Silk for Silver: Dutch-Vietnamese Relations, Tonkin 1637-1700 9004156011, 9789004156012

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Silk for Silver

TANAP Monographs on the History of Asian-European Interaction Edited by

Leonard Blussé and Cynthia Viallé

VOLUME 5

Silk for Silver Dutch-Vietnamese Relations, 1637-1700

By

Hoang Anh Tuan

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2007

The TANAP programme is funded by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). This book is printed on acid-free paper.

ISSN 1871-6938 ISBN 978 90 04 15601 2 © Copyright 2007 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands

This book is dedicated to my mentors:

Professor Femme Gaastra Professor Leonard Blussé Professor Nguyễn Quang Ngọc

SERIES EDITOR’S FOREWORD Probably nowhere in the world have such profound changes in historiography been occurring as in the nation states of Monsoon Asia that gained independence after the conclusion of the Pacific War in 1945. These traditionally outward-looking countries on the rims of the Indian Ocean and the Eastern Seas have been interacting with each other through maritime transport and trade for more than two millennia, but the exigencies of modern nation-building have tended to produce state-centred historical narratives that emphasize a distinctive heritage and foster cultural pride and identity on the basis of such heroic themes as anti-colonial resistance. No one will deny the need for and utility of such ‘nation-building’ agendas, but an inward-directed national historiography does not necessarily prepare one’s citizens for our present age of regional co-operation and globalization. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the coastal societies of Monsoon Asia witnessed the entry of European traders, the emergence of global maritime trading networks, and the laying of the foundations of colonial empires that reached their apogees in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The difficulties of studying this pre-colonial and early colonial past should not be underestimated. Local sources are often rare because of wars and the frequent changes of both indigenous and colonial regimes. The hot and humid tropical climate is also unkind to the preservation of manuscripts. The mass of western-language data preserved in the archives of the former East India Companies and those of the Spanish and Portuguese empires in Asia often have an undeniably Europe-centred character and bias. Thus we face not only a highly imbalanced supply of source material, but also the very complex problem of how to decode the hidden agendas that often colour these primary materials. Over the past fifty years there has been a pronounced effort in academic circles in North America, Australia and the former European colonial nations to ‘decolonize’ historical writing on Asian-European interaction, albeit for reasons totally different from those in their Asian counterparts. Increasingly doubt has been cast on such longstanding paradigms as the superiority of the dynamic West over static Asian societies. Historians of international trade such as the late Holden

viii

series editor’s foreword

Furber, whose description of this period as ‘The Age of Partnership’ inspired the name of the TANAP programme, have taken an interest in the various ways and means by which Asian-European interaction began in various kinds of competition, collaboration, diplomacy, and military confrontation. This approach has forced historians to return to the archival sources and the places where these events unfolded with the result that new frontiers of research have opened up in which close partnerships between Asian and European historians, with their specific cultural tool kits and linguistic backgrounds, are now starting to bear fruit. In anticipation of the four hundredth anniversary of the establishment of the Dutch East India Company in 1602, members of the History Department of Leiden University proposed the establishment of an international research programme aimed at training a new generation of Asian historians of Asian-European interaction in the early modern period. It was taken for granted that any such drive towards international educational co-operation should be carried out in carefully planned collaboration with the National Archives in The Hague, the Arsip Nasional of the Republic of Indonesia in Jakarta and the archives of Cape Town (South Africa), Colombo (Sri Lanka) and Chennai (India), which together hold several kilometres of archival records from the former Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie. The TANAP—Towards a New Age of Partnership—educational and archival preservation programme was started in 2000 thanks to generous grants from the Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), the Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of Tropical Research (WOTRO), the Netherlands UNESCO Commission, and Leiden University. Twelve universities in Asia sent some thirty young lecturers to Leiden during 2001-2003. Under the auspices of the Research Institute for Asian-African and Amerindian Studies (CNWS), these historians participated in an advanced master’s programme that included intensive courses on historiography, palaeography and the old Dutch written language. With additional funding from several Asian foundations, in 2002 seventeen of the TANAP graduates from Sri Lanka, India, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, China, Taiwan, Japan, South Africa and the Netherlands began working towards a PhD degree at Leiden. Three others went on to pursue their doctorates at universities elsewhere in

series editor’s foreword

ix

the world. The TANAP Monographs on the History of Asian-European Interaction, which includes two studies on early modern South African society, are the offspring of their doctoral theses defended at Leiden. Leonard Blussé Leiden University

CONTENTS Preface and Acknowledgements Abbreviations Explanation for units of measurement Glossary Maps INTRODUCTION The subject Tonkin in the intra-Asian trade of the VOC Source materials and analytical framework

xvii xxi xxiii xxv xxx

1 3 5

PART ONE: THE SETTING Introduction

9

Chapter One: Political background 1. Vietnamese maritime trade prior to 1527 The Hundred Việts and the Vietnamese The Chinese colonization of northern Vietnam, 179 BC–AD 905 Independent Đại Việt and the state monopoly of foreign trade, 1010−1527 2. Incessant conflicts and political schisms, 1527–1672

11 11 11

Chapter Two: Economic background 1. Handicraft industries and export commodities Raw silk and piece-goods Ceramics Other miscellaneous exports 2. New trends in foreign trade A more open trend in foreign trade, the 1500s The birth of the seventeenth-century commercial system Complicated trading conditions 3. Foreign merchants

26 26 27 30 31 33 33

12 16 19

36 39 44

xii

contents The Chinese The Japanese The Portuguese The Dutch The English Other foreign merchants Concluding remarks

44 48 50 52 52 55 57

PART TWO: THE POLITICAL RELATIONS Introduction

59

Chapter Three: Intimate phases 1. The abortive Dutch trade with Quinam, 1601−1638 2. The Dutch arrival in Tonkin, 1637 3. Ideological struggles and belligerent decisions, 1637−1643 Military or peaceful involvement, 1637−1641? Tension escalating in Quinam, 1642 The Dutch military defeats, 1642−1643 4. The Quinam interlude and frigid relations with Tonkin, 1644−1651 The VOC’s unilateral war with Quinam, 1644−1651 The peace agreement with Quinam, 1651 Frigid relations with the Trịnh, 1644−1647 The relationship deteriorated, 1647−1651

61 61 66

Chapter Four: Vicissitudes, decline and the final end 1. Revival of the relationship, 1651–1660 Verstegen’s commission to Tonkin, 1651 A short-lived permanent factory, 1651 The first phase of decline, the 1650s 2. Attempts to expand the Tonkin trade, 1660–1670 The decline in the Tonkin-China border trade and the loss of Formosa The VOC’s ‘Tinnam strategy’, 1661–1664 Tonkin as a permanent factory, 1663 Continued decline, the 1660s 3. Towards the final end, 1670–1700 The eventful 1670s

70 70 74 77 83 83 86 88 91 96 96 96 98 99 103 104 106 110 111 115 115

contents Decline intensified, 1680–1690 The last ship, 1699/1700 Concluding remarks

xiii 118 121 123

PART THREE: THE COMMERCIAL RELATIONS Introduction

125

Chapter Five: The import trade 1. Silver 2. Japanese copper zeni The Vietnamese monetary system prior to the seventeenth century The cash shortage in the 1650s and the VOC’s import of Japanese copper zeni into Tonkin 3. The arms trade and the import of other miscellaneous items

127 127 133

Chapter Six: The export trade (i): Tonkinese silk for Japan 1. The Far Eastern silk trade prior to the early 1630s 2. The period of experiment, 1637−1640 3. The period of high profit, 1641–1654 Silk trade under military alliances, 1641–1643 Decline of Formosa and rise of Tonkin, 1644–1654 4. The period of decline, 1655–1671 5. On the capital and profit

143 143 146 148 149 150 156 160

Chapter Seven: The export trade (ii): Other products 1. Tonkinese products for the Netherlands Silk piece-goods Musk 2. Gold for the Coromandel Coast 3. Tonkinese ceramics for the insular South-East Asian markets Concluding remarks

165 165 165 168 171

133 134 139

176 184

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contents

PART FOUR: DUTCH-VIETNAMESE INTERACTIONS Introduction

187

Chapter Eight: The Dutch East India Company trade and its impact on seventeenth-century Vietnamese society 1. Dutch residents and local society Factories and factors The directorship: the need for ‘Vietnamese learning’ and diplomatic activities Religious practices and anti-Christian sentiments in Tonkin Paid company and sentimental attachment: foreign merchants and Vietnamese women 2. The impact of the VOC trade on Tonkin’s economy The VOC’s import of monetary metals and its impact on the silver/cash ratio Impact on prices Impact on labour The commercial centres and the commercial system Were the first seeds of capitalism sown? 3. The Dutch catalyst in the Tonkin-Quinam conflict 4. Miscellaneous issues Concluding remarks

198 202 204 206 208 210 212 214

CONCLUSION Conflicting interests and the political vicissitudes The intra-Asian trade and varying commercial trends Trade as a bridge for Dutch-Vietnamese interactions

216 218 219

APPENDICES 1. Vua (Emperors) Lê and Chúa (Kings) Trịnh in seventeenth-century Tonkin 2. Governors–General and Chief Factors of the Dutch factory in Tonkin in the seventeenth century 3. Dutch shipping in Tonkin, 1637–1699 4. Foreign shipping in Tonkin, 1637–1699 5. Intended division of the Tonkin cargo for Japan, 1645 6. Tonkinese silk exported to Japan by the VOC, 1635–1697

189 189 189 191 194 196 198

223

224 225 228 230 231

contents 7. Silk prices as recorded by the Deshima factory, 1636–1668 8. Tonkinese ceramics exported to Batavia and other places, 1663–1681 9. Re-shipments of Tonkinese ceramics, 1670–1681 10. Ceramics imported into Tonkin, 1637–1681 11. Porcelain the VOC ordered in Japan for the Trịnh rulers, 1666–1681

xv

233 234 235 236 238

Notes

239

Bibliography

275

Index

287

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 1. Letter of Chúa Trịnh Căn to Governor-General Willem van Outhoorn, 16 Dec. 1699, VOC 1623 xxxiv 2. Tonkinese boats in the Hồng River (Baron, Description of Tonqueen, seventeenth century) 14 3. A Tonkinese warship in the Hồng River (Baron, Description of Tonqueen, seventeenth century) 20 4. Tonkinese elephant troops and infantrymen (Baron, Description of Tonqueen, seventeenth century) 20 5. Tonkinese soldiers practising sword fighting (Baron, Description of Tonqueen, seventeenth century) 22 6. Detailed drawing of a Dutch cannon currently preserved at the ancient capital of Huế (BAVH 1916, 390) 22 7. Vua (Emperor) Lê at his court (Baron, Description of Tonqueen, seventeenth century) 23 8. Chúa (King) Trịnh at his court (Baron, Description of Tonqueen, seventeenth century) 25 9. A part of Thăng Long, the capital of Tonkin, showing the Dutch and English factories (Baron, Description of Tonqueen, seventeenth century) 38 10. The Thái Bình estuary or the main entrance of the ‘River of Tonkin’ (VOC Map, Nationaal Archief, The Hague. Indications highlighted by the author) 40

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contents

11. The Japanese genho tsuho minted for export during the 1659-1685 period (Luc Duc Thuan, ‘Japan Early Trade Coins’)

LIST OF FIGURES 1. The commercial system of seventeenth-century Tonkin 2. The VOC’s import and export trade with Tonkin in the seventeenth century 3. Division of the capital sent to Tonkin for the 1644/5 trading Season 4. Intended division of the Tonkinese silk cargo, 1645 5. Intended division of the Tonkinese goods for Japan, 1645 6. Silk exported to Japan by the VOC, 1637–1697 7. Purchase and sales prices of Tonkinese raw silk, 1636–1668 8. Division of silk imported into Japan by the VOC, 1636–1668 9. Division of profits from silk imported into Japan by the VOC, 1636–1668 10. Division of the Tonkin cargoes, 1645–1695 11. Tonkinese ceramics exported to Batavia, 1663–1681 12. Ceramics exported to the South Seas, 1663–1682 13. Division of ceramics exported to the South Seas, 1663– 1682 14. Ceramics exported by the VOC, 1602–1682 15. The VOC’s import of silver and copper zeni and the fluctuation of the silver/cash ratio in Tonkin, 1637–1697 LIST OF TABLES 1. The VOC’s import of silver into Tonkin, 1637–1668 2. Re-export of Japanese silver from Batavia to Tonkin, 1656–1663 3. The VOC’s import of Japanese copper zeni into Tonkin, 1660–1679 4. Goods ordered by Chúa Trịnh Tạc, 1668 5. Composition of the Tonkinese silk cargo for Japan, 1644 6. The VOC’s export of musk from Tonkin, 1653–1681 7. The prices of several Tonkinese commodities, 1642

137

36 126 128 145 152 156 161 163 163 167 180 180 181 182 200

129 131 136 140 152 170 203

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The writing of this monograph has a rather complicated history and the Sino-Vietnamese term ‘Duyên Phận’ (ᒴٝ—fortune) seems most appropriate to describe my five years of work to accomplish it. When people all over the world were happily welcoming the new millennium, I started my career as a lecturer in Maritime Archaeology at the Faculty of History, Vietnam National University, Hanoi. Just one month after the beginning of my academic life, in the spring of 2000, I was invited by a group of Japanese archaeologists to join in the excavations of the remains of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) factory in Phố Hiến. Many a cold winter night lying in the only guest-house in this historical town and staring at the Dutch compound indicated on a nineteenth-century French map of Phố Hiến, I often dreamt that one sunny, lucky day I would lay my hands on such objects for the daily use of the Dutch factors as tobacco pipes and drinking glasses. Alas, the days passed without bringing any significant results and the excavation ended after just one and a half months. The soil was not willing to tell us the forgotten story of the Dutch merchants in Phố Hiến, a Japanese archaeologist tried to cheer me up at the farewell party, adding that perhaps the VOC archives in The Hague might be more yielding if one would give it a try. How the well-preserved Dutch documents would be induced to speak was nonetheless a big enigma for me at the time. Just half a year after my unsuccessful attempt in Phố Hiến, Dr Hendrik E. Niemeijer visited Hanoi to interview potential Vietnamese students for the TANAP project (Towards A New Age of Partnership: A Dutch-Asian-South African Historical Research Project). Exchanging spade for notebook and instead of digging soil, leafing through huge VOC bundles, I started my VOC study in the framework of the Advanced Master’s Programme (2002) and then of the PhD Programme (2003–2006) at Leiden University, aiming to interrogate the priceless holdings of the VOC archive on Vietnam and making my discoveries known to my readers. ‘Không thày đố mày làm nên’ (Without your teachers, you can achieve nothing) is a saying that we Vietnamese students all learn by heart from an early age. I owe a debt of gratitude to my promotors, Professor Femme Gaastra and Professor Leonard Blussé. Professor

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preface and acknowledgements

Gaastra, despite his tight timetable, unfailingly would spend every Wednesday morning of the working week to help me get through the intricacies of seventeenth-century Dutch and bring to light the vital sources of information on the Tonkin trade which were long buried in the vast VOC records. Professor Blussé took great pains in scrutinizing the various drafts and unceasingly offered valuable comments right up to the last moment before this work was published. Without their guidance and support, this project could not have come to a fruitful end. Special thanks are also due to my supervisor Professor Nguyễn Quang Ngọc, who from the outset has stirred in me a lasting interest in early modern Asian history, and who has given me thoughtful advice and constant support on the ‘home front’ at the National University of Vietnam in Hanoi over the past five years. I would like to express my thanks to other teachers, scholars, and friends, whose assistance and advice were of great importance in many ways at various stages during my research: Arano Yasunori, Felipe Fernández Armesto, P. Borschberg, J. R. Bruijn, Cao Xuân Tứ, A. Farrington, John Guy, A. J. E. Harmsen, Kawakatsu Heita, Els M. Jacobs, J. Kleinen, G. Knaap, J. T. Lap, Adrian Lapian, T. J. Lindblad, Li Tana, Bruce Lockhart, Yoko Nagazumi, Nara Shuichi, Ngô T. T. Lâm, Nguyễn Thừa Hỷ, Nguyễn Hải Kế, Nguyễn Thế Anh, Nguyễn Văn Kim, Phan Huy Lê, Dhiravat na Pombejra, Om Prakash, A. Reid, Shiba Yoshinobu, Hugo s’Jacob, Yumio Sakurai, Oscar Salemink, G. B. Souza, Yolande Spaans, K. W. Taylor, Paul A. Van Dyke, L. Wagenaar, R. Wezel, J. E. Wills Jr., Yao Keisuke, and Zhuang Guotu. My five-year research in the Netherlands and England was financed by the TANAP Research Programme, the Research School of Asian, African, and Amerindian Studies (CNWS), Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), and Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of Tropical Research (WOTRO). I would like to thank Dr Hendrik E. Niemeijer, coordinator of the TANAP programme, Mrs Marijke van Wissen-van Staden, and CNWS office manager Mrs Ilona Beumer, for facilitating the institutional needs in these years. I am grateful to Mrs Rosemary Robson for her whole-hearted assistance in correcting and improving my English, and to Cynthia Viallé for her unreserved help in checking my translations of the seventeenthcentury Dutch quotations and reading the final manuscript. Special thanks also go to my fellow participants in the TANAP Research Programme, the friendly staff of the Nationaal Archief of the Netherlands in The Hague and the British Library in London, the members

preface and acknowledgements

xix

of the Institute for the History of European Expansion and Global Interaction (IGEER) of Leiden University, and to my colleagues at the Faculty of History in Hanoi, who have been taking over my teaching duties the past five years, thus enabling me to concentrate fully on my research in Leiden. I owe a lifelong debt of love and gratitude to my father, who, despite the serious illness he has been suffering over the past ten years, has never failed to encourage his son to pursue his protracted study in Leiden. I thank my wife, Thùy Linh, for shouldering all the laborious work at home and taking care of our little son, Hoàng Lê Phong, when I am away doing research. Their love and yearning have greatly fired me to complete my research on time.

ABBREVIATIONS BAVH BEFEO BL DHQGHN EIC KCH KHKT NA NCLS NFJ OIOC OBP TCKH VHTT VOC XN

Bulletin des Amis de Vieux Hue Bulletin de l’École Française d’Extrême-Orient British Library, London Vietnam National University, Hanoi—Publishing House English East India Company Journal of Archaeology, Hanoi Sciences and Technologies, Hanoi – Publishing House Nationaal Archief (National Archive of the Netherlands in The Hague) Journal of Historical Studies, Hanoi Archief van de Nederlandse Factorij in Japan (Dutch factory in Japan), NA Archive of the English East India Company preserved at the Oriental and Indian Office Collection, BL Overgekomen brieven en papieren: Letters and papers received from Asia, NA Journal of Science, Hanoi Culture and Information, Hanoi – Publishing House (Archive of the) Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, the Dutch East India Company, NA Past and Present Magazine, Hanoi

EXPLANATION FOR UNITS OF MEASUREMENT Currencies 1 tael

1 rixdollar (rijksdaalder) 1 quan (long string) 1 tael

= 10 maas = 100 conderin = 3 guilders 2 stivers (before 1636) = 2 guilders 17 stivers (1636–1666) = 3 guilders 10 stivers (1666–1743) = 48 stivers (up to 1665) = 60 stivers (after 1666) = 10 tiền (short string) = 600 cash (kasjes) = c. 2,000 cash (before the 1650s) = c. 6–700 cash (during the 1650s and 1660s) = c. 2,200 cash (during the 1670–1700 period)

Weights 1 picul

1 catty 1 tael

1 Dutch pound faccaar

= 100 catties = 125 Dutch pounds = c. 60 kg = 16 taels = 600 gr = 37.5 gr = 0.0759 Dutch pound = 0.0827 English pound = 494 gr = 13.17 taels a unit of weight used in the Tonkin silk trade. The calculation was one tael of fine silver for some taels of raw silk. For instance, the silk price of 15 faccaar means one tael of fine silver (c. 2.17 guilders) for 15 taels of raw silk (c. 1.13 Dutch pounds).

GLOSSARY C.: Chinese; D.: Dutch; H.: Hindi; J.: Japanese; M.: Malay; P.: Portuguese; V.: Vietnamese. Bakufu bariga baa(s) bogy burgemeester cabessa calambac

capado chio(s) Chúa calico

catty chious chiourons chop

eiryaku sen

galiot(a) genho tsuho

(J. ኟࢌ) the Shogunate Government. (P.) belly, used to designate second quality goods. See also: cabessa and pee. silk textile from Tonkin. (J.) yellow (raw) silk. (D.) mayor, for instance, of Nagasaki. (P.) head, used to designate the first quality goods, especially silk. See also: bariga and pee. resin from the finest kind of aloeswood, with a strong, pleasant scent, used in medicine and fragrance. Or the dried root of the Chinese rhubarb used as laxative. also capada: eunuch. silk textile from Tonkin. (V.) Lord, but actually King (vương: ‫ )׆‬in the context of seventeenth-century Tonkin. See also: Vua. all-cotton fabric woven in plain or tabby weave and printed with simple designs in one or more colours, originally from Calicut (India). (M. käti) a unit of weight. 100 catties = 1 picul (c. 60 kg). See: Explanation for Units of Measurement. silk textile from Tonkin. also chiouronghs, chouwerons: silk textile from Tonkin. (H. chhäp) an official stamp or permit, by extension any official document bearing a seal-impression or stamp. (J.) coin minted in Nagasaki for the Restored Ming in southern China and the Zheng in Formosa prior to the early 1680s. small ship which could both be sailed and rowed. (J.) coin minted in Nagasaki for export, mainly to Quinam and Tonkin, between 1659 and 1685.

xxvi hockiens

glossary

(V. hoàng quyến?) (also hockingh, hockins) yellow silk textile. (J.) a system in which Chinese silk imported to Japan itowappu was purchased by Japanese merchants at prices fixed by the Japanese authorities, namely the heads of the five shogunal cities (Miyako, Edo, Osaka, Sakai, and Nagasaki) in order to prevent rising prices as a result of competition. This system was first applied to the Portuguese in 1604, to the Chinese in 1633, and then to the Dutch in 1641. It was annulled in 1654 and was re-applied from 1685. (J.) the maritime prohibition policy of the Japanese kaikin Tokugawa. kanme (J.) a monetary unit. One kanme = 100 taels of silver. (D.) coins made of copper, zinc, or spelter with a kasjes hole in the centre. Kasjes circulated in Tonkin in the seventeenth century could either be locally minted or imported from China or Japan. See: Explanation for Units of Measurement. (J.) small gold coin in Japan, weighing 18 gr., valued koban at six rixdollars. See also: oban. kroon (D.) coin used in the Indies, also called leeuwendaalder, valued at 39 stivers (1615) and at 48 stivers (1639). (D.) silver coin minted in Holland, valued at c. 3.60 kruisdaalder guilders. lb Dutch pound (pond), 0.495 kg. leeuwendaalder (D.) see: kroon. lings (V. lĩnh?) (also: linghs, langhs, pelings, pelangs) silk textile from Tonkin. loas (V. lụa?) silk textile from Tonkin. maas (also: mas, maes) a unit of weight. 10 maas = 1 tael. See: Explanation for Units of Measurement. Mexican silver coins. Mexicanen musk a substance with a strong, penetrating odour obtained from a small sac under the skin of the abdomen of the male musk deer, used in perfume and medicinally. nachoda (Persian: na-khuda) (also anachoda, annakhoda) captain of an Asian vessel, especially Chinese junk.

glossary navet oban

Ongia opperhoofd

pagoda pancado pee

pelings perpetuaan picul provintiëndaalder putchuck

quan

radix china

rial of eight

rixdollar

xxvii

(P. naveta) small sea-sailing ship. (J.) gold coin only in use among the daimyo (lords of domains), worth 7 koban and c. 45–50 taels of silver. See also: koban. (V. Ông già?) mister, sir, nobleman. (D.) chief of the Dutch factory in Tonkin (and in other Dutch trading-places in Asia) with the VOC rank of senior merchant (opperkoopman) or merchant (koopman). coin used popularly in Coromandel (worth 120 stivers). (P.) see: itowappu. (P.) foot, term used to designate the lowest quality of goods, especially silk. See also: bariga and cabessa. (also pelangs), see: lings. (also pepertuana) durable woollen fabric from England. (M.) a unit of weight. One picul = c. 60 kg. See: Explanation for Units of Measurement. (D.) silver coin minted in Holland, worth 2 guilders 8 stivers (1606), 2 guilders 10 stivers (after 1606). (H. pachak) dried, fragrant, spicy root of Saussurea costus, a species of thistle, used for burning as incense or in medicine as a stomach tonic, diuretic, and expectorant. (V.) a monetary unit used in Tonkin (and Quinam). One quan (long string) = 10 tiền (short string) = 600 coins (kasjes). See: Explanation for Units of Measurement. (or China root) the dried root of the smilax china, used for medicinal purposes. The root is astringent and slightly tonic; the parched and powdered leaves were used as a dressing on burns and scalds. (D. reaal van achten) Spanish silver coin, minted in Peru, Mexico, and Sevilla, worth 48 stivers (before 1662) and 60 stivers (after 1662). (D. rijksdaalder) silver coin, worth 48 stivers (up to 1665), 60 stivers (after 1666).

xxviii sandalwood

sappanwood

shichusen

shuin-sen schuitzilver sittouw spelter

sumongij Surat rupee tael the thua tiền toraisen

Vua

wako yakan

glossary the fragrant red wood of the Pterocarpus santalina, native to South India, used for carvings, cosmetics, and incense. (D. sappanhout) the red dye-wood of the Caesalpina sappan, found in South-East Asia but mainly exported from Siam, used for medicine and for dying cotton products. (J.) copper coin minted privately in Japan. In the early seventeenth century, in an attempt to standardize the monetary system, the Japanese Government forbade the circulation of these coins in Japan. They were therefore exported to Quinam and Tonkin in a considerable quantity (J. ‫ )ํٱڹ‬Japanese Red Seal ship. (D.) silver ingot cast in the shape of a small boat. silk textile from Tonkin. (D. spiaulter) zinc alloyed with small amounts of copper, lead and a few other metals, usually found in the form of ingots, slabs, or plates. silk textile from Tonkin. (D. Suratse ropia): silver coin, valued 37½ stivers. See: Explanation for Units of Measurement. a monetary unit and a unit of weight. See: Explanation for Units of Measurement. silk textile from Tonkin. see: quan (J.) copper coins imported to Japan from China. In the early seventeenth century, in an attempt to standardize the monetary system, the Japanese Government forbade the circulation of these coins in Japan. They were therefore exported to Quinam and Tonkin in a considerable quantity. (V.) King, but actually Emperor (Hoàng Đế: ႓০) in the context of seventeenth-century Tonkin. See also: Chúa. (J. ଦപ) Japanese pirate. (J.) kettle.

glossary zeni

xxix

(J.) A Japanese term used by the Dutch to indicate coins (kasjes), imported by foreign merchants into Tonkin. See also: kasjes, eiryaku sen, genho tsuho, shichusen, toraisen.

Map 1. Vietnam in seventeenth century South East Asia

Map 2. VOC map of Vietnam (Tonkin and Quinam), late 1650s Source: Nationaal Archief, The Hague.

Map 3. VOC illustration of ‘The River of Tonkin’, seventeenth century Source: Nationaal Archief, The Hague.

Map 4. The ‘River of Tonkin’ as depicted by the English c. 1670s Source: British Library, London. Indications highlighted by the author.

Illustration 1. Letter of Chúa Trịnh Căn to Governor General Willem van Outhoorn, 16 Dec. 1699, VOC 1623.

INTRODUCTION The subject Students of Vietnamese history have long bemoaned the enduring ignorance about the relationship between the Vietnamese Kingdom of Tonkin1 and the Dutch East India Company (the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, hereafter VOC), caused by the fact that the VOC documents relating to Tonkin have remained unexplored. These rich and enticing sources on the political economy of seventeenth-century Tonkin have posed a virtually insurmountable barrier to researchers because they are written in seventeenth-century Dutch.2 There is one exception. W. J. M. Buch, who had on an earlier occasion written about the VOC relations with Quinam, devoted an article to Dutch-Vietnamese relations under the title ‘La Compagnie des Indes Néerlandaises et l’Indochine’, published in Bulletin de l’École Française d’Extrême-Orient (1936-7).3 Although this study provides readers with a chronological history of the VOC in Indo-China, it fails to analyse the political and commercial trends which constituted the eventful history of the VOC-Tonkin relationship in detail. Consequently, it does not provide any analysis of the Dutch impact on the political economy of Tonkin, nor does it present any idea about the position of Tonkin in the intra-Asian trading network of the VOC. Despite the need of, and continuous calls for, a comprehensive study of the VOC-Tonkin relationship, only a few articles have appeared in the second half of the twentieth century in which the operation in Tonkin of the VOC are dealt in the framework of the East Asian trade of the Dutch Company in general. None of these articles has dealt fully with the VOC-Tonkin relationship per se.4 This lack of knowledge about the Tonkin trade of the VOC has occasionally led historians to inappropriate conclusions. In 1961, Thành Thế Vỹ wrote Ngoại thương Việt Nam hồi thế kỷ XVII, XVIII và nửa đầu thế kỷ XIX [The Foreign Trade of Vietnam in the Seventeenth, Eighteenth, and Early Nineteenth Centuries] which remains a standard work in this field up to today.5 In this study, Thành Thế Vỹ used Buch’s article as one of the Western sources available at the time he was writing. Some of his conclusions on the Tonkin trade of the VOC as well as the development of foreign trade in seventeenth-

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century Tonkin are unconvincing, however, largely because of the lack of figures on the VOC’s import and export volumes. Similarly, in the early 1970s, Nguyen Thanh Nha in his Tableau Économique du Vietnam aux XVIIe et XVIIIe Siècles argued that, as the commodity economy and foreign trade of the country developed, the elite of Vietnamese society became a less monolithic group succumbing to the intrusion of an ‘invading power’, that is money. Because of the shortage of concrete figures, it was not clear in his arguments what the seventeenth-century foreign trade of Vietnam looked like or to what extent this development influenced local society. Moreover, some of his claims of fundamental socio-economic changes such as the emergence of the ‘embryonic bourgeoisie’ seem, as A. B. Woodside has pointed out, ‘exaggerated, or at least not thrown into proper relief by comparisons with the greater changes occurring in neighbouring societies at the same time’.6 As a study of the monetary aspect of Vietnamese history, John K. Whitmore’s article, ‘Vietnam and the Monetary Flow of Eastern Asia, Thirteenth to Eighteenth Centuries’, has correctly demonstrated the position of Vietnam in the international monetary system in the medieval and early modern periods. However, the significant turning-point of the seventeenth century and such monetary aspects as the volume of precious metals and coins imported into Tonkin by the Dutch and other foreigners as well as the impact of this trade on the local price level, labour, and handicraft industries are not properly addressed.7 It was not until the early 1990s that the socio-economic history of central and southern Vietnam (Quinam or Cochin China) in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was brought to light by Li Tana’s Nguyễn Cochinchina. After analysing the internal aspects of Quinam, Li analyses the dynamics of the country with respect to overseas trade, placing central Vietnam in the closely knit trading networks of East and South-East Asia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.8 It is no exaggeration to say that Li’s landmark study has offered historians a standard reference on early-modern central and southern Vietnam. Her achievement probably explains the fact that, since the publication of her work, most of the studies on early modern Vietnam have dealt in fact with Quinam and have virtually failed to mention Tonkin. Two such works can serve as an example here. In an attempt to include Vietnam in the world of early modern South-East Asian maritime commerce, in his profound work Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce Anthony Reid has argued that, in

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opposition to the sustained urban growth in the other South-East Asian countries where power shifted from the older capitals to trade-based cities, the trade boom gave Vietnam the impetus to develop a new type of a cosmopolitan, commercial city—the capital Thăng Long. He praises the grandeur of the capital compared to other South-East Asian cities.9 The crucial miss in Reid’s discussion of the commercial development of Thăng Long in the seventeenth century is that he considered this phenomenon in itself, not placing it in the context of the interrelated commercial trading network, first, along the ‘Tonkin River’ and secondly and more importantly, in the East and South-East Asian trading networks which were being run effectively by both Asian merchants and European commercial enterprises. Similarly, in his reflective work Strange Parallels, Victor B. Lieberman, too, has discussed every aspect of seventeenth-century Tonkin except its foreign trade, whereas he did deal properly with the overseas trade of Quinam.10 In short, the clear-cut fact inexorably emerges that, in contrast to the availability of good references relating to Quinam, the protracted ignorance of the foreign trade of Tonkin has continued to challenge historians who have wished to obtain a bird’s-eye view on northern Vietnam in the early modern era. This monograph deals specifically with VOC-Tonkin political and commercial relations between 1637 and 1700. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that, since the VOC was the largest trading partner of Tonkin and its archive is the best documented, a comprehensive study of the Dutch enterprise will not only highlight the VOC-Tonkin relationship per se, it will also help to draw attention to such relevant aspects of seventeenth-century Tonkin as economic development and social transformation. Before introducing the analytical framework of this study, it is of importance to recapitulate one of the most relevant aspects of this monograph: the Tonkin connection in the intra-Asian trade of the VOC during the seventeenth century. Tonkin in the intra-Asian trade of the VOC Recent research on VOC trade has rightly considered its well-devised intra-Asian trade the key factor in the commercial success of the Dutch Company in Asia in the seventeenth century.11 Shortly after their arrival in Asia, Dutch merchants realized the importance of establishing and maintaining a closely knit trading network between various

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trading markets. The prime task of such a network was to supply goods for their homeward-bound ships but it also had a second essential role: to yield profits by redistributing Asian goods to these places. The intra-Asian trade of the VOC was run as follows. Silver was invested in Indian textiles which were indispensable to conducting the pepper and spice trade with the Indonesian Archipelago. While the bulk of the Indonesian spices was shipped to the Netherlands, a large amount of these commodities was also distributed to various Asian trading centres such as India, Persia, Formosa (present-day Taiwan), and Japan. Raw silk and silk piece-goods procured in Bengal, Persia, China, and Tonkin were sent to Japan, where they were exchanged for Japanese silver and, in the later period, copper and gold. The bulk of Japanese silver was sent to various Asian trading-places as investment capital and, to a lesser extent, it was exchanged for Chinese gold in Formosa. This gold, together with that which arrived from the Republic itself was remitted to the Coromandel Coast in order to keep the textile trade running smoothly.12 With the successful re-organization of its East Asian trade during the 1630s, the fan-shape trading network of the VOC, spreading out from its centre in Batavia, enjoyed a period of high profits and great effectiveness. By the middle of the seventeenth century, the intra-Asian trade had become so important to the entire business of the VOC in the East that, writing to their masters in the Netherlands in 1648, the Governor-General and the Council of the Indies in Batavia figuratively referred to it as the ‘soul of the Company which must be looked after carefully because if the soul decays, the entire body would be destroyed’.13 If the intra-Asian trade was the key factor in the success of the VOC business in general, its exclusive trade with Japan, which the Dutch enjoyed from the early 1640s, made a critical contribution to the success of this intra-Asian trade. Insofar as the financial aspect of the Company was concerned, the rapid enlargement of its business in Asia in the early seventeenth century required an annual increase in the amount of its capital mainly in the form of silver bullion and gold. Despite the fact that there were no serious problems regarding the supply of these metals from the Netherlands, there was a limit to the capital that the directors were in a position to send to the East Indies.14 The best solution to this shortage problem was to develop the Japan trade in order to procure silver from this island nation. The annual production of Japanese silver had increased spectacularly throughout

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the latter half of the sixteenth century and peaked during the first three decades of the seventeenth century.15 Yet, in order to obtain Japanese silver, the Dutch needed Chinese silk. Prior to the arrival of the Dutch in the Far East in the early 1600s, what was known as the Chinese-silk-for-Japanese-silver trade had been conducted smoothly by Portuguese, Chinese, and Japanese traders. Having no direct access to mainland China, the VOC was forced to conduct a ‘third-country trade’ in order to purchase Chinese silk at a regional rendezvous. It was this trading strategy which encouraged the Company to make contact with Quinam during the first three decades of the 1600s. Nevertheless, by the middle of the 1630s the outflow of Chinese silk to regional markets gradually dried up as the economy of China was thrown into disarray by internal political chaos. Tonkinese silk presented itself as an ideal alternative to Chinese yarn on the Japanese market from this time until the middle of the 1650s, when Bengali silk began to capture the Japanese market and became profitable. Between 1641 and 1654, the VOC’s Tonkin-Japan trade reached its zenith. It is estimated that during this fourteen-year period, out of the 12.8 million guilders’ worth of commodities which the VOC shipped to Japan, the contribution of Tonkinese raw silk and silk piece-goods was 3.5 million guilders.16 By analysing the VOC’s import and export trade with Tonkin, this monograph demonstrates the critical role of the Tonkin connection, at least in a certain period, in the Far Eastern trade of the VOC in particular and its intra-Asian trade in general. Source materials and analytical framework This monograph analyses the political and commercial relations between the VOC and Tonkin during the period 1637-1700. It will focus on various aspects of the mutual relationship between the two parties, namely: the vicissitudes in political relations and varying trends in the VOC’s import (silver and copper) and export (silk, ceramics, musk, and gold) trade. The research begins with a glimpse into the history of the Vietnamese maritime trade, focusing particularly on the seventeenth-century foreign trade of Tonkin and the arrival of the VOC in Quinam and Tonkin. After having presented a general background to Vietnamese historiography and the Dutch setting, it analyses the VOC-Tonkin political and commercial relations in detail as this is the

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main thesis of this monograph. Finally, it examines Dutch influence on indigenous society and economy. Since this study deals specifically with the VOC-Tonkin relationship, the principal sources are the Dutch records relating to Tonkin preserved at the Nationaal Archief (National Archive) of the Netherlands in The Hague.17 Most of the information and figures used in this study have been extracted from the unpublished collection of Overgekomen Brieven en Papieren which contains most of the records of the VOC’s Tonkin factory between 1637 and 1700. For the years in which the Tonkin factory records have been lost, relevant information about the VOC’s Tonkin trade could be found in the records of the VOC factories in Formosa and Japan. The published VOC sources such as the Generale Missiven and the Batavia Dagh-register also provided helpful information on the VOC-Tonkin political relations. In order to deal effectively with diverse themes in one book, this monograph employs different methodologies. Instead of applying a simple chronological narrative as Buch has done, this study uses the thematic approach in examining the vicissitudes in the political relations. In Part Three, which examines the commercial relations, I investigate the structure of the VOC’s Tonkin trade and its changes over time. I also make use of the quantitative method to demonstrate the trends in the VOC’s import and export trade with Tonkin. When necessary, a comparison between Dutch records and records in other languages such as English and Vietnamese is made. As a background, Part One (Chapters One and Two) provides an overview of Vietnamese historiography. Since there have been different, even contradictory, points of views about the foreign trade of Vietnam, its overseas trade in particular, several sub-chapters are devoted to recapitulating the ideas of several schools.18 It is argued in this section that, although the Vietnamese found themselves in an extremely favourable geographical position lying across the East-West and the North-South maritime routes, they were far from active in participating in maritime activities. It was the civil wars between the Trịnh and their Nguyễn rivals in the early seventeenth century, leading to the political separation of Quinam and Tonkin, which reversed the attitude of both rivals toward foreign trade. In foreign traders both sides found a crucial source of supply of weapons and money to prosecute their rivalry and ambitions for territorial expansion. In Tonkin, the arrival of foreign merchants with large capital sums stimulated the development of its commodity economy, especially the silk and

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ceramic industries. The permanent residence of foreign merchants in the capital laid the foundation for an interrelated commercial system along the ‘Tonkin River’, linking the commercial centre of Thăng Long with the outside world. Part Two (Chapters Three and Four) examines the political history of the VOC-Tonkin relationship in detail. It has already been mentioned that the chief aim of the VOC was to acquire silk which it could trade in Japan, while the Lê/Trịnh rulers expected some more tangible advantages than just commerce from the Dutch Company, namely a military alliance and a regular supply of weapons. Conflicting interests severely challenged the strength of the mutual relationship. After a short period in which an intimate relationship was enjoyed, the VOCTonkin tie deteriorated and ended embarrassingly in 1700. On the basis of major historical events, this part highlights the major phases in the VOC-Tonkin political relationship in the period 1637-1700. Part Three (Chapters Five to Seven) analyses the VOC’s Tonkin trade from its inception in 1637 to its end in 1700. Arriving in Tonkin with the expectation of acquiring Vietnamese silk to export to Japan in exchange for silver, the Dutch Company was indeed able to conduct this trade to its satisfaction until the middle of the 1650s. Then, the demand of Japanese consumers shifted from Vietnamese silk to the Bengali product. Consequently, the Tonkin-Japan silk trade of the VOC, indeed its Tonkin trade in general, began to decline, notwithstanding endless attempts made by the High Government19 to revive the ailing patient during the 1660s. After the ‘silk age’, the Dutch Tonkin factory switched to the export of such products as Vietnamese silk piece-goods and Chinese musk to the Netherlands, Chinese gold to the Coromandel Coast, and Vietnamese ceramics to the insular SouthEast Asian markets. In Part Four (Chapter Eight) an attempt is made to examine the Dutch impact on the indigenous society during the 1637-1700 period. Utilizing information and analyses from the preceding chapters supplemented by contemporary travelogues, this chapter highlights significant transformations in the local politics, society and economy under Dutch influence. While conclusions on the political and economical aspects can be drawn on the basis of concrete figures and information, we can only speculate on the Dutch impact on the cultural and social domains. Incontrovertibly, the VOC’s import of metals for coinage and export of local products from Tonkin stimulated the development of the commodity economy of Tonkin. This is largely believed by Vietnamese

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historians to have contributed remarkably to the emergence of ‘sprouts of capitalism’ in Vietnam. The Dutch participation in several of the military campaigns of Tonkin against Quinam in the 1640s, not to mention their regular supply of weapons and ammunition throughout the seventeenth century, are regarded as an external catalyst in the Tonkin-Quinam wars.

PART ONE: THE SETTING Vietnamese-speakers occupied an extremely narrow coastal strip, wedged between sea and mountains and balanced at either end by an open delta, that of the Red River in the north and of the Mekong in the south. The eight-hundred mile corridor itself was cut up into narrow east-west basins, with no single center of gravity, no interior axis comparable to the Irrawady or Chaophraya.20

Introduction A watery environment and a maritime atmosphere are striking features which impress foreigners once they arrive in Vietnam. Leaning against the western mountain range, the long, extenuated country enjoys three thousand kilometres of Eastern shoreline covering the entire Indo-Chinese coast. This auspicious topography means that most Vietnamese live relatively near to the open sea. Watching ships passing by from a Vietnamese beach, it would be impossible not to think of a glorious history of maritime trade written by local mariners. Such a natural upwelling of feeling had indeed once been shared by the French priest Alexandre de Rhodes who visited Vietnam in the early seventeenth century.21 Despite this maritime environment, Vietnamese maritime history, taken as a whole, was far from significant, especially when the tremendous geographical advantage that the Vietnamese have on their doorstep is considered. The ancient Vietnamese who had originally occupied the mountainous and hilly north-western part of modern northern Vietnam began to exploit the Hồng (Red) River delta as early as the first millennium BC, but they virtually halted their exploration on the coastal plain. The newly arrived Vietnamese contented themselves with cultivating the rather infertile littorals, casting an indifferent eye on all ships passing by and unresponsively turning their backs to all commercial tides which prevailed in the waters adjacent to them in the later periods. This disinterested attitude towards seafaring activities was fostered by the Vietnamese dynasties which ruled the country from the early eleventh century.22 Although the political crises and conflicts they engendered during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries forced Vietnamese rul-

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ers to thaw their frigid attitude towards overseas trade and encouraged them to contact foreign merchants in their quest for military support, this improvement was but transient. As the costly Tonkin-Quinam conflict eventually was terminated in a ceasefire in 1672, the Vietnamese rulers’ concessions to foreign trade decreased. By the early eighteenth century, there were hardly any Western merchants left in northern Vietnam. In the central and southern regions, despite the Nguyễn’s more open and flexible outlook, foreign trade also declined. Notwithstanding the predominant presence and administrative control of the southern Vietnamese in most of the water frontier of the lower Mekong delta from the mid-eighteenth century, their participation in this regional trading hub was marginal.23 Before examining in detail the eventful political and commercial history of seventeenth-century Vietnamese-Dutch relationship in the following chapters, it is important to provide historiographies with a focus on relevant topics. This part therefore briefly introduces the history of Vietnamese maritime trade, the internal political unrest versus economic enlargement from the early sixteenth century and after, the expansion of the country’s foreign trade, and the lively presence of foreign merchants in northern Vietnam in the seventeenth century.

CHAPTER ONE

POLITICAL BACKGROUND 1. Vietnamese maritime trade prior to 1527 Les Tunquinois à peine exercent-ils aucun Traffiq hors du Royaume, pour trois raisons principales. La première, parce qu’ils n’ont pas l’art de la boussole, & du navigage, ne s’éloignans iamais dans la mer de la veuë de leurs costes, ou de leurs montagnes. La seconde, parce que leurs vaisseaux de port ne sont pas à durer aux brisans des vagues, & contre les tempestes qui arrivent ordinairement en un long voyage; les planches, & les pièces de bois n’estant point jointes, & attachées à cloux, ou à chevilles, mais seulement avec certaines ligatures, qu’il faut renouveller tous les ans. Et la troisième est, parce que le Roy ne permet pas qu’ils passent aux autres Royaumes, où le Traffiq obligeroit les Marchands de s’ habituer, ce qui diminueroit le tribut personnel qu’il tire de ses sujets. Alexandre de Rhodes (1651)24

The Hundred Việts and the Vietnamese Prior to the middle of the first millennium BC, the area of what is present-day southern China and northern Vietnam was occupied by a large ‘non-Chinese’ community, the Việt (Yue) people. The Việt community consisted of different groups which were popularly known as Bách Việt (Baiyue or Hundred Việts). When Emperor Qin Shihuang successfully unified China and established the Qin Dynasty in 221 BC, there were still four known Việt kingdoms: Đông Âu (Dongou), Mân Việt (Minyue), Nam Việt (Nanyue), and Lạc Việt (Luoyue). While the first three occupied modern southern China, Lạc Việt was situated in what is today northern Vietnam. Hence, the Việt group which formed the Kingdom of Lạc Việt was one group among what were known as ‘Hundred Việts’ and is widely believed to be the ancestor of the Vietnamese nation today. Thanks to the widespread use of metal tools, this Việt group gradually expanded the territory in which they lived from the mountainous and hilly areas down to the plains in order to exploit the heavier soils in the lower Hồng River delta and the northern coastal plain. Around the beginning of the

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Christian era, the Vietnamese were largely occupying what is present northern Vietnam.25 In 221 BC, the Chinese Qin Empire invaded its southern neighbours and began a long-term process of sinicizing the Việt people. After successfully pacifying the Việt states in 214 BC, the Qin established four commanderies in the newly conquered lands, namely: Mân Chung (Minzhong); Nam Hải (Nanhai); Quế Lâm (Guilin); and Tượng (Xiang). The last commandery included northern Vietnam.26 According to Vietnamese historiography, in order to try to repel the Qin invasion, the people of Lạc Việt allied with the people of Tây Âu (Xiou) to form the Kingdom of Âu Lạc (Ouluo). After 210 BC, when Emperor Qin Shihuang died and other Việt states supplanted the Qin occupation, the Vietnamese Kingdom of Âu Lạc declared its independence in c. 208 BC. However, a bare thirty years later, in 179 BC, Âu Lạc was conquered by Nam Việt (Nanyue), which, in 111 BC, itself succumbed to the Chinese Han Empire. Consequently, Âu Lạc was incorporated into the Han Empire together with Nam Việt and ruled by successive Chinese dynasties until the early tenth century.27 As revealed in the early Chinese sources, the Chinese motive for conquering their southern neighbours was to raid the prosperous Việt states. The Việt kingdoms had long had a reputation among the Chinese as rich lands which produced plenty of valuable goods, especially sub-tropical products such as rhinoceros horns, elephant tusks, kingfisher feathers, and pearls. Indeed, the Việt people not only enjoyed fertile paddy-fields but they were privileged by an advantageous geography which enabled them to communicate and trade with people in the southern territories. It was this coastal trade which enriched the Việt kingdoms. Early Chinese documents praised, among many other Việt places, Phiên Ngu (Panyu, near modern Guangzhou (Canton)), the capital of the Kingdom of Nam Việt, as a collecting-centre for luxury and valuable goods such as rhinoceros horns, elephant tusks, tortoiseshell, pearls, fruit, cloth, silver, and copper. It was said that Chinese merchants trading to this place all grew very wealthy.28 The Chinese colonization of northern Vietnam, 179 BC–AD 905 These Chinese sources recount that at the time of the Chinese colonization, in certain periods northern Vietnam acted as an entrepôt or commercial hub of China’s maritime trade. These valuable documents also provide evidence of a regular trade between modern Guangzhou

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and the ports of the north-western coast of the Gulf of Tonkin which brought the former great wealth. Around the Christian era, the ports of embarkation for the Chinese South Sea trade were Hepu and Xuwen lying on the north-eastern shore of the Gulf of Tonkin, where pearlfishing and a pearl market had been well established. Later, these two ports lost their role and foreign merchants began to visit the adjacent areas of modern Hanoi regularly.29 From the middle of the third century, a protracted revolt broke out in northern Vietnam. Worse still, the covetousness of Chinese governors and prefects there not only hampered the local trade, it was even considered the major cause which led to the Chàm invasion of northern Vietnam in the middle of the fourth century.30 Shortly after the relationship with the Chàm Kingdom was stabilized, a series of Vietnamese revolts against the Chinese colonization broke out. These largely ravaged the local trade and discouraged foreign merchants who now resolved to sail farther north to modern Guangzhou, where trading conditions were relatively peaceful.31 Despite the fact that peace was restored later and foreigners occasionally arrived in northern Vietnam to trade, it seems that the Hồng River delta could never regain its position in the regional maritime trade once it had been lost. Meanwhile, the port of Guangzhou continued to thrive and quickly became China’s maritime gateway to the South Seas. From the Sui Dynasty (589–618), not only did most Chinese junks leave for the South Seas from this port, but foreign vessels trading to China also brought merchants to reside and trade at Guangzhou.32 In contrast to these Chinese sources which generally acknowledge the important position of northern Vietnam in the early periods of China’s maritime trade, the Vietnamese chronicles in the later periods simply considered northern Vietnam during the Chinese millenarian colonization a purely agriculture-based country and the Vietnamese as farmers whose economy was based largely on paddy-fields and domestic handicrafts.33 Taken in conjunction with Vietnamese written documents, recent archaeological studies have also tended to support this largely and conventionally believed viewpoint. Moreover, meticulous analyses of motifs of boats engraved in the early Vietnamese bronze drums (dated around the beginning of the Christian era) have led scholars to draw the conclusion that these engraved motifs reflected ‘freshwater boats’, not ‘marine vessels’ which could sail in the open sea.34

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chapter one

Illustration 2. Tonkinese boats in the Hồng River

Admitting their ancestors’ weakness in seafaring activities, Vietnamese scholars have sought a justification in the putative generosity of Mother Nature. The general ecosystem of the sub-tropical region indubitably gifted the primitive inhabitants with sufficient food, but on the down side it made them less inventive and sapped any ambition for the improvement of technology. From this point of view, the fertility of the Hồng River delta and the propensity of the coastal plains to allow expansion have often been blamed for the inadequacy of the Vietnamese in the regional maritime trade.35 In short, conventional Vietnamese historiographies see northern Vietnam as an agrarian country and the Vietnamese as farmers who contented themselves with cultivating the bare coastal fields while glancing incuriously at all ships sailing past their coast. Was northern Vietnam under the Chinese millenarian colonization, though only in certain periods, an entrepôt in the maritime trade of China as has been vividly depicted in the early Chinese documents? If this were a true picture, what was the role of the Vietnamese in these commercial activities? The following arguments seek to answer these questions as well as to draw some preliminary conclusions on this topic which continues to arouse controversy. In the first place, there are some geographical terms in the early Chinese sources which perhaps need further clarification. Although

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the concept of modern political borders when doing historical research should be erased from the mind, particularly for the complex topic of the Hundred Việt community, it still should not be overlooked that the fact that the ports of Hepu and Xuwen, though located in the northeast of the Gulf of Tonkin, still geographically and historically were in the orbit of present-day Guangdong. By the Christian era, these two places were undoubtedly occupied by the Việt people. However, it is also certain that the Việt people who occupied these ports were not the Vietnamese from present-day Vietnam. Hence, these two ports basically developed without a Vietnamese contribution. The second point which requires comment is that, although early Chinese sources described the Việt people as skilful sailors, they failed to distinguish to which Việt group these seamen belonged. Since the Vietnamese had descended into the coastal areas a relatively short time before, they could hardly have been those who sailed professionally to the southern China ports for commercial purposes. Weighed against this, the ports in modern Guangdong had long been known as places which produced good sailors and the best shipbuilding timber. Consequently, the ‘Yue sailors’ described in the early Chinese records were unlikely to have been the Vietnamese. Even by the time northern Vietnam had become a hub of Chinese maritime trade, it appears that the Vietnamese may not have played an active role in this commercial dynamism either. Instead, Chinese and sinicized Việt merchants were said to be commercially mobile and dynamic in the lands newly conquered by the Chinese.36 Finally, the fact that Vietnamese maritime trade was insignificant during the millennium of Chinese domination does not necessarily gainsay the important position of northern Vietnam in the regional maritime trade. After being pacified and ruled by the Chinese, Jiaozhi (synonymous with northern Vietnam) became the headquarters of the Jiaozhou Prefect which was entrusted by successive Chinese dynasties to act as the commercial hub of China’s maritime trade. One plausible reason for this trust was perhaps that northern Vietnam conveniently was located between China and other southern kingdoms from where such valuable sub-tropical products as calambac, rhinoceros horns, elephant tusks, tortoise-shell, pearls, and the like arrived. This felicitous geographical position for trading with the southern lands continued to play a significant role for Vietnam in the period of independence and this will be analysed below.

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Independent Đại Việt and the state monopoly of foreign trade, 1010−1527 After a series of unsuccessful revolts against Chinese domination in the eighth century, from 905 to 1010, the Vietnamese Khúc, Ngô, Đinh, and Former Lê Dynasties enjoyed more success and steadily supplanted the Chinese administration. They were victorious in repelling several Chinese military interventions. An embryonic independent Vietnamese administration was established and progressively renewed which laid a solid foundation for the development of the Vietnamese Kingdom of Đại Việt (Great Việt) during the Lý (1010−1226), Trần (1226−1400), and the early stage of the Lê (1428−1788) Dynasties. The Đại Việt’s capital was established in Thăng Long, modern Hanoi. During this independent era, except for a brief invasion and occupation by the Ming Empire between 1407 and 1428, Đại Việt was a kingdom which made its mark in the region and thrice defeated the Mongol invaders during the thirteenth century. It crushed the Chinese Ming troops in the early fifteenth century, and gradually suppressed the Chàm Kingdom of Champa in order to extend its southern border in the subsequent centuries.37 The independent Đại Việt Kingdom experienced rapid economic growth, especially in rural agriculture and handicrafts. The Vietnamese textile industry had developed so spectacularly by the early reigns of the Lý Dynasty that, in 1040, King Lý Thái Tông gave his courtiers all the Chinese silks stored in the state depository and decided from then on to use local silk instead of that from China for court dress. The mining industry, especially gold-mines, also began to flourish, which in turn gave the tributary trade with China a boost. Other handicraft industries also progressed rapidly. During the Trần and the early stage of the Lê Dynasties, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, large quantities of Vietnamese blue and white wares were exported to the regional and international markets.38 The economic growth offered a good opportunity for the expansion of Đại Việt’s foreign trade. This economic branch was still restricted as it was monopolized by the dynasties and confined mainly to the tributary trade with China. Indeed, in its early reigns, the Lý Dynasty did seek to stimulate foreign trade when, in 1012, Đại Việt requested the Chinese Song for permission to trade to Yongzhou in modern Guangxi by sea. This petition was rejected; the Song only allowed the Vietnamese the trade to Guangzhou and other border markets which it

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had granted earlier. In 1149, Javanese and Siamese merchants arrived eager to trade with Đại Việt. The Lý Dynasty opened Vân Đồn seaport in the modern north-eastern province of Quảng Ninh for foreign trade. It simultaneously allowed foreign merchants to trade in the Diễn Châu district in the modern province of Nghệ An.39 From the early Trần Dynasty (1226–1400), foreign trade was put under strict control in response to the pressure of the Mongol invasion. In order to prevent infiltration by Chinese spies, Đại Việt forbade foreign merchants to venture to inland markets and restricted their trade to some coastal places appointed for that purpose. This partly explains the famous adage written by a thirteenth-century Chinese traveller who noted that ‘This country [namely Đại Việt] does not trade [with foreigners].’40 The northern seaport of Vân Đồn seemed to decline from the mid-thirteenth century blighted by the Trần’s vigilance in uncovering Chinese spies and consequently the restrictions on the country’s foreign trade. Conversely, the southern commercial centres of Đại Việt in modern Thanh Hoá, Nghệ An, and Hà Tĩnh flourished. There, foreign merchants were not restricted simply to the purchase of Vietnamese merchandise but also could acquire valuable commodities from neighbouring countries such as Champa, Laos, and Cambodia.41 The only contentious issue, if any, concerning the overseas trade of Đại Việt in the independent periods is whether we should consider it a commencement or merely a continuity. Those who have disregarded the role of northern Vietnam in the regional maritime trade before the independent period see now a fresh commencement of the maritime trade of the country thanks largely to the rapid economic growth.42 In contrast to this point of view, others consider the overseas trade of Đại Việt in the independent era simply as a continuity, even a somewhat pale shadow of what it had been. Momoki Shiro, for instance, argues that Đại Việt was no longer a great South China Sea trading centre after the tenth century although its development still depended more on the control of trade networks and export commodities than on peasants and agrarian produces.43 The major cause of the dwindling of the maritime trade of Đại Việt after the tenth century was the fatal shifting of the Chinese maritime trade centre from northern Vietnam to southern China during the Tang Dynasty. Chinese junks trading to the Southern Seas now departed from Guangzhou and Fujian and often sailed past northern Vietnam to call at either the southern Vietnamese seaports of Diễn Châu or the Chàm seaports in modern central Vietnam. These transformations in the regional maritime trade caused the

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southern commercial centres of Đại Việt to flourish more prosperously than the northern seaport of Vân Đồn.44 The heyday of these southern commercial centres was short-lived. The Chàm who then occupied the southern part of central Vietnam increasingly became involved in the South China Sea trade and gradually moved their maritime centres to the southern seaports of Kauthara and Panduranga in modern Phan Rang. These commercial places siphoned off foreign merchants into the Chàm coast. In the meantime, the alteration of several commercial routes affected Đại Việt’s foreign trade significantly. The most significant re-routing was the reversal of Cambodian maritime trade towards the Gulf of Siam. These centrifugal movements derived Đại Việt of its profitable intermediary position between China and other southern kingdoms which it had been enjoying thus far. This explains, at least partly, the fact that during the Trần era (1226–1400), Đại Việt concentrated more on agriculture than on foreign trade. Besides, the Trần’s vigilance prompted by the Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century toughened the strict measures imposed by the court to control foreign trade. These measures were taken in order to prevent Chinese spies from entering the country. Foreign merchants were now forbidden to visit the inland markets and they were strictly confined to the north-eastern seaport of Vân Đồn. These daunting measures contributed to three glorious victories of the Trần against the Yuan-Mongol troops in the second half of the thirteenth century. By the end of the following century, however, the Trần had declined and the dynasty was eventually usurped by Hồ Quý Ly, who founded the Hồ Dynasty in 1400 but failed to preserve independence of the country from Ming invasion and occupation between 1407 and 1428.45 After successfully liberating the country from the Chinese occupation in 1428, Lê Lợi established the Lê Dynasty (1428–1788). The remarkable revival of the country’s agrarian economy throughout the rest of the fifteenth century elevated Đại Việt to an economic and military power in the region. The state vigilance intent on ejecting Chinese spies which had been strictly regulated throughout the Trần Dynasty was eased. Chinese merchants, for example, were reportedly allowed to trade at nine ports and border markets. Despite this lessening of restrictions, foreign trade was still strictly monopolized and largely bridled by the court whose Confucian ideology sought to develop agriculture at the expense of trade. Articles 612–617 of the

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Lê Code, for instance, regulated the heavy fines to be imposed on and severe punishments inflicted on both officials and ordinary people who carried out illegal trade at the Vân Đồn seaport.46 2. Incessant conflicts and political schisms, 1527–1672 Les Portugais qui estoient avec nous, luy firent des presens qui leur semblèrent plus sortables, & plus propres du temps, c’est à sçavoir de belles armes complettes pour couvrir la personne du Roy, s’il vouloit s’en servir à la guerre ... Il n’eut pas alors le loisir de nous entretenir de plus longs discours ayant toutes ses pensées tournées à l’attaque qu’il alloit faire. Alexandre de Rhodes (1651)47

After the Lê Dynasty had slid into a decline in the late fifteenth century, in 1527, Mạc Đăng Dung, a high-ranking courtier, supplanted the crumbling Lê, claimed imperial status, and established the Mạc Dynasty. The Mạc continued to rule the country from the capital Thăng Long, which was now popularly called Đông Kinh (the East Capital, also historically and geographically a designation of the delta of the Hồng River) to distinguish it from the Tây Kinh (the West Capital) in the Thanh-Nghệ region which was under the sway of the restored Lê Dynasty. Shortly after the Mạc usurpation, in 1532, Thanh-Nghệ loyalists began a movement to restore the Lê Dynasty, using Thanh Hoá and Nghệ An Provinces as a base from which to rival the Mạc in Đông Kinh. Among the supporters of the Lê restoration movement was Nguyễn Kim, another high-ranking courtier of the Lê Dynasty. It is important to stress here that, although Emperor Lê Trang Tông was enthroned in 1532, the restoration movement was entirely masterminded by Nguyễn Kim. When this orchestrator was poisoned by a Mạc agent in 1545, Trịnh Kiểm, his son-in-law, succeeded him and continued the fight with the Mạc. In 1592, the restored Lê defeated the Mạc and returned to Đông Kinh. The Mạc fled to the northern province of Cao Bằng and continued to contest the Lê/Trịnh court until the late seventeenth century under the spiritual protection of the Chinese Ming and Qing Dynasties.48 At the time the Lê and the Mạc were fiercely waging war, conflict and confrontation erupted among leaders of the Lê restoration movement which consequently led to another internal conflict in the following century, the Trịnh-Nguyễn wars. After succeeding Nguyễn

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Illustration 3. A Tonkinese warship in the Hồng River

Kim in 1545, Trịnh Kiểm assassinated Nguyễn Uông, Nguyễn Kim’s eldest son, and kept a vigilant eye on Nguyễn Hoàng, the second son of Nguyễn Kim. In this way he consolidated his position and eliminated his potential rivals. Considering his precarious position under Trịnh Kiểm’s suspicion, Nguyễn Hoàng feigned insanity and returned to the countryside. In 1558, Nguyễn Hoàng asked his sister to intercede with Trịnh Kiểm, her husband, to appoint him governor of Thuận Hóa prefecture, consisting of present-day Quảng Bình, Quảng Trị, and Thừa Thiên Huế Provinces. Believing that Nguyễn Hoàng would not be able to survive in such a vulnerable frontier jurisdiction, Trịnh Kiểm approved the request. In the same year, Emperor Lê Anh Tông appointed Nguyễn Hoàng garrison commander of Thuận Hóa prefecture. In 1572, Nguyễn Hoàng was awarded the southerly prefecture of Quảng Nam, which consisted of modern Đà Nẵng, Quảng Nam, and Quảng Ngãi Provinces, for his meritorious services to the country over the past years.49

Illustration 4. Tonkinese elephant troops and infantrymen

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While the Đông Kinh and Thanh-Nghệ regions were badly devastated during the fierce Lê-Mạc wars, the southern prefectures of Thuận Hóa and Quảng Nam enjoyed a fairly peaceful atmosphere thanks to Nguyễn Hoàng’s benign government. Strikingly enough, the people of the infertile Thuận-Quảng regions were capable of supplying provision not only for themselves but also for the Lê/Trịnh troops garrisoning the Thanh-Nghệ Provinces. Besides agriculture, foreign trade also flourished. The northern annals of Đại Việt sử ký toàn thư had to admit the fact that Nguyễn Hoàng ‘ruled with geniality …; seaborne merchants from foreign kingdoms all came to buy and sell, a trading center was established’.50 When the Mạc were finally driven out of Thăng Long in 1592, Nguyễn Hoàng brought his armies back to Đông Kinh to counterattack the Mạc alongside the Lê/Trịnh troops. He cherished the hope of eliminating the Trịnh family in order to unify the country under his sway. In 1599, his hope seemed blighted as Trịnh Tùng, his rival, was promoted from the rank of grand duke to that of king (vương) while Nguyễn Hoàng still remained a grand duke. Having to swallow this setback in the face-to-face competition with Trịnh Tùng at court and, having spent almost ten years in Đông Kinh without achieving his ambitions, Nguyễn Hoàng made a sudden return to his southern base in the same year.51 From that moment on, Nguyễn Hoàng began to plan his new strategy: establishing his own independent kingdom. Under these conditions he expanded foreign trade using it as a crucial means to gain money and, more importantly, modern weapons to arm his troops. Therefore, through foreign merchants trading to Hội An, the Nguyễn rulers imported Western weapons and military technology which contributed decisively to the survival of Nguyễn’s embryonic independence against seven fierce counter-attacks by the Lê/Trịnh armies between 1627 and 1672.52 The sustained consolidation of Thuận-Quảng worried the Lê/Trịnh rulers in Đông Kinh. In 1620, taking the Nguyễn’s tarrying with tax payment as a pretext, Trịnh troops harassed the southern border but were repelled. Considering its well-armed troops after almost three decades of consolidation and painfully aware of the Trịnh’s hostile attitude, the Nguyễn decided to abandon the sending of their tax obligations to Đông Kinh and openly declared their intention to restore the Lê Dynasty. In 1627, the Trịnh raised the banner of ‘supporting the Lê Emperor to suppress the rebellious Nguyễn’ as a rallying call to attack Thuận Hoá, commencing the Trịnh-Nguyễn wars, popularly known in

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Illustration 5. Tonkinese soldiers practising sword fighting

Vietnamese history as the conflict between Đàng Trong (Quinam) and Đàng Ngoài (Tonkin).53 Notwithstanding their numerous armies—as many as 180,000 soldiers were deployed at some times in the conflict—the Trịnh could never get over the Nguyễn defensive walls at Đồng Hới. Seven campaigns launched by Tonkin were all defeated by Quinam. The southern armies also hit back and briefly held some parts of Nghệ An Province between 1655 and 1660.54

Illustration 6. Detailed drawing of a Dutch cannon currently preserved at the ancient capital of Huế. This cannon may have been one of those the Nguyễn confiscated from the Dutch shipwrecks off Quinam’s shore

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After the seventh campaign ended without any breakthrough, the Lê/Trịnh of Tonkin decided to end this protracted and costly conflict, bitterly accepting their failure to suppress the Nguyễn separatists. The Gianh River in modern Đồng Hới, the unconquerable frontier in this conflict, came to serve as the border between the two kingdoms. The 1672 cease-fire offered each side a free hand to focus on their own territorial affairs. Tonkin carried out a series of attacks on the Mạc clan who had been stubbornly contesting the Lê/Trịnh rulers under the spiritual protection of the Ming and later on the Qing Dynasties. In 1677, Cao Bằng was completely pacified; some members of the Mạc clan fled to China but were later on captured and handed over to the Lê/Trịnh rulers by the Chinese authorities in 1683. In the meantime, the Nguyễn also geared up their territorial expansion towards the south. Under increasing pressure from the southern Vietnamese, the Chàm Kingdom had finally vanished by the turn of the eighteenth century. From now on, the southern frontier region was completely open to the Vietnamese-speaking people who gradually made their dominant presence known in present-day Saigon and the surrounding provinces throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.55

Illustration 7. Vua (Emperor) Lê at his court

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On paper, the numerous Trịnh troops could or should have easily defeated the Nguyễn armies, which were much smaller in number. This assumption would have been entirely misplaced. Recent studies have looked for the causes of the Trịnh failures in various aspects of the conflict. It is popularly argued that the distance of the battlefield decisively hindered the Trịnh armies which had to travel hundreds of miles to the southern frontier and required a well-maintained supply of provisions along extenuated routes. In contrast, the Nguyễn soldiers only needed to garrison in their forts to resist the northern invaders. Climate also played a hand; because of the sub-tropical climate of the Thuận Hoá region, the Trịnh armies could only campaign during the spring season when the weather was relatively cool and dry, but had to withdraw before the hot and rainy summer season. Therefore, the southern armies which were garrisoned in well-built forts mounted with superior ordnance simply needed to persist in their defence to see the Trịnh withdrawing their troops before a lack of provisions forced them to and their soldiers succumbed to the intolerable climate.56 Nevertheless, the really crucial factor was the difference in the weaponry employed by each side in the war. While the Nguyễn were in the position to arm their troops with Western-style cannon, ordnance, gunpowder, and other military innovations which were either imported from overseas or manufactured locally by employing knowledge garnered from Western technology, the Trịnh still mainly employed traditional and Chinese-style weapons. Superior weapons offered better results. Hence, the Nguyễn not only successfully resisted the Trịnh attacks at Đồng Hới, they even had the armed capability to destroy Dutch ships in the early 1640s, and to overrun and occupy the southern territory of the Trịnh for several years at the end of the 1650s.57 Why did Nguyễn Quinam have access to Western weapons and modern military technology while Trịnh Tonkin did not? Indubitably, it was the well-organized foreign trade of the Nguyễn which played a key role throughout the seventeenth-century wars. With a clear strategy in his mind after returning from Đông Kinh in 1599, Nguyễn Hoàng and his successors consolidated and facilitated the foreign trade of the country to build relationships with other foreign powers, most notably the Portuguese in Macao and the Japanese Tokugawa. Via these commercial and political links, the Nguyễn could import foreign weapons and modern military technology. This bestowed on the Nguyễn almost three decades in which to prepare for the conflict which broke out in

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Illustration 8. Chúa (King) Trịnh at his court

earnest in 1627. Instead of looking outwards, the Trịnh mired in the ongoing wars with the Mạc. Moreover, it seems that the Trịnh rulers did not really consider employing Western weapons and modern military technology until after their second defeat by the Nguyễn in 1633. By this time, the Trịnh must have been fully aware of the superiority of Western weaponry which the Nguyễn had been employing so efficiently. The Trịnh, therefore, energetically began to seek external military assistance from foreign powers to balance the internal conflict. To lure foreign commercial and military powers to their land, the Trịnh rulers utilized the products of Tonkin’s handicraft industries. The following section discusses this sector of the local economy during the centuries of political unrest.58

CHAPTER TWO

ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 1. Handicraft industries and export commodities Gái thì giữ việc trong nhà Khi vào canh cửi khi ra thêu thùa.59

The sixteenth-century political crisis caused severe devastation of Vietnam’s agriculture and conscriptions required by the incessant military campaigns, compounded by natural disasters, largely contributed to regular crop failures. More critically, large tracts of the state-owned land were gradually privatized by local rulers, diminishing the area of public land, the most crucial means of production on which Vietnamese peasants relied. Consequently, the number of landless farmers grew quickly, causing a disproportionate surplus of unemployed labourers in northern Vietnamese villages.60 In contrast to the overcrowded Hồng River delta of Đông Kinh, Thuận Hoá and Quảng Nam were less densely populated. Here unfailing opportunities were available for northern migrants to acquire and exploit plenty of land once they ventured into these southern prefectures. This was not a new demographical development. Since the late 1400s, the Vietnamese-speaking people had been constantly migrating, either voluntarily or forcibly made to do so, to Thuận Hoá and Quảng Nam. The flow of migrants continued throughout the 1500s in response to the increasing pressure from the population boom and the subsequent land shortage in Đông Kinh. After Nguyễn Hoàng was appointed Governor of Thuận Hóa in 1558, then of Thuận Hoá and Quảng Nam jointly in 1572, the social composition of Vietnamese immigration to the southern regions changed completely, including not only landless farmers and exiles but also wealthy people, the majority of them relatives and dependents of the Nguyễn family. Hence, the population of these southern prefectures artificially peaked in the latter half of the 1500s.61 While a large number of landless peasants resolved to leave their northern hamlets to look for a new life in the southern frontier region, those who remained behind looked for an instant income from tra-

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ditional handicrafts. The excess of labourers fortuitously coincided with the increasing demand for local export handicraft products from the late sixteenth century, fuelled by the regular arrival of foreign merchants in search of such items. These factors stimulated the development of the country handicrafts and temporarily helped solve the problem of an excess workforce.62 Raw silk and piece-goods There is an abundance of silk in Tonkin. The natives, both the rich and the poor, all wear silk. The Dutch trade to every corner where they could yield profit. Every year they ship away a great quantity of Tonkin’s silk. They are the largest exporter of Tonkin’s silk to the Japan market. J. B. Tavernier (1679)63 The chief riches, and indeed the only staple commodity, is silk, raw and wrought: of the raw the Portuguese and Castilians in former days, the Hollanders lately, and at present the Chinese, export good quantity to Japan, etc.: of their wrought silks the English and the Dutch expand the most. Samuel Baron (1685)64

Silk had been woven by the Vietnamese for centuries and some sorts of Vietnamese silk piece-goods had become internationally famous. By the mid-1200s, fully aware of the high quality of Vietnamese silk, King Thái Tông of the Lý Dynasty decided henceforth to dress the court in local silks instead of Chinese products. Although featuring prominently among the tributary items sent to China, Vietnamese silk was also exported to various regional markets on board of foreign ships. In his famous Suma Oriental, the early sixteenth-century Portuguese traveller Tomé Pires noted that the Vietnamese Kingdom of Cochin China (synonymous at the time with Đại Việt) produced, amongst other valuable items, ‘bigger and wider and finer taffeta of all kinds than there is anywhere else here and in our [countries]. They have the best raw silks in colours, which are in great abundance here, and all that they have in this way is fine and perfect, without the falseness that things from other places have.’65 By the early seventeenth century, Vietnamese silk had become so popular on the regional market that the French priest Alexandre de Rhodes, who first arrived in northern Vietnam in 1627, noted that this product, together with aloes wood, was among the most important of the merchandise which lured Chinese and Japanese merchants to trade

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with Tonkin.66 Silk was undoubtedly the key item which encouraged the annual arrival of Japanese and Chinese junks in Tonkin in the first decades of the 1600s. As the Japanese consumers became used to the Vietnamese product, the volume of Vietnamese silk exported to Japan by the Chinese, Japanese, and Portuguese increased from the early 1630s. In 1634, the Dutch factors at Hirado recorded that in this year Chinese junks brought in total 2,500 piculs of both Chinese and Vietnamese silk to Japan.67 The prospect of a profitable silk trade with the Trịnh lands encouraged the VOC to establish political and commercial relations with northern Vietnam. Two years later, the Dutch chief factor in Japan, Nicolaas Couckebacker, compiled a promising report on the current production and trade of Tonkinese silk.68 In the following year, the Dutch made their inaugural voyage to Tonkin and began to export Vietnamese silk, alongside that from China, to Japan. In the second half of the seventeenth century, the Dutch also exported Vietnamese silk to the Netherlands. The English, who began to trade with Tonkin from 1672, also exported Vietnamese silk to London from the late 1670s. Despite an auspicious beginning, the annual quantity of Vietnamese silk exported to Europe by the Dutch and the English was neither regular nor substantial.69 In the early seventeenth century silk was produced in virtually every Tonkinese village. Silk weaving was a traditional household handicraft. There were, however, several manufacturing centres where silk textiles were produced in great quantities. Most of these places were located either within the capital Thăng Long itself or in the surrounding prefectures in the present-day provinces of Hà Tây, Sơn Tây, Bắc Ninh, Hải Dương, and Sơn Nam, where orchards of mulberry trees were watered and fertilized by the Hồng River. Besides the silk textiles made by ordinary people, a considerable quantity of silk was manufactured by state-owned factories, whose products were confined not only to court dresses and the tributary trade but were also delivered to foreign merchants from whom in return the royal families received silver, copper, and curiosities.70 In the actual process of silk production, there were two major crops per year. The ‘summer’ crop harvested between April and May was the largest crop. In the 1630s, the Dutch estimated that the summer crop yielded around 1,500–1,600 piculs of raw silk and roughly 5,000– 6,000 silk piece-goods, whereas, the ‘winter’ crop harvested between October and November provided around half of the amount yielded by the summer harvest. Consequently, foreign merchants involved in the

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Tonkin-Japan silk trade often arrived in Tonkin before the summer to buy silk and departed for Japan before the southern monsoon ended in July or August. Shortly after the summer harvest, a silk auction was organized by the court in the capital Thăng Long. The delivery price varied according to the privileges which foreign merchants enjoyed but was always higher than on the free market. Afterwards local weavers and brokers sold and delivered their products to the foreigners according to what they had purchased. The winter yarn was either kept for Japan-bound shipments in the summer or shipped to Europe. From the second half of the seventeenth century, the Dutch mainly exported Tonkinese winter silks to the Netherlands. These winter cargoes were first shipped to Batavia in the spring and transhipped in vessels leaving for Europe. The English, who failed to re-open their trade with Japan in 1673, also exported Tonkinese silk to London during the last quarter of the seventeenth century.71 Despite the large amounts produced annually, the quality of Tonkinese export silk was generally lower than that of its Chinese and Bengal counterparts, which were also exported regularly to Japan in the seventeenth century. The reason for this lay in the characteristics of the local mulberries, the silkworms, and the tropical climate of Tonkin. Mulberry trees planted in northern Vietnam, according to an eighteenth-century European traveller, were ‘small shrubs, which are every year cut down to the ground in the winter and the plant of which must be renewed from time to time, if they would obtain fine silk, … the old plants, as well as the large trees, give but indifferent silk’.72 The silkworm was another decisive factor. The silkworm bred in Tonkin adapted well to the tropical climate and even spun cocoons during the hot summer, but the bulk of these were yellow, hence, the yarn was yellow (bogy), which was neither esteemed nor marketable on the Japanese market. The Vietnamese therefore tried to import Chinese silkworms which spun white yarn. Unused to the tropical climate, the imported silkworms were only able to spin cocoons in the cool weather of autumn and spring. By this time most of the mulberry trees had been chopped down. The amount of this sort of silk was therefore small, contributing to the fact that the winter silk crop was quantitatively inconsiderable. Despite the small amount of the winter silk, there were often not enough buyers because foreign merchants were well aware of the very fact that the Japanese ‘make a great difference between the new silk and the old’.73 The ‘new silk’ here referred partly to the summer prod-

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uct to distinguish it from the ‘old’ which was harvested during the winter. During the early 1660s, silks were often so abundant in the winter sales that the prices dropped rapidly. A high-ranking local mandarin of Tonkin therefore requested Batavia to send ships to Tonkin during the New Year season to buy all winter silks which were sold at relatively low prices.74 Ceramics They [the Vietnamese] have porcelain and pottery—some of great value—and these go from there to China to be sold. Tomé Pires (1515)75

Pottery was used by the Vietnamese from the Neolithic age, c. 5,000 years before the Christian era. During the Chinese millenarian rule (179 BC–AD 905), Vietnamese pottery techniques, especially those for producing glazed ceramics, steadily advanced under the influence of Chinese ceramic technology. The independent era from the early tenth century then provided good conditions for the development of the Vietnamese ceramic industry. Đại Việt’s Yuan-style brown underglaze wares and the glassy-green celadons of the Trần Dynasty (1226−1400) were not only produced in sufficient quantities for domestic use, they also found good prices on the international market. Siamese and Javanese merchants trading to Đại Việt purchased, among other local merchandise, ceramics and exported them mainly to insular SouthEast Asian markets in modern Indonesia and the Philippines. Although the Vietnamese ceramic industry suffered a slight setback during the brief Ming invasion and occupation (1407−28), the diffusion of advanced Chinese ceramic technology to northern Vietnam during this period helped improve the quality of Vietnamese ceramics, especially the Vietnamese blue and white wares. Hence, various types of ceramics in conjunction with the overglaze-enamelled wares were exported to regional and international markets in the early reigns of the Lê Dynasty (1428−1788), especially when the Ming reinforced its ban on the foreign trade of China. Profiting from this embargo, Vietnamese ceramics were now exported to places as far away as Egypt and Turkey in the west, South-East Asian insular markets in the south, and Japan in the East. After the Ming lifted its ban on foreign trade in 1567, high-quality Chinese porcelain and ceramics again flooded the international market. Consequently, Vietnamese wares had to cede their predominant position but briefly rebounded in the early 1670s,

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when the Chinese Qing Dynasty again curbed its foreign trade in a concerted effort to eliminate the Zheng clan in Formosa.76 Prior to the sixteenth century, most of the Vietnamese ceramics exported to the international market were manufactured at the Chu Đậu kilns in modern Hải Dương Province. This production centre, however, declined rapidly throughout the sixteenth century, falling victim to the vast devastation caused by the Lê-Mạc wars. By the early seventeenth century, Bát Tràng ceramic village, which was located relatively close to Thăng Long, emerged as the major ceramic centre in Đại Việt. Consequently, most of the ceramics which the Chinese, Dutch, and the English exported to the South-East Asian market in the late seventeenth century were manufactured there.77 The quality of Vietnamese export ceramics varied according to the demand on different markets. The fifteenth- and sixteenth-century export ceramics were mainly fine wares, probably because the international demand for such high-quality products was facing a severe shortage of fine Chinese porcelain. Such Vietnamese ceramics exported to Western Asia as the octagonal bottles with underglaze-cobalt decoration or the dishes with peony sprays painted in underglaze-cobalt were as fine as Chinese products. By contrast, the quality of the late seventeenth-century Vietnamese wares exported to the insular South-East Asian countries was much lower. The Dutch and Chinese shipments of Vietnamese wares consisted mainly of coarse wares for daily use such as plates, cups, and rice bowls. The demand for this sort of ware was also largely attributable to the current shortage of Chinese coarse wares in the regional markets after the Qing banned its people from sailing abroad in order to isolate and suppress its Zheng rivals in Formosa. If fine Chinese porcelain could be substituted by Japanese high-quality Hizen porcelain, the Chinese coarse wares were then supplemented by Vietnamese coarse ceramics.78 After successfully pacifying Formosa in 1683, the Qing lifted its ban on foreign trade. Chinese porcelain of all qualities again flooded the international market. Vietnamese ceramics, repeating the sixteenth-century story, again failed to compete with coarse Chinese porcelain in the regional markets.79 Other miscellaneous exports The lacquerware made in Tonkin was, according to a seventeenthcentury European traveller, ‘not inferior to any but that of Japan only, which is esteemed the best in the world; probably because the

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Japan wood is much better than this at Tonquin, for there seems not any considerable difference in the paint or varnish’.80 The most popular objects of Tonkinese lacquerware were drawers, cabinets, desks, frames, and trays. These were chiefly made of ‘fir’ and lacquered white. One seemingly insurmountable problem was that local joiners were reportedly so careless that they often damaged objects. Besides, Vietnamese lacquerers were generally not innovative or inventive in their craft. They failed to produce new objects and fashion decorative motifs to meet the discerning demand of the international market. As a consequence in an effort to improve Tonkinese lacquerware contracted for London, during the 1680s the English East India Company planned to send one English carpenter to Tonkin to instruct local lacquerers in preparing objects. Occasionally, the English Company also sent undecorated objects from London to Tonkin to be lacquered there.81 The English trade in Tonkinese lacquerware was rather short-lived. From the late 1680s, the English directors in London frequently complained about the low-quality lacquerwares which the English factory in Thăng Long had sent home. Disgruntled they ordered that only fine objects should be purchased for London from then on.82 The Dutch, on the other hand, were not interested in trading in Tonkinese lacquerware as they could always obtain Japanese products. Tonkinese copperware was occasionally exported by foreign merchants. In 1688, for instance, in Thăng Long the English bought two great bronze bells for Constantine Phaulkon, a Greek adventurer who rose to power at the Siamese court of King Narai, in Siam. These bells were confiscated by the local mandarins when the English were retreating via the Hồng River to their ship at Doméa.83 The refining of silver was another important craft. It was generally more profitable for foreign merchants to have their silver refined before putting it into circulation.84 Cinnamon was another highly sought-after item. However, the court strictly monopolized the production of and trade in this product and severely punished the smuggling of cinnamon. This monopoly was reinforced until the early eighteenth century, when the local people were finally allowed to peel and trade cinnamon provided that they paid tax to the Government.85 Despite the strict court monopoly during the seventeenth century, the contraband trade in cinnamon continued. Nevertheless, the annual quantity of cinnamon was far from substantial. In 1643, for instance, acting on Batavia’s demand for cinnamon for the Netherlands, the Dutch factors in Thăng Long purchased 635

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catties at the general price of 5 taels per picul. Considering the poor quality of that year’s cinnamon which may not have fetched good prices on the home market, the Dutch chief resolved to send this portion of cinnamon to Japan, where it yielded 17 taels per picul on average.86 Musk and gold were also desirable items which foreign merchants, the Dutch in particular, exerted themselves to procure in Tonkin. While gold was important to the Dutch Coromandel trade, musk was in great demand in the Netherlands. The bulk of these two products was not actually produced locally but came from the Chinese provinces of Yunnan and Guangxi and, to a lesser extent, the Kingdom of Laos.87 The Dutch demand for these products increased in the 1650s as Zeelandia Castle (Formosa) failed to purchase enough Chinese gold to meet requirements on the Coromandel Coast. Batavia therefore urged its factors in Tonkin to import both Chinese and Vietnamese gold for the Coast factories. Unfortunately, political chaos in southern China not only disrupted the flow of Chinese goods to Formosa, it also impeded the export of Chinese gold and musk to northern Vietnam, preventing the Dutch factory in Thăng Long from fulfilling Batavia’s demand. The depression in the VOC’s Tonkin gold and musk trade did not come to an end until the early 1670s when the Tonkin-China border trade was revived. By this time the Dutch Company was no longer keen on pursuing Chinese gold in Tonkin as from the mid-1660s the Japanese Government had granted the Dutch permission to export Japanese gold. The Dutch factory in Thăng Long therefore mainly bought up musk for the Netherlands.88 2. New trends in foreign trade And though the Chova [Chúa] values foreign trade so little, yet he receives from it, embarrassed as it is, considerable annual incomes into his coffers, as tax, head-money, impositions, customs, &c. But though these amount to vast sums, yet very little remains in the treasury, by reason of the great army he maintains, together with other unnecessary expenses. Samuel Baron (1685)89

A more open trend in foreign trade, the 1500s The Vietnamese rulers never sought to encourage trade, especially overseas trade. While domestic trade was limited to the most basic

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level at which ordinary people could exchange their surplus goods for other daily necessities, foreign trade was strictly monopolized by the court and mainly confined to the tributary trade with China and, to a much lesser extent, with southern vassals such as Laos and Champa. The rulers neither dispatched ships to other countries for commercial purposes nor did they encourage ordinary people to do so.90 Foreign merchants arriving in Đại Việt were also restricted to living and trading in some coastal market-places only. This certainly contributed to making the Vietnamese, as Tomé Pires accurately portrayed them in the early sixteenth century, ‘a very weak people on the sea’.91 Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century political unrest transformed Đại Việt’s foreign trade. After supplanting the decaying Lê in 1527, the Mạc Dynasty sought to reform the country’s economy which had been plunged into a rapid decline. Not only were rural agriculture and handicrafts revived, foreign trade was also stimulated in response to the Mạc’s flexible, more liberal outlook on this economic branch. The Đại Việt’s internal economic revival in the early years of the Mạc Dynasty fortuitously paralleled the expansion of the South China Sea trade networks throughout the sixteenth century which, in turn, considerably stimulated the country’s foreign trade. Huge quantities of Vietnamese handicraft products such as silks and ceramics were exported to the international market throughout this century.92 The Mạc’s open-minded policy towards foreign trade was scrupulously maintained even after they had been driven out of Thăng Long in 1592 by the Lê/Trịnh, who undoubtedly realized the tremendous advantage of having foreign merchants in their land for at least two reasons. First and foremost, since handicrafts were following a steady upwards trend in production and offered a substantial quantity of goods for export, the presence of foreign merchants to export these surplus products was extremely important. Therefore, the regular arrival of the Japanese shuin-sen between 1604 and 1635 was crucial to the steady development of Tonkinese handicrafts and foreign trade. Hence, what has become known as the Tonkinese silk for Japanese silver trade was embryonically shaped during the early decades of the 1600s. The Tonkin-Japan trading link was fuelled by the Portuguese participation from 1626. In order to cut the heavy losses caused by the itowappu (the yarn allotment) on the exportation of Chinese raw silk to Nagasaki, the Portuguese resolved instead to export Tonkinese raw silk.93 This explains the large amount of 965 piculs of Tonkinese yarn the Portuguese procured for their Japan trade in 1636.94 This coincided with the

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promulgation of the Japanese maritime prohibition (kaikin), which not only encouraged the Portuguese but also prompted the Dutch to replace the Japanese at several trading-places in South-East Asia, including northern Vietnam. With active Dutch participation from the late 1630s, the Tonkin-Japan trading orbit continued to grow and this period of florescence lasted until the middle of the 1650s. It was this lucrative trade which lured the English back to the East Asian markets in the early 1670s.95 The second reason for the welcome afforded foreign traders by the Vietnamese rulers, especially the Lê/Trịnh authorities from the early 1600s, was that they were aware of the dual contribution of foreign trade. Besides money in the form of precious metals, the Lê/Trịnh rulers also hoped to procure modern weapons from foreign merchants in order to balance the disparity in armament in their rivalry with the Nguyễn. Prior to the outbreak of the Trịnh-Nguyễn wars in 1627, the Trịnh troops had mainly been armed with China-derived firearms which were evidently far inferior to the modern Western-style weapons employed by the Nguyễn.96 The superiority of the Nguyễn’s Western-style weapons offered their troops an advantage over the Trịnh armies. By their second consecutive defeat in 1633, the Trịnh must have realized the superiority of the Nguyễn defensive walls which were defended by Western-style ordnance and piled with high-quality ammunition. The pre-eminence of the Western cannon and pistols the Portuguese presented the Trịnh rulers on their arrival in the late 1620s prompted the latter to seek out an alliance with a European power for the purpose of obtaining Western-style weapons. This explains why Portuguese merchants were warmly welcomed and Portuguese priests were allowed to preach with considerable freedom in northern Vietnam during the first few years after their first arrival in 1626.97 But after they found out about the continuing Portuguese intimacy with their Nguyễn rivals, the Trịnh began to lure the Dutch into an alliance with them by offering the Dutch Company many attractive trading privileges. At this point it must be said that before making any alliance with European powers, the Trịnh had endeavoured to buy foreign weapons from Asian merchants trading to their land.98 In short, the Mạc’s policies of opening up foreign trade was assiduously cultivated and slightly modified in the early reigns of the Lê/Trịnh Government to tie in with their weapon-seeking strategy. This was the key factor which transformed the seventeenth-century foreign trade of Tonkin into a ‘golden era’ and, more significantly,

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gave birth to an unprecedented commercial system which is briefly discussed in the following section. The birth of the seventeenth-century commercial system As far as the transformation of Đại Việt’s foreign trade is concerned, the Mạc’s more open outlook on foreign trade and the Lê/Trịnh’s continuation and modification of these flexible policies gave birth to an inter-related commercial system which prevailed in the foreign trade of Tonkin throughout the seventeenth century. This was stimulated by a new element: the presence of foreign merchants in the capital Thăng Long and other inland commercial centres. It seemed that by the dawn of the 1600s, foreign merchants were allowed to reside and trade in Thăng Long and Phố Hiến. The presence of foreigners in various inland cities was the key factor in the emergence of an unprecedented commercial system which consisted of three places located along the ‘River of Tonkin’: Doméa, Phố Hiến, and Thăng Long.99 These three places were functionally different to but organically interrelated with each other. Doméa (today Tiên Lãng District of Hải Phòng City) was no more than an anchorage and temporary residence for foreign sailors according to the Dutch and English documents. After having navigated safely through the channel of the sandbar, foreign ships sailed up to Doméa, a riverine village which in those days was located five or six leagues from the sea. Here, cargoes were unloaded and conveyed to Phố Hiến and Thăng Long on river barges. When the trading season ended and export cargoes were ready, local boats again shipped these cargoes down to Doméa to be loaded on board ships. During the trading sea-

Hồng River…

THĂNG LONG Commercial centre; Permanent factories

…local boats…

…Thái Bình River…

DOMÉA Anchoring place; sailors’ residence

Figure 1. The commercial system of seventeenth century Tonkin

Gulf of Tonkin

PHỐ HIẾN Customs office; Temporary factories

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son, crews rested at Doméa for about two months to repair their ships and prepare provisions for their departures. Should one ship have to wait for a longer time, the crew could reside in riverside houses which were erected specifically for foreign sailors. There were no large-scale business transactions at Doméa, beyond daily services and the supply of provisions.100 Phố Hiến was a customs town lying between the anchorage Doméa and the political and commercial centre Thăng Long. Phố Hiến, with the seat of the governor, controlled all river traffic passing the town. In certain periods, foreign merchants had to establish their temporary factories and residence here. The Dutch had a short residence at Phố Hiến between 1637 and 1640, as did the English during the 1672−83 period.101 The development of Phố Hiến must have been stimulated by the presence of foreign merchants, though often only for short times. As soon as these foreigners moved up to Thăng Long, the commercial life of Phố Hiến declined.102 On their arrival in the summer of 1672, the English disappointedly depicted Phố Hiến in the following way: ‘it is so farr from all commerce, we can doe noething, noe merchants come to us’. Therefore, the English thought of ways to escape Phố Hiến for Thăng Long, but they did not get permission to reside and trade in the capital by the court until 1683. The English always visited Thăng Long, where they rented houses for several months while they carried out their business and they returned to their factory at Phố Hiến when the trading season had ended. By the late 1680s, Phố Hiến had grown so commercially desolate that, although it was still a sizeable town with around 2,000 houses, ‘the Inhabitants are most poor people and soldiers’.103 After a brief period of commercial successes, from the middle of the seventeenth century, Phố Hiến mainly functioned as a customs town. Foreign merchants sailing between Doméa and Thăng Long often called here to report their passage and offer presents to the Governor.104 Thăng Long, the forerunner of modern Hanoi, was not only the political headquarters but also the biggest commercial centre of Đại Việt and Tonkin until the late eighteenth century. The prosperity of Thăng Long probably reached its peak during the seventeenth century thanks to the planned development of handicraft industries, the expansion of the foreign trade, and, remarkably, the presence of foreign merchants in the city. During the seventeenth century, most of the export products of Tonkin were manufactured either within or in the vicinity of Thăng Long, which ensured that the capital was an important economic centre.105 Foreign products were sold there and

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Illustration 9. A part of Thăng Long, the capital of Tonkin, showing the Dutch and English factories. The Dutch held a factory throughout the 1640 1700 period, while the English had a brief residence here between 1683 and 1697

local export merchandise gathered in Thăng Long was then shipped down to Doméa to be loaded on board foreign ships. Because Thăng Long was the biggest rendezvous in Tonkin, foreign merchants preferred to settle there to other places. Consequently, the number of foreigners residing in the capital grew steadily and this growth was of great concern to the Lê/Trịnh rulers who, from the middle of the century, issued a series of decrees to restrict and gradually reduce the number of foreigners dwelling in the capital to transact their business. After the half-hearted court policies in the 1650s and 1660s, the Chinese were finally forced to leave the capital for other places in the 1680s. Despite their eviction, they still tried in one way or the other to visit Thăng Long during the trading season. After that, the Dutch (and the English from 1683 onwards) were the only foreigners who were allowed to dwell and conduct business in Thăng Long. From this time, however, commercial activities in Thăng Long fell into a rapid decline. Shortly after the court had banished the Chinese, one after another European merchant abandoned the trade with Tonkin, mainly because it had become unprofitable, although the draconian measures of the court against foreign merchants may have played a role as well. As a result, the commercial function of Thăng Long was considerably reduced.

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In short, the seventeenth-century commercial system of Tonkin burgeoned from the constant enlargement of its foreign trade. In turn, this commercial system facilitated the development of the overseas trade of the country. As court policies on foreign merchants were tightened and their trade with Tonkin simultaneously became less profitable, foreign merchants gradually left northern Vietnam. The commercial system lying along the ‘Tonkin River’ consequently faded. In addition to the draconian measures of the court hampering foreign merchants, deteriorating trading conditions also discouraged them as their trade with this country was less lucrative. The following part discusses the major hindrances which obstructed foreign merchants once they arrived in Tonkin to trade. Complicated trading conditions As for foreign traders, a new comer suffers, besides hard usage in his buying and selling, a thousand inconveniences, and no certain rates on merchandizes imported or exported being imposed, the insatiable mandareens caused the ships to be rummaged, and take what commodities may likely yield a price at their own rates, using the King’s name to cloak their griping and villainous extortions, and for all this there is no remedy but patience. Samuel Baron (1685)106

The complication of the transportation system was the first challenge which faced foreign merchants trading with Tonkin. The main estuary of the ‘River of Tonkin’, that is the modern Thái Bình estuary, was naturally barricaded by a long, large sandbar which offered a relatively large but shallow channel for ships to sail through. In order to navigate this channel safely, ships needed a combination of favourable wind, high tide, and, more crucially, the skilled assistance of local pilots who were mainly fishermen living in a coastal village called Batsha, probably present-day Phương Đôi village of Tiên Lãng district, Hải Phòng city. In the early 1630s, the Dutch described the channel through the sandbar as ‘very dangerous …, a Japanese junk had been shipwrecked a few years earlier after having touched the hard-sand seabed’.107 The channel silted up year by year because of the annual alluvium deposited in it. By 1648, only a decade after their first arrival, the Dutch factors in Tonkin became so anxious about the rapid silting up of the Thái Bình estuary that they appealed to the High Government from then on to send only shallow-draught flute ships which could carry relatively large cargoes to Tonkin and

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Formosa. They should not draw more than twelve feet of water.108 In the same year, Philip Schillemans, the Dutch chief in Thăng Long, applied to the Lê/Trịnh court for permission to enter Doméa through the Văn Úc estuary, which was located farther north of the mouth of the Thái Bình River. This petition was granted. Any sense of relief was short-lived as the Dutch soon realized that the Văn Úc River was neither deeper nor safer than the Thái Bình estuary. The request for shallow-draught flute ships was again sent to Batavia.109 By the time the English arrived in Tonkin in 1672, the hazard presented when sailing through the channel had become a great challenge for foreign ships, especially Western vessels. The English crossed over ‘the barr with much hazard and danger but (blessed be God) in safety, onely lost a boate and an anchor’.110 Sixteen years later, an Englishman accounted this hazardous entrance in the following words: ‘the channel of the bar is hard sand, which makes it the more dangerous; and the tides whirling among the sands, set divers ways in a tides time; which makes it the more dangerous still’.111 The depth of the channel varied from season to season. When the northerly monsoons blew (November−January) the water was as high as 26 or 27 feet at spring tide; when the southerly monsoons blew (May−July) the water was not above 15 or 16 feet at spring tide. Because most European ships, with the exception of some Dutch and Chinese vessels from

Illustration 10. The Thái Bình estuary or the main entrance of the ‘River of Tonkin’

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Japan making port there in the winter time, arrived in Tonkin from southern quarters around the summer, the ebb-tide season, they needed assistance from local pilots.112 Having safely crossed the sandbar, ships entered the Thái Bình River and sailed about six leagues up to their anchorage at Doméa. Shortly after ships had anchored at Doméa, capados (local mandarins, often eunuchs, representing the Chúa and the Crown Prince in dealing with foreign merchants) went down to Doméa to register the people on board, list merchandise and money, receive presents, and purchase desirable merchandise for the royal families. Only after the mandarins had visited and inspected the ships, could the cargoes be discharged and the ships repaired and provisioned for their departure. Unloaded cargoes would be conveyed to Thăng Long or/and Phố Hiến on board local boats which were chartered at reasonable prices. Local rowing boats were the major vehicles to ferry merchants and merchandise between Doméa and Phố Hiến/Thăng Long. Besides presents and goods for the Chúa, princes, and high-ranking mandarins, foreign merchants were obliged to deliver a certain amount of their money, mainly silver and copper, to these noblemen in exchange for raw silk and piece-goods. The amount of precious metal handed over differed from nation to nation. While the Chinese were generally exempted from this obligation, every trading season the Dutch had to advance on average 25,000 taels of silver to the Chúa, around 10,000 taels to the Crown Prince, and approximately 1,000 taels to each high-ranking capado. These amounts could occasionally be decreased if the Dutch had little silver that particular year. Because the local rulers often supplied bad silk and at much higher prices, the Dutch and other foreigners always tried to conceal part of their money so that they could spend more on goods on the free markets. In 1644, for instance, the Dutch brought as many as 100,000 taels to Tonkin but they pretended to have no more than 20,000. After many arguments, the Chúa reluctantly accepted 12,500 taels, reminding the Dutch to advance the full amount of 25,000 taels the next year.113 There were also occasions when the Dutch failed to buy silk from local producers, hence, willingly offered more silver to the local authorities. In 1649, for instance, the Dutch offered the Chúa and the Crown Prince 46,735 taels in total in order to receive 355 piculs of raw silk from them. The reason for this acquiescence was that the powerful, highranking mandarin Ongiatule had falsely accused the Dutch of attacking and destroying the Japanese Resimon’s junk in which Ongiatule had

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shares. The Chúa said that if the accusation was proved, he would kill all Dutch people currently living in his country. Local people, fearing the consequences, did not dare to deal with the Dutch.114 With the exception of presents and the money advanced to local rulers for the delivery of silk, foreign merchants were exempted from all import and export taxes.115 This was said to be more advantageous to the foreigners than having them pay taxes, considering the high customs duties they had to pay for every arrival at and departure from Quinam. According to the Nguyễn scales of taxation, each Europeanrigged ship had to pay 8,000 and 800 quan (one quan varied between 0.5 and 1.0 guilder) respectively for its arrival and departure, while an Asian vessel paid approximately 3,000 for its arrival and 300 quan for its departure.116 Because the Chúa often bought foreign goods at very low prices, sometimes lower even than the purchase prices, the mandarins preferred to take foreign goods in his name so that they could also benefit from the low prices. Out of their depth, foreign merchants preferred to avoid dealing with local rulers. There was a general regulation that mandarins were obliged to pay foreigners once the Chúa had paid. But it was a false security as the mandarins in charge of the royal family’s business often delayed payments. To collect overdue and long-standing debts, foreigners had to submit petitions to the Chúa, who then ordered their debtors to honour these within a certain time.117 Only after the local rulers had bought what they wanted, could foreign merchants commence the sale of the remaining part of their cargoes, mainly to local brokers. In order to commence their business transactions, they needed to have a chop, a trading licence from the court, which would permit them to trade freely. Each licence was valid for one trading season only, hence, foreigners needed to apply for a new chop on their arrival. With a chop in hand, they were supposed to trade freely with the local traders, but in reality, this licence could be obstructed by local mandarins. In order to manipulate the sale of foreign merchandise on the local market as well as the supply of local goods to foreign merchants, some influential eunuchs did their best to prevent foreigners from trading directly with local people. Besides high-level obstruction, foreign traders also faced strong competition from both local brokers, foreign speculators living permanently in Tonkin, and fierce rivals among themselves. On their first arrival in 1637, for instance, the Dutch, despite the trading privileges offered by the Chúa, faced harmful obstruction from local mandarins who wanted

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to monopolize the supply of local silk to the VOC.118 This kind of obstacle not only remained unresolved, it even worsened as the Trịnh rulers gradually revoked the trading privileges, the baits that they had originally used to lure the Dutch into a military alliance with them between 1637 and 1643. In 1649 the Dutch factory in Thăng Long was virtually isolated. The eunuchs who had long been endeavouring to monopolize the silk supply to the Company sent their servants prowling around the Dutch residence armed with bamboo sticks to beat off any local people coming to the Dutch factory to sell silk. The Dutch complained about this to the Chúa, who offered them no remedy but a frigid answer: ‘I have not summoned you to my country’.119 As Tonkin’s wars with Quinam eventually ended in 1672, the former’s need of foreign weapons also eased off, hence and consequently the Trịnh’s interests in foreign trade declined. In 1672, when the English arrived in Tonkin for the first time, they were put in their place by a local mandarin, who made it clear to them that ‘while wee [the English] were out wee might have kept out. The king was king of Tonkin before wee came and would be after we were gone, and that this country hath noe neede of any forreigne thing’.120 What worried foreign merchants most was that the legal system did not provide any surety for the conduct of trade. The mandarins in charge of dealing with foreign merchants handled matters in a way which pleased them and from which they could obtain profits.121 If the foreigners ran into difficulties, they had to address themselves to the mandarins whose benevolence depended on the copiousness of the gratuity they received. In the spring of 1644, for instance, the Dutch in Thăng Long had to bribe the Minister of Justice when petitioning him to secure a stay of execution for some drunken Dutchmen who had badly injured court servants in a blazing row in which a Dutchman had been killed.122 The only channel of communication was through the interpreters, who also operated as traders or brokers. Consequently, their loyalty to their foreign employers was often doubtful as they were also subjected to the mandarins’ pressure. Aware of this predicament, foreigners always tried to find non-native interpreters in order to lessen their dependence on the people of Tonkin.123 As elsewhere throughout Asia, Portuguese was the language which foreign merchants trading in Tonkin often used to communicate with local people through the channel of interpreters. Despite all the difficulties and setbacks, foreign merchants doggedly

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pursued their trade with Tonkin throughout the seventeenth century. The reason, needless to argue, lay in the handsome profits, as the English senior merchant himself confessed in 1673, after sadly bemoaning the virtually unbearable trading conditions in northern Vietnam. ‘The Dutch have long experienced these things and very many affronts’, wrote the English chief, ‘but because they have noe way to revenge themselves of them and finding good profitt upon theire silk for Japan, they suffer patiently, as we must doe if we contynue here.’124 The following section briefly introduces the principal foreign merchants trading with Tonkin throughout the seventeenth century, whose presence was unquestionably the central abutment which bridged the isolated Gulf of Tonkin to connect the Kingdom of Tonkin to the outside world during this commercial century. 3. Foreign merchants With all these rich Commodities, one would expect the People [of Tonkin] to be rich; but the Generality are very poor, considering what a Trade is driven here. For they have little or no Trade by Sea themselves, except for Eatables, as Rice and Fish, which is spent in the Country. But the main Trade of the Country is maintained by the Chinese, English, Dutch, and other Merchant Strangers, who either reside here constantly, or make their annual Returns hither. William Dampier (1688)125

The Chinese China remained the main trading partner of Đại Việt even after it became independent in the early tenth century. Although the Chinese Song Dynasty banned its subjects from trading with several ‘barbarous’ lands, including Vietnam, until the early twelfth century, Chinese trading vessels sometimes ‘drifted’ to the southern neighbour of Đại Việt, where they were warmly welcomed by local people. Upon their return, they carried home valuable cargoes of textiles and cash.126 The thirteenth-century Mongol conquest of China severely affected the opportunity of Chinese merchants to trade with Vietnam. It also forced Đại Việt to reduce its foreign trade and impose a strict control on foreign traders to its country to prevent the infiltration of Chinese spies. After successfully expelling the Ming occupation and restoring the independence of the country in 1428, the Lê Dynasty relaxed the state vigilance on Chinese merchants a little. Even so,

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foreign merchants were allowed to reside and trade at nine appointed trading-places only. In the southern provinces of Nghệ An and Hà Tĩnh, Chinese merchants could also trade at three market-places.127 In general, despite its relaxation of policies towards foreign trade, the Lê Dynasty continued to exert vigilance in dealing with foreign trade as well as with foreign merchants trading in its territories. The Lê Code which was in force at the end of the fifteenth century, for instance, included several articles strictly regulating foreign merchants, especially the Chinese.128 Despite the Vietnamese rulers’ harsh measures against them, Chinese merchants were not deterred from regularly visiting Vietnam. It is presumed that they were the major carriers of Vietnamese ceramics to the international market during the first half of the sixteenth century. In his Suma Oriental written in the early 1500s, Tomé Pires noted that the Vietnamese ‘rarely come to Malacca in their junks. They go to China, to Canton … to join up with the Chinese; then they come for merchandise with the Chinese in their junks’.129 After the Ming lifted its ban on foreign trade in 1567, the number of Chinese junks trading to Đại Việt presumably increased, despite the fact that the number of licences granted by Chinese authorities to junks sailing to northern Vietnam was relatively small. This official figure is contradicted by a late sixteenth-century account which states there was a great number of Chinese vessels leaving Chinese ports for neighbouring countries either with or without a licence issued clandestinely by governors of China’s southern seaports.130 These ‘neighbouring countries’ certainly included Đại Việt, considering the shortness of the voyage as well as the long-standing trading relationship between the two countries. Another Chinese document written in 1593 reveals the fact that despite the Ming prohibition on Chinese people from trading with the Japanese, ‘villainous merchants recklessly send goods to Giao-chi and other places where Japanese come to trade with them.’ ‘Giao-chi’ (Jiaozhi) here obviously refers to Đại Việt or northern Vietnam.131 The statement contained in this document is strongly supported by the fact that by the early 1590s, Japanese shuin-sen began to visit northern Vietnam.132 The more open attitude of the Vietnamese Mạc Dynasty towards foreign trade encouraged Chinese merchants who wished to trade with Đại Việt. The number of overseas Chinese residing in northern Vietnam seemed to grow constantly throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Since Đại Việt needed to exchange surplus handicraft prod-

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ucts for precious metals and other necessities, the Vietnamese rulers had to thaw their frigid attitude towards the expansion of foreign trade. The Chinese and other foreigners reportedly resided and traded in inland commercial centres such as Phố Hiến and Thăng Long.133 The Chinese community in the capital grew so quickly that in 1650, the court, mindful of the ongoing political turmoil in China after the collapse of the Ming Dynasty in 1644, ordered all foreigners, but with the Chinese especially in mind, to be moved to the southern quarters of Thanh Trì and Khuyến Lương, which were about five kilometres from the capital.134 Although the implementation of this plan was delayed and foreign merchants continued to live in the capital, the concern of the court about the Chinese did not diminish. During the 1663 nationwide survey on foreigners residing in Tonkin, the Chinese were split into two categories: permanent and temporary residents. Three years later, the court ordered that Chinese who wanted to live permanently in Tonkin had to register as a member of Vietnamese families and adopt Vietnamese customs which would involve changing their hairstyle, the way of dress, and the like. In 1687, the Government stepped up its control of the overseas Chinese, forcing them to leave Thăng Long for surrounding areas. After this ukase, the Chinese could only visit the capital with a written permission granted by local authorities. Smarting from these harsh regulations, with the exception of those who were content to move to Phố Hiến, most of the Chinese left Tonkin for other countries.135 In order to compete with other foreign merchants trading in Tonkin, the overseas Chinese established a solid trading network to promote mutual assistance. Wealthy Chinese owned silk workshops and willingly offered their products to their countrymen at reasonable prices. Chinese middlemen gathered local goods during the off season and sold them to Chinese merchants during the trading season. There is abundant evidence that most of the Chinese junks arriving annually in Tonkin were involved in the export of Tonkinese silk to Japan. Utilizing their well-established trading networks, these Chinese wasted no time in buying cargoes of silk and left for Japan before the Dutch were in a position to do so. After the autumn sale in Nagasaki, these Chinese merchants returned to Tonkin with sufficient quantities of Japanese silver to purchase more Vietnamese silks. Besides relying on their solid trading networks, the Chinese sometimes received financial support from Japanese officials who secretly invested money in the Tonkin-Japan silk trade. In the 1646−7 trad-

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ing season, for instance, a part of the 80,000 taels which the Chinese brought to Tonkin was contributed by Japanese officials in Nagasaki. In Tonkin, by offering higher prices to local silk-producers, the Chinese had no problem acquiring 400 piculs of raw silk and a large number of silk piece-goods and departed for Japan in early July. Only after the Chinese had sailed away could the Dutch begin their transactions and then leave for Japan in August.136 Although the Tonkin-Japan silk trade showed a steady decline from the mid-1650s, a considerable number of Chinese merchants were still involved in this trade route. As revealed from the journal registers of the English factory in Tonkin, the English failure to export local silk to London was often caused by the fierce Chinese competition. In 1676, for instance, the English factory could not purchase enough silk piece-goods for Europe because five Chinese junks had ‘swept the country of what silk was made’.137 Besides the Chinese involved in the Tonkin-Japan silk trade, there was a small number of overseas Chinese trading between Tonkin and other South-East Asian ports, but the volume of this trade was relatively small. Another community of overseas Chinese in northern Vietnam was involved in the Tonkin-China border trade. These Chinese, co-operating with Vietnamese merchants, re-exported such foreign merchandise as South-East Asian spices and European textiles from northern Vietnam to southern China. The return trade consisted of, among other miscellaneous items, Chinese gold and musk which were in great demand among European merchants in Tonkin. This border trade seemed to flourish from the early 1650s, profiting from the stagnation of the mainland China-Formosa trade which diverted the flow of Chinese gold and musk to northern Vietnam at the expense of Formosa. After a little more than a decade, from the early 1660s, the Tonkin-China border trade was very adversely affected by the political chaos in southern China.138 Commercial setbacks in conjunction with the measures taken by the court from the mid-seventeenth century which damaged the Chinese, discouraged Chinese merchants from maintaining their trade with the Lê/Trịnh domain. After having been expelled from Thăng Long in the late 1680s, a large number of overseas Chinese decided to leave Tonkin for other countries. Those who were content to move to Phố Hiến and the border town of Quảng Yên in the present-day north-eastern province of Quảng Ninh continued to trade, albeit on a lesser scale. By the late seventeenth century, the Dutch, who had vainly tried to establish a permanent factory at Quảng Yên in the early 1660s, noted

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that this town had been transformed into a commercial hub in the wake of the removal of the Chinese to this place. Although such inland commercial places as Thăng Long and Phố Hiến rapidly declined from the late 1680s, profiting from the presence of the Chinese, Quảng Yên continued to thrive in the next century.139 The Japanese The relationship between Vietnam and Japan presents a fascinating picture. The initial contact between the two countries may have commenced in 1509, when a Ryukyan delegation visited Đại Việt.140 For a very long while after that brief encounter nothing more was heard, probably because of the chaotic situation in the island empire which was the theatre of civil war. In 1592, of the nine licences which Kampaku Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the military ruler of Japan, issued to junks trading abroad, one was granted to a vessel which sailed to northern Vietnam.141 This does not exclude the possibility that the Japanese already visited the Vietnamese coast earlier than the issue of this 1592 licence. An entry in the Vietnamese annal Đại Việt sử ký toàn thư vaguely implies the presence of Japanese merchants and pirates along the Vietnamese coast in the 1550s.142 This is endorsed by a Chinese document written in the early 1590s which confirms that the Japanese regularly visited Chao Chi (a Chinese term which was synonymous with Đại Việt or northern Vietnam) to buy silks from Chinese merchants.143 Cogently, northern Vietnam was far from important to the Japanese in their hunt for Chinese silk. Since the late sixteenth century, the seaport of Hội An in Quinam had enjoyed a reputation among foreign traders as an important rendezvous, where Chinese ships carrying valuable cargoes of silk arrived annually.144 Most of the Japanese shuin-sen which traded with Vietnam made port at Hội An. The reason was not only the fame of Quinam as a rendezvous but its reputation as a producer of several key export items such as aloes wood and calambac. In this it surpassed Tonkin which offered merely local products, most notably silks and textiles. Unsurprisingly, and in marked contrast, the Nguyễn’s international outlook and flexible policies towards the foreign trade of Quinam also encouraged foreign merchants to make use of Hội An and turned it into an international entrepôt throughout the seventeenth century.145 In contrast to the Nguyễn’s successful dealing with the Japanese,

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the Trịnh were not only incapable of utilizing the shuin-sen system, they even irritated the Japanese rulers with their half-hearted attempts at diplomacy. While the Nguyễn had contacted the Japanese Bakufu through Japanese shuin-sen merchants as early as 1600, the Trịnh only sent their first diplomatic letter to Edo nearly a quarter of a century later in 1624 in rather indifferent terms expressing their wishes to create a good relationship with the Japanese Government.146 It seemed that increased hostilities with the Nguyễn prompted the Trịnh to consider widening their international relationships in order to support their military campaigns. There is also a sound possibility that some Japanese merchants trading between Japan and Tonkin, who also acted as diplomatic agents for the Shogun in dealing with northern Vietnam, may have influenced the Trịnh rulers to promote the bilateral relationship between Tonkin and Japan. In 1628, one year after the official outbreak of the Trịnh-Nguyễn wars, Chúa Trịnh Tráng dispatched a second letter to the Shogun Iemitsu. The style of this letter, however, was so arrogant that the Japanese Shogun, annoyed by the Trịnh’s haughtiness and bearing in mind his favourable relationship with the Nguyễn rulers of Quinam, immediately issued a ban on shipping to northern Vietnam, prohibiting Japanese merchants to sail to the Trịnh domain.147 No shuin-sen arrived in Tonkin in the next two years but in 1631, the Japan-Tonkin trade was resumed. It was short-lived as the maritime prohibition decreed by the Japanese Government in 1635 abolished the shuin-sen system and the Japanese trade with Tonkin consequently ended. Some Japanese merchants remained in Tonkin and acted either as brokers or interpreters for foreign merchants.148 Patchy source materials prevent a proper documentation of a quantitative account on the Japanese trade with Tonkin during the 1604–35 period. A record of the 1634 trading season which has survived reveals that a shuin-sen heading for northern Vietnam that year was allotted the relatively large capital of 800 kanme or 80,000 taels of silver. If we are to accept Iwao Seiichi’s estimate that the average capital per shuin-sen stood at 500 kanme or 50,000 taels, around 2,000,000 taels or 7.5 tons of Japanese silver were shipped to northern Vietnam by the Japanese shuin-sen in the first three decades to be exchanged for Tonkinese silk and other local products.149 That amount of money, combined with that brought to Tonkin by the Chinese and Portuguese, contributed to the rapid development of Tonkinese handicraft industries and foreign trade at that time.

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The Portuguese Beginning to sail regularly between Malacca and China after 1511, the Portuguese must have become gradually acquainted with the Vietnamese coast. Around 1524, the Portuguese had reportedly erected a stele in the Chàm Islands, off Hội An coast, to mark their presence at that place. In 1533, a Portuguese priest even visited the Hồng River delta but was forced to leave shortly afterwards because of political turmoil and fierce fighting.150 As the Portuguese had commercially and religiously set their sights on both China and Japan, they paid little attention to Vietnam. But after having successfully settled in Macao in 1557, and carrying on the profitable Macao-Japan trade, the Portuguese also became interested in trading with Hội An. By the early 1580s, there were reportedly some Portuguese residing in central Vietnam.151 Besides Portuguese merchants, Portuguese missionaries also endeavoured to preach in central Vietnam from the late sixteenth century. So modest was their achievement in proportion to the excessive expenses that the Portuguese missionaries resolved to abandon their religious propagation after just a few years. No further attempt to preach in Vietnam was made until the early 1600s when Portuguese missionaries in China and Japan found themselves facing increasing difficulties arising from State policies against the Christian religion. Because of this, the Portuguese looked further afield and again turned their attention towards Vietnam. Subsequently, the Portuguese established their mission in Quinam in 1615 and went on to set up another mission in Tonkin twelve years later.152 In contrast to their commercial and religious activity in Quinam, no significant attempt was made with respect to Tonkin until 1626. In this year, the Portuguese in Macao sent their first delegates, missionaries rather than merchants, to the Trịnh realm.153 The Trịnh rulers, under the pressure from the conflict with their Nguyễn rivals, warmly welcomed the Portuguese, allowing them to trade and preach freely in their territory. It seemed that the northern rulers were hoping to enter into an alliance or at least to receive military support. It proved a vain hope as Portuguese merchants in Macao were hesitant about conducting trade with Tonkin in the following years, held back by the current unprofitable trade compounded by the high risk of piracy and shipwreck. The non-appearance of the Portuguese in 1628 and 1629 coupled with their continuing intimacy with the Nguyễn, angered the Trịnh ruler who decreed a ban on the propagation of the Christian religion in his land in 1630 and deported all missionaries from Tonkin.

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Portuguese merchants were exempted from this ban.154 The Portuguese trade with Tonkin gathered momentum in the early 1630s because of the stagnation of the trade with Japan. The itowappu (the yarn allotment) system which was expressly devised to gain a tighter grip on the sale of Chinese yarn in Japan seriously reduced the annual Portuguese profits. As a result, the Lusitanian merchants resolved to cut down the import volume of Chinese silk.155 In 1634, the Portuguese brought a mere two hundred piculs of Chinese silk to Japan, but simultaneously increased their annual import of Chinese piece-goods and Tonkinese raw silk which were exempted from the itowappu restrictions. This explains the steep increase in the import volume of Tonkinese silk by the Portuguese. In 1636, three Portuguese vessels arrived in northern Vietnam from Macao and bought 965 piculs of Tonkinese raw silk in total for Japan. It was at a cost as one galiota was shipwrecked off the Island of Hainan.156 In 1635, when the Japanese Government abolished the shuin-sen system and banned its subjects from trading abroad, the Portuguese hoped to replace the Japanese trading network in northern Vietnam. This strategy was doomed to be short-lived as they were expelled from Japan in 1639. Despite all their commercial setbacks, the Portuguese in Macao maintained a regular trade with Tonkin until the late 1660s.157 There is no doubt that in the Portuguese trade with Tonkin, silver and copper cash constituted the staple items imported into Tonkin. There was a steady demand for copper cash because, although the Vietnamese had been using this sort of currency for centuries, the dynasties could not mint sufficient coins to meet the domestic demand. To make up the deficiency, a large part of this currency circulating in northern Vietnam was imported from China.158 Since there was a great amount of unused copper coins in Japan, prior to 1639, the Portuguese occasionally shipped these copper coins from Japan to Tonkin. After losing their Japan connection, the Portuguese imported Chinese coins minted in Macao into Tonkin.159 Their trade in copper coins yielded spectacular profits. In 1651, for instance, the Dutch glowered jealously as their Portuguese competitor enjoyed a net profit of 20,000 taels from the cargo of copper coins they had shipped to Tonkin. The Dutch also learnt that in 1650 the Portuguese had even earned as much as 180,000 taels from the copper cash cargo valued at 120,000 taels sent to Quinam.160 After a decade or so, from the early 1660s the Portuguese copper cash trade with northern Vietnam faced fierce competition from the Chinese and the Dutch, who also

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imported Japanese copper coins into Tonkin in great quantities as will be discussed in details in Chapter Five.161 The Dutch The first Dutch contact with Vietnam occurred in 1601 under embarrassing circumstances: some twenty sailors from a Dutch ship were killed by Vietnamese people in central Vietnam.162 The Dutch none the less resolved to trade at Hội An, which was famous among foreign merchants as an important South-East Asian emporium where such valuable export merchandise as Chinese silks could be procured. All the Dutch efforts to establish regular trade links with Quinam between 1601 and 1638 produced nothing but hatred and grievous losses. By the middle of the 1630s, the Dutch antipathy towards the Nguyễn had probably reached its boiling point. In the meantime, Batavia was also considering turning its Vietnamese trade to Trịnh Tonkin.163 The resolve of the VOC to trade with Tonkin was stimulated even more by the seclusion policy imposed by the Japanese Government in 1635. As Tonkinese silk now became fairly profitable on the Japanese market, the Dutch at Hirado lost no time in replacing the shuin-sen and prepared an inaugural voyage to the Trịnh realm.164 In the spring of 1637, the Grol left Japan for Tonkin. The official relationship between the Dutch East India Company and the Kingdom of Tonkin was established in the same year and lasted until 1700. During the course of sixty-three years, the VOC imported mainly Japanese silver and copper cash (kasjes in seventeenth-century Dutch) into Tonkin in order to buy, among a selection of local products, Tonkinese silk for Japan, ceramics for South-East Asian insular markets, and silk piece-goods and musk for the Netherlands.165 The English The expectation of founding a profitable intra-Asian trading network with Japan serving as a headquarters was the motive spurring the English on to open their trade with Quinam as early as they established their Japan trade in 1613. In this year, the English factory in Japan entrusted this task to two English merchants who were subsequently sent to Hội An on board a Japanese junk. The mission proved ill-fated: one Englishman was murdered alongside with one Dutchman and one Japanese merchant, and the other one mysteriously disappeared.166 This misfortune degenerated into acrimonious recrimination as the

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Dutch and the English blamed each other for the catastrophic murder of their men. Despite the fact that the English in Japan later sent two other merchants to Hội An to investigate this murder, no final conclusion was reached.167 After the 1613 incident, the English made no further attempt to enter into a relationship with the Vietnamese as their factory in Japan was eventually closed down in 1623 after only ten years of unsuccessful trade. Enjoying greater flexibility of movement, English free merchants did sporadically visit both Tonkin and Quinam.168 The reconstitution of the English East India Company in the 1660s caused a significant shift in its Asian trade.169 The Company attempted to expand its trade to East Asian countries, using Banten, its only base in South-East Asia, as a springboard for launching this strategy. Around 1668, the Court of Committees in London was looking for an appropriate opportunity to re-open relations with Japan using Cambodia as a channel.170 The plan to re-enter the Japan trade—in this the directors in London may have been influenced by their officials in Banten or they themselves may have overestimated its prospects—was then put into practice at the end of 1671.171 The directors of the English Company entertained no doubts that trading with Japan would be profitable, as they had observed at first hand the considerable success of the VOC in the preceding decades. They also grew convinced that the regional trade between Japan and other areas would reap extra profits for their Company.172 Among the selected targets was Tonkin, whose silks and other textiles were highly valued and could fetch good prices in Japan. Traders who took Tonkinese silks to Nagasaki were in turn able to purchase Japanese silver and copper. These valuable metals would be brought back to invest in local merchandise at other factories to keep up the flow of goods in the Japan trade and to supply goods marketable in Europe. The ultimate aim of the English in trading with Tonkin was, therefore, to create the so-called Tonkinesesilk-for-Japanese-silver trade, as had successfully been undertaken by the Dutch since 1637. The search for new markets for English manufactured goods was another reason which spurred the Company on to carry out this plan.173 As this strategy was approved by the Court of Committees in London, in 1671 a fleet of three ships was sent to open trading relations with Tonkin, Formosa, and Japan. In the summer of 1672, the Zant arrived in Tonkin, where the English were allowed to reside in and trade at Phố Hiến, a small town which was circa 50 kilometres from

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Thăng Long. After such a promising beginning in Tonkin, the English found themselves in a precarious situation in East Asia because the Japanese Government refused to grant the English a trading licence.174 The Japan misadventure placed the English factory in Tonkin in a dilemma since, from the outset, the English considered their factory in northern Vietnam a mere supplier of silk for the Japan trade. Now the hope for the Japan trade proved to be Dead Sea fruit, was it necessary to maintain the Tonkin factory? In the meantime, the Third AngloDutch war in Europe (1672−4) severely affected the English trade in Asia. Because of the Dutch hostilities, English shipping in the SouthEast Asian waters was forced to stop. Consequently, the English in Tonkin were isolated from the rest of the Company trading factories in the East until the summer of 1676, when the first English ship since 1672 arrived in Tonkin. The combination of these negative developments put the Company trade with northern Vietnam in an almost untenable situation in the first decade of its expansion strategy.175 Despite the ban on trade with Japan and the unprofitable local operations, the Court of Committees in London decided to continue its trade with Tonkin. From a strategic perspective, the Company held the long-term view that the East Asian markets offered great potential despite current difficulties and setbacks. At the same time, the English factors in northern Vietnam were also endeavouring to find alternative outlets for Tonkinese products to justify the continuation of the Tonkin factory. In fact, shortly after their arrival in 1672 the English had been aware of the fact that Tonkinese silk found a ready market in Manila. Consequently, in their reports to Banten and London, the English in Tonkin urged their masters to negotiate with the Spanish so that they could exchange Tonkinese silk for Spanish silver.176 Nor was Manila the only market. Several sorts of Vietnamese high-quality silk piece-goods were thought likely to yield profit on the London market. These optimistic proposals may have influenced the Company directors in their deliberations about the continuation of the Tonkin trade in the mid-1670s.177 As the Manila project finally turned out to be nothing but an illusion, the English factory turned to exporting Tonkinese lacquerware and various sorts of silk piece-goods such as baas, loas, pelings, hockiens, and the like to London. This trade proved successful for nearly a decade thanks to high sale prices and a quick turnover on the home market. The rub was the small cargoes which the English factory in Tonkin could afford to send home. From the middle of the 1680s,

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the directors in London often complained about the poor quality of the products which the Tonkin factory dispatched. The situation in the Tonkin factory was dire as it was afflicted by constant losses, the upshot of private trading, embezzlement, and contradictory decisions made by the factors. Disappointed by the negligible quantity of local products which the English factors in Tonkin could manage to send to England, as the deficit increased and uncollected debts rose to more than 30,000 pounds sterling, the Court of Committees finally decreed the Tonkin factory be abandoned in 1693. The Tonkin malaise, however, dragged on until 1697 when Fort St. George was able to send one ship to bring the Company servants and property back to the safe haven of Madras.178 Other foreign merchants Although the Spanish in Manila never made any overtures to open official relations with the Lê/Trịnh Government, they occasionally sent ships to Tonkin to purchase local goods, particularly silk and musk. According to a Dutch observation in 1651, the Spanish in Manila sent a junk to Tonkin to explore the possibility of creating a triangular trading network between Manila, Tonkin, and Cambodia. In order to facilitate this mission, the Governor of Manila had even given the owner of this junk, a Spanish Brabander, the title of ‘ambassador’ of Spanish Manila. In the following year, this junk returned to Tonkin with a capital of 30,000 taels in which the Governor of Manila reportedly had a share of 20,000 rials. Every penny of this capital was exchanged for Tonkinese raw silk and various sorts of musk. In Cambodia this cargo yielded a handsome profit. The appearance of this Spanish ‘interloper’ in Tonkin worried the Dutch factors, who then suggested to their masters in Batavia that this junk ‘be diverted’ to other places.179 While the Dutch sought vainly for a ruse to stop the Spanish intrusion into the Indo-Chinese markets, the latter geared up their commercial strategy to penetrate the Tonkin trade by co-operating with the Japanese free merchant Resimon, who had been living and trading in northern Vietnam for many years, in order to strengthen the Tonkin-Manila trade route. In 1654, Resimon bought a junk and hired a Dutch pilot to manage the regular voyage between Tonkin and Manila. The Dutch factors protested about the interference of Resimon but to no avail.180 It seemed that the Spanish involvement

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in the Tonkin-Manila trade did not end until the late 1660s, after suffering several disastrous losses. In 1666, the Castilian vessel operating regularly between Manila and Tonkin foundered in the Gulf of Tonkin. Although the crew survived, their cargo was a complete loss. In the following year, Resimon, who had been actively involved in the Tonkin-Manila trade since the mid-1650s, died, leaving this trade route deserted. Two fatal misfortunes within two years were a severe blow to the Tonkin-Manila trade route in which the Spaniards had been active participants, and ended the brief Spanish commercial relations with northern Vietnam.181 The first French delegates, priests masquerading as merchants, arrived in Tonkin in 1669 but were neither permitted to trade nor allowed to preach in this country. The reason for the French failure, as recounted by the Dutch factors in Thăng Long, was their fairly worthless presents for the Chúa and other high-ranking courtiers.182 Although the French mission sailed away with its tail between its legs, the two French priests who had arrived in Tonkin a few years earlier continued to preach secretly in the littoral village of Doméa. When the court discovered the nature of their work, these Frenchmen and three Vietnamese Christians were imprisoned. After their release, the two priests were ordered to remain at Doméa and were forbidden to propagate their faith in the country. Despite being restricted, these Frenchmen continued to convert the Vietnamese clandestinely.183 In 1674, the French in Siam sent another delegation to Tonkin. The junk which carried the French mission was caught up in a tempest and drifted to Manila, where the priest by the name of Pallu and the English merchant Nicolas Waite, who had taken his passage from Siam to Tonkin, were immediately imprisoned by the Spanish.184 In 1680, the French made their third effort to establish themselves in northern Vietnam when another mission left Banten for Tonkin. The Lê/Trịnh rulers gave the French mission a fairly warm welcome and granted its members permission to live and trade at Phố Hiến. Although the French did maintain a factory at this town, the volume of their trade with Tonkin was disappointingly low.185 In 1682, the fourth French mission arrived in Tonkin with presents and a letter from King Louis XIV to the Lê/Trịnh rulers, soliciting free trade and propagation of the Christian religion in northern Vietnam. The Lê/Trịnh rulers granted free trade but adamantly refused to allow religious propagation in Tonkin.186 The French therefore had no option but to continue

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their meagre trade and pursue their religious mission clandestinely in northern Vietnam in the years thereafter. Siamese merchants arrived to trade with Đại Việt as early as the twelfth century but their trade with Vietnam in the following centuries was irregular. As an offshoot of their active participation in regional trade in the early modern period, Siamese merchants sporadically visited the central Vietnamese coast.187 As a dispute raged between Quinam and Siam over the Nguyễn invasion of Cambodia in the 1650s, the Siamese rulers contacted the Trịnh in Tonkin asking them to challenge the Nguyễn in Quinam. Hence, in 1659 and 1660, a Siamese ambassador spent time travelling back and forth on board Resimon’s junk as it traded between Tonkin and Siam to negotiate with the Trịnh rulers about an embargo on the Nguyễn import of Siamese rice in retaliation for their invasion of Cambodia. The negotiations seemed to have ended unsatisfactorily. No trading relationship between Tonkin and Siam was engendered by these diplomatic activities.188 A decade later, the Siamese trade with Tonkin seemed to revive as the Siamese King dispatched two junks to trade with Tonkin in 1670 and 1671 consecutively. Strangely enough, the sailors on one of these two junks did not return. This incident embarrassed the Siamese ruler who later sought help from the VOC in order to bring the junk and its sailors back to Ayutthaya.189 Acting on the Siamese King’s request, Batavia ordered its servants in Tonkin to force these Siamese to return home. In 1675, six out of the seven Siamese expatriates were brought home on board a Dutch ship. The Siamese captain managed to stay in Tonkin after having married a Vietnamese lady, who was later detained by the English for owing overdue debts.190 This incident must have discouraged the Siamese rulers, for the Siamese trade with Tonkin ended, despite sporadic visits by Siamese merchants to northern Vietnam on board foreign junks. Concluding remarks Using the area of what is nowadays the Hồng River delta in northern Vietnam as a solid base, the Vietnamese-speaking people constantly expanded their living space towards the south throughout the second millennium AD. By the eighteenth century the southwards movement had generally been completed; the Vietnamese inhabited the entire eastern shoreline of the Indo-Chinese coast. Strangely enough, they did

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not utilize this watery and maritime environment to turn their country into a maritime power in the region, despite the fact that the country did provide several key items for export and international maritime trade routes ran just along the Vietnamese coast for many centuries. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the state policies towards foreign trade underwent a severe transformation. Political crises forced the dynasties to reduce their strictness towards trade, overseas trade in particular, to seek weapons and military support from the Western trading companies. The expansion of handicraft industries offered Tonkin annually a large amount of products (silk and ceramics) for export to regional and international markets. Foreign merchants such as the Chinese, Japanese, Portuguese, Dutch, English, and French regularly arrived to trade there.

PART TWO: THE POLITICAL RELATIONS Nu met het vertreck van dit schip, soo send ick desen brieff aen den Bataviasen Coning, op dat hy myne meeninge soude konnen weten, dat de coopmanschappen, die in het aenstaende mochten gesonden werden, nevens eenige groote stucken, die ick sal betaelen met syde naer haer waerde; oock soo versoeck ick, dat my een constapel Macy [mach?] toegesonden werden om by my te blyven, daermede ick versoecke de Koninck van Batavia my gelieve te helpen tot myn contentement, opdat wy, soo langh de son en maen haer schynsel geven sullen, voor altoos vrunden blyven mogen.191

Introduction The ultimate goal of the Lê/Trịnh rulers in their exertions to lure the VOC to Tonkin was to create a military alliance with the VOC in order to fight against Nguyễn Quinam. Batavia was nothing loath as it wanted to establish trading relations with northern Vietnam in its bid to export raw silk and silk piece-goods to Japan. If this were to facilitate its silk trade, the Company, as it had to do elsewhere in Asia, was willing to involve itself to a certain extent at least in the politics of Tonkin. The mutual relationship which developed between Tonkin and the VOC in the 1637–1700 period, despite attempts by both sides to keep it on an even keel, underwent many vicissitudes as will be discussed in detail in the next two chapters.

CHAPTER THREE

INTIMATE PHASES …where since wee [the English] arrived have heard of yours Majestie’s great kindness to the Hollanders, as loving & receiving them as people of your own family … We acknowledge that the Dutch at present may be in greater favour with your Majestie, having lived here many yeares, butt in all other places wee have the priority of them … Wee likewise request of your Majestie to give order to your mandarines to settle and confirme us with the same accostomed previledges that the Dutch have already procured from your Majestie.192

1. The abortive Dutch trade with Quinam, 1601−1638193 The first contact between the Dutch and the Vietnamese took place even before the foundation of the Dutch East India Company. In 1601, a Dutch fleet commanded by Admiral Jacob van Neck en route to South-East Asia from Macao called at a Chàm bay to take on fresh water. Fearful of the Dutch presence, the local inhabitants living around that bay fled. Shortly after this first Dutch visit to central Vietnam, the VOC ships the Leiden and the Haarlem on their way to the Middle Kingdom called at the Vietnamese coast where twenty-three Dutch sailors were killed by the local people. This bloody encounter did not discourage the Dutch from visiting Quinam. The merchants Jeronimus Wonderaer and Albert Cornelisz Ruyll were sent to Hội An to negotiate the opening of trade and were given a friendly welcome and granted a licence to trade freely at Hội An. Shortly afterwards, a rumour spread that the Nguyễn rulers were preparing a surprise attack on the Dutch. Upon hearing this unfounded rumour, the Dutch merchants hastily returned to their ships after having raided and burnt one village on their way to the sea. Because the southerly monsoon had ended, the Leiden and the Haarlem did not pursue their intended voyage to China and returned to Patani.194 The Dutch needed many years to overcome the aftermath of this unfortunate encounter. As the Malay Archipelago was the main theatre of the Dutch commercial activities in the East, central Vietnam was of little importance. This state of affairs altered with the establishment

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of the Japan trade in 1609. Trading with Quinam became suddenly attractive to the Dutch Company. For a profitable trade with Japan, the Dutch, just as their Chinese and Portuguese competitors, needed Chinese silk, and since China’s ports remained closed to the Dutch, they needed to procure Chinese silk at such regional rendezvous as Hội An.195 In 1613, the Dutch factory in Japan sent two merchants and a small cargo valued at 9,000 guilders to Hội An. This attempt again ended in a bitter loss of both people and property. One of the two Dutchmen was murdered together with an English merchant who had just arrived from Japan. The cause of this murder was never fully uncovered despite the investigations of two merchants sent to Hội An by the English factory in Japan.196 What the 1613 misfortune did reveal was that the Dutch aggression in Hội An in 1601 now came back to haunt them. After this second loss, Dutch eagerness to trade with central Vietnam was greatly dampened and simultaneously their hatred of the Nguyễn domain strengthened. Some Dutchmen even proposed raiding Chinese and Portuguese vessels trading to Hội An to exact vengeance and compensate themselves for their string of losses in this country.197 In 1617, the Dutch were offered an opportunity to break the deadlock. In this year, the Dutch factories in Siam and Patani received letters from high-ranking mandarins of Quinam, inviting the Company on behalf of the Chúa to trade with their country. The Patani Council accepted the invitation and decided to send two ships which were used to capture Portuguese vessels to Quinam, but both of them ended up in Hirado without visiting Hội An. In the following years, two other ships were destined for Quinam but, considering the high risk in trading with central Vietnam, the crews mutinied and refused to obey their masters’ order. Hence, the opportunity to re-open the dialogue with the Nguyễn rulers was regrettably wasted. During the 1620s, the Dutch made no further attempt to make contact with the Indo-Chinese coast as they had their hands full with their Chinese campaign, which led to the establishment of a foothold on Formosa in 1624.198 By the early 1630s, another opportunity presented itself to the Dutch to open trade with Quinam. In the autumn of 1632, a junk which the Dutch had captured from the Portuguese drifted to the Hội An shore, where, according to the local custom, it was held. The Dutch survivors were released and sent to Batavia on board a Chinese junk. The Nguyễn rulers accordingly sent a letter to the High Government in Batavia, reporting this accident and cordially inviting the Dutch

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Company to trade in their country. In view of the current stagnation of the VOC’s Formosa-Japan trade,199 Batavia immediately embraced this new opportunity to establish trading relations with Hội An. In 1633, two Dutch ships carrying two skilled merchants, Paulus Traudenius and François Caron, left Batavia, carrying an adequate capital of 278,000 guilders. These merchants were warmly welcomed by the Nguyễn, who granted them favourable trading privileges. Despite their facilitation by the court, the Dutch could not match the Portuguese and the Japanese in buying and selling goods. Two junks arrived from Japan with 300,000 taels and fiercely competed for the silk. Consequently, most of the Dutch capital remained unspent. Feeling disappointed, the Dutch merchants left for Formosa with most of the unspent money, leaving only two Dutchmen with a small amount of capital to maintain the Company presence at Hội An.200 This failure did not stop Batavia from making another attempt to trade with Quinam. But, in order to avoid the stiff Portuguese and Japanese competition during the trading season, the Dutch resolved to send ships to Hội An from Formosa during the wintertime. By so doing, they hoped to purchase winter silk which was normally harvested between October and December. This strategy miscarried as there was a large number of overseas Japanese residing permanently at Hội An. So powerful were these overseas Japanese that they had the wherewithal to influence the local authorities to hinder the Dutch trade. Thwarted by these tactics, the Dutch failed to purchase gold and silk, although there was an abundance of these two products on the local market. Hence, of the 186,485 guilders the Company had earmarked for the Quinam trade this year, 111,549 guilders remained unspent and had to be shipped back to Batavia in the spring of 1634.201 Misfortune continued to beset the Dutch trade with Hội An. In the winter of 1633, the Kemphaan and the Quinam en route from Formosa to Batavia were shipwrecked off Quinam. Salvaged goods, including merchandise, money, and cannon, which the Dutch survivors brought ashore, were confiscated by the local mandarins. The current unprofitable trade with Quinam coupled with the Nguyễn’s arcane confiscation laws disgusted Batavia and aroused even more aversion.202 Those Dutch merchants who had experienced the Quinam trade insisted that the Company would attain nothing from that country but losses and calamities. Their thoughts were no doubt influenced by the fact that silk and gold, the two key products which the Company had high hopes of procuring from Quinam, could since 1633 be provided by Formosa.

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In the meantime, the demand for gold on the Coromandel Coast had also eased as the Coast trade went into a state of temporary decline.203 Considering the difficulty in re-opening the relationship once it had been officially abandoned, Batavia restrained itself from exacting any vengeance. Grinding up its loins yet again, the Company made another attempt to trade with central Vietnam in the following year. Despite the patience shown by Batavia, the Company trade in Quinam could not make a break-through. So depressing was the Dutch trade at Hội An in 1634 that only 37,403 of 57,287 guilders could be spent on low-quality silk and gold. Worse still, the Grootebroek en route from Hội An to Formosa ran into a storm and wrecked on the Paracels, off the coast of Quinam. Thirteen survivors were humiliatingly treated by the local authorities while the salvaged goods, valued at 23,580 rixdollars, were again confiscated. The only saving grace was that the Chúa allowed the people to return to Batavia on a Japanese junk.204 This year’s losses snapped the patience of Batavia with respect to its trade with Quinam. Upon the return of the Japanese junk to Hội An in the summer of 1635, the Governor-General sent a letter to the Chúa, demanding him to return the salvaged goods and monies which his mandarins had unjustifiably robbed from the Dutch survivors. To stress his demand, the Governor-General assigned Abraham Duycker, who had been directing the Company trade in central Vietnam up to that time, to negotiate compensation with the Nguyễn ruler. Duycker was expected to accomplish three tasks: negotiate with Chúa Nguyễn to retrieve all confiscated goods and monies; to extract more trading privileges for the Company; and imply that if the Nguyễn declined these requests, the Company would ally with the Trịnh rulers of Tonkin and simultaneously impose a protracted blockade on the coast of Quinam.205 The new Chúa who succeeded his father in 1635 refused the Company’s demand for compensation, despite his partiality for the Dutch.206 Reviewing the sum of 23,580 rixdollars, the Chúa reasoned that it had been illegally confiscated and embezzled by a mandarin who had been beheaded the previous year. He was neither responsible for such an illegal action nor should he bear responsibility for what had happened during his father’s reign. Therefore, the Chúa wanted the Company to withdraw its demand for compensation. In return, he would grant the Dutch favourable trading privileges, exempting them from all taxes and the obligation to give presents. This concession

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pleased Duycker but did by no means satisfy the Governor-General and the Councillors of the Indies, who severely reprimanded him for his unsuccessful negotiations. Consequently, in the summer of 1636, Nicolaas Couckebacker, the chief factor of the Hirado factory, was assigned the position of the Company representative in re-negotiations with Chúa Nguyễn. In its letter to the Nguyễn ruler, Batavia insisted on compensation and uttered a stern warning it would attack Quinam if its requests were not fulfilled unconditionally.207 The haughty tone of the letter from Batavia extremely annoyed the Nguyễn ruler. Had his courtiers seen the letter, said the Chúa during his personal meeting with Duycker, they would have killed all Dutch merchants currently trading in his country. The Chúa adamantly refused the Company’s demand for compensation and told Duycker that he was willing to return one cannon which his people had salvaged from the Grootebroek, although Duycker had counted eighteen pieces altogether on his previous visits. He also rejected Duycker’s request for a meeting with Couckebacker, who was currently lying at anchor off the Hội An coast. The Chúa angrily expostulated that he was the king of a country, not a merchant whose only concern was to discuss trade. Should he feel like dealing with the Company, he would write directly to the Governor-General. Replying to the threat from Batavia to ally with the Trịnh and launch an attack on Quinam, the Chúa ironically provoked Duycker, saying that he was ready to welcome the Dutch fleets. They could exact all the revenge they pleased. Otherwise they should feel free to trade with his country.208 The final attempt to negotiate made by Batavia thus failed embarrassingly. Threats made no impression at all on the Nguyễn rulers and also from a simple commercial viewpoint, the Company would gain nothing from fighting the Nguyễn. As it so happened trade did not suffer as the Hirado factory sent a ship to Hội An in the spring of 1637. There, Duycker and the other Dutchmen were warmly received by the Chúa, who promised to facilitate the Company trade and offered them a well-built house in Hội An in which they could reside in comfort. Even more important was the partiality of the Japanese residing in Hội An towards the Company. Duycker therefore believed that the Company trade with central Vietnam would be profitable this year.209 The scene changed drastically, however, after Duycker left Hội An for Batavia in March 1637. Because the Japanese resolved to co-operate with the Chinese in the running of the Quinam-Japan trade, they reneged on the agreement they had made with the Dutch. Therefore,

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most of the Dutch silk contracts with the Japanese were unfulfilled. As luck would have it, silk was scarce and expensive on the local market that season because heavy rains had largely destroyed the summer silk harvest. The shortage was compounded by the fact that the Trịnh rulers forbade their people to export Tonkinese silk to Quinam. Consequently, Dutch merchants in Hội An could spend only 54,123 of 130,004 guilders on silk and other miscellaneous items.210 However, as no decision from the High Government to abandon the trade with the Nguyễn domain was forthcoming, the Japan factory and Zeelandia Castle were obliged to continue the Quinam trade. In the spring of 1638, Duycker again sailed to Hội An from Formosa with a cargo valued at 61,218 guilders. Silk and sugar, the two key items which the Dutch expected to purchase in Hội An, were scarce and dear. It was believed that as long as the Trịnh rulers persisted in their ban on the export of Tonkinese silk to Quinam, the silk shortage in central Vietnam would undoubtedly drag on. The Dutch now seriously wondered whether it was worthwhile to maintain a trade with Quinam which was both unprofitable and miserable while their trade with Tonkin and Formosa was much more profitable and pregnant with promise. In a disappointed tone Duycker wrote to Hendrick Jansz Nachtegael, the chief of the Dutch factory in Siam, for advice. He did not know that the Governor-General and the Council of the Indies had already decided to abandon the Company trade with Quinam. In the summer of 1638, Batavia sent a ship to Hội An to take its servants and property to Formosa; the Dutch trade with Quinam had finally come to an end. The decision of Batavia to abolish its trade with central Vietnam was made after having carefully considered the risks involved in continuing its relationship with the Nguyễn rulers, since it had officially established political and commercial relations with the Lê/Trịnh one year earlier.211 2. The Dutch arrival in Tonkin, 1637 The Dutch had already been looked for during the past year since the Portuguese had given notice of our intended expedition. They had repeated the usual calumnies, prejudicing the King of Tonkin against us. They had even suggested to him [Chúa Trịnh Tráng] that we probably intended to try to take his life; that we would no doubt enter his presence well armed with sabres and pistols, and that we would set out from Quinam to come here. Carel Hartsinck (1637)212

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In contrast to their repeated endeavours to build a relationship with Quinam, the Dutch did not bestow much attention on trade with Tonkin in the first three decades of the seventeenth century. In fact, in 1613, the Hirado factory half-heartedly sought to establish relationships with both Vietnamese kingdoms when it assigned two Dutch merchants to put this plan into operation. These Dutchmen, as mentioned in the previous sections, arrived first at Hội An, where one was assaulted and the other murdered. Although the Dutch made various efforts to trade with central Vietnam from this year on, there was no plan whatsoever to trade with the north until the early 1630s when Japanese politics and commerce underwent a critical transformation.213 In 1635, the Japanese Tokugawa Government promulgated a policy of seclusion, prohibiting Japanese people to sail abroad. Consequently, the Japanese shuin-sen trading system was disrupted. Such Western merchants as the Portuguese and the Dutch all hoped to seize the place of the Japanese traders at various trading-places including the Vietnamese Kingdoms of Tonkin and Quinam. After trying vainly to improve their trade with Quinam, the Dutch finally decided to shift their commercial focus to Tonkin, whose silk had become increasingly profitable on the Japanese market. Besides, the Trịnh rulers of Tonkin had also dropped hints about granting them favourable trading privileges once they actually began to trade with northern Vietnam.214 It is certainly curious that the Dutch were so tardy in opening up trade with Tonkin, in contrast to their repeated attempts to establish trade with Quinam. Tonkinese silk had been regularly exported to Japan and it was well-known that the bulk of the Vietnamese silk available in Quinam was not locally produced but imported from Tonkin. Yet it was the Dutch commercial weakness in Japan during the first three decades of the seventeenth century which restrained them from expanding their trade to other countries in the region. Until 1621, the Dutch factory at Hirado in Japan was virtually isolated from the rest of the Company’s intra-Asian trading network.215 Besides, Tonkinese silk was obviously inferior to the Chinese product which was still easily purchasable in central Vietnam. Hence, Tonkin was commercially less attractive than Quinam. Not until the middle of the 1630s when Tonkinese silk became more marketable and profitable on the Japanese market, did the Dutch Company begin to consider trading with the Lê/Trịnh domain.216 In 1636, Couckebacker gathered reliable information from merchants who had been trading with Tonkin in order to compile a report

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on the current trading situation in northern Vietnam. This impressive report contained information on such important topics as geographical features, the commercial and political situation, and trading prospects. Most remarkable was Couckebacker’s optimistic estimation that Tonkin annually produced approximately 1,500 to 1,600 piculs of raw silk, 5,000 to 6,000 silk piece-goods, and a substantial quantity of cinnamon. The bright future of the Tonkin trade drawn in Couckebacker’s report encouraged the Governor-General and the Council of the Indies to seek to establish relations with the Lê/Trịnh rulers the following year. In 1637, the Grol left Japan for northern Vietnam.217 Handicapped by repeated Portuguese slanders on them, the Dutch were slightly suspect when they arrived in Tonkin. Because the Portuguese had begun to expand their trade with Tonkin after the Japanese seclusion policy in 1635, they were worried about the arrival of the Grol. Hence they tried to severely prejudice the Trịnh ruler by saying that the Dutch probably intended to assassinate him. To provoke the Chúa, the Portuguese had rumoured that the Dutch had offered the Nguyễn 150 pearls for the Chàm Islands off the coast of Hội An. Their minds full of forebodings, the local authorities were at first quite vigilant with the Dutch on their arrival. They ordered them to lay down their weapons and not to fire their cannon. Thanks to Hartsinck’s dexterous and courteous behaviour, the Dutch were able to overcome this early challenge. The Dutch chief sat upon the mats willingly during receptions, showed his reverence for the Chúa, chewed betel after the local custom, and elegantly took off his cap and bowed when visiting the royal tombs. Consequently, the Dutch not only established fairly good relations with the court, they were also granted more favourable trading privileges than other foreign merchants. The Chúa even symbolically adopted Carel Hartsinck as his own son, offering him court dress and flags so that the Dutch chief could enter Tonkin freely on his next arrival.218 Incontrovertibly, the Trịnh’s warm reception of and generosity towards the Dutch was a strategy to lure them into a military alliance or, at least, to obtain Western weapons to suppress their Nguyễn rivals. After their second defeat at the hands of the Nguyễn in 1633, the Trịnh rulers had been assiduously seeking military assistance from Western powers. The Portuguese had once been the Trịnh’s target but their irregular arrivals, and especially their intimate relations with the Nguyễn, displeased the Trịnh.219 As clearly reflected in the Dutch records, at times at which Batavia was vainly demand-

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ing compensation from the Nguyễn, the Trịnh hinted that they would willingly compensate the Company for the losses that it had suffered in the Nguyễn domain should Batavia agree to trade and be an ally of Tonkin.220 These hints dropped by the Trịnh obviously influenced the Dutch negotiations with the Nguyễn ruler. During their first meeting with a Tonkinese mandarin, the Dutch were informed that Chúa Trịnh had been awaiting the Dutch arrival impatiently and would cordially welcome them in the capital. The Chúa’s decree sent to the Dutch said: ‘The arrival of the Dutch gives satisfaction to the Chúa. Commissioners have been sent to escort the Dutch and their goods to the royal court.’ At every meeting the Chúa without fail asked Hartsinck about Dutch power, their relations with other European countries, and whether they would be willing to ally with Tonkin to fight against Quinam. Carel Hartsinck adroitly responded satisfactorily to all the Chúa’s questions but invariably politely excused himself from discussing any alliance, saying that such an important decision could only be made by the Governor-General in Batavia.221 Despite the trading privileges granted by the Chúa, the Dutch trade in Tonkin was severely obstructed by some high-ranking eunuchs. These mandarins tried in one way or the other to extort money from the Company in exchange for raw silk and piece-goods and openly expressed their desire to manipulate the silk supply. They also obstructed the Dutch sale of import goods and appropriated a large part of the Company goods on the Chúa’s account to resell them in the local market. These impediments, however, could not dim the attraction of the Tonkinese silk trade. The Dutch noticed on their arrival that, the year before, the average purchase price of Tonkinese raw silk had been 45 taels per picul while that in Quinam had stood between 100 and 130 taels per picul. It was the low purchase price of Tonkinese raw silk which had lured the Portuguese to visit Tonkin in the winter of 1636/7 with three ships. Because many foreign ships arrived, the purchase price of Tonkinese raw silk rose to 60 taels per picul on average, but this still left it far lower than that in Quinam.222 Therefore, the Dutch could easily exchange their cargo valued at 188,166 guilders for 536.95 piculs of raw silk and 9,665 silk piece-goods, valued at 190,000 guilders in total. This silk cargo reportedly yielded an average profit of 80 per cent in Japan. The success of the inaugural voyage to Tonkin prompted the Dutch to cultivate intimate political relations with the Trịnh rulers in order to facilitate their silk trade between Tonkin and

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Japan. At long last they had found the raw silk and silk piece-goods they so hungrily desired to run their Japan trade. From now on, Tonkinese silk left on board Dutch ships in exchange for Japanese silver and Dutch ordnance. 3. Ideological struggles and belligerent decisions, 1637−1643 Military or peaceful involvement, 1637−1641? It was noted earlier that, by the middle of the 1630s, the Trịnh’s strategy of luring the VOC into a military alliance fortuitously coincided with the latter’s plan to carve itself a place on the Tonkin market so as to export silk to Japan. In order to reach their goal, the Trịnh rulers first inveigled the VOC out of the Nguyễn domain and having succeeded persuaded Batavia to ally with them to wage war against their Nguyễn rivals. They hinted that they would compensate the VOC for all the financial losses which the Company had suffered at the hands of the Nguyễn rulers, provided the Company traded with and supported Tonkin militarily. At this juncture, Duycker’s negotiations with Chúa Nguyễn Phúc Lan to procure compensation and trading privileges for the Company failed. The time was ripe to encourage Batavia to shift its commercial focus from Quinam to Tonkin. Nevertheless, the VOC found itself on the horns of a dilemma: how could it maintain the relationship with Tonkin without stirring up adverse reactions in Quinam and vice-versa. Despite the current unprofitable state of the Company trade with Quinam, mindful of the Company’s long-term strategy for the Indo-Chinese Peninsula, the High Government still wanted to seek an amicable relationship with the Nguyễn Kingdom.223 Military involvement with the Trịnh rulers was not a favourable option for the Company at this moment, since it had already overburdened itself with wars and conflicts elsewhere in Asia.224 Batavia therefore needed to calculate carefully all possible gains and losses should it ally with Tonkin in a war against Quinam.225 As reflected in the VOC documents, prior to the Company’s inaugural voyage to Tonkin in 1637, Batavia still believed that it could maintain peaceful relationships with both Vietnamese kingdoms simultaneously. In his instruction to Carel Hartsinck in Tonkin in the spring of 1637, Duycker optimistically reasoned that, although the TrịnhNguyễn wars had already been in full swing for several years, the local

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inhabitants still had no difficulty in crossing the border to exchange their commodities.226 Duycker’s opinion was perhaps optimistically coloured by the fact that the Portuguese had been trading peacefully with both Vietnamese kingdoms up to that time. Notwithstanding his stated belief, Duycker still instructed Hartsinck to sound out Chúa Trịnh Tráng’s attitude towards the Company given that the latter was waging war against Quinam to gain compensation.227 To the north the Trịnh rulers were constantly pressing the Dutch to enter into a military alliance and to support them materially with soldiers, ships, weapons, and other martial paraphernalia to fight against Quinam. Chúa Trịnh Tráng not only openly expressed his desire to ally himself with the Dutch during his meetings with Hartsinck at his palace in 1637 but, in order to persuade the Governor-General in Batavia of the final victory over Quinam, he showed how powerful his armies were, at least on paper, in the following impressive list:228 300,000 2,000 10,000 1,000 50,000 1,000 30,000 20,000

excellent soldiers big elephants warhorses well trained for warring war galleys heavy guns which can be used both on land and on board the galleys pieces of ordnance guns with red lacquered stocks and long butts which can also shoot 30 bullets guns with black lacquered stocks and short butts which can also shoot 30 bullets

And in order to explain the reason why he had waged war against Nguyễn Quinam as well as his current need of the Company’s military support, the Chúa gave the following justifications:229 My country Tonkin lies at the centre [of the region]. Kings and Lords from the East, West, and North come to pay their respects to me with the exception of the South [Quinam]. The people there are country folk whose lives and contacts are weak and who carry out all good and laudable things in a wrong way. They rely on and comfort themselves in unusual ways and do not obey me. If I want to war against them at sea with galleys then the passage thence is too far for me, and the billows too high and the wind and the rain disadvantageous. Therefore I cannot achieve this by this means which leads these wicked people to persist even more in their wrongful ways and behaviour; which pleases them. These are the reasons why I have planned to seek the help from the Dutch. Should Your Majesty be willing to agree, then I shall ally my country forever with your country. Could you kindly supply me with

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In the same letter, Chúa Trịnh also promised to cover the costs and expenses incurred by the Company by sending ships and soldiers for up to two to three hundred thousand rixdollars. Above all, once the rebellious region had been completely pacified, he would grant the Company favourable privileges allowing it to reside, trade, build forts, and collect taxes and pluck all sorts of ‘incomes’ and ‘fruits’ from Quinam.230 Besides this letter to the Governor-General, Chúa Trịnh Tráng and Crown Prince Trịnh Căn, who succeeded his father in 1657, also sent letters and presents to President Nicolaas Couckebacker in Hirado to strengthen the relationship. In the capital Thăng Long, Chúa Trịnh Tráng even symbolically adopted Carel Hartsinck as his own son.231 In 1639, Chúa Trịnh sent his first ambassador to Batavia in order to attract more attention from the Company. The sole mission of the Tonkinese delegation was simply to visit the Company headquarters and observe its military prowess in order to seek out if there were any truth in the Portuguese calumnies about the Dutch. For the past few years, the Lusitanians had been busily spreading rumours that the Dutch in Asia were nothing better than pirates. As the Tonkinese Ambassador was extremely impressed by the grandeur of the VOC headquarters in Batavia as well as the cordiality with which the High Government treated him, the Portuguese slanders on the Dutch transpired to be groundless. More importantly, the envoy’s report of his voyage to Batavia impressed the Chúa and prompted him to consolidate political relations with the Company. Anxious to lure the Dutch into a military alliance to counter-attack Quinam, he generously granted the Dutch factors even more trading privileges to buy and sell commodities in his territories.232 Upon the return of the Tonkinese delegation, Batavia assigned Couckebacker to be the Company representative to negotiate with the Chúa about conditions necessary to forge a military alliance. Couckebacker had been scrupulously instructed by the High Government that he should always parry the Chúa’s direct demands for Dutch assistance. He explained to the Chúa that the Company was a trading enterprise and, hence, should not involve itself in military actions. As

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matters stood, its ships in Asian waters were subject to the Portuguese threat, and the Company desperately needed to hold some squadrons in reserve to protect its servants and property from its mortal enemy. Should the Chúa need weapons to fight against Quinam, the Company would try to sell him some of its spare ordnance and ammunition. In exchange for the Company’s assistance, the High Government expected the Chúa would generously grant the Dutch factors more trading privileges and simultaneously forbid the Portuguese to trade with Tonkin. Chúa Trịnh rejected these conditions and the negotiations stagnated. If the High Government did not reduce its unreasonable conditions, the Chúa threatened, he would terminate the relationship with the Company. His armies were powerful enough to pacify the Nguyễn Kingdom without Dutch assistance. If the Company did not want to assist him but wanted only to trade with his country, they should feel free to come. Such menaces did not embarrass Couckebacker in the least. He politely thanked the Chúa for no longer demanding military assistance from the Company. Shortly after this unsuccessful round of negotiations, Couckebacker left for Formosa and Batavia. As predicted, upon his departure, Chúa Trịnh Tráng sent a letter to Governor Van der Burch in Formosa, demanding the Company to provide him with five warships, 600 well-armed soldiers, 100 pieces of ordnance, and 200 gunners to attack Quinam in his next campaign.233 Upon his arrival in Batavia in December 1639, Couckebacker submitted a detailed report of his mission to Tonkin to the High Government. According to what he had observed and perceived during his short visit to Thăng Long, the politics of Tonkin were rather unstable. Although the Trịnh family had completely amassed the power at court in its own hands, its position was highly vulnerable. The Mạc clan who had been driven out of Đông Kinh since 1592 remained a constant threat to the Lê/Trịnh Government. Around the capital, the Chúa’s opponents also threatened to overthrow him. Given this situation, all the Chúa’s promises to the Company were by no means guaranteed. Ruminating on the perspective of a military alliance with Tonkin, Couckebacker pessimistically concluded that what the Trịnh rulers wanted was not to create a genuine alliance but to effectuate a transfer of the burden of their war onto the Company.234 Couckebacker’s cautious advice about dealing with the Trịnh ruler did not alter the ultimate decision of Batavia to ally with Tonkin to wage war against Quinam. In his letter to Chúa Trịnh Tráng in 1640,

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Governor-General Van Diemen thanked the Chúa for entertaining his official so kindly during his visit to Tonkin, and he expressed his hope to establish a successful alliance between the two parties in the future. The Governor-General also expected the Chúa to inform him of the date as well as the garrisoning place for the first allied campaign, so that the High Government could send squadrons to Tonkin. Because he did not receive a reply from the Trịnh ruler, the Governor-General sent another letter to Thăng Long in 1641.235 In November of the same year, Governor Paulus Traudenius in Formosa also dispatched a letter of his own and presents to Chúa Trịnh Tráng. Delighted with the Company’s apparent readiness towards forming an alliance, the Trịnh ruler planned to send another ambassador to Batavia to strengthen the relationship and discuss the first allied campaign. Before Captain Jacob van Liesvelt, who had just arrived from Formosa, left for Batavia with the Tonkinese commissioner, the Chúa finally agreed to two important conditions: to compensate the Company willingly for its losses in Quinam in the past few years, and to send his armies to garrison Poutsin, the estuary of the Gianh River on the border between Tonkin and Quinam, to await the Dutch fleet. After achieving these concessions, Van Liesvelt departed for Batavia with a Tonkinese envoy on 18 January 1642.236 Tension escalating in Quinam, 1642 The relationship between the VOC and Quinam worsened after Batavia withdrew its servants and property from Hội An completely in the summer of 1638. Tensions between the two parties escalated in the next few years as Batavia step by step cautiously committed itself to a military alliance with Thăng Long and these tensions erupted in the spring of 1642 when the Company suffered new misfortunes at the hands of the Nguyễn rulers. On 26 November 1641, the Maria de Medicis and the Gulden Buijs sailing to Batavia from Formosa encountered a storm and were wrecked on the coast of Quinam. Eighty-two survivors (thirty from the Gulden Buijs and the rest from the Medicis) managed to come ashore with a considerable amount of money and merchandise. The rest, including Captain Jacob Jansen, the merchants Guilelmo de Wilt and Jan de Waert, and some Japanese, lost their lives. As soon as the survivors reached the shore, they were captured and held at Hội An. The salvaged goods, including money and eighteen cannon, were confiscated. The Chúa later summoned two constables to serve in his palace and released three Chinese merchants amongst the

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survivors, sending them to Batavia on board a Chinese junk sailing via Palembang to inform the High Government about the foundering of the Company ships.237 As the news of the imprisonment of Company servants and the confiscation of salvaged goods reached Batavia, the High Government decided unanimously to attack Quinam to avenge its losses.238 Tensions soon spilled over into an open conflict by Jacob van Liesvelt’s hostile appearance off the Quinam coast. After his departure from Tonkin, on 6 February Van Liesvelt passed the Bay of Tourane where present-day Đà Nẵng city is situated. There, the Tonkinese Ambassador asked Van Liesvelt to capture some Quinamese. Anxious to please the mandarin, the Dutch captain, ignorant of the recent wreck of the Company ships, sent thirty well-armed soldiers ashore to capture several hundreds of Quinamese and then quickly sailed away. At sea, the captives informed Van Liesvelt about the latest shipwrecks and the Dutch prisoners at Hội An. The captain therefore returned to negotiate with the Nguyễn rulers for an exchange of prisoners.239 In Quinam, the news of the appearance of the hostile Dutch ship and its raid on the coastal people soon reached the court. A fleet of thirty-five ships commanded by the Crown Prince was ready to defend the coastal area against a Dutch attack.240 In response to the Prince’s demand for a meeting, Van Liesvelt appointed Isaacq Davids the Company representative to negotiate with the Prince. Both sides agreed to release all captives. Following the agreement, Van Liesvelt freed all Quinamese captives on board, keeping only the Quinamese mandarin and the Japanese interpreter, whom the Prince had sent to negotiate with Van Liesvelt, as security. With a great show of reluctance, the Prince refused to free any Dutch prisoners until Van Liesvelt had released his officials and had also handed over the Tonkinese Ambassador to Quinam. High handedly the Prince threatened to execute all Dutch captives if his order was not obeyed within one day. Van Liesvelt strongly protested against the Prince’s exorbitant ultimatum and threatened that any such assault would lead to fierce revenge by the Company. During these tense negotiations, the Dutch captives at Hội An secretly informed Van Liesvelt that the Prince was preparing a large fleet of some 300 well-armed vessels to launch a sudden attack on the Dutch ship. After a few days of fruitless negotiation, Van Liesvelt decided to leave for Batavia, carrying with him the Quinamese official and the Japanese interpreter.241 Both parties blamed each other for the incidents and not unnaturally

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interpreted them differently. The Nguyễn accused Van Liesvelt of capturing their subjects illegally in peacetime. Regarding the shipwreck of the Maria de Medicis and Gulden Buijs, directly after the accident, the Chúa had sent three Chinese survivors to Batavia to inform the Governor-General of the incident. The rest of these survivors were not imprisoned but guarded by the Japanese chief at Hội An. The Chúa wanted to see the official reply from Batavia on this matter before taking any decision. The Chúa took pains to stress that the court had the right to take all survivors prisoners and confiscate all salvaged goods from every shipwreck along the coast as was laid down in local law.242 Even leaving this tradition aside, since the VOC had officially allied itself with his enemy, the Trịnh, he had all the more reason to do so. Eager to please the Nguyễn rulers, the Japanese chief affirmed the genuineness of this statement.243 What had the Nguyễn rulers actually done during these incidents? It is possible to piece together a general picture of these events with the help of sporadic, and sometimes contradictory, documents. The survivors of the Maria de Medicis and the Gulden Buijs were held captive at Hội An under the surveillance of the chief of the Japanese community. Three Dutchmen were ordered to serve in the Chúa’s palace and the rest was provided with six bales of rice and 6,000 copper coins. The Dutch prisoners at Hội An lived in constant trepidation after hearing all sorts of rumours. Some said that Chúa Nguyễn would sooner or later send them to Batavia, while other rumoured that should the tension escalate and the Company remain steadfast in its alliance with Trịnh Tonkin, the Dutch captives would be executed. Pertinently, the actions of the Nguyễn rulers before Van Liesvelt’s raid imply that they had indeed tried to avoid a military confrontation with the Company.244 After Van Liesvelt had left Quinam for Batavia, Chúa Nguyễn summoned twelve Dutchmen to his palace. He strongly condemned Van Liesvelt’s hostility towards his people at a time at which he and his people had been endeavouring to deal peacefully with the Company in order to eschew tension. After sending three Chinese survivors to Batavia to inform the Governor-General, he had even thought of releasing the rest of the Dutch captives. Now he had to wait for the Governor-General’s reply on this matter. Perceiving the Chúa’s hesitation, the Dutch prisoners asked him to let them carry his letter to the Governor-General in Batavia, where they would try their best to dispel the tension. Their request was granted; fifty Dutchmen were allowed to sail to Batavia under the command of Joris Welten, the former captain

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of the Gulden Buijs, on 19 March 1643. The rest remained at Hội An until good news should arrive from Batavia.245 The good news, for which the Dutch prisoners were longing, never came as the VOC-Quinam relationship was raised to a higher level of tension because of another misfortune. Only two days after she had left Quinam, the junk carrying the fifty Dutchmen was attacked by a Portuguese ship off the Chàm coast. The unarmed Dutch junk was quickly overwhelmed and most of those on board were killed. Eighteen Dutchmen narrowly escaped by diving into the water.246 After the Portuguese had sailed away, the survivors landed on the Chàm coast where four more died of exhaustion. Thirteen survivors were well received and later distributed to the care of several high-ranking mandarins by the Chàm King. The last man, Juriaen de Rooden, was presented to the King of Cambodia, who later freed him and let him go to Batavia.247 The Dutch military defeats, 1642−1643 While the antipathy of Batavia towards Quinam was growing day after day, the Nguyễn concessions in these incidents were not perceived correctly. After the shipwreck of the Maria de Medicis and the Gulden Buijs, the High Government agreed unanimously to ally with Tonkin to take revenge against Nguyễn Quinam.248 The goals of the military operations were to liberate the Dutch captives at Hội An, to seek compensation, and, equally important, to save the reputation of the Company which had been badly damaged after the accumulation of misfortunes in Quinam. Consequently, in the summer of 1642, a fleet of five ships carrying 222 men (the Kievit carried seventy men, Meerman sixty-five, Wakende Boei thirty-five, Zeeuwsche Nachtegaal thirty-five, and Brack seventeen) commanded by Jan van Linga was launched to attack Quinam. The fleet carried orders from Batavia to capture as many Quinamese prisoners as it could on the way to Tourane. There, Van Linga would send the Governor-General’s letter to Chúa Nguyễn. Another letter would be sent to the Dutch captives at Hội An, ordering them to escape with the assistance of the fleet. Van Linga should try to convince the Chúa that, once the Dutch captives were released, the Company would stop its overtures to Tonkin. If the Chúa did not free all Dutch prisoners within forty-eight hours, Van Linga would execute half the Quinamese captives and the other half would be sent to Tonkin.249

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From 31 May 1642 the Dutch fleet began to raid coastal villages in Quinam. The Dutch troops landed at the Bay of Cambir (modern Quảng Ngãi Province), where they burnt around 400-500 houses and captured thirty-eight people. In order to swell the number of captives, Van Liesvelt, who was sailing with the fleet, proposed a reckless tactic. Unfortunately this led to a heavy loss of Dutch soldiers. Leaving the fleet behind, Van Liesvelt and some twenty soldiers went to Champullo (Cù Lao Chàm), off the Hội An coast, on a small boat in order to launch a sudden attack and capture local people. The Quinamese, having been warned by the local authority about the Dutch hostility, were very vigilant in their look-out for the arrival of these Dutchmen. They therefore made a surprise attack on the Dutch vessel and immediately killed Van Liesvelt and ten more men. The others were badly injured and died later as a result of their wounds.250 Despite this heavy loss, Van Linga did not break off negotiations with the Nguyễn rulers. But after all further attempts to free the last Dutch captives at Hội An failed, the Dutch commander took the fleet to the Gianh River to join the Trịnh armies.251 To Van Linga’s surprise, there was no Tonkinese army at the Gianh River; Chúa Trịnh Tráng had not mounted the campaign as he had informed Batavia he would do. Disappointed in the Trịnh ruler, Van Linga and the Dutch fleet sailed northwards to Tonkin. In his letter to Chúa Trịnh, Van Linga exaggerated the Dutch actions off Hội An and expressed his disappointment with the non-appearance of the Chúa’s armies. Chúa Trịnh Tráng justified himself to Van Linga, stating that he had been there in April to await the Dutch fleet. Because the Dutch did not come when they said they would, he finally withdrew.252 His intention now was to campaign during the following spring; he exhorted the Dutch fleet to arrive in time to put itself under his command. After having settled the final agreements about the next campaign with the Chúa, Van Linga took the fleet to Formosa.253 In its instruction to the fleet, the High Government had anticipated the possibility that the Trịnh armies might not campaign, and hence had instructed Van Linga that, should the Trịnh ruler fail to show up, he should either sail to Tonkin or continue to raid along the coast of Quinam before proceeding to Formosa.254 After the first unsuccessful attempt at co-operative action, Batavia grew suspicious of the ambivalent behaviour of the Trịnh ruler and wary of the somewhat unusual nature of the military alliance proposed by Tonkin. Nevertheless, its losses in Quinam were so heavy that Batavia could arrive at no better

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a solution than pursuing vengeance. With some perception of the way matters stood, the High Government was aware that even the least concession to Quinam would irritate the Trịnh rulers, probably severely disrupting its lucrative exportation of Tonkinese silk to Japan. In his letter to Chúa Trịnh Tráng of December 1642, Governor Paulus Traudenius in Formosa expressed his regret that Van Linga’s fleet had not met the armies of Tonkin at the Gianh River to mount an attack on Quinam. The Governor also confirmed that, as the Chúa had demanded, a fleet of five ships would be in Tonkin in the coming spring to join the campaign.255 As planned, a fleet of five ships (the Kievit, Wakende Boei, Zeeuwsche Nachtegaal, Wijdenes, and Zandvoort) and 290 soldiers (130 infantry and 160 mariners) under the command of Johannes Lamotius left Formosa for Tonkin in January 1643. According to Traudenius’s instruction to Lamotius, the fleet was to garrison near the islands of the Fishers at the estuary of the Thái Bình River. There, Lamotius should fire his guns to inform the people of Tonkin of the arrival of the Dutch fleet. Detailed instruction for the campaign would be given by Antonio van Brouckhorst, the chief of the Tonkin factory. If the Chúa’s armies were again not ready to attack Quinam, Lamotius should wait for a maximum of ten days and then set sail for Batavia before the north-east monsoon ended.256 To the disappointment of Lamotius, the Chúa was again not ready for the campaign. After a few days lying at anchor in the Gulf of Tonkin, Lamotius decided to sail the fleet to Batavia. This displeased Chúa Trịnh Tráng who insisted that these ships remain in Tonkin in order that their companies would march to Quinam with him. Lamotius refused to wait as Governor Traudenius had instructed him to sail to Batavia should the armies of Tonkin not be ready. Having failed to persuade Lamotius to wait for his troops, Chúa Trịnh demanded that the Wakende Boei and fifty gunners be left behind in order to depart to the Gianh River with him in the summer. Lamotius agreed. At the end of February, the remaining four ships left Tonkin for Batavia. Within a few days, the Zeeuwsche Nachtegaal and the Kievit were forced to return to Tonkin because the monsoon had changed. The return of these ships delighted the Chúa but worried the High Government because Batavia feared another shipwreck. Lamotius was severely reprimanded for his irresponsible command as well as his ill-judged agreement with the Chúa to leave the Wakende Boei behind.257 Despite two failed campaigns, Batavia was still prepared to send another fleet to ally with the Trịnh to attack Quinam in the summer

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of 1643.258 In its letter to Chúa Trịnh Tráng in the spring of 1643, Batavia confirmed that the Dutch fleet would appear at the Gianh River in the summer and await his armies. This letter was brought to Thăng Long by President Jan van Elseracq on his way to Japan. The Governor-General’s letter reinforced by Elseracq’s visit certainly encouraged the Trịnh ruler to dispatch his troops to the Gianh River. Therefore, in the third lunar month (around April) of 1643, Chúa Trịnh commanded 10,000 soldiers and a large warship fleet to set out to attack Quinam.259 While waiting for the arrival of the Dutch fleet to pursue the campaign at sea, Tonkinese infantry tried to capture some forts but to no avail. According to Chúa Trịnh’s letter to GovernorGeneral Van Diemen, his soldiers secretly strewed caltrops to trap the Nguyễn armies on the battlefield. This tactic proved abortive because the southern soldiers discovered what had been done and hence did not venture onto the battlefield. The Tonkinese army was already depleted as a large number of Tonkinese soldiers had died in attempts to conquer several forts. Because many of his soldiers were dying every day, falling victim to the hot summer climate and because no Dutch fleet showed up as Batavia had promised, the Chúa eventually withdrew his troops in August 1643.260 In the meantime, because of the non-arrival of the Kievit, Wakende Boei and Zeeuwsche Nachtegaal, Batavia had to select other ships for the campaign. These were the Wijdenes, Waterhond, and Vos, carrying 200 soldiers under the command of Pieter Baeck, but the ships could not leave Jambi for the Gianh River until the end of June. Commander Pieter Baeck was instructed that should Chúa Trịnh Tráng be disparaging about this small fleet, he should justify himself by explaining that the High Government really had planned to send a larger fleet to ally with Tonkin, but the absence of the three afore-mentioned ships had upset the scheme. The Governor-General believed that the fleet, although consisting of only three ships, would still be effective in the campaign if the Kievit and Zeeuwsche Nachtegaal, which Batavia supposed had had to return to Tonkin because of contrary wind, would join up with the Wakende Boei to sail with the Chúa’s armies to the Gianh River. The High Government also carefully instructed Baeck how to negotiate with the Nguyễn rulers should they propose the Company a ceasefire.261 On 7 July, the fleet was just around five miles from the Gianh River when they were engaged in a fierce battle with some sixty warships of the Nguyễn navy. The Wijdenes caught fire and exploded, killing

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Commander Pieter Baeck and most of the people on board. Those who managed to jump from the ship were captured and executed by the Nguyễn soldiers. The other two ships were heavily damaged; Captain Jan Erntsen of the Waterhond also died during the fight.262 Shocked by this fierce battle, the Waterhond and the Vos managed to escape. Not daring to call at the Gianh River to look for the Trịnh armies who were garrisoned so near the battle that they could even hear the gunfire, the Waterhond and the Vos fled to the Gulf of Tonkin. On 19 July, these ships accidentally encountered the Meerman, a Company ship en route to Japan from Tonkin with a large cargo of silk.263 Hearing of the new defeat, Van Brouckhorst immediately sent a message to the Dutch factors in Thăng Long to instruct them how to deal with the Trịnh rulers, especially with the Chúa when he returned from the battlefield. Afterwards the Meerman sailed to Japan. At the end of July, the Waterhond and the Vos also left Tonkin for Formosa. The Prince had tried in vain to detain the Dutch ships until the Chúa returned so that they could justify their failure to ally with his father’s armies at the border.264 The Dutch officials in the Northern Quarters (Japan, Formosa, and Tonkin) believed that the defeat of Pieter Baeck’s fleet would arouse strong opposition to the Company trade in Thăng Long and plant the seeds of doubt about Dutch naval power in the Trịnh minds. The dilemma which the Dutch officials in the Northern Quarters were facing was how to confess their defeat to the Trịnh rulers without harming the reputation of the Company. In his letter to Chúa Trịnh Tráng in October 1643, President Van Elseracq of the Nagasaki factory exaggerated the ‘victory’ of the Vos and the Waterhond, simultaneously stretching the heavy loss of the Nguyễn navy up to at least seven warships and around eight hundred soldiers. And, in order to assuage the Chúa’s discontent with the Company, Elseracq admitted that the nonappearance of the fleet at the Gianh River was blameworthy. Those who had made such a terrible mistake would be severely punished by the ‘King of Holland’.265 In fact, the Dutch factory in Thăng Long suffered much less obstruction than the Dutch officials had generally presumed; there followed no maltreatment of the Dutch factors. The business transactions of the factory were maintained peacefully perhaps because of the Chúa’s expectation that the military alliance with the VOC would be continued. Shortly after his arrival in the capital, Chúa Trịnh summoned to his palace Merchant Isaacq Gobijn, whom the Prince had kept as

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hostage after Van Brouckhorst’s departure for Japan in July. The Chúa wanted to hear the complete story about the incident from the Dutch representative. After a peaceful discourse, Gobijn was allowed to sail to Formosa with the Kievit and the Wakende Boei.266 After Gobijn’s departure, Chúa Trịnh sent a long letter to the Governor-General. He informed the ‘Hollantschen Prins’ [‘Prince of Holland’] about the failure of the co-operation and described the unsuccessful campaigns of his soldiers in their assaults on some well-built forts in Quinam. The Chúa blamed the failure on the Dutch side: I had expected that you would assist me with ships and soldiers but none arrived. I provisioned the three ships which remained in my country so that they could accompany me on my march to Poutsin adequately and respected the soldiers on board because they were mighty fighters. But they did not help me and were wanting in courage to fight against the enemy. When I ordered them to do battle with and destroy the Quinamese armies, they simply excused themselves and sailed their ships back and forth on the deep sea, so far from the coast. Therefore the people of Quinam all laughed at your soldiers.267

After having reminded the Governor-General one more time of the ‘true story’: that those cowardly Dutch gunners had been ‘laughed’ at by the Nguyễn soldiers, the Chúa provoked him: So, please come here with your ships and 5,000 men to fight against Quinam until the final victory has been achieved. But you should send brave soldiers, not merchants, because even if you send twenty ships to the coast of Quinam, they could not do the Quinamese any harm because they are far from the sea. Therefore you should send well-trained soldiers to fight on land.268

Despite or perhaps because of the Chúa’s letter, Batavia ended its military alliance with Tonkin. The short-lived coalition only resulted in three unsuccessful campaigns because of the following reasons. Most certainly, Batavia had underestimated the strength of the Nguyễn army. In its instructions to the fleets destined for Quinam, Batavia often gave the commanders guidelines about how to negotiate with the Nguyễn rulers should the latter surrender or propose a ceasefire with the Company. It is rather ironical that, even after the 1642 defeat in which Van Liesvelt and some twenty soldiers died, Batavia still clung to its arrogant belief in its superiority when it again advised Pieter Baeck how to bargain with the Nguyễn, should the latter propose the Company a truce. Moreover, and as a consequence of the serious underestimation of Batavia, the Dutch commanders and sol-

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diers were overconfident and hence too impulsive when they set about attacking Quinam. Van Liesvelt and his companions died as a result of their reckless tactics. In the summer of 1643, the fleet of Pieter Baeck simply swaggered past the shore of Quinam without taking any precautions. Therefore, when some sixty Nguyễn warships suddenly surrounded and attacked the Dutch fleet, the Wijdenes caught fire and exploded immediately. The Waterhond and the Vos had only eight and six cannon respectively on board; the rest were reportedly lying dismantled in the hold.269 Finally, the ambivalence allied with the hesitation of the Trịnh rulers during these allied campaigns was another critical cause which led to the final failure of the alliance. Hamstrung by the consecutive failures of the Trịnh armies to appear in the summer of 1642 and spring of 1643, the two Dutch fleets were sent there to no purpose. The Dutch gunners who had travelled to Nhật Lệ with the Trịnh armies in the summer of 1643 described the Chúa as being so faint-hearted that he dared not attack the enemy who were very close to his garrison. When the Dutch soldiers urged him to fight, he refused, giving as his justification that he did not want to put the Dutch gunners in danger. What the Chúa was expecting was a powerful Dutch fleet from Batavia. Therefore, when no fleet arrived as he expected, he withdrew his forces, leaving the Wakende Boei and Kievit stranded in the shallow estuary vulnerable to the threat of the Nguyễn armies.270 4. The Quinam interlude and frigid relations with Tonkin, 1644−1651 The VOC’s unilateral war with Quinam, 1644−1651 The defeats of the Company by Quinam, not counting the heavy losses incurred prior to this war, aroused more hatred against the Nguyễn. The High Government in Batavia unanimously agreed to continue the prosecution of military revenge on Quinam. But now distrusting the Trịnh rulers, Batavia decided to act on its own. The unilateral war waged against Quinam had three aims. The primary motive was that Batavia wanted revenge on Quinam for its heavy defeats in 1642 and 1643 and felt it necessary to save the Company’s reputation which had been recently blackened. Batavia was also anxious to liberate the rest of the Dutch captives who were still held prison in central Vietnam. Finally, if possible, the High Government was desirous of

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seeking compensation for all the losses the Company had suffered at the hands of the Nguyễn rulers. In 1644, Hendrik Dircsz. van den Graeff (or Platvoet), in command of the Lillo and the Haring carrying 115 soldiers, blockaded the coast of Quinam. The fleet was under orders to raid all ships trading with Quinam and capture as many inhabitants as it could. Having sailed from Batavia in June, Platvoet’s fleet met the Kievit, Leeuwerik, Dolfijn, and Wakende Boei returning from Phnompenh one month later. In Cambodia, a fierce battle between these Dutch ships and the Cambodian armies had broken out in which Captain Hendrik Harouze had been killed and the Dutch fleet had suffered severe damage. After the unexpected meeting, Sijmon Jacobsz. Domkes, the interim Commander of the fleet returning from Phnompenh, and Platvoet went to visit the King of Champa, who had been maintaining good relations with the Company and had even adopted Pieter van Regemortes, the former chief factor of the Cambodia factory, as his son.271 Afterwards, Domkes joined Platvoet to launch an attack on Quinam. From 24 July, a fleet of four ships consisting of the Kievit, Leeuwerik, Lillo, and Haring began to cruise along and raid the coast of Quinam. Apart from the sporadic forays, this united fleet could not find any considerable target because the littoral of Quinam was quiet. Whether it was safe was another matter and a landing was neither safe nor had instructions for it been issued. Therefore, after a few days of patrolling the coast of Quinam without achieving anything, the fleet sailed to Formosa.272 After this 1644 fiasco, Batavia launched no official attack on the Nguyễn territory any more. Despite this apparent withdrawal, the VOC-Quinam relationship remained hostile. The Company ships sailing through Nguyễn waters were instructed to capture any ship whatsoever trading with Quinam. In the years leading to the 1651 peace agreement, there were several attempts by both sides to exchange captives. By the end of 1643, there were nineteen Dutch prisoners at Hội An. One year later, this number had been reduced to fourteen: five had died of disease. For its part, the VOC held seventeen Quinamese captives in Formosa; the number of them at the other places is unknown.273 Despite their imprisonment, the Dutch prisoners at Hội An managed to send several letters to their masters in Formosa, Siam, and Batavia, requesting them to arrange an exchange of captives.274 These letters may have contained indirect signals from the Nguyễn rulers to the Company, calling for a dialogue and for an end to the harmful hostilities. This did not elicit any posi-

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tive reply from the Dutch side, although several letters were sent to the Dutch captives at Hội An by the Dutch officials.275 In 1644, the crisis could have been defused with the active assistance of the French priest Alexandre de Rhodes. Having received permission from Chúa Nguyễn Phúc Lan, the French priest, who was then preaching in central Vietnam, proposed to act as a mediator in a reciprocal exchange of captives. He urged the Dutch captives at Hội An to write a letter to their Governor-General on 26 June 1644 requesting him to arrange the exchange.276 Meanwhile the Quinamese captives in Formosa also sent a similar letter to Governor François Caron, petitioning that one of them be allowed to return to Quinam to appeal their Chúa for a complete exchange of captives, while the rest remained in Formosa as hostages until all Dutch prisoners at Hội An had been freed.277 The Dutch officials turned a deaf ear to these petitions, and this matter was ignored until the early 1650s. Was this because the High Government still believed that it could solve the crisis by force? Or was Batavia afraid that the Company’s reputation might be disgraced by proposing a ceasefire? These questions still remain unanswerable. Nevertheless, several events relevant to the Company trade in the Indo-Chinese Peninsula may provide clues about what influenced Batavia’s attitude towards Quinam. The tension between the VOC and Cambodia is the first to spring to mind. In the wake of the escalating tension with the Cambodian court, in September 1643 the chief factor of the Dutch factory, Pieter van Regemortes, and most of the Dutch merchants in the capital Phnompenh were murdered and imprisoned; the factory was looted. To avenge this assault, a fleet of five ships commanded by Admiral Harouze sailed up the Mekong River to attack Phnompenh in 1644. This mission failed miserably; the Admiral was killed during the battle. The following year, the King of Cambodia stepped up to challenge the Company by sending it an impertinent letter.278 It was just at this juncture that the relationship between Batavia and Tonkin entered a difficult phase after the Company’s withdrawal from the military alliance. Despite the erosion of the relationship between the court and the factory, the Company’s export of Tonkinese silk to Japan yielded high profits. As the ‘Quinam issue’ remained sensitive, Batavia obviously avoided dealing with this matter in order to protect its vulnerable commercial relations with the Trịnh domain. Finally, the exchange of captives was no longer an important issue for Batavia because, after a successful gaol-break of six Dutchmen in 1645, there were only eight Dutch captives left in

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Hội An. By 1650, only three men were reportedly still alive.279 These were perhaps the major reasons which reduced the interest of Batavia in negotiating with Quinam as it was careful not to tread on toes and thereby avoided irritating the Trịnh rulers in Thăng Long. The peace agreement with Quinam, 1651 In 1648, Chúa Nguyễn Phúc Tần was enthroned. The political transformation in Quinam paved the way for a new dialogue with Batavia. Shortly after succeeding to power, the new Chúa stated that he was willing to release the remaining Dutch captives and sign a truce with the Company to end the current hostility between the two parties provided that Batavia showed its willingness to negotiate.280 The Nguyễn ruler’s proclamation was cordially welcomed in Batavia. In fact, by the late 1640s, the Gentlemen XVII281 had been urging the High Government to look for an appropriate occasion to end the tenacious and harmful confrontation with Quinam. This order was indeed mentioned again in their letter to Batavia in 1650.282 In early 1650, the Nguyễn rulers stepped up the process of normalizing the relationship with the VOC when a high-ranking mandarin from the Nguyễn court stated in his letter to Bingam, the chief of the Chinese community in Batavia, that the Nguyễn rulers were now ready to release all Dutch captives and sign a peace agreement with the Dutch Company. In January 1651, Batavia freed some Quinamese captives as a gesture towards commencing the process of normalization with the Nguyễn Kingdom. In April of the same year, Batavia concluded the ‘Quinam issue’ when it assigned Willem Verstegen, the former chief factor of the Dutch factory in Japan, as the Company representative in the negotiations with Quinam. In June, Batavia sent a letter to the Dutch captives at Hội An, asking them to inform Chúa Nguyễn of the final decision of Batavia. Simultaneously, another letter was dispatched to the Quinamese mandarin via Bingam, informing him of Batavia’s plan to send an ambassador to Quinam at the end of the year. 283 The commission to Quinam was successful. Leaving Batavia in April 1651, Verstegen arrived in Tonkin in July, where he visited Chúa Trịnh Tráng with a view towards enhancing the mutual relationship, and where he inspected the Tonkin factory.284 In the summer of 1651, Verstegen sailed for Formosa, from where he departed for Quinam in November. Off the Quinam coast, Merchant Hendrick Baron was sent ashore to inform the local authorities about the arrival of the Dutch

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commissioner. The Dutch delegates were cordially received. When Baron returned to the ship, ten mandarins accompanied him to inform Verstegen that Chúa Nguyễn was awaiting his arrival; coastal inhabitants had been ordered to welcome any Dutch ship arriving in their country warmly. After this short and pleasant prelude, Baron travelled to the Chúa’s palace. A few days later, Baron returned with a local mandarin, who had been entrusted by Chúa Nguyễn to discuss preparations for a peace treaty with Verstegen. The preliminaries for the treaty ran smoothly. Verstegen also returned thirty-three Quinamese prisoners and handed the Governor-General’s presents to the Chúa. On 27 November 1651, Verstegen went to the court and was entertained in style by the Nguyễn rulers. The Chúa also returned the last three Dutch prisoners, granted the Company free trade in his country, and allowed Verstegen to seek out a plot of land on which to build a factory at Hội An. On 8 December 1651, the ten-article treaty was completed and signed.285 In the days thereafter, the chief of the Japanese community assisted Verstegen in buying a house at Hội An in which to re-establish the Company factory. Having successfully concluded his mission, Verstegen departed for Batavia. The newly-established factory was managed by the Chief Factor Hendrick Baron and several Company servants.286 The 1651 treaty ended a decade of unremitting crisis between the VOC and Quinam, but the pleasant interlude was short-lived. Right after Verstegen’s departure, the newly revived relationship was torn apart. Upon hearing the rumour that Verstegen had had some Tonkinese ambassadors on board his ship, the Chúa immediately ordered his officials to inspect the Dutch vessel. By the time the inspectors arrived at the harbour, Verstegen had already sailed away. The Japanese chief in charge of checking foreign vessels insisted that he had inspected the ship carefully and he had found no such people. Despite the Japanese chief’s assurance, Chúa Nguyễn still kept Baron and four Dutch factors imprisoned and was even toying with the idea of executing them. It was said that the Chúa changed his mind and reprieved the Dutch prisoners only minutes before the planned execution. In January 1652, the Dutch factors and their property were shipped to Batavia on a Chinese junk. Chúa Nguyễn sent an equivocal letter to the Governor-General, stating that, despite all the negative developments after Verstegen’s departure, he still felt bound to the newly signed treaty and hence expected Batavia to continue to send ships to trade with his country. In Batavia, the incident was interpreted negatively:

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the High Government considered the Chúa’s maltreatment of its servants a ‘devious play’ to insult the Company. Pushing aside the newly renewed relationship, Batavia again declared war on Quinam.287 Frigid relations with the Trịnh, 1644−1647 The negotiations for a military alliance between Tonkin and the VOC which had lasted five years (1637–41) ended quickly after three unsuccessful allied campaigns. After the disastrous summer of 1643, the Tonkin-VOC military alliance was automatically terminated. No further co-operation was openly discussed although Chúa Trịnh kept asking for support in the form of weapons and ammunition from the Company. In his letter to Governor-General Van Diemen in 1643, Chúa Trịnh Tráng asked the High Government to provide him with ships, weapons and, above all, 5,000 infantry men to fight on land in the next campaign.288 The Chúa’s extravagant demands could not be answered in time because his letter was carried to Formosa and the translated version did not arrive in Batavia until 1645.289 The silence of Batavia annoyed the Chúa. According to the Dutch factors in Thăng Long, perhaps to prove to the Company that Tonkin could prosecute the war with its own means, Chúa Trịnh sent a large force of thirtyone galleys, 15,000 soldiers, and a large number of elephants, horses, and other equipment to attack Quinam in May 1644. Another army of 30,000 soldiers under his command was held in readiness in the capital to assist the frontier troops if needed.290 Notwithstanding its unilateral war against Quinam and the Trịnh insistence that the alliance be upheld, Batavia still decided to end the military co-operation with Tonkin. After all the misfortunes, Batavia now realized that a final victory over Quinam was an illusion. It also recognized the correctness of the predictions of Hartsinck and Couckebacker on the nature of the alliance which Chúa Trịnh Tráng wanted to create with the Company. In 1643, Hartsinck insisted to the Gentlemen XVII in Amsterdam that the Company should never trust the Trịnh promises. Therefore, it did not make any sense to ally with Tonkin.291 The following year, Chúa Trịnh Tráng openly stated that the Company had played a too minor role in the military alliance and, taken as a whole, it was rather Tonkin which had assisted the Company during the conflict with Quinam than the other way around. When this haughty statement reached Batavia, the High Government concluded that the Trịnh rulers had accepted the fact that the military alliance between the Company and Tonkin had officially ended.292

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The end of the intimate stage marked the commencement of a period of a frigid relationship between the VOC and Tonkin. On his arrival in Tonkin in December 1643, Van Brouckhorst soon sensed the distant attitude of the local mandarins. The eunuchs of the Chúa demanded 50,000 taels of silver for their master in exchange for raw silk at a price of 15 faccaar, while the market price was currently 35 faccaar. After numerous repudiations, Van Brouckhorst offered 12,500 taels, giving as his excuse that the factory had been supplied with only 20,000 taels this year. The Chúa accepted this small amount in the end but warned Van Brouckhorst that the amount of 25,000 taels was now fixed for the arrival of every ship.293 On his return to Tonkin in December 1644, Van Brouckhorst was stopped at the estuary: the Chúa had decreed that if the Dutch were unable to advance him the fixed amount of 25,000 taels of silver for the silk delivery, in order to avoid unnecessary quarrels they should not enter Tonkin. Van Brouckhorst had to acquiesce in the demand in order to secure the relationship.294 It was also agreed that from that year onwards, the annual amount of silver the Dutch factory had to advance to Chúa Trịnh would be 25,000 taels. The excuse that the Company had been supplied with only a small amount of silver from Japan would no longer be tolerated. Disputes over the silver advance were still not played out as the Chúa sometimes demanded extra silver in the event that more Dutch vessels should arrive in Tonkin. Such an instance speedily presented itself: in June 1645, the Gulden Gans was sent to Tonkin to assist the Zwarte Beer to convey the silk cargo to Japan. Chúa Trịnh Tráng asked the Dutch factory for a surcharge of 12,000 taels for the arrival of the Gulden Gans. The Dutch factors rejected the Chúa’s demand and explained to him that the ship had been sent to Tonkin to replace the Zwarte Beer, which was not seaworthy enough to sail between Tonkin and Japan. Therefore it carried neither silver nor merchandise but only the Governor-General’s presents to him. The Chúa later withdrew his demand but his discontent with the Dutch factory clearly increased.295 The cool relationship was further exacerbated by the misbehaviour of the Company servants. In January 1645, a scuffle occurred between two drunken Company servants and a group of local people. One factor was killed in the fight. A dozen of the Chúa’s servants were badly injured. The fight landed the factory in a sea of trouble. The Chúa insisted on having the second Dutch rowdy executed and fined the Dutch factory 1,000 taels to compensate for the loss of his servants.

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The Dutch factory delayed handing the second Dutch rabble-rouser over to the court and liberally bribed the chief mandarins in charge of investigating the scuffle. During the New Year festival, Van Brouckhorst also offered the courtiers lavish presents. The trouble was finally resolved by conciliatory Dutch actions. The bribes, however, cost the factory an excessive amount of money.296 In January 1646, this kind of trouble erupted again. The Junior Merchants Heycoop and Harten were seriously assaulted by some Chinese belonging to the merchant fleet of the Chinese mandarin Iquan (Zheng Zhilong). Merchant Jan van Riebeeck appealed to the court, demanding the Chinese villains be punished and compensation for the Dutch factors. The Dutch petitions were entirely ignored. It was said that the Trịnh rulers did not dare to deal with Chinese merchants trading under the auspice of Iquan.297 After the quarrels had been settled, the instability of the local politics threatened the safety of the Dutch factory and greatly hindered its trade. In April 1645, Trịnh Tạc was raised to the status of Crown Prince and Chúa Trịnh Tráng offered him the absolute control over the state army. When the Chúa fell gravely ill in May, other princes rebelled to overthrow the Crown Prince.298 The struggle quickly turned the capital Thăng Long into a bloody battlefield where, according to some sources, around 4,000 people were killed. During the insurrection, the Dutch Company servants hid themselves fearfully inside the factory. Although the rebellion was eventually extinguished, the local trade was badly affected. Trade in the capital had completely stagnated and its resumption took months to revive.299 Observing the Chúa’s discontent with the Company, local mandarins, especially the capados (eunuchs) openly obstructed the Dutch factory trade. They tried in whatever way they could contrive to squeeze silver out of the factory by delivering low quality silk at high prices. In 1650, for instance, besides the 25,000 taels advanced to the Chúa and the 10,000 to the Crown Prince, the Dutch factory had to provide 10,000 taels more for five chief capados: 7,000 to Ongiatule; 1,000 to Ongiavun; 1,000 to Ongsjadert; and 1,000 each to Ontjenudgween and Tun.300 The delivery price of silk varied from person to person according to their position at court and their relationship with the Company. It is certain that payment received from the capados was often more liberal than that from the royal family but still much worse than that which the free merchants were offering. Despite the concessions the factory made on the silver advance, the relationship

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of the factory with the capados was not always peaceful. In 1647, for instance, dissatisfied with the Dutch factory, some capados spread the rumour that the court had forbidden the local people to trade with the Dutch factors. The factory trade consequently stagnated as local sellers, fearful of trouble, stopped dealing with the Dutch. The Dutch factors appealed to the court and won: the Chúa approved the free trade of the factory.301 In the same year the capados presented Chúa Trịnh with a plan to monopolize the silk supply to the Dutch factory. According to their proposal, the Dutch procurement of silk and other sorts of local products should be confined to some specially appointed merchants at fixed prices. The factory lodged a strong protest about this plan and put a serious complaint to the High Government in Batavia saying that the capados had obviously learnt about the Japanese itowappu system and now wanted to apply it in their own country.302 Had the Chúa approved this proposal, the Company’s Tonkin trade would no longer have been feasible. Determined to prevent the Chúa from approving the capados’ plan, Van Brouckhorst went to the court to offer the Chúa 5,000 taels and requested that the Dutch free trade be renewed. His petition was granted. The capados refused to relinquish their idea to persuade the Chúa to approve their monopoly plan in the following years.303 While all this manoeuvring was going on, the Chinese competition in purchasing local silk had become more heated from the mid-1640s. Besides the great quantity of Chinese silk exported to Japan directly from mainland China, Chinese merchants now also increased their export volume of Tonkinese silk to the Japanese market. Some Japanese officials in Nagasaki also had shares in Chinese junks sailing between Tonkin and Nagasaki and they offered Chinese merchants large capitals to run the Tonkin-Japan silk trade. In 1646 and 1647, the Chinese arrived in Tonkin with 80,000 and 120,000 taels respectively. By offering local sellers twenty taels more per picul of raw silk, the Chinese quickly procured large cargoes and left for Japan.304 The relationship deteriorated, 1647−1651 Carel Hartsinck (1637−41) and Antonio van Brouckhorst (1641−7) were both capable and experienced directors. During their terms of office, the factory established and maintained a good relationship with the court despite the Chúa’s displeasure with the Company after the termination of the military alliance in 1643. After the retirement of

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Van Brouckhorst in 1647, however, the relations of the factory with the court deteriorated. Perceiving the importance of the personality of the director in managing the Tonkin trade, in the mid-1640s, Van Brouckhorst began to train Jan van Riebeeck to be his successor. The chief was convinced that Van Riebeeck was ideally suited to the position on account of his knowledge of the local language and his civil behaviour towards the local people. When Van Brouckhorst sailed to Japan in the autumn and winter of 1646, Van Riebeeck managed the factory skilfully in his absence. In order to circumvent the capados’ hindrance in buying silk, Van Riebeeck went to silk-producers in the evening when his presence would not be greatly remarked upon, to advance money and buy silk.305 Instead of applauding his initiative, the High Government was irritated by his private trade. In the summer of 1647, Van Riebeeck was summoned to Batavia to justify his private undertaking. Philip Schillemans became the third director of the Dutch factory in Tonkin (1647-50).306 The new director proved incapable of managing the trade of the factory. During his term, the Dutch political and commercial position in Tonkin markedly deteriorated. The Chúa and the Crown Prince refused to pay the full sum which often occasioned the factory grievous losses. The size of the annual cargoes of silk which the Tonkin factory sent to Japan shrank and was less stable. In the spring of 1649, the factory was demolished and moved to another site because the Prince wanted the ground on which it stood to build a shooting range. This removal cost the factory an excessive amount of money.307 As the Chúa grew more hostile towards the Company, local mandarins imposed draconian measures on the Dutch factors. Having failed to monopolize the silk supply to the Dutch factory, some capados tried to hinder the Dutch free trade. They sent servants to prowl around the Dutch residence and thrashed local people coming to trade with the Dutch factory. When the Dutch complained about the damages they had suffered, the Chúa gave a cool reply: ‘Ick en heb uw niet in mijn landt geroepen’.308 In 1650, the factory again suffered a series of losses and setbacks. On Whit-Monday, the crews of the Maasland and the Beer went ashore to enjoy the festivities. Upon return, they were assaulted by Chinese merchants sailing upstream. Both sides were embroiled in a noisy scuffle in which a boatswain of the Company was killed and four more sailors were badly injured. The Chúa strongly condemned the

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misbehaviour of the Dutch in his country and fined the factory 50 rials for its rowdiness. The Dutch lodged a protest against the unreasonable fine, but to no avail.309 During this conflict, another problem arose as a result of a false accusation made by the great eunuch Ongiatule.310 This capado had a large share in a junk owned by the Japanese free merchant Resimon. Because of the late arrival of the junk, he accused the Dutch Company of having attacked and destroyed the vessel at sea. Upon hearing this accusation, the Chúa threatened to behead all the Dutch factors if the allegation was proved true. Although it soon transpired that the claim was false, the factory business transactions ground to a complete standstill because the local people, sensing the tension, dared not trade with the Dutch factors. Caught in a cleft stick, the factory had to advance most of its silver to the court to be exchanged for the delivery of 355 piculs of raw silk.311 Worse still, the Japan-bound ship ran into a heavy storm at sea which soaked most of the merchandise on board. Consequently, the profit margins of the cargo for this year varied between only 35 and 40 per cent.312 Discouraged by all troubles the factory had encountered during the past few years, beginning in 1649, Philip Schillemans frequently requested the High Government to be allowed to resign. To justify his resignation, the chief asserted the Tonkin factory was currently facing three major difficulties: i) the confrontations with local rulers, especially with the Trịnh court, ii) the limitation on buying capacity which meant that part of the investment capital was unspent, and iii) the large-scale private trade arranged by factors of the Northern Quarter. Besides his request to resign, Schillemans also recommended Merchant Willem Bijlvelt to succeed him in his post. The chief complimented Bijlvelt on his intelligence and dexterity in handling affairs.313 In Batavia, the High Government was greatly displeased with Schillemans’ reports and severely reprimanded him for his lacklustre management. Junior Merchant Jan de Groot was appointed the fourth director of the Tonkin factory. In order improve the management there, Batavia decided to send De Groot first to Japan, where Van Brouckhorst, the former director of the Tonkin factory, could advise him how to manage the Tonkin trade. Afterwards, De Groot would sail to Tonkin to succeed Schillemans.314 While the accumulated difficulties of the factory were as yet not solved, Schillemans died in June 1650. Jacob Keijser succeeded him and managed the business smoothly in this interim period, despite stiff

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competition from foreign merchants. That year three junks from Japan and another three from Batavia brought a large amount of capital to Tonkin which was exchanged for 820 piculs of raw silk and a considerable quantity of silk piece-goods.315 In the summer, the court issued a placard proclaiming that, within a short time, all foreigners would be moved to a new place outside the capital. Under the court’s new arrangement, the Dutch factory would be removed to the area governed by the eunuch Ongiatule. The Dutch factors were anxious because the move would undoubtedly cast upon the Company an unbearable expense because of having to rebuild residences and storehouses. An even worse prospect was that should the factory be moved to the area governed by Ongiatule, its import and export trade would sooner or later be manipulated by this powerful capado. Before his departure to Japan, Keijser petitioned the Chúa to allow the factory to remain in Thăng Long in order to avoid incurring excessive building costs. After his petition had been rejected, the Dutch chief appealed to the Chúa, asking him to delay the move until he had returned to Tonkin from Japan. Chúa Trịnh Tráng and Crown Prince Trịnh Tạc ‘encouraged’ the chief to leave and not to worry about the factory. The Chúa ordered Keijser to buy ten cannon for him and two more iron pieces for the Crown Prince. In July, Keijser departed for Japan. The management of the factory was entrusted to Hendrick Baron assisted by eight assistants and gunners.316 Understanding the importance of satisfying the Chúa and the Crown Prince in their demand for goods, the Tonkin factors urged the High Government to do its utmost to provide the goods ordered by the Trịnh rulers. Zeelandia Castle was entrusted with arranging such commodities for ships leaving for Tonkin. In March 1651, the new director, Jan de Groot, arrived in the capital Thăng Long. His reception was not very cordial as the Chúa was disappointed with the objects which the Company offered him and complained that the Dutch had been bringing less merchandise and fewer rarities to his country. As the Chúa showed even less good will towards them, the Dutch factors suffered more difficulties in their efforts to buy and sell goods. In 1651, despite their constant petitions, the Dutch were still not allowed to maintain their factory inside the capital. Observing the Chúa’s hesitation, the capado Ongiatule, assisted by the Japanese merchant Resimon and supported by the Crown Prince, continued to importune the Trịnh ruler to move the Dutch factory to an area under his authority.317 Reporting to Batavia in 1651, Chief De Groot explained that unless

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the factory remained in the capital, the Tonkin trade would no longer be profitable for the Company. Excessive expenses would be incurred for building a new factory. This would be compounded by the handicap that the appointed area was quite far from the centre of the capital so that there would be fewer merchants coming to trade with the factory, especially during the rainy season. Worst of all, once the factory was under Mandarin Ongiatule’s authority, the Company would have to sell foreign merchandise to and buy local goods from him. At long last, his persistent attempts to monopolize the Company trade would be crowned with success. Another concern to which De Groot referred in his report was the political instability in Tonkin. Chúa Trịnh Tráng was now seventy-four years old and physically enfeebled. It was widely rumoured that, upon the Chúa’s death, the capital would likely be embroiled in a fierce rebellion. The Dutch factors worried that in any such insurrection the factory would be looted. Even if the factory were to survive such a pillaging, the risk of losing the advance money which the factors had already handed over for the silk delivery was still high. Not a single penny from the annual advance of around 60,000 taels of silver could be guaranteed to be received back, even after peace would have been restored. Taking these risks into consideration, De Groot suggested that the Company should suspend its Tonkin trade for a few years.318 Despite the chief’s cautions, the High Government resolved to maintain its Tonkin trade. Batavia expected that although the Chúa was elderly, he would still live for many years to come. Upon his death, the Crown Prince would succeed to the throne peacefully because the Chúa’s brother, the most dangerous threat to the succession of the Crown Prince, had been poisoned the year before.319 The High Government therefore urged its factors to improve the relationship with the Trịnh rulers in order to facilitate the Company trade. To assist its servants to overcome all present difficulties, especially to maintain the factory in the capital and to shore up the eroding relationship with the Trịnh court, in the summer of 1651, Batavia decided to send an ambassador to Tonkin.320

CHAPTER FOUR

VICISSITUDES, DECLINE AND THE FINAL END 1. Revival of the relationship, 1651–1660 Verstegen’s commission to Tonkin, 1651 As mentioned in Chapter Three, by the early 1650s, constrained by the Gentlemen XVII’s insistence on ending the harmful conflict with Quinam, the High Government in Batavia decided to sign a peace treaty with the Nguyễn rulers. Batavia assigned Willem Verstegen, the former chief factor of the Nagasaki factory, the Company representative to negotiate with the Nguyễn Government. Before visiting Quinam during the winter, Verstegen would sail first to Tonkin as the Company’s ambassador with a fourfold mission: to assist the factors to obtain permission from the Chúa to retain the factory in the capital; to negotiate with the Chúa to obtain more trading privileges for the Company so that the factors would be able to commence their transactions straight after the Company ships had arrived and dispatch their ships as soon as they had finished business; to sign a contract with the Crown Prince to buy all the raw silk and silk piece-goods should the Trịnh ruler repudiate the previous points; and to inspect the factory, because the Gentlemen XVII had been complaining about the rumour then widely circulating that private trade in the Northern Quarters (Tonkin, Japan, and Formosa) had been flourishing on a very large scale.321 Leaving Batavia in April, Verstegen arrived in Tonkin in July 1651. His sudden visit helped him to discover an extensive private trade rampant among most of the Tonkin factors. On board the Kampen and the Witte Valk anchored at Doméa, the inspector found and confiscated large amounts of private goods loaded for Japan. Inside the factory, factors audaciously stored their private goods alongside the Company’s commodities. The bookkeeping at the factory was neither accurate nor updated; some entries of De Groot’s private goods were even mistakenly entered in the Company records. Taking good note of De Groot’s deplorable mismanagement, Verstegen dismissed him and sent him to Formosa to be prosecuted by the legal branch there. Jacob

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Keijser, who was also accused of indulging in private trade but on a minor scale, was appointed interim director of the factory.322 The Dutch Ambassador and entourage were royally entertained at court. The Chúa delightedly accepted the Governor-General’s letter and presents to him, as did the Crown Prince and the highly influential mandarin Ongiatule. Pleased with the appearance of the Dutch Ambassador as well as the Governor-General’s apparent partiality towards his country, Chúa Trịnh Tráng acquiesced in most of Batavia’s requests. He allowed the Dutch to retain their factory in the capital itself and promised to facilitate their transactions. He also bestowed a high-ranking mandarin title on Verstegen which was engraved on a gold plate. Both the Chúa and the Crown Prince made plans to send their ambassadors to Batavia in the winter to congratulate Governor-General Carel Reniers on his taking office and to consolidate the mutual relationship with the Company.323 Upon his return, Verstegen wrote a long, detailed report on his inspection of the Tonkin factory. The commissioner assessed that prospects for the Tonkin trade were more optimistic and promising than had been reported by the factors and the trade itself was still profitable, despite the hindrances and obstructions it had to suffer. He therefore disagreed with De Groot’s earlier suggestion to suspend the Tonkin trade. The report was also highly critical of De Groot’s management. His own observation had shown him that De Groot, just as his predecessor Schillemans, was not respected by the local people. At the meeting with the Chúa, a mandarin had even severely castigated De Groot for his insolence and accused the chief of selling the GovernorGeneral’s presents to the Chúa to local people. Verstegen therefore advised the High Government to send only skilfully diplomatic and highly responsible chiefs to Tonkin. In order to curb the private trade between Tonkin and Japan, Verstegen suggested that from then on the chief should no longer travel to Japan but remain in Thăng Long to direct the factory trade during the off season.324 The relationship between the factory and the court was remarkably improved after Verstegen’s visit. The chief was often invited to the royal festivities and to attend audiences, while the factors had more liberty to trade. When the Delfhaven departed for Batavia in November 1651, the Chúa sent his ambassador and fifteen mandarins, and the Crown Prince sent his own ambassador and another ten officials to revitalize the relationship with Batavia and to congratulate GovernorGeneral Carel Reniers (1650–3) on his appointment to office. Chúa

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Trịnh Tráng informed the High Government that he had adopted the Governor-General as his son and granted him the title Theuuw Baeuw Quun Congh (Thiếu Bảo Quận Công: ֟অಷֆ) being, in the Chúa’s words, ‘the highest rank in the mandarin system of Tonkin’.325 The title was engraved upon a gold plate weighing 20 taels. The Crown Prince also presented the Governor-General, now his ‘brother’, a mandarin’s cap and three princely parasols as ‘a proof of his eternal love’. The Tonkinese delegates were entertained cordially. In June 1652, they returned home on board a Company ship leaving for Tonkin.326 A short-lived permanent factory, 1651 Shortly after Verstegen’s visit, Batavia promoted the Tonkin factory to a permanent rank in order to enable its factors to reside there with a substantial capital with which to trade during the off season. It is possible this decision was taken on the basis of at least two deliberations. First, the improvement in the relationship between the High Government and the Lê/Trịnh court after Verstegen’s mission meant that the factory would enjoy a favourable position in the years to come. Second, the annual cargoes of Tonkinese silk exported to Japan had yielded high profits in the past few years. By leaving more factors residing in Thăng Long, Batavia hoped to increase the purchasing capacity of the factory and maximize the profit in the Company’s Tonkinese silk trade. Indeed, in the mid-1640s, Antonio van Brouckhorst had already urged Batavia to assign at least one or two junior merchants and several gunners to take charge of the factory after the Company ships had departed for Japan.327 The rub was that it seemed that most of the Company servants wanted to sail to Japan rather than remain in Thăng Long. Such a decision was reinforced by the fact that Chúa Trịnh had sometimes ordered the chief not to leave many factors behind after the Company ships had sailed away.328 After such high expectations, the life-span of the Tonkin factory was ephemeral. In the spring of 1652, the High Government decided to withdraw the project. This abrupt annulment was made after due consideration was given to the risk of leaving a large amount of capital in Thăng Long in the hands of a few servants. It was buttressed by the fact it was reported by the Deshima factory that profits on Tonkinese silk had begun to decline in Japan, overtaken by the strong competition of the Chinese, who also actively participated on the Tonkin-Japan

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shipping route. It was therefore impractical to maintain a permanent factory in Tonkin at this time.329 The abolition proved to be the right decision. In these years, the Chinese competition was so fierce the Dutch factors could only commence their transactions after the Chinese had spent their capital on local products and left for Japan. Sadly, the improvement in the mutual relationship with the Trịnh rulers was also transient. A few months after Verstegen’s visit, the Crown Prince and his mandarins again squeezed the factory to pay excessive amounts of silver for silk at high prices. If their demand was not met, they would find some way or other to obstruct the factory trade. In 1653, the factory suffered a serious loss after the execution of the chief capado Ongiatule. This eunuch still owed the factory 14,499 guilders and the Chúa, who had confiscated his fortune, declined to pay the debt.330 Matters deteriorated when, after succeeding to the throne, Crown Prince Trịnh Tạc informed the factory that from now on he would continue to enjoy 25,000 taels of silver every year as his predecessors had done. He also demanded another 7,000 taels, the amount that the factory had often offered to Ongiatule. Over and above this, the Company had to provide him with four long iron cannon at the cost of 14,000 taels. These would be paid for in silk. The Dutch factors complained that the erstwhile Crown Prince was obviously imitating the Japanese Shogun in dealing with foreign merchants.331 Although the amount was later reduced to 22,000 taels, the High Government was still disgusted with his demand because, as well as 25,000 taels the factory had to offer Chúa Trịnh Tráng, almost half of its annual capital went to the Trịnh rulers, who invariably delivered bad quality silk at excessively high prices. Batavia hoped that Chúa Trịnh Tráng would soon stop dealing with the factory so that the factors could reduce the amount of silver advanced to local rulers in order to reserve more capital for buying silk on the local market.332 The first phase of decline, the 1650s Despite the competent management of the interim director Jacob Keijser (1651–3), the Tonkin trade of the Company began to show a decline in these years. In Japan, the profit margin on Tonkinese silk gradually fell, as it failed to match the marketability and profitability of Bengali silk.333 There was no let-up in the private trade of the Dutch merchants and Keijser too was accused of conducting illegal trade as

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well as mismanagement. He also made the mistake of promising the Trịnh rulers to declare in detail all commodities and capital shipped to Tonkin, not a very smart move by a merchant who wanted to negotiate. As well as this concession, the factory would present them with very valuable goods. The High Government heavily reprimanded Keijser for making this agreement, saying that this would be too costly for the Company and troublesome for his successors. In April 1653, the Governor-General dismissed Keijser and recalled him to Batavia to account for his private trade and alleged wrongdoings. Louis Isaacszn Baffart was appointed chief of the Tonkin factory (1653–6).334 Baffart succeeded in improving personal relations with some capados, thereby facilitating the procurement of local goods for the factory. The capado Ongiadee helped Baffart negotiate with the Trịnh rulers to reduce the amount of silver advanced to them for silk. He also agreed to sell all the Laotian musk he could procure in the area he governed to the factory.335 Despite these achievements, the Dutch Tonkin trade was facing a long-term decline. From the mid-1650s, Tonkinese silk became less profitable and marketable on the Japanese market. This co-incided with the deterioration of the local trading situation in Tonkin. A series of natural disasters ravaged the annual production of Tonkinese silk. The 1654 flood ruined most of the mulberry groves, causing a severe shortage of silk on the local market. Worse still, the shortage of copper coins led to a severe loss in purchasing power of silver, the main form of investment capital the Company had set aside for its Tonkin trade. Reporting to Batavia on the loss on the silver/ cash exchange in April 1654, the Tonkin factory lamented that the exchange rate per tael of silver had slumped from 1,600–1,700 cash during the last three months to only 800 cash. There was a gloomy prediction that within a short time one tael of silver would likely drop to 700 to 600 to 500 cash only.336 Because of the silk shortage and the devaluation of silver, the purchase price soared. In 1653, the Dutch factors were already aware that the purchase price of Tonkinese silk had increased by 20 per cent on average. Consequently, out of the cargo worth 300,000 guilders the Tonkin factory dispatched to Japan in 1653, silk occupied only roughly 55 per cent of the total. In 1654, the Tonkin cargo to Japan was valued at 174,531 guilders only; the unspent capital had to be shipped to Formosa. Considering the meagre profit margin which Tonkinese silk yielded in Nagasaki this year, Baffart suggested to the Governor-General that the High Government should suspend the Tonkin factory for a while.337 Batavia disapproved

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of this suggestion. Instead, it reduced the investment capital destined for the Tonkin trade in 1655 and ordered the factors to buy no Tonkinese yarn for the Japan market. Therefore, only 25,773 guilders were sent to Thăng Long to buy silk piece-goods for the Netherlands.338 Mindful of the irregular silk production in Tonkin in recent years, in an attempt to lessen the dependence on the procurement of silk for Japan, Batavia decided to import Tonkinese and Bengali silkworms to produce silk in Batavia. In 1653, the High Government ordered the Tonkin factory to transport local silkworms to Batavia. The first shipment was pretty much of a disaster because most of the silkworms died during the long voyage to Batavia. Those which survived as well as the samples of Tonkinese mulberry flourished in Batavia. The High Government hoped that abundant mulberry groves would produce opulent silk crops.339 In 1654, Batavia again sent a demand for Tonkinese silkworms. This time the factory failed to fulfil this order because the superstitious Vietnamese farmers, fearing that their silkworms would die should the strangers watch them, wanted neither to show nor sell their silkworms to the Dutch.340 The High Government not only attempted to solve the shortage in the silk supply, but it tried at the same time to reduce the losses of the Tonkin factory on the silver/cash exchange as well. It is important to point out here that although the Vietnamese had been using copper cash for centuries, as a rule Vietnamese dynasties could not mint sufficient coins to meet the demand of the local market. They therefore had to rely partly on the copper coins minted in China. Because of the current political and economic chaos in mainland China, the regular supply of Chinese coins to northern Vietnam had virtually drawn to a standstill, causing a serious shortage of copper coins. The situation was the same in the southern Kingdom of Quinam.341 In order to cut their losses on the silver import and reduce their dependence upon these coins, the Portuguese had been importing copper coins minted by Chinese in Macao into Tonkin.342 In 1654, Batavia made its first attempt towards solving the copper cash shortage in Tonkin when it had coins minted locally in order to send them to northern Vietnam. It was a good try but the experiment failed because the Trịnh rulers devalued these coins.343 The shortage of copper coins in Tonkin went on until the following decade. In the early 1660s, however, the Company successfully dealt with the copper cash equation when it began to import Japanese zeni (copper cash) into Tonkin in great quantities.344 Despite all the exertions of the High Government, the VOC’s Tonkin

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trade continued to lose ground in the latter half of the 1650s. After a temporary suspension, the Company once again exported Tonkinese silk to Japan in 1656, but the profit margins were so slender that the Company again cancelled the importation of Tonkinese silk to Japan between 1658 and 1660.345 The capital which Batavia destined for its Tonkin trade was consequently reduced. There were internal causes as well. The unstable political situation in Tonkin also contributed to the decline in the factory trade. In 1655, the other princes prepared an insurrection to supplant the Crown Prince. The rebels threatened to burn down the capital. Had the Chúa failed to defuse the insurrection at the very last moment, the city would have been subjected to bloodshed. A great number of the inhabitants of the capital fled to the countryside for fear of a bloody massacre. The panic-stricken Dutch and other foreigners remained in the capital. Although the rebellion was eventually prevented, it took months to restore the commercial rhythm of the city. Right after this political turmoil, the Tonkinese armies marched south to attack Quinam. The fifth Tonkinese military campaign against Quinam dragged on for almost six years (1655–60), being the longest and most costly campaign during the half century of war between the two kingdoms. This time, the Nguyễn armies not only stood their ground and successfully defended their fortresses but also overran some parts of the Trịnh’s southern province of Nghệ An and occupied this until 1660. Attacks and counter-attacks happened every year during the period 1655–60, causing heavy losses on both sides. At the end of 1660, the southern armies were forced to withdraw behind the former border, the Gianh River. The Trịnh troops overran the frontline but were unable to achieve a decisive victory and conquer the whole southern kingdom.346 In 1661, the Trịnh armies again attacked Quinam but gained no result.347 The economy of Tonkin was seriously devastated during this protracted campaign harassed by subsequent natural disasters and the voracious demand for soldiers, which led to a shortage of labour. In 1660, the Dutch factors estimated that around one-fifth of the population of Tonkin was forcibly conscripted. Most of them reportedly became impoverished after returning home from the battlefield.348 Trying to come to terms with these military problems prompted the Trịnh rulers to consolidate their relationship with Batavia in order to secure a supply of weapons and ammunition. As reflected in the VOC records, from 1655, the Trịnh rulers regularly sent letters to Gover-

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nor-General Joan Maetsuyker demanding military equipment. When armament was urgently needed, the Trịnh rulers even confiscated cannon from the Company ships anchored at Doméa. To prepare for the 1656 attack, Chúa Trịnh Tạc asked for the nine cannon on board the Cabo de Jacques when this ship arrived and went on to ‘confiscate’ seven more pieces when she left Tonkin.349 Despite such importunity, the High Government would not and could not fully satisfy the Trịnh demands. Most certainly, Batavia did not want to change its nonaligned attitude towards the Trịnh-Nguyễn wars and, undeniably, it was itself burdened by its military involvement throughout Asia. In Europe, the Dutch were still at war with the English. Just at this juncture, the Dutch Twelve-Year Truce with the Portuguese was drawing to a close. After a period of relative quiet, an offensive episode in Asia erupted with the commencement of the term of office of GovernorGeneral Joan Maetsuyker (1653–68).350 In the Indonesian Archipelago, the hostile relationship with various sultans remained unmitigated. In Indo-China, the war with Cambodia had not ended, and a new confrontation with the Nguyễn broke out again shortly after the 1651 Peace Treaty. Elsewhere in parts of South Asia, such as Ceylon and India, the Company’s military attempts to supplant the Portuguese went temporarily into abeyance, but a prosecution was to take place once the truce ended.351 2. Attempts to expand the Tonkin trade, 1660–1670 In fine, it is pity so many conveniences and opportunities to make the kingdom rich and its trade flourishing should be neglected; for if we consider how this kingdom borders on two of the richest provinces in China, it will appear that, with finall difficulty, most commodities of that vast Empire might be drawn hither …; nay, would they permit strangers the freedom of this inland trade, it would be vastly advantageous to the kingdom; but the Chova [Chúa] … has, and will probably in all times to come, impede this important affair. Samuel Baron (1685)352

In the early 1660s, political and military tensions challenged Tonkin on both sides. Even as its fifth campaign against Quinam could make no break-through on the southern frontier, Tonkin was increasingly being challenged by the Manchu armies on the northern frontier with China. After gradually beating back the restored Ming forces, the Qing armies approached the China-Tonkin border and demanded the

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Lê/Trịnh Government send tribute to Peking.353 Being exceedingly preoccupied with the conflict with Quinam, Tonkin could not dispatch its first tribute to Peking until 1663.354 Consequently, the Manchu soldiers attacked Vietnamese merchants trading to southern China and hindered the Chinese in exporting such merchandise as Chinese gold and musk to Tonkin. Bowing to this escalating tension, the TonkinChina border trade stagnated, which greatly impeded the import and export trade of the Dutch factory. Calamity followed calamity and the Company lost Formosa to the Zheng family in 1662. All these negative developments forced the VOC to readjust its strategy towards the Tonkin trade in the first half of the 1660s. The decline in the Tonkin-China border trade and the loss of Formosa In the mid-1640s, China became embroiled in a dynastic war between the newly established Qing and the waning Ming, which lasted until the early 1660s. Since the Ming-Qing conflict was largely fought out in the southern provinces of China, it exerted an enormous impact on the politics and economy of Tonkin. At Cao Bằng, the Mạc clan sought the spiritual protection of the Ming Dynasty in their efforts to continue their rivalry with the Lê/Trịnh in Thăng Long. The Ming intervention was the deciding factor which prevented the Lê/Trịnh rulers from toppling their Mạc rivals until the late 1670s.355 The long-lasting conflict in southern China also affected the commerce of Tonkin, and as stated, the border trade between the two countries was the chief victim. Despite the Trịnh’s restriction on the border crossing, both Vietnamese and Chinese merchants still could exchange their commodities on a quite large scale. For the most part the goods exported to China from Tonkin included South-East Asian spices and European textiles which were imported into Tonkin by the Dutch, Chinese and other foreign merchants. In return, Chinese gold and musk were among the miscellaneous goods which merchants brought to northern Vietnam. From the late 1650s, the Chinese gold exported to Tonkin became one of the most important products on which the VOC set its sights for the Coromandel trade. The reason was that Chinese gold had become scarce in Formosa reflecting the economic stagnation of the China-Formosa trade. The High Government therefore ordered the Tonkin factory to purchase as much Chinese gold as possible for the Coast factories. Chinese musk was bought for the Netherlands.356

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Before long, these two items grew scarce in Tonkin as the border trade declined. In 1655, the Tonkin factory reported to Batavia that, although the civil war in China had not caused a complete stagnation in the exportation of Chinese goods over the China-Tonkin border, it had reduced the flow of Chinese gold to northern Vietnam to a remarkable extent.357 The annual volume of the border trade had fallen steadily by the early 1660s. In 1661, Peking reminded the Lê/Trịnh court that should the latter fail to send tribute to Peking within a short time, the border would be violated.358 Because Thăng Long did not dispatch a tribute to Peking in 1662, Chinese soldiers attacked the Vietnamese merchants travelling to the border to buy Chinese gold and musk, confiscating all their capital and commodities.359 These merchants were later released and ordered to return to Thăng Long to inform the Lê/ Trịnh court that tension on the border would not be resolved until their tribute had arrived at Peking. Consequently, the Tonkin-China border trade was temporarily interrupted. The Tonkin factory therefore failed to procure the much wanted Chinese gold and musk.360 While the stagnation in the Tonkin-China border trade had not yet improved, the Far Eastern trading network of the VOC was severely affected by the loss of Formosa to the Zheng family in 1662. Indeed, the Dutch Formosa trade had already been in a decline from the mid1640s because of the fall in the annual export volume of Chinese goods to the island.361 In 1656, in an attempt to control the export of Chinese goods and to monopolize the lucrative trade between China and Japan, Zheng Chenggong (alias Coxinga), alleging that the Dutch had molested his junks in the South-East Asian waters, imposed an economic embargo on Dutch Formosa, driving the Company’s Formosa trade into a complete standstill. In early 1660 there were rumours that the Zheng armies would invade the island sometime in April of the same year. After gathering enough evidence to convince themselves of this eventuality, Governor Fredrik Coyett and the Council of Formosa prepared for an invasion and requested assistance from Batavia. The Governor-General and the Council of the Indies reacted quickly and in late July a fleet of twelve ships arrived in Formosa from Batavia. As the months passed without any invasion from the mainland, the commander and most of the experienced officers in the fleet left Formosa for Batavia in two of the ships despite the vigorous protests of Coyett and the Formosa Council; the rest remained on the island. At the end of April 1661, the Zheng troops invaded the island. After resisting for

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nine months, the Dutch surrendered. The loss of Formosa was a severe blow to the Company’s East Asian trading network.362 The VOC’s ‘Tinnam strategy’, 1661–1664 In its efforts to recover from the heavy loss of Formosa to Zheng Chenggong in 1662, the VOC formed a naval alliance with the newly established Qing Dynasty, principally to take revenge on the Zheng clan, but also to obtain trading privileges from the Chinese Court to compensate for the loss of Formosa. Despite sporadic joint naval operations in the years 1662–4, which effectively reduced Zheng power in Amoy and Quemoy, the final goal of conquering Formosa did not materialize owing to Peking’s hesitation. The trading privileges which the Chinese granted the Company in the early years of the mutual relationship were consequently revoked.363 Another way of gaining a niche in the China trade was to attempt to penetrate China from Tonkin. The Company records reveal that besides using the diplomatic channel to Peking, Batavia also instructed its Tonkin factors to cruise along the coastline to explore the seaport system of north-east Tonkin, near the Chinese border, and to look for possibilities to establish a permanent factory there for direct trade with the Chinese. In April 1661, Batavia sent the Meliskerken to Tonkin, where she was ordered to obtain a licence from the Trịnh rulers to explore the area called Tinnam in the present north-eastern province of Quảng Ninh. What was the major aim of this exploration? The answer is directly related to the Company’s demand for Chinese gold and musk. Prior to the 1650s, Zeelandia Castle had regularly been sending Chinese gold, as well as silver imported from Japan, to Coromandel.364 The annual volume of this precious metal supplied by Zeelandia Castle fell sharply from the mid-1650s owing to the competition from the Zheng, especially after the latter decreed a complete embargo on the Formosa trade in 1656. With the loss of Formosa in 1662, the Company’s shortage of gold became even more exigent. Batavia therefore turned its attention to the Tonkin factory, urging the Dutch factors in Thăng Long to import Chinese gold for Coromandel, where the latest profit was reportedly 25½ per cent.365 As vividly reflected in the records of the Tonkin factory, from the beginning of the Company trade with Tonkin gold had been purchased there sporadically mainly to be re-exported to India. The major part of the gold the Dutch factors procured in Tonkin was, however,

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not locally produced, although Tonkin had several gold-mines in the north-western region.366 Besides these, Tonkin also mined gold in the present-day northern province of Thái Nguyên, and copper and silver in modern Tuyên Quang, Thái Nguyên, Hưng Hoá, and Lạng Sơn. The annual output of these metals, particularly gold, was far from substantial, however.367 Most of the gold available in northern Vietnam, besides a small part which came from the western kingdom of Laos, originated from the southern Chinese provinces of Yunnan and Guizhou.368 This Chinese gold and also the much sought-after musk were transported mainly by Chinese and Vietnamese merchants. As for the gold price, in 1661 it was recorded by the Tonkin factors that the purchase price of the best gold in Gingminfoe, the chief city of Yunnan, reached a maximum of 90 taels, resulting in a profitable gold/silver ratio of 1:9. The Vietnamese merchants who often traded to China also affirmed that the gold price in Tonkin was generally lower than that in Guangzhou.369 The High Government therefore wanted to establish a second factory in Tonkin, near the border with China precisely to procure Chinese gold for the Coromandel Coast and, in the long run, to obtain a direct access to mainland China. This was something that the Company had set its sights on ever since its first arrival in Asia. It was, however, neither safe nor easy to make such exploratory voyages in the northern part of the Gulf of Tonkin in the early 1660s. This area had a reputation of being a dangerous place for trading vessels, made unsafe by the daring raids of the pirate Thun. Because of political chaos in southern China, what were known as ‘Chinese longhair pirates’ gathered around the north-eastern Tonkin-China border to raid trading vessels sailing between Tonkin and such southern Chinese ports as Macao and Guangzhou. In July 1660, the Prince of Tonkin commanded a large fleet of some seventy well-armed ships to attack the Thun gang. Although a large number of his men were captured, Thun himself managed to escape.370 The region was therefore still not completely safe for ships making passage there. Despite this risk, the Tonkin factory still managed to explore the area called Nova Macao. After obtaining a licence from the Prince to undertake the voyage, Hendrick Baron and his colleagues carried out an exploratory voyage in March 1662. From Doméa, the Meliskerken sailed northwards, wove a course among the Archipel Islands, and finally arrived at Tinnam. On 18 April, Baron left Tinnam to travel overland to the province of Loktjouw from where he continued to

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travel to Tjoeang, a place in the Province of Ay, on horseback. At a meeting with the Governor of Loktjouw, he was advised to return to the capital because the ambassadorial road was unsafe. Heeding the advice, Baron decided to return to Loktjouw and then to the capital Thăng Long, where he and his men arrived safely on 3 May 1662.371 Despite its safe return to Tonkin, the mission was far from successful: no factory was set up mainly because of the chaotic situation on the border and the disapproval of the Tonkin court. Nevertheless, after this voyage of exploration, the Dutch factory continued to observe the area and nourished the hope of making a break-through into mainland China from that border market. Upon his return, Baron made a meticulous report on the expedition and presented his thoughts on the Tinnam trade. He believed that establishing a permanent factory in that area would in the long run be commercially profitable and strategically important for the Company. He set out a detailed analysis of every place in the area. Ay and Loktjouw were located relatively close to some important provincial cities along the border and would attract local merchants coming to trade with the factory. The drawback was that these places were located relatively far from a waterway, hence, the challenge would be to find ways of reaching them and transporting goods. Tinnam was therefore considered to be the most suitable location. Having a permanent factory there would be ideal for the Company for a number of reasons. Principal among them was that Tinnam was close to Thenlongfoe, therefore travelling between the two places would not be inconvenient. This support was bolstered by the fact that local merchants preferred travelling to Tinnam rather than to other places. As nobody disputed, Tinnam had a good harbour; the Company ships could anchor conveniently in front of the factory. They would have no difficulty reaching there as the coastal area and its adjacent islands, including the area lying between Vanning and the mouth of the River Tinnam, had been carefully sounded, and was said to be very navigable. Then there was the fact that Tinnam was not so far from Nanning. Those who travelled between these places said that they normally needed twenty-seven days to complete a trip, either on foot or by boat. Finally and also importantly, if a factory were to be founded at Tinnam, not only would goods pour into this place from the south-western provinces and Nanning, but gold would also arrive from Yunnan in a more substantial quantity than ever before. Musk could also be procured without the competition which complicated this trade in the capital Thăng Long.

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There, Resimon, enjoying the auspices of the local mandarins, often bought up all the musk before the factory could even enter the market. In 1662, for instance, the Tonkin factory failed to procure any musk because the capado Ongia Haen had assisted the said speculator to make a clean sweep of all musk which was carried to Thăng Long from Ay and Loktjouw.372 The precautions taken by the Trịnh rulers, however, turned the Dutch ‘Tinnam strategy’ into nothing but a distant dream. Highly conscious of the current chaos in southern China, the Trịnh rulers were not happy with the Dutch plan to trade on the north-eastern border, and hence delayed granting them permission to trade at Tinnam. Despite the courtesy shown by Governor-General Joan Maetsuycker in sending several letters to him concerning the Company’s application for the Tinnam trade, the Chúa still procrastinated about allowing the Company a licence to commence its trade on the border. In August 1663, Chúa Trịnh summoned several Dutch factors to his palace for a discourse on the Tinnam trade.373 After the dialogue, the Chúa promised to consider the Dutch petitions, but no official approval was forthcoming. In 1664, the Dutch application to commence trading in Tinnam succumbed to a complete failure. The Dutch factors lamented to their masters in Batavia that the capados in charge of conducting the application for the factory were too timorous to intercede with the Chúa, and the mandarin Ongdieu had ‘maliciously’ interpreted the Company’s ‘Tinnam strategy’ as ‘very harmful’ to Tonkin. Expressing his opinions on this matter during his audience with the Chúa, the mandarin said that the Dutch presence on the border would undoubtedly entail political disorder, hence, threaten the security of the country. The Trịnh’s hesitation to approve the Dutch petition therefore dragged on interminably. Reporting to the High Government in early 1664, the Dutch factors in Thăng Long wrote that, while any chance of the Tinnam trade was extremely doubtful, the only thing that they could endeavour to do at this moment was to attract the attention of Chinese merchants coming to Tonkin. In their letter to Batavia at the end of 1664, the factors sadly confirmed that it was absolutely hopeless to cherish any hope for the eventuation of the Tinnam strategy. The Chúa had hinted several times that he would never allow any foreigner to trade at Tinnam.374 With the said confirmation, the ‘Tinnam strategy’ of Batavia finally ended.

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Tonkin as a permanent factory, 1663 As the Tinnam project soon proved to be a great delusion, the Dutch factors suggested that the High Government should repromote the Tonkin factory to the rank of permanent. They argued that since the Company’s Tonkin trade had been in rapid decline, repromotion would help to improve the situation. The argument was set out in the following points. As the Tinnam plan had been disapproved by the Trịnh rulers, the Company should nurture its only factory in Thăng Long. In order to improve the current limitation on purchasing capacity, the factory needed more personnel to conduct the trade, especially to procure Chinese goods which arrived sporadically in Tonkin during the off season. A second hurdle was that the annual production of Tonkinese silk had rapidly decreased in the past few years. Because of the Zheng belligerence in regional waters, various junks sailing between Tonkin and Japan were forced to suspend their voyages. In view of this suspension and because they were doubtful about the buying capacity of the Dutch factory, Tonkinese silk-producers turned part of their mulberry grounds into paddy-fields. The factors therefore hoped that the repromotion of the factory would not only foster the factory’s purchasing capacity but also encourage local people to maintain their silk production.375 The factors’ arguments were simultaneously reinforced by recommendations from the Company’s trading partners in Tonkin. In his letter to the Governor-General at the end of 1662, the Tonkinese mandarin Plinlochiu informed Batavia that Tonkinese winter silk had been produced abundantly during the past few years, but there had not been enough customers to buy up those great quantities and the purchase price had also been considerably reduced. If the Company ships arrived in Tonkin only in May and left for Japan shortly afterwards as they had been doing hitherto, how could the factors procure enough silk in such a short time? Plinlochiu therefore advised the Governor-General to keep ships, factors, and a substantial capital sum in Tonkin to purchase winter silk to make the silk cargoes for the Japan-bound ships ready before the summer.376 At the same time, Resimon sent a letter to Director-General Carel Hartsinck. According to the Japanese middle man, the annual silk production of Tonkin had been quite unstable in recent years because for safety’s sake local silk-makers only began to work after foreign ships had arrived and the merchants had advanced them money. He therefore advised the High Government to hold one ship back in Tonkin to encourage local people to produce silk for

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the Company. Otherwise, Tonkinese farmers would switch over to planting rice and beans which were the staple provisions of the local inhabitants.377 On the basis of these recommendations it was decided on 24 April 1663 to repromote the Tonkin factory to a permanent station for three cogent reasons: to stimulate the Tonkinese to maintain their annual production of silk for which the Company still had a great demand in both the Netherlands and Japan; to help the factors to select raw silk and silk piece-goods more carefully; and to attract more Chinese merchants to come to Tonkin with gold and musk in order to increase the export volume of these products of the Tonkin factory. The Tonkin factory would be staffed with fourteen people residing there permanently to conduct the trade. Besides the increase in personnel, annual investment capital would also be increased in order to save a certain amount of money for the winter trading season. It was also agreed that half of the annual capital for the Tonkin trade, which consisted mainly of silver and copper coins, would be supplied by the Deshima factory; the rest would be provided by Batavia.378 Continued decline, the 1660s As the Tinnam strategy did not work out as expected, the decline in the Company’s Tonkin trade which had begun in the latter half of the 1650s continued inexorably. During the first three years of the 1660s, the annual export volume of the Tonkin factory stood relatively low largely in view of the meagre profit margins the Tonkinese silk cargoes brought on the Japanese market. Because the Tonkinese silk cargo valued at 185,372 guilders sent to Japan in 1659 produced only a 25 per cent profit,379 Batavia informed the Tonkin factory in 1660 that the investment capital for the Tonkin trade that year would be reduced.380 Notwithstanding the paucity of the available funding, only 12,038 guilders could be spent on local goods. This depressing export volume was said to be due to the Trịnh’s fifth military campaign against Quinam which had absorbed most of the country’s labour forces into the army. Likewise, fearful of sudden conscriptions, a large part of the inhabitants of the capital fled to the countryside.381 The investment capital for the 1662 trading season was sharply increased, totalling 405,686 guilders. Batavia urged its factors in Thăng Long to spend at least 100,000 guilders on gold which was in high demand for the Coromandel trade. The rest should be invested in raw silk and

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silk piece-goods for both Japan and the Netherlands. The Tonkin factory failed to fulfil these orders. Because the Qing armies had raided merchants trading across the border in retaliation for the Lê/Trịnh’s failure to send their first tribute to Peking, there was hardly any Chinese gold or musk on offer on the Tonkin market. The Dutch factors therefore had no choice but to spend only 22,761 guilders on gold. The silk cargo for Japan was also much smaller than expected, valued at only 150,000 guilders. The reason for this limited cargo was that a devastating typhoon and subsequent rains had destroyed most of the mulberry groves in the country. The capital Thăng Long was also flooded. The bulk of the silk stored in the Dutch factory was soaked because of the rain. Nor were these natural calamities the only reason. The local silk industry had been heavily eroded in the past few years because of the impoverishment of the people.382 All this hit just at a time when the economic depression in Tonkin was worsened by the shortage of copper cash which led to a devaluation of silver. The rapid fall of the silver/cash ratio which began in the early 1650s went on into the first half of the 1660s and caused the Company heavy losses. As mentioned previously, in 1654, the High Government had made an unsuccessful attempt to right the cash equation when it had sent copper zeni coins minted in Batavia to Tonkin.383 Since then, Batavia had found no appropriate solution to cut the loss of silver imported until 1663, when it began to export Japanese copper zeni to Tonkin in great quantities.384 In 1660, Resimon blamed the current silver devaluation on the VOC, arguing that the great amounts of silver imported into Tonkin by the Company had caused the rapid fall in the silver/cash ratio.385 This accusation was not ungrounded although it was not the main reason for the distortion of the exchange rate. While the shortage of these copper coins was the major factor in the rapid fall of the silver/cash ratio, the large quantities of Japanese silver annually imported into Tonkin by both the Dutch and by the Chinese also contributed to the depression of the exchange rate. Batavia was by no means bothered with such a harmless indictment. It was more concerned with how to cut the loss of silver imported into Tonkin and reduce the dependence of the Tonkin factory on the local copper coins. As 400,000 Japanese copper zeni sent to Tonkin in 1661 turned out to be profitable, these denomination coins were thereafter regularly imported into Tonkin until the second half of the 1670s.386 The ‘discovery’ of the efficacy of importing Japanese copper zeni into Tonkin did help to relieve the Company’s dependence on local

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coins and to reduce the losses on the importation of silver, but it could not revive the steadily declining Company’s Tonkin trade. The repromotion of the Tonkin factory in 1663 did not work out as expected either. During the summer 1663, Tonkin again suffered from heavy rains and high water. Most of the provinces, including the capital Thăng Long, were flooded, which considerably reduced the production of summer silk. Consequently, out of the 373,465 guilders the Company had sent to Tonkin, the factory could spend only 198,974 on silk for the Japan-bound ship. As the Tonkin-China border trade had ground to a complete standstill, the Company’s demands for cargoes for Coromandel and Europe could not be fulfilled either.387 The decline of the VOC’s Tonkin trade intensified in these years despite the fact the High Government poured a substantial amount of investment capital into Tonkin. When those large sums of money could not be spent entirely during the trading seasons, this stimulated the factors to embezzle, to misuse money, and to pursue private trade. Despite his skilful management, the Chief, Hendrick Baron, was suspected of indulging in private trade. His successor, the interim Director Hendrick Verdonk, was even recalled to Batavia to justify himself before the Justice Council for the same crime.388 Corruption such as this considerably eroded the Tonkin trade in the later years. In order to foster the Tonkin trade after the 1663 repromotion, Batavia instructed its Tonkin factors to eliminate several stiff competitors, even if they had to resort to dirty tricks. The first target was the free Dutch merchant Bastian Brouwer. This man had bribed some high-ranking capados in order to procure their auspices to speculate in goods which seriously harmed the import and export trade of the factory. In 1664, the High Government ordered Brouwer to return to Batavia but he refused to do so.389 The second target was the great Chinese merchant Itchien who had been among the most feared competitors of the Tonkin factory for many years. This merchant not only possessed substantial trading capital which he either owned himself or with which he was provided by Japanese officials at Nagasaki, he also had constructed a strong trading network between Tonkin and Japan. His brother resided in Tonkin and acted as an agent in purchasing goods and making the cargoes ready for him. Batavia therefore wanted to obstruct this merchant’s trade in order to boost the Company’s Tonkin-Japan silk trade. In March 1664, Itchien returned to Tonkin from Japan with a large capital of 200,000 taels. Shortly before his arrival, the factory made great exertions to advance a large part of its

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money for raw silk and silk piece-goods. The Dutch chief presented the Chúa with two iron cannon and submitted a petition, requesting that the court prohibit Itchien from commencing his business until the Dutch factors had finished theirs. The petition was rejected. The Chúa said that he wanted foreigners trading freely and equally in his country, hence, he would not favour one above another.390 Desperately trying to prevent Itchien from sailing back to Japan, the Dutch factors sent the Hooglanden to the entrance of the river and spread the rumour that the crew had been ordered to capture any foreign ship coming to and going out of Tonkin. Frightened by this rumour, two Chinese junks did not dare to depart for Japan in the summer of 1664.391 The Tonkin factory therefore could assemble a large silk cargo for Japan, valued at 387,135 guilders. Despite all the hard work, this considerable cargo made a profit of scarcely 19 per cent in Nagasaki.392 In the following year, Batavia stepped up its project to eliminate the Company competitors in Tonkin when it ordered the Tonkin factors to attack and capture the Chinese junks trading between Tonkin and Cambodia, and to intercept the Siamese vessels sailing between Tonkin and Japan.393 The problem was that this was a double-edged tactic. The Trịnh rulers were displeased with the Dutch factors’ aggression and ordered them to cease perpetrating such hostile actions in their country. The Japanese reaction was reportedly even more harmful to the Company, because these junks contained large shares belonging to Japanese officials in Nagasaki. In April 1665, Batavia wrote to the Deshima factory that it had ordered the Tonkin factors to end the blockade of these junks in order to avoid fermenting discontent among the Japanese.394 The factory’s relationship with the court, apart from the Chúa’s displeasure with the factors because of their hostility towards Itchien, passed smoothly during the 1660s. It was their need of weapons and ammunition that inclined the Trịnh rulers to consolidate the relationship with Batavia. Prior to 1672, when Tonkin campaigned against Quinam for the last time, the Chúa and the Crown Prince regularly dispatched letters and presents to the Governor-General. In return, they often demanded, besides various miscellaneous items, more martial paraphernalia as ordnance, bullets, ammunition, saltpetre, and sulphur. The court also dealt more reasonably with the factory in terms of payments. In 1666 and 1667, for instance, in order to persuade the High Government to provide him with ordnance for the forthcoming campaigns against both the Mạc in the north and the Nguyễn in the south,

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Chúa Trịnh Tạc willingly paid the factory for saltpetre at prices which were even higher than those on the market.395 In Batavia, the High Government also tried to satisfy at least some of the Trịnh’s demands in order to avoid their displeasure which might lead them to impede the VOC trade. Saltpetre and sulphur were often sent to Tonkin in great quantities, but the demands for cannon and ammunition proved more difficult to satisfy. Batavia lamented the current shortage of these commodities, saying that the wars against France and England in Europe had lessened the supply considerably in recent years, while the limited number of weapons the Company currently possessed was desperately needed for the defence of its fortresses throughout Asia. In general the Chúa ‘sympathized’ with the Governor-General, but he occasionally reacted irately and rhetorically argued: ‘I have absolutely no doubt that the Governor-General needs them [pieces of ordnance and cannon balls] for the defence of your fortresses. But you should be aware that I also badly need them to defend mine … I am certain that my demands are not at all beyond your supply capabilities’.396

In 1671, when he was preparing for the last campaign against the Nguyễn, Chúa Trịnh Tạc asked the High Government to provide him not only with weapons, as he had often requested, but also with a skilled constable, who should reside in Tonkin to assist him.397 Batavia again apologized for its inability to satisfy the Chúa’s demands. The Governor-General expressed his hope that the Company’s failure to satisfy the Chúa’s demands would not affect their mutual friendship.398 The Chúa again replied that he entirely ‘sympathized’ with the difficult situation in which the Company found itself and promised to continue his support for the Company servants in his country.399 3. Towards the final end, 1670–1700 The eventful 1670s The 1670s witnessed several remarkable transformations in Tonkin which, in the long run, reversed the Trịnh’s attitude towards the foreign trade of the country in general and their relationship with the VOC in particular. In 1672, the last campaign mounted by Tonkin against Quinam ended without achieving any breakthrough. Exhausted by the costly and protracted conflict both sides resolved to put an end to the rivalry.400 Tonkin now turned its efforts towards pacify-

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ing the Mạc clan. After the Nan Ming Dynasty was finally defeated and the Zheng family fled to Formosa in the early 1660s, the Mạc were isolated and weakened. Therefore, in 1677, the Tonkin armies easily vanquished their Mạc rivals and completely pacified Cao Bằng Province. Some members of the Mạc family fled to southern China but were later captured by the Qing armies and extradited to Tonkin in 1683.401 Gradually peace was restored in northern Vietnam after almost two centuries of civil war. The cessation of military activities by Tonkin by the early 1680s saw a remarkable reduction in its demands for weapons and martial paraphernalia from the Company. On paper, there seemed to be no obstruction to a revival of the economy after peace prevailed in the country. Ironically though, the situation declined in a totally opposite direction. The country suffered a series of regularly recurring crop failures during the last quarter of the seventeenth century. The decline in the agriculture-based economy of Tonkin dragged on and intensified during the first half of the eighteenth century which led to subsequent peasant rebellions and social disorder.402 This grave situation was not helped by several reforms introduced by the court that compromised the efficiency of the administrative system. After the end of the conflict with the Nguyễn and the complete pacification of their Mạc rivals, there was a remarkable transfer of power from military officials to the literati.403 The orthodox Confucian ideology revived, a school of thought which scorned trade, foreign trade in particular. These negative developments discouraged foreign merchants. Under the combined yoke of the depression of the economy and the court’s harsh measures against them, a large part of the local Chinese population began to leave Tonkin in the late 1680s, followed by the English and the Dutch in 1697 and 1700 respectively.404 The VOC’s Tonkin trade was severely affected by those transformations. Because of the current low profits of its Tonkin trade, the High Government resolved to take measures. In the summer of 1670, the Hoogcapel was wrecked at sea while en route to Japan from Tonkin. Seizing this accident as an opportunity, Batavia decided to close the Tonkin-Japan direct shipping route in an attempt to cut the excessive charge of maintaining this trade as well as ending the large-scale private trade arranged for their own benefit by factors.405 From 1671, all cargoes prepared by the Tonkin factory were ordered to be shipped to Batavia, from where they would be distributed to different destinations. This reform of the Tonkin-Japan silk trade marked a milestone in the

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history of the VOC commerce with Tonkin. The meagre profit margin yielded by the Tonkinese silk cargoes in Japan continued to decrease after 1671. In 1678, for instance, the Deshima factory reported to Batavia that Tonkinese raw silk and silk piece-goods had made a profit respectively of only 16 and 14 per cent, hardly enough to cover the transport costs. Discouraged by the report, Batavia decided to reduce the export volume of Tonkinese silk to Japan, conceding its failure to revive the regular export volume of Tonkinese silk to Japan throughout the 1660s. In 1679, the High Government informed the Tonkin factory that, as the Tonkin trade continued to slump, it had been forced to reduce both the annual amount of investment capital for the factory as well as the number of factors residing in Thăng Long in a move to cut unnecessary expenses.406 The 1671 reform could not prevent the further decline of the Tonkin trade. While the sale of Tonkinese raw silk stagnated in Japan, this yarn was unmarketable in Europe because of its low quality. The Company’s import and export trade with Tonkin was therefore reduced to a minimal volume. Worse still, the stagnation of the Tonkin-China border trade dragged on, preventing the transportation of such import goods as South-East Asian pepper and European textiles from northern Vietnam to southern China. It also obstructed the flow of such Chinese goods as gold and musk into Tonkin.407 Consequently, from this time the Tonkin factory often made a deficit as its daily expenses exceeded its yields. In 1678, for instance, the factory spent 24,049 guilders while it profited only 3,016 guilders, suffering a deficit of 21,036 guilders. This situation never again improved before the end of the Company trade with Tonkin.408 The stiff competition from the other foreign merchants in Tonkin in the 1670s caused the Dutch Tonkin factory more difficulties. Besides the Chinese, and occasionally the Portuguese and Spanish from Macao and Manila, the French and English also appeared on the scene. In 1669, the first French ship visited Tonkin in order to seek permission to trade and to make propaganda for the Christian faith in northern Vietnam. Although any activity by the French mission was forbidden by the Lê/Trịnh court, the French priests who had arrived in Tonkin earlier continued to live in the coastal area, preparing the way for another group of French merchants and missionaries in Tonkin in the early 1680s.409 The English arrived in Tonkin in the summer of 1672. After a few years of being forced to live in the small town of Phố Hiến, the English were finally allowed to reside and trade in the capi-

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tal Thăng Long, competing with the Dutch factory in the buying and selling of goods.410 Decline intensified, 1680–1690 During the 1680s, the VOC’s Tonkin trade slid even further into a decline for various causes. In 1680, a big flood ravaged the vast province of Thanh Hoá and caused a severe famine in the southern region. In the following year, a protracted drought which afflicted the major provinces of the country again led to another famine, causing hundreds of deaths everyday. So severe was the 1681 famine that, according to Dutch observers, starving people had to eat dead bodies lying unburied in order to survive. Chúa Trịnh Tạc urged the Dutch factory to import rice and whatever other provision it was possible to acquire.411 Two famines within two years largely destroyed the economy of Tonkin, especially the handicraft industries. After these famines, prices rose sharply reflecting the scarcity of goods available.412 Natural disasters continued to devastate the economy of Tonkin in the following years, exacerbating the country’s economic decline. In 1688, another largescale famine hit the country. Consequently, Chúa Trịnh Căn again had to request the Dutch Company to provide his country with rice. The arrival of the Gaasperdam in the summer with eighty bales of Javanese rice was therefore warmly welcomed.413 Punishing competition from other European merchants contributed, just as before, to the decline of the Company’s Tonkin trade. By the early 1680s, the French Tonkin trade had been consolidated considerably. In 1680 and 1682, two French missions arrived in Thăng Long to negotiate with the Trịnh rulers about trading privileges and to disseminate Christian propaganda. The French priests who had arrived in Tonkin in the early 1670s were also involved in trading activities.414 In 1683, the English began to run their factory in the capital and competed fiercely with the Dutch. They arrived with a trading capital of 80,000 rials and offered higher prices to local weavers to buy pelings for their homeward-bound ship.415 By offering copious presents and satisfying most of the Trịnh’s demands, the English acquired more favourable trading privileges than the Dutch. In the late 1680s, the Dutch factors realized that the Trịnh rulers were more inclined to deal with the English than with themselves. The reason was that the English had offered Chúa Trịnh Căn better cannon. The Tonkin factory therefore urged the High Government to send more superlative presents to the court next year. In 1689, the Governor-General wrote

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to the Chúa and asked him to protect and facilitate the Dutch factors. Batavia’s letter and presents placated the Chúa for a while. After the Company failed to supply him with the objects demanded, the relationship between the factory and the court deteriorated again.416 After Batavia decided to reduce the annual investment capital for the Tonkin trade in 1679, approximately 150,000 guilders were remitted to the Tonkin factory every year, less than half of the amount that Batavia had often sent to Tonkin in the years up to the mid-1650s. Because Tonkinese raw silk fetched virtually no profit on the Japanese market, in 1681, Batavia ordered the Tonkin factory to restrict its purchase to musk and silk piece-goods for the Netherlands. The Governor-General also requested Chúa Trịnh Căn to deliver no raw silk to the factory.417 In 1686, the bottom dropped out of the Tonkinese raw silk market in Japan because of the change in the regulations on the import and export trade issued by the Japanese Government in 1685.418 A Chinese junk carrying Tonkinese raw silk to Japan this year even had to return with its complete cargo unsold.419 The GovernorGeneral again reminded the Chúa that the transformation in the Japan trade had forced the Company to end its exportation of Tonkinese silk to the island market. He therefore expected that the Chúa would pay the factory in either cash or silk piece-goods such as pelings, which could still be sold in the Netherlands. The requests from Batavia fell on deaf ears. The Trịnh ruler forced the Dutch factors to accept raw silk, asking why he should change the regular mode of payment which his predecessors had practised for so many years. Because of the low purchase price for Tonkinese raw silk, Batavia ordered the Tonkin factory to have some samples of local raw silk spun using the Chinese and Bengali methods in order to forward them to the Netherlands. It seems that the experiment failed and the project of spinning Tonkinese yarn by new methods was eventually revoked.420 The deteriorating relationship between the factory and the court caused even more concern than the trade problems. Since Chúa Trịnh Căn (r. 1682–1709) had succeeded to the throne, the relationship between the factory and the court rapidly worsened. Because the Tonkin trade yielded such meagre returns, Batavia reduced the value of presents sent to the Chúa, something that displeased him. In 1682, the Chúa informed the factory that were the presents to continue to be of such a low value, the Company would have to leave his country in order to avoid a dispute.421 In 1688 and 1689, Chúa Trịnh Căn stopped sending letters to the Governor-General as Batavia had failed to send

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him the objects he demanded.422 In 1691, Chúa Trịnh threatened to deport the Dutch factory from the capital because Batavia had failed to send the crystal ware which he had ordered in the past few years. In order to please the Trịnh ruler, the Dutch factors offered him more gifts and promised to present him with a fixed amount of goods every year.423 The Chúa’s discontent with the Company probably reached its nadir in 1693 when he had the chief factor, Jacob van Loo, and the captain of the Westbroek imprisoned because Batavia had failed to send him amber. The Dutchmen were not released until the factory had signed an agreement to guarantee the delivery of amber and other objects which the Chúa had ordered on the next ship.424 Because of the detention of Van Loo and the captain, the departure of the Westbroek was delayed until January 1694. A few days after her departure for Batavia, she was forced to return to Tonkin by contrary winds. In the meantime, the Chinese arriving in Batavia from Tonkin had informed the High Government about the Chúa’s insults to the Dutch factors. The Governor-General and the Council of the Indies therefore resolved to send Johannes Sibens, the former chief factor of the Tonkin factory, to Thăng Long to assist the factors to resolve the problems. Batavia also urged the directors in the Netherlands to send the red amber and crystal ware that they had ordered for the Chúa in the past few years as quickly as possible.425 Sibens’ arrival in Thăng Long did ease the tension for a while.426 In the summer of 1695, the amber and crystal ware which the Chúa had ordered finally arrived, but to the factors’ disappointment, he was unimpressed with his gifts which the Company had ordered for him from the Netherlands with so much difficulty. The Chúa seized a large part of the factory’s silver and goods in payment for raw silk, and heaping insult upon injury, the Crown Prince also insulted the Dutch factors. In 1694, he asked the factory for 200 taels of silver for which he would pay in silk. The Dutch excused themselves explaining that they had no silver with them at that moment. Merchant Gerrit van Nes and the interpreter of the factory were immediately summoned to his palace, where they were detained for ten days and were not released until they had paid ‘fines’.427 In 1695, the Chúa again imprisoned the factory interpreter and confiscated a part of the factory silver in order to compensate himself for the insignificant gifts that Batavia had offered him that year. The current tension with the court confused the factors.428 On the departure of the Cauw to Batavia, the Chúa and the

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Prince again sent letters to the Governor-General demanding various sorts of merchandise.429 The last ship, 1699/1700 After the imprisonment and the detention of Company servants, in the mid-1690s the High Government began to consider the possibility of ending the Company’s unprofitable trade with Tonkin. In their missive to the Gentlemen XVII in 1695, the Governor-General and the Council of the Indies suggested to put an end to the trading relations with the Lê/Trịnh Kingdom. But for as long as no official reply from the Board of the Directors was forthcoming, the High Government was obliged to continue the Tonkin trade. In its missives to the Tonkin factory, Batavia always ordered its factors to behave circumspectly in order to avoid any confrontation with the Trịnh rulers. The Governor-General also requested the Chúa to grant the Company more trading privileges as well as to protect its servants currently trading in his country.430 When the Cauw arrived in Tonkin in the summer of 1696, the Chúa, dissatisfied with the modest presents Batavia offered him, again seized part of the factory’s silver. All the while, the Dutch factory continued to suffer increasing snubs and insults: the interpreters were detained for twenty days while the factory was ransacked by some twenty-five soldiers. Their intransigence brought the business of the factory almost to a complete standstill. Consequently, the cargo which the Cauw carried to Batavia at the end of this year was valued at around 57,000 guilders only.431 During their meeting in the summer 1697, the Governor-General and the Councillors of the Indies again considered abandoning the Company’s Tonkin trade. It was argued that since the Tonkin trade had yielded no profit in recent years and the factors had often been humiliated, there was no point in maintaining such a fraught trading relationship. Their only concern was that once the relationship had officially been terminated, it would be extremely difficult for the Company to return in the future. Moreover, since no official reply from Holland had arrived, the High Government did not want to take responsibility for such an important decision. Hence, no final conclusion on the fate of the Tonkin trade was made. 432 The relationship between the Company and Tonkin deteriorated further in 1697 and 1698. Despite the Governor-General’s reconcilia-

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tory letters to them, the Trịnh rulers continued to make extravagant demands on the factory. They also neglected to reply to the Governor-General in 1698.433 During their meeting in January 1698, the Governor-General and the Council of the Indies again agreed that the Company should withdraw from Tonkin.434 In the same year, the Gentlemen XVII’s reply on the Tonkin issue arrived in Batavia: the Gentlemen XVII still wanted to maintain the Tonkin trade. If the Company abandoned its trade with the Lê/Trịnh Kingdom, where else could it buy such silk piece-goods as pelings, hockiens, and chiourongs for Patria? Unswayed by these arguments, the Governor-General and the Council of the Indies continued to defend their opinion that the Tonkin factory should be closed. They argued that, if the Company could not purchase pelings and other such textiles from Tonkin, it could expediently spend that investment capital on the other products at the other trading-places such as Bengal and Batavia, with the prospect of making a much more promising profit. Nevertheless, at this moment, Batavia wanted to wait for the official reply from the Trịnh rulers before making any final decision.435 When it became aware that the Trịnh rulers had neglected to reply to the Governor-General when the Cauw left for Batavia in the winter of 1698/9, the High Government concluded that the Company had no reason whatsoever to delay the abandonment of the Tonkin trade.436 In June 1699, the decision to give up the Tonkin trade was finalized.437 The Cauw was sent to Tonkin for the last time to bring the Company servants and property back to Batavia. In letters to the Chúa and the Crown Prince to explain the Company’s decision, the Governor-General confirmed that the Company might consider returning to Tonkin if the Chúa thought that it was necessary.438 In contrast to Batavia’s expectation, Chúa Trịnh Căn was not at all discomposed about the Company’s withdrawal. After removing all Company property, Chief Factor Van Loo handed the factory keys over to the capados. And without a formal farewell or any such ceremony, the Dutch quietly left the capital Thăng Long for Doméa to prepare for their departure. In the winter of 1699/1700, the Cauw left for Batavia, carrying all the Dutch factors, the Company’s assets, and a small cargo valued at 58,956 guilders. Before the Cauw’s departure the Chúa sent the following letter to the Governor-General: 439 I am the King whom Heaven empowers to govern and protect my subjects. Because I govern according to the mandate of Heaven, foreigners

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come to my country from different places to reside and trade. All foreign merchants arriving in my land from faraway countries receive my beneficent protections. You complained that I had not replied to your letter last year. It was neither because I was displeased with you nor because I disrespected you. On the contrary, my respect for you was as much as it ever had been. I did not do so because I did not want you to waste time replying to me. You must have already known that although Heaven neither speaks nor writes to us, yet governs the Earth with four seasons. What is the use of exchanging letters? They are nothing more than papers that make nonsense and trouble sore eyes. While all foreign merchants had to reside outside the capital Thăng Long, your people were allowed to live inside. They were even allowed to build a stone factory. These favours are evidence that I always favoured your people above other foreigners. You complained about my strictness towards your people. I accept that truth. But your people caused all such strictures. Anyone who lives in my country has to obey the local laws; as those living in your country should obey your laws. The Dutch forgot this. They often declared only half of the cargoes they shipped to my country. This caused me great losses. I do not oppose the decision to recall your people and abandon your trade in my country, but I hope you will change your opinion.

Concluding Remarks Just as elsewhere in Asia, the commercial relations of the VOC with Tonkin were closely interwoven with local political ambitions. After a few years of hesitation, the High Government agreed to ally with Tonkin to attack Quinam, responding to the Trịnh rulers’ intolerable pressure, not to mention the Dutch desire for revenge on Quinam. But Batavia sent fleets to Tonkin in 1642 and 1643 to no avail. The Dutch revocation of the military alliance with Tonkin displeased the Trịnh rulers and contributed to the steady erosion of the Tonkin-VOC relationship. In order to facilitate the import and export trade of the Tonkin factory, the Governor-General and the Council of the Indies continued to send presents and letters to the Trịnh rulers and maintain fairly favourable political relations with Thăng Long until the early 1680s. From then on the rapid decline of the Company’s Tonkin trade and the Trịnh’s dismissive attitude towards the factory discouraged the High Government from maintaining its relationship with Tonkin and eventually forced it to abandon the Company’s factory in Tonkin.

PART THREE: THE COMMERCIAL RELATIONS Phi Thương Bất Phú (ॺ ೸ լ ༄).440 The main Trade of the Country [Tonkin] is maintained by the Chinese, English, Dutch, and other Merchant Strangers, who either resided here constantly, or make their annual Return hither. These export their Commodities, and import such as are vendible here. The Goods imported hither besides Silver, are Salt-peter, Sulphur, English Broad-cloaths, Cloath-rashes, some Callicoes, Pepper and other Spices, Lead, great Guns, &c. William Dampier (1688)441

Introduction The procurement of local silk products for Japan, and, to a much lesser extent, gold for Coromandel, and silk piece-goods and other miscellaneous items such as musk for the Netherlands was the raison d’être for the operations of the VOC in Tonkin. In order to procure local products, the Tonkin factory needed to be provided with ready cash consisting mainly of silver bullion. Copper and zeni (copper coins) from Japan were also imported into Tonkin to be circulated along with the local and Chinese copper cash (the round coin with a square hole in the middle) at any time of the devaluation of silver. Compared to silver and copper zeni, other miscellaneous items imported by the VOC into Tonkin were of minor importance, and hardly made up more than five per cent of the Company’s annual imports (see Figure 3).442 Such commodities consisted mainly of provisions for the Dutch factors’ daily use such as wine, arrack, and butter. Some sorts of merchandise like pepper, glassware, knives, Japanese yakan (kettles) also found customers in the local market. But the most important import commodities were those that the Lê/Trịnh rulers specifically demanded such as cannon, bullets, saltpetre, sulphur, ammunition, various sorts of Indian and European textiles, and curiosities.443

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silver/copper: 1637-71

TONKIN

JAPAN

FORMOSA

silk: 1637-71

silk/musk/ gold/ceramics

EUROPE COROMANDEL

copper/silver/ weapons/spices 1637-1700

silk/musk/gold 1637-1700 silver/ misc. items

BATAVIA

copper silk 1672-1700

ceramics 1663-81 spices 16371700

SOUTHEAST ASIAN PORTS

Figure 2. The VOC’s import and export trade with Tonkin in the seventeenth century

CHAPTER FIVE

THE IMPORT TRADE ’t Geene wy daar komen aan te brengen en den handel dryven, bestaat meest in silver; oock kopere kasjes, die in Japan gegoten off gemaeckt worden … voort eenige specereyen, saltpeter, cattoene lynwaten, dog alles, buyten het voorsch. silver ende kopere kasjes, in geen groote quantiteyt, alsoo het vertier daarvan seer kleyn is. Pieter van Dam444

1. Silver Of all the merchandise imported into Tonkin by the Company, silver constituted the staple commodity. Notwithstanding the relatively high demand for Japanese copper zeni during the 1660s and 1670s, silver was absolutely indispensable to the Dutch Tonkin trade. The English who arrived early in 1672 to trade with Tonkin for the first time lamented the partiality for silver, admitting that ‘the life of this trade is money [silver]’.445 Most of the silver which the Dutch and the Chinese imported into Tonkin originated from Japan. It is a wellknown fact that, after the re-opening of their Japan trade in the early 1630s, the Dutch trading position in Japan had been consolidated and was stronger than ever before. Buttressed by this expansion and security, they were able to export a considerable amount of Japanese silver every year. Therefore, when the Dutch were presented with the opportunity to replace the Japanese in exporting Tonkinese silk to Japan from 1637, they also used Japanese silver to exchange for Tonkinese silk—the most popular trading method which the Japanese and Chinese had followed thus far. In Japan, silver could be readily procured by the Dutch factors so that the Tonkin-bound ships could depart with the required amount of silver before the end of the northeast monsoon. In Tonkin, the Dutch factors advanced this silver to local rulers, brokers, and silk-weavers in order to acquire silks during the summer sale. Although silver could be advanced for big silk contracts, small business transactions in the local market were normally required to be paid in copper cash. The Dutch therefore had to exchange part of their

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silver for local coins for both the peddling trade and daily expenses. After Japan banned the export of its silver in 1668, most of the silver the VOC imported into Tonkin was either from the Netherlands or other Asian countries. Coincidently, from this year, the annual import volume of this precious metal to Tonkin by the Company decreased not only because silver was in short supply but also because of the current general decline in its trade with northern Vietnam.

In merchandise 12,840 (3.2%)

In Japanese silver 384,750 (96.8%)

Figure 3. Division of the capital sent to Tonkin for the 1644/5 trading season (Dutch guilders) Source: Calculated from NFJ 57, Dagregister Nagasaki, 22 Oct. 1644.

In the early years of their trade with Tonkin, the Dutch often had their imported silver refined by the local refiner in order to acquire purer bullion.446 The so-called refining of the Japanese and ‘Mallacx’ silver was a regular occurrence throughout the first half of the seventeenth century, but afterwards it seems to have been abandoned when losses were incurred. The 1656 refining of various silver imported into Tonkin reportedly encountered all-round grievous losses as the kronen or leeuwendaalders lost 24 per cent, the Japanese schuitzilver 16 per cent, the rijksdaalder and provintiëndaalder 8, and the Spanish rials 4 per cent, respectively. Consequently, the silver valued around 180,000 guilders which the Company sent to Tonkin that year incurred a general loss of 4¾ per cent after being refined. From that year, it seems that silver imported into Tonkin from which the purchase price of silks would be judged was tested only for its purity content.447 As the Company’s Tonkinese silk trade yielded high profits in Japan in the 1637–54 period, Japanese silver was sent directly to northern Vietnam on board the Dutch ships which sailed annually between these two places. Every year the amount of silver supplied to Tonkin

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was relatively stable, valued at around 100,000 taels. In the heyday of the Dutch Tonkinese silk trade (1644–52), the quantity of silver sent to northern Vietnam rose to around 130,000 taels per year. Table 1 shows how, until the mid-1650s, silver always occupied approximately 95 per cent of the annual imports; other import products shared around 5 per cent only. (See also Figure 3 for the 1644/5 trading season.) Table 1. The VOC’s import of silver into Tonkin, 1637 1668 (silver in taels; total capital in Dutch guilders) Year

Silver

Total capital

Year 1653 1654 1655 1656 1657 1658 1659 1660 1661 1662 1663

1637 1638 1639 1640 1641 1642 1643 1644 1645 1646 1647

60,000 130,000 25,000 80,000 60,000 100,000 135,000 150,000 130,000 130,000

188,166 298,609 382,458 439,861 202,703 297,529 299,835 397,590 454,606 352,544 377,637

1648

130,000

457,928

1664

1649 1650 1651 1652

100,000 70,000 110,000 230,000

334,105 372,827 552,336? 680,294

1665 1666 1667 1668

Silver

Total capital

40,000?

149,750 25,773 184,215 276,077

50,000 *c. 90,000 *100,000 *5,000 *32,000 *50,000 *100,000 65,000 100,000 *35,000 80,000

*40,000

317,500 64,773 164,703 405,686 394,670 347,989 420,245 419,779 137,181 254,219

Sources: VOC 1123, 1124, 1140, 1141, 1144, 1145, 1146, 1149, 1156, 1158, 1161, 1163, 1166, 1169, 1172, 1175, 1184, 1194, 1197, 1206, 1213, 1216, 1219, 1220, 1230, 1233, 1236, 1240, 1241, 1243/4, 1252, 1253, 1259, 1264, 1265, 1267/8; Dagh register Batavia 1637 1668/9; Generale Missiven, I IV. Note: *: Silver from Batavia, the rest directly from Japan.

After this relatively regular and stable phase, the annual import of Japanese silver into Tonkin by the Company decreased—a fall which can be attributed to various factors. From the viewpoint of the TonkinJapan commerce of the Company, the decrease in the Japanese silver flow to northern Vietnam was a reaction to the rapid drop in the annual profit margins which Tonkinese silk could yield in the early 1650s. As a matter of fact, at this point the Dutch decided to switch to Bengali silk which was becoming marketable and profitable on the Japanese

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market. The annual amount of capital, silver in particular, which Batavia assigned to the Tonkin trade was subsequently reduced, a logical move as it was highly dependent upon two factors: the demand for Tonkinese silk and the quantity of Bengali silk intended for Japan. From the perspective of the exchange rate, the reduction in the silver import into Tonkin by the Company was perhaps an indirect consequence of the fall of the silver/cash ratio caused by a serious shortage of local coins. In 1652, the Dutch in Thăng Long had already lamented the grievous losses incurred when exchanging silver for copper coins. In the following year, within three months, this ratio slumped from 1,600 to 1,700 cash down to less than 800 cash per tael of silver. At the current falling rate, the Dutch factors reported to Batavia, the ratio was likely to reach as low as 700 to 500 coins per tael within a short time.448 No doubt as part of the same economic process the purchase prices had increased generally 20 per cent, causing a huge loss to the export trade of the Company. In 1654, for instance, the purchase price of Tonkinese raw silk was 5.15 guilders per catty, while in the 1636–49 period it had been on average 3.5 guilders. This silk was sold in Nagasaki at 6.92 guilders per catty, offering a roughly calculated profit margin of around 34 per cent only.449 This meagre yield was so discouraging that Batavia resolved to suspend the export of Tonkinese silk to Japan for a while in 1655. Hence, the Dutch factory in Thăng Long was provided with only 25,773 guilders to buy piece-goods for the Netherlands.450 From this year, the Company began to reduce the annual capital it invested in the Tonkin trade and the silver imports were reduced as well. After 1655, the annual silver capital remitted for the Tonkin trade hardly ever reached the former level of 100,000 taels. In the 1656–68 period, with the exception of a few particular years when the Company attempted to revive its export of Tonkinese silk to Japan, the annual amount of silver the Company sent to Thăng Long stood at around 60,000 taels. As soon as the Company’s direct trade route between Tonkin and Japan was seriously affected by the diminution in the annual profit margin, the silver needed for the Tonkin trade was provided from Batavia in lieu of Japan. The reason for this change is unclear. It can, however, be confidently assumed that this had nothing to do with the capacity of the Company to export Japanese silver, since this export was relatively stable until the Japanese Government’s ban on the export of silver in 1668. It may therefore be hypothesized that this was another attempt by the High Government to acquire tighter control of this trading route, or at least to reduce as much as it could

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the private trade between these two places which was said to have been pursued on a rather large scale.451 This hypothesis is based on the fact that 77,000 taels of Japanese silver were exported to Batavia for the first time in 1656. In the years leading up to 1662, the Deshima factory sent a total of 632,648 taels of Japanese silver to Batavia, of which 375,000 taels were earmarked for the Tonkin trade. Table 2. Re export of Japanese silver from Batavia to Tonkin, 1656 1663 (taels) Year

Japan to Batavia

Batavia to Tonkin

1656 1657 1658 1659 1660 1661 1662 1663 1664 1665 1666 1667

77,000 100,000 83,500 43,700 132,000 76,448 120,000 0

0 . 90,000 0 100,000 5,000 32,000 50,000 100,000 *35,000 0 0 0

0 40,000 80,000

Sources: VOC 1213, 1216, 1219, 1220, 1230, 1233, 1236, 1240, 1241, 1243/4, 1252, 1253, 1259, 1264, 1265, 1267/8; Dagh register Batavia 1656/7 1666/7; Generale Mis siven, III IV. Note: *: Silver from the Netherlands, the rest is Japanese silver from Batavia.

After the loss of Formosa in 1662, the Company continued to foster the hope of approaching China from its Tonkin foothold, manoeuvring to obtain a licence from the Lê/Trịnh rulers to establish another factory in Tinnam in the north-eastern province of Quảng Ninh, from which to trade with China (see Chapter Four). As this expectation soon proved to be a piped dream, in April 1663 Batavia repromoted the Tonkin factory to the status of a permanent trading station with the intention of attracting Chinese traders to Tonkin in order to facilitate the procurement of Chinese gold for Coromandel, as well as Chinese musk and Tonkinese silk piece-goods for the Netherlands. In this situation the Company’s supply of silver to its factory in Thăng Long in 1663 and 1664 revived, reaching 100,000 and 135,000 taels respectively. Since the Tonkin factory could not spend all this money on the items

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which the Company had ordered, and the cargoes purchased yielded too meagre a profit in Japan, Batavia again reduced the annual capital, including silver, for the Tonkin factory in the following years. Although the Japanese Government’s ban on the export of silver in 1668 did not cause the Dutch Company any serious problems since it quickly turned to exporting gold and copper instead,452 it did slightly affect the Dutch Tonkin trade. Having been deprived of the traditional flow of Japanese silver, Batavia now had to look for this precious metal in other places. In 1664, when the sending of Japanese silver to Batavia was temporarily suspended, Batavia had already switched over to supplying Tonkin with silver from the Netherlands. Out of approximately 55,000 taels which the Tonkin factory had demanded for the 1664 trading season, Batavia could afford only 35,000 taels as little silver had arrived from Holland.453 During the so-called ‘zeni period’, which covered the years between 1663 and 1677, the annual quantities of silver imported into Tonkin by the Dutch Company were particularly low compared to the quantity of zeni, except for the first three years when the Tonkin factory was newly repromoted to a permanent office and hence supplied with a relatively large amount of capital. Between 1666 and 1677, silver shipped to Tonkin barely accounted for one-fifth of the Company’s annual investment. The form of the silver for Tonkin also changed from bullion to coins, consisting of both Western and Asian species such as provintiëndaalders, kruisdaalders, Mexican rials, Surat rupees and so forth. In Tonkin, most of these coins were melted down to make silver ingots before being circulated. After the ‘zeni period’, these silver coins constituted the staple of the Company’s silver investment in Tonkin until 1700. In 1672, for instance, a total of 1,761 marks and another five chests (c. 5,000 taels) of silver bars were sent to Tonkin.454 Silver bars appear quite often in the list of cargoes consigned to Tonkin until the mid-1670s, before being replaced by provintiëndaalders, Surat rupees, and Mexican rials. When it proved to have been profitable to have sent some 52,016 Surat rupees to Tonkin in 1675, this Indian coin was then regularly imported there not only by the Dutch but also by the English. In 1677, for example, Batavia shipped a total of 152,000 Surat rupees to Tonkin.455 In the next year, the Dutch observed that their English competitors had also procured a considerable quantity of silver from Surat and shipped this to Tonkin on the Formosa.456 The Dutch import of these silver coins into northern Vietnam remained stable until they eventually abandoned the Tonkin trade in 1700.

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2. Japanese copper zeni The Vietnamese monetary system prior to the seventeenth century The history of the Vietnamese monetary system prior to the French colonization of the nineteenth century can be divided into two major periods: the period of gold and silver, and that of copper coins. The Vietnamese used silver and gold as the major form of exchange until the tenth century when they successfully supplanted the Chinese colonization which had lasted a thousand years and established their own independent kingdom.457 Influenced by the Chinese monetary system in which copper coins had been used for centuries, King Đinh Bộ Lĩnh (968–79) minted copper coins bearing his regnal title, Thái Bình. In 984, King Lê Hoàn (980−1005) of the Former Lê Dynasty minted the Thiên Phúc coins. After that, copper coins were sporadically minted during the Lý (1010–1226) and Trần (1226–1400) Dynasties, and, as has been pointed out by Whitmore, were ‘as much for a political as an economic purpose’ since the Vietnamese relied heavily on the supply of copper coins from China.458 It seems that the supply of Chinese copper coins to northern Vietnam ran smoothly during these centuries which gave considerable impetus to the rapid expansion of Đại Việt’s economy. There was a brief period during the Hồ Dynasty (1400−7) when paper money was introduced.459 After liberating the country from the Ming occupation (1407–28), the Lê Dynasty (1428−1788) attempted to stabilize the increasing demand for cash by minting good Vietnamese copper coins. It also reset the value of these coins: one quan (long string) made ten tiền (short string) and consisted of 600 copper cash coins. This standard value remained unchanged until the nineteenth century.460 The one stumbling-block was that the minting of cash by the Lê Dynasty failed to keep pace with the indigenous demand. In order to reduce the shortage of these denomination coins, the central government stepped up the number of coins minted in the state factories, and it passed decrees (in 1434, 1486, 1658, and 1741) to forbid the Vietnamese to select the good and neglect the damaged coins. These efforts had little effect because there were different sorts of coins which were minted in different metals. Copper and zinc coins simultaneously circulated in the country, especially the zinc ones minted by the Mạc Dynasty in the sixteenth century. In order to stabilize the monetary system, in 1663, Thăng Long

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decreed all zinc coins be destroyed.461 More important to the monetary situation was that, by the seventeenth century, the Lê/Trịnh rulers enjoyed an alternative source of supply of both minting materials and coins from foreign merchants trading to Tonkin. As analysed in the preceding chapters, great quantities of silver and, to a lesser extent, Japanese zeni (copper coins) were imported into northern Vietnam by the Dutch, Chinese and other foreign merchants. This affected the silver/cash exchange ratio and had a great impact on the economy of Tonkin. The cash shortage in the 1650s and the VOC’s import of Japanese copper zeni into Tonkin As the scarcity of local copper coins led to the fall in the exchange ratio of silver/cash, causing a great devaluation in the silver imported into Tonkin, foreign traders quickly switched from silver to copper, especially to copper coins, in order to cut the losses which would have been incurred by silver imports.462 Utilizing their advantageous foothold of Macao, where Chinese copper coins could be either newly minted or existing specie procured, in 1652, the Portuguese sent a navet to Tonkin carrying a goodly sum in copper coins minted by the Chinese residing in Macao. Despite the Tonkinese rulers’ attempts to devaluate this specie, the Portuguese still profited around 20,000 fine taels from this special cargo and, more importantly, relieved their dependence on copper coins in business transactions. The scarcity of cash afflicted not only Tonkin, it also caused upsets in Quinam, hence the import of copper coins offered an even more spectacular profit in the southern kingdom. In 1651 the Portuguese had reportedly earned an impressive profit margin of 150 per cent from this copper coin, enjoying a net profit of 180,000 taels from 120,000 taels’ worth of zeni imported into Quinam.463 Having no access to the supply of Chinese copper coins at that moment, the Dutch factors in Thăng Long managed to reduce the loss indirectly by shrewdly eschewing any straight competition with the Chinese in purchasing local goods. Realizing that copper coins often became dear when foreign ships arrived, the Dutch factors in Tonkin proposed to their masters that from now on the Company ships should be sent to Tonkin a little earlier. This would allow them to commence their business transactions before the Chinese; should this scheme go awry they should keep their silver unspent until the Chinese had left for Japan.464 This was obviously a passive and, hence,

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ineffectual solution. The cash shortage continued to ravage the Dutch import and export trade. In April 1654, the Tonkin factors lamented that the exchange rate, which had been 1 tael of silver for 1,600-1,700 cash in the last few months, had fallen to only 1/800. At this rate of fall, predicted the factors, it would likely plummet to the rate of 1/700 to 600 to 500 within a short time. In the same year, the High Government made its first effort towards alleviating the Company’s drawback in this copper cash equation, having some copper zeni minted in Batavia and shipped to Tonkin for a trial. This attempt failed because the Lê/Trịnh rulers accepted only the big coins and devalued the small ones.465 The cash plague showed no sign of abating and after 1660 was more detrimental to the Company. This year, the silver/cash ratio fell to 1/570 to 850 only, setting a new record of a silver devaluation up to 30 per cent. The low exchange rate was perhaps one of the reasons the Trịnh rulers refused to accept any of the silver the Dutch offered them for the delivery of silk. And, perhaps to reduce to some extent the scarcity of copper coins which seemed to have reached an alarming level, the Trịnh rulers had a great quantity of copper coins minted by the State mint. The court’s efforts to control the shortage of copper coins meant that the embryonic plan of the Japanese entrepreneur Resimon to import Japanese copper zeni, as the Dutch chose to describe it figuratively, ‘vanished into thin air’.466 Batavia was doubly disadvantaged as it had no means to dissipate the sluggishness of its factors in their grappling with the shortage of copper coins which compared badly with the dynamism of other foreign merchants trading to Tonkin. Having thought long and deep, in 1660 Batavia ordered the Deshima factory to purchase some Japanese copper zeni as samples for Tonkin. The next year, 400,000 coins were sent to the Dutch factory in Thăng Long and this proved to be a success, yielding a profit of 40 per cent.467 But the most successful aspect of this trial was that besides silver, from now on the Company could send Japanese copper zeni to Thăng Long compensating, at least partly, the loss in the silver trade the Company had had to endure thus far in Tonkin. Having hit upon a good solution, from 1663 the Dutch regularly imported Japanese copper zeni into Tonkin and, as soon as this specie became popular and profitable in northern Vietnam, they reduced the import of silver to a remarkably small quantity (Tables 1 and 3).

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Table 3. The VOC’s import of Japanese copper zeni into Tonkin, 1660 1679 (pieces, unless stated otherwise) Year

Total

Year

Total

1660 1661 1662 1663 1664 1665 1666 1667 1668 1669

0 400,000 0 9,230,000 c. 15,762,184 31,524,369 800,000 10,080 lb. 10,540,000 15,748,300

1670 1671 1672 1673 1674 1675 1676 1677 1678 1679

7,750,000 c. 21,400,000 6,360,000 8,520,000 23,809,523 17,568,000 c. 39,400,000 c. 5,000,000 0 0

Sources: VOC 1233, 1236, 1240, 1241, 1243/4, 1252, 1253, 1259, 1264, 1265, 1267/8, 1272, 1278, 1283, 1290, 1294, 1302, 1304, 1307, 1311, 1314, 1320, 1322, 1330, 1339; Dagh register Batavia 1661 1679.

This naturally prompts the question: what were these Japanese copper zeni and how did they fit into the Vietnamese market? Generally speaking, the export of Japanese copper coins to Vietnam can be divided into two major phases; each phase marked by different sorts of coins. The first period was the early seventeenth century when, in an attempt to standardize the monetary system of Japan, the Japanese Government decided that only good coins minted in Japan could be circulated on the Japanese market. Coins imported from China (toraisen) or minted privately in Japan in the earlier years (shichusen) were banned from domestic circulation. The Japanese shuin-sen merchants and the Dutch, Chinese, and Portuguese therefore exported these banned and hence devalued coins in great quantities, mainly to central Vietnam, where the Nguyễn rulers, having neither a source of copper nor a coin supply, either used them as money or melted them to cast guns and utensils for daily use.468 Consequently, these coins circulated in Tonkin alongside other sorts of cash. The French priest Alexandre de Rhodes, who arrived in northern Vietnam in the late 1620s, observed two sorts of coins in use on the Tonkinese market: the ‘great coins’ imported into Tonkin by the Chinese and Japanese and accepted throughout the whole country, and the ‘small coins’ minted locally and circulating only inside the capital and four surrounding provinces.469 The second phase took place between 1659 and 1685. During this period, the Japanese in Nagasaki were allowed to mint Nagasaki trade

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coins for export. Besides the coins which were minted for the Nan Ming in southern China and the Zheng family in Formosa in the later period (eiryaku sen), the bulk of the Nagasaki trade coins was shipped to both central and northern Vietnam. Most of these coins bore the Chinese Song reign title of Yuanfeng (Viet. Nguyên Phong) and were called genho tsuho by the Japanese.470

Illustration 11. The Japanese genho tsuho minted for export during the 1659 1685 period

The genho tsuho coins were not only crucial to the economy of Quinam, whose severe need of all sorts on coins to meet the great demand of the local market virtually never abated throughout the seventeenth century, they also played an indispensable role in balancing the monetary system of Tonkin during the third quarter of the 1600s. As already mentioned in passing, in the early 1650s, Tonkin suffered a severe shortage of coins probably because of the disruption of the regular cash flow from China owing to political chaos on the border. The Portuguese therefore switched over to importing coins minted by the Chinese in Macao into Tonkin. This trade yielded high profits.471 In order to cut the losses on the silver import as well as to reduce their dependence on foreign copper cash, the VOC introduced copper coins minted in Batavia into Tonkin in 1654. This experiment failed and from this year to 1661, when it shipped some 400,000 Japanese copper zeni to Tonkin as an experiment, the Dutch Company made no effort to profit from the cash shortage in Tonkin.472 As the Japanese copper coins were accepted and proved to be profitable in Tonkin, they were increasingly imported by the Dutch as well as the Chinese until the late 1670s. Thanks largely to the sufficiency of these coins, the shortage of copper coins in Tonkin was basically solved; the silver/ cash ratio subsequently revived.

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The revelation of the profitability of the Japanese copper zeni in the Tonkin trade assumed even greater significance after the 1668 ban on the export of silver by the Japanese Government. If silver still accounted for roughly 40 per cent of the investment capital in 1668, the last year of the dispatch of a consignment of silver bullion to Tonkin by the Company, it was almost none in the following year, but simultaneously 15,748,300 Japanese copper zeni accounted for approximately 40 per cent of that year’s capital. In 1674, 23,809,000 zeni sent to Tonkin by the Dutch accounted for around 66 per cent of the total capital and two years later, the share of this specie had even increased to around 73 per cent. Taking the entire ‘zeni period’ into account, these Japanese copper coins provided around 22 per cent of the annual capital sent to Tonkin by the Company.473 It may well be that proven Dutch capacity for importing Japanese zeni into his kingdom was the reason for the Chúa to grant the Dutch the monopoly of this specie in Tonkin in 1675. The Company, however, could not enjoy this privilege for long because, in the following year, zeni became cheap in northern Vietnam. Reporting trading conditions at the factory in 1675, the chief of the Tonkin factory, Albert Brevinck, informed his masters in Batavia that the Japanese copper zeni had been losing profit by the day.474 The next year, copper ingots were said to be preferred to zeni though the latter were still indispensable to the purchasing of local goods, particularly low-quality silk. Armed with these figures, for the import of metals to Tonkin this year, Batavia ordered the Deshima factory to lessen the number of zeni, while expecting a good quantity of copper. In obedience to this order, only 5,000,000 zeni were conveyed to Tonkin in 1677. The year after, it was widely reported that from now on the Tonkin factory no longer required the Japanese copper zeni.475 The Company once again switched back to importing silver into Tonkin as it had done regularly before the zeni period. The reasons of this sudden end are a bit of a mystery. Iwao Seiichi has suggested that the circulation of Japanese zeni in Tonkin had been reduced after 1661 when an embassy from Qing China arrived in Thăng Long and ordered the Lê/Trịnh rulers to strike Chinese copper coins for circulation in Tonkin themselves.476 It is true that the Qing decrees and presents arrived in Thăng Long in 1662 and, in the following year, Tonkin sent its first tribute to Peking.477 Nevertheless, this seems to have had no effect at all on the import into or the circulation of the Japanese zeni in Tonkin since these coins were imported in

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growing quantities by the Dutch and the Chinese until 1677. It could well be that the VOC stopped importing Japanese zeni into Tonkin after 1677 because of the growing availability of Chinese coins allied with the attempts of the Tonkinese court to mint good copper coins in the State minting houses. 3. The arms trade and the import of other miscellaneous items With the exception of silver and copper which constituted the most distinguishable trends in the VOC’s import trade with Tonkin during the 1637–1700 period, the importation of all other commodities was small by comparison. While Western items such as cloth and textiles were too expensive for a relatively poor consumer market like Tonkin, other Asian trade goods such as spices were largely imported into northern Vietnam by Chinese and other Asian merchants. This conspired to make the VOC’s importation of miscellaneous commodities into northern Vietnam peripheral to that of silver and copper zeni, and any such items were often a clear reflection of the Trịnh rulers’ demands. Since the Trịnh’s ultimate aim in creating a relationship with the Dutch was to obtain military support, understandably their regular demand for goods, besides silver and copper and several sorts of curiosities, from the Dutch Company consisted of weapons and such military paraphernalia as pieces of ordnance and cannon balls and bullets of various sizes, other ammunition, saltpetre, sulphur, and Arabian horses. Most of the pieces of ordnance and the cannon balls which the VOC sold to the Trịnh rulers were those which were currently used by the Company itself in Asia.478 In 1649, for instance, Chúa Trịnh Tráng informed Dutch chief factor Philip Schillemans that he wanted ten iron ordnance pieces for himself and two more for his eldest son when the Company ships arrived in Tonkin next time. In order to please the Tonkinese ruler, the Dutch had to remove two cannon from their establishment in Formosa to present to the Chúa in 1650. These pieces satisfied the Trịnh ruler so much that he again asked for two more cannon which shot balls with a larger diameter than those which the Company had presented him that year.479 Because the armies of Tonkin were constantly being defeated and overrun, during its fifth campaign against Quinam (1655–60) the Trịnh kept demanding cannon, balls and all sorts of ordnance from the Company. In 1661, in

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order to arm with all due speed an urgent campaign against Quinam, the Chúa ‘asked’ for and ‘confiscated’ six cannon from on board the Meliskerken which was anchored at Doméa.480 Table 4. Goods ordered by Chúa Trịnh Tạc, 1668 2 20 100,000 50,000 10,000 20 5 5

10 6

metal ordnance which fire 60 tael balls iron ordnance, to wit: 10 pieces of 50 tael balls and 10 pieces of 80 tael balls; together with many ginjoujap [?] as had always been sent catties of sulphur catties of saltpetre balls for each ordnance pieces of red cloth pieces of black cloth pieces of blue cloth together with 20 pieces of perpetuanen of all colours, as much amber as the Governor General would be pleased to send. amber necklaces, all sorts of chintzes, as much white linen as had been sent before. barrels of olive oil, as much copper and tin as the Governor General would be pleased to send.

Source: Letter from Chúa Trịnh Tạc to Batavia in 1668, in Dagh register Batavia 1668 1669, 239 40.

The Dutch, in common with other foreign merchants, were far from willing to deal with the Trịnh rulers because the latter often devalued the import goods in order to get away with paying more cheaply for what they ordered and bought.481 In 1662, for instance, Chúa Trịnh Tạc divided the saltpetre which the Dutch imported into Tonkin for him into three grades, a stratagem which reduced the average price to only seven taels per picul whereas he had agreed with the Dutch factors the year before to pay ten taels five maas per picul. This subtracted 3,245 taels of silver or 11,009 guilders from the profit which the Company had counted on making on this commodity. The reason for this unexpected lowering in price, as explained by the Chúa, was that the saltpetre the Company offered him that year was white and of poor quality; another consideration which had swayed him was the current low price on the free market.482 The Trịnh skinflint attitude to payments discouraged the Dutch, who responded by trying to delay or reduce the earlier demands. In the late 1660s, perhaps in order to prepare for their seventh campaign against Quinam (1672), the Trịnh rulers increased their

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annual orders for weapons and ammunition. Once bitten Batavia now often delayed and cut down on the quantities, reasoning that the Dutch themselves needed weapons badly in the long-drawn-out war with the English in both Europe and Asia. Replying to the Governor-General in 1667, Chúa Trịnh Tạc wrote in a disgruntled tone that the Dutch were not the only people with enemies and needing weapons. He believed Batavia could always reserve some arms and ammunition for him to defend his fortresses as well.483 As the frequency of their conflicts with the Nguyễn and the Mạc eased after 1672 and 1677, the Trịnh’s demand for weapons from the Company lessened. Cannon were now frequently ordered to be cast or bought in the Netherlands modelled after wooden mock-ups.484 This kind of order, which often took the Company around three or four years to fulfil, reflects the loss of prestige of Western weapons in the eyes of the northern Vietnamese rulers, who paid less and less for them. In 1678, for instance, the Dutch Company lost 3,000 guilders on the pieces of ordnance which it had bought for the Tonkinese ruler in the Netherlands because Chúa Trịnh Tạc was so miserly in his payments.485 From this period, all the guns to which the Chúa took exception were returned to Batavia. Instead, he and his successors asked the Company to provide him with skilled Dutch constables and gun-smiths who would reside in Thăng Long to assist in the Trịnh war efforts.486 The Dutch and other foreign merchants also imported a great variety of exotic objects and curiosities into Tonkin. They included rare animals such as Arabian horses, lions, and parrots; such varied sorts of curiosities as Japanese printed textiles and screens, diamond rings, amber, textiles, tulip bulbs, olive oil, and Spanish wine. Generally, these curiosities were brought to Tonkin by the foreigners as presents for the local rulers but, occasionally, the Chúa, princes, and mandarins asked the Dutch to either buy or to have these made for them. Gifts were generally considered a favourable means by which foreign merchants could ingratiate themselves with the local authorities in order to facilitate their trade. There was also a down side to this gift-giving. Special demands could be a sort of burden, especially if the local rulers were dissatisfied with the objects offered. In 1665, for instance, the amber beads which Batavia sent the Chúa and the Prince as presents were not accepted because they were not red enough. The Queen also was dissatisfied with the pearl that the Dutch offered, demanding the Dutch to find another pearl which was similar to the

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wooden model she had sent to them.487 In the summer of 1693, the dissatisfaction of the Chúa with the presents which the Company had offered him even generated such tension that the chief of the Dutch factory, Jacob van Loo, and the captain of the Company ship Westbroek were imprisoned. The reason was that the Chúa was neither satisfied with the horse which the Company had presented him, nor had the amber he had ordered arrived.488 The imprisonment of the Dutch factors occurred again in the following years whenever the Trịnh were discontent with presents and objects ordered.

CHAPTER SIX

THE EXPORT TRADE (I): TONKINESE SILK FOR JAPAN In vorige tyden hebben wy de syde en syde-manufacturen, by ons daar ingekoft, met een schip directlijck nae Japan gesonden, en daarop redelycke winsten behaalt, maar de voorsch. syde naderhant seer in prijs geresen sijnde, behalven dat de Chinesen daar mede in het vaerwater quamen, heeft die directe vaart en handel beginnen af te nemen, sulcx dat men eyndelijck, vermits de sobere winsten en sware onkosten van soo een schip daartoe specialijck te gebruycken, deselve heeft gestaeckt. Pieter van Dam489

1. The Far Eastern silk trade prior to the early 1630s Chinese raw silk and silk piece-goods were undoubtedly among the most important merchandise which European merchants trading in Asia in the early modern period attempted to procure for both the intra-Asian trade and the European market. In pre-modern times, these products were much sought after in Japan, where they could be exchanged for silver which was an important requisite in the intraAsian trade. Long before the Portuguese participation in the Far Eastern silk trade, the exchange of Chinese silk for Japanese silver had been consummately managed by Chinese and Japanese merchants. Then by the sixteenth century, the increasing raids by Japanese pirates (wako) along the China coast forced the Ming Dynasty to limit the maritime activities of its coastal inhabitants and to prohibit Chinese merchants from trading with Japan. As they faded from the scene, the Portuguese, having established a system of footholds from India to China, opened their lucrative China-Japan silk trade in 1545. The Ming ban on Chinese shipping to Japan enabled the Portuguese to complete the circle of their intra-Asian trade network and enjoy the fruit of the profitable Macao-Japan silk trade through the latter half of the sixteenth century.490 At the dawn of the seventeenth century, the Portuguese MacaoJapan silk trade declined as their privileged position in Japan eroded. More seriously, from being king of the castle, the strength of Asian

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merchants, soon compounded by the arrival of other European rivals, challenged the Portuguese Asian trading network. Chinese merchants remained the most formidable competitors and after the 1590s the Japanese also emerged as another doughty rival. Organized under the shuin-sen policy, the latter began to frequent South-East Asian ports with large amounts of precious metals eager to import Chinese silk and other marketable goods for their home market. The arrival of the English and the Dutch in Asia at the end of the sixteenth century was another serious threat to the Portuguese trading position. In 1609, the VOC established a factory at Hirado (Japan). In the first two decades Dutch Japanese trade was far from significant as the VOC was not yet secure in its position in East Asia.491 Having no direct access to China, the Dutch ships frequented South-East Asian ports where Chinese merchants often arrived with silk and silk piece-goods. Yet, the annual amount of Chinese silk which the Company could manage to obtain from these rendezvous was insubstantial, although, in order to foster its Japan trade, the Company often reduced the demand for the Chinese silk for the Netherlands whenever the demands of these two marketplaces collided.492 Among the trading-places where VOC ships sailed to buy Chinese silk was Hội An. As mentioned in Chapter Three, all the attempts of the Dutch to trade with this place, just as their vain efforts in China, resulted in only hatred and losses.493 With the establishment of the Formosa trade in 1624, to a certain extent, the Dutch were able to compensate for their inability to enter into a commercial relation with China.494 From the early 1630s, VOC attempts to expand its Far Eastern trade happened to concur with several political and commercial transformations in Japan which contributed enormously to the enlargement of its trading network. A few years after its abolition of the shuin-sen network in 1635, the Japanese Government deported the Portuguese from Nagasaki, triggering remarkable changes within the East Asian maritime trade network.495 In 1636 Nicolaas Couckebacker, the Opperhoofd of the Hirado factory, joyfully informed his masters in Batavia of the declaration of the Japanese seclusion policy and the subsequent possibility to expand the Company trade to several places with which Japanese merchants formerly had regularly traded.496 Considering the current transformation in the Far Eastern trade, the High Government in Batavia confidently reported its planned strategy to take over the Japanese trading network at several places in the Indo-Chinese Peninsula to the Gentlemen XVII.497 Among the

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countries targeted was Tonkin which enjoyed a good reputation as a silk-producer and silk-exporter of the East among European merchants and travellers.498 In 1637 the first Dutch ship arrived in northern Vietnam; with it the VOC relationship with Tonkin was officially established. From this year, the Company began to export in the main Tonkinese raw silk and silk piece-goods to Japan and, to a much lesser extent, to the Netherlands (see Figure 4). In short, the VOC’s Tonkin trade revolved around the central activity of exporting local raw silk to Japan and importing Japanese silver back into Tonkin.499

For Japan 122,400 (90.6%)

For the Netherlands 12,600 (9.4%)

Figure 4. Intended division of the Tonkinese silk cargo, 1645 (taels) Source: Dagh register Batavia 1644/5, 108 22.

During its first thirty-three years, the VOC’s Tonkin-Japan direct silk trade was subject to various fluctuations which clearly fell into three main phases: the period of experiment (1637−40); the period of high profit (1641−54); and the period of decline (1655−70). While the Company trade with Tonkin managed to keep going until 1700, and its export of Tonkinese silk to Japan still occurred sporadically in the 1670−1700 period, the Tonkin-Japan silk trade generally ended in 1670 when Batavia halted the Tonkin-Japan direct shipping for two reasons: unprofitable trade conditions and to control the private trade between these two places. After that the Tonkinese silk cargoes intended for the Japan trade were all carried to Batavia, where they were transhipped onto the Japan-bound ships.

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At least thirteen years before commencing their trade with Tonkin, the Dutch in Japan had already taken note of the marketability and profitability of Tonkinese silk goods on the Japanese market. In 1624 the Dutch factors at Hirado noted that among the junks arriving from various destinations, one was from Tonkin laden with silk and silk piece-goods.500 In 1633 the Hirado factory again reported to Batavia that among the 2,500 piculs of raw silk the Chinese shipped to Japan, a large amount was Tonkinese.501 In 1636, the Chinese made a large profit on their silk trade thanks to the high sales price, to wit: Tonkinese silk was generally sold at Hirado at 290 taels per picul; the Quinamese silk at 233 taels, the Chinese silk at 267 taels, and the bogy or yellow silk was sold at 325, 288, and 240 taels per picul.502 To prepare for the inaugural voyage to Tonkin the following year, Chief Factor Couckebacker gathered information from those who had visited Tonkin and made a detailed report on the Tonkinese silk trade noting pertinent data about geographical, political, and trading situations, local customs, silk harvests, the current prices of silk, and the like. He optimistically calculated that annually, besides other local goods, northern Vietnam could deliver 1500–1600 piculs of raw silk, 5 to 6 thousand piculs of piece-goods and a batch of cinnamon.503 A cargo valued at 188,166 guilders consisting of 60,000 taels of silver, 300 piculs of copper, 200 piculs of iron ingots and other miscellaneous items was prepared for the Grol, which sailed to Tonkin in early 1637.504 The inaugural voyage was a success. The cargo valued 188,166 guilders was exchanged for silk and silk piece-goods at fair prices: 15 faccaar from the King; 16 faccaar from the free market; and 17 faccaar from some mandarins.505 In July, the Grol left Tonkin for Japan via Formosa with a cargo worth around 190,000 guilders, consisting of 53,695 catties of raw silk (168,378 guilders) and 9,665 various piece-goods (11,268 guilders).506 In Japan, the Tonkinese silk cargo was sold at 180 taels per picul, the bogy or yellow silk at 265 taels, making a general profit margin of around 80 per cent. In January 1638, Hartsinck, the chief factor of the Tonkin factory, returned to Tonkin with a capital of 298,609 guilders. This year, the Company formally established a factory and, with the Chúa’s permission, explored the potential of the silk trade in the north-western city of Zenefay (most probably Yên Bái). In July the Zandvoort returned to Japan with 800

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piculs of raw silk; another cargo of 285 piculs of raw silk and 8,972 silk piece-goods was shipped to Japan on board a chartered Chinese junk. At the sale in Japan, Tonkinese raw silk fetched an average of 240 taels per picul, reaping 60 taels more than the year before. Meanwhile, the sale of 300 bales of Persian silk at Nagasaki reportedly yielded a loss of 4,525 guilders.507 The second Tonkin cargo that year valued at 113,645 guilders, which was loaded on the chartered Chinese junk, was expected to contribute a profit of at least 230,000 guilders.508 Hartsinck’s missive analysing both the advantageous and disadvantageous aspects of the Tonkin trade raised optimistic hopes in Batavia. The local capados (eunuchs) were the main obstruction to any success in the free trade the Chúa had granted the Company. These mandarins, who had carved themselves a niche as brokers and speculators, manoeuvred to monopolize the silk supply to foreign merchants in order to squeeze more of its silver from the Company forcing it to purchase silk at dearer prices, and hinder the Dutch from carrying out direct transactions with local people. Although this had not yet become clear, the high expectations fostered by the Trịnh ruler of creating a military alliance against his Nguyễn rival with the Company was to lead the Company into a costly military involvement in the future. The maintenance of a factory in Tonkin was said to be impractical, as Hartsinck had pointed a negative picture of Tonkin as a ‘treacherous and thievish country’, and had intimated the factory might be looted after the ships had left. The competition from the Portuguese and the Chinese was also fierce. In 1637, for instance, the Portuguese arrived from Macao with two junks and one navet; two other vessels, one priests’ junk and one galliota had arrived in Tonkin the previous November and December and had wintered there to buy silk. As the Dutch sailed up to the capital Thăng Long, these two vessels were preceding down the Hồng River preparatory to departing for Macao, carrying on them 620 piculs of raw silk. In April the other Portuguese junks left Tonkin with a large cargo consisting of, among other goods, 965 piculs of raw silk.509 None of this dimmed the current profit of the Tonkin trade, however. With the exception of a certain amount of silver which the Dutch factory had to advance local rulers for the delivery of silk, they were exempted from arrival and departure taxes. The success of the 1637 voyage heralded a handsome profit for the Company’s Tonkin-Japan silk trade in the following years. Hartsinck, despite his complaints about the commercial climate in Tonkin, also

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confidently calculated that the Dutch factors would be able to purchase around 1,000 piculs of raw silk besides a good part of piece-goods for Japan. The annual profit from this trade, according to Hartsinck, could be around four tons of gold. These promising figures encouraged Batavia to carry on its trade with northern Vietnam.510 In 1639 and 1640 the Company trade with Tonkin was closely interwoven with political activities. In 1639 Couckebacker, who was assigned to be the Company representative in negotiating with the Trịnh, visited Tonkin to discuss the military alliance and future attacks on Quinam in more depth. In the same year, the Trịnh ruler sent a delegation to Batavia to consolidate the mutual relationship. Dutch trade in Thăng Long was therefore facilitated. In this year, the Tonkinese silk cargo for Japan which was valued at up to 311,268 guilders consisted of 685 piculs of raw silk. In 1640, the Company’s capital for the Tonkinese silk trade was increased to 439,861 guilders.511 Enriched by this large amount of money, the Tonkin factory managed to purchase three rich silk cargoes valuing approximately 758,455 guilders and sent these to Batavia, where 622,000 guilders’ worth of raw silk and silk piece-goods were then reshipped to Japan.512 Disappointment was in store as these large cargoes yielded only an average profit margin of 40 per cent. Despite the temporary fall in the Tonkinese silk profit, Batavia once again remitted the Tonkin factory a good capital sum in the following year. The confidence of Batavia was paid off handsomely as its Tonkin-Japan silk trade began to take off in this year, a trend which strengthened. 3. The period of high profit, 1641–1654 The boom period of the VOC’s Tonkinese silk trade coincided with some crucial political transformations in East Asian countries as well as a remarkable change in the regional maritime trade network. When the final attempt of the Macao Portuguese to resurrect their trade with Japan failed in 1640, a large number of Portuguese merchants had no option but to migrate to the South-East Asian ports in search of new ventures. At more or less the same time—because of the Japanese Government’s seclusion policy—Japanese merchants were deprived of their Tonkin-Japan silk trade, having to cede it to the Dutch and the Chinese. In China, after the invasion of the Manchu in 1644, a protracted civil war devastated the economy. This political chaos also

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caused a drastic fall in the regular influx of Chinese goods to the Dutch entrepôt of Formosa.513 Shortly before the decline of the Formosa trade, in 1641 the itowappu (the yarn allotment) system in Japan was extended to cover all Chinese silk and silk piece-goods imported to Japan.514 This would have undoubtedly reduced the profit margins on the Chinese goods the Company imported to Japan, if the heads of the five shogunal cities and the Governor of Nagasaki were not to raise the itowappu sales prices of Chinese varieties.515 Confronted with the revision of the itowappu, the VOC had to readjust its silk trade and its silk supplies to Japan in order to avoid falling into the trap of overdependence on this sales system. Besides strengthening the Tonkin trade by providing more capital and ships to boost the import volume of Tonkinese silk for Japan, Batavia also sought to import other silks which were not restricted by the itowappu system. In 1644, the Dutch factory in Persia purchased 527 bales of Persian silk at excessively high prices, valued at a total of 427,249 guilders to send to Japan. It was a wasted effort. This expensive cargo yielded only 50 per cent in Nagasaki, which was highly unsatisfactory in view of the high investment capital and excessive expenses incurred.516 Batavia therefore decided the next year to use the capital with which it had intended to purchase Persian silk to buy Bengali silk for the Japanese market.517 Thereafter Bengali raw silk and piece-goods were regularly exported to Japan and steadily gained a place on the market, before turning out to be the most marketable and profitable silk goods in Japan from the mid-1650s.518 Silk trade under military alliances, 1641–1643 As discussed in detail in Chapter Three, the years from 1641 to 1643 witnessed the most intimate political relations between Tonkin and the VOC. Batavia sent three fleets to assist the Trịnh armies in their attack on Quinam in 1642 and 1643. Two out of these three fleets were defeated off Hội An.519 Basking in the glow of this intimate relationship, the Company’s silk trade in Tonkin was conducted satisfactorily. In Japan, however, Tonkinese silk was still sold at irregular gross profits, its sales price fluctuating to the rhythm of the import volume of Chinese yarn. In 1641, the Tonkinese silk cargo totalling 202,703 guilders encountered ‘grievous losses’ in Nagasaki owing to the reiteration of the proclamation of sumptuary laws by the Shogunate.520 Because of the current

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depression of the silk auction in Nagasaki, the council of the Deshima factory decided to ship back all the goods which could not fetch the cost price there, hoping that they could be sold at a fair profit in the Netherlands or in other regional markets.521 Despite the stagnation of the silk market in Japan, a capital of 300,000 guilders was prepared for the Tonkin factory.522 The next year a Tonkin cargo of 129,352 guilders fetched a good profit in Japan because, as the Dutch in Nagasaki were informed, Chinese piece-goods had risen more than 30 per cent in Miyako, Osaka, and Edo. In the light of the meagre imports by the Chinese, they were likely to rise a further 20 per cent. The heads of the five shogunal cities also urged the Dutch to import more silk for the next year.523 Seeing the high profit margins which the Japan trade offered in the 1642 trading season, Chinese merchants who used to sail to Formosa now sailed directly to Nagasaki in 1643. In that year, many junks of the Chinese mandarin Zheng Zhilong alias Iquan arrived at Nagasaki, carrying some large cargoes of silk and silk piece-goods. This stream of Chinese junks sailing directly to Japan caused a drastic fall in the flow of Chinese goods to Formosa. The Siam and Cambodia cargoes were also small, reflecting the shortage of export goods in these countries.524 Meanwhile, Tonkinese silk gained a good profit of 120 per cent in Nagasaki, having sold at 272 taels 6 maas 9 condrins per picul on average.525 The itowappu prices for Chinese raw silk were fixed at 275 taels for the first grade and 245 taels for the second. The heads of the five shogunal cities and the Governor of Nagasaki promised the Dutch to raise the itowappu prices to 295 and 265 the next year, provided that the Company were to supply the market with a large quantity.526 Decline of Formosa and rise of Tonkin, 1644–1654 In August 1644 Governor Lemaire in Formosa informed the Deshima factory that half of the Company’s demand for Chinese goods from Formosa remained unfulfilled.527 In the meantime, Iquan’s junks continued to sail directly from mainland China to Nagasaki heavily loaded with silk cargoes. In Japan, Chinese raw silk of the first and the second grades were sold respectively at 355 and 325 taels per picul, offering the Chinese a high profit margin.528 In August 1648 a letter from the Governor of Formosa to Fredrik Coyett, the chief factor of the Deshima factory, informed him that the import of

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commodities from China had shrunk to almost nothing.529 In 1651, Batavia was informed that the Formosa trade had managed to gain a small advantage albeit that mainland China had provided no important merchandise to Formosa.530 In Tonkin, the Dutch factory was now also confronted with a more difficult phase. Feeling disappointed with the poor military performance of the Dutch in the 1642 and 1643 campaigns, Chúa Trịnh withdrew some trading privileges he had previously granted the VOC altogether and grew stricter in dealing with the Dutch factors.531 The Chúa’s palpable discontent encouraged his officials to obstruct Dutch trade, causing the Company many losses. Local politics also conspired to thwart the Dutch. Several rebellions and insurrections which broke out during this period not only largely damaged the national economy, they also obstructed the foreign trade of Tonkin. Yet, despite this brooding atmosphere, the VOC’s Tonkinese silk trade generally flourished until the mid-1650s. To strengthen it, Batavia decided to leave a junior merchant and some assistants provided with a substantial sum of money in Tonkin after ships had sailed to Japan. This was to foster the procurement of local products, especially the winter silk. The Company now also started to export more Tonkinese raw silk, silk piece-goods, and several sorts of local products such as musk and cinnamon to the home market in the Netherlands.532 In the years 1644 and 1645, the Dutch factors in Thăng Long ran the silk trade satisfactorily, exporting large cargoes of Tonkinese silk and silk piece-goods to Japan, where they yielded good profits. In Nagasaki, the 1644 cargo of 299,572 guilders consisting of approximately 665 piculs of raw silk made a profit of 104 per cent (or 90 taels of silver per every picul of raw silk).533 The next year, Tonkinese raw silk was sold at 322 taels per picul. The other raw silks generally fetched lower profits: the Persian silk yarn which had been purchased at a much higher price was sold at only 262 and 254 taels per picul,534 and the itowappu price for Chinese raw silk was fixed at 320 and 280 taels per picul for the first and the second grades respectively.535 Another hundred piculs of Tonkinese silk were forwarded to the Netherlands, as Formosa was incapable of supplying the commodity.536

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Table 5. Composition of the Tonkinese silk cargo to Japan, 1644 (totalling 299,572 guilders) 64,515

8,017 2,334 2,911

6,162 4,043 4,340 233 6,233

catties of raw silk of which: 50,712 catties from local people 13,803 catties from the Chúa and local mandarins pieces of raw soumongij pieces of raw baas pieces of white pelings of which: 2,042 pieces figured 869 pieces plain pieces of Tonkinese hockiens pieces of Senuasche [?] hockiens pieces of white chios or unpatterned satijntges pieces of velvet lined with gold and diamond catties of sitouw or coarse wrought silk

Sources: NFJ 57, 1 Sept. 1644; Dagh register Batavia 1644 5, 108 22.

Silk piece-goods 32,019 (26.16%) Raw silk 90,000 (73.53%)

Cardamom 239 (0.19%)

Cinnamon 142 (0.12%)

Figure 5. Intended division of the Tonkinese goods for Japan, 1645 (taels Japanese silver) Source: Appendix 5.

In the next two years, the profit on the Tonkinese silk trade decreased slightly. This was the unhappy outcome of the heavy rains in 1645 which flooded a large part of the Tonkinese mulberry groves. Consequently, the capital which Batavia had remitted for the purchase of winter silk remained unspent. Worse still, the Zwarte Beer and Hillegaersbergh, which conveyed the Tonkinese silk cargoes to Japan in July 1646, were caught in a storm at sea; most of the merchandise was soaked.537 Because of its spoiled condition, Tonkinese raw silk generally gained 50 taels less per picul than the previous year. None-

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theless the other raw silks yielded a nice profit: Chinese silk was sold at 300 taels per picul for the first grade and 260 for the second; the Persian at 206 taels per picul at first but slumped to 198 taels at the end of the sales season.538 In 1647, high-ranking eunuchs at the Lê/Trịnh court attempted to persuade the Chúa to approve their plan to monopolize the silk supply to the Dutch Company. According to their proposal, the Dutch purchase of silk should be confined to some appointed merchants only and at fixed prices. Had the Chúa approved these mandarins’ plan, reported the Dutch factors in Thăng Long, the Company’s Tonkin trade would have been baulked.539 At the same time, the Chinese competition in Tonkin remained fiercely unremitting. Almost inevitably, some clashes and scuffles broke out between the Chinese and the Dutch.540 Seeing the impressive profits which Tonkinese silk yielded in Japan and basking in the protection of the Zheng family, Chinese merchants returned to Tonkin with 80,000 taels of silver. By offering higher purchase prices to local weavers and brokers, they experienced no trouble in exporting around 400 piculs of raw silk and another large batch of silk piece-goods. The stiff Chinese competition in purchasing silk brought the transactions of the Dutch factory to a complete standstill. Only after the Chinese had left Tonkin for Japan in July, could the Dutch factors commence their business. Thanks to an abundant silk harvest this year, they experienced no difficulty in purchasing a cargo of 634 piculs of raw silk for Japan, where it made a reasonable profit margin.541 This year, the itowappu prices for Chinese first- and the second-grade raw silk were 310 and 270 taels per picul respectively while Bengali yarn was reportedly sold at 80 taels less than it had previously yielded.542 Under the weak management of the Chief Factor Philip Schillemans, cracks began to appear in the Tonkin trade in 1648.543 This year, Chinese merchants arrived with 120,000 taels and again offered local sellers 20 taels of silver for every picul of raw silk, siphoning off most of the silk available on the local market. So abundant was this year’s summer silk harvest that, after the Chinese had left, the Dutch factors still managed to buy 522 piculs of raw silk, 12,273 pelings, 14½ piculs of cardamom, a good amount of velvet, sumongij, chiourong, putting together a large cargo worth 393,584 guilders for Japan.544 In Nagasaki, the Tonkinese raw silk bought from the Chúa and the Crown Prince, which occupied the bulk of the cargo, was sold at 333 and 279 taels per picul respectively. The Bengali silk ‘did not fetch the price

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it should have done and the piece-goods yielded an even lower profit’ while the Persian silk which had necessarily been purchased at high prices yielded less than 20 per cent.545 In 1649, the volume of the Tonkinese silk cargo for Japan decreased dramatically hampered by the scarcity of goods in the aftermath of storms and floods. Out of the large capital which the Company had invested for the Tonkin trade, 160,000 guilders remained unspent and had to be shipped back to Formosa at the end of the trading season. Worse still, shortly after its departure, the Kampen, carrying the Tonkinese silk cargo worth 254,126 guilders, ran into a storm at sea. When sheltering close to the island of Nanau off the Chinese coast, thirteen crewmen were captured by the local inhabitants and the ship was chased away.546 All such misfortunes aside, the Tonkinese silk cargo yielded a spectacular profit of around 400,000 guilders. Happily, the Bengali silk cargo also made a good profit which buoyed the Dutch up with high hopes of satisfactory profits in the following years as the Bengali yarn gained a wider reputation on the Japanese market.547 In 1650, the Tonkin cargo valued at 329,613 guilders, consisting of 595 piculs of raw silk, fetched a relatively low profit in Nagasaki because the sales price dropped 174 taels per picul on average compared to the sales of the previous year. Similarly, Bengali raw silk also lost 233 taels per picul. The slump in the sales prices in Nagasaki that year was caused by the enormous amount of silk that the Chinese had carried to Japan: sixty-nine junks from mainland China had reportedly brought a total of 930 piculs of raw silk to Nagasaki while several junks from northern Vietnam carried 820 piculs of Tonkinese raw silk, not counting another sizeable amount of silk piece-goods.548 At the time of the erosion of the Tonkin trade, a rumour circulated claiming that the private trade of the Company servants in the North-Eastern Quarters was flourishing on a very large scale. Disquieted by this rumour, the Gentlemen XVII ordered Batavia to inspect the Company trade in these places. Willem Verstegen was sent as an extraordinary commissioner to Tonkin in 1651 to inspect the factory and assist the factors to overcome the challenges with which the capado had confronted them. Ongiatule was angling to have the Dutch factory removed to a place under his governance in order to monopolize the silk supply to the Company.549 In that same year Batavia decided to promote the Tonkin factory to a permanent trading centre in view of the visible improvement in the Tonkinese silk trade after Commissioner Verstegen’s visit and the good profit margins which

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Tonkinese silk had been bringing on the Japanese market in the recent years. This plan, however, was short-lived. Batavia withdrew the plan shortly after its approval because of the political and trading instability in Tonkin, which made it a precarious undertaking to keep a large capital sum there with only a few servants after the Company ships had sailed away.550 Nevertheless, the Dutch Tonkinese silk trade evidently did improve after the commissioner’s visit. In the summer of 1651, the VOC shipped a silk cargo of around 362,000 guilders to Japan, where the profit it made was reported to be 102 per cent.551 Tonkinese raw silk was sorted into three kinds: the primero was sold at 277 and 283 taels 7 maas per picul; the secondo at 239; and the silk which had been delivered by the royal family was sold at 225 taels 9 maas per picul. Bengali silk was sold at even higher profit margins, yielding 174¾, 121¾, and 192¾ per cent respectively for the finished silk, bariga, and pee.552 Inspired by the satisfactory profit the Tonkinese silk cargo had yielded in Japan the Company decided to send 680,194 guilders to northern Vietnam for the 1653 trading season, but this large investment did not succeed as expected. In his letter to Batavia, Keijser, the chief factor of the Tonkin factory, reported that the Tonkin trade had begun to decline and offered less profit by the day and consequently the maintenance of a permanent factory in the capital Thăng Long was very injurious.553 In Tonkin ‘the trade was worse than it has ever been’. Flooding had destroyed a large part of the mulberry groves. More seriously, the shortage of copper coins caused a general increase of around 20 per cent in the purchase price of all merchandise.554 The price of raw silk and silk piece-goods had risen. The cabessa, for instance, was bought at the price of 8, 7½ and 7 faccaar.555 The silk piece-goods were also very scarce because local weavers, shocked by the high costs of raw silk, stopped their production of piece-goods. Out of the Tonkin cargo of 300,000 guilders to Japan this year, raw silk and silk piece-goods were valued at not more than 174,531 guilders.556 This cargo yielded only 70 per cent in Japan, which was too inconsiderable in view of the huge expenses and high risks of the Tonkin trade. The Company therefore reduced the investment capital assigned to the Tonkin factory in 1654 to 149,750 guilders only, reserving, when added to the money unspent remaining at the Tonkin factory, a total capital of around 365,238 guilders for the next trading season.557 In 1654, the volume of the Tonkinese silk cargo shrank further and it was valued at only 159,000 guilders. In Nagasaki, the net profit on

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the Tonkinese silk trade continued to fall, making a profit margin of only 34 per cent while the Bengali silk rumals and charkhanas were sold at gross profits of 66 and 122 per cent respectively.558 Because of these disappointing profits, the Company exported no Tonkinese silk yarn to Japan in 1655.559 While the Vietnamese silk trade faltered, the Company’s silk trade in Bengal continued to progress. The large gap between the purchase and sales prices brought the Bengali silk a general profit margin of at least 120 per cent this year and marked an end to the lucrative period of Tonkinese silk in Japan.560 Tonkinese

Total Silk

1637 1639 1641 1643 1645 1647 1649 1651 1653 1655 1657 1659 1661 1663 1665 1667 1669 1671 1673 1675 1677 1679 1681 1683 1685 1687 1689 1691 1693 1695 1697

2400 2200 2000 1800 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0

Figure 6. Silk exported to Japan by the VOC, 1637 1697 (thousand Dutch guilders) Sources: Adapted mainly from: Klein, ‘De Tonkinees Japanse zijdehandel’, 168 (See Appen dix 6); Oskar Nachod, Die Beziehungen, Table C. The total amount of silk imported into Japan in the years 1663 and 1664 appeared neither in Klein’s nor Nachod’s tables but the Tonkinese silk cargoes to Japan were recorded in Generale Missiven, III, and Dagh register Batavia 1663 and 1664. Note: the total amount of silk imported into Japan in 1640 was 3,457 guilders.

4. The period of decline, 1655–1671 The decline of the VOC’s Tonkin silk trade had been foreseen some years before the Company’s export volume of Tonkinese silk to Japan finally fell to nought in 1655 (see Appendix 6 and Figure 6). The decline was revealed not only in the smaller and irregular silk cargoes the Tonkin factory sent to Japan during the early 1650s, but

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also in the narrowing gap between the purchase and the sales prices of Tonkinese raw silk (see Appendix 7 and Figure 7). As the annual profit margins brought by Tonkinese silk in Japan began to grow irregular from the early 1650s, Bengali silk quietly gained ground on the Japanese market. In 1649, Dircq Snoecq, the chief factor of the Deshima factory, observing the excellent profits yielded by that year’s Bengali silk cargo, already hoped that Indian silk goods would be profitable in Japan in the years to come when they had become better known.561 The annual profit which Bengali silk contributed to the Japan trade of the Company rose steadily. In 1653 the gross profit of Bengali silk shot up to 174¾, 135, 121¾, and 192¾ per cent respectively for the finished silk, bariga, cabessa, and pee, achieving the highest profit margin among the textiles the Company imported to Japan. The mongo, another unfinished Bengali silk which was sent as a trial, even yielded 200 per cent. The Bengal cargo of 150,388 guilders, therefore, made a net profit of 191,241 guilders in Japan in that year.562 In 1655, a crucial change in the Japanese sales system of all silks imported to Japan affected the division of the silks the Company imported into Japan. Between November 1654 and September 1655, fifty-seven Chinese junks arrived in Nagasaki, flooding the Japan market with 1,401 piculs of raw silk and another large quantity of piece-goods.563 Finding itself unable to buy this excessive amount of silks, the Japanese guild of silk merchants petitioned the Government to relieve it of the obligation to buy all Chinese silk. The Shogun therefore cancelled the itowappu system altogether.564 The abolition of the yarn allotment raised anxieties in Batavia for, without this fixing-price policy, Chinese silk would undoubtedly be sold at higher profit margins. Batavia was worried about the current weakness of the Company in importing Chinese silk. Although civil war in China disrupted the flow of Chinese goods to Formosa, Zheng Chenggong (Coxinga) continued to carry out an exclusive trade in Chinese silk with Japan. As a consequence, the profit on the Chinese silk trade had fallen into the hands of the Zheng family, not the Company. Under these circumstances, Bengali silk became the key answer to the challenging question of how the Company could maintain its lucrative silk trade with Japan. Following its 1653 success, Bengali silk continued to yield handsome gross profits. In 1656 the average profit margin of the cargo of Indian yarn reportedly stood at 101 per cent.565 So marketable and profitable was Bengali silk on the Japan

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market that, in 1661, the Dutch factors in Nagasaki wrote to Batavia stating that they were willing to receive as much Bengali silk as the Company could afford to send.566 During the 1656–72 period, the VOC’s export of Bengali silk to Japan grew rapidly, occupying fourfifths of the total amount of raw silk which the Company sold on the Japanese market.567 The profitability of Bengali silk on the Japanese market caused a rapid decline in the export volume of Tonkinese silk to Japan from the mid-1650s. The instability of Tonkinese politics and its economy was another important reason which accelerated the decline in the VOC’s silk trade with northern Vietnam. The fifth and the most costly military campaign in the series between Tonkin and Quinam which lasted for almost six years (1655–60) absorbed most of the workforce of the country and largely destroyed its economy.568 In this unpredictable environment, the annual export volumes of Tonkinese silk to Japan by the VOC were unstable. In 1657, for instance, out of the 300,000 guilders which Batavia remitted for the Tonkin trade, the Dutch in Thăng Long could manage to spend only 93,606 guilders on Tonkinese silk. Feeling disappointed with the current depression of the Tonkinese silk production, Batavia again halted the export of Tonkinese silk to Japan in 1658. Nevertheless the Company’s Tonkin-Japan silk trade was resumed in the next year, when 185,000 guilders were sent to Thăng Long to purchase silk for Japan. In the years just previous to 1662, when the Formosa base of the Company was finally conquered by the Zheng, the annual Tonkinese silk cargoes to Japan were valued at around 180,000 guilders. Despite these relatively large shipments, the profit margins yielded in Japan were too small.569 In contrast to the current low profit made by Tonkinese silk, the Bengali product yielded on average 110 per cent in 1658 and continued to rise spectacularly in the following years, reaching the impressive record of 192 per cent in 1671.570 The popularity and profitability of Bengali silk from the mid-1650s decisively supplanted the predominant position of Tonkinese silk on the Japanese market. The loss of Formosa to the Zheng in 1662 as well as the Company’s abortive ‘Tinnam’ strategy led to the decision of Batavia to repromote the Tonkin factory to the status of a permanent trading station in 1663.571 By this elevation, Batavia hoped to foster the procurement of both Chinese gold and musk and Tonkinese silk for both Japan and the Netherlands.572 Under these circumstances, between 1664 and 1668, the Tonkinese silk cargoes sent to Japan were relatively large, valued

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at 250,000 and 300,000 guilders per shipment. In 1669, the Tonkinese silk cargo to Japan was even valued as high as 432,000 guilders.573 These lucrative cargoes were assembled primarily because of the permanent factory and secondly because of the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665–7). As the war in Europe made sailing conditions hazardous, home-bound Dutch shipping was suspended. The Tonkinese silk cargoes intended for the Netherlands were therefore rerouted to Japan. Considering the prospect of recommencing the export of Tonkinese silk piece-goods to Europe once the war ended, the Dutch factors in Thăng Long dared not to stop buying Tonkinese silk, fearing that the local farmers would turn the mulberry groves into paddy-fields. The only option open to them was to send the Tonkinese silk cargoes to Japan.574 Notwithstanding these sizeable shipments, the profit margins were disappointingly meagre. In 1664, for instance, the Tonkin cargo of 387,135 guilders which was about one-quarter of the total capital imported to Japan that year barely scraped a 19 per cent profit. The Company’s plan to send one skilled silk-weaver to Tonkin to assist the regeneration of the silk trade was consequently cancelled.575 The 1665 silk load which was valued at up to 337,779 guilders again only just made a profit of 20 per cent.576 In the next two years, Tonkinese silk suddenly once more turned out to be marketable when two cargoes valued at 250,876 and 299,000 yielded respectively 101 and 112 per cent in Nagasaki.577 The Dutch in Thăng Long exported silk worth 322,000 guilders to Japan in 1669, but the profit margin decreased to only 80 per cent. In 1670, the Hoogcapel on its way from Tonkin to Japan with a cargo of 199,177 guilders encountered a heavy storm and was lost at sea. Batavia, seizing upon this accident as a motive, decided to abandon the Tonkin-Japan shipping route. It was openly stated that another misfortune at sea should be avoided since the Tonkin factory often failed to send ships to Japan before July or August, the typhoon season. Sound as this argument was, it was not the real reason. By abandoning the direct TonkinJapan silk trade, Batavia hoped to end the large-scale private trade conducted by the Dutch factors in these two places which was said to have spiralled beyond the control of the Company.578 In 1677 a relatively large load of Tonkinese silk valued at 268,000 guilders was again shipped to Japan. Although piece-goods generally yielded 40 per cent, raw silk profited barely more than 16 per cent.579 Between this year and 1699, when Batavia eventually decided to end its trade with northern Vietnam, Tonkinese silk was exported to Japan

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at irregular intervals and on a minor scale. The gross profits varied between 16 and 25 per cent.580 As a consequence of the depression in its Tonkin-Japan silk trade, Batavia sent most of Tonkinese silk piece-goods to the Netherlands. 5. On the capital and profit Gaps of several years in the records have made it impossible to present any absolute calculation on the total capital the Company invested in the Tonkinese silk trade. Nevertheless, a rough calculation on the capital and profit can be made for most of the years. Some pioneering research on this topic will be utilized in this paragraph.581 The short experimental period failed to produce good profits, although Batavia often sent a large annual capital sum to Tonkin between 1637 and 1640. During these years, Batavia spent around 1.1 million guilders on Tonkinese silk. Despite this enormous sum, the average annual profit yielded in Japan stood at only 30 per cent. The reason for this low profit margin was the ready availability of Chinese silk which still accounted for 63 per cent of the total amount of silk which was imported to Japan by the VOC, hence Tonkinese silk had a share of only 37 per cent. The profit margins on these two sorts of silk were relatively proportional: Chinese silk brought 70 per cent of the total profit while Tonkinese silk made a contribution of a modest 30 per cent (Figures 8 and 9). The positive signals of the flourishing of the Company’s Tonkinese silk trade in the second period can be seen in the growing gap in the profit margin on Tonkinese silk in comparison to the Chinese product. These profit margins were the result of the difference between the purchase and the sales prices. As the Company had to purchase Chinese silk from middlemen in Formosa and other rendezvous, the purchase price of Chinese silk was generally high. In contrast, Tonkinese silk could be procured at a reasonable price by the Dutch factors in Thăng Long. This made a great difference in the profit margins, which were respectively 45, 56, and 67 per cent for Chinese silk and 56, 95, and 114 per cent for Tonkin product in the first three years. The second period (1641–54) witnessed the spectacular success of the Company’s Tonkinese silk trade from the point of view of both large capital and high profit margins. Large capital sums were remitted for the Tonkin trade, inspired primarily by the encouraging profit

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12 10 8 6 4 2 1636 1637 1638 1639 1640 1641 1642 1643 1644 1645 1646 1647 1648 1649 1650 1651 1652 1653 1654 1655 1656 1657 1658 1659 1660 1661 1662 1663 1664 1665 1666 1667 1668

0

Purchase (in Tonkin)

Sale (in Japan)

Figure 7. Purchase and sales prices of Tonkinese raw silk, 1636 1668 (Dutch guilders per catty) Source: Adapted from Appendix 7.

margins which the Tonkinese silk trade had been yielding and also by the current decline in the Formosa trade. According to P. W. Klein’s calculations, during this fourteen-year period, out of around 12.8 million guilders’ worth of goods the VOC imported to Japan, approximately 7 million or 54 per cent consisted of raw silk and silk piece-goods. Out of this 7 million, Tonkinese silk fetched around fifty per cent, meaning approximately 3.5 million guilders were spent on Tonkinese silk.582 Making sound economic sense, the wide gap between the purchase and sales prices of Tonkinese silk offered high profit margins. Throughout this period, the purchase price of Tonkinese raw silk stood at around 3.5 guilders per catty, while the average sales price fetched in Japan was 8 guilders per catty. This offered an average gross profit margin of 130 per cent for the entire period, much higher than that on Bengali and Chinese yarns which yielded 105 and 37 per cent respectively.583 The high profits obtained from the Tonkinese silk trade during this fourteen-year period was even more significant to the Company’s Japan trade, considering the gradual reduction in the net profit made in recent years. Whereas the annual net profit of the Japan trade had varied between 1 and 2.4 million guilders in the 1635–9 period, it fell to only 0.5 million in 1642 and fluctuated between 0.38 and 0.95 million in the 1649–54 period.584 In the most lucrative year of 1649, for instance, the purchase and sales prices of Tonkinese raw silk were

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respectively 3.64 and 9.97 guilders per catty, making a profit margin of roughly 174 per cent. Hence, the Tonkinese silk cargo which was valued at 299,000 guilders that year would yield a profit of around 363,660 guilders. (It should be kept in mind that calculations on the profit do not include all sorts of expenses.) Consequently, of the 709,000 guilders the Company’s Japan trade yielded this year, Tonkinese silk contributed roughly 51 per cent.585 For the entire 1641–54 period, the Tonkinese silk contributed 71 per cent to the gross profit of the Company’s silk trade in Japan and around one third of the total profit which the Deshima factory transferred to Batavia.586 During the third period of the VOC’s export of Tonkinese silk to Japan (1655–70), the low profit margin compounded by the irregularity of silk production in northern Vietnam reduced the annual capitals remitted for the Tonkin trade. The import volumes of Tonkinese silk now depended on two factors: the erratic demand on the Japan market and the export volume of Bengali silk to Japan. Since it had been introduced to Japan for the first time in 1640, Bengali silk gradually won itself a stable position on the Japanese market and, from the early 1650s, proved to be more marketable and hence profitable than its Tonkinese counterpart.587 If the purchase price of Tonkinese raw silk in the years 1637–49 had fluctuated between 2.54 and 3.64 guilders per catty, it rose to 4.43 and 5.84 guilders per catty in the 1665–8 period, causing a sharp increase of around 66 per cent in the purchase price. In the meantime, the sales price of Tonkinese yarn in Japan fell drastically, offering profit margins of only 58, 34, and 29 per cent respectively in the years 1652, 1654, and 1656. Between 1665 and 1669, the Company’s export of Tonkinese silk to Japan revived; the value of the annual cargoes stood at around 300,000 guilders. This short-lived recovery can be attributed to the decision of Batavia to lower the annual import volume of Bengali silk to Japan to at most 170,000 pounds in order to stabilize the sales price588 and the repromotion of the Tonkin factory to the status of permanent in 1663. In spite of these changes, Tonkinese silk did not regain its oncelost predominance over Bengali silk on the Japanese market. The annual profits remained small. In 1668, for instance, the Tonkinese raw silk cargo valued at 369,000 guilders raised a profit of only 26 per cent in Nagasaki.589 During the last quarter of the seventeenth century, alongside the rapid reduction in its silk export to the Japanese market, the Company’s export of Tonkinese silk to Japan was insubstantial, valued at

163

18

37

5

68

77

63

13

19

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1636- 1641- 16551640 1654 1668 Tonkinese silk

Chinese silk

Bengali silk

17

30

7

71

76

70

7

22

Figure 8. Division of silk imported into Japan by the VOC, 1636 1668 (per cent)

1636- 1641- 16551640 1654 1668 Tonkinese silk

Chinese silk

Bengali silk

Figure 9. Division of profits from silk imported into Japan by the VOC, 1636 1668 (per cent) Source: Adapted from Klein, ‘De Tonkinees Japanse zijdehandel’, 172 3 (Table 4).

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hardly above 20,000 guilders per shipment. Obviously, the profits were proportionally paltry. Not wishing to flog a dead horse, the Company decided that the major part of Tonkinese silk, especially silk piecegoods should be exported to the Netherlands.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE EXPORT TRADE (II): OTHER PRODUCTS 1. Tonkinese products for the Netherlands En dewyle men ’t comptoir daar hadde, en mede voor ’t vaderlant inkoop liet doen van syde stoffen, voort muscus en anders, wiert de voorsch. syde, sooals die voor Japan wiert ingekoft, over Batavia derwaerts gevoert, en dat soo lang als daarop eenigh voordeel wiert behaalt. Maar deselve vervolgens meer en meer verduyrende, is dat eyndelijck mede nagebleven, en het comptoir alleen gehouden, met seer weynigh bedienden, tot inkoop van syde waeren, soo voor ’t vaderlandt also voor Persiën, mitsgaders muscus en andere kleynigheden. Pieter van Dam590

Silk piece-goods In the overall Company policy of exporting Tonkinese raw silk to Japan, the export of Tonkinese silk and silk piece-goods to the Netherlands constituted no more than a sideline. Evidence to support this assertion is the very fact that up to about 1670, as Glamann has pointed out, the Company’s export of Asian piece-goods to Europe was generally modest and came a poor second to its sales within Asia.591 Among the silk items which the Company brought home in the first three decades of the seventeenth century, Chinese items unmistakably constituted the chief group. But when it established a factory in Persia in the early 1620s, the Company was able to procure Persian silk for the Netherlands, and it decided to reserve Chinese silk for the Japan trade which was in a process of restructuring in the early 1630s.592 Shortly after the establishment of trading relations with northern Vietnam in 1637, the Dutch factors began to send Tonkinese silk textiles to Batavia, where they were reloaded on board the homeward-bound ships. The export volumes of Tonkinese silk piece-goods to the Netherlands in the first years were neither substantial nor regular in comparison to those sent to Japan, since Chinese piece-goods still constituted the staple in the homeward-bound cargoes. From the

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early 1640s, political turmoil in mainland China obstructed the regular influx of Chinese goods to Formosa and reduced the annual import volumes of Chinese products of the Company.593 As a consequence the VOC fostered the import of Tonkinese silk piece-goods to the Netherlands. In 1644, the chief of the Tonkin factory, Antonio van Brouckhorst, suggested to Batavia that in order to facilitate the purchase of Tonkinese silk and piece-goods for both Japan and the Netherlands, it would be advisable to leave one junior merchant and some assistants supplied with substantial amounts of money to reside permanently in the capital Thăng Long to buy silk in the off season.594 This proposal was approved; the Company’s export of Tonkinese silk and piecegoods ran smoothly in the years which followed. In the 1645 trading season, for instance, out of the 135,000 taels (approximately 385,000 guilders) which the Company provided for the Tonkinese silk trade, Batavia instructed that 122,400 taels (90.4%) was to be spent on raw silk and silk piece-goods for Japan, the rest of 12,600 taels (9.6%) was to be used to buy raw silk and silk piece-goods for the Netherlands (see Figure 10).595 When the profit margins which Tonkinese silk cargoes fetched in Japan fell rapidly from the early 1650s, Batavia resolved to suspend the Tonkinese silk export to Nagasaki for a while, but ordered the Dutch factors in Thăng Long to purchase Tonkinese silk piece-goods only for the Netherlands.596 In response to the current shortage of copper coins, hence, the devaluation of silver, the purchase price of Tonkinese raw silk increased on average 20 per cent. Tonkinese weavers, shaken by the high price of the raw silk, only wove piece-goods after foreign merchants had advanced the sum required to pay for them in full. Because of this, the 1655 and 1656 cargoes of piece-goods which the Tonkin factory sent to the Netherlands were valued at only 25,773 and 16,000 guilders respectively.597 If the 1645 composition of silk and silk piece-goods had been 90.6 per cent for Japan and 9.4 per cent for the Netherlands, it was already 68 and 32 per cent respectively in 1661. Out of 264,144 guilders allotted to the Tonkin trade that year, Batavia ordered 84,144 guilders to be spent on local piece-goods for the Netherlands, consisting mainly of pelings.598 This composition was permanently maintained throughout the decade of 1660–70. In 1664, for instance, out of the 164,703 guilders Batavia sent to Tonkin, 50,000 were to be spent on

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For Japan

15.3

1645

19.1

68.2

90.4

100

84.7

79.9

31.8

9.6

the export trade (ii): other products

1688

1693

1695

For the Netherlands

Figure 10. Division of the Tonkin cargoes, 1645 1695 (per cent) Sources: Dagh register Batavia 1644 5, 108 22; 1661, 89 91; 1664, 298; VOC 1453; 1536; 1537; 1580; 1596.

silk piece-goods for the home market, the rest would be invested in raw silks for Japan, making a rough ratio of 30/70.599 In the last three decades of the Company’s Tonkin trade, the annual capital reserved for the procurement of Tonkinese piece-goods for the Netherlands showed an overall increase, prompted by the slump in the Company’s export of Tonkinese raw silks to Japan reinforced by its cancellation of the Tonkin-Japan direct shipping route in 1671. As the profit margin on Tonkinese silk in Japan fell drastically during the 1670s, the Dutch factors in Thăng Long were instructed to procure Tonkinese silk piece-goods, most popularly among them pelings, for the Netherlands. From the early 1680s, the Company’s export of Tonkinese silk to Japan virtually ended; besides some local miscellaneous items the Dutch factors in Thăng Long bought Tonkinese silk piece-goods for the European market only.600 The annual capital for purchasing Tonkinese piece-goods consequently increased to between 100,000 and 150,000 guilders per year. In 1681, for instance, out of 113,318 guilders invested in the Tonkin trade, Batavia ordered its fac-

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tors to buy no goods other than pelings and musk for the Netherlands, earmarking nothing for the Japan trade. To make sure that this composition would be adequately fulfilled, in his letter to Chúa Trịnh Tạc, the Governor-General requested the latter not to supply the Company with any raw silk that year.601 Choosing not to heed the Governor-General’s request, the Chúa forced the Dutch factors to accept a large amount of Tonkinese yarn, but at better prices. The next year, the English and the French also arrived in Tonkin with large amounts of capital to buy silk piece-goods for Europe, escalating the fierce competition between these European rivals and consequently pushing up the purchase prices, particularly those of pelings and musk. Given these circumstances and resultant prices, the Tonkinese piecegoods cargo reportedly yielded no profit in the Netherlands.602 This discouraging trading situation dragged on notwithstanding exertions by the Company to improve the state of its Tonkin trade. In 1686, the Governor-General again demanded the Chúa pay the Company in either cash or such silk piece-goods as pelings instead of raw silk because Tonkinese yarn was currently not marketable and therefore not profitable. Batavia’s request again fell on deaf ears; Chúa Trịnh Căn forced the Dutch factors to accept raw silks for the silver which the factory had advanced him earlier.603 In 1688, Batavia instructed the Tonkin factory to order local spinners to spin Tonkinese raw silk using the Chinese and Bengali methods, hoping that the innovation in spinning would make it suitable for the European market. Therefore, in the summer of 1688, samples of Chinese and Bengali raw silk were sent to Tonkin to be spun. Soon afterwards, the well-thought-out plan proved illusory. After one year of bringing in low prices, Tonkinese yarn again grew scarce and expensive as the harvest had been poor. In spite of this, the Dutch factors still managed to have 72 catties of Tonkinese raw silk spun using the Chinese and Bengali techniques.604 It seems that these samples failed to find favour with Western consumers as nothing came out of this attempt. Consequently the export of Tonkinese silk piece-goods stumbled for around one more decade before it finally ended when the Company abandoned its Tonkin trade in early 1700. Musk Musk was another highly sought-after item in the Netherlands. Although exported from Tonkin, repeating the story of gold, the major part of musk available on the Tonkin market was not produced locally but, if

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we are to believe the Company historian Pieter van Dam, it originated mainly from the Chinese provinces of Yunnan and Sichuan and, to a lesser extent from the kingdom of Laos.605 Reviewing the history of the Company’s musk trade, it seems that its interest in this product was not awakened until 1652, when the Dutch factors in Tonkin were ordered to purchase some Laotian musk for the Netherlands as an experiment. That same year, Batavia was informed that Bastiaan Brouwer, a Spanish Brabander working the triangular trade between Manila, Tonkin, and Cambodia under the auspices of the Governor of Manila, had also bought a large quantity of musk in Tonkin and carried it to Cambodia, where he gained a good price of 80 taels per catty.606 When it turned out that musk was also a marketable item in Holland, the Tonkin factory was ordered to supply the homeward-bound cargoes with whatever musk it could obtain in Tonkin. But after a few halcyon years, in the late 1650s, musk, as did gold, became scarce on the Tonkin market. The civil war in southern China severely curtailed the flow of the Chinese musk to Tonkin. Chinese and Vietnamese merchants involved in the cross-border trade were often robbed by the Qing soldiers, acutely exacerbating the scarcity of Chinese musk on the Tonkin market. The Laotian musk was therefore preferred. In 1655, the Dutch factors in Thăng Long utilized their good relations with the capado Ongiadee to contract with him to buy all the Laotian musk which would be exported to Tonkin through the region governed by him.607 This agreement failed to live up to expectations because the annual quantities of Laotian musk exported to Tonkin were neither regular nor substantial. Consequently, the Dutch factors could purchase for Batavia only 25 catties of musk that year.608 The low export volumes of musk from the Tonkin factory were in part also attributable to Resimon’s stiff competition and speculation. As long as this Japanese free merchant was still facilitated and protected by local mandarins, the Dutch procurement of musk, not to mention gold and piece-goods, would still have to contend with very exacting competition indeed. Between 1650 and 1660, when the Dutch export volume of musk from Tonkin hardly surpassed some 30 catties per year, this entrepreneur experienced no difficulty in sending 112 catties 10 taels of musk to Siam in the year 1659 alone. This portion of musk was then bought by the Dutch factory in Siam at a much higher price. The next year, the Siam factory, again, had to buy 72½ catties of musk which Resimon had sent from Tonkin. To rub

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salt into the wound, Batavia had to pay interest on its late payment to Resimon.609 Dissatisfied with the mediocre performance of the Tonkin factors in procuring musk, in 1661 Batavia unrelentingly increased its demands for this product as well as for Tonkinese pelings. Out of the 264,144 guilders Batavia destined for the Tonkin factory during the 1661–2 trading season, 180,000 was earmarked to buy Tonkinese raw silk for Japan, and the rest was to be spent on pelings and 1,800 ounces of musk for the Netherlands.610 No matter what Batavia did to encourage some improvement in the purchase of musk in Tonkin, its efforts fell on stony ground. The Tonkin trade was so ailing at that moment, the Dutch factors were hard put to buy any musk at all for the domestic market. Table 6. The VOC’s export of musk from Tonkin, 1653 1681 Year

Amount

Year

Amount

1653 1656 1663 1664 1665 1669 1670 1671

some 25 catties 14 taels 2 maas 1717/32 catties plus 8 taels 3 maas 131 catties 15 taels 1 maas 102 catties 208 catties 200 catties

1673 1674 1675 1677 1678 1679 1680 1681

192 catties 304½ catties 326/8 catties 118¾ catties 156½ catties 156 catties 176 catties 170 catties

1672

some

Sources: Dagh register Batavia 1653 1682; VOC 1197, 1290, 1294, 1386.

In his report to the Governor-General, Hendrick Baron, the chief factor of the Tonkin factory, explained that the current depression in the musk trade in Tonkin was primarily caused by the Manchu military campaigns against the Nan Ming and its staunch supporters, the Zheng clan in south-eastern China. The other fly in the ointment was Resimon and his manipulations. With the full support and connivance of the mandarin Ongiahaen, this merchant did his best to procure all Chinese musk as soon as this product crossed the border.611 In 1663, the directors in the Netherlands demanded 3,000 ounces of musk for the next homeward-bound voyage. Besides urging its Tonkin factors to supply the bulk of this demand, Batavia also ordered the factory in Agra (India) to provide the Company with supplies of this product. The High Government stressed that in order to timely dispatch

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musk and Tonkinese piece-goods to the Netherlands, the Tonkin factors should send whatever items they could purchase to Batavia before 1 November. To the disappointment of Batavia, Tonkin sent in 1663 and 1664 only 14 taels 2 maas (around 0.9 catty) and 17 17/32 catties of musk respectively. The reasons for these paltry cargoes were a reprise of those of previous years, namely the Manchu violence on and around the border and Resimon’s speculations.612 Despite these meagre supplies, Batavia raised its order for musk at the Tonkin factory in the 1664 trading season, demanding for the Netherlands 50,000 guilders’ worth of silk piece-goods and 4,000 ounces of musk.613 The Dutch factors in Thăng Long now resolved to contract with Resimon to buy all the gold and musk from him. Despite their efforts, they could procure for Batavia only 8 taels 3 maas of musk in the winter of 1664 and 20 catties more in the summer of 1665, barely fulfilling one sixth of the total demand.614 These tiny cargoes raised the ire of Batavia, especially when it was informed that other foreign merchants trading in Tonkin had been able to purchase more musk than its factors. The Castilian merchant Gonsalvo Discouar, for instance, had percipiently co-operated with Resimon and spent a considerable capital on both Tonkinese silk piecegoods and Chinese musk. Believing that the export volume of musk could be increased if its factors in Tonkin were to do their best, Batavia sternly renewed the order for the previous year and stressed that the Tonkin factory should provide the homeward-bound ships with 4,000 ounces of musk. Just as the pressure Batavia exerted on its factors for musk seemed about to hit the ceiling, the Company’s Tonkin musk trade started to improve, responding favourably to the revival of the Tonkin-China border trade. A cargo valued at 56,492 guilders that the Tonkin factory sent to Batavia in the winter of 1665 reportedly contained 111 catties 15 taels 1 maas of musk.615 After this, the annual export volume of musk by the Tonkin factory increased considerably and remained stable until 1700, when the Company finally severed its trading relations with Tonkin. 2. Gold for the Coromandel Coast The same Countries [Boutan and Yunnan] yield gold also, and supply this Country [Tonkin] with it: for whatever Gold Mines the Tonquinese are said to have in their own Mountains, yet they do not work upon them. William Dampier (1688)616

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In the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the supply of gold and silver played an indispensable part in the entire commercial activities of the Dutch East India Company in the East. As a fixed rule, right from its foundation in 1602, every chamber of the Company was instructed to send silver pieces of eight to Asia as investment capital, and if this specie was not provided in full, then gold was consigned as an alternative.617 As early as 1602, gold was included in the Company’s cargoes dispatched to Asia when 247,500 guilders in rosenobels was exported under the auspices of the Company.618 Silver in the form of both minted coins and bullion was the sort of money which was indispensable to the Company in running its intra-Asian trade throughout the two centuries of its existence. Nevertheless, in some places gold was preferred, especially on the eastern coast of the Indian Sub-Continent. The Indian trade of the Company required both silver and gold as investment capital: silver was generally in high demand in Bengal and copper was very acceptable in Surat, but gold was desirable in Coromandel. During the seventeenth century, the Coromandel Coast was the most important destination for the gold exported from Europe and by Asian gold exporters. To maximize the profit on the Coromandel trade, or at least to direct this trade into the most profitable channels, the Company was forced to provide its Coast factories with gold. The gold supply from the Netherlands to Asia was not always sufficient to cover the demands. During the 1640s, for instance, Batavia’s requests for adequate amounts of capital were not always satisfied; its demand for African gold for its Asiatic trade was ignored altogether by the Gentlemen XVII.619 The Company was not entirely dependent on the Netherlands for its supply of precious metals, although during the first thirty years of the Company’s existence, its trading capital relied heavily on the money sent from the Republic. After this, however, the trend changed significantly. In the case of the gold supply for Coromandel, for instance, by the early 1630s, a larger proportion of the annual capital was being provided by Asian factories which relieved the Coast of its dependence on the Netherlands for the supply of capital.620 This change can be largely attributed to the developments in the intra-Asian trade which not only enabled the VOC to make profits on its intra-Asian trading network, but also helped furnish its factories with desirable and marketable commodities.621 One of the key factors which enabled the Company to establish its pre-eminent position in this commerce was the Japan trade. Generally speaking, after this trade

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had been restructured and strengthened in the early 1630s, the Hirado factory, and, later on, the Deshima factory were able to export a substantial amount of silver every year from Japan. The major part of this silver was shipped to Formosa, where it was exchanged for Chinese commodities which were sought after on both the Asian and European markets. During the 1640–60 period, the Company regularly exported silver valued at around one million guilders per year from Japan. Part of this silver was exchanged for Chinese gold in Formosa which was then exported mainly to Coromandel, supplementing the gold which was purchased from Java, Malacca, Laos, and Indragiri.622 The gold supply from the island of Formosa to Coromandel proceeded smoothly during the 1630s, before falling into a phase of decline from the early 1640s, induced by the decline in the Formosa trade. Facing the decline in the gold supply from Formosa, the Company was forced to look for alternative possibilities. In fact, in 1640, the Japan factory, conscious of the importance of providing the Coromandel trade with gold, had already exported some Japanese koban (small gold coins) and oban (large gold coins), valued at 144,050 taels for the first time. The Dutch export of Japanese gold was short-lived because the Japanese Government issued a ban on the export of gold in the following year, fearing a drain of bullion. Because this ban on the Japanese gold export was strictly enforced until 1665, the Company had to look for a gold supply from other places. When the gold supply from East Asia stagnated, the Company factory in Gamron in Persia started to purchase the gold which arrived there from Europe via the land route. In the 1640s and in the following decade, this Persian factory could provide the Indian factories annually with a substantial sum consisting mainly of silver and gold.623 In South-East Asia, the Company itself endeavoured to mine gold on the West Coast of Sumatra, and lost no time in procuring this precious metal from various other places such as Manila, Makassar, and Malacca, eager to supply the Indian Coast with whatever gold it could afford.624 In spite of its assiduous efforts, the total amount was inconsiderable. In the context of this gold shortage, Tonkin emerged as an alternative gold supplier in the late 1650s, born of necessity when the gold supply from the East Asian quarters rapidly declined. In order to comprehend the sudden emergence of Tonkin in this role, some facts should be clarified. In 1651, it was reported to Batavia that the flow of Chinese gold to Formosa had come to a complete standstill. The capital which Zeelandia Castle could afford to send to the Coroman-

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del Coast struggled to reach around 6 tons, 4 tons (400,000 guilders) less than it had been planned.625 In the middle of the 1650s, the High Government was again informed that the VOC servants in Formosa, suffering from the poor trade caused by the civil war in mainland China and Zheng’s embargo on Dutch Formosa, were struggling to gather a mere 3 tons of gold, 8 tons less than 1653. Pertinently, it was noted that the flow of Chinese gold now streamed in the direction of Tonkin instead of Formosa.626 The Dutch loss of Formosa to Coxinga in 1662 disrupted the regular gold flow from Formosa to eastern India and exacerbated the Company’s gold shortage even more severely. In the meantime, the profit margins on gold on the Coromandel Coast revived in the 1660s because the Mughal Emperor demanded his tribute be paid in gold pagodas.627 Batavia therefore turned to Tonkin in its hopes of solving the gold issue, and urged its factors in Thăng Long to import Chinese gold for Coromandel, where the latest profit was said to be 25½ per cent.628 Most of the gold the Company purchased for India in Tonkin was not mined locally. Although in the seventeenth century gold was mined in the present-day northern province of Thái Nguyên, the annual gold output was negligible.629 The major part of the gold available on the Tonkin market was actually imported from China.630 Vietnamese and Chinese merchants trading across the border often travelled to Yunnan and Guizhou to buy Chinese gold. The price of Chinese gold sold in northern Vietnam was said to be reasonable. In 1661, for instance, the purchase price of Chinese gold in Tonkin, according to a Vietnamese merchant trading to Nanking, was lower than that in Guangzhou.631 Ever alert, Batavia, therefore, ordered the Tonkin factors to purchase as much Chinese gold as they could and, to devise a long-term strategy, penetrating the Chinese gold market from the Tonkin springboard. As the Company’s petitions to the Lê/Trịnh rulers for a licence to trade on the border were repeatedly delayed, Batavia repromoted its Tonkin factory to a permanent trading headquarters in the hope that a boost in status would easen the procurement of the Chinese gold pouring to northern Vietnam.632 Despite all these strategies, the Tonkin factory often failed to supply the Coast factories with adequate gold cargoes. Rising military tensions in southern China meant Vietnamese and Chinese merchants could not trade across the border. In 1661, under pressure from the increasing demand for gold for the Coast, the High Government, while

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still nurturing the hope of obtaining a licence from the Japanese Government to export Japanese gold to India, urged the Tonkin factors to purchase whatever gold they could find to supply the Coromandel trade.633 The next year, Batavia again demanded the Tonkin factors spend at least 100,000 guilders on gold. Under such a constraint, the Tonkin factors planned to spend 102,107 guilders on gold, and the idea was to keep another large amount of money ready in stock, awaiting the arrival of another consignment of gold which was expected to arrive from Yunnan. Hopes were dashed as the rainy weather impeded the journey of the traders. To make matters worse, Qing soldiers raided the Vietnamese merchants trading on the border in order to punish the Lê/Trịnh court for the delay in sending its tribute to the new dynasty in Peking.634 As a consequence of these commercial setbacks, the Tonkin factory could purchase only 3,861 taels of gold, valued at approximately 22,716 guilders. Shipped to the Coast factories in 1663, this small sum of gold brought a profit of 23½ per cent at Paliacatta.635 The weakness of the Tonkin factory in supplying gold for Coromandel was one of the reasons which prompted Batavia to urge the Gentlemen XVII in the Netherlands to supply gold for the Asian trade of the Company. In 1664, the general missive from Batavia to the directors requested that its demand for minted gold and ducats valued at 500,000 guilders per year was to be continued.636 As has been demonstrated by Tapan Raychaudhuri, the demand for gold from the Netherlands in the late 1650s and early 1660s by Batavia, was temporary because the Deshima factory was officially permitted to export Japanese gold again in 1665.637 In April 1663, the High Government resolved to repromote the Tonkin factory to the status of a permanent office, in order to stimulate the gold and musk trade across the Chinese border.638 Batavia had high hopes its factors in Thăng Long would be able to furnish the return ships with gold.639 In December, the Zeeridder returned to Batavia with a cargo valued at 148,295 guilders, consisting of approximately 1,900 taels of gold. In the spring, the Bunschoten also sailed to Batavia, carrying a small cargo of 31,211 guilders, consisting of 674 taels of gold for Coromandel.640 Despite these disappointing gold cargoes, in the 1664 trading season Batavia continued to insist that the Tonkin factory endeavour to supply the Coast factories with whatever gold it could procure in Tonkin. In order to fulfil this order, the Dutch factors contracted with the Japanese

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entrepreneur Resimon that he would sell all the gold he had at the end of the trading season at the fixed price of 12.5 taels of silver for one tael of 24-carat gold.641 This contract could not be honoured because of the current severe shortage of gold on the Tonkin market. Unable to fulfil the demand, the Dutch factors resolved to use most of their capital to buy silk and piece-goods. Consequently, upon the departure of the Zeeridder for Batavia in November 1664, the Tonkin factors were able to send only 713 taels of gold, promising their masters to try their best in the coming months to spend around 60,000 to 70,000 guilders on gold.642 This promise the Tonkin factory also failed to keep: the Bunschoten’s cargo for Batavia consisted of only 1,387 taels of gold. In their missive to the Governor-General in 1665, the Dutch factors confessed that the gold trade in Tonkin had virtually stagnated and, worse still, the prospect of improving the procurement of gold in the future seemed hopeless.643 In November of the same year, no gold was found in the Tonkin cargo shipped to Batavia. The Tonkin factory lamented that this year’s failure had been caused by the complete stagnation of the gold flow from China. Daunted by various difficulties, Chinese gold merchants no longer visited northern Vietnam.644 In order to maintain the gold supply to the Coast after the consecutive failures of the Tonkin factory to procure Chinese gold, in 1663 the Deshima factory ignored the Japanese Government’s ban on gold exports and deliberately exported Japanese gold coins.645 After the Shogunate authorized their 1664 application for the export of gold, the Dutch began to export Japanese gold in considerable amounts from 1665. From 1668, when the Japanese Government banned the export of silver and lowered the purchase price of Japanese gold, the Dutch export of Japanese gold rose sharply. The problem of the gold supply to Coromandel was now basically solved because the Japanese koban could easily be reminted into Indian pagodas as their metallic content was nearly the same.646 Consequently, from the mid-1660s, Tonkin was no longer considered an important gold supplier for the Coast, although Chinese gold was still occasionally procured in Tonkin and exported to Coromandel. 3. Tonkinese ceramics for the insular South-East Asian markets The Earthen Ware of this Country [Tonkin] is coarse and of grey Colour, yet they make great quantities of small Earthen Dishes, that will hold

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half a Pint or more. They are broader toward the brim than at the bottom, so that they may be stowed within one another. They have been sold by Europeans in many of the Malayan Countries, and for that reason Capt. Pool in his first Voyage bought the best part of 100,000 in hope to sell them in his return homeward at Batavia, but not finding a market for them there, he carried them to Bencouli on the Island Sumatra, where he sold them at a great profit to the Governour Bloom … The China Wares which are much finer, have of late spoiled the sale of this Commodity in most places. William Dampier (1688)647

The porcelain trade of the VOC had begun in the very early years of its trade with Asia. Since the profitable auction in the Netherlands in 1604 of Chinese porcelain captured from the Portuguese ship Santa Catarina, the demand for Chinese ceramics in the Dutch Republic had swelled. The Company’s export of Asian wares, mainly Chinese ceramics, to Europe was irregular as it was dependent on a myriad of factors. The VOC’s export of Chinese wares to Europe flourished in the 1630s, but soon stagnated as political chaos in mainland China severely disrupted production. Under the increasing pressure exerted by the Manchus, the Chinese Ming Dynasty eventually collapsed in 1644. The dynastic change led to a protracted conflict between the die-hard supporters of the Ming and the newly established Qing which largely destroyed the porcelain manufacturing centre of Jingdezhen and consequently caused a severe shortage of fine Chinese porcelain. After 1647 fine Chinese porcelain was virtually unprocurable on the international market. The VOC, in search of a substitute, switched over to the export of Japanese Hizen porcelain. In 1650 and 1651, the Deshima factory sent 145 dishes and 176 pieces of Hizen ware to Tonkin. In 1652, a Japanese porcelain cargo consisting of large and small medical pots was shipped from Deshima to Formosa. After that, the VOC often exported Japanese Hizen porcelain to Batavia, marking the beginning of a regular trade in fine Japanese ware. In 1657, a load of Japanese porcelain was shipped to the Netherlands to test its salability. As this cargo found a favourable market, the VOC regularly exported Japanese porcelain to Europe.648 After around a decade of high profits, the Company’s export of Japanese porcelain to the Netherlands declined and temporarily ended in 1665, mainly because of the high purchase prices in Japan.649 Fine porcelain was only part of the story. While Western merchants opened the European market for fine Chinese and Japanese porcelain,

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Chinese merchants maintained their regular export of coarse Chinese ware, produced mainly in Fujian and Guangdong, to the insular SouthEast Asian market. This too was to suffer from the political upheavals of dynastic change. From the early 1660s, the traditional flow of coarse Chinese porcelain to this vast market stagnated in the wake of the political changes in southern China. Finally having to succumb to the superior power of the Qing, the last-ditch Ming loyalists in southern China were defeated. In 1662, the Zheng abandoned their foothold on the coast of mainland China and withdrew to Formosa. Pursuing a policy of isolating and then pacifying Zheng Formosa, the Qing Dynasty closed the door for China’s foreign trade, and removed its subjects from the coastal areas. The traditional flow of coarse Chinese porcelain to the South-East Asian markets, which had been regularly maintained by the Zheng family, was disrupted, causing a severe shortage of coarse Chinese ware on the regional market.650 Whereas Chinese fine porcelain had been amply supplemented by fine Japanese products, coarse Chinese ware was then substituted by Tonkinese ceramics. Coarse Tonkinese ceramics were now widely exported to the regional markets until the early 1680s. This ushered in a big change. Despite the fact that Tonkinese ceramics had been sporadically exported to the regional market prior to the early 1660s, the annual export quantities were presumably inconsiderable. In 1663, Batavia noted that a Chinese junk had arrived from northern Vietnam with 10,000 groove porceleijn koppen (coarse ceramic cups).651 In the next five years, roughly 250,000 pieces of Tonkinese ceramics were shipped to Batavia by the Chinese (see Appendix 8). These large cargoes of Tonkinese ceramics impressed the High Government and prompted it to participate in the export of Tonkinese ceramics to the insular South-East Asian markets. In response to the swing, in 1669 the Dutch factory in Thăng Long sent the first load of 381,200 coarse Tonkinese cups to Batavia.652 From this year until the early 1680s, when Chinese porcelain again flooded the international market, the Dutch were among the foreign exporters of Tonkinese ceramics to the insular South-East Asian market (see Appendix 8). Taken as a whole, the emergence of Tonkin as a major ceramic exporter in the early 1660s was simply a transitory substitution, similar to what had happened during the sixteenth century.653 In a nutshell, the expansion of Tonkinese export ceramics to the regional markets in the early 1660s was stimulated by two main causes:

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the disruption of the traditional flow of coarse Chinese ceramics to South-East Asia after 1662, and the decline in the Dutch Tonkinese silk export. As hinted at in the previous chapter, more can be said about the second factor. By the late 1660s, the VOC’s endeavours to revive its Tonkinese silk trade proved to be futile. In April 1669, Batavia therefore instructed its factors in Tonkin to ballast their return ships with local ceramics, which the latter executed with great promptitude.654 In the following year, the Dutch in Thăng Long reported to their masters that the quality of the Tonkinese ceramics was better than that of the previous year.655 The Dutch factors managed to purchase large cargoes of Tonkinese wares for the Batavia-bound ships. The VOC’s export of Tonkinese ceramics to the insular South-East Asian markets during these years can be considered as a dual success: the VOC’s regular trade with northern Vietnam ran smoothly during the time its Tonkin-Japan silk trade stagnated because of low profits, and it also benefited, though rather inconsiderably, from the export of Tonkinese ceramics. Following sound economic principle, the annual export volume of Tonkinese ceramics to the regional market fluctuated according to the demands of the insular markets. While Figure 11 shows the fluctuation in the total export amount of Tonkinese ceramics to Batavia during the 1663–81 period, Figure 12 demonstrates a relatively stiff rivalry between Tonkin, Chinese, and Japanese wares competing for a dominant position in the regional market. After emerging as a major ceramic export commodity in the early 1660s, coarse Tonkinese ceramics dominated the South-East Asian markets in the years 1669 and 1670. Putting together Tonkinese ceramic cargoes exported to South-East Asia by other foreign merchants, roughly one million pieces of Tonkinese ceramics were shipped to the insular markets during these two years. During these two years alone, 772,600 pieces of Tonkinese ceramics were shipped to Batavia by the VOC. This supremacy was short-lived as the annual quantity of Tonkinese ceramics which reached Batavia in the years thereafter fell drastically. From 1672, the VOC factories in Baros, Cirebon, Toulougbauw [?], and Banten often sent Tonkinese ceramics back to Batavia as they failed to find buyers (see Appendix 9). In the meantime, only three years after the peak of the ceramic export of Tonkin, Japan reemerged as ceramic exporter when some 563,098 pieces of Japanese porcelain were sent to Batavia in 1673.656 From 1677, coarse Chinese ware

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180 650000 600000 550000 500000 450000 400000 350000 300000 250000 200000 150000 100000 50000

1663 1664 1665 1666 1667 1668 1669 1670 1671 1672 1673 1674 1675 1676 1677 1678 1679 1680 1681

0

Figure 11. Tonkinese ceramics exported to Batavia, 1663 1681 (pieces) Sources: Adapted from Appendix 8. 700000

Tonkinese Chinese

600000

Japanese

500000 400000 300000 200000 100000

1682

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1663

0

Figure 12. Ceramics exported to the South Seas, 1663 1682 (pieces) Sources: Adapted from Appendix 8; Dagh register Batavia 1624 1682; Volker, Porcelain; Ho, ‘The Ceramic Trade, 35 70. Note: It has been noted by Bennet Bronson that some quantitative data on the export of Chinese and Japanese wares in Volker’s (and consequently Ho’s) research are not reliable. Bronson, ‘Export Porcelain in Economic Perpective’, 129.

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began to reach the insular markets in large quantities again, marking a spectacular return after it had to cede the market to Tonkinese and Japanese products. According to the VOC records, altogether roughly 1.5 million pieces of Tonkinese ceramics were shipped to the regional market between the 1660s and 1680s. The real number must undoubtedly have been much higher, in view of the fact that we are not in the possession of the full data.657 Regardless of this matter and taking into account only the numbers recorded in the VOC documents, between 1663 and 1681 Tonkinese ceramics had a share of 30 per cent of the total amount of ceramics exported to the South Seas (stretching from Japan in the east to the east coast of Africa in the west), while Chinese, Japanese, and Persian wares amounted to 33, 36, and 1 per cent respectively. If we accept Volker’s ‘very conservative estimate’ that 12 million pieces were exported by the VOC during its first eighty-years of trading Asian ceramics (1602–82),658 Tonkinese ceramics, which were exported exclusively for fewer than two decades, shared approximately 12 per cent; Japanese wares which were exported for around three decades counted for 16 per cent; and the remaining 72 per cent were mainly coarse Chinese ceramics. 1 33

36

30

Japanese

Tonkinese

Chinese

Persian and other

Figure 13. Division of ceramics exported to the South Seas, 1663 1682 (per cent)

Tonkinese ceramics were mainly bought for use in insular SouthEast Asia. During this period—with the exception of several recorded shipments made by the English from Tonkin to their headquarters in Banten and India—Tonkinese ceramics were exported mainly to Batavia by the Chinese and the Dutch.659 There they were redistributed to such different consumer markets as Banten, Cirebon, Baros,

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72

12

Japanese

Tonkinese

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Chinese and Other

Figure 14. Ceramics exported by the VOC, 1602 1682 (per cent) Sources: Adapted from Appendix 8; Volker, Porcelain, 218; Ho, ‘The Ceramic Trade’, 35 70.

Palembang, Timor, Banda, Gresik, West Coast of Sumatra, and the like. In the southern Philippines, reflecting the ambiguous political division, Tonkinese ceramics were imported by both the Dutch and English Companies.660 Besides these insular South-East Asian markets, Tonkinese ceramics were also sporadically exported to Japan and the Indian Sub-Continent.661 Some English homeward-bound ships reportedly carried loads of Tonkinese ceramics but these cargoes were insignificant.662 According to the Dutch records, the assortment of the seventeenthcentury Tonkinese export ceramics was rather monotonous. It included mainly cups, rice-bowls, tea cups, and roof tiles. Artistic and sophisticatedly decorated objects such as celadon pedestals, blue and white kendi, hollow-backed glazed stoneware tiles, tall jars, and the like were not mentioned, although these objects have quite often been found at archaeological sites in Java. Various explanations can be adduced for this anomaly. The written documents may not have been detailed enough, or possibly, the Dutch were not interested in trading these sorts of objects. Making a further deduction from the second supposition, it is more likely that it was the Chinese or others who exported these products. Whatever the reasons behind the absence of written documents on these sorts of objects, it is clear that the majority of Tonkinese wares exported to the regional markets in the late seventeenth century consisted of utensils for everyday use which were largely manufactured at the Bát Tràng ceramic village. Descriptions of the Tonkinese ceramic cargoes were often brief,

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being nothing more than short notes on the sending of Tonkinese ceramics among other local goods shipped to Batavia. The patchiness of documents prevents us from reconstructing an insightful picture on the export of Tonkinese ceramics. As for the capital and profits made, it is certain that the total capital the VOC spent on Tonkinese ceramics was not remarkable, considering the low value of this commodity. In 1670, 214,160 pieces of Tonkinese ceramics cost only 2,650 guilders, making an average price of 1.24 cent per piece. Based on this we can calculate that the 772,600 pieces of Tonkinese ceramics exported by the VOC cost a total of 9,560 guilders, a far cry from what was spent on the Company’s Tonkinese silk shipments. The profits that the VOC made on these Tonkinese ceramic cargoes were presumably small. Besides exporting Tonkinese ceramics, the Dutch and other foreign merchants also imported, mainly Chinese and Japanese, porcelain into Tonkin. Appendix 10 shows the sporadic VOC shipments of foreign porcelain into Tonkin. It also reflects the fairly unconcerned attitude displayed by the Company towards this minor trade. Since the Company’s import trade, as analysed earlier, focused mainly on precious metals and, to a lesser extent, on the commodities demanded by local rulers, such miscellaneous items as ceramics failed to spark any interest. Most of the ceramics which the Company imported into Tonkin indeed often pertained to the orders of local rulers. In contrast to the Dutch meagre import, the Chinese imported considerably more. In 1676 alone, for instance, Chinese merchants brought 9,000 pieces of (most probably Chinese) cups, plates, flasks, brandy-flagons, and brandy-cups, and approximately 100,000 pieces of Japanese assorted wares to Tonkin (see Appendix 10). This still begs the question of whether such large amounts of Chinese and Japanese wares shipped to northern Vietnam were consumed in Tonkin itself or whether they were reshipped to other marketplaces. Since the Dutch Company often complained about the high purchase prices of Japanese porcelain in Japan, it is doubtful if these expensive items were all consumed in Tonkin, where the long tentacles of the Royal Court had already forbidden its subjects to use ‘exotic merchandise’ including foreign ceramics and textiles.663 Appendix 11 shows that, unlike the Chinese who deliberately imported Chinese and Japanese porcelain into Tonkin as merchandise, the VOC shipments of foreign porcelain to Tonkin were often contingent upon the Trịnh rulers’ demands and orders. While the number of objects per order was inconsiderable, totalling hardly more than

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some dozens of pieces, the assortment of the objects ordered was monotonous. They were mainly flasks which were apparently used as ornaments by the court and royal family.664 The court demonstrated the size and decorative motifs by providing wooden models and handed them over to the Dutch factory to be made in Japan since the VOC had no access to mainland China. Concluding remarks Silk was the centre of gravity which pulled the VOC towards Tonkin in the late 1630s. Thanks primarily to their political and military concessions but with their patient endurance also, Dutch merchants were able to conduct their import and export trade with Tonkin satisfactorily in the first twenty years. Raw silk and silk piece-goods were exported to Japan in substantial quantities in the years leading to 1654, where they yielded handsome annual profits for the Company. As the Tonkin-Japan silk trade grew less profitable from the mid-1650s, the Company altered its focus from raw to woven silk which it exported mainly to the European market. Miscellaneous items such as musk and cinnamon were also carried home while gold purchased in Tonkin was sent to the Coromandel Coast, and ceramics were largely shipped to insular South-East Asia. As in most Asian trading-ports, the Company needed silver and copper as its main forms of investment capital if it were to conduct its export trade profitably. The proportion of silver to copper varied from period to period according mainly to the demand on the local market and the supply of these items. The ready access of the Company to these metals in Japan was an enormous advantage to its Tonkin trade and maximized its profit margins in the major periods of its entire trade with the Lê/Trịnh domain. Being a link in the chain of the intra-Asian trade, the Company’s Tonkin trade depended heavily on the vicissitudes in the demand and supply sides in this trading network. The case of the Tonkin-Japan silk trade can be considered as an exemplary instance. As Tonkinese silk lost its allure on the Japanese market, the Company switched over to the export of piece-goods and miscellaneous items to be sent to Europe and to ceramics for the insular South-East Asian markets. These alternative export lines did not necessarily imply the prospect of the nice profit margins which they offered but simply reflected the persistence of the Company in its endeavours to avoid losing a trading station

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which might putatively be important to its commercial strategies in later periods. In the case of Tonkin, it was the prospect of penetrating the vast market of China which stimulated the Company to hang on to its factory in Thăng Long for at least a decade until it was eventually closed. By the turn of the eighteenth century, however, Batavia cancelled its trading relations with Tonkin as, prior to that time, its perspective on the China trade had dimmed considerably.

PART FOUR: DUTCH-VIETNAMESE INTERACTIONS They [the animals] are very shy since the English and Dutch settled here; for now the Natives as well as they shoot them: but before their Arrival the Tonquinese took them only with Nets … Since the Jesuits came into these parts, some of them [the Tonkinese] have improved themselves in Astronomy pretty much. They know from them the Revolution of Planets; they also learn of them natural Philosophy and especially Ethicks … several Mechanick Arts and Trades so that here are many Tradesmen, viz. Smiths, Carpenters, Sawyers, Joyners, Turners, Weavers, Tailors, Potters, Painters, Money-changers, Paper-makers, Workers on LackerWare, Bell-founders, &c. William Dampier (1688)665

Introduction The seventeenth century has long been considered a watershed in Vietnamese history. It witnessed not only social transformation born of the protracted series of political crises, it also saw the penetration of regional and international trading networks into the country. A combination of internal and external factors led to a remarkable metamorphosis of Vietnamese society and its economy during this eventful century. The vicissitudes in the southern Vietnamese Kingdom of Quinam have been clarified in a series of comprehensive works in recent years, those of Tonkin have remained unstudied.666 On the basis of the information and analyses which have been reviewed in the preceding chapters, this part is devoted to sketching the major features of Dutch influence on the politics, economy, and society of seventeenthcentury Tonkin.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANY TRADE AND ITS IMPACT ON SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY VIETNAMESE SOCIETY 1. Dutch residents and local society Winter, the tenth lunar month, [the court] forbade its subjects to study the Christian religion. In the past, people of Christian lands arrived in our country and propagated their fallacious religion to attract the poor. Many foolish and ignorant people followed this belief. Inside the churches, men and women lived cheek by jowl with each other. [The court] had previously expelled the priests but the religious tracts were still circulated and places for preaching still remained. The iniquitous habits were therefore not stopped. Now [the court] again forbade [the propaganda of the Christian religion]. Toàn thư (1663)667

Factories and factors In order to pursue the import and export trade as profitably and conveniently as possible, the VOC needed to establish and maintain a factory in Tonkin, just as it had done in many other trading-places throughout Asia. In the first few years, the Dutch were lodged in the customs town of Phố Hiến, midway between the sea and the capital Thăng Long. As the diplomatic relations between the Company and Tonkin pursued a steady course in these years, in the early 1640s, the Dutch were granted permission to reside and trade in Thăng Long. After their removal upriver, their factory at Phố Hiến was deserted. The Dutch factory in the capital was moved several times during the 1640s before it found a permanent location in the early 1650s. Patchy descriptions of the early years of the Dutch residence in Tonkin prevent us from making any feasible reconstruction of the Dutch factory in this period. All that can be said with certainty is that it often consisted of one or two poorly constructed thatched and mud-walled houses, closely resembling most of the indigenous dwellings which were highly vulnerable to thieves, fires, and storms. In 1649, the Dutch residence was completely demolished because the Crown Prince wanted the ground to build a shooting-range. The next compound was

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erected on the bank of the Hồng River, near present Long Biên bridge. Although the factory suffered several fires and floods which required very thorough repairs, it was well maintained until 1700 when the Company resolved to leave Tonkin. The methods of management of the Tonkin trade were also subject to change. Prior to 1671, the Tonkin factory was subordinate to both the High Government in Batavia and the VOC factory in Japan. Batavia reserved the right to issue general instructions on the Tonkin trade, leaving the calculation of and deciding on the annual investment capital, the import and export volumes of the Tonkin factory to the Japan factory. Consequently, the profits and losses on the Tonkin cargoes were calculated and subsequently entered into the bookkeeping of the Japan factory. Zeelandia Castle in Taiwan was also involved in managing the Tonkin trade to a certain extent through supplying some of the goods and objects that the Tonkin factory demanded. After direct shipping between Tonkin and Japan was discarded in 1671, the Tonkin factory fell directly under the High Government in Batavia. The number of Dutch factors residing in Thăng Long either rose or fell according to the state of commercial reforms and untrammelled functioning of the Company’s Tonkin trade at any particular time. As the Company’s import and export trade in the early years enjoyed the backing of the local authorities by grace of the amicable relationship between Batavia and Thăng Long, the Dutch factors could easily procure silk around two months before sending ships to Japan while the southern monsoon still prevailed. The revocation of the military alliance with Tonkin by Batavia in 1644 harmed the Tonkin-VOC relationship, but none the less the High Government decided to reinforce the trading capacity of the Tonkin factory by increasing the number of Dutch factors in Thăng Long. By the early 1650s, there were around nine Dutch factors in residence in Thăng Long at any one time. The personnel of the Tonkin factory consisted of one director, one assistant-director, one bookkeeper, one surgeon, several assistants including merchants, soldiers and, occasionally, such people as tailors and trumpeters. Wary of being spied on by the local inhabitants, the Dutch factory restricted the employment of locals as much as possible, hiring the Tonkinese mainly as mediators and interpreters. As part of their duties, these Vietnamese employees were actively involved in trade, selling the import items and buying local goods for the Company. When the Tonkin factory was promoted to permanent status in 1663, the number of Dutch factors in Tonkin shot up to fourteen, but

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it was again reduced to around ten after the revocation of the promotion. In 1679, when Batavia reduced the annual investment capital assigned to the Tonkin trade, there were only five Company servants left in Thăng Long. They were joined by a few slaves and soldiers for menial duties, to guard the compound, escort the chief when he went out, and to assist the factors in such daily business as weighing and ferrying goods up and down the river. Generally speaking, the number of Company servants residing in Thăng Long was smaller than that at other trading-places such as Siam in the same period.668 Although the personnel lived in Tonkin the whole year round, their business transactions were conducted mainly during the summer trading season, which took place between May and July. Prior to the early 1670s, the transactions of the Dutch factory concentrated solely on advancing silver for the delivery of silk. After the Company ships arrived in Tonkin early in the spring, the factors would hand the silver over to local mandarins, brokers, and silk-producers. Between May and July, they would be busy collecting silk from those to whom they had advanced the money, as well as buying products from retailers. In July or August, the chief accompanied the rich silk cargoes to Japan and would not return to Tonkin until the next spring, bringing with him sufficient capital to prepare for the next trading season. After the Tonkin-Japan route was abandoned in 1671, the Company ships left Tonkin for Batavia during the wintertime and would not return until early the following summer. The reconstitution of the Company’s Tonkin trade in the early 1670s required more factors to live in Tonkin and carry out the commercial transactions before the Company ships arrived from Batavia. The advantage of this shipping arrangement was that the Company ships leaving Tonkin could always carry with them the silk and piece-goods purchased during the winter trading season to Batavia, where they were transhipped either to Japan or the Netherlands. The directorship: the need for ‘Vietnamese learning’ and diplomatic activities Similar to, or even more demanding than other trading-places in the East, the success of the Tonkin trade depended heavily on the knowledge and experience of the chief of the factory in his dealings with the indigenous authorities. His ability to maintain favourable relations with the court and with the mandarins in charge of the Company trade

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was of the utmost importance. To undertake such a task, he needed to have a good knowledge of the local customs and, more importantly, the local language. In the early years of the Tonkin trade, the chiefs of the Tonkin factory were carefully selected from merchants who had a good knowledge of Tonkin or of the ‘East Asian’ trade in general. This was a great help when they had to contact local rulers and other people. The first chief, Carel Hartsinck, for instance, was quite familiar with the ins-and-outs of the Tonkin trade when he visited Tonkin for the first time in 1637. He had obtained in Japan reliable information from foreign merchants, mainly Japanese and Chinese, trading to Hirado. The inaugural VOC voyage to Tonkin under his command was consequently a sound success. In the years that followed, the High Government often appointed a merchant to this office who had already been living in Tonkin for a few years. After the establishment of the Dutch factory in Thăng Long in the 1640s, it was a common, though unwritten, regulation that, in the final years of his term, the incumbent chief trained a merchant whom he trusted in order to recommend him to the High Government. The advantage of this arrangement was that the successor had already accumulated a great deal of experience about the local trade and society before he actually succeeded to the directorship. For obvious reasons the policy of training and preparing merchants who had been living in Thăng Long for the directorship of the Tonkin factory was not without drawbacks. It appears that the longer a merchant lived in Tonkin, the greater the risk he would become embroiled in private trade as a consequence of his good knowledge of the local trade. In the middle of the 1640s, for instance, the most suitable person for the succession to the Tonkin directorship, Merchant Jan van Riebeeck— who, according to the incumbent director Antonio van Brouckhorst, understood the Vietnamese language well and behaved civilly to the Vietnamese—was disapproved by the High Government with which he stood accused of private trade. This proved to be a costly mistake. The third director, Philip Schillemans, who had virtually no previous knowledge of the Tonkin trade, failed to deal diplomatically with the local mandarins and thus contributed largely to the erosion of the Company’s Tonkin trade in the following years. Despite the endless efforts made by the High Government to curb the private trade between the Northern Quarters, plus heavy fines on those who brought private silk and textiles to Japan, Tonkinese silk

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was still smuggled to Nagasaki by the Company servants.669 It was said that as long as the Japanese officials and traders at Nagasaki supported if not encouraged this activity, it was impossible for the Company to eliminate its servants’ Tonkin-Japan private trade.670 After the dismissal of the incompetent Schillemans, Batavia expected that the appointment of Jan de Groot in 1650 would restore the Tonkin trade. In order to provide the new chief with the necessary experience in managing the Tonkin trade and in dealing with the Tonkinese rulers, the High Government even sent him to Japan where he was trained by the former Chief Factor Antonio van Brouckhorst before he sailed to Tonkin to succeed Schillemans. To the great disappointment of Batavia, the new chief was found guilty of conducting a large-scale private trade, just a few months after he took office. He was immediately dismissed. The interim director, Jacob Keijser (1651–3), proved to be a skilled manager, but he never won the approval of the High Government because he too was accused of trading privately on a large scale. Other competent directors as Hendrick Baron (1660–4) and Hendrick Verdonk (1664–5) were also reprimanded for carrying out illegal actions. It was only after the abandoning of the direct Tonkin-Japan shipping route in 1671 that the Tonkin factors’ private trade could be almost eliminated. Even in the later years Tonkinese goods were still being privately transported to Batavia by the Company servants, though on a much lesser scale. It is important to point out here that what has been called the ‘Vietnamese learning’ of the Dutch, and indeed of other foreign merchants at that time, was confined to the learning of the spoken Vietnamese language. As the seventeenth-century Vietnamese people used two entirely different language systems, the Vietnamese language for speaking and Chinese characters for writing, the Dutch often only learnt to speak Vietnamese, which was a pragmatic necessity for their daily business. Pertinently, by that time the process of romanizing the Vietnamese spoken language by Western priests had been carried out for around a century.671 This may have helped the VOC servants to note down the pronunciation more easily. In the Dutch records, there are sporadic notes on the pronunciation of the Vietnamese language. In 1651, for instance, the Vietnamese mandarin title of ‘Thiếu Bảo Quận Công’ which Chúa Trịnh Tráng granted Governor-General Carel Reniers was spelled by the Dutch as ‘Theuuw Baeuw Quun Congh’. Although there is a discrepancy between the seventeenth-century and today’s transcription, the sounds of these two phrases, when we read

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them aloud, are quite similar. Just a few years before this event, Jan van Riebeeck had reportedly written some paragraphs of his report to the Gentlemen XVII in Amsterdam in the romanized Vietnamese language to show his masters how good his Vietnamese was.672 Besides observing the diplomatic protocol of the Tonkinese court, participating in the local festivities was the other important part of the activities of the chief and the factory council as well. Such activities often proved costly because the guests were expected to come with valuable presents. Since there were many feasts throughout the year in Tonkin, they became a real burden on the Dutch as well as other foreigners. There were four great occasions a year which cost the Dutch excessive amounts of money for presents for the Emperor, Chúa, and great mandarins: the New Year holiday; the May festival; and the birthdays of the Emperor and the Chúa. Besides these four main festivities, foreign merchants were quite often invited by high-ranking mandarins to dinner, dramatic performances, music, and the like at their houses. These invitations, again, cost a considerable amount of money in term of presents and tips. Religious practices and anti-Christian sentiments in Tonkin The propagation of the Christian religion was forbidden in Tonkin, except for the short period between 1626 and 1630 when the priests of the Society of Jesus in Macao were allowed to propagate their faith freely and convert the Vietnamese. After a few years preaching in Tonkin, in 1630 the French priest Alexandre de Rhodes of the Society of Jesus and his colleagues were expelled.673 The anti-Christian policy of the court during these years was half-hearted, however, and the Jesuits in Macao continued to visit Tonkin after 1630 to resume their conversion work which was, as noted by the Dutch in 1633, just as fruitful as it was in mainland China.674 The number of Tonkinese Christians increased rapidly and, by the early 1640s, had reportedly reached around 100,000. The large number of Tonkinese Christians converts must have irritated the court, especially after a chaotic fight between hundreds of Tonkinese Christians and some fifty Chinese in the southern province of Nghệ An in 1639. To a certain extent, the religious disorder in Nghệ An in 1639 can be considered a miniature of the Shimabara Rebellion of 1637 and 1638 in Japan which led to the Tokugawa persecution of the Japanese Christians, Western priests, and finally to the expulsion of the Portuguese from Japan. The Lê/ Trịnh Government, too, reacted strongly to this event and pursued

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both the local Christians and the Western Jesuits without compunction. Nevertheless, it appears that the anti-Christian sentiment of the Lê/Trịnh court was not as strong as that of the Japanese Tokugawa and the clandestine propagation and conversion continued in Tonkin, though under more difficult circumstances.675 Learning from the harsh experiences of religious persecution to which their colleagues in Japan had been subjected, and in order to avoid unnecessary trouble with the Tonkinese rulers, the Company servants in Thăng Long constantly warned their masters in Batavia not to transport priests or religious objects to northern Vietnam.676 The anti-Christian sentiment eased slightly in the following years but was exacerbated again in 1663 when the court issued a decree banning all sort of propagation and practice of the ‘erroneous beliefs’, namely the Christian religion, in Tonkin.677 This decree was maintained so strictly throughout the following decades that, according to Dutch observations in 1677, the religious work of the French and Portuguese priests bore ‘very inconsiderable fruit’ in Tonkin.678 Under increasing pressure from the Lê/Trịnh Government, in 1678 the Spanish Dominican monk Joan D’ Arjona was expelled to Banten, where he appealed to the High Government in Batavia for passage on board a Company ship departing for Ayutthaya.679 The suppression of Christianity by the Tonkinese Government probably reached its zenith in August 1694 when the Governor of Phố Hiến had the English flag burnt in front of him, forbidding the English from then on to fly their flag in Tonkin because the English flag bore a cross on it. Although the English tried to vindicate themselves—as did the Dutch who also interceded for their English competitors—that the cross merely symbolized their country and had nothing whatsoever to do with the Christian religion, the mandarin insisted on forbidding them to fly their flag unless the cross was removed.680 The Dutch did not suffer any trouble from the anti-Christian sentiment of the Tonkin court. In contrast to its strict regulations on religious propaganda, the Tonkinese court generally tolerated the religious practices of the foreigners as long as they did not perform their devotion publicly. It appears that the Company servants in Tonkin could pray inside the factory, while sailors could also follow their religious observances on board their ships at Doméa. Except for their observance, the Dutch, who were ‘too loose Livers to gain reputation to their Religion’,681 made no attempt to propagate their faith in Tonkin.

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Paid company and sentimental attachment: Foreign merchants and Vietnamese women The relatively high degree of autonomy and the potent economic importance of women in early modern and modern South-East Asia is well-known. Recent research on sexual relations in early modern South-East Asia has revealed the striking fact that women enjoyed a high degree of freedom and played an active part in courtship and lovemaking.682 Seventeenth-century Tonkin was again an ‘exception’ to this pattern attributable to the ‘progressive imposition of the sternly patriarchal Confucian system in the fifteenth century’.683 The Lê Code of the late fifteenth century contained a series of stern articles governing the sexual relations between women and men, placing special emphasis on the virginity of women.684 At the peak of the influence of Confucianism, this sexual norm was strictly guarded. It appears that, just around a century later, such regulations were being severely challenged. Besides the sixteenth-century political crises and social disorder, the arrival of foreign merchants, and hence their need of sexual partners, must have been a decisive catalyst in transforming Vietnamese social norms towards sexual relationships. By the late 1680s, the custom of buying wives in Tonkin, in the eyes of an English traveller, had degenerated into that of ‘hiring Misses’:685 [This] gives great liberty to the young Women, who offer themselves of their own accord to any Strangers, who will go to their Price. There are of them of all Prizes, from 100 Dollars to 5 Dollars … Even the great Men of Tonquin will offer their Daughters to the Merchants and Officers, though their Stay is not likely to be above five or six Months in the Country: neither are they afraid to be with Child by White Men, for their Children will be much fairer than their Mothers, and consequently of greater Repute, when they grow up, if they be Girls.

This passage is rather shocking to Vietnamese today whose general image of Vietnamese women in the early modern period is of mere followers of first their parents and then their husbands and their sons. They were believed to have had virtually no liberty in their social or sexual lives. It is therefore not surprising at all that, until today, there has been hardly any research by Vietnamese historians into this phenomenon. In the most recent historiography, there have been various loose remarks on the increase in ‘obscene’ thoughts and novels which led the court in 1663 to issue a decree to ‘forbid the obscene relations between man and women’. It seems that this decree had no effect, as the court issued other decrees in 1718 and again in 1760 forbidding

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the printing and selling of pornographic poems and literature.686 The promulgation of the 1663 decree is an indication that the situation had presumably reached an alarming level by that time. Although there was no official statement about the root of such a problem, it is most likely that the arrival of male foreign merchants in Tonkin in the seventeenth century must have largely contributed a challenge to the local sexual norms, a phenomenon which was repeated in many other South-East Asian societies in the early modern and modern periods. It has been pointed out in recent research that the need for sexual partners of itinerant traders turned many local women into temporary wives, concubines, and prostitutes.687 It seems evident that this trend was incompatible with the seventeenth-century Vietnamese Confucian ideology on sexual relationships. Patchy information in the Dutch and English sources on seventeenth-century Tonkin supports this assertion. Not too long after their first arrival, local ‘vrouwen’ [women] began to appear in Dutch factors’ daily lives although, in a similar situation to Dutch employees at other trading-places, there were hardly any detailed accounts depicting their sexual affairs. It is, however, possible to presume that it was quite easy for the Company factors to live with local women just as their colleagues in Japan enjoyed ‘Japanese wives’ and keisei (courtesans) in Hirado and after their move to restricted Deshima, or as the Company employees in Ayutthaya who courted and lived with the Siamese and Mon women.688 In 1657, for instance, the assistant Evert Janszoon obtained permission from the chief of the Tonkin factory to take a Vietnamese lady with whom he had been living for many years to Batavia to marry her.689 Another Dutch merchant living in Tonkin in the 1650s and 1660s, Hendrick Baron, had entered into a sexual relationship with an indigenous lady who had borne him a son, Samuel Baron. Although the Dutch and English sources do not provide detailed information about this interesting story, it is clear that such an affair was not problematic for either side and this mestizo son faced no problems from the local authorities which many mestizo children in other places such as Siam suffered. In the early 1670s, Samuel Baron was even employed by the English East India Company because, according to his statement, his grandfather on his father’s side had been Scottish.690 Maintaining a temporary marriage or a sexual relationship would be economically profitable for both parties. Besides the money a woman was promised before entering into the relationship, she could

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also make herself and her partner extra profits by retailing the import goods and using her husband’s money to invest in local goods in the off season and sell them during the trading season. The property of the English chief during the early 1690s was even retained by his ‘Tonquinse wench’, who strenuously challenged the new English chief factor whenever the latter tried to retrieve the Company’s property which had been embezzled by his predecessor.691 While the arrangement of a temporary marriage and a permanent sexual partner was popularly resorted to in the capital Thăng Long where foreign factors resided permanently, prostitution was reportedly rife at the anchorage of Doméa, where sailors often rested two or three months awaiting their departure. Women who had been refused by wealthier merchants, wrote Dampier in 1688, would be ‘caressed by the poor Seamen, such as the Lascars, who are Moor of India, coming hither in Vessels from Fort. St. George, and other places’.692 The most dreadful report on the widespread prostitution at Doméa was the English chief’s laments in 1694 which said that, while the Dutch seamen were all in good health and lusty thanks to the good discipline of the Dutch factory, the sailors on the English frigate the Pearl were gravely ill due to ‘excessive debauches’.693 As a curiosity it may be mentioned here that it has recently been stated in the Vietnamese media that Emperor Lê Thần Tông (r. 1619–43 and 1649–62) had a ‘Dutch wife’, although the Dutch records contain no such information.694 2. The impact of the VOC trade on Tonkin’s economy Cassies [copper coins] were very high, att 24 & 25,000 cassies per barr which sometime the noise of a ship’s coming and great deal of silver given out make their fall 30 or 40 per cent which so much proportionally enhances the price of goods which thing considered your Honours &ca. will perceive, as formerly advised … how much it would be to the Right Honourable Company’s advantage to have … a double stock since money here is not to be procured att any reasonable rate.695

The VOC’s import of monetary metals and its impact on the silver/ cash ratio As mentioned in Chapter Five, the Vietnamese reduced the shortage of small change between the thirteenth and eighteenth centuries by exchanging silver and gold for Chinese copper coins. This outflow

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of silver in exchange for Chinese copper coins was recorded by a European writer in the late 1680s: Another occasion of hindrance and stop to trade is, that they [the Lê/ Trịnh rulers] permit the greater part of what silver comes into the country (commonly a million dollars per annum) to be carried to Bowes and China, to be exchanged for copper cash, which rises and falls according as the Chova [Chúa Trịnh] finds it agree with his interest; besides, this cash will be defaced in few years, and consequently not current, which grand inconveniences causes considerable losses to merchants, and signal prejudice to the public. Thus goes the silver out of the country, and no provision is made against it, which is very bad policy. 696

The bulk of the precious metals which Tonkin used in exchange for Chinese copper coins consisted of Japanese silver bars and, to a much lesser extent, of silver bars which were melted down in Tonkin from Spanish rials, Dutch silver coins, and Indian rupees. There were basically four sorts of silver circulating on the local market. The finest sort was called lysee which contained 100 per cent pure silver, the other three were respectively rials of eight (94 per cent), rixdollars (85 per cent), and Japanese silver (82 per cent).697 Large transactions could be paid in silver, but small business deals and daily expenses required copper cash. Since Japanese silver constituted the most important investment capital of the Dutch and Chinese, it was regarded as the basic silver in the exchange for cash in Tonkin. Consequently, the ‘silver’ foreign merchants often mentioned in their ‘silver/cash exchange rate’ referred directly to Japanese silver.698 The shortage of sources prevents any reconstruction of a full account of the silver import into Tonkin by foreign merchants. Nevertheless, the VOC archives allow us to obtain an overall view on the Dutch Company’s imports of this precious metal into Tonkin from 1637 till 1668, when the Japanese Government banned the export of Japanese silver.699 During this period, roughly 2,527,000 taels of mainly Japanese silver (or approximately seven million Dutch guilders) were imported into Tonkin by the VOC. After losing its access to Japanese silver, the Dutch Company switched over to the import of such miscellaneous silver coins as provintiëndaalders, kruisdaalders, Mexican rials and Surat rupees. By that time, the annual quantity was considerably less as the Company’s Tonkin trade declined rapidly in the second half of the seventeenth century.700 Although there are no records on the silver imported into Tonkin by other foreign merchants in the same period, sporadic information extracted from the VOC records suggests

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that Chinese merchants carried as much Japanese silver as did the Dutch to Tonkin. Quite apart from this, prior to the mid-1630s a large amount of Japanese silver had been shipped to northern Vietnam by the Japanese, Chinese, and Portuguese. Regardless of the absence of source materials and taking into consideration only the figures given in the VOC records, it seems that this stream of precious metal had been crucial to the Lê/Trịnh rulers in their efforts to stabilize the monetary system and the economy of Tonkin. This import of silver into northern Vietnam affected the silver/cash ratio and hence the buying and selling prices in Tonkin. The exchange ratio between silver and cash often fluctuated, as figuratively noted by the English factors in 1696, according to ‘the noise of a ship’s coming and great deal of silver given out’.701 Figure 15, which consists of three different quantitative factors, has been composed on purpose to demonstrate the different trends in the exchange ratio only. 4500 4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500

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Silver import

1797

1695

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1691

1689

1687

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1683

1681

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0

Zeni import

Figure 15. The VOC’s import of silver and copper zeni and the fluctuation of the silver/cash ratio in Tonkin, 1637 1697 Sources: Table 1; sporadic numbers given in Overgekomen Brieven en Papieren, G/12/17 1 to G/12/17 10, and Dagh register Batavia 1624 1682. Notes: Exchange rate: cash per tael of silver; silver import: x 100 taels; zeni import: x 1,000 pieces.

As shown in Figure 15, when the Dutch first arrived in 1637, one tael of silver was worth around 2,000 cash. By the late 1640s, the silver/cash ratio began to fall, reaching the ratio of 1/1,500 in the early

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1650s, and it slumped to 1/800 in April 1654. It was then predicted by the Dutch factors that the ratio would be likely to drop to 1/700-500 within a few months should the situation not improve. This exchange rate continued to stand low until the early 1660s, when the composition of silver/copper coins imported into Tonkin by the Dutch, and the Chinese as well, was altered. As is vividly reflected in Figure 15, at the times at which the silver/ cash ratio fell rapidly, the annual import volume of silver into Tonkin by the VOC increased sharply. This raises the question of to what extent did these contradictory trends relate to each other? It seems that the great amount of silver imported into Tonkin by the Dutch Company prior to the 1650s considerably affected the exchange rate. Indeed, by 1653 the VOC servants in Thăng Long had already realized that the exchange rate was often lowered upon the arrival of a foreign ship. They therefore planned to exchange silver for copper cash either before or after the trading season in order to reduce the loss on the silver exchange. It was a forlorn hope, since it placed the factory in a dependent position.702 In 1660, Resimon blamed the low silver/cash ratio on the Dutch Company. The Japanese free merchant accused the Dutch of importing too much silver into Tonkin which contributed largely to the depression of the exchange rate.703 It all depends how one looks at it: the shortage of copper coins in Tonkin during the 1650s caused the severe fall in the silver/cash ratio, yet the surplus of silver on the Tonkin market in turn also affected the exchange ratio. Resimon’s accusation was therefore by no means groundless, although it was not perfectly true. It is interesting, too, to note from Figure 15 that, in contrast to the contradiction between the amount of silver imported and the exchange rate, the import of Japanese copper coins into Tonkin seems to have been parallel with, or even propped up, the silver/cash exchange ratio. After their successful introduction of Japanese copper zeni into Tonkin for the first time in the early 1660s, the Dutch regularly imported these coins until the late 1670s. The introduction as well as the regular importation of these coins in the later years undoubtedly helped Tonkin to overcome its severe shortage of copper coins and to stabilize the exchange rate. The above-mentioned figure reflects one clear-cut fact that, as the quantity of Japanese copper zeni imported into Tonkin by the VOC increased sharply in the early 1670s, the silver/cash ratio revived remarkably. By 1672, the silver/cash exchange rate had increased to 1/1,200 and it even rose to 1/1,450 in 1676. By the early

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1680s, it had even reached the level of the late 1630s, standing at the ratio of 1/2,200.704 With the revival of the silver/cash ratio, the severe shortage of copper coins which had badly affected the economy of Tonkin during the 1650s and the early 1660s was basically solved. Impact on prices Examining the general trend in the prices in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Vietnam, Nguyen Thanh Nha has concluded that, while the price level was quite stable in the long run, the prices tended to rise and fall within short periods.705 This conclusion is sustained by the fluctuation in prices mentioned sporadically in the VOC records. It appears that it was the VOC’s import of silver and cash into Tonkin in particular which affected the change in the local exchange rate and hence caused a slight rise in the purchasing price of local goods in a short period. However, these imports did not have any lasting impact on the trend of prices in Tonkin in the seventeenth century. As rice constituted the staple, the prices of other wares seemed to rise and fall according to the price of rice. By and large, the buying and selling prices were highly dependent on the abundance of the agricultural harvests, including the mulberry crops which were crucial to the silk industry. They often rose in years of crop failures and the subsequent scarcity of goods and foods, and quickly returned to the normal level when the situation was stable again. They were also severely affected at times when cash grew scarce. In the VOC trade in Tonkin, there were two major sets of prices to which the Dutch as well as other foreign merchants paid particular attention. The first set, and the one with which they were most concerned, was the price of local export goods, silk in particular, since foreign merchants considered Tonkin almost solely as a supplier of raw silk and silk piece-goods. Prior to the early 1650s, when Tonkin experienced a severe shortage of cash, the purchase price of raw silk in Tonkin remained virtually unchanged, fluctuating at around 3.5 guilders per catty. It rose to around 5 guilders per catty during the 1650s and 1660s, before settling back to the price of the 1630s in the following decades.706 Tonkinese silk became cheap in the later half of the 1680s when the Japanese market turned its back on it. In 1687, for instance, the purchase price of Tonkinese raw silk even slumped as low as to around only 2 guilders per catty on the free market.707 The prices of other commodities also fluctuated proportionally.

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Table 7. The prices of several Tonkinese commodities, 1642 Raw silk Sittouw Cinnamon Sumongij Baa Hockiens Pelings Zenuwasche [?] hockiens Velvet Chio

152,380 3,400 11,000 2,810 3,200 1,200 3,600 1,400 7,000 1,400

cash per picul

cash per piece

Source: Calculated from VOC 1146, Instructie voor Brouckhorst op zijn voyagie naer Tonkin [Instruction for Brouckhorst sailing to Tonkin], 15 Dec. 1642, fos. 708 11. Note: 1 tael of silver = 2 guilders 17 stivers = c. 2,000 cash.

The second set of prices consisted mainly of food stuffs. As mentioned before, similar to and even more subject to fluctuations than export commodities, the price of food stuffs was hugely dependent on the annual harvest. It seems that, with the exception of such difficult times as natural disasters, famines, and military campaigns, the prices of daily provisions remained virtually unchanged throughout the seventeenth century. In the early 1640s one kilogram of rice cost around 20 cash and a hen cost around 110 cash. By the 1670s, a hen was said to have been only 80 cash. As reflected in the Dutch and English records, foreigners enjoyed a rather luxurious life when residing in Tonkin. Their daily expenditure on food was extremely high in comparison to that of the local population. In 1642, for example, a Dutch factor budgeted 129 cash per day on average for such sumptuous foods as chicken, geese, fish, rice, vegetables, eggs, crabs, prawns, fruits and the like. Thirty years later, an English factor spent an average of 223 cash per day.708 These expenses were out of the question for the common people of Tonkin where a carpenter or a weaver earned hardly 40 cash per day. In the early 1690s, a Tonkinese rice cup was sold to the English at the price of 3.7 cash. Hence, a potter needed to sell at least thirty rice cups in order to buy a hen or at least five pieces to buy one kilogram of rice.709 In short, while the import and export trade of the foreigners may have influenced the price of export goods in certain periods, it seems that their residence did not make a lasting impact on the local food prices. It might well be that the number of foreign merchants resid-

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ing in Tonkin to trade was too small in order to affect the prices of provisions and daily services. Impact on labour In his profound research on the impact of the European East Indian Companies on the early modern economy of Bengal, Om Prakash concluded that the ‘rather impressive increase in income, output and employment took place mainly because the Euro-Bengal trade was not a ‘normal’ trade involving an exchange of goods for goods, but one involving an exchange of precious metals for goods, implying an export surplus for Bengal’.710 It must be stated from the outset that the foreign trade of Tonkin was by no means comparable to that of its Bengal counterpart in terms of either size or duration. Nevertheless, the nature of these two places showed some reciprocal similarities if the ‘bullion for goods’ trade, that is silver and copper for silk and textiles, which shaped the structure of the trade of the European Companies with Bengal is taken into consideration. Bengal therefore may serve as a suitable model for studying the internal aspects of the seventeenth-century foreign trade of Tonkin. In order to discern the impact of foreign trade on the division of local labour, the silk industry in particular, it is necessary to recapitulate the general features of the silk and textile industry of Tonkin in the seventeenth century. The silk manufacture of Tonkin had developed spectacularly by the first half of the seventeenth century and several silk-producing centres flourished inside and nearby the capital Thăng Long. Even so, the bulk of the raw silk and silk piece-goods was still produced by farmers who had been pursuing this work as a traditional household handicraft for centuries. By the early 1640s, there were approximately 953,810 households (or 4,769,050 people) in northern Vietnam; the majority resided in the Hồng delta basin.711 Although most of these households were involved in silk manufacturing, there can be no question they ever contemplated abandoning their paddy-fields and switching over to mulberry groves completely. Incontrovertibly, silk was produced by Tonkinese farmers as a side-line. As this handicraft industry was immensely popular, the annual production could still meet the increasing demand of foreign merchants. The VOC spent approximately 13,514,028 guilders mainly on Tonkinese silk between 1637 and 1699, an average of around 215,000 guilders per year (Appendix 3). This period also witnessed the development of the Chinese trade with Tonkin. Although we do not have

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any accurate figures about the Chinese purchases, fragmentary information in the Dutch records suggests that the total Chinese investment in their Tonkin trade amounted to around two-thirds of that invested by the Dutch. If this is correct, then another sum of approximately 9,009,352 guilders was invested in Tonkinese products, mainly silk, by the Chinese during the 1637–1700 period.712 This means that there would have been 22,523,380 guilders spent on Tonkinese export products, most notably silk, by the Dutch and the Chinese between 1637 and 1700, an average sum of around 350,000 guilders per annum, apart from the purchases made by the Japanese and Portuguese in the earlier period as well as those of the English and French during the last quarter of the seventeenth century.713 How far did this large sum of money contribute to the development of the silk industry in Tonkin? A definite answer cannot be given, but it is certain that this industry must have been boosted by the foreign demand, because the seventeenth century witnessed a spectacular development in the silk industry in northern Vietnam. When this product was still highly marketable and profitable in Japan, it was reported by the Dutch that 1,500 piculs (90 tons) of raw silk and around 6,000 silk piece-goods such as pelings, baas, chio, sumongij, hockiens and the like were produced for export annually.714 In order to produce this quantity, large numbers of labourers must have been involved in this industry. The absence of historical documents on the average silk production per household means figures for it have to be deduced. According to a present-day farmer in the Hồng delta province of Thái Bình, his family harvests 10 kilograms of raw silk on average per season. Assuming that a seventeenth-century household harvested the same amount, at least 9,000 households or around 45,000 labourers (around 1 per cent of the population of Tonkin) could possibly have been involved in manufacturing 90 tons (1,500 piculs) of raw silk; leaving aside a great number of reelers, bleachers, weavers and so on involved in the process of producing silk piece-goods. If we make a simple calculation that a household, regardless of its investments and expenses during the season, harvested 10 kilograms (166.5 catties) raw silk per season, at the average price of 3.5 guilders per catty, this yielded around 60 guilders per year from the silk production. In an agricultural country like Tonkin, where the majority of prices were affected by the rise and fall of the rice price, the sum of 60 guilders was equal to around 39 piculs (or 2,331 kilograms) of rice at the price of 15 tiền (about 1.5 guilders) per picul.

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This amount of rice was more than sufficient for a five-person family. Naturally this calculation is fairly rough and simple because it fails to account for the fact that farmers had to pay tax and sell part of their product to the court at low prices. Yet, it demonstrates how the silk and ceramic industries must have contributed greatly to the expansion of the seventeenth-century economy of Tonkin as they provided largescale employment for labourers. The rub was that these flourishing industries were unstable as Tonkinese silk and ceramics were by and large supplementary to Chinese products. Therefore, when Bengali and Chinese silk were available, Tonkinese yarn lost its predominance on the regional market. From the late 1660s the Tonkinese farmers began to convert their mulberry groves into paddy-fields and as a precaution local weavers would not begin their work until the foreign merchants had arrived or advanced them money. The decline in the silk industry also affected other classes such as merchants, brokers and the like. By the late 1680s, ‘the merchant commonly stays 3 or 4 months for his goods after he has paid for them; because the poor are not employed till ships arrive in the country, and then they are set to work by the money that is brought thither in them.’715 The departure of the English and the Dutch in 1697 and 1700 respectively, not to mention the exodus of many Chinese merchants during the 1680s, must have greatly reduced the number of Tonkinese labourers who had been either fully or partly employed in export handicraft industries. The commercial centres and the commercial system Another aspect of the impact of foreign trade on Tonkin’s economy was the growth of commercial centres, hence the development of a commercial system. The capital Thăng Long is the most outstanding example. Besides its function as a political centre, Thăng Long had also served as an important commercial centre in the Vietnamese Kingdom of Đại Việt since the eleventh century. With the establishment of the Lê Dynasty in 1428, the commercial role of this city entered a period of constant expansion. The royal citadel and the palaces in the city were surrounded by an economic-residential area stretching along the bank of the Hồng River. Prior to the late sixteenth century Thăng Long was still a remote place, far removed from the main routes of international commerce. Other commercial centres in the region such as Ayutthaya, Pegu, and further the Javanese port towns of Demak and Banten had developed much earlier.716

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Once it was permitted, the residence and commercial activities of a foreign community contributed towards linking this commercial city to international trade. In the following century, such foreign merchants as the Chinese, Portuguese, Dutch, and English all resided and traded in the capital. Thăng Long was therefore transformed into an international ‘trading city’, a status attributable largely to a series of capital development policies promulgated by the Lê/Trịnh, the development of a commodity economy, and great social migrations.717 The presence of foreign merchants in Thăng Long enlivened the commercial life of the city. It attracted more local people to come to trade directly with foreign traders. As mentioned before, the Dutch factors bought the bulk of their silk from local authorities and brokers. They also purchased this product from local farmers and retailers who travelled to the city on market days to sell silk and piece-goods. There were also silk guilds and silk factories in the city, which were linked to various interregional silk-trading networks. For example, raw silk and unfinished piece-goods from the villages of Bưởi, La, and Mỗ were transferred to Hàng Đào Street, where they were redyed, bleached, and finished, before being sold to foreign merchants.718 There were also various miscellaneous services in the city which also in part served the foreigners, including the silver refining, portage, and even prostitution. Phố Hiến was another town which developed during this commercial century. Although the establishment of the place called the ‘Hiến Department’ can be dated back to the late fifteenth century, it was not until the early seventeenth century that this town developed commercially, though this florescence was relatively short-lived. There was an unwritten law that foreign merchants arriving in Tonkin for the first time had to reside and trade at the riverine town of Phố Hiến, around fifty kilometres downstream from Thăng Long. After having resided there for a few years they were approved of by the court and were permitted to establish a factory in the capital Thăng Long. Enlivened by the temporary residence of the Chinese, Japanese, and the Dutch during the first half of the seventeenth century, commercial life in Phố Hiến flourished for a few decades. At the zenith of its glory, Phố Hiến is said to have consisted of two major quarters: one for the Chinese and the other for Japanese merchants. There were also various quarters in which export products were made. The commercial life of this town faded quickly, however, as the number of overseas Japanese decreased after the seclusion policy introduced by the Japanese Gov-

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ernment in the mid-1630s and after the removal of the Chinese and Dutch residences to the capital in the early 1640s. Even then, Phố Hiến maintained its function as a customs office. It controlled all fluvial transport passing by as well as the flow of import and export goods between the capital Thăng Long and the anchorage of Doméa.719 The development of Thăng Long and Phố Hiến was remarkable. The commercial function of other places which were involved in the foreign trade of Tonkin in the seventeenth century was of minor importance. Doméa, which has been overestimated by some Vietnamese historians as a commercial centre, was actually an anchorage. Despite its humble status, this place played a crucial role in the birth of the seventeenth-century commercial system in Tonkin.720 By the dawn of the eighteenth century, the town of Quảng Yên on the north-eastern border with China was reportedly flourishing, benefiting from the residence of throngs of Chinese merchants. By this time, however, the foreign trade of Tonkin was already in rapid decline; one after the other foreign merchant was leaving the Kingdom of Tonkin. Were the first seeds of capitalism sown? The question of whether the first seeds of capitalism had been sown in Vietnamese society in the pre-modern period in the wake of the development of the commodity economy of the country and the expansion of its foreign trade was the topic of an enduring debate among Vietnamese historians during the 1960s. As the northern Vietnamese were setting up a political system with a socialist orientation after the defeat of the French in 1954, it was said that ‘the study on the emergence and development of the capitalist economy and the bourgeoisie contributes an important significance to today’s revolutionary task’.721 By that time, populist propaganda spread the story that the country had evolved directly from a feudal into a socialist society without experiencing a capitalist period. Most Vietnamese scholars, however, believed that, although Vietnam was by and large a feudal society until the establishment of the socialist government immediately after the Second World War (1945), capitalist elements had obviously taken root in it. In other words, the first seeds of capitalism had been sown in Vietnamese feudal society several centuries earlier.722 In this debate on the sprouts of capitalism in Vietnam, one of the central questions was when and in which forms they emerged in Vietnamese society. The various answers and propositions adduced can be divided into two major groups. The first group believed that there

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had been an embryonic capitalist mode of production in northern Vietnam as early as the seventeenth century. The most visible indications of such a new economic trend were the large-scale handicraft industries in textiles and ceramics as well as the increasing number of free labourers working in these industries.723 Taking a contrary position, the historians of the second school claimed that such indications were not convincing enough and accused the scholars of the first school of ‘misinterpreting’ the Marxist theory of capitalism. They concluded that ‘the commodity economy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was a feudal economy’, and that what is known as the ‘capitalist mode of production neither sprouted nor developed in the feudal period between the seventeenth and the early nineteenth century’.724 It is not my intention to reassess this complex debate which covers various fields and many centuries since this study focuses on the Dutch-Vietnamese relationship. Nevertheless, since this monograph deals with the development of the commodity economy and foreign trade of Tonkin in the seventeenth century, it may be useful to toss some relevant information into this dispute in order to prompt a reconsideration of the once-dominant question of whether the first seeds of embryonic capitalism were sown in seventeenth-century Tonkin. Recapitulating the debate from a twenty-first century perspective, it is clear that both schools have presented convincing historical facts. Their approaches and arguments, however, have been too heavily influenced by classical Marxist theories on capitalism, which would have been much more appropriate to the European context than the Oriental and Vietnamese background. In most of the cases, instead of considering the phenomenon of the expansion of the commodity economy as it was in seventeenth-century Vietnamese context, scholars have tended to frame it into the Marxist theories of, for instance, the mode of production, the productive force and the like. In this sense, it seems that the Vietnamese scholars made the mistake against which Marx had often warned: not to consider his theory as a detailed prophecy. In recent research it has been stressed that the transformation from feudalism to capitalism cannot be located on any one day in any one month in any one year, and that it was a transition composed of a multitude of partial changes.725 Looking back at the case of seventeenth-century Tonkin, it is obvious that significant transformations occurred in the economy and society of the country such as the privatization of state-owned land, the increasing number of free labourers, the development of the handicraft industries and foreign trade, and the

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growth of several commercial centres. These, to a certain extent, could be considered the embryonic elements from which a capitalist mode of production evolved. However, as was the situation in most other Asian countries, these elements were prevented from developing any further to transform Tonkin from a feudal to a capitalist society.726 It has recently been pointed out that the two basic economic elements from which commercial capitalism sprouted, namely a long-distance trade and the large-scale production of handicraft manufactures, failed to materialize in Vietnam.727 As mentioned in the preceding chapters, although silk was the key export product of Tonkin in the seventeenth century, silk manufacture was by and large a household handicraft industry. Most of the labourers working in the silk-producing areas around Thăng Long were part-time workers who travelled to the capital during the off season in search of extra income and would return to their villages during the cultivation and harvest seasons. In short, there were new socio-economic elements apparent in seventeenth-century Tonkin, but they never attained the strength to transform Tonkin from a feudal to a capitalist society. 3. The Dutch catalyst in the Tonkin-Quinam conflict All rich curiosities instruments or materialls of war never escape the King or in fine anything else that he fancies, & he take them at his owne rates. The Dutch takes care to furnish him, but it’s with such things as yield them profitt. … The Dutch bring him yearly saltpeeter, brimstone, cast round shott from the Coast, demy-culverin.728

The Dutch East India Company played an active role in the TonkinQuinam wars in the early 1640s. As a maritime trader whose wishes were to export Tonkinese silk to Japan, it had quickly become involved in the Vietnamese political crisis. By the late 1630s, the High Government began to consider an alliance with the Lê/Trịnh Government to fight against Nguyễn Quinam. Dutch activities in the early 1640s transformed them from the position of having to be persuaded by Thăng Long into that of the persuader, as they enthusiastically urged the Lê/Trịnh rulers to campaign against Quinam. The prevaricating Lê/Trịnh rulers consecutively backed out of the allied campaigns in the summer of 1642 and the spring of 1643 without offering a good reason. But it is clear that the enthusiasm of the Dutch greatly influenced the Trịnh rulers to send troops to attack Quinam in the summer of 1643.

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This joint campaign was unsuccessful as the Dutch ships were heavily damaged by the Quinamese navy before they had had a chance to co-operate with the Tonkinese troops to attack Quinam. Three bitter failures within two years and the two ambiguous non-appearances of the Tonkinese armies discouraged the High Government which decided to revoke the military alliance with Tonkin after the 1643 defeat. Instead, it continued to take revenge on Quinam alone in the period 1644–50. Because of increasing pressure from the Gentlemen XVII in the Netherlands, Batavia finally signed a treaty to end the protracted conflict with Quinam in 1651. Within only a few months, the treaty was not worth the paper it was written on. In the early 1660s, Batavia made several attempts to trade with Quinam, but in vain.729 Despite its revocation of the military alliance with Tonkin in 1644, the Company still supported Tonkin against Quinam by selling weapons and military equipment to the former. Hundreds of cannon and a huge number of cannon balls, ammunition, saltpetre, sulphur and other martial appurtenance were shipped to Tonkin by the VOC. This supply was maintained at a high level even after the Trịnh-Nguyễn conflict ceased in 1672. The reason was that another rival of the Lê/Trịnh rulers on the border with China, the Mạc family, was not completely defeated until the late 1670s. In 1675, for instance, the Experiment carried a total of 40,800 Dutch pounds of refined Bengali saltpetre and 20,000 musket balls to Tonkin. The bronze cannon which Batavia had ordered to be manufactured in the Netherlands for the Tonkinese rulers according to the wooden models had not yet arrived there to be forwarded to Tonkin.730 Generally speaking, despite their non-involvement the Dutch still played a critical part in the Trịnh-Nguyễn wars by supplying weapons and military equipment to the Lê/Trịnh rulers. Towards the end of the Tonkin-Quinam conflict, the Tonkinese rulers demanded the Company to provide them not only with weapons but also with such specialists as military engineers and constables in order to assist them to improve the quality of their armies. Since the Tonkin trade was no longer lucrative, the High Government often found excuses not to comply with the Trịnh demands. A stance it would never have dared to adopt at other important trading-places such as Japan, where it was more than willing to satisfy the Japanese rulers in order to facilitate its trade.731 In order to reduce discontent at the court as much as possible, Batavia ordered its servants in Thăng Long to do whatever they could to satisfy the Trịnh rulers. In 1677, for instance, Chúa Trịnh Tạc had a big gun cast by his craftsmen but

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then could not shift it. The Dutch and the English were summoned to the court and asked to design a big crane to move the gun. According to the English source, despite having a Dutch carpenter with them, the Dutch failed to construct a suitable crane to shift the gun but the English successfully lifted it. After their failure in this competition, the Dutch suffered a great deal of resentment and subsequent hindrance to their trade from the local authorities.732 In any such discussion, it is important to bear in mind the fact that, although Dutch weapons were a critical element in the seventeenthcentury Vietnamese political wrangle, they did not arrive in Vietnam, in Sun Laichen’s words, ‘in vacuum’ since the military technology of Đại Việt (both Tonkin and Quinam) was quite well developed by that time.733 Vietnam had long been known as an ‘intermediary in technology transfers’ and by the late sixteenth century its weapons had become quite superior on the battlefields against the Chinese in the north as well as against the Chàm in the south.734 While the Nguyễn rulers in central Vietnam had better access to Western-style military technology, the Chinese-style weapons of the Lê/Trịnh were by no means far inferior to those of their Nguyễn rival. Supplemented by Dutch weapons after 1637 the fighting quality of the northern armies improved considerably. Alexandre de Rhodes noted in the early 1650s that the Tonkinese musketeers handled their weapons ‘with great dexterity’.735 By the late 1680s, there was a comment by a European traveller that the Tonkinese soldiers were ‘good marksmen … inferior to few, and surpassing most nations in dexterity of handling and quickness of firing their muskets’.736 Besides wielding the guns which were often described, the Tonkinese soldiers were also armed with the socalled ‘Backs Guns’ which were carried and handled by two soldiers. These weapons were said to be extremely useful in clearing passes or firing over the rivers, where the enemies were firmly entrenched.737 This sort of weapon must have been critical in attacking the Nguyễn troops assembled on the southern bank of the Gianh River. 4. Miscellaneous issues The arrival of foreign merchants and priests in the early modern period offered the Vietnamese a good opportunity to learn Western techniques. It was said that Chúa Trịnh Tráng was very excited about the accuracy of the European cog-wheeled clocks and hour-glasses with which the French priest Alexandre de Rhodes presented him in

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1627.738 Since clocks were strange objects to the Vietnamese who had virtually no knowledge of such mechanisms, the European priests in Tonkin were said to be ‘purposely skilled in mending Clocks, Watches, or some Mathematical Instruments’. The reason was that knowing they were so skilled the mandarins would ask them to come to the capital Thăng Long, a place strictly forbidden to the priests, to mend the malfunctioning clocks for them. Once they were in the city, these priests would seize any opportunity to preach and convert the Vietnamese.739 Clocks were so attractive and respectable that, according to some sources, in the eighteenth century a Vietnamese man from Quinam even travelled to Holland to learn the techniques of making and mending clocks. Upon return, he was employed by the Nguyễn rulers. With his skills and knowledge, he was not only capable of mending malfunctioning time-pieces but also of manufacturing very sophisticated cog-wheeled clocks and telescopes.740 The trading connections between Tonkin and foreign merchants with other Asian ports also offered the Vietnamese a good opportunity to travel. Prior to the seventeenth century the Vietnamese dynasties had rarely sent ships to other countries to trade. The Vietnamese, when they travelled abroad, went first to such ports in southern China as Guangzhou where they took passage on board of foreign vessels to visit other trading-places.741 With the arrival of foreign merchants from the late sixteenth century, the Tonkinese could travel on board foreign ships to Nagasaki, Batavia, Malacca, and Ayutthaya. Free foreign merchants living in Tonkin even fitted out their own vessels and hired as many as fifty Vietnamese seamen to sail between Tonkin and other ports. For instance, in the 1650s and 1660s the Japanese merchant Resimon, who was residing permanently in Tonkin because he could not return to Japan, possessed two junks sailing between Tonkin and Manila and Siam. Most of the sailors on these junks were Vietnamese. There were also a number of Vietnamese sailors and people living and trading in such South-East Asian ports as Banten, Batavia, Ayutthaya, and Malacca.742 Occasionally, the Tonkin court also asked the Dutch Company to allow its officials to travel to Nagasaki on board the Company ships leaving Tonkin for Japan. The purpose of their voyages, as recounted by the Dutch factory in Thăng Long, was to sell Tonkinese silk in Nagasaki in order to buy various sorts of Japanese objects for the royal family.743 The Tonkinese court did not raise strong opposition to the travelling abroad of its subjects until the late seventeenth century, when it issued

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a decree forbidding such passage. This was caused by the accident to an English junk in Quinam in 1693. In that year, some English factors in Thăng Long bought a junk and signed on some thirty Tonkinese crew to sail the junk to trade in Malacca. Upon its return the junk was wrecked off the Quinam coast; the Tonkinese people were captured. Seizing upon this accident as a pretext, in January 1694 the court issued a decree forbidding foreign merchants from allowing the Tonkinese to travel on board their ships leaving Tonkin. With this decree, a century of relative freedom in sailing abroad on board foreign ships by the Tonkinese people ended.744 Concluding remarks The Dutch left their influence on virtually every aspect of Tonkin society between 1637 and 1700. While the Dutch impact on the local culture and society still leaves much to be speculated on and examined, their influence on the indigenous economy is obvious. The economy of Tonkin was stimulated by the great amounts of silver, copper, and copper coins imported into the country by the Dutch Company during the period 1637–1700. The Dutch import and export volumes had a considerable impact on the local exchange rates, on prices, and on labour. Besides, the VOC also played a role as an active catalyst in the Tonkin-Quinam crisis, even though its involvement in the Vietnamese conflict was rather transient.

CONCLUSION The seventeenth century represented a turning-point in Vietnamese history. The political disorder of the sixteenth century had culminated in the political and territorial separation between the two opposing kingdoms: Tonkin in the north ruled by the Lê/Trịnh court and Quinam in the south governed by the Nguyễn family. During the series of Trịnh-Nguyễn wars (1627-72), Tonkin launched seven military campaigns against Quinam. None of these expeditions achieved a decisive result. While the wars did absorb a great deal of the manpower and finance on both sides, it has to be admitted that they also stimulated the development of the commodity economy and foreign trade of both countries. In Tonkin, the Vietnamese rulers revised their hitherto negative attitude towards trade and traders in favour of a more positive outlook, and accepted the presence of foreign merchants in their country as they were eager to buy modern weapons with which to gain an edge in the long-lasting conflict with the Nguyễn of Quinam. Political schism was not the only change, even though it was probably the most drastic. The economy of Tonkin also transformed significantly during this century. The privatization of land reduced the amount of the state-owned land on which farmers relied considerably, causing a huge surplus of labour in the Hồng River delta. Although many landless people migrated to the south, a large number managed to find work in local handicraft industries and trading-related services. In response to the development of the commodity economy of the country and the increasing demand for Vietnamese silk on the regional markets, such foreign merchants as the Japanese, Chinese, Portuguese, and later the Dutch, English, and French regularly visited Tonkin. The burgeoning of the country’s foreign trade generated a commercial system linking the commercial city of Thăng Long to the regional and international maritime trading networks – a phenomenon not seen in preceding centuries. Political and commercial transformations in East Asia during the 1630s, but above all the seclusion policy of the Tokugawa Shogunate which forced Japanese merchants to withdraw from overseas shipping and excluded the Portuguese from the Japanese market, greatly affected foreign trade in Tonkin and its diplomatic relations with the outside world. Under mounting pressure to seek

216

conclusion

military support from a Western power, Thăng Long lured the Dutch into a short-lived military alliance. Despite the vicissitudes in their political and commercial relations, the Dutch-Vietnamese relationship lasted until the end of this century. In the preceding chapters I have reached a number of conclusions about the political and commercial history of the Dutch East India Company in seventeenth-century Tonkin. I have also analysed general features of early modern Tonkin and investigated Dutch impact on the local society and economy. I shall not review these conclusions in the following pages since they have been better placed in more detailed and deeply analysed contexts. Instead, I would like to draw some general conclusions about the VOC-Tonkin relationship in the seventeenth century, focusing on three major points: political vicissitudes; fluctuating commercial trends; and the Vietnamese-Dutch interactions. Conflicting interests and the political vicissitudes The political history of the VOC-Tonkin relationship is an eventful story of conflicting interests cultivated by each side. The Trịnh rulers realized that it would be a difficult task to conquer Quinam, whose well-built walls were sturdily defended by cannon supplied mainly by the Portuguese. However, from the early 1630s, the possibility of obtaining military support from a Western military power nurtured their hope of a victory in this war. Because the Portuguese had supported Quinam, the Trịnh rulers targeted the Dutch for help. Their continuous hints that they would grant the Dutch Company trading privileges should the latter abandon Quinam and ally itself and trade with Tonkin did encourage the Dutch to deal more sternly with the Nguyễn rulers and in 1637 to commence their relationship with Tonkin. In order to cajole the Dutch Company into a military alliance with them, the Trịnh rulers granted the Dutch factory more trading privileges than it did to other foreigners. The persistent persuasion of the Trịnh paid off handsomely as Batavia eventually agreed to send ships and soldiers to assist Tonkin to conquer Quinam in the early 1640s. In contrast to the Trịnh insistence, the Dutch were far from interested in becoming embroiled in the Vietnamese political crisis. As was its attitude towards the other kingdoms in mainland South-East Asia, the VOC never considered conquering and colonizing the Indo-Chinese Peninsula a serious option. Its policies towards both Quinam and

conclusion

217

Tonkin in the seventeenth century were designed only to improve its commercial positions in these countries. Consequently, after opening trade relations with Tonkin, acutely aware of the importance of maintaining a friendly relationship with the Nguyễn domain to facilitate its shipping between Batavia and its Northern Quarters such as Japan, Formosa, and Tonkin, Batavia still tried to maintain a friendly relationship with Quinam. The heavy losses of Company ships, cargoes, and sailors in central Vietnam in the spring of 1642, however, caused Batavia to change its mind. The VOC-Quinam tension culminated in sporadic outbursts of open conflict between 1642 and 1651, when a short-lived peace agreement was concluded. Under such circumstances, the decision of Batavia to ally itself militarily with Tonkin in a joint venture to conquer Quinam was a dual-purpose strategy: revenging itself on Quinam and improving its relationship with Tonkin in order to facilitate its lucrative Tonkin-Japan silk trade. Even now, the hesitance of the Trịnh to send troops to rendezvous with the Dutch fleets in 1642 and 1643 is still inexplicable. It would seem to be implausible that, after half a decade of persuading the Dutch to create a military alliance, the Trịnh would not prepare a large operation to conquer Quinam with the Dutch support. Paradoxically, the Trịnh did not campaign as they had informed Batavia they would. This vitiated any efforts made by the two Dutch fleets in the summer of 1642 and the spring of 1643. The third campaign of the hapless allies in the summer of 1643 also failed bitterly. While Thăng Long blamed the unsuccessful alliance on the Dutch soldiers’ lack of will to fight, Batavia interpreted the ambiguous non-attendance of Tonkin armies in 1642 and 1643 as a ‘malicious trick’ by the Trịnh to transfer the heavy burden of conquering Quinam onto its shoulders. Whatever the cause may have been, Batavia now decided to suspend its military alliance with Tonkin despite the Trịnh insistence, reinforced by the unilateral wars it fought against Quinam during the period 1644-51. The termination of the military alliance ended the intimate phases in the VOC-Tonkin relationship. Notwithstanding their constant demand for weapons, the Trịnh rulers now dealt more harshly with the Dutch factors. As a consequence, the Vietnamese-Dutch political relationship deteriorated rapidly, especially from the middle of the 1650s, when the Tonkin-Japan silk trade of the Company declined. The failure of the ‘Tinnam strategy’ in the early 1660s was a severe blow to attempts by Batavia to revive the Tonkin trade and heavily affected the VOC-Tonkin relationship in the following years. The subsequent

218

conclusion

reconstitutions of the Tonkin trade by the High Government in the 1670s (abandoning the Tonkin-Japan direct route in 1671 and reducing the annual capital for the Tonkin factory in 1679) meant that the value of its annual presents to the Trịnh was also reduced. This irritated the Trịnh rulers and, from the early 1690s, was the major cause of disputes between the court and the factory. Tonkinese rulers detained Dutch factors and interpreters whenever they felt dissatisfied with the presents and goods Batavia offered them. Disappointed with the unprofitable Tonkin trade as well as extremely annoyed by the increasing maltreatment of its servants, from the middle of the 1690s, Batavia considered withdrawing from the Tonkin factory. It was the Gentlemen XVII’s hesitance about abandoning the relationship with Tonkin which delayed the withdrawal from the Tonkin factory until the spring of 1700, when the Cauw brought all the Company’s assets and servants to the safe haven in Batavia. The intra-Asian trade and varying commercial trends One of the most crucial factors which contributed to the success of the VOC’s intra-Asian trade during the seventeenth century was its well-devised Japan trade. As silk was regarded as the key to unlocking the Japanese market, the pursuit of this commodity was pivotal to the success of the VOC’s Japan trade. Possessing no direct access to mainland China, the Dutch Company endeavoured to procure Chinese silk from regional markets outside China. Chinese silk attracted the VOC to Quinam, but in the end it was Tonkinese silk which prompted the Dutch Company to shift its commercial focus from central to northern Vietnam in the mid-1630s. There were three major phases in the history of the VOC’s silk trade with Japan: the phase of the Chinese product prior to the early 1640s; the phase of Tonkinese silk between 1641 and 1654; and the phase of Bengali silk from 1655. Tonkinese silk played a crucial role in the success of the VOC’s Japan trade between 1637 and 1654. The success of the Tonkin silk trade was particularly significant to the Japan trade of the VOC if we bear in mind the very fact that the net profits which the Dutch factory in Nagasaki transferred annually to Batavia during these years were falling rapidly. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that, if Surat was the ‘left arm’ of the spice trade with the Moluccas, Tonkin, certainly for the 1641-54 period, was the ‘left arm’ of the silver trade with Japan.

conclusion

219

Being a link in the chain of the East Asian trade and, in a broader perspective, the intra-Asian trade, the commercial function of the Tonkin factory was often reconstituted according to the commercial re-organization of the Company’s Asian trade. If prior to the mid1650s the Tonkin factory functioned as a silk provider for the Japan trade, this role altered significantly in the decades thereafter. From the middle of the 1650s, the Tonkin factory was ordered to diversify its export products, ranging from Tonkinese raw silk to Tonkinese silk piece-goods and ceramics, and Chinese musk and gold. The ‘Tinnam strategy’ devised by Batavia in the early 1660s for the purpose of trading across the Tonkin-China border was obviously an attempt to adapt its Tonkin trade to the transformations in the East Asian trade and the intra-Asian trade. The decline of the Japan trade of the Company during the last quarter of the seventeenth century forced Batavia to reduce the size of its Tonkin trade. With its decision in 1679 to reduce the amount of annual investment capital for the Tonkin factory down to approximately 150 thousand guilders, Batavia indirectly admitted its failure to revive the Tonkin trade to the levels of the preceding decades. Nevertheless, the Tonkin factory still provided some marketable commodities necessary to the Company trade and could serve as a strategic connection in the long-term strategy of the Company towards the Middle Kingdom. But when its factors were increasingly being maltreated in Thăng Long, Batavia eventually decided to abandon the Tonkin trade in the spring of 1700. Trade as a bridge for Dutch-Vietnamese interactions Although the Dutch were not the first Europeans to trade in Tonkin in the early modern period, they were by far the most influential merchants. Their permanent residence in the capital and large-scale trade influenced the indigenous society and economy critically. It appears that in northern Vietnam, the Dutch interacted well with, though were not really integrated into, the indigenous society. The Dutch Company servants, especially the chief merchants, learnt the Vietnamese language and familiarized themselves with Vietnamese customs to facilitate the trade of the factory. Some of them lived in domestic harmony with their ‘Tonkinese wives’, and itinerant maritime traders found it easy to go ‘hiring misses’ or courtesans. Vietnamese-Dutch

220

conclusion

offspring was born as a consequence of these sexual relationships. While trading and interacting on an intimate level, the Dutch, along with other Europeans, also diffused Western thoughts, technology, ethic, religion, and other new streams of ideas into Tonkin. The impact of Dutch trade on the indigenous economy was unequivocally clear. The rise and fall of the annual import and export volume of the Tonkin factory was the factor which decided the production of, for instance, raw silk and silk piece-goods, and hence, the number of labourers employed in these industries. It also affected other aspects of the local economy such as the silver/cash ratio and buying and selling prices. It is therefore no exaggeration to say that during the course of sixty-four years of residing in and trading with Tonkin, the Dutch significantly influenced the local political economy. If any one single external factor which contributed to the internal transformations of seventeenth-century Tonkin had to be singled out, the influence of the Dutch, together with the Chinese, must take pride of place.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

VUA (EMPERORS) LÊ AND CHÚA (KINGS) TRỊNH IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY TONKIN a. Vua (Emperors) Lê: Period

Emperor

Title of Reign

1600-1619 1619-1643 1643-1649 1649-1662 1663-1671 1672-1675 1676-1705

Lê Lê Lê Lê Lê Lê Lê

Thuận Đức Vĩnh Tộ Phúc Thái Khánh Đức Cảnh Trị Dương Đức Vĩnh Trị

Kính Tông Thần Tông Chân Tông Thần Tông Huyền Tông Gia Tông Hy Tông

b. Chúa (Kings) Trịnh: Period

King

1570-1623 1623-1657 1657-1682 1682-1709

Trịnh Trịnh Trịnh Trịnh

Title of Reign Tùng Tráng Tạc Căn

Bình An Vương Thanh Đô Vương Tây Đô Vương Định Vương

APPENDIX 2

GOVERNORS GENERAL AND CHIEF FACTORS OF THE DUTCH FACTORY IN TONKIN IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY a. Governors–General of the VOC: 1636-1645 1645-1650 1650-1653 1653-1678 1678-1681 1681-1684 1684-1691 1691-1704

Antonio van Diemen Cornelis van der Lijn Carel Reniers Joan Maetsuyker Rijcklof van Goens Cornelis Janszoon Speelman Joannes Camphuys Willem van Outhoorn

b. Chief Factors of the Dutch factory in Tonkin: 1637-1641 1642-1647 1647-1650 1650-1651 1651 (Mar.-June) 1651-1653 1653-1656 1657-1659 1660-1664 1664-1665 1665-1667 1667-1672 1672-1677 1677-1679 1679-1687 1687-1691 1691-1700

Carel Hartsinck Antonio van Brouckhorst Philip Schillemans Jacob Keijser (interim opperhoofd, first time) Jan de Groot (dismissed by Commissioner Verstegen) Jacob Keijser (interim opperhoofd, second time) Louis Isaacszn Baffart Nicolaas de Voogt (de Voocht) Hendrick Baron Hendrick Verdonk Constantijn Ranst Cornelis Valckenier Albert Brevinck Johannes Besselman Leendert (Leonard) de Moy Johannes Sibens Jacob van Loo

APPENDIX 3

DUTCH SHIPPING IN TONKIN, 1637-1699 Year

Name of ship

Value (guilders) of import

1637 1638 1639 1640 1641 1642

1643

1644 1645 1646 1647 1648 1649 1650 1651 1652 1653 1654 1655 1656 1657 1658 1659 1660 1661

Grol, plus a junk from Formosa Zandvoort; Waterlooze Verve; Wijdenes Rijp; Lis; Waterlooze Verve Lis; Engel; Rijp Meerman (two trips); Klein Rotterdam Kievit (two trips); Brack (two trips); Kelang; Kievit; Wakende Boei; Meerman (two trips); Zeeuwsche Nachtegaal Kievit; Wakende Boei; Zeeuwsche Nachtegaal; Wijdenes; Zandvoort; Lillo; Waterhond; Vos; Jonge Zaaier Leeuwarden; Zwarte Beer; Bresken Gulden Gans; Zwarte Beer; Hillegaers bergh Zwarte Beer Kampen; Witte Valk Kampen; Witte Valk; Zwarte Beer; Maas land Witte Valk; Kampen; Delfhaven Witte Valk; Taiwan; Katwijk; Bruinvisch Witte Valk; Taiwan; Kampen Witte Valk; Zeelandia Vleermuys Cabo de Jacques (two trips) Coukerken; Wakende Boei Zeeridder; Spreeuw Roode Hert Roode Hert; Meliskerken

export

188,166 298,609 382,458 439,861 202,703 297,529

190,000 187,277 311,268 431,974 240,380 129,352

299,835

200,000

397,590 454,606

299,572 378,092

352,544 377,637 457,928 334,105

? 352,454 393,384 254,126

372,827 552,336 680,294 149,750 25,773 184,215 276,077 317,500 64,773 164,703

513,293 ? 434,628 ? 300,000 ? ? 93,606 318,183 316,487

226 Year 1662 1663 1664 1665 1666 1667 1668 1669 1670 1671 1672 1673 1674 1675 1676 1677 1678 1679 1680 1681 1682 1683 1684 1685 1686 1687 1688 1689 1690 1691 1692 1693 1694 1695 1696

appendices Name of ship Klaverskerke; Bunschoten; Roode Vos Bunschoten; Hooglanden; Zeeridder Elburg (two trips); Zeeridder; Bunschoten Spreeuw; Zeeridder; Buiksloot Spreeuw; Hilversum; Zwarte Leeuw Witte Leeuw; Buiksloot Buiksloot; Zuylen; Overveen Bloempot; Overveen; Pitoor Vredenburgh; Pitoor; Hoogcapel Bleyswyck; Meliskerken; Armuyden Meliskerken; Bleyswyck; Papegay Papegay; Meliskerken Papegay; Voorhout Experiment; Marken Janskercke; Croonvogel Experiment; Croonvogel Experiment; Croonvogel Croonvogel Croonvogel Croonvogel Croonvogel Croonvogel Croonvogel; Bombay Wachthond Wachthond Gaasperdam Gaasperdam Gaasperdam Gaasperdam Gaasperdam Boswijk Westbroek De Wind Cauw Cauw

Value (guilders) of import

export

405,686 394,670 347,989 420,245 419,779 137,181 254,219 184,657 183,804 366,338 318,327 182,544 167,386 343,600 244,933 385,213 19,284 110,576 113,318 132,354 165,420 197,879 138,980 60,303 58,000 ? 115,091 174,930 174,786 150,759 ? 172,711 50,000 84,813 61,502

318,264 510,102 533,785 309,384 371,044 11,459? 16,019? 44,194? 249,335? 297,529 450,998 80,030 215,943 147,668 90,800 488,407 230,334 125,608 94,922 126,053 137,964 172,145 161,480 ? 111,371 74,648 158,371 145,453 345,943? 125,933 130,000 219,843 49,840 57,000

appendices Year 1697 1698 1699 1700

Name of ship Cauw Cauw Cauw Tonkin factory was closed

227 Value (guilders) of import

export

~50,000 ~50,000 ~50,000

~50,000 ~50,000 58,956

Sources: Adapted from figures given in Overgekomen Brieven en Papieren; Dagh register Batavia 1624 1682; Generale Missiven (Vols. I VII); BL OIOC G/12/17. Note: The capital invested for one trading season could be transferred to the following season should the Tonkin factory fail to invest the whole sum in local goods that year. As a consequence, the amount of import and export capital in one trading season does not always tally.

APPENDIX 4

FOREIGN SHIPPING IN TONKIN, 1637-1699 Year

Dutch

Chinese

Portuguese

English

Other*

1637 1638 1639 1640 1641 1642 1643 1644 1645 1646 1647 1648 1649 1650 1651 1652 1653 1654 1655 1656 1657 1658 1659 1660 1661 1662 1663 1664 1665 1666 1667 1668 1669

2 3 3 3 3 9a 9a 3 3 1 0 2 4 0 3 4 3 2 1 2 2 0 2 1 2 3 3 4 3 3 2 2 3

0 1 0 0 3 3 5 2 5 4 5 6 3 2 2 0 3 2 1 1 2 3

1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 3 0 1 4 1 0 0 0 1 1 4 3 0

appendices

229

Year

Dutch

Chinese

Portuguese

English

Other*

1670 1671 1672 1673 1674 1675 1676 1677 1678 1679 1680 1681 1682 1683 1684 1685 1686 1687 1688 1689 1690 1691 1692 1693 1694 1695 1696 1697 1698 1699 1700

3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0

3 4 4 2 1 2 3 1 2 2 2 1 4 4 2 0

0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 0 3 1 3 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0

6 5 1 0 3 1 3 1 2 1 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 -

Sources: Adapted from sporadic figures given in Overgekomen Brieven en Papieren; BL OIOC G/12/17; Dagh register Batavia 1624 1682; Generale Missiven I VI; Souza, The Survival of Empire, 114. Note: *: including Siamese, Spanish, French and other South East Asian vessels. a: including ships Batavia sent to Tonkin (to ally with the Tonkinese force) to at tack Quinam.

APPENDIX 5

INTENDED DIVISION OF THE TONKIN CARGO FOR JAPAN, 1645 (taels Japanese silver) 20,250 60,000 4,000 4,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 200 20 20 50 120

catties of raw silk from the Chúa catties of raw silk from local people pieces of soumongij pieces of raw and black baas pieces of Toncquinse hockins pieces of plain and figured Zenuaasche hockins pieces of pelings pieces of white chios pieces of velvet lined with gold piculs of cinnamon piculs of cardamom piculs of sittouw Total for Japan piculs of silk of the best quality for the Netherlands

Total capital for the Tonkin factory in 1645 Sources: NFJ 57, 22 Oct. 1644; Dagh register Batavia 1644 5, 108 22.

27,000 63,000 6,904 8,095 3,273 3,333 1,666 1,428 666 142 239 227 122,400 12,600 135,000

APPENDIX 6

TONKINESE SILK EXPORTED TO JAPAN BY THE VOC, 1635-1697 (thousand Dutch guilders) Year Total import

Silk

Tonkinese silk Total raw silk

1635 1636 1637 1638 1639 1640 1641 1642 1643 1644 1645 1646 1647 1648 1649 1650 1651 1652 1653 1654 1655 1656 1657 1658 1659 1660 1661 1662 1665

1,009 1,593 2,647 3,625 3,471 6,286 1,067 737 774 1,377 1,432 901 789 649 578 916 974 1,031 917 707 683 1,412 1,061 1,084 1,138 994 1,236 1,583 1,756

713 1,116 1,420 2,219 1,687 3,457 470 423 451 525 939 459 400 431 277 579 584 521 626 395 323 867 611 571 710 626 896 1,083 1,174

0 0 177 167 0 622 178 87 118 234 297 307 287 327 209 299 362 362 310 159 0 225 90 0 183 0 174 144 231

0 0 168 155 55 492 164 72 101 190 243 222 214 187 201 257 280 295 261 150 0 223 79 0 183 0 174 143 228

Tonkinese silk via Formosa 0 80 21 1 55 0 1 2 0 1 0 1 9 0 3 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 6 0

Batavia

appendices

232 Year Total import

Silk

Tonkinese silk Total raw silk

1666 1667 1668 1669 1670 1671 1672 1673 1677 1679 1686 1687 1688 1689 1690 1691 1692 1693 1694 1695 1696 1697

1,010 551 1,346 750 2,017 1,409 1,409 998 1,437 860 1,102 501 1,739 1,065 1,478 997 1,010 729 818 500 575 80 355 12 576 173 488 70 572 157 555 144 613 270 735 204 450 237 730 177 473 208 891 210

208 299 432 322 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

205 235 369 322 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Tonkinese silk via Formosa

Batavia

59 0 3 0 0 268 148 52 0 22 24 26 3 0 20 0 0 11 16

Source: Adapted from Klein, ‘De Tonkinees Japanse zijdehandel’, 168 (Table 1).

(236) (138) (33) (0) (9) (24) (5) (3) (6) (20) (0) (0) (0) (16)

APPENDIX 7

SILK PRICES AS RECORDED BY THE DESHIMA FACTORY, 1636-1668 (Dutch guilders per catty) Year 1636 1637 1638 1639 1640 1641 1642 1643 1644 1645 1646 1647 1648 1649 1650 1652 1654 1655 1656 1657 1658 1660 1665 1666 1667 1668

Tonkinese silk

Chinese silk

Bengali silk

purchase

sale

purchase

sale

purchase

sale

3.71 3.24 3.20 3.63 3.35 3.25 2.54 2.62 2.95 3.02 3.33 3.60 3.58 3.64 -

7.88 5.08 6.25 7.79 4.83 3.09 6.14 7.32 6.47 8.12 7.51 6.84 9.90 9.97 -

4.89 4.94 5.20 4.99 4.80 4.87 4.81 5.69 5.97 8.15 5.28 12.67 11.02

9.83 7.18 8.12 8.35 5.83 8.83 7.83 9.26 8.07 7.64 7.76 8.82 14.95 11.02

4.08 4.11 4.18 4.11 3.97

8.08 7.04 8.32 12.06 6.47

4.39

6.95

9.49

9.49

2.84

6.44

5.15 4.85 5.39 -

6.92 7.56 6.96 -

8.68 -

10.43 -

3.94 3.81 4.44 4.61 3.95

8.80 7.87 7.20 6.53 8.30

4.51 4.43 4.78 5.84

5.46 8.94 10.16 7.41

5.90 -

10.20 -

4.31

7.27

4.14 2.78 3.75 3.95

4.99 6.81 8.39 6.57

Source: Klein, ‘De Tonkinees Japanse zijdehandel’, 170 (Table 2).

APPENDIX 8

TONKINESE CERAMICS EXPORTED TO BATAVIA AND OTHER PLACES, 1663-1681 a. to Batavia Date

Carriers

Description

3/1663 3/1664 3/1666 2/1667 5/1668 1/1669 4/1669 11/1669 2/1670 3/1670 11/1670 4/1672 1/1675 3/1675 7/1678 1/1680 1681

1 junk 2 junks 2 wanckans Zevenster 1 ship Overveen* 1 Chinese junk Pitoor* 2 vessels 1 Chinese junk Pitoor* 1 vessel 1 Chinese junk 1 vessel 1 vessel 1 junk 1 Batavian Chinese junk

10,000 coarse cups 120,000 middle-sized cups 60,000 coarse cups 30,000 coarse cups 40,000 coarse cups 381,200 cups 70,000 cups 177,240 cups 95,000 coarse cups Loaded with coarse wares 214,160 pieces worth 2,650 guilders 5,000 coarse cups Loaded with Tonkinese wares 30,000 coarse cups 100,740 pieces and 8 cases 85,000 coarse cups 120,000 cups

b. to other places Date 2/1669 2/1674 2/1680 3/1681

Carriers 1 Chinese junk 1 Chinese junk EIC Advice EIC Societeyt

Destination Banten Siam Banten Europe

Description Some ceramics 90,000 cups Tonkinese coarse wares Tonkinese coarse wares

Sources: Adapted from sporadic figures given in Overgekomen Brieven en Papieren; BL OIOC G/12/17; Dagh register Batavia 1624 1682; Volker, Porcelain. Note: *: VOC ships.

APPENDIX 9

RE-SHIPMENTS OF TONKINESE CERAMICS, 1670-1681 Date 6/1670 1670 1670 1670 10/1671 1671 7/1672 7/1672 7/1672 8/1672 11/1672 1672 1672 6/1680 12/1680 3/1681 1681

Carrier

From

Destination Description

3 vessels

Batavia

Westkust

Ceramics worth 168 rds 1 vessel Batavia Amboina 8,000 cups 1 vessel Batavia Banda 89,391 cups 1 vessel Batavia Timor Ceramics worth 30 rds 1 vessel Batavia Gresik Ceramics worth 30 rds Banda 89,000 cups, 30,000 Cabeljauw* Batavia roof-tiles 1 vessel Batavia Palembang Cups worth 30 rds 1 vessel Batavia Banjer Cups worth 40 rds 1 vessel Batavia Pakalongen Cups worth 40 rds 1 vessel Batavia Aracan Cups worth 680 rds 8,138 cups unsold at Amboina Baros Batavia 25,000 returned Cirebon Batavia 2 bundles of teacups were sent back 1 ship* Touloungbauw Batavia 6,000 cups were [?] sent back 1 ship* Banten Batavia 10,000 cups were sent back 1 English ship Batavia England Some Tonkinese ceramics Banten Batavia 5,000 cups were returned

Sources: Adapted from sporadic numbers given in Overgekomen Brieven en Papieren; BL OIOC G/12/17; Dagh register Batavia 1624 1682; Volker, Porcelain; Farrington, ‘English East India Company Documents Relating Pho Hien and Tonkin’, 148 61. Notes: * VOC ship; rds (rixdollars)

APPENDIX 10

CERAMICS IMPORTED INTO TONKIN, 1637-1681 Year

Carriers

From

Descriptions

Grol*

Taiwan

1 Chinese junk 1 Portuguese vessel 1 vessel of Iquan Witte Valk*

-

85 pieces of fine porcelain as samples Some porcelain Some ceramics

-

A large quantity of ceramics

Taiwan

1 vessel 8 vessels

Batavia -

1662 1663 12/1663

3 ships* 1 ships* Hoogelande*

Batavia Deshima Batavia

10/1664 10/1665 1667 10/1668 1669 6/1672 5/1674

Spreeuw* Spreeuw* Overveen* Overveen * Eendracht* Meliskerken* Papegay*

Batavia Japan Japan Japan

5/1675

Experiment*

Batavia

2/1676

2 Chinese Japan junks 1 Chinese junk China

260 coarse bowls and plates worth 16 guilders Rice-bowls worth 105 rials These vessels arrived from Batavia, Manila, and Macao with ‘many ceramics’. With ‘curious porcelain’ Some porcelain 1,000 pieces of Japanese porcelain for the Chúa Some porcelain 8,860 Japanese ceramics One lot of unspecified porcelain 676 pieces of Japanese porcelain 164 pieces of Japanese porcelain One case of Japanese porcelain 5 straw bundles of Japanese porcelain 6 straw bundles of Japanese porcelain (totalling 117 pieces) With silver, cash, and Japanese porcelain 400 bundles of cups painted with dragons, 200 bundles of smaller cups, 200 bundles of plates, 50 ditto flasks, 20 ditto smaller kind, 10 bundles of small white arrack flagons, 20 bundles of small brandy cups

7/1637 12/1644 2/1645 5/1645 11/1647 6/1653 1655

1676

Batavia Batavia

appendices Year 1676

5/1676 1678

7/1680 2/1681

3/1681

7/1681

Carriers

From

1 Formosan junk

Japan

237

Descriptions

32,000 cups, 17,400 ditto different kinds, 39,900 plates, 4,800 small arrack cups, 500 tea-pots, 2,000 large bowls, 10 large dishes (Of these two ships, the Chúa bought 7,000 cups painted with dragons, 2,000 ditto smaller kind, 7,000 plates, 1,000 smaller arrack cups, 10 large dishes, 10 jugs, 500 coarse cups, 200 tea cups. The viceroy bought: 5,000 cups, 1,000 ditto smaller, 3,000 tea plates, 400 small arrack cups, 5 large dishes, 40 flasks, 600 plates with dragons Batavia 87 pieces of Japanese porcelain Janskercke* 50 fine round porcelain teapots similar to the accompanying models as to figures and shapes and 60 small flasks similar to the accompanying models Batavia 3,000 pieces of Japanese porcelain Croonvogel* 1 Chinese junk Japan 5 straws bundles of small figured plates, 1 with white tea-cups, 150 with figured rice bowls, 170 with ditto plates, 100 with small arrack jugs, 20 bundles of common bowls, 1 ditto small arrack cups, 30 figured pots. 10 small arrack jugs to the old Chúa as presents; 5 small arrack jugs to the viceroy as presents 1 Chinese junk Japan 200 straw bundles figured porcelain cups, 25 with small common arrack jugs, two packs with trifles, small birds, lions, etcetera, 105 straw bundles with plates decorated with fishes, 8 with small arrack jugs, to the viceroy 5 figured arrack jugs Batavia Japanese flasks and teapots Croonvogel*

Sources: Adapted from sporadic numbers given in Overgekomen Brieven en Papieren; BL OIOC G/12/17; Dagh register Batavia 1624 1682; Volker, Porcelain. Note: *: VOC ship.

APPENDIX 11

PORCELAIN THE VOC ORDERED IN JAPAN FOR THE TRỊNH RULERS, 1666-1681 Date 3/1666 1668 11/1669 1670 1/1672 2/1673 3/1673 6/1673 1678 6/1681 6/1681

Description of orders The prince requested 50 Japanese tall, narrow flasks with floral pattern Batavia ordered Japanese porcelain for Tonkin and other places Deshima factory ordered 30 Japanese flasks for Tonkin via the Otona [supervisor] of Deshima The Chúa demanded 30 porcelain flasks made after wooden models Deshima received 4 wooden models to make cups and pots for Tonkin Wooden models from Tonkin lost in the wreck of the Cuylen burgh Small jars to be made or bought for the Chúa according to models Deshima received new models to order flasks for Tonkin Tonkin requested 1,000 middle-sized rice-bowls and 2,000 teaplates of the medium quality 6,000 pieces of Japanese porcelain delivered to the Chúa Japanese flasks and teapots were sent to Tonkin

Sources: Overgekomen Brieven en Papieren; Dagh register Batavia 1624 1682; Volker, Porcelain; NFJ 310.

NOTES Notes to Introduction 1 From the early seventeenth century, Đại Việt was split into two kingdoms: Đàng Ngoài (Tonkin) ruled by the Lê/Trịnh and Đàng Trong (Quinam) governed by the Nguyễn. ‘Đàng Ngoài’, (‘outer road’ or ‘outer direction’) was known to Westerners as Tonkin (also Tonquin, Tonqueen), a corruption of the Vietnamese name ‘Đông Kinh’ (literally meaning: Eastern Capital). The term ‘Đông Kinh’ used in this book refers narrowly to the deltaic plain of the Hồng River, while ‘Tonkin’ and ‘Đàng Ngoài’ are alternatively used to refer to Northern Vietnam which included both Đông Kinh and the Thanh Nghệ regions. Đàng Trong (‘inner road’ or ‘inner direction’) was usually recorded as Quinam, a corruption of the Vietnamese term ‘Quảng Nam’. The English and other Westerners called Quinam Cochin China, which, in the seventeenth century, consisted of the prefectures of Thuận Hoá and Quảng Nam but gradually expanded its territory towards the south, incorporating what is today the southern part of Central Vietnam and the Mekong River delta by the eighteenth century. On the terminology of these terms: Nguyễn Tài Cẩn, ‘Về việc dùng hai động từ ‘vào’ ‘ra’ để chỉ sự di chuyển đến một địa điểm ở phía nam hay phía bắc trong tiếng Việt hiện đại’ [About the Usage of the Two Verbs ‘To Go In’ and ‘To Go Out’ to Indicate Travel to a Point in a Southern Direction or a Northern Direction in Modern Vietnamese], TCKH 4 (1991), 36 42; Keith W. Taylor, ‘Surface Orientations in Vietnam: Beyond Histories of Nation and Region’, The Journal of Asian Studies, 57/4 (1998), 949 78. 2 Phan Huy Lê, ‘Phố Hiến: Research Issues to Be Considered’, in The Association of Vietnamese Historians & People’s Committee of Hải Hưng Province (ed.), Phố Hiến: The Centre of International Commerce in the 17th 18th Centuries (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1994), 10 22. 3 W. J. M. Buch, ‘La Compagnie des Indes Néerlandaises et l’Indochine’, BEFEO 36 (1936), 97 196 & 37 (1937), 121 237; id., De Oost Indische Compagnie en Quinam: de Betrekkingen der Nederlanders met Annam in de XVIIe eeuw (Amsterdam/Paris, 1929). 4 The most significant study of the VOC’s Tonkin trade is the article by P. W. Klein, ‘De Tonkinees Japanse zijdehandel van de Vereenigde Oost indische Compagnie en het inter Aziatische verkeer in de 17e eeuw’, in W. Frijhoff and M. Hiemstra (eds.), Bewogen en Bewegen: de historicus in het spanningsveld tussen economie and cultuur (Tilburg: Gianotten, 1986), 152 77. In this article, the silk trade of the VOC with Tonkin throughout the entire period of the relationship is studied in detail. Besides, several publications by Japanese scholars have also partly dealt with the VOC’s Tonkin trade. See Nara Shuichi, ‘Silk Trade between Vietnam and Japan in the Seventeenth Century’, in Phố Hiến, 162 83; Yoko Nagazumi, ‘The Tonkinese Japanese Trade in the Mid seventeenth Century’ (in Japanese), Annual Reports of Josai Graduate School of Economics, 8 (1992), 21 46; Kato Eiichi, ‘Shuinsen Licence Trade and the Dutch in Southeast Asia’, in The National Committee for the International Symposium on the Ancient Town of Hội An (ed.), Ancient Town of Hội An (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1993), 142 8. 5 Thành Thế Vỹ, Ngoại thương Việt Nam hồi thế kỷ XVII, XVIII và nửa đầu thế kỷ XIX [The Foreign Trade of Vietnam in the Seventeenth, Eighteenth, and Early Nineteenth Centuries] (Hanoi: Sử học, 1961).

240 6

notes

Nguyen Thanh Nha, Tableau Économique du Vietnam aux XVIIe et XVIIIe Siècles (Paris: Cujas, 1970). For criticisms of some of Nguyen Thanh Nha’s claims, see the book review by Alexander Woodside in The Journal of Asian Studies, 30/4 (1971), 922 3. 7 John K. Whitmore, ‘Vietnam and the Monetary Flow of Eastern Asia, Thirteenth to Eighteenth Centuries’, in J. F. Richards (ed.), Precious Metals in the Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds (California: Carolina Academic Press, 1983), 363 96. 8 Li Tana, Nguyễn Cochinchina, Southern Vietnam in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Ithaca: SEAP, 1998). See also: Li Tana and Anthony Reid (eds.), Southern Vietnam under the Nguyen, Documents on the Economic History of Cochinchina (Dang Trong), 1602 1777 (Singapore: ISEAS, 1993); Li Tana, ‘An Alternative Vietnam? The Nguyen Kingdom in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 29 (1998), 111 21. Besides Li’s works, there are also several remarkable studies on early modern Central and Southern Vietnam. See, for instance, Nola Cooke, ‘Regional ism and the Nature of Nguyen Rule in Seventeenth Century Dang Trong (Cochinchina)’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 29 (1998), 122 61; Nola Cooke and Li Tana (eds.), Water Frontier: Commerce and the Chinese in the Lower Mekong Region, 1750 1880 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2004); Charles Wheeler, ‘Re thinking the Sea in Vietnamese History: Littoral Society in the Integration of Thuận Quảng, Seventeenth Eighteenth Centuries’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 37/1 (2006), 123 53. 9 Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, Vol. 2: Expansion and Crisis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 62 3, 71 and passim. 10 Victor B. Lieberman, Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800 1830, Vol. 1: Integration in the Mainland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), ‘Chapter Four’. 11 Om Prakash, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal 1630 1720 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 15 23; Leonard Blussé, ‘No Boats to China: the Dutch East India Company and the Changing Pattern of the China Sea Trade, 1635 1690’, Modern Asian Studies, 30/1 (1996), 51 70; Paul A. Van Dyke, ‘How and Why the Dutch East India Company Became Competitive in Intra Asian Trade in East Asia in the 1630s’, Itinerario, 21/3 (1997), 41 56; Femme Gaastra, The Dutch East India Company, Expansion and Decline (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2003), 124 6. 12 Gaastra, The Dutch East India Company, 121 4; Prakash, The Dutch East India Company, 16, 19; Ryuto Shimada, The Intra Asian Trade in Japanese Copper by the Dutch East India Company during the Eighteenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 5 8. 13 Om Prakash, ‘European and Asian Merchants in Asian Maritime Trade, 1500 1800: Some Issues of Methodology and Evidence’, in J. M. Flores (ed.), Revista de Cultura 13/14: The Asian Seas 1500 1800, Local Societies, European Expansion and the Portu guese (Macao, 1991), 131 9 (Reprinted in Om Prakash, Precious Metals and Commerce, Variorum 1994). See also: Holden Furber, Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient, 1600 1800 (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1976), 3 27; Els M. Jacobs, Koopman in Azië: de handel van de Verenigde Oost Indische Compagnie tijdens de 18de eeuw (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2000). 14 Prakash, The Dutch East India Company, 16, 19. See also: Femme Gaastra, ‘The Exports of Precious Metal from Europe to Asia by the Dutch East India Company, 1602 1795’, in Richards (ed.), Precious Metals, 447 76; id., ‘The Dutch East India Company and its Intra Asian Trade in Precious Metals’, in Wolfram Fischer et al. (eds.), The Emergence of a World Economy, 1500 1914 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1986), I, 97 112. 15 Atsushi Kobata, ‘The Production and Uses of Gold and Silver in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Japan’, Economic History Review, 18/2 (1965), 245 66. See also: Robert LeRoy Innes, The Door Ajar: Japan’s Foreign Trade in the Seventeenth Century (Diss., The University of Michigan, 1980), 21 41.

to part one

241

16

Klein, ‘De Tonkinees Japanse zijdehandel’, 152 77; Blussé, ‘No Boats to China’, 51 70; Hoàng Anh Tuấn, ‘Mậu dịch tơ lụa của Công ty Đông Ấn Hà Lan với Đàng Ngoài, 1637 1670’ [The VOC Tonkin Silk Trade, 1637 1670], NCLS 3 (2006), 10 20. 17 A general guide to the VOC records relating to Quinam and Tonkin can be found in: Truong Van Binh and John Kleinen, ‘Verenigde Oost Indische Compagnie (VOC), Materials on Relations between the Dutch East India Company and the Nguyen Lords in the 17th and 18th Centuries’, in Ancient Town of Hoi An, 37 48; Hoàng Anh Tuấn, ‘Công ty Đông Ấn Hà Lan ở Đàng Ngoài, 1637 1700: Tư liệu và Nghiên Cứu’ [The Dutch East India Company in Tonkin, 1637 1700: Documents and Research Issues to Be Considered], NCLS 3 (2005), 30 41. 18 See Chapter One for a detailed discussion of this debate. 19 (Dutch Hoge Regering). The Government of the VOC in Asia, residing in Batavia. Its members were the Governor General and the Councillors of the Indies.

Notes to Part One: The Setting 20

Lieberman, Strange Parallels, 343. Alexandre de Rhodes, who visited both central and northern Vietnam in the early seventeenth century, was impressed by the fact that there were at least fifty sizeable sea ports along the Vietnamese coast, each of which could afford between fifteen and twenty big ships to lie at anchor at the same time. These ports were so safe that vessels could lie overnight without necessarily dropping anchor. Alexandre de Rhodes, Histoire du royaume de Tunquin (Lyon: Jean Baptiste Devenet, 1651), 56 7. Such a wonder has been briefly discussed in Charles Wheeler, ‘A Maritime Logic to Vietnamese History? Littoral Society in Hội An’s Trading World c. 1550 1830’, paper presented at the conference Seascapes, Littoral Cultures, and Trans Oceanic Exchanges, Library of Congress, Washington DC, 12 15 Feb. 2003; id., ‘Re thinking the Sea in Viet namese History: Littoral Society in the Integration of Thuận Quảng, Seventeenth Eighteenth Centuries’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 37/1 (2006), 123 53. On Vietnam’s ‘water tradition’: Keith W. Taylor, ‘The Birth of Vietnam: Sino Vietnamese Relations to the Tenth Century and the Origins of Vietnamese Nationhood’ (Diss., The University of Michigan, 1976), “Introduction”. 22 On the Vietnamese expansion to the lower Hồng River delta and their seafaring weakness: Hà Văn Tấn et al., Khảo cổ học Việt Nam [Archaeology in Vietnam], II (Hanoi: KHXH, 2000); Phan Đại Doãn, Làng Việt Nam: một số vấn đề kinh tế xã hội [The Viet namese Village: Some Socio economic Issues] (Hanoi: KHXH, 1992); Diệp Đình Hoa, ‘Thực tiễn và triết lý sinh thái nhân văn của người Việt trong nông nghiệp’ [Reality and Eco humanistic Thought of the Vietnamese about Agriculture], NCLS 1 (1992), 11 20; Chử Văn Tần, ‘Những đặc trưng cơ bản của văn minh Việt Nam thời khai sinh’ [Significant Features of Early Vietnamese Civilization], KCH 2 (1994), 7 16; Hà Văn Tấn, ‘Các hệ sinh thái nhiệt đới với tiền sử Việt Nam và Đông Nam Á’ [Tropical Eco systems and Vietnam ese and South East Asian Prehistory], KCH 3 (1982), 6 16. A brief history of independent Vietnam from the eleventh century on can be found in Trương Hữu Quýnh et al., Đại cương lịch sử Việt Nam [A Brief History of Vietnam], I (Hanoi: Giáo dục, 1999). 23 On Vietnamese foreign trade in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: Thành Thế Vỹ, Ngoại thương Việt Nam; Nguyen Thanh Nha, Tableau Économique du Vietnam; Keith W. Taylor, ‘Nguyễn Hoàng and the Beginning of Vietnam’s Southward Expansion’, in Anthony Reid (ed.), Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 42 65; Li, Nguyễn Cochinchina; id., ‘An Alternative Vietnam?’, 111 21; Charles Wheeler, ‘Cross Cultural Trade and Trans Regional Networks in the Port of Hoi 21

242

notes

An’ (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 2002); Lieberman, Strange Parallels, ‘Chapter 4’; Cooke and Li (eds.), Water Frontier.

Notes to Chapter One 24

Rhodes, Histoire du royaume de Tonkin, 56. On the Hundred Việt, the Vietnamese, and the Vietnamese historiography of the early period: Taylor, The Birth of Vietnam; Trương Hữu Quýnh et al., Lịch sử Việt Nam, 58 102; Wang Gung Wu, The Nanhai Trade: The Early History of Chinese Trade in the South China Sea (Singapore: Time Academic Press, 1998), 1 14. Recent researches have even hypothesized that the modern Vietnamese may have originated from the Lawa who still inhabit modern northern Thailand. See: Tạ Đức, ‘Người Lạc Việt phải chăng là một nhóm Lawa cổ? [Could the Lạc Việt People be an Ancient Lawa Group?]’, NCLS 5 (2000), 56 69. 26 Wang, The Nanhai Trade, 1 14. 27 Taylor, The Birth of Vietnam, ‘Chapters 1 & 2’; Wang, The Nanhai Trade, 7 14; Trương Hữu Quýnh et al., Lịch sử Việt Nam, 47 80. 28 Wang, The Nanhai Trade, 7. 29 Ibid., 17, 25. 30 Ibid., 31 5. 31 Trương Hữu Quýnh et al., Lịch sử Việt Nam, 63 98; Wang, The Nanhai Trade, 37 8. 32 Wang, The Nanhai Trade, 17, 25, 31, 35, 38, 44, 45; Jenifer Holmgran, Chinese Colo nization of Northern Vietnam: Administrative Geography and Political Developments in the Tonking Delta, First to Sixth Century AD (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1980), 175; Kenneth R. Hall, Maritime Trade and State Development in Early Southeast Asia (Honolulu: Hawaii University Press, 1985), 194 7; Momoki Shiro, ‘Dai Viet and the South China Sea Trade from the 10th to the 15th Century’, Crossroads, 12 1 (1998), 1 34. A brief account of the Vietnamese historiography of this period can be found in Taylor, The Birth of Vietnam; Trương Hữu Quýnh et al., Lịch sử Việt Nam, 63 98. 33 See, for example, Toàn thư (4 vols). It is important to keep in mind that these chroni cles were compiled after the Vietnamese had regained their independence from the Chinese, namely, post tenth century (Taylor, The Birth of Vietnam, ‘Introduction’). Li Tana even suggests that for political and ideological reasons, the Vietnamese writers of the Toàn thư deliberately failed to mention the international commerce which the Vietnamese had been pursuing in this famous annal. Li Tana, ‘A View from the Sea: Perspectives on the Northern and Central Vietnam Coast’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 37/1 (2006), 83 102. 34 Nguyễn Văn Kim, ‘Vị trí của một số thương cảng Việt Nam trong hệ thống buôn bán ở Biển Đông thế kỷ XVI XVII: Một cái nhìn từ điều kiện địa nhân văn’ [On the Position of some Vietnamese Seaports in the Trading System of the Eastern Sea during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries], in id., Nhật Bản với Châu Á, 108 19. 35 See: Hà Văn Tấn, ‘Các hệ sinh thái’; Diệp Đình Hoa, ‘Thực tiễn và triết lý’; Chử Văn Tần, ‘Những đặc trưng cơ bản’; Phan Đại Doãn, Làng Việt Nam; Trương Hữu Quýnh et al., Lịch sử Việt Nam. 36 In her recent article on ancient and medieval Vietnamese maritime trade, Li Tana argues that northern Vietnam was highly dependent on maritime activity until the fifteenth century. Moreover, the Vietnamese were also active in the triangular trade between northern Vietnam, Hainan, and Champa. Li, ‘A View from the Sea’, 83 102. 37 For a general account on the independent era of Vietnam, see Trương Hữu Quýnh et al., Lịch sử Việt Nam, ‘Part 4’. On the Vietnamese defeats of the Mongol and Chinese 25

to chapter one

243

Ming in the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries: Hà Văn Tấn and Phạm Thị Tâm, Cuộc kháng chiến chống xâm lược Nguyên Mông thế kỷ XIII [The Resistance to the Yuan Mongol Invasions in the Thirteenth Century] (Hanoi: KHXH, 1968); Phan Huy Lê and Phan Đại Doãn, Khởi nghĩa Lam Sơn và phong trào giải phóng dân tộc đầu thế kỷ XV [The Lam Sơn Revolt and the National Liberation Movement in the Early Fifteenth Century] (Hanoi: KHXH, 1965). On Champa: George Maspero, The Champa Kingdom: The History of an Extinct Vietnamese Culture (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 2002); Momoki Shiro, ‘A Short Introduction to Champa Studies’ in Fukui Hayao (ed.), The Dried Areas in Southeast Asia (Kyoto, 1999), 65 74. 38 Trương Hữu Quýnh et al., Lịch sử Việt Nam, 136 49, 190 215; 324 30; Yoji Aoyagi, ‘Vietnamese Ceramics Discovered on Southeast Asian Islands’, in Ancient Town of Hội An, 72 6; John Stevenson and John Guy, Vietnamese Ceramics: A Separate Tradition (Michigan: Art Media Resources, 1997), 47 61. 39 On the expansion of Đại Việt handicraft during the Lý and Trần Dynasties: Phạm Văn Kính, ‘Một số nghề thủ công hồi thế kỷ X XIV: nghề dệt, ghề gốm, nghề khai khoáng và luyện kim [Some Handicrafts in the Tenth Fourteenth Centuries: Weaving, Ceramics, Mining, and Metallurgy]’, NCLS 3 (1976), 42 53; Guy, ‘Vietnamese Ceramics in International Trade’, in Stevenson and Guy, Vietnamese Ceramics, 47 61; Momoki, ‘Dai Viet’: 18 22. Examining the number of Vietnamese tributes to the Chinese court as well as the value of their tributary goods, Momoki Shiro argued that Đại Việt must have earned consider ably from this tributary trade system with China because the value of the gifts which the Chinese court returned to their vassals was always higher than that which the vassal countries had presented to it. This, according to Momoki, partly explains why Đại Việt was the most enthusiastic vassal in sending tribute to China after it became independent in the tenth century. In his recent study, John Whitmore proves that the rise of northern Vietnam’s coastal trade in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries had contributed greatly to the state formation of Đại Việt. John K. Whitmore, ‘The Rise of the Coast: Trade, State and Culture in Early Đại Việt’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 37/1 (2006), 103 22. 40 Quoted from Li, Nguyễn Cochinchina, 59. 41 Phạm Văn Kính, ‘Bộ mặt thương nghiệp Việt Nam thời Lý Trần [The Commercial Face of Vietnam during the Ly and Tran Dynasties]’, NCLS 6 (1979), 35 42; Hall, Maritime Trade, 173 5; Momoki, ‘Dai Viet’: 11 15; O. W. Wolters, Two Essays on Dai Viet in the Fourteenth Century (New Haven: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 1988). 42 See: Phạm Văn Kính, ‘Bộ mặt thương nghiệp Việt Nam’: 35 42; Trương Hữu Quýnh, Lịch sử Việt Nam, 148 9, 209 11. 43 Momoki, ‘Dai Viet’, 1 34. Li, however, believes that, after its independence in the tenth century, the maritime trade of Đại Việt was quite flourishing thanks to its intermedi ary position between overseas countries and China. Northern Vietnam was also actively involved in the horse, salt, and slave trade in the Jiaozhi Ocean which stretched from the south east coast of China southwards across the Gulf of Tonkin towards Champa. Li, ‘A View from the Sea’: 83 102. 44 Momoki, ‘Dai Viet’: 1 34; Hall, Maritime Trade, 194 7; Lieberman, Strange Paral lels, 365. 45 See Hall, Maritime Trade, 181 6 and Momoki, ‘Dai Viet’, 18 19 for arguments on maritime transformation in the Indo Chinese Peninsula. Discussion on the Trần agrarian expansion can be found in Sakurai Yumio, Land, Water, Rice and Men in Early Vietnam, translated by T. A. Stanley, edited and published privately by Keith W. Taylor, Cornell University (n.d.), 271 2 and Lieberman, Strange Parallels, 362 5. On the collapse of the Trần and the defeat of the Hồ by the Ming in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth cen

244

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turies: John K. Whitmore, Vietnam, Hồ Quý Ly and the Ming (1371 1421) (New Haven: Yale Southeast Asia Studies, 1985). 46 Quốc triều hình luật [The Lê Codes] (Ho Chi Minh City, 2003), 221 3. See also: Nguyen Ngoc Huy, Ta Van Tai and Tran Van Liem, The Lê Code: Law in Traditional Vietnam: A Comparative Sino Vietnamese Legal Study with Historical Juridical Analysis and Annotations (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1987). A discussion of Đại Việt’s regulations on foreign merchants can be found in Momoki, ‘Dai Viet’, 18 23. 47 Rhodes, Histoire du Royaume de Tunquin, 135. 48 An account of the fifteenth century Vietnamese historiography can be found in Trương Hữu Quýnh et al., Lịch sử Việt Nam, 338 45; Taylor, ‘Surface Orientations’, 949 78; Trần Quốc Vượng, ‘Trạng Trình Nguyễn Bỉnh Khiêm trong bối cảnh văn hoá Việt Nam thế kỷ XVI [Nguyễn Bỉnh Khiêm in the Cultural Context of Sixteenth Century Vietnam]’, in Trần Thị Băng Thanh and Vũ Thanh (eds.), Nguyễn Bỉnh Khiêm: về tác gia và tác phẩm [Nguyễn Bỉnh Khiêm: His Life and Works] (Hanoi: Giáo dục, 2001), 70 83. 49 Toàn thư, III, 132 and passim. Thực lục, I, 27 8, Trương Hữu Quýnh et al., Lịch sử Việt Nam, 342 3. An analysis of Nguyễn Hoàng and the Nguyễn southward expansion can be found in Taylor, ‘Nguyễn Hoàng’, 42 65; Li, ‘An Alternative Vietnam?’, 111 21. 50 Toàn thư, III, 147, quoted from Taylor, ‘Nguyễn Hoàng’, 49. See also the Nguyễn annal Thực lục, I, 31. 51 Toàn thư, III, 205, 208; Thực lục, I, 33 5. A detailed analysis of Nguyễn Hoàng’s competition with Trịnh Tùng for power at court during the period 1592 9 and his resolution to return to Thuận Hoá can be found in Taylor, ‘Nguyễn Hoàng’, 55 9. 52 C. R. Boxer, Portuguese Conquest and Commerce in Southern Asia, 1500 1750 (London: Variorum Reprints, 1985), 165 6; Taylor, ‘Nguyễn Hoàng’, 61 5; Li, Nguyễn Cochinchina, 43 6. 53 On the terminology of these words, see note 1 in ‘Introduction’. 54 The seven campaigns took place in 1627, 1633, 1643, 1648, 1655 60, 1661, and 1672. See for details Toàn thư, III, 226 90. Analyses of Tonkin’s military power can be found in Alain Forest, ‘La guerre et le militaire dans le Tonkin des Trinh’, in Nguyễn Thế Anh and Alain Forest (eds.), Guerre et paix en Asie du sud est (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1998), 135 58. 55 Cương mục, II, 340 1, 349 53; Lịch triều, IV: Section of International Relations, 204. On the Nguyễn southward movement: Taylor, ‘Surface Orientations’; Li, Nguyễn Cochinchina; Cooke and Li (eds.), Water Frontier. 56 In his letter to the Governor General of the Dutch East India Company in Batavia in 1643, Chúa Trịnh Tráng complained that a large number of his soldiers had died on the battlefield succumbing to harsh weather, and therefore he asked for more military assistance from the Company. See VOC 1149, Getranslateerden brieff van den Toncquinsen coninq aen den gouverneur generael gedateerd anno 1643 [Translated letter from the King of Tonkin [Chúa Trịnh Tráng] to the Governor General], 1643, fos. 683 5; François Valentyn, Oud en Nieuw Oost Indiën (Dordrecht and Amsterdam, 1724 6), III, 17 18. Discussions of geographical features of the frontier of Đồng Hới can be found in L. Cadière, ‘Le mur de Đồng Hới: etude sur l’establissement des Nguyễn en Cochinchine’, BEFEO 6 (1906), 138; Keith W. Taylor, ‘Regional Conflicts Among the Việt People between the 13th and 19th Centuries’, in Nguyen The Anh and Forest (eds.), Guerre et paix, 109 34. 57 Thực lục, I, 55 6; D. G. E. Hall, A History of Southeast Asia (London: MacMillan, 1968), 415; Boxer, Portuguese Conquest, 165 6; Li, Nguyễn Cochinchina, 43 6; Sun Lai chen, ‘Chinese Military Technologies and Đại Việt, 1390 1497’ (Working Paper No. 11, National University of Singapore, 2003). 58 Brief discussions of handicrafts will focus on the Trịnh domain only. On economic aspects of the Nguyễn realm: Li, Nguyễn Cochinchina; Wheeler, Cross Cultural Trade.

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Notes to Chapter Two 59 ‘Lasses take care of all work at home, Now spinning and then embroidering’ (Viet namese ditty). 60 Nguyễn Danh Phiệt, ‘Việt Nam thời Mạc Cuộc chiến không khoan nhượng giữa hai tập đoàn phong kiến Lê Trịnh và Mạc [Vietnam in the Mac Period The Remorseless Struggle between the Lê/Trịnh and the Mạc Feudal Clan]’, NCLS 9 (2004), 3 13. 61 Li, Nguyễn Cochinchina, 18 31. 62 Phan Huy Lê, ‘Chế độ ban cấp ruộng đất thời Lê sơ và tính chất sở hữu của loại ruộng đất thế nghiệp [The Land Conferring Regulation in the Early Period of the Lê Dynasty and the Nature of the Possession of Ancestral Land]’, in id., Tìm Về Cội Nguồn [Back to the Source] (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1998), I, 576 90; Nguyen Thanh Nha, Tableau Économique du Vietnam; Li, Nguyễn Cochinchina, 24 8; Trương Hữu Quýnh et al., Lịch sử Việt Nam, 354 70. 63 J. B. Tavernier, ‘Relation nouvelle et singulière du Royaume du Tonkin’, Revue Indochinoise (1908), 514. 64 Samuel Baron, ‘A Description of the Kingdom of Tonqueen’, in John Pinkerton (ed.), A Collection of the Best and Most Interesting Voyages and Travels in All Parts of the World (London, 1811), IX, 663. 65 Tomé Pires, The Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires: An Account of the East, From the Red Sea to Japan, Written in Malacca and India in 1512 1515, tr. and ed. Armando Cortesão (London: Hakluyt Society, 1944), 115. 66 Rhodes, Histoire du royaume de Tonkin, 56 7. 67 Dagh register Batavia 1634, 249 50. 68 Dagh register Batavia 1636, 69 74. 69 For descriptions of Tonkinese silk production and trade: Valentyn, Oud en Nieuw Oost Indiën, III, 6 11; Pieter van Dam, Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie, 2 I, ed. F. W. Stapel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1931), 363 4. Detailed accounts of the VOC’s export of Tonkinese silk will be analysed in Chapter Six. 70 Richard, ‘History of Tonquin’, 716, 736, 738 41; Nguyen Thanh Nha, Tableau Économique du Vietnam, 117; Nguyễn Thừa Hỷ, Economic History of Hanoi in the 17th, 18th and 19th Centuries (Hanoi: ST Publisher, 2002), 155 69. 71 In the VOC records the Dutch called the summer crop somertijt and the winter crop wintertijt. Dagh register Batavia 1636, 69 74; William Dampier, Voyages and Discover ies (London: The Argonaut Press, 1931), 49 50; Valentyn, Oud en Nieuw Oost Indiën, III, 6. 72 Richard, ‘History of Tonquin’, 740. 73 BL OIOC G/12/17 2, Journal Register of the English factory in Tonkin, 11 12 May 1675, fo. 133. 74 Nara, ‘Silk Trade’, 167; Dagh register Batavia 1663, 71 and passim. 75 Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 48. 76 John Stevenson, ‘The Evolution of Vietnamese Ceramics’, 23 45, and John Guy, ‘Vietnamese Ceramics in International Trade’, 47 61, in John Stevenson and John Guy (eds.), Vietnamese Ceramics: A Separate Tradition (Michigan: Art Media Resources, 1994); Phan Huy Le et al., Bat Trang Ceramic, 14th 19th Centuries (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1994); Kerry Nguyen Long, ‘Vietnamese Ceramic Trade to the Philippines in the Seven teenth Century’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 30/1 (1999), 1 21. 77 Hán Văn Khẩn and Hà Văn Cẩn, ‘Gốm Chu Đậu Việt Nam [Chu Đậu Ceramics]’, paper presented at the workshop Vietnamese Japanese Relations from the Fifteenth to the Seventeenth Centuries as Seen from the Ceramic Trade (Hanoi, Dec. 1999); Kerry Nguyen Long, ‘Bat Trang and the Ceramic Trade in Southeast Asian Archipelagos’, in

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Phan Huy Lê et al., Bat Trang Ceramic, 84 90; Nguyen Thua Hy, Economic History of Hanoi, 185 95. 78 Bennet Bronson, ‘Export Porcelain in Economic Perspective: The Asian Ceramic Trade in the 17th Century’, in Ho Chumei (ed.), Ancient Ceramic Kiln Technology in Asia (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1990), 126 50; Ho Chumei, ‘The Ceramic Trade in Asia, 1602 1682’, in A. J. H. Latham and Heita Kawakatsu (eds.), Japanese Industrialization and the Asian Economy (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 35 70; Gunder A. Frank, Reorient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 97. 79 Aoyagi, ‘Vietnamese Ceramics’, 72 6; Stevenson and Guy, Vietnamese Ceramics, 47 61, 63 83. 80 Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 47. 81 BL OIOC E/3/90, London General to Tonkin, 1682, 1684 and 1685, fos. 40 1, 214 15, and 296 8; BL OIOC E/3/91, London General to Tonkin, 1687, fos. 225 8; Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 47 8; Nguyen Thua Hy, Economic History of Hanoi, 197 9. 82 BL OIOC E/3/92, London General to Fort St. George, 1691, fo. 68; BL OIOC E/3/92, London General to Tonkin, 1691, 1692, 1695, fos. 75, 102 3, 179 80, 193. 83 Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 72 3. 84 Nguyen Thua Hy, Economic History of Hanoi, 175 7. 85 Lịch triều, III: Section of National Resources, 74 5. 86 VOC 1145, Missive from Antonio van Brouckhorst to Batavia, Oct. 1643, fos. 647 50. 87 Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 49; Van Dam, Beschryvinge, 2 I, 364 6. 88 Dagh register Batavia 1661, 49 55, 87, 89 91; 1663, 71 and passim; Generale Mis siven, II, 451 2, 781; Generale Missiven, III, 69, 386 9. On the VOC’s demand for gold and musk: Tapan Raychaudhuri, Jan Company in Coromandel 1605 1690: A Study in the Interrelations of European Commerce and Traditional Economy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962); Peter Borschberg, ‘The European Musk Trade with Asia in the Early Modern Period’, The Heritage Journal, 1 (2004), 1 12; see also Chapter Seven for further analyses of the Company’s exportation of gold and musk from Tonkin in the latter half of the seventeenth century. 89 Baron, ‘Description of Tonqueen’, 664. 90 Hồng Thái, ‘Vài nét về quan hệ giữa Việt Nam và các nước Đông Nam Á trong lịch sử [Some Features on the Relationship between Vietnam and South East Asian Countries in History]’, NCLS 3 (1986), 63 9. 91 Pires, Suma Oriental, 114. On Đại Việt regulations on foreign residence, see Riichiro Fujiwara, ‘The Regulation of the Chinese under the Trịnh Regime and Pho Hien’, in Phố Hiến, 95 8; Momoki, ‘Dai Viet’, 1 34. 92 Guy, ‘Vietnamese Ceramics in International Trade’, 47 61. 93 Itowappu (Japanese) or pancado (Portuguese) was a system in which Chinese silk imported into Japan was purchased by Japanese merchants at prices fixed by the Japanese authorities, namely the heads of the five shogunal cities (Miyako, Edo, Osaka, Sakai, and Nagasaki) in order to prevent rising prices as a result of competition. This system was first applied to the Portuguese in 1604, to the Chinese in 1633, and then to the Dutch in 1641. It was annulled in 1655 and was re applied from 1685. Innes, The Door Ajar, 248 9, 264; Prakash, The Dutch East India Company, 120 1; The Deshima Dagregisters 1641 1650, ed. Cynthia Viallé and Leonard Blussé, XI (Leiden: Intercontinenta, No. 23, 2001), 412. 94 Innes, The Door Ajar, 264; George B. Souza, The Survival of Empire, Portuguese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea 1630 1754 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 114. 95 Anthony Farrington, ‘The English East India Company Documents Relating Pho Hien and Tonkin’, in Phố Hiến, 148 61; Hoang Anh Tuan, ‘From Japan to Manila and

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Back to Europe: The Abortive English Trade with Tonkin in the 1670s’, Itinerario, 29/3 (2005), 73 92. 96 Sun, ‘Chinese Military Technologies’. 97 Rhodes, Histoire du Royaume de Tunquin, 135. 98 Japanese passengers on vessels visiting northern Vietnam in the 1630s reportedly sold weapons to the Vietnamese. Innes, The Door Ajar, 149 50. 99 The ‘River of Tonkin’ in the Western documents was actually a complex of several rivers which linked the capital Thăng Long with the sea. The Hồng River rises from China and flows to the Gulf of Tonkin passing Thăng Long. In the province of Hưng Yên, it splits into two main river systems: the Hồng River system flows past the modern city of Nam Định and the Thái Bình River system flows past present day Hải Phòng City. The ‘River of Tonkin’ in the Dutch and English texts includes the Hồng River from Hanoi to Hưng Yên and the Thái Bình River system from Hưng Yên to the sea. 100 Because of the dearth of written sources, Vietnamese researchers used to consider Doméa a port city or a commercial centre with large scale business transactions. Nguyễn Thừa Hỷ, ‘Sông Đàng Ngoài và Doméa: Một đô thị cổ đã biến mất [The Tonkin River and Doméa: A Vanished Town?]’, XN 4 (1994), 24 5; Đỗ Thị Thuỳ Lan, ‘Vùng cửa sông Đàng Ngoài thế kỷ XVII XVIII và dấu tích hoạt động của thương nhân phương Tây [The Area of the Estuary of the Tonkin River in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries and the Remains of the Commercial Activities of Western Merchants]’ (BA thesis, Vietnam National University, Hanoi, 2003), 57 82. This hypothesis is not supported by the Dutch and English documents, which depict Doméa as nothing more than an anchorage at which sailors awaited business transactions which were carried out in the capital Thăng Long. 101 C. B. Maybon, ‘Une Factorerie anglaise au Tonkin au XVIIe siècle (1672 1697)’, BEFEO 10 (1910), 169 204; Farrington, ‘The English East India Company’, 148 61; Nguyễn Quang Ngọc, ‘Some Features on the Dutch East India Company and Its Trade Office at Pho Hien’, 132 41. 102 Indigenous literature and poems praised the prosperity of Phố Hiến throughout the seventeenth century, setting up contradictions to the information derived from Dutch and English records. For research on Phố Hiến using indigenous sources, see Trương Hữu Quýnh, ‘The Birth of Pho Hien’, in Phố Hiến, 29 38; Nguyen Tuan Thinh, ‘Stele of Chuong Pogoda and the Past Appearance of Phố Hiến’, in Phố Hiến, 142 4. However, quantitative analyses of data from two local stelae at Phố Hiến reveal not such prestigious a picture of Phố Hiến, indicating an agrarian instead of a commodity economy town. Detailed information on this research can be found in Vu Minh Giang, ‘Contribution to Identifying Pho Hien through two Stelae’, in Phố Hiến: The Centre of International Commerce in the 17th 18th Centuries (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1994), 116 24. 103 Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 17 18. 104 This duty seemed to be slack by the last quarter of the century. In 1672, for instance, the English on their way to Thăng Long bypassed the audience with the governor as they were informed that he could not entertain them until they had paid their respects to the prince in the capital. BL OIOC G/12/17 1, English factory records, 13 July 1672, fo. 11. 105 Nguyen Thua Hy, Economic History of Hanoi, 154 220; Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, II, 63. 106 Baron, ‘Description of Tonqueen’, 663. 107 Dagh register Batavia 1636, 69 70. 108 VOC 1172, Missive from Schillemans and Van Brouckhorst to Batavia, 19 Nov. 1648, fos. 495 513; Generale Missiven, II, 356 7. 109 Generale Missiven, II, 389 91, 465. For the natural characteristics of the river sys tems in northern Vietnam, see Lê Bá Thảo, Thiên nhiên Việt Nam (Nature of Vietnam) (Hanoi: KHKT, 1977). 110 BL OIOC G/12/17 1, English factory records, 25 June 1672, fo. 4.

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Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 15. Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 14 16. Classical descriptions of river trans portation in Tonkin can be found in Dagh register Batavia 1636, 69 74; Valentyn, Oud en Nieuw Oost Indiën, III, 1 6; Van Dam, Beschryvinge, 2 I, 363; Baron, ‘Description of Tonqueen’, 658 9; Richard, ‘History of Tonquin’, 712. An interesting analysis of the tides of the Gulf of Tonkin during the seventeenth century can be found in David E. Cartwright, ‘The Tonkin Tides Revisited’, The Royal Society, 57/2 (2003), 135 42. 113 VOC 1156, Missive from Antonio van Brouckhorst to Batavia, 26 Jan. 1644, fos. 147 8; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 121. 114 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 130. 115 Ibid., 153; A. Lamb, The Mandarin Road to Old Huế: Narratives of Anglo Vietnam ese Diplomacy from the 17th Century to the Eve of the French Conquest (London: Chatto & Windus, 1970), 50. 116 The duty on Asian vessels varied between 300 and 4,000 quan for each arrival and between 30 and 400 quan for each departure. Lê Quý Đôn, Phủ biên tạp lục [A Compilation of the Miscellaneous Records When the Southern Border Was Pacified] (Hanoi: KHXH, 1977), 231 2. See also Li, Nguyễn Cochinchina, 83. 117 Generale Missiven, II, 389; Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 49 50. 118 VOC 1124, Daghregister van Carel Hartsinck van de negotie gedaen met ‘t schip Groll naer Toncquijn van 31 Jan. 7 Aug. 1637 [Diary of Carel Hartsinck of the trade car ried out on the ship Grol to Tonkin from 31 Jan. 7 Aug. 1637], fos. 53 79; J. M. Dixon, ‘Voyage of the Dutch Ship ‘Groll’ from Hirado to Tongking’, Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, 9 (1883), 180 215. 119 Generale Missiven, II, 389 90. 120 BL OIOC G/12/17 1, English factory records, 3 July 1672, fos. 6 7. See also Hoang Anh Tuan, ‘From Japan to Manila and Back to Europe’, 73 92. 121 BL OIOC G/12/17 8, English factory in Tonkin to London and Banten, 29 Dec. 1682, fos. 304 8. 122 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 122. 123 BL OIOC G/12/17 2, English factory in Tonkin to London, 2 Feb. 1674, fos. 100 5. 124 BL OIOC G/12/17 2, English factory in Tonkin to Banten, 5 Oct. 1673, fos. 88 92. 125 Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 49. 126 Momoki, ‘Dai Viet’, 1 34. 127 Ibid. 128 See Articles 612 616 of the Lê Code in Quốc Triều hình luật, 221 3. 129 Pires, Suma Oriental, 115. 130 Juan Gonzalez de Mendoza, The History of the Great and Mighty Kingdom of China, reprinted from the translation of R. Parke and edited by Sir George T. Staunton (London: Hakluyt Society, 1853), 95. Details on licences issued for various destinations between 1589 and 1592 can be found in Innes, The Door Ajar, 53. 131 ‘Giao chi’ was a Chinese name for northern Vietnam. Innes (The Door Ajar, 54), however, believed that the ‘Giao chi’ mentioned in this record referred to Hội An (Faifo) in central Vietnam. 132 Innes, The Door Ajar, 56. 133 Chau Hai, ‘The Chinese in Pho Hien and Their Relations with Other Chinese in other Urban Areas of Vietnam’, 211. 134 Generale Missiven, II, 450 2; Fujiwara, ‘The Regulation of the Chinese’, 97 8. 135 Cương mục, 300; Fujiwara, ‘The Regulation of the Chinese’, 97; Chau Hai, ‘The Chinese in Pho Hien’, 210 16. 136 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 124. 112

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BL OIOC G/12/17 4, English factory in Tonkin to Banten, 30 Nov. 1677, fos. 216 20. 138 Dagh register Batavia 1657; 1659; 1661. 139 VOC 8364, Missive from Sibens to Batavia, 10 Jan. 1692, fos. 1 3. See also Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 186. 140 Takara Kurayoshi, ‘The Kingdom of Ryukyu and Its Overseas Trade’, in J. Kreiner (ed.) Sources of Ryukyuan History and Culture in European Collections (Munchen: Ludi cian Verlag, 1996), 49. 141 Innes, The Door Ajar, 54. 142 The Toàn thư, III, 132, records that in the tenth lunar month of 1558, Chancellor Trịnh Kiểm requested the Lê Emperor that Duke Nguyễn Hoàng be promoted Governor of Thuận Hoá to guard against the ‘eastern pirates’. Historians largely believed that these vaguely mentioned ‘eastern pirates’ were Japanese pirates who were raiding along the Vietnamese coast. See Taylor, ‘Nguyễn Hoàng’, 45 6; Nguyễn Văn Kim, ‘Quan hệ Việt Nam Nhật Bản thế kỷ XVI XVII: Góp thêm một số tư liệu và nhận thức mới [Viet nam Japan Relations in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: New Documents and Reassessments]’, in id., Nhật Bản với Châu Á, 121. 143 Cited from Peri Noel, ‘Essai sur les relations du Japon et de l’ Indochine sur XVIe et XVIIe siècles’, BEFEO 23 (1923), 2 3, 15. 144 Innes, The Door Ajar, 53. 145 Kawamoto Kuniye, ‘The International Outlook of the Quang Nam (Nguyen) Regime as Revealed in Gaiban Tsuusho’, in The National Committee for the International Sym posium on the Ancient Town of Hội An (ed.), Ancient Town of Hội An (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1993), 109 16; Li, Nguyễn Cochinchina; Wheeler, Cross Cultural Trade; Ishizawa Yoshiaki, ‘Les quartiers japonais dans l’Asie du Sud Est au XVIIème siècle’, in Nguyễn Thế Anh and Alain Forest (eds.), Guerre et paix en Asie du sud est (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1998), 85 94. 146 According to Hayashi Akira’s Tsuko ichiran [A Collection of Letters Exchanged between the Japanese Government and Foreign Countries in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries], there were eight letters sent to the Tokugawa Government between 1601 and 1606 by Nguyễn Hoàng. In return, the Japanese Bakufu replied to the Nguyễn six times. Cited from Li, Nguyễn Cochinchina, 61. 147 Innes, The Door Ajar, 139; Li, Nguyễn Cochinchina, 61. 148 Nguyễn Thừa Hỷ and Phan Hải Linh, ‘Quan hệ thương mại giữa Nhật Bản và Việt Nam thế kỷ XVI XVII’ [Japan Vietnam Commercial Relations in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries], paper presented at the workshop Vietnamese Japanese Relations from the Fifteenth to the Seventeenth Centuries as Seen from the Ceramic Trade (Hanoi, Dec. 1999). 149 Iwao Seiichi, Shuin sen Boeki Shi no Kenkyu [A Study of the Trade of Red Seal Ships] (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1958), 49, 269. 150 P. Y. Manguin, Les Portugais sur les côtes du Viêt Nam et du Campá (Paris: École Française d’Extrême Orient, 1973), 48 9; Nguyễn Thừa Hỷ, ‘Quần đảo Paracels và các nhà hàng hải Bồ Đào Nha trong thế kỷ XVI’ [The Paracels and the Portuguese navigators in the sixteenth century], TCKH 3 (1998), 30 42; R. Jacques, Les missionnaires portugais et les débuts de l’Église catholique au Viêt nam, Vol. 1 (Reichstett France: Định Hướng Tùng Thư, 2004), 46 51. 151 Lamb, The Mandarin Road, 19; Manguin, Les Portugais, 186. 152 Jacques, Les missionnaires portugais, Vol. 1, 53 5, 67 9. 153 P. Baldinotti, ‘La Relation sur le Tonkin de P. Baldinotti’, BEFEO 3 (1903), 71 7. 154 Alexandre de Rhodes, Divers voyages et missions (Vietnamese edition) (Ho Chi Minh City: Uỷ ban Đoàn kết Công giáo, 1994), 69 84; Souza, The Survival of Empire, 113.

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Innes, The Door Ajar, 248 9, 264; Prakash, The Dutch East India Company, 120 1. 156 Dixon, ‘Voyage of the Dutch Ship ‘Groll’’, 180 216; Manguin, Les Portugais; Innes, The Door Ajar, 264. 157 Souza, The Survival of Empire, 114. 158 For a brief history of Vietnamese coinage and currency, see Đỗ Văn Ninh, Tiền cổ Việt Nam [Ancient Vietnamese Coinage] (Hanoi: KHXH, 1992); Robert S. Wick, Money, Markets, and Trade in Early Southeast Asia, The Development of Indigenous Monetary Systems to AD 1400 (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1992), 19 65; Whitmore, ‘Vietnam and the Monetary Flow’, 363 96. 159 Souza, The Survival of Empire, 115 20. 160 VOC 1184, Missive from Pieter Boons to Batavia, 2 Nov. 1651, fos. 1 11; Generale Missiven, II, 651 2. 161 On the Portuguese trade in copper coins with Tonkin, see Souza, The Survival of Empire, 115 20; Shimada, The Intra Asian Trade in Japanese Copper, 23 5. 162 Details of the first arrival of the Dutch and their abortive trade with Nguyễn Quinam in the years leading to 1638 will be analysed in detail in Chapter Three. 163 A general account of the Dutch trade with Quinam during the first four decades of the seventeenth century can be found in Buch, De Oost Indische Compagnie; id., ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), ‘Chapter 2’ and ‘Chapter 3’. 164 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 136 62. 165 See the following chapter for the inaugural Dutch voyage to the Trịnh land. A concise account of the Dutch silk trade with Tonkin can be found in Klein, ‘De Tonkinees Japanse zijdehandel’, 152 77. Political and commercial relations between the Dutch Company and Tonkin will be highlighted in the following chapters. 166 The English accused the Dutch of being troublemakers causing the death and abduc tion of the English merchants. They claimed that the Nguyễn rulers had actually planned to murder the Dutch to avenge the murder of the Quinamese by the Dutch in previous years (Richard Cocks, Diary of Richard Cocks, Cape merchant in the English factory in Japan, 1615 1622: with Correspondence, edited by Edward Maunde Thompson, Vol. 2 (London: Hakluyt Society, 1883), 268). The Dutch, on the other hand, blamed the English servants, claiming that the rude behaviour of the English merchants towards the Nguyễn rulers had cost them their lives. However, while killing these rude English, the Nguyễn rulers had accidentally murdered one Dutchman as they failed to distinguish between the European merchants (Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 117). Similar judgements can be found in C. B. Maybon, Histoire moderne du pays d’Annam, 1592 1820 (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1920), 65; Hall, A History of South East Asia, 358; Lamb, The Mandarin Road, 12 15. 167 There was a similar assassination, though undated, recorded in the account of the Italian priest Christopher Borri, who lived in Hội An between 1618 and 1622, just a few years after the said murder. According to Borri’s explanation, the assassination was openly carried out by the Nguyễn rulers in order to please the Portuguese. The victims of this assassination, Borri says, were only Dutch merchants. See Borri, ‘An Account of Cochin China’, in John Pinkerton (ed.), A Collection, 796 7. See also Chapter Three for further discussions of this incident. 168 Innes, The Door Ajar, 99 100. 169 On the English East India Company: K. N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company 1660 1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); J. Black, The British Seaborne Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). 170 In the late 1660s, the Banten Agent’s proposal for opening trading relations with Japan, Formosa, Tonkin, and Cambodia was approved by the Court of Committees in London. The Banten Agent planned to initiate trading relations with Cambodia, from where

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the English factors would try to penetrate Japan with a letter of recommendation plus ambassadors from the Cambodian King (BL OIOC E/3/87, General of the Court of Com mittees to Banten, Jan. 1668, fos. 106 7). The plan to penetrate Japan via Cambodia was, however, finally abandoned and the English decided to sail to Nagasaki from Formosa on their own account in June 1673. Ts’ao Yung ho, ‘The English East India Company and the Cheng Regime on Taiwan’, in Chang Hsiu jung et al., The English Factory in Taiwan, 1670 1685 (Taipei: Taiwan National University, 1995), 1 19. 171 C. R. Boxer, Jan Compagnie in Japan 1672 1674 or Anglo Dutch Rivalry in Japan and Formosa (Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, S.I.: s.l., 1931), 139 46, 161 7; Ts’ao Yung ho, ‘The English East India Company’, 1 19. 172 Femme Gaastra, ‘The Shifting Balance of Trade of the Dutch East India Company’, in Leonard Blussé and Femme Gaastra (eds.), Companies and Trade, Essays on Overseas Trading Companies during the Ancien Régime (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 1981), 47 69. 173 D. K. Basett, ‘The Trade of the English East India Company in the Far East, 1623 1684’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1/4 (1960), 32 47, 145 57; Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia, 54, 215 20. 174 On the English mission to Japan: BL OIOC G/12/17 2, English factory in Tonkin to Banten, 24 July 1674, fos. 110 16; Boxer, Jan Compagnie in Japan, 139 46, 161 7. See also Leonard Blussé, ‘From Inclusion to Exclusiveness, the Early Years at Hirado, 1600 1640’, in Leonard Blussé, Willem Remmelink & Ivo Smits (eds.), Bridging the Divide: 400 Years the Netherlands Japan (Leiden: Hotei Publishing, 2000), 42; Derek Massarella, A World Elsewhere: Europe’s Encounter with Japan in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 359 63. 175 Hoang Anh Tuan, ‘From Japan to Manila and Back to Europe’, 73 92. 176 BL OIOC G/12/17 2, English factory in Tonkin to Banten, 7 Dec. 1672, fos. 41 55. 177 BL OIOC G/12/17 2, English factory in Tonkin to Banten, 24 July 1674, fos. 110 16. 178 A full account of the political and commercial relations between the English East India Company and Tonkin between 1672 and 1697 can be found in the complete set of the Journal Registers of the English Factory in Tonkin (BL OIOC G/12/17 1 to G/12/17 10). 179 Generale Missiven, II, 652. 180 Ibid., 702, 779. 181 Generale Missiven, III, 613. 182 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1637), 166. 183 Generale Missiven, III, 882, 903; IV, 3. 184 BL OIOC G/12/17 2, Thomas James to William Gyfford, 25 Dec. 1674, fos. 139 41. 185 Maybon, Histoire moderne du pays d’Annam, 82. 186 Taboulet, La geste française en Indochine, Histoire par les textes de la France en Indochine des origines à 1914 (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1955), 85. 187 Li, Nguyễn Cochinchina, 88; Li and Reid (eds.), Southern Vietnam under the Nguyen, 31; C. E. Goscha, ‘La présence vietnamienne au royaume du Siam du XVIIème siècle: vers une perspective péninsulaire’, in Nguyễn Thế Anh and Forest (eds.), Guerre et paix, 211 44; Kennon Breazeale, ‘Thai Maritime Trade and the Ministry Responsible’, in id. (ed.), From Japan to Arabia: Ayutthaya’s Maritime Relations with Asia (Bangkok: The Foundation for the Promotion of Social Sciences and Humanities Textbook Project, 1999), 29 32. 188 Dagh register Batavia 1661, 49 55; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 142. 189 Dagh register Batavia 1672, 358 9.

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190

BL OIOC G/12/17 2, English factors in Tonkin to the Governor of Phố Hiến, 5 Mar. 1675, fos. 127 8.

Notes to Part Two: The Political Relations 191 ‘Now at the departure of this ship I am sending this letter to the King of Batavia, in order that he will be informed of my intention to pay for the commodities, which may be sent in the near future, together with a few pieces of large ordnance, in silk according to their value. I also request that one constable be sent to me to remain with me. I request the King of Batavia to aid me with this [i.e. sending the constable] to my satisfaction in order that we shall remain friends for ever for as long as the sun and the moon will shine’. Letter from Chúa Trịnh Tạc to Governor General Joan Maetsuyker in 1670, in Dagh reg ister Batavia 1670, 205 6.

Notes to Chapter Three 192 BL OIOC G/12/17 1, Petition of the English factory in Tonkin to Chúa Trịnh Tạc, 18 July 1672, fo. 12. 193 The writing of this sub chapter is based largely on the pioneering work of Buch, De Oost Indische Compagnie. 194 Buch, De Oost Indische Compagnie, 9 10 ; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 114 15; H. A. Foreest and A. de Booy (eds.), De vierde schipvaart der Nederlanders naar Oost Indië onder Jacob Wilkens en Jacob van Neck (1599 1604), II (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980 1), 67 91; Li and Reid (eds.), Southern Vietnam under the Nguyen, 6 26. The following stories on the Dutch in central Vietnam have been largely based on Buch’s pioneering research. 195 Kato Eiichi, ‘From Pirates to Merchants: The VOC’s Trading Policy towards Japan during the 1620s’, in Reinhold Karl Haellquist (ed.), Asian Trade Routes: Continental and Maritime (London: Curzon Press, 1991), 181 92; id., ‘Shuinsen Licence Trade’, 142 8. 196 The Italian priest Christopher Borri, who lived in Hội An between 1618 and 1622, recorded this incident: ‘The King [Chúa Nguyễn Phúc Nguyên] ordered all the Dutch to go ashore … but as they were going upon the river in boats, they were on a sudden assaulted by the gallies, which destroyed most of them. The King remained master of their goods; and to justify this action, alleged, that he very well knew the Dutch, as notorious pirates, who infested all the seas, were worthy of severer punishment; and therefore, by proclama tion, forbid any of them ever resorting to his country.’ Christopher Borri, ‘An Account of Cochin China’, in John Pinkerton (ed.), A Collection of the Best and Most Interesting Voyages and Travels in All Parts of the World (London, 1811), XI, 796 7; see also Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 117; Lamb, The Mandarin Road, 12 15. 197 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1636), 117 18. 198 Buch, De Oost Indische Compagnie, 17; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 119 21. On the Dutch involvement in China, see Leonard Blussé, ‘The Dutch Occupation of the Pescadores, 1622 1624’, Transactions of the International Conference of Orientalists in Japan (The Toho Gakkai, XVIII, 1973), 28 44. 199 Blussé, ‘The Dutch Occupation of the Pescadores’, 28 42; Ts’ao Yung ho, ‘Taiwan as an Entrepôt in East Asia in the Seventeenth Century’, Itinerario, 21/3 (1997), 94 114. 200 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 122 30. 201 Buch, De Oost Indische Compagnie. 202 All foreign merchants complained about this confiscation law which was also said to

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have been implemented in Pegu. See Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 15; Frédéric Man tienne, ‘Indochinese Societies and European Traders: Different World of Trade? (17th 18th Centuries)’, in Nguyen The Anh and Yoshiaki Ishizawa (eds.), Commerce et Navigation en Asie du Sud Est (XIVe XIXe siècle) (Tokyo: Sophia University, 1999), 113 25. 203 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 132 3; Raychaudhuri, Jan Company in Coromandel, 187 8. 204 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 135. 205 VOC 1120, Instructie door gouverneur Hans Putmans [in Tayouan] aen Abraham Duijcker naer Quinam [Instruction from Governor Putmans to Duijcker going to Quinam], 21 Feb. 1636, fos. 225 31; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 136 7. 206 Chúa Thượng (Nguyễn Phúc Lan, 1635 48) succeeded Chúa Sãi (Nguyễn Phúc Nguyên, 1613 35). 207 VOC 1120, Missive from Abraham Duycker to Batavia, 7 Oct. 1636, fos. 459 78; VOC 1120, Translaet van de missive van den coninck van Quinam ontfangen tot Batavia 12 Dec. 1636 [Translation of the missive received from the King of Quinam [Chúa Thượng] in Batavia on 12 Dec. 1636], fos. 491 2; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 139 40. 208 Dagh register Batavia 1636, 91 3; Buch ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 136 45. 209 VOC 1123, Sommarium der coopmanschappen van 8 Oct. 1636 3 Maert 1637 naer Batavia, Siam, Cambodja, Quinam en Toncquijn versonden. [Summary of the commodi ties sent to Batavia, Siam, Cambodia, Quinam, and Tonkin, from 8 Oct. 1636 to 3 Mar. 1637], fos. 782 3. 210 VOC 1123, Missive from Duycker to Governor General Antonio van Diemen, 21 Nov. 1637, fos. 970 7. See also Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 157 8. 211 VOC 1127, Missive from Henrick Nachtegael [in Siam] to Abraham Duycker in Coutchin China, 3 May 1638, fos. 369 80; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 159 62. 212 Dixon, ‘Voyage of the Dutch Ship “Groll”’, 180 215. 213 Buch, De Oost Indische Compagnie, 12. On political and commercial transformations during the early 1630s, see Akira Nagazumi, Dhiravat na Pombejra, and A. B. Lapian, The Dutch East India Company in Japan, Siam and Indonesia: Three Essays (Working Paper No. 16, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1982); Van Dyke, ‘How and Why’, 41 56. 214 Generale Missiven, I, 513 22; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 142. 215 Kato Eiichi, ‘Unification and Adaptation, the Early Shogunate and Dutch Trade Policies’, in Leonard Blussé and Femme Gaastra (eds.), Companies and Trade: Essays on Overseas Trading Companies during the Ancien Régime (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 1981), 207 29; id., ‘Shuinsen Licence Trade and the Dutch in Southeast Asia’, in Ancient Town of Hội An (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1993). 142 8; Blussé, ‘From Inclusion to Exclusiveness’, 13 32. 216 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 141 3 and passim; Van Dyke ‘How and Why’; Ts’ao Yung ho, ‘Taiwan as an Entrepôt’, 94 114. 217 Dagh register Batavia 1636, 72 3, 104; Valentyn, Oud en Nieuw Oost Indiën, III, 7 18; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 150 2. 218 A detailed account of the inaugural Dutch voyage to Tonkin can be found in VOC 1124, Daghregister van Carel Hartsinck van de negotie gedaen met ‘t schip Groll naer Ton cquijn van 31 Jan. 7 Aug. 1637 [Diary of Carel Hartsinck of the trade carried out on the ship Grol to Tonkin from 31 Jan. 7 Aug. 1637], fos. 53 79; VOC 1124, Translaet missive van den coninck van Tonquin aen den Governeur Generael [Translated missive from the King of Tonkin [Chúa Trịnh Tráng] to the Governor General, [1637], fos. 80 1; VOC 1124, Acte waerbij den coopman Carel Hartsinck van den coninck van Tonquin tot sijn geadop teerde soon verclaert ende aengenomen wert [Act in which Merchant Carel Hartsinck has been declared and accepted as the King of Tonkin’s adopted son], [1637], fo. 85. See also Dixon, ‘Voyage of the Dutch Ship “Groll”’; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 152 4. 219 Because of the unprofitable trade with Tonkin as well as the high risk of piracy and

254

notes

shipwreck on the Macao Tonkin trading route, Portuguese merchants in Macao did not sail to Tonkin in the years 1628 and 1629. Largely owing to the Portuguese non appearance, the Chúa, in a fit of disappointment, deported all the Jesuits who had arrived in Tonkin on board the Portuguese ships in 1626 and 1627. Rhodes, Histoire du royaume de Tunquin, 121 30, 154 6, 221 5, 272 5. 220 VOC 1120, Instructie door gouverneur Hans Putmans aen Abraham Duijcker naer Quinam medegegeven [Instruction given by Governor Hans Putmans to Duycker going to Quinam], 21 Feb. 1636, fos. 225 31; Dagh register Batavia 1636, 67, 91; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 137, 142. 221 VOC 1124, Dagregister Groll, fos. 53 79; Dixon, ‘Voyage of the Dutch Ship “Groll”’. 222 VOC 1124, Translaet missive van den coninck van Tonquin aen den Gouverneur Generael [Translated missive from the King of Tonkin [Chúa Trịnh] to the Governor General], [1637], fos. 80 1; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 140. 223 Dagh register Batavia 1631 1633, 433. 224 Gaastra, The Dutch East India Company, 37 65; C. R. Boxer, Jan Compagnie in War and Peace 1602 1799 (Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia, 1979), 1 28. 225 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 166. 226 Dixon, ‘Voyage of the Dutch Ship “Groll”’, 180 215. 227 Ibid. 228 VOC 1124, Translaet missive van den coninck van Tonquin aen den Gouverneur Generael, 1637 [Translated missive from the King of Tonkin [Chúa Trịnh Tráng] to the Governor General, 1637] , fos. 80 1. 229 Ibid. 230 Ibid. 231 VOC 1124, Translaet missive van den coninck van Tonquin aen president Couck ebacker [Translated missive from the King of Tonkin [Chúa Trịnh Tráng] to President Couckebacker], 1637, fo. 82; VOC 1124, Translaet missive van den prins van Tonquin aen president Couckebacker [Translated missive from the Prince of Tonkin [Trịnh Tạc] to President Couckebacker], 1637, fo. 83; VOC 1124, Acte adoptie Hartsinck als soon van de coninck van Tonquin, [1637], fo. 85. See the preceeding section for the inaugural VOC voyage to Tonkin in 1637. 232 N. MacLeod, De Oost indische Compagnie als Zeemogendheid in Azië, II (Rijswijk: Blankwaardt & Schoonhoven 1927), 318 19. 233 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 167. 234 Ibid., 167 8. 235 A detailed discussion of Couckebacker’s arguments concerning the Chúa’s ambiva lent delays during these campaigns as well as the current hesitation of Batavia to continue its alliance with Tonkin can be found in Buch, De Oost Indische Compagnie, 74 7; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 168 9. 236 MacLeod, De Oost Indische Compagnie, II, 319; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 169. The Gianh River in modern Quảng Bình Province served as the borderline between Tonkin and Quinam throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Cương mục, II, 260. 237 Dagh register Batavia 1641 1642, 124 6, 641. 238 VOC 665, Resoluties Gouverneur Generaal en Raden, 12 Apr. 1642; MacLeod, De Oost Indische Compagnie, II, 319 20; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 174 5. 239 Dagh register Batavia 1641 1642, 124 6. 240 The Crown Prince was Nguyễn Phúc Tần, Thực lục, I, 55 6. 241 Dagh register Batavia 1641 1642, 124 6; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 172. 242 According to the seventeenth century English traveller William Dampier, the confis cation law was in force not only in Đàng Trong but also in Pegu: Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 13. See also Mantienne, ‘Indochinese Societies’, 113 25.

to chapter three 243

255

VOC 1141, Letter from a Japanese in Quinam to his compatriots in Batavia, fos.

135 7. 244

Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 170 1. VOC 1140, Missive van de gevangens uijt Quinam aen den gouverneur Paulus Traudenius [in Tayouan] [Missive from the prisoners in Quinam to Governor Paulus Trau denius], 19 July 1642, fos. 295 8. 246 Generale Missiven, II, 190 1. 247 VOC 1141,Verclaringh van den corporael Juriaen de Rooden aengaende de cru eliteijt bij de Macaose Portugeesen aen de 50 Nederlanders bij den coningh van Quinam gelargeert gepleeght [Declaration by Corporal Juriaen de Rooden concerning the cruelty perpetrated by the Portuguese from Macao against the fifty Dutchmen set free by the King of Quinam], fos. 138 40. 248 VOC 665, Resoluties Gouverneur Generaal en Raden, 12 Apr. 1642. 249 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 174 5. 250 MacLeod, De Oost Indische Compagnie, II, 320. 251 VOC 1140, Reports, resolutions, declarations, diaries, and documents of Captain Van Linga during the voyage from Batavia to Quinam, fos. 347 95. 252 Chúa Trịnh clearly lied to Van Linga because the Vietnamese annals recorded no such campaign in the spring and summer of 1642. 253 VOC 1140, Reports, resolutions, declarations, diaries, and documents of Captain Van Linga during the voyage from Batavia to Quinam, fos. 347 95. 254 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 175. 255 VOC 1146, Missive van Traudenius in ‘t Casteel Zeelandia aen den coninck van Toncquin [Missive from Traudenius in Zeelandia Castle to the King of Tonkin [Chúa Trịnh Tráng]], 15 Dec. 1642, fos. 722 3. 256 VOC 1146, Instructie voor Lamotius vertreckende over Toncquin ende Quinam naer Batavia [Instruction for Lamotius sailing to Batavia via Tonkin and Quinam], 12 Jan. 1643, fos. 720 1. 257 VOC 1145, Missive from Antonio van Brouckhorst to Governor General Antonio van Diemen, 1 Oct. 1643, fos. 99 103; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 181. 258 VOC 1145, Resolutien bij Johan van Elseracq ende sijnen raedt op de custe van Toncquin ende in Japan genomen 30 Meij, 10 Junij en 23 September 1643 [Resolutions taken by Johan van Elseracq and his council off the coast of Tonkin and in Japan], fos. 146 9; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 182. 259 For the 1643 campaign of Tonkin: Cương mục, II, 253; Toàn thư, III, 237; VOC 1149, Getranslateerden brieff van den Toncquinsen coninq aen den gouverneur generael [Translated letter from the King of Tonkin [Chúa Trịnh Tráng] to the Governor General], 1643, fos. 683 5. 260 Ibid. 261 VOC 666, Resoluties Gouverneur Generaal en Raden, 11 May 1643. 262 Thực lục, I, 55 6; C. C. Van der Plas, Tonkin 1644/45, Journaal van de Reis van Anthonio van Brouckhorst (Amsterdam: Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen te Amsterdam, 1955), 18 25. 263 VOC 1145, Missive from Van Brouckhorst to Governor General Antonio van Diemen, 1 Oct. 1643, fos. 99 103. 264 VOC 1144, Daghregister gehouden bij den ondercoopman Gobijn [Diary kept by Junior Merchant Gobijn], 13 July 30 Oct. 1643, fos. 694 714; Van der Plas, Tonkin 1644/45, 18 25. 265 VOC 1148, Missive van Van Elseracq [in Nagasaki] aen den grootmachtigen coninck van Annam, Chotsingh, [Missive from Van Elseracq to the powerful King of Annam [Chúa Trịnh Tráng], 30 Oct. 1643, fos. 138 9; MacLeod, De Oost Indische Compagnie, II, 322. 266 VOC 1144, Dagregister Gobijn, 13 July 30 Oct. 1643, fos. 694 714. 245

256 267

notes

Excerpted from VOC 1149, Getranslateerden brieff van den Toncquinsen coninq aen den gouverneur generael [Translated letter from the King of Tonkin [Chúa Trịnh Tráng] to the Governor General], 1643, fos. 683 5. 268 Ibid. 269 Van der Plas, Tonkin 1644/45, 18 25. 270 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 184. 271 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 221. 272 Buch, De Oost Indische Compagnie, 100 3; L. C. D. Van Dijk, Neerlands vroegste betrekkingen met Borneo, den Solo Archipel, Cambodja, Siam en Cochinchina (Amsterdam: J. H. Scheltema, 1862), 328 9. 273 Dagh register Batavia 1643 1644, 25; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 190. 274 VOC 1140, Missive van de gevangens uijt Quinam aen den gouverneur Paulus Traudenius [Missive from the prisoners in Quinam to Governor Traudenius], 19 July 1642, fos. 295 8; VOC 1164, Translaet missive door de gevangene Nederlanderen in Quinam op 13 Julij 1647 aen den president Pieter Antonissen Overtwater geschreven [Translated missive written by the Dutchmen imprisoned in Quinam to President Overtwater], 13 July 1647, fos. 469 70; VOC 1170, Brieven door den praesident Pieter Antonisz. Overtwater desen jare 1648 aen de gevangene Nederlanderen in Quinam geschreven mitsgaders de becomen antwoort daerop [Letters written by President Overtwater to the Dutch prisoners in Quinam and the reply received], 1648, fos. 477 80. 275 VOC 1164, Missive geschreven door den president Pieter Antonissen Overtwater aen de gevangenen in Quinam [Missive written by President Overtwater to the prisoners in Quinam], 30 Mar. 1647, fo. 465; VOC 1170, Brieven door praesident Overtwater aan de gevangene Nederlanderen in Quinam geschreven, 1648, fos. 477 80. 276 VOC 1148, Dutch prisoners in Quinam to Governor General Van Diemen, 26 July 1644, fos. 522 3. 277 VOC 1149, Translaet request der gevangene Quinangers aen den gouverneur Francois Caron in dato 20 November 1644 gepresenteert [Tranlated request from the Quinamese prisoners to Governor François Caron presented on 20 Nov. 1644], fo. 634. 278 H. P. N. Muller, De Oost Indische Compagnie in Cambodja en Laos (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1917), 348, 352, 355; MacLeod, De Oost Indische Compagnie, II, 317; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 219 20; Carool Kernsten, Strange Events in the Kingdoms of Cambodia and Laos (Chiangmai: White Lotus Press, 2003), 1 17, 47 9. 279 Generale Missiven, II, 391. 280 Chúa Nguyễn Phúc Tần (1648 87) succeeded his father Chúa Nguyễn Phúc Lan (1635 48). 281 (Dutch: Heren XVII) The board of seventeen directors representing the six chambers of the VOC. 282 Van Dijk, Neerlands vroegste betrekkingen, 119; Plakaatboek, II, 143. 283 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 193 4. 284 VOC 1182, Rapport van Willem Verstegen, wegens sijn besendingh na de Noor der quartieren, besonderlijck van Toncquin, Taijouan ende Quinam [Report from Willem Verstegen on his mission to the Northern Quarters, particularly Tonkin, Tayouan, and Quinam], 20 Jan. 1652, fos. 71 126. 285 VOC 1187, Accoort ende verbont tussen d’edele Comp. ende den coninck van Quinam gemaect [Agreement and treaty between the VOC and the King of Quinam], 9 Dec. 1651, fos. 506 8. For a translation of this treaty into modern Dutch and English: Buch, De Oost Indische Compagnie, 112 13; Anthony Reid, ‘The End of Dutch Relations with the Nguyen State, 1651 2’, in Li and Reid (eds.), Southern Vietnam under the Nguyễn, 33 7. 286 A full description of Verstegen’s mission in 1651 to Tonkin, Formosa, and Quinam can be found in his report: VOC 1182, Rapport van Willem Verstegen, wegens sijn besend ingh na de Noorder quartieren, besonderlijck van Toncquin, Taijouan ende Quinam [Report

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from Willem Verstegen on his mission to the Northern Quarters, particularly Tonkin, Tayouan, and Quinam], 20 Jan. 1652, fos. 71 126. See also: Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 194 6. 287 VOC 1188, Rapport van den oppercoopman Hendrick Baron wegen de Quinamse constitutie [Report from Senior Merchant Hendrick Baron concerning the constitution of Quinam], 2 Feb. 1652, fos. 628 33; VOC 1188, Daghregister van den oppercoopman Hen drick Baron [Diary of Chief Merchant Hendrick Baron [in Quinam], 15 Dec. 1651 2 Feb. 1652, fos. 634 48; Reid, ‘The End of Dutch Relations’, 35 7. 288 VOC 1149, Getranslateerden brieff van den Toncquinsen coninq aen den gouverneur generael [Translated letter of the King of Tonkin [Chúa Trịnh Tráng] to Governor General [Van Diemen], 1643, fos. 683 5. 289 Dagh register Batavia 1644 1645, 108 122. 290 Dagh register Batavia 1644 1645, 111. However, the Vietnamese annals mention no such military campaign by Tonkin against Quinam in 1644. 291 VOC 1141, Discourssen ende cort rapport over eenige poincten concernerende den jegenwoordigen stant der Japanse, Chinese, Tonquinsche commertie, insgelijcx ons gevoe len wegen de Quinamsche saecken, en hoe de Tonquinsche negotie bij vertieringe van eenige profitabile coopmanschappen in Europa, soude connen verbetert, wijder uijt gebreijt werden, te presenteren aen de Ed. heeren bewinthebberen der Vereenichde Nederlandsche Oostindische Compagnie ter vergaderinge van de seventiene, getekent Carel Hartsinck, Amsterdam 26 Augustij 1643 [Discourse and short report on some points concerning the present state of the trade with Japan, China, and Tonkin, furthermore our opinion on the Quinam affairs, and how the Tonkin trade could be improved and expanded by the sale of some profitable commodities in Europe, to be presented to the Directors of the VOC at the meeting of the Gentlemen Seventeen, signed Carel Hartsinck, Amsterdam, 26 Aug. 1643], fos. 359 74. 292 VOC 1156, Missive from Antonio van Brouckhorst to Batavia, 26 Jan. 1644, fos. 147 8; Dagh register Batavia 1643 1644, 141 3. 293 VOC 1156, Missive from Van Brouckhorst in Tonkin to Batavia, 26 Jan. 1644, fos. 147 8; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 187. 294 VOC 1156, Missive from Van Brouckhorst [in Nagasaki] to Batavia, 24 Oct. 1645, fos. 223 8. 295 Generale Missiven, II, 300. 296 VOC 1156, Missive from Van Brouckhorst [in Nagasaki] to Batavia, 24 Oct. 1645, fos. 223 8; Dagh register Batavia 1644 1645, 108 22. 297 VOC 1161, Dagregister Tonkin, 29 Nov. 1645 31 July 1646, fos. 705 46. 298 Cương mục, II, 256; Toàn thư, III, 238 9. 299 Toàn thư, III, 238 9; Generale Missiven, II, 281; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 122. 300 Generale Missiven, II, 527 8. 301 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 127. 302 For the itowappu system, see note 93 in Chapter Two. 303 Generale Missiven, II, 308. 304 Generale Missiven, II, 325 6; VOC 1166, Advies door den coopman Jan van Rie beeck aen de heeren bewinthebberen over den handel in Toncquin anno 1648 [Advice from Merchant Jan van Riebeeck to the Gentlemen XVII concerning the Tonkin trade 1648], fos. 669 84. 305 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 124. 306 VOC 1169, Instructie voor den oppercoopman Philips Schillemans als opperhooft na Toncquin [Instruction for Senior Merchant Philip Schillemans going as opperhoofd to Tonkin], 29 Nov. 1647, fos. 395 7. 307 Generale Missiven, II, 389.

258

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308

‘I did not summon you to my country’, Generale Missiven, II, 389. VOC 1175, Dagregister Tonkin, 25 Feb. 4 Sept. 1650, fos. 448 94; Generale Mis siven, II, 450 2. 310 For Ongiatule, see note 330 in Chapter Four. 311 VOC 1175, Dagregister Tonkin, 25 Feb. 4 Sept. 1650, fos. 448 94; Buch, ‘La Com pagnie’ (1937), 129 30. 312 Generale Missiven, II, 422. 313 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 130 2. 314 VOC 672, Resoluties Gouverneur Generaal en Raden, 14 June 1650; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 130 1. 315 VOC 1175, Dagregister Tonkin, 25 Feb. 4 Sept. 1650, fos. 448 94; Generale Mis siven, II, 450. 316 VOC 1175, Instructie aen den eersten assistent Hendrik Baron in Tonckin gelaten [Instruction for First Assistant Hendrik Baron in Tonkin], 27 July 1650, fos. 446 7; VOC 1184, Instructie voor den eersten adsistent Hendrick Baron door den coopman Jacob Keijser verleent [Instruction for First Assistant Hendrick Baron from Merchant Jacob Keijser] 27 July 1650, fos. 20 2; Generale Missiven, II, 450 1. 317 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 132. 318 Generale Missiven, II, 527 8. 319 None of the Vietnamese annals recorded this event. 320 Generale Missiven, II, 528 9. 309

Notes to Chapter Four 321

Generale Missiven, II, 485; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 194 6. VOC 1184, Instructie door de commissaris Verstegen aen den coopman Jacob Kaiser als opperhooft over ’t comptoir Toncquin [Instruction from Commissioner Verstegen to Merchant Jacob Keijser as the opperhoofd of the Tonkin factory], 11 July 1651, fos. 62 8. 323 Generale Missiven, II, 530 2. 324 VOC 1182, Rapport van Willem Verstegen, wegens sijn besendingh na de Noorder quartieren, besonderlijck van Toncquin, Taijouan ende Quinam [Report from Willem Ver stegen on his mission to the Northern Quarters, particularly Tonkin, Tayouan, and Quinam], 20 Jan. 1652, fos. 71 126; Generale Missiven, II, 530 2. 325 Generale Missiven, II, 575. 326 Ibid. 327 E. C. Godée Molsbergen, De Stichter van Hollands Zuid Afrika Jan van Riebeeck (1618 1677) (Amsterdam: S. L. Van Looy, 1912), 32. 328 Generale Missiven, II, 528. 329 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 135 6. See Chapter Six for a detailed account of the Company’s silk trade with Tonkin. 330 Ongiatule (Ông già Tư lễ) was the eunuch Hoàng Nhân Dũng who was executed in 1652 for attempting to murder the Chúa: Toàn thư III, 242 3; Cương mục II, 262; VOC 1197, Missive van de raad van Tonkin aan Batavia [Missive from the Tonkin Council to Batavia], Nov. 1653, fos. 598 611; Generale Missiven, II, 650 1, 654 5. 331 VOC 1220, Rapport aan gouverneur generaal Joan Maetsuyker van Nicolaas de Voogt [Report to Governor General Maetsuyker from De Voogt], 7 Dec. 1657, fos. 839 47. 332 Generale Missiven, II, 655 6. 333 Klein, ‘De Tonkinees Japanse zijdehandel’; Hoang Anh Tuan, ‘Mậu dịch tơ lụa của 322

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Công ty Đông Ấn Hà Lan với Đàng Ngoài, 1637 1670 [The VOC Tonkin Silk Trade, 1637 1670]’, NCLS 3 (2006). 334 Generale Missiven, II, 697 702; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 138. 335 VOC 1197, Missive from the Tonkin Council to Batavia, Nov. 1653, fos. 598 611; Generale Missiven, III, 69. 336 VOC 1206, Missive from Louis Baffart from Tayouan to Batavia, Nov. 1654, fos. 65 90. 337 Ibid.; Generale Missiven, II, 696, 697 702. 338 VOC 677, Resoluties Gouverneur Generaal en Raden, 27 Apr. 1655; Generale Mis siven, III, 2. 339 VOC 1197, Missive from the Tonkin Council to Batavia, Nov. 1653, fos. 598 611; Generale Missiven, II, 759. 340 VOC 1206, Missive from Louis Baffart from Tayouan to Batavia, Nov. 1654, fos. 65 90; Generale Missiven, II, 779. 341 On the shortage of copper coins in Quinam: Buch, De Oost Indische Compagnie, 25; Li, Nguyễn Cochinchina, 90 3. 342 Generale Missiven, II, 777 8. On the Vietnamese monetary system: Whitmore, ‘Viet nam and the Monetary Flow’, 363 96. See also Chapter Eight for the usage and production of copper coins in Vietnamese history. 343 VOC 1206, Missive van Louis Baffart uit Tayouan aan Batavia, Nov. 1654, fos. 65 90. 344 See Chapters Five and Eight for more detailed discussions of the shortage of copper cash in Tonkin in the mid seventeenth century. 345 Klein, ‘De Tonkinees Japanse zijdehandel’, 152 77. 346 According to the records of the Dutch factory, the Tonkinese troops flooded the southern kingdom. Chúa Nguyễn had to flee to the ‘southwestern mountains near Cambo dia’ to hide from the Trịnh armies (Dagh register Batavia 1661, 50 1). The Vietnamese annals also recount that the Trịnh armies could defeat the Nguyễn in southern Nghệ An but could not overrun the border. 347 Cương mục, II, 262 91; Toàn thư, III, 244 59; Cadière, ‘Le mur de Đồng Hới’, 87 254. 348 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 143. 349 Dagh register Batavia 1656 1657, 49; 1663, 71 and passim. 350 Gaastra, The Dutch East India Company, ‘Chapter 2’. 351 Hall, A History of Southeast Asia, 312 25. 352 Baron, ‘Description of Tonqueen’, 664. 353 Dagh register Batavia 1661, 49 55. 354 Cương mục, II, 296. 355 Lịch triều, IV, 147 50, 204. On the Ming Qing transition: John E. Wills Jr., Pepper, Guns, and Parleys, The Dutch East India Company and China, 1662 1681 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 1 28; Lynn A. Struve (ed.), Time, Temporality, and Impe rial Transition: East Asia from the Ming to Qing (Honolulu: Association for Asian Studies and University of Hawaii Press, 2005). 356 A detailed account of the export of Chinese gold and musk by the Tonkin factory will be given in Chapter Seven. 357 Generale Missiven, II, 881. 358 Dagh register Batavia 1661, 49 55. 359 Dagh register Batavia 1663, 71 and passim. The first Tonkin tribute to Peking was recorded in June 1663: Cương mục, II, 296. Toàn thư (III, 264) however noted that the 1663 Tonkin tribute was to Ming China. This must have been mistakenly recorded. 360 VOC 1240, Missive from Hendrick Baron to Batavia, 12 Nov. 1662, fos. 1355 74. 361 NFJ 57, Dagregister comptoir Nagasaki, 1 Aug. 1644; NFJ 61, Dagregister comp

260

notes

toir Nagasaki, 15 Sept. 1648; Generale Missiven, II, 452; Ts’ao Yung ho, ‘Taiwan as an Entrepôt’, 94 114. 362 For the Dutch loss of Formosa to the Zheng in 1662: Generale Missiven, III, 386 9; Wills, Pepper, Guns, and Parleys, 25 8; Leonard Blussé, Tribuut aan China, Vier eeuwen Nederlands Chinese betrekkingen (Amsterdam: Cramwinckel, 1989), 65 72; Tonio Andrade, Commerce, Culture, and Conflict: Taiwan under European Rule, 1624 1662 (Ph. D. Diss., Yale University, 2000), 314 24. 363 For the vicissitudes of the Sino Dutch relationship in the 1662 81 period: Wills, Pepper, Guns, and Parleys. 364 Raychaudhuri, Jan Company in Coromandel, 186 9. 365 Generale Missiven, III, 386 9. 366 Dagh register Batavia 1661, 49 55. 367 On mining in Tonkin in the seventeenth century: Lịch triều, III, 76 9; Trương Hữu Quýnh et al., Lịch sử Việt Nam, I, 370 1; Whitmore, ‘Vietnam and the Monetary Flow’, 370 3. 368 Dagh register Batavia 1661, 49 55; Baron, ‘Description of Tonqueen’, 663; Dam pier, Voyages and Discovery, 49; Van Dam, Beschryvinge, 2 I, 361 5. 369 For the export of Laotian gold to Tonkin: Nguyen Thanh Nha, Tableau Économique du Vietnam, 160, 170. A general account of the exportation of Chinese gold to Tonkin via the border can be found in Dagh register Batavia 1661, 49 55. 370 Dagh register Batavia 1661, 49 55. 371 VOC 1236, Missive from Hendrick Baron to Batavia, 13 Nov. 1661, fos. 829 55; Dagh register Batavia 1661, 89 91. Most of the place names found in the Dutch records remain unidentified because of the odd pronunciation and hence orthography. 372 VOC 1240, Missive from Hendrick Baron to Batavia, 12 Nov. 1662, fos. 1355 74; Dagh register Batavia 1663, 71 and passim. 373 The Chúa wanted to know how far Tinnam and Vanning were from the capital, Thăng Long, and whether his subjects at those places were vulnerable to the Chinese threat. The Dutch answered the first question, saying that those places did not seem to be terribly far, but did not answer the second. Dagh register Batavia 1663, 689 92. 374 VOC 1241, Missive van het opperhoofd en de raad van Tonkin aan Batavia [Mis sive from the Opperhoofd and Council of Tonkin to Batavia], 6 Nov. 1663, fos. 356 66; Dagh register Batavia 1663, 689 92; 1664, 202 4, 548 50. 375 VOC 1240, Missive from Baron to Batavia, 12 Nov. 1662, fos. 1355 74; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 160. 376 Plinlochiu to Governor General Joan Maetsuycker, in Dagh register Batavia 1663, 71 and passim. 377 Resimon to Director General Carel Hartsinck, in Dagh register Batavia 1663, 71 and passim. 378 VOC 678, Resoluties Gouverneur Generaal en Raden, 24 Apr. 1663; Dagh register Batavia 1663, 338; 1664, 204. 379 Generale Missiven, III, 305, 307. 380 Ibid., 346 7. 381 Ibid., 377, 378. 382 VOC 1236, Missive from Baron to Batavia, 13 Nov. 1661, fos. 829 55; VOC 1240, Missive from Baron to Batavia, 12 Nov. 1662, fos. 1355 74; Generale Missiven, III, 450 1. 383 VOC 1206, Missive from Louis Baffart from Tayouan to Batavia, 18 Nov. 1654, fos. 65 90. 384 On the exportation of Japanese copper coins to Tonkin by the VOC: Shimada, The Intra Asian Trade in Japanese Copper, 95. See also Chapters Five and Eight for detailed analyses of this subject.

to chapter four 385

261

Generale Missiven, III, 346 7. VOC 1236, Missive from Hendrick Baron to Batavia, 13 Nov. 1661, fos. 829 55; Generale Missiven, III, 450 1. 387 Dagh register Batavia 1663, 689 92. 388 Dagh register Batavia 1665, 108. 389 VOC 679, Resoluties Gouverneur Generaal en Raden, 14 June 1664; Generale Mis siven, III, 450 1. 390 Dagh register Batavia, 1663, 689 90. 391 VOC 1252, Missive from Hendrick Verdonk to Batavia, 23 Feb. 1665, fos. 209 48. 392 Dagh register Batavia 1664, 506, 581. 393 Ibid., 143 4. 394 Dagh register Batavia 1665, 89. 395 Chúa Trịnh Tạc to Governor General Joan Maetsuycker, 1666 and 1667, in Dagh register Batavia 1666 1667, 221 2, 400. 396 Id., 1667, in Dagh register Batavia 1666 1667, 400 1. 397 Id., 1671, in Dagh register Batavia 1672, 9 10. 398 Id., 1672, in Dagh register Batavia 1672, 193 7. 399 Id., 1668 and 1673, in Dagh register Batavia 1668 1669, 239; 1673, 72 3. 400 Toàn thư, III, 288 90; Thực lục, I, 84 88; Cương mục, II, 329 30. 401 Cương mục, II, 340, 349 50. 402 According to Vietnamese historiography, out of the twenty four year period between 1675 and 1698, there were eight years in which Tonkin experienced severe natural disasters such as drought, flood, heavy hail, and dike breaks which all led to large scale famines (Cương mục, II, 335 78; Trương Hữu Quýnh et al., Lịch sử Việt Nam, 394 8). This period was therefore as miserable as the years 1561 1610, when fourteen years out of sixty saw agricultural failures. Lieberman, Strange Parallels, 396 7. 403 Keith W. Taylor, ‘The Literati Revival in Seventeenth Century Vietnam’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 1 (1987), 1 23. 404 See Chapter Two for a general account of the presence, activity, and departure of foreign merchants in seventeenth century Tonkin. 405 Generale Missiven, III, 741. 406 VOC 694, Resoluties Gouverneur Generaal en Raden, 10 June 1679. 407 VOC 1294, Missive from Albert Brevinck and the Tonkin Council to Batavia, 18 Oct. 1673, fos. 522 37. 408 Generale Missiven, IV, 344. On the profits and expenses of the Tonkin factory in the last decades: Klerk de Reus, Geschichtlicher Überblick der Administrativen, Rechtlichen und Finanziellen Entwicklung der Niederländischen Ostindischen Compagnie (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1894), Appendix IX. 409 Generale Missiven, III, 712; Maybon, Histoire moderne du pays d’Annam, 77. 410 Hoang Anh Tuan, ‘From Japan to Manila and Back to Europe’, 73 92. 411 VOC 1362, Missive from Leendert de Moij and the Tonkin Council to Batavia, 8 Jan. 1681, fos. 996 1005; VOC 1377, Missive from Leendert de Moij and Johannes Sibens to Batavia, 5 Jan. 1682, fos. 556 64; Generale Missiven, IV, 539 41. On Tonkin’s natural disasters and famines: Cương mục, II, 347. 412 BL OIOC G/12/17 7, Records of the English Factory in Tonkin, 22 June 1682, fol. 286. 413 VOC 1453, Missive from Johannes Sibens and Dirck Wilree, and the Tonkin Council to Batavia, 19 Dec. 1688, fos. 299 312. 414 Maybon, Histoire moderne du pays d’Annam, 82, 84. 415 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 180. 416 VOC 1453, Rapport van den ondercoopman en Tonckins opperhooft Joannes Sibens 386

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aen Batavia, 18 Jan. 1689 [Report from Junior Merchant and Opperhoofd of Tonkin Joannes Sibens to Batavia], fos. 313 15; VOC 1462, Missive from Sibens and the Tonkin Council to Batavia, 26 Nov. 1689, fos. 8 9. See also Chapter Two for detailed accounts of foreign merchants in seventeenth century Tonkin. 417 Generale Missiven, IV, 435 6. 418 In 1685 the Japanese Government issued regulations to limit the maximum value of goods the Dutch and the Chinese could import. Accordingly, the Chinese were limited to a total of 6,000 kanme in silver (600,000 taels of silver) while the Dutch were restricted to 3,400 kanme (340,000 taels of silver). Discussions of the Japanese regulations on the import and export trade can be found in Innes, The Door Ajar, 319 27; Prakash, The Dutch East India Company, 134 5. 419 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 183 4. 420 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 183 4. 421 VOC 1377, Missive from Leendert de Moij and the Council to Batavia, 2 Jan. 1683, fos. 565 7. 422 VOC 1485, Translaet missives van den koninck van Toncquin aen gouverneur gen erael Johannes Camphuijs [Translated missives from the King of Tonkin [Chúa Trịnh Căn] to Governor General Camphuys], 1691, fos. 181 3. 423 The annual gifts included seven pieces of red felt, two pieces of black felt, three pieces of blue felt, four pieces of red perpetuanes, twenty pieces of red bethilles, thirty pieces of woollen cloth, twenty pieces of fine salemporis, ten catties of fine amber, some aloes wood, some parrots, and two thoroughbreds aged 5 or 6 years. VOC 8364, Briefje van Sibens en raad tot Tonkin aan Batavia [Note from Sibens and Tonkin Council to Batavia], 10 Jan. 1692, fos. 1 3. 424 VOC 8365, Missive from Jacob van Loo and the Council to Batavia, 23 Nov. 1693, fos. 1 3. 425 Generale Missiven, V, 687. 426 VOC 1557, Sibens on his mission to Tonkin, 13 Dec. 1694, fos. 219 24. 427 VOC 1580, Missive from Van Loo and Leendertsz to Batavia, 24 Dec. 1694, fos. 1 7; Generale Missiven, V, 721. 428 VOC 1180, Van Loo and the Tonkin Council to Batavia, 25 Nov. 1695, fos. 12 35. 429 VOC 1580, Prince of Tonkin to Batavia, 1695, fos. 37 9. 430 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 190 5. 431 Generale Missiven, V, 820. 432 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 190. 433 Generale Missiven, V, 830. 434 VOC 713, Resoluties Gouverneur Generaal en Raden, 28 Jan. 1698. 435 VOC 713, Resoluties Gouverneur Generaal en Raden, 10 June 1698. 436 VOC 1609, Missive from Van Loo to Batavia, 3 Dec. 1698, fos. 1 12; Generale Missiven, VI, 54. 437 VOC 714, Resoluties Gouverneur Generaal en Raden, 2 June 1699. 438 Generale Missiven, VI, 75 6. 439 VOC 1623, Chúa Trịnh Căn to Governor General Willem Outhoorn, 1699, fos. 15 16. See also Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 194. 440 No commerce, no wealth (Vietnamese proverb).

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Notes to Part Three: The Commercial Relations 441

Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 49. In Bengal, for instance, treasure mainly silver bullion and coins accounted for as much as 92 per cent of the value of the VOC’s import trade to this region between 1708 9 to 1716 17. Om Prakash, ‘Bullion for Goods: International Trade and the Economy of Early Eighteenth Century Bengal’, The Indian Economic and Social History Review, 13 (1976), (159 87), 163. (Reprinted in Om Prakash, Precious Metals and Commerce). 443 Van Dam, Beschryvinge, 2 I, 361 2. 442

Notes to Chapter Five 444

‘That which we import and trade there [Tonkin] consisted mainly of silver, also copper cash, which are cast or made in Japan … Furthermore some spices, saltpetre, cotton textiles, but, apart from the afore mentioned silver and copper cash, all goods in small quantity, because their consumption is very scant’. Van Dam, Beschryvinge, 2 I, 361 2. 445 BL OIOC G/12/17 1, English factory in Tonkin to Banten and London, 10 Oct. 1672, fos. 36 7. 446 Dagh register Batavia 1636, 69 74. 447 Generale Missiven, III, 109 10. A detailed account of the refining of the ‘Mallacx’ silver can be found in VOC 1140, Specificatie van ‘t Mallacx zilver in Toncquin geraff ineert [Specification of the Mallacx silver refined in Tonkin in 1641], fos. 158 60. 448 Generale Missiven, II, 697 702. 449 Calculated from Klein, ‘De Tonkinees Japanse zijdehandel’, 170 (Table 2). 450 VOC 677, Resoluties Gouverneur Generaal en Raden, 27 Apr. 1655. See also: Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ 1937 (121 237), 140. 451 Generale Missiven, II, 485. See Chapters Three and Four for an account on the private undertakings of the Dutch factors in Tonkin and the investigation of Commissioner Verstegen in the early 1650s. 452 Gaastra, ‘The Exports of Precious Metal’, 453. 453 VOC 1241, Missive van opperhoofd en raad in Tonkin aan Batavia [Missive from Opperhoofd and Council in Tonkin to Batavia], 6 Nov. 1663, fos. 356 66; Dagh register Batavia 1664, 298. 454 Dagh register Batavia 1672, 160, 193 4. 455 Dagh register Batavia 1675, 186; 1677, 140, 177. 456 VOC 1339, Missive from Jan Besselman and Council in Tonkin to Batavia, 17 Sept. 1678, fos. 500 9; Dagh register Batavia 1678, 224. 457 Taylor, The Birth of Vietnam, 203 4. See also: Wick, Money, Markets, and Trade, 19 65. 458 Whitmore, ‘Vietnam and the Monetary Flow’, 183 4. See also: Đỗ Văn Ninh, ‘Tiền cổ thời Lý Trần’ [Money in the Lý Trần Dynasties], NCLS 6 (1979), 26 34; id., Tiền cổ Việt Nam. 459 Lịch triều, III, 61. 460 A brief account of the Vietnamese monetary system can be found in Whitmore, ‘Vietnam and the Monetary Flow’, 365 70. 461 Lịch triều, III, 63 4; Whitmore, ‘Vietnam and the Monetary Flow’, 367 9. 462 See Chapter Four for further details on Tonkin’s cash shortage in the early 1650s and Chapter Eight for discussions of the fluctuation of the silver/cash ratio. 463 Generale Missiven, II, 651 2. On the Portuguese import of copper coins into Tonkin:

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Souza, The Survival of Empire, 115 20. A general account of foreigners’ import of coins into Quinam can be found in Li, Nguyễn Cochinchina, 90 3. 464 VOC 1197, Missive from the Council in Tonkin to Batavia, Nov. 1653, fos. 598 611; Generale Missiven, II, 697 702. 465 VOC 1206, Missive from Louis Baffart from Tayouan to Batavia, 18 Nov. 1654, fos. 65 90; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 139. 466 Dagh register Batavia 1661, 49 55. 467 VOC 1236, Missive from Hendrick Baron to Batavia, 12 Nov. 1661, fos. 829 55; Dagh register Batavia 1661, 89; Generale Missiven, III, 450 1. 468 Luc Duc Thuan, ‘Japan Early Trade Coins and the Commercial Trade between Viet nam and Japan in the 17th Century’, www.VietAntique.com; Whitmore, ‘Vietnam and the Monetary Flow’, 363 96. On the export of Toraisen and Shichusen to Quinam: A. van Aelst, ‘Japanese coins in southern Vietnam and the Dutch East India Company, 1633 1638’, Newsletter (The Oriental Numismatic Society, 109, Nov. Dec. 1987), (n.p); Li, Nguyễn Cochinchina, 90 3. 469 Rhodes, Histoire du royaume de Tonkin, 59 60. 470 Innes, The Door Ajar, 587; Luc Duc Thuan, ‘Japan Early Trade Coins’; Shimada, The Intra Asian Trade in Japanese Copper, 95. 471 Generale Missiven, II, 651 52; Souza, The Survival of Empire, 115 20. 472 VOC 1206, Missive from Louis Baffart from Tayouan to Batavia, 18 Nov. 1654, fos. 65 90; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 139. 473 These percentages are calculated from figures shown in Table 3. 474 VOC 1314, Missive from Albert Brevincq and Council to Batavia, 19 Nov. 1675, fos. 19 22; Generale Missiven, IV, 88. 475 Generale Missiven, IV, 88, 111, 174. 476 Quoted in Shimada, The Intra Asian Trade in Japanese Copper, 95. 477 Cương mục, II, 296; Toàn thư, III, 260, 262, 264. 478 A general account of Đại Việt military technology can be found in Sun, ‘Chinese Military Technologies’. 479 VOC 1175, Missive from Philip Schillemans to Batavia, Nov. 1650, fos. 495 513; Generale Missiven, II, 389 91, 450. 480 VOC 1236, Missive from Hendrick Baron to Batavia, 13 Nov. 1661, fos. 829 55. See also: Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1637), 144 5. 481 This was not only a complaint of foreign merchants but was also confirmed by European travellers who visited Tonkin during this century. See Baron, ‘Description of Tonqueen’, 663 64; Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 49 50. 482 VOC 1240, Missive from Hendrick Baron to Batavia, 12 Nov. 1662, fos. 1355 74; Dagh register Batavia 1663, 71 3. 483 Letter from Chúa Trịnh Tạc to Governor General Joan Maetsuyker in 1667, in Dagh register Batavia 1666 1667, 400 1. 484 Generale Missiven, IV, 86 8, 221. 485 VOC 1339, Missive from Johannes Besselman to Batavia, 17 Sept. 1678, fos. 500 9; Dagh register Batavia 1678, 224. 486 Letters from Chúa Trịnh Tạc to Batavia in 1672 and 1679, in Dagh register Batavia 1672, 67 9; 1679, 100 3. 487 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1637), 163. 488 VOC 8365, Missive from Jacob van Loo and Council in Tonkin to Batavia, 23 Nov. 1693, fos. 1 3.

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Notes to Chapter Six 489 ‘In previous times we sent the silk and the silk piece goods, which we purchased there [i.e. Tonkin] on a ship straight to Japan, and we made a reasonable profit on them. But because the price of the aforesaid silk rose considerably afterwards, apart from the fact that the Chinese also joined in the trade, the direct shiping and trade started to decline. So finally, because of the meagre profits and the onerous expenses of employing a ship specially for this purpose, this [direct shipping] was abandoned’. Van Dam, Beschryvinge, 2 I, 362. 490 On the Portuguese China Japan trade in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries: Chang T’ien Tsê, Sino Portuguese Trade from 1514 to 1644, A Synthesis of Portuguese and Chinese Sources (Leiden: Brill, 1933); Michael Cooper, ‘The Mechanics of the Macao Nagasaki Silk Trade’, Monumenta Nipponica, 27/4 (1972), 423 33; Souza, The Survival of Empire. 491 Kato Eiichi, ‘Unification and Adaptation’, 207 29. 492 Kristof Glamann, Dutch Asiatic Trade, 1620 1740 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958), 114. 493 See Chapter Three for the abortive Dutch trade with Quinam. See also: Buch, De Oost Indische Compagnie; Ancient Town of Hoi An; Li, Nguyễn Cochinchina. 494 Blussé, ‘The Dutch Occupation of the Pescadores’, 28 42; Ts’ao Yung ho, ‘Taiwan as an Entrepôt’, 94 114. 495 Nagazumi, Dhiravat and Lapian, The Dutch East India Company in Japan, Siam and Indonesia; Van Dyke, ‘How and Why’, 41 56. 496 Generale Missiven, I, 513. 497 Ibid., 522. 498 See Pires, Suma Oriental, I, 114 15. 499 On the VOC silk trade with Tonkin: Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 97 196 & (1937), 121 237; Klein, ‘De Tonkinees Japanse zijdehandel’, 152 77; Nagazumi, ‘The Tonkinese Japanese Trade’, 21 46; Nara, ‘Silk Trade’, 162 83. 500 Dagh register Batavia 1624 1629, 12. 501 Dagh register Batavia 1634, 249 50. 502 Generale Missiven, I, 589. 503 ‘Dagh register Batavia 1636, 69 74. See also: Van Dam, Beschryvinge, 2 I, 361 5; Valentyn, Oud en Nieuw Oost Indiën, III, 1 6. 504 On the VOC’s successful inaugural voyage to Tonkin: VOC 1124, Daghregister van Carel Hartsinck van de negotie gedaen met ‘t schip Groll naer Toncquijn van 31 Jan. 7 Aug. 1637 [Diary of Carel Hartsinck of the voyage of the Grol to Tonkin in 1637], fos. 53 79; Dagh register Batavia 1637, 144; Dixon, ‘Voyage of the Dutch Ship ‘Groll’’. 505 Faccaar: see Glossary. VOC 1124, Daghregister Groll, fos. 53 79; Van Dam, Beschryvinge, Vol. 2 I, 361 5. 506 Generale Missiven, I, 585; Klein, ‘De Tonkinees Japanse zijdehandel’, 165 6. 507 Generale Missiven, II, 736 7. 508 The Chinese owners killed nineteen Dutchmen on board, robbed the Company cargo and took it to Cambodia. During the sale of this cargo, the Dutch factors in Cambodia discovered what had happened thanks to some notes kept in the silk bales. Generale Mis siven, II, 7 8; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 206. 509 VOC 1124, Daghregister Groll 1637, fos. 53 79. 510 One ton of gold valued at around 35,416 taels of silver or 100,935 guilders: Ge nerale Missiven, I, 742; VOC 1124, The act of Chúa Trịnh Tráng to adopt Carel Hartsinck as his own son, fo. 85. 511 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 168.

266 512

notes Dagh register Batavia 1640 1641, 146; Klein, ‘De Tonkinees Japanse zijdehandel’,

167. 513

Ts’ao Yung ho, ‘Taiwan as an Entrepôt’, 94 114. Innes, The Door Ajar, 248 5; Prakash, The Dutch East India Company, 120 1; The Deshima Dagregisters 1641 1650, 412. 515 Dagh register Batavia 1643 1644, 147; Generale Missiven, II, 211 12. 516 Generale Missiven, II, 247. 517 Generale Missiven, II, 233. 518 On the export of Bengali silk to Japan in the 1640 52 period: Prakash, The Dutch East India Company, 122 4. 519 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 184 95. 520 Dagh register Batavia 1641 1642, 58, 62 5, 72. The number given in Generale Missiven, II, 146, for that year’s Tonkin cargo to Japan was 225,000 guilders. On Japan’s sumptuary laws: Donald H. Shively, ‘Sumptuary Regulation and Status in Early Tokugawa Japan’, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 25 (1964 5), 123 64. 521 The Deshima Dagregisters 1641 1650, 33 4. 522 Generale Missiven, II, 146 7. 523 NFJ 56, Dagregister comptoir Nagasaki, Aug. Sept. 1642. 524 NFJ 57, Dagregister comptoir Nagasaki, June Nov. 1643. 525 Generale Missiven, II, 211 12; Van der Plas, Tonkin 1644/45, 23. 526 The Deshima Dagregisters 1641 1650, 116. 527 Ibid., 166 7. 528 NFJ 57, Dagregister comptoir Nagasaki, Feb. Sept. 1644. 529 The Deshima Dagregisters 1641 1650, 322. 530 Generale Missiven, II, 452. 531 VOC 1156, Missive from Antonio van Brouckhorst to Batavia, 15 Oct. 1644, fos. 149 55. 532 Ibid.; Godeé Molsbergen, De Stichter van Hollands Zuid Afrika, 32; Buch, ‘La Com pagnie’ (1937), 121 4. 533 Dagh register Batavia 1644 1645, 108 22. 534 Ibid., 222. 535 The Deshima Dagregisters 1641 1650, 215 16. 536 Generale Missiven, II, 281. 537 VOC 1156, Missive from Van Brouckhorst in Nagasaki to Batavia, 24 Oct. 1645, fos. 223 8; VOC 1161, Dagregister Tonkin, 29 Nov. 1645 31 July 1646, fos. 705 46. 538 Generale Missiven, II, 289; NFJ 59, Dagregister comptoir Nagasaki, 12 20 Sept. 1646. 539 Generale Missiven, II, 308. 540 Godeé Molsbergen, De Stichter van Hollands Zuid Afrika, 39. 541 Generale Missiven, II, 325 6. 542 NFJ 60, Dagregister comptoir Nagasaki, Sept. Oct. 1647. 543 VOC 1169, Instruction for Philip Schillemans as opperhoofd of the Tonkin factory, 29 Nov. 1647, fos. 395 7. 544 Sumongij, chiourong, and the like are sorts of Tonkinese silk textiles. Most of them remain unidentified owing to the odd phonetic spellings of the European merchants. VOC 1172, Missive from Schillemans and Van Brouckhorst in Nagasaki to Governor General Cornelis van der Lijn, 19 Nov. 1648, fos. 381 4. 545 Generale Missiven, II, 364 5; NFJ 61, Dagregister comptoir Nagasaki, 9 & 24 Nov. 1648. 546 Generale Missiven, II, 389 1. 547 Ibid., 390; The Deshima Dagregisters 1641 1650, 367. 548 Generale Missiven, II, 422, 450 1. 514

to chapter six 549

267

Ibid., 530 2; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 132 4. Information on Ongiatule can be found in note 330 in Chapter Four. 550 Generale Missiven, II, 697 702. 551 VOC 1184, Missive [from Tonkin] to Governor General Carel Reniers, 24 Nov. 1651, fos. 14 19; Klein, ‘De Tonkinees Japanse zijdehandel’, 177 (Table 1). 552 Generale Missiven, II, 618. 553 VOC 1197, Missive [from Tonkin] to Batavia, Nov. 1653, fos. 598 611. 554 Generale Missiven, II, 697 702. On the currency system and the shortage of copper cash during the 1650s: Whitmore, ‘Vietnam and the Monetary Flow’, 363 6; Souza, The Survival of Empire, 115 20. 555 Generale Missiven, II, 777. 556 VOC 1197, Missive [from Tonkin] to Batavia, Nov. 1653, fos. 598 611; Generale Missiven, II, 777. 557 Generale Missiven, II, 756. Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 139 41. 558 Prakash, The Dutch East India Company, 124. 559 Klein, ‘De Tonkinees Japanse zijdehandel’, 167. 560 Calculated from Klein, ‘De Tonkinees Japanse zijdehandel’, 170 (Table 2). 561 The Deshima Dagregisters 1641 1650, 367. 562 Generale Missiven, II, 618. 563 Generale Missiven, III, 68. 564 Innes, The Door Ajar, 279 85; Prakash, The Dutch East India Company, 124. 565 Generale Missiven, III, 67. 566 Prakash, The Dutch East India Company, 125. 567 Ibid. 568 On the fifth campaign of Tonkin against Quinam: Cương mục, II, 263 91. 569 For a general account on the Company’s Tonkin trade between 1655 and 1660: Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 140 5. The above calculation was based on sporadic selec tions of numbers given in VOC 1213 (1655/6), 1216 (1656), 1219 (1656), 1220 (1657), 1230 (1659), 1233 (1660), 1236 (1661); Generale Missiven, III; Dagh register Batavia 1656/7 1661. 570 Prakash, The Dutch East India Company, 125. 571 VOC 678, Resoluties Gouverneur Generaal en Raden, 24 Apr. 1663. On the Dutch loss of Formosa in 1662: Wills, Pepper, Guns, and Parley, 25 8; Ts’ao Yung ho, ‘Taiwan as an Entrepôt’: 94 114. 572 Dagh register Batavia 1661, 89 91; 1663, 158; 1665, 548. See Chapter Four for the Dutch ‘Tinnam mission’ and their strategy towards the procurement of Chinese gold and musk. 573 Klein, ‘De Tonkinees Japanse zijdehandel’, 168. 574 VOC 1278, Missive from Cornelis Valckenier and Council to Batavia, 5 Jan. 1670, fos. 1861 2; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 166 7. 575 Dagh register Batavia 1664, 506, 581. 576 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 163. 577 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 164; Klein, ‘De Tonkinees Japanse zijdehandel’, 168. 578 Generale Missiven, III, 741. 579 Klein, ‘De Tonkinees Japanse zijdehandel’, 168; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1936), 173 4. 580 Klein, ‘De Tonkinees Japanse zijdehandel’, 176. 581 Those groundbreaking studies include Oskar Nachod, Die Beziehungen der nieder ländischen ostindischen Kompagnie zu Japan im siebzehnten Jahrhundert (Leipzig: Rob. Friese Sep., 1897); Buch, ‘La Compagnie’; Klein, ‘De Tonkinees Japanse zijdehandel’. 582 Klein, ‘De Tonkinees Japanse zijdehandel’, 166 9.

268

notes

583

Adapted from numbers given in Klein, ‘De Tonkinees Japanse zijdehandel’, 169 and Table 2. It is important to keep in mind that the VOC’s calculation of profits on the Tonkinese silk trade rarely took the shipping costs into account. 584 Nachod, Die Beziehungen, Table A (Umsatz Tabelle) and Table C (Einfuhr von Rohseide), CCII CCVI. 585 Calculated from Nachod, Die Beziehungen, Tables A and C; Klein, ‘De Tonkinees Japanse zijdehandel’, 166 71; Generale Missiven, II, 388, 389 91. 586 Klein, ‘De Tonkinees Japanse zijdehandel’, 169, 173 (Table 4). 587 Generale Missiven, II, 696; Souza, The Survival of Empire, 115 20; Richard von Glahn, ‘Myth and Reality of China’s Seventeenth Century Monetary Crisis’, The Journal of Economic History, 56/2 (1996), 429 54. 588 Prakash, The Dutch East India Company, 125 6. 589 Generale Missiven, III, 741.

Notes to Chapter Seven 590 ‘And while we maintained a factory there [in Tonkin] and also bought silk piece goods, musk and other items for the Netherlands, the silk which we bought for Japan was carried thither via Batavia. This was done as long as it yielded any profit. But [the silk] grew more and more expensive so that we finally abandoned this, and the factory was maintained, manned by just a few servants, only in order to purchase silk piece goods for the Netherlands and Persia, and also to buy musk and other miscellaneous items.’ Van Dam, Beschryvinge, 2 I, 362. 591 Glamann, Dutch Asiatic Trade, 133. 592 Ibid., 135; Femme Gaastra, ‘De Textielhandel van de VOC’, Textielhistorische Bij dragen, 34 (1994), 56 7. 593 In the 1644 trading season, Zeelandia Castle reported to the Deshima factory in Japan that half of the Company’s demand for Chinese goods to be procured there could not be fulfilled. In 1648, the Governor of Formosa kept lamenting that the export of Chinese com modities to this island from the mainland had dwindled to almost nothing. This situation remained more or less the same in the 1650s. NFJ 57, Dagregister comptoir Nagasaki, 10 Sept. 1643; NFJ 61, Dagregister comptoir Nagasaki, 15 Sept. 1648. 594 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 121 4. 595 Dagh register Batavia 1644 1645, 108 22; Van der Plas, Tonkin 1644/45, 30. 596 Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 140. 597 VOC 1216, Missive from Gustavus Hanssen to Batavia, 20 Feb. 1656, fos. 436 42; Generale Missiven, II, 777; Generale Missiven, III, 2, 61. 598 Dagh register Batavia 1661, 89 91. 599 Dagh register Batavia 1664, 298. 600 See Chapter Six for detailed information on the Company’s export of Tonkinese silk to Japan. 601 Generale Missiven, IV, 435, 490; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 177 8. 602 VOC 1377, Missive from Leendert de Moij and Johannes Sibens to Batavia, 5 Jan. 1682, fos. 556 64. 603 VOC 1438, Missive from Tonkin to Batavia, 24 Jan. 1687, fos. 669 70. 604 VOC 1456, Missive from Dirck Wilree and the Tonkin Council to Batavia, 19 Jan. 1689, fos. 2018 20. 605 Van Dam, Beschryvinge, 2 I, 364 5. See also: Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 49; Baron, ‘Description of Tonqueen’, 663; Richard, ‘History of Tonquin’, 711. For a general account of the musk trade in the early modern period: Borschberg, ‘The European Musk Trade’, 1 12.

to chapter seven 606

269

VOC 1194, Missive [from Tonkin] to Batavia, 8 Dec. 1652, fos. 165 239; Generale Missiven, II, 651 2. 607 VOC 1216, Missive from Gustavus Hanssen to Batavia, 20 Feb. 1656, fos. 436 42; Generale Missiven, III, 69. 608 Dagh register Batavia 1655, 46 7. 609 Dagh register Batavia 1661, 54 5, 87. 610 Ibid., 89 90. 611 VOC 1240, Missive from Baron to Batavia, 12 Nov. 1662, fos. 1355 74; Dagh register Batavia 1661, 89 91; 1663, 71 and passim. 612 VOC 1241, Missive from the Opperhoofd and Council in Tonkin to Batavia, 6 Nov. 1663, fos. 356 66; Dagh register Batavia 1663, 689 92; 1664, 65 7. 613 Dagh register Batavia 1664, 298. 614 Dagh register Batavia 1664, 298, 548 50; 1665, 83, 193, 222, 370 2. 615 VOC 1253, Missive from Constantijn Ranst to Batavia, 30 Oct. 1665, fos. 1712 34; Dagh register Batavia 1665, 370. 616 Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 49. 617 For a general account of the Company’s bullion trade, see Glamann, Dutch Asiatic Trade, 50 72; Gaastra, ‘The Exports of Precious Metals’, 447 76. 618 Gaastra, ‘The Export of Precious Metals’, 453. According to Glamann (Dutch Asiatic Trade, 51), ‘not until 1618 gold was sent intended for the Coromandel Coast in all 72,000 rials out of the total cargo of the money of 612,000 rials. 619 Glamann, Dutch Asiatic Trade, 57. Gaastra (‘The Export of Precious Metals’, 453), examining such Company documents as the orders from Batavia, resolutions of the Gen tlemen XVII, and receipts in Asia, has stated that 1632 to the end of the 1650s was the ‘period without gold’. The demand for gold from Batavia began once again in 1658, and in 1662 gold was sent from the Netherlands to Asia. 620 Raychaudhuri, Jan Company in Coromandel, 187. 621 Niels Steengaard, The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century: The East India Companies and the Decline of the Caravan Trade (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1973), 140. 622 Raychaudhuri, Jan Company in Coromandel, 189. 623 Gaastra, ‘The Export of Precious Metals’, 464 5, 474 (Appendix 4). 624 Ibid., 466; Glamann, Dutch Asiatic Trade, 58. 625 Generale Missiven, II, 451 2. 626 Ibid., 781. 627 Raychaudhuri, Jan Company in Coromandel, 190 1. 628 Generale Missiven, III, 386 9. 629 Dagh register Batavia 1661, 49 55. See also: Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 49; Baron, ‘Description of Tonqueen’, 663; Van Dam, Beschryvinge, 2 I, 361 5; Lịch triều, III, 76 9; Whitmore, ‘Vietnam and the Monetary Flow’, 370 3. 630 Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 49; Baron, ‘Description of Tonqueen’, 663. 631 Dagh register Batavia 1661, 49 55. 632 VOC 678, Resoluties Gouverneur Generaal en Raden, 24 Apr. 1663. A detailed discussion of this issue can be found in Chapter Four. 633 Generale Missiven, III, 386, 440. 634 VOC 1240, Missive from Baron to Batavia, 12 Nov. 1662, fos. 1355 74; Dagh register Batavia 1663, 71 and passim. 635 Generale Missiven, III, 450 1, 457. 636 Ibid., 457 66. 637 Raychaudhuri, Jan Company in Coromandel, 189. 638 VOC 678, Resoluties Gouverneur Generaal en Raden, 24 Apr. 1663; Dagh register Batavia 1663, 158; 1664, 202 4.

270 639

notes

Dagh register Batavia 1663, 209. VOC 1241, Missive from Opperhoofd and Council in Tonkin to Batavia, 6 Nov. 1663, fos. 356 66; Dagh register Batavia 1664, 65 7. 641 Dagh register Batavia 1664, 548 50. 642 VOC 1252, Missive from Verdonck to Batavia, 23 Feb. 1665, fos. 209 48. 643 VOC 1253, Missive from Constantijn Ranst to Batavia, 30 Oct. 1665, fos. 1712 34. 644 Dagh register Batavia 1665, 83, 370 2; Generale Missiven, III, 491. 645 Nachod, Die Beziehungen, 357. 646 Raychaudhuri, Jan Company in Coromandel, 191. 647 Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 48. 648 Cynthia Viallé, ‘De Bescheiden van de VOC betreffende de handel in Chinees en Japans porselein tussen 1634 en 1661’, Aziatische Kunst, 3 (Amsterdam: Rijksmuseum, 1992), 26. 649 Cynthia Viallé, ‘Japanese Porcelain for the Netherlands: The Records of the Dutch East India Company’, in The Kyushu Ceramic Museum (ed.), The Voyage of Old Imari Porcelains (Arita, 2000), 176 83. 650 Ho, ‘The Ceramic Trade’, 35 70. 651 Dagh register Batavia 1663, 71 2. 652 Dagh register Batavia 1666 1667, 241. 653 On the fifteenth and sixteenth century export of Vietnamese ceramics for the inter national market: Guy, ‘Vietnamese Ceramics in International Trade’, 47 61; John Guy, ‘Vietnamese Ceramics from the Hoi An Excavation: The Cu Lao Cham Ship Cargo’, Orientations (Sept. 2000), 125 8. 654 VOC 1278, Missive from Cornelis Valckenier and Council to Batavia, 5 Jan. 1670, fos. 1861 2. 655 VOC 1278, Missive from Cornelis Valckenier and Council to Batavia, 12 Oct. 1670, fos. 1892 1907. 656 Ho, ‘The Ceramic Trade’, 35 70. 657 Dampier (Voyage and Discoveries, 48) noted in his account written in 1688 that the English export of Tonkinese ceramics to the Indian market brought considerable profits. 658 Volker (Porcelain and the Dutch East India Company, 218) estimated that out of around 12 million pieces of ceramics which the Company traded between 1602 and 1682, Tonkinese wares made up approximately 1,450,000 pieces, the rest was Japanese (1,900,000 pieces) and Chinese and others (8,650,000 pieces). 659 Dagh register Batavia 1681, 120 1. 660 Kerry Nguyen Long, ‘Bat Trang and the Ceramic Trade, 84 90. 661 Dampier, Voyage and Discoveries, 48; Louise Allison Cort, ‘Vietnamese Ceramics in Japanese Contexts’, 62 83’, and Guy, ‘Vietnamese Ceramics in International Trade’, 47 61, in Stevenson and Guy, Vietnamese Ceramics. 662 Dagh register Batavia 1681, 200. 663 The Lê/Trịnh court decreed in 1661 that ‘Confucian scholars, dignitaries, young bachelors, village headmen, village elders, mandarin’s children and grandsons, as well as civilians have to use domestic products’. Quoted from Thành Thế Vỹ, Ngoại thương Việt Nam, 61. More detailed regulations of the Tonkinese court on this can be found in Cương mục, II, 282 90. 664 Trần Đức Anh Sơn, ‘Đồ sứ Việt Nam ký kiểu tại Trung Hoa từ 1804 đến 1924 hiện tàng trữ tại Bảo tàng Mỹ thuật Cung đình Huế [Porcelain Ordered in China for the Viet namese Court between 1804 and 1824 which is Preserved in the Huế Imperial Museum of Fine Arts]’ (Diss., Vietnam National University, Hanoi, 2002), 27 37. 640

to chapter eight

271

Notes to Part Four: Dutch-vietnamese Interactions 665 666

Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 24, 46. See Li, Nguyễn Cochinchina; Wheeler, Cross Cultural Trade.

Notes to Chapter Eight 667

Toàn thư, III, 265. BL OIOC G/12/17 1, Tonkin factory to London, 7 Dec. 1672, fos. 41 55. On the Dutch factory and factors in Siam, see George Vinal Smith, The Dutch in Seventeenth Century Thailand (Northern Illinois University: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Special Report No. 16, 1977); Dhiravat na Pombejra, ‘VOC Employees and their Relationships with Mon and Siamese Women: A Case Study of Osoet Pegua’, in Barbara Watson Andaya (ed.), Other Pasts: Women, Gender and History in Early Modern Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000), 195 214. 669 Van der Chijs, Nederlandsch Indisch Plakkaatboek, I, 509 12. 670 Yoko Nagazumi, ‘From Company to Individual Company Servants: Dutch Trade in Eighteenth Century Japan’, in Leonard Blussé and Femme Gaastra (eds.), On the 18th Century as a Category of Asian History: Van Leur in Retrospect (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 147 72. 671 On the romanization of the Vietnamese language by the Western priests: Jacques, Les missionnaires portugais, I. 672 On the Dutch learning the Vietnamese language: Generale Missiven, II, 575; Godée Molsbergen, De Stichter van Hollands Zuid Afrika; Buch,‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 126 8. 673 Rhodes, Histoire du royaume de Tonkin, 254 9. 674 Generale Missiven, I, 397. 675 On the persecution of the Christians in Japan in the late 1630s and the deportation of the Portuguese: Innes, The Door Ajar, 156 64. On the religious disorder in Tonkin in 1639: Rhodes, Histoire du royaume de Tunquin, 288 308. 676 Generale Missiven, II, 177. 677 Toàn thư, III, 265. 678 Dagh register Batavia 1677, 4 5, 427. 679 Dagh register Batavia 1678, 202. 680 BL OIOC G/12/17 9, Tonkin factory records, 21 Aug. 1694, fo. 369. 681 Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 70; Susan Legêne, ‘The Spirit of Christianity, the Spirit of a Trading Nation’, in Blussé et al. (eds.), Bridging the Divide, 82. 682 Anthony Reid, ‘Female Role in Pre colonial Southeast Asia’, Modern Asian Studies, 22/3 (1988), 629 45; id., Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, I: The Lands below the Winds, 146 50; Barbara Watson Andaya, ‘From Temporary Wife to Prostitute: Sexuality and Economic Change in Early Modern Southeast Asia’, Journal of Women’s History, 9/4 (1998), 11 34. 683 Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, I, 146. 684 See: Hồng Đức thiện chính thư [Hồng Đức Reign Edicts and Decrees Promulgated for Good Government], (Saigon: Nam Hà Ấn Quán, 1959), 39; Quốc triều hình luật, 157 9. 685 Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 40. 686 See: Toàn thư, III, 264 5; Trương Hữu Quýnh et al., Lịch sử Việt Nam, 391; Nguyễn Thừa Hỷ, ‘Kinh tế hàng hoá và đời sống văn hoá của nước Đại Việt thế kỷ XVI đến đầu thế kỷ XVIII [The Commodity Economy and the Cultural Life of Đại Việt, Sixteenth Early Eighteenth Centuries]’, (Unpublished manuscript, Institute of Vietnamese Studies 668

272

notes

and Development Sciences, Vietnam National University, Hanoi, 2005). 687 See for details: Reid, ‘Female Role in Pre colonial Southeast Asia’; id., Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, I, 146 50, Andaya, ‘From Temporary Wife to Prostitute’; Dhiravat, ‘VOC Employees’, 195 214. 688 The Deshima Dagregisters 1651 1660, viii; Dhiravat, ‘VOC Employees’. 689 VOC 1222, Missive from Nicolaes de Voogt to Governor Fredrick Coijett [in Tayouan], 7 Aug. 1657, fos. 334 7; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 142. 690 On Samuel Baron: VOC 1330, Jan Besselman and the Tonkin factory to Batavia, 13 Oct. 1677, fos. 697 705; BL OIOC E 3 87, London General to Banten, 21 Sept. 1671, fo. 239. On the mestizo children in Siam: Smith, The Dutch in Seventeenth Century Thailand, 101 2; Dhiravat, ‘VOC Employees’, 200 14. 691 See for details from BL OIOC G/12/17 9, Tonkin factory records, May 1693 July 1697, fos. 318 475. 692 Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 40. 693 BL OIOC G/12/17 9, Tonkin factory records, 13 May 1694, fo. 361. 694 Some people believe that one of the statues in the temple of the Lê Kings in Thanh Hóa Province is a Dutch lady because her face looks Western. I have visited the temple but have found no such distinguishing features of the statue in comparison to the others which are placed on the same altar. On the anecdote on Vietnamese media: Mai Thanh Hải, ‘Giai thoại về 108 vua chúa [Anecdotes on 108 Kings and Lords of Vietnam]’, www. mofa.gov.vn. 695 BL OIOC G/12/17 9, Tonkin factory to Fort St. George, 24 Nov. 1696, fo. 460. 696 Baron, ‘Description of Tonqueen’, 664. 697 BL OIOC G/12/17 1, Tonkin Factory to London, 7 Dec. 1672, fos. 41 55. 698 Nguyen Thanh Nha, Tableau Économique du Vietnam. 699 Detailed figures on the VOC’s import of silver can be found in Table 1 in Chapter Five. 700 See also Chapter Five for more detailed analyses of the VOC’s silver import into Tonkin. 701 BL OIOC G/12/17 9, Tonkin factory to Fort St. George, 24 Nov. 1696, fo. 406. 702 VOC 1197, Missive [from the Council in Tonkin to Batavia], Nov. 1653, fos. 598 611; Generale Missiven, II, 697 702. 703 Generale Missiven, III, 346 7. 704 Numbers extracted from the records of the English factory in Tonkin: BL OIOC G/12/17 1, fos. 41 55; G/12/17 3, fo. 169; G/12/17 6, fo. 272. See also Chapter Five for details on the VOC’s import of Japanese copper zeni into Tonkin. 705 Nguyen Thanh Nha, Tableau Économique du Vietnam. 706 See Chapter Six for details of the prices of Tonkinese raw silk. 707 Calculated from Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1637), 183 4. 708 Calculated from VOC 1140, Specificatie van de on ende montcosten anno 1642 in Toncquin gevallen [Specification of the daily expenses of the Tonkin factory, 1642] fos. 133 9; BL OIOC G/12/17 1, Tonkin factory records, 20 Aug. 1672, fos. 29 30. 709 BL OIOC G/12/17 9, Tonkin factory records, 25 Dec. 1693, fo. 340. 710 Prakash, ‘Bullion for Goods’, 159 87; id., The Dutch East India Company, 234 48. See also: Femme Gaastra, ‘Geld tegen Goederen: Een Structurele Verandering in het Neder lands Aziatisch Handelsverkeer’, Bijdragen en Mededelingen Betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, 91/2 (1976), 249 72. 711 Li, Nguyễn Cochinchina, 171. 712 According to the VOC records, there were many years in which the Chinese invest ment in their Tonkin trade even surpassed that of the Dutch Company. In 1664, for instance, the Chinese arrived in Tonkin from Japan with 200,000 taels of silver (c. 570,000 guilders) to buy silk for the Japanese market, while the Dutch factory was provided with 347,989

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273

guilders only. VOC 1252, Missive from Verdonk to Batavia, 23 Feb. 1665, fos. 209 48; Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 161 2. 713 If we take Iwao Seiichi’s estimation that one shuin sen carried an average investment capital of around 50,000 taels of silver (or 155,000 guilders), approximately 2,000,000 taels of silver (or 6,200,000 Dutch guilders) had been brought to Tonkin by the Japanese alone between 1604 and 1635. Iwao, Shuin sen, 49, 269. 714 Dagh register Batavia 1636, 69 74. 715 Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 49. 716 Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, II, 62 3. 717 Philippe Papin, Historie de Hanoi (Paris: Fayard, 2001), 161; Nguyễn Thừa Hỷ, Economic History of Hanoi, 5 19. 718 Nguyễn Thừa Hỷ et al., Đô thị Việt Nam thế kỷ XVII XVIII [Vietnamese Towns in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries], (Unpublished manuscript, Department of His tory, Vietnam National University, Hanoi, 2004), 27 9. 719 Most of the Vietnamese historians still believe that Phố Hiến flourished commercially throughout the seventeenth century. This was based mainly on the assumption that the Dutch and other foreign merchants maintained their factories at Phố Hiến, even after they had been allowed to reside and trade in the capital. In fact, once they had been granted a licence to trade and live in Thăng Long, foreign merchants in general abandoned their trading footholds at Phố Hiến. See: Phố Hiến; Phan Huy Lê, ‘Pho Hien’, 10 22; Nguyễn Thừa Hỷ et al., Đô thị Việt Nam, ‘Chapter Three’. 720 See Chapter Two for discussions of the role of Doméa as well as its position in the commercial system along the ‘Tonkin River’. 721 Đoàn Trọng Truyến, Mầm mống Tư bản chủ nghĩa và sự phát triển của Chủ nghĩa Tư bản Việt Nam [The Seeds of Capitalism and the Development of Capitalism in Vietnam] (Hanoi: ST Publishers, 1959), 4. 722 The debate on the emergence of capitalism in Vietnam in the Early Modern and Modern Periods can be found in NCLS in the 1960s. 723 See for detailed arguments: Nguyễn Việt, ‘Bàn về mầm mống chủ nghĩa Tư bản ở Việt Nam dưới thời Phong kiến [On the Seeds of Capitalism in Vietnam in the Feudal Period]’, NCLS 35 (1962), 21 34; NCLS 36 (1962), 28 37. 724 See: Đặng Việt Thanh, ‘Vấn đề mầm mống Tư bản chủ nghĩa dưới thời Phong kiến ở Việt Nam [On the Seeds of Capitalism in Vietnam in the Period of Feudalism]’, NCLS 39 (1962), 33 43; NCLS 40 (1962), 41 47. 725 Immanuel Wallerstein, ‘From Feudalism to Capitalism: Transition or Transitions?’ Social Forces, 55/2 (1976), 273 83. See also: Claudio J. Katz, ‘Karl Marx on the Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism’, Theory and Society, 22 (1993), 363 89. 726 See M. A. P. Meilink Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indo nesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), 9. Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, II, 268 70. 727 Nguyen Thua Hy, Economic History of Hanoi, 222 34; id., ‘Kinh tế hàng hoá’. 728 BL OIOC G/12/17 4, Tonkin factory to London, 7 Dec. 1672, fo. 42. 729 See: Buch, ‘La Compagnie’ (1937), 145 58. 730 Dagh register Batavia 1675, 129 32. 731 The Deshima Dagregisters 1651 1660, ii. See also: G. K. Goodman, Japan: the Dutch Experience (London: Athlone, 1986). 732 BL OIOC G/12/17 4, Tonkin factory records, Aug. 1677, fos. 212 15. 733 Sun, ‘Chinese Military Technology’. 734 Ibid.; Nguyễn Thế Anh, ‘Traditional Vietnam’s Incorporation of External Cultural and Technical Contributions: Ambivalence and Ambiguity’, Southeast Asian Studies, 40/4 (2003), 444 58. 735 Alexandre de Rhodes, Rhodes of Vietnam, The Travels and Missions of Father

274

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Alexandre de Rhodes in China and Other Kingdoms of the Orient, tr. Solange Hertz (West minster: Newman Press, 1966), 57. 736 Baron, ‘Description of Tonqueen’, 686. 737 Ibid.; Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 54 5. 738 Rhodes, Divers voyages et missions, 70 1. 739 Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, 69. 740 Lê Quý Đôn, Phủ biên tạp lục, 328 9. See also: Nguyễn Thế Anh, ‘Traditional Vietnam’s Incorporation’: 444 58. 741 Pires, Suma Oriental, I, 114 15. 742 Generale Missiven, II, 613, 702, 779; Dagh register Batavia 1661, 49 55. 743 VOC 1278, Missive from Cornelis Valckenier to Batavia, 12 Oct. 1670, fos. 1892 1907. 744 BL OIOC G/12/17 10, Tonkin factory records, May 1693 Feb. 1694, fos. 318 45; VOC 1580, Missive from J. van Loo and Leendertsz to Batavia, 24 Dec. 1694, fos. 1 7.

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INDEX Agra, 170 Amoy, 106 Amsterdam, 88, 194 Anglo Dutch war, 54, 159 Archipel Islands, 107 Arjona, Joan D’ (Dominican monk), 195 arrack, 125 Âu Lạc (Ouluo), 12 Ayutthaya, 57, 195, 197, 206, 213 baas, 54, 102, 203, 205 Bắc Ninh, 28 Bách Việt (Baiyue), 11 Baeck, Pieter (VOC commander), 80 3 Baffart, Louis Isaacszn (VOC director), 100 Bakufu, 49 Banda, 182 Banten, 53 4, 56, 179, 181, 195, 206, 213 Baron, Hendrick (VOC director), 86 7, 94, 107 8, 113, 170, 193, 197 Baron, Samuel (EIC merchant), 27, 33, 39, 103 Baros, 179, 181 Bát Tràng, 31, 182 Batavia, 4, 6, 29, 30, 32 3, 40, 52, 55, 57, 59, 62 6, 68 80, 82 8, 91 103, 105 6, 109 17, 119 23, 126, 129 32, 135 8, 140 1, 144 9, 151 2, 154 60, 162, 165 81, 183, 185, 190 1, 193, 195, 197, 200, 211, 213, 216 19 Batsha, 39 Beer (VOC ship), 92 Bencouli, 177 Bengal, 4, 29, 122, 129, 156 7, 172, 204 Bengali silk, see silk product, 7, 158 Bijlvelt, Willem (VOC merchant), 93 Bingam (Chinese chief in Batavia), 86 bogy, 29, 146 Brack (VOC ship), 77 Brouckhorst, Antonio van (VOC director), 79, 81 2, 89, 90 3, 98, 166, 192 3, 203

Brouwer, Bastiaan (Dutch free merchant), 113, 169 Buch, W.J.M., 1, 6 Bunschoten (VOC ship), 175 6 Bưởi, 207 Burch, Johannes van der (VOC governor), 73 Cabo de Jacques (VOC ship), 103 calambac, 15, 48 Cambir, 78 Cambodia, 17, 53, 55, 57, 84 5, 103, 114, 169 armies, 84 cargoes, 150 Court, 85 King, 77, 85 maritime trade, 18 VOC factory, 84 cannon, 22, 24, 35, 63, 65, 68, 74, 83, 94, 99, 103, 114 15, 118, 125, 139 41, 211, 216 Canton, 12, 45 Cao Bằng, 19, 23, 104, 116 capados, 41, 90 4, 99 100, 109, 113, 122, 147, 154, 169 cardamom, 152 3 Caron, François, 63, 85 Cauw (VOC ship), 120 2, 218 ceramics Chinese, 30, 177, 179, 181 Tonkinese, 176, 178 83 trade, 180, 182 Vietnamese, 30 1, 45 Ceylon, 103 Chàm bay, 61 coast, 18, 77 invasion, 13 Kingdom, 13, 16, 23 King, 77, 84 seaports, 17 Chàm Islands, 68, Champa, 16 7, 34

288

index

Champullo, see Cù Lao Chàm Chao Chi, see Jiaozhi Chaophraya, 9 charkhanas, 156 China foreign trade, 178 maritime gateway, 13 maritime trade, 12 3, 15 ports, 15, 45, 62 trade, 106 China derived firearms, 35 China Formosa trade, 47 China Japan silk trade, 143 Chinese ceramics, see ceramics ceramic technology, 30 Court, 106 junks, 13, 17, 28, 45 7, 62, 75, 87, 91, 114, 119, 147, 150, 157, 178 ‘long hair pirates’, 107 merchants, 12, 18, 44 8, 74, 90 2, 104, 109, 111, 113, 143 4, 150, 153, 174, 178, 200, 206, 208 millenarian rule, 30 musk, see musk porcelain, see porcelain silk, see silk silkworms, 29 spies, 17 8, 44 traveller, 17 chios, 152, 203, 205 chiourongs, 122, 153 chop, 42 Chova (Chúa), 33, 103, 199 Chu Đậu, 31 cinnamon, 32 3, 68, 146, 151 2, 184, 203 Cirebon, 179, 181 clocks, 212 13 Cochin China, 2, 27 coins Chinese, 51, 101, 139 copper, 51 2, 76, 100 1, 111 12, 125, 130, 133 6, 138 9, 155, 166, 198 9, 201 2, 214 Japanese, 52, 136 8, 201 silver, 132, 199 Vietnamese, 133 Confucian ideology, 18, 116, 197 constables, 74, 141, 211 contraband trade, 32

copper cash, 51 2, 101, 112, 125, 127, 133, 135, 137, 199, 201 coins, see coins Coromandel Coast, 4, 7, 33, 64, 107, 171 2, 174, 184 trade, 33, 104, 111, 172 3, 175 Couckebacker, Nicolaas (VOC director), 28, 65, 67 8, 72 3, 88, 144, 146, 148 Coyett, Fredrik (VOC governor), 105, 150 Cù Lao Chàm (Champullo), 78 Đà Nẵng (Tourane), 20, 75, 77 Đại Việt,16 8, 27, 30, 31, 34, 37, 44 5, 48, 57, 206, 212 foreign trade, 16, 34, 36 economy, 133 Đại Việt sử ký toàn thư, 21, 48 Dam, Pieter van, 127, 143, 165, 169 Dampier, William, 44, 125, 171, 177, 187, 198 Đàng Ngoài, 22 Đàng Trong, 22 Davids, Isaacq (VOC representative), 75 Delfhaven (VOC ship), 97 Deshima, 177, 197 VOC factory, 98, 111, 114, 117, 131, 135, 138, 150, 157, 162, 173, 175 6, 197 VOC Council, 150 Diemen, Antonio van (VOC Governor General), 74, 80, 88 Diễn Châu, 17 Đinh Bộ Lĩnh, 133 Đinh Dynasty, 16 Discouar Gonsalvo (Castilian merchant), 171 Dolfijn (VOC ship), 84 Doméa, 32, 36 8, 40 1, 56, 96, 103, 107, 122, 140, 195, 198, 208 Domkes, Sijmon Jacobsz. (VOC com mander), 84 Đông Âu (Dongou), 11 Đồng Hới, 22 4 Đông Kinh, 19, 21, 24, 26, 73 Dutch Company, 1, 3, 7, 33, 35, 62, 67, 86, 90, 93, 118, 132, 137, 139, 141, 153, 183, 199, 201, 213 14, 216, 218 19

index merchants, 3, 61, 63, 65 7, 85, 99, 113, 184, 197 prisoners, 75 7, 84 5, 87 Republic, 177 sailors, 61 ships, 24, 52, 57, 63, 70, 75, 81, 84, 87, 128, 144 5, 159, 211 Dutch Vietnamese relations, 1, 187, 209, 216, 219 Duycker, Abraham (VOC director), 64 6, 70 1 East Asia, 54, 144, 215 East Asian trade, 1, 4, 192, 219 Edo, 49, 150 Egypt, 30 eiryaku sen, 137 elephant tusks, 12, 15, 20, 71, 88 Elseracq, Jan van (VOC president), 80, 81 English East India Company (EIC), 32, 53, 197 competitors, 132, 195 directors, 32 merchants, 52, 56, 62 trade, 32, 54 English carpenter, 32 flag, 195 ships, 54 Entrepôt, 12, 14, 48, 149 Euro Bengal trade, 204 European commercial enterprises, 3 companies, 204 countries, 69 market, 143, 167 8, 173, 177, 184 merchants, 38, 47, 118, 143, 145 Experiment (VOC ship), 211 faccaar, 98, 146, 155 firearms, 35 Fishers Island, 79 Former Lê Dynasty, 16, 130, 133 Formosa (EIC ship), 132 Formosa, 4, 6, 31, 33, 40, 47, 53, 62 4, 66, 73 4, 78, 79, 81 2, 84 6, 88, 96, 100, 104 6, 116, 126, 131 2, 137, 139, 144, 146, 149 51, 154, 157 8, 160 1, 166, 173 4, 177 8, 217 Council, 105 trade, 105, 106, 149, 151, 161, 173

289

Formosa Japan trade, 63 Fort St. George, 55, 198 France, 115 French colonization, 133 delegates, 56 King (Louis XIV), 56 merchants, 117 mission/missionaries, 56, 117 18 Fujian, 17, 178 Gaasperdam (VOC ship), 118 galliota, 147 Gamron, 173 genho tsuho, 137 Gentlemen XVII (Heren XVII), 88, 96, 121 2, 144, 154, 172, 175, 194, 211 Gianh River, 23, 74, 78 81, 82, 102, 212 Giao chi (Jiaozhi), 45 gifts, 120, 141 Gingminfoe, 107 Glamann, K., 165 Gobijn, Isaacq (VOC merchant), 81 2 gold African, 172 Chinese, 4, 7, 33, 47, 104 7, 112, 131, 158, 173 4, 176 Japanese, 33, 173, 175 6 merchants, 176 trade, 5, 176 Vietnamese, 33 Governor General, 4, 64 6, 68 9, 71 2, 74, 76 7, 80, 82, 85, 87 9, 97 8, 100, 103, 105, 109 10, 114 15, 118 23, 140 1, 168, 170, 176, 193 Graeff, Hendrik Dircsz. van den (VOC commander), 84 Gresik, 182 Grol (VOC ship), 52, 68, 146 Groot, Jan de (VOC director), 93 7, 193 Grootebroek (VOC ship), 64 5 Guangdong, 15, 178 Guangxi, 16, 33 Guangzhou, 12 3, 16 7, 107, 174, 213 Guizhou, 107, 174 Gulden Buijs (VOC ship), 74, 76 7 Gulden Gans (VOC ship), 89 Hà Tây, 28 Hà Tĩnh, 17, 45 Haarlem (VOC ship), 61

290

index

Hải Phòng, 36, 39 Han Empire, 12 Hàng Đào Street, 207 Hanoi (Thăng Long), 13, 16, 37 Haring (VOC ship), 84 Harouze, Hendrik (VOC captain), 84 5 Harten (VOC merchant), 90 Hartsinck, Carel (VOC director), 66, 68 72, 88, 91, 110, 146 8, 192 Hepu, 13, 15 Heycoop (VOC merchant), 90 Hiến Department, 207 High Government (Hoge Regering), 39, 62, 66, 70, 72 5, 77 80, 83, 86, 88, 91 101, 103 4, 107, 109 10, 112 18, 120 3, 130, 135, 144, 170, 174 5, 178, 190, 192 3, 195, 210 11, 218 Hillegaersbergh (VOC ship), 152 Hirado, 28, 52, 62, 65, 67, 72, 144, 146, 173, 192, 197 Hizen, 31, 177 Hồ Dynasty, 18, 133 Hồ Quý Ly, 18 hockiens, 54, 122, 152, 203, 205 Senuasche, 152 Hội An, 21, 48, 50, 52 3, 61 8, 74 8, 84 7, 144, 149 Holland, 121, 132, 169, 213 King, 81 Prince, 82 Hồng River, 14, 19 20, 28, 32, 36, 50, 57, 147, 190, 106 Hồng River Delta, 11, 13 4, 26, 50, 57, 215 Hoogcapel (VOC ship), 116, 159 Hooglanden (VOC ship), 114 horses, 88, 142 Arabian, 139, 141 hour glasses, 212 Hundred Việt (Baiyue), 11 Hưng Hoá, 107 India, 4, 103, 106, 143, 170, 174 5, 181, 198 Indian factories, 173 pagodas, 176 rupees, 199 silk goods, 157 Sub Continent, 172, 182 textiles, 4, 125

trade, 172 yarn, 157 Indo China, 1, 103 Indo Chinese, 9, 55, 57, 62, 70, 85, 144, 216 Indonesia, 30 Indonesian archipelago, 4, 103 Indragiri, 173 intra Asian trade, 3 5, 143, 172, 184, 218 19 Iquan (Zheng Zhilong), 90, 150 junks, 150 Irrawady, 9 Itchien (Chinese merchant), 113 14 itowappu, 34, 51, 91, 149 51, 153, 157 Iwao, Seiichi, 49, 138 Janszoon, Evert (VOC assistant), 197 Japan, 4 7, 27 33, 41, 44, 46 54, 59, 62 3, 67 70, 79 82, 85 6, 89, 91 4, 96 102, 105 6, 110 14, 116 17, 119, 125 32, 134, 136, 143, 144 63, 165 7, 170, 173, 177, 179, 181 4, 190 5, 197, 205, 210 11, 213, 217 18 trade, 4, 34, 52 4, 62, 70, 119, 127, 144 5, 150, 157, 161 2, 165, 168, 172, 218 19 VOC factory, 66, 173, 190 Japanese copper coins, see coins copper zeni, see zeni Government, 33, 49, 51 2, 54, 119, 136, 138, 144, 173, 175, 176, 199 maritime prohibition, 35 market, 5, 29, 52, 67, 91, 100, 111, 119, 136, 146, 149, 154 5, 157 8, 162, 184, 202, 215, 218 officials, 46 7, 91, 113 14, 193 porcelain, see porcelain printed screens, 141 printed textiles, 141 silver, see silver yakan, 125 Jansen, Jacob (VOC captain), 74 Java, 173, 182 Javanese merchants, 17, 30 port towns, 206 rice, 118 Jesuits, 187, 194 5 Jiaozhi, 15, 45

index Jiaozhou, 15 Jingdezhen, 177 Justice Council, 113 kaikin (Japanese maritime prohibition), 35 Kampaku, 48 Kampen (VOC ship), 96, 154 kasjes, 52, 127 Kauthara, 18 Keijser, Jacob (VOC director), 93 4, 97, 99 100, 193 keisei, 197 Kemphaan (VOC ship), 63 Khúc Dynasty, 16 Khuyến Lương, 46 Kievit (VOC ship), 77, 79 80, 82 4 Klein, P. W., 156, 161, 163 koban, 173, 176 kronen, 128 kruisdaalders, 132, 199 Lạc Việt (Luoyue), 11 2 lacquerware, 31 2 Tonkinese, 32, 54 Lamotius, Johannes (VOC commander), 79 Lạng Sơn, 107 Laos, 17, 33 4, 107, 169, 173 Lascars, 189 Lê Anh Tông (Emperor), 20 Lê Code, 19, 45, 196 Lê Dynasty, 18 9, 21, 30, 44 5, 133, 206 Lê Hoàn (King), 133 Lê Lợi (Emperor), 18 Lê Mạc wars, 21, 31 Lê Thần Tông (Emperor), 198 Lê Trang Tông (Emperor), 19 Lê/Trịnh, 23, 34, 66, 104, 207, 212 armies/troops, 21 authorities, 35 Court, 19, 40, 98, 105, 117, 153, 175, 195, 215 domain, 47, 67, 184 Government, 35, 55, 73, 104, 194 5, 199 200, 210 Kingdom, 121 2 rulers, 7, 21, 23, 35, 38, 56, 59, 68, 104, 125, 131, 134, 135, 138, 174, 210 11 leeuwendaalders, 128 Leeuwerik (VOC ship), 84

291

Leiden (VOC ship), 61 Lemaire (VOC governor), 150 Li, Tana, 2 Lieberman, Victor B., 3 Liesvelt, Jacob van (VOC captain), 74 6, 78, 82 3 Lillo (VOC ship), 84 Linga, Jan van (VOC captain), 77 9 loas, 54 Loktjouw, 107 9 London, 28 9, 32, 47, 53 5 Loo, Jacob van (VOC director), 120, 122, 142 Louis XIV (King of France), 56 Lý Dynasty, 16 7, 27, 133 Lý Thái Tông (King), 16 lysee, 199 Maasland (VOC ship), 92 Mạc Đăng Dung, 19 Mạc agent, 19 clan, 23, 73, 104, 116 Dynasty, 19, 21, 25, 34, 45, 114, 116, 133, 141, 211 usurpation, 19 Macao, 24, 50 1, 61, 101, 107, 117, 134, 137, 143, 147 8, 194 Macao Japan trade, 50 Madras, 55 Maetsuyker, Joan (VOC Governor Gen eral), 103 Makassar, 173 Malacca, 45, 50, 173, 213 14 Malay Archipelago, 61 Mân Chung (Minzhong), 12 Mân Việt (Minyue), 11 Manchu, 148, 177 armies/soldiers, 103 4 invasion, 148 military campaigns, 170 violence, 171 Manila, 54 6, 117, 169, 173, 213 project, 54 Governor, 55, 169 Maria de Medicis (VOC ship), 74,76 7 Marxist theories, 209 Meerman (VOC ship), 77, 81 Mekong River, 85 Delta, 10

292

index

Meliskerken (VOC ship), 106 7, 140 mestizo, 197 Mexican rials, 132, 199 Ming Dynasty, 46, 104, 116, 143, 177 Empire, 16 forces/troops, 16, 103 invasion/occupation, 18, 30, 44, 133 intervention, 104 loyalists, 178 Ming Qing conflict, 104 Minister of Justice, 43 Miyako, 150 Mỗ, 207 Moluccas, 218 Momoki, Shiro, 17 mongo, 157 Mongol conquest of China, 44 invasion of Vietnam, 17 8 invaders/troops, 16 8 Moor, 198 Mughal Emperor, 174 Mulberry damage to, 100, 152, 155 groves/grounds, 100 1, 112, 152, 155, 159, 204, 206 crops, 202 trees, 28 9 musk, 5, 33, 47, 52, 55, 104 9, 111 12, 117, 119, 125 6, 151, 158, 168 71, 184 Chinese, 7, 104, 131, 169 71, 219 Laotian, 100, 169 trade, 33, 169 71, 175 Nachod, Oskar, 156 Nachtegael, Hendrick Zansz (VOC direc tor), 66 Nagasaki, 34, 46 7, 53, 91, 100, 113 14, 130, 136, 144, 147, 149 51, 153 5, 157 9, 162, 166, 193, 213 Governor, 149 50 trade coins, 136 7 VOC factory, 81, 96, 218 Nam Hải (Nanhai), 12 Nam Việt (Nanyue), 11 2 Nan Ming Dynasty, 116, 137, 170 Nanking, 174 Nanning, 108 Narai (King of Siam), 32 Nationaal Archief, 6

navet, 134, 147 Neck, Jacob van (VOC admiral), 61 Nes, Gerrit van (VOC merchant), 120 Netherlands, 4, 6 7, 28 9, 32 3, 52, 101, 104, 111 12, 119 20, 125, 128, 130 2, 141, 144 5, 150 1, 158 60, 164 72, 175, 177, 191, 211 Nghệ An, 17, 19, 22, 45, 102, 194 Ngô Dynasty, 16 Nguyễn Hoàng, 20, 21, 24, 26 Nguyễn armies/soldiers, 24, 80 3, 102 domain/Kingdom, 62, 66, 69 70, 73, 86, 217 invasion of Cambodia, 57 navy, 80 1 rivals, 6, 35, 50, 68, 70 rulers, 21, 49, 61 2, 65 6, 70, 74 6, 78, 80, 82, 84, 86 7, 96, 136, 212 13, 216 separatists, 23 Nguyễn Kim, 19 20 Nguyên Phong (Yuanfeng), 137 Nguyễn Phúc Lan, 70, 85 Nguyễn Phúc Tần, 86 Nguyen Thanh Nha, 2, 202 Nguyễn Uông, 20 Nova Macao, 107 oban, 173 Ongiadee (Tonkinese mandarin), 100, 169 Ongia Haen (Tonkinese mandarin), 109 Ongiatule (Tonkinese mandarin), 41, 90, 93 5, 97, 99, 154 Ongiavun (Tonkinese mandarin), 90 Ongsjadert (Tonkinese mandarin), 90 Ontjenudgween (Tonkinese mandarin), 90 Osaka, 150 pagodas, see Indian Palembang, 75, 182 Paliacatta, 175 Pallu (French priest), 56 Panduranga, 18 Paracels, 64 Patani, 61 2 Council, 62 Pearl (EIC ship), 198 Pegu, 206, 54 Peking, 104 6, 112, 138, 175 pelings, 54, 118, 119, 122, 152 3, 166 8, 170, 203, 205

index pepper, 4, 117, 125 Persia, 4, 149, 165, 173 VOC factory, 173 Persian silk, see silk wares, 181 Phan Rang, 18 Phaulkon, Constantine, 32 Phiên Ngu (Panyu), 12 Philippines, 30, 182 Phnompenh, 84 5 Phương Đôi, 39 Pires, Tomé, 9, 34, 45 Platvoet (Graeff, Hendrik Dircsz. van den VOC commander), 84 Plinlochiu (Tonkinese mandarin), 110 porcelain Chinese, 30 1, 177 8 Japanese, 177, 179, 183 Hizen, see Hizen trade, 177 Portuguese competitors, 51, 62 junks/vessels, 51, 62, 147 merchants, 35, 50 1, 148 missionaries/priets, 35, 50, 195 trade, 51 traveller, 27 Prakash, Om, 204 precious metals, 2, 35, 46, 144, 172, 183, 199, 204 provintiëndaalders, 132, 199

293

Quemoy, 106 Quinam (VOC ship), 63 Quinam, 1 3, 5 6, 8, 10, 22, 24, 42 3, 48 53, 57, 59, 61 7, 69 80, 82 8, 96, 101 4, 111 15, 123, 134, 137, 139 40, 148 9, 158, 187, 210 18 Quinamese, 75, 78 armies, 82 captives/prisoners, 75, 77, 84 7 mandarins/officials, 75 navy, 75, 211 silk, see silk

Qin

raw silk, see silk Raychaudhuri, Tapan, 175 Red River Delta, see Hồng River Delta Regemortes, Pieter van (VOC director), 84 5 Reid, Anthony, 2 Reniers, Carel (VOC Governor General), 97, 193 Republic, see Dutch Republic Resimon (Japanese merchant), 55 6, 93 4, 109 10, 112, 135, 169 71, 176, 201, 213 Rhodes, Alexandre de (French priest), 9, 11, 19, 27, 85, 136, 194, 212 Riebeeck, Jan van (VOC merchant), 90, 92, 192, 194 Rooden, Juriaen de (VOC sailor), 77 rosenobels, 172 rumals, 156 Ruyll, Alber Cornelisz, 61 Ryukyan delegation, 48

Dynasty, 11 Empire, 12 occupation of northern Vietnam, 12 Qin Shihuang (Emperor), 11 Qing armies, 103, 112, 116 Dynasty, 19, 23, 31, 104, 106, 138, 177 8 soldiers, 169, 175 quan, 142, 133 Quảng Bình, 20 Quảng Nam, 20 1, 26 Quảng Ngãi, 20, 78 Quảng Ninh, 17, 47, 106, 131 Quảng Trị, 20 Quảng Yên, 47 8, 208 Quế Lâm (Guilin), 12

Saigon, 23 Santa Catarina (Portuguese vessel), 177 satijntges, 152 Schillemans, Philip (VOC director), 40, 92 3, 97, 139, 153, 192 3 schuitzilver, 128 Senuasche hockiens, see hockiens shallow draught flute ships, 39 40 shichusen, 136 Shimabara Rebellion, 194 shuin sen, 34, 45, 48 9, 51 2, 67, 136, 144 Siam, 18, 32, 56 7, 62, 66, 84, 150, 169, 191, 197, 213, 234 Siamese ambassador, 57 court, 32

294

index

King, 57 merchants, 17, 57 rice, 57 trade, 57 vessels, 114 Sibens, Johannes (VOC director), 120 Sichuan, 169 silk auctions, 29, 150 Bengali, 5, 99, 129 30, 149, 153 8, 162 3, 218 Chinese, 5, 16, 48, 51 2, 62, 91, 143 4, 146, 149, 153, 157, 160, 163, 165, 206, 218 industry, 112, 202, 204 6 market, 119, 150 merchants, 157 Persian, 147, 149, 151, 153 4, 165 piece goods, 4, 5, 7, 27 8, 47, 52, 54, 59, 68 70, 94, 96, 101, 111 12, 114, 117, 119, 122, 125, 131, 143 55, 159 61, 165 8, 171, 184, 202, 204 5, 219 20 production, 28, 101, 110, 158, 162, 205 Quinamese, 146 raw, 4 5, 27 8, 34, 41, 47, 51, 55, 59, 68 70, 89, 91, 93 4, 96, 111, 114, 117, 119 20, 130, 143, 145 55, 157 9, 161 2, 165 6, 168, 170, 184, 202 5, 207, 219 20 Tonkinese, 5, 28 9, 34, 46, 49, 51 2, 54, 66 7, 69 70, 79, 85, 91, 98 100, 102, 110 11, 117, 119, 127 31, 143, 145 68, 171, 179, 183 4, 192, 202, 206, 210, 213, 218 19 Vietnamese, 7, 27 8, 67, 156, 215 silkworms, 29, 101 silver bullion, 4, 125, 138 coins, 132, 199 ingot, 132 Japanese, 4, 5, 34, 46, 49, 52, 53, 70, 112, 127 32, 143, 145, 152, 199 200 Mallacx, 128 trade, 34, 53, 135, 218 sitouw, 152 smuggling, 32 Snoecq, Dircq (VOC director), 157 Sơn Nam, 28

Sơn Tây, 28 Song Dynasty, 16, 44, 137 South China Sea, 17, 18, 34 South Seas, 13, 180 81 South East Asia, 2, 35, 53, 61, 173, 179, 181, 184, 196, 216 Spanish, 54 6, 117 ‘interloper’, 55 rials, 128, 199 silver, 54 wine, 141 Sui Dynasty, 13 Suma Oriental, 27 Sumatra West Coast, 173, 177, 182 sumptuary laws, 149 Surat, 132, 172, 218 rupees, 132, 199 Taiwan, 4, 190 Tang Dynasty, 17 Tavernier, J. B., 27 Tây Âu (Xiou), 12 Tây Kinh, 19 textiles, 28, 44, 48, 53, 122, 141, 157, 183, 192, 204, 209 European, 47, 104, 117, 125, 139 Indian, 4 Japanese, 141 Tonkinese, 165 Thái Bình regnal title, 133 estuary, 39 40 province, 205 river, 36, 40 1, 79 Thái Nguyên, 107, 174 Thăng Long, 3, 7, 16, 19, 21, 28 9, 31 4, 36 8, 40 1, 43, 46 8, 54, 56, 72 4, 80 1, 86, 88, 90, 94, 97 8, 101, 104 6, 108 13, 117 18, 120, 122 3, 130 1, 133 5, 138, 141, 147 8, 151, 153, 155, 158 60, 166 7, 169, 171, 174 5, 178 9, 185, 189 92, 195, 198, 201, 204, 206 8, 211, 213, 215 17, 219 Thanh Hoá, 17, 19, 118 Thành Thế Vỹ, 1 Thanh Trì, 46 Thanh Nghệ, 19, 21 The Hague, 6 Thenlongfoe, 108 Theuuw Baeuw Quun Congh, 193

index Thiên Phúc (regnal title), 133 Thiếu Bảo Quận Công, 98, 193 Thừa Thiên Huế, 20 Thuận Hoá, 20 1, 24, 26 Thun (pirate), 107 tiền, 133, 205 Tiên Lãng, 36, 39 Timor, 182 Tinnam, 106 9, 131 river, 108 strategy, 106, 109, 111, 158, 219, 219 plan, 110 project, 110 trade, 108 9 Tokugawa Iemitsu, 49 Tokugawa Shogunate, 149, 176, 215 Tonkin commodity economy, 6 7, 207 9, 215 factory (EIC), 54 5 factory (VOC), 6 7, 79, 86, 92 3, 97 8, 100 1, 104 7, 109 14, 116 23, 125, 131, 132, 138, 146, 148, 150, 154 6, 158 9, 162, 166, 168 71, 174 6, 190, 192, 197, 218 20, 227, 230 Gulf, 13, 15, 36, 44, 56, 79, 81, 107 market, 70, 112, 168 9, 174, 176, 201 River, 3, 7, 39 trade, 1, 6, 7, 49, 54 5, 68, 91 3, 95, 97, 99 104, 110 11, 113, 116 19, 121 3, 127, 130 2, 138, 145, 147, 149, 153 5, 158, 160, 162, 166 8, 170, 184, 190 3, 199, 205, 211, 217 19 Tonkin China border trade, 33, 47, 104 5, 107, 113, 117, 171, 219 Tonkin Japan silk trade, 7, 29, 46 7, 91, 113, 116, 145, 147 8, 158 60, 179, 184, 217 Tonkin Manila trade, 55 6 Tonkin Quinam crisis, 214 Tonkin Quinam wars/conflict, 8, 10, 210 11 Tonkinese ambassador, 72, 75 armies/soldiers, 22, 80, 102, 211 12 delegation, 72 silk, see silk toraisen, 136 Toulougbauw, 179

295

Toyotomi Hideyoshi (Japanese Kampaku), 48 Trần Dynasty, 16 8, 30, 133 Traudenius, Paulus (VOC governor), 63, 74, 79 Trịnh Kingdom, 121 2 rulers, 25, 35, 43, 49 50, 57, 59, 64, 66 71, 73, 79, 81, 83, 86, 88, 90, 94 5, 99 104, 106,0,9022 cm 109 10, 114, 118, 121 3, 125, 131, 134 5, 138 40, 174, 183, 199 200, 210 11, 216, 217 18 Trịnh Căn, 72, 118 19, 122, 168 Trịnh Kiểm, 19 20 Trịnh Tạc, 90, 99, 103, 115, 118, 140, 141, 168, 211 Trịnh Tráng, 49, 66, 71 4, 78 81, 86, 88 90, 94 5, 97 9, 139, 193, 212 Trịnh Tùng, 21 Tượng (Xiang), 12 Turkey, 30 Tuyên Quang, 107 Twelve Year Truce, 103 Vân Đồn, 17 9 Vanning, 108 Văn Úc estuary, 40 Verdonk, Hendrick (VOC director), 113, 193 Verstegen, Willem (VOC representative), 86, 87, 96 9, 154 Vietnam, 2, 3, 8 15, 17 8, 27 30, 33, 35, 39, 44 5, 47 52, 54 7, 59, 61 2, 64 8, 83, 85, 101, 104 5, 107, 116 17, 128 9, 132 9, 145 6, 148, 154 5, 158 9, 162, 165, 174, 176, 178 9, 183, 195, 200, 202, 204 5, 208 10, 212, 217 9 foreign trade, 1 2, 6 Vietnamese ceramics, see ceramics coins, see coins gold, see gold maritime trade, 5, 10 1, 15 merchants, 47, 104 5, 107, 169, 175 rulers, 10, 33, 35, 45 6, 141, 215 seamen/sailors, 213 silk, see silk Volker T., 180, 182 Vos (VOC ship), 80 1, 83

296

index

Waite, Nicolas (English merchant), 56 wako, 143 Waterhond (VOC ship), 80 1, 83 weapons Chinese style, 24, 212 West Coast, see Sumatra Westbroek (VOC ship), 173, 182 Whit Monday, 92 Whitmore J. K., 2, 133 Wijdenes (VOC ship), 79 80, 83 Witte Valk (VOC ship), 96 wooden mock ups, 141 Wonderaer, Jeronimus (Dutch merchant), 61 Xuwen, 13, 15

Yên Bái, 146 Yunnan, 33, 107, 168 9, 171, 174 5 Zandvoort, 79, 146 Zeelandia Castle, 33, 66, 94, 106, 173, 190 Zeeridder (VOC ship), 175 6 Zeeuwsche Nachtegaal (VOC ship) Zenefay, 146 zeni, 101, 112, 125, 127, 132 9, 200 1 Zheng Chenggong (Coxinga), 105 6, 157, 174 Zheng belligerence, 110 embargo, 174 rivals, 31 Zheng Zhilong, see Iquan Zwarte Beer (VOC ship), 89, 152