Sir George Grey, K.C.B., 1812-1898: a study in colonial government n296wz412

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SIR GEORGE GREY K.C.B., 1812-1898

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,9aei: ars i tad iy . .2? Coos kK: . Pom Bhs a ods a Ns err sy ' ZA ol LS ait: . . Se and Grey was able to gratify colonial opinion by abolishing all dues on shipping, a concession which elicited an address of thanks and was made the occasion for a lively public breakfast.3® The Council gratified His Excellency by

making permanent provision for his salary at the augmented rate of £1,500 a year.37 Grey gained further favour by supporting the settlers’ protests against the introduction of ‘conditional pardon men’ from the convict colonies.*8

Consequently, news of his appointment to New Zealand was unwelcome and disturbing. The South Australian found it galling to lose so capable a ruler just when he had mastered the situation.?®

Even the emigrants themselves, harsh as they at first thought His Excellency, must now thank him for his friendly severity.* Though he had not been able to put the finishing touch to his work

by establishing democratic parliamentary government, he had brought the colony well along the road to economic self-reliance, which was the indispensable condition of constitutional advancement, 82 Grey (66) 14 June 1844, CO 13/38. $3 Stanley (12) 4 Feb 1845, CO 396/6.

34 §. Australian 6 Aug 1844. 35 Ibid. 18 July 1845. 36 Ibid. 4 July 1845. His modified customs tariff, however, more than compensated for the loss of revenue; Pike 397, Dutton, 61, 75. 87 Grey (73) 5 July 1845, CO 13/43. 38 §. Australian 9, 19 Sep 1845.

$9 Ibid. 26 Sep 1845. 40 Ibid. 21 Oct 1845.

5! :

CHAPTER 6

The Aborigines

I hold it to be imagining a contradiction to suppose, that individuals subject to savage and barbarous laws, can rise into a state of civilisation. Grey, 4 June 1840 THOUGH credit must be given to Grey for approaching the problem of the South Australian aborigines in a spirit of genuine benevolence,

yet by modern ethnological standards his understanding was superficial and faulty, and, by any standards, the means at his disposal were so inadequate that what he did amounted to no more than a few friendly gestures. Like the more humane of his contemporaries, he was guided by pious sentiments rather than systematic knowledge and established principles. The humanitarians of that time regarded aborigines all the world over as much the same sort of people and expected them to respond identically to similar treatment. If neglected and maltreated by white invaders more civilised than themselves, they would succumb under pressure of warfare, disease and vice, but if they were protected by the Government and taught by the missionary, there was some hope that they might be rescued from heathen barbarism and fitted to survive in a modern Christian society. Grey’s basic precepts were substantially those of the Aborigines Committee report of 1837.1 On the strength of a brief experience

amongst the Western Australian aborigines, he had produced a neat programme of native civilisation all ready for execution. Politically, the Government must prevent hostilities between colonists and natives by extending military and police protection over the tribal areas, and by appointing protectors and magistrates 1 PP 1837/425.

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THE ABORIGINES

to establish friendly relations and bring the tribes under British law. Within this political framework, the missionaries should labour to convert them to Christianity. On the economic side, the Government and _the colonists should offer the aborigines regular employment as labourers, farm hands and servants and thus draw them into

association with Europeans, teach them improved techniques, inculcate habits of industry and thrift, and encourage decent manners. Finally, native boarding schools should be established by the Government, or by the missionary organisations aided by Government grants, whereby the younger generation could be drawn away from the debasing customs of the tribe and brought up in a civilised

manner. The end product was to be a Europeanised aborigine, equipped spiritually and morally, intellectually and technically to hold his own as an individual in European society, capable of owning land, marrying by civil contract, registering the birth of his

children at the registry office, and behaving like a responsible, law-abiding citizen. . Grey realised more clearly than most of his contemporaries that

the aborigine’s social behaviour was governed by an elaborate system of tribal law,” and that if he was to advance in civilisation tribal custom must be entirely superseded by the more enlightened

western code. Merely to apply British law to the regulation of relations between the settlers and the aborigines was not enough.

They are as apt and intelligent as any other race of men I am acquainted with; ... yet in many points of character they are totally dissimilar to them; and from the peculiar code of laws of this people, it would appear not only impossible that any nation subject to them could ever emerge from a savage state, but even that no race, however highly endowed, however

civilised, could in other respects remain long in a state of civilisation if they were submitted to the operation of such

barbarous customs.®

Exactly as he did later in South Africa, he persuaded himself that the weaker members of the tribe were ‘suffering under their own laws’, and were being subjected to the violence of their fellows.

I believe that the course pointed out by true humanity would be, to make them from the very commencement amen-

able to the British laws, both as regards themselves and 2 See D. J. Mulvaney in Historical Studies ANZ viii, 30 (May 1958) p. 146.

: ‘ner on the Aboriginal Inhabitants of Australia, 4 June 1840, PP 1841/311

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SIR GEORGE GREY

Europeans; for I hold it to be imagining a contradiction to suppose, that individuals subject to savage and barbarous laws, can rise into a state of civilisation, which those laws have a manifest tendency to destroy and overturn. I have known many instances of natives who have been almost

or quite civilised, being compelled by other natives to return to the bush; more particularly girls, who have been betrothed in their infancy, and who, on approaching the years of puberty have been compelled by their husbands to join them.é

It is hard to imagine where, prior to 1840, Grey could have found an ‘almost or quite civilised’ native. But passing that point, the striking thing about his review is that he observed native customs only to condemn them. As an earnest Christian, he never questioned the supreme rightness of the Christian religion for all races of man-

kind, nor doubted that the aborigines would receive the gospel gladly and be uplifted by it from their own debasing superstitions. Similarly, he took it for granted that European modes of life and standards of conduct, being so evidently superior to those of primitive tribal life, were bound to prove congenial and welcome. He also imagined that the transition would be relatively rapid and that the important initial stages might be accomplished in the course of a single generation.

In fact, he was assuming everything that had to be proved. Bentham-like, he aimed at increasing human happiness, but he ignored the corollary that every man is the best judge of his own

happiness. It was a colossal fallacy to assume that a nomadic hunter accustomed to living naked in the open would readily find himself at ease when dressed in unfamiliar clothes, housed under a roof, put to strange daily tasks, and expected to speak a strange language and conform to new rules of conduct amongst foreigners who regarded him as an inferior. Even more presumptuous was the

notion that the aborigine could be weaned from his ingrained spiritual beliefs merely by expounding to him the simple and evident

truths of the Christian faith. Until the texture of native life and society was better understood and the character of his spiritual beliefs was grasped, the European benefactor, however wellintentioned, was likely to fail, because he could make no intimate contact with the mind and spirit of his pupil. An almost complete lack of understanding of the aborigine prevailed for the first century of European colonisation in Australia.

In that period, a population estimated at about 300,000 in 1788

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4 Réport on the Aboriginal Inhabitants of Australia, 4 June 1840, PP 1841/311 p. 44.

THE ABORIGINES

diminished to about a quarter of that number, and the diminution has continued without appreciable abatement.5 Moreover, 93 per cent of the surviving full-blooded aborigine population in 1947 was

to be found in Queensland, Western Australia and the Northern Territory, where colonial settlement has been least and the tribes have retained more of their original territory. In Tasmania the

native population has disappeared altogether; in New South Wales and Victoria it is practically extinct, and in South Australia it numbers little over 2,000. Many circumstances contributed to this tragic result—casualties in conflicts with the Europeans, losses in

tribal wars as tribes were driven back one upon another by the advancing colonists, destruction of game and roots, deprivation of hunting and fishing rights, new diseases, drunkenness and other vices. But the most important and least understood reasons were probably psychological and spiritual. The aborigines were attached in a peculiarly intense way to their traditional lands by reason of their belief in pre-existence and

reincarnation.® Every phase of their life was bound up with elaborate ritual emphasising the idea of the historic continuity of the tribe from the ‘dream-times’ of the past through the present into the future. The men were bound together in a secret fellowship

in which, as they advanced by discipline and experience, they became keepers of mysterious knowledge concerning the fate of the

tribe. The tribe and its tribal territory were inseparable things. Expropriation meant more than deprivation of territorial rights and economic usufruct of the land; it endangered the existence of the tribe because it severed the living from contact with the spirits of their ancestors, which, they believed, were the source of the life of

each succeeding generation. The conception of a child was not, to them, merely the biological result of sexual intercourse of the parents; it was the reincarnation of the spirit of a tribal ancestor through the ‘dreams’ of the father. The spirits of the past dwelt in the sacred places of the tribal land, and to depart from them was to remove themselves from the source of life into a land of strange hostile spirits in whose presence they could not survive. In so far as Christianity merely destroyed their belief in pre-existence without substituting new positive beliefs in their place, and as colonisation dispossessed them of their spiritual homes, the aborigines lost their hope of life, lost their will to live—and died out. ® 60,663 full-bloods in 1928, 51,379 in 1938, 46,638 in 1947. Half-castes increased from 16,818 in 1928, to 25,712 in 1939 and 27,179 in 1947. Elkin 9; OYBA p. 6965 FoxcroftAborigines 157. 8 See23 Elkin Australian (1948), esp. chs. 2, 4, 6, 7, 8.

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SIR GEORGE GREY

During Grey’s governorship, the settlers of South Australia had come into regular contact with only the half dozen or more tribes on the south-east coast and the lower Murray river.7 None of the tribes was very large, as the food resources of the country restricted the population; few exceeded 1,000, some were only 200 or 300, and 500 or 600 was an average size. It was estimated in 1842 that there were about 650 aborigines in the immediate vicinity of the white settlements.’ In 1844, 790 aborigines assembled at Govern-

ment House to partake of roast beef and bread in honour of the Queen’s birthday.® Moorhouse estimated in 1843 that there were 1,600 aborigines in the Adelaide district, including Encounter Bay, Moorunde, Port Lincoln, and the Hutt river, and that in the larger area extending 160 miles north and 200 miles east of Adelaide there might be 3,000. Eyre put the figure at 6,000. A more recent scientific

estimate concludes that in the whole of South Australia in 1840 there were probably 10,000 natives.?° Even taking the highest figure,

the native population within a radius of 150 miles from Adelaide

was already outnumbered by the colonists in 1841. The tribes, moreover, were not closely united or organised for war, as the effective social unit was the smaller family group or ‘horde’ of 40 or 50 souls, and consequently the aborigines were unable to interpose any real resistance to colonisation. The settlers found them troublesome rather than dangerous; explorers like Sturt and Eyre met with real kindness and friendliness amongst them.

The immediate problem which Grey inherited was to prevent collisions between the aborigines of the Murray and Glenelg rivers and the overland parties coming into South Australia from Sydney and Port Phillip. Gawler had taken a military view of the situation and treated aborigines outside the settled districts as enemy aliens. In August 1840, Major O’Halloran, the Police Commissioner, had led a punitive expedition to the mouth of the Murray and summarily

executed two natives of the Milmenrura tribe, who were held responsible for the murder of the crew and passengers of the Maria.*4

This arbitrary action was disapproved in London; indeed, Stanley concluded that O’Halloran was guilty of murder and that Gawler was an accessory before the fact and could only be indemnified by Act of Parliament.!* In April 1841, a party of eleven Europeans, driving 5,000 sheep from Sydney, was attacked just inside the South

Australian border, the sheep were stolen, and three Europeans 7 See Radcliffe Brown in OYBA 23/687 for some account of the principal tribes.

8 S.A. Register 26 Nov 1842. ® South Australian 24, 28 May 1844. 10 Radcliffe Brown, OYBA 23/687 seq.

11 Gawler (12) 15 Aug, (13) 5 Sep 1840, Mitchell Library typescript copies. 12 Stanley (confidential) 14 Dec 1841, CO 396/2.

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THE ABORIGINES

wounded. The colonists demanded retaliation, and O’Halloran had again been despatched with a police party when Gawler, learning that his previous proceedings were disapproved, recalled the expedition ‘in a huff’ and left the situation to his successor. A party of ten volunteers had then started off on their own and engaged three or four hundred armed natives, killing eight or ten.18

Grey took the view that the aborigines were British subjects, not aliens upon whom war might be waged,!* and he was not prepared

to let the settlers take the law into their own hands. Another

volunteer group was being got together to protect a party of drovers under Langhorne, shortly expected to reach the disturbed district.

Grey forbade it as a private enterprise, but authorised an official expedition under O’Halloran and Moorhouse, the Protector of Aborigines, in which thirty-one volunteers participated after being sworn’ in as special constables. The undertaking was thus brought under proper discipline, though the expenses were met mainly by private contribution. The leaders were instructed that there must be no indiscriminate reprisals; they were to obtain an interpreter, inquire for the parties responsible for the late attack, and bring the offenders back to Adelaide for trial. Moorhouse was advised to release one or more of the prisoners to inspire the confidence of the tribe.1°

Langhorne’s party, however, was attacked before the police expedition made contact with it, four Europeans were killed and two wounded, and the sheep were carried off and slaughtered. O’Halloran’s force rescued the survivors and saved 710 head of cattle, but made no attack upon the tribe. 6 The Adelaide settlers demanded summary vengeance before further atrocities occurred. John Ellis, who was expecting Robinson’s party with some 7,000 sheep, asked Grey to issue arms to eighteen young men whom he proposed to send out at his own expense to escort the drovers safely to Adelaide. Grey refused. He told his Executive Council that, while the Government would protect the settlers as far as practicable, it also had a duty to the aborigines as subjects of the Queen. Robinson, he said, was fully aware of the danger he was running in moving beyond the region in which British law could be enforced, and took this risk in pursuit of private profit, not from any motive of public policy. As Governor, he could not permit settlers to act from a desire for revenge. 13 S.A. Register 22 May 1841; Grey (3) 29 May 1841, CO 13/20. '4 Grey to Gouger 27 May 1841, SAA 188.

© Grey to O’Halloran and Moorhouse 31 May 1841, SAA 188; Grey (5) 3! May 1841, CO 13/20. 18 Grey (15) 5 July 1841, CO 13/20.

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: SIR GEORGE GREY I can... never sanction any mode of punishment, which may involve alike the innocent and guilty men, women and children in its consequences.??

Eventually he arranged for a party of ten police and fourteen volunteers to proceed to the Murray river under Sub-Inspector Shaw, accompanied by Protector Moorhouse. As in the case of O’Halloran’s June expedition, he forbade aggression; their object

was to escort Robinson in, establish friendly relations with the hostile tribes, capture the murderers if possible, but on no account to fire on the natives unless actually attacked.18 The sequel was another tragic affair. Robinson’s party had beaten off one native assault before O’Halloran came up with them. The

combined force was then attacked by a body of 150 armed aborigines, and, after allowing the natives to come practically within spear-throw, the Europeans opened fire and killed about thirty and wounded ten more.?9 A board of inquiry exonerated the leaders and

praised them for their restraint, but Stanley considered that there had been unnecessary violence.” Grey sought to rectify this unhappy situation in two ways. He

proposed to Governor Gipps that they should jointly prohibit overland expeditions except under proper police escort, to the costs of which the sheep-owners concerned should contribute.?! Gipps, however, thought the conditions were too restrictive and declined to co-operate.22 Grey’s second step was more productive of results. Moorhouse, though ‘a gentleman of a mild and humane disposition,

strongly attached to the cause of the Aborigines’, was not fit for field duties.22 Grey therefore appointed Eyre the explorer as Resident Magistrate and Protector of the Aborigines to reside at Moorunde on the Murray river, establish friendly relations with the

aborigines, adjust their grievances, and shepherd the overland

parties through the district. A small detachment of troops accompanied him to support his authority. Grey’s instructions to Macdonald, the Protector at Port Lincoln, and to Eyre were that they should acquaint the aborigines with the

friendly intentions of the Europeans, and try to make amends to them for driving away their game and interfering with their use of part of their lands. Every two months, they should distribute food 17 Ex. Co. Mins. 10 July 1841. See also HRA (I) vol. 21 pp. 695 seq. 18 Grey (16) 3 Aug 1841, CO 13/20. 19 Grey (26), (28) 3, 13 Sep 1841, CO 13/21. 20 Grey (52) 30 Oct 1841, CO 13/21; Stanley (25) 13 May 1842, CO 396/2. ‘21 Grey (16) 3 Aug 1841, CO 13/20. 22 Gipps to Stanley (141) 11 Aug 1842, HRA I, 22, pp. 197-9. 23 '§.A, Register 11 Sep, 30 Oct 1841.

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THE ABORIGINES

(usually no more than 3 Ib. of flour per person), and employ the occasion for instructing the natives in good behaviour and inducing them to refrain from plunder. As magistrates, they should administer

justice impartially to the natives and the colonists, and offer rewards to the aborigines to bring their offenders to justice. Punishment should be either by imprisonment, or whipping by one of the offender’s relatives, and in all cases the offender should be given to

understand that he was being punished not for revenge but as a deterrent to further offences.**

Eyre proved in many ways a good choice for his post. He had travelled much amongst the natives, and had found them friendly

and amenable.25 He believed they were not fundamentally aggressive, but that being short of food they found the sight of so many sheep and cattle moving over land they were accustomed to think of as their own too great a temptation. He began his mission

hopefully, and in his early reports claimed to have established friendly relations with all the tribes along the border between New South Wales and South Australia.?* His influence may have helped

to put a stop to attacks on the overland route, but probably the tranquillity was chiefly due to the diminution of the traffic. After twelve months, however, Eyre grew more pessimistic. The Government could not afford to support his efforts adequately, and

he complained that he did not get enough food and blankets to distribute. Though there were signs of a favourable response to his

overtures in some quarters, he found that the well-disposed aborigines were invariably overruled by the turbulent ones, and the

young people dared not disobey the elders. It was impossible to exercise effective magisterial authority over them, partly because of their unco-operativeness, partly because the law did not allow him to accept the unsworn testimony of native witnesses.??

There was not much that Grey could do to remedy the situation. Economy had to be the ruling principle of his administration. He needed the services of three more protectors but he had no funds,”®

and Stanley declined to ask for a parliamentary grant for the aborigines.?® Grey framed an ordinance authorising the acceptance of native testimony in the courts, but this did nothing to encourage 4 Grey to Macdonald 27 Sep 1841, Grey to Eyre 1 Oct 1841, SAA/CSO. For Port Lincoln disturbances 1842-4, see Angas Savage Scenes I pp. 190 seg. 25 His Journals of Discovery (1846) sympathetically describe the daily life of the

aborigines and offer some sensible hypotheses concerning their origin and tribal movements. 26 Eyre 10 Jan, 5 Feb, 18 March 1842, CO 13/25. 2? Eyre’s report 1 Feb 1842, S.A. Register 10 Feb 1843. oe Grey (76) 21 April 1843, CO 13/32. Stanley (75) 8 Nov 1843, CO 9396/2.

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SIR GEORGE GREY the natives to resort to a law that was utterly strange to them.*° Eyre lost heart, and told his friend Scott that he had long been sick of his present appointment and of himself, and had nothing but vexation and annoyance.*! Grey became displeased with him when

he wrote direct to Stanley requesting another appointment. Eyre came to Adelaide to make his peace, and dined at Government House,®? but he was uneasy at Grey’s manner.

When the next change may come over the spirit of his

dream I know not—but hope it will not be when he is writing

his Despatch to Lord Stanley about me.

Some efforts were being made to provide for the education of aboriginal children. The German missionaries Teichelmann and Klose established a school near Adelaide for children between the ages of 5 and 10, and it was claimed that all their pupils knew the

alphabet and many were well advanced in the ‘three R’s’.*4 Moorhouse reported that their educational capacity was as great as that of European children.** In 1844, the Government opened a free native school at Adelaide,** and the Methodists ran a well-attended Sunday school.?’ Grey experimented with new methods of teaching, and at his own expense instituted a system of giving pocket-money to the pupils—ed. a week to those who could read the New Testament,

14d. a week to the class below, and 1d. a week to all others who attended diligently.?° The insuperable difficulty remained, however, of inducing the children to remain at school when their parents and

elders required their return, and Grey’s hopes that they would graduate from school to service in respectable European homes were frustrated. Girls were demanded by their promised husbands as

soon as they reached the age of puberty,*® adolescent boys were required to return to undergo initiation to manhood according to

tribal custom, and nothing that the authorities could do could prevent what Grey regarded as a deplorable relapse to barbarism.

Attempts to induce adult aborigines to work for Europeans produced some results. R. W. Newland reported that the natives at Encounter Bay were learning to reap with sickles and that their work

was as good as that of Europeans.* In the 1843 harvest, natives 304 & 8 Vict no. 8; Grey (97) 14 Aug 1844, CO 13/38; S.A. Register 12 July it Eyre to Scott 22 Nov 1844, SAA 951. See also Dutton 350. 82 SAA/CSO 11 Mar 1844. 33 Eyre to Scott 8 Dec 184AAq4, S 951. 84 Grey (116) 24 July 1843, CO 13/33. 85 §, Australian 4 April 1843; Grey (49) 10 April 1844, CO 13/36. 86 Grey (27) 16 Feb 1844, ibid. 87 Grey (149) 2 Dec 1844, CO 13/40.

88 SAA/CSO 27 Nov 1845. 39 Foxcroft 111. 40 S.A. Register 11 Dec 1841. . 60

THE ABORIGINES

reaped several hundred acres of grain; another dozen or so worked regularly as porters at Port Adelaide.*! This occasional employment,

however, never appears to have affected very large numbers of natives, nor did it appreciably modify their mode of life. For the rest, Grey continued to display a scholarly interest in the

study of the aboriginal language. He encouraged the efforts of Schurman and Meyer to collect vocabularies of the dialects of the

tribes of the Port Lincoln and Spencer Gulf area, and himself published a valuable Vocabulary of the Dialects of South-Western Australia in 1841.** It was at Grey’s instance, also, that the artist

George French Angas made his valuable pictorial record of aboriginal scenes in his South Australia Illustrated of 1847.48 Of more

direct benefit to the aborigines, Grey introduced legislation for the

care and protection of destitute aboriginal children,** and endeavoured without success to make free land grants for the endowment of native institutions. *°®

There his efforts ceased. His measures for the civilisation of the aborigine scarcely touched the surface of the problem. He demonstrated his benevolent intentions, but the means of any extended generosity were not at his command, and the native response to

what little he had to offer was disappointing. Even his police measures showed signs of breaking down, for Eyre’s withdrawal from

Moorunde was followed by a renewal of native attacks on the overlanders at the end of 1844 and during 1845.*® The experience of his five-year sojourn in South Australia, though it did not shake his

basic convictions about native policy, should have taught him that the civilisation of a native people was not as easy to effect in practice

as it was to write up in a report calculated to impress the Colonial Office. #1 Grey (1) 2 Jan 1844, CO 13/36. * Grey (3) 5 Jan, (84) 26 May 1843, (54) 18 May 1844, CO 13/31, 33, 37. For Grey’s own linguistic studies in Australia, see Grey Journals II chs. 9 and 15, and Collier 14-15. 43 Mulvaney loc. cit. p. 147. 447 & 8 Vict no. 12; Grey (104) 7 Sep 1844, CO 13/39. #5 Stanley (80) 14 Nov 1843, CO 396/2. 46 Grey (127) 28 Sep 1844, (12) 16 Jan 1845, CO 13/40, 43; S. Australian 7 March 1845.

61

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CHAPTER 7

Review of South Australian Governorship

Through life, the discipline of South Australia, the knowledge acquired there, accompanied me. Grey, 14 April 1891.4

Grey’s tour of duty in South Australia had begun with a personal tragedy. In July 1841, his son, the only child of his marriage, died at the age of five months. Born at sea, the infant had apparently suffered neglect for which Grey was disposed to blame his wife, so that in addition to grief at their loss there was a marked coolness between them. Mrs. Grey conceived an aversion to Adelaide, which she only

slowly overcame,? and her husband’s preoccupation with public

affairs and the strain of his unpopularity doubtless made him difficult to deal with and contributed to her low spirits. In these circumstances, Government House was a quiet and rather sad place. The Greys entertained little, and at first shunned all public amuse-

ments,* partly from personal reasons, partly to set a fashion of frugality in contrast to the lavish functions of Gawler’s day.* They enjoyed children’s parties with magic lanterns and conjurers,® but

beyond the Governor’s Ball on the colony’s anniversary day (28 December) and the Queen’s Birthday celebrations in May, formal functions at Government House were infrequent and on a modest scale. Eyre wrote,

I am at present staying at Government House—’tis a sad lonely place now with so few inhabitants and as the Greys see hardly any one, one feels as it were lost in so large a building.® 1 Adelaide Observer 18 April 1891.

2 Grey to his aunt 23 May 1844, SAA 174. 8 SAA 787, 1 Nov 1841. + Grey to Russell 18 Nov 1840, PP 1841/394, App. p. 137.

5 Pike 499. 6 Eyre to Gawler 28 August 1841, SAA/A813. 63

SIR GEORGE GREY

Perhaps George Warren was referring to this apparent lack of sociability when he described Grey as ‘a very talented man, far superior I should say to Col. Gawler as a governor, but far inferior as a gentleman’, and went on to accuse him of being mean.’ Nevertheless, Grey tackled his job in Adelaide with enthusiasm

and optimism. ‘I regard it’, he once said, ‘as the most interesting career, in which I could possibly be engaged.’® He had need of all the courage which his sense of vocation could give him, for he had to fight his battles practically single-handed, with scant help from his subordinates. The South Australian Register described his Executive

Council as so much ‘official rubbish’ and commiserated with him

on being ‘saddled with such intolerable nincompoops’.? Grey readily discovered their short-comings for himself, and instituted a vigorous campaign for instilling greater discipline and efficiency into

the public service. He made a practice of paying personal calls early and late in the day, and senior officers found themselves smartly reprimanded for laxity of attendance at their offices during

business hours.4° He demanded prompt and unquestioning obedience to orders. When Torrens, the Collector of Customs, got up a departmental petition against reductions in expenditure, Grey wrote a stinging reproof.

If Mr. Torrens is satisfied with the justice of my views, he should afford them a warm support; if he is discontented with them he should decline to continue to act under me, but under

no circumstances should he in any manner lead his subordinates to imagine that he does not cheerfully co-operate

with the Government.!4

Smillie, the Advocate General, had one set of documents returned

to him with the curt minute, ‘they are perfectly useless to me’, and eventually Grey had to recommend that he be replaced by a competent barrister from England.}* He told Robert Gouger that the accounts he sent up were not fit to be signed, and in 1844 reported

| that he was an imbecile and removed him from office.}* Jackson, the former Treasurer promoted to Colonial Secretary in 1841, was called in question over the muddled state of the 1839-41 accounts, and resigned in June 1843, angrily accusing Grey of ‘an alacrity of suspicion’ which made it unsafe for a person of even unimpeachable 7 G. Warren 16 Nov 1845, SAA/A416. 8 Grey to his aunt 23 May 1844, SAA 174.

, 9 S.A. Register 5 June, 9 Oct 1841. 10 SAA 188, 787 passim.

11 SAA 188, 787, 30 Aug 1841 passim. 12 SAA/GLB 7 April 1842.

13 Grey (167) 27 Dec 1844, CO 23/40. 14 Grey (81) (83), 20, 23 July 1844, CO 13/38.

64

REVIEW OF SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNORSHIP

integrity to serve under him.}° Sturt, the Registrar General, after being arraigned before the Council for an indiscreet letter in support of Borrow and Goodiar’s claims, was so shaken that he shrank from further personal encounters with Grey.16

Grey’s sternness arose largely from his suspicion that his subordinates were financially interested in some of the dubious transactions of the late régime. He put his own integrity above criticism by scrupulously refraining from all land investments and declining to accept any gifts or favours whatever. On principle he even refused

a small present of new potatoes from John Warren of Southfield.’ The former careless mode of financial administration had produced a thoroughly unhealthy state of affairs, and officials throughout the

service had become accustomed to perquisites which Grey considered irregular. His harsh discipline aroused resentment, but

he never doubted that his duty required him to be relentless in the unpleasant task before him. One of his most useful services to the

colony was to reorganise the whole system of public expenditure. Officials were forbidden to disburse moneys paid into their offices and merely pass over the unexpended balance to the Treasury; each department was put on a definite establishment and was expected to keep within a budgeted expense account; no Government contracts were let except by public tender, and payments were made monthly instead of quarterly.1® Enforced by the Governor’s close personal supervision, the new system was an important step forward towards a better standard of public morality. His Adelaide experiences gave him a low opinion of the business community whose one object seemed to him to make money regardless of consequences. Though he had gone as far as he dared, and further than Treasury approved, in paying Gawler’s debts, he found that the traders and bankers would abate none of their claims, but pestered and persecuted him to the bitter end. Borrow and Goodiar, who had already received over £5,000 for the construction of the colonial gaol, claimed an additional £28,000. Grey reluctantly paid them a further £6,432 (in colonial debentures at 10%) in full settlement, but they then threatened to institute legal proceedings to recover

the balance. Grey replied that he would not allow the case to go before a jury, because the sum involved was so large and the number of interested people so great that it was hopeless to expect impartiality. 15 Gre

16 Ex Oo eh Ban aye D Pek 844. 17 SAA 787, 10 April 1844.

18 SAA/GLB 2 April 1842 seg.; Grey (57) 27 May 1844, CO 13/27. 19 Grey (56) 10 Nov 1841, (42) 20 Feb 1843, (66) 14 June 1844, (123, 124) 23 Sep 1844, CO 13/21, 31, 38, 39; Ex. Co. Mins 9 July 1844 seq.; S.A. Register 22 Sep 1842; S. Australian 7 June 1844.

65

SIR GEORGE GREY | The Bank of South Australia was nearly as troublesome. Edward

Stephens, its manager, declined to honour the bills which Grey drew on the Treasury, whereupon Grey transferred the Government’s account to the rival Bank of Australasia. Stephens then refused to release a sum of £10,000, held to the credit of the land fund, except on the impossible condition of being repaid for certain losses in respect of bills dishonoured by Treasury. Grey protested in

vain at this ‘intimidating’ behaviour.?® A few months later, the Bank went out of its way to discredit the Governor by stating, quite incorrectly, that Treasury had dishonoured his bills amounting to £1,850 drawn to meet the costs of poor relief.?1

With Hagen and Morphett at this time obstructing the Governor’s measures in the Legislative Council and organising public protests against taxation without representation, and Allen denouncing Grey as a ‘foul specimen of hypocritical turpitude’ and demanding his recall,?? it almost looked as though there was a conspiracy against him amongst leading citizens whose private interests were affected. Grey endured their assaults bravely, stuck determinedly to his own course, and professed to hold no personal ill-will towards those who maligned him.?* But his Adelaide experiences in fact strengthened his prejudice against merchants and financiers as a class, undermined his faith in elected town councils, and caused him to doubt the wisdom of representative government in a small community so easily swayed to violent opinions by self-appointed leaders with an axe to grind. Everything in South Australia drove Grey in upon himself and led him to develop an extreme form of self-reliance. His domestic life left him lonely. His high conception of his authority as Governor

gave him an air of conscious superiority which forbade intimacy

and caused his critics to ridicule his ‘self-exaltation’ and his ‘haughty and supercilious airs’.24 The indifferent calibre and

dubious loyalty of his officials led him to trust no one but himself, and the hostility of the business community and his unpopularity amongst the settlers emphasised his isolation. The remoteness of his station put him beyond the effective reach of Whitehall. The Colonial Office could only indicate the broad lines

of policy they wished him to follow and leave all practical details to his discretion. Grey asked for, and was permitted, a considerable

latitude in carrying out his instructions. He erred once. On the _ delicate question of the payment of contractors’ bills, he wrongly 20 Grey (85) 31 May 1843, CO 13/33; S. Australian 28 Feb 1843.

21 Grey (129) 15 Sep 1843, CO 13/34. 22 S$. Australian 7, 17 March 1843.

23 Ex. Co. Mins 12 Dec 1844. 24 S.A. Register 3 Dec 1842 passim. 66

REVIEW OF SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNORSHIP

forecast the British Government’s intentions and incurred censure—

which he took badly; but even on this point, Stanley eventually confirmed his action. On several occasions, Grey’s determination caused the Colonial Office to agree with him despite their own opinions. He did not carry out Stanley’s orders about the reemigration of indigent settlers to New South Wales;?5 he retained control of the post office for the local Government when it was proposed to bring it under British rules;#6 and he secured approval for his system of sale of mineral lands despite the fact that Stanley preferred Crown leases subject to payment of royalties.27 Though he had not yet fully perfected his peculiar art of despatch-

writing, some of his phrases and arguments foreshadowed the techniques which he employed so powerfully to get his own way in New Zealand and South Africa. He would on occasion threaten ‘the most fearful consequences’ if his advice was not followed,?* a foretaste of those gloomy predictions which he indulged in so much in

later years that they came to be known as ‘Grey’s terrorism’. He sometimes harped on the theme that he was ‘acting solely from a sense of duty’ ;?® his duty to the Queen was later to be his excuse for

every sort of disobedience to ministerial instructions. He could be querulous when the British Government was slow to support him or when colonial opinion obstructed him; ‘my health and spirits’, he wrote in October 1842, ‘are completely broken’.®° But as yet he did not overplay his hand, and the Colonial Office had no cause to complain of defiance or evasion. Grey was young in the service, still

feeling his way into favour. Stephen sometimes found Grey’s despatches rather doctrinaire, as for instance when he discussed the

relative effectiveness of imprisonment or the death penalty for aborigines,®! or theorised about the system of land sales.32 On one

such communication, Stephen minuted: I doubt whether your Lordship will prosecute a correspondence on a principle so abstract as this, for if so I hardly see how

you could avoid a deviation from the practical, into the theoretical style of writing, with which style, as a Minister

of the Crown, your Lordship has, of course, no proper

concern, #3

In the main, however, Grey showed no lack of practicability. He had undertaken a task of great difficulty and, as Lord John Russell 26 See above p. 28. 26 Grey (156) 10 Dec 1844, (2) 4 Jan 1845, CO 13/40, 43. 27 Stanley (13) 18 Sep 1845, CO 3096/6.

28 Grey (17) 17 Feb 1842, CO 13/24. 29 Grey (18) 17 Feb 1842, ibid. 8° Grey (95) 3 Oct 1842, CO 13/27. 31 Grey (10) 11 June 1841, CO 13/21. %? Grey (51) 22 April 1842, CO 13/25. 33 Stephen 20 Dec 1842, CO 13/20.

67

_ SIR GEORGE GREY frankly admitted, he had succeeded beyond expectation by reason of his discretion, energy, and judgment.*4 Stanley, whose warmest compliments had a touch of icy austerity, wrote in 1845:

It is satisfactory to me to be able to express to you the favourable sense entertained by Her Majesty’s Government of the Zeal and ability with which you have administered the affairs of your Government. They are ready to acknowledge that it is to your careful superintendence of those affairs, as well as to the judicious measures of reform which you have found it necessary to introduce into the various branches of the Public Service, that the result exhibited in these papers is to be attributed.*°

Six months later, Stanley paid Grey the further compliment of asking him to undertake the duty of rescuing New Zealand from the condition of bankruptcy and misgovernment into which it had fallen.

After the repeated testimonies I have borne to the value of your public services in administering the government of South

Australia, it would be very gratifying to me to prove my esteem for your capacity and your public spirit by proposing

to you some other office of higher rank and of increased emolu-

ment. Still I am convinced that I shall give you a yet more welcome proof of the confidence which Her Majesty reposes in you, by inviting you to undertake public duties more arduous

and responsible than those in which you have hitherto been engaged, though recommended to your acceptance by hardly any other consideration. *®

The puzzling fact that Grey was to be ‘Lieutenant Governor’ of New Zealand whereas his predecessors Hobson and FitzRoy had both been ‘Governors’ did not imply any loss of rank, but the reverse.

The governorship of South Australia was technically senior to that of New Zealand, and the title ‘Lieutenant Governor’ implied that Grey was literally ‘holding the place’ of Governor in New Zealand without prejudice to his seniority. In fact, he was given a higher salary and endowed with additional powers, and Stanley added, I incline to the opinion that your services may be more useful

at New Zealand, from its being clearly understood by the colonists and by yourself, that you appear among them rather

as a temporary commissioner, for the adjustment of the 34 Hansard LXXXI, 947. 35 Stanley (3) 16 Jan 1845, CO 396/6. 36 Stanley (1) 13 June 1845, PP 1846/337 p. 68.

68

REVIEW OF SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNORSHIP

difficulties in which the colony is at present involved, than on the ordinary footing of a Governor.?’

The South Australian colonists were by this time coming to a better appreciation of what Grey had done for them, and they parted with him with evident marks of regret.28 George Warren summed it up when he wrote:

I wish Captain Grey success. I think he will be a great man yet, and hope we may never have a worse Governor.*®

Adelaide citizens made amends for their former fractiousness by giving him a warm send-off, and the austere Grey proved sentimental enough to be so overcome by his emotions that he could not complete his farewell speech. On 25 October, he sailed from Adelaide to the

colony which, with two interruptions, was to be the scene of his political career for the next fifty years. The friendly editor of the South Australian commiserated with him at having to take over New

Zealand ‘in the most miserable ruinous and (almost) irretrievable condition’, but added, We doubt not his complete success; for nothing is impossible to men like him.*° 37 Stanley (1) 13 June 1845, ibid. Robe who assumed the administration of South Australia was also appointed Lieutenant Governor, as though the governorship were reserved for Grey’s return.

38 See above p. 51. 89 G. Warren 16 Nov 1845, SAA/A416.

40 §. Australian 26 Sep, 21 Oct 1845.

PART II

New Zealand, 1845-1853

as —" i

‘

'

' ?

CHAPTER 8

New Zealand in 1845

We propose now to submit the solution of these yet greater difficulties to Captain Grey. Sir Robert Peel, 19 June 1845

Tue colonisation of New Zealand, officially commenced in 1839, had by 1845 run into difficulties which threatened disaster. British policy was founded on two conflicting principles, the humanitarian principle of the missionaries aiming at the protection and advancement of the Maori race, and the colonising principle of the New Zealand Company conceived chiefly in terms of land sales and European emigration. Missionaries and colonisers worked at logger-

heads, and the New Zealand Government in its early years could neither frame a policy which would reconcile the two points of view nor execute one which would satisfy either.

At the time when strong political authority was most needed, it was most lacking. The Colonial Office and the Company directors were too far away to control the situation, though they might have

issued clearer orders and given more generous financial aid. Everything depended on the officials in New Zealand. The first three Governors, all of them naval officers without experience of civil administration, were crippled by lack of resources. Captain William Hobson was an invalid, Lieutenant Willoughby Shortland a pompous mediocrity, and Captain Robert FitzRoy an eccentric philanthropist. All three quarrelled with the principles on which the Company was operating, so that the unfortunate tradition of hostility

between Government and Company which originated in England in 1838 kept the two organisations working at cross purposes in New Zealand.

Hobson, deeming the management of the Maoris to be his 73

SIR GEORGE GREY

primary duty, planted his capital at Auckland, five hundred miles north of the Company’s principal settlements at Wellington and Nelson. The geographical dispersion of the colonists was aggravated by the existence of settlements at the Bay of Islands and Hokianga

in the far north and Akaroa in the South Island, and by the foundation of new townships at Wanganui and New Plymouth. Twelve thousand colonists spread themselves in half a dozen feeble

little groups over nearly a thousand miles of territory, in the presence of a warlike native population six or seven times as numerous as themselves. Effective government and defence were quite impossible in these circumstances. The New Zealand Company worked on the assumption that there was ample land available in the colony, and that it might sell this at a ‘sufficient price’ to English buyers and use the proceeds to send out organised groups of settlers. Its enterprise, however, whether inspired more by the instincts of philanthropy or commerce, was doubly premature, for the directors neglected to obtain the previous approval of the Government before helping themselves to what,

upon the creation of a colony, could only be Crown land, and furthermore they took Maori consent for granted. The former defect was belatedly repaired in November 1840, when Lord John Russell granted the Company a charter and generously allowed it four acres of land per £1 expended on colonisation, a bargain under which the Company claimed 1,300,000 acres. But this agreement was made on the understanding that the Company had extinguished

the Maori title to a much larger area of land and that a surplus would revert to the Crown. On investigation Commissioner Spain

found the Company’s purchases defective. Colonel William Wakefield, the Company’s principal Agent, had tried to buy land wholesale from a few of the more accessible and amenable chiefs, and acting in ignorance of the Maori custom of communal tenure had ignored the rights of many of the native owners.

The Government’s decision to investigate all claims before confirming titles raised unfounded expectations on the part of the Maoris, and was a source of bitter disappointment to the settlers. Bishop Selwyn observed,

The difficulties in the Southern Division seem to be expressed in the dilemma: that justice required an investigation of the Title of the New Zealand Company, but that it could not be instituted without infinite disagreement and

confusion.}

1 Selwyn memorandum Nov 1845, NA-G 19/1.

14

NEW ZEALAND IN 1845 Instead of the millions of acres Wakefield had bargained for, Spain, after much delay, awarded less than a third of a million—72,000 at

Port Nicholson (Wellington), 150,000 at Nelson, 60,000 at New Plymouth, and 40,000 at Wanganui.? Nor could the settlers obtain

undisputed possession of even these much reduced areas. The Maoris would not quit certain sections of the Port Nicholson block, they refused to give up the Hutt valley, and created such an uproar

at New Plymouth that FitzRoy rejected Spain’s award altogether and repurchased a small 3,500-acre block for the settlers instead. More seriously, the rash attempt of the Nelson settlers in 1843 to occupy the Wairau district in face of the opposition of the Ngatitoa

chiefs Te Rauparaha and Te Rangihaeata led to a murderous affray in which Captain Arthur Wakefield and 21 other settlers were killed.4 War seemed imminent. The Wellington and Nelson settlers clamoured for the arrest and punishment of Te Rauparaha, ‘this beast of prey . . . hardened in blood and avarice—a common enemy of mankind’. Te Rangihaeata contemplated an attack on Wellington, and was with difficulty restrained by the persuasions

of the Rev. Octavius Hadfield of the Otaki mission station and Wiremu Kingi, chief of the Atiawa at Waikanae. FitzRoy patched up a precarious truce by promising that the Government would exact no revenge because the settlers had been the aggressors, but in Maori eyes this magnanimity was a confession of weakness which

brought the Government into contempt. As for the Cook Strait settlers, they never forgave FitzRoy for his ‘infamous conduct’ in publicly reprimanding them for their behaviour. After three weeks he comes down to Wellington where he breaks out in the most violent and intemperate language, says that we are all the most ‘wicked and foolish’ persons he ever heard of, tells young [E. J.] Wakefield he is the ‘devil’s mission-

ary’ and a libeller of the natives, and that the whole European population have no object in view but to ‘obstruct the growth of Christianity and seek the extermination of the natives, but bad as they may be we, the Nelson people, were far the worst’.® Thereafter, the Company’s settlers were in sorry plight. Colonel

Wakefield declined Crown grants for the limited areas FitzRoy offered, resident purchasers could not get titles to the land they had bought, labourers were consequently unemployed and destitution * Spain to FitzRoy 31 March 1845, PP 1846/203. 3 See below pp. 100 seq. * Nelson Examiner Supplement 23 Dec 1843; Dillon MSS 7 Aug 1843; Saunders I ch. 19, Rusden I ch. 7, Marais 1 34.

°N.X. Spectator 18 Jan 1845. 6 Dillon MSS 11 Feb 1844. 75

SIR GEORGE GREY

threatened. News of the desperate situation in New Zealand reacted

on British opinion and brought the Company’s share-selling operations to a standstill. Strong representations were made that the Government by its interference had wrecked the Company’s project and ought to come to its assistance. A select committee of 1844 under the chairmanship of Lord Howick’ denounced the policy of the treaty of Waitangi,® and urged a revision of instructions

to make land more readily available for colonisation. The directors

pressed for proprietorial powers of government, and failing this demanded the establishment of representative institutions to make New Zealand a more attractive field for colonisation. Lord Stanley resisted this pressure, but after his resignation in December 1845 the Colonial Office became increasingly favourable to the Company’s interests.

Meanwhile, in the northern districts of New Zealand, another crisis loomed up. The chief cause was the perennial impecuniosity of the Government. The British Government had annexed New Zealand

reluctantly, announced a policy of high-minded philanthropy, and then tried to govern the colony on the cheap, vaguely hoping that with some initial help from New South Wales it could pay for itself out of customs duties and land revenues. It took six years of increas-

ing financial confusion to dispel this illusion. Within three years, the Colonial Government, spending £40,000 a year, was £82,000 in debt, and Treasury had to cancel most of this liability and provide a small annual grant of £7,565. Three years later another financial crisis had developed; the debt had crept up again to about £75,000, annual expenditure rose to £49,000, revenue had shrunk to less than £20,000 a year, and FitzRoy was fending off bankruptcy by issuing paper money. Revenue could only come from two main sources—land sales and customs duties. After a short initial bout of speculation in Auckland, when town lots sold for £555 an acre and rural land fetched £93 Ios.,

this source dried up almost completely, partly because of the confused state of land titles, partly because the Auckland community relied too much on Government expenditure and did too little to bring land into cultivation. The Maoris fed Auckland while

the wealthy colonists speculated and the poor came to the Government for relief. There was practically nothing to export, the

import trade slumped, and customs revenue shrank to vanishing ? Later third Earl Grey, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1846-52.

8 The chiefs recognised British sovereignty and were promised undisturbed possessions of their tribal lands, the Crown to have the right of pre-emption in respect of lands they were willing to sell (6 Feb 1840). 76

NEW ZEALAND IN 1845

point. The Governor had to use the proceeds of the land fund for general purposes, and became unable to buy land from the Maoris to re-sell to the colonists, consequently the land revenue also declined. By 1844 FitzRoy was reduced to desperate straits, and began indulging in frantic experiments to avert ruin. He abolished

customs duties in order to prevent smuggling and encourage legitimate trade; he imposed an income-tax, assessable by the taxpayer himself, which yielded nothing; he issued debentures and made them legal tender because there was no specie; and he. waived the Crown right of pre-emption of Maori lands in the hope of stimulating economic enterprise. But nothing he did could rescue the north from its dismal condition of slump.

The Maori situation deteriorated even more. Hobson and

Shortland had been lethargic; FitzRoy was full of naive enthusiasm but infirm of judgment and without the means of implementing any

progressive policy. George Clarke, the Chief Protector of the Aborigines, for want of funds was unable to execute any of his benevolent ideas for providing the Maoris with schools, hospitals, hostels or courts of law. Bishop Selwyn complained that the Govern-

ment had not ‘exhibited itself in its parental character to any appreciable amount’, but appeared to the Maoris as ‘only as a thing

of soldiers, barracks, constables, and gaols’.® If so, it must have seemed a pitifully makeshift concern, as FitzRoy only had a score of policemen and a few hundred troops which he borrowed from New South Wales in an emergency. Maori grievances grew, and, as the Government was too weak to deal with them, they rapidly led to turbulence and rebellion.?° The missionaries had told the chiefs that the treaty of Waitangi would protect their rangatiratanga (chieftainship) and their possession of lands, and create a political authority able to defend the country against French invasion and restrain the settlers from committing misdeeds. The corollary of British authority over the natives was not stressed by the treaty-makers and the impression prevailed that the chiefs would continue to rule their tribes as before, the Government merely having a say in disputes between Europeans and Maoris. The idea that as British subjects they owed obedience to the

Government was as yet strange to them. They had accepted the treaty of Waitangi in the expectation of receiving positive benefits—more European settlers who would ® Selwyn memorandum Nov 1845, NA-G 19/t. 19 Maning War in the North, Burrows Diary, Thomson New Zealand, Cowan New K Grey was overjoyed. Suddenly, when he least expected it, an opportunity seemed to have been afforded to him to solve the South African problem for all time, at 62 Lytton 23 Aug, CO 48/380. 63 Lytton (separate) 6 Sep 1858, GH 23/27. 54 Lytton (private) 6 Sep 1858, PP 1860/216. 56 Grey (128) 20 July 1859, PP 1860/216.

416

FEDERATION AND RECALL

which prospect he recovered some of his former enthusiasm and

penned his classic despatch of 19 November 1858." :

Unfortunately he could not, even on this occasion, lay aside his

sense of frustration at having been so long curbed, or forget his bitterness at unmerited persecution, and too outspokenly he repeated what he had urged in a dozen earlier despatches, that the decision to abandon the interior had been a mistake. The British Government

had been falsely informed that the Orange Sovereignty was ‘a bubble and a farce’, that the ‘country ‘would hardly keep halfstarved antelopes’ and ‘could never produce wool’. For paragraph after paragraph he inveighed against the injustice of the withdrawal

and its disastrous consequences, and displayed marked animus against Clerk, the perpetrator of the Bloemfontein Convention. In fact, he said, the prospects of the Free State were far brighter than _ those of the Cape, as the land was more fertile and capable of supporting a dense population producing wool and corn. Its inhabitants had a. close affinity with those of the Cape, and ~

the mere fact of calling these people different would not make them so, nor would the fact of a mere fordable stream running between them sever their sympathies. The division of South Africa into four or five separate states meant that there would always be war at some point or other, and if one state was at war the others must either interfere or maintain an armed neutrality. The smallness and weakness of the separate settlements encouraged native hostility, whereas union would increase the strength and importance of the entire community, and react beneficially on the natives as well as the Europeans. Therefore he recommended federal union under a parliamentary system, with a responsible ministry and the fullest local freedom for the provincial governments on the model of his New Zealand constitution of 1852.

Though the resultant federation could not immediately become self-defending, it would permit an immediate diminution of the British military forces, and its growing prosperity would ultimately permit their entire withdrawal. Belatedly answering Lytton’s questions, Grey stated that it was

geographically impossible to unite Natal to the Cape without including the Free State or Kaffraria proper, and the Cape would be unlikely to agree to annex Kaffraria unless the Free State and Natal were also to be joined together. In the event of federation, the Cape would probably wish to be divided into two or three states. Finally, if it was Britain’s intention ultimately to withdraw from 56 Grey (separate) 19 November 1858, PP 1860/216.

417

SIR GEORGE GREY

South Africa, it was better that the colonies and states should unite and become strong so that the separation from the Mother Country could be amicable.

_ It was unfortunate that Grey should have put forward his proposals in such an argumentative manner. His nagging complaints

against Clerk and the Secretaries of State who had supported abandonment were damaging, and the fact that he put a general federation in the forefront and only dealt with Lytton’s questions in a postscript strengthened the impression that he was dominated

by a fixed idea and was making the facts fit his fancy. His

impassioned style of advocacy prejudiced his recommendations. His conception was a noble one, but he could have made out a better case for federation than he did, especially on the all-important point of self-reliance. He might have shown that the commando system, if

organised on the lines of Currie’s augmented Frontier Police and operated federally by four states, could have performed the duty of internal defence better than the regulars—though this view would have been ill-recetved by the War Office. A closer economic and financial survey might have demonstrated the prospects of selfsufficiency more convincingly than his specious assurances of future affluence which the Colonial Office simply disbelieved, having heard

_ the story so often before. He would have done better to have faced up squarely to the numerous practical difficulties which stood in the

way of securing local agreement to federation. By avoiding discussion of them and treating the consent of the Free State and the

Cape as a foregone conclusion, he gave an air of unreality to the whole project and exposed himself to criticism. There was just a chance—a possibility rather than a probability— that federation could have been achieved at this time by his statesmanship, if London could have been induced to see it. The situation

was certainly more favourable in 1858 than when Carnarvon and Froude made their ill-judged effort in 1875-7. Grey had created a great amount of goodwill amongst the burghers of the Free State as well as in the Cape and Natal. Despite Clerk’s rough dealing, there were no deep animosities dividing the Europeans south of the

Vaal and the Tugela. A union comprising the Cape, the Free

State, Kaffraria, and Natal would have created a compact

manageable political unit with, as Grey claimed, a great economic future. His boldly speculative policy of spending a moderate sum of money now to avoid large and repeated expenditures in the future

was justified by past experience and was to be vindicated again

and again in the future. Momentarily the Free State was in difficulties and needed help which Great Britain and the Cape could 418

FEDERATION AND RECALL

have afforded if they had been so disposed. Though there was a disposition on the part of some of the Free State Boers to accept such

help in their time of need and reassert independence thereafter, as the Transvaal Boers did in and after 1877, there was a possibility that if, under nominal British rule, the Free State found itself as

self-governing as the New Zealand provinces did after 1854, it might have been satisfied to sacrifice independence for the sake of

military security and a share of the Cape customs.5’ The big difficulty would be to get the Cape to agree.

Grey had the means of making objective appraisal of this sort in 1858, in which case it would have been worthy of serious

consideration. Instead, he put his case argumentatively and abstractly, and, as things were at the Colonial Office, invited rebuff.

Merivale, asking pardon for plain words, wrote, I had expected greater fairness & freedom from mere passion, when his judgment was seriously appealed to. The facts are so

distorted, or loosely stated, as to be worthless; the motives which he attributes (I speak from knowledge of the views of successive Secretaries of State) purely imaginary. As to federation, he thought Grey was too ready to apply his New Zealand scheme to South Africa, where conditions were different. You, however, will be able to judge for yourself, whether the scheme is a mere dream, or a statesmanlike conception. Plans,

judged even more wild & impracticable at first, have been successful, 58

Carnarvon was disappointed that Grey had not produced very substantial reasons for his proposal. He thought South Africa lacked

identity of interests and outlook, and that the marked inequality of the several parts in size, population, development and resources

would raise difficulties over representation and _ financial contributions. The Free State, Natal, British Kaffraria were all small and poor. Would the Cape willingly make good all these collective deficiences? Federation would react against the natives,

and Great Britain could not be indifferent on this score. He concluded that Grey had proceeded by a process of historical distortion to a conception of a ‘Colonial Utopia’. Lytton had no patience with Grey’s answer. He did not even bother to read it carefully, but dismissed it at a glance as ‘a great waste of ability’. 57 Grey visualised a loose form of federation in which there could be republics and presidents as well as colonies and governors.

58 Merivale 1 Jan 1859, CO 48/390. 69 Carnarvon 7 Jan 1859, tbid.

419

, SIR GEORGE GREY Impracticable plans argued at immense length—& running into much vague declamation.*®°

He disapproved of federation on the ground that Parliament would not be inclined to reverse its palicy in order to create an independent federal republic for whose defence England would have to pay,®! and

told Grey that Her Majesty’s Government are not prepared to depart from the settled policy of their predecessors by advising the resumption of British sovereignty in any shape over the Orange Free State.® Unaware of Lytton’s hostile attitude, Grey was already preparing

the way for federation. On 14 December he received a despatch instructing him that his answer to all questions on the subject of federation should be that he could say nothing without previous instructions from Her Majesty’s Government.®* He did not realise that this terse order arose out of the misgivings entertained by the Colonial Office on hearing that he had advised certain Free State

burghers to approach their Government on the subject of federation.** Governor Sir E. Head just about this time had without

authority recommended Canadian federation in his speech to Parliament, and Grey’s offence was classed with Head’s as committing the British Government to a policy which they had not

approved. Lytton had decided that Grey must be cautioned but not rebuked,®* but Grey, having only the mild text of a short despatch to go by, read into it neither rebuke nor caution. It appeared to him to mean, not that federation was in disfavour, but

merely that while the question of general federation was under consideration he was not to commit himself formally as to a partial federation of the Cape and the Free State.® Boshof meanwhile had proposed to his Volksraad that inquiries should be made as to the terms on which the Free State might be

federated with the Cape, and intimated his preference for association with the Cape rather than with Transvaal.*? He was opposed by a strong pro-Pretorius party which objected to any British scheme, while a middle group favoured an alliance for just 6° Lytton 12 Jan 1859, CO 48/3q0. 61 Draft despatch (Jan 1859), ibid. 62 Lytton (separate) 11 Feb 1859, PP 1860/216.

68 Lytton (57) 5 Nov 1858, ibid. 64 See above p. 414.

65 Minutes by Merivale, Carnarvon, Lytton on Grey (156) 14 Aug, 6 Oct 1858,

es $1390; o) eo July 4850, PP 1860/216 67 6 Dec 1858, ‘iderter 33 Feb 1859.

420

FEDERATION AND RECALL

long enough to get the Free State out of its present Basuto trouble. One Gustavus Vousie said,

Let the Governor only settle affairs with Moshesh & then he can take up his skin (Kaross) and walk.® By 12 votes to 11 the Volksraad resolved to approach the Governor

about federation (7 December), and Grey promised to refer the question to the Cape Parliament in its next session.®® In London Merivale characterised this as ‘an act of direct disobedience’ and Lytton resolved that it ‘must be disapproved strongly tho’ civilly’.”°

A firm despatch was written directing Grey’s attention to the despatch of 5 November and observing that he had not given the President the answer he was instructed to give; he would since have received the decision of Her Majesty’s Government not to acquiesce

in the resumption of sovereignty over the Free State, and Lytton hoped it had reached him in time to modify his communication to the Cape Parliament. At the same time he warned the Governor that he must not ignore instructions or act in opposition to them.”? The warning came too late. Grey met his Parliament on 16 March

1859, and in his opening address he mentioned the Free State’s request and warmly commended a general South African federation. Eloquently he expounded the benefits which would arise—federation would broaden the basis of self-government, train up a noble race

of statesmen, minimise the risks of native war, and increase prosperity by affording greater security for life and property, instead

of allowing the country to drift divided ‘into an uncertain and gloomy future’.”? This was one of the peak moments of Grey’s South African career, and the immediate occasion of his dramatic fall from grace.

Anti-climax came quickly. The Cape members showed little enthusiasm for the glorious future which their Governor predicted, being more conscious that they were being asked to help to defend the Free State and surrender part of their customs revenue for no very tangible benefits.73 No sooner was federation mentioned than the eastern province wanted self-government, Uitenhage petitioned for autonomy, ’4 and British Kaffraria protested against annexation?®

—all of which prejudiced the proposal in the minds of westerners. Enthusiasm in the Free State, never unqualified, wavered, and the 68 C. S. Orpen to Grey 24 Nov 1858, GC/APL. 8° Boshof to Grey 5 Jan 1859; Grey (8) 13 Jan 1859, PP 1860/216.

70 Minutes 1 March 1859, CO 48/393. 71 Lytton (108) 5 March 1859. 7 Speech 16 March 1859, GC/SAPL. 73 Advertiser 23, April 1859. 74 Ibid. 14 May 1859. 76 Ibid. 20 April 1859. 421

SIR GEORGE GREY , retirement of Boshof weakened the pro-British party. Then came Lytton’s despatches of 11 February and 5 March repudiating all intention of receiving the Free State back into the British fold, and Grey had the mortification of having to inform his Parliament that his proposals were no longer feasible.”¢ He was still unaware of how serious a predicament he had got himself into. He replied to Lytton’s despatch of 5 March by asserting

that he had striven faithfully to carry out the policy of non-intervention which had been laid down for him, though it was opposed to his life-long convictions to tolerate native slavery in the republics. He had been instructed to report on the federation of

| all British subjects in South Africa, and it was not certain in law whether the Free State Boers could be deprived of their British citizenship against their will without an Act of Parliament. Natal could not be federated without the Cape or Kaffraria, so it was essential that he should consult the Cape Parliament. He had committed Her Majesty’s Government to nothing, and the moment he informed the Cape Parliament there were insuperable objections to reunion with the Free State, the whole subject of federation had

been quietly dropped. The note of disapproval in Lytton’s communication was so unexpected that he thought there must be some misapprehension about what he had done.?? Lytton and his colleagues were tired of Grey. For twelve months or more there had been constant bickering and friction on almost every

point of policy, Elliot was exasperated at his open defiance in the

matter of British Kaffrarian expenditure, and Merivale was

weary of ‘the continual undercurrent of discontent which Sir George Grey maintains’”* and ‘the endless windings of Sir Geo.

Grey’s ingenious, but constantly changing speculations’.?® Even

- Carnarvon had to admit that it was ‘impossible to feel the confidence in Sir G. Grey’s views . . . which is natural and desirable to feel in the reports of any Govr.’® It was decided to recall him. The reasons given for this act of discipline were that, instead of waiting for instructions, he had deliberately brought the question of federation before the Cape Parliament and had not only expressed

his own opinion in favour of it but had intimated that the British Government might also be expected to approve it; he had thus placed the British Government in a position of serious embarrassment and endangered the success of the policy they were following,

, 422

76 Grey (separate) 1 April 1859, GH 23/27. 7? Grey (58) 19 April 1859, PP 1860/216.

7% 12 Aug 1858, CO 48/380. 79 17 Feb 1859, CO 48/394. 80 4 June 1859, zbid.

FEDERATION AND RECALL

and his continuance in office was no longer in the public interest.

Lytton expressed regret that Grey’s many admirable qualities should be so seriously impaired by his unfortunate disposition to disobedience, and recalled in some detail how he had exceeded his

authority on earlier occasions in introducing German civil immigrants into the Cape and in overspending the British Kaffrarian account.®!

It looked like a good case to present to Parliament against an intractable and thoroughly exasperating subordinate, but it was in fact a harsh verdict and sentence. Lytton had toyed with the idea of federation and ‘after a good deal of discussion was not much in favour of it’,8? but he had kept Grey in ignorance of what his opinion was®’ while asking misleading questions. He had practically

decided against federation by 6 October.

My impressions are .. . at the first blush, that in federation with these Dutch republics we have much to risk & nothing to gain—we reverse, in it, the old story of the giant & dwarf in

which the Dwarf got the wounds & the giant the profit—it

seems to me that, here, the Dwarf would be thrusting her Dutch Nose into all sorts of black squabbles, from which the British giant would always have to pull him out, with the certainty of more kicks than halfpence . . . if a firm decision be arrived at,

that it is a thing to discourage & resist, that decision shd. be communicated to the Govr. with peremptory precision, but in a careful & well reasoned despatch for Parliamy. production.®*

But he amused himself with Aisop’s fables and withheld any announcement of his half-formed decision until he received Grey’s

answer to his inquiries of 6 September. He refused to see that Grey might have been genuinely misled by his communications, and

unfortunately Grey’s reputation for ingenious evasion warranted such doubts. He exaggerated the embarrassments likely to arise

from Grey’s parliamentary announcement, and seized the Opportunity to mete out the punishment which he had deferred in

the previous August. Grey was being condemned, not for his federation pronouncement alone, for that was comparatively harmless, but for a long series of past offences great and small which had made for him powerful opponents in Parliament.®5 81 Lytton (147) 4 June 1859, PP 1860/216. 8 Merivale 30 July 1859, CO 48/395. 83 Carnarvon 6 Oct 1858, CO 48/395. 84 Lytton minute (n.d., c. 6 Oct) on Grey (156) 14 Aug 1858, tded. 85 Cf. Lytton 23 Aug 1858, CO 48/380.

423

SIR GEORGE GREY

Recall was a heavy and unexpected blow, but Grey bore it with dignity, almost with relief, though he bemoaned the fact that the opportunity to federate South Africa was perhaps being lost for ever.56 He was weary of his war with officialdom, yet sustained by a

deep sense of the rightness of his conduct. In a long despatch in July, he dispassionately but firmly defended himself against Lytton’s accusations.®’? The Secretary of State, he said, had ‘unintentionally’ done him a grave injustice. To the general charge that his views on

, South Africa did not coincide with those of the British Government he opposed the unanswerable argument that he had served under seven Secretaries of State since 1854, none of whom had thought

alike. Lytton in particular, not having made up his mind about federation, was unable to state what his views were, though Grey had pressed for instructions.

You have now formed strong views upon these subjects. Had you formed them at the time I begged for your instruc-

tions regarding them, and had you consequently then

acquainted me with them, I should not have been placed in the unpleasant position I now occupy.

Lytton’s letters of 6 September led him to believe that he was ‘strongly in favour of such a federation’; if he had misunderstood their intention, the source of the error was not in Cape Town.

Excuse me for saying so, but mistakes may occur in Despatches from a distant superior, or they may not always be so easy to understand, even if emanating from one of our most skilful writers.

After a lengthy defence of his actions in reference to German immigration and expenditure in British Kaffraria, he justified himself on larger grounds, quoting Lytton’s own compliments in his favour. It is admitted that I have with sagacity foreseen and averted probable wars between Her Majesty’s subjects and her enemies; that I have availed myself of unexpected and strange incidents in the history of those nations which have so long been enemies

of Her Majesty, so as to use them at once for their advantage and for the security of the Queen’s possessions; and none can

deny that from my rule here has sprung a tranquillity, contentment, and prosperity hitherto unknown... . If, then, success is not to be the measure of the necessity 86 Grey (141) 31 July 1859, GH 23/27. 87 Grey (128) 20 July 1859, PP 1860/216.

424

FEDERATION AND RECALL

and propriety of the amount of responsibility to be assumed, how is it to be estimated? . . . If Her Majesty’s possessions and Her Mayjesty’s subjects are saved from threatening dangers, and they gratefully acknowledge this, whilst the empire receives

no hurt, is it a fitting return that the only reward he should receive should be the highest punishment which it is in the power of Her Majesty’s Ministers to inflict? This may be the reward that they bestow; but the true one, of the consciousness

of difficult duties performed to the best of his ability, with great personal sacrifice, they cannot take from him. The Cape Colony thought like Grey. News of his recall produced

an extraordinary outburst of feeling in the Governor’s favour throughout a normally phlegmatic community. Every newspaper

in the country deplored Lytton’s action and defended Grey’s character and conduct; scarcely a town or a village did not forward its address of sympathy; all sorts of institutions and societies with which he had been usefully connected presented memorials, and hundreds of his friends expressed their personal regret. Europeans, Fingos, and Hottentots petitioned against his removal and asked for his reinstatement. The Advertiser thought that he had been dismissed because he took a large statesmanlike view of the South African

situation and employed his argumentative powers to put his misguided superiors in the wrong—a thing not to be forgiven. Many people were convinced that Grey was disgraced because

he opposed the appointment of Lord Derby’s kinsman Cole as Attorney General, and were indignant at.the ‘arbitrary exercise of authority’ by a distant Government. At a Cape Town public meeting, Barry described the recall as a thunderbolt, Ebden extolled Grey’s humane enlightened policy, Saul Solomon admired Grey as ‘a man of the people’ with ideas of his own and moral courage to

stand up for them, and said it was unprecedented to recall a Governor in the very height of his success. Rutherfoord said his recall endangered the peace of South Africa, Fairbairn believed that neither Grey nor his policy could easily be destroyed, Watson praised him for his unfailing justice and generosity to the poor, and sO many more wished to add their vocal testimony that the meeting

had to adjourn to a second day, when it was resolved to erect a marble ad’.88 statue in honour of ‘the best Governor South Africa ever A month after receiving Lytton’s letter of censure, Grey handed the government of the colony over to Major-General Wynyard, who

had lately replaced General Jackson. Cape Town gave him a 88 Advertiser 20, 23, 27 July 1859; Port Elizabeth Telegraph 3 Aug 1859.

425

SIR GEORGE GREY

tremendous send-off. His final levee was the fullest ever known, Adderley Street had been decorated and a triumphal arch erected at the wharf, his carriage was drawn through the streets by the crowd, and Grey was so affected by the demonstration that he could not speak. He did not know, as the Celé sailed sadly out of Table Bay on 21 August, that three weeks earlier Newcastle had reviewed his predecessor’s decision and was prepared to reinstate him as Governor.®® 89 Newcastle (13) 4 Aug 1859, PP 1860/216.

426

" CHAPTER 29

, South African Epilogue Natal must thus become our real frontier. Grey, 9 February 1861

Fortune had treated Grey unkindly. A fortnight after signing the despatch for his recall, Lytton was replaced by Newcastle. Though

he too disapproved of certain of Grey’s actions and required assurances of future obedience, he was sensible of Grey’s exceptional abilities and high ideals and was unwilling to interrupt the valuable

work he was doing among the natives. Provided therefore that Grey had not so compromised himself as to be unable to carry out a line of policy opposed to his recent recommendations, Newcastle was prepared to allow him to resume his administration.1 Unluckily, Newcastle’s despatch missed Grey at Cape Town by a few days, and he was subjected needlessly to the painful experience of a long seavoyage amongst inquisitive passengers, while suffering from a deep sense of injustice and failure. His reception in England made some amends for this ordeal. Newcastle received him graciously, Grey

made his peace with the Colonial Office and accepted reappointment,? the Treasury refunded the money he had advanced to save the British Kaffrarian Government from collapse in 1858,3 and he had a much needed rest before he returned to duty. Misfortune, however, still pursued him. At the end of April 1860, he and Lady Grey embarked at Plymouth on the Forte, commanded by Admiral Sir Henry Keppel, who had visited Wellington in 1850 1 Newcastle (13) 4 Aug 1859, PP 1860/216. This despatch was written several weeks before Newcastle read Grey’s own ‘able and temperate’ defence of 20 July 2 Grey to Newcastle 29 Oct 1859, tbid. 3 92 Nov-8 Dec 1859, CO 48/400.

427

SIR GEORGE GREY

in command of the Meander. Keppel gives the following cryptic account of what ensued. [9 June 1860]. An untoward event occurred during the first watch. Under extreme pressure from Cdptain Turnour and

the surgeon, who stated that the Governor would either

commit suicide or murder his wife, I consented to return to Rio Janeiro, and reached that port on the evening of the 12th. Next morning, having landed the Governor, Lady Grey, and maid, sent an officer to know when His Excellency would be ready to embark. He sent word he was then ready, and that if I would not write home what had occurred he would not.

I kept my word.® ,

Lady Grey’s indiscretion has been described as ‘a foolish little act’®

} involving a flirtatious letter which she would not surrender to Sir George. Whatever it was,’ her behaviour outraged Grey’s sense

of propriety and caused him to separate from her for the next thirty-seven years. She returned to England and Grey proceeded alone to the Cape, while Keppel was removed from the Cape

command to the less important Brazilian station, and soon afterwards found himself permanently on the inactive list.

This domestic upheaval cast a shadow over Grey’s life for the next few years. Coming on top of the nervous strain of his recent administration, the high excitement of his quarrels with the British Government, and the sense of frustration which he felt at being forbidden to carry out the one policy which he believed would save South Africa from misfortunes, it left him dejected and dispirited. During his last year at the Cape, he was a Governor with little heart in his work, and he had not been back six months before he volunteered to return to New Zealand.°®

The arrival of Prince Alfred (14 July) on a royal tour of South Africa gave Grey some opportunity of recovering his amour-propre,

and for the next few months he was in constant attendance at receptions, balls and public functions throughout the Cape and Natal. The young prince placed the first book on the shelves of the

Cape Town Public Library, tipped the first barrow-load of spoil into the new Cape Town breakwater, went hunting, visited native kraals, met Sandile and Moshesh, saw round Natal, and generally 4 Dillon MSS, 1 June 1850. Charlotte Godley described Keppel as ‘a very goodnatured, dandy little man’, fond of dancing, and his wife as an ardent conchologist—‘she is odd, some say cranky, and never sees anyone’. (Letters 43.) 5 Keppel A Sailor’s Life III, pp. 40. seq. ® Mrs. S. T. George to Isobel Aston 6 Dec 1896, GC/APL.

7 Of. W. S. Grahame to McLean, 25 Sep 1860, who makes rather more of it than that; McLean MSS. 8 See below p. 435. 4.28

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WAR AND CONFISCATION, 1863-1864 Maungatautari district, abandoning Ngaruawahia without a fight,

and on 8 December Cameron occupied the King’s capital and hoisted the Queen’s flag. 41

Grey wrote on g December,

There can, I think, be no doubt that the neck of this unhappy rebellion is now broken, and that there is now no probability of the insurrection becoming general.”

He was far too ‘optimistic, but a partial peace might have been possible had he been able to offer fair terms at once. Some of the Maoris were putting out peace feelers. Pene Pukewhau suggested the restoration of the prisoners and cessation of hostilities, but Fox replied (30 November) that the Governor could not treat with them till they laid down arms.*? Te Wheoro reported (3 December) that the Waikato chiefs were prepared to yield the lands occupied by the troops, but feared to surrender their arms lest they should be

imprisoned or. transported.44 Tamihana said that they had lost nearly all their arms at Rangiriri, and could not go on fighting

while so many prisoners were hostages in the hands of the Government.

Friend, it is your side alone which is still in arms. That is to say the steamer which is at work in the Waikato making ‘pas’

as it goes on. When they finish one, they come on a little further and make another. Now then, let the steamer stay away. Do not let it come hither. Grey replied (6 December) that when Ngaruawahia was occupied he would talk of peace.*5

Whitaker and Fox wished to accompany the Governor to Ngaruawahia. The terms which they proposed were that the rebels should declare their submission to the Queen, give up their arms and ammunition, and reside peacefully at such places as the Government might appoint; their lands would be confiscated, but 500,000 acres would be reserved for their use and Crown grants would be issued to them; those who submitted (other than murderers) would not be imprisoned. Grey was unhappy about these conditions, and, though he wished to visit Ngaruawahia to receive the submission of the Waikato chiefs if they should offer it, he had no desire to be fettered by the presence of his advisers. After much hesitation, he agreed to their proposals, but at the last moment he cancelled his visit (16 41 NZ Gazette 1863, 535 Seq. 42 Grey (182) 9 Dec 1863, CO 209/175.

43 AJ 1864, Ee p. 1. 44 Grey (180) 8 Dec 1863, CO 209/175. ] 45 Grey (179) 8 Dec 1863, ibid.

501

SIR GEORGE GREY

December) and informed the rebel chiefs that if they wished for peace they should send a deputation to him at Auckland under safe conduct. He explained his change of mind by saying that, on reflection, he realised that none of the leading chiefs had offered to submit; a few secondary chiefs were trying to secure the release of

the prisoners, while the tribes remained in arms and were busy preparing fresh defensive positions, and in the circumstances it was unwise to press for peace lest his action should be misconstrued as a

sign of weakness.“ This reasoning is plausible rather than convincing. The Ngatimaniapoto would almost certainly not have submitted,*? but there was some possibility that the lower Waikato and Ngatihaua chiefs might have come to terms, and any chance of splitting the rebel combination and setting a precedent for surrender was worth taking. The Government’s terms were severe enough to discredit any suggestion of weakness, and it is hard to see what they stood to lose—except perhaps the favour of the colonists if peace were

made too soon. The real reason for Grey’s hesitancy was probably his suspicion

that Whitaker and Fox, with their eyes on the rich lands of the Rangiaowhia district beyond Ngaruawahia, did not want peace yet

awhile and had insisted on accompanying him to prevent any undue leniency. The Prime Minister’s belligerence was further

demonstrated in January 1864, when he urged the military occupation of Tauranga in order to close the route by which the East Coast tribes were sending reinforcements to the Waikato, and lay waste the farms of the Kingite sympathisers from whom the rebels were deriving food supplies.48 Grey felt that “under the present

form of Government’ he ought to yield to the opinions of his ministers, though he did so ‘with some reluctance’.4® Six hundred

troops occupied Tauranga on 21 January. Smith, the Civil Commissioner, at once protested against the destruction of crops of friendly and neutral Maoris and persuaded Colonel Carey to defer action till he could communicate with Auckland. Ministers caused Smith to be severely reprimanded for interfering, but Grey wrote to him,

I feel very much obliged to you for the fearless and honourable way in which you did your duty on this occasion, thereby preventing me from being the cause of bringing much misery upon many innocent people. © 46 Grey memo. 18 Dec 1863, AJ 1864 E2 p. 5. 47 Grey (28) 15 Feb 1864, CO 209/179.

| 48 Whitaker 19 Jan 1864, AJ 1864, E2 p. 7. 49 Grey 19 Jan 1864, ibid. p. 8. 50 Grey to Smith 25 Jan 1864, ibid. p. 11.

502

WAR AND CONFISCATION, 1863-1864 He also personally requested Carey not to make any aggressive move ~_nor to seize any cattle or destroy any crops unless he was completely

satisfied that the owners were open enemies.5! Whitaker and Fox maintained that all the Maoris west of Tauranga were rebels, and complained of the Governor’s correspondence with their subordinate

officer, but on purely military questions Grey had the right of decision, and he suspected that ministers were deliberately extending the war to the Bay of Plenty in order to seize what Fox called ‘the harbour of the Waikato’. *

In January Cameron renewed his advance up the Waipa valley, and following a successful skirmish at the Mangapiko stream (11 February), his forces by-passed the Maori stronghold of Paterangi, took Rangiaowhia by surprise (21, 22 February), and established themselves at Te Awamutu and Kihikihi. From here, BrigadierGeneral Carey made a sudden move eastwards and surrounded

Rewi Maniapoto and some 300 of his followers and allies at Orakau with an overwhelming force of 2,000 troops (31 March). There ensued one of the most famous battles in the annals of Maori history. Cameron wrote,

It is impossible not to admire the heroic courage and devotion of the natives in defending themselves so long against overwhelming numbers. Surrounded closely on all sides, cut

off from their supply of water, and deprived of all hope of succour, they resolutely held their ground for more than two days, and did not abandon their position until the sap had reached the ditch of their last entrenchment.°*°

When all hope of successful resistance was gone, they were called

upon to surrender, but they refused, fearing that they would be taken to Auckland and never liberated. Heoi ana! Ka whawhai tonu, ake, ake, ake! (Enough! -We will

fight on, for ever, and ever, and ever!)

Then it was proposed to let the women and children come out | before the final assault, but the answer came, Ki te mate nga tane, me mate ano nga wahine me te kupu. (If the

men die, the women and children will die with them.) **

51 Grey to Carey 25 Jan 1864, thid. |

52 Fox War in NZ 121; Sewell Journal 13 Feb 1864. 53 7 April AJ I,1864 54 Cameron AJ 1864 Ex p. 14;1864, Rusden 381.Es, p. 51.

593

: SIR GEORGE GREY On the afternoon of the third day of the siege, the remnant of the starving garrison marched out in the face of their foe and broke through the ranks of the astonished soldiers. Sir Henry Havelock said it was the finest thing he had ever seen in his career.®* Sir Jj. E. Alexander, another eye-witness, records:

Suddenly ... the Maori garrison came out of their entrenchment on to the open, and in a silent and compact body moved

on without precipitation. There was something mysterious in their appearance as they advanced towards the cordon of troops without fear, without firing a shot, or a single cry being

heard even from the women and children, who with their principal chiefs were in their midst. *®

The cavalry headed them off and many were killed as they fled, but Rewi and a remnant of 100 or so of his followers escaped across the Puniu river to the hills at Hangatiki.®’ Orakau virtually ended the Waikato campaign, but the war was spreading like fire in the fern. Sporadic fighting was going on in Taranaki without much profit to either side—a series of skirmishes

at Kaitake (11, 22, 24 March), a minor pitched battle at Sentry Hill (30 April), and a great deal of crop-burning by the British flying columns,*8 Of more sinister significance was the ambuscade of

Te Ahuahu (6 April) in which Captain Lloyd and six men of the 65th Regiment were killed and mutilated. Lloyd’s head was carried off as a prophetic emblem by the leaders of a new fanatically militant

. Maori sect, commonly known as the Hauhaus, whose high priest Te Ua claimed to have received the Archangel Gabriel’s promise of the assistance of the heavenly hosts to drive the pakeha out of New Zealand.®® Grey expressed disgust at their barbarous practices and thought that the delusion would quickly die out,®* but events proved him wrong. ‘The fighting spread to Tauranga, where the presence of the troops provoked ambuscades and skirmishes, leading to an unsuccessful

attack on the Maori entrenchments at Pukehinahina, or Gate Pa (29 April), when 46 officers and men lost their lives and 122 more were wounded.®! This reverse was expunged two months later when 65 Gorst New Zealand Revisited 283.

6 Alexander Bush Fighting 169; cf. Paerata Battle of Orakau. : 67 Carey 3 April 1864, AJ 1864 Eg p. 51; Grey (53, 56) 21 April 1864, CO 209/179; Alexander 159 seq. 68 Grey (47, 57, 66, 84) 5, 25 April, 4, 30 May 1864, CO 209/179, 180. 59 See AJ 1864 E8, Papers relative to the Pai Marire religion. © Grey (60) 26 April, (80) 26 May, (85) 30 May 1864, CO 209/179.

594 ,

61 Cameron 5 May 1864, NZ Gazette 1864 p. 203; Mair Story of Gate Pa; Rusden IT, 294; Cowan I, 112.

WAR AND CONFISCATION, 1863-1864

the Maoris were decisively defeated at Te Ranga (21 June), over 100 being killed including the principal Ngaiterangi chief Rawiri Tuia.*2 The remnant of the tribe laid down their arms, and in

August Grey visited Tauranga and received their formal submission.®* In the south, a Hauhau war-party threatened to attack Wanganui, but was soundly defeated by the loyal Maoris in an extraordinary pitched battle on Moutua island (14 May), where 450 men fought it out with muskets and meres (stone clubs) on a strip of land 300 yards by 20.84

The victories at Orakau and Te Ranga afforded another opportunity for making peace, but at this critical tume Grey and his ministers were so much at cross purposes that decisive action was

impossible. Disagreements about the detention of the Maori prisoners, the terms of submission of the rebels, and the amount of

land to be confiscated raised the constitutional question of the respective powers of the Governor and his advisers under responsible government and produced deadlock. Over 200 prisoners were confined on board the hulk Marion in Auckland harbour. The Waikato chiefs thought that the prisoners were being harshly treated and that they would eventually be tried

and transported or hanged, and Grey who had an uncanny understanding of the Maori mind was of opinion that this belief was driving them into a mood of desperation which had been exhibited in their suicidal resistance at Orakau.®* He dreaded a recurrence of

such an event and urged ministers to announce that the prisoners would be released and treated on the same terms as other rebels who

laid down their arms; some of the less serious offenders might be conditionally released without delay, especially Tioriori, who had protected the Te Awamutu settlers and chivalrously attempted to save an English officer’s life at Rangiriri.** Ministers refused to make

an exception in Tioriori’s case and advised that all the prisoners should be tried by court martial.6? Whitaker, with unnecessary

brusqueness, said that they were determined to keep them in custody till the rebellion ended, whether with or without a trial was

20.

‘not of essential importance’; their detention was deterring the rebels from murdering the settlers, and he meant to keep them as hostages for the conduct of their friends in arms.® Grey pleaded that

62 A, E . 74 Seq.

A 63 Gran a oy 6 Aug a GO ato) ‘be Gres ep eeches 5, 6 Aug in AJ 1867 64 Rusden II, 276. 65 Grey (64) 3 May 1864, CO 209/180. 66 Grey (53) .6 April 1864, CO 209/79; Grey memo. 29 Feb, 7, 12 April

1864, AJ 1864 Er.

8? Fox g March 1864, ibid. 68 Whitaker 26 April 1864, tid. 595

SIR GEORGE GREY

a serious responsibility lay upon himself in sanctioning a harsh policy which tended to prolong the war and increase the expense to Great Britain and to the colony, and that his acute anxiety gave him a strong claim upon ministers’ consideration.*® Whitaker retorted that the Governor had no responsibility in the matter whatsoever. Ministers are responsible for the suppression of the rebellion;

for the whole policy by which it is proposed to suppress it; and above all, for taking care that it is so suppressed that it may not be renewed at a future period.” The Prime Minister’s determination to have his own way caused Grey to refer the matter to the Secretary of State with a request for instructions. 7! Ministers thereupon informed him that if he imagined

that he could ask the Imperial Government to withdraw from them powers which had once been conferred, he was making responsible

government ‘unintelligible in theory and powerless in action’.” From this point, the discussion degenerated into what FitzGerald called the ‘Memorandummiad’?*—an endless exchange of lengthy documents of an increasing petty and futile description. Whitaker’s contributions were bluntly outspoken. Fox was studiously offensive in a cheap, clever fashion. Grey was more subtle and never departed from a scrupulous correctness of outward form; but, having found

that Fox was concealing facts from him, he bombarded him with requests for information about the medical condition of the prisoners and a thousand and one minutiae connected with their management,

: never alleging but for ever implying some fault on ministers’ part, and goading Fox into fresh furies and fulminations. The tragedy was that all this fault-finding and self-justification seriously diverted

the Government from important practical questions. As Fox said, ‘They have wasted words and been beating the air’,?4 and Whitaker confessed, ‘This, however, is not Government; it is not the work in which practical men of business can be engaged’.?5 Grey hesitated to take matters into his own hands till he received instructions from London. He told ministers that they might do as they liked (17 June), then changed his mind and, at Fox’s suggestion, offered to take

custody of the prisoners himself at the cost of the Imperial Government (23 June), but went back on this decision when Fox accused him of carrying out his own views in defiance of advice 69 Grey 29 April 1864, tid. 70 Whitaker 2 June 1864, ibid. 71 Grey (72) 7 May 1864, CO 209/180. 7 Whitaker 2 June 1864, AJ 1864, E1. 73 And the ministers ‘memorandummies’, NZPD 1864 p. 127. 74 Fox 22 Sep 1864, AJ 1864 Er. 75 Whitaker 14 Oct 1864, ibid. E2A p. 17.

506

WAR AND CONFISCATION, 1863-1864

(25, 29 June). Eventually, he arranged for the prisoners to be transferred to his island home of Kawau, where they were to have

formed a sort of self-supporting Moravian settlement under Rev. B. Y. Ashwell, the former Waikato missionary. Unfortunately, White, the superintendent, neglected to take their parole, and they escaped to the mainland (10-11 September), formed a camp in the

hills above Mahurangi, made friends amongst the natives of Kaipara and Whangarei, and created a first-class war scare which brought Grey’s policy of leniency into disrepute. Cardwell, who succeeded Newcastle at the Colonial Office in April,?@ eventually ruled that if the Governor did not agree with his ministers’ advice he might properly determine the fate of the prisoners for himself.77 This decision gave rise to a fresh outburst of ministerial wrath in the

course of which Fox let slip the ulterior motive of ministers’ manoeuvres.

In the meantime, while so much ‘generosity’ is shewn towards the Maoris in arms, His Excellency’s sympathy is withheld from the unfortunate English colonists, . . . and the Colonial Government is unable to provide for their reinstatement . . . because His Excellency declines to confiscate the lands of those who have inflicted so much misery upon them.”®

Confiscation was the real crux of the trouble. Whitaker had promised Newcastle that in accepting responsibility the ministers would ‘fulfil their duties with prudence and with justice’.7? What : they understood by ‘prudence and justice’ was indicated by Fox.

The only hope of saving a remnant of the Maori race is the termination of the present struggle by their full acknowledgment of their mistake, their full acceptance of its consequences, and submission to the supremacy of law; it will not be done by treaties of peace which might leave the impression that they are an independent people, or at liberty on any future imaginary casus belli to take up the sword.

The Government wanted a material guarantee against any future resistance to ‘the legitimate progress of colonisation’, and nothing was ‘more pernicious to the native race than the possession of large

territories under tribal title, which they could neither use, nor * Newcastle retired on account of ill-health and died on 18 Oct 1864 at the

Br Cosiwell (76) 27 June 1864, AJ 1864 D5. Grey arranged for some of the escaped prisoners to be taken back to the Waikato; others remained with their | northern friends till 1865 when they quietly returned home.

*8 Fox 30 Sep 1864, AJ 1864 Er. 7% Whitaker 29 Feb 1864, AJ 1864 Ea. 507

SIR GEORGE GREY learn how to use’.®° Confronted with the unequivocal demand for the

conquest and spoliation of the Maoris, Grey, bound by instructions

to follow ministerial advice, was put in an unenviable position. Publicly, he continued to echo his ministers’ views, saying that ‘mercy requires that future contests should be prevented’ and hoping that the Government would act ‘in a spirit of liberality, generosity, and of mercy’.§? Behind the scenes, he began to resist their designs. On 2 February 1864, ministers had without consulting him notified

the Waikato rebels that ‘the disposal of their lands rests with the Governor’. Grey inquired what power the Governor might exercise in the matter, to which Fox somewhat insolently replied that His Excellency’s power might be exercised to its fullest extent—‘under the advice of His Responsible Ministers for the time being’.®? After

the fall of Orakau, ministers presented a draft proclamation requiring ‘every man who desires peace’ before 1 July 1864 to declare his loyalty before a magistrate, surrender his arms, and submit to the law; murderers, plunderers, and other offenders would be liable to punishment; the others would either be employed by the

Government or allotted land on which to live temporarily, and eventually they would receive Crown grants for what land was to be

theirs; the rest of the land would be confiscated for European colonisation.§? At an Executive Council on 30 April, Grey signed the draft copy but put it on record that he did so against his own wishes. He objected that the proclamation applied to the whole of New Zealand, that to threaten the confiscation of the land of distant and neutral tribes was tantamount to inviting a general insurrection,

and that in requiring all natives to lay down their arms under promise of protection the Government was undertaking more than it could fulfil, and the effect would be to put the well-disposed natives

who disarmed at the mercy of the ill-disposed tribes which did not. He proposed to restrict the proclamation to the Waikato-Thames

area, and retain a discretionary authority to permit natives who surrendered to retain their arms under licence.®*

Whitaker scornfully rejected Grey’s reasonable suggestions. Nothing would content him short of the complete disarmament of the natives and the colonisation of the island by armed settlers. Grey considered that if the ministers had genuinely desired peace they would have accepted his amendments and concentrated on the

practical purpose of settling the Waikato. His suspicions were 80 Fox 5 May 1864, PP 1864/10262 p. 33.

: 81 Grey (67) 5 May 1864, CO 209/180. 82 AJ 1864 E2 pp. 33, 3583 Draft Proclamation (22 April 1864) ibid. p. 35. 84 Grey 3 May 1864, ibid. p. 36; Grey (71) 7 May 1864, CO 209/180.

508

WAR AND CONFISCATION, 1863-1864

confirmed when they proceeded to press for fresh military operations in the Thames, Taranaki, and Wanganui areas.®* Their

proclamation read like a declaration of war; the mere hint of it excited great alarm amongst the Wellington, Hawke’s Bay, and East Coast Maoris.®* Believing that its promulgation would provoke wide-

spread rebellion, Grey by his written protest virtually vetoed it.

The immediate consequence was the postponement of the Waikato military settlement scheme. Whitaker pressed for confisca-

tion of the Waikato lands up to the line of the Puniu river for immediate occupation by the military settlers.87 Grey replied by raising doubts as to the legality of confiscation on such a scale, arguing that the New Zealand Settlements Act 1863 was avowedly passed to authorise limited settlement for the preservation of peace whereas the present proposals involved very severe punishment which was likely to extend the war.8® The Prime Minister, angrily now, accused the Governor, in his zeal for the Maoris, of going back on his previous declarations on the subject. Newcastle, he said, had approved the confiscation of the lands of any tribes which resorted to rebellion,®® and had explicitly committed the execution of native policy to the responsible ministers; and if there were any technical defects in the Act, the Assembly would soon remove them.

Grey had originated the idea of the military colonisation of the Waikato; he stood fully committed to the policy, and apparently he

still intended to carry it out, but he would not do so until he obtained assurances that it would be executed in a spirit of moderation. He fell into a dangerous mood in which he opposed

everything that his ministers suggested. He objected to their proposals to settle the Waikato regiments between Pirongia and Maungatautari on the pretext that this would interfere with the movements of the troops.® He found fault with their draft Order in Council for proclaiming Waikato a native district for confiscation purposes on the score that it contravened the letter of the Act by including the lands of more than one tribe. He demanded proof that any considerable part of the Waikato people had fought against the Government,®! and quibbled about the definition of the term ‘rebel

native’ until in exasperation Whitaker defined it for him as any person whose lands it was proposed to take under the Settlements 85 Whitaker 27 June 1864, AJ 1864 E2 p. 69. “6 AJ 1864 E2 pp. 47, 77 and D6 p. 6. 8? Whitaker 6 May 1864, AJ 1864 E2 p. 38. Cf. Russell 22 April seq., ibid. p. 52 8 Grey 5, 6, 11 May 1864, tbid. p. 39 seq. 89 Whitaker 17 May, 3 June 1864, ibid. p. 46.

90 AJ 1864 E2 pp. 52 seq. 81 Grey 25 May 1864, thid. p. 54. 599

SIR GEORGE GREY

Act without compensation.®? He paid no attention to the plea that financial exigency made it imperative to get the settlers on the land without delay; he would do nothing till ministers defined precisely how much land they wished to confiscate, and he reminded them

that his original proposals had been to put the settlers nearer to Auckland, between Pokeno and Ngaruawahia, not far away in the south at Kihikihi and Te Awamutu.®? Ministers declined to set a limit to the amount of land they would confiscate, and in effect

asserted the right to regulate the quantity to be taken by the financial needs of the Government, which could not yet be determined as the rebellion was still in progress. Grey took his stand on the principle that the amount of land to be forfeited must depend

on the degree of criminality of the native owners, and refused to give way. The Colonial Office was inclined to blame him for not following

the straightforward course of carrying out his original Waikato settlement plan® (though it is hard to see how he could have done so when his ministers were not prepared to co-operate), but fully supported him in his refusal to permit unlimited confiscation.®*® This

decision was conveyed to him in an elaborate despatch from Cardwell who expressed grave objections to the Settlements Act.

It renders permanently insecure the tenure of native property throughout the Islands, and is thus calculated to alarm our friends. It makes no difference between the leaders and

, contrivers of rebellion and their unwilling agents or allies, and is thus calculated to drive to despair those who are but half

our enemies. The proceedings by which unlimited confiscation of property is to take place may be secret, without argument and without appeal; and the provision for compensation Is as

rigidly confined as the provision for punishment is flexible

and unlimited.

Considering that the colony was defended by an Imperial army, he would have been justified in disallowing the Act, but he trusted to Grey’s ‘strong and resolute hand’ to prevent abuse. He preferred that any forfeiture of land should take the form of a ‘cession’ of territory

imposed by the Governor and the General upon the conquered ’ tribes as a condition of pardon. Should this be impracticable, he authorised the Governor to bring the Settlements Act into force on certain conditions—the duration of the Act should be limited to 82 Grey 25 May 1864, tdid. p. 59. 93 Ibid. p. 60.

94 Fortescue 16 Aug 1864, CO 209/180. ,

.85 Rogers and Fortescue 16 April 1864, CO 209/178.

510

WAR AND CONFISCATION, 1863-1864

two years, the whole amount of land to be confiscated should be made known at once, a commission not removable by the ministry should be constituted to consider which lands should be forfeit, and finally,

It should be clearly understood that your own concurrence in any forfeiture is not to be considered as a mere ministerial

act, but that it will be withheld unless you are personally satisfied that the Confiscation is just and moderate.” This British decision apparently gave Grey all that he wanted.®’ It was now ministers’ turn to complain—

In the hands of the Governor is all the power; he alone can move troops; he alone can confiscate; he alone has the fate of prisoners in his hands. Ministers are really powerless.” But Grey could not govern New Zealand without the co-operation of the New Zealanders; he could only bring government to a standstill. As the constitutional head of a parliamentary government, he was not entitled to act except through his ministers. If he could neither accept their advice nor induce them to accept his decisions, the onus lay upon him to find other advisers who would be more

amenable to his wishes and who could gain the support of the colonial Parliament. This was the classic dilemma of all colonial Governors, which none solved except by discreet surrender. In New

Zealand, as Grey pointed out, there were special difficulties to hamper him. The Assembly only met infrequently for short sessions, and the Governor had no means of consulting other political leaders or of appealing past ministers to the elected representatives.®®

Grey proposed to issue a proclamation offering a free pardon to all

who swore allegiance and ceded such land as the Governor and General demanded. He declined to give any assurance that he would take enough land for military settlement and for sale; he would go

no further than justice required; and he refused to insist upon the surrender of arms.1& Whitaker denounced the proclamation as a waste of time and refused to advise its promulgation, accusing Grey ofa ‘breach of faith’ in making it impossible for the Government to 96 Cardwell (43) 26 April 1864, AJ 1864 E2 Appendix p. 20. 97 Cardwell to Grey (private) 26 April 1864, GC/APL. 98 Whitaker 14 Oct 1864, AJ 1864, E2A p. 17. 99 Grey (124) 26 Aug 1864, CO 209/191. 100 Grey 7, 8 Sep 1864, AJ 1864 E2 pp. 89 seq.

511

SIR GEORGE GREY fulfil its promises, and of sacrificing the interests of the colony for the sake of patching up ‘hollow and delusive peace’.1°4 Grey took offence at this criticism.

The Governor . . . unhesitatingly appeals to his country and to posterity to judge between his views and those of his Respon-

sible Advisers, and to pronounce whether when a man has to come to a decision amidst so many and great difficulties, his Responsible Advisers ought not to refrain from clouding his judgment, and trying to force him to a decision he does not

approve, by using such language as their Memorandum contains. 102

At the same time, he announced his intention of issuing the terms of peace without ministers’ advice.1®3 A few days later, he remarked to Reader Wood that by delaying issue of the proclamation ministers were prolonging the war, and Whitaker seized upon this as a pretext

to tender his resignation.!°* His real reasons, however, were the stoppage of his confiscation project and the financial collapse of his administration.

The £3,000,000 loan had proved a failure. The Imperial Parliament would only guarantee £1,000,000 of it on the stringent conditions that £500,000 was repaid to the Treasury to discharge the colony’s past debts, and that after 1864 the colony should pay for British troops at the rate of £40 per head for infantry and £55 for

| cavalry instead of £5 as heretofore.!°® The response of the London money market was unfavourable, and the agents could not raise more than £800,000 at a heavy discount.1°6 Meanwhile, the colonial

Government had been spending freely. Whitaker was loth to disclose the state of the accounts, but Grey insisted on knowing so

that he might discuss the financial position with Whitaker’s prospective successor. It appeared that the Government had already drawn the sum of £716,000 against debentures deposited in

London to the amount of £1,250,000, and had overdrawn its account with the Bank of New Zealand to the extent of £80,000.1""

The full extent of its expenditure was not ascertainable as the accounts were in serious arrears. Whitaker stoutly maintained that there would be no financial difficulty if his confiscation scheme were 101 Whitaker 8, 13 Sep 1864, ibid. pp. 80, 91. 102 Grey 14 Sep 1864, ibid. p. 92. 103 The proclamation was eventually issued by the Governor’s sole authority on

26 Oct. It gave the rebels till 10 Dec to submit, and included the condition that Maoris who resided in European settlements and the ceded areas must give up their arms. VK Gazette 1864 p. 399.

104 Ibid. p. 96. 105 Cardwell (65) 26 May 1864, AJ 1864 Ba p. 15. 106 AJ 1864 Be p. 39. 107 {bid. p. 39. 512

WAR AND CONFISCATION, 1863-1 864

adhered to, but Grey compelled ministers to curtail their demands for native lands—first to 1,600,000 acres (30 September), then to a mere 180,000 acres for the immediate location of the military settlers already brought into the colony (27 October).1°® In these circum-

stances, Whitaker had to advise the stoppage of all colonial war expenditure, the demobilisation of the whole of the colonial defence forces, and the summoning of the Assembly.1!° ‘Responsible Government in New Zealand’, Whitaker concluded, ‘can never be satisfactorily worked under His Excellency Sir George Grey.’111 It certainly could not work satisfactorily while Whitaker and Russell were his principal advisers, and though Grey was not faultless in the matter, ministers must bear a considerable share of the blame for the sorry situation that developed. ‘They took office with the fixed intention of pursuing a policy of ruthless suppression of the Maori rebellion, if not of the Maori race. It was easy for them

to appeal to the war-time passions of a Parliament in which the Maoris were unrepresented and secure approval for their design. Once the Assembly dispersed, ministers were virtually irresponsible, and they immediately displayed a determination to subordinate the

Governor to their will by refusing him an effective voice in their councils. In a situation which called for a large amount of give and take, inasmuch as imperial and colonial interests were closely bound together, they tried to dictate a policy of war and confiscation,

to be executed by the Imperial army which was under Grey’s command, and at British expense for which Grey would be held responsible. Both in their purpose and in their manner of proceeding,

they overreached themselves. Not only were they subordinating imperial interests to those of the colony, they were laying themselves open to suspicion.

The ministry was a small body of only five persons. Of these, Gillies resided in the South Island, Wood was absent in London, and

Fox spent much time touring the native districts. The effective powers of government thus fell into the hands of Whitaker and Russell, whom Grey described as ‘the two partners who comprise one

of the leading legal firms in the town of Auckland’.1!2 Both were interested in land-purchase operation, and Russell was a director

of the Bank of New Zealand, the Government’s principal local creditor.113 Grey, who was little disposed to be bullied by anybody, was distinctly averse to taking his orders from these two gentlemen.

He showed them a large measure of deference as long as he 108 Whitaker 3 Oct 1864, AJ 1864 E2A p. 5. 108 Ibid. E2 p. 95, E2A p. 8.

110 Jbid. E2A p. 9. 111 hid, E2 p. 100. 2 Grey (3) 26 Aug 1864, CO 209/182. 113 See Saunders II, 122. 513

SIR GEORGE GREY

conscientiously could, and until May 1864 he presented his own views ‘in the gentlest manner’, almost as a suppliant, only to be met with curt refusals and brusque demands. At the Executive Council of 28 May, for instance, he found himself confronted with a decision

which ministers had reached in private conclave, and put in the position of being required to signify his formal approval to their proclamation without discussion. When he attempted to debate the matter, ministers left the council room, ‘without’, Grey recorded, ‘my precisely catching what was said’.114

Cardwell deplored the fact that the Governor and his advisers should have fallen into the habit of transacting their business ‘by means of adverse Minutes, . . . involving great and deplorable delay in the conduct of present and pressing affairs’, and wished that they might proceed ‘under relations of mutual confidence, and in a friendly and cordial spirit’.445 But mutual mistrust had become so pronounced that day-to-day personal consultations had become _ distasteful and futile. The objectionable practice instituted by Fox of publishing the memoranda exchanged between Governor and ministers was calculated to destroy altogether the confidential relationship which was indispensable under responsible govern-

ment. But it was not faulty procedure which destroyed the confidence; it was lack of confidence which wrecked the machinery of co-operation. Similarly, the arrangement whereby ministers were

permitted to see the Governor’s despatches before they were transmitted to the Secretary of State led, in the circumstances, to perpetual friction and impaired Grey’s ability to communicate freely with the Colonial Office. Rogers thought that ‘Sir G.G, should

write more confidentially to his superiors, and not confine himself to writing d’p’ches wh. are all communicated to & therefore in a measure written for his Ministers & the Colony’.116 This might have enabled Grey to explain his actions more comprehensibly, but could scarcely have remedied the situation, as no imperial instructions or suggestions could have been acted upon without revealing the correspondence. The trouble lay much deeper than defects in procedure. Rightly or wrongly, Grey suspected the Whitaker ministry of designs with which he could not conscientiously associate himself. He should

perhaps have foreseen their object earlier and avoided putting himself in the position where he seemed to be a consenting party. The weakness of his constitutional position forced him into devious 114 Grey 28 May 1864, AJ 1864 E2 p. 57. 118 Cardwell (139) 26 Dec 1864, PP 1865/11291. 116 Rogers minute (c. 18 Aug 1865), CO 209/190.

514

WAR AND CONFISCATION, 1863-1864 courses in his campaign of obstruction. He became overwrought and

ill with anxiety so that his judgment was, as he admits, at times clouded and he sometimes failed to act resolutely or consistently. But, at bottom, as Grey saw it, a great injustice was in danger of being perpetrated, and rather than allow it he was prepared to wreck the ministry.

9I5

, CHAPTER 34 ‘Self-Reliance’, 1864-1865

Sumus sine rebus Belli satis.

Captain Brassey, 22 July 1865

THE defeated Waikato tribes ignored Grey’s proclamation of 25 October and remained sullenly mistrustful of the Government’s

intentions. ‘The Taranaki rebels were still unsubdued, and the Hauhau fantasy, symptom of their rejection of European influences, was gaining converts and threatening to extend the war to the East

Coast and the Wairarapa. This situation sharpened the settlers’ apprehensions, discredited Grey’s policy of leniency, and made him

extremely unpopular. The army in New Zealand was developing ideas of its own; the soldiers found Maori warfare distasteful, while senior officers were quite out of sympathy with the objects for which they supposed they were fighting and freely criticised the colonists

in their letters to England. British patience and generosity were wearing thin, and Cardwell, without abating his claim to control native policy, was demanding prompt settlement of the colony’s debts and the early return of the troops. The Colonial Government

was in serious financial difficulties and seemed to lack the means of self-defence, yet hotly resented British interference. With everybody

| at loggerheads, Grey was finding it difficult to reach firm decisions, or, when he did, to get them carried out. The miserable quarrel with his late ministers left him nervous and over-strained, and there were times when the complications of the situation seemed to baffle him.

After much delay, he convened the General Assembly at Wellington on 24 November, and asked Weld to form a ministry. Weld was an old political opponent of Grey’s,! who had recently supported Stafford’s ‘war party’, criticised Fox’s peace programme 1 See above pp. 142, 158, 261.

516

“SELF-RELIANCE, 1864-1865 of 1861-2, and condemned Grey’s surrender of Waitara in 1863. Nevertheless, Grey respected his talents and integrity, and believed that he would prove more accommodating than Whitaker over confiscation and the surrender of arms.? Hitherto Weld had agreed with Stafford in opposing the colony’s acceptance of responsibility for native affairs, but recent events had convinced him that the system of divided authority must be got rid of and that ‘the time had come to put into force the true old-English policy of self-reliance’.®

The Imperial Government claimed a determining voice in native policy so long as it supplied a large army for the colony’s defence, but

Weld thought that the colony could neither support the cost of the troops nor allow itself to be overruled on matters of policy by a distant, ill-informed authority. He was therefore prepared to risk the alternative, and let Britain withdraw her troops on the assumption that, when the colony provided for its own defence, it would have full control of its own native affairs.

Trusting Grey as little as when he had called him ‘the artful Dodger of Governors’,4 Weld before accepting office took the precaution of securing the Governor’s approval to a memorandum embodying the main principles of his policy. These included the immediate removal of the seat of the Government from Auckland to Wellington in accordance with the decision of the Assembly 1n its last session, the formation of a small standing colonial defence force, and the confiscation of sufficient rebel land to enable the Government to fulfil its obligations to the immigrants. Pending the Imperial Government’s approval of the self-reliance principle, the colony would ‘undertake a reasonable liability for the services of the troops actively engaged in the field, at the special recommendation of His Excellency’s Ministers, and for such troops only’.® On this under-

standing, he formed a talented ministry which included Sewell (Attorney General), Fitzherbert (Treasurer), Major Atkinson

(Defence) and Major Richardson (Postmaster General).

J. C. Richmond subsequently took office as Colonial Secretary, and

Mantell, later replaced by FitzGerald, as Native Minister. Grey had no faith in self-reliance. He doubted if the colony’s finances could support it, and moreover he lacked any incentive to dispense with the regular troops, because so long as they remained he was authorised to exercise discretionary authority in deciding the

terms of the peace. Opportunist as ever, he bowed to political 2 Weld Notes 25; NZPD 1864 p. 14; Sewell Journal 25 Nov 1864; Saunders I,

? Lovat 123. 4 Weld 12 June 1853, Stafford MSS. 5 Weld memo. 22 Nov 1864, AJ 1864 Aa.

517

SIR GEORGE GREY

necessity and accepted Weld’s propositions in the comfortable knowledge that a considerable time must elapse before the new arrangement could come fully into force and that meanwhile his powers would remain unimpaired. Sewell sensed the Governor’s duplicity.

Sir George Grey is a dangerous man to enter into relations with; but it must be done by somebody. . . . There is no doubt that he will throw us overboard at the first opportunity... . It is lamentable to have to deal with a man whom it is impossible to trust or believe.®

The Assembly’s support for self-reliance was as dubious as the Governor’s. Weld moved four resolutions asserting that the system of joint responsibility had resulted in divided counsels, vacillating policy, and unnecessary expense, and requesting the Home Government to withdraw the troops in order that ministers might assume control of native policy.”? The Auckland members responded by demanding the separation of the northern colony and the continuance

of British responsibility for native affairs and defence till the rebellion was suppressed. The Auckland Provincial Council and the majority of the Auckland settlers supported this proposal, and Grey,

notwithstanding ministers’ objections, told Cardwell that ‘unless some such arrangement .. . is carried out, it will be impossible to bring to a satisfactory termination the difficulties prevailing in this country’. The House of Representatives rejected separation by 35, votes to 18, and the Legislative Council by 10 votes to 9. Weld’s self-reliant resolutions, however, had to be modified to secure acceptance, and finally stated, not that the troops should be withdrawn forthwith, but that the colony would attempt to organise its own defence with a view to their withdrawal. Weld still affirmed that he would dispense with them at the earliest possible moment,?° but it was by no means certain that this was the wish of Parliament. Self-defence hinged upon finance. The war had cost New Zealand

nearly £750,000 in the past twelve months, the colony’s debt amounted to £1,400,000, and its revenue, though increasing, was completely swallowed up in ordinary civil expenses.11 ‘The Government dared not suggest taking away the three-eighths of the customs

revenue allocated to the provinces, or touching the provincial territorial funds.12 It was decided, therefore, to impose additional 6 Journal 23 Nov, 4 Dec 1864. 7 NZPD 1864-6 p. 47. 8 Grey (3) 5 Jan 1865, CO 200/188. 9 NZPD 1864-6 pp. 94 seq, 24410 Weld go Dec 1864, AJ 1865 Ar. 11 Fitzherbert 3 Dec 1864, NZPD 1864 pp. 75 seq. 12 Weld memo. 20 March 1865, AJ 1865 Ar.

518

“SELF-RELIANCE, 1864-1865 customs duties calculated to yield about £200,000, and for the rest

to rely upon loans, raising the interest rate on the balance of the

£3,000,000 loan from 5 per cent to 6 per cent, and issuing £1,000,000-worth of three-year debentures at 8 per cent. These measures did not relieve the immediate cash situation. The late Government, through Russell’s influence, had financed itself by advances from the Bank of New Zealand, but the failure of the English loan shook the Government’s credit, and when the new ministers asked for an accommodation of £300,000 to tide them over

the next three months their request was sharply rejected. The best they could do was to borrow £120,000 at 7 per cent on the security of debentures, which in the event proved practically unsaleable on

the Australian market.1* Matters were made worse when the

Commissary General proposed to stop the issue of pay and rations to the colonial forces and required the immediate repayment of past advances from the military chest. Weld could only ask the Governor to appeal to the Imperial Government to come to their aid either by

guaranteeing the whole of the 1863 loan or by making a parliamentary grant-in-aid.!4 Grey patched up a precarious arrangement with Cameron for continued advances from the military chest,!° remitted £500,000 in 4 per cent debentures to cover the colony’s military debts, and laid further claim to virtue on the part of his ministers by representing that they did not recommend a policy of hasty and indiscriminate confiscation, which had been their predecessors’ panacea for regaining solvency. He earnestly commended their loan proposals, and, with scant consideration for their advice, ventured his own opinion that, to place the colony in a position of security, an

additional million would be required beyond what they recommended. ?®

Cardwell returned an uncompromising refusal. Since April 1863

the Imperial Treasury had spent £2,000,000 on the defence of ‘an established, and in the main, a flourishing and advancing Colony’, which, on its own showing, had a rising customs revenue and rich prospects from the sale of confiscated land. He could hold out no hope that Parliament, which with difficulty had been induced last session to offer a guarantee for a loan of £1,000,000 on conditions

which the colony had rejected, would guarantee a _ further £2,000,000 or £3,000,000 ‘upon less secure terms’. He could see no 13 AJ 1865 B2; Sewell Journal 25 Dec 1865 seg; Saunders IT, 139. 14 Weld 20 March, Fitzherbert 23 March 1865, AJ 1865 Ar. 15 Grey to Cameron 7 March 1865, tbid. A4 p. 13 passem. 16 Grey (49) 8 April 1865, CO 209/189.

519

SIR GEORGE GREY

reason why New Zealand should not maintain an adequate armed force at its own expense, and recommended that it begin economising

at once by sending the British troops home.!’ Grey was very indignant at the tone assumed by the Secretary of State, and took his refusal to imply a lack of confidence in himself.1® The fallacy of Cardwell’s argument was that a colonial defence force would cost the colony more than the British regiments. The fallacy of Weld’s plan was that, while so much of the colony’s revenue was allocated to provincial purposes, the central Government could afford to pay for neither British troops nor colonial forces. Between the two of them, Grey was left to effect the pacification of the country with no likelihood that the means at his command would be adequate to accomplish his purpose.

On 17 December, Grey, on ministers’ advice, confiscated the Waikato as far south as Raglan, Pirongia, and Maungatautari, promising the loyal natives that their lands would be secured to them

and that rebels who submitted would receive portions of land for themselves and their families. ‘The Government reserved the right to construct roads in any part of the island and prohibited Maoris from

bringing arms into the settled districts.19 Fox accused Grey of granting to Weld everything that he had refused to Whitaker,”® but

this was not the case. Whitaker’s declared intention had been to

confiscate at least 4,250,000 acres north of Raglan and Tauranga, of

which over 2,000,000 acres were to have been reserved for sale.

Only after he had tendered his resignation did he reduce his

; demands to the more modest figures of 1,000,000 acres in the Waikato and 600,000 acres at Taranaki, doing so avowedly to avoid the imputation of prolonging the war for the sake of land. The area

confiscated in the Waikato under the Weld proclamation was approximately 1,200,000 acres, of which 230,000 acres were reserved for natives, and Weld was tacitly abandoning the hope of recovering any significant portion of the war expenses out of the sale of the confiscated lands.?1

The most unfortunate feature of the case was that the punishment fell most heavily upon the Waikato and Ngatihaua tribes while the more hostile Ngatiamaniapoto went practically scot free. The loyal

Wiremu Nera of Raglan took offence when a large portion of his lands were taken without his consent, and Tamihana protested against the confiscation line coming south of Ngaruawahia. Grey 17 Cardwell (50) 26 July 1865, AJ 1865 A6. Cf. Cardwell to Grey (private) 26 July 1864, GC/APL. 18 Sewell Journal 8 Oct 1865. 19 Proclamation 17 Dec 1864, NZ Gazette. 20 Wellington Independent 7 Jan 1865. 21 See Lovat 123.

520

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‘SELF-RELIANCE’, 1864-1865

could only explain that the annexation was not so much direct

punishment of offenders as a matter of political necessity to afford | security to the Auckland settlement,?2 and endeavour to effect conciliation by means of tribal allotments and cash compensation.

For some months there was considerable apprehension that the dispossessed Maoris would renew their resistance, but in January the chiefs agreed amongst themselves to cease hostilities, and on 27 May Tamihana made his formal submission.?* This gesture, however, was not entirely convincing, as Tamihana’s influence had waned, and Rewi and his followers continued in a state of surly independence, resisting any form of pakeha interference in the ‘King Country’ south of the confiscation line. The large immigration schemes of Domett and Whitaker had been stopped when the Government’s loan proposals fell through, but there were some 3,000 military settlers to be disposed of and

about an equal number of civil immigrants from the United Kingdom and Cape Colony. The Auckland Superintendent, acting as agent of the General Government, settled the civil immigrants on 10-acre and 5-acre lots near Waiuku, Tuakau, Drury and Pokeno, while Grey authorised the location of the military settlers on their 50-acre sections at Hamilton, Cambridge, Kihikihi and Pirongia, where they could protect the frontier. The two essential conditions of success were that the Government should assist the immigrants

until they could bring their farms into production, and that the sale of large farms in the vicinity should create a market for the settlers’ labour. Neither condition was fulfilled. The penniless state

of the Government caused it to default in its bargain to provide employment for a reasonable period, while Grey’s susceptibility to British sentiment coupled with Weld’s antipathy towards Auckland put a stop to the sale of Waikato lands. This not only annoyed the Auckland Provincial Government but caused extreme hardship to the immigrants, many of whom drifted away from their villages in search of work, thus defeating the purpose of the scheme.**

The most urgent military problem that remained was the suppression of rebellion in the neglected Taranaki and Wanganui districts. The Ngatiruanui and their confederates had long been regarded as the most lawless and turbulent tribes in New Zealand, and it was a settled point of policy that, as soon as the Auckland position permitted, an expedition should be despatched against 22 Grey (36) 3 May 1866, CO 209/196; cf. NZPD (1886) LV, 340. 23 Grey (74, 76) 24, 30 May 1865, CO 209/190. 24 See AJ 1865 Da; Sewell Journal; NZPD 1865; Norris Armed Settlers; Morton Confiscation.

521

SIR GEORGE GREY

them. Accordingly, Weld recommended an immediate campaign for the establishment of one or more strong military posts in the area, the completion of the New Plymouth-Wanganui road, and the occupation of the coastal belt by military settlers. His policy, however,

was not clearly conceived. He regarded the Waikato settlement scheme as a costly failure, yet for want of a better solution he advised substantially the same plan for Taranaki. Nor was it easy for him to reconcile the new campaign with his self-reliant policy. He did not wish the operation to delay the departure of the British troops, and vaguely advised that it should be undertaken by a colonial force,?> though in fact no sufficient force existed. Major Atkinson, who had a practical military knowledge of the country, believed that two detachments of 500 men, aided by friendly natives,

could clear the whole area before the end of the autumn, and Colonel Warre, senior military officer at Taranaki, was of the same opinion.”®

Grey agreed as to the necessity of the campaign, but wanted ministers to come out unequivocally with a recommendation that it should be undertaken by British troops, otherwise he did not see how it could be effected at all. As there were over 2,000 military settlers in the Waikato, he thought that one British regiment might safely be withdrawn for the southern operation. General Cameron,

however, entertained quite different ideas. He agreed that the Ngatiruanuis and Taranakis should be driven away from the New

Plymouth settlement, but he was strongly averse to extending the war into the Wanganui area in order that the Government might seize more land.?’ Unfortunately, Cardwell’s instructions associating him with the Governor in determining the amount of land to be ceded encouraged him to think that he was entitled to veto policy, and the confidence reposed in him by the Colonial Office and the War Office put him in a strong position to press his views. Grey instructed him that the campaign must be undertaken, not in order to confiscate land, which was an incidental point, but to punish active rebels and restore peace.2® Cameron resented this decision and obstructed its execution. He contemptuously dismissed

the notion that the district could be quickly subdued by a small force, ordered the preparation of a full-scale expedition by the

regulars, and warned Grey that it would probably delay the return of the troops for two years; ‘indeed,’ he wrote, ‘if the 25 Weld memo. 15, 30 Dec 1864, AJ 1865 Ar. Cf. NZPD 1864 pp. 15-16. 26 Atkinson speech 2 Aug 1865, NZPD 1865 p. 232; Sewell Journal 6 Jan 1865. 27 Cameron to Grey (private) 21 Jan 1865, AJ 1865 A4. 28 Grey to Cameron 16 Dec 1864, ibid. 522 C—O

‘SELF-RELIANCE’, 1864-1865

extensive scheme of confiscation, road-making, &c., contemplated by Ministers (in which I do not know whether you concur or not) is to be carried out, I think we ought to apply for reinforcements’.?°

The system of ‘double government’ from which Weld had sought to escape became a species of ‘treble government’, in which Grey found himself struggling with his responsible ministers on the one

hand and an obstinate, uncooperative General on the other. His conduct in these circumstances tended to be hesitant and cunning rather than firm and straightforward. On 30 December, Weld, Fitzherbert and Richardson went off to Wellington, the new capital, leaving the other ministers to follow a month or so later, but Grey

refused to leave the north, first on the pretext that the escaped prisoners demanded his attention, then because he expected a peace

delegation from the Waikato chiefs. He avoided ministers by spending much time at Kawau, and deferred discussion of the Taranaki situation till Weld had left and he had only Sewell, Atkinson and Mantell to deal with. These three protested against the scale of Cameron’s preparations and reiterated that the troops must not be detained, as the colony had not the means to pay for them.®° Grey retorted that this was inconsistent with their having recommended the Wanganui campaign, and seemed not to take their views about the return of the troops seriously, whereupon Atkinson stated categorically that ministers were not prepared to advise any operations which might detain the troops or require reinforcements.*! Grey tried hard to shake ministers’ decision, and desired to know how they proposed to organise the defence of the colony without the British troops. Sewell and Atkinson accordingly sketched out a plan for raising a force of 1,500 armed constabulary, which was to operate under the command of the Colonial Government. The cost, estimated at about £150,000 a year, would have to come out of the £3,000,000 loan. *”

Grey queried this proposal on financial grounds and did his utmost to persuade them not to let the present opportunity slip. _ The Taranaki campaign was essential, the troops were available, they should not pay much attention to the petulant old General; and he hinted that, if they followed a moderate line of native policy which he could approve, the Home Government would probably not insist upon payment. ‘The old story of the Tempter’, wrote 29 Cameron to Grey (private) 5 Jan 1865, ibid. 80 Sewell memo. 3 Jan 1865, AJ 1865 Ar. 31 Atkinson memo. 6 Jan 1865, AJ 1865 Aq p. 2; cf NZPD 1865 pp. 327 seq. 32 Sewell Journal 7 Jan 1865; Weld minute 20 March 1865, AJ 1865 Ar.

523

SIR GEORGE GREY : Sewell. ‘It ended in our agreeing to withdraw our Minute.’* Grey

wrote to London for permission to recruit 1,500 men from the British regiments to form the new colonial force,34 and meanwhile

ministers understood that the Wanganui campaign would be conducted on the economical lines recommended by Atkinson.

A week later in the Executive Council (14 January) Cameron upset these arrangements by insisting that the Waikato could not be held except by the regulars, laughing at the idea of 1,500 colonials

being of any use at all, calling Atkinson’s plan of operations at Wanganui utterly impracticable, and dilating on his favourite theme

that the war was being fought for profit.25 Ministers felt helpless when the General Officer Commanding gave military advice of this

sort. They had drafted a proclamation announcing that the Government would take possession of a strip of coast 10 miles wide from north of Waitara to Wanganui and Grey had approved it, but Cameron objected saying that confiscation on this scale would cause general war and compel him to ask the War Office for more troops. Grey showed no disposition to defend his ministers’ views and gave way on the point of confiscation, being satisfied for the time being to confiscate only a smaller area, known as Middle Taranaki, lying

west of the Waitara-Waimate track behind Mount Egmont.*é Grey’s double-dealing at this stage was most unfortunate. He was

putting his ministers in a false position by inducing them to recommend the employment of British troops, which they could not

afford, on the specious pretence that the Imperial Government, } despite all it had said, would not in fact insist on payment. He had no good reason to believe that Cardwell would relent, and if he really hoped he would his judgment was gravely at fault. Even if the expectation had been reasonable, his argument was self-contradictory. The indispensable condition of this hypothetical British generosity would be, as Grey himself said, moderation towards the defeated rebels, which could only mean abstention from large-scale confiscation. But the whole object of the campaign was to effect the

permanent subjection of the country by military settlement. If confiscation was to be abandoned, ministers were being put in the ridiculous position of recommending a campaign to annex the

territory, and giving up the territory to evade payment for the campaign. 83 Sewell Journal 7 Jan 1865; Grey to Cameron (private) 7 Jan 1865, AJ 1865

4 Poe (16) 7 Jan 1865, CO 209/185. 35 Sewell Journal 14 Jan 1865. 36 N. 3 ir yg,

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OPPOSITION, 1879-1890 Anglo-Saxon race . . . determine that a certain thing shall not take place, no other nation can go to war with them.”°

The New Zealand Parliament chose Sir George Grey, Sir Harry Atkinson and Captain W. R. Russell to represent the colony

in the Federal Convention which met at Sydney in March and April 1891. In January, however, Grey became seriously ill in mind and body,*! his life was despaired of, and his friend and biographer W. L. Rees prematurely delivered a valedictory oration in the House lamenting that a noble public career was evidently drawing fast to a close.”* But Grey recovered and his dauntless courage enabled him to make the trip to Sydney despite his doctor’s prognostications. Accompanied by his niece Mrs. 8. T. George and her eldest daughter Julia, he sailed on the Tarawera (24 February) and was given a tremendous ovation in Australia both as a veteran statesman out of the pages of history and as a great liberal thinker of the present day. Grey was greatly touched by this warm reception which, he said, made him feel as much at home in Sydney as in Christchurch or Dunedin, and he began to entertain a somewhat more favourable view of federation.7®

The Convention’* met in an atmosphere of calm and courteous deliberation—‘men went there to learn and not to dogmatise’?5— but a touch of melodrama was lent to the proceedings by the vanity of the two grand old men of the occasion, Parkes and Grey, each disinclined to defer to the other.”® Parkes, conservative and severely

practical, wanted a close federation on the Canadian model with a strong central executive, a Crown-appointed Governor-General at a salary of £10,000, a nominated upper house, and a powerful lower chamber elected from the colonies in proportion to their population. Grey, cherishing Utopian ideas of a federation of the whole AngloSaxon world,’’ preferred to leave the maximum of power to the colonies and concede only limited authority to the Commonwealth. He found the idea of a nominated British Viceroy with a princely salary highly obnoxious, and moved an amendment in favour of an

elected Governor who might be chosen from the ranks of the colonists themselves. After a warm discussion, the Convention divided and Grey was left alone as the only voter for the ‘ayes’, till 70 Ibid. LXIX 613. 71 Mrs. S. T. George to Miss Isobel Aston 28 June 1897, 20 Jan 1898, GC/APL.

7 28 Jan 1891, NZPD LXX 24. 73 Grey 3 Aug 1891, wbid. LX XIII 55. 74 See Official Report of National Australasian Convention Debates (Sydney 1891) ;

Proceedings, PP 1890-1, LVI 227.

75 Russell 3 Aug 1891, NZPD LXXIII 57. %6 Deakin Federal Story 34. 77 For his resolutions on imperial federation and alliance with U.S.A. see

Onslow’s despatch 21 Aug 1891, AJ 1892 Ai p. 10, and CHBE VII part 2, p. 204.

645

SIR GEORGE GREY

‘the sight of that calm, noble figure, that sorrowful bowed head’ moved Dr. Cockagne and Mr. C. C. Kingston to come and sit with him in a minority of three against thirty-five. 78 Equally objectionable in Grey’s opinion was the proposal to allow the different States to retain their existing franchise laws, which in

some cases permitted plural voting. He protested against this undemocratic survival and pleaded so persistently for the principle of ‘one man one vote’ that T. W. Leys, the editor of the Auckland

Star who was attending the conference on behalf of the New Zealand press, warned him that he was becoming a bore on the subject. 7?

The Convention closed on g April, and Grey spent the next two months journeying round the eastern parts of Australia. His tour developed into a triumphant progress. Adelaide brought back nostalgic memories of half a century ago and the citizens gave him so tumultuous a reception on his seventy-ninth birthday that he was too overcome by emotion to address more than a few faltering words to the crowded Town Hall. But he soon recovered his tongue and, sensing his opportunity, proceeded to harangue the people of Australia much as he had done those of New Zealand in his electoral campaigns of the ’seventies. There was a stirring quality about the eloquence of this frail, old man who stood before his audiences as a living relic of Australia’s pioneering past and a dying prophet of its

future. His simple, forcible advocacy of the basic principles of democracy and social equality had a dramatic appeal and caused a press sensation.8® Momentarily Grey the demagogue eclipsed Parkes

the politician. At Adelaide, Broken Hill and Melbourne, Goulburn, Newcastle and Sydney, the ardent spirit of his will triumphed over his bodily infirmity as he spoke his message to mass meetings of

thousands. He earnestly advocated the doctrine of ‘one man one vote’, imploring the people to ‘subordinate every other question to the attainment of this vital principle of the political equality of all men’,§! and the plea which had failed to move the Convention found

a ready response with the public of both New South Wales and Victoria. His championship of the rights of the working classes and

the trade unions invigorated the Labour movement, and E. J. Houghton expressed the gratitude of the New South Wales Trades and Labour Council for his encouragement. Those words of advice have been quoted by myself and other

of the Labour candidates at many of our meetings, and... . % Rees 432. 79 Reminiscences of T. W. Leys, per Mr. Alan E. Mulgan. 80 Collection of newspaper cuttings in GC/APL. 81 Cit. Rees 436.

646

OPPOSITION, 1879-1890

their effect has been very marked. . . . Indeed, some of our men gave you all the credit. The Australian Federal Convention was the last major political incident of Grey’s career. He returned to New Zealand in June 1891 and reported on his mission in an impressive speech on 3 August.8? But the three nebulous resolutions which he moved in favour of regional federations, imperial federation, and a federation of the English-speaking race were quietly shelved, and Ballance summed up the attitude of the country when he said that ‘from every point of view, the whole weight of the argument is against New Zealand entering into any Federation except a Federation with the Mothercountry’.®4 82 FE. J. Houghton to Grey go June 1891, GC/APL.

83 NZPD LXXIII 49 seq. 84 Ibid, 71.

647

CHAPTER 42

Last Years, 1891-1898

| Horei Kerei, Aue! Ka nui matou aroha ki a koe. In April 1892 Grey celebrated his eightieth birthday. The occasion was marked by the publication of his Life and Times, written from his own notes and reminiscences by W. L. Rees and his daughter Lily Rees. Amongst the many messages of congratulation which he

received was one from J. E. FitzGerald, which so touched the chords of his memory that he replied at length, recalling their early aspirations when as young men they had first become identified with

the fortunes of New Zealand. FitzGerald and his Canterbury Association friends had hoped to reproduce in New Zealand the institutions of the old world with its established churches, its aristocratic structure, its feudal customs.

On the other hand I thought that a new world should be

called into existence, a world freed from established churches, from great inequalities of landed possessions, and of rank— with no standing armies, with equal political rights, and with

facilities for affording to all a complete education. I believe that such a new world would surpass in population and strength the old world, and would even from its inception influence the old world, and compel its rulers to adopt new laws and regu-

lations which the new world had shewn were of a beneficial character. I believe that the tendency of the United States would be

to call such a new world into existence, that the English

language would be the language of the world, and the new race united with England under all ordinary circumstances preserve

the peace of the world. 1 Grey to FitzGerald 31 May 1892, ATL/MSS.

648

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.

LAST YEARS, 1891-1898 His mind still dwelt on great projects, but he was ceasing to be able to stand up to the strain of public life. Late sittings in the House left him so exhausted that he could not read the printed page before him. He told his friend James Coates,

I am at times so worn out and weary, that I long to escape to quietude, but an inner sense of duty compels me in spite of myself to march on.? One by one, his old friends and foes were passing from the scene— Sheehan in 1885, Macandrew two years later, Whitaker and Weld in 1891. Bell, one of his oldest New Zealand friends, retired in the same year. In 1893 Grey made a pilgrimage to the deathbed of the bitterest of all his political opponents, William Fox, that they might part as friends. In the same year, John Ballance died and the choice of the new Premier caused a party crisis. Ballance had hoped to be succeeded

by the polished and proficient Sir Robert Stout, but Stout had not borne his full part in politics since his defeat at the polls in 1887 and was not at the time a member of Parliament. Seddon, who had been acting-Premier during Ballance’s illness, manceuvred to secure his own appointment, and solicited Grey’s advice. Grey, who had never overcome his old dislike of Stout, at once telegraphed back (1 May), |

Do it. You have the capacity; do not shrink. . . . You are acting in a great crisis, such as makes a hero. Act with your Maker for the good of His creatures. . . . Be brave, unselfish, gentle, but resolute for good. Reflect before acting; gain time for thought. The good will soon gather round you.* His strong support influenced the cabinet at the crucial moment, and

2;.

on the same evening Seddon entered upon a thirteen-year term as Prime Minister which lasted till his death in 1906. Grey had passed on the torch of his Liberal faith to his most apt pupil, one who learned from his master’s mistakes as well as from his teachings.

After the 1892 session Grey ceased to appear in Parliament, though he was re-elected for Auckland City in December 1893

and did not formally resign his seat until 1895.* In 1888 the Georges,

who had lived with him at Kawau, found it necessary to reside in Auckland for the sake of their children’s education. Grey was no longer fit to be left alone. He suffered continually from rheumatism, a Grey to Seddon’? May 1893, GC/APL. Sce R. T. Shannon in Hidorica

Studies A.N.Z. viii, 30 (May 1958). 4N.X. Parl. Record 97.

. 649

SIR GEORGE GREY

was prone to fainting fits, and sometimes became violently excited for days on end.® So he sold his beloved Kawau® and came to live

with the family at St. Stephen’s Avenue. But he could not settle down. Inactivity chafed and fretted him, the social amenities of club

life did not appeal to him,’ and he became thoroughly miserable except when he could forget himself in the company of children. Early in 1894, yielding to a sudden whim, he slipped quietly away

to Wellington without revealing his intentions, and took ship for England with the idea of seeing Queen Victoria again before he died. Her Majesty received him graciously and honoured the devoted old man by investing him as a Privy Councillor.® ‘The Queen, observing his infirmity, intimated that he need not kneel before her, but Grey

gallantly if unsteadily insisted on going through the perilous performance of genuflexion. The act is symbolic of his whole career:

his duty to his Queen must be done, even though she expressly forbade it.®

William Gisborne, one-time member of the 1877-9 ministry now in retirement in Derbyshire, speculated on what Grey’s return to England might mean. Fancy your G.O.M. Sir George Grey being here. . . . People in England, I think, hardly as yet realise what he has been and

what he is. . . . I wonder if he may be induced to remain in England and to take a Peerage. Stranger things have happened. It is possibly on the cards that even at his advanced age he may, if a general election takes place soon, be elected as a

Home Ruler in Ireland. There is no doubt that if between twenty or thirty years ago he had remained in England he

would now have been a great political factor in Parliament. ... He and Gladstone have a great many popular qualities in common. It would have been an interesting study, if they had both been in England together during the last 25 years to see their relative evolutions in political life.'° Possibly Grey cherished ambitions of this sort. For some weeks, London lionised him, and he engaged in a round of public functions, visiting the House of Lords, addressing members of the House of

Commons on the Samoan question, presiding at a missionary conference, and holding forth at the National Liberal Club on 5 Isobel Aston 19 Oct 1897, GC/APL. 6 Lands and Deeds Registry office, Auckland, LT 46/254, 15 May 1888. 7 The late Sir Algernon Thomas used to say that Professor Aldis and himself were the only people in the Northern Club who ever spoke to Grey.

8 Auckland Star 27 April, 3 May 1897. 9 Milne 6.

10 W. Gisborne to R. A. Edwin 20 April 1894, ATL/MSS.

650 —

LAST YEARS, 1891-1898 imperial federation and colonial self-government. His speech on this last occasion was a remarkably prescient anticipation of the position of the Commonwealth in the mid-twentieth century.

Let them leave to the men of every portion of the Empire the power of self-government, and let the whole body be bound in one great agreement to stand together in all common objects, to endeavour to instil nothing but lofty thoughts into the officers of Government in different parts of the world, and to educate

mankind to fulfil the duties which must be performed in the 2oth century. That could all be accomplished by local selfgovernment. (Cheers.). . . Already the colonies possessed those powers of self-government, and very little was required to make the United States and themselves absolutely one people for all

great common objects. (Loud cheers.) Virtually at the present moment they were united with those States, and might be said already to have entered into a compact with them, unwritten and unspoken, and yet recognised, that all their differences

should be determined by arbitration. War now appeared

impossible between these two great nations.11

Declining health, if nothing else, forbade any more energetic participation in politics than the writing of articles to the press, and failing sight and intermittent attacks of rheumatism made even this

much difficult. He found a Good Samaritan in the person of Miss Isobel Aston, who used to come daily to his rooms in Park Place, Kensington, to read to him, write for him, and minister to his personal comfort. Here too came the impressionable young journalist James Milne, of the Daily Chronicle, to spend many fascinated evenings by the fireside listening to Grey’s recollections, which he subsequently published under the title of The Romance of a Pro-Consul (1899). Grey’s memory was fertile rather than reliable,

and though the spirit of the man shines truly enough through Milne’s narrative, the record of events is sadly distorted by forgetfulness and invention. Grey’s English relatives became very concerned about the problem of his care and accommodation. His niece, Mrs. Augusta Campbell, thought that some of his kinsfolk ought to take entire charge of him and look after his money, as he was becoming unbusinesslike, but

he had been out of England so long that he had become almost a stranger. ‘I have asked them all round’, she told Isobel Aston, ‘and no one will even offer to pay him a visit. Any one who went to him 11 Times, 19 June 1894. See also Times Weekly 13 April—-22 June 1894, Auckland Star 25 April-3 May 1894, Contemporary Review vol. Ixvi (1894) pp. 192 seq.

651

SIR GEORGE GREY

would have a hard life of course.’!* His cousin Lord Stamford intervened at one stage to prevent Grey from becoming involved in an unwise speculation in New Zealand gold-mining shares. +% Then unexpectedly Lady Grey, whom Sir George had not seen since their abrupt parting at Rio de Janeiro in 1859, announced that

she thought it was her duty to return to him; Lord Stamford and Miss Aston acted as friendly mediators, and a reconciliation was effected in October 1896.14 The press romanticized the affair and waxed sentimental about these two sad, lonely people coming together again in the evening of their lives;!° it was even reported (quite erroneously) that Queen Victoria had been responsible for their reconciliation. In fact, the arrangement worked badly from start to finish. Thirty-seven years of separation was a big gap to be bridged, and their temperaments had never been compatible. Lady Grey unwisely pressed for an immediate financial settlement, Grey became suspicious and irritable on the subject, and the excitement made them both ill. Lord Stamford’s well-meant efforts to make the peace did not help. Letters from New Zealand disclosed that Grey had apparently dissipated his whole fortune on his Kawau home; the sale of the property in 1888 had realised only £12,000, and in 1896 his bank account amounted to only £5,000, the interest on which barely covered his living expenses. Lord Stamford was disagreeably surprised, Mrs. Constance Orr (another of Grey’s nieces) was frankly incredulous, and Grey was subjected to a good deal of anxiety about the whole business.16 His reduced resources would not permit him to do more than rent a rather cramped suite of rooms at the Norfolk

Hotel, South Kensington, and (according to Mrs. Campbell) Lady Grey resented the lack of luxury and became overbearing.?’ In the early part of 1897, the situation had deteriorated dreadfully. Grey had a succession of serious illnesses, he suffered from delusions,

his speech became unintelligible, there was talk of committing him

to an asylum, and three times his doctors despaired of his life. Miss Lavinia Coates, sister of his friend Sir James Coates, came to look after him, and Lady Grey was induced to go off for a while to Bournemouth to relieve him of the excitement of her presence.!®

In June, he had recovered sufficiently to get about again in a 12 Mrs. A. Campbell to Isobel Aston (n.d.), GC/APL. 13 Letters of Lord Stamford 27 Sep 1896, J. Martin, and J. W. Colmer 31 Oct

1896, GC/APL. 14 Lord Stamford 15 Oct 1896, Mrs. A. Campbell 19 Oct 1896, Annie George 6 Dec 1896, ibid.

15 Cf. Henderson 266. 16 Aston letters, GC/APL. 17 Mrs. A. Campbell 2 Aug 1897, GC/APL. 18 Auckland Star 6, 20 May 1897; Aston letters, GC/APL.

652

LAST YEARS, 1891-1898 bath-chair, and on one of his first outings, faithfully attended by Miss Aston, he called at the Hotel Cecil on Seddon who had come to attend the Queen’s Jubilee. After a long and heartfelt talk, the New Zealand Prime Minister picked up his fragile guest in his arms and tenderly carried him out to his coach.!® A few weeks later (24 July)

Seddon repaid the call, and that evening at a press dinner at the Cecil he recalled Sir George’s last words to him as he took his leave.

Give my kind wishes to the people of New Zealand, and may God take you into His keeping.?° From this time, Grey’s condition became steadily worse. For some months before his death, his mind failed him completely, and when

Lady Grey suddenly died early in September 1898 he could not comprehend what had happened. His own end came mercifully at last on the evening of 19 September 1898. On 26 September, he was

buried in state at St. Paul’s Cathedral.?1 Of the many tributes to his memory, none was more poignant than the message from the Maori people. Horei Kerei, Aue! Ka nui matou aroha ki a koe. (George

Grey, alas! Great was our love for thee.)

Soldier, explorer and administrator, man of letters and science,

thinker and dreamer, autocrat and demagogue, politician and

political prophet—Grey stands out as one of the most remarkable colonial figures of the Victorian age. So much in his make-up and in

his early career bore promise of greatness. He had talents and virtues above the ordinary—the gift of oratory, great energy of body

and mind, worthy ideals, dauntless courage, phenomenal strength of purpose, and a selfless devotion to duty. Intellectually he combined quick perception with a serious, reflective turn of mind, and showed a marked capacity for bold speculative thinking, prompt

decision, and fearless execution. Fortune favoured him with exceptional opportunities, and for many years he had almost unquestioned power to experiment with his ideas in new communities

still young enough to be moulded by the master-hand. Yet, in the event, his successes—some of which were real, others a little spurious

—were overshadowed by his failures. Grey blamed adverse circumstances—the resistance of the vested interests which he

threatened, the calumnies of jealous critics, the stupid officiousness 19 Auckland Star 15 July 1897; Drummond 306. 20 J. Milne 25 July 1897, GC/APL. 21 "The funeral was arranged by the Agents of the Colonial Governments under

whom Grey had served, but the bill was sent to S. T. George to be paid out of the small estate of £800 which Grey left. Aston letters GC/APL. Times 27 Sep 1898.

653

SIR GEORGE GREY

_ of the uncomprehending authorities under whom he worked. But the chief obstacles to his success were his own inward failings

—flaws in his thinking, errors in his judgment, and above all certain moral defects in his character which (as Pember Reeves said) ‘made him almost impossible’. His thinking was rash. Though he valued scholarship, he was not by habit scholarly. He collected books but did not study them much,

preferring to gather his ideas easily from conversations and correspondence with other people, rejecting those arguments which did not agree with his own preconceptions, and modifying what he accepted to suit his own thought. There was a superficial brilliance

about his reasoning, and he spoke and wrote with wonderful persuasiveness, but his flair for quick generalisation often led him to reduce complicated situations to an artificial simplicity. He rarely

analysed problems systematically or impartially, but thought his way quickly to conclusions which he adopted as articles of faith and defended with magnificent disregard for facts. His method is well exemplified by his 1840 report on the civilisation of native peoples, which was based on the Aborigines Report of 1837, modified in the

light of his own brief but vivid acquaintance with the West Australian aborigines, and presented in the form of a few simple principles of policy which he prescribed as a specific remedy for all occasions. It was clever, cogent, and naively optimistic. ‘Twenty or thirty more years of experience might have taught him the errors of

his diagnosis and prescription, yet Grey never seriously modified his first-formed views on the subject. As he told the Maori chiefs in 1845, he never altered what he once said. His mind closed too quickly on certainties, and there was more of the dogmatism of the doctrinaire in his attitude than the wisdom of the philosopher or the intelligent realism and flexible opportunism of the statesman. Time and again, his romantic imagination built up great castles

of fancy on the relatively scanty foundations supplied by his knowledge and reason. He was, in fact, a perfectibilist of the eighteenth-century type handling nineteenth-century facts and anticipating twentieth-century conclusions. Confronted with the squalor and depravity of life of the Australian aborigines, the New Zealand Maoris, and the teeming tribes of South Africa, he thought in terms of fundamental reform and sudden and complete social regeneration. In New Zealand, his vision of an equalitarian society peopled by ‘the unborn millions’ came near to blinding him to the present necessities of the existing generation. His South African

programme was almost as startling and prophetic as that of Umhlazaki himself. Nothing would satisfy him short of the 654

LAST YEARS, 1891-1898

destruction of the Kafir tribal system, the scrapping of the Boer Conventions, federation, and a revolutionary policy which would merge blacks and whites into one harmonious people governed by an indigenous race of enlightened statesmen.

What made Grey such a ‘terrible and fatal man’, in Tancred’s trenchant phrase, was that he combined romantic idealism with a fierce determination to carry his ideas into immediate practice. He was both dreamer and man of action. As a boy, he rebelled against the classical discipline of his Guildford school by running away. As a subaltern still in his ’teens, he formally protested against flogging,

and not long afterwards abandoned soldiering to go in search of new lands on which to settle the Irish people. Grey himself put his finger on the critical trait of his character when he wrote in 1838, ‘I am daily becoming more prudent, less presumptuous’. But he could never change his nature. He successfully curbed his impetuosity in South Australia, because as a junior official on probation he had to move circumspectly to

confirm the favour of Whitehall. Success fed his self-assurance, praise flattered his self-esteem, and he came to New Zealand in 1845 arrogantly self-confident and disposed to make maximum use of the large discretion necessarily permitted to him at so great a distance from the seat of authority. His energetic and sensible administration rescued New Zealand from disorder and set it on the road to security and stability. His reputation for efficient management of the settlers’ affairs and for skill in the handling of the Maori people was well deserved. But his sense of personal power encouraged him to dangerous courses, and his fixed ideas on public questions led him into errors which, rather than admit, he persisted in and prevaricated about. He let his dislike of the missionary landbuyers, of land-speculators generally, and of the New Zealand Company and the Canterbury Association, lead him into partisan decisions which he bolstered up by the unscrupulous devices of disparagement and misrepresentation. He justified his views on native policy and the need to defer representative government by assertions and arguments which strained the truth. There was an underlying sincerity of purpose in what he did and he was motivated

by considerations of public welfare not of private gain, but his outlook was warped by the intensity of his beliefs and by his ruthless

determination to get his own way. In South Africa, he overreached himself. There is something pathetically naive as well as tragically heroic about his belief that within the space of six or seven years he could change the course of history, civilise the Kafirs, humanise the European frontiersmen,

x 655

SIR GEORGE GREY |

pacify the border, unify South Africa, and reconcile the British Government and Parliament to a system which was the very reverse of that which they had just decided upon. Egotistically, he was so

convinced of the correctness of his own views that he could not conceive how any right-minded person could raise valid objection, and supposed that the opposition he experienced arose from the

folly and jealousy of lesser men than himself. Fortified by this belief, he persisted in going his own way despite instructions, trusting that success would justify his conduct. But success eluded him, and his

frantic efforts to perform great deeds with inadequate means only wore out his nerves and undermined the confidence of the British Government in his capacity.

: The Grey who came back to New Zealand in 1861 was a changed man, bitter, disappointed, his self-confidence sadly shaken by his African experiences. From the first, he was enveloped in an atmosphere of mistrust and double-dealing. He had little confidence in his London superiors, nor had they much in him. His relations with his

ministers, with the General Assembly, and with the colonists at large were strained and guarded. Too long accustomed to thinking for himself and acting on his own, he found it galling to have to work in constitutional fetters, and never learnt the knack of explaining his

intentions frankly and winning approval for his plans. The Cape

politicians had gladly given him a free hand to deal with the frontier problem at Britain’s expense, his General had been entirely amenable to his direction, and he had had only the distant officials of

Downing Street to contend with. But in New Zealand he found himself curbed by his responsible advisers, checked and thwarted by the Assembly, criticised by his own General, and narrowly watched from Westminster. To avoid or to overcome opposition, he practised deceptions which only increased the suspicion with which he was regarded. Moreover, his professions of benevolence no longer carried

conviction with the Maoris, their rejection of his peace terms compelled him against his real wishes to resort to war, and he found himself committed to a policy of coercion and confiscation which he did not fully approve but which he could not control. His

convictions were at war with themselves, his inner conflicts of conscience put an intolerable strain on his overwrought nerves, his

judgment became confused, his temper uncontrolled, and he allowed himself to become embroiled in arguments and recriminations which reduced policy to confusion and ended in his dismissal. That he should have returned to political life in 1874 after such a

breakdown and such a public disgrace is a tribute to his superb courage and devotion to duty. Grey was a man who never accepted 656

LAST YEARS, 1891-1898

defeat. ‘Feeble and ill [he might be], and sometimes depressed; but he was never daunted, and he never knew when he was beaten.’22

Courage, it has been said, is the great virtue. Grey had both the physical courage to risk his life bravely, and the moral courage which

enables a man ‘to stake his career, happiness, his whole future on his judgment of what he thinks either right or worthwhile’.2 But he lacked the higher and rarer form of moral courage, the courage to admit himself in error and change his course, and that moral failing was responsible for the twist in his character that diverted him from the truth, aggravated the inner conflicts of his mind, precipitated outward conflicts with other people, and barred the way to greater

achievement. | Yet, m those last twenty courageous years of his active life, Grey

found his true vocation, that of the public orator and the political prophet. He was too ardent and too idealistic to be a successful practical politician, and his short-lived prime-ministership was a fiasco. But his radical beliefs, his vivid political imagination, and his unwavering faith that the welfare of the people must prevail foretold

the future, and by foretelling it helped to implant conviction and thus make it capable of realisation. New Zealand’s present-day democracy and welfare state is his debtor. It is worth remembering, however, that Grey thought in terms of moral as well as material welfare, and fought a life-long battle against the corruption and degradation of politics that come from the pursuit of personal profit. Though he were a minority of one, he might still rise in his place and say again as he said in 1884: The corruption that takes place consists of members coming up here to insist on money for their constituencies; there is the thing. 22 Scobie Mackenzie, 28 Jan 1891, NZPD LXXI 26. #3 Field-Marshal Sir William J. Slim Courage and Other Broadcasts (1957) p. 6.

657

Chronology of Principal Events in Sir George Grey’s Career

6 April 1812 Lieutenant-Colonel G. Grey killed at Badajoz. 14 April 1812 George Grey born at Lisbon.

1826-1829 At Royal Military College, Sandhurst.

14 January 1830 Commissioned ensign in 83rd Foot Regiment.

1830 Went to Ireland with his Regiment.

1833 Promoted Lieutenant.

10 January 1836 Re-entered Sandhurst, senior department. 5 November 1836 Obtained certificate and special commendation.

5 July 1837 Sailed from Plymouth for Western Australia. 2 December 1837 Commenced exploring at Hanover Bay. 11 February 1838 Wounded in conflict with aborigines.

17 April 1838 Sailed from Hanover Bay for Mauritius. 1839

17 February Left Fremantle on second expedition to N.W. Australia.

20 March Commenced return from Shark Bay to Perth.

31 March Wrecked at Gantheaume Bay. 21 April Arrived back at Perth. 24 August Appointed Resident Magistrate at Albany, King George’s Sound.

2 November Married Eliza Lucy, daughter of the late Sir Richard Spencer. 1840

March Returned to Perth, and thence to Adelaide. 11 April Sailed from Adelaide for England.

20 October Appointed GOVERNOR OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA. , 1841

5, January Sailed from England.

16 February Son, George, born at sea.

10 May Arrived at Adelaide. 15 May Assumed office as Governor. : 659

SIR GEORGE GREY

8 June Repudiated liability for Governor Gawler’s debts. June O’Halloran’s police expedition against aborigines. 25 July Son died, aged 5 months. 20 August Reduced scale of poor relief. August Further conflicts with aborigines. September Appointed Eyre Protector at Moorunde. 1842

20 June Reprimanded for drawing bills on Treasury.

July Increased customs tariff, shipping dues, and pasturage fees.

30 July South Australia Government Act. 1843

20 June First session of new Legislative Council. 17 November Regulations for annual pastoral leases. 1844

April seq. Agitation for representative government. April-May Excursion to southern districts of colony. August seq. Sturt’s Central Australian expedition. 1845

31 January Revised scheme of pastoral leases.

ZEALAND.

13 June Appointed LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR OF NEW

26 October Left Adelaide for New Zealand. 14, November Arrived at Auckland. 18 November Assumed office. 28 November Met Maori chiefs at Kororareka. 1846

11 January Ruapekapeka captured. 22 January Peace terms issued. 12 February seg. §_ Visited Wellington and Wanganui. 2 April Gillespie murders at Lower Hutt. 16 May Skirmish at Boulcott’s farm. 16 June Skirmish at Mabey’s farm. 25 June ‘Blood and money’ despatch on missionary

| 660 lands.

23 July Arrest of Te Rauparaha.

15 September Trial and execution of Te Wareaitu.

CHRONOLOGY OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS 1847

26 February seg. Visited Taranaki.

18 April Gilfillan murders at Wanganui. 3 May Recommended suspension of parts of the 1846

Constitution Act.

30 November New constitution proclaimed. Grey became

| 1848

GOVERNOR-IN-CHIEF.

3 January seq. Tour of colony—Bay of Islands, Wellington,

Wanganui, Nelson, Port Chalmers, Taranaki.

April seq. Wiremu Kingi’s migration to Taranaki.

12 June Kemp’s South Island purchase.

15 August seq. Established Executive Council of New Munster.

September seq. Settlers’ agitation for representative government.

18 November Invested K.C.B. (Civil Division).

November Provincial Councils Ordinance.

21 December New Munster Legislative Council opened. 28 December Visited Nelson; Waitohi purchase. 1849

15 May McLean’s Rangitikei purchase. 17 July Recommended cheap land policy.

5 December seq. Overland journey from Auckland to Rotorua. 1850

January-March Visited ‘Taupo and Taranaki.

5 July Surrender of New Zealand Company’s charter. 19 November seg. Visit to Otago, Auckland Is., Akaroa, Lyttelton.

1851

14 February Visited Nelson.

19 May seq. Session of Legislative Council at Wellington. 1852

10 April seq. Visit to Christchurch. 30 June N.Z. Constitution Act (15 & 16 Vict. c. 72).

30 July Applied for leave of absence. 1853

17 January New constitution proclaimed. ,

4. March Issued cheap land regulations. 661

SIR GEORGE GREY

g March Encounter with Gibbon Wakefield. 30 March Judgment in Dorset v. Bell. g May Stopped payment of Auckland share of N.Z. Company’s debt. 1 August Mantell’s Murihiku purchase.

8 August seq. Financial circulars to Provinces. 18 August seq. Tour of Wairarapa.

8 November seg. Sailed with Bishop Selwyn to New Caledonia and Norfolk Island. 31 December Nailed from Auckland for England. 1854

25 May Appointed GOVERNOR OF CAPE COLONY AND , HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR SOUTH AFRICA.

5 December Arrived at Cape Town.

17 December War scare on eastern frontier. 22 December Outlined new native policy.

| 1855 ,

January-February Visited Eastern Province and British Kaffraria.

7 March Proposed British pensioner settlements. 15 March Opened session of Cape Parliament.

June Burgher Defence Force bill amended.

12 August British Government rejected pensioner proposal. September Revisited frontier and introduced magistrates scheme.

5-6 October Mediated between Orange Free State and the Basuto.

October-November Visited Natal. 1856

March Proposed £200,000 immigration loan.

March Grey Hospital, King William’s Town, founded. April Renewed Basuto disturbances; Grey requested additional troops.

June-July Revisited frontier to prepare for arrival of German Legion.

June — Beginnings of Kafir cattle-killing delusion.

July - Grey Institute, Port Elizabeth, founded. 23 July Warned Free State and Basutoland against hostilities. 5 August War scare on Cape frontier. 16 August Plans for dealing with Kafir excitement. 18 August seg. Revisited frontier. 662

CHRONOLOGY OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS

28 August Instituted Native Police Force in British Kaffraria.

6-16 September Interviews chiefs. with principal British Kaffrarian

18 September Arrival of reinforcements; revised military dispositions.

27 September Warnings to Sandile, Kreli and Moshesh. 20 December Recommended federation as solution of Free State problem.

December Kafir relief scheme brought into operation. 1857

January Arrival of German Legion.

January M. W. Pretorius elected President of Transvaal. 18 February The day of the prophecy; Kafir war scare. February seq. Revisited frontier district; Michel’s alarming military report.

3 March Martial law proclaimed in British Kaffraria. 25 March Proposed scheme of German civil immigration.

23 April Following Pretorius’ ‘invasion’ of the Free State, Grey revived his federation proposals.

May Arrest of Umfundisi and others.

25 May Labouchere rejected federation proposal. 5 June Labouchere disapproved German civil immigration. 6 August News of Indian Mutiny reached Cape Town. 18 August War Office complained of German Legion being kept mobilised. 19 August Grey completed arrangements with Godeffroy’s for German immigration.

24 August seq. Currie’s commando against Fadana.

26 August Labouchere ordered six regiments from Cape to India.

August Grey proposed £1,000,000 loan for Cape Town harbour.

September Arrest of Maqomo; Sandile’s submission. 5, November Grey demurred at orders for removal of six regiments.

1 December Arrest of Pato. 1858

February Further troops sent from Cape to India.

5 February War Office declined to replace troops sent from Cape.

5 February Regulations for village settlements and taxation in British Kaffraria. 663

SIR GEORGE GREY

11 February seg. |§ Expulsion of Kreli from Transkei.

March Portion of native locations in British Kaffraria confiscated. 19 March War between Free State and Basuto. 25 March Grey proclaimed neutrality of the Cape. 4. May Stanley reprimanded Grey over the Godeffroy contract.

5 May British Kaffrarian grant reduced. 6 May Military collapse of Free State; proposals for union with Transvaal.

3 June Grey intervened to prevent union of Free State and Transvaal.

23 June Grey inquired whether his resignation was expected.

July: Parliamentary committee criticised Grey re despatch of troops to India.

20 August Visited Bloemfontein.

6 September Lytton requested Grey’s views on federation. 14 September seg. Mediation between Free State and Basuto: talks on federation.

29 September Treaty of Aliwal North. 5 November Lytton ordered Grey not to discuss federation with the Free State without further instructions.

19 November Grey’s federation despatch.

15 December Treasury refused to increase the British Kaffrarian grant.

17 December Free State Volksraad approved overtures for _ federation with Cape. 1859

January seq. Dispute with Colonial Office over Southey’s appointment as Attorney General.

11 February Lytton rejected Grey’s proposals to resume sovereignty over the Free State.

5 March Lytton again warned Grey not to commit himself concerning federation.

16 March Grey raised the federation question in Cape Parliament. 18 March Treasury complained of excess expenditure in British Kaffraria.

31 March Commencement of construction of Cape TownWellington railway.

4 June Grey censured and recalled.

20, 31 July Grey’s defence of his proceedings.

4 August Newcastle cancelled Grey’s recall. 21 August Grey left Cape Town for England. 664

CHRONOLOGY OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS 1860

April Sailed from England for South Africa. 13 June Separated from his wife.

4 July Arrived at Simon’s Bay.

14. July seq. Prince Alfred’s visit to South Africa.

3 August Proposed extension of native system throughout Kaffraria. September Visited Natal with Prince Alfred. 22 October British Kaffraria created a separate province. 1861

17 January Offered to return to New Zealand.

February-March Ccurrie’s mission to Kaffrarian chiefs.

May-June Shepstone’s mission to Zululand; recognition of Cetywayo.

25 May Newcastle invited Grey to return to New Zealand. July | Natal alarmed by Zulu threat. 15 August Grey sailed from Cape Town for New Zealand. 26 September Arrived at Auckland.

3 October Sworn in aS GOVERNOR OF NEW ZEALAND.

4. November Plan of native institutions agreed to by Fox Ministry.

4-14. November Visited Bay of Islands and Hokianga. 9-17 December Visited ‘Tuakau and Taupari (Lower Waikato).

19 December Ordered completion of the Waikato road. 1862

14 July General Assembly met at Wellington. 29 July Resignation of Fox ministry. 6 August Domett Ministry formed. (Reconstructed 23 August.)

25, November Purchased Kawau.

1863 :

I-10 January Visited Taupiri and Ngaruawahia.

4. March Visited New Plymouth. 12 March Omata block reoccupied.

19-20 March Fracas at Kohekohe. 24 March Gorst ordered to leave Te Awamutu. (Left 17 April.)

4 April Tataraimaka block reoccupied. 18 April Ngatimaniapoto war-party left Waikato for Taranaki. 22 April Grey proposed to abandon Waitara. 665

SIR GEORGE GREY

4 May Murders at Oakura.

11 May Proclamation abandoning Waitara. 4 June Fighting commenced at Katikare. Grey returned to Auckland.

g July Maoris expelled from south Auckland district. 12 July Cameron’s troops crossed the Mangatawhiri. 17 July Engagement at Koheroa. 26 July Tamihana took up arms against the Government.

19 October General Assembly met at Auckland.

30 October Domett resigned. Whitaker-Fox Ministry formed.

20 November Battle of Rangiriri. 8 December Ngaruawahia occupied by British troops. 16 December Grey cancelled his projected visit to Ngarua-

| wahia.

1864

21-22 February Capture of Rangiaowhia. 31 March-2 April Battle of Orakau.

6 April Captain Lloyd’s party ambushed. 15-16 April Grey visited Pukerimu in the Waikato. 29 April Battle of Gate Pa, Tauranga. May Dispute with ministers concerning peace terms. 21 June Battle of Te Ranga, Tauranga.

5-6 August Grey received surrender of rebels at Tauranga. 30 September Whitaker-Fox ministry tendered its resignation.

26 October Grey proclaimed terms of peace on his own authority.

24, November General Assembly met at Wellington. Weld Ministry formed.

17 December Waikato confiscation proclamation. 1865

5 January ‘Taranaki-Wanganui campaign ordered.

25 January Skirmish at Nukumaru. 25, February Battle of Jerusalem.

27 February Cardwell ordered the return of five regiments.

2 March Murder of Rev. C. 8. Volkner at Opotiki. 1 April Peace terms proclaimed. 22 April Proclamation against Hauhaus.

May Open quarrel between Grey and General Cameron.

27 May Submission of Wiremu Tamihana. 22 July Capture of Weraroa pa. Fulloon murdered at Whakatane. 26 July General Assembly met at Wellington.

666

CHRONOLOGY OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS ©

2 September Peace proclamation. 4 September Martial law proclaimed at Bay of Plenty. 21 September Murder of Kereti at Weraroa.

1 October Murder of Broughton.

11 October Stafford Ministry replaced that of Weld. October-December Bay of Plenty and Hawke’s Bay campaigns by colonial troops.

27 November Cardwell ordered reduction of N.Z. forces to three regiments. 1866

January-February General Chute’s West Coast campaign.

March-May Grey visited Hawke’s Bay, East Cape, Bay of Plenty and Rotorua, Raglan and Hamilton.

13 June Minute on atrocities reported by Colonel Weare.

June Renewal of Hauhau disturbances at Patea, Pokaikai.

2 October Attack on Pungarehu. 12 October Hauhau raid on Napier.

1 November Carnarvon censured Grey concerning Weare’s correspondence.

1 December Carnarvon censured Grey over retention of troops. December Grey’s tour of the central districts of North Island.

1867

January-February Grey visited South Island. January-March Renewed fighting in Tauranga district.

18 June _ Buckingham notified Grey of his dismissal. 1868

5 February Relinquished Governorship. Retired to Kawau.

April-May Visit of Prince Alfred to N.Z.

g September Grey sailed from N.Z. for England via Panama.

. 1869 April Address to Royal Society on ‘Maori Sagas’.

November Pamphlet on ‘The Irish Question’.

March Candidate in Newark by-election.

November Returned to New Zealand. 1870-74.

In retirement at Kawau. 667

SIR GEORGE GREY 1874

14 October Petition against abolition of Provinces. 1875

24 March. Elected SUPERINTENDENT OF AUCKLAND PROVINCE.

27 March Elected Member of House of Representatives for Auckland City West.

20 July- 5th session of 5th N.Z. Parliament. 24 October

1876

15 June-31 October 1st session of 6th Parliament.

1 November Provincial Governments abolished. 1877

19 July- and session of 6th Parliament. 10 December

8 October Defeat of Atkinson ministry. 15 October Grey took office as PRIME MINISTER.

6 November No confidence motion defeated by Speaker’s casting vote. 1878

January Meeting with King Tawhiao at Te Kopua. 5-11 May Conference with Tawhiao at Hikurang). 20-30 June Meeting with Maori chiefs at Waitara.

26 July-2 November 3rd session of 6th Parliament.

3 October Beer Tax bill defeated.

31 October Electoral bill withdrawn. 1879

2-13 May Failure of negotiations with King Tawhiao.

25 June Maori resistance at Waimate plains. 25 June Resignation of Robert Stout.

1 July Resignation of John Ballance. 11 July-11 August 4th session of 6th Parliament. 29 July Grey defeated on vote of no confidence (47 votes to 34). General Election.

24. September- ist session of 7th Parliament. 19 December 668

CHRONOLOGY OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS

3 October Grey defeated by 43 votes to 41. 8 October Resigned office of Prime Minister. 24. October Desertion of ‘the Auckland Rats’. 1881

12 August- Resisted Hall’s Representation bill (country 2 September quota and plural voting). 1882

April Grey advised Governor to ask Whitaker to form ministry. 1883

15 June seg. Sponsored Confederation and Annexation bill (Pacific Islands) but opposed federation of

: 1884

New Zealand with Australia.

August Grey failed in attempt to form a Liberal Ministry and advised Governor to send for

Atkinson.

1885

3 June Introduced Land for Settlement bill. 1886

15 May Sold Kawau.

1889

5 August Carried amendment in favour of single vote. 1890

January IlIness prevented Grey from participating in New Zealand’s Jubilee. June President of Auckland Anti-Poverty League. 18q1

January-February Serious illness.

March-April Represented New Zealand at Federal Convention, Sydney.

April-May Tour of eastern Australia. 1893

1 May Advised R. J. Seddon to accept office as Prime Minister.

669

SIR GEORGE GREY 1894.

8 March Sailed on Gothic to England.

April Sworn in as Privy Councillor. 1896

October Reconciliation with Lady Grey. 1897

June-July Last meetings with R. J. Seddon

| 1898

5 September Death of Lady Grey.

19 September Grey’s death. :

26 September Burial in St. Paul’s Cathedral.

670

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Grey Manuscript Collections :

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Childe-Pemberton, W. S. Life of Lord Norton (Sir C. B. Adderley) 1814-1905 (1909). Collier, J. Str George Grey, Governor, High Commissioner and Premier, A historical biography (1909). Egerton, H. E. Selected Speeches of Sir Wilkam Molesworth (1903).

Fawcett, Mrs. Life of Sir William Molesworth (1901).

Garnett, R. Edward Gibbon Wakefield (1808). | Grey, H. G. 3rd Earl. Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell’s Admintstration, 2 vols. (1855).

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Milne, J. Zhe Romance of a Pro-Consul; being the Personal Life and Memories of Sir George Grey, K.C.B. (1899). Morison, J. L. British Supremacy and Canadian Self-Government (1919).

Morrell, W. P. British Colonial Policy in the Age of Peel and Russell (1930). O’Connor, I. Edward Gibbon Wakefield (1928). Rees, W. L. and L. Life and Times of Sir George Grey, K.C.B. (1892). Whately, E. J. Life and Correspondence of Richard Whately (1866).

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Chapman, Judge H. S. Letters and Papers 1839-65. ATL. Clarke, G. Letters, etc. HLD, ATL. Clendon, J. R. Letters and Papers. APL. Clifford, Sir C. Papers 1848-54. CM. Coates, Sir J. Papers. ATL. Colenso, Rev. W. Letters. HBM. Dillon, Hon. C. A. Letters 1843-53. ATL. Eyre, E. J. Papers and Notes. GAL. Featherston, Dr. I. E. Papers. GAL. FitzGerald, J. E. Letters 1839-65. ATL. Gisborne, W. Papers. ATL. Gladstone, W. E. Correspondence with J. E. FitzGerald and Sir C. B. Adderley. British Museum Add. MSS 44368.

Godley, J. R. Letters 1848-61. CM, HLD, CUL. Hadfield, Rev. O. Letters to C.M.S. ATL. Hall, Sir J. Letters and Papers. GAL. Lyttelton, Lord. Letters. CM, CUL. McLean, Sir D. Letters and Papers 1842-78. ATL. Mantell, W. B. D. Letters 1842-95. ATL. Masters, J. Autobiography. ATL. Morgan, Rev. J. Letters and Journals 1833-65. ATL. Parkes, Sir H. Miscellaneous Papers. ATL. Richmond, J. C. and J. P. Letters. GAL. Selwyn, Bishop G. A. Letters etc. ATL: Diocese of Auckland. Sewell, H. Private Journal 1853-66. CUL. Sinclair, Dr. A. Letters and Papers 1843-60. GAL. Smith, T. H. Papers. AML. Stafford, Sir E. W. Letters and Papers 1846-92. ATL. Stout, Sir R. Papers. ATL.

Taylor, Rev. R. Journal. ATL, AML. Von Tempsky, Major. War Journal 1863-4. ATL, AML. Wakefield, E. G. Letters. CUL, ATL, WPL, and British Museum Add. MSS 35261. Whitaker, Sir F. Papers. AML. Williams, Archdeacon H., and Bishop W. Letters and Papers.

: AML, ATL, HLD.

Wynyard, General R. H. Letters and Papers. In possession of Mr. M. H. Wynyard of Onehunga N.Z. Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers [Referred to by year of presentation and, where available, Session Paper number. ] 1845—108, 130, 131, 171-2-3 (Confidential), 245, 246, 247, 357, 369, 378, 517-3 and u, 660, 661. 1846—63, 64, 203, 271, 323, 337, 435, 448, 623, 624, 690, 712, 722.

676

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184.7—763, 837; 892.

1848—31, 345, 899, 1002. 1849—86, 268-v, 1063, [unnumbered May 1849], 1120, 1126. 1850—123, 128, 349, 667, 1136, 1280. 1851—369, 372, 430, 595, 605, 614, 667, 1398, 1402, 1420, 1421. 1852—-82 (Confidential), 96 (Confidential), 179, 314, 355-v, 396, 579; 1475; 1476, 1483, 1489, 1499, 1539.

1853—206, 1607, 1684, 1693. : 1854—372, 1779. 1855—160. 1857—145, 171. 1858—100, 2096. 1859—251.

1860—282, 288, 552, 2719, 2747. 1861—423, 1341. 1862—2835, 3040. 1863—112, 177, 467. 1864—0238, 251, 326, 332, 3277, 3304, 3355, 3356, 3380, 3386. 1865—3425, 3455, 3480, 3495, 3525. 1866—50, 3601, 3661, 3695, 3750. 1867—3833. 1868— 40109.

1869—307. 1870—83, 180. 1872—522. 1882—3382. 1883—3689. 1885—4413, 4492, 4521.

New Zealand Journal of the Legislative Council, 1854 seq. Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative Council, 1854 seq. Journal of the House of Representatives, 1854 seq. Appendices to the Fournals of the House of Representatives, 1854 seq. Parliamentary Debates, 1854-98.

Ordinances of New ealand, 1841-9, edited A. Domett (Wellington 1850).

Ordingne of New Kealand, 1841-53 (Wellington 1871). Statutes of the General Assembly, 1854 seq. Statistics of New Zealand, 1853 seq.

New Kealand Government Gazette 1840-7, 1853 seq. New Ulster Government Gazette 1848-53. New Munster Government Gazette 1848-53. New Munster, Annual Blue Books 1848-53. New Ulster, Annual Blue Books 1848-53.

677

SIR GEORGE GREY Bennett, J. B. Statistics of New Zealand for 1853, 1854, 1855, 1856 and

7857 (Auckland 1858). Jourdain, ‘i R. Digest of Land Laws of New Xealand (Wellington 1920). Jourdain W. R. (ed.). Aestory of Land Legislation and Settlement in New Kealand (Wellington 1925). Mackay, A. (ed.). A Compendium of Official Documents relative to Native

Affairs in the South Island, 2 vols. (Wellington 1872-3). Maori Deeds of Land Purchase in the North Island of New Kealand, 2 vols.

(Wellington 1877-8). Plans of Maorn Deeds, North Island, 2 vols. (Wellington 1877-8). New Kealand Official Year Book, 1892 seq.

New Kealand Parliamentary Record (Wellington 1913, 1925, 1950). Scholefield, G. H. New yal.?Marine: 3. Royal 313, 324-6, 367. New165, Zealand, 88, , 101, 106-7, 157, 159, 177, Artillery, 361n., 371, 372, 376, 400n., 8 192, 20 No 2 oo, 22° 256 5s 9 b 9 3 3 > 75 3 bd 401, 412, 435, 540; Royal Engineers, = 458, 460, 463-4, 468, 471, 473, 479,

A 361n., 40" Root Regiments: ane 481, 490, 493, 498, 520, 522, 526-7,

cs °9 359, 3 In., 399, 8 6509, 88591, I 608 61032 6 . 529, 4.13; 539, 599, » O19,

9 5) *9 ’ 5) O, 514, , 550, -8

Rew a0 3.6 ni 377°, sens : th Rogers, Sir Frederic (Lord Blachford),

Regt., 350, 361n., 373, 377, 401; Rellectons WAITEEA an 6 14th Regt., 554,>556-7; 18thOOO, Regt 6 O12, 606. 612. 6: 9203 8 5932 59”: -) 5) 4 02-3, O32, 488, 552; 550-7; 58; 5805 23rd = Rookes, Major Charles Cecil, 536, 537

Ree se} aR cet, 15 4otn Rotorua, 213, 225n., 465, 546, 552, 570 Reet ”, ° 037 ae, 30 i ; tg: Royal Geographical Society, 8

"9 ’ ) ’ , > Royal Society, 584

50th Regt., 457-8, 5545 556-7; Runangas, 180, 457-69, 473, 47735 568-9 57th Regt., 481, 557; 58th Regt., Ruapekapeka, 84, 86-91, 97, 102-3, 20

88n., Reg., 337, 350, R Rick Os 97: 3: 207 9 ’89,9 372; 3 2 6oth ’ usn, KWichard, 100,ar:112 361n., 390, 400n., 412; 65th Regt., Russell (Kororareka), 212, 231, 461 488, 504, 533, 5513 68th Regt., 551; Russell, Col. A. H., 465-6, 539 70th Reg., 533, 5513 73rd Regt., 335, Russell, Lord John, 19-20, 25, 68, 74,

350, 301n-» 390 or j,bom Reet. 240, 250, 317, 404n.

pour? Sues 37h BITS. 40's 31" Russell, Thomas, 475, 478, 484-5, 495Regt., 5» 6, 85; 85th Regt., 359; 496, 513, 519, 539-40, 571-2; 593, 638

361n., 390, 413; Bgth Regt., 350,360, Russell, Capt. (Sir) William Russell, 361n., 372, 377, 400n.; 93rd Regt., 372; 222, 611 95th n. Regt., 372, 377, 401; goth Regt., Russians, 348-9

° ? . ’ ry, 214, 231

Reid, Donald, 592 624 St. Hill. Hen

Reitz, F. W., 294 St. John’s College, Auckland, 113, 158, Representative government: South 219-20, 268, 302 Australia, 24, 45-6, 48, 51, 66; Samoa, 644, 650

New Zeaane> 7°, 142, 143-49 147- Sandhurst, Royal Military College, 150, 150-9, 107, 104, 227, 232, UHAP. 4-5, 85, 538

17, 282, 284, 655. Cape, 291-2, 294-8 Sandile, 307-8, 314, 318, 326, 320, 332, Responsible government: Canada, 240. 335-75 349) 351-45 357, 366, 380, 383,

Cape Colony, 293-5, 417. New 428 Zealand, demand for, 249, 255-6, Saunders, Alfred, 632 , 260, 262-3, 294, 445; native situation Savings banks, 159, 207

a reason for deferment of, 143-4, Schools and Colleges, 4, 655; South

227-8, 249-50; conceded, 143: 4453, ana po. aie transfer of control of Maori affairs, 185,53; 206-7, -23,porate “35 ,

454-7, 471, 473-7, 484, 491, 496, 273, 276, 298, 309, 462, 465, 487, 104

INDEX . Schools and Colleges—(contd.) 459, 460, 553, 560-1, 567-8, 585,

490, 560, 653. South Africa, 302, 304, 590, 595, 616, 654-6. See also under 313, 315, 318-21, 324, 329, 342-3, subject headings, Agriculture, British

345, 346, 3555 393 Kaffraria, Confederation, Defence,

Scott, John, Lieutenant Governor, 344, Kafirs, etc.

433-5 South Australia, 20, CHAPS. 3-7, 119,

Seddon, Richard John, 624, 627, 634, 145, 154-5, 189, 309, 646, 654:

649, 653 Aborigines, 39, 44, 52-61 ; agriculture,

‘Self-Reliance’ policy in New Zealand, 22, 27, 28-9, 34-8, 60-1; cattle- and 471, 516-18, 522, 530-1, 538, 540-1, sheep-farming, 22, 26, 29, 36-40, 56-9;

544-5, 550-7, 567 constitution, 21-2, 24, 44, 45-51, 66;

Selwyn, Bishop George Augustus, 74, emigration, 21-2, 26-9, 34-5, 37, 41-3;

77, 96, 113, 133, 137-8, 140, 158, 67; exploration, 39-40; finance, 20,

169-70, 206, 219, 267, 268, 270, 271, 21-35, 37, 39, 45-8, 50-1, 59, 64, 66;

277, 280, 287, 462, 468, 473, 498, 643 land, 21, 24, 34, 37-8, 42, 67; Sewell, Henry, 143, 200-2, 204, 250, mining, 35, 39, 40-1; population, 258-62, 266, 278, 281-2, 286, 294, 22, 54-5, 56; trade, 29, 34-6, 41, 46,

445n., 453-6, 467, 474-5, 478, 495; 50

497, 517, 523-4, 528, 534-5, 540, South (or Middle) Island, New Zea-

572-4 Jand, go, 107, 163, 173-5, 181-2, 451, 461, 471-2 620, 621, 623, 626, 633

Seymour, Commodore F. Beauchamp, 513, 561, 589, 592, 595-6, 604, 606,

Shark Bay, 14-15, 17 Southern Division, New Zealand, 74,

Shaw, Rev. William, 319 99, 147

Sheehan, John, 569n., 590, 600, 602-3, Southey, (Sir) Richard, 297, 367n.

608-10, 619-20, 623, 649 Southland, 187, 444, 594. See also

Sheep-farming. See Pasture-farming Murihiku Shepherd, Alexander, 155, 280 Spain, William, 74-5, 95, 100-1, 105, Shepstone, (Sir) Theophilus, 344-6, 166, 176, 180

431, 434-5 Speculation, Speculators, 20, 22, 34-5,

Shipping dues, 46, 51 41, 76, 119, 182, 185-6, 189, 199, Ships, 8-9, 13, 14, 19, 45-6, 56, 88, 91, 201-3, 239, 264, 282, 30g-10, 340, 104, 106, 111, 113, 147, 158, 177, 446, 477, 598, 619, 620, 632 209, 224-5, 265, 268-71, 426, 427-8, Spencer, Sir Richard, 18 453, 454, 465, 479-80, 490, 492, Squatters, 37-8, 175, 183, 190-1, 199,

499-501, 505, 542, 564, 586, 606, 610 595 .

Shortland, Lieut. Willoughby, 73, 77, Stafford, (Sir) Edward William, 243,

99, 130, 144 260, 282, 445N., 453-4) 473-5» 4952 516,

Sinclair, Dr. Andrew, 82, 154, 158, 196, 539-41, 545, 553, 555, 561, 566-7,

_ 201, 243, 279 571-3, 579 |

Siwani, 307, 319, 335-6, 337, 351, 358, | Stamford, Earl, 652

380-1 Stanley, Edward George Geoffrey

Slavery, 176, 211, 214-15, 222, 230, Smith, Lord (14th Earl Derby,

422 g-¥.), 27-9, 31-3, 40-1, 42, 48, 56,

Small-holders, 38, 143, 190, 198-200, 58-9, 67-8, 76, 79, 122-3, 125, 143, 202, 210, 635, 638-9: German civil 144, 147-8, 164, 199

immigrants (Cape), 362-4, 394. Stanley, Edward Henry, Lord (15th

See also Fencibles, German Military Earl Derby, qg.v.), 394-7, 402, 404n.,

Legion, Military Settlers, Pensioners 414, 429

Smillie, William, 45, 48, 64 Stephen, (Sir) James, 24, 28, 30-1, Smith, Frederick, 14, 17 35, 41-2, 67, 80, 101, 124, 153, 204, Smith, Sir Harry, 308, 334 286 Smith, Thomas Henry, 465, 502 Stephen, Judge Sidney, 201 : Socialism, 635-6, 639-41, 646 Stephens, Edward, 66 Solomon, Saul, 301, 404, 425 Stewart, William Downie, 625-6 Somerset, Lord Charles, 302 Stewart Island, 444, 446 Sotheby, Capt., 231, 281 Stirling, Sir James, 8, 14

South Africa, 53, 67, 83, 94, 118, 146, Stock (or Stockwe), 307, 379

205, 221, 227, 280, Cuaps. 20-9, Stokes, Robert, 100, 104 705

SIR GEORGE GREY Storks, Col. Sir Henry, 399n., 583 480, 529, 546, 552, 554-5, 575, 595

Strockenstrom, Sir Andries, 297, 300 Taupo pa, Porirua, 101, 105, 110 Stout, (Sir) Robert, 592, 602, 603, 610- Tauranga, 465, 480, 502-4, 520, 532,

611, 614, 618, 620-1 546, 552, 567, 570, 571

Sturt, Charles, 7, 22, 39, 48, 56, 65 Taylor, Rev. Richard, 105, 116, 206,

Sugar, 15, 343 231, 281

Sunday Island, 271 Te Awamutu, 3577., 466, 487-8, 490, Superintendents, New Zealand, 200, 503, 505, 510

248-51, 253-5, 259-60, 280, 445, 521, Te Hapuku, 183, 184, 465, 487

574, 589-91, 593-4, 596-7, 629 Te Heu Heu (Mananui), 227, 466,

Supreme Court: South Australia, 45; 546, 554-5

Cape, 385; New Zealand, 115, 126-7, Te Hoktoi, 487, 609n.

138-40, 201-2, 212, 258, 260, 283, Te Kooti, 568 544 Te Mamaku, 107, 110, 113-16 Survey: South Australia, 21-2, 24-5, Te Ngakau, 608, 609, 620

37; New Zealand, 101, 105, 117-18, Te Paea, 479-80, 486, 487 123-2, 124, 126, 128, 173, 180, 192, Te Pihoi Mokemoke, 487, 490 449, 496-7, 991; 567, 572; 591, 593-4, Te Puni, Honana, 102, 108-9, 177, 179;

609, 619-20 209

Swainson, William, 155, 219, 280 Te Ranga, battle of, 505 Sydenham, Charles Poulett Thomson, Te Rangiatea, 115-16

1st Baron, 155, 198, 261, 295 Te Rangihaeata, 75, 100-17, 145, 166,

Sydney (New South Wales), 56, 225, 181, 209-10, 221, 278, 462

267-8, 271, 271n., 493, 645-6 Te Rangihaheke, Wi Maihi, 278

Symonds, Lieut. John Jermyn, 98, 105, Te Rangihiroa, 525

117, 126, 138, 214, 231 Te Rangitake. See Wiremu Kingi

Te Rauparaha, 75, 78, 100-15, 144,

Tabal, 301, 3357., 337 165-6, 176, 181, 209, 221, 366-7

Tahiti, 108, 270-1 Te Rauparaha, Tamehana, 113, 165-6 Tamati Waka Nene, 79-80, 83-4, 86, Te Ua Haumene, 504-6, 541, 560

431 591

QO-2, 102, 113, 209-10, 215 Te Wareaitu, Matengi (Martin

Tambookies, Tembu, 306-7, 3127., 334, Luther), 112, 115-16 357, 364, 368, 380, 381, 383-6, 390, Te Wheoro, Major Wiremu, 467-8,

Tancred, Dr. A. J., 404 Te Whero Whero Potatau (King Tancred, Henry John, 475, 575, 655 Potatau I), 79, 94, 113, 170-1, 176, Tangahoe tribe, 551 209, 447, 450n., 479, 486, 609 Taranaki, Province and district of, Te Whiti, 618-19, 633

158, 277, 278, 560, 592; population, Te Whiwhi, Matene, 278 trade, 163, 444, 447-8, 490n.; Atiawa Teichelman, 60

migration to, 156, 176-81; Maori ‘Teira, 448-9, 482, 484-5

feuds, 179, 207, 446; land problems, Telegraphs, 551, 623

100, 176-81, 182, 183, 194, 195-7, 232, Thaba Bosego, 410, 412, 414

447-50, 468-9, 480-5, 607, 610; war Thames (New Zealand), 224-5, 276, (1860-1), 436, 448-51, 457, 476, 563- 492, 509, 594, 606, 623-4 564; military operations (1863 seq.), Thomas, Sir Godfrey John, 40, 239n.,

487, 492, 504-5, 509, 516, 521-34, 279

540; confiscation, 493-4, 520-1, Thomas, Rev. Sir John, 3

522-3, 524-7, 532-3. See also New ‘Thomson, Dr. A. S., 231

Plymouth Thomson, James William, 622, 633

Taranaki tribe, 176, 178, 227, 449-50, Timaru, 592, 606 454, 468, 482, 487, 493-4, 516, 521-2 Timor, 9, 14, 19

Taringa Kure, 100-1, 103 Timotiu, 92

Tasmania, 34, 55, 116, 473 Tioriori, 487, 505

Tataraimaka, 178, 187, 454, 480-2, Titokowaru, 580, 618-19

483, 485, 57048on. Toise, 307, 321, 334-7, 354, 358, 368 Taupari, 462,490, 465,492, 467-8, Tomoana, Henare, 626

Taupiri, 219, 479-80, 480n. Tonga, 268

Taupo, 157, 208, 227, 276, 447, 466, Torrens, R. R., 45, 64 706

INDEX

Trade: South Australia, 28-9, 35, 37, 383-4; Kafir police, 308, 366, 388, 46. New Zealand, 78, 81, 162, 443-4, 430; Tambookie allies, 383-4. New 564; depression (1879 seq.), 618, 633; Zealand (1860-72), Armed Police, Maori, 225, 446, 4'77. Pacific Islands, 458, 523, 619; Colonial defence

268-9. Cape, 293, 401, 402. Natal, force, 517, 523-8, 535-44, 551-2, 344. Orange Free State and Trans- 553, 555, 504, 567; Forest Rangers,

vaal, 406 : 494, 499, 509, 528, 535-7, 542, 545,

Transkei, 318, 319, 328, 330, 340-1, 564, 567, 570; military settlers 346, 348-50, 381, 383, 403-4, 414, (Waikato Regiment), 493, 497-9,

430-3, 435 508-9, 511-12, 521-2, 524, 528, 542,

Transportation, 7, 116-17, 365-6, 379, 545-8, 551-5, 564, 619; militia and

501, 505, 643-4, volunteers, 526-8, 544, 552, 554, 555»

Transvaal, 292, 315, 340, 348, 429, 564, 567, 580; Maori allies, 458, 487,

432, 434 527-9, 534-7, 542, 545, 547-8, 552-5,

Travers, Capt. Frederick J., 603 570

Treasury, British: South Australia, Tuakau, 488, 495, 521

22-4, 28, 29-33, 47, 66. New Zealand, Turanga (Gisborne), 220, 546 76, 93n., 146-7, 148, 162, 454, 459-60, Tzatzoe, Jan, 307, 335”., 337 |

512, 519, 566, 569. South Africa,

146-7, 315, 3175 391, 393, 395-6, 427, Umhala, 307, 318, 321-2, 335-8, 349, 437, 459. See also British Government, 353, 356-8, 379, 381, 388

and Finance Umhlakaza, 323, 348, 357-8, 368, 386,

Troops, British: Australia, 25, 58, 148. 560, 619, 654

New Zealand (1840-53), 77, 79, 81, Unemployment, 75, 625, 629, 636, 640

85-93, 95, IOI-12, 117, 120, 132, United States of America, 7, 234, 236, 132n., 146-7, 148, 151, 206-8, 221, 248, 269, 471, 635, 648, 651 237. Proposed Tahiti expedition Universities, 4, 302, 635, 641-2

(1852), 270. South Africa, 146-7,221, | Urewera, tribe and district, 208, 480,

292, 296, 304-5, 308, 309-10, 322, 542-4, 552, 554-5

341, 348, 350-1, 354, 361, 364-6, a

371-9, 383, 390-1, 396, 400-2, 406-7, Victoria, Queen, 193, 197, 261, 278,

412-13, 416, 417-18, 435. Despatch 373-4, 424-5, 429, 447, 488, 492,

of, to India, 300-1, 365, 371-80, 383, 597, 652-3; accession of, 9; Queen’s

388, 390-4, 396, 400-2, 405, 410, name used to impress natives, 78, 412-13, 415, 438. New Zealand 82-3, 92, 115, 167, 210, 331, 3373 (1860-72), 445, 449-52, 457, 458, native addresses to, 170, 220, 322; 460-4, 467-8, 471, 478-9, 481-94, Grey’s conception of his duty to, 9,

499-504, 509, 512, 522-48, 551-2, 261, 392, 398-9, 402, 557, 566, 568,

554, 560, 563-4, 566-71, 575, 580-1; 635, 650

return of, to England, 471, 516-20, Victoria (Australia), 646 522-23, 528, 533-4, 539-41, 546-7, Victoria (Cape), 309, 327, 351, 364 551-8, 561, 563, 568-9, 574-5, 581. Vigne, Herbert, 337, 380 See also Regiments, British; German Village settlements: New Zealand, 189,

Military Legion 198, 202. Kafir, 329, 338, 355-8.

Troops, Colonial: South Australia, 380-1, 403

volunteers and policy, 25, 57-8. Vogel, (Sir) Julius, 539, 588-9, 590n., New Zealand (1840-53), militia, 592, 594-5, 597, 600, 631-5, 644 police, pioneers, etc., 77, 85, 88, 104- Volkner, Rev. Carl Sylvius, 534, 542

112, 206; Maori allies, 79, 81-2, 85- Volunteers, 57-8, 88, 300, 373, 451,

QI, 102, 107-9, 111-13, 206, 270; 527-8, 564, 567

see also Fencibles. Cape Colony, Von Tempsky, Major Gustavus Ferdimilitia, 297, 299-300, 308, 310, 351, nand, 494, 535, 545 383-4; Frontier Mounted Police, 294Nn., 299-300, 315, 316, 350, 361, | Waddy, Brigadier R., 536-7 363, 373, 377, 383-4, 388, 398, 419, | Waerengahika, 220, 544 431; Cape Mounted Rifles, 324, Wages, 26, 34, 36, 325, 367, 581, 636, 640 350, 361, 372, 377; volunteers, 373; | Waiapu, 214, 465, 544

Hottentot corps, 308, 375, 383; Waikanae, 75, 111-13, 176-7, 179-80, Fingos, 306, 308, 351, 364, 375, 209, 212, 231, 466 797

| SIR GEORGE GREY Waikato, district and tribe, 176, 208, 249, 256, 257, 286, 294; tiff with 209, 461-3, 533; missions and schools, Grey (1853), 256-9, 2825 criticises

| 219-20, 462, 487; economic progress, New Zealand Company, 263, 263n.

224-6, 227, 446; land problems, Wakefield, Edward Jerningham, 75,

187, 450-1, 463-4, 477, 593, 594: 243 _.

607-9, 620; feud with Atiawa, Wakefield, Col. William, 74-5, 164, 176-7, 180, 227, 482; feud with . 166, 176, 182, 281 Ngapuhi, 461; feud with Arawas, Walker, Dr., 9, 14, 17

552; King movement, 447 seq. (see Wallis, Dr. James, 602, 611, 614-15

Maori King movement); Waikatos Wanganui, 206, 212, 231, 494, 607; participate in Taranaki war (1860-1), purchase and settlement of, 74-5, ~ 449-51, 454-5; reject Grey’s peace QQ, 101, 105, 117, 163n., 164, 182,

overtures, 461-5, 467-9, 479-81, 187; hospital, 215, 217; school,

486-9; failure of Gorst’s mission, 219-20; settlers’ demand for cheap 462, 466-7, 487; prospect of war, land, 196, 200; Wanganui tribe, 101, 436, 454, 457, 464, 481, 486-8, 563; 110, 113, 116-17, 156, 209, 447-8, military preparations, 465, 467-8, 570; hostilities (1846-7), 105, 107, 479-81, 488-90; the Waikato cam- 110, 112-13, 116-17, 151, 156, 183, paign (1863-4), 489-90, 492-5, 499- 209; support for King movement,

504, 505, 507, 516, 520-1, 522-3, 447-8; military operations, etc.

551-2, 567, 571; confiscation and (1863-72), 504-5, 509, 521-36, 540, military settlement, 492-4, 499, 501- 542, 545, 556, 563-4 502, 507-12, 519-22, 544-5, 571-2; War Office, 146, 296, 372, 375s 418, Grey’s negotiations for settlement 437, 438; criticises Grey’s handling

(1878-9), 607-10, 620 of German Legion, 363, 391-3, 394,

Waimate North, 461, 464 396-400; despatch of troops to Waimate South, 524, 606, 618-22 India, 378, 391, 394, 399-402; Grey-

Waingongoro, 529, 532, 55! Cameron dispute, 522, 524, 530, 531,

Wainul, 106, 113-16, 145 538, 563; relations between Grey and Waipa, 462, 465, 479, 495, 609 Chute, 557, 570, 580 Waipounamu, 1737., 184, 187 Ward, Crosbie, 454, 474-5, 495, 539-40 Waipukarau, 1637., 184, 187 Ward, Sir Henry, 400 Wairarapa, 164, 182-4, 190-1, 198, 202, Ward, (Sir) Joseph George, 639

214, 222, 227, 272, 466, 494, 516, Warden line (Basutoland), 341, 342, 534, 566; Wairarapa Small Settlers’ 348, 413

Association, 198, 202 Warner, John Cox, 307, 384

Wairau, 158n., 165-6, 172-3, 182, 187, Warre, Col. Sir H. J., 481, 522, 527,

192; Wairau massacre (1843), 75, 531, 532, 570

78, 95, 100-1, 104-5, 131 Warren, George, 64, 69

Wairoa (Hawke’s Bay), 465, 544, 546 Warren, John, 65 Waitangi, 92; Treaty of, 76, 77-8, 83, | Waterhouse, George Marsden, 621 86, 95, 163, 167-72, 210, 304, 477, Waters, Rev. H. T., 319

498 Weare, Col. H. E., 547-50, 562, 580

Waitara, 177-81, 447-9, 468, 480-6, Weare, Rev. T. W., 547-50, 580 491, 495, 517, 524, 527, 532, 561, Weekes, Dr. Henry, 239

572, 609-10 Weld, (Sir) Frederick Aloysius: pion-

Waitohi, 173, 182, 187, 192 eer sheep-farmer in New Zealand, Waitotara, 527, 529, 531 182; opinion of Grey, 142, 282, Wakefield, Capt. Arthur, 75 473, 574; views on New Zealand

Wakefield, Daniel, 155 constitution, 158-9, 238, 250, 261, Wakefield, Edward, 265, 276, 621 262; Prime Minister (1864-5), 516, Wakefield, Edward Gibbon, 621n.; 540, 544-5, 567, 571, 572; death his theory of colonisation, 6-7, 21, (1891), 649 36-7, 188, 194; influence on New Wellington (New Zealand), town, dist-

Zealand policy, 148, 167, 250-1; rict and province, 74, 90, 209, 221,

disregard of Maoris, 244; challenges 267, 278, 282, 427, 527, 556, 610,

Grey’s cheap land policy, 200-1, 621, 625, 641, 650; population and 258, 281; views on representative economic progress, 163n., 183-4, and responsible government, 244-5, 190, 443-5; land transactions, 99, 708

INDEX

Wellington (New Zealand)—(contd.) Williams, Archdeacon Henry, 78, 92, 163-6, 182, 184-6, 193-6, 199-203, 95-8, 130-41, 170, 280-1, 283 255, 273; Maoris, 221, 227, 466, 509, Williams, Rev. William (later Bishop),

516; Maori disturbances (1843-7), 97, 137-8, 140, 283

75, QO-I1, 100-17, 120, 145; govern- Williamson, John, 562, 572 ment, 99-100, 147, 155-161; demand Wilson, Rev. J., 379 for self-government, 153, 159, 236-7, Wilson, J., 192n., 217, 231 240-6, 255-8, 262, 265; capital, seatof Wilson, Dr. P., 279 government, 516-17, 523, 528, 534, Winburg, 341-2, 410 539, 553-5) 557 588, 590, 595, 597; Windvogelberg, 337, 383

magistrates’ courts, 213-14, 231; Wine, 36, 642

hospital, 215-16; abolition of prov- Wiremu Kingi Matakatea, 545

inces, 590 Wiremu Kingi Te Rangitake, 75, 102,

Wellington (Cape), 297, 301 112-13, 116, 156, 176-81, 209, 448-

Welman, Dr., 324, 369 459, 468, 482-5, 490

Weraroa, 527, 529-30, 533-7, 541-2, Wiremu Nera, 465, 467, 479, 480

545, 546, 548, 575 Wiremu Tamihana Tarapipi Te Waha-

Wesleyan Missionary Society. See Mis- roa, 447, 450, 453, 465, 468, 479-

sionaries 481, 487-9, 501, 520-1, 546

654 372, 499

Western Australia, 7, 8-20, 36, 51, 55, Wiseman, Commodore Sir William,

Westland, 624 Witchcraft, witchdoctors, 214-15, 321, Whaingaroa, 187, 465 323, 331-3, 354-5, 380 Whakatane, 225n., 541-2 Witsie, 340, 342, 347 Whakatohea tribe, 542 Wodehouse, Sir Philip, 297

Whalers, whaling, 34, 78, 175 Wood, Reader Gilson, 454, 4.70, 474-55 Whately, Archbishop Richard, 4, 20 484, 495-6, 497, 512, 513, 590, 592, Whitaker, Sir Frederick: opinion of 627-8, 632 Grey, 162n.; land dealings, 281, 282, Wool, 29, 35-6, 183, 186, 189, 293, 344,

458, 513; 638; Attorney General, 346-7, 443-4, 592 475, 475n., 598, 626; view of Maori Wynyard, Major-General Robert situation (1863), 489, 495; Prime Henry, 94, 155, 161, 200, 253, 262, Minister (1863-4), 496-515, 520, 561, 270, 280, 283, 294, 425, 435

563, 571-4; (1882-3), 6ogn., 631, 633 c aboation ot ain me GL eo?” Xosa. See Amaxosa

death 649, Ot Xoxo, 307, 326, 329, 335% 337, 357

Whiteley, Rev. John, 170 3 Whitmore, Major-General (Sir) George

Stoddart, 552, 602-3, 633 Zulus, Zululand, 306, 340, 343-6, 431-5

799

%

y

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