Social and Political Deglobalisation: Covid-19, Conflict, and Uncertainties in Malaysia 9819968224, 9789819968220

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Social and Political Deglobalisation Covid-19, Conflict, and Uncertainties in Malaysia Edited by Khoo Ying Hooi Kavitha Ganesan Anantha Raman Govindasamy

Social and Political Deglobalisation

Khoo Ying Hooi · Kavitha Ganesan · Anantha Raman Govindasamy Editors

Social and Political Deglobalisation Covid-19, Conflict, and Uncertainties in Malaysia

Editors Khoo Ying Hooi Department of International and Strategic Studies Universiti Malaya Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Kavitha Ganesan Universiti Malaysia Sabah Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia

Anantha Raman Govindasamy Centre for the Promotion of Knowledge and Language Universiti Malaysia Sabah Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia

ISBN 978-981-99-6822-0 ISBN 978-981-99-6823-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6823-7 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore Paper in this product is recyclable.

Acknowledgements

This edited volume is the result of a collaboration between the Centre for the Promotion of Knowledge and Language Learning at Universiti Malaysia Sabah (UMS), and the Department of International and Strategic Studies at Universiti Malaya (UM). UMS organised its inaugural International Conference on Politics and International Studies in 2018, with the second jointly organised with UM in 2020. This volume represents part of their joint commitment to sharing knowledge and ideas, further informed by the battle against the Covid-19 pandemic, specifically its local manifestations, the most serious of which unfolded over 2020– 2021. Arguably, the pandemic catalysed a process of deglobalisation, and although there have are scholarly contestations over whether or not we are in a temporary phase of such a phenomenon, we cannot neglect the evidence gathered from our local context and synthesised here. We have witnessed similar trends worldwide, for example the rise of geopolitical tensions, where interactions among countries and institutions were called into question. Therefore, in this edited volume, we foreground the discourse on deglobalisation in the Malaysian context, bringing in a range of perspectives on its costs and implications. Thus, Covid-19 becomes our point of focus, a prism through which the unfolding of various critical issues in Malaysia is observed. This includes a specific focus on Sabah, long-marginalised as peripheral to the peninsular-centric academic, political and economic discourse. Since the pandemic first unfolded, Malaysia experienced several changes in government, a rapid decline in v

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

its economic growth, rising unemployment and costs of living as well as a general deterioration of human rights in theory and praxis—all of which run counter to the ethos and logic of globalisation. In this edited volume, we collectively recognise the need to explore these phenomena, in all their political, economic, social and ecological facets. In the act of completing this project, we would like to thank all contributors for enabling the conceptualisation, production and publication of this volume.

Contents

Deglobalisation in Malaysia as a Subject of Theoretical Study Introduction: Reconsidering (De)globalisation in the Aftermath of Covid-19 Khoo Ying Hooi and Anantha Raman Govindasamy

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Political and Socioeconomic Intersections in a Deglobalising Malaysia Yan Yin Yeo and Ei Sun Oh

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Malaysia’s Defensive Priority Dilemma: Prioritising Military Strategy Amidst Covid-19-Mediated Deglobalisation Roy Anthony Rogers

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An Antidote to Deglobalisation: Conceptualising Youth Activism in Malaysia Vyshnav Menon

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Deglobalisation’s Biopolitical Implications for Malaysians Bio-constitutionalism, Power Relations and Endemic Inequalities: Implications of the Commodification of the Right to Health in a Deglobalising Malaysia Pin Lean Lau

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CONTENTS

Labour Issues in Malaysia Amidst Deglobalisation Sheila Devi Michael Mediated Xenophobia and Covid-19: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Media Representations of Migrant Workers in Malaysia Kwan Yee Kow and Mohamad Zaki Samsudin Political and Social Deglobalisation in Malaysia: Discrimination Against Migrants and Refugees During the Covid-19 Pandemic Aaron Denison Deivasagayam

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Deglobalisation in Sabah Skewed Priorities in Sabah’s Food Policies: (Post-) pandemic Mediated Deglobalisation and Food Security Firdausi Suffian Digital Poverty and Inequality During the Covid-19 Pandemic in Keningau, Sabah Esther Jawing, Junaidah Januin, Veronica Petrus Atin, Kamsilawati Kamlun, John Mark Storey, and Siti Hasnah Tanalol Lockdowns and Food Security: Embodying Native Wisdom in Rice Production Among the Indigenous Lundayeh in Sabah Kavitha Ganesan and Shaffarullah Abdul Rahman Index

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Notes on Contributors

Veronica Petrus Atin is a senior lecturer at Universiti Malaysia Sabah, whose doctorate specifically focused on developing pedagogical grammar of Kadazandusun as a less-commonly taught language, based on learners’ learning styles. Her areas of interests include minority language education, English language teaching and learning, language and culture and pedagogical grammar. Aaron Denison Deivasagayam is a doctoral candidate at Hiroshima University. His research interests cover Malaysian and Japanese politics, international relations, human rights and regionalism. He was formerly an international programme officer at the British High Commission in Kuala Lumpur, focusing on various institutional reforms. Kavitha Ganesan is a senior lecturer at Universiti Malaysia Sabah, with a primary interest in Malaysian literature in English, specifically female life-writings and postcolonial indigenous studies. Her work on the indigenous Lundayeh people of Sabah has been published in eTropic and the Routledge Companion to Humanism and Literature. Anantha Raman Govindasamy is an associate professor in politics at Universiti Malaysia Sabah. His research areas focus on Malaysian politics, specifically on the ethnic Indian minority and East Malaysian politics. He is the author of From Pakatan Harapan to Perikatan Nasional (2021), published by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.

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Khoo Ying Hooi is an associate professor at Universiti Malaya. She specialises in human rights, power politics, democratisation and civil society in Southeast Asia, especially Malaysia and Timor-Leste. Her monographs and co-edited volumes have been published by Lexington, Routledge and Palgrave Macmillan. Junaidah Januin is a senior lecturer at Universiti Malaysia Sabah and is currently pursuing her doctorate in academic discourse competence. She has more than twenty years of teaching experience and specialises in academic writing, learner autonomy, ethnic language preservation and prison education. Esther Jawing graduated from the University of Warwick and is a senior lecturer at Universiti Malaysia Sabah. She specialises in teaching English as a second language, prison education and English language teaching for technical and vocational education and training. She is also active in several social innovation projects in education. Kamsilawati Kamlun is a lecturer at Universiti Malaysia Sabah with a M.Ed. (TESL) from Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. She co-authored Ready to Work: English for Employment (Cengage Learning Asia), and her research interests include English language studies, reader response, literary studies, sociolinguistics and English for specific purposes. Kwan Yee Kow is a lecturer at the School of Communication and Creative Arts, the University of Wollongong Malaysia, and was formerly a journalist covering a range of beats for several media organisations. Her research interests include press and media reform, journalism regulation, communication policies and practices. Pin Lean Lau is an assistant professor in bio-law at the Law School of Brunel University, London. Her research encompasses European, international and comparative law for genome editing, global biosecurity, ethical-legal governance for artificial intelligence systems, biomedical technologies, bio-constitutionalism and legal futures fore-sighting. Vyshnav Menon is a former research assistant at the Institute of Malaysian and International Studies, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. He was involved in research on electoral system reform as well as public perceptions of democracy, with a degree in international relations and economics from the Australian National University.

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Sheila Devi Michael is a senior lecturer in the Department of International and Strategic Studies, Universiti Malaya. She lectures on international relations studies and specialises in non-traditional security studies, human trafficking, migration and global governance. She is the deputy editor of the Malaysian Journal of International Relations. Ei Sun Oh is the principal advisor of the Pacific Research Center of Malaysia and senior fellow at the Singapore Institute of International Affairs. He was formerly with the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Nanyang Technological University, besides serving as political secretary to the prime minister of Malaysia. Shaffarullah Abdul Rahman is a senior lecturer at Universiti Malaysia Sabah, with a doctorate in philosophy from Monash University. His current research focuses on the intersections between social epistemology and indigenous knowledge. Roy Anthony Rogers is an associate professor with the Department of Strategic and International Studies, Universiti Malaya. He is currently the deputy executive director of the Asia Europe Institute, and his research interests are the governments and politics of the Central Asian republics and Xinjiang. Mohamad Zaki Samsudin is a senior lecturer at the School of Communication and Creative Arts, the University of Wollongong Malaysia. His primary research interests are in socio-political issues related to multiculturalism and ethnic integration. He has been involved in research and consultancy projects promoting peace education and intercultural dialogue. John Mark Storey teaches academic reading and writing and English for creative communication at Universiti Malaysia Sabah, specialising in literature and literary linguistics. He is passionate about establishing a youth reading culture through new forms of textual engagement. Firdausi Suffian is currently a deputy rector of academic affairs and senior lecturer at Universiti Teknologi MARA (Sabah campus). He is also a visiting lecturer at Mondragon University, Spain. He specialises in the political economy, particularly focusing on the role of institutions, institutional change and economic policy.

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Siti Hasnah Tanalol is a senior lecturer in the Information Technology Foundation Programme at Universiti Malaysia Sabah. She is actively involved in the field of augmented reality applications and is also an associate member of the User Experience Research Group. Yan Yin Yeo is a senior fellow at the Pacific Research Center, specialising in infrastructure, sustainability, electoral analysis and struggles among East Malaysians. She was previously private secretary to Sabah’s minister of youth and sports as well as the minister of health and people’s well-being.

List of Figures

Political and Socioeconomic Intersections in a Deglobalising Malaysia Fig. 1 Fig. 2

Classification and proportion of jobs, 2019–2021 (DOSM, 2021a, 2021b) Foreign direct investment in Malaysia, 2017–2021 (DOSM, 2021c)

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Lockdowns and Food Security: Embodying Native Wisdom in Rice Production Among the Indigenous Lundayeh in Sabah Fig. 1 Fig. 2 Fig. 3

Location of Long Pasia Within Sabah (Wikimedia, n.d.) Malay-language Sunday mass in Long Pasia, photographed during fieldwork in August 2018 A typical Lati’ Ba’ in Long Pasia, photographed during fieldwork in September 2020

190 195 199

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List of Tables

Political and Socioeconomic Intersections in a Deglobalising Malaysia Table 1

Stimulus packages introduced by the Perikatan Nasional government (Ministry of Finance Malaysia, 2021)

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Mediated Xenophobia and Covid-19: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Media Representations of Migrant Workers in Malaysia Table 1

Number of articles analysed from two Malaysian news organisations

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Digital Poverty and Inequality During the Covid-19 Pandemic in Keningau, Sabah Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 Table 4

Digital teaching experiences among Keningau’s schoolteachers Educational disadvantages faced by Keningau’s schoolteachers Paradoxes of technology usage among Keningau’s schoolteachers Shortcomings in the provision of ICT facilities among Keningau’s schoolteachers

176 177 178 179

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LIST OF TABLES

Lockdowns and Food Security: Embodying Native Wisdom in Rice Production Among the Indigenous Lundayeh in Sabah Table 1 Table 2

The stages of a Lati’ Ba’ cycle Paddy yield by individual households, 2017–2021. The names of the families have been omitted to maintain anonymity, in accordance with research ethics

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Deglobalisation in Malaysia as a Subject of Theoretical Study

Introduction: Reconsidering (De)globalisation in the Aftermath of Covid-19 Khoo Ying Hooi and Anantha Raman Govindasamy

Introduction Around the world, the novel coronavirus disease 2019 (Covid-19) pandemic brought out the best and worst in terms of how governments managed this intersectional crisis, with implications for public health and other human effects. For example, it has disrupted global trade, the movement of critical products as well as the continuity of supply and value chains, primarily because of restrictions placed upon domestic and international human movement. Such global supply chain disruptions have, for example, resulted in weaker global trade (Dass, 2020). The pandemic coincided not just with tensions between the United States (US) and

K. Ying Hooi (B) Department of International and Strategic Studies, Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia e-mail: [email protected] A. R. Govindasamy Centre for the Promotion of Knowledge and Language Learning, Universiti Malaysia Sabah, Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. Ying Hooi et al. (eds.), Social and Political Deglobalisation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6823-7_1

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China, but also a sustained questioning of and disassociation from international trade and other aspects of globalisation. Globalisation generally refers to governmental policies favouring free trade, open borders, the free movement of capital, goods and services as well as the elimination of tariffs and—within a neoliberal framework—is popularly perceived as a critical driver of unprecedented economic growth worldwide. Political critiques of such policies, which should be ideologically distinguished, may be broadly categorised as follows. The political left considers globalisation as a form of domination by multinational businesses, characterised by limited domestic policies and regulatory oversight, while the right sees it as a platform that could have impacts on respective national sovereignties (Flew & Iosifidis, 2020; Wijesinghe, 2021). Studied in the context of this bifurcated division, Covid-19 offered an opportunity for protectionists and nationalists to portray globalisation’s effects as the culmination of years of indiscriminate policies (Yaya et al., 2020). Indeed, its spread may be attributed to globalisation and interconnectedness. Thus framed as a threat to a society’s regular functioning, Covid-19 serves as a shifting signifier that can arguably be deployed for political gain. It has also triggered a discussion around an essential dynamic: deglobalisation. This concept is not new, in and of itself, and in simple terms, it can be regarded as the opposite of globalisation, although we stress that it may mean different things to different actors. For instance, deglobalisation can be specifically seen as the reduced movement of goods, capital, services and humans themselves (Dandolov, 2021). Before proceeding, we also emphasise that this should not be confused with the discourse around the so-called antiglobalisation movement: a misleading name given its concern for international considerations of “the need for seeking a fairer deal for the deprived and the miserable, and for a more just distribution of opportunities in a suitably modified global order” (Sen, 2006, p. 148). Deglobalisation is instead characterised by decreased connections, interdependence, integration and interconnectivity, where the pandemic-induced retreat from global economic integration can be regarded as one aspect of this trend (Evenett & Baldwin, 2020). But there are many other intersectional factors at play, for instance political competition among major powers (Ripsman, 2021) and contestations around global value chains (Pegoraro et al., 2020; Wijesinghe, 2021). Covid-19 has triggered further discussion on the uncertainties of deglobalisation’s consequences, the crucial role played by technologies such as mobile

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devices, internet-based applications and social media (Balsa-Barreiro et al., 2020) and the more inward-looking approaches to managing Covid-19. In this context, Malaysia offers opportunities for insightful case studies. Notably, it was one of the first countries to respond to the severity of the virus by implementing various responses accordingly to minimise health, economic and social impacts as well as limit transmissions (Shah et al., 2020). The National Crisis Preparedness and Response Centre under the Ministry of Health had already been activated as early as 5 January 2020—even before the World Health Organization’s announcement of a global health emergency (New Straits Times, 2020a). The government also had National Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Plan ready, which had been developed in 2006 as a comprehensive response to influenza pandemics (Hamzah et al., 2021). Its first local case was detected on 25 January (New Straits Times, 2020b), and cases were largely under control until transmissions were significantly catalysed by a major religious event in Sri Petaling, Kuala Lumpur, in March (Barker, 2020). Malaysia then imposed a series of lockdown measures, known locally as Movement Control Orders (MCOs). Starting on March 18, these were meant to break the chain of Covid-19 transmissions (Shah et al., 2020). Instituted under the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases Act (1988), the MCO—usually referred to in its singular form, despite variations such as the Enhanced MCO and Recovery MCO—was designed to restrict the movement of people into or out of particular areas, including closing all businesses except for those providing essential services and items. Its enforcement was tightened when cases increased, thus resulting in significant restrictions for the general public. Several levels of MCOs, varying in length and severity, were to continue until the end of 2021 when Covid19 was regarded as a less significant domestic threat. But official measures to contain and securitise the pandemic were complicated by significant political changes that began in February, which led to the rise of authoritarian governance and the suspension of rights and freedoms—thus offering an analytical parallel with developments abroad. The incumbent Pakatan Harapan (PH) government under Mahathir Mohamad was toppled through a so-called political coup—the debate over its legitimacy is contested—and replaced by the Perikatan Nasional (PN) coalition under Muhyiddin Yassin, before being replaced in turn by Barisan Nasional’s leadership under Ismail Sabri Yaakob. At the time of writing, a further change in government has ensued, with a PH–BN “unity government” in power. The analysis below primarily focuses on the period coinciding

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with the worst effects of the pandemic in 2020–2021, which includes major events such as the suspension of Parliament for seven months starting January 2021 after PN declared a state of emergency, allegedly over Covid-19 concerns (Kumar, 2021). Such measures proved ineffective, given the government’s inability to control cases, which eventually had profound consequences for the domestic economic sectors and financial market (Majid, 2020). In fact, Malaysia’s heightened vulnerability to global developments has been long noted, partly as a function of recent political instability (Central Bank of Malaysia, 2018). Overall, this period was characterised not just by a tremendous impact on health, but also political and economic instability, as well as rising unemployment and the curtailment of civic spaces. As such, it remains a key site of scholarly interest, including the political dimensions of how a consideration of the “state-in-society”—i.e., as seen in the temporal overlaps between changes in government and actual governance—affected the local handling of the pandemic (Por, 2023), although we instead aim to broaden scholarly focus by unpacking the local manifestations of (de)globalisation to a deeper degree. This chapter thus provides further insights into Malaysia’s positionality within the discourse on (de)globalisation, by collectively taking the conflicts and uncertainties surrounding the Covid-19 pandemic as a key framework. The main question for us is as follows: how has the pandemic influenced (or continues to influence) a local process of deglobalisation that was already underway beforehand, when heightened risks to future trade and the possibility of strategic conflicts usher in a climate of profound uncertainty?

Reviewing the Discourse on Deglobalisation The antecedents of deglobalisation are primarily economic in nature (Kornprobst & Paul, 2021), but its discourse is multifaceted: hence, the discourse is examined through three perspectives—economic, political and social—with the first being the primary focus in the literature. Cases such as the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union can be treated as a manifestation of all three aspects. Looking at economic globalisation specifically, this discourse reached its height between the late 2000s and the early 2010s, after which political and social dimensions gained significance. Within the literature, globalisation itself is significantly connected and discussed together with multinationalism and international economic integration. Hence, the roles played

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by international organisations such as the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development are considered to be significant. However, when inequality and unfairness became critical issues among trading nations, resistance towards globalisation led to the emergent discourse of regionalism instead (Menon, 2021), characterised by regional integration agreements such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for TransPacific Partnership. This cyclical dynamic can be summed up as such: globalisation begets deglobalisation, which can result in a return to some form of globalisation (Kim et al., 2020). Despite an understanding of this relationship, the literature on deglobalisation is still limited. This term is generally attributed to Walden Bello (2004) as an alternative proposal and counterbalance to the increasing entrenchment of (neoliberal) capitalist structures. For Bello, there are 14 features of deglobalisation, the most significant of which concerns production for the domestic market—arguably, there may not be much conflict between Bello’s model and a form of globalisation premised upon equitable and sustainable development.1 Although generally characterised as a process of diminishing interdependence and integration between specific units, typically nation-states (Kim et al., 2020), the term is subject to dispute. Martinez (2021) opines that the concept generally has two meanings: (1) a solution for local manufacturers in combatting foreign competition and (2) the decline of international economic trade and investment. Scholars argue that drivers of deglobalisation include trade imbalances, political pressure, populism, high unemployment rates and international trade tensions (Kim et al., 2020). To some extent, the term is often considered as inevitably having negative connotations.

1 The remaining features are as follows: (1) subsidies at the national level; (2) strong trade policies; (3) industrial policies, including subsidies, tariffs and trade, to strengthen manufacturing sectors; (4) long-postponed measures of equitable income redistribution; (5) a deemphasis on growth but an emphasis on upgrading the quality of life instead; (6) transforming power and transportation systems into decentralised systems based on renewable sources; (7) maintaining a healthy balance between a country’s carrying capacity and the size of its population; (8) employing environmentally congenial technology; (9) using a gendered lens to ensure gender equity; (10) applying strategic economic decisions to the market or technocrats; (11) monitoring civil society as well as institutionally supervising the private sector and the state; (12) transforming into a mixed economy; and (13) replacing centralised global institutions with regional ones.

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Several historic phases of deglobalisation (followed by a rebound in globalisation) have been noted in the world economy (Kim et al., 2020). These include the period bookended by the First World War’s outbreak in 1914 to the end of the Second World War in 1945. The Great War produced prolonged economic dislocation, including the withdrawal of Russia from capitalist world trade after the communists took power in 1917, the outbreak of the so-called Spanish influenza in 1918, monetary instability in the early 1920s, the introduction of new immigration restrictions in the US, the Great Depression’s lengthy effects starting in 1929 and increased protectionism in the 1930s (which arguably deepened the global economic downturn). Such turmoil in the process towards integration led to the world economy suffering significant reversals (Irwin, 2012, 2020; Lee & Park, 2020). More recent examples include the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008, while the influence of multinational enterprises (MNEs) saw periods of distrust towards globalisation (Martinez, 2021). More recently, the so-called US–China trade war placed pressure on various world economies (Lee & Park, 2020), resulting in increased trade tensions and protectionist measures (Chi, 2020). For instance, China began to turn inwards, introducing policies to promote the domestic development of its leading industries under President Xi Jinping, while the US embraced an “America First” policy under Trump, which shifted away from trade liberalisation and towards protectionism (Irwin, 2020). Notably, there seems to be a tendency for such discourse to centre on the more economically developed countries, where the debate between globalisation (i.e., free trade) and deglobalisation (i.e., trade protectionism) is coded in economic terms (Kim et al., 2020). With Covid-19, protectionist policies are even more significant (Dandolov, 2021)—economic deglobalisation manifests as vulnerabilities in the global value chain and MNE activity, as well as diminished flows of goods, services, capital and information through long-distance market transactions (Afesorgbor et al., 2021; Lee & Park, 2020). Increased regionalisation and localisation emerge, thus reducing trade interdependence. As economies regionalise and localise, further uncorrelation occurs, thus pushing investors to rethink their approaches (Chi, 2020). Seen from a realist approach, economic deglobalisation can be regarded in individualistic terms (Behera, 2021; Zehra, 2011), where different regions and countries experience the pandemic differently based on their respective economic indicators (Afesorgbor et al., 2021).

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Meanwhile, political deglobalisation discourages international cooperation and has resulted in the re-emergence of nationalism to a significant degree, given how international cooperation has been significantly curtailed while a higher level of nationalism has emerged regarding Covid19-related issues such as the provision of medical devices and vaccines (ibid.). Such political deglobalisation exposes the flaws inherent in global governance, where the proliferation of organisations in the international arena could lead to potential political fragmentation, hence complicating cooperation accordingly (Jubilut & Limongi, 2021; Ripsman, 2021). From a realist perspective, such an international environment can be viewed as being anarchic (but not in its specific ideological sense), given the lack of a centralised system, consequently drawing attention to the need for effective international cooperation (Jubilut & Limongi, 2021). Finally, social deglobalisation further reveals global income inequality, resulting in misalignment and confrontations between peoples (James, 2018). Here, Mbembe (2018) sees three aspects of deglobalisation: digital computation (which engenders a new, common world as well as configurations of reality and power), borderisation (which is no longer simply a line of demarcation separating distinct sovereign entities) and migration.

Covid-19-Related Impacts of Deglobalisation With Covid-19, the impacts and discourse of deglobalisation have not only increased but also gone beyond developed countries, thus becoming effectively vernacularised elsewhere (Antràs, 2020; Peng et al., 2021; Williamson, 2021). Through the lens of economic globalisation, Covid19 has been seen to reduce economic integration (Evenett & Baldwin, 2020; Irwin, 2020) and is manifested in protectionism, justified by the need to maintain national security and public health (e.g., procuring medical gear and food supplies), with an emphasis on domestic sourcing (Afesorgbor et al., 2021; Irwin, 2020). Thus, a new form of globalised affairs emerges, where political leaders rethink their erstwhile approaches to investments in free markets—for example, they are more inclined towards domestic actions to safeguard their citizens from falling below the poverty line (Martinez, 2021). For instance, China and India are moving towards greater self-reliance and inwardness, having observed the impacts on their respective economies: in particular, China’s formerly export-driven economy now relies more heavily on domestic demand

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(Subramanian & Felman, 2020). Aside from that, the fragility of the global value chain has been revealed, existing economic and social inequalities are exacerbated, while foreign direct investment has decreased (Afesorgbor et al., 2021; Lee & Park, 2020). Political deglobalisation is significantly seen in increased nationalism (Bieber, 2020), with an emphasis on the state’s role in decision-making. With mainstream politics moving towards support for tightened border controls and further limits on migration (Betz, 2020), in the long run, these measures could entail negative consequences for policies related to migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers, in ways that are less “friendly” and which overlap with social deglobalisation. For instance, the increased emphasis on maintaining ethnic homogeneity in Western and Eastern Europe is not just a by-product of pandemic-induced shifts in migration dynamics, but may also be characterised as a sign of intra-European deglobalisation (Dandolov, 2021). Further, the inefficiency of regional and global governance is another indicator of political deglobalisation (Permal, 2021). For instance, European Union member states disagreed on a common union-wide response to Covid-19, most clearly seen in the case of Italy, the site of Europe’s first major outbreak in early March 2020. Despite appealing to other member countries for help when it experienced shortages of emergency medical equipment, none responded in significant measure (Lee & Park, 2020). Meanwhile, the World Health Organization was accused of being partial towards China by the US, which threatened to withdraw from the international body, by extension seriously weakening its capacity to lead a global effort in resolving the pandemic (Lee & Park, 2020). Such absences of coordinated and cooperative responses could accelerate major problems (Irwin, 2020), especially given the attenuation of foreign relations. The most obvious example is the worsening of US–China relations, whose respective differences in containing the spread of Covid-19 have, by extension, influenced the international relations approaches of other countries (Kornprobst & Paul, 2021). At least until it reversed its “zero Covid” policy, China’s tightly controlled authoritarian measures, which allowed for the imposition of strict lockdowns, had arguably contained the pandemic more effectively than liberal approaches such as the US model (Lee & Park, 2020). Regarding social deglobalisation, worldwide inequality has deepened, with disproportionate impacts on poor and vulnerable communities, which carry much of the pandemic’s health and economic burdens. For instance, many are not covered by health insurance and do not receive

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unemployment benefits (ibid.). Low-wage and informal economy workers (who are most likely to lose work opportunities), the elderly and poor (who are especially vulnerable to Covid-19 and suffer disproportionately high death rates) as well as migrants and refugees (who face continued discrimination and are subject to heightened securitisation) are among the worst-hit communities. In the Malaysian context, the general logic of globalisation was assumed to run along conventional neoliberal lines. It was seen as a way of boosting prosperity for all by making markets more extensive and efficient—meanwhile, criticism of such trickle-down economics has been elucidated at length elsewhere (see, for example, Sen, 2006). Regardless, there have been technological advances and higher foreign investments, with faster income growth for capitalists and highly skilled workers. Malaysia’s integration into global value chains has played a crucial role in its economic development, although as argued in this volume, it had historically already been integrated into modern capitalist systems, albeit to a lesser degree, from the colonial period. Since independence in 1957, Malaysia has developed into an upper-middle-income country. Indeed, if we view globalisation in a broader temporal and institutional sense, historic trade routes have been central to its precolonial states’ respective development, and hence, recent trends are a continuation of its interconnectedness. Within this dynamic, the impact of the Cold War cannot be underestimated, especially given that authoritarian states were historically excellent drivers of capitalist growth, having crushed dissent raised by the political left and enabling the consolidation of capital among elites (Watson, 2021). Seen in this light, almost every important aspect of globalisation—involving trade, capital, labour migration, technology and information flows—has left a deep imprint on its economy and society, steering it away from being highly dependent on primary commodities (e.g., tin and rubber) towards a foci on manufacturing and services (e.g., electronics and Islamic banking), although the significance of its agricultural sector—particularly palm oil—remains high. The early phases of engagement with modern globalisation markedly reduced poverty and inequality rates, but in its later stages, an excessive dependence on lowskilled foreign labourers—who are often relegated to stigmatised and hazardous jobs—may have compromised its economy’s competitiveness. Malaysia’s multi-ethnic society has also posed considerable challenges in terms of balancing domestic needs and equitable development against a greater engagement with globalisation. Thus, the nature and impact of

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globalisation have changed over time, with the openness and economic liberalisation (which is not necessarily political) of its open economy simultaneously being vulnerable to global economic shocks (Lee, 2019). Thus, the public health crisis has also had broad and severe negative consequences for Malaysia’s economy. At the same time, national unilateralism has been expanding at the expense of effective regional and global policy cooperation, thus boding ill for ASEAN. Drawing from the above discussion, we ask how economic, political and social deglobalisation has had impacts on Malaysia. A few key issues can be highlighted, particularly related to migrant workers (and other non-citizen communities such as refugees). Malaysia’s heavy reliance on migrant workers, who were already living in poor and unsanitary conditions as well as lacking access to healthcare and worker protection, is particularly problematic, and the human consequences have been further compounded by the implementation of various MCOs. The authorities tend to view migrant workers as a separate, temporary community serving no long-term strategic interest. The pandemic’s outcome has significantly revealed their vulnerability to policy blind spots and exclusions (Wahab, 2020). There might also be localised effects of the broader trade war, especially for competitive producers in “developing” countries such as Mexico, India, Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia. Barriers were put up to prevent the further spread of the pandemic—although not to halt trade and “legal” migration flows—yet negative economic effects persist. The calls for trade protectionism and insular policies threaten to unravel Malaysia’s gains from globalisation. While a diversified export market and product mix provide a buffer against global uncertainties, integration remains crucial for further growth (Central Bank of Malaysia 2018). Therefore, since 2020, Malaysia has issued several stimulus packages to mitigate the economic impact, and of particular interest is 2021’s National People’s Well-Being and Economic Recovery Package (PEMULIH). Valued at RM150 billion, it consists of a direct fiscal injection of RM10 billion in the forms of wage subsidies, unemployment assistance and cash aid, with special grants for micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises as well as more financial support for struggling households. There was also a RM400 million provision to increase the vaccination programme’s capacity (Ministry of Finance Malaysia, 2021). This, however, was a stopgap measure rather than a systemic or structural overhaul.

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Objective, Approach and Outline In our context, not all 14 features of deglobalisation outlined by Bello (2004) existed at the time of Covid-19’s onset—indeed, Malaysia was very much committed to a neoliberal approach. However, a decision between globalisation and deglobalisation policies has effectively been made regarding its economy, where selective deglobalisation is pursued— for instance, employing bilateral trade barriers and emphasising protection, such as mitigating against the risks of Covid-19. Therefore, discussions on political and social deglobalisation must continue, given the implications of several sweeping legislative measures taken to alleviate mass panic and protect the health of citizens (Shah et al., 2020). For instance, the Prevention of Control of Infectious Diseases (Measures Within the Infected Local Areas) Regulations 2020 and Covid-19 Act 2020 (which was passed by the Dewan Negara, or the Senate, on September 22 and came into force the next day), once combined with the provisions of the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases Act 1988 and the Police Act 1967, would certainly provide authority to curb transmissions (The Star, 2020). Following the declaration of a state of emergency, the Malaysian Emergency (Essential Powers) (No. 2) Ordinance 2021 then came into play.2 The question, therefore, concerns one’s freedom under the law—how is it curtailed under the pretext of safeguarding public interests (i.e., combatting Covid-19), when restrictions on democratic spaces lead to the weakening of governance at the national level? This edited volume therefore provides a crucial platform, not only as a retrospective record of the pandemic, but also as a framework by which to understand its various dynamics and paradoxes, setting them within the discourse of (de)globalisation (including how the state responded with policies which, to some extent, undermined the practice of democracy and the rule of law). As editors, we believe that this book captures such crucial and complex developments, but more importantly, unlocks other

2 The Ordinance, promulgated without parliamentary approval, revives the draconian

provisions of the Anti-Fake News Act 2018, which was repealed in October 2019 by the PH government. It also ostensibly sets out to combat “fake news”, which is defined here as “any news, information, data, and reports, which is or are wholly or partly false relating to Covid-19 or the proclamation of emergency, whether in the forms of features, visuals or audio recordings or in any other form capable of suggesting words or ideas”.

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perspectives for understanding Covid-19 in its local context—particularly among marginalised communities—based on rich empirical evidence. Therefore, our contributors’ chapters critically examine specific issues related to key socioeconomic and political developments, primarily occurring in the 2020–2021 period. There is no singular methodology—our contributors deploy a combination of methods, ranging from case studies to in-depth fieldwork and textual analyses. They were given a free rein to decide on their respective structures and approaches based on their areas of expertise, so long as these were anchored within the broader theme of deglobalisation. As such, we refrain from taking a deliberate stance on whether or not to support (de)globalisation, especially given that this concept means different things to different actors. The first section, including this chapter, primarily deals with the rise of theoretical debates on deglobalisation during Covid-19 in the global environment and its impact on the developing world. Yan Yin Yeo and Ei Sun Oh argue, based on case studies, that Malaysia has missed the opportunity to become a high-income nation, where Covid-19 and the impact of the ongoing war in Ukraine directly exacerbated domestic socioeconomic inequalities and disparities. Roy Anthony Rogers focuses on the dilemmas faced by Malaysia in responding to traditional and non-traditional security threats, particularly whether or not a focus on procuring and maintaining conventional weaponry is capable of ensuring national security. Arguably, the government’s focus remains set on prioritising traditional security threats, particularly in the allocation of national funds. Vyshnav Menon examines three interrelated trends—i.e., illiberalism, deglobalisation and youth activism, where such activism became increasingly important in safeguarding democracy, especially given the rise of pandemic-triggered political and economic uncertainty. His central claim is that civic engagement and youth activism are necessary to safeguard human rights issues at this time. The second section provides a close observation of how deglobalisation and Covid-19 undermined Malaysian democracy, by primarily employing a human rights perspective. Pin Lean Lau examines bio-constitutional shifts and their implications for human rights through the commodification of citizens’ rights to health. The pandemic has exacerbated irregularities in the provision of basic healthcare and has increasingly commodified access to such—such are the results of factors including deglobalisation, internal political rivalry and the re-interpretation of democracy along populist lines. Thus, there is a need to renegotiate

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such “suspended” constitutional rights, with implications for others. Sheila Devi Michael explores the issue of foreign labour and specifically argues that although the foreign labour force has significantly contributed to economic development, it was significantly marginalised through mistreatment and persecution, exploitation and abuse as well vaccine discrimination. Kuan Yee Kow and Mohamad Zaki Samsudin highlight the role of mainstream print media (a lynchpin of regime hegemony) in the socialisation of rising discrimination among the general public, which was particularly directed against such foreign workers as well as refugees. Based on a discourse analysis, they argue that mainstream print media constructed negative representations which further contributed to rising xenophobia. Finally, Aaron Denison Deivasagayam provides a detailed study of such lived discrimination, arguing that deglobalisation not only enabled increased operations targeting these communities but also resulted in a corresponding change in public perceptions. The third section specifically focuses on deglobalisation’s manifold impacts in the East Malaysian state of Sabah. Although it is one of the federation’s most ethnically diverse states, rich in natural resources such as petroleum, it is also the poorest. Firdausi Suffian explores Sabah’s food policies specifically and highlights the challenges faced in the agricultural sector at large, where deglobalisation has put pressure on subnational regions that are dependent on food imports. The impact is particularly significant for Sabah, which prioritises industrial crops over agro-food production. Hence, he suggests that policymakers emphasise local food security and the maintenance of supply chains. Esther Jawing and her team investigate the impact of digital poverty on a learning community in Keningau and suggest that the digital divide has exacerbated existing inequalities in education, as seen in the limitations caused by a pandemic-era lack of infrastructure and internet connectivity—thus, the sudden shift to online learning during the MCOs further disadvantaged underprivileged communities. Finally, Kavitha Ganesan and Shaffarullah Abdul Rahman discuss the indigenous Lundayeh wet paddy cultivation system (Lati’ Ba’ ) and highlight how globalisation contributed to the erosion of their indigenous identity, until Covid-19 restrictions created an opportunity for the community to maintain a semblance of its traditional lifestyle through paddy cultivation. Here, deglobalisation may indeed be favourable for remote communities such as the Lundayeh.

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Conclusion Today, the era of an unbridled open market and open borders faces significantly challenges—even as the immediate threat of the pandemic appears to be much less pronounced, geopolitics, economic downturns, rising inequality, failures to develop new political structures to manage the illeffects of globalisation and responses to new threats remain salient. Moreover, the heightened concern regarding national sovereignty—as illusory as this consciousness is, given how interconnected we are even at a quotidian level—has been amplified among many governments, especially regarding their economic policies. Hence, they are less keen on dismantling trade barriers, but instead focus more on safeguarding jobs, preventing intellectual property theft and deterring rising cybercrime, thus making the return of “offshored” production by MNEs in the 1990s and 2000s more likely. The exact impacts of deglobalisation differ based on the countries in question, of course, but appear to be mainly determined by their economic status. A few developing countries would benefit in the short run but would likely fail to sustain this advantage because of the heightened risk to future trade and the possibility of strategic conflicts. To some extent, the discourse on deglobalisation may have been exaggerated by Covid-19, particularly because some countries proved to be much more resilient than anticipated—however, this does not mean overlooking its very human consequences and the general failure of lofty promises to “build back better”. What cannot be denied is that international cooperation is necessary to prevent the consequences of deglobalisation from being reinforced by Covid-19’s ongoing fallout, wherein traditional approaches might be replaced by new solutions. Our current assessment may be summed up as such—by focusing on the Malaysian context, there are signs of deglobalisation, but globalisation continues to be relevant. Acknowledgements The authors would like to express their gratitude and sincere appreciation for the contributions of their research assistant, Jessie Lee, in completing this work.

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Jubilut, L. L., & Limongi, A. A. A. (2021). The COVID-19 pandemic in a time of deglobalization: Challenges and perspectives for global governance and international cooperation. Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, 49(1), 1–12. Kim, H.-M., Li, P., & Lee, Y. R. (2020). Observations of deglobalisation against globalisation and impacts on global business. International Trade, Politics and Development, 4(2), 83–103. https://doi.org/10.1108/ITPD-05-2020-0067 Kornprobst, M., & Paul, T. V. (2021). Globalisation, deglobalisation and the liberal international order. International Affairs, 97 (5), 1305–1316. Kumar, P. P. (2021, July 26). Malaysia parliament battle resumes with Muhyiddin in hot seat. Nikkei Asia. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Malaysia-in-transi tion/Malaysia-parliament-battle-resumes-with-Muhyiddin-in-hot-seat Lee, C. (2019). Globalisation and economic development: Malaysia’s experience (ERIA Discussion Paper Series, 307). https://www.eria.org/uploads/media/ discussion-papers/Globalisation-and-Economic-Development-Malaysia-Exp erience.pdf Lee, H. H., & Park, D. H. (2020). Post-covid Asia: Deglobalization, fourth industrial revolution. World Scientific. Martinez, M. (2021). Deglobalization during COVID-19. The Borgen Project. https://borgenproject.org/deglobalization/ Mbembe, A. (2018). Deglobalisation. Esprit, 12, 86–94. Menon, J. (2021). ASEAN’s limited regional integration spells globalisation, not failure (Working Papers in Trade and Development 2021/02). ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. Ministry of Finance Malaysia. (2021, June 28). Govt launches PEMULIH package worth RM150bln, including fiscal injection of RM10bln—PM . Ministry of Finance Malaysia. https://www.mof.gov.my/en/news/press-cit ations/govt-launches-pemulih-package-worth-rm150-bln-including-fiscal-inj ection-of-rm10-bln-pm Majid, M. (2020, March 17). Covid-19: Panic and the Malaysian economy. New Straits Times. https://www.nst.com.my/opinion/columnists/2020/03/575 187/covid-19-panic-and-malaysian-economy New Straits Times. (2020a, January 25). 3 coronavirus cases confirmed in Johor Baru. https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2020/01/559563/bre aking-3-coronavirus-cases-confirmed-johor-baru New Straits Times. (2020b, February 3). Health Ministry rejects claim of being ‘late’ in tackling coronavirus crisis. https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/ 2020/02/562044/health-ministry-rejects-claim-being-late-tackling-corona virus-crisis Pegoraro, D., Propris, L. D., & Chidlow, A. (2020). De-globalisation, value chains and reshoring. Industry, 4, 152–175.

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Peng, M. W., Kathuria, N., Viana, F. L. E., & Lima, A. C. (2021). Conglomeration, (De)globalization, and COVID-19. Management and Organization Review, 17 (2), 394–400. Permal, S. (2021). Cascading effect of COVID-19: Deglobalisation and its impact on global governance. Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs, 1–9. Por, H. H. (2023 [in press]). Governing the Covid-19 pandemic in Malaysia: Shifting capacity under a fragmented leadership. Pacific Affairs. Ripsman, N. M. (2021). Globalisation, deglobalisation and Great Power politics. International Affairs, 97 (5), 1317–1333. Sen, A. (2006). Identity & violence: The illusion of destiny. Penguin. Shah, A. U. M., Safri, S. N. A., Thevadas, R., Noordin, N. K., Abd Rahman, A., Sekawi, Z., Ideris, A., & Sultan, M. T. H. (2020). COVID-19 outbreak in Malaysia: Actions taken by the Malaysian government. International Journal of Infectious Diseases, 97 , 108–116. Subramanian, A., & Felman, J. (2020). How deglobalisation is hurting the world’s emerging economies. World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/age nda/2020/09/convergence-threatened-by-deglobalization-covid19/ The Star. (2020, March 17). Health DG: Movement control can boost ministry’s fight against Covid-19. https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2020/ 03/17/health-dg-movement-control-can-boost-ministry039s-fight-againstcovid-19 Wahab, A. (2020). The outbreak of Covid-19 in Malaysia: Pushing migrant workers at the margin. Social Sciences & Humanities Open, 2(1), 100073. Watson, J. K. (2021). Cold war reckonings: Authoritarianism and the genres of decolonization. Duke University Press. Wijesinghe, A. (2021). Trade origins of protectionism and deglobalization of our time. Institute of Policy Studies, Sri Lanka. Williamson, P. (2021). De-globalisation and decoupling: Post-COVID-19 myths versus realities. Management and Organization Review, 17 (1), 29–34. Yaya, S., Otu, A., & Labonté, R. (2020). Globalisation in the time of COVID19: Repositioning Africa to meet the immediate and remote challenges. Globalisation and Health, 16(1), 1–7. Zehra, N. (2011). The realist state and deglobalization. Pluto Journals, 8(2), 33–52.

Political and Socioeconomic Intersections in a Deglobalising Malaysia Yan Yin Yeo and Ei Sun Oh

Introduction Deglobalisation can be associated with the increasing relevance of protectionist policies, which may diminish the international movement of goods, capital, services and people. According to Harold James (2018), the 2008 global financial crisis stimulated a move towards deglobalisation, although this was at least partial and hesitant. Global trade in goods and services slowed significantly, particularly between September 2008 and April 2009, supply and demand remained low while international banking activities were also affected. Such financial fragmentation (or renationalisation) also has political aspects, where growing nationalism and populism reduced multilateral cooperation and manifested in events such as the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union, Donald

Y. Y. Yeo (B) · E. S. Oh Pacific Research Center of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia e-mail: [email protected] E. S. Oh e-mail: [email protected] E. S. Oh Singapore Institute of International Affairs, Singapore, Singapore © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. Ying Hooi et al. (eds.), Social and Political Deglobalisation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6823-7_2

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Trump’s victory in the 2016 United States (US) presidential election as well as his government’s subsequent “trade war” with China. Deglobalisation has been accelerated by the Covid-19 pandemic, where major world economies adopted inward-looking and highly nationalistic approaches, taking steps such as localising the production and provision of essential goods and services to increase self-reliance and reduce risk factors outside of their control (Lim, 2021). Heightened political uncertainty and the possibility of future pandemics are expected to accelerate deglobalisation, thus posing a negative long-term impact on trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). According to the recent findings from the 2021 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report, the world economy suffered its sharpest drop in international trade in the second quarter of 2020, with global merchandise trade falling by more than 20% year-on-year. Its Investment Trends Monitor also indicated that global FDI plunged from USD1.5 trillion to USD859 billion from 2019 to 2020 (UNCTAD, 2021). This chapter concerns the impact of Covid-19-mediated deglobalisation on Malaysia, which has historically shown strong economic growth. Although the World Bank was optimistic that Malaysia would experience a successful transition from an upper-middle-income economy to a high-income one by 2030 (Lim, 2020), the pandemic’s onset and the Russia–Ukraine war have hampered Malaysia’s prospects. The slow adoption of practices associated with the “Fourth Industrial Revolution”’ as well as low research-development-commercialisation and-innovation capacity and capability are major structural factors which continue to diminish Malaysia’s competitiveness, and as we argue below, will gradually cause Malaysia to shift towards greater deglobalisation. Moreover, various lockdowns and international travel restrictions have further reduced production capacity and consumption. Instead of implementing development projects, the government prioritised the safeguarding of lives and livelihoods through the provision of economic stimulus packages. This trend persisted into 2021, where ongoing cases led Fitch Solutions to revise Malaysia’s 2021 gross domestic product (GDP) growth downwards to 0% (E. Lee, 2021). Given these conditions, we explore how the pandemic has exacerbated domestic socioeconomic inequality and how it becomes linked to further deglobalisation. Specifically, we will focus on data gathered between 2019 and 2021, which will provide key insights for our argument.

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Deglobalisation and Socioeconomic Challenges Socioeconomic Challenges Arising from the Covid-19 Pandemic Malaysia endured a slow recovery from the pandemic, and despite high vaccination rates—97.6% of the adult population was fully vaccinated as of 23 May 2022 (The Star, 2022)—this did not detract from the fact that by September of that year, its total Covid-19 cases per million people exceeded those of neighbouring Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines (Worldometer, 2022a, 2022b). In 2020, its gross national income per capita was RM42,503 (USD10,111), an amount which remained 20.4% below the minimum threshold needed to achieve a high-income economy status, as estimated by the World Bank. This is because only essential services were allowed to operate during the strictest periods of the lockdowns (Bunyan, 2020), the GDP contracted by 17.1% in 2Q20, the second quarter of that year (Idris & Salim, 2020). Although the Perikatan Nasional (PN) government, which presided over the worst of the pandemic, introduced numerous stimulus packages to ease financial burdens, the rising cost of living and losses of jobs meant that essential expenses (e.g., shelter, food, utilities) grew expensive, while many businesses were barely able to stay afloat. Until June 2021, shortly before this government’s collapse, Malaysia had spent a total of RM530 billion on eight stimulus packages (see Table 1). Although various economic recovery incentives were provided to enhance employability, a dire national economic outlook means that uncertainty in the job market persists, as the result of a combination of partial and total lockdowns. Unemployment figures can be obtained from the Department of Statistics Malaysia (DOSM), where 778,200 individuals, or 4.8% of the working population, were unemployed in July 2021, resulting in an increase of 0.3 percentage points from May (DOSM, 2021a). This reality was particularly reflected among Malaysians employed in low- or semi-skilled jobs. Since such work required their physical presence, movement restrictions constrained their ability to earn a living, which led in turn to reduced incomes and, therefore, the need to request help from community members or food banks (Harris, 2021). Besides this, various other challenges existed. Although various schemes and programmes—e.g., Skim Jaminan Penjanaan Pekerjaan (JanaKerja), the Short-Term Employment Programme (MyStep), place-and-train initiatives, as well as reskilling, upskilling and apprenticeship programmes— ostensibly provided opportunities for Malaysians to be hired or provided

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Table 1 Stimulus packages introduced by the Perikatan Nasional government (Ministry of Finance Malaysia, 2021) Stimulus package

Date introduced

Total (RM billion)

Prihatin Rakyat Economic Stimulus Package (Prihatin) Prihatin Package for Small and Medium Enterprises (Prihatin SME+) Short-term Economic Recovery Plan (Penjana) Prihatin Supplementary Initiative Package (Kita Prihatin) Malaysian Economic and Rakyat’s Protection Scheme (Permai) Strategic Programme to Empower the People and Economy (Pemerkasa) Strategic Programme to Empower the People and Economy Plus (Pemerkasa+) National People’s Well-being and Economic Recovery Package (Pemulih)

March 2020

250

April 2020

10

June 2020 September 2020

35 10

January 2021

15

March 2021

20

May 2021

40

June 2021

150

them with new skill sets, fresh graduates found it particularly challenging in trying to secure high-skilled and well-paid jobs. After all, Malaysia’s job market comprises mostly semi- and low-skilled jobs. A breakdown of such jobs between 2019 and 2021 is relevant here. As of 4Q19, shortly before the pandemic’s onset, 62.4% of jobs were classified as semi-skilled, while 13.3% were low-skilled. As of 2Q21, this composition remained similar—62.2% and 13.1%, respectively (see Fig. 1). As a result, the youth unemployment rate (pertaining to those aged 15–24 years) increased from 9.9% to 11% from 4Q19 to 2Q21. Since additional costs are incurred in training new hires without working experience, employers are generally not motivated to hire fresh graduates, thus forcing some youths into low-paid, short-term jobs. Furthermore, changing policies between PN and the subsequent Barisan Nasional (BN) government, especially those related to pandemic mitigation measures, rendered many large corporations as well as small and medium enterprises (SMEs) largely inoperable, with some having to downsize their employee rolls or cut salaries. Non-essential services and businesses, such as hotels, tour agencies, shopping malls and restaurants, could not afford to pay for operational expenses such as rent and utilities, given their lack of business.

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Fig. 1 Classification and proportion of jobs, 2019–2021 (DOSM, 2021a, 2021b)

According to a survey by the Ministry of Entrepreneur Development and Cooperatives in July 2021, up to 580,000 enterprises, or 49% of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, were at risk of closing down by October 2021, risking the jobs of seven million Malaysians in the process (New Straits Times, 2021). Assuming that each worker has an average of two dependents, this would mean that another 14 million individuals would be affected. In addition, many retailers could not operate at maximum capacity and therefore saw limited customers and shorter operating hours. Given their tight margins and low footfalls, there were more temporary or permanent outlet closures. Data from the National Property Information Centre in 2020 showed a decline in occupancy rates for shopping complexes, falling from 79.2% to 77.5% from 2019 to 2020. Melaka’s complexes recorded the lowest occupancy rate (63.3%), followed by those in Negeri Sembilan (66.6%), Pahang (72.2%), Penang (72.8%), Sarawak (73.9%), Kedah (74.6%) and Johor (74.9%). In June 2021, various retail groups1 stated that up to 30% of shops in malls had closed because of the pandemic, and 300,000 workers had lost their jobs over the past 16 months. Workers from low-income families are arguably more vulnerable today than during the pre-pandemic period.

1 Specifically, these were the Malaysian Shopping Malls Association, Malaysia Retailers Association, Malaysia Retail Chain Association, Bumiputera Retailers Organisation as well as the Selangor and Kuala Lumpur Electrical Home Appliances Dealers’ Association.

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With the losses of jobs and income, they would fall deeper into poverty and debt. According to the Economic Action Council secretariat, more than 600,000 households initially belonging to the “Middle 40” (M40) income group have slipped into the “Below 40” (B40) category (Kana, 2021). Day-wage earners were particularly affected, with many struggling to recover from the effects of the prolonged lockdown. Because they could not work remotely, extended lockdowns deprived them of daily income. Despite various efforts to reduce the development gap between Peninsular Malaysia and the two East Malaysian states (comprising Sabah and Sarawak) under the Eleventh Malaysia Plan (2016–2020), the latter continue to face enormous challenges in catalysing socioeconomic development. According to the Twelfth Malaysia Plan (2021–2025), as announced by Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob of BN, between 2016 and 2020, Sabah and Sarawak recorded the lowest GDP growth compared with the others: merely 1.0% and 0.9% per annum, respectively. Compare this with the national average of 2.7% growth per annum. Besides the pandemic, the low prices of crude oil, palm oil and rubber were other causal factors, which translated to a high poverty rate of 25.3% and 12.9%, respectively, in 2020. It should be noted that among the ten poorest districts in Malaysia, eight are from Sabah and one is from Sarawak.2 Four Examples Using four examples, we explore several socioeconomic issues that became apparent as the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russia–Ukraine war unfolded. These form the central theme of discussion in many households within the low-income bracket.

Example 1: Period Poverty Many female-headed, hardcore poor and B40 households viewed disposable sanitary products such as pads and tampons as luxuries. Since they do not have sufficient or any disposable income, they prioritise spending 2 Out of these eight districts in Sabah, Tongod (with a poverty rate of 56.6%) is the poorest, followed by Pitas (53.6%), Kota Marudu (46.1%), Beluran (45%) and Kudat (41.5%). Meanwhile, Pusa is the poorest district in Sarawak (38.6%).

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on basic needs over menstrual hygiene—in short, they experience period poverty. This is defined as a lack of access to the safe and hygienic use of sanitary products because of financial constraints (Tull, 2019), although it also does affect wealthier countries such as the United Kingdom and the US. In Malaysia, an average pack of 16 disposable sanitary pads costs approximately RM10, while a package of 16 tampons costs RM28. As a result, many young girls and women use tattered clothes, coconut husks, newspapers and even banana leaves in place of these unaffordable products. Without proper access, they cannot concentrate on their studies or work during menstruation. Being worried about menstrual leaks or period pain, some stay at home instead, thus resulting in a dynamic which may eventually lead to higher school dropout rates or lower-income prospects in the long run. Lower educational attainment might reduce earning capacity for themselves and their families, besides lowering self-esteem.

Example 2: Digital Poverty3 The former chief minister of Sabah, Salleh Said Keruak, defines digital poverty this way: as a state of deprivation within the community, especially in terms of information and communication technology (ICT), either because of the lack of relevant infrastructure or necessary skills (Bernama, 2020). Although more Malaysians are using digital services and uptake is indeed increasing—one out of three Malaysians are new to digital services (Google, Temasek & Bain & Company, 2020)—connectivity and affordability issues persist among urban and rural dwellers, where one device per person remains the norm. Data from the Ministry of Education showed that as of April 2020, 36.9% of students nationwide did not possess any electronic devices, while only 6% had their own computers, 5.67% their own tablets, 9% their own laptops and 46% their own smartphones (Chan et al., 2020). Therefore, many children from low-income families still find it difficult to access learning materials online. Even if one already has the necessary devices (e.g., computers and smartphones) as well as high-speed Internet access, they could still be digitally poor because they lack ICT proficiency. Because of poverty or a lack of awareness, an estimated 1.7 million primary and secondary school students do not have the proper tools or appliances to access knowledge digitally (The Sun Daily, 3 See Chapter “Digital Poverty and Inequality During the Covid-19 Pandemic in Keningau, Sabah” by Jawing et al. for a further discussion on digital poverty.

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2020). Many do not have adequate Internet access at home to participate in remote learning opportunities. Aside from having few digital devices or subscribing to limited Internet access plans, rural citizens often have unstable connections. Students had to look for particular spots with better access for online learning activities, such as Veveonah Masibin from Pitas, Sabah, who resorted to climbing a tree to write her university exams (The Star, 2020). Meanwhile, a teacher in Sarawak led a group of primary and secondary school students through a jungle, from his village in Nanga Sumpa to Nanga Jambu in Lubok Antu, to access better Internet coverage (Goh, 2020).

Example 3: Health Inequality4 Despite the high national vaccination rate, low vaccination coverage in some states arguably hindered economic recovery. Several figures from September 2021 suggest a deep degree of health inequality. According to the Covid-19 Vaccine Supply Access Guarantee Special Committee (JKJAV), 1,569,346 individuals (56.9% of the adult population) in Sabah had registered for vaccinations, a percentage which was relatively far behind that of the next lowest state, Kelantan (72.1%) (JKJAV, 2021b). Although the National Covid-19 Immunisation Programme outlined the creation of mobile vaccination clinics as a key strategy, most such sites were concentrated in urban areas along the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia (Hasbullah, 2021), while there was a relatively low number of vaccine administration centres allocated for states such as Kelantan, Terengganu, Pahang, Sabah and Sarawak (JKJAV, 2021a). This degree of inequality further compounded the poor healthcare prospects in East Malaysia, which already had a relatively lower distribution of doctors compared with the peninsula. In 2019, the official ratio of doctors to the general population was 1:817 and 1:682 in Sabah and Sarawak, respectively: far below the national average of 1:482 (Ministry of Health Malaysia, 2020). A lack of medical specialists and amenities not only hindered vaccination, but also posed further challenges for rural hospitals in reaching remote populations. For those who live beyond five kilometres of any healthcare facility, state district officers have to drive on 4 See Chapter “Malaysia’s Defensive Priority Dilemma: Prioritising Military Strategy Amidst Covid-19-Mediated Deglobalisation” by Rogers for an overview of more urgent health measures undertaken in Sabah by the Malaysian Armed Forces.

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muddy, uneven roads and sometimes ride boats to reach them. Due to limited Internet connectivity, telemedicine—using ICT to improve patient outcomes by increasing remote access to care and medical information—is not a practical option (World Health Organization, 2010).

Example 4: Food Insecurity Although roadblocks and limitations on market operating hours are no longer in effect, the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war has disrupted the global supply chain, thus resulting in a drastic mark-up of the prices of goods and services, even if this situation may not appear apparent from the ground. The inflation of food prices, in particular, affects the purchasing power and savings of the M40 and B40 communities and has also generally exacerbated food insecurity. Ironically, Malaysia is rich in natural resources, including fertile land for agriculture, but an overreliance on food imports has been a side effect of the government’s focus on agricultural crops (namely palm oil).5 Over the last decade, food imports have amounted to RM482.8 billion versus exports of RM296 billion (DOSM, 2021d). When more foreign currency is required to purchase the same amount of imported food and goods, the disparity exerts a continuous downward pressure on the ringgit. Depreciation results in more expensive imported food, which eventually forces more household decision-makers in lowerincome brackets to reduce their food intake or purchase cheaper, less nutritious options (e.g., canned or instant food), and thus, there is a particularly negative impact on marginalised communities. Within these dynamics, controlling food prices can only go so far. Prospects for Re-globalisation The emerging socioeconomic challenges studied above have triggered concerns that Malaysia may not successfully re-globalise in the postpandemic era. Undoubtedly, the reopening of international borders had a near-immediate salutary effect, with a higher economic growth rate posted as early as 2Q22 (8.9% year-on-year) shortly after borders reopened in April. However, whether or not Malaysia can consistently 5 See Chapter “Skewed Priorities in Sabah’s Food Policies: (Post-)pandemic Mediated Deglobalisation and Food Security” by Suffian for a detailed discussion of food security, specifically in Sabah.

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sustain a positive economic trajectory in the next few years is not easily predictable. Indeed, a substantial rise in the headline inflation rate from 2.3% to 4% year-on-year between April and November was noted in 2022 (DOSM, 2022a, 2022b). We can first look at the cost of food. Among all items, the food and non-alcoholic beverages category was the main contributor to the overall rise in inflation—from 4.1% to 7.3%. The current prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim of Pakatan Harapan (PH), has often expressed concern about the rising cost of living and food insecurity, having rebranded the existing agriculture and consumer affairs ministries accordingly (i.e., the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security and the Ministry of Domestic Trade and Cost of Living ), thus suggesting a top-down prioritisation in terms of revamping the local food supply chain. But this is only one aspect of the challenge. Despite petrol subsidies and price control measures, Malaysians still face considerable challenges because of other rising living costs and stagnant wages. Apparently, the household debt as of June 2022 was already valued at RM1.375 trillion, having exceeded even the federal government’s debt of RM1.045 trillion. The fourfold increase in the overnight policy rate by the Central Bank of Malaysia (Free Malaysia Today, 2022) implies that individuals who are servicing housing, vehicle and personal loans have to pay higher monthly instalment payments, thus slashing monthly disposable incomes especially among the lower-earning M40 and B40 communities, with subsequent negative prospects for successful re-globalisation.

Deglobalisation and Political Challenges Malaysia had experienced frequent changes in its federal administration over the past five years—from BN to PH in 2018, which was replaced by PN, followed by BN, before PH regained power in 2022 by forming a “unity government” with BN. Although the “confidence and supply agreement” between PH and Ismail Sabri’s administration somewhat stabilised the political situation from September 2021 until Parliament’s formal dissolution in October 2022, it did not prevent the fifteenth general election from being called a few months earlier than expected. Granted, similar agreements have been implemented in many mature parliamentary democracies (e.g., the United Kingdom, Germany, New Zealand, Australia). But in these cases, both sides of the political divide are typically competent, less corrupt and less abusive of power, where

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their main differences are largely ideological. Without winning outright majorities in their respective parliaments, they enter into coalitions or agreements with one another to make up a sufficient majority to form governments. This was not the case here, given that Ismail Sabri’s coalition was riddled with individuals who were either corrupt, advocated extremist policies or simply incompetent. Most of PN’s cabinet members were retained, including the former prime minister appointed to head the national recovery council. Even under the current “unity government”, the prospects of stability remain unclear. It consists of members from PH and BN and several other coalitions and parties: Gabungan Parti Sarawak, Gabungan Rakyat Sabah and Parti Warisan (Anis & Ibrahim, 2022). The prospect of a relatively conservative, theocratically inspired coalition coming to power would still have to be considered by foreign and domestic investors alike. Although Anwar has won a vote of confidence in Parliament by gaining more than two-thirds of all votes (Yunus & Yusof, 2022), Malaysia’s current anti-hopping law still contains a loophole—it does not prevent a political party from leaving one coalition for another. According to Article 49A, A member of Party A who is a member of the House of Representatives shall not cease to be a member of that House, if Party A, who is a member of a coalition of political parties, leaves that coalition whether or not Party A joins another coalition of political parties or forms a new coalition of parties.

Hence, any party has the right to leave PH after the election and join, for example, a BN-led government (Ng, 2022). Furthermore, while the anti-hopping law prevents individual lawmakers from switching party affiliations, they could still switch their political support for premiership candidates who are not favoured by their parties, thus adding yet another layer of instability. Notwithstanding these issues, the costs of doing business in Malaysia remain among the lowest in Southeast Asia, although recent political instability arguably dissuaded major technology firms from setting up their regional headquarters, offices or factories here. For instance, Apple and Samsung set up production lines in Vietnam whereas Amazon planned to build three data centres in Indonesia’s West Java province instead.

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As a result, Malaysia has lost out on FDI at a higher rate than its fellow Southeast Asian countries and the rest of the world. Note that FDI fell by 55% and amounted to just USD3 billion, compared to the regional loss of 25% (UNCTAD, 2021). The DOSM’s quarterly balance of payments report reveals that Malaysia saw a steep decline in FDI in 2018 compared to 2017 (DOSM, 2021c), and although FDI more or less stagnated (or stabilised) in 2019—i.e., from RM30.7 billion to only RM32.4 billion— the impact of Covid-19 saw FDI plunge to RM14.6 billion in 2020. Thus, in 2Q21, Malaysia registered a net inflow of RM8.2 billion, down from RM9.1 billion in 1Q21 (Fig. 2). Despite Malaysia’s economy having grown by 7.1% in the 1991–2000 period, economic growth between 2001 and 2010 fell to 4.6% because of a series of economic shocks (e.g., the “dot-com bubble” downturn in 2001 and the global financial crisis in 2008–2009). Covid-19 contributed significantly to an even lower annual growth rate of 4% from 2011 to 2020. Although the Malaysian economy has still grown by 5.2% per annum overall, if measured over the past three decades, this rate is still below the annual growth target of 7% initially targeted in the Vision 2020 plan. Moreover, the revocation of the cabotage exemption policy for submarine cable repairs in November 2020 resulted in Facebook and Google bypassing Malaysia entirely through the planned construction of Apricot, a new 12,000-kilometre subsea cable connecting Japan, Taiwan, Guam, the Philippines, Indonesia and Singapore, to further boost regional connectivity (Wong, 2021). Malaysia’s exclusion is projected

Fig. 2 Foreign direct investment in Malaysia, 2017–2021 (DOSM, 2021c)

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to result in a loss of high-capacity connectivity and investments worth USD300–400 million (Hazim, 2021). Therefore, when a major opposition bloc (i.e., BN) is essentially coopted into supporting the government of the day, it can ill-afford to perform the traditionally appropriate functions of the political opposition. Despite not fully holding governmental power, PH would have to shoulder the same blame if things fall apart. Such politicking does tremendous harm to Malaysia’s long-term viability as a parliamentary democracy. In fact, a Bloomberg commentary once went as far as to argue that Malaysia could be becoming a “failed state”, with its unstable political trajectory and inept handling of the pandemic (Moss, 2021). Therefore, there is concern that if Anwar’s administration does not meaningfully stimulate Malaysia’s economy through structural reforms, such failure will trigger more uncertainties. Coupled with the socioeconomic implications arising from the Russia–Ukraine war, the government is under greater political and competitive pressure to revitalise and reshape the economy, create new industries targeting digitalisation, renewables, green energy and climate change mitigation, increase high-quality investment as well as grow skilled and high-income employment opportunities (H. G. Lee, 2021).

Conclusion and Recommendations The Malaysian government can develop targeted incentives for businesses, such as by attracting foreign or local investors to open factories, high-tech FDI aimed at integrating the domestic supply chain, promoting a spillover in terms of technology transfer as well as developing new entrepreneurs and technopreneurs in food security and electric vehicles, for instance. However, a whole-of-government—if not a whole-of-society—approach appears hard to come by. Deglobalisation implies that for the foreseeable future, Malaysia will remain consumed by power struggles among the various political elites as well as witness turf wars between the power centres within and outside the government proper. In addition, if trade and global production lines are further disrupted by deglobalisation, domestic production and consumption will increasingly become the mainstays of the economy, necessitating a transition process which could prove painful to major manufacturers, SMEs as well as individual professionals and salaried workers. A deglobalised world, coupled with domestic political uncertainties and socioeconomic challenges, constitutes fertile ground

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for the rise of nationalism or outright jingoism, which would further complicate post-pandemic socioeconomic recovery.

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Lee, E. (2021, August 16). Fitch slashes Malaysia growth to 0% for 2021. The Edge Markets. https://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/fitch-slashesmalaysia-growth-0-2021 Lee, H. G. (2021, September 15). Insight: The necessity of reform. The Star. https://www.thestar.com.my/business/business-news/2021/09/ 15/insight---the-necessity-of-reform Lim, I. (2020, June 25). World Bank: Malaysia can be high-income nation within 10 years despite Covid-19, but six reforms needed for transition. Malay Mail. https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2020/06/25/ world-bank-malaysia-can-be-high-income-nation-within-10-years-despitecovid/1878842 Lim, J. (2021, January 14). Wealth: Key investment themes in a recovery year. The Edge Markets. https://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/wealth-key-inv estment-themes-recovery-year Ministry of Finance Malaysia. (2021, July 29). Aid package, economic stimulus packages help people and economy survive during Covid-19 pandemic [press citation]. https://www.mof.gov.my/en/news/press-citations/aid-packageeconomic-stimulus-packages-help-people-and-economy-survive-during-covid19-pandemic Ministry of Health Malaysia. (2020). Health Indicators 2020. https://www.moh. gov.my/moh/resources/Penerbitan/Penerbitan%20Utama/HEALTH%20I NDICATOR/FlipBook%20Petunjuk%20Kesihatan/Petunjuk%20Kesihatan% 202020.html#p=158 Moss, D. (2021, July 9). Malaysia is staggering down the road to failed statehood. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-0708/malaysia-raises-the-white-flag-on-the-road-to-failed-statehood New Straits Times. (2021, July 7). 580k MSME businesses will fail if current lockdown prolongs, says MEDAC. https://www.nst.com.my/business/ 2021/07/706024/580k-msme-businesses-will-fail-if-current-lockdown-pro longs-says-medac Ng, S. F. (2022, October 19). Malaysia’s Anti-hopping Law: Some loopholes to mull over. Fulcrum. https://fulcrum.sg/malaysias-anti-hopping-law-some-loo pholes-to-mull-over/ The Star. (2020, June 17). Sabah girl stays in tree to get Internet connection. https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2020/06/17/sabah-girl-staysin-tree-to-get-internet-connection The Star. (2022, May 24). Covid-19: Over 22.9 million adults in Malaysia fully vaccinated. https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2022/05/24/covid19-over-229-million-adults-in-malaysia-fully-vaccinated The Sun Daily. (2020, November 23). 1.7 million students facing ‘digital poverty’? https://www.thesundaily.my/local/17-million-students-facingdigital-poverty-FF5272676

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Tull, K. (2019, Jan 23). Period poverty impact on the economic empowerment of women. Institute of Development Studies. https://assets.publishing.service. gov.uk/media/5c6e87b8ed915d4a32cf063a/period.pdf UNCTAD. (2021). Key statistics and trends in international trade 2020. https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/ditctab2020d4_en.pdf Wong, A. (2021, August 17). Facebook and Google’s undersea cable to bypass Malaysia in Asia Pacific. Malay Mail. https://www.malaymail.com/news/ malaysia/2021/08/17/facebook-and-googles-undersea-cable-to-bypass-mal aysia-in-asia-pacific/1998304 Worldometer. (2022a, September 16). Daily new cases in Malaysia. https://www. worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/malaysia/ Worldometer. (2022b, September 16). Reported cases and deaths by country or territory. https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/ Yunus, A., & Yusof, T. A. (2022, December 19). [Updated] Anwar gets his vote of confidence as PM. New Straits Times. https://www.nst.com.my/news/nat ion/2022/12/862426/updated-anwar-gets-his-vote-confidence-pm World Health Organization. (2010). Telemedicine: Opportunities and developments in Member States: Report on the second global survey on eHealth 2009. https://www.who.int/goe/publications/goe_telemedicine_2010.pdf

Malaysia’s Defensive Priority Dilemma: Prioritising Military Strategy Amidst Covid-19-Mediated Deglobalisation Roy Anthony Rogers

Introduction This chapter analyses the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on Malaysia’s defence budget and the priorities of the Malaysian Armed Forces, which are constituted of the Malaysian Army, the Royal Malaysian Navy and the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF). In terms of national defence, the central dilemma faced by nation-states facing economic uncertainties amidst deglobalisation is how they are still able to maintain expensive conventional weaponry—a situation complicated by ongoing conflicts such as the war in Ukraine, and more immediately relevant for our context, the military tensions in East Asia. In the local context, millions of ringgit have been spent procuring modern defence assets meant to defend the country from internal and external threats. In the 2022 Budget, which was approved by Parliament following over a year of political, economic and social difficulties, the total allocation for defence purposes was RM16.4 billion (USD3.8 billion). It should be emphasised that RM11.10 billion was earmarked for operational costs alone,

R. A. Rogers (B) Asia Europe Institute, Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. Ying Hooi et al. (eds.), Social and Political Deglobalisation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6823-7_3

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with the remaining RM5.04 billion to be spent on development. This figure was approximately the same as the amounts allocated in 2020 and 2021 (USD3.81 and 3.83 billion, respectively). Similar figures were noted in 2018 and 2016, when USD3.47 billion and 4.17 billion were allocated, respectively (Macrotrends, 2021). But these amounts are dwarfed in comparison to Malaysia’s immediate neighbouring states. Consider Singapore’s USD12.3 billion and Thailand’s USD6.3 billion allocations in 2022 alone—it is not possible to match such figures given the ongoing financial difficulties. The question that arises is whether or not the state is still able to shoulder even comparatively modest expenses, especially given that the economy, i.e., the main domestic concern, is still recovering. Seen in this light, procuring as well as maintaining defence assets set further financial constraints domestically. The general trajectory of the Covid-19 pandemic is discussed in detail elsewhere in this volume, but this chapter differs by considering it from a defence perspective. It is useful to note that the pandemic has challenged the general consensus on the relevance of preparing conventional warfare and raised the question of whether or not the capabilities conferred by conventional weapons can fully protect a particular country. Several articles have been written about the pandemic’s impact on security and warfare. For example, Dutton et al. (2021) as well as Mehri and Thurner (2020) have analysed the military’s roles and challenges in dealing with emergent security challenges, Knudson et al. (2020) have studied the challenges of the Covid-19 pandemic from a military medical corps perspective, while Graham (2020), Clarke (2020) and Fall (2021) have discussed the use of military forces in efforts to contain the spread of Covid-19. Unfortunately, published writing on this dynamic relationship is still limited, especially from a Malaysian point of view, thus suggesting this chapter’s scholarly relevance. It sets out to discuss the non-traditional security (NTS) challenges posed by the pandemic, especially when the international community chose to limit transnational activities and close off borders, analyses whether or not deglobalisation has had an impact on security and military affairs in Malaysia, as well as the overall impact of the pandemic on security priorities—i.e., moving away from being overly focused on traditional, state-centric threats, and towards NTS threats involving non-state actors instead. To sum up, I analyse the preparedness of conventional warfare combatants in overcoming NTS threats in a post-pandemic age characterised by deglobalisation, using the Malaysian Armed Forces as a case study.

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My argument can be divided into three parts. The first defines NTS, which is an important step because the threats posed by a pandemic fall into this category. The second discusses the extent to which conventional weapons remain relevant and are capable of dealing with such threats, given that the efficacy of conventional approaches in facing new security challenges are being questioned. The third is empirical in nature and covers the Malaysian military’s role in facing pandemic-related challenges.

Non-traditional Security and Deglobalisation All states in Southeast Asia, with the exception of Thailand, inherited their armed forces from their former colonisers, which initially established and trained these forces during colonial rule. After independence, the armed forces continued their roles by defending the emergent postcolonial states from internal and external threats (and arguably also defended neocolonial interests in states whose leaders were perceived as being closely aligned with their former masters). Such a task was significantly complicated by the withdrawal of metropolitan military bases, as was the case in Malaysia and Singapore when the British eventually withdraw their forces some years after independence (Ngoei, 2019). In the early stages of independence, most Southeast Asian states had to deal with internal threats, primarily communist insurgencies, ethnic contestations and separatist movements. However, this situation began to change when major threats to these regimes, namely communism, began to subside towards the beginning of the 1990s as the Cold War reached its end. Hence, some regional states began efforts to modernise their armed forces in readiness for new threats such as terrorism and transnational crime. However, others such as Myanmar and the Philippines still faced ethnic threats and separatist movements, two categories which sometimes overlap. However, NTS threats differ significantly from the abovementioned traditional security threats in that they are not limited to military, political and diplomatic conflicts, but can also pose a threat to national sovereignty and development as well as human survival at large (Caballero-Anthony, 2016). In contrast to traditional security concepts, NTS transcends military frameworks and the policing of boundaries because it is capable of threatening humanity itself. Thus defined, NTS covers broader aspects such as pollution, climate change, resource security and disease (e.g., Covid-19), compared with traditional security’s focus on national issues, as generally seen from the perspective of the nation-state. Because NTS

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emphasises the importance of human security, while traditional security only pays attention to domestic and foreign threats, the strategies deployed to deal with emergent threats are more comprehensive in that they combine both military and non-military means, versus the traditional focus on force, alliances and increased military capabilities. In discussing NTS, we inevitably also talk about globalisation, which is essentially concerned with interdependence, mediated by the development of communication and transportation technologies as well as international flows of investment and trade, while encompassing political, economic and cultural aspects (Amin, 2002). Definitions differ between scholars but are generally similar. It should be emphasised that globalisation has both positive (e.g., the development of new industries, jobs, communication channels and transportation technology) and negative (e.g., increasing dependency of developing countries on developed countries) effects. And it has become clear that NTS threats such as terrorism, climate change and pandemics occur more quickly because of globalisation. For example, the first Covid-19 case was detected in Wuhan, China, in November 2019, linked to visitors to the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market—and within months, large-scale lockdowns had been implemented virtually everywhere. Thus, this was the most extreme of several recent pandemics and epidemics, such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, avian influenza and Ebola. According to Mary CaballeroAnthony (2016), NTS threats are often transnational and unilateral solutions are often not feasible, instead requiring comprehensive political, economic and social solutions, as well as the provision of humanitarian aid and military force. Such solutions transcend borders and encompass cooperation between various entities, including local governments, state and non-state actors as well as regional and global organisations. Thus, there is concern that deglobalisation, as manifested in reduced trade liberalisation and the concurrent increase in protectionist policies, has contributed to the deterioration of globalisation, as measured by the reduction of interdependence and integration between societies. For this chapter’s purposes, this reduction is especially salient at the level of the nation-state. It should be emphasised that the term has been in use since the 1970s to refer to a decline in economic integration despite continued economic activity. Bordo (2017) and Martin (2018) both argue that the process of globalisation has declined, rather than increased. The Covid-19 pandemic has only added momentum to this process, particularly given reduced mobility because of border closures. Despite the

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availability of vaccines as well as a significant decline in Covid-19 cases and mortality rates, the international community remains cautious and is not fully prepared to open up national economies to pre-pandemic levels, although this reluctance may also be triggered by international conflicts and rivalries. Curiously, scholarly writing on military deglobalisation is relatively limited. Bremmer (2022) asks if globalisation is still relevant in the current situation of conflict and pandemic, despite eventually insisting that interdependence remains essential. Rogoff (2022) mentions the impact of the war in Ukraine as a cause of deglobalisation, but he does not address military deglobalisation in detail. Joseph Nye (2001), who is among the few who have written on the subject, once argued that with the end of the Cold War, this process unfolded within the military because international conflicts were subsiding, and so major powers such as the United States reduced their foreign deployments abroad (Nye, 2001)— or at least this was the case until the so-called War on Terror. Meanwhile, Hammes (2016, 2019) argues how the “Industrial Revolution 4.0” and the production of intelligent, small and cheap weapons—such as drones, to give an example from ongoing wars—have changed patterns of dominance in security away from established entities such as the US military, especially because smaller state and non-state actors are also capable of fielding such weapons.

The Relevance of Conventional Weapons in the Post-Pandemic Era For the Malaysian Armed Forces, the key question is whether or not conventional armaments and approaches can deal with NTS threats such as pandemics. But for the general public, there is low confidence in the Armed Forces’ ability to procure military assets responsibly. Consider the revelation that littoral combat ships commissioned by the government and costing as much as RM6.08 billion were expected to be completed in 2022, but until now, the Royal Malaysian Navy has not yet received a single ship. This is not to mention the bribery scandals surrounding its procurement of Scorpene submarines for coastal defence some years earlier. Furthermore, public faith in state institutions remains shaken by the low extent of healthcare preparedness, especially given how intensive care units in most public hospitals and quarantine centres proved insufficient at the height of the pandemic, while concerns over the wages

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and working conditions of healthcare workers were rife. Therefore, what rationale does the government have for spending billions on redundant procurement and maintenance work, given that improvements to the level and quality of healthcare services—in addition to other sectors such as education or welfare—are more immediately urgent? Consider also the different operational challenges at play between traditional security and NTS threats—for example, identification. In a military campaign, it is much easier to identify a specific area where belligerents are based, as well as its residents: such a strategy was deployed during the so-called Malayan Emergency against the combatants of the outlawed Communist Party of Malaya and its allies. The logic of containment, as evidenced through the creation of so-called New Villages, which isolated the general populace from the opposing Malayan National Liberation Army at great human cost, was coupled with the deployment of mechanisms of control such as mandatory identification cards and state propaganda. Thus, with the division of Malaya into “black” and “white” areas, it became possible for security forces to identify, with some precision, where belligerents were generally located (usually in jungles, with urban centres largely falling under state control early in the Emergency) and to subsequently launch offensive operations using ground troops or airstrikes.1 However, with Covid-19, the “enemy” is highly virulent, and is therefore much more technically challenging to detect and curb. Even analogous strategies of containment, such as the various lockdowns known as Movement Control Orders (MCOs), were not completely effective. Unlike human combatants, viruses spread and mutate quickly. In this context, national security particularly depended on the state’s ability to test, identify and quarantine Covid-19 patients, a task further complicated by asymptomatic carriers. Thus, various operational challenges can already be identified through this comparative exercise. Although “hotspots” were identified and civil defence forces did carry out sanitisation on a large scale, the extent to which such measures were effective was a topic of debate among medical experts (Pfordten, 2021). Perhaps given the focus on domestic healthcare and security concerns, much less attention was paid to military affairs during the ongoing MCOs, which suggests that the use of conventional weapons to counter security challenges remains relevant. Several examples from within the space of one year alone can be discussed. It should be emphasised that

1 See Harper (1999) and Yao (2016) for more details on the campaign.

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several involve Chinese forces: there is a history of incursions by the People’s Liberation Army Navy and Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessels into Malaysian waters, especially around Beting Patinggi Ali, also known as the Luconia Shoals—i.e., the southernmost point of the disputed Spratly Islands—which is located off the coast of Sarawak (Yeo, 2021). In November 2020, the CCG confronted the Malaysian navy in connection with efforts by Chinese ships to disrupt oil exploration operations in Sawarakian waters (Malaysiakini, 2021). In 2021, a Boeing 737–400 belonging to Israel Aerospace Industries-Elta, registration number 4XAOO, took off from Tel Aviv for Singapore on 18 May for what was reportedly a test flight. En route, 4X-AOO entered Malaysian airspace on 20 May before landing at the air force base in Paya Lebar. It is believed to be a prototype aircraft capable of reconnaissance (The Star, 2021). In another case, Ilyushin Il-76 and Xian Y-20 aircraft belonging to the People’s Liberation Army Air Force were detected flying very close to the Malaysian maritime zone’s airspace off the coast of Kota Kinabalu in Sabah on 31 May. These were transport aircraft with various capabilities, including transporting paratroopers and tanks as well as reconnaissance. Their movements were detected by the RMAF’s ground control, which asked their pilots to identify themselves and their intentions. However, a response was only given when a Hawk 208 fighter jet was deployed to intercept these aircraft. It must be emphasised that this jet is now 25 years old, one of many aging military assets that need to be replaced to effectively defend national sovereignty from foreign military aggression. And in September, less than 24 hours after the RMAF completed joint exercises with counterparts from the United States (US), two more Chinese ships entered Sabahan waters. Therefore, upgrades are timely and in line with proposals in the Defence White Paper 2019, which called for the RMAF to be equipped with medium-range air defence capabilities and more radar equipment (ibid.). The naval incursions are particularly interesting from a regional geopolitical perspective. In early October, the auditor-general’s report showed that 89 incursions by CCG and Chinese navy ships occurred in the 2016–2019 period. According to the Royal Malaysian Navy, 29 of these incursions occurred in 2018–2019 (Daily Express, 2021). Foreign vessels often enter Malaysian waters, especially around Beting Patinggi Ali— the deputy commander of the Navy, Rear-admiral Datuk Abdul Rahman Ayob, stressed that such incidents had already been detected since 2013, and have indeed increased in recent years. These comments were made

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in response to reports in several international defence portals claiming that CCG ships had encroached upon the waters of Malaysia’s exclusive economic zone (Malaysiakini, 2021). In recent decades, China has intensified militarisation in the South China Sea, particularly around the Spratly Islands—which are geographically closer to the territorial waters of the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)— by transforming coral reefs into checkpoints and military bases. As a result, China has effectively occupied part of the waters claimed by regional countries, a move which has been interpreted as a challenge to their territorial integrity. Besides, the presence of the CCG and Chinese fishermen have disrupted local fisheries in what ASEAN states claim as their traditional fishing areas as well as exploratory petroleum projects in the South China Sea. Therefore, it is irrational to ignore the role of the military as well as its conventional weapons. Such recent events have reminded the Malaysian government that its armed forces must be on constant alert. The ability to project a strong defence as a deterrent in defending national interests is crucial. Therefore, it is safe to argue that despite emergent NTS challenges, this does not mean that conventional warfare is totally irrelevant. What the government needs to do is to re-evaluate its defence policy in view of the pandemic’s outbreak and such incursions, which demand a balance between emphasising conventional warfare and adapting NTS challenges. The military played a vital role in managing the Covid-19 pandemic, of course, but its key area of concern—i.e., traditional security issues such as armament, maintaining the balance of power and deterrence—cannot be ignored or neglected. The focus on the Covid19 pandemic has deflected attention away from the traditional role of the military, but this does not negate the military’s role in ensuring national security. Despite economic deglobalisation, the impact of deglobalisation remains to be significantly seen, from a military perspective at least. Traditional threats such as border incursions do still exist, and the strengthening of international military alliances in response to perceived threats from China are salient examples. For instance, AUKUS—an alliance involving Australia, the United Kingdom and the US—was formed as recently as 2021. Such trends do not suggest deglobalisation but are instead reflective of increasing military globalisation, even if such alliances are premised upon rivalries brought about by deglobalisation elsewhere, such as between the US and China. Therefore, it is reductionist to suggest

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that we are either in a phase of globalisation or deglobalisation, given that both movements may coexist simultaneously. We might posit that there is a decoupling in terms of (de)globalisation, and the war in Ukraine offers a further example. Although it has negatively affected the economic and business sectors, thus exhibiting deglobalisation in this sense, from a military aspect, globalisation has actually been further entrenched. The war has led to the overt spread of weapons from the US to Ukraine on the grounds of maintaining its defences, including the possible delivery of ground-launched small diameter bombs, to improve Ukraine’s defensive and counterattack capabilities against Russia. In addition, the US also plans to equip its allies in Eastern Europe with such weapons, in response to increased demand from these countries, and arguably through the political lobbying of domestic weapons manufacturers.

The Role of the Malaysian Armed Forces During the Lockdowns On the domestic front, the Malaysian Armed Forces, as a pillar of defence and national sovereignty, is well adapted to Covid-19-related challenges. The chief of the defence force was called upon to support the government’s efforts by mobilising military personnel to assist the Royal Malaysian Police in manning roadblocks through Operation Penawar (lit., “cure”). Thus, military personnel bore their collective responsibility as frontliners in controlling public movements under the MCO by assisting the efforts of federal, state and local governments. The Armed Forces were also the lead agency in implementing Operation Benteng (lit., “fortress”) from May 2020, which consolidated the roles of various national security agencies and aimed to strengthen land and maritime border controls against cross-border criminal activities—indeed, it was mainly designed to prevent the entry of so-called “illegal” migrants— as defined by the state—who were regarded as potential Covid-19 carriers.2 It is evident from mainstream and social media texts that both 2 See Chapters “Labour Issues in Malaysia Amidst Deglobalisation”, “Mediated Xenophobia and Covid-19: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Media Representations of Migrant Workers in Malaysia” and “Political and Social Deglobalisation in Malaysia: Discrimination Against Migrants and Refugees During the Covid-19 Pandemic”, in particular, for further discussion on the discourses of (il)legality and migration.

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operations had achieved much success in supporting the government’s objectives accordingly, although it should be understood that because of the hegemonic media context in Malaysia, we should be cautious about interpreting such texts. Some examples from East Malaysia are particularly relevant to the broader discussion on the military’s relevance in managing NTS threats. The Armed Forces set up a field hospital to help the Ministry of Health address the treatment needs of Covid-19 patients, while the Ninth Malaysian Infantry Brigade assisted the civilian authorities in isolating Level One patients—the highest risk level—at the Kanowit Indoor Stadium (The Straits Times, 2021). The Third Battalion of the Royal Ranger Regiment was primarily responsible for assisting in the preparation of this venue, which at its height was capable of accommodating 70 patients, equipped with double-decker and single beds donated by Tegas Kesuma Sdn Bhd and equivalent sets of mattresses, pillows and bedding donated by the Junaco Park Camp. The chief of the Armed Forces, General Tan Sri Affendi Buang, stated that such cooperation was part of its commitment to the secondary duties of ensuring public wellbeing and health. In addressing logistical needs, such as transporting medical aid and equipment, the military could deploy its assets as needed, especially making air deliveries using RMAF aircraft. The establishment of field hospitals in locations apart from Kapit and Tawau was also subject to current needs and existing capabilities, and such services were provided by the Health Services Division in particular. Its Royal Health Corps organised the movement of a team from the First Medical Battalion based at Muara Tuang Camp to Kapit on 6 May 2021 to operate a similar hospital to that in Tawau (Free Malaysia Today, 2021). The temporary Kapit hospital had a 40-person capacity, equipped with wards, a pharmacy as well as an x-ray and emergency treatment room—it operated in collaboration with Sarawak’s State Health Department and mobilised staff from the brick-and-mortar Kapit Hospital to assist the military medical team in providing inpatient treatment as well as administrative and support services. It is important to note that the Armed Forces’ involvement increased with the number of Covid-19 patients, which had stretched public health services significantly. In this critical situation, the Royal Health Corps in particular and the Armed Forces at large were mobilised to build field hospitals to assist public hospitals accordingly. What is interesting here is that these hospitals could be developed and operated immediately,

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according to the needs of the Ministry of Health. Although they operated using temporary tents, containers and halls, they were managed by specialist doctors, nurses and support teams using equipment similar to that in brick-and-mortar hospitals. Outbreak prevention measures and standard operating procedures were in effect (Malaysia Military Times, 2021). This focus on the local community’s needs was in line with the principles of the 28th Supreme Command of the Fifth Pillar, which emphasises improving the Armed Forces’ relationship with the general public. These increased roles and responsibilities were acknowledged by its commander, General Datuk Zamrose Mohd Zain. Thus, the military also plays a role in “military operations other than war”, e.g., natural disaster relief operations, humanitarian assistance as well as operations in built-up areas (ibid.). The Malaysian Army’s involvement in analogous operations overseas had long gained worldwide recognition and admiration, especially from the United Nations, thus indirectly supporting a broader national agenda of maintaining good relationships with and extending assistance to the international community. Furthermore, the experience and knowledge gained by army members abroad was indeed utilised in this health emergency as well as to strengthen its domestic relevance and roles. It should be emphasised that these are only secondary tasks, however: the main task of the Armed Forces is facing any possible threat. As early as 2020, General Affendi had stressed how domestic economic strain had eroded the state’s ability to implement a planned defence procurement and development programme. Therefore, the Armed Forces had to plan accordingly so that its existing assets would always be in a state of readiness (The Sun Daily, 2020).

Conclusion Conventional economic, political or military preparations were incapable of keeping the Covid-19 pandemic under control, a problem exacerbated and mediated by globalisation. Even as Covid-19 seemingly recedes, the likelihood of new pandemics emerging remains high. A reactionary argument is that the rapid progress of globalisation needs to be controlled to curb such pandemics, and although the economic sector has gradually opened up after cases started declining, health concerns remain salient and pre-Covid-19 openness may not return in full. In the field of defence, specifically, a debate has arisen regarding the extent to which expensive

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conventional armaments remain relevant, especially given the increased need to protect nation-states from NTS threats. Undoubtedly, Covid-19 has challenged the prioritisation of (re)armament, but traditional threats remain (e.g., foreign invasions, arms races, territorial disputes), hence suggesting its continued necessity for security and defensive purposes. In the Malaysian context, military forces managed to adapt to the Covid19 challenges and played an essential role in helping to inhibit further transmissions, as seen in the involvement of its personnel as frontliners during the MCOs. The military has expertise not only in armament and warfare, but also possesses a high level of discipline and range of skills that can be deployed equally well to emergency law enforcement and pandemic mitigation alike. Its expertise in providing medicine and humanitarian aid thus suggests the need for its sacrifices and contributions to be appreciated and respected alongside those of medical practitioners— the same goes for all those who played their roles, whether overtly or behind the scenes. Returning to the topic of (de)globalisation: although socioeconomic deglobalisation may indeed be happening, the reverse is true for military and security cooperation. Given that hostilities between great powers continue, most significantly the US–China rivalry in our context, there is a need to strengthen all aspects of military preparedness. The implications of cooperation between China and Russia, as a counterpoint to the US and its various allies, suggests an intensification of military globalisation. This situation is very different from that which Nye once imagined—therefore, such globalisation remains an area for further analysis.

References Amin, A. (2002). Spatialities of globalisation. Environment and Planning a: Economy and Space, 34(3), 385–399. Bordo, M. (2017). The second era of globalization is not yet over: An historical perspective (NBER working paper no. 23786). Bremmer I. (2022). Globalization isn’t dead? Foreign Affairs. https://www.for eignaffairs.com/world/globalization-isnt-dead Caballero-Anthony, M. (2016). An introduction to non traditional security studies. NTU Press. Clarke, J. L. (2020). Pandemic and armed forces: Which roles are appropriate? Pandemic and Armed Forces, 19(2).

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Daily Express. (2021). China intruded into Sabah, Sarawak waters 89 times in last three years. http://www.dailyexpress.com.my/news/155746/china-int ruded-into-sabah-sarawak-waters-89-times-in-last-three-years-/ Dutton, L. K., Rhee, P. C., & Shun, A. Y. (2021). Combating an invisible enemy: The American military response to global pandemics. Military Medical Research, 8. Fall, G. F. (2021). Military responses to Covid-19, emerging trends in global civil-military engagements. Review of International Studies, 47 (2). Free Malaysia Today. (2021, June 3). Armed Forces to open 6 more field hospitals. https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2021/ 06/03/modular-hospital-6-more-field-hospitals-coming-up/ Graham, E. (2020). The armed forces and Covid-19. International Institute for Strategic Studies. https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2020/04/easiaarmed-forces-and-covid-19. Hammes, T. X. (2019). Deglobalization and international security. Cambria. Hammes, T. X. (2016). Will technological convergence reverse globalization? Center for Security Studies. https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/ articles/article.html/3f2bdd68-d632-4572-b5ae-90857368c90e Harper, T. (1999). The end of empire and the making of Malaya. Cambridge University Press. Knudson, M., Jacobs, L. M., Jr., & Elster, E. A. (2020), How to partner with the military in responding to pandemics: A blueprint for success. JAMA Surgery, 155(7). Macrotrends. (2021). Malaysia military spending/defence budget 1960–2021. https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/MYS/malaysia/military-spendingdefense-budget Malaysiakini. (2021, October 1). Navy assets monitor, identify presence of foreign ships in national waters. https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/ 593676 Malaysia Military Times. (2021, June 11). One-year term of 28th Malaysian chief of army. https://mymilitarytimes.com/index.php/2021/06/11/oneyear-term-of-28th-malaysian-chief-of-army/ Mehri, M., & Thurner, P. W. (2020), The effect of the Covid-19 pandemic on global armed conflict: Early evidence. Political Studies Preview, 19(2). Ngoei, W.-Q. (2019). Arc of containment: Britain, the United States, and Anticommunism in Southeast Asia. Cornell University Press. Nye, J. S., Jr. (2001). Military deglobalization? Long-distance military interdependence is taking new forms. Foreign Policy, 122. Pfordten, D. (2021, June 5). Top scientists back Dr Adeeba’s criticism of public sanitisation effort. https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2021/ 06/05/top-scientists-back-dr-adeebas-criticism-of-public-sanitisation-effort

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The Star. (2021, May 29). Israeli aircraft did not loiter in Malaysian airspace. https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2021/05/29/israeli-air craft-did-not-loiter-in-malaysian-airspace. The Straits Times. (2021). Malaysia’s armed forces to build six more field hospitals amid Covid-19 surge. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malays ias-armed-forces-to-build-six-more-field-hospitals-amid-covid-19-surge The Sun Daily. (2020, November 7). Budget 2021: Army to optimise operations of assets with RM2.3 billion allocation. https://www.thesundaily.my/local/ budget-2021-army-to-optimise-operations-of-assets-with-rm23-billion-alloca tion-ND5027582 Yao, S. (2016). The Malayan emergency: Essays on a small. NIAS Press. Yeo, M. (2021). China sends 16 military aircraft over disputed South China Sea shoals near Malaysia. Defense News. https://www.defensenews.com/glo bal/asia-pacific/2021/06/01/china-sends-16-military-aircraft-over-disputedsouth-china-sea-shoals-near-malaysia/

An Antidote to Deglobalisation: Conceptualising Youth Activism in Malaysia Vyshnav Menon

Introduction Across the region, from the pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong to the Civil Disobedience Movement in Myanmar, both of which significantly involved youth and student activists have gathered much attention in recent years, catalysed not just by mainstream but also social media. Numerous regional social and political movements have protested increasing deglobalisation and the suppression of democratic norms, wherein these activists played an increasingly relevant role in mainstream political discourse. Arguably, these movements are part of a transnational spread of ideas and movements—in short, they demonstrate a key aspect of globalisation, despite the onset of deglobalisation in the regional context. Globalisation has played a defining role in Malaysia’s neoliberal restructuring in the aftermath of the global financial crises of recent decades, so much so that the ideals of the current generation of digitally connected

V. Menon (B) Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. Ying Hooi et al. (eds.), Social and Political Deglobalisation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6823-7_4

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youth1 —who should not be conflated with students, even if the two groups significantly overlap—are strongly influenced by the resulting social and political consequences. The growing influence of liberal ideals, juxtaposed against increasing local and regional authoritarian tendencies, has resulted in significant political friction within Malaysian society, as is the case with its Southeast Asian counterparts. After significant repression under decades of authoritarian governance, Malaysia is arguably experiencing its third major wave of activism, which can be traced back to the Reformasi (Reform) movement in 1998. This wave has grown over the past two years, as catalysed by both the pandemic’s onset and the infamous “Sheraton Move”, a political coup which saw the collapse of the Pakatan Harapan (PH) government in February 2020. Malaysia entered a period of political instability and economic uncertainty, one which became intertwined with the Covid-19 pandemic’s onset shortly afterwards. As countries across Southeast Asia tackled economic recession and social upheaval, many witnessed a significant regression towards authoritarianism, where individual freedoms were curtailed by governments under the pretext of implementing Covid-19 prevention measures, which I argue are symptomatic of deglobalisation. The pervasiveness of illiberalism and the durability of authoritarianism over the course of the pandemic were demonstrated by a high degree of state intolerance towards open dissent by the media and civil society groups, which I argue fuelled an increase in youth activism and youth-led non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Several avenues for youth participation emerged, which were not necessarily aligned with any political ideology or political organisation, thus suggesting that future policies may be underpinned by the emergent discourses of pluralism and equality. The rise of support for multi-ethnic parties such as the Democratic Action Party (DAP), Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) and the newly formed Malaysian United Democratic Alliance (MUDA), which strongly advocate for multiracialism and equality, highlights a shift away from ethnocentrism.2

1 The definition of “youth” in the local context is subject to the Youth Societies and Youth Development Act (Amendment) 2019 (Act 668). A recent amendment now defines the youth as those aged between 15 and 30. See, for example, the following report in the New Straits Times: https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2019/07/501 288/youth-now-defined-those-between-15-and-30. 2 However, see, for example, analyses by Bridget Welsh of the breakdown of the recent fifteenth general election results, which demonstrate that ethnicity continues to play a

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Nonaligned NGOs such as Undi18, which successfully campaigned to lower the minimum voting age to eighteen, have socialised younger generations into political discourse and practice, and there is significant demand for good governance, judicial independence as well as economic security. To some degree, mainstream political parties have been pushed to align their policies accordingly, especially after considering that during the pandemic, youth-led initiatives and student movements stepped up in the absence of government assistance. These were particularly vocal affairs, as seen for example in the #BenderaPutih (White Flag) movement and the #Lawan (Fight) protest—with the latter demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin over his government’s mismanagement of the Covid-19 crisis and its decision to suspend parliament through emergency rule. Furthermore, an increase in civic awareness regarding democratic processes beyond the ballot box and the importance of individual freedoms will likely play a central role in countering illiberalism and deglobalisation. Such movements, coupled with rising political engagement, highlight the shifting attitudes of Malaysian youth, away from apathy and towards engagement in activism. Therefore, this chapter seeks to explore three interrelated trends—i.e., illiberalism, deglobalisation and youth activism—by examining the evolution of contemporary Malaysian youth activism, beyond online discourse and towards tangible social and political movements, as well as the role that younger generations are making for themselves in mainstream political discourse. Globalisation has undoubtedly ushered in political and social change— and in some cases regime change, where state power gave way to capitalist control. As waves of (neo)liberalisation increased over the past decades, the inherent link between youth and student activism as well as the development of Malaysian society and democracy has only grown in significance. Having been made to feel irrelevant or alien in Malaysian political discourse under years of authoritarian policies, such activism is once again making its way back into mainstream politics. The implementation of automatic voter registration, thanks to the efforts of Undi18 as well as the mass mobilisation of youth during the pandemic, offers a glimpse into the potential roles of younger generations in domestic politics. significant factor in Malaysian politics: https://bridgetwelsh.com/articles/ge15-ethnic-vot ing-analysis-part-1-an-introduction/

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Youth Activism in Malaysia The First Wave: Pre-independence Student movements played a defining role in shaping Malaya’s political and social dynamics prior to independence. Such pre-independence movements arose among its diverse communities, taking various forms during the early twentieth century. Because of a lack of incentives and facilities on the part of the colonial government to enrol the ethnic Malays into English-medium education, the pre-independence Englisheducated student body was comprised mostly of non-Malay students, many of whom were ethnic Chinese and Tamils (Weiss, 2005, p. 291). This imbalance was further cemented by the fact that the only statesupported university in Malaya and Singapore was the English-medium University of Malaya. Not all its students were apolitical, of course: consider the case of the University Socialist Club (Loh et al., 2012). Outside the colonial ambit, however, ideologies and politics from elsewhere, notably Indonesia and China, travelled and a significant left-wing, anti-imperialist movement spread throughout Malaya and Singapore. For example, the students enrolled in Chinese independent schools were particularly vocal in espousing a “Malayan consciousness” and thus openly contested discriminatory colonial policies (Quah, 2020). Malayan nationalism was highly contested, particularly in the wake of the period known as the “Malayan Spring”, and contestations between interethnic solidarity and a homogenous national entity would remain an omnipresent feature of political discourse in the decades that followed, as seen among students and political elites alike. The Second Wave: Post-independence Following independence, societies at university campuses such as Gabungan Pelajar-pelajar Melayu Semenanjung (Peninsular Malay Students’ Union), the University of Malaya Students Union and the National Union of Malaysian Students played larger roles in public discourse (Weiss, 2011, p. 55). Student unions and organisations were pushed to the forefront of activism in propagating issues pertaining to social domestic policies, but protests against American intervention in Vietnam and demonstrations in solidarity with Palestine suggest that an espousal of democracy and human rights was not limited to the nationstate, and such internationalism was once a major aspect of student

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activism. In the 1960s, student activists even joined forces with peasants and farmers to challenge state-led developmental policies. Left-wing groups also emerged abroad, such as the Federation of United Kingdom and Eire Malaysian and Singapore Students’ Organisation.3 The rise of numerous student bodies, which cut across ethnolinguistic and partisan lines, played an important role in providing direct feedback to the mainstream political apparatus. However, this tolerant environment would not last: following the 13 May incident in 1969 and a further rise in student activism (such as the Baling protests in 1974), greater restrictions were imposed upon student bodies and movements. Notably, the Universities and University Colleges Act (UUCA) 1971 would impede the rise and development of youth activism across campuses, while marking further state entrenchment in universities. The implication was that freedoms were not absolute, given that the state primarily suppressed dissent and student voices. Speakers’ Corners and student unions were also disbanded, before being replaced by more docile and apathetic Student Representative Councils. In this increasingly authoritarian environment, intellectual containment was paramount in creating a politically sterile environment on campus, free from communal and political strife. In retrospect, while the initial intention of introducing the Act aimed to enhance state control over students, subsequent amendments aimed at dismantling the independence and self-governing capacity of the universities themselves (Wan, 2019, p. 9). In essence, government intervention in and encroachment upon the freedoms of expression and academia resulted in a significant loss of autonomy. Such curtailment saw a decline in student-led activism after 1975, as the developmental state model shaped policies in the coming decades. The Third Wave: The Asian Financial Crisis and the Reformasi The two decades leading up to the Asian financial crisis in 1997 were a relatively dormant period for campus politics and student activism, given the threat of detention and repression. However, the Reformasi in 1998 catalysed a renewed sense of optimism and idealism, by playing a crucial role in reigniting the development and role of civil society and civic 3 The political nature of this organisation is clear from the transcript of a speech given by Poh Soo Kai to its members in 1975 (Editor 1975).

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engagement in addressing systemic and structural injustices. The mass support for the movement hinted at wider discontent with corruption, a lack of transparency and gross infringements upon civil liberties, following the derailment of decades of continuous economic growth under the New Economic Policy (NEP) and through government intervention. Affirmative action policies primarily targeting the Bumiputera community proved successful in expanding access to tertiary education, as seen in the remarkable growth of university enrolments: from around 8,500 in 1970, there were nearly 38,000 tertiary students in 1985 (Weiss, 2011, pp. 187–188). As a result, Malaysia experienced nearly a decade of high gross domestic product growth, averaging 8.9 per cent growth between 1988 and 1996, which was attributed to a modernising shift from an agriculture-based to manufacturing-based economy (Ariff & Abubakar, 1999, p. 417). But the Asian financial crisis brought about political repercussions for this neo-mercantilist industrialisation model, where the very visible hand of the government in commanding the economy grew clear. During this period of severe regional economic and political instability, the value of the ringgit fell, with ripple effects for small- and medium-sized enterprises that had borrowed extensively as well as for investor confidence, thus resulting in a negative growth rate in 1998 (Ping & Yean, 2007, p. 917). In Indonesia, rising inflation and a rapidly devaluating rupiah brought about severe economic and social impacts, which manifested in the Reformasi movement that led to the end of Suharto’s New Order. Similar sentiments spilled over into Malaysia (indeed, the name of this movement also travelled) as economic repercussions caused discontent within the ruling United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), thus creating a rift between the deputy prime minister-cum-finance minister, Anwar Ibrahim, and the prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad—this rift may thus be categorised as a clash between reformist and limited democratic political models, respectively. Their dispute played a large role in Anwar’s controversial dismissal from both roles in 1998, signalling the beginning of events that led to the Malaysian Reformasi. Through his association with the Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, which Anwar headed in his youth) and other NGOs which commanded immense grassroots support, tens of thousands of protestors rallied against Mahathirist policies, calling for an end to deep-rooted corruption, cronyism and nepotism (Weiss, 1999, p. 427). This high tide of idealism was aided by support from opposition parties

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such as the Democratic Action Party and Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (the Malaysian Islamic Party), which sparked a quick resurgence in youth activism, especially among the non-Malay population which had become disenfranchised by ethnocentric politics introduced under the NEP. The suppression of individual freedoms under the now-repealed Internal Security Act (ISA) 1960 did little to deter the political opposition and civil society organisations, and Anwar’s controversial arrest on the grounds of sodomy and corruption were widely viewed as being politically motivated and patently unfair. The subsequent arrests of several of his followers and associates in the Reformasi were seen as a heavyhanded attempt to stifle both political freedom and freedom of expression (Lee, 2002, p. 59). The excessiveness of detentions under the ISA during the early 2000s prompted a backlash from student groups. In 2002, four final-year students at Universiti Sains Malaysia were handed a one-semester suspension on the grounds that they had conducted anti-establishment activities (i.e., being involved in an illegal assembly as well as selling and wearing anti-ISA badges and paraphernalia) (Tan, 2002). Such events sparked further discussion on democratisation and institutional reform, particularly among younger generations. A shift in attitudes grew salient throughout the 2010s, arguably mediated by the greater channels of communication enabled by the Internet, and went on to play a major role in numerous movements, including the historic 2018 general election where Malaysia’s first change in government occurred. I argue that this “third wave” of youth activism has persisted into the present, post-pandemic context.

Covid-19 and the “Third Wave” of Youth Activism Context Following the onset of the pandemic and the corresponding political and economic turmoil, there has been a resurgence in youth activism, further empowered by the success of the Undi18 movement. Covid-19 struck Southeast Asian economies when other external deglobalising factors, such as slowing global economic growth and the so-called trade war between the United States and China, resulted in major regional impacts. Malaysia and Thailand, which were heavily integrated into regional supply chains, were affected by the decreased demand for goods. At home, factionalism and internal disagreements resulted in the February 2020

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political coup, a defining event for large numbers of voters, especially youthful ones, who became increasingly disenfranchised with the state of local democracy. Despite political uncertainty, standard operating procedures and lockdowns known as Movement Control Orders (MCOs) were swiftly implemented by the newly formed Perikatan Nasional government, which initially proved effective at containing transmissions, gaining international praise and recognition accordingly. However, its success was quickly undone following the federal decision to proceed with the Sabah state election. Hundreds of politicians and individuals travelled to East Malaysia, and coupled with the movement of voters within Sabah itself, meant that thousands of case clusters subsequently broke out in West Malaysia (Lim et al., 2021, p. 2), thus triggering a detrimental second wave of cases. The proclamation of a state of emergency in early 2021 rolled back democratic institutions even further, but still failed to improve conditions. Such failures compounded the devastating impacts on the livelihoods of thousands, especially among small business owners as well as marginalised and vulnerable groups (e.g., low-income and foreign workers, refugees, the youth). Considering how the youth unemployment rate was already thrice as high as that of older cohorts, the lack of safety nets to safeguard the interests of those in the “Below 40” community and fresh graduates further compounded matters (Research for Social Advancement, 2020, p. 1). A rising unemployment rate had a disproportionate impact on the informal sectors, which were not conducive to remote work, thus exacerbating inequality further, again particularly among the youth. Over the course of the pandemic, several stimulus packages were introduced, amounting close to RM380 billion (USD90 billion) in provisions (Nambiar, 2022).4 These packages were primarily targeted towards lower household income groups as well as vulnerable communities as well as micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises. For young entrepreneurs, the economic stimulus packages were effective as a short-term strategy, which allowed for the deferment of monthly tax payments and loan moratoriums (Lim et al., 2021, p. 5). However, because of heightened instability among fresh graduates, there was an 4 These included the Prihatin Rakyat Economic Stimulus Package (PRIHATIN) and Short-term Economic Recovery Plan (PENJANA), as well as the PERMAI, PERMEKASA and PERMEKASA+ packages, among others. See Chapter Two by Yeo and Oh for a more complete discussion.

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employment boom in the so-called gig economy—the majority of its workers were reportedly young but had failed to secure stable full-time jobs, and although they had some form of employment, they lacked benefits such as medical insurance and retirement funds. Furthermore, because policymakers emphasised job and income protection, these packages did not target specific age groups or sectors. Instead, they inadvertently benefited older and more experienced workers (Aun & Zhang, 2021, p. 10). Overall, the lag in terms of implementing regulatory policies risks putting these marginalised workers into a more vulnerable position in the long run. Having been primed to play a critical role in national development plans, ranging from socioeconomic to political development, the youth grew significantly disillusioned by the government’s subsequent actions and endless politicking. Recent graduates, young professionals and job seekers channelled their discontent with failures in government policies into mobilisation over online platforms, resulting in a sense of widespread discontent towards the ruling government. The government’s shortcomings were clearly seen in terms of its failure to implement effective standard operating procedures and targeted stimulus packages, as well as for rolling back democratic practices. Pandemic, Politicking and Protest: Undi18 and the #Lawan Protest Frustrations among the youth and students resulted in widespread social media campaigns and protests against government inaction and draconian legislation, such as the resurrection of the repealed Fake News Ordinance following the emergency proclamation. Regardless of the new legal provisions, hundreds of activists (including students) still marched in Kuala Lumpur on 31 July 2021, demanding the resignation of the prime minister over his government’s mishandling of the pandemic. These movements were orchestrated alongside social media campaigns highlighting public dissatisfaction, where large groups of nonaligned, youth-centric civil society groups played important organisational roles. These actions are indicative of a wider narrative of youth activism in articulating new ways of engaging with policy matters, regardless of their ideological position. Digital activism and political engagement, particularly among the youth, are key factors in fostering a politically attuned population. As of 2022, Malaysia has one of the highest rates in Internet penetration in

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Southeast Asia, with 91.7 per cent of the population being active social media users.5 This medium was essential for activists during the pandemic, who used it to rally participants for online protests and to organise food baskets for the needy. Platforms such as Instagram and Twitter became highly democratic spaces for deliberation—at least for those with sufficient digital access—where several movements manifested and eventually had major impacts on local political dynamics. The pre-pandemic Undi18 student movement and the #Lawan movement (which demanded Muhyiddin’s resignation) are two recent examples of the effectiveness of online campaigns, suggesting how Internet spaces can collectively constitute a mainstream platform for political discourse and movement. With MCO restrictions shifting public assemblies and activism online, online activism became a keystone for political activism, largely propagated by the youth. This phenomenon can be linked in turn to changes in media usage and consumption, as well as the advent of social media networks. The result is a new dynamic in public discourse, where emergent actors and organisations play larger roles in shifting public perceptions, through which an awareness of violations (e.g., the detentions of activists and rising deaths of minorities in police custody) is further highlighted. It is worth looking at these two movements in turn, starting with Undi18. Beginning as an online student movement in 2016, the end result was the unanimous passing of the historic Constitution Act (Amendment) 2019, popularly known as the “Undi18 Bill”, by the Senate on 16 July 2019, which automatically added millions of new voters between the ages of 18 and 21 to the electoral roll. What began as a campaign to raise political awareness among younger generations ultimately became codified as law, following countless townhall and engagement sessions. The prospect of having millions of new voters resulted in an increase of youth-centric policy dialogue, where this resurgence in youthful idealism was amplified by (online) civic education by youth-centric NGOs aiming to reduce gaps in political literacy and civic education. After all, the capacity for informed decision-making and critical thinking must be developed to reshape political knowledge, prior to the youth joining organisations or participating in democratic practices. Through this extensive network of NGOs with a wide following, key ideas 5 These figures are obtained from Asia Pacific Digital. See the data at the following hyperlink: https://www.asiapacdigital.com/digital-marketing-insight/malaysia-digital-mar keting-2022.

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and information could be disseminated and shared quickly. These organisations proved pivotal in combatting the trend towards deglobalisation and illiberality by increasing civic knowledge and awareness at the grassroots level, especially regarding democratic practices, thus progressively reducing ambiguity about its processes. Presumably, future election results would be potentially skewed by the sudden addition of a new demographic. This prediction can be interpreted as the reason for delays in the bill’s implementation: the Malaysian government postponed its enforcement by a year, citing “practical difficulties” (Lim, 2021), thus triggering a strong backlash from youth NGOs and the wider population. The #ManaUndiKami (Where Is Our Vote) campaign took shape online, translating into a sit-in outside parliament (Adam, 2021). Hundreds of young protestors and a few prominent opposition members of parliament expressed their sympathies, where members of MUDA and NGOs such as Undi18 staged an 18-minute silent protest, while activists from Bersih 2.0 and Demokrat Nasional signalled their solidarity and support. Such mobilisation was an early indication that the youth could potentially have a significant impact on political discourse, where solidarity can manifest in a decisive and potent force for change. Similarly, the #Lawan protest represented another significant milestone, proceeding smoothly despite government warnings and intimidation. Hundreds of youths converged at Dataran Merdeka (Independence Square) to protest the government’s failures during the height of the pandemic in 2021. Increasingly partial attitudes towards activism by student groups had increased over the course of the pandemic, culminating in numerous student unions and NGOs taking to the streets in protest. For context, middle- and lower-income families were struggling to afford basic necessities and a wide social backlash emerged online through the #BenderaPutih campaign, which highlighted the economic vulnerability of disenfranchised groups—as mentioned earlier, many of their members were youths. Over the past decade, there had been little to no increase in entry-level wages although the cost of living had risen disproportionately. Economic factors were already a known powder keg— after all, the introduction of an unpopular goods and services tax in 2015 played a key role in influencing the 2018 general election (Welsh, 2018, p. 102). Socioeconomic disparities only worsened during the pandemic, where the spectre of rising daily cases was coupled with the lack of cohesive policies and containment strategies. The subsequent #BenderaHitam (Black Flag) movement called upon social media users to display a black

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flag across multiple platforms to protest the government’s failures, and the momentum behind this and other online movements culminated in the student-led #Lawan demonstration. On that day, the presence of youthled coalitions of activists from several organisations and NGOs, such as Sekretariat Solidariti Rakyat, was a significant indication of youthful solidary in the face of repressive governance.

Confronting Deglobalisation: A Youth-Centric Approach Over the course of the pandemic, the youth across Southeast Asia and beyond have responded in unique ways, vernacularising their struggles effectively despite growing deglobalisation. From Hong Kong to Thailand, the curtailment of democratic freedoms faced determined resistance from an interconnected generation of youth, whose members were not confined to their respective national political landscapes, but who distinguished themselves as part of a single international community in common solidarity. This section briefly looks beyond Malaysia to contextualise other movements within the broader regional landscape. In Hong Kong, large pre-pandemic protests emerged in response to the erosion of the territory’s temporary judicial and political independence, despite these elements being guaranteed under the Sino-British transfer of sovereignty (Lee et al., 2019). Students played an indispensable role in sustaining and amplifying the 2019 protests, in the light of the proposed Extradition Treaty and Education Policies, which would encroach upon their independence. The protests also highlighted growing animosity towards the Chinese Communist Party’s increasing interference in Hong Kong’s affairs. Since 2003, protest movements had become a regular occurrence—the “Occupy Central” movement in 2014 lasted 79 days, and was one of the largest and most enduring civil disobedience campaigns ever witnessed. The result was an increase in “localism” among younger generations, especially in resisting increasing levels of integration with the mainland (Lee et al., 2019). Often described as being “leaderless”, the decentralised nature of such movements played a key role in keeping the protests alive, significantly aided by platforms such as Telegram. Online protests also coalesced in the #MilkTeaAlliance, which united netizens across Thailand, Taiwan and Hong Kong. This movement was unique because it aroused transnational sentiments and promoted intra-Asian solidarity against growing illiberal and authoritarian

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tendencies—and by extension, the parochial nationalist sentiments engendered by deglobalisation. Through the deployment of social media tactics, the #MilkTeaAlliance became an essential tool for inculcating solidarity among like-minded pro-democracy activists. Drawing inspiration from their counterparts in Hong Kong, young Thais took to the streets during the pandemic, in opposition to the military junta and in defiance of Thailand’s own state of emergency decree. The return of student protests challenged Thailand’s authoritarian political structure and sought a new constitution, this time with a noticeable feature—a broader reform of the monarchy, the lynchpin of the nation’s distribution of power and wealth (Dedman & Lai, 2021, p. 119). Social and political unrest, rooted in the structural economic inequalities exacerbated by the pandemic, led to months of anti-government demonstrations by reform-oriented, pro-democracy student and civil society groups (Strangio, 2020). The economic strain of the pandemic enabled the voicing of previously taboo discourses, thus constituting a major challenge to the Thai political establishment. Student protests have helped create a more permissive environment, thus enabling a plethora of opinions and criticism to emerge. Serious economic problems tied to weak leadership have led to increased resentment with institutions and political elites, thus strengthening the protesters’ belief that sovereignty should be vested in the common people.

Conclusion The recent regional rollback in democratic norms has become clear, even with entrenched globalisation and Internet penetration. The development of political grassroots movements and the return of open political discourse to universities may yet play a greater role in keeping conservatism and authoritarianism at bay, although this is by no means a guarantee given the capacity of right-wing elements to mobilise accordingly. Therefore, confronting post-pandemic deglobalisation entails creating a system of governance that can accommodate the aspirations and desires of younger generations while resisting the trend towards political “monopoly and monotony” brought about by Malaysia’s persistent coalition politics: a system which tends to resist radical change (Ooi, 2022). It is imperative to realise the political significance of the youth and their demands in helping to bring about meaningful engagement and policy

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change, especially in the economy and its underlying sociopolitical conditions, while still recognising that “Malaysian politics is fragmented partly because the society itself is divided” (ibid.). In this dynamic, youth engagement is crucial. Future governments must ensure that their considerations are accounted for in assessing the impacts of planned actions, legislation, policies or programmes. As a result, the younger generation must also be prepared to play a more active role in enabling better governance and steering away from deglobalising tendencies. Economic growth and development must be balanced against the need to reduce inequality and human rights violations. Therefore, the key point here is the need to move towards equitable growth and sustainability in order to deliver distributive justice, along with truly democratic representation at all levels of decision-making (as opposed to top-down consultations with selected informants or participants). A combination of youth-led development and mainstreaming strategies can only begin when they are given fair representation and opportunities to be involved in discourse and praxis. Although the lowering of the minimum voting age from 21 to 18 is a step in the right direction, more emphasis on leadership development is still needed, besides the need to build a cohesive civic education blueprint to instil the values of democracy and freedom of speech at the level of the school curricula. Thus, there is a need for political institutions to promote youth-orientated engagement, in a transition away from traditional, hierarchical structures and towards promoting inclusive platforms. Doing so encourages the involvement of younger generations and enshrines greater civic liberties by revisiting legislation such as the Universities and University Colleges Act. With the renewed wave of local activism, it is clear that youth influence will keep growing, perhaps exceeding its heights in the 1960–1970s, with new youth leaders and organisations paving the way to restoring youth-led activism within mainstream politics. Such trends are already in motion. The empowered “Undi18 generation” is already exercising its newly acquired constitutional rights, if the Johor state election of 2022 is any indication. MUDA’s electoral debut witnessed its first assemblywoman being elected to the Puteri Wangsa constituency, even while its other candidates fell short in three other contested seats. The influx of youthful voters prompted political parties from across the divide to field their own younger candidates, thus resulting in a significantly lower median age (i.e., below 30) of candidates. If this episode is indicative of future trends going into future elections,

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then political parties must realise the potential contributions of younger candidates and their ability to amplify the opinions and frustrations of an underrepresented and marginalised generation. Perhaps this has already been understood by existing coalitions, if we consider how MUDA’s relative success was enabled by both its “electoral pact with PH [Pakatan Harapan] and [its] own ability to attract and excite new voters” (ibid.). However, it is important to remember that the youth electorate is not one homogenous entity but is also split along socioeconomic divides. In today’s globalised society, political polarisation has been attributed to growing inequality, and Malaysia is no exception. Growing disenchantment with governments and rising economic marginalisation can mainstream populism, extreme policies and conservative rhetoric in political discourse. Regardless of the complications at play, I argue that the younger generation may potentially act as a new third force, acting as an additional check-and-balance, thus altering the political equilibrium for the foreseeable future. Only then will the political landscape encompass a more inclusive and reflective policy discourse and debate, thus ensuring that the aspirations and visions of future generations are accounted for and safeguarded.

References Adam, A. (2021, March 27). “Where is our vote?” Youths sit for 18 minutes in front of Parliament to protest the delay of Undi18. Malay Mail. Aun, L. H., & Zhang, K. (2021). The Covid-19 recession: Rough times for young Malaysians. ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. Ariff, M., & Abubakar, S. Y. (1999). The Malaysian financial crisis: Economic impact and recovery prospects. The Developing Economies, 36(4), 417–438. Dedman, A. K., & Lai, A. (2021). Digitally dismantling Asian authoritarianism. Contention, 9(1), 97–132. Editor. (1975). Dr Poh Soo Kai speaks at FUEMSSO. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 5(2), 265–268. https://doi.org/10.1080/00472337508566949 Lee, T. (2002, July). Malaysia and internal security act: The insecurity of human rights after September 11. Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, 56–72. Lee, F. L. F., Yuen, S., Tang, G., & Cheng, E. W. (2019). Hong Kong’s summer of uprising: From anti-extradition to anti-authoritarian protests. China Review, 19(4), 1–32. Lim, I. (2021, July 27). Undi18’s 2022 delay: Judge questions why govt only now citing MCO, ‘practical difficulties’ when Constitution amended in 2019. Malay Mail.

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Lim, J. T., Maung, K., Tan, S. T., Ong, S. E., Lim, J. M., & Koo, J. R. (2021). Estimating direct and spill-over impacts of political elections on Covid19 transmission using synthetic control methods. PLOS Computational Biology, 17 (5). Loh, L. E., Lim, C. T., & Seng, G.-Q. (2012). The University Socialist Club and the contest for Malaya: Tangled strands of modernity. Amsterdam University Press. Nambiar, S. (2022, February 9). Malaysia’s big budget belies year of COVID-19 brutality. East Asia Forum. Ooi, K.-H. (2022, November 1). Monopoly and monotony of political representation in Malaysia. New Naratif. https://newnaratif.com/monopoly-and-mon otony-in-malaysia/. Ping, L. P., & Yean, T. S. (2007). Malaysia ten years after the Asian financial crisis. Asian Survey, 47 (6), 915–929. Quah, S. R. (2020). Imaging Malaya, practising multiculturalism: The Malayan consciousness of Singaporean Chinese intellectuals in the 1950s. In Y. X. Show & G. P. Ngoi (Eds.), Revisiting Malaya: Uncovering historical and political thoughts in Nusantara (pp. 159–184). SIRD. Research for Social Advancement. (2020, December). The impact of COVID-19 on the youth in Malaysia: A survey report. REFSA Brief, 12. https://refsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Youth-Survey-ReportREFSA-Brief-Issue-12.pdf Strangio, S. (2020, October 19). Defying state of emergency, Thailand student protests roll onward. The Diplomat. Tan, K. (2002, January 31). USM students suspended for anti-establishment acts. Malaysiakini. Wan, C. D. (2019). The universities and University College Act in Malaysia: History, Context & Development. Kajian Malaysia, 37 (2), 1–20. Weiss, M. L. (1999). What will become of reformasi? Ethnicity and changing political norms in Malaysia. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 21(3), 424–450. Weiss, M. L. (2005). Protest and possibility: Civil society and coalitions for political change in Malaysia. Stanford University Press. Weiss, M. L. (2011). Student activism in Malaysia: Crucible, Mirror, Sideshow. Southeast Asia Program Publications. Welsh, B. (2018). “Saviour” Politics and Malaysia’s 2018 Electoral Democratic Breakthrough: Rethinking Explanatory Narratives and Implications. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 37 (3), 85–108. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 186810341803700305

Deglobalisation’s Biopolitical Implications for Malaysians

Bio-constitutionalism, Power Relations and Endemic Inequalities: Implications of the Commodification of the Right to Health in a Deglobalising Malaysia Pin Lean Lau

Introduction Over the last three decades, especially since the late 1990s to early 2000s, hitherto unseen biomedical technological development has become temporally intertwined with the emergence of global bio-capitalism and potential improvements to human quality of life. As such, the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic may provide room for analysis, given that key global biomedical players recently developed, manufactured and distributed vaccines at significant scope and speed: an achievement further mediated by the digital age’s technologies. However, existing and novel concerns emerged for legislators, policymakers, market stakeholders and ordinary citizens themselves. Given that security and safety are of paramount concern, this chapter posits that a fundamental alteration in Malaysia’s dominant position in Southeast Asia has occurred, although this remains in an early stage of development.

P. L. Lau (B) Brunel Law School, Brunel University London, Greater London, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. Ying Hooi et al. (eds.), Social and Political Deglobalisation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6823-7_5

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Here, the simultaneous emergence of populism and a modified form of democracy (Sajó & Tuovinen, 2018) echoes similar developments in the former Eastern Bloc, coupled with neoliberal underpinnings (Barry et al., 1996) which have thus far proven damaging at both national and interpersonal levels. While Malaysia’s existing political situation had long attracted criticism, the local onset of Covid-19 demonstrates that the ruling government lacked not just leadership but also empathy for its citizens. Before the imposition of lockdowns, known locally as movement control orders (MCOs), and a state of emergency, a turning point in the local political narrative had already emerged—i.e., a modified democracy in the form of a “back-door government” under Muhyiddin Yassin of the Perikatan Nasional coalition—which coincided with Covid-19’s declaration as a pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO) (Kurlantzick, 2020; WHO, 2020). This supposedly democratic government (Head, 2020) was largely tolerated because of the pandemic’s urgency, although much less visible was its quick alteration of how fundamental rights are exercised (Shitindo, 2020) as well as the sanctity and supremacy of the Federal Constitution itself. Ultimately, this government was short-lived, and by August 2021, Ismail Sabri Yaakob of Barisan Nasional took over the political leadership (Deutsche Welle, 2021). But its temporal overlap with the pandemic resulted in not only one of Malaysia’s most significant constitutional crises but also the erosion of a key fundamental liberty: the right to health. Even though the Constitution does not specifically define such a right, Part II has been interpreted and widely accepted as such (Islam, 2013). This interpretation is buttressed by Malaysia’s accession to international instruments relating to the right to health, as well as numerous pieces of legislation addressing various aspects of healthcare. While there may be legitimate “state[s] of exception” (Agamben, 2005)—e.g., some fundamental rights may be held in abeyance or the rule of law may be circumvented in the name of protecting public interests—the discourse surrounding this right is all the more compelling given Covid-19’s onset. The fumbling policies of the government resulted in more hardships for citizens and the curtailment of this right, but more concern was directed towards the question of which political party should wield governmental power. The provision of reparations and aid was a secondary priority, introduced to prevent further domestic deterioration. This displacement of the rule of law indirectly forced Malaysia’s constitutional sphere into

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retreat through a bio-constitutional shift, thus triggering a vicious cycle of eroding rights. Hence, this chapter studies Covid-19’s transformative effects at the constitutional level, i.e., through the renegotiation of individual rights to health, by suggesting how bio-constitutionalism and commodification theory can be applied as frameworks for understanding the pandemic’s effects, hence necessitating a renewed dialogue on the nature of constitutional rule of law and democracy in Malaysia. It posits that the pandemic has highlighted the commodification of the right to health, which amplified systemic inequalities in terms of healthcare and other rights. This state of affairs is intertwined and consistent with the narratives and characteristics of deglobalisation.

Understanding (Il)liberal Democracies Before proceeding, we first need to make some political considerations. The concept of an illiberal democracy has a recent history. First introduced by Fareez Zakaria (1997), the rise of such democracies has been difficult to explain. Perhaps it is best to begin by defining a liberal democracy. [A] political system marked not only by free and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion and property. (p. 22)

Meanwhile, the concept of an illiberal democracy became infamously associated with Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orban, who “emphatically and unequivocally expressed his support for illiberal democracy” in 2018 (Plattner, 2019). A succinct account of this term, as intertwined with populism, is as follows. In the ensuing years, especially with the global surge of populism, […] an outlook that emphatically claims to be democratic and that relies for its legitimacy on elections as expressions of the popular will. Yet when populists come to power, they tend to infringe upon the rule of law, the independence of the courts and the media, and the rights of individuals and minorities, as has been the case in Hungary. Moreover, these illiberal aspects of populism had begun to surface not just in countries lacking a liberal tradition but even in longstanding Western democracies. (p. 10)

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In Malaysia, the so-called Sheraton Move, which gained this moniker because of the meetings held in a branch of the Sheraton Hotel by several factions of the then-opposition government, may thus have to be reconsidered (Bowie, 2021), even if a new government has since been elected. Suppose that this move can be regarded as a constitutionally legitimate coup d’état—after all, all the lawmakers involved had been popularly elected and their government had been sanctioned by the king—we can ask several questions. What does this say about constitutional integrity? What does this imply for the rule of law and democracy? Was this a constitutional watershed moment that requires revisiting the constitutional framework itself? These questions remain unanswered. Coupled with Covid-19-related events, I argue that these provided the impetus for a bio-constitutional shift. While the term “illiberal democracy” may be too harsh a label here, its underlying characteristics may apply in our discussion, given that several aspects of governance are not significantly different from cases elsewhere, as seen in the widening cracks in Malaysia’s fundamental regulatory systems. Failures in democratic governance (Amnesty International, 2021), questionable access to distributive and substantive justice in healthcare (Dzulkifly, 2021) and the neglect of general welfare have contributed to growing public dissatisfaction. Any possible answers that may emerge through constitutional or regulatory frameworks of protection are often inadequate, while lacking uniformity, consensus, detail and coherence. Further, the suspension of Parliament through emergency rule (Al Jazeera 2021) arguably impinges upon the reasonable exercise and pursuit of individual human rights in accordance with the Constitution (Human Rights Watch, 2021). These destabilising events and considerations form the backdrop of my argument.

Bio-constitutionalism and Commodification Bio-constitutionalism provides a crucial framework for ascertaining: (1) how constitutional law precepts have shifted during the pandemic; (2) how commodification theory, focusing on the right to health, has facilitated this shift; and (3) the resulting implications for human rights, particularly this right to health, and endemic economic inequalities. Bioconstitutionalism can be understood as a theory of constitutional law which analyses the relationship between constitutional frameworks and technologies, and which first gained prominence through science and technology studies. It is interested in defining and classifying “rights

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and loci of decision-making power” (Krajewska, 2013, p. 3) and can “include a full range of sites and processes in which individuals work out their biopolitical relationships with the institutions that regulate them” (Jasanoff, 2011), which “extends beyond the amendments and interpretations of legal texts to include constitutional practices and “constitutional moments ” which radically restructure state–society relations” (Krajewska, 2013, p. 3, emphasis mine). Thus defined, bio-constitutionalism suggests a key linkage between two general fields: (1) technologies and life sciences as well as (2) the law and government. Because the first field may disrupt human living conditions in myriad ways, individuals are required to adapt accordingly, in ways which may affect their constitutional and individual human rights. Although the pandemic may not be conventionally categorised under this field, its onset has necessitated that individuals work out how they can exercise such rights, accounting for both (interlinked) political disturbances and a lack of strong governance. Commodification theory suggests another framework for understanding how bio-constitutionalism in Malaysia has been affected. Generally concerned with “the process of converting human, social or cultural value into market value”, where such entities previously “do not initially possess a market value” (RICHES Project, 2014), commodification can be understood in the context of this chapter as the “reorganisation of our personal lives and relationships on the model of market relation[s]” (Davis, 2003). In short, there is now a need to exercise a system prioritising the value of our bodies in the capitalist market (Maloney, 2015). Marx refers to the “fetishism of commodities” (2020), which emerges “when [a] product enters the market as a commodity, [and] it is transformed into something transcendent, and its value is determined by market relations” (Chorbajian, 2020, p. 28). Precisely such a transformation occurred during Covid-19’s onset, with regard to one’s right to health. By understanding how bio-constitutionalism operates in practice, the pandemic reveals deep crises in terms of the social, economic and health inequities created by the entrenchment of neoliberalism. The neoliberalism which was only nascent 25 years ago, now dominates global decision-making, manifesting in reduced health spending for all countries (including under austerity) and the growing deregulation, privatisation, and commodification of health care like other social sectors. (Forman, 2020)

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The commodification of healthcare is certainly not a new phenomenon, and Malaysia’s healthcare system includes both public and private schemes (Barraclough, 2000). The effect of semi-privatisation is to deepen and exacerbate the rifts between those who can afford private services and those who rely on government-funded ones. Those who can afford to financially participate in this market process, as a function of their socioeconomic class, are likelier to better maintain their personal health. The less fortunate lack this opportunity, and inequalities marginalise those living in society’s excluded, “dead spaces”, as per Mbembe’s (2019) conception of necropolitics. The effects are particularly salient regarding the commoditisation of vaccines and the limitation of movements within certain demarcations under the MCO restrictions. In essence, the ways in which healthcare services are designed, acquired and used are embedded in existing power structures and dynamics that disadvantage certain groups—in this equation, not only people and communities must be considered, but also their networks and localities. Despite the teleological aim of technological developments to improve the quality of human life and living, this goal is far from the reality.

Legal Considerations In this section, two key legal areas that can contribute to arguments on deglobalisation in Malaysia are discussed. Before proceeding, I will introduce a few key categories that are often discussed in the local economic discourse. Three key income groups have been identified, namely the so-called T20, M40 and B40 income groups, which refer to the “Top 20”, “Middle 40” and “Below 40” communities, respectively, subdivided based on their relative financial wealth (Shah, 2021). These indicators are measured in accordance with the Gini coefficient index (International Labour Office, 2016). The first area addresses Covid-19’s transformative effect on bioconstitutionalism and its implications for human rights, as seen in the commodification of the right to health (and more broadly, the human self). Bio-constitutionalism arguably unfolded in the exercise and operation of individual rights. Transformed into “bio-political bodies” (Foucault & Gordon, 1980), citizens are subject to the commodification of such rights, taking into consideration not just power relations between the state and individuals, but also how the state of their fundamental rights is itself altered.

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The second area extends this alteration of fundamental rights into economic inequalities, specifically the lived experiences of members of the B40 tier and their subsequent (in)ability to exercise their right to health. While this sub-section is primarily formulated as an economic analysis, it is by highlighting the disparities between different income groups that I can draw attention towards how Covid-19 weakened the exercise of human rights. When these key legal areas are viewed holistically, the ensuing consequences (which may or may not lead to deglobalisation) become more apparent. Key Area 1: Bio-constitutionalism and Commodification The emergence of bio-constitutionalism in Malaysia should not come as a surprise. According to Jasanoff (2011), it is possible for certain key constitutional moments to alter state–society relations, where the centrality of the term “bio” here specifically denotes the intersection between the law, the sciences and the body (i.e., pandemic governance, in our case). Such moments, as championed by scholars such as Bruce Ackerman, acknowledge that history is often the bridge between constitutional textuality and its reality or practice (McConnell, 1994). Hence, this chapter pivots on several key constitutional moments, namely the Sheraton Move and the pandemic’s onset, and overall pandemic governance, which have collectively functioned to alter the operation of constitutional law. Here is one such example. A succession of MCOs was imposed by the federal government beginning March 2020 and only ended in December 2021. The restrictions applied in each phase were adjusted in accordance with the number of reported Covid-19 cases. While these MCOs were initially welcomed as part of the government’s measures to ensure public safety by cutting transmission rates within communities, public perception and faith in the ruling government would subsequently dwindle (Kurlantzick, 2021). Malaysia initially handled the onset of the pandemic admirably through early interventions, stringent lockdowns and robust emergency preparedness (Ratcliffe, 2020), with successes popularly attributed to the Ministry of Health and its director-general, Noor Hisham Abdullah, who showed high standards of professionalism and knowledge, thus leading many to regard him as a national hero (Arumugam, 2020). However, as political infighting continued, the government’s ability to control outbreaks weakened, and inconsistencies in pandemic governance emerged. Most notable was a lack of clarity

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over specific MCO restrictions (Aziz, 2021) or the standard operating procedures applying to certain businesses and industries, both of which negatively compounded health and economic conditions (Mark et al., 2021). It may not be possible to pinpoint the exact moment when the formerly tenacious rule of law began to wither, but I suggest that this is likely correlated with the beginning of a shift in the fraught constitutional framework. If we were able to find such a correlation, it would then align with the theory of constitutional moments. Does this mean that we must also now question the veracity of our Constitution’s textuality and the legitimacy of the Sheraton Move? Theorists of constitutional moments generally accept that a constitution can be amended “without any actual changes to the text”, a paradoxical dynamic that “makes it difficult to know precisely what changes in the constitutional regime have been made” (McConnell, 1994, p. 117). I suggest the following provocation: is it possible to read the Constitution as having been “amended” in some way through such constitutional moments? Another vexing aspect concerns the right to health, especially when the pandemic has crucial implications for when law meets the nexus of life and death (Hurlbut et al., 2020), thus prompting the need for self-preservation through not just the “commodification of self” (Davis, 2003) but indeed, living itself. Commodification theory suggests that based on their positionalities within social communities, Malaysians appear to be indirectly assigned their respective “economic value[s]” (RICHES Project, 2014). Even though people are not traded like common goods per se, the implication that privilege or oppression is socially situated is enough to suggest its applicability here. Thus, I argue that the pandemic appears to have brought to light a new recognition that the right to health has been commodified. For example, when the government announced that citizens living in Selangor and Kuala Lumpur—i.e., the most populous and economically important parts of the country—could voluntarily opt-in and register for AstraZeneca vaccines (Gangadaran, 2021), in a limited precursor to the national vaccination rollout, this move produced a desperate rush of potential registrants. The national contact tracing and vaccination registration application, MySejahtera, experienced technical difficulties; frustration and complaints appeared on various social media platforms, with users being dismayed, angry and frustrated at their inability to register accordingly (Povera & Arumugam, 2021). Although this was a

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reasonable plan in theory, in practice, its execution effectively excluded residents of other states. On one level, the exercise of the right to health is spatially encoded. Taking this analysis of disparity one step further, did all persons in Selangor and Kuala Lumpur actually have the opportunity to register their interest? Doing so is predicated upon seemingly quotidian considerations, e.g., owning either a smartphone or computer and having internet access. This is to say that technology mediates one’s opportunity to exercise their right to health. Further, a minority of vaccinations allegedly involved empty syringes (Zolkepli, 2021), although whether or not this was malicious or the result of human error does not deny the realworld effects—e.g., the health minister was forced to deny unfounded conspiracies that these incidents were linked to sales on the black market (The Star, 2021). Thus, the mere existence of these theories and their mass circulation is symptomatic of a public fear that one’s right to health can be unduly compromised and commodified. Such commodification requires renegotiations of political and economic freedoms, with the aim of: (1) determining one’s individual “value” on the market; (2) prioritising and declaring one’s right to health over another’s; and (3) enabling privileged access to, for example, earlier vaccination rollouts and medical treatment in hospitals (Chan & Perimbanayagam, 2021). This is not to mention more everyday concerns, including but not limited to gaining access to shops to buy necessities or earning the questionable “luxury” of working from home while not losing employment. Such commodification penetrates the core of legal, regulatory, administrative and general state governance, manifesting as a new kind of social order. This emergent state of affairs forces individuals to work out their new bio-political relationships with the state. As a result, individuals embody and embed commodification through their access to vaccines, economic displacement or ability to reunite with family and loved ones across MCO district borders. I suggest a radical interpretation here: such wilful commoditisation occurs within the control and scope of governance and political systems, and once these are interlocked with the (in)ability to exercise fundamental rights, they may grow serious enough to straddle the borders of Mbembe’s “dead spaces”. As a more radical version of Foucauldian biopolitics (Foucault & Gordon, 1980), the “political making of spaces and subjectivities in an in-between of life and death” occurs (Mbembe, 2019, p. 37). And in such a space—Covid-19, in our case—a person may die,

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[…] because of a set of other people’s decisions […] about the pricing of drugs, patent laws, economic policy, national priorities, and international sanctions. These had structured [their] environment in a way that made it impossible for them to survive. (Wolff, 2012, p. 11)

Paul Farmer’s seminal work, Pathologies of Power, refers to such a phenomenon as “structural violence” (Farmer, 2003). Even though we may not be able to attribute the deaths of citizens to Covid-19 to any visible violence inflicted by the state, the modification of Malaysia’s lived democracy through unwritten amendments and further aggravated by commodification may further detract from international norms of recognised human rights, thus further entrenching the deglobalisation process. Key Area 2: Economic Inequalities Building on the argument that the commodification of the right to health and a shift in bio-political relationships would affect all Malaysians at some level, a facile conclusion would be that all such suffering is equal. But this is not the case. How do existing economic inequalities affect the lived experience of such dynamics? Commodifying the right to health poses a more serious problem when we consider such endemic inequalities (Lee & Choong, 2020), wherein the consequences of commodification extend societal and economic disparities. Piketty (2015) interrogates how societies justify such inequities, attributing these to the persistence of particular political and property regimes, a lack of will to challenge this “quasi-sacralization” of related rights and the eventual “unjust disparities in income, wealth and political power” (Kaiser-Schatzlein, 2020). Previously, I briefly traced Malaysia’s relativist approach to domestic and international human rights (Lau, 2019, pp. 263–266), but the vestiges of inequalities are much more complex—indeed, these are never just vestiges. While much scholarship attributes them to ethnic differences (Ravallion, 2020), I move away from this contentious issue to instead focus on how economic inequalities (i.e., as measured by income) have been magnified by the pandemic, which by extension affect the aims of social and distributive justice, as connected to the right to health. Despite the Malaysian government’s efforts to minimise the financial and economic impact of Covid-19, ranging from setting up a special Covid-19 fund for patients affected by quarantine procedures, providing

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further funding for the Ministry of Health as well as economic stimulus packages for individuals and businesses (Shah et al., 2020, pp. 111– 112), these still constituted stopgap measures. Note that the pandemic inflicted particular difficulties upon and contributed to increased poverty rates among members of the B40 community as well as small and local businesses (Rahman, 2020, p. 1). These extended to B40 access (or lack thereof) to effective communication and connectivity, with implications for infrastructural access to healthcare. The AstraZeneca case reflects (mostly) urban desperation, but there is little indication of whether or not B40 citizens are similarly able to access such initiatives as their more affluent counterparts. There is little data on whether or not such a lack is a function of their economic conditions, digital literacy, network connectivity and smart devices or rurality, among other factors. A report from the International Labour Organization provides detailed analyses of Covid-19’s domestic socioeconomic impact, suggesting a particularly negative impact for this community (Lim, 2020, p. 104). Economic stimulus packages remain insufficient, while unemployment and poverty continue to the point that many families can no longer support themselves. Another report commissioned by the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (2021) reveals that many urban, low-income households living in Kuala Lumpur could not afford proper sustenance and resorted to cheap vegetables and instant noodles, thus suggesting that the “loss of or reduced income requires behavioural modification including in food access and prudent spending on food” (p. 11). It should be no surprise that the #BenderaPutih (White Flag) campaign was established at the community level, where lower-income families experiencing distress during lockdowns could fly a white flag as a plea for help from neighbours or volunteers, for instance (BBC, 2021). This spirit of volunteerism was notable and was seen elsewhere among volunteers in vaccination centres (Ladisma & Said, 2021) or during the early stages of the pandemic in the production of personal protective equipment for hospital staff and frontline workers (Tariq, 2020) or outreach to rural outposts (Grunebaum, 2020). While this sense of community is commendable, it is simultaneously indicative of the government’s inability to provide aid at a systemic and structural level. If a majority of the B40 community has been pushed headlong into extreme poverty and deprivation, how can its members be expected to exercise their rights to health, access vaccinations and generally protect themselves from the pandemic’s further complications? In Amartya Sen’s

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foreword to Farmer’s book, he writes about the asymmetry of power and how it can generate “a kind of quiet brutality” (Farmer, 2003, p. xvi). Despite positive progress in its national vaccination programme and recovery plan (Tan, 2021), manifested in the promise of robust recovery under the National Recovery Plan even before the MCOs formally ended (Povera & Yusof, 2021; Zahid, 2021), there remains uncertainty about these outcomes in the year since. In terms of income and economic disparities, other studies remind us that during the pandemic, “the highest income group took the opportunity to invest in the financial market” while those adversely affected instead “used the money to pay the necessary bills” (Shah, 2021). Economic realities as well as class and racial divisions within society create “newly regularised social relations” (Bratton, 2021, p. 133), where such disparities are rife. In order for the economy to stabilise, a collective approach is needed. Governments need to support and trust the actions of their public health authorities while assisting groups such as the B40 community, who engage in their own biopolitics with the state (p. 11).

Conclusion: Transitioning Away from Deglobalisation? Given these considerations, I argue that the pandemic has generally contributed towards the deglobalisation process in Malaysia, in line with a general trend elsewhere (Irwin, 2020). Countries enforced international border restrictions, thus interrupting the pre-pandemic flow of business, goods, capital and workers—these effects extended to the world’s major economies, which also experienced massive economic burdens (Barua, 2020). Other risks emerged as well, and Bratton argues that, [t]he anarchic state of international politics in which nations close from one another and compete for resources such as data or vaccines—when it needn’t be a zero-sum game—is both unnecessary and dangerously uncoordinated. (Bratton, 2021, p. 13)

In the case of Malaysia, it is therefore necessary to acutely reflect upon its post-pandemic politics:

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[…] both in terms of how the state interacts with society as well as in terms of how a human society that is utterly planetary in scope knows itself, models itself and attempts to compose, organise and care for itself through various mechanisms. (p. 12)

Considered in these terms, deglobalisation can be additionally debilitating, especially when we consider Malaysia’s polarising stance on the international stage. Consider its non-signing and non-ratification of a key international instrument, the International Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Bon, 2015), particularly when neighbouring countries such as Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines have done so. The key provisions that are pertinent to the pandemic include, among others, ensuring that individuals have an adequate standard of living, with sufficient food, clothing and housing, as well as the maintenance of physical and mental health to the highest attainable standard (see Articles 11 and 12, respectively). Accession to human rights covenants or legislation at an international level may be the critical nudge needed for Malaysia’s recovery, perhaps even serving as a turning point away from further deglobalisation. Legal frameworks must not be limited to translation, but must also be vernacularised based on the conditions on the ground (Bon & Wong, 2023). However, this is only one aspect in a series of necessary events towards reforms in political and socioeconomic governance. Malaysia’s new government needs to reflect upon and implement serious action in engaging in post-pandemic politics, i.e., by being inclusive, unified, restorative and rational, where sloganeering (i.e., “Malaysia Madani”) needs to manifest in concrete policy. While it is easy to presume that biopolitical power relationships do not exist between individuals and the state because “they are difficult and disturbing”, this is simply “another way of allowing biopower to be exercised without accountability” (Bratton, 2021, p. 17). At this juncture, it is worth recalling that the United Nations Development Programme calls upon nation-states to “dramatically overhaul policies and invest in public health, economic stimulus, and social safety nets, to help countries recover faster from the Covid-19 pandemic” (2020). Indeed, “redressing inequality between groups, including ethnicity and gender, will require continual, and more systematic, policy responses” (Lee & Choong, 2020). But the heart of the matter is that Malaysia has long neglected the causes and effects of structural violence on its

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own peoples. Under its newly elected government, Malaysia must reaffirm the centrality of human rights and avoid descending into full-scale deglobalisation. What is needed is to critically review power relations and connections to truly understand and prevent suffering—whether by Covid-19 or other crises—as intertwined with the social and economic rights of its peoples.

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Tan, W. L. (2021, September 21). Covid-19: National recovery plan regulations amended—Coronavirus (COVID-19)—Malaysia. Mondaq. https://www. mondaq.com/operational-impacts-and-strategy/1113268/covid-19-nationalrecovery-plan-regulations-amended Tariq, Q. (2020, April 20). Covid-19: Volunteers coming together across Malaysia to produce PPE for frontliners. The Star. https://www.thestar.com. my/tech/tech-news/2020/04/20/covid-19-volunteers-coming-together-acr oss-malaysia-to-produce-ppe-for-frontliners The Star. (2021, July 23). Empty syringe case was due to human error, not linked to black market, says Dr Adham. https://www.thestar.com.my/news/ nation/2021/07/23/dr-adham-empty-syringe-case-was-due-to-human-error United Nations Development Programme. (2020). Position note: The social and economic impact on Covid-19 in the Asia-Pacific region. United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund. (2021). Families on the Edge (Issue 4). WHO. (2020, March 11). WHO Director-General’s opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19. https://www.who.int/director-general/spe eches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefingon-covid-19---11-march-2020 Wolff, J. (2012). The human right to health. W. W. Norton. Zahid, S.J. (2021, June 16). Citing lack of clarity, business coalition says unconvinced by National Recovery Plan. The Malay Mail. https://www.mal aymail.com/news/malaysia/2021/06/16/citing-lack-of-clarity-business-coa lition-says-unconvinced-by-national-reco/1982596 Zakaria, F. (1997). The rise of illiberal democracy. Foreign Affairs, 76(6), 22–43. Zolkepli, F. (2021, July 23). Bukit Aman say 13 reports so far on empty syringe vaccinations. The Star. https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2021/ 07/23/bukit-aman-say-13-reports-so-far-on-empty-syringe-vaccinations

Labour Issues in Malaysia Amidst Deglobalisation Sheila Devi Michael

Introduction The onset of the Covid-19 pandemic temporarily slowed the pace of globalisation (Faiola, 2020), thus disrupting much-integrated, interconnected and interdependent international supply chains, which had been growing significantly since the 1980s. In general, globalisation is synonymous with economic growth, thus necessitating a labour force for the development process—after all, such globalisation, regardless of its net economic growth and impact, is facilitated by neoliberal policies. Thus, the swift movements of trade, capital, labour, people, technology, information and communication between countries have largely benefited various national economies for decades (Rodrik, 2011), although it is important to note that this process also facilitates and perpetuates significant negative practices—specifically, this chapter will focus on how these play out in migrant labour. Using such labour as a lens through which we can understand globalisation, specifically in its Malaysian context, it becomes easier to understand how the demand for foreign labour has become increasingly important for the maintenance of economic development, which means

S. D. Michael (B) Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. Ying Hooi et al. (eds.), Social and Political Deglobalisation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6823-7_6

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that a race to the bottom in terms of labour rights and conditions is necessary for the maintenance of the neoliberal economic order (Friedman, 2007). Economic globalisation has led to job opportunities that can influence the dynamics of the labour market (Das & Ray, 2020; Mushtaq et al., 2022) by encouraging people to leave their homes for income. Concurrently, multinational corporations are among the actors complicit in this system, where they offer employment opportunities to promote and facilitate the free movement of products and services across borders. In Malaysia, such labourers—who primarily hail from poorer and (more slowly) developing countries within the region, and sometimes from outside it (such as those from South Asian countries)—are needed in practically every significant industrial sector which the local population shies away from, most significantly in heavy industry, plantations and construction. In short, it is not just developed states but also their quickly developing counterparts, which stand to gain immensely from this process, thus suggesting that we view this form of globalisation as a double-edged sword (Hoyt & Brooks, 2003). As much as states and populations benefit hugely through material development at the level of the nation-state, this gain has its costs, for example, the impacts on the overall global economy and environment, human well-being and the escalation of transborder criminal activity (Roccu & Talani, 2019). Further, another result may be an institutionalised dependence on foreign remittances at the expense of significant domestic economic development, such as in the case of the Philippines (Marasigan, 2022). Therefore, many critics predominantly urge states to slow down the pace of globalisation to circumvent its negative human and ecological consequences. It is imperative for us to acknowledge that a reverse trend seems to be taking hold—the pandemic has accelerated an ongoing deglobalisation process (Irwin, 2020), where the uncertainties outlined above have already compelled state and non-state actors to decelerate the rapid pace of development (James, 2017; Kim et al., 2020). Kim et al. (2020) have observed that deglobalisation is characterised by the reduction of interdependence and integration on a global scale, particularly between different countries. Indeed, the fast-paced and large-scale movements of people across borders, whether for work or tourism, escalated Covid-19 into a pandemic. The crisis forced national governments to limit the flow of people entering and leaving their respective countries by limiting or closing international borders, and when this proved to be an insufficient measure, many implemented lockdowns with varying degrees of severity.

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But the speed of such deglobalisation has caused global economic growth to slow down significantly, leading to reassessments of political, economic and social affairs at domestic levels, consequently worsening the dilemmas foreign workers face globally. Notably, the long-standing exploitation of less-skilled foreign workers persists despite the onset of deglobalisation and the pandemic (Slaughter & Swagel, 1997; Wahab, 2020). Malaysia was among the first countries to immediately implement lockdowns, known locally as movement control orders (MCOs), which were exercised with differing degrees of severity. Starting from March 2020, their enforcement resulted in uncertainties regarding human rights issues, and in particular, their impacts on foreign workers triggered serious labour disturbances. According to Mohd Juraij (2022), the slowdown in terms of globalisation could reduce cooperation and integration between Malaysia and international and regional organisations (such as the World Trade Organization and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, respectively), with subsequent political implications. At the level of the nation-state, deglobalisation could reduce economic progress while increasing unemployment rates and the potential for international conflict (ibid.). Therefore, the timing of this study is crucial, and to further understand the situation at hand, it leverages existing literature and secondary sources pertaining to Covid-19’s local impact, including academic writing, reports from international organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and media texts.

Defining the “Foreign Workers” The terms “migrant workers” and “foreign workers” are used interchangeably here—according to the International Labour Organisation (ILO), “migrant workers” are non-resident foreign workers […] attached to a host country for work purposes (ILO Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97), Article 11). This definition has been effectively legalised through the Employment Act 1955 (Act 265). On the local front, meanwhile, the Immigration Department and the Department of Labour Peninsular Malaysia both use the term “foreign workers” lengthily, which informs their actions and policies accordingly.1 Henceforth, the labour issues discussed in this chapter generally revolve 1 See their websites at https://www.imi.gov.my/ and https://jtksm.mohr.gov.my, respectively, for further information.

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around foreign workers in a deglobalising Malaysia, whose government recorded various failures in managing and dealing with various issues pertaining to them. Since the outbreak of the pandemic, the government has fallen off the bandwagon in terms of protecting foreign workers, thus heightening the ongoing debate on labour. Before proceeding, a brief overview of the Malaysian economic and labour landscape is crucial. For decades, Malaysia has faced various conundrums with regard to labour, where colonial-era labour migration patterns—particularly from India and China—evolved to meet the demands of the agriculture and plantation sectors in what was then loosely known as Malaya (Kaur, 2014; Lee & Khor, 2018). As the British consolidated political and economic control of the Malay States, particularly in terms of integrating its imperial possessions into a global economic order, such labourers were urgently required. Notably, in the decades to come, the labour force was significantly depoliticised and made more amenable to capitalist development, with corresponding implications for interethnic tensions among Malay(si)a’s increasingly multi-ethnic population (Ali, 2021). However, the general crackdown on class-based politics was insufficient for the needs of extractive capitalism. With the economic focus turning towards export-oriented industrialisation, the demand for foreign labourers increased exponentially because of existing labour shortages (Abdul Rahman et al., 2012), only for the economy to further expand into the construction, manufacturing and automotive sectors— and not to mention the domestic sector (World Bank, 2019). As a result, these various considerations became a pull factor for jobseekers from neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia (Kaur, 2006), and soon Malaysia facilitated the entry of many foreign workers. On the eve of Covid-19’s onset, in the 2018–20 period, the Malaysian government estimated that 1.4–2 million documented migrants had arrived (International Organization for Migration Malaysia, 2022). However, a World Bank (2019) report provides a higher estimate: 2.96–3.26 million labourers, including 1.23–1.46 million individuals living in and facing irregular situations. Such situations are especially significant for undocumented foreign workers because of their vulnerable status, although it should be noted that in some cases, such as in East Malaysia, irregular migration is partly the function of the imposition of modern international boundaries which have split up existing maritime-based communities (Somiah, 2021). Covid-19 exacerbated the conditions of irregularity among foreign workers, which further exposed them to exploitation. The enforcement of

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various lockdown measures raised uncertainties about the government’s stance on human rights amidst deglobalisation. On the local front, Wahab (2020) outlined how foreign workers were forced to work despite the risk of contracting Covid-19 and were further exploited when employers failed to pay their wages. Such labour exploitation was rife, but these foreign workers had no avenue to lodge protests, fearing the loss of their jobs since the Ministry of Human Resources (MOHR), under which the Department of Labour falls, had advised employers to terminate their foreign workers first if layoffs were inevitable (The Star, 2020). Additionally, they faced further discrimination in terms of a lack of access to basic necessities and healthcare services. With the implementation of the MCO, their general welfare was side-lined, with various cases of abuse emerging with regard to their rights to mobility, earning a living, clean food and water, as well as healthcare (including vaccinations), among others. The prevalence of such discrimination violates the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2003).

A Typology of Labour Issues The ILO (2003) vehemently advocates for the rights of foreign workers given that they are vulnerable communities which have limited rights and protections, but such advocacy has generally received a short shrift locally. The extent of exploitation can be roughly gauged from the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia’s (SUHAKAM, 2020) statement that labour abuses intensified throughout the pandemic—hence, Covid-19 should not be seen purely from a healthcare perspective, but also through an economic lens. SUHAKAM has further highlighted how some foreign workers were already not being paid their salaries before the outbreak, and this trend persisted with the MCO’s subsequent announcement. This pattern of exploitation is inextricable from their vitality to domestic economic growth, given that employers prioritise profits over the welfare of their foreign workers. By discriminating against, manipulating and exploiting them, employers are sited in a position of power, leaving their workers dependent and vulnerable, with few bargaining opportunities and limited protections. Therefore, some consequences of deglobalisation can be observed when the government disassociates itself from the plight of vulnerable groups. Three key categories of labour issues are discussed

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below: (1) mistreatment and persecution; (2) exploitation and abuse; as well as (3) vaccine discrimination. Despite this typological distinction, we acknowledge that there are often various overlaps between them, which in turn suggest that labour issues be treated holistically. Mistreatment and Persecution When the World Health Organisation (WHO) announced Covid-19’s classification as a pandemic in 2020, the Malaysian government was one of the earliest to implement lockdowns as a preventive measure (New Straits Times, 2020). However, such securitisation also entailed harsh and inhumane responses towards foreign workers. During the various MCOs, it was found that the legal foreign workers were also treated unfairly (Sandanasamy et al., 2020), while their undocumented counterparts faced further discrimination and threats from the authorities because of their socalled illegality (Al Jazeera, 2020). Generally, both groups suffered unfair termination of employment, unpaid wages and poor living conditions (ILO, 2020; Sri Priya, 2020; Wahab, 2020). For the latter category, specifically, their unlawful status was largely the result of various circumstances, one of which was that employers had confiscated their passports to prevent workers from running away— this practice remains widespread despite being prohibited under the Passport Act 1964. Once caught, undocumented foreign workers were detained in cramped and unhygienic detention centres, which in turn exposed them to an increased risk of infection (Sandanasamy et al., 2020). Frequent immigration raids involving arrests and detentions were conducted in areas known to have significant migrant populations, amidst rising xenophobia (Amnesty International Malaysia, 2020). From early May, announcements of immigration raids drove foreign workers into hiding, particularly those without valid passports and/or working passes, further compounding the situation (R. Razak, 2020; Wahab, 2020). As a result, many were absent from worksites, fearing being caught and detained—unsurprisingly, they were also unable and/or unwilling to come forward for Covid-19 screenings, despite the government’s attempts at persuasion and promises of amnesty. Consequently, the raids were not reduced and cramped detention centres became even more overcrowded, thus increasing the risk of transmission and further worsening the physical and mental health conditions of existing detainees (ILO, 2020). Subsequently, the ILO (2020) submitted a report detailing

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how 6,467 foreign workers had contracted Covid-19, and that they were already at a high risk of contracting the disease, having had to work in difficult conditions even before the first MCO was implemented. In the first place, these foreign workers should not have been working under such conditions, and after falling ill, their employment was terminated— meanwhile, local workers who contracted the disease maintained their jobs, in the light of the MOHR’s abovementioned directive to prioritise the welfare of local employees (ILO, 2020 ). The Malaysian Trades Union Congress (MTUC) also reported that some employers had “sacked and abandoned” their foreign employees without notice and payment of wages (Free Malaysia Today, 2020). Besides that, the discriminatory construction of health requirements can be seen in terms of Covid-19 testing—while local workers did not necessarily have to present negative tests, there were significant regulations for foreign workers, who were to be screened before being allowed to return to work—thus contravening the Employment Act’s provisions (Malaysiakini, 2020). Such discrimination clearly demonstrates the institutionalised ill-treatment of foreign workers and is symptomatic of the unease among the local community, thus contributing to the growth of further negative sentiment towards this group. Exploitation and Abuse The working definition of exploitation used here borrows from the United Nations (UN), i.e., a situation that involves a first party taking advantage of another party to gain a positive outcome (UNODC, 2015). Exploitation is evidently linked to injustice, not just in terms of taking advantage of a person, their situation or vulnerability, but also in terms of how such an advantage is inherently unfair—that is, not based on consensus (McLean & McMillan, 2009). It is difficult to specify the exact nature of such unfairness or the means by which opportunities to take advantage of a second party arise in the first place. Therefore, McLean and McMillan (ibid.) assert that any analysis of exploitation must be inextricably linked to an understanding of power—defined here as an advantageous position from which one exploits another—and (in)justice. Such situations played out frequently during the pandemic, where foreign workers were restricted in terms of their movements and trapped in the countries in which they were working at two levels: (1) by border closures

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and travel restrictions as well as (2) by their employers through exploitative and abusive work practices (ILO, 2020). Moreover, practices that are associated with unfair advantages are generally premised upon labour exploitation, whether potential or actual, as well as manipulation and cheating by employers. Illegal practices generally involve more extreme dynamics, which include forced prostitution and begging, as well as the placement of workers in conditions of virtual slavery and servitude. These practices fit the definition of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (one of three supplementary protocols to the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime), which was ratified at its General Assembly. Looking specifically at Malaysian foreign workers, they are disproportionately affected because of the various conditions under which they work and survive, chiefly the result of their migrant status and the weak legal protection afforded to them (ILO, 2020). For example, they may be forced to work for more than the agreed-upon hours while not being compensated accordingly, thus constituting examples of forced labour. The ILO has also raised concerns over some key indicators showing the presence of forced labour domestically (ibid.). Over the years, local NGOs such as Tenaganita have expressed their dissatisfaction with the government’s minimal efforts at addressing and mitigating such exploitation (R. Razak, 2020; Wahab, 2020), while international relations have soured between Malaysia and its regional neighbours: the vicious treatment of foreign citizens has prompted the governments of Indonesia and Cambodia, for example, to stop sending workers to Malaysia. Some case studies are useful here, the first of which involves Malaysia’s most important rubber glove manufacturer—what makes this additionally useful for our analysis is how it suggests a continual interplay between domestic and international interests despite the onset of deglobalisation. The degree of exploitation occurring onsite was made clear when the United States’ Customs and Border Protection (CBP) authority imposed a ban on Top Glove Corporation Berhad’s products because of allegations of labour exploitation (Ananthalakshmi & Bowie, 2022; Latiff, 2021). During the first MCO, the manufacturer allegedly exploited its largely foreign employees by underpaying and deceiving them into working seven days a week on a supposedly “voluntary basis”, for a sum much lower than the standard wage (A. Razak, 2020). According to Adrian Pereira of the North–South Initiative, these employees were paid only RM8 per hour instead of the standard rate of RM11.54. This clearly illegal practice runs

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counter to the Employment Act, which stipulates that employers must pay 1.5 times the normal hourly rate for off-day work. Such exploitation only came to light when a foreign worker from Nepal acted as a whistle-blower, supplying photographic evidence that Top Glove was not adhering to Covid-19 safety measures, including social distancing (Thomas, 2020). However, Top Glove’s management denied such allegations by firmly insisting that since March, all its factories had implemented safety measures and that it was monitoring all locations—a claim that was undermined by December 2020 when 5,147 workers in its Klang factories tested positive, a 29-year-old Nepali worker died and the whistle-blower himself was fired.2 An activist argued that exploitation was inevitable— otherwise, it would have been impossible for the factories to practise social distancing, considering that 30,000 foreign workers were required to produce around 200 billion gloves annually for export. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the company to protect the welfare and rights of its foreign workers who are the major contributors to its profits and broader national economic growth (ILO, 2020). Although the government’s enforcement of strict lockdown measures initially limited Top Glove to operating with only half of its staff, weeks later, the corporation and many other Malaysian businesses were exempted from such requirements because these were deemed “essential”.3 After receiving this exemption from the government, Top Glove resumed business as usual, prior to the CBP ban in July. The decision followed the CBP’s investigation and discovery that foreign workers had been abused, based on multiple forced labour indicators in Top Glove’s production process including debt bondage, excessive overtime, abusive working and living conditions, and the retention of personal identification documents (CBP, 2021). More damningly, there were also allegations of elements of human trafficking—consequently, in June 2021, Malaysia was downgraded to Tier 3 status (the lowest-ranking tier) in the United States 2 Later, the management issued a statement insisting that the whistle-blower had not been fired, but they had supposedly amicably resolved the issue (Lee & Ananthalakshmi, 2020). 3 It is useful to briefly note that despite this demarcation between “essential” and

“nonessential” services, foreign workers were reportedly exploited by being forced to continue working in jobs that were classified as “nonessential”, a situation that was further compounded because they were uncertain about their own employment status, having had limited contact with their employers (Sandanasamy et al., 2020)—however, there is insufficient space for a full discussion here.

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Department of State’s (2021) Trafficking in Persons Report. As such, both private and national interests have been implicated, thus indicating that the problem extends beyond Top Glove and to the complicity of the Malaysian government, which has not only failed to meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking fully, but also in making significant efforts to do so. It is important to note that Top Glove’s labour exploitation incident was just one among other factors for the government’s low ranking in the report. It was only in September 2021 that the CBP modified its forced labour findings regarding Top Glove, lifting this ban and allowing for the imports of disposable gloves made at its facilities in Malaysia (CBP, 2021). The decision arose because of improvements to the foreign workers’ living and working conditions, such as upgraded hostel facilities and promises to compensate them for the fees they had initially paid to employment agents in their home countries (which resulted in their debt bondage in the first place). However, not all employers have taken such initiatives to mitigate labour issues, thus constituting a challenge for the Malaysian government, especially given the intertwined interests and external pressures. Meanwhile, a second category of cases involves domestic workers. Since implementing the various lockdowns, the MOHR announced that there would be no further entry of foreign workers, including domestic ones, but this does not alleviate the severity of the issue. Marja Paavilainen from the ILO highlights that less than one per cent of domestic workers receive social protection in the Asia–Pacific region, one of many barriers facing them (AWANI Tonight, 2022). Employed in many households, such workers are usually female and foreign (ILO, 2020, 2021b)—hence, they are effectively subject to double discrimination. Regarding demographics, the ILO (2015) estimates that 73% of all migrant domestic workers are women, and according to the MOHR’s estimate, as of August 2021, 92,481 workers were employed locally (Malay Mail, 2021). During the pandemic, they became a burden for employers who had lost their jobs but still needed to support an additional member of their households (i.e., the live-in workers). Others endured longer working hours and abusive situations. According to Paavilainen, during the MCO, these “maids”—as they are colloquially called—were further isolated and not allowed to leave their employers’ houses because employers feared that they would contract Covid-19—with greater temporal and spatial proximity, they were then exposed to more harassment and violence than usual (ILO, 2020).

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Further compounding their condition is the Employment Act itself, which clearly states that as domestic servants, they are therefore excluded from the rights and benefits associated with other forms of employment, including regulated work hours, paid holidays, rest days as well as maternity benefits (ILO, 2021a). Therefore, there is also a gendered component to be considered in this discussion, given the feminisation of the domestic workforce and its clear devaluation. However, such legal exclusions have not prevented these workers from mobilising effectively, despite the spatial and temporal constraints of being largely confined to separate households. For instance, by making use of smartphones and digital connectivity, the grassroots-level Indonesian Migrant Domestic Workers Association in Malaysia, PERTIMIG, actively mobilised its workers—even during the lockdowns—and maintains links to other organisations abroad, such as the International Domestic Workers Federation, in a demonstration of international solidarity and recognition of shared struggle (Nasrikah & Okui Lala, 2021). As with the Top Glove incident, international considerations and connections continue to play a key role despite the onset of deglobalisation. Vaccine Discrimination Not only did foreign workers already face discrimination in terms of gender, race, colour and religion (Putul & Mia, 2020), but further stigmatisation emerged in the provision of health services, where a chain of misinformation and disinformation created a sense of fear among workers, subsequently preventing them from coming forward for Covid-19 testing and further compounding their precarious situation (Thomas, 2020). Furthermore, foreign workers who actually contracted Covid-19 did not receive proper healthcare because of the absence of inclusive policies and access. The various pre-pandemic barriers to affordable healthcare for migrant workers have already been discussed in detail elsewhere, including differential pricing schemes implemented by the Ministry of Health (Abdul Razak & Nordin, 2018). Now, on a day-to-day level, Ng (2022) points out how the pandemic revealed the non-inclusivity of legal, health and social protection policies for these workers. For instance, a sick foreign worker at a construction site feared seeking medical help from the government hospital because his work permit had expired, thus requiring him to go to a more expensive private clinic to obtain medical aid. He tested positive for Covid-19 and had to go to the hospital immediately,

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but he could not do so because of a shortage of ambulance services, and thus he would have to pay for a private one. Therefore, he resorted to using a ride-hailing service because of the prohibitive cost entailed— presumably, this would have exposed his driver to potential illness. Thus, the limited (or absent) access to healthcare services plays out at many levels. Deglobalisation further alienated foreign workers, who were less protected and faced further discrimination in the provision of vaccines, especially those who had been detained for not having the necessary legal documentation (Human Rights Watch, 2021; Ng, 2022). When the national vaccination plan was being discussed in February 2021, the MTUC and the Malaysian Employers Federation (MEF) debated prioritisation in terms of vaccine rollouts—that is to say, between targeting Malaysians and migrant workers first. The MTUC argued that the first priority should be vaccinating Malaysians (Free Malaysia Today, 2021), although the economic centrality of foreign workers was highlighted by the MEF’s executive director, Shamsuddin Bardan, who argued that it was vital to vaccinate foreign workers simultaneously, since they were classified as a high-risk category in terms of spreading Covid-19 (ibid). In both cases, a narrative of Otherness and exclusion is perpetuated— rather than to target foreign workers on the grounds of healthcare, they were portrayed in entirely objectifying terms. It was only in economic terms that they were somewhat humanised—a similar sentiment to Shamsuddin’s was made by the president of the Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers, Soh Thian Lai, who echoed the view that foreign workers, as major contributors to national economic growth, should be included in the vaccination plans. Because of past cases where foreigners had been detained en masse in the early phases of the pandemic, despite government assurances that they would not be discriminated against (Sukumaran & Jaipragas, 2020), more substantial engagement now took place. The Ministry of Health’s director-general, Noor Hisham Abdullah, made assurances that foreign workers would not be discriminated against, and that they would be given immediate medical attention and subject to decontamination procedures, in addressing the 2,000 foreigners without permits at detention centres (The Straits Times, 2020). Subsequently, foreign workers were able to receive their vaccinations, and the Red Crescent Society helped those who feared arrest (Musliza & Hadi, 2021). Providing vaccinations was a crucial humanitarian step during the pandemic, and on a related note,

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the government committee on securing vaccine supplies gave assurances that both undocumented foreign workers and asylum-seekers registered with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees were to be included in its plans (Latiff, 2021).

Conclusion: The National Action Plan on Forced Labour and its International Implications The labour issues involving foreign workers discussed above were significantly highlighted during the pandemic, thus demonstrating how deglobalisation became intertwined with the government’s concerns. Even if Malaysia effectively decoupled from much of the world during the lockdowns, there remained significant international linkages, whether at the state or grassroots levels (such as seen with the CBP and PERTIMIG, respectively). On the domestic front, the government worked with NGOs such as the Red Crescent Society to resolve labour issues concerning foreign workers, which resulted in a key effort: the launch of the five-year National Action Plan on Forced Labour (NAPFL) by the MOHR, spanning 2021–25. Released when the pandemic remained a salient threat, it focused on improving awareness, enforcement as well as access to remedies and support of various services, with a view to eliminating labour exploitations by 2030. This national plan is a written commitment to eradicating any form of labour abuse by working closely with various stakeholders, namely employers’ and workers’ organisations, particularly the MEF, MTUC and civil society. NAPFL’s five-year course of action comprises four strategic goals. The first is to increase awareness and understanding of forced labour among individuals at increased risk, duty-bearers and the general public. Next is capacity-building, by further strengthening law enforcement among the relevant government authorities. The third is migration management, by establishing bilateral agreements with “sending” countries to ensure transparent processes, while encouraging participating countries to prepare their residents for migrant life and work actively. Finally, the fourth is facilitating victim protection through improved mechanisms and procedures. Overall, its structured matrix is supplemented by separate monitoring and evaluation components. But with that being said, the NAPFL, according to the MOHR, is not a blueprint for implementation. It is instead an overall framework for results-based implementation, allowing for adaptation in the varying contexts of peninsular Malaysia

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and the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak, with their respective labour frameworks. Different organisations are expected to integrate the NAPFL provisions into their organisational plans and activities within the stipulated timeline. Regardless of the NAPFL’s effectiveness, what remains clear is that a system of exploitation and dependency had led to great domestic strain because of deglobalisation. This chapter’s narrowed scope discusses the various forms of labour issues observed during the implementation of strict lockdowns, particularly in charting their effects on foreign workers. However, such issues are not new and remain an ongoing problem necessitating serious attention and responses from the government. Despite the possibility of decreased interconnection, Malaysia remains vitally interconnected with its regional and near-regional neighbours—after all, its foreign workers come from Indonesia, Bangladesh, Cambodia and the Philippines, to name a few entanglements, and they contribute greatly to important sectors of Malaysia’s economic development. For decades, these foreign workers have encountered discrimination and exploitation by employers, agents and companies as a function of their vulnerability as migrants and (in many cases) undocumented status. Thus dehumanised, employers can treat them inhumanely, causing injury and even death, much to the detriment of international relations. It is imperative that the government steps up its efforts to address labour issues as well as to enhance the NAPFL’s implementation and enforcement to eliminate all forms of labour abuses. Working closely with various stakeholders—including various industries, NGOs and activist groups—is an equally significant step in achieving the plan’s goals, particularly because these stakeholders are experienced, have ample knowledge of the context and can protect the rights of foreign workers at all times. Additionally, the government has established an outcome matrix to monitor each goal in order to ensure the efficacy of its national policies accordingly. It is timely to return to Michelle Bachelet’s persuasive argument that the Covid-19 pandemic should not be used as an excuse to engage in human rights violations (Lieberman, 2020): especially violations directed against foreign workers, in the Malaysian case.

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References Abdul Rahman, H., Wang, C., Wood, L. C., & Low, S. F. (2012). Negative impact induced by foreign workers: Evidence in Malaysian construction sector. Habitat International, 36(4), 433–443. Abdul Razak, M. F., & Nordin, R. (2018). The right to health: Discriminatory treatment against migrant workers in Malaysia. Jurnal Undang-Undang Dan Masyarakat, 23, 15–24. Al Jazeera. (2020, July 3). Locked up in Malaysia’s lockdown. https://www.aljaze era.com/program/101-east/2020/7/3/locked-up-in-malaysias-lockdown Ali, A. (2021, February 18). Why is it difficult to organise around class in Malaysia? New Naratif. https://newnaratif.com/why-is-it-difficult-to-org anise-around-class-in-malaysia/ AWANI Tonight. (2022, June 20). Less than 1% domestic workers get social protection in APAC. https://www.astroawani.com/rancangan/awani-ton ight/awani-tonight-less-1-domestic-workers-get-social-protection-apac-197 6041 Bowie, N. (2022, February 11). Migrant labour abuse bouncing back on Malaysia. Asia Times. https://asiatimes.com/2022/02/migrant-labourabuse-bouncing-back-on-malaysia/ CBP. (2021, September 9). CBP modifies forced labour finding on top glove corporation Bhd. [Press release]. https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/nationalmedia-release/cbp-modifies-forced-labour-finding-top-glove-corporation-bhd Das, R. C., & Ray, K. (2020). Does globalisation influence employment? Empirical investigation on individual as well as panel of South Asian Countries. Review of Market Integration, 12(1–2), 7–34. https://doi.org/10.1177/097 4929220969222 Employment Act 1955 (Act 265). Faiola, A. (2020, June 20). The virus that shut down the world. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/world/coronaviruspandemic-globalization/ Free Malaysia Today. (2020, April 8). Sacked and abandoned, foreign workers now living in squalor, says MTUC. https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/cat egory/nation/2020/04/08/sacked-and-abandoned-foreign-workers-now-liv ing-in-squalor-says-mtuc/ ———. (2021, February 13). Vaccinate locals first, says MTUC, but bosses group disagrees. https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/ 2021/02/13/vaccinate-locals-first-says-mtuc-but-bosses-group-disagrees/ Friedman, T. L. (2007). The world is flat: A brief history of the twenty-first century. Picador / Farrar, Straus & Giroux.

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Hassan, H. (2021, July 12). Malaysia sees rise in suicides and calls to helplines amid Covid-19 pandemic. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/ asia/se-asia/malaysia-sees-rise-in-suicides-and-calls-to-helplines-amid-covid19-pandemic Hoyt, K., & Brooks, S. G. (2003). A Double-Edged Sword: Globalization and Biosecurity. International Security, 28(3), 123–148. Human Rights Watch. (2021, June 30). Malaysia: Raids on migrants hinder vaccine access. https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/30/malaysia-raids-mig rants-hinder-vaccine-access Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2003). International convention on the protection of the rights of all migrant workers and members of their families. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instru ments/international-convention-protection-rights-all-migrant-workers ILO. (2015). ILO Global estimates on migrant workers. https://www.ilo.org/ wcmsp5/groups/public/—dgreports/—dcomm/documents/publication/ wcms_436330.pdf ———. (2020). Protecting the rights of domestic workers in Malaysia during the Covid-19 Pandemic and beyond. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/pub lic/---asia/---ro-bangkok/documents/publication/wcms_748051.pdf ———. (2021a). Supporting migrant workers during the pandemic for a cohesive and responsive ASEAN Community. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/gro ups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---sro-bangkok/documents/publication/ wcms_816971.pdf ———. (2021b). ILO Global estimates on international migrant workers. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/%40dgreports/%40dcomm/% 40publ/documents/publication/wcms_808935.pdf ILO. (2021). Global Estimates of Modern Slavery: Forced Labour and Forced Marriage. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@ipec/ documents/publication/wcms_854733.pdf International Organization for Migration Malaysia. (2022). Migration overview in Malaysia. https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl486/files/ inline-files/infosheet-march-2022.pdf Irwin, D. A. (2020). The pandemic adds momentum to the deglobalization trend. Peterson Institute for International Economics, 23. James, H. (2017). Deglobalisation as a global challenge. Center for International Governance Innovation. Papers No. 135. Kaur, A. (2006). Order (and disorder) at the border: Mobility, international labour migration and border controls in Southeast Asia. In Mobility, labour migration and border controls in Asia (pp. 23–51). Palgrave Macmillan UK. Kaur, A. (2014). Plantation systems, labour regimes and the state in Malaysia, 1900–2012. Journal of Agrarian Change, 14(2), 190–213.

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Kim, H. M., Li, P., & Lee, Y. R. (2020). Observations of deglobalization against globalization and impacts on global business. International Trade, Politics and Development, 4(2), 83–103. Latiff, R. (2021, February 11). Malaysia offers COVID-19 vaccinations to foreign residents, undocumented migrants. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/art icle/us-health-coronavirus-malaysia-vaccines-idUSKBN2AB0E1 Lee, H. A., & Khor, Y. L. (2018). Counting migrant workers in Malaysia: A needlessly persisting conundrum. ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute. Lee, L., & Ananthalakshmi, A. (2020, December 13). Malaysia’s Top Glove fired whistleblower before virus outbreak. Reuters. https://www.reuters. com/world/asia-pacific/insight-malaysias-top-glove-fired-whistleblower-bef ore-virus-outbreak-2020-12-13/ Lieberman, A. (2020, October 20). COVID-19 is not an “excuse” for human rights violations, UN human rights chief says. Devex. https://www. devex.com/news/covid-19-is-not-an-excuse-for-human-rights-violations-unhuman-rights-chief-says-98192 Malay Mail. (2021, September 19). No entry of foreign workers, including maids, until Dec 31, says minister. https://www.malaymail.com/news/mal aysia/2021/09/19/no-entry-of-foreign-workers-including-maids-until-dec31-says-minister/2006748 Malaysiakini. (2020, June 30). End discrimination against foreigners and migrants in COVID-19 responses. https://www.malaysiakini.com/announ cement/532379 Marasigan, T. S. (2022, November 23). The Philippines’ dangerous dependence on the exploitation of its people. New Naratif. https://newnaratif.com/thephilippines-dangerous-dependence/ McLean, I., & McMillan, A. (eds.). (2009). The concise oxford dictionary of politics. Oxford University Press. Mohd Juraij, A.R. (2022, December 16). Deglobalisation has multiple impacts on Malaysia. The edge markets. https://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/ deglobalisation-has-multiple-impacts-malaysia MOHR. (2021). National action plan on forced labour (2021–2025). https:// www.mohr.gov.my/ebook/National%20Action%20Plan%20On%20Forced% 20Labour/NAPFL%202021-2025.pdf Mushtaq, M., Ahmed, S., Fahlevi, M., Aljuaid, M., & Saniuk, S., (2022) Globalization and employment nexus: Moderating role of human capital. PLoS ONE, 17 (10). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0276431 Musliza, M., & Hadi, A., (2021, October 1). NGO in Malaysia helps vaccinate undocumented migrants who fear arrest. Benar News. https://www.benarn ews.org/english/news/malaysian/vaccination-program-10012021150255. html

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Nasrikah & Okui Lala. (2022). Rasa & Asa [documentary]. https://freedo mfilm.my/festival/film/rasa-dan-asa/ New Straits Times. (2020, March 16). 14-day movement control order begins nationwide on Wednesday. https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2020/ 03/575180/14-day-movement-control-order-begins-nationwide-wednesday Ng., S. H. (2022). Health inequalities amongst refugees and migrant workers in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic: A report of two cases. Asia Bioethics Review, 14(2), 107–114. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41649-021-00198-8 Putul, S. J., & Mia, M. T. (2020). Exploitation of migrant workers in Malaysia and protection under domestic laws. In Proceedings of the international law conference (iN-LAC) (pp. 125–131). Razak, A. (2020, May 1). Top Glove accused of underpaying & deceiving Malaysian factory workers in bid to meet global rubber glove demands amid COVID-19. Business and Human Rights Resources. https://www.businesshumanrights.org/en/latest-news/top-glove-accused-of-underpaying-deceiv ing-malaysian-factory-workers-in-bid-to-meet-global-rubber-glove-demandsamid-covid-19/ Razak, R. (2020, May 1). Tenaganita condemns raids on undocumented migrants, refugees in Kuala Lumpur. Malay Mail. https://www.malaymail. com/news/malaysia/2020/05/01/tenaganita-condemns-raids-on-undocu mented-migrants-refugees-in-kuala-lumpur/1862190 Roccu, R., & Talani, L. S. (2019). Introduction: The globalisation debate. In R. Roccu & L. S. Talani (Eds.), The dark side of globalisation (pp. 9–15). Palgrave MacMillan. Rodrik, D. (2011). The globalization paradox: Why global markets, states, and democracy can’t coexist. Oxford University Press. Sandanasamy, F., Paavilainen, M., & Baruah, N. (2020). COVID-19: Impact on migrant workers and country response in Malaysia. International Labour Organization. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/pub lic/---asia/---robangkok/documents/briefingnote/wcms_741512.pdf. Slaughter, M. J., & Swagel, P. (1997, April). The effect of globalization in the advanced economies. IMF Working Paper 97/43. https://www.imf.org/ext ernal/pubs/ft/wp/wp9743.pdf Somiah, V. (2021). Irregular migrants and the sea at the borders of Sabah, Malaysia: Pelagic Alliance. Palgrave Macmillan. Sri Priya, S. (2020, April 9). Migrant workers and refugees cry for help. The Star. https://www.thestar.com.my/metro/metro-news/2020/04/09/ migrant-workers-and-refugees-cry-for-help SUHAKAM. (2020). Dialogue with vulnerable communities: An assessment of needs and next steps amid COVID-19 pandemic. https://www.suhakam.org. my/dialogue-with-vulnerable-communities-an-assessmentof-needs-and-nextsteps-amid-COVID-19-pandemic/

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Sukumaran, T., & Jaipragas, B. (2020, May 1). Coronavirus: hundreds arrested as Malaysia cracks down on migrants in Covid-19 red zones. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3082529/ coronavirus-hundreds-arrested-malaysia-cracks-down-migrants Tan, T., Carvalho, M., Sivanandam, H., & Rahim, R. (2020, 9 December). Nearly 100,000 Malaysians have lost jobs since start of MCO, says HR ministry. The Star. https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2020/12/ 09/nearly-100000-malaysians-have-lost-jobs-since-start-of-mco-says-hr-min istry The Straits Times. (2020, May 25). Malaysia’s health chief warns against discrimination of migrant workers amid coronavirus outbreak at detention centres. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/coronavirus-breaksout-at-detention-centres-in-malaysia-health-ministry-warns-against The Star. (2020, March 20). Human Resources Ministry releases FAQ during MCO period. https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2020/03/20/ human-resources-ministry-releases-faq-during-mco-period?fbclid=IwAR3d xwKulHrJS6eXxIVMoUguVkwtwG2Q3iK9-DJnMk5KfCVt7qOlRF38cEI Thomas, J. (2020, April 18). Worker accuses Top Glove of lax Covid-19 measures. Free Malaysia Today. https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/cat egory/nation/2020/04/18/worker-accuses-top-glove-of-lax-covid-19-mea sures/ United States Department of State. (2021) Trafficking in persons report. https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-trafficking-in-persons-report/ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC]. (2015). The concept of “exploitation” in the trafficking in persons protocol. Issue Paper. Wahab, A. (2020). Migrant workers and covid-19 outbreak in Malaysia. IKMAS Working Paper 3/2020. Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. World Bank. (2019, March 28). Malaysia estimating the number of foreign workers (A report from the labour market data for monetary policy task). https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/953091562223517841/ pdf/Malaysia-Estimating-the-Number-of-Foreign-Workers-A-Report-fromthe-Labour-Market-Data-for-Monetary-Policy-Task.pdf World Health Organization. (2020, December 31). Coronavirus disease (COVID19): Herd immunity, lockdowns and COVID-19 [Press release]. https://www. who.int/news-room/q-a-detail/herd-immunity-lockdowns-and-covid-19

Mediated Xenophobia and Covid-19: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Media Representations of Migrant Workers in Malaysia Kwan Yee Kow and Mohamad Zaki Samsudin

Introduction Research suggests that globalisation is more than just an economic phenomenon concerned with trade, markets, foreign investments and international value chains; it also entails cultural, political and social dimensions (Dabic et al., 2020). However, criticism has focused on globalisation’s contributions to rising inequality, the erosion of the cultural influence of local institutions and the uneven distribution of public resources. From a more conservative viewpoint, emergent threats to national and regional identities as well as values have accompanied some of globalisation’s multinational processes (Brady et al., 2016; CuervoCazurra et al., 2020). Increased nationalism has also led to significant discourses on deglobalisation, social movements and xenophobia (Piketty,

K. Y. Kow (B) · M. Z. Samsudin University of Wollongong Malaysia, Shah Alam, Malaysia e-mail: [email protected] M. Z. Samsudin e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. Ying Hooi et al. (eds.), Social and Political Deglobalisation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6823-7_7

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2015). An emergent theme is migration—a key and hotly debated consequence of globalisation, which also implicitly functions as a process of increasing interdependence among nation-states, especially in the labour market (Witt, 2019). Challenges in handling migratory flows have always involved strategies of managing migrant communities humanely while pursuing two simultaneous, crucial challenges: (1) mitigating the social tensions between migrant and local communities; and (2) ensuring the sustainability of economic growth at the national level (Grech, 2021). In the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, foreign workers and migrants were inevitably marginalised from a public health perspective. A lack of access to health and social services, coupled with poor living conditions, have caused migrant communities to suffer disproportionately, thus potentially leading to a vicious cycle. Some countries have since tightened their migration policies, including Malaysia, the focus of this study. It is worth noting that the pandemic’s onset led to the introduction of increasingly restrictive measures, particularly the banning of unauthorised migration and increased management of foreign worker populations. Consider how in March 2020, a mass religious gathering at a mosque in Kuala Lumpur became the largest Covid-19 cluster in Southeast Asia, among whose attendees were hundreds of migrants and refugees. The Malaysian government urged attendees, irrespective of immigration status, to present themselves for a free screening if they exhibited symptoms, assuring them that no arrests would be made. It later announced that immigration operations would be suspended for the duration of Malaysia’s lockdowns—a series of measures known locally as Movement Control Orders (MCOs), which began on 18 March and were exercised with varying degrees of severity for almost two years. However, back-pedalling occurred soon afterwards, and rights groups have accused the government of encouraging xenophobia amidst the pandemic-related economic slowdown. This was most notable in May 2020, when the authorities conducted a series of immigration crackdowns and arrested more than 2,000 undocumented migrants, drawing condemnation from various quarters and becoming the subject of international media coverage. As for local media, however, a different picture emerged, judging by the media representations alone. Hence, there is also a cultural dimension at play, which this chapter aims to investigate further. It provides an overview of the media representations of migrant workers during the MCOs, focusing on mainstream newspaper and online media texts

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published between March and December 2020. We argue that such reportage may have contributed to the escalation of xenophobia in the public discourse. Indeed, such a globally disruptive event may provoke widespread sensemaking in societies, as political leaders and other social actors seek to understand its underlying causes and consequences, thus marking a significant watershed moment in debates on globalisation and deglobalisation (Branicki et al., 2021). If we argue that media content has the potential to generate or accelerate the discourse of deglobalisation, this chapter gains an increased significance. By employing a critical discourse analysis (CDA) and drawing from Antonio Gramsci’s conception of hegemony, we examine media representations of migrants by studying the approaches to reporting on and narrating the struggles faced by migrant workers. This analysis involves several social actors, including political leaders, law enforcement officials, activists and the migrants themselves, all of whom are represented differently. We argue that there are two broad typologies in these emergent representations: (1) the mainstream press, which is linked to elite interests, is instrumental in consolidating the ruling government’s influence over society, escalating xenophobia as part of a strategy to garner political support; but (2) the so-called alternative press generally tends to provide some space for rational-critical discourse by embracing a more humanitarian perspective regarding the plight of migrants, thus challenging the right-wing ideology espoused by the mainstream press.

Theoretical Framework and Methodology Hegemony An often-facile assumption is that the ideas of the ruling class are also the dominant ideas of a particular period, but this is much too simplistic an approach. Therefore, the basic premise of the Gramscian conception of hegemony, where “man is not ruled by force alone, but also by ideas”, offers a more nuanced approach to understanding the confluence of media and elite interests in the Malaysian context. In Gramsci’s view, the ruling class governs based on the consent of and alliances with civil society to secure its dominant position (Gramsci, 1999). In more “classical” examples, political systems exert power over civil society through and in association with institutions such as the national education system and the media. The latter is of particular interest to Gramsci, who viewed

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that it was able to “create and develop its readers’ needs” and “progressively enlarge” its readership (quoted in Forgacs, 2000, p. 379). With this perception in mind, Gramsci also argued for a broad press to reflect not just public opinion, but also different levels of social and cultural development, rather than to rely on a single press reflecting the views of the centre (Forgacs, 2000). In other words, Gramsci’s understanding of the media serves as a reminder for media theorists, who tend to overstate the encompassing reach and influence of ideology alone. Further, it has been noted that media workers may buttress a regime’s legitimacy by offering constructive criticism from within government-linked media outlets (Randhawa, 2022). There are times, however, when structural forces do not necessarily determine individual actions, which helps to explain the emergence of alternative presses and independent news portals offering rational-critical discourse in Malaysia. However, even new media is not a purely democratic space, and the discourses circulated may not always be emancipatory or progressive. Curiously, there have not been many media studies employing variations of hegemony as theoretical frameworks in the regional context (see rare examples by Heryanto & Mandal, 2003; Randhawa, 2022). Therefore, this chapter marks a useful addition to the existing literature and presents a framework through which we can analyse (de)globalisation discourses within Malaysian print and online media. Critical Discourse Analysis By accounting for Gramsci’s perspective on the media, our discussion on its representations, xenophobia and deglobalisation is expanded upon through CDA. As a methodology, it owes an intellectual debt to hegemony, and is traceable to theoretical developments from the Birmingham School of Cultural Studies, neo-Marxist cultural theory and poststructuralist discourse (Threadgold, 2003). The purpose of CDA, as applied to social research, is to systematically analyse the various relationships manifested in our use of language—e.g., power, control, ideology, dominance and discrimination—including where one speaks from and the medium through which this occurs. Thus, CDA provides a useful framework to analyse news texts that can be interpreted as reflecting the media’s generalised attitude towards migrants in Malaysia. Whether or not news articles fairly depict migrants and foreign workers remains questionable,

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given that powerful agents exercise control over some media organisations (e.g., the state news agency, Bernama), thus leaving no room for marginalised groups to represent themselves. Generally, media coverage of migration has considerable consequences for public opinion—and therefore also for policymakers—because: (1) it influences how members of society learn about migrant workers, where negative depictions may reinforce pre-existing ethnic or racial stereotypes; and (2) the media also has an important impact on the formation of political judgements and decisions. A specific CDA approach, the socio-semantic model, was introduced by van Leeuwen (1996, 2008) and will be applied to systematically suggest how social actors are represented in the selected media texts. This methodological framework is useful for analysing “how social and political inequalities are manifested in and reproduced through discourse” (Wooffitt, 2005, p. 137). We are primarily concerned about how various actors are depicted, and whether this depiction would further encourage xenophobia or provide a holistic understanding of migration. We expect the selected texts to provide valuable evidence regarding the discursive climate of society at large, by highlighting how migration issues are framed and the specific forms of language used to describe the authorities’ narratives, local sentiments and views from the migrant community. As such, we also indicate the social actors who participate in and/or are excluded from such debates (Laliberte et al., 2015). Scope Our scope of study primarily focuses on two mainstream news organisations: The Star and Berita Harian. We assume that alternative media outlets generally espouse a more humanitarian perspective regarding the plight of migrants, and for this reason, we focus only on the mainstream press here. Our sample texts were drawn from those published between 18 March and 31 December, representing much of the first year living under the various MCOs. This selection includes incidents such as immigration crackdowns, speeches and statements by political leaders as well as accounts by human rights activists and columnists. Table 1 tabulates the number of articles analysed and their sources.

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Table 1

Number of articles analysed from two Malaysian news organisations

News Organisation

Number of Articles Analysed

The Star (English language) Berita Harian (Malay language)

15 30

The Media Landscape in Malaysia This section provides an overview of the media landscape, which could shed light on why the mainstream and alternative media cover migrant issues differently. We posit three main reasons: (1) Malaysian media has long been controlled through censorship laws; (2) there is significant and controversial political ownership within the media landscape; and (3) there are different views on the roles and responsibilities of the media in society. Media regulation already started during the British colonial era, when the governor of the colony of Penang issued a licence to the Prince of Wales Island Gazette, the first English-language newspaper published in British Malaya.1 Owned by A.B. Bone, a businessman from Madras, India, he had requested that a newspaper censorship system be instituted before the Gazette’s publication, thus representing the beginning of the link between the state and the press in what eventually became Malaysia (Dhari, 1992; Mohd Safar, 1996). After independence, the long-ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) inherited these British media laws, having perceived that the media’s role was to disseminate information and the government’s ideology to maintain harmony within the state’s multi-ethnic social fabric. Hence, the role of media was directly tied to nation-building and its practitioners were not encouraged to criticise the government, but to instead present its ideology and official narrative. Formerly critical presses, such as Utusan Melayu, would eventually be pressured into obedience through various means. Press freedom was further constrained during Mahathir Mohamad’s first tenure as Prime Minister between 1981 and 2003, when the government used its authority to manage media companies and control freedom of expression among journalists. The press was also targeted

1 Formerly called the Government Gazette.

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during the mass arrests codenamed “Operasi Lalang” in 1987.2 Social activists, opposition politicians, academics and members of civil society were detained, and as a “punishment” for reporting this political clampdown on their front pages, three newspapers (The Star, Sin Chew Jit Poh and the now-defunct Watan, published in the English, Chinese and Malay languages, respectively) had their publishing permits suspended for months. When privatisation was later encouraged by Mahathir, this allowed the ruling elite and BN’s business acquaintances to invest aggressively in the media industry (George, 2007; Gomez, 2004; Mustafa, 2014). By the end of the 1990s, the component parties of BN already controlled or had substantial interests in even more major English-, Malay- and Chinese-language newspapers via their investment arms and political affiliates. For instance, The Star is currently partly owned by one of BN’s component parties, the Malaysian Chinese Association, while another, the United Malays National Organisation, owns Berita Harian. Most of these mainstream media organisations upheld uncritical or openly partisan positions as part of their editorial policy. Towards the end of the twentieth century, in a bid to attract foreign investors from the information technology sector, Mahathir promised that there would be no censorship of the internet (Zaharom & Mustafa, 1998)—indeed, the trend towards liberalisation in the public sphere was maintained under his successor, Abdullah Badawi. Since then, the emergence of online news portals (e.g., Malaysiakini) following the Reformasi movement, which coalesced around the sacking of Mahathir’s deputy, has had a significant effect on the media landscape.3 Although such news portals were unlicensed and not regulated directly under the Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984, their content is still monitored under different regulations, including the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998, the Official Secrets Act 1972 and the Sedition Act 1948, thus enforcing censorship across various levels. A change of government in 2018 saw the new Pakatan Harapan government extending further 2 Operasi Lalang targeted protestors disputing the Ministry of Education’s decision to appoint some 100 senior assistants and supervisors to Chinese-medium primary schools. The Chinese community was concerned that the appointment of these non-Chineseeducated staff might force students and parents to use English or Malay in communication. 3 Anwar Ibrahim—now Prime Minister at the time of writing—was removed from his post by Mahathir, and whose supporters initiated the Reformasi (Reform) movement in an anti-BN protest. Such mobilisation was not sufficient to prevent Anwar’s eventual conviction and imprisonment for sodomy.

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media reform efforts.4 However, this government was short-lived. In late February 2020, the Perikatan Nasional (PN) coalition unexpectedly took over following a political coup and press freedom remained restricted— this meant that ongoing discussions on a proposed media council were put on hold.5 One example of repression, which will be discussed further below, includes a case in July 2020 when Al Jazeera journalists were interrogated by the authorities after broadcasting a documentary about migrant workers in Kuala Lumpur during the pandemic. The intersection between Covid-19 and media representations will form the crux of this chapter.

Analysis of Findings The first nationwide MCO enforced by the government to control the spread of Covid-19 resulted in mass-scale and sudden losses of work and income (at least for those who were unable to work remotely), where only industries in critical sectors (“essential services”, in local parlance) such as food production and healthcare were allowed to keep operating. The regulations affected the migrant worker community significantly: many could not go to work, especially those in construction sites and nonessential services. While the MCO restrictions alone did not contribute to any friction in terms of its relationship with locals, the situation took an abrupt turn because of one specific incident. By using this as a case study, it is possible to understand two notable dynamics at play—i.e., (1) misrepresentations; and (2) silencing—both of which are linked with hegemonic, government-aligned narratives. On 4 July, Al Jazeera aired a special report as part of its 101 East programme entitled “Locked Up in Malaysia’s Lockdown”. This 25minute report focused on the struggles faced by migrant workers during the MCO. Since they could not work because of the restrictions, many were left stranded in generally dilapidated living areas, relying entirely on their savings for food and other basic needs. The programme also took a critical stance against the Malaysian enforcement agencies’ perceived lack 4 This coalition was a direct successor to Pakatan Rakyat coalition, which was formed in 2008. Following reorganisation, it emerged in its current form, which won power in the 2018 general election and currently forms a “unity government” with BN. 5 Further details on the Media Council and its pro tem committee can be found here: https://mediacouncil.my/.

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of empathy for the plight of these migrant workers. Following its airing, however, the mainstream press chose to back the stance and narrative perpetuated by the PN government, using derogatory and loaded terms such as “illegal migrant workers”, which failed to explain the context of this complicated policy issue. Because newspaper articles are constructed in a problem-orientated manner, their narrative foci implicitly highlighted the authorities’ viewpoints. Between July and September, numerous articles were published and which can be read as highlighting the alleged threats posed by migrant workers. Thus, we can interpret a clear attempt by mainstream media actors to justify the government’s aggressive actions against undocumented migrant workers. The Star, the highest-circulated English-language local newspaper, published more than 30 articles or reports covering migrant workers, at least 13 of which predominantly highlighted negative reactions by various government officials to the Al Jazeera report. The diction and approach to reporting are of particular interest to us. Consider how a particular narrative (i.e., “migrant workers are a threat”) was used in almost all the reports, emphasising quotes from government officials, police officers, academics and local citizens living in areas with significant migrant worker populations. In these reports, migrant workers were always blamed for “causing a spike in Covid cases”. Residents living near factories were cited by the media, expressing their “fear” of the infected migrant workers living in the area. Articles cited professors, columnists and economic experts who claimed that foreign workers were responsible for “spreading the virus” and “increasing hiring cost[s] that worsens the country’s economy”. In this fashion, individual pre-existing stereotypes may be considerably reinforced by the highlighting of xenophobic sentiments among such so-called experts and opinion leaders. A similar overall narrative can be found in Berita Harian, the highestcirculated broadsheet in Malaysia, which published articles and reports that condemned the Al Jazeera report more aggressively, whether directly or indirectly. Words such as “fitnah” (slander), “tidak beretika” (unethical) and “dakwaan palsu” (false accusation) were repeatedly used to describe the report, particularly in articles published on 6, 7 and 10 July. An article from 20 July went even further, questioning the legal status of Al Jazeera itself—by criticising its position as a media agency operating in Malaysia, it thus insinuated the existence of a foreign imperialistic agenda (Chinnasamy, 2020; Kamarulzaman, 2020). Meanwhile, more than 90 articles were published about migrant workers between July and

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September 2020, with most misrepresenting the community in a negative light. Migrant workers were repeatedly described or associated with words such as “bahaya” (dangerous), “ancaman” (threat), “jenayah” (crime), “seludup” (smuggling) and “sindiket ” (syndicate, i.e., crime syndicate). In surveying the various reports, some key observations emerge: migrant workers are collectively depersonalised, blamed and described with negative characteristics. Such misrepresentations extended even to cases where they were clearly not at fault. After hundreds of thousands of migrant workers were detained by the authorities, local businesses suffered a manpower shortage—yet when the media highlighted this issue, local business owners reported that having to hire migrant workers was equally “troublesome”, thus buttressing existing stereotypes of migrants as groups that would run away from employers (Achariam & Easwaran, 2020). Some also claimed that the community started businesses without licences after returning from immigration camps, thus creating “unnecessary” competition with locals. All in all, the media portrayed migrant workers as the source of various problems, from health to labour. An intersection between the demonisation of Al Jazeera’s staff and the migrants is seen regarding a Bangladeshi worker who was interviewed for the programme: the journalists were described as having purposely made a series of false accusations against the Malaysian authorities, whom the writer exhorted to immediately detain and deport them. Furthermore, this cursory analysis shows that ministers’ barefaced denials in response to reports on immigration raids were frequently quoted by the mainstream reporters. This is a typical process because fact-checking before including direct quotes is uncommon, let alone personally visiting immigration camps to verify if there was indeed any mistreatment. Compounding the problem is how media texts often cited the authorities in a particular fashion, framing them as if they were speaking on behalf of all Malaysians. Ministers’ quotations were paraphrased misleadingly, with headlines such as “Al Jazeera reports have frustrated the rakyat [citizens]” or “Malaysians want heavy penalty against the foreign media”, for example, becoming common. This practice reflects how mainstream media organisations explicitly play their roles in nation-building by buttressing official narratives, and part of this process includes problematically speaking on behalf of all Malaysians, who are portrayed as a single entity. The misleading implication is that they all wanted the government to repress Al Jazeera (and by implication,

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migrant workers) for tarnishing the country’s image. This was simply not the case in the lifeworld—human rights organisations and concerned individuals based in Malaysia have vocally condemned the government’s mistreatment of migrant workers (Paul, 2020; Welsh, 2020). A similar logic operates in the representations of migrant workers, who are generally framed and blamed for Malaysia’s own negative representation abroad: the media mainly represents them as a mass, undifferentiated group rather than as individuals. In contrast, some of the authorities, ministers, human rights activists and locals were portrayed as specific individuals with particular names and positions. The inclusion of such specific details acknowledges that these subjects are real people living in the real world. Comparatively, in most of the news articles analysed here, migrant workers were referred to using plural nouns and treated statistically. In general, individuals were only quoted when they were the subjects of a particular report, and were rarely given the chance to contribute to the policy debates which pertained to them. Such policies are thus generated externally, without a clear understanding of the systemic and structural issues that have left many workers remaining undocumented despite years of working in Malaysia, or other key issues such as human trafficking and forced labour, none of which were particularly well explained by the selected mainstream media organisations. Their failure to present the complexity of this issue arguably worsened xenophobic sentiments. Consider how the views of migrant workers were usually excluded, even when the news texts contained appeals to their improved working conditions, hostels and general living environments. Instead, recommendations for action arrived from outside the community: local actors such as the government, civil society members or human rights organisations were prominently featured instead. To be fair to the authorities, there have been reports from government officials acknowledging the importance of improving migrant workers’ welfare. However, the media tends to assign a passive role to these migrants as recipients of government benefits, without recognising the fact that they have often been exploited through globalisation, in a dynamic that persists even during this unfolding process of pandemic-mediated deglobalisation.6 Taken together, all these constitute forms of silencing.

6 See, for example, Chapter 6 by Michael for a further discussion.

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This preliminary analysis shows that at an editorial level, The Star and Berita Harian have no qualms about supporting the government’s point of view. Hence, the reactions against migrant workers in general and the Al Jazeera report in particular are arguably typical of a Gramscian view of hegemony, with its attendant acts of coercion and consensus. In reaction to perceived threats to its hegemony, the PN government and its allied actors (including the press), mobilise resources to support the status quo. In this process, government authorities, academics loyal to its cause and presumably some media workers themselves would apply their influence accordingly. A key point in hegemony is that it does not require the use of force, in contrast to the stereotypical assumptions about authoritarian regimes—rather, it still relies on shoring up ideological support from key actors in society. The narratives and arguments presented by the mainstream media are often redundant, but because they are reiterated so frequently and openly, they are capable of exerting an authorial presence capable of shaping discourse and lived experiences to a significant degree (Said, 1975). To put it very simply—but perhaps not in too reductionist a fashion—how else can migrants possibly be imagined, when reductionist and demeaning terms are immediately conjured up? However, this is not to say that the general public simply accepts media texts uncritically. The examples of protest noted above are already evidence to the contrary, and after all, news reports may be encoded one way, but decoded in another (Hall, 1997).

Discussion and Ethical Reflections In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as adopted by the United Nations, established that everyone is entitled to their respective inalienable rights and freedoms. Similarly, the UNESCO Mass Media Declaration (1978) invited the media to, […] contribute to promoting human rights, in particular by giving expression to oppressed peoples who struggle against […] all forms of racial discrimination and oppression and who are unable to make their voices heard within their territories.

However, the effect of everyday media reportage, specifically in the case of migrant workers during the Covid-19 pandemic, is undoubtedly a reflection—and perhaps even a causal factor—in the escalation

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of xenophobia, whether in thought or action. That this sentiment has been allowed to be perpetuated is unfortunate, being antithetical to the ideal ethos of globalisation as a “new deal” for the global community at the start of the twenty-first century, notwithstanding the negative effects that have been wrought upon various countries and individuals in the process, as highlighted in other chapters. The pandemic has further escalated nationalism, not just in terms of “vaccine nationalism”, but also because the authorities of many countries saw the movements of potential carriers into their respective borders as the biggest threat, hence the persistence of actions such as refusing entry to Rohingya refugees who were already in Malaysian coastal waters. We argue that the Malaysian media should not just focus on the negative aspects of globalisation, but to remain critical by also considering the benefits of this process. However, given the perpetuation of some problematic narratives—for example, some media outlets have framed migrant workers as the cost of globalisation—there is work to be done. This is not a social phenomenon unique to Malaysia: in advanced democracies such as the United States and the United Kingdom, the influence of right-wing ideologies and politics has grown through the deployment of effective media strategies. Therefore, it is crucial that xenophobic media narratives be contested among journalists themselves and by social activists in advocating for more objective and constructive analyses. We argue that newsrooms greatly affect how members of the general public learn about migrant groups and form political judgements accordingly. Therefore, an ethical approach to journalism is essential in disseminating inclusive narratives about migrant workers while simultaneously guaranteeing freedom of expression for all—including for the workers themselves. It is crucial that editors and journalists learn about and vernacularise key international texts condemning discrimination, racism and hate speech, such as the declarations alluded to at the beginning of this section. The notion of fair and respectful media representations has long been entrenched in international codes of media ethics. However, these will remain at the level of rhetoric unless local media organisations, journalists’ associations and actors from industrial sectors actually adapt and practise specific ethical codes of conduct for migration reporting. Moreover, there remains no international monitoring of local dispositions towards migration. Consequently, complaints from the public, civil society and academia are ineffective at revealing the existence of alleged discrimination.

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To understand discrimination in media reporting, we have to start by understanding what is lacking in news coverage, for example, the visibility of migrant workers. It may not be possible to mimetically represent the reality and complexity of migration, but a more complete representation can emerge if the community actually appears and speaks in the news. Newsrooms should understand that the terms used to qualify migrant workers and the visual material selected to document their living conditions are key aspects in shaping representations. Pejorative terms such as “illegal workers” or “outsiders” should not be used. For example, the British Broadcasting Corporation has banned the term “illegal migrants” from its internal ethical code (Ethical Journalism Network, 2015, p. 21). Words with neutral connotations such as “undocumented” should be used instead, to avoid criminalising the community. Likewise, value-laden words such as “invasion”, “flood” or “chaos” must be eliminated. Indeed, the deployment of phrases such as “our country”, “our nation”, “our culture” or “our traditions”, with their notions of exclusivity, tend to worsen societal divisions. Human rights activists argue that the media should not represent the migrant community in binary opposition with host societies (Desmarès, 2018), and therefore, this “us against them” narrative in news coverage, even if unintentionally deployed, must stop. The same goes for the deployment of homogenising terms that represent groups of individuals as a uniform mass, because fixed and oversimplified images of migrant workers also tend to convey negative and unfair representations. It is necessary for journalists to ensure a diverse and representational coverage of the many migrant communities to platform a wide array of voices, thus further informing the public about their diversity—the conditions faced by an Indonesian domestic worker would, for example, be very different from those experienced by a Bangladeshi construction worker. Therefore, journalists and editors should diversify their sources of information by offering more spaces to migrant workers and/or (but perhaps to a lesser degree) individuals working directly with the community. Journalists should also be aware that in interviewing migrant workers, it is their responsibility to ensure the safety of their sources. The Bangladeshi worker’s deportation cited above, in the case of the Al Jazeera documentary, is a vivid case in point of the risks involved in revealing migrant workers’ identities, although its potential elimination is complicated by the practice of “bulletproofing” news stories. Therefore, journalists should ethically grant anonymity to those most at risk to avoid

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the potential consequences facing these individuals, either from within their host societies or countries of origin. Some media experts have proposed that media regulations be introduced by the state to prevent stigmatisation, racism and xenophobia from being escalated by unprofessional news coverage. Some international groups have been calling for such regulations to counter xenophobia, as exacerbated by certain media outlets. However, the implementation of such regulations seemingly contradicts press freedom in particular, and freedom of expression in general—is there a way to ensure that ethical standards can be upheld without resorting to a battery of laws that can be misused, such as those cited above? In semi-authoritarian regimes such as Malaysia, given that the existing media environment is already so restrictive, further regulations may threaten the media’s independence, hence returning us to the key problem that we have outlined. We emphasise that freedom of expression is a reciprocal right that should inculcate tolerance and understanding among all individuals, and that this should not be construed as espousing support for hateful discourse. Ethical standards that seek to eradicate stereotypical, discriminatory and xenophobic statements do not restrain journalists’ autonomy, but instead, they should be understood as engendering a space where everyone’s voices can be safely heard. Therefore, instead of imposing further state regulations, the internalisation of ethics and professionalism should be emphasised as more effective solutions instead. It is essential that we create a functional, selfregulating community involving unions of journalists, media activists, non-governmental organisations and universities to support and conduct activities, workshops or training, with the goal of improving migration coverage, countering xenophobia and promoting ethical representations of migrant workers. Media organisations should take the initiative to hold internal discussions on potential ways to counter xenophobia, for example, by assessing their existing training practices to raise awareness of the need for coexistence, engaging in the critical analysis of broader systems and structures as well as, if they deem it necessary, developing partnerships to design new training activities. In the potentially fraught coverage of migration- or refugee-related stories, it is crucial that newsrooms employ journalists or freelancers with a good knowledge of the international refugee regime as well as the causes and consequences of economic migration.

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Such a functional community—or perhaps even a national media council, if discussions on its establishment proceed without undue delay— can play a constructive role in defining and reinforcing ethical standards on representations. Its first step should be to make existing reporting guidelines more accessible to journalists and the public across multiple languages, and that these should be seen as living documents, i.e., they should be reassessed systematically to review the details of codes of ethics and, if deemed necessary, to also encompass specific reporting guidelines to counter xenophobia and hatred towards migrant workers. Discussions should take place to assess how effectively journalists are carrying out their reportage, for instance, by adjudicating complaints regarding discriminatory migration coverage. Lastly, the media community should actively share ideas and experiences on international migration reporting guidelines to assess the feasibility and relevance of adopting a more uniform code of ethics. Existing projects aiming to provide analyses of migration coverage, counter xenophobia and promote ethical representations of migration, regardless of the parties behind them, should be evaluated to monitor their implementation and assess their impact (Desmarès, 2018).

Conclusion As the Covid-19 pandemic unfolded, so too did two contradictory processes. Globalisation continued to facilitate the distribution of vaccines worldwide, even as deglobalisation manifested in the different ways in which countries enforced lockdown measures, by preventing foreign nationals from crossing their borders, to the detriment of the international movement of tourists, goods and supplies, for instance. Such preventions at the height of the pandemic were necessary and justifiable to control transmissions, but what was not justifiable was the xenophobic, anti-migrant attitude that falsely blamed migrant workers for the high number of local transmissions. This sentiment informed an overarching narrative that emerged from our analysis of mainstream media reports, which not only misrepresented but also silenced the community. We argue that media reporting can potentially accelerate deglobalisation through its negative representations of migrant workers, thus emboldening xenophobic sentiments within society—resolving such sentiments constitutes a key priority on the global migration agenda. Notably, the growth in popularity and use of social media has not diminished the influence of traditional media such as newspapers and

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television, especially among middle-aged and older adults. Indeed, the consumption and discussion of such news texts, as circulated and shared on social media, may effectively buttress their influence and legitimacy despite emerging digital transformations. Hence, the mainstream press should vigilantly consider its moral responsibility in inculcating positive societal values. Instead of continuously perpetuating hatred and animosity among various communities, the press should consider embracing a more constructive and inclusive narrative that celebrates cultural diversity and the positive features of globalisation, while remaining critical of social realities and the very real factors which led to the emergence of negative sentiments in the first place. This is not an easy task—indeed, it requires professional fact-checking to verify all data received and provide a clearer context for every issue covered by the media. Its practitioners should not allow themselves to perpetuate politically hegemonic narratives with clear or vested interests, but in practice, the reality of media ownership constitutes a key barrier towards being critical. For now, proactive initiatives such as creating a functional community to provide training and hold workshops to foster a more professional media environment are key steps. The conventionally perceived role of the media as a tool for preserving hegemony must be accounted for. Otherwise, the media will not be able to play its esteemed role as the Fourth Estate—even while we acknowledge that the ideals and traditions of journalism, like all things, are an invention—unless and until it is able to be critical and independent.

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Political and Social Deglobalisation in Malaysia: Discrimination Against Migrants and Refugees During the Covid-19 Pandemic Aaron Denison Deivasagayam

Introduction The Covid-19 pandemic affected many countries worldwide, including Malaysia, bringing about a changing environment in terms of how we interact with each other at a global scale. It has interrupted tourism, trade and supply chains, which have in turn affected the global economy (Ali & Nilashi, 2020), arguably leading to a global recession with a greater impact than the 2008–9 global financial crisis (International Monetary Fund, 2020), with corresponding impacts on social lives and interpersonal interactions between and within countries. For the governor of the Bank of Japan, Haruhiko Kuroda (2020), the pandemic’s impact on Asian economies mainly resulted in: (1) decreased exports; (2) decreased inbound-related demand against a background of tightened border controls; and (3) decreased domestic private consumption. Such limited political, economic and social interactions significantly slowed down the

A. D. Deivasagayam (B) Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Hiroshima University, Hiroshima, Japan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. Ying Hooi et al. (eds.), Social and Political Deglobalisation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6823-7_8

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rate of globalisation, or perhaps even reversed it altogether in a process that might be termed as “deglobalisation” (Abdal & Ferreira, 2021; Bloom, 2020). As discussed in Chapter 1, deglobalisation is not a novel process. Although costly in terms of economic losses, it arguably reduced Covid-19 transmissions, particularly since international travel was a significant factor for the initial increase in cases worldwide (Farzanegan et al., 2020). Many countries faced significant challenges in balancing globalisation and deglobalisation; hence, striking the right balance between both processes is crucial for ensuring that globalisation continues in a different form under the so-called “new normal”. In order to better understand this reversal, it is crucial to further explain (de)globalisation. Rather than a limited definition pertaining to the increased movement of goods, capital and workers (Grieco & Ikenberry, 2003), a more encompassing definition extends beyond an economic framework alone. For example, Sassen (2007) views globalisation as a set of cross-border and inter-escalating supranational dynamics linking and integrating territories, organisations and/or (state) institutions in transnational networks (e.g., global production chains, financial markets, city networks, activism networks, social movements). Deglobalisation, meanwhile, is a relapse in such international flows, largely manifested in trade protectionism, regulations of capital flows, limitations of movements and attempts to restrict access to information, for example (Manfredi-Sanchez, 2021). By unfolding, deglobalisation represents a weakening interdependence between nation-states, not just in economic but also political and even social terms. Its effects are felt at the domestic level—on political and social fronts, political elites and local citizens may voice their displeasure, not directly with globalisation per se but its concrete manifestations. The right-wing pushback mostly exhibits anti-migrant and anti-refugee sentiments or the apparent interference of international organisations into local norms and affairs, thus contributing to the rise of populism or nationalism (although these may overlap, they are distinct phenomena). Notable pre-pandemic examples include the so-called “Brexit” and right-wing populist movements in Poland and Hungary. The Covid-19 pandemic has shifted momentum towards further deglobalisation, and particularly worrying is the corresponding neglect of international norms and human rights—this chapter will focus particularly on migrant workers and refugees in the Malaysian context, many of whom were deported unlawfully, having been labelled as health risks,

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while others were excluded from access to healthcare and social protection systems by the authorities, who justified these actions as acts meant to prioritise the protection of citizens (International Organization for Migration, 2022; Khalidi & Muhamad Noor, 2020). The general effect has been the reinforcement of public perceptions that these communities pose risks, rather than being at risk themselves (Hennebry & Hari, 2020). This chapter demonstrates how political and (eventually) social deglobalisation affected migrants and refugees, who became the targets of discriminatory government policies (e.g., unfair detentions). At this point, I will make a conceptual distinction between the executive authorities and the legislative political elites, to distinguish between state institutions such as the police and immigration officials, versus elected lawmakers engaged in party politics. Collectively, these would be regarded as part of the government (which of course refers to executive, legislative and judicial entities). I argue that the two entities studied here play very different roles in this context. Meanwhile, the government’s more domestic approach in handling the pandemic (i.e., by appealing to populist sentiment) instead of a global or universal ethos drew positive responses from members of the public, who generally regarded migrant workers and refugees as threats to health and safety. Specifically, I examine the government and general public’s pre-pandemic attitudes and perceptions towards these groups, and whether or not there was a sort of acceptance of them on the bases of labour and humanitarian responsibilities. In a sense, this chapter functions as a coda to the discussions that have emerged in this section of the volume, further contextualising the various issues discussed so far—i.e., the right to health, labour exploitation and freedom of expression—within the broader framework of pandemic governance vis-à-vis migrants and refugees.

Pre-pandemic Perceptions Towards Migrant and Refugee Communities Malaysia has had a long history of hosting migrants—in the modern sense of the term—with significant movements dating back to the British colonial period (Mosbah et al., 2018). This dynamic persisted after independence, where economic growth and development left Malaysia increasingly reliant on export-oriented, labour-intensive industries. Recruiting foreign labour was an essential part of its development strategy, a task made easier by political stability (Hamzah et al., 2020; Kaur, 2010). As

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of 2020, Malaysia was home to approximately two million documented foreign workers, and an estimated additional two to four million undocumented ones (Lee, 2020). Despite a presumed discomfort with their numbers, there was a tacit public understanding, echoed by the government, that their presence was necessary to fill employment gaps in jobs that were not attractive for locals. Meanwhile, there has historically been a tolerance for refugees, especially those fleeing persecution from within Southeast Asia. In the 1970s, refugees who fled the Vietnam War were allowed access before they were repatriated (Kaur, 2007). Refugees from Mindanao, in the southern Philippines, applied for asylum and were eventually granted residency visas, an offer which was extended to ethnic Chams fleeing Cambodia in the 1970s and Bosnians following the Bosnian civil war in the 1990s. More recently, Malaysia has emerged as a primary host of Muslims fleeing persecution in Myanmar, Afghanistan, Yemen and Palestine, among other territories. Thus, there has long been a general understanding that Malaysians need to carry out their humanitarian duties for the refugee community, and in some cases, this approach is in line with supporting a foreign policy agenda for global Muslim solidarity. The Rohingya of Myanmar offer an insightful case study here. In 2016, Islamic non-governmental organisations organised a well-received pro-Rohingya rally, with thousands of Malaysians and Rohingya refugees in attendance, where they strongly condemned the Burmese government’s genocide against the community (Teoh, 2016). The rally was also attended by the then-Prime Minister, Najib Razak, who urged action from the United Nations and fellow Asian leaders, besides criticising Myanmar’s the then-Head of State, Aung San Suu Kyi, for not taking serious action against the military (Menon, 2016; The Guardian, 2016). As of the end of November 2022, some 182,990 refugees and asylum-seekers were registered with the local United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), most of whom were from Myanmar (UNHCR, 2022). Of these, more than 100,000 were Rohingya, with the rest being other persecuted ethnic minorities. Regardless, from a security standpoint, the Malaysian government has at times been concerned about some members of these communities being involved in illegal or even militant activity, although such cases are usually not widespread. Members of the public had expressed frustration

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and complaints about certain members of migrant and refugee communities whom they deemed as being impolite or who were operating businesses without licences. Such generalisations have contributed to growing hostile and negative perceptions towards them among the general public. Official complaints lodged with the authorities were acted upon, but in some instances, the authorities themselves were deemed to have continuously harassed individuals with no connection to these complaints. A careful balancing act by the government was observed prior to the start of lockdowns—known locally as Movement Control Orders (MCOs), which varied according to the severity of transmissions—when a mass religious gathering in Kuala Lumpur became a Covid-19 hotspot at the end of February 2020 (Ananthalakshmi & Sipalan, 2020), just prior to the MCO’s declaration. Almost 16,000 people, including 1,500 foreigners, attended the gathering and were considered as “close contacts”, as the number of confirmed cases among the attendees increased. The government had asked all attendees, irrespective of their legal immigration status, to present themselves for free testing if they exhibited symptoms, making assurances that no arrests would be made (Razak, 2020). It should be noted that following political manoeuvring, a new government, dominated by the Perikatan Nasional coalition with the collusion of Barisan Nasional, had just come into power and was therefore lacking legitimacy, having emerged without a popular mandate and needing to shore up legitimacy—and I will argue below that securitisation would henceforth play a significant role in maintaining the new government’s public image.1 Henceforth, it might be regarded that despite what seemed to be a series of punitive if largely ineffective measures—especially given that the government’s own actions, such as allowing the Sabah state election to proceed despite rising case numbers, were arguably more destructive in terms of human health—the performative nature of actions targeting marginalised groups and their significant visibility would go a long way towards shoring up legitimacy, perhaps in a variation of which Iza Ding (2020) terms as “performative governance”. With increasing case numbers came a significant shift in the treatment of migrants and refugees. The government began to not only support but to even encourage excessive actions by the executive authorities, i.e., state institutions, to portray a positive image of its handling of the pandemic, which 1 A further discussion of the political background and this government’s constitutionality can be found in Chapter 5 by Lau.

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in turn earned positive reactions from the public, in a demonstration of the dominant ethos of deglobalisation. Clearly, the concept of universal humanitarian values was no longer of immediate relevance.

Repressive Measures Towards Migrants and Refugees During the Pandemic It has been suggested that there is a positive correlation between refugee populations in a particular state, and said state’s degree of repression (Wright & Moorthy, 2018). This may well be the case here, although I contend that this phenomenon also extends to migrants in general. Below, some repressive actions taken by the executive authorities against migrants and refugees, with the collusion and encouragement of legislative political elites, will be documented. Using lockdown measures as an excuse, state actions left many members of these communities vulnerable, and they were further targeted through discriminatory standard operating procedures (SOPs) that persisted even after lockdowns ended. Hardline anti-migrant and anti-refugee policies underlined the various MCOs, particularly from May 2020 onwards, operated in tandem with social deglobalisation, as expressed in deepening hatred and xenophobia among the public (Fishbein, 2020). The shift in the government’s attitude, away from an inclusive balancing act towards espousing nationalism (Wahab, 2020), can be read as a manifestation of deglobalisation, particularly through border restrictions and police actions which triggered widespread fear and affected thousands of (un)documented migrants and refugees. Strict border controls were not specific to Malaysia, but their local impact is indicative of shifts away from a historic tolerance towards refugees. On 16 April, about 200 Rohingya refugees arrived by boat in Langkawi but were denied entry by the authorities, citing fears that they would contribute to rising Covid-19 cases (New Straits Times, 2020a). They were just provided with food and asked to leave. On 11 June, another boat carrying about 300 refugees tried to land but was also turned back—it was believed that the boat had been at sea for three to four months and had already tried to enter the country’s waters several times. Regardless of border restrictions, this was in stark contrast to the treatment of Vietnamese refugees decades earlier, but perhaps this occurred out of genuine fear of increased Covid-19 cases. Meanwhile, on the domestic front, a series of police raids, arrests and detentions ensued. On 1 May, as many as 700 undocumented migrants,

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including some Rohingya refugees, were apprehended following immigration raids at Jalan Masjid India, a neighbourhood in Kuala Lumpur, which was home to thousands of migrants and refugees (Al Jazeera, 2020). This neighbourhood was located close to three buildings that had been placed under an Enhanced MCO—i.e., essentially a total lockdown— after a surge in local cases (The Straits Times, 2020). Another round of raids took place on 11 May, where 1,368 undocumented migrants were arrested at the Selayang Wholesale Market—the area around which had been subject to identical restrictions—located just outside Kuala Lumpur (Latiff, 2020). Among those arrested were 261 women and 98 children. Three days later, a third raid in the same area saw the arrest of 113 undocumented migrants, including 11 children, for reportedly possessing forged documents and overstaying (Malay Mail, 2020). Consider how disease prevention may not have been the sole focus—the government also claimed that Rohingya refugees dominated and controlled businesses at this market (Rohingya Women Development Network and Elom Empowerment, 2020; Sukhani, 2020). Thus, the authorities appeared to be using the lockdowns to selectively round up members of migrant and refugee communities, as implicitly confirmed by Abdul Hamid Bador, the former inspector general of police—he had stated that these actions were necessary to maintain order and prevent migrants from travelling, which he claimed would increase the risk of infections (BBC, 2020). Ironically, state actions arguably worsened the risk of transmissions in addition to violating their rights. Images that circulated on social media showed dozens of arrested migrant workers lining up in close quarters, where all those arrested, including women and children, were loaded into cramped and unsanitary police trucks. Such actions followed a logic of containment, isolation and alienation, which resulted in their placement into detention centres to reduce the risk of spreading Covid-19 to Malaysians, rather than adhering to the regular SOPs which called for citizens to be housed in hygienic quarantine centres. The premeditated nature of these operations was made obvious when media workers were prevented from taking pictures and videos (Zack, 2020). Indeed, such actions were the norm in the government’s handling of the pandemic, as explicitly encouraged by political elites. The former Defence Minister—and later Prime Minister—Ismail Sabri Yaakob, who was also the senior minister in charge of security, defended the government’s actions, arguing that those arrested should not receive preferential treatment because they had violated immigration

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laws and were hence subject to punishment (Kanyakumari, 2020). The then-Prime Minister, Muhyiddin Yassin, blamed undocumented migrants for the increase in Covid-19 cases in Sabah during a national television address in October (Esmaquel, 2020; Loheswar, 2020)—ironically, his government’s decision to allow its state election was significantly more calamitous.2 While one might argue that both senior political leaders were only focusing on “illegal” and “undocumented” migrants, the reality was very different: after all, most individuals detained were indeed legally within their rights to be in Malaysia. The encoding of “migrants” with “illegality”—and thus being “undocumented”—further worsened matters. With no visible way of determining a migrant’s or refugee’s “legal” status outside of inspecting their paperwork, by extension, all migrants and refugees are subject to suspicion. The introduction of a Recalibration Programme (Repatriation) in November can be read as a result of such elite support. This initiative, which targeted undocumented migrants who overstayed or entered Malaysia without a valid pass, entailed “voluntary” repatriation to their countries of origin (Immigration Department of Malaysia, 2020). In reality, this meant forced deportations. Up to August 2021, 96,809 undocumented migrants had been “repatriated” (Malay Mail, 2021), primarily to Indonesia, Nepal, Bangladesh and Myanmar. The most controversial “repatriations” occurred in February 2021, when 1,086 Myanmar nationals were sent back despite a court order against this action (BBC, 2021; Strangio, 2021). Amnesty International Malaysia and Asylum Access had filed a court challenge when the government first announced the plan, arguing that Malaysia would be returning vulnerable people to persecution, given the recent return of military rule in Myanmar. The activists asserted that among this group were vulnerable asylum-seekers and refugees from the minority Chin, Kachin and non-Rohingya Muslim communities, but the Immigration Department maintained that none of the deportees were Rohingya refugees or asylumseekers, while also insisting on the programme’s “voluntary” nature (The Straits Times, 2021). Meanwhile, foreigners who spoke out against such discriminatory treatment were also unilaterally deported without due process, most notably Rayhan Kabir, a Bangladeshi national who had 2 This is not to forget that in the Sabahan context specifically, the notion of “undocumented migrants” runs counter to a historic fluidity in regional migratory patterns that were eventually disrupted by the borders of modern nation-states (Somiah, 2021).

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openly spoken up in an Al Jazeera documentary, before being eventually arrested and deported following a manhunt (The Straits Times, 2020b). Although no specific reason was given, the implication was that the government was displeased with his criticisms (Chu, 2020). Such forced deportations remain couched in the language of public protection and/or agency of the “volunteers”, despite the open manhunts and clear circumvention of court orders. Such repressive actions and policies, tacitly encouraged by the government, have resulted in nearly 29,000 individuals, including asylumseekers, being arrested for allegedly violating the MCO—some refugees were held in police stations for days before being fined and released, lacking fluency in the Malay language to explain where they were going and what they were doing (Fishbein, 2020). SOPs continued to discriminate against marginalised communities, even as restrictions were briefly lifted under the Recovery MCO. As businesses resumed work, it was mandatory for employers to ensure that all foreign workers, including migrants and refugees, undergo Covid-19 tests (Latiff & Das, 2020). Those who did not contribute funds to the Social Security Organisation were required to pay their own costs out of pocket, neatly allowing employers to evade paying the necessary expenses (Malaysiakini, 2020; New Straits Times, 2020b). It was only after much pressure from trade unions that the government decided to reverse this policy. These SOPs also extended beyond workplaces and to places of worship. Foreigners were prohibited from participating in congregational prayers, including Friday sessions, at local mosques alleged because of increased of Covid-19 cases among their community (Choong, 2020). Such normalisation also implicated those holding a legal status, thus enforcing their separation from society, whose members appear to have subscribed in part to state goals and justifications—the possible dynamics of which are discussed elsewhere in this volume.3 Indeed, the government appeared to gain popularity through its punitive actions, despite clear violations of international norms and human rights. The dehumanisation of foreigners, now signified as the locus of Covid-19 transmissions, took precedence over morals, values and principles.

3 See Chapter 7 by Kow and Samsudin for further details.

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Public Opinion and Reactions by Human Rights Groups Although various civil society and international organisations called out the government for its discriminatory actions, the general public seemed convinced by their necessity and apparently supported these actions. Previous positive and humanistic attitudes were eroded by the pandemic’s onset and the justifications provided by the government (E. Ding, 2020). The emergent negative public perception towards refugees was cemented when the head of the Myanmar Ethnic Rohingya Human Rights Organisation Malaysia, Zafar Ahmad Abdul Ghani, was wrongly accused of demanding citizenship and equal rights for the Rohingya refugees in Malaysia, allegations which he denied (Augustin, 2020). Videos of him were circulated on social media, and whether this was done by accident or design, only increased negative public sentiments towards refugees and further justified repressive official actions. This is not to say that communities such as the Rohingya were completely passive; rather, they were agentic to some degree and engaged in what Nursyazwani and Aslam Abd Jalil (2023) have termed as “grateful politics”, by performing gratitude through online campaigns such as #ThankYouMalaysia and #GratefulRohingya, besides self-policing to mitigate the negative public perception against them. As a result of these allegations, the public perception of the Rohingya refugees and migrants in general devolved, where online abuse and xenophobic comments were targeted towards the community on social media. Note, however, that “cybertroopers” are a mainstay in the local digital landscape, and it can be difficult to distinguish between state actors and ordinary Malaysians in digital discourse.4 For example, some comments on Facebook called for the Rohingya to be chased out of Malaysia, since they were not the responsibility of the Malaysian government, while others accused them of being ungrateful and arrogant (Augustin, 2020). Zafar, his family and fellow committee members were the primary target of abuse and death threats (Free Malaysia Today, 2020a). Online petitions demanded that the Rohingya be deported, one of which garnered almost 20,000 signatories before being removed by the host website

4 See the work of the media scholar, Benjamin Y.H. Loh (n.d.) for further information on cybertroopers.

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for espousing hate speech (Bedi, 2020). Abuse spilled out into the lifeworld, where a Rohingya grasscutter was accused of not complying with the MCO’s regulations, although he was clearly a contract worker out at work, and harassed into proving that he was indeed Muslim (Free Malaysia Today, 2020b). Arguably, these attitudes were influenced and reinforced by the actions of the authorities and political elites. Despite the nearly overwhelming public opinion in support of state actions, there were dissenters. Local human rights groups were concerned by these negative developments, and the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM) urged the authorities to halt these arrests immediately, and to keep their initial promise of treating all peoples equally, regardless of immigration status. Citing Article 5(1) of the Federal Constitution, SUHAKAM argued that the government needed to ensure that no person was to be deprived of their life or personal liberty, including their rights to food, work and health (SUHAKAM, 2020). Similarly, the North–South Initiative, an organisation that monitored labour and immigration-related abuses, noted that there was a persistent false perception that Malaysia simply did not have enough resources to go around, i.e., the justification for why the government should help Malaysians first (Chung, 2020). Such rhetoric simply inflamed public opinion towards migrants and refugees, much in line with the trend of deglobalisation. Meanwhile, international organisations condemned the ongoing repression and crackdowns. Felipe González Morales, the United Nations’ special rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, issued a statement urging the Malaysian authorities to refrain from raiding areas under lockdowns to arrest and detain migrants, emphasising that alternatives to detention should always be considered first—after all, opportunities for physical distancing and other preventive measures may not be available in detention facilities (OHCHR, 2020). Amnesty International Malaysia (2020) also issued a statement expressing concern about such disregard for human rights and public health, urging the authorities to immediately release detainees and stating that there was no reason to detain undocumented migrants if they tested negative for Covid-19—meanwhile, those who did test positive should have unrestricted access to essential health services and safety. Representatives of the European Union and the United States also expressed concern regarding the “voluntary” deportation of the Myanmar nationals and had futilely attempted to dissuade Malaysia from proceeding, arguing that by doing so, it was effectively legitimising Myanmar’s military government (Ananthalakshmi & Latiff,

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2021). Following such criticism, the government justified its actions as being necessary: as a sovereign state with its own set of laws, it had the authority to act against “illegal immigrants” who endangered national security and public wellbeing. Thus, the response accorded was coded in line with the broader sentiments of deglobalisation, having eschewed the language of human rights, protocols and conventions of the United Nations (to which Malaysia belonged), thus dismissing such criticisms and urging as foreign interference. For members of migrant and refugee communities, fear ensued, with many becoming concerned about their safety. Some were fearful of receiving more xenophobic remarks while others experienced significant psychological distress, particularly when they heard sirens or bumped into uniformed authorities. The constant reversals in government policies contributed to growing distrust, and as a result of increased raids and arrests, the community lost trust in government announcements altogether, particularly those relating to them. As a result, many failed to appear for screenings—some preferred remaining silent and even died from Covid-19, being too afraid of getting arrested. Arguably, they had been used as scapegoats by the Malaysian government to deflect blame from its own inability to manage the pandemic effectively, which succeeded in harnessing public opinion and uncertainty. Therefore, the authorities could act without much opposition from the public, except for some dissenting minority voices. Otherwise, protests were further muted by the MCO restrictions.

Conclusion The mistreatment of migrants and refugees demonstrates a clear decline in the discourse and practice of human rights, where the Malaysian government successfully appropriated deglobalisation-related sentiments to convince the public that it was necessary to arrest, detain and deport members of these marginalised groups. It chose to employ what I call a domestic approach by prioritising the rights and security of Malaysians over foreigners, rather than pursuing an approach premised upon the notion of global citizenship, which is arguably a cornerstone of globalisation. As the number of Covid-19 cases increased, the government needed to scapegoat a particular party, and thus migrants and refugees became the obvious victims. Arguably, doing so detracted from the systemic and

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structural erosion of the right to health among citizens.5 For instance, further neglect of marginalised Malaysians, such as those from the ethnic Indian community, were not discussed to any significant degree (Thambiah & Loh, 2023). Using the erosion of human rights as a proxy for the process of deglobalisation, I argue that initial punitive actions (e.g., mass arrests) were enhanced through supportive public statements made by influential political elites, including the prime minister. The entrenchment of deglobalisation was clear when large segments of the public seemingly became convinced that such actions were the best way to recover from the pandemic. Criticisms by human rights and international organisations were regarded as forms of interference into Malaysia’s internal affairs. Such actions were undeniably populist and nationalistic in nature, unfairly targeting non-citizens who were excluded from the body politic. The migrant and refugee communities, regardless of the (il)legality of individual members’ statuses, were assumed to be part of the problem and subject to maltreatment throughout the various MCOs. Although the government has since softened its stance by requiring employers to play a greater role in protecting foreign workers (such as through the National Action Plan on Forced Labour),6 allowing migrant and refugee communities to enter mosques again and providing vaccinations regardless of immigration status, the fear from the period studied here persists—such are the long-term effects of discursive violence. This is not just a Malaysian issue, of course: the ideals and practice of globalisation have taken a back seat in many other countries, where border restrictions and the need to protect citizens have been prioritised by ruling governments. By acting upon these fears, however harshly, pandemic governance arguably garners public support: a trend that we might expect to see in future crises. But while globalisation may yet return to its privileged position, the impacts of deglobalisation may linger on and, in the Malaysian context, remain particularly salient for migrants and refugees.

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5 See Chapter 5 by Lau for further details. 6 See Chapter 6 by Michael for further details.

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Today. https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/opinion/2020/04/ 26/who-are-the-rohingyas-and-what-do-they-want/ Sassen, S. (2007). A sociology of globalization (1st ed.). W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. Somiah, V. (2021). Irregular migrants and the sea at the borders of Sabah, Malaysia: Pelagic Alliance. Palgrave Macmillan. Strangio, S. (2021, February 24). Defying court order, Malaysia deports asylum seekers to Myanmar. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/def ying-court-order-malaysia-deports-asylum-seekers-to-myanmar/ SUHAKAM. (2020, May 2). Press Statement No. 15 of 2020 (“Suhakam Urges Authorities to Cease Arrest of Undocumented Migrants during Covid-19 https://suhakam.org.my/2020/05/press-statement-no-15-ofCrisis”). 2020-suhakam-urges-authorities-to-cease-arrest-of-undocumented-migrantsduring-covid-19-crisis/ Sukhani, P. (2020, July 10). The Shifting Politics of Rohingya Refugees in Malaysia. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/the-shifting-pol itics-of-rohingya-refugees-in-malaysia/ Teoh, S. (2016, December 4). Mass rally in Malaysia calling for support of Myanmar’s Rohingya Muslims. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes. com/asia/se-asia/mass-rally-in-malaysia-calling-for-support-of-myanmars-roh ingya-muslims Thambiah, S., & Loh, B.Y. (2023). Confronting Malaysian Indian stereotypes and state neglect: The ‘SuguPavithra’ Episode within mainstream national discourse. In B. Y. Loh, & J. Chin, (eds.), New media in the Margins. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7141-9_6 The Guardian. (2016, December 4). Malaysia PM urges world to act against “genocide” of Myanmar’s Rohingya. https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2016/dec/04/malaysia-pm-urges-world-to-act-against-genocide-of-mya nmars-rohingya The Straits Times. (2020a, May 1). Malaysia detains hundreds of refugees and migrants during coronavirus lockdown. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/ se-asia/malaysia-detains-hundreds-of-refugees-and-migrants-during-virus-loc kdown ———. (2020b, July 25). Malaysia arrests Bangladeshi worker critical of its treatment of migrants. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysiaarrests-bangladeshi-worker-critical-of-its-treatment-of-migrants ———. (2021, February 22). Malaysia deports 1,086 Myanmar nationals, despite court-ordered stay. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysia-pre pares-to-deport-myanmar-asylum-seekers-and-detainees-despite-outcry UNHCR. (2022, November). Figures at a Glance in Malaysia. https://www. unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance-in-malaysia.html

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Wahab, A. (2020). The Outbreak of Covid-19 In Malaysia: Pushing Migrant Workers at the Margin. Social Sciences & Humanities Open, 2(1), 100073. Wright, T. M., & Moorthy, S. (2018). Refugees, economic capacity, and host state repression. International Interactions, 44(1), 132–155. Zack, J. (2020, May 12). Immigration detains 1,368 illegals after Kuala Lumpur Wholesale Market raid Monday (May 11). The Star. https://www.the star.com.my/news/nation/2020/05/12/immigration-detains-1368-illegalsafter-kuala-lumpur-wholesale-market-raid-monday-may-11

Deglobalisation in Sabah

Skewed Priorities in Sabah’s Food Policies: (Post-)pandemic Mediated Deglobalisation and Food Security Firdausi Suffian

Introduction Measured in terms of resources, Sabah is one of the richest states in Malaysia and is the main contributor to the national gross domestic product (GDP), as measured over the past decades (Suffian, 2021).1 It is also the third-largest contributor to the agricultural sector after Sarawak and Johor, having prioritised palm oil and other industrial crops such as rubber and cocoa. Following the federal government’s decision to expand palm oil plantations in the 1980s, vast swathes of land were converted into industrial cropland, which means that to date, Sabah remains Malaysia’s largest producer of palm oil (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2019). Conversely, the expansion of the agro-food subsector is quite limited, and thus Sabah relies on imports of food crops, especially rice (Kelly et al., 1 However, nuance is needed here, especially considering Sabah’s relative poverty according to other measures. See the other discussions in this section, particularly Chapter 10 by Jawing et al.

F. Suffian (B) Faculty of Administrative Science and Policy Studies, Universiti Teknologi MARA, Shah Alam, Malaysia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. Ying Hooi et al. (eds.), Social and Political Deglobalisation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6823-7_9

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2017). Regardless, according to the Sabah Maju Jaya Plan (SMJ, introduced in 2020), its paddy and rice subsectors have always remained one of the more important considerations in Sabah’s agricultural development, despite remaining underdeveloped compared to its peninsular Malaysia counterparts (Suffian et al., 2022a). In general, close to 70% of available cropland is used for cultivating industrial crops, thus reducing the available land for food production. Given that paddy requires a longer period to yield harvests compared to palm oil, most companies venture into the latter industry (Lamdin et al., 2016). Regardless, the state government aims to boost domestic production and raise the rice self-sufficiency level (SSL), given that this is the state’s staple food. Various lacklustre programmes were rolled out over the past decades to improve paddy production and capacity, and the 1990s-era objective of achieving a 60% SSL remains unattained. This struggle is particularly serious in the context of Covid-19mediated deglobalisation, where nation-states have started to focus on ensuring their domestic interests, as inferred from the implementation of “local solutions”, export bans and more restrictive non-tariff barriers. Policymakers are cautious about the international trade in goods and services (James, 2018), including the food subsector, with implications for the broader supply chain. Lockdowns and trade restrictions disrupted this chain and raised governmental concerns over the accessibility of food supplies, hence leading to an emphasis on ensuring that their respective populations have sufficient staple food. Hence, countries or subnational regions that rely on food imports, such as Sabah, are at risk of food insecurity. Consequently, its state government reiterated the importance of food security by emphasising the expansion of the agrofood subsector to achieve the intended SSL. Using qualitative methods of primary data-gathering—e.g., interviews with key policymakers, focus group discussions with farmers, think tanks as well as small- and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs)—and secondary sources (e.g., published and unpublished government reports), this chapter analyses the skewed priorities in Sabah’s food policies, framed in the context of (post-)pandemic deglobalisation.

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Deglobalisation, State Institutions and Sabah’s Food Policy Stiglitz (2002) simply defines globalisation as the removal of barriers to free trade and the closer integration of national economies. In short, it is concerned with economic integration to increase the movement of goods, services and capital across borders, where the “retreat of the state” allows capitalist expansion to penetrate international borders (Strange, 1997). Neoliberal proponents argue that the main role of the globalised state is ensuring business-friendly local environments so that the “free market” can operate at an optimal level. However, the recent rise of deglobalisation—i.e., reversed or decreased interdependence and integration among countries (Gedikli et al., 2015)—offers room for analysis. Trade protectionism can be read alongside financial crises, political decoupling as well geopolitical tensions (Antràs, 2020). After worldwide Covid-19 outbreaks, various countries became even less connected, for example by imposing trade restrictions and banning exports to tackle domestic shortages—particularly of food. Hence, the “return of the state” plays a strategic role in the prioritisation of domestic interests and focusing on “local solution[s] first” (Kornprobst & Wallace, 2022). It is important to mention, however, that the state is a set of institutions (Haggard, 2004), and these individual institutions play a significant role in the success and/ or failure of policy configurations and implementation. By setting the “rules of the game”, whether through formal “rules” such as the implementation of policies, laws and regulations, or informal ones such as norms, values and embedded conventions (North, 1991, p. 479), institutions structure the interactions of actors, which could potentially affect societal, political and economic outcomes. These rules are heterogeneous by nature, and thus vary between countries—and in the Federation of Malaysia’s case, significant variations exist even between individual states. Such institutions are influenced by histories, power relations and norms, which shape political and economic actors’ interactions, ideas and interests in the policymaking domain accordingly (Hall, 1990; Scott, 2008; Suffian, 2019). Unsurprisingly, food policies are linked to institutions, where government policies are responsible for shaping an environment to enable farmers to develop their technical capacity (e.g., skills, experience, expertise) and capital (e.g., investments in machinery, equipment, technologies) to produce higher levels of output. Although these are fundamental

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components in growing food policies, they are merely a “proximate cause” of development (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008). The abovementioned histories, power relations among policymakers’ respective interests and norms (e.g., patronage) embedded in institutions continue to affect policy outcomes. History can be said to form a path of dependence, and thus plays an encouraging role for “societal forces” (Pierson, 2000). As such, it can shape interactions between actors, manufacturing policy preferences and priorities. Seen in this light, the reaping of vast economic benefits from previous policies makes it difficult for actors to contest existing policymaking processes. For instance, if most cropland was gazetted for industrial crops because of lucrative export earnings, the conversion of these lands for use in the food subsector is quite unlikely, because doing so will undermine landowners’ financial interests. Institutions structure the balance of power in policymaking, by hindering or facilitating policy implementation. In the context of a centralised federations such as Malaysia (Loh, 2010), centralised administrative structures can constrain subnational policymakers, who have to prioritise national-level policies as well as coordinate and perform these because the state government is dependent upon the provision of considerable federal resources. Similar to the notion of state–society relations and drawing from Migdal’s (1988) “hard state” approach (see also Kohli, 2014), unorganised groups such as individual paddy farmers, with their weak societal control over resources and limited bargaining power, are disadvantaged through the uneven entrenchment of power and become dependent upon redistributive policies from the state—such a dynamic is generally expressed through political patronage (Gomez, 2002; Tan, 2008). Patron–client networks can shape the execution of policy interests to a considerable degree, which may not necessarily be in line with the actual economic interests of the state. Such networks constitute an exchange of sorts: in order to obtain the benefits of a policy, disempowered people have to form close ties with local authorities, who benefit materially in turn from these “clients”. Institutions function as a double-edged sword in configuring and implementing policies, serving as either constraining or enabling factors in the policymaking process (Suffian, 2018). In the context of food security, the overarching goal is to ensure that food is available, accessible and in stable supply for dietary needs (Food & Agriculture Organisation, 2020). But policy objectives of expanding the food subsector, especially in developing countries, require a “big push” from the state

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to form various favourable policy arrangements and ecosystems for the food industry. Farmers and SMEs are dependent upon the government to orchestrate upskilling, investment, technological advancement activities as well as research and development initiatives to expand the agro-food industry. After all, market mechanisms do not respond spontaneously in terms of allocating resources to develop the food subsector. However, the main obstacle is the fact that industrial commodities remain of primary (economic) interest, as evidenced by the statistic that Malaysia is the second-largest producer of palm oil in the world (Malaysian Palm Oil Council 2020). But reprioritising food policies can be an onerous task because previous policy arrangements revolved around industrial crop production. Over the years, the state has acknowledged low productivity, the limited adoption of technology and mechanisation as well as a lack of irrigation and drainage facilities as major concerns facing the food subsector. Hence, this chapter analyses Sabah’s agricultural sector by applying an institutional lens to discern the challenges towards expanding this subsector, which is particularly crucial in the (post-) pandemic context.

An Overview of Agricultural Policies in Sabah To reiterate, the Malaysian federal structure is highly centralised or asymmetrical (Suffian, 2021), where most economic planning and development plans fall under the purview of the central government (Loh, 2010). The Federal Constitution provides for federal and state functions under the Ninth Schedule, while the Tenth Schedule details revenue collection based on their respective jurisdictions (Suffian, 2021). This administrative and fiscal centralisation means that the federal government has a wider scope in terms of revenue collection, as well as more extensive responsibilities and functions (including policymaking) compared to state governments (Hutchinson, 2014). To a certain extent, the individual state governments do exercise autonomy (e.g., over land, religion, agriculture and immigration matters), with some leeway to formulate their own policy terms (Suffian et al., 2022b). Here, agriculture is our prime concern. Sabah formulated its first agricultural policy in 1992, and the development of such policies (four in total at the time of writing) is greatly influenced by and aligned with the direction of national agricultural policies, incorporating local geographical advantages in the process. We will study each of them in turn below.

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First Sabah Agriculture Policy (1992–2010) (SAP1) This policy combined the new development philosophy and direction contained in both national and state-level plans, namely the Second LongTerm Plan Framework (Rangka Rancangan Jangka Panjang Kedua) (1991–2000), Vision 2020 and the Sabah Long-term Plan Framework. It replaced the Policy Recommendations on the Orderly Development of Agriculture in Sabah of 1984, on the advice of Sabah’s Agricultural Advisory Council. The policy was implemented while Sabah’s economy was growing at a rate of 6% per year. During this time, the contributions of agricultural and livestock production to the state’s GDP increased from a 12.6 to 25.4% share in the 1980–1990 period, while that of the fisheries subsector decreased from 2.1 to 1.9%. The overall increase in agricultural production’s share because of a rapid development in commodity crops (e.g., cocoa, palm oil, rubber) and a steady increase in livestock production. However, the development of agro-based industries remained relatively slow—exports were generally still in their primary form—while food production only grew slightly. Therefore, the aim of SAP1 was to address these significant shortcomings in addition to accelerating the modernisation of the agricultural sector into a viable commercial and sustainable sector, as aligned with the Second National Agriculture Policy. Thus, planners anticipated the creation of market-led agribusiness, farms and enterprises producing innovative products and processes, as well as envisioned the expansion of local food production. This plan would maximise income through the optimal use of agricultural resources, thus contributing to Sabah’s GDP and economic growth, with the specific objectives of increasing the productivity and earning power of farmers, ranchers and fishermen, the growth rates and efficiency of related industries as well as the level of food production. Second Sabah Agriculture Policy (1999–2010) (SAP2) SAP2 was formulated in line with the Third National Agricultural Policy (1998–2010), while still emphasising SAP1’s commodity-based strategies. The new objectives were transforming smallholders into part of a more commercial and dynamic subsector as well as increasing overall efficiency and productivity, domestic food production levels and targeting the development and growth of local agro-based downstream industries (e.g., processing and manufacturing), all with the goal of promoting a

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globally competitive agricultural sector, strengthening essential economic foundations and basic support services, while ensuring sustainable and environmentally friendly development. SAP2 focused on the optimal utilisation of this sector’s resources by enhancing domestic food production as well as improving networking between vertically and horizontally integrated agribusinesses, this further strengthening linkages between the agricultural sector and others. For example, it aimed to create a greater role for the private sector, improve essential economic foundations and incorporate basic support services in the process. Third Sabah Agriculture Policy (2015–2025, Ongoing) (SAP3) SAP3 retains the basic principles of SAP2, although it now places a more comprehensive focus on food security, besides strengthening outputs and sustainably developing economic resources. There are nine key focus areas, primarily in paddy and vegetables. It also calls for a minimum production growth rate of 3% SSL annually for food crops, livestock and fishery products, aiming to increase farmers’ and producers’ monthly household income levels to RM4,000. It also aims to ensure longterm sustainability for economic resource and the environment while highlighting other economic crops (e.g., those related to agro-tourism). Sabah Agriculture Blueprint (2020–2030, Ongoing) The SAB is a new aspiration launched in 2020 (but which is still aligned with the objectives of SAP3) to increase the productivity, quality and revenue of Sabah’s agricultural industries, specifically by promoting and investing in innovation, research and development as well as further expansion; supporting a competitive and productive food industry; increasing access to high-value global markets by acquiring new ones; maintaining existing markets and addressing barriers to trade; sustainably managing Sabah’s natural resources; and finally, developing programmes and incentives to encourage the participation of young “agropreneurs”.

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Issues and Challenges State-Level Policy Configurations Achieving policy objectives requires proper strategic planning. From SAP1 to the SAB, even though these were executed at the state level, they remained aligned with National Agriculture Policies 1–3 and National Agrofood Policies 1–2. However, I argue that Sabah’s efforts to expand food production and capacity were insufficient in terms of strategic planning, particularly in the paddy subsector—indeed, its SSL in 2020 was still only 22.81%. In this context, policy (mis)configurations can also be the root cause of the other agricultural development issues seen in land affairs, irrigation and drainage, research and development as well as technological advancement. Indeed, data from the Department of Statistics Malaysia (2019) show that the land area under paddy cultivation actually declined from 42,496 to 39,426 ha in the 2010–2020 period. Ever since SAP1, Sabah has never achieved a 60% SSL for paddy. In fact, this SSL actually fell from 40% in 2004 to the abovementioned level. Some informants claim that this lack of agricultural development in Sabah is the result of insufficient funding from the federal government. However, this may be a fallacy—after all, the state government does have full control over land affairs and local development planning, and hence some autonomy over which crops should be prioritised. Additionally, funds from Lembaga Pertubuhan Peladang (the Farmers’ Organisation Authority), the main federal vehicle for expanding rice production, is channelled in turn to two bodies—i.e., Pertubuhan Peladang Negeri (the State Farmers’ Organisation) and Pertubuhan Peladang Kawasan (the Area Farmers’ Organisation)—which are both responsible for providing pesticide, fertiliser and machinery to the farmers and SMEs registered as their members. In Sabah, the latter is given the responsibility for handling machinery and operates three branches covering the areas of Kota Belud (where it provides ploughing services to the districts of Kota Belud, Kota Marudu and Pitas), Papar (covering Papar to Kuala Penyu) and Keningau (covering the rural areas of Keningau, Tambunan, Tenom and Nabawan). Based on these coverage areas, the amount of machinery provided by the state agency is clearly inadequate for enhancing paddy cultivation and production. Furthermore, the volume of pesticide provided by the state government agency is clearly insufficient—farmers only receive approximately 0.5 litres per year—and most farmers and agencies must rely on “middleman” such as

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rice mills and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). In Kota Belud, a key rice granary area, most paddy farmers rely on millowners for ploughing and harvesting services (which they then purchase on credit), and to whom they must sell their produce at a very low price. The federal-level Integrated Agriculture Development Areas (IADA) scheme exists to help such agriculture development. The Sabah Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (formerly known as the Ministry of Agriculture and Agro-Based Industry) established IADA in Kota Belud in 2015 to strengthen the paddy and rice industry in Sabah as well as to achieve the elusive 60% SSL. Among its objectives is to increase the national average rice production to 6.5 metric tonnes per hectare per season, with RM3.64 billion allocated to develop irrigation and drainage infrastructure in this granary area. It also aids farmers in marketing their harvests, for example by providing better packaging for Tambatuon’s indigenous rice variety, beras keladi. Meanwhile, the Sabah Department of Agriculture is responsible for implementing policies formulated by this ministry, and its portfolio includes overseeing the rice industry’s development to improve production and increase the income levels of rice farmers. The mechanisms that have been implemented so far include providing subsidies for tasks such as paddy ploughing (RM494 per ha or RM200 per acre, with no area limits), the rehabilitation of abandoned paddy farmland, extension and advisory services as well as research and development into rice varieties. However, various changes of government have delayed some of these key development plans, while land affairs have further constrained paddy development. Because Sabah requires approximately 70,000 ha of cultivated farmland to reach this goal, an additional 31,000 ha of land is needed. Under the Shafie Apdal state administration, 10,000 ha was allocated to Kota Belud for this purpose, only to be derailed by a replacement government in 2020, which then rolled out its own agriculture development plan, Sabah Maju Jaya, which retains some of the SAB’s objectives but whose strategies have thus far been unsuccessfully implemented. In addition, a lack of irrigation and drainage systems (which are also under state jurisdiction) disrupts paddy production. There is a dearth of strategic planning at the state level to expand these systems accordingly, while the unstable political environment hampers new infrastructure development. Focus group discussion data reveal that research and development into quality seeds and novel farming techniques remain limited at the state level. Despite there being various varieties of indigenous rice that can

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be commercialised at the national level,2 these varieties are not given enough attention by state agencies because their cultivation processes are more challenging than conventional ones. Nonetheless, the various policies, from SAP1 to SAB, do aim to upgrade paddy-related technology and machinery, as seen in IADA’s latest project in the Kota Belud granary area: however, such efforts remain limited to only some areas. Policy Implementation and Coordination The government’s role in ensuring effective policy coordination and implementation to support agricultural activities can be performed through “extension services”, as performed by intermediaries who channel information and technology to farmers and entrepreneurs, especially in rural areas. For the paddy subsector, knowledgeable and well-equipped extension officers are expected to play essential roles as implementers and information disseminators, thus linking agencies, farmers and solution-providers. The fundamental purpose of their services is to systematically provide education, training and seminars, while encouraging new techniques, technologies and information-sharing in accordance with farmers’ needs and abilities. However, it is difficult to implement such services because of a lack of strategic collaboration for the effective implementation of development programmes. Such strategic planning involves the federal and state levels, as well as various ministries and agencies, in order to identify objectives and make decisions about the allocation of resources. A strategic plan must bring all stakeholders together, particularly in defining and monitoring key indicators aligned with national and state agriculture policies. However, the state government does not have any such strategic plan—this lack significantly hampers federal–state coordination—to spearhead such development, and hence does not reflect a particularly high-level commitment to long-term policies (e.g., SAP1, SAP2, SAP3). The fact that the state government has always prioritised the development of commodity crops despite the severity of Sabah’s low SSLs in food production suggests that it is not serious about overcoming the issue. Oil palm is the predominant crop, with estates primarily owned by state and private companies such as Yayasan Sabah, Sawit Kinabalu, Hap Seng and 2 See, for example, the remarkable diversity of domestic rice varieties outlined in Chapter 11 by Ganesan and Abdul Rahman.

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IOI. Meanwhile, smallholders have support from anchor companies in selling their produce, but the same support does not hold for growers of food crops, who are primarily smallholders and SMEs. Strengthening extension services can help increase productivity and encourage farmers’ further involvement in commerce or export, but this is not the case here. For example, indigenous rice varieties have high demand and nutritional value, but the marketing support offered by state agencies is very limited. Agencies involved with various development programmes do not only lack funding but also have insufficient extension and technical staff to support the needs of a large number of smallholders, a problem that is spatially compounded by the fact that they are widely scattered throughout the state. There are only two to three extension officers per district for all food crops, who are tasked not only with disseminating essential information but also monitoring and licensing operations as well as providing technical knowledge and advisory services to farmers and producers. Thus, for example, there is a lack of monitoring of pesticide usage on vegetables in Ranau and among hill paddy farmers in rural areas. Additionally, for the paddy subsector, the state’s policies have effectively remained the same since SAP1—a lack of political will can be inferred because of the persistence of inadequate infrastructure and facilities, particularly in rural areas. These include insufficient farm roads, water and electricity supply as well as storage facilities, all of which hamper development. Because the water supply plays a major role in paddy cultivation, its management is the key focus here. Primarily supplied through rainfall and irrigation, efficient water management can increase productivity levels and thereby incomes. Consequently, inadequate drainage and irrigation facilities in potential paddy-growing areas remain critical problems for the growth of the paddy and rice industry. The Department of Irrigation and Drainage is responsible for providing the crucial irrigation facilities and infrastructure for cultivation, but these are not generally available to Sabahan farms at a significant scale. Therefore, inadequate drainage and irrigation facilities in potential paddy areas persist. Only 11,649.95 ha (or 32% of the total paddy area) is classified as “K1” (the most conducive category), while another 11,933.34 ha (33%) and 12,927.17 ha (35%) are classified as “K2” and “K3” (which are only rain-fed), respectively. Poor road networks and basic facilities have affected not only the marketing of agricultural products but also the delivery of farm inputs and other services, including extension services, hence resulting in a

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lack of monitoring. Paddy cultivation is particularly affected by a lack of equipment and contractors for ploughing and harvesting services, compounded by frequent machinery breakdowns which have disrupted the planting schedule. Thus, staggered planting by individual farmers occurs, preventing the scheduling and synchronisation of cultivation patterns. This situation has created major pest and disease outbreaks as well as ineffective water management systems and reduced crop harvests. Besides, the high cost of machinery, coupled with limited maintenance expertise, is particularly reflected in the grossly inadequate number of tractors available for land preparation and harvesting. Thus, farmers need to wait for their turn to use such equipment, thus further affecting the quantity and quality of their produce and the planting schedule. In some circumstances, farmers must still use traditional or manual planting alternatives, marshalling a large workforce to collect the mature rice crop. Patronage Patronage, as a form of corruption, is tied to the provision of a variety of factors (e.g., technology and machinery, budget allocations, human capital development) that have a direct impact on the agro-food subsector. Political interference in the distribution of aid affects the development and implementation of agricultural projects. The political linkages between state agencies and their recipients (i.e., SMEs and farmers) are significantly important to this analysis. If they have strong linkages with members of the local political elite or representatives of relevant agencies, farmers and SMEs can enjoy the privileges of accessing extension services, incentives and subsidies, infrastructure as well as technology development. For example, the paddy cultivation area owned by the village head may fall under the “K1” category, being well-equipped with a good irrigation system and water supply. An SME entrepreneur who cultivates vegetables using a hydroponic system can expand operations through the provision of financial assistance, secured through close relations with local political representatives. An officer with the relevant agency gets subsidies to purchase ploughs and harvesting machinery for his own use, while his fellow farmers still use traditional methods. Without a good patronage relationship, additional effort is required to get state assistance. For example, farmers may need to pay the person-in-charge of delivering subsidised fertiliser delivery charges. According to a successful hydroponic farm owner, who is now frequently visited by extension officers from the

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relevant department for monitoring purposes, he had to work hard to access these services. This situation leads to an unequal distribution of state allocations to target groups and inefficient policy implementation, because SMEs and farmers are hampered by limited financial or technical support unless they have strong relationships with political elites or representatives from the relevant agencies. Farmers as well as Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises Although most Sabahans own suitable land for agricultural development, such activities do not occur at a large scale. One reality of agriculture is that it is not always a profitable sector, especially with regard to food production: Sabah’s farmers have had to issue orders to stop selling rice to the peninsula because they were not making any profits, while also having to cover the associated delivery fees. Tellingly, most paddy farmers are categorised as part of the “Below 40” group, i.e., the lowest income level, and are highly dependent on agriculture (particularly paddy) to maintain their daily needs. However, most cannot afford sufficient fertiliser, pesticide, technology and machinery, given that they only have limited assistance from the government. For decades, the level of assistance received has remained about the same, and there is a lack of support in terms of technology and machinery. Thus, middlemen provide assistance on credit, and as discussed above, farmers are hindered from fully participating in commerce. They also lack knowledge about the roles or functions of federal and state government agencies because of their dependency on the extension officers—whose help was infrequently available. The implementation gap has instead been filled on a stopgap basis by NGOs such as the Partners of Community Organisation (PACOS) Trust and System of Rice Intensification (SRI)-Mas, which provide courses and training on organic farming methods. The farmers of Kampung Tambatuon Kota Belud revealed that the NGOs introduced organic pesticide to prevent paddy diseases, while facilitating most local SMEs in commercialising a type of milk powder made from organic rice and Penjaram’s local variety, beras merah, by supplying a processing machine and other forms of aid. An ageing population is another issue, compounded by digital and technical illiteracy (e.g., being unable to advertise produce through social media or using drones to deliver fertiliser and pesticides).

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SME involvement is another essential factor in agriculture development—by encouraging stakeholders to participate in this industry, farmers can gain increased competence and upskill themselves. Participation can be encouraged by strengthening modern agricultural training, providing good networking opportunities and improving access to information. For hydroponic and aquaponic SMEs, specifically, they face huge challenges in starting up farms and businesses. First and foremost, the high cost of raw materials (e.g., organic fertiliser and pesticides) needed to develop farming systems is compounded by the lack of state subsidies (which are limited to their conventional versions). Such provisions are not suitable for sustainable agricultural production. To receive financial grants, SMEs need to participate in competitions which focus on innovation and pitch their work accordingly, thus adding another hurdle. Moreover, the prices of raw materials are continuously increasing, thus requiring state interventions in price-control measures. Meanwhile, the state’s own lack of technical knowledge as well as its limited monitoring and coordinating capacity is particularly pronounced for novel farming techniques. While the crops produced through such techniques do meet a high market demand, most SMEs still cannot afford to adopt new technology and machinery, remaining reliant on conventional industrial techniques such as fertigation. No substantial collaborative relationships currently exist between the state government and SMEs, which consequently lack strategic marketing and effective distribution channels, although IADA does assist in marketing their produce.

Conclusion The (post-)pandemic acceleration of deglobalisation has seen various countries adopting more inward-looking policies to address domestic problems, such as the implementation of trade restrictions and export bans. Stricter rules have been imposed upon various aspects of trading, thus resulting in a greater focus on domestic interests and socioeconomic welfare. There is political pressure for policymakers to ensure that domestic interests are met, especially in food provisions. During the pandemic, various economic problems manifested domestically—where Malaysia could previously offset problems via imports, its overreliance on industrial crops now served as a wake-up call for policymakers to reorient the agricultural sector, particularly in expanding the crucial agro-food

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subsector. This effort requires both federal and state governments configuring and designing policies to facilitate domestic enterprise growth. This “big push” to expand the agro-food subsector and its production capability is necessary, given that market mechanisms do not transfer resources spontaneously. Hence, deglobalisation has increased the strategic role of the state, which had seemingly been in retreat from international neoliberal market forces. Its roles and responsibilities are particularly key in prioritising agro-food production over industrial crop exports. However, the role of the state is influenced by various institutions, and may be potentially constrained in turn by their respective histories, power relations and existing norms. In Sabah, these institutions themselves have deterred the expansion of the agro-food subsector, derailing the state government’s various goals of achieving long-term food security (including SSLs), farmers’ incomes and technology usage, especially for paddy production. Meanwhile, the cultivation of industrial crops continues expanding because of the associated lucrative earnings. Although the Covid-19 crisis has prompted the government to expand paddy production, efforts to reinvigorate this subsector seem bleak, particularly given the lack of strategic planning, inefficiencies in coordination and implementation as well as the limited development of infrastructure. In order to increase sustainable agricultural exports, Sabah’s state government’s commitment should be strengthened in various forms, for example, by reducing the influence of middlemen (to ensure equitable profits for farmers) or an unsustainable reliance on NGOs (which have stepped in to fill in policy execution shortcomings), strengthening research and development efforts besides making other systemic and structural changes, as suggested above.

References Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. (2008). The role of institutions in growth and development. Review of Economics and Institutions, 1(2) Antràs, P. (2020). De-globalisation? Global value chains in the post-COVID19 age [online conference proceedings]. Central Banks in a Shifting World, 11–12 November 2020. Department of Statistics Malaysia. (2019). Selected agriculture indicator. https://www.dosm.gov.my/v1/index.php?r=column/cthemeByCat&cat= 72&bul_id=b2M4QlpZamFlN2w5ZjFPRlY4TElSUT09&menu_id=Z0VTZG U1UHBUT1VJMFlpaXRRR0xpdz09

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Food and Agriculture Organisation. (2020). The state of food security and nutrition in the world: Transforming food systems for food security, improved nutrition and affordable healthy diet. https://doi.org/10.4060/cb4474en Gedikli, A., Erdo˘gan, S., & Yıldırım, D. (2015). After the global crisis, it is globalisation or globalonelisation. IGI Global. Gomez, E. T. (2002). Political business in East Asia. Routledge. Haggard, S. (2004). Institutions and growth in East Asia. Studies in Comparative International Development, 38(4), 53–81. Hall, P. (1990). The role of interests, institutions, and ideas in the comparative political economy of the industrialised nations. In L. Mark & Z. Alan (Eds.), Comparative politics: Rationality, culture and structure. Cambridge University Press. Hutchinson, F. E. (2014). Malaysia’s federal system: Over and covert centralisation. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 44(3), 422–442. James, H. (2018). Deglobalisation: The rise of disembedded unilateralism. Annual Review of Financial Economics, 10, 219–237. Kelly, K. S., Shamsudin, M. N., Sharifuddin, J., & Mohamed, Z. (2017). Sustaining paddy self-sufficiency and land demands in Sabah, Malaysia: A structural paddy and rice econometric model analysis. International Journal of Food and Agricultural Economics, 5(1), 29–43. Kohli, A. (2014). India democracy: An analysis of changing state-society relations. Princeton University Press. Kornprobst, M., & Wallace, J. (2022). What is globalisation. Chatham House. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/10/what-deglobalization Lamdin, J., Salim, M. S., & Wong, W. (2016). Sabah roles and contributions towards fulfilling the nation’s strategies in achieving 100% SSL in rice production. Department of Agriculture Sabah. Loh, K.W. (2010). Restructuring federal–state relations in Malaysia: From centralised to co-operative federalism. The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 99(407). Migdal, J. (1988). Strong societies and weak states: State-society relations and state capabilities in third world countries. Princeton University Press. North, D. (1991). Institutions. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1), 97–112. Pierson, P. (2000). Increasing returns, path dependence and the study of politics. American Political Science Review, 94(1), 251–267. Scott, W. R. (2008). Institutions and organizations: Ideas and interests. Sage Publications. Stiglitz, J. (2002). Globalization and its discontents. W.W. Norton & Company. Strange, S. (1997). The retreat of the state: The diffusion of power in the world economy. Cambridge University Press. Suffian, F. (2018). Politics of industrial policy. University of Bristol.

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Suffian, F. (2021). Political economy of Sabah’s economic development: Economic policy and federal-state relations. Borneo Review, 17 (1), 1–21. Suffian, F. (2019). The role of institutions and development: The political economy of Malaysia’s industrial policy-making. Journal of Administrative Science, 16(1), 1–33. Suffian, F., Jamluddin, I. S., & Suffian, F. (2022a). Institutional analysis of food security in Sabah. Journal of Islamic, Social, Economics and Development, 7 (46), 57–67. Suffian, F., Mansur, K., Jamluddin, I. S., Puyok, A., & Abdul Majid, A. (2022b). Institutions and industrial development in Sabah. International Journal of Accounting, Finance and Business, 7 (41), 30–41. Tan, J. (2008). Privatisation in Malaysia: Regulation, rent-seeking and policy failure. Routledge.

Digital Poverty and Inequality During the Covid-19 Pandemic in Keningau, Sabah Esther Jawing, Junaidah Januin, Veronica Petrus Atin, Kamsilawati Kamlun, John Mark Storey, and Siti Hasnah Tanalol

Introduction The Covid-19 pandemic has challenged the movement towards global integration, and instead further accelerated trends towards deglobalisation (e.g., the United Kingdom’s separation from the European Union). Yet at an everyday level, Covid-19 necessitated the need for and reliance upon various technologies that facilitated—and possibly developed as a consequence of—globalisation, given a daily reliance on technologies which allowed people to virtually maintain their work and lifestyles insofar as

E. Jawing (B) · J. Januin · V. P. Atin · K. Kamlun · J. M. Storey Centre for the Promotion of Knowledge and Language Learning, Universiti Malaysia Sabah, Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia e-mail: [email protected] J. Januin e-mail: [email protected] V. P. Atin e-mail: [email protected] K. Kamlun e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. Ying Hooi et al. (eds.), Social and Political Deglobalisation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6823-7_10

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possible. Thus, a heightened demand for digital technologies emerged, with broadband and telecommunications service providers seeing a surge in usage. Online meeting platforms (e.g., Zoom, Microsoft Teams, Cisco Webex) paved new and innovative ways to ease communication during lockdowns, given that seminars, conferences and meetings largely shifted online. Seen from this vantage point, the uptake of such technologies appears to have furthered globalisation with respect to communication, despite contrary trends in politics, economics and other fields. Regarding the educational landscape specifically, it was generally disrupted worldwide by various enforced lockdowns, and the shift to online teaching widened educational inequalities within learning communities—a loose pedagogical term which may include both teachers and students. Essentially, this entire notion charts a “move away from an individualistic focus, to one that recognises the contribution of others [e.g., teachers and students alike] to every individual’s learning” (Kilpatrick et al., 2003, p. 2). Note that there are varying definitions of what exactly learning communities are—this term is often used without much reflection—which can broadly be divided into two categories. The first focuses on the human element of communities, and the profits that accrue from building on the synergies of individuals in common locations or with common interests as they work towards sharing understandings, skills and knowledge for shared purposes. The second is focused on curricular structures (i.e. an inanimate structure) as the means to developing ‘deeper’ learning of (implied) pre-determined curricular content. (p. 3)

Despite the existence of the communication technologies described above, teaching and learning activities were hampered by limited infrastructure, particularly for people with a lower socioeconomic status, including marginalised groups. Among them, refugees and stateless

J. M. Storey e-mail: [email protected] S. H. Tanalol Preparatory Centre for Science and Technology, Universiti Malaysia Sabah, Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia e-mail: [email protected]

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people who may not formally qualify as citizens were further excluded. Despite the wealth of technological resources available online, educational inequalities persisted in the tangible problems arising from limited infrastructure (Ahmad et al., 2021; Gong, 2020). These inequalities spawned various issues related to digital poverty in the educational landscape, which begs a fundamental question: how sustainable can online teaching and learning really be? This question remains important even in the post-pandemic context. Despite a heightened dependency on digital technologies to sustain work, education and even mental health, not every country has equal access to these, nor is such access distributed evenly among their people. Educational inequalities and digital poverty coincide significantly with spatial factors, and these intersections were most vivid for rural Malaysian students who were unable to join online lessons because of a lack of internet access in their home villages. In the state of Sabah, several notable cases emerged. Veveonah Mosibin, a university student, had to climb a tree to access the internet in order to write an online examination. Students from a secondary school in Keningau built a hillside hut, which they called “Puru Online”, sited in a location with improved internet access. Two teenagers in Ranau tragically drowned in a river after looking for a spot with better connection to access online lessons. Overall, these cases shared one commonality: poverty, whether digital or otherwise. Digital poverty generally refers to the lack of access to technology and the internet, which can prevent individuals and communities from participating fully in the digital world (Sparks, 2013). The result is limited access to information, education and job opportunities, thus resulting in socioeconomic disadvantages. Digital poverty disproportionately affects low-income communities, rural areas and developing countries, and is considered to be a major challenge in ensuring equitable access to technology and its benefits (Chatman, 1996; Sparks, 2013). In this sense, digital poverty can be seen as a form of deglobalisation because it limits access to technology which is increasingly necessary for education and workforce training. Unequal opportunities for different people can slow down global economic growth and integration. In addition, addressing digital poverty is crucial for ensuring equitable access to education and technology, as well as in promoting equitable, sustainable progress and development at the global level. Therefore, by using a case study approach

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centring on a learning community in Keningau, Sabah, this chapter highlights the disruptive nature of the pandemic on education, specifically using digital poverty and inequality as key frameworks.

Literature Review In theory, the emergence of technologies arguably encourages globalisation and promotes varied opportunities for people to unite in a borderless digital world. However, inequalities were already noted by the late 1990s, when digital poverty was first defined with reference to those who were left out because of socioeconomic and class barriers, or who were resistant to technology (Chatman, 1996). Over time, it became a phrase used “to encompass a wide range of social disparities in access to and use of digital equipment and services, particularly the ability to access the Internet in terms of both physical connection and ease of use” (Sparks, 2013, p. 8). Thus, the precise definition of “digital poverty” has evolved significantly. Regarding information and communication technology (ICT), the terms “digital poverty” (see for example Barrantes, 2007) and “digital divide” (see, for example, Coleman, 2021) are used to describe the link between ICT and social inequalities. In this research, the term “digital poverty” is defined according to three determining factors: (1) economic resources or income; (2) cognitive abilities to use ICT; and (3) physical access to ICT, understood here as its availability (Barrantes, 2007). Meanwhile, the conditions of digital poverty vary according to four variables: (1) age; (2) educational level; (3) availability of infrastructure; and (4) types of technology used. Manduna (2016) found the availability and use of ICT by students from both disadvantaged and privileged families studying computer science at the tertiary level in South Africa indicated that a large proportion of respondents came from rural areas where personal finances, infrastructural development (including ICT facilities) and trained ICT staff were limited. Such barriers may have excluded these students from accessing ICT tools in the first place. In another study, Tayo et al. (2016) explored the experiences and perspectives of 20 community members in Nigeria’s Oyo and Ogun states regarding their access to and usage of ICT. The affordability of computers and the high tariffs for internet access were argued to be contributing factors to inequality in ICT access and use, before being cited as evidence of Nigeria’s wealth disparities and digital divide. The researchers argued that unequal growth among

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Nigeria’s marginalised poor meant that they risked missing out on the positive effects of ICT, such as an improved ability to exercise creativity, improve their economic competitiveness and social inclusion. A more recent Malaysian study by Dawood et al. (2019) discovered that regional, urban–rural differences influenced access to the internet and ICT. Residents in urban Sungai Petani reported substantially better access than residents in Tanjung Dawai, a rural fishing village. Sungai Petani’s residents generally had higher salaries and were better educated, and were therefore more likely to buy smartphones and be computer-savvy. Access, including the availability of ICT infrastructure, was also a major issue in rural areas, which generally had inferior hardware, in line with findings that the rapid rate of technological improvement in internet connectivity can cause rural areas to remain permanently behind their urban counterparts in terms of implementing resources that are readily available in urban areas (Kos-Łab˛edowicz, 2017). Although seemingly prevalent in underdeveloped and developing countries, digital poverty also affects communities in developed countries, such as the United States. As Ayre (2020) notes, [a]ccording to BroadbandNow, the number of people who lack broadband Internet access could be as high as 42 million. The FCC [Federal Communications Commission of the United States] reports that at least “18 million people lacked access to broadband Internet at the end of 2018. Even if all the libraries were open and circulating hundreds of Wi-Fi hotspots, we’d still have a very serious access problem. (p. 2)

The biggest challenge facing us is how we can solve digital poverty among disadvantaged communities to reduce educational inequalities between different segments of the learning community. Education presents a particular problem because any “digital project”, such as the delivery of education during the lockdown, requires transformations, coordination and linkages between a wide range of devices, from “music players to video recorders to cameras”, so as to “manage […] all aspects of what Jobs dubbed as your ‘digital lifestyle’” (Isaacson, 2011, p. 379)— after all, the division between leisure and work devices is no longer clear-cut. This heightened dependency on digital technologies increased significantly during the pandemic. Indeed, teachers worldwide struggled to keep up with rapidly changing technology, increasing amounts of information, navigating different online platforms and following standard operating procedures (Adedoyin & Soykan, 2020; Heng & Sol, 2021).

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Hence, in this study’s rural Sabahan context, the biggest hurdle remains resolving educational inequalities linked to digital poverty.

Analysis and Discussion Context: The Learning Community in Keningau, Sabah Regarding access to the internet, Gong (2020) observes that Sabah ranks last in Malaysia, with 82% mobile and 3.1% fixed broadband subscription rates, respectively. Compare this figure with the federal territory of Kuala Lumpur, with 249.6 and 16.4% subscription rates, respectively. In contrast to these figures, in 2020, Sabah’s education director announced that 98% of local teachers were prepared to conduct online learning and facilitation activities because they were fully equipped with Wi-Fi services, internet data plans and the necessary smart gadgets to run lessons for students. Conversely, about 52% of students did not have access to the internet or the enabling devices needed to participate in these scheduled sessions— therefore, there was a lack of student participation in both synchronous and asynchronous lessons (Ahmad et al., 2021; The Borneo Post, 2020). In order to ensure that no students were left behind, teachers were instructed to physically send learning materials such as textbooks, workbooks and worksheets directly to students’ homes or those of their village heads (The Borneo Post, 2020). The director added that internet access in rural areas had been an issue for years, primarily because of insufficient bandwidth to access online learning resources, which was in turn attributed to a lack of: (1) infrastructure to provide effective broadband services; and (2) digital devices to support learning at home (Berita Harian, 2020). The necessity for high technology usage during the Covid-19 pandemic further widened the existing gap in education pertaining to digital poverty, thus highlighting the lack of digital devices and infrastructure, as well as shortcomings in the learning environment. Vernacularising the definition of digital poverty in this context, Ahmad et al. (2021) state that it is not defined solely as a failure to obtain internet access and gadgets alone, but also involves the learning environment itself in terms of a lack of appropriate amounts of time, space and family support. Keningau, the fifth-largest town in Sabah, is governed by the Keningau District Council—it is the capital of the district of the same name—and surrounded by several small towns such as Apin-Apin, Bingkor, Sook and Nabawan. It can be reached by road from Kota Kinabalu and Sandakan,

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as well as by small aircraft (Hadi, 2006). According to the Department of Statistics Malaysia (DOSM), the district’s total population is 355,555 people of various ethnic groups (e.g., Brunei Malay, Kadazandusun, Murut, Bajau, Chinese, Indian, Lundayeh). Sabah is classified as a poor state, with a 19.5 and 23.9% absolute and relative poverty rate, respectively (DOSM, 2020; DOSM, n.d.). Responses were obtained from 13 female and two male teachers from a selected school who were surveyed during the pandemic. They fell into the following age ranges—i.e., 20– 30 (13.3%), 31–40 (33.3%) as well as 41 and above (53.3%)—while their years of teaching experience varied from 1–5 years (13.3%), 6– 10 years (20%), 11–15 years (26.7%) to over 16 years (40%). In general, its learning community experienced a lack of infrastructure, digital devices and a conducive learning environment, all of which disrupted teaching and learning activities. Our research primarily focuses on obtaining feedback from teachers but does not discount the importance of considering students within this dynamic. Here, online learning and digital poverty are closely interwoven, where significant disruptions to the learning ecosystem emerged. Digital Teaching Experiences in Keningau We found that approximately half the teachers surveyed had computer skills as well as access to computers and mobile devices. In addition, most were able to use search engines to find supplementary material for their teaching and learning activities. Moreover, a significant number acknowledged that technological skills might increase their competency in integrating e-learning into lesson plans, besides accepting ICT’s importance in enhancing work productivity. Finally, most recommended ICT usage in teaching and learning, continuing to use ICT in the postpandemic period, sustaining such usage accordingly as well as integrating ICT usage during and after the pandemic. The exact percentage data is listed in Table 1. In general, teachers were optimistic about the full integration of technology during school closures. These statistics indicate a general optimism about employing ICT as an instructional tool despite the extent of digital poverty within the local learning ecosystem. It was acknowledged that better facilities, infrastructure and technological skills could facilitate online teaching and learning, revolutionise classroom dynamics as well as aid dormant learners. These findings echoed those by Mallow and Rahman (2021), Hennessy et al.

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Table 1

Digital teaching experiences among Keningau’s schoolteachers

No

Item

Frequency (%)

1 2 3

Teachers had the necessary computer skills Teachers had access to computers and mobile devices Teachers were able to use search engines to find supplementary materials for teaching and learning Teachers’ technological skills might increase their competency at integrating e-learning in teaching and learning Teachers understood the importance of ICT in enhancing job productivity Teachers recommended ICT usage for teaching and learning Teachers would continue to use ICT in the post-pandemic period Teachers would sustain ICT usage in the post-pandemic period Teachers would integrate ICT usage during and post-pandemic

46.0 53.0 93.3

4 5 6 7 8 9

86.7 66.0 60.0 60.0 66.6 53.3

(2015) as well as Mouza and Barrett-Greenly (2015), who claimed that such optimism is fuelled by both the benefits of adopting ICT for teaching and the digital skills which they acquired in the process. It was further argued by Mwapwele et al. (2019) that most teachers surveyed were optimistic about the use of ICT for teaching and learning, thus indicating their willingness to employ it despite the budgetary, technical and digital skills limitations affecting their schools. Additionally, we suggest that the general willingness to further use ICT in post-pandemic teaching and learning practices acknowledge its ongoing usefulness. Educational Disadvantages Faced by Rural Teachers The data suggest that educational disadvantages such as the lack of elearning support from schools exist, but teachers’ respective confidence levels are expected to increase should these necessary skills and expertise be inculcated. A lack of both technological training and familiarity with learning management systems (LMSs) were cited as reasons for the educational disadvantages faced during the Covid-19 outbreak (see Table 2). Although the Ministry of Education developed a massive open online course to train teachers on how to use digital platforms effectively (Dreesen et al., 2020), we suspect that those in rural areas may not have had access to or else had little knowledge about accessing these courses, as

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Table 2

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Educational disadvantages faced by Keningau’s schoolteachers

No

Item

Frequency (%)

1 2

Lack of e-learning support from schools Lack of both technology and LMS training

93.3 66.3

indicated by the fact that none of them referred to any such support. The data indicate that one of the main difficulties in utilising technology was a lack of e-learning assistance from their schools, with respondents stating that they would feel more comfortable teaching the relevant programmes if they were provided with the necessary skills and competence to do so. Although teachers stated that they would be comfortable applying ICT tools, paradoxically, they seemed uncertain about the types of support which they had received. Reportedly, schools had attempted to organise ICT training courses, but 74.3% of teachers still admitted to lacking confidence in using online platforms, while 73.3% were unsure about installing applications and software. In fact, 66.3% of instructors reported a lack of technological and LMS training. These responses indicate that teachers generally felt that they had not received sufficient support and training during the sudden transition to online teaching, and were indeed overwhelmed by the number of online applications which they were expected to use. They were also expected to combine all these newly introduced online teaching components as if they were a part of a single, integrated LMS, despite their insufficient familiarity with asynchronous or live video discussions, or the appropriate applications for facilitating these techniques. Generally, they felt that their success in online teaching depended on technical and pedagogical support from their schools. Almpanis (2015) concurs when they argue that institutional e-learning assistance can influence the success or failure of online education provisions. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether or not schools can adequately fulfil such needs. Just the year prior to Covid-19’s onset, Philipsen et al. (2019) had argued that training programmes for online teaching were still insufficient. Thus, institutions must have a clearer vision about their online teaching and learning goals.

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Paradoxes of Technology Usage We suggest that there is a paradox at play: teachers exhibited optimism in technology usage but simultaneously displayed pessimism in terms of utilising new and current ICT tools such as Zoom and Webex (see Table 3). There was some hesitation in terms of installing software or using learning applications accordingly, and indeed, most respondents were reluctant to utilise the latest versions of such tools. Based on their responses, teachers were optimistic about using new technology despite some hesitation, perhaps because of the sudden shift to remote teaching, after which they were further hampered by insufficient knowledge about online pedagogy (McAllister & Graham, 2016). This situation might be related to their perception of what online learning entailed, given that “fully online learning” has not been explicitly defined (Singh & Thurman, 2019) or implemented at the school and classroom levels. Clearly, their training on conducting online courses during lockdowns had been organised in an ad hoc manner. The teachers seem to have been poorly prepared and equipped to deal with these unprecedented developments, but even though most had never taught online sessions, they were still expected to redesign their teaching approaches to meet the expectations of students in a fully virtual environment. When training courses were conducted fully online, it was anticipated that teachers would be overwhelmed by new and alien avenues for teaching, thus causing them to experience technostress, anxiety and burnout (Hassan et al., 2019; Othman & Sivasubramaniam, 2019; Pillay et al., 2005). We argue that teachers’ pessimism is linked to the detrimental effect of digital poverty upon the education system. Its determining factors, Table 3

Paradoxes of technology usage among Keningau’s schoolteachers

No

Item

Frequency (%)

1

Reluctant to utilise new and current information technology in teaching Pessimistic about using online platforms Reluctant to install software or use learning applications to support teaching and learning Reluctant to try the latest software or learning applications

53.4

2 3 4

60.0 93.3 66.7

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as pointed out by Barrantes (2007), can be observed here, and are particularly manifested as follows. . teachers appeared to depend largely on their own (insufficient) mobile and home internet services, because their schools’ basic internet provisions were deemed inadequate for the task; . teachers’ own cognitive abilities in using ICT, which they needed for future training, appeared to have had a negative impact on their usage of technology; and . their students may not have had similar facilities, which may have dampened teachers’ enthusiasm and passion for online teaching.

Digital Poverty and Inequalities Our findings suggest that teachers generally noticed a lack of necessary infrastructure or facilities for online teaching and learning, such as hardware such as sufficient random access memory (RAM), speakers and fast processors, access to adequate teaching and learning software as well as relevant applications and internet access/connectivity (Table 4). It should be noted that at the onset of Malaysia’s lockdowns, private telecommunication firms such as Maxis, Digi, Celcom and UMobile provided teachers and students with a one gigabyte of free internet data between 8am and 6 pm daily (Chung et al., 2020). However, the availability of this provision was not observed by the respondents, and perhaps this was also the case in other rural areas of Sabah, thus running counter to the state government’s promotion and advocacy of ICT. As stated in the Sabah State ICT Blueprint, the government aimed to,

Table 4 Shortcomings in the provision of ICT facilities among Keningau’s schoolteachers No

Item

1 2 3 4

Lack Lack Lack Lack

Frequency (%) of of of of

infrastructure (e.g., RAM) speakers and fast processors access to adequate teaching and learning software access to applications and internet/connectivity

86.7 66.3 60.0 73.3

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[…] empower society, bridge the income gap, reduce socio-economic inequalities, enhance the quality of life, and improve the quality of human capital. It covers also how ICT is utilised in the education, health as well as community programmes across the State. (Sabah Ministry of Resource Development and IT, 2011, p. 3)

The contrast between this lofty statement and the responses gathered highlights the discrepancy between policies as well as the actual levels and lived experiences of ICT empowerment within this community. From our survey, teachers not only struggled with unreliable internet connections but also a lack of hardware (e.g., RAM, speakers and fast processors) and software (e.g., teaching and learning software, subscription to key online applications), which further exacerbated the challenges faced by remote teaching. It appears that such infrastructure and connectivity issues have not been addressed properly by the relevant local authorities despite the state’s substantial investment in technology, although it may also be the case that these shortcomings could have resulted from the sudden shift to remote teaching, which arguably caught local authorities off-guard and presented difficulties in putting together an effective framework to address the challenges posed by the transition. Regardless, this failure suggests that a lack of government support in terms of ICT infrastructure provisions contributed significantly to digital poverty (Dashtestani, 2020; Dawood et al., 2019; Noor et al., 2020; Yeap et al., 2021). In short, by using Keningau as a case study to represent rural areas, the lack of ICT usage in rural areas may be the result of: (1) a shortage of infrastructure, thus making it difficult to establish a reliable and fast internet connection (Wheeler Report, 2020); (2) digital illiteracy, or a lack of the necessary digital skills to use ICT effectively, which can in turn reduce motivation to use technology (Garbe et al., 2020; Lembani et al., 2020); (3) a reduced availability of informational and educational resources compared to urban areas, thus further widening the digital divide (Lembani et al., 2020); and (4) insufficient government policies, as seen in the lack of government investments in ICT infrastructure and digital programmes (Liu, 2021; Zamani et al., 2022). We highlight the need for better funding and resources to support digital education, because after all, such inequalities in technological access create a divide between those who have the resources to take advantage of the benefits of technology and those who do not. The result is the further exacerbation of global and subnational disparities: presumably, user experiences

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in urban Kuala Lumpur differed significantly from those in the so-called periphery.

Conclusion and Recommendations Our intention was to ascertain how digital poverty disrupted education and widened inequalities since schools shifted fully online during the Covid-19 pandemic. From our results, we argue that issues related to digital poverty have had a negative impact on the quality of education within learning communities in rural areas—as inferred from the responses of teachers, although not students—hence reducing students’ abilities to participate in and benefit from global learning opportunities. Without equitable access to digital technology and the internet, rural or underprivileged communities are generally further distanced from educational resources, networking opportunities with other global learning communities as well as virtual learning experiences. This lack of access can also exacerbate the pre-existing digital divide between rural and urban areas—residents of the former are likely to have lower digital literacy rates and technological skills, thus potentially contributing to a cycle of poverty. Rural residents lack equal access to high-quality education and employment opportunities, thus leading to a widening gap in socioeconomic development and further isolating these areas, thus limiting their ability to grow and thrive. Such divides can exacerbate deglobalisation, and in order to address rural digital poverty and promote equity in education, we offer several recommendations in line with Malaysia’s educational policy of providing a comprehensive, balanced and quality education for all. The key aspects which are relevant to this chapter include increasing access to education as well as improving teaching and learning quality. Our recommendations to address inequalities in education are as follows. . Government initiatives: Governments, both at the state and federal level, can provide funding and support for programmes aimed at increasing access to technology and the internet in underprivileged areas. . Public–private partnerships: Such collaborations can provide resources and expertise accordingly.

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. Non-profit organisations: They can provide access to technology and the internet, as well as digital literacy training for underserved communities. . Digital literacy programmes: Such training for individuals and communities can impart the necessary skills and knowledge to use technology effectively. . Affordable devices and internet access: Programmes and initiatives aimed at making these resources more affordable for low-income families can help reduce the impact of digital poverty. We reiterate that it is important to address digital poverty and ensure equal access to technology and the internet because only when these issues are fully addressed can digital poverty be eradicated and educational inequalities be bridged. We note several limitations of this study, namely its small sample size, how it is statistically unrepresentative of the entire teacher population in Keningau district as well as its primary focus on teachers rather than students. However, this is not to discount the agency of students in their educational journeys, bearing in mind that the perspectives of youths themselves are often neglected by adult decision-makers. Regardless, in Southeast Asia, there is increasing cognisance of how children are indeed agentic (Faller-Capistrano, 2022), thus suggesting that future studies also consider their wants and needs. Nevertheless, considering the scarcity of related studies in Sabah’s rural interior, our findings indicate promising avenues for further research into the educational challenges arising from digital poverty for learning communities, inclusive of both teachers and students alike. Acknowledgements This research was supported by Universiti Malaysia Sabah under Grant Award No. SDK0291-2020.

References Adedoyin, O. B., & Soykan, E. (2020). Covid-19 pandemic and online learning: The challenges and opportunities. Interactive Learning Environments, 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1080/10494820.2020.1813180 Ahmad, S. H. A., Yusof, S. M., Meri, A., & Modili, C. (2021). Isu dan Pendefinisian Semula Digital Poverty dalam Pengajaran, Pembelajaran dan Penyeliaan (PPDP) Secara Atas Talian [Issues and the redefinition of “digital poverty”

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Garbe, A., Ogurlu, U., Logan, N., & Cook, P. (2020). COVID-19 and remote learning: Experiences of parents with children during the pandemic. American Journal of Qualitative Research, 4(3), 45–65. Gong, R. (2020). Digital inclusion: Assessing meaningful internet connectivity in Malaysia. Khazanah Research Institute. Hadi, R. (2006). Asal Usul Keningau. KB Publication Sdn. Bhd. Hassan, N., Yaakob, S. A., Halif, M. M., Aziz, R. A., Majid, A. A., & Sumardi, N. A. (2019). The effects of technostress creators and organizational commitment among school teachers. Asian Journal of University Education, 15, 92–102. Heng, K., & Sol, K. (2021). Online learning during COVID-19: Key challenges and suggestions to enhance effectiveness. Cambodian Journal of Educational Research, 1(1), 3–16. Hennessy, S., Haßler, B., & Hofmann, R. (2015). Challenges and opportunities for teacher professional development in interactive use of technology in African schools. Technology, Pedagogy and Education, 24(5), 1–28. Isaacson, W. (2011). Steve jobs. Simon & Schuster. Kilpatrick, S., Barrett, M., & Jones, T. (2003). Defining learning communities. Joint New Zealand Association for Research in Education & Australian Association for Research in Education International Conference, Auckland, New Zealand, 29 November–3 December 2003. Kos-Łab˛edowicz, J. (2017). The issue of digital divide in rural areas of the European Union. Ekonomiczne Problemy Usług, 1(126/2), 195–204. Lembani, R., Gunter, A., Breines, M., & Dalu, M. T. B. (2020). The same course, different access: The digital divide between urban and rural distance education students in South Africa. Journal of Geography in Higher Education, 44(1), 70–84. Liu, J. (2021). Bridging digital divide amidst educational change for socially inclusive learning during the COVID-19 pandemic. Sage Open, 11(4). Mallow, M. S., & Rahman, S. S. S. A. (2021). Online education in Malaysia: The good, the bad, the ugly and the way forward. In Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference on Education & Education of Social Sciences. Manduna, W. (2016). Empirical study of digital poverty: A case study of a University of Technology in South Africa. Journal of Communication, 7 (2), 317–323. McAllister, L., & Graham, C. (2016). An analysis of the curriculum requirements for K-12 online teaching endorsements in the US. Journal of Online Learning Research, 2(3), 247–282. Mouza, C., & Barrett-Greenly, T. (2015). Bridging the app gap: An examination of a professional development initiative on mobile learning in urban schools. Computers & Education, 88, 1–14.

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Mwapwele, S. D., Marais, M., Dlamini, S., & Van Biljon, J. (2019). Teachers’ ICT adoption in South African rural schools: A study of technology readiness and implications for the South Africa connect broadband policy. The African Journal of Information and Communication, 24, 1–21. Noor, S., Isa, F. M., & Mazhar, F. F. (2020). Online teaching practices during the COVID-19 pandemic. Educational Process: International Journal, 9(3), 169–184. Othman, Z., & Sivasubramaniam, V. (2019). Depression, anxiety, and stress among secondary school teachers in Klang, Malaysia. International Medical Journal, 26(2), 71–74. Philipsen, B., Tondeur, J., Pareja Roblin, N., Vanslambrouck, S., & Zhu, C. (2019). Improving teacher professional development for online and blended learning: A systematic meta-aggregative review. Educational Technology Research and Development, 67 (5), 1145–1174. Pillay, H., Goddard, R., & Wills, L. (2005). Well-being, burnout and competence: implications for teachers. Australian Journal of Teacher Education, 30(2). Sabah Ministry of Resource Development and IT. (2011). Sabah state ICT blueprint. https://www.sabah.gov.my/main/Content/info/State%20ICT% 20Blueprint%20Final.pdf Singh, V., & Thurman, A. (2019). How many ways can we define online learning? A systematic literature review of definitions of online learning (1988–2018). American Journal of Distance Education, 33(4), 289–306. Sparks, C. (2013). What is the “digital divide” and why is it important? The Public, 20(2), 27–46. Tayo, O., Thompson, R., & Thompson, E. (2016). Impact of the digital divide on computer use and internet access on the poor in Nigeria. Journal of Education and Learning, 5(1), 1–6. The Borneo Post. (2020, May 5). 52 pct students in Sabah have no internet access, gadgets for online learning. https://www.theborneopost.com/2020/05/ 10/52-pct-students-in-sabah-have-no-internet-access-gadgets-for-online-lea rning/ Wheeler Report. (2020, July 8). Education and COVID-19—Part II— Technology—The Wheeler Report. http://www.thewheelerreport.com/blog/ 2020/06/17/education-and-covid-19-part-ii-technology. Yeap, C. F., Suhaimi, N., & Nasir, M. K. M. (2021). Issues, challenges, and suggestions for empowering technical vocational education and training education during the COVID-19 pandemic in Malaysia. Creative Education, 12(8), 1818–1839. Zamani, A., Mohamad, M., Reesha, A., & Kamarudin, R. (2022). The impact of Covid-19: A literature review on the challenges in e-learning. Creative Education, 13, 3490–3503. https://doi.org/10.4236/ce.2022.1311224

Lockdowns and Food Security: Embodying Native Wisdom in Rice Production Among the Indigenous Lundayeh in Sabah Kavitha Ganesan

and Shaffarullah Abdul Rahman

Introduction If interconnectedness can be seen as one of the main indicators of the globalisation process, then when it comes to discussing remote communities, the key issues to consider are the source and nature of this interconnectedness. Working between the intersections of globalisation and its antithesis, deglobalisation, using an anthropological framework (specifically indigenous studies), our problem is further complicated by the Covid-19 pandemic and the ways in which it has affected various communities worldwide, including indigenous Malaysians. Nevertheless, a common thread that cuts across these constraints and complexities is sustenance—that is, despite the challenges and limitations posed by the simultaneous existence of globalisation and deglobalisation, the pandemic has further highlighted the requirement for staples such as rice, and

K. Ganesan (B) · S. A. Rahman Universiti Malaysia Sabah, Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia e-mail: [email protected] S. A. Rahman e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. Ying Hooi et al. (eds.), Social and Political Deglobalisation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6823-7_11

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thus wet paddy cultivation by the indigenous Lundayeh people is both necessary and timely. It is for this reason that we begin this chapter by presenting a brief overview of the Lundayeh, before tracing how interconnections were brought about through the timber route linking their remote village of Long Pasia to the outside world. We then explain deglobalisation by situating it in the Malaysian nation-state’s context, where the key aspect among numerous efforts at creating a national identity was the national language’s institutionalisation, which threatened indigenous identity by rendering the use of the native Lundayeh language educationally and economically unimportant. We continue by examining wet paddy cultivation in relation to Lundayeh native wisdom, as expressed through their Lati’ Ba’ system and conclude with data on the paddy harvested by different households in Long Pasia during the lockdown periods (known locally as Movement Control Orders) to argue that the community’s native wisdom helped it to withstand the effects of these restrictions. At the heart of our argument is a twofold observation: not only did native wisdom provide these villagers with a sustainable food-sourcing method, but such practices were also an expression of agency, therefore contributing—albeit in a small way—to ensuring the sovereignty of an endangered indigenous identity.

The Lundayeh People The Lundayeh are an indigenous minority in the state of Sabah, whose origins can be traced to the Kerayan-Kelabit Highlands of East Kalimantan. These inland Lundayeh migrated to other parts of Borneo and settled along more conducive riverbanks: their place of origin was a mountainous terrain which complicated any agricultural activities. As a matter of fact, their community’s name suggests its origins: Lun (people) and dayeh (upriver), if read together, becomes a river-based self-referential term, and thus implies that their ancestors used to occupy the headwaters, whose geographical location led to hill paddy cultivation.1 In contrast, the Lun Lod, who occupied the lowlands, cultivated wet paddy. 1 The community resorted to wet paddy cultivation following a change in their dwelling structure (i.e., from longhouses to individual households). This was because hill paddy cultivation required arduous work, and therefore a workforce living together in a longhouse unit was conducive to labour. When the community shifted to individual houses—a

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Up until the 1960s, researchers who worked closely with the community used the spelling “Lun Dayeh” rather than “Lundayeh”. These river- and cultivation-based identities merged as recently as the 1970s, where all subgroups were classified together as a single ethnic category (“Lundayeh”) because of their shared linguistic commonalities, and were officially accepted and registered by the Sabah state government as such (Crain, 1978; Ganang, 1970). Before territorial divisions were drawn between the Brooke, British and Dutch colonial powers in Borneo, the Lundayeh inhabited a borderless terrain.2 It has to be noted that because of their migration and settlement patterns, the Lundayeh are not only found in Sabah, but also in all of contemporary Borneo’s other political units—however, ethnic labels vary from one to another. These colonial territories eventually became components of independent nation-states (i.e., Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia), which invariably affected the ethnic identity of the community: in Sabah they are known as “Lundayeh”, but in Sarawak they are the “Lun Bawang”, or else the “Dayak Lundayeh” in Kalimantan and “Lun Bawang Murut” in Brunei, despite sharing linguistic and cultural elements (Wong et al., 2007). Presently in Sabah, the community mainly resides in Sipitang, Tenom and Keningau. Long Pasia, a remote highland location within the Ulu Padas region of Sipitang district, lies about 1,000 metres above sea level. It is one of the remaining heartlands of the Lundayeh, and has a population of approximately 400 people ( Fig. 1).

Globalisation, the Timber Route and the Erosion of Indigenous Identity Globalisation has brought about a multitude of changes to the traditional Lundayeh way of life, and it is visible in terms of the community’s relationship with the forest and the loss of various aspects of indigenous identity. Researchers who worked with the villagers of Long Pasia began recording these changes and more importantly, the turmoil resulting from logging because of the construction of the timber route in 1998 by Sabah Forest Industries Sdn. Bhd., which connected Long Pasia to the nearest move encouraged by the colonial government—their cultivation methods shifted as well (Crain, 1970, pp. 169–185). 2 In the past, the Lundayeh were mislabelled by the colonisers as “Murut”, who actually belong to another language family (Deegan, 1970; Langub, 1987).

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Fig. 1 Location of Long Pasia Within Sabah (Wikimedia, n.d.)

township in Sipitang district. Long Pasia was previously only accessible by air: helicopter services transported doctors and military border scouts, and at times carried provisions for the villagers.3 Through the construction of the gravel route, the villagers’ travel time to town has been shortened to 4–6 hours by four-wheel-drive, down from a three-day journey by foot. Alison Hoare, who spent 1999–2000 in Long Pasia, documented the impact of logging and growing discontent among the village folk, but only to an extent: they realised that engaging in conflict with the logging company was impossible and strove to find ways of reconciliation instead (Hoare, 2002). Regardless, the highlanders of Long Pasia started to witness the degradation of their native identity because of the ensuing rapid depletion of the surrounding forest environment. The forest land and their indigenous identity are closely connected because they were hunter-gatherers whose

3 The inaccessibility of the dense forest area in highland locations of Borneo was also documented during the Second World War (Marles et al., 2016, p. 86).

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livelihoods depended on forest resources. The men hunted game for protein while the cultivation of their staple food (i.e., rice) was carried out by women.4 With deforestation, their resources decreased, hence threatening traditional food-sourcing methods. Ganesan et al. (2020) discuss their language’s rich vocabulary for varying hunting methods that have become less useful since the men seldom hunt, and even during these rare occasions, they use modified techniques to suit the depleted forest land. Besides this, another direct impact brought about by the logging route and deforestation is that they often resort to store-bought items: meat is purchased from shops in Sipitang and fast food is becoming more common (pp. 208–210). In short, the interconnectedness brought about by the timber route has arguably been changing parts of their core cultural identity, namely food systems, which have been altered to suit present living conditions. Another important point in relation to cultural identity, and with specific regard to food-sourcing, is that a typical sense of gender complementarity among swidden agriculturalists exists. Men and women have an equal distribution of labour (even if their tasks are differentiated), and therefore the food that is brought to the family unit is a result of this shared effort. Janowski (2002), in her discussion of the Kelabit from highland Borneo (who as mentioned, share a common ancestor with the Lundayeh), terms such gendered partnership as “rice-based kinship” (p. 132). Kelabit kinship is secured less by biological relationships but more so by rice meals. The act of growing rice by women, combined with the meat hunted by men, are both meant for the consumption of all dependents and descendants living in the longhouse. This system demonstrates that married couples jointly provided meals, hence securing their positions as the heads of the hearth-group or family unit. Such food systems are necessary for maintaining the social order and hierarchical structure of the longhouse.5 Thus, we contend that when the available forest land decreases, such as in the case of Long Pasia, male contributions 4 Even though men participate in agricultural activities (e.g., strenuous tasks such as clearing land for cultivation), women mainly engage in the labour associated with paddy cultivation itself. 5 Similar to the Kelabit, the Lundayeh were also longhouse-dwellers. But in Long Pasia and many neighbouring Lundayeh villages, they reside in individual households. During the colonial period, following the strong discouragement of longhouse-dwelling because it ostensibly caused numerous communal disputes and was the main cause of life-threatening diseases, longhouses were completely abandoned (Crain, 1970, pp. 169–185).

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become ambivalent at best and invisible at worst.6 The cultural consequences are grave, considering that during the colonial period, another key marker of adult male masculinity, headhunting, was abolished and eventually erased from the Lundayeh cultural collective through their conversion to Christianity. Bornean indigenous belief systems were founded upon the division into the human (seen) and non-human (unseen) worlds. This is to say that the hidden and unknown parts of the dense rainforest were as equally important as the familiar forest plains where food was sourced. As a matter of fact, these unfamiliar parts were treated with much caution and reverence. This complementarity between seemingly opposing forces of life (male/ female; upper world/underworld) also shaped animistic beliefs regarding the cosmos. Elsewhere, we have examined how this native belief system was formed in relation to the dense Bornean forest (Ganesan & Abdul Rahman, 2022). Even though the villagers of Long Pasia are devout Christians today, the notion of complementarity is central to their cultural identity and is still practised in accordance with their faith, such as during agricultural activities and communal gatherings (irau). This is why the disappearance of forest land is not merely a matter of food scarcity that can be overcome through modification and adjustment, but can constitute a threat to the crucial “life force” from which the entire cultural tapestry of the community is woven. Compounding their already-altered sociocultural beliefs over numerous generations is the deforestation and connectivity brought about by the logging route. We urgently call for intervention to preserve their indigeneity, and argue that otherwise, the loss of such identity will not only be inevitable but also rapid. Thus, we consider how cultivation practices enable the villagers of Long Pasia to safeguard their indigeneity, seeing as this system is rooted in their native wisdom.

6 Although many men have migrated to nearby towns and cities in search of wage

employment, those who still reside in the village have resorted to cultivating crops like rubber and fruit trees for cash because hunting does not provide them with sufficient protein. The cash economy has now become dominant. Information obtained during fieldwork in February 2020 from Nooh Dawa, a Lundayeh resident who runs the homestay in Long Pasia where we stayed throughout.

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Deglobalisation, the Nation-State and Language Identity We view the idea of transforming Malaysia into a nation-state through a common linguistic identity as being entrenched in deglobalisation because, similar to other postcolonial nations, language politics lies at the heart of nation-building (see, for example, Leow, 2016). The issue is complex when considering its multi-ethnic makeup, where the need for homogeneity (however misguided), both culturally and linguistically, is premised upon integrating various groups into a common nationality. How does such an aim fragment the linguistic identity of this isolated population, and does this journey unwittingly inculcate monolingualism while sidelining indigenous languages? During British colonial rule, the Lundayeh were mislabelled as “Murut”. The reason for this wrongful labelling is unclear, but there is a common belief among scholars that the Lundayeh may have come from Mount Murut (also spelt “Murud”), the highest peak in Sarawak, where one of the early Lundayeh settlements was located. Jayl Langub (1987) laments that “[a] varied assortment of mountain peoples in northern Sarawak and the interior districts of Sabah [were referred to in such a way when] the term has never been used in self-reference among these peoples” (p. 291). To make matters worse, it was common practice among colonisers to create and establish stereotypes regarding their subjects; hence, the term “Murut” was freighted with negative connotations. Deegan (1970) explains that the classification system was introduced by “foreigners in a derogatory fashion to classify hill peoples such as the Lundayeh and Lun Bawang when in fact it refers to the Tagals, a neighbouring group” (p. 264). In fact, even as far back as 1913, the name “Sarawak Murut” was used to refer to “drunken, dirty, and indolent” people by the British North Borneo Herald (1913, p. 36). Even though the use of the term “Murut” to refer to the Lun Dayeh and Lun Bawang was erroneous and confusing, this misuse was not vehemently resisted in the past. As Kahn (2012) points out, there was significant flexibility regarding ethnicity among the peoples of Borneo, given their diverse and constantly shifting ways of life. Ethnicity was rarely an issue and in fact, migration was a fertile ground for the crossfertilisation of languages and cultures. When the British introduced ethnic categories for census and administrative purposes, such flexibility and hybridity began to unravel, totally collapsing when these ethnic categories

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were reified in postcolonial Malaysia for governance purposes. At this point, the Lundayeh fought for their ethno-linguistic classification, and thus the term “Lundayeh” began to be used in the 1970s. Among their justifications was that the Lundayeh language was different from Murut. But how did such a language that was important for the consolidation of in-group identity just some decades ago become so critically endangered in recent years? When nationalistic efforts intensified in newly independent Malaysia, especially following the 1969 racial riots—there were other factors at play during this incident, of course—the call for a national language became one of the main foci to unite the diverse West (Peninsular) and East Malaysians. The implementation of the New Economic Policy in 1970 demonstrated that ethnic cohesion was to be built through Malay-medium education, which was also meant to alleviate poverty and increase participation among the economically underprivileged members of society.7 The Razak Committee, which was accorded the responsibility to study the prospects of colonial Malaya’s plural education system for the purposes of negotiation between its multi-ethnic leaders, is perhaps most relevant regarding non-Malay languages. The committee’s principle was “to make Malay the national language of the country whilst preserving and sustaining the growth of the languages and cultures of non-Malay peoples living in the country” (Government of Malaya, 1956, Art. 9). This is why the institutionalisation of Malay as the national language did not initially pose a threat to the indigenous languages of Sabah and Sarawak. But over the years, they became less relevant or significant. Since nation-building was premised upon Malay, which as the national language was also the primary medium of instruction, it invariably became the language for employment purposes and economic growth (Brown, 2007; Lee, 2009). As a direct consequence, many parents in local indigenous communities, especially those in remote areas, resorted to speaking in Malay to their children to give them an early start even before their schooling years. This is why Ethnologue, which maintains a database on the status and use of world languages, has listed numerous indigenous languages from Sabah and Sarawak as either “6B” (threatened),

7 Although the contestation between Bahasa Melayu (the national and official language) and English (the second language, with its colonial legacy) resulted in numerous shifts in policy, it falls outside the scope of our discussion.

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“7” (shifting) or “8a” (moribund) on the Expanded Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale. The spoken Lundayeh language is currently categorised as “6B”, which means that “the language is used for faceto-face communication within all generations, but it is losing users”.8 Our findings corroborate Ethnologue’s categorisation—during our fieldwork in the 2018–2019 period, we observed that while members of the older generation spoke in Lundayeh among their peers, they spoke in Malay with their grandchildren. Even the Sunday mass was held in the Malay language: the pastor explained that Malay was the preferred language because everyone was conversant in it. Furthermore, there were worshippers from neighbouring villages present (Fig. 2). Jacqueline Pugh-Kitingan, Head of the Culture, Heritage and Arts Cluster at the Borneo Institute for Indigenous Studies, suggests a different dynamic at play. While she considers intermarriages between members of different language groups as one of the main causes in the rapid decline of indigenous languages, she opines that the parents and the older generation,

Fig. 2 Malay-language Sunday mass in Long Pasia, photographed during fieldwork in August 2018

8 See https://www.ethnologue.com/about/language-status for further details on classification.

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[…] insist on speaking to their children in a broken version of the Sabah Malay dialect which is the market place lingua franca throughout Sabah. [They] mistakenly believe that this will help the children do well at school, which uses standard Malay, not Sabah Malay, as the main medium of instruction. (Borneo Today, 2020)

This is to say that the children neither grow up proficient in the standard variety of Malay taught in schools, nor do they become proficient in their native language. Hence, they doubly lose out when it comes to language identity. Regardless, these children are (largely) monolingual because they habitually speak in Malay, be it the colloquial (i.e., Sabah Malay) or standard variety. Whether or not the belief that Malay is the language for survival contributes to the broad mindset that it is best for rural children to grow up speaking some variety of the language, the consistent theme regarding the shift in language use is that fluency enables the younger generation to leave their isolated locations in search of better opportunities.9 This is a direct result of state-level policies that continue to emphasise the use and status of Malay for educational progress, employability and economic growth. As recently as 2022, Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob called for the renewed use of Bahasa Melayu, not only domestically but more importantly, at regional and international levels, in order to elevate the global status and visibility of the language (The Star, 2022). It may also be useful at this point to examine the Lundayeh from the perspective of their past belief system and its relationship to state governance. When the colonial government asserted control, the unseen colonisers were regarded as a powerful force within this framework. Arguably, this is why the colonial-era, top-down abolishment of numerous animistic practices and large-scale religious conversions were eventually successful. Likewise, when the independent federal government took over, the belief in an unseen but powerful force remained dominant. Janet Hoskins (1996, pp. 1–49), for example, draws parallels between headhunting, colonialism and the postcolonial nation-state by tracing connections with tribal understandings of power, autonomy and subjugation. We argue that this is a possible reason why state policies are slowly 9 Language shifts, as defined by Fishman (1964), refer to a speech community losing the habitual use of its heritage language because of competition from a regionally and socially more powerful language.

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but surely accepted, which by extension means that indigenous language usage has fallen to a critically low level—noting of course that there are many reasons for communities making adaptations, while cautioning against resorting to a facile cultural determinism.

Deglobalisation, Covid-19 Restrictions and Paddy Cultivation Here, we provide an alternative viewpoint regarding another manifestation of Malaysia’s deglobalisation process, this time in relation to Covid-19. We argue that nationwide restrictions were paradoxically salutary for these remote villagers because their cultivation methods, passed down from one generation to another, survived these constraints and in fact served as an avenue to reassert native agency. The Lundayeh ability to sustain food production and consumption, despite prolonged restrictions meant to contain the pandemic in 2020–2021, was reasserted in their wet paddy cultivation system, Lati’ Ba’. First, we discuss their religious background and cultivation of fadey adan (a local paddy crop) to understand the shift from hill paddy to wet paddy cultivation, and next, we argue that understanding sustainable food practices in Long Pasia requires an account of indigenous wisdom, as embodied in Lati’ Ba’. Since the Lundayeh dwell in what is essentially a highland terrain, it is easy to overlook the fact that they are presently better known for bera’ adan, which essentially requires wet paddy farming methods. The Lundayeh actually cultivate an incredible variety of rice grain—both hill and wet rice varieties—such as lawid, madari, adan, kilu, labuan, itam, merah, rabai, sapit, lemak, rindu, pad wi, buda, safuq, telleu, sia and kedinga. Although the Lundayeh still cultivate a small portion of hill paddy on their own land, fadey adan and its variants now dominate much of wet paddy cultivation in Long Pasia. But how did the Lundayeh begin to shift from hill paddy to primarily wet paddy cultivation? Two important factors are at play here: the central role of the Christian church in preparing the Lundayeh people for cultural change and the adoption of fadey adan in the late 1960s, both of which are culturally connected to the community’s food system. Before the Lundayeh converted (Lees, 1979), their primary dwelling was the longhouse. In particular, the veranda or gallery played an important role in the pre-Christian social nexus. It was precisely in this common area that one’s social status was fully displayed. The fact that some

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members can share their yield with fellow longhouse-dwellers provides an important occasion for the elevation of their social status. After fully embracing Christianity, the church effectively replaced the veranda as the focal point of social events in Long Pasia (Pearson-Rounds & Crain, 1998). This change is crucial not only in terms of replacing the physical space for social gatherings, but also in changing how many social events were organised. To illustrate, activities which used to be solely organised by those who cultivated paddy have now been subsumed by the church, such as the responsibility for collecting food for agricultural events. Hence, the underlying role of the church in changing Lati’ Ba’ cannot be overstated. Just as the Lundayeh have moved to church-centred settlements, so too has hill paddy farming transitioned to wet paddy cultivation. Fadey adan is more suitable for wet paddy cultivation than other varieties. While the role of church in effecting changes is sociocultural in nature, the adoption of fadey adan as the main crop has both historical (if relatively recent) precedents and originates from within the Lundayeh food system itself. According to our informants, fadey adan was originally brought from Belawid in nearby Kalimantan Utara, Indonesia. It was said that a Mr Sigar was the first to bring these seeds back to Long Pasia for the purpose of cultivation in 1967.10 When the villagers learned of the uniqueness of fadey adan, they asked Mr Sigar for seeds so that they too could cultivate this variety. Currently, around 80 families in Long Pasia work as paddy farmers, most of whom cultivate this variety in their respective fields. This recent precedence must also be understood in relation to the Lundayeh food system. When the villagers of Long Pasia visited their relatives in Long Semadoh, Sarawak, they were introduced to luba’ laya (a soft rice food item made from bera’ adan wrapped in banana leaf) and liked its unique taste. The reasons why a number of paddy farmers have elected to cultivate wet paddy can be attributed to the fact that luba’ laya is a quintessential Lundayeh food.11 This is because it remains fresh for a few

10 Initially, fadey adan was cultivated from adan dari stock, which is white in colour. Lundayeh farmers also cultivate other types of white adan, namely adan layu and adan keladi. The difference between them is determined by the length of the stalk, the colour of the paddy leaves and the sizes of the seeds. Apart from white adan, there is also adan sia kulit (red adan) and adan item (black adan). 11 For a comprehensive account of the Lundayeh food system, see Ganesan et al. (2020).

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days, thus suiting hunters in the jungle and cultivators in the field alike (Fig. 3). It is important to consider native wisdom regarding the rice cultivation season in tandem with the hunting season. We cannot discuss the Lati’ Ba’ without understanding how the hunting and agriculture seasons are closely planned to optimise the labour force needed for rice cultivation. During our fieldwork in February 2020, our informant, Pith Kaya, was very specific about the date when ngefu bibit fadey (lit. “soaking paddy seeds”) commenced, i.e., 25 July, which she said was the same every year. It was not clear why this particular date was chosen to mark the beginning of wet paddy cultivation, but when we checked the date

Fig. 3 A typical Lati’ Ba’ in Long Pasia, photographed during fieldwork in September 2020

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against the hunting season (from late June to early July),12 the chosen date made sense because it did not clash with hunting activities (see Table 1). Because the Lundayeh men spent seven days in the jungle before returning to Long Pasia with their hunt, the two-week interval between hunting seasons and ngefu bibit fadey optimised hard labour so that the paddy cultivation season could commence. Thus, the planting schedule has complemented hunting activities for many generations. Table 1

The stages of a Lati’ Ba’ cycle

Activity

Purpose

Completion time

Calendar date

Ngefu bibit fadey

Paddy seeds are soaked in sacks so that their white roots can grow (or germinate) Paddy seeds are sowed so that samai fadey can grow Rice field boundaries are set to cultivate paddy and differentiate between types Paddy is transferred to the field Grass growing between paddy shoots is weeded to prevent disruptions Paddy is harvested

1–5 days

Late July

1 month

August

1–2 weeks

August

1 week

Late August–Late October October

Paddy is dried Paddy is winded to filter out dried grass and empty paddy Paddy is milled

1 month 1 month

Late January–March March March

2–3 hours a day

March

Ngisak samai fadey

Ngifeng ba’

Nibu fadey Demamu udu’

Ngerani fadey Midang fadey Malid fadey

Ngigin

Two months after nibu fadey

2 months

12 Even though hunting has vastly decreased in recent years because of dwindling forest land, the Lundayeh men do undertake occasional hunting trips and when they do, they go deeper into the jungle where game is less scarce.

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Since the Lundayeh are culturally part of the Dayak ethnic group, it is tempting to lump Lati’ Ba’ together with the indigenous rice cultivation systems practised by other groups elsewhere in Borneo. Indeed, Murhaini (2021) seems to argue that Dayak rice cultivation systems in Kalimantan are commonly practised everywhere in Borneo. To be fair, although cultivation in Long Pasia roughly follows some common stages,13 this generalisation is inaccurate because it fails to account for how the Lundayeh have predominantly become wet paddy farmers. Since Lati’ Ba’ does not require jungle-clearing and the burning of fields, it is important that we distinguish clearly between hill and wet paddy cultivation practices, a topic which we now turn to in detail. Although ngefu bibit fadey only begins on 25 July, it is easy to overlook how preparations are already planned at least six months ahead. Three things require our further attention to understand how indigenous wisdom is embodied in the preparation and commencement of Lati’ Ba’. First, the sacks used for ngefu bibit fadey are the same as those used to store the harvest from the previous cultivation season at their lefo fadey (barn). The fact that cultivators make use of the same sacks speaks volumes about how their system embodies sustainability. Second, the paddy seeds are not bought or brought in from elsewhere, but rather, are sourced from the ngerani pade’ (paddy-milling) process in Long Pasia itself. Between both the ngefu bibit fadey and ngerani pade’ stages, six months will have passed, but it is worth noting that the selection of paddy sacks is already earmarked long before the commencement of cultivation. Third, the number of seeds that needs to be soaked depends on the size of the paddy fields; nevertheless, cultivators often prepare extra plots. Although one acre requires ten gantang of seeds (one gantang is equivalent to 14 small milk cans), they would normally prepare 12–18 gantang to: (1) mitigate the loss of paddy seeds should they be eaten by sparrows; and (2) share some extra seeds with their fellow farmers, thus suggesting forethought in case of possible misfortunes and arising communal needs. Over the course of Lati’ Ba’, the sustainability of the practice becomes unassumingly clear. While the Lundayeh have embraced “modernity” for 13 According to Purwanto and Haryono (2020), there are ten common stages of the rice farming cycle for the Dayak in Kalimantan: (1) inspecting land; (2) determining land area; (3) cleaning farming tools; (4) slashing; (5) cutting the trees; (6) burning the land; (7) weeding; (9) harvesting; and (10) thanksgiving (begawai).

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at least 30 years, the native wisdom of Lati’ Ba’ remains shielded from the effects of globalisation—we suggest that this is because rice cultivation in Long Pasia has always been traditionally organic, despite how globalisation has changed much of the traditional way of life, which bodes well for sustainable food production. Despite its relative remoteness, Long Pasia is actually not short of modern infrastructure, such as telecommunication towers. Yet its rice farmers do not seem to depend on modern machines, fertiliser and pesticide, although some well-off families can indeed buy machines for ploughing and milling. Otherwise, practices can remain lowtech. For instance, in order to dig holes at the paddy nurseries so that the seeds can germinate, a sharp stick is used. To make the soil thoroughly muddy, soft and soggy, hoes and buffaloes are deployed. For irrigation, bamboo rafts are used to transport water from the nearby river. For milling, a large plastic drum is used to knock the grain loose from the straw. To separate the husk and dried grass, farmers simply use the wind. Before grinding the paddy to make rice, they first dry it out under the sun. As with rice cultivation everywhere, pests are a natural enemy. In fact, the Lundayeh discovered that as early as the second stage of cultivation (ngisak samai fadey), insects could lay waste to the nurseries. Since the Lundayeh farmers shun the use of pesticides, they elect to use natural defences in the form of crushed lemongrass, mixed with water and sowed in the nurseries. Since Lati’ Ba’ requires hard labour, the farmers employ ruyud, a rotational system of working together, which operates as follows. Family members or relatives form groups, rotating work on different areas for days and weeks. For example, a group works on one paddy field on Monday, and another works at the same place on Tuesday. Ruyud is normally employed during the nibu fadey and ngerani fadey stages. While the embodiment of Lundayeh wisdom is evident over the course of Lati’ Ba’, the discussion of the relationship between indigenous wisdom and food sustainability is incomplete if an account of the post-cultivation calendar is left out. For context, we ask how the Lundayeh people can sustain themselves. We believe that the answer is twofold: (1) the harvest is meant to sustain the family for a number of years; (2) and their staple foods are extensively rice-based, thus complementing their food system and culture (Table 2). This yield demonstrates that the Lundayeh households, whether they cultivate a large field or a small plot, produce consistent yield. This point is of interest to us because it shows that despite the nationwide restrictions

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Table 2 Paddy yield by individual households, 2017–2021. The names of the families have been omitted to maintain anonymity, in accordance with research ethics Family

Paddy seeds ( gantang)

Land size (acre)

Year

Produce (sacks)

Family A

13

3

Family B

18

6

Family C

18

4

Family D

13

2

Family E

10

1.5

2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

104 103 106 70 86 103 105 108 106 180 78 106 102 70 75 60 57 62 70 58 40 38 20 20 23

in place during the pandemic, there was a sustainable form of production taking place. When we interviewed Families A and C, whose yields seem to have somewhat decreased in 2020–2021, we were informed that this was the result of pest invasions, and not caused by the restrictions themselves. In fact, Family B went on to produce as many as 180 sacks in 2021. It may be tempting to believe that this seemingly overabundant supply would go wasted. But Lundayeh wisdom accounts for excess production: because rice is so integral to their food system, there is almost always a use for it. Consider the typical Lundayeh diet: biter (rice porridge), luba’

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laya 14 and pinaram (fried rice-flour cakes). Although bera’ adan is meant primarily for personal or communal use, the surplus is sold to visitors and guests in Long Pasia.

Conclusion We argue that the erosion of Lundayeh indigenous identity is a direct result of both globalisation and deglobalisation trends. However, the community’s native wisdom, which has been inherited and shaped over many generations, has survived and is manifested in a sustainable food production system despite Malaysia’s own deglobalisation policies, which were meant to contain the spread of Covid-19. This is to say that the effects of deglobalisation cannot simply be regarded as having entirely negative impacts on native communities. As detailed in this chapter, with specific reference to the Lundayeh, such deglobalisation can paradoxically prove to be an advantage for otherwise marginalised communities under specific circumstances. Acknowledgements The authors of this article are part of the FRGS/1/ 2018/WAB06/UMS/02/1 research project (Lundayeh oral tradition: Gendered sounds and the changing cultural landscape of Ulu Padas, Sabah), which is funded by the Ministry of Higher Education. The data on paddy yield is funded by the Universiti Malaysia Sabah Internal Grant Scheme, SBK0450-2018 (“Innovating indigenous socio-economy among Lundayehs: The commodity of Bera Adan in Long Pasia”). The authors would like to acknowledge and express their deepest gratitude to their primary informants (Ricky Yakub Ganang, Frank Dawat Yusia and Dayanara Sandra Lukas) for their assistance during this research.

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14 People commonly cooperate during irau to make luba’ buayeh (a crocodile-shaped rice food item).

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Lee, H. G. (2009). Language, education, and ethnic relations. In T. G. Lim, A. Gomes, & A. Rahman (Eds.), Multiethnic Malaysia: Past, present, and future (pp. 207–230). SIRD. Leow, R. (2016). Taming Babel: Language in the making of Malaysia. Cambridge University Press. Lees, S. (1979). Drunk before dawn. OMF Books. Marles, J. E., Jukim, M. H., & Dhont, F. (2016). Tropical war stories: Preserving oral histories from World War II Borneo. eTropic, 15(2). Murhaini, S. A. (2021). The farming management of Dayak People’s community based on local wisdom ecosystem in Kalimantan Indonesia. Heliyon. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2021.e08578. Pearson-Rounds, V., & Crain, J. (1998). From bang tetel to bawang: Patterns of transformation and coherence in Lundayeh-Lun Bawang architecture. In R. L. Winzeler (Ed.), Indigenous Architecture in Borneo: Traditional patterns and new developments. Borneo Research Council. Purwanto, S. A., & Haryono, H. (2020). Dimensi Adat dan Dinamika Komunitas Dayak di Kalimantan Timur. Antropologi Indonesia, 67–87. Wikimedia. (n.d.). Long Pasia. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bor neo_Topography.png. Wong, J. K. L., Bala, B., & Bee, B. B. B. (2007). Masyarakat Lundayeh di Sabah: Satu Kajian Asal Usul, Migrasi dan Klasifikasi Etnik. Pemuliharaan Sejarah dan Tamadun Borneo Ke Arah Pengukuhan Negara Bangsa. Pusat Sejarah Brunei, Kementerian Kebudayaan, Belia dan Sukan.

Index

A Abdullah, Noor Hisham, 77, 100 Al Jazeera, 74, 94, 116–118, 120, 122, 135, 137 Antiglobalisation, 4 Armed forces, 39, 41, 46–49 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 7, 12, 46, 91 AUKUS, 46

B Barisan Nasional (BN), 5, 24, 26, 30, 31, 33, 72, 114–116, 133 Below 40 (B40), 26, 29, 30, 60, 76, 77, 81, 82, 163 #BenderaPutih, 55, 63, 81 Bio-constitutionalism, 14, 73–77 Borneo, 188–191, 193, 201 Brunei, 189

C Censorship, 114, 115

China, 4, 8–10, 22, 42, 46, 50, 56, 59, 92 Civil society, 7, 54, 57, 59, 61, 65, 101, 111, 115, 119, 121, 138 Classification system, 193 Climate change, 33, 41, 42 Cold War, 11, 41, 43 Commodification theory, 73–75, 78 Constitutional moment, 75, 77, 78 Critical discourse analysis (CDA), 111–113 Cultural identity, 191, 192 Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 96–98, 101

D Definition of “youth”, 54 Definition of exploitation, 95 Deforestation, 191, 192 Digital literacy, 81, 181, 182 Digital poverty, 15, 27, 171–175, 178, 180–182

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. Ying Hooi et al. (eds.), Social and Political Deglobalisation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6823-7

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INDEX

E East Malaysia, 28, 48, 60, 92 Economic deglobalisation, 8, 46 Election, 22, 30, 31, 54, 59, 60, 63, 66, 116, 133, 136 Emergency, 5, 6, 10, 13, 44, 48–50, 55, 60, 61, 65, 72, 74, 77 Employment Act, 91, 95, 97, 99 Extension services, 160–162

F Federal and state functions, 155 Financial crisis, 8, 21, 32, 57, 58, 129 Food insecurity, 29, 30, 152 Food policy, 15, 152–155 Food security, 15, 29, 33, 152, 154, 157, 165 Fourth Industrial Revolution, 22, 43

H Health inequality, 28 Hegemony, 15, 48, 111, 112, 116, 120, 125

I Ibrahim, Anwar, 30, 31, 33, 58, 59, 115 ICT infrastructure, 173, 180 Illiberal democracy, 73, 74 Indonesia, 12, 23, 31, 32, 56, 58, 83, 96, 102, 136, 189, 198 Internationalism, 56 Irregular, 92 Islam, 11, 72, 132

J Journalism, 114, 116, 118, 121–125

K Keningau, 15, 158, 171, 172, 174, 176–180, 182, 189

L Language politics , 193 Lati’ Ba’ , 15, 188, 197–202 #Lawan, 55, 62–64 Learning community, 15, 170, 172, 173, 175, 181, 182 Lundayeh people, 188, 197, 202

M Malaysian Employers Federation (MEF), 100, 101 Malaysian Trades Union Congress (MTUC), 95, 100, 101 Media council, 116, 124 Middle 40 (M40), 26, 29, 30, 76 Military deglobalisation, 43 Ministry of Education, 27, 115, 176 Ministry of Health, 5, 48, 49, 77, 81, 99, 100 Ministry of Human Resources (MOHR), 93, 95, 98, 101 Mohamad, Mahathir, 5, 58, 114 Moral responsibility, 125 Movement Control Order (MCO), 5, 12, 15, 44, 47, 50, 60, 62, 72, 76–79, 82, 91, 93–96, 98, 110, 113, 116, 133–135, 137, 139–141, 188 Muslim, 132, 139

N National Action Plan on Forced Labour (NAPFL), 101, 102, 141 Nationalism, 4, 9, 10, 21, 22, 34, 56, 65, 109, 121, 130, 134, 141, 194

INDEX

Neoliberal, 4, 7, 11, 13, 53, 72, 75, 89, 90, 153, 165 New Economic Policy (NEP), 58, 194 Non-governmental organisation (NGO), 54, 55, 58, 62–64, 91, 96, 101, 102, 123, 132, 159, 163, 165 Non-traditional security (NTS), 14, 40–44, 46, 48, 50

O Overview of agricultural policies in Sabah, 155

P Paddy cultivation, 15, 158, 161, 162, 188, 191, 197–201 Pakatan Harapan (PH), 5, 13, 30, 31, 33, 54, 67, 115 Palm oil, 11, 26, 29, 151, 152, 155, 156, 160 Patronage, 154, 162 Perikatan Nasional (PN), 5, 6, 23, 24, 30, 31, 60, 72, 116, 117, 120, 133 Period poverty, 27 The Philippines, 23, 32, 41, 83, 90, 102, 132 Political deglobalisation, 9, 10 Populism, 7, 14, 21, 67, 72, 73, 130, 131, 141 Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases Act, 5, 13 Protectionism, 4, 8, 9, 12, 21, 42, 130, 153

R Reformasi, 54, 57–59, 115 Regionalism, 7 Reliance on migrant workers, 12

209

Repatriation, 132, 136 “Return of the state”, 153 Right to health, 72–80, 131, 141 Rohingya, 121, 132, 134–136, 138, 139 S Sarawak, 25, 26, 28, 45, 102, 151, 189, 193, 194, 198 Selective deglobalisation, 13 Self-sufficiency level (SSL), 152, 157–160, 165 Sheraton Move, 54, 74, 77, 78 Singapore, 32, 41, 45, 56 Small and medium enterprise (SME), 24, 33, 152, 155, 158, 161–164 Social deglobalisation, 9, 10, 12, 13, 131, 134 South Asia, 90 Sovereign, 4, 9, 16, 41, 45, 47, 64, 65, 140, 188 Spratly Islands, 45, 46 Standard operating procedures (SOP), 49, 60, 61, 78, 134, 135, 137, 173 State–society relations, 77, 154 Stimulus package, 12, 22–24, 60, 61, 81 T Timber, 188, 189, 191 Top Glove, 97–99 Traditional security, 14, 41, 42, 44, 46 U Ukraine, 14, 22, 26, 29, 33, 39, 43, 47 United States (US), 3, 8, 10, 22, 27, 43, 45–47, 50, 59, 96, 121, 139, 173

210

INDEX

“Unity government”, 5, 30, 31, 116 Universities and University Colleges Act (UUCA), 57, 66 US–China trade war, 8

V Vaccine, 9, 15, 28, 43, 71, 76, 78, 79, 94, 100, 101, 124 Value chain, 3, 4, 8, 10, 11, 109 Violence, 80, 83, 98, 141

X Xenophobia, 15, 94, 109–113, 117, 119, 121, 123, 124, 134, 138, 140 Y Yaakob, Ismail Sabri, 5, 26, 72, 135, 196 Yassin, Muhyiddin, 5, 55, 62, 72, 136 Youth activism, 14, 54, 55, 57, 59, 61 Z “Zero Covid” policy, 10