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Table of contents :
PREFACE
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
CONTENTS
NOTATIONAL CONVENTIONS
PART ONE: ON SOME LINGUISTIC NOTIONS
I. SIGN, MEANING, SIGNIFICATUM AND DENOTATUM OF A SIGN
II ON THE SIGNIFICATUM OF A MORPHEME
III. ON THE SIGNIFICATUM OF A SENTENCE
IV .THE INTERRELATION BETWEEN 'PERFORMANCE', 'COMPETENCE', 'IDIOLECT' AND 'LANGUAGE
V. GRAMMATICALNESS
PART TWO: A RECOGNITION AND PRODUCTION COMPETENCE SYSTEM
VI. A RECOGNITION COMPETENCE SYSTEM (A DECODING COMPETENCE
VII .A PRODUCTION COMPETENCE SYSTEM (AN ENCODING COMPETENCE SYSTEM)
VIII. GENERAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX OF PROPER NAMES
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JANUA LINGUARUM STUDIA M E M O R I A E N I C O L A I VAN WIJK DEDICATA edenda curai C. H. VAN S C H O O N E V E L D Indiana University

Series Maior, 50

SIMULATION OF NATURAL LANGUAGE A FIRST APPROACH

by

F.J.VANDAMME State University of Ghent

1972

MOUTON THE HAGUE • PARIS

© Copyright 1972 in The Netherlands. Mouton & Co. N.V., Publishers, The Hague. No part of this book may be translated or reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, or any other means, without written permission from the publishers. This work was supported by a grant of the 'Universitaire Stichting' of Belgium.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER: 79-189695

Printed in The Netherlands by Mouton & Co., Printers, The Hague.

microfilm,

To Leo Apostel

The acceptance or rejection of abstract linguistic forms just as the acceptance or rejection of any other linguistic form in any track of science, will finally be decided by their efficiency as instruments, the ratio of the results achieved to the amount and complexity of the efforts required. Rudolf Carnap 1

1

Carnap, Rudolf, "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology". Reprinted in Carnap's Meaning and Necessity (Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, enlarged edition, 1956), pp. 205-221.

PREFACE

The purpose of this book is an inquiry into some aspects of natural language 1 . The starting point is the trivial and naive realization that, to the user of the language, there is 'something' that corresponds to the words of his language (though not necessarily to all of them). In my opinion this 'something' is the concept, and the concept is in many cases thought to correspond to something in the nonlinguistic world. In many approaches the concept 2 is not mentioned as a link between the word and that which in the nonlinguistic world can be named by it (more about this further on). By introducing this link, however, we are given the opportunity to generalize: the word 'table', for example, not only designates the particular object on which this book is now lying, but it can also designate an object of similar shape in the diningroom, and even the fancy-table. 1

The notion 'natural language' is not explicitly defined in this work. With this term all systems of communication which have traditionally be called language are indicated. I do not try to propose here some criteria to differentiate 'natural languages' from other communication systems. Our approach in fact only wants to throw some light upon a few aspects of the natural languages. To this purpose, it is sufficient to take into account only these communication systems about which there exists unanimity that they are natural languages. As a consequence of the fact that no marginal cases are considered, no techniques for a clear cut differentiation are necessary. * The necessity of the introduction of 'concepts' as an intermediary is shown excellently by the following experiment of Osgood (A Behavioristic Analysis of Perception and Language as Cognitive Phenomena, p. 99). One is conditioned for a certain reaction when a certain word is heard; f.i. one withdraws one's hand from a button, when hearing the word 'joy', 'die' (if one does not withdraw, one will get an electric shock). If one hears the word 'boy', nothing happens, while, on the contrary, one hears the word 'glee' one will also withdraw one's hand. Some remarks are also necessary about my use of the notion 'concept'. What is left of an input description, after having passed a series of abstractors is called 'a concept' (a simple concept). As a consequence, a whole set of inputs can be mapped on the same concept, viz. what is left of a whole set of inputs after having passed the same series of abstractors can be identical. Operations are also possible with these simple concepts (addition, etc... .)• The results of operations on concepts are also called concepts (complex concepts). Bruner in his A Study of Thinking calls our simple concepts 'Properties'. He defines them as discriminable characteristics of an event, that can have several values, f.i. colour (this is equivalent to my definition, I think). A criterial attribute is for Bruner an attribute able to differentiate one event from another. A combination of criterial attributes is a concept. My notion of 'complex concept' differs from the one of Bruner only in so far that I do not require parts of it to be criterial attributes.

8

PREFACE

For what is designated by a word is not generally (except in the case of some specific classes, i.e. proper names) an unique object. The object-concept-word approach reduces the problem to identify all objects which can be named by a word to the simple question: Which objects do conform to the concept which corresponds to this word? I admit that in some cases we do use the word 'table' to denote a unique object. This uniqueness, however, is established through the use of certain operators that are characteristics of the language system (i.e. demonstratives: this table; articles: the table; etc. ...). Here I touch upon another specific characteristic of language, namely that language is a system. The quantitative break-through of this view of language seems to have been effected by de Saussure, his Geneva School, and especially by the Prague School. 3 Malmberg and Ivic even assert — and I agree with them — that this is the basic idea of most modern linguists4. If we assume that a natural language is a system, it becomes important to determine the characteristics of this system. This leads us to (a) the problem of language universals (see Greenberg 1966), viz. of the characteristics that hold true for all systems of communication which are languages, and (b) the problem of the discrimination between accidental and essential language universals (the true language universals). The necessity of such a discrimination was pointed out clearly by Hockett in "The problem of universals of language" 6 : "Suppose that all the languages of the world except English were to become extinct. Thereafter, any assertion that is true of English would also assert a (synchronic) language universal." It is clear that such a language universal would not necessarily teach us something about 'language' and that, in consequence, it would not necessarily be a 'valid' language universal. The search for the u n i v e r s a l of language is further complicated by the fact that we can only take into account the languages actually known, which form only a subset of the set of languages that now exist, or at one time existed, or could possibly exist (on the assumption that not all possible languages have been actualized). In this book I want to draw special attention to a few essential characteristics of the language system as a system. I will give special attention to those characteristics which fundamentally affect linguistic method. The first difficulty one encounters when trying to describe language as a system of communication is the limitation of the physiological and the psychological data. In consequence, when constructing hypotheses one is obliged to rely mainly on the effective use of the communication system. However, more or less accidental intrusions (i.e. limitation of memory, distracted attention, etc. ...) may distort the ideal activities which are possible with the communication system. By putting competent 8

Milka, Ivic, Trends in Linguistics, pp. 113-117. Godel, R. "F. de Saussure's theory of language", p. 486. 4 Malmberg, B., Structural Linguistics and Human Communication, p. 3. Milka, Ivic, Trends in Linguistics, p. 114. • Hockett, C. F., "The problem of Universals in Language" in Universals of language, p. 3.

PREFACE

9

users of language in ideal experimental circumstances, where disturbances are reduced as much as possible, one may observe the results of the approximation of their ideal language-production and language-recognition abilities. On this basis one can build hypotheses about their system of recognition and production competence, viz. about their language skill in itself. If it should be deemed necessary and if the nature of the data obtained should be such that it should be possible, one could try to build a system that covers both the systems of language-recognition and language-production. As soon as this system could be constructed, it would be possible once again to deduce the recognition and the production systems from it. It is important to keep this hierarchy in mind. I hold it — in principle — impossible to construct a system that covers both production and recognition, solely on the basis of the effective use of the system of communication, while neglecting the intermediate links 'production- and recognition-competence systems'. 8 This seems to me the fundamental mistake made by the transformationalists, 7 and it may account for the ever returning criticism — despite Chomsky's defence — that they only describe a production-competence system instead of an all-embracing system. In reaction to this—in my opinion—methodological mistake, i PROPOSE A METHOD TO DESCRIBE THIS PRODUCTION AND RECOGNITION COMPETENCE SYSTEM. T h i s m e t h o d

is exemplified mainly by the description of some parts of the Dutch language, with occasional references to the English and the German language. THE MOST STRIKING RESULT OF THESE DESCRIPTIONS IS THE APPEARANCE OF WIDELY DIVERGENT CHARACTERISTICS IN BOTH SYSTEMS.

The hypothesis, upheld by many people, that the recognition and production competences are two independent components, though in a feedback relation to each other, is sustained by our results. It seems natural that there is a feedback relation between both, since when sequence A is encoded, after decoding the sequence A is usually obtained again. This work is not concerned with the phonological side of the language system, except where it throws a vivid light on other characteristics. The phonological component of language surely requires a monograph on its own. When studying natural language as a system, i TRY TO MAKE NO ABSTRACTION OF THE USER OF THE LANGUAGE. Indeed, a knowledge of the system of natural language not only enlarges our knowledge of man, but it is necessary to have a certain knowledge of man in order to be able to study his language system. And here I mean in the first place a certain knowledge about the way he records, assimilates and produces information. I also consider it desirable to present my hypotheses about natural language in the " Also L. Apostel adopts this point of view in his article: "Epist&nologie de la Linguistique". ' Methodologically, it is very dangerous to start with the view that the formal characteristics of the production- and recognition-competence system are identical. This limits arbitrary possible results of the investigations. At the starting point, it seems to us necessary to leave open the possibility of formal divergencies between both systems. The constatation a posteriori that both systems are formally identical, remains possible in this hypothesis and is much more valuable.

10

PREFACE

form of partial simulation in an automaton, because this enables me to present some of the hypotheses more accurately. Such partial simulation could not only be regarded as a way to present a theory more accurately, but could even be considered a pragmatic requirement for cognitive sense.8 The words of Carnap, quoted in the beginning of this book, imply a tension which can be found in many works and certainly will be found in mine; it is the tension between the introduction of new abstract notions and the more traditional concepts. I hope that the results achieved by the new concepts introduced in this book will outweigh the amount and the complexity of the efforts required. I realize that what is said in this book is not conclusive, but I hope to have put forward at least a few encouraging views for the elaboration of new, more fruitful approaches to the study of language and its philosophy. In Part One, I treat some general linguistic problems. In Chapter I, I define a number of notions, such as the notions of sign, meaning, significatum, etc. ... These take such a central place in this work that it would be dangerous to use them in a purely intuitive manner. Chapter II examines an attempt to solve the problem of how to define a significatum of a morpheme. In Chapter III, I treat the question: What is the relation between the significatum of a sentence and the significata of the morphemes that belong to it? In Chapter IV, I examine the relation between competence and performance on one side, and between idiolect and language on the other. In Chapter V, I define the consequences of my views about competence for the concepts of 'grammaticalness' and 'grades of grammaticalness'. Part Two presents my personal view of a possible description of a recognition and production competence system. The importance of these two systems was pointed out in Part One, Chapter IV. In order to present clearly my attempt to describe the recognition and the production system, I have illustrated the description by examples from the Dutch language — with references to English and German, as I already said —, realizing, however, that my concrete elaboration of it can be refined and extended. In the description of the recognition system (Part Two, Chapter I) I exemplify my approach to linguistics with a partial description of the article, the adjective, the adverb, the noun, the verb, the auxiliary, the verb used as an adjective, the active sentence (subject-verb-object; object-verb-subject), the passive sentence, the interrogative sentence, the complementizers, the preposition, the relative pronoun and relative clause, the 'if ... then' relation, the relative sentence with the interpretation of an implication, the conjunction (the ones which order and the ones which do not), " This is maintained by L. Apostel in a discourse, entitled: "Een basis voor een dynamische kennisleer tegenover een statische zienswijze van het logisch Empirisme". (A basis for the dynamic epistemology, an opposite of the static one of the logic empirism) on a colloquium in Ghent for the students in philosophy of Ghent and the Netherlands.

PREFACE

11

and the relation between the adjective, the relative clause and the ordering conjunction. My choice of the part of the Dutch language which illustrates my approach was governed by the results of transformational grammar. I have tried to prove that (a) the chief language phenomena that this grammar is able to describe can also be described by my approach and that (b) my approach is able to point out typical characteristics of language, which are not (or even cannot) be made explicit by the transformational system. I am thinking more specifically of the 'operations on meanings', which play such a fundamental part in recognition and which throw an important light on certain 'incidental facts' in the production of language. As such, however, the spirit of this book is certainly not anti-transformational, for to me transformational grammar seems an important milestone in the evolution of linguistic theory, but I consider it rather post-transformational. For some detailed discussions on the transformationalists, some knowledge about their theory can be of importance. However, the main tenets and the methodological renovations can certainly be understood without a knowledge of transformational grammar. I illustrate the production system (Chapter II) by the noun clause (noun, adjective, participle used attributively, article, etc....), the simple sentence, the complementizers, the active and passive of the simple sentence and of the complementizers, the interrogative sentence and the conjunction. Apart from the fact that — as I already admitted above — the parts of Dutch described in this work, are still open to further elaboration, corrections and simplifications, there still remains a considerable part of Dutch that has not been touched upon in this book. Only do think, for example, of the various kinds of negation, 9 each with its very different possible encoding, of the disjunction, etc. ... I hope that the limited part of Dutch I have selected will be sufficient to test the fruitfulness of the approach here presented and thus may confirm to a certain degree the partial methodological renovation of linguistics, being the purpose of this book. It is clear that the proposed method should be further confirmed by evidence from non-Indo-European languages10 as well from a further description of Dutch, German and other Indo-European languages.

* There is — I think — a necessity to hypothesize in some natural languages at least also a nonantinomy-negation (for discussion about antinomy-negation see Katz: "Analyticity and the Contradiction in Natural Language"), viz. a negation where a property is denied without its implying that something else positive or a disjunction of other positive elements results from it. More about this in my review of L. Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, part III. 10 A tentative to describe some parts of Fulani (a North African language) was made by A. Diallo and F. Vandamme in their article: "Quelques caractéristiques du Poular considéré du point de vue du langage comme système de décodage".

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my gratitude to L. Apostel (State University Ghent), H. Putnam (Harvard University), N. Chomsky (M.I.T.), S. Kuno (Harvard University), R. Jakobson (Harvard University and M.I.T.), L. Antal (Eôtvôs University Budapest, Hungary), J. Kruithof (State University Ghent), and E. Vermeersch 1 (State University Ghent), all of whom contributed to this work by their help and encouragement. I have also greatly profited from the conversations and discussions about some of the problems treated in this work with M. De Mey, A. Phalet, A. Cornelis, L. Theyskens, A. Fâché, Mrs. Schepen. I gratefully acknowledge their support. I would also like to thank the Belgian American Educational Foundation for having enabled me to stay at the M.I.T., which gave me the opportunity to come into direct contact with the transformationalists, an experience that was of tremendous value to this work. I also thank the 'Nationaal Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek' (the National Foundation for Scientific Research) for its financial support. I also wish to express my thanks to C. Loonens, M. Schepen, V. Nôsselt, H. Van Dorpe and A. Vandamme-Dewitte for their help in preparing the final version, and to A. Vandamme-Dewitte especially who has so kindly helped me in the laborious task of preparing a joint authors-terminological index. Finally I want to express my gratitude to those people who have not been mentioned, but who contributed to this work by discussions, advice and material help. F. J. Vandamme

1 Heuristically E. Vermeersch's work: Epistemologische inleiding tot een wetenschap van de mens played an important role in the construction of our theory. In a certain sense, our theory could be seen as a proposal for an interpretation and concrétisation of some parts of his models.

CONTENTS

Preface Acknowledgement Notational Conventions

7 13 19

PART ONE: ON SOME LINGUISTIC NOTIONS

I:

II:

Sign, meaning, signification and denotatum of a sign

25

1. Outline and description of the model 1.1 Description of inputs and its transmission to the description model 1.2. Description-model program 1.3. Output-program 1.4. Association-program and meaning-program

25 25 26 26 27

2. Sign and significatum

27

3. Expansion of the sign-concept and the concept of meaning

28

4. A few additional definitions 4.1. Communication 4.2 Language

29 29 29

On the significatum of a morpheme

30

1. The problem

30

2. The relation connotatum-significatum

47

3. Some cues for determining the significatum of a morpheme III:

. . . .

53

On the significatum of a sentence

60

1. Introduction

60

16

TABLE OF CONTENTS

2. Which relations do exist between significata of elements which are parts of a sentence 2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 2.4.

IV:

64

Property-assignment Object operations Concept operations Logical operations

64 64 64 65

3. The significatum of a sentence

65

The interrelation between 'performance', 'competence', 'idiolect', and 'language'

68

1. Performance and competence 1.1. The approach of the transformationalists to competence and performance 1.2. Is a competence which overarches production and recognition competence necessary 1.3. Some arguments for the relative independence of the speech recognition and the production-competence system

V:

68 68 70 74

2. Idiolect and language

77

Grammaticalness

81

PART TWO: A RECOGNITION AND A PRODUCTION COMPETENCE SYSTEM

VI:

A recognition competence system

87

1. A recognition algorithm 1.1. Introductory remarks 1.2. Basic program for the recognition procedure 1.3. Explanation of some commands of the cyclical program 1.4. A few comments

87 87 88 89 90

. . .

2. An attempt to determine some relation programs I and II of Dutch . 2.1. The article 2.2. The adjective 2.3. The verb 2.4. The preposition 2.5. The conjunction 2.6. The relative clause 2.7. The relation between the adjective, the relative clause and the ordering conjunction 2.8. On the morpheme 'zijn'

92 92 96 101 114 120 131 143 148

TABLE OF CONTENTS

2.9. Some considerations on the complementizers 2.10. Postscript VII: A production competence system

17

152 162 165

1. A production algorithm 1.1. Introductory remarks 1.2. Scheme of a general strategy and a basic production algorithm . 1.3. Explanation of some commands of the cyclical program . . . 1.4. Some subroutines

165 165 170 171 172

2. Some surface structures 2.1. Noun clause 2.2 The simple sentence 2.3. The active-complementizer sentence 2.3.1. The dat-complementizer 2.3.2. The te-complementizer 2.3.3. The infinitive-complementizer 2.3.4. The infinitive-complementizer depending on another complementizer 2.3.5. The Compl ste depending on another complementizer 2.3.6. The Compl Sdat depending on another complementizer . . 2.4. The relation between a complementizer sentence and the simple sentence 2.5. The question 2.6. The passive sentence 2.6.1. The simple passive sentence 2.6.2. The passive in the complementizer 2.6.2.1. The C o m p l y , 2.6.2.2. The Compl st 2.6.2.3. The Compl slnf 2.7. The conjunction

174 174 179 181 181 182 185

190 194 196 196 200 200 202 204 205

3. Review of the discussed surface structures in their most general form

211

186 189 190

VIII: General and methodological conclusions

214

Bibliography

219

Index

224

NOTATIONAL CONVENTIONS

To every sign a concise explanation is given. A more explicit explanation can be found on the page which is indicated in the explanation. XZ

Y

— v y n y n +1 n v n +1 (Xy * dem art N cjg PB VD OD D PP RP x (7) (x) (>>) X R Z An, B Ars B A {n + nS -* nP nS -» (n + nP ^ (n + nS-> (n +

Ca I X,( 7) X11 Y, (Z)

the deletion of X in Y substitute Y for X in Z

x) S x) S x) S x) P x) P

(p. 95) (p. 95) (p. 95) (p. 95) (p. 119) (p. 119)

(p. 95) (p. 139) (p. 134) (p. 134) (p. 134) (p. 107) (p. 119) (p. 95) (p. 100) (p. 103) (p. 95) (p. 109)

(p. 137) (p. 98) (p. I l l )

NOTATIONAL CONVENTIONS

Sp

21

the program which has to be executed as the first one SPECIFIC TO THE ENCODING SYSTEM

Ncl Prep Ncl [X Y]z K

x

['Y] - A + B A © B 7i Yla Y2 Y3 Yia Y4b

r

noun clause (p. the noun clause modified by a preposition (p. Z may precede or succeed every category which occurs between the brackets [...] (p. K = S or P (S = succeed; P = precede); X has to be K, relative to F i n the structure between brackets [...] (p. A may precede B, but A may also succeed B (commutativity) (p. A must precede B (there is no commutativity) (p. the object argument of the verb (p. the object argument of the verb which can be added after the S I or S II, or before the GS I (p. the verb (p. the subject argument of the verb (p. an adverb which modifies a verb (p. a prep, clause which modifies a verb (p.

174) 174) 180) 174) 179) 179) 179) 192) 179) 179) 179) 179)

PART O N E

ON SOME LINGUISTIC NOTIONS

I SIGN, MEANING, SIGNIFICATUM AND DENOTATUM OF A SIGN1

1. OUTLINE A N D DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL This subdivision outlines the characteristics of a computer which roughly simulates human information processing, in so far as this processing is relevant to some hypotheses about natural language.

1.1. Description of inputs and its transmission to the description

model

The input-unit receives and describes2 stimuli. This description requires some operations of the computer, for stimuli are corrected, modified and abstraction is made of some of their properties before being interpreted by the computer. Correction, modification, and abstraction are continued during the process of interpretation, if this is necessitated by other data (i.e. stimuli previously interpreted). A stimulus X is called accepted by the automaton when it receives a description from the automaton's input-unit, in other words when the input-unit has an output for stimulus X. The output of the input-unit (the description of input X) can then be transmitted to the description model by order of the main program. The description model is part of the automaton's memory-unit where the descriptions of inputs are stored, and which may be assumed to be a model of the world. Descriptions are stored in the description model according to a well-determined strategy which makes the recovery of descriptions possible and avoids the repeated storing of identical descriptions in different locations of the model. Therefore, if the storage strategy establishes that a particular description has not previously been stored in the model description, this description will be transmitted to a specific 1 I treated this chapter extensively and formally in my Master of Arts dissertation: "Partiële simulatie van het concept 'Betekenis'" (Partial Simulation of the Concept 'meaning') (1966) and also in my article: "Sketch of a Partial Simulation of the Concept of Meaning in an Automaton". I only recaputale it briefly here. I have also treated there the notion 'simulation'. * My notion 'description of input' is neatly related with the notion 'form' used by E. Vermeersch in his article "Information and Philosophy" and his book Epistemologische inleiding tot een wetenschap van de mens (Epistemological Introduction to the Sciences of Mankind). So he states ("Information and Philosophy", p. 146): "By a form of the input we understand a distinguishable state of the input". In my approach, a description of an input specifies how an input is distinguished by the computer from other inputs and internal data.

26

ON SOME LINGUISTIC NOTIONS

location in the description model by order of the main program. If, however, a description has previously been stored in the description model and has not been erased, the .storage program will re-activate it in the description model (for example, by increasing the magnetism in the memory cells where the particular description is stored). A DESCRIPTION WILL BE CALLED ACTIVATED WHEN IT HAS JUST BEEN STORED IN THE DESCRIPTION MODEL OR WHEN IT HAS BEEN RE-ACTIVATED BY THE STORAGE PROGRAM.

It is also possible that descriptions are stored in the input-register in their order of appearance at the input-receptor and that, when the input-register is full the contents of it are stored according to the storage strategy explained above. From this, one may get the impression that only descriptions from inputs are present in the model. It is, however, conceivable that results of compilations of elements previously stored in the memory are admitted, whether having passed an abstractor or not. It is also possible that information about internal conditions of the automaton can be stored in the description model. And I would not even exclude the possibility that, before any information is brought in through input or internal observation, the description model already contained description series (thus, a priori elements), which may necessarily or accidentally ensue from the construction features of the automaton. With what has been assumed so far solipsism remains possible, viz. in case every input is an output of the automaton itself.3 1.2.

Description-model-program

A part of the descriptions of inputs will, when transmitted to the description model, not only activate their own descriptions through the storage program. Indeed, by mediation of the description-model-program 4 it is possible that when a particular part of the description model is activated (this part will be called 'the ACTIVATOR'), another part of the model is also activated ('the ACTIVATED'). The inputs whose descriptions have this property (of activating not only cells in the description model in which their respective descriptions are stored, but also other cells in the description model) will actually be a subclass of the inputs. This class is called /, ; the class of descriptions of I, inputs is called Bt. 1.3.

Output-program

The output-program which regulates the activation of the output components and which makes the necessary activation currents available for the activation com* My ontology is very simple. I only hypothesize a system which is able to make some operations and provides arguments for these operations. I take no standpoint about the ontological statute of these 'arguments'. I agree with Carnap (Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie) that these standpoints cannot be confirmated nor falsified by science. 4 The description-model-program is a program which determines the interdependences of the activation of cells or sets of cells in the description-model.

SIGN, MEANING, SIGNIFICATUM AND DENOTATION OF A SIGN

27

ponents, depends on the state of the automaton. The execution of particular parts of the output-program may depend on the state of the different parts of the automaton (control-unit, work-unit, memory, working-memory unit, description model, etc. ...). If some part of the output-program is such that for an execution of it, activations in different parts of the automaton are necessary (for example an activation in the description model and a command from the control-unit to the output-unit), I will say that there is a disposition to that particular output if one or the other is present. As this 'partial' activation may, however, be a necessary condition for various outputs, the result of it will be a disposition to a class of outputs. I will call this class 'the disposition class of the activation'. Expressed more generally, a disposition to an output is a state of some parts of an organism at a particular moment, so that — under certain supplementary conditions — the output in question occurs. 5 A disposition must always be a specific state in an automaton. Sometimes a state of inactivity of a certain part of the model may be a necessary condition for an output; the inactivity of that part will then be a disposition to this output. 1.4. Association-program

and meaning-program

Association-program and meaning-program are sub-programs of the descriptionmodel-program, which — in my opinion — must be clearly distinguished from each other. As a result of activation of a particular part of the description model both programs activate another part of the model. In Chapter 2: "The Significatum of a Morpheme", the necessity of distinguishing between these two programs will be made clear. 2. SIGN A N D SIGNIFICATUM

I have called I, those inputs or input-series whose descriptions, when transmitted to the description model, are activators for the description-model program (see 1.2.). I will call I m the inputs whose descriptions are activators for the meaning program. It is conceivable that there are inputs whose descriptions are activators for both the meaning and the association programs. I will call Mt the class of descriptions of inputs belonging to Im. M, is a proper subclass of Bt, viz. the descriptions of the inputs belonging to /,. I CALL Mt A PROPER SUBCLASS OF THE 'SIGNS'.

That which has been activated in the description model by mediation of the meaning program at a description Y belonging to Mt will be called the 'significatum' 6 of this description Y, which I call a 'sign'. * Related definitions of dispositions are found in: Morris, Ch., Sign, Language and Behavior; Hull, CI., Principles of Behavior; Mowrer, O. H., "A Stimulus-Response Analysis of Anxiety and its Role as a Reinforcing Agent"; and Mowrer, O. H., Some Methods of Measurement. • My notion 'significatum' is related to Frege's notion 'Sinn'. One could define 'denotatum' of a

28

ON SOME LINGUISTIC NOTIONS

The signs belonging to Mt are linked with pairs, triads, etc. of elements in the description model, depending on whether they can activate besides their own description, via the meaning-program, one or several of the descriptions stored in the description model. A distinction must, however, be made between the sign linked with various others and invariably linked with those whatever the context, and the sign which is linked by the meaning program with different descriptions relative to the different contexts (i.e. different activations). The importance of signs (particularly language signs) in the process of constructing new concepts (abstractions of descriptions) with or without intermediation of definition will not be discussed here. I will, however, touch upon the differentiation of concepts in Chapter 2: 'The Significatum of a Morpheme'.

3. EXPANSION OF THE SIGN-CONCEPT AND THE CONCEPT OF MEANING 7

The explanation of the fact that a particular sign X has the significatum Y can be found in the meaning program. Let us assume that P, is the part of the meaning program which connects the sign X with the significatum Y. I will say of EACH PART OF THE DESCRIPTION SERIES WHICH IS NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT FOR THE EXECUTION OF A PART OF P, (P, connecting a significatum with the whole of the description series) that it 'HAS MEANING'. The meaning of a description series will be the part of the meaning program which determines the working of the description. This definition of meaning allows us to say that descriptions which are not connected with a significatum by the meaning program can also 'have meaning'. This in case they execute via their meaning program operations on significata, on meanings, or connect relations of signs with their significata, or execute operations on relations. EVERY DESCRIPTION WHICH HAS MEANING WILL BE CALLED A 'SIGN'.

In my opinion the class of signs which have no significatum is not empty. I think that, among others, the logical operators belong to that class. My approach to the interpretation of 'meaning' is closely related to L. Antal's. It was also influenced by Morris's and Wittgenstein's point of view, though in some respects it considerably differs from theirs. 8

word as that in the world which conforms to the significatum of this word. An interesting discussion on Frege's notion 'Sinn und Bedeutung* can be met in Ignacio Angelelli's work Gottlob Frege and Traditional Philosophy. 7 About problems of the concept 'meaning' Laslo Antal's books are very important, viz. Content, Meaning and Understanding and Questions of Meaning. In my analysis of the concept 'meaning', I am very indebted to him. * A more extensive discussion on the relation of my interpretation of meaning to Wittgenstein and Morris, see "Sketch of a partial simulation of the concept of meaning", and "Review of L. Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations".

SIGN, MEANING, SIGNIFICATUM AND DENOTATION OF A SIGN

29

Recapitulation. — The meaning of a sign is a hypothesis explaining why a significatum Y corresponds to a particular sign X (or to a particular sequence of signs). Hence it is a hypothesis which helps to explain the use of the words. This explanation is found in a directed description-model program, possessing certain characteristics. A sharp distinction must be made between the description-model program and the association program.

4. A FEW ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS

4.1. Communication In a broad sense communication is the process of communicating a property. 9 The term is used in this sense, for example, in the sequence 'communicating vessels'. E. Vermeersch 10 thinks the term 'influence' is more suitable in this interpretation of 'communication'. He furthermore makes a distinction between influences which are 'information' and the influences which are not. Where influence by information is concerned, form is of the utmost importance. 'Form' is here best interpreted as being that which is responsible for the fact that the input-unit of a system, takes a certain state which is distinguishable by this system,. An interpretation of'communication' now suggests itself: The process of influencing by means of information, viz. of communicating properties (a) which are responsible for the fact that the input-unit of a system takes a certain distinguishable state, and (b) the form of which is of the utmost importance for the system, while the matter or energy which 'transports' the form is of secondary or no importance. 'Communication' in an even narrower sense is the process of communicating by means of the specific kind of forms which are called 'signs'. From now on I will use the term 'communication' in the narrowest sense: The process that takes place between different systems (automata, human beings, etc.) whereby, by means of signs emitted by one system, descriptions (different from the descriptions of the signs themselves) are activated in the respective description models of each system. The descriptions must, however, be descriptions of identical data. Signs which are communicative with regard to a certain set of systems are called 'corn-signs', relative to this set of systems. 4.2. Language Language is a system of 'corn-signs'. In what follows I will try to describe some important characteristics of that system. '

10

Morris, Ch., Sign, Language and Behavior, p. 118. Vermeersch, E., "Information and Philosophy", pp. 143-144.

II O N THE SIGNIFICATUM O F A MORPHEME1

1. THE PROBLEM In this subdivision, proceeding from the problems about the significatum arising from the theory of de Saussure, I will examine the solutions proposed by the transformational grammars. Some aspects of these problems will be discussed rather extensively. The problems under consideration are: (a) the necessity of differentiating the significatum of a word from its connotatum, (b) the problem of the practical grounds on which to differentiate them, and (c) the problem of the introduction of selectional restrictions. F. de Saussure's concepts of 'signe', 'signifié' and 'signifiant' — in the version popularized by the editors Ch. Bally and A. Sechehaye 2 — are well-known. Therefore, and because my primary concern is not a historical reconstruction, they will not be discussed at length. But, familiar though these concepts may be, they raise some interesting problems. The determinations of these problems and their tentative solution will be my primary concern. I shall, however, have to touch occasionally on the relation between Bally and Sechehaye's conceptions and conceptions which seem — in my opinion — more likely to reflect de Saussure's view. D e Saussure's basic idea seems to be that a sign is the combination of a concept (signifié) and a sound-image (signifiant). 3 Beside this, however, de Saussure also attached great importance to the notion of 'valeur' (value). 1

By morpheme I mean a language-sign, viz. a com-sign which belongs to a language system, which is meaningful and which is itself not divisible into smaller meaningful elements which are also language-signs. I like to leave open here the problem if there exist morphemes which are smaller than a word. I will not discuss here either criteria and heuristics to determine the morpheme. For this problem I refer f.i. to F. de Saussure's Cours de Linguistique générale, pp. 104-107 (Translation Baskin) and Z. Harris' Methods in Structural Linguistics and "Distributional Structure". * Much criticism is made about the authenticity of what is found in the edited Cours de Linguistique générale, as representing F. de Saussure's opinion. The edited course is a compilation and reconstruction (as the editors themselves told it in their preface) from notes taken by students from three courses in 'General Linguistics' (1906-1911) given by F. de Saussure and from a few other sources indicated by the editors. A general recognized estimater of the authenticity of the edited course is Robert Godel with his work: Les sources manuscriptes du cours de linguistique générale de F. de Saussure. 3 Baskin, Wade, English translation of Cours de linguistique générale, p. 67 : "I call a combination of a concept and a sound-image a sign...". Godel, p. 190: "C'est donc cette association de deux

ON THE SIGNIFICATUM OF A MORPHEME

31

There is a striking discrepancy between the editors' and Godel's interpretations 01" 'valeur'. To the editors the 'VALUE' OF A SIGN consists in ITS RELATION TO ALL THE OTHER SIGNS OF THE SYSTEM." Godel 5 holds as it lLe signe envisagé par le côté du signifié et partant comme terme d'une opposition'. To Bally and Sechehaye the 'valeur' of a word depends on the oppositions existing between all the signs of the language system. To Godel it depends rather on the opposition of the 'signifié' (significatum) of the word. I will, as yet, refrain from taking sides in this case. The following examples, given by the editors to clarify the notion of 'valeur' are of considerable importance : Modern French 'mouton' can have the same signification as English 'sheep' but not the same value, and this for several reasons, particularly because in speaking of a piece of meat ready to be served on the table, English uses 'mutton' and not 'sheep'. The difference in value between 'sheep' and 'mouton' is due to the fact that 'sheep' has beside it a second term while the French word does not ... ... The value of just any term is accordingly determined by its environment; it is not possible to fix even the value of the word signifying 'sun' without first considering its surroundings: in some languages it is not possible to say 'sit in the sun'. 6 Several questions force themselves on the reader; 1.1. — The first questions concern the languages — not mentioned by Bally — in which it is impossible 7 to say 'sit in the sun' (or in which analogous problems arise). What one may ask oneself is : 1.1.1. — Is such an expression impossible in those languages because the equivalents of 'sun' and 'to sit' belong to syntactical categories whose combination is impossible? In other words: Is the incorrectness of 'sit in the sun' of the same type as the incorrectness of 'John is the'? 1.1.2. — Is the expression made impossible by the native speakers' knowledge of the world — because, for example, the combination of concepts expressed in the sequence is 'strange'? For, if the sun is a god to them and if it is impossible to sit in a god, or if 'sun' has the significatum of 'planet' only and not of 'sunshine', in both éléments égalements immatériels, mais absolument différents, qui est proprement le signe..." (N 7, §2; 10 p la; II 55 fin; III 114, 1222). 4 Baskin, Wade, (id.) pp. 114-116. Especially: "On the one hand the concept seems to be the counterpart of the sound-image, and on the other hand the sign itself is in turn the counterpart of the other signs of language. Language is a system of interdependent terms in which the value of each term results solely from the simultaneous presence of the others". 6 Godel, (O.c.), p. 244: "Le chapitre qu'on vient d'étudier ne contient pas une véritable définition de la valeur linguistique. Celle qui a été proposée plus haut (p. 223) le signe envisagé par le côté du signifié et partant comme terme d'une opposition, ne semble pas contredite par les divers raisonnements qui convergent vers cette notion très complexe. La complexité tient à ce que la valeur linguistique dépend de trois ordres de rapports: la relation interne du signe (le signifié est la valeur de signifiant), la relation des termes in absentia; la relation des termes in praesentia". • Baskin, (op. cit.), pp. 115-116. 7 The problem is if the example 'to sit in the sun' is authentically given by F. de Saussure or if it is an illustration given by Bally and Sechehaye.

32

ON SOME LINGUISTIC NOTIONS

cases it would be a factual absurdity to say 'sit in the sun'. In this case saying 'sit in the sun' is not a linguistic impossibility but a factual absurdity comparable to, for example, 'A dog has 16 legs' - except, perhaps, for a difference in degree of absurdity. This difference in degree could be explained as follows. Let us consider sentences (1), (2) and (3). (1) A table thinks. (2) A computer thinks. (3) The table is black. Sequence (2) is crucial here. More and more people are discussing the problem whether a computer actually thinks or not, and quite a few are even convinced that it does. It is difficult to maintain that the combination of concepts forming sequence (2) is absurd, and - in consequence - that sequence (2) is absurd. Sequence (2) certainly does not seem as absurd as sequence (1). Therefore one could argue that to a human being a combination of concepts which he accepted less as true or which has less frequently been asserted true to him has a lower probability than the combination of concepts which he has accepted more as true or which has been asserted true to him more often. Likewise, those combinations of concepts are more probable when there exist analogous combinations of concepts which are accepted as true by, or which have repeatedly been asserted true to him. It is obvious that this does not apply to analytical and contradictory combinations of concepts. Due to their structure they are either true or false and automatically get a probability of 0 or 1. According to the hypothesis mentioned above, (1) would be less probable than (2), while (2) is less probable than (3) to most people. A combination of concepts is, perhaps, called absurd if neither such combinations nor strongly analogous combinations are (or are very rarely) accepted as true or come across as asserted true. This may explain why a few years ago most people considered a sentence such as (2) absurd. 1.1.3. - A third hypothesis which could account for the impossibility of a sequence as 'sit in the sun' in certain languages is that in those languages certain significata may not be considered capable of combination with certain other significata. This kind of restriction would be independent of the factual reality in the world. Also the combination of their significantes is syntactical in this hypothesis. Godel's interpretation of 'value', combined with the example given by Bally ('sit in the sun') perhaps suggests yet another interpretation of 'valeur' - which may be closer to what de Saussure actually had in mind. This interpretation resembles the hypothesis in 1.1.2. Fuller reference will be made to this point in subdivision 2 of Chapter II: "On the Relation Between Connotata and Significata". The questions formulated in 1.1.1., 1.1.2. and 1.1.3. already indicate the problems arising when one tries to determine linguistic incorrectness. I want, however, to emphasize already that the answer to this problem is very important for the con-

ON THE SIGNIFICATUM OF A MORPHEME

33

struction of a grammar. For, should a grammar permit above mentioned sequences or not? The answer to this will deeply influence the kind of elaboration and the complexity of the grammar. More will be said about this further on. 1.2. — I also wish to make a remark about part of the statement of the editors quoted above: "The difference in value between 'sheep' and 'mouton' 8 is due to the fact that 'sheep' has beside it a second term while the French word does not ...". The interpretation of 'valeur' as given by Bally and Sechehaye makes rather trivial, the observation that French 'mouton' and English 'sheep' have a different value. 'Sheep' and 'mouton' are different signs (they have different sound-images). Therefore, by definition, the value of these words — as is the case with every word from one language when compared with its equivalent in another language — must be different. For this reason the sentence quoted seems to confirm Godel's interpretation. In his interpretation the observation that there is a difference in value between French 'mouton' and English 'sheep' is not at all trivial, and from this it becomes clear that every word in one language does not necessarily have a value different from the equivalent in another language. For, in Godel's definition, the value of a sign is not determined by the interrelation of the sign with all the other signs (significans inc l u d e d ) , b u t b y t h e INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN THE SIGNIFICATA OF SIGNS.

T h e inter-

relations may be (partly) identical in two languages. As a consequence a sign from one language and the corresponding sign from another may have (partly) the same value. 1.3. — Another important problem — for linguistics in general and more particularly in the framework of de Saussure's theory — is the precise determination of THE CONTENT OF A SIGNIFICATUM CONNECTED WITH A PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANS OR COMBINATION OF SIGNIFICANTES.

Is the significatum of, for example, 'arbor' the concept of a Gestalt 'tree' (viz. an abstract visual form) or is it the concept of a Gestalt 'tree' including the Gestalt of an indefinite number of 'leaves'? Or is it even more complicated: the concept of a Gestalt 'tree' with the concept of the Gestalt 'leaves' in a particular relation to the tree? There are several tentative solutions to this problem. I will only deal with the position of the proponents of the transformational grammar on this problem. I think their position is most clearly and most explicitly expressed in Philosophy of Language by J. J. Katz and in Aspects of the Theory of Syntax by N. Chomsky. Summed up briefly, Katz' view 9 of semantics is as follows: The function of semantics is to interpret 10 a deep structure of a sentence in terms of "meaning". Since words 8 Funk & Wagnalls, Standard College Dictionary: mutton "the flesh of a sheep used as food, especially the flesh of a mature sheep as distinguished from lambs". " Katz: The Philosophy of Language, pp. 151-155. 10 I will draw attention to the fact that intuitively the competence of the transformational school

34

ON SOME LINGUISTIC NOTIONS

are at the lowest level of a deep structure, the study of semantics should begin at the level of the word. Semantics must determine also the; meaning of the higher components of deep structure by means of the meaning of the individual words.

This

implies that semantics has two kinds of sub-components. The first is the lexicon in which the 'meaning' of each word can be found. The second is a system of 'projection rules' 11 with the help of which the meaning of each higher constituent is determined, on the basis of the meaning of the constituents that are dependent on the higher constituents. (In their framework it is possible to determine formally what depends on what). The result obtained by applying the dictionary and the projection rules to a sentence is called a semantic interpretation of the deep structure of the sentence and, consequently, of the sentence which this deep structure underlays. To Katz the 'meaning' of a word is not an indivisible entity, but a composition of is a very hybrid composition. The syntactical and phonological components have many characteristics of a production system. The semantic component of these is a recognition system. For instance, Katz, p. 151: "The semantic component interprets underlying phrase markers in terms of meaning. It assigns semantic interpretations to these phrase-markers which describe messages that can be communicated in the language. That is whereas the phonological component provides a representation of that message which actual utterances having this phonetic shape convey to the speakers of the language in normal speech situations". There seems a need here to clarify why the semantic part is not a system which permits, — given an input of the cognitive system (A) —, to construct a deep structure (B) which is the input for the transformational part. As it is now the case, (A) (see scheme 1) is the output of the semantics and (B) the input. (B) however, is at the same time the input for the transformational part of the grammar. The output of this part of the syntax, after applying some readjustment rules, is the input of the phonological component. We have thus a situation as sketched in scheme 1. Scheme 1: A "meaning" r

B "deep structure" (phrase structure grammar) 1 C "transformational component" i "phonological component" D In this approach (B) is very crucial. The obvious question is "Why?" Why not a situation as sketched in scheme II or III? Scheme II A Scheme III A i t B B i T

c

c

I D

t D

Scheme II resembles more a production system, scheme III more a recognition system. I defend the view that a recognition as well as a production competence is needed (see later on and see also my article "On problems implied by the concept performance"). 11 In "The Structure of a Semantic Theory", Katz and Fodor only construct projection rules, which structure very poorly the semantic markers of a sentence, viz. a concatenation of semantic markers and a Boolian conjunction of distinguishes. In Katz' Philosophy of Language (pp. 167-170) several different projection rules are given. There the meaning of a constituent is a partially ordered summation of the meaning of the dependent constituents.

ON THE SIGNIFICATUM OF A MORPHEME

35

concepts in a particular relation to each other. He believes that these atomic concepts are themselves, however, indivisible and probably universal. 12 In the lexicon the meaning of a word must be so specified that all necessary information is provided for the projection rules to work properly. That is why — always according to K a t z — each word must have the following specifications : (a) a set of symbols representing the basic concepts which constitute the meaning of a word. These basic concepts are called 'semantic markers', (b) A set of symbols for selectional restrictions, viz. some semantic markers cannot — according to him — stand in particular relation (deep-structure relation) to some other semantic markers. The symbols representing this kind of restriction are called 'selectional restrictions'. 13 K a t z calls a 'lexical reading' the 'semantic markers' and the 'selectional restrictions' of a word in one of the possible interpretations of that word. What is the status of the combination of semantic markers connected with a word X '\n one of its lexical readings? These markers are concepts. Should they be regarded as (A) the significatum of X in one of its interpretations, or as (B) the significatum and the connotatum of XI By connotatum 14 of a word X for a person Z — in the broadest interpretation of the word connotatum — I mean all that Z may possibly associate with the significans and the significatum of X when he uses the word. It is clear that several kinds of connotata can be distinguished on the basis of (a) the content, (b) the characteristics of associations (cognitive, emotive, etc.), and (c) the persons relative to whom the connotatum is determined, namely subjective, intersubjective, etc. M y impression is that K a t z and his followers regard the semantic markers as describing the significatum of a word. I do not think that it is in Katz' intention to include into a description of the meaning of a word (a lexical reading) for instance the intersubjective opinions about the significatum of the word (viz. cognitive, intersubjective connotatum of a word). In other words, I do not believe that Katz wants the semantic markers for 'horse' to include in their description the information that the leg of a horse weighs X kilos and has a length of Y metres, or that the origin of the genus horse dates back L years and happened by mutation of the genus Z . If K a t z does not differentiate the connotatum (in its widest sense) and the significatum of a word, all our factual knowledge about the referent of a word will have to This at least is the position of K a t z and F o d o r in " T h e Structure of a Semantic Theory". In " T h e Structure of a Semantic Theory", F o d o r and K a t z distinguish three parts in the lexical content of a w o r d : a. semantic markers, b. selectional restrictions, c. distinguishes. The semantic markers intend to reflect whatever systematic semantic relations hold between that item and the rest of the vocabulary of the language. Semantic markers essentially determine restrictions and play a role in selectional restrictions. The distinguishers are this part of the meaning which does not play a role in selection of meanings and selectional restrictions. In the Philosophy of Language the distinguishers disappear. However, the factual hybrid content of distinguishers are introduced as semantic markers. 14 More about connotatum, see later on. 11

15

36

ON SOME LINGUISTIC NOTIONS

be expressed by semantic markers. As a result, no room would be left for synthetical truth or falsehood. All sentences would be either analytical or contradictory.16 This result could be avoided by stating that in a lexical reading some associations can be connected with each other by disjunction. This creates, however, a problem: If the significatum of a word only contains disjunctions, only one kind of contradictory or analytical utterance is possible, viz. respectively (a) a conjunction or implication with the sequence of disjunctions in one member and with the negation of ALL disjunctions (in one of its possible formulations) in the other one, and (b) the implication with the second member as a repetition of the first. Therefore, it is necessary to construct at least a part of the lexical reading of a word by associations which are not connected by disjunction. For yet another separate reason it does not seem to me permissible either to connect all intersubjective associations with a significans by means of a disjunction. In principle I can understand that for instance the properties 'living', 'dead', ... are accidental and therefore disjunctive associations of a significatum of the word 'bird'. This can, however, not be said of the concept 'female' for the word 'nun', or 'mammal' for the word 'whale', etc. On the basis of our knowledge or conception of the world it is not true that 'a whale is or is not a mammal', while it is true that 'a bird is or is not alive'. In other words, it is not possible that one whale is a mammal while another is not, but one bird can indeed be alive while another is not. The conclusion that can be drawn from this is that there are associations which cannot be connected with a significans by means of disjunction. Once this has been accepted, it is not difficult to prove that a differentiation between significatum and connotatum is necessary. When you have found concepts which must be conjunctive associations to a significans and you know that they form part of the significatum Y, you obtain the following: If their belonging to Y is denied, you get a contradiction; if their belonging to Y is affirmed, you get an analytical judgment. Let us consider sentences (1) and (2). (1) A whale is a mammal. (2) A whale is not a mammal. Sentence (2) — although false — does not appear to be contradictory, nor does sentence (1) seem analytical. (More about this in Chapter II, 2). As a consequence, 'mammal' does not belong to the significatum of 'whale'. Though this proves that the intersubjective associations to a significans need not automatically belong to the significatum Y of that significans, I do agree that in the process of the evolution of the significata of the words they can become integrated in Y. How this happens, must be determined by the study of the evolution of the significata. It is also obvious that by use of definition — for instance in the language used in science — the normal significatum of a word can be changed and extended, 16

Katz in his article "Unpalatable Recipes for Buttering Parsnips" also argues that a differentiation between significatum and association is necessary.

ON THE SIGNIFICATUM OF A MORPHEME

37

which may equally come to influence the evolution of the significatum of a word in natural language. Another argument for the differentiation of 'significatum' and 'connotatum' will be given in Chapter II, 2. Let us now construct a few lexical readings for some words to make clear some characteristics of Katz' approach. The words in (...) will be used as samples for semantic markers, and the words in & ... & as symbols for selectional restrictions. bachelor (—married) ( + m a n ) ( + a n i m a t e ) table (+physical object) (—animate) ... eat (...) & + animate for subject & ... In Katz' view we have a semantic anomaly when we have a constituent for which no semantic reading can be found, i.e. when for no possible deep structure of the constituent in question a projection rule can be found which can — without violating the selectional restriction — form the meaning of the constituent on the basis of the meaning of the constituents that are part of it. As we now see the two problems I mentioned in the introductory discussion of de Saussure are also present in the framework of transformational grammar. These problems are: (A) the problem of determining the content of the significatum of a morpheme, and (B) the problem of whether there are linguistic restrictions to the combinatory possibilities of significata. The latter problem must be clearly distinguished from the problem of linguistic restrictions on the combination of categories 16 of words. (In [B] the linguistic restrictions on combinations of significata of these categories are concerned). Katz 17 says that the contradiction and the analyticity depend on whether the semantic markers of the predicate (a) (VP) are included in the semantic markers of the subject (b) (NP) or whether markers in (a) are the negation or the contradictory of those in (b). (Subject and predicate can be formally defined in transformational grammar, e.g. in Chomsky's Aspects of the Theory of Syntax). In the first case we have analyticity, in the second we have contradiction. One condition is, of course, that no selectional restrictions are violated. With these notions in mind we can say that — in Katz' approach — (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) "

'The bachelor is married' is contradictory. 'The bachelor is unmarried' is analytical. 'Our bird is dead' is contradictory. (?) 'A dog has sixteen legs' is false (synthetical) 'This dog eats' is perhaps true (synthetical) 'This bird eats' is perhaps true (synthetical)

About the notion 'category', see Chapter III, footnote 5. A detailed version of this can be found in J. J. Katz' "Analyticity and Contradiction in natural languages". 11

38

ON SOME LINGUISTIC NOTIONS

(7) 'A table eats' is a semantical anomaly 18 (8) 'A man is a the' is syntactically deviant. Sentence (3) creates a problem. Nobody will say that this sentence is contradictory. To avoid being compelled to call it contradictory one could possibly say that the semantic marker 'animate' is not a part of the significata of the word 'bird'. If we do not include this semantic marker, sentence (6) becomes semantically anomalous because — according to the selectional restrictions of Katz — the subject of the verb 'eat' must be animate. We may wonder whether we are not giving the wrong interpretation to the word 'animate', whether with a different interpretation sentence (3) would not be contradictory, or in other words the sentence 'something that is animate, is dead' would not be contradictory. What we are facing here is the problem of the interpretation of semantic markers. A remark that J. J. Katz makes on semantic markers is "..., although the semantic markers are given the orthography of a natural language, they cannot be identified with the words or expressions of the language used to provide them with suggestive labels." 19 As a consequence the problem arises : How then has a label for a particular semantic marker to be interpreted? If it is agreed that the label for a semantic marker does not have to be interpreted in the same manner as it is normally interpreted in a natural language, what interpretation should be given to it — as it is clear that it must have some interpretation. I do not think that Katz will defend the position that this interpretation of a semantic marker which belongs to a language Lu is necessarily not or sometimes not explicitly expressible in this natural language Lx (or, for that matter, in any other language). It is obvious that a semantic marker needs an interpretation different from the implicit role and function it has for the selectional restrictions. But the set of semantic markers constitutes the significatum of a word. Now if these semantic markers have no content, the question is: "What is communicated by language?" To make the interpretation of a label of a semantic marker Y explicit you can use as a control for a proposed interpretation (a) the accepted selectional restrictions relating to this marker Y, and (b) analytical and contradictory sentences in which the semantic marker Y appears. When you have a hypothesis for the function of a certain semantic marker (in respect to selectional restriction, analyticity, contradiction, etc.), you can try to find an explicit interpretation of the label that is at least reconcilable with the hypothesized function. If no such explicit interpretation reconcilable with the hypothesis can be found, you may be obliged to change the initial hypothesis or to make a major change in the theoretical framework. 18

Chomsky even argues that the sentence 'the table eats' is a syntactical deviant sentence (see e.g. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax). " J. J. Katz, The Philosophy of Language, p. 156.

ON THE SIGNIFICATUM OF A MORPHEME

39

Bearing this in mind, I will discuss an attempt to find an explicit interpretation for the semantic marker 'animate'. We know that — to Katz — sentence (8) is semantically anomalous, because a verb such as 'eat' requires an animate subject (this is a selectional restriction on the verb 'eat'). (7) This bird eats. (8) This table eats. Sentence (7), however, is semantically correct. In consequence, we know that the semantic marker 'plus animate' must belong to the set of semantic markers of 'bird', but not of 'table'. What kind of interpretation has to be given to animate, to account for the fact that 'bird' has the "property" described by this label whereas 'table' has not? The interpretation that comes most easily here is that something 'is alive'. This interpretation does not fit the case, however. If 'animate' is given the interpretation of 'being alive' and if "this semantic marker" belongs to the semantic reading of 'bird', then 'this bird is alive' or 'this living bird' must be analytical. Sentence (9) is not contradictory, however, but sentence (10) is. (9) This bird is dead. (10) This living bird is dead. Consequently, 'animate' — in the hypothesis that it is a part of a semantic reading of 'bird' — cannot have the interpretation of 'living'. If the hypothesis that it is a part of a semantic reading of 'bird' is rejected and if we keep the hypothesis of the above mentioned selectional restriction on the verb 'eat' (viz. having an animate subject), then sentence (9) must be semantically anomalous, which it certainly is not. A tentative stance to get a solution to this problem is that the significance of 'dead' is synonymous with "having been alive but not anymore" 20 . This interpretation of 'dead', though perhaps correct, offers no solution either. The reason why is that sentence (11) is not contradictory, but sentence (12) is. (11) This bird was alive, but not anymore now. (12) This living bird was alive, but not anymore now. Another kind of tentative position for a solution is to try to find another interpretation for 'animate' which differs from 'being alive'. The first of this kind is the proposal to interpret 'animate' as 'organic'. 21 Although this solution seems attractive, it is much too broad because, as a consequence of this interpretation, sentences (13) and (14) would be semantically correct, and sentences (15) and (16) anomalous. (13) A wooden door eats. ,0 11

This is a proposal of Y. Willems in a personal discussion. This is a proposal of W. Ver Eecke in a personal discussion.

40

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(14) A tooth eats. (15) An iron door eats. (16) A stone eats. Another tentative answer seems, at the first sight, more likely to be satisfactory. It is as follows: 'Animate' must be interpreted as 'a typical member of this species is alive'.22 Consequently, 'a bird is dead' is not contradictory, nor is 'this bird is alive' analytical. With this interpretation a sentence such as 'This dead bird eats' is not contradictory, nor semantically anomalous. I think Katz would like it to be either. He can accomplish this by saying, for instance, that 'eat', 'think' (viz., all verbs with a selectional restriction of 'animate') have a semantic marker 'alive'. If that is so, then 'This dead bird eats' becomes contradictory. Two remarks must be made. First of all in this approach sentence (17) is anomalous. (17) This archaeopteryx eats.23 A typical member of this species is not alive. Consequently, 'archaeopteryx' is not animate (according to the last definition). Therefore it does not satisfy the selectional restriction of the verb which requires animate subjects. Another remark is that if we say that 'eat' has a semantic marker 'alive', then sentences (18) and (19), (20) and (21) are synonymous. (18) (19) (20) (21)

He eats. He is alive and he eats. Eat! Be alive and eat!

This does not seem very natural. What is even less natural is that sentence (22) is not contradictory, but sentence (23) is, although both must be synonymous if 'alive' is a semantic marker of 'eat'. The reason for this is that when we negate the verb 'eat', we negate all of the semantic markers that are part of the lexical reading of 'eat' (if this is not the case, we have to introduce a new type of negation). (22) He does not eat, but he is alive. (23) He does not eat and he is not alive but he is alive. In respect to the first remark, viz., the anomaly of sentence (17), the anomaly could be avoided by broadening the proposed interpretation of 'animate' into "a typical member of this species was once alive". Here two new problems arise. One of them is in connection with the nature of a semantic marker. Fodor and Katz24 contend that a semantic marker is atomic. If this implies that a semantic marker is not itself divisible into other semantic markers, then it is difficult to see how 'a typical member of this species was once alive' could do without the semantic " "

14

This was a proposal made by H. Putnam in a personal discussion. Each species of animals or plants which does not exist anymore can substitute 'archaeopterix'. Katz, J. J., and Fodor, J. A., "The Structure of a Semantic Theory", p. 496.

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marker 'past' as a real part of it. The same can be said about an interpretation of 'animate' as 'having been alive'. The other problem is that sentences (24) and (25), in this interpretation of'animate', will be semantically anomalous. (24) The unicorn eats. (25) The giants eat. In theoretical specialized language this result might be called a success, but it seems a strange result where a natural language is concerned. The requirement that a typical member of a species should ever have been alive, seems rather arbitrary as a requirement for sentences (24) and (25). One conclusion that can definitely be drawn from this discussion is that the task of making semantic markers explicit not only is NOT trivial, but even a necessity in Katz' framework. One could even conclude that 'animate' is not a semantic marker for 'bird'. In consequence it would be difficult to maintain that there is a selectional restriction on the verb 'eat' ('animate subject'). If one does not reject the selectional restriction on 'eat', 'A bird eats' is semantically anomalous — which it obviously is not. If the selectional restriction is rejected, sentence (7) (The table eats) is not a semantically anomalous sentence, but a synthetic false one. In this case there would be no fundamental difference between (4) and (7): both are synthetical false sentences. The only difference may consist in the degree of falseness — one is perhaps more obviously false than the other — but both are false sentences. A solution to the problems raised by the selectional restriction of 'animate' may be found in the integration of the semantic marker 'animate' as a disjunctive component of the significatum of the word 'bird' — and not as a conjunctive element. It is necessary here to account for the integration of disjunctive elements in the significatum of a word. For it could be argued that disjunctive elements are accidental elements associated with the non-disjunctive (i.e. essential) elements of the significatum, and therefore only a part of the connotatum of a word. Yet, another question is whether the introduction of disjunctive parts is sufficient to save the selectional restrictions in all cases — because not all semantic markers can be disjunctive parts of a significatum (as was proved above). Let us now consider yet a more general argument to expose the problems inherent in the acceptance of the use of selectional restrictions in the field of semantics. In a seminar Katz told us that it is necessary to construct selectional restrictions so that sentences (26 a and b) are semantically anomalous, but not (27 a and b).2B (26) a. A hand is a part of a finger, b. The hand of the finger. The argumentation is not dependent on the example. We could as well use the sentence "the table eats".

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(27) a. A finger is a part of a hand, b. A finger of a hand. This could be realized by a selectional restriction on the lexical reading of "a part of" or "of", etc. ... This could be made possible by, for example, the restriction that the NP following the above mentioned expressions (X) must be subordinated to the NP preceding them (Y) (or standing in another syntactic relation to X). This kind of subordination could be obtained by the introduction of certain kinds of indexes. If a wordj has a lexical reading to which belongs a semantic marker with an index of the appropriate type, and if this index is lower than the one of a semantic marker belonging to a reading of word 2 , then wordi must precede and word 2 must follow the expression. Otherwise the constituent would be semantically anomalous. The restriction that the index must be of the appropriate type prevents us from taking X to be a part of Y of which it cannot possibly be a part. This guarantees that sentence (28) is not semantically correct, whereas sentence (29) is. (28) The hand of a tree. (29) A branch of a tree. It is clear that this approach implies a very complex strategy of indexes, as in Dutch, for example, it is quite normal to speak of 'the foot of a tree' (de voet van een boom). 26 If we adopt this approach with indexes, sentences (30) and (31) must be semantically anomalous. (30) The gills of a horse. (31) The gills of a whale. Horses and whales are mammals. Gills are parts of fish and not of mammals. The indexes must be organized in such a way that sentences (30) and (31) are semantically anomalous. Let us now, for a moment, consider the position of semantics in a language. If the approach mentioned above is adopted, somebody who knows English is supposed to know that a whale is a mammal and that no mammals have gills. Every speaker of English must also know that tables, machines, etc. ... are '-animate', and that it is therefore foolish to say that 'a machine thinks'. When, however, a bunch of people discuss the problem whether machines do indeed think — 'Do machines think?' 27 — we must conclude that their knowledge of English is poor, or that their English is in evolution, viz. that the significatum of either 'machine' or 'think' has changed or is changing. A conception of language as the one held by Katz gives me the impression that our " Still much more complex strategies are necessary for instance to make semantically anomalous a sentence as "ik ben met mijn verkeerde bed uit het been gestapt" (I left my leg with the wrong bed), a transformation of "Ik ben uit bed gestapt met het verkeerde been (I left my bed with the wrong leg)" what means 'to be in a bad temper*. " See the book Minds and Machines.

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knowledge and view of the world is strongly limited by our language: much of the evolution of our view of the world would be reduced to a simple change in the significata of the words. A remark of H. Putnam 28 seems quite to the point here: "It is a distortion to say that Einstein merely changed the meaning of the words. Indeed, it was precisely because Einstein did not change the meaning of the words, because he was really talking about shortest paths in the space in which we live and move and have our being, that general relativity seemed so incomprehensible when it was first proposed. To be told that one could come back to the same place by moving in one direction on a straight line! Adopting general relativity was indeed ADOPTING A WHOLE NEW SYSTEM OF CONCEPTS, BUT THAT IS NOT TO SAY 'ADOPTING A NEW SYSTEM OF VERBAL LABELS'."

It seems a real distortion and an untenable position to regard the transition from 'a whale is a fish' to 'a whale is a mammal' as a linguistic process, consisting in the mere substitution of the semantic marker 'mammal' for the semantic marker 'fish' in the lexical reading of 'whale'. It does not seem possible to me to maintain that semantically 'a whale has gills' was once correct, but has now become anomalous. In my opinion sentences (32 to 35) are synthetical sentences. The same applies to sentence (36). I do agree, though, with the fact that our knowledge of the world may account for considerable differences in the degree of evidence of truth or falseness. (32) (33) (34) (35) (36)

A whale is a fish. A whale is a mammal. A whale has gills. A finger has three hands. Machines think.

Here it is clear that in Katz' approach to language, our thinking and our opinion about the world are too strongly determined and limited by the introduction of selectional restrictions. For, if this approach is adopted, the above-mentioned evolution of thought becomes inexpressible in language. In order to express them, you need an evolution of the significata of words, but then the change is no real evolution of thought. Indeed, who would say that the man who claims there is a lot of gold to be found on the shore has made a discovery if he appears to be using 'gold' as a significans for the significatum of the word 'sand'? Somebody who says that machines can think does not usually change the significata of the significantes 'machine' and 'think', or the selectional restrictions. If this were the case, he would never be able to tell us anything new, except perhaps that his language has changed or that he does not understand the language. However, I agree that a lot of discoveries and inventions do in part depend on a change in the meaning of a word (explication of the word used). The change in meaning may have been of considerable importance heuristically. But a discovery is M

Putnam, H., Minds and Machines, p. 86.

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not important solely on the basis of a change in meaning; if it only depends on that, it may not even be a discovery. I hope this emphasizes sufficiently the danger of making too strongly depending on language not only 'general knowledge', but also its communication, as is done by the use of the selectional restrictions. If we ignore this, important changes in opinion or at least the communication of them becomes in fact impossible. I do not, however, wish to deny the fact that certain characteristics of language can indeed fundamentally influence our concept formation, our mental development, and our opinions. To what extent this may happen seems to be an open question so far. But in this connection L. S. Vygotsky's Thought and Language seems very interesting. In my opinion, therefore, expression (37) is false, but not at all semantically anomalous. (37) A hand of a finger. The semantic structure or the structure of the significata of (37) is identical with the one of the expression (38). (38) 'A hand' is a part of 'a finger'. Both are false. Our connotatum of 'finger' is such that 'a hand' is not, or cannot be a part of 'a finger'. But this does not imply that they are semantically anomalous. Maybe they are contradictory or only obviously false. Whichever it is, depends on the content of the significata and the connotata of 'hand' and 'finger'. It appears to me that the same can be said of sentence (39). (39) The green laugh was loud. This sentence contains two judgments (argumentation for this analysis can be found in Part Two): roughly (a) the laugh was green and (b) this peculiar laugh was loud. Part (a) is obviously false in the strict interpretation of the words that belong to it. Part (b) may be false too. That depends on how you see the relation between the two parts. Put more formally, what about 3A' (P (Qx)), if P and Q are predicates and if 3X(Qx) is false? I will not discuss this problem here. In any case it is not at all clear to me how this type of sentence can be used as a justification for the existence of selectional restrictions in semantics. Another argument against selectional restrictions is connected with fairy-tales. In order to describe and explain the use of language in fairy-tales, where trees talk or fight, or rabbits give orders to human beings, etc., transformational grammars will need a rather elaborate extra-syntactical and semantic apparatus. If selectional restrictions are not used, such an elaborate apparatus will not be needed. I am also aware of yet another possible situation. When we hear an utterance which completely deviates from our opinions about the world, including the opinion we have about the speaker and his views, we will conclude that the speaker cannot

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have intended what we have understood. And we will try to give another interpretation to the utterance, 29 an interpretation that is more up to our expectations. Such a possibility does not require the introduction of linguistic selectional restrictions either, not does it justify them. The process of correction can be set off simply on the grounds of our opinions and the realization of deviations from it. We may, for example, hypothesize that we have misunderstood some part of the utterance, in which case we will replace this part by another word or other words (certain restrictions on substitutions certainly exist). We may also make a more suitable syntactical analysis of the sentence or supply certain words with other lexical readings. Or we may hypothesize that the speaker producing the utterance used an elliptical code. Then, on the basis of our knowledge of the elliptical code, we may try to reconstruct the explicit code. We may also think that some words were used metaphorically, or that the speaker deliberately changed the significatum of a word in an arbitrary way ('arbitrary' — from the linguistic point of view). In this case we may, given the situation, try to guess how the linguistic code was changed, i.e. which word has been given the significatum of which word. The following anecdote may serve to illustrate the last-mentioned situation. Two friends are going to school. One always has a bookbag with him. One day he forgets his bag. Realizing this, he suddenly says: 'I forgot my razor!' His friend, knowing that he does not need a razor at school and seeing that he has not got his bookbag with him, may conclude — rightly — that he really intended to say that he forgot his bookbag. 30 I will briefly deal with the phenomenon of metaphor here, though more will be said about this further. When we hear a sentence such as 'This mountain is a mouse', we will not usually — rightly or wrongly — in view of the knowledge we have, interpret it in its strict sense, but rather as something like 'This mountain is very small compared with other mountains in its environment'. This does not, however, imply that we conclude that this sentence is semantically anomalous in its strict interpretation 31 . It only proves that the strict interpretation of it seems improbable. It is also conceivable that a semantically correct sentence, though clearly audible, " Another possibility is that one concludes that the received utterance as a whole is not spoken by the same speaker. About this subject are interesting (a) Rommetveit's book Linguistic and Nonlinguistic Components of Communication, and (b) also the experiments of G. Peeters in "Causal attributions of messages as a function of intermessage semantic relations". This is a personal experience. A friend of mine took this manner of communication with significantes with arbitrary significatum. There even was no associative link, for instance: 'a razor instead of a bookbag, a television instead of a pencil,...'. In general he was rather well understood. For similar examples, see Vygotsky in Thought and Language. " Even the question can be asked if the penomenon 'metaphore' can be applied on ungrammatical sentences! In case of a negative answer, one cannot argue that a sentence as 'A table eats' is anomalous, but gets an interpretation by metaphor. It must be obvious that real grammatical sentences can be used metaphorically. Everybody will agree about the grammaticalness of "This mountain is a mouse". Are there examples of sentences, which are metaphorically used and of which everybody agrees that they are ungrammatical? From the analysis given further on, it will become clear that a metaphor is an operation on significata and connotata of grammatical sentences.

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sounds so improbable (when we are totally unable to find a more probable interpretation for it) that we conclude that the speaker used 'the wrong word(s)' or that his mastery of the language is poor. But, again, this does not mean that the sentence — we heard — is a semantical anomaly, simply because the content sounds unlikely. The conclusion from all this is that it is not at all clear whether 'selectional restrictions' are linguistically justifiable. Why hypothesize such a strong restriction on a language? A restriction which — in principle — so strongly reduces the capacity of language for the communication of thought? Why should it be 'impossible' in English or Dutch, or indeed in any other language, to ask seriously the question: 'Do you think that tables talk to each other?' Why should we not be allowed to express the truism — although truisms seems to come very natural to some users of language — that 'tools do not eat' and that 'the table, which does not eat, cannot have a stomach-ache'? However, in the transformational approach such sentences are syntactically deviant or semantically anomalous. Everybody, including Chomsky and Katz, agrees that we do understand sentences as 'The table eats', etc. ... but Chomsky argues that they are only understood in analogy with grammatical sentences.32 We are placed, therefore, in a rather paradoxical situation. First we need many complications to make these sentences syntactically deviant (Chomsky) or semantically anomalous (Katz), then we need complications to make them understandable, viz. to eliminate the complications we first constructed. Because there are no fundamental nor decisive arguments which justify or necessitate the first complications, it seems reasonable to omit them. The strangeness we experience in certain situations when hearing sentences as 'the table eats', 'the cigar smokes John', etc. seems to have to be explained on the ground of the place of the content of the sequence in our model of the world. This hypothesis is partly confirmed by the observation that the above-mentioned sentences, which are affirmations, are less strange or not at all strange when denied or put in question. My hypothesis that a sentence as 'the table eats' is grammatical recognizes to the fullest extent the simplicity of the linguistic system and the usability of language for communication, which — to my mind — is underrated by Chomsky. I also want to draw attention to the fact that even Chomsky does accept that some grammatical sentences are cognitively absurd. In "The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory" 33 he writes: "Grammatical sentences may or may not be significant and we must distinguish between grammatical nonsense and non-grammatical nonsense". Also, when we perfectly understand, even if by analogy — as Chomsky and Katz agree on such as possibility — sentences as 'a table eats', we do need a cognitive system too to reject these sentences (in fact rather their structures of concepts) as obviously false. " "

Chomsky, N., Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. Chomsky, N „ "The Logical Structure of the Linguistic Theory", op. cit. 8.

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When, then, it is clear that in any case a cognitive system is necessary,34 why not use it in such a way that the theory of the language system is maximally simplified?

2. THE RELATION CONNOTATUM-SIGNIFICATUM

The concept of connotatum has already been widely discussed.35 As is the case with the concept of meaning, the number of interpretations given to 'connotatum' equals about the number of authors that have dealt with the problem. In section 1,1 already proposed an interpretation of the concept of connotatum. By the connotatum of a word (or sequence of words) I mean — in its broadest interpretation — the set of all possible associations with the significans and the significatum of that word (or sequence of words). 36 As I have said above, it is important to distinguish between different types of connotata. This can be done according to various criteria, for example (a) the kind of associations, (b) the number or quality of the people who make the associations, and (c) the duration of the association in the life of an individual or in the evolution of a culture. This problem will not be dealt with extensively here. 37 When I speak about the connotatum of a word (or sequence of words) I will use it in a more restricted sense, namely the set of all the concepts that are cognitively (i.e. by means of cognitive processes) and directly associated with the significatum of a word by a particular group of people (the intersubjective connotatum). When using this concept, we must distinguish four important parts connected with the concept of 'sign': 'significans', 'significatum', 'meaning', and 'connotatum'. In chapter I, I defined the concept of meaning as the relation between the significans and the significatum.

My interpretation of the concept of meaning was motivated by the view that the 'meaning' of a word is a hypothesis which helps to explain the use of that word. 34

Some other arguments about the necessity of a nonlinguistic-cognitive system are given in "De transformationale grammatica en haar toekomst" [The transformational grammar and its future], " I.e. Mill, J. S., "Logique", I, II, § 5. Martin, "Towards a systematic pragmatic". 38 It is a problem whether meaning — viz. that what helps to explain the use of a word, must be limited to the explanation of the cognitive use, or whether it includes the explanation of the emotive use of a word being therefore not extralinguistic. Is it necessary for the explanation of the emotive use of a word to make a differentiation analogous to the differentiation connotatum, significatum? " See f.e. Martin, (op. cit.).

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I searched for this explanation in a directed program connecting a significans, a word, with a certain program or significatum. Of course, where or when the word actually will be used depends on (a) its meaning, viz. the characteristics of its meaning and (b) the usability of these characteristics for the speaker's purpose. By interpreting 'meaning' as THE HYPOTHESIS WHICH EXPLAINS THE USE OF THE 38 WORD TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SITUATION, and not — as Wittgenstein does — as the use itself one has the advantage that the task of describing 'meaning' really is simplified. Let us put this more concretely. Suppose there is a big fire — everybody will interpret the cry 'Water!' as an invitation to bring water to extinguish the fire. Suppose, however, that a dykeburst which everybody feared would happen, happens indeed. The exclamation 'Water!' will be understood by everybody involved in this situation as a warning of the danger of water. If, however, a stranger who has not been informed about the imminent dykeburst gets involved in the latter situation, he may when hearing the exclamation 'Water!' think there is a fire somewhere — while everybody else is thinking of the dykeburst. This example clearly illustrates the fact that the significatum of a word is integrated in a model of the world. Different states of a listener's model of the world cause entirely different reactions. Here, I do agree with Wittgenstein39. Yet there is something that Wittgenstein neglects, viz. that these situations have something in common: one element of the cause of reaction, namely the significatum 'water'. The other element of the cause, of reaction which is responsible for the differences, is the differing state of the model of the world. And it is precisely the common element that makes the study of language possible. Let us make an analogy. My actual use of 'a knife' will depend on (a) the characteristics of 'the knife', (b) the purpose I have, and (c) the usabiltiy of these characteristics for my purpose which will in turn depend on the characteristics of the object I want to influence. Similarly, the actual use of any word must depend on the characteristics of its meaning, my purpose and the usability of these characteristics for my purpose which will depend on the characteristics of the object I want to influence. Here in casu this is the model of the world, of the listener, the interrelations between parts of it, viz. associations, etc. ... It will be obvious that a description of all possible uses of a word and of all possible associations with that word can be indefinite. To try to describe this is practically impossible. Therefore the interpretation of 'meaning' as the use of a word and the identification of significatum or connotatum is not rewarding. It is not, then, rewarding to try to describe all possible uses of 'a knife'. But to try to describe the characteristics of 'the knife' which explain its uses seems more realistic to me. The same applies to 'meaning'. 38 M

Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 43. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 27.

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But as the actual use of the knife is not only dependent on the characteristics of the knife but also on the object I want to influence with it, the model of the world and therefore the connotatum of a sign is as important for the actual use of the word as the significatum of the word. The connotatum indicates how a significatum is connected with the model of the world for a particular person (or group) at a particular time. It is a sub-structure of the model of the world and it is in constant change. The model of the world is, for instance, important for the solution of ambiguity and thus for the problems of translation. I even believe that the solution of the problems involved in completely automatic translation will depend on the possibility of simulating models of the world. Up to now I have repeatedly adduced evidence for the necessity of differentiating 'significatum' (a linguistic notion) from 'connotatum' (a notion of the model of the world). Actually this differentiation is not very easy to make. By hypothesis each is composed of elements connected by a description-model program, although two different ones, viz. the meaning program and the association program. I know of no direct method (i.e. a method determining which elements in the human being are activated by the former or the latter program) to differentiate the two programs. The following indirect method seems therefore useful to me. At the outset no differentiation is made between the connotatum and the significatum of a sign. The confusion between the two is kept on purpose. Then a differentiation is made on the basis of the hypothesis (the minimal hypothesis) that the significatum of a morpheme is as minimal as possible, viz. that only those concepts or that combination of concepts which are necessary and sufficient to explain the presence of a morpheme in a certain context, are parts of the significatum of a morpheme. IF WE MAKE USE OF THIS HYPOTHESIS, A MORPHEME HAS A MAXIMAL POSSIBILITY TO BE

USED. Of course, by means of definitions the significatum of a word can always be expanded. This is what often happens in the specialized languages of science. The more the significatum is expanded, the more difficult communication becomes. In section 3. of this chapter this 'minimal method' and some requirements for the contexts will be discussed more extensively. At present I shall clarify the difference between 'significatum' and 'connotatum' by a few examples. Suppose that in natural languages, as in English or Dutch, the significatum of the significans 'whale' is something of about this shape:

(I will later discuss the kind of arguments which — in my opinion — can be used to

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form a hypothesis about the signification of a particular significans, a hypothesis which remains open for revision. I do not wish to discuss the problem of whether the concept of whale is indeed a shape — the problem of the nature of concepts is not within the scope of this work). T o me, part of the connotatum of the sign 'whale' includes that it is a mammal, it always lives in water, and considerable adaptations have been necessary for it to be able to live in water. T o be sure, quite a lot of people will agree that this is indeed part of the connotatum of 'whale'. Yet I think it is possible for competent users of the language to be convinced that a whale is a fish. The discovery that a whale is a mammal is not, perhaps, a very old one. In this connection the Dutch significans for 'whale' — walvis — is typical: the significans 'fish? is part of the significans 'walvzs'. In English there would be something analogous if, for example, a blackbird were not a bird, but a fish. It is theoretically possible that one day a scientist finds serious evidence for the fact that a whale is a fish after all. He may find that a whale is a fish that lived on the shore for a considerable period of time and underwent some adaptations to that purpose. After that terrestial period the animal became aquatic again and re-adapted itself to its environment. This would amount to the whale, though homothermous, having more characteristics in common with fish. In my opinion such a change in our opinion about our model of the word could happen without any change in the significata of the words 'fish', 'whale', 'mammal', but on the basis of new observations, better observations or better criteria. On the other hand it must be clear that in these cases the connotata of the words 'fish', 'whale' and 'mammal' will undergo a fundamental change.

This, then, exemplifies

how there can be a change in the connotatum of a word without any change in the significatum of it. Another interesting example illustrating the fruitfulness of the use of the notions 'significatum' and 'connotatum' is offered by the problem raised by 'the morning and the evening star'. Astronomers say that the two stars are in fact but one and the same. Yet, have they the same significatum? I would argue that the significatum of 'morning star' is something like 'the star which generally can be seen in the morning as the last star', whereas the significatum of 'evening star' is something like 'the star which can be seen in the evening before all the other ones'. T o some people the fact that these two stars are one and the same may be a part of the connotatum of these signs. Here again theoretically the possibility exists — though this may be highly improbable — that this observation is proved wrong or that a wrong hypothesis produced a wrong conclusion. Such changes do not need to be explained by changes in language, but by changes in our opinions about the world. The introduction of the notion of 'significatum' and of the 'minimal hypothesis' about the significatum of a word has the important advantage that it explains the usefulness of language for communication between people with widely divergent or

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quickly changing opinions. To one person the connotatum of the word 'salt' will perhaps be 'something that is used in cooking meals', to another it may be 'NaCl' — but both will perfectly understand each other when one asks 'Will you pass me the salt, please.' The distinction 'connotatum' — 'significatum' also explains how it is possible that one person to whom the connotatum of 'whale' includes that it is a fish, is amazed to learn that a whale has no gills. Whereas some other person who thinks it is a mammal would be equally amazed to hear that a whale has gills. Both, however, would understand the expression. To the one it may be a false sentence, to the other a true one, but to both it would be a correct sentence as far as language is concerned. After all this, however, I want to emphasize once again the important point that not each sign necessarily has a significatum. What is, for example, the significatum of 'to' in 'I think to go home'? Or of 'to' in 'I think to see that'? In Chapter I, I defined a 'sign' as 'a form which has meaning'. 'Meaning' is NOT used here as a synonym for 'significatum'. The meaning of a word can be a program consisting in (a) connecting a significans with its significatum, (b) making connections between meanings of other words, (c) performing operations on meanings of other words or even (d) making a connection between a significans and a dummy symbol which has a certain connotatum. About meanings of the kind mentioned in (d) one could perhaps say that certain words used in highly specialized sciences have such a kind of meaning. In this respect a quotation from Quine's Word and Object40 is quite enlightening: One tends to imagine that when someone propounds a theory concerning some sort of objects our understanding of what he is saying will have two phases: first we must understand what the objects are, and second we must understand what the theory says about them. 41 In the case of molecules two such phases are somewhat separable, thanks to the moderately good analogies which implement the first phase; yet much of our understanding of 'what the objects are' awaits the second phase. In the case of the wavicles there is virtually no significant separation; our coming to understand what the objects are is for the most part just our mastery of what the theory says about it. Picture two physicists discussing whether neutrinos have mass. Are they discussing the same objects? They agree that the physical theory which they initially share, the preneutrino theory, needs emendation in the light of an experimental result now confronting them. The one physicist is urging an emendation which involves positing a new category of particles, without mass. The other is urging an alternative emendation which involves positing a new category of particles with mass. The fact that both physicists use the word 'neutrino' is not significant. To discern two phases here, the first an agreement as to what the objects are (viz. neutrinos) and the second a disagreement as to how they are (massless or massive), is absurd.

In other words, for Quine too, the function of certain scientific terms is only a function in the system. The significatum of such words (viz. what a neutrino is) is zero, except 40 41

Quine, W. v. O., Word and Object, p. 16. In other words firstly learn the significatum and then its connotatum.

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ON SOME LINGUISTIC NOTIONS

perhaps for one element which has the role of activating the special associationrelations. In this case there is a maximal independency of thought from language. Of course, the function of this term or any other term in the system (connotatum of this term) can change. That happens when our opinion changes. But this does not necessarily imply that there is a change in significans, significatum or meaning. These may change and the connotatum can perhaps exercise some influence on this change. I wish to come back here to the importance of the possibility of definition in a language. Although the significatum of a word is minimal in my hypothesis, it is sometimes practical to use a term with a more expanded significatum. This can be achieved by describing the intended significatum by a combination of signs which has for significatum the intended significatum. If by stipulation we equal the significatum of a certain word X (definiendum) with the significatum of the sequence mentioned (definiens), then we can by stipulation vary the significatum of a word. This is a very powerful apparatus which is a part of language and which is very rewarding when used, for instance, in science. There are, however, a few peculiar characteristics and restrictions on a scientific use of this definition-apparatus, which will not be discussed here. 42 Earlier in this work I discussed the problem of how to interpret de Saussure's 'value'. With Bally and Sechehaye's examples and the criticism and interpretation of Godel in mind, one could perhaps accept that in my framework de Saussure's 'value' of a sign is identical with the connotatum of it, as far as this connotatum is composed from the significata of other signs of the same language, which are opposed to it. This interpretation is accounted for by (a) the fact that the difference in valueinterpretation between a sign and its translation is not trivial and (b) by the possibility to explain the fact that 'to sit in the sun' cannot — because of difference in 'valeur' of the words used — be used in certain languages, by the different connotata of these words in the various languages. In this interpretation of 'valeur', concepts which are associated with a word x, but are not a part of the significatum of any sign in the particular language the word x belongs to, (if such a thing exists at all) are not included in de Saussure's concept of value — as far as I understand it. Vygotsky, 43 however, says in Thought and Language: "We imagine thought and speech as two intersecting circles. In their overlapping part thought and speech coincide to produce what is called verbal thought ...". " The problem of reconstruction of the significatum of a word (Carnap, R., "Logical Foundation of Probability") is partly the problem how to translate the vague concept into exact terms. This, however, is not an arbitrary manner (Carnap gives a few adequacy requirements). A difficulty is that it may be possible that all the terms are vague to a certain extent (Quine: "Word and Object" and Jiri v Neustupny: "On the Analysis of Linguistic Vagueness"). Therefore the problem is not as much how to translate a vague term! into exact terms, but how to translate a vague term! into vague terms 2 , with such a restriction though that the vague terms 2 are clear enough (more clear than term!) for the purpose, or for certain aspects of the purpose. 48 Vygotsky, Thought and Language, p. 47.

ON THE SIGNIFICATUM OF A MORPHEME

53

I think Vygotsky is right at least in the underlying hypothesis that there is thought which is to a certain extent independent of language. In other words, that it is not the case that ([language c thought] • [thought cz language]). I do not wish to discuss this here. But I do wish to take a look at the consequences in the hypothesis that Vygotsky is right. Our whole thinking certainly has an influence on the actual use of language and not only that part of our thought which is the intersection between language and thought. Therefore, I think, a more general notion of connotatum — than the one I hypothesize to correspond with de Saussures notion valeur — is important too.

3. SOME CUES FOR D E T E R M I N I N G THE SIGNIFICATUM OF A MORPHEME

The manner in which Katz in Philosophy of Language accounts for a certain marker being a part of the significatum (Katz calls it the meaning) of a word can be reduced to the following prototype. He writes 44 : "The English words 'bachelor', 'man', 'priest' have a semantic feature in common which is not part of the meaning of any of the words 'child', 'mole', 'mother', 'classmate', 'nuts', 'bolts', 'cow' etc. ... The first set of words, but not the second, are similar in meaning in that the meaning of each member contains the c o n c e p t of maleness.

IF WE INCLUDE THE SEMANTIC MARKER (MALE) IN THE LEXICAL

READINGS FOR EACH OF THE WORDS IN THE FIRST SET AND EXCLUDE IT FROM THE LEXICAL ENTRIES FOR EACH OF THE WORDS IN THE SECOND, WE THEREBY EXPRESS THIS EMPIRICAL GENERALIZATION . . .

In general,45 then, the mode of expressing semantic generalizations is the assignment of readings containing the relevant semantic marker(s) to those linguistic constructions over which the generalizations hold and only to those. The problem which immediately presents itself here is how to establish beyond question that a certain 'concept' or semantic marker is really a part of the significatum of the word and not a part of the connotatum of this word. How to make sure that in 'bachelor', 'priest', 'man' the concept 'male' is really a part of their significatum? Certainly, the method one would seem to induce from Katz' instances is that if we have two sets of words and if we find a property which is true for the whole of the first set and not true for any member of the second, then this property is a semantic marker. This seems, however, difficult to maintain. Applying this method, we can say, looking at "sparrow, bluejay, robin, whiting, codfish, etc." on the one side, and "door, umbrella, mountain, etc." on the other, that the first group has the property of being 'born in an egg', the second group does not. The same can be said about the property of 'to be able to eat', 'sleep', etc. Or, let us look at "milk, butter, water, etc." and at "door, mountain, etc." We can say that only the first group has the 11

"

Katz, J. J., Philosophy of Language, p. 157. Katz, o.c., p. 158.

54

ON SOME LINGUISTIC NOTIONS

property that the members of it can be put into any kind of recipient and that they take the shape of it. Let us also take a look at the sets (E, F) and (G, H) where E F G H

= = = =

man, car, ear, egg ... port, form, Katz, word, male ... chicken, lion, man ... cow, sheep, rabbit, chair, table ...

All members of E have the property of having only three letters, while this is not true for the members of F. The members of G have the property of eating animals, while this is not true for the set H. The question even arises if it is not possible to find for an arbitrary property a set of words which have this property (associated) and another set which lacks it. If this is true, then, are all properties semantic markers? Can the number of semantic markers be increased indefinitely? 46 Are all properties which happen to be associated with a set of words a part of the significatum of the words contained by that set? If not, under what kind of conditions is a property (concept) a semantic marker? The answer that the concept must be atomic and that therefore a concept such as 'born in an egg' cannot be used, can hardly be a solution. How to decide whether a concept is atomic? That we use more than one word to communicate it, does not prove that it is not atomic. 47 In Section 1., I already mentioned the MINIMAL METHOD. According to this method the significatum of a word is the combination of concepts which is SUFFICIENT AND NECESSARY TO EXPLAIN THE UNITY WHICH IS FOUND BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT UTTERANCES IN WHICH THIS WORD is USED. (Hypothesis I).

The first of the many problems that arise here is that a method is necessary to determine in what kind of utterance the word occurs for which we are trying to determine the significatum. That this is not always very easy becomes clear from sentences (1) and (2). (1) It swings. (2) Its wings. In speech it may be methodologically difficult to distinguish one from the other. A method that can be used here is the method discussed by Zellig Harris in "Distributional Structure" and Methods in Structural Linguistics. I will not take this problem into account here. I will only hypothesize that it is possible to determine and to recognize effectively the minimal language signs in a sequence of signs. A second problem is whether every sequence of language signs may be taken into " Bolinger touches an analogous problem in his "The atomization of meaning". " Katz, Philosophy of Language, p. 156: "It is important to stress that, although the semantic markers are given in the orthography of a natural language, they cannot be identified with the words or expressions of the language used to provide them with suggestive labels.

ON THE SIGNIFICATUM OF A MORPHEME

55

account when trying to determine the significatum of a word. One important remark is that utterances in which words are used metaphorically must be handled very carefully. The reason for this is that — in my opinion — the metaphorical use of a word means that the significatum b of a word X is replaced by the significatum a of a word Y. However, some parts of the connotatum of X with the significatum b are preserved, although a is now the significatum of X. For instance, in 'this car is a slug' the association 'slow' which is a part of the connotatum of the significatum 'slug', will be assigned to 'slug' in the interpretation of 'slug' with the significatum 'car'. Which part of the connotatum of a word will be preserved in metaphorical use, will depend on the connotatum of the word used metaphorically. If (a) the significatum of the metaphorically used sign ('slug' with the interpretation of 'car') and if (b) the significatum of this sign when not used metaphorically ('slug' in the interpretation of 'slug') have a same association, then this association will be preserved when this sign is used metaphorically. Thereby, however, this particular association will be especially stressed. The characteristic of especially stressing an association seems to me the most important function of a metaphor. The consequence of such an interpretation is that if somebody says 'this car is a slug' while the car in question is riding very fast although it is very small, then the association stressed may be 'the smallness of the car'. If, however, the car is very dirty and the speaker considers a slug to be a very dirty animal, then the stressed property may be the dirtiness. It is, of course, possible that the association which is stressed by metaphorical use is not the same for the speaker and for the listener. It is also possible that the metaphorical use, viz. the temporary substitution of the significatum b of a word X by another significatum a, with the above-mentioned intention, gives rise to a substantial change in the meaning of X. This may happen when the temporarily substituted significatum a becomes a constant part of the significatum of X, and the original significatum b may even disappear. 48 It will be obvious to everybody that for determining the significatum of a word 49 it is dangerous to use sequences in which the word is used metaphorically, because of the change of the significatum of a word occurring in metaphorical use. For the same reason, the same must be said about words which are used with a stipulated significatum or by definition. Neither can utterances in which the physical qualities of the significans are discussed, be taken into account to determine the significatum of the significans X. 18

In an extensive treatment of the phenomenon 'metaphor', it is necessary to relate the several degrees of metaphorical use (more explicit or more implicit) with simile, f.i. 'this car looks like a snail' (a simile), is more explicit than 'this car is a snail'. 49 One could perhaps argue that such utterances could be used for determining not the significatum of the metaphorically used word X, but the significatum of the word Y, of which the significatum is substituted for the one of the word X. Certainly, in cases where Y is not explicit (i.e. this is a snail, [while indicating a car]) this is dangerous too. Several words with a rather analogous significatum can be hypothesized to be Y.

56

ON SOME LINGUISTIC NOTIONS

Another restriction which is very much quoted is the restriction of syntactical grammaticalness. Against this restriction one can argue that in normal conversation there are, in fact, generally quite a lot of syntactically ungrammatical sentences. Why then should it not be permitted to use syntactically ungrammatical sentences — provided they can be understood — to determine the significatum of a word that is contained in them? Perhaps this criticism can be partly countered by the remark that in the process of understanding syntactically ungrammatical sentences, it is not always very clear, what, of that which we understood, depends on the significata of the words which are part of them and what depends on the special mechanism we use (i.e. the correction code) in understanding syntactically ungrammatical sentences. The conclusion seems to be that it is also dangerous to take into account ungrammatical sentences. If these are used at all, they should be used very carefully. The same must be repeated for elliptical sentences. R. Jakobson 50 repeatedly emphasized, that in linguistic discussions based on data which include elliptical utterances, one must be conscious of the fact that one is working with a subcode (though subcode should by no means be interpreted as 'inferior code'). Its peculiar characteristics and its relation to the explicit code of the natural language must be taken into account. Let us now take a closer look at the minimal method I proposed to determine the significatum of a word X. We try to find a set Y of utterances I, ... /„. The condition on the set is that A' is a part of each /, (/, is a variable over 1 ... ri) that is a member of the set — 7( by preference fulfilling the conditions mentioned above (i.e. I t by preference not elliptical, etc.). Included in the set we can have variants of intonation patterns, of word order, of the number of words, of the words themselves, etc. Then we try to describe the combinations of concepts, situations, facts, events 51 etc. hypothetically. (I do not want to take an a priori standpoint about the nature of the significatum) which we associate with each I t . Let us call this description of t0

Jakobson, R., "The Saussurian Course and Linguistic Vistas of Today", Springterm 1967. " The problem arises how to describe these concepts, etc. A solution can be found in simulating them. For instance the word 'circle' must have as significatum the concept circle. A simulation of this concept can be a sequence of elements which is a description of the state of a certain apparatus. The input description of everything (or nearly everything) that is called a circle (and this only) must bring, after having undergone a standard sequence of operations, the apparatus in the state of which the sequence is the description (A simulation of the concept 'circle' can be found in J. Culbertson's Consciousness and Behavior, pp. 83-122). I will stress that this sequence of elements cannot be compared with the words of the natural language. It is a characteristic of the natural language that the relation between words and their significata is mainly arbitrary. However, in the case of simulation the sequence of elements which is a description of the state of the apparatus is directly dependent on the input, viz. on the description of the input which will bring the apparatus in a certain state. This accepted, it is not trivial to connect a word with its hypothesized simulated significatum. The approach by simulation provides a means for escaping from the circularity of the traditional explanatory dictionary, where words are explained by words. It is also a sketch of the human situation. In the human being too, the verbal sign system is connected with a non-verbal sign system. A nonverbal sign system that represents the human internal model of the world. I prefer the expression 'non-verbal sign system' to 'non-verbal system', because the concepts refer to things in the outside world. However, for sure, they are no signs in the narrow interpretation given in Chapter 1.

ON THE SIGNIFICATUM OF A MORPHEME

57

/, 'Ki', and the set of Kt ( i =i... n ) , 'Z'. The following step is to look for what is common to all Ki which are a part of Z. Let us call this part W. Now we have to see if in set Y there is something else than the word X which is common to all /,. If this is the case, we try to include in set Y sentences In+1,...,n+p so that in this modified set Y only the word X is common to all sentences (i = 1 ...„ + p ) . For this modified set Y we try again to determine W. The next step is to try to find real subclasses of W, viz. Ut, U2, U3 ... and then to see if there is an U t so that Xcan be used as significans for [/,. The problem is also to determine the criteria on which U t is sufficient. One way to do this is to check whether the sentences in which the word occurs, can indeed get the desired interpretation with Ut as significatum. All analytical sentences must remain analytical with [/, as a hypothetical significatum. 82 The same applies to contradictory sentences. After this you have to try to determine the minimal U( which is sufficient to account for the unity found in set Y. With this you turn to the second qualification of the minimal method, viz. everything that the significatum of a word includes must be necessary to explain the unity. On the basis of this — when X can be used as a hypothetical significans for Ut and if there is no Uj where ( U j c U ( ). — (Ut c Uj) and X can be used as a hypothetical significans for Uj, then Ut is the significatum of the significans X. (CUt n W) is a part of the connotatum of X. If there is no real subclass U of W which is sufficient, then you hypothesize W as the significatum of X. W must, of course, be sufficient too. If this is not the case, then W must be expanded by a new analysis of the associations in /¡, etc. ... The qualification that everything in the significatum must be necessary can be motivated by the arguments for the differentiation between the significatum and connotatum; i.e. (a) if one extends the significatum with non-disjunctive elements which are not necessary, then some sentences will become contradictory, though not all of them will be experienced as contradictory, and (b) the fact that one has to take the minimal set of disjunctive parts (if one does accept disjunctive elements in the significatum) can be defended on the ground of general considerations of communication and the practical impossibility to describe all associations which can be connected with a word by disjunctions. Some more remarks on the minimal method are needed. However, I should like first to give a rough illustration of the minimal method. For more such empirically validated results, a more extensive investigation of languages would be necessary. Let us, for example, read a picture book on which one could make comments such as : "This is a tree and this is a cow. It's a beautiful cow, isn't it?" The same com" Of course, one must take care that an utterance generally accepted as true is not necessarily analytical. Very interesting experimental research on intuition about analyticity and contradiction is: Apostel, L., Mays, W., Morf, A., et Piaget, J., Les Liaisons analytiques et synthétiques dans les comportements du sujet.

58

ON SOME LINGUISTIC NOTIONS

ments could be made about some three-dimensional figures in copper. But then you may have to point out that these are not the real animals, that, for example, "you can only see a real lion in the zoo" or "a real cow in the meadow", etc. With a hypothesis about the significata of a word, we must be able to explain the use of the word 'lion' and the unity found in all sentences in which it occurs, but this also includes the specification 'real lion', etc. You could try to do this in the following way: the significatum of 'a cow', 'a lion', etc. is the concept 'cow', 'lion', etc. — and this is hypothesized to be a specification of a form abstractor. 53 In that case a two-dimensional or three-dimensional iron cow, as well as a cow in flesh and bones, is a cow. Each particular kind of cow (i.e. two-dimensional, etc.) will have a certain set of associations (connotata) to it. It is possible for one of these sets to be privileged. The cow with this set of associations is the 'real cow' then. The specification 'real' indicates (a) that a choice must be made between the several possible sets of associations to the significatum of 'cow', and (b) which set of associations is to be chosen. As a consequence, a picture of a cow will not be a real cow. An interesting question is: on what grounds will a certain set of associations be preferred in connection with a certain significatum? Perhaps on the ground of frequency of occurrence, or of origin (viz. the set of associations which played the most important part in the construction of the concept 'cow'). This analysis can be confirmed by the observation that 'a cow is a real cow' is not analytical, for if it were the question 'Is this cow a real cow?' would be trivial, which it is not. If the notion of 'to exist (be) in flesh and bones' (a characteristic of the real cow) was a part of the significatum of 'cow', then the sequence 'a cow has flesh and bones', would be analytical too. An important remark about the minimal method is that in each attempt to determine the significatum of a word, one will always be able to use only a finite set of the utterances of the practically infinite set of utterances of which X can be a part. The results obtained will never be more nor less than an 'empirical' hypothesis about the significatum of a word. If other evidence is brought forward which proves that there is an ( U j c: Ut) • —(Ut cz Uj) and Uj is sufficient, or if it can be proved that Ut is not sufficient, then we must substitute another U for Ut (in the first case by UJ). Last but not least, I wish to mention that it is possible, of course, to find 2 sets Y and Z of utterances of which X is a part, but such that if W is what is common 53 The theory one accepts in constructing concepts will be very important for the construction of a significatum. This can be shown by the following problem: Is 3/4 apple also an apple? Clearly yes. Has one therefore to specify that an apple is a variable part (with certain conditions certainly, viz. 1/1000 of an apple is not an apple) of a certain form. Not necessarily. In dependence on the abstraction and generalization operations one hypothesizes, it may be possible that a 3/4 apple causes in the computer (in the human mind) such a state of which the description is the concept apple. This does not imply that the information of the incompleteness of the apple is lost. For, one can conserve as data, that from which abstraction was made.

ON THE SIGNIFICATUM OF A MORPHEME

59

to the associations of each utterance of Y and W' to each utterance of Z, the intersection of W and W is empty (Case A) or even that Wn W = M, but M is not sufficient or necessary for the unity which is found in Y or in Z with respect to X (Case B); or it is sufficient and necessary for Y but not for Z (Case C) or vice versa (Case D). The conclusion, I think, that has to be drawn in this case is that the same word has two different significata: two entirely different ones (Case A), or two that are partly the same (Case B), or one which is included in the other — but the inverse is not true. I do not want to imply that the cues I described here are also the cues used to discover the significatum of a word by the child learning his mother tongue or the adult learning a foreign language. This problem is not within the scope of this work. I have also abstained from a thorough comparison of my position with Ziff's in Semantic Analysis. The essential difference is in (a) the use I make of the minimal hypothesis and (b) the sometimes small but fundamental difference between my determining the associations common to all sentences (with the restrictions discussed above) in which a word X is used and where only X is common to the significantes of all the sentences, and Ziff's State projections (conditions which are generally satisfied when a syntactical, non-deviant sentence is uttered) and State regularities (the same, except no reference to what is generally the case).

Ill ON THE SIGNIFICATUM OF A SENTENCE

In the introduction (sectionl) I try to prove the necessity of the hypothesis that a semantic structure must exist. I also open a discussion about the meaning of some morphemes. I thought it more justifiable to regard the morphemes which indicate "linguistic relations" as indications of relations between significata. If these are interpreted as elements which denote relations between significantes, they have to be translated into abstract relations which, in their turn, have to be transposed into relations between significata. As a consequence of my approach, the differentiation 'syntax/semantics' can be called into question. In section 2, I discuss some relations between significata. A few of the many possible encodings of these relations are elaborated in greater detail in Part Two. In section 3, the following problem is treated: Are the limitations on the permitted combinations of significata linguistic or cognitive? This does not call into question the linguistic limitations on the combinations of significantes. These limitations will be repeatedly exemplified in Part Two.

1. INTRODUCTION

When the significata of all the words which are compounds of a particular sentence have been determined, it is not yet possible to assert that the significatum of the sentence has been determined too. It would be very simple if the summation of these significata should give us the significatum of a sentence. That this is not the case becomes clear when you look at sentences (1) and (2). (1) Evy is killed by Mike. (2) Mike is killed by Evy. Although the two sentences have identical morphemes and consequently also the same significata as sub-parts, the significatum of these two sentences are different. The word-order in the sentences puts the same significata in different relations to each other. You can even assert that the difference in the significatum of sentence (1) and (2) is caused by the different position which is taken by the same significata. It is, then, at least not always possible to identify the significatum of a sentence by the Boolian summation of the significata of the morphemes in the sentence. That is why a semantic (significatum) structure is surely necessary. Therefore, the problems encountered here are (a) which are the relations existing

61

ON THE SIGNIFICATUM OF A SENTENCE

between the significata in a sentence, and (b) in which way are these relations expressed by a language? It will become clear later on that the same relation between significata can be expressed by a language in various ways. It is remarkable that some morphemes which express such a relation between significata, are — wrongly — regarded as elements without meaning. Ziff, Chomsky, Katz and Postal accept the presence of meaningless elements in language L. Although they are considered meaningless by them, they are — after all — accepted to be integral parts of the language. Therefore, they are taken to be morphemes. It is, of course, clear that Ziff et al. see 'the morpheme' as a notion which is independent from the notion of meaning and which is based on a kind of distributional analysis. 1 One such meaningless morpheme for them is, for example, 'to' in sentence (5). (5) I like to go home. Ziff used this example to illustrate a meaningless morpheme (See Semantic Analysis, p. 14). Chomsky, Katz, Postal and Ross also bann this kind of morpheme from the deep structure. That is their common way of dealing with all the other elements which indicate pure relations between significata (or rather, as they see it, which indicate pure relations between parts of the sentence): i.e. such elements as declension, conjugation, complementizers, passive, wordorder, etc. I will use RE to denote the elements which they consider to indicate the relations between the parts of the sentence. Before expounding why I consider them mistaken in their approach, I will sketch the problem in their own system. I already mentioned the notion of 'deep structure', which is very important in transformational grammar. A main characteristic (/) of the deep structure of a sentence is that it includes all elements, and only those, which determine the meaning of that sentence (Chomsky, Katz and Postal). This characteristic (/) does not imply — to my mind — that the elements of a sentence which do not explicitly appear in the deep structure of it, do not possess meaning. At first sight this judgement may sound paradoxical. Not any longer, however, once you come to realize that in transformational grammar the RE's are present in the deep structure in an abstract translation (viz. the branching of a tree). Let us call the abstract translation of the RE's the TE's. Everybody will agree that it is unjustifiable to conclude that the RE's do not have any influence on the significatum structure of a sentence, because they are not — materially — found as such in the deep structure. Is it possible that elements are meaningless, while their abstract translations are meaningful? An example will illustrate this. Consider the following: 1

Ziff, Paul, Semantic Analysis, pp. 13-15. Harris, Z., Methods in Structural

Linguistics.

62

ON SOME LINGUISTIC NOTIONS

(6) Mike is killed by me. According to Chomsky's transformational grammar, the deep structure of (6) looks as follows: S « NP

1

I V I kill

1 VP I

I NP I N I Mike

Sentence (6) contains the morphemes be + (V+ en). These morphemes indicate — as I understand them — relations between the significata of the parts of the sentence, viz. the NP preceded by 'by' is subject, and the NP preceded by be + (V + en) is object of the sentence (argumentation for this follows below). Chomsky and his followers omit be + (V + en) as such in the deep structure, but they represent the relations expressed by it by means of the branching of a tree. Then, these abstract relations have to be transposed into relations between significata. (For the necessity of a significatum structure: see the beginning of this chapter). Today the necessity of a significatum structure is also recognized by some transformationalists (Katz in Philosophy of Language). It is, therefore, incomprehensible that the RE's should be regarded as meaningless elements. Though I do agree that some of these elements do not possess a significatum, the role they play in indicating the relations between the significata of other morphemes in the sentence is important. In my approach THE MEANING OF THE REMORPHEMES IS THE PROGRAM X WHICH PUT A INTO RELATION WITH B, WHERE A IS THE MORPHEME AS FORM AND B MEANS THE ROLE OF THE MORPHEME (PROGRAM Y ) IN INDI-

For that reason the RE's are not at all irrelevant curious language data without a real function. The following problem too seems very important to me. Is it not an error of Chomsky, Katz et al. to regard the RE's as indications of relations between the PARTS OF THE SENTENCE? In my opinion, they rather seem to lay relations between the SIGNIFICATA OF THE PARTS OF THE SENTENCE. The importance of this is enormous. Chomsky and Katz are obliged — as was already mentioned — to translate the elements which indicate relations into abstract relations and then in their semantics they have to transpose these abstract relations between the parts of the sentence into abstract relations between significata. If the RE's are interpreted as I proposed, the result is a considerable theoretical simplification. All that is needed is a device for indicating the abstract relations between significata. Thus, the device for translating used by Chomsky becomes superfluous— which means that a very complex device has become unnecessary. Indeed, this CATING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SIGNIFICATA OF OTHER MORPHEMES.

ON THE SIGNIFICATUM OF A SENTENCE

63

translating device includes many ordered rules and, in consequence, the result of one rule has to be the argument of the other: viz. the output of the one is the input of the other. This implies that it is impossible to apply different rules at the same time. If there is a way to do without this kind of translating device, a simplified theory would result. What motivation may exist to propound yet a third kind of structure between the semantic structure and the pure surface structure? Is it not sufficient to give an identical meaning to synonymous sentences? What is the use of an identical abstract structure between parts of sentences? Even within transformational grammar deep structure does not seem to me a natural finishing point. Would it not be possible to execute transformations till the semantic structure of the sentence is obtained? The introduction of the concept of deep structure does not seem necessary to me on grounds of phonology either. Is the possibility ruled out that the data about the structure of a sentence required for the phonological component are supplied by the surface structure, and perhaps also by the significata structure? If necessary, transformational grammar can always call upon the intermediate structures (which I consider uneconomical). In my approach, data of certain relation programs, etc., can also be taken into account (see recognition system). My approach to recognition proposes the immediate determination of the structure of the significata of the sentence, and not at first of the structure of the parts of the sentence (neither surface structure nor deep structure). I do agree that some kind of surface structure is indispensable to a production system. But would it not be possible in this system too to proceed at once from the semantic structure to the surface structure, 2 whether or not by means of transformations? The result of this approach is that the differentiation 'syntax/semantics' becomes dimmed. Referring to this characteristic, I quote a statement made by Minsky in a discussion about a program presented by a student as a solution to a certain problem of translation: "Perhaps the program's most interesting aspect is THE WAY IT CUTS ACROSS THE LINGUISTIC FORMAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS, thus avoiding problems that, it seems to me, HAVE MORE HINDERED THAN HELPED MOST STUDIES OF LANGUAGE."3

I accept this idea, because — at present — when considering language from the point of view of its function in communication, I do not see any justification in splitting the encoding or the decoding system into two independent parts which are syntax and semantics.4 * This remark seems to me necessary, even if one adheres to the hypothesis of a competence overarching production and recognition. 8 Minsky, "Artificial Intelligence in Information". 1 A discussion on this problem can also be found in the epilogue. It seems also interesting to me to draw attention on the Russian linguistics where there exists a strong trend to omit the distinction 'syntax/phonology'. In his comments on the Soviet Mathematical Linguistics, in his article "Soviet

64

ON SOME LINGUISTIC NOTIONS 2. WHICH RELATIONS DO EXIST BETWEEN SIGNIFICATA OF THE ELEMENTS WHICH ARE PART OF A SENTENCE?

I will only discuss the relations which I shall make use of further on in this work. 2.1. Property-assignment (This relation can certainly be found in Dutch, English and many other languages) A property or a combination of properties 'X' can be assigned to another property or a set of properties. This is called 'the property assignment operation' and is represented by ' m '. 'Am B' designates that the property or set of properties B is assigned to the property or set of properties A. It is perhaps also possible to propound that lA m B' is analytical, when A already includes B. If B is the negation of A, then 'A m 5 ' is contradictory. (1) Mike is ill. 'Mike' is the element A and 'ill' is the element B with in between the word 'is' which indicates ' m ', the property assignment. Presented abstractly, this relation looks as follows: (2) Mike m ill. One may wonder here why the generally accepted formalization of the predicatecalculus is not applied. The reason for this is that I do not want a priori to put a complete functional and intentional identity between the two. 2.2. Object operations: 'N/A' An operation with property (properties) N is executed on an object (which is supposed to be present in the real world) with the property (properties) A (see section 2.3. for the explanation). 2.3. Concept operations: 'N/"A'" An operation with property (properties) N is executed on the property (properties) A. The following question may arise here: What is the difference between object operation and concept operation? The concept operations ( = property operations) describe operations on descriptions of inputs. In the case 'iV/"/1"', the operation N is executed on the description A. The object operation ' N / A ' is an operation executed by the properties N on someand East-European Linguistics", Robert Abernathy writes the following: "As some of the topics noted above already illustrate classifications by the properties of models or methods tend to cut across the long-standing division of linguistic subject matter into phonology, morphology, and syntax, and modern theories perhaps do deny that such levels have any significant degree of autonomy (p. 124)".

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thing which causes an input with A as description. Thus, it is not an operation on a description, but on that which causes this description. The problem of the 'real existence' of that which causes a certain description is irrelevant here. Examples will clarify the difference between object operation and concept operation. Sentence (3) exemplifies an object operation. (3) I eat meat. The operation 'eat' is executed on that which gives rise to the concept 'meat'. (4) I expect Mike to come. An operation of 'expectation' is said to be executed on the concept combination 'Mike comes'. 2.4. Logical operators I think logical operators are also operators on significata. They will not, however, be discussed here. The question suggesting itself here is: How can a certain relation between significata be motivated? I accounted for the existence of relations between significata or semantic structures in Chapter III, section 1. The way to hypothesize actually certain relations between significata can be seen as analogous to the way to determine a certain significatum for a morpheme. One only needs to substitute the specification 'word' by 'word or structure' in the minimal hypothesis, which now becomes: The influence of a morpheme or of a structure of morphemes in the significatum structure is that which will be sufficient and necessary to explain the unity of the various expressions which possess this word or structure. (For more about the minimal hypothesis and its motivation, see Chapter II: Significatum of a Morpheme). Everyone will agree that 'the influence on the significatum structure' may be a semantic relation of a certain kind. I will not extensively treat the concrete semantic structures here. The concrete relations between significata play, of course, a fundamental role. But as they only illustrate production process and recognition process, I believe it justifiable here to neglect the enormous elaboration of motivating extensively the semantic relations.

3. THE SIGNIFICATUM OF A SENTENCE

The significatum of a sentence is a combination of the significata and the elements which indicate relations between words. It must be possible to determine in a recursive way the admitted combinations, viz. the admitted structures of these two kinds of elements. It seems important to me to make a reference to the fact that this problem

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differs from the problem of the selectional restrictions. Where selectional restrictions are concerned the following question can be put: Within a certain structure which includes significata and elements to indicate relations, are there linguistic limitations on the kind of significata (subsets of significata) which stand in relation to each other? The problem dealt with here is how to determine the admitted combinations of significata and elements which indicate relations. Put more concretely: Are, for example, ARB and ARRB admitted structures, if A and B are significata and R indicates the relation? Selectional restrictions pose the following problem: Are there restrictions on the content of A and B whereby, for instance, ARB can be admitted? The conclusion I have drawn is that linguistic restrictions on significata are an infertile, cumbersome and unjustifiable hypothesis. As a consequence, no further subcategorization of significata needs to be made when forming the admitted semantic structure. The specification which A with which B, can be in a relation R, is an analytical contradictory or a synthetical specification. Therefore every combination ARB is either true or false, although some combinations can be very obviously false and highly improbable in a certain model of the world. Therefore the interpretation of selectional restrictions as cognitive restrictions instead of linguistic ones, must in my opinion also be rejected. I must refer once again here to the difference between the two problems mentioned above and the linguistic problem of what kind of limitations there are on combinations of word categories, and the related problem of what kind of word categories actually exist.5 This is important for the problem of determining the admitted combinations of words. Examples will illustrate the difference between non-admitted concept structures and non-admitted word structures. Formally, the following is an admitted concept structure: [Mike m [eats / bread]]. Both 'Mike eats bread' and 'Bread is eaten by Mike' are admitted combinations of words, which communicate the already mentioned combination of concepts. 'Mike bread eats' is a non-admitted combination of words. A non-admitted combination of concepts is, for example, A R R B . It is also obvious that every attempt to communicate an admitted combination of concepts does not always imply an admitted combination of words. The questions arising about the admitted combinations of significata are (a): Are the admitted combinations of significata universal, or — in other words — are they valid in all languages which are generally accepted as natural languages? Then, (b): • The definition of the categories which are used in the production- and recognition system (f.i. noun, etc.) is implicit, which means that the categories are defined by the functions they get in the several introduced rules. As a consequence the adequacy requirement of this theory is that the introduced rules must succeed (a) in expressing an intuition of the competent user of language (the notion 'competent user of language' will be discussed in Chapter IV), and (b) in being productive for description, explanation and prediction. I believe that this approach is analogous to the one of Chomsky in his transformational grammar.

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Are there combinations which are specific for certain languages? In the latter case: which admitted combinations are universal and which are not? And how can this be explained? Finally (c): In what way is the significatum of a sentence related to the cognitive system? I will regard the significatum of a sentence as the input or the output of the human cognitive system. The notion of 'cognitive system' has to be taken in a broad sense. In the case of the production sentences the significatum of a sentence will be regarded as the output of the cognitive system, which output will be the input of the production system. In the case of the recognition of sentences the significatum of the sentence, which is the output of the recognition system, will be the input of the cognitive system. In this connection the following question arises immediately: Does the control over the admitted combinations of significata belong to the language system? It seems, in fact, quite possible that the limitations on the combinations of significata form part of the cognitive system.6 I do not, at present, wish to defend a definite point of view in this, though I continue, of course, to agree that there are linguistic limitations on the combination of significantes. This hypothesis is (just as the minimal hypothesis in the problem of determining the significatum — see Part One, Chapter II) of great importance, because it increases the possibility to use language as a means of communication. Since the necessity of language restrictions as well as of cognitive restrictions on the admitted combinations of significata has not been proved, it seems to me more economical to hypothesize cognitive restrictions only. For there is no doubt about the existence of cognitive restrictions. If one does accept this hypothesis, it becomes clear that the question of the universality or the particularity of the limitations on the combinations of significata will be a question of the universality of the cognitive laws (viz. limitations on the combinations of concepts). With this hypothesis the study of the significata of a sentence in a certain language would give an insight into the cognitive system of the community who uses this language. I do not, however, exclude (see Vygotsky's hypothesis mentioned above) the fact that there could be cognitive laws which do not find a direct reflection in the limitations on the combinations of the significata of morphemes. The cognitive system may, perhaps, be more extensive than the part of it which is uttered in the language. In consequence the following interesting tasks are offered here: (a) to construct a theory for describing the significata structures (b) to give an efficient description of these structures for specific languages; (c) to compare these data among themselves and to compare them with the data provided by the cognitive psychological studies. * After having performed an independent study of the significata structures, it seems necessary to me to compare them with the logical structures. As far as my studies up to now reveal, a close similarity between both clearly exists. This may perhaps be used as an argument in favour of the tenet which says: the limitations on the admitted significata structures are not linguistic, but cognitive.

IV THE INTERRELATION BETWEEN 'PERFORMANCE', 'COMPETENCE', 'IDIOLECT' AND 'LANGUAGE'

1. PERFORMANCE A N D COMPETENCE

1.1. The approach of the transformationalists to competence and performance I will here mention the large sub-systems of language which the transformationalists hypothesize to explain the factual use of language. These sub-systems include a competence (A), an algorithm (B) in order to construct on the basis of A, a recognition- and a production competence system (C and D) and the material realization of C and D, viz. E and F. C and D are introduced because it is hypothesized that all grammatical sentences can be recognized and produced by the user of the language, if abstraction is made of all material limitations.

Chomsky elaborates his point of view on the relation between competence and performance in Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Chapter I: Methodological Preliminaries). There he says: "A grammar of a language purports to be a description of the ideal 1 speaker-hearer's intrinsic competence. If the grammar is, further-more, perfectly explicit, we may call it a 'generative grammar'. 2 Each user of a language has built and interiorised such a grammar, although it is not a model for the speaker or the listener. It attempts to characterize in the most neutral possible terms the knowledge of the language that provides the basis for actual use of language by a speaker-hearer." 3 What is hypothesized in this framework is a competence (A) that provides the basis for speech recognition (C) and speech production (D), an algorithm (B) for the actual construction of (C) and (D) on the basis of A, and last but not least the material realization (E) and (F) of (C) and (D) respectively. One has to hypothesize (C) and (D) on the ground of the hypothesis made by the transformationalists (who work on speech recognition and speech production algorithms) that in independence on all 1

Chomsky's interpretation of this ideal hearer-speaker is sketched in the following quotation: (Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, p. 3) "Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speakerlistener in a completely homogenous speech-community, who knows its language perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interests, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance... Under this idealization, performance is a direct reflexion of competence (p. 4)". 1 Chomsky, N., op. cit., p. 4. * Chomsky, N., op. cit., p. 9.

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material limitations, it is in principle possible to recognize or to produce all sentences. (Therefore one can speak of a recognition competence system and a production competence system). It is not clear to me whether (E) and (F) are components with special characteristics or whether they are only (C) and (D) connected with a limited memory and possibly influenced by motivation, distraction, etc. Limitations and mistakes in performance (the use of language) can be caused by the algorithm (5), by (E) and (F) 4 or by the use made of (E) and (F). In relation to (C) the works of Stanley R. Patrick and Susumo Kuno 5 deserve to be mentioned. In "A Recognition Procedure for Transformational Grammars" Stanley R. Patrick has formulated an algorithm for constructing a recognition system on the basis of transformational grammar. The recognition is limited. Given a certain (written) sentence, it only ascribes to it all possible deep structures. The semantic interpretation is not taken into account. In "The Predictive Analyzer" S. Kuno intends the same. His algorithm, however, differs fundamentally from that of S. R. Patrick. In Patrick's approach a whole sentence has to be received before recognition can go on. In Kuno's approach the recognition can start after a part of the sentence has been received. Other possible approaches to recognition (C) in the transformational frame are, amongst others: [a] the immediate determination of the meaning of the sentence by the recognition system after receipt of the whole sentence; [b] the immediate determination of the meaning of a constituent of the surface structure of a sentence after receipt of that part of the sentence which gets this surface-constituent description; [c] the immediate determination of the meaning of a word of the sentence at the receipt of that part. Obviously approach [b] is better than [a], and [c] is better than [b]. It is clear that one has already understood parts of a sentence before one has received the whole sentence. For instance in 'John, who was ill yesterday, will go to school today', one knows already that John was ill yesterday, before receiving the sentence 'will go to school today'. Therefore [b] is better than [a] because it is difficult to see how on a (C) system where one needs first to receive the whole sentence before one can interpret it, a (F) system can be based where the opposite is true. For the same reason [c] is better than [a] and [b], for in the sentence 'John hurts ... 4

Interesting considerations on the limitations of the material realization of C and D, viz. E and F, can be found in Chomsky's "On Certain Formal Properties of Grammars" and in Measures of Syntactic Complexity, by Bar-Hillel, Y., Kasher, A., and Shamir, E. 6 Other interesting approaches to C are those of Matthew and the MITRE Corporation: Matthew, G. H., "Analysis by Synthesis of sentences of natural languages"; and Walker, Chapin, Geis, Gross, Recent Developments in the MITRE Syntactic Analysis Procedure.

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(pause) ... Harry' one knows already that John hurts before receiving the whole constituent {VP) 'Hurts Harry'. An interesting problem is also the genesis of the competence (A), and (B). This has already been widely discussed.6 It is striking that the proponents of transformational grammar strongly insist on their axiom of the innateness of fundamental typical linguistic characteristics of the competence.

1.2. Is a competence which overarches production and recognition competence necessary? In this section the necessity of an overarching system (A) will be examined. The arguments in favor of this system — namely that it is the unique explanation of the necessary correspondence between the recognition (decoding) and production (encoding) competence systems — are rejected. Two other explanations are proposed. The more important one is the hypothesis of a complex negativefeedback-relation between the recognition- and the production-competence systems. Another way to account for the necessity of (A) may consist in the proof that there is a language phenomenon that can only be explained by the introduction of (A). I will try to demonstrate that this is not the case.

To Chomsky grammar is a description of the ideal speaker-listener's competence. One may wonder if for this purpose the subsystems (C) and (D) are not sufficient. In other words, one can put into question the necessity of an overarching system (A). One could argue here that (C) and (D) cannot be constructed without (A). This can either be interpreted (a) ontogenetically or (b) system-theoretically. In the Introduction, I pointed out that system-theoretically the opposite is true. In Part Two, I construct an 'analysis by analysis procedure' (a recognition procedure) and a 'synthesis by analysis procedure' (a production procedure). Both are built on the basis of ideal speech performance and they are independent of a system (A) or (B). It is thus possible to give practical proof of the possibility of the construction of (C) and (D) without (A) or (5). One of Chomsky's arguments for the necessity of (A)7 is that one can only explain the correspondence between (C) and (D) by introducing (A). This correspondence is necessary on the grounds that normally one understands what one has produced, and vice versa (see Fig. 1). In other words the input P I of the production competence system (D) is identical with the output P I of the recognition system (C) after the output PI, which corresponds to P I , has been received as input P2 and has been handled by (C), and vice versa. This, however, is still too strong a requirement. It seems to me more correct only 6

Chomsky, N . , Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Chapter I, "Methodological Preliminaries", esp. 'Formal and Substantive Universals', § 5 ; Lenneberg, E., Biological Foundation of Language, and "The Capacity for Language Acquisition"; Putnam, H., "The 'innateness hypothesis' and explanatory models in linguistics"; Vandamme, F., "Is Transformational Grammar a Contribution to the Theory of Innate Ideas?"; and Vandamme, F., Review of W. Levelt's "Over het Waarnemen van Zinnen". 7 Personal discussion.

' p e r f o r m a n c e ' , 'competence', ' i d i o l e c t ' , a n d ' l a n g u a g e '

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Cognition system

/ Input PI

Output PI Recognition system C

Production system D Output P 2

Input R2

Fig. 1 to require that generally there is at least one PI which is identical with PI when P2 is recovered as input R2, and vice versa, and this for the reason that R2 can be ambiguous. I think it is clear that this correspondence is only normally the case. First of all, in the genesis of language it is obvious that the child who is learning his mothertongue or the adult who is learning a foreign language is sometimes able to understand sentences which he is not able to produce (or vice versa).8 It also happens sometimes that speakers of a language say that what they have said (P2) — or rather what they have been understood to have said (PI) — differs from what they intended to say (PI). As a result they try to correct their utterence P2. Sometimes, however, people maintain that they are not able to correct P2 in such a way that it expresses what they intended to say. In other words: that which they understand of P2 differs from PI. This might perhaps be explained by a non-correspondence between the systems (D) and (C).9 I agree, however, that the correspondence between (C) and (D) normally exists. Yet, to my mind, Chomsky's explanation of this fact is not the only possible explanation. If, for instance, one regards the recognition- and production-competence systems as innate (as Chomsky does with the overarching system [^4]), one can always assume that the innate characteristics of (C) and (D) are such that the necessary correspondence is guaranteed. Another explanation — which seems to me much better and which does not need to appeal to innateness of peculiar language characteristics — is that the systems (C) 8

There are a mass of examples in literature which stress this fact, i.e. "Open discussion" in The Acquisition of Language, Bellugi and Brown, eds., p. 40. • I agree that one could try to explain it by the facts that (1) the production system is not able to handle Pi or (2) that there is an interference of the emotional system (J. Kruithof attracted my attention to this). All these explications could even be combined, I think.

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and (D) are in a complex negative feedback relation to each other, so that the correspondence is guaranteed. Fig. 2 gives a rough sketch of the proposed approach.

C : recognition competence system D : production competence system Dt : detector Cm: comparator Ctr : control X : general cognitive operation unit If a change occurs in system (C), then a corresponding change in (D) must be made in the case where the change in (C) causes a disconnection in the correspondence between (C) and (D). The reverse is, of course, also true. Therefore, every change in (C) and (Z)) is detected by the respective detectors Dtx and Dt2- If a detector detects a change, this change is investigated in the comparator, in view of the correspondence between (C) and (D). This investigation can be reduced to the investigation if condition (a) or / and (b) is fulfilled. Condition (a): the input Pi (see Fig. 1) of the production system D is identical with the output i?! of the recognition system C, after the output P2, which corresponds to Pu is received as input R2 and has been

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handled by C. This condition can be weakened into the requirement that at least there is one output Rt which is identical with input Px — and this may happen in the case where R2 is ambiguous. Condition (b) is that there is at least one output (in case Pi can have several encodings by D) P2 which is identical with R2 when Ru which corresponds to R2, is introduced in D as Pt. Of course, in this investigation a certain strategy must be followed, because the set of possible inputs and outputs are an infinite set. Therefore this investigation may be — and even must be, if one wants the comparator to handle its task efficiently — limited to the investigation (in view of the correspondence between [C] and [D]) of the outputs of (C) and (D) in the handling of which the change (s) — over a certain delay, i.e. since the last state of adaptation —, which occurred in the system, has a certain influence. Even this is, perhaps, too great a task, so that it will be necessary to use samples. If a certain inadaptation between (C) and (£)) is observed and if this inadaptation exceeds certain limits (these limits may differ from person to person) then the Ctr. (Control unit) has to activate Unit X. The Control unit may possibly also be activated under external influences, viz. corrections made by people in its environment. This may perhaps even explain the evolution in the systems (C) and (D) beyond the adaptation between (C) and (D). It is possible to argue that both sources of activation are necessary to activate Unit X. Unit X is a general cognitive operation unit. This unit has the task of adapting D, or C. For instance in case it adapts D, it has to do this, taking into account (1) the changes in (C), (2) the actual characteristics and the specific task of (D) and (3) the data provided by Cm about non-adaptation between (C) and (D), and (4) the observation of corrections made in its environment by people. On this basis unit X makes a hypothesis for the adaptation of (D) (or [C]) and on the basis of this hypothesis it changes (D), viz. performs a few operations on (D). In this way we obtain a change of (D). This change is detected by Dt2 and is communicated to Cm. The result of this investigation is then communicated to Ctr and if the adaptation is not sufficient, Unit X is set to action again. This goes on till (C) and (D) are again sufficiently adapted to each other. 10 This approach with complex negative feedback relations between (C) and (D) offers the advantage that (a) no new linguistic component has to be introduced, as is the case if the overarching system is accepted, (b) no algorithm has to be constructed on the basis of this overarching system to get the systems (C) and (D), and (c), a new look on the study of the ontogenesis of language is in this approach possible. For the germs of a new approach to this problem without postulating innate linguistic characteristics appear. Unit X which is introduced is composed of a set of general 10 The power of this approach would become clearer by an example. However, therefore I firstly need to make some hypotheses about the internal structure of C and D. This is, however, only done in Part Two of this book. An example of this approach is proposed in my paper "Some Results of a Cybernetic Approach to the Study of Natural Languages" proposed at the International Congress of Cybernetics' (London).

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cognitive operations and as such it is hypothesized to be the basis of all human learning. With this economy in mind, one can rightly ask if (A) is really necessary. Apart from the problem of proving the necessity of it, the hypothesis of an overarching system (A) poses yet another problem: How are we to transcend (C) and (D)? What guarantees that the generative grammar of Chomsky is indeed an overarching system? How can one be sure that it is really more than a production competence? Is R. Jakobson 11 not right when he says that an ideal component that is neither a production nor a recognition system is impossible? The demonstration that by means of an algorithm it is possible to construct a recognition competence from a transformational grammar is not at all a proof for the fact that this transformational grammar is an overarching system Y. For it is possible in some cases to get from a given (D) (viz. a production system) a corresponding (C) (recognition system) by an algorithm. But this does not necessarily imply that either (D) or the algorithm gets the status of an overarching system. Another way to prove the necessity of the overarching system (A) may consist in demonstrating that there is a language phenomenon that can be explained by the introduction of (A) and (B), but not by the subcomponents C-D-E-F only. The language performance of an ideal speaker-hearer can certainly be explained by (C) and (D). The many actual deviations which can occur in normal conversation can be explained by (E) and (F). The problems of language learning can be reduced to those of the genesis of (C) and (D). 1.3. Briefly formulated, some arguments for the relative independence of the speechrecognition (C) and the production-competence system (D) I do not intend to discuss extensively all the arguments which confirm the independence of (C) and (D). I will only indicate some lines along which confirmations can be found. Some opinions of a few important authors on this problem are also quoted.

1.3.1. — As will be seen in Part Two characteristics of the communication system differ widely according to whether one takes it from the decoding or from the encoding point of view. These characteristics cannot be incorporated into one and the same system. These characteristics will be recapitulated in the conclusion of this book. It does not seem fruitful to summarize them here, before a more detailed explanation and justification has been provided. 1.3.2. — Another argument is connected with recent discussions on the phoneme. The transformational school under the guidance of Chomsky and Halle declares that the phoneme is a superfluous notion. Their motivation is based on an approach to language which appears strongly to be constructed from the production point of II

Personal discussion, 1967.

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view, although they intend a system overarching the production and recognition system. One may wonder whether it is justified for such an overarching system to bear so strong a resemblance to a production system. For, as R. Jakobson proves with convincing arguments, 12 there is nothing that justifies the priority of the languageproduction system over the recognition system. It goes without saying that he underlines the fact that there are relations between both: "Both are two coupled mechanisms, each of which affects the other." The necessity of the phoneme is equally defended by some people. This defence is, however, mainly based on considerations of language perception. Thus, in his article "The Role of Phonic Elements in Speech Perception" R. Jakobson argues: "Again and again we must insist on the perceiver's probabilistic attitude towards the verbal input; HE CANNOT DO WITHOUT PHONEMIC DISCRIMINATION", and "... When we start an outline of linguistic universals or a unilingual description by examining the groundwork of language, first and foremost we treat its semiotic rudiments, namely the distinctive features and the intrinsic laws of their combinability into bundles and consequences, with a consistent reference to the physical data processed and converted into 'SENSE-DISCRIMINATING' elements (smyslorazlicitel'nye, according to the apt Russian designation used by Cistovic et al.)". An analogous opinion is held by A. Hill in his article "The Promises and Limitations of the Newest Type of Grammatical Analysis". Hill, however, argues that as the phoneme is necessary from the perception point of view, it must also be the end product of the production system. He writes: "The best formulation of the total operation of hearing that I can give is that the input is phonemes, in much the classic sense. These phonemes are then processed by the syntactic component of the hearer's native-speaker grammar, which results in their translation into phonemes in their syntactic setting — in short, the Halle-Chomskyan morphophonemes. Chomsky's 'phonological component' is then the end process by which the syntactical constructed morphophonemes are translated back again into classic phonemes, ready to be uttered and to be operated on by another hearer". 13 Nevertheless A. Hill accepts that the production- and recognition-competence systems are only partially identical. He argues: "Transformationalists often assume the fact that the hearer is also a speaker, and that language will be fully and completely described if the speaker is fully and completely described. I would deny this conclusion, and as a result believe that the identity of hearer and speaker is only partial." 14 Can we, if we take for granted the view that the recognition and production systems "

Jakobson, R., "The Role of the Phonic Elements in Speech Perception", pp. 8-9. Hill, A. Archibald, "The Promises and Limitations of the newest Type of Grammatical Analysis", p. 30. 14 Hill, A. A., id., p. 2 7 , 1 want to stress that the transformationalists intend to describe the competence which characterizes the speaker as well as the hearer. However, I agree with Hill and R. Jakobson that in fact their competence description is rather a description of the speaker. 13

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are only partially identical, say that Hill is justified in concluding that the phoneme is also necessary in the production system, because it is necessary in the recognition system? To me this does not seem clearly a priori. Logically it could be possible that the omission of the phoneme in the production system is justified, while it cannot be dispensed with in the recognition system.15 This solution for the phoneme controversy, if justified, would confirm the hypothesis of the existence of a language-recognition and a language-production competence, each with their own characteristics. 1.3.3. — Another, more anecdotical argument for the independence of the productionand recognition-competence systems is the following. In the course "Topics of Transformational Grammar" given by G. Lakoff (Harvard University) a student at a certain moment argued that a sentence generated by a particular rule was ungrammatical. As he was expressing his view, he was, however, using the very construction whose grammaticalness he doubted. The reaction to this was general laughter and the student at once agreed that the structure must be grammatical since he himself had produced it. This anecdote proves that it is possible that a certain sentence seems unnatural as far as the recognition-competence system of a person is concerned (idio-recognitioncompetence-system), while the same sentence is entirely natural where the productioncompetence system of that person is concerned (idio-production-competence-system). However, the student concluded erroneously that this particular sentence was grammatical, because he had produced it with his production-competence system. 1.3.4. — Another indication of the independence of (C) and (D) systems is the fact that it is possible for one of the two systems to be severely injured, while the other remains intact. One could try to locate this injury on the levels (E) and (F), viz. on the performance level. It is, however, not at all clear whether this is indeed possible. It is certainly impossible if one interprets (E) and (F) as being (C) and (D) to which has been added the influence of the memory-unit, etc. For in this case the injury of the memory-unit, etc. must have as much influence on recognition as on production. In this case the only explanation of the possibility of damage to the recognition capabilities — production remaining intact, or vice versa — is the independence of the recognition- and production competences. R. Jakobson too concludes from the data of aphasia that there is a substantial difference between encoding (D) and decoding (C). He states: "The substantial difference between the encoding and decoding operations in verbal behavior is eloquently documented by the typology of aphasic disorders, and namely by the striking similarity between the so-called motor,

16 E. Vermeersch argues that perhaps on the basis of the necessary feedback relation between the recognition and the production system a proof for the necessity of the phoneme can be found in the production system too.

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predominantly encoding, and the so-called sensory, primarily decoding impairments." 19 1.3.5. — In G. Miller's The Psychology of Communication17 one can find a growing awareness of the possibility of the independence of (C) and (D). In other words, some doubt of Chomsky's ideas on competence is growing in somebody who hitherto fully supported them. I think one can see this in the following quotation: "One problem a psycholinguist faces is to decide whether speaking and listening are two separate abilities, coordinate but distinct, or whether they are merely different manifestations of a single linguistic faculty." 18 The linguist, in fact, faces a similar problem. When he describes and explains a language, has he to describe and explain one competence or has he to describe and explain a production-competence system and a recognition-competence system as two separate abilities? 1.3.6. — Osgood too upholds the view that (C) and (D) are two components with specific characteristics. In his article "A Behavioristic Analysis of Perception and Language as Cognitive Phenomena" he states: "The minimal units in language decoding are called phonemes. ... In language encoding, the smallest functional units are probably syllables."19 2. IDIOLECT A N D LANGUAGE 8 0 'Competence' is generally defined as a skill, a skill of an individual. However, the linguist is interested in the language of the community rather than in the language of the individual as such, viz. his idiolect. In this section some approaches to reach the language of the community will be discussed. A cursory examination will also be made of the notions 'language family' and 'dialect'.

Every language user is supposed to have built the language-competence systems (C) and (D) by means of (a) his internal characteristics and possibilities — innate characteristics which are only useful for constructing a language or general characteristics used for constructing all kinds of skills — and (b) linguistic data, viz. outputs of the performing systems of other language users. "

Jakobson, R., "The Role of the Phonic Elements in Speech Perception", p. 2. Miller, G. A., The Psychology of Communication. M. D e Mey indicated to me this important development in Miller's opinion. 18 Miller, G. A., id., p. 74. " Osgood, C. E., "A Behavioristic Analysis of Perception and language as Cognitive Phenomena", p. 190-191. 80 The problem of the interrelation 'idiolect/competence' is also a problem which arises in Chomsky's framework. Every individual internalizes a competence. Which competence is, however, the competence of a certain language? The view "Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with the ideal speakerlistener in a completely homogenous speech community" brings no real solution to the problem. How to determine the competence of such an ideal speaker-listener in such an ideal community? About this problem I am talking here. 17

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Linguists are usually not much interested in idio-competences. 21 Taking into account that there are probably at least small differences between the idio-competences of each pair of language users, then how is it possible to construct the competences of a certain language or dialect for a certain community? A first possible approach is that one hypothesizes or imposes the idio-competences of a certain person A, who is thought for some reasons to be competent in the matter, as being the competence system of language X for the whole community. Language users whose competence is analogous (to what extent?) to the competence of person A are then called members of the language community X. Another strategy can be to hypothesize that the competence ^ of a language is the competence which explains better the language performance of most language users. A third possible approach is that one hypothesizes as the language of the community a competence which is most analogous to most idio-competences of a certain group. In this approach one needs first to describe the idio-competences of the different members of a group and subsequently one has to try to construct a competence which most resembles the idio-competences. This is certainly a very laborious task. An evaluating function for measuring the resemblance will also be necessary. This third approach could be modified into the following task: Given a set of idiocompetences, is it possible to construct by means of a certain algorithm a general competence with a maximal resemblance to the individual competences of most members of the group? Under what conditions is this possible? A fourth approach which seems very reasonable is that a general competence X is constructed from performance data (a) which are performed in an ideal situation, viz. with as few distractions as possible and maximal carefulness and (b) which most members of the community consider with a certain constancy, possible outputs or inputs of their language-competence system. In other words — a certain statistical research is introduced. A fifth possibility — and the last one to be discussed — is a combination of the first and the fourth approach. The general competence X of a language of a community is constructed from the performances in an ideal situation of a set of persons who are considered competent in the matter. The difference between the fourth and the fifth approach is perhaps that the former yields the competence of the factual language of a community, whereas the latter yields the culturally validated language. When applying the methods one to five it is possible that one comes to realize that a better result would be obtained if two or more competence systems A'for a language community is introduced, on the grounds that one gets two or more bodies of homogeneous data. In this case it will be advisable to hypothesize two or more languages for this community. It is obvious that each competence will also permit sequences which have never 21

Of course, for a speech-therapist, knowledge of the idio-competence as well as of the language competence is certainly indispensable.

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actually been uttered. However, once uttered, they must be accepted by the speaker or most speakers of the language community to whose competence it belongs. A proviso must be made. It could be argued that there are rules at work in the competence which are limited in their application in the language performance, for instance by limitation of memory, etc. An obvious problem, then, is how to differentiate between (I) the case where too general a rule is part of a competence and (II) the case where a rule is only limited in its application in performance because of extra-linguistic elements such as memory, etc. Let us take an example and consider sentences (1) up to (4). (1) (2) (3) (4)

I I I I

think. think that I think. think that I think that I think. think that ... that I think.

The first sentences are certainly grammatical. After what number of embeddings does this construction become ungrammatical, if it becomes ungrammatical at all? Chomsky's point of view is that this construction is always grammatical. Nevertheless, it will be clear to everybody that after a certain number of embeddings this construction becomes unintelligible to every listener.22 The differentiation between case (I) and case (II) can only be made on the basis of the knowledge of the possible material limitations to the performance levels (E) and (F). For, in my opinion, one should only hypothesize such general rules to belong to the competence if (a) their 'performance limitations' (if these exist) can be explained by established limitations of the performance levels (E) and (F) and if (b) on the basis of the variability of these established limitations (i.e. change in memorysize) they cannot be built into the competence in an economical manner. Another problem is how to construct the language families. The solution most ready at hand is to do this by taking into account the resemblances and the identical characteristics of the competence systems.23 But what about the differentiation between language and dialect? In this respect the following quotation of de Saussure seems to me important: "Languages and dialects differ quantitatively but not by nature." 24 22

A tentative way to establish under what conditions inbeddings are understandable is made by Yngve, V. H. in "A Model and a Hypothesis for Language Structure" and in "The Depth Hypothesis". A critique on his ideas can be found in Chomsky's and Miller's "Finitary models of Language Users", pp. 474-475. 23 An analogous point of view and interesting comments about the problem of differentiating several languages are found in F. de Saussure's Course in General Linguistics, pp. 191-193, "Concerning the diversities of languages", and pp. 193-196, "Complications of geographical diversity". " De Saussure, F., id., p. 193, "Two idioms may differ in any degree. They may bear a striking resemblance to each other like Zend and Sanskrit, or be as entirely dissimilar as Sanskrit and Gaelic. All intermediate degrees are possible: Greek and Latin are more closely related to each other than to Sanskrit, etc. IDIOMS THAT DIFFER ONLY SLIGHTLY ARE CALLED DIALECTS, BUT THIS WORD MUST BE

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If one considers the context in which this statement occurs, I think it should be interpreted as stating that the difference between (a) the difference between two languages and (b) the difference between a language and a dialect is not an essential difference, but only a quantitative one. In other words, the difference between two competences where one is a language and the other is a dialect (of this language) is less than the difference between this language and any other language. Thus, from a linguistic point of view there is no essential difference between a language and a dialect. This does not exclude, however, that there can be an important difference between the two from a general cultural point of view.

USED LOOSELY.

W E SHALL SEE THAT LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS DIFFER QUANTITATIVELY, NOT BY

NATURE." Very revealing is also the chapter: "Languages have no boundaries", pp. 203-205.

V GRAMMATICALNESS

In this chapter I propose a definition of 'grammaticalness'. I also discuss a few constructions which provide an explanation for the fact that some ungrammatical sentences can be understood. The possibility to introduce grades of grammaticalness is also investigated.

An utterance can be called grammatical when (a) a semantic interpretation can be given to it by the recognition system C and (b) when it can be produced by the production system D. The correspondence between C and D must be such that the utterances produced by C can be generally recognized by D, and vice versa. From now on, the symbol Y will refer to C and D together. Thus grammaticalness is a relative notion. Sentences that cannot be interpreted or produced by this system Y will be ungrammatical, relative to Y. As a consequence, sentences that cannot be produced by the production system D but can be interpreted by the recognition system C, and vice versa, will — according to the above-mentioned definition — be considered ungrammatical, relative to Y. That this may be the case was shown in Chapter IV, 2. This approach to grammaticalness is supported by the hypothesis, discussed in Part One, Chapter IV and Part Two, which says that the language system is compounded out of a production and recognition system which are relatively independent of each other. That is the reason why an expression can be regarded as a valid part of the language, when it is accepted by both systems. However, it is obvious that many utterances, though considered ungrammatical, are perfectly understood. So, for instance, 'I holded it', instead of 'I held it'. How can this be explained? If the recognition- and production-competence systems are adapted to each other in such a way that one can understand what one has produced, and vice versa, —the ideal situation — then it is clear that the recognition competence system will not be able to interpret ungrammatical sentences. The problem arising from the fact that ungrammatical sentences can be understood all the same may perhaps be solved by approach A, viz. when you are not able to interpret an expression by the normal system, a correction code is executing such alternations on the received utterance that it becomes understandable.

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However, the correction code will probably be put into action not only when an utterance is received for which no interpretation can be found, but also when an utterance can only get a strange interpretation taking into account the listener's opinion of the world, of the speaker and of himself. Therefore the action of the correction code must be dependent on the received utterance as well as on the opinions of the listener. 1 There is, however, certainly a limit to the influence of the listener's opinion on the correction process. If the adaptation requirement between the recognition (C) and the production (D) competence system is weakened, so that it is only necessary for C to be able to decode what D encodes but NOT vice versa, then one could argue (solution B) that all sequences that can be understood are understood by the use of the normal recognition competence system, but that the ungrammatical ones cannot be produced by the normal production competence system. I prefer solution A. For, in this approach, the recognition competence system is much easier to construct. If, with one recognition system each sentence that can be understood — grammatical or ungrammatical — has to be interpreted, then one will need a very broad system indeed. Widely divergent grammatical mistakes can occur. Therefore it is doubtful if such a recognition-competence system can be constructed. If one reduces the problem of the understanding of ungrammatical sentences to the problem of how to convert them into grammatical ones, something — I think — is gained. Another argument in favor of solution A is that, independently of its function of guaranteeing the interpretation of ungrammatical sentences, the correction code is also needed — as was already pointed out — for converting sentences with improbable significata into sentences with more probable significata. In a careful description of the correction code it will certainly be necessary to determine the interrelations between the correction code, the metaphorical and the elliptical code. Is the code for converting an elliptical code into an explicit one a subcode of the correction code? The difference between the elliptical and the explicit code is illustrated 2 by sentences (1) through (3). (1) It was sent by the senator from Ohio. 1

That one's opinions strongly influence the correction-code is clearly proved by an experiment of David Bruce (Bruce, D., "Effects of Context Upon the Intelligibility of Heard Speech"). Here I quote a description of this experiment by Miller: "The English psychologist David Bruce recorded a set of ordinary sentences and played them in the presence of noise so intense that the voice was just audible but not intelligible. He told his listeners that these were sentences on some general topic — sports, say — and asked them to repeat what they heard. He then told them they would hear more sentences on a different topic, which they were also to repeat. This was done several times. Each time the listeners repeated sentences appropriate to the topic announced in advance. When at the end of the experiment Bruce told them they had heard the same recording every time — all he had changed was the topic they were given — most listeners were unable to believe." (Miller, G., The Psychology of Communication, p. 76). 2 This is an instance given by R. Jakobson in his course "The Saussurian Course and Linguistic Vistas of Today".

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(2) It was sent from Ohio by the senator. (3) It was sent by the senator who is from Ohio. Sentence (1) can be interpreted as synonymous with (2) or with (3). But in the explicit code, 'the careful spoken language', sentence (1) is not ambiguous. There is a phonological break before or after 'by the senator'. (4) It was sent / by the senator from Ohio. (5) It was sent by the senator / from Ohio. Sentence (4) ('/' indicates a phonological break) is synonymous with (3) and sentence (5) with (2). The ambiguity present in the elliptical code (sentence [1]) is not present in the explicit code (sentences [4] and [5]). When the phonological break is omitted, i.e. in written language, sentences (4) and (5) become ambiguous. Depending on the possibilities of the correction code, an utterance on which the correction code operates can be corrected in «-ways. Therefore it can be «-ambiguous. How to minimize '«'? A principle could be that as few changes as possible may be made on the input utterance by the correction code, in order to get a grammatical sentence. Moreover, the possible changes must be ordered, viz. the changes which are hypothesized to be less fundamental have to be ordered first, etc. Perhaps the order of possible changes must also be made dependent on the received structure of the sentence, the word, the morpheme, etc. All this is certainly not yet enough. It still leaves too much freedom to the correction code. Another solution (C) to the problem of the understandability of ungrammatical sentences could be a combination of the approaches A and B., viz. an enlarged decoding-competence system combined with a correction code. C is better than B because here at least not all ungrammatical sentences that can be understood have to be decoded by the decoding-competence system. Therefore the recognitioncompetence system is certainly easier to construct in this approach than in B. But how is one to determine in a non-arbitrary way which of the ungrammatical sentences the recognition-competence system should be able to handle and which of them should be dealt with by the correction code? This approach is interesting in the case where (C) and (D) are not entirely adapted to each other. When everything is considered, however, A seems to me the most reasonable approach. In approach A the problem of determining grades of grammaticalness must be turned into the problem of determining grades of ungrammaticalness. All the sentences which can be both produced and recognized by the production- and recognition systems respectively are grammatical and only these. In the correction of ungrammatical sentences the correction code will have to make more or less important changes in one case (ungrammatical sentence X) than in the other (ungrammatical sentence Y). Therefore one can say that X is more ungrammatical than Y. One can express this even in the following way: Y is more

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grammatical than X. This statement is valid only under the reservation that it is not interpreted in such a way that X or Y is grammatical. Both are ungrammatical. In order to avoid this possible confusion I prefer to speak of grades of ungrammaticalness rather than of grades of grammaticalness in ungrammatical sentences. The correction code can also work on different levels (phonological, syntacticsemantic, cognitive...)- Therefore it may be possible to speak of grades of ungrammaticalness for each level. Another problem consists in determining when the correction code may be put into action. Is this to be done, when no interpretation is possible or probable after one has searched all possible semantic interpretations of a sentence? This is certainly too restrictive. Then, under what conditions and on which minimal components is the correction code able to operate?

PART TWO

A RECOGNITION AND PRODUCTION COMPETENCE SYSTEM

This part contains the construction of a recognition and a production algorithm. Subsequently is investigated which kind of data are required for the operation of the algorithm. I do not treat here the degree of analogy1 between these algorithms and the human ones, occurring in function and formal characteristics. Nevertheless an analogy on both accounts is intended. In many cases, beside the Dutch examples, German or English equivalents are mentioned. I want however to stress that IN GENERAL I DO NOT DISCUSS THE GRAMMAHCALNESS OF THE GERMAN AND THE ENGLISH EXAMPLES. They are only introduced to exemplify better the structure of the Dutch examples.

1

I tried to define formally the notion 'analogy' and to construct a measure for analogy in "An explication of the concept 'Analogy'". Later on, my approach proved to be similar to the one of F. Gonseth in his articles: "L'analogie en tant que méthode de connaissance" and "Principes de la connaissance analogique", I am grateful to F. Gonseth for having directed my attention to this.

VI A RECOGNITION COMPETENCE SYSTEM (A D E C O D I N G COMPETENCE)

1. A RECOGNITION ALGORITHM: A CYCLICAL PROGRAM TO DETERMINE THE SIGNIFICATU M OF A SENTENCE

1.1. Introductory remarks In Part One, I have argued that to every sign is attached one meaning programThis program can be subdivided by branch instruction. When decoding a sentence you need (a) to determine with which meaning program or submeaning program each sign is used and (b) to execute this program in order to get the message, viz. the significatum of the sentence. For both tasks an algorithm is necessary. This algorithm should preferably be cyclical, for it must be possible to determine all interpretations of an utterance if such is required. In other words, taking into account all possible submeaning programs of the signs which are part of an utterance, the alogrithm must be able to construct all possible interpretations (significata) of this utterance. In the construction of the algorithm I make use of the psychological hypothesis that generally we only give one interpretation to one particular sentence. To a certain extent this interpretation may differ from person to person. This slight difference may perhaps be explained by the different ways of ordering the submeaning programs. The ordering may depend on the frequency with which a person meets a certain submeaning program. So a subprogram met with more frequency would be ordered before the one met with less frequency, etc. ... Probably the context of a sign exerts a relative influence on the ordering of submeaning programs too. In a certain context one submeaning program is sometimes more probable than another. You can take this into account by introducing a mechanism by which contexts (linguistic or even — in a subsequent but more difficult development of the mechanism — extralinguistic) execute reordering operations — with temporary effect — on the submeaning programs. Eventually, if a reordering operation is frequently met with, it can affect the ordering definitively on grounds of the first mentioned ordering principle. I shall not discuss such a mechanism here. It could also be argued that the ordering of the submeaning programs is partly relative to the speaker one is listening to. This could help to explain why, when read-

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ing a book of an author whom one is reading for the first time, one often has some difficulties in understanding exactly what he means. However, after a few pages — whether or not one repeats from the beginning — everything is going smoothly. To the first hypothesis, viz. that in general one gives only one interpretation to a sentence, I add the following: only when urged by certain contexts (f.i. contexts which explicitly indicate that an ambiguity is present, etc. ...) or if one explicitly wants it, a second, third, ... or «-th interpretation is looked for. Of course, it is agreed upon that if one has been urged several times to search for different interpretations of a sentence, and been able to find them, then (and also under the other condition of forming associations) one can have associated to the sentence the property 'having several interpretations'. My proposal for a cyclical recognition program has — as far as its formal characteristics are concerned — been deeply influenced by the one used by S. Kuno in his article "Predictive Analysis and a Path Elimination Technique". An important limitation of my approach has to be noted. I take for granted the morphemical recognition. I suppose the problems to construct the meaning of a word from the meaning of the single morphemes to be solved. I only propose an algorithm for constructing the meaning of a sentence from the meaning of its components, viz. words. The following terminology is used. A sentence has 1 ... n words. K is the iT-th word of the sequence 1 ... K... n. K has a meaning program. fV(K) is the set of the submeaning programs of K. The submeaning programs are ordered. The member of W(K) which comes first in the order is stored in I,, the /'-th is stored in I, and the last one in I„. Each submeaning program is composed of three parts (two of them may be zero). These parts are: (a) the relation program III (the significatum program), (b) the relation program II and (c) a relation program I. The relation program III of 1( indicates which significatum is designated by the word K in the interpretation^ The relation program II indicates the kind of semantic relation which the significatum of Kt has to other significata. The relation program I of Kt operates in the relation programs II, III or I of other words. 1.2. Basic Program for the Recognition Procedure2 1. set (k) = 1. 1.a. set (/) = 1. 2. Take W i m , execute its significatum program (its relation program III) and store the result in A(k). 3.a Bring a copy of fV im to the ordering inquiring program (O.I.P.). 1

A review on the structure of a computer and its programs and references to interesting works are given in "Schets voor een gedeeltelijke simulatie van het betekenisbegrip in een automaton" by F. Vandamme. Certainly for a first approach the following works are interesting: Siegel, P., Understanding Digital Computers and Gnedenko, Koroljuk, Justschenko, Elements der Programmierung.

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4.

Does the O.I.P. indicate an operation on the relation programs I or II of W i(k) or vice versa? If not, go to 6. 5. Store a copy of this operation in M(k) and execute this operation. 6. Is the relation program of W i m executable? If it is executable, put a copy in C(k) in the form ((k) # / # . . . , ) execute it and go to 8. 7. Check whether it could become executable by receiving other information. If so, store in B(k) as ((k) # / # ...) and go to 8. 7.a. Store i(k) in X and go to 9. 8. Execute the relation programs stored in B(l) ... B(kh but in such a way that if B(t) can be executed, then a copy of B(i) is stored in C (() and B(l) erased. If it is no longer executable, even if further information is received, then write i(k) from B(i) in X and go to 9. 8.a. (k) + 1 -> (k). if (k) > n, then go to 14, otherwise to l.a. 9. Reconstruct the situation before X. 9.a. X + X-* Wtm (X is a constant which has to be added to i of the sequence i(k) to obtain the next rule of W m ) viz. on the number of the submeaning proif i > m (m is dependent on grams) write (k) in n and go to 11. 10. Go to 2. 11. fx — 1 —• (Jfc). 12. If (k) = 0, go to 13; the sentence has been scrutinized exhaustively. If (k) ^ 0, reconstruct the configuration of (k), take i(k) from C(k) and put in X, and go to 9.a. 13. Stop. 14. If a 1 is stored in F ( a 1 is stored in V only when there is a necessity to search for several interpretations of the sentence having the words 1 ... n), execute 7.a. 1.3. Explanation of some commands of the cyclical program Command 1: two counters are needed. These are k and i. In commands 1 and l.a. they are put on 1. Command 2: In this command is taken the submeaning program of the A>th element, which is the z'-th in the order of the submeaning programs of k. Subsequently its relation program III is executed and its result (viz. its significatum) is stored in Am. This will be needed to make the execution of its relation program II possible. Command 7.a.: If a relation program I or II of W ( m is inexecutable, then the submeaning program of (k) which first follows W i m , is taken. This is done by command 9. One only reaches command l.a., in case of a negative answer in command 7. In case of a positive answer one goes to command 8. Command 8.a.: '«' equals the number of words included in the sentence.

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Command 9: In the algorithm I have mentioned the operation "reconstruction". When a submeaning program was executed, it is always stored in addition with the information about its ordering in the sequence of signs and its ordering in the order of submeaning programs of (k), viz. W m . With this information one is able to reconstruct every position one had, on condition that the inverse of each operation is available. Command 9 . a . : ' m ' indicates the number of submeaning programs of (&). Command 10: If no submeaning program can be found for (k), which is executable, then another interpretation must be used for the (k— l)-th word. Command 11 determines this (k — l)-th element. Command 14: In order to search for a new interpretation for a sentence, another submeaning program must be used for at least one word. The determination of another submeaning program for a word happens by command 9.a. However, 9.a. requires that the old one is placed in A. Commands 7.a. and 8 put submeaning programs in A which are proved to be inexecutable. Command 12 also puts submeaning programs in A, when these submeaning programs were executable, but proved not to be combinable with certain submeaning programs of following words, or when a new interpretation has to be searched for. By means of 14, command 7.a. will also put in A submeaning programs which are executable, in order to allow the search for new interpretations of the sentence. By introducing command 14, all possible interpretations of a sentence A are systematically searched for, if a '1' is present in V. Let the following example illustrate this. One has a sentence A composed of four words. Suppose one gets with the first reading the interpretation: "1 2 2 3 3 1 4 3 " (1 2 indicates that for the first word the second submeaning program was used). Command 14 will guarantee: (a) that while keeping "12233!" constant, there is searched whether one may obtain acceptable interpretations of sentence A with "4 (i > 3 ) ", and which ones they are. (b) That by means of command 9.a., if "4, > 4 m ", command 11 is applied, and so all possible interpretations are searched for " 3 ( ( > 1 ) " and "4", keeping constant "1 9 " (c) That by means of command 9.a., when "4, > 4 m ", command 11 is applied, but when "3¡ > 3 m ", command 9.a. will again refer to 11 and so all possible interpretations are searched for " 2 ( ¡ > 3 ) " and 3 and 4, keeping constant 1 2 . Etc. ... 1.4. A few

comments

1. You can rationalize the algorithm by executing command 9 — viz. the reconstruction process — only in the case that when one has taken the inverse of all parts of the submeaning program of fVHk) (which is proved to be inexecutable), which differs from the new submeaning program fVjm, then not all ( W j m — T) are executable, not even when further data can be brought in ( T being the set of parts which are common to W i(k) and lVJ(k)).

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This strategy has the benefit that one avoids to execute the same program twice or more. Look e.g. at the sentence "The bank is dirty". If at a certain moment one observes from contextual information that here one has to interpret 'bank' not as 'the slope of land at the edge of a watercourse' — as one has originally done it —, but rather as 'an institution for lending or borrowing ... money', then one can make a simple substitution, instead of making the reconstruction up to (k) = 1. You can introduce this in the proposed algorithm as follows: 9.a. and 9.b. precede 9. All references to 9 must be substituted by 9.a. 9.b. has to be specified as follows: 9.b.: 1/ Compare Wjm with A (viz. Wim) and bring the common parts in T. 2/ Make the inverse of (I — T). 3/ Go to 2, while substituting Wim by (W J ( k ) — T) and while substituting 7.a. by 7.a.l. (which specifies: 'go to 9'3). It will be necessary also to subdivide 8.a. into 8.a.l. and 8.a.2. The present 8.a. must then be 8.a.2. The command which substitutes in its turn 7.a.l. by 7.a. is 8.a.l. Indeed after the solution of the difficulty with W i m , 7.a.l. is no longer necessary. 2. Does there exist any psychological evidence on which to base a choice between the strategies A and B, when a certain submeaning program is proved to be inexecutable? A: reconstruction of a certain position under certain conditions and trying another submeaning program. B: to start again with the complete analysis of the same sentence. In the last approach one must of course take into account the information of the submeaning programs which were already used, but which were inexecutable. If this is not observed, you would get a loop. For instance, you start with the first-ordered submeaning program -* this one proves to be inexecutable -> begin again -> try the first ordered one, etc. ... You could also avoid this by making a random change in the order of submeaning programs when starting again. 3. Obviously it is quite a job to construct all possible interpretations of a sentence with this program. This is certainly also the case for the human language user. One sometimes needs a lot of time to observe ambiguities, even if one knows that they are present. 4. If a certain interpretation of a sentence is strange on grounds of one's philosophical views, e.g. the opinion one has about the speaker, etc. ..., then this can be a motivation to search for another interpretation. This can be done by command 14, or by the correction operations not discussed here. Correction of the input-sentence itself will be made if one hypothesizes that in the communication process some data are lost or deformed. As far as these processes are dependent on our world-views, they are extra-linguistic. Without doubt they have a strong effect on the use of the recognition and production system. 5. You could also propose to execute the relation programs I by the O.I.P. (the ordering inquiring program). This could perhaps simplify the algorithm. 3

Taking into account the convention that all *9' was substituted by 9a, 7a specifies 'go to 9a'.

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2. ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE SOME RELATION PROGRAMS I AND II OF DUTCH

Introductory Remarks. — A method for determining the relation program III was discussed in Part One, Chapter II. I will now try to determine some relation programs II and I. Although I am conscious of the necessity to determine the relation programs on the morpheme level as well, for the sake of simplicity in demonstrating the theory, I mainly treat the relation programs II and I on the word level, supposing that the internal significata structure of the word is a datum. Another remark I should like to make is, that I agree that the proposed relation programs can and have to be adapted or modified if new empirical data make this necessary. Such eventual adaptation does not necessarily discredit the basic assumptions underlying the theory. Such is only the case if new data are introduced, which cannot be explained without a change of this basic assumption. It is also probable that several exemplifications can be simplified inside the theory. The exemplifications are only given in order to explain more clearly the theory and to illustrate its possibilities. The phonological problems of the communication process by means of language are only taken into account accidentally.

2.1. The Article The function of the definite articles 'de' and 'het' in Dutch, 'the' in English and 'der, die, das' in German is a specific kind of operation on a general term. I interpret 'general term' as does W.v.O. Quine does: "Semantically the distinction between singular and general terms is vaguely that a singular term names or purports to name just one object, though as complex or diffuse an object as you please, while a general term is true of each, severally, of any number of objects."4 You can simulate these terms in an automaton as follows:5 "An abstractum is a description of the state of one or more abstractors". All descriptions (see Part One, Chapter I) brought in these abstractors, which get these abstractors in the state described by a certain abstractum, are instances of this abstractum. Language signs which have as a significatum an abstractum or a set of abstracta, are 'general terms'. In my opinion it is not necessary that for each abstractum or set of abstracta a language sign exists which has this abstractum or set of abstracta as a significatum. A language sign is a 'singular term', when its significatum is a description which is an instance of an abstractum. * Quine, W. v. O., Word and Object, pp. 90-91. • This was more extensively treated by myself in "Schets van een gedeeltelijke simulatie van het betekenisbegrip in een automaton", pp. 95-98.

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The execution of a definite-article operator on the significatum of a general term results in a definite-singular term. 6 The indefinite term "een, 'n" in Dutch, 'a, an' in English and 'ein' in German is an operator on a general term, of which the execution results in an indefinite singular term. I shall indicate respectively the fact of the execution of the definite and indefinite article operator by: " I d . . . I " and "/,„ ... / " . For instance the execution of the definite article 'the' on the general term 'table' will be indicated by: "I d table / " . When one knows (a) which kind of operator the article is, one still has to know (b) where its arguments are. In other words the relation program which specifies (a) is only a part of the submeaning program of the article. Another part is the program which indicates which general term it has as argument. For, in a sentence several general terms can succeed one another. D o the articles operate on all succeeding general terms? Not at all, only on the first succeeding noun. 7 This can be proved by sentences (1) and (2). (1) De man zag koe. The man saw cow. (2) De man zag de koe. The man saw the cow. 'Zien (see)' is a verb which needs a singular term as its object. 8 Sentence (2), but not sentence (1) fulfills this requirement. From this you can propose the rule that the article only operates on the first succeeding noun. If this were not the case, then sentence (1) must be correct as well. Apparent contradictions of this conclusion are sentences (3) and (4). (3) Een tafel en stoel stonden in de hoek. A table and chair were standing in the corner. (4) De brood etende politieagent. Der Brot essende Polizist. ' One can also get singular terms by other means: i.e., under some conditions, by making the plural of a general term. The article can also have other functions. I do not treat them here. For more about them in Dutch, see Rijpma en Schuringa Nederlandse spraakkunst, § 214. ' One can ask if it is necessary to specify that the first succeeding noun must be a general term. I think that one can argue that the article operates on the first succeeding noun. However, if this noun is already a singular term, this operation will become cognitively strange. That a noun is already a singular term will be strongly dependent on the context (linguistic or extra-linguistic context). So the same expression can be (cognitively) strange in one context and allright in another one. In both cases they are, however, linguistically correct. For instance, the sentence: "I see a Mike". In Dutch the proper name is generally used as a singular term. However, in a context, where a set of persons with the name Mike are gathered together, this is not as much the case. I agree that in certain cultures and so also in certain languages, some sequences of nouns will generally be used as singular terms. This can be an important datum about their performance. 8 This does not seem to me a linguistic, but a cognitive requirement on the significatum of the verb zien, viz. the specific operation which is designated by this verb, requires as argument not an abstractum, but an instance of an abstractum.

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In sentence (3) the indefinite article operates on 'table' and 'chair', the two succeeding nouns. In (4) it does not operate on the first, but on the second noun. That these sentences do not refute the conclusion, will be demonstrated for sentence (3) during my discussion on the conjunction, and for sentence (4) during my discussion on the adjectively used participle. Another specification is still necessary. Sentence (5) shows it. *(5) De zag man. The saw man. Following the rule, the article operates on 'man', because 'man' is the first succeeding noun. This gives an inadequate result. Therefore the following addition to the rule is necessary: the first succeeding noun on which the article operates, must immediately succeed the article. But now you will get troubles with sentences (6-7-8). (6) De goede man. The good man. (7) De werkende man. The working man. (8) De hard werkende man. Der schwer arbeitende Mann. The method used to solve this difficulty constitutes the power of my approach to the recognition system. In my view, this method makes use of the fundamental characteristics of the recognition system. Beside their significatum program (relation program III) and their relation program II (viz. the program of a morpheme X which indicates the position of the significatum of X in the significatum structure of the sentence, in regard to the significatum of other morphemes in the sentence), certain morphemes have a relation program I operating on the relation program I or II or III of other morphemes. Taking this and the sentences (6-7-8) into account, you can hypothesize that the relation program II of the article is changed by adjectives, the adjectively used participle and the adverb. The argument of the article operation will, by this change, not anymore be the first immediately following word which has to be a noun, but the second successor which has to be a noun. A condition must also be put on the execution of the relation program II. There must be an agreement between the article and its argument as far as gender and number are concerned. 9 This is proved by sentences (10 till 15). (10) *(11) *(12) (13) •

De man. Der Mann. Het man. Das Mann. De kind. Der Kind. Het kind. Das Kind.

In German there is also, beside an agreement in genus and number, an agreement in case.

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*(14) Het kinderen. Das Kinder. (15) De kinderen. Die Kinder. In order to be able to formalize the proposed hypotheses, let us make the following notational conventions. 1 / Q IS A VARIABLE FOR THE CATEGORY OF WHICH THE RELATION PROGRAM IS INDICATED BY THE EXPRESSION, IN WHICH Q OCCURS.

2/ 'nS • {X) • £2' indicates the zz-th successor of Q, which moreover must belong to the category X. 'nS • X • Q' (notice that X is not between plain brackets) indicates the w-th X which succeeds Q. For instance '3S • (N) • i2' indicates that the third word which succeeds £2 must be a noun. ' 3 5 • N • Q' indicates the third noun which succeeds Q. This noun can be the 20-th successor of £2. Analogous to it is: 'nP • (X) • £2' indicates the w-th predecessor of Q which has to belong to the category X. 'nP • X • £2' indicates the n-th X which is a predecessor of Q. I 1 3/ X Y Q means that there has to be an agreement between X and £2 in gender and number. Y can be equal to or different from 0 (£1 dominates X). 41 (A')obl means that the program X or its derivation is obligatory. Therefore the program X or the program Y, if Y results from an operation on X of the relation program I of another word (in which case Kis a derivation of X) must be executed. 5/ JV is a symbol for 'noun'. Art is a symbol for article. Art II is a symbol for the relation program II of the category 'article'. Art I is a symbol for the relation program I of the category 'article'. Etc. ... 6/ Ac / X indicates that in the program X, nS must be substituted for (n + 1) S, in other words nS (n + 1) S. Therefore the n-th successor mentioned in X is replaced by the (n + l)-th successor by means of the operator Ac. 7/ X => Y means, if X then Y. So, you get the following formalized programs: Definite

article:

Significatum program (relation program III): I d ... I. Relation program II: (/„ I S • (N) • Q I) obi. Indefinite

article:

I d is substituted by I i n in these two formulas. kd]ective

and

adjectively

used

participle.

Relation program Adj 1 A : ((IP • (Art) • Q)=> Ac I Art II) obi.

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2.2. The

Adjective10

An adjective Xt immediately succeeded by an adjective Xj, modifies X}. In other words the significatum of Xt is assigned to the significatum of Xj. Sentences (1) and (2) illustrate this. (1) Het The (2) Het The

geelgroene koper. yellow-green copper. donkergroene gras. dark-green grass.

This is no longer the case when a phonological break 11 or a case-marking 'a'12 follows or is connected to Xt (the case-marking 'a' can replace or at least shorten the phonological break). Look at sentences (3) to (7). (3) Het goed groot brood. The good big bread. (4) D e grote, stoute jongen. Der große, unartige Knabe. (5) D e grote, geweidig slanke jongeling. Der große, ubermassig schlanke Jüngling. (6) D e geweidige, drinkende man. Der riesige, trinkende Mann. (7) Het goede, grote boek. Das gute, große Buch. (8) Ik werk hard. Ich arbeite schwer. (9) Ik eet vlug koekjes. Ich esse schnell Gebäck. In (8) and (9) the adjectives 'hard' and 'vlug' modify the verb. When an adjective 10 Only the real adjectives are taken into account. The relation program of the adjectives, derived from nouns, prepositions or coordinators by suffixing a morpheme, has not been taken up here. 11 If one does not agree that in the explicit code in sentence (3) there occurs a phonological break, then one will get an ambiguity in sentence (3). 'Goed' can then be a modifier of 'groot' as well as of 'brood'. This ambiguity then can sometimes be solved on the basis of the projection of the significata in the model of the world of the listener. " The case-marking's' (more correctly its relation program I) indicates explicitly that the relation program II must be chosen, by which the adjective modifies a noun. If one accepts the hypothesis of the existence of a phonological break in "De goede, grote jongen" in explicit speech, then the casemarking 'a' relation program is redundant. If one does not accept the hypothesis about the phonological break, then one will have to adapt the relation program Adj IA by replacing '(Art)' by '(Art v Adj (Adj II„))' 'Adj (Adj II„)' means the adjective for which the relation program II„ is taken. The same adaptation must be made, if one accepts that optionally the case-marking's' can substitute for the phonological break. As will be shown, with the phonological break hypothesis, this is not needed. In English the suffix 'ly' indicates that an adjective is used adverbally, in other words that it has the relation program II by which it modifies an adjective or a verb.

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modifies another adjective or a verb, it is called an adverb or it is adverbally used. Of course, an adjective can also modify a noun as in sentence (10). (10) Het grote boek. The big book. Using these data you can construct the following relation program II for the adjective. Adj 11. (X, m Q) obi i r (a) X, = IS • (N) • Q or (b) Xt = I S • (adj) • Q or (c) Xt = IP • (V)-Q Informally, an adjective Xt assigns its significatum to (a) the immediately succeeding noun, or (b) to the immediately succeeding adjective or (c) to the immediately preceding verb. As far as (a) is concerned there must be an agreement in number and gender between Xt and N. In modern Dutch, however, the case-marking 'a' is mostly optional as far as the masculine and the neuter singular is concerned. 13 As is proved by sentences (11 to 23), this is only true for the neuter singular when the noun modified by the adjective X„ is also modified by a definite article or a demonstrative. Therefore the relation program I of the definite article and the demonstrative makes an operation on rules of the agreement of the adjective, viz. to permit the case-ending 'a' for adjectives modifying neutral singular nouns. *(11) Ik eet grote brood. Ich esse große Brot. *(12) Een grote brood. Ein große Brot. *(13) Zure bier. Sauere Bier. *(14) Mijn grote brood. Mein groß Brot. *(15) Ieder grote brood. Jedes groß Brot. *(16) Welke grote brood. Welches groß Brot. (17) Groot brood. Großes Brot. (18) Een groot brood. Ein großes Brot. (19) Ieder groot brood. 13

Nederlandse spraakkunst,

Rijpma en Schuringa, pp. 180-181.

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(20) (21) (22) (23)

Jedes große Brot. Welk groot brood? Welches große Brot. Dit grote brood. Dit groot brood. Dieses große Brot. Het grote brood. Het groot brood. Dat dwaze gerucht. Dat dwaas gerucht. Das dimme Gerücht.

As to the order of the subprograms of the relation program II of the adjective, I will stress the fact that it is only based on an intuitive impression of frequency. Although I agree that the ordering of the subprograms can and must be made by scientific research, I have judged this to be outside the scope of the present work. The assignment of the significatum of an adjective to a significatum of another word is obligatory, in other words an argument for the assignment operation must be found. To explain the phenomena which appear in sentences (3 to 7), you can use the relation program, for the phonological break. PBIa: S • (ß) • adj; => Ca/( ) (adj I I J . Ca/ X (Y) indicates the deletion operation i.e. X must be deleted in Y. Informally one gets: if a phonological break immediately follows an adjective Xh then the specification '(•••)'> viz. 'immediately' must be deleted from the program adj II a . Instead of the immediately following noun, one will now have the specification 'the next following noun'. You could also expand Adj IA by substituting the specification '(art)' by '(art v (adj ^ P B))\ The specification 'X ^ Y' indicates the concatenation of X and Y. This approach would avoid that in sentence (24) 'goede' modifies 'Piet'. (24) De goede, doodt Piet. The good, kills John. However, a definitive choice between both approaches is difficult, because one could determine by means of a rule in the O.I.P. (O.I.P.i) that an adjective can not pass certain categories, f.i. a conjugated verb. So, the interpretation of (24) would also be avoided. Only considerations of economy and generality can decide here. For instance, is such a rule of the O.I.P. useful for a whole set of categories or only for the adjective? Taking this into account, one can also ask here why not specify in the relation program of the adj II a "the first succeeding noun" instead of "the immediately following noun"? In sentence (25), if no phonological break is present between 'geweldig' and 'gelezen', there would be ambiguity of meaning in this approach. (If a phonological break would be present (sentence 26) then this ambiguity would be solved). (25) Een geweldig gelezen boek. Ein enorm gelesenes Buch

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(26) Een geweldig, gelezen boek. Ein enormes, gelesenes Buch. However (25) is not ambiguous at all. "Geweldig" only modifies "gelezen" and certainly not "boek"! This is an argument against the last-proposed modification. Using the relation programs we got up to now, sentence (27) is ambiguous, for it may have several significata structures. (27) Ik drink geweldig, zuur bier. 'Geweldig' can modify the noun 'bier' by help of the phonological break operation or it can modify the verb 'drink' by means of the relation program of adj IIC. In fact sentence (27) is ambiguous in this respect. As a consequence the prediction on the basis of the theory proves to be true. Thus one gets a confirmation of the theory. A complication arises when we take sentences (28 to 31) into account. (28) Ik zag de goed werkende jongen. i I Ich sah den gut arbeitenden Knaben. (29) Ik zag goed werkende jongens. OR

Ich sah gut arbeitende Knaben. (30) Ik zag kleine, vlug lopende kinderen. I I Ich sah kleine, schnell laufende Kinder. (31) Ik zag vlug lopende kinderen. OR

Ich sah schnell laufende Kinder. Sentences (29) and (31) are ambiguous, whereas this is not the case for (28) and (30). The adverb Xi must search its argument between the open article or the open adjective and their respective argument, if the article or the open adjective precedes Xt. An open operator is an operator which has not yet found its argument. When it has found it, it becomes closed. One can take this into account for a generalization of the rule "0° art I" (see p. 118). In this last rule the specification "adj II C " is also needed in (f). You can also ask how to explain the phenomena observed in sentences (32) and (33)? *(32) Ik veel eet brood. Ich meistens esse Brot. (33) Veel eet ik brood. Meistens esse ich Brot. By the program adj IIC, (32) and (33) will not get an interpretation. But only (32) is ungrammatical. This is not the case with (33). To get the interpretation for (33) one needs the following relation program I of 'the first word of the sentence'. Below, I will prove that the first word relation program is important in many other cases as well.

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0 / : P • (0) • a d j j r => Aa / adj,II c y adjjll c

(adjj = adj s (adj, R adj,))

Informally, when no word (0) immediately precedes the adjective used with the program adj IIC or with the program adj IIj, when it modifies an adjective with a program adj IIC, one must execute the operation Aa on this program. By the operation Aa, the specification 'mP' is substituted by 'mS'. By this rule, it is ensured that 01 will not be executed on "Dikke jongens eten brood" (fat boys eat bread). The sentences (34) to (38) prove the necessity of the introduction of a relation program I for the participle. (34) Ik eet een goed gesneden brood. I I Ich esse ein dick-belegtes Brot. (35) Ik eet een gesneden goed brood. I i Ich esse ein belegtes dickes Brot. (36) Ik eet veel. Ich esse viel. (37) Ik heb veel gegeten. Ich habe viel gegessen. *(38) Ik heb gegeten veel. Ich habe gegessen viel. The same rule as for the ' 0 I' must be used for the participle I. Therefore the following generalization can be made14 (P • (0) • adj IIC) v (P • (adj II) • D) => Aa / adj IIC. By the introduced relation programs one is able to specify the argument of the adjective operator.15 Up to now the interrelations of the several operations with the same noun as argument have not been treated. For instance, in "de grote, ronde doos" (the big round box) the article operates on the noun. Subsequently the adjective 'rond' modifies 'de doos', finally 'groot' modifies 'de grote doos'. An argument and a formal treatment of this can be found in section 2.7.: 'the relation between the adjective, the relative clause and the ordering conjunction'. 11

The formulation of this rule guarantees that program participle T can only operate once because only one adj can immediately precede the participle. So no problem arises for the explication of the ambiguity in: "Ik eet veel dik gesneden brood" Ich esse viel dick belegtes Brot. 15 One has also this type of sentences: Karel de Goede reisde veel. Karl der Gute reiste viel. D e graag geziene Karel de Goede reisde veel. Der gern gesehene Karl der Gute reiste viel. This could be explained by introducing a program, saying that in case an article and an adjective cannot get its argument, that the noun is their argument which immediately precedes.

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However, it seems interesting to introduce the convention: "Xm PP" already here; this means X with the properties or significata earlier assigned to it (PP — preceding properties). Taking this into account, one can rewrite the program adj II as follows: ad) II: XtmQ

I obi

(a) X, = ( I S • (Nm PP) • Q) or (b) Xt = ( I S • (adj m PP) • Q) or (c) Xt = ( I P • (Km PP) • Q). 2.3. The Verb (1) Ik eet. Piet eet. I eat. Mike eats. (2) Ik sla. I slap. (3) Ik eet brood. Piet eet brood. I eat bread. Mike eats bread. (4) Ik sla hem. I slap him. Taking into account sentences (1) and (2), it is clear that the verb assigns certain properties to the preceding noun (with its modifiers) or to the personal pronoun. Sentences (3) and (4) illustrate that the verb assigns to the preceding noun or personal pronoun, the property of executing a certain action on the succeeding noun or personal pronoun, which type of action is determined by the verb itself. From (1), one notices that the first succeeding noun is optional. So one can propose the following relation program for the verb (V11^): VIIA: Xim

QKX2}

Xx = I P •

+

PP-£2

X2 = IS'

+

PP-£3

The following notational conventions must be made : (1) pp means personal pronoun. (2) : X i s optional. I 1 I 1 (3) lXt Z Vf or 'Vj Y Xt' : Z and Y are variables for significata structures.

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A RECOGNITION AND PRODUCTION COMPETENCE SYSTEM

(Xt dominates the verb Vj). That which dominates the verb Vj determines the number and person of the verb Vj. It also gets the nominative. V / Xt indicates that Xt gets the accusative. It is interesting to note that the declension 'in Dutch does not exist anymore for the noun, but still for the pronouns. Let us now take a look at sentence (5).

1

(5) Jan zie ik. Obj subj. Den Mann sehe ich. (6) Het beeld schilderde Piet. obj. subj. Das Bild malte Peter. (7) Piet doodt Pol. obj. subj. subj. obj. Peter tötet Paul. (8) De politiekordons konden de betogers niet doorbreken, hoewel ze zulks proobj. subj. beerden om dichter bij het witte Huis te komen. Die Polizeikordons konnten die Demonstranten nicht durchbrechen, otwohl sie derartiges probierten, um näher an das Weiße Haus zu gelangen. The subject of sentence (5) is the personal pronoun which succeeds the verb. This is indicated by the declension of the pronoun. In sentence (6) there is no doubt — on the basis of our knowledge of 'beeiden' and 'Piet' — that here too the succeeding noun is the subject. From a linguistic point of view (6) is ambiguous. The ambiguity of sentence (7) is also apparent. Sentence (8) is also ambiguous. But from the context we know that the noun succeeding the verb is the subject, because the demonstrators are the ones trying to approach the White House. From all this it is obvious that one needs a relation program complementary to V UA, viz. VII B . VIIB :

X1m£2/X2 Xx = IS • N + PP • Q X2 = IP • N + PP • Q

For every verb the relation program VllA or VIIB (exclusive disjunction) is obligatory. However, V IIA is preferable in Dutch. Only if V llA cannot be realized or if an interpretation results which is cognitively strange, then V II B is chosen. From this it is clear that for the verb the following specification is necessary: VII:

(VIIA

! y 2 V Hb) obi.

The following notations must be introduced:

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103

' y' is the notation for the exclusive disjunction \ Y 2 is the notation for the exclusive ordered disjunction. S o ' ! ] y 2 I " means that X or Y must be chosen, but that there is a preference for X. ' j v 2 is the notation for the inclusive ordered disjunction. The discussion made about the adjective, viz. whether the relation program must specify the immediately succeeding noun instead of the first succeeding noun or immediately preceding instead of the first preceding noun can be repeated here as well. In the first approach the adjective and article relation program I will have to operate on the open verb program. In the last approach, the O.I.P. program (O.I.P.n) will have to limit the range of the F I I program. Here also considerations of economy and generality will have to decide which approach is the better of the two. In the following I shall not return to this problem. Every time the choice between both approaches is open, for the sake of simplicity in illustrating the theory I will choose the second approach when both approaches are possible. In some cases operations I are needed on V11^ and VII B . This is for instance the case with the interpretation of sentences (11) and (12). (11) Ziet Jan de bakker? Sieht Jan den Backer? (12) Loopt Jan vlug? Lauft Jan schnell? Sentences (11) and (12) illustrate that, when the first word of a sentence is a verb, the properties expressed by the verb are assigned to the first succeeding noun with its formerly assigned properties, and that the second succeeding noun is the object of the verb. One gets this by specifying that, when the verb is the first word of the sentence, the operations Aa and Ac are executed on V llA. Here Aa indicates the substitution of nP by nS or formally nP -* nS, and Ac indicates the substitution of nS

b y (n + x) S o r f o r m a l l y nS-*(n

+ x)

S.

Formally stated the question-rule looks as follows:

However, one gets the same result by executing the operators Ab and Cb on Vllg • Ab indicates the substitution of nP by (n + x) S or formally nP -* (n + x) S; Cb / Z, (Y) indicates the addition of the characteristic(s) Z to Y. Here Cb / « )), X1 is needed, in other words the X2 must be made optional. Formally the alternative of Q I x looks as follows: Q I , : I P • ( 0 ) • Ve -> (Ab

(x=i)

/ VIIB) • (C„ / < >, (AT2)).

Is it possible to make a choice between Q I x and Q I 2 ? At first glance this is difficult because both have the same complexity. However, one could simplify the program

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past participle

subordinated clause

2

0

3

2

4

2

1

1

2

0

0

3

1

3 1

passive

present participle

2

VllB

adjectively used participle

adverb adverbial clauses

VIIA

— iHHi

"IIA

question

Q I2 by omitting the operation Cb. Instead, one needs a rule of the O.I.P. (O.I.P. 2 ) which specifies what is optional (and when) in the program VII B . One knows that, when the question or the adjectively used participle operator is executed, X2 viz. the object is optional (more on this below). When the passive is executed, then the subject is optional. The same applies when the question and the passive operator are executed. This can lead to the induction of the general rule 'O.I.P. 2 ' for the O.I.P.; in this way one obtains a substantial economization. As soon as an operation is executed on V IIB, the element of V IIB which then does not dominate the verb, becomes optional. Thanks to this rule one can omit a special optionalizing operation for every This is an case mentioned above. Accordingly, the Q I 2 will be simpler than Q argument for the view that in Dutch, the program VIIB or in other words the sentence structure 'object — verb — subject' is more fundamental than the program V llA (the sentence structure 'subject — verb — object'). By taking V IIB as more fundamental one obtains an economization in several other cases as well. This is proved by the following matrix:

6 3

In the matrix, the rows represent the basic programs, while the columns represent the target programs. The numbers indicate the number of operations needed to get from a basic program to the corresponding target program. All along the line, we see that with V \lB as a basic program less operators are needed. Below I shall discuss the different target programs and the operators used to obtain them. I am only anticipating here in order to mention this striking fact. However, it must be clear that I only develop both approaches in order to prove that one must be preferred to the other. For the decoding system one of the two approaches must be chosen. While discussing the operation executed on the basic program by the question operation, I treated one characteristic of the question. However, something important remains. In these sentences where the question operation was at work a questionmarker must appear in the significatum. It seems to me that in Dutch the relation between the IS • N • V and the verb is normally questioned. For, both the relation between the verb and the semantic subject (in an active question) and the relation between the verb and the semantic object (in a passive question) can be subjected to a question. This is illustrated by (13) and (14).

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105

(13) Eet Jan brood? I i 7 subj. Ißt Jan Brot? (14) Werd ik geslagen? I I ? obj. Wurde ich geschlagen? It is however, important to note that by the use of stress we are able to question the relation of the significatum of the stressed part to any word it is related with in the sentence. See sentences (15-16-17). (15) Eet ik v661? I i 7

Esse ich viel? (16) Eet ik brood? I i ? Esse ich Brot? (17) Eet ik lekker brood? I 7 I Esse ich ein wohlschmeckendes Brot? So, as the relation program III of the question one can propose: QUI: IP (0) • K - > * £ • ? X, = R (Xj R Xk)

((Xj = IS • (N) • Vf) • (Xk = F f III)) Y ((Xj = the significatum of the stressed word Y) • (Xk — argument i Y 2function II of 7)). The notational conventions must be enlarged once more: (a) R is a variable for one of the significata relations; i.e.'m ' or '/'• (b) X (Y) indicates that X has the characteristic(s) Y. Taking into account sentence (12), Q I must also modify Adj IIC, such that the adj IIC does not modify the immediate predecessor which has to be a verb, but the second predecessor which has to be a verb. In other words by Q I the operator Bc has to be executed on adj !! m x 7 / X 2 /*/ X3

=

IS-VD-Q

16 Other such instances are given by Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations, § 60 and the following ones. 17 Which and how many operations does one need in the operation program 'worden I' to derive V I I c from F I I b ? One needs: (a) an operation causing X2 to dominate the verb. Automatically X^ will be optional (see the O.I.P. 2 program discussion); (b) An operation to find Xt, viz. an operation which specifies that Xt = IS- N + PP- door; (c) An operation to find the X3. To derive VII C from V I I „ one needs the operations a, b, and c. One must have beside a-c, d-f too: (d) an operation to make Xt optional; (e) an operation to delete the optionality of X2; and (f) an operation to find X2.

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X2 = \P • N + PP • Q 1*1 X1 = IS- N + PP- door. But what about the question operation on a passive sentence? If one executes the Q I j on VII C , one obtains: X3 = IS- V-Q X2 = IS-N + PP-Q Xi = 2S-N + PP- door We get a wrong result for X3 and X1. One can avoid this by placing the immunity sign '/*/' before X3 and X1 in V IIC. No program operation can be executed on a program preceded by an immunity sign. When executing Q I2 on V IIC, we obtain a wrong result for X2. One can avoid this by making the O.I.P. (O.I.P. 3 ) specify that in the operator Ab, x = 0 when the question operator works on a passive sentence.18 Also the preposition has a relation program I which operates on the relation program II of the verb. This is proved by sentences (24 to 27). (24) Door de man werd hij gedood. Durch den Mann wurde er getötet. (25) Met mijn handen sloeg ik hem. Mit meinen Händen schlug ich ihn. (26) Onder de tafel zag ik hem. Unter dem Tisch sah ich ihn. (27) In mijn bed sliep ik. In meinem Bett schlief ich. When a sentence begins with a preposition, one must execute the operations Aa and Ac on the relation program V UA, so that the first succeeding noun is the subject, and the second succeeding noun is the object. The same operations can be used for the passive sentence on VII C , since wrong results are excluded by the introduction of the immunity sign in VII C . Formally you get: Prep Ila:

IP • 0 - Q

(Aa • Ac

/ V llA

y c.

If one takes V II B as the basic program of the verb, then again one gets a simpler result. Only the operation Ab must be executed on V II B . There are no troubles either when the sentence is passive, because of the introduced O.I.P. 3 . Formally this last approach is as follows: Prephb\ 18

lP-0-Q=>Ab/VllByc.

Taking this into account, one still needs one extra operation to get FII C from VIIB. V He from V llA one still needs two extra operations.

To derive

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Tt seems to me important to stress the point that Q and Q I 2 are identical to Prep I l a and Prep l l b respectively. But the same programs are also needed for Adj. and Adj I 2 in case the adverb is the first word of the sentence. This is illustrated in sentences (28) and (29). (28) Vlug sneed ik brood. Schnell schnitt ich Brot. (29) Vlug sneed ik. Schnell schnitt ich. Thus, a generalization can be made between Q Prep I l a and Adv Ii on the one hand and Q I 2 , Prep I 16 and Adv I 2 on the other. This can be expressed by the rule 0 Ig: 1P • (0) • (Vc y Adj II y Prep) => ... Informally, if the verb or the adjective or the preposition is the first word of the sentence, we have before us the same operations as specified earlier in Q I t and Q I 2 . This generalization however is too loose because it does execute the mentioned operations on the following sentences also. (30) Goede kinderen eten brood. Gute Kinder essen Brot. (31) Met de hand werkende kinderen. Mit der Hand arbeitende Kinder. This can be avoided in two ways. First of all one can construct a NIand a DI program which stops the operation of 0 / , on a verb succeeding them. The second way is that the 0 /„ is specified in such a way that this unwanted result is avoided. This can be done as follows: 0 /„,: \P • (0) • (Vc v prepi (prep, RVC)) v adj, (adj, IIC) => ... Consideration of economy and generality must decide here too. The characteristics of the adjectively used participle are striking as well. Both the present and the past participle can be used adjectively in Dutch. (32) Het met de bal speiende kind lacht. Das mit dem Ball spielende Kind lacht. (33) De door de bal getroffen politieagent viel. Der durch den Ball getroffene Polizist fiel. *(34) De getroffen door de bal politieagent viel. Der getroffen durch den Ball Polizist fiel. (35) De kijkende politieagent haalde zijn neus op. Der schauende Polizist pfiff. (36) De gedode vogel lag op de grond. Der getötete Vogel lag am Boden.

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(37) Het brood etend kind hoestte. Das Brot essende Kind hustete. A subpart of the relation program II of the adjectively used participle is identical to a subpart of the relation program II of the adjective; this subpart will guarantee sentence (32) to have the same significata structure as "Het kind dat met de bal speelde, lachte" ("Das Kind das mit dem Ball spielte, lachte."). I will discuss this in section 2.7.: "The relation between the adjective, the relative clause and the ordering conjunction". Here, I only want to concern myself with the kind of operations on the relation program II of the verb which are necessary to get the relation program of the adjectively used participle. In sentence (37), 'kind' is the subject of 'eten', while 'brood' is the object. In other words, the noun which first succeeds the present participle is the subject. The noun which precedes it is the object. 19 This is got formally when the present participle (OD) executes the operators Aa and Ba on V llA. Ba is the operator which substitutes the specification 'first succeeding' by 'first preceding', viz. (1S-+ IP). Formally: ODIat : Ä.-BJV

UA.

Are there other changes of the V11^ necessary? Here also the object is optional, and there is also an agreement although of a special type (viz. analogous to adjective-noun agreement). Therefore the OD I must also make a shift from the verb-agreement to the adjective-agreement 20 between the participle and the subject in gender and number. When VII B is used as a basic program, no operation must be executed except for the agreement-shift-rule, since the optionality of the object is guaranteed by O.I.P. 2 . Let us call the program for the execution on the basic program VIIB, OD I„. In sentence (33), the object of the adjectively used past participle 'getroffen' is the first succeeding noun, while the subject is the first noun succeeding 'door' which in its turn precedes the past participle as sentence (34) illustrates. This last characteristic is common to all prepositional and adverbial modifiers of the adjectively used present and past participles. They precede the participle. This will be discussed in section 2.4.: 'On prepositions'. When using V as a basic program, one gets a program appropriate to the function of the adjectively used past participle, by executing on VII X the operations 19

On the results of the participle programs themselves, other operations can be executed. So one will get the interpretation of the sentence (a) and (b) by executing the program Adj or PB I„ on the results obtained after executing the participle programs. Of course, the programs Adj 1A and PB I, must be expanded by mentioning the adjectively used participle too. (a) De etende, weggevlogen vogel. Der fressende, weggeflogene Vogel. (b) De gekwetste, gevangen soldaat. Der getötete, gefangene Soldat. " The agreement rules are not treated here.

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(a) and (b), (d) and (e) (they are mentioned in footnote 17). When using V I I B as a basic program, one needs the operations (a), (b) and Ac. However, in order to execute these operations on a FII-program, one condition must be fulfilled: the past participle must immediately be followed by a noun. The program I for adjectives, adverbs or adjectively used participles can operate on this specification of the adjectively used participles as well as on the adjectives in general. So one can formulate VD I a and VD I a , as follows: VD /„,: S • (iV) • VD VD /„: 5 • (N) • VD

a • b • d • e / VIIA. a-b-AJ V\lB.

Looking at sentences (38), (39), (40) and (41), we see immediately that still other changes of the relation program II of the verb are necessary. (38) Het kind, etend het brood, lacht. Das Kind, essend das Brot, lacht. (39) Het kind, brood etend, lacht. Das Kind, Brot essend, lacht. (40) De politieagent, getroffen door de bal, lachte. Der Polizist, getroffen durch den Ball, lachte. (41) De politieagent, door de bal getroffen, lachte. Der Polizist, durch den Ball getroffen, lachte. (42) Kinderen, etende paarden ziende, lachten. Kinder, fressende Pferde sehend, lachten. (43) Kinderen, ziende etende paarden, lachten. Kinder, sehend fressende Pferde, lachten. (44) Kinderen, ziende paarden etende, lachten. Kinder, sehende Pferde essend, lachten. A phonological breaks (rule PB I„) immediately preceded by a noun, will execute some operations on the OD Ia of the present participle succeeding PBU and immediately succeeded by another phonological break 2 ; if there is no present participle fulfilling these requirements, then the operations are executed on the first present participle succeeding PBX and preceding PB2• This is illustrated by (38), (39), (42), (43) and (44). The limitation of the use of the PB lb is identical to the one of the D I program (see section 2.4.: Preposition). Therefore in the O.I.P. 4 mentioned there, PB I b must be added to the specification o f ' / ' (see section 2.4.: Preposition). But there is also a necessity to introduce the O PB I rule, because no operator which is not between the PB1 and the PB2 can operate inside PB1 and PB2. The opposite is true as well, except in cases where a rule explicitly specifies that one should go outside PBi and PB2. This is clearly shown by the already-mentioned sentences, f.i. (41). viz. the subject of the verb 'lachte' is the ' I P • N • V, which precedes PBt. Therefore one must add 'PB°Ib' to the interpretation of B in the O.I.P. 4 program (see section

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111

2.4.: Preposition). I want to stress the fact that the open PB If, operator is only closed when PB2 is reached. What kind of operations must in fact be executed here on the present participle program? The subject of the present participle is the noun preceding the PBi. The object is the noun succeeding it or (exclusive disjunction) preceding the OD, but at any rate preceding the PB2. So one can formulate PB as follows: PB Ib: IP- (AO • Q, - A. II K, {OD, I.-) • C„ / < >, (.Ba) (OD, I.-) OD, = OD / ((IS • ( ß 2 ) • OD) ! Y 2 (15 • OD • ß j ) . K indicates the substitution operation Q // PBl, ( Z J . Informally, the operator Aa is substituted by K, in the OD I a program of the present participle immediately succeeded by a phonological break 2 , or if this condition is not fulfilled of the one, first succeeding ß x ; also the operation Ba is optional. If one uses the program OD I a instead of OD\\ then the PB Ifc must look as follows: \P • (N) • £2

(K

2

Ba • (Aa)) / VIIB.

Informally, when a phonological break succeeds immediately a noun, then K must be executed on the V II fl program, subsequently the operation Ba. The operation A„ is optional. For the past participle an analogous PB I c is needed which operates on the VD I„ program. PB Ie: IP- (N) -Q^AC II K(VD, Iaj) VD, = VD ((15 • (Q2) • VD)! Y 2 (1S • VD • QJf. K indicates the following substitution operation: QHPBulXJ. The sentences (45 to 48) throw some light on a few difficulties in the PB rö and PB \c These can easily be solved by a general rule concerning the preposition. Therefore no changes in the PB I& and PB I c are needed. I shall discuss this rule in section 2.4. (45) Piet, aan de tafel etend, lachte. Peter, am Tisch essend, lachte. (46) Piet, aan de tafel brood etend, lachte. Peter, am Tisch Brot essend, lachte. (47) Piet, aan de tafel etend brood, lachte. Peter, am Tisch essend Brot, lachte. (48) Piet, etend het brood aan tafel, lachte. Peter essend das Brot am Tisch, lachte. Because of the adjectival use of the present participle, some problems arise concerning the relation program II of the article and the adjective.

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(49) Het brood etend kind. Das Brot essende Kind. (50) De brood etende politieagent. De grote, brood etende politieagent. Der Brot essende Polizist. Der große Brot essende Polizist. *(51) Het brood etende politieagent. Das Brot essende Polizist. (52) Het koe melkend kind. Das Kuh melkende Kind. (53) Het koe melkend, grote kind. Das Kuh melkende, große Kind. *(54) De koe melkend, grote kind. Die Kuh melkend, großes Kind. *(55) De koe melkend kind. Die Kuh melkend Kind. (56) Het etend kind. Das essende Kind. *(57) Het brood etend politieagent. Das Brot essende Polizist. From sentences (49 to 57) we may draw the following conclusion: when a noun 7,, immediately preceding a present participle, is not modified by a preposition,21 the article, as well as the adjectives which are followed by a phonological break, are assigned to the noun Y2, i.e. the noun first succeeding the present participle, whereas both article and adjectives were up to now only modifying the noun Yt. The formulation of OD I 6 . is: OD /„.: 15 • (ODt) • Ni => [Xm ((IP • art • OD,) • (P • adj. (S • (PB) • adj) • OD,))] and X = IS • N • OD(. However, if we wish to take into account sentences (58, 59, 60), we must alter this program slightly. (58) De het kind slaande politieagent. Der das Kind schlagende Polizist. (59) De het kind slaande grote politieagent. Der das Kind schlagende große Polizist. (60) De het grote gepijnigde kind slaande politieagent. Der das große, gepeinigte Kind schlagende Polizist. 11 This requirement must not be mentioned in OD I t , for this is accounted for by the preposition program.

A RECOGNITION COMPETENCE SYSTEM

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(61) De grote, het bleke, gepijnigde kind slaande politieagent. Der große, das bleiche, gepeinigte Kind schlagende Polizist. (62) Het groot, zwart, dik brood etend kind. Das große, schwarze, weiche Brot essende Kind. First of all it is necessary to specify that the relation program of the article executes the operation Ac viz. mS -> (m + x)S. on the relation program I I of the open article and adjective. I would propose as Art I,, : artj Art Ib : (1

PO

v

art I I j art) ^ A J 0°

adj,

v adj II,

By this we get a good result in sentences (58) and (61). However, in (58) if we execute OD I b . as well, 'het' which in fact modifies 'kind', will modify 'politieagent'. This can be prevented by specifying that OD I 6 . is only to be executed when the noun succeeding the OD has not yet been modified by Art I t . The ambiguity of sentence (62) proves that in OD I„. one has to substitute (nP • adj (S • PB • adj) • OD,) with n^K(K

being arbitrarily chosen) for (P • adj (S • PB • adj) • OD,).

Informally, the

substituting part indicates all adjectives which are the n-th to precede OD,, and which are succeeded by a phonological break. For, in (62) 'groot' and 'zwart' can be interpreted as modifying 'brood' as well as 'kind'. Another interpretation is that 'groot' modifies 'kind', while 'zwart' modifies 'brood'. Taking all this into account, one can formulate OD I b as follows: adj OD /„: ( I S • (OD,) • NO • - (JSTm v

(art I 6 )

art Xm ( ( I P • art • OD,) • (nP • adj (S • (PB) • adj) • OD,)). An analogous program for the adjectively used past participle is superfluous. The past participle cannot be immediately preceded by a noun which is not preceded by a preposition. The program I of the preposition will avoid difficulties here. Up to now I have treated the relation program V11^ and V I I B and their development into other programs as parallel to each other. One could try to find a program to generate the former from the latter and vice versa. V II B can be obtained by executing Aa, Ba and 'C a / < ) , ( V11^)' on V11A. By executing the operators Aa and Ba on VIIB, one obtains V11^. As is pointed out earlier, 24 operators are required to obtain 9 different programs on the basis of V 11^; to obtain the same programs on the basis of V II B , only 12 operators are needed. This result clearly indicates that in Dutch it is much more economical to hypothesize V II B as the basic program for the verb. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that in Dutch the normal program for the conjugated verb is the

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A RECOGNITION AND PRODUCTION COMPETENCE SYSTEM

V llA. Taking this into account, it will be necessary to execute Aa and Ba on V II B , when receiving a conjugated verb, because there is a high probability that a V 11^ program will be used. If one gets a cognitively bizarre result, then the reverse operation must be executed, together with the 'Ca / < ), ( V11^)' operation. 2.4. Preposition The prepositions have a double function in a sentence. In the first place they modify a noun with its assessed properties, as sentences 1 to 4 indicate. (1) Met de handen. With the hands. (2) Met ijzer. With iron. (3) Met een dikke neus. With a big nose. (4) Met een neus die vuil is. With a nose which is dirty. etc. Let us formalize this function of the preposition as follows: Prep,j / / , : ([X, m PP] m Q) obi and X1 = IS • N • Q. In Prep ( j';" is a variable on the several prepositions and '_/' is a variable on several subprograms of the preposition,. The combination of the preposition with what is modified by its program Il l s modifies a verb or a noun (see sentences 5 to 8). (5) Jan kijkt met zijn ogen. John is looking with his eyes. t I—i—' (6) Ik zie de tafel naast de deur. I see the table beside the door. (7) Ik zie naast de deur, de tafel. I see beside the door, the table. (8) Ik zie de tafel die naast de deur staat. I see the table which is beside the door. Sentence (6) is ambiguous. It can be interpreted as synonymous with (7) or with (8). In (8) I see the table of which is specified that it is beside the door. In (7), looking beside the door, I see the table.

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Let us indicate by Prep^ II n the program determining what the Prep u II, combination modifies. I do not intend here to discuss all the possible programs IIn of all the prepositions. 2 ' I would like, however, to take a closer view on the program IIn of the preposition 'met' (with) in order to illustrate the approach. (9) Ik eet vlees met een vork. i I Ich esse Fleisch mit einer Gabel. (10) Ik zie Piet met een verrekijker. I 1 IQ" Ich sehe Peter mit einem Fernglas. (11) Ik word met een verrekijker in mijn boekentas geslagen. i i Ich werde mit einem Fernglas in meiner Aktentasche geschlagen. (12) Ik word door Piet met een verrekijker in de boekentas geslagen. i

1

ihr

Ich werde durch Peter mit einem Fernglas in der Aktentasche geschlagen. (13) Ik kijk met een verrekijker in mijn broekzak naar de zee. i i Ich schaue mit einem Fernglas in meiner Hosentasche nach dem Meer. (14) Ik zie Piet met een verrekijker in de broekzak. Ich sehe Peter mit einem Fernglas in der Hosentasche. (15) Zie ik Piet met een pet op het hoofd? l 1 inn Sehe ich Peter mit einer Mütze auf dem Kopf? (16) Zie ik met een pet op het hoofd Piet? Sehe ich mit einer Mütze auf dem Kopf Peter? In (9) 'met' is plus minus synonymous 23 with 'door middel van, met behulp van (by means of)'. In (11), on the contrary, 'met' is synonymous with 'hebbend', bezittend (having)'. In the interpretation of 'door middel van (by means of)', 'met' can only modify a verb. In the interpretation 'hebbend (having)', it can only modify a noun. In some situations, a resulting ambiguity, may be solved by the listener, on the mere principle that he has an opinion on the world and on the speaker. For instance, when hearing sentence (9), a common human being knows it to be improbable that the speaker would mean: 'Ik eet vlees dat een vork heeft [I am eating meat, which has a fork]'. On the contrary, when he hears a sentence as 'Ik eet vlees met dikke randen', then the interpretation of 'having' will be the more probable one. 2a However, a more extensive research made hereon by Schelstraete and me indicated a strong resemblance between the several relation programs of all the prepositions. !s With synonymous I intend synonymy of the significata. Here the connotata may be different. For synonymy I refer to my "Sketch of a partial simulation of the concept of 'meaning'". Logique et analyse, 9, 1966.

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Let us try to formalize these subprograms of 'met'. The sentences (10) to (16) illustrate that 'met' in the meaning of 'having' (met,l) modifies the first preceding noun or the noun which dominates the verb. 24 P r e p ^ J I n - ^ m [Prep m e t J l II,] ^ ( X1 = ( I P • N • Q) y N (N Y V) The sentences (17) to (24) illustrate the program of 'met' in the interpretation of 'by means of' (met,2). (17) Met de verrekijker zag ik Piet. Mit dem Fernglas sah ich Peter. (18) Ik zag Piet met de verrekijker. Ich sah Peter mit dem Fernglas. (19) Ik zag met de verrekijker Piet. Ich sah mit dem Fernglas Peter. (20) Ik zie met de verrekijker werkende politieagenten. Ich sehe mit dem Fernglas arbeitende Polizisten. (21) Ik zie met de verrekijker werkende politieagenten. Ich sehe mit dem Fernglas arbeitende Polizisten. (22) Ik zie met de verrekijker de werkende politieagenten. Ich sehe mit dem Fernglas die arbeitenden Polizisten. (23) Ik zie met de verrekijker goed werkende politieagenten.

" Sentence a=b=c in one of their respective interpretations. Therefore one can hypothesize that these three types of sentences must get an identical significata structure. (a) Het boek naast de deur is vuil. Das Buch neben der Tür is schmutzig. (b) Het boek is naast de deur en is vuil. Das Buch ist neben der Tür und ist schmutzig. (c) Het boek dat naast de deur is, is vuil. Das Buch das neben der Tür ist, ist schmutzig. To assure this, the modification of a noun by a prep IIH (preposition clause) must be added to the significata structure by a conjunction. The reason why and more specification on how will appear in G: the relation between the adjective, relative clause and the ordering conjunction. The same approach is needed for an apposition f.i. "Jan, de bakker, is ziek". Jan, der Bäcker, ist krank. One could take the standpoint that the difference between a Prep IIu with a restrictive function and a Prep IIu without a restrictive function, is the difference between a Prep II U connected to a significata structure, respectively with an ordering conjunction or a non-ordering conjunction.

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Ich sehe mit dem Fernglas vortrefflich arbeitende Polizisten. (24) Ik zie goede, met de verrekijker werkende politieagenten. Ich sehe vortreffliche, mit dem Fernglas arbeitende Polizisten. One could propose as basic program for the Prep me t,2ll n : PrePmeuJhi '• Xi m (Prepmet>2 n.) and Xi = ( I P • V • Ü) The interpretation of sentence (17) can be obtained by expanding the operation 0 I (see section 2.2. : The adjective). In 0 I the specification Adj II C must be substituted by '(adj II C v Prep m e t , 2 II n )\ The ambiguity of sentences (20) and (21) and at the same time the phenomena in (25) to (29) can be explained by the following program I of the adjectively used present or past participle and the consideration later on about the few restrictions on the execution of D I. (25) De door Jan geslagen jongen. Der durch Jan geschlagene Junge. (26) De hard geslagen jongen. Der schwer geschlagene Junge. *(27) De geslagen door Jan jongen. Der geschlagene durch Jan Junge. *(28) De geslagen hard jongen. Der geschlagene schwer Junge. (29) De geslagen harde jongen. Der geschlagene schwere Junge. *(30) De werkende met de verrekijker politieagent. Der arbeitende mit dem Fernglas Polizist. DI: Aa / (Prep 2 IIn • Adj 1IC). The PB I 6 and the PB I c must however, be expanded so that the D I rule is optional, when PB I„ or PB I,, is executed. For, as well (31) as (32) is all right. (31) De man, etend met de hand, ... Der Mann, essend mit der Hand, ... (32) De man, met de hand etend, ... Der Mann, mit der Hand essend, ... The sentences (20) to (24) and (31a) to (33a) prove that a limitation is needed for the rule D I. D I may not seek its argument between an open article, an open adjective or an open Prep II„ and their respective argument, if the participle itself is not placed between respectively the open article, the open adjective or the open Prep II„ and their argument. The opposite is true too. A participle preceded by an open article

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or adjective cannot search an argument outside this open article, adjective or Prep II, and their argument. (31a) Ik zie de met de verrekijker kijkende politieagent. Ich sehe den mit dem Fernglas schauenden Polizisten. (32a) Ik zie de met de verrekijker kijkende politieagent. Ich sehe den mit den Fernglas schauenden Polizisten. (33a) Ze kijken met gestolen verrekijkers. Sie schauen mit gestolenen Ferngläsern. One can formulate this O.I.P. 4 rule as follows: 0./.i>.4: B(J)oB{x) B = CP • 0°art) v (P • 0°adj) v (P • 0°Prep II,) /= Dtl x — the argument of Dt I. An open operator is closed at the moment it finds an argument. Therefore, the formulation of O.I.P. 4 guarantees that the argument o f / must be between the open operator and its argument and vice versa. With only this kind of limitation by the O.I.P.4 it will be obvious that cases can exist where ambiguity arises, because it is not clear if the Prep 2 IIn or Adj II C is an argument of the D I or not. This is the case where no open article II„ or open adjective precedes the participle. By this, the ambiguity of (20) can be explained. Of course, there are still other limitations on D I of a more general order; f.i. it cannot pass a conjugated verb. This kind of restriction (O.I.P. 1) must be taken up by a general operator limitation O.I.P. theory. A theory which is not taken up here, but only occasionally met with. (34) De naar de deur kijkende koe. Die nach der Tür blickende Kuh. (35) Het met de bal speiend kind. Das mit dem Ball spielende Kind. (36) Het in de zon staande glas. Das in der Sonne stehende Glas. (37) Ik zag met de vette hand geschilderde doeken. Ich sah mit der schmutzigen Hand bemalte Leinwand. (38) Ik zag met de hand gebakken broden. Ich sah mit der Hand gebackene Brote. In the O.I.P.4 ' / ' must be expanded too. This limitation operation is not only true for the D I, but also for the Art II as is illustrated in sentences (34-35-36), and for the VD I as is illustrated in (37). The limitation is also true for the V II with all its

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modifications. However in the O.I.P. 4 it is necessary to substitute 'P. 0° Prep II,' by 'P.0° CI .Prep If,' indicates the open operator with its argument included, which closes it. In this formulation, an open operator K which precedes the Prep II, operator K+ 1 cannot have as an argument the argument of the operator K + 1. So one needs to formulate O.I.P. 4 as follows: B(f)oB(x) B = ( P • 0°art) v (P • 0°adj) v (P • 0 O c , Prep II,). / = V II, D I, VD I, Art II. x = the argument o f ' / ' . In sentence (34), the extended O.I.P. 4 will keep the first article 'de' from modifying 'deur', as it is the fact with the second article. This modification is also ascertained by the Art program. However, one must also make sure — as it is the case with the Art Ifc program — that the first article now modifies the second succeeding one; it is not enough that it cannot modify the first noun. This can be obtained by an O.I.P. 5 convention, saying that an argument of an Art II, V I I , ... which is not to be sought within a certain range, may be sought beyond it. Not only is the influence of the Art I 6 smaller than the influence of the O.I.P. 4 and the O.I.P. 5 , but it is also different. For, in sentence (60) (see Chapter II, section 1.3.: The verb), Art keeps 'de' from modifying ' l S - J V - d e ' , viz. 'kind'. This result can equally be obtained by indicating in O.I.P. 4 , ' P • 0 Oci art' instead of ' P • 0°art'. But then, in 'ik zie de man', the verb 'zie' will not be able to obtain 'man' as argument. Therefore, it is necessary to put ' P • 0°_^cart instead of ' P • 0°art' in the O.I.P. 4 . 0 c _j means that the specification 'c/' is not valid for the operator X. Vc designates the conjugated verb operator. If this is accepted, the program Art I b is, of course, superfluous. O.I.P. 5 is more economical than Art I„, because it can also be used for the V II as is illustrated in (38) and (39). It will be useful too in other cases as will be illustrated in Chapter II, section 1.5.: 'The conjunction'. (39) Piet, op de tafel etend, lachte. Peter, am Tisch essend, lachte. In the O.I.P. 4 , ' / ' must also be expanded to include the 0° OD I and 0° VD I, as is illustrated in sentences (40) and (41). (40) Ik zag brood etende kinderen. Ich sah Brot essende Kinder. (41) Door Piet werden door de politieagenten gedode kinderen gezien. Durch Peter wurden durch die Polizisten getötete Kinder gesehen. The verb may not search its argument between the non-dominating argument of the adjectively used participles. The dominating argument is the last argument of the adjectively used participle. Only when this one is attained, the open participle will

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be closed. As a consequence of the convention on the interpretation of O'T, only this argument can be an argument for an outside operator. It seems to me an interesting question if in the O.I.P. 4 the ' / ' may be generalized to all possible operations! 2.5. The Conjunction (1) Eens waren er Ieren samen met Chinezen op een boot, en op een dag werden de Ieren door de Chinezen gedood. Once there were Irishmen together with Chinamen on a boat and one day the Irishmen were killed by the Chinamen. (2) De Ieren werden op een dag door de Chinezen gedood en eens waren er Ieren samen met Chinezen op een boot. One day the Irishmen were killed by the Chinamen and once there were Irishmen together with Chinamen on a boat. (3) Ik at het vlees op en verteerde het. I ate meat and I digested it. (4) Ik verteerde het vlees en ik at het op. I digested the meat and I ate it. (5) Ik verteerde het vlees en ik zal het eten. I digested the meat and I shall eat it. Sentence (1) differs from sentence (2), as does sentence (3) from sentence (4) in one of its possible interpretations; sentence (4) f.i. describes a physiological impossibility in one of its possible interpretations: I cannot eat meat which I already digested. The sentences (1) to (4) illustrate that in Dutch the coordinator 'en' ('and' in English) can be interpreted as implying a certain order between the parts of the sentences which are coordinated. 25 In this interpretation of 'en', (p • q) (q • p). For this reason, 'en' is not commutative here: this 'en' differs essentially from the logical conjunction. There are, however, cases where 'en' is used commutatively: this will be illustrated by sentences (6) to (9). (6) Jan eet brood en Piet drinkt melk. John eats bread and Mike drinks milk. (7) Piet drinkt melk en Jan eet brood. Mike drinks milk and John eats bread. (8) Ik slaap en Piet snurkt. a6

Philip N. Johnson-Laird describes in his article "Katz on Analyticity" an analogous phenomenon in English. He concludes from this that "the model of the world" has an influence on the semantic interpretation, viz. in solving the ambiguities. So he states: "Even if the theory allowed for the fact that a conjunction can convey information about temporal order, a fundamental difficulty remains. A mature speaker can utilize setting in deciding whether temporal order is implied by conjunction. The theory should therefore include the effects of setting upon semantic interpretations. Katz and Fodor (1963) however, maintain that this amendment is impossible in principle".

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I am sleeping and Mike is snoring. (9) Piet snurkt en ik slaap. Mike is snoring and I am sleeping. The conjunction implying an ordering will be indicated by ' © ' (En IIIa). The usual conjunction by ' + ' (En III6). The En II of the En III„ and the En n i 6 consists in the significatum of the En III a , respectively the En IIIj, being placed between the significatum structure of the sentence which precedes 'en' and the sentence which succeeds it. 'En' is thus a coordinator between sentences (Another interpretation of 'en' beside the one of coordinator between sentences, will be given below, viz. En Ic). In some cases however, the sentence preceding 'en' or the one succeeding 'en', or both happen to be incomplete. A sentence is incomplete when it is determined by observation that some obligatory operations are not executed. In this case a program must complete the incomplete sentence(s). This program includes an En I a , an En and a general convention O.I.P. 6 . One can formulate En II as follows: En II: A En III B A is here the significatum structure of the sentence I which precedes 'en', and B the significatum structure of the sentence II which succeeds 'en'. In I and II, only the normal programs may be applied. The rules En I and the convention O.I.P. 6 may only be applied when the En II proves to give a wrong result. Let us first look at the En I a ; its power and its limitation. The first noun which succeeds 'en' (viz. JV2) must have the same structural relation to the verb as the first noun (N x ) which precedes 'en'. Of course the O.I.P.'s and more specially the O.I.P. 4 and O.I.P. 5 are equally valid here. The general convention O.I.P. 6 has to be introduced too. This convention says that, when an operator finds an argument beyond an 'en', the argument and the operator has to be reduplicated and to occur at both sides. If a verb is reduplicated, all the arguments (object and subject of the verb) and equally the modifiers of the verb must be repeated at both sides of 'en', with exception for those elements of which one of the same type is already present at both sides. Formally: En Ia:

RV => N2RV N2 = IS-N -Q iVj = IP-N £2

For simplicity of exposition, let us indicate by I the part which precedes 'en' and by II the part which succeeds 'en'.

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Prototype A (10) Ik eet brood en taart. Ich esse Brot und Kuchen. (11) Ik eet brood en ik eet taart. Ich esse Brot und ich esse Kuchen. On account of the 'En a ' 'taart' must stand in the same relation to the verb as does 'brood'. In other words both must be objects of the verb 'eet'. On account of the convention, arguments and modifiers of 'eet' are to be repeated in II, with exception for those elements which are already present at both sides. 'Eet' has no modifiers, its arguments are the subject and the object. There is already an object in II, therefore only the significatum structure of 'ik eet' (viz. ik m eet) must be repeated in II. As a consequence (10) and (11) are guaranteed to be synonymous at least in one of their interpretations (this proviso, which is made every time, will no more be repeated). For the same reasons, the synonymity of (12) and (13) is guaranteed. (12) Zie ik Jan en Pol? Sehe ich Jan und Paul? (13) Zie ik Jan en zie ik Pol? Sehe ich Jan und sehe ich Paul? (14) Piet en Jan eten brood. Peter und Jan essen Brot. (15) Piet eet brood en Jan eet brood. Peter ißt Brot und Jan ißt Brot. Let us now look over (14); by applying En I a , 'Piet' and 'Jan' must have the same relation to the verb: 'Jan' is the subject of the verb and consequently so is 'Piet'. On account of the O.I.P. 6 , the verb with its arguments and modifiers must be repeated in I. It is worth noting that in this case there exists a special agreement rule between the verb and that what dominates it. (16) De brood en suiker etende jongen. Der Brot und Zucker essende Junge. (17) De brood etende jongen (i) en de suiker etende jongen (1) . Der Brot essende Junge und der Zucker essende Junge. In (16), on account of the En I a , 'brood' and 'suiker' must have the same relation to the verb. 'Suiker' is the object of 'eten' and so is 'brood'. Prototype B (18) Jan en dromende kinderen sliepen. John und träumende Kinder schliefen. = Jan and N2 = kinderen.

and N2 must have the same relation to the verb.

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But N 2 stands in relation to two different verbs. A hierarchy of verbs must be introduced, so that, if an N is an argument of a main verb (a conjugated verb), then the main verb is preferential to the verbs used adjectively. Prototype C (19) Ik zag taart en brood etende kinderen. Ich sah Kuchen und Brot essende Kinder. (20) Ik zag taart en ik zag brood etende kinderen. Ich sah Kuchen und ich sah Brot essende Kinder. (21) Ik zag kinderen die brood aten en ik zag kinderen die taart aten. Ich sah Kinder, die Brot aßen und ich sah Kinder die Kuchen aßen. The sentence type (19) is ambiguous. (19) can be synonymous with (20) or with (21). This ambiguity can be explained as follows. The expanded O.I.P. 4 has made sure that the verb cannot search its argument among the non-dominating argument of the adjectively used participle. The ambiguity is caused by the indeterminateness whether

is an argument of the participle or not.

I f the point of view is adopted that it is an argument of the participle, then N2

=

brood, and 'kinderen' is the object of 'zag'. I f the view is adopted that 'taart' is not an argument of the participle, then 'taart' is object of 'zag' and N2 En I„ must transgress 'brood' on the basis of the O.I.P. 4 .

= kinderen. The

This example and also

several following ones, f.i. (22), make it obvious that in O.I.P. 4 '/' must be extended so that it also contains En I. (22) Ik zie mieren op straat en muggen. Ich sehe Ameisen auf der Straße und Mücken. (23) Ik zie mieren op straat en ik zie muggen op straat. Ich sehe Ameisen auf der Straße und ich sehe Mücken auf der Strasse. The synonymity of (22) and (23) is also guaranteed by En I a and the O.I.P. 6 . N2

=

muggen and iVj = mieren. 'Straat' is not the '1 P • N • en', for this is prevented by the O.I.P. 4 (see earlier). N t is object o f ' z i e ' ... etc. (see prototype A). The only difference with A consists in the fact that here the conjugated verb is equally modified by a prepositional clause, which for this reason must be repeated too. (24) Ik zie op straat en in huis mieren. Ich sehe auf der Straße und im Hause Ameisen. (25) Ik zie mieren op straat en ik zie mieren in huis. Ich sehe Ameisen auf der Straße und ich sah Ameisen im Haus. What about (24)? First of all En I a cannot be executed here. N t # straat, for this is prevented by the O.I.P. 4 .

On account of a convention mentioned earlier, the

operator cannot transgress the conjugated verb. So the Nt there is no N ! in (24).

^ ik. As a consequence,

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The O.I.P.g, however, makes it possible that the identical significata structure of (24) and (25) can be got. The object of 'zie' is the '15 • N • zie'. On account of the O.I.P.4 and the O.I.P. 5 the object must be searched beyond 'op straat' and 'in huis'. So one will find 'mieren'. It is required by the general convention O.I.P. 6 , that the verb, the arguments and its modifiers must be repeated at both sides, except the elements of which there exists one at both sides of 'en'. 'Op straat' and 'in huis' are prepositions of place and thus of the same type. They must not be repeated. Only 'ik zie' has to be repeated in II and 'mieren' in I. (26) Worden mieren door mij op straat gezien en in het huis muggen? Werden Ameisen durch mich auf der Straße gesehen und im Hause Mücken? (27) Worden mieren door mij op straat gezien en worden muggen door mij in huis gezien? Werden Ameisen durch mich auf der Straße gesehen und werden Mücken durch mich im Haus gesehen? In (26) Nt = mieren, N2 = muggen, the same as in prototype A. (28) Ik zie mieren en op straat muggen. Ich sehe Ameisen und auf der Straße Mücken. (29) Ik zie mieren en ik zie op straat muggen. Ich sehe Ameisen und ich sehe auf der Straße Mücken. (30) Ik zie mieren op straat en ik zie muggen op straat. Ich sehe Ameisen auf der Straße und ich sehe Mücken auf der Straße. There seems to arise a problem about the question whether the modifications of the verb which are present in part II have to be repeated in part I. In my opinion 28 = 29 # 30. This means that the O.I.P. 6 must be limited. The modifications of the verb, stated in II, must not be repeated in I although, as was illustrated in (22), the modifiers of the verb in I must be repeated in II. Also the arguments of the verb in II have to be repeated in I and vice versa as is already demonstrated. Prototype D (31) De grote en de kleine jongen. Der große und der kleine Junge. (32) De grote jongen en de kleine jongen. Der große Junge und der kleine Junge. An operator beyond 'en' — as it was the case for the conjugated verb — clearly makes an exception on the specification '0° cl art' in the O.I.P. 4 . For this reason, in the O.I.P.4, the specification 'P • 0°.^ c art' must be substituted by 'P •

{ p

j. Art'

This done, the identity of the significata structures of (31) and (32) is assured.

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On account of the O.I.P. 6 , the argument of the article 'de' and the adjective 'grote', is 'jongen', which has to be repeated. (33) Ik zie goed en veel. Ich sehe gut und viel. (34) Ik zie goed en ik zie veel. Ich sehe gut und ich sehe viel. The O.I.P.6 guarantees the identical significatum structure of both (33) and (34). 'Veel' seeks for an argument on the left hand of 'en'. It will be found in 'zie'. 'Zie' is a verb, and for this reason, the verb must be repeated together with its arguments and modifiers but without those of the same kind, in casu 'goed'. (35) Ik zie P o l , etend brood, en Piet. Ich sehe Paul, essend Brot, und Peter. (36) Ik zie Pol, etend brood, en ik zie Piet. Ich sehe Paul, essend Brot, und ich sehe Peter. In (35), the N t is Pol and not at all 'brood' on the basis of the O.I.P. 4 . So no problems arise here. But what about sentences (37) to (42)? (37) Pol zie ik en John Piet. Paul sehe ich und Hans Peter. (38) Pol zie ik en John ziet Piet. Paul sehe ich und Hans sieht Peter. (39) Pol zie ik en Piet ziet John. Paul sehe ich und Peter sieht Hans. (40) D o o r mij wordt Pol geslagen en John door Piet. Durch mich wird Paul geschlagen und Hans durch Peter. (41) D o o r mij wordt Pol geslagen en door Piet John. Durch mich wird Paul geschlagen und durch Peter Hans. (42) D o o r mij wordt Pol geslagen en door Piet wordt John geslagen. Durch mich wird Paul geschlagen und durch Peter wird Hans geschlagen. (37) = (38) # (39) en (40) = (41) = (42). This is also assured by the En I fl and the O.I.P.

For instance in (37), Nt

= ik and N2 = John. Both must show the same

relation to the verb. The verb in casu is 'zie'. The arguments and modifiers have to be stated in I as well as in II, except those of the same type common at both sides. Nt

and therefore also N2 are subjects. The specifications of the verb in I are the

object and the subject. There is a subject present in II, but the question arises if there is also an object. In sentences (28, etc. ...) there were no problems about the modifications of the

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verb in II. The first preceding conjugated verb is the verb which they modify. The modifications of the verb in II however are only valid for I. Now here, there are several approaches (solutions about N3) possible to solve the problem of (37) to (42), in other words one can specify that a '2S • N • en' is the object if the conjugated verb in I is a VII, or in O.I.P. 6 , that, when the verb program VII is repeated in II, it has to be repeated with a V llA program after the N2. In this case too, the '25 • N • en' will be the object. The identity of the significata structures of (40), (41) and (42) does not give rise to any problem. This cannot be said, however, of the sentences (43 to 47). (43) Ik zie Pol en John Piet. Ich sehe Paul und Hans Peter. (44) Ik zie Pol en John ziet Piet. Ich sehe Paul und Hans sieht Peter. (45) Ik zie Pol en Piet ziet John. Ich sehe Paul und Peter sieht Hans. (46) Pol wordt door mij geslagen en Piet door John. Paul wird durch mich geschlagen und Peter durch Hans. (47) Pol wordt door mij geslagen en Piet wordt door John geslagen. Paul wird durch mich geschlagen und Peter wird durch Hans geschlagen. (43) = (44) ^ (45) and (46) = (47). It is obvious that in (43) the N1 has a different relation to the verb than the N2. In (46), there is no N, at all, for the operator EN Ia may not operate beyond a conjugated verb (O.I.P.i). The problem in (43) can be solved by the specification that in the En Ia program the V llA substitutes ' I P • N • VII^' for the ' I P • N • en'. But how to prevent this rule to be applied in f.i. sentence (10)? This is perhaps made possible by specifying that this substitution is only able to be executed if there is a second N present which follows N2 (solution A). The problem in (46) and (47) can be solved by the same substitution operation, if the passive operation is executed on the conjugated verb (FII C ). There is no difficulty with (40), because in (40) another operation is already executed on V IIC. So one has no more VII C . Formally stated: VI: (VllA

v Vllc) => IP ' N • en // IP • N • Vc (En Ia).

However, all this seems rather unnatural. The problem in sentence (10), provoked by the rule VI (see above), allows perhaps another approach, i.e. a rule En I a _ which has to be ranged before En I a . Then En I a may only be applied if En I fl _! cannot be executed. En /„_!: - (Vc • bet • ((15 • N2 • en), ((2S • N3 • en) v PrepdoorJ)) => (N2 R V) = R (Ni RV))-(R(MRV) = CRt) and Nt = ( A Y Vc) • ( P - N , • en)

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M — N3 y N (IS • N • door). Informally, when no conjugated verb occurs between the noun which first succeeds 'en' (N 2 ) and the noun which secondly succeeds 'en' (iV3), or the prepositional modification 'door', will show the same relation to the conjugated verb as does N2 . Nt is here the noun preceding 'en' and dominating the verb . N3 or the N succeeding 'door' will be the non-dominating argument. On this ground the sentences (37) to (48) get their interpretation in a more straightforward manner. However, the rule En I,,-! may be expanded to all prepositional clauses and even adverbial clauses as suggest the following sentences. (48) Ik eet met mijn handen en Jan met een lepel. (49) Ik eet veel en Jan weinig. As a consequence it is justified to substitute in En I a _ ! 'Prep v Adj c ' for 'Prep doorJ '. Let us now look at the following sentences. (49) Ik eet brood en drink melk. Ich esse Brot und trinke Milch. (50) Ik eet brood en ik drink melk. Ich esse Brot und ich trinke Milch. (51) Hij at brood en dronk. Er aß Brot und trank. (52) Hij at brood en hij dronk. Er aß Brot und er trank. (53) Ik sloeg Piet en werd geslagen door Pol. Ich schlug Peter und wurde geschlagen durch Paul. (54) Ik sloeg Piet en ik werd geslagen door Pol. Ich schlug Peter und ich wurde geschlagen durch Paul. Here (49) = (50), (51) = (52) and (53) = (54). In (49), (51) and (53) the first noun preceding the conjugated verb in II is the first noun preceding the conjugated verb in I. This can be assured by a rule En I 6 saying that the specification '1P • N • Vc' in the program of the verb Xt, must be replaced by the specification '\P • N • (IP • Vcj • en) when a conjugated verb X, with program Vlla or VIIC succeeds immediately 'en'. Formally: Enlb:

I S • (Vc llA v c ) • en => I P • N • Vc // IP • N • (IP • Vcj • en) (Vc IIA v c ).

The question can be put forward whether this program will cause a wrong interpretation for sentence (55). (55) At Piet brood en sloeg Jan? Aß Peter Brot und schlug Hans? No, this will not be the fact, because the En I programs are only used when no

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interpretation can be found for I and for II with the normal program, I and II being considered as normal sentences. As was argued earlier, sentences (10) and (11) have only an identical significatum structure in one of the possible interpretations of (10). This will become clear by the sentences (56), (57) and (58). (56) Jan en Piet zullen deze zware zak dragen. Jan und Peter werden diesen schweren Sack tragen. (57) Jan en Piet samen zullen deze zware zak dragen. Hans und Peter werden zusammen diesen schweren Sack tragen. (58) Jan zal deze zware zak dragen en Piet zal deze zware zak dragen. Hans wird diesen schweren Sack tragen und Peter wird diesen schweren Sack tragen. (56) is in one of its interpretations significata-synonymous with (57), and in another interpretation with (58). The interpretation of (56) whereby it is synonymous with (57), can be got by the rule En / c . En Ic: (Ji R N

i y

f

2

R N2) => (N, (+ y ©) N2).

The following conventions are made here: / i = Prep II, v f2 f2 = VII Nt = IP • (iV) • en N2 = IS- (N) • en. This rule makes it possible to take 'Jan' and 'Piet' together in sentence (56). One also gets a good result in sentences (59) to (61). (59) Ik zag Jan en het met de bal speiend kind (samen). Ich sah Hans und das mit dem Ball spielende Kind (zusammen). (60) Ik zag Jan en met de bal speiende kinderen (samen). Ich sah Hans und mit dem Ball spielende Kinder (zusammen). (61) Ik zag Jan met kinderen en Piet (samen). Ich sah Hans mit Kindern und Peter (zusammen). (62) Ik zag Jan en de politieagent Piet. Ich sah Hans und der Polizist Peter. Equally in sentence (62), the rule En I c can be applied. But, if 'Jan' and 'politieagent' are taken together, then the N3 viz. 'Piet' gets no place in the significata structure of the sentence (62). When it is observed that by applying En I c , one gets a wrong interpretation of the sentence then another interpretation must be sought for (here En Ia_x). Therefore it is not necessary to modify the En I c program. If one accepts program En !„_!, En

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has also to be ordered before En I c as it was the case with En I a . In this case too, En I c can only then be applied, if En I a _! cannot be executed. One gets a good result by application of En I c in (63) and (64). (63) Ik zie Jan en de politieagent. Ich sehe Jan und den Polizisten. (64) Ik eet met een mes en een vork. Ich esse mit einem Messer und einer Gabel. (65) Ik eet met een mes en een vork samen. Ich esse mit einem Messer und einer Gabel zusammen. (66) Ik eet met een mes en ik eet met een vork. Ich esse mit einem Messer und ich esse mit einer Gabel. I want to stress the fact that for sentence (64) only program En I c is able to be applied. The En Ia and the En I s cannot be executed here at all. This is thought to be a good result, because it is clear that (64) = (65) # (66). In instances where the En I a as well as the En I c can be applied, a choice is possible. However, there where 'samen' succeeds a coordinator 'en', the En Ic rule is obligatory. (67) Jan en Piet dragen een zak. Hans und Peter tragen einen Sack. (68) Jan en Piet samen dragen een zak. Hans und Peter zusammen tragen einen Sack. (69) Jan en Piet dragen samen een zak. Hans und Peter tragen zusammen einen Sack. (70) Jan en Piet dragen een zak samen. Hans und Peter tragen einen Sack zusammen. (71) Samen, Jan en Piet dragen een zak. Zusammen, Jan und Peter tragen einen Sack. (72) Jan en ik zien Pol en Piet samen. Hans und ich sehen Paul und Peter zusammen. (73) Jan en ik zien samen Pol en Piet. Hans und ich sehen zusammen Paul und Peter. Taking into account the data of (68 to 73), one can propose as program I of 'samen': Samen I: IP • en • samen v 15 • en • samen => (En I c ) obi. Informally: the En I c has to be applied on the first 'en' which precedes 'samen' or on the first succeeding 'en'. The ambiguity of (73) proves that the non-ordering exclusive disjunction in Samen I is justified, because one has the choice to execute En I c on the preceding or on the succeeding 'en' but not on both. An important characteristic of the significata structures connected to each other

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by an ordering conjunction is that the properties ascribed to a concept in one of the preceding members of the conjunction are also valid in the subsequent members. This is illustrated by sentence (74). (74) Eens waren er leren en Chinezen op een boot, en op een dag werdende leren door de Chinezen gedood. Einmal waren Iren und Chinesen auf einem Schiff, und eines Tages wurden die Iren durch die Chinesen getötet. One of the interpretations of this sentence is that the Irishmen on the boat were killed by the Chinese. The same characteristic is true in a context of sentences. As a result, one could hypothesize that a context is a sequence of sentences, implicitly connected with each other by an ordering conjunction (other implicit relations are perhaps also possible). This is confirmed by the observation of the identical meaning of sentences (75-76), (77-78) and (79-80). Also evident is the interpretation of 'en' in (76), (78) and (80) as the ordering conjunction. (75) Ik eet vlees. Ik verteer dit vlees. Ich esse Fleisch, ich verzehre dieses Fleisch. (76) Ik eet vlees en ik verteer het. Ich esse Fleisch und ich verzehre es. (77) De deur is zwart. Ik schilder ze rood. Die Tür ist schwarz. Ich streiche sie rot an. (78) De deur is zwart en ik schilder ze rood. Die Tür ist schwarz und ich streiche sie rot an. (79) Ik schilder de deur rood. Ze is zwart. Ich streiche die Tür rot an. Sie ist schwarz. (80) Ik schilder de deur rood en ze is zwart. Ich streicht die Tür rot an und sie ist schwarz. This conception of approaching the context explains perhaps the frequent use of 'en' by children. A child must learn to express the ordering conjunction between sentences by other means than by the coordinator 'en', eventually by a zero operator. The implicit means to express an ordering conjunction in the spoken language differs widely from the written language. In the written language — maintained by R. Jakobson as a subcode of the spoken language — the explicit linguistic means to express the ordering can be substituted by the distance between the sentences, by a point. ... In the spoken language this is done by the time distance, but also the intonation can express the connection between two sentences. For this reason, a child must not only learn the several explicit linguistic ordering possibilities but also the implicit ones. When he learns to write, he must learn to substitute the spoken implicit ones by the written implicit ones. As long as he has not learnt this, he has to use the explicit ones. This explains

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perhaps why a child uses more frequently 'en' in his first written texts than in his spoken performances at that time. The discussed characteristic of the ordering conjunction can be taken into account by adding the sign 'PP' to every concept X. So one gets T m PP\ 'PP' is the symbol for all properties assessed to X in the preceding members of the ordering conjunction of the significatum structure. 2.6. The relative clause (1) Eens waren er leren samen met Chinezen op een boot, en op een dag werden de leren door de Chinezen gedood. Einmal waren Iren zusammen mit Chinsen auf einem Schiff und eines Tages wurden die Iren durch die Chinesen getötet. (2) Op een dag werden er leren, die samen met Chinezen op een boot waren, door de Chinezen gedood. Eines Tages wurden Iren, die zusammen mit Chinesen auf einem Schiff waren, durch die Chinesen getötet. If 'en' in (1) is interpreted as being the ordering conjunction, than there is also an interpretation of (2), whereby (1) and (2) are synonymous. This leads to the conclusion that a sentence with a relative clause can have a significatum structure identical with the sentence with an ordering conjunction. Concerning 'the conjunction' in subdivision 2.5, roughly spoken,'R t © Z,' is proposed as the significatum structure of the conjunction 'P, en Qi in the interpretation of the ordering conjunction. Here P and Q are variables on utterances and R and Z are variables on the significatum structures of respectively P and Q. For these reasons, a sentence in which a relative clause occurs, will also have in one of its interpretations a significatum structure of the type 'R © Z ' . Here, either ROT Z must be the relative clause. Because of the fact that the ordering conjunction is used, it is very important to know which one of both is the relative clause. In the ordering conjunction, the P is R and the Q is Z. However, special ordering elements in P or in Q can produce the effect that the Q is R or vice versa, f.i. in (3). (3) Ik at brood en tevoren had ik mijn bed gemaakt. Ich aß Brot und davor hatte ich mein Bett gemacht. (4) Ik maakte mijn bed en ik at brood. Ich machte mein Bett und ich aß Brot. (5) Ik at brood en ik maakte mijn bed. Ich aß Brot und ich machte mein Bett. (3) = (4) ^ (5). The temporal ordering is perhaps more emphatic in (3) than it is in (4). It is possible that the ordering is also more emphatic in (6) than in (7). (6) Ik at brood en (toen) (vervolgens) ging ik naar school.

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Ich aß Brot und (dann) (anschließend) ging ich zur Schule. (7) Ik at brood en ging naar school. Ich aß Brot und ging zur Schule. Elements which emphasize the ordering will sometimes be used to stress the fact that a conjunction is employed in its interpretation of ordering conjunction. It is also interesting to note the effect of the special elements on the relation program V 1IB of the verb. They execute the Ab operator on the V11^ as it was the case with Prep I 16 . Therefore a generalization between both can be made. (8) John schilderde de deur, die zwart was, rood. Hans strich die Tür an, die schwarz war, rot. (9) De deur was zwart en (vervolgens schilderde John ze rood) John schilderde ze rood. Die Tür war schwarz und (anschließend strich Hans sie rot an) Hans strich sie rot an. (10) John schilderde de deur rood en (vervolgens was ze zwart) ze was zwart. Hans strich die Tür rot an und (anschließend war sie schwarz) sie war schwarz. (11) De deur, die John rood schilderde, was zwart. Die Tür, die Hans rot anstrich, war schwarz. (12) Jan die naar school reed met een fiets, viel. Hans der zur Schule fuhr mit einem Fahrrad, fiel. (13) Jan, die van zijn fiets viel, reed naar school. Hans, der von seinem Fahrrad fiel, fuhr zur Schule. (14) Jan reed naar school met een fiets en hij viel (vervolgens) er van. Hans fuhr zur Schule mit einem Fahrrad und (anschließend) fiel er von ihm herunter. (15) Jan viel van zijn fiets en hij reed naar school. Hans fiel von seinem Fahrrad und er fuhr zur Schule. (8) = (9) # (10) = (11) and (14) = (12) * (13) = (15). This illustrates that, when the tense of the conjugated verb of the relative clause is simultaneous with the one of the main sentence, the relative clause is in structure 'R © Z', the R. The relative clause however, can also be interpreted as synonymous with the non-ordering conjunction. This ambiguity is also illustrated in (12) to (15) and in (16) to (18). So (16) can be interpreted as synonymous with (17) or with (18). (16) Jan, die ik sloeg, sloeg Pol. Hans, den ich schlug, schlug Paul. (17) Ik sloeg Jan en daarna sloeg Jan Pol. Ich schlug Hans und danach schlug Hans Paul. (18) Jan sloeg Pol en ik sloeg Jan. Hans schlug Paul und ich schlug Hans.

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Let us now take in view the case of the relative clause with a tense anterior or posterior to the main sentence. (19) Jan schildert de deur die zwart zal zijn. Hans strich die Tür an die schwarz wird werden. (20) Jan schildert de deur en vervolgens zal ze zwart zijn. Hans strich die Tür an und anschliessend wird sie schwarz sein. (21) De deur, die Jan schildert, zal zwart zijn. Die Tür, die Hans anstreicht, wird schwarz sein. (22) Jan schildert het beeld, dat hij zal verkopen. Hans bemalt die Figur, die er verkaufen wird. (23) Het beeld dat hij zal verkopen, schildert Jan. Die Figur die er verkaufen wird, bemalt Hans. (24) Jan schildert het beeld en hij zal het verkopen. Hans bemalt die Figur und er wird sie verkaufen. (25) Jan, die door Piet werd geslagen, zal Piet doden. Hans, die durch Peter geschlagen wurde, wird Peter töten. (26) Piet, die Jan zal doden, sloeg hem gisteren. 26 Peter, der Hans töten wird, schlug ihn gestern. (27) Jan werd door Piet geslagen en hij zal Piet doden. Hans wurde durch Peter geschlagen und er wird Peter töten. (19) = (20) = (21); (22) = (23) = (24); (25) = (26) = (27). This illustrates that if the verb Xt of the relative clause is posterior relative to the one of the main sentence, then the relative clause must be ordered after the main sentence. If the verb Xt is anterior, then the relative clause must be ordered before the main sentence. The relative clause has, beside the function of expressing the relation of the relative clause to the main sentence, also another function: it refers to the noun which precedes immediately. One can formulate these functions of the relative pronoun as follows. I 1 RP Ia : i J P J I I = int ( 1 P - N - RPt ) obi. Informally: the significatum (relation program III) of the relative pronoun , (RPt ) is identical with the one of the first noun which precedes the relative pronoun,. There has to be an agreement between both. The noun dominates. The operation is obligatory. This function is illustrated by sentence (28). (28) Jan, die een soldaat is, die nog nooit gevochten heeft, is ziek. I I i I Hans, der ein Soldat ist, der noch niemals gekämpft hat, ist krank. * Sentence (26) is ambiguous on two accounts, viz. (a) the ambiguity of the function of the relative pronoun in the relative clause (more about this later on), and (b) the ambiguity of the referrent of the personal pronoun 'him'.

s

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Let us now formalize the function of the relative clause whereby it determines the relation between the relative clause and the main sentence. RP IIa : Vci • (sm v ant) • Vcj => Rcl © Ms Vci • post • Vcj => Ms © Rcl Vct: the conjugated verb of the relative clause. Vcj: the conjugated verb of the main sentence. X • sm • Y: the tense of X is simultaneous with the one of Y. X • ant • Y: the tense of X is anterior to the one of Y. X • post • Y: the tense of X is posterior to the one of Y. Rcl: relative clause. Ms: main sentence relative to the relative clause. The alternative interpretation of the relative pronoun, whereby the sentence with the relative clause is synonymous with a non-ordering conjunction can be formulated as follows : RP //„: Rcl + Ms But, what kind of significatum structure has to be ascribed to a sentence in which several relative clauses do occur. A possible approach could be found in considering the relative clauses as a set of sentences, connected to the main sentence respectively before or after it by an ordering or a non-ordering conjunction.27 Formally one would get: (S„ ... S3 + S2 + St) © R © ( Z i + Z2 + Z 3 + ... Z „ ) Here St is the significata structure of a relative clause which has to be ordered before the main sentence. Z, is one which has to be ordered after the main sentence. A more complex significata structure will be obtained, when other relative clauses are imbedded in the relative clause. So one can get the following significata structure: [(*!

© Si © YJ + (Z2 © S2 © Y2) + ...] © R © [(*!

© Zi © FJ +

(...)]

In principle, it is possible that several X's and 7's appear here; in A'and F t o o several relative clauses can appear. Therefore the application of program RP II a can result in very complex significatum structures. In the RP II a , the notions 'relative clause' and 'main sentence' are mentioned. It is necessary for the O.I.P. to provide an explicit interpretation of these notions: two possible approaches will be provided here. A first one will consist in the intentional interpretation, another one will be given by describing the respective boundaries of these clauses. "

A proposal for the use, in some cases, of the ordering conjunction between the several relative

clauses is elaborated in 2.7: the relation between the adjective, the relative clause and the ordering conjunction.

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(29) Jan die groot is, eet brood, dat zuur is. Hans der groß ist, ißt Brot, daß sauer ist. (30) Jan die soldaat is, ging naar huis. Hans der Soldat ist, ging nach Haus. (31) Jan, die brood at, dat zuur was, lachte. Hans, der Brot aß, welches sauer war, lachte. These sentences illustrate that the main sentence relative to the relative clause consists in the conjunction member of the significatum structure in which the significatum of the antecedent is a part. In other words, the conjugated verb of which the antecedent is an argument is the main verb of the main sentence. For instance in (31), the main sentence relative to the relative clause 'dat zuur was' is clearly the relative clause 'die brood at'. The relative clause is, however, composed of the first conjugated verb following the relative pronoun with its arguments and modifiers. Formally: Rcl = (IS • Vc, • RP) • (X) (XR Vt) Ms = Xt • Vj [Xt R Vj] • (Y) (YR Vt) X, = RP,Ul Here '(X) (7)' means every X for which Y is true. 'X R 7 ' means that X has the relation R to Y, and Xt = IP • N • RP. The main sentence consists of (a) the antecedent of the relative pronoun, (b) the verb to which the antecedent has a direct relation (R) (this is the case only when the antecedent is an argument of the verb V}) and (c) all elements which have a relation to Vj. But what does happen if X is an argument of a preposition? The preposition can modify either a noun or a verb. There is some evidence (see f.i. footnote 24) for considering a preposition as a member analogous to a relative clause conjunct with the main sentence. Here, the main sentence can be defined in the same way. In this sense, the same things happen as well when the antecedent of the relative clause is an argument of a preposition as when the antecedent is itself a part of another relative clause. Taking this into account one can rewrite the specification Ms as follows. Ms = Xt • K(Xi R K) • (r) (YR K) K = (K v Prep) Xt= 1 P N RP The second approach to the determination of the relative clause and the relative sentence will be given below. There exists also a functional analogy between the adjectively used participle, the relative clause and the conjunction. (34) Jan, etende brood, lachte. Hans, Brot essend, lachte. (35) Jan, die brood at, lachte.

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(36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41)

Hans, der Brot aß, lachte. De etende Jan lachte. Der essende Hans lachte. Jan at brood en lachte. Hans aß Brot und lachte. Jan lachte en at brood. Hans lachte und aß Brot. De getroffen vogel viel op de grond. Der getroffene Vogel fiel auf den Boden. De vogel die getroffen werd, viel op de grond. Der Vogel der getroffen wurde, fiel auf den Boden. De vogel werd getroffen en viel op de grond. Der Vogel wurde getroffen und fiel auf den Boden.

A clause with an adjectively used past participle must be considered as being anterior to the relative main clause. As a consequence it must be ordered before it. The present adjectively used participle is simultaneous with the main sentence. However, the sentences (34 to 38) suggest that the adjectively used present participle has to be connected to the main sentence by means of a non-ordering conjunction. Taking into account the relative clause, the adjectively used participle and the prepositional clause, one can try to make a first approach to a general notion of 'subordinate clause'. 28 Sub cl: Q-(X) {X R Q) and Q = (IS • VCj • RP) v (Prep) v V, (D I) An important influence of the relative pronoun on the relation program of the verb or the relative clause consists in the fact that subject and object precede the verb as is illustrated in sentences (42) and (43). (42) Piet die brood at, braakt. Peter der Brot aß, bricht. (43) Piet die John sloeg, lachte. Peter der Hans schlug, lachte. (44) Piet, die at, lachte. Peter, der aß, lachte. The relative clause in sentence (43) even as in (42) (from a pure linguistic point of view) is ambiguous. It can be interpreted as (a) "Piet hits John" and as (b) "John hits Piet". However, the interpretation (a) is more frequent. 29 This leads to the conclusion that the first noun which precedes the verb Xt in the relative clause is the subject or *• The notion 'subordinated clause' can be expanded. This can be done by substituting in Q, the specification 'IS • Vcj • RP' by 'IS • Vc, • Z' and Z is a list of elements which introduce subordinated clauses, f.i. toen, indien, etc. " A statistical study is needed to verify this statement.

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the object and the relative pronoun respectively object or subject. Of course, if X, is passive, then all ambiguity has vanished. The subject is the noun preceded by 'door' and the relative pronoun is the object. One can explain these data with the program RP I 6 . RPI„:

Bd^i

/ Vll

Informally, the operation Be (viz. nS -*• (n + x) P) may be executed on V UA as well as on V II B : V 11^ being chosen, the relative pronoun will be the object; V II B being chosen, it will be the subject. In case no noun (in fact no noun without a preposition) occurs between the relative pronoun and the verb (f.i. 44), then no object is present in the relative clause. For, in V11^ as well as in VIIB (VllB after the execution of an operation: see earlier) only the object is optional (more about this later). This is the good result. In sentence (45) too, the program RP I„ will provide the right result. For, on account of the O.I.P. 5 an operator cannot search an argument between the operator Prep II, and its argument (the argument included). (45) Jan die met de verrekijker keek, lachte. Hans der mit dem Fernglas schaute, lachte. It is well known that besides the interpretation of a relative clause as connected with the main sentence by a conjunction, an interpretation is possible whereby the relative clause has a relation to the main sentence which is strongly analogous to the implication. (46) Mensen die rijk zijn, hebben koorts. Menschen die reich sind, haben Fieber. (47) Mensen zijn rijk en ze hebben koorts. Menschen sind reich und sie haben Fieber. (48) Mensen die rijk zijn, zijn siecht. Menschen die reich sind, sind schlecht. (49) Mensen zijn rijk en ze zijn siecht. Menschen sind reich und sie sind schlecht. (50) Indien mensen rijk zijn, dan hebben ze koorts. Wenn Menschen reich sind, dann haben sie Fieber. (51) Indien mensen rijk zijn, dan zijn ze siecht. Wenn Menschen reich sind, dann sind sie schlecht. So (46) differs in one of its possible interpretations from (47). Also (48) # (49). However, (46) is in a possible interpretation a paraphrase of (50), and (48) of (51). The significatum structure of the sentences as (50) is R (-») Y. In a first approach the significatum structure of the sentence, which follows 'indien' seems to be R ; and Y is the significatum structure of the sentence following 'dan'. Of course, R or Y itself can show a complex structure: i.e. an ordering conjunction can occur in them.

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More data, however, are needed for a detailed version of the relation program 'indien'. In this perspective let us look over the following sentences : (52) Ik zal je slaan, indien je nadert. Ich werde dich schlagen, wenn du näher kommst. (53) Dan zal ik je slaan, indien je nadert. Dann werde ich dich schlagen, falls du dich näherst. (54) Indien je nadert, dan zal ik je slaan. Wenn du näher kommst, dann werde ich dich schlagen. (55) Indien je nadert, zal ik je slaan. Wenn du dich näherst, werde ich dich schlagen. (56) Indien je het brood, dat ik gekocht heb, ziet, gooi het (dan) weg! Falls du das Brot, das ich gekauft habe, siehst, werfe es (dann) weg! (57) Indien je het brood dat ik gekocht heb, ziet, dan zal je het weggooien. Wenn du das Brot das ich gekauft habe, siehst, dann wirst du es wegwerfen. (58) Indien mensen rijk zijn, zijn ze dan siecht? Wenn Menschen reich sind, sind sie dann schlecht? (59) Indien je rijk bent, (dan) ben je siecht. Wenn du reich bist, (dann) bist du schlecht. (60) Indien je rijk bent, ben je (dan) siecht? Wenn du reich bist, bist du (dann) schlecht? (61) Indien je rijk bent, wees (dan) goed! Falls du reich bist, sei (dann) gut! On the basis of these data, a first conclusion can be made : there exists a small difference between the implication present in (56), (58), (60) and (61), and the implication present in the other examples. In the first set the implication is expressed in a question or in an order. As a consequence, one has not 'i? (=>) Y', but ' R ((=>) m ?) Y' or '£((=>) m order) F . Secondly it can be established that, in a question or an order, 'dan' succeeds the verb and the object; 'dan' (then) is also optional. R is everything between 'indien' and the first phonological break following 'indien'. Everything else is a part of Y. This is, of course, only true for the explicit code. In the spoken performances, this phonological break can sometimes either disappear or be introduced by the correctioncode. If this approach is adopted, the determination of Y and R requires a rule PB ld, guaranteeing that a phonological break immediately succeeded by a relative pronoun or a subordinate conjunction (the list has to be exhaustively determined) will execute the operator Ac(x=1) on the determination '15 • PB • indien'. Or, in other words, R will be extended to the second phonological break. (62) Indien ge Jan, / die ziek is, { ziet, 3 zeg hem dan dit. Falls du Hans, der krank ist, siehst, sage ihm dann dieses. (63) Indien ge Jan, nadat hij naar zee is geweest, ziet, zeg hem dit.

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Falls du Hans, nach dem er am Meer gewesen ist, siehst, sage ihm dieses. (64) Indien ge Jan ziet, die ziek is, zeg hem dit. Falls du Hans siehst, der krank ist, sage ihm dieses. (65) Indien ge Jan ziet, nadat hij naar zee geweest is, zeg hem dit. Falls du Hans siehst, nachdem er am Meer gewesen ist, sage ihm dieses. The sentences (62 to 65) illustrate that PB ld, viz. Ac(x=i), may only be applied to the '(15 • PB • indien)', if the extra condition is fulfilled that the succeeding phonological break which follows 'indien', is on its turn preceded by the conjugated verb. If this is not the case, viz. if '(IS1 • Vc • indien)' succeeds the '(15 • PB • indien), then Ac(x=2) must be executed on ' ( I S • PB • indien)'. This is only true if one agrees that in (62), (2) is also a phonological break. This characteristic suggests another more economical approach (PB Id.). R extends to the first PBh which follows the ' I S • Vc- indien' (the first conjugated verb which succeeds 'indien'). Only when this PBi is followed by a relative pronoun, a subordinate conjunction, etc. ... the operator Ac(x=1) has to be applied to the '(IS • PB • indien)'. Taking this into account, one can try to give a general determination of a subordinated clause by the description of its boundaries. A tentative was made earlier to give an intentional determination of it. This approach here is perhaps more economical. Sub cl I: (jc) ((* = morpheme) • (x • bet • (yt, K)) Here y = y (y e Z). Z is the list of subordinating conjunctions. K = I S - P B - Vci ( I S • V,-yd. Informally, the subordinate clause contains everything between the subordinated conjunction and the first phonological break, following the conjugated verb, which succeeds the conjunction in the first place. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the 'Fc, ( I S • V, • >>,)' may not be sought in another subordinated clause imbedded in the first one. In this perspective, the O.I.P. 4 must be expanded. In B the specification '0° e 'Sub cl V must be added. The specification ' C r in '0OCI' is still too strong, because the relative pronoun can search its antecedent (the argument of RP I a ) in another subordinated clause as was illustrated in sentence Oc, (31). This can be redressed by the specification Sub Ia Sub cl I' instead of '0 cl I', in other words the operator RP I a may search its argument, viz. its antecedent, in another subordinate clause. The relative main sentence can be defined as everything left, when the subordinate clause is substracted. The O.I.P. 4 and the O.I.P.j are equally valid here. Let us look at sentence (66). (66) Ik zeg dat, indien ge ziek zijt, wanneer hij komt, ge zult sterven. 1 2 3 45 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Ich sage daß, falls du krank bist, wenn er kommt, du sterben wirst.

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The subordinate clause (I) beginning with 'dat' (1) ends with the first phonological break which follows the first succeeding conjugated verb, itself not appearing in another subordinated clause, on account of the 0.1.P. 4 and O.I.P. 5 . This end here is clearly situated after 13. The relative main clause is what remains, in casu '1 n 2'. Also on account of O.I.P. 4 and O.I.P. 5 the subordinate clause II, beginning with 'indien' (4), ends after 10. The relative main clause is 11, 12 and 13, viz. what remains of I. The subordinate clause III, beginning with 'wanneer' ends with 10. The relative main clause is what remains of II, viz. 4, 5, 6 and 7, etc. Having done this, let us now formalize the relation program of 'indien'. Indien II: X{^>) Y X = S • Sub cl • indien Y = Mcl Informally, the relation program II of 'indien' determines the relation between the subordinate clause (X) beginning with 'indien' and the relative main clause (Y). The relation is an implication relation. I want to draw attention to the fact that the implication relation may not a priory be identified with the logical one. They are certainly very analogous to each other, but it is not my intention to discuss this here. (67) Indien Jan de brood etende vogel met de hand doodt, dan ... Wenn Hans den Brot essenden Vogel mit der Hand tötet, dann ... Sentence (67) illustrates good enough the influence of 'indien' on the relation program II of the verb. Bd must be executed on V II B . The same is true for the relative pronoun. However, the application of Bd on V \\A is optional. This is not the case with 'indien'. The same relation program I is valid for the temporal clauses as is illustrated in (68). (68) Toen Piet hem zag, zei hij ... Als Peter ihn sah, sagte er ... As a consequence, a generalization can be made. Z/:

(m) (meZ)=>

Bd I

VllB

All the members of the list Z (Z is a list of morphemes introducing subordinate clauses) execute the operation Bd on VIIB. An extra rule, however, must assure that with Z = RP, Bd may optionally be executed on V11^. Sentences (69) and (70) give rise to a problem, analogous to the one already encountered with the relative pronoun. (69) Indien Jan doodde, dan ... Wenn Hans tötete, dann ... (70) Toen Piet keek, ... Als Pieter schaute, ...

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When an operation is executed on V II B , the object becomes optional — as has earlier been maintained — but not the subject. If the object is not expressed, it is clear that the subject is not the \2P • N • Vy but the ' ( I P • N • V)'. In other words, when an 'object' can be found, but not a subject, then the 'object' must be interpreted as the subject. This can be assured by a general interpretation rule which interpretes the program. 'Indien' has also an influence — as was pictured in sentences (52) to (61) — on the program II of the question and the order. Indien I: me Y -*• (=> m m) m = question designator v command designator. Informally, if the question or command designator program appears in Y, the relative main clause, the question or command designator is assessed to the implication relation between R and Z. It is also worth noting that if a subordinate clause begins a sentence, it executes the same operations on the V II as the question and preposition operator do. The 0 program must therefore be expanded, viz. the condition under which the 0 I must be applied, has also to include the list with morphemes beginning subordinated clauses. Let us now return to the relative clause with the interpretation of an implication. (71) De mensen die ziek zijn, hebben koorts. Die Menschen die krank sind, haben Fieber. (72) Indien mensen ziek zijn, dan hebben ze koorts. Wenn Menschen krank sind, dann haben sie Fieber. (73) Mensen zijn ziek en ze hebben koorts. Menschen sind krank und sie haben Fieber. (74) (De) mensen die koorts hebben, zijn ziek. (Die) Menschen die Fieber haben, sind krank. (75) Indien (de) mensen koorts hebben, dan zijn ze ziek. Falls (die) Menschen Fieber haben, dann sind sie krank. In one of its possible interpretations, (74) is a paraphrase of (75) but not of (71) and (72). In this interpretation, (74) is not a paraphrase of (73). This could allow us to hypothesize that the significata of a relative clause can be the first element of an implication relation to the relative main sentence. (76) Piet slaat (de) kinderen die rijk zijn. Peter schlägt Kinder die reich sind. (77) Piet slaat kinderen en ze zijn rijk. Peter schlägt Kinder und sie sind reich. (78) Kinderen die rijk zijn, worden door Piet geslagen. Kinder die reich sind, werden durch Peter geschlagen. (79) Kinderen die rijk zijn, slaat Piet.

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(80) (81) (82) (83)

Kinder die reich sind, schlägt Peter. Indien Piet kinderen slaat, dan zijn ze rijk. Falls Peter Kinder schlägt, dann sind sie reich. Indien kinderen geslagen worden door Piet, dan zijn ze rijk. Wenn Kinder durch Peter geschlagen werden, dann sind sie reich. Indien kinderen rijk zijn, dan slaat Piet ze. Wenn Kinder reich sind, dann schlägt Peter sie. Indien kinderen rijk zijn, dan worden ze door Piet geslagen. Falls Kinder reich sind, dann werden sie durch Peter geschlagen.

But the opposite is true too for sentence (76) : in an interpretation, it is a paraphrase of (78) (the passive of 76), (79), (80) and (81). It differs, however, from (82) and (83). Of course, in an interpretation^, (76) is also — as has already been repeatedly argued — a paraphrase of (77). This suggests that, if the antecedent of the relative clause is an object (X2), the relative clause with the interpretation of an implication is the second component of the implication. The first component is the relative main sentence. If the antecedent of a relative clause is a noun which is an argument of a preposition, the relative clause with the interpretation of an implication is the first component, as is suggested by (84), (85) and (86). Because, (84) is synonymous with (85), but it differs from (86). (84) Op tafels, die zwart zijn, staan bloempotten. Auf Tischen, die schwarz sind, stehen Blumentöpfe. (85) Indien er tafels zwart zijn, dan staan er bloempotten op. Wenn Tische schwarz sind, dann stehen darauf Blumentöpfe. (86) Indien er bloempotten op tafels staan, dan zijn die tafels zwart. Falls Blumentöpfe auf Tischen stehen, dann sind die Tische schwarz. Taking this into account, one can propose the following relation program I for the relative pronoun in order to make possible the interpretation of the relative clause as a component of an implication relation. RP /„: Y{Xt y (I'm Prep)) => (Rcl -» Ms) Y (X2) => (Ms -* Rcl) Y — Y (RP I a 7), viz. Y is the argument of RP la, in other words the antecedent of the relative pronoun. Informally, RP Id says that, if the antecedent of the relative pronoun is subject or modified by a preposition, the relative clause is the first member of the implication and the main clause the second. If the antecedent is an object, the opposite is true. It is not at all clear to me whether the choice between the interpretation of the relative clause as a component of an implication or of a normal ordering conjunction is linguistically optional or not. If it is linguistically optional, then the linguistic ambiguity, resulting from this can only be solved on grounds of the extra-linguistic

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knowledge of the listener. If it is not linguistically optional, it must be indicated which interpretation has to be chosen by means of certain categories in the context or by a certain intonation pattern. I am however, more inclined to believe that, if there is no optionality, the differentiation is only made by a certain intonation pattern (however, even about that I am not sure). For, (76) — perhaps with a different intonation — can just as well be interpreted as a paraphrase of (77) as well as a paraphrase of (80), although (77) # (80). (87) also can be interpreted as identical with (88) as well as with (89), although (88) # (89). (87) Mannen die een hoed dragen, gaan naar buiten. Männer die einen Hut tragen, gehen nach draußen. (88) Mannen dragen een hoed en gaan naar buiten. Männer tragen einen Hut und gehen nach draußen. (89) Indien mannen een hoed dragen, gaan ze naar buiten. Falls Männer einen Hut tragen, gehen sie nach draußen. Also the characteristic of the modifications of the antecedent by an article seems irrelevant for the choice between the several interpretations of the relative clause. This is suggested by (71), (74) and (76). 2.7. The relation between the adjective, the relative clause and the ordering conjunction (1) Ik zie de groene tafel. I see the green table. (2) De tafel is groen en ik zie ze. The table is green and I see it. (3) De grote, zwarte deur is kapot. The big, black door is broken. (4) De deur is zwart en de zwarte deur is groot en de deur is kapot. The door is black and the black door is big and it is broken. (5) Deze dikke, dwaze mensen hebben een neus. These thick, foolish people have a nose. (6) Deze dwaze, dikke mensen hebben een neus. These foolish, thick people have a nose. (7) Deze dwaze mensen, die dik zijn, hebben een neus. These foolish people, who are thick, have a nose. (8) Deze dikke mensen, die dwaas zijn, hebben een neus. These thick people, who are foolish, have a nose. (9) Deze mensen zijn dik en ze zijn dwaas en ze hebben een neus. These people are thick and they are foolish and they have a nose. (10) Deze mensen zijn dwaas en ze zijn dik en ze hebben een neus.

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(11) (12) (13) (14)

These people are foolish and they are thick and they have a nose. De grote, zieke mensen. The big, ill people. De zieke, grote mensen. The ill, big people. Grote, zieke mensen. Big, ill people. Zieke, grote mensen. Ill, big people.

Sentence (1) is a paraphrase of (2), and (3) of (4). So is also (5) of (7) and (10), while sentence (6) is a paraphrase of (8) and (9). The difference between (5) and (6) seems very small. The same can be said of the difference between (11) and (12). The difference is due to the order in which the properties are ascribed to the noun. For instance in (5), the property 'dik (thick)' is assessed to 'deze dwaze mensen (these foolish people)'. In (6) the opposite occurs: to 'deze dikke mensen (these thick people)' the property 'dwaas (foolish)' is assessed. At a first glance this difference seems cognitively very small. One could perhaps argue that the difference one gets is only a difference in stress, in attracting attention; as it can be maintained for the difference between the passive and the active. However, that the difference is much more fundamental here is shown by the sentences (15 to 18). (15) De grootste, dommejongen. The biggest, foolish boy. (16) De domme, grootste jongen. The foolish, biggest boy. (17) De domme jongen, die de grootste is. The foolish boy, who is the biggest one. (18) De grootste jongen, die dom is. The biggest boy, who is foolish. The referent (denotatum) of the utterance (15) is not necessarily the referent of the utterance (16). For, the referent of (15) is not necessarily the biggest boy of the group whose members are compared as far as their size is concerned, while this is certainly true for the referent of (16). The importance of the difference between (15) and (16) therefore is obvious. Yet, it seems to me that sentences (17) and (18) are ambiguous. They can be interpreted as synonymous with (15) and with (16). If (17) is synonymous with (15) then the relative clause modifies 'dommejongen'. In the interpretation of (17) as synonymous with (16), the relative clause only modifies 'jongen' and the adjective 'domme' modifies 'de jongen die de grootste is'. Something analogous is true for (18). The relative clause 'die dom is' can modify 'grootste jongen' as well as only 'jongen'.

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From this, one can conclude that in the significatum structure, the significatum of the relative clause may be ordered by ' © ' before or after the significatum structure of the adjective(s). If the significatum of the relative clause precedes, it will only modify the noun. If it succeeds the significatum structures of the adjective(s), it will modify the noun which is already modified by the adjective(s). The reason is that every noun, in each member of the ordering conjunctions, is accompanied by the determination lPP\ viz. the preceding assessed properties. This is a symbol for the properties ascribed to the noun in the preceding members of the ordering conjunction. The assessment of the PP to a noun means that these preceding assessed properties are still valid. All this makes it clear that (a) the expressions with an adjective modifying a noun, (b) the conjunction and (c) the main sentence modified by the relative clauses, have a very analogous significatum structure and even are synonymous in some of their possible interpretations. By which program can this be obtained? Well, by a program treating the adjectives together with the noun and the article, which they modify, as members of an ordering conjunction. The adjectives which are situated the closest to the noun are ranged the farthest away from the significatum structure of the main sentence. The ones which are further away are ordered nearer by. Equally, PP must be added to every noun in an ordering conjunction. So, this gives as significatum structure of (5) the following: [[Id mensen I m PP] m dwaze] © [[Id mensen I m PP] m dikke] © [l d mensen I m PP]m hebben / [I(1)neus I m PP] Formally this relation program II of the adjective can be stated as follows: Adj / / „ : [Adj II, © X] X is the relative main sentence together with the components already connected to the main sentence by some relation(s) or other. In other words the adjective executes its program II, and together with a repetition from the noun with its article which it modifies, it is placed before (a) the already existing significatum structure (eventually 0 ) of the relative main sentence (see about the notion relative main sentence section 2.6.: the relative clause) and before (b) the components already ordered before the relative main sentence. By this rule it is ensured that the significata of the adjective which is further away from the noun, which it modifies, will be placed closer to the relative main sentence than the adjective which is nearer to the noun, which it modifies. Taking into account the PP specification of the noun, the required result is obtained. By the relation program II of the relative clause was determined that under some conditions the significata structure of the relative clause was connected with it before the relative main sentence. This rule and the Adj II n account for the same significatum

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structure of the sentences (5), (7) and (10). The same is the case for the sentences (6), (8) and (9). However, taking into account the characteristics of the relation of the relative clause to the preceding adjectives, modifying the same noun, — as these characteristics are illustrated in (17) and (18) — the relation program II of the relative clause has to be adapted. The significatum structure of the relative clause can be ordered before or after all the significatum structures of the adjectives which have as argument the antecedent of the relative clause. This, of course, on condition that the relative clause is ordered before the relative main clause. This could lead to the proposition of the RP \lc instead of the RP II„. RP II C : Vci • (gt y ant) • VCj => ( X © Y ® Z) v ( Y ® X ® Z) Vct • Post • Fcj => Z © Y Y = The relative clause beginning with the relative pronoun RPj. Z = The relative main clause. X = the significata of the adjectives of which the argument is the antecedent of the RPj, viz: x (adj, Rx) = x (RPj III inr ). The proposed relation program I I n of the adjective seems, however, a little bit too strong. It seems to me unmotivated to order relative to each other the significatum structures (viz. their significata with a repetition of the noun they modify) of all the adjectives. It seems better to me, that only the significatum structures of the adjectives (and relative clauses) which modify the same noun, are ordered relative to each other. It is better that the set of significatum structure of the adjectives (and relative clauses) which modify the same noun,, are connected to the set of significatum structures of the adjectives which modify another noun, by the non-ordering conjunction. Taking this into account, one could propose the relation program Adj II IIa . Adj // I I a : [[[Adj, II, © X] + Y] © Z] Z = The relative main sentence of the adj,. X = The significata structures already assessed to the argument Kt which is modified by the adj; and which has to be ordered before Z. Y = The significata structures which have also to be ordered before Z, but which modify another argument — already interpreted — than the one Adj , modifies. Of course, Y can be complex. The sentences (19 to 22) seem to me important. They indicate that the relation program Adj II IIa equally seems to be valid for the adjectively used participle. Therefore one can adapt this program. Then one gets: Adj II, Adj //,,„,:

JOD I J ©x

fWJ

+ Y © Z

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(19) De grootste door Piet gedode man lag op de grond. Der größte durch Peter getötete Mann lag auf dem Boden. (20) De door Piet gedode grootste man lag op de grond. Der durch Peter getötete größte Mann lag auf dem Boden. (21) De grootste brood etende man lag op de grond. Der größte Brot essende Mann lag auf dem Boden. (22) De brood etende grootste man lag op de grond. Der Brot essende größte Mann lag auf dem Boden. However, if the PB lb rule is executed on the adjectively used participle, its significata seem to be ordered in the same way as the relative clause. For, (23) and (24) are ambiguous. (23) can be interpreted as (19) or as (20). F o r instance the referent of (23) can be the biggest man and this man happens to be killed by Piet. In this interpretation it is synonymous with (20). The referent of (23) can also be the biggest of the men who are killed by Piet. In this interpretation (23) is synonymous with (19). (24) can be interpreted as (21) or as (22). Therefore the RP II C has to be adapted to take into account this generalization. (23) De grootste man, gedood door Piet, lag op de grond. Der größte Mann, getötet durch Peter, lag auf dem Boden. (24) De grootste man, etend brood, lag op de grond. Der größte Mann, essend Brot, lag auf dem Boden. However, there seems to be a connection between the adjectives and the relative clauses also on another point. Let us look at the sentences (25 to 28). (25) Dikke, grote mensen hebben een rode neus. Dicke, große Menschen haben eine rote Nase. (26) Indien mensen dik en groot zijn, dan hebben ze een rode neus. Falls Menschen dick und groß sind, dann haben sie eine rote Nase. (27) Mensen die dik en groot zijn, hebben een rode neus. Menschen die dick und groß sind, haben eine rote Nase. The Adj II|Ia is also valid here, on the understanding that an implication sign is needed instead of the non-ordering conjunction between the X and the Z, X being situated in the first member of the implication. However, the sentences (28 to 36) show that the inverse implication sign appears in case the argument of the adjective I I is not the subject or is modified by a preposition. This is identical with the program of the relative clause with an implication interpretation. Therefore, a generalization can be made between both. Here also, the problem arises whether the interpretation of the adjective Hn as a member of a conjunction or of an implication is optional. (28) Perzen slaan grote Spartanen.

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Perser schlagen große Spartaner. (29) Indien Perzen Spartanen slaan, dan zijn die Spartanen groot. Falls Perser Spartaner schlagen, dann sind diese Spartaner groß. (30) Perzen slaan grote Spartanen die ziek zijn. Perser schlagen große Spartaner die krank sind. (31) Indien Perzen Spartanen slaan, dan zijn ze groot en ziek. Falls Perser Spartaner schlagen, dann sind sie groß und krank. (32) Grote Spartanen, die ziek zijn, eten rauw vlees. Große Spartaner, die krank sind, essen rohes Fleisch. (33) Indien Spartanen groot en ziek zijn, dan eten ze rauw vlees. Falls Spartaner groß und krank sind, dann essen sie rohes Fleisch. (34) Grote Spartanen eten rauw vlees. Große Spartaner essen rohes Fleisch. (35) Indien Spartanen groot zijn, dan eten ze rauw vlees. Falls Spartaner groß sind, dann essen sie rohes Fleisch. (28) = (29), (30) = (31), (32) = (33) and (34) = (35). 2.8. On the morphene 'zijn One could argue that the morpheme 'zijn' and its derived forms in one of its possible interpretations 30 indicate that the characteristics of the adjective immediately succeeding 'zijn', must be assessed to the noun which precedes 'zijn' in the first place. (1) Jan is ziek. Jan ist krank. (2) De deur is zwart. Die Tür ist schwarz. Accepting this, 'zijn' would have the following programs. Zijn IIIa: m Zijn IIa: Xm Y X = 1 PN Q 7 = 1 5 - (adj) • Q m = zijn III a However, the sentences (3) and (4) are also grammatical. (3) Ziek is Jan. Krank ist Jan. (4) Zwart is de deur. The morpheme 'zijn' can also get an interpretation of a possessive pronoun. I do not treat this here. Nevertheless an expression as "Vader zijn hoed" is not ambiguous, for there is no agreement between 'zijn' and 'vader' in the interpretation of 'zijn' as a copula.

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Schwarz ist die Tür. Therefore one needs to introduce also the program Zijn II b . Zijrt II„: Xm Y X = 1 S-NQ Y = 1 P • (adj) • Q But the programs 'Zijn II a ' and 'Zijn Iii,' are not sufficient to determine the function of 'zijn' in the sentences (5 to 9). (5) Jan is (onze) bakker. Jan ist (unser )Bäcker. (6) Jan is de bakker. Jan ist der Bäcker. (7) Een muis is een zoogdier. Eine Maus ist ein Säugetier. (8) Dikwijls is Jan bakker. Öfters ist Jan Bäcker. (9) Een goed bakker is Jan. Ein guter Bäcker ist Jan. (10) Dure gasten zijn muizen. Teuere Gäste sind Mäuse. This implies that one has to expand the programs Zijn II a and Zijn II,,. One can try to do this as follows. In Zijn II a , one expands the interpretation of Y: Y=((ISadj, ( - / ) • ß ) Y (1 / = S • {X (adj IIn) v AT)-adj,

S-N-Q))

Informally F i s (a) the first succeeding adjective which is not followed by a morpheme with a relation program Adj IIn ( v i z - no other adjective or adjectively used participle follows the adj ( ) or by a morpheme which is a noun; or Y is (b) the first succeeding noun. The power of this program is illustrated in the sentences (5 to 7) and (11 to 15). (11) Jan is erg ziek. Jan ist schwer krank. (12) Muizen zijn dure gasten. Mäuse sind teure Gäste. (13) Dit is lekker, bruin bier. Dies ist schmackhaftes, braunes Bier. (14) Dit is vlug bereid bier. Dies ist schnell zubereitetes Bier. (15) Dit is goed. Dies ist gut.

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Taking into account (8 to 10), T ' in Zijn II 6 has to be expanded as follows: Y = (1 P • (adj) • Q)

y

(1 P • N • Q)

In (8) of course, the 0 I 9 operation is executed in Zijn II,,. Let us now look at the sentences (16 to 21). (16) Jan is ziek. Jan ist krank. (17) Jan was ziek. Jan war krank. (18) De deur was zwart. Die Tür war schwarz. (19) De deur zal zwart zijn. Die Tür wird schwarz sein. (20) Jan werkt hard. Jan arbeitet schwer. (21) Jan werkte hard. Jan arbeitete schwer. There clearly exists an important difference between the significata of (16) and (17), of (18) and (19), and of (20) and (21). The conjugation of 'zijn' as is also the case with the verb in general, expresses a modification of the property assignment of the relation program of'Zijn II' or ' V I T . This explains the noted difference. As a consequence, the significatum structure of (16) is something as: (Jan (m m B ) ziek) Here, 'Jan' and 'ziek' are symbols for the significata of the sign 'Jan' and 'ziek'. ' m ' is the relation program III of 'zijn' and '2?' is the property expressed by the conjugation of 'zijn', viz. the result of the relation program II of the conjugation. In Dutch, B is a tense. ' H I ' is the property assignment to another property assignment. This influence of the conjugation on the significata of a sentence can be expressed as follows: Cjglll: Cjgll:

Y XU2Y X = m (m e Fe II)

Thus the significatum 7 of the conjugation is assessed to the property assignment which belongs to the relation program II of the verb which is conjugated. (22) Is Jan ziek? Ist Jan krank?

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(23) Is de deur zwart? Ist die Tür schwarz? The question arises, of course, whether in a sentence in which 'zijn' is copula, the relation program I of the question which was introduced for the verb is equally able to be used. Concerning this question, program Q and Q I 2 have been introduced for the verb. Q may only be applied on 'Zijn lla\ if Yis a noun and not an adjective (case A). So it may be applied in (24). (24) Is Jan onze bakker? Ist Jan unser Bäcker? If Y is an adjective (case B) one gets a wrong result. For, in (22) when Q I j is applied, Y must be interpreted as (2 5" • adj • Q). An analogous problem arises when Q I 2 is executed on Zijn II,,. A good result is obtained in case A, a wrong result in case B. One could try to solve these problems by subdividing Zijn II a and Zijn II b in two subcases. A subcase (1) where Y is a noun, and a subcase (2) where Y is an adjective. So for Zijn II 0 l the Q has to be applied, while on Zijn II M , Q I2 must be applied. On Zijn II a 2 as well as on Zijn II M the operator Aa has to be applied. Another solution brings to light a completely different approach to the copula. I feel a greater inclination towards this one because of its being more economical and its expressing a generalization between the verb and the copula. This solution proposes a relation program II for the copula which is identical with the other verbs. But before going on, let us return to the program of the adjective. I have introduced three different programs for an adjective. One by which an adjective modifies a noun, one by which it modifies another adjective and one by which it modifies a verb. This last program however can still be divided. An 'adjective' can modify the properties of the verb which are assessed to its subject, or it can specify the assessing of the properties of the verb. The former is illustrated in (25), the latter in (26). (25) Ik eet veel. (Ik m (eet m veel)) Ich esse viel. (26) Ik eet dikwijls. (Ik (m mdikwiils) eet). Ich esse öfters. Which of both it is, depends on the subclass the adjective belongs to. Therefore in the Adj II a fourth case (d) has to be introduced, viz. (d) Xt = m ( m e V (\ P • ( V) • O)). Let us now return to the second approach to 'zijn'. As already stated in this approach, the relation program II for the copula is identical with the one for the normal verb. Here of course, the X2, in Xt m X2 / X3, equals 0 . In some languages — but not in Dutch — the Adj. II,. can have a special agreement with 'zijn', viz. an agreement

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between the subject of "zijn" and the Adj IIC. This is an influence of 'zijn' on the agreement rules. Adj IIC will modify — as is the case with any other verb — the properties of the verb 'zijn'. But, as has already been stated, this is the empty class. Explicitly, f.i., the significata structure of (1) is: J a n m ( 0 m ziek) It is rather obvious that ( 0 m ziek) = ziek. Therefore one gets 'Jan m ziek'. The significata structure of (5) is explicitly: Jan m 0 / bakker. It is also clear that 0 / X = X. So one gets: 'Jan m bakker'. An important difference, however, with the normal verb consists in the fact that the Adj IIC and the X3 are exclusively disjunct in the significata structure of the relationprogram II of the verb 'Zijn', for with both one gets an impossible significate structure. In this approach is needed neither a special Zijn II a , nor a Zijn II 6 , nor a special relation program for the question operator on 'Zijn'. The function of Zijn ir b is obtained by the independently motivated 0 I and 0 I 9 programs (see above, section 2.3.: The verb). This program equally produces (8). Taking into account the independently motivated generalized 0 \ g (section 2.3.: The verb), the sentences (28, etc.) can also be easily interpreted without further emendation. (27) Jan is op zolder. Jan ist auf dem Speicher. (28) O p zolder is Jan. Auf dem Speicher ist Jan. There are still many other interpretations of the morpheme 'zijn', but I do not intend to discuss them here. 2.9. Some considerations on the

complementizers

It is certainly without doubt that the complementizer is not connected to the relative main clause by a conjunction sign. For, (1) differs from (2) and (3) from (4). (1) Ik overtuig de dokter (ervan) dat hij moet komen. 3 1 I persuade the doctor that he has to come. (2) Ik overtuig de dokter (ervan) en hij moet komen. I persuade the doctor and he has to come. 31

It is perhaps stylistically better to write 'Ik overtuig de dokter ervan dat hij moet komen'. However (1) with the omission of 'ervan' seems to me also grammatical. But here, for my approach to the complementizer, the omission or the addition of 'ervan' brings no fundamental changes. In a complete description, the function of 'er' must be described too. This must be done in the framework of a description of the function of 'er* in general.

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(3) Ik denk dat hij ziek is. I think that he is ill. (4) Ik denk en hij is ziek. I think and he is ill. My hypothesis about the semantic function of the complementizer is that the main verb of the relative main sentence executes a concept operation on the significatum of the complementizer. The differentiation between the concept operation and the object operation is already discussed in Part One, Chapter III. An object operation is an operation on what is supposed to be in the real world. A concept operation is an operation on concepts. So in (1), on the object 'dokter (doctor)', viz. on the referent of'doctor','I' executes the 'persuasion operation' with the concept combination contained in the complementizer 'dat hij moet komen' (that he has to come). Yet, it seems a problem if the relation between the verb and the complementizer is identical with the relation between the verb and the noun whose place is taken by the complementizer (if one really can say this). In other words is the relation between C and A in (6) identical with the relation between C and B in (5)? (5) Ik zie Piet. Ich sehe Peter. C~B ~c IT (6) Ik zie hem ploegen. Ich sehe ihn pflügen. ~C

A

~C

A

If one answers positively, then the verb 'zie' executes a concept operation not only on the complementizer, but also on its semantic subject. In this case, it would be better not to hypothesize the complementizer to indicate the presence of the concept operation: in fact, it would be preferable that the verb in casu in its relation program II indicates that it has a concept operation. Then the function of the complementizer would be reduced to (a) the organization of the significatum structure of the complementizer sentence itself and (b) the determination which operator is executed on it. One could also take the standpoint that C is ambiguous in its relation to B, because C could be a concept operator as well as an object operator on B (exclusive disjunction). Here too the relation program II of the verb has to indicate this ambiguity. A third possibility that can be held up is that the verb C unambiguously is an object operator for B, but a concept operator for A. Here two approaches are possible: the relation program II of the verb indicates the exclusive possibility of an object operator on a noun or a concept operator on a complementizer. The other approach is that the complementizer indicates that the verb has to execute a concept operator. Here, it must be taken into account that there has to be an agreement between the verb and the complementizer, viz. to a certain verb corresponds a certain complementizer. In Dutch the concept operation is f.i. executed on the complementizers 'dat', 'te'

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and ' i n f , in English f.i. on the complementizers 'that' and '... to'. Here I do not take into account other complementizers. These complementizers are exemplified in (7 to 11). (7) I expect that he will come. (8) I expect John to come. (9) Ik hoop dat hij zal komen. I hope that he will come. (10) Ik hoop hem te zien. I hope to see him. (11) Ik zie hem ploegen. Ich sehe ihn pflügen.

(Compia t h a t ) (Compls t0) (Compls dat ) (Compls te) (Compls

lnf )

The significata structure of the sentences (7 to 11) is of the following kind: I m [expect A / "he m [comeHQvill"]] Ik m [hoop A / "ikm [zie / "hem"]] One can wonder, however, why in (11) 'zien [to see]' is a concept operation. At a first glance this could seem strange. If it is not a concept operation, then one has an exception on the general characteristics of the complementizer. Is it really an exception? In fact, an observation is fundamentally determined by the concepts. 32 As a consequence, one can interpret 'Ik zie X (I see Xy as 'I have an input which activates in me the concept X\ If this is true, then "zien" is an operation which lays relations between inputs and concepts and therefore a concept operation. The same can be repeated for 'zeggen (to say)'. 'Zeggen (to say)' in one of its possible interpretations describes an operation turning concepts in outputs. There also exist verbs, which at the same time execute an object operation on one argument and a concept-operation on another one. This is illustrated in (12) and (13). (12) I persuade the doctor to see John. (13) I compell the doctor to see John. One can assess to them respectively the significatum structures (14) and (15): (14) Im [persuade [A / [\d doctor I] + B j ["Id doctor Im sees / "John"]]]. (15) I m [compell [A / [I,, doctor I] + B / ["!„ doctor I m sees / "John""]]]. However, one may wonder whether an imperative 33 is present in the significatum structure of the complementizer sentence. Because, if one substitutes in the sentence (12)'thete-compl(to-compl)'bythe'dat-compl(that-compl.)',then(12) = (16) ^ (17). 32

This is argued f.i. by L. Apostel in his article "Justification and Decision", p. 276, 1.8. c. " This was suggested to me by L. Theyskens. It is also worth noting that (16) is more ambiguous than (12). For, 'hij' (he) can refer to 'dokter' (doctor) or to a contextual determined person, not mentioned in the sentence.

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(16) Ik overtuig de dokter dat hij moet komen. (17) Ik overtuig de dokter dat hij komt. As a consequence one can propose (18) instead of (14) as the significatum structure of (12). (In the same way [15] can be emended). (18) I m [persuade [A / [I d doctor I] + B / ["I,, doctor I [ m m o r d e r l sees / "John""]]]. This seems only true with those verbs of which the complementizer is in the position B. If the complementizer is in the position A (more about this, see below) as is the case with 'beloven [promise]', this does not seem true anymore, f.i. in (19). (19) Ik beloof John te komen. I promise John to come. For, (19) = (20) # (21). (20) Ik beloof John dat ik kom. (21) Ik beloof John dat ik moet komen. When looking at the sentences (12) and (13) it becomes clear that for the Compl Ste (Compl sto ) some parts of the complementizer sentence are not repeated, if they are already present in the relative main clause. In (12) this is 'the doctor'. The problem is to make explicit what is implicitly expressed. This problem becomes still more obvious when looking at sentences (22) and (23). These sentences differ from each other in what is implicit. (22) I promise Bill to go home early. Ik beloof Bill vroeg naar huis te gaan. (23) I persuade Bill to go home early. Ik overtuig Bill vroeg naar huis te gaan. In sentence (22), 'I (ik)' is implicit in the complementizer. With Compl Sdat (Compl sthat ) one would have (24). (24) I promise Bill that I shall go home early. Ik beloof Bill dat ik vroeg naar huis zal gaan. In (23) it is not 'I (ik)' which is implicit, on the contrary it is 'Bill'. With the Compl Sda , (Compl sthat ) one would have (25). (25) Ik overtuig Bill dat hij (Bill) vroeg naar huis moet gaan. I persuade Bill that he (Bill) has to go home early. How to solve this problem? First of all, I want to note that 'to promise (beloven)' and 'to persuade (overtuigen)' have a different relation program I I : I think that the significatum structure of (22) and (23) is respectively (26) and (27).

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(26) I m persuade [A / Bill + B\"Xx go home early"]. (27) I m promise [A / "X2 go home early" + B / Bill]. In (26), Xi = Bill and in (27), X2 = I. The following evidence can be adduced for the significatum structures of (26) and (27): 'To persuade' and 'to promise' have two arguments. One of them can be complementizer, but not both. (28) I promise Bill to John. (29) I persuade John of this idea. In (28) the noun succeeding 'to' indicates the person to whom something is promised. In (29) the noun succeeding 'of' indicates what John is persuaded of. It seems to me a good hypothesis to order in the significatum structure the arguments of the verb using the principle that the argument without preposition must be ordered before the argument with a preposition. Following this principle one gets the structure of (26) and (27). The correctness of this hypothesis is confirmed by the passivation of (22) and (23). (30) Bill wordt door mij beloofd te komen. Bill is promised by me to come. (31) Te komen wordt door mij beloofd aan Piet. To come is promised by me to Bill. (32) Bill wordt door mij overtuigd naar huis te gaan. Bill is persuaded by me to go home. In (22) (significatum structure 27), if we take (A) 'Bill' as object and we turn the sentence into the passive, we get a sentence which fundamentally differs in meaning from (22). This is illustrated by (30). However, if we take the complementizer as the object (A), then one gets a good result. The opposite is true for the passive of (23). All this makes it clear that with the verb 'to promise' the complementizer is the real object, something which is not true with 'to persuade'. The same facts are true in Dutch. The same can be illustrated with the verbs 'to ask', 'to expect', etc. Therefore one can conclude that if a verb has two arguments that very one is the real object, which in the passive dominates the verb. The real object has to be ordered before the second argument in the significatum structure. This is for the easiness of differentiation. For certain verbs the real object can be substituted by a complementizer; this is not true for other verbs. Taking this into account and the facts already mentioned about the problem of the implicit parts of the Compl ste (Compl sto ), one can propose that the semantic subject of the CompI ste is the object of the relative main sentence, if this object is ordered before the significatum of the complementizer clause. This is the case with (26). If this is not so, then it is identical with the subject. This is the case with (27).

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Let us now try to express all this more formally. In the hypothesis discussed above that the verb in casu in its relation program II indicates that it has a concept operation 34 , one has four kinds of relation programs II for the verb, viz.: (1) The one described earlier with an object operation on X2. X^ m Q j X2

(2) The one with a concept operation on X2. X1 m Q / "X2"

Three and four are a combination of (1) and (2), viz. two operations, an object- and a concept operation, are executed. They differ, however, in the ordering of these operations. In (3) the object operation precedes the concept operation. In (4) the concept operation precedes the object operation. 36 For every verb it is important to know if it has the relation program VIIlt VII2) KII 3 , or VII4. Some verbs 36 which have the relation program VIllt are: 'eten (to eat), slaan (to beat), duwen (to push), etc.'. All verbs which can have a complementizer, but which do not have two arguments, have a relation program VII 2 , i.e. 'denken (to think)'. Verbs with relation program Vll3 are: admonish (vermanen); command (bevelen); want (verlangen), expect (hopen); allow (toelaten); help (helpen); compell (verplichten); persuade (overtuigen); order (bevelen). Verbs with the relation program KII 4 are: 'promise (beloven), say (zeggen), prevail (rekenen op) (John prevailed upon John to come home)'. The FII3 and FII 4 are formally as follows. VII3: VIIA\

Xim

Q (A I M ® BI "Z")

m Q(A/

"Z" © B\

M)

It will be important to determine how to find the argument of the concept operator and the object operator in V I I 3 and VII 4 . (33) I persuade the doctor of something. Ik overtuig de dokter (van) iets. *(34) Ik overtuig iets de dokter. (35) Ik overtuig van iets de dokter. " In the hypothesis that a complementizer indicates that the verb has to execute a concept operation, one needs a relation program II of the complementizer. One could then propose: Compl II: X/ "Y" X = V(VceMs) Y = Compl sent Informally the complementizer indicates that the verb of the relative main sentence executes a concept operation on the complementizer sentence Y. " One could also argue to introduce a V II 5 for the verbs which are neither object, nor concept operations, f.i. 'to run [lopen]'. " I do not intend to give an extensive list of verbs with the determination which relation program II they have.

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(36) Ik overtuig de dokter (ervan) te komen. The sentences (33), (34) and (35), (36) suggest for the VII 3 : M = 1S-N-Q Z = Compl s V 1 5 ' Prep c/van (of) - Q v IS-N

•Q

'Z', the argument of the concept operator (here in casu of B) is either the complementizer sentence or (exclusive disjunction) the first succeeding preposition clause or (exclusive disjunction) the second succeeding noun. This last specification is only true if one agrees that 'van' (of) in (33) is optional. The fact that the preposition is optional for the argument of the operator B can be used as evidence against the interpretation of B as a prepositional modification (eventually a conceptual modification) of the verb instead of an argument of the verb. For, in a normal prepositional clause the preposition is never optional. *(37) Ik beloof iets iemand. Ik beloof een tafel Paul.37 Ich verspreche etwas jemandem. Ich verspreche einen Tisch Paul. (38) Ik beloof iemand iets. Ich verspreche jemandem etwas. (39) Ik beloof iets aan iemand. *(40) Ik beloof te komen John. Ich verspreche zu kommen John. (41) Ik beloof John te komen. (42) Ik beloof te komen aan John. Looking at sentences (37 to 42), in the VII4 one has to interpret Z and M as follows : M = 1 S • Prep c/aan (t0) • Q x v 2 (1 S • (N) • Q) Z = Compl v IS-N ( —M) • Q (43) lets beloof ik aan iemand. (44) lets beloof ik iemand. (45) Iemand beloof ik iets. (46) Aan iemand beloof ik iets. (47) lets overtuig ik de dokter. (48) De dokter overtuig ik iets. (49) Van iets overtuig ik de dokter. (50) De dokter overtuig ik van iets. Taking into account the sentences (43) to (50), one could propose to modify the Xu the M and the Z in VII3 and VII4 as follows: In both Xj = (1 P • N • Q) v (1 S • N • Q) " Sentence (37) is strange, if 'iets' is interpreted as the argument of A/, and 'iemand' as the argument of B/.

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(FII3)': M = L Z = T y V 2 (0 Y Prep c/ van(of) w 2 S • N • Q) (FII4)': M = Prep c/aan ( t o ) ! y 2 Z, Z = 7 J y 2 (1 5 • N ( - (M v JTi)) • £2 y 0 Here L = 1 S • (N ( - XJ) • Q y 1 P • (N (—A^)) • Q T = compl s 0 = 1 P • (N ( - (A\ v M) • fl As a consequence of this modification a sentence as (51) is ambiguous in at least 2 ways. (51) Jan belooft Piet een boek. 'Jan' can be the subject as well as 'Piet'. However there is still another ambiguity present. This one is illustrated by (52). (52) Jan belooft Piet (aan) Paul. 'Jan' can also be the thing or the one who is promised to somebody. In this interpretation Piet is the subject and Paul is the person whom somebody is promised. However another — much more economical — approach is also possible. First let us have a look at (53) and (54). (53) Te komen hoop ik. (54) Dat hij komt hoop ik. One can get the right interpretation of sentence (53) and (54) by applying the structure VIIB, X2 being the complementizer. In the same way the interpretation of sentences (43) to (52) can be gotten in a more economical way, by applying the VllB, X2 being optional M or Z. Here, however, VllB must execute the operation Ac on the argument which does not precede. In these case however, ' I S - Prep clx • £?' must be substituted by 'Prep clx' in the specification of M and Z in VII3 and VII4. To find the verb dominating element of the Compl ste (Compl sto ) the required operation, as it was explained earlier, can be formalized as follows: I-* Comply /: Xj (xj Vt) = 1 P • Xk (XK e Vf II) • Z Vt = the main verb of the complementizer sentence. Vf = the main verb of the relative main sentence of the complementizer. Informally: the Xj which dominates the verb of the complementizer is the XK which firstly precedes the significatum of the complementizer in the significatum structure of the verb of the relative main sentence. If the verb Vf of the main sentence has a F I I 3 program, the Xj = M. If this verb has a VII4 program, then the Xj = Xx. As a counter-example to this rule, one could present:

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(55) Ik kocht een scheermes om me (zelf) te scheren. I bought a razor to shave myself with. (56) Een scheermes wordt door mij gekocht om me (zelf) te scheren. A razor is bought by me to shave myself with. Sentence (55) = (56). However, the subject of (55) is 'I (ik)'. At first glance, the rule Compl 3 I is wrong, for the 'razor' is the object of 'buy', and 'buy' is the main verb. However, (55) is not a counter-example, because here we have not a Compl STo but a kind of a causal sentence. The same is true for the sentences (57), (58), (59). (57) Ik koop zeep om me te wassen. I buy soap to wash myself with. I buy soap in order to wash myself. (58) Ik draag kleren om me te beschermen. I wear cloths to protect myself. (59) Ik koop zeep om Jan te wassen. I buy soap to wash John with. In these sentences 'I (ik)' is the dominating element of the causal sentence. As a consequence, we may conclude that what dominates the verb of the causal sentence is the subject of the relative main sentence. In English, there arises some ambiguity because the same morphemes are used for a complementizer and for a causal sentence. In Dutch, there is no ambiguity on this account because of the presence of the morpheme 'om', which accompanies 'te', when it has the interpretation of a causal sentence. In English however there is no real ambiguity either, for the reason that with the verbs where 'to' can be used as a complementizer, 'to' cannot be used as a causal sentence. As a consequence, when 'to' appears and the verb of the relative main sentence cannot have a complementizer 'to', then 'to' introduces a causal sentence. (60) Ik overtuig John (ervan) om me gerust te stellen. *(61) I persuade John to be able to shave myself. (62) Ik overtuig John ervan om me te kunnen scheren. In Dutch, 'though', an ambiguity arises on another account. Sentences (63) and also (60) are ambiguous. The subject of 'beschermen' can be 'John' as well as 'ik'. As a consequence there is an optionality. Compl 3 I or a special causal sentence I rule may be applied. (63) Ik draag John om me te beschermen. Another important task — I only want to touch it here — is the identification of the complementizer sentence. For the Compl S(Ut no problems arise. The Subcl I can be applied without any difficulties. For the Compl ste , the task is a little more complex and for the Compl s l n f , it is still worse.

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Concerning the Compl Sinf and Compl ste all the arguments and the modifications of the verb Xt of the complementizer can precede Xt. As a consequence, the intentional approach seems necessary here. The intentional approach for the complementizers would be the following: Compl s = (1 S • • {X) (XR K = dat v te v Vll2

V,)

Informally, the complementizer sentence consists in the verb V( which follows K and all elements which have a certain relation to the verb, viz. which are its arguments or its modifiers. K is the morpheme 'dat', 'te' or a verb with a relation program VII2. There has to be an agreement between K and the verb Vit viz. if K is 'te' or a ' K I I 2 ' , then Vt has to be an infinitive. If K is 'dat', then V, has to be a Vc. If K is a Vll2, in other words if one has an infinitive complementizer, then the VIIB program (see earlier) cannot be executed, for the Compl slnf has to follow the main verb. This characteristic is confirmed by the facts that sentences (65) and (67), are ungrammatical while (64) and (66) are grammatical. (64) Ik zag boeren ploegen. Ich sah Bauern pflügen. *(65) Boeren ploegen zag ik. Bauern pflügen sah ich. (66) Ik zag boeren het land beploegen. Ich sah Bauern den Boden durchpflügen. *(67) Boeren het land beploegen zag ik. In order to find the arguments of the K,, the Z I rule has to be applied. For the discussion on Z I, see section 2.6.: The relative clause. However, also a Compls?" I has to be introduced. (68) Jan zei dat Piet de boer hoopte te zien. Jan sagte dass Peter den Bauern hoffte zu sehen. (69) Jan zei dat Piet hoopte de boer te zien. Jan sagte dass Peter hoffte den Bauern zu sehen. (70) Ik hoop John te hören roepen. Ich hoffe John zu hören rufen. (71) Ik hoop te hören John roepen. For as the sentences (68) and (70) illustrate, the verb Xt may search its object before the relative main verb Yt, if a Compl ste or Compl slnf of which the relative main verb Y, is itself in a Compl Sda , or a Compl ste .

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2.10. Postscript Up to now I proposed to assign to the adjective and the relative clauses in one of their interpretations, a relation program II by which they get the same significata structure as a coriespor ding conjunction. The significata structures of the conjunctive sentences themselves were reduced to the significata structure of the most explicit conjunction, which itself is composed out of the significata structure of the sentence which precedes and the one which follows 'en (and)', connected to each other by an operator (proposal I). (1) De zieke man eet brood. The sick man eats bread. (2) De man die ziek is, eet brood. The man who is ill, eats bread. (3) De man is ziek en eet brood. The man is ill and eats bread. (4) De man is ziek en hij eet brood. The man is ill and he eats bread. (5) Jan en Piet eten brood. John and Peter eat bread. (6) Jan eet brood en Piet eet brood. John eats bread and Peter eats bread. So (1), (2), (3) and (4) get the same significatum structure. Their significatum structure is most directly mirrored in (4). However, it is obvious that (1), (2) and (3) express their significatum more economically than (4), as far as the number of the morphemes are concerned. The same is true for (5) and (6); (5) is much more economical than (6). As a consequence one could propose an opposite approach (proposal II). Instead of considering (6) respectively (4) as best mirroring the significatum structure of (5) and (6) respectively of (1) to (4), one could consider the most concise conjunction as best mirroring their significatum structure. 38 This could imply that the input and the output of the cognitive system are minimally redundant. In the encoding process, however, the redundancy could be increased. In the first approach the opposite is the case. The input and the output of the cognitive system are maximally redundant, but in the encoding process the redundancy could be diminished. As long as no psychological or physiological evidence on this solves the choice between both approaches, one can try to make a choice on the basis of system- theoretical considerations. First of all, it is important to establish if both approaches have the same power (influence). In other words, are both approaches able to assess a same significatum structure to several language constructions with synonymous significata, f.i. to the sentences (1) to (4)? " The same problem arises in the framework of the transformationalists. The surface structure is much less redundant than the deepstructure.

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163

Secondly, which approach is the simplest one? By this problem one is confronted with the not at all trivial problems of determination and measurement of the simplicity and the economicity of a theory. 39 I do not intend to discuss this, nor to make a choice between both approaches. I only wanted to mention in principle the possibility of the second approach. The difficulties for a psychological decision in a choice between both approaches are clearly expressed in the following quotation of L. Apostel: 40 "Het lijkt mij heel moeilijk de twee redundanties van de taal en van het denken van elkaar te scheiden, daar het denken zich of wel manifesteert in de taal zelf of wel in het handelen. In het tweede geval zouden we dan de redundantie van handelen en taal vergelijken, wat op zichzelf een ander probleem is en ook niet zonder moeilijkheden gebeuren kan." [It seems to me very difficult to separate the redundancies of language and of thought. For thought manifests itself either through the language or through the actions. In the latter case, one would compare the redundancies of the action and the language, being another problem, not very easy to execute.] Nevertheless one could try to bring forward the following argument as a justification for the proposal I. A child learns first to produce and to understand the most explicit conjunction. The reduced conjunction and the use of the relative clauses seem more difficult to be attained. They also have a more complicated relation program. Now, one could argue that, if the reduced conjunction mirrors in the best way the significatum structure of these several sentences, it would be normal and even easiest to learn first the reduced conjunction: but this seems contrary to the facts, which seem to affirm the predominance of proposal I. 41 Although I think that this argument makes proposal I the more probable, I want to stress the fact that there are two dangerous a priori's contained in this argument. The first one is that it is not necessary — although very probable — that, although the reduced conjunction mirrors the significatum of the adjective, relative clause and the conjunction structures in the best way, it is most easily encoded or decoded. Such an argument can only be throughly valid if the proposal II gets a concrete realization. Another more dangerous a priori of this argument is that it is not necessary — although it is mostly hypothesized — that the genesis of language is cumulative. In other words, that the language system of the child is a real subpart of the system of the adult: it is at least logically possible that the development of the language system 89

Problems of economicity of a theory and how these problems arise in several sciences is touched on in my "Is realisme economischer dan solipsisme". 40 This is a quotation from a letter of L. Apostel, dated February 1,1967, occasioned by an exchange of letters on this problem. 41 This argument cannot be used as a justification for taking the adjective construction as best mirroring the significata structure of the adjective, the relative clause, the reduced conjunction and the explicit conjunction. For, every adjective conjunction can be converted into a conjunction, but not every conjunction can be converted into an adjective construction. This last is f.i. the case with the sentences (5) and (6).

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is such that the more the child learns the economy in language expression, the more he learns the economy in its cognitive system or vice versa. A combination of both is also possible, viz. the economy of the language - and the cognitive system influence each other in such a way that at a certain stadium the one is the more economical while at another stadium the other is the more economical. 42 I want also to stress the fact that, by comparing the economy of thought and language as far as their respective outputs and inputs are concerned, only one aspect — although an important one — of the general economic problem of the language and cognitive system is considered. For, in a general comparison of the economy and the redundancy in the cognitive and in the language system, one has also to take into account the processing apparatus i.e. the relation programs. For, an economy as far as the number of the morphemes and the number of elements in the significatum structure are concerned, is perhaps able to imply very complicated and not-economical relation programs. Another remark — independent of the preceding one — I want to make, is that one can try to simplify the representation of the proposed relation programs by replacing all identical subparts by a symbol, f.i. everywhere '1 P • N • Q' could be replaced by Hu'l S-N-Q' by H2, etc. This would not cause a fundamental simplification, but it would perhaps be more practical.

42

If one prefers the proposal II, and if one accepts the proposal to consider a linguistic context as a conjunction of sentences, then it will perhaps also be necessary to give the normal sentence a significata structure, which corresponds with a member of the conjunction.

VII A P R O D U C T I O N C O M P E T E N C E SYSTEM ( A N E N C O D I N G C O M P E T E N C E SYSTEM)

1. A PRODUCTION ALGORITHM 1.1. Introductory

remarks

I intend to discuss a system for converting a certain significata structure into an expression of the language L. O n e can try to do this in several ways. O n e way is t r a n s f o r m a tional g r a m m a r (with some adaptation). In fact some people, i.e. A. A. Hill, regard transformational g r a m m a r as a production system, despite Chomsky's repeated attempts to refute this. An i m p o r t a n t drawback to this approach is that (A) in order to start the encoding, the complete significata structure with its concrete significata included has to be given. This is n o t at all a natural requirement. F o r since we can already understand a part of the sentence before we have heard it as a whole, it is also possible — at least it seems so to me — to encode a part of a significata structure before the whole structure is constructed. O n e could try t o justify (A) by pointing out that it is only a characteristic of the competence system. The p e r f o r m a n c e can differ in this f r o m the competence. The validity of this argument may be d o u b t e d on the g r o u n d of the consideration that differences between the competence and the performance systems can only be introduced (a) if this differentiation accounts for variations and (b) if greater economy is gained by it (see Part One, Chapter IV). This is the more true when one regards the performance system as being the competence system connected with the factual limited memory, the factual cognitive a n d emotive system, etc. ..., in one word the competence system connected with the whole h u m a n being or more generally with the whole being of the language user. Also S. Dik's 'Functional g r a m m a r ' 1 can be interpreted as a production competence system, although it is not intended as such by Dik. His a p p r o a c h as well as mine has the advantage that the significatum structure can be specified in the course of the encoding process. In Dik's a p p r o a c h even the construction of the significatum structure has t o occur and can only occur in the course of the encoding process. It 1 I discussed this in a review of S. C. Dik's Coordination.

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is also typical for this approach that the significatum structure has to be built up from the more general specification to the more specific ones. Perhaps this approach is another extreme and as Chomsky's approach, very difficult to maintain from a psychological and physiological point of view. I consider my approach to occupy a middle position. The significatum structure may, but not necessarily, be specified entirely before the starting of the encoding process. Nevertheless, I think that some parts of the significatum structure are to be given priority before other ones, in other words that a strategy in the construction of the significatum structure has to be used in coordination with the encoding system. For instance, for the encoding of a sentence, at least in Dutch and in English, the specifications ' m QH^'J viz. the modifications of the property assessing operator (for instance, a question mark, a wish marker or a command marker or 0 in case of a normal sentence2) are very important, for these specifications determine a special construction of the sentence. If one does not know the kind of the specifications ' m m y ' , which are present in a particular significatum structure, the encoding will be hampered, for the morphemes pronounced first may f.i. rule out the possibility of the construction of a question. If in this case a ' m ITIO' (Q = question mark) is added to the significata structure it will be impossible to encode this structure and one will have to start it over again. I do think that, in fact, one frequently does make such 'new starts', but I also think that a strategy is used or at least can be constructed to minimize such 'second trials'. Not only do I argue that the encoding process can go on before the whole significata structure is constructed, but I even believe that there is an interaction between the output of the encoding system, the processing of it and the further development and completion of the significatum structure (the output of the cognitive system). As a consequence, one could propose the following strategy. Some data on the significatum structure, i.e. the ' m m i " , must be given which permit to take some basic decisions about the choice of a sentence structure. Once this structure is chosen it can guide the further construction of the significatum structure. The argument I use in favor of the idea that a strategy which is coordinated with the encoding system has to be used in the construction of the significatum structure, could perhaps be doubted by somebody on the basis of the following considerations. A question, a command, etc. ... can also be expressed indirectly. This is illustrated in the sentences (1) to (9). This could lead to the conclusion that the ' m CDF' is not so important. Because, if one begins in such a manner that it is not possible to express the question, etc. ... directly, then one can still express it indirectly. * I do not want to identify a 'normal sentence' with a 'declarative sentence'. This under influence of J. J. Austin's arguments in How to do Things with Words. In this book he proposes a new classification of the sentences. I call normal sentence the declarative sentence (Austin's constative) as well as the performative ones. Austin describes the performative sentence as follows: "It indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action — it is not normally thought of as just saying something" (pp. 6-7).

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(1) Ga naar school! Geh zur Schule! (2) Ga je naar school? Gehst du zur Schule? (3) Möge je rijk worden. Mögest du reich werden. (4) Ik beveel je naar school te gaan. Ich befehle dir zur Schule zu gehen. (5) Ik vraag je of je naar school gaat. Ich frage dich ob du zur Schule gehst. (6) Ik wens dat je toch maar naar school wou gaan. Ich wünsche daß du doch mal zur Schule gehen mögest. (7) Dat je toch maar naar school wou gaan, wens ik. Daß du doch mal zur Schule gehen mögest, wünsche ich. (8) Naar school te gaan, beveel ik je. Zur Schule zu gehen, befehle ich dir. (9) Of je naar school gaat, vraag ik je. Ob du zur Schule gehst, frage ich dich. First of all it does not seem obvious to me that sentences (1) (2) and (3) are synonymous with (4), (5) and (6). If they are not synonymous, then the counterargument is void. But, even if one considers them synonymous, the counterargument can be disproved, for the indirect expression of a question, a command, a wish, etc. ... also implies a very specific structure of a sentence. One needs to choose a typical verb with a complementizer adapted to the verb. Also the special intonation for a command, a question, etc. ... is preserved. I also wish to mention that the question which does not apply to the relation between significata, but to the significata themselves, does not seem to me so important for the general structure of the sentence, for the normal sentence structure can be preserved. (10) Welke jongen eet brood? Which boy eats bread? For the significatum structure of (10), I propose the following. [jongen m ?] m eet / brood Another remark one could try to make is, that with the construction of a normal sentence, one is also able to express always a question, a command, etc. ... provided one does use the adapted intonation. But here too, this special intonation is already noticeable from the first morphemes of the sentence. Therefore here too the specification ' m m r is important, from the beginning of the encoding process. In the discussion of the ' m m y , I only gave instances with lY' interpreted as a

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question, a command, etc. ... However, as was occasionally mentioned in the discussion of the recognition system, ' 7 ' can also be an indicator of time. ' I " is in this interpretation also of primary importance for the encoding process as is apparent from the sentences (11) to (15). (11) Ik zie de man op de toren. Ich sehe den Mann auf dem Turm. (12) Ik heb de man op de toren gezien. Ich habe den Mann auf dem Turm gesehen. (13) Ik heb de man gezien op de toren. Ich habe den Mann gesehen auf dem Turm. (14) Ik zal de man op de toren zien. Ich werde den Mann auf dem Turm sehen. (15) Ik zal de man zien op de toren. Ich werde den Mann sehen auf dem Turm. Dependent on time, the verb takes another place in the sentence structure. However, it is true that the impact of the time indicator in the sentence structure is not as important as the impact of the question marker, the command marker, etc. ... It is, of course, possible that the basis data ' m 171^' are identical for a whole context. As a consequence it will be more efficient to determinate these data only once. In this case, one can indicate the range of a peculiar ' m [ J ] 7 ' by specially introduced conventions. Without doubt there can be given more specification for the strategy to construct the significatum structure. So the presence of a concept-operator in a significatum which has to be encoded, or even the presence of a concept-operator in the argument of the concept-operator and the characteristics of the argument of the conceptoperator are also important to determine if a complementizer has to be chosen, and which one and which complementizer structure. It is not a priori true that some strategy is valid for all languages, in other words that it is universal. Because, when an encoding system differs fundamentally from another, it will be obvious that important differences in the significatum-construction strategy can occur, on the ground that the strategy to construct a significatum structure has to be coordinated with the encoding system. However, a strategy will be needed in every language. For, it is very improbable that some language does exist, where what so ever significatum structure can be expressed by a sentence which begins with no matter which category(ies) of morpheme(s). In Dutch, once the ' m r n ^ ' are determined, one has still an important freedom in the construction of the sentence. For instance, when one has a significata structure such as (16), one can at least encode this as (17), (18) and (19). (16) Ik [ m Q J 0 ] eet / brood. (17) Ik eet brood. Ich esse Brot.

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(18) Brood eet ik. Brot esse ich. (19) Brood wordt door mij gegeten. Brot wird durch mich gegessen. How one is to choose between the several alternatives seems to me a psychological or stylistic problem rather than a linguistic one. Yet I will mention here a few factors which seem to me to have an important impact on the choice between the alternatives. In many cases a sentence begins with the word that has a significatum that already occurred in the preceding sentence. To realize this, the passive may be needed in some cases. I shall illustrate this factor by a few instances. (20) Once there were three little ducks who lived with their mother in a nice brown barnyard. Their names Ducky Daddle, Ducky Diddle, and Ducky Doddle. (21) "Good-bye", said the three little ducks, and they put their heads under their wings. 3 (22) I expect we must leave the 'could' unreduced. It has some operational import, indeed, but only in a partial way.4 Another factor is that an adult will try to avoid as much as possible the explicit ordering conjunctions, certainly if they have as members the modifiers of a noun. So an adult will prefer (24) to (23). (23) Jan is groot en hij is ziek en hij gaat naar school. John is big and he is ill and he is going to school. (24) a. De grote zieke Jan gaat naar school. The big sick John is going to school, b. De grote Jan die ziek is, gaat naar school. The big John, who is ill, is going to school. In this informal approach to the problems of the encoding procedure, one can already put forward some general problems and so some lines for possible research. A first problem I already touched upon, is what and how much of the significata structure has to be determined before the encoding process can go on? Another one is under what conditions the significatum structure K may be changed, while the competence encoding process of is already going on and without the necessity of beginning again. Suppose for instance that part A of the significatum structure of (25) is already processed, viz. by (26) and that one wants to substitute (25) by (27). (25) [man m ill] © [man m PP] m see / me (26) The man who is ill, ... (27) [manm ill] © [Im saw / (manm PP)] * (20) and (21) are extracts from Three Little Ducks, a Rand McNaliy junior elf book. 4 This is an extract from Quine's "The Problem of Meaning in Linguistics", p. 25.

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In this case one is not obliged to begin again and to say (28). But by the use of the passive, one can, preserving (26), get the encoding of (27) by adding 'is seen by me'. So one gets (29). (28) I see the man who is ill. (29) The man who is ill, is seen by me. In this hypothetical case the passive is not only a stylistical variant, but indicates some characteristics of the thought process which gives (27) as output. With this I do not uphold the view that this is a function of the passive. I only wish to stress the possibility of it. Another important characteristic of the encoding process is that after the encoding of a significatum structure K in the sentence N, the decoding of N, viz. the significata structure L, can be compared with K. If an important difference is found between L and K one can try to minimize this difference by a sentence M. That, for instance, by stating that some operations must be added or subtracted from K. 1.2. Scheme of a general strategy and a basic production

algorithm

A strategy is proposed by which on the basis of a partial analysis of the significatum structure a certain surface structure (sentence structure) is chosen. Then, this significatum structure guides the whole production process. An algorithm for this task is outlined.

On the basis of the discussion in the introductory remarks, it is already possible to give an outline of a first approach to a speech production competence system. First of all, one has to choose a member of the conjunction of which the significata structure is composed. On the basis of the ' m CD1", specifications of the chosen member and eventually of other data one can determine the set of sentence structures (surface structures) that can be chosen. As a consequence, one knows to which category the first pronounced word has to belong, to which one the second, etc. ... (of course in dependence on the chosen structure). Once the set of the possible structures are determined, one has to make a choice between them. I do not discuss here the factors which can influence the choice (some remarks about it were made in the introductory remarks). 5 Subsequently (a) the words have to be selected whose significatum equals a part of the significatum structure which has to be encoded and (b) these have to be produced. The chosen surface structure indicates to which word category every word has respectively to belong. This strategy is implemented in the following basic algorithm: (1) Store in Z the significatum structure, which has to be encoded in language L. (2) Set (K) = 1. (3) Go to subroutine 01 (This is a strategy to choose the surface structure that will 5

Of course, it is also possible that the choice is made on the basis of a word or of a certain structure that one will 'per se' have in the sentence, etc.

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guide the encoding of Z. More about 01 in section 1.4.: 'Some subroutines'). (4) Determine the category which has to be the K-th element of the sentence, taken into account the choice made in 3. Place it in m. (5) Determine the substructure and the subroutine of the category present in m and place it in Q. (6) Go to this subroutine. (7) K + 1 -> K. (8) If S - K > 0 then go to 4. (9) I f Z = Z x go to 14. (10) Write in Z 2 the difference between Z and Z¡. (11) Erase Z. (12) Store Z 2 in Z. (13) G o to 2. (14) Stop.

1.3. Explanation of some commands of the cyclical program Explanation to command: (1) (2) (5) (7)

' Z ' is a symbol for an address in the memory unit. 'AT' is a symbol for a counter. The substructures and the subroutines of every category are stored. 'K 4- 1 => K' has to be interpreted as follows: '1' must be added to the number which the counter indicates at this moment. The counter must then indicate the number which results by this summation. (8) is the number of categories specified in the chosen surface structure. (9) Every part of the significatum structure which is encoded, is stored in Z t by the subroutine of the indivisible categories (see below). By command (9), it is checked, if what is encoded, viz. what is in Z l s equals that what has to be encoded, viz. what is in Z (approach A). One could also uphold the view (approach B) that by the recognition procedure, the output of the encoding system, viz. the sentence, is analyzed, and subsequently what is decoded, is compared with what has to be encoded. If there is also a difference, then the necessary corrections are made in the subsequent utterances. In this approach, it will be necessary to store in Z t the result of the decoding process. One could also propose (approach C) a combination of these two strategies, viz. a first irregular control in the manner of approach A, and a second irregular control in the manner of approach B. I am most inclined to this approach. Psychological evidence has to decide between these several approaches. It seems also important to me to mention here that in the performance hiats are certainly present in the control. It happens that someone makes a verbal slip without

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noticing it. So someone may say6 "The meeting begins at four o'clock" while he intends to say "at two o'clock". He himself does not notice the verbal slip, and consequently does not correct it. Several listeners who know that it is at two o'clock can notify the speaker of this mistake. The speaker will be very surprised at his slip. This accident could indicate that the approach B is not very probable. Taking this into account and on the basis of the considerations in Part I, Chapter IV, the approach C seems to me more justified. (9-13) These commands guarantee that if the significata structure of the uttered sentence deviates from the structure Z which has to be encoded, then the differences (Y) are encoded. This deviation can be caused by the omission in Z t of some parts of Z. In principle it can also be possible that in a lexicon the correct word for a certain significatum cannot be found on the ground that the significatum of every word expresses too much or too little. By a new sentence with significatum Z 2 , it can be tried to suppress the differences. It is however conceivable that the difference is not enough to make possible a new sentence. This could be solved by the approach where parts of Z1 may be optionally repeated in Z 2 . One could also consider such a situation a stimulus for the cognitive processes with as a consequence that optionally some new thought not present in Z, will be added to Y. Now it will be possible to form a new sentence, but it will be a less redundant one. 1.4. Some subroutines Subroutine 01. (1) Check whether a question, wish, command or normal sentence is necessary, viz. if in t h e ' m U J Y ' specification, there is a question, wish, command or zero marker. (2) Check whether a complementizer structure is necessary. (3) Define the set X of possible surface structures on the basis of the data got by (1) and (2). (4) Make a choice between them. I do not intend to treat more in detail how to make decisions for choosing the desired surface structure. One could perhaps argue that (3) is superfluous, for in encoding one does not construct the class of all possible encodings, except in some rare cases. By analogy one does not try to find all possible interpretations except in some rare cases. However certainly with an encoding competence system, it must be possible to construct all possible encodations. One could propose the introduction into the subroutine 01 of a subroutine 01.1, of which command 3 is a part. In the case one proceeds to 01.1, then all surface structures present in the set Xare systematically selected for use. The encoding of a certain significatum structure Z comes only then at an end when all members of X have been used. Some surface structures and the relations between each part of the surface struc* This is a personal experience.

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tures with the significata structure will be treated in the subdivision II: some surface structures. Subroutine 02: the subroutine of the Ncl (Noun clause). — By command 5 of the main program, one will go to this subroutine, if 'Ncl' is present in m (see command 4). The Ncl is discussed below. n d = 1. n + 1 Determine and its relation to the significatum Yt which will be encoded as a verb (a general convention is needed that if the significatum of N j is found between "..." then the Y, has to be between "...") too. n + 2 Determine the J-th element of the Ncl and store it in P. n + 3 Determine the subroutine and the substructure of P and store the substructure in Q + 1. n + 4 Go to the subroutine of P. n + 5 If R - d = 0 go to 7. n + 6d+l=>d and go to n + 2. Some comments: n d is a counter. n + 4 Subroutine P must be such that, when P is executed, one returns to subroutine 02. n + 5 R is the number of subcomponents present in the substructure of Ncl. 7 is the command 7 of the main program. If one finally gets the atomical components, i.e. article, adjective, noun, preposition, etc. ..., then the subroutine of these elements, will lead us to look at Z, if there is an element which modifies N t and which can be encoded as an article, adjective, preposition, etc. (of course the necessary agreement in genus, number and case has to be guaranteed too). This procedure can perhaps indicate how the language can have an influence on the construction of the significatum structure, in other words how the language can influence the cognitive processes. Because, when one is looking whether something can be encoded in a category Xt and one does not find anything, then eventually one can change or extend the significatum Z with the intention and with the consequences that Xt can be used. Subsequently the encoding of the atomical components eventually together with information about the supercomponents they belong to, have to be transferred to the phonological component. These processes are not treated by me. The significata which are encoded have to be stored in Zx, Subroutine 03: (1) Determine the part Yt of the significatum structure which operates on < < . . . » . (2) Determine the encoding of Yt. (3) Determine which complementizer structure has to be chosen, taking into account the data got by (2).

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2. SOME SURFACE STRUCTURES 2.1. Ncl (Noun clause) [PP] Y [ © © Lt U:PB® Ui (Ut R Nt) © PB Ui : (prep. Ncl v Ncl) S: (PB © RP (RP. R. iVj) © Rcl + PB) T: PB © participle construction © PB (more about the participle construction, see later on). Each part between viz. L j and in L t also only the last member, viz. the X^ is not optional. Therefore, if 4 is chosen, this member becomes obligatory. (5) If in part II, (1), (2) and (3) are chosen, then one can get the following sequences, except those ones marked by '*', being ungrammatical in my opinion. (6) De heel grote, op de tafel zittende jongen. ... Der sehr große, auf dem Tisch sitzende Junge. (7) De, dat hij naar huis ging, zeggende jongen. ... Der, daß er nach Hause ging, sagende Junge. *(8) De op het gras te werken zijnde boer. ... Der auf dem Gras zu arbeiten seiende Bauer. *(9) De Piet te zien hopende jongen. ... Der Peter zu sehen hoffende Junge. *(10) De Piet ploegen ziende jongen. ... Der Peter pflügen sehende Junge. *(11) De zeggende dat hij naar huis ging jongen. ... Der sagende daß er nach Hause ging Junge.

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*(12) De hopende Piet te zien jongen ... Der hoffende Peter zu sehen Junge. *(13) De ziende Piet ploegen jongen. ... Der sehende Peter pflügen Jonge. *(14) De dat hij naar huis ging, gezegde jongen. ... Der daß er nach Hause ging gesagte Junge. (15) De het brood opetende jongen. ... Der das Brot aufessende Junge. (16) De (aan tafel) het brood (aan tafel) opetende jongen. 7 Der (am Tisch) das Brot (am Tisch) aufessende Junge. (17) De met de hand het brood opetende jongen. ... Der mit der Hand das Brot aufessende Junge. (18) De (vlug) het brood (vlug) aan tafel (vlug) opetende jongen. ... Der (schnell) das Brot (schnell) am Tisch (schnell) aufessende Junge. *(19) De het brood aan tafel opetende vlug jongen. Der das Brot am Tisch aufessende schnell Junge. (20) De door de politie gedode Vietnamezen. ... Die durch die Polizei getöteten Vietnamesen. (21) De (zachtjes) door de politie (zachtjes) gedode Vietnamezen. ... Die (grausam) durch die Polizei (grausam) getöteten Vietnamesen. *(22) De gedode door de politie Vietnamezen. ... Die getöteten durch die Polizei Vietnamesen. These examples justify the formulations made of 1, 2 and 3. They illustrate that only the 'dat-complementizer' may be used in the surface structure: 'complementizer © OD © Nt\ The place of the brackets in Ncl also guarantees that, it is then also necessary to choose 3, if 2 has been chosen. The reverse is not true. This is needed, because modifiers of Nx can precede or succeed M, as well as both. If there is no M, then 2 is superfluous. It is also very important that Ncl is mentioned in 3. By this we get a possibility of embedding, and one can get the sentences (23), (24), etc. ... (23) De het met de hand gebakken brood opetende jongen. Der das mit der Hand gebackene Brot aufessende Junge. (24) De het in de door olie bevuilde oven gebakken brood opetende jongen. Der das in dem durch ö l verschmutzte Ofen gebackene Brot aufessende Junge. ' The brackets are used for economy's sake. It is a way to take into account more than one sentence. One of the elements between brackets can be chosen. So (16) can be read respectively as (a) and as (b). (a) De aan tafel het brood opetende jongen. Der am Tisch das Brot aufessende Junge. (b) De het brood aan tafel opetende jongen. Der das Brot am Tisch aufessende Junge.

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Also sentences of the type (25) can be got. (25) De brood etende, met de knikkers speiende jongen. Der Brot essende, mit den Schussern spielende Junge. Because '3' in the Ncl can be repeated. This is guaranteed by the specification M = (...)". I want to draw attention to the fact that the PB which ends M, can only be repeated n _ 1 , if M is repeated n times. This is gotten by the specification (... © (PB)""1)".

In case Q will be chosen after M, then by the interpretation of Q, a w-th PB will be introduced. If, however, Q is not chosen, then Nt will be expressed without a PB which occurs between M and Nl. (6)

By choosing 1, 2, 3 and 4 one can get the following sentences. (26) De dikke, opgevulde, donker lederen tas. ... Die dicke, gefüllte, dunkele lederne Tasche. (27) De dikke, met een mes gedode, grote man. Der dicke, mit einem Messer getötete, große Mann, etc. ...

(7) By choosing 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6, 7, 8 we get more complex sentences. I will only give examples of 1 and 4, 6, 7, 8, being conscious that each example of 1 and n (n ^ 4) can be made more complex by adding 2 and 3. This is illustrated by (28) and (29). (28) Het zware beeld dat ik op straat gezien heb, staande in de regen, is gestolen. Das schwere Standbild, das ich in der Straße gesehen habe, im Regen stehend, ist gestolen. (29) Het zware, met de hand gebeeldhouwd, marmeren beeld, dat ik op straat gezien heb, staande in de regen.. ,8 Das schwere, mit der Hand gemeißelte, Marmor Standbild, das ich in der Straße gesehen habe, im Regen stehend... In Ncl, there is an exclusive disjunction between 6 and 7. This is motivated by the ungrammaticalness of (32), if the relative clause is interpreted as modifying 'jongen'. The same is true of (33), if the prepositional clause modifies 'jongen'... (30) De jongen, die ziek was. ... Der Junge, der krank war. (31) Deze jongen met een fiets. ... Dieser Junge mit einem Rad. *(32) Deze jongen, met een verrekijker, die ziek was. ... Dieser Junge, mit einem Fernglas, der krank war. *(33) Deze jongen, die ziek is, met een verrekijker. ... 8

Sentences (28) and (29) are ambiguous, because 'staande' can have 'beeld' as well as 'ik' as subject.

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(34) (35) (36) (37)

*(38) (39)

*(40) *(41) A(42) o(43) (44) (45) A(46) (47)

Dieser Junge, der Krank ist, mit einem Fernglas. Deze jongen, een bakker. ... Dieser Junge, ein Bäcker. ... Deze jongen die ziek was, (brood) etend (brood). Dieser Junge, der krank war (Brot) essend (Brot). Deze jongen die ziek was (door de politie) gedood (door de politie). Dieser Junge der krank war (durch die Polizei) getötet (durch die Polizei). Deze jongen die ziek was, (met een mes) door de politie (met een mes) gedood (met een mes). ... Dieser Junge der krank war, (mit einem Messer) durch die Polizei getötet (mit einem Messer). Deze jongen, door de politie met een mes gedood vlug. Dieser Junge, durch die Polizei mit einem Messer getötet schnell. De jongen (met zijn handen) etend (met zijn handen) vlees (met zijn handen). ... Der Junge (mit seinen Händen) essend (mit seinen Händen) Fleisch (mit seinen Händen). ... De man gedood gruwelijk. ... Der Mann getötet grausam. ... De man gedood gruwelijk door de politie. ... Der Mann getötet grausam durch die Polizei. ... Jan, lezend meestal, zit dikwijls op de trein. 12 Jan, lesend meistens, sitzt häufig im Zug. Jan, lezend meestal een boek, zit dikwijls op de trein. Jan, lesend meistens ein Buch, sitzt häufig im Zug. Jan, meestal lezend een boek, zit dikwijls op de trein. Jan, meistens lesend ein Buch, sitzt häufig im Zug. Jan meestal lezend, zit dikwijls op de trein. Jan meistens lesend, sitzt häufig im Zug. Het kind (brood) etend (brood) vlug. Das Kind (Brot) essend (Brot) schnell. Jan meestal een boek lezend, zit dikwijls op de trein. Jan meistens ein Buch lesend, sitzt häufig im Zug.

The examples (35-47) illustrate that there is almost free permutation of all major categories as far as the present participle construction is concerned, with only the restriction that the adverb cannot follow the participle. When considering the sentences marked by ' o ' or '?' as ungrammatical, one can formulate the participle construction as follows :9 * If one considers the sentences marked with an 'o' and a 'A' as grammatical, then there is free permutation also of the If one considers only the sentences marked with an 'O' as grammatical, then 'P • • VC has to be substituted by 'P • • (V, v Ncl), viz. Yia has to precede either the verb Vh or the Ncl.

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a) \ODVT + < N c l > W l . r i K l + < n „ > ] p - < y - > b) [ < 0 © VDRTFR»>

+

V

'-N1

=

Y3V(

-N, = YM 5

The following conventions are made here: r 4 f l means adverb. Y4B = Prep Ncl + T T = door © Ncl (NT = Y3 V,) L X + Y' indicates the free order between X and Y '^T© T\ X has to precede Y In the structures (a) and (b), it is possible by the distribution of the < . . . ) brackets to choose only OD or respectively VD. 2.2. The simple sentence There are also two basic patterns for the simple sentence. They are exemplified by sentences (1) and (2). (1) Brood at ik vlug. Brot aß ich schnell. (2) Ik at vlug brood. Ich aß schnell Brot. The sentence structure which is exemplified in (1) can be formalized from an encoding point of view, as follows: SI: Ncl ( J V l = o b j K l ) © Fi © N c l ( „ l = s u b j K l ) © « F b e p a » " © « K b e p , » " 1

T

'

V

'

* Y3

'

'

T YAA

'

'

1

y4b

'

Remarks: (1) iV, indicates the central N of the main Ncl, more about this in 2.1. (2) The categories which are put between

are optional.

What is not optional has to be actualized, when the sentence structure I is used. (3) The JYs are modifiers of the verb Y2. They can be 'Prep Ncl' (Y4B) or adverbs (r 4 „). They are ordered relative to each other. This is illustrated by sentence (3) and (4). (3) Brood at ik vlug met mijn handen. Brot aß ich schnell mit meinen Händen. *(4) Brood at ik met mijn handen vlug.

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Brot aß ich mit mein Händen schnell. This makes it clear that Y4a has to precede Y4b. Of course, Y4a can have a complex structure too. For the adverb which modifies the verb Y2 can itself be modified by another adverb, and this one on its turn by another one. As a consequence, one can propose for Y4a the following structure:

X„ is an adverb and Yn is the significatum of Xn. Yn modifies 7„_ t . is the significans of Yn_1. X„_1 dominates X„, etc. Xt is the significans of Y1. V1 is the significans (a verb) of the significatum Q. Y1 modifies Q and Xx is dominated by Vi.10 (4) 7 4 a and Y4b may be repeated several times, as is indicated by sentences (5) and (6), on condition that the several realizations of them are of a different type. 11 In the other cases where Y4a and Y4b occur, I will not repeat this characteristic. (5) Ik eet brood thuis met mijn handen. Ich esse Brot zu Hause mit meinen Händen. (6) Ik eet dikwijls vlug. Ich esse häufig schnell. *(7) Brood eet ik vlug goed. Brot esse ich schnell gut. (8) Brood eet ik op zolder, in een hoek. i I i i Brot esse ich auf dem Speicher, in einem Eck. The abstract sentence structure, which is exemplified in sentence (2) is the following one. SII :

Ncl ( W l = l u b J V l ) © Vi © [ © (JVl i -Li u i i i ._ Y

Y3

\

r2

i

Y

Y,

z

[X Y] indicates that Z may occur before, between or after each element mentioned in the brackets. So ' Z X Y\ T Z Y' and lX YZ\ are alright. (11) Jan eet brood met zijn handen. Jan ißt Brot mit seinen Händen. 10

The agreement operation between the adjective and the verb or adjective which is dominating, is nihil in Dutch. I introduce the domination specification to illustrate the possibility of the approach for languages where there is a factly agreement. So in Latin, the adjective 'bonus' when used as an adverb, is changed into 'bene'. 11 I do not discuss here whether this is (a) a linguistic or (b) a cognitive restriction, that can be accounted for by the opinion of the world of the language user. In the first approach, in the sentence formulai, this specification has to be taken up. This can be done by the convention '(J0 l n l '. This means that the category X may be repeated n-times, on condition that the several realizations of X are of a different type.

A PRODUCTION COMPETENCE SYSTEM

*(12) Jan Jan (13) Jan Jan *(14) Jan Jan *(15) Jan Jan (16) Jan Jan

181

eet brood graag met zijn handen. ißt Brot gerne mit seinen Händen. eet (graag) met zijn handen (graag) brood. ißt (gerne) mit seinen Händen (gerne) Brot. eet brood met zijn handen graag. ißt Brot mit seinen Händen gerne. eet met zijn handen brood graag. ißt mit seinen Händen Brot gerne. eet. ißt.

The motivation of S II is given by the sentences (2) and (11 to 17). Y4b may — as is illustrated in these sentences — occur everywhere in the sentence structures, on condition that it succeeds Y2. Sentence (16) proves that only the semantic subject and the verb are obligatory in such sentence structures. All other parts are optional. All that is taken into account in the formulation S II. 2.3. The complementizer sentence (the active) I will only treat here the 'dat'-, the 'te'- and the 'infinitive'- complementizer. They are respectively indicated by 'CompUdot', 'Compete' and 'Complsinf'. In this section 2.3, I only treat the internal structure of the complementizer sentences. The interrelation with the main sentence can be found in section 2.4.

2.3.1. The 'dat'-complementizer:

Compkiat

Let us first look at the following data. (1) Ik denk dat Jan brood eet. Ich denke daß Jan Brot ißt. (2) Ik denk dat Jan graag brood eet met zijn handen. Ich denke, daß Jan gerne Brot ißt mit seinen Händen. *(3) Ik denk dat Jan brood eet graag. Ich denke daß Jan Brot ißt gerne. *(4) Ik denk dat graag Jan brood eet. Ich denke, das gerne Jan Brot ißt. (5) Ik denk dat Jan (graag) met zijn handen (graag) brood eet. Ich denke, daß Jan (gerne) mit seinen Händen (gerne) Brot ißt. o(6) Ik denk dat Jan brood graag eet. Ich denke daß Jan Brot gerne ißt. A(7) Ik denk dat met zijn handen Jan brood eet.12 Ich denke, daß mit seinen Händen Jan Brot ißt. 12

I mark a sentence in four ways. If an ' o ' precedes a sentence, then there exist some doubts on its grammaticalness. If a 'A' is preceding the sentence, then there is a strong doubt about it. If (*), then the sentence which is marked, is ungrammatical. If nothing is preceding, the sentence seems to me grammatical.

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(8) Ik denk dat Jan eet. Ich denke, daß Jan ißt. On the basis of these data, one sees that the adverb has to succeed the subject 7 3 , but it has also to precede the verb Y2. This, if one accepts (6) to be grammatical. The preposition clause Y4b, which modifies the verb, may precede or succeed each main category. However, if one excludes sentence (7) as ungrammatical, then YAb has to follow y 3 . Hypothesizing (6) and (7) as grammatical, one gets the following structure for the 'Compl s d a t \ ComplSdat:

Y3 © [ < y 1 > ] < r - > © [y 2 ] < r < t >

If one hypothesizes to be ungrammatical the sentences of the structure of (6) and (7), then one gets: Y3 © [ © ©

ly'4*

In case only (6) is considered ungrammatical, then one gets: LY3 © © © Y2-\u" 2.3.2. The 'te'-complementizer:

Complste

(1) Ik hoop John te zien. Ich hoffe John zu sehen. (2) Ik hoop (vlug) John (vlug) te zien. Ich hoffe (schnell) John (schnell) zu sehen. *(3) Ik hoop John te (vlug) zien (vlug). Ich hoffe John zu (schnell) sehen (schnell). (4) Ik hoop John te zien met een verrekijker. 13 Ich hoffe John zu sehen mit einem Fernglas. (5) Ik hoop (met een verrekijker) John (met een verrekijker) te zien. Ich hoffe (mit einem Fernglas) John (mit einem Fernglas) zu sehen. (6) Ik hoop (vlug) met een verrekijker (vlug) John (vlug) te zien. Ich hoffe (schnell) mit einem Fernglas (schnell) John (schnell) zu sehen. *(7) Ik hoop (met een verrekijker) John te zien (met een verrekijker) vlug (met een verrekijker). Ich hoffe (mit einem Fernglas) John zu sehen (mit einem Fernglas) schnell (mit einem Fernglas). 13

Sentence (4) is ambiguous. 'Met een verrekijker' can modify the verb 'zien' as well as the noun 'John'. To guarantee this last possibility, one can permit the Compl ste to add

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A RECOGNITION AND PRODUCTION COMPETENCE SYSTEM

superscripts to Yl in the Comply viz. the [ 7 J 2 , may precede or succeed Ylt However, they may not precede Y3, nor succeed K (viz. te + Y2). This is the normal condition for the position of Z in the comply As there are categories which are put between the Yl and the Y2 of the comply it is clear that the Z can precede or succeed, etc. ... these categories. This is illustrated in the following sentences. A consequence will be that for decoding, there will arise ambiguity and it will sometimes be difficult to determine, if a certain YAa (an analogous problem arises for Y^) modifies the Y2 of the Compl sl , or of the Compls2. (20) Ik hoop John met mijn eigen oren te horen praten door de telefoon. Ich hoffe John mit meinen eigenen Ohren zu hören sprechen durch das Telephon. (21) Ik hoop John door de telefoon met mijn eigen oren te horen praten. Ich hoffe John durch das Telephon mit meinen eigenen Ohren zu hören sprechen. (22) Ik hoop John te horen praten met mijn eigen oren door de telefoon. Ich hoffe John zu hören sprechen mit meinen eigenen Ohren durch das Telephon. (23) Ik hoop (met een netje) John (met een netje) te zien muggen vangen (met een netje). Ich hoffe (mit einem Netz) John (mit einem Netz) zu sehen Mücken fangen (mit einem Netz). The ComplSinf depending on the ComplSdat: (24) Ik zie dat Jan de boer ziet ploegen. Ich sehe daß Jan den Bauern sieht pflügen. (25) Ik zie dat Jan de boer het land ziet ploegen. Ich sehe daß Jan den Bauern den Boden sieht pflügen. o(26) Ik zie dat Jan ziet de boer het land ploegen. Ich sehe daß Jan sieht den Bauern den Boden pflügen. *(27) Ik zie dat Jan ziet de boer ploegen het land. Ich sehe daß Jan sieht den Bauern pflügen den Boden. (28) Ik zie dat Jan de boer (vlug) het land (vlug) ziet ploegen. Ich sehe das Jan den Bauern (schnell) den Boden (schnell) sieht pflügen. *(29) Ik zie dat Jan vlug de boer het land ziet ploegen. Ich sehe daß Jan schnell den Bauern das Land sieht pflügen. (30) Ik zie dat Jan de boer het land ziet vlug ploegen. Ich sehe daß Jan den Bauern den Boden sieht schnell pflügen. *(31) Ik zie dat dan de boer het land ziet ploegen vlug. Ich sehe daß Jan den Bauern den Boden sieht pflügen schnell. (32) Ik zie dat Jan (met een houten ploeg) de boer (met een houten ploeg) het land ziet ploegen (met een houten ploeg).

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189

Ich sehe daß Jan (mit einem hölzernen Pflug) den Bauern (mit einem hölzenen Pflug) den Boden sieht pflügen (mit einem hölzernen Pflug). *(33) Ik zie dat Jan de boer het land ploegen ziet. Ich sehe daß Jan den Bauern den Boden pflügen sieht. These data illustrate that the influence of the ComplSdat on the Compl slnf , depending on the main verb of the ComplSda, is identical with the one of the Compl ste . Here, however, Zhas to be interpreted as the Y2 of the ComplSdat20. Therefore a rule may be formulated:

' • » W W / " ' " ' " Ste

The same ambiguity arises here and for the same reason as was the case with ComplSinf, being dependent on a Complst(,. The following sentences illustrate this. (34) Ik hoop dat ik John met een netje zal zien muggen vangen. Ich hoffe daß ich John mit einem Netz werde sehen Mücken fangen. (35) Ik hoop dat ik John met mijn eigen oren zal hören praten. Ich hoffe daß ich John mit meinen eigenen Ohren werde hören sprechen. 2.3.5. Complste

depending on another

Compl

(1) Ik hoop John (ervan) te overtuigen Piet te doden. Ich hoffe John (davon) zu überzeugen Piet zu töten. (2) Ik hoop John te (kunnen) beloven Piet te (zullen) doden. Ich hoffe John zu (können) versprechen Piet zu (werden) töten. *(3) Ik hoop John Piet te beloven te doden. Ich hoffe John Peter zu versprechen zu töten. *(4) Ik hoop John Piet (ervan) te overtuigen te doden. Ich hoffe John Peter (davon) zu überzeugen zu töten. (5) Ik denk te hopen John te zien. Ich denke zu hoffen John zu sehen. *(6) Ik denk John (te hopen) te zien (te hopen). Ich denke John (zu hoffen) zu sehen (zu hoffen). (7) Ik denk dat ik (kinderen) hoop (kinderen) te zien. Ich denke daß ich (Kinder) hoffe (Kinder) zu sehen. (8) Ik denk Jan per brief te beloven naar huis te komen. Ich denke John per Brief zu versprechen nach Hause zu kommen. *(9) Ik denk Jan te beloven naar huis te komen per brief. Ich denke Jan zu versprechen nach Hause zu kommen per Brief. These data suggest that the rule for the Compl slnf dependent on a Compl sle or a 20

Taking into account the sentences marked with an 'o', what was said in note (19) can be repeated here.

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A RECOGNITION AND PRODUCTION COMPETENCE SYSTEM

Compl Sda „ is valid also for a Compl ste dependent on a Compl Sdat , but not when it is dependent on another Compl ste . In this last case the normal complementizer structure is used and this immediately after the first complementizer structure. 2.3.6. The Complsiat depending on another Compl (1) Ik hoop dat hij door de telefoon zal zeggen dat ik ziek ben. Ich hoffe daß er über das Telephon wird mitteilen das ich krank bin. *(2) Ik hoop dat hij zal zeggen dat ik ziek ben door de telefoon. Ich hoffe daß er wird mitteilen daß ich krank bin über das Telephon. (3) Ik hoop Jan (per brief) (met vele argumenten) te overtuigen dat hij moet naar huis komen. Ich hoffe Jan (per Brief) (mit vielen Argumenten) zu überzeugen daß er muß nach Hause kommen. *(4) Ik hoop Jan te overtuigen dat hij naar huis moet komen (per brief) (met vele argumenten). Ich hoffe Jan zu überzeugen daß er nach Hause muß kommen (per Brief) mit vielen Argumenten. The normal Compl Sdat structure is used for the Compl Sdat , which depends on another complementizer and this immediately after the first complementizer structure. 2.4. The relation between a complementizer sentence and the simple sentence Up to now I have treated the distribution of the categories in the simple sentence, and also in the complementizer sentence. An obvious extension is the treatment of the relation between both. In other words, how can the structure of a complementizer be imbedded into a simple sentence structure? In a first approach, one could propose that in the simple sentence structures S I and SII, the main category Y¡ (which we earlier always interpreted as the Ncl, which is object) can also be interpreted as a complementizer sentence. This enables us to take into account the analogical function of Ncl as object and the complementizer sentence. Which kind of complementizer can substitute for the object, is however dependent on Y2, viz. the verb of the simple sentence.21 By this method one gets the following sentences. (1) Ik denk dat Jan ziek is. Ich denke daß Jan krank ist. (2) Dat Jan ziek is, denk ik. Daß Jan krank ist, denke ich. (3) Ik denk veel te werken. 81

If one considers the sentences (15) and (16) to be ungrammatical, then in the S I structure, the Complsinr cannot substitute the Ylt even if otherwise the Y2 can have a Complsinf.

A PRODUCTION COMPETENCE SYSTEM

(4) (5) (6) (7) (8) *(9) *(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) A(15) A(16)

191

Ich denke viel zu arbeiten. Veel te werken denk ik. Viel zu arbeiten denke ich. Ik denk te werken. Ich denke zu arbeiten. Te werken denk ik. Zu arbeiten denke ich. Kinderen te slaan, denk ik. Kinder zu schlagen, denke ich. Ik hoop dikwijls dat Jan ziek is. Ich hoffe oft daß Jan krank ist. Dikwijls dat Jan ziek is, hoop ik. Oft daß Jan krank ist, hoffe ich. Ik hoop dat Jan ziek is dikwijls. Ich hoffe daß Jan krank ist oft. Ik zie met mijn verrekijker dat Jan op de grond ligt. Ich sehe mit meinem Fernglas daß Jan auf dem Boden liegt. Ik zie dat Jan op de grond ligt met mijn verrekijker. Ich sehe daß Jan auf dem Boden liegt mit meinem Fernglas. Dat Jan ziek is, hoop ik dikwijls. Daß Jan krank ist, hoffe ich oft. Ik zie de boer ploegen. Ich sehe den Bauern pflügen. De boer ploegen, zie ik. Den Bauern pflügen, sehe ich. Kinderen roepen, hoor ik. Kinder rufen, höre ich.

The ungrammaticalness of (9) and (10) is assured by the fact that in the structure SI, y 4 a has to succeed the Yt. This is not the case in (9). In the Structure S II, Y4a has to precede the IV This explains the ungrammaticalness of (10). But what about verbs which have two arguments? (17) Ik vermaan de dokter te komen. Ich ermahne den Arzt zu kommen. (18) Ik beloof John te komen. Ich verspreche John zu kommen. (19) Ik beloof John een tafel. Ich verspreche John einen Tisch. (20) Te komen vermaan ik de dokter. Zu kommen, ermahne ich der Arzt. (21) Te komen, beloof ik John. Zu kommen, verspreche ich John.

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A RECOGNITION AND PRODUCTION COMPETENCE SYSTEM

(22) De dokter vermaan ik te komen. Den Arzt ermahne ich zu kommen. (23) John beloof ik te komen. John verspreche ich zu kommen. (24) John beloof ik een tafel. John verspreche ich einen Tisch. (25) De dokter vermaan ik met een geweer te komen. Den Arzt ermahne ich mit einem Gewehr zu kommen. *(26) Te komen de dokter vermaan ik. Zu kommen den Arzt ermahne ich. *(27) Ik vermaan te komen de dokter. Ich ermahne zu kommen den Arzt. *(28) Ik beloof te komen John. Ich verspreche zu kommen John. (29) lets vermaan ik John. Etwas ermahne ich John. (30) Een tafel beloof ik John. Einen Tisch verspreche ich John. These data prove that — provided Y2 permits it — a Yla (viz. another argument) can succeed the Si-structure as well as the Sil- one. This leads to the sentence (17), (18), (19), (22), (23) and (24).22 This adding operation can be expressed as follows: adding rule I: S • Yla • (SI y

SII)

Whether the first argument (viz. the argument which is most closely related to the significatum of the significatum of the verb Y2) is Ylt or whether it is Yla, depends on Y2. Also the execution of the adding rule I depends on the verb Y2. This was also the case with the substitution rule I. The interpretation plurality of must be expanded so that, in dependence on the Y2, the Yla too can be substituted by a complementizer. 22

With verbs of the kind of 'beloven' (promise), which have two arguments, the encoding of one of these arguments, viz. the argument of which the significatum is the farthest away from the significatum of the verb (I call this argument the second argument, the other one the first argument), can be accompanied by a special preposition. The sentences (a to d) illustrate that this preposition is optional if the encoding of the second argument precedes the encoding of the first. (a) Jan beloof ik een tafel. Jan verspreche ich einen Tisch. (b) Ik beloof Jan een tafel. Ich verspreche Jan einen Tisch. *(c) Ik beloof een tafel Jan. Ich verspreche einen Tisch Jan. (d) Ik beloof een tafel aan Jan. With a verb of the kind of 'overtuigen' (persuade) the adapted preposition of the second argument is always optional. For some verbs the first as well as the second argument can optionally be preceded by a special preposition.

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193

It will also be dependent on the significatum structure and the verb Y2, whether Y1 or Yla (exclusive disjunction) may be substituted by a complementizer. To get the sentences (20, 21, 29 and 30) one needs the following structure: Yla © Y2 © Y3 © Yt *(31) Van te komen overtuigde per brief ik de dokter. Um zu kommen überzeugte per Brief ich den Arzt. (32) Van te komen beloofde ik per brief John. Um zu kommen überzeugte ich per Brief John. (33) Van te komen overtuigde ik per brief de dokter. Um zu kommen überzeugte ich per Brief den Arzt. *(34) Van te komen (vlug/*) overtuigde (vlug/*) ik de dokter per brief (vlug/*). Um zu kommen (schnell) überzeugte (schnell) ich den Arzt per Brief (schnell). (35) Van te komen overtuigde ik (vlug) (per brief) (vlug) de dokter (per brief). Um zu kommen überzeugte ich (schnell) (per brief) (schnell) den Arzt (per brief). (36) Te komen beloofde ik. Zu kommen verspreche ich. Taking into account the sentences (31 to 36), the structure just mentioned, must be completed as follows. 23 yu © r 2 © Y3 © [ © ] • ( w ° r d e n '

I

In the first member of the conjunction, T, Y4a, Y4b and Yla are in an exclusive disjunction relation to each other. The structures GS I and GS II can be gotten respectively from the structures SII and PS II by an operation 0 1 . I 1 01: P-0-(Y4AV Y4bv TV Q v Yla) => Z © Ncl (Ncl Vc) Z is the conjugated verb. In other words, when a sentence begins with an adverb, a prepositional clause, a T, or a complementizer, then the category which dominates the conjugated verb has to succeed immediately the conjugated verb.28 27

See note 24. An analogous approach for Y4

+

2.6.2.2. The passive Compl ste (1) Ik hoop (door Piet) te worden onderzocht (door Piet). Ich hoffe (durch Peter) zu werden untersucht (durch Peter). *(2) Ik hoop te worden door Piet onderzocht. Ich hoffe zu werden durch Peter untersucht. *(3) Ik hoop onderzocht door Piet te worden. Ich hoffe untersucht durch Peter zu werden. (4) Ik hoop vlug te worden onderzocht. 83

The sentences (a to d) suggest that in the ComplS(iat or Complste, depending on the passive Compls, the normal Complsaat or Complste is used and has to follow immediately the passive complementizer structure. This was also the case with the ComplSdat and the Complste which depends on an active Compl s . (a) Ik denk overtuigd te zijn door Piet dat de koning zal komen. Ich denke überzeugt zu sein dürch Peter daß der König wird kommen. *(b) Ik denk overtuigd te zijn dat de koning zal komen door Piet. Ich denke überzeugt zu sein daß der König wird kommen durch Peter, (c) Ik denk overtuigd te zijn door Piet naar huis te gaan. Ich denke überzeugt zu sein durch Peter nach Hause zu gehen. *(d) Ik denk overtuigd te zijn naar huis te gaan door Piet. Ich denke überzeugt zu sein nach Hause zu gehen durch Peter. Etc. ...

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203

Ich hoffe schnell zu werden untersucht. *(5) Ik hoop gezien (vlug/*) te (vlug/*) worden (vlug/*) door Piet (vlug/*). Ich hoffe gesehen (schnell) zu (schnell) werden (schnell) durch Peter (schnell). (6) Ik hoop (vlug) door Piet (vlug) gezien te worden. Ich hoffe (schnell) durch Peter (schnell) gesehen zu werden. (7) Ik hoop (met een verrekijker) gezien te worden (met een verrekijker) door Piet (met een verrekijker). Ich hoffe (mit einem Fernglas) gesehen zu werden (mit einem Fernglas) durch Peter (mit einem Fernglas). *(8) Ik hoop gezien met een verrekijker te worden. Ich hoffe gesehen mit einem Fernglas zu werden. (9) Ik hoop (vlug) (met een verrekijker) (vlug) door Piet (vlug) (met een verrekijker) (vlug) gezien te worden (met een verrekijker). Ich hoffe (schnell) (mit einem Fernglas) (schnell) durch Peter (schnell) (mit einem Fernglas) (schnell) gesehen zu werden (mit einem Fernglas). (10) Ik beloof John gedood te zullen worden. Ich verspreche John getötet zu werden. (11) Ik (vermaan) (overtuig) de dokter onderzocht te worden door mij. Ich (ermahnte) (überzeuge) den Arzt untersucht zu werden durch mich. *(12) Ik hoop door Piet te worden (vlug/*) onderzocht (vlug/*). Ich hoffe durch Peter zu werden (schnell) untersucht (schnell). (13) Ik hoop (met een verrekijker) te worden onderzocht (met een verrekijker) door Piet (met een verrekijker). Ich hoffe (mit einem Fernglas) zu werden untersucht (mit einem Fernglas) durch Peter (mit einem Fernglas). (14) Ik hoop (vlug) (met een verrekijker) (vlug) door Piet (vlug) (met een verrekijker) (vlug) te worden onderzocht (met een verrekijker). Ich hoffe (schnell) (mit einem Fernglas) (schnell) durch Peter (schnell) (mit einem Fernglas) (schnell) zu werden untersucht (mit einem Fernglas). (15) Ik hoop (gezien) te worden (gezien). Ich hoffe (gesehen) zu werden (gesehen). A(16) Ik hoop te worden met een verrekijker onderzocht. Ich hoffe zu werden mit einem Fernglas untersucht. If one does agree with these data,34 then the following structure for the Passive Compl ste can be proposed. + [Z]p-

Of course, it is true for the active Compl ste as well as for the passive Compl sle that the significatum of what dominates the verb — the semantic object in the P Compl ste — has in some cases to be identical with the semantic object or in some cases with the semantic subject of the main verb on which the complementizer depends. For instance: (17) Ik hoop overtuigd te zullen worden door Piet. I I subj. Ich hoffe überzeugt zu werden durch Peter. (18) Ik overtuig Jan gedoopt te worden. I i subj. Ich überzeuge Jan getauft zu werden. As a consequence, it will not be possible to make a passive of all Compl ste . This is for instance the case with the following sentences. (19) Ik hoop te zullen brood eten. Ich hoffe Brot zu essen. (20) Ik hoop Jan te beloven te komen. Ich hoffe Jan zu versprechen zu kommen. 2.6.2.3. The passive ComplSinf (1) Ik zie (door een boer) het land (door een boer) beploegd worden (door een boer). Ich sehe (durch einen Bauern) den Boden (durch einen Bauern) gepflügt werden (durch einen Bauern). *(2) Ik zie het land beploegd door een boer worden. Ich sehe den Boden durchpflügt durch einen Bauern werden. *(3) Ik zie door een boer (worden) beploegd (worden) het land. Ich sehe durch einen Bauern (werden) durchpflügt den Boden. *(4) Ik zie het land worden beploegd. Ich sehe den Boden werden durchpflügt. I consider the sentences (2 to 4) ungrammatical, but on the other hand (1) grammatical. In the hypothesis that this is true, the following structure must be proposed for the P Compl slnf : [F, © Z] T It is important to note that here Z — VD / Y2 © worden.

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205

*(5) Ik zie het land beploegd (vlug) worden (vlug) door een boer (vlug). Ich sehe den Boden durchpflügt (schnell) werden (schnell) durch einen Bauern (schnell). (6) Ik zie (vlug) (door een boer) (vlug) het land (vlug) (door een boer) beploegd worden (door een boer). Ich sehe (schnell) (durch einen Bauern) (schnell) den Boden (schnell) (durch einen Bauern) durchpflügt werden (durch einen Bauern). (7) Ik zie (met een ploeg) het land (met een ploeg) beploegd worden (met een ploeg) door een boer (met een ploeg). Ich sehe (mit einem Pflug) den Boden (mit einem Pflug) durchpflügt werden (mit einem Pflug) durch einen Bauern (mit einem Pflug). *(8) Ik zie het land beploegd met een ploeg worden door een boer. Ich sehe den Boden durchpflügt mit einem Pflug werden durch einen Bauern. a(9) Ik zie geslagen worden. Ich sehe geschlagen werden. (10) Ik zie Piet geslagen worden. Ich sehe Peter geschlagen werden. Taking into account the sentences (5) to (8), one can indicate the possible positions of YAa and Y4b, viz.:

[[yj'4* + z]+ Sentence (10) illustrates that YAa, YAb and Tare certainly optional. So one gets: [[y1]© z]+ © Z]< r >

+

© X]

'

(w

(Y^F'" worden

°rden'

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A RECOGNITION A N D PRODUCTION SYSTEM

In dependency on the kind of the complementizer, Y3 has to disappear, and K will get a special interpretation, and special agreement-rules are valid. 5. The passive complementizer: [[y 1 ] © z ] < r > + Something analogous is true about 5 as happens in 4, viz. in dependency on the kind of the complementizer (a) Y1 has to disappear, (b) Z will get a special interpretation and typical agreement rules will be valid. Now one can ask whether it is possible to generate these five structures from one or more primitive structures by applying a finite set of rules in a finite number of times. First I want to mention that 4 and 5 can be derived from the more general structure Gs i n . © [[y 1 ]