Silent Coup of the Guardians: The Influence of U.S. Military Elites on National Security 0700633987, 9780700633982

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[128.104.46.206] Project MUSE (2024-03-03 14:41 GMT) UW-Madison Libraries

silent coup of the guardians

William A. Taylor, Editor

Silent Coup of the Guardians The Influence of U.S. Military Elites on National Security Todd Andrew Schmidt

University Press of Kansas

© 2023 by the University Press of Kansas All rights reserved Published by the University Press of Kansas (Lawrence, Kansas 66045), which was organized by the Kansas Board of Regents and is operated and funded by Emporia State University, Fort Hays State University, Kansas State University, Pittsburg State University, the University of Kansas, and Wichita State University. Names: Schmidt, Todd Andrew, author. Title: Silent coup of the guardians : the influence of U.S. military elites on national security / Todd Andrew Schmidt. Other titles: Influence of US military elites on national security Description: Lawrence : University Press of Kansas, [2023] | Series: Studies in civil-military relations | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2022014510 (print) | LCCN 2022014511 (ebook) ISBN 9780700633982 (cloth) | ISBN 9780700633999 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Civil-military relations—United States. | National security— United States—Decision making. | United States—Armed Forces—Officials and employees—Interviews. | Elite (Social sciences)—United States. | BISAC: POLITICAL SCIENCE / American Government / Executive Branch | HISTORY / Military / United States Classification: LCC JK330 .S36 2023 (print) | LCC JK330 (ebook) | DDC 322/.50973—dc23/eng/20220810 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022014510. LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022014511.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data is available. Printed in the United States of America 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 The paper used in this publication is acid free and meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48–1992.

Dedication

To my dear brother, Trent Stephen Schmidt November 25, 1975–February 11, 2011 A loving son, a caring minister, a prolific poet, a courageous warrior, a dedicated friend. A member of the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team—Sky Soldiers—and a noncommissioned officer, the backbone of our United States Army. U.S. Army Sergeant Trent Schmidt was a veteran of Afghanistan, fighting in Logar Province out of Combat Outpost Charkh—the “Charkh Tank.” He was a respected military intelligence analyst and interrogator, trusted by his subordinates, peers, and leadership for his exceptional skill sets. Trent lost his best friend Matt “Matty” Hennigan, on June 20, 2010, in a firefight in vicinity of Tangi Valley and Combat Outpost Shank. He was designated to escort Matty home to his family, leaving a part of himself in Afghanistan that he would never recover. I consider my younger brother to be a casualty of war—“collateral damage” in the cold vernacular of military conflict. I believe Trent suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder. He returned home to our parents while on official leave, en route to assignment with U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, but died in a head-on collision just a few short miles from his boyhood home in Greenwood, Indiana. A native Hoosier, Trent was a graduate of Greenwood High School, a recognized student leader and star athlete in varsity football, wrestling, and track and field. It would be hard to find a better, safer, more wholesome place to grow up and develop as a young man than Greenwood and the greater Johnson County area—nurtured by family, friends, church, and community. He graduated from Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis and Indiana Bible College with concentrated studies in political science, philosophy, religion, and French. Sergeant Trent Schmidt’s awards and decorations include the Combat Action Badge, Army Commendation Medal, Army Achievement Medal, Afghanistan Campaign Medal, Global War on Terrorism Medal, Army Parachutist Badge, and Air Assault Badge. A signed certificate from the President of the United States hangs in my parents’ home, much like, I suspect,

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too many other Gold Star families. Beneath the presidential seal, it reads, “The United States of America honors the memory of Trent S. Schmidt. This certificate is awarded by a grateful nation in recognition of devoted and selfless consecration to the service of our country in the Armed Forces of the United States.”

Trent was more than a brother to me—he was a brother-in-arms. He challenged me, grounded me, and loved me. I wish, more than anything, that I could have better understood the emotional and psychological pain he suffered. I wish I could have broken through his warrior stoicism.

Regardless of the nature of the political culture in which he lives, the modern military officer is oriented toward maximizing his influence in politics and policy. In nations with highly institutionalized political systems, the military attempts to exert its influence over the making of national security policy . . . ineffective governments frequently find that they are unable to control their military establishments, which come to exercise independent political power. We refer to such armies as praetorian. —Amos Perlmutter and Valerie Bennett, The Political Influence of the Military (1980)

Contents

List of Figures and Tables Acknowledgments Disclaimer

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List of Acronyms Preface

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Introduction

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Chapter One: Military Elites and Praetorian Propensities Chapter Two: Genesis of the Guardians Chapter Three: The Scholarly Road Map

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Chapter Four: Military Elites as an Epistemic Community Chapter Five: The Role and Influence of Military Elites Chapter Six: Conclusions

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Appendix A: Sample Population Appendix B: Wave One

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Appendix C: Wave Two

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Appendix D: Interview Methodology

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Appendix E: Military Elite Conceptual Attributes and Theoretical Implications 214 Appendix F: Analysis of the National Security Strategies of the United States 216 References Index

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List of Figures and Tables

figures Figure 1: Confidence in the Military as an Institution, 1981–2017 122 Figure 2: Policy Overlap 144 Figure 3: Percentage of Military-Centric Content, NSS Documents, 1987–2017 173 Figure 4: Discretionary Budget Authority (Billions), DOD and DOS, 2000–2024 (Estimated) 176

tables Table 1: Military Elites 28 Table 2: Conceptual Attributes of Epistemic Communities 85 Table 3: Criteria for Selection and Presentation of Raw Data 86

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Acknowledgments

“Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?” said Alice. “That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,” said the Cat. “I don’t much care where—” said Alice. “Then it doesn’t matter which way you go,” said the Cat. “—so long as I get SOMEWHERE,” Alice added as an explanation. “Oh, you’re sure to do that,” said the Cat, “if you only walk long enough.” —Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (1865)

Thank you to several individuals and organizations that made this book possible. The leadership and staff of the School of Advanced Military Studies and the Advanced Strategic Planning and Policy Program fully approved of my work and continue to support my educational endeavors. Thank you to Ambassador David Miller, Colonel (Retired) Mike Shaler, Harvard’s Belfer Center, Stanford’s Hoover Institution, and those that assisted in the many incredible interviews conducted during the study that underpins this book. Thank you to many of the directors and senior faculty across multiple departments and centers at the United States Military Academy at West Point; the staffs of the Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth; the Watson Library, University of Kansas; and the National Defense University, Archives and Special Collections. Not many fully understand the important role of think tanks in our society and system of government. One of the many benefits they provide, particularly in times of hyper-partisanship and polarization, is a neutral or semineutral ground for experts, academics, and practitioners to find solutions to our most wicked policy problems. I would like to thank the following think tanks for providing immeasurable and invaluable service to our nation through their scholars: the American Enterprise Institute Atlantic Council, Brookings Institution, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, and Center for a New American Security. A special thank-you to all the incredible public servants and senior retired officials who provided support for my research. The list is too long to name them all. However, there are some that stand out as having helped inspire, motivate, and conceive this book in its current form in some way. They answered xiii

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questions, facilitated access to fellow elites, questioned my assumptions and biases, and helped me understand the greater purpose of this work beyond the findings. They include (in alphabetical order): Ambassador Richard Armitage, Lieutenant General David Barno, General James Cartwright, General George Casey, Mrs. Michelle Flournoy, Mr. Stephen Hadley, General Carter Ham, General Michael Hayden, General James Jones, General George Joulwan, Lieutenant General Don Kerrick, Lieutenant General Robert Kimmitt, Lieutenant General Doug Lute, Mr. John McLaughlin, Ambassador Deborah McCarthy, Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster, Ambassador David Miller, Mr. Frank Miller, General Richard Myers, General David Perkins, General David Petraeus, Ambassador Thomas Pickering, Vice Admiral John Poindexter, General Colin Powell, General Dennis Reimer, General Peter Schoomaker, Lieutenant General Ricky Waddell, Lieutenant General Eric Wesley, and Mr. Robert Work. To currently serving senior executive and active-duty military service members, Department of Defense and Department of State civilians, and the National Security Council Staff, thank you for taking very limited and valuable time to share your experiences and observations. The willingness of these public servants to give generously of their time to a PhD student strengthens my faith that, beneath an exceptionally rancorous political environment, there remains a deep core of committed individuals, past and present, who stand ready to serve when called, again and again. In the Department of Political Science at the University of Kansas: thank you, Dr. Mariya Omelicheva, for your patience and faith in my efforts. I am humbled by the amount of time and work you invested in my journey. Special thanks also go to Dr. Don Haider-Markel for demonstrating gracious patience during my periodic pop-ins; Dr. Mark Joslyn, always ready with a smile, encouragement, and “work around” for any bureaucratic hurdle; Dr. John Kennedy, a tremendously supportive methods coach that gave more than I deserved; and Dr. Adrian Lewis, the inaugural recipient of the Pittaway Military History Professorship and the go-to for just about every military officer that comes through KU for their PhD. RLTW! Faculty outside of my department who provided significant feedback and consultation include Dr. Alesha Doan and Dr. Jay Johnson. The training, development, methods, and feedback required to conduct this study were a combined effort of these tremendous scholars. Finally, I would like to thank Ms. Joyce Harrison, Dr. Bill Taylor, and the entire team at the University Press of Kansas. Thanks as well to so many scholars and academics from other institutions that I cold-called out of the blue to interview, ask questions, and seek advice and input, including Dr. Andrew Bacevich, Dr. Richard Betts, Dr. Stephen Biddle, Dr. John Burke, Dr. Anthony Cordesman, Dr. Jason Dempsey, Dr. Peter Feaver, Mr. Jason Galui, Dr. Peter Haas, Dr. Fred Kagan, Dr. Tim

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Kane, Dr. Richard Kohn, Dr. Marxen Kyriss, Dr. Pete Mansoor, Dr. Suzanne Nielsen, Mr. David Rothkopf, Dr. Nadia Schadlow, Dr. Pete Schifferle, Mr. Richard Sinnreich, Dr. Don Snider, Dr. Heidi Urben, Dr. Stephen Walker, Dr. Jaron Wharton, and Dr. Andrew Whiskeyman. To my parents: you have invested so much into my life that I will never be able to either fathom or repay. Thank you for raising me with traditional values to guide my steps, to seek a liberal education, to think independently, to travel the world, and to invite adventure and discovery . . . a yearning to learn, achieve, and accomplish. To my brother and sister: thank you for challenging me to be a better person, for helping to form who I am. To my sister: your unconditional love and spirit bind our family, and it is one of the great honors of my life to be called your brother. To my wife: you are the best thing that ever happened to me. You saved me from myself and continue to wrap me in your love. Although it may be cliché, you make me strive to be a better version of myself each and every day. Thank you for supporting my personal and professional endeavors and for your patience and perseverance during our long and multiple geographical separations. You are the love of my life, and I am very fortunate to have you as my best friend and wife. I love you, and I love being your husband. I have been and continue to be exceptionally blessed.

Disclaimer

I conducted this research with the approval of the U.S. Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) and the University of Kansas. The original manuscript was submitted to SAMS for accountability, tracking, review, and feedback. Two SAMS faculty members attended the public defense of this study, and one SAMS faculty member reviewed the book manuscript, recommending publication. Final manuscript submission to the publisher was approved through official U.S. Army Public Affairs channels. Regardless, there is an expectation of academic freedom as long I do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations and security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. This is an academic endeavor that offers fresh, maybe even controversial, perspectives in the interest of encouraging debate and further study. Sample concepts and ideas that inform this book have been previously published as opinion articles in the U.S. Army War College’s War Room online journal; the United States Military Academy’s Modern War Institute online journal; the Association of the United States Army’s ARMY magazine; and the Pacific Council on International Policy’s online magazine. The analysis, findings, conclusions, arguments, and opinions expressed in this book are those of the author. The names of people, organizations, and institutions listed or mentioned in this book are not an indication of endorsement. They have neither offered nor been solicited for an endorsement of the findings or my opinion related to the implications of the findings. Additionally, the views of this book do not reflect official positions or policies of the U.S Government, Department of Defense, the United States Army, the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, the School of Advanced Military Studies, the officer corps of the military, or the University of Kansas Department of Political Science. They belong to the author, along with any flaws, biases, and errors that may exist. And finally, in accordance with recommendations made in this book, proceeds will be donated to the U.S. Diplomatic Studies Foundation. The objective of the foundation is to support the professional development of our nation’s diplomatic corps on par with counterparts in the military and other agencies. The foundation’s programs include a groundbreaking “Peace Games” program that brings together representatives from the interagency xvii

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community to work through challenges related to crisis management, stabilization operations, war termination, and winning the peace. Please consider supporting their efforts by visiting www.usdiplomaticstudies.foundation.

List of Acronyms

APNSA ASP3 AUSA CIA CJCS CMR COCOM D/CIA DAP DASD DHS DOD DOE DOJ DOS FBI FOIA FPA GAO HQDA IR IRB JCS NATO NSC NSS OPTEMPO OSD OSD-P ROTC SAMS SAP SCIF SES

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Advanced Strategic Planning and Policy Program Association of the United States Army Central Intelligence Agency Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff civil-military relations Combatant Commander Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Deputy Assistant to the President Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Department of Homeland Security Department of Defense Department of Energy Department of Justice Department of State Federal Bureau of Investigation Freedom of Information Act foreign policy analysis General Accounting Office Headquarters, Department of the Army international relations Institutional Review Board Joint Chiefs of Staff North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Security Council National Security Strategy operational tempo Office of the Secretary of Defense Office of the Secretary of Defense, Policy Reserve Officers Training Corps School of Advanced Military Studies Special Assistant to the President sensitive compartmented information facility Senior Executive Service xix

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TRADOC USAF USD-P USMC USN

Training and Doctrine Command United States Air Force Under Secretary of Defense, Policy United States Marine Corps United States Navy

Preface

There is no neutrality. There is only greater or less awareness of one’s biases. —Phyllis Rose, Writing on Women (1985), 77

As a young U.S. Army officer selecting books from the Army’s recommended reading list, I read Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the State. However, being assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division, I was more captivated by Anton Myrer’s novel Once an Eagle. I revisited Huntington and Myrer multiple times over the next two decades, gaining a better understanding of the content and main characters with each reading. I began to see how both books inform one another as to how the military sees itself and its place in society through dueling role conceptions—the salty “muddy boots” soldier most at home in distant trenches with fellow troops versus the politically sophisticated, well-educated warrior more at ease among civil society elites in the government warrens of the nation’s capital. The exact moment I became truly absorbed in the study of civil-military relations was during the first weeks of a deployment to Kandahar, Afghanistan, in 2004. I was standing in the blistering summer heat outside a dusty, olive-drab canvas tent that doubled as a company command post and sleeping quarters. Surrounded by Hesco barriers and burlap sandbags next to the tarmac of Kandahar International Airport, I watched U.S. and allied cargo aircraft, fighter jets, and helicopters landing and taking off at all hours of the day and night, knowing these same capabilities were simultaneously ongoing throughout Afghanistan, in Iraq, and around the world. The epiphany in that moment of the incredible power projection capabilities of the United States was awe-inspiring. A couple years later, as a young major fresh out of Georgetown University’s School of Public Policy, I found myself working in the immediate office of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. On my first day, at the coffee station in his outer office, the secretary—wearing a crisp light-blue collared button-down shirt, a gray fleece vest, and that ever-present twinkle in his eye—wished me a chipper “Good morning, major!” I admit that I was a bit starstruck. xxi

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As a junior field-grade officer in the Pentagon, I often sat quietly, almost invisible, in the back of meeting rooms inside of sensitive compartmented information facilities (SCIFs) taking notes while senior military and civilian leadership discussed strategic policy issues. It was curious seeing how high-ranking civilians—appointed for jobs in which they had little or no experience or expertise—regularly deferred to their military advisers on important decisions. I was confused. The power dynamic did not match my preconceived notions of the nexus of civilian and military leadership. Who was really in control?

There are, no doubt, extraordinary civilian elites who are immensely qualified to do the jobs to which they are appointed. Several were interviewed for this study. They possess an exceptional understanding and comprehension of strategic policy and politics. Just as important, they are phenomenal leaders. Many have served in the military or have immediate family members serving in the military. Regardless of how they serve the nation, they have skin in the game. Qualified civilian elites are a minority, however, in a rapidly shrinking pool of civil servant talent and human capital. In greater context, there is a dangerous trend of anti-intellectualism in American society that is increasingly reflected in a growing population of novice civilian officials, elected and appointed, who are terribly—even dangerously—underqualified. Often, their views, incompetence, and backgrounds limit their potential and prevent them from fulfilling traditional roles, responsibilities, and duties in their parent institution for the jobs to which they were elected or appointed. Novice political actors are, many times, narrowly focused on partisan politics, more loyal to presidential personality or political party than to the U.S. Constitution. Indeed, it is apparent that, increasingly, they conflate a fleeting oath to the Constitution with fealty to party, leader, or a constituency’s ideological demands. The top priority is maintaining and gaining power. Novice political actors can also include academic “experts” in a particular policy domain with no practical experience outside of a think tank or university. Although they may bring a great deal of academic knowledge, most often they lack any supervisory, managerial, or leadership experience. Wielding significant authority on paper, novice political actors are oftentimes outmatched by military counterparts, having little recourse than to trust, depend, and heavily rely upon military elites that shepherd and direct them through their daily appointed responsibilities. This growing epidemic and imbalance in civil-military relations is a consequence of imbalanced institutional investments; a dearth of competent political appointees; a political environment that discourages and disincentivizes civil service; extreme partisanship and political polarization; uninspired

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recruitment of younger generations to public service; poor civic education and growing political ignorance in American society; lack of intellectual curiosity exacerbated by disinformation; and failures stemming from a vacuum of capable leadership among elected officials. Through no fault of their own, civil servants suffer from a lack of institutional support, leadership, and investment in their collective manning, education, training, and professional development. Over decades, influence over policy shifted. Power has slowly been ceded to the military—and to military elites in particular. In contrast, military promotion requirements compel careerlong education, training, and professional development. The military branches send their best and brightest, those with the potential for continued promotion, to work in the Pentagon, on the Joint Staff, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, within the halls of Congress, and throughout other state and federal agencies, organizations, and institutions. Legislation dating back to the 1800s intended to ensure civilian preeminence and control of the military has been repealed by modern-day lawmakers. As civilians have delegated more responsibility to the military, the military has become less accountable to civilian leadership. More current legislation, such as the Goldwater–Nichols Act, has become hollowed out and made ineffectual. Civilian vacancies are a reflection of political disinterest and neglect; a shallowing pool of expertise; and a broken Senate confirmation process. Rather, political positions, many at the executive level, are often filled with novice, and increasingly extreme, partisan appointees. Many of these appointees are unconfirmed by the Senate, amateurs serving in an “acting” capacity with no real vested, long-term interest in good governance, balanced civil-military relations, or national security.

Since the violent rioting that overtook our nation’s Capitol building on January 6, 2021, both Republicans and Democrats have used terms such as “sedition,” “terrorist,” “treason,” “insurrection,” or “coup” to describe the event, its participants, and its leaders. These terms are, of course, politically charged. By the end of 2021, a quick, unscientific Google news search of “U.S. coup” returned nearly 25 million results. News reports and articles describe and sensationalize the events of January 6, assigning blame with no single stakeholder accepting appropriate responsibility. These articles have evolved over time to increasingly warn of a future American civil war. In the majority of mainstream articles, the villains are right-wing radicals, paramilitary militias, rogue active-duty military units, and a population of extremists within the military’s ranks. To be clear from the outset, I do not believe the United States is in danger of falling into a civil war in the fashion of Somalia, Syria, Iraq, or Rwanda.

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Neither do I believe that the United States is in danger of experiencing a military coup d’etat. We are not Bolivia, Burundi, Thailand, or Turkey. In this book, the term “coup” it is not used in the context of a hostile military coup d’état overthrowing a democratically elected government. Rather, it is used to signify the claiming of power and influence over a competitor, much more in the tradition of how Native Americans “counted coup” against rivals to demonstrate courage. The term “guardian” harkens back to the writings of Xenophon and Plato, referring to guardians of the state that allow inhabitants to “live their lives in blissful security” (Xenophon 2008). The most elite guardians were the bravest warrior-scholars or warrior-philosophers, capable of legislating and governing. Plato went so far as to commend the most elite guardians as best-suited to be rulers of the state, suggesting that “the elder must rule the younger; and the best of the elders will be the best of the guardians”—the warrior-scholar elite and philosopher-kings. He warned, however, that guardians can become too comfortable in governing and with political affiliation. He stated, “when the guardians degenerate into boon companions, then the ruin is complete” (Plato 2008). The history of Rome’s Praetorian Guard provides an example of Plato’s forewarning. The Praetorian Guard was drawn from elites within the Roman Empire’s military. Under the reigns of Augustus and the Julio-Claudian Dynasty, this imperial unit evolved into political actors that were incorporated into the “overall civic administration” of Rome. Its members were increasingly involved in matters of national security, foreign diplomacy, and intelligence-gathering, as well as in domestic missions such as aiding law enforcement and augmenting responses to domestic emergencies. By the third century AD, the Praetorian Guard was viewed as fundamental to Rome’s continuity of government but also as a “symptom and cause” of the empire’s decline and eventual collapse (Bingham 2013, 2–3; Gibbon 1957, 91). Today, praetorianism describes a dynamic where military elites within a state actively participate in government. Put simply, politics has penetrated their ranks. They are political actors with political preferences that intervene in the policy process, whether to corral a novice executive, preserve and maintain the status quo, correct and redirect policy in accordance with their preferences, dominate policy process to effect control, or a combination of these actions. The behavior of these military elites falls along a spectrum of praetorianism that ranges from moderate political actors in the policy process to dominant actors in the governing process (Nordlinger 1977).

It is well established that a majority of contemporary U.S. military officers, active-duty as well as retired, are comfortable openly identifying with the

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Democratic Party or Republican Party. They demonstrate clear partisanship, act on their partisan political beliefs, and, more recently, openly engage in public and on social media in a political and partisan manner (Holsti 2001; Feaver and Kohn 2001; Urben 2010; Golby 2011; Urben 2017). Suggesting that military elites within the officer corps are unbiased, impartial, nonpartisan, or apolitical is naïve and simply not accurate. If political partisanship is not openly expressed, it is privately confided. In small, trusted audiences and private conversations outside the workplace, across the dinner table, or over a beer, military elites share their political beliefs, opinions, and affiliations. Regardless of where or how their politics is expressed, military elites, like all actors in a government or polity, cannot cognitively separate their political beliefs and preferences from their behavior, role, and influence in the policy process. Rather, they maneuver to inject their beliefs and biases into the policy process, whether consciously or subconsciously, in an effort to achieve their policy preferences. Facilitating this dynamic, military elites are heavily embedded and relied upon in the policy process. As a group, they constitute a powerful epistemic community in the national security policy process that is no longer effectively controlled by civilian leadership. Rather, in matters of national security, civilians are exceptionally reliant and dependent upon military elites. They rely on them to inform decisions. They rely on them to establish, control, manage, and lead planning and decision-making processes. Finally, they rely on them to carry out and implement policy decisions once they are made. In the coming years, however, the time and space available for national security decision-making, potentially existential in nature, will shrink. On our current national trajectory, our peer competitors will surpass us. Already, the velocity of technological advancement has outpaced human faculties, ethics, policy, politics, and decision-making. Technological innovation and convergence has multiplied threats to our national security beyond full comprehension. In an increasingly complex international strategic environment fraught with great power competition, the rapid evolution of technologies—such as biotechnology, quantum and “edge” computing technologies, nanotechnology, neurotechnology, artificial intelligence, robotics, augmented reality, unmanned weapons, hypersonic vehicles, and space- and cyber-based capabilities—this convergence of dynamics will only make this decision-dynamic a more acute challenge. Distinguishing traits of change in the character of conflict in the twentyfirst century will be the speed in which both change and conflict occur; simultaneity of multidimensional contests against an expanding array of threats; continual evolvement of fluid international relationships; the consequences and implications of rapidly changing human geography; and

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persistent disorder and conflict (Joint Staff 2016). This global environment will be marked by persistent interstate conflict short of war. It will be primarily nonkinetic, avoiding conventional, mass formations of manned weapon platforms such as armored tanks, aircraft, carrier groups, and infantry and artillery formations. Rather, outbreak of crisis and conflict will increasingly incorporate our own poorly protected personal data. This data, whether freely given or stolen, will be weaponized against us in an effort to distract, divide, and diminish. Militarized conflict will include space-based capabilities, cyber warfare, (dis)information operations, and autonomous, unmanned systems incorporating artificial intelligence. In the fleeting moments that preface conflict of this character, national security and foreign policy decisions and actions will have political and military facets and consequences that require rapid decision and response. Military and civilian elites, locked in a struggle for power and influence in the realm of national security policy, should consider where the balance of power falls in the context of what is best for our American democracy and national interests (Rumsfeld 2004a, 2004b). In this global environment that is rapidly advancing and increasingly technical, how do civilian institutions—plagued by partisanship, polarization, and gridlock and nominally led by intellectually feeble, vacillating elected officials that “can barely turn on a laptop computer”—protect and guard the Republic (Sanger 2019)?

Like all social science work, this book is not immune to bias. In this case, the bias is shaped by the oath of office I have taken multiple times over the course of my career. It is an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic. It is an oath of allegiance not to a president but to a sacred duty performed with honor in service to country. The bias of this book is based on trust—trust that, no matter the actor, individuals will tend to always act in their own self-interests. The findings presented here are a clarion call for understanding the implications of a powerful, politicized military elite with growing praetorian propensities. Its members increasingly believe their actions are required to protect the Republic. And maybe they are. However, this book is not merely a call for recalibrating an imbalance of power in civil-military relations. It does not call for the military to step down but for civilians to step up! Americans: YOU bear responsibility. Dr. Tom Nichols (2021), a professor at the U.S. Naval War College, observed that Americans in the twenty-first century are intolerant of complexity, hold no coherent political beliefs, and count their collective and growing ignorance as a virtue. Americans increasingly believe that individual opinions should be

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treated and weighed with equal respect. Absurdity and idiocy should not be called out or confronted. We increasingly listen to media personalities and elected representatives that mirror these attributes. As a consequence, our collective incompetence and moral failings make us our own worst enemy. American cultural evolution and technological development have created and negatively influenced generations of Americans with debilitatingly short attention spans vulnerable, even attracted to, distortions of truth and incapable of considering complex concepts, ideas, uncertainty, and long-term planning (Johnson 2018). As Anne Applebaum (2020) characterizes the issue, Americans from both ends of the political spectrum fear diversity of thought and the debate of ideas. Americans want security and simplicity, increasingly surrounding, insulating, and suffocating themselves in an echo chamber of conformity and their own simpleminded thoughts. Fragile egos must be protected. Experiential knowledge, preferences, feelings, and emotions are now considered evidence and fact and are given moral equivalence. In what has become an era of “magical realism,” to follow expert advice and established knowledge is folly, whereas pursuing internet-amplified conspiracy, fairy tales, and wokeness is a demonstration of autonomy. Americans are undermining their own civil society, casting aside the ideals of an American democratic republic, drawn to “the seductive lure of authoritarianism” (Applebaum 2020; Nichols 2021). Continued election of demagogue-ish, predisposed authoritarians, reckless progressives, backward populists, and novice politicians contributes to the problem. Neglect of long-term investment in education and an emphasis on career public service exacerbates imbalance in civil-military relations. Continued restriction of resources to the institutions that govern elements of national power (other than the military), and a future strategic environment that will unleash a convergence of revolutionary technologies, threaten dire consequences for what is today a paralyzed American polity. America is paralyzed. Americans themselves are paralyzed by ignorance. We are in the grips of competing, anti-intellectual movements on both sides of the political spectrum. We find ourselves sitting in Plato’s cave, pathetically bickering and bemused, drifting away from our democratic ideals, witnessing a silent coup of the guardians. —Todd Andrew Schmidt Fort Leavenworth, Kansas August 2022

Introduction

The collapse of trust in institutions and politics is a well-known story in the United States. The American public . . . not only has ceased to trust government, but many Americans have come to believe that these institutions and the elites who inhabit them are actively hostile to ordinary citizens. . . . Levels of trust in everything and everybody but the military (which should be a warning sign in a democracy) have fallen to historic lows. —Tom Nichols, Our Own Worst Enemy (2021), 67

Hundreds, maybe thousands, of articles have been written about the six major national and international events that occurred during the final drafting of this book. Each event involved the U.S. military in one way or another and are at least tangentially related to themes contained in the chapters that follow. These events included the COVID-19 pandemic; violent rioting in the aftermath of the murder of George Floyd; the 2020 U.S. presidential election; seditious rioting at the U.S. Capitol building in Washington, D.C.; the inauguration of President Joseph Biden; and the exodus of U.S. troops from America’s twenty-year war in Afghanistan. Although the president, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Centers for Disease Control were the public faces of the government’s response to the COVID-19 emergency, in large part the response was led and resourced by the U.S. military. Beginning in 2020 under the umbrella of Operation Warp Speed and the leadership of General Gustave Perna, this interagency initiative was tasked to respond to an extraordinary global pandemic. The military helped significantly with facilitating vaccine development, manning and funding operations, directing logistical support, building field hospitals, dispatching hospital ships, and deploying medical units to support civilian hospitals and state and local vaccination operations throughout 2020, 2021, and 2022. When the crisis was at its worst, President Donald Trump and President Joseph Biden both turned to the U.S. military as the nation’s most trusted institution. The military was the only governmental organization capable of leading sustained interagency efforts at the required scope and scale. As 1

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President Biden stated on January 13, 2022, at a press conference discussing a surge in the omicron variant of COVID-19 and a major, related deployment of military support, “when you want something done, you call on the military.” In the wake of George Floyd’s murder, valid, legal protests and violent, criminal rioting exploded in major cities across America. Following calls for “law and order” in the leadup to the 2020 presidential election, the military reluctantly entered the political fray as the president threatened military intervention and attempted to politicize the military to his electoral advantage. Military leaders at the highest levels, active and retired, were compelled, in unprecedented fashion, to deny the military’s role in partisan politics, domestic law enforcement, and the democratic election process. And yet a record number of retired military service members, including over 700 generals and admirals, actively endorsed political candidates. With little regard for their former colleagues still serving or for the institutions they once served, these retirees lent their prestige and rank by offering fullthroated, public endorsements of and advocacy for political candidates who aligned with their political beliefs. Feeling free from the bounds of their oath to the Constitution and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, they acted in pure self-interest. Politically active military members, particularly retirees, joined ranks in a frontal assault on their political adversaries, enthusiastically participating in partisan activities. Many military service members—active duty, retired, and recently separated from active duty—propagated misinformation, endorsed extremist views, and spread conspiracy theories on social media. Some condoned the idea of a military coup, while others advocated for contingency planning against an attempted military coup. Most alarming, significant numbers were involved in the storming of our nation’s Capitol building (Astor 2021; Bender 2021; Golby and Feaver 2021; Eaton, Taguba, and Anderson 2021). In one of the most shameful incidents of seditious activity in U.S. history, top elected officials and retired military officers, inspired by a desperate and defeated presidential administration, promulgated, promoted, and disseminated false statements and misinformation related to the 2020 election results. This initiated, in the opinion of many, a massive, violent, and deadly riot, if not an insurrection, that breached the Capitol building. As live news footage demonstrated, the building was vandalized, and fearful members of Congress from both sides of the aisle huddled inside under threat of attack. Rioters in tactical military gear, many with military backgrounds and training, hunted congressional leaders while carrying hangman nooses and chanting “hang Mike Pence” (Foreman 2021). In the days following this tragic event, the U.S. House of Representatives Republican Party Minority Leader, Congressman Kevin McCarthy,

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reflecting on President Trump’s culpability in the riot, stated that the president should take responsibility for his role and resign. Congresswoman Elizabeth Cheney, an unquestionably conservative Republican from Wyoming and daughter of former Vice President Richard Cheney, voted with a small minority of Republican colleagues to impeach the president. These Republican representatives, along with Democratic colleagues, charged the president with summoning and assembling an angry, violent mob to attack a coequal branch of government. Congresswoman Cheney described it as the greatest “betrayal by a President of the United States of his office and his oath to the Constitution.” The Senate Majority Leader at the time, Mitch McConnell, a conservative Republican from Kentucky and member of the president’s party, stated that President Trump was guilty of “a disgraceful dereliction of duty . . . practically and morally responsible for” feeding the American public lies and provoking a mob to violent, riotous behavior. For the first time in U.S. history, in a bipartisan vote, House Resolution 24 of the 117th Congress (1st Session) impeached a president for a second time during his one-term presidency. The president of the United States was thought to have violated his oath to the U.S. Constitution by a majority of Americans who felt he should be held accountable. In the wake of the rioting, approximately 25,000 National Guardsmen and active-duty military personnel were deployed to the nation’s capital. The military, in an unprecedented show of force, was called to protect against further insurrection and violent interference by right-wing extremists in America’s tradition of a peaceful transfer of power. More than two months after President Biden’s inauguration, the National Guard remained on duty in the nation’s capital, justified by intelligence that continuing domestic threats warranted their presence. Within the ranks of the riotous mob were a concerning number of suspects believed to be active-duty military, reservists, National Guard, and retired or former military veterans. Estimates and studies concluded that current and former military member involvement was as high as 15–20 percent, with many having ties to right-wing extremist groups. Reportedly, several suspected rioters were military officers, including an active-duty U.S. Army psychological operations officer from Fort Bragg, North Carolina; an active-duty Marine Corps major from Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia; a retired U.S. Air Force lieutenant colonel from Texas; and a Pennsylvania state legislator, retired U.S. Army colonel, and former Army War College instructor (Shapiro 2021). Indications of military participants in the Capitol riot were significant enough for the Department of Justice and Department of Defense to launch investigations to identify criminal suspects, as well as to understand the depth

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and breadth of political radicalization and extremism within the military ranks. Despite concerns for such insider threats, retired senior military officers publicly raged on social media against the perceived inappropriateness of security screening for troops, and over 100 retired generals and admirals signed an open letter advancing lies and conspiracy theories surrounding the 2020 presidential election. Finally, in 2021, President Biden ordered the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan near the midpoint of his first year in office. One could argue that the evacuation of troops and noncombatant civilians would be, by the very nature of the mission and the theater of operations, unavoidably chaotic. Indeed, it was. Thus, the timing of the withdrawal at the beginning of the president’s first administration provides time for recovery in the court of public opinion. Every moment, and the movement of troops, civilians, and aircraft, seemed to be broadcast worldwide in real time. Meanwhile, the potential for a tragic attack by a determined terrorist threat was exceptionally high. Whether withdrawal had occurred during Biden’s administration or a previous administration, it would have been against the best military advice of America’s military elites. The consequence of withdrawal, regardless of its timing, would have meant a dip in the public’s confidence and approval of both the president and the military, as the public questioned and processed the end of a twenty-year war that had taken and maimed thousands of American and Afghan lives. What was the human toll? Was it worth it? Did our warriors die in vain? These are questions that will persist for decades, particularly for the families of the fallen. Each of these events stirred great passion and emotion among Americans and around the world. International travel halted to a trickle. Americans hoarded toilet paper and cleaning supplies while isolating at home. Businesses shut down. Children’s playgrounds were ghostly vacant. High-school proms, graduations, and classroom teaching were cancelled. Outdoor dining became a new convention. Colleges and universities shuttered their campuses and went to remote learning. Unemployment soared. Wearing medical masks became a social norm. The term “social distancing” entered our lexicon. Overworked, sleep-deprived nurses and first responders became heroes. Vaccines became politicized. The vaccinated signaled their virtue. The unvaccinated were demonized. The medical and pharmaceutical industries saw enormous profits. In many states and countries, “vaccine passports” and negative COVID tests were often required to attend public events, eat at restaurants, and travel. Meanwhile, presidents, prime ministers, royal figures, members of Congress, and the wealthy were seemingly exempt from COVID laws. Rapidly evolving

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and sometimes conflicting guidance from health experts simultaneously terrified, confused, and enraged millions of Americans. Violent rioting continued to scar major cities. Confidence in the president and the military dropped to historic, if not unprecedented, lows. During the withdrawal in August 2021, videos of Afghans—many of them loyal to and supportive of the United States—surging against barricades at Kabul International Airport, cramming inside C-17 aircraft, and dropping from the wheel wells of U.S. cargo planes went viral. Images of American troops killed and wounded in the final days of the war in Afghanistan where rebroadcast over and over for political advantage. As the press, political pundits, historians, and scholars sift through and analyze these events and the “magical realism” that accompanied this period, it will also be seen by civil-military relations scholars as a period of modulation wherein civil-military relations became precariously imbalanced. With growing uncertainty in the twentieth century—gaining momentum in the wake of 9/11 and peaking over the course of Trump’s presidency—the resulting dissonance in civil-military relations is of such magnitude that it calls into question many foundational assumptions that underlie the current body of knowledge. Left unchecked, this disparity in influence and power will change the very character of American democracy. Upon taking office, President Biden issued the “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance.” Compelled by a pattern of disconcerting civil-military dynamics, he directed his administration to recommit to and renew faith in the apolitical nature of the U.S. military and other governmental institutions. The president announced his intent to commit resources to revitalizing national security professional development and expertise within the government’s civilian workforce (Biden 2021). In the minds of many, a dangerous imbalance in civil-military relations required quiet recalibration to preserve the American Republic. Just as the peaceful transfer of power following a U.S. presidential election is no longer taken for granted in America, neither can civil-military relations be taken for granted (Dempsey 2021). The principle of civilian control of the military is no longer sacrosanct. Indeed, civilian control of the military may no longer be effective, rightly understood and valued, or realistically feasible. President Biden warned in his January 20, 2021, inaugural address that “democracy is fragile”; likewise, the balance of civil-military relations is delicate and unstable. The growing political radicalization and polarization in American government created a vacuum of civilian leadership, knowledge, expertise, and power. Political rivals and adversaries, too busy combating each other, have abandoned the helm of the ship of state. This vacuum suffocates reason, compromise, intellectual curiosity, professionalism, and, over time, the ability to

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effectively govern. This evolution of American government is the product of a sick society—a society afflicted with an anti-intellectual obscurantism that has become epidemic. Ignorance is now a celebrated virtue in America. Opinions, no matter how misinformed, are now referred to as “my truth,” demanding consideration and respect. Absurdity and idiocy, rampant in the public square, are mirrored in a yellow press that demands freedom, although free of accountability; it is focused on market share and profit as it pawns sensationalized headlines through clownish yet self-righteous media personalities. These same symptoms are reflected in the politicians Americans elect (Nichols 2021). Somewhat secluded from society, the military provides protective overwatch of this buffoonery. Watching from the wings of government is a faction of exceptionally capable and influential guardians—America’s military elites. They perceive frightening societal decay and are prepared to fill the growing vacuum of leadership with a modern Praetorian Guard, embodied by well-educated, sophisticated, highly experienced U.S. military elites, both active and retired. They increasingly fill roles in civil society and government intended for competent civilian leadership—whether democratically elected or politically appointed—that is accountable to the American electorate. In many cases, military elites take on their guardianship with a reluctant sense of duty. They may seek elected office as an outlet for a continued desire for civil service, knowing that their military experience can help inform legislative debate. Alternatively, they may serve on boards as directors, as faculty or in administration at institutions of higher education, or in executive leadership positions within industry and the private sector, sharing their expertise and knowledge. If asked by a president to serve in some important capacity, military elites, even after a lifetime of military service, feel obligated to their commander in chief. Although their service may fill the short-term political needs and interests of a president, this does not necessarily equate to doing what is best for the country or support American democratic ideals in the longer term. Likewise, many military elites, particularly the retired, are not immune to their own ambitions, desire for continued relevance, or possessing a romanticized, even narcissistic, self-image of “a man on horseback” come to save the nation. These retired gray beards are no longer bound by professional norms and the traditional code of silence as it relates to political opinions and personal ambitions. Increasingly, it seems, retired military elites willingly, aggressively, and sometimes ruthlessly take on a partisan role. Their actions can, in the opinion of many, demonstrate a lack of care and consideration for the consequences and implications. They are often seen as hell-bent on seeking their own self-interests—power, influence, relevance, financial gain—at the fratricidal

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expense of the reputation of the military institution and those who continue to serve on active duty.

Purpose and Design of the Study To better understand the role of military elites in American society and its political system, my first objective in publishing this book is to provide original scholarship related to understanding the communal characteristics, conceptual attributes, and exceptional influence of military elites as an epistemic community in the national security policy process. These communal characteristics and conceptual attributes empower military elites, as an epistemic community, providing them with nearly overwhelming influence in the policy domain. This disparity of influence, whether in government or civil society, needs to be understood, addressed, and corrected, not to weaken the military but to strengthen the checks and balances against growing praetorianism; to strengthen investments in competing institutions of national power and public education; and to counterbalance military elites through the selection and election of competent civilian leaders. The effort to understand the influence of military elites and the conceptual attributes of a military epistemic community falls, inescapably, at the intersection of multiple fields of study. There are elements of political science, international relations, political psychology, sociology, anthropology, public policy and administration, and civil-military relations. At this busy academic intersection, I hope to provide better clarity and understanding for how and why the U.S. military may be at an inflection point of increasing praetorian and political behavior, as well as increased involvement in civil society. Second, in this study I provide an understanding of the current state of U.S. civil-military relations from an insider’s perspective. There is growing disparity in this critical relationship that favors the military. I attempt to explain a little of the why. Additionally, current U.S. civil-military relations theory is wanting. It falls short. It has generated and sustained flawed and false narratives, insinuating that U.S. civil-military relations are stable, static, and generally unchanging. Likewise, it has promulgated a misguided narrative that the U.S. military is generally apolitical, nonpartisan, and deferential to its civilian masters. This is simply not true. Rather, that is an unsupported precept of a nuanced American mythology. Last, in this book I probe the potential consequences and implications of unhealthy, imbalanced U.S. civil-military relations at a time of societal turbulence and revolutionary change. A realistic framework of civil-military relations needs to be negotiated in the face of an awe-inspiring look into the

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future of militarized conflict. This new framework must be considered in the context of a realistic understanding of civil-military relations in the past and present, in addition to the role of military elites within that relationship. Scholarship investigating questions at the nexus of civil-military relations and national security issues can be difficult without direct knowledge or practical experience (Jordan and Taylor 1981). Gaining real insight into how military elites honestly think about civil-military relations can test the candor of their responses; it is a politically sensitive subject. Gathering in-depth, forthright responses with the opportunity to ask follow-up questions is not something that can be done through stock survey research designs. The sensitive nature of national security work also amplifies the challenge. Important and valuable current data is likely classified. Current and former participants in the process may not be willing to discuss sensitive information, relationships, and events that provide important empirical observations. Historical data can be difficult to trace and gather because it is not centrally located and must be collected from geographically dispersed presidential libraries and national archives. Finally, current data, not approved for public release, may be frustrated by long-delayed Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request processes. In an effort to negotiate these challenges, I designed this study to rely on unclassified, qualitative, insider academic research. “Insider academic research” is defined as research conducted by a trusted and empowered organizational or community member. It is not research conducted by an outside scholar that has temporarily joined an organization or community for the purposes of research (Adler and Adler 1987; Kanuha 2000; Brannick and Coghlan 2007; Unluer 2012). My intent was to ensure compliance with rules that govern the military and allow for a modicum of academic freedom while not becoming burdened by hurdles that can slow or impede the gathering of data. I also designed the study to maximize understanding of the complexities of a social phenomenon ill-suited for quantitative methodologies. Qualitative methods are better suited for theory development, describing and interpreting process, and the behavior, role, and influence of actors in the policy process. Qualitative studies often precede quantitative studies, contributing to and preparing issues for future quantitative, statistical analysis (Bitsch 2005). The description of the research as “insider” refers to the nature of my status as a military officer. My experience, position, and rank provided me, as an assigned and sanctioned researcher, a window into a unique military culture and social group. It also provided me the ability to communicate and share unclassified, analytical observations that incorporate personal knowledge and judgment (Adler and Adler 1987; Asselin 2003; Dwyer and Buckle 2009). It is important to understand that, as critics and skeptics might suspect, this methodological approach is controversial in social science (Morse 1998).

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Detractors counsel against insider research, suggesting that “it is not wise for an investigator to conduct a qualitative study in a setting where he or she is already employed and has a work role.” The role of investigator and employee are, in this opinion, incompatible and “may place the researcher in an untenable position” (Morse 1998, 61). Insider research can be considered “problematic . . . frequently disqualified because it is perceived not to conform to standards of intellectual rigor” and because it may reflect a lack of objectivity, lack of neutrality, lack of detachment, personal stakes, conflicts of interest, and/or “substantive emotional investment” (Brannick and Coghlan 2007, 60; DeLyser 2001; Hewitt-Taylor 2002). In contrast, many social science scholars find that insiders that are native to an organization or community they are investigating have unique insight and knowledge “from the lived experience” that enhances the data-gathering process (Brannick and Coghlan 2007, 60; Bonner and Tolhurst 2002). This provides the insider an ability to take tacit knowledge and articulate and reframe it as contextually embedded, theoretical knowledge. Insider research provides rich and complex knowledge because of intimate familiarity, not because of a context-free, detached neutrality (Evered and Louis 1981; Bonner and Tolhurst 2002). Insider academic research results in a valuable creation and transfer of knowledge between practitioners and academics (Rynes, Bartunek and Daft 2001). Notable dynamics of insider academic research include access, preunderstanding, role duality, and organizational politics. There is also the important issue of bias and partiality. To address the challenge of my personal biases and prevent or reduce the inherent bias associated with insider research, it was important that I identify my assumptions, conduct detailed reflection at each stage of the investigation, explore themes and messages that may run counter to expected findings, and consult regularly with outside experts to provide a check on my methodology and analysis in progress. This was critical because complete neutrality was impractical, as readers will see in the biases that come through in this text (Dwyer and Buckle 2009). Reference to “access” is defined as “the ability to get into the organizational system and to be allowed to undertake research” (Brannick and Coghlan 2007, 67). This description is broken into two parts: primary, natural access to the organization; and secondary access or permission to conduct research. Undertaking research included organizational consent to access information. By nature of my rank and position, I was also able to contact people to whom outside observers would not otherwise have access (Herrman 1989; Tedlock 2000; Coghlan 2003; Rouney 2005). Finally, my “assignment” to attend the University of Kansas was for the sole purpose of permitting me to conduct original research in the pursuit of a doctoral degree. The term “preunderstanding” refers to organizational and process knowledge, insight, and experience gained over the course of a career, prior

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to engaging in study (Gummesson 2000, 57). It is the lived experience of a “native” researcher, knowledge of “everyday life” within the military as an organization and societal group (Nielsen and Repstad 1993). Researchers from within an organization are familiar with the jargon and language of their organization. They know how to navigate the organization’s bureaucracy to gain access to information, data, and people (Smyth and Holian 2008). Insiders know the “taboo phenomena of what can be talked about and what cannot” (Brannick and Coghlan 2007, 67). They know the formalities to extend, the faux pas to avoid, and can discern nuances in the language, objectives, and agendas of people within the organization. In an interview scenario, the insider knows how to best frame questions, follow up on replies, participate in discussion, and obtain richer, relevant data while building trust rather than creating anxiety or suspicion (Smyth and Holian 2008). The term “role duality” refers to a scholar’s role as both a member of and researcher within the military organization. These opposing roles of organizational member/native researcher can create conflicts related to loyalty, values, and role identity (Stephenson and Greer 1981; Geirish 1997; DeLyser 2001). Researchers inside an organization may harbor motives to change or influence the organization of which they are a member. Additionally, they may face a dilemma that causes conflict and friction with superiors and influences how they characterize their findings. The friction between these roles is more likely to occur when research is being conducted covertly or when the researcher wants to continue and progress in the organization and must manage the aftermath of their report and related organizational politics (Nielsen and Repstad 1993). No covert research was conducted during this study. No classified materials were accessed. No classified operations are mentioned. Likewise, I understood that any further promotion within the organization was highly unlikely. Each interview and all access granted were solicited with full disclosure that I was conducting unclassified research for a doctoral dissertation pursued in the course of completing a U.S. Army–sponsored, fully funded PhD program while serving on active duty. The underlying research for this book was approved by the director of the U.S. Army’s Advanced Strategic Planning and Policy Program (ASP3) at the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the University of Kansas Institutional Review Board (IRB). Chapters were provided individually (as well as a full, complete copy) to the U.S. Army for review and feedback. A peer review of this book was provided by a self-identified faculty member of SAMS. Finally, the book manuscript was given clearance for publication through appropriate U.S. Army Public Affairs channels. Organizational politics plays a role in all insider academic research

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(Brannick and Coghlan 2007). In the military, despite an institutional respect for academic freedom, a superior’s encouragement and approval of insider research in an academic environment may be interpreted as controversial or subversive by superiors outside the military academic environment. An example of how organizational politics impacts this book relates to how I attribute the thoughts, ideas, and opinions of interview subjects. Interview excerpts in this book, although coded, are generally unattributed. Sample participants are described in a manner that provides context to their opinions and demonstrate variance in background experience. As a final note regarding insider research, I have disclosed that I am an active-duty military officer, a U.S. Army colonel, competitively selected by a centralized board of senior officers to attend Senior Service College, commonly referred to as “war college.” I was further selected in a highly competitive secondary process to participate in the ASP3 and assigned to the University of Kansas to pursue my PhD. I viewed all aspects of my work as being within the scope of my official duties. Thus, I sent all solicitations for interviews and access to data from either my official government email account or on University of Kansas/Department of Political Science letterhead with a military signature block that contained my rank and military service affiliation. I received significant assistance from active and retired senior-ranking mentors, advisers, and a personal and professional network that provided advice on the formulation of research questions, conceptualization of the role of military elites in the policy process, and a starting point for data collection. The advantages to this insider approach provided ready access to senior officials for the purpose of conducting elite interviews. Initial credibility and trust came with my rank and professional affiliation. A comfortable rapport with senior officials was rooted in my career of military service and an understanding of a common language and vocabulary that can be hard to comprehend for those unfamiliar with the military and national security establishment.

Methodology To best understand the national security policy process and the role of military elites, the research design relies on semistructured elite interviews, oral histories, archival documents, and memoirs to determine whether the evidence supports the causal process informed by my “grounded theory” approach (George and Bennett 2005, 6). Elite interviews are well-positioned to investigate the complex behaviors, motives, and beliefs of military elites because they help investigators understand the diverse experiences, knowledge,

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and opinions, as well as the role of relationships, alliances, and access to resources, within military-elite communities (Minichiello et al. 1995; Valentine 1997; Dunn 2005; George and Bennett 2005; Tansey 2007; Cross 2011). In the context of national security and foreign policy, elite interviews are highly relevant as critical sources of information and data regarding a highly political process at the pinnacle of state policy making (Tansey 2007).

The Interviews (n=105) The interviews in this study included senior, cabinet-level officials, four-star generals, and ambassadors from six presidential administrations serving at the head of the State Department, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the intelligence community (i.e., the CIA). Interviews also included a population of well-respected think tank fellows; internationally recognized scholarly experts; and midcareer executive-level professionals. See Appendix A: Sample Population for demographics on the national security experts. Senior retired officials were eager to share their experiences and observations, as well as facilitate, in a “snowball effect,” further interviews with elite contacts. For example, an interview with a former National Security Advisor led to additional interviews with a former CIA director and senior director in the National Security Council (NSC) staff. A planned visit to conduct archival research at the National Defense University evolved into unanticipated interviews with a former U.S. Central Command commander, a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a former secretary of state. Although sampling decisions evolved, the systematic technique of how interviews were coordinated and conducted did not change. Interviews with younger, midcareer experts and professionals with the potential to serve in future presidential administrations or entertaining their own political ambitions were not as forthcoming in discussions and were intent on closely curating their public image. Several of the interviewees for this study went on to serve in the Biden administration. Those who were still in position or fresh from their time in government service were very cognizant that history has yet to be written regarding their time in service. These interviewees were detectably motivated by a personal agenda that was recognizable in the narrative they provided. No two interviews were exactly the same. Interviews were conducted over the phone, over video, and in person. Venues varied, from noisy coffee shops on the outskirts of the Pentagon to dining rooms inside elite, private, cosmopolitan clubs. Some were in offices along Massachusetts Avenue’s Embassy Row, while others were conducted at an interviewee’s favorite bar or restaurant

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in the Washington, D.C., area. Some were in the Pentagon cafeteria, while others were in more secure facilities.1 One particular video interview was conducted with the interviewee in the galley of a yacht moored in Annapolis, Maryland. A few significant interviews were conducted in impressive, well-appointed boardrooms and high-rise corner offices blocks away from the White House. Conditions, the phrasing of questions, rapport, and personal chemistry varied with each subject. Midcareer interviewees often spoke in anxious whispers while sitting at a remote cafeteria table, furtively glancing around the room at their fellow think tank colleagues. Others, long retired, spoke with bombast and strong conviction, jovially welcoming a debate of ideas. Some were eager to talk with no pretext of a question, while others were keen to listen to the theoretical context of my study and ask questions before responding thoughtfully. Several interviewees did not allow recording. However, the majority welcomed it. On request, a few subjects stipulated that a copy of the interview transcript be provided for their personal records. When a telephonic or in-person interview was not feasible, one high-ranking interviewee agreed to provide written answers to interview questions through the staff at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. A significant portion of time was spent at the beginning of each interview gaining trust and building rapport. Answers were sometimes exceptionally guarded and vague. Younger, less experienced civilian interview subjects tended to ask my opinion at times, to which they would provide their concurrence. The wording of questions may have influenced answers. More than once, I had the perception that interviewees may have been telling me what they thought I wanted to hear. Although every interview was different, each sample participant was approached in a similar manner with prepared questions. Questions were provided prior to an interview engagement and were approved by a panel of experts and through the IRB process. Questions were designed to be broad and interrelated. I tried to avoid leading the participant and elicited wide-ranging responses that would allow for follow-up questions as needed. Although the same general questions were asked of each participant, the order and phrasing of the question may have been altered based on how a conversation flowed or out of the interest of the participant. This study incorporated a “theoretical sampling” method to determine 1. Interviews conducted in private Pentagon offices, by Department of Defense regulation, did not allow cellular or recording devices. However, each senior military officer I interviewed in the Pentagon provided oral consent to take and record handwritten notes with the explicit intent to utilize them in this study.

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interview samples, meaning that sample decisions evolved during the research process based on emerging and developing opportunities, themes, and concepts that were relevant to developing theory in the context of military elites. Although an initial course of action for sampling was planned, the plan, once in action, changed (Corbin and Strauss 1990). Although sampling decisions evolved, the systematic technique of how interviews were coordinated and conducted did not change. Interviews were conducted in two waves. Wave One sample participants (n=75) were, primarily, think tank fellows, academics, and midlevel elites and national security experts. The experience of a midlevel expert was typically at or below the “Deputy Assistant” level within a cabinet agency. Midlevel “General Schedule” (GS-level) experts typically held the rank of GS-14 through Senior Executive Service (SES) III. Within the National Security Council staff, midlevel experts typically served at or below the rank of “Special Assistant” and “Senior Director.” For active-duty and retired military, midlevel experts typically held the rank of O-5 (Lieutenant Colonel) through O-8 (Major General). See Appendix B: Wave One for details on these sample participant demographics. Wave Two interview participants (n=30) were senior, exceptionally experienced, and high-ranking national security and foreign policy elites. Senior experience was at the highest ranks of a cabinet agency, the National Security Council, the intelligence community, or the military. Within cabinet agencies, they held the rank of Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Under Secretary, Ambassador, and SES I-II. Within the National Security Council, they included “Deputy Assistant to the President” (DAP) and “Assistant to the President.” Within the CIA, they included both Directors and Deputy Directors. Military elites, as previously described, typically include active-duty and retired flag officers at the rank of O-9 (Lieutenant General/Vice Admiral) or O-10 (General/Admiral). Senior elite interviews in this study represent the combined experiences of a former Secretary of State, Under Secretary of State, and eight U.S. Ambassadors; a Deputy and Under Secretary of Defense; two Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; two Vice Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; three Army Chiefs of Staff and two Army Vice Chiefs of Staff; one Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps; three Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency; five National Security Advisors and three Deputy National Security Advisors. Four star–level general officer experience also included seven Combatant Commanders and five Army Command/Service Component Commanders. Multiple three-star flag officers interviewed had held cabinet-level or ambassadorial rank. See Appendix C: Wave Two for details on these sample participant demographics. See Appendix D: Interview Methodology for greater detail regarding interviews, sample population, and data analysis.

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Additional Sources To augment the interview process, I also relied on oral histories, archival research, and personal memoirs. Population and sampling procedures remained the same. Categorization of sources and coding procedures remained consistent. This provided for combining results of analysis, despite variance in the method of data collection. In interviews and oral histories, subjects often referred to their own memoir, memoirs of their peers, and/or public documents or information that could be verified only through FOIA requests. In each of these cases, memoirs, public documents, and FOIA requests were utilized for corroboration and authentication. These sources add further context, nuance, and supporting facts. The oral histories I rely on are predominantly from three sources: the Presidential Oral Histories collection at the Miller Center, University of Virginia; the National Security Council Project: Oral History Roundtables collection at the Brookings Institution; and a special collection of oral histories graciously provided by Dr. Peter Feaver, Dr. Tim Sayle, and Dr. Jeffrey Engle in the course of their work on behalf of Southern Methodist University’s Center for Presidential History. Extensive archival research was conducted at National Defense University’s Special Collections, Archives, and History Office on the Washington, D.C., campus at Fort McNair. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld also made a significant collection of his personal papers available in the Rumsfeld Archives online. Mr. Paul Schott Stevens, former executive secretary of the National Security Council under President Ronald Reagan, made available his personal collection and archive of papers during his time on the NSC staff. Finally, I relied on memoirs, Freedom of Information Act requests, and open-source reporting, documents, and data.

Role of the Researcher When I submitted my manuscript proposal, peer-review comments recommended that I make the book more readable and less academic. Bias removed from the academic version of the manuscript was allowed in the book manuscript. I am a product of the military, and my bias is evident. This book is purposely value-laden. Indeed, I chose the topic because it explores ideas, concepts, and relationships about which I am keenly interested and passionate. Regarding bias in the data: interview subjects, and information gathered in oral histories, archives, and memoirs, are assumed to be truthful. They are relating and sharing their independent realities. These realities are socially constructed and, in some cases, vary widely. I also assume and recognize

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Introduction

that dynamics within the interview process influence both the subject and the interviewer. Variance in each interview relates to my deliberate effort to build rapport, pursue lines of thought, have in-depth discussions, explore concepts, and gain a full picture of what a subject believed, observed, and experienced in relation to a historical period in their life. This variation results in a unique and dynamic influence between both interviewer and subject in each engagement.

Organization of the Book With the preface and this introduction, the reader should have a grasp of my approach, objectives, and methodology. I propose that military elites constitute an epistemic community, playing a unique role with exceptional influence on national security and foreign policy. Coupled with extenuating dynamics, military elites find themselves in an advantageous position in an imbalanced civil-military relationship that has important implications for American national security. In chapter 1, I provide context to the study, as well as definitions for and exploration of key terms and concepts. Terms such as “national security,” “foreign policy,” “influence,” and “military elites” get thrown around in conversation, the media, and academia, but how do we define or operationalize them? For a study to be of real value, key terms and concepts need to be precise and well-defined. In chapter 2, I lay out the genesis of the “guardian” concept, providing historical narrative and context that challenges the American heritage and mythology. The narrative that Americans have a strong tradition of “antimilitarism” is a general theme in mainstream American heritage studies. Likewise, the narrative that American military officers have long held beliefs in preeminent civilian authority and a tradition of apolitical behavior undergirds our American mythology. But are these accurate? In this chapter, I shed light on these topics and provide a case study on President Dwight Eisenhower’s fractious relationship with his senior military leaders. In chapter 3, I provide the scholarly road map this book follows to navigate the role that military elites play in national security. The influence of military elites cannot be fully explained and understood from a singular theory or field of study. I begin with the role of the president in national security policy, drawing from presidential studies in political science scholarship. I then tackle the role of military elites from an international relations and foreign policy analysis perspective, examining important scholarship on decisionmaking in crisis, the role of groups and individuals in the policy process and actions of the state, and organizational and bureaucratic politics. Finally, I

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review current civil-military relations theory and show it to be institutional in its approach, focused on idyllic, unidirectional relationships with prescriptive, normative bias toward control of the military. In chapter 4, I begin to unpack the findings of the study. I set the stage by rounding out the background to epistemic community theory, amplifying the conceptual attributes that epistemic communities exhibit, and explaining why these attributes, when manifested and taken together, allow epistemic communities to be so influential. The findings are provided through an engaging narrative that skillfully incorporates representative excerpts from the interview process. In chapter 5, I continue to unpack the findings of the study, focusing on how the conceptual attributes of military elites operationalize their influence. I focus on the role military elites play in the policy process and their influence on the outcomes, as demonstrated by the National Security Strategy and defense appropriations within the federal budget. At the beginning, as well as in the conclusion of this chapter, there is not an intent to oversell the current or irreversible influence of military elites but rather to call attention to the virulence of their influence in a growing vacuum of capable, seasoned civilian leadership. In chapter 6, the concluding chapter, I discuss the consequences and implications of the findings from an academic perspective and more generally. I suggest adjustments to the framework of epistemic community theory, particularly as to how epistemic communities exhibit conceptual attributes and how these determine influence. I encourage scholars and practitioners to revisit and expand consideration of the behavior, role, and influence of military elites, diplomats, intelligence community professionals, and other groups of experts in the context of epistemic community theory to provide for a more nuanced understanding of national security and foreign policy decision-making. Finally, I suggest that scholars look anew at civil-military relations theory based on the reality of the current American polity and potential futures. America faces a complex future environment wherein national security and foreign policy decision-making requires nuanced understanding of the strategic international political, economic, and military environments. Rapid response to threats, both below and above the threshold of conflict, require an equally responsive leadership and policy process. Any future research agenda must examine the evolution of the civil-military balance of power relations, with particular examination of a growing trend of praetorianism among military elites in response to an atrophy in competent civilian political leadership.

Chapter One

Military Elites and Praetorian Propensities

The “politicalization” of the high military that has been going on over the last fifteen years is a rather intricate process: as members of a professional officer corps, some military men develop a vested interest—personal, institutional, ideological—in the enlargement of all things military . . . [and] some are zealous to enlarge their own particular domains. As men of power, some develop quite arrogant, and others shrewd, drives to influence, enjoying as a high value the exercise of power. . . . The professional military are not inherently out for political power. . . . Power essentially political in nature may be and has been thrust upon them by civilian default. (emphasis added) —C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (1959), 199–200

Military elites have always harbored praetorian propensities. It is in their DNA. World War II was a tipping point in how the United States considered the role of the military in society, however. There was a sea change in how military strength and military influence were accepted in the political process and on national security policy. The military, previously isolated from society, was paraded down Main Street in nearly every town and city in the United States. The military’s elites were venerated and canonized as living “secular saints” (Bryant, Swaney, and Urben, 2021). In the lead-up to and during World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt relied on military elites. He handpicked men such as General of the Army George C. Marshall to run the military. Subsequently, he turned to the military to mobilize the country, plan for war, execute multitheater campaign plans, lead a global alliance, negotiate the war’s termination, and conduct postconflict operations. To assist him in managing his cadre of military elites, he appointed U.S. Navy five-star Fleet Admiral William Leahy to be his “Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief.” In the Cold War that followed, President Harry Truman, a veteran of World War I, also tapped military elites to fill key positions in his administration. President Dwight Eisenhower and President John Kennedy, both veterans of World War II, followed suit. President Ronald Reagan, a veteran 18

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of World War II, not only filled key administration positions with military elites but also changed existing legislation that insulated civilian jobs against military influence and appointments, removing barriers to expand the military’s influence in matters. President George H. W. Bush, a veteran of World War II, relied on military advisers in the NSC. With a tremendous deference for his military commanders, Bush famously made a very public effort to stay out of the military policy domain. Fast-forward to the present: military elites in national security and foreign policy decision-making have become fixtures in the process. Civilian leaders have come to over-rely on military elites to inform political and policy decisions. They rely on military elites to establish, lead, inform, and manage planning and decision-making processes. They rely on military elites to carry out and implement policy decisions after they are made. Whether senior civilians recognize and acknowledge it, the U.S. military, in the domain of national security, increasingly ensures and serves as the continuity for American government between presidential administrations. Civilian counterparts bail out of government positions in the outgoing administration, searching for higher-paying private sector jobs. Elected officials and appointees coming into a new administration have very little or no executive experience at the federal level. The experience they do have is oriented toward politics, not governing. Presidents, increasingly lacking any military experience, are no different. The consequence is a vacuum of leadership, knowledge, and expertise. At the highest levels of the military, this fact is widely recognized, assumed, accepted, and, indeed, publicly insinuated by the military’s most senior leaders (Tyson 2008). Senior military officers are, by necessity, increasingly embedded across the highest levels of government. These senior military officers are relied upon, influential, and comfortable acting autonomously, as they need to and must be. Military elites are regularly called upon to fill cabinet- and executive-level federal government positions filled historically by a skilled and experienced corps of professional civil servants. Relying on the military to fill these roles is necessitated by a recognized, rapidly shrinking pool of seasoned, experienced civilian experts and an exceptionally partisan and gridlocked confirmation process that hampers presidents in the manning and appointment of senior civilians to key positions across administrations. A consequence of this growing military influence and praetorian role is a tenuous tipping of the scales in a delicate civil-military balance of power that favors the military over the long term and cannot be quickly counterbalanced and corrected. A shrinking pool of civilian talent means that politicians and political appointees enter into positions of executive authority “deeply ignorant” of their roles, responsibilities, and authorities. They require significant time to

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reorient and transition from campaign, private sector, corporate, or think tank positions to learning new government jobs and governing a uniquely powerful nation. Yet many of the most important decisions they will make come early in their tenure, “at a time when they are least capable of deciding wisely” (Hess 2002, 12–13). This is particularly important as it relates to the role of commander in chief. Presidents are often hobbled not only by their own inexperience and unfamiliarity with their new job but also by civilian advisers and political appointees with equally flimsy qualifications. Other than the senior military elites that serve them, presidents find themselves surrounded by strangers and, in many cases, incompetents (Hess 2002; Cheney 2000). If America’s military elites were altruistic, nonpartisan, apolitical guardians of the Republic, acting with benevolence in the exercise of their power and influence in government, why should Americans care? Would it not provide a glimmer of hope to see a powerful, functioning governmental institution acting coherently despite a political system that is plagued and crippled by hyper-partisanship, polarization, and gridlock? As Rosa Brooks (2016), Georgetown law professor, describes, America’s governmental institutions are increasingly incompetent and dysfunctional. It is “little wonder,” Brooks states, that the military is the only remaining, effective, functioning government institution that is reasonably successful in delivering returns on taxpayer investment. The hollowing-out of America’s civil service and governmental institutions has evolved over decades. Slowly and steadily, it has progressed in such a manner that finds the foundational principle of civilian supremacy and control over the U.S. military no longer inviolate. Civilians no longer effectively control the military because they are no longer able to do so. Military elites now play a unique role with exceptional influence over U.S. national security and foreign policy. Examples facilitating this evolution include significant measures taken early in the Trump administration. President Trump delegated vast authorities to military elites, essentially abdicating civilian oversight responsibility as a check-and-balance mechanism. Meanwhile, as the military’s budget increased, civil servants across the executive branch were fallaciously castigated as “deep state” government saboteurs. Turnover of civil servants increased, while retention of talent suffered. As this dynamic spread across the federal government over the course of Trump’s time in office, third-string “acting” political appointees, unconfirmed by the Senate, were, out of necessity, brought into the administration to fill the gaps. An ironic consequence of these actions, good or bad, was that Trump over time was less able to effect change and achieve his administration’s objectives. Within the Department of Defense, in the final year of his administration,

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and specifically during the 2020 presidential campaign, Trump expressed public frustration over his lack of control over national security and military policy. He lamented at a September 7, 2020, news conference that “top people in the Pentagon . . . want to do nothing but fight wars,” accusing the brass of being “globalists.” These accusations raised the ire and objections of Trump’s Joint Chiefs of Staff. The White House chief of staff, Mark Meadows, meekly excused the president. He stated that Trump was not referring to any specific military leader but instead to a more general, unspecified military cabal. Although Trump may have achieved some of his defense and national security objectives, the military continued to maintain troop commitments and a presence in combat zones across the Middle East, against Trump’s public statements and Tweets. This is not only a phenomenon that occurred during Trump’s Republican administration. Democratic President Barack Obama reportedly felt boxed in by his senior military leaders as it related to the military options they provided him in achieving his national security policy objectives, which included military drawdowns and withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan. Under President George W. Bush, in what became known as the “Revolt of the Generals,” senior military officers, both active and retired, protested incompetent civilian leadership of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. President Bill Clinton, promising to allow homosexuals to serve openly in the military, was quickly stymied and shut down by senior military leaders and forced to compromise, with the failed policy of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Military elites keeping unorthodox, unconventional, or progressive presidents in check may be a good thing. Not allowing politicians and political appointees to run amok in positions granted exceptional authority on paper may be a good thing. Enforcing rational, reasonable (if not outdated and inefficient) process, procedure, convention, and formality should be a check and balance against knee-jerk reaction to political winds, whims, and extremes. Yet, overreliance on the military due to a shallow pool of capable civilian leadership is a growing pattern. One of the first cabinet announcements coming from the transition offices of President-elect Biden was the intent to nominate retired four-star General Lloyd Austin to be secretary of defense. Only a few years out of the military, Austin’s nomination required special approval by Congress because of a well-intentioned law requiring a longer cooling-off period between military service and filling the role of defense secretary. In an oft-repeated historic example, General George Marshall set the precedent for recently retired four-star generals by taking the reins of the Department of Defense. With the nomination and approval of retired four-star General James Mattis to serve as the first secretary of defense under Trump, General Austin’s nomination normalized this pattern. Having multiple active-duty and retired general officers serving as secretaries at Defense,

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State, Homeland Security, and Veterans Affairs, and as White House chief of staff and National Security Advisor, all within the first decades of the twentyfirst century, demonstrates an incredible level of continued and increasing dependence on military elites. It also signals a dearth of qualified civilian leadership across multiple cabinet-level agencies and offices. Seeing politicians surrounded by military elites in or out of uniform and wrapping themselves in the symbolism of the American flag may be appealing to average Americans and signal strength and unity on the domestic and global stages. Presidents expect the expertise, reputation, and prestige of military elites to be projected upon them personally and upon their administrations. A consequence of this evolution, however, is the militarization of U.S. national security strategy, foreign policy, and homeland security. National strategies meant to integrate all elements of national power and incorporate an integrated whole-of-government approach to national and homeland security challenges are viewed as infeasible and increasingly aspirational (Schake and Mattis 2016b). Repeated failures to integrate other elements of national power in pursuit of national security goals and objectives leads to a weakened ability of the United States to formulate, pursue, and realize grand strategy (Locher 2010). Lieutenant General (Retired) Brent Scowcroft, a tremendous influence on national security policy for over forty years, lamented, in one of his last sponsored studies by the Atlantic Council, that the United States continues to lack coherence in its global approach and has no consistent global strategy. The United States is plagued by persistent “strategic confusion” (Crocker et al. 2016, i). Despite efforts to pursue integrated whole-of-government approaches to achieve national security objectives and deter its adversaries, the United States pursues and implements short-sighted, coercive, muscle-bound policies dominated by the military. Domestic policy, diplomatic issues, and challenges that are clearly outside the scope of the military’s mission set are increasingly wrapped in the veil of national security. Cast and labeled as a national security “concern,” the military is relied upon to tackle identified problems and achieve desirable policy outcomes (Milner and Tingley 2015). A related effect is that the military, with a growing list of challenges and demands on its resources, requires and receives increased federal funding at the expense of other governmental agencies. This spiraling dynamic creates an undercurrent and drift toward overreliance on military power as rival institutions are increasingly underfunded, under-resourced, undermanned, and, many times, poorly led. These trends, combined with the existing and anticipated global security environment, provide cause for examining the role of military elites in the national security policy process. This examination will help answer how

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national security and foreign policy decisions are affected and implemented by military elites and how their influence impacts a precarious balance of power in civil-military relations. This examination rests on a fundamental proposition that a dynamic community of military elites constitutes an epistemic community, that is, a group of elite military officers with authoritative knowledge that play a unique role with exceptional influence on national security and foreign policy. Since 9/11, this epistemic community of military elites has been at war continuously while working alongside civilian leaders, elected officials, and political appointees with very limited, episodic national security and foreign policy experience. The implication is that the majority of civilians in government have little, if any, skin in the game. Given the validity of this assumption, scholars and practitioners need to better understand the evolving role of military elites in U.S. national security and how it has come to fill a critical leadership/knowledge/power vacuum (Higbee 2010; Jenkins and Volden 2017). Understanding these trends, and the role of military elites within them, has significant theoretical implications in understanding important influences on U.S. national security and foreign policy decision-making, as well as implications for understanding imbalanced civil-military relations in practice versus theory. Upcoming chapters explore the behavior, role, and influence of U.S. military elites on national security policy through the lens of epistemic community theory. This study treats military elites as a unit, as a homogenous community. This unit of analysis is, in a way, unitary, but what makes this research different is that, instead of postulating the unitary a priori, or preexisting, it interrogates what makes military elites into such a powerful unitary actor. It describes what creates the unity within this community. The result is not a faceless unitary actor but rather a social actor characterized by a set of conceptual attributes and characteristics that are complex and nuanced.

Epistemic Community Theory Epistemic community theory is a seldom-referenced theoretical framework within international relations studies positing that networks of professionals with recognized expertise and authoritative, consensual knowledge exert exceptional influence over policy process, decision-making outcomes, and implementation (Haas 1992; Cross 2011). Previous work has demonstrated the utility of epistemic community theory in analyzing international networks of experts and their influence on crossnational policies. It helps international relations scholars understand individual and group behavior in the international system and transnational policy process. It provides a more nuanced

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understanding of the role these actors play and the influence they exert on process and outcomes. With the work of Haas (1992), Cross (2011, 2013a, 2013b), and others (Thomas 1997; Sugden 2006; Libel 2016), epistemic community theory has demonstrated utility in analyzing the behavior of defense sector elites in both an international and domestic environment. This book extends the analysis by applying an epistemic community theoretical framework to a specified, homogenous group of U.S. military elites. First, through a detailed analysis of the conceptual attributes of epistemic communities as defined by current scholarship, it proposes that military elites constitute an epistemic community, distinct from competing networks of professionals. Second, by demonstrating what scholars would expect to be the outcomes of a policy process under the heavy influence of military elites, it proposes that military elites play a unique role and exercise exceptional influence on U.S. national security policy. Examining the behavior, role, and influence of military elites on national security and foreign policy in the context of epistemic community theory is important because there are no investigations into those attributes and that community at the domestic level in U.S. decision-making, particularly the military. This investigation fills that gap. Additionally, it provides important expansion and modifications to the epistemic community theory framework. It illuminates additional aspects of a union of experts, accounting for their hold on knowledge and influence. Finally, it provides nuance to the conceptual attributes that characterize epistemic communities, how they are perceived, and how they behave in practice. I contend throughout this analysis that U.S. military elites are defined and characterized by specific conceptual attributes that empower them in the policy process. These conceptual attributes include: shared normative, principled, causal, and political beliefs; shared notions of validity; common policy enterprise; profession and ethos; internal cohesion and intragroup trust; consensual, authoritative knowledge and expertise; perception of an uncertain, complex environment; and external relationships, alliances, and resources. Despite these common attributes, it is important to note and understand that the influence individual military elites wield is mediated by personality, experience, the political environment, and the challenges that arise related to national security. I also argue that military elites—lawfully subordinate to and under the constitutional command and control of civilian authority—play a unique role in, and possess weighted influence on, policy, process, and implementation. Put simply, the relationship between military elites and civilian counterparts has evolved and is more nuanced than past and current civil-military relations theory and scholarship suggests. The implications of this weighted influence, evolution in relationship, and nuanced interaction challenge the

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reality of any effective principle of civilian control and meaningful civilian leadership authority. Idyllic theoretical assertions related to civilian control of the military are, in other words, a fanciful myth (Mills 1959; Finer 1962; Bletz 1972; Abrahamsson 1972; Korb 1979; Bacevich 1997; Boggs 2005; Gibson 2008; Schiff 2009; Ackerman 2010; Shulman 2012). A consequence of this evolution is that military elites, serving in advisory roles, have claimed power over rivals in the policy process. A silent coup of an increasingly praetorian military elite has occurred to the extent that military elites, rather than simply advising civilians, effectively influence and essentially control U.S. national security policy. This is not to say that presidents do not get their way if they choose not to follow the counsel of military elites. There are a myriad of episodic occasions wherein presidents overrule their military advisers. President Biden’s decision to withdraw from Afghanistan in summer 2021, against the advice of his most senior military advisers, is an example. As the president’s allies and critics took note, there was a very steep political price to pay for going against the military elites’ best military advice. Although not the sole cause for the president’s severe dip in public opinion, Biden’s approval ratings dropped precipitously during the disastrously messy Afghanistan withdrawal. For historic context, President Biden’s approval ratings fell lower than any other president since President Eisenhower, at the same time in their respective administrations, with the exception of President Trump (Gallup 2021a).

What Defines a “Military Elite”? To say that military elites effectively influence and essentially control U.S. national security policy requires understanding key terms in more detail. First, we need to understand, precisely, what or who military elites are and why it is important to study and understand them as a variable in the policy process. Second, it is important to understand how the influence of military elites is operationalized in the policy process. Third, if military elites’ influence is bounded to specific policy domains, we need to understand how those are defined. And last, we need to understand how this study fits into current theory and scholarship. Historically, the term “military elite” has been defined very broadly and with very little precision. It is thrown around in scholarly literature, conferences, panel discussions, podcasts, and in editorial articles and media interviews with inadequate explanation. For the purposes of this academic study, the term “military elite” does not refer to all military officers or to service members assigned to elite military combat units. Janowitz (1957, 1960) and Huntington (1957) refer to “military elites”

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as “the officer corps” or “career officers.” By this definition, military elites would roughly constitute 17.5 percent of our armed forces’ personnel endstrength (DOD 2021). Others define “military elite” as officers with potential for advancement, attending professional military education appropriate for their rank in residence, and likely to be promoted and emerge as future leaders (Feaver, Kohn, and Cohn 2001) (Feaver and Gelpi 2004). These aggregations remain excessively broad. Junior officers, having served less than ten years in the military, are not considered “elite” by military standards or within the military community. Labeling them as such is disingenuous. Rather, they are considered, from a personnel perspective, to be midcareerists. Regardless, there is a rationale for a broad definition of the term “military elite.” An expansive definition does have important scholarly utility to academics. Casting a wide net and including a vast population of so-called elite officers supports significant, groundbreaking, large-n, institutional studies such as the Triangle Institute for Security Studies project of 1998, a YouGov study funded by the Hoover Institution in 2016, and the important and noteworthy work of more current civil-military relations scholars. These important studies rely on survey data, measuring, for example, the political preferences, opinions, and beliefs of the officer corps. Interestingly, the Department of the Army does define military “elite.” It specifies as “elite” those “world class” officers that have attained the grade of rank colonel (DA PAM 600-3 2017, 16). Still, this remains unconvincing because, as those in the military community know very well, not all colonels are equal. As this study will demonstrate through interviews with several of the military’s highest-ranking officers, attaining “flag rank” and becoming a general or admiral does not necessarily qualify an officer as “elite.” Serving as Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric Shinseki is legendarily cited as telling a class of newly minted one-star generals that if all of them were lost simultaneously in a plane crash they easily could be replaced the very next day—the macabre message being that one-star generals should remain humble, as they are expendable. Military elites, in the context of this study, are not simply active-duty military officers or, for that matter, any senior military officer at the rank of colonel or higher. In recent years, there were over 11,000 colonels / Navy captains (4.7 percent of the military’s officer corps) and less than 900 generals and admirals (0.37 percent of the military’s officer corps) in the military (DOD 2021). For purposes of this study, the term “military elite” is more prescriptive. Military elites are a dynamic group of senior generals and admirals at the rank of O-9 and O-10 (three-star and four-star officers) serving in nominative command and staff positions. They are active-duty and retired, and

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they directly interface with and advise senior civilian leadership, elected officials, and foreign governments as participants in the national security policy process in their current assignment or by nature of their advisory role and responsibilities (see table 1). Additionally, military elites routinely engage and interact with key influencers in the national security process, including think tanks, academia, the media, and the general public, on a regular and routine basis. This community of military elites is generally populated from a select pool of one- and two-star generals / admirals and colonels / Navy captains and field-grade officers at the rank of lieutenant colonel / commander and major / lieutenant commander that consistently perform in an exceptional manner above and beyond their peers. They are repeatedly selected for command positions at progressively higher organizational levels, nominative positions, competitive programs, and special professional developmental assignments. These officers are in the top 0.5 percent of their cohort. This pool of officers is routinely selected to attend resident service schools or public and private universities in pursuit of civilian graduate degrees, followed by unique utilization assignments in which they interact with civilian elites across the federal government, at think tanks, and within academia. Examples of these programs include several “war college” fellowships at Harvard, MIT, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Brookings Institution, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and many other elite institutions. Additional programs for more junior officers include the White House Fellowship, Congressional Fellowship, Office of the Secretary of Defense/ Joint Chiefs of Staff (OSD/JCS) Internship, and more. Many serve as an aide-de-camp or executive assistant to senior flag officers and political appointees. Often, officers selected to these types of positions and programs are routinely selected at a higher rate for early promotion, as well as for command and leadership positions at successively higher organizational levels. These highly sought-after positions and assignments provide opportunities for this pool of officers to work outside a traditional tactical and operational assignment progression. They are selected to work at strategic levels in the highest echelons of the U.S. government. Their jobs, experiences, and resulting professional networks provide them routine access to senior officials and civilian elites whereby they build relationships based on a foundation of trust and confidence. These relationships often influence future assignments and potential early promotions. Highly sought-after assignments are typically nominative. A select few are commonly referred to as “black book” jobs. Officers that fill these assignments do not necessarily remain in this elite class or status. Successive assignments, life choices, career paths, health, discipline, and performance determine whether they remain in or revisit classification as military elites.

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Table 1: Military Elites Status

Rank

Assignment history Routine responsibilities

Active duty / Retired

Three- and four-star flag officers (generals and admirals)

Service chiefs, Combatant Commanders (CCDRs), Joint Staff, OSD, NSC, the White House, and other governmental agencies

Advise, engage, and routinely interact with the president, Congress, foreign heads of state, cabinet secretaries, ministers of defense, ambassadors, foreign military, other governmental agencies, senior civilian political appointees, think tanks, academia, the media, and the general public

One- and two-star flag officers (generals and admirals); colonels/Navy captains; select field grade officers

Board-select command positions; boardselect broadening opportunities; nominative positions; and special professional development assignments such as aide de camp, executive assistants, and fellows

Advise, engage, and interact with Congress, foreign heads of state, cabinet secretaries, ministers of defense, ambassadors, foreign military, CJCS, service chiefs, Combatant Commanders, NSC, Joint Staff, OSD, other governmental agencies, senior civilian political appointees, think tanks, academia, and the media

Pool of potential military elites Active duty

Source: Compiled by the author.

Military elites should be in a career field and on a career trajectory providing them with experiences, training, education, and professional development that develop in them characteristics that civilian elites deliberately seek out. These characteristics generally include the ability and capacity to communicate with and provide the best military advice to national command authorities, Congress, foreign leaders, and the public with credibility, candor, and discretion, particularly in times of crisis. Civilian leaders seek to appoint military elites with broad and successful operational backgrounds that include leading major commands in large-scale and global contingency and combat operations. Military elites should exhibit an exceptionally strong and wide-ranging intellect that demonstrates a grasp of international relations, geography, and

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history, as well as a sophisticated understanding and comprehension of national politics, bureaucratic politics, and interagency process. These officers should be ethical, trustworthy, innovative, and adaptive, possessing the ability to lead and manage peers that are of equal caliber. They should understand the roles and responsibilities of the military services, Service Chiefs, Combatant Commands, and the Joint Staff. Senior military elites should demonstrate a willingness to disagree with the secretary of defense and president in private, while providing support and effective leadership of military forces once decisions are made. They should possess strong character and a healthy respect for civilian control of the military, coupled with compatibility with the leadership styles of the service secretaries, the secretary of defense, and the president (W1-I14; Rumsfeld 2001a). Finally, it is important to address why retired military elites are included with active-duty military elites. The American public, although enamored by the military, knows very little about it or about military culture and conventions. They are not likely to discriminate or differentiate between active-duty military and retired veterans, for example, especially when retired military elites continue to carry their impressive titles of “general” or “admiral” into retirement. In fact, as Jim Golby and Peter Feaver (2021) have noted in their valuable research, it is not a valid assumption that average Americans make “neat distinctions between active-duty and retired” military elites. Rather, the vast majority of Americans make little distinction in the duty status of senior officers. They are more likely to recognize the glittering stars on the shoulders of a senior officer and to “conflate the views of retired generals and admirals with those serving on active duty,” assuming “that the views of retired officers either ‘closely’ or ‘somewhat closely’ reflect the views of the men and women on active duty.”

Why Study the Influence of Military Elites? In 127 AD, Juvenal posed the question Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?—“Who guards the guardians?” “No political group is more influential and less studied,” according to Welch and Smith (1974). Understanding military elites and their influence in the political or policy process can seem like an impenetrable task. It is not necessarily conducive to contemporary social science trends that emphasize and incentivize quantitative studies. Unfortunately, this leaves a significant variable in the political and policy process unexplored. To this point, understanding the process of formulating national security policy in the United States remains an understudied area of scholarship in international relations (IR) and foreign policy analysis (FPA). The omissions

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are substantive. Much of the FPA literature focuses on crisis decisionmaking, including the initiation of war, imposition of sanctions, and other salient issues, while “foreign policy decision-making in the absence of crisisrelated factors has gone largely unexplored” (Asterino-Courtois and Trusty 2003, 359; Wharton 2018). Subsequently, we know much more about how onetime foreign policy decisions are made. Scholars tend to focus on exceptional policy decisions that are made under conditions of time pressure and situational exigency (the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example). Additionally, studies of foreign policy related to specific countries and regions have been prioritized over research on broader foreign policy strategy. The omissions are also theoretical. Current civil-military relations theory is institutional and unidirectional. It looks at the military en masse and restricts study of the relationship to how civilians generally control the military institution. Additionally, scholarship related to understanding the behavior, role, and influence of U.S. military elites in the policy process at the domestic level is largely nonexistent. Influences that shape U.S. national security policy are many. External influences include the international political and economic environment, interstate relationships with adversaries and allies, and the role of international institutions. Internal influences include the domestic political and economic environments; the role of government institutions; the administrative organization and policy process; and a president’s personality and relationships with political adversaries, allies, and elites. Several studies focus on the individual and collective influence of civilian elites on policy, process, and implementation and are generally well documented in the literature. Very few studies, however, help understand the beliefs, behavior, role, motive, and influence of military elites, as a specified group of political actors, within the policy process. All policy arenas have resident elites that may influence each respective policy field. For example, the secretary of state represents a community of senior foreign service officers, diplomats, and foreign policy elites and stakeholders that may act as an epistemic community in relation to foreign policy. Likewise, intelligence community elites may constitute an epistemic community. Past scholarship has relied on the general assumption that military elites may contribute as actors in the policy process, but not as a singular epistemic community, only as a subcomponent of a wider epistemic community. The difference, I contend, is that U.S. military elites are not a subcomponent of an epistemic community but instead constitute a unique and exceptional epistemic community in their own right. I examine each of the conceptual attributes of epistemic communities, demonstrating in nuanced detail how military elites exhibit each characteristic. I also demonstrate how

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they are able to operationalize these conceptual attributes to influence policy willfully and systematically in the policy process. Epistemic community theory has remained silent on this until now, leaving the consideration of U.S. military elite influence ripe for further investigation.

Operationalizing Influence To say that military elites are exceptionally influential in the policy process is a generic claim. It requires understanding how that exceptional influence is operationalized. The term “influence” is defined by Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary as both a noun and a verb. It is the static capacity to cause or produce an “effect in indirect or intangible ways,” without the exertion of force or “direct exercise of command,” coupled with the dynamic “indirect or intangible affect,” alteration, or “condition of development” of the target of influence. The military describes influence as the act or power to produce a desired outcome or end on a target audience (Joint Publication 3-13 2012, I-3). International relations theorists describe influence, in the policy process, as the ability to write, interpret, implement, and administer policy (Milner and Tingley 2015). These definitions assume that being in a position to influence equates to achieving influence on policy outcome. Measuring influence, however, is an imperfect science because of the diversity of influences on a decision maker (Aron 1966). It is “one of the most important and elusive concepts in the study of politics” (Betts 1977, 5). Despite data that may overwhelmingly demonstrate direct and indirect, formal and informal influences, distinguishing between the policy preferences of military elites and civilian leaders is difficult. This difficulty is a product of an interactive and integrated process. Military elite and civilian counterparts interact and integrate vertically and horizontally within and across governmental institutions and federal agencies. There is an expectation that military elites and civilian counterparts are mutually responsible for informing, formulating, and implementing national security strategy. For the scholar, it may appear impossible to objectively detect whose influence is greatest in the policy process. Where does the influence of military and civilians begin and end? An equally daunting challenge is to differentiate the sources of influence from its outcomes, thus avoiding tautological reasoning. Columbia University’s Dr. Richard Betts (1977) argues that military influence is direct when it concerns the formal and informal recommendations made to decision makers, as well as the control of policy implementation. Military influence is indirect when it concerns how military elites control

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information, agenda-setting, policy options, and the premise of civilian decisions. Influence, however, should be demonstrated in policy outcomes. It is not enough to demonstrate that military elites predominantly establish and control the organizational structure that produces policy. It is not enough to demonstrate that military elites control the information that informs the process. It is not enough to demonstrate that military elites predominantly control the procedures and human resources staffing the process. And it is not enough to demonstrate that military elites are predominantly responsible for controlling the implementation of policy decisions. One may posit, however, that all of these dynamics suggest a unique role and exceptional influence in the policy process. In multiple conceptual approaches to the policy process, the role and influence of professionals with specialized knowledge and expertise are common variables affecting decision makers and the decision-making process. The authoritative knowledge and expertise of professionals provide them jurisdictional prerogatives over policy deliberations and implementation. Their influence and ability to protect policy jurisdiction are dependent, however, on their ability to maintain credibility with a president, political appointees, elected officials, and the American public. Assuming they maintain credibility, their influence and control of policy are essential to the process and “cannot be eliminated or significantly constrained” (Dixon 1984, 142–143). Military elites, as an epistemic community, have conceptual attributes and positions of influence that provide them with elements of power or capacity to influence. This remains a static definition of influence. However, it is how these elements of power are exercised to affect policy that is, arguably, the true measure of influence, because it taps the ability of an actor to translate preferences and interests into policy. In the following chapters, I define and explain the static elements of influence that epistemic communities possess—the conceptual attributes listed above. I follow with a demonstration of how military elites constitute an epistemic community possessing these conceptual attributes. I then demonstrate how these conceptual attributes are converted and dynamically employed in the policy process to affect policy, process, and implementation. Military elites operationalize their exceptional influence directly and indirectly, formally and informally, across the executive and legislative branches of government, as well as vertically within organizations and agencies. The real weight and measure of military elite influence is tethered to the degree to which policy process and outcomes are altered or changed. Policy process and procedures are established and modified, and policy outcomes are effectively distorted to reflect the beliefs, preferences, and views of military elites above and beyond any competing group or community that seeks to influence national security policy.

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Military elite influence is operationalized in the shaping and informing of a president’s national security agenda; in determining the choices and courses of action a president makes; and in maintaining control, as the primary tool of implementation, once decisions are made. A such, we would expect to see, broadly, the explicit outcomes of this influence in how the role of military force is emphasized in the National Security Strategy (NSS) in peacetime and war, regardless of the political party and preferences of the president. We would also expect to see the outcome of military elites’ influence in how the President and Congress allocate discretionary federal spending to achieve strategic goals and objectives. Secretary of Defense General Lloyd Austin, appointed by President Biden, in one of his first public statements posted to the Department of Defense website on January 19, 2021, signaled his expectations to the president and Congress. In confirmation hearing testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Austin stated that the Department of Defense and the military “need resources to match strategy, a strategy matched to policy, and a policy matched to the will of the American people” (Garamone 2021). Justification for defense spending is “guided by” and based broadly on the “role of military force in the National Security Strategy” (DOD 2018a, 1; Arthur 2018, 15). In other words, Department of Defense budgetary requests are “strategy driven.” They are, by law, required to be “formulated around” the projected needs and requirements to “meet the objectives of the NSS” (DOD 2018a, 1).1 A more detailed exploration of these concepts in relation to military elite role and influence is provided in chapter 5. In the course of this study, an interview participant suggested that the surge in military elite influence is more recent, tied to an effort to correct a perceived overstepping of boundaries by civilians into a military policy enterprise and guarded prerogatives (W1-I49). However visible military influence may be in the present, the unique role and exceptional influence of military elites have evolved over time. The rising tide of military influence has a much richer and deeper context when considering the historic role of the military in American society and the history of U.S. civil-military relations.

National Security and Foreign Policy The term “national security” was coined in the run-up to World War II and examined by E. Pendleton Herring in the context of American antimilitarism (Herring 1941; Stuart 2008). Pendleton’s thesis was that American culture 1. The requirement to submit strategy-driven budgetary documents to Congress is statutorily mandated by the Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986.

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and a presupposed tradition of antimilitarism, stretching back to the pre– Revolutionary War era, caused America to be ill-prepared for international conflict and foreign relations in the twentieth century. He argued that, for the United States to be better prepared for a leading role in the world, it must evolve its method and approach to national security and foreign policy. In short, he argued for a greater praetorian role for military elites throughout the highest echelons of the federal government (Herring 1941). National security and foreign policy are often used together or interchangeably in this book. To be clear, national security policy deals with problems and challenges related to pursuing U.S. national interests and protecting those interests from political, economic, and military threats (Shoemaker 1991). National security policy overlaps with, and includes elements of, diplomacy and foreign policy, domestic policy, law enforcement, military and defense policy, financial and economic policy, and intelligence policy. An alternative interpretation suggests that foreign policy is at the center of all this if viewed as a Venn diagram. Foreign policy encompasses the activities of government officials that influence events and relationships internationally between the United States and foreign governments and citizens. In this approach, foreign policy encompasses national security, economic, trade, and monetary policy (Destler 1972, 5). The rationale for using either term interchangeably? From World War II to the present, military considerations have dominated U.S. foreign policy, and the definitions are now seen as broadly overlapping (Lovell 1974; Jordan and Taylor 1981). This matters because it relates to how policy is organizationally influenced, led, informed, developed, decided, and implemented. In line with Herring’s pre–World War II recommendations, a major evolutionary development during the war and under President Franklin Roosevelt’s administration was the intimate involvement, role, influence, and association of military elites with the formulation and implementation of national security and foreign policy. World War II also created an intimate connection between the military and American society (Sarkesian 1994). As Americans accepted the role of the United States on the international stage during World War II, they also accepted the increasing militarization of its national security and foreign policy. It is important to note and define the terms “militarization” and “militarism.” These terms refer to “an emphasis on military considerations . . . to the neglect” of other elements of national power, as well as to other national economic and social priorities (Vagts 1959, 13–14). This implies a dominant bureaucratic position and power of the military relative to other agencies. The military becomes a dominant priority in budget allocations. Military power becomes the dominant means of realizing diplomatic and national security objectives. Finally, military elites rise to fill dominant positions in the

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national security and foreign policy decision-making process (Milner and Tingley 2015). Over time, the increasing role of military elites in the national security policy process shifted the tone and tenor of U.S. national security policy, as well as the scope of policies that fall within the boundaries of national security concerns. For example, complex policy issues such as the illegal drug trade, childhood obesity, immigration, election security, natural disasters, national infrastructure, cyber security, viral pandemics, and climate change are now politically branded as “national security issues.” No doubt, there may be good arguments for labeling such a broad array of issues as national security concerns. However, as the number of rebranded national security issues have grown, so have presidential administrations increasingly sought shortsighted, militarized solutions designed for electoral politics. Attempting to achieve short-term policy gains with electoral benefits has had the effect of making national security and foreign policy less bipartisan and more polarizing because of politicized/partisan goals and objectives. In a detrimental cycle, the politicization of national security and foreign policy has led to an overreliance on military means to achieve the agenda of the administration in power. As militarized policies increase in scope and scale, the military becomes more politicized, while competing government institutions become hollowed out in the budgetary process. The long-term impacts of this self-defeating process have been policy that is disjointed, destabilizing, and ultimately irresponsible (Lock-Pullan 2006; Crocker et al. 2016). An equally serious consequence is the so-called increasing politicization of the military as it is drawn into the partisan political fray. However, military elites have been waging political, intergovernmental, and bureaucratic battles for decades. Indeed, the genesis of the guardians and their partisan political role in government can be traced to America’s founding.

Chapter Two

Genesis of the Guardians

One of the chief forces behind a national establishment was a specific group of men: for the most part, veterans of the Continental Army, believers in a far stronger central government, and founders and leaders of the Federalist Party and the [U.S.] Government after 1789. . . . The military establishment was intimately involved in nearly every one of the great events and struggles which have . . . attracted the attention of historians. . . . And at no other peacetime period in American history, with the exceptions of 1865–1877 and the post-1945 years, did military affairs exert more influence on national life than during the twenty years after independence. —Richard Kohn, Eagle and Sword (1975), xii

Denying the inherent, natural tension and subsurface struggle between the military and its civilian leadership is disingenuous. Many recognize the discord in civil-military relations yet try to minimize it by describing it as “healthy.” This, too, is misleading. Below a façade of civility between military elites and civilian leaders is an epic, persistent power struggle along the fault lines of civil-military relations. Each side grapples to contain the influence of the other while endeavoring to maximize their own advantage. In this chapter, I discuss the genesis of the guardians, ending with a brief case study of President Dwight Eisenhower’s experiences with military elites serving under his administration and demonstrating the myth of effective civilian control. Clashes between military elites and civilian leaders are born from deep divides. These divides are related to professional culture, standards of conduct, values, worldview, and profound philosophical divergence related to governing and national security. Military elites take great pride in their shared military history, heritage, culture, traditions, pageantry, prerogatives, and protocols. Increasingly, military service is a family tradition. The majority of civilians do not relate. They have not heeded the sirens at a forward operating base warning of incoming rockets and artillery. They have never heard the “big voice” announcements on a base calling for emergency 36

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blood donations as medical evacuations are inbound to an expeditionary field hospital. They do not write their blood type on their boots or kiss a Saint Michael’s pendant before boarding a helicopter or going outside a perimeter on patrol. They have not waited in line at a phone bank, anxiously awaited mail call, or watched their battle-buddies laugh or cry as they hear news from family at home. They have not visited with the wounded at Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, walked the fields of Arlington National Cemetery, and visited with Gold Star families. The majority of civilians are not personally vested in the military’s mission. They do not have skin in the game. Deep divides between military elites and civilian counterparts are also rooted in a foundational belief that the military is held to higher standards of conduct in comparison to civilian leadership. Military elites are accountable to a blind and demanding code of military justice. With veiled condescension, military elites generally believe that they are apolitical, above politics and the political scrum, faithfully committed to the higher ideals of the United States Constitution. There is an additional, fundamental difference between civilian elites and military elites. Civilian politicians have an “electoral connection” (Mayhew 1974). They place domestic and electoral politics as a top priority. Military elites, in contrast, do not have an electoral connection. They are less inclined to calculate domestic politics in the process of national security and foreign policy decision-making. They are not politically accountable for their actions. Military elites do have political interests that motivate them, however. These interests include ambitiously seeking advantage for themselves and their parent organization. They seek to protect and maintain professional norms and prerogatives. They seek to propagate “self-serving strategic conceptions” of the international environment that justify advancing policy preferences that may run counter to a president or presidential agenda (Kupchan 1994, 34; Weber 1964; Wilson 1991; Zegart 1999). Simmering under the surface, these differences and divides rarely surface or attract the attention of the public. Public awareness of civil-military relations and the role of the military and military elites in U.S. society gained renewed media attention over the course of the administration of President Donald Trump. In early 2017, following the president’s inauguration, the Associated Press published an article describing the new administration in its early, chaotic, formative stage—a dynamic experienced by every new, first-term administration. Buried toward the bottom of the article was a somewhat startling claim. The authors reported that the new secretary of defense, retired General James Mattis, and the new secretary of homeland security (later White House chief of staff), retired General John Kelly, had explicitly agreed that one of them would always remain tethered to the president and the White House as a precaution

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against what they both perceived as an exceptionally rocky start for the new administration (Salama and Pace 2017). For many, having seasoned, retired four-star generals shepherding a new, unorthodox, and inexperienced president in the early, potentially vulnerable days of a new administration was reassuring. For civil-military relations scholars and astute military service members, it should have raised cautionary flags. Were military elites assuming an increasingly praetorian role in the new administration? If the article was accurate, why did Mattis and Kelly feel compelled to take seemingly unprecedented safeguard measures in monitoring the actions of the new president? Four years later, during the 2020 presidential election, concerns over the role of military elites in the Trump administration persisted (TIP 2020). Contending with a global pandemic and an outbreak of violent rioting in cities across the nation, President Trump, on June 1, 2020, delivered a lawand-order–themed speech in the White House Rose Garden. The violent rioting and civil unrest were related to the murder of George Floyd, an African American man from Minneapolis, by local law enforcement officers. Following his speech, the president, accompanied by members of his staff and national security team, walked off the White House grounds and across Lafayette Square for a photo opportunity in front of St. John’s Church. The photo op featured the president clumsily holding a bible. Political pundits questioned whether the exceptionally awkward event was staged to garner support from the president’s political base. There was a great deal of media frenzy around the episode because Lafayette Square had, minutes earlier, been forcibly cleared of protesters by police in full paramilitary riot gear, shooting rubber bullets, deploying tear gas, and launching flash-bang grenades. There was a curious feature in the photographs taken that day. The senior uniformed leader of the U.S. military, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), uncharacteristically clad in combat fatigues, accompanied the group in what could have been interpreted as a demonstration of partisan support for the president in a very politically charged moment. To provide additional context, days earlier the secretary of defense, a former U.S. Army infantry officer, had reportedly encouraged state governors to consider America’s towns and cities as a “battlespace” to be dominated with the deployment of National Guard units (Myers 2020). Within hours of the viral photographs, an unprecedented response came from a stable of retired four-star generals and senior military officials denouncing the president’s and, by extension, the CJCS’s actions. This included General John Allen, General Vincent Brooks, General James Mattis, Admiral Mike Mullen, General Colin Powell, and General Joseph Votel, among others. In smaller audiences, senior executive leadership of the U.S. Army,

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both uniformed and civilian, admonished the Army to remain apolitical, to not break trust with the American people. Active-duty generals, admirals, and senior civilian leadership from across the military services and the Department of Defense issued official statements calling for calm, reason, and unity. The Chief of Staff of the Army warned against politicians using the military as political props and pawns. Nearly every statement highlighted the military’s oath to protect and defend the U.S. Constitution, a clear message that the military serves the people of the United States, not a presidential personality. Ten days after the president’s inelegant photo op, General Mark Milley, Trump’s CJCS, acknowledged his blatant mistake. He explained the event as an unintentional, awkward blunder and apologized for his actions. Knowing his exceptional lapse in judgment, viewed through the lens of strained civilmilitary relations, was damaging, he admitted that his actions reinforced a perception of a military involved in domestic politics and taking political sides. General Milley reinforced the ideal of an apolitical military, but the significant damage to the military’s image was done. For citizens on differing ends of the political spectrum, particularly those skeptical of the military, it was clear that there is a struggle fomenting below the thin veneer of well-balanced civil-military relations. In the months and weeks before and after the 2020 election, disillusioned, retired military officers from both sides of the political spectrum advocated for military involvement in the electoral process. From the political left, two retired lieutenant colonels, John Nagl and Paul Yingling, penned a bizarre “open letter” to General Milley. In their letter, these officers suggested that Trump would need to be removed from office by military force (Nagl and Yingling 2020). From the political right, following President Trump’s loss to former Vice President Joe Biden, retired Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, Trump’s first National Security Advisor, reportedly spread misinformation and hyped conspiracy theories, claiming the election was fraudulent and had been stolen (Rosenberg 2021). Flynn reportedly met with Trump in the Oval Office and advocated for suspending the U.S. Constitution, implementing martial law, and having the military administer a second election (Bender and Hanna 2016; Altman et al. 2020). Reports stated that Flynn echoed similar sentiments in May 2021, suggesting to a large conference of Trump supporters and conspiracy theory enthusiasts that a brutal and deadly military coup was justified in the United States and was a reasonable response to Trump’s loss in the 2020 election (Houlahan and Crow 2021). Although publicly chided and chastised for these extremely wacky rants and a basic misunderstanding of how the U.S. legal, political, and constitutional system works, these officers, from both sides of the political spectrum, are more extreme examples of the increasing

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willingness, particularly by retired military officers, to engage in exceptionally partisan political behavior. In the remaining days before the 2020 presidential election, General Milley waded into the civil-military debate multiple times. In a National Public Radio interview on October 11, 2020, General Milley reassured Americans: “There is no role for the U.S. military in determining the outcome of a U.S. election. Zero. There is no role” (Silva 2020). Ironically, over 700 retired generals and admirals, trading on the prestige of their former profession, publicly endorsed the main presidential candidates. Still, General Milley was compelled to reinforce his narrative. On the weekend prior to the 2020 Presidential Election, he told reporters that the U.S. has a “very long tradition of an apolitical military that does not get involved in domestic politics.” Following the election, General Milley, attending the inauguration of President Biden, reportedly stated, “No one has a bigger smile today than I do” (Leonnig and Rucker 2021). Regardless of context, the impression that military elites had picked a political side in the election will continue to linger.

A Mythical Apolitical Military The narrative of an apolitical, nonpartisan military is a nuanced, if not contrived, part of American mythology. American government has always been well seeded with, and much influenced by, military elites from its founding. Still, mainstream American heritage asserts that the United States has a strong tradition of antimilitarism (Lewis 2012). This conventional interpretation of early U.S. heritage is well established, captured in America’s own experience with the British colonial army, written exchanges between the “Sons of Liberty;” articles in The Federalist Papers, and in the debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1787. A near-universal view that a standing military—unchecked, unrepresentative, unelected, and unaccountable—is an enemy of liberty and a potential instrument of tyranny was a foundational belief of the early American public and a tenet of Presidents Thomas Jefferson’s and James Madison’s liberal DemocraticRepublican Party that developed in the early 1790s. While the embrace of antimilitarism and the rejection of a standing military may have characterized early America, it should not be confused with Americans lacking in a strong martial spirit. Additionally, history books tend to gloss over the fact that there were nuanced and distinct differences of opinion on the role of a standing military. A powerful faction of nationalist veterans of the American Revolution, “believers in a far stronger central

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government, and founders and leaders of the Federalist Party,” advocated for a strong standing military establishment from the earliest days of the new American government (Kohn 1975). It was a plank of their political platform and a policy position intended to strengthen a weak federal system. Led by President George Washington, this powerful contingent of Continental Army veterans—America’s inaugural military elites—filled critical positions throughout his presidency and future administrations. They were an early apparition of an epistemic community of military professionals. This community of professionals was bound together by wartime experiences, a warrior culture, military values, discipline, and leadership that had been instilled through years of frontier military service. These early military elites viewed external threats as existential to the new nation they were creating. A standing military was imperative to deterring clear and present national security threats posed by Native Americans in the Northwest Territory, a British army that remained as a menacing threat on U.S. borders, and perceived threats from abroad (Kohn 1975). Indeed, from Washington to President Abraham Lincoln, military elites and veterans would remain entrenched in American politics, with eleven of sixteen presidents having served in the military, five of whom were former general officers. During the American Civil War and the Reconstruction Era, military elites wielded unprecedented political influence in both domestic and military policy. It was common for general officers to be appointed to senior ranks for purely political reasons, whether to garner political support of a specific constituency or to address a complex political issue or challenge. Many of these politically appointed generals were empowered to overrule civilian governments and displace democratically elected civilian officials. Indeed, Civil War–era military elites administered governmental processes and superseded civilian institutions by running courts, levying taxes, supervising elections, and drafting state constitutions. Military elites were charged with domestic law enforcement duties in the American West, as well as with quelling organized labor disputes and violence in the East. The increasing praetorian involvement of the military in post–Civil War Reconstruction ultimately led to the passage of a number of laws to hamper this from happening in the future. The Act of July 15, 1870 (ch. 294, § 18, 16 Stat. 315, 319) was passed to ensure that “no officer of the Army on the active list shall hold any civil office, whether by election or appointment, and every such officer who accepts or exercises the functions of a civil office shall thereby cease to be an officer of the Army, and his commission shall be thereby vacated.” The Posse Comitatus Act of 1887 was later passed, constraining the military from involvement in

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the administration of domestic policy and law enforcement within the United States.1 Military elites of this era were no strangers to electoral politics, particularly at the national level. In the wake of the American Civil War, the Indian Wars, and the Spanish–American War, eight of the nine presidents that followed Lincoln were military veterans, having served as senior officers and generals in the U.S. Army. Notably, seven of the eight were Republicans. Military elites, imbued with great ambition and far from being apolitical, remained deeply entrenched in partisan politics. As such, they wielded immense influence over national security, defense, and military policy. In the U.S. Army, in particular, these late-nineteenth-century guardians were exemplified by two military elites that would become the most senior officer in their service, the Commanding General of the Army: Lieutenant General John Schofield and Lieutenant General Nelson Miles. Schofield served as Commanding General of the Army from 1888 to 1895. He displayed a keen understanding of Washington politics and had a reputation as a politically astute insider that knew how to influence, compromise, negotiate, and patiently and deliberately navigate the federal government’s institutional and bureaucratic politics. Schofield recognized that military elites could not be apolitical. They could not separate the military from politics but must accommodate politics and partisanship to achieve their political and policy preferences (Connelly 2006). Over time, he learned two overarching tenets that guided his actions and that he deemed critical to ensuring military elites were successful in achieving their objectives in the policy process. First, he understood that it is not the decision maker who ultimately exercises power. Power, in Schofield’s estimation, resides with the adviser behind the scenes who is able to inform and manage the decision-making process 1. The intent of the act of July 15, 1870, was reaffirmed in 1925, appearing as section 1222 of the Revised Statutes and was made part of the United States Code in the 1925 edition as 10 U.S.C. § 576 (See Rev. Stat. § 1222 [1st ed. 1875], 18 Stat. pt. 1, at 215; 10 U.S.C. § 576). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled in Riddle v. Warner (1975) that the principal concern of the congressional act of 1870 “was to assure civilian preeminence in government, i.e. to prevent the military establishment from insinuating itself” into government positions that would, over time, allow it to become “paramount” to civilian leadership and control. Nearly a decade later, in 1983, the Reagan administration amended the 1870 law allowing Vice Admiral John Poindexter to serve as Reagan’s National Security Advisor while remaining on active duty with the U.S. Navy. Although some restrictions remained, the general prohibition of active-duty military and veterans serving in positions in government intended for civilians was essentially repealed, and precedent for further exceptions to this policy were set.

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and successfully influence civilian decision-making authorities and decision outcomes. Second, he understood that, for the military to be able to succeed in the political sphere, military elites needed to “appreciate the political implications of their actions.” Like his predecessors General William Sherman and General Philip Sheridan, Schofield understood that this required overhauling and dedicating significant resources to the professional development and education of the officer corps and the military elites who would rise from its ranks (Connelly 2006). Nelson Miles served as Commanding General of the Army from 1895 to 1903. His storied career included combat service, particularly in the Indian Wars, that he later parlayed into a failed run for the presidency in 1904. Along with pursuing his ultimate political ambitions, he had no reservation about participating openly and explicitly in political activity while serving on active duty. He directly lobbied members of Congress in his official capacity in an effort to gain support for Army programs and his own political and policy preferences. He made public speeches and gave media interviews to manipulate the press and to further his personal and parochial interests. To many civilian elites and elected officials, he was viewed as unscrupulous. Following the Spanish–American War in 1898, Miles’s conduct reached a boiling point. In 1899, the government published a report by the imperiously named Commission Appointed by the President to Investigate the Conduct of the War Department in the War with Spain. A subsequent article by Secretary of War Russell A. Alger was published in 1901 in the North American Review, a top literary magazine of the time. Both documents paint a portrait of Miles as quibbling and unsoldierly. Refusing to provide sworn testimony before Congress, he evaded questioning and misrepresented facts. At an official board of inquiry concerning the war and his conduct, he equivocated. In the press and media interviews, he forwarded falsehoods and scapegoated his superiors and subordinates for misconduct during the war (Alger 1901). Subsequently, Miles’s political actions and ambitions were a powerful catalyst for some of the most far-reaching and impactful civil-military policy to come out of the presidential administrations of William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt. To fundamentally change a system that had produced a political praetorian such as Miles, Secretary of War Elihu Root, an immensely skilled leader and political operative, oversaw changes that would alter the character and culture of the Army forever. To begin, Root ordered a comprehensive review of the Army’s total readiness. Second, he conducted a review of the Army’s plans for conflict contingencies and material readiness. Third, he conducted a review of the Army’s officer selection and promotion processes. Finally, he conducted a review of the Army’s training readiness and ability to conduct

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large-scale training exercises. His findings established that the Army was wholly “unprepared or being prepared for war” (Jessup 1938, 253). In an ironic remedy to these shortfalls, Root, now advised by the retired Schofield and informed by the writings of progressive military leaders, enacted a series of reforms championed by the military. These reforms were significantly influenced by studies conducted by Major General Emory Upton and Major General William Carter (Upton 1912; Connelly 2006). To begin, Root changed the assignment process for officers. Rather than serving primarily in staff or frontline unit positions, officers were required to alternate between staff duties and frontline unit leadership positions. The intent was to ensure that officers gained experience in the field with tactical warfighting units and used this experience to improve understanding, empathy, and performance in the exercise of their staff duties. Relatedly, Root created the General Staff Corps system within the War Department with the passage of the General Staff Act of 1903. On the advice of Schofield, Root vacated the position of Commanding General of the Army with the retirement of Miles and created the position of Chief of Staff of the Army (Dodge 1899). This had the effect of propping up civilian leadership while strengthening the influence and advisory role of military elites. It shrouded the policy process in a manner that reinforced, pro forma, civilian control of the military while limiting and removing civilian interference in military affairs. Regarding the General Staff Act, Upton described it as a “political coup” (in the sense of a major victory): The conflict between the civil authority, represented by the Secretary of War, and the military authority, represented by a commanding general, and the consequent interference by civilian secretaries in the command of troops, always inexpedient and usually disastrous, has been obviated by the General Staff Act of 1903, which secures unity of professional military command, through the interposition of the Chief of Staff, with a body of military assistants, between the civil authorities and the military forces of the country. (Upton 1912, iv) Secretary Root took the additional step of overhauling the Army’s politicized and patronage-based promotion system. Unlike today’s military, where promotions early in a career are predominantly merit-based, for well over a century promotions “were controlled by personal and political considerations.” For example, state governors influenced promotions for the politically well connected, and command positions were often filled through popular election within a unit. A consequence was that officers unfit for service were retained “not by any pretension to merit, but by the unscrupulous use of political influence” (Upton 1912, 433–434). Secretary Root, following

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Upton’s recommendations, instituted a more merit-based system requiring examinations and board review of promotions.2 Lastly, Secretary Root lobbied Congress for funding to support the creation of the Army War College. Securing a $20,000 appropriation, Root recommended that President Roosevelt establish the Army War College by executive order, which he did on November 27, 1901. Schofield, as with his predecessors Sherman and Sheridan, had been an early advocate for professionalization of the officer corps and the continued institutionalization of the military’s professional education system. In his advisory role with Root, Schofield had influenced significant change. These military elites presided over a renaissance in military professionalization. They oversaw the creation of an early combined arms training center at Fort Riley, Kansas, as well as the expansion of the Army’s postgraduate education institutions, particularly the Infantry and Cavalry School (later to become the Command and General Staff College) at Fort Leavenworth, also in Kansas. Similar professionalization occurred in the United States Navy. As Americans entered the twentieth century and stumbled into World War I, military elites found themselves at a pinnacle of power. Oyos (2018) and Yarmolinsky (1971) argue that the roots of military influence and the waning of antimilitarism can be traced to the increasing professionalization of the military’s officer corps under the direction of Theodore Roosevelt and in the aftermath of World War I. Indeed, up until World War II, the existence and size of a standing army was the principal debate in U.S. civil-military relations (Ekirch 1956; Bletz 1972; Kohn 1975). The reinforced lessons of the American Civil War, the Indian Wars, and the Spanish–American War were that the military, to be successful in the world of institutional and bureaucratic politics, must produce, through systematic professional military education, cadres of senior officers and military elites able to persuasively think, write, and engage at a strategic level; compete in a fractious, partisan, and polarized political environment; and lead in an increasingly public arena. They could not eschew politics but must embrace it. They could not afford to be apolitical but rather required a nuanced and sophisticated understanding of political accommodation to achieve their policy preferences in the interest of national security (Connelly 2006). By World War II, the investments in military professionalism had paid significant dividends. The combined arms training centers, the postgraduate education system, and the war colleges provided proving grounds for 2. Even in the twenty-first century, there remains a persistent challenge in the modern military promotion process, wherein promotions, meant to be merit-based, are still subject to the influence of personal relationships, political considerations, commissioning source, and patronage.

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a generation of military officers and future elites to hone their tactical warfighting skills as well as their strategic, global outlook. Military elites such as Stephen Luce, Alfred Thayer Mahan, John Pershing, Fox Conner, William Leahy, George Marshall, Ernest King, Douglas MacArthur, Chester Nimitz, Dwight Eisenhower, Henry Arnold, William Halsey, Omar Bradley, Mark Clark, Maxwell Taylor, Matthew Ridgway, and George Patton played leading roles in the establishment, development, and advancement of an influential epistemic community of military professionals from the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century. Following World War II, the tradition and sentiment of antimilitarism in the United States began to fade dramatically (Jackson 1965; Yarmolinsky 1971; Sarkesian 1994). World War II was a catalyst, vaulting military elites into a position of preeminent power (Kemble 1973). The military became the principal executor of U.S. foreign policy, a role with profound influence, power, and authority on a global scale (Hudson 2015). Moreover, the technological revolutions of warfare during World War II and the follow-on implications changed the way Americans began to think about the military, armed conflict, and the development and exercise of military power (Lauterbach 1944; Laski 1949; Ambrose 1972a; Barber 1972; Lewis 2012). Subsequently, the image of military elites in American society began to evolve (Mills 1959; Kemble 1973). In the aftermath of World War II, military elites were well aware of the prestige and high regard with which they were now held in American society as members of an honored profession (Pogue 1973). They used this political and social capital to influence significant organizational change that would control U.S. national security policy moving forward. The creation of the National Security Council within the Executive Office of the President was a codification of lessons learned during World War II and the unorthodox, disorganized, and chaotic leadership style of President Franklin Roosevelt (Jackson 1965). Admiral Sidney Souers, a former executive secretary of the NSC and the first Director of Central Intelligence, provided congressional testimony that the NSC was intended to be an organization essentially run by military elites and to provide a measure of control and influence over future presidents (Jackson 1965). Inside the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff, created simultaneously with the NSC, became a powerful influence on national security policy within the executive branch, forming a “miniature State Department” and ensuring that “military considerations and military logic” dominated the national security policy process (Yarmolinsky 1971, 34–35). Military influence over the levers of national security policy were unmatched, and military elites began to assert control, driven (in their minds, at least) by necessity. Concerned with the post–World War II international

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environment, military elites began drafting national policy documents almost immediately. They formally and informally proposed policies of nuclear deterrence in 1945 and Soviet containment in 1946, long before the State Department and Ambassador George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” did so (Bletz 1972). With the explicit support of military elites such as General George Marshall, Congress repealed the legal limitations prohibiting military elites from directly lobbying Congress in matters of national security policy, particularly on matters related to the budgetary process and defense spending (Marshall 1949). Authorized by the National Security Act of 1949, military elites were no longer bound by the regulatory restraints of the 1921 Budget and Accounting Act. Military elites were now empowered and encouraged to provide their views to Congress, even if it meant undermining presidential policy and priorities. As Huntington describes it in a very understated way, “the relations between Congress and the military became a problem in civil-military relations” (Huntington 1957, 415). By 1953, a presidential committee report attested to the military’s influence, finding that “military professionals are the makers of national policy,” not the President or Congress (Jackson 1965, 80). Civilian leadership, elected officials, and competing institutions lack a “take charge” mentality; do not do enough to assert leadership in foreign policy; lack respect for and attach too little importance to future strategy and planning; and are “wedded to a philosophy of reacting to problems as they arise” (Jackson 1965, 69). The absence of guidance and instruction following the war created a leadership vacuum. Military elites, particularly the Joint Chiefs, understanding the threats now posed by a nuclear world and Soviet power, considered civilian leaders to have abdicated their responsibilities, failing to fulfill their duties and obligations related to national security policy. To fill this vacuum, the Joint Chiefs welcomed increased delegation of authority and aggressively usurped power from civilian leaders and their diplomatic counterparts (Bletz 1972; Holsti 1972). Military and defense expenditures during and after World War II reached unprecedented levels, representing over half of the federal budget and over 40 percent of U.S. gross domestic product (Ambrose 1972a; Clotfelter 1973; Higginbotham 2017). “By the end of the war . . . the United States was the strongest military power in the world” (Barber 1972, 302–303). A standing military with global commitments and presence became the new norm as the United States implemented the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the policy of containment toward Russia and international communism (Lewis 2012). This tremendous growth in resources was accompanied by the continued ascendency and appointment of military elites to a growing number of

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positions of power and influence (Raymond 1964; Clotfelter 1973). Historically, the military and military elites acted as advisers to and agents for the president in matters of national security and foreign policy. During and after World War II, however, military elites began to serve in the roles of presidential envoys and ambassadors and is leadership positions within the State Department, the CIA, and other federal agencies and commissions such as the Immigration and Naturalization Service. They had primary responsibility for formulating and implementing decisions on both domestic and foreign policy issues (Ambrose 1972b; Bletz 1972; Clotfelter 1973). Retired and active-duty military elites filled government positions typically reserved for civilians (Vladeck 2018). Military influence and control over national security and foreign policy was perceived to be as vast as the military commitments abroad and the responsibilities at home. Caution against and fear of an increasingly exclusive reliance on military power in U.S. foreign policy was real. Military encroachments in civilian and private sectors were seen as a subtle and silent coup, as military elites dominated diplomacy because of their institutional size, resources, crisis orientation, and a civilian cohort of counterparts that readily acquiesced (Ekirch 1956; Ackley 1972; Ambrose 1972a; Clotfelter 1973). As Mills noted in his description of this growing caste of military elites: Since Pearl Harbor, those who command the enlarged means of American violence have come to possess considerable autonomy, as well as great influence, among their political and economic colleagues. Some professional soldiers have stepped out of their military roles into other high realms of American life. Others, while remaining soldiers, have influenced by advice, information, and judgment the decisions of men powerful in economic and political matters, as well as educational and scientific endeavors. . . . They are now more powerful than they have ever been in the history of the American elite; they have now more means of exercising power in many areas of American life which were previously civilian domains; they now have more connections; and they are now operating in a nation whose elite and whose underlying population have accepted what can only be called a military definition of reality. . . . Although the generals and the admirals have increasingly become involved in political and economic decisions, they have not shed the effects of the military training which has moulded their characters and outlook. . . . We must not forget the self-confidence that is instilled by the military training and career: those who are successful in military careers very often gain thereby a confidence which they readily carry over into economic and political realms. Like other men, they are of course open to the advice and moral support of old friends who, in

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the historical isolation of the military career, are predominantly military. (Mills 1959, 198–200) In Mills’s observation and characterization of military elites, he describes a military caste that appears in American society following Pearl Harbor and America’s entry into conflict in World War II. According to Mills, this caste of military elites operates with significant influence, autonomy, confidence, and sophistication, navigating across the blurred lines of national military, political, and economic policy domains. This military caste gained notoriety throughout the 1940s and onward. Observing the growth of this military caste and its increasing power and influence during World War II, the political scientist Harold Lasswell proposed the probability of a “future course” in politics that predicted a developing dominance and supremacy of military elites as “the most powerful group in society” (Lasswell 1941, 455). His article “The Garrison State” became the foundation for the first wave of post–World War II civil-military relations scholarship, particularly the works of Samuel Huntington (1957) and Morris Janowitz (1957, 1960). Steadily, the professionalism, sophistication, influence, and political power of military elites began to overshadow civilian counterparts. The military, now a proven adaptive organization, had learned hard-won lessons. Military elites were resolute in their belief that national security, national defense, and foreign policy could not afford unpredictable, unorthodox leadership or disorganized administration of inexperienced, incompetent elected officials and political appointees. National security policy required a cadre and caste of guardians—seasoned, experienced leaders who ensured a measured, informed, and disciplined policy process. Given this argument, how would military elites respond if one from their own ranks were to, once again, occupy the Oval Office?

President Dwight Eisenhower and His Generals: A Case Study Bacevich (1997) describes the new reality in stark terms: “Conditions have rendered the terms of that contract [i.e., for civilian control of the military] obsolete . . . these traditions are no longer binding in practice. Never as apolitical as American citizens have liked to imagine, the U.S. military today has become a powerful and quasi-autonomous force in American politics.” At the beginning of the Cold War, during President Dwight Eisenhower’s administration (1953–1961), there was tremendous civil-military conflict

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regarding American national security policy and America’s approach to international relations. Senior military officers such as Matthew Ridgway, Maxwell Taylor, and James Gavin—legendary heroes in military lore—had irreconcilable differences with their president and commander in chief, a man who had served beside them in combat and worn a military uniform for decades. Ridgway, Taylor, and Gavin all made multiple efforts to thwart Eisenhower’s political agenda and carry their political message and beliefs directly to the American people. In Ridgway’s (1973) memoirs, he quotes General Douglas MacArthur from a speech given to the Massachusetts state legislature in July 1951. MacArthur stated: “I find in existence a new and heretofore unknown and dangerous concept that the members of our armed forces owe primary allegiance or loyalty to those who temporarily exercise the authority of the Executive Branch of Government rather than to the country and its Constitution which they swore to defend. No proposition could be more dangerous.” MacArthur’s insinuation, and by extension Ridgway’s implication, is that the military does not owe allegiance to a president or to a political party but is granted, by its oath, permission to defy political leadership. Volumes of history have been written about the life of Dwight David Eisenhower as a soldier and as the thirty-fourth president of the United States. This case study, however, relies predominantly on primary resources, including the nine volumes of Eisenhower’s presidential papers, his own autobiography, and the autobiographies of his contemporaries. Three secondary resources stand out and were incorporated into this case study. The first is Fred Greenstein’s The Hidden-hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader, an analysis from a presidential studies perspective of Eisenhower’s presidential leadership style. Second, Dale Herspring’s The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush provides a detailed case study from a civil-military relations perspective, focusing on the relationship between Eisenhower and the military elites of his administration. Third, Andrew Bacevich’s 1997 essay “The Paradox of Professionalism: Eisenhower, Ridgway, and the Challenge to Civilian Control, 1953–1955” is an excellent case study from an historian’s perspective, imploring historians to confront the vacuum of scholarly attention they have paid to civil-military relations. My purpose in this short case study is not to provide new historical revelations. Rather, I wish to provide a fresh review of history through the specific lens of civil-military relations to highlight events during Eisenhower’s presidency, teasing out and demonstrating the strained relationship he had with military elites and why. Eisenhower’s experience working with military elites as president and commander in chief, enduring their persistent, intentional,

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and obvious political activities to influence public policy contrary to his agenda, was so impactful that he addressed it twice, in two major speeches. First, within the early days of his first administration he warned of “humanity hanging from a cross of iron,” referring to ballooning military expenditures that threatened a recovering global and domestic economy that had been devastated by World War II and the Korean War. Eisenhower’s “cross of iron” speech foreshadowed an arms race with the Soviet Union and outlined how military spending would displace investments in education, infrastructure, health care, scientific research and development, agriculture, and other human security investments. Later, in the waning days of his second administration, he warned of a “military-industrial complex” that threatened American democracy. In his farewell speech on January 17, 1961, Eisenhower cautioned Americans to “guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence” by a military-industrial complex in which military elites were integral actors and complicit partners. He recognized and called out a “disastrous rise in misplaced power” in a military-industry political (and economic) alliance that threatened American liberties and democratic governance. Few presidents were (and are) equipped, particularly by experience, to exercise control over America’s politicized military elites and their corresponding political alliances. Eisenhower left office having twice forewarned the public and his successors. On the surface, Eisenhower was a successful two-term president. He maintained, on average, a 64 percent public approval rating over the course of his presidency—an unheard-of achievement by today’s standards. Following his presidency, he consistently ranks among the topten presidents by survey and popular opinion. Yet as president he was casually dismissed by many presidential scholars, critics, and political observers. He was viewed as an average, unsophisticated, and sometimes inept leader. However, Eisenhower’s success as a president, according to Greenstein, relied on his ability to cloak his political prowess in a leadership style developed during his military career. He tended to be an unsentimental, pragmatic, political realist. To achieve his political objectives, Eisenhower, in true military fashion, preferred an indirect approach and application of influence and power rather than a full-on frontal attack. As the premier military elite of World War II, leading Allied forces in Europe and navigating a strategic political-military nexus occupied by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, U.S. Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman, and French President General Charles de Gaulle, Eisenhower exercised political influence through exceptionally informed logic, reason, and appeals to national security interests backed by his professionalism and military competence. As president, Eisenhower expected his senior

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military leaders to also be exceptionally informed and strategic-minded. He expected them to put aside parochialism. When debate over policy ended and decisions were made, he expected the military to fall in line and support his decisions. These expectations, in Eisenhower’s opinion, were not met. Bacevich (1997) describes how military elites, when challenged by one of their own, explicitly and deliberately set about, in a determined fashion, to undermine the president, his national security agenda, and his personal credibility. They defaulted to indirect political action and activities to achieve their interests and policy preferences. They lobbied Congress. They manipulated media coverage and public opinion through interviews and leaks. They formed powerful alliances with industry and aligned themselves with military interest groups. Eisenhower’s senior military leaders, although they may have been driven by a conviction that they were acting in the best interests of the nation and that they were apolitical actors, aggressively pursued parochial interests in direct contravention of the president’s known expectations and public agenda. This insinuation against Eisenhower’s policy agenda is alarming because it presupposes that the political beliefs of these military elites, shrouded in concern for U.S. national security, should outweigh the policy agenda of the president of the United States, a nationally elected leader, politically accountable to the American electorate. We see, with increasing frequency, this same dynamic played out in the twenty-first century. Today, the political activities and praetorian propensities displayed by Eisenhower’s generals are a well-practiced playbook of exercises to exert political influence. The Machiavellian actions of military elites in the past serve as examples of the political and partisan activities we see in modern presidencies.

Background According to the official history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Council of War: A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942–1991, no one knew the military better than Eisenhower, and no other president had as great an impact on the Joint Chiefs until Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. “Ike” (Eisenhower’s longtime nickname) was the first real military professional to serve as president since Ulysses Grant and as president had “unrivaled experience in military affairs” that “tended to neutralize” the influence of the Joint Chiefs (Reardon 2012). He had served in the shadows of Fox Conner, John Pershing, Douglas MacArthur, and George Marshall prior to becoming the Commanding General of the European Theater of Operations; Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force; Military Governor in Germany; Chief of Staff of the Army; and Supreme Allied Commander of Europe. He had worked with

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the private sector and American industry during the national mobilization of World War II. He knew the personalities of world leaders. He had a sophisticated understanding of American allies and alliance politics. He knew the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. military, as well as its allies and adversaries. He understood the military as an institution. He understood military culture and language. He understood the dynamics of military bureaucratic politics. He understood electoral and partisan politics as it related to national security. He understood how to work with Congress, as well as how to get work done within the executive branch. There was no greater military insider than Eisenhower, and then he became president. Eisenhower’s military experience sets him apart from all other presidents. No other president in U.S. history had so expertly wielded the unprecedented military might and power that Eisenhower had during World War II. Ironically, it was Eisenhower’s vast experience that put him at odds with the military. As soon as Eisenhower shed his military uniform in exchange for a suit and made the decision to run for president, conflict with military elites began. A foreshadowing of the conflict and friction Eisenhower would face came during his first presidential campaign. Eisenhower earned the ire of his former colleague and subordinate General Omar Bradley, President Harry Truman’s Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Bradley’s deep displeasure with Eisenhower stemmed from two primary causes. First, Eisenhower incited Bradley’s outrage for failing to staunchly defend General George Marshall from the insidious and libelous attacks of Republican Senators Joseph McCarthy and William Jenner. Rather, both notorious senators were courted by Eisenhower to endorse and support his campaign as the Republican presidential candidate. General Marshall, a national hero in his own right, had been Eisenhower’s boss and mentor, responsible for championing Eisenhower’s promotions, assignments, and resources during World War II. Bradley felt that Eisenhower had betrayed his old mentor. Second, Bradley was disapproving of Eisenhower’s politicization of the Korean War. Well informed of and consulted on Truman’s decisions and the military’s actions related to that war, Eisenhower disingenuously, in Bradley’s opinion, began to publicly question and disparage Truman’s wartime leadership. In a much publicized political move, Eisenhower promised to visit Korea, observe and learn of the current situation in an effort to end the war, and “to serve the American people in the cause of peace” (Bradley and Blair 1983, 656). In Bradley’s mind, this was pure political showmanship. In contrast, General Bradley and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were already perceived as partisan political actors in the Truman administration, particularly by the Republican opposition. Conservative senators accused Bradley and the Joint Chiefs of advocating for political and economic policy. This

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was, in the opinion of Congress, beyond the norm of providing the best military advice to the president as his senior military advisers. As Eisenhower took over the reins of the presidency, in matters of defense he had both short- and long-term tasks to achieve. First, ending the Korean War was a top priority. Second, he intended to reorganize the Department of Defense. Third, he was intent on a complete reevaluation of America’s theory of war and doctrine for achieving strategic advantage in the Cold War against communism and the Soviet Union. Finally, he wanted to ensure that the American economy remained solvent for a future of Cold War conflict that would last for decades.

War Termination in Korea Less than a month after achieving electoral victory in 1952, Eisenhower, on November 29, flew to Korea to see and understand the costly war firsthand. General Bradley and an entourage of attendees accompanied the president-elect. Along the way, Bradley briefed Eisenhower on the current state of the war and what to expect from the South Koreans as well as from senior U.S. military leaders. Both groups were vested in achieving a decisive victory. However, the resources required to achieve decisive victory risked widening the international conflict and further escalation that could create momentum toward use of atomic weapons. On the issue of avoiding widened conflict and escalation, Eisenhower and Bradley agreed. At the highest levels, Eisenhower spent limited time with South Korean President Dr. Syngman Rhee. More important, he met with General Mark Clark, the most senior military representative on the ground, commander of all United Nations forces in Korea. Both President Rhee and General Clark were advocates for increased commitment of military forces and a renewed offensive to push the Chinese and North Koreans back to the Yalu River. This course of action, as Bradley had prebriefed Eisenhower, was meant to achieve decisive victory and avoid a drawn-out, negotiated armistice. However, Eisenhower parried attempts at in-depth discussions aimed at gaining his support. Despite advocacy from Rhee and Clark to pursue an aggressive offensive, Eisenhower left Korea unconvinced that an attack against the Chinese and North Koreans would succeed. To the contrary: he was certain that any offensive conducted on the required scale to achieve decisive victory would risk global conflict. In the end, General Clark led a negotiated armistice with the North Koreans that was signed on July 27, 1953, six months after Eisenhower’s inauguration. Clark, the youngest officer to ever be promoted to four stars, would retire three months later.

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Defense Reorganization During the last year of President Truman’s administration, Omar Bradley and the Joint Chiefs advocated for a military budget of over $45 billion. The justification for this defense budget was based on a series of national security studies provided to Truman by the military-dominated NSC alleging that America’s strategic deterrence and defenses were inadequate to the atomic threat posed by the Soviet Union. The budget and corresponding political fallout for the $10–14 billion deficit it would create, however, would be executed and realized under Eisenhower’s presidency. An argument could be made that the Joint Chiefs were politically and adroitly exploiting a seam between the outgoing and incoming administrations. Regardless, Eisenhower was not an advocate for deficit spending. Over the course of his presidency, he put constant pressure on the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs to cut spending. With unparalleled insider experience, Eisenhower knew there were costly redundancies across the services, particularly related to military basing; logistics infrastructure; research, development, and acquisition; intelligence gathering; and human resources (Eisenhower 1963). These costly redundancies, for good or ill, continue to exist today. Eisenhower also firmly believed that a strong defense could be achieved and sustained over the long term only by a strong economy. Unlike the Joint Chiefs, Eisenhower no longer had the luxury of considering the national security of the United States through a narrow military lens. He had to consider the whole of American society and government, as well as the future of American democracy and American allies in the international system. Three months following his inauguration, Eisenhower laid out his longterm vision and defense doctrine in a message to Congress that prefaced his effort for immediate reform of the Department of Defense. He acknowledged the political reality of an immediate global threat posed by the Soviet Union. Responding to this threat required shaping “international conditions under which freedom can thrive,” not merely in the short term or long term but indefinitely (Eisenhower 1953). To the public, he stated that “we can’t look forward to a solution to the problems we have inherited as of next year or even in the next decade, possibly not in our lifetime.” The foreign policy, national security, defense, and economic policy agendas that Eisenhower championed had to be forward-thinking to ensure that short-term, politically expedient solutions did not “wreck the very concepts on which all free government is constituted” (Eisenhower 1954a, 309). Achieving Eisenhower’s vision of a free government, a free people, and a prosperous economy required avoiding defense spending that would bankrupt the nation. Defense spending in support of

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an expansive military establishment required comprehensive reform in three fundamental areas. First, Eisenhower clearly recognized the growing imbalance in civilmilitary relations that favored the military. His reforms called for “clear and unchallenged civilian responsibility . . . to maintain democratic institutions, but also to protect the integrity of the military profession.” National security and military policy decisions “must be made by politically accountable civilian officials” to protect against military elites becoming partisan political actors (Eisenhower 1953). Eisenhower’s intent was to strengthen the role, responsibility, and authority of the secretary of defense. Unfortunately, Eisenhower’s early nominations for secretary of defense, first with Charles Wilson, then with Neil McElroy, undermined his efforts to rebalance civilian control. These two picks, although successful business leaders, were widely recognized as inexperienced and ill-suited in many ways to the job. Neither possessed military experience or any significant experience in federal government or inside the beltway of Washington, D.C. They were selected more for their corporate experience, administrative skills, and fiscal management abilities than for their national defense credentials (Reardon 2012). A significant consequence of this dynamic required Eisenhower to become overly involved in defense and military policy decisions typically delegated to the secretary level. He “frequently took over military planning and issued detailed guidance and direction,” taking on the roles of “Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and National Security Advisor all in one” (Reardon 2012). Second, Eisenhower reforms extended to economizing national defense. Eisenhower believed that an essential tenet of defense reorganization must be to protect the American economy. This would be achieved by pursuing maximum military effectiveness at minimum cost and with increased efficiencies. With tens of thousands of jobs and hundreds of billions of dollars of defense spending at stake, Eisenhower knew that he would face significant resistance from multiple stakeholders from across the political terrain. To inform his policy decisions, Eisenhower relied on multiple studies to support his objectives. One study was led by former President Herbert Hoover in a congressionally commissioned effort; the second was an internally commissioned study named “Project Solarium.” On April 16, 1953, Eisenhower, in a much-publicized foreign policy speech, evoked the image of “humanity hanging from a cross of iron.” This metaphor for the harmful, wasteful, and exorbitant defense spending, burdening the U.S. and Soviet economies, laid out the imperative for launching the Hoover Commission and Project Solarium in July 1953. The Hoover Commission (formally, the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government) was authorized by Congress and

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chaired by the former president. To complete the commission’s mandate, Hoover divided his team into subordinate task forces. The intent of each task force was to study different functional areas of the government and make recommendations “to promote economy, efficiency, and improved service.” One designated task force was the Business Organization of the Department of Defense (Hoover 1949; National Archives 1947–1955). Simultaneous to the work being done by the Hoover Commission, Eisenhower directed his new administration to begin “re-examining the world situation . . . to see what is it that we now need most to insure our security and our peaceful existence” (Eisenhower 1954b, 330). This initial internal national security review became Project Solarium. The work of the Hoover Commission and Project Solarium informed what would become the tagline for Eisenhower’s defense reorganization: the “New Look.” The New Look initiative would become an holistic defense policy agenda seeking to balance Eisenhower’s priority of maintaining a vibrant national economy with the priority of ensuring a balance of power with the Soviet Union. The “New Look” tagline was coined as a more diplomatic and tactful description of the doctrine known as “massive retaliation,” a controversial strategy that relied on nuclear weapons to deter enemies and secure world peace. Pursuing the New Look strategy created a political chasm between Eisenhower and his generals that would last until the end of his presidency. This initiative would create such polarization that it would spur and define an opposing policy agenda and defense doctrine for which Eisenhower’s successor, President John Kennedy, would advocate: flexible response.

The New Look To provide a unique understanding of President Eisenhower’s New Look policy agenda, it is best viewed through the lens of his own memoir, Mandate for Change, in parallel with The Uncertain Trumpet, written by one of his greatest critics, General Maxwell Taylor. The phenomenon of political elites publishing a scintillating tell-all book upon resigning from a senior position within a presidential administration is commonplace by today’s norms. In 1959, however, it was not. Following America’s development and deployment of the atomic bomb in World War II, the defense doctrine of massive retaliation came into vogue. Put simply, this doctrine suggested that the threat of use of nuclear weapons would deter the aggressions of competing great powers and provide for the strategic security of U.S. interests. In Eisenhower’s estimation, America could not afford to mobilize, train, equip, and field an army of 100 infantry divisions or an Air Force of 10,000 aircraft to stop a massive Soviet invasion

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of Western Europe (Zaffiri 1994). In contrast, a deliberate pursuit of the strategy of massive retaliation, in the minds of Eisenhower’s generals, would make the military, and particularly the United States Army, increasingly irrelevant. Eisenhower, pursuing a “peace dividend” following the Korean War, felt compelled to make massive retaliation the cornerstone of his national security policy. The New Look agenda was rolled out in 1953. It was a decision driven by politics. It was based on a war-weary public eager to end the Korean War. It overly relied on strategic air power to avoid costly conventional ground conflict. And it fed the American penchant for simple technological solutions (Taylor 1959). The New Look agenda also advanced and bought time for Eisenhower’s desire to shore up and strengthen the U.S. national economy. By the end of 1953, Eisenhower had changed out his Joint Chiefs of Staff, described by some as a regime change. The senior military leader turnover was described by Eisenhower himself as a natural culmination and expiration of their terms of service (Eisenhower 1963, 448). Newly appointed chiefs were, in the view of Taylor, “regarded as members of the Administration team.” They were expected to work toward the objectives of the president’s policy agenda under the guidance of civilian leadership. Dissenting opinions and nonconcurrence with policy decisions should be offered in private. In public, Eisenhower’s expectation (arguably the expectation of all presidents) was unity, support, and advocacy (Taylor 1959, 19). Achieving the goals of the New Look required reducing spending on and the size of conventional ground and sea forces while increasing the size of and modernization investments in strategic air power and atomic weapons. This reprioritization of military spending would afford Eisenhower the ability to achieve some of his domestic policy objectives, such as major investment in and expansion of national infrastructure. With the completion of the Hoover Commission’s review of the executive branch in 1955, Eisenhower’s experiential knowledge of and intent to trim the military’s bureaucracy, largesse, and redundancy were now supported by the findings of the congressional commission. Armed with the commission’s findings, Eisenhower prepared his budget request to Congress. In very short order, Eisenhower would publicly clash with the Joint Chiefs as they maneuvered politically to undermine their commander in chief’s economic agenda. For example, Eisenhower’s military spending priorities were obviously not favorable to the U.S. Army. In Eisenhower’s view, “the Army had expanded far beyond its necessary peacetime” strength (Eisenhower 1963, 451). This put Eisenhower’s new Army Chief of Staff, General Matthew Ridgway, in an awkward position. How could he support and advocate for a policy that, from his point of view, weakened U.S. ground forces and conventional military strength?

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A national hero forged on the battlefields of World War II and the Korean War, General Ridgway was very aware and proud of his image as a “muddy boots” warrior. He meticulously curated this public image, often wearing an unbuckled steel combat helmet, neck scarf, airborne wings, and hand grenades hanging from his uniform for official photographs. Ridgway was well aware of the power of public persona, intentionally and deliberately nurturing his romantic warrior image within the U.S. Army and with the American public. He was also a devout believer in the separation of the military profession and warrior culture from a liberal civilian society yet protective of the privileges accorded to the military’s officer corps. Ridgway’s beliefs in the prerogatives and entitlements of his rank and station were stated explicitly during his swearing-in as the Army’s nineteenth Chief of Staff. As he recalls in his memoirs, Ridgway expected civilian leaders to “scrupulously respect” the advice of military elites. Civilians were not to “force unanimity” or “compel adherence” to partisan political agendas. Ridgway warned that, if a president expected loyalty from his military elites, then a president must understand that “loyalty and complete trust cut both ways. They must flow just as strongly from the top down as from the bottom up.” Political leaders must commit to the same level of loyalty to the military as they expected in return. Ridgway and Eisenhower were set on a clear course for conflict. Eisenhower’s New Look defense spending agenda cut the Army’s budget from $13 billion to under $10 billion over the course of Eisenhower’s two presidential terms. Ridgway, rather than working with the administration, set out to work against it. Ridgway’s recalcitrance and defiance of Eisenhower was personal, professional, and philosophical. On a personal level, Ridgway believed Eisenhower was undermining his senior military leaders. Ike solicited their best military advice but often discarded it. He expected their public support, implicating them, in Ridgway’s opinion, in misguided policy decisions. Professionally and philosophically, Ridgway believed that a theory of war based on massive retaliation was doomed to fail. As Bacevich (1997) outlines, in Ridgway’s mind massive retaliation as policy was absurd. It ran counter to core beliefs of the military as a profession; principles of war and the use of force; and the laws of land warfare that protect civilian populations. It solely considered the Soviets as a primary threat and dismissed threats to U.S. national security interests globally. It was backward-looking, assuming that the Soviets would seek a massive conventional confrontation on the same fields of World War II rather than fighting limited and unconventional wars on the peripheries of conflicting and intersecting spheres of influence (Zaffiri 1994). Ridgway therefore believed he had a moral

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obligation to oppose Eisenhower’s policy agenda. His disobedience and refusal to support Eisenhower’s national security policy agenda were, in his mind, justified. Calling for a review or study of controversial issues is an often joked about, but seriously practiced, bureaucratic tactic to slow down ambitious policy implementation. It creates a tactical pause in implementation. It is hard to resist politically for fear of criticism or opposition to the study, because opposition may signal weakness or flaws in the policy. A thorough study requires bringing in key stakeholders, forming a task force, and gathering data, all in the name of preventing a rush to failure. In an attempt to stymie Eisenhower’s policy agenda, Ridgway found an able ally in Major General James Gavin, his Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations on the Army Staff. Gavin, according to archival papers and his own writings, brought together a brain trust of like-minded officers to coordinate and strategize how best to demonstrate critical flaws in the president’s policies (Gavin 1958). Gavin’s group set out to study the president’s policy agenda “to help people think through the implications of such a national policy.” The implications were clear. While Ridgway took his argument to Congress and made national headlines with his criticism of Eisenhower’s policies, Gavin, with Ridgway’s consent, intended to take the Army’s argument directly to the American public through the media in an effort to discredit Eisenhower’s agenda. Gavin was later promoted to lieutenant general in 1955 and went on to serve as Army Chief of Research and Development. Known as a strong public opponent of Eisenhower, Gavin never made his fourth star. He retired in 1958 and very soon published his own book, War and Peace in the Space Age, outlining his opposition to Eisenhower’s policies and warning of the consequences of a weakened national defense. He was later rewarded, called back to public service three years later by President John Kennedy to serve as ambassador to France (Fowler 1990). When Ridgway had exhausted every effort to oppose Eisenhower’s policy, he was essentially forced into early retirement in 1955. Ridgway served only one two-year term under Eisenhower, although it is customary for service chiefs to serve two two-year terms at the pleasure of the president. Ridgway was succeeded by General Maxwell Taylor. In the process of replacing Ridgway, Eisenhower interviewed General Taylor. Taylor describes the interview process as taking a sense of his ability to be loyal to the president. Although Taylor “apparently passed the test,” one of his first actions was to draft the “first coherent statement of the strategy of Flexible Response.” Taylor “was, if anything, even more censorious” of Eisenhower’s policy agenda (Taylor 1959; Reardon 2012). Over the next four years, from 1955 to 1959, Taylor worked at odds with

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Eisenhower’s New Look agenda, but in a more subversive manner. Through Brigadier General William Westmoreland, his ambitious Secretary of the General Staff and one of the youngest generals in the Army, Taylor allowed a small group of Army colonels on the Army Secretariat staff to write and surreptitiously release anti–New Look position papers to critics of the president and his New Look policy agenda. The intentional leaks of these position papers were deniable and well-distanced from Taylor, yet they were successful in publicizing the Army’s position in the public domain (Zaffiri 1994). For his personal part, Taylor captures his perspective of the history of his travails in two chapters of his book, The Uncertain Trumpet. He describes the inner workings and conflicts of the JCS, the parochial contests for resources, lobbying efforts with Congress, and the manipulation of the media through leaks and interviews. An argument could be made that Taylor’s book was a job application to serve under the next presidential administration. If it was, he was successful. He was recalled to active duty by President John Kennedy and eventually appointed to serve as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1962. A retired four-star general publishing a book critical of the president he had served for four years as the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Army’s most senior officer, within months of his retirement was a relatively new phenomenon. Taylor explains in the foreword, however, that issues he needed to raise were of such importance that no “cooling period” could be afforded. For students of history and civil-military relations, Ridgway’s, Gavin’s, and Taylor’s histories and nuanced relationships with Eisenhower provide excellent examples of exceptionally political generals. Throughout his time as president, Eisenhower describes the bureaucratic and political resistance he faced in trying to pursue and implement his national security policy agenda. He was accused of endangering U.S. national security and wrecking the Army and Navy. A fundamental friction between Eisenhower and his critics was whether the United States should focus on immediate, national, existential threats versus securing America’s international allies and interests along global, overseas frontiers. Should the United States invest in a military capable of strategic deterrence and great power conflict through nuclear capability and strength? Or in a conventional military capable of engaging in great power competition and multiple, smaller, simultaneous conflicts? This debate and the competition for resources continue today. Although Eisenhower was ultimately successful in his eight-year bureaucratic wrangling and conflict with his senior military leaders, the persistent resistance he faced from military elites frustrated him immensely. His frustration is captured in a letter to a high-school friend from his hometown, Everett Hazlett. In the letter, penned in 1956, Eisenhower laments the shallow,

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shortsighted, parochial small-mindedness he perceives in his military chiefs. “I simply must find men who have the breadth of understanding and devotion to their country rather than to a single Service,” he wrote. Obviously, those in opposition to Eisenhower’s policies would object to this description. In their minds, they were doing what was best for their country, national security, and the military profession. Eisenhower knew that, even though he had the experience and knowledge to fend off the political machinations and pressures of the military chiefs, a time would come when future presidents and political leadership were not prepared to engage with the military because of a lack of knowledge and experience. He warned that “some day there is going to be a man sitting in my present chair who has not been raised in the military services and who will have little understanding” of how to negotiate with the military in policy and budgetary processes. Eisenhower, in expressing his fears, predicted a future wherein presidents and members of Congress were easily influenced, unable to provide effective control of the military, and disadvantaged by this imbalance in civil-military relations. He shuddered in apprehension “to think of what could happen in this country” when faced with exceptional tension, division, and polarization (Eisenhower 1963, 455). His fears were prophetic.

Summary The fact that President Eisenhower, with unprecedented military experience, would begin and end his presidency with warnings to the public related to military spending, the militarization of American foreign policy, and the power and influence of the military and military elites in government and society should not be diminished. Whether he laments “humanity hanging from a cross of iron” and the immense burden defense spending takes on the American economy, or a warning to “guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence” of a military-industrial complex and a foreboding and “disastrous rise in misplaced power,” Eisenhower’s charge to his successors is clear: imbalance in civil-military relations, no matter how slow and subtle it may occur, bleeds the American republic of its civil liberties and ability to maintain democratic governance. The fact that Eisenhower—one of the U.S. military’s greatest heroes and elites—was so arduously challenged by his senior military officers provides a great lesson and case study for today’s political leaders and civil-military scholars. The influence of military elites must be balanced by sustained investment in and development and promotion of a competent civilian cadre of national security, foreign policy, and defense experts with the knowledge,

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experience, empowerment, and vested interest as the military epistemic community they will work alongside in the policy process. In the next chapter, I will focus on the scholarly road map that underpins how and why this military epistemic community became so powerful. The scholarship that explains this phenomenon is drawn from several fields and subfields of political science in addition to other social sciences. I ultimately focus on how policy decisions are made at the national level and why assumptions of effective civilian control of the military are no longer valid.

Chapter Three

The Scholarly Road Map

Politics and ideology do not necessarily control a nation’s policies or even determine the nation’s interests. Those policies and interests are often shaped, if not fundamentally determined, by subordinates making decisions in the immediacy of events and guided by doctrine and policies that reflect a particular agency’s outlook and culture. —Walter Hudson, Army Diplomacy (2015), 9

Impartiality is inhuman. Likewise, military elites are not and cannot afford to be impartial, apolitical observers of the policy process (Powell 1989; Kupchan 1994). In fact, it is ridiculous to claim that military elites are impartial, that they do not have opinions, beliefs, preferences, and partiality related to politics and policy. By their human nature and organizational culture, military elites are self-interested, aggressive, hyper-competitive, and ambitious political actors (Kupchan 1994; Pierce 2010). The road map to understanding U.S. military elites as political actors crosses a multitude of fuzzy academic boundaries. Understanding how military elites constitute an epistemic community in relation to the national security policy process; how national security and foreign policy decisions are affected and implemented by this epistemic community; and how these dynamics impact civil-military relations leads to a nexus of scholarship in three fields of study: presidential studies, international relations (IR), and civilmilitary relations. These fields draw from and cross-fertilize with additional areas of study: political psychology, sociology, anthropology, foreign policy analysis (FPA), security studies, public policy, and public administration. In this chapter, I navigate presidential studies, international relations, and civil-military relations scholarship to demonstrate how each field contributes to understanding the national security and foreign policy process. Academic debates highlighted here will not be resolved. Rather, throughout this exploration of scholarship, questions central to this book come to light. How does a homogenous group of military elites behave in the policy process and why? What role do they play? And why is their influence in the policy process noteworthy and exceptional? 64

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The Role of the President in National Security Decision-Making The vast responsibilities of the presidency can limit a president’s ability to exercise inherent power and authority effectively. Extant scholarship suggests that presidents have very little direct control over procedure and process. They are heavily dependent on expert advisers for information and rarely have time to think for themselves. Additionally, they have divided authorities shared with Congress that dilute their power, causing them to be reliant on their abilities to bargain and negotiate (Neustadt 1960; Jordan and Taylor 1981; Nathan 1983; Nathan and Oliver 1994; Hess 2002; Burke 2000, 2009). Assisting a president in the execution of inherent responsibilities is the institution of the presidency and the federal bureaucracy that make up the executive branch of government. Studies of the presidency investigate this institution and its complexity, specialization, and the ebb and flow of presidential power. Examinations have investigated tendencies related to growth; bureaucratization; politicization; centralization and control of information; staffing and organization; and decision-making in pursuit, control, and attainment of political goals and objectives (Burke 2016). Presidential studies also consider the individual holding the office. These studies investigate and theorize that it is a president’s character (Barber 1992; Hargrove 1974); personality (Neustadt 1960; Hargrove 1966; Simonton 1988); operational code (George 1980; Walker, Schafer, and Young 1999); leadership style (Greenstein 1982, 2009; Hermann 2002, 2003); or leadership strategy (Nathan 1983) that matter most in decision-making and the ability to govern effectively. A president’s actions and decisions are influenced by personal characteristics and qualities as a leader, as well as by individuals who advise the president, the process that facilitates decision-making, and the institutions and individuals that implement and administer a president’s decisions. Under these conditions, Waltz (2000) contends that an assumption of rationality and “nicely calculated decisions” on the part of elite decision makers, particularly in the context of international relations, foreign policy, and national security, is not valid but, as Simon (1945) states, “preposterous.” Rational decisionmaking is bounded by cognitive limitations as well as external constraints (Lindblom 1959; Sprout and Sprout 1965; Smith 1968; Brecher, Steinburg and Stein 1969; Steinbruner 1974; Jervis 1976; George 1980; Steiner 1983; Simon 1985; Mandel 1986; Skowronek 1993; Mintz and DeRouen 2010). In other words, presidents do not have perfect knowledge. They are only able to decide and act on incomplete information, assuming risk in uncertain environments. Subsequently, their decisions are influenced by their individual (and in many cases group) psychology, personality, perceptions, preferences, beliefs, values, and character (Cottam et al. 2016).

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Theories of behavior, rational or otherwise, are either normative or descriptive. They either prescribe how actors should behave or they claim to describe how actors behave in practice (Simon 1972; Milner and Tingley 2015). Cognitive models of decision-making provide insight, considering behaviors related to decision-making, relevant actors, level of information and expertise, how information is analyzed and utilized, perceptions of given options, and how each option is evaluated. In other words, they focus on the behaviors of actors in the policy process (Simon 1957; Sprout and Sprout 1965; Tetlock 1998; Breuning 2007). These cognitive models require two steps. First, they require a determination of choices and, second, do so in the context of the decision maker’s knowledge and capability to make the most optimal decision (Breuning 2007). Cognitive models of decision-making take into account imperfect human reasoning; need for power; cognitive complexity; level of expertise and prior policy experience; perception and misperception; information gathering; incomplete, dynamic information and ambiguity; uncertainty and complexity; time pressure and stress; personality traits and emotions; memory, mental shortcuts, and heuristics that the human mind utilizes to process information; predispositions, beliefs, biases, and errors; as well as organizational structures that influence the decision-making process (Jervis 1976; George 1980; Mandel 1986; Vertzburger 1990; Preston 2001; Mintz and DeRouen 2010). A potential implication of these limitations is that presidents, motivated by need, insecurity, and personality, may affiliate themselves with or become increasingly dependent on and influenced by trusted expert advisers (Preston 2001; Hermann 1986; Browning and Jacob 1964). For example, presidents need, seek, and rely upon expert advice in policy areas in which they have little or no experience, particularly at the beginning of a first administration. Additionally, motive and need for affiliation are amplified in politicians with less cognitive complexity. For example, consider how presidents surround themselves with military elites in senior positions within their administration, particularly in policy areas where they have no experience. Politicians with less cognitive complexity and little intellectual curiosity are less affected by information. They may ignore the daily influx of intelligence they receive. They may disregard history and context as they relate to world events. They may have little interest in ambiguous or complex problems, conflicting information, contradictory viewpoints, and multiple options. Their preference is for simple, distinct, well-defined black-and-white options with little deliberation in the decision-making process (Preston 2001, 10). Presidents seek the advice and counsel of experts as a cognitive shortcut in making decisions. They naturally rely on elites that have day-to-day responsibilities for running the subordinate organizations within the executive

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branch to which they were appointed to lead. They overdelegate presidential authority and provide exceptional autonomy that, once given, is rarely rescinded (Pieczynski 1985). Oftentimes, presidents are insecure in their decision-making ability, particularly in matters of national security and foreign policy or during times of national and international emergency, creating “strong incentives to associate themselves closely” with military elites. They appoint military elites to high-profile positions in an effort to bolster trust and confidence in their personal leadership (Schake 2017). Generally, expert advisers and advisory groups, such as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Chiefs collectively, possess high levels of professionalism, specialization, division of labor, stability, continuity, procedure, and resources. These qualities provide them with greater influence in the policy process (Huntington 1965; Polsby 1968). In the specific context of national security and foreign policy, individuals or groups that possess greater experience, expertise, and authoritative knowledge are exceptionally influential when the international and domestic political implications of policy decisions are perceived as particularly complex and uncertain (Holsti 1976; George 1980; Simon 1985; Preston 2001; Schafer and Walker 2006). Presidents must accept, however, that elites who lead and work within governmental institutions, bureaucracies, and agencies are not impartial, apolitical observers. They are political actors with their own agendas, beliefs, interests, and ambitions (Neustadt 1960). Clausewitz (1976), a favored theorist among military elites, asserts that, if war and conflict are acts of policy, then the military is a political instrument and that, by extension, military elites are political actors. As sophisticated political actors, military elites should be examined as such. Control of vast resources and budgets inherently make the military, as both an institution and a collective, an incredibly powerful political interest group able to place exceptional pressure on presidential administrations. Additionally, the military’s process of socialization and professionalization encourages politicization rather than insinuating affective neutrality into the professional military ethos. In other words, the likelihood of politically active military elites increases with increased professionalization and expertise (Nordlinger 1977). Military elites are not obedient, reactive observers and advisers. They make every effort to “anticipate, influence, and regulate” their environment, consistent with their policy preferences and organizational interests (Abrahamsson 1972, 13–17). Multiple studies over time reinforce this theme: military elites are not impartial, neutral, or apolitical. Rather, they are politically active and increasingly more partisan (Abrahamsson 1972; Holsti 1998; Davis 2001; Feaver and Kohn 2001; Szayna et al. 2007; Urben 2010; Golby 2011). These dynamics fuse studies of the presidency and presidential decision-making with the fields of international relations and foreign policy

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analysis. Yet there is a distinct seam in knowledge between the fields of literature that begs questions related to behavior, role, and influence of those individuals or groups of individuals in position to advise presidents. This is due to the perception of national security policy being “too domestic for students of international relations and too foreign for students of American politics” (Zegart 1999, 3).

International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis Understanding how one-time national security and foreign policy decisions are made under crisis conditions, time pressure, and situational exigency is well-trodden ground in IR and FPA literature. Numerous analyses explain specific dynamics and micro-foundations of policy and decision-making. These studies focus on individual decision-making events to uncover generalizable knowledge and weave together “strands of IR theory” to make sense of state policy in the context of international politics (Hudson 2002, 11). IR scholars investigate a host of microlevel determinants to explain the decision environment, psychological factors of the decision makers, and international and domestic influences (Brecher, Steinburg and Stein 1969; Hudson 2002; Mintz and DeRouen 2010). The role of the military as an institution is also mentioned in FPA literature in both the Organizational Process Model (Wildavsky 1964) and the Bureaucratic Politics Model (Allison 1971). Yet there is no systematic examination of military elites as a distinct group of actors. Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1962) provided a foundational contribution to IR and FPA literature when they identified individual decision makers as the key to understanding the actions and policies of a state (Hudson 2002). In the context of national security and foreign policy decision-making, individuals who participate in the policy process and administration, and their individual personalities, beliefs, and preferences, matter (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1962; Vertzburger 1990; Rosati 2000; Hudson 2005; Schafer and Walker 2006). Decision-making and dynamics at the group level, such as in the National Security Council, also matter in understanding how policy is determined and implemented (Halperin 1974; George 1980; Janis 1972; Burke and Greenstein 1989; Maoz 1990; ’t Hart et al. 1997; Mintz and Wayne 2016). Understanding how individual actors and groups of actors influence foreign policy is critical to understanding decision-making, process, and implementation. Theories of individual predisposition and operational code (Lasswell and Lietes 1949; Lietes 1951; George 1969; Holsti 1969; Walker and Schafer 2007), as well as understanding the psychological and leadership traits of leaders and advisers (De Rivera and Rosenau 1968; Hermann 1970; Cottam

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1977), provide insight into the nuance of national security and foreign policy decision-making. Theories of groupthink (Janis 1982; Kowert 2002; Schafer and Crichlow 2010) and polythink (Mintz and Wayne 2016) seek to explain group dynamics that affect national security and foreign policy decision-making. Understanding the nuanced interplay and influence among and between political institutions, individual personalities, advisory groups, interest groups, and government bureaucracies requires dissembling the process and understanding the decision units and their size, composition, behavior, and influence on the final policy decisions and actions taken by a state (Halperin 1974; Vertzburger 1990; Mearsheimer and Walt 2009; Mintz and DeRouen 2010; Brooks 2013). The role of organizations and bureaucratic politics has been explored by Huntington (1960), Weber (1964), Allison (1971), Halperin (1974), Rhodes (1994), and Marsh (2014). Allison’s (1971) landmark case study of the Cuban Missile Crisis investigates high-level group decision-making dynamics, theorizing how organizational structure and bureaucratic influences drive the behavior of political elites. Rosati (1981) describes bureaucratic influences on policy as pluralistic in nature with multiple actors engaging one another in the policy process. It is a politically competitive environment wherein bureaucratic elites form fluid and changing coalitions; bargain, negotiate, and position themselves to protect policy turf; and expand organizational influence (Mintz and DeRouen 2010). Studies of decision-making and debate by small groups in relation to policy outcomes demonstrate a complex and oftentimes unpredictable process. Yet understanding the composition of these small groups, the dynamic interactions of the actors, and the role of leadership provides a “bridge between impersonal and institutional forces on the one hand, and concrete decisions and actions by political leaders on the other” (’t Hart et al. 1997, 6; Vertzberger 1990). IR scholarship, much like presidential studies, finds that administration officials and political elites who advise presidents and lead government agencies, bureaucracies, and institutions have differing and competing interests, identities, images, and national role conceptions as those relate to the role of the United States in the international community (Holsti 1970; Walker 1987; Breuning 1997). Domestic role contestation, in the context of role theory, provides insight and understanding of the national security and foreign policy behavior of states in the international system. Generally, role theory asserts that the national role conception, image, and identity adopted and shared by a society decisively determines state behavior and national security interests and policy (Holsti 1970; Halperin 1974; Kaplowitz 1990; Browning 2006; Harnisch 2011). It links a state’s national role conception, image, and identity to state foreign policy and behavior in the international arena (Breuning 2011).

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Role contestation is a clash between competing, heterogeneous societal groups, both internal and external to the state. Role contestation can occur vertically between societal “establishment” elites and the populist masses within a state. Role contestation can also occur horizontally between competing societal elites within a state (Holsti 1970; Cantir and Kaarbo 2012, 2016). Horizontal role contestation between governing elites considers the influence of competing principled and causal beliefs within small advisory groups and elite decision makers and the competing roles and interests of bureaucratic agencies (Hirata 2016; Cantir and Kaarbo 2016). Military elites are not exempt from the findings of these studies. Neither are they specified or addressed. This research agenda, and the FPA literature generally, fall short in addressing the behavior, role, and influence of distinguishable, homogenous societal elites, particularly military elites in relation to state behavior, presidential decision-making in national security and foreign policy, and their extensive power and influence across international and domestic policy domains (Boggs 2005). Filling a gap, civil-military relations literature generally addresses the behavior, role, and influence of the military in a state polity. Studies on militarism, images of the military in American society, and the idyllic civil-military relations and balance of power are voluminous. In the next section, I focus on the contest between civilians and the military in the policy process. I address military elite behaviors, competing roles and interests, and the dynamic nature of influence of each group in the context of national security and foreign policy.

Civil-Military Relations Theory In the United States, civil-military relations (CMR) scholarship, both past and present, most often offers an institutional approach that focuses predominantly on an idyllic, unidirectional, and textbook relationship between civilians and the military as a unitary actor. The vast majority of CMR scholarship related to the United States relies on a fundamental assumption and bedrock democratic principle of civilian control. Whether in the context of American politics or comparative politics, there is an ever-present normative bias that consistently focuses on prescriptive control of the military. This normative bias, coupled with questionable assumptions, creates a scholarly blind spot. This blind spot is caused by a selective, romanticized, and sometimes mythical history of the U.S. military and an institutional persona of conformance to a seemingly inviolable constitutional principle. Article II, section 2 of the United States Constitution states “the President

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shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.” A natural consequence of this contextual foundation and the assumption of its inviolable nature can minimize the military’s role as an institution and military elites as influential advisers to the president. The civil-military problematique, as Feaver (1999) calls it, is the epic national security dilemma of democracies on which scholars have focused their investigations. This dilemma hinges on understanding how a “hierarchy of authority” that places civilians in a position of control over a “hierarchy of power” that favors the military is the underlying puzzle of CMR scholarship. The underlying question in CMR literature focuses on reconciling a military organization powerful enough to undertake any mission civilian authorities may require with military elites disciplined and subordinate enough to restrain themselves to the limits imposed by the civilian authority (Feaver 1999). Two strands of literature flow from this problem. One strand generally argues that a professional military is a priori subordinate and apolitical. Thus, civilians should restrict their interference in the military’s domain. A second strand generally argues that a professional military is ipso facto political, potentially partisan, and not dependably neutral. In this case, civilians must remain vigilant in maintaining a healthy equilibrium in civil-military relations and the exercise of military power. Huntington’s (1957) cornerstone work The Soldier and the State defends the separation of military elites from civil society and argues for civilian restraint that provides the military with expansive autonomy. He contends that, in matters of civil-military relations, political elites, prone to political motivations, should demonstrate objective deference to a politically neutral, professional military. The level of objective control ceded to the military is dependent upon on the military’s level of “professionalism.” Huntington argues that the more professional the military, the more objective control and deference should be given by civilian leadership. This is a view widely favored by the U.S. military. Huntington’s work is considered required reading for all officers and is regularly listed on service chiefs’ recommended reading lists. In a survey of the inventory of the military’s premier research libraries, Huntington’s The Soldier and the State is well stocked on the shelves—roughly four to six times or more than any other book in the CMR genre. Huntington idealistically assumes professionalism, a term that he frustratingly underspecifies and equates to political neutrality (Huntington 1977; Snider and Carlton-Carew 1995; Feaver 1999). Deference to the military, he contends, is justified because it achieves a desirable equilibrium along the

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spectrum of protecting liberty and providing security. In addition, it is justifiable because professional military elites, in Huntington’s assumption, are motivated by a “sense of social obligation” and beneficence toward the society they serve (Huntington 1957). Although the principle of civilian control is clear and inviolable, its application and practice in reality are complex (Goodpaster 1977). Revisiting his work post-Vietnam, Huntington and General Andrew Goodpaster (1977) address the complexity and difficulty in the application of civilian control over the military. The complexity of its application is rooted in the reality that military elites possess a “vast, diverse, and intricately interwoven body” of knowledge and expertise that is indispensable. Civilian “amateurs,” as Goodpaster references them, are ill-suited to advise in matters of national security and war. He clarifies this assertion, stating that military professionals do not have a monopoly on wisdom. Civilians can and do possess academic knowledge. The difference between civilians and military professionals that justifies objective deference is the military elite’s vast and careerlong training and experience in the application of force, combat, and national security affairs (Goodpaster 1977). Interestingly, Huntington ascribes to the military professional an ethic of conservative realism, describing the military writ large as a conservative institution manned by a warrior caste on the periphery of liberal society. While an idealistic, liberal society is concerned with peace and equality, a realistic, conservative military provides protective overwatch with a primary focus on authority, hierarchy, obedience, force, violence, and war (Huntington 1977). Janowitz (1960) offers a competing view to Huntington. He argues that, as war and militaries become more technologically advanced and conflict becomes more constant, the military, vitally and necessarily, becomes more professional. Military professionalism, however, does not conform to Huntington’s traditional description of the concept; it is more pragmatic. With increased professionalism and capability come increased influence and politicization. This implies a risk of military influence capable of supplanting civilian leadership and control. He concludes that increased professionalism of the military requires increased subordination. Subordination or subjective control of the military is dependent on its level of meaningful integration with civilian values and civil society (Janowitz 1960; Snider and Carlton-Carew 1995; Feaver 1999). Janowitz warns of “unanticipated” militarization and securitization, metastasizing from a democratic ideal to Lasswell’s (1941) concept of a “garrison state.” This evolution springs from a dynamic wherein political leadership is constrained by both political environmental and its own cognitive limitations to exercise effective control over the military. This warning from the 1960s seems prophetic over sixty years later. As Mills (1959) writes:

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Politicians thus default upon their proper job of debating policy, hiding behind a supposed military expertise; and political administrators default upon their proper job of creating a real civilian career service. Out of both these civilian defaults, the professional military gain ascendency. It is for such reasons, more than any other, that the military elite—whose members are presumably neither politically appointed nor politically responsible—have been drawn into the higher political decisions. The Huntington–Janowitz debate forms the predominant foundation of CMR literature in the United States. By the 1970s, however, the image of the military in American society had changed. Resentment by civil society toward the U.S. military was a consequence of societal divides caused by the Vietnam War and changing generational attitudes toward the military and military service (Goodpaster 1977). The experience of Vietnam drove the military to become increasingly introspective. Extensive internal studies focused on how to improve training, education, and the professional development of the force. Particular focus was put on improving the professionalization of the officer corps, coupled with the end of conscription and a transition to an all-volunteer force (Bletz 1972; Goodpaster 1977; Menard 1977; Bagnal 1985; Bacevich 2005). Abrahamsson’s (1972) critical post-Vietnam work, Military Professionalism and Political Power, extends Janowitz’s theory. He investigates the belief system of military elites, finding that military professionalism produces political conservativism. The common belief system of military elites begins with the selection process (self and institutional) for those who join the military and continues with the socialization process, education, training, and combined career experiences of military elites. His conclusion is a rejection of Huntington’s assertion that professional military elites are apolitical. Despite public animosity and alienation of the military in the shadow of the Vietnam War, military elites remained “intimately involved” in domestic politics and foreign policy (Clotfelter 1973, 5). Several Cold War–era CMR studies focus on the dynamic role and influence of the military on national security and foreign policy, finding that military elites continued to serve in key and powerful positions with authority to make fundamental policy decisions. They continued to be embedded in the policy process, with unmatched influence in policy formulation and decision-making. Once policy decisions were made, civilians continued to empower military elites to administer and implement policy (Clotfelter 1973; Cimbala 1995; Stockton 1996; Johnson 1996; McMaster 1997). Relative stability in the civil-military balance of power throughout the Cold War teetered with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and fall of the Berlin Wall. This led to a post–Cold War “renaissance of interest in civil-military

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relations” scholarship in the 1990s. This dynamic is the central argument of Michael Desch’s theory of civil-military relations—that the stability of civil-military relations is dependent on the level of external and internal “threat” (Desch 1999, 2). Greater external threat correlates with increased stability in the relationship, while internal threat and domestic tension correlate with a turbulent relationship. Desch suggests that considering civil-military relations in the context of whether or not there is potential for a military coup that forcefully or violently takes over a government misses the point. Rather, it is the nature and dynamics of the relationship between military professionals and civilian elites, and the level of influence each exercise on national policy and who prevails in the debate, that are the key indicators of the balance of power in civil-military relations (Huntington 1957; Desch 1999). Post–Cold War scholarship also focused on a potential “crisis” in civilmilitary balance of power relations as internal domestic politics took precedence over national security, foreign policy, and international affairs (Kohn 1994). The absence of an external, existential threat and an increase in domestic political pressures increased conflict between civilian and military elites and challenged the stability of the relationship. The external, international environment had changed drastically with the fall of the Berlin Wall (Cimbala 1995). Civilian leaders pushed for a rapid, expansive drawdown of military forces in an effort to realize a peace dividend (Bracken 1995). A liberal U.S. societal culture began pushing for change in its conservative military institution (McIsaac and Verdugo 1995). Romanticized and historical expectations and images of military utilization in the next big war gave way to increased deployments and military action in support of nontraditional military roles such as peacekeeping missions, nation-building, human security, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief efforts (Gilroy 1995). By the mid- to late 1990s, scholars, now joined by practitioners, were asserting that civilian control of the military faced an uncertain future. A new military ethos was evolving. Civilian control was increasingly illdefined, and changes in the normative conceptions of civil-military relations required “much more research” (Snider and Carlton-Carew 1995, 16). By the late 1990s, Secretary of Defense William Cohen (1997) warned of a “chasm” growing between the military and civil society, and the author and journalist Thomas Ricks (1997) wrote of a “widening gap” between the military and the society it is sworn to protect. Civilians and elected leaders increasingly lacked military experience, understanding of the military, the application of military force in pursuit of political ends, and the role of the military in national security and foreign policy (Bianco and Markham 2001). An op-ed published by former Chairman of

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the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell in New York Times warning of expansive civilian “use of force” policies, and reported his related tense exchange and chastisement of Secretary of State Madeline Albright; these are often used as anecdotes in support of Cohen’s warning (Powell 1992, 1995).1 At the end of the 1990s, CMR scholarship was focusing on the growing gap. Scholars investigated attitudes and beliefs of both civilians and military elites (Holsti 2001; Gronke and Feaver 2001); attitudes and opinions within the officer corps (Davis 2001); the differing cultures between the military and civil society (Weigley 2001; Burke 2000); and the decline in military service and experience among members of Congress (Bianco and Markham 2001). Studies focused on the differences of opinion between civilians and the military; the political preferences, voting behavior, and political activities of the military (Holsti 1998; Feaver and Kohn 2001; Urben 2010); and the growing isolation of the military from civil society (Eitelberg and Little 1995; McIsaac and Verdugo 1995). Scholars sought to understand the changing nature of civilian control, policy preferences, and decision-making in the context of the size and use of military force during war and peace (Desch 1999; Bamford 2002; Feaver and Gelpi 2004). Finally, political economy scholars contributed with studies related to domestic and international politics and the influence of defense spending (Gold 1990; Whitten and Williams 2011). Despite scholarly interest, investigation into and public debate on the state of civil-military relations remain hampered for several reasons, many of which have been outlined by Desch (1999). First, most American scholars tend to have little interest because they think questions related to the dynamics of U.S. civil-military relations are long settled. If there is one thing scholars have learned from the 2016 presidential election to the present, it is that this is not the case. Civil-military relations in the United States are just as fragile as our democracy. Second, elected and appointed officials do not want to appear to be the weaker partner in the relationship. Acknowledging that civilians have relinquished effective control of the military could have potential political ramifications. Often, to punctuate their relative power, civilians will exercise their prerogative to dismiss, relieve, or fire a senior military officer for some exceptional transgression as a demonstration of “civilian control.” This is political theater. Likewise, the military has little interest in such studies. Drawing attention 1. Powell describes Albright as viewing the military as “toy soldiers to be moved around on some sort of global game board.” The exchange angered and frustrated him because he felt obligated to explain a brief history of military operations and planning and the importance of asking civilian leaders tough questions related to conversations surrounding military “use of force” (Powell 1995, 576–577).

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to growing praetorian trends, for example, draws unwanted attention. Rather, professing an unchanging fealty to and indoctrination with the principle of civilian control, there is a collective denial of the import of changing culture and modern attitudes toward civil authority and civil society. Finally, both military and civilian elites have little to gain from making democratically elected civilian leadership appear weak and incompetent to either domestic or international audiences (Desch 1999). Publicly, military elites who remain on active duty demonstrate deference and respect for civilian leadership, actively propping them up politically. In private, (though at times captured by the media) it is common for active-duty military elites to express personal opinions regarding civilian leadership that are less than flattering. This can take the form of leaks or off-the-record background interviews that create a narrative that undermines political leadership. Undermining the public gestures of active-duty elites, retired military elites have demonstrated a newfound freedom from the bounds of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. No longer restricted from openly sharing their political opinions and partisan leanings, they wear and are addressed by their retired rank, virtue-signaling to the public that they should be trusted. They frequently and shamelessly wield their credentials to endorse political candidates. They run for political office, prominently posting patriotic pictures of themselves in uniform on their campaign and official websites, with many falling to the temptation to exaggerate their service records. Retired military elites, in a gross violation of professional norms and responsibility, have demonstrated, particularly in the early decades of the twenty-first century, significant public condescension, criticism, contempt, and clear partisanship in American domestic politics. Closely coupled with this dynamic, the military institution is, in this author’s opinion, clearly in denial of its own collective and changing attitudes toward civilian authority (Powell 1995; McMaster 1997; Cohen 2000; Feaver 2003; W2-I25). The principle of “civilian control” is often lip service to prop up a necessary charade. Third, the U.S. public—average Americans—has a short attention span and little interest or patience for civil-military conflict and tension. They are consumed with the real-life responsibilities of working, raising a family, and experiencing life challenges that confront them. As the complexity of government has increased, average citizens are unable to exercise their civic responsibilities responsibly and effectively. Out of a sense of insecurity, they listen to those who stoke their fears. Although public confidence in elected officials may be at historic lows, the public, many times, lacks the political knowledge and will to hold politicians accountable (Somin 2016). Additionally, although the public demonstrates significant deference to the military, people do not understand or grasp the intricacies of it. There is tangible ignorance as average citizens struggle to distinguish between active-duty

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and retired military (Golby and Feaver 2021). Awed by the valorous cornucopia of shiny awards, medals, and rank that adorn a military uniform, they assume that the rants of military retirees represent the active-duty force. Generally speaking, Americans revere the military. Military members are, in the minds of many, viewed as “secular saints” (Bryant, Swaney, and Urben 2021). Public opinion approval ratings of the military consistently dwarf those of elected officials, governmental institutions, big business, the media, and, more recently, organized religion (Gallup 2021b). In the end, Americans often vigorously shake the hands of service members they encounter and relay a sincere, “Thank you for your service.” Fourth, prominent and upcoming scholars are generally disinterested in questioning the principle of civilian control. They express optimism about the state of U.S. civil-military relations, taking a comparativist perspective. They focus on niche quantitative studies and provide mainstream op-eds that are more easily published. Warnings related to severe imbalances in civilmilitary relations in the United States are overstated, they allege. They suggest it is only a problem in underdeveloped and nondemocratic countries with a history of violent military coup d’états (Desch 1999; W1-I38). Finally, there is a challenge in gaining access to data and interviews due to the confidential nature of national security policy decision-making, classification of records and documents stored in archives, and executive privilege. In the past, there have been congressionally or executive-commissioned studies that look at the state of the national security policy process. Such studies could cut through these limiting factors and, with the right leadership and mandate, conduct an executive-level review that includes investigating the state of civil-military relations between civilian leadership and military elites. With the United States seemingly in a state of continuous war for two-plus decades, CMR scholarship has continued to evolve. A new theme appears to be gaining increasing interest and momentum. The fundamental, constitutional principle of civilian control is being renegotiated, contested, and questioned. Why? Increasingly, the military is becoming more skeptical of the American public, popular culture, and liberal societal trends (Ricks 1997; Holsti 2001; Gronke and Feaver 2001; Owens 2011). Military service members generally, and large segments of the officer corps specifically, are disheartened by American civilian culture. Military members increasingly express opinions related to civilian society, finding it to be corrupt, materialistic, greedy, self-indulgent, undisciplined, and dishonest. Military attitudes toward civilian leadership view governing elites as illequipped to make decisions related to national security. Civilians, lacking any military experience, are ignorant of the institution they are meant to control (Hillen 1999; Murchison 1999; Kitfield 2000). In contrast, military members

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see themselves in a different light. They find themselves to be morally superior, as “honest, disciplined, loyal, and free of materialism, corruption, or self-indulgent tendencies” (Holsti 2001, 57–74). Two years after 9/11, military officers increasingly believed that, in matters of war, civilian leaders no longer had the right to be wrong. Feaver (2003, 300) states: We may be seeing the emergence of a norm among American military officers that civilian control does not mean civilians have the right to be wrong. . . . Officers see no inconsistency between endorsing civilian control and endorsing an “insist” role for the military, where “insist” implies “accept our advice or else.’” A RAND study found that civilian leadership is viewed as increasingly irrelevant to the national security and foreign policy process (Szayna et al. 2007). Civilian control of the military is conditional. It is contingent on the fundamental premise that civilian leadership demonstrates the cognitive complexity and intellectual curiosity to assert itself in military matters, ably and knowledgeably questioning and probing military elites regarding national security and military strategy (Cohen 2002; Holtzclaw 2016). In the third decade of the twenty-first century, the language and definition of “civilian control” is evolving, as has the role of civilians in relation to the military. Gibson (2008) argues there is no longer parity between civilians and military elites as it relates to military professional preparation and expertise in national security and foreign policy. The lack of a countervailing force in the policy process creates an imbalance of power in civil-military relations that favors the military. Gibson, a former senior military officer and member of Congress, insinuates that military elites must actively prop up civilian leaders serving in titular positions. Recognizing the military’s dominant position in the policy process, he calls for the military to avoid giving the “appearance” of directing policy, so as not to take advantage of novice administrations, political appointees, and elected officials (Gibson 2008, 125). Schiff (2009, 12) asserts that previous CMR literature related to the United States deliberately tries to preserve the myth of military subordination to civilian control. This creates a confusing dilemma for contemporary scholars studying national security and foreign policy decision-making because of the gap between the literature and reality. Not until scholars remove the presumption of civilian control can the “dearth of appropriate theoretical frameworks” be filled (Gibson 2008; Schiff 2009). By 2016, data and findings related to the 1998 Triangle Institute for Security Studies project begged to be revisited. Schake and Mattis (2016a) led a study finding that civil-military balance-of-power relations were in turmoil.

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Findings in this study suggest that the U.S. government is incapable of longterm, whole-of-government approaches to national security and foreign policy challenges because of a manifest lack of capacity and capability outside the military. Military elites are reportedly embarrassed to be associated with the amateurism of novice administrations that lack, in their view, any strategic planning or military experience (Owens 2016). In contrast, elected officials and senior civilian leadership with little or no military experience feel they lack the moral authority to manage the military. Instead, they rely heavily on military elites, hoping to stand in the shadow of the military’s credibility with the American public. Civilian officials fail to realize that this dependency on the military erodes their own credibility, public standing, and public trust. The American public, meanwhile, has come to trust and revere the U.S. military, holding it “in such high regard” that the civilian government has allowed resident “strategic thinking to atrophy” (Schake and Mattis 2016a, 302–315). The military is seen as the last fully functioning federal governmental organization, and military elites are increasingly seen as the last remaining pool of trusted leadership capable of dependably and successfully navigating congressional confirmation (Brooks 2016; W2-I6; W1-I4; W1I30). This overreliance on the military has made U.S. national security and foreign policy flimsy and inadequate to the challenges of the international environment. Politicians, lulled into a sense of complacency by military elites, now face far-reaching consequences tied to their failure to balance military influence (Schake and Mattis 2016a).

Scholarly Gaps and Shortfalls Treating the military as a political institution and military elites as individual political actors and advisers creates a thread of concordance between presidential studies, international relations, and civil-military relations literature. The theoretical frameworks and approaches discussed above are helpful. Yet they all have a mix of shortfalls. Generally, terms, definitions, and concepts are underspecified. Motive is not clearly explained or differentiated between individuals and groups. The unidirectional and normative nature of the civil-military relationship is called into question. Validity of foundational assumptions is questionable and requires renewed investigation. Because the military is generally treated as an institution, the role of military elites at an individual or group level of analysis is left inadequately explored. Current CMR and IR literature fails to provide systematic treatment of military elites and to question their influence in a manner that is grounded in theory. If military elites are identified separate from the military as an

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institution, they are either aggregated with a broader, heterogeneous group of elites or the population is ill-defined and lacks exclusivity. These shortfalls cause a failure to account for the role of military elites as a homogenous group and the nuances of their influence on policy, process, and administration. They ignore important dynamics that bind networks of elites together and that determine how and why individual or group policy preferences may prevail. Gaps remain in understanding the real-world behavior and role of military elites and how they influence national security policy decisions despite theories promoting the myth of civilian control. In the next chapter, I focus on epistemic community theory and related findings on how military elites embody conceptual community attributes. I explain the framework and define key terms and concepts, charting a course for how identified gaps in the literature reviewed here may be filled.

Chapter Four

Military Elites as an Epistemic Community

As a coherent group of men the military is probably the most competent now concerned with national policy; no other group has had the training in coordinated economic, political, and military affairs; no other group has had the continuous experience in the making of decisions; no other group so readily “internalizes” the skills of other groups nor so readily engages their skills on its own behalf; no other group has such ready access to world-wide information. Moreover, the military definitions of political and economic reality that now generally prevail among the most civilian of politicians cannot be said to weaken the confidence of the warlords, their will to make policy, or their capacity to do so within higher circles. —C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (1959), 199

More than half a century after publishing his classic work The Power Elite, C. Wright Mills remains correct in his observations of elites in the military. No other organized group of actors in the political process are as continuously engaged, trained, educated, experienced, and competent in matters of national security policy, decision-making, and policy implementation. His reference to military elites “as a coherent group” of political actors is echoed throughout history and across multiple fields of study. Investigation into the emerging role of issue networks (Heclo 1974), advocacy coalitions (Sabatier 1988), bureaucratic agencies (Allison 1971), and communities of practice (Wenger 1998; Adler 2008) acting in concert toward the achievement of policy objectives and political agendas has threads that stretch back to ancient Greece. Xenophon (2008) describes a dialogue in which Socrates discusses the roles and relationships between civilian rulers and military leaders. Socrates posits that warriors and generals possess special knowledge—epistêmê. He suggests that civilian rulers without special knowledge of war and warfighting are exceptionally reliant on military elites to govern. Fleck (1979) and Kuhn (1962) resurrect the same concept and term— epistêmê—in the twentieth century in the context of the natural sciences and 81

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sociology. Fleck’s original work (1935) investigates the role and characteristics of “thought collectives” that exemplify and are conditioned to think within a specific paradigm and thought style (Fleck 1979, xiii). Kuhn (1962) describes “scientific communities” with shared beliefs, methods, techniques, and standards that define their trade. Ruggie (1975) and Haas, Williams, and Babai (1977) bring the concept of “epistemic communities” into international relations scholarship in the 1970s. Ruggie (1975) describes epistemic communities as being bound together by shared behaviors, norms, and knowledge. Haas, Williams, and Babai investigate the role of an international scientific group, described as an epistemic community, consisting of a “network of individuals and groups” that influence policy based on “shared specialized knowledge.” Members of an epistemic community use their knowledge and beliefs to influence policy. “Their expertise entitles them to be heard in discussions of public policy in preference to other interest groups because their knowledge is held to be less self-interested” and because it is more comprehensive and offers “special insight” (Haas, Williams, and Babai 1977, 38). The conceptualization of epistemic community influence on policy was not fully developed, however, until Peter Haas (1989) explored its role and influence in the context of international environmental policy. In Haas’s findings, an epistemic community made up of ecologists and marine biologists were “granted formal decision-making authority in national administrations.” This epistemic community was intimately involved in the policymaking process as well as in the implementation, supervision, and enforcement of policy decisions (Haas 1989, 380). Haas found that epistemic communities exhibit like-mindedness, similar core beliefs, and common political values. An epistemic community’s influence is exceptional when it gains, retains, and sustains bureaucratic power and “control over a substantive policy domain.” This influence and control is enabled when its members populate and participate in national-level decision-making forums and the relevant government officials are uninformed, uncertain, and inexperienced in the relative policy domain. These dynamics provide an epistemic community the ability to control policy, “convert their interests into new national policies,” consolidate power, and “promote its own preferred vision” and policy agenda (Haas 1989, 380–389). Yet epistemic community theory remains an obscure and underutilized framework in international relations literature, particularly in understanding national security and foreign policy decision-making. Cross (2013b) attributes this lack of development of the theory to its original conceptualization and a number of limited case studies related to the influence of groups of scientists early in its development. Epistemic communities are not solely comprised of scientists acting in transnational networks (Haas 1992). They may be made

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up of like-minded subgroups within a profession, such as diplomats (Cross 2011), bankers (Kapstein 1992), and economists (Ikenberry 1992). They exist and act at both the international and domestic levels. Epistemic community theory has been applied to investigate and understand the development, evolution, and integration of European Union security and defense policy (Howorth 2004; Webber et al. 2004; Faleg 2012; Cross 2011, 2013a). At the domestic level, epistemic communities can emerge as well (Haas 1992). Epistemic community theory has been employed to understand nuclear arms control policy (Adler 1992) and public management and interagency cooperation in the United States (Thomas 1997). Outside the United States, epistemic community theory has been utilized in the United Kingdom to understand reform in its national security sector (Sugden 2006) and in Israel to understand paradigmatic shifts in national security policy (Libel 2016). In this book, epistemic community theory and framework are employed to provide greater fidelity in understanding how a homogenous group of U.S. military elites behave in a manner that provides them a unique role with exceptional influence on national security and foreign policy. The theory is further developed and defined at the domestic level, providing it greater utility in understanding how domestic epistemic communities work, particularly within the nuances of national security and foreign policy decision-making. An epistemic community is generally defined as possessing (1) shared normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for action; (2) shared causal beliefs, which derive from analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which serve as basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; (3) shared notions of validity, meaning intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and (4) a common policy enterprise, meaning a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which professional competence is directed out of conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence. (Haas 1992, 3) These four elements of an epistemic community—shared normative and principled beliefs; shared causal beliefs; shared notions of validity; and a common policy enterprise—differentiate it from other groups such as interest groups, advocacy coalitions, bureaucratic agencies and coalitions, social movements, academic disciplines, and professions (Haas 1992, 18). Cross (2013b) reconceptualizes and expands upon the attributes of epistemic communities defined by Haas. She argues that “epistemic communities

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do not simply exist or not exist” (Cross 2013b, 148). Rather, to better understand the role and influence of epistemic communities, it is more productive to consider the varying degrees of influence they may have over policy and process. To understand degrees of influence, it is “necessary to examine their internal dynamics” that provide a better gauge of an epistemic community’s strengths and weaknesses. These internal dynamics include: professionalism; internal cohesion; authoritative knowledge; perceptions of uncertainty in the political environment; and relationships with government. Based primarily on the work of Haas and Cross, in this investigation I establish that U.S. military elites constitute an epistemic community based on the data and related findings presented in the following chapters. However, in the following sections of this chapter, I provide greater specification in defining these conceptual attributes and internal dynamics. Second, Cross’s internal dynamics are expanded upon to provide a richer understanding of how they determine the level of influence an epistemic community possesses. Third, because of the considerable overlap in the conceptual boundaries of these attributes, I provide greater clarity in an effort to demonstrate how each attribute is unique and different, even while remaining interdependent of one another. Finally, I explain why these conceptual attributes and internal dynamics matter in the context of both the theoretical framework and the proposed epistemic community under question. Before presenting the data and results, it is important to review the original research questions. The first question is to determine whether military elites constitute an epistemic community. The second question is to understand how and why national security decisions are affected by this epistemic community. The final question is to understand how these dynamics impact civil-military balance of power relations. These questions drove the formulation of the two propositions under consideration. Proposition One—U.S. military elites constitute an epistemic community. Proposition Two—U.S. military elites, constituting an epistemic community, play a unique role with exceptional influence on national security and foreign policy process and administration. The findings substantiate that military elites do constitute an epistemic community. They conform to and exhibit the conceptual attributes outlined by Haas and Cross. These conceptual attributes are listed in table 2. Many of the findings also support related extant literature that is incorporated in the narrative below. For five of the conceptual attributes (1–5 in table 2), sample participants agreed that the attributes strongly and accurately characterize the behavior

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Table 2: Conceptual attributes of epistemic communities Shared normative, principled, causal, and political beliefs Shared notions of validity Common policy enterprise Profession and ethos Internal cohesion and intragroup trust Consensual, authoritative knowledge and expertise Perceptions of an uncertain, complex environment External relationships, alliances, and resources Source: Compiled by the author.

of military elites. The findings further specify these conceptual attributes in relation to military elites, as well as to epistemic community theory more generally. For two of the conceptual attributes (6–7), there is notable support for military elites exhibiting these characteristics. However, there is interesting variance and nuance demonstrating the impact of domestic politics on epistemic community influence and the ability of epistemic community members to convincingly propagate conceptions of the policy environment that support their policy preferences. The final conceptual attribute in table 2, External Relationships, Alliances, and Resources (8), sets military elites apart from competing epistemic communities and is fundamental to the unique role and exceptional influence exhibited by military elites in the policy process. Cross (2013b) identified relationships as important to gaining access to decision makers. However, as this investigation demonstrates, strong relationships (internal and external to the community), international and domestic alliances, and access to and control of resources provide exceptional asymmetric advantage in influencing policy. Appendix E: Military Elite Conceptual Attributes and Theoretical Implications provides an abbreviated road map of the findings below and a description of the nuanced theoretical implications of the findings related to Proposition One. The raw data samples presented below are select quotations coded and extracted from individual interviews according to six criteria (see table 3). Quotations are long enough to provide context but are abridged to omit language that would identify the sample participant. They demonstrate and represent themes in response. They incorporate similar and common words, phrases, sentences, and passages found throughout the data set. They are fairly related to a proposition, as well as to one or more attributes that reflect the theoretical construct. It is important to note that sample quotations sometimes depart from the substantive idea of a particular attribute the study seeks to demonstrate. Mapping and matching quotations to concepts was not a perfect process. It never

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Table 3: Criteria for selection and presentation of raw data Support and substantiate proposition OR contradict, dissent, and diverge to demonstrate variance and highlight nuance Exemplify data set (provide a sense of the whole) Substantiated and supported by extant scholarship and literature Support conceptual attribute and directly related to findings Demonstrate general patterns in response (describe and develop the meaning of the related conceptual attribute in context) Provide variation and novel development of theory by identifying conditionality and consequential nuance in the conceptual attribute Source: Compiled by the author.

is. This is to be expected when conducting interviews with practitioners and academics unfamiliar with the framework and technical definitions of conceptual attributes within epistemic community theory. Indeed, not a single sample participant was familiar with epistemic community theory. The selected quotations exemplify the data set and provide a sense of the whole. Or, to avoid overly biased sampling, they present important contradiction, dissent, and divergence that bring forward unexpected themes and variance. This provided a valuable, nuanced understanding of epistemic community behavioral characteristics. Variation is critical to analysis because it provides for understanding differences of opinion among sample participants from different backgrounds, affiliations, and levels of experience. It also provides for important, novel development of epistemic community theory by identifying conditionality and consequential nuance in the theoretical construct. Finally, it adds to the body of knowledge and understanding in the “how and why” of national security and foreign policy process and administration work in practice.

Shared Normative, Principled, Causal, and Political Beliefs The military ethic is thus pessimistic, collectivist, historically inclined, power-oriented, nationalistic, militaristic, pacifist, and instrumentalist in its view of the military profession. It is, in brief, realistic and conservative (Huntington 1957, 79). Haas (1992) argues that epistemic communities possess shared normative, principled, and causal beliefs. An internal dynamic of military elites, as has been demonstrated in more recent CMR scholarship, is that they also share political beliefs. I add the element of shared political beliefs for three reasons. First, contemporary studies demonstrate that it applies to military elites. It

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is a distinguishing feature of this group and cannot be ignored. Second, it is directly related to the concept of causal beliefs and how community members see the world. And third, it provides nuance to the conceptual attribute that should be explicitly considered in future investigations. The conceptual attribute of “shared normative, principled, causal, and political beliefs” is an element of a broader contemporary military culture. The term “culture” is defined by Lewis (2012) as the total pattern of human behavior, thought, speech, and action. Military culture is “essentially how things are done in a military organization” and consists of military belief systems, values, philosophies, traditions, and customs that create a shared professional ethos (Dorn et al. 2000, 7). These shared beliefs of military elites are composed of the normative, principled, causal, and political. Normative and principled beliefs provide a value-based rationale for the behavior and actions of community members (Meyer and MolyneuxHodgson 2010). Normative beliefs relate to how conduct of military professionals aligns with the concepts and core values of honor, courage, integrity, commitment, selfless service, loyalty, duty, and respect. These values are common across the military services. Principled beliefs relate to cause-effect relationships, such as a belief that hard work and determination result in success; promotion and advancement are based on merit; attention to detail ensures excellence; competition is critical to team-building and builds unit esprit d’corps; and physical fitness is a foundational trait of a warrior. Causal beliefs are derived from a community’s collective experience and how they perceive linkages between problems and solutions and how this informs beliefs related to linkages between policy action and desired outcomes (Meyer and Molyneux-Hodgson 2010). Huntington (1957) generalizes that military elites share common causal beliefs in regard to international relations, describing them as conservative realists. He suggests that military elites ascribe to beliefs that international relations and politics are governed by an Hobbesian human nature that is constant and unchanging. Military elites tend to focus on the military security of the state. They have an unrelenting concern for existential military threats and the continuous likelihood of war. They tend to think of states as unitary, rational actors that act rationally in their self-interests, that states exist in an international system of anarchy wherein they continually seek power and advantage in order to provide security and self-preservation. Finally, they are inclined to define power primarily in material terms, favoring a strong military (Carr 1945; Waltz 1959; Niebuhr 1960; Abrahamsson 1972; Morgenthau 1973; Feaver 1996). Understanding the belief system of military elites is important for two reasons. First, it provides a window into understanding their political beliefs. Second, how the belief system of military elites aligns with their civilian

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counterparts and elected officials impacts the level of influence they have in the policy process. In the work of Haas (2001) and Cross (2011), both scholars argue that epistemic communities strive to be politically untainted and impartial in a critical effort to be embraced and respected by political leaders across the political spectrum. This is a difficult, if not impossible, task because of the challenges of separating one’s core internal beliefs from one’s external behaviors. In regard to the political identity and beliefs of military elites, it is well documented that military officers tend to self-identify as politically conservative and, increasingly, as Republican (Holsti 1998; Davis 2001; Feaver and Kohn 2001; Szayna et al. 2007; Urben 2010; Golby 2011). In the past, the term “political conservativism” referred to an aversion to rapid change, strict interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, federalism, Judeo-Christian norms and values, free-market capitalism, limited government, low taxes, low national debt, American exceptionalism, democratic evangelism, noninterventionism, and a realist approach to international relations. Three major studies in this century demonstrate that political identity and beliefs within the military officer corps grow increasingly conservative with time spent in military service. Military officers with moderate and liberal political beliefs become less likely to identify as moderate or liberal over time. Those that do identify as liberal tend to exit the military at a higher rate than their more conservative counterparts. Moderate and liberal military officers that do remain in the military for a career tend to hold less moderate and less liberal political beliefs as a group as they reach more senior rank (Feaver and Kohn 2001; Urben 2010; Golby 2011; see also Holsti 1998). Although military officers may self-identify as being politically conservative or as registered Republicans, it is increasingly unclear whether these military members understand what it means to hold truly conservative values or whether they are more wed to a political party identification. There are no studies demonstrating that military officers uniformly understand what “conservatism” entails. Some find the characterization of military elites as conservatives as being overly broad. There is speculation that military elites may possess more liberal beliefs regarding global politics (Mahoney-Norris 2001). Others find contradictory opinions among military elites related to what they think their current belief system is versus what it ought to be (Pierce 2010). Finally, for future studies, it would be valuable to understand the role that religion and race play in influencing a military members’ political beliefs, particularly in the shadow of a rise in Christian nationalism among whites, by far the largest demographic among military officers, as well as reports of a potential increase in extreme white supremacist beliefs within the military. In the following section, the selected interview excerpts provide examples

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of what military elites believe about themselves, as an in-group, as well as how they are perceived by others, as an out-group. It is fair to say that the quotations are cherry-picked. However, as a reminder to the reader, that is the nature of the methodology. Interview excerpts are deliberately selected to provide a “sense of the whole” as it relates to themes identified throughout all the interviews gathered across the sample population. The direct quotations have been slightly edited for sense and consistency. Do military officers believe they share a common belief system? The first excerpt is from a former senior military officer that has worked at the highest levels of the Pentagon. This officer is a highly respected scholar, published author, former military academy instructor, and university professor. In both my scholarly work and in my personal experience, I find that we tend to draw individuals into the officer corps that have shared belief systems and a shared worldview. This is something we have in common before we join the military. That belief system is then codified in the socialization process we experience throughout our military career . . . and, as a whole, we tend to become more conservative the longer we serve. (W1-I17) This feedback suggests that the military, particularly among the officer corps, attracts members that may already have shared belief systems that are strengthened by their entry, socialization, and enculturation into the military profession. It suggests that there may be a stereotypical military elite, which should come as no surprise. There are stereotypes of military service members related to professional culture, just as there are in other government institutions such as the FBI, the CIA, or the Department of State. Sharing an opinion on stereotypes as they relate to belief systems, a State Department Foreign Service Officer stated, I think the stereotypes are generally accurate. The military tends to lean conservative. The State Department tends to lean liberal. Those leanings are apparent in our respective cultures, too. Military culture is very hierarchical and rich with tradition and has a high esprit d’corps. State culture is very individual-centric. There is no esprit d’corps. We tend to be liberal academics, bookish, and wonky. (W1-I64) This observation was supported by others outside government. A wellknown author, former NSC staff official, think tank fellow, and college professor with a career focused on observing the national security and foreign policy process stated: “Military elites have always tended to be conservative. They know that at the end of the day, the military are the ones that have to implement policy, carry out missions, and put the lives of men and women on the line” (W1-I7).

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Military elites recognize that they have shared belief systems, particularly as to politics and worldview. General John Hyten, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, stated it very succinctly for a professional forum of national security-focused students, academics, and practitioners. He described military elites this way: “We in the military don’t get to look at the world the way we wish it was. We have to look at it the way that it is” (Hyten 2019). The message was clear: Military elites do not have the luxury of idealism; they must be realists. The socialization process referenced above takes place over decades in which shared normative, principled, and causal beliefs of individuals and the military community are mutually constituted (Atkinson 2014). It is a process of social interaction, cultural transmission, indoctrination, and training. Individual members are incorporated into the community as they learn, accept, and reflect the identity, beliefs, norms, values, practices, and language of the community (Dawson and Prewitt 1969; Pitkin 1972; Johnson 2001; Atkinson 2014). These interview excerpts also demonstrate the complex and difficult nature of disentangling normative, principled, and causal belief systems from opinions related to the political beliefs of military elites. The responses highlight and hint at a consensus of opinion among sample participants that military elites are also politically tainted. They are not apolitical, impartial, or neutral. This is not to say that military elites all identify with a particular political party or that they all agree on policies meant to achieve national security goals and objectives. However, military elites who lack impartiality and exhibit biased political behavior can be favored when political preferences align with those of civilian decision makers. General Maxwell Taylor provides a relevant example. His book Uncertain Trumpet signaled an alignment of beliefs with President John Kennedy, for whom he served as a senior military adviser, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and ambassador. In contrast, military elite influence can be muted when political preferences are not in alignment with political decision makers. A more recent historical example includes General James Mattis, as exemplified in his resignation letter to President Trump. Although serving as Trump’s civilian secretary of defense, Mattis was deferentially referred to by Trump as “General.” As the relationship between Mattis and Trump deteriorated, however, Mattis stated his belief in a final letter to Trump that presidents deserve to have advisers “whose views are better aligned” with the commander in chief. Ultimately, military leaders, active-duty and retired, who act with partisan political behavior risk long-term diminution of the military’s collective influence. More concerning, studies indicate that the increasingly partisan

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behavior of military service members diminishes overall public trust and confidence in the military. When military elites, active-duty or retired, become political partisans, civilian leaders from both sides of the political spectrum, as well as the public at large, increasingly view the military with skepticism and diminished respect (Golby, Dropp, and Feaver 2012; Schake and Mattis 2016a). Unfortunately, military elites are increasingly perceived as politically tainted and vulnerable to political capture. A skeptic may argue that General Mark Milley, regardless of his intentions, is an example. A skeptical observer might find that Milley exhibited exceptional political behavior to remain in the favor of President Trump, despite post–Trump administration books detailing his actions as a savior, staving off a war with China; safeguarding the U.S. nuclear arsenal; or dramatic confrontations with extreme right-wing members of Congress during his service under President Biden’s administration. Collectively, all could be viewed as endeavors to correct his admitted mistakes and shore up his historical legacy from a civil-military relations perspective. The political evolution of military elites—however faint, pronounced, or pragmatic—affects the military’s unique role in society. Rather than viewed as guardians above political fray, military elites, active-duty and retired, are viewed as having entered a fickle political scrum. This evolution determines influence according to the political party and policy preferences of the presidential administration in power and in which they serve. This dynamic is discussed further in chapter 5 but roughly translates into the skepticism they may encounter under Democratic presidential administrations versus the policy preference alignment they may experience under Republican presidential administrations.

Finding: There is a strong finding that military elites definitively share normative, principled, causal, and political beliefs. This finding is supported by the data of this investigation, as well as by previous scholarship. This supports the proposition that military elites constitute an epistemic community and reaffirms Huntington’s assertions related to a military ethic. More important, regardless of whether an epistemic community demonstrates this conceptual attribute, what matters most is how they are perceived by decision makers. In the short term, politically tainted epistemic communities may have strong influence when policy preferences align with decision makers. However, they lose influence as policy preference alignment shifts. In the long term, politically tainted epistemic community members are viewed with skepticism and distrust by the public at both ends of the political spectrum.

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Shared Notions of Validity The conceptual attribute of shared notions of validity in epistemic communities refers to whether military elites demonstrate “intersubjective, internally defined, and co-constituted criteria for weighing and validating expertise” within their profession, policy domain, and enterprise (Haas 1992, 3). In other words, weighing and validating the expertise of military elites can be subjective and difficult to define and measure. However, internal to the community, validation of expertise and knowledge is demonstrated in three ways. First, validation is gained through a promotion system that, early in a military career, objectively measures merit, determining whether military service members merit promotion through observation and performance. To merit promotion objectively, military members attend military schools and civilian graduate degree programs and have their personnel files reviewed by specially convened selection and promotion boards that certify candidates’ professional development and preparation for increased rank and responsibility. At the more junior ranks, they also attend tradecraft schools, such as Airborne School and Ranger School, that teach specialized skill sets that prepare service members to perform technical tasks related to tactical leadership and combat. Second and more subjectively, military members validate their expertise and knowledge internal to the community by demonstrating commitment, character, and competence. This is accomplished over time by being selected for and serving successfully in multiple leadership positions at increasing levels of responsibility within the organization. It is demonstrated by maintaining a record and reputation of conforming to military values and standards related to moral and ethical behavior; maintaining a professional appearance and high level of physical fitness; and possessing clear tactical and technical expertise and proficiency. The ability to perform successfully over time—in multiple assignments, increasing levels of responsibility, varying geographic locations, garrison environments, contingency operations, and combat— builds an officer’s reputation within the community that tacitly validates individual expertise and knowledge. And third, as military officers become more senior in rank, their expertise and knowledge are validated externally. As they increasingly work with senior civilian leadership, elected officials, and political appointees, their expertise and knowledge are tacitly validated by the trust civilians place in them. Trust is gained internally and externally by demonstrating the ability to discreetly communicate and convey advice and institutional needs and interests. Military elites should be sophisticated enough to ensure they are seen as being less central to public narratives, allowing civilian politicians to receive positive credit and political capital for policy decisions, despite how decisive military

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elites were in the ultimate policy outcome (Shulman 2012). Civilian leaders demonstrate trust through the access they grant military elites as advisers and confidantes and through a willingness to delegate decision-making authority. Shared beliefs and common experiences create a social construct in which everyday life within an epistemic community can tend to weight and validate a group’s internal beliefs and behaviors. Over time, the unique structure of military life in particular imposes, weights, validates, and legitimizes military institutional, community, and individual beliefs, values, knowledge, and practices. Shared notions of validity are gained by recurring, shared, and collective experiences within their professional domain, core competencies, and common policy enterprise (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Haas 1992; Meyer and Molyneux-Hodgson 2010). For example, if a community lives, works, and socializes together on a routine basis over time, it creates a unique experience relatively insulated and isolated from other segments of society. This insularity norms members over time, rewards conformity, and creates an in-group dynamic that forms a strong identity and can construe reality (Adler and Bernstein 2005). This self-reinforcing, environmental “bubble” nurtures shared notions of validity, a sense of community, and in-group identity based on shared experiences, personal relationships, and a professional network (Deaux et al. 1995). This is important to the theoretical framework because it relates to and reinforces the consensual nature of the community’s knowledge and expertise. It demonstrates internal cohesion and intragroup trust within the community, as well as the level of entitativity outside of the community. In the context of this study, the term “entitativity” refers to the strength of the perception of those outside of the military (i.e., the general public) regarding those in the military as a distinct, coherent, and cohesive group, whether active-duty or retired. The nomenclature of this particular conceptual attribute—shared notions of validity—was unfamiliar to sample participants. However, after defining and describing the term, it immediately provoked comment, as it was related to the process of professionalization that military elites undergo throughout their career. A senior military officer with NSC experience and serving as a military academy instructor at the time of the interview stated: This idea that military officers are different from their civilian counterparts and how this is reinforced by shared notions of validity is really critical, because it’s a deliberate process. It’s the process of professionalization. It’s how we socialize and professionalize our officers unlike any other governmental agency. We do it by building a shared identity through shared experiences. We do it by enforcing and conforming to values and norms of behavior. By holding ourselves to a higher standard. (W1-I6)

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Shared social identity is “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel 1981, 255). Those who self-identify as being a member of a social group validate the salience of being recognized as a member of the group by society, as well as the salience of the authoritative knowledge possessed by the community. They deliberately behave in accordance with and conform to group norms and values and rely on the group to guide and validate their behavior (Brewer 1991; Terry and Hogg 1996; Tropp and Wright 2001). Interviewees made frequent and common references to the effective indoctrination and validation of military values and norms achieved through a deliberate and careerlong enculturation and socialization process. This process involved the military’s selection and promotion of officers within its ranks; the progressive professional development programs officers experience; and the progressive assignments and broadening opportunities available to officers that reinforce and validate military values, norms, beliefs, identity, and experiences. The effect, observed another college professor with extensive NSC experience, was that notions of validity intensify over time and the longer you serve. Military officers are exposed to and immersed in a very unique culture. They progress through and endure a number of unique and common experiences in what may oftentimes be a very intense environment. This can be in their military schooling or maybe in combat. And it would be impossible for these experiences to not shape their worldview or validate their sense of having a very unique identity that is recognized and honored by society. (W1-I47) Several participants, particularly from the State Department, contrasted their experiences with military service members. They recognized and acknowledged the unique role military culture has in validating beliefs, identity, experiences, expertise, and knowledge. It is not common across the U.S. government.1 For example, a retired ambassador noted that the State Department had a rigorous selection process, referring to the Foreign Service Exam. However, once selected to work at the State Department, he stated, there is no enculturation process, and no one gets weeded out for a failure to perform. There is an orientation, however, “State 101,” and tradecraft 1. Multiple State Department studies have been conducted that support the views of sample participants in this study. See Bedford et al. (2017), “State Department Reform Report,” and Boyatt et al. (2003), “Secretary Colin Powell’s State Department: An Independent Assessment.”

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and language training. But there’s no formalized, careerlong, professional development program. The assignment process is ad hoc. It is not merit-based. Assignments are more determined by your “corridor reputation” and are very “free market.” Professional development opportunities exist, but there’s very little incentive . . . there’s no value placed on continuing education. (W2-I29) There is a noteworthy caveat that shared notions of validity may result in or lead to a rushed, sometimes rigid, thought process or approach to problem-solving. It was very evident in primary resources and interview responses that military elites view themselves as action-oriented, professional problem solvers with a sense of urgency. They tend to believe, very enthusiastically, that they have a unique ability to quickly grasp and rapidly understand strategic or operational challenges. As a whole, they are overly confident in this belief. Likewise, they tend to be critical of their civilian counterparts, harboring a skeptical perception of civilians having an overwillingness to engage in time-consuming philosophical debate and discussion related to strategic or operational issues. Civilian leaders want to be presented with options that provide flexibility, while action-oriented military elites want decisiveness in a course of action for which they can plan, resource, and act upon. Military elites can tend to project high confidence in their approach to and ability to solve problems and successfully navigate national security crises. This confidence is rooted in the validation of their experiences, training, knowledge, and expertise. General George Casey communicates this dynamic in his reflections on leading the war in Iraq. He describes urgently crafting the central tenets of his campaign strategy from public statements of the president, because “the higher up you go, the less guidance you receive” (Casey 2012, 6). There is a common insinuation in military elites’ responses that politicians are challenged in articulating what they want to accomplish or how they envision the operationalization of strategic policy. They can lack a sense of urgency and shy away from giving too much guidance for fear of being perceived as micromanaging. They sometimes flinch from asking questions that may reveal their ignorance. A college professor and retired senior military officer confirms this dilemma, describing civilians in the NSC process as displaying “a baffling incompetence in not knowing what questions to ask” when consulting with military elites in regard to national security policy and planning (W1-I16). At times, particularly during war, aggressive military elites can usurp civilian prerogatives and authority. Retired Lieutenant General Michael DeLong, former U.S. Central Command, Chief of Operations in the leadup to

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Operation Iraqi Freedom, described elite, highly educated civilian counterparts in the State Department as having no sense of urgency. Civilians at the State Department were more concerned, in DeLong’s view, with protocol and using proper channels of communication that wasted precious time. DeLong describes a process in which diplomats were ultimately sidelined and pushed aside. In time-constrained, chaotic crisis, military elites decided who to talk to and what should be said. They did not have time, in their opinion, to waste in academic discussion. They confidently and firmly believed that they knew what they wanted, when they wanted it, and how to get the answers they needed to achieve the political and military objectives of the president (DeLong 2004). This was a common theme from both military elites and civilian counterparts. A former civilian member of President Trump’s NSC and think tank fellow observed: “Military elites are driven to lead and find solutions. State and the [Intelligence Community] are thinkers, not problem-solvers. Leading and problem-solving are not their mission and it’s not an integral part of their organizational culture” (W1-I54). A fellow civilian colleague that had worked in both the Obama NSC and Trump NSC echoed these sentiments, stating: The military culture makes it a well-oiled machine. Its emphasis on planning and contingencies result in a level of preparedness that other agencies lack. They are able to bring “off the shelf” solutions to policy issues for presidential consideration in a very rapid process. They beat other agencies to the punch because they’ve planned for so many contingencies and scenarios. The State Department is more ad hoc and free-flowing, which causes it to become paralyzed in a rapid decision-making process because of their lack of preparedness (W1-I68). Both of these quotations demonstrate the implications of shared notions of validity. It can serve to enhance the influence of an epistemic community. However, it can also have negative impacts on the policy process that must be noted.

Finding: There is a strong finding that military elites do have shared notions of validity. This supports the proposition that military elites constitute an epistemic community. The validation process that military elites endure throughout their career is objective and subjective, internal and external; it is strengthened and intensified through careerlong educational experiences, graduated professional development, and experience. However, there is a caveat. The process of socialization, professionalization,

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and gaining experiential knowledge does not mean, particularly at the strategic level, that every challenge or crisis can be handled with a “playbook” of “off the shelf” solutions, standard operating procedures, and a well-oiled planning process. The history of U.S. military conflict is littered with hardfought, costly victories gained through brute strength, human casualties, and strategic endurance—not critical thinking. Military elites, as well as epistemic communities more generally, imbued with this conceptual attribute, may rush the policy process out of a sincere sense of urgency that can constrain critical thinking and hinder a civilian leader’s ability to gain adequate or full situational awareness. This has the potential to exacerbate a dynamic of “groupthink” within an epistemic community and create vulnerabilities, whether politically, strategically, or otherwise. Elected leaders may delegate authority, but they cannot delegate responsibility. Overextending trust and excessive delegation of decision-making authority allow powerful military elites to pursue policy and strategy that ultimately and inherently follow self- and institutional interests and equities. Excessive delegation of authority propagates self-serving strategic conceptions of the international and operational environments. It subordinates national interest to more narrow, parochial interests that, in the long term, jeopardize national security (Kupchan 1994).

Common Policy Enterprise Military elites strongly believe they hold near-sacred, sole jurisdiction over a range of common policy domains that make up a common military policy enterprise. This sacred jurisdiction is heavily guarded against civilian interference, and military elites may be more likely to resign or threaten resignation over disagreements in this policy enterprise if civilian leaders are perceived to be violating or infringing upon the military’s self-proclaimed policy domain prerogatives. Even the president, as commander in chief, is unwelcome to meddle in this military policy enterprise, as the Eisenhower case study in chapter 2 demonstrates. The guarded jurisdiction of policy and associated prerogatives of military elites afford the military significant advantage and influence in the policy process. Interference by civilians is met with stiff resistance, recalcitrance, contempt, and selective obedience, perceived as an intrusive endeavor counter to military interests (Bacevich 2007). The military policy enterprise encompasses leadership, management, and administration of policies that regulate and govern the military’s vast institution, bureaucracy, resources, and operations.

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The military’s common policy enterprise includes a full spectrum of service-specific and joint force–related policy domains that encompass, at the highest levels, strategic policy, defense budget demands, and operational planning considerations for an array of national security problem sets. At the parochial level, this policy enterprise includes how military services govern their respective professions, regulate business operations, and allocate resources. Examples can also include policies that govern force end-strength and design, human resource regulations, and use of force or rules of engagement decisions. Understanding the conceptual attribute of common policy enterprise is important, because it helps provide understanding and explanation for how military elites typically approach the national security policy process. Military elites believe resistance to civilian infringement upon the common military policy enterprise is validated through historical, collective experiences. They share a conviction that civilian meddling by novice or incompetent actors in military policy leads to potentially disastrous outcomes that can threaten national security. In addition to the lessons provided by the Eisenhower case study in chapter 2, another great case study of this struggle is provided in the history of the Vietnam War. The contentious relationship between the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and President Lyndon Johnson led to extensive internal debates among the Joint Chiefs. As they considered resigning en masse on two separate occasions, vehement, simmering disagreements persisted with the president over military policy and operations during the war. Even four-star General Creighton Abrams, favored within the Johnson administration, reportedly threatened resignation because of interference and micromanagement by civilian leadership (Zaffiri 1994; Reardon 2012). As quoted in chapter 2, General Matthew Ridgway explained during his swearing-in as Chief of Staff of the Army that military elites expect scrupulous respect and deference in matters of military policy because of their extensive experience. Described by General Andrew Goodpaster in his work with Huntington, a specialized and rigorous selection process, careerlong investment in professional education, indoctrination of common values centered on service to and defense of the nation, and an assignment process that provides progressive experience and growing responsibility are intended to develop senior officers that possess expertise and corresponding recognition and prestige in matters of service-oriented and joint warfighting, defense policy, national security, and foreign policy at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The inference is that military elites are vested national security professionals. They are not temporary amateurs appointed for a political season to safeguard America’s national security interests. Military elites prefer that civilians remain in their own area of expertise (Herspring 2013). When civilian leaders stray outside of their expertise and

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endeavor to influence military policy, they rarely offer effective change in the interest of or in alignment with institutional preferences (Hudson 2015). Examples of this dynamic include congressional attempts to improve military policy related to issues of sexual assault and harassment or service member sexual preferences and identification, as well as attempts to investigate and screen military service members for affiliation with extremist organizations. In each case, military elites, regardless of whether they agreed with the need for addressing these important issues, staunchly defended their prerogatives in dealing with these matters internally, claiming that outside interference by civilians undermines the military chain of command and organizational order and discipline. Former CJCS General John Shalikashvili signaled his feelings on civilian interference in military matters, particularly if civilian leaders have no military experience. In matters of military policy, Shalikashvili stated: “My feeling is that [National Security Advisor Anthony Lake] must always be conscious, when it comes to making military decisions on the use of military power, that the president has not served and that he has not served” (Feaver and Gelpi 2004, 64). The implication is that civilians, particularly those who have not served in the military, lack the professional competence and judgment to adequately consider decisions related to military policy. Military elites, by contrast, gain extensive professional expertise through a deliberate process that has developed and evolved through internal review, as well as from legislative requirements. The careerlong educational and professional development process is systematic and progressive in its approach. It validates and promotes military professionals indoctrinated with institutional values, moral qualifications, standards of integrity and fitness, and abilities to perform at increasing levels of rank and responsibility (U.S.C. Title 10 2017, §§ 385–386). To become a military elite, service members must matriculate through a decades-long, rigid, relatively uncorrupted “meritocratic and technocratic” winnowing process (Cohen 2016, 85). As one former senior naval officer and senior civilian executive with the NSC experience noted: Unlike any other governmental organization, military elites are promoted primarily through merit for the first twenty years of their career. After that, your relationships and your personal network play a bigger role in your promotions and assignments. There are also a few that are “legacy,” that got their stars because of their daddy and their last name, but for the most part you promote on merit. (W1-I60) This career advancement process is meant to ensure that military elites are “educated, trained, and experienced in joint matters to enhance the joint

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warfighting capability and lethality of the United States through a heightened awareness of joint requirements, including multi-service, interagency, international, and non-governmental perspectives” (DOD 2018b, 5). It also ensures expertise and qualification in planning, organizing, developing, coordinating, synchronizing, and implementing expansive national-level policy that achieves national security and military goals and objectives (DOD 1985). This process is unique across the U.S. government. No other agency or institution develops its elites in such a deliberate and expansive manner. Documents provided by the Joint History Office demonstrate how General Shalikashvili, admonished the Service Chiefs to promote and support professional development programs that develop strategic leaders. These programs provide opportunities for high-performance, high-potential officers to “experience, first-hand, the national security policy process with agencies like the White House, CIA, Justice Department, and Capitol Hill.” Officers in these programs bring back an appreciation for the “magnitude and scope of military operations,” as well as “a fresh perspective and renewed energy.” They “return to their parent Service more experienced and able to assume increasing leadership positions” (Shalikashvili 1994). A review of senior flag officers’ résumés reveals that, by the time officers reach the rank of Lieutenant General/Vice Admiral (O-9), they will have led organizations and service members at nearly every tactical and operational level within their respective service. They will have attended, on average, at least three accredited institutions of higher education, typically attaining two masters-level degrees. They will have served in an average of five operational assignments overseas and four joint assignments, working with sister military services or other governmental agencies such as the NSC, State, and the CIA for extended periods of time (DOD 2018b). At the highest terminal rank of General/Admiral (O-10), military elites will have led multiservice, multiagency, and multinational organizations in expeditionary environments and in contingency operations ranging from war to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. They will have worked closely with National Command Authorities, members of Congress, foreign leaders, and the leadership of international organizations and corporations. They will have served in an average of six joint and operational assignments, respectively. Unlike any other U.S. government agency or institution, this developmental assignment process is required by law (U.S.C. Title 10 2017, §§ 662–664). Admiral James Stavridis, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, relates in his memoir that the professional development and broadening assignments afforded by the U.S. Navy provided him opportunities to learn the interplay of politics, economics, finance, business, culture, language, and

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security. He gained a greater understanding of international affairs and how relationships, partnerships, friendships, and alliances were critical to personal and organizational success. His assignments, education, and unique opportunities developed his strategic-mindedness; gave him experience in leading and managing an immense organization; developed his ability to engage key stakeholders to influence policy at home and abroad; and prepared him to interact with and influence international and domestic counterparts, ministers of defense, and heads of state (Stavridis 2014). At the national strategic level, however, the common military policy enterprise increasingly overlaps with policy areas that are less military-centric, more political and economic, and increasingly contested. At this level, military elites should be able to straddle and navigate a military-political environment and landscape. Some military elites are confident and think they have been well prepared to engage at this level. Others have signaled that, at the national level, military elites begin to find themselves significantly challenged by other actors, as well as by their own abilities. As one retired Combatant Commander transparently reflected: As I came up through the ranks, my assignments and experience made me an excellent Division Commander. Beyond that, I was always out of my comfort zone because my engagements were more outside of my parent organization and increasingly with civilians. This is a difficult adjustment for one- and two-star general officers. Fraught with missteps. Thrust into an interorganizational environment, ill-prepared for engaging with the media, think tanks, industry and Congress. No traditional professional development experiences prepare generals for this. . . . We continue to try to address these shortcomings. (W2-I3) These shortcomings do not go unnoticed by civilian leaders. In an oral history conducted by Daalder and Destler (1999b), former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) Ellen Frost described the imperative of understanding policy outside of a military-centric context: “International stability in a national security sense has a direct bearing on the economy,” she noted. Military actions in the Taiwan Strait provide a cogent example. Frost describes military elites as struggling to understand economic globalization and the role of military force in it. She observed and warned of the potential for “tunnel vision” by military elites. The “stove-pipe divisions” in the national security policy process can “often disregard the national security implications” and political and economic risks that should be addressed by the NSC (Daalder and Destler 1999b, 42). A retired senior flag officer with extensive operational and political experience across multiple presidential administrations explained it this way:

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Imagine the players . . . in the Situation Room during the decisionmaking process. The only ones who are there with a professional preparation . . . are the uniformed military. Most of the rest of them are . . . from a political experience, or a legal experience, or a commercial, a business experience. So, the only ones that really come with professional training for what they’re doing at that moment . . . are typically the military officers. This breaks down as issues are considered in a broader political context where that military dimension of a question, a national security question overlaps, and intersects other dimensions of national power, such as political, economic, diplomatic, and so forth. Frankly, many civilian colleagues will have a broader experience, because of their political expertise . . . but regardless of their civilian experience, military experience typically dwarfs what they can contribute and bring to the table. Military officers come in numbers to the table. They bring with them a level of prestige civilians don’t have or haven’t yet earned, and there is deference. Deferential treatment. Deferential consideration of their advice. (W2-I9)

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A retired, senior military officer and former SES agreed: Civilians don’t fully understand and appreciate the implications of policy. And, generally, they know this and are unwilling to contradict military advice. Civilians tend to be younger, inexperienced, but they are highly educated. They tend to lack organizational skills and are less systematic in their approach to policy. The military tends to send its best and brightest to engage in the policy arena. They’re mature. They understand structured thinking, problem-solving, how to plan, and they are typically the gatekeepers of information that informs the policy process. They use that information to drive the process, and, if they are talented, they make civilians feel a part of the process. (W1-I23) These responses demonstrate that military elites take ownership of both a common military policy enterprise and the national security policy enterprise. Their jurisdiction is clearly recognized by civilian counterparts. However, as military policy begins to overlap with other policy domains, military elites are conflicted about their role and challenged to adapt and adjust to the politics and resistance they encounter from other actors in the policy process. A highly respected academic and former Army War College professor provides a competing observation, suggesting that, although civilians may possess greater expertise and knowledge in national security policy, military elites possess the greater advantage in this contest of wills: Civilians have much greater expertise and knowledge as it relates to national security strategy and foreign policy. We just don’t understand

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and know how to operationalize it. And the military is conflicted on how involved it wants to be in the formulation of strategy and policy. Their priority is operations and tactics. Military elites are caught up in a tension regarding their identity as “muddy boots” leaders, versus politically astute, cosmopolitan Washington . . . insiders. (W1-I10) A retired four-star general with extensive executive-level military and intelligence service across multiple presidential administrations, ending with the Obama administration, offered a very opinionated view. He emphasizes the claim of military jurisdiction over the common military policy enterprise, seemingly challenging presidential authority: Civilians are more conceptual in their thinking. They have neither the work ethic, knowledge, or experience required to understand how to operationalize strategic concepts. The military understands strategic concepts, and we excel in understanding how to operationalize strategy and policy. If a political appointee or president attempts to tweet out a policy, expecting it to magically become reality, the Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] pretty much says, “Fuck you!” We don’t jump to tweets here. We have a process. (W2-I19) Collectively, these excerpts demonstrate that military and civilian elites recognize the divide in policy expertise, as well as the limitations of military elites and civilians. They also demonstrate that military elites are influenced by a professional culture that, at the strategic level, creates tension related to their identity. They have worked for decades, in many cases starting from the lowest ranks, enduring and succeeding in a career that requires frequent geographic relocations, extended spousal and family separations, and challenging, sometimes life-endangering or life-threatening conditions and circumstances. Because of this unique, careerlong professionalization process and the extraordinary experiences they have endured to reach the ranks of the elite, they are, in many ways, like blue-collar workers who now finds themselves in the boardroom. This adjustment, challenging and insurmountable to most, may find them comparing, measuring, and judging their experience and path to the pinnacle of government against that of their civilian counterparts. The conclusions they draw from this reflection may influence their disposition toward civilian leadership and civilian control. As for how military elites may confront civilian leaders or how involved they may want to become in the policy process, it is evident that they often prefer an indirect approach. They may attempt to avoid direct confrontation, putting civilian leadership off balance by providing leaks to the media,

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background, off-the-record interviews, and only select information to congressional allies. They may also skirt the edges of a policy issue in an effort to find a “Goldilocks” solution, also known as “satisficing” (W2-I2; Simon 1957). These political tactics may be used when too little military involvement and influence in the policy process can lead to unfavorable policy outcomes. Likewise, too much military involvement can lead to “ownership” of the policy and its potential consequences. Achieving less-than-optimal results can be frustrating. As the disorganized exit from Afghanistan in 2021 and the resulting fallout demonstrated, military elites do not want to be in a position where they are blamed and left holding the bag for poor policy. Similarly, elected officials do not want to feel boxed in by the military in regard to making policy choices. A former senior military officer with extensive NSC experience that included appointment as a National Security Advisor described his approach to bringing on a new administration: Military elites must be willing to engage in political dialogue and make political arguments to help a president make good decisions. Presidents often come into office with little or no experience. The first weeks and months of an administration are very chaotic and take time to settle down as the president and political appointees learn their new jobs and understand how to exercise power. Our job is to safeguard the system, safeguard the process, safeguard the government. And, when I was serving, we made sure that the president was allowed to be president. (W2-I21) This paternal theme related to military elites being guardians of the government is echoed multiple times, particularly by retired four-star generals. Senior military officers commonly cast themselves in the position of often providing mentorship to novice, inexperienced executives. A former Combatant Commander describes his experience working with President Bill Clinton: Politicians have short attention spans. They need military elites to guide them. Generals need to be able to tell a president “time out” when it comes to their national security ambitions. We have to coach them to ensure there is clear political guidance, adequate resources, a clear strategy, clear lines of responsibility and command, and clarity of purpose and mission. (W2-I25) A second retired four-star and former member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff describes why presidents and senior civilian leadership may often feel boxed in. They feel boxed in, because they are—purposefully. The impetus for the

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formation of the NSC in the wake of FDR’s unorthodox leadership style, as described in chapter 2, was precisely to provide a military check on the president. Presidents need to know the boundaries of their power; boundaries set by constraints emplaced in the policy process. This former member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff described his approach to providing counsel to President Obama: I would sit down and give it to him [the president] behind closed doors, and say, “Here’s the plus, and here’s the minus. I understand where you’re coming from. As long as you stay inside these boundary conditions, we can probably live with a solution anywhere in this area.” Military elites are a guardrail. We help civilians work through policy issues, crisis planning and management, understand issues, understand a process by which to find solutions. But then you need to back out, and you let them run it. Civilians need constraints on their activities to ensure their actions are reasonable and responsible. (W2-I2) These interview excerpts describe how multiple retired four-star officers managed their interactions with a president. They describe how they navigate between maintaining jurisdictional control over military policy and national security while providing presidents limited flexibility in their policy decisions. Each flag officer viewed their role as being a safeguard and guide, protecting the status quo, guiding presidential decisions, and guarding against irresponsible executive action and recklessness.

Finding: There is a strong finding that substantiates that military elites do have a common military policy enterprise in which their expertise is recognized and respected. The policy enterprise encompasses leadership, management, and administration of policies that regulate the military institution, bureaucracy, and global operations. Additionally, the selection, promotion, training, and development of military elites are governed by law with practical impacts that substantiate and strengthen this conceptual attribute. The result is that civilians extend a high level of deference to military elites and recognize their authoritative knowledge and expertise in their common policy enterprise. Military elite influence goes beyond the military policy enterprise with increasing overlap with national security and foreign policy. However, as policy discussion and debate shifts away from purely military matters and overlaps with other policy domains, their knowledge and expertise may be increasingly contested by policy advisers and elites with competing knowledge,

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expertise, and policy preferences. Finally, military elites may restrain their explicit involvement in the policy process, attempting to realize a balance that achieves policy preferences while ensuring civilians remain responsible for policy outcomes.

Profession and Ethos Epistemic community theory refers to a conceptual attribute of professionalism and possessing a professional ethos in relation to groups of experts in a policy domain. Sarkesian and colleagues (1975) characterizes the military profession as having a well-defined organizational structure administered by professional military officers with special knowledge, expertise, and education; a self-regulating membership through strict selection and promotion criteria; and individuals imbued with a calling and commitment to serve their nation. They are a “conscious and coherent group operating within but largely apart from” the government (Sarkesian et al. 1995, 15). West Point [the United States Military Academy] and ROTC [the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps] both socialize and enculturate cadets for military service. We ensure they are able to conform to the culture and perform. There is a formal process to weed out those that don’t exhibit the professional ethic and level of professionalism to be commissioned. Cadets are steeped in the leadership ethos of our culture, our professional ethic, our Army Values and high standards through a rigorous assessment, selection, and training process to ensure they have the character and good judgment we expect, even at the entry level. By holding them accountable, we reinforce our culture in a deliberate norming process. (W1-I26) This quotation, from a two-star flag officer and former Commanding General, ROTC Cadet Command, and the socialization process he describes, demonstrate the components of a distinct military culture, profession, and ethos. A clear military culture is detectable within these words. And its characteristics are weaved through the conceptual attributes of epistemic communities explored in this study. It is defined by “prevailing values, philosophies, customs, traditions, and structure, that over time, have created shared individual expectations within an institution about appropriate attitudes, personal beliefs[,] and behavior” of its members (Dorn et al. 2000). The culture of a profession governs much of the ethos and behavior of its ever-changing membership (Jans and Schmidtchen 2003). Being a member of a profession has implications. Membership is not granted or solely based on education level, time in service, or rank. It implies

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that members work together formally and informally to continually improve the profession. They contribute and share knowledge and best practices, ceaselessly reviewing, refining, and endeavoring to establish and improve upon the profession’s vision, mission, values, role, conduct, and standards (Larson 1977). A profession operates within a code of ethics and manifests a professional culture with shared norms and values (Greenwood 1957). Professions are more than just occupations. They possess purpose presumably linked to providing altruistic services to serve the public good and public need (Cogan 1953). They are motivated by professional ethics, morality, and a “sense of social obligation” and beneficence toward the society they serve (Huntington 1957; Greenwood 1957; Sarkesian 1981). Military professionalism is exceptional, however, because it requires a defining “special knowledge” related to the “management of violence in the service to the state” (Sarkesian 1981, 7–9).2 Professions are also characterized as possessing an authoritative and systematic body of consensual, shared knowledge. This unique characteristic—possessing consensual, shared knowledge— defines the military profession. Its professional status is objective, granted only by the authority of the state. It is subjective in that it encompasses unique characteristics not typically found in other professions, including a sense of honor, allegiance, duty, and commitment to serve the state (Bradford and Brown 1973; Janowitz 1960). At the individual level, this characteristic is measured through attitude and conduct in accordance with and conformity to a body of institutional values and ethics. At the institutional level, the military establishes rules of conduct and performance criteria that reinforce its values and ethics across the profession. At a societal level, the values and ethics of the military are, or should be, linked to the society it serves. This linkage of values and society’s assessment of the military’s performance in accordance with these values result in society granting the military profession legitimacy, trust, confidence, and prestige (Sarkesian 1981, 13). For the military as an institution, the formal pursuit of professional expertise at the strategic level grew out of a collection of failures identified in the Spanish–American War and World War I (W1-I14; W1-I62; Pappas 1967; Schifferle 2010). Military services, reflecting on these failures, came away with a “deep feeling of professional incompetence” and recognized a lack of strategic preparedness (Schifferle 2010). A key observation and example relate to how military elites possessed no experience, knowledge, or comprehensive understanding of how to mobilize a nation for war. 2. This differs from law enforcement officials in that the military’s mission is to fight and win wars by engaging in combat. It is not trained, or authorized by law, to engage in community policing and enforcement of local, state, or federal laws.

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Overcoming these shortfalls required an overhaul of the military’s training and education programs. The military service colleges were the “critical link” for improving the professionalism of the military’s officer corps and building a proficient group of military elites capable of mobilizing the United States for World War II and leading an alliance of nations in a global campaign. The objective was to train and indoctrinate future generations of professional officers that shared a common ethos, language, and attitude toward problem-solving (Schifferle 2010). It was “specially apparent” that military elites advising at the highest levels of government and leading U.S. forces “should have broader knowledge” beyond purely military duties. The military during this period of self-reflection was directed by civilian leaders, including President Theodore Roosevelt and Secretary of War Elihu Root, to develop a “full comprehension” of all elements of the national government, economy, and industry necessary to mobilize, coordinate, and implement national policy as it related to national security and the conduct of war (Pappas 1967, 89–90). World War II led to a further realization of shortcomings in the professional development of military elites. If the United States were to be involved in global conflict as a superpower, the military profession required of its elites extensive professional development, training, education, and experience in two key areas. First, military elites should understand how to lead and manage joint-service warfighting. Second, it was imperative that the military continue broadening the focus of its elites beyond military matters and markedly improve development of politically astute leaders capable of acting and advising at the national and international levels (Pappas 1967). The war college faculty and leadership recognized that, for military leaders to appreciate the political objectives of war, developing something more than military expertise was required. Military elites needed dedicated time to think about international relations theory and how national security and foreign policies were formulated. They also needed to pursue opportunities, assignments, and experiences related to participating in the national security policy process and implementation of national policy (Pappas 1967). The results of these deliberate initiatives were that, after World War II, American military elites became the principal executor of U.S. foreign policy with profound influence, power, and authority on a global scale (Hudson 2015). Military elites today are highly professionalized, well-educated, exceptionally experienced, and confident in their interactions with civilian counterparts. Kohn, echoing Mills, states that “we have created a separate military caste” of warriors, a designation that brings with it deference, prestige, and reverence (Kohn et al. 1994, 24). To support Kohn’s claim, a former DASD in the Trump administration describes an experience during his orientation at the beginning of the Trump administration:

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[Secretary of Defense] Mattis said in front of a large group of us, all political appointees. One of the key messages he sent is, “You need to be at the top of your game every single day.” It was almost like a challenge. It was kind of an interesting way of putting it. “Because the uniforms that you’re dealing with have been . . . steeled by fifteen years of combat and are deadly serious about what they’re doing,” or something to that effect. It was almost like, “You need to know the mettle of the people that you’re dealing with because it’s going to be a struggle.” Several military elites express similar feelings behind closed doors. It’s kind of like, “We’ve been fighting, therefore we have a better sense of what the broad politicalmilitary policy should be.” Certain parts of the Pentagon, particularly the Joint Staff right now, have a much more constrained vision of what the role of civilians should be. And, at the end of the day, I do believe that civilians should defer to military professionals in how policy is implemented. Very few political elites actually understand policy. We tend to be generalists. Frankly, political appointees have a stereotype. I’ll admit it. First of all, we don’t really have any skin in the game. We are the guys that are in and out of think tanks, going to cocktail parties, consulting, or teaching in a university. We come into the government when our side wins, we stay for about two years, then we leave and try to figure out how to monetize our experience. Meanwhile, military professionals and their families are bearing and internalizing the costs of war and policy. (W1-I49) A former Deputy Secretary of Defense echoed similar sentiments: Military elites are the professionals. They speak with a very well-informed authority on issues and they are willing to engage civilians in debate in ways a political appointee may not have anticipated. . . . Political appointees also find themselves at a disadvantage in policy debates because military elites have an asymmetric information advantage, meaning they have historical knowledge and personal, practical experience in many policy matters that civilians lack. Unlike military elites, civilian political appointees are not continually engaged in government and national security policy matters. They come and go. They spend significant time in the private sector where their only “knowledge” [indicates air quotes] comes from the internet, Fox News, or CNN. The weaker a civilian’s knowledge base, experience, and leadership—the more influence military elites will have on policy outcomes. (W2-I30) Both excerpts are from political appointees, one from a junior DASD and the second from the second-highest–ranking civilian in DOD. Both communicate respect, deference, and reverence for the profession, ethos, and

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prestige of military elites. They also signal recognition of a moral authority and expertise that military elites bring to the policy process because of their experience in the trenches and on the frontlines of national security policy implementation.

Finding: There are strong findings in the data, scholarship, and history substantiating that military elites exhibit the conceptual attribute of having a distinct profession and ethos. Military elites periodically and routinely reinforce their professional ethos through cradle-to-grave professional development that strengthens and reinforces this attribute. Additionally, the more connected members feel to their community and profession, the greater sense of esprit d’corps within the community and entitativity from outside observers. The evolution of military elites increasingly operating in the political sphere is a natural outgrowth of its professionalization. The military, as a learning and adaptive organization, recognized the need for its elites to be “professionally trained and educated to make political appraisals,” particularly when advising presidents and political appointees about the political implications of the use and employment of military power and forces (Abrahamsson 1972, 155). The result is a highly professional corps of military elites heavily embedded in an exceptionally political process and relied upon by a shrinking pool of competent, qualified civilian appointees. Internal Cohesion and Intragroup Trust To actors outside of the military community, considered to be the “outgroup” in this context, the elements of internal cohesion and intragroup trust provide the “in-group” with greater legitimacy and reinforce the perception of their authoritative knowledge. The greater the familiarity, similarity, and likeability among an in-group, the greater the level of perception, referred to as “entitativity,” by out-group observers regarding the level of coherence of an in-group or community (Dasgupta et al. 1999; Lickel et al. 2000). This attribute allows a community to overcome internal differences, speak with a unified voice, and increase its outward influence and ability to persuade others in the policy process (Rothstein 1984; Cross 2013b; Tsingou 2003). An example of how internal cohesion and intragroup trust develops within an epistemic community made up of elite, senior military officers is the early professional development, indoctrination, training, and education that military cadets experience in military academies and the respective military service ROTC departments and programs. This socialization and enculturation process continues through the comprehensive education, training,

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development, and mentorship that young military officers receive at the beginning of and then throughout their careers. Apart from education and training, internal cohesion and intragroup trust develops from the insular experience of military personnel. Service members interact formally and informally on military bases and in garrison communities where they and their families live and work closely. Secluded from civilian life, military service members, in addition to working and training together, also regularly dine, conduct physical fitness training, and socialize together. Children in military communities go to the same schools and participate in garrison-sponsored activities and sports leagues. Military spouses socialize together in clubs, neighborhood associations, and support groups. Military families see one another in the Post Exchange, commissary, movie theater, post office, library, hobby centers, health facilities, and public pools. They attend church together and celebrate life events together, including birthdays, anniversaries, and graduations. During wartime and operational deployment, these interactions and relationships are intensified as military communities are drawn closer by the stress of separation, coping with operational risk and uncertainty, a shared sense of sacrifice, and, in expeditionary (overseas) environments, even closer living and working quarters. Internal cohesion and intragroup trust are a product of these shared experiences. They nurture a shared worldview among the military community and influence political beliefs and ideology. They validate a perception of authoritative knowledge with both the in-group and the out-group through professional development, experiences, and socialization (Adler and Bernstein 2005; Tsingou 2003). These social attributes of an epistemic community shape its members’ behavior and reinforce their beliefs and ethos within the military profession (Wendt 1992, 1994). When asked about internal cohesion and intragroup trust among military elites, a military academy professor and senior military officer with exceptional experience observing and assisting four-star military flag officers as a military aide de camp put it this way: “Something interesting about military culture is that we know each other’s families. We know where each other lives. We workout together. We work together. We eat together. We socialize together. We shop together. Our kids go to school together. And when we’re deployed, our wives and kids rely on this close-knit community for support” (W1-I8). Common beliefs, shared notions of validity, and a common policy enterprise are all characteristics that build upon one another to create a distinct social identity, personal relationships, and a sense of community that defines group members’ concept of self and how they view their role and influence on the policy process (Marsh and Rhodes 1992). The socialization, professionalization, relationships, common experiences, and organizational (selection,

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promotion, training, and development) processes described above determine the strength or weakness of an epistemic community’s internal cohesion and intragroup trust (Cross 2013b). As already described, military elites place high value and emotional significance on their military-social identity and their status as a member of the military-social group. Membership implies several dynamics. It implies that individuals consider themselves members of the group; the group collectively considers each individual a member; out-group observers recognize membership; interactions between members are morally binding; and relationships with the out-group are held to different standards (Haas and Drabek 1973; Tajfel 1981). Even if there are substantial disagreements—and there are—robust social cohesion can enable an epistemic community to overcome internal differences and thus be more externally persuasive. As a retired senior military officer and college professor stated: The military has a powerful culture and sense of identity. There is exceptional internal cohesion, and this creates a powerful incentive to conform. Any resistance comes with a price. Those [who] fail to conform aren’t promoted. So, there is absolutely a sense of internal cohesion, shared beliefs, shared preferences, and shared values. This does not mean that military elites always agree on everything. They most definitely do not. (W1-I16) “Exceptional internal cohesion” refers to the value and emotional significance military members place on their group identity. It relates to the core nature of military service and the decisions that military elites are called upon to make. Military service and decisions made by military elites can be uniquely stressful in that the inherent risks and costs associated with military service and decisions can be measured in the loss of human life (Nielsen 2010). If it is not the life-or-death decisions related to service members in combat, it is the “life-and-death” decisions related to the survival of a military service in the bureaucratic and political contest for resources (W1-I22). Given these conditions, it would be natural for military elites to have robust debate and substantive disagreements regarding risks and costs related to policy options and strategy while agreeing and maintaining consensus on strategic objectives. An example, described by a former Chief of Staff of the Army and other senior defense officials, relates to the 2007 force “surge” in Iraq. It was clear that the Multi-National Force–Iraq, under the leadership of General George Casey Jr., was struggling to achieve the President George W. Bush’s objectives. At that time, both Lieutenant General David Petraeus and Lieutenant General Ray Odierno were known to be advocating for a change in policy

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to surge troops pursuant to a counterinsurgency strategy. While Odierno, a senior military adviser to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, worked to influence her, Petraeus, through his mentor and advocate, the retired General Jack Keane, sought to influence the White House (Rice 2011; W1-I47; W1-I51; W2-I8; W2-I4). Petraeus and Odierno were soon promoted to their fourth star and proceeded to implement and lead the new surge strategy. Casey, following his relinquishment of command, assumed the position of Chief of Staff of the Army. In his new position, he was charged with resourcing the new strategy. Although this anecdote may be viewed as unfounded hearsay, if true it provides an example of military elites disagreeing on policy and strategy while simultaneously working together to achieve common strategic objectives. As one retired three-star flag officer with extensive NSC experience put it: “There is no such thing as unanimous military advice” (W2-I22). Regardless, differences among military elites do not dissuade them from meeting frequently, formally and informally, to discuss those differences and exchange ideas (Atkinson 2014). The strength of internal cohesion allows military elites to “overcome internal differences,” remain externally persuasive, and reinforce their legitimacy as a defined, harmonic community (Cross 2013a, 11). Being recognized as a defined, coherent community allows military elites to extend influence externally and increases their ability to persuade and bargain with other groups and communities (Rothstein 1984; Cross 2013a, 149; Tsingou 2003). Additionally, the strength of internal cohesion and intragroup trust that develops from a strong network of relationships provides them with unrivaled access to information and knowledge across the military domain. The following excerpts from two senior military officers, both with extensive NSC experience at the three- and four-star level, demonstrate how military elites exhibit internal cohesion and intragroup trust. A former senior military officer, member of Obama’s NSC, and think tank fellow stated: You don’t have to look any further than the NSC and the military officers that are detailed to it or interact with it, representing the Joint Staff, to find an embodiment of internal cohesion and intragroup trust. These guys come prepared. They come empowered. There’s a huge imbalance. And it’s intimidating, sometimes, to civilians. And I think it’s hard for civilians to go against it because, for one thing, the military community does a pretty good job of equipping them with facts and figures and charts and slides, you know, stuff that they can bring to bear on a conversation in a much more robust way then a lot of civilian agencies can and do. (W1-I18) A former senior military aide from the Reagan administration and National Security Advisor offered this compelling perspective:

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The military has an identity now that gives it a “praetorian guard” status in our society. They’re placed on a pedestal. From Reagan forward you see the public confidence levels in the military, as an institution, go from 50 percent to consistently above 70 percent in the last several years. First, it’s because Reagan made a deliberate and concerted effort to restore prestige and regard for the military, post-Vietnam, because it had become so tarnished. Second, there was also a concerted effort by the military to improve its brand. From [the passage of the 1986 Goldwater–Nichols defense reorganization law] to the present, senior flag officers without four or five operational and joint assignments and probably two or three graduate degrees became an anomaly. If you see GOs [general officers] without this level of experience and education now, it’s probably because of something political. Regardless, now we have this super-cohesive community, exceptionally trained and educated, forged in nearly two decades of combat, and revered by a society that they are becoming more and more distant from. (W2-I13)

Finding: There are strong findings in the data, backed by extensive scholarship, substantiating that military elites possess internal cohesion and intragroup trust. This conceptual attribute is strongly recognized internally within the military as well as externally by nonmilitary sample participants. Strong cohesion and intragroup trust are a product of shared beliefs, socialization, professionalization, and experiences. A recognizable, strong, well-defined, coherent epistemic community allows members within the community to extend influence externally and increases their ability to persuade and bargain with other actors and stakeholders. If an epistemic community is defined too broadly, its influence can be diffused or muted. Finally, and most important, although there may be substantial disagreement regarding policy or strategy within an epistemic community, this does not necessarily diffuse cohesion and trust as long as the community maintains regular, periodic, formal, and informal meetings and interactions that allow its members to work through internal differences. Consensual, Authoritative Knowledge, and Expertise The concept of consensual, authoritative knowledge and expertise is rooted in an experience–knowledge–policy enterprise relationship. Rothstein (1984) quotes Ernst Haas’s definition of consensual knowledge, defining it as “a body of beliefs about cause-effect and ends-means relationships among variables (activities, aspirations, values, demands) that is widely accepted by the

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relevant actors, irrespective of the absolute or final ‘truth’ of these beliefs” (Rothstein 1984, 736). As governments evolve, bureaucracies expand, and the demand for authoritative knowledge and policy expertise proliferates. This creates a unique role and fundamental need for knowledge elites (Brooks 1965; Nelkin 1979; Suleiman 1984). Political appointees are rarely equipped to fill this role, particularly over time. The military, alongside long-term civil servants and subject-matter experts across the federal government, fill this unique role and are a repository of specialized knowledge that civilian leaders rely upon “to identify salient issues, define national interests, and formulate policies” (Atkinson 2014, 46). For the frustrated, novice, ill-equipped, or incompetent elected official or political appointee, “knowledge elites” and subject-matter experts have become vilified and labeled as the “deep state,” when in fact they are the vanguard custodians of institutional procedure, policy process, ethical requirements, regulatory law, and, in extreme cases, the United States Constitution. The consensual nature of epistemic community knowledge is rooted in the shared experiences of community members that validates and legitimizes experiential knowledge inside the community. The authoritative nature of epistemic community knowledge is rooted in the doctrine that undergirds their policy enterprise and in the recognition provided from outside the community by civilian authorities and decision makers who perceive military elites as possessing authoritative knowledge to which they defer in the policy process. When civilian leaders, elected officials, and political appointees rubber-stamp military recommendations, delegate decision-making authority, and allow military elites to initiate, ratify, resource, implement, and monitor decisions throughout the policy process, they have effectively recognized the authoritative nature of military knowledge and expertise (Szayna et al. 2007). Outside recognition is the sine qua non element determining whether or not military expertise and knowledge are authoritative. The complexity of national security policy challenges can test the cognitive limitations of decision makers. It creates a dynamic that “tests the limits of human understanding” (Haas 1992, 13). This complexity creates a dynamic of uncertainty, coupled with inadequate information that challenges rational decision-making and the ability to attach ends and means (George 1980; Rothstein 1984). In this complex and uncertain environment, members of an epistemic community can assist decision makers in understanding causeeffect relationships, issue-event linkages, action-inaction consequences, political-state interests, and related policy options and alternatives (Haas 1992). Epistemic communities, fulfilling this role in a state, possess the “supreme instrument of power” in governing (Schattschneider 1960, 66). They provide clarity in a decision-making process, sharing their consensual knowledge

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with decision makers while, alternatively, defining, limiting, and controlling the policy options and choices that decision makers consider. With each of the previous conceptual attributes that characterize epistemic communities, sample participants’ responses overwhelmingly substantiated that military elites, as a social group, embody the respective characteristic being examined. This is not the case with this particular attribute. There is a noteworthy nuanced divide that breaks down along distinct lines related to experience, profession, and politics. Military elites within the sample were either self-critical or self-serving. Self-critical remarks tended to come from Wave Two participants with more experience. Self-serving comments tended to come from Wave One participants with less experience. Academic professionals tended to concur with the self-critical remarks provided by Wave Two military elites. Their concurrence rested on philosophical differences and an academic definition of “expertise.” Finally, respondents indicated that, when military elites ventured into advising on issues that had a significant political component, their knowledge and expertise were more likely to be contested. As one retired senior officer and think tank fellow described the situation: “The only thing that overrides military influence is electoral politics” (W1-I29). Despite nuanced disagreements, there were strong perceptions among the majority of sample participants that acknowledge, accept, and defer to the idea of military elites possessing consensual, authoritative knowledge and expertise that provide them with special jurisdiction over the common military policy and within the national security enterprise. Philosophical and semantic disagreements regarding military knowledge and expertise weakened when put in the context of real-world practice, signaling that presidents, political appointees, and practitioners have a bias toward military elites with a résumé that includes decades of experience at the tactical and operational levels of the military, war, and the policy process, versus the academic or political résumé demonstrating scholarship about underlying theories related to that experience or political bona fides related to electoral politics. The interview excerpts below come from two military officers and a midlevel civilian policy director. All were detailed to the NSC during different administrations, but their observations are interestingly similar. A senior military officer and college professor stated: There is an enormous amount of respect for their [military elites’] expertise. I cannot think of a single instance when I saw any civilian official question a senior officer’s expertise. The fact of the matter is that the military is the 800-pound gorilla in the room, and there’s usually more than one or two of us in the room. And we are perfectly capable of crafting,

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planning, and executing policy without wanting a lot of guidance. It’s not the same for other agencies and institutions. (W1-I6) A senior military officer, think tank fellow, and former aide to the CJCS put it this way: “Typically, military elites are the most prepared participants in a room because they have to be. I call it ‘over-prepared squared.’ They will typically have the most current facts, data, and intel all wrapped together in experience and historical context” (W1-I59). And a former NSC political appointee and think tank fellow stated: When you see the principals sitting around the table in the Situation Room, when a four-star speaks, everybody quiets down and listens. . . . They can come with outsized personalities and reputations that overwhelm civilians [who] have limited bandwidth and limited experience in national security matters. The result is that civilians will only push military elites so far. There is a line they won’t cross. (W1-I32) Wave Two participants respond differently. They are more reflective of their experience, describing the conditionality of their knowledge and expertise. They have a richer understanding of the military’s shortfalls, as well as how the military’s identity and image play a role in influencing civilians. Civilians in Wave Two transparently acknowledge the power dynamic, or power imbalance, they experienced or felt in their interactions and work with military elites. Likewise, military elites freely discuss, from their perspective, the insecurity of civilians in the national security policy process. The civilians and the military respondents in this study generally understand and acknowledge that issues related to national security are too important to allow for novice interference, increased uncertainty, and ignorance to be unnecessarily injected into a realm of international relations that could quickly accelerate into militarized conflict. A retired, former four-star service chief highlights the nuanced differences between military knowledge and expertise, as well as the perception and insecurity of civilians in the process: As I look at the last several presidential administration transitions, at least from Bush 43 [George W. Bush] to the present, what you have is a bunch of civilians elected by the American people coming in who have no experience fighting in our wars since 9/11 and their dealing with a bunch of military leaders who have been at this since 9/11. So there’s a huge difference in knowledge about what’s going on. You have all these civilian folks [who] are smart, intelligent, capable people. But they haven’t been

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involved. Yet they’re now sitting around the table involved in making decisions. I think that’s an integral factor in civilian willingness to defer to military elites. (W2-I11) A retired, former four-star commanding general of the Army’s Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) Command echoed the service chief’s observations. He reflected that one of the most dramatic steps in a military officer’s career is entering into the world of being a flag officer and potentially serving as a military elite involved in matters of national security. He reveals that military elites enter into the national security policy realm with equally daunting challenges when compared with their civilian counterparts. Describing newly minted, one-star general officers that may matriculate into national security elites, he stated: They’ve done an exceptionally good job in their career to this level but just find it very difficult when they pin on a star because up until this point they’ve been doing a lot of things that they’ve been doing all along, just on a larger scale. And some officers just aren’t intellectually prepared to make the transition. . . . We promote maybe forty out of 4,000. In that group of forty, you’ll have maybe one or two [who] are capable and intellectually equipped to think and perform at the strategic level. You may not have any. And not every great Division Commander is meant to be promoted either. They just don’t necessarily see the world strategically. . . . We still promote GOs to four stars that are “frozen in time” as great brigade commanders. (W2-I12) A retired senior military officer and corporate executive within a leading Army advocacy and lobbying organization agreed with the former TRADOC Commander just quoted: The military has a lot of two- and three-star senior leaders that were confident, charismatic commanders at the O-6 level. But that’s the end of the story. One in fifty, maybe one in a hundred truly have what it takes to operate successfully at the strategic level and make a real difference for their service. The problem is that they all tend to think that since they have stars on their shoulders they’re the one. They quickly forget the good fortune, grace of God, and relationships that got them to where they’re at. (W1-I36) Sample participants overwhelmingly agreed that military elites possess authoritative knowledge related to military tactics and operations. Although military elites inspire deference and respect for their practical knowledge,

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influence in the political sphere can be conditional. Influence can be personality dependent and generally unexceptional if a military elite is viewed as intellectually and politically unsophisticated. Of the sixteen sample participants who were four-star flag officers, only three were universally recognized by both military and civilian sample participants as exceptionally gifted in their ability to think and operate at the strategic level in both the military and the political spheres of the policy process. This nuance is captured in the literature. Bruscino (2010) and Cohen (2016) both find that there are military-academia divides on the definition of “expertise” and “strategic thinking,” respectively. In terms of semantics, Bruscino contends that it is impossible for military elites to become experts “in an academic sense” of the term because “of the myriad subjects with which they contend on an everyday basis.” Military elites should “understand policy, politics, diplomacy, economics, culture, and communication” within the context of national security and military strategy. Knowing and understanding are not necessarily the same as having expertise. Expertise, in Bruscino’s opinion, is the “stock and trade” of academics (Bruscino 2010, 144–147). Cohen’s critique of military elites relates to their ability to operate and think at the strategic level. He excoriates the senior military education system embodied by the service war colleges as a “necessary tick mark” in the careers of rising military elites, a third of whom will become flag officers (Cohen 2016, 83). Senior officers do not competitively apply to these institutions and are not denied because of poor academic records. It is “virtually impossible to flunk out,” and “being selected for attendance is more important” than academic performance. Attending military schools is often chided as “taking a knee,” seen as taking time away from serving time in frontline units and potentially hobbling career progression. Cohen also suggests that military academic institution standards are low relative to civilian institutions. Although standards continue to evolve, faculty and administrators are “not necessarily chosen for any academic expertise.” Military faculty and school administration positions are “good but usually terminal jobs” in a military career (Cohen 2016, 83–84). A retired service chief weighed in on the military-academia divide, comparing and contrasting the two professions’ weaknesses: The services tend to develop leaders more in the context of “what to think,” not “how to think.” We train leaders to think in a linear fashion, not holistically, and it hurts our flag officers when they reach three- and fourstar level. [However], academic and theoretical expertise without practical experience is dangerous. Academics don’t understand the consequences of policy. They don’t understand the resources required. They have no

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clue and they’re not really interested. They’re more interested in testing a theory, writing a book, and turning their eighteen- to twenty-four-month experience into a better paying job when they leave government. (W2-I8) A final theme of civilian insecurity surfaced in sample interviews related to this conceptual attribute. It suggests that novice presidents and inexperienced civilian leaders are timid, passive, and insecure in making decisions related to national security. This creates a leadership void. “Military elites will naturally fill a void and vacuum of leadership,” states a retired senior military officer and corporate executive (W1-I36). As one senior flag officer and former Combatant Commander with extensive NSC staff experience described it: Civilians want the military to lead the policy process. Presidents can be insecure in making decisions related to national security. They know they’re dependent on the military and it frustrates them and can cause suspicion and distrust. They want to know that the Joint Chiefs and their Combatant Commanders are 100 percent on board. They can feel like they’re boxed in by the military. But to say a president is “boxed in” is really to say that a president is forced to face reality. Presidents can hope for options that meet their political needs, but it rarely happens in the realm of national security. Reality and “best case political scenario” rarely agree. (W2-I26) A retired, former CJCS echoed these sentiments and suggests that politicians, besides being insecure, can also be cognitive misers: Civilians leaders can be lazy. They tend to accept the recommendations of the services blindly. Most presidents and Secretaries of Defense defer to military elites because politicians can often be insecure in their decision-making capabilities and the decisions they do make are based on politics and political ideology, versus the reality of our capabilities, needs, strategy, and threat. (W2-I24) During one interview, a military officer and senior national security official in the Trump administration expressed significant frustration, venting about civilian inexperience and timidity: Educating an inexperienced president is really difficult, particularly in an extremely chaotic political environment. Having to educate a new NSC staff full of political appointees [who] lack experience on how to plan, at the beginning of an administration, adds to the difficulty. . . . They have no idea how to govern. It was exceptionally disorganized. There was no

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cohesion. . . . Then reality sets in and it’s scary. It’s intimidating. They don’t want to be responsible for making decisions. (W2-I6) A retired four-star Combatant Commander and CJCS offered context for dynamics that can cause military elites to exhibit arrogant entitlement in positions of influence and civilians leaders to be insecure: Too often, at the highest levels, military elites develop a strong sense of entitlement based on how long they’ve served and their experience. They come to believe that they are indispensable. That they deserve certain treatment and certain positions. They believe that it is their time. They have earned their perks, incredible privileges, and prerogatives. They can become impatient with politicians, patronizing and, sometimes, openly condescending or disrespectful. . . . Most politicians defer to military elites because they can often be very insecure in their decision-making capabilities. (W2-I24) The idea that presidents, political appointees, and elected officials are timid, passive, and insecure when making national security decisions is nuanced and requires explanation. Politicians behave in this manner for several reasons. They may be timid, passive, and insecure because of their inexperience (Higbee 2010). And whereas domestic policy missteps can be corrected, national security policy missteps can have permanent, irreversible, global, and existential consequences. Additionally, both a president and the Congress may be unable to master national security and foreign policy issues and are unable to provide effective civilian control and guidance because “the technical details often seem impenetrable,” the “mystique” of national security issues can be intimidating, and the influence of military elites providing expert advice can be overwhelming (Warburg 1989, 278). It may be that politicians are indifferent and disinterested because they are focused on domestic politics and a domestic agenda that is more likely to benefit partisan power dynamics, electoral outcomes, and reelection (Warburg 1989). If they lack military, national security, and foreign policy experience, they do not want to be labeled “soft on defense” or appear unpatriotic by opposing the interests of military elites. It is a “guns versus butter” debate that yields passive leadership that can be easily co-opted (Abrahamsson 1972; Warburg 1989). A final variable that enters into the political equation is the American public’s reverence, respect, and high public opinion and approval of the military as an institution. Data gathered from Gallup polls related to confidence in public institutions demonstrates that public approval (“great deal” or “quite a lot”) of the military was consistently above 60 percent and was 70 percent from 1991 to

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