Social Inequality in the World of the Text: The Significance of Ritual and Social Distinctions in the Hebrew Bible 9783666550249, 9783525550243, 9783647550244

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© 2011, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ISBN Print: 9783525550243 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647550244

Journal of Ancient Judaism Supplements Edited by Armin Lange, Bernard M. Levinson and Vered Noam

Advisory Board Katell Berthelot (University of Aix-Marseille), George Brooke (University of Manchester), Jonathan Ben Dov (University of Haifa), Beate Ego (University of Osnabrück), Ester Eshel (Bar-Ilan University), Heinz-Josef Fabry University of Bonn), Steven Fraade (Yale University), Maxine L. Grossman (University of Maryland), Christine Hayes (Yale University), Catherine Hezser (University of London), Jodi Magness (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), Carol Meyers, (Duke University), Eric Meyers (Duke University), Hillel Newman (University of Haifa), Christophe Nihan (University of Lausanne), Lawrence H. Schiffman (New York University), Konrad Schmid (University of Zurich), Adiel Schremer (Bar-Ilan University), Michael Segal (Hebrew University of Jerusalem), Aharon Shemesh (Bar-Ilan University), Günter Stemberger (University of Vienna), Kristin De Troyer (University of St Andrews), Azzan Yadin (Rutgers University)

Volume 4

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht

© 2011, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ISBN Print: 9783525550243 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647550244

Saul M. Olyan

Social Inequality in the World of the Text The Significance of Ritual and Social Distinctions in the Hebrew Bible

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht

© 2011, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ISBN Print: 9783525550243 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647550244

For William K. Gilders, Nathaniel B. Levtow, Jordan D. Rosenblum, and Karen B. Stern, the first Brown generation, with gratitude

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar. ISBN 978-3-525-55024-3 ISBN 978-3-647-55024-4 (E-Book)

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© 2011, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ISBN Print: 9783525550243 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647550244

Table of Contents

Introduction ...............................................................................................

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Section 1: Rites and Social Status Introduction ............................................................................................... 15 Honor, Shame and Covenant Relations in Ancient Israel and Its Environment .................................................................................. 17 What Do Shaving Rites Accomplish and What Do They Signal in Biblical Ritual Contexts? ........................................................... 37

Section 2: Gender and Sexuality Introduction ............................................................................................... 53 “And with a Male You Shall Not Lie the Lying Down of a Woman”: On the Meaning and Significance of Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13.............. 57 “Surpassing the Love of Women”: Another Look at 2 Sam 1:26 and the Relationship of David and Jonathan ............................................. 85 Occasionally Beyond Gender: The Rhetoric of Familial Nurture in Discourses of West Asian Kings and their Agents ............................... 101

Section 3: Disability Introduction ............................................................................................... 117 “Anyone Blind or Lame Shall Not Enter the House”: On the Interpretation of 2 Samuel 5:8b ..................................................... 119 The Exegetical Dimensions of Restrictions on the Blind and the Lame in Texts from Qumran ........................................................ 129 The Ascription of Physical Disability as a Stigmatizing Strategy in Biblical Iconic Polemics ....................................................................... 141

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Table of Contents

Section 4: Holiness, Purity, and the Alien Introduction ............................................................................................... 157 Purity Ideology in Ezra-Nehemiah as a Tool to Reconstitute the Community................................................................. 159 “Sie sollen nicht in die Gemeinde des Herrn kommen”: Aspekte gesellschaftlicher Inklusion und Exklusion in Dtn 23,4–9 und seine frühen Auslegungen ........................................... 173 Mary Douglas’s Holiness/Wholeness Paradigm: Its Potential for Insight and its Limitations ............................................... 187

Section 5: Death, Burial, Afterlife, and their Metaphorical Uses Introduction ............................................................................................... 199 “We are Utterly Cut Off”: Some Possible Nuances of nigzarnû lƗnû in Ezek 37:11 ................................................................. 201 Unnoticed Resonances of Tomb Opening and Transportation of the Remains of the Dead in Ezekiel 37:12–14...................................... 211 Was the “King of Babylon” Buried Before His Corpse Was Exposed? Some Thoughts on Isa 14:19 ..................................................................... 221 Some Neglected Aspects of Israelite Interment Ideology......................... 225

© 2011, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ISBN Print: 9783525550243 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647550244

Introduction

Fifteen essays are included in this volume, two of which have not been published previously. They date to the last seventeen years, and all reflect in some manner my ongoing interest in literary operations of classification and their social implications. I am particularly fascinated by the production of distinctions that create social inequality in the world of the text, and have the potential to generate hierarchical social relationships in contexts where biblical texts might have had an influence on the day to day experience of real people. Such distinctions include male/female, dead/living, unclean/ clean, buried/unburied, holy/common, mourn/rejoice, alien/native, honored/ shamed, whole/defective, all emic in nature, characteristic of the rhetoric of the text. As this list of binary oppositions suggests, my work has touched upon issues of gender, sexuality, purity and pollution, sanctification, death and afterlife, foreignness, and disability, among other topics. I examine distinctions with particular attention to the fate of persons who are negatively affected by them: those who are cast as inferior; those who are marginalized socially, economically, or ritually; those who are excluded entirely from community (e.g., the blind and the lame in 2 Sam 5:8b, who are apparently excluded from the temple, or the person with a genital “flow,” who is separated from the community according to Num 5:1–4). But I also focus in some of my work on those privileged persons and groups who derive benefits of one sort or another from classificatory operations (e.g., the honored, those with “whole” bodies, the native, the holy). Though denied by some scholars, much of biblical literature has a discernible political dimension— whether explicit or implicit—and this is brought into relief through the study of the Bible’s classificatory operations and their social implications. Social goods are not evenly distributed by biblical texts, and I believe it is the responsibility of scholars to illuminate the complex and often subtle forms of inequality which the Bible creates and communicates. Given our dependence on literary representations and our almost complete lack of access to historically situated, real-life experience, I speak of the impact of classificatory operations and their social implications in the world of the text. I do so while affirming the possibility that resulting distinctions could have had an impact on the lives of historically-situated people in settings in which the texts in question were authoritative in some way, though unhappily we can only speculate about this, given the limitations of surviving evidence.

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Introduction

A second abiding theme of my scholarship over the past fifteen years is the study of ritual as it is represented in extant texts, particularly the analysis of social distinctions produced and perpetuated by cultic and other rites. Though we have no access to historically-situated ritual practice, we do have literary representations of rites. These are valuable because they are ideologically charged and were intended to shape the thought patterns of their target audiences. They may idealize ritual practice, model it, or critique contemporary manifestations of it known to the authors of the texts in question. Yet literary representations of rites must also have had some relationship to contemporary practice in order to resonate with their intended audiences. Therefore they have potential to tell us something about historical practice, even if that something must remain rather vague and elusive. Given their potential social impact, it is not surprising that rites of status change are a focus of my interest in a number of these essays (e.g., circumcision, shaving, purification, burial or disinterment, shaming or honoring). Undergoing circumcision might mean the difference between inclusion in the cultic community or exclusion from it if one is a male foreigner, as Exod 12:43–49 suggests; the impossibility of purification from an ongoing “ritual” impurity such as skin disease has serious social implications for the affected person as a number of texts make clear (Lev 13:45–46; Num 5:1– 4). Though practices such as circumcision and purification are generally represented as salutary and ameliorating in biblical texts, some rites of status change vary in meaning and effect depending on their agent and on their purpose. Disinterment by an enemy is humiliating and may do harm to the dead in concrete ways (Isa 14:19; Jer 8:1–2), but the removal of a corpse or bones from a tomb by family members or allies for a beneficial purpose has a very different result (2 Sam 21:13–14). Shaving rites are similar in their ambiguity and their need for careful, contextually-sensitive interpretation. Thus, there is much to be said about ritual practice and its social implications in the world of the text. We can consider the potential real-world impact of textual representations of rites, and, because textual representations of ritual practice had to have some meaning for their intended audience, we can also speculate about the relationship of textually represented rites to ritual practice as it might have been manifest in some historical contexts. Because certain ritual practices such as shaving and disinterment can be ambiguous, we must pay close attention to issues of purpose and agency as we strive to interpret them. In contrast, other rites such as purification and circumcision are for the most part consistent in their resonances. Several essays in this volume also reflect a third enduring interest of mine: the early history of the interpretation of biblical texts, including inner biblical exegesis. Though trained as a scholar of the Hebrew Bible in its

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Introduction

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ancient West Asian context, I developed a serious interest in the history of biblical interpretation soon after finishing graduate school. My second book A Thousand Thousands Served Him: Exegesis and the Naming of Angels in Ancient Judaism (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr/Paul Siebeck, 1993) was my first contribution in the area of ancient biblical exegesis, and I have continued to publish on the topic intermittently. Two essays in this volume represent my work on inner biblical exegesis (“Purity Ideology in EzraNehemiah as a Tool to Reconstitute the Community”; “‘Sie sollen nicht in die Gemeinde des Herrn kommen’: Aspekte gesellschaftlicher Inklusion und Exklusion in Dtn 23,4–9 und seine frühen Auslegungen”); a third study’s focus is biblical interpretation in the Dead Sea Scrolls (“The Exegetical Dimensions of Restrictions on the Blind and the Lame in Texts from Qumran”). Deut 23:4–9, a pre-exilic text which apparently seeks to restrict the entry of males of four specific foreign groups into the Israelite cultic community, was clearly of ongoing interest to ancient exegetes. The reformulation (“contemporization”) of Deut 23:4–9 in a number of interesting ways is reflected in a variety of biblical texts from the sixth and fifth centuries (Lam 1:10; Ezek 44:9; Isa 56:1–8; Ezra 9:12; Neh 13:1–3). This recasting suggests both the authority of Deut 23:4–9 for a number of later communities as well as the creative efforts of those communities—and those of their opponents in the case of Isa 56:1–8—to understand the text in ways that were relevant in their social contexts. Similarly, texts such as 2 Sam 5:8b and Lev 21:17–23, which restrict cultic and communal participation of persons with physical “defects” (mûmîm), have a significant afterlife in a number of texts from Qumran, whose the authors reformulate earlier biblical materials to suit their needs and those of their communities. In both cases, classificatory operations among exegetes continue to produce hierarchically significant distinctions, and these may differ from those of the original texts in question. Thus, whether we speak of inner biblical exegesis or biblical interpretation in a post-biblical corpus such as the Dead Sea Scrolls, an indisputable diachronic dimension to operations of classification emerges through the study of the ways in which older texts have been recast and reformulated over time. The history of the interpretation of texts such as Deut 23:4–9; 2 Sam 5:8b and Lev 21:17–23 illustrate this diachronic dimension nicely. I have divided the volume into five sections: (1) Rites and Social Status, (2) Gender and Sexuality, (3) Disability, (4) Holiness, Purity, and the Alien, and (5) Death, Burial, Afterlife, and their Metaphorical Uses. I provide an introduction for each section, in which I describe the content of the essays, and how they relate to other essays selected for that section and to the larger themes of the volume as a whole. In some cases, I reflect on the develop-

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ment of my thinking over time (in other words, how my mind has changed or remained the same), and comment on reactions to my work by other scholars. As mentioned, thirteen of the fifteen essays included in this volume were previously published, and are reprinted here with typographical errors corrected and style made consistent, but otherwise with little or no revision. It is my pleasure to acknowledge the copyright holders for permission to reproduce these essays: the Society of Biblical Literature, for permission to reprint “Honor, Shame and Covenant Relations in Ancient Israel and Its Environment,” Journal of Biblical Literature 115 (1996): 201–218; “What Do Shaving Rites Accomplish and What Do They Signal in Biblical Ritual Contexts?” Journal of Biblical Literature 117 (1998): 611–22; “Some Neglected Aspects of Israelite Interment Ideology,” Journal of Biblical Literature 124 (2005): 601–16; and “Unnoticed Resonances of Tomb Opening and Transportation of the Remains of the Dead in Ezekiel 37:12– 14,” Journal of Biblical Literature 128 (2009): 491–501; the Catholic Biblical Association, for permission to reprint “‘Anyone Blind or Lame Shall Not Enter the House’: On the Interpretation of 2 Samuel 5:8b,” Catholic Biblical Quarterly 60 (1998): 218–27; and “‘We are Utterly Cut Off’: Some Possible Nuances of ʥʰʬ ʥʰʸʦʢʰ in Ezek 37:11,” Catholic Biblical Quarterly 65 (2003): 43–51; Koninklijke Brill NV for permission to reprint “The Exegetical Dimensions of Restrictions on the Blind and the Lame in Texts from Qumran,” Dead Sea Discoveries 8 (2001): 38–50; and “Purity Ideology in Ezra-Nehemiah as a Tool to Reconstitute the Community,” Journal for the Study of Judaism in the Persian, Hellenistic and Roman Periods 35 (2004): 1–16; the Journal of Hebrew Scriptures, for permission to reprint “Mary Douglas’s Holiness/Wholeness Paradigm: Its Potential for Insight and its Limitations,” Journal of Hebrew Scriptures 8 (2008): article 10:1–9; and “The Ascription of Physical Disability as a Stigmatizing Strategy in Biblical Iconic Polemics,” Journal of Hebrew Scriptures 9 (2009): article 14:1–15; the University of Chicago, for permission to reprint “‘And with a Male You Shall Not Lie the Lying Down of a Woman’: On the Meaning and Significance of Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13,” Journal of the History of Sexuality 5 (1994): 179–206 (copyright 1994 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 1043-4070/0502-0001); Princeton University Press, for permission to reprint “‘Surpassing the Love of Women’: Another Look at 2 Sam 1:26 and the Relationship of David and Jonathan,” in Authorizing Marriage? Canon, Tradition and Critique in the Blessing of Same-Sex Unions, ed. Mark D. Jordan, 7–16, 165–70. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006 (copyright Princeton University Press); and Verlag Walter de Gruyter Gmbh & Co. for permission to reprint “Was the ‘King of Babylon’ Buried Before His Corpse Was Exposed? Some Thoughts on Isa 14,19,” Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 118 (2006): 423–26 (now

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available electronically at www.reference-global.com). The remaining two essays, “Occasionally Beyond Gender: The Rhetoric of Familial Nurture in Discourses of West Asian Kings and their Agents,” and “‘Sie sollen nicht in die Gemeinde des Herrn kommen’: Aspekte gesellschaftlicher Inklusion und Exklusion in Dtn 23,4–9 und seine frühen Auslegungen,” are published here for the first time. I would like to thank Bernard Levinson for suggesting that I submit a proposal to publish this volume in the Journal of Ancient Judaism Supplements series, and for his helpful reactions to its initial draft. I would also like to acknowledge Armin Lange and the rest of the editorial board of the series for their critical feedback concerning the book’s shape and content during the review process. Brian Rainey, with support from Brown University, assisted with the final preparation of the manuscript, and I am grateful for his efforts and for Brown’s continuing support. Finally, I would like to thank Frederik Schockaert for sage advice at various points in the development of this book, and for help with technical matters during the production process.

© 2011, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ISBN Print: 9783525550243 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647550244

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Section 1: Rites and Social Status

© 2011, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ISBN Print: 9783525550243 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647550244

© 2011, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ISBN Print: 9783525550243 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647550244

Introduction

The impact of my engagement with social scientific approaches to the study of the Hebrew Bible will be obvious to any reader of this volume, as will be my abiding interest in the temple cult and other ritual contexts such as the tomb or the royal court, particularly as settings for the generation of social differentiation. The two essays that follow represent early forays into the study of ritual and its social dimensions, and my first substantive interaction with social anthropological theory. In “Honor, Shame and Covenant Relations in Ancient Israel and Its Environment” (1996), I combine an engagement with anthropological theory of honor and shame (particularly that of Julian Pitt-Rivers, John G. Peristiany, and Michael Herzfeld) with a close, philological analysis of honor/shame rhetoric in biblical ritual texts. I do this in order to understand the complex roles of honor and shame in treaty relationships (a relatively neglected topic at the time of initial publication). I argue that honor and shame, conferred through ritual action in public contexts such as the royal court or the sanctuary sphere, communicate relative social status: “To honor a loyal treaty partner confirms publicly the strength of existing covenant bonds; to diminish or shame one who is loyal in covenant communicates at minimum a loss of status and may in fact constitute a covenant violation.” Today I would state explicitly that such ritual action not only signals social distinctions, it actually brings them into being. I make this idea explicit for the first time in the essay on shaving rites which follows this paper (passim and especially n. 4). Though the idea that rites create social distinctions is not stated explicitly in “Honor, Shame and Covenant Relations in Ancient Israel and Its Environment,” it is implicit throughout the essay, including in my observation that through his ritual action, a suzerain could create a hierarchy of honor among his competing vassals which “publicized the relative status of each vassal vis-à-vis the suzerain and other vassals.” Honor, though reciprocally bestowed like covenant love (’ahăbâ) and covenant loyalty (h̡esed), differed from love and loyalty because it functioned to produce carefully calibrated social distinctions among vassals, encouraging competition between them and bringing the unequal aspects of the suzerainvassal relationship into sharp relief. From my perspective—and a distance of fifteen years—this is the most interesting suggestion of the essay. In “What Do Shaving Rites Accomplish and What Do They Signal in Biblical Ritual Contexts?” (1998), I treat a topic that had been previously

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neglected in the field—not unlike honor and shame—and challenge the conclusions of social anthropologists who have claimed that shaving rites always have “specific, trans-cultural and trans-historical meanings” (e.g., that hair cutting always represents acceptance of social control [Christopher R. Hallpike], or that manipulating head hair has sexual connotations [Edmund Leach]). Instead, I argue that biblical shaving rites have a range of possible meanings, and these depend on the socio-ritual contexts in which the rites occur. Shaving might make and mark a ritual state of separation, as in a mourning context, or aggregation, as in the ritual process of reintegrating the Nazirite or the person who has recovered from skin disease. It might be associated with purification, submission to divine authority, self-debasement, or erasure of a previous identity. Yet I also conclude that one can generalize to some degree about biblical shaving rites. Their specific meanings may be context-dependent, but in all of the cases I examined, “[s]having effects and marks ritual transition, a change of status of the one shaved.” The degree to which such a generalization has any larger application outside of biblical texts still awaits assessment, though it is my suspicion that is does. In contrast to my article on honor and shame, in which I mainly embrace the insights of social anthropology in order to enrich my reading of biblical materials, in “What Do Shaving Rites Accomplish?” I use biblical materials for the first time as a basis to critique and reformulate the conclusions of social anthropologists. Evaluation and revision of theory on the basis of my own data set will become a theme in much of my work published after this essay, as I strive to contribute to larger, interdisciplinary attempts to theorize social phenomena (e.g., in my book Biblical Mourning: Ritual and Social Dimensions [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004], in which I assess the utility of some of the lesser known ideas of Robert Hertz and Arnold van Gennep about mourning). In addition, the identification of “flexible” ritual practices comparable to shaving rites, and attempts to chart the range of their potential meanings, will continue in my work (e.g., with the phenomenon of disinterment, which I explore in several essays included in section 5 of this book). One final note: Were I to rewrite this essay today, I would change the way I characterize the pollution of mourning and mourners. Instead of characterizing mourners as “defiled,” I would argue that among those who utilize mourning rites it is only the mourner over the dead and the person afflicted with skin disease who are polluted; others (e.g., petitioners of the deity, or those mourning after a personal or corporate calamity) are not. This contrast functions to create distinctions between mourners of various types, and is therefore not insignificant. I develop this argument in some depth in my book Biblical Mourning (2004).

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Honor, Shame, and Covenant Relations in Ancient Israel and its Environment

Copious studies of the concept of covenant, treaty rituals, and associated terminology have been published in recent decades, including many investigations seeking to place Israelite covenant making in its wider ancient West Asian context.1 Covenant cutting, knowing, loyalty (h̡esed), love and hatred, brotherhood and friendship, curse and blessing are now commonplace concepts in the discourse of biblical and West Asian specialists and have been for several decades.2 Few would dispute that covenant was a primary basis for social organization in the West Asian cultural sphere in ————— 1

On this scholarly activity and the neo-Wellhausenian writings published partially in reaction to it, see the useful and relatively recent survey of Robert A. Oden, Jr., “The Place of Covenant in the Religion of Israel,” in Ancient Israelite Religion: Essays in Honor of Frank Moore Cross (ed. Patrick D. Miller, Jr., et al.; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), 429–47. Revisionist arguments against the antiquity of the covenant concept in Israel, its early central position in Israelite life and community, and the role of mutuality in covenant are to me—as to many others—often tendentious and generally unconvincing. Apt criticism of the arguments of revisionists such as Lothar Perlitt and Ernst Kutsch may be found in James Barr, “Some Semantic Notes on the Covenant,” in Beiträge zur alttestamentlichen Theologie: Festschrift für Walther Zimmerli zum 70. Geburtstag (ed. Herbert Donner, Robert Hanhart, and Rudolf Smend; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1977), 37–38; and Jon D. Levenson, Sinai and Zion: An Entry into the Jewish Bible (Minneapolis: Winston, 1985), 25–26 n. 10, who cites Barr’s critique with approbation. At the same time, speculations about the role of covenant in Israel before the emergence of the monarchy are equally lacking in cogency; we know very little of Israel’s pre-monarchic history, and Pentateuchal narratives of the ancestors cannot be used to reconstruct second-millennium life and praxis. 2 Some of the crucial early publications that helped to shape the current approach of many to this area of study include George E. Mendenhall, Law and Covenant in Israel and the Ancient Near East (Pittsburgh: Biblical Colloquium, 1955); Dennis J. McCarthy, Treaty and Covenant: A Study in Form in the Ancient Oriental Documents and in the Old Testament (AnBib 21; Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1963); William L. Moran, “The Ancient Near Eastern Background to the Love of God in Deuteronomy,” CBQ 23 (1963): 77–87; idem, “A Note on the Treaty Terminology of the Sefire Stelas,” JNES 22 (1963): 173–76; Delbert R. Hillers, Treaty-Curses and the Old Testament Prophets (BO 16; Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1964); Klaus Baltzer, Das Bundesformular (2d ed.; WMANT 4; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1964); Herbert B. Huffmon, “The Treaty Background of Hebrew yƗda‘,” BASOR 181 (1966): 31–37. Additional references to early and later scholarship may be found in the discussion of Oden, “Place of Covenant,” 430–34, and the extensive bibliography in Moshe Weinfeld, ʺʩʸʡ, TWAT 1:781–82 (= TDOT 2:253–54). The presence of the technical rhetoric of covenanting indicates a covenant setting. Aside from the words bƟrît (“covenant”) and h̡esed (“covenant loyalty”), one might argue for a covenant context based on the presence of love/hate terminology, curse/blessing, the rhetoric of brotherhood, friendship, goodness, or some combination of these.

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which Israel emerged as a distinct polity. Though certain aspects of covenant have been closely scrutinized, work remains to be done; the points of contact between the universe of covenanting and the notions of honor and shame have yet to be explored in any depth.3 In covenant-related discourse from a diverse range of West Asian contexts the vocabulary of honor and shame occurs; notions of honor and shame must therefore play a role in West Asian covenant relations, including those evidenced in Israelite sources. It is my purpose here to initiate an exploration of the place of honor and shame in West Asian covenant relations, with Israel as the primary focus of investigation. This is a programmatic piece; it is intended as a prolegomenon to a more detailed and comprehensive book-length study to come. In this piece, I will begin with a brief survey illustrating the ubiquity of the notions of honor and shame in Israelite and other West Asian sources; after this, I will examine the functions of honor and shame in West Asian covenant settings specifically, drawing on evidence mainly from Mari, the Amarna archive, Assyrian materials, and the Hebrew Bible; then I will proceed to a detailed analysis of the covenant dynamics of a number of Israelite narrative texts and one lyrical text in which honor and shame play a part: 2 Sam 19:1–9, 10–44; 2 Sam 10:1–6; 1 Samuel 31/2 Samuel 1–2; and Lamentations 1. My inquiry has been shaped to a large extent by contemporary anthropological theory on honor/shame and on ritual; I draw on the insights of this literature in order to illuminate the social and political functions of honor and shame in their ancient settings and the manner in which honoring or diminishment (which results in shame) publicizes the relative status of participants in ritual action, a usual locus for the conferring of honor or shame.

—————

3 Walter Harrelson notes that “honor is closely connected with justice, righteousness, and peace—key terms in the covenant vocabulary of the OT,” but he does not develop this observation (“Honor,” IDB 2:639—40). I have found no other case in which a connection has been made between honor and covenant.

© 2011, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ISBN Print: 9783525550243 — ISBN E-Book: 9783647550244

Honor, Shame, and Covenant

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I. Honor and Shame in Israelite and Other West Asian Sources Honor and shame, long of interest to anthropologists,4 are seldom discussed by scholars of ancient Israel and West Asia.5 Yet these concepts are not at all alien to the worldview of ancient Israelites or their neighbors. On the contrary, they are common almost to the point of banality, occurring in discourses concerning many aspects of social relations: war, international diplomacy, marriage, the family, the penal system, and death and the afterlife.6 A few examples illustrate the range of experience (and the variety of —————

4 Among the discussions by anthropologists, see esp. John G. Peristiany and Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Introduction,” in Honor and Grace in Anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 1–17; and Michael Herzfeld, “Honour and Shame: Problems in the Contemporary Analysis of Moral Systems,” Man 15 (1980): 339–51. Some older works of note include Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Honor,” in The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 6:503–11; idem, “The Anthropology of Honour,” in idem, The Fate of Shechem, or The Politics of Sex: Essays in the Anthropology of the Mediterranean (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); and John G. Peristiany, ed., Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1965). Herzfeld advocates a sound “particularism” in ethnography; he argues that “indigenous terminological systems” must be analyzed in their linguistic and social context in order to be understood with any precision. Not all anthropological studies have acknowledged the cultural and social specificity of constructions of honor and shame, though this has been the tendency increasingly (e.g., the introduction of Peristiany and Pitt-Rivers, Honor and Grace, 4). It is my purpose in this piece to explore West Asian honor/shame usages contextually, avoiding acontextual generalizations. It should be noted in passing that Margaret Mead’s contrast of shame culture/guilt culture, though once of much interest, is no longer influential in anthropological discussion. For a critique, see Peristiany and Pitt-Rivers, Honor and Grace, 6–7. 5 Exceptions include the brief articles “Honor” (W. Harrelson) and “Shame” (S. J. De Vries) in IDB 2:639–40 and 4:305–6, respectively; the TWAT entries ʣʡʫ (C. Dohman and P. Stenmans) in 4:13–23, ʭʬʫ (S. Wagner) in 4:196–208, ʸʴʧ (J. Gamberoni) in 3:116–21 (= TDOT 5:107–11), ʳʸʧ II (E. Kutsch) in 3:223–29 (= TDOT 5:209–15) and ʹʥʡ (S. Seebass) in 1:568–80 (= TDOT 2:50– 60); the entry ʣʡʫ by Claus Westermann in Theologisches Handwörterbuch zum Alten Testament (2 vols.; Munich: Kaiser; Zurich: Theologischer Verlag, 1971), 1:794–812, esp. 797–98; David Daube, “The Culture of Deuteronomy,” Orita 3 (1969): 27–52, on Deuteronomy’s “shame-cultural bias”; Martin A. Klopfenstein, Scham and Schande nach dem Alten Testament (ATANT 62; Zurich: Theologischer Verlag, 1972), a study of shame vocabulary (especially the roots bwš, klm, and h̡rp) in the Hebrew Bible; Lynn M. Bechtel, “Shame as a Sanction of Social Control in Biblical Israel: Judicial, Political and Social Shaming,” JSOT 49 (1991): 47–76. For Akkadian usages, see CAD 8:17, entry 5 on kabƗtu; 13:55–56, entry 2 on qalƗlu; see also AHw 1:416–17; 2:893. Reference works lacking entries for “honor” and “shame” include the six-volume ABD; The New Westminster Dictionary of the Bible (ed. Henry S. Gehman; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1970); and DBSup. Encyclopaedia Biblica (9 vols.; Jerusalem: Bialik, 1950–88), 4:4–6 has an entry for ʣʥʡʫ ʤʥʤʩ but nothing for the verb kbd; Harper’s Bible Dictionary (ed. Paul J. Achtemeier; San Francisco: Harper, 1985) has a small article on “shame” (932) but nothing on “honor.” Weinfeld’s survey of covenant in Israel (including a detailed discussion of the technical vocabulary of covenant) lacks reference to honor and shame (ʺʩʸʡ, 253–79); the overview of George E. Mendenhall and Gary A. Herion also makes no reference to these concepts (“Covenant,” ABD 1:1179–1201). 6 Though the vocabulary of honor and shame is somewhat complex, forms of the Hebrew verbs kbd (“to be honored”/“to honor”) and qll (“to be diminished” or “dishonored”/“to diminish” or “dishonor”) and their Akkadian cognates kabƗtu and qalƗlu are paired frequently in honor/shame

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literatures) in which the rhetoric of honor and shame play a part. Honor, generally speaking, is owed by an inferior to a superior: by the young to the elderly (Lev 19:32; Isa 3:5; Lam 5:12); by the worshiper to his or her deity (ARM 2.77.14; CAT 1:17 V 20, 30; Exod 20:12//Deut 5:16; Hag 1:8; Mal 1:6); by a child to a parent (Exod 20:12// Deut 5:16; Ezek 22:7 [cf. Prov 19:26]); by the living to the dead (Isa 14:18); by a dishonored or diminished person to an honored person (Isa 3:5). Minor deities honor Yhwh (Ps 29:1– 2), just as a hierarchy of honor is evident among the gods of other West Asian pantheons (CAT 1:3 III 10; VI 19–20; 1:4 IV 26; VIII 28–29; Enuma elish 4:3). In short, honor and shame communicate relative social status, which may shift over time. Honor can be gained through military victory (Exod 14:4, 17–18; 2 Kgs 14:10) and lost through defeat and exile, where it is replaced by shame (Isa 23:9; Nah 3:10; Lam 1:8). It is a commodity of value, actively sought both by deities and by human beings. It is often conferred or inscribed in the public sphere, through ritual action such as sacrifice and the order of its distribution; the reception and treatment of messengers; the presentation of gifts; participation in mourning rites. Honor is meant to be recognized and acknowledged; it is very much a public phenomenon. Loss of honor or diminishment results in shame; diminishment communicates a loss of social status (Isa 16:14; 23:9; Jer 46:12; Hos 4:7; Lam 1:6,8). Like honor and its inscription, diminishment and shame also have a public dimension; they too may be conferred in ritual settings, for all to witness and acknowledge (e.g., Deut 25:9–10 [cf. Num 12:14]).

II. Honor and Shame in Covenant Settings Specifically There are several points of contact between the sphere of covenant relations in particular and the notions of honor and shame. In contrast to noncovenantal social contexts in which persons of inferior status consistently honor their superiors (e.g., child/parent, young/elderly, inferior gods/superior gods), treaty partners must honor one another, just as they must love one another, even in situations where they are unequal.7 To honor a loyal ————— discourses and appear to be antonyms. In addition to qll, forms of the verbs klm, bwš, and h̡pr II (“to be ashamed”/“to shame”); bzh and zll (“to be despised”/“to despise”); and h̡rp (“to reproach”) are attested in biblical Hebrew, and some of these verbs are contrasted directly with forms of the verb kbd. In addition to kbd, verbal forms of the root hdr are attested occasionally (Lev 19:32; Lam 5:12; Prov 25:6) and the noun hƗdƗr (“honor”) is paired frequently with kƗbôd in poetry. Thus, the verb hdr appears to be a synonym of the verb kbd. For bibliography on these roots, see the entries listed in n. 5. 7 Covenant love is a well-established concept in scholarship on West Asian covenant relations. See further Deut 6:5–9; 7:8–11 (where Yhwh’s love is described); 1 Kgs 5:15; and Ps 89:24. The classic treatment by William L. Moran shows that to “love” means to serve or be loyal in cove-

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treaty partner confirms publicly the strength of existing covenant bonds; to diminish or shame one who is loyal in covenant communicates at minimum a loss of status and may in fact constitute a covenant violation.8 The conferring of honor and the inscription of shame may function to externalize conformity or nonconformity to covenant stipulations or to communicate relative position in a status hierarchy. Covenant honor, like covenant love, is reciprocal; it applies to partners in parity treaties and to those in covenants of unequals (vassal-suzerain treaties), even if the reciprocal nature of honor is not always made explicit.9 Yhwh himself—the suzerain par excellence in Israel—participates in reciprocal honor, as do human overlords. In 1 Sam 2:30 Yhwh says: “Those who honor me I will honor10; and as for those who despise me (bǀzay), they will be diminished (yƝqƗllû)” (or, perhaps, “dishonored”).11 This verse illustrates perfectly the ideal expectations of reciprocal ————— nant; Moran further points to evidence that “love” in nonparity treaty contexts—as in parity contexts—is mutual: the suzerain “loves” his vassal as the vassal “loves” his suzerain (“Love of God,” 77–87). See also the brief treatment of Frank M. Cross, Canaanite Myth and Hebrew Epic (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973), 268–69. 8 See below for discussion of vassals who compete for honor in a status hierarchy controlled by their overlord. In such instances, diminishment is protested but does not constitute violation where it might in a treaty situation of equals. But even among equals, there was often a degree of flexibility, as we shall see. 9 Sometimes texts will emphasize the honor owed to the suzerain by the vassal, leaving unmentioned the honor the suzerain owes in return. See especially texts concerned with worshipers honoring Yhwh (e.g., Isa 24:15; 29:13; 43:23; Mal 1:6; Ps 50:15; 86:12; Prov 3:9; 14:31). Other texts suggest that the suzerain too must honor the vassal, as I will show. 10 Other examples of a suzerain honoring a vassal are attested. In Ps 91:15, Yhwh says he will honor his loyal worshiper, and Isa 43:4 implies that he honors Israel: “Because you are precious in my sight,” // “You are honored and I love you.” Compare Prov 27:18, which states that “the one who attends his lord will be honored” (wƟšǀmƝr ’ădǀnƗyw yƟkubbƗd), presumably by the suzerain himself. Non-Israelite sources suggest that these sentiments from a suzerain are not at all unusual. See EA 88:47 and 245:39 (in Jørgen A. Knudtzon, ed., Die El-Amarna Tafeln [2 vols.; Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1907, 1915]), where a suzerain’s honoring of his vassals is mentioned explicitly; see also Simo Parpola, Letters from Assyrian and Babylonian Scholars (SAA 10; Helsinki: Helsinki University Press, 1993), #56.9–10 and rev. 3, a letter in which an earthquake is interpreted as an omen meaning that Esarhaddon, king of Assyria, will be “diminished with those he honors” (itti kabtnjtƯšu iqallil), presumably his vassals. 11 kî mƟkabbƟday ’ăkabbƝd ûbǀzay yƝqƗllû. The precise nuance of yƝqƗllû is not entirely clear in this context, though the root qll/qlh is often contrasted with the root kbd (see n. 6). Something like “be cursed” (Pual qll) is possible, given that a series of curses follows in vv. 31–36, and execrations are expected for covenant violators; the verb, however, is pointed as a Qal. It is also possible that the Qal could have the sense of “be cursed” as well as “be diminished,” “trifling” (cf. P. Kyle McCarter, Jr., I Samuel: A New Translation with Introduction, Notes and Commentary [AB 8; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980], 86, who translates yƝqƗllû as “accursed,” but without comment). Another possible meaning for the Qal is “be dishonored,” usually expressed by the Niphal of qll or qlh; see, e.g., Gen 16:4, 5; Nah 1:14, cases where the Qal may suggest “dishonored.” In 2 Sam 6:22, the Niphal qll (ûnƟqallǀtî, “I will abase myself,” “be dishonored”) is contrasted with Niphal kbd (’ikkƗbƝdâ, “I will be honored”), though the meaning of the passage is unclear. Elsewhere the Niphal of qll/qlh is contrasted with the Niphal or Hitpael of kbd (Isa 3:5;

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honor: to repay honor is the appropriate response to one who bestows honor; likewise, to return humiliation is the goal of one who is diminished or despised by a treaty partner, though this is not always possible or practical. Expressions of honor in covenant settings abound. Yhwh’s worshipers honor him through appropriate sacrifices and other cultic rites, just as a vassal honors a human suzerain with expected demonstrations of servitude and covenant loyalty. Partners in parity treaties honor one another in any number of ways. Frequently honor is expressed through the appropriate reception and treatment of the emissaries of one’s treaty partner.12 In EA 20, 27 and 29, Tushratta, king of Mitanni, writes to his ally the pharaoh emphasizing the extent to which he has honored the messengers and even the troops of the king of Egypt (20:64–65, 67; 27:108; 29:30–31, 32, 37). But the embassy itself, and the gifts that often accompany it, must also communicate the honor worthiness of the partner to whom it has been sent. Apparently, this was not always thought to be the case. In EA 1, the pharaoh complains to the king of Babylon regarding the status of the messengers he has sent to Egypt: they are “nobodies” (rƯqa), in contrast to those who are honored, who should have been sent (1:15,18).13 In EA 27, Tushratta of Mitanni objects to the pharaoh’s gift of gold-covered wooden statues; he claims that the pharaoh’s father had promised him statues of solid gold and reminds his ally of his own unassailable covenant loyalty (27:32–36). Sensitivity even to minor expressions of diminishment is a frequent theme in covenant discourses between partners in parity treaties, as the Amarna correspondence amply illustrates. But rarely are minor cases of perceived diminishment judged to be covenant violations, worthy of serious retaliation. This response was apparently reserved for major humiliations that could not simply be protested. A minor diminishment was always protested; besides protest, it was sometimes countered with a similar action by the offended party or by honoring gestures intended to set an example for the offender to emulate.14 The diminished party in these exchanges probably felt that there was more to be lost through termination of the treaty and pursuit of war than ————— Prov 12:9). Deut 27:16—“Cursed is he who dishonors (maqleh, Hiphil participle) his father and his mother”— contrasts nicely with the commandment of Deut 5:16//Exod 20:12 (“Honor your father and your mother”). At all events, the meaning “diminished” for yƝqƗllû suggests dishonor when contrasted with “honored.” See similarly the uses of Akkadian kabƗtu and qalƗlu. 12 On the role of the messenger generally, see further Samuel A. Meier, The Messenger in the Ancient Semitic World (HSM 43; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988). 13 The translation “nobodies” for rƯqa is Moran’s (Amarna Letters, 1, 3 n. 6). 14 E.g., EA 28:17–19, where Tushratta of Mitanni informs the pharaoh that he intends to detain Mane, the pharaoh’s messenger, until the pharaoh allows Tushratta’s messengers to return to him. In EA 3, the king of Babylon writes to the pharaoh that he will continue to make gestures of friendship though the pharaoh has detained his messenger, sent inadequate gifts of greeting, and neglected his obligation to honor his ally in any number of other ways.

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through protesting a minor gesture of diminishment and pressing the offending party to conform to covenant expectations. There is evidence that reciprocal honor in Israel and West Asia had hierarchical dimensions in a setting of unequal covenant relations. The suzerain demands and gets precedence in honor, expressed in a variety of ways for all to witness; vassals, for their part, compete for position in a hierarchy of honor controlled by the suzerain. In 1 Sam 2:29, the sons of the priest Eli take for themselves the first fruits from the sacrifices and offerings to Yhwh; thus, Yhwh accuses Eli as follows: “You honored (wattƟkabbƝd) your sons more than me.” A hierarchy of honor is evident in this passage, as is the public, ritual setting in which it is inscribed: sacrificial rites. Yhwh, as suzerain, is first in honor; the priests, his servants, cannot take what is by right his. By allowing them to do so, Eli has upset the status hierarchy; he has accorded his own sons greater honor than he has Yhwh. Hierarchical, reciprocal honor is also evidenced among vassals who compete for position in a status hierarchy controlled by their human suzerain. In EA 88:46–47, Rib-Hadda of Byblos protests jealously to the pharaoh that “the messenger of the king of Akko is more honored than (my) messenger” (mƗr šipri šar Akka kabbit ištu mƗr šipr[Ưya]). EA 245:39 is similar; here, kubbutu and qullulu are contrasted, not unlike their cognates kbd and qll in 1 Sam 2:30: the pharaoh has “diminished” Biridiya, his vassal, and “honored” his “less important”15 fellow vassals (“brothers” in the covenant idiom). In a letter to the crown prince of Assyria, Tabni, a haruspex and servant of the prince, complains that the prince has honored another haruspex instead of Tabni by giving him privileges that Tabni previously enjoyed.16 In all of these cases, vassals acknowledge their diminishment vis-à-vis other vassals with whom they compete for position in a hierarchy of honor that communicates relative status.17 But besides protest to the suzerain, there is little that they are able or seem willing to do, even in cases of major diminishment. And significantly, no one accuses the suzerain of breaking covenant. Unlike a case of the serious diminishment of an equal by an equal, or a suzerain by a vassal, which would bring swift retaliation, the diminishment of a vassal by a suzerain apparently is not understood as a covenant violation. It is the suzerain’s right to reassign a vassal to another place in the status hierarchy, and there is little or nothing the vassal can do about it. A suzerain must love all of his vassals, as they must love him, but he may distinguish between ————— 15

Translation of Moran, Amarna Letters, 299, 300 n. 7. Parpola, Letters, #182 passim, but esp. rev. 11, 14. 17 EA 47 also attests to competition for honor among vassals of the pharaoh but without explicit honor vocabulary. In this letter, the petitioner complains that the pharaoh has sent messengers to other vassal kings but not to the petitioner; the pharaoh has also sent his tablet to other kings but not to the petitioner. 16

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them by means of honor and its inscription; he can honor one vassal more than another, though he loves them all and acts toward all of them with covenant loyalty. Here, covenant honor is distinguishable from covenant love and covenant loyalty; unlike covenant love and loyalty, it may be bestowed incrementally by the suzerain, in a context of hierarchy. The lack of equality in a suzerain-vassal relationship is brought into sharp relief through the public dynamics of honor and diminishment. Public actions by parties in covenant or their representatives functioned to communicate statements about the state of covenant relations between those parties (e.g., articulation of hierarchy, extent of conformity). The context for such actions was frequently ritual: public rites became a medium through which the state of covenant relations was effectively communicated. And covenant relations were never static; they were maintained through the public inscription and reinscription of honor, or transformed by means of public diminishment or shaming.18 Distribution of sacrifices before military engagements, festivities after victory on the battlefield (including the distribution of booty seized from the enemy), public mourning rites at the death of a ruler, the reception of emissaries from foreign covenant partners—these are all public actions with ritual dimensions that might confer honor or shame, depending on the intentions of each of the participating parties. Several biblical examples help further to illustrate the social and political functions of honor and shame in the Israelite universe of covenanting and make clear the important role played by ritual action in the inscription of honor and shame. A detailed analysis of the covenant dynamics of 2 Sam 19:1–9, 10–44; 2 Sam 10:1–6; 1 Samuel 31/2 Samuel 1—2; and Lamentations 1 follows. These are among the most intriguing biblical texts illustrating honor/shame dynamics in covenant settings, though by no means the only examples; I have already mentioned a number of other texts of interest earlier in this discussion.

—————

18 Anthropologists have frequently highlighted the public dimensions of honor and shame. See, e.g., Herzfeld’s discussion, “Honour and Shame,” 341. On the ritual dimension specifically, see Peristiany and Pitt-Rivers, Honor and Grace, passim.

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III. 2 Samuel 19:1–9 2 Sam 19:1—9 describes the immediate aftermath of Absalom’s defeat before David’s return to Jerusalem; rich in covenantal rhetoric, it is an excellent point of departure for my detailed discussion. This text illustrates well the notion of reciprocal honor, its connection to covenant, and the importance of ritual in conferring honor. Absalom, David’s rebellious son, is dead, killed by Joab’s attendants during the struggle in the Forest of Ephraim. Though David’s forces are victorious and Absalom’s are routed, the king mourns; on a day of victory he engages in ritual behavior expected at a time of corporate (or personal) loss (weeping, lamentation, isolation; vv. 1– 2). The result of his behavior is reported in v. 3: “So the victory (tƟšnj‘â) on that day became mourning (’Ɲbel) for all the people” when they hear that the king is mourning for Absalom. In v. 4, we are told that the people act as if “shamed” (klm, Niphal) when they enter the city; it is the shame of a defeated army the text reports, one that flees before the foe.19 In v. 5, David’s mourning gestures are recapped, for emphasis, and in v. 6, Joab confronts the king concerning his behavior and its effects: “You have shamed today (hǀbaštƗ hayyôm) the face of all your servants, those who saved your life today … by loving those who hate you and by hating those who love you … For you have said today that you do not have officers and servants” (my emphasis). After Joab warns David that his behavior will result in unprecedented disaster (including the loss of his army), David ceases his mourning and appears enthroned at the city gate, in public view, as had been expected in response to his army’s victory. Why is David’s mourning such a problem? Why does it shame his loyal followers, and why is it explicitly associated with covenant violation by Joab? Mourning and rejoicing are ritual type and antitype in Israelite culture; entry into one state automatically excludes manifestations of the other.20 The mourner tears clothes, fasts, weeps, laments, experiences affliction in a number of other ways (various forms of shaving, ashes on the head, sitting on the ground), and avoids cultic service; the participant in cultic joy—the mourner’s opposite—eats and drinks, anoints the head, wears festal garments, and participates in the rites of the Temple.21 David did not —————

19 wayyitgannƝb hƗ‘Ɨm bayyôm hahû’ lƗbô’ hƗ‘îr ka’ăšer yitgannƝb hƗ‘Ɨm hanniklƗmîm bƟnûsƗm bammilh̡Ɨmâ. Defeat certainly dishonors or shames the vanquished and their allies, as many texts make clear. See Isa 16:14; 20:5; 23:9; Jer 46:12; Hos 4:7; Lam 1:6, 8. 20 See the illuminating study of Gary A. Anderson, A Time to Mourn, A Time to Dance: The Expression of Grief and Joy in Israelite Religion (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991), whose approach I adopt here. 21 It is exceedingly rare to find all ritual manifestations either of mourning or rejoicing in a narrative description; scholars are able to reconstruct the range of ritual action associated either

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follow the prescribed pattern of ritual behavior following a victory in battle; he did not rejoice with his army. Rejoicing after victory would have entailed sacrifice, feasting, and other public demonstrations confirming victory and the honor of king and people.22 Instead, he privileged his private feelings, introducing mourning rites where they were inappropriate; by doing so, he turned the rejoicing of victory into the shame of defeat for the entire army.23 As Julian Pitt-Rivers and John G. Peristiany have observed, rites “establish consensus as to ‘how things are.’”24 Because David was the suzerain, his actions had the power to shape consensus, even if they were inappropriate to the occasion; his behavior communicated the illegitimacy of rejoicing, the ritual antitype to mourning, even though rejoicing was expected.25 Though corporate victory should have overshadowed and even displaced personal loss, David did not allow for this. In the eyes of the people, victory was turned into defeat, a state associated both with mourning and with shame. Thus, David’s act constituted covenant violation: he loves those who hate him (his rebellious son Absalom) and hates those who love him (his loyal servants). To “hate” in a treaty context means to violate covenant; to “love” means to conform to covenant stipulations. Exod 20:5– 6//Deut 5:9–10 illustrate the covenant associations of such love/hate lan————— with rejoicing or mourning by referring to multiple texts describing each. Anderson makes this point (Time to Mourn). 22 On ritual conveying honor—“making manifest the honorable status of the actors”—see Peristiany and Pitt-Rivers, Honor and Grace, 2. That victory in battle confers or increases honor is made clear by 2 Kgs 14:10, the message of warning from Joash of Israel to Amaziah of Judah: “You have certainly defeated Edom and your heart has lifted you up; be honored (hikkƗbƝd), and remain in your house” (my emphasis). A passage illustrating rejoicing after victory is 1 Sam 11:13–15: Saul’s kingship is renewed at Gilgal after victory over the Ammonites; sacrifices are performed and the king and all Israel “rejoice” greatly. After victory in battle over Amalek, Saul leads sacrifices at the shrine in Gilgal (1 Sam 15:15, 21, 30–31). He begs a reluctant Samuel to appear at the sacrifices with him: “Honor me (kabbƟdƝnî nƗ’) before the elders of my people and before Israel; return with me and I will worship Yhwh your god” (1 Sam 15:30). The passage implies that Samuel’s absence would have dishonored the king; it illustrates the pattern of rejoicing after victory and underscores the importance of ritual—and the presence of important figures at such rites—in conveying honor. Anderson notes the connection of sacrificial feasting and victory in battle (Time to Mourn, 21). 23 On the connection of mourning to defeat, see 1 Sam 4:12–13; 2 Sam 1:2, where public mourning gestures follow reception of the news of defeat in battle. Anderson cites rabbinic discussion in which a conflict between the rejoicing requirements of a festival and the demands of mourning are resolved in favor of festival observance (Time to Mourn, 50). 24 Peristiany and Pitt-Rivers, Honor and Grace, 2. See similarly the earlier discussion of PittRivers in “The Anthropology of Honour,” 15–16: Ritual and ceremonial action “serve to establish the consensus of the society with regard to the order of precedence; they demonstrate what is acceptable by reference to what is accepted.” 25 David’s powerful position in the hierarchy of reciprocal honor accorded him the power to shape consensus. Rejoicing was impossible without the king’s participation, just as it was apparently threatened after Saul’s victory over Amalek if Samuel had refused to be present (1 Sam 15:30; see n. 22 above for discussion).

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guage nicely; there Yhwh characterizes himself as a god who punishes those who “hate” him and acts with covenant loyalty (h̡esed) toward those who “love” him (glossed in the text as “those who keep my commandments,” i.e., serve the suzerain). Human treaty partners “love” and “hate” in the same manner. In 1 Kgs 5:15 we are told that Hiram of Tyre, wishing to confirm covenant relations with Israel at Solomon’s accession to the throne, sends representatives to Solomon “for Hiram had always been a lover of David” (that is, loyal in covenant to David).26 Because David did not act appropriately toward his loyal servants, the legitimate covenant expectations of a victorious army were not met. There was no public rejoicing to confirm victory and honor, no sacrifices to reward the army for their loyalty to the beleaguered king.27 David’s intentions—innocent to be sure—were irrelevant; only his ritual actions had significance. Through these actions, he effectively honored his enemy while shaming his loyal supporters.28 Why should this case of diminishment or shaming of vassals be treated differently from the cases discussed previously? In the other examples, a suzerain reassigns a single vassal to a new and lower station in the hierarchy of honor that communicates the relative status of vassals vis-à-vis one another and their suzerain. In such cases, covenant violation is not an issue; it is the right of the suzerain to diminish or honor individual vassals as a way of publicizing their relative status at any particular time. In the case of 2 Sam 19:1–9, David has shamed all of his vassals; the shaming has no relation to the assignment of relative position in a status hierarchy; and David has effectively honored his enemy Absalom by public mourning on account of his death. So 2 Sam 19:1–9 contrasts significantly with the other examples discussed previously, and this may explain Joab’s accusing David of covenant violation. By honoring the enemy—who should be diminished or shamed29—and shaming his whole army, David has apparently gone beyond his rights as suzerain and broken covenant.

————— 26

Cf. EA 27, passim, where the rhetoric is strikingly similar. On the distribution of sacrifices and other food items as a form of payment for services rendered or to be rendered, see, e.g., 1 Sam 13:8–12. 28 Interestingly, this is not the only case reported of David acting without regard to ritual requirements; see 2 Sam 12:15–23, where he radically reinterprets the purpose of mourning rites. 29 A desire to increase the shame of a vanquished enemy is typical and enhances one’s own honor. In Isa 23:9, Yhwh promises “to dishonor all the honored” of Tyre, whom he will defeat. See further Isa 16:14. Enemies must be diminished and allies honored. See ARM 2.113.31, where diminishing the enemy (lit., the head of the enemy) is discussed (qaqqad ayyƗb bƝlƯya Ibaal Addu uqallil). In Ps 132:18, Yhwh promises to shame David’s enemies. 27

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IV. 2 Samuel 19:10–44 Vassals competing for position in a hierarchy of honor is an issue in the narrative of 2 Sam 19:10–44. Judah’s elders are the first to bring David back over the Jordan at David’s own request (vv. 12–15). When the Israelites learn that their rivals the Judeans have been assigned the task of bringing the king back, they are furious and object vigorously: “Why have our brothers, the men of Judah, stolen you and brought the king and his household and all the men of David with him over the Jordan?” (v. 42). The Judeans answer that they are close relations of David—“the king is near to us”—and that the king has not favored them in the past. This response is unacceptable to the Israelites; they insist that they have a larger share in David than do the Judeans and that they were the first to think of bringing the king back. Then they ask the Judeans: “Why have you diminished me?” (ûmaddûa‘ hƟqillǀtanî; v. 44). This text illustrates some of the dynamics of a competitive hierarchy of honor at work. The Israelites and the Judeans, both recently defeated rebels, decide to return to the king and now compete for position in a ritual context: the return of David and his entourage across the Jordan. David invites the Judeans to take the place of precedence, and they do, angering the Israelites, who claim to have been “diminished” by this action. Curiously, the Israelites do not accuse David himself of diminishing them, though he is the suzerain. Perhaps they were unaware of David’s invitation to the Judeans. In any case, they seem to have expected the Judeans to cede to them automatically the premier place in the hierarchy of honor. It would seem that not only can a suzerain diminish a vassal, but apparently a vassal can diminish a rival vassal by claiming his place of honor in a status hierarchy and getting away with it, as this example illustrates.

V. 2 Samuel 10:1–6 A third text of interest is 2 Sam 10:1–6, a narrative describing Ammonite violation of covenant with Israel. Nahash, king of the Ammonites and David’s partner in a parity treaty,30 has died; his son Hannun rules in his stead. —————

30 So it would seem. The comments of the Ammonite courtiers in v. 3—David’s seemingly appropriate gestures to a treaty partner cloak his true motives: conquest—suggest that the treaty is one of equals rather than one between a suzerain and a vassal. In contrast, see 2 Sam 8:12, where Ammon is listed among powers subdued by David. But this notice could refer to the state of affairs after David’s war against Ammon described in 2 Samuel 10–11. Pinhas Artzi also regards this treaty as one of equals (see his “Mourning in International Relations,” in Death in Mesopotamia

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Like any good treaty partner, David sends emissaries to the court of Ammon; these “comforters” (mƟnah̡ămîm), who participate symbolically in the mourning process,31 function to honor publicly the deceased,32 confirming the covenant bond as the throne of Ammon passes to a new ruler.33 David himself says: “I will practice covenant-loyalty (h̡esed) with Hannun as his father practiced covenant-loyalty with me” (v. 2). Yet Hannun’s courtiers suspect David’s motives; they convince Hannun that David means to conquer Ammon (v. 3).34 The Ammonites seize David’s representatives who have been sent as “comforters,” whose very presence functions to inscribe honor and communicate David’s covenant loyalty in the public, ritual setting of national mourning rites. The Ammonites shave off half the beard of each of David’s representatives, cut off their garments so that their buttocks are exposed, and expel them.35 The emissaries are described as “exceedingly shamed” (niklƗmîm mƟ’ǀd); they return to Israel but are told by David to remain in Jericho—away from the royal capital—until their beards begin to grow back (v. 5). War against Ammon follows. The Ammonites intentionally break their covenant with David; they do so by publicly shaming his representatives and, through them, David and Israel. The servants of David who came to honor the dead king of Ammon through assuming the role of mourners are themselves dishonored; the Ammonites manipulate and distort a commonplace gesture of mourning (cutting/shaving the beard) in order to bring shame to the emissaries.36 In ————— [ed. Bendt Alster; Mesopotamia: Copenhagen Studies in Assyriology 8; Copenhagen: Akademisk, 1980], 162, brought to my attention by Gary A. Anderson). 31 See Anderson, Time to Mourn, 84, and n. 74 for discussion and citations. 32 See 2 Sam 10:3: hamƟkabbƝd dƗwƯd ’et-’ƗbîkƗ bƟ‘ênêkƗ kî šƗlah̡ lƟkƗ mƟnah̡ămîm, “Does David honor your father in your eyes because he has sent to you comforters?” 33 Cf. 1 Kgs 5:15, where Hiram of Tyre, David’s ally, sends his servants to Jerusalem when he hears of Solomon’s accession to the throne, “for Hiram had always loved David” (i.e., conformed to covenant expectations). See further Artzi, “Mourning in International Relations,” 162–65; and Meier, Messenger, 32–34, for parallels and discussion of the function of mourning between treaty partners. Artzi examines two second-millennium parallels of note: the mourning of Hittite ruler Hattushili III for his “brother” Kadashman-Turgu of Kardunijash, and that of Mitanni king Tushratta over Pharaoh Amenhotep III. See Moran, “Love of God,” 80–81, for further examples of interest. 34 This interpretation has been disputed; see P. Kyle McCarter, Jr., II Samuel: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB 9; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1984), 270 n. 3. 35 Meier points out that it was standard procedure in ancient West Asia “to repulse messengers from non-allied third parties” (Messenger, 138–39). If David’s emissaries had simply been repulsed by Hannun of Ammon, and thereby been treated as the embassy of a non-ally, the covenant would have effectively been violated. Instead, they were seized, humiliated, and expelled. 36 On cutting the corner of the beard as a mourning gesture, see Lev 19:27; 21:5, where it is proscribed. Isa 15:2 and Jer 48:37 speak of “diminishing” the beard as a mourning gesture; Jer 41:5 speaks of “shaving” the beard. See further Anderson, Time to Mourn, 62 n. 6; and McCarter, II Samuel, 270. In no case do these texts speak of shaving off half the beard, a grotesque gesture to be sure.

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addition, they expose the “nakedness” of David’s servants, thereby shaming them further.37 Such double shaming—in an international or “official” mourning context38—makes Ammon “odious” (b’š Niphal) to David, and war ensues.39 In this instance, ritual action is intentionally distorted in order to shame an ally and violate covenant by so doing; the twisted shaving rite is augmented by a more prosaic humiliation (exposure) intended perhaps to adumbrate the shame of military defeat.40 In the universe of reciprocal honor, David had little choice but to respond with military action; only through victory for Israel and defeat (and thus humiliation) for Ammon could David recover honor for himself and his people after such a devastating, public inscription of shame.

VI. 1 Samuel 31/2 Samuel 1–2 Covenant obligations and the notions of honor and shame are associated in a less explicit way in 1 Samuel 31 and 2 Samuel 1–2, narratives describing or referring to the death and burial of Saul and his sons. 1 Samuel 31 tells of the death of Saul and his sons in battle at Mount Gilboa. After Israel’s defeat, the Philistines find the corpses of Saul and his sons on the field and strip them; they take Saul’s weapons as a prize of war for their temple; they decapitate Saul and presumably his sons and hang up their bodies on the wall of Beth Shan (1 Sam 31:9–10). Each of these acts is dishonoring to Saul and his sons and, through them, to vanquished Israel.41 To have no burial, to have one’s body dismembered or decapitated,42 and to be hung up —————

37 Exposure of the genitalia and/or buttocks (= “nakedness”) was dishonoring in this cultural sphere (see Michal’s ironic comment to David in 2 Sam 6:20). Display of naked genitalia or buttocks had associations with military defeat and exile (Amos 2:16; Isa 20:1–6); ideally, people were to keep themselves covered (see Gen 3:7) and to cover others when necessary (Gen 9:23; Isa 58:7). In an extrabiblical treaty context, exposure of the wives of covenant violators is attested as a curse; see Sefire I A 41 (Joseph A. Fitzmyer, The Aramaic Inscriptions of Sefire [BibOr 19; Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1967], 14–15,16–17). 38 The language is that of Artzi, “Mourning in International Relations,” 161—70 passim. Presumably, the ambassadors of other Ammonite allies (and perhaps vassals) were also present to witness David’s and Israel’s humiliation, thereby making it that much more acute. 39 The Niphal of b’š (“to become odious” or “make oneself odious”) may be a technical term for covenant violation; compare 2 Sam 16:21 and probably Gen 34:30 and 1 Sam 13:4. See also the Hiphil in 1 Sam 27:12. Many commentators note the connection between the shaming of David’s embassy and the war that ensues. 40 McCarter has taken a different approach; he has argued that “the particular combination here [shaving and exposure] suggests symbolic castration.” See his fuller discussion in II Samuel, 270– 71. 41 Note the very public context of these humiliations. On the shaming of enemies, see n. 29. 42 Lack of burial and body dismemberment are standard curses, in a covenant context (Deut 28:26; 1 Kgs 14:11) or otherwise (2 Kgs 9:10, 36–37). Potential covenant violators were threat-

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in public43 are all humiliations with serious implications; the exposure of nakedness and the loss of symbols of status further underscore Saul’s and Israel’s shame. When Gileadites in Jabesh hear of this, they remove the corpses from the wall of Beth Shan, bring them to Jabesh, and burn them; then they bury the bones and fast for seven days (1 Sam 31:11–12). David and his men mourn at the news of Saul’s death (2 Sam 1:11). When David hears of the deeds of the Gileadites, he commends them for their loyalty as vassals: “Blessed are you by Yhwh, because you did this act of covenant loyalty (h̡esed) with your lord Saul, by burying him” (2 Sam 2:5). David goes on to attempt to woo the Gileadites, informing them that the Judeans have made him their king, and hinting that Gilead should follow suit. The loyal acts of the Gileadites of Jabesh are our principal concern. They are described by David as actions befitting a sound vassal-suzerain covenant relationship. Though honor and shame are not mentioned explicitly in these passages, the Gileadite actions function to remove disgrace and to confer honor to the dead king by means of appropriate burial and mourning rites.44 The burning of the bodies is odd and may have something to do with their state of decapitation.45 Honor is once again tied to covenant loyalty, ————— ened with decapitation or dismemberment in ancient West Asian treaties; see Sefire I A 39–40 (Fitzmyer, Aramaic Inscriptions, 14–15); and the treaty between Ashurnirari VI and Mati’ilu of Bit-Agusi (Ernst F. Weidner, “Der Staatsvertrag Assurniraris VI. von Assyrien mit Mati’ilu von Bit-Agusi,” AfO 8 [1932]: 18–19). On the dismemberment of covenant violators, see generally Robert Polzin, “HWQY‘ and Covenantal Institutions in Early Israel,” HTR 62 (1969): 233–40. For the curse of nonburial in nontreaty contexts, see the Eshmunazor of Sidon sarcophagus (KAI 14:8), which includes the curses “let them not be buried in a grave” and “let them have no resting place among the Rephaim” (shades of the dead) for those who would disturb the sepulcher. See also Tabnit of Sidon (KAI 13:8) for the latter curse. 43 The hanging of corpses in a public setting was one method used to dishonor the enemy. See Josh 10:26, where the five vanquished Amorite kings are executed and hung on five trees by Joshua and Israel. See also 2 Sam 4:12, where the murderers of Eshbaal, son of Saul, are executed at David’s order: their hands and feet are cut off before they are hung at the Hebron pool. Lam 5:12 sets in parallel two humiliating observations: “Princes are hung by their hands” // “The faces of elders are not honored” (lǀ’ nehdƗrû). Not surprisingly, Deut 21:23 describes “one who is hanged” (tƗlûy) as “cursed of God.” 44 Compare the texts promising a dishonorable end to the life of Jehoiakim, king of Judah: he will be tossed in the grave of an ass outside Jerusalem, without lamentation (Jer 22:18–19); he will not be buried (Jer 36:30). The Gileadites of Jabesh provided for Saul precisely what Jehoiakim will lack according to these texts: mourning rites and an honorable burial. Cf. also Jer 34:5, regarding Zedekiah of Judah, who will be appropriately mourned and lamented. 45 On the evidence for cremation in ancient Israel, see Elizabeth Bloch-Smith, Judahite Burial Practices and Beliefs About the Dead (JSOTSup 123; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1992), 52–55. BlochSmith associates cremation with the Phoenicians and speculates that the Gileadites of Jabesh might have been Phoenicians themselves because they burn the bodies of Saul and his sons (54 n. 3). This seems highly unlikely; the condition of the bodies is probably a better explanation. But see Jer 34:5, where reference is made to burning of the dead king as his ancestors were burned (cf. 2 Chr 16:14). These texts certainly suggest a royal institution, at least in Judah in the period of the divided kingdoms and after.

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and in this case to the removal of a suzerain’s—and by extension, the nation’s—shame. David promises blessings for Jabesh from himself and from Yhwh for their act of covenant loyalty. That obligations to the suzerain last beyond his death is illustrated not only here but also by various West Asian inscriptions, including the Sefire corpus, where the vassal is obligated to avenge (nqm) the suzerain’s blood from the hand of his “haters.”46 The inhabitants of Jabesh-Gilead, loyal to their lord Saul even after his death, act to provide him with an honorable burial; this in turn functions to efface shame and restore honor to Israel.

VII. Lamentations 1 Lamentations 1 is another interesting example of honor/shame dynamics at work in a context concerned with covenant relations. In contrast to the preceding three examples, which are narratives, Lamentations 1 is a lyrical text, one of five separate laments composed soon after the fall of Jerusalem in 587/6.47 Lamentations 1 introduces the figure of vanquished Jerusalem. She is like a widow, isolated and in mourning; she has been transformed by defeat from a princess into a forced laborer; now she is exiled from her land (vv. 1–3). Covenant language appears first in v. 2: “She has no comforter from among all her lovers (’ǀhăbêhƗ),” // “All her friends (rƝ‘êhƗ) have treated her deceitfully,” // “They have become her enemies.” On several other occasions throughout the lament, the poet emphasizes the image of the isolated widow who lacks a comforter (vv. 9, 16, 17, 21). In v. 2, the image of the widow without a comforter is tied directly to the image of Jerusalem’s “lovers”: “She has no comforter from among all her lovers.” These “lovers” are, on one level, Judah’s allies, other small nations such as Edom, bound with Judah in covenant to resist Babylonian hegemony.48 The failure of Judah’s allies to aid her in her time of need is a covenant viola—————

46 See Sefire III 11 in Fitzmyer, Aramaic Inscriptions, 98–99. Cf. Lev 26:25, where Yhwh promises “covenant vengeance” (nƟqam bƟrît) for Israelite violators. On the obligations of the vassal after the death of his suzerain, see further Esarhaddon’s vassal treaties (Donald J. Wiseman, The Vassal Treaties of Esarhaddon [London: British School of Archaeology in Iraq, 1958], 31–58 passim). 47 For background, see Delbert R. Hillers, Lamentations: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB 7A; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1972), xv–xxiii. 48 On another level, adulterous relations with male lovers may be implied. See further the discussion in Hillers, Lamentations, 19. The anti-Babylonian alliance of Judah and other small nations in 597, after the first deportation, is the subject of Jeremiah 27. The alliance then consisted of Edom, Moab, Ammon, Tyre, and Sidon. The history of this coalition after that point is obscure, though various biblical texts suggest that Edom at least was still in covenant with Judah at the time of Jerusalem’s destruction.

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tion; it is dramatized in the image of the widow who lacks a comforter though she had many lovers, and in the following images of her lovers treating her deceitfully and becoming her enemies. As we have seen, mourning rites are a context in which allies honor allies by sending comforters (2 Sam 10:2–3); similarly, in noncovenantal personal relations, an individual mourner can expect friends to function in the role of comforter (Job 2:11–13; Jer 16:7). An ally or friend who does not fulfill this obligation is no “lover.” Thus the figure of Jerusalem as a widow mourning without comforters from among her lovers, a city whose allies deserted her in her time of need and turned against her. The rhetoric of honor is introduced twice in Lamentations 1. In v. 6, we are told that “all her honor (hădƗrƗh) has gone forth from the daughter of Zion.” The wider context of the poem suggests that this loss of honor is a result of the humiliations Jerusalem has endured: her defeat, her exile, the loss of the Temple, the disloyalty of her allies, the desperation of her people. Her diminishment is extreme; she has descended from a position of honor to a place of shame (from princess to exiled forced laborer in the figure of v. 1). The ubiquitous mourning imagery of this lament underscores Judah’s humiliation; mourning after a military debacle is typical and is frequently tied directly to the experience of shame.49 In v. 8 we are told that “all who honored her despise her (kol-mƟkabbƟdêhƗ hizzîlûhƗ),” // “For they have seen her nakedness”; in v. 11 she states: “See Yhwh and look, for I am despised.” Who honored her and now despises her? Her former allies are the primary candidates. As allies, they would have practiced covenant love; they would have honored their covenant partner Judah in public contexts and in doing so would have externalized their covenant loyalty for all to see. Now, at Judah’s downfall, they are disloyal in covenant; they have withheld aid and have perhaps even joined with the foe; they have despised her publicly.50 The public display of Jerusalem’s nakedness and the fact that enemies have seen it fit well as an image in this lament over national defeat and exile. Exposure of nakedness was a mode of inscribing shame (2 Sam 10:4–5), a common way of diminishing enemy prisoners on their way into exile (Isa 20:1–6; Amos 2:16). To see the nakedness of a foe is something over which to rejoice; one covers a friend’s or relative’s nakedness. Jerusalem, defeated, isolated, and despised, had no one to cover her nakedness, no one to comfort her. —————

49 See, e.g., Jer 9:18 (Eng. v. 19), where a lament over Judah is quoted in part: “How we are devastated,” // “We are greatly shamed,” // “For we have left the land,” // “For they have thrown down our dwellings.” On the connection of defeat and mourning, see n. 23. 50 For evidence suggesting Edom’s violation of covenant at the time of the fall of Jerusalem, see Ps 137:7; Obad 8–14; Lam 4:21–22.

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VIII. Conclusions Covenant ideologies shaped profoundly both social and political relations in ancient Israel and its environment. Though scholars have paid little attention to the place of honor and shame in covenant dynamics, honor and shame were clearly components of a larger complex of ideas related to covenant, a complex characterized by notions of reciprocity. Just as covenant love and covenant loyalty were reciprocal, even between suzerain and vassal, so was honor in a covenant setting. To love one’s treaty partner was to conform to covenant stipulations, as William L. Moran and others have shown; to honor an ally, suzerain, or vassal was to demonstrate in the public sphere—often in a ritual setting—conformity to covenant. To honor was the public means of demonstrating covenant love, and rites were frequently the setting in which such demonstrations occurred. Ritual institutions were vehicles for confirming or transforming the state of covenant relations. In contrast to covenant love and covenant loyalty, reciprocal honor in a covenant setting could have hierarchical dimensions. Whereas love and loyalty were simply owed to any treaty partner, honor was more complex: partners in a parity treaty honored one another equally; in contrast, a suzerain was able to honor one vassal more than another, creating a hierarchy of honor that publicized the relative status of each vassal vis-à-vis the suzerain and other vassals. A suzerain could choose to diminish a vassal and increase the honor of another vassal, thereby demonstrating his hegemony. In contrast, a vassal had little choice but to accept the will of the suzerain and to continue to honor him. Such a hierarchy of honor brought the unevenness of a suzerain—vassal relationship into sharp relief. The dynamics of diminishment and shame, like those of honor, were complex. Sensitivity to even the slightest degree of perceived diminishment is a common theme in texts concerned with covenant honor. But not all diminishment was treated in the same way. Cases of significant diminishment or shaming by vassal or ally were often judged to be covenant violations; these resulted in predictable efforts to restore honor and shame the violator, usually through military defeat. But minor cases of diminishment by one ally of another rarely resulted in more than protest and threat or protest and example setting. In such instances, the slightly diminished party probably felt that there was more to be lost in terminating the treaty and pursuing restoration of honor through war than in protesting a minor gesture of diminishment with the hope that the offending party would do a better job conforming to covenant expectations in the future. Though honor and shame dynamics certainly played a role in covenant relations in Israel and its environment, it is interesting that prescriptive texts rarely require the Israelite to honor Yhwh, the suzerain par excellence. No

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central passage parallels the command to love Yhwh in Deut 6:5–9. Yet the command to honor parents has a place in the Decalogue (Exod 20:12; Deut 5:16), whatever its precise meaning. Prescriptions to honor Yhwh are found outside of legal materials, though they are less common than one might imagine.51 And in human treaty contexts, prescriptive statements requiring honor are extremely rare. It would seem that honor was frequently an implicit requirement in covenant relations. Most of the evidence for the relationship of honor to covenant is found not in prescriptive contexts but in narrative materials making reference to the state of covenant relations between two parties (e.g., Amarna documents, Assyrian letters, biblical narratives such as 2 Samuel 19). That treaty partners will honor one another is assumed. A dearth of prescriptive texts demanding honor in covenant contexts may help to explain the lack of scholarly attention to honor as a component of covenant relations.52

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51 Ps 22:24: “Those who fear Yhwh, praise him!” // “All the seed of Jacob, honor him!”; Prov 3:9: “Honor Yhwh from your wealth” // “From the first fruits of all your ingathering.” See also Isa 24:15: “Therefore, with ’njrîm (?) honor Yhwh.” 52 I would like to express my thanks to Baruch Halpern, Gary A. Anderson, Susan A. Harvey, Shaye J. D. Cohen, Stanley K. Stowers, John J. Collins, and one anonymous reader, whose helpful suggestions allowed me to improve this piece at several stages in its development. As always, errors of fact or judgment remain my responsibility exclusively.

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What Do Shaving Rites Accomplish and What Do They Signal in Biblical Ritual Contexts?*

Shaving rites are a component in quite a number of biblical rituals. Surprisingly, however, they have not yet received a comprehensive treatment by scholars in the biblical field. When shaving rites are treated—in commentaries on specific biblical passages, in dictionary and encyclopedia articles— they are usually associated in a perfunctory manner with specific contexts such as mourning, or specific functions such as achieving purification, causing humiliation, or bringing about the surrender of an individual’s power or personality.1 Sometimes mention is made of the association of shaving with rites of transition (rites de passage), though usually with little ————— *

My thanks to Stanley K. Stowers, Burke O. Long, Victor Avigdor Hurowitz and Theodore Lewis for reading the manuscript in its penultimate form, and for providing helpful suggestions toward its improvement. I would also like to thank Brian Schmidt, who kindly sent me his reactions to the initial proposal, and made helpful bibliographic suggestions. Naturally, any errors of fact or judgment are my responsibility alone. 1 Among recent dictionary and encyclopedia entries, see J.J.M. Roberts, “Shaving,” in The HarperCollins Bible Dictionary (ed. Paul J. Achtemeier; San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1996), 1005: “As a sign of mourning and as part of several purification rituals, shaving had religious significance in Israelite society”; see similarly Adele Berlin, “Hair,” ibid., 398 and Georg Fohrer, “Scheren,” in Biblisch-Historisches Handwörterbuch (ed. Bo Reicke and Leonhard Rost; 4 vols.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962–79), 3:1690–1691. The surveys of G. Johannes Botterweck, ʧʬʢ, TDOT, 3:5–20 and Michael Fishbane, ʸʲˈ, Encyclopaedia Biblica (9 vols.; Jerusalem: Bialik, 1950–88), 8:326–34, make no serious attempt to develop a comprehensive understanding of shaving rites. The commentaries of Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB 3A; New York: Doubleday, 1991) on Lev 13:33 and 14:8–9, and Baruch A. Levine, Numbers 1–20: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB 4A; New York: Doubleday, 1993) on Numbers 6 and Numbers 8 have little to say about shaving per se. Other commentaries are similar in their neglect. Moshe Greenberg, Ezekiel 1–20: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB 22; Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1983), 126, comments with respect to Ezek 5:1–4 that “ritual shaving signified surrender of power or personality,” citing Theodor H. Gaster, Myth, Legend and Custom in the Old Testament (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 437–38. Greenberg also claims, though without argument, that the shaving of all head hair was degrading (ibid., 127). See also Brian B. Schmidt, Israel’s Beneficent Dead: Ancestor Cult and Necromancy in Ancient Israelite Religion and Tradition (1994; Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 1996), 166 n. 132, on shaving effecting purification and in some contexts (e.g., Isa 7:20; 2 Sam 10:1–6), humiliation. Humiliating acts of shaving are attested also in cuneiform texts. See for example the Laws of Hammurabi, par. 127, and the Middle Assyrian Laws, A par. 18–19 in Martha T. Roth, Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor (SBLWAW 6; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995).

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or no discussion.2 Typically, no attempt is made to chart the specific functions of ritual shaving in rites of transition to see whether any patterns emerge,3 or to ask whether shaving has a larger function in biblical ritual that goes beyond its particular function in any specific ritual setting— whether, in other words, there is a relationship between the shaving of the mourner on the one hand, who departs from quotidian life and enters a state of polluted separation, and the shaving of the Nazirite as he or she completes the ritual requirements of the Nazirite vow and moves a step closer to reentering the day-to-day life of the community. It is my purpose to consider a number of shaving rites that have a particularly clear association with rites of transition; I do so in order to see whether it is possible to generate a comprehensive explanation of what such shaving rites accomplish in biblical ritual settings and what they signal to participants and onlookers.4 I am interested in exploring both the specific functions and associations of ritual shaving in rites of transition and the larger question of what—if anything— each specific shaving rite might share in common with other such rites. Manipulation of parts of the body or the body as a whole through such activities as tattooing, shaving, laceration and circumcision is common to ————— 2

Gordon J. Wenham, The Book of Leviticus (NICOT; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1979), 208, associates insightfully the shaving rite of Lev 14:8–9 with rites of aggregation, though with little further discussion. On the rites de passage in general, see the classic monograph of Arnold van Gennep, Les rites de passage (Paris: Emile Nourry, 1909) (published in English as The Rites of Passage [trans. M.B. Vizedom and G.L. Caffee; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960]), who introduced the basic terminology of the rites de passage (“rites de séparation,” “rites de marge,” “rites d’agrégation”). See also Victor W. Turner, “Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period in Rites de Passage,” in The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1967), 93–111; idem, The Ritual Process: Structure and AntiStructure (Chicago: Aldine, 1969); Edmund Leach, Culture and Communication (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 77–79 and more recently, Jean S. La Fontaine, Initiation (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), 24–29, who includes a survey of postvan Gennep elaboration and modification of van Gennep’s rites de passage model. 3 For example, are shaving rites usually or always associated with rites of separation, as some anthropologists have argued (e.g., van Gennep, Rites of Passage, 53–54, 54–55, 78, 166; Leach, “Magical Hair,” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 88 [1958]:158, 162; idem., Culture and Communication, 61, 62, 77, 78)? 4 There has been much discussion among students of ritual about whether rites simply mirror social distinctions or actually bring them into being. My own view is that they must do both; thus, I speak of shaving rites effecting or accomplishing changes in status, as well as communicating or signaling them. On rites shaping reality, see further the discussions of David I. Kertzer, Ritual, Politics & Power (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1988) and Catherine Bell, Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Ian Morris, DeathRitual and Social Structure in Classical Antiquity (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) follows this approach. For the older view, that ritual patterns encode and promote prevailing social arrangements, see Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology (1970; London and New York: Routledge, 1996). Leach, Culture and Communication, 77, argues that rites of transition have “the double function of proclaiming the change of status and of magically bringing it about.”

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many cultures. As social anthropologists have long noted, such manipulation—often labeled mutilation5— functions to distinguish individuals and classes of persons and to communicate such status distinctions in a clear manner.6 Head and facial hair are particularly well suited to effect and mark social and ritual differentiations, since they are easily visible and easily manipulated by means of full or partial shaving, depilation, coloring, cutting or some combination of these.7 Unlike certain other forms of ritual manipulation of the body (e.g., circumcision, laceration, tattooing), shaving brings about only a temporary change in appearance, in that the shaved hair will always grow back after a time; as a result, shaving is well-attested cross-culturally in rites of transition that effect only a temporary change in the individual’s status (e.g., mourning rites),8 though it is also used at times to bring about and to mark longer-term change as well.9 When all is said and done, shaving proves to be a uniquely flexible way of bringing about and marking status change in ritual settings. A number of biblical texts mention shaving parts of the body (e.g., the head, the beard) or the whole body as a central component of certain rituals that we might characterize as rites of transition. I want to look briefly at a selection of biblical shaving rites in order to identify their context-specific functions to see whether any patterns emerge, and in order to identify the —————

5 I avoid the term “mutilation” because an action deemed mutilating by one culture may have a very different significance in another. One only needs to think of the perception of circumcision during the Hellenistic and Roman periods among Greeks or Romans and assimilationist Jews, on the one hand, and traditionalist Jews, on the other, to get a sense of just how culturally bound the notion of mutilation is. On views of circumcision among Greeks, Romans and Jews, see R. G. Hall, “Epispasm and the Dating of Ancient Jewish Writings,” JSP 2 (1988): 71–86, especially 76– 77. 6 Raymond Firth, “Hair as Private Asset and Public Symbol,” in Symbols: Public and Private (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973), 288, 298; Leach, Culture and Communication, 61– 62; Anthony Synnott, The Body Social: Symbolism, Self and Society (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 127. 7 On hair’s suitability as a marker of social distinctions, see Christopher R. Hallpike, “Social Hair,” Man 4 (1969):257; Paul Hershman, “Hair, Sex and Dirt,” Man 9 (1974):291. 8 Leach, Culture and Communication, 61 on shaving as “reversible” in contrast to other forms of ritual “mutilation,” and therefore particularly “appropriate as a metaphor for the reversal of social time that is called for in rites of transition.” He argues that “irreversible mutilations” more typically mark “permanent stages in social maturation.” 9 Leach’s tendency to associate rites of shaving with temporary status change requires modification given the data from ancient West Asia. This evidence suggests the association of shaving with long-term as well as short-term status change, change such as the entry of an individual into slavery, a social status that can last many years or a whole lifetime, though it is reversible. The “abbuttu lock,” the marker of the slave in some Mesopotamian contexts (mainly Old Babylonian), is imposed by means of shaving when the slave is separated for slavery; cutting the abbuttu lock frees the slave. See the Laws of Hammurabi, par. 146, 226–27 and the Laws of Eshnunna, par. 51– 52 in Roth, Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor. See further CAD 5:130 (“gullubu”) and AHw 1:297 (“gullubu[m],”) with examples.

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larger, common function of shaving rites if indeed there is one. In Numbers 8, the Levites shave their bodies as one of several rites of preparation for their dedication.10 The pericope begins in v. 6, where Moses is ordered to separate the Levites “from the midst of the people of Israel, and purify them.” Verse 7 specifies the manner in which they are to be purified: Moses will sprinkle “waters of purification” (mê h̚at́t́Ɨ’t)11 upon them; they will pass a razor over their entire flesh; they will wash their garments. Offerings and other ritual actions follow, leading to the dedication of the Levites to God. In this particular ritual scenario, shaving is presented as a component of purification: It is paired with clothes washing and the reception of “purifying waters.” At the same time, it effects separation: It occurs at the beginning of the dedication process, when the Levites are separated from the rest of the people and move into a transitional (or liminal) state from which they will eventually emerge in their new role as cultic servants. One might argue that the shaving of the Levites brings about and marks their submission to divine authority as well.12 Shaving rites of this sort are attested in other ancient West Asian ritual contexts in which temple personnel are separated for cultic service13; they are also well known in contemporary ethnographic literature dealing with priestly initiation.14 In every case shaving in such ritual contexts helps to bring about and mark the initial separation of the soon-to-be cultic specialist; at the same time it may also have other func—————

10 The whole pericope is assigned by Israel Knohl to H (The Sanctuary of Silence: The Priestly Torah and the Holiness School [1992; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995], 105) though it seems likely that the redaction history of the chapter is more complex, as Noth recognizes (Numbers. A Commentary [1966; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1968], 67–69). Verse 14, for example, appears to repeat most of the content of the command in v. 6 but in a distinctly H style (note the use of the Hiphil of bdl). 11 On mê h̚at́t́Ɨ’t, see Levine, Numbers 1–20, 274–75; Milgrom, Numbers (JPS Torah Commentary; Philadelphia and New York: Jewish Publication Society, 1990), 61. 12 Daniel E. Fleming believes this is a primary function of the shaving of the Emar NIN.DINGIR (high priestess) at her installation, citing Victor W. Turner’s view that “symbolic submission is characteristic of the liminal period.” He also notes the association of hair cutting with rites of separation (The Installation of Baal’s High Priestess at Emar [HSS 42; Atlanta: Scholars, 1992], 181–82). 13 The shaving of the Emar NIN.DINGIR mentioned above is an interesting Syrian parallel (Emar VI.3, #369, lines 7–28; see Fleming, Installation, 11 for text in transcription; 50 for translation). Shaving of priests and other temple servants at their separation for cultic service is attested also in Neo-Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian sources (CAD 5:130 [“gullubu”]). An interesting case from Mesopotamia, which ties shaving explicitly to purification and includes an elaborate series of incantations over the knife to be used, may be found in Rykle Borger, “Die Weihe eines EnlilPriesters,” BO 30 (1973):163–76. My thanks to Victor Hurowitz for drawing my attention to this example. 14 Firth, “Hair as Private Asset and Public Symbol,” 289. See also Hershman, “Hair, Sex and Dirt,” 287 and Leach, “Magical Hair,” 155–56 on Brahmin tonsure.

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tions, such as purification and/or effecting and marking submission to the deity. Numbers 6 describes the voluntary separation of a man or a woman from the congregation by means of the Nazirite vow.15 The Nazirite abstains from alcoholic drinks and all products of viticulture for the period of the vow (vv. 3–4); shaving of the hair of the head is proscribed (v. 5), as is contact with any corpse (vv. 6–8). The Nazirite is to be “holy” (vv. 5, 8), and the Nazirite’s hair is allowed to grow unimpeded.16 Verses 13–20 describe the rites which effect the completion of the Nazirite vow—rites of aggregation or incorporation. The Nazirite first offers gifts at the opening of the tent of meeting (vv. 13–17); the Nazirite then shaves his or her “consecrated head” there and burns the shaved hair in the fire of the altar under the šƟlƗmîm offering (v. 18). Rites of the tƟnûpâ follow (vv. 19–20), completing the rites of aggregation. At that point the Nazirite is free to drink wine; she or he has rejoined the congregation. In this ritual scenario, in contrast to that of the dedication of the Levites in Numbers 8, shaving is not associated at all with purification; the Nazirite, described as “holy,” has maintained a rigorous degree of purity, avoiding all corpse contact and presumably other sources of defilement as well.17 Nor is shaving here associated with rites of separation. On the contrary, the shaving rite occurs as one component of the series of aggregation rites which move the votary out of a state of separation back into the common life of Israel. The aggregation dimension of the shaving rite of the Nazirite remains for the most part unacknowledged by biblical scholars18; instead, they have argued mainly about whether the shaving and burning of the votary’s hair represent an offering of sorts to the deity, or simply an appropriate way to dispose of the consecrated hair.19 (The latter explanation strikes me as the more likely of the two.) —————

15 Knohl assigns Num 6:1–21 to P, though he believes it has experienced H editing and adaptation (Sanctuary of Silence, 105). Noth, Numbers, 53 considers 6:1–21 not from P per se, but “adapted to ideas of the P-narrative.” Philip Budd, Numbers (WBC 5; Waco, Tex.: Word Books, 1984), 69–70 sees the section as P with a secondary stratum added; he also provides a nice survey of opinion on source assignment for this pericope. 16 If corpse contact occurs, the Nazirite must purify himself or herself and shave the head as part of this process; then the vow begins again. In this case, the hair is polluted (wƟt́immƝ’ rǀ’š nizrô) and the shaving is associated explicitly with purification (Num 6:9–12). 17 Levine notes that the Nazirite’s level of purity is comparable to that of the high priest (according to Lev 21:11), and thus higher than that of priests (according to Lev 21:1–4) (Numbers 1– 20, 221 n.6). See similarly Milgrom, Numbers, 44. 18 Wenham is once again an exception (cf. n. 2 above), though he provides little discussion (Numbers. An Introduction and Commentary [Leicester and Downers Grove, Ill.: Inter-Varsity, 1981], 88). 19 On the question of whether the shaved hair is an offering or simply holy matter requiring appropriate disposal, see Noth, Numbers, 57; Botterweck, ʧʬʢ, 13–14; Timothy R. Ashley, The Book of Numbers (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1993), 148; Roland de Vaux, Ancient Israel (1961;

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Texts such as Isa 15:2; 22:12; Jer 16:6; 41:5; 48:37; Amos 8:10; Job 1:20 mention rites of shaving the head or cutting the beard, or parts of each— shaving a bald spot on the head or cutting the corner of the beard— associated with entry into the ritual state of mourning.20 Some texts describe mourners who pull out the hair of the head or beard, another form of hair manipulation associated with the first stages of mourning (Ezra 9:3). Shaving, pulling out or cutting hair, when these actions are associated with mourning, are always described in biblical texts as occurring among the rites separating the mourner from the rest of the people.21 The mourner weeps, tears clothing, fasts, puts earth or ashes on the head, wears sackcloth, sits or lies on the ground, manipulates the hair of the head and/or beard through shaving, cutting or depilation. In some descriptions, laceration is also associated with mourning (Jer 16:6; 41:5).22 After a circumscribed period of separation (usually seven days) during which the mourner is defiled23, the mourner returns to the community by means of aggregation rites.24 As with the Levites in Numbers 8, shaving is here a rite associated ————— 2 vols; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), 2:436, all of whom favor the appropriate disposal explanation; and George B. Gray, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Numbers (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1903), 68; and Levine, Numbers 1–20, 233–34, who favor the offering interpretation. Levine discusses a possible Kition parallel in which shaved hair may be dedicated to a deity. Jacob Licht, ʸʡʣʮʡ ʸʴʱ ʬʲ ˇʥʸʴ (3 vols.; Jerusalem: Magnes, 1985), 1:93–94 opposes the offering hypothesis. 20 See also Lev 19:27; 21:5; Deut 14:1; Ezek 7:18; Mic 1:16. 21 Though note that there are nonbiblical exceptions to this pattern. The mourning for Nabonidus’s mother, described in an inscription from Harran, mentions shaving rites accompanying purification and the discarding of mourning attire at the end of seven days of mourning (see Cyril J. Gadd, “The Harran Inscriptions of Nabonidus,” Anatolian Studies 8 [1958]:52–53; ANET, 562 [trans. Oppenheim]). Rabbinic texts bear witness to a proscription on the cutting of any body hair during the thirty day mourning period. See Masseket Semahot 7:11; 9:11 (Dov Zlotnick, The Tractate ‘Mourning’ [Semahot] [YJS 17; New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966], including the Hebrew text) and further, the discussion of Emanuel Feldman on the halakah of mourning (Biblical and Post-Biblical Defilement and Mourning: Law as Theology [New York: KTAV, 1977], 79–89). Shaving or cutting hair upon completion of mourning functions as a rite of aggregation both in the Babylonian example and in the rabbinic context. My thanks to Shaye J. D. Cohen for pointing me in the direction of Masseket Semahot. 22 H and D texts such as Lev 19:27 and Deut 14:1—which proscribe such rites, whatever their motivation—ought to be regarded as innovative, given the weight of biblical evidence that suggests the normativity of shaving and laceration rites. See further Schmidt, Israel’s Beneficent Dead, 166–78, for an insightful discussion of these texts. 23 On the defilement of the mourner, see Feldman, Biblical and Post-Biblical Defilement and Mourning. 24 Unhappily, in comparison to the many texts bearing witness to the mourner’s rites of separation, these aggregation rites are poorly attested. Numbers 19, however, describes aggregation rites after seven days of defilement for the person who has had contact with a corpse or with the tent where a corpse was present. Another interesting text is 2 Sam 12:20, where David undertakes rites of aggregation that include rising from the ground, washing, anointing himself, changing clothes

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with entry into a state of separation. But in contrast to the ritual context in that narrative, in biblical texts describing mourning rites shaving and other forms of hair manipulation have no association whatsoever with purification; the mourner is in fact unclean, and will remain so for the mourning period. Shaving, cutting and depilating hair in the mourning context are associated with other rites which are self-abasing and uncomfortable or even painful for the mourner (e.g., tearing clothes, sitting on the ground, wearing sackcloth, pouring ashes on the head, self-laceration, fasting); these function to induce the culturally prescribed reaction of tears and misery even when this might not otherwise manifest itself.25 The constellation of these self-abasing mourning rites may also have been intended to create or intensify a temporary identification with the dead for the duration of the mourning period.26 Thus, shaving, along with other mourning rites, effects and signals the mourner’s separation from the community; at the same time, shaving and other mourning rites may induce culturally prescribed responses from the mourner and may create or intensify a temporary identification between the mourner and the departed. In Deut 21:12–13, a captive alien woman who is to become the wife or concubine of her Israelite captor is to enter the house of her captor, shave her head, cut her nails, remove her “garment of captivity,”27 and then mourn ————— and finally, entering the sanctuary and eating a meal. (In this instance, David shocks his courtiers by ending the mourning state at the news of his child’s death.) 25 On this see the discussion of Gary A. Anderson, A Time to Mourn, A Time to Dance: The Expression of Grief and Joy in Israelite Religion (University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991), especially 1–18; Anderson cites earlier research, including the groundbreaking work of Alfred R. Radcliffe-Brown (The Andaman Islanders [1922; reprinted, New York: Free Press, 1964]) and the more recent monograph of Richard Huntington and Peter Metcalf, Celebrations of Death: The Anthropology of Mortuary Ritual (1979; rev. ed.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 26 Various texts suggest this, among them Gen 37:35. See further Anderson, Time to Mourn, 69, 78, 82, 87, 89; Feldman, Biblical and Post-Biblical Defilement and Mourning, 93; and Schmidt, Israel’s Beneficent Dead, 178, who believes self-laceration and tonsure were eventually banned because they effected too great an identification between mourner and departed. 27 It is not clear to what the expression “garment of captivity” (Ğimlat šibyƗh) refers. Many commentators have understood it to be the garment the woman was wearing when she was captured rather than a special garment given to prisoners of war to mark them off from others. See, for example, Peter Craigie, The Book of Deuteronomy (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1976), 281; A.D.H. Mayes, Deuteronomy (NCB; London: Oliphants, 1979), 303; Richard Clifford, Deuteronomy (Old Testament Message 4; Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1982), 113. Heather McKay has suggested to me that the garment of capture itself would very likely mark the prisoner as an alien, since the garment and other forms of adornment would probably differ from those utilized by women of the victors’ culture (oral communication). Most of the literature on the treatment of prisoners of war in West Asia focuses on the Mesopotamian evidence, which is considerably more extensive than that of small Levantine states such as Israel. On this, see Samuel I. Feigin, “The Captives in Cuneiform Inscriptions,” AJSL 50 (1934): 217–45; Ignace J. Gelb,

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for her parents one month28; after this, her captor is permitted to become her husband.29 In this case, shaving, nail cutting and the removal of the “garment of captivity” begin the transition in the woman’s status from alien prisoner of war to wife or concubine of an Israelite.30 These rites move the woman into a period of liminality during which she mourns her parents, whom she will never see again (it is probable that they are “socially dead” to her, though not physically dead). These gestures are all to be understood as rites effecting the separation of the woman from her previous identity. As others have noted, hair, nails and secretions of the body are easily manipulated, and sometimes treated in certain cultures “as symbolically equal to the person from whom they came.”31 To shave off the hair and cut the nails, in combination with discarding the “garment of captivity” and mourning “socially dead” parents, probably means in this context to cut off the captive from her past, erasing her old identity and preparing her to assume a new identity in Israel.32 Nonetheless, some have argued that the shaving ————— “Prisoners of War in Early Mesopotamia,” JNES 32 (1973): 70–98; Bustenay Oded, Mass Deportation and Deportees in the Neo-Assyrian Empire (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1978). 28 The thirty-day mourning period is significantly longer than the more widely attested sevenday period, though, as commonly noted, it is not unprecedented (see for example Num 20:29; Deut 34:8). 29 In the MT, the verbs glh̡, ‘Ğh and swr (Hiphil) are 3fs, indicating that the woman performs the ritual actions herself; in the LXX, they are 2ms, indicating that these rites are performed on the woman. 30 The woman’s social status after her marriage has been a matter of debate. Calum Carmichael, The Laws of Deuteronomy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974), 59, 61 argues that the woman is “prima facie a slave,” though she receives special treatment; her status is “more like that of a full wife than a concubine.” He cites Godfrey R. Driver and John C. Miles, The Assyrian Laws (Oxford: Clarendon, 1935), 127–128 on the legal status of captive women in the secondmillennium Assyrian context; these could be slaves, concubines or full wives. In contrast, see Jeffrey Tigay, Deuteronomy (JPS Torah Commentary; Philadelphia and New York: Jewish Publication Society, 1996), 194, who does not view the captured woman as a slave; and William L. Moran, “Deuteronomy,” in A New Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture (ed. Reginald C. Fuller, et. al.; London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1969), 271, who believes the captive to have the legal status of a concubine. (Moran’s commentary was brought to my attention by Tigay’s work.) See also Feigin, “The Captives in Cuneiform Inscriptions,” 244, who saw the captive as a concubine. 31 Hallpike, “Social Hair,” 258; cf. similarly Gaster, Myth, Legend and Custom, 438 and Moran, “Deuteronomy,” 271. Cuneiform evidence lends support to this understanding. Texts from a number of periods mention the use of nail marks on clay tablets in place of a seal, pointing to a symbolic location of personhood in the nail. See further the entry “s̞upru” in CAD 16:251 for specific citations. 32 See Pierre Buis and Jacques Leclercq, Le Deutéronome (Paris: Gabalda, 1963), 147; Moran, “Deuteronomy,” 271; Craigie, The Book of Deuteronomy, 281; Mayes, Deuteronomy, 303, all of whom take the position that the captive’s acts erase her old identity. For two texts from Mari that are not dissimilar to Deut 21:12–13, see ARM 1.8, 75 and the discussion of Michel Du Buit, “Quelques contacts bibliques dans les archives royales de Mari,” RB 66 (1959): 576–77. I wonder if there is not a magical dimension to these acts of nail cutting and shaving, given the incantations and other rituals that survive from Mesopotamia in which nails or hair are cut off in order to effect

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here ought to be understood as a mourning rite33; others, as a purification rite.34 The pairing of shaving the head with cutting the nails suggests neither mourning nor purification, given what we know of the ritual requirements of each of these processes.35 It seems as if the ritual combination of shaving, cutting nails, discarding the “garment of captivity,” and mourning “socially dead” parents is best explained as a formula intended to erase the woman’s past and set the stage for her aggregation into the Israelite community. Leviticus 13–1436 describes, among other matters, the various manifestations of skin disease (s̞Ɨra‘at) in persons and the ritual action required to bring about the purification of an individual afflicted by it. Two passages in Leviticus 13–14 demand our attention: Lev 13:33 and 14:8–9. Lev 13:33 is part of the larger unit 13:29–37, which describes persons with an itch affliction (nega‘ hanneteq) considered s̞Ɨra‘at of the head or beard and others who have a non-s̞Ɨra‘at itch affliction. The person deemed to have the appearance of an ambiguous itch affliction is separated seven days (v. 31); on the seventh day, that person is to be examined by the priest (v. 32). If the itch affliction has not spread, has no yellow hair in it, and its appearance is not deeper than the skin, then the afflicted individual must shave himself except for the place of the itch affliction (vv. 32–33). He is then separated seven more days, after which he is pronounced clean if the itch affliction still has not manifested the signs of s̞Ɨra‘at. At that point, he must wash his clothes (vv. 33–34). The individual with an ambiguous itch affliction is under suspicion of pollution, and so must be separated from the community for two one-week intervals, until his purity can be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Between the one-week intervals of separation, the afflicted individual shaves himself except for the affected spot. The shaving ————— the removal of an individual’s sin or to avert various kinds of portended evil. For an example of a namburbu (apotropaic) ritual involving shaving of body hair, intended, like other namburbu rituals, to prevent a portended evil, see François Thureau-Dangin, Rituels accadiens (Paris, 1921; repr., Osnabrück: Otto Zeller, 1975), 36. Other examples of namburbu rituals are to be found conveniently in Richard I. Caplice, The Akkadian Namburbu Texts: An Introduction (Malibu, Calif.: Undena, 1974). My thanks to Gary Beckman for providing clarification concerning namburbu rituals and for suggesting Caplice’s monograph. 33 Berlin, “Hair,” 398; Larry G. Herr, “Shave,” International Standard Bible Encyclopedia (4 vols.; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1979–88), 4:454; Craigie, The Book of Deuteronomy, 281, considers the possibility that shaving and the other rites performed by the captive are mourning rites. As Tigay points out, this explanation goes back to antiquity; he cites Josephus, Ant. 4.257 and Nahmanides (Deuteronomy, 194). 34 Schmidt, Israel’s Beneficent Dead, 166 n. 132; Roberts, “Shaving,” 1005. 35 Nail cutting is never mentioned as a component of mourning rites or rites of purification in biblical sources. 36 A P text according to Knohl, Sanctuary of Silence, 105, except for 14:34, where he finds H. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 63, also views Leviticus 13–14 as mainly P (he assigns 13:47–59 to P2, and 14:34–53, 54–57 possibly to H).

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takes place after the priest has established that the signs of polluting s̞Ɨra‘at are absent. What is the function of this shaving rite? It is clearly a required component of the afflicted individual’s movement from suspected mƟs̞ôrƗ‘ to normal community member and marks the progress of his aggregation from the first stage of suspicion to the last stage (the final week of separation). Whether the shaving is also to be associated with purification is a difficult question to answer. On the one hand, the individual in question has not been shown to be unclean, so why would the shaving function to purify him if he requires no purification? On the other hand, a standard purification rite—washing clothes—is mandated at the end of the process even after the afflicted individual has been shown to be clean, and a shaving rite is required of the person actually being purified from s̞Ɨra‘at in Lev 14:8–9. The afflicted individual of Lev 13:33 is being treated somewhat37 like a recovered mƟs̞ôrƗ‘, probably because his itch affliction resembles s̞Ɨra‘at enough to warrant protective measures such as shaving and laundering, just in case. The shaving in Lev 13:33, like the laundering in 13:34, may just be a prophylactic rite of purification as well as a component and marker of the suspect afflicted individual’s progress to the next ritual stage in his aggregation process. Lev 14:8 is part of the larger unit 14:1–32, which describes the requirements for the purification of one actually afflicted with s̞Ɨra‘at. In Lev 14:8, after an elaborate series of purification rites including being spattered with blood and pronounced clean by a priest, the person cured of skin disease washes his clothes, shaves off “all his hair,” bathes and is then clean; he may enter the camp but cannot yet dwell there. Seven days later, a repetition of these actions occurs—but here we are told specifically that “all his hair” includes that of the head, beard and eyebrows—after which the cleansed person brings offerings to the cult, thereby entering the next phase in his elaborate and extended process of aggregation. Shaving in this context is frequently interpreted as a rite of purification, and this seems correct, given its close association with other purificatory rites such as bathing and washing clothes. Yet shaving here, as in 13:33, is also a component and marker of the aggregation process; the first shaving renders the aggregating individual fit to enter the camp and signals that fitness; the second shaving qualifies the aggregating individual to offer the required offerings, the next stage in his aggregation process, and makes evident that qualification.

—————

37 Not completely, since all of the ritual acts required of the recovered mƟs̞ôrƗ‘, are not in evidence here.

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What Do Shaving Rites Accomplish

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The texts discussed above illustrate well the variety of shaving rites associated with rites of transition in biblical sources.38 What, then, can be concluded from this survey? It is clear that shaving may function either as a rite of separation (Num 8:7; Deut 21:12; various texts describing mourning rites) or as a rite of aggregation (e.g., Lev 13:33;14:8–9 and Num 6:18). Shaving contributes to and signals the purification process in certain ritual contexts (e.g., Lev 14:8–9 and Num 8:6–7), and an individual’s entry into a state of pollution in others (e.g., various texts describing mourning rites); in still other contexts, shaving is associated neither with purification nor with entry into a state of pollution (e.g., Num 6:18). Thus, shaving rites are flexible; they do many things; one must look to their context to determine precisely what they accomplish and what they signal. The common tendency among biblical scholars to associate shaving too readily with purification should therefore be challenged on the basis of the data reviewed here. Likewise, the idea that shaving is particularly to be associated with rites of separation.39 Yet, is there any one characteristic shared by all of the shaving rites discussed? I believe that there is. I want to argue that these shaving rites may do different things, may send different context-specific messages, and may occur at different junctures in the ritual process, but they share something in common: In each case, they effect a change in an individual’s —————

38 Three other texts describe rites of shaving at transitional points. These are Gen 41:14, in which Joseph shaves and changes his clothes upon his release from prison (before seeing Pharaoh); 2 Sam 14:25–26, which states that Absalom would shave his head every year and weigh the hair; and Ezek 5:1–4, which describes an elaborate and complex symbolic act consisting of Ezekiel shaving the hair of his head and beard, weighing the hair, dividing it into three parts, burning one-third, striking one-third with a blade, and winnowing one-third. Gen 41:14 describes a process of aggregation, the movement from prison back to community, and the association of shaving with changing clothes suggests purification, though why Joseph should need to purify himself in this context is not clear to me. (On changing or washing clothes and the purification process, see Gen 35:2; Lev 14:8, 9; 15:13 among other texts.) Absalom’s head shaving is described as a ritualized activity at the end of each year, signaling perhaps the passing of the old year and the advent of the new (?). Ezekiel’s symbolic act functions on several levels at once, communicating to onlookers a message of impending disaster (exile and destruction for the people), and perhaps alluding to the shaving of the Nazirite, as others have noted, though the reason for this, if indeed there is an allusion, remains obscure. (The oft proposed allusion is to be found in the act of burning one-third of the hair. Note that the Nazirite burns all of the consecrated hair of the head [Num 6:18], while Ezekiel burns one-third of his head and beard hair [Ezek 5:1–2]. There may in fact be no allusion at all.) 39 Anthropologists going back to van Gennep have argued that shaving rites are mainly or always associated with rites of separation, or entry into liminality (see n. 3 for citations), but the data I have presented here do not support this position. Shaving contributes to and signals aggregation as much as separation. Cross-cultural evidence presented by anthropologists writing more recently also challenges this point of view. See Carol Delany, “Hair in Turkish Society,” Anthropological Quarterly 67 (1994):167 on the Hajj, where haircutting by male and female pilgrims and shaving of facial hair by males occur at the time when the Muslim pilgrims rejoin the mundane world.

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status and serve as a public, temporary marker of this status change. The Levites move into a state of purity and separation from the community in Numbers 8. The Nazirite moves in the opposite direction, from abstinent separation back to the lifestyle of the typical Israelite, from holiness back to commonness. The person formerly afflicted with s̞Ɨra‘at moves from a polluted separation to cleanness and the opportunity once again to be a part of the community and its cultic life. The mourner moves from day-to-day life into a temporary state of separation and defilement. The captive foreign woman moves from alien prisoner to wife/concubine and community member. In all of these cases, shaving helps to effect the movement of the individual to a new status and marks the change. Change in status is literally inscribed—through the manipulation of hair—on visible parts of the body such as the head or face for all to see.40 Besides effecting and signaling status change, each shaving rite has significance on a second, “local” level, that of the particular ritual context in which the shaving rite occurs. On this level, shaving may accomplish and signal several things at once (e.g., separation and impurity, or aggregation and purification). One must look to the individual ritual context to determine what shaving accomplishes and what it signals, beyond status change generally understood. Until fairly recently, some social anthropologists seeking to understand shaving rites have tended to argue that such rites had specific, transcultural and transhistorical meanings. Leach, whose 1958 article “Magical Hair” became the starting point for much subsequent discussion, argued that manipulation of head hair in most cases has sexual connotations: “head hair is a visible symbolic displacement of the invisible [clothed] genitals.”41 Hallpike, writing about a decade later to challenge Leach, countered with an equally general, transcultural and transhistorical position: Hair cutting symbolizes entry into social control, while avoidance of hair cutting (=long hair) communicates separation from social control.42 Critiques of Leach and Hallpike have emphasized the need to understand each shaving rite in its cultural setting, to chart its relation to other rites, and to avoid misleading generalizations that do not apply transhistorically, transculturally or even in all cases within the same culture at a single time. There is no intrinsic meaning to hair or its manipulation; all meaning is culturally dependent and context-bound.43 Biblical representations of shaving rites certainly lend —————

40 Notice that in each shaving rite discussed above, visible parts of the body are shaved. (In some of the rites, non-visible parts of the body are shaved as well.) 41 Leach, “Magical Hair,” 153. 42 Hallpike, “Social Hair,” esp. 260–261. 43 Firth, “Hair as Private Asset and Public Symbol,” 256–64; Synnott, The Body Social, 123– 126; Delaney, “Hair in Turkish Society,” 159; Jeannette Mageo, “Hairdos and Don’ts: Hair Symbolism and Sexual History in Samoa,” Man 29 (1994): 407, 409–410, 421–422.

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weight to the approach that emphasizes the importance of context for understanding what shaving rites accomplish and what they signal. Yet biblical materials also suggest that generalization is possible on another level (at least within Israelite culture as biblical texts represent it): Shaving effects and marks ritual transition, a change of status of the one shaved. An assessment of the potential validity of this generalization beyond biblical representations of shaving rites will have to await further investigation.

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Section 2: Gender and Sexuality

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Introduction

Gender and sexuality have been abiding interests of mine since the early nineties and are best considered together since they are enmeshed, etic categories. (To study sexuality, one cannot avoid considering questions of gender, and vice versa.) “‘And with a Male You Shall Not Lie the Lying Down of a Woman’: On the Meaning and Significance of Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13” (1994) and “‘Surpassing the Love of Women’: Another Look at 2 Sam 1:26 and the Relationship of David and Jonathan” (2006) are my two contributions to ongoing debate about homoeroticism and the Hebrew Bible. Each essay focuses on a text whose meaning is much more difficult to establish than is frequently assumed. In each, I provide a philologicallybased argument intended to clarify exactly what the text(s) seek to communicate and I consider the implications of my findings. In “‘And with a Male,’” I argue that the key to interpreting the opaque idiom miškƟbê ’iššâ (“the lying down of a woman”) in Lev 18:22 and 20:13 is the similar and apparently related idiom miškab zƗkƗr (“the lying down of a male”) found elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible. I conclude that Lev 18:22 and 20:13 proscribe one specific homoerotic act between males (anal intercourse) and that 20:13, which mentions both men in its final form, originally mentioned only the penetrator, probably punishing him for “feminizing” his partner. (That 20:13 underwent editorial revision over time is indicated by its awkward change from a singular focus at the beginning of the verse [“As for the man …”] to a plural focus in the middle, and by the emphasis on the culpability of both partners at the end of the verse [“they—the two of them— have committed an abomination; they shall certainly be put to death; their blood is upon them”].) The implications of this argument are not insignificant, given the continuing debates within some conservative religious communities about gay membership, ordination, and marriage. If only one homoerotic sexual act is proscribed by the Hebrew Bible, men who do not engage in that act do not violate biblical law. The article has generated a lively critical response. A number of scholars working in the area have accepted my argument that the laws speak of one sexual act, anal intercourse (e.g., Martti Nissinen, “Die Liebe von David und Jonatan als Frage der modernen Exegese,” Biblica 80 [1999]: 258; Jerome T. Walsh, “Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13: Who is Doing What to Whom?” JBL 120 [2001]: 201, 204, 208; Susan Ackerman, When Heroes

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Love: The Ambiguity of Eros in the Stories of Gilgamesh and David [New York: Columbia University Press, 2005], 26, 195). But the argument that it is the insertive partner who was originally addressed has been resisted by some. Though Walsh believes that it is the receptive partner who is the center of the law’s concern, I find this difficult to accept given the way in which Lev 18:22 is phrased in Hebrew: “And with a male you shall not lie …” By implication, the addressee (“you” masculine singular) may lie “the lying down of a woman” with a woman, suggesting that it is the penetrator who is addressed, and not the receptive partner. If it were the receptive partner, why state that he should not perform the act in question with a male? With whom other than a male could he possibly perform it? Thus, I continue to believe that it is the insertive partner who is addressed in Lev 18:22 and mentioned in the original formulation of 20:13, with the receptive partner added to the punishment formulation of 20:13 through editorial activity at a later stage. One aspect of the essay that I no longer find satisfactory is its purity analysis, which does not sufficiently distinguish between what many scholars today refer to as “ritual” and “moral” impurity. (For my current views on “moral” and “ritual” pollution and their complex relationship, see “Purity Ideology in Ezra-Nehemiah as a Tool to Reconstitute the Community” (2004) in this volume.) I am also no longer so sanguine that the mixing of two otherwise defiling substances is at issue in Lev 18:22 and 20:13, as well as in several of the other prohibitions in these chapters. Purity concerns are likely not at issue in these laws. Rather, it is more likely, as mentioned earlier, that the insertive partner is prohibited from (and punished for) turning another male into the legal equivalent of a woman (“feminizing” him in other words). “‘Surpassing the Love of Women,’” is an essay originally commissioned for a book which considers same sex unions from the perspectives of the Jewish and Christian religious traditions. Here, I revisit biblical representations of the relationship of David and Jonathan and consider whether or not there is any cogent evidence for a homoerotic dimension to their love. Though I reject attempts to see sexual love in the obvious covenant rhetoric of the prose narratives about Jonathan and David in 1 Samuel, I find the striking love comparison of 2 Sam 1:26 impossible to explain away as a covenant idiom, as is so often attempted. Simply put, the comparison of Jonathan’s love for David to “the love of women” (for David) differs from love comparisons in treaty contexts. In these, the covenant love of treaty partners of the same class is compared (e.g., an ally’s love for his ally is compared to that of his ally for him) or covenant love itself is compared to another type of love requiring fidelity. But in 2 Sam 1:26, Jonathan’s love for David is compared not to the love of a covenant partner of the same

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Introduction

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class, but to “the love of women,” generally construed by scholars as an idiom for sexual or sexual-emotional love, an idiom with no treaty fidelity resonance. This may suggest that a homoerotic and possibly sexual relationship existed between Jonathan and David, at least in the poet’s mind. If this interpretation is correct, 2 Sam 1:26 would constitute the single example in the Hebrew Bible of a “sexual-emotional linking of two men in a context free of condemnation …” The third article included in this section, “Occasionally Beyond Gender: The Rhetoric of Familial Nurture in Discourses of West Asian Kings and their Agents,” appears in print for the first time in this volume. It analyzes several epigraphs which describe an ancient West Asian king or his agent as both a mother and a father to those for whom he has responsibility. This rhetoric departs from the more common, gendered image of the royal care giver or his agent as a father. I argue that the rhetorical norms of gender are transcended in these inscriptions in order to compare the king implicitly with the gods, who are not infrequently described using a similar, gendertranscending rhetoric. In the same way, the king’s agent is compared implicitly with the king. Curiously, conventional gender distinctions are collapsed in this totalizing rhetoric which reclassifies the king or his agent as beyond gender, suggesting a higher status for him than he would otherwise have. In contrast, gender distinctions are brought into relief in 2 Sam 1:26 to establish the superiority of Jonathan’s love for David over against the love of women, and in Lev 18:22 and 20:13 in order to delineate acceptable sexual behavior.

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“And with a Male You Shall Not Lie the Lying Down of a Woman”: On the Meaning and Significance of Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13

Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13 occur in the context of legislation in the Holiness Code (or “H Code”)1 which constructs sexual boundaries for ancient Israelites. The laws of 18:22 and 20:13 pertain to male-male sex, though it is not clear at first glance exactly which acts or act they proscribe.2 The statutes utilize an otherwise unattested idiom—miškƟbê ’iššâ, “the lying down of a woman”—to describe prohibited sexual activity between males, an idiom whose meaning is not at all transparent. The laws of Lev 18:22 and 20:13 read as follows: wƟ’et zƗkƗr lǀ’ tiškab miškƟbê ’iššâ tô‘Ɲbâ hî’ And with a male you shall not lie the lying down of a woman; it is a tô‘Ɲbâ.3

—————

I would like to express my thanks to all who offered helpful suggestions and criticisms during the development of this study. I am especially indebted to Susan Ackerman, David Konstan, Shaye J. D. Cohen, Stanley Stowers, Howard Eilberg-Schwartz, my graduate student William Gilders, and the two anonymous readers for the Journal of the History of Sexuality. As always, errors of fact or judgment are my responsibility exclusively. 1 Leviticus 17–26 has long been considered a collection of legal materials of separate provenance from the Priestly School, attributed to the Holiness School, so called because of their concern for the holiness of Yhwh and the whole land of Israel, its protection, and their demand that Israel be holy too. This unit is called the “Holiness Code” by most scholars (in short notation, “H Code”). In the past, it was thought to have been incorporated by the Priestly Source (or “P”) into P’s great legal corpus stretching from Exodus 24 well into Numbers, possibly before the sixth century BCE, possibly during that century or soon after. The most recent work on the relationship of the H materials and P tends to modify and even reverse aspects of this hypothesis: H materials occur among P materials outside the so-called Holiness Code (in Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers), so H is by no means restricted to Leviticus 17–26; H was P’s editor, not vice versa. This conclusion characterizes the work of both Jacob Milgrom (Leviticus 1–16:A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary [AB 3; New York: Doubleday, 1991], 13–35) and Israel Knohl (“The Priestly Torah versus the Holiness School: Sabbath and the Festivals,” Shnaton 7/8 [1983/ 84]: 109–46 [Hebrew], published in English in Hebrew Union College Annual 58 [1987]: 65–117). 2 Most modern commentators do not acknowledge the ambiguity of these legal formulations, though John Boswell notes that there is “considerable room for doubt about precisely what is being prohibited” (Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980], 101, n. 34). 3 Conventionally translated “abomination.” It is the only act to be labeled such in the laws of Leviticus 18 themselves; in the redactorial frame of Lev 18:26–30 all the preceding acts are

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wƟ’îš ’ăšer yiškab ’et zƗkƗr miškƟbê ’iššâ tô‘Ɲbâ ‘ƗĞû šƟnêhem môt yûmƗtû dƟmêhem bƗm And as for the man who lies with a male the lying down of a woman, they—the two of them—have committed a tô‘Ɲbâ; they shall certainly be put to death; their blood is upon them.

Commentators for more than two millennia have struggled to interpret these laws. Some have understood them to prohibit specifically the insertive role in anal intercourse; others, the insertive and receptive roles; still others all sex acts between males.4 They are the only such laws in the Hebrew Bible; ————— tô‘Ɲbôt (contrast the framework in vv. 1–5, where ma‘ăĞeh, “deed,” “act,” occurs instead; this suggests the hand of a different redactor in the prologue to the laws of chapter 18). The meaning of tô‘Ɲbâ is not altogether clear; it may not mean exactly the same thing in all circles. It occurs commonly in wisdom texts such as Proverbs; in Deuteronomy and Deuteronomistic materials; in Ezekiel; and in H. Outside of Israel, the word occurs in the sixth century BCE Tabnit inscription from Sidon (KAI 13:6) where the opening of a grave is called a tô‘Ɲbâ of the goddess Ashtart. Usage in general suggests the violation of a socially constructed boundary, the undermining or reversal of what is conventional, the order of things as the ancient might see it. Examples of tô‘Ɲbôt illustrate this well: unclean animals (Deut 14:3); sacrificial animals with bodily defects (Deut 17:1); violation of dress conventions (cross-dressing either way; Deut 22:5 and 4QOrda [= 4Q159 2–4 1:7]); reversal of expected behavior roles, e.g., he who justifies the wicked and declares the innocent guilty in a legal setting (Prov 17:15). Yhwh is said to despise the tô‘Ɲbâ (Deut 12:31). The conventional translation “abomination” suggests only what is abhorrent; it does not get across the sense of the violation of a socially constructed boundary, the reversal or undermining of what is conventional, but viewed as established by the deity. Boswell’s notion (Christianity, 100–101) that the tô‘Ɲbâ is usually associated not with what is “intrinsically evil,” but with what is “ritually unclean” is simply unfounded; this polarity is alien both to H and to the wider Israelite cultural context (see similarly the criticisms of David F. Greenberg, The Construction of Homosexuality [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988], 196; on Boswell’s treatment in general, Greenberg’s critique is useful [195–96]). On the sense of tô‘Ɲbâ in various biblical contexts, see further Milgrom, ʤʡʲʺ, Encyclopaedia Biblica (9 vols.; Jerusalem: Bialik, 1950–88), 8:466–68 (Hebrew); and especially Paul Humbert, “Le substantif tô‘Ɲbâ et le verbe t‘b dans l’Ancien Testament,” ZAW 72 (1960): 217–37. 4 Among classical rabbinic discussions, see Siphra, Qod 9:14 and the similar material in b. San 54b. These texts assume that the law of Lev 18:22 proscribes the insertive act. They expand the prohibition to cover both the activity of the insertive partner and that of the receptive partner by reference to the penalty of Lev 20:13, which mentions both men; laws elsewhere concerning the qƗdƝš, who is assumed to be a receptive cult prostitute by the rabbis (opinion of R. Ishmael according to b. San 54b who cites Deut 23:18; 1 Kgs 14:24); or by repointing the consonantal text of tškb in Lev 18:22 as a passive verbal form (opinion of R. Aqiba according to Siphra, Qod 9:14 and b. San 54b: “you shall not lie …” becomes “you shall not be laid …”). Rashi, commenting on Lev 20:13, thought the law referred to the insertive role specifically. See further the modern, methodologically sophisticated discussion of Michael L. Satlow, “‘They Abused Him Like a Woman’: Homoeroticism, Gender Blurring, and the Rabbis in Late Antiquity,” Journal of the History of Sexuality 5 (1994): 1–25, who engages other texts as well as some of those mentioned above. Satlow’s discussion brought Siphra, Qod. 9:14 to my attention. Recent commentators on Lev 18:22 and 20:13, like their premodern counterparts, tend to divide into two groups: those who assume that the laws refer specifically to anal intercourse between men, and those who assert that they refer to homoerotic acts in general (frequently labeled “homosexuality” by these scholars).

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there is absolutely nothing analogous to them in the other Israelite legal collections mediated to us,5 though their uniqueness has not generally been acknowledged by scholars.6 In contrast, other laws in Leviticus 18 and 20 ————— None of these scholars provides a sustained argument in defense of his position on the meaning of the laws. For the former view, see among others Stephen F. Bigger, “The Family Laws of Leviticus 18 in Their Setting,” JBL 98 (1979): 202; Baruch Levine, Leviticus (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1989), 123; Thomas M. Thurston, “Leviticus and the Prohibition of Homosexual Acts,” in Homophobia and the Judaeo-Christian Tradition (eds. Michael L. Stemmeler and J. Michael Clark; Dallas: Monument Press, 1990), 16; Satlow, “They Abused Him Like a Woman,” 5, 6 and n. 12, 9, 10. For the latter view, see among others Norman H. Snaith, Leviticus and Numbers (London: Nelson, 1967), 126; Gordon J. Wenham, The Book of Leviticus (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1979), 259; Susan Niditch, “The ‘Sodomite’ Theme in Judges 19–20: Family, Community and Social Disintegration,” CBQ 44 (1982): 368–69; Greenberg, The Construction of Homosexuality, 191; Howard Eilberg-Schwartz, The Savage in Judaism (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1990), 183; and David Biale, Eros and the Jews (New York: BasicBooks, 1992), 29. Karl Elliger, Leviticus (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr/Paul Siebeck, 1966), 241, assumed that the laws proscribe pederasty. 5 Several discrete legal collections in addition to those of H and P are embedded in the Pentateuch; these include the “Book of the Covenant” (Exod 20:22–23:33); the J-mediated materials of Exodus 34; the large Deuteronomic legal collection (Deut 12–26); the Deuteronomic curses (Deut 27:15–26); and the Decalogue (in two forms: Exod 20:2–17 and Deut 5:6–21). 6 Satlow is an exception, though he does not mention all of the other legal collections where one might expect analogous laws to occur (“They Abused Him,” 5, n. 10). Some scholars and translators allege that Pentateuchal laws other than Lev 18:22 and 20:13 concern males who engage in sex acts with other males, but this has not been demonstrated convincingly. The material concerning the qƗdƝš remains unclear; the word, which occurs in a number of biblical contexts, means simply “holy one,” though it is frequently translated “male cult prostitute” (see Deut 23:18 [Eng. 17]; 1 Kgs 14:24; 15:12; 22:47, 2 Kgs 23:7; on the qƟdƝšâ, the female “holy one,” see Gen 38:21, 22; Deut 23:18 [Eng. 17]; Hos 4:14). Recent discussion has tended to cast doubt on the assumption that the qƗdƝš was a cult prostitute of any sort, let alone one who engages other males. On the qƗdƝš and his counterpart the qƟdƝšâ, see further Mayer I. Gruber, “The qadesh in the Book of Kings and in other Sources,” Tarbiz 52 (1983): 167–76 [Hebrew], who argues that the qƗdƝš was a temple singer; Joan G. Westenholz, “Tamar, qƟdƝšâ, qadištu, and Sacred Prostitution in Mesopotamia,” HTR 82 (1989): 245–65, who challenges the idea of sacred prostitution in Mesopotamia and elsewhere in the ancient Near East. In contrast, see recently Karel van der Toorn, “Female Prostitution in Payment of Vows in Ancient Israel,” JBL 108 (1989): 193–205, who argues that prostitution of women and men to fulfill vows occurred in ancient Israel and that the qƗdƝš and qƟdƝšâ cannot be separated from this phenomenon. In passing, van der Toorn refers to the qƗdƝš as a “catamite,” but offers no evidence to support this interpretation (ibid., 201). Related to the qƗdƝš according to Deut 23:18-19 [Eng. 17–18] is the “dog” (keleb), whose “price” should not be brought to Yhwh’s temple to fulfill any vow. Translators have frequently understood this term to refer to a male prostitute who engages other males, translating “sodomite” or something similar. The term also occurs in a list of cultic staff from a Phoenician temple in Kition, Cyprus (KAI 37B:10), but without reference to function. Even if the “dog” were a male prostitute—which is not clear—there is no evidence that his activity involved other men. Whatever the meaning of the “dog” and qƗdƝš, the passages concerning them do not represent general proscriptions of some or all male-male sexual acts; only Lev 18:22 and 20:13 can be taken that way. The Sodom and Gomorrah story in Genesis 18–19 is obviously literary and not legal; at issue is the threat of (gang) rape of male guests by an unruly crowd of men, who also threaten the host Lot, himself a resident alien. Such threats are illustrative of the general wickedness of the cities of the plain according to J, the traditionist responsible for the story. An argument against the carnal

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that proscribe incestuous relations (Lev 18:6–18; 20:11–12, 14, 17, 19–21), adultery (Lev 18:20; 20:10), and human-animal couplings (Lev 18:23; 20:15–16)—laws to which Lev 18:22 and 20:13 are frequently compared— are paralleled elsewhere: both the Book of the Covenant and the curses of Deuteronomy prohibit human-animal sex acts (Exod 22:18; Deut 27:21); other Deuteronomic legal materials interdict male-female couplings that violate incest boundaries (Deut 23:1; 27:20, 22–23); and adultery is forbidden in a number of Israelite legal contexts.7 Given this, there is no reason to assume any necessary association between the prohibitions of male couplings found in Lev 18:22 and 20:13 and the various incest, adultery, and bestiality interdictions present in the same legal contexts.8 If there is a link, it must be the result of transmission and/or redactorial intention; the contemporary investigator is responsible to seek out reasons why the tradents and/or editors of Leviticus 18 and 20 might have associated laws prohibiting incestuous relations, adultery, bestiality, and male couplings. The H framework material in these chapters associates all the violations enumerated with uncleanness and the potential defilement of the land of Israel, which must be protected. In the final form of Leviticus 18 and 20, there is no separating Lev 18:22 and 20:13 and the other laws in these chapters from H’s distinct construction of purity. ————— nature of the threats is as unlikely as it is audacious; Lot’s answer to the men of the city in Gen 19:8—“I have two daughters who have not known a man. … Do with them as you like”—and the sexual use to the verb “to know” in the parallel version of the story in Judges 19 indicate that coerced intercourse is meant when the unruly gang demands “to know” the guest(s). Compare Boswell, Christianity, 93–96, who develops the thesis of Derrick S. Bailey, Homosexuality and the Western Christian Tradition (London: Longmans, Green, 1955), that the men of Sodom were not demanding sexual relations. At the same time, to ignore the very specific context of the threats (gang rape of male guests and their resident alien host) and generalize about biblical attitudes toward “homosexuality” is equally mistaken. Commentators have tended to emphasize the threat of rape against Lot’s guests, while ignoring the threat against Lot himself and his status as a resident alien, someone generally viewed in Israelite law as vulnerable and in need of special protection from oppression (see, e.g., Exod 22:20 [Eng. 21]; 23:9). 7 Exod 20:14 and Deut 5:18; Deut 22:22, 23–24, 25–27; Num 5:11–31. 8 Some commentators assume such a necessary association; they tend to be apologists for a conservative morality, and their arguments build on the final H casting of the laws of Leviticus 18 and 20, in which all of the enumerated sexual violations are called tô‘Ɲbôt and associated with the allegedly defiling behavior of the Canaanites and Egyptians. Conservative commentators tend to amplify and highlight the associations established by the final redactors of Leviticus 18 and 20 without reference to issues of redactional intention or legal prehistory. See, e.g., Norman Lamm, “Judaism and the Modern Attitude to Homosexuality,” in Contemporary Jewish Ethics (ed. Menachem M. Kellner; New York: Sanhedrin, 1978), 379, who emphasizes that “sodomy,” “buggery,” and incest are “linked” in these passages; the implications of his comment are obvious. See similarly the widely cited commentator David Z. Hoffmann, who argues that both homoerotic sex acts and bestiality share an end in common: satisfaction of “animal desire” [my emphasis] rather than reproduction (Sefer Vayikra [Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kuk, 1953], 2:23). This approach is found also in classical rabbinic texts, as Satlow shows (“They Abused Him,” 21–22 and nn.).

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In this article, I seek to address some of the problems associated with the interpretation of the laws of Lev 18:22 and 20:13 in a thoroughgoing way. My purpose is threefold: (1) to establish the meaning of Lev 18:22 and 20:13 on philological grounds and to offer suggestions concerning their editorial history; (2) to compare and contrast the notions of gendered sexual roles and the bounding of receptivity evident in these laws with those of Athens, Rome, and Assyria, all of which had laws in some manner restricting male couplings; (3) to assess recent explanations of the presence of Lev 18:22 and 20:13 among the laws of Leviticus 18 and 20 and in the wider H legal context and to offer my own proposal.

I What do Lev 18:22 and 20:13 actually mean? Determining this is complicated by the presence of the opaque idiom miškƟbê ’iššâ in both formulations.9 The most common translation of miškƟbê ’iššâ, “as with a woman,” is interpretive, not literal: it remains to be demonstrated whether it captures the sense of the prohibition adequately.10 A study of the uses of a similar and apparently related idiom miškab zƗkƗr, “the lying down of a male,” provides some insight into the meaning of the opaque miškƟbê ’iššâ. The expression miškab zƗkƗr occurs in Num 31:17, 18, and 35, and Judg 21:11 and 12.11 In Judg 21:12, a virgin girl (na‘ărâ bƟtûlâ) is defined as one who “has not known a man with respect to the lying down of a male” (lǀ’ yƗdƟ‘â ’îš lƟmiškab zƗkƗr).12 Her opposite, the nonvirgin, mentioned in verse 11, is a woman who “knows the lying down of a male” (’iššâ yǀda‘at miškab zƗkƗr). The same idiom occurs in Num 31, a text that also seeks to distin—————

9 The reason for the plural miškƟbê ’iššâ remains unexplained, though it came to the attention of rabbinic commentators in the Talmud and elsewhere, who speculated that it referred to two possible sex acts with a woman. See, e.g., b. San 54a, 55a, and b. Yeb 54b, where the two miškƟbôt are discussed. 10 Some conventional English translations of Lev 18:22: “You shall not lie with a male as with a woman; it is an abomination” (RSV and NRSV); “Do not lie with a male as one lies with a woman; it is an abhorrence” (NJPS); “You must not lie with a man as with a woman. This is a hateful thing” (JB); “Thou shalt not lie with mankind as with womankind: it is an abomination” (KJV). Virtually without exception, the difficult “lying down of a woman” is rendered “as with a woman” or something similar. 11 Bigger, “The Family Laws,” 203, notes the existence of the idiom miškab zƗkƗr when discussing miškƟbê ’iššâ, and claims miškab zƗkƗr is a “P expression.” Its use in Judges 21 suggests that it is not an idiom restricted to P. Bigger does not use miškab zƗkƗr to determine the range in meaning of miškƟbê ’iššâ. 12 On the preposition lƟ meaning “with respect to,” see E. Kautzsch, ed., Gesenius’ Hebrew Grammar (trans. A. E. Cowley; 2nd ed.; Oxford: Clarendon, 1910), par. 119u; Paul Joüon, Grammaire de l’hébreu biblique (Rome: Institut Pontifical Biblique, 1923), para. 133d.

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guish between women who are virgins and women who are nonvirgins. The nonvirgin is “any woman who knows a man with respect to the lying down of a male” (kol ’iššâ yǀda‘at ’îš lƟmiškab zƗkƗr; verse 17); the virgin is any woman who has “not known the lying down of a male” (lǀ’ yƗdƟ‘û miškab zƗkƗr; verses 18, 35). The idiom miškab zƗkƗr, literally “the lying down of a male,” must mean specifically male vaginal penetration in these contexts: the experience of miškab zƗkƗr defines a nonvirgin over against a virgin, who lacks such experience specifically. The expression “to know the lying down of a male” seems to mean the same thing as the more commonplace idiom “to know a man”; texts such as Judg 21:12 and Num 31:17 use two equivalent expressions to make the same point, where either alone would be sufficient, as Judg 21:11 and Num 31:18, 35 indicate.13 Are the expressions miškab zƗkƗr and miškƟbê ’iššâ a pair? The expression miškƟbê ’iššâ, like miškab zƗkƗr, is clearly sexual, and neither miškab nƟqƝbâ (the expected companion of miškab zƗkƗr) nor miškƟbê ’iš (the expected companion of miškƟbê ’iššâ) are attested. Why zƗkƗr is paired with ’iššâ instead of nƟqƝbâ or ’iššâ with zƗkƗr instead of ’iš is not at all clear.14 If miškƟbê ’iššâ and miškab zƗkƗr are a pair, as they appear to be, and miškab zƗkƗr has a restricted usage, as it apparently does, the range of meaning for the idiom miškƟbê ’iššâ should be equally restricted. If miškab zƗkƗr means specifically “male vaginal penetration,” its analogue miškƟbê ’iššâ should mean something like “the act or condition of a woman’s being penetrated,” or, more simply, “vaginal receptivity,” the opposite of vaginal penetration.15 Thus, in vaginal intercourse, a woman experiences (idiomatically “knows” or “lies”) miškab zƗkƗr (male penetration) while presuma-

————— 13

Compare Gen 24:16, where “virgin” (bƟtûlâ) is further defined by the comment “no man had known her.” 14 As an aside, I note that among the Dead Sea Scrolls a plural miškƟbê zƗkƗr occurs (1QSa 1:10). The use of this idiom at Qumran at the end of the first millennium is at odds with its use in Numbers 31 and Judges 21; here, it refers not to what a woman experiences in intercourse with a man but to what a man experiences with a woman (wƟlǀ’ yi[qrab] ’el ’iššâ lƟda‘tƗh lƟmiškƟbê zƗkƗr). Perhaps the restricted use of the idiom as attested in Numbers 31 and Judges 21 was lost by the end of the millennium; possibly the meaning of the idiom had changed. A solution is elusive, though the former explanation is more plausible than the latter. 15 This is a speculation of course, since there are no extant texts in which the idiom miškƟbê ’iššâ is actually used of a coupling between a man and woman (it occurs only in Lev 18:22 and 20:13). Several readers of prepublication versions of this manuscript raised the possibility that miškƟbê ’iššâ could refer to acts other than vaginal receptivity, but I think it unlikely; to assume this, one would have to assume that miškab zƗkƗr also refers to a range of sexual acts, and this position cannot be defended in light of the biblical evidence for the restricted usage of miškab zƗkƗr.

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bly, she offers her partner miškƟbê ’iššâ (vaginal receptivity), which he experiences (“knows” or “lies”).16 But what of the use of the idiom miškƟbê ’iššâ to describe a sex act between men? The usage here seems anomalous if this idiom did indeed refer to what a male experiences in vaginal intercourse, as I have suggested. If I am correct that the range of meaning to be attributed to miškƟbê ’iššâ is as limited as the range of miškab zƗkƗr, then the male-male sex laws of H appear to be circumscribed in their meaning; they seem to refer specifically to intercourse and suggest that anal penetration was seen as analogous to vaginal penetration on some level, since “the lying down of a woman” seems to mean vaginal receptivity.17 Why anal intercourse and not some other sexual act between men? The idiom “to lie with” means to copulate in other legal and nonlegal contexts, so I think it very likely that it has such a meaning in Lev 18:22 and 20:13 as well, except in this case, anal intercourse is meant. Which partner in a male-male coupling is addressed by the law in Lev 18:22? The insertive partner or the receptive one? I believe it is the penetrator rather than the penetrated man. In other legal contexts, men are commanded not “to lie with” various female receptive partners.18 In fact, in the wider context of biblical law, the idiom “to lie with” is used exclusively of insertive partners.19 I suspect that the same is true of Lev 18:22 and 20:13: the laws address the insertive partner in a male-male coupling. Furthermore, “with a male you shall not lie the lying down of a woman” implies that you (masculine singular [m.s.]) shall lie “the lying down of a woman” with a female. If this is so, it would again suggest that the insertive partner is addressed. This would make perfect sense, given that a woman experiences “the lying down of a male” when she engages in intercourse, and a man presumably experiences “the lying down of a woman.” This interpretation ————— 16

In biblical prose idiom, a woman can “lie” with a man just as a man can “lie” with a woman: see, e.g., Gen 19:33–35 passim, where the idioms šƗkab ‘im and šƗkab ’et are used of Lot’s daughters (brought to my attention by ibn Ezra’s comments on Lev 18:22); the interchangeability of šƗkab ‘im and šƗkab ’et suggests that there is no difference in meaning between them. Compare also Gen 39:7, 12; 2 Sam 13:11, where women demand that a man “lie with” them. Since both a man and a woman can “know” or “lie” sexually, there is probably no difference in meaning between the two idioms: both mean to experience intercourse. 17 Bigger, “The Family Laws,” 203, picking up on the use of miškƟbê ’iššâ to describe an act between men, and using a different vocabulary, makes a similar point: he states that the Israelites viewed “homosexuality as an unnatural variant of heterosexuality.” At issue here is a single legal collection (that of H) and its view of a single sex act (anal penetration of a male), not the modern constructs “homosexuality” and “heterosexuality,” and not the issue of “natural” acts versus “unnatural” acts. “Proscribed” would have been more suitable than “unnatural.” 18 For example, Lev 19:20; 20:11,12, 18, 20 in H; and Lev 15:18, 24, 33; Num 5:19 in P. 19 Though elsewhere, in nonlegal settings (Gen 19:33–35 passim; cf. Gen 39:7, 12; 2 Sam 13:11), a woman “lies with” a man, as noted above.

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is consistent with the views of some traditional interpreters of the law, who believed that the verses address the insertive partner.20 The other possible interpretation—that the law addresses the potential receptive partner— seems less likely, since it appears that miškƟbê ’iššâ is what a male experiences in vaginal intercourse, and the law stipulates that “you” (m.s.) shall not experience it with a male.21 The law of Lev 18:22 addresses only one of the participants (“you” m.s.); in contrast, the formulation in 20:13 begins by mentioning “the man who lies” (i.e., “you” of 18:22) but changes number from singular to plural in the middle of the verse. As it now stands, the formulation with the penalty in Lev 20:13 emphasizes the guilt of both parties: “they—the two of them—have committed a tô‘Ɲbâ; they shall certainly be put to death; their blood is upon them.” The change of number from the beginning of the law to its conclusion is awkward; it suggests redactorial activity intended to widen the scope of the law to include both parties. The emphatic attention to the culpability of both partners also leads me to suspect editorial recasting. Are there analogous cases of such redactorial reworking elsewhere among the laws in H? The best example is Lev 20:10, a law concerning adultery, which shares characteristics with Lev 20:13. Leviticus 20:10 begins by mentioning “a man who commits adultery with the wife of his neighbor” and states that “he shall surely be put to death” (môt yûmat); then it adds, awkwardly, “the adulterer and the adulteress” (hannǀ’Ɲp wƟhannǀ’Ɨpet). As in Lev 20:13, the law begins by focusing on a singular subject (“the man who commits adultery”); in contrast to 20:13, the penalty is prescribed for the man alone, and only afterward is the adulteress included in the penalty.22 At all events the effect is the same: laws originally mentioning a single guilty party were recast awkwardly in order to apply the death penalty to both partners. In the case of Lev 20:10, the law originally applied to the adulterer alone; in the case of Lev 20:13 (as in 18:22), to the insertive partner in a male-male coupling. If my suggestion of editorial reworking is correct, then only the respective insertive partners (the adulterer and the insertive partner of the male-male coupling) were punished by both of these laws at an earlier stage in their formulation. In the —————

20 See, e.g., m. San 7:4; m. Ker 1:1; and Rashi on Lev 20:13. Contrast the views attributed to R. Aqiba and R. Ishmael in b. San 54b, who assert that both the insertive and receptive partners are addressed by the law; see similarly ibn Ezra on Lev 18:22. 21 Many thanks to my colleagues Shaye J. D. Cohen and David Konstan (conversation, December 8, 1993) and one anonymous reader for their suggestions and criticism, which have helped me to clarify and strengthen my argumentation at this juncture. 22 Compare the similar formulation of an adultery statute in Deut 22:22. It begins by addressing “a man who lies with a woman who is another man’s wife” but goes on to prescribe the death penalty for both parties using very emphatic language.

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final form of the various laws of Leviticus 20, all parties involved in sexual boundary violations are to be put to death or otherwise penalized.23 But this says nothing about the earlier form of these laws, several of which appear to have been more restricted in their application.24 Thus we may speak of at least two identifiable stages in the development of Lev 18:22 and 20:13: (1) a final, redacted version of the laws that is extant in the biblical text, in which the act of the insertive partner is the focus of the prohibition (both 18:22 and 20:13); the receptive partner is equally culpable (20:13); and male-male intercourse is associated with other sexual acts, all of which are described as defiling to the self and the land, called tô‘Ɲbôt, and associated with the Egyptians and/or the Canaanites in H framing materials (18:1–5, 24–30; 20:7–8, 22–24); and (2) an earlier stage of development, which I have reconstructed, in which anal penetration of another male was proscribed, and probably called a tô‘Ɲbâ 25; the insertive partner was probably executed; and the receptive partner was not penalized or even mentioned in 20:13. The reason for the proscription of male-male anal intercourse at this earlier or penultimate stage is unclear. Purity considerations, central to the framing materials of the final redaction of Leviticus 18 and 20, are not evident from either 18:22 or 20:13 themselves, even in their final casting.

II Notions of gendered sexual roles were apparently crucial in shaping H’s boundary constructions defining licit and illicit sex acts at both the penultimate and final stages in the development of Lev 18:22 and 20:13. Anal —————

23 For example, the man who marries a woman and her mother, or the man who lies with his daughter-in-law, or the woman who has intercourse with an animal. 24 Though an awkward change of subject is commonplace throughout the laws of Leviticus 20, 20:15 and 17 are especially noteworthy. Leviticus 20:17 begins with “a man who takes his sister … and sees her nakedness” and continues with the woman seeing “his nakedness” and a punishment addressed to both parties: “they will be cut off.” But then the text awkwardly switches back to the man alone: “The nakedness of his sister he uncovered; he shall bear his punishment.” Reworking of biblical law was a commonplace; on this, see the discussions of David Daube, Studies in Biblical Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1947), 74–101; and Michael Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985), 187–90, who cites Daube. 25 In the final redaction of the laws of Leviticus 18, all of the prohibited acts are called tô‘Ɲbôt (Lev 18:26–27, 29–30); in the laws themselves, the word tô‘Ɲbâ occurs only in Lev 18:22 and 20:13. Given this anomaly, it seems likely that the association of male-male anal intercourse and the notion of tô‘Ɲbâ predates the final, redactional stages of these chapters. If anything, H redactors responsible for materials in the framework of 18:24–30 probably elaborated the tô‘Ɲbâ idea from 18:22 and 20:13, applying it to all of the listed violations.

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receptivity is compared by implication to vaginal receptivity through the use of the idiom miškƟbê ’iššâ, but the laws make clear that vaginal receptivity has no acceptable analogue among men: Lev 18:22 and 20:13 imply that a male must experience (“lie”) “the lying down of a woman” with women only.26 Receptivity is bounded on the basis of biological sex; it is constructed as appropriate exclusively to females; it is gendered as feminine. Neither the laws of Lev 18:22 and 20:13 nor the framing materials give reasons why this is so; there is no allusion in them to the “structure of creation,” the expectation that human males and females will couple and procreate as in the Priestly Source’s (P’s) creation story (Gen 1:l–2:4a). If the Holiness School were P’s editors, as Israel Knohl, Jacob Milgrom, and others now believe, they might well have had access to the creation story of the Priestly Source with its command to “be fruitful and multiply.” Whether or not they had access to it or to something similar of their own (which we no longer have), there is no direct allusion to such ideas in Leviticus 18 or 20. In contrast, later rabbinic commentators (postclassical) developed the gendered and sex-bound framework implied in Lev 18:22 and 20:13, grounding it explicitly in “creation.” In his comments on Lev 18:22, the medieval commentator Abraham ibn Ezra states that the male was created “to do” (la‘ăĞôt) and the female “to be done” (lƟhƝ‘ƗĞôt); creation’s scheme should not be “overturned” by any breakdown of these roles. The bounding of receptivity exclusively to women may explain why only the insertive partner in a male-male coupling is addressed directly (i.e., in the second person) in Lev 18:22. When there is direct address in a legal context, as in Leviticus 18, generally male landowners heading households are called upon; women—like minors, slaves, resident aliens, and the poor—are generally mentioned only in the third person, when they are mentioned at all.27 Because the penetrator is viewed as male in the legal ————— 26

This observation applies to earlier versions of these laws as much as the final casting, for there is no reason to assume the idiom miškƟbê ’iššâ was not present at earlier stages of the development of Lev 18:22 and 20:13. 27 A good example of this is Lev 18:23: “With any beast you (m.s.) shall not give your effusion … nor shall a woman stand before a beast. …” The individual male who has relations with a quadruped is addressed directly; the woman who does the same is mentioned in the third person. Not all legal formulations use direct address; many laws address men, or both men and women, indirectly (e.g., Deut 22:5, 13–21, 22, 23–27, 28–29). It may be that women are addressed implicitly in certain legal texts such as Deut 16:11–12, 13–14 (on the celebration of the festivals of Shabuot and Sukkot). Here, “you (m.s.) and your son, your daughter, your male slave, your female slave, the Levite … will rejoice before Yhwh” during these festivals; missing is the wife, who may be addressed by implication through the mention of her husband (in other words, “you” m.s. implies the wife also). In any case, women are not typically addressed directly in biblical law. On the male head of household’s exclusive control of landed property and most household assets during his lifetime, see Raymond Westbrook, Property and Family in Biblical Law (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1991), 14.

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context of Lev 18:22, he alone is addressed directly by the legislation; the receptive partner, viewed as the equivalent of a female, is not.28 I have argued that only the insertive partner in a male coupling— like the man who commits adultery in Lev 20:10—was punished at an earlier stage in the development of these laws. How can this be explained? Possibly because each penetrator was seen as an agent acting on the body of his receptive partner (the woman in the case of adultery; the penetrated male in a male coupling); the receptive partner was in turn viewed as a passive recipient of that action rather than an active participant in his or her own right. Receptivity, if viewed as passivity, would perhaps have rendered them guiltless at a stage before the work of the final H tradents. In the final form of the laws of Leviticus 18 and 20, purity concerns are paradigmatic: all the violations enumerated cause defilement and threaten the Israelite presence in the land, for the land cannot tolerate such uncleanness (Lev 18:24–30; 20:22–26). Therefore, all who participate in any of the enumerated violations are a threat to the land’s purity and must be punished accordingly. Otherwise, Israel might lose its land. Thus the laws must have been reworked, with punishment of all parties, to incorporate the distinct view of the purity of the land and the need for its protection. Classical cultures also bounded receptivity but in a different manner. Recent scholarship suggests that socially sanctioned penetrative sex acts were restricted to couplings of social unequals in the Athenian context29: adult male citizens penetrated only legal inferiors such as slaves, women, foreigners, or youths.30 Adult males of the citizen class were never to be penetrated themselves; in fact, the literature denigrates those who were thought to be receptive.31 A male of the citizen class who is willingly penetrated ————— 28

Neither party is addressed directly in Lev 20:13. I am indebted particularly to the work of Kenneth J. Dover, Greek Homosexuality, (2d ed.; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989); David M. Halperin, One Hundred Years of Homosexuality (New York: Routledge, 1990); John J. Winkler, The Constraints of Desire (New York: Routledge, 1990); and Amy Richlin, The Garden of Priapus (rev. ed; New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), and “Not before Homosexuality,” Journal of the History of Sexuality 3 (1993): 523–73, for information on Athens and Rome. 30 Some claim that youths of the citizen class were never anally penetrated, for that would have been degrading for them; instead, intercrural penetration was practiced. See Dover, Greek Homosexuality, 91–100, on intercrural and anal penetration, and 103–4 on the “dishonor” of a citizen who allows another to penetrate him in any manner. Others acknowledge this as the ideal but argue that real penetration occurred (Halperin, One Hundred Years, 55, citing Dover, “Postscript, 1989” in Dover, Greek Homosexuality, 204–6). Dover points out in his postscript that the evidence of the vases for intercrural penetration must be balanced by a consideration of the evidence from comedic texts, which suggest that anal penetration did occur (ibid., 204; cf. 99, where Dover mentions evidence from comedy). See also Mark Golden, “Slavery and Homosexuality at Athens,” Phoenix 38 (1984): 308–24, on the status of boys. 31 Dover, Greek Homosexuality, 103; Halperin, One Hundred Years, 22–23. 29

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“detaches himself from the ranks of male citizenry and classifies himself with women and foreigners.”32 Thus, two adult male citizens could not legitimately engage in sex acts.33 The practice of prostitution by a male citizen was forbidden by law, and the practitioner was subject to restrictions on his political activities and, potentially, severe penalties; in contrast, prostitution by male noncitizens was approved, even taxed!34 Rome was similar to Athens in a number of respects. Freeborn males penetrated females and males of inferior status but not each other.35 Their sanctioned pederastic relations were restricted to youths who were not freeborn, such as prostitutes and slaves36, much in contrast to the pederasty of Athens, in which youths of the citizen class were courted by adult male citizens. As in Athens in the case of the citizen class, the penetration of a freeborn Roman male was the subject of censure and prohibited by law.37 In addition to anal penetration, Roman society had very particular ideas about oral penetration, which it constructed in a similar manner: the receptive role was degrading and excluded for the freeborn male.38 The receptive and insertive roles were primarily status-bound in both the Athenian and Roman contexts, though the language of gender played an important part in the manner in which these roles were discussed. In both contexts, inappropriate penetration was frequently likened to feminization: to be penetrated was to be feminized, to surrender male status and authority, a baffling act in these cultural settings.39 However, in both contexts “feminization” of certain males (noncitizens, nonfreeborn) was acceptable because of their inferior status. At ————— 32

Dover, Greek Homosexuality, 103–4. Halperin, One Hundred Years, 31, describes the idea as “virtually inconceivable.” See also Dover, Greek Homosexuality, 103–4; and Niko Besnier, “Polynesian Gender Liminality through Time and Space,” in Third Sex, Third Gender: Beyond Sexual Dimorphism in Culture and History (ed. Gilbert Herdt; New York: Zone Books, 1994), 285–328, 554–66, on some comparable patterns of homoeroticism in Polynesia. 34 Dover, Greek Homosexuality. 19–39. On the problem of the date of the law, see ibid., 33–34, who argues that it must date at least to the period before 424 BCE. 35 Richlin, “Not before Homosexuality,” 533. 36 Richlin, “Not before Homosexuality,” 537–38. See also Garden of Priapus, 34, 220. 37 See, further, Richlin’s survey of various materials on infamia, rape, and the lex Scantinia in Roman contexts (“Not before Homosexuality,” 554–71). Richlin argues that the lex Scantinia punished freeborn men who were receptive in intercourse. 38 Richlin, “Not before Homosexuality,” 534, 539, Garden of Priapus, 26, 220 and “The Meaning of Irrumare in Catullus and Martial,” Classical Philology 76 (1981): 40–46. Compare Athenian evidence in Dover, Greek Homosexuality, 99, on the vases, which suggest that male-male oral copulation was “peculiar to satyrs”; Dover also mentions some contradictory textual evidence. See also Dover’s postscript, Greek Homosexuality, 205: “The role of the fellator is essentially subordinate. .. . So far we have no evidence that an erastes fellated his eromenos.” 39 Richlin, “Not before Homosexuality,” 531, citing Seneca (Epistolae 95.21) on women, who are “born to be penetrated” (pati natae) and receptive men, who “suffer womanish things” (muliebria pati). For Athens, cf. Dover, Greek Homosexuality, 103–4. 33

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Athens and Rome, slaves, foreign residents, and other legal inferiors did not claim the same legal rights and privileges as the freeborn; nor were legal inferiors subject to the same restrictions in behavior. In contrast to the purely sex-bound and gender-bound receptivity of Lev 18:22 and 20:13, where no status, age, or other distinctions are made, at Athens and Rome receptivity was status-bound but not sex-bound, with gender playing a role in shaping the sexual rhetoric.40 The wealth of comparative evidence to be culled from classical cultures is not matched by the ancient Near East, though Babylonian, Assyrian, Egyptian, and other materials are extant.41 Of the various extant corpora of Near Eastern legislation, only the Middle Assyrian Laws (MAL) and the Hittite Laws deal at all with the subject of male-male sexual relations; Hammurapi, Eshnunna, and other legal collections say nothing about this matter. Nor is there legal evidence from Egypt. Neither the Hittite Laws nor the Middle Assyrian Laws prohibit male-male intercourse without qualification. Paragraph 189 of the Hittite Laws states that a man may not have sexual relations with his mother, daughter, or son. The context suggests that kinship is the issue in the case of the son, not his sex: he is mentioned as one-third of the family triad.42 Nowhere in this corpus is there a general ————— 40

I am conscious of the difficulties one encounters when setting out to compare legal evidence such as Lev 18:22 and 20:13 to a wider range of cultural materials such as what survives from classical Athens and Rome. At Athens, e.g., it is possible to speak about how a variety of sources that did not necessarily come from the same time period portray homoerotic behaviors; these include illustrated vases, other visual representations, literature of various kinds, graffiti, jokes, laws, etc. (see further Dover, Greek Homosexuality, 1–17, on the range, date, and provenance of source materials). Scholars have detected and discussed conflicts among the various witnesses themselves. For Rome there is a similar range of data. But for ancient Israel there is no such body of materials. By necessity, if comparisons are to be made, we must liken a pair of laws from a single legal collection to a fairly wide-ranging variety of cultural materials from various time periods from Athens and Rome. There is something to be gained by comparing what little we have from Israel to the evidence of other civilizations, as long as we remain conscious of the potential pitfalls. 41 On Assyria and Babylon, see the excellent survey of Jean Bottéro and Herbert Petschow, “Homosexualität,” in Reallexikon der Assyriologie (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1975), 4:460–61, who discuss visual representations as well as texts. On Egypt, see the brief treatment of Wolfhart Westendorf, “Homosexualität,” in Lexikon der Ägyptologie (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1977), 2:1272–74, with bibliography; Hans Goedicke, “Unrecognized Sportings,” Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt 6 (1967): 97–102, who reconstructs a variety of attitudes—positive and negative— toward homoeroticism in Egypt; and Lise Manniche, “Some Aspects of Ancient Egyptian Sexual Life,” Acta Orientalia 38 (1977): 11–23, esp. 14–15, and Sexual Life in Ancient Egypt (London: Routledge, 1987). Much thanks to Steven Thompson for pointing me in the direction of the last two references. 42 Harry A. Hoffner, “Incest, Sodomy and Bestiality in the Ancient Near East,” in Orient and Occident: Essays Presented to Cyrus H. Gordon on the Occasion of His Sixty-Fifth Birthday (ed. H. Hoffner; AOAT 22; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener; Kevelaer: Butzon & Bercker, 1973), 83, makes this point.

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interdiction of male-male couplings.43 Middle Assyrian Law A 19 concerns false accusations of a male engaging in repeated, apparently voluntary receptive intercourse44; it says nothing about repeated penetration of other males. A second law, MAL A 20, seems to proscribe rape involving two males of equal status (or some kind of relationship of physical proximity, though this seems less likely).45 The equal status of the partner is suggested by the word tappƗ’u, often translated “companion,” “colleague,” or “neighbor.”46 Only the insertive partner is punished in MAL A 20 (and with rape and castration!); the receptive partner (the tappƗ’u) is apparently viewed as the victim of aggression so that no penalty is prescribed for him.47 The verb nâku/niƗku48, “to have (illicit) intercourse,” is used throughout MAL A 19– 20; though it does not necessarily indicate coercion by the insertive partner, it does suggest clearly that his act is illicit in some manner. His punishment, however, suggests that he used force, as others have argued.49 It seems as if —————

43 See further the discussion of Hoffner, “Incest,” 83, 84. Hoffner believes that these laws date at least to the middle of the seventeenth century BCE. 44 The Gtn (iterative) of nâku/niƗku is used: “They have (illicit) intercourse with him repeatedly” (ittiniknjš). The verb nâku/niƗku, “to have (illicit) intercourse,” occurs throughout the formulations of MAL A 19–20. It is used elsewhere of illicit sex acts (e.g., adultery, in MAL A 17 68; 18 74). Derived nouns and adjectives include nƯku, “adultery,” “fornication” and nƯku/nƯktu, “ravished,” “raped” (see MAL A 23). Some of these obviously imply coercion, though it is not clear that the verb, when used alone, necessarily suggests the use of force; certainly in MAL A 19 it does not (likewise MAL A 17 68 and 18 74). On the verb nâku/niƗku, see further “nâku (niƗku),” in CAD 11.1:197–98. On the sense of MAL A 19, see further Bottéro and Petschow, “Homosexualität,” 462. 45 For example, contiguous neighbors, as in MAL B 8 or 19. See below for a discussion of the possible meanings of tappƗ’u. 46 See the discussions of Godfrey R. Driver and John C. Miles, The Assyrian Laws (Oxford: Clarendon, 1935), 66–68; and more recently, Guillame Cardascia, Les lois assyriennes (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1969), 68; and Bottéro and Petschow, “Homosexualität,” 461–62, on tappƗ’u. See also Wolfram von Soden, Akkadisches Handwörterbuch (3 vols.; Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1965–81), 3:1321–22. Driver and Miles argue that the “tappƗ’u was a person belonging to or taken into the family or clan or village-community for the purpose of the common ownership or cultivation of land” (Driver and Miles, Assyrian Laws, 67). Later, as individual holdings increased, tappƗ’u came to designate the neighbor. They acknowledge that this formulation is the result of complete conjecture. But there are instances in the MAL themselves where it is clear that the tappƗ’u is the next door neighbor (see B 8 and 41 on this); other uses of the word in the MAL are ambiguous. It seems likely that the tappƗ’u was more generally one of equal status. The word is used of business partners, fellow officials, even fellow soldiers or officers in various contexts and periods, in addition to neighbors (as discussed by Driver and Miles, Assyrian Laws, 66). In Old Babylonian commercial contexts, a related abstract noun tappnjtu occurs commonly, with the meaning “business partnership” (thanks to Ben Foster for pointing this out to me). Bottéro and Petschow, “Homosexualität,” 461–62, describe the tappƗ’u as one “du même rang social” or, “qui fréquente la même société,” which seems apt. 47 Cardascia, Les lois assyriennes, 134–35. 48 See n. 44 above. 49 See the discussions of Bottéro and Petschow, “Homosexualität,” 462; and Greenberg, The Construction of Homosexuality, 126 and n. 5, who follows Bottéro and Petschow.

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the law in A 20 is concerned with the rape of a man by another of equal status or close relationship, while the law in A 19 concerns repeated, voluntary assumption of the receptive role in intercourse. Middle Assyrian Laws A 19–20 occur in the context of a series of laws addressing crimes committed against married women. Guillame Cardascia and Jean Bottéro have both concluded that the placement of MAL A 19–20 suggests that the receptive partner in a male-male coupling was viewed in this legal setting as the equivalent of a woman.50 This observation seems valid whether the receptivity was coerced or not, since one law (A 19) concerns consensual behavior and the other probably describes coerced acts. On this one may compare both H and the evidence from the classical world: in both contexts, receptivity is associated with femininity and feminization. In Lev 18:22 and 20:13, as in MAL A 20, the receptive partner was not originally punished; only the penetrator was penalized, though in the biblical context there is no evidence to suggest that the insertive partner used coercion. Were receptivity and the insertive role status-bound in the Middle Assyrian Laws, as they were at Athens and Rome? Or were appropriate configurations of sexual behavior constructed on another basis? We are told in A 20 only that if a male penetrates a tappƗ’u (presumably by force), he will be punished by castration and rape; nothing is said of the penetration (forced or unforced) of males who are not the tappƗ’u of the hypothetical insertive partner, nor of those who may be the tappƗ’u but are not forced into receptivity.51 If it were licit for a male of higher status to penetrate only a male of lower status, the situation would have been in some respects comparable to that of Athens and Rome. Though likely, it is in no way clear that this was so; only an argument from silence can be made. If it were acceptable for a male to penetrate one of equal status, as long as the relations were consensual, then the construction of sanctioned sex acts reflected in MAL A 20 would contrast sharply with the evidence of Athens and Rome. But again, as in the case of penetrating a male of lower status, only an argument from silence can be made.52 Further, the law of A 20 might well have been based on ideas of community and physical proximity rather than equal status, since it is possible that tappƗ’u suggested these, though this seems less likely. If this were the case, it might have been licit to penetrate males who —————

50 Cardascia, Les lois assyriennes, 41; and Jean Bottéro, Antiquités assyro-babyloniennes (Paris: École pratique des hautes Études, 1967), 87–88. 51 Driver and Miles, Assyrian Laws, 71, anticipate me on this point, as do Bottéro and Petschow, “Homosexualität,” 462. Driver and Miles believe it was only an offense to have sexual relations with one’s tappƗ’u. Bottéro and Petschow take a more nuanced position, pointing out that forcing the tappƗ’u is the issue, not intercourse with the tappƗ’u per se. 52 For such an argument, see Bottéro and Petschow, “Homosexualität,” 462. They are probably correct.

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were not part of one’s village or clan, or those who were, with their consent. If the tappƗ’u were a member of the village or clan rather than one of equal status, then the construction of licit sex acts would again contrast with Athens and Rome, for community membership would play a central role in creating boundaries. Whatever the meaning of tappƗ’u, MAL A 20, like the evidence from Athens and Rome, differs from Lev 18:22 and 20:13, which proscribe male-male couplings without qualification, both at the penultimate and final stages in the development of these laws. The general proscription of male-male intercourse in Lev 18:22 and 20:13 is striking in light of the evidence from Athens, Rome, and the Middle Assyrian Laws. In the classical cultural contexts, status plays a significant part in determining licit and illicit couplings between males and in the bounding of the receptive and insertive roles: a nonfreeborn male could be legitimately penetrated by any man; in contrast, a freeborn male could not be penetrated by another of equal status, nor by a male of lower status. In the Middle Assyrian Laws, status, coercion, and repeated acts of receptivity appear to play a part in constructing the boundaries between sanctioned and prohibited behaviors among men.53 In contrast, Lev 18:22 and 20:13 ban all male couplings involving anal penetration, seemingly those coerced and those voluntary; those with men of higher status, equal status, or lower status; those with men of one’s own community or another community.54 The comprehensive character of the prohibitions appears to antedate the activity of the final H redactors; there is no evidence that the two formulations were ever anything but general in scope. Why might status concerns and the element of coercion have played no part in the laws of Lev 18:22 and 20:13 at any stage in their development? Why should the proscription presumably apply to all possible couplings involving anal penetration? For the reconstructed penultimate stage, we can only speculate; for the final casting, more can be said. Two approaches seem potentially fruitful: (1) examination of the role and rhetoric of status in H outside of Lev 18:22 and 20:13; and (2) consideration of H’s concern to prevent the defilement of the land of Israel. Israelite legal collections, including H, recognize elements of social stratification in the community: the slave is mentioned alongside the freeborn and the freed; the poor are mentioned in contrast to “you,” members of the community of male landowners addressed by such legal collections as Deuteronomy 12–26 and Exod 20:22–23:33. Legal materials also tend to affirm —————

53 As mentioned previously, it is possible that community membership rather than status is the key to understanding this restriction. 54 Contrast Boswell, Christianity, 101, n. 34, who speculates that the laws were possibly meant to restrict only cultic prostitution. There is no evidence to support this idea.

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the inferiority of women to men.55 However, a rhetoric of inclusivity permeates much of H’s material, particularly in the discourse sections framing the laws: there is one law for all, for the native-born as well as the resident alien (Lev 24:22). The rhetorical contrast of native-born Israelite versus resident alien56 probably serves as an inclusion encompassing at minimum all free male residents of the land (and their families, where applicable).57 If status does not have an impact on legal formulation in H, if there is truly one law for all as H claims, then this may be one reason why the prohibition of male-male intercourse in Lev 18:22 and 20:13 is general, apparently unrelated to the status of the insertive and receptive partners. If the freeborn and the freed, the native-born and the resident alien all enjoy equal status under the law, a prohibition of any sort would necessarily be addressed to all free male residents of Israel without exception. It would not be possible to proscribe certain activities for one group (say, native-born free Israelites) and sanction the same activities for another (say, resident aliens) living under the same law. The comprehensiveness of the proscriptions in Lev 18:22 and 20:13 is evident in the choice of terms employed: Lev 18:22 addresses the landowner (“you” m.s.)58, and forbids penetration of “a male” (general term) rather than prohibiting intercourse with “your neighbor”59 (i.e., one of equal status; a more particular restriction). The law avoids —————

55 A woman was viewed as the property first of her father and later of her husband; examples illustrating her legal status abound in texts of the Hebrew Bible (see, e.g., Exod 20:17//Deut 5:21). 56 The rhetorical contrast occurs many times throughout H in a number of forms: nativeborn/resident alien (Lev 17:8, 10–12,13,15–16; 18:26; 19:3; 24:16, etc.); Israelite/resident alien (Lev 17:8, 10, 12, 13; 20:2; 22:18, etc.). Compare the Deuteronomistic inclusive idiom “bond or free” (Deut 32:36; 1 Kgs 14:10, 21:21; 2 Kgs 9:8, 14:26). 57 Some material in H suggests that slaves were excepted from the one law notion; it appears that different laws applied to them in certain situations. In Lev 19:20–22, a man has intercourse with a slave betrothed to another man. In contrast to Deut 22:22; 22:23–24; 22:25–27, where the penalties for intercourse with a betrothed virgin or the wife of another man are severe (execution for the man in all cases; for the woman in all but one case), such coupling with a slave who is not yet freed results in a relatively light penalty for the man (a guilt offering), and no apparent penalty for the woman. Lev 19:20 makes it clear that the slave’s status requires a less severe penalty than death for both parties: “They shall not be put to death, for she was not (yet) freed.” There is certainly a tension between the particular law in Lev 19:20–22 and the rhetoric of inclusivity found most frequently in the framing materials of H. Either this law contradicts the notion of one law for all, or the slave is an exception, with a separate status. 58 See the earlier discussion of direct address in Israelite legal materials at the beginning of section II. The laws tend to address directly heads of households when they make use of direct address (“you” m.s.); women, minors, resident aliens, and others are mentioned in the third person, when mentioned at all. 59 Hebrew rƝa‘, presumably one of equal status, a fellow landowner (cf. the tappƗ’u of the MAL, and see the list of the neighbor’s potential possessions in Exod 20:17 [// Deut 5:21], which includes house, wife, slaves, and draught animals). Laws referring specifically to injuries done to the neighbor and/or his property are abundant in biblical legal materials (e.g., Exod 20:16, 17 [// Deut 5:20, 21]; 21:14; 22 passim), including H (Lev 19:13, 16, 18; 20:10).

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particulars, remaining general in scope. The companion law in Lev 20:13 is also framed in general terms (“a man … with a male”). Again, the neighbor is not mentioned, for the social status of the receptive partner plays no role in shaping the interdiction. In the final form of Leviticus 18 and 20, issues of defilement are clearly paramount. But at an earlier stage in the development of these laws, perhaps the idea of legal inclusivity, now evidenced in the rhetoric of the final form of H, played a role. On this, only speculation is possible; scholars know nothing of the prehistory of this rhetoric and ideology and nothing of the social context in which the laws of Lev 18:22 and 20:13 emerged. But I am assuming that the laws emerged in some proto-H social context and that the ideology and rhetoric of inclusivity also had a prehistory in H communities. Certainly, in the final redaction of this material, the pronounced concern to avoid defilement of the land is wellserved by laws that were already comprehensive in character, for whatever reason.

III A number of recent commentators have wrestled with the laws of Lev 18:22 and 20:13, generally as part of an attempt to make sense of the constellation of sexual proscriptions attested in Leviticus 18 and 20. Some scholars have been inclined to explore how the laws of Leviticus 18 and 20 function as a group and to suggest what if anything unites them. In practice, commentators have tended to focus on the final form of the text, with little or no attention to issues of textual development over time. Certainly, the arrangement of the laws in Leviticus 18 and 20 as they now exist ought to be a focus of interpreters: even if individual laws or groups of laws had a prehistory, they function within their final setting in a particular way, and this must be considered. But the laws of Leviticus 18 and 20 must also be analyzed with reference to the larger Holiness corpus and its distinct rhetoric and ideology, though in practice this is rarely done. Finally, the development of the individual laws and the legal collections in Leviticus 18 and 20 over time cannot be ignored. It seems clear that individual laws or groupings of laws each have their own history, as do larger collections of laws.60 Several distinct approaches to understanding the meaning of Lev 18:22 and 20:13 in their final form are to be found in recent interpretive literature. One way of understanding these prohibitions emphasizes alleged connec-

————— 60

On this, see further Westbrook, Property and Family, 55.

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tions with so-called idolatry.61 Another approach utilizes Mary Douglas’s arguments in “The Abominations of Leviticus” with regard to prohibited animals, arguing that male-male anal intercourse is forbidden because the receptive male does not conform to his class (male).62 A third view sees the wasting of male seed in nonprocreative acts as the central concern in the sexual laws of Leviticus 18 and 20, including 18:22 and 20:13.63 Finally, it has been argued that the mixing of otherwise defiling emissions is at issue in several of these sexual proscriptions.64 Each of these approaches focuses entirely on the meaning of the prohibitions in their final form, with greater or lesser attention given to the wider chapter context; the possibility that these laws had a prehistory before the activity of the final H tradents and redactors—and thus possibly a different meaning in an earlier context— either is never raised or is given insufficient attention. In this section of the essay, I will consider each of these approaches and develop my own position on the meaning(s) of Lev 18:22 and 20:13 in their final chapter and wider H settings. The “idolatry” approach of Norman H. Snaith and John Boswell to understanding Lev 18:22 and 20:13 is probably the least convincing of the four to be discussed. It depends on the presence of Lev 18:21, which refers to child sacrifice to an alleged god Molek65, and/or on a restricted and inaccurate understanding of tô‘Ɲbâ, the so-called abomination, a word that occurs in Lev 18:22 and 20:13 with reference to the male-male intercourse described and in the framing materials of 18:26–30 with reference to all the violations enumerated in the chapter. It is very likely that Lev 18:21 is secondary to the series of laws in 18:19–23, attracted by the presence of a —————

61 Snaith, Leviticus and Numbers, 126; and Boswell, Christianity, 100. Boswell speculates that the laws might have been meant to proscribe cult prostitution rather than noncultic, homoerotic behaviors (101, n. 34). He assumes such prostitution existed in non-Yhwistic sanctuaries (his “pagan”; see his discussion of the qƗdƝš, 98–99). As mentioned in n. 6 above, this assumption is questionable. 62 Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger (London: Harmondsworth, 1970), 54–72; repr. of Purity and Danger (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1966); Thurston, “Leviticus and the Prohibition of Homosexual Acts,” 15–16. 63 Eilberg-Schwartz, The Savage in Judaism, 183; Biale, Eros and the Jews, 29. 64 Bigger “Family Laws,” 202–3, on several laws in Lev 18:19–23. His argument is not effectively applied to 18:22; see my treatment ahead. 65 It is highly unlikely that the noun mǀlek was ever the name of a god; on the contrary, there is reason to believe it was a technical sacrificial term associated specifically with cults of child sacrifice in the Northwest Semitic cultural sphere. The major corpus of relevant comparative evidence hails from Punic North Africa. See further Otto Eissfeldt, Molk als Opferbegriff im Punischen und Hebräischen und das Ende des Gottes Moloch (Beiträge zur Religionsgeschichte des Altertums 3; Halle: Niemeyer, 1935); and Lawrence Stager, “The Rite of Child Sacrifice at Carthage,” in New Light on Ancient Carthage (ed. John G. Pedley; Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1980), 1–11.

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shared idiom and key word in verse 20.66 Leviticus 18:21 prohibits child sacrifice to an alleged god Molek, where surrounding laws in verses 19–20 and 22–23 all refer to prohibited sexual acts. Thus some scholars have argued that the interdiction of Lev 18:22 has some connection to the prohibition of the worship of gods other than Yhwh, the god of Israel (i.e., to socalled idolatry). Another reason frequently given for making the connection between Lev 18:22 and the worship of other gods is the presence of the word tô‘Ɲbâ, the so-called abomination, in the legal formulations of Lev 18:22 and 20:13 and the H framework materials of Leviticus 18 (verses 26—30). But tô‘Ɲbâ is not restricted to descriptions of non-Yhwistic cults or even cult activity per se; on the contrary, it has a broad usage that may vary from source to source, and its use in Lev 18:22 and 20:13 tells us little, except that the acts described in those verses are boundary violations of some sort.67 In short, neither Lev 18:21 nor the presence of tô‘Ɲbâ in 18:22 and 20:13 provide convincing evidence that male-male intercourse is proscribed because it is associated with the worship of other gods. Thomas M. Thurston’s approach to understanding Lev 18:22 is interesting, and worthy of serious consideration. After asserting without argument that the law refers to anal intercourse, he develops Douglas’s paradigm by applying it to Lev 18:22. Douglas had argued that there is a pattern to be discerned in the dietary laws of Leviticus 11 and Deuteronomy 14: every living creature should conform to the characteristics of its class and those that do not are forbidden to Israelites. Thurston argues that Lev 18:22 is best understood in the same way; the prohibition is present because the receptive male in anal intercourse does not conform to his class (male as opposed to female): boundaries are blurred when a male plays the receptive role. Thurston is correct to assume that the law refers to anal intercourse and not to other sexual activities, and there is much to be said for introducing the issue of the gendering of sexual acts. After all, the fact that the receptive partner is not addressed directly in Lev 18:22 suggests that he was probably viewed as the legal equivalent of a woman, as I have argued. But there are problems with this approach. The law in Lev 18:22 addresses directly only the insertive partner in a male coupling. In 20:13 the receptive partner is mentioned together with the insertive partner in the punishment —————

66 The key word is zera‘, “seed,” which occurs in v. 20 as well as v. 21; the idiom is lǀ’ tittƝn, which is also found in both verses. Cases of attraction resulting from shared idioms or key words are ubiquitous in biblical literature, including legal materials. The Molek prohibition of Lev 18:21 is paralleled by a far more detailed formulation in Lev 20:2–6. The proscription in 20:2–6 precedes the introductory framework material of the chapter, suggesting it is secondary there as well: it was probably added after the attraction of v. 21 to chapter 18 for the sake of symmetry between the two chapters. 67 See further my discussion of tô‘Ɲbâ and its uses in n. 3 above.

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section, but so awkwardly that I suspect he was added at some stage during the development of these laws. Originally, both formulations apparently focused only on the insertive partner; there is no evidence that the receptive partner was ever the central focus of these laws. Given the lack of focus on the receptive partner, it seems unlikely that the laws were ever motivated by a concern that the anally receptive male conform to his class. Stephen F. Bigger and Howard Eilberg-Schwartz have each contributed to the broader discussion of the shape and shaping of Leviticus 18 and 20, and each has developed an interpretive paradigm for understanding how these legal collections function. Bigger published his article on Leviticus 18 in 1979.68 In it, he observed that Leviticus 18 could be divided into two parts: verses 7–18, concerning incest violations, and verses 19–23, which bring together other sexual crimes. He spends the majority of the article on the incest proscriptions but has some interesting comments to make about verses 19–23. Bigger argues that these verses are all concerned with maintaining the “sexual purity of the individual.” He suggests, though not very boldly, that each violation involves a “misuse of semen”: in this series of laws, semen is mixed with other human semen; animal semen; or other defiling fluids, leading to uncleanness. In verse 19, a man is forbidden from having intercourse with a menstruant; Bigger points out that “both semen and menstrual blood were defiling on their own, and mingled together these presented a double threat.”69 Verse 20 involves “non-group adultery”; Bigger suggests that the commingling of the semen of two different men (husband/adulterer) may have been the reason for this prohibition.70 Verse 21, which prohibits child sacrifice, has but a tenuous connection to the rest of the material in Bigger’s view.71 Bigger claims that verse 22, concerning the male-male coupling, also involves the misuse of semen, but nowhere explains how it is misused. Finally, verse 23 forbids human-quadruped couplings in two laws. Bigger draws attention to the word tebel, “confusion” or “mixing,” used in verse 23 to describe the coupling of quadruped and woman in intercourse; he suggests that this confusion “may have referred to the mixing of different types of semen in the receptive animal or woman, or the confusion of species and social roles.”72 The former explanation is more consistent with his observations about the other proscriptions: with regard to the laws of verses 19–20, he suggested that the mixing of defiling fluids was at issue. The notion of forbidden mixings, suggested by the word tebel in Lev 18:23 and 20:12, was elaborated in some detail with reference to the ————— 68

Bigger, “Family Laws,” 187–203. Bigger, “Family Laws,” 202. 70 Bigger, “Family Laws,” 202. 71 Bigger, “Family Laws,” 202. See my earlier discussion. 72 Bigger, “Family Laws,” 203. 69

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dietary laws by Douglas.73 Curiously, Bigger did not cite Douglas, though he too emphasized mixing/confusion as an underlying theme in Leviticus 18.74 Bigger’s idea that it is prohibited to bring defiling fluids into contact is striking and may indeed underlie each of these proscribed couplings; it needs to be considered seriously, especially because a rhetoric forbidding mixing is present in two of the laws in Leviticus 18 and 20 (18:23; 20:12), and Lev 19:19 as well.75 Eilberg-Schwartz, in a discussion of menstrual blood and other defiling fluids, briefly considered what might tie together the laws of Lev 18.76 He argued that all of the acts listed in Leviticus 18, including the law of verse 21 forbidding child sacrifice to an alleged god Molek, are interdicted because they “pose a threat to the integrity of the Israelite lineage.” He continues: “Incest violations and adultery pervert and obscure lines of descent. By the same token, homosexuality, bestiality performed by a man, and offering one’s children to Molech waste Israelite seed. … The same is true of sexual relations with a menstruating woman. … It is true that when a woman has intercourse with an animal, Israelite seed is not wasted. But since this sexual act cannot result in conception, it too is considered a ‘perversion.’”77 In a recent contribution to the interpretation of the laws of Leviticus 18 and 20, David Biale, following Eilberg-Schwartz, proposed that the laws in question all proscribe acts that threaten procreation or its results (i.e., living children) or do not lead to it: “What unifies all these acts is that they are considered affronts to procreation, either because they are sterile (homosexuality and bestiality), produce illegitimate progeny (adultery, incest), destroy progeny (sacrifice to Molech), or represent rebellion against the source of one’s own legitimacy (insulting one’s parents).”78 Bigger and Eilberg-Schwartz each consider the law of Lev 18:22 in the context of wider discussions of the laws of chapter 18. Bigger claims that male-male intercourse discussed in Lev 18:22 is forbidden because it con————— 73

Douglas, Purity and Danger, 54–72. Bigger was not the first to suggest that concern about the mixing of semen might lie behind several of these prohibitions. In his commentary on the word tebel (“mixing”) in v. 23, Rashi spoke of mixing human and animal semen; regarding v. 20, the Vulgate’s rendering suggests a concern for semen mixing. See further Snaith, Leviticus and Numbers, 125–26, who cites these texts and finds this approach plausible. 75 Where interbreeding quadrupeds, sowing two kinds of seed in one field, and making garments with two kinds of stuff are prohibited. Compare Deut 22:9–11, which parallels the list in Lev 19:19 but with slight differences. 76 Eilberg-Schwartz, The Savage in Judaism, 183. 77 Eilberg-Schwartz, The Savage in Judaism, 183. In this instance, as in the case of “mixing” semen, premodern interpreters anticipate the arguments of moderns. The medieval commentator Nahmanides suggested that both male-male and human-animal couplings were prohibited because they do not lead to procreation. 78 Biale, Eros and the Jews, 29. 74

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stitutes “misuse of semen,” but he does not elaborate, and it remains unclear to the reader precisely what he meant by this. Eilberg-Schwartz, followed by Biale, seems to understand Lev 18:22 to prohibit all types of male-male sex; he argues that such acts “waste seed,” not unlike a male having intercourse with a menstruating woman, or a man coupling with a female quadruped, acts that would produce no offspring. Bigger focuses attention on the notion of “mixing” as an underlying theme uniting a number of the prohibitions of Leviticus 18; Eilberg-Schwartz argues that the laws share in common the idea of defending the lineage from various potential threats, including the wasting of male seed by means of acts that do not lead to procreation. Bigger’s theory is appealing and is anchored in the vocabulary and conceptual universe of the text itself, but his treatment of Lev 18:22 is wholly inadequate. He does not show how the “misuse of semen” in Lev 18:22 relates to the various mixings of defiling emissions he identifies in the laws of Lev 18:19, 20, 23, or any other kind of mixing for that matter. Eilberg-Schwartz’s presentation is more thoroughgoing and bolder than is Bigger’s; he integrates his interpretation of Lev 18:22 into his wider theoretical discussion quite well, but the theory itself, though systematically presented, is not anchored in the conceptual universe of the text. EilbergSchwartz does not contend with the notion of “mixing” (tebel), mentioned in both Lev 18:23 and 20:12. Yet surely “mixing” must have some relation to the ideas undergirding Leviticus 18 and 20 in their final form; it may in fact be a primary organizing notion. Furthermore, Eilberg-Schwartz assumes that all male-male sexual acts are proscribed by Lev 18:22, but this is clearly not the case: only intercourse is interdicted. Sexual acts other than intercourse between males—and between males and females—waste seed; they are nonproductive of offspring, and yet they are not prohibited by these laws. The laws concerning sexual couplings all seem to refer specifically to intercourse.79 This suggests to me that a concern for productive sexual relations might not underlie the laws of Leviticus 18 in their final form. If it did, one might expect other genital acts that result in ejaculation but do not lead to conception to be proscribed. Bigger was correct to observe that a number of the sexual acts prohibited in Lev 18:19–23 involve the possible mixing of otherwise defiling bodily emissions: semen and menstrual blood in a menstruating woman (Lev 18:19); the semen of two different men in a receptive woman who commits adultery (Lev 18:20); and human semen and animal semen in a receptive woman or female animal in cases of human-animal coupling (Lev 18:23). —————

79 The various idioms used suggest this: “to uncover the nakedness of”; “to take”; “to approach to uncover nakedness”; “to lie with”; “to set your effusion in”; “to stand before (in order) to copulate.”

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The problem is Lev 18:22, where two men have intercourse. Bigger stated that semen here is “misused,” but never made clear what he meant. Could Lev 18:22 be another case of avoiding the mixing of otherwise defiling bodily emissions, as in Lev 18:19–20, 23? Like menstrual blood and semen, excrement defiles in certain purity constructions, including that of Ezekiel, who is widely viewed as sharing H’s purity system (in other words, Ezekiel belonged to the Holiness School).80 I will assume from Ezek. 4:9–15 that excrement defiles in H circles, even though this is not evidenced in H itself. If excrement pollutes in H’s purity ideology, the reason for the proscription of male-male intercourse in the final form of H’s work might then be to prevent two otherwise defiling agents—excrement and semen—from mingling in the body of the receptive partner.81 As Bigger and many others have observed, the various sexual acts enumerated in Leviticus 18 and 20 lead to defilement of the individual in the final, highly redacted form of those chapters; uncleanness must be avoided according to H framework materials in chapters 18 and 20 for the land of Israel must be kept free of defilement so that Israel may dwell there, avoiding expulsion.82 In the final form of H, male-male anal intercourse may have been proscribed in order to prevent the mixing of two otherwise defiling substances, and thereby prevent the defilement of the land of Israel. According to P, any ejaculatory act renders a man and his female sexual partner unclean until evening (Lev 15:16–18). Defilement must be kept apart from the sanctuary/desert camp, where Yhwh is thought to be present. So an unclean person must avoid the sanctuary sphere until he or she is clean. But according to H, the whole land of Israel—like the sanctuary according the purity constructions of P and other biblical sources—must be protected from pollution.83 The purity system of H, in contrast to other biblical ideologies, erects a boundary around the whole land, treating it as holy and in need of protection. Yet surely H does not demand an end to all ejaculatory acts and other events of the life cycle that are defiling (e.g., birth, menstruation) in order to avoid contamination of the land of Israel! ————— 80

See specifically Ezek 4:9–15. Zechariah 3:1–5, another text in which excrement defiles, may also reflect this construction of purity. Compare Deut 23:13–15; 2 Kgs 10:27, and the Temple Scroll from Qumran (11QTemp 46:13–16) for such associations in other, non-H, purity contexts. On the symbolism of excremental defilement, see further the discussion of Baruch Halpern, “‘The Excremental Vision’: The Doomed Priests of Doom in Isaiah 28,” HAR 10 (1986): 109–21. 81 A possible problem with this thesis has been pointed out to me by David Konstan (December 8, 1993): if the avoidance of mixing two defiling agents in the body of a receptive partner were the motive, why is there no ban on anal intercourse with a woman? In response, I note that anal intercourse with a woman is not attested in any Israelite context. Possibly it was not part of the Israelite repertoire of sexual acts. Nevertheless, I note the potential difficulty. 82 See Lev 18:24–30; 20:22–26. 83 See further Milgrom, Leviticus, 13–51, on views of purity in H and P.

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Because the threat of the mixing of two otherwise defiling emissions may well link together the nonincest sexual laws of chapters 18 and 20, perhaps the H tradents responsible for the final form of chapters 18 and 20 believed that only the mixing of such defiling emissions was threatening to the purity of the land.84 Perhaps menstruation, parturition, ejaculation, and other events causing defilement according to P were only mildly defiling according to H, unthreatening to the continued presence of Israel in the land as long as no mixing with other defiling emissions was involved. That H has nothing to say about these sources of uncleanness apart from mixings is probably telling in itself. How did P view such mixings? The Priestly Source seems significantly less threatened by them: where H would cut off from the community a man and a menstruating woman who have intercourse (Lev 20:18), P simply states that they are each unclean for seven days (Lev 15:24).

IV What can be concluded from this investigation? The laws of Lev 18:22 and 20:13, with their opaque idiom miškƟbê ’iššâ, concern specifically the act of intercourse between two males; they do not refer to other sexual acts. This interpretation has been assumed by some commentators past and present but has never before been demonstrated philologically to my knowledge. Leviticus 18:22 addresses directly only the insertive partner, and Lev 20:13 begins by mentioning only him in the third person; the receptive partner, very likely viewed as the legal equivalent of a woman, is not addressed directly by these laws. Furthermore, there is good reason to suspect that, at an earlier stage in the development of Lev 18:22 and 20:13, only the insertive partner was punished, in contrast to the final form of these laws in which both partners are subject to execution. Why only the insertive partner, and why the proscription? The penetrator may have been viewed before the final H casting as the only active agent and thus the only one culpable, condemned possibly for causing the “feminization” of his partner. Or he may have also been seen as someone committing an act construed as an assault (cf. MAL A 20), though there is no evidence to suggest this. Another possible approach is that the insertive partner may have been viewed as ————— 84 The incest laws (Lev 18:7–18) have their own complex history of transmission, as a number of other commentators have argued (e.g., Bigger, “Family Laws,” 196–202). The semen-mixing thesis will work for some of these (e.g., Lev 18:7, 8, 14, 15, 16), but not necessarily others (e.g., Lev 18:9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 17). We could assume that all of the potential female partners mentioned in vv. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 17 are otherwise married, but that is not stated and does not seem to be the reason for the proscriptions.

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not conforming to his class because of his choice of partner.85 In any case, the insertive partner is the focus of the laws in their penultimate form, and his action is described as a boundary violation (tô‘Ɲbâ). The laws in their penultimate form viewed the receptive partner as the legal equivalent of a woman: he is not addressed directly; he is very likely seen as a patient rather than an agent; he is viewed as “feminized”; he is not deserving of punishment (cf. MAL A 20). Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13 prohibit male-male intercourse without qualification, in contrast to other ancient cultures, where status, coercion, and other issues play a role in the bounding of licit and illicit sexual behavior between men. It may be that H’s ideology and rhetoric of inclusivity contributed to the shaping of these laws as general prohibitions in their penultimate stage, though this must remain a speculation. Certainly purity considerations unique to H are predominant in the final casting of Lev 18 and 20. The laws of Lev 18:22 and 20:13 in their final setting may well be part of a wider effort to prevent the mixing of semen and other defiling agents in the bodies of receptive women, men, and animals, mixings that result in defilement of the individuals involved. The primary concern of H tradents responsible for framework materials in chapters 18 and 20 is preserving the purity of the land, which itself is threatened by the defiling sexual acts enumerated in Lev 18 and 20. Intercourse between two males, like intercourse with a menstruant, adultery, incest, and bestiality, threatens to defile the land in the final form of Leviticus 18 and 20. All male-male intercourse couplings are proscribed because all such couplings would threaten the purity of the land according to the H tradents responsible for framework materials. Did Israelites abhor male couplings, as has been generally assumed up to the present? Certainly the evidence of the Hebrew Bible is insufficient to support this view. Such a generalization is more easily defended for adultery, incest, and human-animal couplings, all of which are prohibited in legal materials outside of H. But intercourse between males is mentioned in no other Israelite legal setting. Though the origin of the proscriptions is opaque, in the final form of H they cannot be separated from purity-related concerns.86 Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13 appear to prohibit intercourse exclu————— 85

Here I modify Thurston’s application of Douglas, discussed previously. In his recent discussion of homoeroticism (his “homosexuality”) in ancient Israel, Greenberg, like others before him, raises the possibility that Persian influence might have been responsible for the presence of these laws in Leviticus: “The homosexual prohibition of Leviticus could have had a Zoroastrian source” (The Construction of Homosexuality, 192). This argument is difficult to accept for a number of reasons: (1) The laws apparently had a complex history predating the work of the final H tradents, which themselves are not necessarily postexilic (i.e., Persian period) in provenance; there is no agreement on the antiquity of H, but many specialists would 86

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sively, while ignoring other potential sexual acts between males. For the laws in their final setting, this is best explained with reference to the distinct purity concerns articulated in the H framework materials: other sexual acts between men, in contrast to intercourse, are unthreatening to the purity of the land because they do not involve the mixing of two otherwise defiling emissions in the body of a receptive partner. This observation also helps to explain the frequently observed lack in H of an analogous law to Lev 18:22 and 20:13 regarding women. In a coupling of two women, there is no threat of defilement by means of the commingling two otherwise polluting substances in the body of a receptive partner. The reason for the generation of the laws of Lev 18:22 and 20:13 remains unclear, though the act of the penetrator was certainly the focus of concern from the beginning. Perhaps the insertive partner was originally condemned as a boundary violator because his act “feminized” his partner or because he did not conform to his class (male) when he chose another male as a partner in intercourse.

————— date at least portions to the period before the Babylonian exile, and Lev 18:22 and 20:13 certainly antedate the final stages of redaction. Thus, they may well be preexilic themselves. (2) There is no evidence that purity concerns are a borrowing from the Persian sphere, though this is what Greenberg seems to imply (ibid.,192); on the contrary, concern for defilement is evident in early biblical materials (including defilement from corpses, cited by Greenberg as evidence for “Iranian influence”). Sources which many specialists date to the tenth through seventh centuries BCE bear witness to purity concerns: see, e.g., J (Gen 7:2–3; 8:20); pre-Deuteronomistic materials in Samuel and Kings (1 Samuel 21; 2 Sam 3:29; 5:8; 11; 2 Kings 10:27); and Deuteronomistic materials (Deuteronomy 14; 15:21; 17:1; 23:12–14; 2 Kings 23 passim).

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“Surpassing the Love of Women”: Another Look at 2 Samuel 1:26 and the Relationship of David and Jonathan

The love of Jonathan for David reported in the biblical text has been the focus of much attention from both non-specialist commentators and professional biblical scholars. Many non-specialists, and some biblical scholars, have claimed that texts such as 1 Sam 18:1–3 and 2 Sam 1:26 suggest that David and Jonathan shared a homoerotic love, with some arguing that this love was expressed sexually.1 At the same time, most specialists addressing these texts have ignored or dismissed both sexual and non-sexual homoerotic interpretations. Instead, biblical scholars have often argued that the relationship of Jonathan and David is best understood as a close friendship, with a number of commentators underscoring the political dimensions of —————

I am grateful to Susan Ackerman, William Gilders, Tracy Lemos, Steven Weitzman, Marsha White, the participants in Brown University’s Culture and Religion of the Ancient Mediterranean faculty seminar (January 2004), and the contributors to this volume for critical feedback on an earlier draft of this essay. Needless to say, any errors of fact or judgment remain my responsibility alone. 1 For the sexual interpretation among non-specialists, see, e.g., Tom Horner, Jonathan Loved David: Homosexuality in Biblical Times (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1978), 26–39; Jody Hirsh, “In Search of Role Models,” in Twice Blessed: On Being Lesbian, Gay, and Jewish (ed. Christie Balka and Andy Rose; Boston: Beacon, 1989), 84; for a non-sexual but homoerotic reading by a non-specialist, see David F. Greenberg, The Construction of Homosexuality (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 114. Greenberg speaks of “homophilic innuendos” throughout the passages in question and speculates that an explicit sexual relationship may have been present in the original text and deleted by editors. David Halperin understands the relationship to be erotic, though not sexual (One Hundred Years of Homosexuality and Other Essays on Greek Love [New York and London: Routledge, 1990], 11, 83). Among specialists, see especially the article of Silvia Schroer and Thomas Staubli, “Saul, David, und Jonatan—eine Dreiecksgeschichte? Ein Beitrag zum Thema ‘Homosexualität im Ersten Testament,’” Bibel und Kirche 51 (1996):15–22, which argues that the relationship was homoerotic and “very probably” sexual as well (“eine homoerotische und sehr wahrscheinlich auch homosexuelle Beziehung,” 15); David Gunn, The Fate of King Saul (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1980), 93; Erhard Gerstenberger, Das dritte Buch Mose Leviticus (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993), 271; Martti Nissinen (“Die Liebe von David und Jonatan als Frage der modernen Exegese,” Biblica 80 [1999]: 262) writes of the relationship as portrayed in the “History of David’s Rise” as a friendship with some homoerotic coloring, though for him there is no evidence that it was explicitly sexual. Susan Ackerman argues for the presence of “eroticized and perhaps sexualized language and imagery” in the narrative of David and Jonathan (When Heroes Love: The Ambiguity of Eros in the Stories of Gilgamesh and David [New York: Columbia University Press, 2005]).

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the love of Jonathan for David. According to these scholars, the rhetoric of love found in the biblical materials describing the relationship of Jonathan and David is clearly a manifestation of ancient West Asian covenant discourse, in which loyal partners in a political relationship—whether equal or unequal in status—are said to love one another, and refer to one another using the terminology of kinship (e.g., “brother” in parity relationships; “father” and “son” in treaties of unequals).2 Though there can be no doubt that covenant discourse has indeed shaped the descriptions of Jonathan’s relationship to David, are the majority of specialist commentators correct to dismiss or ignore the homoerotic interpretation entirely? My purpose in this paper is to explore whether or not the biblical text might also suggest a homoerotic—and possibly sexual—relationship between Jonathan and David alongside the obvious covenant bond attested in both the prose narratives of 1 Samuel and in the elegy of 2 Sam 1:19–27. The focus of my interest is the curious claim of David’s Lament with respect to Jonathan: “Your love for me was wondrous, surpassing the love of women” (2 Sam 1:26). At the end of this investigation, I will consider briefly the implications of a homoerotic interpretation of 2 Sam 1:26 for contemporary debate regarding gay marriages and same-sex unions. Though rarely recognized by non-specialists, the covenantal dimensions of the Jonathan/David materials are quite explicit and have been well eluci—————

2 See Frank Moore Cross’s treatment, which emphasizes the kinship background of much of covenant discourse (“Kinship and Covenant in Ancient Israel,” in From Epic to Canon: History and Literature in Ancient Israel [Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998], 11). For the covenant interpretation of the relationship between David and Jonathan, see Martin A. Cohen, “The Role of the Shilonite Priesthood in the United Monarchy of Ancient Israel,” HUCA 36 (1965): 83; Ernst Jenni, “ahev to love,” TLOT, 1:47, 48–49; Gerhard Wallis, ʡʤʠ, TDOT 1:104– 105, 109; Jerzy Wozniak, “Drei verschiedene literarische Beschreibungen des Bundes zwischen Jonathan und David,” BZ 27 (1983): 213–18; P. Kyle McCarter, Jr., II Samuel: A New Translation with Introduction, Notes and Commentary (AB 9; Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1984), 77; Cross, ibid., 9–10; and Steven L. McKenzie, King David: A Biography (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 84. Markus Zehnder has published a detailed critique of Schroer and Staubli, “Saul, David und Jonatan,” in which he also interprets the love idiom in the Jonathan and David narratives as covenant discourse (“Exegetische Beobachtungen zu den David-JonathanGeschichten,” Biblica 79 [1998]: 157–59, 165, 168–70, 174). For explicit denials of a homoerotic relationship, see, e.g., Cohen, ibid., 83; Jenni, ibid., 48; Zehnder, ibid.,153–79; Simon B. Parker, “The Hebrew Bible and Homosexuality,” QR 11 (1991): 10–11; McKenzie, ibid., 85, and Shimon Bar-Efrat in The Jewish Study Bible (ed. Adele Berlin and Marc Zvi Brettler; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 621. See also Michael L. Barré’s review of Horner’s book in CBQ 41 (1979): 464: “As for David and Jonathan, the author shows no awareness that the language describing their relationship is largely drawn from treaty terminology.” Martti Nissinen (Homoeroticism in the Biblical World: A Historical Perspective [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1998], 55–56) advocates the friendship interpretation, but without an explicit discussion of the covenant dimension evident in the texts. However, his article incorporates the covenant dimension (see “Liebe von David und Jonatan,” 253).

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dated for the most part by scholars in the biblical field.3 1 Sam 18:1 states that “the soul of Jonathan was knit to the soul of David, and Jonathan loved him as himself”; in v. 3, we learn that “Jonathan and David cut a covenant (bƟrît) because he [presumably, Jonathan] loved him as himself.”4 1 Sam 20:14–15 speaks of David’s covenant loyalty (h̡esed) owed to Jonathan and his descendants and v. 17 mentions an oath of Jonathan prompted by his love for David. In David’s speech to Jonathan in 1 Sam 20:7–8, he uses the language of a subordinate treaty partner in relation to Jonathan, referring to himself as Jonathan’s “servant” (‘ebed) and mentioning the treaty context explicitly: “You will be loyal in covenant (literally, “do covenant loyalty”) to your servant, for you brought your servant with you into the covenant of Yhwh.” In contrast, although 2 Sam 1:19–27, David’s Lament over Saul and Jonathan, does not mention a covenant directly, it speaks nonetheless of Jonathan as David’s “brother,” a treaty term native to the discourse of allies.5 The mention of “cutting a covenant” (kƗrat bƟrît), “doing covenant loyalty” (‘ƗĞâ h̡esed), and the swearing of an oath in the David/Jonathan narratives suggest clearly that the love that accompanies these actions, and even prompts them, is covenant love. Similarly, the use of the terms “servant” in 1 Sam 20:7–8 and “brother” in 2 Sam 1:26 also suggests a covenant setting, though the texts apparently disagree on the nature of the treaty relationship between Jonathan and David, with 1 Sam 20:7–8 casting David as the subordinate partner, and 2 Sam 1:26 suggesting a treaty of equals.6 The language of love is native to covenant settings, a commonplace not only in biblical texts concerned with covenantal relations but also in extra-

—————

3 See especially John A. Thompson, “The Significance of the Verb Love in the David-Jonathan Narratives in 1 Samuel,” VT 24 (1974): 334–38, who analyzes the Jonathan/David materials in light of William L. Moran’s observations with respect to covenant love (“The Ancient Near Eastern Background of the Love of God in Deuteronomy,” CBQ 25 [1963]: 77–87); Wozniak, “Drei verschiedene literarische Beschreibungen,” 213–18; McCarter, II Samuel, 77, and recently Cross, “Kinship and Covenant,” 9–10. See also Moran’s comments on the love idiom in such texts as 1 Sam 18:1–3, 16; 20:17 (ibid., 81, 82, n. 33). 4 On the use of the expression “to love x as oneself” in treaty settings, see Moran (“Love of God,” 80) who cites a parallel in Esarhaddon of Assyria’s succession treaty. For the text, see Simo Parpola and Kazuko Watanabe, eds., Neo-Assyrian Treaties and Loyalty Oaths (SAA 2; Helsinki: Helsinki University Press, 1988), 6:266–68. 5 Cf. 1 Kgs 9:13; 20:32–34 and the comments of Mordechai Cogan, I Kings: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB 10; New York: Doubleday, 2000), 299, 468. There are also many examples of this usage in extra-biblical West Asian sources. 6 Though Wozniak ignores 2 Sam 1:26, he finds in the narratives in 1 Samuel three different interpretations of the covenant between Jonathan and David. While 1 Sam 19:1–7 and 20:1–21:1 cast David as the subordinate partner and 1 Sam 23:16–18 depicts Jonathan in the vassal role, 1 Sam 17:12–18:4 suggests a treaty of equals (“Drei verschiedene literarische Beschreibungen,” 217–18).

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biblical West Asian treaties and related correspondence.7 In such contexts, “to love” means to establish a covenant bond or to conform to treaty obligations.8 Biblical examples of the love idiom used in the covenant between Yhwh and Israel include the command to Israel to love Yhwh: You shall love Yhwh your god with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your might. And these words, which I command you this day, shall be upon your heart (Deut 6:5–6).

A second such example is Yhwh’s statement in the Decalogue that he is loyal in covenant to those who love him (that is, to those who keep his commandments) while punishing those who hate him (that is, those who break covenant) and their descendants: For I, Yhwh your god, am a jealous god, visiting the iniquity of parents upon children to the third and even the fourth generation of those who hate me, but doing covenant loyalty for the thousands, for those who love me and keep my commandments (Exod 20:6; Deut 5:10).

The rhetoric of covenant love is manifest also in texts that describe treaty relationships between kings, between a king and his people, or between other individuals. One example of such a use of love language is the description of David’s loyal treaty partner Hiram, king of Tyre, as a “lover of David” in 1 Kgs 5:15. In 1 Sam 18:16, all Israel and Judah are said to be “lovers” of David, because he led them in war; in 18:22, it is the servants of Saul who are said to love David. The speech of Joab to David in 2 Sam 19:7 refers to David’s loyal army as “those who love” him and to his enemies, led by his rebellious son Absalom, as “those who hate” him. In all of these cases, love means loyalty in the context of a covenant bond, whether it be between a deity and a people, a king and a fellow king, or a king and his army. The fourteenth century BCE Amarna archive of diplomatic correspondence between Pharaohs Amenhotep III and IV and their allies and vassals illustrates a comparable use of the rhetoric of love in extra-biblical treaty contexts. In a number of Amarna letters, the Pharaoh’s ally King Tushratta of Mittani uses the love idiom frequently to describe his relationship with the Pharaoh, his treaty partner, or the relationship of his forebears with those of the Pharaoh. An example is EA 17:24–28: “My father loved you, ————— 7 The classic treatment of covenant love is Moran’s, and most of the following examples are taken from Moran’s discussion (“Love of God”). 8 On loving as establishing a covenant bond, see the comments of McCarter, I Samuel: A New Translation with Introduction, Notes and Commentary (AB 8; Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1980), 282, on 1 Sam 16:21, where Saul “loves” David, and appoints him his weapon-bearer: “The king has given official recognition to the young man, has made a kind of legal commitment to him; that is, he has ‘loved’ him.”

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and you in turn loved my father. In keeping with this love, my father [g]ave you my sister.”9 In EA 19:1–2, Tushratta addresses the Pharaoh as “[my] brother, my son-in-law, who loves me, and whom I lov[e],” thereby combining love language with that of brotherhood, as would be expected in a parity treaty context.10 Similarly, the rhetoric of love is used in the letters of vassals to the Pharaoh, and the love is mutual: Just as the vassal loves his lord, so the Pharaoh loves his vassal. In EA 53:40–44, Akizzi of Qatna states that he and several other vassals love Pharaoh, their lord; “all of these kings,” says Akizzi, “are my lord’s servants.”11 EA 121:61–63 assumes that the suzerain should love his vassal, meaning in this context to act on his behalf against a common enemy.12 As in the letters of allies preserved at Amarna, to love in the letters of vassals means to be loyal to the treaty partner. Other West Asian diplomatic texts of the second and first millennium bear witness to similar uses of the love idiom and other technical covenant language. Correspondence between the Hittite king Hattusili III and the king of Babylon speaks of the kings as “affectionate brothers,” their relationship as “brotherhood,” and their interactions as loving.13 In the first millennium BCE treaties of Esarhaddon and Ashurbanipal of Assyria, vassals swear to love their suzerain and loyal vassals are described as those who love their lord.14 In all of these cases, both biblical and extra-biblical, use of the love idiom indicates either the establishment of a political relationship or, more commonly, its perpetuation through the loyalty of participants, as a number of scholars have pointed out. Though the covenant interpretation accounts well for the love rhetoric in the prose narratives of David and Jonathan and for the use of the term “brother” to describe Jonathan in David’s Lament (2 Sam 1:26), it does not effectively explain the Lament’s love comparison (2 Sam 1:26). In this poem, a dirge probably composed at the time of the deaths of Saul and Jonathan, possibly of Davidic authorship, and attributed to David in the prose framework, Jonathan’s love for David is compared to the love of —————

9 See Moran, The Amarna Letters (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 41, for the translation. The Akkadian text in transliteration may be found in Hans-Peter Adler, ed., Das Akkadische des Königs Tusratta von Mitanni (Kevelaer: Butzon & Bercker; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1976), 122. 10 Moran, Amarna Letters, 43 for the translation; Adler, Akkadische, 128 for the transliteration of the Akkadian text. 11 Moran, Amarna Letters, 125 for the translation; Jorgen A. Knudtzon, Die el-Amarna-Tafeln (VAB 2.1; Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1915), 326, for the text in transliteration. 12 See Moran, Amarna Letters, 200; Knudtzon, el-Amarna Tafeln, 526. 13 Gary Beckman, Hittite Diplomatic Texts (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1996), 133, 135, for the translation. For the Akkadian text in transliteration, see Albertine Hagenbuchner, Die Korrespondenz der Hethiter (2. Teil; Texte der Hethiter 16; Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1989), 281, 283, 284. 14 See Parpola and Watanabe, Neo-Assyrian Treaties 6:207, 266–68; 9:18, 32.

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women and found to be superior: “Your love for me was wondrous, surpassing the love of women.”15 Though various scholars have maintained that this statement too concerns covenant love, they have not recognized that the comparison is extremely peculiar in a covenant context, given what we know of love comparisons made by treaty partners in other West Asian texts. For love comparisons in treaty contexts are of two types: the covenant love of treaty partners is compared in one of several ways, or covenant love itself is likened to another, analogous love type that, like covenant, also requires fidelity. In both types of love comparison, loyalty or disloyalty to the obligations of the covenant bond is the issue that gives rise to comparison in the first place. Yet the comparison of 2 Sam 1:26 fits neither pattern, though it shares characteristics with both. The fact that it likens Jonathan’s love to the love of women—generally understood by scholars to be a reference to sexual or sexual-emotional love—suggests that a non-covenantal interpretation of 2 Sam 1:26 is likely, one in which fidelity is not the focal issue.16 The first type of love comparison native to covenant settings likens one treaty partner’s love in covenant to that of another treaty partner of the same class (e.g., an ally’s love is compared to that of his ally) or compares two different manifestations of a treaty partner’s love (e.g., an ally’s love for his ally is likened to his love of his ally’s predecessor). The comparison may be constructed in one of the following ways: “the love of x is like the love of y,” “the love of x is greater than the love of y,” or “the love of x for y is greater than the love of x for z.” In each example of this type of love comparison, fidelity to treaty obligations is clearly the focus of concern. In EA 17:24–26, Tushratta, king of Mittani states the following concerning the ————— 15

Many scholars believe that the dirge is ancient, and a number think that it was composed by David himself. On the antiquity of the lament as indicated by its internal characteristics, see Frank Moore Cross and David Noel Freedman, Studies in Ancient Yahwistic Poetry (Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1975), 6 and Cross, Canaanite Myth and Hebrew Epic (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973), 122–23. Inclusion of the elegy in the apologetic “History of David’s Rise” points to a tenth century date of composition. (On the date of the “History of David’s Rise,” see McCarter, I Samuel, 27–30.) For an argument in support of the probability of Davidic authorship, see McCarter, II Samuel, 78–79. Points in favor of Davidic composition include the exact match of the dirge’s content with the context in which it has been placed by the compiler, suggesting that it was actually composed for the occasion of the deaths of Saul and Jonathan. Also, as McCarter points out, it would serve little or no purpose to compose such a dirge long after the deaths in question. Finally, there are the elegy’s highly personal and boldly stated sentiments regarding Jonathan, which also do not suggest pseudonymous composition. Hans J. Stoebe has argued that vv. 25–27 of the dirge could well be an authentic Davidic composition, though he does not believe that the whole lament is (Das zweite Buch Samuelis [Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1994], 96). Text-critical aspects of this verse are ably dealt with by McCarter, ibid., 73. 16 On “the love of women” as sexual or sexual-emotional love, see the argument later in this essay.

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relationship of his father to the Pharaoh, his treaty partner: “My father loved you, and you in turn loved my father.”17 This statement illustrates one type of comparison mentioned, as the love of each partner is comparable. The following examples illustrate another type, in which the love of one partner for his ally is said to be greater than his love for his ally’s predecessor. In EA 19:12–13, Tushratta states that the Pharaoh, his treaty partner, has loved him ten times more than he loved his (Tushratta’s) father.18 In EA 26:30–34, Tushratta, writing to the Egyptian queen mother, states that he demonstrates ten times more love for her son the king than he did for her dead husband, his predecessor.19 In these and other cases, the love of a king in a treaty context may be likened to the love of a fellow king, his ally and treaty partner, or different manifestations of a king’s covenant love may be compared. The comparison may suggest equality of love or superiority of love, but the thing compared is always another example of covenant love.20 The second type of love comparison attested in covenant settings likens covenant love to another love type to which it can be compared because the latter type also requires fidelity. This kind of love comparison is associated in particular with descriptions of a metaphorically female Israel’s relationship to her (male) god. Thus, according to Jer 2:2, the love of Israel for Yhwh during her early days was like the love of a young bride for her husband: I remember the loyalty (h̡esed) of your youth The love of your betrothal Your following me in the wilderness In a land not sown…

The defining characteristic that each love type has in common is fidelity; this is the focus of the comparison and what makes comparison possible. Israel is likened to a young bride precisely because Israel was loyal in covenant in her “youth,” according to Jer 2:2, just as an idealized young bride is loyal to her husband and does not stray.21 Hos 3:1 is similar in its comparison of Hosea’s love for an adulterous woman to the love of Yhwh for a disloyal Israel that worships other deities, thereby violating covenant obligations: “Go, love a woman who is loved by another and who is an adulte—————

17 See Moran, Amarna Letters, 41, for the translation; Adler, Akkadische, 122, for the Akkadian transliteration. 18 Moran, Amarna Letters, 43; Adler, Akkadische, 128. 19 Moran, Amarna Letters, 85; Adler, Akkadische, 208. 20 A similar pattern of comparison of members of the same class is found in 1 Kgs 1:47, though it concerns the reputation of a king rather than his love in covenant. In this text, the servants of David bless David at the time of Solomon’s accession as follows: “May God give Solomon a greater name than your name, and may he exalt his throne above your throne.” 21 For another, more negative, view of Israel’s youth, see, e.g., Ezek 20:5–13; 23.

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ress; (it is) like the love of Yhwh for the children of Israel. As for them, they turn to other gods and are lovers of raisin cakes.” In this example, the basis for the comparison is disloyalty rather than loyalty, but as with Jer 2:2, Israel’s loyalty to Yhwh, or lack of same, finds an analogue in the loyalty or disloyalty of a wife to her husband. Just as an adulteress lacks fidelity to her husband, so too does Israel with respect to her god. A third example of this type of love comparison is found in EA 24:121–23. Here it is said that the love of allies for one another ought to be like the love of a person for his patron god: “As man loves Shimige on seeing him, so do we want, between us, to love one another.”22 In this instance, as in the others, fidelity is the basis for the comparison: the loyalty (=love) of human treaty partners for one another ought to be like the loyalty (=love) of a worshiper for his patron deity. In each of these examples, the two types of love that are compared are similar, and therefore comparable, because fidelity is expected to characterize each love type. How is the comparison of 2 Sam 1:26 similar to the two types of love comparison characteristic of treaty contexts and how does it differ from them? First, it should be noted that the comparison of 2 Sam 1:26 shares a “love of x is greater than the love of y” structure with some of the comparisons that liken the love of one treaty partner to that of another of the same class. And like comparisons of covenant love to an analogous love type, 2 Sam 1:26 likens one type of love (Jonathan’s love for David) to another (the love of women). That said, one must also observe that 2 Sam 1:26 does not compare the love of one treaty partner to that of another of the same class. Rather, it likens Jonathan’s love to “the love of women,” an expression generally understood by scholars to be a reference to sexual or sexualemotional love.23 If 2 Sam 1:26 were concerned with covenant love, we might expect it to say something like “your love for me was wondrous, surpassing the love of other brothers” (=partners in a parity treaty), or “surpassing my love for you.” Such formulations would compare the love of treaty partners of the same class (e.g., the love of other allies for David or that of David himself for Jonathan). This kind of comparison would make sense in a context in which parity treaty language is used elsewhere in the ————— 22

Moran, Amarna Letters, 71, Gernot Wilhelm’s translation of the letter from the Hurrian. For the text in transliteration, see the references listed in ibid., 63. 23 Though the expression “the love of women” does not occur elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible, a number of texts suggest that it should have a significant sexual or sexual-emotional component. On this, see the discussion later in this essay. In any case, it is unlikely that the “love of women” is an expression for covenant love, given the usual sexual-emotional connotations of “love” when it is associated with women, and given that covenant partners are typically male and the discourse of covenant is cast in masculine terms (“brother,” “brotherhood,” “father”/“son,”) in biblical texts antedating the sixth century BCE. Note, however, the later exceptions to this pattern with respect to marriage and personal relations (Mal 2:14; Prov 2:17; Ruth 3:10).

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same verse of the relationship in question (“my brother Jonathan”). Also, unlike comparisons of covenant love with another love type, the two love types of 2 Sam 1:26 do not share a basis for comparison if Jonathan’s love for David refers to covenant love. For in other examples of this type of comparison, covenant love is likened to another kind of love sharing a central characteristic: fidelity to a set of obligations. An example of this, as noted, occurs in Jer 2:2. There, Israel’s love for Yhwh in its early days is like the love of an idealized young bride on account of the fidelity common to both types of love. In 2 Sam 1:26, however, Jonathan’s love for David is compared not to another love type that is characterized by fidelity, but apparently to the experience of sexual or sexual-emotional love with women as a class. Were we to translate the Hebrew ’ahăbat nƗšîm as “the love of wives” instead of “the love of women,” it seems at first blush that one could make a case that fidelity to obligations is at issue, since the wife must not commit adultery, and men such as David had multiple wives.24 But even comparison to “the love of wives” would be odd in a human covenant context such as this, given that the relationship in question involves two men, that male-female love as constructed in biblical and other West Asian texts consistently has a sexual component, even if it is only potential, and given that male-female love is typically hierarchical in its casting, in contrast to the fraternal covenant language found elsewhere in the verse, which suggests parity.25 Thus, there are serious difficulties raised by understanding the Hebrew expression ’ahăbat nƗšîm as “the love of wives,” and by arguing that fidelity to obligations is the basis for the love comparison. It is more plausible to translate the expression “the love of women,” as virtually all commentators and translations do, and investigate possible bases for the love comparison other than covenant loyalty. The comparison of 2 Sam 1:26, though it shares characteristics in common with both kinds of love comparison made in treaty contexts, differs from both types in important ways. Though it uses love rhetoric, it is likely not a statement about fidelity to a treaty. To what, then, might the love comparison of 2 Sam 1:26 refer? It seems impossible to ignore the potential significance of the sexual or sexualemotional interpretation of the expression “the love of women.” As mentioned earlier, this understanding is commonplace among scholarly commentators on this passage, and certainly seems defensible, though the ex—————

24 Because the word nƗšîm can mean either “women” or “wives,” contextual considerations must determine how it is to be translated. 25 My thanks to William Gilders, whose questions and suggestions have helped me to strengthen the argument at this juncture (oral communication).

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pression itself occurs nowhere else in the Hebrew Bible.26 As is frequently observed, the Hebrew root “to love” (’ƗhƝb) and its derivatives can have a sexual or sexual-emotional meaning in certain contexts, particularly when associated with the relations between men and women. Hos 3:1 is an excellent example of the sexual usage (“Go, love a woman who is loved by another and [who is] an adulteress …”), as is 2 Sam 13:1, 4, 15, verses which describe, using derivatives of the root “to love,” the sexual desire of David’s son Amnon for his half sister Tamar, whom he violates. In 1 Kgs 11:1, Solomon is said to have “loved many alien women,” with a list of foreign wives and concubines following. The association of “love” and eroticism or sex in biblical descriptions of the relations of men and women is equally true of the few texts that describe a woman as the lover rather than the object of love. Prov 5:19 speaks of a man’s wife as “doe of love” and advises: “Let her breasts satisfy you at all times,” // “With her love, may you be intoxicated always.” Even if an emotional component is evident in such love, as it certainly is in a text such as 1 Sam 18:20, which describes the love of Michal for David, the sexual component remains ever-present, at least potentially if not explicitly.27 If “the love of women” refers to the sexual or sexual-emotional love women offer a man, the comparison of Jonathan’s love to it suggests that the two types of love have something in common, a basis for comparison. Because it seems as if fidelity is not likely to be that basis, the sexual or sexual-emotional component of love itself could well be. Like love comparisons of the covenant type, those of the sexual or sexual-emotional type are attested in biblical materials. An example is Gen 29:30, where Jacob’s love for Rachel is compared to his love for Leah in a manner not unlike the love comparison of 2 Sam 1:26: “He came

————— 26

Scholars who assume that the “love of women” refers to sexual love include Jenni, “ahev to love,” 47; Halperin, One Hundred Years, 83; Parker, “Homosexuality,” 11; and Cross, “Kinship and Covenant,” 9. In contrast, Zehnder, following Albert A. Anderson, suggests that the expression “the love of women” might refer to a mother’s love for her children rather than to sexual love (“David-Jonathan-Geschichten,” 156). This seems highly unlikely, given that mothers per se are not mentioned, but rather women, and given the evidence for a sexual or sexual-emotional meaning of “love” in contexts where it is associated with the relations of men and women. On this, see Susan Ackerman, “The Personal is Political: Covenantal and Affectionate Love [AHEB, AHABA] in the Hebrew Bible,” VT 52 (2002): 440–41, and the discussion later in this essay. Also, the poet is comparing something he has experienced—Jonathan’s love—to something else he has experienced—the love of a plurality of women, hardly a comparison suggestive of an individual mother’s love for her child. David as both lover and beloved of a plurality of women occasions no surprise, given his portrayal in surviving narrative traditions (see, e.g., 1 Sam 18:20, 28; 26:39–42, 43; 2 Sam 3:2–5). 27 Ackerman (“Personal is Political,” 452–53) understands only 1 Sam 18:20, 28, to speak of a woman as the lover of a man, though I believe Prov 5:19 is another example of this.

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also to Rachel and he loved Rachel more than Leah.”28 Thus, the elegy may be suggesting through its comparison that Jonathan’s love for David was of a sexual or sexual-emotional type and that it was more wondrous than the same such love David had experienced from women. If David’s Lament suggests that Jonathan’s love for David is of a sexual or sexual-emotional type rather than a covenantal type, why would treaty terminology (“my brother, Jonathan”) be used by the poet in the same verse of the composition? As I have observed, the language of brotherhood and the love idiom are at home together in covenant discourse, as are love comparisons that make a statement about fidelity. In fact, the use of fraternal terminology before the love comparison in 2 Sam 1:26 sets up the reader to expect a love comparison focused precisely on the issue of loyalty in covenant, but such does not come to pass. It may be that the poem’s author (David?) drew purposefully upon the vocabulary and rhetorical conventions of treaty discourse in a intentionally subversive way, manipulating such familiar forms to communicate an unexpected and even startling observation about Jonathan’s love: Although the two were bound by a parity treaty, there was more to their relationship than simply a covenant bond. The suggestion that covenant idioms were manipulated in order to communicate such an assertion is strengthened by the observation that David is portrayed as a non-conformist and even a manipulator of ritual and social conventions in the prose narratives about him. One example of this is his behavior at the death of his infant son, described in 2 Sam 12:20–23. Having undertaken petitionary mourning rites in an attempt to save his child’s life, David, upon hearing the news of the child’s death, abandons his mourning posture and, through a series of ritual reversals, returns to quotidian life, baffling his servants by so doing. When confronted by his courtiers about his nonconforming ritual behavior, he answers their query in a way that suggests that he believes mourning after death to have no purpose whatsoever, because the dead cannot be brought back again. And because it has no purpose, he refuses to meet social and ritual expectations by enacting it. A second example of David as ritual and social non-conformist is 2 Samuel 19, the narrative describing the aftermath of his army’s vanquishing of Absalom, his rebellious son, and Absalom’s followers. Instead of rejoicing with the army, as is expected after victory, David privileges his own, private feelings, mourning the death of his son. David reverses this nonconforming ritual behavior only after he is warned that he will lose the army’s support entirely if it continues. In 2 Sam 3:31–37, like 2 Sam 1:19– —————

28 Note the explicit sexual dimension of the love of Jacob indicated by the verb “to come to” (bô’ lƟ-).

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27 a part of the apologetic “History of David’s Rise,”29 David manipulates mourning rites to achieve political ends at the death of Abner. I acknowledge that it is odd indeed to find anything subversive or even unconventional in a dirge such as 2 Sam 1:19–27, characterized as much of it is by idealization of the dead and conventional, gendered imagery.30 Nonetheless, verse 26, however it is interpreted, departs from convention, and David is portrayed as a manipulator of ritual and social norms in the “History of David’s Rise” and other narratives of 1 and 2 Samuel, particularly norms associated with mourning. In short, whether or not David authored the dirge attributed to him, its manipulation of treaty discourse is not inconsistent with the portrayal of David’s ritual behavior in the narratives describing his career. A number of scholars have pointed to alleged impediments to a homoerotic and sexual interpretation of 2 Sam 1:26, and I shall consider these presently. Markus Zehnder, followed by Steven L. McKenzie, argued recently that the statement about Jonathan’s love in 2 Sam 1:26 is best characterized as “poetic exaggeration” (“dichterische Übertreibung”), not intended to be understood in a literal, possibly erotic, sense.31 Though Zehnder did not provide an argument directly in support of this assertion, McKenzie defended it by drawing upon Zehnder’s later assertions regarding the whole complex of materials about David and Jonathan: “Homosexual acts were condemned in Israelite law (Lev 20:13). So David’s apologists would hardly have described him as homosexual or included a piece that described him that way.”32 Aside from McKenzie’s problematic projection of contemporary, Western categories on the ancients (“homosexual”/ “heterosexual”), a practice that has been well critiqued by others,33 his assumption that (all?) homoerotic acts were condemned by Israelite legal tradition and his argument that, therefore, David’s apologists would not include a text such as 2 Sam 1:19–27 if it suggested a sexual relationship between David and Jonathan, are unconvincing for a number of reasons. First, unless one is reading the biblical text canonically, something a historian does not do, one cannot make a case that the surviving biblical legal corpora in general oppose same —————

29 On this hypothetical apologetic source document, see McCarter (I Samuel, 27–30) who, like previous commentators, compares the Hittite “Apology of Hattusili III.” 30 Saul and Jonathan are presented as idealized warriors, the women of Israel as mourners who weep over their deaths. 31 Zehnder, “David-Jonathan-Geschichten,” 155–56. See similarly McKenzie, King David, 85; Parker, “Homosexuality,” 11; and others. 32 McKenzie, King David, 85; cf. Zehnder, “David-Jonathan-Geschichten,” 173–75. 33 See especially Nissinen, “Liebe von David und Jonatan,” 251–52, 260–61, 262, for a critique of such anachronistic practice among biblical scholars. The language of both Zehnder and Schroer and Staubli is similar to McKenzie’s (e.g., “homosexuelle Beziehung”). A classic statement of the “constructionist” position is that of Halperin, One Hundred Years, 15–40, 154–68.

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sex sexual acts between males; only Lev 18:22 and 20:13 voice any opposition. And furthermore, as I have argued elsewhere, these laws, which are part of the Holiness legislation and date very likely to a period long after the composition of 2 Sam 1:19–27, only oppose anal intercourse; they have nothing at all to say about other potential sexual acts between men.34 In contrast, earlier legal materials, such as the “Book of the Covenant” (Exod 20:22–23:33) or the legal collection in Deuteronomy 12–26, do not even touch on the issue of homoerotic sexual acts. Therefore, McKenzie’s argument that David’s apologists would have been reluctant to make use of a text that included a homoerotic statement because of Lev 20:13 lacks cogency. For it cannot be shown that any community in Israel ever opposed all homoerotic sexual acts, nor is it evident that consensual anal intercourse between males was proscribed by any circle before the Holiness School interdicted it at a time likely long after the composition of David’s Lament.35 In short, it is not at all clear that the tenth century BCE apologists responsible for the “History of David’s Rise” would have been particularly bothered by a homoerotic meaning to the love comparison of 2 Sam 1:26. What is clear, however, is that a central priority of the apologists responsible for the “History of David’s Rise” is to show that David was innocent of the deaths of Saul, Jonathan, Abner, Eshbaal, and other Saulides who stood in the way of his ascent to the throne.36 Inclusion of the Lament underscores the narrative’s insistence on David’s innocence with respect to Saul’s and Jonathan’s deaths. Not only does David not serve the Philistines in battle against Israel at Mt. Gilboa, he and his men mourn publicly at the report of the deaths of Saul and Jonathan and Israel’s defeat, in effect switching sides and declaring an affiliation with Israel and Saul rather than with Achish of ————— 34

“‘And with a Male You Shall Not Lie the Lying Down of a Woman’: On the Meaning and Significance of Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13,” Journal of the History of Sexuality 5 (1994): 179–206. The argument has been accepted by Nissinen (“Liebe von David und Jonatan,” 258), among others (e.g., Bernadette J. Brooten, Love Between Women: Early Christian Responses to Female Homoeroticism [Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1996], 61; Jerome T. Walsh, “Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13: Who is Doing What to Whom?” JBL 120 [2001]: 201, 204, 208). Though the date of the Holiness Source is debated, even advocates for an early date place the origin of H no earlier than the last half of the eighth century (e.g., Israel Knohl, The Sanctuary of Silence: The Priestly Torah and the Holiness School [Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995], 204–12; Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary [AB 3; New York: Doubleday, 1991], 27); conventionally, it is dated much later. 35 Though the law of Lev 20:13, like other laws in Leviticus 20, betrays signs of redactional expansion (see Olyan, “And with a Male,” 186–88), there is no evidence to suggest that a protoform of it was or even might have been in existence in the tenth century, very likely the time of the composition of the Lament. 36 See, e.g., James C. Vanderkam, “Davidic Complicity in the Deaths of Abner and Eshbaal: A Historical and Redactional Study,” JBL 99 (1980): 521–39; McCarter, I Samuel, 28–30; Steven Weitzman, “David’s Lament and the Poetics of Grief in 2 Samuel,” JQR 85 (1995): 354–55.

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Gath, David’s overlord, and the other Philistines.37 The Lament functions in its immediate narrative context almost like a proof text for David’s true loyalty to Saul and Israel: he mourned for them, as allies do, and even composed this lament on their deaths.38 In a word, the inclusion of the dirge by the apologists responsible for the “History of David’s Rise” cannot be used in a convincing way to determine the meaning of the love comparison of 2 Sam 1:26, because the lament as a whole so beautifully serves the apologetic purposes of the compilers, no matter what v. 26 may suggest. Any conclusion drawn about the meaning of 2 Sam 1:26 must therefore emerge out of an analysis of the statement itself. If David’s Lament suggests that a homoerotic and possibly sexual relationship existed between Jonathan and David, what are the implications for contemporary debate over gay marriages and same sex unions? Marriage and marriage-like unions generally assume sexual relations of some kind, and the laws of Lev 18:22 and 20:13, as well as other biblical texts, have been cited by various religious conservatives as an impediment to state and community recognition of same sex unions or gay marriages. I have argued elsewhere on philological grounds that the laws of Lev 18:22 and 20:13 prohibit anal intercourse specifically; they have nothing to say about other forms of same-sex sexual activity between men and nothing whatsoever to say about such activity between women.39 If this interpretation is correct, then the Hebrew Bible, even read canonically as a single work, only limits rather than proscribes sexual relations between men, and allows them between women. Such a reading of biblical law opens up the possibility of justifying the blessing of gay marriages and same sex unions in religious contexts that embrace the authority of the Hebrew Bible in some sense, because the sexual activity normally associated with such marriages or unions would not necessarily violate scriptural law. In addition, a homoerotic relationship between Jonathan and David, especially a sexual one, would provide an example in the biblical text itself of the sexual-emotional linking of two men in a context free of condemnation, though not a direct model for a formalized union or marriage, as the ancients in question appar-

—————

37 On this, see my full argument in Biblical Mourning: Ritual and Social Dimensions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 53–54. 38 The same literary technique is repeated in 2 Sam 3:31–37 with Abner’s death. There, David orders public mourning for Abner, and composes a dirge for him. His actions lead the people to believe that he is innocent of Abner’s death. For the lament’s function in the larger literary context of 2 Samuel as a whole, see the perceptive observations of Weitzman, “David’s Lament,” 354–59. 39 “And with a Male.”

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ently had no notion of such a coupling. For such a direct model one must look elsewhere than in the biblical text.40

—————

40 E.g., to the unions identified by John Boswell in Same Sex Unions in Premodern Europe (New York: Villard, 1994), if they were indeed what Boswell claimed.

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Occasionally Beyond Gender: The Rhetoric of Familial Nurture in Discourses of West Asian Kings and their Agents

Anyone who has investigated the representation of kings and their agents in the literary remains of ancient West Asia has certainly noticed the prominence of the theme of care giving. Kings often describe themselves as paradigmatic advocates for the widow, the fatherless, the resident alien, the poor, and the oppressed.1 They are portrayed as having an obligation to care for their peoples, providing such benefits as protection, peace, prosperity, and justice. Royal agents, who represent the king and exercise power on his behalf, are often portrayed similarly.2 Familial terminology is commonly employed in royal care giving discourses because it is imbued with connotations of nurture, duty and—in the case of the father in particular— authority, as Hammurapi’s claim to be “a lord who is like a natural father to his people” illustrates.3 Though the vast majority of representations of royal —————

I am deeply indebted to Jamie Novotny, Seth Richardson, James Allen and Matthew Rutz for providing references and for advice about how this essay might be improved. Any deficiencies which remain, however, are my responsibility alone. 1 See, e.g., Hammurapi’s self description in his epilogue xlvii:59–62 (Rykle Borger, Babylonisch-Assyrische Lesestücke [2nd ed.; 2 vols.; Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1979], 1:46); “Kirta” (CAT 1:16 VI 32–34, 45–47); Sennacherib’s self-identification as “one who helps the weak” (a-lik tap-pu-ut a-ki-i; Daniel David Luckenbill, The Annals of Sennacherib [Chicago: University of Chicago, 1924], 23 OIP 2 i 6); and a Neo-Assyrian literary letter to a king—likely Ashurbanipal—who is described as “one who rescues the wronged” (mu-še-zib —ab-li; Alasdair Livingstone, Court Poetry and Literary Miscellanea [SAA 3; Helsinki: Helsinki University Press, 1989], 61 #28:9). The same theme is found in Egyptian literature (e.g., Amenemhet’s Instructions [Wolfgang Helck, Der Text der “Lehre Amenemhets I. für seinen Sohn” (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1969), 25]). Powerful men who are not kings are represented similarly (e.g., “Aqhat” [CAT 1:17 V 6–8]; Job 29:12–16). Kings and other authorities who fail to fulfill these expectations are censured, as in “Kirta” or, implicitly, 2 Sam 15:2–6. On the theme of the king protecting the vulnerable, see, e.g., F. Charles Fensham, “Widow, Orphan, and the Poor in Ancient Near Eastern Legal and Wisdom Literature,” JNES 21 (1962):129–39. All translations are my own unless otherwise indicated. 2 Thus, when I speak of royal care giving, I refer both to the king’s actions, and to those of his representatives. 3 xlviii:20–24: –a-am-mu-ra-pí-mi be-lum ša ki-ma a-bi-im wa-li-di-im a-na ni-ši i-ba-aš-šu-ú (Borger, Babylonisch-Assyrische Lesestücke, 46). The idiom abu (w)Ɨlidu, “natural father,” is redolent of care giving in cuneiform contexts early and late. See other royal and divine examples

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care giving activity are gendered in a manner characteristic of the cultural context, there are exceptions.4 On occasion, the rhetoric of royal nurture transcends the rhetorical norms of gender, and one particular case of such exceptional rhetoric is the focus of my interest in this study. Specifically, I shall investigate several texts which speak of the king or his agent as both a father and a mother (or describe his behavior as like that of both a father and a mother) to those for whom he has responsibility (e.g., his people, his vassals, others in his care).5 Such gender-transcending rhetoric is also used of deities on occasion in some West Asian literary materials, and I shall argue that its use by or on behalf of kings makes a totalizing statement about the quality of regal nurture which goes beyond the usual claims of royal rhetoric and may invite comparison with the activities of the gods. Similarly, its use by or with regard to royal agents suggests that they themselves possess king-like qualities. I end with some thoughts on late second millennium and early first millennium occurrences of the rhetoric.6 Royal nurture is represented in ancient West Asian texts using any number of images. A classic formulation is that of Hammurapi in his epilogue, who mentions bringing peace, safety, justice and prosperity to his people, and employs a variety of nurturing images in his discourse to establish his claims: he made the people “lie down in pastures”; his “benign protection” is spread over his city; he is “a shepherd who brings peace”; he held his people in his lap. All of this is done so that the strong should not oppress the weak, and that the widow and fatherless should receive justice.7 1 Kgs 5:5, describing the reign of Solomon, is a relevant biblical example of the association of prosperity and peace with the reign of a successful king: “Judah and Israel dwelt safely, each (person) under his vine and his fig tree, from Dan to Beersheba, all the days of Solomon.” 1 Kgs 4:20 adds that under Solomon, “Judah and Israel were numerous as the sand which is by the sea, eating, drinking and rejoicing.” Northwest Semitic royal inscriptions from the first millennium also foreground these themes. Kulamuwa of ————— of the use of this idiom, as well as divine uses of ummu (w)Ɨlittu, “birth mother,” in my discussion ahead. 4 On gender as a cultural construction rather than a trans-cultural, trans-historical given, see the groundbreaking essay of Joan W. Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” in idem, Gender and the Politics of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 28–50. 5 For my purposes there is no substantive difference between saying that the king or his agent is a father and mother to those for whom he has responsibility, and stating that he is like a father and mother to them, as both statements situate the king or his agent beyond gender. 6 Occasionally, cuneiform sources may speak of a king directly or indirectly as a “mother,” or describe his behavior as like that of a mother, but such rhetoric, though interesting from a gender perspective, is not my focus in this essay. See, e.g., Gudea Cylinder A xii 21–23 (Dietz Otto Edzard, Gudea and His Dynasty [RIM 3/1; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997], 76). My thanks to Matthew Rutz for this citation. 7 See xlvii:32–62; Borger, Babylonisch-Assyrische Lesestücke, 1:45–46.

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Sam’al emphasizes enriching his people with herds, flocks, silver, gold, and linen clothes, while the royal agent Azatiwada mentions the establishment of prosperity, peace, and public safety during his regency over the Danunians.8 Panammu I of Sam’al speaks of peace, an end to slander, and prosperity for his people, using an expression similar to that of 1 Kgs 4:20: “And in my days also Y’DY ate and drank.”9 Neo-Assyrian texts present the successful king who has fulfilled his care giving obligations as a provider of food, oil and clothing, and a protector of his people.10 In all of these contexts, the king or his agent is represented as a successful care giver, and nurture in a variety of forms is constructed as a royal obligation. Non-familial care giving, including royal nurture, is not infrequently cast in familial terms, since idealized family members are represented as dutiful nurturers who are also authorities if they play a parental role. Thus, when writers wish to make a claim about the quality of the care giving of a deity, royal personage, or official, they often invoke the model of the nurturing parent or sibling. Ashurbanipal refers to Ishtar of Nineveh as “the Lady of Nineveh, my birth mother (um-mu a-lit-ti-ia),” suggesting that the goddess has been a steady source of nurture to him.11 Yarim-Lim, writing to his ally Yashub-Yah`ad, claims to have been “like a father and brother” to him, while he, for his part, acted like Yarim-Lim’s foe and enemy. This implies that family members such as a father and brother have a duty to act as allies, advocates and protectors.12 Ahiqar, speaking to Nabusumiskun, the ————— 8 Kulamuwa: KAI 24:11–13; see now the critical edition of Josef Tropper, Die Inschriften von Zincirli. Neue Edition und vergleichende Grammatik des phönischen, sam’alischen und aramäischen Textkorpus [ALASP 6; Münster: Ugarit Verlag, 1993], 42–43, with bibliography, as well as Michael O’Connor, “The Rhetoric of the Kilamuwa Inscription,” BASOR 226 (1977):15–29. Azatiwada: KAI 26 A 1:5–6, 11; A 2:4–9; see now the critical edition of John David Hawkins, Corpus of Hieroglyphic Luwian Inscriptions. Volume I: Inscriptions from the Iron Age (Untersuchungen zur indogermanischen Sprach- und Kulturwissenschaft 8.1; Berlin: De Gruyter, 2000), 49–50, 53, with bibliography, as well as K. Lawson Younger, Jr., “The Phoenician Inscription of Azatiwada: An Integrated Reading,” JSS 43 (1998):11–47. On Azatiwada as regent of Urikki, king of the Danunians, see the discussion of Edward L. Greenstein, “Autobiographies in Ancient Western Asia,” CANE 4:2429. 9 KAI 214:9; see Tropper, Inschriften von Zincirli, 67. 10 On the Neo-Assyrian discourse of royal provision and protection, see the discussion of Cynthia R. Chapman, “Without Rival: The Royal Performance of Masculinity in Assyrian Royal Inscriptions and Palace Reliefs,” in eadem., The Gendered Language of Warfare in the IsraeliteAssyrian Encounter (Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2004), 29–33, particularly her remarks on the topos of the king as provider of food, oil and clothing. 11 For this text, see Livingstone, Court Poetry and Literary Miscellanea, 13. Other NeoAssyrian texts evidence a similar imagery applied to the king’s patron deity. 12 A 1314, lines 6–9: a-na-ku ki-ma a-bi-im ù a-—i-im a-[b]a-aš-še-kum at-[t]a a-[i]a-ši-im kima li-im-nim ù a-ia-[b]i-im ta-ba-aš-še-em, in Georges Dossin, “Une lettre de Iarîm-Lim, roi d’Alep, à Iašûb-Ia—ad, roi de Dîr” Syria 33 (1956): 66. On duty as a central component of kinship relations, see Frank M. Cross, “Kinship and Covenant in Ancient Israel,” in idem, From Epic to Canon: History and Literature in Ancient Israel (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,

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man sent to assassinate him, reminds him that once upon a time, he himself was saved from an unjust death by Ahiqar, who protected and nurtured him as a brother is bound to do: “I brought you to my house. There, I supported you as a man (would) with his brother …” (ybltk lbyt’ zyly tmh hwyt msbl lk k’yš ‘m ’h̡why).13 Job describes his care for the poor and vulnerable using familial language: “A father was I to the poor,” // “The lawsuit (rîb) of him I did not know I researched” (29:16). A brother mentioned in an OB letter fails to do precisely what Job does for the stranger, thereby falling short of expectations: “I have a brother, but he does not investigate my legal circumstances.”14 This last example, as well as the letter of Yarim-Lim and the Ahiqar passage cited above, bring into relief the obligatory dimension of familial nurture, for care giving is not only represented as paradigmatically familial, but also a duty within the family context. Though familial idioms are commonly used in West Asian texts to speak of nurture, parental language may also be employed to establish, assert, or recognize authority, and fraternal language to speak of equality of status. In Isa 22:21, Elyakim son of Hilkiah, described as Yhwh’s servant, will assume Shebna’s role as royal steward: I will dress him in your tunic, bind him with your sash, and your authority I will place in his hand. He shall become a father to the dwellers of Jerusalem and the House of Judah.

In this passage, the royal official Elyakim’s authority is established and communicated in part by his figurative fatherhood to Jerusalemites and other Judeans. Similarly, Deborah is said to be “a mother in Israel” when she functions as leader (Judg 5:7), and Nabusumiskun refers to the former royal adviser and seal bearer Ahiqar as “the father of all Assyria, upon whose counsel Sennacherib the king and all the army of Assyria depended” (’bwh zy ’twr kl’ zy ‘l ‘t́th snh̡’ryb mlk’ wh̡yl ’twr [kl]’ [hw]w).15 Equality of status among biologically unrelated persons is communicated by use of the term “brother,” as in 2 Kgs 9:2, regarding Jehu and his fellow officers. ————— 1998), 3–5, who discusses the obligation of kin in West Semitic tribal societies to protect family members. 13 Bezalel Porten and Ada Yardeni, Textbook of Aramaic Documents from Ancient Egypt: Volume 3 Literature, Accounts, Lists (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, Department of the History of the Jewish People, 1993), 30, 32 (col. 3, line 48 to col. 4, line 49). 14 Georges Boyer, Contribution à l’histoire juridique de la 1re dynastie babylonienne (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1928), 64 #119:28–30. On the idiom warkata parƗsu, “to investigate legal circumstances” or “take care of,” see CAD 12:173–74. 15 Porten and Yardeni, Textbook of Aramaic Documents from Ancient Egypt, 32 (col. 4, line 55–56).

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Familial idioms of inequality and equality are also illustrated by formal treaty language in which the suzerain is spoken of as father, the vassal as son, and allies as brothers of one another.16 Two examples from Ugaritic correspondence illustrate these patterns well. In one letter from a vassal to his lord, a TL[M]YN writes to YBNN, addressing him as “my lord” (’adny) and “my master” (b‘ly); he identifies himself as “your son” (bnk) and “your servant” (‘bdk).17 In a second letter, the king of Tyre writes to his ally, the king of Ugarit, referring to himself as “your brother” (’ah`k), and to the king of Ugarit as “my brother” (’ah`y).18 The obligations incumbent on family members are also implied by the use of familial terminology to describe treaty relationships.19 As a father protects his son, the suzerain must protect his vassal; as a brother helps his brother, so must an ally come to the aid of his ally. Yet even in treaty discourse, the care giving dimension of familial relations may be present as well, as in Yarim-Lim’s letter cited above.20 At all events, the use of familial idioms in treaty contexts is most likely based on the nurturing and hierarchical axes of idealized familial relations, as well as the obligatory dimension of kinship. Unsurprisingly, royal representation, including royal care giving, is typically gendered masculine in ancient West Asian sources. Kings are characteristically represented playing paradigmatically masculine roles for their cultures: they are successful warriors who fight for their peoples and extend their territory, “shepherds” who protect and provide for those they rule, “fathers” to their people and their vassals, “brothers” to their allies, and when vassals themselves, “sons” to their suzerain.21 Royal agents, like —————

16 On these common idioms, see, e.g., Jesús-Luis Cunchillos, in Textes ougaritiques tome II: Textes religieux et rituels; correspondance (ed. André Caquot, Jean-Michel de Tarragon, and Jesús-Luis Cunchillos; Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1989), 247–48; William Moran, The Amarna Letters (1987; Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), xxiv–xxv; Carlo Zaccagnini, “The Interdependence of the Great Powers,” in Amarna Diplomacy: The Beginnings of International Relations (ed. Raymond Cohen and Raymond Westbrook; Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 144–45; Cross, “Kinship and Covenant,” 8–11. 17 CAT 2:64:1–5, 9–12. 18 CAT 2:38:1–3. See similarly 2:44:1–3, and many other missives and treaties from various West Asian and North African contexts during the second and first millennia BCE. 19 As emphasized by Cross, “Kinship and Covenant,” 8–9. 20 He writes to his “brother” Yashub-Ya—ad concerning the latter’s hostility (=non-familial treatment). 21 On the king as “father” and “shepherd” in cuneiform sources, see CAD 1:68 and 14:310–11, and William W. Hallo, “Royal Titles from the Mesopotamian Periphery,” Anatolian Studies 30 (1980):194–95. For the king as father, see also M.-J. Seux, Épithètes royales akkadiennes et sumériennes (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1967), 33, 384–85; for the title “shepherd,” see further Joan Goodnick Westenholz, “The Good Shepherd,” in Melammu Symposia IV: Schools of Oriental Studies and the Development of Modern Historiography (ed. A. Panaino and A. Piras; Milan: University of Bologna and IsIAO, 2004), 281–310. See Jer 3:15; Zech 10:2, 3 for biblical examples of the king as shepherd, and 1 Sam 24:12 and Isa 9:5 for the king as father. On the topos

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kings, are portrayed in a typically masculine fashion. The elegy of 2 Sam 1:19–27 celebrates Saul’s and Jonathan’s lives in highly gendered terms characteristic of the representation of rulers in West Asian sources. They are warriors, who employed their weapons with singular skill, killing many foes: From the blood of the slain, from the fat of the warriors, the bow of Jonathan did not turn back, the sword of Saul did not return empty.

The poem also celebrates their physical strength and agility, comparing the dead king and his son to wild animals thought to possess such qualities: They were swifter than eagles, they were stronger than lions.

They are hailed as loved by the people, and Saul specifically is praised for enriching his subjects, a common motif of royal care giving: Daughters of Israel, weep for Saul, the one who dressed you in scarlet with dainty things, who placed ornaments of gold upon your clothing.22

Though killed in battle, the poet, through his use of the imagery of the successful warrior, suggests that the masculinity of Saul and Jonathan is in no way compromised by their deaths, though no doubt their enemies would have claimed otherwise.23 Similar gendering of royal representation, both in texts and in visual images, is found elsewhere in West Asian texts and art. The Neo-Assyrian king is typically portrayed as a victorious warrior of unequalled might and skill, before whom vanquished enemies prostrate themselves, and to whom they bring gifts demonstrating their submission.24 The Assyrian king, often described as “shepherd” (rƝ’û), protects and provides for his people.25 Visual representations enrich our understanding of what constitutes masculinity in the Neo-Assyrian context, with emphasis on ————— of the king as shepherd in Egyptian literature, see, e.g., Dieter Müller, “Der gute Hirte,” ZÄS 86 (1961):126–44; the king as father is touched on briefly in Hermann Grapow, Die bildlichen Ausdrücke des Aegyptischen (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1924), 132. For the king as “son” of his overlord and “brother” of his ally, see, e.g., the materials cited in nn. 16 and 17. 22 The topos of the successful king enriching his people is discussed ahead. 23 Such a death in battle would have been interpreted very differently in a Neo-Assyrian context, as Sennacherib’s reactions to his father Sargon’s death suggests. On this, see “The Sin of Sargon” in Livingstone, Court Poetry and Literary Miscellanea, 77 #33. My thanks to Jamie Novotny for bringing this point and text to my attention. 24 Chapman, “Without Rival,” 20–59 is the best recent study of the Neo-Assyrian evidence from the perspective of gender. 25 For examples, see Chapman, “Without Rival,” 21, 31–33.

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the king’s elaborate beard, developed torso, good posture, and concentration in battle.26 Enemies are not infrequently emasculated verbally or visually through comparison or association with women or things feminine (e.g., in treaty curses), or through claims that they failed to perform gendered activity appropriately (e.g., they left wives and children vulnerable to harm).27 Northwest Semitic inscriptions also emphasize the king’s gendered accomplishments, such as his enrichment of his people (e.g., Kulamuwa), or his victories in war and territorial acquisitions (e.g., Mesha).28 A royal agent might also speak of masculine and distinctly royal accomplishments such as providing for his people, military successes, building activities, and peace-making with foreign enemies (Azatiwada).29 That the West Asian king is typically portrayed embodying an idealized masculinity brings into relief the exceptional nature of the texts which speak of the ruler or his agent as both a father and a mother, or like a father and a mother, to those for whom he has responsibility. In the recently published bilingual inscription from Çineköy, Urikki, king of Que and vassal of Assyria, states that “the king of [Assyria and] all the house of Assyria became for me a father [and] a mother.”30 Similarly, in EA 161, it is the Pharaoh’s agent Han’i who is said to have provided for the visiting Syrian vassal king Aziru of Amurru in like manner: “When I came to the king, my lord, Han’i met me; he took care of me like a mother, like a father (ki-i-ma MÍ.um-mi ki-i-ma a-bi).”31 Kulamuwa uses a slightly different construction to claim that he caused a group of his people (the MŠKBM) who “lived (?) like dogs”32 to prosper: “To some I was a father, and to some a mother, and to some a brother.”33 Azatiwada, evidently an official acting as regent for a royal minor (likely the same Urikki of Que at an earlier point ————— 26

Chapman, “Without Rival,” 26 and n. 27. Chapman, “Without Rival,” 41–44, 48–58. 28 Kulamuwa: KAI 24:11–13; see Tropper, Inschriften von Zincirli, 42–43. Mesha: KAI 181. 29 Azatiwada: KAI 26 A 1:4–5, 13–20, 2:9–3:2; see Hawkins, Corpus of Hieroglyphic Luwian Inscriptions, 49–54. 30 Lines 7–9 in the Phoenician inscription: wmlk [’šwr w] kl bt ’šwr kn ly l’b [wl] ’m, with restoration of mlk [’šwr] on the basis of the parallel Luwian text and the larger context (Recai Tekoglu and André Lemaire, “La bilangue royale louvito-phénicienne de Çineköy,” Comptes rendus de l’Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres [2000]: 994, 968). My thanks to Omur Harmansah for bringing this reference to my attention. 31 For the Akkadian text and the English translation I have quoted, see Shlomo Izre’el, Amurru Akkadian: A Linguistic Study (2 vols.; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1991), 2:32, 34. 32 On this reading, see Tropper, Inschriften von Zincirli, 39–41, who provides a summary of debate and advocates ytlk!n (a Gt of hlk) as the best reading in context. Cf. O’Connor, “The Rhetoric of the Kilamuwa Inscription,” 19, 22 who defends the reading ytlwn and translates “cringed.” 33 KAI 24:10–11; see Tropper, Inschriften von Zincirli, 41–42 (w’nk lmy kt ’b wlmy kt ’m wlmy kt ’h̡). His treatment includes a discussion of the syntax and the obscure MŠKBM. 27

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in time), claims that Baal made him “a father and a mother to the Danunians.”34 In a poem of self-praise, Ishme-Dagan of Isin states that “I am kind like a father, attentive (?) like a mother.”35 Similarly, a prayer for Samsu-iluna of Babylon addresses the king as follows: “With your shepherd’s crook may you lead Sumer and Akkad as if you were their mother and father!”36 Kulamuwa and Azatiwada claim the role of paternal and maternal care giver for themselves, and Ishme-Dagan speaks similarly, comparing his benevolent conduct to that of a father and mother; Urikki speaks of his overlord, the king of Assyria, and all the house of Assyria, having played the roles of father and mother for him; Aziru, a Syrian vassal of the Pharaoh, states that the Pharaoh’s agent Han’i took care of him as would a mother and father; and Samsu-iluna is called upon to rule Sumer and Akkad as if he were their father and mother.37 Given that care giving in the form of providing justice, protection, prosperity and peace is a common masculine activity in the representation of kingship, and that the image of the ideal father is not infrequently employed to communicate such nurture, what might have motivated the writers of these texts to jettison conventional gendered language? In other words, why was it not sufficient to claim that these kings or royal representatives functioned as fathers do? Why add the role of mother and in the case of Kulamuwa, the role of brother as well? I want to argue that including the role of mother (and in one instance, mother and brother) produces a rhetoric of familial nurture which transcends the rhetorical norms of gender, suggesting a superior quality of care giving. Thus, if the king as father is the paradigmatic male care giver, —————

34 KAI 26 A 1:8; see Hawkins, Corpus of Hieroglyphic Luwian Inscriptions, 49 (p‘ln b‘l ldnnym l’b wl’m). Younger believes that the use of father and mother together here suggests not only compassion, but conceiving and birthing the Danunians (“Phoenician Inscription of Azatiwada,” 14, 24). I doubt whether conceiving and birthing is at issue, given the mention of both father and mother rather than mother alone. 35 “A Praise Poem of Isme-Dagan,” ETCSL A 236–50 (http://etcsl.orinst.ox.ac.uk/cgi-bin/etcsl. cgi?text=t.2.5.4.01#) for the translation. See also Willem H. Ph. Römer, Sumerische ‘Königshymnen’ der Isin-Zeit (Leiden: Brill, 1965), 51–52 for the Sumerian text and a German translation. My thanks to Matthew Rutz for pointing this text and these references out to me. 36 “A Prayer for Samsu-iluna (Samsu-iluna C),” ETCSL C 18–24 (http://etcsl.orinst.ox.ac.uk/ cgi-bin/etcsl.cgi?text=t.2.8.3.3&display=Crit&charenc=gcirc&lineid=t2833.p4#t2833.p4) for the translation. See also Adam Falkenstein, “Ein sumerisches Kultlied auf Samsu’iluna,” Archív Orientální 17 (1949): 217, 219 for the Sumerian text and a German translation. My thanks to Matthew Rutz for pointing this text and these references out to me. 37 The theme of the king as father and mother is also found occasionally in Egyptian literature, e.g., Merenptah is described as a good shepherd who keeps his army alive, a father and mother for everyone. On this usage, see Müller, “Der gute Hirte,” 137 and n. 4, as well as 142, where the “Autobiography of Rekhmire,” a text with this rhetoric from the era of Thutmose III, is quoted. Grapow, Die bildlichen Ausdrücke des Aegyptischen, 132, cites what appears to be a variant of the Merenptah example, with Sethos I as the subject.

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the king as father and mother is an even better nurturer. Such binary discourse is totalizing, in that father and mother together encompass all parental roles; to add brother to the mix in the case of Kulamuwa produces a construction which brings together both generations of paradigmatic familial care givers. Were sister also present in Kulamuwa’s discourse, he would lay claim to the nurturing roles of both parents and both types of sibling. (It is typically the parent or sibling who is represented in West Asian literary works as dutiful familial caregiver rather than aunts, uncles or cousins.) Such totalizing binary rhetoric is a not uncommon way to speak of incomparability in ancient West Asian literature. Among the many texts which one could cite is 1 Sam 2:6, in which totalizing binary rhetoric is marshaled to demonstrate Yhwh’s singularity: “Yhwh kills and makes live,” // “He brings down to Sheol and he raises up.” // “Yhwh dispossesses and enriches,” // “He debases and exalts …”38 In short, it seems likely that representing the king as both father and mother is used to claim preeminence in care giving, one of the central responsibilities of West Asian kings. As paramount nurturer, the king would be without equal among his peers, a position kings are fond of claiming, as Kulamuwa’s comments on the failings of his predecessors and his own successes illustrate.39 The regent Azatiwada’s self identification as divinely appointed father and mother to the Danunians suggests that he, too, is the paramount nurturer, without rival. This hyperbolic, king-like assertion is not surprising, given Azatiwada’s other bold claims, which function to portray him as the peer, or even the superior, of neighboring kings (e.g., he made peace with foreign kings, who recognized his authority; he was chosen by Baal, and bears the epithet “blessed of Baal”; he made his people live).40 ————— 38

That Yhwh’s incomparability is at issue is clear from v. 2. Other examples of totalizing binary constructions from the Hebrew Bible include the expressions “knowledge of good and evil” (e.g., Gen 2:9), suggesting the totality of culturally conditioned normative behaviors, and “from Dan to Beersheba” (e.g., Judg 20:1; 2 Sam 3:10), indicating the whole land of Israel. See also the list of totalizing dyads (“to everything there is a season”) in Eccl 3:1–8. 39 KAI 24:2–5; Tropper, Inschriften von Zincirli, 31–35. 40 Though w’p b’bt p‘ln kl mlk (line 12) is not entirely clear, the most likely meaning in the context is that other kings acknowledged Azatiwada’s authority, given the usual sense of fatherhood in treaty settings. For debate about how to interpret this line, see Younger, “The Phoenician Inscription of Azatiwada,”16, n. 30. That Azatiwada’s epithet hbrk b‘l, best rendered “blessed of Baal,” is also borne by Urikki in his own inscription (line 3) may suggest another instance of Azatiwada making quasi-royal claims. The parallel was brought to my attention by Aaron Schade, “A Text Linguistic Approach to the Syntax and Style of the Phoenician Inscription of Azatiwada,” JSS 50 (2005): 39, n. 5. For Urikki’s text, see Tekoglu and Lemaire, “La bilangue royale louvitophénicienne de Çineköy,” 994, 996, who also point out the parallel. On hbrk b‘l as “blessed of Baal,” see Hawkins, Corpus of Hieroglyphic Luwian Inscriptions, 58. For Azatiwada’s claim that he “made the Danunians live” as kingly style, see Maria G. Amadasi Guzzo, “Le roi qui fait vivre son peuple dans les inscriptions phéniciennes,” Die Welt des Orients 15 (1984): 113.

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The assignment of the care giving roles of father and mother to a single individual is not restricted to the rhetoric of ancient West Asian kings or their representatives. Preeminent West Asian deities are also sometimes portrayed in this manner.41 Some texts speak of the deity as both father and mother to the worshiper, while others suggest that s/he has an obligation to respond as a human father and mother would. Penitential prayers to Enlil petition the deity to forgive “like a birth mother, a natural father (ki-ma ummi a-lit-ti a-bi a-li-di),” common idioms of paradigmatic nurture in cuneiform texts.42 In a Neo-Assyrian prophecy addressed to Esarhaddon, a deity (probably Ishtar) announces to the king: “I am your father and your mother. Between my wings I brought you up.”43 Similarly, Hittite hymns speak of the Sun goddess of Arinna as a father and mother to all the lands and the Sun god as a father and mother to the oppressed and solitary, for whom he plays the role of advocate.44 As with the king as father and mother, crediting the deity with multiple, familial nurturing roles is a way to speak of preeminent divine care giving, since gods, like kings, are more commonly represented in typically gendered nurturing roles vis-à-vis worshipers (e.g., Mullissu as the young Ashurbanipal’s mother, and Ishtar of Arbela as his nanny in a Neo-Assyrian prophecy).45 Such rhetoric also ————— 41

Egyptian texts beginning in the New Kingdom also attest to a similar usage. Amun-ReHarakhti and Re are called “the mother and the father of everyone,” while another deity (possibly Osiris), is “the father and mother of the sun people.” See Christian Leitz, Lexikon der ägyptischen Götter und Götterbezeichnungen (Leuven: Peeters, 2002), 3:257; 1:579, which list the relevant primary texts in each case. My thanks to James Allen for bringing this material to my attention. 42 Stephen Langdon, Babylonian Penitential Psalms (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1927), 14 (K 5992, rev. 16). See similarly other texts in Langdon’s volume. 43 Simo Parpola, Assyrian Prophecies (SAA 9; Helsinki: Helsinki University Press, 1997), 18 #2.5, lines 26’–27’: a-na-ku AD-ka AMA-ka bir-ti a-gap-pi-ia ur-ta-bi-ka. Peter Machinist has argued that the theme of divine nurture and parenting of the king in Neo-Assyrian texts has its Assyrian origin in the age of Tukulti-Ninurta I. Though he quotes a number of Neo-Assyrian texts, including this one, the rhetoric of the deity as both father and mother is not a focus of his investigation (“Kingship and Divinity in Imperial Assyria,” in Text, Artifact, and Image: Revealing Ancient Israelite Religion [BJS 346; ed. Gary Beckman and Theodore J. Lewis; Providence: Brown Judaic Studies, 2006], 152–88, esp. 165–69). 44 René Lebrun, Hymnes et prières hittites (Louvain: Centre de histoire des religions, 1980), 158 for the text and 168 for a French translation (CTH 376 A i 46’); 95, 102 (CTH 372 i 35–38). 45 Parpola, Assyrian Prophecies, 39 #7, rev., line 6. Sometimes a deity might be represented playing a role normally assigned to the opposite gender, e.g., when Yhwh claims he will comfort Jerusalem “like a man whose mother comforts him” (Isa 66:13). See also personal names such as ‘ttr-’um, “Attar is (my) mother” (Frauke Grøndahl, Die Personennamen der Texte aus Ugarit [Studia Pohl 1; Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1967], 46, who suggests in passing a possible relationship to the rhetoric of Kulamuwa and Azatiwada) and ’m’šmn, “Eshmun is (my) mother” (Frank L. Benz, Personal Names in the Phoenician and Punic Inscriptions [Studia Pohl 8; Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute Press, 1972], 269). It may be that this is another kind of rhetorical strategy which seeks to transcend gender norms in order to emphasize the deity’s superior care giving abilities.

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complements other totalizing dyadic structures of the sort mentioned earlier which can be used to set a god apart from others, including potential competitors (e.g., 1 Sam 2:6). Perhaps what is most striking about the use of the gender transcending rhetoric of multiple, familial care giving roles for West Asian kings or their agents is both its general rarity across millennia, and, with respect to the late second millennium and early first millennium, its apparent geographic concentration in Anatolia and Syria. I have spoken of six West Asian texts which bear witness to this rhetoric, three of which are dated to the first half of the first millennium, and one of which is dated to the 14th century BCE.46 That the subjects of the three first millennium texts, Kulamuwa, Azatiwada, and Urikki, have charge over Anatolian kingdoms in the ninth and eighth centuries BCE is noteworthy. Aziru, for his part, is king of the Syrian kingdom Amurru during the 14th century. Neo-Assyrian rulers, a number of whom were contemporaries of the Anatolian rulers of interest, do not portray their care giving in this way in extant materials, nor do other West Asian kings or their agents represent themselves or their overlords in this manner during the late second millennium and early first millennium.47 In contrast, the rhetoric of the king as his people’s shepherd is widespread in many West Asian contexts, and the figure of the king or official as father is also not uncommon.48 In short, these four texts stand out as unusual for their rhetoric and notable for their geographic concentration. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that such rhetoric had at least some degree of popularity in Anatolia during the ninth and eighth centuries, as the inscriptions of Kulamuwa, Urikki and Azatiwada suggest. What of the origins of the use of the rhetoric in late second millennium Syria and early first millennium Anatolia? Unfortunately, no confident answer to this question is possible. The earliest apparent floruit of the rhetoric applied to kings is witnessed in early second millennium Mesopotamia (e.g., Ishme-Dagan and Samsu-iluna), but no evidence exists to suggest that the rhetoric of these early second millennium texts exercised any kind of direct influence on our late second millennium and early first millennium examples. The Amarna letter, in which a Syrian king describes ————— That Ishme-Dagan of Isin ruled during the 19th century BCE, and Samsu-iluna of Babylon was king in the 18th century obviously indicates that the rhetoric has a long history in West Asia. I am aware of several other early second millennium cuneiform texts which are rhetorically similar to those of Ishme-Dagan and Samsu-iluna, but my focus here is the late second and early first millennium examples, given their striking characteristics. 47 It is interesting to note that though the Neo-Assyrian king never self-identifies in this manner, Urikki, writing in Phoenician and Luwian for a domestic audience, refers to the king of Assyria—and all the house of Assyria—as a father and a mother to him. Though applied to the Assyrian overlord, the rhetoric was evidently Anatolian, not Assyrian. 48 See n. 21 for citations. 46

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the behavior of his overlord the Pharaoh’s representative, postdates a text in Egyptian from the time of Thutmose III which describes the king as father and mother of all people.49 It also postdates another New Kingdom Egyptian text which describes Amun-Re as “father and mother of the one who puts him in his heart” (jt mwt n rdj sw m jb.f).50 Yet the Amarna example in question bears witness to the rhetoric applied to the Pharaoh’s agent rather than the Pharaoh himself or a deity. It could be that such an application represents a borrowing from an Egyptian milieu, given that Aziru is a vassal of the Pharaoh corresponding with the Egyptian court, and given that gender transcending rhetoric applied to both king and deity is witnessed in extant New Kingdom texts. However, it is equally possible that the usage was already established in Aziru’s cultural environment, whatever its origin. Whether a borrowing or not, the use of such rhetoric for the king’s agent likely derives from its use for kings themselves, as Azatiwada’s later self representation as a king in everything but name suggests. The origin of such rhetoric applied to ninth and eighth century Anatolian rulers is also obscure, though it may not be too much to suggest that contemporary rhetoric of the divine, nurturing father-mother may well have served as a model for some or all of the occurrences of the royal rhetoric in the ninth and eighth centuries, just as the rhetoric applied to kings was probably the model for the rhetoric of the regent Azatiwada. Neo-Assyrian materials do not appear to have been the source of such rhetoric applied to kings, nor does it seem very likely that cuneiform texts of the early second millennium were. In any case, it may be that by representing the king in this manner, the writers of these texts sought to establish an implicit comparison to divinities who play the same care giving roles.51 At all events, for the Kulamuwa or Çineköy inscriptions from first millennium Anatolia, this hypothesis assumes an awareness of a comparable, contemporary divine rhetoric of the kind extant in second millennium Hittite hymns and in first millennium Neo-Assyrian materials. This remains quite uncertain, since we —————

49 See Müller, “Der gute Hirte,” 142 for this example, as well as Alan H. Gardiner, “The Autobiography of Rekhmire,” Zeitschrift für Ägyptische Sprache und Altertumskunde 60 (1925):69, and Norman de Garis Davies, The Tomb of Rekh-mi-Re at Thebes (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1943), 81 and pl. 11, lines 17–18. I thank James Allen for the latter two references. 50 See Leitz, Lexikon der ägyptischen Götter und Götterbezeichnungen, 579. The other New Kingdom references to a deity as both father and mother which are listed by Leitz are all post1400 BCE. I am grateful to James Allen for this reference and for advice about the dating of the texts in question. 51 After developing this hypothesis, I came across Müller’s discussion of the occasional Egyptian use of father-mother rhetoric for the Pharaoh, in which he suggests something similar, though his focus is on leadership, not care giving: “die Art der Apostrophierung läßt dabei darauf schließen, daß man speziell in der Führung … eine göttliche Funktion des Königs sah” (“Der gute Hirte,” 142).

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cannot know the range of divine or royal rhetoric familiar to the writers of our texts, nor can we determine on the basis of extant materials which, if any, of these writers were innovating.

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Section 3: Disability

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Introduction

My scholarly interest in disability as a basis of ritual and social differentiation, which ultimately resulted in a monograph (Disability in the Hebrew Bible: Interpreting Mental and Physical Differences [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008]), was sparked initially by the rather opaque saying in 2 Sam 5:8b: “Anyone blind or lame shall not enter the house.” In “‘Anyone Blind or Lame Shall Not Enter the House’: On the Interpretation of 2 Samuel 5:8b” (1998), I explore possible meanings of the adage with particular attention to the identity of the blind and lame who are excluded from the “house,” the meaning of “house” in this context (most likely, the temple), and how the exclusion posited by the saying differs from the limits placed on the temple service of priests with mûmîm (“defects,” including blindness and lameness) according to Lev 21:17–23. Deut 23:2, a text which may exclude male worshipers with genital damage (another type of “defect”) from the Jerusalem temple, is also compared, given the possibility that the saying of 2 Sam 5:8b refers to worshipers rather than priests. (This still seems likely to me.) The essay laid the groundwork for my chapter entitled “The Qualified Body: The Dyad Whole/Blemished” in Rites and Rank: Hierarchy in Biblical Representations of Cult (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) and its observations were further reworked and elaborated in my book Disability in the Hebrew Bible, where I also responded to a critic (Jeremy Schipper) who was reluctant to accept my argument that the “house” of the saying is most plausibly interpreted as a reference to the Jerusalem temple. In “The Exegetical Dimensions of Restrictions on the Blind and the Lame in Texts from Qumran” (2001), I extend my interest in the stigmatization of blind and lame persons and their marginalization from cultic and other ritual contexts to the Dead Sea Scrolls. I consider the treatment of earlier, biblical texts such as 2 Sam 5:8b, Lev 21:17–23, Num 5:3, Deut 23:2 in Dead Sea Scrolls such as the Temple Scroll, the War Scroll and the Rule of the Congregation. I find a general tendency in the exegesis of Qumran texts to increase the degree of ritual and social marginalization of blind and lame persons, in one case (the Temple Scroll) by recasting blindness as a polluting condition. This paper brings together my interests in ritual contexts such as the temple cult, the creation of ritual and social distinctions, disability, and the early history of biblical exegesis. Like “‘Any-

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one Blind or Lame,’” it too provided a foundation for later reworking and elaboration, in this case in chapter 7 of my book Disability in the Hebrew Bible (“Exegetical Perpetuations, Elaborations, and Transformations: The Case of Qumran”). The third article in this section, “The Ascription of Physical Disability as a Stigmatizing Strategy in Biblical Iconic Polemics” (2009), extends my analysis of the treatment of disability in biblical sources to the anti-iconic polemics of texts such as Jeremiah, Second Isaiah, Habakkuk, and the Psalms. Because I was only able touch briefly on these polemics in Disability in the Hebrew Bible, this essay provided me with an opportunity to examine them in some depth. Though the polemics have been much discussed, including some of their strategies of vilification, it is only very recently that the role played by disability in them has been seriously considered by scholars. At all events, I explore how the attribution of physical disabilities such as blindness, deafness, and an inability to move independently is used to denigrate disfavored icons (“idols”) and to distinguish them from the “real” god. I also attempt to locate this particular stigmatizing strategy among other approaches used by biblical polemicists to devalue and de-legitimize the icons they oppose. Thus, in addition to analyzing antiiconic polemics from the perspective of disability, I theorize the whole range of strategies used by polemicists to disparage disfavored icons. Though this essay is not my first contribution to the study of disability in the Hebrew Bible, it is my first serious foray into the analysis of anti-iconic polemic in biblical sources, a subject which I considered only briefly in my early work on the asherah and Asherah (Asherah and the Cult of Yahweh in Israel [SBLMS 34; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988]).

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“Anyone Blind or Lame Shall Not Enter the House”: On the Interpretation of Second Samuel 5:8b

Verse 8b of 2 Samuel 5, “therefore they say, ‘Anyone blind or lame shall not enter the house’” (‘iwwƝr ûpissƝah̡ lǀ’ yƗbô’ ’el habbƗyit), contains a clearly marked popular saying. Set off from its present context—the story of David’s conquest of Jerusalem—its interpretation has long challenged commentators. Though there is a consensus among scholars that the aphorism was originally independent from its present context1, in the final casting of the biblical text the narrative in which the adage is embedded serves an etiological purpose, that of explaining the origin of this curious saying by situating it in the circumstances of David’s conquest.2 In the narrative account of that conquest, the inhabitants of Jerusalem claim that the lame and the blind will prevent David from conquering the city (v. 6); David, in turn, refers to the lame and the blind as “those who are despised by the soul of David” (v. 8).3 As many scholars have pointed out, the whole passage is fraught with difficulties, including the identification of the blind and the lame both in the aphorism and in the wider, contextual narrative.4 My inter—————

1 See, for example André Caquot and Phillipe de Robert, Les livres de Samuel (Commentaire de l’Ancien Testament 6; Geneva: Labor & Fides, 1994), 403; P. Kyle McCarter, II Samuel: A New Translation with Introduction, Notes and Commentary (AB 9; Garden City: Doubleday, 1984), 137; Hans W. Hertzberg, I & II Samuel (OTL; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1964), 269; Christa Schäfer-Lichtenberger, Stadt und Eidgenossenschaft im Alten Testament (BZAW 156; Berlin: De Gruyter, 1983), 385. 2 One might compare 1 Sam 5:5, an etiology explaining the origin of a Philistine cultic custom, which is embedded within the “Ark Narrative.” Both etiologies, not atypically, begin with ‘al kƝn. On etiological narrative, see Burke O. Long, The Problem of Etiological Narrative in the Old Testament (BZAW 108; Berlin: Töpelmann, 1968). 3 This is the reading according to the qere (wƟ’et happish̡îm wƟ’et ha‘iwrîm ĞƟnnj’ê nepeš dƗwƯd). The ketib suggests a different understanding: “As for the blind and the lame, they hate David’s soul (ĞƗnƟ’û nepeš dƗwƯd).” The ketib is impossible, the qere difficult. The lame and the blind are clearly marked as the direct object and, therefore, cannot be the subject of what in the ketib appears to be a perfect verb (Ğn’w); thus, the qere reads a passive participle. But a problem remains: “As for the lame and the blind, those who are despised by the soul of David” is not a sentence! In contrast to the ketib and qere of the MT, 4QSama reads the feminine singular perfect (Ğn’h), with nepeš dƗwƯd as the subject, which solves the difficulty. The text is clearly problematic at this juncture, as McCarter (II Samuel, 40) and other commentators have pointed out. 4 On 2 Sam 5:6–9 there is a burgeoning literature concerned mainly with the identification of the s̞innôr and of the lame and the blind in the narrative preceding the aphorism. Among the relatively recent assessments of the passage, its problems, and relevant scholarly viewpoints are

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est is in the meaning of the saying itself and its implications for reconstructing ideologies of cultic restriction and exclusion in ancient Israel. It seems clear that the adage was attracted secondarily to the present story of Jerusalem’s conquest. It does not fit well into the narrative, even as an aside, since in the preceding narrative there is no mention of a “house” from which the blind and the lame are excluded.5 The very presence of the lame and the blind in the preceding narrative (vv. 6, 8a) suggests that the aphorism was attracted secondarily. In the saying, the blind and the lame are mentioned in the singular instead of the plural used in the narrative in vv. 6, 8a, without the definite article in contrast to vv. 6, 8a, and in order inverse to that of v. 8a.6 The similar structure of the Jebusite claim in the narrative (lǀ’ tƗbô’ hƝnnƗh and lǀ’ yƗbô’ dƗwƯd hƝnnƗh, “You shall not come here” and “David shall not come here”) and in the saying itself (lǀ’ yƗbô’ ’el habbƗyit, “He shall not enter the house”) may also help to explain the attraction of the adage. The identification of “the house” mentioned in the saying is a good place to begin. The house which the blind and the lame may not enter is most likely a sanctuary, probably the temple of Jerusalem.7 The word bayit, “house,” is commonly used for temples. The idiom bƗ’ ’el also suggests that “the house” is a temple. This idiom and others like it (bƗ’, bƗ’ bƟ) are often used to describe both priestly service at shrines,8 and to describe the entry of worshipers into a sacred complex as well.9 If the “house” is a sanctuary, who are the blind and the lame, and why are they banned from entry? The blind and the lame of 2 Sam 5:8b are either priests or worshipers. ————— Caquot and de Robert, Les livres de Samuel, 401–404; Johannes P. Floss, David und Jerusalem. Ziele und Folgen des Stadteroberungsberichts 2 Sam 5,6–9 literaturwissenschaftlich betrachtet (ATAT 30; St. Ottilien: EOS, 1987); an older study of note is that of Hans J. Stoebe, “Die Einnahme Jerusalems und der Sҍinnôr,” ZDPV 73 (1957): 73–99. 5 The following verse (v. 9) mentions a house, which is probably the royal palace in this instance; see similarly Schäfer-Lichtenberger, Stadt und Eidgenossenschaft, 389, n. 76, with citations. No temple (“house”) existed in Jerusalem before Solomon built one. 6 See the discussions by Floss, David und Jerusalem, 38; Vincenzo Scippa, “David conquista Gerusalemme,” Bibbia e Oriente 27 (1985): 68; and G. Brunet, “Les aveugles et boiteux jébusites,” in Studies in the Historical Books of the Old Testament (VTSup 30; ed. John A. Emerton; Leiden: Brill, 1979), 66, among others. 7 Or Yahwistic shrines in general, though this seems less likely, given the aphorism’s association with Jerusalem in its narrative context. Many scholars have taken the position that the “house” is the Jerusalem temple. The LXX made this identification explicit (typhloi kai chǀloi ouk eiseleusontai eis oikon kyriou). See further Floss, David und Jerusalem, 39 n. 100. 8 For priestly service, see Exod 28:29, 35 (bƟbǀ’ô ’el haqqǀdeš); Lev 16:23 (ûbƗ’ ’ahărôn ’el ’ǀhel mô‘Ɲd); Exod 28:30 (bƟbô’ô lipnê yhwh) and Lev 16:17 (bƟbô’ô lƟkappƝr baqqǀdeš). 9 For worshipers or others (excluded aliens), see Lam 1:10 (bƗ’û miqdƗšƗh); Ezek 44:9 (kolben-nƝkƗr ‘erel lƝb wƟ‘erel bƗĞƗr lǀ’ yƗbô’ ’el miqdƗšî), 44:27 (bƟyôm bǀ’ô ’Ɲl haqqǀdeš); Isa 56:7 (wahăbî’ôtîm ’el har qodšî).

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If the blind and the lame of 2 Sam 5:8b are priests, Lev 21:17–23 is the closest text for comparison. A restriction of the cultic activities of priests with physical defects is witnessed in the H materials in Lev 21:17–23, though not in any other biblical source.10 Priests who possess a “blemish” (mûm) may not officiate at sacrifices to Yhwh, bring near offerings, or approach the curtain of the holy of holies, according to this text. Blind and lame priests head the list of those with bodily imperfections warranting restriction (v. 18). Though the cultic activity of priests with physical defects is limited, according to Lev 21:17–23, they may nonetheless eat of the sanctified foods reserved for the priesthood: “The food of his God, from the most holy things, and from the holy things he may eat, but to the curtain he shall not come, nor shall he approach the altar, for he has a blemish; he shall not profane my sanctuaries for I Yhwh sanctify them” (vv. 22–23).11 The fact that the text allows priests with physical defects to eat of the sanctified food offerings suggests that they are permitted access to the sphere of the sanctuary; clearly, they have not been entirely excluded because of their physical imperfections.12 Nor are their blemishes understood as a threat to the holiness of the sanctuary, as long as they do not approach the altar or the holy of holies. In contrast, if the aphorism in 2 Sam 5:8b concerns blind and lame priests, it may represent an ideology in which these cultic personnel are entirely excluded from the sphere of the sanctuary, not simply from officiating at the altar, bringing near offerings, and approaching the holy of holies, as in Lev 21:17–23. In a word, the command that they “shall not enter the house” could suggest that they shall have no access whatsoever to formal, public worship. The same idiom and others like it (bƗ’ ’el, bƗ’) are used elsewhere to indicate that certain worshipers (e.g., certain aliens) are not allowed to enter the sphere of the sanctuary.13 Yet there are other texts in which these idioms are used to describe a specific activity: priestly entry —————

10 There are parallels, however, in Mesopotamia, Greece, Rome, and elsewhere in the ancient Mediterranean world; see Yeshayahu Leibowitz and Jacob S. Licht, ʭʥʠʮ, ʭʥʮ, Encyclopaedia Biblica (9 vols.; Jerusalem: Bialik, 1950–88), 4:725 (Hebrew), who cite such parallels. On Mesopotamia, see also Karel van der Toorn, Sin and Sanction in Israel and Mesopotamia: A Comparative Study (Studia Semitica Neerlandica 22; Assen/Maastricht: Van Gorcum, 1985), 29–30. Van der Toorn mentions texts in which it is clear that priests and diviners must be physically perfect, and he lists disqualifying physical imperfections, pointing to the comparable material in Lev 21:17–23. 11 In Hebrew, wƟlǀ’ yƟh̡allƝl ’et miqdƗšay kî ’ănî yhwh mƟqaddƟšƗm. The plural “sanctuaries” in this context (H) is curious, given the assumption of cultic centralization elsewhere in H. 12 If they had been entirely excluded from the sanctuary, how would they gain access to the holy things and most holy things, which are offerings brought to the sanctuary by Israelites? A priest is entitled to eat of any of these offerings as long as he is “clean”; a priest’s dependent may eat of certain holy things as long as he is clean. On these offerings, see Num 18:8–19. 13 See the phrases quoted in n. 9.

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into the deity’s tent or temple.14 Because of these two uses of the idiom bƗ’ ’el, we cannot be certain whether its use in 2 Sam 5:8b suggests exclusion from the sphere of the sanctuary as a whole or exclusion only from the priestly privilege of entering the temple building. If the idiom does suggest total exclusion from the cultic sphere, then the proscription of blind and lame priests in 2 Sam 5:8b is more severe than that of Lev 21:17–23; it would represent an alternative ideology of cultic restriction for priests. But even if the idiom suggests only that blind and lame priests may not enter the temple building per se, we have a witness, nonetheless, to an ideology of cultic restriction for priests which contrasts with that of Lev 21:17–23. In Lev 21:17–23, blemished priests may not approach the holy of holies, officiate at the altar, and bring near offerings; in 2 Sam 5:8b, blind and lame priests may not enter the temple building.15 If the blind and the lame of 2 Sam 5:8b are worshipers, Deut 23:2 is the primary text for comparison. According to Deut 23:2, “whoever has crushed testicles and whoever has a penis cut off shall not enter the assembly of Yhwh” (lǀ’ yƗbǀ’ pƟs̞ûa‘ dakkƗ’ ûkƟrût šopkâ biqhal yhwh). The expression “enter the assembly of Yhwh” occurs several times in the context of Deuteronomy 23 (vv. 2, 3, 4, 9). Though the meaning of the expression is not entirely clear in its context, in sixth-century texts such as Lam 1:10; Isa 56:3–7; and Ezek 44:7, 9 this idiom is interpreted to mean “enter the sanctuary sphere.” Lam 1:10 states: “She [Jerusalem] saw nations enter her sanctuary,” // “Those about whom you commanded: ‘They shall not enter your assembly’” (lǀ’ yƗbǀ’û baqqƗhƗl lƗk).16 Lam 1:10 either paraphrases Deut 23:4 or quotes a form of the text which differs from that of surviving biblical manuscripts. In either case, Lam 1:10 suggests that the ————— 14

See the phrases quoted in n. 8. McCarter (II Samuel, 140), among others, mentions the possibility that 2 Sam 5:8b excludes blind and lame priests; he cites Lev 21:17–23. Floss (David und Jerusalem, 39–40) develops this position in some detail, comparing Lev 21:17–23, from which, he argues, the singulars “blind and lame” are derived. In his view, 2 Sam 5:8b reflects the position of Lev 21:17–23, grounding it etiologically. Unhappily, neither Floss nor McCarter noticed that 2 Sam 5:8b may exclude blind and lame priests completely from the temple complex, or may at least proscribe their entry into the temple building, while Lev 21:17–23 presents a different set of restrictions. Others doubt whether any connection to priests can be made at all; see, for example, Leibowitz and Licht, ʭʥʠʮ, ʭʥʮ, 724 (without argument). 16 Lam 1:10 seems to allude to the exclusion of the Ammonite and Moabite from the assembly of Yhwh in Deut 23:4 and perhaps to the partial exclusion of the Edomite in Deut 23:9. In any case, Lam 1:10 bears witness to an interpretive move to widen the scope of the exclusion to include the Babylonians (presumably; see 2 Kgs 25:9, 13–18), if not all aliens. The tendency to broaden Deut 23:4 is witnessed in later texts such as Neh 13:1–3, where it is understood to refer to all aliens, and Isa 56:3–7, where the original restriction and a broadening to all aliens are rejected. On Lam 1:10, see similarly Delbert R. Hillers, Lamentations: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB 7A; Garden City: Doubleday, 1972), 25. 15

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idioms “enter the assembly” and “enter the house” must mean the same thing: to enter the sphere of the sanctuary. In Isa 56:3–7, Deut 23:2–9 is understood in a similar way; like Lam 1:10, Isa 56:3–7 represents the proscription on entry into Yhwh’s assembly as a ban on participation in official worship. Isa 56:3–7 alludes to the exclusion of select aliens and men with damaged genitals in Deut 23:2–9, though it presumes a broadening of these restrictions, which it rejects.17 In Ezek 44:7 and 44:9, Deut 23:4–9 is interpreted as a passage excluding uncircumcised aliens specifically from cultic participation.18 If 2 Sam 5:8b prohibits the entry of blind and lame worshipers into the sphere of the sanctuary, it is much like Deut 23:2, which apparently excludes worshipers with damaged genitalia. Blind, lame and genitally mutilated male worshipers all possess a physical defect or “blemish” (mûm) which disqualifies them from entering the temple complex.19 Just as Deut 23:2 appears to prohibit men with damaged genitals from entering the sanctuary sphere, 2 Sam 5:8b (if it refers to worshipers) proscribes entry into the temple complex to those who are blind and lame. In each case, the proscription is general and is comparable to the exclusion of sacrificial animals with blemishes witnessed in D (Deut 15:21; 17:1), in H (Lev 22:17–25), in P (Lev 1:3, 10; 3:1; 4:32, and passim), and elsewhere (Mal 1:8, 13). The proscription is also comparable to the exclusion of priests with similar somatic imperfections from serving at the altar, bringing near offerings or approaching the holy of holies witnessed in H (Lev 21:17– 23). Yhwh desires “whole” and “complete” sacrifices without blemish, and according to H, Yhwh also desires priests without blemish to serve at the —————

17 In Isa 56:3–5, the eunuchs who observe Yhwh’s Sabbaths and keep his covenant are urged not to despair: “I will give to them in my house and within my walls a monument and a name better than sons and daughters; an eternal name I will give to them, which shall not be cut off.” The exact meaning of this passage remains unclear, though the mention of “a monument and a name” in Yhwh’s house is striking, for it is from the temple that the eunuch is excluded according to this text. But does this text mean that the writer rejects an apparent ban on the eunuch? This is clear regarding aliens in Isa 56:7: they may enter the sanctuary and participate in cultic rites. My guess is that the eunuch too is welcome, according to this text, and that the statement about the “monument and name” in the temple is meant to suggest this. This interpretation would provide some symmetry between v. 7 and vv. 3–5; since much of the rhetoric of Isa 56:3–7 is symmetrical, I believe that this interpretation is likely. 18 See especially v. 9, where the allusion to Deuteronomy 23 is clear: kol ben nƝkƗr ‘erel lƝb wƟ‘erel bƗĞƗr lǀ’ yƗbô’ ’el miqdašî. Ironically, the original law in Deut 23:4–9 concerned only the exclusion of circumcised peoples (Ammonites, Moabites, Edomites, and Egyptians) from the assembly (see Jer 9:24–25); uncircumcised peoples are not even mentioned in that context. 19 In contrast to the interpretation of Deut 23:4–9 in sixth-century texts such as Lam 1:10; Isa 56:3–7; and Ezek 44:7, 9, in fifth-century texts such as Ezra 9:12 and Neh 13:1–3, 23–27 the same passage, Deut 23:4–9, was taken as a reference to intermarriage. This interpretation ultimately came to predominate in rabbinic circles. On these two interpretive trajectories in post-biblical contexts, see further Shaye J. D. Cohen, “From the Bible to the Talmud: The Prohibition of Intermarriage,” HAR 7 (1983): 23–39, esp. 31–34.

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altar, approach the holy of holies, and bring near offerings. If 2 Sam 5:8b refers to worshipers, then two texts—Deut 23:2 and 2 Sam 5:8b—bear witness to the exclusion also of worshipers with blemishes from the sanctuary. In contrast, in sources other than D (Deut 23:2) and the aphorism of 2 Sam 5:8b such a ban is not mentioned or alluded to. It is possible that this ideology of cultic exclusion was not shared by the groups from which P and H came, or by other groups concerned with protecting the sanctity of the cultic sphere. Alternatively, other texts do not bear witness to the cultic exclusion but may assume it.20 In later times, some Jewish interpreters read 2 Sam 5:8b as a text with reference to worshipers. The writers of the Temple Scroll, recasting the restriction of 2 Sam 5:8b and elaborating upon it, proscribe the entry of blind persons into the sanctuary-city and associate the presence of such persons with pollution.21 Similarly, several Tannaitic texts exclude blind and lame Jewish males from obligations to pilgrimage, probably echoing the concerns of 2 Sam 5:8b.22 Does 2 Sam 5:8b address blind and lame priests, or blind and lame worshipers? In a number of other contexts, the idiom bƗ’ ’el is used both of priests entering temple structures and worshipers entering sanctuary spheres; since it is not an idiom limited to designation of either group’s activities, it is of little help in determining the identity of the blind and lame —————

20 This formulation owes much to the conceptualization of Mary Douglas (Purity and Danger. An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo [New York: Praeger, 1966], 50–52; eadem, “Deciphering a Meal,” Daedalus 101 [1972]: 76–77), who has emphasized both the paradigmatic idea of wholeness or completeness as characteristic of holiness and the symmetry of cultic exclusion of animals and restriction of priests with physical defects. I develop this line of thinking further here. 21 11QTemp 45:12–14 in Yigael Yadin, The Temple Scroll (3 vols.; Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 1983), 2:193. Yadin argues that the writers of the Temple Scroll derived the proscription not from 2 Sam 5:8b but from Lev 21:17–23, expanding the prohibition on blemished priests there to apply it to all Israelites. Though Yadin mentions 2 Sam 5:8b, it is not clear to me how he thinks it fits into his developmental schema (1:289–90). The uncleanness of the blind is an interesting innovation, nowhere apparent in the biblical text but evident elsewhere in Qumran materials (1QSa 2:3–10). Why the Temple Scroll does not also prohibit the lame is unclear, though Yadin argues that “blind” is intended to stand for all blemishes. See ahead for my similar argument regarding the possible function of “blind and lame” in 2 Sam 5:8b and of pƟs̞ûa‘ dakkƗ’ and kƟrût šopkâ in Deut 23:2. My argument was in its final form before I came across Yadin’s similar comments regarding the Temple Scroll. 22 See, for example, m. Hag 1:1; Mek. Rabbi Ishmael, Mishpat́im 20 (Mechilta d’Rabbi Ishmael [ed. H. S. Horovitz and I. Rabin; 2nd ed.; Jerusalem: Bamberger & Wahrmann, 1960], 333). The influence of 2 Sam 5:8b is not explicit, however, in either text. The Mishnah simply lists excluded categories of persons; the Mekilta develops justifications for each excluded category listed in the Mishnah on the basis of a rather loose reading of Exod 23:14, 17. The exclusion of the blind from pilgrimage is justified by quoting the word yƝrƗ’eh (“he shall appear” or “he shall be seen”); the exclusion of the lame is supported by quoting šƗlôš rƟgƗlîm (“three pilgrimage festivals,” literally, “three feet”). My thanks to Shaye J. D. Cohen for pointing me in the direction of these two texts.

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in 2 Sam 5:8b, but there are reasons to suspect that worshipers are intended in 2 Sam 5:8b. The fact that priests are not explicitly identified in the text suggests that the proscribed group is not specialized but general, that “anyone blind or lame” is any Israelite afflicted with these conditions. The popular nature of the adage also suggests a general exclusion. I do not imagine that members of the populace at large were much concerned about the qualifications for priestly service; they would have a personal interest, rather, in restrictions that would affect their own access or the access of members of their family to cultic space and actions. In a word, the evidence suggests that the blind and the lame of 2 Sam 5:8b are Israelite worshipers rather than priests. At minimum, we can assume that according to some circles in Israel worshipers with bodies damaged in at least some respects were excluded from the temple sphere. Deut 23:2 prohibits the entry of men with damaged genitals, and it is likely that 2 Sam 5:8b proscribes blind and lame worshipers. Yet these two texts taken together treat only damaged male genitals, blindness and lameness, leaving other physical defects and mutilations unaddressed. Are these particular physical imperfections somehow more threatening than others to the sanctity of the temple complex? Or did other blemishes also disqualify worshipers from entry into the sanctuary according to the circles responsible for 2 Sam 5:8b and Deut 23:2? Symmetrically speaking, it would be rather odd if other physical imperfections were not grounds for excluding worshipers. Lev 21:18–20 contains a long list of defects disqualifying a priest for service at the altar and for other specialized activities; Lev 22:22–24 presents a similar list of blemishes disqualifying animals for sacrifice. In light of this parallel material it is rather surprising and puzzling that Deut 23:2 and 2 Sam 5:8b, together, mention only a few defects. How might this be explained? One possible approach to the problem is to view “the blind and lame” and their counterparts in Deut 23:2 as synecdoches, representative of all blemished worshipers disqualified for cultic participation according to the circles responsible for these texts. This approach has some appeal, for it produces the expected symmetry with materials excluding mutilated and physically defective animals from sacrifice and with the passage in H restricting the activities of blemished priests. Furthermore, other texts such as Mal 1:8, 13 and Deut 15:21 appear to have such a synecdochic meaning. Mal 1:8 names only three conditions—blindness, lameness, and sickness— which seem to stand for all disqualifying physical imperfections in that context;23 Mal 1:13 mentions mutilated (?),24 lame, and sick animals, with —————

23 “You say, ‘How have we despised your name?’ By bringing defiled food to my altar. And you say, ‘How have we defiled it?’ When you say the table of Yhwh is despised. When you bring

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the same intent. Deut 15:21 addresses the issue of blemished sacrifices of the firstborn of flock and herd: “If there is a blemish in it—(if it is) lame or blind (or has) any evil blemish—you shall not sacrifice it to Yhwh your God.”25 In this text, “lame or blind” and “any evil blemish” read as awkward glosses. (Deut 17:1, a similar law regarding blemished sacrificial animals, evidences a single gloss—kǀl dƗbƗr rƗ‘, “any evil thing.”) In Deut 15:21, the first gloss was probably intended to function synecdochically, that is, to represent all blemishes; the second gloss seems to have been added later to make that function unambiguous. Blindness and lameness seem to be emblematic of physical imperfection in these texts; this suggests that the presence of synecdoches in 2 Sam 5:8b and Deut 23:2 is at least plausible, if not probable. In Lev 21:18, blind and lame priests stand at the head of the long list of physically imperfect functionaries; perhaps this suggests the importance of blindness and lameness as representative blemishes.26 In a word, though it is not possible to be certain that the conditions named in Deut 23:2 and 2 Sam 5:8b were intended to be understood synecdochically, it seems likely that they were. An alternative approach, producing no symmetry, is to assume that the defective persons of Deut 23:2 and 2 Sam 5:8b are somehow more threatening to the holiness of Yhwh and his sanctuary than are others with blemishes, and so are banned from the sanctuary by these texts while the others are not. Given the concern elsewhere that the bodies of priests and sacrificial animals be without defect, this explanation seems less likely than my proposal that we understand the defects mentioned in Deut 23:2 and 2 Sam 5:8b synecdochically. In their concern for physically perfect bodies, these two texts are comparable to Lev 21:17–23 regarding priests and to Lev 22:17–25; Deut 15:21; 17:1, and other texts regarding animals for sacrifice. If the defective persons mentioned in 2 Sam 5:8b and Deut 23:2 are understood as emblematic of all blemished persons, then these texts suggest that some circles in ancient Israel advocated a ban on worshipers with a variety ————— near the blind for sacrifice, is it not evil? And when you bring near the lame and the sick, is it not evil?” (Mal 1:6–8). 24 The meaning of the word gƗzûl is unclear. For the interpretation “mutilated,” cf. Mic 3:2, where the root gzl is used for the tearing off of skin. “Stolen” or “taken by violence” is another possibility; for this interpretation, see translations such as the RSV and the NRSV. 25 In Hebrew, wƟkî yihyeh bô mûm pissƝah̡ ’ô ‘iwwƝr kǀl mûm rƗ‘ lǀ’ tizbƗh̡ennû layhwh ’ƟlǀhêkƗ. 26 As David Konstan and William Gilders (in personal communications) have pointed out to me, the emblematic function of “blind and lame” may be due to the locus of each condition: blindness in the eyes at the top of the body, lameness in the feet at the bottom. In other words, “blind and lame” could be intended to be inclusive, covering all defective conditions of the body from top to bottom. Here one might compare our idiom “head to toe,” suggesting the whole. Such inclusive idioms are commonplace in Biblical Hebrew (“Dan to Beersheba,” “bond and free,” “native and resident alien,” “good and evil,” to name but a few).

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of physical defects, just as some circles prohibited the entry of mutilated and otherwise imperfect sacrificial animals into the cultic sphere, and at least one group (represented by H) restricted the cultic activities of blemished priests.27 Verse 8b of 2 Samuel 5 has proven to be a challenging text with important implications for our understanding of ideologies of cultic restriction and exclusion in ancient Israel. It may bear witness to an ideology in which blind and lame priests are either excluded entirely from the temple complex or banned from entering the temple building itself. In either case, the text would bear witness to an ideology in contrast with H’s position in Lev 21:17–23, which allows priests with blemishes to remain in the sanctuary sphere but not to officiate at the altar, bring near offerings to Yhwh, or approach the holy of holies. It is more likely, in my view, that 2 Sam 5:8b represents an ideology in which blind and lame worshipers are excluded from public worship, as men with damaged genitalia are excluded in Deut 23:2. It is possible that these exclusions ought to be understood in a narrow, literal sense: only the blind, the lame, and genitally mutilated males are excluded from the sphere of the sanctuary. It seems more likely, however, that the prohibited categories of persons ought to be understood in a broader, synecdochic sense: blind, lame, and genitally mutilated persons stand for all who have physical blemishes. The broader reading is appealing when one considers H’s long list of blemishes disqualifying sacrificial animals (Lev 22:22–24) and restricting the activities of priests (Lev 21:18–20), as well as the apparent synecdochic usages in Mal 1:8, 13 and Deut 15:21. At all events, 2 Sam 5:8b suggests that a ban on worshipers with at least some physical defects was in force in Jerusalem at some point in time.

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27 It is interesting to note that the deaf and dumb are not explicitly excluded from the sanctuary in any text, not even in those that list conditions affecting sacrificial animals (Lev 22:22–24) and priests (Lev 21:17–23). This is curious, and it must have an explanation. Perhaps deafness and dumbness were understood as conditions less readily visible in this culture than lameness and blindness were. Blindness can affect the eyes, causing the iris to become less distinct and to appear to blend with the eyeball. Therefore, it can be readily visible to the onlooker. Certainly, textual evidence suggests that all four of these conditions were viewed as limitations in Israelite culture (see Pss 35:5–6; 38:14). Later, a text from Qumran (1QSa 2:3–10) lists deafness and dumbness, along with blindness and lameness, as conditions warranting exclusion from the assembly.

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The Exegetical Dimensions of Restrictions on the Blind and the Lame in Texts from Qumran

Several Qumran texts exclude the blind, or the blind and the lame, from the vicinity of the deity or that of his angelic servants. In 11QTa 45:12–14, the blind may not enter the holy city.1 According to 1QSa 2:3–10, the blind and the lame, among others with bodily imperfections or impurities, may not present themselves in the congregation of the men of renown. In 1QM 7:4– 5, the blind and the lame, along with others having permanent blemishes or polluting conditions, are forbidden from participating in the eschatological war. Each of these proscriptions has its basis in particular biblical texts, yet each reflects exegetical reworking of those texts. Though the Qumran texts in question have on occasion been discussed as a group by some previous commentators, I do not believe that they have received a sufficiently thorough treatment with respect to their exegetical dimensions.2 It is my purpose, therefore, to examine each of these passages in turn in order to identify their biblical underpinnings, and the exegetical moves made by interpreters intent on recasting biblical texts to serve their own distinct purposes.3 —————

1 On the question of the Temple Scroll’s provenance there is no consensus. Some believe it is not a product of the Qumran community; others see it as a text produced by the sectarians. Compare, for example, the views of Yigael Yadin, The Temple Scroll (3 vols.; Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society/Hebrew University/ Shrine of the Book, 1983), 1:390–99, to those of Lawrence H. Schiffman, Sectarian Law in the Dead Sea Scrolls (BJS 33; Chico, Cal.: Scholars, 1983), 13–14 or Hartmut Stegemann, “The Origins of the Temple Scroll,” in Congress Volume: Jerusalem 1986 (ed. John A. Emerton; VTSup 40; Leiden: Brill, 1988), 235–56. For the purposes of this paper, 11QTa is a Qumran text in that it was part of the sectarian library, whether or not it is a sectarian product. 2 Among the commentators who have discussed these texts (or, some of them) in some depth, see, most recently, Aharon Shemesh, “‘The Holy Angels are in their Council’: The Exclusion of Deformed Persons from Holy Places in Qumranic and Rabbinic Literature,” DSD 4 (1997): 179– 206, who does not consider 11QTa 45:12–14. Among others, see especially Yadin, The Temple Scroll, 1:289–90 and 2:193; and Schiffman, The Eschatological Community of the Dead Sea Scrolls: A Study of the Rule of the Congregation (SBLMS 38; Atlanta: Scholars, 1989), 43–49; idem, “Exclusion from the Sanctuary and the City of the Sanctuary in the Temple Scroll,” HAR 9 (1985): 309–11. Many others have noted these texts as a group, but with only brief comment (e.g., Johann Maier, The Temple Scroll: An Introduction, Translation and Commentary [JSOTSup 34; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1985], 116). 3 I do not treat 4QMMT B 49–54 as a central text in this study, though it concerns the blind and the deaf. MMT B 49–54 expresses concern that the blind and the deaf cannot conform to purity stipulations because of their respective defects, and seeks to exclude them from t́ahărat

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11QTa 45:12–14 In 11QTa 45:12–14, the blind are excluded from the temple city forever, and their power to pollute Jerusalem is given as the reason for their exclusion: “Any blind persons shall not enter it (the city) all their days; they shall not pollute the city in the midst of which I dwell” (kôl ’îš ‘iwwƝr lô’ yƗbô’û lƗh kôl yƟmêhƝmmâ wƟlô’ yƟt́ammƟ’û ’et hƗ‘îr ’ăšer ’ănî šôkƝn bƟtôkƗh).4 This interesting formulation reflects the influence of 2 Sam 5:8b, Isa 52:1, and Num 5:3b read in tandem.5 It occurs in the context of a series of laws in column 45 of the Temple Scroll concerning various sources of pollution and ————— hammiqdƗš (literally, “the purity of the sanctuary”; Elisha Qimron and John Strugnell, eds., Qumran Cave 4.V: Miqs̞at Ma‘aĞe Ha-Torah [DJD 10; Oxford: Clarendon, 1994], 142, 160 understand this opaque expression to be a reference to holy food; for the vocalization t́ahărâ, see their discussion on 91). But this text, unlike the three of interest to me, does not formulate its position through the exegesis of scripture. I detect no allusion to or reworking of texts such as 2 Sam 5:8b (the idiom lǀ’ yƗbô’ ’el); Deut 23:2–9 (e.g., the idiom lǀ’ yƗbô’ biqhal yhwh); Lev 21:16–23 (e.g., the long list of blemishes and the language of mûm) or Num 5:3b (the idiom ’ăšer ’ănî šǀkƝn bƟtôkƗm). These biblical texts, in various combinations, form the basis for the exegetical activity evidenced in 11QTa 45:12–14; 1QSa 2:3–10; and 1QM 7:4–5. In contrast, MMT B 49– 54 uses non-biblical vocabulary (e.g., sômîm for the blind, instead of the biblical ‘iwwƝr; t́ahărat hammiqdƗš instead of qodƗšîm [on this last point, see Qimron and Strugnell, ibid., 138]). In addition, MMT B 49–54, in contrast to the three texts I shall discuss, does not appear to view the blemishes per se as profaning or polluting. For the text of MMT B 49–54 with reconstructions and commentary, see Qimron and Strugnell, ibid., 50, 52, 160–61. After formulating this argument, an anonymous reader directed me to Moshe J. Bernstein’s “The Employment and Interpretation of Scripture in 4QMMT: Preliminary Observations,” in Reading 4QMMT: New Perspectives on Qumran Law and History (ed. John Kampen and Moshe J. Bernstein; SBL Symposium Series; Atlanta: Scholars, 1996), 32, in which the author points out in passing that B 49–54 and 55–58 “show no signs of scriptural derivation …” 4 For the text, see Elisha Qimron, The Temple Scroll: A Critical Edition with Extensive Reconstructions (Judean Desert Series; Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society; Beer Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, 1996), 63. There are no significant variants of this law in the fragmentary manuscripts. I have translated kôl ’îš ‘iwwƝr as a plural to allow agreement with the plural verb forms and pronominal suffix that follow. The style (kôl + singular noun + plural verb) is characteristic of the author of the Temple Scroll, as Stephen A. Kaufman has pointed out, citing this verse as his primary example (“The Temple Scroll and Higher Criticism,” HUCA 53 [1982]: 35). 5 By contrast, Yadin argued that 11QTa 45:12–14 is an expansion of the restrictions on blemished priests found in Lev 21:16–23 (The Temple Scroll, 1:289–91). He has been followed by a number of subsequent commentators (e.g., Schiffman, “Exclusion from the Sanctuary,” 309; Jacob Milgrom, “The Qumran Cult: Its Exegetical Principles,” in Temple Scroll Studies [ed. George J. Brooke; JSPSup 7; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1989], 170–71) though not all (e.g., Qimron and Strugnell, Miqs̞at Ma‘aĞe Ha-Torah, 160–61). I find no clear allusion in 11QTa 45:12–14 to the distinct idiom and structure of Lev 21:16–23. Neither the language of mûm nor the listing of various blemishes, both characteristic of Lev 21:16–23, occur in 11QTa 45:12–14. By contrast, see below regarding 1QSa 2:3–10 and 1QM 7:4–5, where a cogent case can be made for the influence of Lev 21:16–23. Qimron’s and Strugnell’s suggestion that 11QTa 45:12–14 is derived from Deut 18:13 is equally unconvincing for the same reason (Miqs̞at Ma‘aĞe Ha-Torah, 160–61, n. 128).

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their cleansing requirements.6 Each of the laws in column 45 has a biblical basis,7 but each has been reformulated, the majority using the idiom lô’ yƗbô’ ’el, which was most likely derived from 2 Sam 5:8b (lǀ’ yƗbô’ ’el habbƗyit) and/or similarly formulated texts such as Ezek 44:9 (lǀ’ yƗbô’ ’el miqdƗšî).8 2 Sam 5:8b, which prohibits the blind and the lame from entering the sanctuary sphere, serves as a primary basis for the law in 11QTa 45:12–14.9 2 Sam 5:8b reads as follows: “Anyone blind or lame shall not enter the house” (‘iwwƝr ûpissƝah̡ lǀ’ yƗbô’ ’el habbƗyit). The verse in its own context presents various challenges to the interpreter, not the least of which are the identification of the blind and the lame (priests or common Israelites?) and the reason(s) for their exclusion. In its biblical setting, the adage of 2 Sam 5:8b very likely refers not to priests but to common Israelites.10 Though it is unclear why these blemished Israelites should be excluded from the temple, several possibilities are readily apparent. On the one hand, the saying may suggest that the blind and the lame are unclean, and therefore a threat to the sanctuary’s purity. On the other, it may suggest that though not unclean, the blemished condition of the blind and the lame has the power to profane the temple’s holiness. The law of 2 Sam 5:8b concerning the blind and the lame has been recast in 11QTa 45:12–14. First, the “house” or sanctuary has been replaced by the city.11 The scriptural basis for this is likely the much earlier expansion of the notion of sanctuary holiness to the whole city of Jerusalem as witnessed —————

6 See 11QTa 45:7–10 on nocturnal emissions (miqrƝh laylâ); 45:11–12 on emissions of semen through vaginal intercourse; 45:15–17 on the man purifying himself from a genital “flow” (zƗb); 45:17 on the person who has had contact with a corpse; 45:17–18 on the person afflicted with skin disease (s̞Ɨrûa‘). That the blind are listed among various other polluters ought to give pause to those who might argue that they are excluded from the temple city in 11QTa not because they are intrinsically polluting, but because they cannot distinguish unclean from clean, as in 4QMMT B 49–54. The placement of this law suggests otherwise. 7 11QTa 45:7–10 in Deut 23:10–12; 45:11–12 in Lev 15:16–18; 45:15–18 in Num 5:1–4. 8 E.g., 45:7–8: lô’ yƗbô’ ’el kôl hammiqdƗš; 45:10: wƟlô’ yƗbô’û … ’el miqdƗšî; 45:11: lǀ’ yƗbô’ ’el kôl ‘îr hammiqdƗš. 9 Others, such as Schiffman, have noted in passing the probability of the influence of 2 Sam 5:8b on the formulation of 11QTa 45:12–14, but without argument or detailed exploration, and—in the case of Schiffman—in the context of an argument that identifies another text (Lev 21:16–23) as the primary basis for 11QTa 45:12–14 (“Exclusion from the Sanctuary,” 310). Yadin mentions 2 Sam 5:8b in his treatment of 11QTa 45:12–14, but it is not at all clear why he cites it (The Temple Scroll, 1:290; the original Hebrew edition is equally unclear on this point). On 2 Sam 5:8b in its own context, see Saul M. Olyan, “‘Anyone Blind or Lame Shall Not Enter the House’: On the Interpretation of Second Samuel 5:8b,” CBQ 60 (1998): 218–27. 10 Olyan, “Anyone Blind,” 224 for argument on this point. 11 Other legal reformulations in column 45 may be characterized similarly, though there is no consistent pattern. See, e.g., 45:11, 13, 16, 17 and 18, all of which prohibit entry into the city for those who are polluted, but cf. 45:7, 10, which proscribe entry into the sanctuary for such persons.

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in Isa 52:1, a sixth century text that also concerns keeping polluters away from holy territory: “Awake, awake, dress with your strength, Zion! Wear your beautiful garments, Jerusalem, holy city! For the uncircumcised who are unclean (‘ƗrƝl wƟt́ƗmƝ’) shall not enter you again.”12 There have been two other significant changes besides the replacement of the sanctuary by the city: (1) the lame have been left out of the reformulation in 11QTa 45:12–14, for reasons that are opaque,13 and (2) the law in its reworked form clearly understands the blind to be common Israelites (as opposed to priests) and blindness to be a polluting condition, something that may be implied in 2 Sam 5:8b, but is nowhere suggested unambiguously there. This is a significant observation that has been missed for the most part by previous commentators, as I shall discuss. Finally, the idiom lǀ’ yƗbô’ ’el is not reproduced exactly. In 11QTa 45:13, we find the preposition lƟ used instead of ’el (lô’ yƗbô’ lƗh). The preposition and feminine suffix refer to the city from which the blind are excluded. A similar formulation is found also in 11QTa 45:17 and 18, each with reference to the city, as in 45:13. The idiom bô’ lƟ followed by a noun of place or pronoun replacing such a noun is in fact common in Qumran Hebrew.14 The influence of Num 5:3b is also evident in 11QTa 45:12–14. In Num 5:1–4, persons with skin disease (s̞Ɨrûa‘), persons with a sexual “flow” (zƗb) and persons unclean due to corpse contact (t́ƗmƝ’ lƗnƗpeš) are to be expelled from the camp. Num 5:3b states: “they shall not pollute their camps in the midst of which I dwell” (wƟlǀ’ yƟt́ammƟ’û ’et mah̡ănêhem ’ăšer ’ănî šǀkƝn bƟtôkƗm). This formulation, which does not occur elsewhere in the text of the Hebrew Bible, has clearly contributed to the shaping of the latter section of 11QTa 45:13–14, which reproduces it, mutatis mutandis: “They shall not pollute the city in the midst of which I dwell” —————

12 I understand ‘ƗrƝl wƟt́ƗmƝ’ as a hendiadys construction, rather than as a listing of two separate classes of excluded persons (“the uncircumcised and the unclean”). The singular verbal form suggests the hendiadys reading. Cf. NRSV, NJPS and others who read a double subject. On the extension of holiness to the whole of Jerusalem in Isa 52:1, see the comments of Yadin, The Temple Scroll, 1:291, and the earlier study of Menahem Haran, Between Ri’shonot (Former Prophecies) and Hadashot (New Prophecies): A Literary-Historical Study in the Group of Prophecies Isaiah XL–XLVIII (Jerusalem: Magness, 1963), 96–101 (Hebrew), brought to my attention by Yadin. 13 Yadin argued that the mention of the blind alone is not intended to circumscribe; rather, “the word ‘blind’ [is intended] as a general term for those with any sort of defect” (The Temple Scroll, 1:291). It is not clear to me that this is so in this context, and many other commentators have rejected Yadin’s reasoning on this point (e.g., Schiffman, “Exclusion from the Sanctuary,” 309– 10; idem, Eschatological Community, 48–49; Qimron and Strugnell, Miqs̞at Ma‘aĞe Ha-Torah, 161). 14 See, e.g., 1QM 7:3; 11QTa 47:6; 48:15 and the brief comments of Qimron, The Hebrew of the Dead Sea Scrolls (HSS 29; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986), 88 (par. 500.1) and Qimron and Strugnell, Miqs̞at Ma‘aĞe Ha-Torah, 88.

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(wƟlô’ yƟt́ammƟ’û ’et hƗ‘îr ’ăšer ’ănî šôkƝn bƟtôkƗh).15 Yet the subject of the prohibition has changed; the potentially polluting persons of Num 5:1–4 are now the blind, who nowhere in the biblical text clearly and unambiguously are said to possess the power to pollute. The incorporation of the rhetoric of Num 5:3b in 11QTa 45:12–14 underscores the association of the blind with pollution already suggested by the use of the Piel t́m’ with the blind as the subject and implied in the placement of this law among others concerned with well-established polluters such as the zƗb and the s̞Ɨrûa‘.16 It does so by alluding indirectly to well-established classes of polluters mentioned in Num 5:1–4. Thus, the allusion to Num 5:3b suggests to the reader that the blind are not unlike persons with skin disease, persons with a sexual flow, and persons unclean due to corpse contact (s̞Ɨrûa‘, zƗb, t́ƗmƝ’ lƗnƗpeš). The mention of the blind as polluters in 11QTa 45:12–14 may have biblical antecedents. Though blindness and other conditions cast as blemishes (mûmîm) in biblical texts may profane (h̡ll) holiness without polluting (t́m’), there is one exception and one possible exception to this generalization: Mal 1:7–8 and 2 Sam 5:8b. As I have noted, 2 Sam 5:8b does not explain why the blind and lame are prohibited from entering the temple, leaving open the possibility that their blindness and lameness is understood to be polluting by the circles responsible for this text. The alternative explanation for the exclusion of the blind and lame from the sanctuary in 2 Sam 5:8b is that blindness and lameness profane the sanctuary, and, therefore, those afflicted with these conditions are necessarily to be excluded. The former interpretation of 2 Sam 5:8b rather than the latter certainly seems to be in evidence in 11QTa 45:12–14, where the blind are cast as polluters. A more secure biblical example of blindness and other blemishes construed as polluting may be found in Mal 1:7–8, which concerns blemished sacrificial animals, described in v. 7 as leh̡em mƟgǀ’Ɨl, “polluted food.”17 It is doubtful whether this text had any influence on the formulation of 11QTa 45:12–14. It concerns animals rather than persons, and its distinct rhetoric is not evi-

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Others have noted the use of Num 5:3b in the formulation of 11QTa 45:13–14. See, e.g., Yadin, The Temple Scroll 1:290, 2:193. 16 See n. 6 for a complete list of the other polluters in 11QTa 45. The evidence of the placement of 11QTa 45:12–14 among laws exclusively concerned with polluted individuals and its use of Num 5:3b, indicate that the concern of the law in question is the polluting nature of blindness per se rather than a concern that the blind might pollute accidentally because they cannot see what they are doing. 17 The verb g’l is used as a synonym of the more common t́m’ beginning in texts of the sixth century BCE. See for example Lam 4:14–15; Neh 13:29–30 (in contrast with t́hr); and Dan 1:8 (with regard to unclean provisions at court). 15

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dent in 11QTa 45:12–14. Thus, the Temple Scroll’s notion that the blind are polluting is probably derived from a reading of the ambiguous 2 Sam 5:8b.18

1QSa 2:3–10 In 1QSa 2:3–10, the blind, the lame, and others with bodily defects, along with those burdened by a human uncleanness (t́im’ôt hƗ’Ɨdam), are not to enter the assembly of God because of the presence of the angels of holiness among the congregation: “And any man afflicted with one of the human uncleannesses shall not enter the assembly of God … And any (man) afflicted in his flesh, damaged of feet or hands, lame or blind, deaf or dumb, or afflicted in his flesh with a blemish … these shall not en[ter] to station themselves [in the] midst of the congregation of the m[e]n of renown, for the angels of holiness are in their [congre]gation” (wƟkôl ’îš mƟnuggƗ‘ bƟ’ah̡at mikkôl t́im’ôt hƗ’Ɨdam ’al yƗbô’ biqhal ’Ɲl … wƟkôl mƟnuggƗ‘ bibĞƗrô nƟkƝ’ raglayim ’ô yƗdayim pissƝah̡ ’ô ‘iwwƝr ’ô h̡ƝrƝš ’ô ’illƝm ’ô mûm mƟnuggƗ‘ bibĞƗrô … ’al yƗbô[’û] ’Ɲlleh lƟhityas̞s̞Ɲb [bƟ]tôk ‘ădat ’ă[n]ôšê haššƝm kî’ mal’ăkê qôdeš [ba‘ădƗ]tƗm).19 Like 11QTa 45:12–14, the wording of this passage suggests the influence of several biblical texts. —————

18 I cannot accept the view of Qimron and Strugnell, Miqs̞at Ma‘aĞe Ha-Torah, 160–61, followed by Shemesh, “‘The Holy Angels,’” 201 n. 60, that the verb t́m’ in 11QTa 45:13 means “profane” rather than “pollute.” These scholars appear to be bothered by the fact that no other Qumran materials ascribe the power to pollute to those with blemishes (as opposed to the ability to profane what is holy). This attempt to impose consistency regarding blemishes must be rejected out of hand, given the attested range of meaning of the verb t́m’ (“to pollute”; never “to profane”) and given that the Temple Scroll’s legal positions do not always conform to those of other Qumran texts (see, e.g., Stegemann, “The Origins of the Temple Scroll,” 239–40). 19 For the text without vocalization, see the edition of James H. Charlesworth and Loren Stuckenbruck in The Dead Sea Scrolls: Hebrew, Aramaic, and Greek Texts with English Translations. Volume 1: Rule of the Community and Related Documents (ed. James H. Charlesworth et al.; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr/Paul Siebeck; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1994), 114, 116. Like some others before me, I have emended ’lh to ’l. On this, see Dominique Barthélemy, “Règle de la Congregation (1QSa),” in Qumran Cave I (ed. Dominique Barthélemy and Józef T. Milik; DJD 1; Oxford: Clarendon, 1955), 110, 117; Eduard Lohse, Die Texte aus Qumran (3rd. ed.; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1971), 50 (note b) and others. See further the discussion of Schiffman, Eschatological Community, 37 and n. 5 on this and other possible readings. Schiffman himself reads without emending the text (“… into the congregation of these”), though I find this reading awkward. The expression qƟhal ’Ɲl, a more appealing reading, is also attested in 1QM 4:10, while Schiffman’s qƟhal ’Ɲlleh is not otherwise attested in Qumran material. Furthermore, the expression qƟhal ’Ɲl, as I shall argue and others have noted before me, is a reworking of the expression qƟhal yhwh in Deut 23:2–9. This expression appears as qƟhal hƗ’Ɵlǀhîm in Neh 13:1, itself a loose citation of Deut 23:4. An alternative solution is to assume that ’lh reflects Aramaic influence and need not be emended, as others have suggested. The -h of nk’h is superfluous, probably reflecting the influence of nƟkƝh raglƗyim in 2 Sam 4:4; 9:3. For the vocalization t́im’ôt, see Qimron, Hebrew of the Dead Sea Scrolls, 17.

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Deut 23:2–9 (esp. v. 2) has been read in tandem with Lev 21:16–23 and possibly Num 5:3b or Deut 23:15 to produce the text of 1QSa 2:3–10. The influence of Deut 23:2–9 is apparent from the formulations ’al yƗbô’ biqhal ’Ɲl and ’al yƗbô[’û] … [bƟ]tôk ‘ădat ’ă[n]ôšê haššƝm, which are reworkings of the distinct idiom of Deut 23:2–9 (a combination of the prohibition lǀ’ yƗbô’, the preposition bƟ, and qƟhal yhwh: lǀ’ yƗbô’ … biqhal yhwh).20 In 1QSa 2:3–10, the “assembly of Yhwh” of Deut 23:2–9 is identified with the assembly or congregation of the community, called variously qƟhal ’Ɲl, hƗ‘Ɲdâ or ‘ădat ’ănôšê haššƝm. The influence of Deut 23:2–9 on 1QSa 2:3– 10 is probably to be explained by the exclusion of men with genital defects from the assembly of Yhwh in Deut 23:2. Exclusion on the basis of genital defects in Deut 23:2 is here expanded to various blemishes, in addition to sources of pollution. The influence of Lev 21:16–23 is suggested by the list of forbidden persons with damaged bodies in 1QSa 2:5–6.21 The language of mûm, the mention of the blind, the lame and persons with damaged feet and damaged hands are found in both formulations.22 Furthermore, Lev 21:16– 23 is virtually the only close parallel in the biblical text to this list of blemished persons.23 Yet Lev 21:16–23 concerns restrictions on priests with damaged bodies: they cannot bring near Yhwh’s offerings, though they may remain in the sanctuary sphere and may continue to eat holy foods. By contrast, 1QSa 2:3–10 concerns all men—not simply priests—who are afflicted with a physical blemish, and these are completely excluded from the congregation of the men of renown. Apparently, those responsible for the formulation of 1QSa 2:3–10 used Deut 23:2 and its rhetoric as a basis for their formulation, and brought Lev 21:16–23 to bear on it in order to provide a range of excluded blemishes not unlike that listed in Lev 21:16–23.24 —————

20 2 Sam 5:8b, though it has the prohibition formula lǀ’ yƗbô’, lacks preposition bƟ and qƟhal yhwh. Thus, I do not see it as an influence on the formulations in 1QSa 2:3–10, which retain the preposition and transform qƟhal yhwh into qƟhal ’Ɲl and ‘ădat ’ănôšê haššƝm. Cf. Schiffman, Eschatological Community, 44, who states that 2 Sam 5:8b must have been a major influence on 1QSa 2:3–10, but without argument. Barthélemy notes in passing the derivation of the expression qƟhal ’Ɲl from qƟhal yhwh of Deut 23:2–9 (“Règle de la Congregation,” 117). 21 The influence of Lev 21:16–23 on 1QSa 2:3–10 has been asserted by others. See, e.g., Schiffman, Eschatological Community, 43. 22 However the language concerning hands and feet differs somewhat: Where Lev 21:19 refers to ’îš ’ăšer yihyeh bô šeber rƗgel ’ô šeber yƗd, 1QSa 2:5–6 uses the idiom nƟkƝ’ raglayim ’ô yƗdayim. On this point, see Schiffman’s interesting discussion (Eschatological Community, 43– 44). 23 The only exception is the similar list in Lev 22:18–25, which concerns sacrificial animals with blemishes, not humans. 24 It is curious that the particular genital defects mentioned in Deut 23:2 are not specified in 1QSa 2:5–6, though it seems that 1QSa 2:5–6 includes all blemishes, given general expressions such as wƟkôl mƟnuggƗ‘ bibĞarô and ’ô mûm mƟnuggƗ‘ bibĞarô.

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The possible influence of Num 5:3b or Deut 23:15 on 1QSa 2:3–10 may be discerned in the justification given in 1QSa 2:8–9 for why the polluters and those with damaged bodies may not enter the assembly of God: “For the angels of holiness are [in] their [congre]gation” (kî’ mal’ăkê qôdeš [ba‘ădƗt]Ɨm ). Num 5:3b offers a similar reason for the expulsion of polluting individuals from Yhwh’s camp: “They shall not pollute their camps in the midst of which I dwell” (wƟlǀ’ yƟt́ammƟ’û ’et mah̡ănêhem ’ăšer ’ănî šǀkƝn bƟtôkƗm). Deut 23:15 is not unlike Num 5:3b in that it justifies the removal from the camp of a man polluted by a seminal emission: “For Yhwh your god walks in the midst of your camp … Your camp shall be holy … ” (kî yhwh ’ƟlǀhêkƗ mithallƝk bƟqereb mah̡ănêkƗ … wƟhƗyâ mah̡ănêkƗ qƗdôš). Neither the distinct rhetoric of Num 5:3b nor that of Deut 23:15 is evident in 1QSa 2:8–9, nor does 1Sa 2:8–9 use Yhwh’s presence as justification for the exclusion of those who are blemished. But both biblical texts concern the removal of polluted individuals from the camp, not unlike the exclusion of polluted and blemished persons from the congregation in 1QSa 2:3–4, and all three texts justify their exclusion by reference to the presence of holy beings (either Yhwh himself or his angels). Therefore, though it is difficult to make a strong case for the influence of one or the other biblical text on the shaping of the Qumran text, such influence is certainly a possibility.25

1QM 7:4–5 In 1QM 7:4–5, the blind and the lame, among others with permanent blemishes, are forbidden to participate with the sons of light in the eschatological war. The text states that all participants shall be unblemished with respect to flesh and spirit (tƟmîmê rûah̡ ûbƗĞƗr). Here, in contrast to 11QTa 45:12–14 and much like 1QSa 2:3–10, blindness and lameness are not equated with uncleanness, though the unclean are mentioned as an excluded category separate from those with permanent blemishes: “And anyone who is lame or blind, or limping or a man who has a permanent blemish in his flesh or a man afflicted with an uncleanness of his flesh—all these shall not —————

25 4Q266 8 i 6–9 (4QDa), a fragmentary text related to col. 15 of CD, contains a formulation much like that of 1QSa 2:3–10 in some of its details. After listing physically defective persons (including the blind, lame and deaf) and other unqualified individuals (e.g., the insane), the text states that “none of these shall enter into the midst of the congregation, for the angels of holiness …” (’a[l yƗbô] ’îš [m]Ɲ’Ɲlleh ’el tôk hƗ‘Ɲdâ kî mal’ăk[ê] haqqôde[š] …). The final line of this fragment is much like lines 8–9 of 1QSa 2, but without 1QSa 2’s elaboration. For the text of 4Q266 8 i 6–9, see Joseph N. Baumgarten, Qumran Cave 4. XIII: The Damascus Document (4Q266–273) (DJD 18; Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), 63.

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go with them to the battle” (wƟkôl pissƝah̡ ’ô ‘iwwƝr ’ô h̡iggƝr ’ô ’îš ’ăšer mûm ‘ôlƗm bibĞƗrô ’ô ’îš mƟnuggƗ‘ bƟt́im’at bƟĞƗrô kôl ’Ɲlleh lô’ yƝlƟkû ’ittƗm lammilh̡Ɨmâ).26 The unfitness of the blemished, including the blind and the lame, for service in the war camp is probably derived from a combination of biblical texts, as we have seen in the two previous cases. Lev 21:16–23, which forbids blemished priests from assuming elite priestly duties, appears to be the model for the list of excluded individuals.27 This is indicated by the similar construction of each list: … wƟkôl pissƝah̡ ’ô ‘iwwƝr ’ô h̡iggƝr ’ô ’îš ’ăšer mûm ‘ôlƗm bibĞƗrô (1QM 7:4); … ’îš ‘iwwƝr ’ô pissƝah̡ ’ô h̡Ɨrum ’ô ĞƗrûa‘ (Lev 21:18).28 Lev 21:16–23 also appears to be the source for the language of mûm present in 1QM 7:4. In Lev 21:16– 23, blemished priests cannot approach the altar to bring near Yhwh’s offerings, but they may remain in the sanctuary nonetheless and they may eat holy foods. 1QM 7:4–5 recasts this priestly proscription, applying it to all soldiers in the eschatological war, excluding all persons with permanent blemishes without exception from the war camp. The circle that produced this text likely found support for the total exclusion of all permanently blemished persons in Deut 23:2 and/or 2 Sam 5:8b, texts which exclude certain blemished persons without exception from the assembly or the sanctuary sphere. Each of these texts can be read to apply to a broad cross section of the population, not simply priests; each speaks of total exclusion of the blemished persons in question rather than simply a limitation of their activities, as in Lev 21:16–23. It is difficult to demonstrate dependence on these texts convincingly, however, because there are no obvious or apparent allusions to Deut 23:2 or 2 Sam 5:8b in 1QM 7:4–5. In contrast to 11QTa 45:12–14 and 1QSa 2:3–10, the expression lǀ’ yƗbô’ of Deut 23:2–9 and 2 Sam 5:8b is absent from 1QM 7:4–5. Here, the idioms lô’ yƝlƟkû ’ittƗm lammilh̡Ɨmâ and lǀ’ yƝrƝd ’ittƗm are used instead, and these have no biblical basis. Though 1QM 7:4–5 does not state explicitly why the permanently blemished and the unclean must be excluded from the eschatological war camp, 7:6–7, reworking Deut 23:10–15, suggests that men unclean due to a seminal emission are excluded because of the presence of the holy angels with the armies (kî’ mal’ăkê qôdeš ‘im s̞ib’ôtƗm). Presumably, the same explanation applies to the blind, the lame, and others with permanent ble—————

26 For the text without vocalization, see Jean Duhaime’s edition in The Dead Sea Scrolls: Hebrew, Aramaic, and Greek Texts with English Translations. Volume 2: Damascus Document, War Scroll, and Related Documents (ed. James H. Charlesworth et al.; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr/Paul Siebeck; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1995), 110. There are no significant variants for this law. For the vocalization t́im’â, see Qimron, Hebrew of the Dead Sea Scrolls, 17. 27 Others have made this claim. See, e.g., Yadin, The Temple Scroll 1:290. 28 The notion of a permanent blemish (mûm ‘ôlƗm), explicit in 1QM 7:4, is not mentioned directly in Lev 21:16–23.

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mishes, all of whom had already been mentioned as excluded from the war camp in 7:4–5.29

Conclusion Texts from the Qumran library are well known for their interesting exegetical content. Biblical legal and narrative materials were routinely recast in light of beliefs, practices and expectations of the circles that produced this reworked biblical literature. 11QTa 45:12–14, 1QSa 2:3–10, and 1QM 7:4–5 all concern the blind, or the blind and the lame, and proscribe their entry into the vicinity of the deity or the angelic host. The biblical sources for these proscriptive texts are discernible through a careful examination of the content and rhetoric evidenced in each. Once relevant biblical texts are ascertained, the interpreter may identify and explain the exegetical moves in each text that have made possible the particular recasting of scripture. In contrast to the treatment of the blind and lame in 1QSa 2:3–10 and 1QM 7:4–5, 11QTa 45:12–14 understands the blind as potential polluters of Jerusalem who must be excluded from the holy city. This formulation draws on the rhetoric and/or content of several biblical texts (2 Sam 5:8b; Isa 52:1; Num 5:3b). The casting of blindness as a polluting condition is very likely grounded in a reading of 2 Sam 5:8b, the basis for 11QTa 45:12– 14 as a whole. 2 Sam 5:8b never makes clear why the blind and lame may not enter the sanctuary, nor does it indicate whether the blind and lame are priests or common Israelites. The Temple Scroll formulation addresses these ambiguities in the biblical text. It understands the blind and the lame of 2 Sam 5:8b to refer to all persons (as opposed to priests only), and constructs their condition as polluting, making clear and explicit what is at best only a possible implication of the text of 2 Sam 5:8b itself. Though the blind and lame of 1QSa 2:3–10 are not cast as polluters, their blemish results in their exclusion from the congregation of the men of renown along ————— 29

See, similarly, the argument of Shemesh, “The Holy Angels,” 195 n. 38. The influence of Deut 23:10–15 on 1QM 7:6–7 is evident both in the construction of the war camp as an area to be guarded from defilement (cf. Num 5:1–4) and in the justification for the exclusion of unfit persons which refers to the presence of divine figures. Deut 23:10–12 excludes men defiled by a seminal emission from the camp, and vv. 13–14 require the placement of latrines outside the camp. Deut 23:15 justifies the removal of the man defiled by a seminal emission from the camp and the location of latrines outside of the camp by stating that the camp shall be holy because Yhwh walks there. The justification implies that the presence of a man defiled by a seminal emission or a latrine in the camp would defile the camp’s holiness. 1QM 7:6 is similar. It recasts Deut 23:10–15 for the context of the eschatological war, excluding men defiled by an emission of semen from the armies because of the presence of the holy angels and establishing the locus of latrines 2,000 cubits from the camp.

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with those who are unclean. The basis for this exclusion appears to be Deut 23:2 read in tandem with Lev 21:16–23 and possibly Num 5:3b or Deut 23:15. Deut 23:2 excludes the genitally blemished from the assembly of Yhwh. 1QSa 2:3–10 expands this proscription to all who are blemished, drawing upon the rhetoric of Lev 21:16–23 to do so. Its justification for the exclusion—that the holy angels are present in the congregation—is possibly derived from either Num 5:3b or Deut 23:15, which both mention polluted persons excluded from the camp due to the presence of Yhwh. 1QM 7:4–5, not unlike 1QSa 2:3–10, excludes the blind and the lame, along with other permanently blemished persons and also polluted persons, from the eschatological war camp. Lev 21:16–23 is a central source for this War Scroll formulation, though it is difficult to determine exactly which other biblical texts contributed to it, since no allusions are evident in its rhetoric. Nonetheless, Deut 23:2 and 2 Sam 5:8b are the likeliest candidates, given that both can be read to advocate a generalized exclusion of certain blemished persons from the assembly or sanctuary, not unlike 1QM 7:4–5, and quite in contrast to Lev 21:16–23. The casting of blindness as a polluting condition and the treatment of blindness and lameness as non-polluting, but nonetheless generally disqualifying, conditions requires comment. The contrast between the treatment of blindness in 11QTa 45:12–14 and blindness and lameness in 1QSa 2:3–10 and 1QM 7:4–5 is striking because it points to differences in the purity ideologies of the communities that produced the texts in question. The group responsible for 11QTa had a different notion of what pollutes than did the group(s) that produced 1QSa and 1QM. Where 11QTa 45:12–14 appears to understand 2 Sam 5:8b to suggest that blindness is polluting, at minimum an unusual viewpoint, 1QSa and 1QM stand more squarely within the majority biblical purity tradition in understanding blindness and lameness to be profaning rather than polluting. Nonetheless, both the perspective of 11QTa and that of 1QSa and 1QM go well beyond the restrictions on the blind and the lame found in biblical texts such as Lev 21:16–23 and 2 Sam 5:8b. Where Lev 21:16–23 restricts the cultic activities of blemished priests without removing them from the sanctuary sphere and contact with the holy, 1QSa 2:3–10 reworks Lev 21:16–23 in its exclusion of all blemished persons from the congregation of the men of renown. Where 2 Sam 5:8b prohibits the entry of the blind and lame into the sanctuary, 11QTa 45:12–14 proscribes their entry into the entire city of Jerusalem.30 This tendency to elaborate upon biblical exclu—————

30 Here I agree with Yadin (The Temple Scroll, 1:279–81) that the expression ‘îr hammiqdƗš refers to the city of Jerusalem. For an alternative viewpoint, that the expression refers to the temple

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sions and restrictions, increasing their range and severity, may be observed in a variety of texts among the Dead Sea Scrolls. The resident outsider (gƝr) is among those excluded from the temple according to 4QFlor 1:4, in contrast to biblical texts which place no such restriction on him.31 Thus, 4QFlor expands the list of excluded categories of persons found in such biblical texts as Deut 23:2–9. Deut 23:11–12 judges the man who has had a nocturnal emission to be polluted one day, and requires him to leave the camp until he is clean and bathe at the coming of evening before he reenters the camp. By contrast, 11QTa 45:7–8, recasting this passage, increases to three days the duration of impurity. In order to reenter the sanctuary sphere32, the man must not only bathe on the first and third days of his pollution, but also launder his clothes on those days.33 Thus, the relatively severe treatment of the blind or the blind and the lame in texts such as 11QTa, 1QSa and 1QM is not unlike the treatment of other individuals who are to be excluded from community and cult according to these texts and others from Qumran.

————— complex, see Baruch A. Levine, “The Temple Scroll: Aspects of its Historical Provenance and Literary Character,” BASOR 232 (1978): 14–15. 31 Though there has been some disagreement about the reading wgr in 4QFlor, it seems to be correct. See further Joseph M. Baumgarten, “The Exclusion of ‘Netinim’ and Proselytes in 4Q Florilegium,” Rev Q 8 (1972): 87–96 and George J. Brooke, Exegesis at Qumran: 4Q Florilegium in its Jewish Context (JSOTSup 29; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1985), 101–103. 32 The sanctuary (miqdƗš) replaces the camp of Deut 23:11–12 in 11QTa 45. 33 The influence of texts such as Num 19:12, 19 (the double purification) and Lev 15:13 (bathing and laundering) on the reformulation of Deut 23:11–12 in 11QTa 45:7–8 seems evident.

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The Ascription of Physical Disability as a Stigmatizing Strategy in Biblical Iconic Polemics*

As will be obvious to any reader of the Hebrew Bible, biblical polemics against iconic cult employ a variety of stigmatizing strategies.1 “Idols”2 are condemned as powerless, material in nature, manufactured, and lifeless; they are called abominations, despicable things, even dung balls; they are associated with foreignness, falseness, illegitimate profanation and pollution (both “moral” and “ritual”). Though a number of these strategies of vilification have been explored in some depth by scholars (e.g., the emphasis on the material and manufactured nature of icons), specialists have not investigated the attribution of physical disability to icons as a means to devalue them.3 It is my purpose in this paper to do just that. I shall consider ————— *

I would like to express my gratitude to members of Brown University’s Culture and Religion of the Ancient Mediterranean Seminar; to participants in the seminar series “Violence des dieux— Violence de Dieu” at the Université de Lausanne, especially Thomas Römer and Christophe Nihan; to faculty members and students at the Universität Zürich, especially Konrad Schmid and Christoph Uehlinger; and to participants in the session “Iconism, Aniconism and Iconoclasm in Retrospect and Prospect,” EABS meetings, Lisbon, 2008 for their critical responses to this article in its penultimate form. I especially wish to thank Nathaniel B. Levtow of the University of Montana for his careful reading and critical feedback on an earlier draft of this article. Any errors of fact and judgment, however, remain my responsibility alone. 1 I want to emphasize from the outset that such polemics are selective rather than general. Icons such as the cherubim of the Jerusalem temple, icons that biblical writers approve of, are never denigrated or attacked, yet they possess physical characteristics not unlike those of the stigmatized icons (e.g., the cherubs are made of wood, and plated with gold [1 Kgs 7:23, 28]; alternatively, they are made of solid gold [Exod 25:18; 37:7]). Favored icons are also thought to possess animation and abilities that stigmatized icons are denied by biblical polemics (e.g., the cherubs fly [Ezek 10:5; Ps 18:11], manipulate items with their hands [Ezek 10:7], and stand on guard at the entry to Eden [Gen 3:24]). On the selective nature of biblical iconic polemic, see further Saul M. Olyan, Asherah and the Cult of Yahweh in Israel (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 73, n. 10 and recently, Nathaniel B. Levtow, Images of Others: Iconic Politics in Ancient Israel (Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2008), 12, n. 27. I would like to thank Jordan Rosenblum for reminding me of the assumed abilities of favored icons (oral communication). 2 As “idol” is a derogatory term in English, I place it within quotation marks. 3 I use the term “disability” rather than “inability” purposefully. Several scholars have questioned my choice of “disability,” since they presume that from the polemicists’ perspective, the “idols” are not living beings, and could therefore not possess ability in the first place. As disability implies potential ability, why not speak of “inability” instead? It is true that disability suggests potential ability and therefore, an animate nature. Yet implicit in the polemic is a Judean audience which understands the “idols” to be animated and powerful, and must be convinced of their powerlessness and non-living status. If this were not the case, why make the argument in the

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the ascription of physical disability to icons as one of a number of stigmatizing strategies attested in biblical “idol” polemics, exploring how it is utilized by polemicists to denigrate iconic worship, and why. I am particularly interested in what the attribution of physical disability contributes to iconic polemic that might be lacking in other strategies of disparagement.4 Ascribing physical disability to “idols” is one of a number of strategies deployed by biblical writers to deride iconic worship.5 These stigmatizing strategies can be broken down into three types: (1) strategies that attribute to the icon characteristics generally understood to be undesirable; (2) strategies that bring into relief the manufactured and/or material nature of icons; and (3) the strategy of vilification through the use of denigrating epithets. I shall discuss each type of attack strategy before I attempt to determine where the ascription of physical disability fits among them. (Here I am theorizing the stigmatizing strategies as a whole.) A number of texts ascribe to icons characteristics considered generally objectionable by the writers of biblical texts. An addition to Jer 8:19 associates “idols” with foreignness, a stigmatizing trait according to many cir————— first place, and in such a vociferous way? By ascribing disabilities to “idols,” the polemicists challenge their audience’s assumptions regarding the abilities of “idols” presumed by the audience to be living. Thus, I refer to the physical disabilities ascribed to icons in these polemical texts, because the polemic’s audience understands the “idols” to have the abilities that the polemic seeks to deny them. This assumption is buttressed by the observation that biblical texts represent sanctioned icons such as the cherubs of the Jerusalem temple as animate and able, suggesting that such a notion is not at all foreign to Judean authors and their audiences (see previously, n. 1). Finally, the same vocabulary of disability used of human beings is sometimes used of the “idols,” suggesting the appropriateness of speaking of “disability” rather than “inability” with respect to icons (e.g., ’Ɵlîlîm ’illƟmîm, “mute idols,” Hab 2:18). On the assumption that the Judean audience could have understood the Babylonian “idols” to be animate and powerful, and even victorious over Yhwh, see the comments of Levtow, Images of Others, 70, 83. That the audience for the polemic must have been Judean, see ibid., 34, 80, 170. Scholars who have explored the polemical emphasis on the material and manufactured nature of “idols” include Michael B. Dick, “Prophetic Parodies of Making the Cult Image,” in Born in Heaven, Made on Earth: The Making of the Cult Image in the Ancient Near East (ed. Michael B. Dick; Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 1999), 1–53, esp. 34–44; and Angelika Berlejung, Die Theologie der Bilder: Herstellung und Einweihung von Kultbildern in Mesopotamien und die alttestamentliche Bilderpolemik (Freiburg: Universitätsverlag; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998), esp. 357–411, and idem, “Ikonophobie oder Ikonolatrie. Zur Auseinandersetzung um die Bilder im Alten Testament,” in Religionsgeschichte Israels. Formale und materiale Aspekte (eds. Bernd Janowski and Matthias Köckert; Gütersloh: Chr. Kaiser, 1999), 221, 228–32. 4 It is worth noting that mental disability is never attributed to “idols” by biblical polemic. This is interesting given that the ascription of blindness and deafness to “idols” is intended to suggest ignorance, and mental disability may also have this association in some West Asian texts (e.g., Prov 14:15; 22:3; Babylonian kudurru inscriptions [Leonard W. King, ed., Babylonian BoundaryStones and Memorial-Tablets in the British Museum (London: British Museum, 1912), iii 5 41–42; iv 3 6; v 3 10–12; vi 2 34; etc.]). 5 The following biblical texts ascribe physical disabilities to “idols”: Deut 4:28; Isa 46:7; Jer 10:5; Hab 2:18; Ps 115:5–7.

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cles that produced biblical texts, including the Deuteronomists who were very likely responsible for this gloss: “Why do they provoke me with their idols,” // “with their alien empty things (bƟhablê nƝkƗr)?” To this one might compare other texts of a similar Deuteronomistic provenance that speak pejoratively of things alien, including “alien gods” (’Ɵlǀhê nƝkƗr, e.g., Jer 5:19 and Deut 31:16; see also Jer 2:21; 19:4).6 Another undesirable trait ascribed to “idols” is the power to pollute. This is commonplace throughout the book of Ezekiel.7 Ezek 36:25 serves to illustrate the polluting nature of “idols”: “I shall toss upon you purifying waters and you shall be purified of all your pollution and from all your ‘idols’ (gillûlîm) I shall purify you.” Here, the imagery of purification rites from the universe of “ritual” impurity is utilized to suggest the possibility of the removal of “moral” impurity— pollution that results from sin—caused by the worship of divine images understood to be offensive to Yhwh.8 Other undesirable characteristics attributed to icons include “emptiness” (hebel) (Jer 10:15 [cf. 2:5, 10:3]); “falseness” (šeqer) (Jer 10:14 [= 51:17]; Hab 2:18); “mockery” (Jer 10:15); a lack of profit (lǀ’ yô‘îlû) (Isa 44:9, 10; Hab 2:18 [cf. Jer 2:8, 11 regarding other gods in general]) and, in Ezekiel, the power to profane Yhwh’s holy name (Ezek 20:39).9 Icons are also associated with shame (Jer 10:14), lifelessness (Jer 10:14, “there is no spirit in them”), and a lack of agency, including the inability to save (Isa 46:7; Jer 10:5) or create (Jer 10:11). Emphasizing the material and/or manufactured nature of “idols” is a second, and exceedingly common, way in which iconic worship is devalued —————

6 On the stigmatization of select foreign groups in Deuteronomy, see, e.g., 7:1–6; 12:1–3; 23:4–9. On biblical representations of the alien and things alien, see Saul M. Olyan, Rites and Rank: Hierarchy in Biblical Representations of Cult (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 63–102, 150–69. 7 See Ezek 20:7, 18; 22:3, 4; 23:30; 36:18, 25; 37:23. 8 Lev 19:31, a text of the “Holiness Code,” a collection that shares affinities with Ezekiel, is similar in its suggestion that turning to necromancers and mediums causes one to become “morally” polluted. Lev 19:4, which forbids turning to “idols,” is stylistically similar to 19:31, but does not suggest directly that such worship is polluting. On “moral” impurity and “idol” worship, see Jonathan Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 26–31; and “Idolatry, Incest, and Impurity: Moral Defilement in Ancient Judaism,” JSJ 29 (1998): 392–401. For examples of the combination of elements from the discourses of “moral” and “ritual” impurity, see Olyan, “Purity Ideology in Ezra-Nehemiah as a Tool to Reconstitute the Community,” JSJ 35 (2004):1–16. Berlejung has emphasized the “ritual” pollution suggested by the term gillûlîm—which likely means “dung balls”—in light of the emphasis on the importance of the “ritual” purity of icons in Mesopotamian sources. (Dung is “ritually” polluting in Ezekiel and several other biblical texts [Deut 23:13–15; Ezek 4:12–15; Zech 3:3–5].) On this, see Berlejung Theologie der Bilder, 350–51, 405, 418, and idem, “Ikonophobie oder Ikonolatrie,” 227. 9 On profanation of Yhwh’s name in the Holiness Source and Ezekiel, see, e.g., Lev 18:21; 19:12; 20:3; 21:6; 22:2, 32; Ezek 20:39; 36:20, 21, 22, 23. For other kinds of illegitimate profanation in H, see Lev 19:7; 21:9, 12, 15, 23; 22:9, 15. Illegitimate profanation is a serious offense in H and Ezekiel.

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in biblical polemics. This approach differs from the first strategy discussed in that to be material or manufactured in nature is not intrinsically objectionable in the biblical context, though it is thought to be so in the particular case of icons representing disapproved deities. In other words, for an item to be made of gold or of stone is not in itself stigmatizing, as many texts show; in contrast, items that are characterized as shameful, false, empty, polluting, or foreign (in a xenophobic cultural setting), qualities that are always objectionable, are stigmatized as a result. “Idols,” in contrast to Yhwh, are manufactured: they are made by human agents from materials such as stone, wood, and/or precious metals. Ps 115:4 mentions precious metals and human manufacture in its critique of icons: “Their idols are silver and gold,” // “the work of the hands of a craftsman.”10 2 Kgs 19:18 pairs human manufacture with wood and stone materials: “For they are not gods, but the work of the hands of a craftsman, wood and stone …”11 Many other texts adopt this approach to the disparagement of icons. Isa 40:18–20 condemns the “idol” as something manufactured by craftsmen of wood and precious metals. Jer 10:3–4 emphasizes human production of icons with attention to the materials out of which they are made (wood and precious metals); 10:9 mentions precious metals, skilled human craftsmen, and the icon’s fancy clothing. The focus of Isa 44:12–17 is mainly on the role of craftsmen in the manufacturing process (see also 2 Chr 32:19). In many of these examples, the manufactured and material nature of icons is compared unfavorably to Yhwh’s nature, either directly or implicitly. Where Yhwh creates humanity, the “idols” are themselves human creations.12 A third strategy utilized to deride icons is to speak of them using insulting epithets. Biblical texts routinely refer to “idols” as gillûlîm, likely “dung balls,”13 as in 1 Kgs 15:12 and Ezek 36:25; ’Ɵlîlîm, “worthless things,”14 as in Lev 19:4; 26:1; and Isa 2:8; hăbƗlîm, “empty things,” as in Jer 8:19; 10:8; šiqqûs̞îm, “despicable things,” as in Deut 29:16 and Jer 7:30; and

————— 10

Ps 135:15 is identical. Moshe Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School (1972; Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 1992), 324, 367, lists Deuteronomic and Hoseanic texts that speak of “idols” as human products. My thanks to Nathaniel Levtow for this reference. 12 My thanks to Nathaniel Levtow for helping me to sharpen this point (oral communication). 13 On the probable connection of gillûlîm and dung, see the discussion of H. D. Preuss, ʭʩʬʥʬʢ, TDOT 3:2. On dung as a source of “ritual” impurity, see the discussion in n. 8. Berlejung and others have emphasized the association of the gillûlîm and “ritual” pollution, referring to the gillûlîm as “personifizierte Unreinheit” (“personified uncleanness”; e.g., Berlejung, Theologie der Bilder, 314, n. 1516; 405). 14 Cf. Ps 96:5//1 Chr 16:26 regarding the gods of the peoples, and Job 13:4; Jer 14:14, where ’Ɵlîl // šeqer, “falseness.” 11

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tô‘Ɲbôt, “abominations,” as in Deut 27:15; and Isa 44:19.15 A number of these terms are used of gods other than Yhwh as well as divine images (e.g., šiqqûs̞, used of Kemosh of Moab in MT 1 Kgs 11:7, and tô‘Ɲbâ, used of Milkom of Ammon in 2 Kgs 23:13). Sometimes, two such terms are paired, producing a doubly denigrating combination epithet, e.g., gillûlê tô‘ăbôtayik, “your dung ball abominations” (Ezek 16:36). Such name calling with the intent to vilify might be compared to the biblical practice of referring to the Philistines as “the(se) uncircumcised” (‘ărƝlîm), a stigmatizing nickname common in 1 Samuel and other texts (e.g., Judg 15:18; 1 Sam 14:6).16 In each case, an insulting epithet is substituted for a proper noun (e.g., Philistine) or a common noun (e.g., tƟmûnâ, “likeness”) which is not in itself denigrating.17 Where does the attribution of physical disability fit among the three types of stigmatizing strategy? Like foreignness, falseness, or the power to pollute “morally,” physical disability is a characteristic understood by the text to be generally objectionable, and therefore stigmatizing. Physical disabilities such as blindness, lameness, deafness, and muteness are frequently denigrated in biblical and cognate literatures. The blind, lame, deaf and mute are often associated with devalued qualities such as weakness, dependency, helplessness, ineffectuality and ignorance (e.g., Isa 6:9–10; 56:10; Ps 38:14–15); with divine curse, rejection and punishment (e.g., Deut 28:28–29); and with social marginality (e.g., Deut 23:2; 2 Sam 5:8b; Isa 29:17–21). Some biblical writers imagine a utopian future in which disability is eliminated by Yhwh, suggesting its undesirability (Isa 29:17– 21). Many texts associate disabled persons with other devalued and marginalized social groups (e.g., the poor and the afflicted, as in Job 29:15–16), and one text implicitly compares disabled persons to an arid desert (Isa 35:4–10). Even passages that appear to challenge the stigmatization of persons with physical disabilities by suggesting that they are of special interest to the deity or the powerful nevertheless function to reinforce their

—————

15 I contrast the apparent epithet hăbƗlîm, “empty things,” (e.g., Jer 8:19; 10:8) with the use of singular hebel, “emptiness,” in a verse such as Jer 10:15 (“They are emptiness, works of mockery”). 16 On the stigmatizing of the foreskin in biblical texts, see, e.g., Olyan, Rites and Rank, 64–68. 17 Though Yhwh is said to have no “likeness” (tƟmûnâ) according to Deut 4:12, and Israelites are forbidden to make a cultic “likeness” of Yhwh according to texts such as Exod 20:4/Deut 5:8; and Deut 4:23, 25, other biblical texts speak naturally and without disapprobation of Yhwh’s “likeness” (Num 12:8; Ps 17:15), suggesting that the word in itself is not pejorative in biblical usage.

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stigma by affirming their vulnerability and dependence (e.g., Ps 146:5–9; Job 29:12–16).18 In a number of anti-iconic texts, “idols” are denigrated for their inability to see, hear, speak, feel with their hands, smell, and/or move independently. Psalm 115 lists the disabilities of “idols” as part of its argument that these gods are inferior to Yhwh, who resides in the heavens, and can do anything he wishes (v. 3): They have mouths, but cannot speak; they have eyes, but cannot see; they have ears, but cannot hear; they have noses, but cannot smell; they have hands, but cannot feel; they have feet, but cannot walk; nor can they utter a sound in their throats.19 (vv. 5–7)

Though “idols” possess the anthropomorphic form typical of many a divine being in ancient West Asia, their sensory organs (mouth, eyes, ears, nose, hands) do not function, and they lack the ability to move independently. Jer 10:5 compares icons to a scarecrow in a cucumber patch, that which has an anthropomorphic appearance, but is artificial: “They cannot speak, they must be carried for they cannot walk. Do not reverence them, for they can do no harm. Nor is it in their power to do good.” The text implies that a real god, in contrast, can speak and move independently, can act (doing harm or good), and is therefore worthy of reverence. Because of their disabilities, “idols” cannot act or communicate, and are therefore undeserving of worship. Several other texts attribute disabilities to icons. Hab 2:18 speaks of “mute idols” (’Ɵlîlîm ’illƟmîm) in the context of a critique suggesting that divine images do not profit because they are manufactured. As in Ps 115:5 and Jer 10:5, the fact that icons are unable to communicate is brought into relief. Isa 46:7 highlights the dependence of the “idol” on human worshipers to move it around, not unlike Jer 10:5 and Ps 115:7, as well as the fact that it is incapable of answering or saving. Finally, Deut 4:28 lists the disabilities of “idols” in a manner comparable to Ps 115:5–7, with the intent of suggesting their inability to act as well as their lifelessness. To the usual —————

18 On the stigmatizing of physical disability, see further my study Disability in the Hebrew Bible: Interpreting Mental and Physical Differences (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 19 Ps 135:16–17 contains identical material regarding the mouth, eyes, and ears of “idols”; the statement in Ps 115:6 regarding their noses (’ap lƗhem wƟlǀ’ yƟrîh̡ûn) has apparently been transformed in Ps 135:17 into another remark on their mouths: “Indeed, there is no breath in their mouths” (’ap ’ên [yƝš] rûah̡ bƟpîhem, with ’ap, “nose,” misconstrued at some point as ’ap, “indeed”). The statements in Ps 115:7 regarding the hands, feet, and throat of the “idols” are missing in Ps 135:16–17.

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disabilities (e.g., blindness, deafness) it adds the inability to eat and to smell. These incapacities suggest a lack of animation, since living beings, including deities, are thought to eat food and possess the ability to smell and enjoy aromatics such as incense. Other polemical texts speak directly of the lifelessness of “idols” (e.g., Jer 10:14, lǀ’ rûah̡ bƗm; Hab 2:19, kol rûah̡ ’ên bƟqirbô). Claims of lifelessness, the inability to eat, and the inability to smell, are likely a direct response to Mesopotamian iconic animation rites and ideology, as several scholars have suggested.20 After all, these rites mention specifically the capacity of the animated image to eat food, drink water, and smell incense, behaviors that constitute its divinity.21 Texts that disparage iconic worship by attributing physical disabilities to icons tend to combine this strategy with others that I have reviewed; interestingly, devaluing “idols” through the ascription of disabilities alone is never attested. Thus, Psalm 115 attacks icons by highlighting their material and manufactured nature (“their ‘idols’ are silver and gold,” // “the work of the hands of a craftsman”) and by attributing physical disabilities such as blindness, deafness, and lameness to them. Deut 4:28 is similar, stigmatizing “idols” by emphasizing the fact that they are made by human hands, the materials out of which they are made (wood and stone), and their disabilities (they are “gods … that cannot see, cannot hear, cannot eat, and cannot smell”). Hab 2:18 speaks of their lack of profit, the fact that they are made of cast metal, that they are false teachers, and that they are characterized by a physical disability (muteness). Isa 46:5–7 vilifies icons by focusing on their material and manufactured nature, their inability to move independently, and their inability to answer or to save. Finally, Jer 10:1–16 combines a great number of stigmatizing strategies in its polemic: “idols” are manufac————— 20

See Dick, “Prophetic Parodies,” 42, who states that polemical arguments “against the crafting of the divine statue probably refer[] to the ceremony by which the statue was enlivened, the Babylonian mƯs pî ritual.” Dick makes this statement in the context of a discussion of the “profane construction materials” out of which the “idol” is made; he does not refer directly to eating and smelling. See also Christopher Walker and Dick, “The Induction of the Cult Image in Ancient Mesopotamia: The Mesopotamian MƯs Pî Ritual,” in Dick, Born in Heaven, Made on Earth, 114, who note generally a connection between the claims of Psalm 135 and Jer 10:5, on the one hand, and mƯs pî animation claims, on the other. Berlejung, Theologie der Bilder, 412–13 claims in passing that biblical anti-iconic polemic makes explicit reference to the mƯs pî/pƯt pî rites, but does not provide particular examples. In contrast, Levtow is of the opinion that the writers of the “idol” polemics do not allude directly to mƯs pî rites per se, which were secret, but nonetheless allude to the animation ideology and its claims (Levtow, Images of Others, 57, 90 n. 8, 129). On Mesopotamian iconic animation rites in general, see especially Walker and Dick, The Induction of the Cult Image in Ancient Mesopotamia: The Mesopotamian MƯs Pî Ritual (State Archives of Assyria Literary Texts 1; Helsinki: University of Helsinki Press, 2001); their lengthy essay of the same title in Dick, ed., Born in Heaven, Made on Earth, 55–121; and Berlejung, ibid., 178–283. 21 E.g., MƯs Pî Incantation 3:36–37, 70ab–71ab; 4:19(A)ab, 48ab (Walker and Dick, The Induction of the Cult Image, 134, 141, 149, 151, 163, 166–67, 184, 185).

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tured, made of silver and gold, empty, cannot do harm or good, did not create the heavens and earth, cause shame, are false, are lifeless, and are characterized by physical disabilities. To be sure, a multi-pronged attack strategy probably has more potential for success than does a strategy that focuses on one or two perceived deficiencies, and this may explain the frequent recourse of biblical polemical texts to strategic combinations, including those that incorporate the ascription of physical disabilities to icons. Yet one should also note that many examples of anti-iconic polemic are extant that do not make use of the ascription of physical disabilities as a way to denigrate “idols.” Among these are the curse in Deut 27:15, which speaks of the “idol” as an abomination and as the work of the hands of a craftsman; Isa 40:18–20 and 2 Kgs 19:18, which attack the icon by pointing to its material and manufactured nature; and Deut 29:16, which combines name calling (“despicable things,” “dung balls”) with an emphasis on the material nature of icons (wood and stone, silver and gold).22 Though stigmatizing by attributing physical disabilities is not uncommon in biblical “idol” polemics, the strategy is frequently not attested. Furthermore, as a way to attack icons, the ascription of physical disabilities occurs less frequently than do other stigmatizing strategies, such as emphasizing the material and/or manufactured nature of “idols,” or calling them insulting names. Which disabilities are the focus of iconic polemic? Interestingly, the disability that occurs most frequently in biblical attacks on “idols” is the inability to speak or answer queries. This particular deficiency is mentioned in four of the five polemical texts that make use of the ascription of physical disability as a way to denigrate icons, suggesting the central importance of communication with worshipers as a characteristic of the divine (Isa 46:7; Jer 10:5; Hab 2:18; Ps 115:5; the exception is Deut 4:28). An inability to answer queries or make intentions known suggests, according to these texts, that the “idol” is not a god.23 Contrast Yhwh, who “tells his thoughts to humanity” (Amos 4:13), routinely communicating with his worshipers by means of oracles delivered through prophets, priests, diviners, and others, in a fashion typical of ancient West Asian deities.24 A lack of independent ambulation is a second theme present in a number of anti-iconic polemics (Isa 46:7; Jer 10:5; and Ps 115:7). Texts emphasize the need to carry the “idol” from place to place as an example of its inferiority and non-divine status (e.g., Jer 10:5: “It must be carried for it cannot walk”). In contrast, a ————— 22

Interestingly, the fact that icons are manufactured is not highlighted in this particular text. Similarly, a lack of divine response to the entreaties of Baal’s votaries is construed in 1 Kings 18 as indicative of the non-existence of Baal. 24 Oracular functions, denied to “idols” by biblical polemicists, are indeed a component of mƯs pî rites, as others have pointed out. 23

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true god such as Yhwh moves freely and independently, treading on his foes.25 A third theme, sensory deficits such as an inability to see or hear, are mentioned in two texts (Deut 4:28; Ps 115:5–6). Seeing and hearing, tied frequently to knowledge in biblical discourse, are often mentioned as characteristics of deity. To lack the ability to see and hear suggests a lack of knowledge, wisdom, and understanding, much in contrast to Yhwh.26 In addition to these deficits, an inability to eat, smell, or feel with the hands is mentioned in Deut 4:28 and Ps 115:6–7. I have already discussed eating and smelling as emblematic of living beings, whether divine or non-divine; the ability to feel is probably to be understood similarly. Why incorporate physical disabilities into polemics against icons? Casting “idols” as blind, deaf, mute, and lame functions to deny them knowledge, independent agency, and the ability to communicate. If they cannot know as a result of their blindness and deafness, they are ignorant, and therefore hardly divine; if they cannot communicate because they are mute, they cannot be deities, because deities speak to their worshipers (typically through oracles); and if they cannot move independently and act decisively, they cannot possibly save or be responsible for creation, in contrast to a “real” divine being. The inability of “idols” to eat, smell, or feel with their hands suggests that they lack animation: they cannot be alive, in contrast to “the living god,” Yhwh (Jer 10:10). The ascription of blindness and lameness in particular to “idols” also has other negative resonances worthy of our attention. Unlike deafness and muteness, blindness and lameness are constructed as “defects” (mûmîm) in various biblical sources.27 “Defective” priests, including priests who are blind or lame, may not offer sacrifices according to Lev 21:17–23; “defective” sacrificial animals are generally excluded from the cult, said to be rejected by Yhwh, and, in one text, labeled “abominations” (Lev 22:18–25; Deut 15:21; 17:1).28 Blind and lame worshipers are likely proscribed from entering the sanctuary sphere according to the saying in 2 Sam 5:8b (“Anyone blind or lame shall not enter the house”). Similarly, male worshipers with genital damage (another class of “defect”) are banned from “the as—————

25 E.g., Isa 14:25; 63:3, 6; Amos 4:13; Ps 60:14; Job 9:8; Lam 1:15. The inability to move freely suggests indirectly the inability to fight wars and win victories over enemies. Dick notes that mƯs pî texts “stress the statue’s ability to ‘walk’!” (Dick, “Prophetic Parodies,” 19 n. g). 26 For the connection of seeing and hearing with knowledge and understanding, as well as the association of blindness and deafness with ignorance, see, e.g., Isa 6:9–10; 56:10; Ps 38:14. Knowledge and understanding are frequently credited to the deity, as in Jer 10:7, 12, 14, even familiarity with the innermost thoughts of human beings (e.g., 1 Kgs 8:39; Ps 139:1–6, 23). 27 On “defects,” see my treatment in Disability in the Hebrew Bible, 26–46, 140–48. 28 Where Lev 22:23 allows for the sacrifice of certain “defective” animals as free-will offerings, Deut 17:1 makes no exceptions. The rhetoric of abomination is found in Deut 17:1, but not in Lev 22:18–25 or Deut 15:19–23.

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sembly of Yhwh” (qƟhal yhwh)—likely a reference to the sanctuary sphere—according to Deut 23:2.29 The ascription of “defects” such as blindness and lameness to “idols” in biblical iconic polemic is striking given Yhwh’s rejection of that which is “defective” according to a number of biblical texts. Where the allegedly authentic god is portrayed as wanting no part of these “defects,” whether they be in sacrificial animals, in priests, or—according to several texts—in worshipers, the bodies of the allegedly false gods are themselves characterized by these very conditions according to biblical polemic! By casting the disapproved icons as “defective,” the biblical polemicists find yet another way to ascribe stigma to “idols,” and suggest their illegitimacy in a cultic setting, for the very qualities that the “true” god rejects characterize the “false” gods. This move is not unlike ascribing “ritual” pollution to the “idols” by calling them “dung balls,” for in this case too, a quality incompatible with divinity and the cult is said to characterize the “idols” themselves.30 Each of the physical disabilities ascribed to “idols” functions to deny them divine status or cultic legitimacy, often in ways that differ from other stigmatizing strategies, sometimes in ways that resemble them. To say that such icons are manufactured, to emphasize their material nature, or to call them abominations or dung balls does not address directly—or at all in the case of the insulting epithets—their presumed sensory deficits, inability to communicate, lack of independent movement and action, and non-living status, as the ascription of physical disabilities does. What might be implied by underscoring the manufactured nature of “idols” or the materials out of which they are produced is made explicit through the attribution of physical disabilities to them. Biblical polemicists who underscore the manufactured or material nature of icons argue implicitly that a manufactured wooden object cannot speak; to say explicitly that it cannot makes the point directly and unambiguously, as in Hab 2:18, which speaks of “mute idols” (’Ɵlîlîm ’illƟmîm). Thus, to emphasize the disabilities of “idols” helps to make explicit what may be lacking or only implicit in other strategies of disparagement, thereby enriching and buttressing anti-iconic polemics. Furthermore, to attribute dysfunction to icons, as the ascription of physical disabilities —————

29 For this interpretation of 2 Sam 5:8b, see Olyan, Disability in the Hebrew Bible, 142–43 n. 7, with citations. For “the assembly of Yhwh” in Deut 23:2 as a reference to the sanctuary sphere, see the text’s earliest interpreters (Lam 1:10; Isa 56:3–5; Ezek 44:7, 9) and the discussion in ibid., 141–42 n. 5. In contrast to 2 Sam 5:8b and Deut 23:2, Priestly and Holiness texts do not speak of any exclusion of “defective” worshipers from the sanctuary. Note that Lev 21:17–23 allows defective priests to remain in the sanctuary and continue to have access to the holy foods, suggesting no general incompatibility with holiness. 30 As mentioned, Berlejung, among others, has underscored the association of the gillûlîm and “ritual” impurity. On this, see nn. 8 and 13.

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does, points to their inferiority in a way that differs from other approaches to their denigration. Dysfunction is not a theme in discourses that emphasize the material and manufactured nature of “idols,” or that vilify them through name-calling. Yet to ascribe dysfunction to icons is an effective way to attack them and contrast them with Yhwh. In fact, stigmatizing rival gods through the employment of metaphors of dysfunction is not unknown outside of iconic polemics, as Jer 2:13 demonstrates. Though Jer 2:13 does not mention icons or their alleged disabilities, it compares the other gods, described as “shattered cisterns that hold no water,” to Yhwh, “the fount of living waters.”31 Finally, as mentioned, ascribing “defects” such as blindness and lameness to “idols” functions in a manner comparable to the ascription of “ritual” impurity to them. In each case, the cultic illegitimacy of disapproved icons is brought into relief, and the icons are stigmatized as a result. Some of the rhetoric of the iconic polemics enjoys a range of usage larger than the polemics themselves. Specifically, several of the sensory disabilities attributed to “idols” are also ascribed to a disobedient Israel in a strikingly similar fashion. An example of this is Jer 5:21, where a “foolish people without sense” is said to “have eyes but cannot see,” // “ears but cannot hear.” This is the rhetoric of Ps 115:5–6 word for word, and is very close to that of Ps 135:16–17, but Jer 5:21 does not include the other disabilities listed in Ps 115:5–6 (muteness, an inability to smell, feel with the hands, or walk) or in Ps 135:16–17 (muteness, lack of animation).32 The focus of Jer 5:21 is exclusively two specific sensory disabilities—blindness and deafness—which are commonly associated with ignorance and transgression in biblical literature (e.g., Isa 6:9–10; 42:18–19).33 Contrast “idol” polemics such as Psalms 115, 135 or Jer 10:5, which not only attribute ignorance to icons by ascribing sensory disabilities to them, but also deny them independent agency, the ability to communicate, and status as living beings. As Nathaniel Levtow argues in his recent monograph Images of Others, the central goal of the biblical “idol” polemics is to deny power to Babylonian deities and icons.34 This is not a concern of texts seeking to —————

31 It is possible that Jer 2:13 alludes to the making of icons when it states that Yhwh’s people abandoned him “to hew out for themselves cisterns,” though this remains unclear. My preference is to understand Jer 2:13 as a text independent of the “idol” polemics that also makes use of the ascription of dysfunction to denigrate other gods. 32 The statement regarding the ears varies slightly in most manuscripts of Ps 135:17 (’oznayim lƗhem wƟlǀ’ ya’ăzînû). Cf. Ps 115:6 and Jer 5:21: ’oznayim lƗhem wƟlǀ’ yišmƗ‘û. 33 Ezek 12:2 displays a similar rhetoric and comparable focus. Here, the disobedient people are said to “have eyes to see but they do not see, ears to hear, but they do not hear, for they are a house of rebellion” (‘ênayim lƗhem lir’ôt wƟlǀ’ rƗ’û ’oznayim lƗhem lišmǀa‘ wƟlǀ’ šƗmƝ‘û kî bêt mƟrî hƝm). 34 Levtow, Images of Others, 31–35 and passim.

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censure the people of Israel, for they do not compete with Yhwh for power. In the case of the people, it is their disobedience that is of concern, and this disobedience is attributed to their ignorance, communicated through the ascription of blindness and deafness to them. Thus, the sensory disabilities, which are associated with a lack of knowledge and understanding, are attributed to the people in a text such as Jer 5:21, while other physical disabilities, which relate to issues of communication, independent agency or status as animate beings, are not. The rhetoric of the “idol” polemics finds a larger usage in Jer 5:21 probably on account of the author’s perception of a common ignorance shared by both the disobedient people and the “false” gods. The use of the rhetoric of sensory deficit in a text such as Jer 5:21 may also be intended to allude to the “idol” polemics themselves, suggesting that the people’s disobedience has to do specifically with the worship of other gods.35 Before concluding, I would like to comment briefly on the various rhetorical structures utilized to ascribe disability in the texts under consideration. As the passages I have reviewed and others make clear, disabilities such as blindness, deafness, and muteness might be ascribed to persons or to “idols” in one of several ways: with an adjective such as “blind,” “deaf,” or “mute”; by a non-adjectival construction such as “they have eyes, but cannot see,” // “ears, but cannot hear”; or by a combination of both of these approaches, as in Ps 38:14: “As for me, I was like a deaf person who could not hear,” // “And like a mute person who could not open his mouth.” Though “idol” polemics tend to be characterized by non-adjectival constructions such as “they have mouths, but cannot speak” (Ps 115:5), they sometimes evidence the use adjectives instead, as in Hab 2:18, where the disapproved icons are referred to as “mute idols” (’Ɵlîlîm ’illƟmîm). The use of both adjectives and non-adjectival constructions to ascribe disability to “idols” as well as persons suggests that they are interchangeable: each establishes disability as an attribute in its own way. Ascribing physical disabilities to “idols” is one example of their stigmatization through the attribution of characteristics generally understood to be undesirable in the biblical context (e.g., foreign status, emptiness, falseness, the ability to pollute “morally”). That the physical disabilities of “idols” come to be a focus of iconic polemic is no surprise, given the denigration of such disabilities in biblical and other West Asian literatures, as demonstrated by their frequent association with divine curse, punishment, and rejec—————

35 Here I assume that Jer 5:21 is derived from a text such as Psalm 115. The notion that Jer 5:21 alludes to “idol” polemics is buttressed by Jer 5:22, which states that the people do not reverence Yhwh, though he is responsible for creation. The statements about creation recall hymnic praise of Yhwh typical of the “idol” polemics (e.g., Ps 135:7; Jer 10:10, 12–13, 16).

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tion, as well as weakness, dependence, ignorance, and social marginality.36 The attribution of physical disability to cultic icons opposed by the biblical writers is a strategy of disparagement used in combination with other approaches to the denigration of “idols”; it never occurs alone in biblical texts. Nor is it among the most common ways in which iconic cult is attacked and derided. When it is deployed, the ascription of physical disabilities to “idols” is evidently intended to suggest several deficiencies, most of which share dysfunction in common: a dearth of independent movement and agency, a deficit of knowledge and understanding, inability to communicate with worshipers, a lack of animation, and cultic illegitimacy. These shortcomings are typically marshaled as evidence that the “idols” are not gods and should not receive cultic devotion from worshipers. Other stigmatizing strategies evidenced in biblical “idol” polemics may not suggest these deficiencies at all, may suggest them only implicitly, or may suggest them directly and explicitly, depending on the deficit in question. At all events, the ascription of physical disabilities to “idols” in biblical polemic is an effective polemical tool used strategically by our authors to denigrate and devalue iconic cult of which they disapprove.

————— 36

On this, see my earlier discussion, and n. 18.

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Section 4: Holiness, Purity, and the Alien

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Introduction

Since the late nineties, I have had an abiding interest in the ideologies of purity and holiness represented in the biblical anthology, as well as in biblical notions of that which is understood to be foreign. The potential of ideas about pollution, sanctity and alienage to generate ritual and social distinctions has been of particular fascination to me. This engagement is reflected in Rites and Rank, in which I explore the classificatory operations of a number of emic binary oppositions, including holy/common, unclean/clean, and alien/native, in ritual contexts such as the temple cult. Because purity and holiness ideologies are enmeshed by definition and often shape biblical responses to the foreigner, I treat the themes of holiness, purity and the alien together in this section of the book. All three themes are at issue in the first two papers in this section. In the third essay, I seek to theorize the relationship of holiness to beauty and wholeness. “Purity Ideology in Ezra-Nehemiah as a Tool to Reconstitute the Community” (2004) considers the ways in which intermarriage is stigmatized and foreigners are excluded from the community in Ezra-Nehemiah through the deployment of novel exegetical strategies, particularly with respect to holiness and purity. I maintain, against Christine Hayes and Jonathan Klawans, that so-called ritual impurity does indeed play a role in shaping the anti-alien polemics of Ezra-Nehemiah, in addition to “moral” impurity (the pollution caused by sin). Furthermore, I argue that a variety of purity ideologies are represented by the various hypothetical sources of EzraNehemiah, not simply one ideology as many assume. From my perspective, Neh 13:4–9 is likely the earliest biblical text to bear witness to the alien cast as a “ritual” polluter whose presence in the temple, along with that of his belongings, mandates expulsion and cleansing rites in order to restore purity. In “‘Sie sollen nicht in die Gemeinde des Herrn kommen’: Aspekte gesellschaftlicher Inklusion und Exklusion in Dtn 23,4–9 und seine frühen Auslegungen,” published here for the first time, I analyze the laws of alien exclusion in Deut 23:4–9 in their original, late monarchic setting and explore their early exegesis in the sixth and fifth centuries (including in EzraNehemiah). This essay is the annotated version of a lecture delivered in Münster in May 2010, and includes a discussion of implicit and explicit uses of the holy/common and unclean/clean dyads by early interpreters of

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Deut 23:4–9 in order to differentiate foreigners from Israel and exclude them from the sanctuary or the city of Jerusalem. An example of such exegesis is found in Ezek 44:7, which focuses specifically on the uncircumcised male alien, associating his presence in the temple with illegitimate profanation of holiness in order to exclude him from the cult. As was the case with Qumran reworkings of biblical materials concerning blind and lame persons, the early exegesis of Deut 23:4–9 (including Neh 13:1–3) tends on the whole to broaden the text’s proscriptions and in some instances, to associate the alien with impurity. The study ends with some brief reflections on the employment of social theory in biblical research. The third and final essay included in this section is entitled “Mary Douglas’s Holiness/Wholeness Paradigm: Its Potential for Insight and its Limitations” (2008). This study examines the opposition holy/common and the distinctions it generates from yet another angle: theoretical considerations. I investigate how that which is constructed as holy relates to that which is understood to be physically whole. In so doing, I revisit, critique and reformulate Mary Douglas’s theory of a relationship between holiness and wholeness first set out in her influential study “The Abominations of Leviticus” (Purity and Danger [London: Ark Paperbacks, 1984], 41–57). A link between wholeness and holiness is certainly evidenced in biblical texts, even if not to the degree and with the consistency Douglas asserted. Elaborating upon and modifying Douglas, I argue that wholeness is emblematic not only of holiness, as Douglas argued, but also of beauty. Therefore, the relationship of holiness to wholeness must be re-theorized, taking the larger significance of wholeness into account. In any case, the association of wholeness with holiness and with beauty contributes to their privileging in biblical ideologies.

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Purity Ideology in Ezra-Nehemiah as a Tool to Reconstitute the Community

Among biblical texts, Ezra-Nehemiah lends itself especially well to an analysis that recognizes the socially constructed nature of ideas of “Self” and “Other,” and the malleability of the boundaries that separate groups.1 This is so on account of that work’s overriding concern for self-definition and its establishment of a novel set of group boundaries distinguishing Judeans from others. Among the most significant tools used by the text to reconfigure the Judean community is an innovative and distinct purity ideology that draws upon a variety of precedents in what we might call the purity tradition. It is my purpose in this paper to identify the unique aspects of Ezra-Nehemiah’s purity ideology as well as its precedents, and explore the important role it plays in the reconstitution of the Israelite community as it is represented in the text. I will examine the rhetoric of purity and pollution in Ezra-Nehemiah from two distinct points of vantage: that of the work in its final form, and that of the text from the perspective of its hypothetical sources. By doing so, I hope to shed some light both on the ideology as articulated in the final form of the text and on possible patterns of its development over time. In addition, I respond here to the treatments of purity and impurity in Ezra-Nehemiah by Jonathan Klawans and Christine Hayes, which in my view do not account adequately for the evidence in the text.2 As has long been noted, one of Ezra-Nehemiah’s most striking characteristics is its narrative descriptions of expulsions from cult and community of a group of persons of unparalleled size and range who are classed by the ————— 1

Both self-definition and its counterpart, the constitution of the “Other,” are unending, interconnected “projects” that all groups pursue continuously. On this, see Jonathan Z. Smith, “What a Difference a Difference Makes,” in “To See Ourselves as Others See Us”: Christians, Jews, “Others” in Late Antiquity (ed. Ernest S. Frerichs and Jacob Neusner; Chico, Cal.: Scholars Press, 1985), 46, 48. (“Project” is Smith’s term.) Contemporary examples of change in the constitution of “Self” and “Other” include the following: Who is a Jew after Reform Judaism’s change of definition through the embrace of patrilineality as a consideration? Who is a German after the various legal reforms of the recent past? One might also note how American citizenship has changed over the last two centuries (e.g., though the child of an American mother and a foreign father born abroad could not legally claim American citizenship in the nineteenth century, such is certainly not the case today). 2 Jonathan Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) and Christine E. Hayes, Gentile Impurities and Jewish Identities: Intermarriage and Conversion from the Bible to the Talmud (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

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text as aliens. These include Yhwh-worshiping male foreigners, women of foreign origin who are married to Judean males, and the children these wives have borne to their Judean husbands.3 The removal of all persons classified as aliens from the midst of Israel is justified through a variety of strategies, all of which draw in an innovative way on precedents in the biblical text, some from the rhetoric and ideology of the purity tradition. First, expansive and creative exegesis of earlier texts such as Lev 18:24–30, Deut 23:4–9, and Deut 7:1–6 plays a central role in the exclusionist program, as others have noted.4 Interpreters, presumably from the circles ultimately responsible for Ezra-Nehemiah,5 combined several originally unrelated biblical texts characterized by negative views of foreigners, their behavior or intermarriage between foreigners and Israelites. Each text was then read with reference to the others, the passages thereby generating an expansive exegesis that could be marshaled to buttress the removal of all aliens without exception from the Judean community, as Ezra 9:10–12 and Neh 13:1–3 show.6 A second strategy used by the text to exclude those —————

3 Before Ezra-Nehemiah, these children would have been classified as Judeans on account of their paternity. On this, see texts such as Gen 46:20; Exod 2:21 (cf. Judg 18:30); 2 Sam 3:3; Ruth 4:17; 1 Chr 7:14 and Saul M. Olyan, Rites and Rank: Hierarchy in Biblical Representations of Cult (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 85–87. In contrast, the child of a foreign father and an Israelite mother is classed as an alien in Lev 24:10–16, 23. 4 See especially Michael Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985), 114–29. 5 It is possible, and therefore worth noting, that some of these exegetical moves might have antedated the activity of groups responsible for the sources of Ezra-Nehemiah and for the work in its final form. 6 Ezra 9:10–12 is the best illustration of this strategy: “Now then, what shall we say O our God, after this, for we have forsaken your commandments which you commanded through your servants the prophets as follows: ‘The land which you are about to enter to inherit is a land of defilement (’eres̞ niddâ) because of the defilement (niddâ) of the peoples of the lands (and) because of their abominations which have filled it from end to end with their uncleanness (t́um’â). Now then, your daughters you shall not give to their sons, and their daughters you shall not take for your sons; you shall not seek their welfare or their good ever, in order that you be strong and eat the good things of the land, and you give (it) to your children as an inheritance forever.’” As Fishbane has pointed out, Ezra's prayer combines materials from Lev 18:26–30; Deut 7:3–4; and Deut 23:4–9. The interdiction on intermarriage with the Canaanite nations in Deut 7:3 is reworked here as a proscription of intermarriage without reference to the nationality of the alien spouse in question. Ezra 9 justifies the strict proscription on all intermarriages through allusion to Lev 18:26–30, which associates defiling abominations with the Canaanites, and through quotation from Deut 23:7, which commands Israelites not to seek the welfare of the Moabite and the Ammonite, who are banned from the assembly of Yhwh, whatever that might mean. In Ezra 9:11, the defiling abominations of the Canaanites in Lev 18:26–30 have become characteristic of aliens generally, and are a justification for avoiding intermarriage under all circumstances. In 9:12, the command of Deut 23:7 (“You shall not seek their welfare ever …”), uttered with respect specifically to Ammonite and Moabite males, has been recast to apply to all aliens in question. Similar exegetical moves are evident in Neh 13:1–3, where the permanent exclusion of Ammonites and Moabites in Deut 23:4–

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constructed as alien is attested in Ezra 9:2, 4 and several other passages. These evidence the application of the concept of illegitimate profanation of a holy item to intermarriages between Judeans and foreign women. Israel, cast as “holy seed” (zera‘ haqqǀdeš), is illicitly desacralized through such marriages to aliens, which are in fact labeled “sacrilege” (ma‘al) in the text at several junctures.7 Finally, a powerful and novel purity and pollution discourse explicitly informs several of the narratives that describe and justify the forced removal of persons classed as alien from temple and assembly. Drawing in an innovative manner upon earlier notions of what a number of scholars have called “ritual” and “moral” impurity,8 Ezra-Nehemiah associates those it classifies as foreigners with pollution in three different ways. First, as in the Holiness Source, Deuteronomistic materials and other texts, alleged acts associated with aliens (e.g., “idolatry”, sexual offenses or other “moral” violations) as practiced by aliens themselves and the Judeans associated with them threaten the purity of the land and even Israel’s continued existence in a text such as Ezra 9:1–2, 10–12, 14.9 Second, according to Neh 13:28–30, marriage with alien women pollutes the Judean priestly ————— 7 is cited but interpreted broadly to refer apparently to all who are classed as aliens, including the offspring of mixed marriages (kol ‘Ɲreb). 7 See Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB 3; New York: Doubleday, 1991), 359–61, who is followed by Hayes (“Intermarriage and Impurity in Ancient Jewish Sources,” HTR 92 [1999]: 9–13 and Gentile Impurities, 29–30). Hayes, like Milgrom, has emphasized the importance of this discourse of illegitimate profanation in Ezra 9 and elsewhere as a strategy to counter intermarriage. Indicators of such a profanation discourse include some combination of the following technical terms: ma‘al (“sacrilege”), forms of the verb h̡ll (“to profane”) in combination with derivatives of the root qdš (“to be holy”), ’ašmâ (“guilt”), ’ƗšƗm (“reparation offering”). Other texts in which ma‘al (“sacrilege”) is used to describe the intermarriages in question include Ezra 10:2, 6, 10; Neh 13:27, as well as Ezra 9:4. The rhetoric of Israel as a “holy seed” in Ezra 9:2 is not otherwise repeated in the text of EzraNehemiah. Previously, I had understood Ezra 9:2 to imply that intermarriage with aliens pollutes the lineage, as it does with the priesthood in Neh 13:28–30, but I now believe that the issue in Ezra 9:2 is illegitimate desacralization, not pollution. For my previous view, see Rites and Rank, 83. 8 On the notion of two different and distinct kinds of impurity, one the result of an immoral act and the other the result of contact with a defiling substance, person or thing, see the comments of Baruch A. Levine, Numbers 1–20: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB 4; New York: Doubleday, 1993), 192, among other scholars. Klawans, building on the work of Levine and others, has presented an in depth and systematic study of these two types of defilement from biblical to Tannaitic literature, with attention to the New Testament (Impurity and Sin). Hayes also deals with notions of “moral” and “ritual” impurity in her book Gentile Impurities. Klawans recognizes that “ritual” and “moral” are imperfect designations for these impurity types. He points out that they are contemporary terms that refer to imported categories, and could be misused in an anti-ritualist way. Nonetheless, he finds them convenient for emphasizing the existence of two types of defilement in the Hebrew Bible, “one of which is more associated with sin than the other” (ibid., 22). I myself am not completely comfortable with the terms, but I see Klawans’ point that they can be useful, even given their problems. Thus, I use them here, but in quotations. 9 On “moral” defilement in biblical sources, see Klawans, Impurity and Sin, 26–31.

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bloodline. And finally, Neh 13:4–9 casts the male alien as a perpetual polluter in ritual terms. Thus, in the final form of Ezra-Nehemiah, earlier ideas of both “ritual” and “moral” impurity are marshaled to craft a new, complex and unprecedented ideology of alien pollution. This ideology, together with other anti-intermarriage strategies such as expansive exegesis and the application of the notion of illegitimate desacralization to Judean intermarriages, functions to buttress Ezra-Nehemiah’s exclusionary program. Defilement is associated with aliens in a number of texts in EzraNehemiah. As Klawans has recently argued, the discourse of Ezra 9, a text of the Ezra Memoir, suggests the influence of earlier traditions of “moral” impurity on the formulation of the Ezra-Nehemiah exclusionist program.10 In Ezra 9:1–2, 10–12, 14, it is the “abominations” (tô‘Ɲbôt) of the nations that are at issue. According to the text, these practices have polluted the land of Israel, and the very foreigners responsible for such abhorrent acts have intermarried with Judeans to the point of threatening the Judeans’ continued existence.11 Ezra 9 not only draws upon earlier passages such as Leviticus 18 in its attempt to associate aliens with polluting behaviors and cast them as a threat to Israel. As Klawans notes, it also establishes a link between notions of the “moral” impurity of foreigners and earlier legal texts such as Deut 7:1–4 that proscribe forms of intermarriage or are understood to do so, but do not associate their prohibitions with the polluting acts of aliens.12 In Ezra 9, the defiling behaviors of foreigners, referred to as “abominations,” are brought into relief in the text’s polemic against intermarriage. Such behaviors result in a particular type of pollution that adheres to the sinner and, according to several texts, threatens the holiness of the land and the sanctuary and can result in the expulsion of Israel from their land (e.g., Lev 18:25, 28). Such “moral” impurity, which, as Klawans points out, cannot be communicated by the sinner to others, can also not be removed by means of ablutions or other ritual actions, or the passage of a set period of time, as is the case with “ritual” impurities. It is only through the violator’s punishment or atonement that “moral” impurity might be removed.13 Neh 13:28–30, a text from the Nehemiah Memoir, bears witness to a second way in which Ezra-Nehemiah associates foreigners with defilement. In this passage, it is priestly intermarriage with aliens that pollutes rather

————— 10

Klawans, Impurity and Sin, 43–46. This is the implication of Ezra 9:14. The pollution of the land is discussed in v. 11. 12 Klawans, Impurity and Sin, 45. It does this by quoting Deut 7:3 in the context of a discourse on the polluting abominations of aliens. 13 Klawans, Impurity and Sin, 26–27, for a useful summary of the characteristics of “moral” impurity and the ways in which it contrasts with “ritual” impurity. 11

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than alien actions.14 The priesthood itself and the priestly and Levitical covenants, implies the text, have been defiled by intermarriage with alien women: “Remember them, my God, on account of the pollution of the priesthood and the covenant of the priesthood and the Levites” (zokrâ lƗhem ’ƟlǀhƗy ‘al go’ǂlê hakkƟhunnâ ûbƟrît hakkƟhunnâ wƟhalwiyyim).15 The passage goes on to state that Nehemiah purified the priesthood “from all things alien” (wƟt́ihartîm mikkol-nƝkƗr), though it does not explain how this was accomplished.16 Presumably, purification was secured through the divorce of the priests from their foreign wives and the expulsion of the wives and their children from the sanctuary and community, in the manner narrated elsewhere in Ezra-Nehemiah.17 Such an action would result in the exclusion from the priesthood of all males in the priestly line with any alien ancestry. The notion that intermarriage with alien women pollutes the priestly lineage is novel and striking, buttressing the text’s general argument against intermarriage from yet another angle. And the concept of the polluting nature of such intermarriage appears to have been influenced by ideas associated with both the “moral” and “ritual” impurity traditions. The models ————— 14

Though Klawans does not discuss this passage in any depth, mentioning it only in passing (Impurity and Sin, 43–44), Hayes views pollution of lineage as a type of defilement distinct from “moral” impurity, arguing that it is an innovation of Ezra-Nehemiah, a tool uniquely suited to erecting an impermeable boundary between Israel and aliens (Gentile Impurities, 6–7, 13, 227 n. 31, 26). Although Hayes is correct to argue that a polluted ancestry is impossible to overcome, and hence, genealogical impurity erects an impassable boundary around Israel, she is wrong to claim that such impurity is the only possible source of an impermeable boundary. Pentateuchal texts such as Deut 23:4–7 and 7:1–6 make no exceptions in their proscriptions of Ammonites, Moabites, and Canaanites, and these texts are read broadly in Ezra-Nehemiah (e.g., Ezra 9:12; Neh 13:1–3) to prohibit entry into the community to all who are defined as aliens, including foreign wives of Judeans and the children of Judean fathers and alien mothers. Against Hayes, these texts show that one need not deploy a discourse of genealogical impurity—or any impurity discourse for that matter—in order to erect an impermeable boundary, though such a discourse is an effective way to do so. 15 Hayes, Gentile Impurities, 27, misreads the plural construct noun form go’ǂlê in the expression go’ǂlê hakkƟhunnâ (literally, “defilements of the priesthood”) as a plural active participle in construct (“defilers of the priesthood”). The vocalization of go’ǂlê in the text, normal for the construct form of a segolate plural noun with middle guttural (cf. ’ohǂlê), is simply impossible for the participle. On nouns of the gǀ’al type, see further Joüon, par. 96Aj. 16 I understand “them” of both v. 29 (“Remember them, my God …” zokrâ lƗhem ’ƟlǀhƗy) and v. 30 (“I purified them from all things alien …” wƟt́ihartîm mikkol-nƝkƗr) as references to the priests. The pericope 13:28–31 begins with Nehemiah’s expulsion from his presence of a particular intermarried priest, a grandson of the high priest Elyashib. Focus then shifts to “them,” presumably the priests as a group, who have allowed their lineages and covenant to become polluted, presumably through intermarriages such as that of the grandson of the high priest. I understand “all things alien” (kol-nƝkƗr) of v. 30 as a general expression intended to include alien persons. The expression does not occur elsewhere. 17 Cf. Klawans, Impurity and Sin, 43–44, who mentions only divorce, and Hayes, Gentile Impurities, 27–28, who speaks of the “removal of foreign persons.”

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for the idea that intermarriages defile the priestly lineage are not entirely clear due to a lack of direct textual allusions in Neh 13:28–30, but I suspect that they included the Holiness Source’s list of “morally” polluting sexual unions found in Leviticus 18 and 20 read together with Ezek 44:22, which proscribes priestly intermarriages, in contrast to Lev 21:7, which does not.18 In Leviticus 18, forbidden sexual unions are said to pollute both the transgressor (e.g., Lev 18:20, 23, 24, 30) and the land of Israel (e.g., Lev 18:25, 27, 28), and warrant the penalty of extirpation of lineage (kƗrƝt; 18:29).19 It is an innovation of the Nehemiah Memoir to classify priestly intermarriage as a proscribed and polluting sexual union not unlike those opposed in Leviticus 18 and 20.20 Yet interestingly, the circles responsible for the memoir seem to reverse the Holiness Source’s treatment of sexual transgressions, for in H’s treatment, the sexual sins of Israelites are “morally” defiling (Leviticus 18 and 20), while those associated with the priesthood profane holiness, but do not pollute it (e.g., Lev 21:9, 13–15).21 In the Nehemiah Memoir, it is priestly intermarriage that is cast as “morally” polluting, but it is the same transgression of common Judeans that is treated as an illegitimate profanation of holiness (ma‘al, “sacrilege”; Neh 13:27).22 Though both pollution and illegitimate profanation of a holy item are grave offenses, pollution is clearly the more serious.23 It may well be that the —————

18 Lev 18:24–30 and 20:24, 26 were certainly influential on the circles responsible for the Ezra Memoir, for their rhetoric of defiling alien abominations and separation from other peoples is reflected directly in Ezra 9:1, 11, 14. On this, see especially Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation, 119, who sees Ezra 9:11 as “a deliberate reference” to Leviticus 18. 19 On kƗrƝt (“cutting off”) as an idiom for extirpation of lineage, see Donald J. Wold, “The Kareth Penalty: Rationale and Cases,” SBLSP 1 (1979): 1–45; and Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 457–60. 20 Hayes, Gentile Impurities, 28, 31, argues that the circles responsible for Neh 13:28–30 followed the interdiction of priestly intermarriage in Ezek 44:22 in constructing their notion of priestly lineage pollution, but she does not seem to believe that Leviticus 18 and 20 played a role in the process, given that she does not refer to them. 21 Note especially Lev 21:15: the high priest who marries a prostitute, a divorcee, a widow or an alien (implied by the demand that he marry an Israelite virgin) profanes his seed among his people. Though Hayes assumes that sexual sins necessarily lead to defilement, the evidence of Lev 21:9, 13–15 suggests that this position is untenable (Gentile Impurities, 31). 22 The intermarriages of common Judeans are also treated as the illegitimate profanation of a holy item (sacrilege) in the Ezra Memoir (Ezra 9:2, 4) and the Ezra third person narrative (Ezra 10:2, 6, 10), as Hayes emphasizes in her treatment (Gentile Impurities, 28–31). However, Hayes misses the fact that priestly intermarriage is treated as sacrilege in the Ezra third person narrative, as indicated by Ezra 10:19. This text states that priestly intermarriage resulted in guilt (’ašmâ) and that the priests’ reparation offering (’ašmƗm for ’ăšƝmîm, a universal emendation) was a ram of the flock. Though Hayes quotes this verse (ibid., 29), she seems to think it concerns lay Israelites and not priests, though the text is very clear that these are actions undertaken by priests! On the technical vocabulary of illegitimate profanation or sacrilege, which includes both ’ašmâ (guilt) and ’ƗšƗm (reparation offering), see my discussion in n. 7. 23 Note that pollution of a holy item is never legitimate, while profanation can be in certain cases (e.g., Lev 27:31), and the penalty for such pollution in H is extirpation of lineage (Lev 22:3;

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circles responsible for the Nehemiah Memoir sought to establish a hierarchy of transgression better suited to the contrast between the ritual and social status of priests and non-priests.24 A second innovation of the circles responsible for the Nehemiah Memoir is the casting of the “moral” pollution produced by priestly intermarriages as a defilement of the lineage, communicable to future generations. Lineage defilement is passed on from generation to generation, apparently disqualifying all males in the polluted line from priestly service (cf. Neh 7:63– 65=Ezra 2:61–63).25 From where might this trans-generational dimension of “moral” defilement resulting from intermarriage have been derived? The communicable nature of the pollution of bloodlines resembles communicable impurities associated with “ritual” impurity, in that lineage defilement too can be passed on to others. But “ritual” impurities are communicated through contact or proximity, and in their communicated form, they are not long-lasting, in contrast to pollution of the lineage, which is permanent.26 In ————— see similarly Lev 7:20 [P]), while that for unknowing sacrilege is a 20% fine and return of the holy item in Lev 22:14 (see similarly Lev 5:15–16 [P]). However, a priest’s illegitimate profanation of a holy item can result in death according to H (Lev 22:9). On a scale of severity, extirpation of lineage is a harsher penalty than the execution of an individual. On extirpation, see the citations in n. 19. 24 Hayes’s explanation for an alleged consistent contrast in treatment of priestly and nonpriestly intermarriage in Ezra-Nehemiah as a whole is unconvincing (Gentile Impurities, 31). Her discussion implies that lay intermarriage is not a sexual sin in Ezra-Nehemiah, in contrast to priestly intermarriage, since lay intermarriage does not result in pollution in a text such as Ezra 9. She also suggests indirectly that there is a Pentateuchal precedent for interdicting priestly intermarriage, in contrast to a lack of a clear Pentateuchal position on intermarriage among non-priests: “That Ezra-Nehemiah does not refer to intermarriage between ordinary Israelites and foreign women as defiling suggests an awareness that marriage with foreign women was not universally prohibited in the Torah and that promotion of such a prohibition represented a departure from precedent” (ibid., 31). As I have observed above, sexual sins are not always defiling in H (see Lev 21:9, 13–15), and the same may be true for the sources of Ezra-Nehemiah. Therefore, a lack of pollution rhetoric does not mean that the circles responsible for a text such as the Ezra Memoir did not view lay intermarriages as sexually sinful. Furthermore, it is simply wrong to imply, as Hayes does, that there is a Pentateuchal prohibition on priestly intermarriage. Lev 21:7 suggests no such thing, and 21:14 applies only to the high priest. Oddly, Hayes acknowledges this observation elsewhere in her book (ibid., 27; n. 31 230). Finally, it is simply not true that Ezra-Nehemiah contrasts priestly intermarriage (defiling) and lay intermarriage (profaning) as Hayes argues (passim). As I have pointed out above (n. 22), the treatment of priestly intermarriage depends on the source in Ezra-Nehemiah. In the Nehemiah Memoir, priestly intermarriage defiles the lineage; in the Ezra third person narrative, it profanes holiness, as indicated by reference to the guilt (’ašmâ) it produces and reparation offering (’ƗšƗm) used to remedy the situation. Thus, it is a mistake to generalize, as Hayes does, about the way in which Ezra-Nehemiah as a whole treats priestly intermarriage, since it is treated differently in the different sources. 25 In Neh 7:63–65=Ezra 2:61–63, priests of uncertain ancestry are “polluted from the priesthood” (waygǀ’ălû min hakkƟhunnâ) and denied access to most holy foods, which must mean that they were classified as “polluted” due to ancestry and therefore expelled from the priestly ranks. 26 Klawans, followed by Hayes, claims that “ritual” impurities, even in their noncommunicated form, are short-lived or at least impermanent, in contrast to “moral” impurities,

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any case, the communicability of lineage pollution through reproduction stands in sharp contrast to traditional “moral” impurity, which, as Klawans and Hayes have emphasized, is non-communicable; it appears, rather, to be ultimately derived from the universe of “ritual” impurity.27 Several other characteristics of the narrative in Neh 13:28–30 are apparently drawn directly from the “moral” impurity tradition. The purification of Israelite priestly lineages by means of divorce and expulsion is one example. The corrective that restores lineage purity in Neh 13:28–30 is purification by acts of atonement and punishment. These are comparable to actions taken elsewhere to reverse the effects of “moral” impurity (e.g., expulsion from the land, as in Lev 18:24–25). Also, the notion that the priestly and Levitic covenants have been polluted is clearly derived from the tradition of “moral” defilement, in which abstract entities (e.g., God’s holy name) are subject to pollution on account of sin (see, e.g., Ezek 43:7–8). Thus, Neh 13:28–30 evidences a novel notion of priestly lineage defilement through intermarriage, which incorporates and transforms ideas from both the “moral” and “ritual” impurity traditions.28 A third type of defilement, innovative in nature and derived primarily from earlier ideas of “ritual” impurity, is attested in Neh 13:4–9, another passage from the Nehemiah Memoir. The text describes the removal of the belongings of Tobiah the Ammonite, a Yhwh-worshiper, and those of his house, from the temple court. According to the text, a room of the temple complex that had been a storage place for offerings had been given by the priest-administrator Elyashib to Tobiah, a rival of Nehemiah: “Before this, Elyashib the priest, who was charged with the oversight of the chambers of the House of God, a relation of Tobiah, had established for him a large chamber where previously grain offerings, frankincense, vessels, and the tithe of grain, new wine and oil … had been stored” (v. 5). Nehemiah throws Tobiah's belongings and those of his house out of the room, and orders that the room be purified, and that the offerings formerly kept in the room be restored. The forced removal of Tobiah’s belongings from the temple chamber ought probably to be understood to suggest the expulsion ————— which are long-lasting and possibly permanent (Impurity and Sin, 23, 25–26, n. 23 172; Gentile Impurities, 5, 32). This is not a convincing characterization, given that a “ritual” defilement such as skin disease might last a lifetime, as Klawans himself acknowledges (e.g., the case of King Uzziah, whose skin disease persisted until his death; note also the case of Gehazi in 2 Kgs 5:27; David’s curse of Joab’s father’s house in 2 Sam 3:29 states that skin disease and genital flows will continually plague that lineage). It is more accurate to state that the length of “ritual” impurities vary, depending on the impurity itself and the circumstances of its manifestation. 27 For the non-communicability of “moral” impurity, see Klawans, Impurity and Sin, 26: “Whereas ritual impurity often results in a contagious defilement, there is no contact-contagion associated with moral impurity.” See similarly Hayes, Gentile Impurities, 5, 12, 23, 31, 33. 28 See previously Olyan, Rites and Rank, 49, 83, an earlier form of this argument.

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of Tobiah from the temple complex and community, though this is not stated explicitly.29 Nehemiah’s order that the chamber be purified suggests that he viewed it as polluted “ritually,” and the source of the pollution, the text implies, is the presence of Tobiah the Ammonite, his belongings, and those of his house.30 It is clear that the “moral” impurity of foreigners is not at issue in this passage: There is none of the rhetoric typical of “moral” impurity (e.g., “abomination” [tô‘Ɲbâ]), and Tobiah himself is a Yhwh worshiper, not an “idolater.” Furthermore, Tobiah’s presence temporarily defiles his temple chamber, as would be the case with a “ritual” impurity but not with “moral” defilement,31 and his polluting of the sanctuary room requires purification rites of the type associated with “ritual” defilement. This purification, suggests the text, is successfully accomplished by Nehemiah’s underlings: “I ordered and they purified the chamber, and I returned there the vessels of the House of God, the grain offerings and the frankincense” (v. 9). Is it possible that the source of this “ritual” pollution requiring purification rites could have been something other than the presence of Tobiah himself? As Rainer Albertz has recently emphasized, Tobiah’s activities in the temple were under the priest-administrator Elyashib’s supervision, suggesting that it is unlikely that violations of routine temple purity rules are at issue here (e.g., Tobiah bringing unclean food into the sanctuary sphere).32 A lack of action on Elyashib’s part suggests that he saw no problem with Tobiah’s observance of purity rules while in the Temple complex. In short, other than Tobiah himself, it is difficult to identify a likely source of “ritual impurity” motivating Nehemiah’s purifying actions. ————— 29

That expulsion of those cast as alien from the community—and of Judeans who have intermarried with them—is the theme of much of the chapter (13:1–3, 23–27, 28–30) suggests strongly Tobiah’s expulsion as well. Other commentators have argued that the removal of Tobiah’s goods suggests his expulsion. For this argument, see, e.g., Kurt Galling, Die Bücher der Chronik, Esra, Nehemia (ATD 12; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1954), 252. 30 Many commentators view the chamber as having been polluted “ritually” by Tobiah’s presence. These include Joseph Blenkinsopp, Ezra-Nehemiah (OTL; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1988), 355; H. G. M. Williamson, Ezra, Nehemiah (WBC 16; Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1985), 387; Antonius H. J. Gunneweg, Nehemia (KAT XIX.2; Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1987), 166; and Wilhelm Rudolph, Esra und Nehemia (HAT 20; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr/Paul Siebeck, 1949), 203–204. 31 Klawans, citing Levine, points out that the “morally” defiled do not pollute ritually. Thus, sinners who are “morally” impure have sanctuary access nonetheless, as in Num. 5:13–14 (Klawans, Impurity and Sin, 27 and n. 37; Levine, Numbers 1–20, 207). See similarly Hayes, Gentile Impurities, 23, who places great emphasis on “moral” defilement’s lack of communicability in contrast to “ritual” defilement. 32 Rainer Albertz, “Purity Strategies and Political Interest in the Policy of Nehemiah,” in Essays in Honor of William G. Dever at Seventy (ed. Seymour Gitin, et. al.; Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2005), 11. The text itself states explicitly that Elyashib was charged with oversight of the chambers (v. 4).

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Thus, Neh 13:4–9 appears to evidence a third kind of pollution linked by Ezra-Nehemiah to aliens, one primarily crafted from traditions of “ritual” impurity. Though the cause of pollution is alienage rather than contact with corpses, skin disease, or the experience of a defiling effusion, its effect is to pollute in the manner of a “ritual” impurity.33 Defilement is apparently spread by the alien to his temple chamber and to the items in it. It is possible that it is also potentially communicable to other persons as well, though this is not indicated directly by the passage. The text implies that Tobiah is a perpetual polluter, a threat to the holiness of the sanctuary, requiring expulsion from the temple and presumably, the community. The perpetual nature of Tobiah’s defilement is comparable to the long-lasting and possibly permanent impurity of the person afflicted with skin disease and that of the individual with a genital flow; his expulsion may be likened to their expulsion, for they are removed from the community for the period of their uncleanness in texts such as Lev 13:45–46 and Num 5:2.34 It is even possible that these polluters were models for the perpetually polluting alien of Neh 13:4–9, though about this I can only speculate. The innovative nature of Tobiah’s polluting status is underscored by the observation that the priest-administrator Elyashib obviously found nothing objectionable in Tobiah’s presence in the sanctified space of the temple sphere.35 Clearly, Tobiah is a polluter only in the eyes of the circles responsible for the Nehemiah Memoir. When considering the text of Ezra-Nehemiah in its final form, it is possible to identify a number of ways in which purity is marshaled as one tool to exclude the alien and reconstitute the Judean community. Drawing from the traditions of “ritual” and “moral” impurity, the text as we have it argues that aliens ought to be removed from Judah on account of their sinful, polluting actions; their status as perpetual “ritual” polluters; and because marriages with alien women pollute priestly lineages. We might describe this as an ingenious and effective “three-pronged” attack on intermarriage and on the ————— 33

Klawans and Hayes are both deficient in their treatments of Neh 13:4–9. Klawans has nothing whatsoever to say about the Tobiah episode in Neh 13:4–9, nor does Hayes treat it adequately. Though she quotes the text at length and suggests that Nehemiah’s actions are motivated by the Ammonite proscription in Deut 23:4–7, Hayes conveniently ignores Nehemiah’s order to purify the vacated chamber and its implications (Gentile Impurities, 45–46). Ignoring the purity issues of this text serves the arguments of both Klawans and Hayes, as both insist that aliens are never cast as “ritually” defiling before Tannaitic sources (Klawans, “Notions of Gentile Impurity in Ancient Judaism,” AJS Review 20 [1995]: 285–312; Hayes, Gentile Impurities, 4–6, 122–31,195–96). Scholars will need to assess the larger thesis of Klawans and Hayes in light of the evidence from texts such as Neh 13:4–9. 34 Though compare Lev 15:2–15, 25–30, where the person with a genital flow is not expelled from the community. On the long lasting and potentially permanent nature of certain “ritual” impurities (e.g., genital flows or skin disease), see my comments in n. 26. 35 Olyan, Rites and Rank, 83.

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very presence in the community of those cast as aliens. Yet this reading of the text in its final form, as interesting as it is, may be enriched by means of an examination of the hypothetical sources of Ezra-Nehemiah with respect to their views on aliens, particularly aliens and impurity. Such an analysis may even suggest stages in the development of the anti-alien polemic of the circles responsible for Ezra-Nehemiah if we are willing to accept, at least for the sake of argument, conventional division and dating of the work’s source material. Six units in Ezra-Nehemiah are of central interest to this analysis: the Nehemiah Memoir, particularly Neh 13:4–31; the Ezra Memoir, especially Ezra 9:1–15; the Nehemiah third person narrative in Neh 13:1–3; the Ezra third person narrative in Ezra 10; Ezra 1–6; and the block of material in Neh 7:5–10:40.36 A consideration of these units as discrete blocks of material makes possible a source-sensitive analysis that leads to a number of interesting observations (see Table 1). First, intermarriage, a central issue in the final form of the work, is explicitly opposed in all but one of the source blocks under discussion. The exception is Ezra 1–6, which says nothing explicit about intermarriage, though it takes an anti-alien stance nonetheless (see Ezra 6:21) and seems to suggest that priestly lineages may become polluted, presumably by means of intermarriage (Ezra 2:61–63).37 Intermarriage is constructed as illegitimate profanation or sacrilege (ma‘al) in three blocks of material: the Nehemiah Memoir (Neh 13:27 [cf. Neh 1:8]); the Ezra Memoir (Ezra 9:2, 4); and the Ezra third person narrative (Ezra 10:2, 6, 10, 19). In contrast, the Nehemiah third person narrative does not use distinctive sacrilege terminology (e.g., ma‘al, ’ƗšƗm) with respect to intermarriage, nor do the units Neh 7:5–10:40 and Ezra 1–6. Pollution is associated with aliens and with intermarriage only in select texts, and the nature of the pollution in question varies with the texts. According to the Nehemiah Memoir, intermarriages pollute the priestly bloodline and the covenants of the priests and Levites (Neh 13:29–30) and aliens defile ritually (Neh 13:4–9), though alien acts are nowhere said to pollute “morally.” In contrast, the Ezra Memoir speaks of alien practices as defiling abominations (Ezra 9:11; cf. vv. 1, 14), but does not assert that intermarriage pollutes lineages or covenants or that aliens themselves defile ritually. Like the Ezra Memoir, Ezra 1–6 apparently refers to the pollution of alien acts (Ezra —————

36 On the literary units of Ezra-Nehemiah, see, e.g., Blenkinsopp, Ezra-Nehemiah, 41–47 and Williamson, Ezra, Nehemiah, xxiii–xxxv. 37 Explicit statements opposing intermarriage are found in the Nehemiah Memoir (Neh 13:23– 27, 28–30); the Nehemiah third person narrative (Neh 13:1–3); the block Neh 7:5–10:40 (Neh 10:31); the Ezra Memoir (Ezra 9:2, 12, 14); and the Ezra third person narrative (Ezra 10:2, 10, 18– 19, 44).

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6:21),38 and like the Nehemiah Memoir, it seems to suggest that intermarriage pollutes priestly lineages (Ezra 2:61–63). In contrast to the Nehemiah and Ezra Memoirs and Ezra 1–6, the third person narratives in both Nehemiah and Ezra make no associations of any sort between intermarriage or aliens and pollution. In fact, where the Nehemiah Memoir—and apparently Ezra 1–6—constructs priestly intermarriage as defiling the priestly lineage, the Ezra third person narrative casts priestly intermarriage as profaning of holiness, just like lay intermarriage (Ezra 10:19). Finally, the rhetoric of separation (bdl) from aliens, probably adapted from the Holiness Source,39 is present in all blocks of material under discussion except for the Nehemiah Memoir.40 Thus, the sources of Ezra-Nehemiah, though they all share an anti-alien perspective, articulate their opposition to aliens and to intermarriage in slightly different ways. Sometimes, impurity rhetoric is utilized to remove those understood to be foreign from the community; sometimes, intermarriage is cast as a sacrilege for the same purpose; sometimes, H’s language of separation (bdl) is drawn upon to the same end. The rhetoric of impurity, where it occurs, differs from source to source. The Nehemiah Memoir knows nothing of the polluting abominations of aliens, but priestly lineage and the covenants of the priests and Levites are defiled through intermarriage, and aliens also pollute “ritually” through their physical presence. In contrast, the only alien pollution that the Ezra Memoir knows is that of defiling abominations. If we embrace a tentative diachronic perspective, and assume that the Nehemiah Memoir is our earliest source,41 it appears that the sacrilege idea, the notion that priestly intermarriages defile priestly lineage, and the belief that aliens defile “ritually” were introduced early on into the anti-alien ideology of circles ultimately responsible for EzraNehemiah. The idea that alien acts pollute “morally,” and the rhetoric of ————— 38

I suspect that this is the intent of Ezra 6:21, given the similarity of its rhetoric to that of 9:1, 11, which speak of the pollution of alien acts and separation from the peoples of the land. 39 See Olyan, Rites and Rank, 90, for the argument that circles responsible for Ezra-Nehemiah co-opted and adapted Holiness rhetoric of separation from the peoples and avoidance of all pollution, concretizing H’s call for separation from the nations in the expulsion of “defiling” aliens from the community. 40 See Neh 9:2; 10:29; 13:3; Ezra 6:21; 9:1; 10:11. 41 Here I assume for the sake of argument that Nehemiah’s mission to Jerusalem took place c. 445 BCE (the twentieth year of Artaxerxes I; see Neh 2:1). I am also assuming that his activity antedated Ezra’s, whose mission occurred in the seventh year of Artaxerxes II (c. 398 BCE) rather than in the seventh year of Artaxerxes I (c. 458 BCE; see Ezra 7:7, which mentions only Artaxerxes). Defense of such a reconstruction may be found in J. Maxwell Miller and John H. Hayes, A History of Ancient Israel and Judah (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 468–69. It is widely believed that Nehemiah’s mission took place c. 445 BCE; it is the date of Ezra’s activity in Jerusalem that is a matter of continuing debate. Obviously, how we date the missions of Nehemiah and Ezra has implications for how we date the memoirs attributed to them and other associated materials.

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separation, both missing from the Nehemiah Memoir, may have been added to the mix later. The lack of impurity rhetoric in both the Nehemiah and Ezra third person narratives, often thought to post-date the memoirs with which they are associated, and in the block Neh 7:5–10:40, is striking. It may suggest different emphases in the anti-alien polemics of the circles producing these supplementary texts (e.g., sacrilege and separation rhetoric predominate in the Ezra third person narrative, while separation rhetoric alone is attested in the Nehemiah third person narrative and in the block Neh 7:5–10:40). The reasons for such a shift in emphasis are of course obscure. According to Klawans, “ritual impurity is, in the final analysis, not what lay behind these narratives in Ezra and Nehemiah. The passages in question echo not the priestly traditions relating to ritual impurity, but the Holiness Code traditions related to moral impurity.”42 Hayes, like Klawans, insists that ritual impurity plays no role in Ezra-Nehemiah’s attacks on aliens and intermarriage. For her, it is only moral and genealogical impurity that are associated with aliens in Ezra-Nehemiah (and elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible).43 Though Klawans and Hayes are correct to suggest an important role for the “moral” impurity tradition in the shaping of the Ezra-Nehemiah purity ideology, they nonetheless overstate their respective cases.44 For it is a misunderstanding of the text to insist that “moral” impurity alone is at play in the Ezra-Nehemiah narratives concerning aliens, as Klawans does, or that only “moral” and lineage pollution are at issue there, as Hayes asserts. “Ritual” defilement of a novel sort is evidently a concern in Neh 13:4–9, and the influence of the “ritual” impurity tradition is also discernible in the communicability of lineage pollution by means of reproduction.45 Perhaps more important, Klawans and Hayes have not discerned the complex relationship of the purity ideology of Ezra-Nehemiah to the traditions out of which it developed. Like the expansive exegesis evidenced in EzraNehemiah, the purity ideology witnessed in that work was crafted in a creative and expansive manner from existing ideas about “ritual” and “moral” impurity. In some instances, the circles responsible for Ezra-Nehemiah drew upon, combined, and transformed notions from both purity traditions in order to shape their novel polemic against aliens and intermarriage. A look at the individual sources of Ezra-Nehemiah provides some interesting ————— 42

Klawans, Impurity and Sin, 44. Hayes, Gentile Impurities, 33. 44 Hayes’s genealogical impurity is entirely derived from what I am calling the “moral” impurity tradition, in contrast to my own view. 45 As I have mentioned, Klawans chose not to discuss Neh 13:4–9 and Hayes ignores its purity dimensions completely in her treatment of the episode. See further my discussion in n. 33. 43

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perspectives on the development of the polemic and the role played by purity ideology in it. Table 1: Sources of Ezra-Nehemiah Intermar- Intermarriage riage is opposed sacrilege (ma‘al), requiring a reparation offering (’ƗšƗm)

Intermarriage defiles priestly lineage

Alien acts pollute (“morally”)

Aliens Separation defile (bdl) rhetoric ritually employed with respect to aliens, their abominations or their uncleanness

Nehemiah 13:23– Memoir 27, 28– (Neh 13:4– 30 31)

13:27 (cf. 1:8)

13:29–30 ----------- 13:4–9

-------------

Nehemiah third person narrative (Neh 13:1–3)

13:1–3

------------- ----------- ----------- --------- 13:3

Neh 7:5– 10:40

10:31

------------- ----------- ----------- --------- 9:2; 10:29

Ezra Mem- 9:2, 12, oir (Ezra 14 9:1–15)

9:2, 4

----------- 9:11 (cf. 9:1, 14)

Ezra third 10:2, 10, person nar- 18–19, rative 44 (Ezra 10)

10:2, 6, 10, 19

----------- ----------- --------- 10:11

Ezra 1–6

------------- 2:61-63

----------

6:21 (apparently)

--------- 9:1

--------- 6:21

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“Sie sollen nicht in die Gemeinde des Herrn kommen”: Aspekte gesellschaftlicher Inklusion und Exklusion in Dtn 23,4–9 und seine frühen Auslegungen*

Dtn 23,4–9 hat eine außergewöhnliche exegetische Geschichte erlebt. Entstanden in der Zeit des ersten Tempels, ist Dtn 23,4–9 in dem sechsten und fünften Jahrhundert vor Christus ein wichtiger Text für israelitische Exegeten geworden, die konkurrierende Erklärungen der Gemeinde Jhwhs während einer Zeit der Krise und Änderung geboten haben.1 Wenn die vorhandenen Texte historische Gültigkeit haben, dann ist das Eintreten in das israelitische Volk durch die Heirat oder durch den Eintritt in den Tempel für die Ausleger, welche die Grenzen der Gemeinschaft Israels festlegen wollten, ein bedeutender Punkt der Auseinandersetzung geworden. In dieser Auseinandersetzung über die Bestimmung des Volkes Israel, haben einige Vertreter Dtn 23,4–9 für ihr Argument der Exklusion alles Fremden aus dem Tempel Jhwhs benutzt. Andere Gruppen haben diesen Text als Rechtfertigung verstanden, den Zutritt von unbeschnittenen Fremden zu dem Tempel zu verbieten. Andere wiederum glaubten, dass der Text die Ausländerinnen und ihre Kinder von der Gemeinde ausschließt. Im Gegensatz zu diesen Auslegern haben Verfechter einer inklusiveren Definition des Volkes Jhwhs versucht, dieser oft festgelegten Exklusivität entgegenzuwirken, indem sie Jhwhs Interesse für frommes Verhalten betont haben. In späteren Jahren wird Dtn 23,4–9 fortfahren, einen wichtigen Einfluss auf die Grenzziehung in jüdischen Gemeinden auszuüben.2 Im Laufe der Zeit wurde Dtn 23,4–9 neu dargelegt und ausgearbeitet und wurde so ein herausragendes Beispiel eines lebendigen biblischen Textes, der sich in neuen historischen Kontexten entwickelt hat. Jedoch haben die späteren Auslegungen von Dtn 23,4–9, in vielen Fällen höchstens eine schwache Beziehung zu der Bedeu—————

* Ich möchte den folgenden Personen für Rat und Hilfe mit der Übersetzung dieses Aufsatzes danken: Silja Maehl (Brown University), Rainer Albertz, Rüdiger Schmitt und Jakob Woehrle (Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster), und Klaus-Peter Adam (Lutheran School of Theology, Chicago). Der Aufsatz ist aus einem Vortrag entstanden, den ich im Mai 2010 in Münster gehalten habe. Ich möchte Rainer Albertz für die Einladung danken. 1 Die deutliche wiederholte Formel von Dtn 23,4–9 wird in Lam 1,10 zitiert und Lam 1,10 ist wahrscheinlich ein Text des frühen sechsten Jahrhunderts. Dies legt zu mindest nahe, dass Dtn 23,4–9 vor 587 v. Chr. entstanden ist. 2 Vgl., z.B., 4QFlor 1,4.

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tung des Textes in seinem ursprünglichen Kontext. Es ist meine Absicht, die frühe Geschichte dieses einflussreichen Textes noch einmal zu überdenken. Zuerst untersuche ich die Bedeutung von Dtn 23,4–9 in seinem ursprünglichen, vorexilischen Zusammenhang.3 Hierbei werde ich die Unklarheiten des Textes und die Fragen, die der Text aufwirft, herausarbeiten. Des Weiteren stelle ich die verschiedenen Arten dar, in denen einige Ausleger aus dem sechsten und fünften Jahrhundert Dtn 23,4–9 benutzt haben, um Exklusionen zu legitimieren, während andere versuchten, seinen Einfluss zu untergraben. Ich interessiere mich besonders für die Art und Weise, in der einige frühe Exegeten von Dtn 23,4–9 Ideen von Unreinheit und vom Profanieren von Heiligkeit verwendet haben, um ihre Interpretationen von Dtn 23,4–9 zu stützen. Ich schließe mit einigen kurzen Beobachtungen über meinen Gebrauch von Gesellschaftstheorie zur Erklärung biblischer Texte.

I. Die Bedeutung des Textes in seinem ursprünglichen Kontext Dtn 23,4–9 stellt mehrere exegetische Schwierigkeiten dar, die die Basis widersprüchlicher Auslegungen des Textes während des sechsten und fünften Jahrhunderts geworden sind und heute fortfahren, zeitgenössische Exegeten herauszufordern. Vier nicht-israelitische Gruppen sind der Fokus von Dtn 23,4–9: die Ammoniter, Moabiter, Edomiter und Ägypter. Der Eintritt der Mitglieder jeder dieser Gruppen in die Gemeinde Jhwhs (qƟhal yhwh) wurde im Text diskutiert. Mittels charakteristischer formelhaften Wiederholungen verweigert Dtn 23,4–9 den Eintritt des Ammoniters und des Moabiters in die Gemeinde Jhwhs. Ihre Nachkommen bis in die zehnte Generation sind ebenfalls ausdrücklich ausgeschlossen. Der Text gibt historische Gründe für diesen Ausschluss: Der Ammoniter und der Moabiter haben Israel in der Wüste nicht geholfen und des Weiteren sagt der Text, dass sie den Seher Bil’am angeheuert haben, um Israel zu verfluchen.4 Dagegen schließt der Text den Ägypter und den Edomiter nur bis in die dritte Generation aus, ————— 3

Über Dtn 23,4–9 in seinem ursprünglichen, vorexilischen Kontext, siehe z.B. Ulrich Kellermann, “Erwägungen zum deuteronomistischen Gemeindegesetz Dt 23,2–9,” BN 2 (1977): 33–47; Eduard Nielson, Deuteronomium (HAT 1.6; Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1995), 219–22; Richard D. Nelson, Deuteronomy: A Commentary (OTL; Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 2002), 278; Markus Zehnder, “Anstösse aus Dtn 23,2–9 zur Frage nach dem Umgang mit Fremden,” Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 52 (2005): 300–314; idem, Umgang mit Fremden in Israel und Assyrien. Ein Beitrag zur Anthropologie des “Fremden” im Licht antiker Quellen (BWANT 8; Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2005), 373–80 und das klassische obgleich hoch spekulative Werk von Kurt Galling, “Das Gemeindegesetz in Deuteronomium,” in Festschrift Alfred Bertholet zum 80. Geburtstag (ed. Walter Baumgartner et al.; Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1950), 176–91. 4 Im Gegensatz zu Deut 23,5 sagt Num 22,6, dass nur Balak der König der Moabiter Bilam angeheuert hat, um Israel zu verfluchen.

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dann jedoch ist ihnen der Eintritt in die Gemeinde Jhwhs erlaubt. Der Text gibt konkrete Gründe warum einige Edomiter und Ägypter in die Gemeinde eintreten dürfen: Der Edomiter auf Grund seiner engen ethnischen Beziehung und/oder seines vertraglichen Bündnisses mit Israel5 und der Ägypter, weil die Israeliten in seinem Lande gelebt haben. Dtn 23,8 deutet an, dass der ständige Ausschluss gleichzusetzen ist mit dem Verabscheuen: “Den Edomiter sollst du nicht verabscheuen; er ist dein Bruder. Den Ägypter sollst du auch nicht verabscheuen; denn du bist ein Fremdling in seinem Lande gewesen.” Dtn 23,4–9 erwähnt keine anderen fremden Gruppen. Dieser Text wirft mehrere Fragen auf. Betrifft dieses Gesetz zunächst Einwanderer und ihre Nachkommen, Besucher des Landes, oder eine Kombination von Einwandern, ihren Nachkommen und Besuchern? Der Ammoniter, der Moabiter, der Edomiter und der Ägypter sind grammatikalisch männliche und singularische Subjekte, die das Verb “eintreten” regieren. Bedeutet dies, dass Männer allein die Subjekte des Gesetzes sind? Gibt es weitere Beweise, die uns helfen könnten, das Geschlecht der Adressaten dieses Gesetzes zu bestimmen? Es ist außerdem nicht offensichtlich, was das Idiom “in die Gemeinde Jhwhs eintreten” bedeutet. Ist dies ein Idiom, das Ausländern ständiges Aufenthaltsrecht in der Gemeinschaft zuspricht? Nach der deuteronomistischen Tradition weist dieser Status den Ausländern Rechte und Pflichten wie die Wallfahrt und das Opfer zu: dieselben Rechte und Pflichten, die den Israeliten zugewiesen wurden.6 Oder ist dies ein Idiom das die Heirat mit einem Israelit bedeutet, wie einige spätere Ausleger gedacht haben? Oder bedeutet es einfach, in den Tempel Jhwhs einzutreten, wie mehrere spätere Exegeten geglaubt haben? Schließlich stellt sich die Frage, warum der Text diese vier fremden Gruppen auswählt und andere fremde Gruppen ignoriert? Haben diese vier Gruppen Gemeinsamkeiten? Obwohl es eine Herausforderung ist zu entscheiden, was Dtn 23,4–9 in seinem historischen Kontext gemeint haben könnte, ist es durchaus möglich bei unserem Versuch, den Text zu erklären, einige Fortschritte zu machen. Zuerst setzt das Verbot voraus, dass die erwähnten Mitglieder dieser fremden Gruppen seit Generationen Bewohner Israels sind. Die Bezeichnungen “Ammoniter,” “Moabiter,” “Edomiter,” und “Ägypter,” wurden hier offensichtlich benutzt, um Einwanderer oder ihre Nachkommen bis zu zehn oder mehr Generationen zu benennen. Es gibt keinen Hinweis, dass dieses Gesetz fremde Besucher oder temporäre Bewohner betrifft. Wenn es sie beträfe, gäbe es keinen Grund, warum der Text über Abstammungen von mehre—————

5 In der Aussage, “Den Edomiter sollst du nicht verabscheuen; er ist dein Bruder,” ist die Bedeutung des Wortes “Bruder” unklar. Handelt es sich hierbei um einen ethnischen Begriff, um eine Bezeichnung für ein Bündnis/Bundesverhältnis oder um beides? 6 Z.B. Dtn 16,11 und 14.

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ren Generationen sprechen sollte. In Bezug auf das Geschlecht der Adressaten, ist es wahrscheinlich, dass der Text sich nur mit Männern befasst. Die Verwendung des männlichen singularischen Subjektes und, was wichtiger ist, die Bedeutung, die der Text den ausschließlich männlichen Abstammungslinien zuweist, legen dies nahe. Des Weiteren könnte man auch anmerken, dass das Verbot in Vers 2 nur Männer betrifft. Deshalb betrifft das Gesetz von Dtn 23,4–9 offenbar männliche Einwanderer und ihre männlichen Nachkommen, die zu den vier erwähnten besonderen Gruppen gehören: die Ammoniter, die Moabiter, die Edomiter und die Ägypter. Es ist schwieriger, das undurchsichtige Idiom “in die Gemeinde Jhwhs eintreten” auszulegen.7 Es ist möglich, dass Dtn 23,4–9 den körperlichen Zutritt der Adressaten zu dem Tempel verbietet, wie die meisten frühen Exegeten annehmen. Wenn diese Auslegung richtig ist, dann ist die Formulierung ungewöhnlich, denn das Wort qƗhƗl wird sonst in Deuteronomium in dem Sinne von “Gemeinschaft” und nicht von “Heiligtum” benutzt.8 Anderseits könnte das Idiom “in die Gemeinde Jhwhs eintreten” bedeuten, ein ständiges Mitglied der Kultgemeinde Jhwhs zu werden, das ihre Verpflichtungen und Privilegien akzeptiert, und das auch einen privilegierten sozialen Status vergleichbar mit dem Status des freien, gebürtigen israelitischen Mannes erhält. Anders ausgedrückt könnte das Idiom “in die Gemeinde Jhwhs eintreten” in Dtn 23,4–9 bedeuten, ein gƝr zu werden wie in Deuteronomium formuliert, nämlich ein ständiger fremder Bewohner.9 Daher könnte in Dtn 23,4–9 impliziert sein, dass wenigstens einige männliche fremde Bewohner, die keine gƝrîm waren, einen solchen Status bekommen wollten. Auf diese Weise wäre ihre soziale Marginalität aufgehoben und ihr häufiger Zutritt zu dem nationalen Gott gestattet. Nach dieser Interpretation würde dem Ammoniter und dem Moabiter und ihren Nachkommen der Status des gƝr verweigert, gewissen Nachkommen der edomitischen und ägyptischen Einwanderer jedoch gewährt werden. Ein Vorteil dieser Auslegung ist, dass sie mit der Verwendung von qƗhƗl (“Gemeinde”) anderswo in Deuteronomium vereinbar sein würde, dass heißt die Gemeinschaft Israels, die die dauerhaft fremden Bewohner offensichtich einschließt. Eine dritte mögliche Auslegung des Ausdruckes “in die Gemeinde Jhwhs eintreten” ist die Heirat mit einer Israelitin. Dem Ammo—————

7 Die Literatur, die dieses Problem angeht, ist umfangreich. Siehe z.B. Nielsen, Deuteronomium, 221; Georg Braulik, Deuteronomium (Neue Echter Bibel; Würzburg: Echter, 1986–92), 170; Nelson, Deuteronomy, 278; Zehnder, “Anstösse,” 304; idem, Umgang, 374–76. 8 Dtn 9,10; 10,4; 18,16; 31,30. 9 Betreffend den gƝr fremder Herkunft in Deuteronomium und in dem deuteronomistischen Geschichtswerk und seinen Verpflichtungen und Privilegien siehe z.B. Dtn 28,9–11; 31,11–12 und Olyan, Rites and Rank: Hierarchy in Biblical Representations of Cult (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 74–81.

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niter und dem Moabiter ist die Heirat mit einer Israelitin verboten, wohingegen sie der dritten Generation edomitischer und ägyptischer Einwanderer erlaubt ist. Diese Auslegung ist möglich, aber sie erscheint mir weniger wahrscheinlich als die andere. Alle vorhandenen Texte aus dem sechsten Jahrhundert stützen eine kultische Auslegung, und diese sind die frühesten vorhandenen Auslegungen von Dtn 23,4–9. Der früheste vorhandene Text der eine Heiratsauslegung unterstützen könnte, ist Neh 13,1–3, ein Text des fünften Jahrhunderts, der die Heirat fremder Frauen mit israelitischen Männern und nicht die Heirat fremder Männer mit Israelitinnen betrifft. Des Weiteren hat das Idiom “in die Gemeinde Jhwhs eintreten” in dem früheren Vers Dtn 23,2 höchst wahrscheinlich keinerlei Beziehung zur Heirat. Was haben die Gruppen, die in Dtn 23,4–9 erwähnt werden, gemeinsam? Zunächst ist es entscheidend zu beobachten, dass Dtn 23,4–9 sich auf beschnittene Nachbarn Israels konzentriert. Es ist wahrscheinlich kein Zufall, dass die Liste der beschnittenen Völker in Jer 9,24–25 fast dieselbe Form hat, wie die Liste der Völker in Dtn 23,4–9. Der einzige Unterschied ist, dass Jer 9,24–25 auch noch die Araber erwähnt. Der Text betrifft offenbar nicht unbeschnittene Fremde, Ausländerinnen, oder beschnittene Fremde, die nicht Ammoniter, Moabiter, Edomiter, und Ägypter sind. Ein Gesetz, das beschnittene Nachbarn vorübergehend oder dauerhaft ausschließt, obwohl sie langzeitige Bewohner Israels sind, bedarf einer Erklärung. Die Exklusion der beschnittenen Einwanderer und ihrer Nachkommen aus Nachbarvölkern kann am besten als ein Versuch erklärt werden, die Grenzen zwischen Israel und seinen Nachbarn ohne Ambiguität festzulegen und zu bestimmen. Offensichtlich waren die Grenzen zwischen beschnittenen Nachbarn und Israel nicht so klar wie die Grenzen zwischen Israeliten und unbeschnittenen Fremden. Deshalb konnte die Beschneidung als eine Grenzmarkierung in Bezug auf solche Völker nicht funktionieren, im Gegensatz zu anderen Fällen sowohl der früheren (vgl. mit den Philistern) als auch der späteren aus der Geschichte Israels (vgl. während des sechsten Jahrhunderts in Babylon, wie Genesis 17 nahelegt). Wie über die Israeliten wurde auch über die vier Völker von Dtn 23,4–9 an anderer Stelle gesagt, dass sie Beschneidung ausgeübt haben (vgl. Jer 9, 24–25). Aber die Beschneidung ist nicht die einzige Eigenschaft, die diese Gruppen untereinander und mit Israel teilen. Wie die Israeliten haben auch Ammoniter, Moabiter, Edomiter die kanaanäischen Dialekte gesprochen.10 Daher hatten die Israeliten mit ihnen viel gemeinsam. Schließlich haben alle vier Völker in der relativen Nähe Israels gelebt, besonders die drei kanaanäisch sprechen—————

10 Siehe z.B. Simon B. Parker, “Ammonite, Edomite and Moabite,” in Beyond Babel: A Handbook for Biblical Hebrew and Related Languages (ed. John Kaltner and Steven L. McKenzie; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2002), 43–60. (Die Bibliographie ist auch nützlich.)

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den Völker, die enge Nachbarn gewesen sind. Zahlreiche Ammoniter, Moabiter und Edomiter könnten in Israel gelebt haben, im Gegensatz zu anderen fremden Gruppen. Doch da es aber keinen Beweis gibt, lässt sich darüber nur spekulieren. Die Inklusion der Ägypter in Dtn 23,4–9 ist nicht so leicht erklärbar, da Ägypten geographisch, sprachlich und kulturell ferner von Israel gewesen ist. Trotzdem haben die Ägypter wie die Israeliten Beschneidung praktiziert, selbst wenn die Methode verschieden war, wie einige ägyptische Belege andeuten.11 Außerdem könnte eine relativ große Bevölkerungszahl von Ägyptern, die in dem Land lebten, die Israeliten beunruhigt haben. Vielleicht wurde der Ägypter deshalb, wegen seiner Beschneidung und seiner großen Anzahl unter der fremden Bevölkerung in dem Land, in Bezug auf seinen Eintritt “in die Gemeinde Jhwhs” beschränkt.

II. Auslegungen des Ausdruckes “in die Gemeinde eintreten” während des sechsten und fünften Jahrhunderts Obwohl die Interpretation von Dtn 23,4–9 in seinem ursprünglichen Zusammenhang nicht eindeutig ist, kann man trotzdem viel darüber sagen, wie Exegeten aus dem sechsten und fünften Jahrhundert den Text verstanden haben. Drei Auslegungen des Idiomes “in die Gemeinde eintreten” lassen sich in den vorhandenen Texten finden: (a) in den Bereich des Tempels eintreten (Lam 1,10; Ez 44,9; Jes 56,3–7); (b) in die Stadt Jerusalem eintreten (Jes 52,1); und (c) ein Mitglied der Gemeinschaft Israels sein oder werden, im ausdrücklichen Bezug auf Ausländerinnen, die mit israelitischen Männern verheiratet sind, und ihre Kinder (Esr 9,12; Neh 13,1–3). Mehrere Texte von unterschiedlicher Herkunft zitieren, paraphrasieren oder verweisen auf solche Weise auf Dtn 23,4–9, sodass daraus sichtbar wird, wie der Autor das Idiom im Sinne von “in den Tempel eintreten” versteht. Der Text Lam 1,10, der wahrscheinlich aus der frühen Exilszeit stammt, ist eindeutig betreffend diese Bedeutung. Der Autor paraphrasiert die Eintrittsformulierung von Deuteronomium 23, wenn er erklärt, dass Jerusalem “gesehen hat, dass Völker in ihr Heiligtum gingen, während du (Jhwh) geboten hast: ‘Sie sollten nicht in deine Gemeinde eintreten’” (lǀ’ yƗbǀ’û baqqƗhƗl lƗk). In diesem Abschnitt wird “die Gemeinde Jhwhs” von Dtn 23,4–9 ausdrücklich —————

11 Was die ägyptische Beschneidung betrifft siehe z. B., Robert K. Ritner, “Household Religion in Ancient Egypt,” in Household and Family Religion in Antiquity (ed. John Bodel and Saul M. Olyan; Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), 178; C. de Wit, “La circoncision chez les anciens Egyptians,” Zeitschrift für Ägyptische Sprache und Altertumskunde 99 (1972): 41–48; F. Jonckheere, “La circoncision des anciens Egyptians,” Centaurus 1 (1951): 212–34.

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mit dem Tempel gleichgesetzt (miqdƗšƗh). Ez 44,9 auch ein Text aus dem sechsten Jahrhundert, teilt mit Lam 1,10 dieselbe Auslegung des Idiomes “in die Gemeinde eintreten,” aber hier wird die Eintrittsformulierung selbst neu formuliert, um ihre Bedeutung näher festzulegen: “Er sollte nicht in mein Heiligtum eintreten” (lǀ’ yƗbô’ ’el miqdƗšî). Der Kontext ist eine Diskussion der unbeschnittenen Fremden, die nicht in Jhwhs Tempel eintreten dürfen. Unbeschnittene Fremde, die Israel bewohnen, sind implizit einbezogen unter diesen ausgeschlossenen Ausländern. Das dritte Beispiel der kultischen Auslegung des Idiomes lässt sich in Jes 56,3–7 finden. Die kultische Interpretation ist hier schwerer zu begründen, weil kein wörtliches Zitat oder neue Darlegung des Idiomes von Dtn 23,4–9 vorliegt. Trotzdem scheint mir, dass der Autor von Jes 56,3–7 auf die Verbote von sowohl Dtn 23,2 (betreffend Männer mit beschädigten Geschlechtsteilen) als auch 23,4– 9 anspielt.12 Er debattiert tatsächlich mit seinen Zeitgenossen, die eine einschränkende Auslegung von Dtn 23,4–9 verfechten.13 Der Autor weist auf ein zeitgemäßes Lesen des Verbots hin, wenn er vorschlägt, dass beide, der Eunuch und der fromme Fremde, in den Tempel eintreten dürfen, selbst wenn seine Gegner nicht überzeugt sind. Es ist offensichtlich, dass der Eintritt in den Tempel der frommen Fremden in Jes 56,7 das Hauptthema ist: “Ich werde sie zu meinem heiligen Berge bringen,” // “und werde sie in meinem Bethaus erfreuen.” Dasselbe ist impliziert in dem Vers 5 in Bezug auf den Eunuch, der ein Denkmal in dem Tempel (yƗd wƗšƝm) erhalten wird. Eine zweite Auslegung des Idiomes “in die Gemeinde eintreten,” die wirklich nur eine neue Darlegung der kultischen Interpretation ist, entsteht aus Jes 52,1. Dieser Text sagt, dass “die unbeschnittene Person, die unrein ist,” oder, weniger wahrscheinlich meiner Meinung nach, “die unbeschnittene Person und die unreine Person,” nie wieder in die heilige Stadt Jerusalem, eintreten wird/werden (kî lǀ’ yôsîp yƗbǀ’ bƗk ‘ôd ‘ƗrƝl wƟt́ƗmƝ’). Hier macht der Text eine eindeutige Anspielung auf Dtn 23,4–9. Er benutzt eine veränderte Eintrittsformulierung (lǀ’ yƗbǀ’ bƟ-) und erwähnt die fremden Männer, obgleich die Ausländer von Jes 52,1 nicht beschnittene nahe Nachbarn sind wie in Dtn 23,4–9, sondern Fremde, die unbeschnitten sind und – wahrscheinlich dem Texte zufolge – verunreinigt sind, wenn wir ein komplexes einziges Subjekt lesen, wie ich es vorziehe —————

12 Siehe Joachim Schaper, “Rereading the Law: Inner-Biblical Exegesis of Divine Oracles in Ezekiel 44 and Isaiah 56,” in Recht und Ethik im Alten Testament. Beiträge des Symposiums “Das Alte Testament und die Kultur der Moderne” anlässlich des 100. Geburtstags Gerhard von Rads (1901–1971), Heidelberg, 18.–21. Oktober 2001 (ed. Bernard Levinson und Eckart Otto; Altes Testament und Moderne 13; Münster: LIT Verlag, 2004), 133. 13 Schaper behauptet überzeugend, dass Jes 56,4–7 der einschränkenden Auslegung von Ezek 44,6–9 entgegengesetzt ist (Schaper, “Rereading the Law,” 134).

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(anders ausgedrückt, ein Hendiadyoin).14 “Die Gemeinde Jhwhs,” die in Lam 1,10, Ez 44,9 und Jes 56,3–7 als Tempel verstanden wird, wird hier ausgelegt als die heilige Stadt Jerusalem. Daher wird in Jes 52,1 die Heiligkeit des Tempels auf die ganze Stadt ausgeweitet.15 Diese Auslegung ist ein Model für spätere Gruppen geworden, die einen ähnlichen Stand betreffend Jerusalem verfechten werden (die Tempelrolle aus Qumran ist ein hervorragendes Beispiel16). Eine dritte Interpretation des Idioms “in die Gemeinde eintreten,” begegnet erstmals in Texten des fünften Jahrhunderts und ist wesentlich verschieden von der ersten und zweiten Auslegung. Dieser Auslegung zufolge bezeichnet das Idiom “in die Gemeinde Jhwhs eintreten” nicht den Tempel oder die Stadt. Stattdessen bedeutet es ein Mitglied der Israeliten zu sein oder zu werden und verweist auf Ausländerinnen, die mit israelitischen Männern verheiratet sind, und ihre Kinder. Die Heirat der israelitischen Männer mit fremden Frauen wird in mehreren Texten aus dem fünften Jahrhundert angegriffen. Die Autoren dieser Texte benutzen Dtn 23,4–9 und Dtn 7,3–4, um eine heftige Polemik gegen solche Heiraten zu entwickeln.17 Der Rückbezug auf Dtn 23,4–9 in Texten wie Neh 13,1–3 und Esr 9,12 legt die Wichtigkeit dieses Textes während des fünften Jahrhunderts nahe. In Neh 13,1–3 wird Dtn 23,4–9 paraphrasiert und so verstanden, dass die gemeinschaftliche Exklusion der Kinder von Ausländerinnen mit israelitischen Männern gefordert wird. In Esr 9,12 wird auf Dtn 23,7 (“Du sollst nie ihren Frieden noch ihr Bestes suchen dein Leben lang”) und auf Dtn 7,3 angespielt (Mischehenverbot). In dieser Kombination werden beide Gesetzestexte herangezogen, um die Heirat zwischen fremden Frauen und Israeliten anzugreifen. Auf diese Weise verschiebt der Autor von Esr 9,12 den Fokus von Dtn 23,4–9 von fremden Männern aus vier besonderen Völkern hin zu Ausländerinnen im Allgemeinen.

—————

14 Ein Großteil von Jes 52,1 wiederholt oder überarbeitet Nah 2,1 (Benjamin D. Sommer, A Prophet Reads Scripture: Allusion in Isaiah 40–66 [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998], 82–83). Daher legt das singuläre Subjekt von Nah 2,1 (bƟliyya‘al) ein komplexes einziges Subjekt (ein Hendiadyoin) in Jes 52,1 nahe. 15 Siehe Sommer, A Prophet Reads Scripture, 83–84, 245 der diese Idee Menahem Harans zitiert hat. 16 Z.B. 11Q19 xlv 11–18. 17 Michael Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 115–21, 123–28.

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III. Wem gilt dieses Verbot? Ich habe die These entwickelt, dass es dem Autor von Dtn 23,4–9 darum ging, den sozialen Status von ammonitischen, moabitischen, edomitischen und ägyptischen Einwanderern und ihren männlichen Nachkommen in Israel zu bestimmen. Der dritten Generation der edomitischen und ägyptischen Einwanderer wird erlaubt, “in die Gemeinde Jhwhs einzutreten.” Am ehesten will dieser Ausdruck besagen, ein ständiger fremder Bewohner (gƝr) wie Deuteronomium den Begriff versteht, zu werden. Weniger wahrscheinlich bedeutet der Ausdruck, in den Tempel einzutreten. Dagegen darf der männliche Nachkomme des ammonitischen oder moabitischen Einwanderers nie in die Gemeinde Jhwhs eintreten. Dtn 23,4–9 erwähnt nur diese vier fremden Gruppen; es gibt keine Ambiguität bezüglich der Personen, von denen der Text spricht. Trotzdem zeigen die behandelten Belege, dass die Ausleger des sechsten und fünften Jahrhunderts hinsichtlich der Bedeutung des Gesetzes und der Identität der Personen, von denen es spricht, nicht miteinander übereinstimmten. Einige Ausleger dachten, dass sich das Gesetz auf Ausländerinnen und sogar auf die Kinder von Israeliten mit fremden Frauen beziehe. Was die Männer betrifft, spiegeln die Texte aus dem sechsten und fünften Jahrhundert ebenfalls eine große Bandbreite von Auslegungen wider. Einige Texte legen nahe, dass das Gesetz sich auf alle Ausländer bezieht. Andere Texte meinen dagegen, dass das Gesetz spezifisch unbeschittene Fremde betrifft. Obgleich wir wenig über die sozialen Kontexte wissen, die diese Auslegungen hervorgebracht haben könnten, können wir über die Interpretationen selbst sprechen. Dass das Gesetz sich auf alle männlichen Ausländer bezieht, ist in der Interpretation von Dtn 23,4–9 in Jes 56,3–7 impliziert. Jes 56,3–7 spielt auf eine solche Bedeutungserweiterung von Dtn 23,4–9 an und weist sie ab. Diese Erweiterung legt einen sozialen Kontext nahe, in dem der Zutritt aller fremden Männer zum Tempel zur Diskussion stand. Die Idiome, die der Text benutzt (z.B. ben-nƝkƗr) und die Tatsache, dass die anderen ausgeschlossenen Personen auf die der Text verweist, nämlich die Eunuchen, offensichtlich männlich sind, legen nahe, dass Jes 56,3–7 sich nur auf männliche Fremde bezieht. Lam 1,10 könnte auch implizit auf alle fremde Männer anspielen, allerdings ist dies nicht eindeutig. Lam 1,10 erklärt, dass “Völker” in Jhwhs Tempel in Jerusalem eingetreten sind. Wahrscheinlich denkt der Autor an die Babylonier, weil es Berichte gibt, dass diese den Tempel geplündert und verbrannt haben (2 Kön 25,9.13–18). Aber der Autor könnte auch andere Völker, wie die Edomiter, einbeziehen, da mehrere Texte die Edomiter in Jerusalems Niedergang einschließen (z.B. Ps 137,7; Ob 13). Deshalb könnte Lam 1,10 wie auch Jes 56,3–7 ein allgemei-

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nes Verbot des Tempelbesuchs fremder Männer widerspiegeln, das sich auf eine generalisierte Lesung von Dtn 23,4–9 stützt. Wie schon erwähnt verstehen mehrere andere Texte aus dem sechsten Jahrhundert das Verbot in Dtn 23,4–9 in Bezug auf unbeschnittene Fremde, und stehen so im Gegensatz zu dem Verbot selbst, welches auf vier beschnittene fremde Gruppen verweist. Unter den verbotenen unbeschnittenen Ausländern sind nach Ez 44,9 alle diejenigen, die Israel bewohnen. In Ez 44,7 werden die Israeliten verurteilt, weil sie solche Ausländer in Jhwhs Tempel eintreten lassen. Jes 52,1 richtet sich ähnlich gegen den Eintritt der unbeschnittenen Ausländer in die Stadt Jerusalem. Der Grund, warum die Autoren von Jes 52,1 und Ez 44,7.9 die unbeschnittenen Fremden in den Mittelpunkt stellen, ist völlig unklar. Die Tatsache, dass ältere Gesetze unbeschnittene fremde Männer von dem Tempel und der Gemeinschaft nicht ausdrücklich ausschließen, mag ein Grund sein. Während des sechsten Jahrhunderts, als die Debatte über die Beschneidung als Grenzmarkierung offensichtlich hitzig geführt wurde, haben die Verfechter der Ausschließung Unbeschnittener Dtn 23,4–9 benutzt, um ihren Standpunkt zu untermauern, obwohl der Text den Status der unbeschnittenen Fremden gar nicht erwähnt. Es gibt schließlich die Texte aus dem fünften Jahrhundert, wie Esr 9,12 und Neh 13,1–3, deren Autoren Dtn 23,4–9 umfangreich ausgelegt haben, um ihre Opposition gegen die Heirat zwischen Ausländerinnen und Israeliten zu rechtfertigen. Der Autor von Neh 13,1–3 liest in Dtn 23,4–9 offensichtlich den Ausschluss der Kinder von Ausländerinnen mit israelitischen Männern aus der Gemeinde hinein. Dies ist eine sehr radikale Auslegung, weil die Überlieferung, dass die Identität des Vaters auch die Identität seiner Kinder festlegt, in Israel tief begründet ist. Neh 13,1–3 zufolge werden die Kinder der israelitischen Väter mit fremden Müttern wie Fremde klassifiziert, und deshalb sollten sie von der Gemeinde ausgeschlossen werden. Wie schon erwähnt, verbindet der Autor von Esr 9,12 die beiden Gesetzestexte Dtn 23,7 und Dtn 7,3, um seine Polemik gegen die Heirat zwischen fremden Frauen und Israeliten zu stützen.18 Sein Ziel ist, die Ausländerinnen von der Gemeinschaft auszuschließen.

————— 18

Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation, 115–21, 123–28.

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IV. Binäre Oppositionen, Exklusion und einige abschließende Bemerkungen Mehrere Autoren des sechsten und fünften Jahrhunderts, die versucht haben, Dtn 23,4–9 neuartig und generalisierend auszulegen, haben einige implizite und explizite binäre Oppositionen eingeführt, um ihre Argumente zu stützen. Es gibt auch einen Text (Jes 56,3–7) worin ein Vertreter der Integration von Fremden die binäre Rhetorik der Gegner einer Inklusion derselben benutzt, um seine Meinung zu verfechten. Ich werde zwei solche Oppositionen betrachten: heilig/profan und unrein/rein. Obwohl die Bedeutung des Idiomes “in die Gemeinde Jhwhs eintreten” nicht eindeutig ist, verstehen mehrere Ausleger des sechsten Jahrhunderts “die Gemeinde Jhwhs” als den Tempel Jerusalems oder die Stadt selbst; und beide, Tempel und Stadt, werden als heilig verstanden. Durch eine Betonung der Heiligkeit des Tempels oder der Stadt können die Vertreter der Exklusion die Ausländer als Bedrohung des Kultus kennzeichnen. Nach Ez 44,7 ist der unbeschnittene Fremde, aufgrund seiner Präsenz im Tempel, eine Person, die die Heiligkeit profaniert: “Wenn ihr Ausländer mit unbeschnittenem Fleisch in mein Heiligtum bringt, profaniert ihr es.” Die ungesetzliche Profanierung der Heiligkeit, die ein Kapitalverbrechen gegen Jhwh darstellt, wird in diesem Text mit dem unbeschnittenen Fremden verbunden.19 Natürlich fehlt in Dtn 23,4–9 völlig das Thema der Heiligkeit und deren Bedrohungen. Durch die Verwendung der Opposition heilig/profan und der Verbindung der verwandten Idee der ungesetzlichen Profanierung einer heiligen Sache mit dem unbeschnittenen Fremden, ist der Autor von Ez 44,7 weit über den Inhalt von Dtn 23,4–9 hinausgegangen. Er hat seinen Angriff gegen die Ausländer in einer neuartigen und vielleicht sogar wirksamen Weise gestützt. Dieselbe Opposition heilig/profan ist impliziert in Jes 56,3– 7, aber hier versucht der Autor offensichtlich einer Verbindung aller männlichen Ausländer mit der Idee der Profanierung der Heiligkeit entgegenzuwirken; und es ist ihm hervorragend gelungen. In Jes 56,7 erklärt Jhwh, dass er nicht bloß den Zutritt der frommen Fremden zu seinem Tempel gestattet, sondern sie sogar selber in diesen heiligen Raum bringen wird. Im Gegensatz zu der Meinung des Autores eines Textes wie Ez 44,7, sucht der Autor dieses Textes durch seine Verwendung der autoritativen Stimme Jhwhs zu beweisen, dass Ausländer keine Bedrohung der Heiligkeit darstellen. Die Opposition unrein/rein könnte auch eine Rolle bei der Konstruktion der Polemik gegen die Fremden während des sechsten Jahrhunderts gespielt haben, wenn die Lesart eines Hendiadyoin in Jes 52,1 richtig ist. Jener ————— 19 Was die ungesetzlichen Profanierung einer heiligen Sache betrifft, siehe z.B. Olyan, Rites and Rank, 25–26.

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Lesart zufolge dürfen die unbeschnittenen Fremden, die unrein sind, nicht mehr in die heilige Stadt Jerusalem eintreten. Dieser Text stellt die unbeschnittenen Ausländer als Verunreiniger, die die Heiligkeit bedrohen, dar, und diese müssen daher vom heiligem Raum und dem Kontakt mit heiligen Sachen ausgeschlossen werden. Wie es bei der Profanierung der Heiligkeit der Fall ist, fehlt in Dtn 23,4–9 das Thema der Unreinheit. Vielmehr hat der Autor von Jes 52,1 die Oppositione unrein/rein eingeführt, um seine abgrenzende Polemik zu verstärken. Ehe ich schließe, möchte ich mich noch kurz zur Verwendung der Gesellschaftstheorie in biblischer Forschung äußern. Die theoretischen Zugänge zu den binären Oppositionen werden mein Fokus sein. Die Untersuchung der Art und Weise wie Menschen Realität ordnen, ist unter Sozialwissenschaftlern seit langer Zeit zentral, und die Diskussion der binären Klassifikation geht zurück bis zu frühen Soziologen wie Mauss, Durkheim und Hertz.20 Trotzdem gab es Meinungsverschiedenheiten unter den Forschern über die Art dieser binären Klassifikation. Die einen haben behauptet, dass die binäre Klassifikation eine universelle Praxis ist, eine Eigenschaft der Konstruktion des menschlichen Verstandes.21 Die anderen denken, dass es sich um eine kulturelle Praxis handelt, die weder universell noch innerhalb einer einzigen Gesellschaft dauerhaft belegt ist, und sie muss daher im Zusammenhang ausgelegt werden.22 Angesichts des Mangels an Beweisen für die Universalität der binären Klassifikation, haben die Wissenschaftler, die die binäre Klassifikation als ein kulturelles Phänomen betrachten, meiner Meinung nach die überzeugendere Argumentation geliefert. Auf alle Fälle haben viele Theoretiker argumentiert, dass die binäre Klassifikation eine soziale Hierarchie schaffen kann, wenn das eine Element des binären Paares dem anderen vorgezogen wird.23 Die häufige Verbindung der binären Klassifikation mit sozialer Hierarchie wird von den Belegen, die ich besprochen habe, unterstützt. Die Einführung der Idee eines heiligen Tempels oder einer heiligen Stadt, die durch den Eintritt der unbeschnittenen Ausländer profaniert werden, stigmatisiert jene Fremden als eine Bedro-

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Emile Durkheim und Marcel Mauss, “De quelques formes primitives de classification: Contribution à l’étude des representations collectives,” Année sociologique 6 (1901/1902):1–72; Robert Hertz, “La prééminence de la main droite: Étude sur la polarité religieuse,” Revue philosophique 68 (1909):553–80. 21 Z.B. Claude Lévi-Strauss, Anthropologie structurale (Paris: Plon, 1958) und La pensée sauvage (Paris: Plon, 1962). 22 Z.B. Jack Goody, The Domestication of the Savage Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 52–111. 23 Siehe z.B. Catherine Bell, Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 101–104.

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hung der Heiligkeit und marginalisiert sie.24 Die Klassifikation der unbeschnittenen Ausländer als Verunreiniger hat eine ähnliche Wirkung. Deshalb werden die Fremden, die angeblich verunreinigen oder profanieren, auf neue Art und Weise als minderwertige Personen klassifiziert, die aus der Gemeinde ausgeschlossen werden müssen. Wenn ich die Gesellschaftstheorie nicht kennen würde, besonders die Theorie der binären Klassifikation und ihrer Funktionen, würde ich nicht erkennen, auf welche Art und Weise die Einführung der Oppositionen heilig/profan und unrein/rein exilische und nachexilische Standpunkte der Exklusivität stärkt. Daher kann die Gesellschaftstheorie uns helfen, Muster in unseren Belegen, die wir sonst nicht bemerkt hätten, zu erkennen. Dies ist ein Grund, warum die Gesellschaftstheorie nützlich ist. Jedoch denke ich auch, dass die Theorie unsere Schlüsse nicht vorbestimmen sollte. Kurz gesagt, ist es die Verantwortung des Forschers, die Theorie nicht auf mechanische Weise zu gebrauchen, sondern produktiv damit zu arbeiten. Man sollte sich von ihr inspirieren lassen, aber man sollte sie auch kritisch einschätzen und gegebenenfalls verbessern, wenn ihre Unzulänglichkeiten offensichtlich werden.25

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24 Zur gesellschaftlichen Stigmatisierung und Marginalisierung siehe z.B. Brenda Major and Collette P. Eccleston, “Stigma and Social Exclusion,” in Social Psychology of Inclusion and Exclusion (ed. Dominic Abrams et al.; New York: Psychology Press, 2005), 63–87. 25 Siehe weiter Olyan, Biblical Mourning: Ritual and Social Dimensions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 5; Robert R. Wilson, Sociological Approaches to the Old Testament (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), 28–29.

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Mary Douglas’s Holiness/Wholeness Paradigm: Its Potential for Insight and its Limitations

In her influential essay “The Abominations of Leviticus,” published in 1966 in the volume Purity and Danger, Mary Douglas introduced what I have chosen to call the holiness/wholeness paradigm, in which she links the idea of holiness directly with physical wholeness or completeness.1 Though criticized in its details, the paradigm has been profitably elaborated and modified by biblical scholars, and core aspects of it remain influential.2 It is my purpose in this paper to explore the paradigm’s potential for insight as well as its limitations, and to suggest some ways in which it might be reconfigured in order to explain better the biblical data concerning physical wholeness. In her exploration of the concept of holiness in “The Abominations of Leviticus,” Douglas noted the biblical emphasis on wholeness and completeness, and linked these directly to the holy. For Douglas, “holiness is exemplified by completeness”; in fact, “the idea of holiness was given an external, physical expression in the wholeness of the body seen as a perfect —————

1 Mary Douglas, “The Abominations of Leviticus,” in Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (1966; London: Ark, 1984), 41–57. Though Douglas focuses mostly on physical forms of wholeness, she also includes non-somatic examples in her discussion. On these, see further n. 26. 2 For two important examples of the influence of core aspects of the paradigm, see, e.g., Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16 (New York: Doubleday, 1991), 721: “To be sure, her definition of the term ‘Holy as wholeness and completeness’ … is justified …”; G. J. Wenham, The Book of Leviticus (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1979), 23–25, 169: “In our Introduction[] it was suggested that the notion underlying holiness and cleanness was wholeness and normality.” See also Philip J. Budd, “Holiness and Cult,” in The World of Ancient Israel: Sociological, Anthropological and Political Perspectives (ed. Ronald E. Clements; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 286–90 for synopsis and analysis of reactions to Douglas’s ideas about wholeness and holiness, mainly in relation to the dietary laws. Especially notable in this regard is Michael P. Carroll’s critique and reapplication using Levi-Strauss’s Nature/Culture binary (“One More Time: Leviticus Revisited,” Archives européennes de sociologie 19 [1978]: 339–46). See also Edmund R. Leach, “Anthropological Approaches to the Study of the Bible During the Twentieth Century,” in Structuralist Interpretations of Biblical Myth (eds. Edmund R. Leach and D. Alan Aycock; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 20–21, and Jean Duhaime, “Lois alimentaires et pureté corporelle dans le Lévitique. L’approche de Mary Douglas et sa reception par Jacob Milgrom,” Religiologiques 17 (1998): 19–35. On the dietary laws and the holiness/wholeness paradigm, see my discussion ahead, and in n. 15.

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container.” “To be holy is,” for Douglas, “to be whole.”3 In a later essay, “Deciphering a Meal,” Douglas reiterates this association of holiness with wholeness in a slightly different way: “The sanctity of cognitive boundaries is made known by valuing the integrity of the physical forms.”4 In both “The Abominations of Leviticus” and “Deciphering a Meal,” Douglas understands wholeness as an articulation of holiness: it is an “external, physical expression” of it; it exemplifies it; it makes it known. In short, wholeness is understood as a communicator of holiness. In her more recent work Leviticus as Literature, Douglas reiterates the core ideas of the paradigm: “Only the perfect body is fit to be consecrated, no animal with a blemish may be sacrificed, no priest with a blemished body shall approach the altar …”5 Certainly there is more than a little evidence to support a linkage between the holy and the whole in the biblical text. Nearly all sacrificial animals presented before Yhwh had to be “without (physical) ‘defect’” (kolmûm lǀ’ yihyeh-bô) or “whole” (tƗmîm) according to Lev 22:17–24.6 That most if not all of these sacrifices were sanctified is suggested by a variety of data, including the common label “holy things” or “holy foods” (qodƗšîm) used of offerings reserved for the priests and, in some cases, their dependents, and by characterizations such as “the holy foods which the children of Israel have sanctified to Yhwh” (Lev 22:3). Other texts suggest that offerings not formally classed as qodƗšîm were also sanctified. Lev 19:8 (H) states clearly that the well being offering (šƟlƗmîm) is holy, and Lev 7:19–21 (P), which restricts the eating of the meat of the well being offering only to clean persons, and threatens those who would violate this restriction with termination of lineage (kƗrƝt), suggests as much.7 The link between holiness and wholeness is also evident in Deut 15:19–23, which commands the sanctification of first-born male sacrificial animals to Yhwh. The exceptions to the rule of sanctification are those male cattle, sheep and goats with a “defect” (mûm). According to this text, such animals are not to be brought to the sanctuary and sacrificed; instead, they are to be treated as nonsacrificial game animals are treated, eaten in settlements by the unclean and clean alike after their blood is removed. The fact that persons who are un————— 3

Douglas, “Abominations,” 51–52, 53, 54. Mary Douglas, “Deciphering a Meal,” Daedalus 101 (1972):61–81; 76–77 for the quotation. Here, she emphasizes the value placed on wholeness. 5 Mary Douglas, Leviticus as Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 46. 6 I shall discuss the few exceptions ahead. 7 To Lev 7:19–21 one might compare Lev 22:3 (H), which uses very similar wording to speak of the punishment of those priests who have contact with a holy food while unclean. If the well being offering’s meat were not sanctified according to P, there would be no need to regulate the purity status of those who have contact with it (cf. Deut 15:22). 4

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clean may eat sacrificial animals with “defects” indicates clearly that they are not understood to be holy, for that which is holy must be guarded from pollution, and the text permits unclean persons to eat defective animals. Thus, according to Deut 15:19–23, first-born male sacrificial animals with a “defect” remain unsanctified because they are not whole. Holiness and somatic wholeness are also related in Lev 21:17–23, which requires priests who offer sacrifices to Yhwh and priests of the high priestly line who approach the curtain of the holy of holies to be “defect”-free (=whole): “But to the curtain he shall not come, nor shall he approach the altar, for he has a “defect” (mûm); he shall not profane (wƟlǀ’ yƟh̡allƝl) my sanctuaries, for I, Yhwh, sanctify them” (v. 23). That priests are holy according to Leviticus 21 is indicated in v. 7 (“For holy is he [the priest] to his god”) and in v. 8 (“You shall treat him as sacred, for the food of your god he brings near …”). As has been pointed out, Douglas, who also spoke of sacrificial animals and priests in her treatments, was not correct to claim that all sacrificial animals, all priests and all worshipers had to be physically whole, without “defect,” to gain access to the sanctuary.8 Lev 22:23 allows the sacrifice of animals with two specific “defects” (probably limbs of uneven length) as free-will offerings9; Lev 21:22 permits priests with “defects” to remain in the temple and eat holy and most holy foods10; Deut 23:2 likely forbids men with genital damage from entering the temple, and 2 Sam 5:8b may bear witness to a proscription of worshipers with “defects,” but no text clearly bans all blemished worshipers, and—interestingly—no text in the P/H tradition even hints at any prohibition of worshipers with “defects.”11 Douglas was also incorrect to suggest—at least as I read her—that sacrifices, priests, ————— 8

E.g., “Abominations,” 51: “Much of Leviticus is taken up with stating the physical perfection that is required of things presented in the temple and of persons approaching it.” For a detailed critique of Douglas on this matter, see, e.g., Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 720–21. Milgrom’s “reception” of Douglas is discussed at length by Duhaime, “Lois alimentaires.” 9 On the specific “defects” in question (ĞƗrûa‘, qƗlût́), see the discussion of Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22 (New York: Doubleday, 2000), 1878. H, the group responsible for Lev 22:23, appears to rank freewill offerings lower than vows and, by implication, thanksgiving offerings, given that animals with these “defects” are only acceptable as freewill offerings. Compare P, which apparently ranks the thanksgiving offering above the vow and the freewill offering (Lev 7:15–16). Milgrom’s critique of Douglas misses the fact that Lev 22:23 allows this exception regarding defective sacrificial animals: “The altar … is served only by whole (unblemished) animals and priests …” (Leviticus 1–16, 721). 10 This point is also noted by Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 721. For the holy and most holy foods, offerings reserved for the priests and their dependents, see, besides Lev 21:22, Lev 22:2–7, 10–13 and Num 18:8–19. 11 On Deut 23:2 and its probable reference to entering the sanctuary, and on the adage of 2 Sam 5:8b, see my discussion in Rites and Rank: Hierarchy in Biblical Representations of Cult (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 107–111.

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worshipers and soldiers are all constructed as holy by biblical sources.12 Certainly priests are hallowed, as are most if not all sacrifices, but according to P, the possession of sanctity distinguishes priests from all other Israelites, including worshipers and soldiers (e.g., Exod 29:33; Num 16:1– 17:5).13 Finally, Douglas tends to blur the biblical distinction between a lack of somatic wholeness (i.e., having a “defect” [mûm]), and impurity. This is clear in her classification of the “leper” and the parturient, both polluters, with persons and sacrificial animals that have “defects” (mûmîm). Though the “leper” and parturient are unclean, their pollution does not render them “defective” (=not whole), and therefore, they ought not to have been included in Douglas’s discussion. The same is true of persons with bodily discharges and priests polluted by corpse contact, both mentioned by Douglas among those who are not whole.14 One might add that unclean animals also have nothing necessarily to do with that which is defective, and clean animals are holy only when designated for sacrifice, if then.15 Even given these weaknesses in Douglas’s formulation, the link she established between holiness and physical wholeness is nonetheless evidenced, though not to the degree and with the consistency that she claimed. The holiness/wholeness paradigm has been elaborated in recent years by a number of biblical scholars in ways that suggest its continued utility. I shall speak of three specific examples of its elaboration, in order of their appearance in the scholarly literature.16 In a 1996 article published in Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, I argued that Douglas’s holiness/wholeness paradigm is evidenced in biblical materials even more extensively than she had suggested.17 My focus was the stones of the altar in Exod 20:25 and Deut 27:5–6, as well as the stones of the temple in 1 Kgs 6:7. Exod 20:25 forbids an altar made of ashlar (cut stone), warning that —————

12 See, e.g., Douglas, “Abominations,” 51, regarding soldiers: “The army could not win without the blessing and to keep the blessing in the camp they had to be specially holy.” The notion that worshipers are holy is implicit in Douglas’s treatment. 13 On Num 16:1–17:5 as a P text, see Olyan, Rites and Rank, 136 n. 63. On H’s view of the sanctity of Israel (contrast P), see Olyan, ibid., 121–22. 14 Douglas, “Abominations,” 51. 15 As is well known, Douglas analyzes the biblical dietary laws in the context of her development of the holiness/wholeness paradigm (Douglas, “Abominations,” 54–57). It is noteworthy that this particular aspect of her treatment has elicited such a spirited and often positive response from biblical scholars, given its problematic relationship to biblical discourses on wholeness and holiness. 16 Other examples of elaboration or modification could be discussed. See, e.g., the papers of Budd and Carroll cited in n. 2. I chose the three examples I discuss because they illustrate well a number of the ways in which Douglas’s paradigm might be supported through elaboration. My critique of her formulation follows. 17 Saul M. Olyan, “Why an Altar of Unfinished Stones? Some Thoughts on Ex 20,25 and Dtn 27,5–6,” ZAW 108 (1996):161–71.

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working altar stones with a tool profanes them: “If you wield your tool upon it, you profane it (wattƟh̡alƟlehƗ).”18 This statement indicates that according to Exod 20:25, altar stones, like most sacrifices and like priests, are sanctified. If this were not the case, the stones would not be subject to profanation. (Profanation transforms that which is holy into that which is common.) Deut 27:5–6, elaborating upon Exod 20:25, also forbids the use of a tool (explicitly iron) on the stones; it refers to the uncut stones from which the altar is to be built as “whole stones” (’ăbƗnîm šƟlƝmôt). Thus, the unworked “whole stones” of Deut 27:6 parallel the uncut holy stones of Exod 20:25. This suggests a connection between the wholeness of the uncut altar stones and their holiness, which is lost according to Exod 20:25 if they are worked with a tool. If I am correct about this connection, then we can compare Deut 15:21. Just as male first-born sacrificial animals with a “defect” are not sanctified according to Deut 15:21, so altar stones that lose their wholeness lose their holiness. In both instances, that which is whole is understood to be holy, and that which lacks wholeness is treated as common. According to 1 Kgs 6:7, the temple, like the altar of Deut 27:6, was to be constructed from “whole stone” (’eben šƟlƝmâ). The verse alludes directly to Deut 27:5–6 by mentioning “whole stone” and noting the absence of iron tools when the temple was built. Yet 1 Kgs 6:7 concerns the building of the temple, not the erection of the altar. It apparently applies the altar law to the construction of the temple, thereby elaborating upon it. Is the whole stone used to erect the temple holy? Though not stated explicitly, the whole stone may well be assumed to be sanctified by the text, given that the altar stones in the same D tradition appear to be (Deut 27:5–6, elaborating upon Exod 20:25), and given that other, non-D texts (e.g., P) understand the various implements of the sanctuary complex to be holy (e.g., Exod 30:22–29). A second, recent elaboration of the holiness/wholeness paradigm is Jacob Milgrom’s notion of “blemished time,” introduced in his analysis of the festivals of Leviticus 23.19 Building explicitly upon my treatment of the altar stones, and implicitly on Douglas’s original articulation of the holiness/wholeness paradigm, Milgrom argues for an analogy between sacred items and sacred time: “Just as the altar must be whole, so must sacred time. As human activity with stone desecrates the altar, so does human activity in time: work. Both space and time in their holy dimension must remain in their natural state; they may not be blemished or desecrated by human labor. To be sure, blemished time is an abstraction. It is not visible, as are blemished space and the changed appearance of a blemished priest, ————— 18 19

Here I translate h̡ereb as “tool” rather than sword, given the context. Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27 (New York: Doubleday, 2000), 1978–9.

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sacrificial animal, or altar …”20 Milgrom understands the Sabbath (hallowed time) as metaphorically whole and subject to “blemish” and desecration via human labor just as holy items such as altar stones are subject to a loss of wholeness and sacredness through being worked with a tool. Susan Niditch’s use of the paradigm to illuminate the proscription of priestly hair cutting and high priestly hair manipulation of any sort in mourning contexts is a third, recent example of elaboration.21 Why must priests eschew shaving rites and high priests the manipulation of intact hair after the death of a close relative? The answer given by the text, as Niditch points out, is priestly holiness.22 Citing Douglas’s point that holiness is related to somatic wholeness, Niditch argues that “the priest needs to maintain bodily boundaries demarcated by intact hair and body.” Thus, she elaborates upon Douglas’s paradigm, arguing that holiness requires wholeness of hair as well as that of body. (Douglas had mentioned the bodies of priests in relation to “defects” [mûmîm], but had said nothing about hair manipulation.) Niditch further develops her elaboration of the holiness/wholeness paradigm in her discussion of restrictions on the high priest. “The high priest is even more holy than the priest and thus his relation to death and the manipulation of hair in connection with death is even more circumscribed.” For the high priest, even disheveled hair “interrupt[s] his wholeness and holy status.”23 Whether or not one finds Niditch’s explanation of proscriptions on priestly and high priestly hair manipulation, Milgrom’s notion of “blemished time,” or my treatment of the stones of the altar and temple convincing, they illustrate well the impact of Douglas’s thinking on biblical scholarship as well as the potential utility of Douglas’s holiness/wholeness paradigm for explaining phenomena of the cult. What of the paradigm’s limitations? Douglas argued that wholeness expresses holiness in a physical way, that the valuing of integrity communicates sanctity, that “holiness is exemplified by completeness.” If I understand Douglas correctly, wholeness acquires its significance through its relationship to holiness, as an expression or embodiment of it. Thus, for Douglas, the privileging of wholeness is the result of its relationship to holiness. This view of wholeness strikes me as overly limited in scope, for integrity of form can be shown to be prioritized in the world of the biblical text apart from considerations of holiness. In short, wholeness is desirable ————— 20

Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 23–27, 1978–9. Susan Niditch, “My Brother Esau is a Hairy Man”: Hair and Identity in Ancient Israel (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 106–107. The prohibitions in question are to be found in Lev 21:5 and 10. 22 Niditch cites Lev 21:6 on the priest’s sanctification (“My Brother Esau,” 106); she could also have cited 21:15 on that of the high priest. 23 Niditch, “My Brother Esau,” 107. 21

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even in cases where holiness is not at issue. A prime example of this is the relationship between wholeness and beauty in a number of biblical texts. In each of the following examples, male or female beauty is discussed in a context completely removed from considerations of holiness. According to 2 Sam 14:25, Absalom’s beauty could not be matched in all Israel. He is described as “a handsome man” (’îš yƗpeh) and the text goes on to state that “from the bottom of his foot to the crown of his head, there was no ‘defect’ (mûm) in him.” Thus, for the author of this text, Absalom’s wholeness, indicated by his complete lack of physical “defects,” is emblematic of his beauty. The same notion that wholeness is emblematic of beauty is to be found in the Song of Songs. In 4:7, the male lover describes the appearance of his beloved: “You are completely beautiful, my companion,” // “There is no ‘defect’ (mûm) in you.” In 6:9, the female lover, praised as singular, is described as “my perfect one,” tammƗtî, an adjective treated as a substantive which is derived from the same root (tmm) as tƗmîm/tƟmîmâ, “whole,” the antithesis of defective; it is likely a reference to the female lover’s physical appearance.24 Finally, Dan 1:4, listing the attributes of the Judean youths to be recruited to Nebuchadnezzar’s court, includes both beauty of appearance (t́ôbê mar’eh) and a lack of “defects” (’ên bƗhem kol-mnjm). In all of these examples, wholeness is closely associated with beauty; in several, it is not only characteristic of the beautiful, it is emblematic of it. Douglas’s claim that “holiness is exemplified by completeness” could also be made about beauty as it is presented in texts such as 2 Sam 14:25 and Song 4:7. That which is whole is not necessarily understood to be beautiful or holy, but wholeness is not infrequently emblematic of both holiness and beauty.25 Given that the holiness/wholeness paradigm as formulated by Douglas does not account for the prioritization of wholeness apart from considerations of holiness, I propose to reformulate it with the focus shifted from holiness to wholeness: Physical wholeness may exemplify beauty or holiness.26 With this change of focus, the paradigm does a better job ex————— 24

Song 5:2 also has tammƗtî used in reference to the female lover. There are countless examples of whole persons, animals or things that are neither holy nor beautiful according to our texts. 26 There are other examples of the valuing of wholeness and completeness apart from considerations of holiness, but these tend to be non-somatic (e.g., Gen 6:9; 17:1, which use tƗmîm in a behavioral sense: “innocent,” “having integrity”). Douglas included non-physical examples of wholeness in her original formulation (e.g., “rectitude and straight dealing”), though she associated them incorrectly with holiness, which she tended to distribute too liberally (Douglas, “Abominations,” 52–53). Are there examples of wholeness exemplifying both beauty and holiness at the same time? Though no explicit examples of this exist to my knowledge, it may be implied by the evident association of defective, first-born sacrificial animals with both non-sanctification and ugliness in Deut 15:19–23. It is clear that according to this text, the whole, first-born sacrificial animal is to be sanctified; what remains unclear is whether it is also considered beautiful. 25

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plaining the evidence of the text. Douglas’s correct observation that wholeness exemplifies, expresses, makes known is preserved; her overly narrow notion of what wholeness communicates is jettisoned. The exceptions not accounted for by Douglas’s holiness/wholeness paradigm also suggest its limitations as an explanatory tool. As mentioned, the paradigm does not explain exceptional holy persons and animals that are not whole. Though a priest with a “defect” (mûm) may not approach the altar, and a potential high priest with a “defect” may not approach the curtain of the holy of holies, according to Lev 21:22, priests with “defects” retain access to the sanctuary and to holy items such as the holy and most holy foods: “The food of his god, from the most holy foods and from the holy foods, he may eat.” There is no hint in this text that the priest with a “defect” loses his sanctity, or loses access to all things holy. Quite the opposite. Likewise, according to Lev 22:23, sacrificial animals with certain, specific “defects” (likely limbs of uneven length) may be sacrificed to Yhwh as freewill offerings.27 Though some biblical texts that I have discussed suggest that a loss of wholeness results in a loss of holiness (e.g., Exod 20:25; Deut 27:5–6; Deut 15:21), or in loss of access to some holy space or holy items (Lev 21:23), this is not the case in every instance. How then are these exceptions to be explained? Though the priest with a “defect” does not lose his sanctification or his access to holy foods according to H, he does lose his access to the primary priestly activity: offering sacrifice. And though Lev 22:23 permits the offering of sacrificial animals with two particular “defects” as freewill offerings, it does not allow such animals to be presented to fulfill vows (or, by implication, as thanksgiving offerings). In other words, defective priests cannot perform central, elite rites, nor can defective sacrificial animals be presented as higher-ranked offerings according to Leviticus 21 and 22 (H). Though tolerated, these exceptional cases nonetheless point to the inferiority of that which is defective and the desirability of that which is whole. The exceptions, whatever their motivation, reiterate the ideal of wholeness as an attribute of the holy, but the fact that there are exceptions suggests that Douglas’s absolute claims (e.g., “To be holy is to be whole”) limit her paradigm’s utility as an explanatory tool. It is also important to point out that Douglas’s paradigm may be better supported by some biblical sources than by others, as the exceptions I have noted are both present only in H texts. When we look at D and the Book of the Covenant, no exceptions challenge the requirement of wholeness for holiness (Exod 20:25; Deut 27:5–6; 15:21). Though Douglas did not distin—————

27 That these are sanctified is likely given the witness of Lev 19:8 (H), which treats the well being offering as holy and subject to profanation, and the witness of Lev 22:21 (H), which classifies the free will offering as a type of well being offering (as does P: Lev 7:11–21).

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guish between biblical sources, it is important that we do so if we are to evaluate the utility of her paradigm with any insight.

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Section 5: Death, Burial, Afterlife, and their Metaphorical Uses

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Introduction

Aspects of death and afterlife in the biblical tradition have been a focus of much of my research during the past decade. Aside from my monograph Biblical Mourning, I have published a number of articles which focus on rites such as burial, disinterment and movement of the corpse; ideas of the afterlife; and the metaphorical uses made of such rites and notions in biblical texts. I am particularly interested in the relationship of death rites (including mourning) and ideas about the afterlife to social differentiation and status change, as well as to notions of honor and shame, gender conformity, and pollution. Of the four essays included in this section, three address cruces in specific biblical texts: Ezek 37:11; Ezek 37:12–14; and Isa 14:19. “‘We are Utterly Cut Off’: Some Possible Nuances of nigzarnû lƗnû in Ezek 37:11” (2003) may be read profitably with “Unnoticed Resonances of Tomb Opening and Transportation of the Remains of the Dead in Ezekiel 37:12–14” (2009). In these articles, I explore several aspects of the death and afterlife imagery of Ezekiel 37:1–14 and its implications. The claim that “we are utterly cut off,” placed in the mouths of exiled Judeans, suggests an understanding of exile as not unlike the afterlife as some (e.g., the author of Psalm 88) conceived of it: complete and total separation from Yhwh without recourse to the promises of his covenant with Israel. The exiles who are said to make this claim equate themselves with the dead, in contrast, implicitly, to “living” Judeans (=non-exiles) who can still worship Yhwh and hope in his future saving acts. I place this saying in the larger context of debates about the impact of the destruction of Jerusalem and the exile on understandings of Yhwh’s covenant with Israel. “Unnoticed Resonances of Tomb Opening and Transportation of the Remains of the Dead in Ezekiel 37:12–14” explores the use of the imagery of benevolent disinterment and transportation of the remains of the dead as a response to the saying “We are utterly cut off.” Far from no longer caring about them, Yhwh himself will raise the “dead” (and “buried”) exiles from their metaphoric tombs and transport them back to their land, thereby confirming his covenant loyalty (h̡esed). This is a striking metaphor, given the typical concern in Priestly and related materials to keep that which is polluting (e.g., the realia of death) far from Yhwh and his space. The third essay in this section, “Was the ‘King of Babylon’ Buried Before His Corpse Was Exposed? Some Thoughts on Isa 14:19” (2006) has as

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its focus the topos of malevolent tomb opening and transportation of the remains of the dead. Here, I argue that Isa 14:19 describes not an unburied “King of Babylon” who is exposed as punishment for depredations committed during his lifetime as scholars have generally assumed, but a previously interred “King of Babylon” who is exhumed and exposed in a manner intended to shame. Burial, tomb opening and movement of the remains of the dead are meant literally in Isa 14:19 and disinterment and transportation are undertaken with malevolent intent. In contrast, such acts in Ezek 37:12–14 are metaphorical, and the disinterment and transportation are motivated by and demonstrate Yhwh’s benevolence. In the fourth article, “Some Neglected Aspects of Israelite Interment Ideology” (2005), I reconstruct a rough hierarchy of burial (from most honorable and desirable to most shaming and undesirable) based mainly on biblical texts, speculate about why certain forms of burial are to be preferred over others, and consider once again the variety of context-dependent meanings ascribed to exhuming and transporting the remains of the dead. I discuss five types of burial: honorable interment in the family tomb; honorable burial in a substitute for the family tomb; honorable interment in someone else’s family tomb; various forms of shameful burial; and nonburial of the corpse. Burial, disinterment and movement of remains, whether literal or metaphorical, emerge in these essays as rites with profound implications for social differentiation and status change, given the close association of notions of honor and shame to the performance of such death rites.

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“We are Utterly Cut Off”: Some Possible Nuances of nigzarnû lƗnû in Ezek 37:11

Though the saying attributed to the whole house of Israel in Ezek 37:11 has attracted no small amount of attention from commentators, the nuances of its third element, nigzarnû lƗnû, have yet to be explored fully.1 A number of interpreters of Ezek 37:11 have pointed out the associations with death of Niphal gzr elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible. Some have cited Ps 88:6—a text in which the dead are described as “cut off” from the hand of Yhwh—as a significant parallel to nigzarnû lƗnû in Ezek 37:11. They have concluded that nigzarnû lƗnû, like the other elements of the saying, suggests that the people of Israel as a collectivity have been consigned or condemned to death.2 This interpretation is even reflected in the way in which many trans————— 1

The full saying and its introduction read as follows: hinnƝh ’ǀmƟrîm yƗbƟšû ‘as̞môtênû wƟ’ƗbƟdâ tiqwƗtƝnû nigzarnû lƗnû. An excellent discussion of the elements of the saying is to be found in Walther Zimmerli, Ezechiel (2 vols.; BKAT 13/2; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1969), 2:896–97, where parallels are listed. Also helpful are the treatments of Dieter Baltzer, Ezechiel und Deuterojesaja: Berührungen in der Heilswartung der beiden großen Exilspropheten (BZAW 212; Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1971), 101–106; Frank L. Hossfeld, Untersuchungen zu Komposition und Theologie des Ezechielbuches (FB 20; Würzburg: Echter, 1977), 382–86; and S. Ohnesorge, Jahwe gestaltet sein Volk neu: Zur Sicht der Zukunft Israels nach Ez 11,14–21; 20,1–44; 36,16–38; 37,1–14.15–28 (FB 64; Würzburg: Echter, 1991), 310–12. On the function of lƗnû in the expression nigzarnû lƗnû, see the discussion of Moshe Greenberg, Ezekiel 21–37: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB 22A; New York: Doubleday, 1997), 746. The versions reflect some struggle with the meaning of nigzarnû lƗnû. Compare LXX diapephǀnƝkamen, Tg. Jonathan ’ăbadnƗ’ lanƗ’; and Vg. abscissi sumus. 2 Greenberg (Ezekiel 21–37, 744–46) is a recent example. Zimmerli’s treatment is often cited by other commentators (e.g., Ronald M. Hals, Ezekiel [FOTL 19; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1989], 269). Zimmerli sums up the meaning of the saying in Ezek 37:11 as follows: “Israel … sieht sich im Geschehen von 587 endgültig zum Tode verurteilt” (Ezechiel, 897). See similarly Walther Eichrodt, Der Prophet Hezekiel. Kapitel 19–48 (ATD 22/2; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966), 357; John W. Wevers, Ezekiel (Century Bible; London: Thomas Nelson, 1969), 279; Manfred Görg, ʸʦʢ, TDOT 2:461; Baltzer, Ezechiel und Deuterojesaja, 104; Hossfeld, Untersuchungen zu Komposition, 363, 383–84; Ohnesorge, Jahwe gestaltet sein Volk, 311–12; and the works cited in the next note. Other texts associating the exiles with death include Ps 107:18: kol ’ǀkel tƟta‘Ɲb napšƗm || wayyaggî‘û ‘ad-ša‘ărê mƗwet. Israelite views of death and the afterlife have been the focus of considerable scholarly attention of late. On burial practices in Iron Age Judah, see Elizabeth Bloch-Smith, Judahite Burial Practices and Beliefs about the Dead (JSOTSup 123; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1992). On ancestor cults, see Theodore J. Lewis, Cults of the Dead in Ancient Israel and Ugarit (HSM 39; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989); Karel van der Toorn, Family Religion in Babylonia, Syria & Israel: Continuity & Change in the Forms of Religious Life (SH[C]ANE 7; Leiden: Brill, 1996), 206–35; Brian B. Schmidt, Israel’s Benefi-

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late nigzarnû lƗnû (e.g., “We are cut off [from life]” or “We are as good as dead”).3 Certainly this expression seems to associate exiled Judeans with death, as many scholars recognize; but might it imply something about Judeans beyond that basic association? Might this statement suggest something, for instance, about the state of exiled Judah’s covenantal relationship with Yhwh? Might it be saying something about the possibility of cultic devotion to Yhwh in Babylon? Are there other potential nuances of nigzarnû lƗnû that remain unrecognized by scholars? My investigation will focus on several possible implications of the expression nigzarnû lƗnû preserved in the popular saying of Ezek 37:11.4 The associations of Niphal gzr with death are easily established. Aside from Ezek 37:11, three of the five remaining secure attestations in the He————— cent Dead: Ancestor Cult and Necromancy in Ancient Israelite Religion and Tradition (FAT 11; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr/Paul Siebeck, 1994; repr., Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 1996); and Lewis’s critique of Schmidt’s position in “How Far Can Texts Take Us? Evaluating Textual Sources for Reconstructing Ancient Israelite Beliefs about the Dead,” in Sacred Time, Sacred Place: Archaeology and the Religion of Israel (ed. Barry M. Gittlen; Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2002), 189–202. On necromancy, see Josef Tropper, Nekromantie: Totenbefragung im Alten Orient und im Alten Testament (AOAT 223; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag; Kevelaer: Butzon & Bercker, 1989). On the afterlife, see, e.g., Nicholas J. Tromp, Primitive Conceptions of Death and the Nether World in the Old Testament (BibOr 21; Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1969); and Lewis, “How Far Can Texts Take Us?,” 183–85. 3 “We are as good as dead” is the translation of JB. For “we are cut off from life,” see Rainer Albertz, Religionsgeschichte Israels in alttestamentlicher Zeit (2 vols.; GAT 8; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1992), 2:417 and Bernhard Lang, Ezechiel: Der Prophet und das Buch (Erträge der Forschung 153; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1981), 113 (“wir sind [vom Leben] abgeschnitten”). See, similarly, Meindert Dijkstra (“The Valley of Dry Bones: Coping with the Reality of the Exile in the Book of Ezekiel,” in The Crisis of Israelite Religion [ed. Bob Becking and Marjo C. A. Korpel; Oudtestamentische Studiën 42; Leiden: Brill, 1999], 121), who translates “we are totally cut off (from the land of the living).” 4 It is likely that this saying, which is attributed to the whole people, like other sayings of an exilic cast preserved in the prophetic corpus about the people, the land, Jerusalem and the Davidic dynasty, must have had currency among some Judeans at some point after 587 BCE (cf. Zimmerli, Ezechiel, 891, who is far more specific in his attribution [the prophet’s circle]). The attribution of the saying to the whole House of Israel is likely a secondary, literary development. Compare other, similar sayings attributed to the whole people or to a plurality in Jer 31:29; Ezek 18:2; Jer 32:36, 43; 33:23. Many scholars seem to assume that Ezek 37:11 preserves a genuine popular saying, though not all do. The classic treatment of such “citations” is Hans W. Wolff, “Das Zitat im Prophetenspruch: Eine Studie zur prophetischen Verkündigungsweise,” in idem, Gesammelte Studien zum Alten Testament (Theologische Bücherei 22; Munich: Kaiser, 1964), 36–129. My interest here is in the phrase nigzarnû lƗnû itself and what it might have suggested to those among whom it had currency. I am not directly concerned with its literary function or that of the saying in which it is embedded, in Ezek 37:1–14, or in the larger work of Ezekiel. For this, see, e.g., the discussion of Baltzer, Ezechiel, 101–6. On vv. 11–14 as a disputation, see Zimmerli, Ezechiel, 888–89 and Daniel I. Block, The Book of Ezekiel. Chapters 25–48 (NICOT; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1998), 379–80. The issue of the unity of v. 11 and vv. 1–14 is dealt with by Rüdiger Bartelmus, “Textkritik, Literarkritik und Syntax. Anmerkungen zur neueren Diskussion um Ez 37,11,” BN 25 (1984): 55–64.

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brew Bible concern the dead or near dead (Isa 53:8; Ps 88:6; Lam 3:54).5 It can be argued that one of two other occurrences of Niphal gzr concerns a separation from the cult and from society analogous to death (2 Chr 26:21).6 Isa 53:8, describing Yhwh’s servant after his death, states that he was “cut off from the land of the living” (kî nigzar mƝ’eres̞ h̡ayyîm) and goes on in v. 9 to describe his sepulcher. Ps 88:6 characterizes the dead in the underworld as forgotten by Yhwh and “cut off” from the his hand (’ăšer lǀ’ zƟkartƗm ‘ôd // wƟhƝmmâ miyyƗdƟkƗ nigzƗrû). When the petitioner of Lam 3:54 believes he is about to die, he says “I am cut off” (nigzƗrtî). Thus, Niphal gzr can be used with the preposition min and a specific referent, or it can be used without min and referent to make a general statement.7 One can be “cut off” from the land of the living, from Yhwh’s hand, from the temple cult, or simply “cut off,” without further elaboration. One who is “cut off” (nigzƗr), either generally speaking or from something specific, is dead, nearly dead or in some condition understood to be socially and ritually analogous to death.8 But more can be said about Niphal gzr than this, and Psalm 88 is the richest text to examine in this regard. The underworld denizens of Psalm 88 are not only “cut off” from the hand of Yhwh; the text also states that Yhwh no longer remembers them (v. 6; ’ăšer lǀ’ zƟkartƗm ‘ôd). Verses 11–13 of the same psalm pose a series of rhetorical questions that anticipate the answer “no,” and these tell us more about the relationship of Yhwh to the dead according to the psalmist: Do you do wonders (pele’) for the dead? Do the Rephaim rise and praise you (yôdûkƗ)? Are your acts of covenant loyalty (h̡asdekƗ) spoken of in the grave,

————— 5

Ps 31:23 nigraztî minneged ‘ênêkƗ should also be mentioned. Several Hebrew manuscripts read nigzartî at this point, suggesting the possibility that nigraztî is a scribal error for nigzartî. It is more probable that grz is a biform of gzr. 6 In 2 Chr 26:21, Uzziah, the king of Judah, is said to have been afflicted with skin disease (s̞Ɨra‘at) until his death. He dwelt in a place set apart for those so afflicted, says the text, “for he was cut off from the House of Yhwh” (kî nigzar mibbêt yhwh). The use of the verb form nigzar here, given its uses elsewhere, suggests that Uzziah, while afflicted, possessed a ritual and social status analogous to that of the dead and mourners for the dead, who are separated from the sphere of the sanctuary. This interpretation finds some support in Lev 13:45–46, a text in which a person afflicted with skin disease must not only live apart from the community, but must appear as a mourner, with torn garments, hair unbound, and the upper lip covered. 7 On lƗnû in the expression nigzarnû lƗnû, see n. 1. 8 Greenberg states that Niphal gzr is used “to depict one who is dead and buried” (Ezekiel 21– 37, 745). This seems too specific, given the use of the verb to describe Uzziah’s separation from the temple cult after he contracts skin disease. I note as an aside that the Niphal of krt is sometimes used to suggest death, as in Gen 9:11: wƟlǀ’-yikkƗrƝt kol-bƗĞƗr ‘ôd mimmê hammabbûl. On this, see also Zeph 1:11; Zech 14:2. The Hiphil of krt is exceedingly common with the meaning “to kill,” “to exterminate.”

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Your faithfulness (’ƟmûnƗtƟkƗ) in the place of perishing? Are your wonders known in the darkness, Your righteous acts (s̞idqƗtƟkƗ) in the land of oblivion?

Not only does Yhwh no longer remember the dead, a striking claim in and of itself; he does nothing for them. They are cut off from his hand, which seems to mean that they exist in a realm beyond the bounds of his activity and, perhaps, his power.9 The dead, for their part, no longer speak of Yhwh’s wondrous acts, his acts of covenant loyalty, his faithfulness, presumably because they no longer benefit from them and do not remember that they once did.10 Nor do they offer Yhwh cultic praise.11 The underworld is described not only as a “place of perishing” but as a “land of oblivion” (’eres̞ nƟšiyyâ), presumably a reference to the forgotten actions, faithfulness and covenant loyalty of Yhwh.12 These claims are hardly unique to Psalm 88. Similar sentiments emphasizing the profound separation of the dead from Yhwh and the living are expressed in Isa 38:11, 18; Pss 6:6; 28:1; 30:10; 115:17–18; and Sir 17:27– 28, suggesting that these ideas about the dead must have enjoyed some degree of popularity over a significant period of time.13 In Isa 38:11, the ————— 9

That the dead are wholly unaffected by Yhwh’s actions is only one perspective on the relation of Yhwh to the dead and the underworld represented in the biblical anthology. It is contradicted by a number of biblical texts that emphasize the limitless nature of Yhwh’s agency, an agency reaching even to Sheol. These passages include 1 Sam 2:6; Hos 13:14; Amos 9:2–4 (especially v. 2); Ps 139:7–10 (especially v. 8); Job 26:6; and Prov 15:11, and may represent a revisionist viewpoint, as some scholars have argued. On this, see the discussion of Klaas Spronk, Beatific Afterlife in Ancient Israel and the Ancient Near East (AOAT 219; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag; Kevelaer: Butzon & Bercker, 1986), 72. Some have attempted to harmonize the two perspectives (e.g., Tromp, Primitive Conceptions, 197 and n. 102). By the middle of the second century BCE, belief in reward and punishment in the afterlife, sometimes including resurrection of the dead, would emerge in a variety of forms. On this, see Dan 12:1–3; 1 Enoch 22:1–14; 27:1–5; and the treatment of John J. Collins, Daniel (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 394–98. 10 Compare Ps 88:11, “Do you do wonders for the dead?” with 88:13, “Are your wonders known in the darkness?” The implication seems to be that because Yhwh does not do wonders for the dead, the wonders are not known in the underworld. 11 The root ydh (especially the Hiphil) is frequently used to indicate cultic praise of the deity. See the discussion in G. Mayer, ʤʣʩ, TDOT 5:431–39. For the use of ydh with hll, see Isa 38:18 ahead, as well as Neh 12:24; 1 Chr 16:4; 23:30; 2 Chr 5:13; 31:2, among others. 12 On the forgetfulness of the dead, see Tromp, Primitive Conceptions, 188. Qoh 9:5 mentions lack of knowledge as a characteristic of the dead: wƟhammƝtîm ’ênƗm yôdƟ‘îm mƟ’ûmâ. Needless to say, there is a tension between texts that speak of the forgetfulness and ignorance of the dead and their separation from the living, on the one hand, and other materials that suggest that the dead might foretell the future for the living and act beneficently on their behalf. On necromancy and ancestor cults, see the literature cited in n. 2. 13 The oldest text of this group may be Isa 38:9–20, Hezekiah’s letter to Yhwh, a thanksgiving song of the individual that may date to the end of the eighth century BCE. On this, see the discussion of Marvin A. Sweeney, Isaiah 1–39 with an Introduction to Prophetic Literature (FOTL 16; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1996), 496–502, with bibliography. The latest text, Sir 17:27–28, is securely dated to the second century BCE. On this, see Alexander A. di Lella, The Wisdom of

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petitioner, describing his imminent death, states that as a dead man he will not see Yhwh in the land of the living, just as he will not look upon humanity again when he is with the underworld’s denizens. Isa 38:18 suggests that the dead cannot worship Yhwh, nor do they hope in his faithfulness: kî lǀ’ šƟ’ôl tôdekkƗ mƗwet yƟhalƟlekkƗ lǀ’-yƟĞabbƟrû yôrƟdê-bôr ’el-’ămittekƗ For Sheol cannot worship you, Death cannot praise you, Those who descend into the Pit cannot hope in your faithfulness.14

Psalm 6:6 states that there is no memory of Yhwh in death and suggests by means of a rhetorical question anticipating a negative answer that the dead cannot worship Yhwh: For there is no remembrance (zikrekƗ) of you in death; In Sheol, who can praise you?

Psalm 28:1 speaks of Yhwh as unresponsive to the dead in the underworld; Ps 30:10 states that the underworld cannot praise Yhwh or tell of his faithfulness; and Ps 115:17–18 contrasts the inability of the dead to praise Yhwh with the living’s obligation to do so: The dead do not praise Yhwh, Nor do those descending into silence. But we will bless Yhwh, Now and forever. Praise Yhwh!

Sirach 17:27–28, a text of the second century BCE, expresses sentiments similar to those of passages such as Isa 38:18; Pss 6:6; 30:10; 115:17–18: There is no praising Yhwh after death. In sum, according to a wellrepresented trajectory of biblical thought epitomized by Psalm 88, the underworld is a sphere separated from Yhwh’s beneficent acts for his people. The dead, cut off from Yhwh’s actions and forgotten by him, do not hope in his faithfulness, nor do they worship Yhwh. They do not even remember him or his acts of covenant loyalty.15 ————— Ben Sira: A New Translation with Notes and Commentary (AB 39; New York: Doubleday, 1987), 9–10. 14 On Yhwh’s ’Ɵmet with the sense of “faithfulness,” see Alfred Jepsen, ʯʮʠ, TDOT 1:313–316, with many examples. Yhwh’s ’Ɵmet is a “shield and buckler” for his worshiper (Ps 91:4); it, along with Yhwh’s h̡esed, guards the worshiper (Ps 40:12). Yhwh is an ’Ɲl ’Ɵmet according to Ps 31:6. To have no access to Yhwh’s ’Ɵmet is clearly a serious liability for the dead. 15 The underworld portrayed in other West Asian sources is similar to that of biblical texts in a number of respects. On the character of the underworld and its denizens in Mesopotamian sources,

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These are striking claims that must be considered seriously in any attempt to reach an understanding of the nuances of nigzarnû lƗnû. After all, wƟhƝmmâ miyyƗdƟkƗ nigzƗrû of Ps 88:6 does not occur in a vacuum; rather, it is said in a context in which other claims about the relationship of Yhwh to the dead and the dead to Yhwh are made. It appears, therefore, that the statement “we are utterly cut off,” an element of the popular saying preserved in Ezek 37:11, may suggest more than the simple claim “we are (effectively) dead.” The expression may imply a whole constellation of ideas concerning the dead comparable to those attested in Psalm 88, where wƟhƝmmâ miyyƗdƟkƗ nigzƗrû occurs, and in related texts. For example, it may suggest that the exiles, like the dead, no longer benefit from Yhwh’s salvific, miraculous activity; that they are forgotten by Yhwh; that they will see him no more; that they cannot worship him; that they cannot hope in his faithfulness. What is it about the experience of the exile that might have suggested to some Judeans that their condition was comparable in its details to that of the dead? Several characteristics of the exilic experience, as we can reconstruct it, may well have prompted comparison with the lot of the dead. These include the destruction of the temple of Jerusalem and the resulting suspension of the cult; popular questioning of the continuing validity of the covenant between Yhwh and Israel; and a feeling evidenced in several documents that Yhwh had abandoned and forgotten his people. The loss of the temple would have provoked a crisis not only for supporters of the Deuteronomistic program of cultic centralization but also for those who believed that Yhwh’s worship was restricted to his territory alone and was therefore impossible in a foreign land.16 The latter position is reflected in texts such as 1 Sam 26:19 and Ps 137:4. 1 Sam 26:19 suggests that Israelites forced to leave Yhwh’s land are consigned to worship other gods.17 Some other biblical texts go so far as to suggest that alien lands are ————— see Jean Bottéro, “La mythologie de la mort en Mésopotamie ancienne,” in Death in Mesopotamia (ed. Bendt Alster; Mesopotamia: Copenhagen Studies in Assyriology 8; Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1980), 25–52. For Ugaritic materials, see Michael C. Astour, “The Nether World and its Denizens at Ugarit,” ibid., 227–38. 16 On Deuteronomistic cult centralization, see, e.g., Deut 12:4–14. Presumably, convinced Deuteronomists would have believed that worship of Yhwh outside of the temple of Jerusalem was illegitimate. 17 The context is the fugitive David’s words to Saul concerning people who might have incited Saul against him: ’ărûrîm hƝm lipnê yhwh kî gƝrƟšûnî hayyôm mƝhistappƝah̡ bƟnah̡ălat yhwh lƝ’mǀr lƝk ‘ăbǀd ’Ɵlǀhîm ’ăh̡Ɲrîm. Compare 2 Kgs 5:17, in which Naaman, the Aramean officer cured by Elisha of skin disease, requests a load of Israelite earth to take back to Damascus so that he can offer cult to Yhwh there. The text seems to assume that without the importation of Israelite earth, an exceptional measure by any estimation, such worship would not be possible in Damascus. Compare also Ezek 11:15, in which the inhabitants of Jerusalem claim that the exiles in Babylon are “far from Yhwh.”

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polluting.18 By definition, polluted territory would be inappropriate for cult. If worship of Yhwh was impossible in a foreign land, either because his cult was restricted to Israelite territory or to Jerusalem or because alien lands defile by definition, how then could the exiles serve Yhwh cultically? The crisis of worship brought about by the exile to Babylon is suggested poignantly by Ps 137:4: “How can we sing a song of Yhwh in an alien land?” Given the difficulties that at least some exiled Judeans appear to have confronted with respect to worship, it would not be surprising if some of them compared themselves to the dead. For the dead, as described in Psalm 88 and related texts, can no longer praise Yhwh or serve him in his sanctuary; and exiled Judeans who believed Yhwh’s worship was impossible in an alien land—for whatever reason—found themselves in an analogous situation, as Ps 137:4 suggests. 19 A number of texts suggest that the continuing validity of the covenant relationship between Yhwh and Israel was called into question in some circles after the events of 587 BCE. Some Judeans appear to have thought that Yhwh had terminated the covenant as a result of the people’s transgressions. Jer 30:22; 31:1, 33; Ezek 36:28; 37:23, 27, among other texts, all present readoption formulae which assume a previous severing of the relationship between Yhwh and Israel.20 In addition, the eternal covenant between Yhwh and Abraham’s descendants in the priestly passages Gen 17:7, 13, 19 was likely intended to respond to those who claimed that the covenant was terminated by Yhwh and the people abandoned.21 Similarly, the ————— 18

E.g., Amos 7:17; Ezek 4:9–15, esp. v. 13; cf. Hos 9:3. The territorial restriction of Yhwh’s worship to Israel was but one position among Israelites and Judeans in antiquity. An alternative view is evidenced by the history of the temple of Yhwh at Elephantine in Upper Egypt (destroyed 410 BCE), as well as biblical texts such as Isa 19:19, 21. Presumably, exiles who might have advocated this position would not have been troubled by the building of a temple of Yhwh in Babylon. But for whatever reason, no evidence survives of such a temple. Regarding Judean temples in Egypt, see also the sanctuary of Onias IV in Heliopolis (Josephus, Ant. 13.3.3, par. 72–73). 20 For example, Jer 30:22: “You shall become my people, and I shall become your god” (wihyîtem lî lƟ‘Ɨm wƟ’Ɨnǀkî ’ehyeh lƗkem lƝ’lǀhîm). Compare the use of the same idiom hƗyâ lƟlƟ- for the incorporation of aliens into the community of Yhwh in Zech 2:15: “Many nations shall be attached to Yhwh on that day, and they shall become my people” (wƟnilwû gôyîm rabbîm ’elyhwh bayyôm hahû’ wƟhƗyû lî lƟ‘Ɨm). Compare also its use for the establishment of the covenant between Yhwh and Abraham in Gen 17:7, 8, the adoption of David’s heir by Yhwh in 2 Sam 7:14, and the adoption of the infant Moses by Pharaoh’s daughter in Exod 2:10. On the idioms hƗyâ lƟlƟ- and hƗyâ lƟ-, meaning “to become,” see HALOT 1:234. On adoption language in ancient West Asian sources, including the texts of the Hebrew Bible, see Shalom Paul, “Adoption Formulae: A Study of Cuneiform and Biblical Legal Clauses,” Maarav 2 (1979/80): 173–85. On this particular formula, see Moshe Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972; repr., Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 1992), 80–81. 21 I view the emphasis on an eternal possession of land (’ăh̡uzzat ‘ôlƗm, Gen 17:8) similarly, and I can think of no other reason that the text should introduce and emphasize the theme of 19

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exilic Deuteronomists argue in Deut 4:31 against unnamed opponents that Yhwh has neither abandoned the people nor forgotten his covenant with their ancestors. Several verses at the end of the so-called Holiness Code are comparable to Deut 4:31, insisting that Yhwh has not broken his covenant with his people in exile by spurning them and loathing them to the point of their destruction (Lev 26:44–45). Even particular covenants, such as that with David or with Levi, were understood by some to have been terminated with the events of 587 BCE. Jer 33:24 quotes a saying it attributes to the people concerning the Davidic and priestly lines: “The two families that Yhwh chose he has spurned” (šƟtê hammišpƗh̡ôt ’ăšer bƗh̡ar yhwh bƗhem wayyim’ƗsƝm). Each of these texts suggests an environment in which some exiles, perhaps many, believe that the covenant linking Yhwh and Israel— as well as other, related covenants—has been abrogated. It is possible, therefore, that among the exiles there were those who claimed that transported Judeans were like the dead, who no longer speak of Yhwh’s acts of covenant loyalty (Ps 88:12) and cannot hope in his faithfulness (Isa 38:18; cf. Ps 30:10) because such beneficence is no longer accessible to them. That certain exiles saw themselves as abandoned and forgotten by Yhwh is suggested by a number of texts, among them Lam 5:20: “Why have you forgotten us (tiškƗh̡Ɲnû) for so long” // “Abandoned us for such a long time?” (See also Lam 5:22). Zion’s nickname “Forsaken One” (‘ăzûbâ), mentioned in Isa 62:4, is another example. Jer 12:7 speaks metaphorically of Yhwh’s abandonment of his “house,” his forsaking his nah̡ălâ; the verse is echoed in the exilic Deuteronomistic updating of the Manasseh pericope (2 Kgs 21:14). The work of Second Isaiah contains a number of passages that suggest that Yhwh was thought by some to have abandoned his people. In Isa 42:16, Yhwh reassures the people that he has not forsaken them and will act in their behalf. Isa 49:14 quotes Zion: “Yhwh has abandoned me (‘ăzƗbanî), my lord has forgotten me (šƟkƝh̡Ɨnî).” Isa 54:7 even has Yhwh admit that he abandoned the people, though only temporarily. These are but a few examples of a common theme in the surviving corpus of literature. Given how widespread the idea of abandonment appears to have been, some Judeans may well have perceived a parallel with the dead, prompting the statement preserved in Ezek 37:11. After all, the tradition that the dead ————— everlasting institutions. To emphasize the eternal nature of the covenant and landholding makes sense only in a context in which the continued validity of these institutions has been called into question. The dating of P and H, however, is a vexed subject among scholars. Obviously, I view the verses of Genesis 17 under consideration as exilic and a combination of P and H material, though others might disagree. For an exilic dating of P, see Frank Moore Cross, Canaanite Myth and Hebrew Epic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), 323–24. For a different view, and one that distinguishes P from H, see Israel Knohl, The Sanctuary of Silence: The Priestly Torah and the Holiness School (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995).

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are forgotten by Yhwh and that he does not act on their behalf is attested in Ps 88:6 and elsewhere as part of a larger complex of beliefs about the dead.22 The popular adage preserved in Ezek 37:11—“Our bones are dry, our hope has perished, we are utterly cut off”—certainly suggests that at least some exiled Judeans saw themselves as comparable to the dead, as is widely recognized. Yet nigzarnû lƗnû, the saying’s third element, may suggest more than the simple claim “we are (effectively) dead.” Its nuances may include a constellation of beliefs about the dead, their condition in the underworld, and their relationship to Yhwh comparable to those found in Psalm 88 and related texts, here applied to the exiles. The expression nigzarnû lƗnû may suggest that exiled Judeans, like the dead, are no longer the beneficiaries of Yhwh’s covenant loyalty, that they cannot hope in his faithfulness,23 that they are forgotten by Yhwh, that they are unable to worship him, and that they will never return to their land. Various exilic texts attest to a popular understanding of the exiled people as rejected and abandoned by Yhwh, who no longer remembers them or his covenant with their ancestors. Other texts from the period bear witness to the struggle of Judeans to come to terms with the loss of the temple of Jerusalem and the crisis of worship brought on also by the deportations. Thus, what we know about the exile suggests an environment in which some Judeans may well have found their lot comparable in its details to that of the dead. And, as in Lam 3:54, the use of a form of Niphal gzr as a general statement, without the preposition min and a particular referent, would communicate the whole constellation of ideas about the dead quite effectively. That the expression nigzarnû lƗnû suggests a complex constellation of ideas about the “dead” exiles is therefore a distinct possibility that scholars ought to consider when they analyze the saying of Ezek 37:11.

—————

22 One characteristic of the dead that likely did not resonate with the exiles is their ignorance of Yhwh’s wonders and his righteous acts (see Ps 88:11–13). The exiles, in contrast, appear to have known only too well what they were missing. 23 Compare wƟ’ƗbƟdâ tiqwƗtƝnû, the second element of the adage in Ezek 37:11.

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Unnoticed Resonances of Tomb Opening and Transportation of the Remains of the Dead in Ezekiel 37:12–14

Whether Ezek 37:12–14 was an original component part of a larger narrative encompassing 37:1–14, or related to material in 37:1–11 in some other way, many commentators view these verses, like 37:1–10, as a response to the saying attributed to a dejected Judah in 37:11: “Our bones are dry, our hope has perished, we are utterly cut off” (yƗbƟšû ‘as̞môtênû wƟ’ƗbƟdâ tiqwƗtƝnû nigzarnû lƗnû).1 The narrative of 37:1–10 contests the saying’s —————

1 All translations in this article are my own. Approaches to the development of Ezek 37:1–14 are many and varied. One viewpoint has been to see vv. 1–14 as a single, original unit, with at most minimal expansion. The most influential exponent of this position, Walther Zimmerli, divides 37:1–14 into two parts: the vision of vv. 1–10, followed by the disputation of vv. 11–14, which experienced some minor expansion in vv. 13b–14. For Zimmerli, v. 11 has a double function: it interprets the vision of vv. 1–10 and introduces the disputation that follows (Ezechiel [2 vols.; BKAT 13; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1969], 2:888). Zimmerli has been followed closely by Ronald M. Hals, Ezekiel (FOTL 19; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1989), 269; Paul M. Joyce’s approach is similar (Ezekiel: A Commentary [Library of Hebrew Bible/Old Testament Studies 482; New York: T. & T. Clark, 2007], 209); in addition, see Rüdiger Bartelmus, “Textkritik, Literarkritik, und Syntax. Anmerkungen zur neueren Diskussion um Ez 37,11,” BN 25 (1984): 55–64, who also defends the single-unit hypothesis. Finally, Moshe Greenberg treats vv. 1–14 as an original unit from the prophet: “The despondency of the exiles, betokened by their drastic death and burial metaphors, is met by the prophet’s stunning counter-metaphors of resurrection and disinterment” (Ezekiel 21–37: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary [AB 22A; New York: Doubleday, 1997], 747). Other scholars challenge the unity of vv. 1–14, taking a variety of approaches. Frank-Lothar Hossfeld divides the material into three original units of differing date and provenance: the vision of vv. 1–11a (including an expansion in vv. 7–10a), the disputation of vv. 11b–13a, and its expansion in vv. 13b–14 (Einleitung in das Alte Testament [ed. Erich Zenger et. al.; 3rd ed.; Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1998], 450, 454–55). See similarly Peter Höffken, “Beobachtungen zu Ezechiel XXXVII 1–10,” VT 31 (1981): 305–17; and, with slight differences, Dieter Baltzer, Ezechiel und Deuterojesaja: Berührungen in der Heilserwartung der beiden großen Exilspropheten (BZAW 121; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1971), 100–18. Harald Martin Wahl has also challenged the unity of 37:1–14, proposing a three-stage process of development: vv. 1–7a + vv.11, 12–14 (including a gloss in v. 13) + vv. 7b–10 (“‘Tod und Leben’: Zur Wiederherstellung Israels nach Ez. XXXVII 1–14,” VT 49 [1999]: 218–39). Finally, Karl-Friedrich Pohlmann understands vv. 11b–12a, 14 as the original core of vv. 1–14, with vv. 1–11a, part of v. 12 and v. 13 added later (Das Buch des Propheten Hesekiel (Ezechiel) Kapitel 20–48 [ATD 22; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001], 494). For further discussion of recent scholarship on the development of 37:1–14, see the survey of Franz D. Hubmann, “Ezechiel 37,1–14 in der neueren Forschung,” in Auf den Spuren der schriftgelehrten Weisen: Festschrift für Johannes Marböck anlässlich seiner Emeritierung (ed. Irmtraud Fischer et. al.; BZAW 331; Berlin: de

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assumption of hopelessness by envisioning a valley of human remains that are reconstituted and reanimated through Ezekiel’s prophetic word and Yhwh’s decisive actions. Similarly, 37:12–14 challenges the people’s despondency with a prophetic word from Yhwh to the people: Thus says the Lord Yhwh, “I am about to open your tombs and raise you up (wƟha‘ălêtî) from your tombs, my people, and I will bring you to the land of Israel. You will know that I am Yhwh when I open your tombs and raise you up from your tombs, my people. I will put my spirit in you and you will live, and I will set you in your land, and you will know that I, Yhwh, have spoken and acted,” oracle of Yhwh.

Both 37:1–10 and 37:12–14 respond to the metaphors of the saying in v. 11, which suggests the “death” of the people.2 The first section (vv. 1–10) takes up the figurative expression “our bones are dry” and offers in response a vision of a reanimated people of great number; the second (vv. 12–14) responds to the claim that the people “are utterly cut off” with a promise that Yhwh will raise them from their tombs, reanimate them, and resettle them in their land. Each section, in its own way, challenges the notion that hope has perished for the Judeans in exile.3 Though 37:1–10 has received much attention from scholars, 37:12–14 has been of less interest, even given its strikingly unusual imagery and its message of restoration in the land.4 It is my purpose to analyze the imagery of 37:12–14, particularly Yhwh’s promise to open the tombs of exiled Judeans, raise them up from their tombs, and bring them back to their land, in light of the resonances of tomb opening and the transportation of the remains of the dead back to ancestral territory and family tomb as witnessed in both biblical and cognate literatures. Ezek 37:12–14 is a response specifically to the claim in the people’s saying (v. 11) that Judeans are “utterly cut off.” As I have argued elsewhere, this expression suggests that exiled Judeans view themselves as essentially ————— Gruyter, 2003), 111–28. My own preference is to see vv. 1–10 and 12–14 as originally separate units of differing provenance reacting creatively to the despondent saying of v. 11 sometime after 587. As others have pointed out, each unit reacts to a part of the saying. To attempt to assign a more precise date and provenance to each unit, or to break the units down further into subunits, or even to determine which unit preceded the other, as some are wont to do, strikes me as a largely speculative exercise. In any case, such questions are not the focus of my interest here. 2 This interpretation of the content of the saying is almost universal. See, e.g., Greenberg, Ezekiel 21–37, 745–47; Zimmerli, Ezechiel, 2:897; Walther Eichrodt, Der Prophet Hezekiel: Kapitel 19–48 (ATD 22; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966), 357; Baltzer, Ezechiel und Deuterojesaja, 104. 3 A point made by Greenberg, Ezekiel 21–37, 747. 4 See, e.g., Greenberg, whose comments on vv. 1–14 focus almost entirely on vv. 1–10 (Ezekiel 21–37, 747–49). Zimmerli’s treatment also privileges the vision over the disputation (Ezechiel, 889–90), though to a lesser degree.

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“dead” as a people, separated from Yhwh in a manner not unlike those who are literally dead in the underworld according to a text such as Ps 88:5–6: I am counted with those who descend into the Pit, I am like a man without help, Among the dead …5, Like the slain, those who lie down in a tomb, Whom you do not remember anymore, And as for them, from your hand they are cut off.6

The expression “we are utterly cut off” in Ezek 37:11 implies not only that the people view themselves as dead for all intents and purposes, but that their relationship to Yhwh has been severed, not unlike the connection of the dead to Yhwh according to Ps 88:6, where it is said that the entombed dead are no longer remembered by Yhwh and are “cut off” from Yhwh’s hand, meaning that he no longer acts on their behalf. Ps 88:11–13 elaborates on the idea that the dead are “cut off” from Yhwh’s hand with a series of rhetorical questions that suggest that Yhwh no longer does wonders for the dead, that the dead cannot praise him, and that his acts of covenant loyalty (h̡esed) and faithfulness (’Ɵmûnâ) are not spoken of by the dead, presumably because they are no longer remembered by them.7 Similarly, the saying of Ezek 37:11 may be suggesting that exiled Judeans, like the dead, can no longer worship Yhwh; that they cannot hope for any kind of saving intervention from him; and that they cannot expect him to keep his covenantal promises. Thus, like the dead, exiled Judeans are “cut off” from Yhwh according to Ezek 37:11. Texts of an exilic and early postexilic provenance suggest a lively debate about the fate of Yhwh’s covenant with Israel, with a number of passages suggesting that the covenant was terminated by Yhwh, who rejected the people (e.g., 2 Kgs 21:14; Jer 12:7; Lam 5:20, 22), and others insisting that the covenant and its promises remain valid (e.g., Lev 26:44–45; Deut 4:31; Isa 54:7–8). If the saying of Ezek 37:11 addresses debate about the status of the covenant, which I believe it does, it belongs to the former group of what we might call “rejectionist” texts, while the responses to the saying in vv. 1–10 and 12–14 belong to the ————— 5

The MT of the first colon of v. 6 reads bammƝtîm h̡opšî, the meaning of which is opaque. The LXX (87:5) is similar (en nekrois eleutheros). 6 For my earlier treatment, see Saul M. Olyan, “‘We Are Utterly Cut Off’: Some Possible Nuances of ʥʰʬ ʥʰʸʦʢʰ in Ezek 37:11,” CBQ 65 (2003): 43–51. 7 Other biblical texts expressing similar sentiments about the relationship of the dead and Yhwh include Isa 38:11, 18; Pss 6:6; 28:1; 30:10; 115:17–18; and Sir 17:27–28. See my treatment of these texts in “We Are Utterly Cut Off,” 47–48. Note that Ps 6:6 states specifically that there is no memory of Yhwh in death (kî ’ên bammƗwet zikrekƗ). On h̡esed as loyalty to covenant, see Frank Moore Cross, From Epic to Canon: History and Literature in Ancient Israel (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 5–9 and n. 12 (for citations).

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latter group of texts that advocate covenant continuity even in the face of disaster.8 The oracle of 37:12–14 responds creatively to the imagery of death and separation from Yhwh suggested by the claim of 37:11 that exiled Judeans are “utterly cut off.” It challenges the saying’s assumption of the people’s metaphorical death in exile and their separation from an indifferent, and even rejecting, god by envisioning Yhwh’s decisive action on behalf of the people in the figure of tomb opening and removal of the remains of the dead for a beneficent purpose. According to 37:12–14, Yhwh will open the tombs of the exiles, raise them up from their tombs, and reanimate them; the figure seems to assume the physical reconstitution of individuals before their reanimation, as in the larger pericope’s first section (37:7–8)—though this is not stated directly, nor is any mention made of the state of the remains in the tombs (bones? corpses?). The figure of 37:12–14 breaks down with its final promise—intended to be understood literally—that Yhwh will return the exiles to their land. The imagery of Yhwh opening tombs and raising up the remains of the dead is striking in a number of ways. First, the association of the deity with tombs and the remains of the dead, even metaphorically, is not what one would expect, given the polluting nature of tombs, bones, and corpses according to passages elsewhere in the book of Ezekiel (e.g., 6:5–7; 9:7; 39:11–16; 43:7–9) and related materials of Priestly and Holiness provenance (e.g., Num 19:11–22).9 Those who have been polluted by contact with tombs, bones or corpses are prohibited from entering the sanctuary sphere and having contact with holy items until they are clean, for pollution, particularly that caused by death-related phenomena, is a profound threat to Yhwh’s continued presence in the sanctuary. Furthermore, the book of Ezekiel speaks frequently of Yhwh’s concern for the preservation of his holiness and that of his sanctuary (e.g., 20:39; 36:22–32; 39:25; 43:7–9). Yet in 37:12–14, Yhwh himself chooses to have such contact with the pollution of death, albeit metaphorically. He does so in order to act beneficently for his people. Far from being “utterly cut off” from Yhwh, exiled Judeans will benefit from their continuing relationship with their god when he removes them from exile and resettles them in their land. The striking image of Yhwh opening the tombs of exiled Judeans and removing —————

8 For a more detailed discussion of the variety of positions on the Mosaic covenant witnessed in surviving texts, as well as treatment of debates about the Abrahamic, Levitic and Davidic covenants during and soon after the exile, see my essay “The Status of Covenant During the Exile,” in Berührungspunkte: Studien zur Sozial- und Religionsgeschichte Israels und seiner Umwelt. Festschrift für Rainer Albertz zu seinem 65. Geburtstag (ed. Ingo Kottsieper, Rüdiger Schmitt, and Jakob Wöhrle; AOAT 350; Münster: Ugarit-Verlag, 2008), 333–44. 9 See also Lev 21:1–4, 11; 22:5; Num 5:1–4.

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their remains for a beneficent purpose functions to underscore Yhwh’s continued willingness to act for his people and by implication, his enduring covenant bond with them and his loyalty (h̡esed) to them.10 The imagery of tomb opening and the transportation of the remains of the dead is striking in yet another way, for tomb opening and transportation can be acts either of malevolence or beneficence, depending on the identity of the actors and the circumstances of the actions undertaken. That such acts could be construed malevolently is made clear by the many curses in tomb inscriptions and other literary contexts that survive from ancient western Asia, including Judah. Numerous tomb inscriptions warn potential grave robbers and others of the dire consequences of opening a tomb and disturbing or removing its contents. Some openly express a fear specifically of the removal of human remains from the tomb, and many mention that no valuables have been left with the dead.11 The Royal Steward Inscription from Silwan, near Jerusalem (c. 700 BCE) is a Judean example of a tomb inscription that denies the presence of valuables and includes a curse on potential violators: “This is [the tomb of ]yahu who was over the house. There is no silver or gold here. Only [his bones] and the bones of his female slave with him. Cursed be the person who would open this!”12 Why the fear of tomb violation and the illegitimate removal of the remains of the dead? Ashurbanipal’s description of his treatment of the tombs and remains of the kings of Elam suggests that tomb opening (and destruction), as well as the removal of the remains of the dead to a far-off place (in this case, Assyria) could be undertaken purposefully in order to harm the ghosts of the dead by denying them care in the afterlife and imposing restlessness upon them: “I took their bones to the land of Assyria, imposing restlessness upon their ghosts. I deprived them of ancestral offerings (and) libations of water” (e-t́ém-me-šú-nu la s̞a-la-lu e-mì-id ki-is-pi na-aq mê A.MEŠ ú-za-am-me-šú-nu-ti).13 Similarly, Gilgamesh 12:151 states that the ghost of the unburied “is not at rest in the underworld,”14 and Esarhaddon’s succession treaty contains a curse associating preservation of the remains of ————— 10

The expressions h̡esed ‘ôlƗm and bƟrît ‘ôlƗm occur in exilic and early postexilic texts advocating continuity of the covenant (e.g., Gen 17:7, 13, 19; Isa 54:8; Ezek 37:26). Though these expressions do not occur in Ezek 37:12–14, Yhwh’s on going loyalty based on the covenant bond is implied by his willingness to act decisively for the benefit of the exiles. 11 E.g., KAI 1:2; 13:3–8; 14:4–12, 20–22; 226:6–10. 12 For this inscription, see Nahman Avigad, “The Epitaph of a Royal Steward from Siloam Village,” IEJ 3 (1953):137–52. My restorations mainly follow Avigad’s suggestions. 13 Rykle Borger, Beiträge zum Inschriftenwerk Assurbanipals: Die Prismenklassen A, B, C = K, D, E, F, G, H, J und T sowie andere Inschriften (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1996), 55 (Prism A vi 74–76 = F v 53–54). 14 Andrew R. George, The Babylonian Gilgamesh Epic: Introduction, Critical Edition and Cuneiform Texts (2 vols.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 1:734.

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the dead in one place and being at rest in the afterlife.15 Both the Yaba and Mullissu-mukannishat-Ninua tomb inscriptions from Nimrud reflect the same set of ideas, calling for the denial of ancestral offerings in the afterlife to those who would remove the remains of these Assyrian queens (implicitly, tit for tat).16 Jer 8:1–2 envisions the removal of the bones of Judah’s leaders from their tombs and their lack of reburial as a punishment for the transgressions of those leaders, perhaps assuming that such removal would disrupt the afterlife of those affected, as evidenced in various Akkadian texts—though no explicit evidence for this survives in biblical or other Judean materials. In short, both Akkadian and biblical texts bear explicit witness to the idea that tomb opening and removal of the remains of the dead could be understood to be acts of malevolence. Akkadian texts further evidence the notion that disinterment and transportation could be used to impose suffering on ghosts of the dead. Yet tomb opening and transportation of the remains of the dead could also be understood as acts of beneficence under certain circumstances, as indicated by both Akkadian and biblical texts. At least one text suggests that the remains of the dead could be moved in order to protect them from abuses imposed by conquering enemies (e.g., Ashurbanipal’s ill-treatment of the tombs, bones, and ghosts of the kings of Elam). The example I have in mind is Merodach-Baladan’s flight from Babylon before Sennacherib, along with his gods and the bones of his ancestors, which he had removed from their tombs according to Sennacherib’s account in the Nebi Yunus slab inscription.17 Given that other Akkadian texts and material remains bear witness to a conqueror’s potential to abuse iconic representations of deities belonging to the vanquished as well as their burial places and the remains of their dead, such an explanation for Merodach-Baladan’s acts in Sennacherib’s account seems most fitting.18 In any case, we have here an ————— 15

Donald J. Wiseman, The Vassal Treaties of Esarhaddon (Iraq 20 pt. 1; London: British School of Archaeology in Iraq, 1958), 77–78 (8:637–40). 16 See Abdulilah Fadhil, “Die in Nimrud/Kal—u aufgefundene Grabinschrift der Jabâ,” Baghdader Mitteilungen 21 (1990): 461–70, esp. 461 (lines 15–18); and idem, “Die Grabinschrift der Mullissu-mukannišat-Ninua aus Nimrud/Kal—u und andere in ihrem Grab gefundene Schriftträger,” Baghdader Mitteilungen 21 (1990): 471–82, esp. 471 (line A 3–4) and 474–75 (lines B 6– 11). 17 See Daniel D. Luckenbill, The Annals of Sennacherib (OIP 2; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924), 85–86 (lines 7–11), with the corrections on line 8 by Eckart Frahm, Einleitung in die Sanherib-Inschriften (AfOB 26; Vienna: Institut für Orientalistik der Universität Wien, 1997), 129. My thanks to Jamie Novotny for directing me to Frahm’s text. 18 Sennacherib’s description of the Assyrian looting of Babylon (689 BCE) includes mention of the physical destruction of icons of divinities found there (Luckenbill, Annals of Sennacherib, 83–84 [lines 48, 50–51]). Similarly, Ashurbanipal speaks of destroying the images of the gods of Elam (Borger, Beiträge zum Inschriftenwerk, 168 [Prism T v 1]). Winged genies with mutilated sensory organs from the reliefs of Nineveh provide physical evidence of concrete acts of mutila-

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example of an heir portrayed as protecting the bones of his ancestors from abuse, just as he protects the images of his gods.19 Benevolent tomb opening and transportation of remains might also be motivated by a desire to confirm or establish a positive relationship (perhaps even a formal relationship of the treaty type) with the dead themselves and with constituencies invested in their fate, as Ashur-etel-ilani’s transportation of the “tomb” (kima——u) of the Dakkurian Shamash-ibni from Assyria back to his native Bit Dakkuri shows.20 Presumably, once the remains of Shamash-ibni were laid to rest “in a tomb in his house” (ina KI.MA– ina qé-reb É-šú), his ghost would benefit in some way (e.g., receive kispu offerings that were possibly unavailable to it while in exile in Assyria).21 (Recall that Ashurbanipal’s motivation for taking the remains of the kings of Elam into exile in Assyria was to deprive them of ancestral cult and impose restlessness upon their ghosts.) At all events, Ashur-etel-ilani positions himself as a benefactor and protector of the tomb of the reburied Shamash-ibni, threatening with curses anyone who would disturb the tomb or its remains ————— tion imposed on divine images by foreign enemies (Silke Knippschild, “Spoils and Iconoclasm: The Ancient Near Eastern Tradition and Athens” [unpublished manuscript, 15]). To this evidence one might compare 1 Sam 5:1–4, a biblical counterpart to such acts of violence against the enemy’s gods, except in this case, the narrative is an apologetic asserting the power of the losing side’s deity over the god of the victor. Though the Israelite ark of the covenant was captured as a prize of war by the Philistines, Yhwh demonstrates his power over Dagon, the Philistine god, in Dagon’s own temple. First, Dagon is found prostrated before the Ark, Yhwh’s throne, an unmistakable gesture of submission. After Dagon is returned to his place, he is found bowing down again, but this time his two hands and head have been cut off. Like gouging out an eye, cutting off ears or a nose, or mutilating a beard, severing one or both hands or the head communicates the powerlessness of the deity whose image is subjected to such violence, as well as that of the god’s followers, and the power of those who are able to impose their will upon it. On the Ark Narrative as an apology from the perspective of the vanquished, see P. Kyle McCarter, Jr., I Samuel: A New Translation with Introduction, Notes, and Commentary (AB 8; Garden City: Doubleday, 1980), 23–26. On mutilation and power, see Tracy M. Lemos, “Shame and the Mutilation of Enemies in the Hebrew Bible,” JBL 125 (2006):240–41; and Knippschild, ibid., 11. 19 Why would Sennacherib portray his enemy behaving in a pious fashion? Perhaps his intent was to suggest the permanence of his own conquest and the extent of the fear he inspired in Merodach-Baladan. He took those items most of value to him and ran, knowing he would never return because of Sennacherib’s might. In any case, the fleeing enemy king is a topos in Neo-Assyrian inscriptions, suggesting his unsuitability to rule. On this theme, see Cynthia R. Chapman, The Gendered Language of Warfare in the Israelite-Assyrian Encounter (HSM 62; Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2004), 33–38. 20 See Grant Frame, Rulers of Babylonia: From the Second Dynasty of Isin to the End of Assyrian Domination (1157–612 BC) (RIMB 2; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), 266–67. I am grateful to Jamie Novotny for bringing this text and the bibliographic reference to my attention. 21 For the reading ina KI.MA– ina qé-reb É-šú, see Frame, Rulers of Babylonia, 267 (line 3). On the kispu, see recently Karel van der Toorn, “Family Religion in Second Millennium West Asia (Mesopotamia, Emar, Nuzi),” in Household and Family Religion in Antiquity (ed. John Bodel and Saul M. Olyan; Ancient World—Comparative Histories; Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), 25–28.

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and calling upon all to protect them. A second, biblical example of this type is to be found in 2 Sam 21:12–14, the story of David’s return of the remains of Saul and Jonathan from their burial place in Jabesh-Gilead to their ancestral tomb in the land of Benjamin: David went and he took the bones of Saul and the bones of Jonathan his son from the lords of Jabesh-Gilead who had stolen them from the square of Bet Shan where the Philistines had hanged them on the day the Philistines defeated Saul at Gilboa. He brought up from there the bones of Saul and the bones of Jonathan his son … and they buried the bones of Saul and Jonathan his son in the land of Benjamin, at Sela, in the tomb of Qish, his father.

This gesture, described by David’s apologists, makes David look as if he has a positive and even formal relationship with Saulides and Benjaminites, just as Ashur-etel-ilani casts himself as a friend of the Dakkurians by the beneficent acts he claims to have done on behalf of Shamash-ibni.22 In both cases, non-family members are portrayed as responsible for the return of disinterred remains of the dead to their native territory for reburial in their respective ancestral tombs.23 Such an act of generosity functions to support claims of a positive and even formal relationship between the benefactor and those who benefit from his largesse, including the dead themselves, who might reap concrete benefits (e.g., gifts of food and drink), and their living relations. For just as disinterment and exile of the remains of the dead could be used to impose suffering on their ghosts, according to Akkadian texts, so, presumably, transportation back to the ancestral tomb and reburial there could improve the lot of the dead. Though biblical texts are somewhat less clear than Akkadian materials regarding how, specifically, the fate of the dead might be improved, I suspect that they share the same set of assumptions.24 ————— 22

David’s apologists seek to distance him from responsibility for the deaths of various Saulides, including those executed by the Gibeonites earlier in the narrative of the chapter. They also seek to present him as having formal, ongoing ties to Saul and his house (e.g., through his marriage to Saul’s daughter Michal; by means of a personal covenant with Jonathan; and by public mourning of the deaths of Saul and Jonathan). For a general discussion of David’s apologists and their goals, see, e.g., P. Kyle McCarter, Jr., II Samuel: A New Translation with Introduction, Notes, and Commentary (AB 9; Garden City: Doubleday, 1985), 445–46. On David’s mourning as a statement of affiliation, see Saul M. Olyan, Biblical Mourning: Ritual and Social Dimensions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 53–54. 23 This is clear in the case of 2 Sam 21:14, which mentions reinterment in the tomb of Qish, and likely in the case of Ashur-etel-ilani’s inscription, which speaks of the return of Shamashibni’s “tomb” (bones?) to “a tomb in his house” (KI.MA– ina qé-reb É-šú). 24 Biblical evidence for ancestral cult practices, though not richly attested, includes 2 Sam 18:18, which suggests the erection of a memorial stela and the invocation of the name of the dead man by his son as a norm, and Deut 26:14; Tob 4:17; and Sir 30:18, which mention or allude to food offerings for the dead. Practices such as invocation of the name of the dead and presenting

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These examples of non-family members taking on responsibility for beneficent disinterment, transportation and reburial of the remains of the dead in their native territory at the family tomb can be supplemented by several biblical narratives of family members who do the same. In Gen 49:29–32 and 50:12–14, P tells of Jacob’s command to his sons that they should bury him in his family tomb at the cave of Machpelah, and the fulfillment of that command by Jacob’s sons, who transport his remains from Egypt to Canaan.25 A second example is the oath Joseph imposes on his family members (“the children of Israel”) to bring up his remains to Canaan when the deity decides to return the people there (Gen 50:25–26).26 According to Exod 13:19, Moses takes Joseph’s bones with him, and Josh 24:32 tells of their eventual interment in ancestral territory at Shechem. Immediate heirs such as Jacob’s sons are portrayed as obligated by blood ties to fulfill the wishes of their father. As for Joseph, his oath is respected by the descendants of the children of Israel, who were bound by it according to biblical narrative. In the case of David and Ashur-etel-ilani, formal ties may or may not have ever existed, but these non-family members seek to cast themselves as benefactors of the dead and their living relations, behaving not unlike those having formal, even familial, ties with the dead, as the examples from Genesis demonstrate. I argue that Yhwh’s promised acts on behalf of the exiles in Ezek 37:12– 14 are best understood in light of what appears to be a biblical and extrabiblical literary topos of benevolent tomb opening and transportation of the remains of the dead, which, in one well-evidenced version of the pattern, are taken from a far off, often foreign, place and reburied in the family tomb in ancestral territory.27 When Yhwh announces that he is about to open the tombs of the exiles and raise them up from their tombs, the reader is struck by Yhwh’s voluntary association—even if metaphorical—with the precincts and realia of death. By utilizing this imagery, the writer of 37:12– 14 seeks to draw the attention of the audience to profound changes in the offing. He interprets the saying in 37:11 (“we are utterly cut off”) to mean that Judeans are figuratively both dead and buried. (Their burial is signaled by the mention of their tombs in vv. 12–14.28) I suggest that the literary ————— food offerings have their parallels in the Mesoptamian kispu (van der Toorn, “Family Religion,” 25–26). 25 A similar scenario, traditionally assigned to JE, is narrated in Gen 50:1–11. 26 My thanks to Thomas Römer for reminding me of this example (oral communication). 27 I suspect that the description of Merodach-Baladan’s flight from Babylon reflects another version of the topos, in which remains are removed from the ancestral tomb in order to protect them from harm at the hands of an enemy. 28 The assumption of entombment may also suggest a figurative association of exiled Judeans with Sheol. If this is the case, the statement of 37:12–13, “I will raise you up (wƟha‘ălêtî ) from your tombs,” is most striking, given that the same idiom is used of bringing up the dead from the

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pattern of a benevolent family or non-family member opening a tomb, transporting the remains of the dead, and reburying them in the family tomb on ancestral land is in the background of Ezek 37:12–14. In a text such as 2 Sam 21:12–14 or the inscription of Ashur-etel-ilani, a non-family member seeks to confirm or establish a positive, and possibly formal, relationship with the deceased and his heirs, casting himself as a benefactor and protector of the dead man, who returns his remains from a far-off, or even foreign, burial place to his ancestral tomb. In narratives of Jacob’s and Joseph’s burials, it is family members who fulfill obligations by transporting the remains of the dead from an alien land to ancestral tombs in Canaan. The writer of Ezek 37:12–14 has Yhwh present himself in the same way, using some of the same imagery. Like David, Ashur-etel-ilani, or Jacob’s sons, Yhwh will demonstrate his loyalty (h̡esed) to exiled Judeans through tomb opening and transportation of their remains for a beneficent purpose. The text also speaks of Yhwh’s reanimation of his “dead” people. Finally, metaphor gives way to a literal promise to return the exiles to their land. Yhwh, through his promised acts, both metaphorical and literal, confirms implicitly the continued validity of the covenant bond between himself and his people (he acts on their behalf), and challenges the implicit and explicit claims of the saying in 37:11, which seems to understand the covenant as having been terminated, and the exiled people’s condition as hopeless.29 Resettling the exiles in the land of Judah is not unlike transportation of exiled remains of the dead back to their native place, as in 2 Sam 21:12–14, the inscription of Ashur-etel-ilani, and the narratives concerning the transportation and reburial of the remains of Jacob and Joseph, except in this instance, the “dead” transported from their “tombs” are to be restored to “life” by Yhwh, returning to Judah, the land of their origin. Given the literary pattern of beneficent tomb opening, transportation of the remains of the dead and their reburial in the family tomb on native territory, this outcome is striking, a creative adaptation by the writer, who abandons the metaphors of death, entombment, and transportation of remains in order to underscore Yhwh’s continuing interest in and loyalty to the “living” Judean community in exile.30 ————— underworld in texts such as 1 Sam 2:6: “Yhwh kills and makes live,” // “He brings down to Sheol and he raises up” (wayyƗ‘al). See also 1 Sam 28:8, 11, 15; Jonah 2:7; Pss 30:4; 40:3; 71:20. Obviously, texts that assert Yhwh’s concern for the dead and his ability to raise the dead up from Sheol have a very different viewpoint from texts such as Ps 88:6, 11–13. 29 Psalm 88:12, whose ideology of death is not unlike that assumed by the saying of Ezek 37:11, suggests that Yhwh’s covenant loyalty (h̡esed) and faithfulness (’Ɵmûnâ) are not spoken of in the tomb/underworld. 30 On the exile as a period of creative literary adaptation, see, e.g., Rainer Albertz, Israel in Exile: The History and Literature of the Sixth Century B.C.E. (Studies in Biblical Literature 3; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003), 160–66, on hybrid psalmic genres.

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Was the “King of Babylon” Buried Before His Corpse Was Exposed? Some Thoughts on Isa 14:19

It is almost universally assumed that the “King of Babylon” of Isaiah 14 was never interred.1 In the words of Joseph Blenkinsopp, “he died an ignominious death after which his corpse remain[ed] unburied.”2 “Now he receives no honorable burial,” states Brevard S. Childs, “but like a loathsome corpse is abandoned and desecrated.”3 Mark Shipp recently summarized the contents of v. 19 as follows: “The tyrant is cast out (ʺʫʬʹʤʥ), far from a grave …”4 To this one might compare Herbert C. Brichto’s translation of wƟ’attâ hošlaktƗ miqqibrƟkƗ at the beginning of that verse—“But you are exposed without sepulture”5—and H. L. Ginsberg’s rendering “while you were left lying unburied” (=NJPS version).6 Otto Kaiser’s understanding is similar: “Aber du bist grablos hingeworfen,”7 as is that of Georg Fohrer (“Doch du bist hingeworfen ohne Grab”8), Rudolf Kilian (“Du aber wurdest hingeworfen ohne Begräbnis”9), and others.10 I would like to challenge this widely held assumption that the king of Isaiah 14 was never buried. A close look at Isa 14:19 suggests to the contrary that he was interred and that his corpse was exhumed and exposed. The verse reads as follows: —————

1 For recent debate over the identification of the king, see the discussion of Marvin A. Sweeney, Isaiah 1–39 with an Introduction to Prophetic Literature (FOTL 16; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1996), 232–33. Sargon II of Assyria has been a popular candidate in recent decades, though not the only one. Sweeney favors him, though he notes the difficulties with the identification. H. L. Ginsberg’s “Reflexes of Sargon in Isaiah After 715 B.C.E.,” JAOS 88 (1968): 49–53 has been an influential contribution to the debate. 2 Joseph Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 1–39: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB 19; Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 2000), 286. 3 Brevard S. Childs, Isaiah (OTL; Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox, 2001), 126. 4 R. Mark Shipp, Of Dead Kings and Dirges: Myth and Meaning in Isaiah 14:4b–21 (AcBib 11; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2002), 157. 5 Herbert C. Brichto, “Kin, Cult, Land and Afterlife—A Biblical Complex,” HUCA 44 (1973):25. 6 Ginsberg, “Reflexes of Sargon,” 52. 7 Otto Kaiser, Der Prophet Jesaja. Kapitel 13–39 (ATD 18; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973), 27. 8 Georg Fohrer, Das Buch Jesaja (3 vols.; ZBK 19; Zürich: Zwingli, 1960–64), 1:173, 180. 9 Rudolf Kilian, Jesaja (3 Vols.; KAT 32; Würzburg: Echter-Verlag, 1986–2001), 2:105. 10 E.g., Hans Wildberger, Jesaja (3 Vols.; BKAT 10; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1965–1982), 1:533, 535, 557–58; Peter Höffken, Das Buch Jesaja (NSKAT 18; Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1993), 136.

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wƟ’attâ hošlaktƗ miqqibrƟkƗ kƟnƝs̞er nit‘Ɨb lƟbûš hărnjgîm mƟt́ǀ‘ănê h̡Ɨreb yôrƟdê ’el-’abnê bôr kƟpeger mûbƗs As for you, you are cast (out) from your tomb. (You are) like a despised shoot, (in?) a garment of the slain, those pierced by the sword, who descend to the stones of the Pit; (you are) like a trampled corpse.11

Interpreters and translators have generally ignored or finessed the wording of wƟ’attâ hošlaktƗ miqqibrƟkƗ, apparently in order to maintain the interpretation that the king was never buried.12 Some (e.g., NRSV) have assumed that the colon suggests abandonment at a distance from the tomb: “But you are cast out, away from your grave.” Shipp’s interpretive summary also reflects this assumption (“The tyrant is cast out [ʺʫʬʹʤʥ], far from a grave …”).13 Others assert a privative understanding of min in this context, with HALOT even going as far as to suggest emending miqqibrƟkƗ to miqqeber in order to derive it (“without a grave”).14 Brichto’s translation noted earlier (“but you are exposed without sepulture”) also embraces a privative meaning, as do the translations of others.15 Though much of the rest of the verse is difficult, wƟ’attâ hošlaktƗ miqqibrƟkƗ is not.16 It requires ————— 11

The section of the verse after wƟ’attâ hošlaktƗ miqqibrƟkƗ presents a number of challenges to interpreters. The phrases kƟnƝs̞er nit‘Ɨb and kƟpeger mûbƗs seem to assume the king as their subject, though the latter phrase is placed awkwardly at the end of the verse (NJPS moves it up). The “slain” (hărnjgîm) of the phrase lƟbûš hărnjgîm are apparently “those pierced by the sword” (mƟt́ǀ‘ănê h̡Ɨreb) and “those descending into the underworld” (yôrƟdê ’el-’abnê bôr), but the relationship of lƟbûš hărnjgîm to what precedes it is at best unclear. Ginsberg’s suggestion that we reconstruct the preposition bƟ before lƟbûš (lost by haplography—the word nit‘Ɨb precedes lƟbûš) is certainly plausible, if not evidenced text-critically (Ginsberg, “Reflexes of Sargon,” 52 n. 32). 12 I suspect that this has been motivated mainly by the desire to identify the king with a known ruler such as Sargon II. 13 Though note his translation: “But you are cast out from your grave” (Shipp, Dead Kings, 132), which suggests an outcome quite different from that of his interpretive summary. 14 HALOT 4:1416. On the privative use of the preposition min, see Bruce K. Waltke and Michael P. O’Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax (4th ed.; Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 1990), 11.2.11e #2 and Ronald J. Williams, Hebrew Syntax: An Outline (2nd ed.; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), par. 321. Examples cited often include 1 Sam 15:26; Jer 48:45 and Job 21:9. 15 Brichto, “Kin, Cult, Land and Afterlife,” 25. Others who adopt this understanding include Fohrer, Jesaja, 173; Kilian, Jesaja, 105; Wildberger, Jesaja, 535; and John N. Oswalt, The Book of Isaiah, Chapters 1–39 (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1986), 324, though Oswalt notes that the wording of v. 19a suggests exhumation; see also Ginsberg, “Reflexes of Sargon,” 52 (“while you were left lying unburied”). Wildberger, Jesaja, 535, insists that v. 19a cannot suggest exhumation, though he provides no argument to support his assertion (“Andererseits kann der Text kaum sagen wollen, daß der ‘Tyrann’ aus seinem Grab herausgeworfen worden sei, sondern wird meinen, daß er unbegraben … hingeworfen wurde”). 16 On these difficulties, see the discussion in n. 11. The LXX of v. 19a en tois oresin, if it is not a free translation, suggests a Vorlage with bhrym, much in contrast to MT’s miqqibrƟkƗ. I suspect that en tois oresin is indeed a free rendering, given a dearth of evidence elsewhere to support it, the lack of any apparent explanation for a relationship between MT’s miqqibrƟkƗ and *bhrym, and the

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no emendation or finessing to make sense. The idiom šlk (Hiphil/Hophal) with min occurs elsewhere with the unambiguous meaning “to cast/be cast from locus A (to locus B).” In Lam 2:1, Yhwh says that he has cast from heaven to earth the majesty of Israel (hišlîk miššƗmayim ’eres̞ tip’eret yiĞrƗ’Ɲl). Using the same idiom, Ps 51:13 states: “Do not cast me out from your presence” (’al-tašlîkƝnî millƟpƗnêkƗ). Ps 22:11 uses a passive form of the idiom, not unlike what we find in Isa 14:19: “On you I was cast from the womb,”// “From my mother’s womb you were my god” (‘ƗlêkƗ hošlaktî mƝrƗh̡em mibbet́en ’immî ’Ɲlî ’Ɨttâ). The idiom also occurs in prose narrative, as in Judg 15:17, concerning Samson (wayyašlƝk hallƟh̡î miyyƗdô, “He cast the jawbone from his hand”) and in Neh 13:8, where Nehemiah claims that he cast all the belongings of the house of Tobiah from Tobiah’s temple chamber to the outside (wƗ’ašlîkâ ’et-kol kƟlê bêt t́ôbiyyâ hah̡ûs̞ minhalliškâ).17 In every case, something or someone is physically cast from one locus to another. Sometimes the second locus is specified (e.g., as in Lam 2:1 or Neh 13:8); more often, it is not. Isa 14:19 wƟ’attâ hošlaktƗ miqqibrƟkƗ is clearly an example of the idiom in question, since it shares the characteristics of one of its two forms: Someone is cast from one locus to another, without specific mention of the second locus. In Isa 14:19, a passive form of the verb šlk is used to describe the act, and the preposition min indicates the locus from which the corpse is taken, in this case the king’s tomb. Thus, wƟ’attâ hošlaktƗ miqqibrƟkƗ of Isa 14:19 is most convincingly translated, “As for you, you are cast (out) from your tomb,” and understood to mean that the king was buried and later exhumed. Exhuming and scattering or transporting buried human remains are frequently understood as acts of hostility to the dead, and are mentioned or alluded to in a number of West Asian texts, including the Hebrew Bible. Sometimes these acts are cast as a form of punishment for the dead. Jer 8:1– 2 is an excellent example of this: “At that time—oracle of Yhwh—they shall bring forth the bones of the kings of Judah … from their tombs, and shall spread them before the sun, the moon, and all the host of heaven whom they loved and whom they served … They shall not be gathered, nor shall they be buried …” Ashurbanipal and the Eshmunazor and Si’gabbar inscriptions also bear witness to the practice of exhuming remains as an act of hostility, and sometimes, punishment. Ashurbanipal speaks of opening the tombs of the kings of Elam and transporting their remains to Assyria in ————— oft noted exegetical character of the Greek text of Isaiah. The editors of the Hebrew University Bible view en tois oresin as an exegetical rendering, comparing Isa 34:3, and noting that ‘slaying in the mountains’ is a common motif, as in Exod 32:12 (Moshe Goshen-Gottstein, ed., The Book of Isaiah [Hebrew University Bible; Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1995], 55n). 17 See similarly Exod 32:19; 2 Kgs 13:23; 17:20; 24:20 (=Jer 52:3); Jer 7:15; 2 Chr 7:20; 25:12.

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order to deny the dead kings repose in the afterlife.18 The Eshmunazor and Si’gabbar inscriptions both attest to a fear that the tomb may be invaded and that the remains of the dead may be removed from the tomb.19 I believe that Isa 14:19 should be understood in light of these data: the king will be punished through exhumation and exposure on account of his depredations during life (see 14:20: lǀ’ tƝh̡ad ’ittƗm biqbûrâ // kî ’ars̞ƟkƗ ših̡attƗ // ‘ammƟkƗ hƗrƗgtƗ). This may present difficulties for the identification of the “King of Babylon” with Sargon II or other known monarchs who were never buried, but it captures the sense of the Hebrew text in v. 19a more successfully than do other translations, and it is not incompatible with the somewhat difficult material that follows in the rest of the verse.20

—————

18 See Maximilian Streck, ed., Assurbanipal und die letzten assyrischen Könige bis zum Untergange Nineveh’s (3 vols.; Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1916), 2:56 (lines 70–76). 19 For Eshmunazor’s concern that his remains not be removed, see KAI 14:5–6, 7–12; for the priest Si’gabbar’s similar concern, see KAI 226:6–10. 20 Even if one were to understand v. 19a to suggest that the king was never buried, lƟbûš hărnjgîm would remain equally difficult syntactically, and its meaning equally obscure. Thus, in terms of making sense of the verse as a whole, nothing is lost by adopting my proposed understanding of wƟ’attâ hošlaktƗ miqqibrƟkƗ.

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Some Neglected Aspects of Israelite Interment Ideology

Canaanite and Israelite burial practices have been of serious interest to archeologists and to archeologically and contextually oriented biblical scholars of late, with significant articles, monographic studies, and essay collections appearing since the early nineties.1 Studies have typically focused on such topics as the classification of types of tombs and the contents of tombs, age/sex interment patterns, and changes in burial practice over time. A few investigators have devoted attention also to aspects of burial ideology. Grave goods have been analyzed for what they might tell us about beliefs in an afterlife or about ancestor cult practices.2 The relationship of the tomb to Sheol has been explored through analysis of biblical texts in conjunction with material remains.3 But for all this recent interest in burial practices and the ideas that undergird them, certain aspects of interment ————— 1

See, e.g., among archeologists, Elizabeth Bloch-Smith, Judahite Burial Practices and Beliefs about the Dead (JSOTSup 123; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1992); Rivka Gonen, Burial Patterns & Cultural Diversity in Late Bronze Age Canaan (ASOR Dissertation Series 7; Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 1992); and the essays in Graves and Burial Practices in Israel in the Ancient Period (in Hebrew; ed. Itamar Singer; Jersualem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi/Israel Exploration Society, 1994), particularly Gabriel Barkay, “Burial Caves and Burial Practices in Judah in the Iron Age” (96– 164). A noteworthy older survey is Ephraim Satran, ʤʸʥʡʷ, ʸʡʷ, Encyclopaedia Biblica (9 vols.; Jerusalem: Bialik, 1950–88), 7:5–24. 2 Bloch-Smith, Judahite Burial Practices, 72–108; Theodore J. Lewis, “How Far Can Texts Take Us? Evaluating Textual Sources for Reconstructing Ancient Israelite Beliefs about the Dead,” in Sacred Time, Sacred Place: Archaeology and the Religion of Israel (ed. Barry M. Gittlen; Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2002), 174, 175–76; Wayne T. Pitard, “Tombs and Offerings: Archaeological Data and Comparative Methodology in the Study of Death in Israel,” in Sacred Time, Sacred Place, 149–50. A brief but useful survey is David Ilan, “Grave Goods,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of Archaeology in the Near East (ed. Eric M. Meyers; 5 vols.; New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 2:433–34. 3 E.g., Nicholas J. Tromp, Primitive Conceptions of Death and the Nether World in the Old Testament (BO 21; Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1969), 139–40; Johannes Pedersen, Israel: Its Life and Culture (2 vols.; London: Humphrey Milford; Copenhagen: Povl Branner, 1926), 1:460–63. A number of scholars draw on both biblical representations of burial and material evidence to reconstruct interment ideas and practices. See, e.g., Bloch-Smith, Judahite Burial Practices, Barkay, “Burial Caves and Burial Practices,” and recently, Lewis, “How Far Can Texts Take Us?,” who argues for an approach that draws upon both material and biblical sources. See also Pitard’s characterization of eclectic scholarship, which utilizes a variety of data (“Tombs and Offerings,” 146–47), and Ron Tappy’s thoughtful discussion of the challenges inherent in using both biblical and material evidence (“Did the Dead Ever Die in Biblical Judah?” BASOR 298 [1995]: 65).

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ideology remain for the most part unexplored.4 It is my purpose in this essay to bring into relief two of these neglected dimensions of Israelite burial ideology. I will begin by reconstructing a rough hierarchy of burial, from most desirable to least, based mainly on the evidence of biblical texts.5 Even a cursory review of biblical descriptions of interment suggests that an honorable burial in the family tomb was clearly the kind of entombment most to be desired, while abandonment of the corpse on the field was the worst possible outcome after death. But between these extremes biblical texts suggest a number of other possibilities: honorable burial in a substitute for the family tomb; honorable burial in someone else’s family tomb; and various forms of dishonorable burial. Drawing on various classes of evidence, I will suggest some possible explanations for why burial in the family tomb was preferable to any other outcome according to many biblical texts. I will then take up the issue of the movement of remains of the previously interred dead, and how such transportation might be viewed as salutary, innocuous, or harmful, depending on the context of the action. I will also consider what concrete effects, if any, lack of burial or hostile transfer of remains from a tomb might have been thought to have on the dead themselves. Though biblical texts are not an unproblematic window into the everyday beliefs and practices of historical Israelites, they are by far our richest resource for reconstructing a hierarchy of burial.6 They are also of importance when considering the range of possible meanings associated with moving the remains of the dead, and so they will be used here, in conjunction with epigraphic and other material evidence, with appropriate caution.7 —————

4 A full treatment of interment ideology that recognizes as much as possible regional/local and diachronic variation and draws on both material remains and texts, is still a desideratum for those who study death ways in ancient Israel. Obviously, when I speak of an Israelite interment ideology, I do not mean to suggest that a single, uniform set of ideas about burial was common to all Israelites through time and space; that the contrary was the case is suggested both by material evidence and by texts. 5 Nonliterary material evidence is, in the main, not particularly helpful for reconstructing this specific aspect of burial ideology, though it is crucial for reconstructing other aspects, as noted above. 6 On the limited utility of the biblical text as a source for reconstructing religious belief and practice, see Saul M. Olyan, Rites and Rank: Hierarchy in Biblical Representations of Cult (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), 13–14. Unfortunately extant biblical evidence of interment lends itself neither to the development of a diachronic perspective nor to uncovering local or regional differences in burial ideology. Thus, for a biblically dependent aspect of burial ideology such as hierarchy of interment, only a rough reconstruction lacking local/regional and diachronic nuance is possible. 7 On the use of biblical evidence along with epigraphic data, nonliterary material evidence, and comparative data from surrounding cultures to reconstruct Israelite belief and practice with respect to burial and other aspects of death and the afterlife, see especially the balanced and helpful recent discussions of Lewis, “How Far Can Texts Take Us?” and Pitard, “Tombs and Offerings.”

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I A hierarchy of burial types, from most desirable to least, may be reconstructed in rough outline from the various biblical texts that speak of entombment. I have identified five distinct ways in which a corpse might be treated after death. The first is honorable burial in the family tomb. This is clearly the outcome most to be desired for oneself or one’s family and friends. It is open to all persons, without regard to how the individual has died or the condition of the corpse.8 Texts suggest that burial in the family tomb is so important that male kin or others bound to the deceased by formal ties will expend great effort to transport the corpse to the family tomb, even if the death occurs at a distance.9 When David’s nephew Asahel dies in battle at Gibeon, David and Asahel’s brothers bring the body to the family tomb in Bethlehem (2 Sam 2:32). Similarly, the corpse of King Ahaziah of Judah, who had been killed by Jehu’s order, is conducted by his servants from Megiddo to Jerusalem for burial (2 Kgs 9:28), as is that of King Josiah by his servants after he is killed by Necho of Egypt (2 Kgs 23:30). In a fourth example, Samson’s brothers and other male kin bring his mutilated corpse up from Gaza to the family tomb in Danite territory (Judg 16:31). The same behavior is represented in P’s ancestral narrative. There, Jacob charges his sons to bury him in the family tomb in Canaan, along with his male and female ancestors: “I am about to be gathered to my people. Bury me with my ancestors, in the cave that is in the field of Ephron the Hittite, in the cave that is in the field of Machpelah, which is by Mamre, in the land of Canaan, the field that Abraham acquired from Ephron the Hittite as a tomb site. There they buried Abraham and Sarah his wife; there they buried Isaac and Rebekah his wife; and there I buried Leah” (Gen 49:29–31).10 Joseph and his brothers fulfill their father’s wish, transporting his corpse from Egypt to Canaan for interment (Gen 50:13). The desire to be buried in —————

8 Suicides, those who die in battle, and those who are executed are buried in the family tomb as readily as those who die of natural causes according to biblical texts (see, e.g., 2 Sam 17:23; 2:32; 1 Kgs 2:34). Likewise, mutilated corpses may be so buried (Judg 16:21, 31; cf. 2 Sam 4:12, where Eshbaal’s head is buried in the Saulide branch tomb in Hebron). On the material evidence for the interment of decapitated bodies and skulls, see Bloch-Smith, Judahite Burial Practices, 71. On suicide in biblical narrative, see Ludwig Wächter, Der Tod im Alten Testament (AzTh 8; Stuttgart: Calwer, 1967), 89–97. 9 On the burial responsibilities of the son and other male kin, see Gen 49:29–31; 50:5–6; Judg 16:31. On the obligations of non-kin bound by a formal relationship to the deceased to bury the deceased, see 2 Kgs 9:28. In 2 Sam 2:5, David describes the burial of Saul and his sons by the men of Jabesh Gilead as an act of covenant loyalty (h̡esed) performed by the Jabeshites for their lord Saul. The Jabeshites, however, do not inter Saul and his sons in their family tomb in Benjamin, but bury them with appropriate honors in Jabesh (e.g., the text mentions that they fasted for seven days). 10 All translations are my own.

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the family tomb may shape economically significant personal decisions, as 2 Sam 19:38 illustrates. There, Barzillay the Gileadite, David’s loyal servant, refuses the king’s offer of a pension in Jerusalem with the excuse that he is old, and wants to die in his city near his parents’ tomb, presumably to guarantee that he will be buried in it.11 Not to be buried in the family tomb is cast as a punishment by various texts. The disobedient man of God from Judah who eats and drinks in Bethel is told in an oracle of Yhwh that as a result of his rebellion, his corpse will not be buried in the family tomb (1 Kgs 13:22). Similarly, the Chronicler makes a point of noting that sinful kings of Judah such as Jehoram, Joash, and Ahaz were not buried in the tomb of the kings in Jerusalem (2 Chr 21:20; 24:25; 28:27), in contrast to favored rulers such as Jehoshaphat and Josiah (2 Chr 21:1; 35:24). The ideal burial takes place in the family tomb and honors the dead through appropriate disposition of the body and the performance of mourning. Idioms of honor (e.g., verbal forms of the root kbd) are sometimes used to describe such rites (2 Sam 10:3; 2 Chr 32:33; Sir 38:17; cf. Isa 14:18). After burial in the family tomb, honorable interment in a substitute for the family tomb seems to be most desirable according to our texts. We learn of such arrangements in several texts. When Saul’s kinsman and military commander Abner is murdered by David’s nephew Joab, David embraces the role of lead mourner in the absence of Abner’s male kin and buries Abner with honors in a tomb in Hebron: “Then David said to Joab and to all the people who were with him: ‘Tear your garments, put on sackcloth, and lament before Abner.’ As for King David, he walked behind the bier, and they buried Abner in Hebron. The king lifted up his voice and wept toward the tomb of Abner, and all the people wept. The king sang a dirge about Abner …” (2 Sam 3:31–32). Abner’s tomb, though it is not located in Benjamin and has no connection to Abner’s family’s patrimonial landholding (nah̡ălâ), effectively becomes a branch of the family tomb when the head of the murdered Eshbaal, son of Saul, is buried there some time later by David, who executes the murderers who had brought him Eshbaal’s severed head (2 Sam 4:12).12 The burial of Eshbaal’s head in Abner’s tomb suggests that it is desirable that the remains of kin be together in death, even if they —————

LXXL kai taphƝsomai en suggests a Hebrew Vorlage with w’qbr b-, “that I might be buried in,” as noted by P. Kyle McCarter, Jr., II Samuel: A New Translation with Introduction, Notes, and Commentary (AB 9; Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1984), 418n. 12 On the probable location of the family tomb on or near the family’s land holding, see Lawrence E. Stager, “The Archaeology of the Family in Ancient Israel,” BASOR 260 (1985): 23; Bloch-Smith, Judahite Burial Practices, 115, 148; and recently, J. David Schloen, The House of the Father as Fact and Symbol: Patrimonialism in Ugarit and the Ancient Near East (Studies in the Archaeology and History of the Levant 2; Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2001), 346–47. Hanan Brichto brought into relief the link of tomb and inalienable patrimony (“Kin, Cult, Land and Afterlife—A Biblical Complex,” HUCA 44 [1973]: 1–54). 11

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are separated physically from the family tomb and patrimony. Other examples of the creation of a branch of a family tomb at a distance from the patrimony include the burial of Saul and his sons together under the tamarisk tree in Jabesh-Gilead (1 Sam 31:13) and the establishment of a royal tomb for David and his descendants in the City of David at the time of David’s death (1 Kgs 2:10). Northern kings follow the same pattern of burial in the capital city according to several texts (e.g., 1 Kgs 16:6, 28). That the honorable burial of Saul and his sons in Jabesh is clearly less desirable than their interment in the family tomb in Benjamin is indicated by 2 Sam 21:12, where David’s apologists, attempting to portray him in the best possible light, present him moving the bones of Saul and Jonathan from Jabesh to the family tomb in Benjamin.13 The royal tombs in Jerusalem and the northern capitals Tirzah and Samaria may be an exception to the pattern of family tomb priority evident in the story of the movement of Saul’s and Jonathan’s bones. After all, capitals such as Jerusalem and Samaria were royal landholdings, purchased or conquered by royal predecessors. Therefore, kings were buried on their own lands, rather than those of another, as was the case with Saul and his sons.14 When their descendants died, they would be buried with them.15 Thus, in a number of respects, the royal tomb would come to resemble the family tomb. A third type of honorable burial is attested in 1 Kgs 13:30, a text that describes the interment of the disobedient man of God in someone else’s family tomb after his violent death. Yhwh had already informed the man of God through his host, the old prophet, that his corpse would not be buried in his family tomb in Judah (1 Kgs 13:22). After the man of God is killed by a lion in the countryside, the old prophet retrieves the corpse and brings it back to Bethel for burial with honors in his own family tomb: “He went and found his corpse cast in the road … The prophet lifted up the corpse of the man of God and laid it to rest on the ass, and brought it back to the city in order to lament [him] and to bury him. He laid the corpse to rest in his own tomb, and they lamented over him, ‘Woe, my brother’” (1 Kgs 13:28– 30). As honorable as the funerary rites described clearly are, the man of God’s burial in the family tomb of the old prophet in Bethel is, nonetheless, inferior to interment in the family tomb according to this text, since it is the denial of burial in his own family tomb that constitutes the man of God’s punishment from Yhwh. This burial type differs from interment in a substitute or branch of the family tomb in that the tomb in question here belongs ————— 13

On the apologetic casting of this narrative, see McCarter, II Samuel, 445–46. Note, however, that these lands acquired by rulers were not the equivalent of the family patrimony. 15 Certainly their successors would be buried in the royal tombs, if not other kin as well. 14

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to another family, the outsider is simply added to the family dead buried there, and (presumably), none of his own kin is buried there with him. Dishonorable forms of interment constitute a fourth burial category, inferior to all types of honorable burial, but evidently preferable to nonburial. In 2 Sam 18:17, David’s rebel son Absalom, who was killed by David’s servants, is cast (šlk, Hiphil) by them into a pit in the forest, after which his corpse is piled over with stones. Several other texts from the Deuteronomistic History describe similar interment rites for dead enemies or covenant violators. In Josh 8:29, the king of Ai is hanged on a tree until evening; then his corpse is brought down and thrown (šlk, Hiphil) at the opening of the city gate, where it is piled over with stones. Similarly, the corpses of five Canaanite kings are hanged for a day and then thrown (šlk, Hiphil) into a cave that is sealed by a pile of large stones (Josh 10:26–27).16 There is also the narrative of the execution of Achan and his dependents after his violation of the rules of holy war. They are stoned, burned, and piled over with stones (Josh 7:25–26). Uriah the prophet’s corpse is cast (šlk, Hiphil) into the “tombs of the people” after his execution by King Jehoiakim (Jer 26:23).17 King Jehoiakim himself will not be lamented at his death according to Yhwh’s oracle in Jer 22:18–19; instead, “in the grave of an ass he will be buried, dragged (sh̡b) and cast (šlk, Hiphil) outside the gates of Jerusalem.” Finally, the corpses of the northern pilgrims murdered by Ishmael ben Netanyah are cast (šlk, Hiphil) into a cistern in Mizpah, apparently without any burial or mourning rites (Jer 41:9). Aside from the absence of conventional funerary honors and rites of mourning, these dishonorable forms of burial have several common characteristics. First, most of these texts speak of the corpse being thrown (šlk, Hiphil) into the burial place, clearly a ritual act of disrespect and disregard; it is an act specifically associated with animal burials in Jer 22:19.18 This is to be contrasted with use of the verb nwh̡ in the Hiphil (“to set at rest”), an idiom used several times in one narrative of honorable interment for the treatment of the corpse (1 Kgs 13:30).19 Several texts speak of the casting of ————— 16

In both Josh 8:29 and 10:26–27, the narrative shows Joshua and Israel following the law of Deut 21:22–23, which mandates the execution of a sinner and the hanging of his corpse on a tree until sundown, after which the corpse must be buried. 17 The expression qibrê bƟnê hƗ‘Ɨm occurs only one other time, in 2 Kgs 23:6. It is unclear exactly how these tombs would have differed from the tombs of the elite. 18 The act of dragging (sh̡b) the corpse in Jer 22:19 ought also to be understood as dishonoring. It is elsewhere associated with the behavior of dogs toward unprotected, exposed corpses (Jer 15:3). 19 See 2 Kgs 23:18, where Josiah commands that the interred bones of the man of God who prophesied Bethel’s destruction be left at rest: hannîh̡û lô ’îš ’al yƗna‘ ‘as̞mǀtƗyw. Not surprisingly, the verb nwh̡ and derivatives such as the noun nah̡at, “repose,” are also used of the repose of the dead. See, e.g., Qoh 6:5; KAI 34:5; 35:2.

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stone piles over the corpses of dead enemies or rebels, evidently a dishonorable rite of burial. In addition, the burial places themselves appear to be dishonoring to different degrees. An ass’s grave—whatever this might have been—is presumably more dishonoring than a nonelite tomb, a forest pit, or a cistern. All must have been viewed as inferior to the family tomb and its honorable substitutes. Finally, the least desirable treatment of the corpse is not to bury it at all. Nonburial is a paradigmatic curse in treaty contexts: “Your corpse shall be food for all the birds of the heavens and for the beasts of the earth, with none to bury” (Deut 28:26).20 One text speaks of the throwing of the exposed corpse onto a field of symbolic significance, using language (šlk, Hiphil) that is similar to that of many narratives of dishonorable burial (2 Kgs 9:25). Descriptions of nonburial frequently include the notation that the dead will not be mourned or lamented and that the corpse will be mutilated by fowl and beasts. Jeremiah 16:4 is typical of such texts: “They shall die of deadly diseases. They shall not be lamented, nor shall they be buried. Like dung upon the surface of the ground they shall be … Their corpse shall become food for the birds of the heavens and for the beasts of the earth.” Though a lack of lamentation is characteristic also of biblical representations of dishonorable burial, mutilation of the corpse by birds and beasts is a uniquely horrible characteristic of nonburial, emphasized in many of its biblical and extrabiblical descriptions. While enemies expose the corpse to the depredations of beasts and fowl (Ps 79:2), family, friends, and allies do what they can to prevent mutilation (2 Sam 21:10) or at least to mitigate some of its damage through appropriate interment and mourning rites (e.g., 1 Sam 31:8–13). Why was burial in the family tomb more desirable for the corpse than any other outcome according to biblical texts? Descriptions of such interment are often accompanied by idioms such as “to be gathered to/come to/lie down with one’s ancestors/people,” suggesting that burial in the family tomb was thought to bring the deceased into some kind of proximity with dead kin.21 Was this simply a physical proximity (i.e., the bones of the de—————

20 See similarly Esarhaddon’s succession treaty in Simo Parpola and Kazuko Watanabe, NeoAssyrian Treaties and Loyalty Oaths (SAA 2; Helsinki: Helsinki University Press, 1988), 49 (6:481–84). 21 For examples of each of these expressions, often used in narratives describing a death followed by burial in the family or royal tomb, see Gen 15:15 (wƟ’attâ tƗbô’ ’el ’ăbǀtêkƗ); 25:8 (wayyƝ’ƗsƝp ’el ‘ammƗyw); 2 Kgs 20:21 (wayyiškab hizqiyyƗhû ‘im ’ăbǀtƗyw); 22:20 (hinƟnî ’ǀsipƟkƗ ‘al ’ăbǀtêkƗ). See also Tromp’s discussion of two such idioms (Primitive Conceptions of Death, 168–71). Tromp, following B. Alfrink, believes that the P idiom ne’Ɵsap ’el ‘ammƗyw means that the deceased has joined dead kin in the underworld; in contrast, following G. R. Driver, he argues that the Deuteronomistic expression šƗkab ‘im ’ăbǀtêkƗ means that he has died “a customary, usual death.” Wächter argues that both expressions originally meant burial in the

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ceased end up with the bones of other dead kin, as tombs seem to indicate),22 or do these idioms suggest something about the nature of the deceased’s afterlife? This is not a question that can be answered definitively given the evidence that survives, though I suspect that idioms of proximity to the ancestors are intended to suggest something about familial social relations in the afterlife.23 Even if my surmise is correct, it is not clear from surviving texts what exactly the nature of the relationship with the ancestors might have been for one who was buried in the family tomb, nor how that relationship might have differed with a different kind of burial (e.g., burial elsewhere, or no burial at all). We simply do not know enough about the familial dimensions of the Israelite afterlife to say very much about this issue.24 Nor do we know much about Israelite ancestral cult practices, though I believe there is sufficient evidence to assume some combination of feeding and memorializing rites were routine after burial among at least some Israelites, perhaps at the locus of the tomb, perhaps with some regu————— family tomb (Tod im Alten Testament, 72). It seems unlikely to me that these expressions have a different sense, given their similarity in form and usage. Whatever their exact meaning, they speak of the recently deceased joining dead kin in some manner, whether physically or in spirit. For further discussion, see Karl-Johan Illman, Old Testament Formulas About Death (Åbo: Åbo Akademi, 1979), 43–45. 22 On secondary burial in Judean family tombs, see the discussion of Bloch-Smith, Judahite Burial Practices, 36–37, 42–43, with citations, and the older general survey of Eric Meyers, “Secondary Burials in Palestine,” BA 33 (1970): 2–29, esp. 10–17. Like most commentators, I assume that these tombs are for lineages, though this has not been proved (for the assumption, see, e.g., Bloch-Smith, ibid., 148; Byron R. McCane, “Burial Techniques,” Oxford Encyclopedia of Archaeology in the Near East, 1:386). 23 Though these idioms occur in narratives of burial in the family tomb (e.g., Gen 25:8), it must be acknowledged that this is not exclusively the case (e.g., Deut 31:16; 32:50). Therefore, it seems unlikely that physical proximity is at issue when these idioms are used. That the afterlife has social dimensions is indicated by a variety of West Asian (including biblical) texts. In Isa 14:9–10, dead kings in the underworld receive and converse with the “King of Babylon,” apparently while the music of his funeral still plays above (hûrad šƟ’ôl gƟ’ônekƗ hemyat nƟbƗlêkƗ). See also the various descriptions of the interactions of the underworld’s denizens in texts such as “Ishtar’s Descent to the Netherworld” (Rykle Borger, Babylonisch-assyrische Lesestücke [2nd ed.; AO 54; 2 vols.; Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1979], 1:95–104); “Nergal and Ereshkigal” (Hermann Hunger, Spätbabylonische Texte aus Uruk [3 vols.; Berlin: Gebr. Mann, 1976], 1:17–18); and the Gilgamesh epic (Andrew R. George, The Babylonian Gilgamesh Epic: Introduction, Critical Edition and Cuneiform Texts [2 vols.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003], 1:634–46 [tablet VII]; 728–34 [tablet XII]). Ruth 1:17 may suggest that burial together in the same tomb means no separation of spirits in death. As noted previously, idioms such as ne’Ɵsap ’el ‘amm- and šƗkab ‘im ’ăbǀt-, used of the deceased even when not buried in the family tomb, must suggest something other than simple physical proximity of remains with those of dead kin. 24 Some West Asian texts, including biblical materials, suggest that aspects of the social relations of the dead in the underworld mirrored life. E.g., dead kings sit on thrones in Sheol (Isa 14:9); dead warriors descend there with their weapons (Ezek 32:27). But note other passages that seem to suggest that status in life might be lost in the afterlife (e.g., Enkidu’s dream of his death and descent to the underworld in the Gilgamesh Epic, where he sees princes transformed into servants).

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larity.25 It may well be that the importance of burial in the family tomb, evidenced in a variety of texts, is directly related to the need to perpetuate the relationship of the deceased with kin both living and dead. It is possible that interment in the family tomb was necessary in order to allow living relations to perform ancestral rites at (regular?) intervals, given the proximity of the family tomb to the kin group and their patrimonial landholding (nah̡ălâ).26 Likewise, as noted, such burial might have been required for the —————

25 For memorializing the dead, see 2 Sam 18:18, which suggests it was routine for a son, after his father’s death, to set up a pillar and invoke the father’s name. However, the text neither indicates how often such invocation might have taken place, nor whether it took place at the locus of the tomb. For feeding the dead, see Deut 26:14; Tob 4:17; and Sir 30:18. The latter two— admittedly late—texts specify the tomb as the locus for delivery of food to the deceased. There is much archeological evidence that may bear on the question of ancestral rites for the dead at the tomb. Remains of food, oil lamps, cooking pots, bowls, and other articles that might have been tied to such rites have been found in various kinds of tombs, and some of these items have even been found in individual burials (e.g., Bloch-Smith, Judahite Burial Practices, 72–81, 105–108). It is possible that some or all of these things were placed with the corpse at the time of interment, as items found with individual burials suggest; but it is also possible that food (and other?) items were deposited as offerings, possibly at intervals, later on. In any case, it seems likely that at least some of these items were intended for the dead to use or consume in the afterlife. On the interpretation of grave goods, see further the works cited in n. 2. Some cuneiform texts suggest that the place of buried remains is the locus for ancestral rites. See, e.g., Ashurbanipal’s assumption that removal of the bones of the kings of Elam from their tombs and their transportation to Assyria would result in termination of their ancestral rites (kispƯ nƗq mê uzammešunnjti. For the text, see Maximilian Streck, ed., Assurbanipal und die letzten assyrischen Könige bis zum Untergange Nineveh’s [3 vols.; Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1916], 2:56 [lines 74–76]). Note that other Mesopotamian materials do not presume that such rites necessarily occurred at the place of burial. Frequently, the home is assumed to be the primary locus, even without evidence of intramural burial (on this, see the discussion of Karel van der Toorn, Family Religion in Babylonia, Syria & Israel [Leiden, New York and Cologne: Brill, 1996], 58–62). An older but still useful survey of the cuneiform evidence is Miranda Bayliss, “The Cult of Dead Kin in Assyria and Babylonia,” Iraq 35 (1973): 115–25; she summarizes evidence for both the royal and non-royal cults. In the West Semitic cultural sphere (including Israel), ancestral rites may have occurred in local shrines as well as at the tomb (van der Toorn, Family Religion, 217–18; van der Toorn cites texts such as KAI 214:17–18 and KTU 1:17 I 25–33 to support his argument for ancestral rites at local sanctuaries in the West Semitic cultural sphere). On the Israelite and Ugaritic evidence pertaining to such cults, see especially Lewis, Cults of the Dead in Ancient Israel and Ugarit (HSM 39; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989) and more recently, “How Far Can Texts Take Us?” 186–205. Like most specialists, I understand acts such as providing the dead with food and invoking their names to constitute ancestor veneration, which itself may assume that the dead can act as benefactors or enemies of the living, depending on how well they are treated (contrast Brian B. Schmidt, Israel’s Beneficent Dead: Ancestor Cult and Necromancy in Ancient Israelite Religion and Tradition [Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 1996], 10 who argues that feeding the dead assumes that they are weak rather than powerful, and so unable to affect the living). I note, however, that Israelite (including biblical) evidence for the ability of the dead to act beneficently or malevolently is lacking, though such data are well attested in surrounding cultures (see, e.g., Lewis, “How Far Can Texts Take Us?” 191–94, who notes examples from Egypt and Mesopotamia). 26 On the relationship of the patrimony to the family tomb, see the literature cited in n. 12.

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deceased to have uninhibited social relations with other family dead in the underworld. Other forms of honorable burial might have been less desirable because they simply could not provide the advantages of interment in the family tomb. Burial in a substitute for the family tomb, located away from the family’s property holding, might have allowed for social interaction of dead family members interred together in the afterlife if more than one family member was buried there (e.g., Abner and Eshbaal), though interactions with other dead kin buried in the family tomb might have been inhibited in some way. In addition, regular ancestral cult observances at the tomb by surviving kin would be difficult to guarantee in such a situation if kin remained settled at a distance. As for a deceased person buried in another family’s tomb, we do not know what kind of social interactions with his own kin he might have had in the afterlife, nor do we know whether he would have received any ancestral offerings from the surviving kin of the family in whose tomb he was buried.27 As with the deceased person buried in a substitute for the family tomb, it would be difficult for his own kin to perform regular ancestral cultic rites for him at the tomb, given their physical separation from it. In short, the reasons for the family tomb’s importance vis-à-vis other forms of entombment remain unclear, though some reasonable speculation is possible regarding the potential role of ancestral rites at the tomb and the social needs of the dead in the underworld in making burial in the family tomb such a priority for the dead and their survivors. But even here, we are frustrated by our ignorance, for we cannot say whether ancestral rites necessarily had to take place at the locus of burial, we do not know how frequently they occurred, nor do we know anything about how burial itself affected familial relations in the afterlife, if at all. Given the possible kin-related explanations for the importance of burial in the family tomb, we can now ask why lack of burial is cast as the worst possible outcome after death. As with dishonorable forms of burial and even individual honorable interment outside of the family tomb, lack of burial meant that the remains of the dead would never share physical proximity with those of other deceased kin. It is possible that it inhibited contact with dead kin in the afterlife, though this must remain uncertain, given our poor understanding of the familial dimensions of the Israelite afterlife. In addition, unburied remains might have proved to be an impediment for ancestral rites if such rites were required at the locus of the deceased’s —————

27 Cuneiform sources bear witness to offerings by non-kin to unrelated, troublesome spirits; such offerings were apparently initiated because of the spirits’ hostility (see Bayliss, “Cult of Dead Kin,” 119).

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remains (normally, the tomb). In contrast to all buried remains, including those interred dishonorably, unburied corpses were subject to mutilation by birds and animals, which was certainly a source of dishonor to the dead and their survivors, and may have also affected the afterlife of the dead in some way, though this too remains uncertain.28 There were probably other singular features to lack of burial that made it uniquely unappealing as an outcome after death. It is possible that at least some Israelites viewed lack of burial as an impediment to the spirit’s rest in the afterlife.29 This idea is attested in cuneiform texts, as is well known. Gilgamesh 12:151 describes the fate of the spirit of the uninterred: “His ghost is not at rest in the underworld” (et́emmašu ina ers̞etim ul s̞alil).30 Ashurbanipal claims to have imposed a lack of repose on the spirits of the kings of Elam by destroying their tombs and removing their remains to Assyria (et́emmƝšunu lƗ s̞alƗlu Ɲmid).31 The same idea is present in a curse in Esarhaddon’s succession treaty.32 One cannot prove that this notion of an unsettled afterlife for the unburied was current in Israel, though it would help us to make sense of the deep and abiding concern attested in many texts to bury one’s own dead and the role of exposure of the corpse on the field as a paradigmatic curse in treaty contexts.33

—————

28 The dead in the underworld may have retained their appearance at the point of death. On this, see the medium’s description of Samuel’s ascending ghost in 1 Sam 28:14 as an old man wrapped in a robe. On spirits in the underworld with the appearance of physical mutilation, cf. Vergil, Aeneid 6.494–99. 29 Brichto seems sure that Israelites believed that the afterlife is negatively affected by lack of burial (“Kin, Cult, Land, and Afterlife,” 36–37). Unhappily, extant evidence does not recommend such confidence. 30 George, Babylonian Gilgamesh Epic, 734. 31 See Streck, ed., Assurbanipal, 2:54, 56 (lines 70–75). 32 Parpola and Watanabe, Neo-Assyrian Treaties, 57 (6:638–40). 33 This interpretation of the significance of nonburial has been rejected by some, who cite texts such as Gen 37:35, where Jacob, mourning for Joseph who he assumes is dead and unburied, speaks of him as if he were in Sheol (kî ’ƝrƝd ’el bƟnî ’ƗbƝl šƟ’ǀlƗh); for this view, see, e.g., Samuel E. Loewenstamm, ʺʥʮ, Encyclopaedia Biblica (9 vols.; Jerusalem: Bialik, 1950–88), 4:758 and Moshe Greenberg, Ezekiel 21–37: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB 22A; New York: Doubleday, 1997), 670. Although some Israelite circles may have believed that burial was not a necessity for a settled afterlife, a view perhaps reflected in Gen 37:35, other groups might well have had the opposite view, as I have suggested. From a comparative perspective, it is interesting to note that Homer bears witness to the idea that the corpse must receive burial in order for the spirit of the dead to enter the underworld (Iliad 23.82).

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II The movement of the remains of previously interred dead is the second neglected aspect of burial ideology that I would like to consider. There is textual evidence that transportation of remains may be viewed as a salutary, fully legitimate deed, as an innocuous action, or as an act of great hostility, depending on who is moving the remains and for what purpose. I would like to identify contexts in which such movement might be positively understood, contexts in which it might be seen as having no particular significance, and contexts in which it might be negatively understood. I will also consider the possible effects transfer of remains might have had on the dead themselves. It is clear that the remains of the interred dead could be moved legitimately in certain contexts by certain persons. Texts tell of the sanctioned removal of remains from one tomb to another, and material evidence attests to (apparently) legitimate movement of bones within a tomb. 2 Sam 21:13– 14 is the best biblical example of the salutary transfer of remains of the interred dead from one tomb to another. In this narrative of David’s apologists, the execution of surviving Saulides by the Gibeonites, made possible by David’s active cooperation, is cast as a necessary remedy to a three-yearlong famine in the land brought on by Saul’s earlier act of oath breaking.34 For our purposes, what is significant in the story is what David does with the bones of Saul and Jonathan. After seven surviving Saulides are executed by the Gibeonites, David collects the bones of Saul and Jonathan from the elders of Jabesh-Gilead and has them transported to the family tomb in Benjamin, where they are buried, along with the remains of the Gibeonites’ victims. Given the apologetic agenda of the narrative, there can be no doubt that David’s transfer of the bones of Saul and Jonathan was intended by the author to be taken as a positive act and even an act of loyalty, not unlike his efforts to have the executed Saulides interred in their family tomb.35 As mentioned earlier, the narrative is also suggesting indirectly that honorable burial in the family tomb is a superior outcome to honorable burial in a substitute for the family tomb, possibly for reasons having to do with ancestral cult observances and the social dimensions of the afterlife. Regular ancestral observances at the site of the remains by living members of the kin group would certainly have been made possible by the transfer of Saul’s and Jonathan’s remains to their family tomb. Perhaps such a change of —————

34 See McCarter, II Samuel, 444–46, with citations, on the apologetic cast of this narrative and its covenantal dimensions. On the type of execution described by causative of the verb yq‘ (hammûqƗ‘îm, wayyǀqî‘njm), see McCarter’s note on 442 and Robert Polzin, “HWQY‘ and Covenantal Institutions in Israel,” HTR 62 (1969): 227–40. 35 See McCarter, II Samuel, 445.

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locus would have improved the afterlife of Saul and Jonathan, though this must remain uncertain. In short, David’s acts as narrated in 2 Samuel 21 may have been intended to bring concrete benefits to the dead as well as make him look good and further distance him from the execution of the seven Saulides. A second example of the sanctioned movement of the remains of the interred dead is the kind of secondary disposition of bones observed in various Judean tombs from the Iron Age.36 In this case, remains are moved to a different location within a tomb, in contrast to their transfer from one tomb to another, as in 2 Samuel 21. Typically, bones in a bench or cave tomb are moved away from the locus of primary interment to another location within the tomb (e.g., under the bench or at the back or sides of the cave). Since such removal represents a fairly widespread pattern, it seems very likely that it was viewed as a legitimate act that did no harm to the dead; perhaps when it was performed with care, it was even beneficial for them in some way we do not understand. Practically speaking, it was necessary to make room for new burials.37 Those transporting the remains of the dead were very likely surviving kin, though we can only guess about this, given the nature of the evidence. It is possible that such removal of bones within the tomb was a typical familial responsibility, not unlike ancestral rites such as invoking the name of the dead or providing food offerings. Along with these examples of sanctioned and even salutary movement of remains by family and friends are cases of transfer understood as hostile acts. Jeremiah 8:1–2 prophesies the future removal of the bones of Judean leaders from their tombs as a punishment: “On that day,” oracle of Yhwh, “they shall bring out the bones of the kings of Judah, and the bones of its princes, and the bones of the priests, and the bones of the prophets, and the bones of the dwellers of Jerusalem from their tombs. And they shall spread them before the sun, the moon, and all the host of heaven whom they loved and whom they served, and after whom they went, and whom they sought, and to whom they bowed down. They shall not be gathered, nor shall they be buried; they shall be like dung on the surface of the ground.”

The honorably interred elite dead of Judah shall be reduced to the status of the unburied through the exhumation and spreading of their remains outside of the tomb. This, according to the text, is a fitting punishment for their worship of gods other than Yhwh. Isaiah 14:19–20 is similar in thrust. In ————— 36

On this, see the citations in n. 22. Meyers notes the oddness of Judean secondary burials in light of evident concerns that the dead not be disturbed. He does not believe that moving bones in the tomb was a “harsh” act, “since emphasis is on joining one’s fathers in the very same grave” (“Secondary Burials,” 2, 15, 17). Careful secondary disposition was likely not understood as disturbing to the dead. 37

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this text, the previously interred “King of Babylon” shall be cast out of his tomb (wƟ’attâ hošlaktƗ miqqibrƟkƗ); separated from other buried kings, he shall be like an unburied, trampled corpse, because of his acts of violence against his own people. As with Jer 8:1–2, the removal of honorably interred remains without their reburial is a hostile act understood as a punishment for dead offenders. Both texts use expressions of dishonor for the dead whose fate it is to be stripped of an honorable burial by their enemies (e.g., nƝs̞er nit‘Ɨb, “an abominated shoot,” or dǀmen ‘al-pƟnê hƗ’ădƗmâ, “dung on the surface of the ground”). As with other passages that narrate dishonorable burials, a form of the verb šlk (passive in this instance) is used in Isa 14:19, this time to describe the act of hostile, dishonoring removal of remains from the tomb.38 A concern to protect the interred remains of the dead from unwelcome disturbance and hostile transfer by tomb robbers or enemies is widely attested in burial inscriptions from a variety of locales in West Asia, including Judah. Burial epigraphs often include a statement that there are no valuables with the dead and a warning to would be tomb robbers or others not to enter the tomb, or disturb or remove the remains of the dead. Formulaic curses typically reinforce the warnings. The fragmentary Royal Steward inscription (KAI 191), from Silwan, near Jerusalem, is not atypical of this genre.39 Dated to about 700 BCE on paleographic grounds, the text, inscribed on the lintel of the tomb, reads as follows: This is [the tomb of ]yahu who was over the house. There is no silver or gold here. Only [his bones] and the bones of his female slave with him. Cursed be the person who would open this. z’t [qbrt …]yhw ’šr ‘l hbyt ’yn ph ksp wzhb [2] ky ’m [‘s̞mth] w‘s̞mt ’mth ’th ’rwr h’dm ’šr [3] ypth̡ ’t z’t.40

To this Judean epigraph one might compare similar Phoenician or Aramaic burial inscriptions on sarcophagi or tombs from the first millennium which —————

38 I cannot agree with those scholars (e.g., Brichto, “Kin, Cult, Land, and Afterlife,” 25) who view the king as never having been buried. The text seems to suggest rather that his burial was reversed; that ultimately he was unburied, becoming like those never buried (e.g., peger mûbƗs). The expression wƟ’attâ hošlaktƗ miqqibrƟkƗ, “As for you, you have been cast out from your tomb,” suggests this rather than the idea that the king was never buried. Cf. the similar use of the Hiphil of šlk with min in Lam 2:1 (hišlîk miššƗmayim ’eres̞ tip’eret yiĞrƗ’Ɲl) and Ps 22:11 (‘alêkƗ hošlaktî mƝrƗh̡em), suggesting removal from one locus to another. On this, see further my article “Was the ‘King of Babylon’ Buried Before His Corpse Was Exposed? Some Thoughts on Isa 14,19,” ZAW 118 (2006): 423–26, reprinted in this volume. 39 On this inscription, see Nahman Avigad, “The Epitaph of a Royal Steward from Siloam Village,” IEJ 3 (1953): 137–52. 40 For the most part, my restorations follow Avigad’s sensible suggestions (“Epitaph,” 143). On issues of paleography and dating, see ibid., 149–50.

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claim that no precious metals are present with the deceased and which curse anyone who might enter the tomb or open the sarcophagus illegitimately (e.g., KAI 13:3–8; 14:4–12, 20–22; 226:6–10; cf. KAI 1:2, which contains only the curses on those who would open the sarcophagus).41 Some of these inscriptions also curse those who would remove the remains of the dead to another place (KAI 14:5–6, 7–12; 226:8–10). The curses in such inscriptions include the death of the invader’s children, lack of burial for him, and no resting place for him among the dead. Inscriptions speak of illegitimate or hostile entry resulting in the disturbance of the dead (rgz, e.g., KAI 13:4, 6, 7), suggesting that the repose of the spirit in the underworld might be affected by unwelcome interference with physical remains and the place of burial.42 Clearly, transfer of the remains of the dead could be understood positively, neutrally, or negatively depending on who is doing the moving and why. Kin, friends, and allies may move bones or other remains if the intent is to benefit the dead in some way or at least not to harm them. Remains may be transported to a different tomb and reburied if the new burial improves on the original interment (2 Samuel 21). Bones may be collected and moved within a tomb, presumably by kin, to make room for new burials. It is possible that careful transportation of remains within the tomb was understood to benefit the dead, though this must remain uncertain. In any case, it seems unlikely that it did any harm to them, given the extent of the practice. Tomb robbers and enemies, on the other hand, were not welcome to enter the tomb, and warnings and curses in tomb epigraphs were meant to keep them out. They could dishonor the dead by removing honorably buried remains from the tomb and leaving them unburied. Worse, it is possible that their actions affected the afterlife of the dead in negative ways. Just as a lack of burial might have had concrete effects on the afterlife of the dead, so, too, might the hostile invasion of a tomb or the exhuming of its remains. Removal of remains could have resulted in the termination of ancestral rites and possibly the disruption of familial relations in the afterlife. Also, the spirit of the dead could have been made restless in some way as a result of exhuming remains. Two neglected aspects of Israelite interment ideology have been the focus of this investigation: hierarchy of types of burial and the range of meanings associated with moving the remains of the previously interred dead. A rough hierarchy of burial types, from best to worst, may be reconstructed on the basis of biblical texts. While honorable burial in the family tomb is most ————— 41

Many scholars have noted these parallels. Forms of the same verb are used of disturbing or rousing the dead in the underworld in a number of biblical texts (e.g., 1 Sam 28:15; Isa 14:9). 42

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desirable and abandonment of the corpse to fowl and beasts is the worst possible outcome after death, a range of other possibilities, some clearly more attractive than others, emerges from a review of pertinent evidence (honorable burial in a substitute for the family tomb; honorable burial in someone else’s family tomb; various types of dishonorable burial). The reasons for the desirability of interment in the family tomb remain unclear; it is possible, however, that such burial was required for the dead to interact in an uninhibited way with dead kin in the afterlife and for ancestral rites from living kin to take place at (regular?) intervals at the site of the remains of the dead. Lack of burial would have dishonored the dead, and may also have inhibited the performance of ancestral rites by living kin; in addition, it may have interfered with the relations of the dead with kin in the underworld. As for the movement of the remains of the entombed dead, it is clear that the meaning of such action is determined wholly by its context. Transportation of bones may be understood as a salutary deed, an innocuous action, or a hostile act, depending on who is doing the moving and for what purpose. It might have affected the afterlife of the dead, either positively or negatively, though this remains uncertain.

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