. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1468-2427.2009.00859.x Swyngedouw E (2010) Post-democratic cities for whom and for what?, Paper presented in concluding session regional studies association annual conference Pecs, Budapest, 26 May 2010 Voorberg WH, Bekkers VJJM, Tummers LG (2015) A systematic review of co-creation and co-­ production: embarking on the social innovation journey. J Public Manag Rev 17(9):1333–1357. https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2014.930505 Watson S (2018) The challenges of collaboration and democratic participation in turbulent and unsettled times. Ital J Urban Stud 3. https://doi.org/10.13133/2532-6562_2.3.14302 Elena Ostanel  Urban Planner. Marie Sklodowska-Curie Fellow, Università Iuav of Venice, University of Toronto and TUDelft. Author: Ostanel E (2020) Communitybased responses to exclusionary processes of neighbourhood change in Parkdale, Toronto. In: Bunce S, Livingstone N, March, L, Moore S, Walks A (eds) Critical dialogues of urban governance, development and activism. UCL Press, London/Toronto; Spazi fuori dal Comune. Rigenerare, includere, innovare (Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2017)

Chapter 9

Fighting Against Monocultures: Wine-­ Growing and Tourism in the Veneto Region Matteo Basso and Laura Fregolent

9.1  Introduction Italy’s fifth Region for population and third in terms of total GDP, Veneto has witnessed the proliferation of several cases of territorial conflict in the last years, in particular as a result of publicly and privately founded mega-projects (Flyvbjerg et  al. 2003) that have brought about massive land-use, and landscape and environmental modifications. Some of these – for instance, the construction of new highways, industrial and energy plants, but also shopping malls and urban renewal projects – were mapped on the occasion of a research project led by the authors, which resulted in the elaboration of the so-called Atlante del malessere territoriale (literally “Atlas of territorial malaise”),1 eventually published in the book Conflitti e territorio (“Territory and Conflicts”, Fregolent 2014). Unlike the “classical” cases of conflict already investigated in Conflitti e territorio (Basso 2014; Fregolent 2014), we focus here on two examples, both subject to intense and widespread public debates at present, arguably to be considered as particularly representative of recent forms of spatial conflict affecting the territory of the Veneto Region. As such, this work represents a first update of the Atlante del malessere territoriale. Specifically, the aim of this chapter is to provide insight into two cases of spatial conflict currently taking place in the Veneto Region, North-Eastern Italy.2 It focuses  See: http://mapserver.iuav.it/website/AtlanteMalessereTerritoriale/AtlanteMalessere Territoriale. html. The Atlas has mapped and classified 72 cases of territorial conflict. 2  This contribution is the result of common reflections shared by its authors. However, Matteo Basso is mainly responsible for Sect. 9.2 and Laura Fregolent for Sect. 9.3; both authors are jointly responsible for Sects. 9.1 and 9.4. 1

M. Basso · L. Fregolent (*) Department of Architecture and Arts, Università Iuav di Venezia, Venezia, Italy e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Fregolent, O. Nel·lo (eds.), Social Movements and Public Policies in Southern European Cities, Urban and Landscape Perspectives 21, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52754-9_9

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on the recently emerged conflicts as a result of growing spatial specialization: the intensification of wine-growing for the production of Prosecco wine in the countryside north of Venice and of mass tourism in the historic city centre of Venice, the capital of the Veneto region. Over the last years, wine-growing and tourism have gradually become two of the most significant sectors of the regional economy (Veneto Region 2018), both with an upsurge in their level of “globalization”: the former due to the strong export-oriented attitude of the Venetian wine-growing (Prosecco first), currently the most productive in Italy; the latter for the increasing presence of international tourists in the Region’s art cities, seaside resorts, mountains and lakes. As increasingly profitable economic phenomena, wine-growing and tourism have eventually become two emerging “mono-cultures” in some parts of the region, largely contested, however, by groups of citizens that have highlighted the negative externalities produced by such exclusive and unregulated (or weakly regulated) economies. This chapter seeks to reconstruct the main characteristics of the conflicts which have emerged around the Prosecco’s monoculture in the area of the DOCG Conegliano Valdobbiadene (Sect. 9.2), and the tourist monoculture in the historic city centre of Venice (Sect. 9.3). Although the cases are very different regarding causes, issues and the contexts of analysis, the two sections follow a similar structure, providing firstly background economic and statistic data on the phenomena, and then highlighting the genesis of the conflicts as cases of spatial conflict, the different range of actors involved and the issues at stake, as well as their policy implications. Due to the intrinsic diversity of the selected cases, this chapter has no claim to generalization. However, we believe that their combination is a useful expedient to understand the local consequences of specialization in apparently highly profitable economic activities, the conflicts arising from it and the need for public regulation that these conflicts concretely manifest.

9.2  W  ine-Growing and Production of Prosecco Wine in the Veneto Region 9.2.1  Some Economic Aspects According to the latest official regional statistics (Veneto Region 2018), Veneto ranks among Italy’s most productive regions for wine-growing, with 53 quality certifications (Denominations of Protected Origin and Protected Geographic Indications) and 8.5  million hectoliters of wine produced during the 2017 grape harvest.3 Veneto’s wine sales for 2016 (1.3 billion euros) alone represented more

 Vineyards in the region amounted to 84,704 hectares in 2017, with a 10% annual growth.

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than 40% of Italy’s total, with five of Italy’s ten most important provinces for wine sales located in the region (Verona, Treviso, Vicenza, Padova and Belluno). Wine, whose exports registered a further 6.4% increase between 2016 and 2017, is the flagship of Venetian agro-food products sold abroad. As its sales reached 2.13 billion euros in 2017, Veneto also became Italy’s first region with reference to exports.4 Most of the wine export sales recorded in 2017 were produced in the UK (almost 430  million euros, +3.6% between 2016 and 2017), the USA (almost 420  million euros, +12%) and Germany (335  million euros, +0.7%). Whereas Nordic countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway showed a slight decrease, export sales surged surprisingly with reference to China (+42.7%), France (+27.5%) and Russia (+20.5%) (Veneto Region 2018). As for the typologies of exported wine, sparkling wine (38% of total exports) confirmed its excellent performance, with a further +15.9% increase between 2016 and 2017. Strengthening a trend that has been ongoing for almost a decade, the sparkling wine’s export growth for 2017 is mainly triggered by the demands of UK consumers (almost 38% of the total exports, +11.6% between 2016 and 2017), China (+96%), Australia (+51.2%), Russia (+41%), Finland (+35.1%), Canada (+26.6%), France (+25.4%) and the USA (+24%). Both in terms of wine production, sales and exports, Prosecco sparkling wine has undoubtedly represented – especially in recent years – the driving force behind the success of the whole Venetian wine sector, and the most popular Italian sparkling wine worldwide (Veneto Region 2018). Prosecco is exclusively produced within three Denominations of Origin, each referring to different wine-growers’ associations (Consorzi di Tutela) and production regulations (Ministerial Decree 17 July 20095). Alongside the historical hillside production zones of Conegliano Valdobbiadene and Asolo in the Province of Treviso (originally established in the 1970s as DOC-Controlled Denominations of Origin, and eventually upgraded to superior DOCG-Controlled and Guaranteed Denominations of Origin), in 2009, a larger DOC zone, stretching across almost the entire Veneto and the neighbouring Friuli-Venezia Giulia region, was created. Approved by the Italian Minister for Agricultural, Food and Forestry Policies, this reform was aimed at expanding the land allocated to wine-growing, so as to meet an ever-increasing global market demand for Prosecco. As a whole, Prosecco export sales reached 665  million euros in 2017, that is 31.3% of total Venetian wines’ export sales, and 82.5% of the regional sparkling wines’ export sales. The foreign demand for Prosecco is mostly driven by the UK (43%), the USA (22%) and Germany (6%) (Veneto Region 2018).

 Indeed, over 35% of Italian wine exports refer to Venetian wines.  Ministerial Decree of 17 July 2009 Establishment of the Controlled Denomination of Origin of «Prosecco» wines, establishment of the Controlled and Guaranteed Denomination of Origin of «Conegliano Valdobbiadene  – Prosecco» wines and establishment of the Controlled and Guaranteed Denomination of Origin of «Colli Asolani – Prosecco» or «Asolo – Prosecco» wines for the respective sub-zones and approval of the related production regulations. 4 5

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The DOCG Conegliano Valdobbiadene is commonly referred to as the «birthplace» of modern Prosecco, as confirmed by the establishment – in Conegliano – of the first Italian Oenological School in 1876. Located 50 km North of Venice, the DOCG is a low density rural area with 15 Municipalities home to 146,134 inhabitants in 2017. The increasing economic importance of its wine sector was formally recognized in 2003, when a regional law (2003, n. 36) designated the area as an agro-food district specifically devoted to the production of sparkling wines. Economically speaking, according to the 2018 annual economic report by the District’s Research Centre (Research Centre of the Conegliano Valdobbiadene District 2018), the 2017 grape harvest produced 97,598 tons of grapes and 685,695 hectoliters of certified wine from 8088 hectares of vineyards, which resulted in 91.4 million bottles of Prosecco put on the market.7 In the 2016–2017 period, the increase in volume and value reached 1% and 2%, respectively; in the long run, however, this growth has been surprising: considering for instance the period 2003–2017, the production increased by almost 132%. In 2017, the DOCG economic structure consisted of 3422 wine-growers, 427 wine-making companies and 185 economic activities producing sparkling wine. Although less intensely than in recent years, this structure also confirmed its positive dynamics between 2016 and 2017. For instance, the number of wine-growers and economic activities producing sparkling wine recorded a 1% and 2.2% increase, respectively.8 More significantly, the total number of employees (6245) increased by a further +5.4% in 2016–2017, especially as regards qualified positions such as oenologists and administrative, commercial and export staff. Oenologists, in particular, grew by 40% between 2003 and 2017, reaching a total of 288 in 2017 (Research Centre of the Conegliano Valdobbiadene District 2018). With reference to the market structure, as its exports registered a staggering 279% growth in volume between 2003 and 2017, Prosecco sparkling wine is unequivocally becoming an increasingly global phenomenon.9 Currently distributed in over 140 countries worldwide, Prosecco has registered a total of 36.4  million bottles exported in 2017 (+1.6% in the period 2016–2017), which corresponded to 192.2 million euros (+6.2%) in terms of value. In this scenario, traditional European destinations (Germany, Switzerland and Austria) were quickly complemented, in the last years, by new markets such as the UK (+1173% bottles exported between 2003 and 2016), Australia and New Zealand (+1022%), Scandinavia (+446%), the USA (+283%) and Canada (+244%) (Research Centre of the Conegliano Valdobbiadene District 2018).

6  Veneto Region Law of 4 April 2003 n. 8, Regulation of the supply chain aggregations and the production districts and local industrial and productive development interventions. 7  Its value of production reached 502,575,888 euros. 8  The number of wine-growers increased by 21% between 2006 and 2016. 9  In 2017, Prosecco sparkling wine sales in Italy and abroad amounted to 58% and 42% respectively.

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9.2.2  Land-Use Changes and Social Conflicts Obviously, such an ever-increasing national and particularly international demand for Prosecco and the consequent profitability of this wine production have brought about an increase in the number of wine-growers and a massive expansion of wine-­ growing land in the entire Venetian area. However, alongside market dynamics, regional wine policies have also played a strategic role. Indeed, not only the decision to enlarge the production area (with the establishment of the DOC zone in 2009), but also the significant and persistent allocation of European non-repayable public grants to wine-growers have become powerful driving forces in the conversion and planting of vineyards.10 Within the DOCG Conegliano Valdobbiadene zone, the wine-growing land amounted to 8088 hectares in 2017, with a + 7.1% increase between 2016 and 2017 and a staggering +80% since 2006 (Research Centre of the Conegliano Valdobbiadene District 2018). A recent study published by Basso (2019) has quantitatively assessed the land-use changes generated by the expansion of viticulture in this zone. Accordingly, in a period of 5  years (2007–2012), the wine-growing land has increased by 10.28%, namely 702.23 ha of new vineyards. Of these, 52.31% were previously cropland, 42.62% grassland, 3.69% woodland and 1.38% urbanized areas. In recent years, these significant land-use changes have led to widespread and intense social conflicts that reflect a growing public concern and awareness about the impacts of such an intensive agro-industry. Starting from the nearly saturated historical area of Conegliano Valdobbiadene, heated social debates have become evident also in the DOCG Asolo, and, more in general, in the wider DOC zone. Environmental associations such as Legambiente (an Italian non-profit organization founded in 1980) and WWF, committees and mostly small informal groups of citizens have emerged, challenging the plantation of new vineyards.11 Significantly, despite their large number, the effort to establish supra-municipal networks to coordinate the various groups has become immediately evident. Official coordination groups such as Fare Rete (literally “networking”), established on the occasion of the application process of this territory as a UNESCO heritage site, but also the recent ColtiviAMO futuro (a pun that basically merges together the verbs to “cultivate” and “love” the future), and the Forum Stop Pesticidi have increasingly become important discussion arenas among different voices, as well as an opportunity to build a critical mass and join together the goals of each single group. Indeed, these types of conflicts have significantly contributed to producing knowledge and fostering a public debate on issues such as the implications on public health and the environment produced by the massive use of chemical products by

 The regional wine policy is made explicit in the Regional Rural Development Programme.  To name but a few: informal groups such as Mamme di Revine (Municipality of Revine Lago), Per i nostri bambini-Gruppo Vallata (Municipality of Follina), Liberi di respirare (Municipality of Refrontolo), Rive Sane (Municipality of Colle Umberto) and the committee Colli Puri: Collalbrigo respira (Municipality of Conegliano).

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wine-growers, but also the landscape, ecological and geomorphological modifications (with consequent hydrogeological instability) connected to the planting of new vineyards in unsuitable areas.12 In short, a rich programme of informative public meetings has been organized in the last years in these territories, with the participation of experts from different backgrounds such as members of the International Society of Doctors for the Environment, the Italian Pesticide Action Network, nutritionists, agronomists, oenologists, geologists, urban planners and the few local wine-growers already committed to the organic production of wine.

9.2.3  Policy Implications In the case of the Prosecco production territories, such social conflicts have played a particularly interesting and innovative role in tackling the issues at stake. Arguably, unlike other cases of territorial conflict that have occurred in the Venetian area over the last years (Basso 2014; Fregolent 2014), local groups here do not act according to a typical Nimby attitude. Indeed, aware of the historical, identity, socio-cultural and economic meaning that wine-growing has had for these areas, their work is not against the viticulture tout-court; on the contrary, striving to foster a dialogue and collaboration also with local authorities and the consortia of wine-growers, these groups aim to train wine-growers and other actors in the wine production chain towards more sustainable products and the cultivation methods of organic wine. While their main long-term goal is the complete transformation of the DOCG Conegliano Valdobbiadene into a Bio-District (namely a territory where wine-­ growing is carried out according to organic production principles), the collaboration between these groups and some municipalities has already generated significant policy implications. In particular, it has brought about the adoption and/or the revision of more restrictive rural police regulations, a municipal tool that sets distances between new vineyards and sensitive areas such as houses, public spaces and buildings, streets and footpaths, rivers, etc., as well as the terms and timing of the chemical treatments. Furthermore, ongoing discussions have focused on the necessity of revising the set of planning tools so as to govern the expansion of wine-­ growing areas, as well as to adopt inter-municipal regulations throughout the entire DOCG territory. As a response to these growing civil society concerns, institutional actors are also promoting reflections on the relationships between chemical treatments and impact on public health. The Prosecco DOCG Consortium (the official association of local wine-growers whose aim is the protection and promotion of Prosecco wine worldwide) has introduced a set of tools aimed at prohibiting or at least reducing the use of certain chemical products.

 This public debate was also fueled by the massive use of social networks, the involvement of local, national and international press but also national television broadcasts.

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To conclude, in the Prosecco production zones, a social demand for regulation of such an intensive land-use practice has recently emerged, thanks to the pressure exercised by local groups of citizens. In parallel, an institutional response has also become evident, although the effective treatment of such an economic phenomenon as a real planning issue (which means not exclusively through sectoral tools, but rather through ordinary territorial and urban planning documents) is only in its initial phases. Indeed, the regulation is still weakly effective precisely when it comes to optimizing the interaction between viticulture and other land-use practices, in particular residential. As seen above, it is these aspects that make ongoing social conflicts particularly significant, at least in the perspective of rethinking a local territorial policy as a whole.

9.3  T  ourism and the Right to Housing in the Historic City Centre of Venice 9.3.1  Context and the Tourism Phenomenon The second case of monoculture analysed in this chapter concerns the tourist pressure in the historic centre of Venice and the impact of this pressure on the quality of public space and the life of the inhabitants. This intense phenomenon, which has occurred in recent years due to the ever-increasing presence of tourists in the historic centre of Venice, is contributing to a substantial reduction in the housing stock that is giving more and more space to the tourist market. Such a situation is basically driving the costs of living up, with the consequent expulsion of residents, which, associated with the ageing of the population and the gradual abandonment of the historic centre by its residents (even if not only caused by tourism), is radically transforming the city. Venice, known worldwide for its history, architectural heritage and scenic geographical location in the lagoon, is visited annually by approximately 28,000,000 tourists. As such, it accounts for a “model”, that of the so-called great cultural destinations, which has been acknowledged and studied in depth in the scientific literature on tourism, particularly in the field of economics. On the supply side, this model is characterized by a high concentration of important permanent cultural attractions (museums, cultural institutions, monuments), a wide variety of temporary exhibitions and events, a well-defined urban structure, as well as a multiplicity of “accessory” services (restaurants, shops, accommodation facilities, travel agencies, tourist guides, etc.). Driven primarily by cultural motivations, the demand can be divided into three main segments (residents, school groups and tourists) with a duration of stay limited to about 2  days, a more or less widespread seasonality

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throughout the course of the year and the presence of a high percentage of “hikers”,13 that is to say “day trippers” who decide to stay overnight in nearby places (Meneghello and Furlan 2007). Some data can help us to understand the pressure of tourist activity on the city. In 2017, the accommodation capacity of Venice amounted to 406 hotels (+2.8% since 2013), corresponding to 30,715 beds (+6.1% since 2013) (Città di Venezia 2018). The complementary offer (6005 structures and 32,505 beds, that is to say 51% of the total) has increased considerably since 2013, +113.4% and + 74.2%, respectively. Of the 6005 accommodation facilities, 84.1% were classified as housing units, 7.5% as B&Bs and 7% as rooms to let.14 In particular, the historic city centre recorded the highest increase in the number of beds of the so-called complementary offer between 2016 and 2017 (+57.4%), while the mainland (Mestre) highlighted a more intense dynamic in terms of beds provided by hotels (+5.2%). With reference to the demand, the total arrivals in the Municipality of Venice in 2017 amounted to around 5,000,000 people (+18.41% since 2013), while the presences were around 11,600,000 (+19.6% since 2013); in the historic city centre, there were approximately 3,200,000 arrivals and 7,900,000 presences. As these already considerable numbers are likely to increase further in the next few years, tourism is consolidating itself as one of the main industries of the city’s economic base. In a recent study the estimated capacity of Venice is around 52,000 people a day, for a total of 19,000,000 visitors a year. The “sustainable” capacity was divided into 15,500 visitors per day (5,700,000/year) from hotel facilities (30%), 22,000 per day (8,000,000/year) from other accommodation (42%) and 14,600 hikers per day (5,300,000/year, 28%). The result was compared to a research conducted in 1988 when the sustainable capacity was estimated at 20,800 visitors a day and the percentage of hotels was 53% (11,000 visitors), non-hotel was 10% (2000 people) and hikers 38% (7800 people) (Costa and Van der Borg 1988). By the end of the 1980s the percentage of visitors to residents was the highest in a study conducted on seven European cities, so high as to transform the historical centre into a touristic “monoculture” where “congestion suffocates economic activities and affects the quality of life of inhabitants” (Van der Borg et al. 1996). In 2007 there were 21,600,000 visitors (59,000 per day) of whom 7% were hikers (COSES 2009). Currently, however, there are 77,000 visitors per day, 5800 from the hotel business, 1050 from other receptive platforms and 57,500 hikers (Bertocchi et al. 2020).

 At the beginning of the 1980s a new kind of tourist began to appear, the hiker, that is, the visitor who does not exceed the threshold of 24 h of stay in the chosen tourist resort. 14  This calculation does not take into account the beds on the tourist market provided by platforms such as Airbnb. 13

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9.3.2  Impact and Conflicts With the flows of tourists becoming more and more global, public debates have recognized not only the economic benefits of such a booming industry, but also the socio-spatial consequences affecting locals. The increasingly conflictual situation between tourists and (the rapidly dwindling and ageing) residents15 has become especially evident, as recently highlighted by the multiplicity of manifestations and public meetings regularly organized by informal groups of citizens and associations. The main issues debated refer broadly to the risk of “museification” of Venice. Specifically, protests emphasize the sailing of giant cruise ships along the Giudecca Canal and the related environmental, landscape and structural impact on quaysides and buildings, the progressive overcrowding of the narrow bridges and public transportation system of the city, the replacement of the housing stock with hotels, B&Bs and rooms for holiday rent (connected to the consolidation of the sharing economy, such as Airbnb), as well as the substitution of local shops and public services with restaurants, bars and souvenir shops. The externalities connected to the intensification of the tourist phenomenon in contemporary cities are varied: overcrowding and the implications on urban mobility and the local public transport system; the bother caused to residents in their daily habits; the intensive and exclusive use of public spaces; the pressure on historical, artistic, cultural and architectural heritage, landscape and environment; the modification of the commercial offer and public services; the expulsion of groups of residents due to the increase in property rents/values and the reduction in the number of apartments/houses on the market for residents (Novy and Colomb 2017). Undoubtedly, Venice summarizes at a very high level all these impacts in a very small and vulnerable space. If we look at the phenomenon from another perspective, we can observe that the increase of tourism demand and the international prestige of Venice have led to a considerable increase in a series of costs. First and foremost, all the costs are related to the purchase of primary and secondary goods and services, in particular the rent and purchase of buildings for both residential and productive use, but also the public management costs of the city such as transport, waste disposal,16 etc. Moreover, they have also involved a radical change in the commerce. Traditional commerce is disappearing; it has become far less diversified and of proximity, and is increasingly polarized on the food and clothing sectors. In addition the practices of use of the historic city have progressively seen an increasing number of residential housing being turned into hotels, bed and breakfasts and apartments aimed at satisfying a

 Just 55,000 residents live in Venice’s historic centre.  The Veritas CEO (multi-utility that manages water and environmental services) in an interview in a local newspaper (Nuova Venezia, March 27, 2018) highlights the huge difference between the number of residents and the quantity of product waste: “we are a city of 280,000 inhabitants, but we produce waste for 400,000. With an average per capita that in the historic city is practically double that of the Veneto Region”.

15 16

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constantly growing tourist demand. In this general framework, Venice becomes a research observatory through which to reconstruct and study the relationships between mass tourism flows and urban issues, also in relation to the accentuation of the depopulation and demographic ageing processes that affect the historic centre (Settis 2014). With the constant growth of tourist flows, the conflicts that highlight the problems connected to the massive intensification of the tourism industry in Venice have become increasingly evident. Committees, associations and, even more, the informal groups of citizens involved in various forms of territorial mobilization have in fact multiplied, thus contributing to the emergence of a civic network strongly committed to obtaining knowledge denouncing and opposing the processes of touristification in progress (Minoia 2017; Vianello 2017). They are not necessarily movements born “against” tourism, but they want to affirm that those who still live in the city do not want to leave, they want the best quality and usability of public spaces, and they want availability of housing at affordable prices. From this point of view, the theme of housing assumes a central position in the protest because it also underlines an identity character, an affection for the places of everyday life. The topic of housing at affordable prices and its availability in the historic centre not usually in competition with the tourism demand becomes a strategic but above all a political issue around which to discuss the quality of living, including the right to housing and the right to the city, which is being increasingly threatened by the growing expulsion dynamics, which have been reported by trade unions. Some of the protest initiatives carried out have the character of an “anti-­ gentrification” action, dealing with permanent access to urban space and housing for vulnerable and precarious social groups (Annunziata 2017). This is the case of ASC  – Social Assembly for the House, a grassroots movement fighting the depopulation of the city since 1998 through commoning processes (Stavrides 2016, 2019) and practices. The ASC is a political space of debate on the possibilities of living in Venice, transforming the meeting of activists and citizens into a claim for public goods17 (78 occupied houses, of which 63 in the historical centre of Venice) (Basso and Fava 2018). These collective practices are the expression of “alternative” forms of experiencing Venice that go beyond the tourist monoculture. In their planning (more than a simple protest action), they appear as concrete manifestations of different concepts of living at home and in the city itself. They “resist” the tendency of the progressive transformation of the housing heritage (public and private) for the exclusive and

 For people who do lose their homes, ASC activists fix up abandoned, dilapidated houses for occupation. In 6 years they have taken over 70 apartments, all of them in Cannaregio and Giudecca; they now host 150 people, including families, singles and young couples. The occupations are illegal, but ASC does not steal the house from anyone  – “we chose apartments that have been abandoned for years and are full of mould and rats” (The Guardian, September 13, 2018; https:// w w w . t h e g u a r d i a n . c o m / c i t i e s / 2 0 1 8 / s e p / 1 3 / occupy-venice-alternative-to-death-of-city-activists-tourism).

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temporary use of the tourism sector and express their “participation against” (Rosanvallon 2006); they want to be part of a collective decision about the future of the city.

9.3.3  Overcoming the “State of Emergency”: Which Policies? Despite these impacts and growing public concerns, the tourism pressure in Venice is not being tackled by specific urban policies, revealing weak coordination between tourism policy and ordinary tools of urban and regional planning. On the contrary, this management is basically left to ad hoc emergency and sectoral institutional measures aimed at temporarily restricting and/or redirecting the movement of flows of visitors, but in any case without a clear territorial strategy. This approach has recently become evident with the installation of people-counters and turnstiles in the most heavily traffic-congested points of pedestrian access to the city (Piazzale Roma and Venice Santa Lucia train station area), as well as the proposal of a ticketing system to access not only Piazza San Marco, but the entire historic city centre. The exceptionality of such a tourism management system and the absence of any real integration between tourism and urban policy are also evident when considering the “paradoxical” situation affecting Venice. As seen, the city’s Mayor is struggling to govern the flows of visitors entering and circulating within the small historic city centre. However, the Mayor is also simultaneously endorsing a number of mostly international private investments in “marginal” areas of the city  – such as the mainland (Venice Mestre train station area) and the small lagoon islands – where new hotels are currently under construction. While the accommodation of tourists in these areas is likely to reduce the pressure on the city centre’s housing market, in particular the conflict between short- and long-term rentals, this solution will in any case continue to intensify (instead of solving) the daily commuter tourism towards the centre with the related problems of overcrowding and deterioration of public spaces. Such a paradoxical situation becomes particularly significant as it clearly highlights the absence of adequate reflection also on the more effective territorial scale at which the tourism dynamics might be governed. Although it is impossible to encompass to such a fuzzy phenomenon within institutional borders, we argue here that a metropolitan dimension is likely to be the more effective in coping with the increasing touristification of Venice. Implementing urban policies specifically oriented to the housing question means to place the focus on the progressive transformation of the historical centre of Venice towards just one “enormous hotel”, it means taking on the depopulation problem and therefore its motivations now also linked to the pressure of tourism. Furthermore, the presence of an important public housing stock in the city gives the public administration, in particular the Municipality and the Veneto Region, owner of the buildings, in the role of key player, the power for putting into action the

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decisions taken. In addition it can reinforce a potential (and significant) space for dialogue with the local cultural and social resources of the city, rediscovering useful elements to guarantee a new strength and weight to public policy actions (Cognetti and Padovani 2016; Fava and Fregolent 2019), which for a long time in Italy – non only in the Venetian case – has disappeared (Storto 2018). As seen, the tourism pressure in Venice is currently being tackled by ad hoc and sectoral institutional measures with almost no coordination between tourism and urban policies. Such a situation is clearly the result of the resistance of those players whose corporative interests are connected to the tourism industry and entails constant delays in the decision-making processes at both the municipal, metropolitan and regional scale. An effective and coordinated urban policy aimed at balancing residents’ needs with those of tourists is strictly required by UNESCO. The sustainable management of the tourism flows in a world heritage site such as the historic city centre of Venice is to be based also on the introduction of a limit quote for tourism and all its related activities (i.e. the access of giant cruise ships to the lagoon).18 This seems to be the direction towards which Venice is moving. Indeed, according to the UNESCO’s decisions adopted during the 43rd session of the World Heritage Committee (Baku 2019), the World Heritage Committee acknowledges, for Venice and its lagoon, «[…] the ‘Project of Territorial Governance of Tourism in Venice’, which incorporates relevant policy tools, including the Sustainable Tourism Program and the ‘Policy for the Integration of a Sustainable Development Perspective in the World Heritage Convention’ […]» (p.  177). Such a document (“Progetto di governance territoriale del Turismo a Venezia”), issued by the City of Venice in 2017, should guide the future integration between tourism and urban policy decisions, arguably going beyond a purely rhetorical dimension and translating into concrete planning actions.

9.4  Conclusions In this chapter, two cases of territorial conflict have been analysed that are very different from each other from the point of view of the problems raised and the socioeconomic and territorial contexts of reference. They do, however, present some interesting similarities: from these it is therefore possible to outline conclusive reflections on the new forms of current territorial conflict. First of all, both are conflicts that arise from dedicating spaces to a single activity. This is due to over-specialization linked to the pressures of global markets. Thanks to the particular role played by committees, associations and informal groups of citizens, both conflicts have produced widespread knowledge and a greater awareness of the problems generated by the intensification of particularly

18

 See also OECD (2018).

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relevant economic phenomena, such as viticulture and tourism. The first case emphasized the landscape and environmental changes linked to the spread of intensive wine-­growing practices and negative repercussions in terms of health and quality of life due to the use of pesticides; the second case highlighted the loss of quality of urban space and the negative externalities generated by the intensive pressure exerted by tourism on cities of art. The cases studied in this chapter have brought to the foreground the enormous economic machinery that moves behind the wine sector (specifically Prosecco), and behind tourism. In both cases, economic monoculture generates huge resources from an economic point of view and therefore well-being albeit concentrated and polarized, but it also breaks up contexts and radically changes them. However, the change does not always exert a positive action and growth, it also manifests itself in the cancellation of what previously existed. In both cases we are confronted with forms of “extractivism”, a category useful to understand the urban, cultural, economic and social transformations that characterize contemporary cities and territories. As David Harvey writes: “The ambience and attractiveness of a city, for example, is a collective product of its citizens, but it is the tourist trade that commercially capitalizes upon that common to extract monopoly rents” (Harvey 2012, 74). In other words, revenue is extracted from the architectural, cultural, landscape and social heritage sedimented in centuries of history. This entails the appropriation of human projects, works, dedication and care and natural resources improved with centuries of collective work and cooperation. It is not our intention to overlook the importance of individual action or the effects of the entrepreneurial spirit of the individual that have certainly contributed to the construction of this “urban and territorial capital”, but even in the presence of such reasoning, the collective value of what is returned to society in terms of landscape, environment, culture and history need not be less. The effects of the “extraction” of natural resources (e.g. in the mining industry) are clear to us, but much less so if the resources are of a social and cultural nature, whose extraction causes, for example, the expulsion of inhabitants as in the case of Venice. The problem of housing, that is, the progressive reduction in the availability of housing in the historic centre and the increase in rents, is the manifestation of the extraction of value that the city suffers which is due to speculation induced by the demands of the tourist industry. Similarly the extraction of value in the Prosecco region is manifested by increasing air pollution, health risks and landscape transformation. Finally, a common feature of the two cases of conflict is the outcome: their actions and collective mobilization have forced local administrations to undertake courses of action aimed at adopting solutions or implementing ad hoc policies. What emerges from the cases analysed, and what we can put forward as a possible hypothesis, is that the onset of conflicts highlights the need for management and the regulation of uses and practices. The implementation of collaborative and inclusive practices can lead to alternative options and solutions with less impact on local communities. These appear to, and increasingly want to, consciously participate in

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changing the places and spaces of their collective living through the action of social movements. The cases analysed here confirm that collective actions are becoming crucial and regular components of the production, governance and change of cities. They may succeed or fail, but their role in shaping the city can hardly be underestimated.

References Annunziata S (2017) Anti-gentrification, an anti-displacement urban (political) agenda. Urbanistica Tre 13:5–9 Basso M (2014) Pianificazione, modelli d’uso del suolo, conflitti. In: Fregolent L (ed) Conflitti e territorio. FrancoAngeli, Milano, pp 129–141 Basso M (2019) Land-use changes triggered by the expansion of wine-growing areas: a study on the Municipalities in the Prosecco’s production zone (Italy). Land Use Policy 83:390–402. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2019.02.004 Basso M, Fava F (2018) Housing Venice. Dalle pratiche alle politiche dell’abitare nella città del turismo globale. In Aa.vv., Proceedings of the XXI National SIU Conference. Confini, Movimenti, Luoghi. Politiche e progetti per città e territori in transizione, Firenze, 6–8 June 2018 Bertocchi D, Camatti N, Giove S, van der Borg J (2020) Venice and overtourism: simulating sustainable development scenarios through a tourism carrying capacity model. Sustainability 12:512 Città di Venezia (2017) Progetto di governance territoriale del turismo a Venezia, assessorato al Turismo Città di Venezia (2018) Annuario del Turismo 2017, assessorato al Turismo Cognetti F, Padovani L (2016) Ri-attribuire valore e senso ai quartieri di edilizia residenziale pubblica e alla politica della casa. Percorsi attraverso il quartiere San Siro a Milano. Archivio di studi urbani e regionali 117:5–25. https://doi.org/10.3280/ASUR2016-117001 COSES (2009) Turismo sostenibile a Venezia. Studio per il coordinamento delle strategie turistiche del Comune di Venezia, March Costa P, Van der Borg J (1988) Un modello lineare per la programmazione del turismo. Sulla capacità massima di accoglienza del Centro Storico di Venezia. Coses Informazioni 32–33:21–26 Fava F, Fregolent L (2019) Report dal fronte casa. Storie, quantità e prospettive della residenza pubblica a Venezia. Archivio di studi urbani e regionali 125:94–119. https://doi.org/10.3280/ ASUR2019-125005 Flyvbjerg B, Bruzelius N, Rothengatter W (2003) Megaprojects and risk. In: An anatomy of ambition. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Fregolent L (2014) Conflitti e territorio. FrancoAngeli, Milano Harvey D (2012) Rebel cities. From the right to the City to the urban revolution. Verso, London Meneghello S, Furlan MC (2007) Il turismo culturale dalle città d’arte al territorio: nuovi fattori di attrattiva e forme di fruizione. Quarto Rapporto Annuale Federculture Minoia P (2017) Venice reshaped? Tourism gentrification and sense of place. In: Bellini N, Pasquinelli C (eds) Tourism in the City. Towards an integrative agenda on urban tourism. Springer, Heidelberg Novy J, Colomb C (2017) Urban tourism and its discontents. An introduction. In: Colomb C, Novy J (eds) Protest and resistance in the tourist city. Routledge, London OECD (2018) Culture and local development: maximising the impact. Venice and the Foundation of Municipal Museums of Venice, Italy Research Centre of the Conegliano Valdobbiadene District (2018) Rapporto annuale 2018 (annual report 2018) Rosanvallon P (2006) La contre-démocratie, la politique à l’âge de la défiance. Seuil, Paris Settis S (2014) Se Venezia muore. Einaudi, Torino

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Stavrides S (2016) Common space. The city as commons. Zed books, London Stavrides S (2019) Common spaces of urban emancipation. Machester University Press, Manchester Storto G (2018) La casa abbandonata. Il racconto delle politiche abitative dal piano decennale ai programmi per le periferie. Officina edizioni, Roma UNESCO (2019) Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage – world heritage committee, Forty-third Session, Baku, Republic of Azerbaijan Van der Borg J, Costa P, Gotti G (1996) Tourism in European heritage cities. Ann Tour Res 23(2):306–321. https://doi.org/10.1016/0160-7383(95)00065-8 Veneto Region (2018) Rapporto Statistico 2018 (Statistical report 2018). Fotolito Moggio, Roma. http://statistica.regione.veneto.it/pubblicazioni_elenco_rapporto_statistico.jsp Vianello M (2017) The No Grandi Navi campaign: protest against cruise tourism. In: Novy J, Colomb C (eds) Protest and resistance in the tourist city. Routledge, London Matteo Basso  Urban and Regional Planner. Department of Architecture and Arts, Università Iuav di Venezia. Author: Grandi eventi e politiche urbane. Governare «routine eccezionali». Un confronto internazionale (Milano, Guerini e Associati, 2017); Vittorio Veneto. Piani e progetti per la città 1878-1995 (Vittorio Veneto, Kellermann Editore, 2019, with A. Marson and M. Baccichet). Laura Fregolent  Architect and Urban Planner. Department of Architecture and Arts, Università Iuav di Venezia. Co-Director Archivio di Studi Urbani e Regionali. Author: Conflitti e territorio (Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2014); Città e politiche in tempi di crisi, (Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2014); Growing Compact (Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2016).

Chapter 10

The Reconfiguration of Urban Movements and Politics in Lisbon  João Seixas and António Brito Guterres

10.1  Introduction In southern European countries, the financial debacle that took hold from 2008 was deeply rooted in urban policies and the property markets. Thus, the origin of the crisis must be sought in the growing disjunction, in previous decades, between the constant production of urban space and the growing financial imbalance. Furthermore, the consequent political reaction of austerity, with its intense and painful effects, altered the social and economic fabric of urban areas as well as the traditional bases for welfare and progress themselves (Cochrane 2007; Seixas and Albet 2012; Nel·lo 2015). The end of the Fordist-Keynesian-Corbusian paradigm, as the urbanist François Ascher (1995) put it, brought a new era in which the relations and functionalities of urban life, work, mobility and consumption constitute incrementally complex hyper-realities with multi-scale influences. The new paces of this transformation have taken place together with the crisis in modernist urbanism and in traditional This text presents a development of the project “Political evolution in the Lisbon of the digital era”, whose first publication is in the following article by the same authors: Political evolution in the Lisbon of the digital era. Fast urban changes, slow institutional restructuring and growing civic pressures in Urban Research and Practice, Volume 12, 2019, pp.  99-110 (see in: https://www. tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17535069.2018.1505272). Some parts of this chapter are here reprinted from this previous article by permission of the publisher Taylor & Francis Ltd. J. Seixas (*) CICS.NOVA, Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas – Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal e-mail: [email protected] A. B. Guterres DINÂMIA-CET, ISCTE Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Fregolent, O. Nel·lo (eds.), Social Movements and Public Policies in Southern European Cities, Urban and Landscape Perspectives 21, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52754-9_10

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redistributive urban policies. Long established structures, from economic systems to cultural landscapes and to the State and administration itself, are becoming increasingly insecure when trying to cope with these transversal changes. Even if there are a billion signs of innovation at the most diverse levels, there prevails an uncomfortable sensation of relative redundancy in the face of weakened societies and economies and a very wide range of new and unidentified technological and financial forces. Amid the impacts of the economic crisis on families and firms, the development of new urban functional intermediations and the influence of digital flows – from global finance to fundamental urban markets such as housing and transport – are clearly changing the dynamics of urban societies and urban economies. In the whirl of events, politics and society seem disoriented and show evident difficulties to pay attention to fundamental aspects (Bauman 2000), immersed in swirling images and (dis)information, focusing mostly on immediate and ephemeral topics. Lisbon is a city – and a large metropolis – where in recent years the rapid pace of change has been manifest and where the paradoxes and unbalances arising from transformation and segregation have become particularly visible (Seixas et  al. 2016). This chapter will analyse these crucial contemporary dilemmas facing the main Portuguese urban system, in three consequential parts. The first section proposes a synthetic listing of main challenges faced by the city in present times – a panorama showing relevant degrees of mismatches between the paces of change. The second section of the chapter looks at the emergence of a wide range of urban social movements, mainly corresponding to a conjunction of new forms of urban life and the new inequalities emerging. The third part of the text gathers the main reflections arising from the two previous parts and proposes a critical analysis for the inevitable but uncertain reconfiguration of urban politics in Portugal.

10.2  Main Dilemmas Facing Contemporary Lisbon Lisbon’s urban condition derives from structural elements that, despite the changes now underway, will remain in place in the medium and long term: its status as the capital city of a state with a long-established historical positioning; its vast regional meta-urban system, which will continue to reach beyond the old logics of metropolitan connections (Félix Ribeiro et  al. 2015); its institutions of education and knowledge and its innovation ecosystems; its extremely strong centrality in the country and even in Europe at the level of cultural production and consumption; its nature as an open, multicultural city with a complex human geography made up of multiple local territories with multifaceted habitats and routines. Furthermore, Lisbon’s substantial insertion in global networks of circulation of technology, people and capital inevitably give diversity to the elements that make up the transformative trends that are now underway. For the purposes of this chapter, we now propose a systematisation of the fundamental dilemmas of Portugal’s largest city. These revolve around four major vectors.

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10.2.1  The Crisis and Changes on Economic Paradigms The last decade brought deep recessions to southern European countries, due to the combination of the major economic and financial crisis and the consequent political reactions on the part of the European Union and various member states. In Portugal, the bailout was formalised through Troika’s (IMF, ECB an EC) memorandum, one of whose chapters focused entirely on the liberalisation of the rental market. Meanwhile, the various phases of the economic and financial crisis gave rise, in a sequential fashion, to major impacts on the economies of urbanisation and on the social fabric that is most dependent on them, growing impacts on the middle and educated classes, and finally a demographic and technical/scientific depression, by way of emigration. The question of spatial justice and socioeconomic inequalities in urban spaces is a key question with cross-cutting effects that become both cause and effect of development or regression (Harvey 2000, 2012; Mayer 2009). In recent years there have been major improvements in employment and unemployment indicators, in major urban economic sectors such as urban rehabilitation, tourism and cultural and creative fields, and in the many economic activities linked to hospitality, retail and services. These may represent an advance towards a healthier economic landscape, but it should not be forgotten that they rest on the growing precariousness of the labour market. For their part, policies to foster a network of start-ups and support creative economic dynamics may represent a new pattern of employment, essentially of young people, with high rates of entrepreneurial dynamism (including a high turnover of company births and deaths) and a significant strengthening of the bases of knowledge, technology and innovation.

10.2.2  Real Estate Markets and Socio-spatial Inequalities The major pressures on Lisbon’s housing market have produced annual increases in average rental prices of more than 20% in the last 4 years.1 This is the result of a decade-long delay in the maturation of real estate markets, significant shortcomings in housing policy and the appearance of new financial activities triggered by Lisbon’s emergence as a global symbol. The latter have been deliberately fostered through an aggressive policy of tax benefits for foreign investment and urban marketing.

1  As recently confirmed, the index of valuation for residential incomes, updated by the INE National Institute of Statistics, registered an annual increase of about 18% per year. This evolution was corroborated by an independent real estate metrics institution as “Confidencial Imobiliário” which reported a variation for the centre of Lisbon of more than 100% compared to 2011 levels; and a global index of 140 for the whole city.

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At the same time the city has witnessed a digital revolution in economic intermediation, with far-reaching influences on the social and economic aspects of daily life. The combination of these factors has triggered enormous pressures on the real estate market (Barata Salgueiro et al. 2017; Lestegás et al. 2018). Among very visible recent examples are the transformations set in motion by new digital intermediation platforms such as Airbnb and Uber, which have proven to be very powerful tools in terms of shifting capital and investments as well as shaping the urban geography itself. These changes – which for the most part are welcome – are throwing up new paradoxes by creating both long-desired opportunities and new difficulties as far as access to housing and the daily life in the city are concerned. They create pressures that have resulted in a growing shortage of housing stock – above all in the rental market – and fostered and sustained, at times dizzying, increases in housing prices. This has evidenced the crisis in the public housing stock, already too low for needs.

10.2.3  Climate Changes and Environmental Challenges The Lisbon region has a relatively large ecological footprint. The city’s unbalanced transport infrastructure and commuting patterns are the inevitable result of decades of metropolitan dispersal that have created a major mismatch between the allocation of housing and jobs. The effects of this mismatch have been aggravated by the predominance of road transport; the permanent lack of commitment to and investment in public transport; and the significant changes in mobility as a result of the economic crisis, changing socioeconomic structures, practices and habits. Improving infrastructure, reducing pressures and changing urban behaviour will require not only policies aimed at reducing consumption but also an increased capacity to anticipate, which is currently difficult given the prevailing uncertainties. Current sustainability equations are above all composed of two main dimensions: on the one hand, consumption and, on the other, pressures to preserve resources and reorganise urban systems. Any truly efficient model of a “sustainable city” must be able to invert the trends that still predominate, gradually reducing the consumption of resources and energy and increasing the value of urban systems. This, in turn, requires an increase in diversity at the lowest level as well as density of territorial knowledge: ensuring the attraction of a significant critical mass of housing, jobs and services to each territory – including, obviously, the city centre – and so managing to improve economic capital itself. Lisbon is still far from having found a balance in these fields.

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10.2.4  Ageing Population, Community Life and Civic Cultures Demographic developments in Lisbon have been characterised by rapid population ageing and decline. These dynamics have been in part mitigated by significant migrant flows. These disruptive changes, combined with metropolitan dynamics, have entailed significant changes in densities and have fostered new forms of using the city. At the same time, improvements in knowledge and education, community life, employment interaction and of political awareness have converged to enhance Lisbon as a lively social and cultural capital (Seixas 2008). Efforts to respond to the economic and social crisis have fostered a surge in civic initiatives and the consolidation of urban movements and third-sector initiatives – in areas ranging from urban ecology to the social economy, from transport to housing. These movements are in turn adding to demands for greater transparency and better governance of the city. The challenges facing the Portuguese capital are of quite a different nature from those of the recent past. None of them can be interpreted in a strictly sectorial way or circumscribed by a single of analytic or administrative category. On the contrary, all of them, by their nature, cut across traditional categories, reflecting a contemporary city as a complex and interconnected system. These challenges question the traditional bases of urban management and planning, on the grounds that they do not at all guarantee an adequate or ecological redistribution of urban assets and a greater socio-spatial cohesion. As a historically quite centralised state, Portugal still has a political-­administrative culture that has difficulties in placing the development of cities and territories as central objects of mainstream politics (Seixas and Marques 2015). However, there is growing recognition of the vast territorial and urban impacts caused by the crisis and the new economic policies underway. Several legal provisions, with a vast political and administrative impact, are presently under debate both in the National Assembly and in the national government – relating sectors like housing, transportation and environment. At the same time, the central administration of the State is preparing for a new wave of decentralisation. This evolution reflects a deliberate attitude of transformation and is expected to result in the promotion of urban governments with greater powers and responsibilities, thus forming new social and political dynamics.

10.3  New Urban Movements In the face of the major changes underway and the relative weakness of the political responses to these in vital areas of urban rights such as housing, a range of urban-­ based social movements have gradually emerged in a multiplicity of ways and in different parts of the city. These at times overlapping movements interact and voice new expressions and demands on the part of citizens for common goods, rights and services (Nel·lo 2015).

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These urban movements, although still relatively marginal in the sociopolitical life of the city of Lisbon – when compared, for example with their counterparts in major Spanish cities – are clearly growing in terms of their sociocultural base and media profile. Some appear to be relatively generic expressions of civic awareness about cross-cutting themes, while others are more specific in nature, focusing on certain subjects or areas of grievance. They can be found in the main urban centre of the metropolis but also in its sprawling outskirts and are without doubt underpinned by widespread use of online networks. In general terms, they can be classed in two large camps: (a) Alternative proposals for urban life: a growing number of movements, groups and projects – very diverse in size – that propose new approaches to urban life (b) Reacting to pressures on social and urban rights: movements and practices relating to the most pressing problems of housing, social rights and the quality of public space, but also fostering culture and community The relatively recent changes in the character of these phenomena make it difficult to identify and classify the new urban movements in terms of formats, positioning and capacities. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify as a seminal moment the important encampment in Rossio – the most iconic square at the centre of the entire urban system – in May of 2011. The action took place in solidarity with the global Indignados movement and occurred precisely at the time when the country had started to be subjected to intervention by the troika and a great wave of austerity policies. The process of convergence that led to the mobilisation in the Rossio encampment had origins in collectives and political parties with pre-existing memberships and online networks that established more concrete interchanges and common platforms – in terms of various objectives as well as of forms of action – for protest. This background made it possible to boost socialisation in ways that were to have an impact in the city in coming years, and a corresponding externalisation of this in urban spaces through new forms of political action distinct from earlier ones (of simple protest or merely using more traditional formal channels). The most critical field of the recent mobilisation by residents and of the upsurge in protests on the part of urban movements is without doubt in the housing issues. Local associations and urban movements of the most varied kinds are exercising arguments of material and immaterial kind against rising rents, property speculation and the consequent dramatic changes on everyday city life in many neighbourhoods. As an example, to this end several associations joined together to create a broad-based movement called Morar em Lisboa (Living in Lisbon), which presented a public charter in February 2017. This movement has served as an open forum for the presentation of proposals to the various institutions responsible for housing. In part to the pressure from these movements that the city council recently approved an Affordable Rent Programme – foreseeing 6000 new homes over the next 4 years, as well as urgently making available for the programme 100 homes in the historic centre. However, the activist considers that this measure, altough relevant, is not sufficient, given the scale and dimension of the problem.

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It should be stressed that the new urban movements are not limited to housing issues and to the central parts of the metropolis. Indeed, a new generation of civic movements is emerging from the many housing estates in the greater urban area, which together account for one-seventh2 of the city’s population. In fact, the metropolitan system of Lisbon is quite peri-urbanised, around five-sixths of its three million population living outside the city centre municipality, both to the north and to the south of the Tejo Estuary. This urban sprawl explains the emergence of several social and community movements in the peripheries, paralleled by the growing sociopolitical movements in the centre. Table 10.1 presents a listing of Lisbon’s most recent urban civic movements, including a categorisation that includes their degrees of success and the expectation of future trends in their evolution. The great majority of these movements can be seen to be consolidate or even growing in strength, evidencing both the increasing role taken by urban movements in the city’s political life and the permanence of the problems to which these movements respond.

10.4  The Reconfiguration of Politics in Lisbon The increasing politisation of relevant urban issues in Lisbon can be seen as the crystallisation of the new urban questions, as foreseen by authors such as Henri Lefébvre, Manuel Castells or Edward Soja. The results of these historical changes make evident the need for a rethink of the urban arenas and the transversal challenges concerning city life (Merrifield 2013; Moulaert et al. 2013). For the territories in Southern Europe, this historical transformation has coincided with a deep economic crisis, the change of balance between private and public interest, the reduction of and redistribution policies. These events have resulted in the emergence of both innovative approaches and practices but also new forms of socio-­ spatial inequalities. In general terms, the effects of the new forms of inequality have so far outweighed the growing social and political reactions. Nonetheless, in most urban areas there can also be confirmed the positioning of new urban social movements and their ever more consistent proposals for change in the social, economic and political spheres. These movements are present at every level of scale, from neighbourhood to national, growingly interconnected at international levels and sustained by principles of collective urban heritage and common goods (Blanco and Gomà 2016; Foster and Iaione 2016). Changes relate likewise to the restructuring of sociopolitical perceptions of cohesion, inclusion and quality of life, and finally to the exercise of citizenship itself 2  There are 64,000 residents in housing under municipal management (http://www.gebalis.pt/ Geral/SobreGebalis/DadosEmpresa/Paginas/DadosdaEmpresa.aspx), but the broader context for this scale of estates in the city includes housing run by the cooperative movement and SAAL, by the IHRU and, for example, by the Instituto de Gestão Financeira da Segurança Social. In other words, the proportion is well over one seventh.

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Table 10.1  Recent urban civic movements in Lisbon Name Form Territory Area of intervention: Housing Morar em M City of Lisbon Lisboa

Habita

A

Associação do A Património e População de Alfama Assembleia de M Ocupação de Lisboa

Type of demand

Right to housing/ affordable housing vs. liberalisation of housing market and gentrification National Right to housing/ affordable housing vs. liberalisation of housing market and gentrification Centre of Lisbon Affordable housing vs. touristification and gentrification

Centre of Lisbon Occupation of municipal building to implement affordable housing Greater Lisbon Rehousing of residents still living in neighbourhoods

C Ass. Moradores Bairros 6 de Maio, Torre e Jamaica Area of intervention: Ecology Horta do C Centre of Lisbon Enjoyment of Monte organic and community horticulture in the city Pensar Verde C Social Use of vacant neighbourhoods spaces for urban horticulture

Movimento Pelo Jardim do Caracol da Penha

M

Centre of Lisbon Use of vacant spaces for public, more ecological uses

Area of intervention: Mobility CiclOficina C Centre of Lisbon Right to non-­ dos Anjos motorised mobility in the city

Degree of success

Trend

Media attention for questions of housing, meetings with various political actors

GS

National housing caravan; preventing evictions under the 2012 rent law

S

S Media attention as a result of the pressures of the growth in tourism and Airbnb in Alfama Media attention during W campaign for local elections, mobilisation of activists; evictions S Commitment from IHRO and Seixal city council to rehouse residents of Jamaica

Occupation of evicted buildings

E

S Victory in municipal participatory budget for implementation of urban allotments and urban green spaces S Victory in municipal participatory budget for implementation of urban allotments and urban green spaces European Commission S award: Do the right mix programme (continued)

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Table 10.1 (continued) Name Mubi

Form Territory C City of Lisbon

Type of demand Right to non-­ motorised mobility in the city

Area of intervention: Community development RDA 69 A Centre of Lisbon Social centre and right to self-­ management practices

Degree of success Spontaneous demonstrations by cyclists, with high participation

Trend S

Consolidation of centre for alternative cultures in Lisbon; pressure from Municipal Police and hygiene inspectorate ASAE on association canteen and hours Há Castelo A Centre of Lisbon Local community Granting of Bip/Zip vs. touristification funds for practices that promote local dynamics Zona Franca Co Centre of Lisbon Pressure from Municipal Police and hygiene inspectorate ASAE on association canteen and hours Passa Sabi A 1ª Coroa (outer Cultural enjoyment Provision by Lisbon city council of a zone) of Lisbon of social diversity with representation headquarters in the neighbourhood; staging of local festival Participatory Pendão em C Lisbon outskirts Social support, diagnostics and Movimento young people, seniors, promotion proposals for public spaces taken on board of local ideas by Sintra town council. Empowerment of participatory practices in municipal programme Provision of association Geração Com A Bairro Social de Housing need; headquarters in Futuro Lisboa improvement of material conditions neighbourhood. Programme of and collective subsidised rents for spaces housing in neighbourhood Nu sta Djunto C Greater Lisbon Support in situations Start of regular of social crisis neighbourhood round Area of intervention: Feminism

S

S

S

GS

S

GS

S

(continued)

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Table 10.1 (continued) Name Femafro

Form Territory A National

INMUNE – Instituto da Mulher Negra em Portugal

I

National

Mulheres na Arquitectura

A

National

Area of intervention: Anti-racism Djass A National

Plataforma Gueto

C

Greater Lisbon

AfroLis

A

City of Lisbon

Type of demand Gender equality and combatting racial discrimination; role of women of African descent Gender and anti-racism; empowerment of Portuguese African heritage Gender quality in architecture

Degree of success Trend GS Letter to UN denouncing racism in Portugal; adoption of collection of ethnic data for 2012 census Information sharing GS

Media attention, organisation of neighbourhood and municipal debates

GS

GS Letter to UN denouncing racism in Portugal; adoption of collection of ethnic data for 2012 census; Memorial to victims of slavery S Combatting racism Media attention in and socio-territorial relation to cases of police violence against discrimination black youths (e.g. Alfragide); organising people’s universities S Creation of a radio Creation of protected spaces for station and launch of a book, Djidiu the expression of black people and people of African descent Combatting racism and support for the culture of people of African descent

Form: A Association, C Collective, Co Cooperative, I Institute, M Movement Trend: E Extinct, GS Growing in strength, S Stable, W Weakening

(Subirats 2016). The conjugation of these trends has accentuated the ambivalence of urban life and the weakening of “traditional” social capital, as the space of urban politics is occupied by new forms of social capital, citizenship and intervention, above all by younger and more digitally proficient individuals. In Lisbon the coexistence of two fundamental and contradictory trends can be identified. On the one hand, the existence of forces fostering the breakup of communities, through the fragmented nature of metropolitan life, digital fragmentation, the financialisation of urban life and the vortex of property market pressures, as well as the functional mismatches resulting from new employment and transport structures. However, on the other hand, there are also new elements reassembling

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communities, as seen in the renewed appreciation for the city and urban life together with the human and biophysical ecology, above all by younger generations, as well as in the gradual reinforcement of public policy at the most local levels. To this should be added, finally, the increase in reactions on the part of citizens and social movements, as detailed above. In our view, these are “deep trends” requiring the reconfiguration of knowledge infrastructures relating to the city and its various social and ecological systems, and consequently the reconceptualisation of the challenges, spaces and political drives in the city. In the face of the fragmentation of urban life – and urban politics – it will be essential to reconstruct narratives of a political nature with global principles that can apply to all urban territories. As we have seen, besides the difficulties and resistance in the positioning of strategic processes in the face of uncertainty and external influences, certain policies of a local nature are trying to adopt strategies and visions for more integrated and inclusive urban life and urban economy. The fact of being the capital city of a much centralised country is also relevant, because the policies implemented in Lisbon have effects beyond the strict city and metropolitan limits. However, and precisely also because of this relevant factor, despite its relative dynamism, the confrontation of these innovative policies with the global financial and political forces still shows that the city and its “municipal political capacity” is not fully prepared to effectively defend its common goods. At the same time, the city has nurtured the emergence of a new generation of urban social movements – since at least the start of the 2010 decade. This relevant (and probably historical) event has taken place because of the powerful conjugation of a renewed interest in urban life and the growing recognition of the right to the city. This interest has been fuelled by the reaction against the effects of the economic crisis and the consequent austerity policies in the urban arena and especially in the field of housing. These movements are quite varied in manner and character, from the more traditional to the ones structured through digital networks and different forms of coordination. They have broader territorial bases and some are not easy to georeferenciate, although they mostly express themselves through local expressions and in the face of recognisable issues in fields such as housing and basic social rights. In such areas, these trends are developing both in the centre of the city and in the periphery, where the large social housing estates are to be found. It is also quite interesting to note that in a highly segmented metropolis such as Lisbon, the digital networks and some steady improvements in mobility have allowed a wider connection with somewhat distant  – or better said, formerly unknown – territories. In this way, people living in distant areas are increasingly sharing ideas and proposals, and increasingly able to mobilise in a coordinate way. It is therefore of major relevance to focus on the growing interrelationship between the social movements in the city and some parts of the local political institutions. Although this still takes place in a partial fashion, it is barely acknowledged or even generates some embarrassment. In fact, one of the biggest divides can still be found in marked inadequacy or even discomfort on the part of the public

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spheres – including the local ones – with regard to the new urban movements and their demands of an increasingly transversal or shared nature. However, while the institutional local politics and some urban movements have recognisable objectives and faces, global agents have much less visibility at the main urban fora. That does not mean that these agents are not connected and influencing politics. Just the opposite: due to the centralised character of the Portuguese administration, to the still visible consequences of the financial crisis, and to the sophistication of new economics and technology, the economic and financial sectors retain a clear differential  – or unbalanced  – capacity to influence urban policies in Lisbon. Despite the “local” and the “ecological” approaches gaining cultural – and thus political – terrain, consequent political urban expressions – such as “common good politics” or “municipalism” – are still quite limited. They are much dependent on the new urban movements as well as on their possible interlinkages with local government. Foreseeably, a municipalism culture will remain difficult to adopt in Lisbon, consistently obstructed by the intricacy of politics at national level in such a way that fundamental decisions  – like the ones affecting the housing system  – might be delayed again and again. Paradoxically, the political affirmation of the city – and its urban challenges – can happen (and sometimes does happen) when national issues are at stake. This is reinforced by the national vision of many local politicians and can also be understood by relevant parts of the Lisbon society itself (Seixas 2008). This scenario is however under heavy pressures – notably due to the situation of housing and real estate markets strongly affected by high rising rents and household indebtedness. These pressures and increasingly severe curtails will continue to threaten larger parcels of the urban society and its social rights, generating stronger popular reactions. Then it might finally appear more evident that urban condition and urban rights are also main vehicles for progress, sustainability and justice. However, this complex conjugation filled by historical elements and local consequences, still needs a larger time span to develop. Or a sudden unexpected change, like the present pandemic crisis, reinforcing the previous trends as well as the expectations.

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