Social Disciplining and Civilising Processes in China: The Politics of Morality and the Morality of Politics 9781032404363, 9781032404370, 9781003353065

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Social Disciplining and Civilising Processes in China

This book argues that a major part of the Chinese government’s road map, formulated in 2017, to modernise China comprehensively by 2049 is the process of social disciplining. It contends that the Chinese state sees that modernisation and modernity encompass not only economic and political–administrative change but are also related to the organisation of society in general and the disciplining of this society and its individuals to create people with “modernised” minds and behaviour; and that, moreover, the Chinese state is aspiring to a modernity with “Chinese characteristics”. The question of modernising by disciplining was extensively dealt with in the twentieth century by leading Western social scientists including Max Weber, Norbert Elias and Michel Foucault, who argued that disciplining, extending from external coercion towards the internalisation of restraints, is indispensable for achieving social order and thereby for “civilisation” – but defined from a European perspective, in relation to developments in Europe. This book therefore not only discusses the Chinese experience of social disciplining, but also, by looking at a non-Western society, identifies universal tendencies of societal change and social disciplining and separates them from particular occurrences. Thomas Heberer is Senior Professor of Chinese Politics and Society at the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany.

Routledge Contemporary China Series

242 Red Tourism in China Commodification of Propaganda Chunfeng Lin 243 Human-Animal Interactions in Anthropocene Asia Victor Teo 244 Deliberation with Chinese Characteristics A Tale of Two Chinese Cities’ Participatory Budgeting Experiences Su Yun Woo 245 The Rise of Confucian Citizens in China Theoretical Reflections and Empirical Explorations Canglong Wang 246 Public Policy and Health Care in China The Case of Public Insurance Peter Nan-shong Lee 247 The Nature and Rationale of Zen/Chan and Enlightenment The Mind of a Pre-Natal Baby Ming Dong Gu 248 Knowledge Production and Epistemic Decolonization at the End of Pax Americana Edited by Naoki Sakai, Jon Solomon, and Peter Button 249 Social Disciplining and Civilising Processes in China The Politics of Morality and the Morality of Politics Thomas Heberer For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/Routledge-ContemporaryChina-Series/book-series/SE0768

Social Disciplining and Civilising Processes in China The Politics of Morality and the Morality of Politics Thomas Heberer

First published 2024 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 Thomas Heberer The right of Thomas Heberer to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-032-40436-3 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-40437-0 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-35306-5 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003353065 Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Contents

List of Figures List of Tables 1 Covid-19 Pandemic: Disciplined Societies Facing a Predicament

vi vii

1

2 Social Disciplining

10

3 Disciplining Concepts in Chinese History: Political Culture Matters

28

4 State and Society in China

52

5 Disciplining Efforts During Early Modernising in the 19th and 20th Centuries

73

6 Disciplining Processes Since the Advent of the “Reform and Opening Policies” (Gaige kaifang)94 7 The Power of Morality: Disciplining and Civilising Projects – Four Case Studies

112

8 Retrospective and Lessons Learnt

168

Bibliography183 Index217

Figures

3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 5.1 5.2 5.3 6.1 6.2 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9 7.10 7.11 7.12 7.13 7.14 7.15

Punishing misconduct monitored by gods The principal authority: the clan head Village code of conduct (Shandong Province) Village code of conduct (Jiangxi Province) Poster of the “New Life Movement” in the 1930s: “When crossing the street be mindful of the traffic light” Disciplining “corrupt and thievish elements” during the San Fan Campaign (1951/1952) Memorial statue of Gerich in Wuhan Trajectory of China’s modernising processes Civilised behaviour in public toilets Propaganda poster for the “Day of Propagating Citizen Morality” The “Socialist Core Values” A public poster explaining one of the socialist “core values” (here: freedom) Civility contract of Anyang City Core value “Civility” Uncivilised behaviour: sleeping during office hours Chinese book on etiquette for females under 20 Sign on tables in restaurants encouraging economical use of food (Zhengzhou, Henan Province) “Civilised and ecological villages” with running water, television and modern schools and powered by biogas Disciplined working processes in a rural enterprise Residential area, Nanjie Village White jade statue of Chairman Mao in Nanjie Village The social credit system – sanctioning misbehaviour “Uncivilised” living conditions in a Yi area (Liangshan Autonomous Prefecture) Veiled women in Southern Xinjiang

33 34 37 38 83 88 91 95 101 113 116 116 119 120 121 127 128 133 134 136 137 143 153 158

Tables

8.1 Covid-19 pandemic: selected countries (infected/deceased, until 5/2022)

170

1

Covid-19 Pandemic Disciplined Societies Facing a Predicament

This chapter starts out by examining an exceptional disciplining process, that is the interconnection between combatting epidemics in China and the associated disciplining policies. It specifically focuses on the Covid-19 pandemic and the Shanghai lockdown in spring 2022 and finally on the abrupt turnaround from a “Zero Covid strategy” to the abandonment of any regulations with regard to the pandemic and its consequences. In this context, action to control the epidemic and the accompanying disciplinary measures represent a recent and salient case of disciplining policies. At the same time, this case illustrates that there are two preconditions for a successful top-down disciplining process: effective state action and popular trust in that action. My first encounter with measures to control epidemic disease in China was in 1999. Shortly after I arrived in a rather remote and poor county in southern Sichuan Province for field research, a policeman came to the guesthouse where I was staying. He handed me a small box of tablets and explained that during my stay in this county I had to take one of these tablets in the morning and another one in the evening every day. “What for and against what?” I asked him. “For the Number 2 disease,” he replied. My enquiry as to what kind of disease this was remained unanswered. An acquaintance told me confidentially that cholera was rampant in this county. Several dozen people had already died. The next day I went to the county’s government building to talk to various officials. However, the janitor told me that nobody was available. All the officials had been ordered by the provincial and prefectural governments to go into the townships and villages to organise both the rural cadres and the local people and instruct them on how to handle the epidemic and obey hygiene and behavioural rules to ensure that the spread of the disease could be rapidly contained. The superior authorities’ orders also stated that if there were any deaths from the disease after one week, the county officials responsible would be relieved of their posts and disciplined. As I heard from well-informed local sources, after a week no one else had apparently died, and the epidemic had been contained. In this case, disciplining was a two-level process: on the one hand, disciplining of the county cadres by superior authorities; on the other, disciplining of the township and village cadres, as well as the local population, by the county officials. Strict DOI: 10.4324/9781003353065-1

2  Covid-19 Pandemic disciplining measures, applicable to everyone involved, had obviously proved to be an effective means of combatting and containing the epidemic. Change of Scene From 2020 to 2022, the global Covid-19 pandemic kept the entire world on tenterhooks. To combat it, governments, politicians, scientists and health experts demanded discipline from the populations and discussed appropriate disciplinary measures. Disciplinary measures seemed to be most pronounced in China (where the epidemic started) and other countries in East Asia. China’s fight against the epidemic was initially derided in Europe, for example, with regard to the sealing off of entire cities and their populations or the general requirement for face masks to be worn. Authoritarian states – in the common view – seem to handle issues ineffectively, inefficiently and non-innovatively. The initial developments seemed to illustrate that China did not have a rational administration at its disposal. Despite initial difficulties, however, China was able to stem the first coronavirus wave relatively quickly. It did so by drastic means that seemed strange to Europeans: mass quarantine, curfews, isolation of entire major cities, mobile phone tracking of infected people and mandatory face masks. But the Europeans proved to be adaptive: after a while, lockdowns and contact bans were imposed in Western countries, mobile phone tracking was introduced, and face masks – initially rejected by experts – soon became mandatory across Europe as well. Historically, Europe has had its own experiences with epidemics and corresponding disciplinary measures even if this is no longer part of historical memory. A look back at European history reveals that extremely drastic measures were taken to combat epidemics in the past. For example, the French philosopher and sociologist Michel Foucault (1926–1984), in his book Surveillance and Punishment, paints a picture of harsh disciplining measures to contain the plague in a French city at the end of the 17th century: A strict spatial partitioning: the closing of the town and its outlying districts, a prohibition to leave the town on pain of death, the killing of all stray animals; the division of the town into distinct quarters, each governed by an intendant. Each street is placed under the authority of a syndic, who keeps it under surveillance; if he leaves the street, he will be condemned to death. On the appointed day, everyone is ordered to stay indoors: it is forbidden to leave on pain of death. The syndic himself comes to lock the door of each house from the outside; he takes the key with him and hands it over to the intendant of the quarter; the intendant keeps it until the end of the quarantine. Each family will have made its own provisions; but, for bread and wine, small wooden canals are set up between the street and the interior of the houses, thus allowing each person to receive his ration without communicating with the suppliers and other residents; meat, fish and herbs will be hoisted up into the houses with pulleys and baskets. If it is absolutely necessary to leave the house, it will be done in turn, avoiding any meeting. Only the intendants,

Covid-19 Pandemic 3 syndics and guards will move about the streets and also, between the infected houses, from one corpse to another, the “crows”, who can be left to die: these are “people of little substance who carry the sick, bury the dead, clean and do many vile and abject offices”. It is a segmented, immobile, frozen space. Each individual is fixed in his place. And, if he moves, he does so at the risk of his life, contagion or punishment. Inspection functions ceaselessly. (Foucault 1995, 195) Europe therefore has its own history of disciplining with regard to pandemic control, including specific coercive measures. China in turn is no stranger to such experiences. To take an example from the early 20th century: during the pneumonic plague in north-eastern China in 1910/1911 with over 60,000 deaths, the physician Dr Wu Liande (1879–1960), who had studied in Europe and was later appointed head of the Chinese disease control authority, isolated entire cities, placed their populations under forced quarantine and introduced face masks from Europe, which he optimised at the same time.1 In this way, it was possible to contain the pneumonic plague relatively quickly. Measures taken by the German colonial authorities in their Chinese colony of Qingdao (1897–1914) also went in this direction: Barbed wire, military posts and village “plague brigades”, quarantine stations, traffic controls by sea and land, large-scale deployment of port and coast guards . . . The German system turned out to be a model of success.2 The German disciplinary “success model”, highly praised at that time, is now considered typical of the so-called authoritarian systems. How times change! After 1949, the new Chinese government took extensive measures to contain and combat epidemic diseases and to improve hygienic and sanitary conditions. Epidemics and their foci were contained or eliminated by sometimes drastic procedures that required a high level of discipline (cf. Brazelton 2019). This not only increased the population’s confidence in the new government but also led to a considerable reduction in the mortality rate and a significant increase in life expectancy. The Austrian writer Bruno Frei (1897–1988), who travelled through China in the 1950s, wrote, for example, about a campaign to combat the rat plague in Chongqing. In his book, he describes how the entire population was mobilised to participate in the “rat battle”. Discipline was top priority. For this purpose, all sewer openings in the flats and houses in the entire city, at a given signal, had to be sealed at exactly the same time. The People’s Liberation Army assisted in organising this. Every Chongqing citizen was informed that they were not allowed to use any toilet or washing facilities that night. In response to a siren signal, the sewers were fumigated with sulphur. Because of this organised collective effort, it was possible to make Chongqing largely rat-free in just one night (Frei 1959, 150–56). What may appear to be a simple disciplinary exercise required a logistical masterstroke: only coherent and collective disciplined behaviour by all inhabitants at the same time provided the prerequisite for successful control of the rat infestation

4  Covid-19 Pandemic and thus the elimination of an important cause of epidemics. This is an example of how a state that has the will to combat such evils and has the confidence of the population and the appropriate organisational capacity is able to ensure collective discipline to solve such issues. Arguably, successful control of an epidemic requires discipline on the part of the population, trust in government action and the acceptance of disciplinary measures. At the same time, those affected must be able to ascertain that the measures taken are appropriate to achieve the objectives. Accordingly, the government must be able to underpin initiated disciplinary measures with a common good orientation and citizens’ willingness to ensure that people’s lives do not get out of control. Governments earn trust when they effectively contribute to solving problems and are capable of reducing uncertainty and preventing instability. Conversely, if harsh disciplinary measures are insufficiently implemented or can only be implemented against considerable popular resistance, the government forfeits trust. Disciplining a Metropolis: The Shanghai Lockdown in 2022 Combatting the Covid-19 epidemic in China was closely linked to the government’s disciplining policies. Take, for example, the case of Shanghai in spring 2022. In the first phase of the epidemic, China – like other countries in East Asia – was able to rely on the discipline and compliance of its population. However, the prolonged citywide lockdown of Shanghai, a metropolis of 25 million inhabitants, illustrates that the population’s initial trust in disciplinary measures was called into question by mismanagement on the part of the local authorities and that trust in these measures had been damaged. Although the strict zero-Covid strategy caused growing resentment among sections of the population, it did for quite some time not lead to active resistance against the political system. This changed with the rigid continuous lockdowns and related policies and the increase of economic and social problems, resulting in protests in numerous cities in November and December 2022, although these remained limited in number and did not directly oppose the political system per se. Prior to the lockdown, Shanghai had been regarded as one of the cities with an exceptionally modern and effective administrative system and an enlightened and disciplined population. As in other Chinese cities with lockdowns, the residents initially behaved in a totally disciplined manner. The mood changed when many people no longer had access to food and medical treatment; delivery services had stopped serving them; and they were isolated either in their homes or in quarantine centres. YouTube videos were circulating in the Chinese and Western media, showing outraged residents in groups calling for food or work and “freedom”. The reason was that the city administration and the existing structures were overwhelmed by a lockdown that lasted for weeks, and in some cases it was no longer possible to provide for the population. The elderly, the sick and the migrant workers were particularly disadvantaged. Moreover, most private companies sent their migrant workers “on leave” without continuing to pay them their wages – as required by law. Since many of these

Covid-19 Pandemic 5 workers had only a narrow “sleeping place” (called a “bird cage”) in rented and overcrowded flats, but were not officially registered in their living quarters, that is staying there more or less “illegally”, they had no access to their sleeping places in the neighbourhoods after the lockdown. As a result, they had to camp out in the open and did not obtain assistance such as food deliveries or medical care through official channels. This affected not only thousands of construction workers, truck drivers, takeaway riders and housemaids but also homeless people and other disadvantaged groups such as the disabled. A harrowing report describes in detail the situation of this group of people. As Shanghai municipality was not aware of this problem, self-organised volunteer groups were the only ones who tried to take care of these people.3 The volunteers organised themselves in neighbourhoods and tried to help needy residents – an initiative independent of the government, although including quite a few party members.4 At the slightest suspicion of Covid infection, people of all ages were isolated in quarantine centres, sometimes forcibly. Problems with food supply, mandatory quarantine isolating people at home for weeks and a lack of manpower for delivery of necessities, the conversion of residential buildings into quarantine isolation sites for Covid-19 patients, inflexibility in dealing with emergency cases, and so on led to many people becoming disillusioned and frustrated with Shanghai’s government policies.5 Although the majority of the people of Shanghai adhered to the regulations in a disciplined manner, some complained via their WeChat accounts or even openly. In some cases, residents publicly protested while the government sent drones flying over high-rise buildings calling for self-discipline.6 People largely adhered to the disciplinary rules set by the state, especially after the central government sent more than 100,000 helpers to the city to take care of the population. The local people did not oppose disciplinary measures or the central government’s zero-Covid strategy per se, but they largely blamed the Shanghai authorities and their bureaucratic and citizen-unfriendly behaviour. Chinese scholars have also held the rigid top-down governance structures responsible for this – as they did with regard to the outbreak of the epidemic in the city of Wuhan.7 The neighbourhoods and their residents’ committees, as grassroots units which would have been most capable of solving problems in their immediate administrative area, simply waited for orders from higher authorities and did not take any problem-specific measures on their own. The situation further deteriorated when entire residents’ committees in a neighbourhood were quarantined, because in that case all the administrative structures also collapsed.8 Furthermore, Chinese reports reveal that there have been numerous cases of corruption and official neglect of duty in the distribution of food and daily necessities to the population, especially to socially weak and disadvantaged groups. The central government therefore called on the Shanghai party leadership to deal with these cases, to discipline officials responsible for this awkward situation and to pay more attention to the needs of the population, especially the elderly and socially vulnerable. It also criticised the Shanghai authorities for this mismanagement9 that had concurrently provoked resistance and dissatisfaction among the population and thus increased the cost of disciplining.

6  Covid-19 Pandemic Regarding East Asia in general, Korean philosopher Byung-Chul Han (2020) argues that the effectiveness of fighting Covid-19 in these countries (e.g. with significantly fewer mortality cases) results from stronger compliance with and obedience to government regulations, a wider acceptance of digital surveillance and a traditionally higher level of trust in government (see Wu 2021; Wu et al. 2021). As he sees it, Confucian discipline plays a major role in this regard. A well-functioning effective government and disciplined behaviour, one might add, can thus be considered preconditions for this kind of trust. A blog entry in January 2020 by the government-critical writer Fang Fang from Wuhan who kept a diary during the lockdown testifies to a similar attitude: The epidemic is our main enemy. I want to fight it with all my might, shoulder to shoulder with the government and the people of Wuhan. I will support all of the government’s demands on the people. (Fang 2020, 34) This comment on government measures by a critical author suggests that many Chinese urbanites for quite a long time had faith in the central government and were willing to accept even extremely harsh measures to contain the “common enemy” Covid-19. Elderly Chinese people in particular are afraid of the possible consequences of vaccination (it was a similar situation in Hong Kong and Taiwan). As a Beijingbased female doctor told the author in August 2022, the distrust at that time was not primarily towards the government or central state measures. Rather, people did not trust private companies that produced the vaccine and did not trust the medical and health sector. Various fraud scandals involving private providers and medical cadres had fuelled this mistrust.10 In 2022, after the lockdown in Shanghai and the constant outbreak of new cases across the country, it became obvious that China’s zero-Covid strategy was no longer working. The economic, social and political costs were mounting: collapse of private enterprises, rising unemployment, growing inflation, disruption of supply chains, significant slowdown in economic growth, inhumane treatment of people, images of fleeing people in the face of looming lockdowns on social media, China’s international isolation, among other costs also increasingly threatened people’s trust in the zero-Covid approach and its benefits, fuelling growing resentment. In the second half of 2022, it became apparent that the government’s “zeroCovid strategy” was no longer tenable. At the site of the largest iPhone factory in China, run by the Taiwanese company Foxconn in Zhengzhou (Henan Province), for instance, tens of thousands of workers protested for weeks in October and November against the strict Covid-19 rules and poor working and living conditions resulting from the rigid lockdown. In October 2022, a wave of protests, highly unusual for China, erupted across the country after ten people died in a fire in a high-rise building in Urumqi (Xinjiang) during the lockdown; the emergency exits had allegedly been wired. In Shanghai, demonstrators even called on President Xi

Covid-19 Pandemic 7 Jinping to resign. The leadership responded with a massive police presence, and the state-controlled media kept quiet about the protests. In a ten-point plan in early December 2022, almost all of the draconian Covid19 measures were abruptly either significantly softened or jettisoned altogether. The result was a nationwide explosion of Covid infections. Hundreds of millions of people fell ill. When the wave hit, the country was largely unprepared: a lack of hospital staff, hospital capacity and intensive care units, a shortage of medicines, insufficient crematorium capacities and so on. Corruption spread as people attempted to obtain a place in a clinic or organise a timely cremation. The death rate among elderly citizens increased rapidly. The over-disciplining by the “zero-Covid strategy” and the associated belief in a political containment of the epidemic gave way to apparent freedom from any disciplinary processes. Nevertheless, the disciplinary institutions remained in place, the political system stable. The loss of trust in the political leadership and the leader Xi, however, weighs heavily and is likely to be reflected in the public’s collective consciousness in the long run. While the Internet remains strictly censored, numerous phone calls, WeChat messages and emails with friends and colleagues from China illustrate how deep this loss of trust goes. “The year 2022 was the most painful year for me,” wrote a researcher from a party-affiliated think tank to the author of this book at the turn of the year 2022/2023. I lost my elderly mother and am sad beyond measure. The current situation in China is only 30 per cent a natural disaster, but 70 per cent a man-made disaster. The leader who is responsible for this disaster will be nailed to the pillar of shame in history. A longer text circulating in China, sent to the author by various people from mainland China, includes the following passage: “If they [meaning the Chinese government, T.H.] had spent one percent of their time and energy on doing a good job in the past three years, would the panic and disorder be as bad as it is today?” And: The government . . . has done only one thing in three years, and that is to try to prove its own greatness and glorious correctness, and in order to do so, it has ignored the facts and sacrificed human lives. If I have argued earlier “that there are two preconditions for a successful topdown disciplining process: effective state action and popular trust in that action,” then the pandemic disciplining process has ultimately failed in this respect. This policy failure is also related to the shift away from the principle of collective leadership introduced under Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s and the renewed turn to the principle of a single leader under Xi Jinping at the 20th National Party Congress in 2022. As we will amplify in Chapter 4, the leader principle has always played a prominent role in China’s political culture, especially when it came to

8  Covid-19 Pandemic avoiding competing concepts and presumed “chaos” (luan) and ensuring the maintenance of order through the concentration of power. The return from collective to individual leadership and the stricter ideological orientation of the party, however, give rise to potential problems: insufficient information for the leader, for fear that the leader might interpret reports of problems as criticism of his leadership style; the danger of absolute concentration of power; an overstretching of social discipline and an excess of ideologisation and thus the demotivation of functionaries, intellectuals and entrepreneurs. Since hardly anyone dares to contradict them, it is difficult for such leaders to recognise that mistakes have been made. And since a change of course could dent their nimbus, they tend to correct even gross mistakes too late. While Xi has long been celebrated for his zero-Covid policy, he has failed to prepare his country for life with the virus. What effects this will have on the party and the government in the long term remains to be seen. In the following chapter, we outline the basic conceptions and the framework of our analysis. Notes 1 Wu Lien-Teh 2014. See also the book by his daughter Wu Yu-Lin 1995. 2 “Erfolgreiche Pestabwehr in Tsingtau 1911” [Successful plague control in Tsingtau 1911]. Excerpts from the PhD thesis by Annette Biener, in StuDeo. Studienwerk Deutsches Leben in Ostasien, June 2020, 7. The excerpts are based on her PhD thesis “Das deutsche Pachtgebiet Tsingtau in Schantung, 1897–1914. Institutioneller Wandel durch Kolonialisierung,” Studien und Quellen zur Geschichte Schantungs und Tsingtaus, Issue 6, 2001. 3 Hua Huo, “Shei zai kuqi? Shanghai yiqing zhong de nongmingong yu kunnan qunti (Who Is Crying? Migrant Workers and Precarious Groups During the Epidemic in Shanghai),” Guancha (Observation), May 20, 2022, accessed May 2022, https:// mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=Mzg5MTczNjY0OQ==&mid=2247484434&idx=1&sn=d 54acb360c9868ac56c64f9fe92360d4&chksm=cfc98334f8be0a229842cbc7b4b2fb1195 4e1b4cb32df4399e658d6445367a4bfd2fd76c6b72&mpshare=1&scene=1&srcid=0520 6Inwx9jQgxlN1yYrRevf&sharer_sharetime=1653120522876&sharer_shareid=a7b8bd 4ce9f2f92ee8d33eac2a172677#rd. 4 “Shanghai kangyi guancha: ‘Shanghai tuanzhang’ neng gei jiceng zhili dailai shenme qishi? (Shanghai Anti-Epidemic Observation: What Lessons Can the ‘Shanghai Group Leaders’ Bring to Grassroots Governance?),” Banyuetantan (Half-Monthly Debate), accessed April 2022, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/N5oqMPrBGa3cFFPYMAUc2g. 5 Manya Koetse, “Shanghai Residents Protest as Pudong Apartments Turn into Quarantine Site,” What’s on Weibo – Reporting Social Trends in China, April 14, 2022, accessed May 2022, www.whatsonweibo.com/shanghai-residents-protest-as-pudong-apartmentbuilding-turns-into-quarantine-site/; Mandy Zuo, Daniel Ren, Yaing Jiang, and Tracy Qu, “With No End to Shanghai’s Covid Lockdown in Sight, Anger Among Residents Is at Risk of Boiling Over,” South China Morning Post, April 14, 2022, accessed April 2022, www.scmp.com/news/people-culture/social-welfare/article/3174313/noend-shanghais-covid-lockdown-sight-anger; Qingnian zhi (Youthology), “Rang Shanghai bei kanjian, rang ‘qiujiu’ bei yanxu (Let Shanghai Be Seen, and the ‘Call for Help’ Be Continued),” April 8, 2022, accessed April 2022, https://qnmlgb.tech/articles/62501 79eb410961fb63db3c8/.

Covid-19 Pandemic 9 6 The following example of a resident provides a vivid insight into the chaotic situation: “Ren zai Shanghai, yinxing, ‘jingzhi’ le 30 tian, que jinpilijin (People in Shanghai, Negative, ‘Still’ for 30 Days, but Extremely Exhausted),” Baidu, April 17, 2022, accessed April 2022, https://mbd.baidu.com/newspage/data/landingsuper?rs=3869893973&ruk=s IEwAYC0xC0PYH_yO5UcAA&sShare=1&isBdboxFrom=1&pageType=1&urlext=%7 B%22cuid%22%3A%22Yu2H8_alB8_f828DlPS5uliPv8YG8Huclu2O8lu62uKz0qqSB %22%7D&context=%7B%22nid%22%3A%22news_9053141703722405702%22%7D. 7 Lü Dewen, “Lun Shanghai yiqing: ‘Qiceng’ bu lao didong shan yao (On the Shanghai Epidemic: If the ‘Grassroots’Are Not Firm, the Mountain Will Shake),” Tengxun wang (Tengxun net), April 8, 2022, accessed April 2022, https://xw.qq.com/amphtml/20220408A01J1200. See also the diary entries of a Beijing citizen which illustrate how chaotic and disorganised the situation was even in the capital. Such experiences are likely to have had a decidedly negative impact on trust in the authorities. See also “Translation: Quarantine Diary: ‘All I Had Was One Question: What Exactly Are the Rules?’ ” China Digital Times, August 19, 2022, accessed August 2022, https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2022/08/ translation-quarantine-diary-all-i-had-was-one-question-what-exactly-are-the-rules/. 8 Zhang Junbin, “Dang juweihui renyuan bei ganran hou . . . (When Residents of the Neighbourhood Committee Were Infected . . .),” Zhongguo Qingnian Bao (China Youth Daily), April 17, 2022, accessed April 2022, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/ EELN2WVxfpJ6WYs1-tda6Q. 9 “Shanghai yancha ‘da li bao’ fubai, hecha wenti xiansuo 108tiao, chufen duoren (Shanghai Strictly Investigates the Corruption of ‘Big Gift Packages’; 108 Clues Have Been Verified, and Many People Have Been Punished),” Pengbo Xinwen (The Paper), April 20, 2022, accessed May 2022, http://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MjM5MzI5NTU3MQ==&mid=265199773 5&idx=2&sn=0ec59ffff2fc94fcc5c311fd9eeb4731&chksm=bd7fdb9b8a08528db34b822f 7ba343aac3e09f91ec5165da941b21773d53299ed1f3df3f3627&mpshare=1&scene=1&sr cid=04309xHDsIu4vFGKFkx0QFwm&sharer_sharetime=1651334035254&sharer_share id=a7b8bd4ce9f2f92ee8d33eac2a172677#rd]. “Dalibao” are donations of food and goods to be distributed among the population. 10 Online talk with Dr  L. Huang, Beijing, July  8, 2022. According to official data, in mid-March only 51% of over-80s (the highest risk group) had received two doses of the Covid-19 vaccine. See also Natasha Khan and Liyan Qi, “Zhongguo kangyi gongzuo duanban: Hen duo laonianren hai mo jiezhong xinguan yimiao (Shortcomings of China’s Anti-Epidemic Work: Many Elderly People Have Not Been Vaccinated Against Covid-19),” The Wall Street Journal, Chinese Edition, May 3, 2022, accessed July 2022, https://cn.wsj.com/articles/中国抗疫工作短板-很多老年人还未接种新冠 疫苗-11651551034. On corruption in the medical and health sector, see “Zhong Jiwei fawen, yue lai yue duo ‘liangmianren’ fuchu shuimian (The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection Issued a Document; More and More ‘Two-Faced People’ Are Coming to the Surface),” July 7, 2022, accessed July 2022, www.yshjw.net/archives/2626.

2

Social Disciplining

This chapter starts by clarifying the most salient terminology (modernisation, disciplining, civilising). Employing the concept of “multiple modernities”, it explains that a single unified path to modernisation across the world does not exist. The interrelationship between modernisation and disciplining the minds and actions of the people was first explored in the 20th century by European social scientists such as Max Weber, Norbert Elias, Michel Foucault and Gerhard Oestreich. Disciplining and social disciplining are concepts which can be used to help trace analytically in what way and with what objective a European country’s population should be adapted to the conditions of modernity, that is a capitalist industrial society in the making and a disciplined, rational socio-economic order oriented towards it. The people’s thinking and behaviour, their customs and habits were to be adapted economically and politically to enable the transition from feudal to capitalist structures. “Social disciplining” is an analytical concept developed by European social scientists to describe and analyse European societies from both a historical and a contemporary perspective. The chapter explains the genesis and current meaning of the concept. The question of whether it can be applied to non-Western societies without subjecting it to biased and unsuitable categorisations will be examined in Chapter 8. Modernisation and Disciplining – Not a Unilinear Process Since 2014, there have been increasing reports that China’s political development under current party leader Xi Jinping has taken on ever more repressive traits. The growing nannyism and content restrictions on scientists, public intellectuals, NGOs and international organisations, and the punishment or detention of critics, have been denounced by Western countries, as have phenomena such as the “Social Credit System”, strict Internet censorship and the methods of dealing with ethnic minorities in Xinjiang. A crucial question addressed in this book is which logic and objective of the party state (hereinafter: state) are hidden behind these various measures and to what extent these factors can be attributed to a specific and uniform political purpose. In our opinion, simply referring to the will of the party DOI: 10.4324/9781003353065-2

Social Disciplining 11 leadership to maintain power is not sufficient to explain these phenomena and their inner coherence. This applies all the more as power always has a functional aspect as well: to serve distinct objectives, be it in the interests of the leader(s), the nation or both. Accordingly, Foucault has argued that, from a Western perspective, power primarily has a negative connotation. However, he notes: We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it “excludes”, it “represses”, it “censors”, it “abstracts”, it “masks”, it “conceals”. In fact power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. (Foucault 1995, 194) Power can productively be deployed, for example, with regard to enforcing rational social norms and rules that ensure orderly coexistence in societies and in the interest of social development. And discipline makes individuals more efficient, more effective and more individualised. In this book, we argue that the function of the current Chinese state as a disciplining and civilising entity is the connecting link tying all the aforementioned policies together under a specific governance logic: to discipline and civilise society to prepare the people to become modernised. In fact, modernisation and modernity encompass not only a process of economic and political–administrative modernising but concurrently one related to the organisation of society in general and the disciplining of this society and its individuals to create people with “modernised” minds in particular. The term “modernisation” in a Western sense does not only refer to economic and technical factors, characterised by industrialisation, production for the market, integration into the world market or the specific role of science and technology but also refer to sociopolitical factors such as social mobility, the political pluralisation of society, expanded opportunities for citizens to participate, the creation of modern administrative structures, a rationally organised bureaucracy, the development of a legal system, legal certainty, and the formation of a rational economic ethos. Social modernisation, in turn, pertains to processes such as urbanisation, individualisation, rationalisation of thought and action, the differentiation of society, domestication of people (disciplining the ego, civilising behaviour, social and inner control), an increase in the level of education, secularisation and the decline in the influence of religion, that is processes that the most important modernisation theorists such as Max Weber, Emil Durkheim and Norbert Elias have vividly described. In addition, modernisation of the mindset, behaviour, norms and values of both society and individuals is part and parcel of modernising processes. Modernisation is therefore a highly complex phenomenon that cannot be captured by a single and brief definition. With regard to discipline, the principal topic of this book, Thomas B. S ­ tephens (1992, 17) noted that “Discipline is a state of mind. It is that state of mind which accepts without question the submission of the will and to the interest of

12  Social Disciplining a hierarchical superior in a group.” This is, however, a rather military definition which fades out both the process of internalising discipline and of inducing a kind of self-disciplinisation and self-discipline in individuals. Of course, a “modern” mind does not mean that only one specific form of “modern mind” and modernity exist and figure as examples to be achieved by each society in the world. Rather, there are multiple patterns of “modern” minds, varying from country to country and from culture to culture.1 Accordingly, modernisation is no longer understood as a unilinear process, nor is there a uniform disciplining and civilising process leading to global convergence, as proponents of the early modernisation theories believed, a process by which the “underdeveloped” or “late developing” countries gradually adopt Western-style democracy and values, thus following the European “civilised” example. Within the framework of “multiple modernities” (Eisenstadt 2000, 2002; Tu 2002b; Fourie 2012; Meyer and de Sales Marques 2018), a broad variety of models of modernising and modernisation are acknowledged. Eisenstadt, for example, rejects the assumption of a homogenising Western blueprint of modernisation and modernities, arguing instead that we face “multiple institutional and ideological patterns” in the modern world, many of them accompanied by “strong anti-Western or even antimodern themes” that are still “distinctively modern” (Eisenstadt 2002, 2).2 Bauman (2000, 2016) has added another facet to the issue of modernity, that is modernity does not mark the endpoint of a specific trajectory. Rather, due to technological, scientific, social and cognitive developments, the perception of what modernity is keeps changing the forms and contents of this trajectory. He called this phenomenon “liquid modernity”, a continuation of “improvement, with no final state in sight” (Bauman 2016, 12). In a similar vein, Tu Weiming claims that the non-Western world has spawned specific cases of modernisation and modernity (Tu 2002a, 217). What is more, “late arrivals” cannot replicate the earlier sequences of industrial development (Bendix 1967, 328). In keeping with this, the post-1949 Chinese leadership bespeaks a “Chinese path to development”, which would differ from Western concepts of modernisation and be based on Chinese peculiarities, ideologically rooted in China’s own history of ideas, its specific political culture and traditions. This slogan can be interpreted as resistance to the European attempt to modernise China according to its ideas of modernisation. Ultimately, this resistance not only manifested itself in violent rebellions (Taiping movement, Yihetuan – “Boxer” movement), but China modernised itself in its own way through this resistance. Modernisation in the “Chinese way” thus continues to this day and leads to massive friction with the West and the latter’s “values”. Bakken has argued that the revival of tradition and the reference to Confucian ideas are necessary “to stop the ‘runaway engine’ of modernisation” (Bakken 2000, 22), thus avoiding social instability, preventing further decline of morality and fostering and reinforcing the Chinese people’s identity. Memories of traditions are enshrined in the minds of the people and can be brought back into their awareness, thus figuring as moral codes, that is an identity-lending element strengthening not only social and moral but also national cohesion.

Social Disciplining 13 If we take the concept “of multiple modernities” seriously, then we should accept that there are different patterns of modernisation: European, Chinese, Indian, Japanese, Latin American, African and so on, which take diverse forms due to historical and cultural differences. And against this background, we must also question whether theoretical concepts of analysis developed for European notions of modernisation can simply be transferred to concepts of modernisation in societies with a different historical and cultural background (more on this in Chapter 8). Modernity, Social Disciplining and Civilising Modernisation, disciplining and social disciplining as concepts and processes emerged historically in the European context and accordingly bear significant European features. They are characterised by the development of trade relations, colonial conquests, the emergence of a capitalist market society, the rationalisation of authority, administration, law and the individual, the weakening of the aristocracy in political terms through loyalty to the state instead of the church and dynasties and the transition to the modern state. In the individual sphere, as Elias shows, civilising of rules of behaviour in Europe triggered a transition from external coercion to self-coercion and self-mastery. The process of modernisation is part of a comprehensive process of transformation that encompasses all the processes we listed earlier. The transformation from feudal to capitalist conditions, combined with a rationalisation of the entire political order, the disciplining of wage labourers, mostly with a rural background, and the gradual emergence of liberal political conditions as well as a new social order, primarily in the 18th and 19th centuries, tied in with gradual processes that began as early as the late Middle Ages and were conceptualised by “modern” European thinkers. Since the late Middle Ages, states and cities have endeavoured to discipline and civilise people and their entire everyday life and behaviour. In particular, a moral crisis caused by failure of the church’s regulatory function in the 16th century and after the Thirty Years War (1618–1648), which was accompanied by enormous impoverishment, barbarisation, uprooting, social disintegration and a decay of morality in Central Europe, led to a large number of administrative rules that were supposed to guide behaviour in a regulated way.3 Specifically in Europe, the modernising process in terms of industrialisation and social change in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries spawned a huge transformation of the power structure of societies, of concepts of political order and individual morality (see e.g. Kieser 1998, 2016). Increasingly, modernisation was accompanied by a top-down disciplining project, often framed as a “civilisational project”, which legitimised the invention of the state monopoly on the use of force and the institutionalisation of a disciplining apparatus. This project was not a fully unorganised one but was pursued through a planned process in which the military, the clergy, state educators, the Inquisition, town councils, poorhouses, political theoreticians, witch-hunting and the organisation of industrial labour played ­crucial parts.

14  Social Disciplining As Samuel Huntington’s seminal and controversial book The Clash of Civilisations (1996) has argued, civilisation is not merely a historical category but is still a widely debated issue today. Huntington has brought this notion of civilisations back into the international foreground. The concept has always been controversial since it encompassed different issues such as a specific level of societal development, as regulated and disciplined behaviour and etiquette, or even Eurocentristic and colonialist perceptions (see e.g. O’Hagan 2007). Moreover, it entails a bipolarity between something conceived of as being “backward” (uncivilised) and something seen as “advanced” (civilised) (see e.g. Boutonnet 2011, 83). Disciplining and civilising were crucial aspects of the European modernising project. Earlier European political philosophers such as Niccolò Machiavelli (1469– 1527), Justus Lipsius (1547–1606) and Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) were already concerned with the issue of societal disciplining. Thomas Hobbes explicitly emphasised the necessity to create disciplined citizens (Krüger 2005; Burchell 1999). “Man is not fitted for society by nature, but by discipline”, wrote Hobbes (Gordon 1991, 14). For Karl Marx (1818–1838), discipline and disciplining were linked to the ­capitalist-rational organisation of labour with a rigid work discipline. “The technical subordination of the workman to the uniform motion of the instruments of labour”, he wrote, engenders a kind of “barrack discipline” as well as “regularity, uniformity, order, continuity” (Marx 1867). For Marx, discipline was inherent in capitalism and subject to profit interests, which did not mean that he saw discipline as something negative in principle. The modern production process required discipline from all members of society, and even in a subsequent (socialist) social system, societal discipline was warranted, albeit based on a more self-determined foundation. Unlike Marx, Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) dealt with the issue of civilisation and discipline from a psychoanalytical point of view. In his well-known work Civilization and Its Discontents (1989), originally published in 1930, Freud highlighted the contradiction between individuality on the one hand and society’s expectations on the other. In the course of the civilising process, the state had enacted laws to regulate living together in the community beyond individual demands. He conceived of this as a restriction and weakening of individuality – albeit a necessary one – in the superordinate interests of human civilisation and civility. Nevertheless, instincts are inherent in human beings and continue to exist immutably. This in turn causes frictions between individual needs and the interests of society as a whole. Freud thus took up a point that comes close to what Weber called the flip side of rationalisation, describing this phenomenon as the “iron cage” of modernisation (see later). In the 20th century, major Western theoreticians of modernisation such as Max Weber, Norbert Elias, Michel Foucault and Gerhard Oestreich associated modernising with the issue of disciplining. In the following section, we outline their principal notions in terms of disciplining and civilising. Max Weber Undoubtedly, Max Weber’s rationalisation concept and rationality approach provided a major stimulus for the social science debate on modern organisation,

Social Disciplining 15 administration, a rational system of rule and modernisation processes in a more general sense. Weber was also one of the early sociologists combining the political, economic, structural and cultural dimensions in analysing modernising processes and modernity. For Weber, state-building was primarily linked to rationalisation and administrative centralisation. He was convinced that rationalisation would trigger modernity and that rationalising life signifies modernity. His concept explicitly comprises the issue of disciplinisation as a side effect of rationalisation. Rationalisation is primarily related to civil service, characterised by “rational specialisation and training”.4 Weber even elevated discipline to a key category of modern society and a “concomitant of the rationalisation process” (Breuer 1986, 45–46). Weber defined “discipline” as the “probability that by virtue of habituation a command will receive prompt and automatic obedience in stereotyped forms, on the part of a given group of persons” (Weber 1978, vol. 1, 53). On the one hand, he conceived of discipline primarily as a negative term, as a mere part of the exercise of power and as “habituation” and “uncritical and unresisting mass obedience” (Weber 1978, vol. 2, 827). On the other hand, for Weber, discipline was nothing but the consistently rationalised, methodically prepared and exact execution of the received order, in which all personal criticism is unconditionally suspended and the actor is unswervingly and exclusively set for carrying out the command. (Weber 1978, vol. 2, 1149) In addition, he emphasised the necessity of “social action” and the rational obedience of an “especially large mass” by “training” (Weber 1978, vol. 2, 1149). Weber called this “rational discipline” (ibid.), referring to “ethical motives” such as devotion, sense of duty, conscientiousness and empathy of the guided according to the will of the leaders (ibid., 1149/1150). In his publication The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, he wrote about the “ethos” of Western Europe and US capitalism embodying traits such as honesty, punctuality, efficiency and professionalism. In capitalism, he argued, “undisciplined” workers and unscrupulous business people were simply of no use. He summarised the corresponding discipline and the way of life associated with it as the “Spirit of Capitalism” (Weber 2011). Elsewhere, he mentioned other factors of a rational discipline with regard to politicians: passion, sense of responsibility, objectivity and duty of truth and demanded an “ethics for politicians” (Weber 2014, 72–81). The general conscription in the 19th century and the trained and drilled discipline of the military (“mother’s lap of discipline”) and large enterprises were, for him, decisive institutions with regard to social disciplining (Weber 1978, vol. 2, 1150–56). On the other hand, Weber was well aware that “rationalisation” and bureaucracy entailed a flip side of societal development, something he labelled as the “iron cage” of these processes, that is the entrapment of people in the cage of effectiveness, efficiency, control, discipline and rational calculation. “With the rationalisation of the political and economic fulfillment of demand, the discipline runs rampant”, wrote Weber, and: “Discipline as a universal phenomenon, irresistibly

16  Social Disciplining and increasingly curtails the meaning of . . . sophisticated actions by individuals” (op. cit. in Waters 2018, 5). In general, however, Weber regarded disciplining as one of the key categories of modern and rationalised societies which shaped the actions of the populace by fostering the internalisation of rules. What Weber did not clarify and probably did not want to clarify was, on the one hand, the historical process of disciplining, on which the discipline of modern times could build and, on the other hand, the concrete patterns of the enforcement of social, rational discipline. At the same time, Weber failed to analyse the interconnectedness of the state and discipline. It was mainly three other researchers who – based on Weber’s rather general statements on discipline and disciplinisation – tried to clarify these processes: Norbert Elias, Michel Foucault and Gerhard Oestreich. Despite many differences in their theoretical approaches and in the interpretation of the term “discipline”, all of them share the interest in the long-term process towards modernity and the changes of human behaviour and action emerging during this process. Norbert Elias Elias enriched Weber’s rationalisation approach by embedding it in disciplining and civilising processes that allowed the conditions for rational behaviour to be created, that is a disciplining ethic. As mentioned in Chapter 2, in his work The Civilising Process, he spoke of the fact that “the personality structure of the individual changes”, thus becoming “civilised” (Elias 1989a, vol. 1, LXIV–LXV, 1989b). By this, he meant the “forms of conduct or behaviour of people”, their “social quality”, their civility, language, clothing and form of living (Elias 2000, 367). Growing control of emotions and drives, refinement of manners, increasing self-control instead of external control, greater mutual consideration and empathy, rationalisation of thinking in the sense of calculating the consequences of one’s actions in advance and ultimately the internalisation of such values by individuals were the results of this process. Elias understood this not as an individual but rather as a societal, that is collective, process, which he examined for the time window of the Renaissance, in which a growing social differentiation and division of labour developed. With this in mind, he wrote: As more and more people must attune their conduct to that of other, the web of actions must be organised more and more strictly and accurately, if each individual action is to fulfil its social function. Individuals are compelled to regulate their conduct in an increasingly differentiated, more even and more stable manner. (Elias 2000, 367) For Elias, civilisation does not mark a completed development or a process to describe something superior in the sense of civilising “inferior” societies or social groups: There is no zero-point of civilising processes, no point at which human beings are uncivilised and as it were begin to be civilised. No human being

Social Disciplining 17 lacks the capacity for self-restraint. No human group could function for any length of time whose adults failed to develop, within the wild and at first totally unrestrained little beings, as which humans are born, patterns of self-regulation and self-restraint. What changes in the course of a civilising process are the social patterns of individual self-restraint and the manner in which they are built into the individual person in the form of what one now calls “conscience” or perhaps “reason”. (Elias, op. cit. in Cesari 2019, 25) In an interview in 1989, Elias further elaborated the idea of the non-existence of a zero-point and negated the existence of an absolute stage of being civilised or uncivilised: The theory of civilisation shows that one can never speak of an absolute state of being civilised or of an absolute state of being uncivilised, but only of stages of civilisation. The idea that there were ever uncivilised human beings is just as false as the idea that one day there might be absolutely civilised human beings. All that can be observed are changeable relationships of equilibrium between more or less civilised tendencies of self-regulation. But, undoubtedly, the self-regulation of human beings in complex industrialised states is more pervasive and more uniform than in simpler societies.5 Elias’s concept of civilisation therefore does not stand for Westernisation but – as Jocelyne Cesari has argued – “rather to the internationalization of western concepts of nation, state, and religion and their grafting in different cultural milieus” (Cesari 2019, 26–27). Elias drew upon Weber’s concept of disciplining. Whereas Weber described discipline as an instrument of rulers’ power over their subjects, Elias dealt more specifically with change in behaviour in an overall social context, that is with the standardisation of social behaviour. He compared this process with traffic regulations for effective and safe road use, which require each individual to control and regulate themselves and adhere to the existing rules (Elias 2000, 368–69). The latter is ultimately related to both disciplinisation (by the state) and self-disciplinisation. Michel Foucault Foucault was essentially concerned with voluntary compliance with norms. This was to be achieved through disciplining of the population and surveillance mechanisms. He described the result – the state-supervised self-control of individuals – as a distinctly productive moment. He defines “government” as the “totality of institutions and practices by which one steers people” (Foucault 1996, 119). Accordingly, power in a hierarchical political system functions via the ability to “bring subjects to a specific behaviour” (power from within) (Foucault 2005, 255–57). This includes both the setting and enforcing of rules and the stimulation of “technologies of the self” (Foucault 1979, 1990, 1992, 2013). In contrast to Elias, in

18  Social Disciplining Discipline and Punish Foucault deals with the dark sides of disciplining, that is the disciplinising processes in France from the middle of the 17th to the beginning of the 19th century and “subjugation of the subject” by means of disciplining techniques. He highlights that the new economic conditions of capitalism and industrialisation require an “economization of the system of punishing”: the disciplining of people first in the monasteries, the military, the schools (by enforcing compulsory schooling for everyone, monitored by the state), factories, prisons and psychiatric clinics and later through new technologies (Foucault 1995). In a hierarchical political system, as Foucault put it, power is expressed as the ability to “make subjects behave in a specific way” without the people affected noticing. Be it in the form of an act of coercion followed by an act of obedience, be it by disciplining actors to behave in a certain way; actors learn that they must behave according to the prevailing rules and norms, otherwise they may be punished if their rule violation is discovered. The more comprehensive the surveillance, the more people internalise morals, norms and rules, whereby the concept of morality ultimately serves as a means of enforcing discipline. Foucault’s (2010) concept of “governmentality” thus adds a further facet of power to disciplining. Foucault is convinced that the most effective form of wielding power is when those who are dominated accept as their own the preferences of those who dominate, because this reduces the costs of supervision. In addition, if individuals become thoroughly familiar with the preferences of their dominators, they might even presage preference changes. In this way, they assist in upholding, and even improving, dominance structures. Foucault’s approach of “technologies of managing people” (Foucault 2010, 46) added the facet of disciplinary power in the administrative system as a means to achieve discipline, self-discipline and conformity among people. He primarily characterised the state as an entity of disciplining and surveillance, apparently overlooking the other side of the coin, that is its function as an educating and moralising state. In the words of Bourdieu, the state is not only a coercive force but also a training instrument (Bourdieu 2014, 281). Gerhard Oestreich While Elias dealt with the internalisation of behavioural norms, the historian Gerhard Oestreich – like Foucault – was interested in an external change in human behaviour enforced by states or cities through coercion. In Europe, this did not take place in the form of a long-term, planned process but was an attempt to bring order into a continuously changing but simultaneously under-civilised society. Oestreich criticised Weber’s thesis of rationalisation as the dominant form of and attitude towards life in capitalist modernity. He explained that rationalisation also existed in absolutist polities. Implicitly, he pointed to an important factor, namely that in the history of state-building and in the theory of the state, debates were primarily focused on economic, military, fiscal and administrative issues but rarely touched upon disciplining and psycho-social aspects. At the same time, he pointed out that absolutist rulers not only thought of ways to maintain power and

Social Disciplining 19 to increase their own resources but also saw themselves as competent, responsible leaders and embodiments of the community acting in the interests of maintaining the political and social order of a given polity. The latter in particular became necessary due to extensive migration of rural dwellers to urban areas in the course of industrialisation. The state therefore launched a disciplining programme to enforce a new concept of order. With regard to Europe, Oestreich (1969) described the process of modernising the minds of the people as “social disciplining” (“Sozialdisziplinierung” in German). He characterised “social disciplining” as a historical process aimed at bringing about a consensus among the members of society on the values and norms that should regulate their behaviour and, if necessary, be imposed in a top-down manner by the state. We argue that the modernisation concept we present here includes the adjustment of political authority to the requirements of social regulation and disciplining. Sheilagh Ogilvie (2006, 43) explained that its meaning is that the state intervenes in the private life of individual people, thus spawning a societal behaviour essential for the creation of a well-ordered state and the capitalist modernisation of the economy. This is also of significance in terms of the current Chinese case. Even under absolutist rulers – as Oestreich notes – rulers would have tried to enforce what he called “social disciplinisation”, that is the disciplining of all subjects with regard to their work (discipline and efficiency), their morals (“virtues”), attitudes and the education to self-discipline (internalisation of these virtues) (Oestreich 1968, 337– 43). The social causes of these measures were the growth of cities, the increasing density of the population and the mode of habitation, processes of urban capitalist industrialisation and, associated with that, the growing social division of labour and social dependencies and finally the increasing variety of tasks and expenditure of the state (see Simmel 1995, 131; Thompson 1967, 56–97).6 This led to a “fundamental disciplinisation”, which from the 18th century onwards gradually covered the entire society (Oestreich, ibid.). The latter differs from the civilisation process described by Elias, which commenced from the social elites, whereas Oestreich was more interested in the top-down process of the absolutist state. Ultimately, he was concerned with disciplining as a central component of social modernisation.7 Disciplining Efforts? Weber, Elias, Foucault and Oestreich coincide in their view that disciplining is a process from external coercion towards the internalisation of restraints that are indispensable to achieve social order. In contrast to the Middle Ages, when external coercion was relatively ineffective since it did not spawn internalisation of rules and norms, external action aimed at internalising was therefore a more successful way of disciplining (van Krieken 1981, 606, 1990a, 1990b). Based on the approaches of Weber (rationalising), Elias (civilising), Foucault (disciplining) and Oestreich (social disciplining), we will try to trace and examine the disciplinary efforts of the current Chinese state. While we define discipline as the fitting of a person into the order of a community and mastering one’s own

20  Social Disciplining will, feelings and inclinations (self-discipline), in this book we focus on the issue of “social disciplining”. We define social disciplining as the implementation of government measures aimed at disciplined behaviour and finally self-discipline or self-regulation within a given society in the interests of this larger community. Social disciplining thus differs from social control, the latter referring to the review and, if necessary, sanctioning of behaviour socially defined as deviant. Social disciplining, in turn, refers to the totality of social disciplinary techniques and their constant practice in the sense of the concept of continuous inculcation as described by Bourdieu and Passeron.8 Historically, by means of social disciplining, a consensus was reached in terms of the societal value system and the rules of social behaviour. The objective was the disciplining of the entire society and the steering of every individual to internalise the new core values and behaviour. In the end, Oestreich’s approach starts out from the perspective of a top-down manner by which the centralised state initiates processes of disciplining. Oestreich characterised this behaviour of the state as a mere “tendency” since both social forces and different government levels (provinces, cities, counties) also impact on central government’s policies and its concept of disciplining society.9 From the perspective of state-building, Gorski also speaks of a “top-down process” in cases where the state figures as the principal actor (Gorski 2003, xvi, 31). As explained earlier, this book focuses on top-down processes as a part of the state’s disciplining policies and technologies and does not touch upon the multitude of bottom-up processes. With regard to Europe, Gorski speaks of a “disciplinary revolution”. He writes: Like the industrial revolution, the disciplinary revolution transformed the material and technological bases of production; it created new mechanisms for the production of social and political order. And, like the industrial revolution, the disciplinary revolution was driven by a key technology: the technology of observation – self-observation, mutual observation, hierarchical observation. For it was observation – surveillance – that made it possible to unleash the energies of the human soul – another well-known but little-used resource – and harness them for the purposes of political power and domination. What steam did for the modern economy . . . discipline did for the modern polity: by creating more obedient and industrious subjects with less coercion and violence, discipline dramatically increased, not only the regulatory power of the state, but its extractive and coercive capacities as well. (Gorski 2003, xvi) The term “disciplinary revolution” is defined by Gorski as a “revolutionary struggle . . . which has, as one of its chief ends, the creation of a more disciplined polity” (Gorski 2003, ibid.). “Civilising”, the Chinese government’s preferred term (as will be shown in Chapter 4), has different meanings in different cultures (Elias 2000, 5–8). Borrowing from Elias, we use it, on the one hand, in relation to creating a new societal morality and, on the other hand, in the sense of “civilised behaviour” related to

Social Disciplining 21 good manners and decency, refinement of life and civilised standards in terms of violence, bodily functions, table manners, social etiquette and internalised selfrestraint. We argue that civilising people’s behaviour in this sense is part and parcel of the process of social disciplining. As the Chinese argumentation shows, it does not mean “Westernisation”. In the Chinese case, it is strongly embedded in the country’s traditional culture.10 With regard to disciplinisation, constant surveillance, supervision and ­information-gathering are central instruments of exerting discipline and policing people’s behaviour. Today, these instruments are becoming increasingly sophisticated by means of new types of technologies such as artificial intelligence, facial recognition, cyberspace control and the leverage of big data for widening the scope of surveillance. Through the new social media, surveillance has become more opaque for the individual.11 By the same token, however, these media have spawned novel types of social organisation and social management (Lyon 2018). Without doubt, China is a forerunner in terms of developing und making full use of such sophisticated surveillance technologies. Drawing on Christopher Dandeker, we argue that surveillance and “surveillance capacity”, that is effective bureaucratic surveillance, are “the basis of systems of administrative power in modern societies” (Dandeker 1990, 194). For Anthony Giddens (1992, 59), surveillance is a fundamental component of the rise of modernity and the modern nation-state and independent of the political system. He speaks of two types of surveillance in modern societies: the accumulation of “coded information” to “administer the activities of individuals about whom it is gathered” and stored, and the “direct supervision of the activities of some individuals by others in positions of authority over them” (Giddens 1985, 14). Talking about the capacity of the state to surveil and monitor, he speaks of the state’s “disciplinary power” (ibid., 15) as crucial for internal pacification and securing law and order (ibid., 189), something that also applies to contemporary China (e.g. the social credit system, see Chapter 7). However, disciplining states do not just serve as actors trying to enforce discipline through administration, penalties and surveillance. They also influence the disciplining process by means of educational, ideological and socialising factors. The goal is to achieve not a slavish subject mentality but the subjectification of the people, that is the creation of subjects who internalise discipline in terms of self-disciplining, who are aware of the rules and norms and consciously respect them.12 New technologies and digital surveillance become increasingly important, the more so as this has led to an increase of the surveillance capacity of both governments and firms (see Deleuze 1992; Galič, Timan, and Koops 2017). In the West, this capacity has resulted more in the endeavour of global companies such as Google or Facebook to collect big data to control, influence and steer the market behaviour of customers, something that is also classified as “surveillance capitalism” (see Zuboff 2019). In China, in turn, it is primarily the state which attempts to control, influence and steer its citizens, not least in the interest of disciplining or civilising them or rather in the interest of self-disciplining in the sense of Foucault. Lyon (2006) emphasises that disciplining, social control and surveillance have two

22  Social Disciplining dimensions: controlling/disciplining and caring, since they are not necessarily only for monitoring and controlling citizens but can also perform protective functions, for example, with regard to public security. Objectives of this Book This book explores the question of why and by what means the Chinese state initiates and carries out processes of social disciplining to modernise both the institutions and society. The starting point are the intentions, the role and functions of the state as a moral state in the context of history and political culture. The focus of the analysis is on the period after the beginning of the reform policy at the end of the 1970s as well as on the era of Xi Jinping, who intends to lead China into comprehensive modernity by 2049/2050 (see Chapter 4). Both the central government policy process and local implementation will be examined. A special chapter (Chapter 7) is devoted to four case studies, which will substantiate and trace the social disciplining processes by drawing on the results of some years of field research and long-term observations. This book thus deals with a fundamental aspect of the Chinese modernisation process, which for a long time has been treated rather marginally and has not been sufficiently recognised in its scope and significance: the process of social disciplining as an important sub-element on the way to modernity in accordance with “Chinese characteristics”. In doing so, the book poses two main questions: (1) The issue of social disciplining, in China primarily referred to as “civilising”, permeates the entire modernisation process and signifies that the Chinese government now assumes an interdependence of modernisation and social disciplining that goes far beyond the “Four Modernisations” programme formulated in the 1970s. As we will show in Chapters 6 and 7, modernisation in this sense requires “people who act in a modern way”, whose thinking and behaviour are to be adapted to the targeted modernisation goal. This raises the question of how to understand disciplining and civilising processes, with a particular focus on contemporary China. (2) We further delve into the long-term change in social structures, human behaviour and action dispositions in the emergence of a Chinese type of modernity. What kind of policies and tools does the Chinese state harness to pursue and implement its disciplining objectives? What is the role of the state in the disciplining process and which impact does Chinese political culture have on this process? Discipline and disciplining endeavours have existed for as long as there have been human communities, because fixed rules are needed to order and hold together a community. In smaller ones, this can be achieved through clan or tribal rules; in larger societies, this is the responsibility of governments (“states”), which clothe

Social Disciplining 23 these rules in law or written instructions for action and sanctions for violations of these rules. Communities and societies need rules whose violation is sanctioned. However, they develop such rules on a different material and ideal foundation and on the basis of different political systems. Without doubt, there are significant differences between Western countries, where laws and courts set strict limits to state action, and the Chinese state, which relies more on appeals to the discipline and selfdiscipline of the population. Structure of the Following Chapters Chapter 3 Disciplining Concepts in Chinese History: Political Culture Matters

Disciplinary concepts are deeply rooted in historical worldviews. Social disciplining is thus part and parcel of collective memory. This chapter addresses the role of philosophical traditions and political culture in China in shaping social discipline. Traditionally, no single, unified state religion existed in this country, and unlike in Europe, religion and a church did not play a prominent role. As this chapter illustrates, various schools of thought and religions shaped people’s minds and actions in different ways, including Confucianism, Legalism, Daoism, Mohism and Buddhism. Similarly, no coherent Chinese morality existed independently of time (historical periods) and space (regions). Different worldviews within China and externally influenced morality engendered moral tensions within communities, and we find moral complexity and differences between classes, urban and rural populations and ethnicities, as well as overlapping patterns of morality and moral behaviour. Chapter 4 State and Society in China

This chapter is concerned with the role and function of the Chinese concept of state and the nexus between state and society. Although we find similarities between Europe and China, there are tremendous differences between the concept and logic of the state and the concept of political order, on the one hand, and modernising processes, on the other. In China, politics and morality are more closely related than in Western concepts and reality. The establishment and development of a well-ordered morality always required state intervention and morality engineering. Based on history and an idealised past, ethical standards were formulated, determining how the emperors, civil servants and the people should behave and which standards and norms they had to follow. Confucianism as a state-­supporting concept formed the basis of the prevailing ethics. Until modern times, peasant rebellions, overthrow of dynasties, and conquerors have changed little with regard to the political institutions. The perpetuation of these institutions as the basis for the interaction between rulers and the ruled played a salient role in ensuring that the Chinese political institutions remained largely constant over the centuries. The

24  Social Disciplining principal purpose of this chapter is therefore to examine the core features of the Chinese concept of the state in history and the present. Without clarifying the historical dimension and its effects, it is difficult to understand the concept of today’s “developmental state” and the logic of the current state which involves the issue of disciplining capacity. And finally, in this chapter we will also delve into issues such as the moral state. Chapter 5 Disciplining Efforts During Early Modernising in the 19th and 20th Centuries

This chapter looks at disciplining efforts in China during early modernising projects in the 19th and 20th centuries. The defeats at the hands of Great Britain and France in the two Opium Wars (1839–1842 and 1856–1860), the “unequal treaties” with foreign powers that followed, these powers’ increasing interference in internal Chinese affairs, the Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864) and its moral and social vision, and not least the defeat in the Chinese–Japanese War of 1894–1895 made it clear that there was a great need for reform and modernisation in China, with the antiquated character of the political system being seen as the core problem. Chapter 5 further addresses the critics of Chinese traditionalism in the context of the 1919 May Fourth Movement in contemporary history and looks at Western and Japanese ideological and cultural influences. For millennia, Japan was eager to learn from China’s world outlook and belief systems. During the Tang and Song dynasties, it sent students to China to learn from Chinese philosophies and morality. This changed in the late 19th century. In contrast to China, Japan had already decided relatively early in that century to learn from the West, not only in terms of technical know-how but also in terms of military training, education and educational content. The Japanese model also had a significant influence on Chinese academics and intellectuals trained in Japan. In the 1930s, President Chiang Kai-shek, who was educated in Japan, dismissed the idea of “Westernisation” and endorsed the notion of constructing a specific Chinese morality based on China’s own traditions. In 1930, he lamented the “moral decay” of the Chinese people and called for a return to the “virtues of the ancestors”. His principal aim was to revive China’s “ancient virtues” and to apply them to modernise society. Without people with a modern mindset and modern behaviour, China could not be modernised. Accordingly, the “New Life Movement” designed a programme quite similar to the Chinese state’s more recent endeavours. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Mao intended to “catch up” with the industrialised countries. However, this was not to be achieved by imitating any particular model but rather by following a “Chinese way”, which should provide proof of the superiority of China’s culture and political system. Political campaigns and mass movements were the predominant means of enforcing political goals, norms, rules and discipline. More than 100 campaigns were carried out in China between 1951 and 1976 as a specific tool for the political disciplining of the Chinese people, as this chapter shows.

Social Disciplining 25 Chapter 6 Disciplining Processes Since the Advent of the “Reform and Opening Policies” (Gaige kaifang)

Here, the focus is on disciplining processes in China since the “Reform and Opening” policies in the late 1970s. As this chapter highlights, in recent decades, the CPC realised that “modernisation” does not only refer to economic–technical factors but concurrently means social modernisation, that is modernisation of the mindset and behaviour of both society and individuals. Creating a “spiritual civilisation” symbolises the symbiosis of the Chinese modernisation process: a combination of modernity, Chineseness and a political system based on China’s peculiarities (Dirlik 1982). Rapid economic and social changes since the late 1970s spawned an erosion of traditional values without new ones replacing them. So far, there has been little willingness among large parts of society to comply with state norms and rules. It is therefore hardly surprising that China’s political leadership speaks of the need to lay the foundations for a new moral order, to create disciplined and civilised citizens and to reinforce intra-societal trust. As this chapter amplifies, in November  2020, the CPC’s Central Committee specified the goals until the year 2050 with regard to civilising: improve social civilisation, strengthen civilised customs and behavioural norms that meet the requirements of the new era and promote ecological and digital civilisation. To illustrate that the civilising and disciplining process in China covers almost all social fields, we will in addition briefly examine further disciplining fields such as civilising urban and rural areas. Chapter 7 The Power of Morality: Disciplining and Civilising Projects – Four Case Studies

This chapter deals with case studies in the context of the power of morality, that is recent disciplining and civilising projects by the Chinese state. Several instruments have been designed to tackle the moral crisis, to create a “culture of sincerity and honesty” and morally sound, socially minded, honest citizens: the most prominent are the creation of a new morality by the moral state; the “anti-corruption campaign”; the so-called social credit system and civilising ethnic minorities. It is the notion of “disciplining” and its variants that are most interesting here. As we explain, the state’s ultimate objective is a process developing from “external coercion”, that is by the state, to self-constraints or self-disciplining by the people. Chapter 8 Retrospective and Lessons Learnt

In this final chapter, we summarise our main findings and address four additional issues crucial for the context of disciplining and civilising in a more general sense: the role of the state as a disciplining agent; the interrelatedness between nationbuilding and disciplining/civilising; urbanisation and disciplining and the issue of who disciplines whom. Finally, we address the differences and similarities between

26  Social Disciplining European and Chinese modernising and disciplining trajectories. We also delve into the question whether the concept of social disciplining can be applied to a non-Western polity. Finally, we will briefly discuss recent social reactions, particularly among younger people, to the conditions of a market economy and social disciplining efforts. The civilising process in China has a tremendous dynamic, with continuously new policies and new developments. I conceive of this process as an expression of the political leadership’s endeavour to catapult Chinese society into “modernity” in record time. This is to be accomplished in a top-down manner, and any attempt to challenge these policies is strictly sanctioned by this leadership. Notes 1 The Western concept of culture is inherently ambiguous. Anthropologists Kroeber and Kluckhon (1952) compiled a list of 164 different definitions in their book “Culture”. Obviously, there is no uniform definition of the term, nor can there be one, because the definition depends widely on the point of view of the observer. No wonder, therefore, that the Western concept of culture is difficult to translate, especially since it highlights different facets in different languages. The modern Chinese term for culture (wenhua) is a loanword from the Japanese – one which had been translated from Western sources into Japanese. 2 The approach now faces criticism for being Eurocentric. We will come back to this point in Chapter 8. 3 The German Max Planck Institute for Legal History and Legal Theory compiled more than 200,000 police ordinances of selected territories and imperial cities of the Holy Roman Empire and adjacent countries (Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland) in the context of a research project on early modern administrative law and has set up a database on this topic. See: accessed May 2022, www.lhlt.mpg.de/research-project/ repertory-of-policeyordnungen. 4 For the China case, Weber argued that the Chinese mandarin was not a rational administrative specialist but a gentleman “with a literary and humanistic education” (Weber 1978, vol. 2, 1401), characterised by “decorous behavior”, observance of prescribed rites, and abandonment of individual self-discipline. 5 “In Reality, We Are All Late Barbarians,” Interview with Helmut Hetzel, 1989, accessed June 2022, https://quod.lib.umich.edu/h/humfig/11217607.0002.208/–four-interviews-withnorbert-elias?rgn=main;view=fulltext. 6 John O’Neill (1986, 47) even argues that “worker discipline was the main ingredient aimed at improving the moral habits of the laboring poor, to make them orderly, punctual, responsible and temperate”. 7 More on Weber, Foucault and Oestreich in terms of disciplining: Breuer 1986. 8 Bourdieu and Passeron (1990) understood inculcation as the continued practice of norms, rules of conduct and behaviour, so that over time these were taken for granted and no longer questioned. 9 Critics of Oestreich’s approach contend that his arguments were too etatist, that is merely analysing disciplining from the vantage point of the state, see for example Schmidt-Glintzer 1997. Since in China the state is the predominant organisation, and a civil society is widely lacking, a rather state-centred perspective certainly makes more sense here than in the European case.

Social Disciplining 27 10 Accordingly, Dieter Senghaas (1998, 22) speaks here of an “engagement of cultures with themselves”. However, we do not use this term in a Western imperialist–colonialist sense or merely in the sense of an external process of civilising other people (e.g. other ethnic groups), something Osterhammel (2006, 9) called the “weapon of a ‘hegemonic culture’ ”. 11 Every social media user is an open book for whoever is charged with or self-appointed for surveillance, although one may be unaware of this oneself (see Zuboff 2019). 12 On subjectification, see Foucault 2006, 237.

3

Disciplining Concepts in Chinese History Political Culture Matters

China has a lengthy history of written records providing information on disciplining ideologies embedded in specific worldviews and concepts of social order. In the following sections, we will address two points: (a) the disciplinary concepts of China’s most prominent belief systems that still have an impact on presentday politics; (b) social disciplining as collective memory. As in other East Asian countries, no single, unified state religion existed in China, and unlike in Europe, religion and a church did not play a prominent role. Various schools of thought and religious belief shaped the minds and actions of the Chinese people in different ways, including Confucianism, Legalism, Daoism, Mohism and Buddhism,1 the critics of Chinese traditionalism in the context of the 1919 May Fourth Movement (see Schwarcz 1986) and Western ideological and cultural influences. Similarly, no coherent Chinese morality existed over time (historical periods) and space (regions). Different worldviews within China and externally influenced morality engendered moral tensions within communities, and we find moral complexity and variations between classes, urban and rural populations and ethnicities, as well as overlapping patterns of morality and moral behaviour.2 In a comparative study, Buchtel et al. (2015) have shown that unlike in Western societies and due to the influence of Confucianism, Chinese morality was strongly linked historically to the issue of becoming “civilised”. Thus, immorality has been primarily associated with “uncivilised” behaviour and incivility.3 Taking history into account is therefore crucial because “civilisational myths, nationalism and the way people have been socialised, have a lot to do with their acceptance of discourses of world order” (Keane and Su 2019, 4). Historical facts, myths and narratives all play a salient role in shaping modern minds. Confucianism Confucianism encompasses three components: a theory of education, a moral system and a social philosophy. Its moral system consists of a set of rules of conduct stipulating how to behave in a strictly hierarchical and disciplined society. Baumann, Winzar and Viengham (2020) summarise the Confucian approach towards the individual as follows: “The cornerstone of the Confucian tradition is that no DOI: 10.4324/9781003353065-3

Disciplining Concepts in Chinese History 29 one is unchangeable, and that everybody possesses the capacity to transform themselves, regardless how little. This is achieved through a balance of soft and hard approaches” (Baumann, Winzar, and Viengham 2020, 105). “Soft approach” here refers to self-reflection; “hard approach”, by contrast, to the punishing of violations of norms and rules (e.g. under a Legalist system). The focus of Confucianism is on learning correct social behaviour by means of a moral education process in which everyone should learn how to conduct themselves within the family, the polity and towards the state. Through moral improvement and education, an understanding of correct social behaviour is acquired – the prerequisite for and basis of a sound political and social order. The ultimate goal is “self-cultivation” as the basis of the order of the world.4 Cultivation of the person as a precondition for “good governance” was already propagated and explained by the canonical Confucian text “Great Learning” (Daxue). Originally, Daxue was a chapter in the Book of Rites (Li Ji), one of the five Confucian Classics ascribed to Confucius himself. It is believed to have originated in the second century bce and listed ethical rules of conduct for all members of the hierarchically structured society so as to prevent social disorder (luan). During the Song dynasty (960–1279), it was selected as a crucial part of the civil service examinations and was a foundational introduction to Confucianism (for details, see Lee 1985; Wang 2019). The text is primarily concerned with learning and selfcultivation. The following quotation illustrates the basic political idea behind the concept of “self-cultivation”. Since this concept is crucial for understanding disciplining and civilising processes in China to this day5, it is worth quoting at length: The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the kingdom, first ordered well their own states. Wishing to order well their states, they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their persons. Wishing to cultivate their persons, they first rectified their hearts. Wishing to rectify their hearts, they first sought to be sincere in their thoughts. Wishing to be sincere in their thoughts, they first extended to the utmost their knowledge. Such extension of knowledge lay in the investigation of things. Things being investigated, knowledge became complete. Their knowledge being complete, their thoughts were sincere. Their thoughts being sincere, their hearts were then rectified. Their hearts being rectified, their persons were cultivated. Their persons being cultivated, their families were regulated. Their families being regulated, their states were rightly governed. Their states being rightly governed, the whole kingdom was made tranquil and happy. From the Son of Heaven down to the mass of the people, all must consider the cultivation of the person the root of everything besides. It cannot be, when the root is neglected, that what should spring from it will be well ordered. It never has been the case that what was of great importance has been slightly cared for, and, at the same time, that what was of slight importance has been greatly cared for . . . the cultivation of the person depends on the rectifying of the mind.6

30  Disciplining Concepts in Chinese History Self-cultivation was highlighted as the root of all politics. Politics and morality were conceived of as closely connected with each other, although the latter gained priority over the former (see Tu 1993, 26). An integral element of self-cultivation was the behavioural etiquette of the upper class. During the Han period (202 bce– 220 ce), personal hygiene and cleanliness were already considered to be features of civilised behaviour and a central behavioural norm for the upper classes. In addition, instinct control and affect regulation, as well as self-observation and selfcontrol in terms of interpersonal interaction and internalisation of moral values developed specifically during the Song dynasty (see Granet 1985, 293–314; Linck 2011, 178–214). The Book of Rites linked the ideal of a well-ordered family to the well-­orderliness of the state: The piety of the son is the attitude with which one should serve the prince; fraternal subordination is the attitude with which one should serve one’s superiors; paternal love is the disposition with which you have to lead the crowd. (Li Gi [Li Ji] 1981, 51) If the family was well-ordered, the state was well-ordered as well. Accordingly, social relationships were regulated in great detail: piety towards one’s parents, adoring love towards elders, loving respect towards one’s wife and children, friendship towards equals, loyalty towards one’s superiors, humanity towards one’s subordinates, polite restraint towards outsiders, behaviour towards the dead according to the rites. While Mencius argued that humans are innately “good”, these “good” factors simultaneously required cultivation and the right environment to flourish.7 This stood in strong contrast to the philosophy of Xunzi (ca. 300 – ca. 239 bce), who took the view that humans tend towards evil (Hsüntze 1966, 184–87). Both, however, believed that through education and self-cultivation, humans could advance their positive sides. The most prominent Neo-Confucian philosopher Zhu Xi (1130–1200)8 compiled the book Family Rituals (Zhuzi jiali, i.e. Master Zhu’s family rituals), which regulated in great detail the ritual behaviour within families and among their members (including those who had passed away), specifically as regards initiations, weddings, ancestor worship, funerals and dealing with ancestral spirits (Chu Xi 1991). According to Ebrey, it figured as a “manual for the private performance of the standard family rituals” and could be found in almost every household (Introduction to Chu Xi 1991, xiii). The following statement illustrates disciplinary norms for progeny:9 Sons who serve their parents (or grandsons who serve their grandparents) and sons’ wives who serve their parents-in-law (or grandsons’ wives who serve their grandparents-in-law) should all get up before the sky brightens. They wash their hands, rinse their mouths, comb their hair, and arrange their

Disciplining Concepts in Chinese History 31 hats and belts (men wear hats, robes, and belts; women wear hats and jackets). Once it is daylight (that is, at the moment the sky brightens), they go to the parents’ room and make inquiries. The men say, “At your service”, and wives say, “Bless you”. Then they ask the parents’ attendants whether the night had been peaceful. When the attendants say it was peaceful, they leave. If it was not peaceful, the attendants explain what happened. This is the “morning inquiry” of the Ritual. (Chu Xi 1991, 26) An important system of disciplining was the imperial system for selecting civil servants, that is the traditional examination system (keju), which candidates for civil service careers had to undergo. Between the years 606 and 1905, it was used to select candidates for public administrative positions. The examinations represented the most important path to social advancement and thus figured as a central goal in life for members of the educated classes. Due to its performance-centred nature, the keju system lent meritocratic traits to the largely absolutist empire. Only males were admitted to the civil service examinations. Officially, class affiliation played no role whatsoever in an application. However, successful participation required many years of prior education, which only people from the upper classes could afford. Not unimportantly, family clans also provided collective funds to elevate some of their members into civil servant positions; the successful candidates would then show gratitude back to the clan. Since the Song period, candidates were required to write essays on topics from the Confucian classics. The candidates had to learn these entire works by heart beforehand. In addition, they were required to write poems on predefined topics and according to predefined verse metre. In essays on political and historical topics, candidates had to prove their loyalty to a dynasty. When reproducing classical writings, only the originals, including officially approved canonical commentaries, were allowed to be reproduced; there was no requirement for candidates’ own interpretations. This rigid system was intended to ensure that the core Confucian norms and values were internalised while at the same time guaranteeing loyalty to the political dynasty and order.10 The product of this kind of education was precisely what Max Weber called the Chinese “gentleman” official, in contrast to the “rational” administrative official in capitalist countries (cf. Note 12). In fact, the examination system had a clearly disciplinary character and, as Barrington Moore put it, ensured that the centuries-old Confucian order remained largely stable despite certain modifications and reforms. Although from time to time, rebellions led to dynastic changes, they did not spark a revolution in the sense of a change in the basic social structures and institutions (Moore 1966). Confucianism and Disciplining Rural Areas Etiquette and the ethics of Confucianism11 were the ideal upheld by the political elite and thus a “minority morality” (He 2015, 28). The common people, who were

32  Disciplining Concepts in Chinese History illiterate, could not obtain guidance from the Books of Rites. The vast majority of people thus had no opportunity to cultivate themselves and to follow their superiors in achieving the elite’s morality goals. Their main concern was to secure their livelihoods and survival. As Mencius (372–289 bce or 385–303 or 302 bce), the second most prominent Confucian philosopher, noted: The way of the people is this: If they have a secure livelihood, they will have a fixed heart; if they have not a certain livelihood, they have not a fixed heart. If they have not a fixed heart, there is nothing which they will not do in the way of self-abandonment, of moral deflection, of depravity, and of wild license. (Mengzi 2006–2020) Without an adequate livelihood, the preconditions for the moral education of the masses were absent (Schwartz 1985, 105–6). The moral conduct of ordinary people tended to be regulated by pictorial representations of the consequences of deviant behaviour (see Figure 3.1). Compliance with moral norms was believed to be monitored by a large number of gods. Disciplining took place primarily within the families and clans according to their norms and rules (see e.g. Yang 1994; Liu 1964). Until today, a clan (jiazu) comprises a group of people with a common surname who consider themselves kin and refers to common ancestors. Clans are basic organisations of social order, particularly in rural areas, and have oral or written clan rules (­zonggui). These rules were and still are based on Confucian values such as respect for parents and the duties of wives towards their husbands and of younger siblings towards their elders. Traditionally, they opposed “laziness, extravagance, gambling, quarrels, violence”, etc. and thus contributed to disciplining rural society and stabilising the country. Ultimately, the clan leaders (clan elders) were and still are responsible for ensuring that clan discipline was observed (Hsiao 1967, 342–46). The clan rules prescribed the manner in which clan members had to behave within the clan, the community and society in general. Such a code of conduct was indispensable to familiarise clan members with the appropriate moral standards. During the Ming and Qing dynasties, the rules were based on the imperial Confucian moral guidelines: Render filial piety to parents; Show respect to seniors by the generation-age order; Remain in harmony with clan members and the community; Teach and discipline sons and grandsons. Attend to one’s vocation properly, And do not commit what the law forbids. (Liu 1959, 23)

Disciplining Concepts in Chinese History 33

Figure 3.1  Punishing misconduct monitored by gods Source: Photo by the author.

Clan members were expected to behave in a disciplined manner in accordance with clan rules. Exemplary deeds were praised and rewarded while violations could be punished for the purpose of deterrence. Forms of punishment included verbal admonitions or reprimands. Somewhat harsher were “bowing, kneeling, or donations” to the clan in general or to the clan’s ancestral hall. More severe punishment consisted of corporal chastisement in various forms (Liu 1959, 40–46). The most severe punishment was expulsion from the clan, depriving the punished person of all rights of membership. In extreme cases, the death penalty, or an order to commit suicide, could also be imposed.12 In rural regions in central and southern China, clans continue to play an important role as social and disciplinary organisations. Even though migration processes

34  Disciplining Concepts in Chinese History

Figure 3.2  The principal authority: the clan head Source: Photo by the author (Guizhou Province).

Disciplining Concepts in Chinese History 35 in the present have separated clan members spatially, urban clan members often continue to maintain contact with their clan, facilitated by modern communication systems (such as smartphones and platforms like WeChat).13 With regard to the disciplining of rural areas, another aspect is of importance: the Xiangyue system. As early as in the 12th century, the aforementioned neoConfucian Chu Xi proposed the introduction of Xiangyue. Specific lectures should propagate both Confucian ideas and imperial policies in the interests of ideological control and disciplining of the behaviour of the population, especially in rural areas (Lee 1985, 25–26). During the Qing dynasty, this system was revived and perfected. Lecturers were commissioned to hold public lectures in rural areas across the country to explain imperial edicts and Confucian ethics to the rural population, usually in public spaces such as temples or ancestral halls. These lecturers were employed and paid by the local level of the administration to elucidate Confucian maxims and moral norms, doing so at least twice a month in villages and among clans in a given administrative area. In some cases, respected senior citizens over the age of 60 with a certain social standing were mobilised for this purpose. In their lectures, they gave examples of both desirable and negative behaviour in the local area. Clan elders, literary officials and the village population were requested to attend these lectures. Cases of violations of the Confucian moral teachings were denounced on public notices, which were removed only when these norm violators (infringers) had visibly corrected their behaviour (Hsiao 1967, 184–205). The objective of this lecture system was, as Ch’ü (1988, 163) has noted: To investigate the custom of their locality, seek to improve it, and encourage the people to be filial, chaste, honest, industrious, frugal, and law-abiding. The officials were also enjoined to wipe out bad customs like idleness, gambling, infanticide, heterodoxy. The magistrates were instructed to visit the villages frequently in order to learn the good and bad customs and try to rectify the bad ones. They were also advised to adopt the lecture system and to discuss with the gentry the customs and problems of their locality. In the 17th and 18th centuries, shortly after the enthronement of an emperor, the new incumbent would issue a specific edict setting out moral maxims. For instance, under Emperor Shun Zhi (1638–1661), six maxims were issued: perform filial duties to your parents; honour and respect your elders and superiors; maintain harmonious relationships with your neighbours; instruct and discipline your sons and grandsons; everyone should have the opportunity to work peacefully for his own livelihood; do not commit wrongful deeds (Hsiao 1967, 186). Under Emperor Kang Xi (1654–1722), the Xiangyue system became part of the official propaganda system of the Qing dynasty (Chü 1988). In 1670, Kang Xi

36  Disciplining Concepts in Chinese History drafted a set of 16 maxims (The Sacred Edict of Kangxi), which were based on and promoted Confucian morality:

Social Relations   1. Perform with sincerity filial and fraternal duties to give due importance to social relations.   2. Behave with generosity to your kindred to demonstrate harmony and affection.   3. Cultivate peace and concord in your neighbourhoods to prevent quarrels and litigations.   4. Manifest propriety and courtesy to make manners and customs good. Education   5. Extend the schools of instruction in order to make correct the practices of scholars (for explanation see Note 14, the author).   6. Reject false doctrines in order to honour learning.   7. Instruct your sons and younger brothers in order to guard them from evil-doing. Livelihood  8. Recognise the importance of husbandry and the culture of mulberry trees in order to ensure a sufficiency of food and clothing.   9. Hold economy in esteem in order to conserve your money and goods. 10. Work diligently at your proper calling in order to give settlement to the aims of the people. Peace and Order 11. Explain the laws in order to warn the ignorant and obstinate. 12. Put a stop to false accusations in order to protect the innocent and good. 13. Abstain from the concealment of fugitives in order to avoid being involved in their punishment. 14. Pay your taxes fully in order to dispense with official urging. 15. Combine in the pao-chia [Baojia system, the author] in order to suppress thieves and robbers. 16. Resolve animosities in order to value your lives duly. Source: Hsiao 1967, 187–88.

Disciplining Concepts in Chinese History 37 In 1724, Emperor Yongzheng issued the The Amplified Instructions of the Sacred Edict (Buchwald 2013) encompassing 10,000 characters. The lectures, however, increasingly degenerated into empty formalism during the late 18th and early 19th centuries, no longer having any appeal among the rural population.14 They were therefore discontinued in 1865, transformed into a police system and finally became part of the Baojia system described later.

Figure 3.3  Village code of conduct (Shandong Province) Source: Photo by the author.

38  Disciplining Concepts in Chinese History In addition, local schools existed in the Qing period to educate promising young people in Confucian values in preparation for the later civil service examinations and with a view to adapting them to the existing ruling dynasty. These schools were also established in settlement areas of ethnic minorities with the purpose of “civilising” them in line with Confucian morality (Hsiao 1967, 235–44; Leibold and Grose 2019). All these measures contributed to the relative stability in rural areas under the Qing dynasty in the 17th and 18th centuries. Furthermore, since ancient times, social codes of conduct (xianggui minyue) were developed specifically for villages. In urban areas, similar arrangements (street regulations or folk conventions) existed. The earliest records of the norms include the conventions of respecting the elderly and maintaining good neighbourhood within a village. Traditionally, these conventions, based on Confucian virtues, stipulated how to behave within society and how to fulfil one’s obligations and demanded that villagers help each other in times of need. They did and do not have any legal character but play an auxiliary role in the implementation of codes of conduct. They are still

Figure 3.4  Village code of conduct (Jiangxi Province) Source: Photo by the author. Note: These rules refer to rules related to environmental standards, greening, village beautification, water purity, civility, etc.

Disciplining Concepts in Chinese History 39 regarded by the government as a form of public education and an instrument of self-regulation. The Fourth and Fifth Plenary Sessions of the CPC in 2014 and 2015 underscored that these conventions, even today, are still of major significance in creating moral order at the local level. In the sessions’ documents, the significance and positive role of citizen conventions, urban and village regulations and codes of conduct were emphasised, accompanied by demands for grassroots party organisations to create a “rule of morality” in their respective administrative units.15 The purpose of these rules and norms was to regulate rural and urban social relations, order residents’ social behaviour and foster a new social civility (see e.g. Littrup 1981; Niu 2014). Discourses on the Role of Confucianism Today Yu Keping, a political science professor at Peking University and public intellectual, argues that “the state system governed by ritual (li) and law is the main political tradition in China, and it still has a profound impact on the behaviour of contemporary Chinese people”. “Li” was also the general framework for governing the country and the foundation of China’s long-term stability (Yu 2021). However, throughout history, Confucianism underwent major transformations and no longer exists nowadays as a state cult.16 But Confucian values are still shaping the minds of the people in terms of thinking and behaviour.17 In the late 1960s, Lucian W. Pye showed that in China, a child’s first encounter with authority was “in the acceptance of the omnipotence of his father” and that one’s self rested on respect for the father’s authority. The acknowledgement of this authority was accompanied by a process of “strict disciplining” and self-disciplining. Self-discipline in this sense meant that an individual could control his emotions, and that manners were strictly separated from sentiments. The overarching point of reference was an (external) authority, the father in one’s family and the “political authority” within one’s polity (Pye 1968, 94–106). According to Oxfeld (2016), Confucian ritual behaviour regarding “moral debts” towards one’s ancestors and family events such as weddings and funerals still play a crucial role specifically in village life. During her fieldwork in a village in Southern China’s Guangdong Province, she found “moral ambivalence”, that is individual variations, contending ideas and moral judgements among villagers based on values and assessments from different periods: traditional ones, those of the Mao era and more recent ones propagated by the CPC as well as assessments according to generation, social experiences, class position, gender, etc. (Oxfeld 2010, 31–33, 43–44). For the social anthropologist Fei Xiaotong (1910–2005), morality was “the life that people in a society should abide by certain norms of social behaviour” (Fei 1992, 71). But in contrast to the Western morality concept, in which morality was “built on the relationship between the organisation and the individual” (ibid., 72), morality in China commences from the individual, thus rendering self-­ disciplining and self-educating a central concept of morality building. Fei refers to

40  Disciplining Concepts in Chinese History the aforementioned classical Confucian text “Great Learning” (Daxue)18 and noted that the sentence “From the Son of Heaven down to ordinary people, all must consider the cultivation of the person as the root of everything” is the starting point in the system of morality inherent in Chinese social structure (Fei 1992, 74). In a similar vein, Tu Weiming (1979, 71) explained that self-cultivation is “the point of departure in Confucianism . . . rather than social responsibility”. A quote from the ancient book Liezi, attributed to the Daoist philosopher Lie Yukou (ca. 450 bce), helps to underscore this argument. In the chapter “Shuofu”, it is noted: King Zhuang from Chu asked Zhan He: “What should be done to put the state in order?” Zhan He replied: “I only understand how to rectify my own self; I don’t understand how to put a state in order . . . I have never heard that when your own self is in order, the state would get in disorder, and I have never heard that when your own self is in disorder, the state can be ordered. The cause of the order is therefore your own self.”19 Thus “real” Confucians were concerned more with improving themselves and less with social responsibility. By contrast, social disciplining in the modern sense is aimed at bringing people into line with social accountability and discipline within the larger society. According to Confucianism, common people are incapable of managing themselves and should be guided by far-sighted officials. If unrest and dissatisfaction occurred, it was the ruler, not the people, who was to be blamed. The subjects owed him respect and obedience, but they had a right to rebel against rulers who deviated from the “path of virtue”. According to this concept, bad government became evident through a decline of agriculture and livelihoods, major natural disasters, constant unrest or wars. Fei Xiaotong spoke of the “Rule of Rituals” which shaped China and the behaviour of the Chinese people and which he conceived of as “recognised behavioural forms” (Fei 1992, 96). Ritual or etiquette, that is a set of written moral rules, norms and customs, should control accepted behaviour in society. The entirety of social conventions and norms should ensure correct behaviour in the interaction and communication with other members of society, thus stabilising social order. It therefore figures as a kind of behavioural orientation. Fei continues: If you act in violation of rituals, your action is not only immoral but incorrect. Rituals are sustained by personal habits. It is as if there were ten eyes watching you and ten fingers pointing at you all the time. You cannot help but follow the ritual. (Fei 1992, 99) Rituals are related to a distinct moral order that is intended to regulate interactions within a given society. The mere existence of such an order signifies that the (Confucian) rituals constituted the disciplining tool of society for many centuries. The aforementioned Li Ji is a clear expression of such a code of conduct.

Disciplining Concepts in Chinese History 41 In the 1980s, many intellectuals initially turned back to traditional Chinese culture. Confucianism was now used to search for moral values and a new value canon that China could build on after the disaster of the Cultural Revolution and the subsequent vacuum of values and morality. This also had an impact on politics and especially on education. In recent years, Confucian values and concepts have been revived and instrumentalised by the Chinese government in order to discipline society and stabilise the current social, moral and political order.20 Social scientist Lü Peng (2012, 118) argued that this happened to avoid or combat the “pathologies” of modernity. Moreover, according to Lü, the revival of Confucianism is related to the concept of a “socialism with Chinese characteristics” and the quest for a “Chinese” value and belief system.21 In 2002, the Ministry of Education demanded that the curricula in primary, secondary and tertiary educational institutions should put a strong focus on moral education.22 Accordingly, Confucian traditions of moral education were re-cultivated in schools and universities, even in party schools, not only as a means of filling the spiritual vacuum and strengthening national self-confidence but – as the Ministry of Education explained – above all in the interests of personality cultivation and as a disciplining tool. In 2005, Zhu Xiaowan, one of the most influential educational researchers, complained about the “cultural gap” between an economic–technological and a cultural–moral focus in education. The basic problem – according to Zhu – was the focus only on economic development and technological progress while neglecting cultural and moral values. He recommended shifting the focus from the economic–technological imperative to a moral and cultural one (Zhu 2005). The Confucian revival is underlined by symbolic politics of Chinese leaders. In 2014, for example, Xi Jinping became the first party leader to visit Qufu (the alleged place of birth and death of Confucius) to take part in the celebrations in honour of the philosopher’s 2565th birthday.23 In his speech, Xi emphasised the importance of Confucian values for China’s present and future development. He also noted that Confucianism and Marxism were not incompatible. Patriotism, Confucian values and, recently, the emphasis on studying Marxism, which officially is still the guiding ideology of the CPC, should thus be merged to form a new national ideology (keyword: “Building a spiritual civilisation”). Officials should regularly attend lectures on Confucianism and classical Chinese thinkers. In 2014, for example, a training centre for local cadres – the Confucius Academy for Traditional Culture – was opened in Guiyang, capital of Guizhou Province (Southern China). These measures are intended to have a disciplining and value-building effect, in the sense of creating new core values as well as a morality based on traditional ethical principles of Confucianism and on self-discipline (see e.g. Billioud and Thoraval 2015). This “revival” is not simply a revitalisation of “Confucianism” or its essence but rather a reinterpretation of its quiddity in the interest of creating a new morality, social discipline and civility. Bakken (2000, 29) depicted this as “a ‘directed’ or ‘guided’ construction of tradition based on a conception of social stability and order”. An interesting current case of moral management at the local level is Kongshengtang, a non-profit private Confucian initiative involved in local moral governance

42  Disciplining Concepts in Chinese History in Shenzhen. It harnesses moral precepts to restructure, reshape and safeguard people from decadent behaviour imported from the West. Its goals accord with those of the CPC, including a strong devotion to filial piety and the core interests of the Chinese nation. The organisation provides welfare, medical care and material support to needy citizens and fosters a Confucian revival.24 Similar organisations are quite prevalent at local level in China and are tolerated as long as their activities are in line with the disciplining and civilising objectives of the Chinese party state. Legalism Another prominent disciplining school of thought which has left its mark until today is “Legalism”. This strand of Chinese political philosophy is concerned with the organisation of the state. Legalism starts out from the conviction that humans are evil by nature and that a strong state with an absolute ruler and strict laws are required to intimidate and discipline the people. As already mentioned, the Confucian Xunzi was also a pioneer of Legalist thinking with his conviction that man is evil by nature. “Human nature is evil, and what is good in man is [the result of] his efforts (wei).” He underscores his conviction by making the following points: • If people follow their natural instincts, social disorder and turmoil will be the result. • Without the example of teachers and cultural traditions, humans remain evil. • The desire of people to become good already proves that people are evil by nature. • If human nature were innately good, then the wise kings would be superfluous. • Those who were considered virtuous were not inherently virtuous. (Hsün-Tzu 1967, 301–14) However, he believed that people could be converted to better conduct through suitable teachers and self-education.25 The Legalists rejected the Confucian idea of education and self-improvement and argued that people could only be “improved” by means of strict and harsh punishments. They believed that laws that regulated rewards and punishments were essential disciplining tools and that it was impossible for people to be disciplined by Confucian values such as humanity, justice or ethical models. Law, which meant criminal law only, was understood as an instrument for enforcing and maintaining order. The demand was for a strong state with a single ruler at the top and rigorous subordination required from the people (see Han Fei 1994). Governing should be carried out by means of a system of penalties and rewards. The principal idea of Legalism was the concept of a comprehensively surveilling totalitarian entity. The statesman and political philosopher Shang Yang (who died in 338 bce), one of the proponents of Legalism, argued that rulers should rule through fear. Even minor offences should be punished so that nobody (except the ruler) would dare to violate the laws or revolt. If people were permanently surveilled and monitored,

Disciplining Concepts in Chinese History 43 they would conceive of suppression as something natural, just as death was part of nature (Lord Shang 1963). Opposing the concept of Confucian virtue, Legalist Shang Yang argued that: If virtuous men are employed in the government, the wicked people will easily deceive them. Therefore it is necessary that the wicked should govern the virtuous. Fear alone can keep the people from transgressing the law, and it is true that “virtue” has its origin in punishments. This “virtue” is, however, not “goodness”. It is merely obedience to the law as fixed by the state. It has nothing to do with morality. (Lord Shang 1963, 84–85) According to the Legalist paradigm, the power of the ruler should be absolute. As Han Fei (ca. 280–233 bce) wrote, instead of occupying themselves with selfcultivation, officials should subserviently and unconditionally serve the ruler. The following quote describes the principle by which rulers should exercise their power and act as supreme authorities and ultimate disciplinarians: If the ruler does not determine with his mouth whether the food is sweet or sour, salty or bland, but if the chef judges this, the cook takes the chef and not the ruler seriously. If it is not the ruler who decides with his ear whether the notes are high or low, clear or unclean, but the court music master, the blind musician fears the court music master and not the ruler. If the ruler does not use statecraft to determine how the state is governed and what is right and wrong, but the minions decide, the subjects have respect for the minions and not for the ruler. A ruler who does not himself follow matters and listen to proposals, but leaves the decision-making and determination to his subjects, is a beggar in his own state. (Han 1994, 513) Although Legalism only once and for a very short period figured as official state doctrine (during the Qin dynasty, 221–207 bce), it always had an underlying impact on thinking and behaviour in China’s politics and among Chinese rulers. It is, therefore, not surprising that Mao Zedong was a strong advocate of Legalism.26 For instance, he praised Shang Yang when he was a high school student, and in his late years, for example, during the “Anti-Confucius Campaign” in 1973/1974, he expressed himself very positively on Legalism and lauded the school as “progressive” (Pines 2014). In Chinese, there is the saying rubiao fali (儒表法里), which means “Confucian on the outside, Legalist on the inside”. The meaning is that although Confucianism was the official state doctrine over the centuries, Legalist principles in fact dominated policies and practices to a large extent and could be employed as “harsh” instruments in subjugating the population to strict discipline (Qin 2019). Or – as Steinmüller (2017, 141) puts it – rubiao fali refers to “rulers [who] pretended to be good-willed Confucians and moral exemplars, whereas in reality they were coldblooded and power-hungry Legalists”.

44  Disciplining Concepts in Chinese History Daoism Daoism, which rejected Confucian values such as its rigid morality, knowledge and piety, as well as private property, was the antithesis to Confucian concepts of order. The state should refrain from interfering in societal matters, because the principle of “Dao” would regulate everything anyway. Daoism was, on the one hand, an expression of passive village protest against strong interventions in local affairs by the ruling elites; on the other hand – as “popular Daoism” – it offered a philosophy of rebellion and subversion. This does not mean that Daoism was opposed to any kind of morality or discipline. Harmony was a crucial goal specifically in terms of preserving the balance between humans and nature. Environment and nature were conceived of as a kind of “sanctuary” in the sense of a “sacred space”, and there was a specific code of conduct for how to behave to achieve harmony and to avoid destroying the natural order (Miller 2005, 140–46; see also Solé-Farràs 2008). Daoist folk religion also endorsed personal values, compliance with Daoist norms and social values. Moreover, mastering Daoist meditation practices, breathing techniques and physical exercises required discipline, although this kind of ethics and discipline differed strongly from Confucian ones (see e.g. Jung H. Lee 2014, 13–31). Daoism is understood as an altruistic, obliging and peaceful worldview. Its selfcultivation maxims, which are reflected, among other things, in martial arts, Taijiquan and Qigong exercises, breathing and meditation techniques and a specific diet to strengthen or influence a person’s qi (vital energy), should concurrently contribute to prolonging life. All these activities required strict internal and external discipline in the daily routine. Self-disciplining techniques were also aimed at supporting the transformation of people’s minds and actions, with an emphasis on spiritual development. Chinese society was traditionally organised around many small Daoist community temples. Local autonomous groups emerged, centred on these temples, as a local form of self-organisation. These temples played an educating and disciplining role for these communities and were much more important for shaping social order than the local bureaucracies (Schipper 1994). Moreover, strict discipline was part of everyday practices in Daoist monasteries (cf. Kohn 2003). Pye (1988, 38–40) once noted that Confucianism accentuates conformity, control, orthodox belief and discipline while Daoism places more emphasis on tolerance, greater private initiative, a low level of control and unorthodox thought. This distinction was and is still reflected in cyclical oscillations between “left” and “right”, ideology and pragmatism, rebellion and conformism. In this way, Confucian discipline was always challenged by its anti-disciplinary Daoist antithesis. From this dualism of Confucianism and Daoism (“China’s two cultures”) and the possibility of switching between the two, Pye concluded that political pragmatism was inherent in the Chinese political culture, by which influence, for instance, the swift transition from a system of Plan-Stalinism to a market socialism was facilitated (Pye 1988, 38–40). Daoist spontaneity could always be countered by a disciplining Confucian component.

Disciplining Concepts in Chinese History 45 Mohism The founder of the Mohist School, philosopher Mo Zi (Mo Ti) (476 or 480 to 390 or 420 bce), argued that in the eyes of heaven, all humans are equal, a notion differing from Confucian hierarchical social convictions. Mo Zi opposed extravagance and excesses on the part of the rulers and the political elite and castigated rampant corruption, nepotism, hedonism, material wealth and arbitrariness among officials. Although there were many laws, according to Mo Zi, they were not properly applied and therefore had no deterrent character. Many civil servants were unqualified for government service, and the people’s needs were not met. Seeing the country in a state of confusion and decadence, he called for the restoration of discipline, specifically in terms of exerting self-discipline. Discipline, thrift, sacrifice and righteousness should first be practised by the ruler and his civil service. The latter should primarily be concerned with ensuring the general welfare and satisfying the material needs of the people. For Mo Zi, righteousness (yi) was the central virtue; however, it was not inherent in man (as advocated by Confucius) but had to be enforced from the outside. At the same time, righteousness was a prerequisite for social order and political stability. His doctrine, which can be located between Confucianism and Legalism, survived only for a few centuries. However, the influence of his ideas endured and had an impact on popular traditions. Since Mohism focused on the principle of universal love (jian ai) and solidarity among people, rejected traditional class differences, preached frugality and modesty and prioritised society over the family, Mohism is thus conceived of as an early socialist trait.27 Chinese Buddhism Chinese Buddhism is also related to cultivating self-discipline. This requires strict mental discipline and the continuous purifying of the mind. In the “Chinese Buddhist Encyclopedia”, it is noted that discipline is “the systematic instruction intended to train a person”, and that the “assertion of willpower over more base desires” and self-discipline are “to some extent a substitute for motivation, when one uses reason to determine the best course of action that opposes one’s desires”.28 The Buddhist school prevalent in China is the “Dharmaguptaka” (Fazangbu), a division of the Buddhist “Vinaya” canon. Vinaya is generally translated as “discipline” (lü) and refers to the norms and procedures of Buddhist monastic communities (see Horner 1957–1970). Buddhist organisations such as the Tzu Chi Charity Foundation, originally established in Taiwan by a Buddhist monk, and now also officially active in mainland China, strive to cultivate moral citizens who care for others and do welfare work without tying these activities to religious objectives. The Foundation’s activities are carried out by volunteers who provide medical care for needy people, campaign to reduce carbon emissions and encourage entrepreneurs to behave in an ethical and socially responsible manner. They also espouse a new moral awareness among citizens. The fact that this Foundation has received awards for its activities

46  Disciplining Concepts in Chinese History from the Chinese government illustrates that its ethical goals appear to be largely in line with the government’s civilising efforts (W. Huang 2017). In addition, like Christian, Muslim and Daoist associations,29 during the Covid19 pandemic, Buddhist religious organisations called upon their members to comply with the rules imposed by the government. As Krause has shown, the Chinese Buddhist Association, for instance, underlined this by pointing to traditional Buddhist instructional measures such as the tenet that “closing is appropriate, opening is not” (referring to the closure of religious sites), “dispersion is appropriate, gathering is not” (referring to collective events within these sites), “stillness is appropriate, not movement” (referring to avoiding contact with others) and “selfcultivation is appropriate, not negligence” (referring to improving body and soul). A ten-point catalogue of measures for clergy and laity enhanced these rules. Honesty, compassion, benevolence, all-embracing love, willingness to donate for the needy and the importance of refraining from spreading misleading rumours were emphasised in this catalogue, along with a call to trust the decisions of party and government, cooperate with the authorities and show willingness to forego personal freedom where necessary to combat the pandemic (Krause 2020, 115–21). Liu Shaoqi and the Issue of “Self-cultivation” Apart from Legalism, the other four schools of thought understand “self-­cultivation” (xiuyang) as a categorical imperative. The Chinese term xiuyang refers to a person’s overall quality. The aim of self-cultivation is to purify the mind. Through self-reflection and self-observation, the body and mind can reach a higher level. In Daoism, for instance, this pertained to the transformation of a person’s inner thoughts and behaviours, later manifesting in their practical actions. Noble qualities should be cultivated, along with the correct attitude towards others and the world. Concurrently, knowledge and morality should be brought to perfection. Ancient Confucianism generally referred to cultivating a perfect personality in accordance with its tenets, so that words and deeds conformed to the rules. According to the Confucian idea of self-cultivation, the “Three Fundamental Bonds” and the “Five Constant Virtues” were the core elements of personal self-cultivation.30 “Three Fundamental Bonds” referred to the cardinal bonds of ruler and minister, father and son and husband and wife while the “Five Constant Virtues” were “benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and trust”.31 Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969) – Mao’s deputy until the Cultural Revolution, a former head of state who was labelled a non-person at the start of the Cultural Revolution (1966) and the “supreme capitalist ruler” within the CPC who three years later died under dramatic circumstances – was finally rehabilitated in the early 1980s. After his rehabilitation, his essay on self-cultivation for party members was reissued. The original version (Part 1) was delivered as a speech on the self-improvement of Communists in 1939 at the party school in Yan’an, the then-headquarters of the CPC. Later, a second part, which dealt with aspects of self-training and organisational discipline, was added to the text. In the two parts, he drew on the Confucian concept of self-cultivation, explaining that party members, and especially those

Disciplining Concepts in Chinese History 47 in leadership positions, needed to transform themselves. In contrast to Confucian principles, he meant self-education in terms of the CPC’s ideology, its moral standards and organisational discipline. Nevertheless, he repeatedly referred to Confucius, Mencius and other prominent Confucian scholars. His fifth maxim of the “Spirit of Respect for Discipline” reads: If you find yourself in the most difficult and dangerous situation, which could even threaten your life, and you are still able to strictly follow the rules of discipline, then you are a good Party member. Because in such a situation, it is easiest to break the rules of discipline. (Liu 1982, 142) As for the discipline of self-cultivation, according to Liu, compliance with party discipline and moral self-discipline are the decisive factors in organisational discipline. Liu’s essay, still influential today, represents a combination of traditional notions of self-cultivation combined with ideological and organisational discipline, something still requested by the party leadership within the context of “democratic centralism”.32 The latter is still regarded as the highest maxim of organisational discipline.33 In sum, the previous section on China’s traditional worldviews illustrates that discipline, disciplining and self-discipline were salient parts of Confucianism, Legalism, Daoism, Mohism and Chinese Buddhism, albeit from different vantage points. In China, morality rests not only on Confucianism but also on other schools of thought. As Fairbank once noted, rulers liked to choose Legalism, that is rewards and punishments, to discipline people, whereas bureaucrats believed that only a ruler who figured as an ethical–moral role model enjoyed legitimacy (Fairbank 1992, 62). Rulers could accordingly switch between the two. Up to the present, China’s political culture is strongly rooted in a long history of disciplining and civilising. Bakken (2000, 86) speaks accordingly of three “pillars” of traditional Chinese society: discipline, education and morality. Social Disciplining as Collective Memory Throughout all historical periods, the Chinese state has endeavoured to subjugate the population with its heterogeneous structures and to establish a coherent system of control, monitoring and discipline. The infamous Baojia system, which was designed by Legalist Shang Yang (Lord Shang 1963, 57),34 has historical antecedents in early dynasties. It played a major role during most dynasties in which the household was the basic unit of social organisation and control (see Hsiao 1967, 25–83). During the Qin dynasty (221–206 bce), people were divided into groups of five or ten households, which had to monitor each other. If a member of a household committed a crime, his or her own group as well as the other groups were required to report it to the authorities. If they did not report it, all group members were collectively punished. If

48  Disciplining Concepts in Chinese History they reported it, they were rewarded. This system was first introduced and developed during the Song dynasty in 1076 and remained in place from the time of that dynasty until the 20th century. According to the original system, ten families were combined into one unit (bao). During the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), this unit was called jia (approximately 4–13 families), with ten jia forming a bao. During the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), households were organised into subgroups of 10 (pai), 100 (jia) and 1,000 households (bao) (Ch’ü 1988, 150–54). It divided village inhabitants into household groups with a headman in charge of each unit. The headman was responsible for public security, tax payments, personal registration and disciplining the group members. This system was also harnessed to enforce law and order and monitor compliance with moral and disciplinary standards. The Baojia envisaged collective liability for misconduct or criminal offences committed by individual group members. Interestingly, from a historical perspective, China at that time already had experience with a scoring system for the elites. As early as the Ming dynasty, a scoring system for good conduct and misbehaviour of officials had been installed. Officials were scored for good (merit) or evil deeds (demerit) using a points system, an idea enshrined in the morality book Ledgers of merits and demerits (Gongguoge) (Sakai 1970, 342–45). Underlying this system, which had historical forerunners in the Song and Yuan (1271–1368) dynasties was the idea that people could cultivate moral self-discipline by internalising this scoring system and its intentions. As Sakai notes: According to this system the value of human deeds could be calculated with so many credits of merits attached to each good deed and so many debits or demerits for the evil deeds. Using the point system provided him in the Ledgers, each individual could evaluate his deeds one by one, add the merits and demerits, and then strike the balance for himself. The greater the balance of merits, the greater the reward he might expect, and vice versa. A conscientious person would go through this process each day, and also calculate how he stood at the end of each month and each year . . . Mechanical though the system was, however, it was based fundamentally on the idea that the individual did the evaluating for himself and took charge of his own fate. (Sakai, ibid., 342–43) After the Ming, the Qing dynasty also adopted and pursued the Baojia system. The Japanese, too, applied it during their occupation of China during 1931–1945. The system had the same function in both urban and rural areas: surveillance and social control of the people. After the Japanese occupation ended in 1945, the Guomindang government also adopted this system. After the founding of the People’s Republic, the CPC officially abolished it but established new disciplining and control instruments. The collapse of civil administration, goods shortages, inflation and public security problems after the CPC’s takeover of power in 1949 apparently required clear discipline-oriented organisational structures.

Disciplining Concepts in Chinese History 49 Interestingly, a sub-system of Baojia, the “head of 10 households” (shihuzhang) system, was revived in various places, including Sichuan, Zhejiang, Fujian and Yunnan Provinces in 2022, as part of the fight against Covid-19. Local authorities argued that its introduction would facilitate the supervision of pandemic prevention, control and containment in urban neighbourhoods and villages and would allow more effective monitoring of households’ compliance with pandemic control regulations.35 However, on the Internet, many people expressed their outspoken opposition to its reintroduction. It remains to be seen whether it will actually be implemented on a national scale or whether the resistance to it will be too great. The “Baidu” knowledge platform still states that the historical Baojia system was about “turning the whole country into one big prison”.36 This example reveals, however, that there are strong attempts to revive historical forms of social control. Social disciplining as a collective memory works from two sides here: first, as a “traditional Chinese instrument of control” in terms of disciplining the population (in the minds of officials), and second, as a negative phenomenon regarding “collective memory” in the minds of wider sections of the population. Notes

1 On Chinese Buddhism, see Ikeda 1990. 2 On rural morality, see, for example, Madsen 1986 or Stafford 2013. 3 On the Chinese perception of “immorality”, see also Yan 2014. 4 The Li Ji is a collection of texts on correct social behaviour and social order; see Li Gi. 1981. Chinese text: accessed December 2021, https://ctext.org/liji/zhs. A complete English translation: Luo 2017. 5 Yao (2018) explains why the Book of Rites still matters today. 6 The Chinese text of Daxue with an English translation can be downloaded here: accessed October 2021, https://ctext.org/liji/da-xue. 7 Mencius (Selections), A. Charles Muller, trans., accessed June 2022, www.acmuller.net/ con-dao/mencius.html#div-2. On the differences between Mencius and Xunzi see Kim 2020. 8 On Zhu Xi’s teachings in general, see Chu Hsi 1990. 9 A very similar description of the obligations towards parents can be found in the chapter “neice” (rules for the inner realm) of the Li Ji. See accessed December 2021, https:// ctext.org/liji/nei-ze/zhs 10 On the imperial examination system, see Franke 1960; Miyazaki 1981; Elman 2002, 2009; Ko 2017; Wang 2013. 11 In contrast to morality, ethics can be defined as “the second-level reflection of moralities” (Steinmüller 2015, 224). 12 On details of the clan rules including punishments, see Liu 1959. 13 On the significance of clans in rural areas today, see, for example, M. Yang 2020, 190–223. 14 This was the reason why Emperor Kang Xi’s edict included the aforementioned maxim 6 (“Extend the schools of instruction in order to make correct the practices of scholars”). 15 The documents of both sessions are available here, accessed June 2021, www.CPCs. gov.cn/xytt/201812/t20181212_123251.shtml and http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/67481/ 399243/. 16 On China’s traditional morality and its contemporary transformations, see He 2015.

50  Disciplining Concepts in Chinese History 17 A good example is the bestseller by Amy Chua (2011) which describes how a “tiger mother” disciplines her children, thus instilling within them a kind of self-disciplining. See also Hammond and Richey 2015. 18 Zhu Xi included this text in the canon of the civil service examination system. On Zhu Xi, see also Chan 1989. 19 Source: Shuofu Liezi, accessed June 14, 2020, www.guoxuemeng.com/guoxue/7151. html. English translation: Graham 1990. On self-cultivation: Cheng 2004. 20 The revival of Confucianism in China after the 1980s, the discourses on its role for China’s future and its relationship to moral education are not addressed in detail in this volume, primarily because these topics are well documented elsewhere. See, for example, Makeham 2003; Song 2003; Billioud 2007, 2016; Billioud and Thoraval 2008; Worsman 2012; Van den Stock 2014a, 2014b; Zlotea 2015; Ambrogio 2017; Tillman 2018; Deng and Smith 2018. 21 Deng and Smith 2018, 302, called this a “spiritual re-sinification”, even identifying a trend of “religionization of Confucianism”. 22 Jiaoyubu guanyu yinfa jiaoyubu jingshen wenming jianshe lingdao xiaozu 2002 nian gongzuo anpai de tongzhi (Notification of the Ministry of Education on Printing and Distributing the Work Arrangements of the Leading Group for the Construction of Spiritual Civilisation of the Ministry of Education in 2002), accessed June 2021, http:// pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=e1cbb29090f776c1bdfb. On the effects of moral development and education among China’s preschool-aged children, see Xu, Jing 2017. This aspect is, however, not covered by this book. 23 Interestingly, in contrast to Xi’s visit to Qufu, during the movement to “Criticise Lin Biao and Confucius” in 1973, a booklet criticising Confucius as the “Sage” of the Reactionary Classes denounced the late Liu Shaoqi, former Chairman of the People’s Republic, for making a pilgrimage to Confucius’s birthplace Qufu and praising Confucius as “great” (Yang 1973, 1975, 83). 24 “Shenzhen Kongshengtang (Shenzhen’s Confucian Church)”, Baidu Baike, Undated, accessed July 2022, https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E6%B7%B1%E5%9C%B3%E5% AD%94%E5%9C%A3%E5%A0%82/3648235; Payette Undated. 25 More on Xunzi: Dubs, “Collection of Xunzi’s Works in Chinese,” 1966, accessed June 2022, www.shicimingju.com/book/xunzi.html. 26 Xi Jinping also frequently quotes Han Fei, see, for example, “Xi Jinping yin ‘Han Feizi’ zhi ju (Xi Jinping Quotes from ‘Han Feizi’),” January 26, 2021, accessed June 2022, www.81.cn/xue-xi/2021-01/26/content_9974820.htm; “Di wushi qi Xi Jinping tan ‘Han Feizi’ (The 50th Issue of Xi Jinping Talks About ‘Han Feizi’),” March 15, 2021, accessed June 2022, www.hgxyq.gov.cn/index.php?c=article&id=3732. 27 On Mo Zi, see, for example, Mo Ti 1975; Mozi da quan 2004; The Mozi 2010; Mozi 2015; Frasier 2016. 28 “Discipline,” Chinese Buddhist Encyclopedia, accessed May 2021, http://chinabuddhismencyclopedia.com/en/index.php/Discipline. 29 Chinese church institutions also called for adherence to the government’s Covid-19 measures and vaccination programme. They participated in the distribution of medicines, food and supplies in neighbourhoods, donated protective suits and assisted in setting up and operating testing and vaccination centres, etc. See Wenzel-Teuber 2022 and corresponding articles in the Catholic newspaper Xinde (Faith), accessed September 2021, www.xinde. org/search?title=%E6%8A%97%E7%96%AB%E6%8F%B4%E5%8A%A9. In this way, they contributed to the observance of discipline required by the state. 30 “Xiuyang (Self-Cultivation),” Baike Baidu (Baidu Encyclopedia), accessed June 2022, https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E4%BF%AE%E5%85%BB/984690; “Geren xiuyang (Self-Cultivation),” Baike Baidu (Baidu Encyclopedia), accessed June 2022, https:// baike.baidu.com/item/%E4%B8%AA%E4%BA%BA%E4%BF%AE%E5%85%BB/ 3659994, Liu 1981.

Disciplining Concepts in Chinese History 51 31 More on these principles, see, for example, Keith N. Knapp, “Three Fundamental Bonds and Five Constant Virtues,” 2009, accessed June 2022, https://chinaconnectu.com/wpcontent/pdf/ThreeFundamentalBondsandFiveConstantVirtues.pdf. 32 The fundamental organisational principle of “Democratic centralism” encompasses the following points: individual party members are subordinate to the party organisation, the minority is subordinate to the majority, the lower party organisations are subordinate to superior party organisations, and all the constituent organisations and members of the party are subordinate to the National Party Congress and the Central Committee of the CPC. See Party Constitution, 2017, Article 10, accessed June 2022, http://english.www. gov.cn/news/top_news/2017/09/27/content_281475888488000.htm#:~:text=The%20 Communist%20Party%20of%20China%20upholds%20and%20promotes%20 socialist%20ethnic,cultural%20and%20social%20development%2C%20and. 33 Part 1 has been published in Liu (1981, 97–167). An English version, accessed June 2022, www.commonprogram.science/documents/how%20to%20be%20a%20 good%20­communist.pdf. The second part (in German only) can be found in Liu 1982. 34 In the book Lord Shang (1963, 57), it was stated: “Now the people in groups of five are responsible for each other’s crimes, they spy on each other to discover transgressions, they denounce each other and cause hostile relations.” 35 See, for example, “Zhongguo chongqi ‘shihuzhang’ zhidu pinglun: Yu daotui shu gannian heyi (China’s Revival of the Head of the ‘Head of Ten Households’ Under Discussion: Does It Mean Going Back Thousands of Years?),” Wenxue Cheng (Civilised City), September 21, 2022, accessed October 2022, www.wenxuecity.com/ news/2022/09/21/11846543.html; “Shiwei zuzhibu: Chongfen fahui ‘shihuzhang’ zuoyong, daying xinyilun yiqing fangkong gongjian zhan (Organisation Department of the Municipal Party Committee: Give Full Play to the Role of the ‘Ten Households Head’ Winning a New Round of Epidemic Prevention and Control),” Neijiang Ribao (Neijiang Daily), July 22, 2022, 市委组织部：充分发挥“十户长”作用 打赢新一轮 疫情防控攻坚战_部门动态_内江市人民政府 (neijiang.gov.cn); Boyd 2022. 36 “Baojia zhidu (Baojia System),” accessed October 2022, https://baike.baidu.com/item/ %E4%BF%9D%E7%94%B2%E5%88%B6%E5%BA%A6/1527820.

4

State and Society in China

This chapter is concerned with core features of both the Chinese concept of the state and the interrelationship between state and society in history and the present. It also delves into issues such as the moral state, the interrelationship between morality and law on the one hand and the state and a moral economy on the other. Finally, it addresses the concept of the “developmental state” to explain the logic of the current state that involves the factor of disciplining capacity. Contrary to the European philosophy of state, an explicit state theory did not exist in the Chinese history of ideas. Rather, based on history and an idealised past, ethical standards were formulated, determining how the emperors, civil servants and the people should behave and which standards and norms they had to follow. Confucianism as a state-supporting concept formed the basis of the prevailing ethics. Until modern times, peasant rebellions, overthrow of dynasties, and conquerors have changed little with regard to the political institutions. The perpetuation of these institutions as the basis for the interaction between rulers and the ruled played a salient role in ensuring that the Chinese political system remained largely constant over the centuries. In China, politics and morality were and still are more closely interlinked than in Western concepts and reality. Although political philosophy and political moralism emphasised the moral perspectives and ethical issues in politics, Western politics was more concerned with the use of power (e.g. Machiavelli, Hobbes). In China, in turn, morality was perceived as an element stabilising social order and consolidating state power. At the same time, politics also plays a major role in the formation and development of morality. Developing and enforcing a moral order requires government intervention and moral engineering.1 A crucial question associated with the concept of the “state” in this context is how the term “politics” is defined in present-day China. Baidu, China’s most widely used and most prominent encyclopedic search engine, informs us that “politics” refers to the behaviour of government, political parties etc. to govern the country. “Politics is . . . the sum of various social activities and social relations carried out under state power.” It affects – according to Baidu – the interests of all members of society and controls their behaviour.2 The Guoxue (National Studies) website simply defines it as “social management” (shehui guanli),3 a term widely used in current Chinese politics. In addition, the term is strongly related to the DOI: 10.4324/9781003353065-4

State and Society in China 53 traditional purpose of politics. As Chen Lai (2019, 146) has shown, since ancient times, politics (of the state) meant “ruling the people” and was conceived of as a purely top-down process. Politics was not only apprehended as a governing process but also had a strong moral overtone. This is also illustrated by the Chinese character for “politics” (政, zheng) which contains the component “rectification” and – in the form of moral rectification as a core task of the state – is tied to the issue of morality (see e.g. Tu 1993, 5–6). A second character (治, zhi) means to regulate or to cure something. In ancient classical writings, zheng primarily referred to power, system, order and the laws of the country, zhi mainly to the management and education (jiaohua) of the people, as well as to bringing about a stable political order. The Chinese term for politics in use today thus contains the meaning of rectifying and regulating a matter pertaining to a family or an organisation, that is a private and a public issue.4 The notion of zhengzhi is thus highly state-centred. It implies a top-down process to control and achieve a stable order and effectively manage society. It thus differs from Western concepts, specifically more novel ones. For example, the English word “politics” is associated with a wide range of fields. It refers to a process related to decision-making in society, power relations, conflict resolution, cooperation, and negotiation between the state on the one hand and groups and individuals on the other. More recent perspectives associate the term with the public sphere, binding regulations for the internal organisation of a polity, the interaction between state and society and the interplay between preservation and change within society. Logic and Function of the Chinese State By its sheer size and ethnic composition, China differs markedly from other nationstates. Pye, accordingly, characterises it as a civilisation that pretends to be a state. The China of today, Pye noted, was as if the Europe of the Roman Empire and that of the time of Charlemagne had continued to exist until today and attempted to function as a unified nation-state (cf. Pye 1990, 58). Pye thus hinted at the heterogeneity and diversity of this country and its conception of the state. China is – one could argue – not simply a uniform system but a complex continent with diverse and heterogeneous geographical, economic, social, political and cultural structures and institutions. Before touching on the traditional logic and function of the state, we will briefly trace its traditional features. It should be noted, however, that throughout history, China’s political institutions have been subject to diverse influences and modifications. Seven points are key for understanding the features of the Chinese state in a historical context: First, Jacques (2012, 244–87) calls the Chinese state a “civilisational state”, thus underscoring Pye’s argument (1997, 209) that the Chinese are tied together not by their identification “with the nation as the state” but by “their sense of culture, race, and civilisation”.5 Second, hardly any other people and their identity were and are so closely connected with history and historical events as the Chinese. This is reflected not only

54  State and Society in China in the constant references to history but also in political discourses and political symbolism.6 The late China historian John K. Fairbank (1986, 11) once argued that “anyone who tries to understand the Chinese Revolution without a considerable knowledge of Chinese history is committed to flying blind among the mountains”, meaning that without studying the history (including China’s history of ideas) and its continuity in contemporary thought and action, it is almost impossible to understand China’s current political and social processes. In a similar vein, jurist and sinologist Karl Bünger reminded us that the state is a historical project and that the institutions of a modern state, in the form of a centralised civil service and a centralised system of tax collection, registration of the population, organisation of armed forces and the management of society, developed much earlier in China (ca. 3rd century bce) than in Europe (Bünger 1985, xiv–xvii). When it became known in 18th-century Europe that it was not descent but merit (through a system of civil service examination) that was the key to obtaining higher government positions in China, European scholars and politicians reacted with incredulity (Gernet 1987, xviii). Talking about the current Chinese state, Jacques (2012, 259) noted that the belief that “China has a communist government and therefore one already knows the answer to all important questions” is the “most impoverished area of debate on China”, because such a perception is ahistorical and views China and its development exclusively from a Western perspective. Similarly, political scientist Yan Xuetong (2019, 134) pointed out in 2019 that although traditionalism does not function as China’s official ideology, the government and Chinese scholars nevertheless agree that domestic and foreign policies must be guided by “Chinese wisdom”, that is indigenous Chinese knowledge developed in different historical periods. Christopher A. Ford (2015, 1037) points out that party leader Xi Jinping continually cites Confucian classics and Chinese history to comment on or explain domestic and international political developments and significant events. Tenets such as xiaokang (modest prosperity), datong (great community or great harmony) and “harmonious society” (hexie shehui) are conceptualisations that did not originate with Xi but are deeply embedded in China’s Confucian and state-theoretical worldviews and at the same time are part and parcel of the modernisation narrative. This continuous reference back to the past was highlighted by former German ambassador to China Erwin Wickert back in the 1980s: In fact, Confucian scholars based their theses and thoughts on models from the gray past in a way that is often tiresome to us, and whenever a problem of the present was discussed, they always came up with a parallel from antiquity. Attacks on politicians were preferably made by attacking a statesman of the past who in some way resembled the living one. And in order to clarify or judge a, perhaps delicate, political question of the present, one discusses a similar situation from the past. (Wickert 1983, 14–15) Third, according to ancient belief, heaven (tian) entrusted the emperor with a mandate (ming) to administer both the earth and the people. Unlike in Europe, the ruler

State and Society in China 55 had no right to rule but held a mandate from heaven that could be withdrawn if he failed to fulfil his duties. And the emperor’s principal duty was to ensure “order” through good governing grounded in a well-ordered moral basis. In the case of “bad” rule, for example, as evidenced by social disorder or even collapse of the order and moral decay, heaven could withdraw this mandate. This was referred to as “change of mandate” (geming). In these cases, the people had the right – at least in theory – to overthrow not only an incompetent ruler but also the entire dynasty. According to Mencius, the right to revolt was a legitimate means available to the people. Geming (change of mandate) is still the common term for revolution today. Fourth, historically, one of the most important tasks of the Chinese state has been to keep the Chinese nation’s foundation healthy, namely agriculture. The state thus had the responsibility to enhance and maintain the sophisticated irrigation system, to build and maintain irrigation channels, and to take care of flood control and land reclamation, all essential tasks for preserving agricultural production and cultivation of crops (particularly rice). The fulfilment of these duties, the size of the country and its structural diversity required a strong and capable overarching authority. Without such a central authority, the state was in danger of falling apart. Accordingly, a hierarchical and complex bureaucracy was established to organise and supervise these operations under the leadership of the emperor. However, the work of this administration had to comply with the existing legal stipulations and regulations. Gernet (1985, xxxii) therefore spoke of the state as “the great organiser of society and territory”. This system concurrently spawned a paternalistic understanding of the state: the ruler and his officials were ideally supposed to act in the interests of the people and had the social duty to take care of their livelihoods. The people, in turn, were expected to fulfil their agrarian duties and to abide by the state order and Confucian principles. Fifth, mastering the Confucian classics was considered to be the best education and was a prerequisite for public office via the classical examination system. It was assumed that every human being was educable and should be taught the basic Confucian rites and rules. Learning and studying were central aspects of socialisation. It was the principal mission of the state to educate the people.7 Furthermore, moral education took precedence over legal punishments, and the latter were to be applied only in cases when moral education had apparently failed. Society was hierarchically organised, and each individual should know his or her place and duties in this hierarchical order. Rulers were expected to demonstrate their suitability to rule by exemplary moral behaviour and fulfilment of duties in the Confucian sense. Heredity was not considered a sufficient condition for office, as had been the case in Europe for centuries. Concurrently, both the rulers and the civil servants were supposed – ideally – to figure as moral role models. Sixth, according to the traditional Chinese conception of the state, it took priority over society. Although social organisations existed throughout history, they were always strictly monitored and guided by the state. Therefore, the idea of society as a communal entity that confronts the state did not exist in 19th-century China and did not play a major role in the Chinese understanding of social and political life. As Lin Yutang has noted, the Chinese are family oriented, not society-minded.

56  State and Society in China Accordingly, the state or nation, not society, was the superior entity and reference point above the family. This is illustrated by the Chinese term for state or nation, guojia, a composition of the two Chinese characters for country (guo) and family (jia). The concept of society had no place in this conception. Words such as “social mind”, “public spirit”, “civic consciousness” or “social service” are Japanese neologisms and did not exist in Chinese notions of social and political life. The family and family mind were not only the key points of reference for individuals and their behaviour but also formed the basis of the state (see Lin 1936, 164–72). Seventh, in imperial times, state power was equated with the power of a single autocratic ruler, a “patriarch” in the Confucian family sense who was able to balance divergent interests and structures. The first Ming Emperor Hong Wu (1368– 1398), for instance, once declared: Ancient wisdom teaches us that a people without a leader will be torn apart and miserable. For if there is no master, the strong rape the weak, the mass the minority. The rich man trembles for his possessions, the poor man is exposed to any kind of economic exploitation. Now I have become your master. I have created laws, the observance of which I demand, and by which I will preserve the rich man’s property and give succor to the poor. Through caring and wise laws, the ruler proves himself to be the father of the people. By morality and a sense of duty, the people make themselves worthy of his care. (op. cit. in Kuhn 1954, 93) Even in the early 20th century, the social democrat Zhang Junmai (Carsun Chang) (1886–1949), a prominent political philosopher, public intellectual and pioneering human rights theorist, expressed the view that “a great task requires a great man”. Such a leader should be able to “synthesize old and new, to shape the course of action, and to lead all parties and groups toward the common goal” (Tan 1971, 265). In the 20th century, for example, Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925),8 Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975), Mao Zedong (1893–1976) and Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) were protagonists and strongmen of great impact in their time. And currently, Xi Jinping has positioned himself as the new strongman in the Chinese polity. According to Ma Debin, the “familistic” conception of the traditional Chinese polity and the persistence of both a central political entity and a bureaucratic system based on an examination system spawned a strong sense of a “community with shared interest and common destiny”. Ma (2010, 76) concluded that these “endowments paved the way for the rise of a modern nationalist ideology and a bureaucratic developmental state for modern East Asia”.9 To summarise, the state was conceived of as the central authority which – throughout history – had to ensure (1) political–social order and stability, (2) social welfare and (3) territorial unity of this heterogeneous giant empire. Moral education of the people was considered as the precondition to guarantee order and stability and was thus a further core duty of the state. In short, traditionally, the core

State and Society in China 57 function of the Chinese state was to preserve stability and avoid disorder (luan) and to safeguard the moral order of society (see e.g. Balázs 1965; Ban Wang 2017). The Chinese perceived the state differently from Western notions: The latter see it as an outsider, an interloper, or even a necessary evil that must be constantly held to account and justified. The Chinese, on the other hand, view the state as an intimate, as part of the family, even as the head of the family. (Jacques 2012, 618–19) A former professor at the Central Party School traces the Chinese people’s specific conception of the state to the persistence of the Chinese traditional political culture: The Chinese society is still a pre-modern autocratic society, because its political culture has not changed, and its political system has not changed. For thousands of years, it is the worship of emperors, and the worship of power that has profound cultural roots among the Chinese people. Therefore, this matter should be viewed from the perspective of traditional Chinese culture. People are subconsciously accustomed to relying on the government and relying on power to live their lives . . . Remember a recent case, when a farmer in Jiangxi had been released innocently imprisoned for 27 years. He thanked the government, right? So you can see how the traditional culture’s worship of power and the imprint of individual dependence on power are deeply rooted in Chinese society. (Chu 2020) The professor’s statement that China is still a pre-modern society raises an interesting point. It is not only that he made this statement in public. The fact that China aims to become a fully modern nation by 2049/2050 spells out that the country is still in the midst of the modernising process and therefore not yet a fully modernised polity. Two scandals made public in 2022 exemplify the pre-modern elements existing in Chinese society. The “Xuzhou Chained Girl Incident” concerned the case of a woman who had been abused, abducted and trafficked many times. She had given birth to eight children during her ordeal and was discovered chained up in a village. The local authorities knew about this case and yet remained silent and took no action. The incident was exposed in January 2022 and led to a major controversy over public morality and the behaviour of local authorities. According to Chinese media reports, this is by no means an isolated case in rural areas.10 A second prominent case which sparked a public outcry was the “Tangshan Incident” in June 2022. In this case, a group of drunken men (members of an organised crime syndicate, according to official sources) violently assaulted four young women who rejected the men’s unwelcome advances in a barbecue restaurant in

58  State and Society in China the city of Tangshan, Hebei Province. The incident left several women seriously injured. This sparked a debate on social media, with users asking why mafia-like organisations could spread to such an extent that these gangs could do whatever they wanted without the security authorities intervening.11 In both cases, some people raised the question why official statements did not mention that the incidents involved violence against women, which is an ongoing problem in China. There was online outrage that the local police or local authorities had apparently not reacted in time and had handled both cases rather carelessly. Some netizens surmised that police entanglements with organised crime may be a reason for this. Why bystanders (in the Tangshan case) or officials familiar with the situation of the abducted and chained woman had not intervened was also discussed. In this context, the prominent writer and social critic Li Chengpeng pointed out that in many cases, people who try to help others who are in distress or being assaulted are not publicly rewarded but can quickly find themselves caught up in police investigations. Li cites numerous examples where courageous helpers were prosecuted for “injuring” perpetrators, whereas the injured perpetrators remained unpunished. Indeed, in some cases, willing helpers were subsequently sued for damages by the victims they had assisted. Accordingly, the willingness to show moral courage in China, says Li, is relatively low. Citizens are not to blame for this, he argues, as it is due to the lack of empathy on the part of the security and judicial authorities.12 Following this incident, China’s Central Civilisation Office revoked the honorary title “National Civilised City” awarded to Tangshan in 2011.13 It is cases such as these, which are by no means isolated incidents, that cause outrage in the country, eroding trust in local authorities and public security and fuelling the belief, even among the political leadership, that the country is facing a moral crisis (see Chapter 6). These examples have, concurrently, been characterised by many Chinese Internet users as manifestations of pre-modern and uncivilised social behaviour. The latter illustrates that the awareness of the need to break with pre-modern uncivilised behaviour, especially among enlightened sections of urban society, is apparently gaining ground. State and Society – Key Points Many Chinese translations of modern Western terms and concepts were adopted from Japanese translations, although the content of the Chinese terms still included ancient Chinese meanings. French sinologist Marcel Granet therefore raised the question whether Chinese characters can be translated in our terms at all, since individual characters are symbolic carriers of moral, social and political ideas, the result of a tradition that has grown over millennia (Granet 1985, 19–37). It is quite obvious that the Chinese term for “civilised” (wenming), for example, did not mean then what it was supposed to mean in Europe as a translation word of “civilised” or what it means in the context of current Chinese campaigns promoting a civilised, healthy and green lifestyle.

State and Society in China 59 In China, the modern concept of “civilisation” arrived from Japan. Wen is an expression of ancient Chinese thinking which, in its most literal sense, meant to understand the “way”, that is the order of the cosmos, and the implementation of this way “in the human world” (Cheng 2014, 190–91). Later, it referred to literacy and people who were educated (in a Confucian sense), that is to the morality of civilised people as opposed to barbarians (yeman).14 It is therefore intimately related to Chinese traditional culture and morals as a precondition for Chineseness. In the course of history, it has been used with different connotations. As Fang (2019, 11–13) notes, wen, for example, manifested “the great way of the universe” and regulated etiquette and music. It was also conceived of as the aesthetic result of “human efforts to shape nature”. Ming means “light” or “shedding light on things” pertaining to cultural prosperity. And, according to Fang, wenming referred to a “progressive way of being” and a society that has achieved a higher level of development and even an ideal polity (ibid., 17/18). The Japanese term was borrowed and incorporated into Chinese with this meaning (Hirono 2008, 26). It is worth noting, however, that civilisation was not limited to ethnic Han Chinese. If they adopted Chinese ways, non-Han could be civilised, too. Rather than marking a dividing line between ethnicities, civilisation distinguished those who had it from those who did not (Wang 1982, 23). Civilisation in China, as Osterhammel (2006, 11) noted, “was an achievement, and others were encouraged to make a similar effort”. Civilising is the task and achievement of “wise rulers or leaders” who urge their people to change their ways. To “become civilised is to change” (Wang 1982, 27–28). The relationship between the civilised elite and non-civilised common people was a hierarchical one, and that would not change. Or let us take the Chinese term shehui (society) as another example. In traditional China, the family and family mind were not only the key points of reference for individuals and their behaviour but also formed the basis of the state (Lin 1936, 164–72). Society had no place in this conception. In classical Chinese, shehui referred to “an annual gathering for agricultural festivities in the rural society” (Zheng and Huang 2018, 428–29). In the 19th and early 20th century, the Chinese term was associated with organisations such as secret societies or religious sects. The term had rather negative connotations, referring to something beyond state control, “unorganised” and “potentially dangerous” social forces, conveying “a sense of disorder and lawlessness”. Jin and Liu conclude that “it is the area where state power is weak or even non-existent” (Zheng and Huang 2018, 429). Concepts such as “social mind”, “public spirit”, “civic consciousness” and “social service” are neologisms for which no Chinese terms existed in social and political life. The same holds for ge of geren, the Chinese phonetic form of the Japanese loanword for individual person.15 The conceptual difficulty of translating “individual” into Chinese stems from differences between what, in present-day terms and referring to present-day social realities, are sometimes described as individualistic and collectivistic societies. In individualistic societies, the self is conceived of as an autonomous entity that exists independently of community relations and tends to give priority to the pursuit of personal goals. In collectivist societies, by contrast,

60  State and Society in China social behaviours are more strongly regulated by norms, duties and traditional obligations. Self-interest is subordinate to the common good. Chinese philosopher Lin Yutang (1895–1976) explained the notion of the individual as follows: The Chinese are a nation of individualists. They are family-minded, not social-minded, and the family mind is only a form of magnified selfishness. (Lin 1936, 164) Chinese geti literally means “single body”. It is understood to refer to a person as part of a collective, for example the family. In fact, the traditional Chinese family system is the very “negation of individualism itself” (Lin 1936, 169) that keeps “single bodies” in check and interferes in the most personal affairs of individuals. Individualistic behaviour is not unknown in China, but the Chinese tradition conceived of the individual as an integrated element within a larger familial, social and political whole and not as an autonomous agent of a self-determined life endowed with freedom of will. Individuals were embedded in a web of social relationships from which they could not escape, except by retreating into eremitism or inner contemplation (Bauer 1976, 1990). These contrasts with regard to the position of the self in society hampered Chinese intellectuals’ understanding of the European notion of the individual; however, while the marketisation of the world has arguably made China more individualistic (Wang 2002), albeit on a lower level, to some extent the perceived differences between Western individualism and Eastern collectivism persist to this day. This is exemplarily manifest in a different understanding of the meaning and significance of freedom or liberty (for more on this issue, see the section “The State and the Individual”). Concerning ziyou, the Chinese term for freedom, there was some concern in China that the Japanese loanword ziyou connoted wilfulness, arbitrariness and recklessness rather than the relationship between individual and collective (Zhao 2006, 322; Liang 1960). In any event, the word came to China, to use Fung’s (2006) words, “as a fusion of personal, national, social, civic, and moral freedoms”: a heavy load that had to be indigenised, that is, absorbed, on the theoretical level by intellectuals, and fathomed by the population at large. The universe of Confucian thought did not envision the free, autonomous individual who is endowed with reason, leads a rational life and seeks to be ruled by reason alone. Ziyou still has some negative connotations in the sense of unrestrained, not being bound by the rules of the community (Eberhard 1984, 31f.). Accordingly, the meaning of ziyou is not quite the same as the Western notion of freedom which means political freedom, among other things. In China, the focus was and is on ethical freedom, that is the freedom to opt for the better and against evil. This conception of freedom did not refer to the social and political environment in which an individual was embedded but to one’s actions as a human being. Not only does the Chinese concept of the state differ from that of the West, so do the notion of law and the nexus between law and morality. This is indicated by the history of the corresponding Chinese term fa (法), usually rendered as “law” in the sense of a legal system. The character refers to “legislation”. In ancient China,

State and Society in China 61 the character “fa” was written differently (灋). A Chinese report explains that this character originally contained three meanings: (1) it symbolised the ancient state power capable of suppressing any kind of resistance and deterring by means of punishment and execution; (2) it embodied the expectation that judges judge justly, punishing the evil and supporting the good; (3) it alluded to the requirement of a fair trial and equal application of the law to all parties involved in a case (Feng 2018). In a more general sense, fa (法) stood for “government ordinance” (see also the section “Morality and Law”). Discipline is nothing new in China, and it was not new at the time when Weber contemplated the rationalisation of society and Elias the civilising process in Europe. In contemporary Chinese, jilü means “discipline”. Liu Zhengtan and Gao (1984, 409) list jilü as a Japanese loanword, although the term has a long history in ancient Chinese literature. It is mentioned, for instance, in the Zuo Zhuan (“The Commentary of Zuo”), thought to date back to the third century bce. There, it occurs in the sentence, “A hundred officials are wary of discipline out of fear”,16 which sounds rather Legalistic in the sense mentioned in Chapter 3, since it suggests an interpretation of discipline as relying on deterrence. Originally, the expression was more closely tied to the observance of Confucian moral rules. In present-day Chinese, jilü comes closer to the Western concept of abiding by rules and regulations to safeguard collective interests and steering the behaviour of people. It also relates to sanctions for non-compliance with rules and norms and to transforming externally imposed discipline into internal self-discipline. The contemporary Chinese concept of discipline, while maintaining some features that are grounded in history and culture, thus also involves enforcing compliance by imposing constraints.17 The State and the Individual As shown in Chapter 3, in China’s traditional conception of the state, the role of the individual was subservient to the state and nation. Politician and political mastermind Kang Youwei (1858–1927), one of the most influential Chinese thinkers in modern times, argued that the state had to gain absolute superiority over the rights of individuals: When you talk about equality, freedom, and the rights of the people, you extend the rights and privileges of individuals. When individual rights and privileges are extended, the power of the state will necessarily be weakened. (quoted in Tan 1971, 25) Even after the end of imperial rule, strong elements of this superiority of the state over the individual have been re-emphasised, for example, by President Sun Yatsen. He wrote: If we apply the term freedom to the individual, we become a heap of loose sand. Under no circumstances should we give more freedom to the individual: instead, let us secure the freedom of the nation. The individual should not have too much freedom, but the nation must have perfect freedom. (Sun 2006)

62  State and Society in China Particularly with regard to the state’s task of preserving the moral order, that is ascribing moral virtues to the state and the state’s task of asserting these values within the polity, this has spawned a different notion of the interrelationship between the individual and the collective on the one hand and the individual and the state on the other. As Pye put it: No people have ever outdone the Chinese in ascribing moral virtues to the state or in deprecating the worth of the individual. First Confucianism and then the Chinese version of Leninism went all out in extolling the importance of rules and society and in minimizing the rights of individuals . . . The individual has consistently been seen as merely a disciplined member of some larger group and the group’s interests are always assumed to take precedence over those of the individual. (Pye 1996, 16–17) What Pye is telling us here is not only that taking care of morality is a task of the Chinese state but also that morality and self-education of the individual are strongly connected to collective interests and the dedication and commitment of individuals to the collective and the interests of the state.18 Political order and social order were therefore comprehended as “essentially coterminous”, and power was inseparably related to morality. As Pye noted, the “Confucian relationship of ethics to politics has no counterpart in western thinking” (Pye 1985, 41 and 86). Borrowing from Susan Shirk, Pye characterised this order as “virtuocracy” (ibid., 22–23), that is a society ruled by the most virtuous person.19 Even today, the CPC, which for decades has described itself as an “always correct” party, believes, in line with its self-image, that it is the only force that can identify, formulate and carry out the interests of the people and the nation, as well as the “correct” goals for the nation and the people, not the rights of individuals. This notion is rooted in the ruler’s paternalistic role as father figure and absolute authority in Confucianism. The Leninist concept of the Communist Party as the vanguard of the proletariat and the idea that history proceeds according to certain laws and inevitably from lower to higher levels of society were quite congenial to traditional Chinese ideas. Bearing this historical background in mind, it can be noted that in the context of Chinese political culture, the state and its fulfilment of tasks enjoyed priority, not only because the ruler was supposed to look after and fulfil the overall interests but also because the people expected precisely this from the state and therefore accepted state hegemony. The State, Competing Social Forces and the Chinese Understanding of “Civil Society” Another feature is that, unlike in Europe, the Chinese state was less challenged by competing forces. It possessed unrestricted authority and, for centuries, was based on a specific notion of a world order that understood the ruler as the guardian of civilisation. While in Europe, the church, the nobility and the urban bourgeoisie

State and Society in China 63 formed a counterweight to the state for centuries, in China dynasties were overthrown when they were no longer able to guarantee order and morality. However, the new dynasties that followed did not challenge the existing structures and Confucian institutions but only the authority and legitimacy of the ruler, whom they replaced with a new one. The lack of competing forces and the state’s endeavour to prevent the emergence of parallel power structures are also reflected in the Chinese notion of “civil society”. In a Western context, “civil society” is conceived of as the development of a public-social sphere autonomous from the state. However, such a definition has never reflected conditions in China, past or present. Although the preconditions for a “civil society” are in place in China, namely in the evolution of social associations, these organisations remain rather powerless if they lack strong connections to state authorities. This is why these associations are looking for multiple connections to the party state. Both the concept and the reality of China’s civil society are therefore quite different from civil society in Western countries. Even its definition is distinct from Western concepts: the Chinese terms used for civil society are shimin shehui, referring to the urban space only, and gongmin shehui, which means “society of public people” and focuses on the responsibility of citizens in terms of public goods and good behaviour (Heberer 2012). It is, therefore, not concerned with the issue of political power. From a Chinese vantage point, civil society is perceived as a non-confrontational model which does not challenge the state but strives for cooperation with it. Morality and the Moral State In China, as already mentioned, the order of the polity was significantly linked to the issue of morality and moral order.20 As Yan (2021) has shown, within Chinese society and public opinion, a “strong moralistic tendency” still exists to this day and is a benchmark for assessing social and political developments throughout history. This phenomenon results primarily from the Confucian concept of virtue and morality, spawning “social expectations of moral excellence among the elite, the compassionate performance of governments, and the ideal of benevolent governance” (ibid.). Yan further notes: Nationwide moral panic erupts whenever a particularly disturbing incident of immorality occurs, such as the scandal over tainted milk powder in 2008, the apathy of 18 passers-by who offered no help when they saw a dying child on the street in 2011, or the faulty vaccines for diphtheria, tetanus, and polio given to hundreds of thousands of children across China in 2018. (Yan, ibid.) Moreover, Tong (2011, 151–54) showed that apart from economic performance, moral performance always figured as a “major dimension of regime legitimacy”. The term “moral” did not only refer to societal morality but also included assessing

64  State and Society in China the “benevolence” of a ruler or government, that is the “welfare of the people and showing compassionate care for them”, for example during natural disasters, famines, war or other calamities. The legitimacy of a ruler was therefore based on moral behaviour and the moral authority of the state, with the result that the issue of morality became a highly politicised issue. Whereas in Europe the state was primarily responsible for law and its enforcement, and the church for morality, there was no such separation in China. As a result, the state or officialdom had the task of educating the people morally, that is, of civilising and disciplining them.21 For centuries, power and authority were closely linked to the (state’s) task of moral education or at least to the goal of ensuring that the people complied with the prevailing moral standards. The relationship between state and morality in the sense of the “moral state” was summed up by Gernet in the phrase “to govern is to educate” (1987, xxiv). For centuries, officials were selected via the aforementioned examination system based on Confucian moral standards. Mao’s “New Human”, the creation of a “spiritual civilisation” in the 1980s and of “moral citizens” and even the social credit system described in Chapter 7 are ultimately part of the continuity of this historical understanding of the state, in which the state sees itself in the role of a creator and guardian of morality, social order and stability. The principles of “governing the country with the help of morality” (yide zhiguo) and “governing the country with the help of law” (yifa zhiguo) remain the declared goals of the current political leadership as well. Xi Jinping also follows these principles when he explains that law represents morality cast in written form while morality allegorises internalised law. Both have to be applied – with guidance from the party (Xi Jinping 2019). As will be shown in Chapters 6 and 7, restoring morality and the social trust associated with it is currently one of the central tasks of the Chinese disciplining state. The Chinese “culture of moral compliance” has also played a major role in containing the recent Covid-19 pandemic. As Wang, Yan, and Boasson (2020, 505) argue: Chinese people have a rooted traditional culture to comply with authority and social rules and conform to public moral standards. When local governments began to implement social grid management (a thorough and systematic population control with screening of suspicious cases from the minimum unit of residence such as buildings, to an upper level such as communities or plots), the power of community-based organisation was tested. They used slogans such as . . . “staying at home is your contribution to the country” to persuade people on a moral level. Morality and Law In the feudal society, where most people’s fate was determined by birth, the difference between lawful and moral rightfulness, that is, between rights as legal and ethical principles and entitlements, was immaterial for most people. In China’s

State and Society in China 65 Confucianist tradition, law had a negative connotation because it came into play only when the traditional moral order (li, the rites) failed, whereas the Legalist school of the Warring States era (fifth to third century bce) valued fa as an instrument of government to uphold social order. Both were not easily compatible with European concepts of law in constitutional states. Despite the remarkable depth and speed of social, legal and political reforms in Meiji Japan (Ravina 2017), it therefore took some time for a general consciousness of this conceptual differentiation to develop. Because Confucianism was then associated with the old order, the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement was basically anti-Confucianist, but the intellectual heritage was difficult to shed entirely. The uncertainty is once again reflected in the translators’ search for terms that were suitable to communicate the ideas represented by the European concepts of right and law. In 2021, Chen Yixin, Secretary-General of the Political and Legal Commission of the CPC Central Committee for some years, explained the interrelatedness between law and morality in China in contrast to European notions that law and morality are connected in some way but are in principle independent spheres. Chen put it this way: Law is written morality, morality is inward law. Both law and morality have the function of regulating social behaviour and social relations in order to maintain social order. Both [law and morality] play a crucial role and function in the state’s governance system. On the one hand, it is necessary to strengthen the supporting role of morality in the context of the rule of law. Legislation, law enforcement, and judiciary have to embody the requirements of socialist morality . . . On the other hand, it is necessary to use the rule of law to solve outstanding problems in the ethical domain. (Chen 2021) Unlike in the West, law traditionally played a minor role in the Chinese conception of the state. Relations between people were primarily governed by the Confucian moral code. Criminal law was intended to sanction violations of the prevailing moral norms and thus remained subordinate to these norms. Social justice was to be achieved through mutual obligations, not by laws. In contrast to Western countries, relations between the people and the state were not defined on the basis of reciprocal rights and duties but in terms of moral obligations, social embeddedness and interdependence. Law professor Zhang Qianfan noted that Chinese legal thought assumed a “bipolarity of human nature”, that is, the existence of two categories of people. The elite of the virtuous and knowledgeable were destined to govern while the ignorant and morally inferior majority had to be governed (Zhang Qianfan 2013). Confucianism considered punishments to be unnecessary as long as the moral norms were observed. The application of law and legislation was not infrequently seen as a sign of decaying morality and decadence. As a result, distrust of rules, laws and contracts prevailed. Furthermore, the right of individuals, the legal institutionalisation of personal freedom, was neither discussed nor practised in law.

66  State and Society in China While European law focused on individuals and their legal protection, in China this meant – ideally – basic material provision and human dignity (“face”). Even today, its role as a moral state is central to the self-attribution of the state’s function. In the 19th century, the decline of the capacity of the Chinese state raised the question of what an effective state is, what it should be like, and what it should be able to do. In contrast to the European constitutional state, which is bound by independent law, the state in China was obliged to ensure the functioning of a (Confucian) moral order as the basis of a functioning polity. In this conception of the state, law played a subordinate role and came into play only when the state was no longer able to ensure morality. The moral function of the state and the prevalence of morality over the law are still relevant today. For instance, the current Chinese Constitution stipulates that: The state shall promote socialist cultural-ethical advancement through widely accessible education on ideals, morality, culture, discipline and law, and through the formulation and observance of different forms of rules of conduct and public pledges among different urban and rural populations . . . The state shall champion core socialist values; advocate the civic virtues of love for the motherland, for the people, for work, for science and for socialism; educate the people in patriotism and collectivism. (Constitution of the People’s Republic of China 2019, Article 24) The Constitution further emphasises as obligations of the people: “The state shall foster the all-round moral . . . development of young adults, youths and children” (ibid., Article 46), and “Citizens of the People’s Republic of China must . . . observe discipline in the workplace, observe public order, and respect social morality” (ibid., Article 53). State and Moral Economy Furthermore, the concept of “moral economy” was, and is, part and parcel of moral authority. This concept assumes that the core concern in peasant societies is the securing of subsistence and that in China peasants expected this to be guaranteed by the state as a core moral responsibility. If the state neglected this responsibility, rebellion was not uncommonly the consequence.22 Therefore, “subsistence ethics became a moral binding between the rulers and the ruled for thousands of years”, thus legitimising state power (Tong 2011, 151). The ethical component is already evident in the Chinese term for economy, which also travelled via Japan to China. The translation points to the special feature of assessing economic activities in China. Jingji or, in full, jingshi jimin, means to order the world and assist the people (Cihai 1979, 2664). At the start of the 20th century, economist Chen Huan-Chang defined Chinese economics as the science of managing wealth in accordance with the principles of justice and in the interests of the people living in a community (Chen 1974, vol. 1, 48–49; also Zheng and Huang 2018, 85–86). This definition illustrates that the traditional Chinese concept

State and Society in China 67 of economy is completely different from Western notions. Whereas the Western concept refers to household economy and thus to individual economic activities, the Chinese definition is much more strongly tied to the collective and its interests. The starting point for economic considerations was, and is, the collective, not the individual. Concurrently, more emphasis was placed on fairer distribution than on production. Rather than meaning that everyone receives the same amount of goods, fair distribution, in this context, means that everyone – within the framework of his or her social position – should have the same starting opportunities (Chen 1974, vol. 2, 460–64), whereby the income gap between the wealthy and the poor should not become too wide. It is the task of the state to ensure justice and equality to guarantee this type of social harmony. For that reason, the state has always intervened significantly in economic activities, and the economy was perceived as falling within the state’s sphere of responsibility. The state also had a duty to manage land ownership, grain distribution, the control of trade, markets and the interplay between supply and demand. The ethical component of Confucianism and the subordination of the individual to collective interests thus become apparent within the concept of economy. From a historical point of view, the dominance of the ethical over the economic sphere was an obstacle to free market-based economic development, especially since profit-making and commerce were negatively valued activities, and production development was strictly controlled by the state. Interestingly, many classical writings dealing with economic issues support a public economy and oppose any increase in private economic activities,23 a fact that has favoured socialist public ownership in more recent times. The Chinese State as a Developmental State With Disciplining Capacity China’s successful socio-economic process since the late 1970s and its relative stability have proved that the mere attribution of “authoritarian system” cannot explain why China’s pathway since the 1980s has been quite successful in generating economic development and social stability, widely eradicating absolute poverty and significantly improving the material life of the Chinese people. Western scholars of China have long debated why, unlike the socialist systems in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, China’s political system did not collapse in the late 1980s but remained comparatively stable despite all the dislocations. More than three decades after the urban protest movements of 1989, China seems to be more stable than in the 1980s. China’s success story cannot be explained by classifying it as an authoritarian system or one-party dictatorship. Most authoritarian states display little or no development at all. They are often “predatory states” or kleptocracies in which elites oppress and exploit the people. The political scientists Gandhi and Przeworski have therefore raised the question of why some autocrats survive for decades while others abdicate or are deposed after a short time (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007, 1279). The concept of the authoritarian state obviously contributes little to

68  State and Society in China the description, analysis and quality of institutions, mechanisms, structures and processes as complex as those in contemporary China. In this context, the question arises whether authoritarian rule possesses a different quality insofar as the majority of the people support this rule because its leadership enjoys authority due to its success in achieving national advancement, continuously improving living conditions for its people, safeguarding stability, national security and sustainable poverty reduction and so on. In that case, people may come to the conviction, based on their experience, that the ruling system successfully translates their interests into a political programme, that the leadership is forward-looking and knows what is best for the country and its people. Authority, credibility and legitimacy then arise when the people realise that their leadership is putting into practice what it has promised.24 The Chinese leadership is quite right in arguing that the party state has ensured that in the course of the reform process since 1978, the economy has grown continuously, education, housing, employment, healthcare and living standards for the 1.4 billion Chinese have steadily improved, and the population can live in peace. China has also made remarkable progress ecologically, socially and culturally. It has the largest middle class of all countries and by 2020 had announced that absolute poverty no longer existed.25 In order to be able to clarify, classify and understand the logic of the Chinese state, in the following sections we focus on the function and action of this state. In doing so, we refer to the concept of the “developmental state”. Developmental states are purpose-oriented and “strong” states. Political elites in such states are dedicated to a specific mission: modernising their nation and enhancing national prosperity and wealth. Firm resolve, consensus and commitment exist among the political and bureaucratic elites to bring about systematic, planned and effective economic development (no matter at what cost). Such states are capable of pushing through all-round development in a top-down manner, across all particularist interests and in the face of resistance. In addition, they must be able to enforce their policies on a nationwide scale. Achieving these goals requires effective state intervention in the economy, as well as monitoring and disciplining of the workforce. Such states are, therefore, also characterised by a close symbiosis of government and enterprises and the capacity to impose “discipline to economic behaviour” on enterprises and businessmen (Amsden 2001, 8; Heberer and Schubert 2020) as part of the developmental state’s disciplining power. Furthermore, developmental states have an efficient bureaucracy at their disposal which is constantly being professionalised and is capable of implementing policies in an effective way and ensuring political and social stability. Developmental states invest heavily in tertiary education, vocational training and research. At the same time, they exhibit a relatively high degree of independence from the influence of distinct interest groups. Without such autonomy, the state cannot exercise effective control over society, regulate social relations or discipline social forces in the interest of national development. Part of this concept is also a repressive attitude to potential opponents of developmental policies and objectives designed by the political elite. Thus, these states are, as a rule, authoritarian political entities. All in all, developmental states exhibit a high level of state capacity and regime legitimacy.

State and Society in China 69 Disciplining processes as part of modernising policies ultimately reinforce the capacity and power of the state (Haggard 2018; Kohli 2004; Woo-Cumings 1999; Heberer 2017; Heberer and Müller 2020). The concept of developmental states – developed by US political scientist Chalmers Johnson in the early 1980s (Johnson 1982) – was originally applied to Japan, later to the role of the modernising state in South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. In all cases, these were political entities in which the political elite pursued planned and successful development top-down and in an authoritarian manner, based on the rule of a unified organisation, be it a single-party system (as in Taiwan and Singapore) or a military dictatorship (South Korea). Even though there are differences between the “prototypes” of the East Asian Developmental State of the 1970s and 1980s, we contend that the economic dimension of China’s modernity project is neatly grasped by this concept and its implicit developmental ideology. Moreover, it offers a suitable framework for understanding the general logic, behaviour and action of the Chinese disciplining state led by the CPC. And it shows – recently, in the Chinese case – that authoritarian states can “mobilize the overwhelming majority of the population to work and sacrifice for developmental projects” (Haggard 2018, 47–48) and that disciplining the people is a significant feature of such states. We therefore argue that the concept of the developmental state is strongly linked to the issue of disciplining as a salient tool to accomplish modernising objectives. From a historical vantage point, the concept of the developmental state is also rooted in the evolution of Chinese political ideas. As Tu Weiming has noted, NeoConfucianism has continuously emphasised a proactive role of the state in relation to economic development, and state or government was always perceived as a “positive force for social stability” (Tu 2002b, 63–64). The philosopher and writer Liang Qichao (1873–1929), one of the most prominent intellectuals in the early 20th century, wrote at the start of the 20th century in Japanese exile that China’s development required a strong but at the same time enlightened and balancing authoritarian and disciplining political entity. China’s development could be rooted only in Chinese features and Chinese values and traditions. His viewpoint anticipated what today is called “socialism with Chinese characteristics” (see Levenson 1959, 41–51). Concerning public morals, Liang pointed out that – in his time – most Chinese people did not care much about national affairs but that morality was related to the fact that people recognise and espouse the interests of the nation and make them their own business. He even advocated a “morality revolution”.26 Liang’s remarks illustrate the group-relatedness of morality as a strong Chinese feature. In addition, he opposed both the idea of a separation of powers and any restrictions on state power by means of checks and balances because both aimed to limit the government’s scope of action and thus weakened its ability to enforce its policies. At the same time – in accordance with the Confucian doctrine – Liang was in favour of leadership by the political elite and opposed any kind of “government by the people” (Liang 1902–06, 1912). Only the elite, according to Liang, was capable of initiating and enforcing a modernising and nation-building process top-down. He argued that the Chinese people’s civilising level was rather low, a factor which

70  State and Society in China would negatively impact upon the country’s modernising trajectory. China’s traditional culture, Liang noted, had not spawned a modern society; therefore, the country could not advance in the direction of a civilised society (Liang 1902–06, 2005, 322–26). He was, however, convinced that a public morality and moral society could be built only on China’s traditional culture and ethics. Liang’s concept is reminiscent of the Singaporean theory of “neo-authoritarianism” popular in China in the 1980s and 1990s, that is the enforcement of economic, social and political modernisation by a strong and capable government. In a similar vein, the historian and philosopher Qian Mu (1895–1990) argued that the elite had a duty towards the nation and the people. He called for an instructional government (xunzheng) that should educate the people to become modernised. And, as noted earlier, Sun Yat-sen advocated a strong state, national renewal and a disciplinary dictatorship so as to educate and prepare people for modernisation. At the 19th Party Congress of the CPC in 2017, the Chinese government decided on a three-step road map for modernising China until 2049/2050: (1) by 2021: replacement of the quantitative growth model by a qualitative one, poverty eradication and creating a society with modest living standards (xiao kang); (2) by 2035: basic modernisation, becoming the world’s number one economic power and leadership in ten high-tech technologies; (3) by 2049/2050: becoming both a leading world power on a par with the United States and a “comprehensive modern society”. Achieving these goals is by no means an easy task. The leadership is determined to fulfil the 2050 mission, arguing that on the one hand, achieving these goals requires a “united and strong” party and a strong and competent leader. On the other hand, it would need both a disciplined contingent of cadres and disciplined, civilised and unified people. In this way – according to the party leadership – China can overcome various groups’ vested interests and ensure that everybody strives to contribute to the achievement of these national goals of rejuvenating the Chinese nation. In addition, to achieve these goals by 2050, the Chinese government has undertaken enormous efforts to “civilise” and “modernise” the behaviour and minds of the people – a further key target of the Chinese developmental state. In summary, the concept of the developmental state, including its social disciplining and civilising function, allows us to better understand the logic and objectives of the current Chinese state, the planned implementation of the aforementioned development goals and the application of disciplining power, that is harnessing disciplining mechanisms and policies to achieve these goals. As shown earlier, this concept has not accrued in a vacuum but has forerunners not only in the modernising case of Japan but also in China’s political thought and political environment in the early 20th century. This concept allows us to understand the objectives of the Chinese state, its planned implementation of these objectives and, at the same time, the use of repressive means and measures. Social scientist Kenichi Ohno described developing states as “authoritarian states with economic capacity” (Ohno 2013) and the political scientist Adrian Leftwich argued that such states stand out not only for successful development but also for political repression and lack of democracy

State and Society in China 71 (Leftwich 2000). According to Leftwich (1993, 614), it is not the character of a regime that is decisive but the “character of the state and its associated politics”. In low-­institutionalised states with a weak civil society, a strong state was needed to realise the goals of modernisation. And, in East Asia, these were usually authoritarian states. This illustrates that authoritarianism is not necessarily an obstacle to development, but under certain conditions and in the context of effective state capacity, it can set in motion an “authoritarian push for development”. The existence of effective development planning, its implementation, institutionalisation and adaptation in terms of institutional change say more about the functioning of a state than the mere attribute “authoritarian”. Notes 1 “Zhengzhi (Politics),” Baidu Encyclopedia, accessed July 2021, https://baike.baidu.com/ item/%E6%94%BF%E6%B2%BB/169778. 2 Ibid. 3 “Chapter 1: Politics and Political Thought,” Guoxue (Chinese National Culture), accessed July 2021, www.guoxue.com/xslz/zgzzsxqy/1z2j.htm. 4 Gernet (1987, xxiv) notes that zhi also conveys the meaning of social harmony and of a well-ordered political order in contrast to luan as a consistent state of disorder. 5 In a similar vein, Mahbubani (2020, 7) argued that “many objective Asian observers comprehend the CPC as a ‘Civilisation Party’ ” and less as a Communist one. 6 As Eberhard (1971) has highlighted, moral values play a symbolic role in Chinese folk ballads, temple decorations and even in Chinese people’s dreams. 7 According to Rawski (1979), it is likely that in the mid- and late 19th century, 30–45% of males and 2–10% of females knew how to read and write. 8 Sun founded the Chinese Revolutionary Alliance in Tokyo in 1905. Later, after the abdication of the Qing dynasty in 1912, he became the provisional first president of the Republic of China and the first leader of the Guomindang (Nationalist Party of China) after the end of the Qing dynasty in 1912. 9 This idea will be elaborated later in the context of the Chinese “developmental state”. 10 “Jiangsu shengwei sheng zhengfu diaochazu fabu ‘Feng County shengyu ba haizi nüzi’ ” (Investigation Team of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee and the Provincial Government Issued a Report on the Investigation and Handling of the ‘Incident of a Woman in Feng County Who Had Given Birth to Eight Children’), Xinhua Net, February 23, 2022, accessed July 2022, www.news.cn/politics/2022-02/23/c_1128407989.htm. 11 “Hebei Tangshan baoli shijian weihe zai Zhongguo wangluo yanshao yulun guanzhu naxie jiaodian? (Why Did the Violent Incident in Tangshan, Hebei, Ignite Public Opinion in China and What Is in the Focus of Public Opinion?),” June 13, 2022, accessed June 2022, www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-61784051. 12 Chengpeng Li, “Zhongguoren weishenme mei you anquangan? (Why Do Chinese People Have no Sense of Security?),” June 18, 2022, accessed June 2022, www.ntdtv.com/ gb/2022/06/19/a103459970.html. 13 Xinlu Liang, “China’s Tangshan City Stripped of ‘Civilised’ Status After Brutal Attack on Women Diners,” South China Morning Post, June 22, 2022, accessed July 2022, www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3182673/chinas-tangshan-city-stripped-civilisedstatus-after-brutal-attack-women; “Tangshan ‘quanguo wenming chengshi’ zige bei tingzhi (Tangshan’s ‘National Civilized City’ Qualification Suspended),” June 23, 2022, accessed June 2022, www.sohu.com/a/560258395_120161493. 14 S. Cheng (2014, 188) refers to the Shangshu (300 bce), the classical “Book of Documents,” and cites the Tang scholar Kong Yingda who interpreted wenming in this way: “Wen designates the ability to engage the order of the cosmos, ming the ability to enlighten

72  State and Society in China the world”. Cheng further notes: “The fact that ming . . . in wenming means ‘light’ and ‘shine’ was perhaps one reason why wenming was adopted as a translation for ‘civilization’, closely linked . . . to the ideologies of the Enlightenment” (Cheng 2014, 189). 15 On Japanese loanwords and their impact on China in general, see Dong 2000; Liu and Gao 1984; Zhao Jian 2006 and Jin and Liu 2009. 16 “Zuo Chuan Huan Gong ernian,” accessed January 2022, https://ctext.org/chun-qiuzuo-zhuan/huan-gong-er-nian. 17 Baidu, “Jilü,” accessed January 2022, https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E7%BA%AA%E 5%BE%8B/4477. 18 Pye (1981, 126) has emphasised the perseverance of the state’s function regarding morality education: “In the politics of both Communist and Confucian China, the power required for governance is supposed to be primarily dedicated to uplifting the moral qualities of the populace, suppressing all tendencies of parochial self-interest.” 19 Tu (1996, 231) called such a system “ethocracy”, that is creating an order that was based not only on moral behaviour by the elite but also on the state’s obligation to take care of the people’s moral education and provide welfare and livelihoods for them. 20 However, within China we find moral complexity and variations within classes, urban and rural populations and ethnicities. In addition, overlapping patterns of morality and moral behaviour exist. On morality, for example in rural areas, see Madsen 1986 or Stafford 2013. 21 We argue that civilising, a term widely used for disciplining processes in China, is one crucial aspect of social disciplining. Whereas discipline relates primarily to a top-down process in which an entire society is educated to compliance, finally internalising general norms and rules, civilising is more related to social behaviour imposed by the elite and finally absorbed by the lower classes with regard to modernity. Since civilising is the predominant term in China, we use both terms, disciplining and civilising, in this book. 22 See Scott 1976; Li Yining 2015. Li connected moral economy more strongly to the need for market regulation by the state. 23 See Böhme 1926, 32, 53, who discusses this topic in relation to the ideas of Mencius and Guanzi. 24 Yinxian Zhang (2022), however, points to another component of regime legitimacy, calling it “passive political legitimacy”. The meaning is that disillusionment regarding Western democracy among Chinese people has increased during the Xi Jinping era, not only due to strict online censorship and anti-Western propaganda but also as a result of developments in Western countries, for example the policies of Trump in the United States, the outcome of the Western mission in Afghanistan, the handling of the Covid19 pandemic in Western countries and Western anti-China media reports that reinforced popular support for the Chinese government. 25 Xinhua News, “China Has Lifted Nearly 800 Million People Out of Poverty,” April 6, 2021, accessed June 2022, www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-04/06/c_139862741.htm; The World Bank, “Lifting 800 Million People Out of Poverty – New Report Looks at Lessons from China’s Experience,” April 1, 2022, accessed June 2022, www.­worldbank. org/en/news/press-release/2022/04/01/lifting-800-million-people-out-of-poverty-newreport-looks-at-lessons-from-china-s-experience. 26 More on this issue: Pusey 1981.

5

Disciplining Efforts During Early Modernising in the 19th and 20th Centuries

Christian Disciplining Efforts and Kang Youwei’s Attempt to Transform Confucianism Into a Religion The Jesuits and other Christian missionaries who first arrived in China pursued the objective of civilising and educating the Chinese people (Kuo 2013, 240–41). They propagated the “advanced European model” of civilising and attempted to make it more comprehensible and acceptable to Chinese people.1 The Jesuits called the Pope jiaohua wang (教化王),2 that is the “king of transformative education”, thus indicating that there were similarities between Catholicism and Confucianism. Many missionaries tried to convince the Chinese people that the backwardness of China on the one hand and the “modernity” of the “West” on the other illustrated that the Christian doctrine was superior to Confucianism. The American Presbyterian missionary William A.P. Martin (1827–1916), for instance, wrote: “Despite its correctness and beauty, in the final analysis [Confucianism, T.H.] does not represent the perfect completion of jiao” (教), that is education (op. cit. in Kuo 2013, 245). He saw in Christianity the force that could realise the “civilising mission” of Confucianism (Kuo, ibid., 246).3 Missionaries attempted to spread not only the gospel but also Western “modern life” among the Chinese.4 Later on, the Guomindang attempted to harness Christian missionaries to support the civilising process by promoting Christian morality specifically in rural areas (Thomson 1969; OldstoneMoore 2002, 120–28). The defeats against Great Britain and France in the two Opium Wars, the “unequal treaties” with foreign powers that followed, the increasing interference by these powers in internal Chinese affairs, the Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864) and its moral and social vision and not least the defeat in the Chinese–Japanese War of 1894/1895 made it clear that there was a massive need for reform and modernisation in China, with the core problem being seen in the antiquated character of the political system. The Taiping Rebellion, the costliest civil war in the history of mankind, claiming 20–30 million lives, was a religious, political and social movement against both the Qing dynasty and the moral decay of society. It represented and was born out of the deprived strata of society, the underprivileged and disadvantaged sections of the population and those who were oppressed and discriminated against DOI: 10.4324/9781003353065-5

74  Disciplining Efforts in China During Early Modernising (among them many people from ethnic minorities) by the central government. The movement’s charismatic leader Hong Xiuquan (1814–1864), who was influenced by Christian belief, created a religious worldview, a synthesis of Confucian, Daoist, Buddhist and Christian concepts (Shih 1967; Boardman 1951) and called for a new social and moral order. In the first part of the Taiping Imperial Declaration, titled Ode on the Original Path of Salvation, Hong noted that people who committed adultery, murder, theft and robbery, engaged in witchcraft and gambling or were lacking in filial piety were “wicked” and should immediately free themselves from this evil behaviour (Shih 1967; Wei 2014). The document also addressed the issue of universal principles, precepts and correct social conduct. The second section of the Declaration (“Ode on the Correct Conduct”, Bai zheng ge) is concerned with standards of behaviour and social norms. The Declaration notes, for example: If one is not upright, calamity will fall upon him as a result of his accumulated evil deeds; If one is upright, happiness will be his due as the result of his accumulated good deeds. If the nobles are not upright, one day they will become oppressed; If the rich are not upright, one day they will be swallowed up by others.5 Hong’s ideas about social norms clearly mirror Confucian notions of morality. The Taiping Rebellion was crushed by the Chinese government with the help of Britain and France in 1864. However, the movement’s ambitions and objectives had, and still have, a strong impact on China’s further development trajectory (see Jen 1973; Spence 1996). The political philosopher Kang Youwei interpreted Confucianism in a different way. Unlike many of his contemporaries, he saw in Confucius not a backward-­ oriented philosopher but a reformer who intended to adapt the institutions of the state to accommodate the changes that were taking place.6 Kang argued that if Confucius were still alive, he would certainly try to reform the existing political and economic system. For Kang, Confucianism was a prophetic doctrine of modernity that had just to be “purified”. He applied this not only to China but to the whole world and to humanity in general.7 Confucian doctrine should be converted into a religion and could thus offer an alternative to Western Christianity, although he saw a close connection between Christianity on the one hand and the imperialist behaviour of Western powers on the other. Kang believed that Confucianism could contribute to the creation of a new Chinese identity, the moral education and civilising of the Chinese people and the development of a social morality (gong de) and thus reinforce the strength of the nation.8 Kang’s principal idea was that the existence of a national, Confucian religion would not only facilitate the Chinese people’s identification with such a religion but also create a social force that could cultivate a new morality and moral education, thus civilising the Chinese and “compete with Christianity for the hearts and the minds of the Chinese people” (Tay 2010, 104). His model was the Christian

Disciplining Efforts in China During Early Modernising 75 church in Western countries, which Kang saw as a strong force for moral education, something he comprehended as a moral mission (Tay 2010, 105). Japanese Influence on Early Chinese Modernising Efforts For millennia, Japan was eager to learn from China’s worldview and belief systems. During the Tang (617–907) and Song dynasties, Japan sent students to China to learn about Chinese philosophies, Buddhism and morality. This changed with Japan’s rapid modernisation process in the late 19th century. In contrast to China, Japan had already decided relatively early in this century to learn from the West (see Chapter 3) and gain insights into its technical prowess, military training, education system and pedagogy. During the “Self-Strengthening Movement” (1861–1895), China sent groups of students for education to the United States and recruited Western technicians, engineers and advisers. However, the movement relied too much upon Western technology (Qu 2016). Only after the defeat against Japan did China begin to rethink this approach. Prior to the Sino-Japanese War (1894/1895), Chinese literati and officials disdained the Japanese. They regarded Japan as an inferior country and spurned Japan’s “copying” of Western patterns of modernity. After the defeat in the war against Japan, and in the course of the national reform efforts by Chinese intellectuals and the young Emperor Guang Xu (1871–1908), the conviction prevailed that it was necessary to learn from the advanced Japanese example and its successful combination of indigenous traditions with modern Western knowledge. In the context of the reform efforts, Kang Youwei formulated the memorandum “A Study of Japan’s Political Change” (Riben bianzheng kao9) in which he presented Japan as a role model and submitted practical reform proposals to the emperor, thus influencing his willingness to embrace reforms. In a similar vein, Zhang Zhidong (1837–1909), one of the most prominent reformers and leading officials in the late Qing period, formulated the “Chinese-style modernising paradigm”, “adopting Western knowledge for its practical uses while keeping Chinese values as the core” (Zhong ti Xi yong). He proposed to the emperor that while sustaining the focus on (Confucian) morality in education, there should be concurrent teaching of foreign technological knowledge, Western ideas and both the social and the natural sciences (Chang 2004). Due to the intervention of Empress Dowager Ci Xi (1835–1908) and conservative forces, the 1898 reform movement was crushed. Its intellectual leaders fled to Japan or were executed. One of the prominent intellectuals executed, Yang Shenxiu, had declared to the emperor: “If China wants to study abroad easily, it must start from Japan” (op. cit. in Lei Yei 2013). At the end of the 19th and in the early 20th century, many young Chinese admired Japan, because it had just won the wars with China (1894/1895) and Russia (1904/1905) – the latter the first defeat of a Western by an Eastern power. Particularly after the failure of the reform movement and due to domestic stagnation,

76  Disciplining Efforts in China During Early Modernising Chinese intellectuals flocked to Japan in their thousands, where they witnessed the formation of a modern constitutional national state and various institutional changes which, in Weberian terms, could be called “bureaucratic rationalisation”. These young people wished to turn China into a modern nation. Mediated by Chinese exiles, some of these sociopolitical innovations too had an impact on China’s civilising processes. Many of the activists involved in the (failed) “Hundred Days’ Reform” of 1898, including Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao and Zhang Taiyan, also fled to Japan to escape execution. Political opponents of imperial power such as, most prominently, the later Chinese president Sun Yatsen and founding members of his political party, as well as Chiang Kai-shek were also exiled in Japan. Sun’s successor Chiang Kai-shek, for example, underwent four years of military training there. The exiles continued their political work in Japan and at the same time became familiar with Japanese modernising and civilising concepts and programmes during the Meiji Reforms. They moreover gained access to Japanese translations of Western theoretical works on economic, social and political modernisation (Wang 1931, 108–14; Schneider 2017b, 91). Just a few years later, the Chinese imperial court and the government realised that reforms were inevitable if China was to catch up with the modern world and that Japan could figure as a role model for China’s modernity. Even Ci Xi, who controlled the Chinese government in the late Qing dynasty, sent study groups to Japan and Western countries to plan for a Chinese constitution, and one particular mission to Japan suggested after its return that China should follow the Japanese development model (Pye 1997, 206). The Chinese government now increasingly sent fact-finding missions to Japan to learn about its reforms in education, administration, military training and the judicial system and to adopt these reforms and implement them in China (Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig 1973, 631–33). Once again, large numbers of Chinese went to Japan to study, some on Chinese scholarships, others funding themselves. Admonishing Chinese students to behave according to Japanese etiquette may have figured as a disciplining effect on Chinese students and their (future) behaviour. Guidance for Chinese students on appropriate etiquette during their stay in Japan included the following points: Don’t spit just anywhere. Don’t urinate just anywhere. Don’t overshoot the toilet when urinating or defecating. Don’t greet friends noisily on the street, and don’t just stand around talking. Don’t go around naked, even in the heat of the summer. At exhibitions, don’t keep asking the price of things. Don’t ask people’s age. Don’t read over people’s shoulders. Don’t rummage through others’ things. In a room, sit still – don’t fidget or shuffle around. When entering or leaving a room, bow. Close the doors behind you.

Disciplining Efforts in China During Early Modernising 77 Don’t chew or suck on ice. Don’t eat off the tatami mats after food has spilled. Keep your rooms neat and clean. Don’t be noisy at night. Don’t fool around with the maids.10 Concurrently, Japanese teachers and advisers were invited to China, where Japanese schools for Chinese students spread rapidly. This exchange, the resulting access to Japanese books and Japanese translations of Western works and the translations of large numbers of these works into Chinese strengthened the influence of modernising ideas, experiences and concepts not only from the West but especially from Japan. Translations of Japanese textbooks also contributed to this process. Between 1898 and 1911, at least 25,000 Chinese attended schools or studied in Japan (Abe 1987; Reynolds 1993, 42; see also Huang 1982). A crucial point in adopting the Japanese education system was the role of Confucian ideas within it. The “Imperial Reform Edict”, for example, conveyed a Confucian concept of morality education that met Chinese expectations, combining indigenous moral values and Western mental, physical and technological education and training. Or, as Abe Hiroshi puts it: “the unique Japanese style of education, combining a moral education that emphasised Confucian thoughts with modern sciences, appeared to be an ideal model for China.”11 As early as 1904, a new educational objective was defined by the imperial government: “knowledge needed in daily life, and of inculcating in them (citizens) the fundamental principle of social relationships and patriotic duties”. The new Chinese school system was redesigned and aligned to the Japanese model after the abolition of the imperial civil service examinations in 1905. This model attracted special attention in China because it combined Western knowledge with East Asian social and moral concepts. Japanese education since the Meiji period had aimed to educate young people to serve the nation and to adhere to traditional (“Confucian”) moral standards and values such as piety and hierarchical social classification, with an emphasis on students’ moral education, especially in elementary schools (Wang 1931; Tsujimoto and Yamasaki 2018; Duke 2009, 47–60). This canon of values, formulated and issued by Japanese Emperor Meiji in 1890 as the Imperial Rescript on Education, articulated the guiding policy principles of education.12 It remained essentially determinative until 1945 and was part and parcel of the Japanese social disciplining project. In 1906, a further aim of education was formulated: “Loyalty to the emperor, dedication to public welfare, utility, patriotism to the country” (Wang 1931, 68–69). In school education, ethics and Confucian classics still played a primary role, along with respect for the absolute authority of the principals and teachers, obedience, the introduction of military discipline as a standard of school discipline, military drill and wearing school uniforms. These educational goals were strongly oriented towards Japanese educational principles and objectives. Even after the 1911/1912 revolution, which abolished the Qing dynasty, Minister of Education Cai Yuanpei defined educational objectives that remained close to late Qing and Japanese

78  Disciplining Efforts in China During Early Modernising definitions: “to give emphasis to moral education, to supplement it with military and utilitarian education, and to complete the process of character-building with aesthetic education”. People should devote their lives to national interests, and education was regarded as a “disciplinary process” (Wang, ibid., 131–39). Similarly, military training and the military system, which Japan had modelled on Germany, and the police, prisons and the judicial system were all reformed along Japanese lines. Discipline was an important issue in this process. Not only was German military discipline adopted. The new responsibilities of the police now also included tasks such as control of hygiene standards in the food industry and public toilets, forms of burial, relief for the poor (soup kitchens) and the operation and supervision of workhouses for prisoners. Disciplining matters impacted “almost every side of the life of the people”. Even the Japanese name for the police (jingcha) was adopted.13 And in 1904 the Chinese Minister Yang Shu praised Japanese military education since it taught “loyalty, patriotism, and obedience to superior officers”,14 that is it contributed to reinforcing social discipline and protecting public order. The aforementioned philosopher and writer Liang Qichao, who lived in Japan for more than a decade, is a good example of how both Japanese and Western thought (in Japanese translation) were conveyed to China. The necessity of creating “new citizens”, “a modern citizenry”, a national, civic morality complementing a private one (Fogel 2004b; Naoki 2004), nation-building, forging a national language as a “sine qua non of modernity”, female education and the abolition of foot-binding were widely discussed ideas at the time (Fogel 2004b; Hiroko 2004). Liang was inspired by Japan’s Meiji Reforms as a role model of modernisation, as were Kang Youwei, Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, among others (Zarrow 2004). They were also impressed by the idea of the state as the basis and guarantor of the nation as developed by Swiss lawyer and politician Johann Caspar Bluntschli15 (1808–1881), which was intensely discussed in Japan. Along these lines, Liang argued that China needed unity and order more than liberty and equality (Bastid-Bruguière 2004). Through Liang’s translations of Japanese and Western books, the Meiji Reforms as well as Western concepts of modernity and the role of the state had a lasting influence on China’s disciplining and civilising processes (see Levenson 1959; Hao 1971; Huang 1972; Fogel 2004a). One of the most influential Japanese thinkers on modernisation and civilisation was the writer, teacher and translator Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835–1901). His work “An Outline of a Theory of Civilization” (Bunmei ron no gairyaku) had a significant impact on Chinese thinkers at the end of the 19th century (see Fukezawa 2008; Seifert 2021). Fukuzawa was an early advocate of the reform and modernisation process in Japan and strongly influenced the reforms during the Meiji period. He particularly emphasised the role of education, learning and science as drivers of Western modernisation. He argued that education would make people behave more virtuously. His ideas and the description of the three stages of primitive, semicivilised and civilised societies had a lasting influence on Chinese thinkers of his time, such as Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao. Fukuzawa’s ideas on the creation

Disciplining Efforts in China During Early Modernising 79 of a “spiritual civilisation”, which were embraced not least by Liang, have had an enduring influence up to the present day.16 Decades later, in the 1920s and 1930s, Japan still organised study tours for Chinese officials, introducing them to the role of compulsory primary education as a means of disciplining and teaching orderly behaviour to the populace as a whole. Moreover, Japanese teachers were invited to teach in China and to instruct teachers on matters relating to disciplining education (Vogel and Harrell 2019). But there are also reports about a lack of discipline among Japanese teachers at Japanese schools in China. For instance, Japanese headmasters adopted codes of conduct for Japanese teachers, such as “no drinking on school premises; no whoring in town; and no wearing of Japanese clothing and geta (wooden clogs), to avoid offending the Chinese” (Reynolds 1993, 77). During that period, Japanese teachers and educational instructors could be found in every Chinese province and at every educational level, even in vocational schools and colleges (see e.g. Wang 2014). This wide coverage of modern Japanese education had a crucial impact on the minds of young Chinese trained by Japanese teachers at home and returning Chinese students who were later employed in China’s administration or education system and shaped the reforms in the military, police, judiciary, prisons and other institutional systems (see Reynolds 1993). Japan’s increasingly aggressive policies and invasions during and after the First World War and later during the Chinese Resistance towards the Japanese Aggression in China (1937–1945) finally ended the Chinese inclination to learn from Japan. Reynolds (1993, 5) describes the end of the 19th century and the early 20th century as the “Golden Decade” in Sino-Japanese relations, even though Japan’s support for China’s institutional modernisation efforts was certainly shaped by its own interests in gaining influence and opportunities for expansion. Indeed, a “Japan fever” (Riben re) developed during this period in China, with a corresponding “China fever” (shina netsu) in Japan (Reynolds, ibid., 35). There were several reasons for this “Japan fever”: (a) Japan was a neighbouring country, which kept the costs of studying low and made travel easy; (b) the similarities between the two scripts made it easier for the Chinese to learn Japanese; (c) the two countries’ cultural proximity facilitated the adoption of Western modernising patterns, especially since they had already undergone a process of Japanisation and were in accord with the Chinese intention of “Chinese spirit and Western techniques” as the basic tenet of modernisation. As van Fleet (2021) has shown, returnees from Japan also had great influence on the early phase of the CPC. Four of the 13 founding members of the Communist Party (1921) had spent extended periods studying in Japan, including some of the Party’s founding fathers such as Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao. Yang Changji, who had also lived for extended periods in Japan, was Mao’s teacher at Hunan First Normal University. He played a major role in shaping Mao’s image of Japan. And the prominent writers Lu Xun and Guo Moruo, early cultural figureheads of the CPC, had also spent years in Japan.

80  Disciplining Efforts in China During Early Modernising The “New Life Movement” of the 1930s At the end of the 19th century and in the first half of the 20th century, we find various efforts to discipline and civilise China, predominantly in urban areas. The so-called study societies (xuehui)17 during the late Qing period can be understood as a movement aimed at civilising and disciplining Chinese society based on Confucianism (Chen 2017). Military and physical education (“military citizenship”) were thought of as crucial elements of civilising, disciplining and nation-building processes (ibid., 128–35). Taking Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan Province in southwest China, as a case study, Wang Di (2003) explained, for example, that in the first half of the 20th century, street supervisors and district supervisors were appointed, accompanied by the issuing of strict behavioural codes. This was supposed to introduce “civilisation” and control public behaviour. In reality, it brought about new forms of social control and urban administration. In the aftermath of these changes, many tasks which were formerly incumbent upon the guilds and temple associations as charitable organisations were transferred to the police. Strict traffic rules and regulations for merchants, the organisation of markets and public hygiene were issued. Gambling, prostitution and mendicancy were forbidden, and a rigid moral code was introduced. Popular culture and leisure habits were also subject to strict controls, that is a new type of orderly and productive urban community was promoted (Wang Di 2003, 132–35; Stapleton 2000). In the 1920 and 1930s, a discourse arose among Chinese intellectuals on a new “cultural construction” and creating a “spiritual civilisation” in a “Chinese way”. The First World War and its outcome signified that following a “Western” path of development was apparently no longer an option for the country. President Chiang Kai-shek dismissed the idea of “Westernisation” and endorsed the notion of constructing a specific new Chinese morality based on China’s own traditions (see Motoh 2013). In 1930, he also lamented the “moral decay” of the Chinese people and called for a return to the “virtues of the ancestors” (Schlomann and Friedlingstein 1976, 68). His principal aim was to revive China’s “ancient virtues” and to apply them to modernising society. Without people with a modern mindset and behaviour, China could not be modernised (see e.g. Tong 1953, 153). These “efforts to educate, to transform morally and militarise” were summed up by Chiang in the term wenming (see Chapter 3), civilising (Oldstone-Moore 2002, 175), as a clear-cut disciplining programme. With regard to school education, new textbooks propagating “modern” and “civilised” behaviour were introduced at the end of the 1920s. New behavioural and moral standards, civic values and a willingness to sacrifice one’s life for the nation were to be disseminated through Boy Scout organisations, military training which started in kindergarten and other social activities. Concurrently, the Guomindang introduced “party doctrine courses” to teach the Guomindang party’s policies and history in schools and higher learning institutions (Culp 2002, 51–55). Courses on “party ideology” (dangyi) focused on the life of society and social values, morality and personal conduct, that is on all facets of public behaviour (Oldstone-Moore 2002, 163).

Disciplining Efforts in China During Early Modernising 81 In a book on curriculum standards published in 1935, it was noted that when teaching civic behaviour and values, teachers should pay attention to ensuring that their students “abide by social discipline”.18 “Selfish desires”, that is putting oneself or one’s family above the interests of the collective or the nation, should be criticised, and teachers should encourage students to improve their moral character, pay attention to a well-kept appearance, be polite towards others, contribute to societal development, etc. so as to “advance the social whole”.19 In addition, textbooks propagated Confucian ethics to develop a new moral order (Culp 2002, 65–69). The “New Life Movement” (Xin shenghuo yundong) initiated by Chiang in 1934 rested upon Sun Yat-sen’s conviction that China needed three steps for its national regeneration and modern nation-building process: (1) restoration of the nation’s political unity and central state power by military rule and martial law; (2) political education of the people by a tutelage government during a transitional period to enable them to exert their citizenship rights; and (3) introduction of a constitutional government (Sun 1918). There is no doubt that Sun was inspired by his experiences in Japan. In 1934, China was again united and centralised, and Chiang wanted to move to the second stage of Sun’s suggested steps, that is the process of educating and disciplining the Chinese people and strengthening their patriotism and loyalty to the nation. A Declaration for Cultural Construction on a Chinese Basis, supported by a major group of intellectuals, advocated that China had to develop its own path to modernisation – one which differed from Western concepts and development trajectories (Motoh 2013, 36–38; Yamada 2017). From the vantage point of development based on China’s characteristics, this approach is not unlike the concept championed by the CPC and its various leaderships nowadays.20 Although the “New Life Movement” was also about counterbalancing Communist influence and spreading Western notions of appropriate conduct (Ferlanti 2010, 963–81, 2012), it was primarily aimed at “modernising” the minds and behaviour of the Chinese people by means of disciplining and at creating a new morality based on a mixture of behavioural standards and traditional Confucian values.21 As such, it was part of nation- and state-building efforts reminiscent of the Meiji Reforms in the 1880s and 1890s in Japan. In his New Year message in 1930, Chiang bemoaned the moral decline of the Chinese people and called for the revitalisation of the ancestors’ virtues (Tong 1953, 155). In his 1934 speech to an audience of 50,000 people in Nanchang, Jiangxi Province, he explained his concept and the purpose of this movement: The general psychology of our people today can be described as spiritless. What manifests itself in behaviour is this: lack of discrimination between good and evil. Between what is public and what is private . . . Because there is no discrimination between good and evil, right and wrong are confused; because there is no discrimination between public and private, improper taking and giving [of public funds] occur .  .  . as a result, officials tend to be dishonest and avaricious, the masses are undisciplined and calloused, youth become degraded and intemperate, adults are corrupt and ignorant, the rich become extravagant and luxurious, and the poor become mean and

82  Disciplining Efforts in China During Early Modernising disorderly. Naturally it has resulted in disorganisation of the social order and national life . . . As a preliminary, we must acquire the habits of orderliness, cleanliness, simplicity, frugality, promptness, and exactness. We must preserve order, emphasise organisation, responsibility and discipline. (Jiang 1934) According to Chiang, this movement should be guided by four values of Confucian morality: Li (regulated attitude), Yi (right conduct), Lian (clear discrimination) and Chi (real self-awareness) (Chiang 1934) or simply by ritual, duty, honesty and shame (Pitstick 2013, 3). Later, these values were fleshed out by the so-called eight qualities: orderliness (zhengqi), cleanliness (qingjie), simplicity (jiandan), frugality (pusu), promptness (xunsu), precision (queshi), harmoniousness (hexie) and severity (yansu) (The New Life Movement 2013). According to Chiang, these principles and values should be applied to everyday life, including in relation to food, clothing, shelter and action and should govern every aspect of human and social behaviour and self-cultivation. Disciplining (jilühua) should be achieved by military training (Jiang 1934; Chiang 1934). Just like Mao, Chiang held the opinion that the military should figure as a role model for disciplining society, not unlike Japan in the 1930s and 1940s. Everywhere, according to Chiang, in the family, the factory and the government office, regardless of place, time or situation, everyone’s activities must be the same as in the army . . . In other words, there must be obedience, sacrifice, strictness, cleanliness, accuracy, diligence, secrecy . . . and everyone together must firmly and bravely sacrifice everything for the group and for the nation.22 In principle, this movement can be conceived of as the first government-led disciplining programme to achieve modernity and may be considered part of the modernising process envisaged by Chiang (Liu 2013). The Guomindang government announced 96 rules, which were a mixture of good social and individual behaviour, correct “modern” etiquette and public order, with 21 items to be implemented. They covered a range of topics: from keeping one’s clothes clean and avoiding making sounds when eating, to punctuality, literacy education, working and learning, cleanliness and hygiene, waste treatment, nature conservation, tree planting and tackling opium use and gambling (OldstoneMoore 2002, 77–79; Ishimaru 1938, 158; Tong 1953, 154–64). Eastman, in turn, mentions 11 items relating to individual conduct and hygiene, probably borrowed from Western forms of etiquette: Don’t smoke or eat when walking! Keep to the left when walking! Look straight ahead! Don’t recklessly throw away garbage! Don’t go whoring or gambling! Keep your buttons buttoned!

Disciplining Efforts in China During Early Modernising 83 Sit up straight! Don’t make noise when drinking! Don’t quarrel or fight with others! Don’t interrupt others when they are speaking! Be prompt!23

Figure 5.1 Poster of the “New Life Movement” in the 1930s: “When crossing the street be mindful of the traffic light” Source: Ishimaru, Foo T. 1938. Chiang Kaishek ist groß. Hankow and Shanghai: Cheng Chung-Verlag, 153.

84  Disciplining Efforts in China During Early Modernising Chiang’s idea was that changes in personal behaviour would alter public attitudes and hence encourage national reform, as had occurred in Europe and Japan. According to Eastman, he “recalled his student days in a Japanese military academy, convinced that the moral fiber of the cadets had been strengthened by the rigorous observance of barracks discipline” (Eastman 1976, 202). The “New Life” mass campaign commenced in Nanchang (capital of Jiangxi Province) in 1934. The city was selected as a model city for the programme. The authorities launched a clean-up campaign, with posters, lectures and public rallies helping to mobilise the “masses”. Volunteers were asked to inspect homes and living quarters and to encourage people to comply with the rules of cleanliness, hygiene and order (see Averill 1981). Although apparently successful in Nanchang, the campaign did not work well in other localities, particularly rural areas. It remained a largely urban movement, mainly against spitting, smoking and littering (Thomson 1969, 158–59). In addition, critics complained that the campaign was primarily aimed at ordinary people without combatting the lifestyle and corruption of Guomindang officials. A further criticism was that China’s main problems were not bad habits and lack of morality but extreme poverty among the Chinese people and that this problem could not be solved by moralistic efforts. And when developing the New Life Movement, Chiang had argued that the campaign would “end beggary, robbery, corruption and dishonesty” (Oldstone-Moore 2002, 130–33) but offered no plan for achieving these goals. Ultimately, the movement was not a success, for several reasons. It failed since its focus was on moralistic goals, combatting decadence and changing the behaviour and habits of the masses, not on improving people’s livelihoods or the country’s economic development. Or – as James C. Thomson (ibid., 158) noted – it was a movement “built on the toothbrush, the mouse trap, and the fly swatter”. Furthermore, in the context of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and resistance to it, this campaign lost its significance. The Japanese invasion led to a shift in national priorities: the objectives formulated by the Chiang government were too abstract and not well understood by ordinary people, the recourse to Confucian values was not attractive for intellectuals, and finally, the government was not effective in mobilising public support but attempted to enforce its programme in a top-down manner.24 Additionally, as Weller (1999, 45) argues, “an uncivil state is in a weak position to promote civility”. Interestingly, there are some striking and intriguing similarities between the objectives and principles of the “New Life Movement” and the CPC’s civilising projects after 1949, including the current ones. Arif Dirlik summarised these similarities as follows: The most pronounced resemblance concerned the relationship of individual behavior to society and polity. Despite crucial differences in premises and methods arising from broader underlying differences in social and political philosophy, the New Life Movement hoped to create a new Chinese bearing many

Disciplining Efforts in China During Early Modernising 85 of the attributes of the ideal Communist in the literature of the sixties . . . And in both instances, the military man – totally dedicated to voluntaristic action in the service of organizational goals – provided the paradigm of the good citizen . . . It shared with Communist-led mass movements the goal of fashioning a citizenry responsive to national needs, willing to endure hardship for the good of society, and ready to exert the maximum effort for the advancement of national progress. (Dirlik 1975, 976) The movement was also aimed at “civilising” rural areas since the peasants were depicted as an “uncivilised mass” that undermined the endeavour to develop a modern nation-state. The book Nongmin de xin shenghuo (New Life for Peasants), published in 1934 and cited by Sara L. Friedman, described peasants as “dissolute (langman), lazy (landuo), decrepit (tuitang), dirty (wuhui), insincere (fuyan), deceptive (guizha), debased (beiwu), crafty (yinxian), [and] hypocritical (xuwei)”. These backward, uncivilised people had to be disciplined and civilised (Friedman 2002, 157). Friedman describes the case of rural Fujian Province in the 1930s and 1940s to portray the implementation of the New Life policies, which focused on the abandoning of early marriage, female footbinding, extravagant funerary customs and other “backward customs” while at the same time propagating orderliness, cleanliness and other “civilised” patterns of behaviour (Friedman 2002, 162–69). In 1966, during his incumbency as president of the Republic of China in Taiwan, Chiang launched a “Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement” (Zhonghua wenhua fuxing yundong) for the island that tied in with the “New Life Movement” and aimed to improve educational standards and foster good customs, morals and civilised conduct, as well as philanthropy among wealthy people (Wang Shou-Nan 1987; Bodenhorn 2002; Chen 2008; Culp 2006; Schak 2009). Many of the “civilised values” and behavioural rules promoted in the 1930s such as “Don’t spit”, “Be punctual”, “Kill flies and rats” and “Cleanliness prevents diseases” (Schlomann and Friedlingstein 1976, 69) are reminiscent of the Mao era and are still promoted today. Disciplining Tools During the Mao Era In his writings before 1949, Mao was primarily concerned with discipline in two ways: (1) intra-party discipline; (2) discipline among the CPC’s armed forces. Regarding the first issue, he pointed out the need for all party members to behave according to the CPC’s disciplinary standards (“democratic centralism”, see footnote 49) to prevent factionalism, splitting and destruction.25 Second, when the Chinese “People’s Liberation Army” began to conquer cities in the course of the civil war, Mao wanted to ensure that they presented a positive image to the urban population, namely as a highly disciplined “fighting force of the people”. In 1947, he therefore issued the “Three Main Rules of Discipline” and

86  Disciplining Efforts in China During Early Modernising the “Eight Points for Attention” that already successfully had been applied in rural areas: Three main rules of discipline (1) Obey orders in all your actions. (2) Don’t take a single needle or piece of thread from the masses. (3) Turn in everything captured. Eight Points for Attention (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Speak politely. Pay fairly for what you buy. Return everything you borrow. Pay for anything you damage. Don’t hit or swear at people. Don’t damage crops. Don’t take liberties with women. Don’t ill-treat captives.26

Military discipline, imposed on society as a whole and ultimately tailored to individuals, remained determinant for his era and the campaign politics associated with it. By no means did Mao oppose modernisation per se. He certainly intended to “catch up” with the industrialised countries. However, this was not to be achieved by imitating one specific model but rather by pursuing a “Chinese way”, which should furnish proof of the superiority of China’s culture and political system. The mass movement he initiated to set up peasant “backyard blast furnaces” for steel production at the end of the 1950s, with which he intended to catch up with Great Britain in steel production, illustrates this. He was looking for a model that would act as a counter-model to Western (including Soviet) models of development. Since modernisation in developing countries is often equated with “Westernisation”, Mao’s search for an alternative path was an attempt to preserve China’s “Chineseness”. As in other developing societies, the trauma of colonial intervention and exploitation by Western powers and the resulting aversion to those powers’ models and institutions had been an important starting point for the Communist movement. In contrast to notions expressed in China in the second half of the 19th century, that is to import modern Western technology but not Western ideas, Mao opposed the import of modern Western technology by advocating China’s decoupling from the world market (“reliance on one’s own strength”, ziligengsheng). The masses were to be the Chinese substitute for technology imports. The total Sinicisation of development was intended to eschew the negative aspects of Western systems and Western models of development, such as the impoverishment of sections of the population, the uprooting of people and individualisation at the expense of societal interests. Ultimately, however, he was concerned with preserving traditional structures of rule. The “new human” he wanted to create was not to be a self-confident

Disciplining Efforts in China During Early Modernising 87 individual but an adapted, compliant member of society. Mao tried to counter the Western negative spectrum with the ideal of a self-sufficient, unitary and egalitarian collective community that was poor but whose life was to be filled with meaning and Communist visions and ideals. With the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), Mao believed he had found the Chinese alternative to modernisation. The Cultural Revolution must therefore also be seen as a response to Western concepts of modernisation. The goal of Mao’s policies and the Cultural Revolution he initiated was industrialisation without sociopolitical modernisation (or modernisation without modernity). A national community of solidarity, as Mao envisioned it, required a maximum of egalitarianism. All divergent tendencies, such as classes and strata, different forms of property, heterogeneous ethnic and religious movements, regional and local particularities, or clan and family interests, were perceived to be detrimental to such a community. The attempt to bring society into line by political campaigning, the fight against any form of special interest through “class struggle” and the restriction of the division of labour ultimately go back to Mao’s ideal, which resulted from a traditional understanding of harmony and a total claim to power. With regard to disciplining, political campaigns and mass movements were the predominant means of enforcing political goals, norms, rules and discipline during the Mao era in particular. Mao’s concept of the Cultural Revolution had significant echoes of political traditions. Sinologist Wolfgang Bauer once pointed out that the almost magical character of a book, the religious veneration of charismatic personalities, the view that will and consciousness can change realities and the belief in a paradisiacal final state have always played a major role in China’s Daoist-messianic and chiliastic movements (Bauer 1988). The permanent interplay of order and chaos was not alien to either Daoism or Confucianism and was certainly understood as an act of purification. Symbolically, this is expressed in Mao’s sentence, frequently quoted during the Cultural Revolution: “There is great unrest under heaven, the situation is excellent.” The idea of a permanent revolution, as well as core phenomena of the Cultural Revolution such as the “Red Book”, the Mao cult, the idea of voluntaristic change in people and notions of a Communist utopia, therefore have firm roots in Chinese political culture. The use of such traditional patterns, which were part and parcel of Mao’s “Sinicisation of Marxism”, may have made socialism (or rather its Sinicised interpretation) more acceptable to large segments of the population. Unintentionally, however, his modernisation strategy created the conditions for reform processes because it weakened the anti-modernisation potential. At the same time, the consequences of his policies created a critical moment after his death (criticism of Mao, of his development model, ultimately of the party and the political institutions under Mao). More than 100 campaigns were carried out in China between 1951 and 1976. The San Fan (Three-Anti 1951) and the Wu Fan (Five-Anti 1952) Campaigns were launched shortly after the founding of the People’s Republic of China. San Fan was directed against corrupt members within the CPC, former Guomindang officials and other officials covering up abuses such as corruption, waste and bureaucracy. Wu Fan targeted the capitalist class and ills such as bribery, theft of state property

88  Disciplining Efforts in China During Early Modernising

Figure 5.2 Disciplining “corrupt and thievish elements” during the San Fan Campaign (1951/1952) Source: Baidu (baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1723197386686144941) (public domain).

and tax evasion. Major campaigns such as the “Great Leap Forward” (1958–1961), the “Socialist Education Movement” (1964–65) and the Cultural Revolution also included a moral and a disciplining component, be it the creation of people with new minds and behaviour or targeting corrupt practices, bureaucratic behaviour of cadres or their “immoral behaviour”. The “Four Cleanups” (Siqing yundong), for example, which were part of the Socialist Education Movement (1964–1965), targeted behaviour such as excessive eating, acquisitiveness, theft of public property, embezzlement, extortion of sexual favours from peasant women and other corrupt practices, which were criticised and punished (Baum 1975). However, the vision espoused by Mao and his followers was to create “new humans”, or, as Meisner (1971, 551) put it, “new people” with a new morality who were the “creators, not the products of the new society”. This worldview ultimately resulted in the moral decline of Mao’s regime (see e.g. Shih 1994). The aim of these mass movements was to consolidate the rule of the CPC and to suppress the forces that challenged this rule. However, they were also intended to change people’s minds, in the interests of solving political and economic problems. This was to be done by mobilising the masses in collective actionism. Arguably, this concept was rooted in the traditional (Confucian) view of humanity, which was shared by Mao: that people could be purified and their thinking changed by

Disciplining Efforts in China During Early Modernising 89 educating them. By influencing their disposition, according to the underlying idea, internal control and self-discipline could be achieved. By means of self-examination and self-perfection (self-criticism), deviators (“sick people”) could be reintegrated into the wider community. “Healing the disease to save the patient” was the principle advocated by Mao. In 1951, Mao called – in an almost Confucian manner – for “a movement for self-education” and “self-remoulding” (Mao 1978, 60). According to Mao, workers and peasants were “poor and blank”, that is untainted and thus malleable in the interests of his revolutionary-disciplinary concept. In 1958, he wrote: The population of 600 million in China has two peculiarities; they are, first of all, poor, and secondly blank . . . A clean sheet of paper has no blotches, and so the newest and most beautiful characters can be written on it, the newest and most beautiful pictures can be painted on it.27 Mao’s “new human” should behave as a disciplined soldier, devoting his entire life selflessly and in a disciplined manner to the party and the construction of socialism. In urban areas, Street Offices and Residents’ Committees were established in the early 1950s and tasked with implementing centrally determined and disciplining policies (e.g. mass campaigns) in the neighbourhoods and dealing with social problems and “problem groups” (the unemployed, retirees, disabled persons, previously convicted persons, etc.). They established preschool facilities, healthcare institutions and small businesses; they also exercised police auxiliary and disciplining functions and acted as registration offices and social service providers. During times of political radicalisation, they mutated into bodies responsible for political and ideological surveillance and control (see Heberer and Göbel 2013). Even the so-called Hukou system, that is a household registration system that tied people, especially rural residents, to their place of birth in an attempt to prevent mass migration to urban areas and divided people into those with a rural hukou and those with a urban hukou (the latter receiving full citizenship and benefits not available to rural inhabitants) was instrumentalised for social control and disciplining the population.28 Over the decades, it was the “working unit” (danwei), that is the space in which someone worked and lived, to which a person belonged and was registered. The danwei organised the political campaigns within its domain, exerted social control and disciplined its members. Victor N. Shaw (1996, 99) called this aspect of the danwei “administrative disciplining”, although this type of disciplining was not only administrative but also sociopolitical. After the Cultural Revolution, the danwei had to foster a new type of working discipline among workers. During that period, “political consciousness” was the focal point for assessing a worker’s behaviour. Demanding working discipline was perceived as a kind of “capitalist behaviour”. After the Cultural Revolution ended, factory cadres and workers had to be retrained to focus once again on parameters such as efficiency, productivity, timeliness and working discipline and to comply with disciplinary rules (see e.g. Chan and Zhu 2003; Rofel 1992).

90  Disciplining Efforts in China During Early Modernising Werner Gerich is an interesting example of how, in the 1980s, the Chinese leadership even used foreign experts as a model to propagate necessary disciplining measures in Chinese companies. Gerich (1919–2003) was one of the first “senior experts” sent to China by the German Retired Experts Service. In 1984, he commenced work as the director of the Wuhan Diesel Generator Factory, thus becoming the first foreign factory director hired to manage a Chinese stateowned enterprise since China’s reform and opening up. During his two-year term in office, he introduced the concept of quality assurance and took measures to discipline the management and staff of the factory. Among other things, he prohibited sessions of the party and trade union branches and banned the reading of newspapers or party documents during working hours. Under his management, the factory became increasingly successful, with the result that the Chinese central leadership honoured him as a role model of successful enterprise management and corporate discipline from which other Chinese companies should learn. He won several awards from the Chinese central government for his performance, and his case was highlighted in party documents and print media across the country. Sociologist Amitai Etzioni has argued that societies such as China’s, which ­create a modern economy while attempting to cling to the socialist system at the same time, are “thick” societies, that is they need a more strictly controlled social order and require processes and institutions that can “mobilize a certain amount of time, activity, energy, loyalty of the members of society to serve one or more common goals” (Etzioni 1999, 33). The danwei evidently served this role for quite some time. The reform process has fundamentally reduced the role of the danwei as a disciplining organisation. The privatisation or closure of many state-owned and collectively owned enterprises, the establishment of companies with foreign investment, the return to family farming in the rural areas and the abolition of large collectives (People’s Communes), the growth of the private sector without danwei structures, the decrease in directive planning requirements and the permitting of new employment channels have weakened the danwei significantly. This was necessary because these structures hindered reform and this rather traditional system was hardly compatible with a market economy.29 From the state’s point of view, therefore, new forms of control, surveillance and disciplining were required. The numerous traditional rating systems (such as the “Five Good Households” or the “civilised households”, used to regularly assess the behaviour of all households) have remained in existence but have now lost their motivational disciplining and control function. The system which in China is called “social management” is – historically and in the context of its political culture – not entirely new. Technological development and the new monitoring options have merely raised social control to a new, more sophisticated technological level. What is specific to China is the traditional role of moral and civilising education, a task that the “Confucian educational government” always had (see, for example, Sun Yat-sen’s demand in the 1920s that the state should establish an “educational dictatorship” in the interests of civilising and

Disciplining Efforts in China During Early Modernising 91

Figure 5.3  Memorial statue of Gerich in Wuhan Source: baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1723197386686144941 (public domain).

92  Disciplining Efforts in China During Early Modernising morally educating the Chinese people) (Sun 1963, 127–29). The disciplining and educational government is now simply pursuing this role by other means, that is modern technological instruments. What is similar between the Mao era and the present is that both are characterised by political disciplining to achieve political goals on the one hand and social disciplining on the other. The difference, however, is that Mao periodically turned to mass political campaigns which impacted on everyone, whereas Xi’s campaigns are primarily affecting officials and party members, with the disciplining and civilising of society being carried through by administrative means and education. It was not until the Covid-19 policy in 2020–2022 that general disciplining of the people was again called for and state disciplinary mobilisation was rehearsed and given a new and solid basis (see Chapter 1). Notes 1 This is a clear case of a European colonial “civilising mission” and hence not what Elias, for example, had in mind when theorising the “civilising process”. 2 The issue of jiaohua, that is educating and transforming, will be explained in Chapter 6 in more detail. 3 Similar arguments were put forward by the German missionary and sinologist Ernst Faber (1839–1899) in his book Zi xi cu dong 2002 (From West to East), originally published by Shanghai Commercial Press in 1902. 4 Hirono 2008, 101–90 provides several case studies on the work of Christian missionaries in China. 5 Bai zheng ge, in Shih 1967, 39. 6 See Kang Youwei 2010a. In a further important publication (2010b), Kang tried to prove that a significant number of Confucian classics had actually been forged. 7 Concurrently, Kang developed a utopian ideal for the benefit of mankind as a whole, including a universal value system grounded in both traditional Confucian and Western values. He also looked at whether Western values could be found in Confucianism and sought commonalities between Western and traditional Chinese values (K’ang 1958; Kang 2021). 8 On Kang’s notion of the separation between state and religion on the one hand and the creation of (Confucian) religious institutions based on Western (Christian) models on the other, see Kuo (2013). On the revival of Confucianism as a religion today: Billioud and Thoraval (2008), Dessain (2014), Fan and Chen (2015). 9 Chinese version, accessed August 2021, www.sohu.com/a/445962444_562249. 10 Reynolds 1993, 62–63. 11 Abe 1987, in Reynolds 1993, 147. 12 Imperial Rescript on Education, accessed August 2021, www.japanpitt.pitt.edu/glossary/ imperial-rescript-education. 13 Reynolds 1993, 147–65. 14 Ibid., 155. 15 Johann Caspar Bluntschli’s Allgemeines Staatsrecht, geschichtlich begründet first appeared in 1852. 16 Huang Sheng, “Fuzeyuji dui Riben he Zhongguo de yingxiang (Fukuzawa Yukichi’s Influence on Japan and China),” Undated, accessed February 2022, https://wenku.baidu. com/view/1e542a46a75177232f60ddccda38376baf1fe0ff.html; Li Na, “Beilun Fuzeyuji de Liang Qichao qimeng sixiang de yingxiang (On the Influence of Fukuzawa on

Disciplining Efforts in China During Early Modernising 93 Liang Qichao’s Enlightenment Thought),” Yanbian Dangxiao Xuebao (Journal of Yanbian Party School) 27, no. 5: 112–14, accessed July 2022, www.cnki.com.cn/­Article/ CJFDTOTAL-YBDB201205034.htm; “Fuzeyuji: yingxiang Liang Qichao de Riben sixiangjia (Fukuzawa Yukichi: The Japanese Thinker Who Influenced Liang Qichao),” Shuizhu Ribao (Shuizhu Daily), 2017, accessed July 2022, www.163.com/dy/article/ D0FTHIPG0523808G.html. Fukuzawa gradually changed from a liberal enlightener to an ultra-nationalist in the 1880s and 1890s. In 1894/1895, he advocated for Japan’s war against the Qing dynasty, which led to a significant loss of his influence in China. 17 According to Liu and Gao 1984, 376, xuehui is a Japanese loanword. 18 Du, Weitao and Zhang, Liuquan, Chuzhong gongmin: Xin kecheng biaozhun shiyong (Lower middle school civics: For use with the new curriculum standards), in Culp 2002, 55. 19 Ibid., 58. 20 For example, the concept of “socialism based on China’s characteristics”, whereby “socialism” stands for the leadership of the CPC in achieving the modernisation goal. 21 As early as the 1920s, Sun Yat-sen advocated the restoration of Confucian values as the basis of a common identity and a common value system of the Chinese people as part of the nation-building process (see Foster 2015, 28–29). 22 Chiang Kai-shek as quoted by Clinton (2017, 135). 23 Xin shenghuo yundong zhi yaoyi, op. cit. in Eastman 1976, 201. 24 On the reasons for the failure, see, for example, Dirlik 1975, 948–54. 25 See Mao Zedong, “The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War,” Selected Works 2 (October 1938), accessed June 2022, www.marxists.org/reference/ archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_10.htm. 26 Mao Zedong, “Instruction of the General Headquarters of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army,” Selected Works IV (October 10, 1947), accessed June 2022, www.marxists. org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-4/mswv4_23.htm. 27 Mao Zedong, “Jieshao yige hezuoshe (Introducing a Co-operative),” in Mao zhuxi yulu (Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong) (Beijing: Xinhua Shudian, 1968), 44. 28 Moreno (2018, 30) argued that the hukou system led to a “reification of the axes between the civilised [urban] and the uncivilised” (rural) people. 29 On the danwei system, see Lü and Perry 1997.

6

Disciplining Processes Since the Advent of the “Reform and Opening Policies” (Gaige kaifang)

From the “Four Modernisations” (sige xiandaihua) to “Spiritual Civilisation” (jingshen wenming) At the start of economic reforms in the late 1970s, China’s leadership promulgated the “Four Modernisations” (of Industry, Agriculture, Science and Technology and National Defence), pointing to China’s determination to catch up and find its place in the modern world. At that time, the notion of modernity was still strongly connected to the quest for continuous economic development to make China strong and prosperous. The conviction that modernisation encompasses more than pure economic– technical modernisation, namely a change towards “modernity”, has matured only gradually in the course of the reform and development process. The modernisation of people’s minds and behaviour in the sense of the Chinese concept of “civilising” (or social disciplining) has increasingly come to the fore in the last decade. While the focus of the developmental state is on the economic–technical–administrative aspect of modernisation, the disciplining and civilising process aims to change individuals’ mindsets and behaviour to bring them in line with the intended “comprehensive modernity” to be achieved by 2050. Figure 6.1 illustrates the fundamental change in understanding the trajectory of modernisation and modernity among the Chinese leadership in recent decades, as well as the complexity of this process. In the last few decades, the CPC leadership realised that “modernisation” refers not only to economic–technical factors, characterised by industrialisation, production for the market, integration into the world market and the specific role of science and technology but also to sociopolitical factors such as social mobility, political pluralisation, expanded opportunities for citizens’ participation, the creation of modern administrative structures, a rationally organised bureaucracy, the development of a legal system, legal certainty and the formation of a rational economic ethos. Wenminghua: China’s Disciplining Project The CPC considers discipline and moral education to be an essential part of its civilising project (wenminghua), by which the state “attempts to subject the population DOI: 10.4324/9781003353065-6

Disciplining Processes in China 95

Figure 6.1  Trajectory of China’s modernising processes Source: Author’s own diagram.

to new modes of discipline, inscribed as ‘civilised’ ” (Anagnost 1997, 12), that is to create a “civilised society”. The CPC thus activated tropes that have been around in China for more than a century. With regard to modern civilisation, historian Xu Jilin (2020, 3) raised an interesting point. He distinguished between modernity (related to “wealth and power”) and modern civilisation, related to “a set of value systems and corresponding institutional arrangements”. He argued that since the late 19th century, many Chinese have perceived wealth and power to be most crucial and considered civilisation and values to be less important. “For a long period”, Xu writes (2020, 7), “wealth and power took precedence over civilisation.” He added: [T]he attitude of Chinese people toward modern civilisation was to pay less attention to universal civilisational values and the corresponding system of rule of law, and more to the technical side, the non-value-related aspects of science and technology, the rational order and the capitalist spirit. After a century and a half of hard work, the China Dream finally became a reality. But only half of the dream was actually realised, and China’s modernity remained incomplete. Wealth and power “rose up”, but civilisation remains lost in a haze. (Xu 2020, 7) This fact could explain why the focus of political and social concern is now shifting more in the direction of Xu’s interpretation of the concept of civilisation. But what does the current Chinese leadership mean by “civilisation”? Alison Kaufman (2018, 2–3) argues that Xi Jinping uses the term in a threefold way: (a) a people tied together by a shared geography, language and history over a long timeframe; (b) in the sense of “culture” (shaped by a common mindset, values, history, etc.) and (c) pertaining to a “process of human development” differing from that of “non-civilised” people and from the type of behaviour perceived to be “noncivilised”.1 This normative understanding, which is strongly related to top-down

96  Disciplining Processes in China disciplining and civilising efforts by the state, is highly relevant for this study. As Kaufman points out, China’s entire modernisation project, from 1840 to today, can be viewed as a quest to become “civilised” . . . that is, to reorient its internal characteristics in such a way [as] to guarantee its national strength, self-determination, and influence in the global arena. (Kaufman 2018, 3) With regard to the current use of the term civilisation, Baidu, the most important Chinese online encyclopedia, informs us that civilisation in the Chinese context comprises five factors: material, political, national, social and human. Meanwhile, two further ones have been added: ecological and the Internet or digital civilisation. The term “civilised society” (wenming shehui) refers to the combination of the elements “civilised social relations, civilised social ideas, civilised social systems, and civilised social behaviour”. In a narrow sense, “social civilising” encompasses the factors “civilising of social subjects” (personal development, family happiness, neighbourhood harmony, social harmony), of social relationships (interpersonal, family, neighbourhood, community and group relationships), of social ideas (social theories, social psychology, social manners and customs and social morality),2 of the social system (social institutions, social structures, social policies, social laws) and of social behaviour (social activities, social work, social management).3 The then-CPC General Secretary Jiang Zemin raised the issue of a “socialist political civilisation”, pointing to the necessity to reform the structures of the political system and the CPC as well as to expand socialist democracy and improve the legal system (see Jiang 1999, 2002; Yang and Zhang 2003; Xiuying Liu 2004; Dynon 2008, 100–2), a point rarely mentioned again after his retirement. Jiang’s idea was to foster a national ethics around issues such as morality, hygiene, decorum, manners, discipline and legal consciousness (see Holmes 2019, 116). A volume published by the CPC Central Party School in 2002 distinguished between three forms of civilisation under socialism: material, political and spiritual. The material aspect consists of the development of the productive forces based on modern science and technology; the political dimension comprises the development of socialist democracy and a socialist legal system; and the spiritual is concerned with the development of a high level of education, science, culture, thought and morality and ultimately the emergence of new humans. However, such descriptions remained very abstract at the time (Zheng Bijian et al. 2002, 274). At the 17th National Congress of the CPC in 2007, “civilised” (wenming) was mentioned 13 times in the report by the then-General Secretary Hu Jintao.4 At the 19th Party Congress (2017), Xi Jinping referred 45 times to the term,5 which shows that it had become increasingly prominent. Although Xi’s report to the 20th National Party Congress in October 2022 mentioned the term only 11 times, he nevertheless stressed that between 2035 and 2050 the country should be built into a “civilised” modern nation, and the “fundamental task of cultivating the people in terms of moral integrity” and “moral, intellectual, physical and aesthetic terms”

Disciplining Processes in China 97 must in any case be realised. The “civilisational level of the whole society”, the establishment of a civic morality based on traditional Chinese virtues, public morality and strict private morality is according to Xi one of the core tasks of the development until 2050.6 The central leadership’s civilising concept has meanwhile trickled down to the lower levels with partly differing understandings. Moreno (2018, 32), for example, cites a banner he spotted in Nanjing City in 2017, which provides a specific definition of wenming: Wenming is a sign of progress, also an important characteristic of a modern nation. The proper condition for the construction of a modern nation and a socialist culture. It means face modernity, face globalization, the future, identity, science and culture, as well as popular socialism. The essential to return China to its greatness. This definition combines modernity in a Western sense with China’s modern political culture (socialist culture), globalisation, modern science and technology and identity politics as a path to regain “greatness” for the Chinese nation. It concurrently illustrates the symbiosis of the Chinese modernisation process: a combination of modernity, Chineseness and a political system based on China’s specific characteristics. This illustrates the protean nature of the concept of “civilisation”, which can be adjusted to exigencies. Concerning the term “discipline”, according to the “Modern Mandarin-Chinese Dictionary” (Xiandai Hanyu Cidian 1979, 528), the term connotes the collective interests of and rule-based processes in organisations. There is, however, another term in use for discipline, guixun (规训). The translations of Foucault’s “Discipline and Punish” and Oestreich’s “Social Disciplining” employ the terms guixun and shehui guixun respectively (Hu Yingfeng 2012).7 For the Chinese concepts of discipline and disciplining (cf. Chapter 3), both jilü and guixun are used. The term jilü is rarely used in relation to societal discipline but rather pertains to party or working discipline. According to Yu Keping, both are modern rather than ancient concepts. However, as Yu notes, jilü originated from the traditional Chinese army while guixun is a fairly new term. Whereas the terms gui and xun were employed in traditional Confucian texts, the combination guixun was seldom used. Guixun as a new term became more popular when the title of Foucault’s Discipline and Punish was translated as “规训与惩罚” (guixun yu chengfa). But interestingly, the Chinese term guixun stands not only for disciplining but also for self-disciplining.8 Confucianism researcher Du Lun argues that due to different traditions, the notion of “disciplining” also varies. In the context of governance, terms such as “governing by virtue” (dezheng) and “rule by rites” (lizhi) played a more prominent role in China’s political culture. Jilü was rarely employed in such a context, but there was more use of terms such as “changing through education” (jiaohua) and “educate and change the minds of the people”9 (jiaomin). The modern term guixun, in turn, is less concerned with rules but means transforming, “instructing”

98  Disciplining Processes in China or “teaching”.10 Finally, guanjiao is another phrase translated as “discipline” but is connected to Confucian ideas of being subject to education, instruction or training. If we relate the term to contemporary use, however, it becomes apparent that in the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC), the term “discipline” was, and is, primarily related to party (political) or military discipline,11 less to social disciplining (see e.g. Li Peng 2018). Effective disciplining requires, in turn, supervision and surveillance technologies. People should adopt and memorise codes of conduct, thus making them their own. The ultimate objective of disciplining was, and is, to establish individuals’ self-control. As described in this chapter, we are concerned with the underlying intentions as well as with the practical policies to improve the level of civilising and discipline, that is the “quality” (suzhi) of the Chinese people. Apart from the economic–technological dimension of modernity à la Chinoise, in recent years, some Chinese intellectuals have put political modernisation in the foreground; they include political scientist Yu Keping, who argues that modernisation requires “modern governance” and, eventually, democratisation as an incremental process (Yu 2019). What was widely lacking in Chinese discourses, however, was the idea that effective modern governance needs citizens to exhibit a public spirit and morality (e.g. Yan 2011, 2019). Modern governance and a stable political entity demand specific preconditions which the Polish sociologist Piotr Sztompka (1993) classified as “civilisational competence”. By this term, he referred to the cognitive preconditions for a stable and modern human order and the imperative of an emerging citizenry with a society-oriented public spirit and a sense of civic responsibility. In addition, we understand “civilisational competence” to mean the acceptance of diverging opinions and political criticism by both the state and society, peaceful and effective management of conflicts and the emergence of empathy, that is the capability to understand the feelings, emotions and minds of other people. In the Chinese discussion about social change, these cognitive aspects of creating disciplined citizens were neglected for quite some time. Recent developments in other world regions (Arab countries, Afghanistan) illustrate that democracy cannot be imposed from outside. The development and stabilisation of modern structures and institutions of governance first and foremost require not only economic development and resources but also the cognitive preconditions for the establishment of a good governance order. In 2020, Zhang Bin, a researcher at Jilin’s Provincial Party School, summarised an ongoing discussion on the “modernisation of people” (rende xiandaihua) as the final goal of the modernising process. He wrote: Human thinking, values, and behaviour are also evolving in the modernisation process. Only with modern people will there be modern activities and the establishment of a modern society. Human modernisation is the prerequisite and destination of modernisation . . . Socialist modernisation requires the transformation of the material and spiritual conditions for people’s existence, including not only the modernisation of science and technology, but also the

Disciplining Processes in China 99 modernisation of lifestyles and values . . . The modernisation of ideas and concepts is related to the transformation . . . from tradition to modernity. (Zhang Bin 2020) Furthermore, Chinese academics such as Chen Yunquan and Zhang Youqun have argued that a certain level of public morality is necessary for securing social order and is a precondition for the “development of civilisation”. In China, they argued, a combination of traditional morality and “elements pertaining to the spirit of our age” was required. However, ethical tradition also had a negative side, that is the dominance of “private morality” in personal relations, as opposed to a societycentred public morality. It was, therefore, necessary to reinforce public morality and to cut back the private one (Chen and Zhang 2002, 103) or, as Yao (2002, 115) put it, to cultivate the “moral character” of citizens. Spiritual Civilisation as a Key Concept In 1979, after the start of the economic reform process, a debate on creating a “socialist spiritual civilisation” (shehuizhuyi jingshen wenming) arose within the CPC as a crucial issue in China’s modernising process. A major reason for this was the increasing influence of foreign ideas among younger Chinese, specifically intellectuals and academics, on the one hand, and an overemphasis on economic development and material wealth, on the other. The term “spiritual civilisation” had previously been harnessed by Liang Qichao and Sun Yat-sen. Both emphasised that this term pertains to values and norms indispensable for creating a modern and powerful nation-state and claimed that what Chinese people were lacking most was “public morality”. Liang argued that Confucianism was primarily concerned with private and less with public morality, the latter in the sense of duties and responsibilities towards society. For intellectuals such as Liang, public morality, modern social ethics, nationalism, rights awareness, etc. were indispensable preconditions for a modern society (Liang 1902–1906; Lin 2017, 112–13). The necessity of constructing a spiritual civilisation was first mentioned by Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) in a speech in October 197912 and gained prominence in the early 1980s.13 The Report by the General Secretary of the CPC Hu Yaobang at the 12th Party Congress in 1982 once again highlighted this point; he argued that besides constructing a “material civilisation” (wuzhi wenming), a spiritual one had to be created as well. By spiritual civilisation, Hu referred to the development of education, science, cultural knowledge and raising people’s minds as well as political and moral standards (Hu 1982). Two brief campaigns – against “spiritual pollution” (qingchu jingshen wuran) in 1983 and against “bourgeois liberalisation” (zichanjieji ziyouhua) in 1986 – aimed primarily to curb Western liberal ideals and influences but lasted only a few months and had little effect (Baum 1995; Carrico 2017). In 1983, a “Socialist Ethics and Courtesy Month” was established, focusing on issues such as civility, politeness, order, morality and hygiene (e.g. sweeping streets). The aim was to foster civilised language, behaviour and environment,

100  Disciplining Processes in China including “learning from Lei Feng”, a behavioural and moral role model (see ­Dirlik 2011, 35–37). According to Dirlik, the topics addressed during this “Month” resembled those of Chiang Kai-shek’s “New Life Movement” in the 1930s, discussed in Chapter 4. In September 1986, the Central Committee of the CPC proposed strengthening the “construction of spiritual civilisation”. The “Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Guidelines for the Construction of Socialist Spiritual Civilisation” emphasised the necessity “to cultivate ideal, moral, educated, and disciplined socialist citizens, and to improve the ideological, moral, scientific and cultural qualities of the entire Chinese nation”.14 However, in reality the effects of this appeal remained relatively low. In the late 1990s, the Chinese leadership started to prepare its bid to host the 29th Olympic Games in 2008. As part of these preparations, it began to promote new and “civilised” behaviour among the Chinese people, particularly at locations that would become Olympic venues, in order to “upgrade China’s world image” (Broudehoux 2012). In 1997, a “Central Spiritual Civilisation Construction Guidance Committee” was established to oversee the civilising agenda. In 2006, the Committee published a “Notice on the Extensive Development of Welcoming the Olympics, Speak Civilisation, and Build a New Style”.15 This document stipulated that the civilised quality of the people should be enhanced, a civilised society, civilised social customs, a civic morality, good moral qualities, civilised etiquette, a scientific and civilised lifestyle and civilised and polite behaviour should be cultivated and a social public order, civilised traffic, civilised audiences etc. fostered. This programme was combined under the heading of “creating civilised cities” (Cartier 2016). In addition, as early as 2002, the “Charter of Civilisation of the Capital’s Citizens” issued by Beijing’s Party Committee stated that “civilised citizens” must respect the law, discipline and public order and that they should beautify the city, comply with the rules of hygiene, protect the environment, dispense with outdated habits, acquire civilised manners, show politeness and enjoy helping other people (Boutonnet 2011, 89). However, the Charter’s requirements go beyond the issue of disciplining or civilised behaviour since they also encompass aspects such as patriotism, preserving stability, praising science and supporting the army (see ibid.), thus transcending the original notion of “civilised”. Plans for implementing the programme were developed and civilisation offices established in all regions. The media, including television broadcasting and the new social media, but also schools and neighbourhood communities were expected to educate people to behave in a civilised manner and create a civilised and polite atmosphere throughout society. Various ministries and offices (traffic, tourism, public security, communication, propaganda departments, etc.) worked out their own implementation plans. The campaign was also intended to promote the development of ecological villages, raise citizens’ environmental awareness, create “clean homes” and ensure the cleanliness of public places, back streets and alleys (ibid.). “Uncivilised behaviour” such as spitting, queue jumping, jaywalking, hawking,

Disciplining Processes in China 101

Figure 6.2  Civilised behaviour in public toilets References to “civilising projects” can even be found in public toilets. In “civilised toilets” (wenming cesuo), this sign (translation: A small step forward, a big step to becoming civilised) is displayed above the urinals, pointing out that it is more hygienic and civilised to stand as close to the urinals as possible. Source: Photo by the author, motorway lay-by, central Yunnan Province.

swearing and smoking was also targeted as part of the education campaign (see Broudehoux 2012). However, the success of this endeavour eroded in the years after the Games. The “Central Civilisation Office” under the CPC’s Propaganda Department, tasked with overseeing the implementation of civilising policies, is now responsible for civilising pilot projects at the local level. By 2021, about 500 “pilot organisations” (“New Era Civilisation Practice Centres”) had been established across the country to propagate the “Socialist Core Values” and to initiate civilising projects at the grassroots. Local “civilising plans” are being drawn up and implemented, and large numbers of volunteers and professional forces will be involved in organising cultural events, teaching classes and lectures to promote civilised behaviour in villages and urban neighbourhood communities, with a focus on changing customs (e.g. extravagant wedding/funeral practices and lavish banquets), promoting clean and tidy rural courtyards, assisting in improving the living and natural environment and increasing local environmental awareness.16 This shows that the government also resorts to fairly traditional propaganda strategies to promote its civilising agenda in rural and urban settlements, including ethnic minority areas. All these measures illustrate that the political elite is not simply concerned with “preserving the power of the Communist Party”, as is so often claimed. Rather, its power is aimed at realising the aforementioned national mission by 2050. The task of the Chinese political elite, that is the agents of the developmental state, led by the CPC, is to ensure that this ultimate goal can be accomplished. The current party leader Xi Jinping called this the realisation of the “Chinese Dream”. By far the majority of the Chinese share this “dream”, that is the vision of developing China

102  Disciplining Processes in China into a comprehensively modern nation with world power status by 2050. And it is precisely this vision, that is the pursuit of this national core interest, which seems to legitimise the Chinese developmental and disciplining state. Due to various “risks”, the CPC leadership believes that to accomplish this mission, a high level of discipline is required. These risks are, specifically, the existence of a value vacuum, since previous “socialist values” – “serving the people”, self-sacrificing for collective interests, collectivism, etc. – no longer correspond to the emerging “socialist market economy” or the “let some people become rich first” policy. Furthermore, the changes since the late 1970s have resulted in a “loss of normative authority” (Rošker 2016, 14). In addition, risks related to opening-up policies, the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent decline of Russia and the tremendous changes within Chinese society have caused “moral decay”. The erosion of the party’s ideology and discipline, the concern that the CPC could lose control over both economy and society and the contentious search for a new, more sustainable, yet stable developmental model have also led to a greater degree of political rigidity. “The government operates by educating desires and configuring habits, aspirations and beliefs”, as Li (2007, 5) has argued, the aim being to ensure that people behave as expected by the state. It seems that the aforementioned document from 2001 and its follow-up policies did not bring much improvement, a point clearly implied by a more recent text from 2019. In October 2019, the Chinese leadership issued a far more detailed document, titled “Implementation of the outline of constructing a citizen morality in the new period”, demanding that all party members and citizens should contribute to the creation of a new moral order (Zhonggong Zhongyang 2019). It was emphasised that solid market economic rules and orderly social governing were still lacking and that both a “moral anomie” and a loss of intra-societal trust were prevalent. The document aimed to create new societal and professional ethics and to reinforce family ethics and personal morality. Among other things, new forms of politeness, protection of public property, ecological behaviour, reforming customs and habits, social etiquette, tourist ethics and digital morality should be fostered. All party members and citizens should behave accordingly in a self-aware manner and figure as role models. All administrative levels, authorities and government bodies were requested to implement this document carefully and thoroughly (ibid.). In November  2020, the CPC’s Central Committee specified the goals for the period to 2035, including those pertaining to civilising: improve social civilisation, strengthen civilised customs and behavioural norms that meet the requirements of the new era and promote ecological civilisation as well as a digital civilisation. In addition, civilised literacy and social responsibility awareness among students should be enhanced and the development of a civilised and healthy lifestyle for all people realised (Zhonggong Zhongyang 2020). Extending Civilising Processes: Ecological and Digital Civilising Ecological civilisation, a programme enshrined in the CPC constitution in 2012 and in the Constitution of the PRC in 2018 and underpinned by a series

Disciplining Processes in China 103 of key policy documents, illustrates that the CPC is serious about realising an ­environment-friendly policy. The programme is portrayed as a “form of civilisation” that follows on from industrial civilisation. Its objective is the “harmonious development of humanity, nature and society”. The term is at the same time associated with a process of transformation of public attitudes and behaviour towards the environment and ecology. It therefore entails a process of transformation of human thinking and beliefs, which has to be initiated and supported by the state. Furthermore, ecological civilisation includes changing consumer behaviour, enhancing people’s environmental awareness and promoting self-discipline in dealing with the environment, nature and natural resources. Thus, ecological civilisation is also seen as integral to developing a spiritual civilisation. The creation of an eco-industry, eco-agriculture and an eco-service sector is part of this process. Ecological civilisation has therefore become part and parcel of China’s disciplining and civilising and its 2050 modernisation agenda (Lord 2018). To enhance the acceptance of this programme among the Chinese people, the party leadership refers not least to classical philosophical concepts as reflected in Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism, such as the concept of tianren heyi, that is harmony between humanity and nature.17 So far, global issues such as global warming, greenhouse gas emissions as its cause, the consequences of climate change such as droughts, floods and heavy rainfall and the related issues of climate protection and climate-conscious lifestyles have featured less prominently in the public debate. Political leaders are well aware of these problems, but they still subordinate them to economic development, raising living standards and improving quality of life and other current priorities for the general public (see e.g. Böge 2021). Nevertheless, the leadership is now paying more attention, in its political thinking, to natural disasters and global warming and taking account of the views of academic experts and think tanks, which is likely to make this issue a focus of political action in the coming years. “Internet civilising” and a campaign called the “Internet civilising project”, which commenced in 1999 and continued after 2012, were aimed at cleaning up the Chinese Internet and regaining party control of public debates and blogging content in the cyberspace. The purpose of the campaign was not only to address the issue of censorship but also to minimise rumours, fake news, pornography, violence, fraud, copyright infringement, etc. (see Yang 2017; Goldkorn 2013; Wangluo Wenming Gongcheng Undated). The disciplining and civilising character of “cleaning up” the Internet was further emphasised by a document in early 2017 which stated: Guide the majority of mobile Internet users to access the Internet in a civilised manner, and actively participate in purifying the network environment and maintaining network order. (Zhonggong Zhongyang 2017) Similar regulations were adopted in 2019 for civilised, “ecological” Internet content (Wangluo xinxi neirong 2019).

104  Disciplining Processes in China Keane and Su (2019, 10) inform us about ways of monitoring, censoring and civilising “antisocial online behaviour” or “online incivility” by means of algorithms, state censorship, the “Great Firewall” (Griffiths 2019) or apps such as the “Study Strong Nation” to test CPC members’ ideological knowledge and attitudes. By means of the latter, “users can accumulate ‘positive energy’ ” by “correctly answering questions about Xi Jinping and his ‘thought’ ”, now propagated as the new ideology of the CPC. An intriguing issue is the phenomenon of uncivilised online behaviour, specifically the dark side of the Internet characterised by online violence, discussion board flaming, online vigilantism, trolling, forum wars, personal attacks, shame campaigns, scams, rumour-mongering and astroturfing (De Seta 2018). A Chinese report on uncivilised Internet behaviour stated: Many netizens suggested that the Internet must be civilised, starting from each individual. For example, do not forward pornographic or violent ­information; use civilised language in chats; abandon bad habits on the ­Internet . . . As early as 2006, the Internet Society of China issued the “Civilised Internet Self-Discipline Convention”, calling on Internet users to start from themselves, and while promoting a healthy development of the Internet, they should assume their social responsibilities and always give priority to the interests of the country and the public, and persist in running the Internet in a civilised manner. (Ding 2020) A report in Renmin Ribao describes how campaigns to educate young people in “Internet civilisation” and “how to become a good young netizen” are organised regularly by the Ministry of Education, the Communist Youth League and other organisations to combat “bad social behaviour online” such as personal attacks and insults, malicious reports, cyberbullying and violent behaviour and illegal activities such as extortion and illicit acquisition of personal data. Among other things, a “youth mode” for apps such as games and online videos and anti-addiction systems have been set up to prevent harmful online behaviour (Liu Yao 2020). The “Proposal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Formulating the Fourteenth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and Long-Term Goals for 2035” issued in November 2020 points out that the construction of a network civilisation should be strengthened and a positive and healthy network culture created (Zhonggong Zhongyang 2020). In September 2021, the Chinese leadership adopted a code of conduct on the “civilising” of cyberspace. The document calls for “civilised” use of the Internet, including enhanced ethical standards and ethical behaviour among Internet users, measures to curb disinformation, fake news and online crime and improved privacy and data security. Furthermore, users should internalise “socialist core values” to realise online and offline civilisation (Zhonggong Zhongyang bangongting 2021). Soon afterwards, 14 Chinese Internet platforms signed a pledge to become “self-disciplined”. The “Convention on the Self-discipline of Building a Clear

Disciplining Processes in China 105 and Sober Cyber Culture Ecosystem” was signed by leading companies such as Weibo, Douyin, Kuaishou, Tencent, Youku and Bilibili. By signing this contract, they undertook to create a clean and upright network culture, to curb unhealthy and immoral content, to promote socialist core values and to foster healthy, positive values conducive to the construction of a spiritual civilisation.18 The civilising and disciplining process even targets the behaviour of children and adolescents, who were believed to be spending many hours a day playing online games with questionable content. The Chinese leadership is concerned about the moral development of young people and minors in general. In August 2021, the Central Propaganda Department of the CPC and the National Press and Publication Administration issued the “Notice on Further Strict Management and Practically Preventing Minors from Indulging in Online Games”.19 It states that in response to the problem of minors’ possibly excessive use of online games, strict measures should be taken to prevent this kind of behaviour. The notice required that the provision of online game services to minors be strictly limited to one hour from 8 p.m. to 9 p.m. on weekends and public holidays only. Online gaming companies such as Tencent and NetEase, game account rental and sales platforms and game live-streaming services were instructed to ban content with “wrong value orientation”, that is content that showed or promoted money worship, obscenity, violence and terror, images of “sissy-type people” (niangpao), homosexuality (danmei)20 and “other bad cultures”. Video games, it was argued, should teach “correct values” and promote core socialist values.21 In 2022, the vice-minister of the Propaganda Department of the CPC Central Committee and vice-director of the Chinese Cyberspace Administration emphasised the necessity of the “moral construction of the cyberspace” and of promoting the construction of social morality, professional ethics, family virtues, and personal morality in cyberspace” (Zhuang 2022). However, the concept of Internet civilisation is based on a combination of political censorship and social disciplining of netizens. Moral and Value Crises Rapid economic and social changes since the late 1970s, accompanied by mass migration from rural to urban areas, the dissolution of collectives (village communities and state-owned companies with a lifelong guarantee of jobs, housing and all-round social security), the commercialisation of all spheres of life and the isolation of many people in urban spaces have spawned an erosion of traditional values without new ones replacing them. So far, there has been little willingness among large sections of society to comply with state-imposed norms and rules, and there is a general lack of legal awareness. Corruption and scandals of all kinds occur frequently, and mafia-like structures are prevalent and have eroded the structures of both the party and the administration system all the way to the top. Countless laws have been passed since the 1980s, but what is still lacking is a functioning moral order. Sociologist Emile Durkheim pointed out that as long as modernity is still in its infancy and law and a legal consciousness are still overlaid by the public’s moral

106  Disciplining Processes in China ideas, the “border between what is permitted and what is prohibited”, what is right and what is not is no longer clear, but can be “shifted almost arbitrarily by the individuals. Such an imprecise and inconsistent morality” – according to Durkheim – “cannot result in discipline” (Durkheim 1893, 1992, 43). By the early 2000s, the Chinese leadership realised that it was facing a “moral crisis”. For example, in 2001 an Outline of the Central Committee of the CPC emphasised: [T]here are still many problems in the moral construction among our citizens. In some areas of society and some locations, there is a lack of morality, and the boundaries between right and wrong, good and evil, beauty and ugliness are confused. Money worship, hedonism, and extreme individualism have grown . . . Non-reliance, deceit and fraud have become social hazards, and the phenomena such as using power for personal gains and corruption are rampant. If these problems are not resolved in a timely and effective manner, they will inevitably damage the normal economic and social order as well as the overall situation of reform, development and stability. (Zhonggong Zhongyang 2001) A notice issued by the CPC’s Central Committee regarding the Outline emphasised that the “construction of socialist ideology and morality” was an important element of its content, as well as central to developing an advanced culture. This should include inheriting the traditional virtues formed by the Chinese nation for thousands of years, carrying forward the fine traditional morality established by the party . . . and learning from the successful experience of moral construction in the world. In 2011, then Prime Minister Wen Jiabao complained about corruption and food safety scandals and lamented the decay of social morality and the extremely serious loss of intra-societal trust. He noted that “if a country does not have the capacity to raise its people’s morale one absolutely cannot call such a country a real strong one and a country respected by its people”. (Wen 2011)22 A few years later, in 2014, the Chinese government once again spoke of a “serious moral crisis”, claiming that a new moral order had to be built to restore trust and social cohesion. A “culture of honesty and sincerity” should be created to encourage the authorities and all citizens to be honest and trustworthy (Guowuyuan 2014). At the same time, the “moral crisis” was reflected in a serious loss of intra-societal trust.23 A survey conducted by Chinese sociologists in the context of the World Values Survey24 (2018, 19–21) revealed a massive loss of this kind of trust, also indicating a moral crisis. According to this survey in China, 86.2% of the surveyed Chinese responded to the question whether or not they would trust unknown people they met the first time with “not at all” or “do not trust very much” (ibid.).25 Indeed, a survey conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 2017 affirmed

Disciplining Processes in China 107 that 91% of respondents had no trust at all or not much trust in people they met for the first time. The people least trusted were online shopowners (56.2%), entrepreneurs (41.2%) and cadres (33.4%) (Cui 2018, 138). In addition, two large-scale surveys in 2014, one conducted by Gao Zhaoming, Director of the Institute of Applied Ethics at Nanjing Normal University, and another by three other scholars, revealed that moral decay and loss of trust were perceived by the respondents as the most serious “social diseases” (Gao 2015; Xu, Yuan, and Tan 2014; Cheng 2015; He 2015). This was reiterated in 2018 by Huang Xianghai, a professor at the Central Party School of the CPC, in an article designated as study material for party committees. Huang noted: Money worship, hedonism, and extreme individualism have grown and spread to a certain extent. Behavioural phenomena such as moral failure, indecency, and vulgarity of all kinds repeatedly breach the minimum standards of public order and decency, generating negative effects on the promotion of the mainstream thinking, ethics, and values of the society.26 Li Yining (2015), one of the most prominent and influential Chinese economists, also spoke of “moral bankruptcy”, “hypocrisy” and moral corruption and called for a “moral renewal” of Chinese society and for the restoration of social trust as an “urgent task”. Trust-building, said Li, is required to improve the credibility of the government, which could be achieved by combatting corruption and enhancing the integrity of government officials, establishing the rule of law and paying attention to the application and implementation of laws, regulations and policies. He also proposed the introduction of a “social credit system” to enhance trust and government credibility (see Chapter 7). In this context, the traditional concepts (imaginaries) of “Chinese civilisation” and “Chinese morality” have been invigorated to give ethical and moral orientation to China’s modernity project and not only domestically: this project, it is argued, would benefit the whole world. Today, numerous Chinese intellectuals are propagating a Chinese form of universalism and moral order, based on traditional Chinese moral values (see e.g. Zhao Tingyang 2006; Xu Jilin 2015, 2017; Qiang 2018; Dreyer 2015; Wang Ban 2017; Heberer and Müller 2020).27 Political scientists Jiang Guofeng and Li Min, who investigated the current causes of the moral crisis, characterise this crisis as a “lack of social responsibility” and a “low awareness of social accountability” among members of society (Jiang and Li 2013). In 2021, Yu Keping reiterated that “trust between people has fallen below the bottom line” of society and talked about the necessity to tackle this issue.28 David Schak (2018, 70–111) depicts in detail many incidents and episodes which indicate a decline of social morality, civility and social trust and exemplify uncivilised behaviour, including lack of driver courtesy, jaywalking, distrust towards strangers, disturbing others, unwillingness to help other people, bad manners in queues and on public transport, littering, ignoring rules and laws, etc. which are well-known and do not need to be described again in this book. The explanation he offers is related to traditional suspicion towards strangers and a lack of

108  Disciplining Processes in China empathy prevalent in peasant societies, the fear that civility will not be reciprocated, the lack of a culture of charity, manners related to family minded behaviour or a lack of social mindedness. Meanwhile, acts of uncivil behaviour are publicly discussed, and the Internet has helped to spread information and encourage debate about this topic. In the end, people expect the state to pay attention to incivility and to improve social trust and social morality. Two spectacular incidents had a distinctly negative impact on the issue of intrasocietal trust: the Peng Yu case (2006/07) and the Yueyue case (2011). A 26-yearold male Peng Yu helped a 65-year-old woman in Nanjing who fell to the ground when leaving a bus and accompanied her to the hospital. Peng also covered the woman’s medical expenses. Afterwards, she blamed Peng for her fall, sued him and demanded compensation. Although she could not provide any evidence for her claim, the court sentenced Peng to pay the woman compensation of 45,877 yuan. The judge argued that it was almost inconceivable that someone would voluntarily accompany an unknown person to the hospital and even cover her hospital costs if he did not feel guilty. Although it later transpired that Peng was responsible for the incident, this case and numerous similar ones had a major negative impact on public opinion and social trust in fellow citizens (Peng Yu Undated; Huang 2016, 914–15; Young 2013). According to Huang, Zhongguo Qingnian Bao (China Youth Daily) in 2013 conducted an online poll to ascertain whether people would be willing to help senior citizens who had fallen in the street. Approximately 56% of the respondents replied that they would refrain from offering assistance for fear of extortion. Only a small minority (5.4%) answered that they would offer help without hesitation (Huang 2016, 914). The second case: in 2011, Wang Yue, a two-year-old girl in Foshan (Guangdong Province), was struck by two vans and was left lying badly hurt in the street. Both drivers absconded. For hours, no passers-by paid attention to the child. Finally, a garbage collector took her to the side of the road and informed her mother. The girl was taken to hospital where she died (Xiao Yueyue Undated; Tang 2014). The incident sparked a nationwide discussion on the value system and morality in China. As early as the 1930s, Lin Yutang drew attention to the lack of public spirit among Chinese people. Only an outsider, an outcast, a person with a “vagabond soul”, he argued, would save an unknown drowning child. Why should a man run the risk of drowning to save a child he had nothing to do with? In principle, Lin argued, such an act would even be a violation of the key Confucian virtue of filial piety, that is the obligation to take care of one’s parents by taking care of oneself and to avoid everything that might harm their feelings. If a son lost his life to save an unknown child, this would inflict harm on his parents, since he drowned for something considered unimportant in traditional Chinese society (see Lin 1936, 166–67; Kwang 2002). In light of this, it is hardly surprising that China’s political leadership speaks of the need to lay the foundations for a new moral order, to create disciplined and civilised citizens and to reinforce intra-societal trust. Three instruments have been designed to tackle the moral crisis, to create a “culture of sincerity and honesty” and morally sound, socially minded, honest citizens:29 (a) the creation of a new

Disciplining Processes in China 109 morality; (b) the “anti-corruption campaign” and (c) the so-called social credit system. It is the notion of social disciplining which is most interesting here. Regarding these case studies, it is the state’s ultimate objective to impose “external coercion” on the people to instil a kind of self-restraint and self-disciplining, a process Elias (2000) and Foucault (1995) examined with regard to Europe (see Chapter 2). In the following chapter, we will further touch upon the issue of disciplining and civilising ethnic minorities as a crucial part of both societal disciplining and nation-building. Notes 1 This resembles Prasenjit Duara’s definition of civilising as efforts bringing true and proper civilisational virtues to all (Duara 2001, 122). 2 This aspect is sometimes referred to as “spiritual civilisation” (jingshen wenming), based on “traditional Chinese culture” and centring on Confucian ideas and ethics. See “Jingshen Wenming,” accessed May 2021, https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E7%B2%B E%E7%A5%9E%E6%96%87%E6%98%8E. 3 “Shehui wenming,” accessed April 2021, https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E7%A4%BE %E4%BC%9A%E6%96%87%E6%98%8E. 4 See “Hu Jintao’s Report,” accessed May 2021, http://zqb.cyol.com/content/2007-10/16/ content_1923411.htm. 5 See “Xi’s Report,” accessed May 2021, www.gov.cn/zhuanti/2017-10/27/content_ 5234876.htm. 6 See “Xi’s Report,” accessed October 2022, www.news.cn/politics/cpc20/zb/ xhwkmh1016/wzsl.htm. Xi also emphasised the urgent need to accelerate the development of an “ecological civilisation”. In general, a book by Xi (2022b) on building a spiritual civilisation deals with this subject in detail. Therefore, it was apparently not necessary to address this issue extensively in his report, especially since his works are part of the ideological training programme for party members. 7 “Guixun yu chengfa (Discipline and Punish),” accessed June 14, 2020, https://baike. baidu.com/item/%E8%A7%84%E8%AE%AD%E4%B8%8E%E6%83%A9%E7%BD %9A%EF%BC%9A%E7%9B%91%E7%8B%B1%E7%9A%84%E8%AF%9E%E7% 94%9F/15262496?fromtitle=%E8%A7%84%E8%AE%AD%E4%B8%8E%E6%83% A9%E7%BD%9A&fromid=7713502; “Angzang de ren: zaoqi jindai deyizhi de ‘kechi qunti yu shehui guixun’ (Dirty People: Early Period of Modern Germany’s Disgraceful Community and Social Disciplining),” accessed June 2021, https://zhuanlan.zhihu. com/p/87063658. 8 Personal communication with Yu Keping, June 11, 2020. I am very grateful for his advice. However, self-discipline is sometimes also called zilüxing. 9 Jiaohua (transformed by education) was already in use in China in the 19th century to explain European civilisation. Fang (2019, 64) translated it as “moralisation”. For more on this, see Billioud and Thoraval 2007; Wu and Yang 2018; Hirono 2008, 24–26. Hirono related this notion to Confucian thought “which held that the emperor had superior morality, and that his task was to ‘educate’ people and lead them to righteousness and morality” (ibid., 26). Pines (2012, 121) translates it as “moral transformation of the people”. 10 Personal communication with Du Lun, June 11, 2020. I am very grateful for his advice. 11 In recent years, the CPC has conducted discipline education programmes for party cadres in all institutions and organisations. See, for example, “The 2021 Discipline and Discipline Education Plan,” accessed January 2022, https://wenku.baidu.com/view/46a f70c97175a417866fb84ae45c3b3566ecdd2f.html. 12 See Deng 1979.

110  Disciplining Processes in China 13 On the history of this debate, see “Shehuizhuyi jingshen wenming (Socialist Spiritual Civilisation),” Baike Baidu, accessed October 2021, https://baike.baidu.com/item/ %E7%A4%BE%E4%BC%9A%E4%B8%BB%E4%B9%89%E7%B2%BE%E7%A5 %9E%E6%96%87%E6%98%8E. 14 See “1986 nian 9yue 28ri Zhongyang tichu jiaqiang jingshen wenming jianshe (On 28 September 1986, the Central Committee Proposed Strengthening Spiritual and Civilised Construction),” accessed October 2021, www.bj148.org/wh/lssdjt/202009/ t20200928_1585254.html. 15 “Zhongyang Jingshen Wenming Jianshe Zhidao Weiyuanhui die 29jie Aolinpike yundonghui zuzhi weiyuanhui guanyu guangfan kaizhan ‘ying Aoyun, jiang wenming, shu xinfeng’ huodong de tongzhi (Notification of the Spiritual Civilisation Construction Guidance Committee and the Organising Committee of the 29th Olympic Games on the Extensive Development of ‘Welcoming the Olympics, Civilisational Speak, Building a New Style’ Activities),” 2006, accessed August 2021, http://pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form. aspx?Db=chl&Gid=ad0dacdc85a95a51bdfb&keyword=&EncodingName=7&Sea rch_Mode=&Search_IsTitle=0. 16 “Zouxiang wenming shijian xin yuezhang – gedi xin shidai wenming shijian zhongxin shidian gongzuo qude zhashi chengxiao (Play a New Chapter of Civilised Practice – the Pilot Work of the New Era Civilising Practice Center in Various Regions Has Achieved Solid Results),” November 23, 2021, accessed June 2022, www.gov.cn/­ xinwen/2021-11/23/content_5652632.htm. 17 Cf. “Shengtai Wenming (Ecological Civilisation),” Baidu Baike, accessed August 2021, https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E7%94%9F%E6%80%81%E6%96%87%E6%98 %8E/8476829; Goron 2021; Hanson 2019; Hansen, Svarverud, and Li 2018. 18 “Goujian qinglang wangluo wenhua shengtai zilü gongyue (Convention on the SelfDiscipline of Building a Clean and Sober Cyberspace Culture Ecosystem),” September 11, 2021, accessed October 2021, https://m.yicai.com/news/101170447.html. 19 “Guanyu jinyibu yange guanli qieshi fangzhi mo chengnianren chenmi wangluo youxi de tongzhi (Notice on Further Strict Management and Practically Preventing Minors from Indulging in Online Games),” August 30, 2021, accessed October 2021, www. nppa.gov.cn/nppa/contents/279/98792.shtml. 20 Both terms borrowed from Japan: niangpao from bishōnen (literally “beautiful youth”), describing a man or boy with gentle or feminine attributes. Danmei originated in Japanese manga in the early 1970s and was introduced to mainland China via Taiwanese translations of Japanese comics in the early 1990s. The term is borrowed from the Japanese word tanbi (“the pursuit of beauty”). 21 See, for example, “The Communication Between the Central Propaganda Department and Other Departments with Tencent, NetEase and Other Leading Game Companies,” accessed October 2021, www.sohu. com/a/488654277_161795. 22 The original text of his speech: “Jiang zhenhua, cha shiqing (Tell the Truth, Examine the Facts),” Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), April 18, 2011, accessed October 2021, http:// opinion.people.com.cn/GB/14411316.html. 23 For more on the issue of moral crisis, see Ci 2009, who identifies four features of this crisis: extensive breach of everyday norms; the involvement of every sector of society; the violation of very elementary norms and the fact that such violations are regarded as “increasingly normal” (20). 24 The World Values Survey (WVS) is the most comprehensive and wide-ranging survey of human values ever conducted. It is an ongoing academic project by social researchers to determine the status of sociocultural, moral, religious and political values of various cultures around the world. 25 A case study on moral distrust towards strangers is provided by Yan 2009. On strangers and moral imaginations, see Haiyan Lee 2014. On China’s moral crisis as a result of the

Disciplining Processes in China 111 reform process and the issue of freedom as a salient question in China’s quest for a better moral and political culture, see Ci 2014. 26 “Zhongxinzu xuexi cankao ziliao 2018 nian di 8 qi – zhongshi he jiaqiang dang de yishi xingtai gongzuo (Central Group Learning Reference Material, Issue 8/ 2018 – Pay Attention to and Strengthen the Party’s Ideological Work),” accessed August 2021, www.baoying.gov.cn/index.php/cms/item-view-id-45922.shtml. An English translation is available: Emphasising and Strengthening the Party’s Ideological Work, translated by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, accessed August 2021, https://­csiswebsite-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/200817_Blanchette_CPC_ Idealogical_Work.pdf. 27 In his book on Chinese core values, Chen Lai, a philosopher at Qinghua University, described the differences between “Western” and Chinese values as follows: morals are more important than laws; the social group is more important than the individual person; the spiritual is more important than the material; responsibility is more important than power and rights; the livelihood of the people is more important than the rule [by] people; order is more important than freedom; this life is more valuable than life in the hereafter; harmony is more valuable than conflict; civilisation is more valuable than poverty; and family is more important than class. See Chen Lai, Zhonghua wenming de hexin jiazhi (Core Values of Chinese Civilisation) (Beijing: Sanlian Shudian, 2015), in Tillman 2018, 1281 28 Yu Keping, “Zheng yinwei you shenchende jia guo qinghai, ta ganyu shuo yixie bieren bu gan shuode hua (Yu Keping: It Is Precisely Because He Has a Deep Sense of Family and Country That He Dares to Say Something That Others Dare Not Say),” 2022, accessed January 2022, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/l5wj_Idplj443lx6rL4adA. 29 See, for example, Li Keqiang, “Rang shixin xingwei wuchu cangshen (Loss of Trust Should Have No Place to Hide),” January 15, 2014, accessed November 2021, http:// news.sina.com.cn/c/2014-01-15/225729253494.shtml; “Li Keqiang zhuchi zhaokai guowuyuan changwu huiyi (Li Keqiang Presided Over the State Council Executive Meeting),” January 15, 2014, accessed November 2021, www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/201401/15/­content_2591053.htm.

7

The Power of Morality Disciplining and Civilising Projects – Four Case Studies

Four Case Studies This chapter examines four fields of state responsibility where in present-day China disciplining is high on the agenda: (1) the function of the state as a moral state striving to create a new social morality in urban and rural areas; (2) the fight against corruption to discipline officials; (3) the “Social Credit System” aimed at reinforcing social trust and creating a new moral order and social discipline and (4) disciplining and civilising ethnic minorities. The aim of this chapter is to illustrate how the policy of disciplining and civilising is implemented and working in practice. Case Study 1: The Moral State – Creating a “New Social Morality” A “moral state” is conceived of as a state which socialises its citizens in moral terms, with a focus on morality as “a driving force for social change and as a basis for stability and legitimacy in political life” (Wilson 1974, xiii). As mentioned earlier, a “new morality”, moral politics, and discipline are to be created and implemented by the Chinese developmental state in a top-down manner. One intention of the CPC in claiming to figure as a moral leader of the Chinese people is to reinforce the party’s moral legitimacy. In the late 1990s, a central “Spiritual Civilisation Guidance Committee” was set up under the party’s Central Committee, along with Spiritual Civilisation Offices to coordinate and implement civilising policies at each government level. Various measures were taken in pursuit of this goal, including the adoption of an “Action Plan for the Development of Citizen Morality” (gongmin daode jianshe shishi gangyao) by the political leadership in 2001 (Zhonggong Zhongyang 2001). Values such as “patriotism and compliance with the law”, “honesty and personal integrity”, “solidarity and friendliness”, “working hard and improving oneself continuously” and “cherishing one’s work and being respectful” were at that time the focus of this campaign (see, for example, the propaganda poster in Figure 7.1).1 In 2003, the Central Committee’s “Commission for the Development of a Spiritual Civilisation” published a new document setting out various measures for implementing this action plan. In the document, 20 September was declared the “Day for Promoting Morality of Citizens”. The propaganda poster campaigned specifically DOI: 10.4324/9781003353065-7

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Figure 7.1  Propaganda poster for the “Day of Propagating Citizen Morality” Source: Photo by the author.

114  The Power of Morality for the “development of a new citizen morality” and highlighted the official “Day of Propagating Citizen Morality”.2 In November 2004, Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), the official daily newspaper of the Central Committee of the CPC, even set up a special column for “discussing the development of a [new] morality”. And in 2008, a “Central Commission for Guiding the Construction of Spiritual Civilisation” was established to shape public opinion and create institutions for voluntary social activities.3 This programme aimed to construct “rule by virtue” and a new way of thinking (sixiang jianshe), a new morality (daode) and a “scientific culture” (kexue wenhua). “New humans” displaying a “high quality” (gao suzhi) should be created, characterised as “Four Have Citizens” (si you gongmin), that is people with high moral standards, noble ideals and a high level of education and discipline.4 This programme sounded rather abstract, and the concept of “civilising” did not play a major role in the documents concerned. People representing these “new humans” were highlighted as “role models”. Role models from which people should learn have always been important in China. According to Confucianism, ideal rulers and ideal officials should serve as moral paragons for the people. This notion of “rule by social example” (Pye 1985, 42) has been maintained by the CPC. By identifying with such role models, the people should continuously discipline themselves. Throughout the People’s Republic, we find a broad variety of role models (model workers, heroes, model peasants, individuals “serving the people”, etc.) who enjoyed high esteem (M. Zhang 1999; Wei 2019; J. Zhang 2019; Becker 2002, 248–49). Since the early 1960s, the aforementioned model soldier Lei Feng has been and remains one of the most prominent role models (see e.g. Jeffreys 2009, 2016; Pan 2018; Gao and Bischoping 2019). The idea behind “models” was that citizens should learn to distinguish between “good” and “bad”, in relation to both actions and people, thus encouraging disciplining and the adoption of more civilised behaviour. In 2015, Xi Jinping specifically emphasised the role of moral models for civilising the people: To give full play to role models, leading cadres, public figures, and advanced models must set a good example for the whole society and serve as models, thus guiding and promoting all people to establish a sense of civility, strive to become civilised citizens, and display a civilised image. (Xi 2015) Here, “civility” refers to a specific kind of social behaviour.5 It is related not only to politeness, benevolence, amenity and good behaviour but also to social virtues such as tolerance, respect, compliance, empathy and treating people equally, volunteering, compassion, humanity and philanthropy. Schak (2018, 7) defines it as “recognising others as fellow beings with whom one shares humanness, assuming that, in general, they have no ill intent towards others”. In rural societies, a general distrust towards outsiders existed, and Chinese people – in common with many pre-modern cultures – were traditionally “family-minded not socially minded” (ibid., 23). Society did not play a major role in people’s minds.

The Power of Morality 115 A further interesting point in the context of disciplining and civilising is the concept of suzhi (quality) and suzhi jiaoyu (quality education) put forward since the 1990s. In official statements, people who are insufficiently civilised or disciplined are characterised as possessing “low quality” (suzhi di) (Bakken 2000, 66–72, 304–10; Anagnost 2004; Kipnis 2006). Arguably, the concept displays various facets. As Huang (2016, 110) has shown, the two characters of the term suzhi, “innate” and “character”, refer “to both innate and nurtured qualities” covering “moral, physical, psychological and intellectual aspects of human individuals and their conduct”.6 Suzhi in this sense refers to “civilised” behaviour or, from the perspective of the state, to modernity and self-discipline (see e.g. Yan 2003, 494). People should endeavour to improve their suzhi by adjusting their behaviour and that of others (Murphy 2004). Suzhi education, in turn, emphasises the task of raising a student’s personal qualities (Wen 2019). The state’s role in this context should commence during childhood and follow government guidelines, thus becoming part and parcel of both parental education and education programmes in kindergartens and schools (Kuan 2015, 37–52). The suzhi concept is part of the state’s power concept. It should figure as an instrument for creating new forms of social control, new patterns of rationality and enforcing new norms and standards of behaviour in the sense of “civilising the minds” of the people. Concurrently, suzhi serves as an argument used by the state to “excuse many things not getting done or not getting done well” by blaming locals for poverty and backwardness,7 not only Han people (China’s ethnic majority) but also ethnic minorities. The “Socialist Core Values” (Shehuizhuyi hexin jiazhiguan)

Under Xi Jinping, the “Socialist Core Values” were declared to be key benchmarks for future behaviour and a new morality.8 These values, characterised by the CPC as “a set of moral principles”9 to cultivate responsible citizens and to boost social ethics (Cao 2018), were promoted by the CPC after its 18th Party Congress in 2012 (Yuan 2008). The values encompass 12 (partly very abstract) points: wealth and strength; democracy; civilisation; harmony; freedom; equality; justice; governing by law; patriotism; devotion (to work); credibility and friendliness. They are propagated almost everywhere in public spaces, in the streetscape, in public buildings, educational institutions, offices, on banners and in short videos and even on small cards placed on restaurant tables. They were introduced since China had “lost its moral compass during its threedecade economic miracle” (Yuan 2008). Originally, they were developed in the Hu-Wen period (2002–2012) as part of the “essence of socialist ideology” (ibid.). After Xi Jinping came to power, the focus shifted towards creating a new type of morality and discipline. The 12 values embody a mixture of Chinese values (such as harmony, patriotism, devotion and credibility) and “Western” ones (democracy, freedom, civilisation) and what are understood as “Marxist” core values (freedom, equality, justice). However, terms such as democracy and freedom are defined and

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Figure 7.2  The “Socialist Core Values” Source: Photo by the author (Beijing).

Figure 7.3  A public poster explaining one of the socialist “core values” (here: freedom) Source: Photo by the author (Beijing).

interpreted differently from “Western” concepts by the CPC.10 Democracy in this sense stands for “socialist democracy”, which – so the argument goes – already exists in the current political system (keyword: “people’s sovereignty”) but should be strengthened in future. Freedom, in turn, is primarily understood as freedom of the collective, of the community or of the state, not of the individual. This signifies that the “socialist core values” are first and foremost based on the party leadership’s interpretation of socialist–Marxist and Chinese “values”. At the same time, Xi emphasises that these core values are rooted in China’s “excellent traditional culture”.11

The Power of Morality 117 In 2020, a further campaign was announced, this time to enshrine the “socialist core values” in each family. Families, it was argued, have a crucial civilising function since they are “the first classroom in life, and parents are the children’s first teachers”. Xi Jinping was quoted as saying that the country and the nation are in order only if families are in order, a very traditional Confucian concept. Families, specifically females, were called upon to develop good conduct and habits and pass “good morality” on to their children, thus establishing “civilised families” (Gow 2017; Shen 2020). At least half of these core values are related to the topical field of social discipline: civilisation (self-awareness in terms of civilised behaviour); harmony (in the sense of peaceable social behaviour); respect for other people; dedication to work (i.e. working discipline); trustworthiness and friendliness, for while they refer to individual behaviour, they are also intended to help rebuild social trust. However, the values are formulated in such a general way that there is significant room for interpretation. In the end, the state figures as a “moral state” which aims to establish new social values in a top-down manner, ultimately in the interests of disciplining and civilising society. In September 2021, guidelines released by the Chinese authorities called for the establishment of a coordination mechanism to integrate core socialist values into the development of the rule of law and legal regulations. The formulation of departmental regulations, judicial interpretation documents, internal party regulations and social norms should “fully reflect the content and requirements of the core socialist values”. The departments concerned should ensure that legislative items uphold these values and are in conformity with laws and regulations to “reflect the value goals of the country, the value orientation of society, and the value norms of citizens”.12 In Chinese tradition, morality and law were always closely interrelated. Both should guide human behaviour and action and stabilise social order. By translating these moral values into legal provisions, the state is attempting to make these values more socially acceptable and enforceable. The CPC has also brought its propaganda tools up to date in the meantime by using rap music for youngsters, cartoon videos for children and film sketches for adults to promote the socialist core values, new habits and modes of civilised behaviour.13 Urban Civilising Rules

Since 2011, a programme to select “National Civilised Cities” (quanguo wenming chengshi) has been in existence, whereby cities that meet the corresponding catalogue of criteria are awarded this title and thus become “model cities”. The catalogue is quite specific and comprehensive and includes the following points: • • • •

An aesthetically beautiful and at the same time practical cityscape Cleanliness and exemplary hygiene in all areas High degree of greening and environmental standards Civilised behaviour of the population in public and in families

118  The Power of Morality • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Ban on smoking in public places and workplaces Civilised behaviour in museums, libraries, memorial halls etc. Civilised behaviour of drivers and pedestrians in traffic No traffic jams Civilised behaviour at bus stops and on public transport Prohibition of driving under the influence of alcohol Making seats available on public transport for the elderly, disabled, sick, pregnant women and parents of babies and small children Friendliness towards foreigners and responsive to their questions >90% satisfaction of the population with the city government and public administration >90% satisfaction of the population with the efficiency of combatting corruption >75% satisfaction of the population with the education system >70% of the population participates in greening activities >60% satisfaction of the population with the public transport system

According to government sources, central authorities should periodically assess whether a city still meets the eligibility criteria for this honour. The following methods should be deployed for this purpose: verbal reports, review of documentation, questionnaires, Internet surveys, on-site inspections and overall observation. Whether these methods actually produce realistic results is almost impossible to verify without local research.14 Moreover, in almost every city, disciplinary regimes are emerging. In 2019, the author visited the city of Anyang in Henan Province where references to the local “civilising contract” (wenming gongyue) were found all over the city. The “contract” encompassed 36 items, including “love one’s work”, “obey discipline”, “abide by the law”, “pay attention to the collective”, “respect elderly people and love children”, “change old habits and customs”, “work conscientiously and meticulously”, “cherish public property and respect teachers”, “lead a healthy life”, “be honest and keep to promises”, “take up the cudgels for a just cause”, “warm-hearted charity”, “respect females”, “family planning”, “preserve stability”, “improve one’s inner qualities” and “find it a pleasure to help others”. Many of these slogans are historical idioms, including some from Confucian classics. Civilising or social disciplining is thus linked to “traditional Chinese values” in contrast to “Western” ones, so as to make them more acceptable to the Chinese people. The state’s drive to ensure compliance with civilising rules, promote social morality, family virtues and professional ethics and accentuate “personal character building” by individuals themselves is connected to its aspiration of “inheriting the excellent traditional Chinese culture” since this kind of civilising and disciplining is strongly linked to “Chinese values” and their legacy and points to the Sinicisation of disciplining in contrast to “Western” disciplining values. In March 2020, the People’s Congress of Beijing adopted the “Regulations of Beijing City for Promoting Civilised Behaviour (draft)”, after having requested online comments by citizens for several months in advance. Among other things, these regulations address and impose fines on “uncivilised behaviour” such as littering, spitting,

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Figure 7.4  Civility contract of Anyang City Source: Photo by the author (Anyang, Henan Province).

smoking in non-smoking areas, non-compliance with waste separation provisions, noise disturbance, wasting water, electricity or gas and failure to observe rules aimed at controlling the Covid-19 pandemic. The Regulations also refer to “uncivilised behaviour” relating to traffic and travel, weddings and funerals, Internet activities,

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Figure 7.5  Core value “Civility” This poster, one of 12 introducing the concepts of the “12 Socialist Core Values” and referring to “civility” (wenming), was found on a wall close to an entrance to Peking University in spring 2019. It depicts a child in traditional costume who seems to be calmly playing a traditional plucked seven-string Chinese musical instrument, a fingerboard zither, which symbolises the connection between traditional and present-day values and shows that these values are part of the ancient Chinese civilisation. Source: Photo by the author (Beijing).

hospitals, public places, etc.15 The ultimate purpose is to improve social morality, individuals’ moral character, public order and citizens’ interaction with each other.16 The final Regulations, officially implemented from 1 June 2020, cover nine major fields: (1) Public Health: clean and hygienic toilets, no illegal dumping of waste, no smoking in non-smoking areas, wearing masks to prevent infection; (2) Public Order: be polite in everyday behaviour, wait in line, do not eat in the subway; (3) Traffic Safety, including correct parking of cars and bicycles; (4) Community Harmony: no noise disturbance, take care of pets; (5) Civilised Tourism: respect customs and rules in tourist areas; (6) Viewing exhibitions in a civilised way; (7) Internet Civilisation: don’t stir up hate in the cyberspace; rational online posting; avoid cyber violence; do not spread rumours; (8) Medical Order: respect medical treatment arrangements and medical personnel; (9) Ecological and Environmental Protection.17 In a similar vein, the regulations adopted by the government of Shenzhen city (January 2020) include points such as “refraining from buying or selling illegal

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Figure 7.6  Uncivilised behaviour: sleeping during office hours Source: Photo by the author (Sichuan Province).

wildlife products”, an effect of the Covid-19 pandemic. They also encourage people to actively contribute to public welfare or charity activities. Philanthropy – that is voluntary donations to the socially vulnerable, welfare and charity activities in response to disasters, and poverty alleviation – is a specific area which the government urges wealthy people to contribute to.18 This request by the state may also be understood as a kind of disciplining and self-disciplining measure with the purpose of encouraging people to share their wealth with the disadvantaged. The fact that there are relatively large local differences in priorities is illustrated, for example, by a notification from the provincial capital of Fuzhou (Fujian Province) regarding the 2022 priorities for “building a spiritual civilisation”. Its provisions include: • Civilising traffic behaviour: government vehicles are not allowed to run red lights; they must give priority to pedestrians at zebra crossings; pedestrians must stop at red lights when crossing roads; helmets must be worn when cycling. • Civilised table manners: pay attention to hygiene (wash hands before eating), be frugal when ordering food; no food waste; use public chopsticks and spoons; do not eat wild animals. • Every cadre should participate in Fuzhou’s “Civilised Table Culture Week”. • Encourage voluntary and honorary activities by all citizens, with more and better training for volunteers.19

122  The Power of Morality The following examples illustrate that the disciplining and civilising process embraces all fields of life and all social groups. Etiquette ( liyi)

Etiquette characterises a set of rules of conduct in a society and refers to classspecific expectations of behaviour. For Norbert Elias, the corresponding rules of behaviour were part of both social control and exercising self-control. The subjugation of the public to these rules is, at the same time, an integral part of the general social disciplining process. In the course of the modernising process, the structure of individuals changes: they become more civilised. As mentioned earlier, according to Elias, “the personality structure of the individual changes without changing the nature of the human being” (Elias 1989a, vol. I, LXIV–LXV). The Western term “etiquette” derives from the French word étiquette and originally referred to behaviour at the royal court. The Chinese term liyi (礼仪), which followed the Japanese translation of the European term, refers to (Confucian) rituals and ceremonies. The Western and Chinese terms thus differ considerably in their original meaning. China is well known as a society of etiquette and ceremonies. Today, table order and manners, seating arrangements, alcohol consumption at banquets and celebrations, procedures and conduct at weddings, funerals and birth ceremonies and giftgiving behaviour and so on are regulated in great detail. Since ancient times, there has been a fixed system of behaviour and etiquette, which – due to Confucian influences – follow strict hierarchical rules. From a Western perspective, Bruno Navarra, who in the second half of the 19th century spent more than 20 years in China, described the significance of the traditional Chinese etiquette as follows: [Y]et there can be no nation in which the forms of etiquette are held in higher esteem, and in which the deliberate neglect of them is more ill received, than among the Chinese. The value of politeness in the Middle Kingdom is evident from the Chinese proverb: “To please your superiors and govern the people, there is nothing better than politeness.” (Navarra 1901, 264–65) In our context, it is not important to present etiquette in its variety and detail, especially as its rules are continuously changing and are also influenced by foreign notions of good conduct. Etiquette culture in the Confucian sense, however, referred only to the upper class and not to the vast majority of the people. The Mao era with its emphasis on peasant and proletarian behaviour, especially the Cultural Revolution and the opening up towards the outside world from the 1980s onwards, led to an erosion of traditional forms of etiquette and the partial adoption of Western forms of politeness. Only in recent decades have there been attempts by the state to reinforce social and individual forms of etiquette and politeness. Among other things, they are part of the civilising process and urban civilising rules.

The Power of Morality 123 Living under modern conditions with modern lifestyles in urban areas and in an international environment also requires modern and civilised manners and an associated etiquette. This – according to a Chinese online platform for young ­people – includes not only adapting to changing social morals and etiquette but also ensuring harmonious relationships in the family and in interpersonal relations, an ecological ethics of behaviour and no longer merely hierarchical subordination. Therefore, the renewal and popularisation of a new etiquette are an essential part of the creation of what is called a spiritual civilisation. This is also intended to create stronger cohesion within society and the entire nation and leads to the emergence of a civic morality and the development of new ethical personalities. In China, it is argued that etiquette is a “core content of Chinese traditional culture” and “an essential part of national and social integration and of China’s civilising process”.20 Rapid urbanisation and commercialisation processes – so the argument goes – have eroded these traditions and weakened them in urban and rural areas alike. In the interests of a modern society with Chinese features, the Chinese traditional culture of etiquette and the socialist core value system should be integrated, since both are essential elements of social civilising and civility. Etiquette should be reinforced throughout society, in families and in educational institutions.21 It is precisely the positive aspects of these traditions, such as ethical family socialisation, neighbourly help, festive cultures, caring for the elderly and social etiquette as a whole, which need to be strengthened. The popularisation of an etiquette culture is conceived of as the cornerstone for good governance based on virtue and morality. Its formation should also be fostered within Chinese businesses, with large state-owned enterprises serving as role models.22 As early as 2011, the Chinese Ministry of Education decided to carry out civilising etiquette education in primary and secondary schools, with a focus on combining traditional forms with modern socialist morality. The aim was to support students’ psychological development and promote good morals and civilised behaviour by encouraging them to internalise this etiquette, thus laying the foundation for a civilised life among the younger generations. Beyond the educational institutions, the social environment in which people live and work (neighbourhood communities, villages, enterprises etc.) and families should also be included in this education. For primary schools, the Ministry stated that the educational goal is to “focus on cultivating civilised habits of the students, to master basic etiquette and etiquette norms, and initially develop good habits of civility, hygiene, order and public morality in learning and life practice”. For junior high school students, the educational objective is that students develop civilised habits and understand the significance of civilised etiquette. Education should enhance awareness of civilised wording and behaviour to encourage students’ development into civilised people. They should “be able to consciously regulate their behaviour and improve their personal quality” – an essentially Confucian notion. High school students, in turn, should in principle “understand the origin and connotation of etiquette” and “cultivate an optimistic, open-minded and

124  The Power of Morality positive character, a sense of responsibility for the family, society and the nation, and establish a social civic consciousness”. Etiquette education for the young generation is regarded as a core element of civilising and disciplining. In China, students’ etiquette also means that they should develop a sense of what type of personal conduct is appropriate in a variety of settings, for instance by obeying classroom discipline, maintaining good behaviour towards parents and elders, dressing appropriately, respecting teachers and observing good table manners, traffic etiquette, etiquette in public, etc.23 The following catalogue of learning objectives for etiquette education sheds light on the Ministry’s objectives: Grades 1–3 in Primary Schools

(1) Personal etiquette Become familiar with polite expressions Master a correct body posture, develop good habits of sitting, standing and walking and maintain a correct reading and writing posture Know how to keep clothes neat and tidy, to love cleanliness and pay attention to hygiene (2) Communication etiquette Be able to communicate with others properly Know how to respect parents and be polite to elderly people Respect teachers and their profession Take care of others, help each other and get along well Become familiar with the basic etiquette of hospitality Abide by rules and regulations, talk softly and do not disturb others Obey public transport rules and pay attention to traffic lights on red Master the etiquette relating to ceremonies such as the Young Pioneer24 team etiquette Grades 4–6 in Primary Schools

(1) Personal etiquette Master polite expressions such as greeting, thanking or apologising Master common body language such as smiling, nodding and bowing Understand the etiquette of our country’s traditional festivals Understand and respect the customs of ethnic minorities (2) Communication etiquette Honour parents and elderly people Learn to listen to others Become familiar with the basic etiquette at the table and eat in a civilised manner Master polite expressions for phone calls

The Power of Morality 125 Abide by etiquette norms in public spaces, behave in a civilised manner when travelling, behave as civilised customers, civilised passengers and a civilised audience The Main Content of Civilised Etiquette Education in Junior High School

(1) Personal etiquette Understand both the basic meaning of etiquette and the significance of learning etiquette Master the etiquette requirements when chatting with people Dress in an appropriate and decent manner Understand the basic etiquette when communicating with non-Chinese Master the etiquette of speaking in public (2) Communication etiquette Understand one’s parents, know how to be grateful to them Master the etiquette of phoning and writing emails, text messages and letters Abide by relevant rules and requirements during collective activities Master the basic etiquette with regard to visiting and receiving other people and be able to communicate with others in a cordial and generous manner Master the etiquette of interacting with classmates of the opposite sex Be tolerant and courteous to others Learn how to communicate in a civilised manner in public places without disturbing others Main Content of Senior High School Civilised Etiquette Education

(1) Personal etiquette Understand the function of etiquette, as well as its connotations and essence Understand the relationship between etiquette and self-cultivation Master the principles and art of communication and personal appearance in various circumstances (2) Communication etiquette Master the etiquette requirements for introducing someone and oneself in various situations Master the etiquette requirements of shaking hands in various situations Master the etiquette requirements of speeches and debates Maintain an appropriate distance from people in public places, such as queues and elevators Master basic foreign etiquette25 A 2022 report on civilised etiquette education activities at a north-eastern college illustrates that these education activities are organised in a campaign-like manner

126  The Power of Morality comprising four stages: making the annual activities public and mobilising teachers and students; teaching etiquette norms; practising these norms and summarising the results of the campaign.26 Educational institutions even conduct etiquette competitions, which are considered to be part of the national “civilising project”.27 Currently, there is a great demand for “etiquette courses”, especially among the spouses of entrepreneurs and managers. This is partly due to the fact that a considerable number of these spouses come from rather uneducated backgrounds and therefore seek training in etiquette, especially when their husbands (or they themselves) are preparing to spend a longer period of time abroad for professional reasons. The participants – so the argument goes – have the feeling that they need to prove to the world that they are not vulgar, money-making upstarts but instead polite and highly literate. They are learning how to peel an orange gracefully, how to hold a fork to eat an oyster, and how to pronounce luxury brands correctly.28 These courses can be extremely expensive and teach both Western and Chinese manners and behaviour.29 In courses for women, participants learn “superior social etiquette”, such as organising and hosting banquets, social skills, diplomatic etiquette and how to behave in luxury hotels and restaurants. Courses are also available for unmarried women over 16 years who wish to be prepared for the search for a potential husband; among other things, they learn how introduce themselves and how to speak and dress appropriately when on a date.30 This section spells out that the discussion on etiquette is closely linked to the civilising process and thus to social disciplining. At the same time, the standardisation of manners and behaviour is supposed to benefit the strengthening of national integration and national identity and is thus part of the nation-building process. At present, it is primarily the urban middle class, above all entrepreneurs, for whom economic success has led to prosperity and social standing and who are trying to adapt themselves and their family members to modern standards of behaviour. The economic elite thus plays a forerunner role here. Among the political upper class, the common practice is to send their children to be educated in elite schools, where there is a constant emphasis on the teaching of civilised conduct, and this has left a lasting mark on the behaviour of this element of the younger generation. As the aforementioned regulations of the Ministry of Education make clear, such standards of conduct should now be adopted throughout society via the education system in both urban and rural areas. The written form of these regulations, however, does not convey any information on how this educational endeavour is to be implemented and what effect it is likely to have on the younger generations. The following example is part of etiquette and civilising education and illustrates in a tangible way how the political leadership envisages the campaign to popularise individual civilisation processes and etiquette rules.

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Figure 7.7  Chinese book on etiquette for females under 20 Source: Photo by the author (Beijing).

Disciplining of Eating Habits and the Entertainment Sector

The “empty plate movement” (guangpan yundong) which emerged in 2020 is a further example of the CPC’s disciplining effort. It aims to change not only the general public’s dietary and eating habits but also the behaviour of cadres by urging them to become role models in avoiding food waste and promoting frugality.31 According to a 2020 Renmin Ribao article, 12% of the food served at mealtimes is wasted while the figure for large banquets is 38%. The article warns that people should be aware of the need to promote food security, especially during crises such as the Covid-19 pandemic (Xiong Jian 2020). In August 2020, the Chinese leadership called upon senior cadres at the central level to take the lead in reducing food waste. They were urged to curb food waste

128  The Power of Morality in their canteens, promote the “empty plate programme” among their subordinates and improve the recycling of kitchen waste. Extravagance and waste at official receptions and banquets should in future be avoided.32 A large number of organisations subsequently adopted similar measures. For example, in Anhui Province, the staff of a food chain put food-saving reminders on each table to encourage diners to be frugal with food. In August 2020, the China Business Federation, China Chain Store & Franchise Association, China Cuisine Association, China Hotel Association and Meituan Dianping (China’s largest ­service-focused e-commerce platform) jointly launched the “Proposal on Stopping Food Waste and Cultivating Saving Habits” for the national catering industry, including various requirements relating to the ordering of food. “By using corporate propaganda screens, official accounts, mini programmes, live broadcasts, etc.”, the “Proposal” intends to strengthen “civilised behaviour” in food ordering. It also suggests that catering companies should take disciplinary steps against violations. During the ordering process, they should urge customers to refrain from ordering excessive quantities. If orders for buffets are likely to result in waste, catering companies should inform customers in advance that additional fees for such orders will be charged.33 In Liaoning Province, a restaurant association urged its members to adopt a model by which less food is ordered than would be customary for the size of the group: for example, a group of ten customers wishing to dine together would only be permitted to order meals for eight people.34 And the All-China Women’s Federation urged housewives to be mindful of the need to avoid waste when purchasing food35 – to mention just two of many examples from across the country. In addition, religious organisations called on their followers to support the campaign. In August  2020, nine official religious associations (including ­Buddhist, Daoist, Islamic and Christian organisations) in Shanghai published a joint

Figure 7.8 Sign on tables in restaurants encouraging economical use of food (Zhengzhou, Henan Province) The sign says: Eat Meals in a Civilised Way. Maintain Frugality and Morality. Source: Photo by the author.

The Power of Morality 129 document calling on believers to support the campaign and emphasising that this was part of a “dining table civilisation” (canzhuo wenming) project.36 Numerous religious associations at city and provincial level across China issued similar statements. Since the early 1990s, the state has expected official religious organisations to provide moral education for their believers to encourage them to contribute to a well-ordered society and develop individual morality (see e.g. Zhao, Zhiyi 2007). Although the rationale behind this campaign is also related to the fear that China might experience food shortages in future (e.g. due to a Western food embargo), such measures figure as part of the overall disciplining process. The “Spiritual Civilisation Construction Commissions” of the localities concerned are responsible for their implementation. In November 2021, the Chinese leadership issued an “action plan” on saving food to prevent a potential food shortage and push forward the Food Waste Law adopted in April 2021, underscoring the necessity of saving food. It also urged the catering sector and canteens to offer small food portions and advise customers on ordering and monitoring the purchasing and use of food.37 A further example is the strict disciplining of the entertainment sector. In September 2021, the CPC’s Central Propaganda Department published a document on “large-scale rectification” of the film and television sector and the decadent behaviour and lifestyles of artists and fan groups to curb moral decay. According to the document, “unethical behaviour” such as encouraging money worship, hedonism or extreme individualism by online celebrities, sky-high payments for artists, “abnormal aesthetics”, declining morality, “vulgar” forms of entertainment, tax evasion and so on have a negative impact on society, especially on young people. Such activities should immediately cease. In addition, the management of celebrity fan groups should be improved and unethical artists punished. The document also pointed out that self-discipline in this sector and the functioning of professional ethics committees needed to improve. Artists and fans were called upon to display “loyalty” towards the party38 and to eradicate “corrupt behaviour” in the entertainment sector.39 The Moral State and Urban Neighbourhood Communities (shequ)

The government (state) figures in this context as a moral state that attempts to implement new institutional patterns in the form of moral standards. In an empirical study, Kuan and Lau (2002, 304) revealed that commencing in the 1990s, many citizens in the People’s Republic held the government responsible for the moral decay of society. Accordingly, people who took this view expected the government to counter this decay by instituting new moral standards. Therefore, the state’s endeavours to improve moral standards within society, and in neighbourhoods in particular, must be understood as a response to criticism of the government for the breakdown of morality and its responsibility to provide a remedy. High expectations exist within the public at large with regard to a “moral renewal of society” spearheaded by the party. A 2004 study among household heads in Shanghai’s shequ revealed that 69.8% of respondents considered knowledge and

130  The Power of Morality education to be the most important overall goals for their children (coming in at a distant second, the next most important goal was having good morals, with 19.5%); only 4.2% named achieving material wealth (money) as most important. The absolute majority (81%) believed that education by the party (meaning, in this instance, the state) was the most important factor. Confucian ethics ranked second (21.3%) (Zhang, Huanhua 2004). These responses also reveal the public’s expectations of the party state’s role and could be interpreted to mean that the government must do more in relation to imparting values. In urban areas, neighbourhood communities figure as grassroots organisations for disciplining and civilising. Following their establishment in the late 1990s, they were understood by the government inter alia as an instrument for educating residents in “civilised behaviour” and “moral development” and for elevating their “moral quality” (Meng and Bai 2006; Shi and Zhuo 2006; Tang, Chongxin 2006). The media and scholarly publications continuously emphasised that the evolution of public morals and the public’s social awareness are “central factors” and goals of shequ development.40 Accordingly, the top-down creation of a new morality is a key element of what is known as “neighbourhood community-building”. In June  2004, then Vice-Minister Chen Jichang of the Ministry of Civil Affairs emphasised that the “development of morals”, especially among the young generation, was a central part of shequ development. He further noted that families, schools and shequ had to work together closely in order to accomplish this task.41 In 2018, the “Organic Law of the PR of China on Urban Residents Committees” stipulated that the “construction of a spiritual civilisation” was a core aspect of creating “civilised cities” and civilised urban communities.42 The instruments for accomplishing this goal included the shequs’ “public conventions” (gongyue), which are intended to inform residents on how to behave. In these conventions, citizens declare their willingness to comply with certain moral standards of behaviour in the neighbourhood and towards other residents:43 mutual respect and assistance, good relations with neighbours, organising conflict mediation, refraining from any kind of domestic abuse of women or children, opposing superstition and uncivilised behaviour, abiding by the laws and regulations, etc. (Shequ jumin gongyue 2018; Ho 2008, 1162–63). Reports pointed to the existence of the “Seven Nots” in some shequ: “Not to spit; Not to litter; Not to damage public property; Not to damage the greenery; Not to jaywalk; Not to smoke in public places; Not to use foul language”. In addition, neighbourhood communities should eliminate the “Six Disorderlinesses”, among them spitting and littering; leaving one’s laundry outside to dry and gambling in public spaces. In many shequ, a brief code of ethics consisting of 20 characters was displayed in public, exhorting residents to love the fatherland and observe all laws; be courteous, honest and sincere; show solidarity and be friendly; be industrious, frugal and progressive; have respect for work and make sacrifices, among other things. It is primarily patriotism, the internalisation of moral values through propaganda campaigns, social control and the conscientious compliance with required standards and official instructions which are supposed to result in the development of a “civic morality”.44 It is no longer the morality of new “socialist humans” that is at

The Power of Morality 131 stake but a new morality of “citizens”. Chinese neighbourhood communities thus differ from similar Western institutions. There is, however, a greater similarity with Japanese neighbourhood associations. As the handling of the 2020/2021 Covid-19 pandemic has demonstrated, the existence of neighbourhood communities with fixed external boundaries, in the form of high walls and access controlled by security guards, has helped to isolate residents from the outside world and thus played a crucial role in fighting the pandemic. A report from Zhejiang University illustrates how this response was organised at the local level in Zhejiang Province: this involved close collaboration between local residents’ communities, local authorities, business associations and hospitals, activities classified as intensified co-production. Neighbourhood communities in particular were requested to play an active role in recruiting volunteers, organising infection prevention/control and providing welfare services. Volunteers traced the sources and spread of Covid-19, collected donations, organised temperature checks at entrances, delivered food to people in quarantine, provided psychological counselling and urged residents to observe social distancing, to behave in a self-disciplined manner and to abide by the rules. According to Chinese authors, this kind of co-production reinforced social trust and helped to prevent the spread of the virus (see Cheng et al. 2020).45 The existence of such communities also contributed to the development of a shared identity, reinforced by neighbourhood anthems and other symbols. Shared identity, in turn, makes collective behaviour, for example during pandemics and lockdowns, much easier. The Covid-19 crisis showed that social control and social disciplining in China’s urban areas seemingly functioned well and were highly effective in curbing the pandemic in the early phase (see Chapter 1). Civilising Rural Areas Since the 2000s: “Building a Socialist New Countryside”

Whereas in urban areas, hundreds of thousands of volunteers guarded the entrances to neighbourhoods, assisted in monitoring compliance with quarantine rules and carried out temperature checks, less is known about how Covid-19 was tackled in rural areas. Chinese investigations reveal that in areas where traditional organisations such as clans or temple organisations still play a prominent role, it was apparently easier to contain the spread of the virus. The expectation of compliance with clan rules certainly affects the behaviour of clan members.46 Furthermore, villages proved to be quite resourceful in the measures they adopted. Tang et al. show that in villages in some parts of Henan Province, a scoring system was established to guarantee compliance with pandemic control rules. People over the age of 65 who had achieved the maximum scores of 50 points received a quarterly bonus payment of 50 yuan. A similar system rewarded village cadres who succeeded in preventing the spread of the virus. In addition, clan elders were included in the village leadership groups that were responsible for pandemic prevention and the disciplining of clan members who were reluctant to comply with the rules (Tan, Song, and Liu 2021).

132  The Power of Morality In a more general sense, disciplining and civilising rural areas to lead peasants to “civility” and modernity has been a key policy since the 1950s. In particular, the purpose of the “Building a Socialist New Countryside” programme (Shehuizhuyi xin nongcun jianshe) in rural areas, initiated by the Chinese leadership in 2005, aimed to reform social conditions and the mindset of the rural population. Originally, the central leadership provided only 20 Chinese characters to spell out the programme: developing [agrarian] production; good living conditions for rural people; creating a civilised countryside and neat and tidy villages and a democratic village administration.47 Local cadres at county and township level were assigned a forerunner role in implementing this policy programme. The CPC attempted to present its cadre contingent as leading figures with a higher level of education and civilised behaviour who were to train the village cadres and villagers in discipline, morality and civilised conduct. The local cadres saw themselves as agents and representatives of the modernising and civilising project at the local level. Stig Thogersen, for example, describes a campaign to improve the hygiene of village toilets in a county in Yunnan Province in the early 2000s: The transformation of the toilets from 1998 till today has been carried out level by level from the top down. The leaders of the county Party committee have frequently gone down to the villages to direct the work. The township mayor and officials in charge have regularly inspected the quality and strictly supervised and urged the work . . . The reform of the toilets answers the need to develop human civilisation, the need of the health of the people, and the need of the construction of a spiritual civilisation. (Thøgersen 2003, 221) The flip side of the idea that many local cadres were believed to be of higher suzhi than rural people, be it peasants, ordinary workers or petty entrepreneurs, and that villagers needed to be “civilised” or “disciplined”, spawned a sense of cadres’ superiority vis-à-vis the rural population. Their “civilising mission” was encapsulated in the concept that they had to take the lead in developing a locality. Suzhi is indeed a meaningful element in the daily lives of cadres, who used it to draw strict boundaries between themselves and the rural populace. As the director of an office in Suining City, Sichuan Province, told the author with regard to villagers and within earshot of the people around: The quality [suzhi] of these people is extremely low. They understand neither our standard Chinese [Putonghua] nor the world. If they are watching TV and see a couple having sexual intercourse they won’t even understand what is happening.48 Civilising processes in rural areas since the 1950s have targeted not only “uncivilised behaviour” but also local customs and manners classified as “backward” or “feudal”. To take Sara L. Friedman’s (2004) description of “civilising processes”

The Power of Morality 133 in Huian County (Fujian Province) as an example, she explores how traditional women’s dresses, hairstyles, marriage practices, same-sex relationships and labour patterns of local Han people were criticised and labelled as “feudal” during the Mao era. At the end of the 1990s, however, the local government discovered that traditional customs stimulated tourism and therefore commercialised them. From now on, these customs were no longer classified as “backward” or “feudal” since they helped to boost local income and market development. Apart from the formal institutions of disciplining by the state, informal institutions play a crucial role. Mattingly (2019) shows that in rural areas, the co-optation of influential local elites, for example, by means of “United Front” policies, the inclusion of these elites in organisations such as “People’s Political Consultative Conferences”, People’s Congresses or the CPC and the infiltration of rural organisations all contribute to strengthening political and social control. Folk religious organisations, temple associations, underground churches, lineage or clan organisations and various other social and cultural organisations assist the party state to infiltrate local societies to exert control and discipline local people. In Deqing County (Zhejiang Province), the local CPC Organisation Department ran study courses for the rural population on “raising citizens’ morality” to “enhance their suzhi”. This programme also included activities such as growing

Figure 7.9 “Civilised and ecological villages” with running water, television and modern schools and powered by biogas Source: Photo by the author (Jiangxi Province).

134  The Power of Morality organic products (i.e. without using pesticides) as “feel at ease vegetables” (fangxin cai). Model villages – in contrast to ordinary villages – were specifically presented as “civilised”, that is environmental friendly, tidy and orderly with freshly painted houses, street lighting, a greening programme, paved roads and waste management. The implementation of these projects was mainly funded by various government levels, with smaller contributions from each village household. In Guizhou Province, the author encountered the “Transforming peasants into urbanites” programme (Nongmin shiminhua). Whether peasants could become urban citizens would depend on the enhancement of their suzhi. Rural people with a higher suzhi – so the argument went – could better integrate themselves into urban society and had less difficulty finding employment in urban settings. The government’s task was to educate younger rural people in technical knowledge and civilised behaviour.49 In the context of the CPC’s 19th National Party Congress in 2017, Xi Jinping proposed a new civilising programme for rural areas, the “Rural Revitalisation Strategy” (xiangcun zhenxing zhanlüe). One year later, the CPC’s “Strategic Plan for Rural Revitalisation (2018–2022)”50 was adopted by the Chinese leadership. Briefly, the “Strategic Plan” aims to implement necessary reforms of rural customs and habits such as wedding and funeral practices, excessive gift-giving, extravagance and waste. “Civilised rural customs” and a civilised morality should

Figure 7.10  Disciplined working processes in a rural enterprise Source: Photo by the author (Jiangsu Province).

The Power of Morality 135 be promoted, based on the “Socialist Core Values”. Further goals are fostering clean and tidy villages, well-ordered families, civilised homes and educational facilities, a modern civilised way of life, civilised customs, good social and professional ethics, social responsibility, etc. (for details, see Xu, Yue 2019). The “Strategic Plan” can thus be understood as the continuation of the previous “Socialist New Village Building” programme. Nanjie Village: A Civilising Model Between Socialist and Traditional Civilising Concepts

Nanjie was raised to the status of a collective role model in the early 1990 backed by prominent and influential leftist politicians in Beijing.51 At least until 2022, Nanjie Village in Linying County, Henan Province, was a distinct example of constructing a new village morality based on traditional cultural concepts. By the late 1980s, this village had already left the path of rural market-oriented reforms and returned to collectivist forms of ownership production as well as a new Mao cult. In 1997, it became a national “model village”, calling itself the “only Communist village in the world”. Its economic structure was based on modern joint venture enterprises. About 3,000 local people administered the economy with a labour force of more than 10,000 external workers. Its industries included various modern enterprises in sectors such as foodstuffs, beverages, alcohol, printing, packaging, pharmaceuticals, crafts and carving, and tourism. Non-invested profits were shared equally among all the villagers, who received foodstuffs, apartments and furnishings, water, electricity, clothing, education and healthcare free of charge. Private ownership was prohibited. Among other things, the village intended to create and inculcate a highly civilised culture and obedience of village discipline. Villagers’ behaviour was rated according to a points system, with ten stars denoting optimal behaviour and penalties imposed for each infringement, resulting in points deduction. Points were awarded for ideology and morality, respect towards teachers and esteem for education, a positive attitude towards labour, a high standard of moral and ethical behaviour, good relations among neighbours, proper conduct towards the environment and in matters of hygiene and commitment to the well-being of the village community. In the case of infringements, social benefits were reduced and had to be purchased from the collective at relatively high prices. Violations of labour discipline or community affairs regulations were punished by criticism and selfcriticism, assignment to a “study course for spiritual civilisation” or “re-education by film show”, which meant that the offenders were named and shamed and forced to explain the reasons for their wrongdoing. As the author was told, the inhabitants of Nanjie seemed to fear this naming and shaming most since it involved a loss of face. Punishment methods could be quite severe. As the party secretary explained, neighbours who frequently quarrel may be instructed to pull down the wall between their apartments to force them to learn to live together harmoniously. And women who squabble over their children may be ordered to watch several “film shows” until they correct their behaviour.52

136  The Power of Morality In an interview with the author, Wang Hongbin, who had served as Party Secretary of Nanjie in 2006, conceded that many people doubted that the rigid moral system adopted in Nanjie was effective but pointed out that no criminal offences had been committed in the village for more than a decade. This, he said, proved that the system was highly effective. He added: In Nanjie there is no disco, no karaoke bar, no sauna. We are a well-ordered village. All over China, young people now like to listen to pop songs. Such songs are prohibited here as they distract people who should be paying attention to their work. Furthermore, nobody in the village plays Majiang [MaJongg]. We instead learn from Chairman Mao, [the model soldier] Lei Feng and a model cadre here in the village.53 This statement has to be viewed in the context of the traditional rural perception of urban “culture” as decadent, corrupt and disorderly, a conviction that is still prevalent in many rural areas today. Some rural people have problems comprehending and coping with China’s rapid transformation process and social change and try to upgrade their own status vis-à-vis urbanites. A Chinese report from 2021 has revealed that Nanjie Village and two other “utopian” socialist “model villages” (Huaxi and Daqiuzhuang) were facing bankruptcy because these models were “incompatible with modern civilisation”. The report

Figure 7.11  Residential area, Nanjie Village Source: Photo by the author.

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Figure 7.12  White jade statue of Chairman Mao in Nanjie Village Source: Photo by the author.

argued that its leading cadres were corrupt, had illegally accrued fortunes running into millions and – contrary to what they were morally propagating – led corrupt lives with, in some cases, several “concubines” and luxury homes. The villages were completely over-indebted and insolvent, according to the report.54 In 2022, however, the crisis of the village seems to have been overcome. Now, the village presented itself as a representative of central policies: the future village development should focus on reducing income inequality, building an “ecological civilisation” and an “environmental sanitation governance”, as well as deepening the villagers’ “spiritual civility”.55 Case Study 2: Disciplining Officials – The Anti-Corruption Campaign Corruption is a well-known problem in contemporary China, which philosopher He Huaihong (2014, 2015, 121) has characterised as a “failure of society” as a whole. It signifies the decay of moral standards within society. It is thus perceived as a manifestation of a societal and moral crisis. This assessment is in keeping with Weber’s and Elias’s analysis of corruption as a side effect of modernisation. In Chinese, two terms meaning corruption exist: tanwu and fubai. Fubai refers in the first instance to the negative aspects of a system, structures or measures, or to the negative moral behaviour of an actor or organisation. If applied to people or a government, fubai means moral and ethical decadence or moral degeneration.

138  The Power of Morality The term is primarily applied to moral matters and stands for everything that does not conform to the ruling morality. It signifies that the behaviour of an actor or organisation deviates from the general norms of society and is a dereliction of duty and discipline, thus damaging or violating common interests or moral standards. This may range from crimes committed by party officials to political and ideological misdemeanours which violate party norms or the current party line. Moreover, social phenomena such as gambling, visiting prostitutes, extramarital affairs, excessive spending on funerals, marriages or banquets, that is violating public morality but also unreasonable public expenditure or wasting public funds are viewed as fubai. As Ko and Weng (2011, 372) have shown, “the morality of state functionaries is regarded as a public issue” and is related to a “code of ethics” of the state. Traditionally, the notion of corruption was, and still is, strongly connected to persons violating public morality and pursuing individual material advantage. The word tanwu, in turn, refers to the abuse of a public position to line one’s own pockets and comes close to the English term corruption, which likewise refers to both the decay and undermining of norms and the venality/bribery of officials. Frequently, in China both terms are combined in signifying corruption as tanwu fubai. The reform process since 1979, market economic processes and the discretionary power of officials with regard to resources and their disposal concurrently caused a massive increase in corrupt behaviour by those in positions of power, that is the discipline of many officials eroded. Material and intellectual corruption was prevalent, the armed forces, managers of state-owned enterprises and private entrepreneurs pursued their individual economic interests, and mafia-like organisations and religious sects spread. The current anti-corruption drive, the most extensive and thorough one that has ever taken place, has been used as a targeted mechanism to discipline both officials and specific social groups (e.g. entrepreneurs). On coming to power in 2012, Xi intended as a first step to discipline the party. To achieve this goal, the new leadership launched a major “Rectification Campaign” (2013) to “thoroughly clean up the working style” of the members of the CPC. This was the prelude to a large-scale anti-corruption drive. The ongoing anti-corruption campaign has four major disciplining functions: (a) to deter, prevent and suppress corruption; (b) to help consolidate the power of the current leadership and enforce its political and developmental programme against all opponents; (c) to push back the growing influence of powerful interest groups on politics, thus regaining central control; (d) to prove that the Xi Jinping leadership is determined to fight corruption effectively, rigorously and as a matter of principle, thus reinforcing trust in the CPC and its political leadership. The campaign successively covered almost all political and social spheres, including leading cadres at various levels, the armed forces, universities, the judicial system, the police, the education, health and cultural sectors, state-owned enterprises and private businesses. In fact, a central goal of the anti-corruption campaign is to bring all officials into line with national (collective) interests. It is about implementing a new discipline

The Power of Morality 139 and morality among leading party members (Yuen 2014; Pei 2016; Heberer 2020). In other words, it is clearly a disciplining project. The anti-corruption drive has certainly led to the exposure of countless cases of corruption with the effect of at least temporarily reducing corruption, waste and immoral behaviour by officials. It has also led to a significant decrease in the squandering of public funds. For instance, since 2014, official banquets and dinners, including the consumption of alcohol at public expense, have substantially decreased. Even the practice of officials visiting bars, restaurants and dubious establishments etc. has almost vanished. As a result, disciplining in this sense works since officials have become more cautious, anxiously attempting to avoid any suspicion of corrupt behaviour. Even family members of senior officials are more careful now,56 and businessmen no longer dare to offer benefits or advantages to higher-level cadres. As Yang (2015) convincingly showed, the anti-corruption campaign has also spawned a new lifestyle and morality, thus underscoring its disciplining character. Quite a large number of officials and entrepreneurs dislike the anti-corruption drive. Officials fear losing a significant share of their income while entrepreneurs complain that mechanisms for influencing policies and gaining access to key resources have decreased and that they have lost opportunities created by previous investments in connections, networks and access to officials. In fact, bribery costs have risen due to the greater risks involved for cadres. New forms of payment have emerged, such as direct payments in foreign currency into offshore bank accounts. However, in view of the systemic corruption in China, where the majority of officials are more or less prone to corruption, the party would eliminate itself if it were to take action against all corrupt cadres.57 The critical question, ultimately, is which actions should be taken by the current leadership to minimise the systemic character of corruption without totally undermining the power of the CPC. The party secretary of the city of Maoming in Guangdong province who had been arrested due to corruption declared on his blog: “If you say that I am a corrupt official, I say that all officials are corrupt. Why have you specifically selected me? . . . Today you caught me; tomorrow your own people will catch you, too.”58 He was pointing to the fact that most officials are corrupt in one way or another and that prosecution was handled in a rather arbitrary manner. This is indicative of the fact that a clear definition of corrupt behaviour is hard to find. In the end, it is a selective fight since the leadership decides who and whose networks are considered to be corrupt or not. Cai (2015, 49) explains this phenomenon with the “political logic” of cadres’ disciplining. On the one hand, political leaders have to punish corrupt behaviour to “show accountability” and “to protect the authority” of the CPC (Cai called this “positional responsibility”). On the other hand, there are the “cost considerations”, that is when punishment is regarded as too costly. In addition, Zhu (2012, 9–12) distinguishes between “forgivable” and “unforgivable” errors. The former “fall within the boundary of tolerance” while the latter are beyond this boundary.

140  The Power of Morality In fact, the anti-corruption drive is supported by the majority of ordinary people, who praise “strongman Xi Jinping” for his courageous course of action and disciplining capacity – the more so as this campaign does not target these people but primarily focuses on corrupt officials and businessmen who benefit by bribing officials. According to a survey by Harvard University’s Ash Center in 2016, 71.5% of all respondents (2011, just 35.5%) supported Xi Jinping’s efforts to combat corruption (Cunningham, Saich and Turiel 2020, 9–10). It is widely expected that the anti-corruption campaign will be a long-term one, accompanied by a thorough follow-up reform programme aimed at accelerating the modernising and disciplining process and consolidating the power of the current leadership. Case Study 3: The “Social Credit System” as a Disciplining and Civilising Instrument The “social credit system” in contemporary China was developed as a further major disciplining instrument (see e.g. Guowuyuan bangongting 2007; Horsley 2018; Song 2019a, 2019b), initially based on one of the “socialist core values”, that is “creditworthiness”. In the West, this system has been widely misunderstood: it is not simply an instrument for surveilling individuals but a system of scoring Chinese enterprises, social organisations, individual citizens and authorities59 by awarding positive scores for good conduct or, alternatively, negative points for serious violations of legal and administrative regulations. It is intended to enhance morality and trust within society and regulate the market. Enterprises or individuals who “positively” contribute to social development (e.g. by engaging in social volunteering or making charity and welfare contributions) or who act as role models are “redlisted” and receive social benefits. In this way, the social credit system should figure as an “incentive for giving citizens a sense of recognition and honour” (Zhang, Wanqing 2020, 581). The system’s primary objective is to enforce legal and administrative regulations, standards and norms. Currently, there is a strong focus on legal violations by enterprises. According to Brussee (2021), the absolute majority of entities punished by blacklisting are enterprises or management staff responsible for environmental damage, violating legal or market standards pertaining to food safety, product piracy, ignoring court decisions, non-payment of wages, lack of labour protection, counterfeiting of vaccines, non-servicing of loans, etc. When this book was published, the “social credit system” had not yet been developed into a uniform, national system with consistent goals, standards, regulations and databases. It is currently implemented only at a few dozen pilot sites, with locally differing objectives, priorities and rules.60 And it is still a rather fragmented and non-transparent system with unclear objectives and locally divergent content, resulting in misuse and arbitrariness at some localities. The establishment of such a system was first considered in October 2003, when the Central Committee of the CPC decided to set up a “social credit system” to standardise the market economic order based on morality and trustworthiness as

The Power of Morality 141 the principal rules of conduct (Zhonggong Zhongyang 2003). In 2009, economist Li Yining was among the first academics to propose establishing a “social credit system”. What he had in mind, however, was to create a kind of economic loan management and a database covering creditworthiness of enterprises, intermediary agencies, banks, insurance companies, individuals, etc. as an important step in trust-building (Li Yining 2009, 2015, 173–75). Some years later, the government took up this suggestion and created a system going far beyond the pure economic credit sphere. In 2013, the Supreme Court published a list of names of people who were classified as untrustworthy, that is who had not fulfilled obligations set forth in a written court judgement, such as failure to pay fines or compensation to a third party despite having the financial means to do so (Quanguo Fayuan 2013). In 2014, the Chinese State Council adopted an action plan to establish a “social trust system” (shehui xinyong tixi), known in Western terms as the “social credit system”, which should – according to the announcement – have been implemented on a nationwide scale by the end of 2020.61 Basically, the translation of the Chinese term xinyong (another Japanese loanword) as “credit” only is rather ambiguous. The Chinese language distinguishes between xinyong as an economic term, on the one hand, meaning borrowing behaviour, that is a unilateral transfer of value conditioned on repayment and interest payment. On the other hand, from an ethical point of view, xinyong actually refers to a moral quality in the sense of “keeping promises”. In the latter sense, it is related to trustworthiness.62 The correct translation of xinyong is therefore “trustworthiness” and that of the system is the “social trustworthiness system”. This designation would in fact be more appropriate since it exactly describes the system’s officially announced purpose. However, since it is better known by the name “social credit system” in the Western media, we will use this term in this book. In general, trust is a crucial foundation for the normal functioning of a society. As sociologist Georg Simmel has highlighted, without trust in one another, society would disintegrate. Since trust exists only between individuals, it has to be constantly reinforced to guarantee social progress (Simmel 1990, 178). Ultimately, social life and social collaboration depend on trust.63 As a principal objective of the social credit system, the government announced that it intended to create a “culture of sincerity, honesty and trust” within society or at least to increase its scope (see Chapter 6). The necessity to establish such a system stems from the insight that China faces a massive loss of intra-societal trust, a rather low level of civilised behaviour among specific sections of the population, a moral crisis and a very low propensity on the part of the public to comply with rules, norms and laws. In addition, the Chinese government acknowledged in 2014 that a low level of legal awareness and a high level of corruption and social scandals exist (see Scheil 2017). Similarly, although China has passed many laws, a functioning social order is still absent (Wu, Xingzhi 2014). The state should therefore figure as a “disciplining state”. Morally impeccable and honest citizens and institutions with social attitudes and concerns should be created, according to the action plan. As a Chinese scholar put it in an interview: “We need a society in which people no longer violate rules and norms. The first step is that people are

142  The Power of Morality afraid of violating these rules, norms and laws”,64 a statement reminiscent of Legalist ideas. However, the social credit system is viewed less as a legal instrument than as a moral and trust-building tool wielded top-down by the state. The decision to introduce such a system takes as its point of departure the conviction that social morality and discipline have to be improved and intra-societal trust and a new morality created. A social scoring system is thus understood as the proper tool to serve these purposes. Similarly, Wang Shuqin, who led a major research project on integrity culture and the social credit system, connects this system explicitly to disciplining and the creation of a new morality and norm system (Wang Shuqin 2017). The sanctions are diverse and can be divided into three major areas: government and administrative matters, business matters and individual social behaviour. Different authorities maintain their own databases, including the Ministry of Environment, the tax authorities and the State Bureau for the Administration of Industry and Commerce. The provisions of the latter stipulate that in the event of “particularly serious” or repeated violations by a firm, such as unfair competition, misleading advertising or violation of trademark law, of consumer interests, of customers’ data privacy or of intellectual property law, a company may be placed on the aforementioned blacklist.65 Depending on the facts and the seriousness of the misconduct, this may result in the withholding of access to bank loans, flight and train tickets, passports, trips abroad, etc. For instance, anyone who does not service their debt, refuses to pay administrative fines or court costs, is in arrears with payments or in a more general sense does not comply with laws or legal obligations; companies that defraud, distort competition, circulate inferior products or violate labour laws; tax evaders or anyone who commits other criminal offences – to mention just a few examples – should face points deductions and further sanctions. A 2019 government report revealed that in 2018 alone, 17.46 million people were blacklisted and denied access to air tickets and 5.4 million persons to high-speed train tickets due to major violations, and 3.59 million companies were no longer allowed to issue shares or to participate in public tenders. Another report reveals that at the end of May 2019, Chinese courts across the country had accumulatively restricted the purchase of 25.04 million air tickets, 5.87 million high-speed train tickets and further disciplined 4.22 million persons for dishonesty (Wang, Wenting 2021). Blacklisting can also lead to withdrawal of trade and business licences, exclusion from insurances or from the purchase of securities or real estate, withholding of passports, etc.66 In future, all data collected from companies and individuals will be registered in central databases.67 The system can thus be understood as a “key component of the Party State’s data supported rule” (Drinhausen and Brussee 2021, 18). Authorities are entitled to check the scores of an enterprise, an organisation or an individual, if this is necessary for fulfilling their duties. Therefore, this system can be characterised as an incentive and deterrence system. There is now a debate among Chinese legal scholars about whether the current punitive measures against “dishonest behaviour” are legally permissible. Wang Wenting, for example, argues that as they are unregulated, such “disciplinary measures”68 are ultimately illegal. The lack of any legal basis for these punishments can lead to considerable arbitrariness (Wang, Wenting 2021).69

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Figure 7.13  The social credit system – sanctioning misbehaviour Source: Photo by the author (Guangdong Province). Note: The three raised hands all display the word “restrictions”. The characters on the man’s chest mean “trust lost”. In his left hand, he holds a piece of paper with the sign for money (yuan), meaning that he is greedy for profit. The words appearing on the street in front of him mean “fulfil your duties”. Until he fulfils his social obligations, the way forward remains blocked for him. The meaning is that if someone has lost society’s trust, their credit points will turn negative and their actions will be restricted until they mend their ways.

Sometimes, we find very diverse regulations at different pilot locations, as well as significant variations between urban and rural areas and larger and smaller cities (see e.g. Creemers 2018). Scheil (2018, 45–48), for instance, writes about the regulations in Shanghai, which primarily focus on payment records and creditworthiness. Although these regulations did not originally provide for the possibility of an administrative objection or a judicial review of administrative decisions, such an option has apparently existed since 2017 (Scheil, ibid.). A study by Vincent Brussee (2021) revealed that the system is highly fragmented among pilot cities: • In Anqing (Anhui Province), the focus was on violations or “model behaviour” in the context of dealing with the Covid-19 pandemic. • In Putian (Fujian Province), famous brands were publicised and rewarded. • In Ningbo (Zhejiang Province), the system was directed against enterprises that were publicly criticised but reluctant to correct their behaviour. • Wuhan (Hubei Province) primarily rewarded citizens’ positive behaviour. • Rongcheng (Shandong Province) focused on volunteering by citizens.

144  The Power of Morality A further report on Rongcheng City reveals a different emphasis, this time on rural morality. Here, when the scheme was set up, every resident received 1,000 points as start-up capital. Citizens were divided into categories A *** (most positive) to D, depending on their points. The focus was on public behaviour with a detailed reward and penalty system (adding or deducting points) (see Mistreanu 2018; Paulo 2019). In rural areas, it is often about supporting the socially weak: looking after poor, sick and elderly family members or co-villagers, avoiding disputes with neighbours and within families, donations for the needy, voluntary services for the community, assisting in maintaining social order, environmental protection, cleanliness of villages, etc. To give a specific example: in 2018, in the city of Hangzhou, the author observed that drivers at a crossing slowed down and stopped at a distance, even if only one pedestrian was using the crossing. Such behaviour was new to him and he wondered how the city government managed to enforce it. For years, the city had demanded that drivers stop at pedestrian crossings. But almost nobody stopped, despite the threat of a fine. According to a Chinese colleague, there was a simple explanation. In the meantime, cameras for facial recognition had been installed above the crossing. Anyone who simply drove on when pedestrians wanted to use the crossing was captured on video by these cameras, resulting in an immediate points deduction. Here, the social credit system acts as a direct instrument of disciplining. And such examples are frequently given by Chinese citizens to explain the necessity of such a system and its popularity. In academia, too, the system serves a disciplining function. In 2019, it was decided to incorporate academic misconduct – plagiarism, fabricating data, falsifying peer reviews, fraudulent acts, etc. – into the social credit system. Such acts of misconduct affect the funding of research projects, qualifications for research positions and job opportunities outside academia and may attract various penalties, including restrictions on applying for bank loans, operating businesses, working in the civil service or access to train and flight tickets. The establishment of a national database on academic misconduct was announced.70 In September 2020, a similar system was introduced by the Ministry of Education, the National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Finance for misconduct among graduate students. Its major objectives include promoting the moral behaviour of graduate students and restoring the reputation of China’s academia. Accordingly, students are now obliged to attend compulsory courses on “academic ethics”, that is good scientific practice.71 And in 2022, the State Council published a further document as part of the development of the social credit system: guidelines for strengthening the integrity of scientific research and protecting intellectual property rights, cracking down on thesis trading, etc. In addition, the document announced that the credit system for ecological and environmental protection, for improving the quality of products and services in the domestic market and for regulating capital, financial markets and the loan system will be further improved. In this way, a “model enterprise integrity management” is to be cultivated.72

The Power of Morality 145 The south-western province of Guizhou was designated a pilot province for implementing the social credit system in 2019. The relevant regulation illustrates which types of violations are the main focus: tax evasion, Internet fraud, the spread of fake news, environmental crimes, counterfeiting of products, non-payment of wages of migrant workers and of invoices of small- and medium-sized private companies, failure to abide by court orders, insurance fraud, misuse of charity donations, fraudulent financial transactions, misleading advertising and violations of environmental and cyberspace laws. “Loss of trust” and “restoring trust” between companies and customers and between authorities and citizens are specifically mentioned as background to this disciplining catalogue. As we have seen in Chapter 3, monitoring and disciplining the population have always played a specific role in China’s political culture. A  scoring system was even in use during the Ming dynasty, assigning points to individuals according to their good or evil deeds (see Chapter 3). This legacy may be one of the reasons why the Chinese do not seem to be very concerned about the social credit system, particularly as many interviewees and people we spoke to argued that only criminals or people violating rules and norms would be negatively affected by the system. However, the social credit system raises numerous questions: Who determines what a good citizen is? Which conception of humans is behind it? Is there any form of transparency regarding the control and use of the system? Who controls it to avoid data abuse? What legal remedies are available to individuals or groups? What can those affected do to rectify registration errors, injustices or wrong decisions? Ultimately, the key question is the control and use of the data collected so as to prevent a kind of technological totalitarianism by those who are in control of the technology. Many people, including intellectuals and academics, seem to know little or nothing about the social credit system or generally welcome it. A frequent argument is that they adhere to laws, rules and standards and therefore are not negatively affected by this system, whereas those not abiding by the rules should be punished through points deduction: this is only just and fair, according to this argument. As a result, many Chinese people regard this (previously fragmented) system less as a mechanism of social surveillance than as a means to steer social behaviour in a direction that increases the level of trust, discipline and order within society, improves civilised conduct, leads to more customer-friendly behaviour by companies and services and reduces Internet fraud. A Chinese social scientist told the author that in the end all governments monitored their citizens, as the NSA and the Snowden case had revealed. In China, the primary task at the moment was to ensure that rules and standards were followed to fight cybercrime and to discipline the people. Only at a later point in time would the question of data protection and human rights come up.73 The goal was to develop self-control and self-discipline, including self-censorship, something that had always been a Confucian educational ideal in the form of “self-cultivation”. This line of argument is reminiscent of the aforementioned concept of “governmentality” coined by Foucault, by which he characterised the disciplining “technologies of

146  The Power of Morality the state” par excellence, that is to control and influence the self, including people’s minds and behaviour, so that they would voluntarily abide by the rules ­established by the state institutions and accept their disciplining technologies. Here, the concept of a “post-disciplinary order” predicted by Robert Castel in the early 1990s seems to become reality, that is that it might become “technologically feasible to programme populations themselves, on the basis of an assessment of their performances, and, especially, of their possible deficiencies” (Castel 1991, 294). In November 2020, a meeting of the State Council’s Executive Committee summarised experiences with the social credit system since 2014 and mapped its further development. Prime Minister Li Keqiang spoke frankly about the problems and identified and analysed the measures to be taken. The social credit system – according to Li – was still in its initial and exploratory stage. Further laws, regulation and standardisation were necessary to ensure the protection of rights and interests. In addition, it should be clarified which items and information should be included in the system and which should not and which kind of behaviour and offences should be penalised or not. Current regulations, specifically local ones, were too broad, general and arbitrary. Offences should be clearly defined, and it should be determined in detail which violations and modes of behaviour should be punished. Only serious cases should be made public, and rules relating to self-correction, rectification and compensation should be worked out. Information security and personal privacy should be widely guaranteed. Legal rights of firms and individuals should in any case be protected (Li 2020; Zichen Wang 2020). Different agencies were reliant on the development of new criteria and regulations for entry and removal from blacklisting and its consequences (see Daum 2021). A few weeks later, the State Council published a set of criteria for the further development of the social credit system. The regulations specified, for instance, that all records of and information on “untrustworthy behaviour” and punishments of individuals, enterprises and other entities should be handled strictly in accordance with laws and regulations. A catalogue of misconduct, imposition of legal sanctions and punishments should be drawn up and made public, and this catalogue should be regularly checked and adjusted. In the case of serious offences, the parties concerned should be informed and must have the right to be heard. In addition, guilty parties should be given the opportunity of reparation. Finally, data protection and privacy should be guaranteed within the confines of the law (Guowuyuan bangongting 2020). In December 2020, the Development and Reform Commission held a conference to discuss the principles of a “Social Credit Law”. The Commission announced that a first draft of such a law was circulating among the local, regional and national departments concerned to generate further input and suggestions (Fagaiwei 2020). Originally, technology and finance companies were assigned the task of devising the system, but their involvement was ultimately rejected by the State Council (Daum 2021). In sum, the social credit system is not only a tool of surveillance. Its primary purpose is to steer people to become morally sound citizens so as to reinforce the order of the polity and society.

The Power of Morality 147 The Cadres’ Evaluation System and Morality

The evaluation system for cadres serves to control, review and monitor the work of officials specifically at the local and regional levels. Its results also have a decisive impact on the career prospects of functionaries. More than a decade ago morality (de) of local leading cadres became a salient issue in evaluating their performance. Even the assessment of their behaviour during leisure time was included in the evaluation process (e.g. whether an official is well-behaved towards his family, conceivably has a mistress, takes drugs, visits prostitutes, gambles, etc.).74 A city in Zhejiang Province, for instance, had decided that, prior to leading cadres’ promotion, neighbours should be consulted on their moral behaviour.75 A county in Hunan Province, in turn, promulgated regulations which determined that, after a leading cadre’s promotion, his or her family members must, in order to abide by the regulations, sign a “moral contract”.76 And a county in Jiangsu employed specific plain-clothes operatives to surveil the behaviour of leading officials during their leisure time. However, such measures were and are highly controversial among local cadres and citizens.77 According to this rationale, private misconduct is related to public misbehaviour, as in the following representative statement: “[M]ost of the officials convicted of corruption in recent years were found to have had extramarital relations” (Chen and Xu 2010, 57). In Zibo in Shandong Province “de” had been subdivided into four elements: “political integrity”, “professional morality”, “social morality” and “family virtue” and split into various moral categories to measure it. In this location it was even turned into a “hard” criterion in cadres’ evaluations (Zhou 2010). De had meanwhile been officially declared to be the most prominent evaluation factor.78 Among the three core aspects of cadres’ behaviour (de, scientific development and paying attention to the interests of the masses), de ranks first (Deng, Wei 2011). A cadre’s de should increasingly and directly be evaluated by the local population – as demanded by the central leadership. This meant a shift from political and economic policing to controlling the cadres’ moral behaviour. Using these traditional approaches, the party state not only attempted to curb misbehaviour and corrupt practices by local cadres but also tried to improve the “quality” (suzhi) of the cadres in both public and private spheres, a shift that was specifically concerned with the hearts and minds of the cadres.79 Regarding the cadres’ evaluation system, the 2019 regulations specifically and repeatedly addressed the necessity of cadres’ political, organisational and moral discipline.80 In a further document issued by the General Office of the Central Committee of the CPC in November 2020, the role of morality in evaluations of leading cadres was still considered to be the most salient issue. In the document it was stipulated that “morality” still ranks “first” throughout the evaluation process (Zhonggong Zhongyang Bangongting 2020). Retired party cadres and party members are now also subject to greater organisational and disciplinary control. In May 2022, the party leadership issued corresponding rules which state that retired cadres and party members, especially those who have held leadership positions, must adhere strictly to the relevant

148  The Power of Morality disciplinary rules. They should neither arbitrarily question major policies of the party’s Central Committee, nor make negative political remarks; they should not participate in activities of illegal social organisations, and they should refrain from using their original authority or positional influence for their own or others’ benefit. They are requested to “resolutely oppose and resist” various erroneous ideological trends and “resolutely oppose” hedonism and extravagance. Those who violate disciplinary rules must expect serious consequences in accordance with the regulations.81 Case Study 4: Disciplining and Civilising Ethnicity Historical Legacy

Due to 2,000 years of continuity of the Chinese central power and culture, traditional ideas shaped, and still shape, conduct towards non-Han peoples and the expectations of how they should behave towards the central power. Imperial China perceived itself to be the cultural centre of the world and its culture as the culture of humanity par excellence. Traditional beliefs recognised that there were numerous peoples with fixed settlements, but only one people, according to these beliefs, was entrusted by heaven with the mission of governing all of humanity. This nation was seen as the centre of the earth, as the “Middle Kingdom” (Zhongguo) and its ruler as the “Son of Heaven”. Relations existed essentially only with weaker and culturally inferior peoples, so the feeling of superiority of the country, which had been largely closed off for centuries, was constantly reaffirmed. Accordingly, the farming Han looked down on the surrounding nomadic hunter-gatherers, who were regarded as culturally and technologically inferior. Accordingly, during imperial times, “non-Han” people (called “national minorities or shaoshu minzu in the People’s Republic of China) were considered inferior to the Han, and the culture of the Han as the highest-ranking one. According to the official discourse, it was the duty of the Han to civilise and modernise the minorities’ societies. The patriarchal state, in turn, had to initiate suitable measures and policies for this purpose. It decided what was useful for a minority group, what was advanced or backward, civilised or uncivilised and which customs or habits were beneficial or harmful and had accordingly to be abolished or reformed. Confucianism, for centuries the state-bearing ideology, was the ideological foundation for the contempt towards the “barbarians”, which was rooted in the notion that, as the great Chinese historian Sima Qian (ca. 145–86 bce) stated, they knew nothing “of li, the proper [i.e. Confucian] rules of life and yi, the duties of life” (de Groot 1892, 1921, 3). To be different was understood by the ancient Chinese as an expression of ignorance of the social structure of relations and of the Confucian rites. They concluded that “barbarians” were unable to control their “emotions”, tended to give way to their feelings and behaved “like birds and wild animals” (Wiens 1954, 219; Müller 1980).

The Power of Morality 149 This perception of “otherness” and Han superiority ran through all the dynasties. This is illustrated by an example from the Ming period, when philosopher and statesman Wang Yangming wrote: Barbarians are like wild animals. Direct civil administration by Han officials would be like trying to keep and tame a herd of deer in the living room of a house. In the end, they will only jump over your weighted altars, kick over your tables and smash everything in wild fear. In the wilderness districts, therefore, you should use a method adapted to the character of the wilderness . . . To divide the dominions of the various chiefs is to establish zones of restriction and corresponds to the policy of pruning the stallion and castrating the boar. (Franke 1967, 356) Nevertheless, Confucianism did not aim to annihilate these people but demanded their subordination to the emperor and their integration into the Chinese empire. The aim was “cultivation” based on Confucian values, that is cultural, non-violent assimilation. Even a “barbarian” could become an emperor but only by fitting into the Chinese system and by giving up his previous identity (Franke 1962, 22). This attitude is still an important component of Chinese nationalities policies. Although this traditional worldview has been disintegrating since the middle of the 19th century, its basic ideas have by no means disappeared. According to Chinese sources, the fundamental idea of disciplining non-Han peoples finds its expression in the (Confucian) principle “Whether a people obeys [the Chinese ruler, author’s note] or not is determined by whether it is conceived as good or bad; whether a nationality submits or resists is determined by whether it is valued or punished”.82 Endeavours to integrate non-Han ethnicities into the Han culture existed throughout Chinese history (see e.g. Herman 2007). As Schneider shows, during the Ming and Qing dynasties, scholar-officials reasoned that non-Han people were uncivilised and required “guidance” by the Han who possessed a superior culture: “It was thus the duty of the respective central state to support civilising these ‘barbarians’ in order to pacify” their settlement areas (Schneider 2017b, 103). In a similar vein, Liang Qichao regarded this kind of assimilation as an indispensable part of China’s nation-building process, in which the Han displayed their “assimilative power”. Thus, Liang referred to the “civilising mission” of the Han towards other ethnic groups across dynasties (Wiens 1954; Schmidt-Glintzer 1997; Schneider 2017b). He argued that “[i]f one is able to transform people so that they become the same as oneself, it is called ‘assimilative power’ ” (Schneider 2017a, 67). This view has subsequently dominated the national discourses. Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek held similar views. Mao, in contrast, distanced himself from this idea and repeatedly warned against “Great Han chauvinism”. In the various political campaigns (e.g. against “local nationalism” in the second half of the 1950s or the “Cultural Revolution”), however, he pursued corresponding goals. The concept of​​

150  The Power of Morality an “assimilating power” became an underlying idea of the “second generation of ethnic policies” in the Xi era as well (see Heberer 2022). In the following, we look at disciplining in relation to “ethnic minorities” and explore how China’s ethnic majority (“Han”) is attempting to discipline “the others”, that is the non-Han people. Sociologist James Scott (1976, 1990, 1998, 2009) has shown how modernising states strive to subject locals to their state- and nationbuilding, their modernising and disciplining concepts and how peasants with differing “moral economies” simply resist. Waters (2018), in turn, tells us how Western development experts have attempted to bring “development” and “discipline” to peasants (in Thailand and Tanzania). These experts saw themselves as “disciplined” in a Weberian sense, regarding the self-sufficient subsistence farmers, however, as undisciplined. Concerning the civilising of ethnic minorities in China, social anthropologist Stevan Harrell, for instance, speaks of “civilising projects” in which one group, the civilizing center, interacts with other groups (the peripheral peoples) in terms of a particular kind of inequality. In this interaction, the inequality between the civilizing center and the peripheral peoples has its ideological basis in the center’s claims to a superior degree of civilization, along with a commitment to raise the peripheral peoples’ civilization to the level of the center, or at least closer to that level. (Harrell 1995, 4) Similarly, Gladney (2004) in line with Scott (2009, 116–26) and Heberer (2001, 2014) also examined the civilising mission of the “centre” towards ethnic minorities. The idea of a mission to “civilise” natives has been described by Edward Said as a “duty to natives . . . for the ‘benefit’ of the natives, or for the ‘prestige’ of the mother country” (Said 1994, 130).83 The distinction between “civilised” and “barbarian” people was by no means a Chinese speciality. Rather, it existed across all cultures as an asymmetric relationship and a perceived distinction between “us” and “the others” (see e.g. Chen 2017, 2–9) or, as Charles Taylor put it, between culture and nature. “We are trained, disciplined, formed, and they are not. The raw meet the cooked”, he wrote (Taylor 2004, 38). In China, in addition, wen, in the sense of literate and learned people, was a further criterion for the distinction between “civilised” and “uncivilised” people. Civilising in this sense refers to changing the social rules of ethnic morality, the modes of living, the lifestyles, customs, habits, rites and morals and adjusting them to the “civilised” ways of the Han ethnic majority. In China, the notion of civilising peripheral people has strong roots in the country’s history, as shown earlier. Hirono (2008, 72), for example, explained that the basic idea of traditional Chinese policies towards ethnic minorities was the Chinese state’s conviction that these minorities could “change their status from uncivilised to civilised by achieving greater proximity to the centre of civilisation and therefore the prevailing civilisational ideology” and that this principle has not changed much during the course of Chinese history.

The Power of Morality 151 Bulag (2021) has pointed out that after 2010 a major shift in the institutional form of the state concept occurred in China: from a “multinational state” to a “unified community of the Chinese nation”. Stronger integration of ethnic minorities into the “unique Chinese state”, for example, by enforcing Mandarin Chinese as the “national language”, downgrading both regional autonomy and the use of minority languages and a stronger convergence of customs, habits and development programmes are part of the new concept of accelerating state- and nation-building. According to the Chinese government, such integration requires a planned disciplining and civilising process, which we would like to illustrate in the following by means of four examples. In the 1990s, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the growth of ethnonationalism and Islamist movements among the peoples of Central Asia sparked concerns among the Chinese leadership that China might face a similar development, especially since Islamism and ethno-nationalism had spillover effects on the western region of Xinjiang. Initially, by means of a “strike-hard” (yanda) campaign, the central government tried to counter such tendencies through tough measures. Nevertheless, terrorism in Xinjiang steadily increased in the form of violence, suicide bombings, attacks on Han Chinese and assassinations of Uyghurs who cooperated with the government. Instead of addressing the causes and their effects, the political leadership concluded that more liberal nationality policies had not spawned better integration of minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet but had apparently led to a further rise in ethno-nationalism and Islamism. In addition, the Chinese leadership perceived the Xinjiang and Tibet cases not as merely ethnic issues but placed them in the context of its internal sovereignty and national and geostrategic security (see Seo and Cho 2013). According to the Chinese government, massive subsidies for infrastructural and anti-poverty programmes, for example in Xinjiang and Tibet, and the development programme for China’s western region (Xibu da kaifa) had not yielded the results hoped for. Instead, major riots in Tibet (2008) and Xinjiang (2009) had caused substantial loss of human life and physical damage, as well as a decline in mutual trust between Han and minority people. Subsequently, a number of terrorist attacks by Uyghurs, not only in Xinjiang but also in various parts of China, strengthened the Chinese government’s conviction that the established nationalities policies were not leading to greater ethnic integration and modernity but had instead nurtured separatism, religiosity and ethnic segregation. Furthermore, despite all the “civilising” and development efforts, Xinjiang’s southern region, mainly inhabited by Uyghurs, remained relatively poor and underdeveloped. Accordingly, a “new generation” of ethnic policies seemed to be necessary (see e.g. Sines 2002; Greitens, Lee, and Yazici 2019/20; Yan 2020). On the one hand, civilisation processes in areas inhabited by ethnic minorities show commonalities; on the other hand, there are great differences. Therefore, in the following, we have chosen four quite distinct minority regions to illustrate commonalities and differences: the Liangshan Autonomous Prefecture of the Yi (Sichuan Province), the Xinjiang Autonomous Region of the Uyghurs, the Tibet Autonomous Region and the Nujiang/2020 Autonomous Prefecture of the Lisu (Yunnan Province).

152  The Power of Morality Civilising Processes: Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture

Fieldwork conducted in 2012 in M. County,84 a rather remote area with a population of 98% Yi people in the Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan Province, provided insights into a “civilising project” among local Yi (see Heberer 2014)85 aimed at “civilising” the customs and traditions of the Yi people.86 Several “health civilising and new living movements” in Yi areas were implemented to encourage local residents to become “civilised”, that is to wash their clothes and bodies, to brush their teeth, to clean their houses, to sleep in beds with cottonwadded quilts, to sit on chairs, to prepare meals on kitchen stoves and to use tables, bowls and chopsticks when eating. Basic necessities such as toothpaste, towels and toothbrushes were distributed free of charge. In collaboration with a Hong Kongbased NGO, M. County also launched a programme to encourage villagers to pay attention to their personal hygiene in daily life. The required items were donated by the NGO and formed part of the civilising programme. In T. Village we observed the creation of a new “ecological” model village as part of the civilising project. In the course of the “construction of new socialist villages”, the traditional Yi houses in the villages close by had been replaced by new ones concentrated in a single village. Seen from the outside, these buildings looked like modernised Yi-style buildings. All were designed in the same stylised pattern. The government had provided building materials worth 30,000 yuan to each household. Further expenses had to be covered by the households themselves, which were also responsible for building the houses. According to the village head, the house type had been specified by the design department of M. County’s planning office and had been discussed with the villagers in advance.87 However, we were told informally that this “village renewal” had been enforced against the will of the majority of the villagers because the designers had not taken traditional Yi customs into account. The building structures left no room for the traditional mode of ancestor worship or places for ancestor tablets. Even the installation of the traditionally important fire pits and ritually significant wooden roof beams had been disregarded.88 At the behest of the county and township authorities, the village’s Party Committee had to enforce the design by badgering each household head separately.89 County authorities viewed the new buildings as an important step towards “civilising” the Yi villages and improving the environment. The official reasoning for enforcing these house designs was that they were “much safer”. A Yi anthropologist argued that “this new village has no future in its current form, since most Yi villagers dislike the new building structures”. In his opinion, “the new village destroys the local culture in the name of environmental improvement and civilising”.90 The case described here laid bare the civilising concept espoused by the government. Replacing traditional houses in Liangshan’s Yi areas was part of an initiative called “Remoulding three types of houses in Yi areas” within the civilising programme. Under the plan, a total of 1,125,000 people in Liangshan Prefecture were to be resettled in new buildings between 2003 and the end of 2012. Here, the carriers of civilisation – in this case the county and township cadres in M. County – “tended to see rational order in remarkably visual aesthetic terms. For them, an efficient, rationally organized city, village, or farm was a city that looked regimented and orderly in a geometrical sense” (Scott 1998, 4).

The Power of Morality 153 A contract between M. County and J. Township on environmental issues included detailed targets for fighting soil erosion, eliminating water contamination, supporting afforestation and forest protection and improving the environment in civilising villages. In turn, the township concluded a contract with the Village Administration Committee in each village under its jurisdiction. These targets clearly illustrated what the civilising project was about. Environmental targets were defined as “cleanliness, maintaining order, beautification and institutionalisation within the villages”. A “leadership group” was established by the township government to monitor and control the implementation of the programme in the villages, and the villages had to report twice a month to this group on its implementation. The programme focused on waste, wastewater, uncontrolled wandering of livestock, illegal digging for natural resources and sanitation and hygiene inside and around the villagers’ houses. Particular attention was to be paid to issues such as the management of the “six disorders” of random dumping of rubbish, discharge of wastewater, unrestricted wandering of livestock, chaotic car parking, illegal digging for minerals and the uncontrolled collection of firewood. Each farmhouse was to be responsible for its own rubbish, pools of water on the ground and unhygienic housing conditions – a programme described as a “civilising project” (Jingyetexi government 2011). At the end of the year, the township had to review the implementation of the programme in the villages.91

Figure 7.14  “Uncivilised” living conditions in a Yi area (Liangshan Autonomous Prefecture) Source: Photo by the author.

154  The Power of Morality Civilising Processes in Xinjiang Autonomous Region

A more recent and specific example of civilising is the re-education of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang. A government document of 2017 published in the West under the heading “China Cables”92 surmised that the “vocational education and training programme”, that is re-education of Uyghurs (see Jacobs 2018) and other members of Muslim minorities in Xinjiang, is strongly connected to disciplining, civilising and relocation to urban areas as part of a labour and employment education and training programme. In a document referring to vocational skills education in Xinjiang’s “Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture” comprising more than 25 points, items 12, 13, 15 and 16 relate to disciplining (“industrial discipline”), self-disciplining and civilising behaviour in daily life, that is changing the manners, habits and hygiene of ethnic people. Item 16 even addresses the issue of scoring daily behaviour and “progress”.93 Social disciplining commences in schools. Lin Yi’s research in minority-Han merger primary schools in Xinjiang revealed that language disciplining was prevalent. According to his investigation, Uyghur students were not permitted to use the Uyghur language in school, and parents of Uyghur students were advised to limit their children’s use of the Uyghur language – if at all – to their family context and not to allow them to speak it in public. In addition, female students were prohibited from wearing headscarves in school, traditionally a “must” for females. And Han teachers complained about “undisciplined” (mei you zhixu), “barbaric” (yeman), “unreasonable” (bu jiang daoli) and “unhygienic” (mei you weisheng xiguan) Uyghur students. One of the Han teachers’ main objectives was to discipline Uyghur students so that they would behave like Han (Yi 2016, 33–36). The following statement of the party secretary of this school reveals the different perception of social morality and behaviour between Han and Uyghurs: We keep emphasizing at various meetings that (female) students are not allowed to wear a headscarf. You can barely find students wearing a headscarf on campus. Yet, if you walk out the campus after classes, you can find that girls will take their headscarf out of their pocket, and put it on. The parents of those girls require that they must wear a headscarf, especially those from Southern Xinjiang. We as a school will definitely never permit them to wear a headscarf. We sometimes behave like underground workers (dixia gongzuozhe) when attempting to prevent them from practicing religion. (Yi 2016, 34) Teachers interviewed by Yi told him that it was essential to discipline the Uyghur students with “verbal or physical violence”. They saw violence as the “most effective technique to discipline” Uyghur students and as an appropriate tool to civilise them (Yi 2016, 36). On the issue of Uyghur workers, Sun (2020, 243–44) and Li (2015, 36) showed that despite tax advantages for enterprises hiring minority workers in Xinjiang, Han entrepreneurs perceive Uyghurs as people with “low skills”, resulting in “high

The Power of Morality 155 costs of training” and displaying a lack of “discipline”, “punctuality”, “contractual compliance”, “sense of efficiency” and “long-term planning”, as well as “easy contentment with the status quo”, “disinclination to improve” and a preference for “spiritual life over material life”. As a result, they are reluctant to employ them. On the other hand, according to Li (2015, 36), low wages, poor working conditions, high pressure etc. trigger conflicts between minority workers and enterprise managements. A document from the Kashgar prefectural government on the training of ethnic minority people from poverty-stricken areas stated: Through military training, the awareness of organisational discipline of urban and rural labourers should be increased and the development of norms of behaviour improved . . . The organisational discipline, ideological awareness, language communication and employment skills of urban and rural workers should be enhanced in order to solve the problem of urban and rural workers’ lack of organisational discipline, language communication difficulties, lack of awareness of discipline, law, and professional skills. (Kashi diqu xingzheng gongshu 2018) With regard to rural areas, another report notes that in a village under the jurisdiction of Hotan City, as a result of labour education “there are fewer idlers basking in the sun, drunks and gambling ghosts are gone, the wallet is bulging, and there is hope for life” (Xinjiang Weiwuer Zizhiqu Shenjiting 2019). Furthermore, in 2018, Xinjiang Daily spoke about letting “the modern civilised lifestyle penetrate into the souls of farmers”; cadres are to “guide farmers to jettison outdated customs and to live a modern and civilised life”.94 A document from Xinjiang’s Chabchar County government outlined the basic idea of this programme: to educate and train “surplus labour” in specific education centres to enhance the local employment rate. The county officials were reminded not “to miss a single household or person” to be trained and employed. The aim is to “turn farmers and herdsmen into industrial workers, to improve labour efficiency, to discipline labour and to abandon selfish thoughts and lazy attitudes”. “Iron discipline” is to be enforced by “militarised management” of these training centres. People unwilling to undergo training must be urged to attend.95 A report on “employment and poverty alleviation training” in four prefectures in Southern Xinjiang explains the programme for the years 2018–2020 and specifies that during this period more than 100,000 people from poor families should receive vocational or entrepreneurial skills training and that after that more than 90% of all people involved should be in employment.96 Buckley and Ramzy (2020) quoted an official from the Junfujie Clothing Company in Kashgar, which trained and employed several thousand workers: “Beginning with military drills before they start their jobs, we foster a sense of discipline.” The Chairman of the company, Sun Yijie, reported that discipline was cultivated through military-style training and that he had already trained more than 6,000 people. Apart from this training, participants were also taught Putonghua (Sun Yijie 2018).97

156  The Power of Morality Civilising programmes specifically focus on villages in Southern Xinjiang. The following example illustrates how a Han Chinese working team from the “Development and Reform Commission” of a military unit was based for quite some time in a village in Xinjiang’s Bachu County to carry out a “civilising mission”. Apart from helping local Uyghurs to diversify and develop agricultural production so as to increase their incomes as part of a poverty alleviation programme, the soldiers propagated “modern” hygiene standards. “Poverty alleviation”, the article states, “begins with diligence” but has also to improve hygiene standards. In relation to the civilising “mission”, the article notes: At the beginning of staying in the village, Wu Fuwen [the vice-team leader] found that most of the villagers’ household hygiene conditions were poor, and the villagers did not develop good hygiene habits such as drinking boiled water, washing feet, and brushing teeth, which had a great impact on their health. In order to change this, Wu Fuwen purchased daily necessities such as toothbrushes, toothpaste and soap at his own expense, and distributed them to the villagers free of charge . . . [He managed] to organise villagers to carry out health care, rewarding those who are excellent, giving personal guidance to those who are backward, and change the villagers’ living habits over time. The result was: “Now the villagers’ courtyards are clean and tidy, and the living, breeding and planting areas are clearly separated. Walking in the village, the neat housing and clean courtyards make people feel refreshed.”98 According to this report, the villagers were very grateful for these efforts by the working group. It quotes villagers who expressed their thanks for the support and guidance on ways of improving hygiene. “Mistrust of modern methods” is seen as a further obstacle to rural development in Xinjiang. Sun quotes a rural official in Southern Xinjiang who told him that he taught Uyghur villagers “to shield crops from the desert sun with plastic coverings, but dubious villagers would take them off as soon as he left” (see Sun 2020, 242–55). These examples illustrate that – like civilising projects which target other minorities, such as those existing in Yi areas –vocational training, particularly in rural areas, is accompanied by other types of civilising which focus on rules of hygiene, that is everyone should clean their teeth, wash their face and feet, clean the house, go to work and follow these rules at least once a day.99 An article in the daily Huanqiu Shibao commented: Young people in Xinjiang are unaccustomed and uncomfortable when they work far away from their hometowns. They must be managed in a unified way and have to be organised, disciplined, regulated, and a baseline must be set. In recent years, after several groups of young people have been recruited to work [in Eastern China], the [Suzhou] Chamber of Commerce has carried out paramilitary education management [to train these people]. The effect has

The Power of Morality 157 been rather good, a point affirmed by the employing enterprises [in Suzhou, additions in brackets by the authors]. (Xinjiang Suzhou shanghui wei pinkun diqu pujiu zhifu zhi lu 2019) Furthermore, civilising initiatives are not confined to rural and industrial labour issues but also focus on local customs. Grose demonstrates this with reference to the example of new (government-built) housing and interiors which eliminate traditional symbols and religious markers related to Islam, that is the transformation of Uyghur domestic spaces. By means of a campaign called “Three News” that included a “Beautifying Spaces” (meili jiating) programme, the intention is to change Uyghur behaviour and lifestyle according to notions of what the government conceives of as “civilised living”. The campaign started in the povertystricken Uyghur core areas in Southern Xinjiang in 2019. The official key aim is to lead the local population to “modernity” (details in Grose 2020).100 Replacing traditional Uyghur architecture and old town buildings by Eastern Chinese ones is apparently also part of the civilising process and considered to reinforce ethnic integration (Kobi 2018). As regards Xinjiang, the Chinese leadership concluded that Uyghurs were not sufficiently civilised since Islamism, support of Islamist sects and terrorist activities had increased (see Greitens, Lee, and Yazici 2019/20) and that such behaviour was not only destroying social and political order but also deviating from “Chinese civilisation”. People affected therefore had to be re-educated in order to be re-­civilised. For example, conversation guidelines for cadres to use when talking to the children of people interned in re-education camps stipulate that the children should be told that their parents are “ideologically infected by bad thoughts. If they do not receive education and correction in time, they might cause major practical harm to the society and the family” (Tuerfan shi jizhong jiaoyu peixun xuexiao xueyuan zinü wenda celüe 2019).101 According to a “White Paper” issued by the Chinese State Council in August 2019, the government established “vocational skills education and training centres” in Xinjiang, where people from the Uyghur and other ethnic groups are taught the standard Chinese language (Putonghua), acquire legal knowledge and vocational skills and also undergo a “de-radicalisation” programme. Training in vocational skills and Putonghua (standard Mandarin) will enable them to find employment or to become self-employed (State Council Information Office 2019). In reality, however, the situation is far more complex.102 According to the “Xinjiang Labour and Employment Security White Paper” issued by the Information Bureau of the Chinese State Council in September 2020, there is an annual average transfer of a “surplus labour force” of 2.763 million people, including 1.678 million from the poorer southern part of the Autonomous Region. Most of them – according to the report – are employed in three industrial sectors: agricultural processing, textile and garment manufacturing and electronic products assembly industries.103 However, no information is given about the specific conditions of this kind of employment.

158  The Power of Morality

Figure 7.15  Veiled women in Southern Xinjiang Source: Photo by the author (1990). Note: Street scenes such as these, showing fully veiled ethnic minority women in the city of Kashgar (southern Xinjiang), warrant civilising measures, according to the Chinese government.

Remarks by Xi Jinping during his visit to Xinjiang in July 2022 seem to indicate that “stability” has largely been achieved in the region and that economic development will henceforth be prioritised again.104 It remains to be seen what this means for future policies and civilising processes in Xinjiang.105 Civilising Processes: Tibet Autonomous Region

Such measures are not confined to Xinjiang but are part of general poverty alleviation programmes that illustrate the civilising mission towards ethnic minorities in general. In a similar vein, Tibetan peasants and herdsmen, especially from remote areas, are trained to become disciplined and skilled factory workers or self-employed.106 A  graph in a related article specifically mentions raising their “quality” (suzhi), cultural (wenhua) and civilising (wenming) level as objectives of the programme.107 Hundreds of thousands of Tibetans were trained in this way; in the first half of 2020, the figure was almost 500,000 people (Zhang Wei 2020). This partly military-style training programme108 aims to develop vocational and entrepreneurial skills and to transform people’s minds through patriotic and legal education, accompanied by Chinese language (Putonghua) training. Trainees should “follow the party”, their “patriotism [is] to be enhanced” and the masses should be “organised and guided to abide by discipline” (Zizhiqu fupin ban 2016).

The Power of Morality 159 A 2020 official document states that this programme should “transform backward thinking” and “delete the negative influence of religion” (Xizang Zizhiqu Shangwuting 2020). A report from Tibet’s Lang County describes in which manner “rural surplus labourers”, that is herdsmen and nomads, have been trained according to the county’s labour transfer plan.109 The ultimate purpose of this civilising programme is not only to turn peasants and herdsmen into disciplined and skilled labourers but also to alleviate poverty and develop Tibet and the Tibetans according to the central government’s modernising concept. It is therefore part and parcel of China’s state- and nation-building process.110 And this is precisely the perception which Scott, Waters and others have described in detail with regard to similar “civilising processes” in other world regions. Civilising Processes: Nujiang Lisu Autonomous Prefecture

Finally, a further example from a smaller ethnic minority area: according to an article published by Renmin Ribao in August 2020, in Nujiang Lisu Autonomous Prefecture of Yunnan Province, an ethnic minority area inhabited mainly by people from the Lisu nationality, a “working group” taught local people how to organise housework and to clean their courtyards. The article described this endeavour and noted: “Blossoms of civilisation have taken root like dandelions and bloomed with fragrance.” The working group also taught the locals to do a good job in beautifying and greening the village roads, in garbage sorting and waste disposal. “Volunteers” go from house to house to check the cleanliness of the villagers’ quarters, front and back, living room and kitchen. “Life should be better, and the environment should be beautiful”, a “volunteer for civilised practice activities” was quoted as saying. As in Xinjiang and Tibet, working groups teach the locals to practise good hygiene, to learn Mandarin and to master new labour skills in order to enable them to find a job in industry. According to the report, a “farmer’s night school” has been set up, and volunteers mobilised to help locals to establish “beautiful new homes” and a “healthy and civilised” lifestyle and to provide job training at the grassroots level (Li Shouhua 2020). Reports from other regions inside China illustrate that members of ethnic minorities are being encouraged to leave their hometowns, to undergo job training and to take jobs in coastal urban areas so as to “transform” and discipline their thinking (see e.g. Su 2020). The idea behind this is not only poverty eradication but also that working in more developed regions and industries might contribute to their becoming more open-minded, disciplined and civilised as a result of this mobility, thus strengthening ethnic integration and loyalty to the Chinese nation and the party state. Similar civilising projects have been conducted in many modernising nations throughout history, targeting the “uncivilised” lifestyles of various indigenous peoples. This was or is apparently part of a “government rationality” aimed at standardising the lifestyles of indigenous peoples (Grose 2020) in the interests of ethnic integration and nation-building.

160  The Power of Morality Undoubtedly, nation-building requires the integration of all ethnic groups into the state as a whole (nation-state). This in turn requires that all ethnicities identify with the nation-state and that the members of these groups also relate their status and identity to the nation as a whole. This is difficult to achieve if the nationstate tries to impose this identity by force, for example in the form of assimilating efforts. Such efforts have rarely led to a successful nation-building process and are more likely to fuel simmering ethnic resentments (for more on nation-building, see Chapter 8). Notes 1 On civilising educational processes in Chinese arts, see Marinelli 2012; Holmes 2019. 2 See the document, accessed April 2022, www.gov.cn/test/2005-06/27/content_9963. htm. 3 Renmin Ribao, October 10, 2008. 4 “Shehuizhuyi jingshen wenming jianshe (Constructing a Socialist Spiritual Civilisation),” Baidu Baike, accessed April 2022, https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E7%A4%BE %E4%BC%9A%E4%B8%BB%E4%B9%89%E7%B2%BE%E7%A5%9E%E6%96% 87%E6%98%8E%E5%BB%BA%E8%AE%BE. 5 Hall (2013) argued that civility is a crucial precondition for the emergence of a civil society. 6 Lin 2017 offers a comprehensive analysis of the suzhi concept. 7 A lack of suzhi is frequently perceived as a “potential source of chaos”; see Sturgeon 2009, 487. 8 The “Socialist Core Values” were first mentioned in a party document in 2006. See Zhonggong Zhongyang (2006). 9 See “Core Socialist Values,” China Daily, October 12, 2017. 10 See, for example, the definition of democracy given by Cui Tiankai, former Chinese ambassador to the United States, in June 2019: “Democracy is a means to deliver a happy life to the people by constantly improving the governance of the country and society”, which in no way corresponds to the concept of political democracy in a “Western” Sense, accessed June 2021, www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgxss/t1669799.htm. 11 Xi Jinping zai Zhonggong Zhongyang zhengzhiju di shisanci jiti xuexi shi qiangdiao ba peiyu he hongyang ninghun juqi qiangji guben (During the thirteenth collective study session of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, Xi Jinping emphasised the cultivation and promotion of the core values of socialism as the basic project of amassing strength and building a solid foundation), accessed October 2021, www.gov.cn/ ldhd/2014-02/25/content_2621669.htm. 12 On the decision, see Renmin Ribao, September 28, 2021, accessed October 2021, http:// politics.people.com.cn/n1/2021/0928/c1001-32239145.html. 13 Examples of cartoon videos on the socialist core values for children, accessed August 12, 2020, https://v.qq.com/x/page/b03497d2rsk.html and videos for adults promoting civilised road user behaviour, accessed August 2021, https://v.qq.com/x/page/o0373g6j0wz. html. 14 See details in “Quanguo wenming chengshi (National Civilized City),” Baidu Baike, accessed July 2022, https://baike.baidu.com/item/全国文明城市/1669848#:~: text=全 国文明城市，简称文明,具有价值的城市品牌. On this issue, see also Cartier 2013. 15 Similar regulations existed in previous centuries in Germany, for example in Nuremberg; see Buchholz 1991. 16 The regulations are available here, accessed May 2022, www.hotbak.net/key/%E6%B5 %81%E6%84%9F%E6%88%B4%E5%8F%A3%E7%BD%A9%E5%86%99%E8%BF

The Power of Morality 161 %9B%E6%B3%95%E6%9D%A1%E5%8C%97%E4%BA%AC%E5%B8%82%E6%96% 87%E6%98%8E%E8%A1%8C%E4%B8%BA%E4%BF%83%E8%BF%9B%E6%9D %A1%E4%BE%8B%E5%85%A8%E6%96%87%E8%8D%89%E6%A1%88.html. 17 “Beijing shi wenming xingwei cujin tiaoli (Beijing Civilised Behaviour Promotion Regulations),” Beijing Qingnian Bao, June 14, 2020, accessed June 1, 2020, http:// bj.people.com.cn/n2/2020/0601/c14540-34054130.html. The Beijing Regulations can be viewed here, accessed June 2020, www.beijing.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengcefagui/202005/ t20200511_1893837.html. 18 Shenzhen Regulations, accessed May 2022, www.szrd.gov.cn/szrd_zyfb/szrd_zyfb_ cwhgb/202001/t20200110_18976358.htm. 19 “Fuzhou shi Gongye he Xinxihua Ju (Fuzhou Bureau of Industry and Information Technology),” “Guanyu yinfa ‘2022 ninan jingshen wenming jianshe gongzuo yaodian’ (Notification on Printing and Distributing the ‘Key Points for the Establishment of Spiritual Civilization’),” 2022, accessed June 2022, www.fuzhou.gov.cn/zgfzzt/sjxw/ zfxxgkzl/gkml/yzdgkdqtxx/202204/t20220413_4343299.htm. 20 “Chuantong liyi wenhua yu dangdai Zhongguo liyi shijian (Traditional Etiquette Culture and Contemporary Chinese Etiquette Practice),” Zhongguo Qingnian Wang (China Youth Net), January 10, 2022, accessed June 2022, http://xschu.dzu.edu.cn/ info/1385/11947.htm. 21 Jiang Jingping, “Yi Zhongguo chuantong liyi wenhua fengfu shehuizhuyi hexin jiazhi tixi (Enriching the Socialist Core Value System Through Traditional Chinese Etiquette Culture),” Huashen zai Xian (Huasheng Online), May 24, 2021, accessed June 2022, http://m. cyol.com/gb/articles/2021-05/24/content_Zb4X5t2AN.html; Xiao Fang, “Chuantong liyi wenhua yu dangdai Zhongguo liyi shijian (Traditional Etiquette Culture and Contemporary Chinese Etiquette Practice),” Guangming Ribao (Guangming Daily), January 12, 2022, accessed June 2022, www.dangjian.com/shouye/dangjianwenhua/wenhuadaguan/202201/t20220112_6281697.shtml. 22 “Liyi Wenhua (Etiquette Culture),” Baike. Baidu, accessed June 2022, https://baike. baidu.com/item/%E7%A4%BC%E4%BB%AA%E6%96%87%E5%8C%96/3467692. 23 “Xuesheng liyi (Student Etiquette),” Baike Baidu (Baidu Encyclopedia), accessed June 2022, https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E5%AD%A6%E7%94%9F%E7%A4%BC %E4%BB%AA/823078. 24 “Young Pioneers” refers to the CPC’s youth organisation for children aged 6–14. 25 Jiaoyubu yinfa “Zhongxiaoxue wenming liyi jiaoyu zhidao gangyao de tongzhi (The Ministry of Education Issued the ‘Guidelines for Civilized Etiquette Education in Primary and Secondary Schools’),” January 21, 2011, accessed September 2022, www. moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A06/s3325/201012/t20101230_114631.html. A central government website on “Civilised Etiquette” (wenming liyi) provides information for school students on politeness, etiquette and conduct of behaviour, accessed June 2022, www.gov. cn/ztzl/wmly_xyly.htm. 26 2022nian xiaoyuan wenming liyi jiaoyu qidonghui juxing (The 2022 campus civilised etiquette education kick-off meeting was held) at Heilongjiang Gongshang Xueyuan (Industry and Commerce College of Heilongjiang Province), April 1, 2022, accessed June 2022, www.hibu.edu.cn/xsc/info/1012/1271.htm. 27 See, for example: “Wenming xiaoyuan liyi pian. ‘Zhongguo meng, liyi xing’. Di wujie xuesheng liyi fengcai dasai juesai (Civilised Campus Etiquette: Finals of the 5th Student Etiquette Style Competition of ‘Chinese Dream Etiquette Walk’),” Chongqing Vocational College of Public Transport, May 9, 2019, accessed June 2022, www.cqgyzy. com/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=439&id=11614. 28 “Zhongguo furen hua zhongjin xue Xifang liyi (Rich Chinese Spend a Lot of Money to Learn Western Etiquette),” Qingnian Cankao (Reference for Young People), accessed June 2022, http://qnck.cyol.com/html/2014-11/26/nw.D110000qnck_20141126_1-21. htm.

162  The Power of Morality 29 “Zhongguo nü tuhao yitian hua 2.5wan xue liyi peixun ruhe dian cai he cha (Chinese Female Local Nouveau Riche Spends 25,000 a Day to Learn Etiquette, How to Order Food and Drink Tea),” Fazhi Wanbao (Legal Evening News), December 19, 2014, accessed June 2022, http://news.sina.com.cn/s/2014-12-19/144031305159.shtml. 30 “Zhongguo furen shengxing shang liyikeqishi tamen geng quede shi zhege . . . (Chinese Rich People Take Etiquette Class? In Fact, What They Lack Is This . . .),” Jiuge toutiao wang (Nine Headlines’ Net), November 25, 2014, accessed June 2022, http://m.iqilu. com/pcarticle/2224667. 31 See “Zhongyang guojia jihuan gongwei xiang Zhongyang he guojia jiguan ganbu zhigong chufa kaixin changyi daitou zhizhu canyin langfei, qieshi peiyang jieyue xiguan jianshe fengqing qizheng de zhengzhi jiguan (Open Letter of the Working Committee of the Central and State Organs to Cadres and Employees of the Central and State Organs: Take the Lead in Stopping Food Waste and Earnestly Cultivate the Habit of Frugality. Build a Clean Political Organisation),” Renmin Ribao, August 17, 2020, accessed September 2021, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2020-08/17/ nw.D110000renmrb_20200817_4-01.htm. 32 See, for example, “Xi Jinping dui zhizhi canyin langfei xingwei zuochu zhongyao zhishi (Xi Jinping Gives Important Instructions to Stop Food Waste),” Renmin Ribao, August 12, 2020. “Departments of Central Authorities to Lead Anti-Food Waste Campaign,” Xinhua News Agency, August 28, 2020, accessed August 2021, www.xinhuanet. com/english/2020-08/28/c_139325278.htm. In this campaign the government is also turning to new social media. See, for example, a rap cartoon video for young people promoting the “empty plate movement”: RAP动漫｜我是光盘我骄傲: https://3g.163. com/dy/article/FJRNVDT405507CKS.html?f=common-recommend-list (produced by Renmin Ribao, August 12, 2020, accessed August 2021. 33 “ ‘Yi quan, er yan, san fangwei’. ‘Guangpan xingdong’ xiaoguo xianzhu (‘First Complete, Second Strict, Third Orientated: The Empty Plate Behaviour Has a Remarkable Effect),” Zhongguo jingji wang (China economic net), October 9, 2020, accessed June 2022, https://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2020-10-09/doc-iivhuipp8653004.shtml. 34 See “Liaoning changyi N-2 diancan moshi: 10 ren juhui dian 8 ren (Liaoning Suggests a N-2 Model for Ordering Meals: If 10 People Are Ordering Meals They Should at Most Order Dishes for Eight Persons),” Guanchazhe wang, August 14, 2020, accessed September 2021, www.sohu.com/a/413181761_115479. 35 “Quanguo fulian changyi: Zhizhi canyin langfei, chongshang qinjian jieyue (AllChina Women’s Federation Urges: Stop Food Waste, Stick to Diligence and Thrift),” Xinhua Wang, August 14, 2020, accessed August 2021, http://sh.xinhuanet.com/202008/14/c_139290589.htm. On the campaign in Shanghai, see Chen and Song 2020. 36 “Shanghai zongjiaojie ‘lixing jieyue fandui langfei’ changyishu (Proposal of Shanghai’s Religious Circles to Support ‘Frugality and Strictly Opposing Waste’),” accessed December 2021, http://mzzj.sh.gov.cn/syxw/20200902/44fb04f6bb054a118fbdf263f82 5acdf.html. 37 The “Action Plan” can be found here, accessed November 2021, www.gov.cn/ zhengce/2021-11/01/content_5648085.htm. 38 “Zhongyang Xuanchuanbu yinfa tongzhi, bushu wenyu lingyu zonghe zhili gongzuo (The Central Propaganda Department Issued a Notice to Deploy Comprehensive Management Work in the Field of Culture and Entertainment),” September 2, 2021, accessed September 2021, http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2021/0902/c1001-32215990.html. 39 A document issued by China’s Cyberspace Administration included a set of rules to regulate celebrities and their fan groups as part of the efforts to reform social “mainstream values”; see “Guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang wule minxing wangshang xinxi guifan xiangguan gongzuode tongzhi (Notice on Further Strengthening the Work Related to the Regulation of Online Information for Entertainment Stars),” November 23, 2021, accessed November 2021, www.cac.gov.cn/2021-11/22/c_1639177815325970.htm.

The Power of Morality 163 40 Liu Jitong 2003, 105; Liu Lina 2004; Renmin Ribao, July 3, 2004, July 29, 2004. 41 Renmin Ribao, June 17, 2004. 42 “Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo jumin weiyuanhui zuzhifa,” accessed March 2021, www.mca.gov.cn/article/gk/fg/jczqhsqjs/201911/20191100021349.shtml. On civilised cities, see Cartier 2016. 43 Cf. for example Renmin Ribao, September 9, 2004 (Dalian); September 10, 2004 (Peking); September 11, 2004 (Shanghai). 44 Similar attempts were also made in the context of the “New Life Movement under Chiang Kai-shek (see Chapter 4). 45 As has been demonstrated in a comprehensive analysis by An and Zhang (2023), reinforcing the control and disciplinary function of neighborhood communities in response to the Covid-19 pandemic has significantly enhanced their disciplinary capacity even beyond the pandemic period. 46 Lily Tsai (2007), for example, has shown that in villages where intact traditional solidarity structures exist (clan organisations, temple associations, etc.) based on common interests, obligations and rules of conduct, communities are more stable and provide better public goods. 47 “Shehuizhuyi xin nongcun jianshe (Building a Socialist New Countryside),” Baidu, accessed April 2022, https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E7%A4%BE%E4%BC%9A%E4 %B8%BB%E4%B9%89%E6%96%B0%E5%86%9C%E6%9D%91%E5%BB%BA% E8%AE%BE, Zhonggong Zhongyang 2005. 48 Interview, Anju, September 17, 2008. Although the interviews in rural areas, including Nanjie Village and Liangshan Autonomous Prefecture addressed in this chapter, were conducted more than a decade ago, they nevertheless illustrate the trajectory of disciplining and civilising processes. The problems mentioned by the interviewees are still topical in many rural areas. 49 Interview, Party School Meitan County, Guizhou Province, August 29, 2010. 50 “Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan yinfa ‘Xiangcun zhenxing zhanlüe guihua (2018– 2022)’ (The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council Issued the ‘Strategic Plan for Rural Revitalisation (2018–2022)’),” accessed September 2021, www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-09/26/c_1123487123.htm. 51 On the historical background of Nanjie, cf. Gao et al. 1998; Cheung 2022. 52 Interview with village Party Secretary Wang Hongbin, October 6, 1996. See also Li, Heqian 1996, vol. 1, 43–49; Deng, Cui, and Miao 1996, 110–29; Heberer and Jakobi 2002. 53 Interview with the Party Secretary of Nanjie, September 26, 2006. 54 “Huaxi cun, Nanjie cun, Daqiuzhuang: bu side wutuobang zhi meng (Huaxi Village, Nanjie Village, Daqiuzhuang: Utopian Dream of Immortality),” Yurun Fenghua (Maple in Rain), July 6, 2021, accessed April 2022, www.mapleinrain.com/2021/07/06/12355/. 55 See accessed January 2023, www.nanjiecun.cn/cunbao.asp?bid=18. 56 In 2022, provisions were enacted on the treatment of business activities of family members of senior officials, including a requirement for officials to report such activities on an annual basis and in full, with severe penalties for non-compliance. See “Zhongban yinfa ‘Lingdao ganbu peiou, zinü jiqi peiou jingshang ban qiye guanli guiding’ (The Central Office of the Central Committee of the CPC issues the ‘Regulations on the Management of Leading Cadres’ Spouses, Children and Their Spouses to Run Businesses and Enterprises’),” Renmin Ribao, June 20, 2022, accessed June 2022, http://dangjian. people.com.cn/n1/2022/0620/c117092-32450478.html. 57 Sun and Yuan (2017) argued that the anti-corruption drive had “less effect in controlling the types of corruption that affect citizens’ lives more directly”, that is grassroots and petty corruption, leading to more satisfaction with fighting corruption at the national and provincial level but less at the local level. 58 “Yige tanguan beibu jingran shuochu zheyangde hua (A Corrupt Official Has Been Arrested; He Unexpectedly Said the Following Words),” Xintangren Dianshitai

164  The Power of Morality (New Tang Dynasty Television), June 30, 2014, accessed April 2022, www.ntdtv.com/ xtr/gb/2014/06/30/a1119782.html. 59 For cadres, a separate system, the cadres’ evaluation system, has existed for many years (see Heberer and Trappel 2013). 60 In mid-2018, approximately 40 pilot locations at city and provincial levels existed; cf. Kostka 2018. 61 “Guowuyuan guanyu yinfa shehui xinyong tixi jianshe guihua gangyao (2014– 2020nian) de tongzhi (Notification of the State Council Regarding Basic Parameters on Establishing a Social Credit System),” 2014, accessed April 2022, www.gov.cn/ zhengce/­content/2014-06/27/content_8913.htm. 62 See “Hewei xinyong (What Is the Meaning of Credit),” accessed March 2022, https:// zhidao.baidu.com/question/19340348.html?fr=qrl3. 63 More on the issue of trust in the context of China: Heberer and Schubert 2011. 64 Interview, Beijing, April 4, 2019. 65 “Jiedu Yanzhong weifa shixin qiye mingdan guanli zanxing banfa (Interpretation of the Provisional Regulations for Dealing with Non-Trustful Enterprises That Have Seriously Violated Legal Stipulations),” May 30, 2018, accessed September 2021, http://credit. mot.gov.cn/zhengcefagui/guojia/201805/t20180530_3027537.html. Link to the regulations, accessed September 2021, http://credit.mot.gov.cn/zhengcefagui/guojia/201805/ t20180522_3023596.html. 66 “2018nian shixin heimingdan niandu fenxi baogao fabu (Report and Analysis on Blacklisting of Untrustworthy Cases in the Year 2018),” accessed April 2022, www.gov.cn/ fuwu/2019-02/19/content_5366674.htm. An overview of the significance of the social credit system for enterprises is provided in Meissner 2017. 67 No more recent report could be found online. However, monthly government reports do apparently exist. See, for example, 2019nian 3yue shixin zhili yuedu fenxi baogao (Monthly Analysis Report on Untrustworthy Governance in March 2019). The report has shown that compared to the previous month, 254,803 new cases were blacklisted, including 224,951 subjects, comprising 53,128 legal persons and organisations and 171,823 natural persons; 84,077 subjects (legal persons) were withdrawn from the untrustworthiness blacklist, comprising 20,461 legal persons and other organisations and 63,616 natural persons, accessed April 2021, www.gov.cn/fuwu/2019-04/15/content_5382882.htm. 68 Another term for “discipline” was used here (chengjie, 惩戒), which means to discipline in order to deter. 69 Disciplinary provisions were issued for judges at the end of 2021. See accessed June 2022, www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-338521.html. 70 See, for example, “Zhongguo jiang ba xueshu buduan xingwei naru shehui chengxin jianshe tixi (China Will Incorporate Academic Misconduct into the Social Integrity Construction System),” January 2, 2019, accessed October 2021, www.ecorr.org/news/ industry/2019-01-02/171518.html. 71 Jiaoyubu et al. 2020; Zhang, Wanqing 2020. 72 “Zhonggong Zhongyang Bangongting Guowuyuan Bangongting yinfa ‘Guanyu tuijin shehui xinyong tixi jianshe gao zhiliang fazhan cujin xingcheng xin fazhan geju de yijian’ (The General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council issued the ‘Opinions on Promoting the Construction of a Social Credit System with High-Quality Development and Promoting the Formation of a New Development Pattern’),” March 29, 2022, accessed June 2022, www.gov.cn/zhengce/2022-03/29/content_5682283.htm. 73 Interview, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, March 24, 2019. 74 Renmin Ribao, July 30, 2010. 75 Renmin Ribao, July 30, 2010. 76 Renmin Ribao, September 8, 2010. 77 Jinri Zaobao, March 6, 2009, September 1, 2011.

The Power of Morality 165 78 Cf. for example Renmin Ribao, May 5, 2011; May 25, 2011; September 8, 2011; September 21, 2011. 79 See for instance an article in Renmin Ribao of September 7, 2010 which emphasises the de factor and requests a halt to the practice of calling local cadres “ghosts and demons” (guishen). 80 See “2019 dangzheng lingdao ganbu kaohe gongzuo tiaoli (Regulations on the Evaluation Work of Leading Party and Government Officials),” Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), April 22, 2019, accessed April 2022, www.gov.cn/zhengce/201904/21/­content_5384955.htm. 81 Zhongban yinfa (issued by the General Office of the Central Committee of the CPC), “Jiaqiang xin shidai lixiu tuixiu ganbu dang de jianshe gongzuo (Strengthening the Party Building of Retired Cadres in the New Era),” Renmin Ribao, May 16, 2022, accessed May 2022, http://dangjian.people.com.cn/n1/2022/0516/c117092-32422121.html. See also: Zhongyang zuzhibu fuzeren (Responsible Person of the Central Organisational Department), “Jiaqiang xin shidai lixiu tuixiu ganbu dang de jianshe gongzuo de yijian (Opinion with Regard to Strengthening the Party Building of Retired Cadres in the New Era),” Renmin Ribao, May 16, 2022, accessed May 2022, http://dangjian.people.com. cn/n1/2022/0516/c117092-32422121.html. 82 For example, as early as 1980, a Chinese conference on nationality theory stated that this principle was still valid up to the present day. Minzu Yanjiu (Nationalities’ Studies), January 1981, 79. Heberer 1984, 313. See also Otto Franke 2019, 321–57. 83 On the concept of civilising missions in China, see also Hirono (2008, 1), who defined it as “an asymmetrical image of the relationship between so-called ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’ to help the ‘uncivilised’ ”. 84 On details of the fieldwork, see Heberer 2014, 736. Although the relevant field research was conducted as early as 2012, subsequent visits to Liangshan Prefecture have shown that the civilising process there is still an ongoing one. The results of the previous research are indicative of how this process is currently taking place in other minority regions. 85 The Yi, with a population of about nine million people, are one of the larger ethnic groups in China. They are the seventh largest of the 55 ethnic minority groups officially recognised by the People’s Republic of China. They live primarily in mountainous areas in the provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou and Guangxi. About two million Yi live in the Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan Province. 86 For instance, the high expenses related to various ceremonies and rituals such as weddings and burials; see, for example, Shama 2008, 1–6. 87 Interview, T. Village, February 12, 2012. 88 Ibid. On the significance of fire pits and interior design for ancestor worship, see Wu 1993, 40. 89 Interview, M. County, February 13, 2012. 90 Interview, M. County, February 15, 2012. 91 This section on M. County is a revised version of a section in Heberer 2014. 92 Without doubt, the photos and documents published on the Xinjiang case since 2018 are horrifying. In this book, we are not concerned with the general issue of the treatment of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang (see Zenz 2021, 2022; International Consortium of Investigative Journalists 2019; United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 2022) as numerous publications are now available on this issue. We focus instead on social disciplining and civilising processes, which are the principal questions addressed in this book. On the Xinjiang issue, see also Alpermann 2021; James 2022a, 2022b. 93 Zizhiqu jiguan fadian (The Autonomous Region Announcement for Administrative Bodies), “Guanyu jin yibu jiaqiang he guifan zhiye jineng jiaoyu peixun zhongxin gongzuode yijian (Opinions on Further Strengthening and Standardising the Work of Vocational Skills Education and Training Centres),” accessed April 2021, www.­ documentcloud.org/documents/6558509-China-Cables-Telegram-Chinese.html.

166  The Power of Morality 94 “Shenru cujin gezu ganbu qunzhong jiaowang jiaoliu jiarong da lao Xinjiang shehui wending he changzhi jian de jianshi jichu (Deeply Promote the Exchanges and Integration of Cadres and Masses of All Ethnic Groups to Lay a Solid Foundation for Social Stability and Long-Term Stability in Xinjiang),” Xinjiang Xinwen zai Xianwang (Xinjiang News Online), February 14, 2018, accessed October 2021, www.xjbs.com.cn/ news/2018-02/14/cms2047926article.shtml. 95 “Guanyu zuohao fuwu Chabchar xian chengxiang fuyu laodongli zhuanyi jiuye gongzuo shishi fang’an (Implementation of the Plan for the Transfer and Employment of the Urban and Rural Surplus Labour Force in Qapqual County),” released by the county government, March 22, 2018, accessed October 2021, https://web.archive.org/ web/20191127080847/www.xjcbcr.gov.cn/info/1200/57613.htm. 96 “Wo qu chutai Nanjiang si dizhou shendu pinkun diqu jiuze fupin peixun cujin jihua pinkun jiating zhiye jineng peixun quan fugai (Our Region Promulgated the Employment and Poverty Alleviation Training and Promotion Plan for the Deeply Impoverished Areas in the Four Prefectures of Southern Xinjiang),” June 9, 2018, accessed October 2021, www.sohu.com/a/234788357_118570. 97 Further details on this issue: Lehr and Bechrakis 2019. 98 “Zhagen jiceng zuo fuwu jianxing shiming ju minxin (Take Root at the Grassroots, Do Service, Fulfil Mission, Garner People’s Heart),” Kunlun Wang. Xinjiang Dangjian Wang (Kunlun Net. Net of Xinjiang’s Party Construction), December 6, 2018, accessed October 2021, http://220.171.42.248/P/C/3324.htm. 99 See, for example, “Qinqi jiao women jiankang shenghuo (Relatives Teach Us to Lead a Healthy Life),” Xinjiang Ribao (Xinjiang Daily), January 8, 2018, accessed October 2021, http://wap.xjdaily.com/xjrb/20180108/95561.html. 100 Sociologist Li, Qiang (2021) speaks about “cultural poverty” among ethnic minorities in Western China. He argues that these groups have developed a distinct way of life, norms and values, generating a “poverty subculture” passed from generation to generation. Accordingly, Li says, the government is facing many difficulties in modernising these ethnic groups and areas, which hampered or even resisted the civilising modernising projects. 101 Civilising Uyghurs was already an issue during the Qing dynasty; see, for example, Ryono and Galway 2015. 102 According to Zenz (2021, 11) “rural persons subjected to labour transfers” differ from people in the so-called re-education camps. The former are “trained in state-run vocational facilities that can be securitized but are not re-education camps. Instead, they are regular vocational schools”; these training programmes, even if they include “militarystyle” education, “can also be run by private companies”. 103 “Xinjiang de laodong jiuye baozhang lanpishu (Bluebook of Xinjiang’s Labour Employment Security),” accessed October 2021, www.gov.cn/zhengce/2020-09/17/ content_5544154.htm. 104 “Xi Jinping zai Xinjiang kaocha shi qiangdiao wanzheng zhunque guanche xin shidai dangde zhijiang fanglüe, jianshe tuanjie hexie fanrong fuyu wenming jinbu anju yele shengtai lianghaode meihao Xinjiang (During His Inspection in Xinjiang, Xi Jinping Emphasised That the Party’s Strategy for Governing Xinjiang in the New Era Should Be Fully and Accurately Implemented, and a Beautiful Xinjiang with a Harmonious, Prosperous, Wealthy, Civilised and Progressive Life and a Good Ecology Should Be Built),” July 22, 2022, accessed July 2022, http://politics.people.com.cn/ n1/2022/0715/c1024-32476930.html. 105 A self-financed scientific fact-finding trip to Xinjiang in May 2023 indicated that the “fight against terrorism and Islamism” (2017–2020) in Xinjiang was, according to authorities in Kashgar Prefecture and Ürümqi, understood as a transitional period that shall now be replaced by a phase of “juridification”. The new Party Secretary Ma Xingrui (since 12/2021) has called for a return to “normality” as soon as possible, which

The Power of Morality 167 is already visible in everyday life, especially in the primarily Uyghur-populated region of southern Xinjiang (Nanjiang), both in urban and rural areas. It is asserted that the “education camps” had been largely dissolved in the meantime. State arbitrariness in the context of the “anti-terror measures” is now admitted, but explained with the “terror emergency” and the traumatisation caused by the terror, not only among the Han, but primarily among the Uyghur population. In the next step, an institutionalisation of law and a return to legal procedures shall be targeted. With the introduction of 15 years of free schooling and vocational training for young Uyghurs, the creation of largely free health care, regionally divided and adapted development and resource aid provided by 19 Chinese provinces (among other things, with regard to investments in industrial, agricultural, service and training sectors) to create training and employment opportunities for Uyghur males and Uyghur women, their wages paid according to nationwide regulations, the state has triggered a new development push primarily in Nanjiang. In essence, this indicates that the policy of “hard” disciplining in the form of a total control of people accused or suspected of terrorism, Islamism or “extremism” (terms only marginally defined) is to be replaced by “soft” forms of disciplining. 106 “Zhiye jineng tisheng xingdong shishi fang’an (2019–2021 nian) (Implementation Plan for Vocational Skills Upgrading Activities 2019–2021),” approved by the People’s Government of Tibet Autonomous Region, accessed October 2021, www.xizang. gov.cn/zwgk/xxfb/zbwj/201911/t20191114_123695.html. There are also reports indicating that these activities are organised in a “military manner”, see, for example, Zenz 2020 or “China Pushes Tibetan Workers into Military-Style Training Centres,” AsiaPacific News.Net, September 23, accessed October 2021, www.asiapacificnews.net/ news/266478125/china-pushes-tibetan-workers-into-military-style-training-centres. 107 “2020 nian Xizang jiang wancheng 10wan nongmumin peixun renwu shixian zhuanyi jin 60wan ren (In 2020, Tibet Will Complete the Task of Training 100,000 Farmers and Herdsmen, and Realise the Transfer of 600,000 Jobs),” April 20, 2020, accessed October 2021, https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1664488397776400612&wfr=spider &for=pc. 108 An article in Xizang Ribao (Tibet Daily), May 3, 2018, points to the military-style skills training: “Changdu shi yan ba ‘wuguan’ jiaqiang nongmumin jineng peixun (Changdu City Strictly Controls the ‘Five Concerns’ and Strengthens Skills Training for Farmers and Herdsmen),” accessed October 2021, https://archive.is/kQVnX#selec tion-441.2-461.113. 109 “Xizang Lang County: Dingdan shi peixun Zhicheng (Tibet’s Lang County: OrderBased Training Supports the Employment of Farmers and Herdsmen),” Xinlang Caijing (Sina Economics and Finance), March 31, 2022, accessed July 2022, https:// finance.sina.com.cn/jjxw/2022-03-31/doc-imcwipii1549157.shtml. 110 See, for example, “Xizang zizhiqu Renmin Zhengfu bangongting guanyu yinfa Xizang zizhiqu 2019–2020 nian nongmumin peixun de zhuanyi jiuye xingdong fang’an de tongzhi (Notice of the General Office of the People’s Government of Tibet Autonomous Region on Printing and Distributing the Action Plan for the Training and Employment Transfer of Farmers and Herdsmen in the Tibet Autonomous Region from 2019 to 2020),” accessed October 2021, https://mall.cnki.net/magazine/Article/ XZZB201907003.htm; “Jinnian Xizang zizhiqu lizheng shixian nongmumin zhuanyi jiuye 60wan ren (This Year, the Tibet Autonomous Region Strives to Realise the Transfer of 600,000 Farmers and Herdsmen to Employment),” June 13, 2020, accessed October 2021, www.sohu.com/a/401664470_120648025?_trans_=000014_bdss_dknfqjy.

8

Retrospective and Lessons Learnt

Modernising and Disciplining in the Chinese Context: A Brief Summary This book started by examining the Chinese quest to modernise the country. Drawing on the Japanese experience (Meiji era) and influenced by Western scientific, technological, political, legal and philosophical ideas, Chinese intellectuals and politicians in the late 19th century debated how to modernise the country – based on Chinese characteristics – and to liberate it from constant foreign intervention, backwardness and poverty. Today, the principal objective of these endeavours is for China to become a leading world power accomplishing what Xi Jinping called the “Chinese Dream”. The principal argument in this book is that disciplining and civilising policies are part and parcel of modernising processes aimed at creating and shaping modern citizens. It is argued that the process of modernisation does not only refer to the economic, political and administrative structures and institutions but concurrently requires a change in the organisation of society in general, including the disciplining of society as a whole and the individuals within it. Undoubtedly, the ultimate purpose of disciplining is to enhance national growth and prosperity in the context of the Chinese disciplinary developmental state and modernise the nation. At a global scale, modernisation is not a unilinear process, with Western development trajectories serving as a “model” for “catch-up development” of non-­ Western countries. Rather, this process is based on the specific historical conditions and the sociocultural background of the country concerned. There is no uniform, unilinear and universal model of modernity but only multiple models and trajectories. Japan is an example of this, having adapted Western institutions to its particularities while remaining “Japanese” in principle. The slogan “Japanese spirit and Western technology” (Wakon yosai), coined in the 1860s, shows that at first, Japan was interested only in the West’s scientific and technical knowledge and was not willing to open itself to Western culture and thinking (see Morishima 1982). The Chinese counterpart was the “Self-Strengthening Movement” (Yangwu Yundong), a period of radical institutional reforms after the Opium Wars in the second half of the 19th century, aimed at “adopting Western knowledge for its practical uses DOI: 10.4324/9781003353065-8

Retrospective and Lessons Learnt 169 while keeping Chinese values as the core” or, in short, “Chinese spirit and Western techniques” (Zhong ti Xi yong). A number of implications emerge from our considerations in this book, from which the different frameworks and institutional conditions for social disciplining and civilising in China become evident: (1) the deep-seated acceptance of the Chinese (central) state as the core authority that has to steer morality and the associated acceptance of government action by the people; (2) the role of nation-building as part of the disciplining and civilising process, and, related to this, the specific understanding of nationhood as part of a Chinese modernisation nationalism; (3) the rapid development of urbanisation, which brought significant challenges to both urban and rural areas and apparently required a specific disciplining and civilising process and (4) the question of which actors and agencies are involved in disciplining activities. In the final section of this chapter, we will look at the similarities and differences in the European and Chinese modernising trajectories and consider whether the European concept of social disciplining can at least partly be applied to China’s disciplining trajectory. The State as an Agent of Disciplining David Easton made a distinction between specific and diffuse support for a political system: specific support pertains to the performance efficiency of the system as perceived by the population; diffuse support, in turn, manifests itself as a type of “advance payment” in the form of trust in the institutions and the foundations of political order independently of the specific system output.1 In this context, trust and support appear to be functionally analogous terms: “specific trust” (as specific support) emerges as concrete demands on the system; “diffuse trust” (like diffuse support) is generated through sustained experiences with institutions and the continuous internalisation of the system’s demonstration of trust, that is the presence of reliability. It becomes apparent that trust, legitimacy and stability in a political system are closely related. As the World Value Survey founded by Ronald F. Inglehart illustrates for the Chinese case, there has been a high level of trust in the central government and the CPC within China’s population for many years. In the 2018–2020 survey period, 94.6% of respondents answered that they had “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of trust in the central government and 90.5% in political parties (essentially the CPC) (World Values Survey 2018). Specific support for the government from a majority of the Chinese people has recently been highlighted as an asset that has contributed to the successful containment of the Covid-19 epidemic in its early phase (see Chapter 1). And indeed, specific support for the government’s strategy to combat the Covid-19 pandemic seemed to play a crucial role in generating more general support until early 2022. Data from various surveys suggest high levels of public approval of government policies to combat the Covid-19 pandemic during this period.2 Chinese citizens

170  Retrospective and Lessons Learnt seemed for a long time to be widely satisfied with and supportive of their government’s performance, at least that of the central level. Dissatisfaction primarily pertained to the actions of local authorities. The narrative of China’s successful efforts to control the pandemic in contrast to Western societies had also increased trust in the Chinese government for quite some time (see e.g. Yinxian Zhang 2022). Historian Qin Hui pointed out that in fighting the pandemic, China could rely on the obedience of its people (Qin 2020, 6). But in China, obedience is not a natural human behaviour. Only if people believe that disobedience will be punished will they be inclined to obey. Sun Yat-sen noted that without control and disciplining, the people behave like a “heap of loose sand” (yi pian san sha), that is they are disunited, undisciplined and lacking a sense of cohesion (Sun Zhongshan 2006, see Chapter 4). Thus, according to the Chinese government, enforcing obedience across society demands top-down monitoring and disciplining. In doing so, the Chinese government turned to technological devices such as mobile phones to exercise control and track sick people’s movements and behaviour; it also introduced mass quarantine, curfews, compulsory isolation, lockdowns of entire cities, villages, streets, residential areas and single apartment houses, a requirement for masks to be worn and monitoring by drones, facial recognition, etc. This, of course, not only is possible in an authoritarian state but also took place in democratic polities, such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in a similar vein, something Qin (2020, 10–11) called “low privacy advantage” and the adoption of “medieval methods”. In fact, pandemic control measures by the government until early 2022 led to a significantly lower number of infections and deaths than in Western countries, even if one takes into account that the official Chinese figures may not always reflect the reality. As the Shanghai case addressed in Chapter 1 reveals, local government was often blamed for all the problems that arose, with the result that it forfeited support for its measures. At the same time, our explanations reveal that the central government’s guidelines, for example with regard to the “socialist core values” or civilising rules, are often too general and therefore tend to be an expression of symbolic politics. By naming “core values”, not least on the basis of common Chinese proverbs, the state on the one hand reminds the population of its collective historical memory; on the Table 8.1  Covid-19 pandemic: selected countries (infected/deceased, until 5/2022) Country

Infected (in millions)

Deceased

United States France Germany United Kingdom Russia China

82.44 29.35 25.73 22.36 17.99 2.35

999,570 148,300 137,500 177,900 370,000 14,570

Source: Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at John Hopkins University. Accessed May 2022. https://gisanddata.maps.arcgis.com/apps/dashboards/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6.

Retrospective and Lessons Learnt 171 other hand, the enumeration of a larger number of values allows local authorities a greater degree of flexibility to select focal points that they believe should be given priority. This flexibility appears as a salient marker of Chinese governance and its civilising policies. Nation-Building, Disciplining and Civilising Nation-building is a process of sociopolitical development that transforms loosely or contentiously connected communities into a common society with a corresponding state. This usually includes the establishment of common cultural standards, a national language, the integration of the population into a nation-state regardless of ethnic or religious composition and a disciplining or civilising process to bring minorities into line with the ethnic majority. Nation-building is usually successful only when an integrative ideology exists that gives rise to a nationalism related to all people living on a national territory irrespective of their ethnicity or religious belief. As long as – according to the Chinese leadership – Uyghurs, Tibetans, Mongols etc. see themselves as Uyghurs, Tibetans or Mongols only and concurrently not as Chinese citizens, the nation-building process remains unfinished. The crux of the nation-building question is whether a cross-ethnicity, that is a national identity, is emerging. “As long as the primary identity and loyalty lies with the ethnic group and remains subordinate to the national identity level, the nation-state remains precarious” (Hippler 2004, 20–21). The nation-building process is thus a crucial part of reinforcing national security.3 In Europe, nations in the modern sense did not emerge until the 17th and 18th centuries. The formation of nations was a lengthy process and frequently accompanied by ethnic cleansing, forced assimilation and expulsions, which can be seen, for example, in Europeans’ treatment of indigenous peoples in the process of creating nation-states such as the United States, Canada and Australia. Corresponding examples existed, and still exist, on a worldwide scale up to the present day.4 In China, after the overthrow of the Qing dynasty in 1912, the question arose as to how to transform a territory (“Middle Kingdom”) into a modern nation-state. From a historical vantage point, the Chinese “nationality question” in the 20th century has been closely linked to nation-building.5 As early as the beginning of the 20th century, Liang Qichao propagated a “great nationalism” (da minzuzhuyi), that is that all ethnic groups that had settled on Chinese territory during the Qing dynasty were to be regarded as part of the Chinese nation. He thus defined the Chinese concept of nation by territory. The non-Han people – according to Liang – should be continuously assimilated into the Chinese culture by means of the education system. For Liang, this was an indispensable part of the Chinese nation-­ building process, especially since he attributed “assimilationist power” to the Han and their culture.6 Liang’s idea of the “assimilationist power” prevailed during Republican times and was embraced again in the Xi era. That the Chinese nationbuilding process is not yet complete is demonstrated not least by the debate on the integration of ethnic minorities and the creation of a “unified nation of all the Chinese people”, a point we briefly addressed in Chapter 7.

172  Retrospective and Lessons Learnt From another nation-building vantage point, it was Sun Yat-sen, above all, who had a shift from “familism” to a national consciousness in mind, that is a transfer of a family related consciousness to one of being a member of a nation. This should be achieved by an “educational dictatorship”, that is a process of disciplining and civilising the entire Chinese people, including ethnic minorities – still an ongoing process today. Since the 1990s, a “new nationalism” has emerged, linked to modernisation policies, pride in progress achieved and the conviction that a non-Western (­“Chinese”) path of development with “Chinese characteristics” is indispensable. This has given rise to a “people’s nationalism,” that is a sense of people’s close bonds with their country and its history and the CPC as the leading force in the modernising process. According to the CPC leadership, the process of creating a common national identity is not yet complete. Local, regional, ethnic, class and other interests in many cases still override its formation. Due to unrest in Tibetan settlement areas (2008), Xinjiang (2009) and Inner Mongolia (2011), but above all due to terrorist threats from Islamist forces, the feeling of a growing disintegration of the peripheral areas intensified among the party leadership, especially since nationalities policy in China is primarily understood as part of national security policy and not as an issue of greater autonomy.7 This unrest triggered a debate within the political leadership and among Chinese intellectuals about necessary changes in nationalities policy. From the academic sphere, Ma Rong, a social anthropologist from Peking University, and the Qinghua professors Hu Angang and Hu Lianhe, argued that special rights for ethnic minorities and the emphasis on ethnic affiliation had led not to deeper integration but to greater segregation and an overemphasis on ethnic particularities. Instead of national coherence, the question of self-government had been placed in the focus. However, according to their argument, assimilation and Hanification were necessary side effects of China’s nation-building and modernisation trajectories.8 In this sense, both Hu Angang and Hu Lianhe advocated a “second generation of ethnic politics”, combined with the abolition of recognition for any ethnic affiliation, the elimination of the system of self-government, the promotion of regions instead of ethnic groups and the strengthening of education in Han Chinese language (Putonghua).9 In this way, they took up ideas which – as described earlier – had already been proposed by Liang Qichao. The state strives to accelerate this process by “creating a unified Chinese nation”, that is by a forced nation-building process, enforcing standard Chinese as the state language and asserting a “common identity of all Chinese ethnicities”. Beyond modernisation processes and social change, this forced nation-building process creates a sense of threat and erosion among ethnic identities and religious, cultural and social communities. For a long time, the party leadership believed that with the modernisation of the minority regions, the problem of integration and the creation of a Zhonghua minzu (unified Chinese nation) could be solved. In 2014, Xi Jinping declared in a speech on ethnic constellations that the previous nationalities policy and the policy of regional autonomy had proven their worth and had to be continued. At the same time, however, ethnic interaction and mixing, Putonghua education instead

Retrospective and Lessons Learnt 173 of education in ethnic minority languages and the building of inter-ethnic communities should be further promoted: an indication of a stronger orientation towards integrative and assimilatory policies.10 This nation-building aspect of ethnic policies was also underscored by Wang Yang, the then-Chairman of the Political Consultative Conference and member of the Politburo Standing Committee, during an inspection visit to Inner Mongolia in early 2021. Wang emphasised that nation-building is a core issue in China’s new nationalities policies. Without a shared sense of the Chinese nation, the goal of “rejuvenating the Chinese nation” could not be accomplished. Accordingly, all autonomous areas inhabited by ethnic minorities should amplify their awareness of the Chinese nation and culture, intensify Putonghua language education and boost ethnic unity and social stability.11 When Xi Jinping visited Xinjiang in July 2022, he also accentuated the significance of the Chinese nation-building process as the requirement of the times: It is necessary to forge a sense of community of the Chinese nation and promote exchanges and integration of the various ethnic groups. Chinese civilisation is the root of the cultures of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang. It is necessary to educate and guide the cadres and the masses to correctly understand the history of Xinjiang, especially the history of national development, establish a firm view of the history of the Chinese nation, and forge the Chinese heart and soul.12 Urbanisation and Disciplining Urbanisation is a salient feature of modernising processes and modernity. Urbanisation processes have always included the need to discipline rural migrants and other newcomers to behave in accordance with the urban order and urban codes of behaviour (Nyiri 2006). This refers also to fields such as market, fiscal, legal, hygiene and organisational discipline as well as civilised conduct. For many decades, the Chinese hukou system, which primarily tied the rural population to their hometowns, restricted the influx of rural people into cities. It was not until the economic reforms after 1978 that rural “migrant workers” (nongmingong) were permitted to stay temporarily in the cities for employment purposes. However, these migrants and their families remained, and most still remain, excluded from basic urban services. By 2020, nearly 276 million migrant workers had found employment in urban areas. This led to a fundamental change in the ratio of people living in urban and rural areas, especially as a growing number of migrant workers gradually obtained residence permits in cities and thus mutated into urban residents. In addition, more and more rural townships and villages were incorporated into urban areas, a development that is also familiar from Europe’s modernising history. Structurally, a change from a rural to an urban society took place in the 2000s. Whereas in 2001 the urban population was only 480.64 million (37.7% of the total population) with a rural population of 795.63 million (62.3%), this ratio shifted to

174  Retrospective and Lessons Learnt 901.99 million urban residents (63.9%) to the disadvantage of the rural population (509.79 = 36.1%) by 2020 (Li, Qiang 2021). The rapid urbanisation process with simultaneous inclusion of the rural population and significant migration from the countryside to the cities not only had effects on the cities’ economic structure and infrastructure, urban employment and housing development; it also engendered social effects in terms of value conflicts and value gaps between the urbanites and population groups with a migrant background. Arguably, rural migrant workers contributed tremendously to urban development and progress. They are, however, predominantly employed in low-wage sectors, performing precarious or less attractive jobs that urban residents are no longer willing to take on. The underprivileged status of migrants led to the re-emergence of traditional forms of organisation such as hometown associations based on place of origin or other informal non-­ governmental organisations. While the first generation of migrant workers consisted mainly of peasants who planned to return to their home regions after some years of urban employment, the second generation of younger and better educated rural people partly intended to settle down in the cities on a long-term basis. As early as 2011, an official document from the Ministry of Civil Affairs made it clear that this second generation would have to be partially integrated into the urban population. They should be guided by the local authorities to behave in a civilised manner, to adopt a civilised lifestyle, to create civilised families and to obey laws and rules.13 A contribution at an economic forum in 2022 pointed out that civilisational measures would have to be taken to integrate rural migrants into the urban civilisation and adapt them to the urban lifestyle and industrial discipline. In particular, they should be encouraged to abide by urban rules and regulations (Zhang, Zhao, and Li 2022). The urban civilisation rules addressed in Chapter 7 are thus tailored not only to urbanites but also, and primarily, to rural–urban migrants. Who Disciplines Whom? A central question is who disciplines whom. The Chinese development state with its disciplining capacity (cf. Chapter 3) plays the pivotal role here, specifically the CPC elite, which functions as the developmental elite, as well as the party with its organisational subdivisions at all levels. They ensure the uniform implementation of development plans and projects. In developing countries, middle classes are assigned a key role in disciplining processes (Davis 2004). This, however, differs from China where this process embraces all strata, including parts of the political elite. At the same time, it subjects all social fields and actors to the process of disciplining. A multitude of organisations and institutions serve the purpose of monitoring and disciplining social and functional groups: • Party officials and CPC members: disciplinary control commissions, which exist at all levels of administration and punish violations of discipline; the ­cadres’ evaluation system

Retrospective and Lessons Learnt 175 • Government officials: National Supervisory Commission of the People’s ­Republic of China, the country’s highest anti-corruption agency, and its subdivisions at all levels of government; the cadres’ evaluation system • Entrepreneurs: administrative offices for industry and commerce, state-owned entrepreneurial organisations, non-governmental entrepreneurial organisations, chambers of commerce and industry associations; the social credit system • Rural population: civilisation rules for rural areas; various policies to create new “socialist villages” and a new village culture; clan organisations; the social credit system • Urban population: neighbourhoods; urban civilisation rules; the social credit system • Migrant workers in urban areas: migrant workers’ service centres; non-­ governmental organisations; neighbourhood communities; clan and hometown organisations • Internet users: Cyberspace Administration of China (abbreviated wangxinban) In addition, the CPC’s “mass organisations”, chambers of commerce, industry associations, various non-governmental organisations, religious and clan institutions, business and scientific associations, neighbourhood organisations and others contribute to the process of disciplining society. The Chinese developmental state in the form of the CPC is the entity that corporatistically reconciles the various disciplining activities and directs them in the required developmental direction. Disciplining Trajectories: Europe and China Compared Disciplining trajectories in present-day China and in Europe in the 17th to 19th centuries offer similarities with regard to the historical endeavour to achieve modernity and, associated with this, the will to develop a code of conduct and shape minds that are understood to be modern, even if modernity can mean very different things in these two distinct cultural circles and in different periods. At the same time, there is a certain congruence in that discipline and civility, as described by Weber and Elias, are core factors in modernisation processes and contribute to political and social order and economic efficiency. Although we find certain similarities between Europe and China, there are tremendous differences between, for instance, the concept and logic of the state and the concept of political order, on the one hand, and modernising processes, on the other. Regarding Europe, Weber, Oestreich and Gorski were primarily concerned with European disciplining processes, particularly their relatedness to Protestantism and Calvinism. In Europe, the disciplining process was associated with the rise of cities and a specific urban life. Van der Loo and van Reijen (1992, 135) identified three initial avenues of disciplining processes: a modern military organisation as the starting point and paragon of disciplining; factory organisation due to the Industrial Revolution and administrative organisation. A strong permeation of the state and the church, on the one hand, and for centuries a division of labour between the church and the state, on the other, existed in which religion served as a source of discipline. Whereas originally, the church was primarily responsible for

176  Retrospective and Lessons Learnt moral disciplining (church discipline), the state dealt with issues of administrative, military and legal disciplining to ensure secular order. With the Age of Enlightenment, the role of the church shifted in favour of the role of the state. Since the French Revolution, there has been a separation of religion and the state, or rather the church and the state in different variants, and the emergence of an ideologically neutral constitutional state. This also altered the role of God-given commandments, which had determined the relationship between state, church and society in Europe for centuries. In addition, modernisation was accompanied by the emergence of far-reaching demoralisation and moral-free spheres. The state therefore took on the task of converting moral norms into state law. Certain moral prescriptions thus became a private field of behaviour that was no longer subject to state punishment. In cases of conflict between law and morality, courts now decided. At the same time, disciplining efforts in Europe took place under the conditions typical of autocratic states, led by an aristocratic upper class which, in early modernising processes, competed with a developing urban bourgeoisie. By contrast, in the People’s Republic of China, the current process of disciplining is taking place under a single-party system that acts as the engine of development and pursues a specific political path with “Chinese characteristics”. Whereas in Europe, cities developed into autonomous forces and produced a self-confident bourgeoisie as a counterpoint to the aristocracy, Chinese cities – historically – remained an appendage of the ruler and his administration, with the result that an urban competing force such as a European bourgeoisie could not evolve. The Chinese literati were – as Eisenstadt has emphasised – both a political–administrative and a cultural elite. There was no separation of state and church, no autonomous cultural elite, no assembly of Estates, no religious elite with an autonomous base. Political, administrative and cultural functions were also not separated (Eisenstadt 1982, 158). Whereas Europe saw the emergence of an autonomous civil society that has played a decisive role as a counterweight to the state since the 19th century, a civil society sphere, in line with Western understanding, is still only marginally developed in China and is subordinate to the state. Due to specific Chinese peculiarities, the functions of the traditional Chinese state differed in many respects from that of the European state. This is particularly evident in the conceptual framework such as the mandate of heaven, the right to change the mandate, that is the overthrow of incompetent rulers, the role of the state as a “moral state” and the traditional civil service examination system. Confucian, Legalist and Daoist concepts and their fusion produced a very specific role structure and interaction between the state and the people. The traditional structures and institutions are still reflected in contemporary Chinese concepts, ideas, task definitions and the logic of state action. In addition, East Asian societies are often considered traditionally state-oriented: the main responsibility for solving social problems lies with the state, not with the creative forces of a civil society acting as a counterweight to it. Finally, a special feature with regard to China is the existence of a paradigm for East Asian developmental states. Japanese scholars called this the “Flying Geese

Retrospective and Lessons Learnt 177 Paradigm”, conveying the idea that Japan had flown ahead of the region, guiding others towards the right path. Admittedly, this paradigm, with Japan serving as a role model, is controversial in the East Asian region, especially because of Japan’s hegemonic aspirations in the first half of the 20th century and its aggressive occupation policy in the region. But Japan’s developmental trajectory and its experience with industrial and foreign trade strategies, economic and technological development plans, etc. served the East Asian “Newly Industrialised Economies” as a blueprint for their own trajectory. The development strands of technology and know-how imports, import substitution through the development of a light industry, export promotion through labour-intensive production, then export promotion by means of higher-value, capital-intensive products and intensification of advanced technologies and promotion of high-tech industries, etc. were largely adopted by the East Asian tiger economies. However, the individual states, especially China, were also careful to adapt these strategies to specific national conditions. It can therefore be argued that the Japanese path to success has given the other East Asian developing states a comparative advantage, since they were able to learn a great deal from Japan’s positive and negative experiences (cf. Akamatsu 1962; Kojima 2000; Kasahara 2013). The question arises whether the European approaches to “social disciplining” and “civilising” can be applied to the Chinese case. We spelled out that European scholars (Weber, Elias, Foucault, Oestreich) have analysed and traced trajectories of modernising but only in European countries. However, theories that were specifically tailored to European developments do not necessarily provide a blueprint for development processes in countries such as China. China’s history of ideas is a case in point: it makes clear that concepts of disciplining and civilising have strong roots in major Chinese worldviews but start from a different vantage point and ontological logic. In this sense, Peter Evans has alerted us to be cautious of “institutional monocropping”, that is “the imposition of blueprints based on idealised versions of Anglo-American institutions” which neglect the distinct features and institutional–organisational particularities of specific countries (Evans 2004, 30). However, that said, theories put forward by European scholars can still provide a sound basis and concepts for tracing, examining and analysing these processes in a non-Western environment as well.14 A study of social disciplining can thus contribute to our understanding of the logic of the Chinese political system and the efforts to stabilise an order characterised by discipline and civility. Due to historical and ideological disparities and experiences, social disciplining does not stand for a time-delayed process in the sense of catching up with the development of disciplining and civilising strategies according to Western standards. Moreover, in both Europe and China, social disciplining is a continuous process with neither a starting point nor an end point. In a contribution to the CPC’s theoretical journal Qiushi in July 2022, Xi Jinping spelled out that China should learn from Western civilisation theories but not copy them. The Chinese concept would differ but could and should contribute to creating a more civilised world on a global scale (Xi 2022a). This at least indicates that even from the point of view of the Chinese leadership, concepts such as those of

178  Retrospective and Lessons Learnt Weber, Elias or Oestreich are not rejected, but that the Chinese history of civilisation is apparently able to make an important contribution to the general history and theory of civilisation. Ultimately, this also applies to the theorem of social disciplining harnessed in this book. In this context, we would like to return to the approach of “multiple modernities” mentioned in Chapter 2. This approach has been criticised as epistemological Eurocentrism, especially by scholars from the Global South.15 They argue that the idea of a parallelism of different modernities remains part of the thought patterns inherent in European–Western institutional modernisation, which would then merely be culturally contextualised or differently shaped in the “non-West”. Certainly, this criticism could also be applied to the concept of social disciplining. However, as valid as some of the criticisms may be, it should be noted that analyses of modernity, modernisation etc. that take a different approach have so far been unable to adequately solve the basic problems criticised and in many cases also refer to European developments. The institutional and structural modernisation efforts of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan or mainland China also go in a direction that the Western concept of modernisation embraces, such as industrialisation, production for the market, integration into the world market, urbanisation, rural– urban migration, the specific role of science and technology, social mobility, the creation of modern administrative structures, a rationally organised bureaucracy, the development of a legal system, the formation of a rational economic ethos, and so on, or – as far as civilisation is concerned – with regard to the development of a new economy: rationalisation of thought and action, the differentiation of society, domestication of people (disciplining the ego, civilising behaviour, social and inner control), an increase in the level of education, secularisation and the decline in the influence of religion, that is processes described by Weber, Durkheim and Elias (see Chapter 2). Therefore, it seems justified to apply the approach of social disciplining to China in the light of the aforementioned institutional and structural differences and the specific Chinese path of modernisation. Responding to Rigid Market Values: Involution, Lying Flat and the Morality of Young People As societal reactions to a rigid market economy characterised by capitalist pursuit of profit and fierce economic and social competition in the West, countercultural youth movements have repeatedly emerged, such as the hippie movement in the 1960s and, later, a wide variety of subcultures (the punk movement, rural, urban and eco-communes etc.), which sought liberation from social norms and constraints through alternative ways of life. Such movements also emerged in East Asia (Japan and Korea), which had repercussions on mainland China. The state’s efforts to increase efficiency and social disciplining invariably elicited a response from society at large. One example is the “lying flat” (tangping) phenomenon, an informal reaction, especially among younger people, to professional and personal stress and competition. The neologism tangping refers to an increasingly prevalent mentality among the younger generation who refrain from

Retrospective and Lessons Learnt 179 engaging in what is known as the “rat race”, a pernicious professional competition in modern business life. Syndromes like this can be interpreted as a kind of silent resistance by frustrated members of the young generation against an educational and working environment increasingly characterised by competitive pressure and dwindling opportunities for advancement in the country’s urban space. On the one hand, this is due to the general economic and labour market situation for graduates of institutions of higher learning. By April 2022, 53.3% of graduates had not yet been offered a job (see Van Oudenaren 2022). In addition, the Covid-19 pandemic has caused many, especially younger, people to lose their jobs. On the other hand, there is the expectation that overtime work will be performed, most of which is unpaid, combined with a lack of career advancement opportunities. A high level of frustration and disillusionment exists among this group of people. There is a strong conviction that the many years of learning and studying and the escalating overtime hours do not pay off and that abandoning working life may be more rewarding (Feng, Cao, and Qu 2022). A similar phenomenon some years ago was captured by the term “Buddha-like attitude to life” (foxi). Foxi is an Internet buzzword whose main meaning is having no desires, no sadness or joy, instead displaying calmness and peace of mind. Similar social phenomena emerged previously in Japan and were labelled hikikomori (social withdrawal; see Zielenziger 2006; Furlong 2008; Teo 2010) or gudetama (landandan in Chinese). Originally, these terms stem from a cartoon character produced by the Japanese company Sanrio. The word gudetama consists of two parts: the meme gudegude meaning lazy and torpid and the Japanese word tamago which means egg (Bonnah 2018). The Chinese term is a simple translation of the Japanese meme. Gudetama swiftly spread among young people in China via the new social media. It refers to young people chilling out, refusing to think about careers and only following their own desires.16 A similar Chinese term in this context is daoxi, which emerged in 2017 and applies to people with a Daoist attitude who are looking for individual self-­ fulfilment and a simple and relaxed life. These phenomena – rejection of competition, striving for a more relaxed life, protracted idleness and the search for alternative ways of living – have triggered an intensive discussion among Chinese social scientists analysing this syndrome.17 Yang Xiong, the Director of the Youth Research Institute at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, explained that family pressure on children to achieve outstanding educational successes forces them into fierce competition that disregards their mental and physical health, their morality, values and aesthetic education. According to Yang, the phenomenon also refers to youngsters who have not learned much about life but are continuously forced to spend much of their time outside school attending tutoring sessions, with the result that they have very limited time for leisure activities (Yang Xiong 2021). In addition, parents’ aspirations do not match those of their offspring, who expect less tiring jobs and high incomes. In many cases, however, these hopes are not fulfilled and young people’s expectations are disappointed. Accordingly, many young people are frustrated with their work and life. Literary scholar Liu Xinting (2020) argues that “lying flat” is caused by social

180  Retrospective and Lessons Learnt factors such as soaring real estate prices, uncertain job prospects and limited opportunities for upward mobility. These young people lack confidence in their own abilities and feel unable to meet both their own and their family’s expectations. They see themselves as the losers in the race for economic and social progress. Sociologist Sun Liping from Tsinghua University explains this in terms of a sense of frustration among China’s overworked middle class (Sun 2021). Historian Qin Hui (2021) believes that “lying flat” is related to the Daoist concept of wuwei, that is “doing nothing” and interprets it as a normal reaction against Confucian overburdening. Anthropologist Xiang Biao (2020), in turn, explains why “involution” (neijuan), a concept originally developed by the late anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1963),18 has recently emerged as a buzzword in the Chinese discourse. Xiang defines it as a “dead end cycle from which one cannot escape”. It is often used to describe “helicopter mothers” who organise every aspect of their children’s lives, as well as IT specialists and graduates from elite universities, that is elements of the young urban middle classes. Mothers are constantly worried about finding the right preschool, school, university and job for their children while urban young people find themselves trapped in a permanent competition and race to the top. Tremendous mental energy is required to outcompete and be more successful than one’s peers while also ensuring that one’s social status does not deteriorate. In fact, “lying flat” represents a kind of informal resistance to values such as subordinating one’s life to the involution cycle and the rat race and sacrificing oneself for the sake of the state, society or company. This exit from society, insofar as it is possible or successful at all, usually leads to different lifestyle choices, values and priorities. Qin Hui is therefore not entirely wrong when he associates “lying flat” with Daoist conceptions of life, since philosophical Daoism envisaged alternative ways of living and attitudes that were different from the strict and regulated Confucian order and way of life.19 Another brief example: in spite of the civilising project by the Chinese state, an increasing number of urban young people have recently begun studying the writings of the late Mao Zedong, searching for new values, ideas and life objectives and cherishing Mao and the generation who intensively studied his works.20 Apparently, they are looking for new ideas and values not in the writings and the civilising programme of Xi Jinping but in works that seemed to be outdated, representing a time of upheaval in the history of the People’s Republic. Whether their interest can be streamlined by the party or becomes a source of hidden opposition is currently difficult to predict. Notes 1 Easton 1965, 267–70, 1975. 2 On this issue: Su, Su, and Zhou 2021; Yuan 2021; Level of Trust in government in China from 2016 to 2021 2022; Wang 2022; Wu et al. 2021; Wu 2021.

Retrospective and Lessons Learnt 181 3 In his speech to the 20th National Party Congress 2022, Xi Jinping highlighted the role of national security as follows: National security is the foundation of national rejuvenation, and social stability is the prerequisite for a strong country. We must unswervingly implement the overall concept of national security, run the maintenance of national security through all aspects of the work of the party and the state, and ensure national security and social stability see accessed October 2021, www.news.cn/politics/cpc20/ zb/xhwkmh1016/wzsl.htm. 4 More on the development of nation-states and nation-building, see Hippler 2004; Wimmer 2018. 5 More on the nation-building process in China, see Han 2013 or Fiskesjö 2006. 6 See, for example, Gao Qiang and Hailing Liu (2002). “Lun Liang Qichao de ‘da minzu zhuyi’,” Baidu Wenku, accessed May 2022, https://wenku.baidu.com/ view/8a0d6c81ec3a87c24028c401.html. A good overview is provided by Schneider 2017b, 90–95. 7 See Weiner 2022, with contributions by Thomas Heberer (Ethnicity in China), Jonathan Lipman (Being Muslim and Chinese), Ben Hillman (Tibet: From Conflict to Protest) and Y.-W. Chen (Ethnic Conflict in Xinjiang and Its International Connections). 8 Ma Rong 2009. 9 Hu and Hu 2012. 10 This speech Kuoda Xinjiang shaoshu minzu dao neidi juzhu guimo (Increase the number of Xinjiang’s National Minorities Moving to China’s Interior), May 2014, can be found here, accessed May 2022, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2014-05-29/195830259246.shtml. See also Bulag 2021. 11 “Wang Yang zai Nei Menggu diaoyan shi qiangdiao jiandingbuyi zhulao Zhonghua minzu gongtongti yishi, laogu jianshe zuguo beijiang anquan wending pingzhang (When Investigating in Inner Mongolia, Wang Yang Emphasised Unswervingly to Forge the Consciousness of the Chinese Nation Community and Firmly Build a Security and Stability Barrier in the Northern Borders of the Motherland),” April 14, 2021, accessed May 2021, www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2021-04/14/c_1127330659.htm. More on recent developments in Inner Mongolia: Leibold 2021. 12 “Xi Jinping zai Xinjiang kaocha shi qiangdiao wanzheng zhunque guanche xin shidai dangde zhijiang fanglüe, jianshe tuanjie hexie fanrong fuyu wenming jinbu anju yele shengtai lianghaode meihao Xinjiang (During His Inspection in Xinjiang, Xi Jinping Emphasised That the Party’s Strategy for Governing Xinjiang in the New Era Should Be Fully and Accurately Implemented, and a Beautiful Xinjiang with a Harmonious, Prosperous, Wealthy, Civilised and Progressive Life and a Good Ecology Should Be Built),” July 22, 2022, accessed July 2022, http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2022/0715/ c1024-32476930.html. 13 “Minzhengbu guanyu cijin nongmingong rongru chengshi shequ de yijian (Opinions of the Ministry of Civil Affairs on Promoting the Integration of Migrant Workers into Urban Communities),” 2011, accessed May 2022, www.poyang.gov.cn/pyxtlx/guifanxingwenjian5mxaiv/201609/f16e55f397ff4f2994dd948f1cdfbc78.shtml. 14 I agree, for instance, with Francis Fukuyama’s argument that a framework for analysing non-democratic systems is still widely lacking in comparative politics; see Fukuyama 2012a, 2012b, 17–18. 15 See, for example, Bhambra 2007; Gluck 2011; Sinai 2020. 16 According to historian Xu Jilin (2021), the well-educated generation born after the 1990s is highly individualistic, lacking inner values and not interested in issues of public life. They are more concerned with their private lives and their “selves”.

182  Retrospective and Lessons Learnt 17 The “lying flat” issue seems to be so important that in an article published in ­October  2021, Xi Jinping specifically warned citizens to “avoid involution and lying flat”. See “Zhasi tuiding gongtong fuyu (Solidly Promote Common Prosperity),” Qiushi (Seeking Truth), theoretical journal of the CPC, 20/2021, accessed May 2022, www. qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2021-10/15/c_1127959365.htm. 18 Geertz used this concept in a different way, arguing that despite centuries of intensive wet-rice cultivation, this has not spawned any substantial political or technological change in Indonesia. 19 In 2021, a new trend emerged among young people in Chinese society: bailan (摆烂), which has been widely discussed online. The meaning is that things can no longer develop in a good direction, so one should stop taking measures to control them and simply let matters take their course. It signifies a voluntary retreat from the life of society due to disillusionment. See Ni 2022; Zheci, wo bu yao bailanle! 2022. 20 “Ditieshang yuelai yueduo de nianqingren kaishi du ‘Maoxuan’ (More and More People Read ‘Mao’s Selected Works’ in Subways’),” Kunlun ce (Kunlun Policy Net), April 17, 2021, accessed May 2022, www.kunlunce.net/e/wap/show2021.php?bclassid=0&classi d=63&id=151731.

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Index

Note: Page numbers in italics indicate figures. Page numbers in bold indicate tables. academic ethics 144 accountability 139 Action Plan for the Development of Citizen Morality (CPC) 112 administrative disciplining 89 aesthetics 129 Afghanistan 72n24, 98 Age of Enlightenment 176 agriculture 55 All-China Women’s Federation 128 Anhui Province 128 Anqing, Anhui Province 143 Anti-Confucius Campaign 43 anti-corruption campaign 25, 109, 137 – 140 antisocial online behaviour 104 Anyang, Henan Province 118, 119 Arab countries 98 assimilating power 149 – 150 assimilationism 171 Australia 171 authoritarianism 67 – 68, 70 – 71, 170 authority: clan elders and heads 34, 131; “head of 10 households” (shihuzhang) system 49; political 39 Bachu County, Xinjiang Province 156 Baidu 52, 96 bailan (摆烂) 182n19 Baojia system 37, 47 – 49 barrack discipline 14 Bauer, Wolfgang 87 Beautifying Spaces (meili jiating) programme 157 behaviour: civilised 100 – 101, 101; obedience 170; uncivilised 100 – 101, 121; unethical 129

Beijing: Charter of Civilisation of the Capital’s Citizens 100; Party Committee 100; People’s Congress of Beijing 118 – 120; “Regulations of Beijing City for Promoting Civilised Behaviour (draft)” 118 – 120 Biao Xiang 180 Bilibili 105 Bin Zhang 98 – 99 bird cages 5 blacklisting 142 Bluntschli, Johann Caspar 78 bourgeois liberalisation 99 Boxer movement 12 Boy Scout organisations 80 Brussee, Vincent 143 Buddha-like attitude to life (foxi) 179 Buddhism 23, 28, 45 – 47 Building a Socialist New Countryside programme (Shehuizhuyi xin nongcun jianshe) 132 – 135 Bünger, Karl 54 bureaucracy 15 – 16, 76 bystanders 58 cadres: evaluation of 147 – 148, 163n58, 174; see also civil servants Cai Yuanpei 77 – 78 Canada 171 capitalism 14 – 15, 21 case studies 25, 112 – 167 Castel, Robert 146 censorship 7, 10 – 11, 104, 145 Central Asia 151 Central Commission for Guiding the Construction of Spiritual Civilisation (CPC) 114

218 Index Central Europe 13 Central Party School 57 Central Spiritual Civilisation Construction Guidance Committee 100 Cesari, Jocelyne 17 Chabchar County, Xinjiang 155 Chang, Carsun (Zhang Junmai) 56 change of mandate (geming) 55 chauvinism 149 – 150 Chen Duxiu 79 Chengdu, Sichuan Province 80 chengjie (惩戒) 164n67 Chen Huan-Chang 66 – 67 Chen Jichang 130 Chen Lai 111n27 Chen Yixin 65 Chen Yunquan 99 Chiang Kai-shek 56, 76, 78, 149 – 150; Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement (Zhonghua wenhua fuxing yundong) 85; New Life Movement 24, 80 – 85 children: norms for 30 – 31 China: Anti-Confucius Campaign 43; anti-corruption campaign 25; Central Civilisation Office 58; church institutions 50n29; civilising 20 – 22; comparison with Europe 175 – 178; Cultural Revolution 41, 54, 87 – 88, 122, 149; culture of moral compliance 64; disciplining concepts 23, 28 – 51; disciplining efforts 1 – 2, 19 – 22, 24 – 25, 73 – 111, 175 – 178; early modernising 24, 73 – 93; educational objectives 77 – 78; ethnic minorities 165n84; Food Waste Law 129; Four Modernisations (sige xiandaihua) 94; Guomindang government 48; Japanese occupation 48, 79; Japan fever (Riben re) 79; law and morality 60 – 61; Mao era 85 – 92; May Fourth Movement 24, 28; Middle Kingdom (Zhongguo) 148, 171; military system 78; Ming dynasty 32, 48, 145, 149; Ministry of Education 41, 104, 123, 144; Ministry of Environment 142; Ministry of Finance 144; modernisation 12, 22, 25, 69 – 70, 94, 95, 168 – 169, 178; moral crisis 105 – 109, 110n25; morality 39 – 40, 47, 49n16, 63; National Civilised City award 58;

National Development and Reform Commission 144; National Press and Publication Administration 105; nation-building 171 – 173; New Life Movement 80 – 85; Olympic Games 100; path to development 12; People’s Liberation Army 85; political culture 7 – 8; pre-modern elements 57 – 58; protests 6 – 7; Qin dynasty 43, 47; Qing dynasty 32, 35 – 36, 38, 48, 71n8, 76, 80, 149; Reform and Opening Policies (Gaige kaifang) 25, 94 – 111; rural population 173 – 174; school system 77, 80; Self-Strengthening Movement 75; Social Credit System 10 – 11, 25, 64, 107, 109, 140 – 148, 143, 164n59, 175; social management 90 – 92; Song dynasty 24, 31, 48, 75; state and society 23 – 24, 52 – 72; State Administration of Industry and Commerce 142; State Council 144; Strategic Plan for Rural Revitalisation (2018–2022) 134 – 135; support for the government 169 – 170; Tang dynasty 24, 75; traditional culture 21, 44, 47, 49n16; urban population 173 – 174; Warring States era 65; Yuan dynasty 48; Zero-Covid strategy 5 – 8 China Business Federation 128 China Chain Store & Franchise Association 128 China Cuisine Association 128 China fever (Japanese: shina netsu) 79 China Hotel Association 128 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 106 – 107 Chinese Buddhism 45 – 47 Chinese Constitution 66, 102 Chinese Dream 101 – 102 Chinese economics 66 – 67 Chinese language: Han Chinese 172; Japanese loanwords 26n1, 59 – 61, 72n15, 80, 93n17, 97, 141; Mandarin Chinese 151, 157; Putonghua 157 – 159, 172 – 173 Chinese morality 24, 28, 49n16, 107 Chinese Resistance 79 Chinese Revolutionary Alliance 71n8 Chinese students: guidance on etiquette for 76 – 77 Chinese values 111n27, 115

Index  219 Cholera 1 Chongqing 3 Christian missionaries 73 Chua, Amy 50n17 church discipline 50n29, 175 – 176 Chu Xi 35 citizen morality: Action Plan for the Development of 112; Day of Propagating 112 – 114, 113; military citizenship 80; moral 64 civic morality 130 civilising 13 – 14; advanced European model of 73; case studies 25, 112 – 167; civilisational competence 98; civilising plans and projects 100 – 101, 101, 150; definition of 20 – 21, 95 – 97; ecological civilising 102 – 105, 120; of ethnicity 148 – 160; extending processes 102 – 105; Internet or digital 96, 102 – 105, 120, 175; material 99; as modern concept 59; nation-building and 171 – 173; New Era Civilisation Practice Centres 101; regulations for promoting civilised behaviour 120 – 121; “Regulations of Beijing City for Promoting Civilised Behaviour (draft)” 118 – 120; rural areas 131 – 135; spiritual 25, 41, 64, 78 – 79, 94, 99 – 102, 109n2, 121 – 122, 130; theory of 16 – 17; in tourism 120; uncivilised behaviour 100 – 101; urban rules 117 – 122; see also moral discipline “Civilised Internet Self-Discipline Convention” (Internet Society of China) 104 Civilised Table Culture Week 121 civility 114, 120, 129; dining table (canzhuo wenming) 129; wenming 58 – 59, 71n14, 80, 97, 120; see also spiritual civility (jingshen wenming) civility contracts 118, 119 civil servants: disciplining officials 137 – 140; evaluation of 147 – 148, 163n58, 174; keju system 31 civil society 62 – 63 Ci Xi 75 – 76 clan elders and heads 34, 131 clans 32 – 35, 49n13, 175; clan rules (zonggui) 32, 49n12 class struggle 87

codes of conduct, see rules of behavior collective memory 47 – 49 collectivism 59 – 60 colonialism 14 Commission for the Development of a Spiritual Civilisation (CPC) 112 – 114 communication etiquette 124 – 125 Communist Party of China (CPC) 25, 39, 96, 133; Action Plan for the Development of Citizen Morality 112; Central Civilisation Office 101; Central Commission for Guiding the Construction of Spiritual Civilisation 114; Central Committee 25, 51n32, 100, 102, 106, 112 – 114, 140 – 141; Central Party School 57, 96; Central Propaganda Department 105, 129; Commission for the Development of a Spiritual Civilisation 112 – 114; discipline definition 98; disciplinary control commissions 174; disciplinary control instruments 48; discipline education programmes 109n11; Japanese influence on 79; New Social Morality (case study) 112; Propaganda Department 101; Rectification Campaign 138; Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) 114; Social Credit System 10 – 11, 25, 64, 107, 109, 140 – 148, 143, 164n59, 175; Socialist Core Values (Shehuizhuyi hexin jiazhiguan) 101, 115 – 117, 116, 120, 170 – 171; Spiritual Civilisation Guidance Committee 112; Spiritual Civilisation Offices 112; Strategic Plan for Rural Revitalisation (2018–2022) 134 – 135 Communist Youth League 104 community harmony 120 Confucianism 23, 28 – 31, 44, 47, 62, 87, 176; educational government 90 – 92; historical legacy 148 – 149; moral standards 64; Neo-Confucianism 69; and punishment 65 – 66; reaction against 180; revival of 50n20; role models 114; role today 39 – 42, 54 – 55; in rural areas 31 – 39, 33 Confucius 41 Confucius Academy for Traditional Culture 41

220 Index “Convention on the Self-discipline of Building a Clear and Sober Cyber Culture Ecosystem” 104 – 105 corruption 5; anti-corruption campaign 25, 109, 137 – 140; entertainment sector 129; fubai 137 – 138; moral 107; tanwu 138; tanwu fubai 138 courtesy: Socialist Ethics and Courtesy Month 99 – 100; see also etiquette Covid-19 pandemic 2 – 8; control measures against 49, 64, 131, 169 – 170; food security during 127; Shanghai lockdown 4 – 8, 170; in Western countries 72n24, 170; zero-Covid strategy 5 – 8 CPC, see Communist Party of China crime, organized 57 – 58 criminal law 65 Cui Tiankai 160n10 cultural gap 41 cultural poverty 166n99 Cultural Revolution 41, 54, 87 – 88, 122, 149 culture: of moral compliance 64; political 28 – 51; scientific 114; traditional 21, 44, 47; wenhua 26n1, 114 cyberspace 104 – 105 Cyberspace Administration of China (wangxinban) 105, 162n39, 175 Dandeker, Christopher 21 danwei (working units) 89 – 90 Daoism 23, 28, 44, 47, 87, 176, 180 daoxi 179 Daqiuzhuang 136 – 137 Daxue 49n6 Day of Propagating Citizen Morality 112 – 114, 113 de (morality) 147 democracy: definition of 160n10; socialist 115 – 116 Democratic centralism 51n32 Deng Xiaoping 7 – 8, 56, 99 Deqing County, Zhejiang Province 133 – 134 de-radicalisation programmes 157 development 12, 101 – 102 developmental state 67 – 71 Development and Reform Commission 146 Dharmaguptaka (Fazangbu) Buddhism 45 digital civilisation 96, 102 – 105, 120, 175

dining table civility (canzhuo wenming) 129 Dirlik, Arif 84 – 85 discipline 10 – 13; administrative 89; barrack 14; case studies 25, 112 – 167; Chinese efforts 19 – 25, 28 – 51, 73 – 93, 88, 94 – 111, 168 – 169, 175 – 178; Christian efforts 73 – 75; church 50n29, 175 – 176; definition of 11 – 12, 15, 19 – 20, 97 – 98; to deter (chengjie, 惩戒) 164n67; early modernising 73 – 93; of eating habits 127 – 129; “Eight Points for Attention” (Mao) 86; of entertainment sector 127 – 129; of ethnicity 148 – 160; Europe vs China 175 – 178; fundamental 19; German “success model” 3; guanjiao 98; guixun 97 – 98; implementation of 174 – 175; industrial 154; iron discipline 155; jilü 61, 97; as key category of modern society 14 – 16; of language 154; metropolis 4 – 8; military 14 – 15, 78, 155; moral 175 – 176; of officials 137 – 140; of progeny 30 – 31; rational 15; respect for 47; in rural areas 31 – 39, 33; scoring systems 48, 131, 145; self-cultivation (xiuyang) 46 – 47; self-discipline 5, 18, 25, 39 – 40, 44, 97, 145; social 10 – 27, 47 – 49, 175 – 178; state agency for 169 – 171; state capacity for 67 – 71; “Three Main Rules of Discipline” (Mao) 85 – 86; Urbanisation and 173 – 174; working 117 Di Wang 80 Douyin 105 Duara, Prasenjit 109n1 Du Lun 97 – 98 Durkheim, Emil 11, 105 – 106 early modernising 73 – 93 East Asia 4, 6, 69 – 71, 176 – 177 Easton, David 169 eating habits 127 – 129 ecological and environmental protection 102 – 105, 120 ecological model villages 133, 152 economics 66 – 67 education 172; Chinese 77 – 78, 80; Confucian government 90 – 92;

Index  221 etiquette 124 – 126, 127; female 78; Japanese 77; jiao 73; maxims for 36; military 78; moral 77; party doctrine courses 80; Putonghua 172 – 173; quality education (suzhi jiaoyu) 115; self-education 39 – 40, 89; transformed by (jiaohua) 109n9 “Eight Points for Attention” (Mao) 86 Elias, Norbert 10 – 11, 14, 16 – 17, 61 empathy 58 empty plate movement (guangpan yundong) 127 – 128 entertainment sector 129 entrepreneurs 175 ethics 49n11, 62; academic 144; of Confucianism 28 – 31; for politicians 15; Socialist Ethics and Courtesy Month 99 – 100 ethnic minorities 10 – 11, 25, 115, 165n84, 171 – 172; historical view of 148 – 151; re-education of 154 – 158 ethocracy 72n19 etiquette 82 – 83; Civilised Table Culture Week 121; communication 124 – 125; of Confucianism 28 – 31; demand for courses in 126; education for females in 127; guidance for Chinese students in 76 – 77; learning objectives 124 – 126; liyi 122 – 126, 127; personal 124 – 125; social 126; Socialist Ethics and Courtesy Month 99 – 100 Etzioni, Amitai 90 Eurocentrism 14, 26n2, 178 Europe 13, 20; advanced European model 73; comparison with China 175 – 178; competing social forces 62 – 63; measures taken to combat epidemics 2 – 3; modernisation 13; nation-building 171; Thirty Years War 13 European model 73 Evans, Peter 177 fa (legislation) 60 – 61, 65 Faber, Ernst 92n3 Facebook 21 Fairbank, John K. 54 familism 56, 172 family 55 – 56, 60 family virtue 147 Fang Fang 6

Fei Xiaotong 39 – 40 feudal customs 133 Five Good Households 90 Flying Geese Paradigm 176 – 177 folk conventions 38 food waste 127 – 128, 128 Food Waste Law 129 Ford, Christopher A. 54 Foshan, Guangdong Province 108 Foucault, Michel 2 – 3, 10 – 11, 14, 16 – 18 Four Cleanups (Siqing yundong) 88 Four Have Citizens (si you gongmin) 114 Four Modernisations (sige xiandaihua) 94 Foxconn 6 – 7 foxi (Buddha-like attitude to life) 179 France 2 – 3, 24, 73 – 74, 170 freedom 4, 60, 115 – 116, 116 Freedom and People’s Rights Movement 65 Frei, Bruno 3 Freud, Sigmund 14 Friedman, Sara L. 85, 132 – 133 fubai 137 – 138 Fujian Province 49, 85 Fukuzawa Yukichi 78 – 79 Fuzhou, Fujian Province 121 – 122 Gao Zhaoming 107 Geertz, Clifford 178 – 180 geming (change of mandate) 55 geren (individual person) 59 – 60 Gerich, Werner 90, 91 German Retired Experts Service 90 Germany 3, 170 Giddens, Anthony 21 Global South 178 Google 21 government 17 – 18, 98 government officials 175 Granet, Marcel 58 Great Britain 24, 73 – 74, 86 Great Firewall 104 Great Han chauvinism 149 – 150 Great Leap Forward 88 Great-nationality chauvinism (da minzu zhuyi) 171 Guangxi Province 165n84 Guang Xu 75 guanjiao 98 gudetama (Chinese: landandan) 179 guixun (规训) 97 – 98 Guizhou Province 41, 134, 145, 165n84 Guomindang (Nationalist Party of China) 48, 71n8, 73, 80, 82 – 83

222 Index Guo Moruo 79 Guoxue (National Studies) 52

individual(s) 59 – 62 industrial discipline 154 industrialisation 13 Industrial Revolution 175 Inglehart, Ronald F. 169 Inner Mongolia 172 – 173 Inquisition 13 integrity, political 147 Internet censorship 7, 10 – 11 Internet or digital civilisation 96, 102 – 105, 120, 175 Internet Society of China 104 involution (neijuan) 178 – 180 iron cages 15 – 16 Islamism 151, 157, 172

Han, Byung-Chul 6 Han Chinese language 172 Han Fei 43, 50n26 Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province 144 Han people 115, 133, 148 – 151, 154, 156, 171 Han period 30 harmony 117 Harrell, Stevan 150 He, Huaihong 137 “head of 10 households” (shihuzhang) system 49 Hebei Province 57 – 58 Henan Province 131 hikikomori (social withdrawal) 179 Hiroshi, Abe 77 history 28 – 51 Hobbes, Thomas 14 homeless people 4 – 5 Hong Wu 56 Hong Xiuquan 74 Hotan City, Xinjiang Autonomous Region 155 households: Baojia system 37, 47 – 49; Five Good Households 90; “head of 10 households” (shihuzhang) system 50; hukou registration system 89, 93n28, 173 – 174 Hsün-Tzu 42 Hu Angang 172 Huang Xianghai 107 Huaxi Village 136 – 137 Huian County, Fujian Province 133 Hui Qin 180 Hu Jintao 96 hukou system 89, 93n28, 173 – 174 Hu Lianhe 172 human nature 42, 65, 170 Hunan Province 147 Hundred Days’ Reform 76 Huntington, Samuel 14 Hu-Wen period 115 Hu Yaobang 99

Japan 24, 168 – 170; China fever (shina netsu) 79; Chinese Resistance to 79; developmental state 69 – 70; Flying Geese Paradigm 176 – 177; Imperial Reform Edict 77; influence on early Chinese modernising efforts 75 – 79; invasion of Manchuria 79, 84; Meiji Reforms 65, 76 – 78; modernisation 75, 178; occupation of China 48, 79; Sino–Japanese War of 1894/1895 24, 73, 75; social withdrawal (Japanese: hikikomori) 179 Japanese loanwords 26n1, 72n15; geren (individual person) 59 – 60; jilü (discipline) 61, 97; xinyong (credit) 141; xuehui (study societies) 80, 93n17; ziyou (freedom) 60 Japan fever (Riben re) 79 Jesuits 73 Jiang Guofeng 107 Jiangxi Province 38 Jiang Zemin 96 jiao (education) 73 jiaohua (transformed by education) 109n9 jilü (discipline) 61, 97 Johnson, Chalmers 69 Junfujie Clothing Company 155 junior high school 125

ideology, national 41 Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture (Xinjiang) 154 immorality 28 Imperial Reform Edict (Japan) 77 indigenous peoples 171

Kang Xi 35 – 36, 49n14 Kang Youwei 74 – 76, 78, 92nn6 – 8 Kashgar, southern Xinjiang 158 Kaufman, Alison 95 – 96 keju system 31 Knapp, Keith N. 51n31

Index  223 Kongshengtang 41 – 42 Kong Yingda 71n14 Kuaishou 105 Lai Chen 53 landandan (Japanese: gudetama) 179 language disciplining 151, 154, 157 – 159, 172 – 173 law 60 – 61, 64 – 66 leader principle 7 – 8 Leftwich, Addrian 70 – 71 Legalism 23, 28, 42 – 43, 47, 65, 176 legislation (fa) 60 – 61, 65 Lei Feng 100, 136 Leninism 62 lessons learnt 25 – 26, 168 – 182 Liang Qichao 69 – 70, 76, 78, 99, 149, 171 Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture (Sichuan Province) 151 – 153, 153, 163n47, 165n83 – 165n84 Liaoning Province 128 liberalisation, bourgeois 99 Li Chengpeng 58 Li Dazhao 79 Lie Yukou 40 Li Ji 49n4, 49n9 Li Keqiang 146 Li Min 107 Lin Yutang 55 – 56, 60, 108 Lipsius, Justus 14 liquid modernity 12 Lisu Autonomous Prefecture (Nujiang, Yunnan Province) 151, 159 – 160 Liu Shaoqi 46 – 47, 50n23 Liu Xinting 179 – 180 Liu Zhentan 61 living conditions 6 – 7, 68, 132, 153 liyi (礼仪) 122 – 126, 127 local moral management 41 – 42 local nationalism 149 love, universal (jian ai) 45 Lu Xun 79 lying flat (tangping) 178 – 180 Machiavelli, Niccolò 14 Ma Debin 56 Majiang (MaJongg) 136 Manchuria 79, 84 Mandarin Chinese 151, 157 Mao era 39, 122 Maoming, Guangdong Province 139

Mao Zedong 24, 43, 56, 79, 85 – 92, 149 – 150, 180; “Eight Points for Attention” 86; New Human 64, 86 – 89; “Three Main Rules of Discipline” 85 – 86 market socialism 44 market values 178 – 180 Ma Rong 172 Martin, William A.P. 73 Marx, Karl 14 Marxism 41, 87, 115 mass organisations 175 material civilisation 99 maxims 35 – 36 May Fourth Movement 24, 28 medical order 120 Meiji Japan 65 Meiji Reforms 76 – 78 Meituan Dianping 128 memory, collective 47 – 49 Mencius 32 meritocracy 31 metropolis discipline 4 – 8 Middle Ages 13 Middle Kingdom (Zhongguo) 148, 171 migrant workers (nongmin gong) 4 – 5, 173 – 175 military citizenship 80 military discipline 15, 78, 155 military education 78 Ming dynasty 32, 48, 145, 149 model villages 133, 134, 152; Nanjie Village (Linying County, Henan Province) 97, 135 – 137, 136 – 137 modern governance 98 modernisation 10 – 14, 22, 73 – 93, 95, 178; early 24, 73 – 93; Four Modernisations (sige xiandaihua) 94; social 11, 19, 25; summary 168 – 169 modernity 12, 41, 178 Mohism 23, 28, 45, 47 Mongols 171 moral contracts 147 moral discipline 63 – 64, 175 – 176; Action Plan for the Development of Citizen Morality (CPC) 112; case study 112 – 137; Chinese morality 24, 28, 39 – 40, 47, 49n16, 107; citizen morality 64, 112 – 114, 113; civic morality 130; Confucian standards 64; crisis of morality 105 – 109, 110n23, 110n25;

224 Index culture of moral compliance 64; in cyberspace 105; Day of Propagating Citizen Morality 112 – 114, 113; de 147; development of morals 130; educational 77; evaluation of cadres 147 – 148, 163n58, 174; and law 60 – 61, 64 – 66; local management 41 – 42; minority 31 – 32; new morality (daode) 112, 114; power of 25, 112 – 167; private 99; professional 147; public 99; rule of morality 39; Socialist Core Values (Shehuizhuyi hexin jiazhiguan) 115 – 117; social morality 147; traditional morality 49n16; in urban neighbourhood communities (shequ) 129 – 131; of young people 178 – 180 moral economy 66 – 67 moralisation 109n9 moralism 63 moral maxims 35 – 36 Mo Zi (Mo Ti) 45, 50n27 multiple modernities 12, 178 Muslim minorities 154 – 158 Nanchang, Jiangxi Province 84 Nanjie Village (Linying County, Henan Province) 97, 135 – 137, 136 – 137, 163n47 nannyism 10 – 11 National Civilised Cities (quanguo wenming chengshi) 58, 117 – 118 National Development and Reform Commission 144 nationalism: ethno-nationalism 151; great nationalism (da minzuzhuyi) 171; local 149; people’s 172 Nationalist Party of China (Guomindang) 48, 71n8, 73, 80, 82 – 83 nationality 171 National Party Congress 7 – 8, 51n32, 96 National Press and Publication Administration (China) 105 National Security Agency (US) 145 National Supervisory Commission (PRC) 175 nation-building 171 – 173 Navarra, Bruno 122 neighbourhood communities (shequ) 129 – 131, 175 neijuan (involution) 178 – 180 neo-authoritarianism 70

Neo-Confucianism 69 NetEase 105 New Era Civilisation Practice Centres 101 New Humans (Mao) 64, 86 – 89; 114 New Life Movement 24, 80 – 85, 83 Newly Industrialised Economies 177 new morality (daode) 112, 114 New Social Morality (case study) 112 Ningbo, Zhejiang Province 143 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 175 Nujiang Lisu Autonomous Prefecture (Yunnan Province) 151, 159 – 160 obedience 170 Oestreich, Gerhard 10, 14, 16, 18 – 20 officials 137 – 140; evaluation of cadres 147 – 148, 163n58, 174; see also civil servants Ogilvie, Sheilagh 19 Ohno, Kenichi 70 Olympic Games 100 O’Neill, John 26n6 online games 105 online incivility 104 Opium Wars 24, 73, 168 – 169 organized crime 57 – 58 otherness 149 paternalism 62 patriotism 41 peace and order: maxims for 36 Peng Lü 41 Peng Yu case 108 People’s Communes 90 People’s Congresses 133 People’s Congress of Beijing 118 – 120 People’s Liberation Army 3, 85 people’s nationalism 172 People’s Political Consultative Conferences 133 People’s Republic of China (PRC), see China personal etiquette 124 – 125; see also etiquette philanthropy 121 plague 2 – 3 plague brigades 3 Plan-Stalinism 44 points systems, see scoring systems; Social Credit System political authority 39 political consciousness 89

Index  225 political culture 28 – 51 political integrity 147 politicians 15 politics 52 – 53, 62, 172 pollution, spiritual 99 Pope 73 popular Daoism 44 positional responsibility 139 poverty, cultural 166n99 PRC (People’s Republic of China), see China primary schools 124 – 125 problem groups 89 professional morality 147 propaganda 35 – 36 protests 6 – 7 public conventions (gongyue) 130 public health 3 – 8, 120 public morality 99 public order 120 public toilets 100 – 101, 101 punishment 33, 33, 65 – 66 Putian, Fujian Province 143 Putonghua 157 – 159, 172 – 173 Pye, Lucian W. 39, 53 qi (vital energy) 44 Qiang Li 166n99 Qian Mu 70 Qigong 44 Qin dynasty 43, 47 Qingdao, Shandong Province 3 Qing dynasty 32, 35 – 36, 38, 48, 71n8, 76; study societies (xuehui) 80; Taiping Rebellion against 12, 24, 73 – 74; treatment of non-Han people 149, 166n100 Qin Hui 170, 180 Qiushi 177 – 178 quality (suzhi) 115, 132 quality education (suzhi jiaoyu) 115 quarantine centres 5 Qufu, Shandong Province 41 rat battle 3 rationality approach 14 – 16 Rectification Campaign 138 Red Book 87 Reform and Opening Policies (Gaige kaifang) 25, 94 – 111 Renaissance 16 Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) 114 respect for other people 117

retrospective 25 – 26, 168 – 182 righteousness (yi) 45 ritual (li) 39 – 40 role models 114; see also model villages Rongcheng, Shandong Province 143 – 144 rubiao fali (儒表法里) 43 rules of behaviour: civilised rural customs 134 – 135; clan rules (zonggui) 32, 49n12; for cyberspace 104 – 105; etiquette (liyi) 122 – 126, 127; New Life Movement 82 – 83; norms for progeny 30 – 31; public conventions (gongyue) 130; “Three Main Rules of Discipline” (Mao) 85 – 86; for urban civilisation 117 – 122, 174; village codes of conduct (xianggui minyue) 37, 38, 38 rural areas 31 – 39, 131 – 135, 134, 175; “Building a Socialist New Countryside” programme (Shehuizhuyi xin nongcun jianshe) 132 – 135; clan rules (zonggui) 32; Covid-19 pandemic in 131; model villages 133; punishment in 33, 33; Strategic Plan for Rural Revitalisation (2018–2022) 134 – 135; “Transforming peasants into urbanites” programme (Nongmin shiminhua) 134; village codes of conduct (xianggui minyue) 37, 38, 38; Xuzhou Chained Girl Incident 57 Rural Revitalisation Strategy (xiangcun zhenxing zhanlüe) 134 Russia 75, 170 sacred space 44 safety, traffic 120 – 121 San Fan Campaign (Three-Anti 1951) 87 – 88, 88 Sanrio 179 Schak, David 107 scientific culture (kexue wenhua) 114 scoring systems 48, 131, 145; see also Social Credit System Scott, James 150 self-censorship 145 self-coercion 13 self-control 145 self-criticism (self-perfection) 89 self-cultivation (xiuyang) 29 – 30, 40, 46 – 47, 145 self-determination 14

226 Index self-discipline 18, 25, 39 – 40, 97, 104, 145, 154; Daoist techniques 44; in Shanghai lockdown 5 self-education 39 – 40, 89 self-mastery 13 self-perfection (self-criticism) 89 Self-Strengthening Movement (Yangwu Yundong) 75, 168 – 169 Senghaas, Dieter 27n10 senior experts 90 senior high school 125 Seven Nots 130 Shandong Province 37 Shanghai 4 – 8, 129 – 130, 170 Shangshu 71n14 Shang Yang 42 – 43, 47 Shaw, Victor N. 89 shehui (society) 59 Shenzhen 41 – 42, 120 – 121 shequ (urban neighbourhood communities) 129 – 131 Shirk, Susan 62 Shun Zhi 35 Sichuan Province 1; “head of 10 households” (shihuzhang) system 49; Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture 151 – 153, 153, 165n84 Sima Qian 148 Simmel, Georg 141 Singapore 69 Sino–Japanese War 24, 73, 75, 79 Snowden, Edward 145 social behaviour: as collective memory 47 – 49; competing forces 62 – 63; management of 10 – 27, 47 – 49, 57 – 58, 90 – 92, 96, 175 – 178; maxims for 36; shehui (society) 59; state and society 23 – 24, 52 – 72; thick societies 90; see also rules of behaviour Social Credit Law 146 Social Credit System 10 – 11, 25, 64, 109, 140 – 148, 143, 175; pilot cities 143, 164n59; proposal for 107 social diseases 107 social etiquette 126 socialism 14, 44, 69, 93n20, 175 Socialist Core Values (Shehuizhuyi hexin jiazhiguan) 101, 115 – 117, 116, 120, 170 – 171 Socialist Education Movement 88 Socialist Ethics and Courtesy Month 99 – 100

socialist spiritual civilisation (shehuizhuyi jingshen wenming) 99 social justice 65 social modernisation 11, 25 social morality 112 – 137, 147 social withdrawal (hikikomori) 179 society (shehui) 59 Song dynasty 24, 31, 48, 75 South Korea 69, 170, 178 Spiritual Civilisation Construction Commissions 129 Spiritual Civilisation Guidance Committee (CPC) 112 Spiritual Civilisation Offices 112 spiritual civility (jingshen wenming) 25, 41, 64, 78 – 79, 94, 109n2; Central Spiritual Civilisation Construction Guidance Committee 100; as key concept 99 – 102; priorities for building 121 – 122; socialist 99; urban construction of 130 spiritual pollution 99 state: as agent of discipline 169 – 171; authoritarian 67 – 68; as civilisational 53; as developmental 67 – 71; moral 63 – 64, 66, 112 – 137; and society 23 – 24, 52 – 72 State Bureau for the Administration of Industry and Commerce 142 State Council 144, 146 Stephens, Thomas B. 11 – 12 Strategic Plan for Rural Revitalisation (2018–2022) 134 – 135 street regulations 38 strike-hard (yanda) campaign 151 strongmen 56 study societies (xuehui) 80 Study Strong Nation app 104 Sun Liping 180 Sun Yat-sen 56, 61, 70, 71n8, 76, 78, 81, 93n21, 99, 149 – 150, 170, 172 surveillance 21 – 22 surveillance capacity 21 surveillance capitalism 21 suzhi (quality) 115, 132 suzhi jiaoyu (quality education) 115 Sztompka, Piotr 98 table manners 121 Taijiquan 44 Taiping Imperial Declaration 74 Taiping Rebellion 12, 24, 73 – 74 Taiwan 69, 170, 178

Index  227 Tang dynasty 24, 75 tangping (lying flat) 178 – 180 Tangshan, Hebei Province 58 Tangshan Incident 57 – 58 tanwu 138 tanwu fubai 138 Tanzania 150 Taylor, Charles 150 Tencent 105 terrorism 151 Thailand 150 thick societies 90 Thirty Years War 13 Thogersen, Stig 132 Thomson, James C. 84 “Three Main Rules of Discipline” (Mao) 85 – 86 Three News campaign 157 tianren heyi 103 Tibetans 158 – 159, 171 – 172 Tibet Autonomous Region 151, 158 – 159 top-down processes 20 traditional culture 21, 44, 47, 49n16 traffic safety 120 – 121 “Transforming peasants into urbanites” programme (Nongmin shiminhua) 134 Trump, Donald 72n24 trust 141, 169 trust-building 107 Tsai, Lily 163n45 Tu Weiming 12, 40, 69 Tzu Chi Charity Foundation 45 – 46

Marxist 115; Socialist Core Values (Shehuizhuyi hexin jiazhiguan) 101, 115 – 117, 116, 120, 170 – 171; Western 72n24, 111n27, 115; World Values Survey (WVS) 110n24 video games 105 viewing exhibitions 120 villages: model villages 97, 133, 134 – 137, 136 – 137, 152; social codes of conduct (xianggui minyue) 37, 38, 38 village toilets 132 Vinaya Buddhism 45 violence 154 virtue, family 147 voluntarism 87 vulgarity 129

uncivilised behaviour 100 – 101, 121 unethical behaviour 129 United Front policy 133 United Kingdom 170 United States 145, 170, 171 universalism 107 universal love (jian ai) 45 urban areas 38, 117 – 122, 174 – 175; National Civilised Cities (quanguo wenming chengshi) 117 – 118, 158; neighbourhood communities (shequ) 129 – 131 urbanisation 173 – 174 Urumqi, Xinjiang Autonomous Region 6 – 7 Uyghurs 151, 154 – 158, 158, 165n91, 166n100, 171

Wang Hongbin 136 Wang Shuqin 142 Wang Wenting 142 Wang Yang 173 Wang Yangming 149 Wang Yue 108 Warring States era 65 Weber, Max 10 – 11, 14 – 16, 31, 61 WeChat 7, 35 Weibo 105 wenhua (culture) 26n1, 114 Wen Jiabao 106 wenming (civility) 58 – 59, 71n14, 80, 97, 120; canzhuo wenming (dining table civility) 129 wenminghua project 94 – 99 Western China 166n99 Westernisation 17, 21, 24, 80, 86 Western values 72n24, 111n27, 115 Wickert, Erwin 54 women 57 – 58, 78, 127 work discipline 117, 121, 134 working units (danwei structures) 89 – 90 World Values Survey (WVS) 110n24 World War I 79 Wu Fan (Five-Anti 1952) 87 – 88 Wu Fuwen 156 Wuhan, Hubei Province 5 – 6, 91, 143 Wuhan Diesel Generator Factory 90 Wu Liande 3 wuwei (doing nothing) 180

values: Chinese 111n27, 115; crises 105 – 109; market 178 – 180;

Xiangyue system 35 – 36, 37, 38, 38 Xibu da kaifa 151

228 Index Xi Jinping 6 – 11, 41, 50n26, 54 – 56, 64, 92, 95 – 96, 114, 138 – 140, 158, 172 – 173, 177 – 178, 181n3, 182n17; Chinese Dream 101 – 102, 168; Rural Revitalisation Strategy (xiangcun zhenxing zhanlüe) 134; Socialist Core Values (Shehuizhuyi hexin jiazhiguan) 101, 115 – 117, 116, 120, 170 – 171 Xinjiang 10 – 11, 165n91, 172 – 173; Autonomous Region of the Uyghurs 151, 154 – 158, 158; Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture 154 xinyong (trustworthiness) 141 Xu, Jilin 95, 181n16 xuehui (study societies) 80, 93n17 Xunzi 30, 42 Xuzhou Chained Girl Incident 57 Yan, Xuetong 54 Yang Changji 79 Yang Shenxiu 75 Yang Shu 78 Yang Xiong 179 – 180 Yi, Lin 154 Yining Li 107 Yi people 151 – 153, 153, 165n84 Yongzheng 37 Youku 105 young people 178 – 180

Young Pioneers 161n24 youth mode 104 YouTube 4 Yuan dynasty 48 Yueyue case 108 Yu Keping 39, 98, 107 Yunnan Province 132, 165n84; “head of 10 households” (shihuzhang) system 49; Nujiang Lisu Autonomous Prefecture 151, 159 – 160 zero-Covid strategy 5 – 8 Zhang Junmai (Carsun Chang) 56 Zhang Qianfan 65 Zhang Taiyan 76 Zhang Yinxian 72n24 Zhang Youqun 99 Zhang Zhidong 75 Zhan He 40 Zhejiang Province 49, 131, 147 zhengzhi (politics) 53 Zhengzhou, Henan Province 6 – 7 Zhonghua minzu (unified Chinese nation) 172 Zhuang 40 Zhu Xi 30, 49n8, 50n18 Zhu Xiaowan 41 Zibo, Shandong Province 147 ziyou (freedom) 60 Zuo Zhuan 61